Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02202/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02202-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AUGUSTUS NELSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

DENNIS BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No.11-2202-GPC(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(DOC. NO. 21)

I

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Augustus Nelson (“Plaintiff”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, filed a

Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint (“SAC”) under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants A. Favila, M. Garcia, and D.

Degeus (“Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss, and a

Wyatt Notice pursuant to Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F. 3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). On August 7, 2012, the Court also

provided Plaintiff with a Notice pursuant to Wyatt. 

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On November 6, 2012, the undersigned filed a Report

and Recommendation (“R&R”) that recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted, and the SAC be

dismissed without prejudice. On July 24, 2013, District

Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel issued an Order Declining To Adopt

The Report and Recommendation (“Order”). The Order stated

that the Court discovered that Plaintiff had previously

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Case No.

10cv1047-IEG(MDD), Report and Recommendation July 15,

2011, adopted August 23, 2011, Judgment entered on August

24, 2011] which appeared to raise the same claims as

raised in this action. The Order directed the undersigned

to set a briefing schedule and determine whether the case

should be dismissed under the principle of res judicata

based on the Judgment entered on August 24, 2011. 

The undersigned ordered Plaintiff and Defendants to

file supplemental briefs that address the res judicata

issue. Defendants filed the Supplemental Brief. Plaintiff

filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental

Brief.

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint,

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief, and Plaintiff’s Response

in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief hereby

finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested, RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED and Plaintiff’s SAC be DISMISSED with prejudice.

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II

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

This statement of facts is based, in large part,

upon the allegations in Plaintiff’s SAC and the administrative appeals that were attached to the First Amended

Complaint as exhibits.1/ At Plaintiff’s request, the Court

attached those exhibits to the Second Amended Complaint,

and has cited them herein. (SAC at 34).

Plaintiff was a state prisoner at Centinela State

Prison at the time of the events herein. (SAC at 1).

Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Men’s

Colony. (Opposition to Motion to Dismiss).

On March 15, 2007, a prison security officer

searched Plaintiff’s cell, which was jointly occupied by

another inmate, and found an inmate-manufactured weapon. 

(Id. at 3; Motion to Dismiss at 1). On March 20, 2007,

prison authorities issued Plaintiff a CDC 115 Rules

Violation Report (“RVR”) for possession of an inmatemanufactured weapon. (SAC at 3; Motion to Dismiss at 1). 

On April 13, 2007, a Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”)

conducted a disciplinary hearing and found Plaintiff

guilty of possessing an inmate-manufactured weapon.2/ (SAC

1/ The Court notes that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which contained

exhibits was supplanted by the SAC.

2/ Plaintiff does not explicitly address whether he attended the initial

disciplinary hearing. However, in Plaintiff’s Second Level Appeal he refers to

being “advise[d] and assist[ed]” in the “preparation of the hearing,” and notes

specific circumstances that surrounded the hearing. Nowhere does Plaintiff assert

that he did not attend the hearing, nor that he was deprived of an opportunity to

appear before the SHO. Based on these reasons and on the information contained

in Plaintiff’s SAC and Exhibits, this Court concludes that Plaintiff was present

for the initial disciplinary hearing on April 13, 2007. 

Additionally, it is unclear from the record whether the SHO informed

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at 3; Motion to Dismiss at 1). On May 23, 2007, approximately 40 days later, Plaintiff was issued an “Inmate

Copy” of the “Findings of Evidence” and “Final Disposition” of that disciplinary hearing (“Inmate Copy”). (SAC

at 3; Motion to Dismiss at 1). The Inmate Copy was dated

May 21, 2007. (SAC at 3; Motion to Dismiss at 1). 

On May 31, 2007, an Institutional Classification

Committee (“ICC”) hearing was conducted to review the

SHO’s findings. (SAC at 15; Motion to Dismiss at 2). 

Plaintiff attended the hearing. (SAC at 15; Motion to

Dismiss at 2). At the hearing, the ICC affirmed the SHO’s

guilty finding for possession of an inmate-manufactured

weapon. (SAC at 15; Motion to Dismiss at 2). As a result,

the ICC imposed an eight-month term in the Security

Housing Unit (“SHU”) and increased Plaintiff’s custody

classification points. (Institutional Classification

Committee Report - Exhibit 1 at 37).3/ On June 25, 2007,

Plaintiff was provided with an Inmate Copy of the ICC’s

decision. (SAC at 16; Motion to Dismiss at 2).

On July 8, 2007, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal

challenging the original guilty finding. (SAC at 16;

Motion to Dismiss at 2). On July 11, 2007, a prison

appeals coordinator “screened out” Petitioner’s appeal for

Plaintiff of the guilty finding at the time of the hearing on April 13, 2007. 

