Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04858/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-04858-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

STANDARD INNOVATION 

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

LELO (SHANGHAI) TRADING CO., 

LTD., et al.,

LELO.

Case No. 15-cv-04858-BLF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR TEMPOARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

[Re: ECF 62]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Standard Innovation Corporation’s emergency request for a 

temporary restraining order against Defendants LELOi AB, LELO, Inc., LELO (Shanghai) 

Trading Co., Ltd., Suzhou Armocon Technology Co., Ltd., SLS Specialty LLC, and 1960 

Novelties, Inc. d/b/a/ Cindie’s. ECF 62. On November 5, 2015, pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-1(b), the 

Court, finding this matter suitable for submission without oral argument, vacated the hearing 

scheduled for February 18, 2016. ECF 100. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff Standard Innovation Corporation’s request for a temporary restraining order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Standard Innovation Corporation (“SI”) commenced this action on December 2, 

2011, in the Southern District of Texas, alleging that Defendants LELOi AB, LELO Inc., and 

LELO (collectively, “LELO”) infringed U.S. Patent No. 7,931,605 (“the ’605 patent”).

1

 ECF 1. 

On the same day, SI filed a complaint at the United States International Trade Commission 

(“ITC”) alleging that LELO infringed the ’605 patent and the ITC instituted an investigation on 

 

1 On August 26, 2015, SI filed an amended complaint which added Defendants LELO (Shanghai)

Trading Co., Ltd., Suzhou Armocon Technology Co., Ltd., SLS Specialty LLC, and 1960 

Novelties, Inc. d/b/a/ Cindie’s. ECF 48.

Case 5:15-cv-04858-BLF Document 102 Filed 11/06/15 Page 1 of 6
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January 4, 2012. ECF 12. On January 23, 2012, this action was stayed pending a final 

determination by the ITC. On June 17, 2013, the ITC issued a final determination finding 

infringement and issuing a general exclusion order with respect to LELO’s Tiani and Tiani 2 

products. Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 7, ECF 51. The ITC did not find infringement with respect to 

LELO’s Mahana product. Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that SI failed to meet the 

domestic industry requirement of Section 337 and reversed the ITC’s decision. Def.’s Opp. to 

TRO at 2, ECF 72. The Federal Circuit issued its decision on May 11, 2015, see LELO Inc. v. 

USITC, 786 F.3d 879, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and this action resumed on August 4, 2015, ECF 35, 

36. 

On September 4, 2015, SI filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF 51. On 

September 18, 2015, SI filed an emergency request for a temporary restraining order. ECF 62. 

On September 29, 2015, LELO filed an opposition to the emergency request for a temporary 

restraining order. ECF 72. While the parties were considering a briefing schedule for the motion 

for preliminary injunction, this action was transferred from the Southern District of Texas to the 

Northern District of California. ECF 86 (transferring case on October 23, 2015). On October 29, 

2015, this action was reassigned to the undersigned.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The substantive standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the 

standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush 

& Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001); Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft, 

887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is 

“an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is 

entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 

A plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish “[1] that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public 

interest.” Id. at 20. Alternatively, an injunction can issue where “the likelihood of success is such 

that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in 

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plaintiff’s favor,” provided that “plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury 

and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 

F.3d 1127, 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Showing 

“serious questions going to the merits” requires more than establishing that “success is more likely 

than not;” rather, it requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a “substantial case for relief on the merits.” 

Leiva–Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2011). Under either standard, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of making a clear showing on these elements and on entitlement to this 

extraordinary remedy. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants LELOi AB and LELO, Inc.

To prevail on its request for a temporary restraining order, SI must demonstrate a 

likelihood of irreparable harm. Because the Court finds this element dispositive under either 

formulation of the test for a preliminary injunction, the Court addresses only whether SI has 

shown a likelihood of irreparable harm.2

SI argues that it will be irreparably harmed absent a temporary restraining order against 

LELO.

3

 According to SI, shortly after filing for a preliminary injunction, LELO drastically 

reduced the prices on its products. Pl.’s Mot. for TRO at 9, ECF 62. SI argues that this conduct 

has the potential to put it out of business and prohibit it from enforcing its patent rights. Id. SI

asserts that LELO’s stronger and well-funded marketing combined with the fact that LELO’s

products may become the only “couples’ massagers on the U.S. market” threatens to eliminate 

SI’s business. Id. at 9-10, ECF 62 (citing Finlayson Decl. to Pl.’s Mot for PI at ¶ 7, ECF 51-36). 

 

2

The Court notes that SI’s showing of its likelihood of success on the merits appears to be strong 

based on the ITC ruling. The Court is not, at this juncture, making a final determination on this 

issue. Should SI pursue a preliminary injunction, the Court will engage in a thorough analysis of 

the evidence.

3 At various points in its request for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff incorporates portions 

of its motion for a preliminary injunction. See Pl.’s Mot for TRO at 3 (incorporating background 

and history), 10 (appearing to incorporate discussion on issues of infringement and validity), ECF 

62. In considering this Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order, the Court has 

reviewed the relevant portions of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the 

parties are advised that future filings must comply with the page limit requirements set forth in the 

local rules and the Court’s standing order and may not incorporate additional materials by 

reference.

