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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1638

BRIAN JONES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KIM BUTLER, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13-C-3838 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2015

Before FLAUM, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Brian Jones seeks postconviction review of his convictions in Illinois state court for

first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. He seeks relief on three separate grounds: that

his convictions were based on insufficient evidence; that he

received ineffective assistance from his trial and appellate

counsel; and that his rights to due process were violated by the

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denial of a post-conviction petition. We affirm the district

court’s denial of habeas relief.

I. Background

In § 2254 proceedings, federal courts are foreclosed from

fact-finding. We therefore defer to the findings of the Illinois

trial court, which have not been challenged and are presumed

to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 613 (7th

Cir. 2012). 

Brian Jones was tried in a bench trial for the first-degree

murder of Kenneth Dunne and the first-degree attempted

murder of Lance Priest. People v. Jones, No. 1-01-947, slip. op.

(Ill. App. Aug. 6, 2002). The trial focused on a shooting that

took place at 91st Street and Ashland Avenue in Chicago

during the early morning (1:45 a.m.) of August 17, 1998. 

Priest served as the State’s primary witness. He testified

that Jones, whom he knew from the neighborhood as “Bird,”

was a member of the Blackstones gang. Priest and Dunne were

standing in front of a liquor store speaking to Raleigh Pritchett,

who was sitting in his car. At that moment, Jones approached

from a distance of seventy-five feet, and said “what’s up

folks.” After saying this, Jones, who was wearing jeans and a

blue and white checkered shirt, reached into his waistband for

a gun, whereupon Priest and Dunne immediately set off

running. Jones opened fire. As he was running, Priest looked

back momentarily and saw Jones shooting at them. 

Dunne was fatally shot and fell to the ground. As Priest

attempted to assist Dunne, he saw a red car approach, causing

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No. 14-1638 3

him to flee several blocks away. By the time Priest returned to

Dunne, police officers had arrived. Priest described the shooter

to the police, including that he wore a blue and white checkered shirt. Priest identified Jones from a photograph produced

by the police. While speaking with the officers, he spotted

Jones driving the red car and alerted the police, who started

running towards the car as it drove away. A few hours later,

the officers took Priest to the apartment of Lasandra Mathies,

where they had apprehended Jones. There, Priest once again

identified him as the shooter.

Chicago police officers Don Ordanas and Richard Maxwell

corroborated Priest’s account of the incident with the red car.

The car, with its engine still warm, was found at a nearby

vacant lot. Police found Jones shirtless and running down the

back stairs of the building in which Lasandra Mathies’s

apartment was located. The officers identified Jones as the

driver of the red car. They also recovered a blue and white

checkered shirt from the apartment, which Sergeant Anita

Medina identified as the shirt that Jones was wearing as he

drove the car. 

Raleigh Pritchett testified that he was sitting in his car

speaking with Priest and Dunne at the time of the shooting.

Pritchett stated that a man approached, said “what’s up folks,”

and began shooting. Altogether, the man fired nine or ten

shots from a distance of fifteen to twenty feet. Despite the hour,

the area was well-lighted, “like almost broad daylight.”

Although he was unable to see the man’s face, he described the

shooter as a brown-skinned black man wearing blue jeans and

a blue and white checkered shirt. Pritchett did not recognize

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the man and could not say from which direction the man

approached. 

Another witness, Sharee Jackson, testified that she saw

Jones at the apartment of her cousin, Lasandra Mathies, on the

night of the shooting. She described him as wearing a blue and

white checkered shirt and carrying a black gun in his pants. At

about 1 a.m., Jones left the apartment with Byron Manson to

get cigarettes. Over the course of her testimony, Jackson

offered various versions of a statement she heard Jones make

when he returned home. On direct examination, she claimed

that she heard Jones say “I shot a moe”—the term “moe”

signifying a member of the Blackstones gang. On crossexamination, Jackson repeated this statement but acknowledged that she did not tell the police about this statement when

she first spoke with them. When asked on re-direct examination what Jones’s exact words were, Jackson said, “I shot a

moe.” On re-cross examination, Jackson denied telling police

that she heard Jones say “I shot the moe.” 

