Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05263/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05263-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 2005 Decided May 31, 2005

No. 03-5345

SPIRIT OF THE SAGE COUNCIL, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

COALITION FOR HABITAT CONSERVATION, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

04-5262, 04-5263, 04-5264

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv01873)

Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for federal appellants. With him on the briefs

was Andrew C. Mergen, Attorney.

Robert D. Thornton argued the cause for intervenors. With

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him on the briefs were John J. Flynn, III, Steven P. Quarles, J.

Michael Klise, and Thomas R. Lundquist, Benjamin S. Sharp,

Guy R. Martin, and Donald C. Baur.

Eric R. Glitzenstein argued the cause for appellees The

Humane Society of the United States, et al. With him on the

brief was Katherine A. Meyer.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: The Spirit of the Sage Council, et

al., sued the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National

Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), challenging the Services’

jointly-issued “No Surprises Rule” on both substantive and

procedural grounds. When the FWS subsequently promulgated

the closely related “Permit Revocation Rule,” the Council

amended its complaint to contest that Rule as well. 

In the orders under review, the district court held the FWS

had not provided an adequate opportunity for the public to

comment upon the Permit Revocation Rule, as required by the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553. Although the

district court did not reach the merits of the Council’s challenge

to the No Surprises Rule, the court held that Rule was

“sufficiently intertwined with the [Permit Revocation Rule] that

it must also be remanded to the agency for consideration as a

whole.” Spirit of the Sage Council, et al. v. Norton, 294 F.

Supp. 2d 67, 91 (2003). The district court further ordered the

FWS and the NMFS to complete the proceedings on remand

within one year and enjoined the Services from applying the No

Surprises Rule in the meantime.

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On appeal the Services do not contest the district court’s

conclusion that the Permit Revocation Rule was procedurally

defective. Rather, they argue the interim suspension of the No

Surprises Rule and the one-year deadline for repromulgation of

the Permit Revocation Rule exceeded the court’s authority under

the APA.

The Council contends these appeals are moot because the

Services have fully complied with the district court’s orders.

We agree with the Council and therefore dismiss these appeals

and vacate the orders under review pursuant to United States v.

Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950).

I. Background

In 1982 the Congress amended the Endangered Species Act

to authorize the Secretaries of the Interior and of Commerce,

who delegated this authority to the FWS and the NMFS,

respectively, to permit the “taking [of an endangered or

threatened species] otherwise prohibited by [the Act] if such

taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out

of an otherwise lawful activity.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). An

applicant for a so-called incidental take permit (ITP) must

submit a habitat conservation plan (HCP) demonstrating to the

satisfaction of the Secretary that: 

(i) the taking will be incidental; (ii) the applicant will, to the

maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the

impacts of such taking; (iii) the applicant will ensure that

adequate funding for the [HCP] will be provided; [and] (iv)

the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the

survival and recovery of the species in the wild[.]

Id. 

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In the first decade this procedure was available the Services

issued only 14 ITPs. Hoping to encourage more private

landowners to enter into HCPs, the Services developed their “No

Surprises” policy, which provided that 

under no circumstances, including extraordinary

circumstances, shall an HCP permittee who is abiding by

the terms of their [sic] HCP be required to provide a greater

financial commitment or accept additional land use

restrictions on property available for economic use or

development. 

Notice of Availability of Final Handbook for Habitat

Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process,

61 Fed. Reg. 63,854, 63,857 (Dec. 2, 1996). 

The new policy had the intended effect. “[B]y September

30, 1998, the Services had issued 243 incidental take permits,

and [as of March 1999] approximately 200 HCPs [were] under

development.” Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to

the Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and

Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,485 (March

9, 1999). The new policy was later codified as the No Surprises

Rule. See 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998).

The Council brought suit in July 1998, claiming, among

other things, the No Surprises Rule violates the ESA “[b]y

precluding the Services from making changes to ITPs/HCPs

which may be necessary to ensure the survival and/or recovery

of endangered and threatened species.” The Coalition for

Habitat Conservation and other organizations representing

permit-holders intervened in support of the Services.

