Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01746/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01746-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Hesam Mohajerin, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Pinal County, a political subdivision of

the State of Arizona, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-1746-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to amend his complaint,

Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s motion to supplement his response to

the motion to dismiss. Dkt. ## 11, 16, 20. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend, grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, and deny as moot Plaintiff’s motion to supplement.

I. Background.

This case arises out of the allegedly wrongful arrest and detention of Plaintiff Hesam

Mohajerin. According to Plaintiff’s complaint, in May of 2006 Plaintiff was arrested by

Defendant William Langan, a detective with the Pinal County (“County”) Sheriff’s Office,

for the alleged sexual assault of Plaintiff’s wife, Andrea Blaylock. See Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 12, 13, 16.

Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Mr. Langan, on more than one occasion, used the guise of

conducting an official investigation to seduce and engage in sexual relations with Plaintiff’s

wife. See id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 24. Mr. Langan has “acknowledged his participation in a sexual

relationship with Ms. Blaylock[.]” Id. ¶ 21. The charges against Plaintiff were dismissed,

and he was released from custody in November of 2006. See id. ¶¶ 22, 23. 

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II. Procedural Posture of this Case.

On September 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed suit against the County, Mr. Langan and his

spouse, and Christopher L. Vasquez, whom Plaintiff claims had supervisory authority over

Mr. Langan (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges a federal cause of action –

violations of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and his right to due

process (Count 1). Plaintiff also alleges several state torts – abuse of process (Count 2),

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count 3), negligence and/or gross

negligence (Count 4), malicious prosecution (Count 5), and false arrest and imprisonment

(Count 6).

On October 22, 2007, Defendants filed their answer to the complaint and, a day later,

a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in part. Dkt. ## 9, 11. On October 29, 2007,

Plaintiff filed notice that he was lodging an amended complaint. Dkt. #12. The notice stated

that “[s]ince Defendants have not yet filed a responsive pleading in this matter, Plaintiff may

file the [amended] complaint without leave of court or the parties to the matter.” Id. at 1. 

A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before

a responsive pleading is served. Otherwise, a party may amend the party’s pleading only by

leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). While

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading within the meaning of Rule 15(a),

see Miles v. Dep’t of Army, 881 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1989), Defendants’ answer is a

responsive pleading, see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,

216 F.3d 764, 788 (9th Cir. 2000). As a result, Plaintiff was required to seek leave of Court

to amend his original complaint. The clerk of court accordingly informed Plaintiff that his

amended complaint was filed prematurely. See Dkt. #13. 

On October 31, 2007, Plaintiff lodged a proposed amended complaint and filed a

document labeled “Notice Regarding First Amended Complaint.” Dkt. ## 16, 17. The

parties agree that the purpose of the “notice” was to seek leave of Court to amend the original

complaint. Plaintiff acknowledged that this “filing is a motion for leave to amend the

complaint and should have been titled as such.” Dkt. #22 at 1. Defendants also note that the

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filing “requests permission to make the proposed amendment[s].” Dkt. #23 at 1. The Court

therefore will treat the document as a motion to amend. 

Finally, Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his response to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. The Court will address, in turn, Plaintiff’s motion to amend, Defendants’ partial

motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s motion to supplement his response to the motion to dismiss.

III. Motion to Amend.

Rule 15(a) declares that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice

so requires.” The Ninth Circuit has noted that “Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments

should be applied with extreme liberality.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir.

1987) (citation omitted). A court may deny a motion to amend, however, if there is a

showing of undue delay or bad faith on the part of the moving party, undue prejudice to the

opposing party, or futility of the proposed amendments. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

182 (1962). The party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing prejudice, futility,

or one of the other recognized reasons for denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs,

LTD. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s amended complaint would be futile, as it “does not

cure the defects in the original complaint.” Dkt. #23 at 2. As explained below, however,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss will not result in the dismissal of all challenged causes of

action. Plaintiff’s amendment is relevant with respect to claims that will not be dismissed,

and its failure to preclude dismissal of some claims is no reason to deny it. The Court will

grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint.

IV. Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff admits that the “amended complaint addresses some ‘housekeeping’ issues

raised by Defendants in their motion to dismiss, but does not materially change the complaint

with respect to the issues advanced by the Defendants.” Dkt. #16 at 1. Defendants similarly

note that the changes in the amended complaint are directed “primarily to imprecise

wording” and that the amended complaint is “substantially the same as the original filing[.]”

