Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-02779/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-02779-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability as Unnecessary

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILL OLIVER KHAN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOE SOLIS, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 08-02779 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY AS

UNNECESSARY

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2007 decision of the California Board of

Parole Hearings (“Board”) finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. The Court ordered

respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an

answer, and petitioner filed a traverse.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 22, 1985, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and

sentenced to seventeen years-to-life. On June 4, 2007, petitioner was denied parole by the

Board for a fourth time. Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court,

which denied the petition in a reasoned opinion on January 9, 2008. Thereafter, petitioner

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filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal, which issued a summary denial on

February 21, 2008. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court, which summarily denied review on April 30, 2008. Petitioner filed the instant

federal petition on June 4, 2008. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Commitment Offense

The following summary of facts is taken from a report prepared by Correctional

Counselor J. Palmer and read into the transcript of the Board hearing:

On December 4, 1984 at approximately 1:00 a.m. officers responded

to the levee on the East side of the Sacramento River directly beneath the

Pioneer bridge. They discovered the body of a 20 year-old man, Michael

Parks, a transient killed by shotgun wounds to the head. Further

investigation led to the [petitioner] being arrested on January 22, 1985 and

subsequently charged with murder second. The 15 year-old co-defendant,

Raul Hyce, was charged with murder first. According to the statements

made during the investigation, [petitioner], his co-defendant, and two other

teenagers had gone out to the levee to shoot rabbits on December 24, shortly

before noon. Raul Hyce was carrying a shingle shot .22 caliber rifle, which

belonged to Khan. Some 15 minutes before arriving to the levee, Khan and

Raul Hyce began talking about killing people and Hyce was musing about

how it felt to actually kill someone. At this point the victim walked by. As

he was walking away from them, Raul Hyce pointed a weapon at him and

the other two teenagers fled. When the victim was approximately 30 feet

away Raul Hyce shot him in the back of the head and he fell. Raul Hyce

then handed the rifle to Khan, who reloaded it. The two ran to the victim to

see if he was dead.

 (Resp. Ex. 1, Ex. D (“Tr.”) at 7-9.) The Board added that the offense report indicated

that after the first shot, the victim was not dead yet and petitioner then shot the victim in

the head. (Id. at 9.)

 B. Parole Suitability Hearing

On June 4, 2007, petitioner appeared with counsel before the Board for his fourth

parole suitability hearing. The Board first reviewed petitioner’s pre-commitment record

and described his childhood as unstable because petitioner had been bounced from his

mother’s house to his father’s house and had never been close with his immediate family

members. (Id. at 10-11, 13.) Petitioner had no criminal history, in part because he was

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convicted of the instant offense as a juvenile and has been incarcerated during his entire

adult life thus far. (Id. at 10.) Petitioner had also engaged in alcohol and marijuana

since he was a child. (Id. at 12.) The Board also noted that petitioner had postcommitment plans to reside with his wife and had several employment opportunities if

released on parole. (Id. at 14-17.) The Board summarized letters of support for

petitioner’s release. (Id. at 17-20.) The Board further considered several laudatory

evaluations related to petitioner’s work skills, work-ethic, and efforts at self-help

programs. (Id. at 20-24.) The Board recognized that petitioner incurred eight 128(a)’s,

the most recent in 2001, and five 115s. (Id. at 24.) In addition, the Board noted that

petitioner’s 2007 psychological report was favorable. (Id. at 24-26.) The Board heard

closing statements from the Deputy District Attorney opposing parole, from counsel for

petitioner in favor of parole, and from petitioner himself explaining his parole suitability. 

(Id. at 33-34.) The Board then took a recess before rendering its decision finding

petitioner unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 41-50.)

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because this case involves a federal habeas corpus challenge to a state parole

eligibility decision, the applicable standard is contained in the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

901 (9th Cir. 2002). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant habeas relief unless

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court’s

factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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Where, as here, the highest state court to reach the merits issued a summary

opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under

section 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. Bains v. Cambra,

204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to

address the merits of petitioner’s claim is the opinion of Sacramento County Superior

Court.

B. Analysis of Legal Claims

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process because the Board’s decision

finding him unsuitable for parole relied solely on the commitment offense and was not

supported by “some evidence” that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. Respondent argues that

California inmates do not have a federally protected liberty interest in parole release. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that California prisoners have a constitutionally

protected liberty interest in release on parole, and therefore they cannot be denied a

parole date without adequate procedural protections necessary to satisfy due process. 

See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has clearly

established that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the

board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise

arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006)

(adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). The “some evidence” standard identified in Hill is

clearly established federal law in the parole context for AEDPA purposes. Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128-29. Additionally, the evidence underlying the board’s decision must have

some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, if the Board’s determination

of parole suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some

indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th

Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

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Recently, the Ninth Circuit reheard en banc the panel decision in Hayward v.

Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir.

2008), which presented a state prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of

parole. The panel had concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no

predictive value regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole and held that because the

Governor’s reversal of parole was not supported by some evidence, it resulted in a due

process violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc

decision in Hayward. Unless or until the en banc court rules otherwise, the holdings in

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, and Irons are still the law in

this circuit.

