Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00631/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00631-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDITH RAMIREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE SALVATION ARMY, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C06-0631 TEH 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

This matter came before the Court on Monday, June 26, 2006, on Defendants’ motion

to dismiss. After carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the

allegations in the complaint, and relevant law, the Court now GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

In this action, ten plaintiffs sue their former employer, the Salvation Army, and

several individual defendants on a host of claims stemming from Plaintiffs’ termination of

employment. Seven plaintiffs are Asian females of Filipino descent, all of whom are over

the age of 50. One of these plaintiffs also suffers from a physical disability. Of the

remaining three male plaintiffs, one suffers from a physical disability, the second is over the

age of 60 and suffers from a physical disability, and the third is over the age of 60 and of

Italian descent.

The complaint asserts fifteen causes of action, including claims for race, national

origin, sex, age, and disability discrimination, harassment, and retaliation asserted against the

Salvation Army under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (“ADEA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Article I, section 8 of the

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California Constitution. Plaintiffs also assert a failure to accommodate claim against the

Salvation Army under Title I of the ADA, as well as a wrongful discharge claim for

termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiffs further allege that the Salvation Army is

liable for failing to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and

harassment from occurring. Two plaintiffs assert a claim against the Salvation Army for

unlawful denial of family or medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, and five

plaintiffs allege that the Salvation Army breached an implied-in-fact contract. Against the

individual defendants only, Plaintiffs assert a harassment claim under California Government

Code section 12940(j) and a retaliation claim under California Government Code section

12490(h). Finally, Plaintiffs assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

against all defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a

plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). A court should not grant dismissal “unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Moreover, dismissal should be with leave to

amend unless it is clear that amendment could not possibly cure the complaint’s deficiencies. 

Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).

In deciding whether a case should be dismissed, a court may generally only consider

the complaint and any attached exhibits that have been incorporated therein. Lee v. City of

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court may consider a

document external to the complaint if the complaint “necessarily relies” on the document and

no party contests the document’s authenticity. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706

(9th Cir. 1998). The court may also consider facts for which judicial notice is appropriate. 

Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, while the court must generally

accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and construe those allegations in the

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Thus, the Court’s rulings on whether Plaintiffs have met their pleading requirements

are no indication of whether Plaintiffs might ultimately prevail on their claims.

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light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court need not “accept as true allegations that

contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).

DISCUSSION

In the motion currently before the Court, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first

fourteen causes of action but do not move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifteenth cause of action for

breach of implied-in-fact contract. Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for

punitive damages. The Court addresses each of Defendants’ arguments in turn below.

I. Discrimination Claims (First through Fifth Causes of Action)

Defendants first move to dismiss the federal claims against the individual defendants

on grounds that Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA do not provide for individual liability.

However, Plaintiffs do not name the individual defendants under their federal causes of

action, and Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED as moot.

In moving to dismiss Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims against the Salvation Army,

Defendants focus on what Plaintiffs will have to establish to recover on their claims at trial or

to survive a motion for summary judgment. However, considering what Plaintiffs must

prove to prevail on the merits of their claims or to create a material factual dispute are very

different questions from what Plaintiffs must plead in the complaint to survive a motion to

dismiss.1

 In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Supreme Court held that

an employment discrimination plaintiff need not allege facts in the complaint that establish a

prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973), and must instead only comply with the “simple requirements of Rule 8(a)”

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-15. Thus, to survive

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s complaint need only contain “a

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short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at

508 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).

As an illustration of this standard, the Court referred to the forms contained in the

Appendix of Forms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that such forms “are

sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement

which the rules contemplate”: “For example, Form 9 sets forth a complaint for negligence in

which plaintiff simply states in relevant part: ‘On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called

Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle

against plaintiff who was then crossing said highway.’” Id. at 513 n.4 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

84 and Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 9). The forms do not contain an example of a discrimination

claim, and the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have ruled on what precisely must be alleged

by an employment discrimination plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss. See Maduka v.

Sunrise Hospital, 375 F.3d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Swierkiewicz but

remanding to the district court to decide in the first instance whether the complaint’s

allegations satisfied the requirements of Rule 8(a)); Castillo v. Norton, 219 F.R.D. 155, 161

(D. Ariz. 2003) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had not ruled on the issue as of December 18,

2003, but that “Ninth Circuit case law favors a tolerant application of Rule 8 to employment

discrimination claims”). Other circuits, however, have held that alleging the simple

statement that “I was turned down for a job because of my race” is sufficient to state a claim

under Title VII. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998).

