Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02869/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02869-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ISRAEL RADILLO SANCHEZ, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

MARION SPEARMAN, 

Respondent.1

No. 2:12-cv-2869-TLN-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner Israel Sanchez is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction 

entered against him on June 4, 2008 in the Yolo County Superior Court on charges of two counts 

of forcible rape, two counts of rape in concert, and one count each of kidnapping, assault, false 

imprisonment, and sexual battery, with a finding that the rape and rape in concert offenses were 

committed under circumstances involving a kidnapping and movement of the victim which 

substantially increased her risk of harm. Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief on the following 

grounds: (1) the evidence introduced at his trial is insufficient to support his conviction on the 

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 Previously named as respondent was People of the State of California. The court now 

substitutes in the correct respondent, the Warden of the Correctional Training Facility (CTF), 

where petitioner is presently incarcerated. “A petitioner for habeas corpus relief must name the 

state officer having custody of him or her as the respondent to the petition.” Stanley v. California

Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. ' 2254). See 

also Smith v. Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 355-56 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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kidnapping charge; (2) his constitutional rights were violated by the prosecutor’s improper use of 

peremptory challenges to exclude five Hispanics from the jury; (3) the denial of his motion for a 

separate trial and the admission into evidence at a joint trial of his and his co-defendant’s 

statements to police violated his federal constitutional rights; (4) the trial court violated his right 

to due process in giving a jury instruction on rape and rape in concert which was tantamount to a 

directed verdict; (5) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (6) the cumulative effect 

of errors at his trial violated his right to due process. Upon careful consideration of the record 

and the applicable law and for the reasons stated below, it is recommended that petitioner’s 

application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Defendants, Alberto Sanchez (Alberto), Israel Sanchez (Israel) and 

Edgar Radillo (Edgar), picked up a young woman and drove her to 

a remote location in Yolo County where they sexually assaulted 

her. All three were convicted by a jury of two counts each of 

forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and rape in concert (id.

§ 264.1) and one count each of assault ( id. § 245, subd. (a)(1)), 

false imprisonment (id. §§ 236 and 237, subd. (a)) and sexual 

battery (id. § 243.4, subd. (a)). (Further undesignated section 

references are to the Penal Code.) In addition, Alberto and Israel 

were convicted of kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), while Edgar was 

found guilty of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment. 

Finally, the jury found as to Alberto and Israel that the rape and 

rape in concert offenses had been committed under circumstances 

involving a kidnapping and movement of the victim which 

substantially increased her risk of harm (§ 667.61). 

Alberto and Israel were sentenced to an aggregate determinate term 

of five years plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to 

life. Edgar received an aggregate determinate term of 23 years, 8 

months. 

* * * 

The People correctly concede Alberto's two rape convictions 

(counts 2 and 4) and the false imprisonment convictions (count 7) 

of Israel and Alberto must be vacated. We thus accept those 

concessions. We also conclude Edgar's conviction for the lesser 

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included offense of false imprisonment on count 1 must be 

dismissed in light of his conviction for the same offense on count 7. 

In all other respects, we affirm the judgments. 

Facts and Proceedings 

On the evening of August 11, 2006, 16–year–old Antonio S. met 

Edgar and Alberto at a school in Dixon and the three smoked 

marijuana. Later, Israel joined them and the four departed in 

Israel's 4–door Acura. They drove around Dixon for a while and 

then headed for Davis. Antonio and Edgar continued to smoke 

marijuana in the back seat of the car. At some point during their 

drive around Davis, they stopped for gas and Antonio purchased a 

bag of Doritos. They then continued their cruise past the local bars. 

That same evening, 23–year–old S.L. and some friends went out for 

a night of dinner and drinking in downtown Davis. At 

approximately 11:00 p.m., S.L. left her friends and went to another 

bar to meet someone. She left that bar at around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. 

She was intoxicated, tired and wanted to go home. However, her 

ride for the evening had already gone home. 

S.L. started walking down the street and thinking how she might 

get home. Just then, Israel and the others drove by. They stopped 

and asked if S.L. was alright and if she needed help. S.L. said she 

wanted to go home and they offered to take her there. S.L. 

accepted the offer and told them she lived off Covell and Alvarado 

in Davis. She got in the back of the car between Antonio and Edgar 

and instructed them to take Highway 113 and exit at Covell. She 

repeated that she just wanted to go home. They agreed to take her 

home. 

A couple of minutes after S.L. got into the car, the men began 

passing around a marijuana cigar to smoke. They offered it to S.L. 

and she took a puff. Israel proceeded onto Highway 113 but did not 

take the Covell exit. As they drove, Antonio began touching S.L.'s 

leg and she told him to stop and pushed his hand away. She 

repeated that she just wanted to go home. 

As they drove away from Davis, S.L. asked where they were going, 

but nobody responded. They eventually arrived at a remote area 

and drove up a dirt driveway. Israel turned off the car and the car 

lights. 

What happened thereafter is less certain. Both S.L. and Antonio 

testified at trial and described different versions. According to S.L., 

the four men got out of the car and ordered her out. She refused, 

and one of them yelled at her to get out. She got out of the car and 

began to cry. S.L. pleaded, “Please don't do this. Please don't. I 

beg you, please stop. Don't do this to me.” One of the men pushed 

S.L. onto the ground near the car and then someone got on top of 

her while the others stood around them in a circle. The man on top 

of S.L. told her to take off her skirt. She refused, and he took it off 

for her, along with her underpants. S.L. then heard cheering and 

laughing and “abrela, abrela,” which means open. S.L. began 

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moving around trying to get the man off of her and he punched her 

in the left eye. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis. The 

man remained on top of S.L. for five to seven minutes and then told 

her not to tell anyone. 

According to S.L., after the first man got off her another took his 

place. He too penetrated her vagina with his penis. This man 

pulled down her shirt and bra and squeezed her left breast “very 

hard.” After this man got off S.L., the men kicked her in the 

stomach and neck. She laid there until she heard the car engine 

start and heard them drive away. 

Antonio testified pursuant to a plea deal whereby he was permitted 

to plead guilty to two felonies with no particular promise as to 

sentencing. According to Antonio, after they arrived at the remote 

location, S.L. said she was going to be sick and she and Edgar got 

out of the car. Israel and Alberto also got out, but Antonio 

remained in the car. Edgar held S.L. while she vomited. Israel 

eventually walked over to them and took over holding S.L. 

Meanwhile, Alberto took S.L.'s purse out of the car and emptied it 

on the trunk. He found condoms inside. 

According to Antonio, Alberto and Edgar eventually joined Israel 

and together they removed S.L.'s clothes. Israel and Alberto then 

walked S.L. over to a grassy area and laid her down. Alberto threw 

Israel a condom taken from S.L.'s purse. Israel got on top of S.L. 

and had sexual intercourse with her. According to Antonio, S.L. 

did not appear to be a willing participant. He heard her moaning 

and yelling “no” and “stop.” After Israel finished, he asked, “Who 

is next?” Alberto gave Edgar another condom from S.L.'s purse 

and Edgar got on top of S.L. and had sexual intercourse with her. 

At some point during the foregoing, Antonio got out of the car and 

smoked a cigarette. He also discarded the empty Doritos bag he 

had obtained at the gas station. By the time Edgar finished with 

S.L., Antonio was back in the car. After Edgar rejoined the others 

at the car, they got in and started to drive away. However, at the 

end of the driveway, Alberto told Israel to stop the car. Alberto got 

out and was gone four to five minutes. When he returned, he told 

them he had beaten S.L. up. On the way home, the others 

instructed Antonio not to say anything about what happened. 

After the men left, S.L. blacked out for a short period. When she 

awoke, her stomach hurt and she was cold. She got up and started 

running from the area for fear that the men might return. In the 

distance, she saw the lights of a city and moved in that direction. 

She was wearing only her top and shoes. S.L. was eventually 

discovered by police officers at 4:45 a.m. walking along County 

Road 102. She appeared injured, stated that she had been raped and 

pointed in the direction of where it had occurred. She informed the 

officers that the rest of her clothes and her purse were still at the 

scene. 

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Officers eventually located the crime scene and found S.L.'s clothes 

and purse. They also found an empty Doritos bag, a condom 

wrapper, two condoms, and a receipt from one of the bars where 

S.L. had been that evening. They located an area where the grass 

appeared to be pressed down as if someone had been lying on it. 

A fingerprint lifted from the Doritos bag was determined to be a 

match to one on file for Antonio. On August 25, officers served a 

search warrant at Antonio's home. They picked up Antonio and 

took him in for questioning. Antonio admitted picking up S.L. that 

evening and indicated three others had been involved. He identified 

one of the participants as Alberto Sanchez but provided only first 

names, Edgar and Israel, for the other two. 

Officers later picked up Alberto, Edgar and Israel and brought them 

in for questioning. DNA from one of the condoms found at the 

scene was later determined to be a match for Edgar, and DNA from 

the other condom was found to be a match for Israel. 

Alberto testified at trial. He admitted picking up S.L. in the early 

morning hours of August 12, 2006, and taking her to a remote 

location. According to Alberto, after they arrived at the scene, he 

walked over to a gate at the entrance to the driveway and remained 

there until they departed 15 minutes later. He claimed not to have 

heard or seen anything that was done by the others with S.L. 

As noted previously, Antonio was given a plea deal and testified for 

the prosecution. The other three were charged with kidnapping 

(count 1), two counts of rape (counts 2 and 4), two counts of rape in 

concert (counts 3 and 5), assault (count 6), false imprisonment 

(count 7), and sexual battery (count 8). They were also charged 

with enhancements on the rape and rape in concert charges for 

having kidnapped the victim and having moved her so as to 

substantially increase her risk of harm. 

Israel and Alberto were convicted as charged. Edgar was found 

guilty on all charges except kidnapping, for which he was instead 

convicted of the lesser included offense of false imprisonment. The 

jury also found not true as to Edgar all of the enhancements on the 

rape and rape in concert charges. 

Alberto was sentenced on the assault charge (count 6) to the upper 

term of four years and on the sexual battery charge (count 8) to a 

consecutive one-third the middle term of one year, for an aggregate 

determinate sentence of five years. In addition, Alberto received a 

consecutive indeterminate term of 25 years to life for one rape in 

concert charge (count 3) and an identical term to run concurrently 

on the other rape in concert charge (count 5). Sentence on the 

remaining counts was stayed pursuant to section 654. Alberto 

received credit for time served of 356 days plus 53 days of conduct 

credits, for a total of 409 days. 

Israel received the same sentence as Alberto, except instead of 

staying sentence on the rape charges (counts 2 and 4), the court 

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struck those charges. Israel received credit for time served of 346 

days plus 51 days conduct credits, for a total of 397 days. 

People v. Sanchez, No. C059763, 2011 WL 3806264, at **1-4 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. Aug. 30, 2011). 

 After the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction, he filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 11. Therein, he 

raised all of the claims that he raises in the petition before this court, with the exception of his 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The petition for review was summarily denied. 

Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 14. 

 Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. 

Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 41. He claimed in that petition that: (1) the evidence introduced at his trial 

is insufficient to support his conviction on the kidnapping charge; (2) his constitutional rights 

were violated by the prosecutor’s improper use of peremptory challenges to exclude five 

Hispanics from the jury; (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (4) the trial court 

violated his right to due process in giving a jury instruction on rape and rape in concert which was 

tantamount to a directed verdict against him; and (5) the cumulative effect of errors at his trial 

violated his right to due process. Id. The California Supreme Court denied that petition with 

citations to In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 (1965) (“habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as 

a second appeal), People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) (conclusory allegations made 

without an explanation of the basis for the allegations or reasonably available documentary 

evidence do not warrant habeas relief), and In re Lindley, 29 Cal.2d 709, 723 (1947) (a claim of 

insufficiency of the evidence can only be considered on direct appeal). Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 42. 

