Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00277/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00277-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOYMA VANESSA MICHEL, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

SAFARILAND, LLC, a Delaware limited 

liability company, AND DOES 1 

THROUGH 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16CV277-GPC(AGS)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff Doyma Vanessa Michel’s (“Plaintiff” or “Michel”)

motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting Defendant United States of 

America’s (“Defendant” or “government”) motion for summary judgment and denying 

Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 93.) Defendant United States 

of America filed an opposition. (Dkt. No. 99.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 100.) 

Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

Background

On October 31, 2017, the Court granted the United States of America’s motion for 

summary judgment on all four causes of action, including negligence, false 

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imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Dkt. No. 86.) 

The parties are intimately familiar with the facts in this case, and the Court incorporates 

by reference the detailed facts presented in the Court’s order on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (Id. at 3-11)

A. Legal Standard on Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

(“Rule”) 59(e) and Local Civil. R. 7.1(i). (Dkt. No. 93; Dkt. No. 93-1 at 6.) 

A district court may reconsider a grant of summary judgment under Rule

59(e). Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 1 Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court has discretion in granting or denying a motion

for reconsideration. Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991). A

motion for reconsideration should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances.

389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A motion for reconsideration, under Rule 59(e), is “appropriate if the district

court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence; (2) clear error or the initial

decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or., 5 F.3d at 1263; see also Ybarra v.

McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011). “[R]econsideration of a judgment after

its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” McDowell v.

Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.

1995)). Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon

Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5 (2008) (citation omitted); see also

Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A Rule 59(e) motion may not

be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”) (citing Kona Enters. v. Estate of

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Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) states that in seeking reconsideration of an order, an 

attorney must set forth an “affidavit of a party or witness or certified statement of an 

attorney setting forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding each prior 

application, including inter alia: (1) when and to what judge the application was made, 

(2) what ruling or decision or order was made thereon, and (3) what new or different facts 

and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such 

prior application.” Local Civ. R. 7.1(i). 

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks the Court’s reconsideration of its ruling in favor of the government 

on all four causes of action. 

A. False Imprisonment

In its order, the Court applied state law enforcement privilege to the false 

imprisonment cause of action, and concluded that the government was not liable for false 

imprisonment after criminal proceedings began on June 3, 2014 as it concerned Agent 

Bulman’s actions. (Dkt. No. 86 at 23.) The Court also held that assuming that the 

private actor standard applied to the actions of Agent Bulman, there was still no evidence 

that his conduct or failure to act subjected the government to liability for false 

imprisonment. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state law governmental 

immunity does not apply to the United States in a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 

action. Therefore, she contends that since state law immunity and federal statutory 

privilege do not apply, the government is liable for her false imprisonment for her 

continued detention after September 10, 2014, when Ambriz’ GC/MS testing revealed the 

substance Michel was transporting was not a controlled substance. 

Defendant counters that Plaintiff merely reiterates her arguments raised in the 

summary judgment motions and has not alleged new facts, has not demonstrated an

intervening change of the law, and has not demonstrated clear error committed by the 

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Court. Therefore, she cannot demonstrate she is entitled to reconsideration of the Court’s 

order. 

The FTCA provides that the government “is liable in the same manner and to the 

same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. In the 

parties’ motions for summary judgment, the parties disagreed as to whether the state law 

enforcement privilege/immunity applied to a claim of false imprisonment by a federal 

law enforcement officer under the FTCA. Defendant argued that because law 

enforcement officers engage in a unique governmental function that has no private sector 

analogue, the law governing state law enforcement officers performing similar actions 

applies. In response, Plaintiff contended that the Government is liable under a “private 

person standard” or in this case, the standard for citizen’s arrest as directed by the United 

States Supreme Court in United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005) and the Ninth Circuit 

case of Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff repeats the same arguments raised on

summary judgment, albeit with more detail and vigor, but essentially she disagrees with 

the Court’s analysis. Moreover, the Court notes that it already addressed the private 

person standard she seeks the Court to apply in her motion for reconsideration. (Dkt. No. 

86 at 23.) 