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SI also argues that it has no adequate remedy at law because “losses of sales, potential sales, 

customers, and potential customers, and the devaluation of [SI’s] intellectual property” are not 

easily measurable. Id. at 10. SI further contends that LELO may not have substantial assets in the 

United States, and thus, monetary damages are likely not recoverable and even if they were, SI is 

unlikely to survive to see a full trial because of “the escalation of [LELO’s price-cutting].”

LELO argues that SI has not shown irreparable harm. According to LELO, SI’s arguments 

are based on “conclusory attorney argument[s]” and are not supported by affidavits or evidence. 

Def.’s Opp. to TRO at 5, ECF 72. LELO also argues that SI has failed to show a casual nexus 

connecting the alleged harm to LELO’s alleged infringement. Id. at 6-7.

The Court finds that SI has failed to show irreparable harm. SI’s request for a temporary 

restraining order lacks evidence supporting its allegations regarding LELO’s conduct. SI argues

that LELO reduced the prices on the Noa, Tiani 2, Tiani 3, and Kalia in an effort to quickly unload 

inventory. However, SI’s evidence only indicates that LELO has distributed a coupon code 

allowing customers to receive 20% off the purchase of a Tiani 2 or Tiani 3. See Exhs. 3 and 4 to 

Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, ECF 62-4, 62-5.4 As LELO notes and SI does not dispute, although the Noa 

and Kalia products are offered at lower prices, these prices are the standard manufacturer’s 

suggested retail price because these products offer less features. See Def.’s Opp. to TRO at 4, 

ECF 72. This highlights the problem with SI’s argument – while LELO may be offering its 

products at a lower price than SI’s products, there could be several explanations for this, such as 

the products having different features, beyond an effort by LELO to unload inventory to escape 

liability. Although SI provided the declaration of Anne Finlayson as support for its arguments, the 

declaration provides no evidence to support the assertion that LELO’s discounts have had an 

actual impact on the market.

SI’s argument that it has no adequate remedy at law also falls short. While SI contends 

that it will suffer a loss in market share and sales, “it has not presented any evidence of actual or 

 

4

The Court also notes that it is not even clear how many people received this coupon and whether 

it was widely disseminated or sent to a few customers. Plaintiff’s exhibits only show that the 

coupon code was sent to one person. Id.

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future losses to supports it conclusion.”5 See Generac Power Sys., Inc. v. Kohler Co., 807 F. 

Supp. 2d 791, 805 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (noting that status as a direct competitor without further 

evidence is not enough to show irreparable harm). While SI correctly notes that the Court should 

consider the ability to recover damages from LELO and whether they have assets in the United 

States, SI must provide some minimal evidence about LELO’s inability to pay. See Robert Bosch 

LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1155 (Fed.Cir. 2011). SI has provided no evidence 

about LELO’s financial condition.6 Finally, SI has failed to indicate any nexus between lost sales 

of its products and sales of LELO’s allegedly infringing products. Asetek Danmark A/S v. CMI 

USA, Inc., No. 13-cv-00457-JST, 2015 WL 5568360, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2015) (“To 

demonstrate irreparable harm in a patent infringement suit, a patentee must establish... a 

sufficiently strong causal nexus relates the alleged harm to the alleged infringement.”). 

Accordingly, SI has failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and because a temporary restraining 

order cannot be issued without demonstrating irreparable harm, the Court DENIES SI’s request 

for a temporary restraining order with respect to LELO.

B. Defendants LELO (Shanghai) Trading Co., Ltd., Suzhou Armocon Technology 

Co., Ltd., SLS Specialty LLC, and 1960 Novelties, Inc. d/b/a/ Cindie’s

SI’s request for a TRO was made ex parte to Defendants LELO (Shanghai) Trading Co., 

Ltd., Suzhou Armocon Technology Co., Ltd., SLS Specialty LLC, and 1960 Novelties, Inc. d/b/a/ 

Cindie’s pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Pl.’s Mot. for TRO at 9, ECF 62. Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 65(b)(1), requires SI to provide “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 

complaint” that “clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to 

the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition,” and a certification describing the 

“efforts made to give notice [to the adverse party] and the reasons why it should not be required.” 

 

5 Because of the motion to transfer venues, the Court notes that this request for a temporary 

restraining order has been pending for almost two months and SI has not provided any 

supplemental evidence regarding lost sales or irreparable harm.

6

In fact, at one point in its brief, Plaintiff argues that LELO has a “well-funded marketing” 

operation which appears to contradict SI’s assertion that LELO does not have the financial 

resources to pay a judgment. Pl.’s Mot. for TRO at 9, ECF 62. This also contradicts the 

declaration of Anne Finlayson which indicates SI has been unable to determine “the most basic of 

financial information about LELO.” See Finlayson Decl. to Pl.’s Mot. for PI at ¶ 10, ECF 51-36.

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)(A)-(B). SI has failed to comply with these requirements and accordingly, 

the Court DENIES SI’s request for a temporary restraining order with respect to Defendants

LELO (Shanghai) Trading Co., Ltd., Suzhou Armocon Technology Co., Ltd., SLS Specialty LLC, 

and 1960 Novelties, Inc. d/b/a/ Cindie’s.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that SI’s request for a temporary 

restraining order is DENIED. SI shall file a Notice of Hearing for a Preliminary Injunction to be 

set for the Court’s next available hearing date. SI may rest on its earlier filed brief and evidence or 

may file a new brief with supporting evidence. In the event that SI files a new brief with 

supporting evidence, incorporation by reference to previously filed documents is not allowed.

Dated: November 6, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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