Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01548/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01548-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RUDOLPH HELENICK, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-1548 PHX RCB MEA

) 

WARDEN WALKER, ARIZONA ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

)

 Respondents. )

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD:

Mr. Rudolph Helenick (“Petitioner”), is presently

incarcerated by Respondents in Florence, Arizona. On June 16,

2006, Mr. Helenick filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Amended

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket

No. 13) on October 31, 2006, asserting that the petition should

be denied as not timely filed. Petitioner filed a traverse to

the answer on November 15, 2006. 

I. Procedural History

In 1982, after a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted

of six counts of burglary in the first degree, nineteen counts

of kidnapping, and six counts of armed robbery. See Answer, Ex.

G. On June 14, 1983, Petitioner was sentenced to the

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presumptive term of 28 years imprisonment on each conviction for

burglary in the first degree, on each conviction for kidnapping,

and on each conviction for armed robbery. See id., Ex. C. Some

of the sentences were imposed concurrently and three of the

sentences consecutively. See id., Exh. C. As a result,

Petitioner was in effect sentenced to a term of 84 years’

imprisonment. See Petition at 1. 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on June 16,

1983. Answer, Exh. I. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions but modified his sentences to correct

a typographical error. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner’s sentences for

each conviction for burglary in the first degree were corrected

to the presumptive term of 20 years imprisonment on each count

of conviction. Id., Exh. M. Petitioner sought reconsideration

of this decision, which was denied on May 3, 1985. Id., Exh. P.

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

denied review on September 11, 1985. Id., Exh. S.

Petitioner initiated an action for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on February 20, 2001. Id.,

Exh. T. Petitioner was appointed counsel, who informed the

court he could find no meritorious issues to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. V. Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for post-conviction relief on November 26, 2002. Id.,

Exh. W. The action for post-conviction relief was summarily

denied on June 20, 2003. Id., Exh. Z. Petitioner sought review

of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which

summarily denied review on June 17, 2005. Id., Exh. BB.

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Petitioner sought relief from this decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court, which denied review on January 23, 2006. Id.,

Exh. DD.

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on June 16,

2006, asserting he is entitled to habeas relief because he was

denied his right to due process of law. Petitioner contends

there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury to find

him guilty regarding the counts of conviction. Petitioner also

contends he was subjected to double jeopardy. Petitioner

asserts his rights pursuant to the Sixth Amendment were violated

because the trial court “combined” the charges against him by

failing “to instruct the jury that each was a different criminal

charge and should be treated as such.” Petition at 6.

Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to convict

him on all of the charges of armed robbery because only one

victim saw a gun and because the state statute regarding a

simulated weapon was not enacted until 1983, two years after his

crimes. Id. Petitioner also asserts his sentences are illegal

and unconstitutional because he was sentenced “under the

‘dangerous offenses’ guidelines which the evidence didn’t

support.” Id. at 7.

II. Analysis

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

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The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). “A state prisoner challenging a non-capital state

conviction or sentence must file a federal petition within one

year from ‘the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.’” Id., quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Additionally, the AEDPA requires state prisoners whose

convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file any

petition for federal habeas corpus relief from those convictions

by April 23, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the AEDPA provides that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

during the pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000). 

Because Petitioner’s state conviction became final

prior to 1996, pursuant to the AEDPA the one-year statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief

began to run on April 24, 1996, and expired on April 23, 1997,

unless it was tolled by any pending action for state postconviction relief. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. 

Petitioner did not have any action for state postconviction relief pending in the Arizona courts on April 24,

1996, when the statute of limitations began to run on

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Petitioner’s federal habeas action. Petitioner did not file any

actions for state post-conviction relief, which would have

tolled the statute of limitations, from April 24, 1996, when the

statute of limitations began running, until April 23, 1997, when

the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action

expired. 

Petitioner did not seek any form of relief from his

convictions and sentences from approximately 1986, through

February 20, 2001, when Petitioner filed his first action for

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure, a period of approximately five years. Even

if this action for state post-conviction relief would have

tolled the applicable statute of limitations, it could not and

did not restart the already-expired statute of limitations for

filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See, e.g., Ferguson

v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Preston v.

Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). 

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only be considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Allen v.

Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has determined that equitable tolling of the

filing deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only

if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control

make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Lott, 304

F.3d at 922; Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces,

rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the

failure to file a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court has

stated: “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears

the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005). 

In his traverse, Petitioner reasserts that he was

denied his right to due process because there was insufficient

evidence of his guilty presented at his trial; that the “trial

court’s decision to combine the charges constituted fundamental

error in violation of [Petitioner’s] Sixth Amendment rights”;

and that the trial court erred by convicting and sentencing him

pursuant to “incorrect statutes.” Docket No. 15. Petitioner

asserts he could not timely file his petition because he

suffered a stroke in May of 1996, “requiring a lengthy hospital

stay...” Id. Petitioner contends he has suffered paralysis and

on-going mental deficits as a result of his stroke. Id.

Petitioner asserts his delay in filing his petition was “not of

[h]is own causing.” Id.

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing he is

entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner did not diligently

pursue his post-conviction remedies. Petitioner does not

explain why he failed to seek federal habeas relief from the

time his conviction became final until the time of his alleged

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1

 The Court notes Petitioner was a lead Plaintiff in a

class-action prisoner civil rights filed in this Court in 1986, which

case was dismissed pursuant to a stipulation of the parties in 1994.

See Helenick, et al. v. Arizona, CV 86-2036 PHX RCB.

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stroke in May of 1996.1 Although physical incapacity by a stroke

may be an “extraordinary circumstance,” Petitioner provides no

evidence that he suffered a stroke or that he was incapacitated

by the stroke. The Court notes Petitioner’s pleadings are

coherent and legible. Additionally, Petitioner does not allege

during what time period he was disabled by the stroke, i.e., the

time period to which he believes he is entitled to equitable

tolling.

Petitioner has not established that there were

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition. A

federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling must also

act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout the period he seeks

to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000);

see also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

Petitioner allowed at least five years to pass, from 1996

through 2001, without pursuing any avenue of federal, or state,

habeas relief and, therefore, the Court concludes that

Petitioner did not act with the requisite reasonable diligence

which would warrant equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. 

III. Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

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to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Helenick’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

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fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 16th day of November, 2006.

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