In June 1999, while this litigation was underway, the FWS

adopted the Permit Revocation Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706 (June

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17, 1999), which provides that an ITP containing an assurance

of no surprises may be revoked in the event of unforeseen

circumstances that will “appreciably reduce the likelihood of the

survival and recovery of the species in the wild,” 16 U.S.C. §

1539(a)(2)(B)(iv), if the Service is not otherwise able to avert

the jeopardy to the species, 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(8) &

17.32(b)(8). Although the NMFS did not adopt a similar rule,

it joined the FWS in arguing before the district court that the

Permit Revocation Rule was not a modification of the No

Surprises Rule, but a mere clarification of how “the Services’

obligations under ... the ESA would be applied to revoke an

HCP permit.” Federal Defendants’ Reply Memorandum In

Support of Cross-motion for Summary Judgment at 9. The

Council then amended its complaint to challenge the Permit

Revocation Rule as well.

After rejecting the Services’ arguments that the Council

lacked standing to bring a facial challenge to the No Surprises

Rule and that the issue was not ripe for review, the court went

on to address, and to uphold on the merits, the Council’s

procedural claim that the FWS had failed to provide proper

notice and an adequate opportunity for public comment before

promulgating the Permit Revocation Rule, as required by § 553

of the APA. The district court accordingly vacated and

remanded the Permit Revocation Rule, which decision the

Services have not appealed.

Without purporting to reach the Council’s substantive

challenge to the No Surprises Rule, the district court further

concluded that Rule was “sufficiently intertwined with the

[Permit Revocation Rule] that it must also be remanded to the

agency for consideration as a whole with the [Permit Revocation

Rule].” 294 F. Supp. 2d at 91. The district court later issued an

order requiring the Services to complete “all proceedings

remanded by the Court[]” within one year of the date on which

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they were remanded and, “pending completion of the proceeding

on remand ... [to] refrain from approving new ITPs or related

documents containing ‘No Surprise’ assurances.” 

After this court denied the Services’ motion for a stay

pending appeal, the FWS solicited public comment on both the

Permit Revocation Rule and its relationship to the No Surprises

Rule, as ordered by the district court. See Proposed Rule,

Endangered Species Act Incidental Take Permit Revocation

Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,681, 29,683 (May 25, 2004). On

December 10, 2004 the FWS repromulgated the Permit

Revocation Rule without substantial change. See Final Rule, 69

Fed. Reg. 71,723.

II. Analysis

The Council argues these appeals are moot because it is

now “impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief

whatever” to the appellants, Beethoven.com LLC v. Librarian of

Congress, 394 F.3d 939, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2005); that is, having

adhered to the procedure required by the district court and

repromulgated the Permit Revocation Rule, the Services are no

longer prohibited from issuing ITPs containing no-surprise

assurances. 

The Services, on the other hand, maintain this court can still

grant effective relief because “the challenged order has ongoing

effects” upon the further proceedings required to resolve this

case. In the alternative the Services argue these appeals are not

moot because the harm of which they complain is one of those

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” So. Pac. Terminal

Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).

As for continuing effects, we note again that the Services do

not challenge the portion of the district court’s order vacating

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* The Intervenors devote a single footnote in their brief to

contesting that ruling but, as we stated in Hutchins v. District of

Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc), “[w]e

need not consider cursory arguments made only in a footnote.” If we

were to consider their argument, however, we would be hard pressed

to see why our holding the district court erred in vacating the original

version of the Rule would provide the Intervenors any relief inasmuch

as the FWS apparently has no intention of recalling the newly

promulgated version of that Rule. 

and remanding the Permit Revocation Rule; we therefore do not

consider whether allowing the FWS to recall the new version of

that Rule would provide it any redress.* Insofar as the district

court suspended and remanded the No Surprises Rule and set a

deadline for the completion of the proceedings on remand, its

orders were the functional equivalent of a preliminary injunction

designed to expedite the court’s further review of the No

Surprises Rule while preserving the status quo in the interim.

And “an appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction

becomes moot when, because of the defendant’s compliance or

some other change in circumstances, nothing remains to be

enjoined through a permanent injunction.” People for the

Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 421

(D.C. Cir. 2005). That is precisely the situation here; the

Services have completed the required rulemaking. The orders

under review require nothing more of them, and hence they have

resumed issuing ITPs containing no-surprise assurances.

