Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04665/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-04665-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANGELA KENNARD, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

LAMB WESTON HOLDINGS, INC., 

Defendant.

CASE NO. 18-cv-04665-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 39 

Pending before the Court is defendant Lamb Weston Holdings, Inc.’s motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 39 (“MTD”); see also Dkt. No. 38 (“SAC”).)1

 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART defendant’s 

motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a California citizen who resides in San Francisco, California. (SAC ¶ 9.) 

Defendant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located in Eagle, Idaho. 

(Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff brings this class action alleging that defendant “unlawfully and unfairly 

packag[ed] its ALEXIA brand SWEET POTATO fries WITH SEA SALT product [the ‘Alexia 

product’] in opaque containers that contain more than 50% empty space.” (Id. ¶ 1.) 

Plaintiff contends that she purchased the Alexia product “several times during 2017 and 

2018 in Daly City,” only to be “surprised when she opened the product that the container had 

more than 50% empty space, or slack-fill.” (Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff does not 

deny that the Alexia product labels accurately disclose the product’s net weight, the number of 

 1

 The Court previously vacated the hearing set for March 19, 2019 pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). See Dkt. No. 45. 

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fries per serving, and the approximate number of servings per container. Namely, the package 

indicates that the bag has “[a]bout 6 servings per container” and that a serving size is “3 oz 

(84g/12 pieces).”2 Instead, plaintiff argues that the container size leads reasonable consumers to 

believe that there will be more fries than there actually are. (Id. ¶ 30.) Specifically, plaintiff avers 

that the Alexia product’s “packaging size” was a “material factor” in making her purchase 

decisions and claims she would not have purchased the Alexia product had she known the “true 

facts . . . concerning [d]efendant’s representations[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 30, 57, 69, 79.) Because “[t]he 

containers (1) do not allow consumers to fully view its [sic] contents; and (2) contains [sic] 

nonfunctional slack fill[,]” plaintiff contends that the packaging is “per se illegal.” (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on August 2, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1.) After defendant 

moved to dismiss and strike the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(f), plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 16 

(“FAC”).) Accordingly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as moot. (Dkt. No. 17.) 

Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the FAC, which the Court granted in part and denied in 

part, giving plaintiff leave to amend its claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act 

(“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq., the “unlawful” and “unfair” prongs of the Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., and the False Advertising 

Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. (Dkt. Nos. 19, 34.) 

 2

 The SAC includes only a partial image of the Alexia product labels. See SAC ¶ 25. A 

plaintiff, however, cannot “surviv[e] a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by deliberately omitting references to 

documents upon which their claims are based.” Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 

1998), as amended (July 28, 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Steinle v. 

City & Cty. of S.F., No. 17-16283, 2019 WL 1323172 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2019). Defendant has 

provided a more complete image of the labels. See Dkt. No. 40 at ECF p. 5. A court may 

consider evidence on which the complaint “necessarily relies” if: (1) the complaint refers to the 

document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the 

authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Here, the product labels are central to plaintiff’s claim, and plaintiff does not 

challenge the authenticity of the images provided by defendant. Accordingly, defendant’s request 

for judicial notice is GRANTED. 

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On January 15, 2019, plaintiff filed the operative SAC. Therein, plaintiff seeks to 

represent the following class of California consumers: All California residents who made retail 

purchases of Defendant’s ALEXIA brand SWEET POTATO fries product during the applicable 

limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. (SAC ¶ 34.) The SAC is 

virtually identical to plaintiff’s FAC, with the exception of: (i) six additional paragraphs 

concerning each statutory slack fill safe harbor provision under California Business and 

Professions Code section 12606.2(c)(1)–(6), (see SAC ¶¶ 15–20); and (ii) allegations regarding 

consumers’ handling practices as to frozen foods, (see id. ¶¶ 22–23). Plaintiff asserts the same 

three claims for relief as in his FAC, namely violations of the CLRA, UCL, and FAL. Defendant 

moves to dismiss each. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), an action may be dismissed for “failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint 

lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri 

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When considering a motion to 

dismiss, a court must accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Furthermore, the court must construe these well-pleaded factual allegations 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 

1986). The complaint must allege “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). It must contain factual allegations sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Id. at 570. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 

‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a 

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 

2009). 

Claims alleging fraud must also meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the 

false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. 

