Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01775/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01775-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1346 U.S. Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JEFFRIES,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 16-cv-1775-JAH(DHB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS (DOC. # 3)

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is the United States’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Doc. # 3). For the reasons set forth

below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2016, Plaintiff Michael Jeffries (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed

an action against Alexander Medina, M.D., in San Diego County Superior Court, Small

Claims Division, Case No. 37-2016-00332636-SC-SC-CTL. (See Doc. # 1, Exh. A). In

his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Medina failed to properly treat Plaintiff at a January

4, 2016 medical appointment when Medina refused to order certain medical tests and

asserted claims for medical malpractice and negligence. Id. 

On July 8, 2016, the United States removed the action to this Court and

substituted in as defendant for Medina on the basis that, at the time of the incident,

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Medina was a federal employee acting within the course and scope of employment

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 233(c). (See Docs. # 1, 2).

On July 14, 2016, the United States filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint based on Plaintiff’s failure to file an

administrative claim prior to commencing suit, which is required under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). (Doc. # 3, pg. 4). Plaintiff did not file a

response in opposition to the United States’ motion to dismiss. On August 22, 2016, the

Court vacated the hearing on the United States’ motion to dismiss and took the motion

under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. (Doc. # 4). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may properly grant a motion to

dismiss as unopposed pursuant to a local rule where the local rule permits, but does not

require, the granting of a motion for failure to respond. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52,

53 (9th Cir.1995). Civil Local Rule 7.1.f.3.c provides that “[i]f an opposing party fails to

file the papers in the manner required by Civil Local Rule 7.1.e.2, that failure may

constitute a consent to the granting of a motion or other request for ruling by the court.”

Although the Court may grant the United States’ motion to dismiss as unopposed, in the

interests of justice, the Court addresses the merits below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Legal Standard Applicable to 12(b)(1) Motions

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the limits on federal jurisdiction

must not be disregarded. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374

(1978). “The party asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving

its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.

2010). Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to

seek dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A party seeking dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction may bring a facial or factual challenge. See White v. Lee,

227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A facial challenge asserts that the pleadings are

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insufficient on their face to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In evaluating such a challenge,

the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Miranda v. Reno, 238

F.3d 1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In contrast, where the defendant challenges the factual basis underlying the

allegations, the court need not accept the allegations as true and may make factual

determinations. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. “Once the moving party has converted the

motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly

brought before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other

evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe

Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (internal citations omitted). In resolving a factual attack on

jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. “No

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed

material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted). However, in the absence of a full-fledged

evidentiary hearing, disputed facts should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.

Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996).

B. Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar to suits against the federal government.

“[T]he United States may not be sued without its consent and . . . the existence of consent

is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 211(1983). The

government’s consent to suit defines the court’s jurisdiction to hear an action against the

federal government. Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987). The party

asserting jurisdiction has the burden to establish jurisdictional facts. Indust. Tectonics, Inc.

v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). Evidence of the government’s consent

to suit must be unequivocal. Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1998).

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DISCUSSION

The FTCA waives sovereign immunity of the United States for certain actions in

tort committed by government employees. Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426,

1429 (9th Cir. 1996). The FTCA “vests the federal district courts with exclusive

jurisdiction over suits arising from the negligence of Government employees.” Jerves v.

United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir.1992). Claims of medical malpractice against

federally funded health care facilities and their employees acting in the scope of their

employment must be initiated under the FTCA. 42 U.S.C. § 233(g); 28 U.S.C. §§

1346(b), 2401(b). The FTCA “provides that an ‘action shall not be instituted upon a

claim against the United States for money damages’ unless the claimant has first exhausted

his administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 (1993) (citing

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). 

In order to meet the FTCA’s exhaustion requirements, a claimant must first file a

claim with the appropriate federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Caton v. United States,

495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974). Only after that administrative claim is denied or has

been pending for six months without a final determination, whichever comes first, may the

claimant file his action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). “The purpose of the FTCA’s

administrative claim procedure is ‘to encourage administrative settlement of claims against

the United States and thereby to prevent an unnecessary burdening of the courts.’” Brady

v. United States, 211F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Jerves, 966 F.2d at 520). The

requirement of administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Brady,

211 F.3d at 502. When a civil action is filed before the underlying administrative claim

has been denied or has been pending for six months, the Court has no jurisdiction and the

matter must be dismissed. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113; Jerves, 966 F.2d at 519.

A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the Complaint

1. Substitution of United States for Medina Was Proper

In order to determine whether the requirements of the FTCA apply to this action,

the Court must first determine if the United States properly substituted in for the named

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defendant, Alexander Medina. The Court concludes that it has. In particular, the United

States filed a certification pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 15.3 (“Certification”), signed by the

Chief of the Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District

of California. The Certification states that, at all times relevant to the complaint, Medina

was an employee of Centro De Salud De La Communidad San Ysidro, Inc., a federal

health center, and that Medina was acting within the scope of his employment at the time

of the incidents alleged in the complaint. (See Doc. # 2-1, pg. 1–2). Plaintiff has not

challenged the Certification or the substitution of the United States as the proper

defendant in this action, nor is there any evidence or allegation in the record suggesting

that the United States is not the proper defendant. Accordingly, the Court concludes that

the United States properly substituted in as the named defendant in the instant matter,

so the FTCA, including its exhaustion requirement, applies in this case.

2. The FTCA’s Exhaustion Requirement Has Not Been Met

The United States asserts that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

complaint because Plaintiff has not filed an administrative claim with the Department of

Health and Human Services (“DHHS”). (Doc. # 3-1, pg. 5). The Court agrees. 

Here, the appropriate federal agency to receive Plaintiff’s complaint is DHHS. (Doc.

# 3-2). In support of its motion, the United States submitted declarations that Centro De

Salud De La Communidad San Ysidro, Inc. and Medina were deemed federal employees

from January 1, 2016, through the present, which includes the date the alleged malpractice

occurred. (See Doc. # 1-3, pg. 1; Doc. # 3-2, pg. 1–3). The United States submitted

further documentation that Plaintiff has not filed an administrative claim with DHHS.

(Doc. # 3-2, pg. 1–3). Because Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements set forth

in the FTCA, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the United States’ motion to dismiss.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the United States’

motion to dismiss (Doc. # 3) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Dated: August 26, 2016

 

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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