Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00245/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00245-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4321 Review of Agency Action-Environment

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, 

et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

GALE A. NORTON, in her official

capacity as Secretary of the Interior,

et al., 

 Defendants,

 v. 

SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER

AUTHORITY, et al.,

 Defendant-Intervenors. 

1:05-CV-01207 OWW LJO

1:06-CV-245 OWW LJO

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS

TO DISMISS, REMAND,

AND STAY. 

PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF

FISHERMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS, et al., 

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

CARLOS M. GUTIERREZ, in his official

capacity as Secretary of Commerce, et

al., 

 Defendants,

 v.

SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER

AUTHORITY, et al., 

 Defendant-Intervenors.

Case 1:06-cv-00245-OWW -GSA Document 106 Filed 02/01/07 Page 1 of 37
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The OCAP governs the coordinated operation of the 1

federal Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State Water

Project. 

2

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision are a number of procedural

motions in two parallel cases: NRDC v. Kempthorne (“NRDC”),

1:05-cv-01207, which concerns the impact of the 2004 Operations

and Criteria Plan (“OCAP”) on the endangered Delta smelt; and 1

Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v.

Gutierrez (“PCFFA”), 1:06-cv-00246, which concerns the impact of

the OCAP on several endangered and threatened species of

salmonids.

In both cases, Plaintiffs challenge biological opinions

(“BiOps”) issued under the ESA by the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) (for the Delta smelt case) and the

National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (for the salmonid

case), which address whether the OCAP will jeopardize the

respective listed species. Among other things, the lawsuits

allege that the BiOps fail to consider the best available science

and rely upon uncertain (and allegedly inadequate) adaptive

management processes to monitor and mitigate the potential

impacts of the OCAP.

In mid-2006, USFWS and NMFS announced that they would reinitiate consultation, respectively, on the challenged biological

opinions. It is anticipated that new BiOps will be issued within

18 months. For several months during the fall of 2006, the

parties attempted to reach a settlement as to the management of

the SWP and CVP during the interim period. These negotiations

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failed to resolve the parties’ remaining disputes. Among others,

dispute continue over: (1) the fact that the Federal and State

Defendants plan to continue to implement the OCAP in accordance

with the challenged BiOps and (2) that the federal defendants

have not promised to maintain the pre-2004 status quo, although

the exact actions they plan to take are unclear.

In both NRDC and PCFFA, the federal defendants now move: 

(1) to dismiss on prudential mootness grounds; (2) for a

voluntary remand without vacatur; or (3) for a stay pending the

completion of renewed consultation based on the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction. In addition, federal defendants move to

consolidate NRDC and PCFFA for the purposes of deciding the above

motions and for the purpose of deciding how the CVP and SWP

should be operated during the interim period, should any such

decision be necessary. 

Plaintiffs oppose dismissing, remanding, staying, or

consolidating these cases. Rather, Plaintiffs request a prompt

hearing on the merits in the NRDC case. If they prevail,

Plaintiffs anticipate asking the court to impose some form of

interim relief.

Defendant-Intervenors and the Sederal Defendants support the

issuance of a stay in this case, rather than dismissal, remand,

or a hearing on the merits. Relative to a hearing on the merits,

which Defendant-Intervenors suggest would be a waste of judicial

resources, Defendant-Intervenors suggest that Plaintiffs always

have the option of appealing to the court for injunctive relief,

should any of the management activities threaten the species. 

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II. BACKGROUND

Both the Delta smelt (NRDC) and salmonid (PCFFA) cases

concern the coordinated operation of the federally-managed

Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State of California’s

State Water Project (“SWP”). Both projects divert large volumes

of water from the California Bay Delta (“Delta”) and use the

Delta to store water. 

The Delta is home to a number of endangered and threatened

species, including the endangered Delta smelt (Hypomesus

transpacificus), a small, slender-bodied fish endemic to the

Delta. Historically, the Delta smelt could be found throughout

the Delta, but the population has declined significantly in

recent years. The Delta and its tributaries are also home to

various endangered salmonid species, including the endangered

Sacramento River winter-run Chinook salmon; the threatened

Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon; the threatened Central

Valley steelhead; the threatened Southern Oregon/Northern

California coho salmon; and the threatened California Coast

steelhead. Plaintiffs concede that the population of one of

these species, the winter-run Chinook, has increased somewhat in

recent years, but the administrative record reveals that their

population remains small and vulnerable. All of the other

salmonid species are alleged to remain low in abundance and face

threats from limited habitat, low stream flows, higher than ideal

water temperatures, and entrainment in CVP/SWP facilities.

//

//

//

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Specifically, prior to authorizing, funding, or 2

carrying out any action, a federal agency must first consult with

USFWS and/or NMFS” to “insure that [the] action...is not likely

to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species

or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse

modification of habitat of such species which is determined...to

be critical....” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) [ESA § 7(a)(2)]. (This

form of consultation is called “formal consultation.” 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.02.) In addition, an independent consultation obligation

arises under § 1536(a)(3) where the federal agency “has reason to

believe that an endangered species or a threatened species may be

present in the area affected by this project and that

implementation of such action will likely affect such species.” 

(This form of consultation is called “early consultation.” 50

C.F.R. § 402.02.) 

5

A. Coordinated Operations and the ESA.

The state and federal agencies charged with management of

the CVP and SWP share certain facilities and coordinate

operations with one another pursuant to a Coordinated Operating

Agreement (“COA”). The COA, which originated in 1986, has

evolved over time to reflect, among other things, changing

facilities, delivery requirements, and regulatory restrictions. 

The most recent document concerning coordinated management is the

Operating Criteria and Plan (OCAP). The OCAP proposes a number

of changes to the coordinated operation of the CVP and SWP, some

of which are discussed in greater detail below.

Because various endangered and/or threatened species reside

in the area affected by the CVP and SWP, the OCAP must comply

with various provisions of the ESA. In this case, the Bureau of 2

Reclamation entered into formal and early consultation with both

the USFWS and NMFS concerning the OCAP’s impact on the various

species under each agency’s jurisdiction. 

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On August 4, 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided Gifford 3

Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378

F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that the USFWS’s

definition of “adverse modification” to critical habitat is an

impermissible interpretation of the ESA because it focuses on

whether critical habitat modifications would impact the survival

of a species, effectively ignoring the statutorily-mandated goal

of “recovery.” In November 4, 2004, presumably in response to

this ruling, the Bureau requested reinitiation of formal

consultation to address critical habitat issues.

