Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01211/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01211-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRES CAMARENA HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-CV-1211-CAB (WVG)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION ON 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Andres Camarena Hernandez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed 

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging 

his convictions in San Diego Superior Court for assault with a deadly weapon, resisting an 

executive officer, battery, being under the influence of methamphetamine, and attempting 

to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime. The trial court also made a true finding that 

Hernandez incurred a prior strike and a prior serious felony. Petitioner raises three claims 

in support of his Petition. 

The Court has read and considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s 

Traverse, and all of the lodgments filed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED. 

///

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The following facts are taken from the California 

Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal, affirming the 

judgment of the trial court.

While under the influence of methamphetamine, 

[Petitioner] got into a violent altercation with two of his brothers, 

with whom he shared a residence. [Petitioner] first punched and 

shoved his brother Elias shortly after Elias returned home from 

work in the afternoon. Elias retreated to his car, locked the door 

and called 911 while [Petitioner] was violently punching the car. 

[Petitioner’s] brother Steven then intervened by trying to pull

[Petitioner] away from the car. [Petitioner] started punching 

Steven, who was walking with a crutch because of a broken 

ankle. [Petitioner] grabbed Steven's crutch, hitting Steven with 

the crutch four times while Steven was on the ground, and then 

continued to punch Steven. Neighbors intervened by pulling 

[Petitioner] off Steven and tackling [Petitioner].

Sheriff deputies arrived in response to the 911 call. 

[Petitioner] was agitated and yelling profanities after the deputies 

handcuffed him. While a deputy was in the process of moving 

[Petitioner] to the patrol car, [Petitioner] jumped up into the air, 

placed his legs straddling the officer's legs, violently twisted his 

body, and attempted to roll. The deputy identified the maneuver 

as a technique used by prisoners to injure an officer's legs.

(Lodg. 5, ECF No. 21-19 at 2-3.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. STATE COURT

On October 30, 2013, Petitioner was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly 

weapon, resisting an executive officer, battery, being under the influence of 

methamphetamine, and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime.

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(Lodgment 1, ECF No. 21-1 at 181-85.)

1 On April 24, 2014, Petitioner filed a direct appeal 

in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodg. 1 at 258.) In his direct appeal, Petitioner argued 

the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right by denying him access to the jurors’ 

identification information, an opportunity to investigate possible juror misconduct, and by 

applying the wrong legal standard to Petitioner’s request for juror identification 

information. (Lodg. 3, ECF No. 21-17 at 22-32.) On April 14, 2015, the California Court 

of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling in an unpublished opinion. (Lodg. 5.) The court 

held the trial court applied the correct legal standard and acted within its discretion in 

determining Petitioner did not establish a prima facie showing of good cause to release 

juror information. (Id. at 5-9.)

On May 18, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme 

Court. (Lodg. 6, ECF No. 21-20.) The petition for review was denied on June 24, 2015, 

without comment or citation to authority. (Lodg. 7, ECF No. 21-21.) On July 5, 2016, 

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Lodg. 8, 

ECF No. 21-22.) Petitioner’s three grounds for relief in support of his petition were: (1) 

suppression of exculpatory evidence; (2) failure to produce the weapon used in the crime 

or to conduct DNA or fingerprint analysis; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 

5.) On August 31, 2016, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for habeas corpus 

without comment or citation to authority. See In re Hernandez, 2016 Cal. LEXIS 7142.

B. FEDERAL COURT

On May 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) The Court dismissed the action without prejudice, 

allowing Petitioner until July 18, 2016 to satisfy the filing fee requirement and file a First 

Amended Petition. (See ECF No. 5 at 3.) On May 25, 2016, Petitioner paid the filing fee. 

(ECF No. 6.) On July 19, 2016, Petitioner filed another petition. (See ECF No. 9.) The 

Court construed this as a motion to reopen the case and a motion to amend. (See ECF No. 