On cross-examination, Steven Kramer, the defense counsel,

elicited the following testimony from Jackson in an attempt to

impeach Jackson about her statement: 

Q: I want to direct your attention back to the early part of

June. You remember receiving a call from someone who

identified himself as Steven Kramer? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And do you recognize that person’s voice as being my

voice? 

A: Yes. 

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No. 14-1638 5

Q: And you answered the phone? 

A: I did. 

Q: Andidentified you [sic]—telling you my name and who

I was representing? 

A: Yes. 

Q: You understood I was Brian’s attorney, is that correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And I asked if you would mind speaking to me about

certain things that you had said to the police officers, is

that correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And one of those things I asked you about was whether

or not you had seen a gun on Brian’s person, is that

correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Do you remember what your response was? 

A: I said yeah. 

Q: You said you did. 

A: Right. 

Q: And did I ask you whether or not Brian had ever made

a statement to the effect that he had shot the moe or

something to that effect? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And what did you tell me? 

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A: I said yes. 

Q: You said yes. 

[Assistant State’s Attorney]: I think at this point I have to

interject. Mr. Kramer’s making himself a witness. Mr. Kramer

has just I think made himself a witness, thereby rendering him

unable to be the lawyer. 

[Mr. Kramer]: I may have at this point, Judge. 

[The Court]: I would agree. Although it’s a little different

than a jury. 

[Mr. Kramer]: Exactly. That’s what I would ask the court to

consider. It is a bench trial. 

[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Then again we are going to

have to object to discovery on behalf of defense. We had no

knowledge of this alleged phone call or statement that were

made to Mr. Kramer rendering him a witness. Had we had that

in June when evidently this happened, perhaps something

could have been done. 

[Mr. Kramer]: Judge, I am taken by surprise by her response to be honest with this court. I didn’t know it would be

necessary to even get into asking that question. I am surprised

by what her testimony is this afternoon. 

After a break, the trial judge sustained the State’s objection

and prevented defense counsel from perfecting his impeachment testimony. 

Detective Robert Lane testified that he interviewed and

took a statement from Jackson several hours after the shooting.

At that time, Jackson did not state that she heard Jones say, “I

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No. 14-1638 7

shot him, moe,” or, “I shot the moe.” Jackson, though, did say

that Jones left the apartment two times that night, but could

not recall whether he left with anyone. Jackson also stated that

she saw Jones with a gun. 

Lasandra Mathies provided alibi testimony for Jones,

stating that he was at her apartment on the night of the

shooting. Around midnight, she left with Jones to buy beer

from a store and they returned immediately afterward. She

testified that Jones again left the apartment at 3 a.m. with

Byron Manson to purchase cigarettes. He did not have a gun

on him when he left, but he did have marijuana. When Jones

returned, he told her that the police chased him. Mathies

admitted to lying to police when she told them that she was the

last person to drive the red car earlier in the evening. On crossexamination, she stated that she also lied to the grand jury by

testifying that, after purchasing beer, she dropped Jones off

and returned to the apartment without him. Mathies claimed

that she told the grand jury that story in response to threats

from the State’s prosecutor. The State’s prosecutor later

testified that he made no such threats. 

Jones testified on his own behalf. He admitted that his

nickname was “Bird,” and stated that he ownedand frequently

wore a blue and white checkered shirt, but that it was a

popular, mass-produced shirt and that others in the neighborhood wore identical shirts. He stated that he left the apartment

with Mathies at approximately 1 a.m. to buy beer and returned

to the apartment immediately afterwards without stopping.He

admitted to driving by the scene of the shooting, but returned

to Mathies’s apartment because he heard one of the Gangster

Disciples say: “There go Bird right there.” Back at the apartCase: 14-1638 Document: 24 Filed: 02/03/2015 Pages: 20
8 No. 14-1638

ment, he removed his shirt because it was hot. When the police

arrived, he went to the back porch to dispose of marijuana. 

Robert Berk, an expert in trace evidence analysis, testified

that he examined the results of the gunshot residue (GSR) test,

which was performed on Jones’s hands four hours after the

shooting. In Berk’s opinion, the results were inconclusive. Berk

also testified that gunshot residue can be transferred from

hands to clothing through normal activity such as changing a

shirt. Berk testified that neither the government nor the

defense requested that he perform a GSR test on the shirt. 