However, Plaintiff does not allege in his SAC or Exhibits that he was not informed

of the disposition any time after the initial finding of guilt. Nor does

Plaintiff assert that he was not informed of the SHO’s finding in a timely manner. 

Plaintiff’s sole contention is that he was not provided with copies of the

disposition in a timely manner. Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff was

aware of the SHO’s guilty finding at the time the decision was rendered.

3/ All of Plaintiff’s Exhibits cited herein refer to the ECF pagination number,

as Plaintiff combined all individual documents into one Exhibit.

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being untimely. (SAC at 16; Motion to Dismiss at 2;

Screening at Second Level - Exhibit 4 at 42). On July 22,

2007, Plaintiff resubmitted the appeal. (Complaint at 18;

Motion to Dismiss at 2). On July 24, 2007, the prison

appeals coordinator “screened out” and cancelled the

appeal again for untimeliness. (Complaint at 18; Motion to

Dismiss at 2; Re-screening at Second Level - Exhibit 6 at

45). On August 8, 2007, Plaintiff submitted his rejected

inmate appeal to the Chief of Inmate Appeals. (Complaint

at 22; Motion to Dismiss at 2). On September 19, 2007,

Plaintiff’s appeal was rejected based on his failure to

receive a second-level appeal decision at the institutional level. (SAC at 22; Motion to Dismiss at 2; Director’s Level Review - Exhibit 7 at 47).

III

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s SAC contains two causes of action. 

First, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by Defendants’

failure to provide him with an Inmate Copy4/ of the SHO’s

findings within five working days of the decision in

accordance with Cal. Code of Regs. 15, art. 5 § 3320(l). 

(SAC at 4-7.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that he was

deprived of his First Amendment right to redress of

grievances when Defendants failed to process his inmate

appeals. (SAC at 13-23; Motion to Dismiss at 10-11.) He

4/ Plaintiff contends that his “Inmate Copy” included the “Findings, Evidence,

and Final Disposition of the CDC 115, Rules Violation Report, prepared by the

Senior Hearing Officer... regarding his review of the CDC 115, RVR, at the

disciplinary hearing.” (SAC at 3.)

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asserts that the violation of these rights resulted in

“atypical and significant hardship.” (SAC at 6.) 

Plaintiff’s claims are brought against Chief Deputy

Warden Armando Favila, Doug Degeus, Appeals Coordinator,

and M. Garcia, Office Technician. All defendants are

named in their individual and official capacities. 

Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of due process

when Defendants provided him with the Inmate Copy approximately 40 days after the disciplinary hearing. He asserts

that since the California Code of Regulations requires

that inmates be provided an Inmate Copy within five

working days following a disciplinary finding, the 40-day

delay had a “chilling effect” on his “ability to [administratively] challenge the disciplinary findings.” (SAC at

4-5 citing to Cal. Code of Regs. 15, art. 5 § 3320(l)). 

Plaintiff contends that receipt of the Inmate Copy 40 days

after the decision “infringed upon his First Amendment

right” to timely appeal the finding. (SAC at 13.) He

concedes that in accordance with California Code of

Regulations 15, art. 8 § 3084.1 (a), an inmate is required

to file an appeal within 15 days after a disciplinary

decision. (Complaint at 13.) However, Plaintiff alleges,

due to the delay in receipt of the Inmate Copy, he was

deprived of his ability to timely appeal the decision. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff claims that, as a result of his inability

to successfully appeal the disciplinary decision, his

housing assignment was changed to the SHU, he was “sub11cv2202 6

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jected to” forfeiture of his job assignment and a decrease

in his work group privilege status, he was transferred

from a low level-III institution to a higher level-IV

institution, and his custody classification status increased. (SAC at 6-7.) 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, special, and

nominal damages from each defendant, costs of filing fees,

and attorney fees.5/ (SAC at 33.) Further, he seeks for

the Court to vacate and dismiss the disciplinary finding

of guilt. (Id.)

IV

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 6, 2012, the undersigned filed an R&R 

that recommended that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be

granted, and the SAC be dismissed without prejudice. (Dkt.

No. 31.) Objections to the R&R were due by December 14,

2012, but neither party filed objections.

Upon review of the matter, District Judge Gonzalo P.

Curiel discovered that Plaintiff had previously filed a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Nelson v. Clark,

10cv1047-IEG(MDD), 2011 WL 3740352 (S.D. Cal. July 15,

2011), Report and Recommendation adopted, 10cv1047-

IEG(MDD), 2011 WL 3739149 (S.D. Cal. August 23, 2011). On 

August 24, 2011, a Judgment was entered against Plaintiff.