 

1 The page numbers cited refer to the page numbers imprinted by Pacer unless otherwise noted.

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11.) On July 26, 2016, the Court granted the motions and deemed the First Amended 

Petition filed as of July 13, 2016, the date in which Petitioner signed the Petition. (See ECF 

No. 11.) On April 12, 2017, Respondent timely filed an Answer to the Petition and lodged 

numerous state court records. (Answer, ECF No. 20.) On May 11, 2017, Petitioner timely 

filed a Traverse. (Traverse, ECF No. 24.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 

L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to 

any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). 

In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide 

whether it agrees with the state court’s determination, rather, the court applies an 

extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was 

objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4, 124 S.Ct. 1157,

L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); see also Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). To 

prevail, a petitioner must establish that “the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error ... beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 

16 (2013).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 

914 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the 

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state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions 

but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, 

the “unreasonable application” clause requires the state court decision be more than 

incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court's application of clearly 

established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). The Court may also grant relief if 

the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the 

higher court's denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06, 

111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not 

“furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent 

review of the record to determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 

223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-

76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court 

need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 

537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be “contrary to” 

clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 

2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at 

the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises three claims that include four separate grounds for relief in his 

Petition. He contends that: (1) the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 95, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); (2) the State violated 

the federal constitution by not producing the crime weapon; (3) the State violated the 

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federal constitution by not conducting DNA or fingerprint analysis; and (4) his trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance. (FAP.)

2 The Court will discuss each in turn.

A. Suppression of Evidence

Petitioner contends the State violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment by 

suppressing evidence. (Id. at 14-16.) In support of his argument, Petitioner claims he 

“checked thouroughly [sic] all the discovery material, plus the list of evidence exibits [sic]” 

and did not find the police reports. (Id. at 16). Petitioner appears to argue that, as a result

of the reports missing, he was not prepared to rebut testimony regarding prior charges for 

obstruction of a public officer under California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) (“Prior 148s”)

contained within those police reports. (Id. at 14.) In addition, Petitioner contends the State

suppressed evidence in the police reports that demonstrated one of the witnesses, Officer 

Glover, knew Petitioner from prior incidents. (Id. at 15). Petitioner argues the State hid the 

name of Officer Glover in the police reports because prior excessive force complaints 

against the officer would have damaged Officer Glover’s credibility and exonerated 

Petitioner. (Traverse at 2.) Petitioner claims Officer Glover’s testimony that he knew

Petitioner prior to the incident “disadvantage[d]” [sic] him. (FAP at 15.) Petitioner cites 

Brady, 373 U.S. 83 at 95 in support of his claims. (Id. at 14.) Respondent argues the state 

court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to Supreme Court 

precedent. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities, ECF No. 20-1 at 4-7.)

“The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In order to prove a Brady violation, Petitioner must 

satisfy three elements: (1) the withheld evidence was beneficial to the defense because it 

was exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the evidence was wilfully or inadvertently 

suppressed by the State; and (3) the suppressed evidence prejudiced Petitioner. Benn v. 

 

2 Petitioner presented the claims regarding the weapon and investigation as a single claim. The Court 

will discuss these as separate claims for clarity purposes.

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Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

Petitioner raised this claim in his state habeas petition. (Lodg. 8.) The California 

Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation to authority. (Lodg. 9.)

Because Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal no reasoned state court decision 

exists and this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine 

whether the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982 (9th Cir. 2000.) 

Common to all three prongs of the Brady test is one element: the evidence must have 

been suppressed or withheld by the prosecution. A thorough review of the record indicates 

the police reports were not suppressed or withheld by the prosecution and Petitioner did 

receive the police reports at issue.

On Thursday, September 26, 2013, the prosecutor, Mr. Allard, sought to introduce 

Petitioner’s Prior 148 offenses contained in the police reports at issue in Petitioner’s trial.

However, the prosecutor had not yet provided the police reports to Petitioner’s counsel, 

Mr. Gonzalez. The trial judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel discussed the police 

reports containing the information of Petitioner’s Prior 148 offenses: 

The Court: All right. Mr. Allard, are you requesting to use prior 

148s, the testimony of the officers with regards to [Petitioner]? 

Mr. Allard: I have to review the cases more thoroughly before I 

can make that call on -- and provide them to Mr. Gonzalez before 

I did that. We can do that this afternoon. 