Plaintiffs, a coalition of non-profit conservation

organizations, filed suit on February 15, 2005, alleging that the

2004 USFWS OCAP BiOp was legally inadequate in light of Gifford

Pinchot and should be invalidated. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs named

as defendants the Department of the Interior and the USFWS. 

(Id.)

6

B. The Development of the 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp.

Prior to 2004, the OCAP operated under Biological Opinions

issued in 1993 and 1995. (The age of these prior BiOps is

potentially important, as Plaintiffs seek to vacate the more

recent documents. Although there is little information about the

1993/1995 BiOps in this record, USFWS asserts that the

information contained within them is now seriously outdated.)

On June 30, 2004, USFWS issued a Biological Opinion (the

“2004 USFWS OCAP BiOp”), addressing the impact of the OCAP on the

Delta smelt. On February 16, 2005, USFWS issued an amended BiOp 3

(the “2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp”), which superceded the 2004 USFWS

OCAP BiOp. 

The 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp addresses the operation of the CVP

and SWP as well as several future actions. These future actions,

some of which are discussed in greater detail below, are: 

(1) increasing flows in the Trinity River; (2) “8500 Banks”; 

(3) operating permanent barriers in the South Delta; 

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(4) operating an intertie between the California Aqueduct and the

Delta-Mendota Canal; (5) a long-term Environmental Water Account

(“EWA”); (6) delivery of CVP water to the Freeport Regional Water

Project (“FRWP”); and (7) various other operational changes,

including changes to a monitoring program at the North Bay

Aqueduct. (2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp at 10, 76-77.)

The 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp concludes that the coordinated

operation of the SWP and CVP, including the proposed future

actions, will not jeopardize the Delta smelt’s continued

existence. (2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp at 223.) Although the 2005

USFWS OCAP BiOp recognizes that existing protective measures may

be inadequate, the USFWS concluded that certain proposed

protective measures, including the EWA and a proposed “adaptive

management” protocol would provide adequate protection. The

proposed adaptive management protocol is known as the Delta Smelt

Risk Assessment Matrix (“DSRAM”). The DSRAM utilizes a list of

trigger criteria monitored on a monthly basis from December to

July. (Id. at 98-103.) If any trigger criteria is met or

exceeded, a Delta Smelt Working Group (“DSWG”) is convened. The

DSWG consists of representatives from USFWS, the California

Department of Fish and Game, DWR, the United States Environmental

Protection Agency, the Bureau, and the California Bay-Delta

Authority. The DSWG then recommends corrective actions to a

Water Operations Management Team (“WOMT”). The 2005 USFWS OCAP

BiOp identifies four specific actions that the DSWG and WOMT must

consider: (1) export reductions at one or both of the projects;

(2) changes in the south Delta barrier operations; (3) changes in

San Joaquin River flows; and (4) changes in the operation of the

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The 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp also includes an incidental 4

take statement that insulates operations implemented according to

the OCAP from liability for taking Delta smelt. (2005 USFWS OCAP

BiOp at 223.)

50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b) calls for the reinitiation of 5

formal consultation “[i]f new information reveals effects of the

action that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a

manner or to an extent not previously considered.”

8

Delta cross channel.4

The federal government now acknowledges that shortly before

the 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOP was completed, a fall midwater trawl

survey of Delta smelt revealed a “substantial decline in the

population index for the species.” At the time the BiOp was

issued, the government asserts that “limited analysis of this

data existed, and the Service relied on the raw data, and its own

professional judgments, as the best scientific and commercial

data available.” However, since the issuance of the BiOp, the

CALFED agencies have analyzed the new trawl data. In part as a

result of their analyses, the Service and Bureau “have concluded

that substantial new information indicates that the agencies

should revisit the [2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp], including the jeopardy

and adverse modification analysis, and incidental take

statement.” (Doc. 240 at 4-5.) 

5

Scientists from CALFED Bay-Delta Program participant

agencies recently developed a document based upon the new data: 

the Interagency Ecological Program Synthesis of 2005 Work to

Evaluate the Pelagic Organism Decline (POD) in the Upper San

Francisco Estuary (the “IEP POD Synthesis”). This document led

the federal defendants to conclude that the OCAP for the CVP and

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SWP may affect Delta smelt in a manner or to an extent not

previously considered. (IEP POD Synthesis, Doc. 240, Attachment

1.) 

In addition, other new information recently became

available, including information concerning changes to the

operation of project elements and new studies on the impact of

climate change. The Federal Defendants submit that this new

information may affect the 2005 USFWS OCAP Biop in several ways: 

First, the environmental baseline and jeopardy analysis

will be revisited, because whether or not the OCAP

implementation will appreciably reduce the likelihood

of survival and recovery of the Delta smelt must be

evaluated against what may likely be a new baseline,

potentially with a lower species population than was

previously understood to exist. Second, the critical

habitat analysis will be revisited, because data on

salinity concentrations, declining population

recruitment activity from downstream areas, and

invasion of the exotic clam species, potamocorbula

amurensis, require further analysis of whether the

implementation of the OCAP adversely modifies critical

habitat, in terms of both survival and recovery of the

species. Third, and finally, the existing incidental

take statement may need to be revised to take into

account recent Delta smelt populations changes.

(Doc. 242 at 6.)

On July 6, 2006, the Bureau of Reclamation (the “Bureau”)

requested that the USFWS re-initiate consultation concerning the

impact of the OCAP on the Delta smelt. (Doc. 240.) In a July 6,

2006 letter from the Bureau to the USFWS, the Bureau acknowledged

that “emerging data indicates an apparent substantial decline in

the Delta smelt population index.” (Doc. 240-2.)

//

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C. The NMFS OCAP BiOp.

In the PCFFA case, a parallel consultation process resulted

in the issuance by NMFS of a Biological Opinion (“BiOp”) on

October 21, 2004, (the “2004 NMFS OCAP BiOp”), which addressed

the impact of the OCAP on the salmonid species. The 2004 NMFS

OCAP BiOp concludes that the salmonid species may be adversely

affected by the CVP and SWP. For example the systems’ dams and

other water management structures have altered some salmonid

species’ habitat and limited the habitat available for spawning

and rearing. In addition the salmonid species may be adversely

affected by project operations. The storage and release of water

will affect river flows and temperatures, and the diversion of

water may result in entrainment at fish screens and pumps. 