Plaintiff presumes that if the private person standard applies, the United States is 

liable for Plaintiff’s continued detention from September 10, 2014, when Ambriz 

completed the GC/MS test which showed no presence of a controlled substance, until her 

release on December 9, 2014.1 

 

1 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that there is no immunity or limitation of liability for private persons 

accused of false imprisonment. In California, a private individual has lawful privilege to effectuate a 

citizen’s arrest if there is probable cause to detain. Fermino v. Fedco., Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994) 

(“Merchants who detain individuals whom they have probable cause to believe are about to injure their 

property are privileged against a false imprisonment action.”). The Court concluded that there was 

probable cause to arrest Michel by Officer Gibbons and the interrogation by Agent Bulman under the

collective knowledge doctrine. Under the private person standard, Michel’s arrest was lawful. The 

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Even if the Court erred in applying the state law enforcement immunity, Plaintiff 

has not demonstrated that applying a private person standard results in the government’s

liability for false imprisonment. In support, Plaintiff cites to one case, Fermino v. Fedco., 

Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994), where the California Supreme Court addressed an

employee’s claim that she was subject to false imprisonment by her employer. In 

Fermino, the employee was summoned to a windowless room and interrogated about an 

alleged theft. Id. at 706. Two managers and two security agents were in the room; they 

accused her of stealing, demanded that she confess and threatened to have her arrested 

unless she confessed and told her that witnesses to the incident were waiting in the next 

room when they were not. Id. at 707. Despite the employee’s repeated requests to leave 

the room and to call her mother, they were denied. Id. She remained in the room for 

more than one hour. Id. The court recognized a merchant’s privilege against a false 

imprisonment claim if the merchant has probable cause to believe an individual will 

injure property under California Penal Code section 490.5. Id. at 715. However, an 

employer’s actions that go beyond a reasonable interrogation and detention constitute

false imprisonment. Id. at 716. The court reversed the trial court’s demurrer in favor of 

the employer. Id. at 724. The Court finds that Fermino is not applicable because it does 

not address a prolonged detention such as Michel’s where there was probable cause to 

initially detain her and then she was transferred to the custody of jailers pursuant to 

criminal court proceedings. 

California recognizes a false imprisonment claim based on a prolonged detention if 

a jailer knows or should have known of the “illegality of the imprisonment.” Sullivan v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 717-18 (1974). A public entity which employs the 

jailer may be liable if jailers “have actual knowledge that the imprisonment of the 

 

question is whether there was a continuing duty on Agent Bulman to investigate the validity of 

Plaintiff’s detention. 

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plaintiff is unlawful or alternatively that he have some notice sufficient to put him, as a

reasonable man, under a duty to investigate the validity of the incarceration.” Id. at 719. 

In Martinez, a plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Los Angeles for false 

imprisonment based on a prolonged detention of 59 days spent in jail in Mexico. 

Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit 

reversed the district court’s summary judgment decision in favor of the City on the false 

imprisonment claim based on prolonged detention. Id. at 1381. The Los Angeles Police 

Department (“LAPD”) initiated an investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest in 

Mexico. Id. at 1377. After Martinez was arrested, his attorney presented the LAPD with 

evidence establishing the Mexican authorities arrested the wrong man. Id. at 1378. After 

receiving this information, the LAPD delayed investigating further. Id. at 1381. 

Martinez claimed that the LAPD officers allowed him to remain in jail in Mexico after 

they knew or should have known he was not the person who committed the crime. Id. at 

1379. The Ninth Circuit concluded there were genuine issues of material fact whether 

the LAPD knew facts which would have caused a reasonable person to investigate the 

legality of Martinez’s incarceration and seek his release. Id. at 1381. In a prolonged 

detention case, the question of liability depends on whether the defendant knew facts that 

the detained person is innocent or should have known facts that would have caused a 

reasonable person to investigate the validity of the detained person’s detention. 

In this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Agent Bulman had facts that would 

have put him on notice to trigger a duty to investigate the drug test results. Plaintiff 

argues that when Agent Bulman interviewed Plaintiff on the day she was detained, on 

June 2, 2014, she told him the substance was not methamphetamine but was cuajo and 

both agreed that testing would reveal whether the substance was a drug or not. Based on 

this conversation, Plaintiff argues that Agent Bulman was aware that the lab test could 

exonerate Plaintiff and he had a continuing duty to investigate especially after September 

10, 2014 when the results of the drug testing revealed she was innocent. First, a dispute 

whether a substance is illicit or not is most likely common at a border stop. Second, 

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Agent Bulman did not have actual knowledge about the results of the drug testing until 

December 3, 2014. He had no knowledge that Ambriz conducted GC/MS testing on 

September 10, 2014 and did not know the results of that test. There was nothing to put 

him on notice that triggered a duty to investigate the test results. 