The Court: All right. Why don’t you provide that to him this 

afternoon. We will see on Monday if he’s prepared to go forward 

with trial or not.

(Lodg. 2-1

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at 31:22-32:3.)

[The Court:] So we will tackle [the admissibility of prior 

offenses] on Monday. Until you have a copy of the reports and 

 

3 Lodgment 2 citations refer to the lodgment number and the reporter’s transcript volume number unless 

otherwise noted.

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you have an idea of what it is you’re trying to get introduced.

(Id. at 34:23-25.)

At the next hearing, on October 17, 2013, before discussing whether the prior 

incidents found in the police reports were admissible pursuant to California evidentiary 

code, Petitioner’s counsel and the prosecutor acknowledged they had received and 

exchanged all discovery: 

The Court: So both of you have gotten all the discovery, you 

think? 

Mr. Gonzalez: Yes, your honor.

Mr. Allard: I believe so, your honor.

(Lodg. 2-3 at 7:10-13.) 4

Since the previous conversation of discovery involved the police reports and defense 

counsel indicated all discovery was received, it was reasonable for the state court to find 

that “all discovery” included the police reports with the prior offenses Petitioner is now 

claiming were omitted. Petitioner provides no evidence, outside of his claim that he could 

not find the reports, which rebuts the record showing the police reports were received prior 

to trial. Lastly, Petitioner has provided no evidence that shows Officer Glover’s name was 

redacted from the reports received by his trial attorney. Indeed, this claim is questionable 

at best and cuts directly against Petitioner’s first argument at worst. If Petitioner never 

received the police reports, as he claims, then Petitioner would be unaware of whether 

Officer Glover’s information was redacted. If Petitioner saw that Officer Glover’s 

information was redacted, then Petitioner must have received the police reports.

Since the record indicates Petitioner received the police reports in question, and 

Petitioner has provided no evidence to the contrary, the Court need not reach the Brady test 

 

4 The Court notes that the Monday after September 26, 2013 would have been September 30, 2013. 

However, the state court judge continued the hearing originally set for September 30, 2013 to October 

17, 2013. (Lodg. 2-2 at 4:26-27.)

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regarding suppressed evidence by the State. Accordingly, the Court finds the state court 

did not rule contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. Petitioner is 

not entitled to relief as to this claim.

B. Failure to Produce and Test the Weapon

Petitioner contends his right to due process was violated because the prosecutor did 

not preserve the weapon used in the crime for which Petitioner was charged. (FAP at 17-

18.) It also appears that Petitioner contends the State should have collected the weapon 

because the crime was serious, forensics were used in other charges against the Petitioner, 

a juror asked for the weapon during deliberations, and DNA testing was necessary. (FAP 

at 17.) In support of his argument, Petitioner claims DNA testing of the weapon would 

have been “exculpatory in nature” because the testing would have determined whether he 

touched the crutch. (Id. at 18). Furthermore, Petitioner argues the State should have 

conducted DNA testing because “other forensic evidence was collected,” such as blood 

samples, and the State called multiple forensic experts to testify. (Traverse at 3-4.) 

Petitioner also argues the evidence was lost “at a very crucial time” and the police “did not 

collect the actual weapon knowing the exculpatory value of that weapon.” (Traverse at 3.) 

Respondent argues the state court did not rule contrary to or unreasonably apply Supreme 

Court precedent when rejecting this claim because there is no constitutional requirement 

to produce the actual weapon. (P&A at 7.)

Petitioner raised this claim in the petition filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodg. 8.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation 

to authority. (Lodg. 9.) Because Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal, no 

reasoned state court decision exists and this Court must conduct an independent review of 

the record to determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000.)