Subsequent to the issuance of the 2004 NMFS OCAP BiOp, NOAA

listed the green sturgeon population segment as threatened and

designated critical habitat for numerous salmonid and steelhead

species. The Bureau acknowledges that this is “new information”

requiring the reinitiation of ESA § 7 consultation on the 2004

NMFS OCAP BiOp. In addition, the federal defendants acknowledge

that independent peer-reviews and an audit “provided important

feedback” on the 2004 NMFS OCAP BiOp. (Doc. 81 at 7.) 

Accordingly, the Bureau and NMFS are revisiting the 2004 NMFS

OCAP BiOp, including “the potential effects of ongoing CVP and

SWP operations to the newly listed species and newly designated

critical habitat, the jeopardy and adverse modification, analysis

and the incidental take statement.” (Id.) 

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III. EVIDENTIARY DISPUTES

A. Plaintiffs’ Requests for Judicial Notice.

In opposition to the federal defendants motion to dismiss,

remand and or stay in the Delta smelt case, Plaintiffs request

that the district court take judicial notice of a number of

documents. One of the documents is an unpublished court decision

in Rock Creek Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. CV

01-152-M-DWM (D. Mont. Mar. 19, 2002) (Docket No. 24). This is a

judicially noticeable court record. No party objects to the

court taking judicial notice of another court document,

consisting of excerpts from the CALFED Programmatic Record of

Decision, issued August 8, 2000, and obtained from the CALFED

website. 

The remaining documents appear to post-date the issuance of

the challenged biological opinions. Federal defendants object to

the court taking judicial notice of these documents on the ground

that the scope of review in this case should be limited to the

administrative record. (NRDC Doc. 283; PCFFA Doc. 88.) Section

706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706,

provides for judicial review of federal administrative actions

based upon “the whole record or those parts of it cited by the

party.” In general, review should be of “the full administrative

record that was before the [agency decisionmaker] at the time he

made his decision.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). For example, post-decisional

documents are not ordinarily included in the administrative

record. See Rock Creek Alliance v. United States Fish and

Wildlife Serv., 390 F. Supp 2d 993, 998 (D. Mont. 2005)(refusing

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to consider post-decisional information not available to the

agency in that particular form at the time of the decision). The

Ninth Circuit recognizes several exceptions to this general rule,

however. District courts are permitted to admit extra-record

evidence:

(1) if admission is necessary to determine whether the

agency has considered all relevant factors and has

explained its decision, 

(2) if the agency has relied on documents not in the

record, 

(3) when supplementing the record is necessary to

explain technical terms or complex subject matter, or 

(4) when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.

Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004).

“These limited exceptions operated to identify and plug holes in

the administrative record...[and] are narrowly construed and

applied.” Id.

The scope of these exceptions permitted by our

precedent is constrained, so that the exception does

not undermine the general rule. Were the federal courts

routinely or liberally to admit new evidence when

reviewing agency decisions, it would be obvious that

federal courts would be proceeding, in effect, de novo,

rather than with the proper deference to agency

process, expertise, and decision-making.

Id.

Plaintiffs make no effort to provide legal authority to

support supplementation of the administrative record with these

post-decisional documents, nor do they suggest why the record of

this case should not be limited to the administrative record. 

Although post-decisional information might be relevant in the

context of a motion for interim injunctive relief, Plaintiffs do

not explain why these documents should be considered as part of

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their continued challenge to the merits of the challenged BiOps. 

The request for judicial notice is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

except with respect to the unpublished decision from Rock Creek

Alliance and the excerpts from the 2000 CALFED Programmatic

Record of Decision of which judicial notice has been taken. 

B. Defendant-Intervenors’ Requests for Judicial Notice.

In both cases, Defendant-Intervenors request that the

district court take judicial notice of:

The August 15, 2002 order of The Honorable Robert E.

Coyle, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of California in Association of California in

Water Agencies v. Evans, E.D. Cal. Case No.

CV-F-00-6148 REC/DLB. 

This is a judicially noticeable public record. Schweitzer v.

Scott, 469 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1979)(“Although

each case must be viewed on its merits, the Court is empowered to

and does take judicial notice of court files and records.”).

In addition, in the NRDC case, Defendant-Intervenors request

that the court take judicial notice of:

The October 27, 2006 Memorandum to the Administrative

Record from Deputy Assistant Secretary, Fish and

Wildlife and Parks explaining the contents of an email

sent by Deputy Assistant Secretary Julie MacDonald to

Steve Thompson, et al., on April 1, 2004, regarding the

Fish and Wildlife Service’s five-year status review for

the Delta smelt. This document was previously made part

of the administrative record in San Luis & DeltaMendota Water Authority v. United States Department of

the Interior (E.D.Cal., Oct. 27, 2006)

F-02-6461-OWW-DLB.

This document is capable of being judicially notice, because a

court can take judicial notice of its own files and records in

other cases. Wible v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 2d 956,

965-66 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Del Puerto Water Dist. v. United States

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Bureau of Reclamation, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1233 (E.D. Cal.

2003) (holding that a federal court “may take

notice of proceedings in other courts...if those proceedings have

a direct relation to the matters at issue.”).

Defendant-Intervenors’ request for judicial notice is

GRANTED. 

C. Objections to Declaration of Christina Swanson,

Submitted by Plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs present the declaration of a Dr. Christina

Swanson, PhD, an experienced fisheries biologist. (NRDC Doc.

280.) In her declaration Dr. Swanson summarizes recent

referenced literature and an oral presentation from a recent

conference. Defendant-Intervenors object to substantial portions

of Dr. Swanson’s declaration the grounds of hearsay. They also

argue that certain portions constitute inadmissible opinion

testimony. (NRDC Doc. 294) As a threshold matter, however, the

district court need not address these evidentiary objections

because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated why Dr. Swanson’s

declaration should be considered by the district court at this

time. Her opinions are based at least in part on post-decision

evidence and are essentially irrelevant to the pending motions. 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Overview.