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KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To comply 

with the Rule 9(b) pleading standard, allegations of fraud “must be specific enough to give 

defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so 

that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Id. 

(quoting Bly-Magee v. Cal., 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)). That is, plaintiff must 

specifically set forth what is false or misleading about a statement and why it is false. Cardenas v. 

NBTY, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 

F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Theories of Liability 

Plaintiff’s SAC is based on two theories of liability. First, consumer deception, namely 

plaintiff alleges that the Alexia product packages are misleading because consumers expect more 

sweet potato fries than are actually included. Second, slack fill, namely plaintiff alleges that the 

Alexia product packaging is unlawful because it violates the California Fair Packaging and 

Labeling Act’s (“CFPLA”) regulation against nonfunctional slack fill, specifically Business & 

Professions Code section 12606.2. More specifically, plaintiff explained that both her CLRA 

claim and the unfair prong of her UCL claim are predicated on both theories of liability; her FAL 

claim and the fraudulent prong of her UCL claim are based on the consumer deception theory 

only; and the unlawful prong of her UCL claim is based on the nonfunctional slack fill theory 

only. (See Dkt. Nos. 47, 48.) The Court addresses each theory of liability in turn. 

1. Consumer Deception Theory 

a. Reasonable Consumer Test 

Plaintiff’s claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL are governed by California law. The 

Ninth Circuit has explained: 

California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or 

fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200. The false 

advertising law prohibits any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.” 

Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17500. “‘[A]ny violation of the false advertising law . . . 

necessarily violates’ the []UCL.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 950, 119 

Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243 (2002) (quoting Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. 

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v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d 197, 210, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660 

(1983)). California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) prohibits “unfair 

methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 

1770. 

[A plaintiff’s] claims under these California statutes are governed by the “reasonable 

consumer” test. Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 

false or misleading advertising and unfair business practices claim must be evaluated 

from the vantage of a reasonable consumer.” (citation omitted)); Lavie v. Procter & 

Gamble Co., 105 Cal.App.4th 496, 506–07, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 486 (Cal.App.2003) 

(“[U]nless the advertisement targets a particular disadvantaged or vulnerable group, 

it is judged by the effect it would have on a reasonable consumer.”). 

Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Under the reasonable consumer standard, a plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the 

public are likely to be deceived.’” Freeman, 68 F.3d at 289 (quoting Bank of the West v. Superior 

Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267 (1992)). “‘Likely to deceive’ implies more than a mere possibility 

that the advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by [a] few consumers viewing it in an 

unreasonable manner.” Lavie, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 508. Rather, the reasonable consumer 

standard requires a probability that a “significant portion of the general consuming public or of 

targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Id. 

 With respect to a false advertising case, the “primary evidence” is the “advertising itself.” 

Brockey v. Moore, 107 Cal. App. 4th 86, 100 (2003). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 

question of whether advertising materials are deceptive to a reasonable consumer “will usually be 

a question of fact not appropriate for decision” at the pleading stage. Williams, 552 F.3d at 938. 

However, actions may be dismissed under the reasonable consumer test when “the advertisement 

itself [makes] it impossible for the plaintiff to prove that a reasonable consumer was likely to be 

deceived.” Id. at 939; see also Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir 2016) (affirming 

dismissal of deceptive advertising claims where the plaintiff’s “claim that the reasonable consumer 

would be deceived” was “not plausible”); Martinez-Leander v. Wellnx Life Scis., Inc., No. CV 16-

08220 SJO (Ex), 2017 WL 2616918, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017) (dismissing deceptive 

advertising claims based on nonfunctional slack fill where “no reasonable consumer could have 

been misled” by product packaging). 

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b. Application to Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that Alexia product packages are misleading because consumers expect 

more fries than are actually included. (SAC ¶ 30.) Defendant argues that the product’s packaging 

would not deceive a reasonable consumer in light of the unit counts, net weight, and serving size 

stated on the package. (MTD at 6–9.) The Court agrees that plaintiff’s claim that the reasonable 

consumer would be deceived as to the amount of fries in an Alexia product package is not 

plausible. 

In Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2016), which plaintiff attempts to 

distinguish, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of deceptive advertising claims on the ground 

that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for consumer deception. There, the plaintiff 

alleged that the defendant deceived consumers about the amount of product in its lip balm. She 

claimed the tube was deceptive because it contained a weighted metallic bottom (which made the 

box feel heavier), was wrapped in oversized packaging, and used a mechanism that allows only 

75% of the product to advance up the tube. Id. at 962. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 

plaintiff had not, and could not, allege facts to state a plausible claim of consumer deception.3 It 

noted that “an accurate net weight label is affixed to every . . . tube and its accompanying 

cardboard box” and concluded that, “the reasonable consumer . . . understands that some 

additional weight at the bottom of the tube—not consisting of product—may be required to keep 

the tube upright.” Id. at 967. It further reasoned that “elaborate packaging and the weighty feel of 

the tube is commonplace and . . . [b]ecause of the widespread nature of this practice, no reasonable 

consumer expects the weight or overall size of the packaging to reflect directly the quantity of 

product contained therein.” Id. While Ebner involved a cosmetic product, nothing in the decision 

suggests that the Ninth Circuit’s application of the reasonable consumer test under state consumer 

 3

 Of note, the district court in Ebner had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, noting 

that “Plaintiff points to no cases in which such packaging, when paired with an accurate net 

quantity label, . . . constituted deceptive marketing practices.” See Ebner v. Fresh Inc., No. SACV 

13-00477 JVS(RNBx), 2013 WL 9760035, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2013). 

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protection laws would have been different in the context of food.4 

Plaintiff focuses on Williams to discount the importance of the serving size and unit 

disclosures because they appear on the side of the Alexia product’s packaging.5 However, 

Williams is factually distinguishable from the case at hand. In Williams, parents of small children 

brought a class action against Gerber based on the allegedly deceptive packaging of Fruit Juice 

Snacks, a food product for toddlers. Williams, 552 F.3d at 936. The two most prominent 

ingredients of Fruit Juice Snacks were corn syrup and sugar, and the only fruit or juice content 

was white grape juice from concentrate. Despite the foregoing, the product: (1) was named “Fruit 

Juice Snacks”; (2) had images of fruits such as oranges, peaches, strawberries, and cherries on the 

box; (3) stated that it was made “with real fruit juice and other natural ingredients”; and (4) stated 

that it was “one of a variety of nutritious Gerber Graduates foods and juices that have been 

specifically designed to help toddlers grow up strong and healthy.” Id. at 936, 939. The Ninth 

Circuit concluded that these features on the packaging would lead a reasonable consumer to 

believe falsely that the product contained the pictured fruits and that all of the ingredients were 

natural. Id. at 939. In light of such deceptive packaging, the court rejected Gerber’s use of the 

ingredient list as a “shield for liability for the deception[,]” explaining that a reasonable consumer 

is not “expected to look beyond misleading representations on the front of the box to discover the 

truth from the ingredient list in small print on the side of the box.” Id. Said differently, and 

 4

 Indeed, California district courts have applied Ebner in the food and other contexts. See, 

e.g., Bush v. Mondelez Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv-02460-RS, 2016 WL 5886886, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

7, 2016) (“Bush I”) (“Here, as in Ebner, it is undisputed that the Go-Pak product labels disclose 

the net weight of included product, as well as the number of cookies or crackers per container.”); 

Martinez-Leander, 2017 WL 2616918, at *8 (“Here, like in Ebner and Bush, Defendants have 

listed the exact number of pills each bottle contains on the labels of both the external box and the 

pill container.”). 

Separately, While plaintiff argues that the size of the packaging itself is a deceptive act, the 

plaintiff in Ebner similarly alleged that oversized packaging was deceptive, and the Ninth Circuit 

nevertheless found “the weight label does not contradict other representations or inferences on 

[defendant’s] packaging.” Ebner, 838 F.3d at 966. 

5

 Plaintiff also cites Brady v. Bayer Corporation, 26 Cal. App. 5th 1156 (2018), which 

relied on Williams in its discussion of the “front-back dichotomy.” Id. at 1167–68. 

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“straightforwardly, Williams stands for the proposition that if the defendant commits an act of 

deception, the presence of fine print revealing the truth is insufficient to dispel that deception.” 

Ebner, 838 F.3d at 966 (emphasis in original). 

Here, it is undisputed that the Alexia product packaging discloses the product’s net weight, 

the number of fries per serving, and the approximate number of servings per container. The 

Alexia product’s weight label and serving size statement do not contradict other representations or 

inferences from defendant’s packaging. “[T]here are no other words, pictures, or diagrams 

adorning the packaging, as there were in Williams, from which any inference could be drawn or on 

which any reasonable belief could be based about how much . . . product” is included. Id. 

