Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00170/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANDRE CARSTARPHEN, SR., )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00170-KD-N

)

JUDGE ROBERT SMITH and )

PROSECUTOR MATTHEW )

SIMPSON, )

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This action is before the Court on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, 

alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. (Docs. 10, 11). Plaintiff Andre Carstarphen, Sr. (hereinafter, “the 

Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, has filed no response in opposition to the motions, and 

the deadline to do so has passed (see Doc. 12). However, prior to the Defendants’ 

filing the motions to dismiss, the Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Motion to 

Release Andre Carstarphen jr. immediately” (Doc. 5), which he has recently 

supplemented (see Docs. 14, 15).

Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b), these motions have been referred to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation as to the 

appropriate disposition, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C), Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1), and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon 

consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the undersigned RECOMMENDS

that the Plaintiff’s “Motion to Release Andre Carstarphen jr. immediately” (Docs. 5, 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 17
14) be DENIED and that the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 10, 11) be 

GRANTED under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

I. Legal Standards

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 

curiam) ((citation and quotations omitted)). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants 

this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or 

to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell 

v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted,” the Court must construe the complaint in 

the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, “accepting all well-pleaded facts that are 

alleged therein to be true.” E.g., Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 

(11th Cir. 2013). “Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain ‘a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in 

order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 

2010) (quotation omitted). “ ‘While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 2 of 17
do.’ ” Id. at 1289 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 

1955, 1964-65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A complaint’s “ ‘[f]actual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the 

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in 

fact).’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must now contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). While this “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ at 

the pleading stage, ... the standard ‘calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the claim.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Moreover, “ ‘the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations 

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.’ ” Id. at 1290 (quoting 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Under the plausibility standard, “ 

‘where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show [n]”—

“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). Iqbal “suggested that courts considering motions to dismiss 

adopt a ‘two-pronged approach’ in applying these principles: 1) eliminate any 

allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there 

are well-pleaded factual allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 3 of 17
U.S. at 679). “Importantly, ... courts may infer from the factual allegations in the 

complaint ‘obvious alternative explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather 

than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Id. (quoting 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567)). “[G]enerally, the 

existence of an affirmative defense will not support a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim. A district court, however, may dismiss a complaint on a 

rule 12(b)(6) motion when its own allegations indicate the existence of an 

affirmative defense, so long as the defense clearly appears on the face of the 

complaint.” Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation 

omitted)).

“Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) come in two forms, 

‘facial’ and ‘factual’ attacks. Facial attacks challenge subject matter jurisdiction 

based on the allegations in the complaint, and the district court takes the 

allegations as true in deciding whether to grant the motion. Factual attacks 

challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.” 

Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) 

(citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). 

Because neither of the Defendants presents any extrinsic evidence in support of 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), their attacks on subject matter jurisdiction are 

“facial” only.

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 4 of 17
II. Analysis

a. Motion for Release

Liberally construing the “Motion to Release Andre Carstarphen jr. 

immediately” (Docs. 5, 14, 15) and the Complaint (Doc. 1), the Plaintiff appears to 

be asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for instance, he has requested money 

damages) and requesting habeas relief for Carstarphen Jr. and others under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (i.e., he requests immediate release of Carstarphen Jr. and other 

named individuals), on the basis of alleged prosecutorial and judicial misconduct 

during Carstarphen Jr.’s criminal proceedings in the Circuit Court of Mobile 

County, Alabama.

To the extent Carstarphen Sr. asserts claims under § 1983, immediate 

release of a state prisoner from confinement is not available as a remedy under that 

provision. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (“[A] § 1983 action will 

not lie when a state prisoner challenges ‘the fact or duration of his confinement,’ 

and seeks either ‘immediate release from prison,” or the ‘shortening’ of his term of 

confinement.” (citations omitted) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 482, 

489 (1973))); D.D. ex rel. Dabney v. Niles, 615 F. App'x 654 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam) (unpublished) (“D.D. and his parents brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 challenging his detention by the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice 

(‘DJJ’) ... Regardless of how the Appellants frame the claims, both claims—D.D.'s 

own claim (Count Two) and his parents' claim based on their parental rights (Count 

One)—are, in their essential nature, challenges to D.D.’s detention. Therefore, the 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 5 of 17
appropriate method to challenge D.D.’s detention is to seek a writ of habeas corpus. 