In both NRDC and PCFFA, the federal defendants move (1) to

dismiss on prudential mootness grounds; (2) to remand the case to

the agency; or (3) for a stay pending the completion of renewed

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consultation based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 

Defendant Intervenors oppose dismissal or remand, but support the

issuance of a stay. Plaintiffs oppose dismissing, remanding, or

staying the case. Instead, emphasizing the fact that Defendants

continue to rely on the challenged BiOps, Plaintiffs advocate

proceeding with a decision on the merits (i.e., they seek a

determination as to whether the BiOps violate the ESA). If they

prevail, Plaintiffs intend to seek interim remedial relief. 

The federal defendants have also moved to consolidate NRDC

and PCFFA for all purposes. The Defendant-Intervenors have all

joined the motion to consolidate. Plaintiffs oppose

consolidation. 

B. Motion to Dismiss on Prudential Mootness Grounds.

The federal defendants argue that both cases should be

dismissed based on the doctrine of prudential mootness. The

doctrine of prudential mootness permits a court, in its

discretion, to dismiss a case when

a controversy, though not moot in the strict Article

III sense, is so attenuated that considerations of

prudence and comity for coordinate branches of

government counsel the court to stay its hand, and to

withhold relief it has the power to grant... Under both

Article III and prudential mootness doctrines, the

central inquiry is essentially the same: have

circumstances changed since the beginning of the

litigation that forestall any occasion for meaningful

relief. 

Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1244 (E.D. Cal.

1999). “[T]he doctrine of prudential mootness...has particular

applicability in cases...where the relief sought is an injunction

against the government.” Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.

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Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1997). A court should

decline to grant declaratory or injunctive relief where the

government “has already changed or is in the process of changing

is policies or where it appears that any repeat of the actions in

question is otherwise highly unlikely.” Building and Const.

Dept. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir.

1993). 

Here, Federal Defendants assert that the reinitiation of

formal consultation is a change in circumstance that forestalls

any possibility of meaningful relief in this court. Federal

Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs’ claims will be considered

through the reinitiated consultation process. (NRDC Doc. 242-1

at 8.) Federal Defendants cite an unpublished district court

case that considered the applicability of prudential mootness

after a federal agency defendant reinitiated ESA § 7

consultation. See, e.g. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Keys, 2004

WL 1048168 (D. Or. May 7, 2004) (applying doctrine of prudential

mootness where agency was in the process of reinitiating

consultation and “plaintiffs’ concerns [would] be fully addressed

in the new consultation”). 

But, Plaintiffs correctly point out that courts have refused

to dismiss on prudential mootness grounds where the action agency

did not indicate an intent to change its operations. See Am.

Rivers, Inc. v. NOAA Fisheries, No. CV-04-0061, 2004 WL 2075032

at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2004). In that case, the district court

refused to dismiss on prudential mootness grounds despite

reinitiation of consultation because the agencies involved did

not intend to change their opinion or alter their operations

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This temperature compliance point is the geographical 6

point at which the temperature must be maintained at or below a

certain level, to protect the salmonids’ ability to successfully

spawn and ensure that their offspring can survive downstream

migration. The Federal Defendants advocate allowing this

compliance point to move geographically upstream during noncritical times of the year, because this will conserve cold water

resources for more critical times of the year. 

17

significantly. 

Here, the Defendants have volunteered to change their

operations to a certain extent. For example, DWR has promised

that it will NOT increase pumping above pre-2004 levels. The

Federal Defendants have made a less firm commitment to maintain

pumping from the Tracy Pumping Plant at “recent historic” levels. 

In addition, Federal Defendants have promised that, during the

interim period, they will 

• not execute long-term water service contracts for CVP

water deliveries; and 

• not further implement new construction activities or

long term projects in the Sacramento Delta without

necessary ESA consultation;

Apart from these promises, however, the Federal Defendants

continue to maintain that the challenged BiOps are valid and

lawful, continue to implement at least some portions of the

measures set forth therein, and continue to operate under the

protection of the incidental take statements included in the

BiOps. 

Plaintiffs point to some specific examples of actions the

Federal Defendants plan to take in reliance on the challenged

BiOps. In the salmonid case, the Federal Defendants want to

alter the the pre-2004 temperature compliance point at Bend

Bridge and refuse to promise compliance with the pre-2004 6

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 The 1.9 MAF coldwater carryover refers to an amount of 7

cold water that is to be held behind Shasta Dam for the purpose

of maintaining the appropriate coldwater compliance point. 

The Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors suggest in the 8

alternative that the court should forgo a decision on the merits,

opting instead to stay the case while allowing Plaintiffs the

opportunity to move at any time for interim injunctive relief. 

This option is discussed in greater detail below. 

The parties also engage in a detailed debate over 9

issues that essentially go to the merits of the complaint or are

relevant to the issuance of an interim remedy. For example,

Plaintiffs maintain that the record indicates that USFWS and NMFS

relied upon flawed science and analyses in reaching the “nojeopardy” conclusions contained in the BiOps. Plaintiffs also

point to evidence that calls into question the Federal Defendants

prediction that interim operation of the CVP and SWP under the

OCAP will not have any “long-term” impacts on the species. 

Essentially, Plaintiffs argue that the Federal Defendants have no

way of knowing whether any long term impacts will result because

their analyses have been based on flawed information. Defendants

strenuously dispute these assertions, maintaining that the BiOps

were lawfully promulgated given the state of the record at the

18

requirement that 1.9 million acre feet (“MAF”) be held behind

Shasta Dam as a cold water carryover. Plaintiffs maintain that 7

the corrective measures (such as the EWA) set forth in the BiOps

are insufficient to protect the species against such changes. 

Plaintiffs’ concerns have not been fully addressed by the

reinitation of consultation. Federal Defendants are relying in

part on the challenged BiOps in operating the CVP and intend to

continue to do so. The controversy over whether the BiOps and

OCAP should have continued viability is real and substantial. 

and this court could provide relief, in the form of a decision

invalidating the BiOps followed by hearings on interim remedies.8

Under these circumstances, it is not appropriate to deem this

case prudentially moot. 

9

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time. For the purposes of deciding the instant procedural

motions, these fact-specific disputes are largely irrelevant. So

long as there is a live controversy and Plaintiffs can obtain

meaningful relief from the district court, dismissal on mootness

grounds is inappropriate. 

19

Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss on prudential mootness

grounds is DENIED.