Next, Michel argues that Agent Bulman’s failure to follow-up with the DEA lab at 

the request of two Assistant U.S. Attorneys was deliberate, willful and/or reckless. 

However, the Court concluded that Agent Bulman’s failure to follow up with the 

AUSA’s requests to check the lab results was allowable under the discretionary function

exception doctrine. There is no indication that his failure to act was deliberate, willful 

and/or reckless. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Agent Bulman had any actual 

knowledge that Plaintiff’s prolonged detention was unlawful and there was nothing to put 

him on notice to trigger a duty to investigate the validity of the detention. 

Under either standard, the private actor standard or applying state law privilege, 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of fact that the government is liable for 

false imprisonment due to Agent Bulman’s failure to act. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on this issue. 

B. Discretionary Function Exception

In the Court’s order on summary judgment, it held that the claims of negligence 

and negligent infliction of emotional distress claim based on Ambriz’ conduct from 

September 29, 2014 when she definitively learned that the substance in the bottles was 

not a controlled substance, and December 9, 2014, when Michel was released from jail 

was protected by the discretionary function exception. (Dkt. No. 86 at 25, 27.) The 

Court explained that the “DEA lab’s decision on which track, rushed or not rushed, to test 

the substance found in Plaintiff’s vehicle was driven by policy considerations.” (Id. at 

27.) 

In the motion, Plaintiff argues that Ambriz did not engage in a “permissible 

exercise of policy discretion” after September 10, 2014, when she completed GC/MS 

testing. She claims that while the DEA has discretion to determine how it prioritizes the 

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testing of drug samples, it does not have a policy about timely submission of drug test 

reports and notifying the case agent of the lab results. Defendant argues that Plaintiff 

merely “recycles” her arguments against Ambriz and has identified no new fact, no

intervening change in law or clear error to justify a reconsideration of the Court’s 

decision. 

Here, the Court concluded, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the decision not to 

rush the lab results was driven by policy considerations. That decision, that the substance 

be tested in the regular course of testing, and not rushed, includes the entire lab testing 

process, and not just the initial decision to not rush the test results. In 2014, a non-rushed 

lab report took about six to ninth months to test. (Dkt. No. 59-3, Ex. G, Malone Depo. at 

55:7-20.) In the regular course of testing, Plaintiff’s substance would have taken six to 

nine months. In this case, the testing was completed within five months, earlier than the 

normal testing time. The Court does not find Plaintiff’s argument concerning the delay 

of the submission of the drug test reports to be persuasive. 

Next, Plaintiff’s argument that once Ambriz knew that the substance was not a 

controlled substance on September 10, 2014, Ambriz did not engage in a “permissible 

exercise of policy discretion” and the discretionary exception did not apply to Ambriz’

decision to hold off submitting her final report until almost two months after testing was 

completed, is not legally supportive. In its order, the Court concluded that Ambriz did 

not have a duty to act because she “had no actual knowledge concerning the facts in 

Michel’s underlying criminal case and no duty to promptly act to secure the release of 

Michel. Ambriz was not an investigating officer, as such, she was not involved in the 

detention and arrest of Michel, involved in the filing of the criminal complaint, aware of 

Michel’s bail status or aware of the evidence in the possession of the Government 

supporting Michel’s charges.” (Dkt. No. 86 at 29 citing Dkt. No. 52-9, P’s Index of Exs., 

Ex. 5, Ambriz Depo. at 124:3-15 (Ambriz testified she did not know whether Plaintiff 

was in custody or not).) Therefore, Ambriz did not know that the test results of 

September 2014 would have dissipated probable cause to detain Plaintiff. 