The Services argue the district court’s ruling nonetheless

has a continuing effect because it “provides [the Council] with

an opening to argue that the new comments [concerning the

proposed repromulgation of the No Surprises Rule] -- and

FWS’s responses or lack thereof -- should be considered in the

district court’s ongoing review of the [No Surprises] Rule.” The

Council, however, has not argued here, and at oral argument

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represented that it will not argue in the district court, that the

Services failed fully to comply with the orders under review,

including the requirement to reconsider the No Surprises Rule

“in tandem with the ... [Permit Revocation Rule],” 294 F. Supp.

2d at 91. Although the Council may yet argue the No Surprises

Rule and the Permit Revocation Rule are inconsistent with one

another, the orders under review did not provide the Council

with that opening; the Council has been making that argument

ever since the Permit Revocation Rule was first adopted, see,

e.g., Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts That Are Not In

Genuine Dispute at 18 (referring to “the tension between the

potential for permit revocation ... in response to unforseen [sic]

circumstances and the No Surprises rule”), and nothing in the

orders makes that argument any more or any less persuasive. 

Finally, the Services argue there is a continuing effect

because a favorable decision by this court could significantly

affect the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to the Council;

specifically, we are told, if the Council obtains “no further relief

concerning the [No Surprises Rule, then] the district court would

be required to eliminate from the fee award all time spent

litigating the [No Surprises Rule] that is distinct from time

litigating the [Permit Revocation Rule].” But the Supreme

Court has squarely rejected this theory: An “interest in

attorney’s fees is ... insufficient to create an Article III case or

controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying

claim.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990).

We therefore proceed to consider whether the present

controversy falls within the exception to mootness for matters

“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” So. Pac. Terminal

Co., 219 U.S. at 515. For an injury to be deemed capable of

repetition, “there must be a ‘reasonable expectation’ or

‘demonstrated probability’ that the same controversy will recur

involving the same complaining party.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455

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U.S. 478, 482 (1982). 

The question is, what does it mean for “the same

controversy” to recur? The level of generality with which one

describes the controversy will often determine the answer. The

inquiry in this case is much simplified, however, because even

the Services’ framing of the controversy shows it is not at all

likely to recur. According to the Services, the district court

exceeded its authority by suspending and remanding the No

Surprises Rule without having held it was either procedurally or

substantively defective -- the court held merely that it was

“intertwined with the [defectively promulgated Permit

Revocation Rule],” 294 F. Supp. 2d at 91 -- and by imposing a

deadline for repromulgating the latter Rule. All these measures

appear, however, to have stemmed directly from the FWS’s

initial promulgation of the Permit Revocation Rule during the

pendency of this litigation over the No Surprises Rule, and all

were evidently aimed at minimizing the delay occasioned

thereby. The orders under review therefore do not bespeak a

belief on the part of the district court that it is generally

authorized to suspend presumptively valid rules or to dictate the

Services’ priorities. Although a recurrence of the peculiar

circumstances that elicited the orders is, of course, a theoretical

possibility, see Beethoven.com LLC, 394 F.3d at 951, as a

practical matter the probability of their recurring is too low to

warrant our deciding the issues presented when no relief can be

afforded. 

The Intervenors, for their part, argue that the district court’s

threshold rulings -- that the Council has standing and that its

facial challenge to the No Surprises Rule is ripe for resolution --

are alone sufficient to keep these appeals from being moot. The

doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness, however, all

derive from the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III.

See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (standing);

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Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803,

808 (2003) (ripeness); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) (mootness). If any

one of them is not satisfied, then the court is without jurisdiction

over the suit and has no occasion -- indeed, may have no

authority -- to consider the others. See Nat’l Kidney Patients

Ass’n v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (dismissing

interlocutory appeal as moot without reaching argument that

district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction). Because the

present appeals are clearly moot, we do not address whether the

Council had standing to bring a facial challenge to the No

Surprises Rule when it did and whether that claim was then ripe

for review.

III. Conclusion

We hold these interlocutory appeals no longer present a live

controversy. Therefore, we dismiss them as moot, vacate the

orders under review, see Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 40, and

remand the case for further proceedings before the district court.

So ordered.

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