C. Motion for Voluntary Remand Without Vacatur.

Alternatively, Federal Defendants move in both cases for

voluntary remand without vacatur. (Doc. 242) 

Voluntary remand is consistent with the principle that

“administrative agencies have an inherent authority to

reconsider their own decisions, since the power to

decide in the first instance carries with it the power

to reconsider.” Trujillo v. General Electric Co., 621

F.2d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir. 1980). Voluntary remand also

promotes judicial economy by allowing the relevant

agency to reconsider and rectify an erroneous decision

without further expenditure of judicial resources. See,

e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 989 F.2d 522, 524 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (granting EPA's opposed motion for voluntary

remand) ("We commonly grant such motions [for voluntary

remand], preferring to allow agencies to cure their own

mistakes rather than wasting the courts' and the

parties' resources reviewing a record that both sides

acknowledge to be incorrect or incomplete."); id. at

524 n.3 (collecting cases); cf. Marathon Oil v. EPA,

564 F.2d 1253, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing

motion for voluntary remand).

NRDC v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 275 F. Supp. 2d

1136, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2002)(citations edited). The district

court in NRDC v. United States Department of the Interior also

held that a voluntary remand need not lead to the vacatur of

the agency action being remanded:

The test for whether to remand an arbitrary and

capricious rule without vacating depends in part on

“the seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and thus

the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly)

and the disruptive consequences of an interim change

that may itself be changed.” 

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ESA § 7(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d), provides: 10

Limitation on commitment of resources

After initiation of consultation required under

subsection (a) (2) of this section, the Federal agency

and the permit or license applicant shall not make any

irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources

with respect to the agency action which has the effect

of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any

reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would

not violate subsection (a) (2) of this section.

20

Id. at 1143 (emphasis added). 

Applying this general framework is difficult here, because

the alleged deficiencies in the challenged BiOps have not yet

been fully litigated. In fact, Federal Defendants continue to

maintain that the BiOps were, in whole or part, validly

promulgated. Federal Defendants do suggest that a change to the

status quo “would have huge ramifications for regional water

users and agriculture (a point on which Federal Defendants defer

to Intervenors).” (Doc. 242 at 12.) But, the water user

Defendant-Intervenors do not support a voluntary remand without

vacatur, nor have they yet presented any evidence or argument

regarding the nature of the prejudice they might suffer if the

BiOps were invalidated. 

Federal Defendants suggest that the district court’s vacatur

analysis should also consider whether continued operation of the

CVP and SWP under the challenged biological opinions would

constitute an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of

resources, invoking the language of ESA § 7(d). Federal 10

Defendants point to the 2001 unpublished opinion in Southwest

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Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service,

2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25027 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2001), which

applied the “irreversible or irretrievable commitment of

resources” test under somewhat similar circumstances. In

Southwest Center, the agency sought a voluntary remand of a

biological opinion to evaluate impacts of new grazing allotments

on endangered species. The plaintiffs sought an injunction

against implementation of the existing biological opinion. The

Southwest Center court denied the injunction, applying a hybrid

injunctive relief standard that incorporated the standard set

forth in ESA §7(d). The Southwest Center court reasoned: 

Although the Supreme Court has made clear that in

balancing the hardships of the parties, threatened and

endangered species are to be given the highest

priority, under the circumstances of this case, where

the Forest Service and the FWS are committed to

complying with the ESA, the economic hardship to

ranchers in issuing an injunction should be considered.

Because there has been an insufficient showing that

continued grazing on these allotments would result in

irreparable harm to the loach minnow and spikedace

while Defendants are consulting, Plaintiff's request

for injunctive relief is denied...

***

The record demonstrates that despite allowing cattle

grazing to continue, conditions on these allotments are

improving. The Forest Service has excluded livestock

from directly accessing key watersheds in the national

forests, in particular, watersheds containing loach

minnow and/ or spikedace habitat. This exclusion has

contributed to improved watershed conditions and has

minimized the adverse effects of livestock grazing to

the loach minnow and the spikedace. Therefore, there is

no evidence that maintenance of the current status quo,

which allows grazing, would result in an irreversible

and irretrievable commitment of resources foreclosing

the implementation of future alternatives, especially

when as here the Forest Service can prevent any

irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources

by moving the livestock to other pastures or removing

the livestock from national forest lands.

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Southwest Center, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25027, 121-123 (emphasis

added). See also Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d

1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005), (under ESA § 7(d) “non-jeopardizing

agency actions [may] continue during the consultation process.”). 

Federal Defendants maintain that, like in Southwest Center,

maintenance of the status quo will not present an irreversible or

irretrievable commitment of resources. In support of this

assertion, Federal Defendants argue that there are various

provisions in the existing OCAP BiOps designed to protect the

Delta smelt and the salmonid populations. 

With respect to the Delta smelt, the Federal Defendants note

that the 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp could require cessation of CVP

operations in some circumstances. In addition, the Federal

Defendants emphasize that numerous other rules, regulations,

subgroups, and teams exist to protect the Delta smelt, including

those teams and processes which make up the Delta Smelt Risk

Assessment Matrix (DSRAM), which is designed to recognize when

take limits are being exceeded and then take action to address

such problems. The problem with relying upon these protective

measures to justify voluntary remand without vacatur is that

Plaintiffs allege that the adaptive management structures relied

upon in the 2005 USFWS OCAP BiOp’s no jeopardy finding are

inadequate and unlawful. The government preemptively responded

to this objection by offering to somewhat strengthen DSRAM.

Despite Plaintiffs’ claims that the DSRAM process is

entirely voluntary, Pl. Memo at 13, there is a

significant record of actions taken to benefit the

smelt in response to recommendations made by the Delta

Smelt Working Group to the WOMT...However, in light of

recent data on the Delta smelt, and to ensure the

adequacy of actions taken to protect the Delta smelt by

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Similarly, the Federal Defendants point to the EWA and 11

to CVPIA(b)(2) water deliveries as protective measures that will

ensure no harm comes to the smelt in the interim period. Again,

Plaintiffs assert in this lawsuit that these mechanisms are

inadequate. 

23

the WOMT during the pendency of the reinitiation of the

§7 consultation process, the Service will require the

Delta Smelt Working Group to adequately document the

technical reasons for its recommendations to the WOMT.

