Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01812/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01812-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH SCHULTE,

NO. CIV. 05-1812 WBS JFM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: COSTS

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SAMUEL L.

JACKSON, THOMAS FRIERY, 

LYDIA ABREU, WILLIAM P.

CARNAZZO, and BRETT M. WITTER,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On September 9, 2005, plaintiff Deborah Schulte brought

suit against defendants City of Sacramento, Samuel L. Jackson,

Thomas Friery, Lydia Abreu, William P. Carnazzo, and Brett M.

Witter, alleging that her First Amendment rights were violated,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. While

plaintiff’s case was pending in this court, the United States

Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Caballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1960

(2006), that “when public employees make statements pursuant to

their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens

for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 55 Filed 10/20/06 Page 1 of 4
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Significantly, “unlike costs awarded under Rule 54, 1

costs awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1919 are not subject to a

presumption that they shall be awarded to a prevailing party.” 

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insulate their communications from employer discipline.” 

Subsequently, defendants filed a supplemental

memorandum to a pending motion to dismiss, arguing that the

Garcetti ruling foreclosed plaintiff’s remaining federal claim. 

Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff Deborah Schulte filed a

statement of non-opposition to defendants’ supplemental

memorandum to their motion to dismiss. Plaintiff then filed a

notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice on June 20, 2006,

conceding that her sole remaining federal claim, a First

Amendment claim by a public employee who had made statements

pursuant to her official duties, was no longer viable. 

Accordingly, this court no longer had federal question

jurisdiction over the case. 

Defendants subsequently submitted a bill of costs

totaling $2,398.01. Plaintiff objects to defendants’ memorandum,

contending that there has not yet been a final determination on

the merits and that defendants should not receive “windfall

financing” of the state court proceedings to follow. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1919, “[w]henever any action or suit is dismissed in

any district court . . . for want of jurisdiction, such court may

order the payment of just costs.” See also Edward W. Gillen Co.

v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 166 F.R.D. 25, 28 (D. Wis.

1996) (noting that the court has discretion to award costs after

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction upon determining that such an

award would be just).1

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Edward W. Gillen Co., 166 F.R.D. at 27.

3

Based on the caselaw existing at the time this action

was filed, a strong argument is made that plaintiff’s federal

claim against defendants was not frivolous at that time. 

Plaintiff later conceded this court’s lack of jurisdiction over

her remaining federal claim promptly after receipt of defendants’

supplemental memorandum pointing out the recent decision in

Garcetti, arguably giving rise to a significant change in the

applicable constitutional law. She additionally recognized that

this court lacked federal jurisdiction over the remaining state

law claims, and expressed her plan to re-file her remaining

claims in state court. Significantly, depending on the outcome

of the state law claims, an award of costs could be made by the

state court at a later time. 

Under these circumstances, this court would be hardpressed to determine that an award of costs to defendants is

just. See, e.g., Tankship Intern., LLC v. El Paso Merchant

Energy-Petroleum Co., No. 04-753, 2006 WL 2349603, at *2 (D.

Conn. July 25, 2006) (finding costs under § 1919 unwarranted, in

part because the plaintiff’s argument for subject matter

jurisdiction “was not frivolous or vexatious,” and “the parties

remain[ed] in active litigation in state court, where the issue

of costs to the prevailing party [could] be determined”); Chester

v. Nw. Iowa Youth Emergency Ctr., 158 F.R.D. 626, 631 (D. Iowa

1994) (noting that, although the federal claims in the complaint

had been dismissed, because plaintiff had cognizable state court

claims, “[a]warding defendants their costs at this point would

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amount to a windfall financing continuing litigation”). 

Accordingly, the court will not exercise its discretion to award

defendant costs in this matter.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ request

for taxation of costs be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: October 19, 2006

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 55 Filed 10/20/06 Page 4 of 4