Dkt. #23 at 1, 2. As the amendments generally are not substantive in nature, but instead

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address technical or clerical errors, Defendants’ arguments in their motion to dismiss apply

equally to the original complaint and the amended complaint. The Court therefore will

consider the merits of those arguments.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s state law claims, except for Count 5, should be

dismissed because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Arizona notice of claim statute, A.R.S.

§ 12-821.01, or the applicable statute of limitations, A.R.S. § 12-821. Dkt. #11. In addition,

Defendants contend that the due process component of Count 1 does not properly state a

claim for relief. Id.

A district court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim “unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims

which would entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994).

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “[a]ll allegations of material fact are

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Smith v.

Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the court must assume that all

general allegations “embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support them.”

Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A. Compliance with A.R.S. § 12-821.01.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims, with the exception of Count 5,

should be dismissed for failing to satisfy Arizona’s notice of claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-

821.01. This statute requires anyone with a claim against a public entity or employee to file

notice of the claim with the public entity or employee prior to initiating legal proceedings.

See Tryon v. Avra Valley Fire Dist., 659 F.Supp. 283, 284 (D. Ariz.1986); Pritchard v. State,

788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ariz. 1990). A notice of claim must be filed within 180 days of the

claim’s accrual. A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). “[A] cause of action accrues when the damaged

party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or reasonably should know the cause,

source, act, event, instrumentality or condition which caused or contributed to the damage.”

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B).

Plaintiff asserts that a notice of claim was filed on or about March 5 and 6, 2007, and

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was supplemented on April 25, 2007. Dkt. #17 at ¶10. The parties dispute when Plaintiff’s

claims accrue within the meaning of the notice of claim statute. Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims accrued on the date of his arrest – May 15,

2006 – and that Plaintiff’s abuse of process, IIED, negligence and/or gross negligence claims,

which are based on the allegedly wrongful arrest, also accrued on that date. Dkt. #11.

Plaintiff asserts that his claims accrued when the charges against him were dismissed and/or

when he was released from custody – in November of 2006. Dkt. #14.

1. False Arrest and Imprisonment.

Citing Hansen v. Stoll, 636 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims accrued on the date of Plaintiff’s arrest.

Dkt. #11 at 3. Plaintiff contends that the Stoll court determined that the plaintiff’s false

imprisonment claim accrued on the date of arrest only because the plaintiff had not been

imprisoned. Dkt. #14 at 6. Plaintiff maintains that Stoll is consistent with his argument that

his false arrest and imprisonment claims accrued on the date of his release. Id.

 Plaintiff’s understanding of Stoll is not supported by relevant legal authority. This

Court previously concluded that “[a] cause of action for false imprisonment or false arrest

‘accrue[s] of necessity’ on the date of the arrest.” Stevens v. Mohave County, No. CV-05-

1987-PCT-FJM, 2006 WL 2772635, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2006) (quoting Stoll, 636 P.2d

at 1242). At least one Arizona case has held that false arrest and imprisonment claims accrue

on the date of arrest. See Rondelli v. County of Pima, 586 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1978). Plaintiff has not cited any Arizona cases that adopt his interpretation of Stoll. 

More fundamentally, Plaintiff’s position is inconsistent with the basic elements of a

false arrest and false imprisonment claim. The Supreme Court of Arizona defined false arrest

and imprisonment “as the detention of a person without his consent and without lawful

authority.” Slade v. City of Phoenix, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975). As a result, “[a]

detention which occurs pursuant to legal authority . . . is not an unlawful detention.” Id.

Similarly, “[i]f the arrest or imprisonment has occurred pursuant to valid legal process, the

fact that the action was procured maliciously and without probable cause does not constitute

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false arrest or false imprisonment[.]” Id. 

In this case, Plaintiff would have been brought before a magistrate within twenty-four

hours of his May 2006 arrest. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (“A person arrested shall be taken

before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. If the person is not brought before a

magistrate within twenty-four hours after arrest, he or she shall immediately be released.”).

Citing Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1096 (2007), Defendants assert that any false arrest

or false imprisonment in this case would have ended when Plaintiff was lawfully bound over

by a magistrate, and that his claim for those wrongs therefore would have arisen, if at all, at

the time of his arrest (or during the 24 hours before the magistrate made a determination that

he should be held). In response, Plaintiff does not assert that he was detained without

process, or more specifically, that he was not brought before a magistrate as required by Rule

4(a). See Dkt. #14. 