 On May 23, 2013, petitioner filed a first amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

this court, upon which this action proceeds. ECF No. 23. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); 

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Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

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precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 2 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

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fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Insufficient Evidence

 Petitioner’s first claim for relief is that the evidence introduced at his trial is insufficient to 

support his conviction on the kidnapping charge because he never “moved” the victim. ECF No. 

23 at 7-9.3

 He claims that the trial testimony was contradictory and inconsistent with respect to 

whether the victim was actually moved, or just pushed to the ground near the car. Id. at 7. He 

contends that the testimony of Antonio Sanchez, who stated that petitioner and Alberto Sanchez 

moved the victim between two and twenty feet from the car, should be “thrown out” because it 

was internally inconsistent with respect to how far the victim was moved and contradicted the 

victim’s testimony that after she got out of the car she was simply pushed to the ground. Id. 

Petitioner also argues that Antonio Sanchez “blatantly lied” on the witness stand in order to 

obtain a plea agreement and a reduced sentence. Id. at 7-8. 

 Petitioner further argues that there was no evidence the victim was unlawfully moved by 

the use of physical force or fear because she initially consented to get in the car and asked for a 

ride home. Id. at 8. He argues that it is not kidnapping when the victim voluntarily asks for a 

ride home. Id. at 9. Petitioner also contends that any movement of the victim was “barely 

minimal” and that he and his co-defendants did not “keep” the victim, but left her “right where 

///// 

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 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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she was at.” Id. at 8-9. Petitioner requests that this court “consider a ‘lesser’ included offense of 

false imprisonment.” Id. at 7. 

 1. Decision of the California Court of Appeal

 The last reasoned state court decision on petitioner’s claim of insufficient evidence is the 

decision of the California Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal denied the claim, reasoning as 

follows: 

Israel and Alberto were convicted of kidnapping as alleged in count 

1. On counts 2, 3, 4 and 5, they were also found to have committed 

the rape offenses in the course of a kidnapping and movement of 

the victim that substantially increased her risk of harm. 

In argument to the jury, the prosecutor mentioned there were 

potentially three kidnappings: (1) “when they passed Covell,” (2) 

“when they went to County Road 26A,” and (3) “when Israel 

carried her to that bush.” The prosecutor further argued the jurors 

need not agree on which leg of the overall movement constituted 

the kidnapping. However, the prosecutor also emphasized that the 

movement of the victim was a continuous course of conduct and 

amounted to but one offense. 

* * * 

In order to prove simple kidnapping under section 207, subdivision 

(a), the prosecution must establish that “‘(1) a person was 

unlawfully moved by the use of physical force or fear; (2) the 

movement was without the person's consent; and (3) the movement 

of the person was for a substantial distance.’” (People v. Bell

(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 435.) 

* * * 

Israel contends the record does not support the prosecution's 

argument to the jury that a separate kidnapping occurred when the 

victim was moved from the car to the grassy area. He argues there 

is insufficient evidence this movement was for a substantial 

distance, as required for simple kidnapping. Israel points out that 

S.L. testified the rapes occurred “fairly close” to the car. He further 

asserts Antonio's testimony about how far S.L. was moved was all 

over the place. Although Antonio indicated S.L. was moved as 

much as 20 feet, he also testified S.L. was moved only a couple of 

feet, and ultimately said he did not know how far she was moved. 

Israel further contends it cannot be determined from the record 

which portion of the overall movement the jury used to convict him 

of kidnapping. Therefore, because there is insufficient evidence 

that the final movement at the crime scene amounted to a 

kidnapping, the conviction must be reversed. 

 

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Where a case is presented “‘to the jury on alternate theories, some 

of which are legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the 

reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory 

the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot 

stand.’” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1122.) In People 

v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 (Green), overruled by People v. 

Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 (Martinez), the defendant was 

convicted of murder, robbery and kidnapping. The latter could 

have been based on any of three distinct segments of asportation. 

(Id. at pp. 62–63.) The trial court misinstructed the jury on the law 

as to the first segment and the high court concluded movement of 

the victim 90 feet in the third segment was insufficient as a matter 

of law for kidnapping. Only the second movement supported the 

conviction. (Id. at pp. 63–65, 67.) Because it could not be 

determined from the record which movement the jury relied on to 

convict the defendant, the kidnapping conviction could not stand. 

(Id. at pp. 71, 74.) 

The present matter does not involve multiple discrete acts of 

kidnapping but one continuous course of conduct that began when 

defendants drove the victim past her exit and ended when 

defendants left her behind at the crime scene. It is unfortunate that 

the prosecutor chose to break down the asportation into segments 

for purposes of jury argument. Apparently the prosecutor was 

concerned that the jury might conclude S.L. had accompanied 

defendants to the crime scene voluntarily. However, whether S.L.'s 

consent was rescinded when they drove past her exit or when she 

was carried from the car to the grassy area after pleading to be left 

alone does not matter. What matters is that at some point during 

this continuum of movement, S.L. no longer went along 

voluntarily. At that point, the kidnapping commenced. 

At any rate, Israel's sufficiency of the evidence argument is 

premised on an assertion that movement of S.L. at the crime scene, 

the purported third segment of the movement, was insufficient as a 

matter of law to satisfy the asportation requirement of simple 

kidnapping. As we shall explain, we disagree. 

In Martinez, the California Supreme Court changed the standard 

previously established in People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562 

and People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588 for assessing the 

asportation requirement for simple kidnapping. Under prior law, 

the only relevant factor was the actual distance moved. (Caudillo, 

at p. 574; Stanworth, at p. 603.) “Martinez overruled Caudillo to 

the extent it ‘prohibited consideration of factors other than actual 

distance’ (Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237, fn. 6) because 

‘limiting a trier of fact's consideration to a particular distance is 

rigid and arbitrary, and ultimately unworkable’ (id. at p. 236). 

Martinez established a new asportation standard for simple 

kidnapping – one that took into account ‘the “scope and nature” of 

the movement . . ., and any increased risk of harm’ – thereby 

bringing the standard closer to the one for aggravated kidnapping. 

(Ibid.) Martinez required a jury to ‘consider the totality of the 

circumstances' in deciding whether a victim's movement is 

substantial. (Id. at p. 237.) ‘Thus, in a case where the evidence 

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permitted, the jury might properly consider not only the actual 

distance the victim moved, but also such factors as whether that 

movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior 

to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and 

increased both the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable 

attempts to escape and the attacker's enhanced opportunity to 

commit additional crimes.’ (Ibid. . . . )” (People v. Bell, supra, 179 

Cal.App.4th at p. 436, italics omitted.) 

Martinez made clear that for simple kidnapping the asportation 

must be “‘substantial in character,’” which may include 

consideration of more than just the distance moved. (Martinez, 

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 235.) 

The jury here was instructed in accordance with the revised 

standard of Martinez. The prosecutor further argued the jury may 

consider such factors as whether the movement increased the risk of 

harm or decreased the likelihood of detection in deciding whether 

movement of the victim was substantial. 

The victim was moved at the crime scene no more than 20 feet. 

However, it is the character of that movement that satisfies the 

requirements for simple kidnapping. During the testimony of 

Antonio S., the prosecution played a DVD depicting the approach 

to the crime scene on a county road and entry up the gravel 

driveway where the sexual assault occurred. That DVD shows 

clearly that any car parked along the driveway would have been 

visible from the county road. However, because of trees, bushes 

and underbrush in the area, movement of the victim from the 

vicinity of the car to a grassy area 20 feet away would have made it 

impossible for anyone passing by on the road to see the assault 

taking place. In other words, the movement decreased the 

likelihood of detection. 

In People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 (Dominguez), the 

defendant moved the victim from the side of a road down an 

embankment to a spot 25 feet away and 10 to 12 feet below the 

road surface. This was a location “where it was unlikely any 

passing driver would see her” and where trees would have tended to 

obscure the crime scene. (Id. at p. 1153.) According to the court: 

“The movement thus changed the victim's environment from a 

relatively open area alongside the road to a place significantly more 

secluded, substantially decreasing the possibility of detection, 

escape or rescue.” (Ibid.) The high court concluded this movement 

was sufficient to support the defendant's kidnapping conviction. 

(Id. at p. 1155.) 

Although Dominguez involved a prosecution for aggravated 

kidnapping, which requires a finding that the movement increased 

the risk of harm to the victim (Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 

1150), Martinez brought the standard for simple kidnapping closer 

to that of aggravated kidnapping (People v. Bell, supra, 179 

Cal.App.4th at p. 436). Essentially, both types of kidnapping are 

 

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assessed in terms of whether the movement increased the risk of 

harm to the victim, but only aggravated kidnapping requires such a 

finding. 

In the present matter, we conclude movement of the victim from the 

car to the secluded area 20 feet away, thereby making it less likely 

the sexual assault would be detected and more likely further crimes 

could be committed on the victim, was sufficient to support the 

kidnapping convictions of Israel and Alberto. 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at ** 20-23. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[T]he dispositive question under 

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318). Put another way, “a reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 

of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos 

v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2, *4 (2011). Sufficiency of the evidence claims in federal 

habeas proceedings must be measured with reference to substantive elements of the criminal 

offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. 

 In conducting federal habeas review of a claim of insufficient evidence, “all evidence 

must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences 

to draw from the evidence presented at trial,” and it requires only that they draw “‘reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson,___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 

2060, 2064 (2012) ( per curiam ) (citation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence and inferences 

drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 

(9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

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 “A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds.” 

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). Because this case is governed by the 

AEDPA, this court owes a “double dose of deference” to the decision of the state court. Long v. 

Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 960 (9th 

Cir. 2011), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2723 (2012)). 

 3. Analysis

 As set forth above, petitioner was convicted of kidnapping, in violation of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 207(a). Section 207(a) provides as follows: 

Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, 

steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, 

and carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into 

another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping. 

As explained by the California Court of Appeal, in order to prove a violation of this 

statute, the prosecution must establish that: “(1) a person was unlawfully moved by the use of 

physical force or fear; (2) the movement was without the person's consent; and (3) the movement 

of the person was for a substantial distance.” Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *20. 

 After a careful analysis of state law and the facts of this case, the California Court of 

Appeal concluded that the kidnapping in this case occurred when the victim no longer consented 

to remain with petitioner and his co-defendants. This conclusion is amply supported by the state 

court record. There was considerable evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial that, while S.R. 

initially asked petitioner and his co-defendants to take her home, she did not consent to being 

taken into the country, moved away from the car, having her clothes removed, or pushed to the 

ground. 

 The California Court of Appeal also concluded that S.L. was moved for a substantial 

distance against her will after her participation was no longer voluntary, even if the kidnapping is 

considered to have happened at the scene of the rape. This conclusion is supported by the 

testimony of Antonio Sanchez, who stated on direct examination that petitioner and Alberto 

walked the victim a “couple of feet” away from the car to a grassy area near a tree, where they 

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laid her down on the ground. Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 303, 307, 308, 392. 

Although Antonio testified on cross-examination that the distance was “about 15 feet” and also 

that he didn’t remember exactly how many feet she was moved, id. at 456, he never wavered in 

his testimony that the victim was moved some feet away from the car to a grassy area. A rational 

jury could have concluded from Antonio’s statements that the victim was moved away from the 

car to a location that “decreased the likelihood of detection.” Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *22. 

As explained by the California Court of Appeal, this is sufficient to satisfy the asportation 

requirement of the kidnapping statute under California law. 

 The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s claim of insufficient evidence is not clearly 

erroneous and does not constitute an unreasonable application of Winship to the facts of this case. 

Certainly, the Court of Appeal’s decision is not “so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas relief on this claim. 