The trial court found Jones guilty of first-degree murder

and attempted murder and sentenced himtoconcurrent prison

terms of 45 and 20 years, respectively. He moved for a postverdict acquittal on multiple grounds, the most significant of

which was that Priest’s identification was insufficient to

support a conviction and that the weight of the evidence

supported a not-guilty verdict. The trial court denied Jones’s

motion, concluding that Priest knew Jones from the neighborhood, lacked any motive to fabricate testimony, and that his

identification, although brief, took place in a well-lighted area. 

Jones appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, arguing that

the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The

court rejected his argument. People v. Jones, No. 1-01-947, slip.

op. (Ill. App. Aug. 6, 2002). 

In 2009, Jones brought an action arguing that his trial and

appellate counsel were ineffective; additionally, he requested

an evidentiaryhearing to consider whether Priest had recanted

his testimony identifying him as the shooter. Upon denial of

that request, Jones argued on appeal that the failure to conduct

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No. 14-1638 9

a hearing on this issue violated his rights to due process. The

Illinois Appellate Court denied him relief. People v. Jones, 2012

Ill. App. 1 Div. 102516-U. The Illinois Supreme Court denied

Jones’s petition for leave to appeal on September 26, 2012.

People v. Jones, 979 N.E. 2d. 883 (Ill. 2012). 

On May 23, 2013, Jones broughtthis habeas corpus petition.

He makes three claims: that there was insufficient evidence to

support a conviction for first-degree murder or attempted firstdegree murder; that his trial and appellate counsel rendered

ineffective assistance; and, that the Illinois Appellate Court

denied his right to due process by not allowing him to present

evidence that Priest had recanted his identification testimony.

The district court held that the evidence was sufficient to

support a conviction and that the failure by the state to grant

a post-conviction evidentiary hearing did not present an issue

of constitutional import. Despite finding that his trial counsel

had been ineffective in failing to perfect the impeachment

testimony of Jackson, the court denied Jones habeas relief as

such failure did not alter the outcome of his trial. Finally,

because the ineffective assistance claim of appellate counsel

was derivative of his claim for ineffective assistance by trial

counsel, it likewise failed. Jones v. Harrington, No. 1:13-cv-3838,

2014 WL 859532 (N.D. Ill. March 3, 2014). 

Jones appeals the district court’s decision to deny his

petition. 

II. Discussion 

A. Sufficiency of Evidence

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Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his conviction for first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder. The standard of review is a rigorous one:

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is

sufficient to support a conviction so long as any rational trier

of fact could find the essential elements of the offense to have

been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Because we consider this claim on collateral review rather than direct appeal, the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act imposes an additional layer of

defense onto this inquiry: we may grant relief on this claim

only if the Illinois Appellate Court applied the Jackson standard

unreasonably to the facts of Jones’s case. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g.,

Trejo v. Hulick, 380 F.3d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 2004). 

As the sole eyewitness identifying Jones as the shooter,

Priest’s testimony was the driving force behind the State’s case.

It also bore several hallmarksofreliability: it addressed specific

facts and was corroborated by other evidence. Priest knew

Jones for years from the neighborhood and recognized him

immediately as the shooter. Following the shooting, he

provided a detailed description of the clothing worn by the

shooter and verified Jones’s identification from a photograph

obtained by the police after Priest named Jones. Significantly,

Priest provided this description to police before Jones approached in a red car wearing the exact blue and white

checkered shirt that Priest described the shooter as wearing. At

that brief encounter, Priest identified “Bird” as the driver.

Later, this same blue and white checkered shirt was found near

the shirtless Jones (in Mathies’s apartment) at the time of his

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No. 14-1638 11

arrest. Finally, Priest provided an in-person identification of

Jones after his arrest. 

Priest’s testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

Like Priest, Pritchett testified that the shooter approached the

group, said “what’s up folks,” and opened fire as Dunne and

Priest fled. Jackson testified that Jones was in possession of a

gun when he left Mathies’s apartment at around 1 a.m. Jones

testified that he wore a blue and white checkered shirt on the

night he was arrested. The only conflicting evidence at trial

was the alibi testimony from Mathies and Jones. Mathies’s

testimony, however, loses force because of her relationship

with Jones and because it contradicted her earlier testimony to

the grand jury that she dropped him off on the night in

question and heard gunshots when she returned from the

liquor store.