If the WOMT does not accept the recommendations by the

Delta Smelt Working Group, then the WOMT will need to

document the technical justification for why the

actions they are proposing for implementation will be

sufficiently protective of the smelt. This finding will

need to be transmitted to the Sacramento Fish and

Wildlife Office of the Service, who will determine if

the WOMT is correct in its determination, thereby

finding that the operations of the facilities remain

within the project description, or in the alternative,

find that the action is inadequate to conserve the

smelt. 

(NRDC Doc. 242 at 19-20.) But this does not definitively answer

the question of whether USFWS lawfully concluded that the DSRAM

process is adequate to protect the Delta smelt from harm caused

by implementation of other aspects of the OCAP.11

With respect to the salmonid species, the Federal Defendants

similarly maintain that the 2004 NMFS OCAP BiOp contains

sufficient measures designed to protect salmonid species:

According to the National Marine Fisheries

Service, the measures being undertaken by Reclamation

to manage salmonid species concerns have, in the recent

past, led to increases in salmonid populations, and

decreases in salmonid species entrainment at the CVP

and SWP project pumps. Declaration of Michael E.

Aceituno, Attachment 3, ¶5 (also discussing charts

accompanying the declaration.) Reclamation’s ongoing

measures, including properly timed cold water releases

and dam operations along the Sacramento River, are

expected to continue to provide a measure of protection

for the salmonid species. Id. at ¶13 (discussing

temperature control device at Shasta Dam, gate

operations at the Red Bluff Diversion Dam, and

continued real time management by the Interagency

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Sacramento River Temperature Control Task Force.) In

addition, no expected long-term effects on listed

salmonids are expected within the interim period of

consultation because of above normal hydrology (i.e.,

full reservoirs and banked water available for fish

protection) and because short-term effects (less than

18 months) are unlikely to have any effect on migratory

salmon species that take 36 months to return as adults.

Id. Accordingly, ongoing operation of the CVP and SWP

in this case will not result in any irreversible or

irretrievable commitment of resources which have the

effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation

of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures.

(PCFFA, Doc. 81 at 16-17.)

Plaintiffs respond to each assertion by Federal Defendants

that the challenged BiOps will benefit or at least not harm the

salmonids. For example, with respect to the alteration of the

temperature compliance point, Plaintiffs rejoin that “[t]he

Federal Defendants fail to explain how the diminution of cold

water spawning habitat in the Sacramento River as well as the

Feather and American Rivers as a result of interim operations is

consistent with ESA requirements.”

As discussed above, the 2004 Salmonid BO found that

operations under the 2004 OCAP would have numerous,

serious adverse impacts to salmonid spawning habitat

due to moving the Sacramento River temperature

compliance point 19 miles upstream, elimination of the

Shasta Reservoir cold water carryover storage

requirement, and reduced stream flows. According to

NMFS’s own analysis, which independent science

reviewers suggested underestimated adverse impacts, the

temperature and carryover “targets” identified in the

2004 BO are inadequate to maintain suitable spawning

habitat. The 2004 Salmonid BO found, for example, that

the change in the Sacramento River compliance point

would eliminate over 40 percent of winter-run Chinook

critical habitat, decrease spawning success, and

effectively limit the population size due to restricted

availability of suitable spawning habitat. NMFS AR

5844, 5920, 5939. Such adverse effects could easily

reverse the rebound the winter-run population

experienced after these temperature controls were put

in place....

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(PCFFA, Doc. 85 at 12.) 

At the very least, there are factual disputes as to the

effectiveness of the various protective measures relied upon by

the challenged BiOps. This makes it impossible to undertake a

proper § 7(d) analysis on the pleadings at this stage of the

case. More critically, it is not entirely clear that the § 7(d)

analysis is relevant to deciding whether a remand without vacatur

is appropriate. Although § 7(d) was taken into consideration in

Southwest Center, the instant case is in a very different

procedural posture than was Southwest Center. In Southwest

Center, the court had already ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on

the merits of their ESA claim. The district court subsequently

denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction that

would have vacated the BiOp, applying a test that incorporated a

detailed examination of the § 7(d) standard. Here, in contrast,

the Federal Defendants request that the case be remanded without

vacatur prior to any decision on the merits. 

Plaintiffs argue that the Federal Defendants should not be

permitted to “have it both ways,” by being permitted to operate

under the challenged BiOps while maintaining that all litigation

regarding those BiOps should cease. In support of this argument,

Plaintiffs cite Rock Creek Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife

Serv., No. CV 01-152-M-DWM, Order (D. Mont. Mar. 19, 2002), in

which the district court refused to authorize a voluntary remand

where the agency refused to withdraw its BiOp. Federal

Defendants attempt to distinguish Rock Creek, arguing: 

In Rock Creek, a voluntary remand without vacatur was

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Plaintiffs also cite Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine 12

Fisheries Serv., 80 F. Supp.2d at 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2000), in

which the district court rejected the agency’s attempts to rely

on a BiOp to defend against a motion for summary judgment while

at the same time arguing the BiOp has been withdrawn and

plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed on Article III mootness

grounds. The Greenpeace court reasoned that the agency “cannot

have it both ways.” Federal Defendants correctly point out that

this case is less relevant because it involved Article III

mootness. 

26

rejected because the agency sought to continue the

construction and operation of a copper and silver mine

in Montana. In contrast, here, Federal Defendants have

explained that any future construction actions require

further ESA §7 review. Declaration of Kirk Rodgers

(Oct. 18, 2006) at paragraph 4 and footnote 1. Instead,

this Court is asked only not to vacate the current,

ongoing operation of the nation’s largest federal water

project, to which additional limitations were adopted

for the specific purposes of protecting Delta smelt and

salmonid species. 

(PCFFA, Doc. 92 at 22.)

Federal Defendants’ argument begs the question, however, of

what potentially detrimental aspects of the OCAP they intend to

implement during the interim period. The mere presence in the

challenged BiOps of programs that might potentially benefit the

fish does not distinguish this case from Rock Creek if Defendants

intend to implement significant detrimental water management

actions (above and beyond those in place prior to the issuance of

the challenged BiOps). 

12

Again, the Ninth Circuit’s general standard for vacatur is

as follows:

The test for whether to remand an arbitrary and

capricious rule without vacating depends in part on

“the seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and thus

the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly)

and the disruptive consequences of an interim change

that may itself be changed.” 