 B. Improper Use of Peremptory Challenges 

 1. Background 

 Petitioner claims in his next ground for relief that his constitutional rights were violated 

by the prosecutor’s improper use of peremptory challenges to exclude five Hispanics from the 

jury. ECF No. 23 at 10-22. In a lengthy and thorough opinion, the California Court of Appeal 

described the background to this claim and its ruling thereon. With citation to People v. Wheeler

(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson), it 

accurately recited the governing law. It noted that after the prosecution exercised its first five 

peremptory challenges on jurors who self-identified as Hispanic, defendants (each of whom is 

Hispanic) raised a Wheeler/Batson challenge and that the prosecution responded with various 

nondiscriminatory reasons for the peremptory challenges, and the trial court rejected the 

challenge without prejudice to renewal at a later time. The state appellate court observed that 

“[i]t is well settled that ‘[a] prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors 

on the basis of group bias – that is, bias against ‘members of an identifiable group distinguished 

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on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds’ . . . violates the defendant’s right to equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Sanchez, 2011 

WL 3806264, at *5. In applying Batson to this record, the state appellate court explained its 

reasoning as follows: 

A Wheeler/Batson challenge involves a three-step process. “First, 

the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a 

prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory 

challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the 

burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges 

were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court 

determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful 

discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial 

motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the 

strike. [Citation.]” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612–

613.) 

Where, as here, the trial court makes no specific finding on whether 

the defendant made the required prima facie showing and the 

prosecutor explains the basis for her challenge, we proceed to the 

second and third steps of the process. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 

Cal.4th 401, 448.) 

“A prosecutor asked to explain his conduct must provide a ‘“clear 

and reasonably specific” explanation of his “legitimate reasons” for 

exercising the challenges.’ [Citation.] ‘The justification need not 

support a challenge for cause, and even a “trivial” reason, if 

genuine and neutral, will suffice.’ [Citation .] A prospective juror 

may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, 

and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons. [Citations.] 

Nevertheless, although a prosecutor may rely on any number of 

bases to select jurors, a legitimate reason is one that does not deny 

equal protection. [Citation.] Certainly a challenge based on racial 

prejudice would not be supported by a legitimate reason.” (People 

v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) 

On direct review, the Batson/Wheeler issue “turns largely on an 

‘evaluation of credibility.’ [Citation.] The trial court's 

determination is entitled to ‘great deference,’ [citation], and ‘must 

be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous,’ [citation].” (Felkner v. 

Jackson (2011) 562 U.S. –––– .) 

“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the 

prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the 

explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some 

basis in accepted trial strategy.' [Citation.] In assessing credibility, 

the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir 

dire. It may also rely on the court's own experiences as a lawyer 

and bench officer in the community, and even the common 

practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, fn. 

omitted.) 

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“The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry is on the subjective 

genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory 

challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons. 

[Citation.] What matters is that the prosecutor's reason for 

exercising the peremptory challenge is legitimate. A ‘“legitimate 

reason” is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not 

deny equal protection. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 903.) 

Prospective Juror Danielle A. 

The prosecutor exercised her first peremptory challenge on Danielle 

A. During the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the prosecutor explained 

she did not feel comfortable having Danielle on the jury because 

“she herself and her husband have been accused and arrested for 

drug offenses.” In her questionnaire, Danielle had answered “yes” 

to the question: “Have you, a close friend, or relative ever been 

ACCUSED or ARRESTED for a crime, even if the case did not 

come to court?” Danielle further indicated the individuals involved 

had been herself, her husband and her son and that there had been 

no trial. Danielle identified the crimes as “drug possession various 

traffic ect. [sic].” In response to the question “What happened?” 

Danielle indicated: “probation, jail time, fines ect [sic].” Finally, in 

response to the question, “How do you feel about what happened?” 

Danielle answered: “Things happened the way they should have[.] 

[Y]ou do something then you deserve the consequences of your 

actions.” 

During voir dire, the court questioned Danielle A. about the prior 

offenses as follows: 

“Q. Now, you make reference in one of the questions to the 

situation involving yourself, your husband and your son. Were any 

charges ever filed in that respect? 

“A. Traffic, a few, but— 

“Q. No felonies or misdemeanors? 

“A. Yes, there were.” 

At the Wheeler/Batson hearing, the trial judge acknowledged that 

perhaps he should have been more assertive in questioning her 

about the prior offenses but he “didn't want to embarrass her.” 

Defendants contend the prosecution had insufficient information 

about the prior offenses to use them as a basis for excusing the 

potential juror. They point out there was no information about the 

age of the offenses, where they occurred, whether there was a 

conviction, or whether they involved misdemeanors or felonies. 

They argue it is uncertain whether Danielle A., her husband or her 

son had been the one involved in the drug offense. Defendants 

further argue the prosecutor failed to question the juror about the 

offenses, thereby demonstrating this was not the motivating factor 

for her challenge. 

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The People acknowledge that the exact nature of the charges 

against Danielle A. and/or her husband and son is not revealed by 

the record but argue the prosecutor need not question a potential 

juror if the prosecutor already has enough information to make a 

decision on whether to allow the person to remain on the jury. 

The People have the better argument. “A prospective juror's 

negative experience with the criminal justice system, including 

arrest, is a legitimate, race-neutral reason for excusing the juror.” 

(People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 450.) This is true 

whether it is the juror herself or a family member who was 

involved. (See ibid.) And while the age of the offense and whether 

it was a misdemeanor or a felony may be relevant considerations, 

they are not determinative. Hence, while a failure to engage in 

meaningful voir dire can in some important circumstances, be 

circumstantial evidence suggesting pretext (People v. Lomax (2010) 

49 Cal.4th 530, 573), we agree with the People it was not necessary 

in this instance for the prosecution to ascertain the details of the 

prior offenses of Danielle A. or her family in order to use this as a 

legitimate basis for a peremptory challenge. 

Defendants argue the pretextual nature of the prosecutor's stated 

rationale is revealed in her failure to challenge two similarly 

situated non-Hispanic jurors, Jurors No. 1 and 11. “‘If a 

prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a [Hispanic] panelist 

applies just as well to an otherwise-similar [non-Hispanic] who is 

permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 

discrimination to be considered’” in the third step of the 

Wheeler/Batson analysis. (People v. Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 

pp. 571–572.) In this instance, Juror No. 1's father had been 

accused of sexual misconduct, and Juror No. 11 had received a 

speeding ticket “for no reason.” 

The People counter that Jurors No. 1 and 11 were not similarly 

situated to Danielle A., because elsewhere in their questionnaires 

they demonstrated a pro-prosecution or pro-victim bias. Juror No. 

11 stated the following about the crimes charged in the instant case: 

“Rape is a very serious and terrible crime that should be punished 

fully.” He also indicated a friend had previously been raped, but no 

charges had been filed and expressed a belief that rape is an 

underreported crime because of fear. Juror No. 1 disclosed that he 

had been a victim of sexual assault throughout his childhood, but no 

charges had ever been filed. 

Again, we agree with the People. While Juror No. 1's father may 

have been accused of sexual misconduct, it also appears Juror No. 1 

may have been the victim. Thus, he can hardly be considered one 

who believes his family may have been unjustly accused. And 

while Juror No. 11 did indicate he had been unjustly accused of 

speeding, he also demonstrated affinity to victims of the crimes 

charged in this matter. Thus, he too was not necessarily one who 

would have a bias against law enforcement. 

The record supports a race-neutral basis for the prosecutor's 

challenge of Danielle A. 

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Prospective Juror Carlos H. 

The prosecutor exercised her second peremptory challenge on 

potential Juror Carlos H. The prosecutor based this challenge on 

the following factors: (1) as a teenager, Carlos had been kicked off 

of a ladder by a border patrol officer who was chasing illegal aliens; 

(2) Carlos had a bad experience with law enforcement in the 

resolution of a case where his grandson was the victim; (3) Carlos's 

uncle had been accused of and arrested for drug addiction; (4) 

Carlos believes some additional evidence is needed to support the 

testimony of a witness; and (5) Carlos's brother was accused of 

sexual assault. Each of these factors is supported by Carlos's 

questionnaire responses. 

Defendants argue the incident with the ladder, which occurred 42 

years earlier, cannot serve as a valid basis for challenging the 

potential juror and the factor involving the grandson as a victim 

actually cuts against the defense, not the prosecution. They further 

argue the prosecutor's failure to question Carlos H. about any of 

these factors reveals their pretextual nature. Finally, defendants 

argue the prosecutor failed to challenge similarly situated jurors 

who had had negative experiences with law enforcement or 

expressed a belief that additional evidence is necessary to 

corroborate the testimony of a witness. 

Given the many factors cited by the prosecutor, she cannot be 

faulted for failing to question the potential juror. There was 

certainly enough from the questionnaire alone to support the 

challenge. As for the age of the ladder incident, this merely goes to 

the weight of the factor. And while the fact the potential juror's 

grandson was the victim of an unsolved robbery may have biased 

him against criminal defendants in general, the prosecutor was free 

to surmise this would also bias him against law enforcement who 

failed to solve the crime. Finally, as to similarly-situated jurors, 

defendants point to none who have the same or similar combination 

of factors as Carlos H. Thus, there were no similarly-situated 

jurors. 

The record supports the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of 

Carlos H.

Prospective Juror Sarah H. 

The prosecution's next challenge was to Sarah H. The prosecutor 

cited two factors supporting that challenge: (1) Sarah had had a 

negative experience with law enforcement; and (2) she had once 

been arrested for assault and had been required to convince the 

judge of her innocence. 

In her questionnaire, Sarah H. answered “yes” to the question 

whether she ever had a particularly bad experience with law 

enforcement officials. She explained: “A police officer, without his 

lights on, ran a red light in Davis and almost hit me while I was in 

the intersection. He then tried to pull me over and give me a 

speeding ticket when I was not speeding. He let me go after seeing 

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I was not alone in my vehicle and I demanded his badge number.” 

Elsewhere in the questionnaire, Sarah indicated that, in 2004, she 

had been accused or arrested for assault by an ex-girlfriend and 

“had to prove [her] innocence and try to convince the judge that 

[the ex-girlfriend] had fabricated the story.” As to how she felt 

about this experience, Sarah explained: “I feel that anyone can be 

accused of something they didn't do and are treated like a criminal 

even when the police report states otherwise.” 

Defendants contend the two grounds mentioned by the prosecutor, 

although supported by the questionnaire responses, were not in fact 

what motivated the challenge. They point to the fact the prosecutor 

failed to ask Sarah H. any questions about these two items and 

failed to challenge other jurors who had had negative experiences 

with law enforcement. In addition, defendants point out “the 

prosecutor completely ignored other significant grounds which 

were likely sufficient to support a challenge for cause . . . .” For 

example, Sarah indicated in her questionnaire that she “can never 

say someone is guilty unless [she has] personally witnessed them 

commit the crime.” She expressed a belief “that law enforcement 

operates by racial profiling” and indicated she did not believe she 

could be “open minded to judging a stranger.” According to 

defendants, the prosecutor's failure to mention these other potential 

grounds for challenge “is consistent with the conclusion that the 

strike was motivated by a discriminatory purpose rather than an 

assessment of the relevant characteristics of the prospective juror.” 

As discussed above, the fact the prosecutor did not also challenge 

Jurors No. 1 and 11, who had had negative experiences with law 

enforcement, does not render the prosecutor's use of this factor in 

challenging Sarah H. suspect. Those other jurors had other 

questionnaire responses that suggested a pro-prosecution or provictim bias. And as for the prosecutor's failure to question Sarah, 

such questioning is unnecessary if the questionnaire response 

provides sufficient information. Sarah was fairly clear in her 

questionnaire responses regarding the nature of the prior incidents. 