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied with

prejudice on the ground that Plaintiff filed the Petition

5/ Plaintiff is precluded from obtaining an award of attorney’s fees due to his

pro se status. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991) (pro se litigants are

not entitled to attorney fees awards).

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for Writ of Habeas Corpus after the statute of limitations

had run. 

On July 24, 2013, Judge Curiel declined to adopt the

undersigned’s R&R in this action and remanded for further

review to determine whether the case should be dismissed

under the doctrine of res judicata based upon the judgment

entered in Nelson v. Clark.

On July 30, 2013, the undersigned ordered further

briefing by the parties regarding the applicability of res

judicata. On August 28, 2013, Defendants submitted a

Supplemental Brief in support of dismissing the case under

res judicata. On September 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed a

Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief (“Supplemental Opposition”). 

V

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”

in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the .

. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957));

Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). Dismissal

of a claim is appropriate only where the complaint lacks 

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a cognizable theory. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 553-565.

The court must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be

drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. N.L. Industries,

Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks

School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9th Cir. 1995). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff

must show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and, (2)

that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th

Cir. 2003); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Finally, where a plaintiff appears in propria

persona in a civil rights case, the Court must be careful

to construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff

any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988); Bretz v.

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027, n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled in the

law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making

errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the

representation of counsel.”).

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2. Res Judicata

Res judicata or collateral estoppel consists of the

doctrines of issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Issue

preclusion bars relitigation of issues of fact or law

actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior

proceeding against the party who seeks to relitigate the

issues. Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir.

1993). Claim preclusion “treats a judgment, once rendered,

as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the

same parties on the same claim or cause of action.”

McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986).

A res judicata defense requires (1) an identity of claims,

(2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity

between parties. Headwaters, Inc. v. Forest Service, 399

F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). 

Where the foregoing requirements are met, a federal or

state habeas decision has res judicata effect on a subsequent § 1983 action. Hawkins, 984 F.2d at 323; see also

Silverton v. Department of the Treasury of the United

States of America, 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981).

 VI

 DISCUSSION

The Judgment in Plaintiff’s previous Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus bars this § 1983 action pursuant to

res judicata because there is an identity of claims, the

habeas decision is a final judgment on the merits, and

there is privity between the defendants in both actions. 

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A. Identity of Claims

In the current case, Plaintiff attempts to

relitigate identical issues decided in his prior Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nelson v. Clark. In determining whether a present dispute concerns the same claims as

did prior litigation, the Ninth Circuit considers: 

(1) [W]hether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be

destroyed or impaired by prosecution of

the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in

the two actions; (3) whether the two

suits involve infringement of the same

right; and (4) whether the two suits

arise out of the same transactional

nucleus of facts. 

Headwaters, 399 F.3d at 1052 [citing Costantini v. Trans

World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)].

“The central criterion in determining whether there is an

identity of claims... is whether the two suits arise out

of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Owens v.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714

(9th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). 

Here, the central criterion is satisfied. Both

actions arise out of the same nucleus of facts, namely,

the events that occurred on and followed the March 15,

2007 search and discovery of an inmate-manufactured weapon

in Plaintiff’s cell. (SAC at 3; Nelson v. Clark, 2011 WL

3740352 at *1). In Owens, the Ninth Circuit upheld the

district court’s determination that the appellant’s claims

arose out of same nucleus of operative facts where both

suits were “predicated on racial discrimination and allege

the same circumstances regarding Appellants' termina11cv2202 11

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tions.” Owens, 244 F.3d at 714. Similarly, both Plaintiff’s prior Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and his

current § 1983 action are predicated on the March 15, 2007

discovery of an inmate-manufactured weapon in Plaintiff’s

cell, the disciplinary committee’s subsequent determination of Plaintiff’s guilt, and the SHO’s failure to

provide him with an Inmate Copy of the SHO's findings

within five working days of the decision. [SAC at 3;

10cv1047-IEG(MDD), Complaint]. 

Furthermore, “the two suits involve infringement of

the same right[s].” Headwaters, 399 F.3d at 1052. Here,

Plaintiff’s first claim in this action alleges that his

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were

violated by Defendants’ failure to provide him with an

Inmate Copy of the SHO’s findings within five working days

of the decision in accordance with Cal. Code of Regs. 15,

art. 5, § 3320(1). (SAC at 4-7.) Likewise, in the previous 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Plaintiff contended

his “rights of procedural due process [were] violated by

prison officials [sic] failure to provide him with the

‘Inmate Copy’ of the Senior Hearing Officer’s Findings and

Final Disposition of the serious CDG 115 Rule Violation

Report within 5 working days after review of the CDG 115.”

