Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01564/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01564-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

M. NORMAN HAMMERLORD,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-1564 JLS (NLS)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

(ECF Nos. 21, 23, 24, 25)

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court are Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police

Department’s (“City Defendants”) motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21), Defendant San Diego Housing

Commission’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 23), Defendant Hendershaw and Associates’

(“Hendershaw”) motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to strike Plaintiff’s SLAPP suit (ECF No.

24), and Defendant Carl Moccafiche’s (“Moccafiche”) motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to

strike Plaintiff’s SLAPP suit (ECF No. 25). Also before the Court are the parties’ oppositions and

replies. The hearing set for all motions on Thursday, November 1, 2012 was vacated, and the matter

taken under submission on the papers. Having considered the parties’ arguments and the law, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions. 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff M. Norman Hammerlord (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action against 

Defendants alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, California Penal Code §118.1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”), and common

law invasion of privacy. (FAC, ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff’s claims arise from the following incident

involving Defendant San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”). Plaintiff alleges that, on January 3,

2011, four officers from the SDPD acting on an anonymous tip entered his apartment, also described

as the “Sanctuary,” without a warrant or Plaintiff’s consent. (FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶ 8.) The agents

allegedly left without arresting or citing Plaintiff, and refused to reveal the source of their anonymous

tip. (Id.) 

On January 5, 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to the SDPD requesting “a copy of all files, field

notes, and any other document” pertaining to their investigation under the FOIA, specifically

requesting the names of the individuals that had made the anonymous tip. (ECF No. 21-4 Exh. B at

4.) On January 10, 2011, Plaintiff received a response from the Deputy City Attorney indicating that

the records he sought were “contained within an investigative file” and “exempt from disclosure,” and

that the SDPD therefore had no documents responsive to his request. (ECF No. 21-4 Exh. B at 5.) 

During February 2011, Plaintiff alleges that he discovered that Defendant Moccafiche, the

resident property manager for Plaintiff’s apartment complex, was a source of the anonymous tip to

the SDPD. (FAC, ECF No. 10 at 12-14.) Plaintiff alleges that Moccafiche described Plaintiff as a

member of the mafia, a drug dealer, and in possession of drugs. (FAC, ECF No. 10 at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff

had previously written a letter to Moccafiche on June 4, 2009, accusing Moccafiche of spreading

rumors that Plaintiff was dealing drugs out of his apartment and demanding the names of any other

individuals involved. (FAC, ECF No. 10 at ¶ 16.) 

During this time, Plaintiff was sent various notices on February 23, 2011, July 11, 2011, and

May 31, 2011 by Defendants Moccafiche and Hendershaw regarding the termination of Plaintiff’s

tenancy. (FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 17, 20-21.) Plaintiff alleges that Hendershaw, the property

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management company for Plaintiff’s apartment complex, eventually brought a fraudulent unlawful

detainer action against Plaintiff and evicted Plaintiff after obtaining a favorable judgment on

November 7, 2011. (FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 22-31.)

Also during this time, Plaintiff alleges that the SDHC received two letters stating that Plaintiff

was a mafia member, a drug dealer, and had pounds of drugs in his apartment. (FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶

32.) Plaintiff alleges that SDHC refused to provide him information regarding those letters when

requested. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that the SDHC terminated his participation in the Section 8

Rental Assistance Program on September 15, 2011, based on false reports provided by the SDPD. 

(FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 35-37.) Plaintiff alleges that the termination hearing was “a sham and a farce”

and that the SDHC withheld several documents. (FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶ 38.)

Plaintiff alleges that, sometime later, he received a file from SDHC. (FAC, ECF No. 10 at 7.) 

With this file, Plaintiff allegedly received four fraudulent police reports related to the January 3, 2011

incident. (FAC, ECF No. 10 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that the reports falsely state that: (1) Plaintiff gave

consent to entry; (2) that various witnesses for the Plaintiff are criminals; (3) that Plaintiff was dealing

narcotics; (4) that the officers had identified themselves as police officers; and (5) that various people

inside and around the apartment had been engaging in drug use. (FAC, ECF No. 10 at 7-9.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions as a whole were part of a “plan of malicious conduct

to annoy, harass, and obstruct Plaintiff’s property rights.” (FAC, ECF No. 10 at ¶ 19.) Based on these

allegations, Plaintiff pursues the following federal claims against all Defendants: (1) fraudulent

statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and (2) violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1983.1

 Plaintiff further alleges a federal claim against City Defendants and SDHC for violation of the

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiff also alleges state claims: (1) against all Defendants for invasion of

privacy; (2) against City Defendants and SDHC for violation of the CPRA; and (3) against Defendant

SDPD for violation of California Penal Code § 118.1.

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Although Plaintiff cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (FAC ¶ 54), the Court interprets Plaintiff’s

allegations as a claim under § 1983. Section 1981 provides for protection for racial minorities and is

inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege a single fact showing that he belongs

to a racial minority or that any Defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the defense that

the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” generally referred to as a

motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and

sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but there must

be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained

in the complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s “judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but

it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. Moreover, “for a complaint to be

dismissed because the allegations give rise to an affirmative defense[,] the defense clearly must appear

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on the face of the pleading.” McCalden v. Ca. Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotations omitted).

Relevant here, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly

important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In giving

liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, a court may not “supply essential

elements of the claim that was not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally and may be dismissed

for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060,

1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court

determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly

cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other

words, where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957

F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss the federal claims against them with prejudice on the grounds that

the underlying statute does not provide a private cause of action, the underlying statute is inapplicable,

and Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Defendants further move to dismiss the state claims against them

with prejudice on the grounds the claims are barred by filing requirements, governmental immunity,

and privilege. 

