Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-03940/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-03940-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Tort Action

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For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE RITCHIE, 

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. C 00-3940 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

Discovery and Review Taxation of Costs

Plaintiff Wayne Ritchie brought an action against the United States of America, alleging that

the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Narcotics tested psychoactive drugs on

unknowing and unwitting American citizens including plaintiff during the 1950s, and that this nonconsensual testing drove plaintiff to commit an armed robbery on December 20, 1957. Plaintiff

initially filed claims against the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (“FTCA”), and against Robert V. Lashbrook and Ira Feldman under the First,

Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff sought twelvemillion dollars in compensatory damages, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. The court held a

four-day bench trial on the FTCA claims and subsequently granted judgment in favor of defendant. 

Now before the court is plaintiff’s motion to compel documents and to review the clerk’s taxation of

costs. 

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BACKGROUND1

As explained in this court’s July 1, 2002 Memorandum and Order, plaintiff, a former Deputy

United States Marshal, alleges that he was unwittingly given food or drinks that were laced with

lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) or another psychoactive drug while he was attending a holiday

party in the United States Post Office Building on December 20, 1957. Compl. ¶ 12. According to

plaintiff’s uncontradicted declaration, Ritchie first arrived at his office’s Christmas party at

approximately noon on December 20, 1957. Ritchie Dec. ¶ 5. He drank a single bourbon and soda

and returned to his office shortly thereafter. Id. Two hours later, Ritchie re-entered the party and

consumed three or four more drinks. Id. at 6. Plaintiff then began to feel paranoid and imagined

that his fellow officers and co-workers had turned against him. Id. at 7. He left work, returned

home briefly, and then visited four bars, where he consumed a total of two more drinks. Id. at 7-9. 

Still fueled by paranoia, plaintiff then resolved to hold up a bar and returned to his office where he

took two revolvers from his personal locker. Id. at 9-10. He entered a fifth bar, had one drink, and

then drew a weapon and demanded money. Id. at 10. Someone knocked Ritchie unconscious, and

he was subsequently arrested. Id. at 10-11.

Plaintiff alleges that he was a victim of a federal program, called “MKULTRA,” dedicated to

the research and development of drugs, including LSD, that might be used to alter human behavior. 

Compl. ¶¶ 18 & 26. Plaintiff maintains that he “first suspected that he might have been

surreptitiously drugged” when he read the obituary of Dr. Stanley Gottlieb, a former CIA agent

implicated in that agency’s mind-control program, in the newspaper on March 15, 1999. Compl. ¶

23. He found additional support for his suspicion in April 1999 when he read a diary entry of

George White, an agent of the Bureau of Narcotics and allegedly the operating head of the CIA’s

“mind-altering program” in San Francisco. See Compl. ¶ 24; Ritchie Dep., Exh. B-12 (White was a

senior employee at the San Francisco Federal Narcotics Bureau in the 1950s). White’s December

20, 1957, diary entry stated, in part, “xmas party Fed bldg Press Room.” Ritchie Dep., Exh. D;

Compl. ¶ 25.2

 White was an MKULTRA subcontractor from approximately 1953 until 1964. 

McGinn Dec. ¶ 5. In that role, he established a safehouse apartment in San Francisco where drug

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tests were conducted on drug informants and prostitutes. Id. Defendant has also produced an

extensive record of newspaper and television coverage documenting federal mind-control

experimentation. Id., Exhs. A-C (newspaper articles) & X (books).

After a number of pre-trial motions, the court conducted a bench trial. At trial, Ritchie

presented two live witnesses during his case-in-chief: himself and a doctor who testified that LSD

was the cause of Ritchie’s attempted robbery. Ritchie also relied on the deposition testimony of Ira

Feldman, a former agent involved with the MKULTRA program. After Ritchie concluded his case

in chief, the government moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 52(c). The court granted the government’s motion. 

The allegations in the instant motion concern the deposition of Feldman on July 30, 2002. 

