Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00080/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cv-00080-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Earnest S. Harris is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed July 10, 2018. 

I.

RELEVANT HISTORY

This action is proceeding against Defendants Sexton, Aquirre, Stewart, Lambert, Gutierrez, L. 

Cellobos, and I. Ramirez for subjecting Plaintiff to conditions of confinement in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. 

As previously stated, on July 10, 2018, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the 

action on the ground that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff filed 

an opposition on August 10, 2018, and Defendants filed a reply on August 16, 2018. (ECF Nos. 22, 

27.) 

EARNEST S. HARRIS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

SEXON, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:18-cv-00080-DAD-SAB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[ECF No. 19]

Case 1:18-cv-00080-DC-SCR Document 28 Filed 09/06/18 Page 1 of 10
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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss, based on res judicata grounds, is properly made under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Gupta v. Thai Airways Intern., Ltd., 487 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). 

However, the court applies California law on claim preclusion to cases brought in federal court under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to 

state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do 

so.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). 

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, 

and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court’s review is 

generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 

(9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Schneider v. California Dept. of 

Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation 

Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court 

must accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Morales v. City of Los 

Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000).

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt 

resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

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III.

DISCUSSION

A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

On May 8, 2015, Plaintiff arrived at California State Prison, Corcoran (COR) security housing 

unit (SHU). Every thirty minutes an officer would walk down the tier and excessively bang on each 

cell door with a small metal pipe. The banging on the cell doors occurs 48 times a day. Plaintiff 

cannot sleep during the day or at night which has led to depression and anxiety. The only time 

Plaintiff is free from the “banging” was when he is on the yard and will often fall asleep while out on 

the yard. Plaintiff confronted several officers, including Defendants Sexton, Aquirre, Stewart, 

Lambert, Gutierrez, L. Cellobos, and I. Ramirez regarding the noise. The officers simply responded 

that they had to do it or its “metal on metal”. Plaintiff has been subjected to the noise level in the SHU 

for over two years. 

Plaintiff contends that in 2014 a policy and procedure began in which the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) put metal boxes on all SHU cell doors 

throughout the prisons in the State of California. The wardens of each prison made a policy that all 

officers working in the SHU would hit a metal pipe on the metal box to send a message that a welfare 

check was conducted on each unit in an effort to combat the suicide rate of inmates housed in the SHU 

who are in the mental health system or triple C. Plaintiff submits that he is not a participant in the 

mental health system or triple C and “security checks” should not be conducted for his cell.1 Plaintiff 

also submits that Defendants do not want to conduct the welfare checks and there are ways to do the 

security checks without loud banging. Defendants implement the welfare checks with loud bangs to 

disturb the inmates so they will file complaints. 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

1. Parties Arguments 

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because they are not at liberty to stop

 

1 Although Plaintiff does not explicitly name the policy at issue in his complaint, it is evident from his allegations and 

attachments that he is referring to the Guard One policy implemented by the Coleman Court. (ECF No. 12 at 16, 18.) 

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using the Guard One protocol, or even to decrease the frequency with which Guard One welfare 

checks are conducted, because at all times they have acted in accordance with an order from the court 

in Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB, a court-monitored class action that has been 

ongoing for over twenty years. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief 

should be dismissed based on judicial comity. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because their actions go 

beyond what is necessary to perform the Guard One welfare checks and that he is not subject to the 

Guard One Policy because he is not a participant in the mental health system. Plaintiff further argues 

that the Guard One Policy should not have been implemented as to all inmates. 

In response, Defendants argue that they have complied with the court’s order in Coleman

which was implemented to create sound which entitles them to qualified immunity. Defendants 

further argue that Plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief in this action to terminate and/or modify the 

Guard One Policy. 