1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 Claims

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because the statute does

not provide for a private cause of action. “[C]laims of fraud or false statements under 18 U.S.C. §

1001 . . . are barred because these criminal statutes do not expressly create a private right of action

upon which plaintiff may sue defendants.” Abou-Hussein v. Gates, 657 F. Supp. 2d 77, 71 (D.D.C.

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2009); see also Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins.

Corp. v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 137 (4th Cir. 1987). Indeed, Plaintiff fails to cite to any authority in

support of his claims. Because leave to amend would be futile, Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658, the Court

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings claims against all Defendants for “actions, . . . done intentionally with the

purpose of harassing Plaintiff and depriving him of his rights.” (FAC ¶ 56.) Although Plaintiff does

not specifically state which rights he was deprived of, Plaintiff seems to allege: (1) City Defendants

maliciously prosecuted or harassed him without due process, (FAC ¶ 9); (2) Moccafiche made false

or misleading statements to obstruct his property rights, (FAC ¶¶ 16-17, 19); (3) Hendershaw made

false or misleading statements in terminating Plaintiff’s tenancy and obtaining a favorable judgment

against Plaintiff to deprive him of his property rights, (FAC ¶¶ 20-22, 30-31); and (4) SDHC

terminated Plaintiff’s participation in the Section 8 housing assistance program without due process

(FAC ¶¶ 32, 35, 38).

A. Against Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department

City Defendants argue that the claim against Defendant San Diego Police Department

(“SDPD”) must fail because SDPD is not a proper defendant for a § 1983 claim. (ECF No. 21-1 at

9.) To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains of was

committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a right secured

by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d

1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Here, dismissal of SDPD

is appropriate because SDPD is not considered a “person” subject to liability under § 1983. The term

“person” does not encompass municipal departments, such as police departments. See, e.g., Paschelke

v. Doe, No. 09-2191, 2010 WL 2640501, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2010); Chadwick v. San Diego

Police Dep’t, No. 09-CV-946, 2010 WL 883839, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010); Vance v. County of

Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 

Further, City Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead a proper cause of action against

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Defendant City of San Diego because Plaintiff makes no allegations of conduct by the City of San

Diego itself and respondeat superior liability does not apply. Although Defendant City of San Diego

itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, a proper defendant under section 1983, see Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801

(9th Cir. 1988), as a municipality it may be held liable under section 1983 only where the Plaintiff

alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution

of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the

City. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Navarro v.

Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “respondeat superior and vicarious liability

are not cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.” Miranda v. Clark Cnty., Nevada, 279

F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged

constitutional deprivation was inflicted in ‘execution of a government's policy or custom.’” Id.

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). With respect to custom, “[l]iability will be imposed upon a

municipality where the plaintiff establishes a series of similar acts sufficient to establish a

‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the “standard operating procedure” of the local

government entity.’” Martin v. County of San Diego, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103 (quoting Ulrich v.

City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts relating to a policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision

by the City of San Diego. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Further, although Plaintiff argues that “[i]t is the

City’s custom to protect themselves from any liability at any cost,” (ECF No. 31 at 7), Plaintiff fails

to allege any facts establishing a “longstanding practice or custom” by the City of San Diego. Martin,

650 F. Supp. 2d. at 1103. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against City

Defendants.

B. Against Defendants Moccafiche and Hendershaw2

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Moccafiche and Hendershaw must fail because

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts indicating that Moccafiche or Hendershaw were acting “under color

2

The Court notes that neither Plaintiff, Moccafiche, nor Hendershaw address 42 U.S.C. § 1983

in their arguments. Having granted Moccafiche and Hendershaw’s motions to dismiss, the Court

declines to consider their motions, in the alternative, to strike a SLAPP suit.

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of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the

conduct he complains of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that

conduct violated a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries, 554

F.3d at 1184. Plaintiff has failed to do so. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims against Moccafiche and Hendershaw.

C. Against Defendant SDHC

SDHC argues that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege facts alleging a § 1983 claim. (ECF No.

23-1 at 7.) As discussed above, there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983, and

liability arises under section 1983 only upon a showing that an official policy or custom caused the

alleged injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Here, Plaintiff only alleges the conduct of a single employee,

Ms. Cyndi Lofftus (FAC ¶¶ 32, 35, 37-38), and alleges no facts concerning SDHC policy or custom. 

Plaintiff’s otherwise conclusory statements are insufficient to support his claims against SDHC. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against SDHC.

3. Freedom of Information Act Claim

Plaintiff’s claims under the FOIA against City Defendants and SDHC must fail because the

statute only applies to federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(1), 552(f). Neither the City of San

Diego nor the SDPD is a federal agency. Further, the definition of “agency” under the FOIA does not

encompass state agencies or bodies. See St. Michael’s Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d

1369, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1981). The SDHC is a state agency and not subject to the FOIA. To the

extent that Plaintiff argues the SDHC is a federal agency because it receives federal funds, (ECF No.

31 at 8), this argument is without merit. Because leave to amend would be futile, Desoto, 957 F.2d

at 658, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims for an alleged violation of the FOIA with prejudice

and without leave to amend. 

4. Other State Claims

Plaintiff has filed various state law claims against Defendants alleging invasion of privacy,

violation of the California Public Records Act, and violation of California Penal Code § 118.1. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

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Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, and thus those claims are also DISMISSED without prejudice.

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CONCLUSION

 For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s federal claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and the

FOIA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s remaining

federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED without prejudice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state

law claims, and thus those claims are also DISMISSED without prejudice. 

To avoid any injustice, the Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint

to state a cognizable federal claim. If he wishes to do so, he SHALL FILE a complaint addressing

the deficiencies noted by the Court within 15 days of the date that this Order is electronically

docketed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 2, 2012

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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