As for the prosecutor's failure to mention other valid grounds for 

excusing Sarah H., we note that the hearing on defendants' 

Wheeler/Batson motion took place the morning after the prosecutor 

made the various peremptory challenges at issue here. When asked 

to comment on the basis for the challenges, the prosecutor began: 

“It might take me a minute because I took out this morning all of 

my Post–It notes in all the areas in justifying these particular areas.” 

In other words, the prosecutor no longer had the notes she used the 

day before to assist her in deciding who to challenge. Therefore, it 

is not surprising that the prosecutor might not recall all of the 

grounds she used to warrant each of the challenges, and no 

particular inference should be drawn from this circumstance. 

We conclude the record supports the prosecutor's peremptory 

challenge of Sarah H. 

 

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Prospective Juror Maria C. 

The next potential juror to be challenged by the prosecution was 

Maria C. The prosecutor explained she was concerned with Maria's 

response to a question about aider and abettor liability. That 

question asked: “The law says that someone who aids or abets a 

crime is equally liable for having committed that offense. Is there 

anyone who has a problem with the concept of law that holds 

someone who aids, facilitates, promotes, encourages, or instigates a 

crime is equally liable for having committed that crime?” Maria 

answered “yes” and explained: “[T]hey can be lying and blaming 

someone else.” 

During voir dire, the prosecutor questioned Maria C. about this 

questionnaire response as follows: 

“Ms. [C.], with regard to your questions on aiding and abetting, you 

indicated that you do have a problem with the concept that 

somebody who aids and abets a crime as being each legally liable 

for that crime. Is that a fair reading of your answer? 

“A. I am not sure. I didn't understand that question really. 

“Q. If the law were to tell you that helping or promoting or 

encouraging a crime that is committed, you are responsible for that 

crime that was committed, even if you are not the person who 

actually committed it. Do you have a problem with that? 

“A. No. 

“Q. And is that with regards to any type of crime or would you 

compartmentalize? 

“In other words, do you know what I mean by that? Would you 

follow the law with regards to that? 

“A. Yes. 

“Q. And would you follow the law on everything? 

“A. Yes.” 

Defendants contend the questionnaire response, when viewed in 

light of the voir dire answers, does not reflect confusion over the 

concept of aiding and abetting but confusion over the wording of 

the question itself and a concern that one defendant may be lying in 

order to get someone else in trouble. They further argue Maria C. 

provided other questionnaire responses that reflect a proprosecution bias, and the prosecutor failed to excuse another 

potential juror, Henry B., who likewise answered “yes” to the 

question whether anyone has a problem with aiding and abetting 

liability. 

We agree the wording of the question could have been clearer. 

Read literally, the question asked whether “anyone” had a problem 

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with aiding and abetting liability. It may reasonably be assumed 

there is someone in the world who has a problem with holding an 

aider and abettor equally liable for a crime. But it does not appear 

Maria C. read the question literally. She expressed a concern that 

one defendant may point the finger at another to get the other in 

trouble without any basis in fact. This, of course, could be a 

potential concern for the prosecution, which intended to use the 

testimony of one of the perpetrators against the others. Thus, 

Maria's response raised less of a concern about her willingness to 

hold aiders and abettors equally liable than a concern with her 

willingness to accept the testimony of a coconspirator. 

As for other questionnaire responses that purportedly reveal a proprosecution bias, we do not share defendants' interpretation of those 

responses. Maria C. answered “yes” to the question whether a 

police officer's testimony will be more truthful than that of a 

civilian witness. She explained: “Sometimes the police either have 

seen what the civilian done [sic] or has a witness for proof.” Aside 

from the incoherence of this explanation, it does not appear to 

reveal a pro-police bias so much as a belief that police may be more 

truthful simply because they either saw what happened themselves 

or have a corroborating witness. In other words, it is not that police 

officers are more truthful, it is just that they often have more firsthand knowledge. 

In response to a question about whether the fact charges have been 

filed against the defendants causes her to conclude they are more 

likely guilty than not guilty, Maria C. answered “yes,” but 

explained, “because depending on what that person has done.” This 

explanation makes no sense in the context and, therefore, provides 

little or no guidance on the issue. 

Maria C. indicated the testimony of one witness would be enough 

for a conviction, but then followed up by answering “yes” to the 

question whether she would require additional evidence to 

corroborate the testimony of a witness. Likewise, Maria expressed 

a belief that cases of sexual assault are over-reported but then 

explained that such cases are nevertheless important and that the 

law regarding sexual assault “could be a little too weak.” In our 

view, the foregoing responses do not reveal a pro-prosecution or 

anti-prosecution bias. 

Finally, as to the prosecutor's failure to excuse Henry B., who also 

answered “yes” to the question about anyone having a problem with 

aider and abettor liability and explained that “[t]his will very [sic] 

from case to case,” we note that defendants themselves excused 

Henry B. just before the prosecutor excused Maria C. Hence, we 

have no way of knowing if the prosecutor would have challenged 

Henry B. as well. 

We conclude the record supports the prosecutor's peremptory 

challenge to Maria C. 

 

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Prospective Juror Monica V. 

The last potential juror to be excused by the prosecution before the 

Wheeler/Batson motion was Monica V. The prosecutor identified 

the following factors informing her decision: (1) Monica is young; 

(2) she has no children; (3) a police officer once battered her father; 

and (4) she believes someone who accepts a ride from strangers is 

responsible for what happens to them. According to the 

questionnaire, Monica was 26 years old and had no children. She 

explained the incident with her father as follows: “A police officer 

battered my dad in Los Angeles . . . he sat my dad in hot the curb 

[sic] and my dad was wearing shorts my dad slide front [sic] to try 

to move from the hot curb and the police hit my dad really bad.” 

She answered “yes” to the question whether she believes one who 

accepts a ride from a stranger is responsible for whatever happens 

to them, and explained: “Because you decided to accept the ride so 

you are responsible if anything happens.” 

Defendants contend the factors cited by the prosecutor did not in 

fact motivate the peremptory challenge, inasmuch as the prosecutor 

failed to challenge non-Hispanic jurors who were young and had no 

children, had had negative experiences with law enforcement, or 

indicated that a person who accepts a ride from a stranger is 

responsible for what happens to them. However, while it may be 

true that the prosecutor failed to excuse certain jurors whose 

questionnaire responses revealed circumstances similar to Monica 

V. as to age, lack of children, prior experiences with law 

enforcement, or responsibility of one who accepts a ride from a 

stranger, defendants cite no juror who had the same combination of 

these factors. 

While comparative juror analysis is certainly relevant in assessing 

the third step of the Wheeler/Batson analysis, “‘we are mindful that 

comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent 

limitations.’ [Citation.] In addition to the difficulty of assessing 

tone, expression and gesture from the written transcript of voir dire, 

we attempt to keep in mind the fluid character of the jury selection 

process and the complexity of the balance involved. ‘Two panelists 

might give a similar answer on a given point. Yet the risk posed by 

one panelist might be offset by other answers, behavior, attitudes or 

experiences that make one juror, on balance, more or less desirable. 

These realities, and the complexity of human nature, make a 

formulaic comparison of isolated responses an exceptionally poor 

medium to overturn a trial court's factual finding.’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 887.) 

We cannot say on the record before us that the trial court erred in 

concluding the prosecutor utilized a valid, race-neutral rationale for 

excusing Monica V. We therefore conclude the trial court did not 

err in denying defendants' Wheeler/Batson motion. 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at **4-12. 

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 2. Legal Standards Regarding Petitioner’s Batson Claim 

 Purposeful discrimination on the basis of race or gender in the exercise of peremptory 

challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See Batson, 

476 U.S. at 79; Johnson, 545 U.S. at 62. So-called Batson claims are evaluated pursuant to a 

three-step test: 

First, the movant must make a prima facie showing that the 

prosecution has engaged in the discriminatory use of a peremptory 

challenge by demonstrating that the circumstances raise “an 

inference that the prosecutor used [the challenge] to exclude 

veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” [Citation 

omitted.] Second, if the trial court determines a prima facie case 

has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to 

articulate a [gender]-neutral explanation for challenging the juror in 

question. [Citation omitted.] Third, if the prosecution provides 

such an explanation, the trial court must then rule whether the 

movant has carried his or her burden of proving the existence of 

purposeful discrimination. 

Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 

 In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, petitioner must show that 

“(1) the prospective juror is a member of a “cognizable racial group,” (2) the prosecutor used a 

peremptory strike to remove the juror, and (3) the totality of the circumstances raises an inference 

that the strike was motived by race.” Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 and Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 

2001)). A prima facie case of discrimination “can be made out by offering a wide variety of 

evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives ‘rise to an inference of discriminatory 

purpose.’” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.) Both Hispanics and 

African-Americans constitute cognizable groups for Batson purposes. Fernandez v. Roe, 286 

F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 At the second step of the Batson analysis, “the issue is the facial validity of the 

prosecutor’s explanation.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). “A neutral 

explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something other 

than the race of the juror.” Id. at 360. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the 

prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” Stubbs v. Gomez, 189 

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F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360). For purposes of step two, 

the prosecutor’s explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 

U.S. at 765, 768 (1995). Indeed, “to accept a prosecutor’s stated nonracial reasons, the court need 

not agree with them.” Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 In the third step of a Batson challenge, the trial court has “the duty to determine whether 

the defendant has established purposeful discrimination,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and, to that end, 

must evaluate the “persuasiveness” of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons. See Purkett, 514 U.S. 

at 768. In determining whether petitioner has carried this burden, the Supreme Court has stated 

that “a court must undertake ‘a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of 

intent as may be available.’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. “[A]ll of the 

circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.” Snyder v. 

Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008). See also Cook v. Lemarque, 593 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (stating the “totality of the relevant facts” 

should be considered “to decide whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation . . . should be 

believed.”). In step three, the court “considers all the evidence to determine whether the actual 

reason for the strike violated the defendant’s equal protection rights.” Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 

893, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 A prosecutor’s reasons for striking a juror may be “founded on nothing more than a trial 

lawyer’s instincts about a prospective juror . . . so long as they are the actual reasons for the 

prosecutor’s actions.” United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United 

States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Excluding jurors because of their 

profession, or because they acquitted in a prior case, or because of a poor attitude in answer to 

voir dire questions is wholly within the prosecutor’s prerogative.” United States v. Thompson, 

827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987). It is not improper for a prosecutor to rely on his instincts 

with respect to the voir dire process. See Power, 881 F.2d at 740 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting 

Chinchilla, 874 F.2d at 699). In short, instinct and subjective factors have a legitimate role in the 

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jury selection process. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252; Burks, 27 F.3d at 1429, n.3 (“peremptory 

strikes are a legitimate means for counsel to act on . . . hunches and suspicions”). 

 The defendant in the criminal prosecution bears the burden of persuasion to prove the 

existence of unlawful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. “This burden of persuasion ‘rests 

with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 2417 (quoting 

Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). 

 “Any constitutional error in jury selection is structural and is not subject to harmless error 

review.” Williams v. Runnels, 640 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Windham v. 

Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998) and Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1997). See also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (stating that among those 

constitutional rights so basic “that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error” is a 

defendant's “right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury”) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted); Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (“because a 

Batson violation is structural error, actual harm is presumed to have resulted from the alleged 

constitutional violation”). 

 3. Analysis

 This court need not address the preliminary issue of whether petitioner established a prima 

facie case of purposeful discrimination because both the state trial and appellate courts ruled on 

the ultimate question of intentional discrimination under the Batson analysis. Hernandez, 500 

U.S. at 359; United States v. Gillam, 167 F.3d 1273, 1278 (9th Cir. 1999). The trial judge 

apparently concluded that petitioner established a prima facie case of racial discrimination 

because he asked the prosecutor to respond to defendants’ Batson motion. RT at 105. The sole 

issue before this court, therefore, is whether the California courts unreasonably concluded that 

petitioner failed to meet his ultimate burden of establishing that the prosecutor’s challenges were 

motivated by racial discrimination under the third step of the Batson analysis. 