See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 

(1973) (‘Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for 

state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and 

that specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983.’).”), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016).

To the extent the Plaintiff is asserting habeas and/or § 1983 claims on behalf 

of Carstarphen Jr. and/or others, he has not shown he is entitled to do so. Nothing 

in the record indicates that the Plaintiff can represent these other individuals in a 

representative capacity, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, and generally a party may only 

“plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel...” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. 

See also S.D. Ala. GenLR 83.2 (“Unless appearing pro se or through counsel under 

General Local Rule 83.3(f) or (g), all parties to proceedings in this Court must 

appear by an attorney admitted to practice in this Court.”). There is no indication 

that the Plaintiff is a licensed attorney (certainly not one who has been admitted to 

practice in this Court).

In this Circuit,

[i]t is well settled that with one narrow exception only licensed lawyers 

may represent others in court...:

“There is no constitutional guarantee that non-attorneys may 

represent other people in litigation. There is a narrow 

exception to this conclusion: a jail-house lawyer may help 

fellow prisoners file initial papers in habeas corpus actions 

when the state has failed to provide alternative aid to such 

prisoners in seeking post-conviction relief. See Johnson v. 

Avery, 1969, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718. This 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 6 of 17
exception results from two factors: (1) special concern for the 

right to seek the writ of habeas corpus, one aspect of the 

general rule that individuals deprived of liberty by the state 

have greater rights to state-supplied attorneys and other 

necessary aids than parties in private civil litigation; (2) the 

fact that prisoners are closed off from the rest of society and 

thus unable to seek out what legal help does exist.”

Thomas v. Estelle, 603 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (quoting Guajardo 

v. Luna, 432 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)) (finding that circuit court 

of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal by pro se prisoner plaintiff of 

dismissal of his § 1983 action where notice of appeal was only signed by that 

plaintiff’s unlicensed “jail-house lawyer” and co-plaintiff)).1 The Plaintiff does not 

fall into this narrow exception.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiff’s “Motion to Release 

Andre Carstarphen jr. immediately” (Docs. 5, 14) is due to be DENIED. In light of 

the undersigned’s finding that the Plaintiff cannot assert claims on behalf of 

Carstarphen, Jr. and the other prisoners identified in the Complaint, the 

undersigned, in addressing the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, will hereinafter 

construe the Complaint as only alleging claims brought on the Plaintiff’s own 

behalf.

b. Motions to Dismiss

1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Judge Smith argues that this action is due to be dismissed under the RookerFeldman doctrine. “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional. It prevents 

 1 “Opinions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the 

Eleventh Circuit.” E.g., Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 n.6 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc)).

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 7 of 17
lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court 

losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced.” Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 

(11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 

inapplicable here, as it only “bars the losing party in state court from seeking 

what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United 

States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself 

violates the loser’s federal rights.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Plaintiff 

(Carstarphen, Sr.) was not the losing party in Carstarphen, Jr.’s criminal 

proceedings,2 and Judge Smith has identified no other state judgment upon which 

to base the doctrine. Accordingly, dismissal on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine is not warranted.

2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits by private individuals in 

federal court against a state unless the state has consented to be sued 

or has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the states’ 

immunity. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363–64, 

121 S. Ct. 955, 962, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); Cross v. Ala. Dep't of 

Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502 (11th Cir. 

1995). “This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.” 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2939, 92 L.Ed.2d 

209 (1986). The Eleventh Amendment applies when “the State or one 

of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant....” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). That is, Eleventh Amendment immunity 

“is available ‘only’ to states and arms of the states.” Walker v. Jefferson 

Cty. Bd. of Educ., 771 F.3d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 2014).

Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 

cases. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1990). 