(emphases in original). “In the absence of any statement or other depiction anywhere on the 

package about [the quantity of fries], . . . it is not plausible that a ‘significant portion of the general 

consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be 

misled’ into thinking” the container would be “filled to the brim with [p]roduct.” Ebner, 838 F.3 

at 966 (quoting Lavie, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 495); Escobar v. Just Born Inc., 17-cv-08126-BRO 

(PJW), 2017 WL 5125740, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017). 

In accordance with Ebner, many district courts have found that where the package itself 

discloses the actual unit counts, a “reasonable consumer” could not be misled. See, e.g., MartinezLeander, 2017 WL 2616918, at *8 (where plaintiff alleged that defendants’ herbal supplements 

were deceptively packaged in slack-filled containers, court rejected theory because “Defendants 

ha[d] listed the exact number of pills each bottle contain[ed] on the labels of both the external box 

and the pill container”); Bush I, 2016 WL 5886886, at *3 (where plaintiff alleged that he was 

deceived as to the amount of snack in the packaging of travel-size snack products, court rejected 

theory because it was “undisputed that the Go-Pak product labels disclose[d] the net weight of 

included product, as well as the number of cookies or crackers per container”); Fermin v. Pfizer 

Inc., 215 F. Supp. 3d 209, 211–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (where purchasers of Advil alleged that they 

were tricked into purchasing the medicine due to the size of Advil’s packaging, the court, applying 

California law, determined “as a matter of law, . . . it is not probable or even possible that Pfizer’s 

packaging could have misled a reasonable consumer” because “each of the packages in Plaintiffs’ 

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Complaint clearly display[s] the total pill-count on the label”).6 

Plaintiff points to Escobar to argue otherwise. There, the plaintiff alleged that the 

defendant’s advertising was misleading because the reasonable consumer would not understand 

when purchasing Mike and Ike and Hot Tamales candy that the amount of candy purchased was 

significantly less than the visible size of the packaging. Id. at *8. Unlike the instant case, Escobar 

did not involve the disclosure of actual unit counts. The court held: 

In the Court’s view, a reasonable consumer is not necessarily aware of a product’s 

weight or volume and how that weight or volume correlates to the product’s size. In 

other words, the fact that the Products’ packaging accurately indicated that a 

consumer would receive 141 grams or 5 ounces of candy does not, on its own, 

indicate to a reasonable consumer that the Products’ box may not be full of candy 

and that, instead, 35.7% of the box is empty. Rather, a reasonable consumer may 

believe that 141 grams or five ounces of candy is equivalent to an amount 

approximately the size of the Products’ box. 

Id. at *9. However, the court critically noted: “This case is distinguishable from Bush, where the 

product’s packaging indicated the number of cookies the package contained, giving the consumer 

a reasonable expectation of the product’s contents beyond just the weight.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). The only other cited in-circuit district court case does support plaintiff’s theory despite 

the disclosure of the number of pretzels contained in each package. See Cordes v. Boulder Brands 

 6

 As a general matter, plaintiff argues that the cases on which defendant relies, including 

Fermin, are distinguishable because they “did not address the effect, if any, of the FDA’s guidance 

in 21 C.F.R. § 100.00 as to the effect of an accurate net weight statement on food packaging that 

contains non-functional slack-fill.” Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC (“Opp.”) at 17, Dkt. No. 41; see also id. at 13–16. However, whether 

Fermin or defendant’s other cited cases considered the FDA’s guidance is irrelevant. As the court 

in Bush v. Mondelez Int’l, Inc., 16-cv-02460-RS, 2016 WL 7324990 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) 

(“Bush II”) explained, “the FDA guidance document is not binding authority for purposes of 

[plaintiff’s slack-fill] consumer deception claims. Those claims are brought under California 

consumer protection laws. Courts, not the FDA, determine whether a product is misleading under 

those laws.” Id. at *3. For the same reason, plaintiff’s argument that the FDA’s final rule 

indicates that labeling statements cannot insulate a manufacturer from slack fill liability, (Opp. at 

8), in addition to its argument concerning the legislative history of California’s slack fill statute, 

are inapposite. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request that the Court take judicial notice of the Bill 