 In evaluating habeas petitions premised on step three of a Batson violation, the standard of 

review is “doubly deferential: unless the state appellate court was objectively unreasonable in 

concluding that a trial court's credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, we 

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must uphold it.” Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 

This court can only grant petitioner’s Batson claim “if it was unreasonable to credit the 

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson challenge.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 

338 (2006). In this case, when asked, the prosecutor expressed a neutral, reasonable basis for the 

use of her peremptory challenges of all five of the Hispanic jurors. RT at 105-07. The 

prosecutor’s reasons were “clear and reasonably specific” and were “related to the particular case 

to be tried.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768-69. They are also supported by the record. The California 

Court of Appeal analyzed each juror’s answers to the juror questionnaire, the prosecutor’s voir 

dire of each stricken juror, and the characteristics of other similar jurors who were not stricken. 

After a thorough comparison, the court concluded that the record supported a race-neutral basis 

for each strike. This court has also reviewed the record and agrees with the characterization of 

the Court of Appeal with respect to the characteristics of the other jurors on the panel who were 

not stricken by the prosecutor. 

 It is true that the fact one or more of the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking the 

Hispanic jurors also applied to other jurors who were not stricken is “evidence tending to prove 

purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241. 

However, the fact that an excused juror shares one or more characteristics with seated jurors does 

not end the inquiry into discrimination in jury selection, nor does it establish that the prosecutor 

was acting with discriminatory intent. Rather, the court must evaluate the “totality of the relevant 

facts” to decide whether “counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be 

believed.” Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2009). For the reasons stated by the 

California Court of Appeal, the similarities between the stricken jurors and several of the seated 

jurors do not undermine the prosecutor’s stated reason for excusing the five Hispanic jurors. 

 This court also notes that petitioner’s jury did contain one Hispanic juror, a fact relevant 

although not decisive. “The fact that African-American jurors remained on the panel ‘may be 

considered indicative of a nondiscriminatory motive.’” Gonzalez v. Brown, 585 F.3d 1202, 1210 

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also 

Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1994) (fact that jury contained an African-American 

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member is “a valid, though not necessarily dispositive, consideration in determining whether a 

prosecutor violated Batson”). 

 After reviewing the record, this court concludes that the state court’s disposition of 

petitioner’s Batson claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law nor did it result in a decision that is based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. The record reflects that the 

state trial judge performed an adequate evaluation of the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging the 

Hispanic jurors and appropriately denied petitioner’s Batson/Wheeler motion. This court agrees 

with the state court that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for her exclusion of five Hispanic jurors 

were her genuine reasons for exercising a peremptory strike, rather than a pretext invented to hide 

purposeful discrimination. Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proving the existence of 

unlawful discrimination with respect to the prosecutor’s challenge to these jurors. Accordingly, 

he is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

C. Violation of Right to Confrontation/Trial Severance 

 Petitioner next claims that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a trial severance and 

the admission at a joint trial of his redacted statements to police violated his right to a fair trial 

and to confront the witnesses against him. ECF No. 23 at 22-23. He specifically complains that 

exculpatory statements he made to the police regarding the victim’s willingness to get into his 

car, which would have negated the kidnapping charge, and her willingness to smoke marijuana, 

which would have impacted her credibility, were redacted from the statements that were 

introduced at his trial. Petitioner argues that the redaction prevented the jury from hearing his 

explanation for the victim’s actions and “made it appear that he had merely been evasive when 

given an opportunity to explain.” Id. at 22. Petitioner explains: 

During Petitioner’s pretrial statement, Petitioner explained that [the 

victim] had consented to ride with us and smoke marijuana. As 

redacted, Petitioner’s statement was stripped of this explanation of 

how he came to drive S.L., with her consent, to the remote location. 

The explanation came in response to police questions on that point 

and the jury would have expected the explanation to be offered at 

that time. 

 

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Petitioner’s statement made it appear that he had merely been 

evasive when given an opportunity to explain. As provided to the 

jury, Petitioner’s exculpatory statement became inculpatory.

ECF No. 37 at 14. Petitioner argues that the fact his “exculpatory” statements became 

“inculpatory” after the redaction constitutes “‘clear’ evidence of a sure Aranda/Bruton violation.” 

Id. He contends that the trial court’s failure to sever his trial from the trial of his co-defendants or 

to allow the introduction of his full statements to police was prejudicial error. ECF No. 23 at 23. 

 Petitioner also argues that the admission into evidence of Edgar Radillo’s redacted 

statements to the police violated his right to confront the witnesses against him, as set forth in 

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), People v. Aranda, 63 Cal.2d 518 (1965), and 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 

 1. State Court Decision 

 Following the defendants’ arrests, each was interviewed by the police and the interviews 

were tape recorded. The prosecution sought to introduce the interview tapes at defendants’ joint 

trial. The California Court of Appeal observed that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a right “to be confronted with the 

witnesses against him.” Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *12 (citing U.S. CONST., amend. VI, and 

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). The court noted that the “central concern” of this right is 

“to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous 

testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Sanchez, id. (citing 

Maryland v. Craig 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)). It also noted that the Confrontation Clause applies 

to hearsay statements that are “‘testimonial’ in nature, including statements made during police 

interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Crawford)). It also 

acknowledged that such hearsay may be admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and 

the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Id. The petitioner 

argued that the trial court should have severed the trials because of the cross-incrimination of the 

defendants’ out-of-court statements and that the failure to do so violated petitioner’s right of 

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The California Court of Appeal rejected that 

argument, reasoning as follows: 

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In People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 (Aranda), the California 

Supreme Court held that when the prosecution seeks to introduce an 

extrajudicial statement of one defendant that implicates other 

defendants, the trial court has three options: (1) in a joint trial, 

delete any direct or indirect identification of codefendants from the 

statement; (2) grant a severance; or (3) if severance is denied and 

effective deletion is impossible, exclude the statement altogether. 

(Id. at pp. 530–531.) In Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 

123 (Bruton), the United States Supreme Court held that 

introduction of an incriminating extrajudicial statement by a 

codefendant violates the defendant's confrontation right, even 

where the jury is instructed to disregard the statement in 

determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. 

Edgar moved in limine to exclude the pretrial statements of his 

codefendants. He argued any statements by the other defendants 

implicating him would have to be redacted in a joint trial and, 

therefore, the court had three options: (1) separate trials, (2) 

redaction, or (3) separate juries. Edgar further argued “there is no 

reasonable means by which the People can redact the statements” of 

the other defendants. By inference, Edgar argued that if the court 

was inclined to admit the pretrial statements, it was required either 

to sever or to use separate juries. Israel and Alberto joined in 

Edgar's motion. 

The trial court refused to sever the defendants' trials and, 

apparently, did not consider using separate juries. Thus, the court 

relied on redaction to protect defendants' constitutional rights. The 

court instructed the jury that the pretrial statements of a given 

defendant could only be considered as evidence against that 

defendant. 

Defendants present a multi-pronged attack on the trial court's 

decision to try them jointly and to permit introduction of redacted 

versions of their out-of-court statements. They contend the court 

had essentially two choices, separate trials or exclusion of the 

statements altogether. They argue the redacted versions of the 

custodial interviews did not adequately eliminate references to 

codefendants, as required by Aranda/Bruton. Israel further argues 

the court erred in excluding from his custodial interview various 

exculpatory statements, which he was entitled to have admitted in 

evidence. As we shall explain, we find no abuse of discretion in 

denying defendants' motion to sever or in admitting redacted 

versions of defendants' out-of-court statements. 

“When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public 

offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, 

unless the court order [sic] separate trials.” (§ 1098.) Under this 

provision, the Legislature has stated a preference for joint trial of 

codefendants charged with the same offense. At the same time, the 

trial court retains discretion to grant separate trials. (People v. 

Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1286.) 

“The court should separate the trial of codefendants ‘in the face of 

an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with 

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codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple 

counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial 

a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.’” (People v. 

Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 312, overruled on other grounds in 

People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1149–1150.) “Whether 

denial of a motion to sever the trial of a defendant from that of a 

codefendant constitutes an abuse of discretion must be decided on 

the facts as they appear at the time of the hearing on the motion 

rather than on what subsequently develops.” (People v. Isenor

(1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 324, 334.) 

Defendants contend the trial court erred in failing to sever their 

trials. However, the only ground asserted for separate trials was the 

cross-incrimination of defendants' out-of-court statements. This is 

also the basis for defendants' separate contention that the trial court 

erred in admitting redacted versions of those statements. Thus, the 

resolution of both issues turns on whether the redacted versions of 

defendants' out-of-court statements eliminated any crossincrimination. 

In Bruton, two defendants – Evans and Bruton – were tried jointly 

for robbery. Evans did not testify, but the prosecution introduced 

into evidence Evans's confession in which he stated he and Bruton 

committed the robbery. (Bruton, 391 U.S. at p. 124.) The trial 

judge instructed the jury it could consider the confession only as 

evidence against Evans. (Id . at p. 125) The United States Supreme 

Court held that, despite the limiting instruction, the introduction of 

Evans's out-of-court confession violated Bruton's Sixth Amendment 

right to cross-examine witnesses. (Id. at p. 137.) 

In Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200 (Richardson), Marsh 

and Williams were jointly tried for murder and the prosecution 

introduced a redacted confession by Williams that omitted all 

references to Marsh and all indications that anyone other than 

Williams and a third person named Martin participated in the crime. 

(Id. at p. 202–203.) The trial court instructed the jury not to 

consider the confession against Marsh. (Id. at p. 205.) As redacted, 

the confession indicated Williams and Martin had discussed the 

murder in the front seat of a car while they traveled to the victim's 

home. (Id. at pp. 203–204.) However, later in the trial, Marsh 

testified that she was in the back seat of the car at the time. (Id. at 

p. 204.) 

The Supreme Court held the redacted confession of Williams fell 

outside the scope of Bruton and was admissible (with an 

appropriate limiting instruction). The court distinguished the 

confession in Bruton as one that was “incriminating on its face,” 

and had “expressly implicat[ed]” Bruton. (Richardson, 481 U.S. at 

p. 208.) By contrast, Williams's confession in Richardson

amounted to “evidence requiring linkage” in that it “became” 

incriminating in respect to Marsh “only when linked with evidence 

introduced later at trial.” (Ibid.) According to the court: “[T]he 

Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a 

nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting 

instruction when . . . the confession is redacted to eliminate not only 

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the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence.” 

(Id. at p. 211.) 

In Gray v. Maryland (1998) 523 U.S. 185 (Gray), Gray and Bell 

were tried jointly for the murder of Stacey Williams. Bell did not 

testify at trial. However, the trial court permitted the prosecution to 

introduce a redacted version of Bell's confession. In the original, 

Bell indicated he, Gray and a third person, Vanlandingham, 

participated in the beating that led to Williams's death. The police 

detective who read the confession into evidence substituted the 

word “deleted” or “deletion” wherever the names of Gray and 

Vanlandingham appeared. Immediately after the redacted 

confession was read to the jury, the prosecutor asked, “after he gave 

you that information, you subsequently were able to arrest Mr. 

Kevin Gray; is that correct?” The officer responded, “That's 

correct.” (Id. at pp. 188–189.) The prosecution produced other 

witnesses who said that six persons, including Bell, Gray, and 

Vanlandingham, participated in the beating. The trial judge 

instructed the jury that the confession was evidence against Bell 

alone. (Id. at p. 189.) 