On May 8, 2007, long after the deposition and the conclusion of trial, plaintiff’s counsel, Sidney

Bender, took Feldman to lunch. During that lunch, Feldman told Bender that shortly before the

scheduled deposition two attorneys representing defendant—Kathleen McGinn, agency counsel for

the Central Intelligence Agency, and Patricia Kenney, assistant United States Attorney—provided

Feldman with a list of questions and proposed answers (“scripts”) in preparation for the deposition. 

Bender also admits that Feldman retracted his statements about the scripts in subsequent

conversations. Bender Dec. ¶ 2. 

Plaintiff presented similar arguments in the context of the government’s motion at the close

of trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). At that time, plaintiff sought sanctions

against defendant arguing that defense counsel was aware of Feldman’s perjurious testimony. The

court reviewed those allegations at the time and concluded that plaintiff had not established by a

preponderance of the evidence that defense counsel had knowingly presented perjured testimony. 

The court sanctioned defendant pursuant to Rule 30(d)(3) because Kenney’s behavior “may well

have denied plaintiff the opportunity to solicit further valuable testimony.” January 5, 2005 Order,

at 15. The court awarded plaintiff reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in taking Feldman’s

second deposition. That ruling was subsequently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Ritchie v. United

States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Motion for Review of Taxation of Costs

An award of costs to a prevailing party is permitted as a matter of course under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).3 An item is not recoverable as a cost under Rule 54(d) unless it is

specifically enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.4 “[Section] 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in

Rule 54(d). Section 1920 enumerates expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the

discretionary authority found in Rule 54(d).” Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.

437, 441–42 (1987). A court denying the prevailing party costs under rule 54(d)(1) must provide its

reasons for doing so. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 592–93 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

Northern District Civil Local Rule 54 sets out procedures for awarding taxable costs and

further delineates the types of costs taxable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Civil

Local Rule 54-3(a)(1) allows for “the Clerk’s filing fee” to be taxed “if paid by the claimant.” Civil

Local Rule 54-3(f) allows for taxing of fees for masters and receivers. No other allowances for any

type of filing fee is made under Civil Local Rule 54. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(a)

provides that a claim for non-taxable costs related to attorneys’ fees can be made by motion. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks two forms of relief: first, he asks the court to compel the discovery of certain

documents for the purposes of challenging the clerk’s taxation of costs; second, he requests a review

of the clerk’s taxation of costs. The court will review each of these requests. 

I. Motion to Compel

Plaintiff seeks discovery of certain “scripts” he alleges that the government’s attorneys

prepared for defendant Ira Feldman in advance of his deposition. He contends that production of the

documents may establish that defendants’ attorneys knew that Feldman was likely to commit perjury

before his deposition was taken. 

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Plaintiff moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 for his requested discovery. 

Rule 34(a) states that: 

[a]ny party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making

the request, or someone acting on the requestor’s behalf, to inspect, copy, test, or sample any

designated documents or electronically stored information . . . which constitute or contain

matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in the possession, custody or control of

the party upon whom the request is served.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). He also cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governing subpoenas 

to support his request. Compelling discovery is inappropriate here because plaintiff has not made a

formal discovery request pursuant to Rule 34 or subpoena under Rule 45. Furthermore, plaintiff has

not properly served either on defendant. Compelling discovery is available only after a formal

request—via request or subpoena—has been rejected by a party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c), 45. In

his reply, plaintiff contends that his motion to compel “could be considered a request for production

of documents by a party to this action.” Pl.’s Reply at 1. It is possible that plaintiff considers a

motion to compel a proper request under Rule 34(c), but this court does not. 

Second, defendant contends that there is no mechanism for discovery at this point in the

litigation. Rule 54(d)(1) does not envision a discovery process as part of a request for review of

taxation of costs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“Except when express provision therefor is made either

in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as

of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. . . .”). The text of the Rule is

silent on whether discovery is permitted as part of the review of a bill of costs. While it may be

unusual to seek post-trial discovery in challenging a bill of costs, it may be justified in extraordinary

circumstances. This is not an extraordinary case such as to justify the discovery sought. 