Analysis of California Senate Bill 735 (1995 – 1996 Regular Session) of Senate Floor of 2/22/95, 

at p. 3 is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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USA, Inc., No. CV 18-6534 PSG (JCx), 2018 WL 6714323 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2018).7 There, the 

court found it was “at least plausible that a consumer could be deceived by a package filled with 

forty percent air, regardless of whether the number of pretzels in the package is displayed on the 

ingredient list.” Id. at *7. Notably, the Cordes court did not discuss, let alone cite to, any of the 

cases applying California law which have held the opposite. See id. 

c. The Packaging is not “Inherently Deceptive” 

Plaintiff attempts to expand the consumer deception theory by arguing as a general matter 

that the size of defendant’s packaging itself is “inherently deceptive,” and therefore the labeling 

statements cannot insulate defendant from liability. (Opp. at 7 (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiff fails to persuade. She continues to rely heavily on Hobby 

Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Younger, 101 Cal. App. 3d 358 (1980) in support thereof. 

However, Hobby, is inapposite in the context of plaintiff’s consumer deception theory.8 That case 

involved a national trade association of the hobby products industry which sued the Attorney 

General for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Attorney General had erroneously 

interpreted and applied certain provisions of the CFPLA, and made no mention or holding as to 

the elements required of a private plaintiff bringing suit under California’s consumer protection 

statutes. See Turcios v. Carma Labs., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 638, 647 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining 

Hobby court “made no holding as to the elements required to bring a private action predicated on 

the statute”). Moreover, plaintiff’s “inherently deceptive” theory would eviscerate the normal 

elements of reliance and injury, which has no support in California law. See Wilson v. Frito-Lay 

N. Am., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1208 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“To prevail on their causes of action 

 7

 Plaintiff otherwise relies on out-of-circuit cases that did not apply California law in 

support of her contention regarding unit disclosures. See Opp. at 10, 12 (citing Izquierdo v. 

Mondelez Int’l, Inc., No. 16-CV-04697 (CM), 2016 WL 6459832 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016) and In 

re McCormick & Co., Inc., Pepper Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 215 F. Supp. 3d 51 

(D.D.C. 2016)). 

8

 Consistent with the Court’s discussion herein regarding plaintiff’s nonfunctional slack 

fill theory of liability, (see infra at 12–14), Hobby held that section 12606’s “nonfunctional slack 

fill prohibition reaches all forms of nonfunctional slack fill (unless excepted),” “whether or not 

there is other proof of deception or fraud.” Hobby, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 366. 

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under the UCL, FAL, and the CLRA, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they actually relied on the 

challenged misrepresentations and suffered economic injury as a result of that reliance.”). The 

Court notes that the only cases that have cited Hobby for the proposition that the size of the 

packaging can be “inherently deceptive” are four district court cases from Missouri.9 None is 

binding on this Court, let alone applied California law. 

d. Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Consumer Handling Practices as to 

Frozen Foods 

Finally, plaintiff attempts to save her claims through new allegations regarding consumers’ 

handling practices as to frozen foods. These are similarly unavailing. Specifically, the SAC 

alleges that “[i]t is common sense that consumers including [p]laintiff expend the least amount of 

time possible to touch and otherwise handle frozen food items, which is uncomfortable to the 

average adult, and that they seek to minimize their handling of frozen food items including 

[d]efendant’s Product at a grocery store to the bare minimum in order to minimize their 

discomfort.” (SAC ¶ 23.)10 However, contrary to plaintiff’s claims, consumers do not need to 

spend a lengthy period of time in order to “feel the [pliable] package and perceive the amount of 

product in the package before purchasing the [Alexia product].” Buso v. Vigo Importing Co., No. 

18cv1328-WQH-BGS, 2018 WL 6191390, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018). Rather, “[a] 

reasonable consumer feels the amount of product in the package when picking it up off the shelf,” 

and plaintiff has not described how a consumer could be plausibly misled by the packaging of the 

Alexia product, as opposed to a box or some other kind of packaging not susceptible to 

 9

 See Hawkins v. Nestle U.S.A. Inc., 309 F. Supp. 3d 696, 703 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 2018); 

Hawkins v. Nestle U.S.A. Inc., No. 4:17CV205 HEA, 2018 WL 746304, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 

Feb. 7, 2018); White v. Just Born, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-04025-C-NKL, 2017 WL 3130333, at *4 n.2 

(W.D. Mo. July 21, 2017); Bratton v. Hershey Co., No. 2:16-cv-4322-C-NKL, 2017 WL 2126864, 

at *2 n.2 (W.D. Mo. May 16, 2017). 

