Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00560/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00560-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 444
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Welfare
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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1 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1), Michael B. Mukasey is substituted

for Alberto R. Gonzales. 

Page 1 of 11

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jim Apolinar,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Peter J. Baum, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________________

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No. CV06-560-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT 

& RECOMMENDATION

 Defendants1

 bring this motion to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. For reasons which follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that

the District Court, after its independent review, GRANT Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The present case involves an application for Supplemental Security Income

(SSI) benefits filed by Plaintiff on May 18, 2001. 

1. CV 04-035-TUC-JMR

On January 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court asking for

review of the Commissioner's decision and alleging several civil rights violations.

(Apolinar v. Barnhart, D. Ariz. CV 04-0035-TUC-JMR, Doc. No. 1). The Appeals

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Council agreed to voluntarily remand the case for reconsideration of medical evidence

and Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. A proposed remand was mailed to Plaintiff,

who filed it, unsigned, moving to admit the proposed stipulation and accompanying

letter as evidence. (Id., Doc. No. 36) On July 14, 2004, United States District Court

Judge John M. Roll remanded the case for re-examination by the Social Security

Administration. (Id.) District Judge Roll further found that the district court had no

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's alternative theories of relief under the Civil Rights Act

and Americans with Disabilities Act. On August 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Notice of

Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (9th Cir. No. 04-16558).

The Commissioner next moved for a remand in the 04-16558 Ninth Circuit

case. On November 19, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued an order in the 04-16558 case

notifying Plaintiff that his appeal would be dismissed if he failed to take certain

actions. On June 21, 2005, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision affirming the district

court’s July 14, 2004, remand order, further finding the questions raised on appeal so

insubstantial as to not require further argument. 

 2. CV 04-435-TUC-RCC

On August 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed his second complaint in district court.

(Apolinar v. Barhnart, Dist. AZ., CV 04-435-TUC-RCC, Doc. No. 1). The district

court dismissed the second complaint with leave to file an amended complaint

containing legally cognizable claims and legal causes of action not duplicating those

contained in Plaintiff's first complaint. (Id., Doc. No. 6) On October 26, 2004,

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, and three days later, on October 29,

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Id., Doc No. 15) On November 3, 2004,

District Judge Collins filed an order advising Plaintiff that the Notice of Interlocutory

Appeal divested the court of jurisdiction, but Plaintiff continued filing pleadings until

on January, 21, 2005, District Judge Collins ordered Plaintiff's suit be dismissed. (Id.,

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Doc. No. 24, 30) Plaintiff filed yet another notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit on

March 22, 2005 (9th Cir. No. 05-15671). On November 23, 2005, an order was

issued similar to the one in the 04-16558 Ninth Circuit case, finding the questions

raised on appeal so insubstantial as to not require further argument and summarily

affirming the district court’s judgment. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Specific Claims 

Defendants assert that the district court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's complaint. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is appropriate when the court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When considering a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the district court may review any evidence, such

as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of

jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir.1988). See, e.g.,

Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1011 n.4 (1947) (“when a

question of the District Court's jurisdiction is raised ... the court may inquire by

affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as they exist.”). 

“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only that power

that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by

Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534,

541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331 (1986) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137,

173-180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114

S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges as jurisdictional basis for his claims that the district court has

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“inherent judicial power and jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff immediate relief in the form

of a Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief pursuant to Title 28 § 1331; § 1332

Paragraph (2), Title 28 § 1343 Civil Rights and Title 42 USCA 1985...” (Doc. No.

1, at 9) Plaintiff alleges that he has been wrongfully denied his Social Security

Disability Benefit checks, retroactive to April of 1986, in the amount of $1,500,000.

Judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is the sole avenue of judicial review

for recovery on any claim, including actions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, for

disability payments arising under the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h);

See also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614-615 (1984). The Supreme Court has

held that Section 405(h) clearly applies in a Social Security case where an individual

challenges the lawfulness of the agencies denial of a benefit, and the statute plainly

bars § 1331 review in such a case, “irrespective of whether the individual challenges

the agency’s denial on evidentiary, rule-related, statutory, constitutional, or other legal

grounds.” Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 10 (2000).

Where the Social Security Act provides “both the standing and the substantive basis

for the presentation of [a plaintiff’s] constitutional contentions”, section 405(h)

precludes resort to federal-question jurisdiction for adjudication of a plaintiff’s

constitutional contentions. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1975). 

Under section 405(g), judicial review is permitted only of a “final decision”

of the Commissioner of Social Security, made after a hearing to which the plaintiff

was a party. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that there has

been no final decision regarding his application for benefits, (Doc. No. 1, at 26), thus,

this Court has no jurisdiction to review Plaintiff’s claims. 