[10cv1047-IEG(MDD), Complaint]. 

Moreover, in this action, Plaintiff’s second claim

alleges that he was deprived of his First Amendment right

to redress of grievances when Defendants failed to process

his inmate appeals. (SAC at 13-23). Analogously, in the 

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previous Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Plaintiff

contended he “was denied the right to redress his grievances and denied the right to exercise freedom of expression as protected by the due process clauses of the First

and Fourteenth Amendments by prison officials obstructing

and interfering with [his] ability to exhaust the department’s administrative remedies.” [10cv1047-IEG(MDD),

Complaint]. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s current action clearly

concerns the same claims as did his prior Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. The present action and the Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus involve the alleged violation of

the same rights and arise from the same nucleus of facts.

Moreover, despite Plaintiff’s contentions to the

contrary, the result is no different where the court that

adjudicated the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus did not

have the power to award the full measure of relief sought

in this action. Plaintiff argues that since he could not

recover damages in the prior Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus cannot

preclude this action where he seeks monetary damages.

(Supplemental Opposition at 12). However, Ninth Circuit

case law demonstrates that the unavailability of damages

in a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus does not preclude

its res judicata effect on a subsequent § 1983 suit. See,

e.g., Silverton, 644 F.2d at 1347 (“The mere difference in

the form of relief is unimportant.”); Hawkins, 984 F.2d at

325 (holding a prior suit had preclusive effect where the 

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previous court had reached a judgment on the merits,

although the plaintiff sought different relief in the two

cases). Thus, despite differences in relief sought,

Plaintiff raised the same claims in the previous Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus that he raises in this action.

Therefore, res judicata applies to this aspect of the

current action. 

B. Final Judgment on the Merits

The judgment entered in Nelson v. Clark constitutes

a judgment on the merits. "The Supreme Court has unambiguously stated that a dismissal on statute of limitations

grounds is a judgment on the merits.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F.3d

1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) [citing Plaut v. Spendthrift

Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995)]. The Ninth Circuit

has also stated that “dismissal of a first habeas petition

for untimeliness presents a ‘permanent and incurable’ bar

to federal review of the underlying claims” because it

“constitutes a disposition on the merits.” McNabb v.

Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiff’s previous Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus was denied with prejudice for untimeliness. Nelson

v. Clark, 2011 WL 3739149 at *1. According to well-settled

case law, this decision constitutes a judgment on the

merits. 

C. Privity Between Parties

Finally, there is privity between the Respondent in

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Warden Clark, and 

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the defendants in the current case, CDCR Officers A.

Favila, M. Garcia, and D. Degeus. To have res judicata

effect upon a subsequent action, the actions must be

“between the same parties or those in privity with them.”

Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403

(1940). The Supreme Court has stated, “the fact that the

parties are not precisely identical is not necessarily

fatal [to res judicata preclusion]... [i]dentity of

parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance.”

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). For example,

“[t]here is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a

representative of the United States is res judicata in

relitigation of the same issue between that party and

another officer of the government.” Id. 

Here, the defendants in both the previous and

current actions are CDCR officers. In Jackson v. Director

of Corrections of California, 2013 WL 3923426, at *1 (C.D.

Cal. July 29, 2013), the court held that prior state

petitions for writ of habeas corpus brought by the plaintiff had preclusive effect on the plaintiff’s subsequent

§ 1983 action. In the first action, the plaintiff named as

respondents the prison Warden and Director, and in the

second, a correctional officer. Id. at *8. In determining

the preclusive effect of the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, the court stated, “[t]he actions involve[d] the

same injury to Plaintiff and the same wrong by prison

officials, even though the form of the actions in state 

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court (Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus) led Plaintiff

to identify as the adverse party his custodian rather than

the individual wrongdoers.” Id. at *9.

This case is substantially similar to Jackson. Res

judicata effect is not precluded solely because the nature

of the lawsuits led Plaintiff to name his custodian,

Warden Clark, in the previous Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, and different “individual wrongdoers” in the

current § 1983 suit. Furthermore, officers of the same

government are in privity for the purposes of res judicata

application. Thus, Defendants are in privity with prior

defendant, Warden Clark. See Sunshine Anthracite, 310 U.S.

at 403. 

Consequently, Plaintiff’s current action is barred

by res judicata because there is an identity of claims

between this action and the prior Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, the decision in the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus constitutes a final judgment on the merits,

and there is privity between the defendants in this action

and the Respondent in the previous Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus.

V

 CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. The Court

further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED

with prejudice.

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This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned

Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 18, 2013

any party to this action may file written objections with

the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all

parties no later than January 3, 2014 The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 20, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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