Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02724/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02724-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN KENNISTON,

Petitioner,

v.

J. MCDONALD, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15-cv-2724-AJB-BGS

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION (Doc. No. 21), 

and 

(2) DISMISSING PETITIONER’S 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Doc. No. 1)

Before the Court is Petitioner Kevin Kenniston’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. No. 1.) In the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), (Doc. No. 21), the Magistrate 

Judge recommended dismissing Kenniston’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(Doc. No. 21.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and 

DISMISSES Kenniston’s writ of habeas corpus. 

I. BACKGROUND

After being found guilty of various crimes, Kenniston appealed to the California 

Court of Appeal arguing: (1) his due process rights were violated when the trial court 

refused to sever the charges; (2) the trial court improperly denied Kenniston’s request to 

substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel; (3) his due process rights were violated 

when the prosecutor made improper comments to the jury; and (4) his right to effective 

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assistance of counsel was violated when defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s 

improper comments. (See Doc. No. 11-40.) 

Kenniston submitted a “Supplemental Brief” to the appellate court, on his own 

behalf. (ECF No. 8 at Ex. A, 22–53.) In it, Kenniston argued the prosecutor failed to turn 

over exculpatory evidence (grounds one and three), there was insufficient evidence to 

support counts 1, 15, 18–20 and 22 (grounds two, four and seven), the court erred in 

permitting expert testimony (ground five) and the prosecutor committed misconduct during 

closing argument (ground six). (See id.) In a letter, the California Court of Appeal informed 

Kenniston that his pro se supplemental brief was being forwarded to his appellate counsel 

to determine what, if any, action should be taken. (Id., Ex. B at 56.) 

The appellate court ultimately affirmed Kenniston’s conviction in an unpublished 

opinion. The court addressed only the claims raised in the brief submitted by Kenniston’s 

appellate counsel. (See Doc. No. 11-45.) 

Kenniston then submitted a “supplemental brief” to the California Supreme Court, 

to which he appears to have attached the supplemental brief he had attempted to submit to 

the Court of Appeal. (See Doc. No. 11-43.) Appellate counsel for Kenniston filed a petition 

for review, raising the same four claims as those presented to the appellate court. 

(Doc. No. 11-44.) The California Supreme Court issued an order stating “The Petitions for 

review are denied.” (Doc. No. 11-46.)

Kenniston, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction 

in case number SCS247814. (Doc. No. 1.) As stated in the R&R, Kenniston raises ten 

claims: 

(1) his due process rights were violated when the state failed to turn over 

information about a prosecution witness; (2) his due process rights were 

violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping 

conviction; (3) his due process rights were violated when the trial court 

permitted expert witness testimony and the prosecution failed to provide 

discovery regarding the expert witness; (4) his due process rights were 

violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on 

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counts 15 and 20; (5) his due process rights were violated because there was 

insufficient evidence to support the true findings on the allegations for 

impersonating a peace officer while committing a felony, pursuant to 

California Penal Code §§ 538d & 667.17 (counts 8, 10, 15, 20 and 22); (6) his 

due process rights were violated because there was insufficient evidence to 

support his convictions on counts 18 and 19; (7) his due process rights were 

violated when the prosecution failed to provide exculpatory documents to the 

defense; (8) his due process rights were violated by the failure to sever the 

charges against him; (9) his right to counsel was violated when the trial court 

denied his request for a continuance in order to substitute retained counsel; 

and (10) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he received 

ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsels.

(Doc. No. 21 at 18.)

In his “Notice of Exhaustion,” Kenniston stated that while his federal petition has 

been pending before the Court, he has been seeking habeas review in the state courts.

(Doc. No. 19.) Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego Superior 

Court. (See Notice, Doc. No. 19, Ex. A at 22.) In it, he raised 10 claims. (See id. at 23–30.) 

The San Diego Superior Court denied his habeas petition in a reasoned decision. (See id.) 