 2 Moreover, an assertion that federal courts are precluded from considering challenges to 

state criminal judgments is patently contradicted by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 8 of 17
Furthermore, the State of Alabama has not agreed to be sued for 

violations of an individual's civil rights. See Ala. Const. art. I, § 15 

(“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made defendant in any court of 

law or equity.”); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 

3057–58, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (citing Ala. Const. art. I, § 14, now 

codified as § 15)...

Whether an entity is an “arm of the state” is determined by 

considering four factors: (1) how the state law defines the entity; (2) 

the degree of state control over the entity; (3) where the entity derives 

its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity. 

Walker, 771 F.3d at 751–53.[3]

 3 In Walker, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently made clear that this 

multifactor test for Eleventh Amendment immunity, which was first articulated as a threefactor test in the panel decision Stewart v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 908 F.2d 

1499, 1511 (11th Cir. 1990), and later refined into a four-factor test in the en banc decision 

Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc), “remains the law of the 

circuit.” 771 F.3d at 752 – 53. 

As noted by the Walker court, in Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama, 

686 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2012), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held: “Whether an agency 

qualifies as an arm of the state is a federal question with a federal standard, but whether 

that standard is met will be determined by carefully reviewing how the agency is defined by 

state law... In conducting our analysis, this court ‘has stated the most important factor is 

how the entity has been treated by the state courts.’ ” 686 F.3d at 1291-92 (quoting 

Tuveson v. Fla. Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir. 

1984) (citing Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 625 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.

1980) (stating that whether an entity is a “ ‘second self’ of the state or a ‘separate and 

distinct’ entity subject to suit ‘must be determined by the law of the state’ ” (citation 

omitted)))). Accord Ross v. Jefferson Cty. Dep't of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 659 (11th Cir. 2012)

(per curiam) (same, quoting Versiglio).

Walker rejected arguments that the Versiglio decision “can be read as collapsing the 

entire Eleventh Amendment multi-factor test into a single dispositive inquiry—whether the 

state courts grant state law immunity to the entity for suits based on state law—” finding 

that such a reading “conflicts not only with our 1990 decision Stewart, but also with our 

2003 en banc decision in Manders.” 771 F.3d at 754 (declining to read Versiglio “in a way 

which violates our prior panel precedent rule and creates interpretive problems for panels 

in the future”). Walker reaffirmed that “how the state courts treat an entity is only one 

part of the first factor of the Stewart and Manders analysis. Within the first factor the court 

also weighs how state statutes treat the particular entity.” Id. (quotation omitted). Walker 

also noted that, “[t]o the extent that Huber held that Eleventh Amendment immunity is 

governed solely by how state law characterizes an entity, it has been superseded by the 

later en banc decision in Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309 (setting out four-part Eleventh 

Amendment immunity test).” Id. n.4.

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 9 of 17
Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 731-32 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) 

(footnote omitted). Moreover, while “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose 

personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state 

law[, o]fficial-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation and quotation omitted). Thus, “a suit 

against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official 

but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit 

against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 

(1989) (citation omitted).

Both Defendants perfunctorily claim entitlement to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity in their motions but make no substantive effort to explain why the 

respective agencies for which they are officers (i.e., the 13th Judicial Circuit of 

Alabama and the Mobile County District Attorney’s Office) should be deemed arms 

of the state of Alabama, whether through application of the four-factor test above or 

through citation to authority previously finding them as such. Generally, the Court 

is under no obligation to advance a defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity for a 

defendant. See McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th 

Cir. 2001) (“[U]nlike other jurisdictional bars, federal courts are required to 

consider whether the Eleventh Amendment strips them of jurisdiction only if the 

state defendant insists that it does.”).4

 4 Moreover, because the Plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee at the inception of this case 

rather than move to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the demands of § 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 10 of 17
In addition, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment protects no personal assets in 

‘individual’ or ‘personal’ capacity suits in federal court.” Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F.2d 

1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1993). “[P]ersons can have individual liability for misconduct 

as government employees. Plaintiffs are not usually required to designate, with 

particular words in the pleadings, that they bring their action against defendants in 

the defendants’ individual or official capacities, or both.” Id. at 1529-30. 