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As to Agent Bulman, Plaintiff also argues that his subjective and erroneous belief 

about a non-existent policy is not subject to the discretionary function exception. The 

Court concluded that Agent Bulman’s failure to follow up with the DEA lab was based 

on a policy decision that rush requests were only made when there was a court date, a 

plea date or an extenuating circumstances, such as when the AUSA makes the rush 

request directly with the DEA lab, or a judge orders testing rushed. (Dkt. No. 86 at 11, 

30.) 

Plaintiff argues that Agent Bulman’s subjective belief is a disputed fact. 

She asserts that Agent Bulman’s belief that he could not make a rush request unless there 

was a trial date or plea agreement date is disputed by the DEA’s rush request form and 

Ambriz’ testimony. (Dkt. No. 93-1 at 26 n. 4.) The Court disagrees. The rush analysis 

request form includes a question that lists reasons that require a checkmark for the 

“nature of rush request” and include, grand jury, preliminary hearing, plea deadline, trial 

call, undercover buys and “other.” (Dkt. No. 94-2, P’s Suppl. Exs, Ex. A at 2.) These 

choices indicate that rush requests are made for specific reasons such as court dates. 

“Other” does not indicate that a rush request can be made without a time-sensitive reason. 

Moreover, the fact that Ambriz testified she receives rush request forms from agents and 

that she would have accommodated Bulman’s request for a rush analysis does not support 

Plaintiff’s argument that Ambriz routinely received rush request forms for cases without 

a trial date or plea agreement date or any extenuating circumstances. Plaintiff’s facts 

only demonstrate that when a rush request is made, the lab policy expedites the testing. 

Here, according to Agent Bulman, there was no justification for a rush request since there 

was no court date. Plaintiff’s facts do not show that Agent Bulman’s understanding of 

the DEA lab policy is contradicted. 

Further, in support, Plaintiff submits an email exchange between Agent Bulman 

and the AUSA concerning the lab testing of Michel’s substance. (Dkt. No. 94-2, P’s 

Suppl. Exs., Ex. B.) While the email exchange was referenced in Plaintiff’s opposition to 

the government’s separate statement of undisputed facts, (Dkt. No. 62-1, SSUF, No. 18), 

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the document was not submitted in the record. For the first time, Plaintiff submits the 

email exchange in her motion for reconsideration. On August 1, 2014, the AUSA wrote, 

“When you get a chance, would you send me your ROI in this case? And would you 

check on the status of the DEA lab report (although I know we’re likely months away 

from that being ready).” (Dkt. No. 94-2, P’s Suppl. Exs., Ex. B at 2.) In response, Agent 

Bulman wrote, “I’ve attached a scanned copy of the approved initial ROI. The DEA Lab 

received the liquid methamphetamine from the port seizure and from the storage unit 

seizure on July 3. I know that the lab is still severely backlogged by at least six months, 

but the samples are there waiting to be analyzed. If and when it becomes apparent that we 

will need to submit a rush analysis, I will do so, but due to their backlog, they have also 

been inundated with rush analysis requests.” (Id.) The AUSA responded, “Thanks! No 

need for a rush request yet, I know how busy the lab is.” (Id.) The email exchange notes 

the extreme backlog at the DEA lab and that a rush analysis request be made only when 

necessary. At that time, it was not necessary to make the rush request. The email 

exchange supports Agent Bulman’s testimony on when rush requests are made. 

Therefore, Agent Bulman’s decision not to follow up with DEA lab based on the 

AUSA’s request is subject to the discretionary function exception. The Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration on this issue. 

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff merely reargues her claim that Ambriz’s conduct was based on her 

reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress to Plaintiff, that is, she 

knew that the laboratory results would exonerate Plaintiff but failed to timely submit her 

lab report. She also claims that Agent Bulman did not exercise policy judgment but had 

an obligation to fulfill the AUSA’s requests and had no authority to refuse to obtain the 

lab results. As discussed above, Agent Bulman was exercising his discretion in following 

DEA’s prioritization policy concerning lab testing and Plaintiff did not demonstrate that 

he acted with reckless disregard to cause her emotional distress. As to Ambriz, the Court 

concluded that the claim was barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) since the claim for 

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intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on facts to support the false 

imprisonment cause of action and her injuries originate from this claim which is 

explicitly exempt under the FTCA. Plaintiff has not demonstrated clear error to justify 

reconsideration. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on the 

intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The 

hearing set for February 15, 2018 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 13, 2018

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