Kenniston then filed a petition with the California Court of Appeal, raising the same 10 

claims. (Id., Ex. B at 32–62.) The appellate court denied the petition in a reasoned decision. 

(Id. at 64–65.) Finally, Kenniston filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was denied without comment or citation. (Id. at 5.) 

This Court denied Kenniston’s motion for stay as moot. (Doc. No. 20.) Magistrate 

Judge Skomal submitted an R&R directing judgment be denied against Kenniston. 

(Doc. No. 21.) Kenniston objected. (Doc. No. 32.) 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This case’s factual background was thoroughly detailed in Magistrate Judge 

Skomal’s R&R. (Doc. No. 21 at 2–12.) This Court fully incorporates by reference the 

factual background section of the R&R into this Order and will reference pertinent facts as 

necessary for the Court’s analysis. 

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate’s judge’s R&R are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–

18 (9th Cir. 1989). 

As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden 

to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de 

novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

IV. DISCUSSION

In his objection, Kenniston makes five arguments: (1) his due process rights were 

violated when the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence; (2) his due process 

rights were violated when he was convicted on certain counts based on insufficient 

evidence; (3) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s failure to sever the 

charges; (4) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court denied 

his request to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel; and (5) his Sixth 

Amendment right was violated because both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective

assistance of counsel. (See Doc. No. 32.) 

A. Brady Violation (Claims One and Seven)

In grounds one and seven, Kenniston argues his due process rights were violated 

when the prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 82 (1963). (Id. at 52.) 

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In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show three things: (1) the 

evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently, (2) the 

withheld evidence was either exculpatory or impeachment material, and (3) the evidence 

was material to the defense. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). Evidence is material under 

Brady only if there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 

419, 433–34 (1995). A “reasonable probability” means a probability “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; United States 

v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the defendant must show that the 

government’s suppression of the evidence undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome). 

In the present case, the crux of Kenniston’s argument is that the prosecution withheld 

additional evidence from the defense in violation of Brady. (Doc. No. 32 at 52.) 

Specifically, Kenniston argues the purported material evidence was a communication 

between Mendez and a member of the district attorney’s office. (Id. at 43.) Mendez is 

Kenniston’s ex-wife, who testified about several incidents in where Kenniston became 

physically abusive and the counts involved alleged kidnapping and false imprisonment 

allegations. (Doc. No. 21 at 2–5.) 

The Magistrate Judge stated that “[e]ven assuming arguendo that the prosecutor 

withheld information regarding a conversation between a District Attorney investigator and 

Mendez, Petitioner cannot establish a Brady violation because he has not shown the 

purported evidence was exculpatory or impeachment evidence, or that any such evidence 

was material.” (Doc. No. 21 at 26.) In Kenniston’s reply, he argues the evidence was newly 

remembered information by Mendez. (Doc. No. 32 at 24.) However, Kenniston failed to 

show what that “newly remembered information” was or whether it was material evidence. 

In support of his argument, Kenniston cites to United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 

189 (4th Cir. 1996), stating that “[i]n making the requisite ‘plausible showing’ of the 

existence of exculpatory information, a defendant must ‘identify the requested [] material 

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with some degree of specificity.’” In her signed affidavit, Mendez states only that she 

“talked more about the incident and how Mr. Kenniston returned me” with an employee at 

the district attorney’s office. (Pet., Ex. A, Doc. No. 1-2 at 101.) However, no specifics are 

offered in Mendez’s affidavit regarding the nature of the “additional information.” 

Kenniston merely speculates the “newly remembered information” could have been 

favorable to the defense. (Doc. No. 32 at 43.) Accordingly, mere supposition as to what a 

witness told prosecutors cannot support a Brady claim. Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.2d 

758, 770 (9th Cir. 2012). 