Nevertheless, “in general, plaintiffs have a duty to make plain who they are suing 

and to do so well before trial.” Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 

1995). “When it is not clear in which capacity the defendants are sued, the course 

of proceedings typically indicates the nature of the liability sought to be imposed.” 

Jackson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994).

Liberally construing the pro se Plaintiff’s Complaint, the undersigned 

concludes that he is asserting claims against the Defendants in both their official 

and individual capacities. Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to 

individual capacity claims, and the Defendants have not sufficiently shown 

entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the official capacity claims 

against them.

3. Failure to State a Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

As both Defendants correctly point out, the Plaintiff’s claims are premised on 

alleged violations of Carstarphen, Jr.’s federal rights during his state criminal 

 

1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring the district court to dismiss an action brought in forma pauperis “at 

any time if the court determines that--the action ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 

defendant who is immune from such relief”) do not apply.

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 11 of 17
proceedings. In an attempt to establish “standing in this case,”5 the Plaintiff alleges 

that the violations of Carstarphen, Jr.’s federal rights “added unnecessary stress 

contributing to more health problems [for the Plaintiff,] resulting in prescribed 

anxiety medication.” (Doc. 1 at 1. See also Doc. 1-3 at 3 (“I Andre Carstarphen, Sr. 

have standing due to stress and new medication with lies on case.”). However, a 

claim under § 1983 must be premised on a state actor’s violation of the plaintiff’s

federal rights. See, e.g., Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583 (11th Cir. 1996) 

(“Section 1983 is no source of substantive federal rights ... Instead, to state a 

section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must point to a violation of a specific federal right.”). 

Distress caused by the violation of another’s federal rights (i.e. Carstarphen, Jr.) 

does not result in the violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.6 Accordingly, the 

Defendants motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are due to be GRANTED on the 

basis that the Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a claim under § 1983.

4. Prosecutorial and Judicial Immunity

 5 A plaintiff “must satisfy three requirements to have standing under Article III of the 

Constitution: (1) ‘injury-in-fact’; (2) ‘a causal connection between the asserted injury-in-fact 

and the challenged action of the defendant’; and (3) ‘that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision.’ ” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992))). “[I]n a 

motion to dismiss, [courts] usually ‘evaluate standing based on the facts alleged in the 

complaint.’ ” Id. at 1335 (quoting Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081). Upon consideration, the 

undersigned concludes that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts establishing Article III 

standing, such that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is 

not warranted.

6 To the extent the Complaint could be construed as asserting only state law claims based 

on this distress (e.g., outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress), the Plaintiff has 

not shown that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. See Baltin v. 

Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997) (“In a given case, a federal 

district court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) 

jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”).

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 12 of 17
The Defendants have also moved for dismissal on the basis of absolute 

judicial and prosecutorial immunity, respectively.

Traditional common-law immunities for prosecutors apply to civil cases 

brought under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–28, 96 S. 

Ct. 984, 993–94, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976). “[A]t common law, ‘[t]he 

general rule was, and is, that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from 

suit for malicious prosecution.’ ” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342, 

106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097, 89 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1986) (quoting Imbler, 424 

U.S. at 437, 96 S. Ct. at 998). In § 1983 actions, prosecutors have 

absolute immunity for all activities that are “ ‘intimately associated 

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Van de Kamp v. 

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 129 S. Ct. 855, 860, 172 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2009)

(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995); accord Jones v. 

Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).

Absolute immunity does not depend entirely on a defendant's job title, 

but involves a functional approach granting immunity based on 

conduct. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1282. This functional approach looks to 

“the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who 

performed it.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S. Ct. 

2606, 2613, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993); accord Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 

n.33, 96 S. Ct. at 995 n. 33.

Absolute immunity accordingly applies to the prosecutor's actions “in 

initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case.” Imbler, 424 

U.S. at 431, 96 S. Ct. at 995. Prosecutors are immune for appearances 

in judicial proceedings, including prosecutorial conduct before grand 

juries, statements made during trial, examination of witnesses, and 

presentation of evidence in support of a search warrant during a 

probable cause hearing. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490–92, 111 S. 