The Illinois Appellate Court, reviewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State, found sufficient evidence to

support the conviction. In evaluating the reliability of Priest’s

identification, the court considered various factors, including:

that the area was well-lighted; there was nothing obstructing

Priest’s view of the shooter; he saw the shooter’s whole body;

he recognized the shooter as “Bird” from the neighborhood; he

immediately and unequivocally identified the shooter within

minutes of the shooting; he provided a detailed description of

Jones’s clothing; identified Jones in a photograph; and, identified him once again to the police when he saw him driving the

red car. Taken together, these factors led the court to “conclude

that a rational trier of fact could find Priest’s identification of

defendant sufficiently reliable to sustain defendant’s convicCase: 14-1638 Document: 24 Filed: 02/03/2015 Pages: 20
12 No. 14-1638

tions.” People v. Jones, 2012 Ill. App. 1 Div. 102516-U at 10

(citing People v. Curtis, 262 Ill. App. 3d 876, 881–82 (1994)). 

There was no legal error in this judgment. Taken as a

whole, the evidence was more than sufficient to support

Jones’s convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree

attempted murder. Even if Priest had been the sole witness to

testify against Jones, his testimony alone would be legally

sufficient to convict Jones. Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938

(7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the “testimony of a single eyewitness suffices for conviction even if 20 bishops testify that the

eyewitness is a liar.”).That Priest’s testimony was corroborated

by other witnesses underscores its sufficiency. Accordingly, the

district court properly denied Jones habeas relief based on the

challenge to sufficiency of the evidence. 

B. Ineffective assistance of counsel

The Illinois Appellate Court denied Jones’s claim for

ineffective assistance of counsel. We assesses whether this

determination involved an unreasonable application of federal

law. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to

establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

show two things: that his counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and that he was prejudiced as a result. Id. at 687–88. The actions or omissions of a

counsel prejudice a party where there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

Before addressing themost pressing issue—whether Jones’s

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect impeachment

of Jackson—we turn briefly to the other allegations of ineffecCase: 14-1638 Document: 24 Filed: 02/03/2015 Pages: 20
No. 14-1638 13

tive assistance brought by Jones against his trial counsel. In

short, none of them has merit, and they have been rightly

dispatched by each court that has reviewed them. 

GSR Testing of Jones’s shirt: Jones’s trial counsel made a

tactical decision to forgo gunshot residue testing because this

testing could have proven detrimental to Jones while offering

little chance to improve his case. As things stood, Jones was

able to argue to the jury that the absence of such residue on his

hands played to his favor, and that, by neglecting to test the

shirt, the government failed to establish its burden of proof.

These arguments were available to Jones without testing the

shirt; for this reason, the state appellate court found that

Jones’s trial counsel was not ineffective. In so holding, the

Illinois Appellate Court reasonably applied Strickland. 

Failure to impeach Priest about Dunne’s gang affiliation: Priest

testified that Dunne did not belong to a gang; however, on the

night of the shooting, he told police that Dunne was a fellow

member of the Gangster Disciples. The conclusion of the

Illinois Appellate Court was a correct application of Strickland:

Jones’s counsel made a reasonable decision to forgo the point

rather than impeach Priest on a relatively minor point that

supported the prosecution’s theory that the shooting was

motivated by gang rivalry. The Illinois Appellate Court’s

conclusion was a reasonable application of Strickland. 

Failure to interview or call Manson and Lester: Jones testified

at trial that Manson and Lester were with him at Mathies’s

apartment on the night of the shooting and that he left with

Manson at 3 a.m. to buy cigarettes. Jones’s trial counsel did not

interview either witness, nor did he call them at trial. The

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14 No. 14-1638

Illinois Appellate Courtrecognized that an attorney’s failure to

investigate to ascertain witness testimony can serve as a basis

for ineffective assistance. Here, however, both Manson and

Lester were subpoenaed by the State as prosecution witnesses

but failed to appear. In fact, the Illinois Appellate Court noted

that statements provided by the two men to police on the night

of the shooting would not have supported an alibi defense; the

shootings took place around 1:45 a.m. and the statements

suggest that Jones left the apartment at 1:30 a.m. and returned

an hour later. People v. Jones, Ill. App. at 14. On this account, the

court found that Lester and Manson were properly State

witnesses whose testimony would have rebutted that of Jones

and Mathies. Even if Manson or Lester offered testimony

favorable to Jones, it risked exposing them to significant

impeachment evidence on account of their prior statements

that Jones was not at the apartment or with them at the time of

the shooting. Given these factors, the Illinois Appellate Court

correctly found that the decision to forgo interviewing Manson

and Lester was within the sound discretion of the trial counsel

and was not ineffective assistance. 