The Supreme Court concluded the redaction was inadequate under 

the circumstances because, although the names of the other 

participants were eliminated, the redacted version continued to refer 

directly to the existence of the nonconfessing defendant. (Gray, 

supra, 523 U.S. at p. 192.) The court explained: “Redactions that 

simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such 

as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of 

alteration . . . leave statements that, considered as a class, so 

closely resemble Bruton's unredacted statements that, in our view, 

the law must require the same result.” (Id. at p. 192.) According to 

the court: “Bruton's protected statements and statements redacted to 

leave a blank or some other similarly obvious alteration, function 

the same way grammatically. They are directly accusatory. Evans' 

statement in Bruton used a proper name to point explicitly to an 

accused defendant . . . . The blank space in an obviously redacted 

confession also points directly to the defendant, and it accuses the 

defendant in a manner similar to Evans' use of Bruton's name or to 

a testifying codefendant's accusatory finger. By way of contrast, 

the factual statement at issue in Richardson – a statement about 

what others said in the front seat of a car – differs from directly 

accusatory evidence in this respect, for it does not point directly to a 

defendant at all.” (Id. at p. 194.) 

In Gray, the Supreme Court noted that Richardson placed outside 

the scope of Bruton those statements that incriminate inferentially. 

(Gray, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 195.) However, the court cautioned 

that not all such statements fall outside Bruton. According to the 

court: “[I]nference pure and simple cannot make the critical 

difference, for if it did, then Richardson would also place outside 

Bruton's scope confessions that use shortened first names, 

nicknames, descriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired, bearded, oneeyed man-with-a-limp,’ [citation], and perhaps even full names of 

defendants who are always known by a nickname. This Court has 

assumed, however, that nicknames and specific descriptions fall 

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inside, not outside, Bruton's protection. [Citation.] . . . [¶] That 

being so, Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind 

of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richardson's inferences 

involved statements that did not refer directly to the defendant 

himself and which became incriminating ‘only when linked with 

evidence introduced later at trial.’ [Citation.] The inferences at 

issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously 

refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which 

involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, 

even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” 

(Id. at pp. 195–196.) 

Defendants point to a number of statements in the redacted versions 

of their interview statements that, they argue, continue to implicate 

the others in the crimes. Thus, they contend, introduction of the 

redacted versions violated Aranda/Bruton. We shall consider the 

interview statements of each defendant in turn. 

Israel Sanchez 

In his interview with police, Israel initially denied ever being in 

Davis, but then acknowledged that he was in Davis around 11:00 

p.m. in his car and saw a “drunk ass girl” come out of one of the 

bars. Israel told the officers the woman got in his car, asked for 

“weed” and then they went cruising. He initially denied having sex 

with her, claiming instead that he had masturbated while standing 

behind her. He initially denied using a condom but then said that 

he had. Later, Israel admitted lying on top of the girl and 

attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. However, he 

claimed not to have been able to penetrate her. Later, Israel 

admitted that he was able to penetrate her “a little bit.” He denied 

striking the woman. Finally, Israel acknowledged that Antonio was 

in the car when this was occurring. 

After explaining that the woman got in the car, asked for “weed,” 

wanted to go home, but then wanted to cruise, Israel said: “So we

cruised around in the fuckin cutties [FN1] and stuff. After that we

post because I guess she wanted to throw up and stuff, she wasn't 

feeling well so we got out of the car and then she was about to 

throw up but she didn't. And she was just saying ‘I don't feel 

well.’” (Italics added.) 

FN1. The term “cutties” in this context “Refers to an area far away 

in distance or in the middle of nowhere.” (Urban Dict. (1999–

2011) <http:// www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Cutties> 

[as of Aug. 30, 2011].) 

Defendants argue the foregoing statement implicated them because, 

by the time the jury heard it, evidence had already been presented 

that both Edgar and Alberto were also in the car with Israel, 

Antonio and S.L. and, therefore, they fell within the reference to 

“we.” 

It is readily clear Israel's statement that “we” cruised around and 

“we” got out of the car did not implicate Edgar or Alberto on its 

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face, especially when Israel had previously indicated that both 

Antonio and the victim were with him in the car and he did not 

mention anyone else. The fact that the statement may implicate the 

others, when considered in conjunction with other evidence placing 

Edgar and Alberto in the car, does not bring the statement within 

the scope of Aranda/Bruton. (Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 

208.) 

Defendants contend the foregoing evidence is “remarkably similar” 

to that in People v. Song (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 973, where this 

court found a violation of Aranda/Bruton. Defendants are 

mistaken. In Song, a detective testified that one defendant told him 

he saw a codefendant force the victim into the car. (Song, at p. 

979.) The People conceded error but argued it was not prejudicial. 

(Id. at p. 981.) 

Song is clearly distinguishable from the present matter. In Song, 

the codefendant's statement implicated the defendant directly by 

name, whereas in the present matter Israel's statement did not 

mention the codefendants by name or suggest the presence of any 

unidentified perpetrators at the time of the offenses. Only by 

reference to other evidence could the “we” mentioned by Israel be 

considered to include Edgar and Alberto. 

Defendants also take issue with a statement made by Israel about 

smoking marijuana. When asked how much marijuana he smoked 

that evening, Israel answered: “Um I think we had like two blunts 

yeah we only had like two blunts rolled up.” (Italics added.) He 

was then asked if he handed a blunt to S.L., and Israel answered: 

“No we were just rotating.” (Italics added.) 

Again, there is no direct reference to either Edgar or Alberto or any 

unidentified persons being present, and the “we” can easily be 

interpreted as referring to Israel, Antonio and S.L. Edgar and 

Alberto are implicated only by virtue of other evidence placing 

them in the car at the time. Under Richardson, this falls outside of 

Aranda/Bruton. 

Finally, defendants take issue with a number of statements made by 

Israel that amounted to admissions by him that he committed the 

various charged crimes. For example, defendants cite Israel's 

admission that, while lying on top of S.L., he attempted to penetrate 

her for six to seven minutes. They further cite Israel's statement 

that S.L. told him to stop and she was too drunk to fight back. 

Defendants argue that, by implicating himself in a forcible rape, as 

alleged in count 2, Israel also implicated them as aiders and abettors 

in that crime as well as rape in concert, as alleged in count 3. 

Defendants further argue these statements negated their own 

assertions at trial that S.L. had gone with them voluntarily and had 

engaged in consensual sex. 

Defendants seek to stretch Aranda/Bruton far beyond its legal 

bounds. The evil those cases seek to avoid is the admission of 

statements by one defendant that identify another defendant, either 

directly or indirectly, as having been involved in the crime without 

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that other defendant having an opportunity to test those statements 

through cross-examination. Aranda/Bruton does not seek to keep 

out all statements by one defendant that might somehow prove to be 

harmful to another defendant once that other defendant's 

participation in the crimes is established through other evidence. In 

this instance, Israel's statements implicating himself alone would 

have an adverse impact on the other defendants as aiders and 

abettors only if Israel also identified those others as having 

participated. However, such participation was established through 

other evidence. Under Richardson, introduction of Israel's 

statements did not violate the confrontation rights of these other 

defendants. 

* * * 

Edgar Radillo 

Edgar first denied having been in Davis at any time during the past 

year, but then admitted recently picking up a girl in Davis. 

According to Edgar, when they arrived at the crime scene, “She 

gets out of the car screaming” and “started tripping out saying she 

was going to call the cops.” Edgar claimed that, after they arrived 

at the scene, he stayed in the car with Antonio and denied touching 

S.L. However, Edgar later admitted putting a condom on and 

intending to have sexual intercourse with her. But, according to 

Edgar, he changed his mind and took the condom off. He denied 

ever getting on top of S.L. but then admitted doing so and rubbing 

his penis on her. He at first denied penetrating S.L. but then 

acknowledged having done so once. Edgar denied getting into 

S.L.'s purse but then admitted taking the condom from the purse. 

He identified Antonio as being present and asserted that Antonio 

remained in the car the whole time. 

After acknowledging that he picked a girl up off the street in Davis, 

Edgar indicated he talked to her and she said “she was going to the 

university or something.” The following colloquy ensued: 

“DETECTIVE HERNAN OVIEDO: Okay. What else did you guys 

talk about in the car? 

“EDGAR RADILLO: Nothing she just talked about uh well what 

we were going to do with our life that she had something but I don't 

know stuff. She was telling me about her life. That she don't like 

white guys and I don't know she was telling me. 

“DETECTIVE HERNAN OVIEDO: Were you guys drinking in the 

car? 

“EDGAR RADILLO: No she was already drunk. We didn't drink at 

all.” 

Defendants contend that, by the time Edgar's interview tape was 

played, the jury was already aware Alberto and Israel were in the 

car with Edgar, Antonio and S.L. Thus, the foregoing implicated 

them in the offenses despite the use of the neutral pronoun “we.” 

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However, as explained earlier, the fact that evidence outside of an 

out-of-court statement can be used to link unnamed defendants to 

the statement does not implicate Aranda/Bruton. In the context 

where Edgar had just explained that he and S.L. were talking to 

each other in the car, the officer's questions about “you guys” and 

Edgar's statement that “we” didn't drink could reasonably be 

viewed as referring to Edgar and S.L. alone. Only when coupled 

with other evidence outside the interview, are Israel and Alberto 

arguably implicated. 

The same goes for Edgar's statement shortly thereafter about how 

S.L. jumped out of the car and was “tripping out: “We were 

already out in the cuts[FN2] we didn't know where we going. I 

don't even know the cuts. I was lost. And then we just ended up 

somewhere. And then she started tripping out saying she was going 

to call the cops and I don't know.” The “we” there could easily 

have referred to Edgar, Antonio, and S.L., whom Edgar 

acknowledged were present. Only by reference to evidence outside 

Edgar's interview are Israel and Alberto implicated. 

FN2. In this context “cuts” means, “A term to describe a remote 

area that is either hidden, distant, or both.” (Urban Dict. (1999–

2011) <http:// www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=cuts & 

page=2> [as of Aug. 30, 2011]. 

Likewise, Edgar's statement that “[n]obody” helped S.L. out of the 

car and over to where she was sexually assaulted did not refer to 

either Israel or Alberto and did not suggest anyone else was present 

besides Edgar and Antonio. 

The remaining statements defendants cite as violating 

Aranda/Bruton all implicated Edgar alone in the crimes. As with 

Israel's statements of a similar nature, defendants argue that by 

implicating himself in a rape, Edgar likewise adversely impacted 

their consent defenses. However, as with Israel's statements, 

Edgar's self-implication is only adverse to Israel and Alberto if 

other evidence outside Edgar's interview placed them at the scene. 

Under these circumstances, there is no Aranda/Bruton error. 

(Richardson, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 208.) 

Alberto Sanchez 

Apparently, the prosecution concluded it could not redact Alberto's 

pretrial interview sufficiently to present it at trial. Instead, Alberto's 

pretrial statements were presented through the testimony of the 

questioning officer. Alberto admitted picking up S.L. but denied 

touching her. Then he admitted shaking hands with her and 

touching her clothing. Alberto claimed S.L. got into the car 

willingly and asked for marijuana. He also admitted touching a 

condom and a pair of panties. 

Defendants contend two of Alberto's statements came in that 

referred to “they” as having done something, as in “they” went to 

the “cutties” and, as Alberto was holding S.L. up while she threw 

up, “they” came over. The remaining statements to which 

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defendants object all implicated Alberto alone in the offenses, and 

the others by implication as aiders and abettors. However, as 

discussed above, none of these statements violated Aranda/Bruton. 

The use of “they” implicates the others only when coupled with 

evidence outside of Alberto's statements, and the self-incriminating 

statements do not fall within Aranda/Bruton even if they might 

ultimately harm the others. 