Additionally, Plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies

before seeking judicial review of a denial of his applications for disability insurance

benefits. See Hironymous, 800 F.2d at 892. He did not do so. Plaintiff filed

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applications for Title II and Title XVI benefits in May 2001. (Doc. No. 26,

Declaration of Dennis Ford, ¶ 3(a) (Attached as Exhibit A)). After denials at all

administrative levels, Plaintiff filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona on January 26, 2004. (Id., ¶ 3(b)). On July 14, 2004, the court

remanded Plaintiff’s case for further administrative proceedings. (Id., ¶ 3(c)). On

August 24, 2004, the Appeals Council vacated the hearing decision and remanded the

case to an ALJ for further proceedings. (Id., ¶ 3(d)). On June 8, 2005, an ALJ issued

an unfavorable decision on Plaintiff’s applications; Plaintiff filed exceptions. (Id., ¶

3(e)). The Appeals Council assumed jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s case and issued an

order vacating the ALJ’s decision and, in September 2005, remanded the case to an

ALJ for further proceedings. (Id., ¶ 3(f)). On March 20, 2006, an ALJ issued an

unfavorable decision and Plaintiff filed exceptions. (Id., ¶ 3(g)). The Appeals Council

assumed jurisdiction of the case and, in July 2006, vacated the hearing decision and

remanded the cases to an ALJ for further proceedings. (Id., ¶ 3(h)). 

At the time Plaintiff filed his complaint that initiated the instant case,

Plaintiff’s case was pending in the Tucson, Arizona, hearing office. (Id., ¶ 3(I)).

Because all ALJ decisions denying Plaintiff’s applications had been vacated by the

Appeals Council, there was no final decision of the Commissioner when Plaintiff filed

his complaint (November 7, 2006). 

Thus, as to all claims arising under the Social Security Act, section 405(h)

precludes resort to federal-question jurisdiction for adjudication of a plaintiff’s

constitutional contentions, and, section 405(g) precludes review of those claims in this

instance because there has been no “final decision” of the Commissioner, and Plaintiff

has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff has alleged twenty counts in his Complaint. Both the standing and the

substantive basis for the presentation of all of Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Social

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2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

Page 6 of 11

Security Act, as all counts involve the acts of Defendants in wrongfully denying

Plaintiff his benefits. Thus, this Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction of

Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that no action may lie for the

unconstitutional denial of benefits in the form of a Bivens2

 action, holding that money

damages may not be recovered from federal official responsible for allegedly

unconstitutional conduct leading to a denial of Social Security benefits. Schweiker

v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 4112, 423-24 (1988) ("When the design of a Government

program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial

mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its

administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies."); Butler v. Apfel, 144

F.3d 622, 624 (1998). 

Furthermore, Defendant ALJ Baum, as a federal hearing officer, is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity for alleged unconstitutional violations under Bivens. See

Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). Defendants Commissioner Barnhart and

Attorney General Mukasey are protected by qualified immunity, as they are clearly

named in their supervisory capacity only, and there is no respondeat superior liability

under Bivens. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted).

As to claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the named Defendants

are federal officers, these claims are not appropriately filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

which requires defendants to be state actors. Because Defendants were acting under

color of federal law, these claim will instead be construed as filed pursuant to Bivens.

See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 950 F.2d 1471, 1473 (9th Cir. 1991) (court

may ignore plaintiff’s initial mischaracterization of action against federal officers as

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a Section 1983 action and, instead, treat the complaint as made under Bivens) rev’d

on other grounds, 508 U.S. 429 (1993). For the reasons stated above, the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. 

As to any claims arising under the Federal Torts Claims Act, Plaintiff has not

filed an administrative tort claim prior to filing his complaint, (See. Doc. No. 26, Ex.

B., Declaration of Jon Carlo), and thus this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over these unexhausted claims. See Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939

F.2d 740, 742- 43 (9th Cir.1991). 

Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under the doctrine of res judicata. See Doc. No.

1, at 2. As correctly noted by Defendants, res judicata is a legal doctrine employed

to determine whether an issue has been previously decided by a court. It is not a basis

for subject matter jurisdiction. Neither do Plaintiff’s references to declaratory

judgment and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, nor the

declaratory judgment statute, found at 28 U.S.C. § 2201, confer subject matter

jurisdiction in a federal court. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Knight, 96 F.3d 1284, 1288

(1996). 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss

this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff’s stated claims.

 B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Generally

Defendants assert that a district court may sua sponte dismiss an action at any

time for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the allegations of a complaint are

“totally impalusible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer

open to discussion.” Citing Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (per

curiam).