In the R&R, Judge Skomal states “to the extent there is any favorable information 

contained in the defense investigator’s reports, it is not inconsistent with evidence already 

represented to the jury.” (Doc. No. 21 at 27.) The R&R notes that Mendez returned to 

testify, stating “she had been drinking on the day of the incident and Kenniston did not 

want her to drive, contrary to her previous grand jury and trial testimony.” (Id.) Thus, the 

R&R reasoned, “to the extent there is any favorable information contained in the defense’s 

investigator reports, it is not inconsistent with evidence already presented to the jury.” (Id.)

As discussed above, Kenniston has not shown that any such evidence was material 

under Brady. As such, Kenniston has not established that the evidence was favorable, much 

less material, to the defense. See Runningeagle, 686 F.2d at 770; see also Downs v. Hoyt, 

232 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Brady claims as too speculative). 

The R&R’s analysis came to the same outcome. Because we find the R&R’s findings 

on this issue reasonable and well-analyzed, we support its conclusion and recommendation 

to GRANT Respondent’s motion to dismiss on these claims and DISMISS claims one and 

seven.

B. Insufficient Evidence (Claims Two, Three, Four, Five, Six) 

In claims two, three, four, five, and six, Kenniston argues his due process rights were 

violated when he was convicted on certain counts based on insufficient evidence.

(Doc. No. 32 at 102–14.) Specifically, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support 

his convictions for: (1) kidnapping (ground two); (2) two counts of impersonation of a 

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public officer and detaining another (ground four); (3) testimony of expert witness Mitch 

Kojima (ground three); (4) five true findings regarding wearing or exhibiting a badge or 

insignia while impersonating a public officer and detaining another (ground five); and 

(5) one count of child abuse likely to cause great bodily harm or death and one count of 

child cruelty (ground six). 

In denying Kenniston’s habeas corpus petition, the appellate court denied all four 

insufficiency of evidence claims on procedural grounds, stating: 

Kenniston also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction. “[C]laims of the insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction 

are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding.” In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 

428, 505 (2012). . . . Although Kenniston asserts that exceptions to these 

procedural bars should apply to his petition, he does not establish a valid basis 

for such an exception. 

(Doc. No. 21 at 32 (citing Notice, ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 64–65).) Judge Skomal agreed the 

claims are procedurally defaulted and thus barred from federal habeas review. (Id.) 

However, the R&R found it easier to dispose of the claims on the merits and thus went into

great depth to discuss each claim for insufficient evidence. (See id.) Yet, in Kenniston’s 

reply, he failed to specifically identify portions of the R&R to which he objected to

regarding the insufficiency of evidence claims, much less state any specific basis for any

objection. Instead, Kenniston merely repeated the same arguments made in his federal 

habeas petition. (See Doc. No. 32 at 102–14.) Kenniston’s reply simply recanted the facts 

of his case but failed to provide any specific objections to the R&R. (See id.) 

For that reason, the Court may assume the correctness of the Magistrate Judge’s 

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law as to portions of the report to 

which no objection is made. Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206. After carefully reviewing the 

relevant papers, including the Magistrate’s R&R and Kenniston’s objections, the Court 

finds the R&R employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably 

applied the law to those facts. As a result, the R&R is accepted and adopted for the reasons 

set forth therein, and Kenniston’s claims two, three, four, five, and six are DENIED. 

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C. Severance (Ground Eight) 

In ground eight, Kenniston argues his due process rights were violated by the trial 

court’s failure to sever the charges. (Doc. No. 21 at 54.) Specifically, he contends his due 

process rights were violated when the trial court denied his request that counts one and two 

(Mendez counts) be severed from counts 3–6, 23, 26–32 (Green counts), and that both these 

cases also be severed from counts 7–10 and 13–22 (impersonation and child endangerment 

counts). (Id.) 

Case number one involves the kidnapping and false imprisonment counts where 

Mendez, Kenniston’s ex-wife, was the victim, (Mendez counts). Case number two is where 

Jessica G., as well as Kylie G. (Jessica’s daughter) were the victims and it involved cruelty 

of a child and disobeying restraining orders, (Green counts). Case number three concerns 

impersonation of an officer with multiple alleged victims, where Kylie G. was a witness to 

several of those incidents, (impersonation counts). 