In general, law enforcement officials have a duty to preserve “evidence that might 

be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.” California v. Trombetta, 

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467 U.S. 479, 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). However, “unless a criminal 

defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful 

evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 

U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). The Supreme Court has not directly 

addressed the duty to collect evidence. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

ruled that the analysis applied to Youngblood is equally applied to the collection of 

evidence and thus “a bad faith failure to collect potentially exculpatory evidence” violates 

“the due process clause.” Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1120 (1989). This duty applies 

only to “material evidence, i.e., evidence whose exculpatory value was apparent before its 

destruction and that is of such nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence 

from other sources.” Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489). “The presence or absence of bad faith by the police for 

purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the 

exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” Youngblood, 488 

U.S. at 56, n.*. The burden of proving bad faith falls on the defendant. Youngblood, 488 

U.S. at 58. Additionally, the rule announced in Youngblood applies to a petitioner in a 

habeas corpus petition. See Mitchell v. Goldsmith, 878 F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1989). Even 

when the police do collect evidence, “the police do not have a constitutional duty to 

perform any particular tests” on that evidence. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59.

A thorough review of the records indicates the weapon was not collected by sheriff 

deputies. The officer reports of the incident lists blood vials, digital photographs, and video 

of the blood draw as the only evidence collected. (ECF No. 21-1 at 51.) Petitioner has not 

articulated how the weapon may have played a significant role in his defense. Moreover,

Petitioner has provided no evidence the sheriff deputies acted in bad faith by not collecting 

the weapon.

The sheriff deputies could have reasonably concluded the weapon had no 

exculpatory value given the multiple and consistent eye-witness statements provided by 

five different witnesses to the event. Steven Hernandez, one of the victims, stated Petitioner 

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“picked up [his] crutch and hit him across the upper back [...].” (Id. at 46.) Elias 

Hernandez, another victim, stated Petitioner “took one of the crutches from Steven” and 

that Petitioner “swung the crutch,” striking Elias and Steven “multiple times.” (Id. at 49.) 

Veronica Roman, a witness, “observed [Petitioner] violently hit Elias and Steven with 

Steven’s crutch.” (Id. at 50) Darrell Barnett, another witness, “observed [Petitioner] 

violently hit and jab Elias and Steven with a crutch in the front yard.” (Id.) Given the 

multiple and consistent witness statements, sheriff deputies could have reasonably 

concluded the weapon had no exculpatory value. Lastly, even assuming the sheriff deputies 

had collected the crutch, the sheriff deputies had no “constitutional duty to perform” a 

DNA test. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59.

Petitioner has failed to show sheriff deputies acted in bad faith by not collecting and 

preserving the weapon. Further, the record indicates sheriff deputies could have reasonably 

concluded the weapon had no exculpatory value. Lastly, the sheriff deputies had no 

constitutional obligation to conduct DNA testing. Accordingly, the Court finds the state 

court did not rule contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel for four reasons: (1) 

his attorney failed to assert a claim for prosecutorial misconduct when the State did not 

conduct DNA testing; (2) his attorney failed to notice the State introduced evidence that 

had not been exchanged during discovery; (3) his attorney failed to go into sufficient depth 

when cross-examining Deputy Glover as to how the deputy knew Petitioner;

5

and (4) his 

attorney failed to object to the submission of “foreign material as evidence” when the State

used an exemplar crutch rather than the actual weapon. (FAP at 15, 19.) Respondent argues 

the state court was not objectively unreasonable in rejecting Petitioner’s ineffective 

 

5 Petitioner brings up this claim in the suppression of evidence ground but the Court addresses it in this 

section because it is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

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assistance of counsel claims because he does not meet the standards required by Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 719, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and AEDPA. 

(P&A at 9.)

Petitioner did not raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. 

Petitioner first raised the ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition for habeas corpus 

to the Supreme Court of California. (Lodg. 8.) The Supreme Court of California denied his 

petition without comment or citation to authority. (Lodg. 9.) Because Petitioner did not 

raise this claim on direct appeal no state court reasoned decision exists and this Court must 

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court's decision 

is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. See 

Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982 (9th Cir. 2000.) 

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law governing ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Baylor 

v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has explained the 

Strickland inquiry as follows:

To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 

conviction must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a 

claim of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption 

that counsel's representation was within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance. The challenger’s burden is to 

show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104, 131 S.Ct. 770178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). “Failure to make the required showing of either 

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deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 700.