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505

F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must look to California law to

determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and

then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

California law provides that a parole date is to be granted unless it is determined “that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of

current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public

safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

The California Code of Regulations sets out the factors showing suitability or

unsuitability for parole that the Board is required to consider. See 15 Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15 § 2402(b). These include “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,” such as:

. . . the circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present mental

state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment

offenses, including behavior before, during and after the crime; past and

present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control,

including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely

be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

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prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not

firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in finding of unsuitability.

Id.

Circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole include the nature of the

commitment offense and whether “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Id. at § 2402(c). This includes consideration of

whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,”

whether the victim was “abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense,”

whether “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrated an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether “[t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. Other circumstances tending

to show unsuitability for parole are a previous record of violence, an unstable social

history, previous sadistic sexual offenses, a history of severe mental health problems

related to the offense, and serious misconduct in prison or jail. Id.

Conversely, circumstances tending to support a finding of suitability for parole

include: no juvenile record; a stable social history; signs of remorse; that the crime was

committed as a result of significant stress in the prisoner’s life; a lack of criminal history;

a reduced possibility of recidivism due to the prisoner’s present age; that the prisoner has

made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use

upon release; and that the prisoner’s institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability

to function within the law upon release. See id. at § 2402(d).

In making its determination in this case, the Board analyzed numerous factors

weighing for and against suitability for parole. The Board began by reviewing the

commitment offense and determined that the offense was particularly cruel and callous

with an inexplicable motive. (Tr. at 41-42.) The Board reviewed the factual scenario,

reiterating that petitioner and his co-defendant shot and killed the victim for no apparent

reason first by the co-defendant, and then again, while the victim was lying on the

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ground, by petitioner. (Id. at 42.) 

The Board noted that petitioner’s unstable childhood and lack of participation in

beneficial self-help programs were factors in petitioner’s suitability for parole. (Id. at

43.) The Board expressed concern that petitioner only recently began attending a

substance abuse program even though it was acknowledged that he has had a long

history with substance abuse prior to and during the commission of the offense. (Id.) 

With regard to petitioner’s disciplinary history, the Board observed that petitioner’s last

128(a) was in 2001 for struggling with his wife during a visit. (Id. at 43.) The Board

commended petitioner for his excellent work reports. (Id. at 47.) However, the Board

commented on petitioner’s recent participation in Alcoholics Anonymous and, in light of

petitioner’s substance abuse history and the role that it played in the underlying offense,

the Board believed that petitioner needed to sustain his participation in that program or a

similar program for a longer period of time to learn how to adjust and understand his

behavior. (Id. at 48.) The Board concluded that the factors tending to show suitability

were outweighed by factors showing unsuitability and denied parole. 

The superior court reviewed the Board’s decision and found that there was some

evidence supporting the Board’s decision to find petitioner unsuitable for parole at this

time. (Resp. Ex. 2.) Specifically, the court noted that the Board properly determined

that petitioner’s crime was carried out in a dispassionate and callous manner and that

petitioner’s history of substance abuse warranted more participation in self-help for that

issue. (Id. at 2-3.) 

This court also concludes that the Board reasonably found that the circumstances

of the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and callous manner. (Id. at 41-42.) The

victim did not act in a threatening manner when petitioner’s co-defendant shot him in the

back of the head, and then after the victim fell to the ground while he was possibly still

alive, petitioner fired another shot into the victim’s head. (Id. at 42.) The Board’s

finding that motive was trivial compared to the seriousness of the crime was also

reasonable. It concluded that the motive was inexplicable because there appeared to be

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no reason to shoot or kill the victim. (Id.) These facts alone amount to “some evidence”

that petitioner would present an unreasonable threat to the public if released, but there

was additional evidence in the record supporting the Board’s parole denial as well. For

example, in light of the fact that petitioner’s present crime was committed after he had

smoked marijuana and sniffed paint, the Board’s concern that petitioner needed

additional programming to deal with his substance abuse prior to becoming eligible for

parole is reasonable. 

The record of the 2007 parole hearing demonstrates at least “some evidence” that

petitioner would pose a risk of harm to society if released and that parole should be

denied. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232–33 (facts of the offense and psychiatric reports

about the would-be parolee sufficient to support denial). The state court’s rejection of

petitioner’s due process claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

the “some evidence” requirement of due process. Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s

assertion, the concern expressed in Biggs is not triggered here because the Board did not

deny parole solely because of the unchanging factor of the nature of petitioner’s offense. 

Cf. Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33. Therefore, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s due

process claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the “some evidence”

standard. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing §

2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). However, the Ninth

Circuit has made clear that a state prisoner challenging the Board of Prison Terms’

administrative decision to deny a request for parole need not obtain a certificate of

appealability. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232. Accordingly, any request for a COA is

DENIED as unnecessary. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED on the merits and a COA is DENIED as unnecessary. 

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

March 25, 2010 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BILL OLIVER KHAN,

Petitioner,

 v.

JOE SOLIS, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV08-02779 JW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Bill Oliver Khan D-48865

California Men’s Colony State Prison

P. O. Box 8101

San Luis Obispo, Ca 93409

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk

3/26/2010 3/26/2010 /s/

Case 5:08-cv-02779-JW Document 11 Filed 03/26/10 Page 10 of 11
Bill Oliver Khan D-48865

California Men’s Colony State Prison

P. O. Box 8101

San Luis Obispo, Ca 93409

CV08-02779 JW 

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