Penal Code section 954 provides in part: 

An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected 

together in their commission, or . . . of the same class of crimes or offenses. . 

. . [P]rovided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice 

and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different 

offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or 

divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.

Aydelott v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 718, 722 (1970); see People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 

259, 276 (1988). In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion under section 

954 in declining to sever properly joined charges, “we consider the record before the trial 

court when it made its ruling” and focus on “certain criteria [that] have emerged to provide 

guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial.” People v. Soper, 45 Cal. 

4th 759, 774 (2009). “First, we consider the cross-admissibility of the evidence in 

hypothetical separate trials. [Citation]. If the evidence underlying the charges in question 

would be cross-admissible, that factor alone is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion 

of prejudice and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly joined charges.” 

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Soper, 45 Cal. 4th at 774–75.

Once criminal charges are properly joined, the “burden is on the party seeking 

severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that 

the charges be separately tried.” Id. at 773. To meet this burden, a defendant must show 

the ruling fell “outside the bounds of reason.” Id. at 774.

In his reply, Kenniston argues that “there was no nexus between the charges related 

to Mendez and Green and the incidents of alleged police impersonation.” 

(Doc. No. 32 at 126.) Kenniston’s main argument revolves around the allegation that 

“none of the alleged incidents of police impersonation involved violence, nor domestic 

partner, or the same class of victim(s), or same facts.” (Id.) 

The California Court of appeal held that the trial court did not err when refusing to 

sever the counts “because the record contains ample evidence supporting the finding that 

both counts were of the ‘same class of crimes or offenses’ under section 954.” (Doc. No. 

21 at 58.) The R&R agreed, reasoning first that misjoinder is not a constitutional violation 

and second that even if it were, Kenniston did not show actual prejudice or harm. (Id. at 

62–64.) Both cases involved some level of domestic violence and both cases relied on 

testimony from the victim. Finally, the R&R states that because the jury acquitted 

Kenniston of the impersonation and child abuse charges, the alleged inappropriate joinder 

did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” (Id. at 

64.) 

In Kenniston’s objection, he merely repeats the same arguments he made in his 

habeas petition and failed to provide any specific objections to the R&R’s analysis. 

(See Doc. No. 32 at 119–32.) Thus, the Court finds the R&R’s conclusion well-reasoned 

and agrees that because both Mendez counts and Jessica G. counts possessed common 

characteristics and attributes, their joinder was proper. See Alcala v. Superior Court, 43 

Cal. 4th 1205, 1220 (2008); Aydelott, 7 Cal. App. 3d at 722 (noting that “because 

consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency, that is the 

course of action preferred by the law.”). Therefore, we DENY Kenniston’s claim on

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ground eight. 

D. Denial of Continuance and Substitution of Counsel (Ground Nine) 

In claim nine, Kenniston argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 

when the trial court denied his request to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel.

(Doc. No. 32 at 154.) A defendant “who does not require appointed counsel” has the right 

under the Sixth Amendment “to choose who will represent him [or her].” United States v. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006).

That right, however, is “not absolute,” People v. Verdugo, 50 Cal. 4th 263, 

311 (2010), and “can be forced to yield if the court determines the 

appointment at issue will result ‘in a disruption of the orderly processes of 

justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.’”

[Citations.] A trial court has “wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel 

of choice against the needs of fairness [citation] and against the demands of 

its calendar” [citation]. 

Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152. The court has, moreover, an “independent interest in 

ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession 

and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.” Id. A “disruption of the 

orderly processes of justice” may result from a defendant’s untimely request to discharge 

counsel. See People v. Ortiz, 51 Cal. 3d 975, 983 (1990). 

