Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02686/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02686-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gaylene Jodie Wathogoma,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-02686-PHX-SLG (DKD)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE SHARON L. GLEASON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Gaylene Jodie Wathogoma filed a timely, fully exhausted Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging her convictions following a 

jury trial for manslaughter, aggravated assault, and two counts of endangerment, and the 

imposition of consecutive, presumptive prison terms totaling 22.5 years. Wathogoma, 

driving drunk, crashed her speeding car into a car that was stopped at a red light, killing a 

passenger in the car. Wathogoma confessed to police that she was the driver. In her 

federal petition, she alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful arrest, 

violation of her confrontation clause rights and Miranda rights, insufficiency of the 

evidence, and sentencing errors. Respondents contend that the grounds raised are without 

merit. The Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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 In Ground One, Wathogoma alleges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Specifically, she contends that counsel failed to argue that her statements were 

involuntary; failed to investigate or use medical expert testimony in the voluntariness 

hearing; failed to argue that her Miranda rights were violated; failed to complete analysis 

of biological evidence on the airbags and driver’s side windshield; failed to use a DNA 

expert at trial; and failed to argue against the State’s claim that Wathogoma’s feet were 

entangled in brake and gas pedals. Defense counsel is not required “to pursue every 

claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic chance for success.” 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 

 In addition, a review of the record indicates that counsel moved in limine to 

suppress Wathogoma’s statements that she had been drinking and was driving the truck 

because “she was so intoxicated that she did not understand the meaning of what she was 

saying, and she did not intelligently waive her Miranda rights.” See Doc. 10, Exh C at 6. 

The trial court denied the motion, finding the statements voluntary because the police did 

not use coercion, promises or threats. The trial court found no Miranda violation because 

Wathogoma had not been in custody when she was questioned the first time. As to the 

second statement, made to an officer while she was in custody, the trial court ruled that it 

was voluntary because there was no interrogation; Wathogoma offered the statement 

without having been asked any questions. See R.T. 2/4/2008 at 37-38. Wathogoma does 

not specify what else counsel should have done in arguing for suppression. See James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). In any event, Wathogoma cannot show prejudice. 

In addition to Wathogoma’s statements, the State presented compelling evidence that 

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Wathogoma was driving drunk: she braced herself for the accident by gripping the 

steering wheel; her feet were tangled under the gas and brake pedals; her hand went 

through the steering wheel; her injuries were consistent with having been in the driver’s 

seat; her passenger’s injuries were consistent with his having been in the front passenger 

seat; her DNA was on the driver’s side airbag and her passenger’s DNA was on the 

passenger side bag. See Doc. 11, Exh 2, R.T. 2/12/08 at 79-108; Exh 4, R.T. 2/13/08 at 

2-20, 21-50; Exh 5, Id. at 51-71, 74-88; Exh 6, Id. at 89-134; Exh 7, R.T. 2/14/08 at 39; 

Exh 8, Id. at 54-77. 

 Wathogoma also contends that counsel failed to adequately challenge the physical 

evidence admitted at trial. A review of the record indicates that counsel credibly 

challenged the State’s case, including a thorough investigation of the physical evidence. 

Counsel hired an accident reconstruction expert and presented eyewitness testimony that 

Wathogoma had been the passenger. See Doc 12, Exh 1, R.T. 2/19/08 at 4-26; Exh 2, Id. 

at 45-87; Exh 3, Id. at 88-123; Exh 4, R.T. 2/20/08 at 5-23. In addition, counsel 

challenged the reliability and sufficiency of the DNA, and elicited testimony from several 

witnesses who stated that they could not say who had been driving. Objectively 

reasonable strategic choices are “virtually unchallengeable” under the Strickland

standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 

 In Ground Two, Wathogoma claims her arrest was unlawful because she was 

never taken before a judge to be advised of the charges against her. The minute entry of 

her arraignment indicates that her initial appearance took place on August 8, 2006. She 

also received notice of the charges from the indictment, filed soon after her arrest. An 

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indictment that tracks the applicable state statute affords the defendant fair notice of the 

charges. United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 In Ground Three, Wathogoma argues that her right to confront the witnesses 

against her was violated because she was unable to confront the aggravated assault victim 

who did not testify at trial. The confrontation clause in the sixth amendment applies to all 

testimonial statements. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). In this case, 

testimony concerning the aggravated assault came from witnesses other than the victim. 

There is no requirement that this testimony come from the victim. In addition, 

Wathogoma does not allege, nor could she demonstrate, that any testimonial statements 

from the non-testifying victim were admitted at trial through other witnesses. 

` In Ground Four, Wathogoma contends that her Miranda rights were violated, 

resulting in her involuntary statements being improperly admitted. The trial court found 

no Miranda violation because she was not in police custody when she was questioned by 

police at the hospital. United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002). In 

addition, the trial court found there was no evidence of coercion, threats, or promises 

made by anyone in order to obtain the statements. The trial court considered the totality 

of the circumstances in making the decision, including the fact that Wathogoma alleges 

that she was suffering from a head injury at the time she made the statements. 

 In Ground Five, Wathogoma contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

the convictions. She contends specifically that there was insufficient evidence to prove 

that she, rather than one of the victims, was driving the truck. The trial court rejected this 

argument, concluding that although there was conflicting evidence on this issue, there 

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was sufficient evidence to prove Wathogoma’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On 

federal habeas review, the question is whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

319 (1979). “Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to 

sustain a conviction.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). In federal 

habeas proceedings, therefore, the Court’s inquiry is whether the state court’s decision 

reflected an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. 

 A rational jury could have found that Wathogoma was driving the truck. The 

following evidence was presented to the jury: she braced herself for the accident by 

gripping the steering wheel; her feet were tangled under the gas and brake pedals; her 

hand went through the steering wheel; her injuries were consistent with having been in 

the driver’s seat, while her passenger’s injuries were consistent with his having been in 

the front passenger seat; her DNA was on the driver’s side airbag and her passenger’s 

was on the passenger side bag. In addition, Wathogoma confessed to police that she was 

the driver. 

 In Ground Six, Wathogoma contends that the trial court improperly sentenced her 

to consecutive terms for the four offenses, when they resulted from a single car accident, 

the evidence of guilt was inconclusive, the trial court decided before the sentencing 

hearing to impose consecutive terms, and she has no prior felony convictions that would 

justify such sentences. Wathogoma failed to allege, either in state court or in this federal 

petition, any violation of the United States Constitution or of federal law. A state court’s 

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“decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state 

criminal procedure and is not within the purview of federal habeas corpus.” See 

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenese, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (1994). Because her claim only asserts 

state law violations, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Souch v. Schiavo, 

289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Gaylene Jodie 

Wathogoma’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Wathogoma has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

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be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 26th day of February, 2014. 

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