Finally, defendant states that it has no responsive documents to plaintiff’s request. It

contends that such a request is baseless and further alleges that plaintiff’s counsel obtained

information on the requested documents in a suspect manner. Plaintiff’s counsel, defendant

contends, contacted Feldman without first contacting Feldman’s counsel and probed Feldman with

questions about privileged communications. Moreover, Feldman subsequently denied any

admissions he made in conversations with counsel. Bender Dec. ¶ 2 (“In subsequent telephone calls

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Mr. Feldman reversed his admission and denied making the above statements.”). 

Defendant has submitted declarations from the two lawyers responsible for preparing

Feldman for his deposition. Both attorneys deny giving Feldman scripts. Kenney Dec. ¶ 6, 8–14 (“I

can state unequivocally that I have never given any witness, including Mr. Feldman, a written

statement of ‘proposed answers.’”); McGinn Dec. ¶ 5–6. Kenney also submits her personal records

indicating that she did not stay at the hotel where plaintiff alleges that the deposition preparation

took place. Kenney Dec. ¶ 11, 12, Exh. A. The court is satisfied that there are likely no responsive

documents to plaintiff’s request, were any such request properly made.

The motion to compel is DENIED. 

II. Motion for Review of Taxation of Costs

Plaintiff seeks review of the clerk’s taxation of costs in the amount of $14,204.63 pursuant to

Civil Local Rule 54-5. He argues that defendant’s unclean hands resulting from deliberate acts of

misconduct in regard to the Feldman deposition entitle him to a denial of all costs. See Association

of Mexican-Am. Educators v. Calif., 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the court may

use its discretion to deny the award of costs to punish prevailing party misconduct). 

Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a reduction of costs because of an alleged contradiction

between the Ninth Circuit and this court in the characterization of Feldman’s deposition testimony. 

In reviewing this court’s imposition of sanctions for the conduct of the government’s counsel at

Feldman’s deposition, the Ninth Circuit described Feldman’s deposition testimony as a “series of

incriminating, contradictory, and combative statements about his role in the CIA’s LSD project.” 

Ritchie v. United States, 451 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2006) (footnotes omitted). Plaintiff contends

that this statement by the Ninth Circuit in describing the events at trial “effectively overruled this

court’s” conclusions that the Feldman’s statements were oblique at best. Pl.’s Mot. at 6. Plaintiff is

incorrect. The Ninth Circuit not only did not effectively overrule this court, it affirmed the court’s

conclusions about Feldman’s testimony, albeit with some reservations: 

Although Feldman made a number of comments in his depositions suggesting that he was

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involved in drugging Ritchie, the district court’s determination that Ritchie did not prove

Feldman’s involvement is not clearly erroneous.

Id. Plaintiff also bases his request for a reduction of costs on the fact that the court awarded him

sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees for the second deposition. While the court is empowered to

reduce or refuse to tax costs where there is misconduct, any misconduct here has been sanctioned

previously. To reduce costs would serve only to doubly penalize defendant. The fact that Ritchie

waived the sanction in order to perfect his appeal is of no consequence. 

Defendant notes that the clerk has already reduced its costs from $26,176.14 to $14,204.62. 

Plaintiff’s spurious allegations against defense counsel, mischaracterization of the Ninth Circuit’s

findings, failure to properly serve defendant with a discovery request before filing a motion to

compel discovery as well as his somewhat dubious conduct toward Feldman, a person of ailing

health, suggest that plaintiff may well be the party deserving of sanctions. However, this case

should find repose in finality and not rise up once more in post-trial, post-appeal reprises.

The motion for review of costs is DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion to compel production is DENIED and the motion for review of costs is

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

_______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. All facts cited herein are taken from the Complaint unless otherwise noted. 

2. The full entry reads: “home flu – xmas party Fed bldg Press Room.” Ritchie Dep., Exh. D.

3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part 

Costs Other than Attorneys’ Fees. Except when express provision therefor is made

either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys’

fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs.

4. Section 1920 provides

Taxation of costs 

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript

necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the

case;

(5) Docket fees under § 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and

salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under § 1828 of

this title.

 A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the

judgment or decree.

ENDNOTES

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