10 Plaintiff argues that this allegation provides “important context” to explain “precisely 

why reasonable consumers do not necessarily ‘feel’ the empty space within a food product’s bag 

packaging displayed in freezers.” Opp. at 6. However, plaintiff, who admittedly purchased the 

Alexia product “several times,” (SAC ¶ 3), presumably would have seen the contents of the 

package after her first purchase of the product and before her subsequent purchases. 

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manipulation. Id.

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e. Conclusion 

In light of the foregoing, plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim of consumer deception 

based on the Alexia product’s packaging. Plaintiff’s CLRA, UCL (fraudulent and unfair prongs), 

and FAL claims are thus DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to the extent they are based on plaintiff’s 

consumer deception theory. 

2. Nonfunctional Slack Fill Theory 

With respect to slack fill, plaintiff does not bring a separate, free-standing claim for 

violation of Business & Professions Code section 12606.2. Rather, plaintiff alleges violations of 

that section as predicates of her UCL unfair and unlawful prong claims and her CLRA claim. 

Section 12606.2 states: 

 11 The out-of-circuit cases on which plaintiff relies to support her proposition that “feeling 

the container is not within the proper scope of a motion to dismiss,” (Opp. at 4–5 (citing Bratton 

and Izquierdo)), do not persuade and were not based on California law. While Escobar is based 

on California law, it is distinguishable because it involved a rigid box, which the plaintiff was 

“unable to inspect” or “otherwise manipulate” prior to purchase. 2017 WL 5125740, at *1 

(internal quotation marks omitted); id. at *10 (noting “the candy Products are kept in a glass 

enclosure, and may be handed to the consumer only once the consumer has paid for their order”). 

Separately, plaintiff contends her allegation that “the average consumer spends a mere 13 

seconds making an in-store purchasing decision,” is “significant” and cites to three Missouri 

district court cases which considered this statistic in denying the motions to dismiss before those 

courts. Opp. at 6 (citing Hawkins, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 704; White, 2017 WL 3130333, at *1, *4; 

and Bratton, 2017 WL 2126864, at *1, *4, *6); see also SAC ¶ 1. However, as defendant notes, 

each of these cases was brought under Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”), which 

the Missouri Supreme Court has characterized as “paternalistic legislation designed to protect 

those that could not otherwise protect themselves.” Hawkins, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 701 (quoting 

High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman, Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. 1992)); see also White, 

2017 WL 3130333, at *2; Bratton, 2017 WL 2126864, at *3. “The Missouri Supreme Court has 

explained that an ‘unfair practice’ under the MMPA covers every unfair practice imaginable and 

every unfairness, to whatever degree.” Hawkins, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 702. And, unlike California’s 

consumer protection statutes at issue here, under the MMPA, “[a] plaintiff need not even allege or 

prove reliance on an unlawful practice to state a claim under the act.” Id. Accepting plaintiff’s 

argument regarding the significance of her 13-seconds allegation would effectively allow any 

plaintiff to avoid dismissal of similar claims by merely inserting that statistic into his or her 

complaint. 

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A container that does not allow consumers to fully view its contents shall be 

considered to be filled as to be misleading if it contains nonfunctional slack fill. 

Slack fill is the difference between the actual capacity of a container and the volume 

of product contained therein. Nonfunctional slack fill is the empty space in a package 

that is filled to substantially less than its capacity for reasons other than any one or 

more of the following: 

(1) Protection of the contents of the package. 

(2) The requirements of the machines used for enclosing the contents in the package. 

(3) Unavoidable product settling during shipping and handling. 

(4) The need for the package to perform a specific function, such as where packaging 

plays a role in the preparation or consumption of a food, if that function is inherent 

to the nature of the food and is clearly communicated to consumers. 

(5) The fact that the product consists of a food packaged in a reusable container where 

the container is part of the presentation of the food and has value that is both 

significant in proportion to the value of the product and independent of its function 

to hold the food, such as a gift product consisting of a food or foods combined with 

a container that is intended for further use after the food is consumed or durable 

commemorative or promotional packages. 