In Wallace, the Supreme Court explained that because “false imprisonment consists

of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held

pursuant to such process – when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned

on charges.” Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1096 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The

operative word in this context is “false,” not “imprisonment” – a false imprisonment claim

ends when the detention is validated by legal process, not when the imprisonment itself ends.

The Supreme Court rejected a “petitioner’s contention that his false imprisonment ended

upon his release from custody, after the State dropped the charges against him,” noting

instead that the claim accrued “much earlier, when legal process was initiated[.]” Id.

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued

in May of 2006. His March of 2007 notice was well beyond the 180-day time limit.

2. Abuse of Process.

Abuse of process “‘is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without

justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that

which it was designed to accomplish.’” Joseph v. Markovitz, 551 P.2d 571, 574 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1976) (emphasis added) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts at 856-57 (4th ed.). Defendants

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contend that Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim accrued at the time of his arrest, but an abuse

of process may occur after an arrest, during the course of litigation. See, e.g., Nienstedt v.

Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 882 (Ariz. App. 1982) (finding that liability for an abuse of process

may be “imposed where the ulterior or collateral purpose involved has been to expose the

injured party to excessive attorney’s fees and legal expenses[.]”). Here, Plaintiff alleges that

Mr. Langan’s “investigation and assistance in the prosecution of Mr. Mohajerin,” which

occurred after Plaintiff’s arrest, constituted an abuse of process. Dkt. #17 ¶32. The Court

cannot say that Plaintiff would be unable to demonstrate that an abuse of process occurred

after his arrest and during a time that would fall within the 180-day period provided for by

the notice of claim statute.

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s IIED claim accrued when he was arrested. The

Court does not agree. Distinguishing the case at bar from another recent decision will help

illustrate why Defendants are mistaken. In Franklin v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-06-02316-

PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 1463753 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2007), a plaintiff alleged that he had been

beaten by City of Phoenix police officers. He was arrested, charged with criminal and civil

offenses, and ultimately acquitted by a jury of the criminal charges. Id. at *1. The plaintiff

filed suit, bringing an IIED claim among other causes of action. Id. at *2. The Court

determined that the claim for IIED accrued on the date of the plaintiff’s arrest. Id. In

arriving at this conclusion, the Court found that the “continuing tort” doctrine did not extend

the point of accrual past the arrest date because the “conduct endured by [the plaintiff] at the

hands of the Phoenix police caused a single set of damages,” referring to the beating and

arrest of the plaintiff. Id. 

By contrast, the factual predicate underlying Plaintiff’s claim of severe emotional

distress includes not only Plaintiff’s arrest, but also the alleged circumstances surrounding

his incarceration – specifically, the allegation that he was detained in order to permit Mr.

Langan to engage in a sexual relationship with his wife. See Dkt. #17 ¶¶ 26, 27. Whereas

Franklin concerned damage that flowed from a single event, Plaintiff appears to allege

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damage created from an arrest and an additional series of events. Moreover, the interactions

between Mr. Langan and Plaintiff’s wife would not have been apparent to Plaintiff at the

time of the arrest because those interactions had not occurred and were not reasonably

discernable from the arrest itself. See A.R.S. § 12-821.01(B). Thus, any damage resulting

from learning of those circumstances could not have arisen at the time of arrest. The Court

cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s IIED claim accrued at the date of arrest and therefore is timebarred.

4. Negligence/Gross Negligence.

In Arizona, “[t]he elements of actionable negligence are the existence of a duty owed

by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty and an injury proximately caused by

that breach.” Flowers v. K-Mart Corp., 616 P.2d 955, 957 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (internal

quotes and citation omitted). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s negligence claim accrued at

the date of arrest. Dkt. #11. 

The basis of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, however, is not limited to the arrest.

Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Langan breached “a duty of care to conduct a reasonable

investigation[.]” Dkt. #17 ¶42. This investigation apparently occurred after Plaintiff’s arrest.

See id. ¶¶ 16, 17 (noting that Plaintiff was arrested and “Defendant Langan then went to the

home of Plaintiff and Ms. Blaylock, purportedly to interview Ms. Blaylock.”) (emphasis

added). Plaintiff may be able to establish facts showing that his negligence claim accrued

after his arrest and is not time-barred. 