“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s 

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The 

likelihood of a different outcome must be “substantial,” not merely “conceivable,” Richter, 

562 U.S. at 112, and when Strickland and AEDPA operate “in tandem,” as here, the review 

must be “doubly” deferential, id. at 105. “When [Section] 2254(d) applies, the question is 

not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

i. Failure to Assert a Claim for Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner argues his counsel was ineffective because his counsel failed to assert a 

claim for prosecutorial misconduct when the State did not conduct DNA or fingerprint 

testing. (FAP at 19.) Petitioner provides no evidence demonstrating why his counsel’s

decisions not to allege prosecutorial misconduct was objectively unreasonable or 

prejudicial.

There is no federal constitutional requirement that law enforcement or the State 

conduct any particular tests during an investigation. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59. Given 

this, raising a claim for prosecutorial misconduct would likely have been a meritless 

argument. “Failure to raise a meritless argument does not constitute ineffective assistance.” 

Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Given this, the 

state court could have reasonably concluded that counsel was not objectively unreasonable 

by foregoing such a claim.

Additionally, a careful review of the record demonstrates Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by the decision such that “the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. The record indicates that regardless of who else 

may have touched the crutch and where, Petitioner grabbed the crutch at some point and 

struck his brother with it during the altercation.

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Petitioner’s brother, Steven Hernandez, testified the following on October 21, 2013:

Q: Go ahead and tell us what happened.

A: After I pulled him off from punching the window, he turned 

around and started punching at me. I tried to defend myself by 

throwing back. My crutch fell. And then [Petitioner] picked up 

the crutch, hit me once in the thigh and about three times in the 

back.

(Lodg. 2-4 at 89:14-19.)

Petitioner’s other brother, Elias Hernandez, testified the following on October 22, 

2013: 

Q: What did you see [Petitioner] do with the crutch when Steven 

was on the ground?

A: [Petitioner] proceeded to strike him with it.

(Lodg. 2-5 at 28:9-11.) 

Petitioner’s neighbor, Veronica Roman testified the following on October 23, 2013: 

Q: And who had the crutch?

A: The brothers. When [Petitioner] pushed his brother down, he 

grabbed the crutch and he hit the brother on the back. 

(Lodg. 2-6 at 134:27-135:1.)

A temporary visitor staying with Veronica Roman, Catalina Vazquez, testified the 

following on October 23, 2013: 

Q: And what happened after the pushing? 

A: Well, [Petitioner] took the crutch away from the one that had 

the crutch and wanted to hit him.”

(Id. at 161:27-162:1.)

Another neighbor, Juanita Jacobo, testified the following on October 23, 2013: 

Q: So after [Petitioner] started the fight, then he took Steven’s 

crutch away and you told Mr. Gonzalez’s investigator that 

[Petitioner], after taking the crutch away from Steven, hit him 

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with it several times. 

A: Yes

(Id. at 176:24-28.)

Given the extensive testimony regarding Petitioner holding the crutch, the 

information Petitioner has provided to the Court is not enough to convince the Court the 

outcome would have been different under the prejudicial prong of Strickland. In the Court’s 

view, DNA and fingerprint analysis of the crutch would have likely bolstered the State’s 

case and hindered Petitioner’s. Given this, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

Since the “[f]ailure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or 

sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim,” Petitioner is not entitled to relief as 

to this claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.

ii. Failure to Object to Demonstrative Crutch

Petitioner asserts a crutch “was brought from [the] prosecutor’s home” and his 

counsel should have objected to its demonstrative use. (FAP at 19.) Petitioner has provided 

no evidence that the prosecutor’s use of a demonstrative crutch was prejudicial to the trial.

A thorough review of the record indicates that the jury was informed on several different 

occasions that the crutch was a demonstrative aid and not the actual weapon. The 

prosecutor identified it as a “demonstrative tool” when examining Petitioner’s brother, 

Steven Hernandez. (Lodg. 2-4 at 121:26-122:5.) Additionally, the state court judge 

clarified the crutch used in the trial was “not evidence” but was simply “a demonstrative 

piece” that the jurors could not consider when deliberating. (Lodg. 2-10 at 40:28-41:3.)

Petitioner appears to claim this is objectionable because it was not the real weapon. 

However, this fails to demonstrate prejudice. For this reason alone, Petitioner’s claim 

should fail.