Furthermore, Alberto eventually testified at trial and was therefore 

available for cross-examination by the other defendants. 

Defendants contend this does not matter, because at the time the 

officer testified about what Alberto said, Alberto had not yet 

testified and therefore was unavailable as a witness and could not 

be cross-examined on his out-of-court statements. But we fail to 

see what the timing of defendants' opportunity to cross-examin[e] 

Alberto about his out-of-court statements has to do with it. The 

ability to cross-examination is the ability to cross-examine, 

whenever it occurs. Aranda/Bruton is not implicated if the 

declarant is available at trial. 

Defendants claim introduction of the pretrial interview statements 

of each of them violated Crawford, even if those statements did not 

implicate them directly. In Crawford, the United States Supreme 

Court “repudiated [its] prior ruling in Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 

U.S. 56, under which an unavailable witness's statements were 

admissible against a criminal defendant if the statement bore 

‘adequate “indicia of reliability.”’ [Citation.] . . . Crawford held that 

out-of-court statements by a witness that are testimonial are barred 

under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause unless the 

witness is shown to be unavailable and the defendant has had a 

prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, regardless of 

whether such statements are deemed reliable by the trial court.” 

(People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 763.) 

There is no question the interview statements of defendants were 

testimonial within the meaning of Crawford and, at least as to 

Edgar and Israel, the declarants were unavailable as witnesses. 

However, “Crawford addressed the introduction of testimonial 

hearsay statements against a defendant.” (People v. Stevens (2007) 

41 Cal.4th 182, 199, italics added.) As explained above, none of 

defendants' interview statements admitted at trial contained 

evidence against any of the others. Thus, they did not implicate the 

confrontation clause. (Ibid.) “The same redaction that ‘prevents 

Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford error.’” (Ibid.; 

accord, People v. Song, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at **12-19. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 a. Severance 

 A court may grant habeas relief based on a state court’s decision to deny a motion for 

severance only if the joint trial was so prejudicial that it denied a petitioner his right to a fair trial. 

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Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993) (court must decide if “there is a serious risk 

that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the 

jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence”); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 

438, 446 n.8 (1986) (“misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it 

results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial”); 

Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see also Comer v. Schiro, 

480 F.3d 960, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (in the context of the joinder of counts at trial, habeas relief 

will not be granted unless the joinder actually rendered petitioner’s state trial fundamentally 

unfair and therefore violative of due process). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the 

denial of severance rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 

(9th Cir. 1997), and must establish that prejudice arising from the failure to grant a severance was 

so “clear, manifest, and undue” that he was denied a fair trial. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 

1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th 

Cir. 1996)). On habeas review, federal courts neither depend on the state law governing 

severance, Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370 (citing Hollins v. Dep't of Corrections, State of Iowa, 969 F.2d 

606, 608 (8th Cir. 1992)), nor consider procedural rights to a severance afforded to criminal 

defendants in the federal criminal justice system. Id. Rather, the relevant question is whether the 

state proceedings satisfied due process. Id.; see also Cooper v. McGrath, 314 F. Supp. 2d 967, 

983 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

 b. Right to Confrontation

 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal defendant the 

right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “The ‘main 

and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.’” Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections for California, 692 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause 

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 

(1965). 

///// 

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 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the state 

from introducing into evidence out-of-court statements which are “testimonial” in nature unless 

the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, 

regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 

(2004). The Crawford rule applies only to hearsay statements that are “testimonial” and does not 

bar the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also Whorton v. 

Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“the Confrontation Clause has no application to” an “out-ofcourt nontestimonial statement.”) Although the Crawford court declined to provide a 

comprehensive definition of the term “testimonial,” it stated that “[s]tatements taken by police 

officers in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.” 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 

 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held 

that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when a facially 

incriminating confession of a non-testifying co-defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if 

the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135. 

“Under Bruton and its progeny ‘the admission of a statement made by a non-testifying 

codefendant violates the Confrontation Clause when that statement facially, expressly, or 

powerfully implicates the defendant.’” United States v. Hernandez-Orellana, 539 F.3d 994, 1001 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 (9th Cir. 2007)). Bruton 

presented a “context[ ] in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so 

great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human 

limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135. 

Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), extended Bruton to a codefendant’s confession, 

under similar joint-trial circumstances, that was “redacted . . . by substituting for the defendant’s 

name in the confession a blank space or the word ‘deleted.’” Gray, 523 U.S. at 188. The 

Supreme Court held that these redactions made no constitutional difference. Id. However, in 

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the admission of a 

nontestifying codefendant’s confession did not violate the defendant’s rights under the 

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Confrontation Clause where the trial court instructed the jury not to use the confession in any way 

against the defendant, and the confession was redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's 

name, but any reference to her existence. 

 Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis. Whelchel v. 

Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2000). “In the context of habeas petitions, the 

standard of review is whether a given error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). Factors to be considered when assessing the 

harmlessness of a Confrontation Clause violation include the importance of the testimony, 

whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 

contradicting the testimony, the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of 

the prosecution’s case. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).4

 3. Analysis

 Petitioner first argues that the trial court’s admission into evidence of his redacted 

statements to police violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause because the redacted 

portions included exculpatory statements regarding the victim’s willingness to get into his car and 

smoke marijuana with him and his co-defendants. Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in 

admitting these redacted statements instead of admitting petitioner’s full police interview, any 

error is harmless. As explained by the California Court of Appeal, petitioner’s explanation to 

police that the victim willingly entered his car and agreed to smoke marijuana with him came 

before the jury through other parts of petitioner’s police interview that were admitted into 

evidence. Specifically, the jury was informed that petitioner told the police that S.L. “first said 

she wanted to go home but then changed her mind and said she wanted to cruise,” that S.L. 

stopped giving directions to her house after she had been in the car for awhile, and that S.L. was 

“asking for the weed.” Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *17.5 These admitted portions of 

 4

 Although Van Arsdall involved a direct appeal and not a habeas action, “there is nothing 

in the opinion or logic of Van Arsdall that limits the use of these factors to direct review.” 

Whelchel, 232 F.3d at 1206. 

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petitioner’s police interview also made clear to the jury that petitioner provided an explanation to 

the police as to why S.L. entered his vehicle and drove into the country with him and his codefendants, and that he wasn’t merely “evasive when given an opportunity to explain.” ECF No. 

23 at 22. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s error, if any, in excluding the exculpatory 

portions of petitioner’s police interview could not have had a substantial and injurious effect on 

the verdict. 

 Petitioner also claims that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause 

by admitting into evidence Edgar Radillo’s statements to police, wherein he referred to the people 

in the car as “we.” Petitioner argues that it was clear to the jury that the pronoun “we” included 

himself and Alberto. As set forth above, the California Court of Appeal, in a thorough analysis, 

concluded that the admission of Radillo’s statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause 

because the statements implicated petitioner only when coupled with other evidence outside of 

those statements. The state court concluded that the word “we” could have been interpreted by 

the jury to refer to Radillo, S.L., and Antonio, who the jurors were already aware were in the car. 

The conclusion of the Court of Appeal in this regard is a reasonable interpretation of the facts of 

this case and is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the holdings in Bruton, 

Richardson, and Gray. Further, unlike the situation in Gray, Radillo’s statements were not 

altered by the trial court to insert a pronoun for petitioner’s name. Rather, Radillo’s statements 

were introduced as he spoke them, with any reference to petitioner being supplied by other 

evidence outside of those statements. The decision of the California Court of Appeal that, under 

these circumstances, the admission of Radillo’s statements did not violate petitioner’s rights 

under the Confrontation Clause is not unreasonable and is certainly not “so lacking in justification 

that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility 

///// 

///// 

 5

 In addition, Antonio testified that while they were in the car, S.L. asked whether the 

defendants had any marijuana and they gave her some. RT at 283-84. He also testified he told 

the police that when S.L. was in the car she asked whether they had “some weed.” Id. at 444. 

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for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Accordingly, petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on this claim.6

 There was no Confrontation Clause error at petitioner’s trial, and accordingly, the trial 

court did not violate petitioner’s federal constitutional rights in denying his motion to sever his 

trial from that of his co-defendants. Further, the joint trial was not “so prejudicial that it denied a 

petitioner his right to a fair trial. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39. Accordingly, petitioner is not 

entitled to relief on his severance claim. 

D. Jury Instruction on Rape and Rape in Concert 

 Petitioner next claims that the jury instructions on rape and rape in concert improperly 

directed a verdict against him, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his 

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. ECF No. 23 at 24-25. Specifically, he claims that 

the express language of these instructions essentially informed the jury that he raped the victim in 

concert with his co-defendants. Id. 

 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows: 

Rape and Rape in Concert Instructions 

The jury was instructed on the rape counts as follows: 

“The defendants, Israel Sanchez, Alberto Sanchez and Edgar 

Radillo, are charged in Counts 2 and 4 with rape by force, a 

 

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 Because the trial court did not commit error under Bruton in admitting the statements of 

Edgar Radillo, there is no Crawford error. See, e.g., United States v. Rakow, 286 F. App’x 452, 

454 (9th Cir. 2008) (court denies Crawford violation where prior testimony of co-defendant was 

admitted against co-defendant, because “. . . absent Bruton error, Crawford has no work to do in 

this context . . . .”) (citing United States v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 854, 856 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002); 

United States v. Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (the same factual circumstances 

surrounding admission of co-defendant’s statement “that prevent Bruton error also serves to 

prevent Crawford error.”); United States v. Gould, No. CR 03–2274 JB, 2007 WL 1302593, at *3 

(D.N.M. Mar. 23, 2007) (“If a limiting instruction is given to the jury, a properly redacted 

statement of a co-defendant, one that satisfies Bruton . . . , does not raise a Confrontation Clause 

issue pursuant to Crawford . . ., because such a statement is not offered against the defendant.”); 

Bolus v. Portuondo, No. 9:01–CV–1189, 2007 WL 2846912, at *21 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007) 

(“Since this court finds no Bruton error, there would be no Crawford error, even if Crawford

were applicable.”). 

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violation of Penal Code Section 261(a)(2). Count 2 refers to the 

rape committed by Israel Sanchez. 

“It is alleged that Edgar Radillo and Alberto Sanchez aided and 

abetted the rape committed by Israel Sanchez. 

“Count 4 refers to the rape committed by Edgar Radillo. It is 

alleged that Israel Sanchez and Alberto Sanchez aided and abetted 

the rape committed by Edgar Radillo.” (Italics added.) 

Defendants assert the foregoing instruction was tantamount to a 

directed verdict on counts 2 and 4, inasmuch as the trial court 

repeatedly referred to rapes committed by either Israel or Edgar as 

if that was a foregone conclusion. However, while we agree it 

would have been better for the trial court to say rapes allegedly 

committed by Israel and Edgar, the references were meant solely to 

alert the jury that count 2 refers to the rape allegedly committed by 

Israel and count 4 refers to the rape allegedly committed by Edgar. 

As noted earlier, instructions should be considered as a whole. 

(People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 823–824.) The 

remainder of the foregoing instruction read: 

“To prove that Israel Sanchez is guilty of rape in Count 1 [sic], the 

People must prove that, one, the defendant had sexual intercourse 

with a woman; two, he and the woman were not married to each 

other at the time of intercourse; three, the woman did not consent to 

the intercourse; and, four, the defendant accomplished the 

intercourse by force, violence, menace or fear of immediate and 

unlawful bodily injury to the woman. 

“To prove that Edgar Radillo and Alberto Sanchez are guilty of 

rape charged in Count 2, refer to the separate instructions on aiding 

and abetting, CALCRIM 400 and 401. 