Failure to provide notice of alibi defense: The Illinois Appellate

Court reviewed Jones’s claim that counsel did not consult him

about a theory of defense and did not disclose the alibi defense

until after the trial had already begun, in violation of the

discovery rules requiring advance disclosure of this defense.

The court found that Jones had not offered any evidence to

show that he was prejudiced by this failure. This was the

correct holding; Jones does not allege that he attempted to

mount an alibi defense to rebut specific accusations but was

prevented by the trial court for failing to disclose such an alibi

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No. 14-1638 15

earlier. Instead Jones argues that because an alibi defense was

potentially available but not utilized by defense counsel, it

must be ineffective assistance. Absent any facts to suggest a

viable alibi defense to rebut specific facts, we cannot find

ineffective assistance of counsel. The failure to call Manson and

Lester was not ineffective assistance because it was unlikely

that either could provide favorable testimony for Jones, still

less develop an alibi defense. In like fashion, this claim fails;

had there been some evidence of a viable alibi defense, Jones’s

argument would have merit. Without such evidence, it does

not. For this reason, he satisfies neither prong of Strickland. 

Cumulative errors: Jones also argues that the errors of trial

counsel, considered together, were sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant a new trial. The Illinois Appellate Court did not

review this claim. The district court concluded that the failure

to review by the Illinois Appellate Court was not error because,

with the exception of the failure to impeach a witness, Jones

had failed to show professionally unreasonable conduct. We

agree. Jones has not established more than one error so there

is no “cumulative” effect; nor can he establish that the case

would have turned out differently as a result of a series of

errors. 

Failure to impeach Jackson: At trial, Jones’s counsel asked

Sharee Jackson questions about a telephone conversation she

had with Jones’s counsel prior to trial. Specifically, Jones’s

counselquestioned Jackson about whether she, in fact, told him

that Jones never said that he “shot the moe.” Jackson denied

saying this to him. The prosecution objected that Jones’s

counsel was making himself a witness. Admittedly caught

unawares by Jackson’s answer, Jones’s counsel acknowledged

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16 No. 14-1638

that he “may have” made himself a witness, and abandoned

the line of questioning. 

The Illinois Appellate Court did not hold this to be ineffective assistance, noting that the cross-examination of Jackson

was not limited to this aborted impeachment. Examining the

record, the court held that “defense counsel extensively crossexamined Jackson on many issues, including her prior statements regarding defendant’s statement and defendant’s

possession of a gun.” Jones, 2012 Ill. App. at 10. The court noted

that defense counsel called a detective to testify that Jackson

did not report that Jones said: “I shot him, moe.” Further, he

elicited testimony that Jackson did not initially inform police

that Jones had a weapon, but first reported this to police later

when she was at the police station. Noting that the decision not

to impeach a particular witness is normally considered a

strategic choice within the discretion of counsel, the court

found that Jones failed to establish the first prong of Strickland.

It stated: “At worst, with the benefit of hindsight, we could

classify counsel’s decision not to perfect the impeachment

regarding Jackson’s statements to him as a mistake in trial

strategy or an error in judgment.” Id. at 11. Such mistake,

however, did not rise to such level that it rendered the actions

of defense counsel constitutionally defective. 

The district court disagreed with the Illinois Appellate

Court, noting that a “reasonably competent lawyer would have

anticipated an objection to the lawyer’s attempt to impeach a

witness on a prior inconsistent statement heard only by the

lawyer.” Jones, 2014 WL 859532 at *10. The district court noted

that—to avoid exactly this predicament—the normal practice

is for the lawyer to conduct the conversation in the presence of

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No. 14-1638 17

a “prover,” that is, a third party who can independently testify

about the contents of the conversation. Id. at 10–11. Jones’s

counsel, of course, failed to do this and found himselfin a bind,

having to choose between withdrawing as counsel to serve as

witness or abandoning the attempt at impeachment. He chose

the latter. On this account, the district court noted that the

failure to interview Jackson properly constituted “a failure of

judgment and an absence of strategy,” rather than an exercise

of discretion. In other words, the Illinois Appellate Court erred

in declining to find ineffective assistance by Jones’s counsel.