Even assuming, arguendo, there was prejudice, there is no indication Petitioner’s 

counsel’s failure to object to the demonstrative crutch was objectively unreasonable. 

Counsel has “wide latitude [] in making tactical decisions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

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Petitioner’s counsel could have reasonably determined the use of such a demonstrative aid 

was not worthy of an objection. This is particularly true since the “use of such 

demonstrative aids is routine” in state court proceedings. People v. Gonzales, 281 P.3d 

834, 867 (Cal. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, Petitioner has failed to show his counsel’s 

decision not to object to the demonstrative crutch was objectively unreasonable.

Since the “[f]ailure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or 

sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim,” Petitioner is not entitled to relief as 

to this claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.

iii. Failure to Go In Depth Of Deputy Glover’s Knowledge Of Petitioner

Petitioner asserts “[his] attorney of record asked Officer Glover if he knew 

[Petitioner] but [did not] go into depth,” claiming this was ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(FAP at 15.) The following is the cross-examination of Deputy Glover by Petitioner’s 

counsel regarding the prior knowledge of Petitioner: 

Q: In this situation, you didn’t know [Petitioner] prior to 

this incident, right?

A: That’s not entirely true, no.

Q: So you know him already?

A: Yes.

Q: Have you personally met him before?

A: I have.

(Lodg. 2-6 at 45:27-46:7). Petitioner’s counsel then stopped questioning Officer Glover 

and his prior knowledge of Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner does not provide any evidence to support his claim that this decision was

objectively unreasonable or prejudicial. It is also quite likely that had Petitioner’s counsel 

explored further the prior relationship that Officer Glover had with Petitioner, damaging 

or otherwise unfavorable information (e.g., Officer Glover had previously arrested 

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Petitioner) may have been revealed. The depth and breadth of cross-examination done by 

counsel is a tactical decision and counsel has “wide latitude [] in making tactical decisions.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Without providing any evidence at all as to why counsel was 

deficient in the cross-examination of Office Glover, Petitioner has failed to meet his 

burden. Since the “[f]ailure to make the required showing of either deficient performance 

or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim,” Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

as to this claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.

iii. Failure to Identify Evidence Not Exchanged During Discovery

Petitioner alleges his counsel failed to recognize the State introduced police reports 

not exchanged during discovery. Petitioner states “had [his] counsel been alert” counsel

would have requested police reports the State introduced at trial but did not exchange in 

discovery. (FAP at 19.)

The record contradicts Petitioner’s claim that evidence was presented without being 

exchanged. As explained above, Petitioner’s counsel acknowledged that the police reports 

in question were received. See, supra, 7:11-8:11. Petitioner does not provide any evidence 

that contradicts the record outside of the naked assertions in his Petition and Traverse 

claiming discovery was not exchanged. Without anything further, Petitioner has not 

satisfied his burden of demonstrating deficient performance or prejudice and, accordingly, 

is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

iv. Conclusion

Because Petitioner has not shown that his counsel performed deficiently and failed 

to show prejudice, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. Accordingly, 

the Court finds the state court did not rule contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly 

established federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this claim.

D. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing. (Traverse at 6.) “In deciding whether 

to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could 

enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle 

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the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). A 

district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing where “the record refutes the 

applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief [.]” Id.; see also Hibbler 

v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012) (“An evidentiary hearing is not required 

on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record.”) (citation omitted).

Petitioner simply claims the state court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and as 

a result this Court should hold an evidentiary hearing. However, the record refutes the 

factual allegations Petitioner asserts in his claim that the State improperly suppressed 

evidence and a portion of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.6 Moreover, the 

record demonstrates that Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were not violated when 

the State did not collect or test the weapon used in the crime. Lastly, Petitioner’s remaining 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are issues that are “resolved by reference to the 

state court record,” Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1147, given the “doubly” deferential standard for 

analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.

For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing be DENIED.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED without prejudice. This Report and 

Recommendation is submitted to U.S. District Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo, pursuant to 

the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 25, 2017 any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

 

6 Specifically, the claim that Petitioner’s counsel failed to object to evidence presented without being 

introduced into discovery is refuted by the record before the Court.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to any objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 1, 2017. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2017

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