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NRDC, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. Similarly, in Modesto Irrigation

District v. Evans et. al., Case No. 1:02-cv-06553-OWW-DLB (May

12, 2004), Doc. 79 at 48, this district court considered whether

to vacate the listing of a salmonid species and articulated seven

factors to be evaluated in determining whether or not to set

aside a rule when it was subjected to an APA based challenge and

remand:

(1) the purposes of the substantive statute under

which the agency was acting;

(2) the magnitude of the administrative error and how

extensive, substantive and serious it was;

(3) the possibility the agency will be able to

substantiate its decision given an opportunity to

do so;

(4) the likelihood that the errors can be mended and

that such changes can be made without altering the

order;

(5) equity and public interest considerations;

(6) the potential prejudice to those who will be

affected by maintaining the status quo; and

(7) the disruptive consequences of an interim change,

which could include invalidating or enjoining the

agency action.

Here, there are significant factual disputes concerning most

if not all of the factors noted above. Federal Defendants

continue to maintain that no administrative errors occurred in

the promulgation of the challenged BiOps. Moreover, Defendants

continue to rely, at least to some extent, on the challenged

BiOps, effectively adopting portions of the OCAP as of 2004 as

the status quo. Plaintiffs’ lawsuits assert that the OCAP was

never properly evaluated for its impacts on the Delta smelt and

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salmonids and impliedly assert that a different status quo should

serve as the baseline. Perhaps most critically, Federal

Defendants deferred to the water users, who arguably would be the

parties most disrupted by returning to the pre-2004 status quo,

to make such a showing. However, the water users do not support

a voluntary remand without vacatur, nor have they presented any

evidence or argument regarding the nature of the prejudice they

might suffer. 

Under all these circumstances it is not possible to conclude

that remand without vacatur is appropriate here. This motion is

DENIED. 

D. Motion for Stay Pending Completion of Re-Consultation

(Based on Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction).

Federal Defendants, along with all Defendant-Intervenors

invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to support the

imposition of stays in both cases pending the completion of reconsultation. Federal Defendants and Defendant Intervenors

suggest, however, that the stay should include an exception that

would permit Plaintiffs to bring a motion for injunctive relief

under ESA § 7(d). Plaintiffs oppose this approach, and instead

request that the cases be heard on their merits. 

Whether to grant a stay lies within the sound discretion of

the district court:

[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the

power inherent in every court to control the

disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of

time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for

litigants. How this can best be done calls for the

exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing

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interests and maintain an even balance...

Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). 

In cases which “contain some issue within the special

competence of an administrative agency,” a court may issue a stay

to permit the administrative agency an opportunity to apply its

special expertise. Davel Communs., Inc. v. Qwest Corp., 460 F.3d

1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has considered a

number of factors when deciding whether a stay based on primary

jurisdiction is appropriate The doctrine has been applied where

there is “(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been

placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative

body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that

subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory

scheme that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in

administration.” Id. at 1087. 

In determining whether to grant a stay based on primary

jurisdiction, the Court must “weigh the benefits of obtaining the

agency’s aid against the need to resolve the litigation

expeditiously.” Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d

199, 201 (5th Cir. 1988). In addition, a court should take into

consideration “the possible damage which may result from the

granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may

suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of

justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of

issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to

result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th

Cir. 1962). “[A party seeking] a stay must make out a clear case

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of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there

is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will

work damage to someone else.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d

1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005)(emphasis added). In Lockyer, the

plaintiff demonstrated the possibility of harm to its interests

from a stay and the defendant failed to make out a clear case of

hardship or inequity. Id. at 1112-13. The Ninth Circuit held

that “being required to defend a suit, without more, does not

constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or inequity’...” Id. 

The Federal Defendants contend that this case is one in

which there is a need for judicial consideration of the expert

and specialized knowledge of the agencies. Forest Guardians v.

United States Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1099 (9th Cir.

2003)(“When the agency is making predictions, within its special

expertise, at the frontiers of science, we must be at our most

deferential.”). Applying the four-part analytical approach from

Davel, 460 F.3d at 1086-1087, the federal government argues that

a stay is appropriate here because there is a need to resolve an

issue – whether the operation of the CVP and SWP jeopardizes the

continued existence of Delta smelt - that is of a type that was

placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative

agency. 

Plaintiffs respond that a stay here would harm their

interests because it would permit the defendants to implement the

challenged BiOps without observing the requirements of the ESA,

until at least April 2008. In theory, this would permit the

defendants to operate the CVP and SWP pursuant to the 2004 OCAP

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(which calls for increased pumping and other types of potentially

detrimental changes). Plaintiffs maintain that the challenged

BiOps provide inadequate protection for the Delta smelt and

salmonids. Plaintiffs submit that allowing the continued

implementation of aspects of the OCAP under the admittedly flawed

BiOps would likely result in harm to the species. 

Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors rejoin that,

under the framework they propose, Plaintiffs’ would have ample

opportunity to protect their interests by moving for injunctive

relief under the standard set forth in ESA § 7(d). But,

Plaintiffs would be at a disadvantage if they were required to

proceed directly to a § 7(d) proceeding. Without a ruling that

the challenged BiOps were unlawful, Defendants start from a

position of legal validity, with two “lawful” BiOps. In

contrast, if the BiOps are first declared unlawful, there is some

authority suggesting that the government would then assume the

burden to prove that its actions were non-jeopardizing. For

example, in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024,

1035 (9th Cir. 2005), a case relied upon by Federal Defendants,

the EPA attempted to register a number of pesticides that

plaintiffs feared might harm endangered fish species. In

approving the pesticides, EPA complied with the registration

requirements of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and

Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq., but did not

consult with NMFS pursuant to the ESA. The district court ruled

that EPA must comply with the ESA as well as with FIFRA and

ordered EPA to initiate and complete § 7 consultation according

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to a prescribed schedule. Having already ruled in favor of

plaintiffs on the merits, the district court entertained a motion

for interim injunctive relief under § 7(d). The Ninth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s decision to place the burden under

§ 7(d) of “showing that its actions were non jeopardizing to

endangered or threatened species” on the action agency. 

....We have not [previously] expressly stated who bears

the burden of showing that the action is

non-jeopardizing, but the burden should be on the

agency, the entity that has violated its statutory

duty.

Placing the burden on the acting agency to prove the

action is non-jeopardizing is consistent with the

purpose of the ESA and what we have termed its

“institutionalized caution mandate[ ].” Sierra Club v.

Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1389. We said as much in Thomas v.

Peterson, where the defendant, the U.S. Forest Service,

urged the district court to conclude that absent proof

by the plaintiffs to the contrary, a proposed project

was not likely to affect an endangered or threatened

species. 753 F.2d at 765. We held that this was an

inappropriate finding for the district court to make.

Id. “It is not the responsibility of the plaintiffs to

prove, nor the function of the courts to judge, the

effect of a proposed action on an endangered species

when proper procedures have not been followed.” Id. The

district court correctly assigned EPA the burden of

proving that its actions were non-jeopardizing.

The district court was not required to balance

interests in protecting endangered species against the

costs of the injunction when crafting its scope.

Congress has decided that under the ESA, the balance of

hardships always tips sharply in favor of the

endangered or threatened species. See Marbled Murrelet

v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.1996).

Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). But, this ruling is premised on

the fact that the agency was found to have been in violation of a

statutory duty. Without such a finding, there would be little

support for the application of this burden-shifting approach. 

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Even under Federal Defendants’ and defendant-intervenors’

proposal that Plaintiffs would remain free to seek provisional

relief pending re-consultation, such relief will require the

parties to litigate on the merits the validity of the BiOps.

Plaintiffs are entitled to have their complaint decided on

the merits, particularly given the fact that Defendants continue

to rely on the challenged BiOps as if they were lawfully enacted. 

The motion for a stay is DENIED. 

E. Motion to Consolidate.

The Federal Defendants move to consolidate NRDC with PCFFA

for all purposes. Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure provides: 

When actions involving a common question of law or fact

are pending before the court, it may order a joint

hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issues in

the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;

and it may make such orders concerning proceedings

therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or

delay.

A district court has broad discretion to decide whether

consolidation is appropriate. In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182

F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.N.J. 1998). A court “must balance the

interest of judicial convenience against the potential for delay,

confusion and prejudice that may result from such consolidation.”

Bank of Montreal v. Eagle Assoc., 117 F.R.D. 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y.

1987) Factors such as differing trial dates or stages of

discovery usually weigh against consolidation. 9 Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2383 (2006). 

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The Federal Defendants first point out that the PCFFA case

was transferred to this Court because it was found to be related

to the NRDC case:

These two cases have (1) overlapping facts and legal

issues and (2) arise out of the same agency action. In

light of the danger of inconsistent relief, these two

cases should be decided by the same court.

(PCFFA, Doc. 13.) But, as Plaintiffs point out, that these

factors favored a transfer does not necessarily indicate that

consolidation of two cases already before the same district judge

is necessary or appropriate.

Federal Defendants maintain that consolidation is

appropriate here because, although there may have been factual

distinctions when these cases were first filed, any factual

distinctions between the two cases vanished when the agencies

reinitiated consultation. This argument, which is related to

Federal Defendants’ contention that the cases are prudentially

moot on the merits, has been rejected. The factually distinct

merits claims are still live. 

Federal Defendants also point out that both NRDC and PCFFA

involve disputes over federal and state government management of

the same regional water resources and the Bureau’s regional water

management obligations under the CVPIA. From a practical

perspective, the Bureau is required to manage the water resources

for both species. Accordingly, Federal Defendants maintain,

consolidation would facilitate the interim management of the CVP

and SWP in a manner that would benefit both species. According

to the Federal Defendants, allowing the cases to proceed

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independently risks inconsistent judgments. While true in

theory, if Plaintiffs prevail on the merits and the Delta smelt

case proceeds to a remedies phase, Reclamation will be afforded

an opportunity to explain not only how various remedies would

impact the Delta smelt, but how any altered management action

would impact the salmonids and/or any other legally protected

interests. 

Finally, Federal Defendants note that all of the NRDC

plaintiffs are also plaintiffs in PCFFA and the same counsel are

assigned to both cases for these organizations. Federal

Defendants maintain that consolidated briefing could help avoid

duplicative proceedings and redundancies. But any efficiencies

gained by consolidation would be countered (or more likely

outweighed) by the additional confusion for the district court of

dealing with two independent sets of scientific facts, not to

mention separate administrative records. For example, with

regard to Delta smelt, the district court may have to examine

whether the adaptive management system upon which FWS based its

original no jeopardy conclusion is adequate to protect Delta

smelt during interim operations. In contrast, in the salmonids

case, the court may need to examine whether the weakening of

temperature controls on the upper Sacramento River will destroy

critical habitat and cause serious harm to the salmon and

steelhead species during the interim period. 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that consolidation of the two

cases would substantially delay resolution of the Delta smelt

case, prejudicing Plaintiffs’ interests. The NRDC and PCFFA are

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at significantly different stages of development. NRDC will be

ready for a merits-type hearing almost immediately, while PCFFA

is at a much earlier stage. Plaintiffs emphasize that time is of

the essence in the Delta smelt case because of the species’

precarious state. 

Under the totality of the circumstances, consolidation is

not appropriate at this time. The sole factor weighing in favor

of consolidation is the possibility that a remedy in the Delta

smelt case might adversely impact the salmonid species. However,

should Plaintiffs prevail in the Delta smelt case, the district

court can consider evidence of any such potential adverse impacts

at that time. Moreover, any potential benefits of consolidation

are far outweighed by the benefits of allowing these cases to

proceed separately, namely (1) avoiding the confusion that would

be caused by litigating cases with independent factual

backgrounds and administrative records; and (2) avoiding further

delay to the Delta smelt case.

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F. Miscellaneous Issues.

Federal Defendants also assert, in the context of their

motion to dismiss/stay in the salmonid case, that “whatever legal

mechanism this Court uses to allow Federal Defendants to complete

a new biological opinion, Plaintiffs’ future attorney’s fees

claims should be denied. Here, Federal Defendants are asking for

an advisory opinion on an issue that has not yet been presented

to the court for review. The court declines to rule on the issue

of attorney’s fees at this time. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

(1) Federal Defendants’ motion for Dismissal on prudential

mootness grounds is DENIED;

(2) Federal Defendants’ motion for Voluntary remand without

vacatur is DENIED;

(3) All Defendants’ and Defendant-Intervenors’ motion for a

stay is DENIED.

All Defendants shall have 20 days from the entry of this

order to answer the complaints in both the NRDC and PCFFA cases.

 Dated: December 29, 2006 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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