Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01308/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01308-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN COMBS,

CDCR #AK-1030,

Civil No. 12cv1308 CAB (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DISMISSING FEDERAL LAW

CLAIMS AS FRIVOLOUS AND FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); AND

(2) REMANDING STATE LAW

CLAIMS TO SAN DIEGO SUPERIOR

COURT

vs.

PUBLIC DEFENDERS OF SAN DIEGO;

STAN JONES,

Defendants.

On April 16, 2012, Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at Chuckawalla Valley State

Prison located in Blythe, California and proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in San Diego Superior

Court. Defendants filed a “Notice of Removal” on May 31, 2012. (ECF No. 1.)

I.

DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL (ECF No. 1)

A. Legal Standard

The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New

York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it

confirms its own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83,

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94 (1998). “Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function

remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Id. (quoting Ex

parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 614 (1868)). District courts must construe the removal

statutes strictly against removal and resolve any uncertainty as to removability in favor of remanding

the case to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Boggs v.

Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988).

Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A state court action can only

be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th. Cir. 1996). Thus, for an

action to be removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either

that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on

the resolution of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction

Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983). Whether federal jurisdiction

exists is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. Under this rule,

the federal question must be “presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id.;

accord Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants seek removal of this action on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint arises under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Plaintiff has not filed a reply to Defendants’ notice of removal, a district

court may remand an action sua sponte if it concludes that it lacks jurisdiction. See Franklin v.

Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); FED.R.CIV.P. 12(h)(3) (district court may sua sponte dismiss

an action, regardless of whether the plaintiffs are proceeding in forma pauperis, if the court

concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint rests on allegations that Defendants violated his constitutional

rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because Plaintiff’s federal claims

appears on the face and throughout his Complaint, the Court finds that his cause of action arises

under federal law, and thus, is removable. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(b).

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II.

Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)

Now that the Court has found the removal of this action to be proper, the Court will conduct

a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s Complaint because he is “incarcerated or detained in any facility

[and] is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a), (c). Section 1915A, enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),

requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous,

malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Resnick

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). A similar screening provision of the PLRA would

apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint even if he elected to initiate this action in federal court and

successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

“Under § 1915A, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept

as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447 (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Nevertheless, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, the court may

not, “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other

grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350,

1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

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Plaintiff names as a Defendant, Stan Jones, the attorney appointed to represent him during his

criminal proceedings. However, a person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983]

only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-

18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Attorneys appointed to

represent a criminal defendant during trial, do not generally act under color of state law because

representing a client “is essentially a private function ... for which state office and authority are not

needed.” Polk County, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th

Cir. 1992). Thus, when publicly appointed counsel are performing as advocates, i.e., meeting with

clients, investigating possible defenses, presenting evidence at trial and arguing to the jury, they do

not act under color of state law for section 1983 purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,

53 (1992); Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320-25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc) (finding that public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983

because, so long as he performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “his function,” no matter

how ineffective, is “to represent his client, not the interests of the state or county.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Jones must be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the alleged

ineffectiveness assistance of his trial counsel, his claim amounts to an attack on the validity of his

underlying criminal proceedings, and as such, is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless and

until he can show that conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

486-87 (1994); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Absent such a showing,

‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under §

1983....’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2388 (2004). Heck holds that

“in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section

1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

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determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence that has not

been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,

643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district

court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it

would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s

action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any

outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should

be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds in

invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, Plaintiff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Jones “necessarily imply the

invalidity” of his criminal proceedings and continuing incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Were

Plaintiff to succeed in showing that Jones rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, an award of

damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction. Id.; see also Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on ineffective assistance claim petitioner must

show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness and that but for

counsel’s errors the result of the trial would have been different); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956,

958-59 (9th Cir. 1992) (remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel is a conditional writ granting

petitioner’s release unless state retries him or allows him to pursue an appeal with the assistance of

counsel within a reasonable time). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional criminal proceedings in a criminal case, and because he has not alleged that his

conviction has already been invalidated, a section 1983 claim for damages has not yet accrued. See

Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. 

Plaintiff also names the San Diego Public Defender’s Office as a Defendant in this matter. 

An agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper defendant under § 1983. Vance v.

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County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Rather, the county or city itself is

the proper defendant. See Id. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

tortfeasor – or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). A

municipality may be liable under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the

constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct.

1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional

right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's

constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” 

Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see Board of the County

Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state a § 1983 claim against the County of San Diego, Plaintiff must

allege facts showing that his injury was caused by individual officers whose conduct conformed to

an official city policy, custom or practice. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a § 1983 claim against the County of

San Diego because he has failed to allege that any individual police officer’s conduct conformed to

an official city policy, custom or practice.

Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) because it is duplicative of a Complaint he has already filed in another civil action. 

Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains identical allegations against the same defendants already

brought before and considered by United States District Judge Anello in Combs v. Pasto, et al., S.D.

Cal. Civil Case No. 11cv1412 MMA (WVG). A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other

courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation

to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v.

Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it “merely

repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Thus, because Plaintiff has already filed the same Complaint he has filed in this action in Combs v.

Pasto, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11cv1412 MMA (WVG), the Court hereby DISMISSES S.D.

Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv1308 CAB (JMA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Cato, 70 F.3d

at 1105 n.2; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

Plaintiff also seeks to bring claims pursuant to California state law against the named

Defendants. However, because Plaintiff cannot identity a violation of a federal law, the Court

exercises its discretion to dismiss Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims without prejudice. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal

claims are dismissed before trial, ... the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Acri v. Varian

Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a),

retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.”) The

Court will remand Plaintiff’s state law claims to San Diego Superior Court.

II.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) The federal law claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint are DISMISSED for failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

(2) The remaining state law claims are REMANDED to San Diego Superior Court.

(3) The Clerk of Court shall close the file.

DATED: June 11, 2012

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States District Judge

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