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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

(Jnited Stato C.OUtt of Appnj~ 

1·rnrh Cir".1:!it 

.. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN l 71990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

KENTON D. COY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES M. GAMBLE, in charge of the 

Wyoming State Prison Honor Farm, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 87-1395 

(D.C. No. 87-22) 

( D. Wyo.) 

Before Mc KAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, Chief 

Judge.** 

**Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Kenton D. Coy (plaintiff) appeals the dismissal of his 

complaint as frivolous under 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d). The district 

court also denied plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal. He thereupon sought leave from this court. This court 

denied the application. Plaintiff then paid his fee and is now 

represented by counsel. We vacate and remand. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff's complaint focused on the ''trusty" system at the 

Wyoming Honor Farm. Plaintiff complained that he "was subjected 

to the governance of other inmates." He alleged that the 

"quorum," a committee of eight inmates, decided who received 

privileges at the honor farm, including use of the telephone, 

visits with family, and excursions, furloughs, and work release. 

In addition, the quorum could "write up" other inmates and decide 

on disciplinary action. Plaintiff alleged that he "was forced to 

abide by the rules and go along with the programs, or otherwise 

not be allowed to be considered for activities such as excursions, 

furloughs, work-release or school-release, or even be written-up 

and transferred back to the prison in Rawlins." Plaintiff also 

complained that the quorum had access to inmate records. Finally, 

he alleged that the quorum decided who would receive medical 

attention, and "[i]f an inmate isn't liked extremely well, he may 

be forced to wait for medical attention." Plaintiff did not 

indicate in his complaint which, if any, of these latter problems 

affected him personally. He did allege that the entire situation, 

combined with the hiring of "ex-convicts as security and staff," 

created a stressful environment for all prisoners. 

Plaintiff has now been released from prison. Plaintiff's 

request for an injunctive remedy thus no longer raises a case or 

controversy. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), 

the plaintiff sought to challenge the policy by Los Angeles Police 

of using chokeholds on suspects during arrests. The Supreme Court 

held that the remote possibility that plaintiff might be arrested 

in the future and again subjected to unconstitutional chokeholds 

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Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 2 
by Los Angeles police officers did not raise a case or controversy 

~or purposes of injunctive relief. Similarly, plaintiff's chances 

of reincarceration do not support a cognizable claim for 

injunctive relief. His request for injunctive relief is therefore 

moot, as he concedes on appeal. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 

v. n.l. 

The proper procedure for disposing of a moot appeal is to 

vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. 

Great Western Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92 (1979); United 

States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Baker v. Bray, 

701 F.2d 119, 122 (10th Cir. 1983). In Munsingwear, the Court 

explained that vacation of an appealed order is required to 

prevent "a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from 

spawning any legal consequence." Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41. 

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment insofar as it 

denied plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff's release from prison did not moot his complaint 

for monetary damages. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415, 

2417 n.l (1987). Thus, the remaining issue is whether the 

district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint as 

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

A complaint should be dismissed as frivolous only "if the 

plaintiff cannot make a rational argument on the law or the facts 

to support his claim." Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1438 (10th 

Cir. 1986); Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 854 (10th Cir. 

1981); see also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447-48 

(1962). In dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the district court 

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Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 3 
reasoned that plaintiff merely "disagree[d] with the limited peer 

t ype system of administration now in effect. The fact the 

plaintiff finds fault with this system does not in any way 

constitute a denial of any constitutionally protected rights." 

The court accordingly concluded that plaintiff's complaint was 

frivolous. On appeal, plaintiff takes issue with this reasoning, 

arguing that several federal courts have previously enjoined the 

practice of permitting trusties to assume administrative duties in 

prison. 

Plaintiff is correct that in the context of prison conditions 

found to be of constitutionally inadequate overall, the federal 

courts have uniformly condemned the prisoner trusty system. See 

Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 

(condemning inmates' exercise of authority over other inmates, but 

rejecting broad remedy of population cap); Jones v. Diamond, 636 

F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1981) (in the context of overall 

shocking prison cond i tions, t r usty system which gave keys to cells 

to trusties and charged them with relaying medical complaints, 

delivering packages, and administering canteen, violated eighth 

amendment); Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 575 (5th Cir. 1981) 

(affi rming district court order prohibiting inmates from having 

"administrative or supervisory authority over other inmates"); 

Newman v. State of Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1330 (5th Cir. 1974) 

(the use of inmate assistants to diagnose ailments and prescribe 

medicines was considered suspect), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 

(1975}; Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972) 

(as maintained in Mississippi 

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prison, "trusty system, 

Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 4 
which allow[ed] inmates to exercise unchecked authority over other 

~nmates, [was] patently impermissible"), aff'd in relevant part, 

501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (abolition of trusty system affirmed 

because system did not conform with Texas law); Nicholson v. 