The R&R notes that on October 22, 2012, attorney Mark Edelman specially appeared 

on behalf of Kenniston, requesting he be substituted in as Kenniston’s new counsel. 

(Doc. No. 21 at 65.) Edelman noted he had been misinformed that Kenniston was then 

representing himself and that there had been no prior continuances in the case, when in fact 

Kenniston’s trial had been continued at least seven times. (Id.) If appointed, Edelman 

estimated he could be ready to start trial the last week of November 2012. (Id.) However, 

after learning the number of proposed witnesses the People intended to call, Edelman 

revised that estimate during the hearing and said he “maybe” would be ready to start trial 

in the middle of December. (Id.)

In denying Kenniston’s motion to substitute in new counsel, the trial court looked at 

the history of the case and found that if Edelman was appointed, there would be a “great 

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disruption or delay” as a result of “new counsel coming up to speed,” as Edelman “would 

not be ready until possibly mid December [sic]” given the complexity of the case; and that, 

unlike Edelman, Kenniston’s current defense counsel and the People were prepared to start 

trial that day. (Id.) 

In Kenniston’s reply, he argues that “the trial court did not state the denial was for 

calendar issues or state inconvenience to the jury; as no jury pool had been called for voir 

dire.” (Doc. No. 31 at 154.) He goes on to argue there was no inconvenience to potential 

witnesses, and the trial court had no grounds for denial of counsel substitution. (Id.)

However, the Court agrees with the R&R’s finding that the trial court properly 

exercised its discretion when it found Kenniston’s eleventh-hour request to substitute in 

new counsel would have adverse effects on the orderly administration of justice, as it would 

have prompted yet another delay of trial of at least close to two months—and likely much 

longer, given the complexity of the case and given Edelman had virtually no familiarity 

with the case when he was making (and already revising during the same hearing) his 

estimate of when he could be ready. (Doc. No. 21 at 67.) Thus, the Court agrees with the 

trial court’s denial of Kenniston’s request to substitute retained counsel and DENIES

ground nine. 

E. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsels (Ground Ten) 

In ground ten, Kenniston argues both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, in 

violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. (See Doc. No. 32 at 148.) 

1. Trial Counsel 

Specifically, Kenniston argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 

move for a new trial based on the prosecution’s alleged failure to turn over exculpatory 

evidence concerning Mendez. (Doc. No. 21 at 76–80.) Additionally, Kenniston contends 

his trial counsel failed to adequately object when jurors reported overhearing two witnesses 

talking outside the courtroom. (Id. at 80–81.) However, Kenniston simply recites the facts 

and makes the same arguments raised in his habeas petition. Kenniston does not provide 

any basis for his objections and instead attempts to re-litigate the same issues. (Doc. No. 

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32 at 152–54.)

“When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge’s reportrecommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo 

review.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be “specific,” the objection 

must, with particularity, identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, 

or report to which it has an objection and the basis for the objection. See Mario v. P & C 

Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002). After conducting the appropriate 

review, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Here, the R&R addresses several issues that Kenniston raised in his habeas petition

including defense counsel’s alleged failure to object to the prosecution’s references to the 

grand jury proceedings; defense counsel’s failure to object when jurors reported 

overhearing two witnesses talking outside the courtroom; and defense counsel’s failure to 

request new trial based on a Brady violation. (Doc. No. 21 at 71–80.) Reviewing this 

analysis, the Court finds Kenniston failed to establish any prejudice in his claims for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Skomal’s

recommendation. (Doc. No. 21 at 71–84.) 

2. Appellate Counsel 

In his habeas petition, Kenniston argues his appellate counsel was ineffective when 

he failed to file two Brady violations. (Doc. No. 32 at 149.) Additionally, Kenniston argues 

appellate counsel failed to review the record in whole thus showing lack of diligence. 

(Id. at 150.) Specifically, Kenniston argues the Grand Jury transcripts were made an exhibit 

at trial and therefore were worthy to review as evidence. (Id.) It is clearly established that 

“[t]he proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is 

that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (citing Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 535–36 (1986)). 