“To prove that Edgar Radillo is guilty of rape in Count 4, the 

defendant [sic] must prove, one, the defendant had sexual 

intercourse with a woman; two, he and the woman were not married 

to each other at the time of intercourse; three, the woman did not 

consent to the intercourse; and, four, the defendant accomplished 

the intercourse by force, violence, menace or fear of immediate, 

unlawful bodily injury to the woman. 

“To prove that Israel Sanchez and Alberto Sanchez are guilty of 

rape charged in Count 4, please refer to the separate instruction on 

aiding and abetting found in CALCRIM 400, 401. 

“Sexual intercourse means any penetration no matter how slight of 

the vagina or genitalia by the penis. Ejaculation is not required. 

“To consent, a woman must act freely and voluntarily and know the 

nature of the act. 

“Intercourse is accomplished by force if the person uses enough 

physical force to overcome the woman's will. 

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“Menace means a threat, statement or act showing an intent to 

injure someone. 

“Intercourse is accomplished by fear if the woman actually and 

reasonably is afraid or she has actually been unreasonably afraid, 

and the defendant knows of her fear and takes advantage of it.” 

The jury was also instructed that the People have the burden of 

proving lack of consent. 

Viewed as a whole, it cannot reasonably be argued the instructions 

directed a verdict on the two rape counts. The jury was clearly 

instructed as to the elements of the offense and that the People had 

the burden of proving each element. 

Defendants also take issue with the trial court's rape in concert 

instructions for the same reason. Those instructions read: 

“The defendants, Israel Sanchez, Edgar Radillo and Alberto 

Sanchez, are charged in Counts 3 and 5 with committing rape by 

acting in concert with each other in violation of Penal Code Section 

264.1. 

“To prove that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must 

prove, that, one, Israel Sanchez personally committed forceable 

[sic] rape and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and 

abetted its commission; two, Edgar Radillo personally committed 

forceable [sic] rape and voluntarily acted with someone who aided 

and abetted its commission. Alberto Sanchez voluntarily aided and 

abetted someone else who personally committed forceable [sic] 

rape. 

“Count 3 refers to rape by Israel Sanchez and the aiding and 

abetting by Edgar Radillo and Alberto Sanchez. 

“Count 5 refers to rape by Edgar Radillo and aiding and abetting by 

Israel Sanchez and Alberto Sanchez. 

“To decide whether the defendants, Israel Sanchez and Edgar 

Radillo, committed rape, please refer to separate instructions that 

I've given you on that crime. 

“To decide whether Alberto Sanchez aided and abetted rape, please 

refer to the separate instructions that I've given you on aiding and 

abetting. 

“You must apply those instructions when you decide whether the 

People have proved rape in concert. 

“To prove the crime of rape in concert, the People do not have to 

prove a prearranged plan or scheme to commit rape. The defendant 

is not guilty of rape if he actually and reasonably believed that a 

person consented to the intercourse. 

 

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“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the 

woman consented. If the People have not met this burden, you 

must find the defendant not guilty.” 

Read as a whole, the foregoing instruction did not direct a verdict 

against any of the defendants on the two rape in concert charges. 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at **30-32. 

 2. Applicable Legal Standards

 In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional claim. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72; Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 

F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury 

instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but 

must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Cupp v. 

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). To prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate 

“that an erroneous instruction ‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.’” Prantil v. State of Cal., 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Darnell v. 

Swinney, 823 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1987)). In making its determination, this court must 

evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a 

component of the entire trial process.’” Id. (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th 

Cir. 1984)). 

 3. Analysis

 For the reasons expressed by the California Court of Appeal, petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that the jury instructions on rape and rape in concert rendered his trial fundamentally 

unfair. Although the language of the challenged instructions referred to “the rape committed by” 

petitioner or Edgar Radillo, the jury instructions, when read as a whole, instructed the jury that it 

must determine, based on all of the trial evidence, whether the prosecutor had proven these 

charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors were specifically advised that if the prosecutor 

failed to meet his burden of proof, they must find the defendants not guilty. This instruction 

belies any argument that the trial court directed a verdict on the rape and rape in concert charges. 

///// 

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Under the circumstances presented here, the challenged jury instructions did not violate 

petitioner’s right to due process. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in: (1) failing to 

cross-examine “all witnesses against him;” (2) failing to cross-examine Antonio Sanchez, who 

falsely testified after entering into a plea agreement that the victim was moved from the car 

before being assaulted; (3) failing to obtain Antonio Sanchez’s “Rap-Sheet;” (4) failing to obtain 

the “Rap-Sheet” of the victim because she “is a Heavy drinker and uses drugs;” (5) failing to 

“stop the trial” after the prosecutor’s struck “all ‘Five’ of the First Hispanic’s [sic] from the jury 

Panel;” (6) failing to request a unanimity instruction instructing the jurors that they must agree on 

exactly which act constituted the kidnapping; (7) failing to request a jury instruction highlighting 

the victim’s testimony that she was pushed to the ground immediately after exiting the car; and 

(8) repeatedly failing to object to “erroneous jury instructions.” ECF No. 23 at 25-29; ECF No. 

37 at 15-16. Petitioner argues that Antonio Sanchez’s testimony was not credible because he 

testified that “Petitioner and co-defendants moved [the victim] (4) four times . . . 16 1/2 feet, then 

two feet, fifteen feet, than he said twenty feet from the car . . . Then he said that “he actually did 

not recall the distance.” ECF No. 37 at 15. He contends that his trial counsel should have filed a 

motion to “throw out” Antonio Sanchez’s “false testimony” in this regard. Id. 

 Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel committed “cumulative errors,” such as: (1) 

failing to “investigate and prepare adequately before trial;” (2) failing to adequately consult with 

petitioner about the trial; (3) failing to investigate petitioner’s “mental and emotional status while 

under the influence of drugs Marijuana;” (4) failing to challenge the admissibility of the 

statements made by Antonio Sanchez; (5) failing to conduct a “proper jury voir dire;” (6) failing 

to object to “the erroneous jury instruction about Kidnapping element and ‘Asportation-byFraud;” (7) failing to preserve “meritorious” claims for appeal; (8) failing to file a motion to 

“suppress” the testimony of Antonio Sanchez; (9) failing to call witnesses on petitioner’s behalf; 

and (10) failing to “make closing arguments at the Sentencing Phase of the trial Proceedings.” 

ECF No. 23 at 28-29. 

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 Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were raised for the first time in his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. As explained above, 

the Supreme Court denied this petition with citations to In re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 (1965) 

(“habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal”), People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 

474 (1995) (conclusory allegations made without an explanation of the basis for the allegations or 

reasonably available documentary evidence do not warrant habeas relief); and In re Lindley, 29 

Cal.2d 709, 723 (1947) (a claim of insufficiency of the evidence can only be considered on direct 

appeal). Assuming arguendo that the Supreme Court’s ruling constitutes a ruling on the merits of 

petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims should be denied. 

 The clearly established federal law for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant 

must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and that (2) the “deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is constitutionally deficient if his or 

her representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside 

“the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687). 

 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. Under AEDPA, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s 

application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Id. at 785. “[B]ecause the Strickland

standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a 

defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 

 Petitioner’s claims regarding the alleged failures of his trial counsel should be rejected as 

unduly vague and conclusory. Petitioner claims in a conclusory fashion that his trial counsel 

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improperly failed to cross-examine “all witnesses against him,” failed to “stop the trial” after the 

prosecutor struck five potential jurors from the jury panel, failed to object to “erroneous jury 

instructions,” failed to “investigate and prepare adequately before trial,” failed to adequately 

consult with petitioner about the trial, fail to challenge the admissibility of the statements made 

by Antonio Sanchez, failed to conduct a “proper jury voir dire,” failed to preserve “meritorious” 

claims for appeal, failed to call witnesses on petitioner’s behalf, and failed to “make closing 

arguments at the Sentencing Phase of the trial Proceedings.” “‘Conclusory allegations which are 

not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.’” Jones v. Gomez, 66 

F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). In light of 

the vague nature of these claims, this court is unable to address them in a thorough manner. 

 Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate prejudice, in particular with respect to his claims 

that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to cross-examine Antonio Sanchez, 

failing to obtain the “rap sheet” of Antonio Sanchez and the victim, failing to request a unanimity 

instruction instructing the jurors that they must agree on exactly which act constituted the 

kidnapping, failing to request a jury instruction highlighting the victim’s testimony that she was 

pushed to the ground immediately after exiting the car, failing to investigate petitioner’s “mental 

and emotional status while under the influence of drugs Marijuana,” failing to challenge the 

admissibility of the statements made by Antonio Sanchez, and failing to file a motion to 

“suppress” the testimony of Antonio Sanchez. Petitioner has failed to explain, and the court does 

not find, that the result of the trial proceedings would have been different had petitioner’s trial 

counsel performed the actions suggested above. More specifically, there is no evidence before 

the court that Antonio Sanchez would have changed his testimony if he was cross-examined more 

thoroughly or pinned down on the exact distance the victim was moved from the car; that the “rap 

sheet” of Antonio Sanchez or the victim would have provided significant impeachment evidence; 

that a “unanimity instruction” was available under state law or would have resulted in a different 

verdict; that the trial court would have allowed a jury instruction highlighting the victim’s 

testimony that she was pushed to the ground immediately after exiting the car; or that petitioner’s 

///// 

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mental abilities were impaired by the use of marijuana. Mere speculation and unsupported 

allegations regarding these issues is insufficient to establish prejudice. 

 Because petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, or 

that any deficient performance resulted in prejudice, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on 

his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

F. Cumulative Error

 In his final ground for relief, petitioner claims that the cumulative effect of the errors 

complained of above violated his right to due process and a fair trial. ECF No. 23 at 31. He 

argues: 

The trial Court’s refusal of Petitioner’s requested pinpoint 

instruction informing the jury that “Asportation by Fraud alone” is 

insufficient to support a Kidnapping, the refusal of a Unanimity 

Instruction on the Kidnapping charge and the admission at a joint 

trial of a statement by Petitioner from which his explanation of the 

asportation had been redacted together with the submission to the 

jury of a legally insufficient Kidnapping theory effectively 

‘Precluded” a meaningful defense which would otherwise have 

been available. Collectively, and in light of the Constitutionally 

infirm Voir Dire and the Instructions which directed Verdicts on the 

rape charges, the Erroneous rulings undermined any confidence in 

the jury’s Verdicts and denied Petitioner Due Process and a Fair 

Trial. 

Id. 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as follows: 

Cumulative Error 

Defendants contend the cumulative effect of errors found to be 

harmless on an individual basis requires reversal of the convictions. 

However, having found no errors that we determined to be harmless 

on an individual basis, we have no occasion to consider this 

contention. 

Sanchez, 2011 WL 3806264, at *33. 

 The cumulative error doctrine in habeas recognizes that, “even if no single error were 

prejudicial, where there are several substantial errors, ‘their cumulative effect may nevertheless 

be so prejudicial as to require reversal.’” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(quoting United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 868 (9th Cir. 1996)). However, where there is no 

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single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional 

violation. See Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1257 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––, 

132 S.Ct. 1757 (2012) (“[B]ecause we hold that none of Fairbank's claims rise to the level of 

constitutional error, ‘there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a constitutional violation.’”) 

(citation omitted); Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir.2011) (“Because we conclude that 

no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible.”). “The 

fundamental question in determining whether the combined effect of trial errors violated a 

defendant's due process rights is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far less 

persuasive,’ Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and thereby had a ‘substantial 

and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury’s verdict.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). 

 This court has addressed petitioner’s claims of error and has concluded that no error of 

constitutional magnitude occurred. There is also no evidence that an accumulation of errors 

rendered petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on 

his claim that cumulative error violated his right to due process. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

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2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: May 21, 2015. 

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