Choctaw County, Alabama, 498 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D. Ala. 1980) 

(court condemned trusty system whereby inmates dispensed and made 

records of medication and had access to prisoner records); Pugh v. 

Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (inmates, inter 

alia, held positions of authority over other inmates, "creating 

opportunities for blackmail, bribery, and extortion;" had access 

to files and mail of other inmates; and dispensed medication), 

affirmed and remanded sub nom., Newman v. State of Alabama, 559 

F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 

419 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (inmates were used to enforce rules and 

preserve discipline, contributing to creation of "overall prison 

conditions which have been found detrimental to the mental and 

moral well-being of inmates"), aff'd in relevant part, 499 F.2d 

367 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 

1970) (expressing concern that Arkansas prison trusty system 

inherently threatened the well-being of the prisoners), aff'd and 

remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Hutto v. 

Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Most if not all of these cases, 

however, concerned clear abuses of the trusty system. The 

prisoners alleged actual harm to their well-being. From the 

allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint, we cannot 

determine whether any similar abuse of the trusty system exists at 

the Wyoming Honor Farm. Similarly, whether plaintiff has suffered 

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Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 5 
either actual harm or merely the threat of harm is not apparent 

rrom the face of the complaint. 1 At the same time, however, 

plaintiff has alleged that prison inmates decide issues of prison 

discipline and privileges, as well as control the provision of 

medical care at the prison. Most if not all of these practices 

have been condemned by the federal courts at one time or another. 

The Supreme Court has indicated that the federal courts owe 

prison administrators considerable deference in the day-to-day 

running of a prison. Nevertheless, the courts continue to have a 

duty to scrutinize prison conditions. "Courts certainly have a 

responsibility to scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual 

punishment.'' Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981). Eighth 

amendment determinations "require careful scrutiny of challenged 

conditions, and application of realistic yet humane standards." 

Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring). 

The district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed 

to allege that any problems in the Wyoming trusty system had 

resulted in any violation of his own right to be free from cruel 

and unusual punishment. On the record as it now stands, the 

district court thus correctly dismissed plaintiff's complaint. In 

light of plaintiff's allegations that the prison trusties at the 

Wyoming Honor Farm exercise substantial control over their fellows 

1 In the context of an action for equitable relief, the Tenth 

Circuit has held that an actual threat of harm in prison, even if 

unaccompanied by a specific injury, may be sufficient to state a 

claim for the deprivation of the right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th 

Cir. 1980), cert.---a-enied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). In the 

circumstances currently before this court, we need not decide 

whether the threat of harm could constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment justifying any award of damages. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 6 
and the considerable precedent in other circuits noting the 

'potential for abuse inherent in the trusty system, we nonetheless 

conclude the court should have dismissed the complaint without 

prejudice so that, if plaintiff is able to support his allegations 

of abuse with more than a cursory and generalized description of 

the system itself, future litigation will not be barred. Neitzke 

v. Williams, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989). 

Accordingly, we remand with instructions to the district 

court to vacate its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with 

prejudice and enter an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint 

without prejudice. Plaintiff may thereafter file a new complaint 

alleging specific instances of abuse impacting on him which 

resulted from the trusty system, assuming he is able to do so in 

compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 

U.S. 337, 347 (1981), the Supreme Court observed that in order to 

meet the eighth amendment's ''cruel and unusual punishment" test 

one of the following conditions must be found to exist: (1) is 

the punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 

crime; (2) do the conditions involve wanton and unnecessary 

infliction of pain; or (3) do the conditions deprive inmates of 

the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. On this 

record, we express no opinion whether plaintiff may be able to 

allege any injury resulting from his treatment at the Wyoming 

Honor Farm. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Wyoming is VACATED, and the cause is REMANDED for 

further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1395 Document: 01019960731 Date Filed: 01/17/1990 Page: 7 
The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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