Ct. 1934, 1942, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 

118, 126, 118 S. Ct. 502, 507–08, 139 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1997); see also Van 

de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 861. “A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity 

from allegations stemming from the prosecutor's function as advocate.” 

Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281. Such absolute immunity also “extends to a 

prosecutor's acts undertaken ... in preparing for the initiation of 

judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his 

role as an advocate for the State.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); 

accord Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (holding prosecutor who proffered perjured testimony and 

fabricated exhibits at trial is entitled to absolute immunity, but a 

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 13 of 17
prosecutor who participated in the search of a suspect's apartment is 

entitled to only qualified immunity).

Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 837-38 (11th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1497 

(2012).

Prosecutors have absolute immunity when “filing an information 

without investigation, filing charges without jurisdiction, filing a 

baseless detainer, offering perjured testimony, suppressing exculpatory 

evidence, refusing to investigate ... complaints about the prison 

system, [and] threatening ... further criminal prosecutions ....” Henzel 

v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1979); accord Marx v. 

Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 789 n.10, 790 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding 

that prosecutors have absolute immunity for rendering legal advice to 

police officers concerning the existence of probable cause to arrest).

Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (footnote 

omitted).

Moreover, it is well established that “[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial 

immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial 

capacity unless they acted in the ‘ “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” ’ ” Bolin v. 

Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Stump v. 

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)). Accord Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 

1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). “This immunity applies even when the judge's 

acts are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Bolin, 225 

F.3d at 1239 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356). “The factors which determine whether 

an act is judicial ‘relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function 

normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether 

they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.’ ” Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 

1547 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980)).

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 14 of 17
Here, all of the Plaintiff’s claims are based on the Defendants’ alleged 

unlawful actions taken in their respective roles as presiding judge and prosecutor in

Carstarphen, Jr.’s state criminal trials. As such, the Defendants are immune from 

the Plaintiff’s claims for money damages. See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239-43. 7 

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss are also due to be GRANTED on 

the basis of absolute immunity.8

III. Conclusion and Recommendations

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is RECOMMENDED that the 

Plaintiff’s “Motion to Release Andre Carstarphen jr. immediately” (Docs. 5, 14, 15) 

be DENIED, that the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. 10, 11) be GRANTED

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), that this action be DISMISSED 

 7 The only other forms of relief the Plaintiff requests are the vacateur of state criminal 

convictions and the immediate release of incarcerated individuals from confinement, which, 

as has already been explained, are not available in § 1983 actions.

8 The general rule in this Circuit is that, “[w]hen it appears that a pro se plaintiff's 

complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court should give the 

pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it with 

prejudice.” Jemison v. Mitchell, 380 F. App'x 904, 907 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 

(unpublished) (emphasis added) (citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) 

(per curiam) (“Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff 

must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court 

dismisses the action with prejudice.”), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. 

Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (overruling Bank as to counseled 

parties)). However, “[d]ismissal with prejudice is proper ... if the pro se plaintiff has 

indicated that he does not wish to amend his complaint or if a more carefully drafted 

complaint could not state a valid claim.” Id. The undersigned finds that even a more 

carefully drafted complaint cannot avoid dismissal for the reasons identified herein. The 

undersigned also notes that the Plaintiff has made no attempt to oppose the motions to 

dismiss, instead choosing to focus his efforts on arguing for Carstarphen, Jr.’s immediate 

release (see Docs. 5, 14, 15), relief that is clearly unavailable in these proceedings. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Court need not afford the Plaintiff an 

opportunity to amend prior to dismissal.

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with prejudice, and that final judgment be entered accordingly under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

IV. Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or 

anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this 

document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). The parties should note 

that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate 

judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge 

on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, 

however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests 

of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for 

the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 19th day of October 2016.

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 16 of 17
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00170-KD-N Document 16 Filed 10/19/16 Page 17 of 17