B. Statute of Limitations.

“All actions against any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one

year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward.” A.R.S. § 12-821. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims (aside from Count 5) were not filed within one year of

their accrual and should be dismissed. Defendants’ argument appears to be premised on their

contention that the date of accrual for these claims is the date of Plaintiff’s arrest. As noted

above, however, Counts 2-4 did not accrue at the time of arrest. Accordingly, Defendants

at this stage have not carried their burden of proving that Plaintiff’s suit was filed outside of

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the applicable statute of limitations. 

C. Due Process Claim.

In addition to his state law causes of action, Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, which provides a remedy to any person who has been deprived of federal

constitutional rights by individuals acting under color of state law, including police officers.

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). Plaintiff alleges violations of two

constitutional safeguards – the “right[] to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures

under the Fourth Amendment” and the “right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment[.]” Dkt. #17 ¶26; see also id. ¶27. Plaintiff clarifies that his due process claim

is one based on the substantive, not procedural, protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Dkt. #14. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim arises under the Fourth Amendment

alone. Dkt. ##11, 19. As a consequence, Defendants urge the Court to dismiss this federal

cause of action to the extent that it is based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 

The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have made clear that the Fourth Amendment

is not the exclusive constitutional lens through which alleged police misconduct may be

judged and that a police officer’s actions can, depending on the circumstances, violate an

individual’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. See, e.g., County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998); Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882 n.7

(9th Cir. 2001); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589-90 (9th Cir.1989). In the context of

malicious prosecution, a substantive due process right “to be free from criminal prosecution

except upon probable cause” does not exist, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994)

(plurality), but a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 may be brought where a

defendant has acted with intent to deprive a plaintiff of a specific constitutional right,

including a right under the Fourteenth Amendment, Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d

1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Langan either arrested, or caused the arrest, of

Mr. Mohajerin without factual basis or probable cause[.]” Dkt. #17 ¶26. Plaintiff thus

appears to assert a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation on the ground

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Plaintiff’s response also asserts that this statement encompasses a First Amendment right,

namely the “right of association with his wife.” Dkt. #14 at 14. But the § 1983 section of

Plaintiff’s amended complaint makes no mention of either the right to association or the First

Amendment more generally. Thus, an alleged deprivation of a First Amendment right cannot

be maintained as part of the § 1983 action. 

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that Mr. Langan maliciously prosecuted Plaintiff without probable cause. Such a claim is

precluded by Albright and will be dismissed by the Court. But Plaintiff alleges an additional

substantive due process violation – that “Defendant Langan’s conduct was deliberately

indifferent to Mr. Mohaerin’s rights, and caused the institution and continuation of the

prosecution against Mr. Mohajerin.” Id. at ¶27. Though not enumerated, these “rights”

ostensibly refer to those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, including the “right to due

process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” Id. at ¶26. In his response, Plaintiff

explains that the due process right contemplated by this statement is the Fourteenth

Amendment’s “right to liberty.” Dkt. #14 at 14.1

 Therefore, consistent with Awabdy,

Plaintiff’s claim that his substantive due process rights were violated by Mr. Langan’s

deliberate indifference to his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests may proceed. 

V. Motion to Supplement.

Plaintiff seeks to supplement his response to the motion to dismiss in order to address

more fully Defendants’ argument regarding the Fourteenth Amendment. Dkt. # 20. Because

the Court has decided to deny the motion to dismiss on this issue, the Court will also deny

Plaintiff’s motion to supplement as moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (Dkt. #16) is granted.

2. The clerk of court is directed to file the lodged amended complaint (Dkt. # 17).

3. Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss (Dkt. #11) is granted in part and

denied in part. The following claims are dismissed: Count 1 – Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim asserting that Defendants maliciously prosecuted him without

probable cause, and Count 6 – false arrest and false imprisonment. The

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following claims remain: Count 1 – Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for violations of

his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures, and for violation of his substantive due process right based on the

alleged intentional deprivation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty

interests; Count 2 – state-law abuse of process; Count 3 – state-law intentional

infliction of emotional distress; Count 4 – state-law negligence and/or gross

negligence; Count 5 – state-law malicious prosecution.

4. Plaintiff’s motion to supplement his response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. #

20) is denied as moot. 

DATED this 7th day of December, 2007.

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