Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03063/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL C. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA RITA JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01468-EMC (MEJ)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE: MOTION TO WITHDRAW

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 75

MICHAEL C. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN FRANCISCO JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03063-EMC (MEJ)

INTRODUCTION

In the above-captioned actions, Plaintiff Michael C. Davis (“Plaintiff”) brought claims 

against Defendants the City and County of San Francisco (the “City”), Alameda County, and 

Santa Rita Jail (“Santa Rita”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Fourteenth 

Amendment rights for denial of medical care. See Third Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 48, Davis v. Santa 

Rita Jail et al., Case No. 14-01468-EMC (MEJ) (N.D. Cal., filed Mar. 31, 2014) (“Lead Case”)

and Davis v. San Francisco Jail et al., Case No. 14-3063-EMC (MEJ) (N.D. Cal., filed July 7, 

2014). On November 13, 2015, the parties and their respective counsel appeared before the 

undersigned for a settlement conference, at which time they reached a settlement and placed it on 

the record. 11/13/2015 Min. Order, Dkt. No. 741; see also Tr. of Nov. 13, 2015 proceedings, Dkt. 

 

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The docket numbers referenced in this Order refer to the entries in the Lead Case. 

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No. 82. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the City agreed to pay Plaintiff $1,000 and Santa Rita 

agreed to pay $7,500. Tr. at 3. The Settlement Agreements were “signed in Court” with the funds 

to be distributed directly to Plaintiff, not his counsel of record. 11/13/2015 Min. Order.

On November 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed the present motion to withdraw the settlement 

agreement, claiming he was “co[erc]ed, lied [to], and railroaded into signing a settlement.” Mot.

at 2, Dkt. No. 75. He indicates he agreed to the settlement because his attorney at the time, John 

Stringer, urged him to settle so he would not “lose the case.” Id. at 1. Mr. Stringer had filed a 

motion to withdraw as Plaintiff’s lawyer the day before the settlement conference, explaining the 

attorney-client relationship had “broken-down to the point that effective communication [wa]s not 

possible” and noting that Plaintiff “refuse[d] to cooperate . . . in preparing discovery requests[.]” 

Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel at 1, Dkt. No. 73. According to Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw the 

settlement, Mr. Stringer warned Plaintiff he could lose the case because “discovery wasn’t filed.” 

Mot. at 1. Defendants filed a joint response opposing Plaintiff’s Motion, asserting “Plaintiff 

signed a valid settlement agreement of his own accord and therefore entered into a binding 

contract” that the Court should enforce. Jt. Opp’n at 2, Dkt. No. 81. The Honorable Edward M. 

Chen, the presiding judge in this matter, granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as his 

attorney and referred Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw the settlement agreement to the undersigned. 

Dkt. No. 83. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Reply. Dkt. No. 85.

The undersigned finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and 

VACATES the January 21, 2016 hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having 

carefully considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the 

undersigned issues this REPORT, which RECOMMENDS the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Withdraw the Settlement Agreement.

LEGAL STANDARD

Courts have “the inherent power summarily to enforce a settlement agreement involving an 

action pending before it.” Brionez v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2007 WL 217680, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

26, 2007) (citing In re Suchy, 786 F.2d 900, 902-903 (9th Cir. 1985)); cf. Kokkonen v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (district court did not have inherent power to 

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enforce settlement agreement after dismissal order had been entered that did not retain jurisdiction 

over the settlement agreement). “A settlement agreement in a pending action may be enforced if 

two requirements are met: (1) both parties must have agreed to the terms of the settlement or 

authorized their respective counsel to settle the dispute, and (2) it must be a complete agreement.”

Page v. Horel, 2011 WL 5117562, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (Chen, J.) (citing Callie v. 

Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1987); Harrop v. W. Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 

(9th Cir. 1977)). 

Even where the underlying claims are federal, “the construction and enforcement of 

settlement agreements are governed by principles of local law which apply to interpretation of 

contracts generally.” United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 

(9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989)). Under California 

law, a proposal constitutes a complete agreement if it is “sufficiently definite” so that the promised 

performance is “reasonably certain.” Barefield v. Darden Restaurants Inc., 2015 WL 4451813, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2015) (quoting Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick, 60 Cal. App. 4th 793, 811 

(1998)). Additionally, “[i]n California, the objective intent of the parties determines a contract’s 

meaning.” Aki v. Univ. of Cal. Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., 2015 WL 1778481, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Apr. 17, 2015) (citing United Commercial, 962 F.2d at 856 (intent is “manifested in the agreement 

and by surrounding conduct—rather than the subjective beliefs of the parties.” (citations 

omitted))). Consequently, “the true intent of a party is irrelevant if it is unexpressed.” Id.

(citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

The settlement agreement in this action meets the requirements for an enforceable 

settlement. First, there is no claim that the settlement agreement was incomplete, and the terms of 

the agreement were and remain sufficiently definite. Specifically, Plaintiff agreed to settle his 

case in exchange for the City’s agreement to pay Plaintiff $1,000 and Santa Rita’s agreement to 

pay Plaintiff $7,500. Tr. at 3. The entirety of those funds was to be paid to Plaintiff, not his 

counsel. 11/13/2015 Min. Order; Tr. at 4 (“Mr. Stringer: . . . . I also want to note for the record 

I’m also waiving all costs on this . . . the check should go directly to Mr. Davis.”). Plaintiff does 

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not assert or provide any evidence that the agreement was incomplete. 

Second, although Plaintiff and his counsel may have had some disagreements prior to the 

settlement conference, Plaintiff himself agreed to the settlement terms—not his counsel. 

Plaintiff’s objective actions and conduct reflect his agreement to the terms of the settlement. As 

Defendants point out, “Plaintiff did not express at any point that he was unclear about the terms of 

the settlement or that he was entering into the settlement agreement due to anything other than his 

own free will.” Opp’n at 3. Further, Plaintiff verbally affirmed his assent to the settlement 

agreement and its terms on the record. Id.; see Tr. at 3. There was nothing about Plaintiff’s 

objective conduct to indicate any lack of intent to form the settlement agreement.

Based on these factors, Plaintiff has no basis to seek withdrawal of the settlement; 

however, Plaintiff also asserts he was coerced and lied to in accepting the settlement agreement. 

Plaintiff’s basis for these arguments appears to be primarily due to the presence of Mr. Stringer at 

the settlement conference. Specifically, Plaintiff contends his lawyer told him he “better take an 

offer” and if he did not, he would “lose the case because [] discovery wasn’t filed.” Mot. at 1. 

Defendants point out that “[t]he parties in this case have had a longstanding discovery dispute[,]” 

and they “have not received adequate responses to their discovery requests from Plaintiff” despite 

the fact that those requests were sent out long ago. Opp’n at 4. They posit that “Plaintiff’s 

counsel was not misrepresenting or threatening Plaintiff but was merely providing Plaintiff with 

legal counsel as the case could not proceed without adequate discovery responses from Plaintiff.” 

Id. Mr. Stringer’s motion to withdraw as counsel indeed indicates that Plaintiff “refuse[d] to 

cooperate . . . in preparing discovery requests[.]” Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel at 1. 

Plaintiff has raised no facts to support he was coerced into accepting the settlement 

agreement or that his lawyer or anyone else made misrepresentations to him such that he was 

improperly or unlawfully induced into agreeing to settle. Rather, the record reveals Plaintiff 

agreed to the settlement in a manner that was voluntary, deliberate, and informed. See Jones v. 

Taber, 648 F.2d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A release of claims under section 1983 is valid only 

if it results from a decision that is voluntary, deliberate, and informed.”). 

As a final note, in his Reply, Plaintiff raises new arguments, asserting the “settlement 

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agreement is no good anyway, you have the 30 day rule, plus it’s not completed, Mr. Stringer 

didn’t sign it.” Reply at 2. Plaintiff does not explain what he means by the “30 day rule” but the 

undersigned is unaware of and has not discovered any such deadline or timing requirement that 

would make this settlement agreement void or voidable. Further, the fact that Mr. Stringer did not 

sign the agreement is inconsequential. The agreement to settle in this case is between Plaintiff and 

the Defendants, and in any case, Mr. Stringer’s statement waiving his fees and costs on the record 

before the Court is binding. See Doi v. Halekulani Corp., 276 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(oral settlement agreement binding when verbally agreed to on the record before court with 

material terms made explicit).

In sum, Plaintiff has put forward no grounds for finding the settlement agreement improper 

or unlawful in this case, and accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion should be denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court DENY

Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw the Settlement Agreement.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, any party may serve and file objections to 

this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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