(6) Inability to increase the level of fill or to further reduce the size of the package, 

such as where some minimum package size is necessary to accommodate required 

food labeling exclusive of any vignettes or other nonmandatory designs or label 

information, discourage pilfering, facilitate handling, or accommodate tamperresistant devices. 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12606.2(c)(1)–(6). Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally 

packages its products in opaque containers comprised of more than 50% non-functional slack fill 

to mislead consumers. (SAC ¶¶ 1, 3, 25, 63, 65.) Defendant opposes, arguing that the Alexia 

product packaging falls within the permitted category for slack fill for “[p]rotection of the contents 

of the package.” (Defendant’s Reply ISO MTD (“Reply”) at 10, Dkt. No. 42 (quoting Cal. Bus. 

& Prof. Code § 12606.2(c)(1)).) 

The Court disagrees. According to plaintiff, “[m]ore than 50% of the interior of the 

[Alexia product’s] containers is comprised of empty space, or non-functional slack-fill,” and 

“[t]here is no practical reason for the non-functional slack-fill used to package the [p]roduct.” 

(SAC ¶¶ 25, 31.) Plaintiff proceeds to elaborate with particularity: 

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The [Alexia product] is . . . sold in freezers at retail stores including retailers such as 

Target department store. In fact, the front label of the [p]roduct’s packaging contains 

a clear and unambiguous instruction to consumers at the bottom right hand corner . . 

. , “KEEP FROZEN.” As such, the contents of the [p]roduct are sold to consumers 

in a frozen condition with ice crystals, which make the individual fries within the 

[p]roduct frozen. The [p]roduct is not sold to consumers in a dehydrated condition. 

In fact, [p]laintiff’s factual investigation of the [p]roduct indicates that the individual 

fries within the [p]roduct are consistently frozen together into one combined lump of 

frozen fries, which has a hard texture just like ice does, and such lump of fries is not 

at all soft, tender, or otherwise flexible in their frozen state within the freezers. Given 

the frozen condition in which the [p]roduct is sold to consumers, the fries are not at 

any serious risk of breaking. Thus, the empty space in the [p]roduct packaging 

cannot be accounted for via the protection of the contents of the package. 

(Id. ¶ 15.) In response, defendant argues the merits, contending that “any reasonable consumer 

would understand that sweet potato fries are long and skinny (frozen or not) and could therefore be 

broken without any extra space in the bag.” (MTD at 13.) While defendant may ultimately be 

correct, determining whether a reasonable consumer would understand that sweet potato fries are 

“long and skinny” and thus susceptible to breakage absent extra room in the packaging is a 

question of fact not contained within the four corners of plaintiff’s SAC.12 The Court will thus not 

resolve it on a motion to dismiss.13 

 Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s remaining claims on the basis that 

she has not sufficiently alleged the presence of nonfunctional slack fill in the Alexia product 

packaging is DENIED as to plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL (unlawful and unfair prongs) claims, to the 

extent they are predicated on plaintiff’s nonfunctional slack fill theory of liability. 

 12 Defendant’s reliance on this Court’s statement at the December 18, 2018 hearing—that 

“[j]ust because there is space, even if it’s 50 percent, is not enough, in my view”—is misplaced. 

See Reply at 11 (quoting Dkt. No. 37 at 4:20–21). That comment was made in the context of 

plaintiff’s consumer deception theory of liability, not her nonfunctional slack fill theory. 

Moreover, the Court disagrees with plaintiff’s suggestion that defendant intentionally 

omitted the portion of the front label of the Alexia product packaging containing the statement 

“KEEP FROZEN.” Opp. at 22 n. 9. 

13 Since defendant does not argue that any of the other five safe harbors under section 

12606.2 applies to justify the empty space in the Alexia product’s packaging, the Court does not 

address plaintiff’s allegations as to those other safe harbors herein. 

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B. Additional Arguments Under the UCL 

The Court, having found a basis for plaintiff’s UCL claim under the unfair and unlawful 

prongs, addresses defendant’s additional arguments regarding these specific prongs. 

1. “Unfair” Conduct Under the UCL 

The “unfair” prong of the UCL creates a cause of action for a business practice that is 

unfair even if not proscribed by some other law. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 

Cal. 4th 1134, 1143 (2003). “The UCL does not define the term ‘unfair.’ . . . [And] the proper 

definition of ‘unfair’ conduct against consumers is ‘currently in flux’ among the California 

courts.” Davis v. HSBC Bank. Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lozano v. 

AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 2007)). Some courts apply a balancing 

approach, which requires courts to “weigh the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity 

of the harm to the alleged victim.” Davis, 691 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Others have held that “unfairness must be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof 

of some actual or threatened impact on competition.” Lozano, 504 F.3d at 745 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).14 

As predicates for her claim under the UCL’s “unfair” prong, plaintiff alleges that 

defendant’s conduct fails the balancing test because the conduct was “immoral, unethical, 

oppressive, and unscrupulous” and caused harm that “outweigh[ed] any alleged benefits” of the 

conduct. (SAC ¶ 66.) Plaintiff further alleges that defendant’s conduct fails the tethering test 

because the conduct violated public policy as embodied in California Business & Professions 

Code sections 12606.2(b) and (c). (Id.) 

 14 Defendant references a third test, which borrows from section 5 of the Federal Trade 

Commission Act, finding “unfair” business practices where (1) the consumer injury is substantial, 

(2) any countervailing benefit to consumers or competition do not outweigh the injury, and (3) the 

consumers could not reasonably avoid the injury. See Camacho v. Auto. Club. of S. Cal., 142 Cal. 

App. 4th 1394, 1403 (2006). This test, however, does not apply in consumer cases and is 

therefore inapplicable here. See Lozano, 504 F.3d at 736 (“Though the California Supreme Court 

did reference FTC’s section 5 as a source of ‘guidance,’ that discussion clearly revolves around 

anti-competitive conduct, rather than anti-consumer conduct.”). 

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Defendant counters that plaintiff’s claim under the balancing test fails for two reasons. 

First, plaintiff’s allegations fail to allege plausibly any consumer deception, foreclosing any “harm 

to the alleged victim.” (MTD at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Second, plaintiff does not 

attempt to allege that her purported injury is outweighed by the “utility” of the empty space, 

namely to protect the sweet potato fries from damage. (Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).) As to the tethering test, defendant argues that the alleged conduct is not tethered to a 

“legislatively declared policy,” but rather plaintiff’s “lone allegation” is “wholly conclusory.” (Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted).)15

While the Court agrees that plaintiff fails to allege any consumer deception, (see supra 

Section III.A.1.b), plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the Alexia product’s slack fill is nonfunctional, 

(see id. Section III.A.2). Moreover, contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiff does allege that 

defendant’s conduct is outweighed by the utility of the empty space. (See SAC ¶ 66.) In addition, 

while the Court agrees with defendant that plaintiff fails to allege any facts connecting defendant’s 

conduct to a “legislatively declared policy,” because plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the balancing 

test, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s UCL unfair prong claim on these additional 

proffered grounds is DENIED. 

2. “Unlawful” Conduct Under the UCL 

The “unlawful” prong of the UCL prohibits “anything that can properly be called a 

business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. 

Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). By proscribing “any 

unlawful” business practice, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, the UCL permits injured consumers 

to “borrow” violations of other laws and treat them as unfair competition that is independently 

actionable. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 180. Here, plaintiff’s claim under the unlawful prong is 

premised exclusively on sections 12606.2(b) and (c) of the Business and Professions Code. 

 15 Plaintiff merely responds that the Court “need not determine which legal standard to 

apply” because her allegations “satisfy all of them.” Opp. at 20. She cites to Hobby, 101 Cal. 

App. 3d at 368, once again, for the proposition that “the size of the packaging itself is inherently 

deceptive under California law.” (Id.) However, as discussed previously, this argument fails. See 

supra at 10–11. 

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(SAC ¶ 65.) 

In light of the Court’s conclusion that plaintiff has established that the Alexia product’s 

packaging contains nonfunctional slack fill, (see supra Section III.A.2), the Court finds that 

plaintiff’s unlawful prong of the UCL claim, predicated on violations of section 12606.2, states a 

plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss the same on the ground that 

there is no predicate violation is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s SAC is GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court ORDERS as follows: 

 Plaintiff’s claims withstand defendant’s motion to dismiss to the extent they are based on 

plaintiff’s nonfunctional slack fill theory of liability, namely plaintiff’s CLRA and UCL 

(unlawful and unfair prongs) claims. Accordingly, defendant’s motion as to these claims is 

DENIED. 

 However, to extent these and other claims are based on plaintiff’s consumer deception 

theory of liability, they do not survive the motion, namely plaintiff’s CLRA, UCL (unfair 

and fraudulent prongs), and FAL claims. Accordingly, these claims are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

Defendant shall file an answer within fourteen (14) days of this Order. 

This Order terminates Docket Number 39. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 12, 2019 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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