 While it is true that pro se complaints, like Plaintiff's, are to be held to a "less

stringent standard" than those drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

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520 (1972), even pro se complaints "must state a claim upon which relief can be

granted by the court." Caldwell v. District of Columbia, 901 F. Supp. 7, 10 (citing

Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C.Cir. 1981). The right of

self-representation is not a license excusing compliance with relevant rules of

procedural and substantive law. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).

However, even though pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, conclusory and

vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents of the

Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Where a plaintiff has paid filing fees and his complaint states jurisdictional

facts, the court may not sua sponte dismiss such an action, however, a paid complaint

that is “obviously frivolous” does not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction and

may be dismissed. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984)

(citations omitted). Furthermore, a court may dismiss as frivolous complaints reciting

bare legal conclusions with no suggestion of supporting facts, or postulating events

and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind, or a complaint which conflicts with facts

of which the district court may take judicial notice. Id., 745 F.2d at 1228, citing

Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 1976). 

A district court can also dismiss a complaint if it is malicious in nature, Phillips

v. Carey, 638 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1981), or if it is plainly abusive of the judicial

process or merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims. Id.; Van Meter v.

Morgan, 518 F.2d 366 (8th Cir. 1975); Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471 (10th Cir.

1972). A malicious complaint is one which contains allegations the plaintiff knows

to be false, is part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitive lawsuits, or

contains disrespectful or abusive language. See In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th

Cir. 1988); Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C.Cir. 1981).

The complaint is patently frivolous and malicious. See, e.g., Neitzke v.

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3

Despite the fact that this is a “paid” complaint and Neitzke dealt with

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, reliance upon Neitzke is appropriate

since that case defines the parameters of a complaint which is frivolous

and malicious.

Page 9 of 11

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (a

complaint is frivolous and malicious when (1) it is based upon “an indisputably

meritless legal theory,” or (2) the claim is based upon “factual contentions [that] are

clearly baseless”3

). The complaint contains no plausible subject matter jurisdictional

claim. This action and its nonsensical allegations should be dismissed pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

C. Failure to State a Claim 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is unintelligible and fails to present a short and plain

statement of his various civil rights claims as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d

409 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 

In general, leave to amend is only denied if it is clear that amendment would

be futile and "that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

amendment." Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting

Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam));

see Poling v. Morgan, 829 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (futility is basis for denying amendment under Rule 15).

The plaintiff was placed on notice of the subject matter jurisdiction problem

by the motion to dismiss. That motion explicitly asserted that dismissal was required

because this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Despite such notice, Plaintiff has

neither responded to the motion, nor tried to cure the problem with amendment.

Furthermore, it is apparent that the jurisdictional deficiencies could not be

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cured by amendment. 

Although the exhaustion requirement of section 405(h) could be waived, the

Ninth Circuit has identified three prerequisites for waiver of the exhaustion

requirement: “The claim must be (1) collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement

(collaterality), (2) colorable in its showing that denial of relief will cause irreparable

harm (irreparability), and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the purposes of

exhaustion (futility).” Kaiser v. Blue Cross of California, 347 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1993)). 

Plaintiff’s claims are not collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement, as

his claim is essentially one for benefits. Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921 (a claim is collateral

if it is essentially one for benefits.) Plaintiff also does not meet the irreparability

requirement for waiver, as he does not show that exhaustion would cause him

irreparable injury. Id. at 922. Nor has he demonstrated that resolution of his claim

would not serve the purposes of exhaustion. 

Because the Plaintiff has not exhausted available administrative review, the

district court lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims, and amendment of the

complaint could not cure this deficiency. 

To the extent Plaintiff’s claims are not barred under section 405(h), Plaintiff

has not identified a valid basis for suing the government that avoids the jurisdictional

bar of sovereign immunity, and no amendment can cure this deficiency. 

Because the Magistrate Judge finds that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over this action, the Magistrate Judge does not reach Defendant’s

contention that this matter should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(2)(4) and

(5) for failure to timely effect service as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). 

III. RECOMMENDATION

This Court recommends that the District Judge, after its independent review,

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GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No. 26).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

A party may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should

use the following case number: CV 06-560-TUC-FRZ.

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by

the District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc). 

NOTICE

Plaintiff is further notified that, pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, this Court has inherent authority to strike from any pleading any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter. The Court will, without

further warning to Plaintiff, strike any documents which contain further descriptions,

such as those noted in the Motion to Dismiss, p.6, that unnecessarily or irrelevantly

reflect on the moral character of an individual, do not contribute to the substantive

claims, or state anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the

court. 

DATED this 4th day of June, 2008.

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