2. Request for Judicial Notice and Background of Guard One Policy 

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of the following documents: 

a. A printout of the relevant pages in the PACER docket sheet for Coleman v. Brown,

Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.), printed on March 9, 2018, Exhibit A;

b. Order dated April 5, 2013, from Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB

(E.D. Cal.), ECF No. 4539, Exhibit B;

c. Order dated July 12, 2013, from Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB

(E.D. Cal.), ECF No. 4693, Exhibit C;

d. Special Master’s Report on his Expert’s Audit of Suicide Prevention Practices in the

Prisons of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, dated January 14, 2015, from 

Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.), ECF No. 5258, Exhibit D;

e. An audit of Suicide Prevention Practices in the Prisons of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, from Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB (E.D. 

Cal.), ECF No. 5259, Exhibit E;

f. Order dated February 3, 2015, from Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJMCase 1:18-cv-00080-DC-SCR Document 28 Filed 09/06/18 Page 4 of 10
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DB (E.D. Cal.), ECF No. 5271, Exhibit F;

g. Stipulation and Order Modifying February 3, 2015 Order Regarding First Watch

Security/Welfare Checks at Pelican Bay State Prison Security Housing Unit, filed December 28, 2015, 

from Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal.), ECF No. 5393, Exhibit G.

(Defs.’ Req. for Jud. Not. (RJN) at 1-3, ECF No. 20.) 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits the Court to take judicial notice at any time. A 

judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally 

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources who accuracy reasonably cannot be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b). Courts may take judicial notice of facts related to the case before it. Amphibious Partners, 

LLC v. Redman, 534 F.3d 1357, 1361-1362 (10th Cir. 2008) (district court was entitled to take 

judicial notice of its memorandum of order and judgment from previous case involving same parties). 

This Court may judicially notice the records and filing of other court proceedings. Tellabs, Inc. v. 

Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 802 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). This includes documents filed in state courts. Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 

1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The Court may take judicial notice of information on a government website when neither party 

disputes either the website’s authenticity or the accuracy of the information displayed. See DanielsHall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010 (taking judicial notice of school district’s 

approved vendors publicly displayed on website); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. V. McPherson, 

No. C 06-4760 SBA, 2008 WL 4183981, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008 (collecting cases). Here, 

Plaintiff does not contest the authenticity of the documents or the accuracy of the information 

presented. Accordingly, Defendants’ request for judicial of Exhibits A through G is granted. 

The Coleman action is a court-monitored class action that has been ongoing since 1990. The 

action relates to inmate mental health issues, and suicide prevention has been a target of the Coleman

remedial effort and is an effort to identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk for suicide. (RJN, Ex. D 

at 2.) The Coleman court ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

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(CDCR) to undertake suicide prevention and reduction programs to be supervised by a Special Master. 

(RJN Ex. C at 5-6.)

On January 14, 2015, the Special Master issued a report on CDCR’s suicide-prevention 

practices and the Guard One Policy was implemented. (RJN Ex. E at 14.) The Special Master 

recommended to CDCR that it continue to implement a directive (as set forth in the May 9, 2014, 

memo) that mandated Guard One welfare checks in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) every 30 

minutes.” (RJN Ex. D at 6; RJN Ex. E at 14-15.) The Coleman court adopted that recommendation 

on February 3, 2015, and ordered that it be implemented. (RJN Ex. F at 3.) 

The Special Master’s recommendation set forth the Guard One procedure and commented as 

follows:

The Guard One system involves a hand-held “pipe,” a metal disc that is attached to each cell 

door, and a software program. The officer conducting housing unit rounds is required to touch 

the end of the pipe to the disc on the cell door. The pipe will then emit a sound and the time of 

the contact wi[ll] be recorded on the pipe. The data from the pipe is then downloaded into the 

software program on a desktop computer in the housing unit by a supervisor, and is reviewed 

daily to ensure compliance. Although the Guard One offers dramatic improvement over 

previous practices, the technology can validate that correctional staff are conducting rounds at 

the required intervals, but it cannot assure that staff are actually observing the interior of each 

cell to verify the inmate’s well-being.

(RJN Ex. E at 14, n.15.) 

3. Applicable Law and Analysis 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners 

not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of confinement. 

Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While 

conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the 

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) 

(quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or 

contrary to evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the 

Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. 

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

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Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in 

prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To 

maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately 

indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. 

Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 

2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th

Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective element. First, 

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate 

health and safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Conditions which result in chronic, long term sleep deprivation may support a claim under the 

Eighth Amendment. See Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1057-61 (9th Cir. 2013); Keenan v. 

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 1996); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Subjectively, if an objective deprivation is shown, a plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials 

acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, that of “deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 733. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must 

not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official 

has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an 

absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mueller v. 

Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Qualified 

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immunity shields government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity balances two important 

interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and 

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 

reasonably,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009), and it protects “all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 

In resolving the claim of qualified immunity, the Court must determine whether, taken in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, whether 

the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993. 

While often beneficial to address in that order, the Court has discretion to address the two-step inquiry 

in the order it deems most suitable under the circumstances. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (overruling 

holding in Saucier that the two-step inquiry must be conducted in that order, and the second step is 

reached only if the court first finds a constitutional violation); Mueller, 576 F.3d at 993-94. 

Defendants argue that they were “unaware of any precedent that would make it beyond 

question that prison officials implementing welfare checks to guard inmate suicides, but making noise 

while doing so, violate the Eighth Amendment.” (Mot. at 7:3-5.) Further, the sounds made by the 

Guard One Welfare checks and frequency is governed by the Coleman orders. 

As stated above, it is clearly established law that excessive noise which leads to an inmate 

suffering sleep deprivation may violate the Eighth Amendment. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d at 1090-91; 

Jones v. Neven, 399 Fed. App’x 203, 205 (9th Cir. 2010); LeMaire v. v. Maass, 12 F.3d at 1460; see 

also Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d at 1057-61. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants’ 

excessive banging on the metal pipe attached to the cell door to cause a disturbance during sleeping 

hours is sufficient to show that their conduct violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment to 

be free of chronic, long term sleep deprivation. An officer would not have believed that intentionally 

banging loudly on the cell doors with a metal pipe causing sleep deprivation over an extended period 

of time was reasonable or allowed under Coleman. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to qualified 

immunity based on the present record. 

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Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. With regard to Plaintiff’s request for 

injunctive relief, Defendants argue it should be dismissed based on judicial comity. Plaintiff seeks an 

injunction to stop the “bamming of my celldoor.” (ECF No. 12 at 12.) As stated in the Court’s 

August 14, 2018, order, “[a] district court retains jurisdiction to enforce its judgments.” Hook v. Ariz. 

Dept. of Corr., 972 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Las Vegas v. Clark County, Nev., 

755 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Skelly v. Dockweiler, 75 F.SUpp. 11, 17 (S.D. Cal. 1947) 

(noting that a court may choose not to exercise its jurisdiction when another court having jurisdiction 

over the same matter has entertained it and can achieve the same result). Plaintiff cannot seek to 

modify and/or terminate the court orders provided in the Coleman action. A claim regarding a 

modification and/or termination of the Coleman orders requires action to be requested in the action 

that issued the order. See Hook, 972 F.2d at 1014. Plaintiff therefore cannot seek systemic relief here 

for any modification or termination of those court orders. 

However, Plaintiff can seek injunctive relief in this action as to the specific way Defendants 

are implementing the Guard One Policy as applied to him. See Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1132 

(9th Cir. 2013) (a plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief based solely on his behalf for medication care 

that relates to him only not barred by Plata class action). There is no showing that Plaintiff’s

individual claim for injunctive relief is duplicative or addressed in the Coleman action. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief should be granted in part and 

denied in part.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the action is granted in part and denied part as follows:

a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied; and

b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief seeking systemic

reform of the Guard One Policy is granted, but it is denied as to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief 

as to implementation of the policy as applied to him based on his allegations that Defendants have 

acted beyond the scope of the policy.

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written objections with 

the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 5, 2018 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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