We agree with the district court that Jones’s counsel was

deficient in failing to prepare for this contingency. 

Finding ineffective assistance, however, is merely the first

half of the Strickland inquiry. Despite finding that Jones failed

to establish the first Strickland prong, the Illinois Appellate

Court evaluated whether Joneswas prejudiced by his counsel’s

failure to impeach Jackson. It concluded that Jones was not

prejudiced because, notwithstanding the impeachment of

Jackson, there was considerable evidence supporting a guilty

verdict. Indeed, had defense counsel successfully impeached

Jackson, it still would not have directly addressed the key

evidence of the case: Priest’s multiple identifications of Jones as

the shooter wearing a blue and white checked shirt (and the

discovery of this shirt by police at Mathies’s apartment). In

light of other evidence at trial, the Illinois Appellate Court

found that Jackson’s testimony on this matter was not of

critical importance to the case. The district court agreed that

Jones was not prejudiced by his counsel’s error. 

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18 No. 14-1638

So do we. We cannot say that Jackson’s testimony would

have altered the outcome even if the impeachment had been

perfected. At best, it would have cast doubt on Jackson’s

testimony about what Jones said when he returned to the

apartment. The fact remains: whatever Jones may or may not

have said, Priest’s identification of him as the shooter remains

uncontested. Therefore, we agree with the state appellate court

(and district court) in concluding that Jones failed to show a

reasonable probability of prejudice. 

Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: Jones claims that his

counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise

several of the issues discussed above. Because we have found

that Jones cannot satisfy both prongs of Strickland to establish

ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, there is no basis for

finding that his appellate counsel was ineffective. Robertson v.

Hanks, 140 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 1998). 

C. Denial of Post-Conviction Petition

Along with his state post-conviction petition, Jones presented an affidavit from Priest in which he called into question

aspects of his trial testimony identifying Jones as the shooter.

In the affidavit, Priest stated that on the morning of the crime,

the police informed him that they had caught the man who

killed Dunne, led him to an area where they asked him to view

a man wearing a blue and white checkered shirt, and questioned whether he was the same man who killed Dunne. Priest

stated that he could not see the man’s face because the lights of

the police car were too bright, but he identified the man as the

shooter because the police said they had other evidence

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No. 14-1638 19

implicating the man. As a result, he was not certain whether

Jones was the man who killed Dunne. 

The circumstances surrounding the affidavit are murky, to

say the least, as Priest had repudiated the affidavit even before

the defense sought the post-conviction hearing. In its motion,

the defense noted that Priest had retracted the recantation, but

did so after receiving threats that his father, who was incarcerated in Illinois, would serve significant additional time if Priest

did not recant. ECF 2-2 at 541. 

The state trial court denied Jones’s motion. He claims that

this was a violation of his due process rights. The Illinois

Appellate Court affirmed this denial, and the Illinois Supreme

Court denied his petition seeking review of this issue. Finally,

the district court denied this claim as well because, instead of

a constitutional issue, it deemed the issue to be a challenge to

a state court’s interpretation of state law post-conviction

procedures and therefore not cognizable on habeas review.

Jones, 2014 WL 859532 at *13.

To warrant an evidentiary review on collateral review,

Illinois law requires a “substantial showing” of a constitutional

claim. People v. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill. 2001). “No

constitutional provision or federal law entitles a defendant to

any state collateral review... .” Jackson v. Duckworth, 112 F.3d

878, 880 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.

551, 557 (1987)). Here, we are disinclined to substitute our

judgment for that of the Illinois courts, who did not view

Priest’s recantation sufficiently credible to warrant a hearing.

This decision was within the authority of the Illinois courts and

did not implicate a constitutional claim. See People v. Steidl, 568

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20 No. 14-1638

N.E.2d 837, 857-60 (Ill. 1991). Absent a constitutional claim, the

district court was correct in denying habeas relief for the failure

of the Illinois courts to hold an evidentiary hearing. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Jones’s petition for habeas corpus. 

Case: 14-1638 Document: 24 Filed: 02/03/2015 Pages: 20