In his reply, Kenniston argues that by not filing these Brady violations, his appellate 

counsel “fell below an objective reasonableness of representation and thus demonstrated a 

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level of incompetence in his representation.” (Doc. No. 32 at 149.) He goes on to argue the 

withheld evidence would have led to an acquittal. (Id.) 

Generally, in his R&R, Magistrate Judge Skomal rendered the following: “First, 

Kenniston argues appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to object to an untimely brief 

submitted by Respondent on appeal.” (Doc. No. 21 at 81.) In a letter written to Kenniston, 

appellate counsel wrote that “‘while [Respondent’s] brief was technically one day late,’ it 

was likely due to an inadvertent calendaring mistake” and that “[u]nder these 

circumstances the Court of Appeal is not going to strike the brief based on a technicality, 

and I will not be filing a motion with the court.” (Id.) As the R&R correctly noted, appellate 

counsel considered the matter and determined any motion to strike would be denied by the 

appellate court. Additionally, Kenniston did not make any showing that objecting to an 

untimely brief submitted by Respondent resulted in prejudice. As such, appellate counsel’s 

performance was reasonable. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 

Second, Kenniston argues his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise 

the Brady claim regarding the “additional information” Mendez allegedly gave to the 

District Attorney’s office. (Doc. No. 21 at 82.) But because his Brady claim lacked merit, 

as discussed supria and in the R&R, Kenniston “has not shown appellate counsel’s decision 

not to raise it on appeal was unreasonable, nor has [Kenniston] established that had 

appellate counsel raised the issue, he would have prevailed on appeal.” (Id.; see Miller v. 

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that appellate counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to raise issue and defendant suffered no prejudice on account on 

counsel’s performance).)

Third, Kenniston claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to review the 

complete record. (Doc. No. 21 at 83.) The R&R stated that “under California law, issues 

regarding the grand jury proceedings are not appealable absent a showing the trial was 

fundamentally unfair. [citation]. As such it was not unreasonable for appellate counsel to 

forgo their review.” (Id. (citing People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal. 3d 519, 529 (1980); Miller, 

882 F.2d at 1434.) Moreover, Kenniston failed to establish that appellate counsel’s failure 

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to review the complete record resulted in prejudice.

In Kenniston’s reply, instead of citing objections to specific portions of the proposed 

findings and recommendations, Kenniston—again—merely submitted a revised version of 

the same arguments it presented to the Magistrate Judge. (Doc. No. 32 at 149–51.)

Moreover, “[t]he objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations 

to which objections are being made. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not 

be considered by the district court.” Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421

(5th Cir. 1987). This, like much of Kenniston’s objection, is an improper attempt to rehash 

his entire argument and have this Court conduct a duplicative review where nearly every 

issue presented to the Magistrate Judge was raised for a second time on objection. Camardo 

v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 

1992) (“parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the apple’ when they file objections 

to a Report and Recommendation, as the ‘goal of the federal statute providing for the 

assignment of cases to magistrates is to ‘increas[e] the overall efficiency of the federal 

judiciary.’” (quoting McCarthy v. Manson, 554 F. Supp. 1275, 1286 (D. Conn. 1982))).

Accordingly, the Court adopts the proposed findings for the reasons stated in Magistrate 

Judge Skomal’s R&R and DENIES Kenniston’s ground ten. 

F. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 330 (2003) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

“reasonable jurists could debate whether [] the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court finds that reasonable jurists could not debate the 

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Court’s conclusion to dismiss with prejudice Kenniston’s claims and therefore 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds the R&R was well-reasoned, incredibly 

thorough, and contains no clear error. Thus, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety,

(Doc. No. 21), GRANTS Respondent’s dismissal motion, (Doc. No. 21), and DISMISSES

Kenniston’s federal petition for habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 1.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 24, 2019

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