In this case, all of the plaintiffs allege that they were terminated and denied

reinstatement because of age, race, national origin, sex, and/or disability. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 44,

52, 58, 62, 66, 70, 80, 83, 88. Plaintiffs further allege that the Salvation Army “has hired

younger, predominantly Caucasian employees to replace Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶ 90. Although

Defendants correctly observe that Plaintiffs include men as well as women, and so it may

appear at first glance that a sex discrimination claim is misplaced, Defendants fail to rebut

Plaintiffs’ argument that Plaintiffs’ gender cannot be viewed in isolation from their race or

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national origin. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ complaint to adequately meet the

lenient pleading standards under the Federal Rules on all asserted discrimination claims, and

the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims, with the following

exception: As to Plaintiff Pergamo, Defendants correctly observe that he only alleges he

“was terminated and denied reinstatement because of his age.” Id. ¶ 70. Thus, the motion to

dismiss Pergamo’s discrimination claims based on race and national origin is GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs failed to persuade the Court at oral argument that Pergamo, an Italian, could state a

race-based claim if given leave to amend, but it appears possible that Pergamo may be able to

state a claim based on national origin discrimination. Therefore, dismissal of Pergamo’s race

discrimination claim is with prejudice, but dismissal of his national original discrimination

claim is without prejudice.

In their reply papers, Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 must be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to allege that their treatment was the result

of an official policy or custom. However, this argument was not included in any way in

Defendants’ opening brief, and the Court therefore need not consider it. Eberle v. City of

Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1990).

II. Failure to Accommodate Claim (Sixth Cause of Action)

Defendants group Plaintiffs’ disability discrimination claim with their claim based on

failure to accommodate under the ADA. The only argument Defendants assert in their

moving papers specifically regarding Plaintiffs’ failure to accommodate claim is that

Plaintiffs Cousineau and Ramirez do not allege any requests for accommodations that

Defendants denied; Defendants do not seek to dismiss the failure to accommodate claim

brought by Plaintiff Higgins. In their reply papers, Defendants argue only that Plaintiff

Ramirez failed to allege a request for accommodations, apparently conceding that the

allegations as to Plaintiff Cousineau discussed in Plaintiffs’ opposition papers are sufficient

to state a claim based on failure to accommodate. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is

DENIED as to Plaintiffs Cousineau’s and Higgins’s claims based on failure to accommodate.

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As to Plaintiff Ramirez, Plaintiffs’ opposition does not identify any alleged requests

for accommodation, nor does the Court’s review of the complaint reveal any such

allegations. The complaint alleges only that Ramirez was not allowed to return to work after

fracturing her left shoulder because Defendant Vickery contended that Ramirez’s proffered

work release order from her doctor was improper. Compl. ¶¶ 72-78. Plaintiffs have failed to

explain why, or even assert that, Vickery’s actions constituted a failure to accommodate or

failure to engage in the interactive process required by the ADA. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action is therefore GRANTED as to Plaintiff Ramirez. 

Because counsel conceded at oral argument that Ramirez never sought accommodations for a

disability and agreed to withdraw her claim, dismissal of this claim is with prejudice.

III. Harassment Claim Against the Salvation Army (Seventh Cause of Action)

As with Defendants’ arguments on Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, Defendants

arguments on Plaintiffs’ harassment claims focus on what Plaintiffs will have to establish to

prevail at trial or to survive summary judgment. Indeed, Defendants have cited no authority

to support a motion to dismiss, as opposed to a motion for summary judgment.

Nonetheless, a review of the complaint reveals that only Plaintiff Higgins alleges that

he was subjected to harassment. Compl. ¶ 44 (alleging that “Plaintiff HIGGINS was

subjected to harassment and discrimination in the workplace”); id. ¶¶ 31-43 (containing

factual allegations related to Plaintiff Higgins). The other plaintiffs allege only

discrimination and, in the case of Plaintiff Cousineau, retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 28, 52, 58, 62, 66,

70, 80, 83, 88. Although the complaint does generically allege that “Plaintiffs were

subjected to pervasive workplace harassment based on race, national origin, sex, age, and

physical disability, which resulted in a hostile and intimidating workplace environment,” id.

¶ 129, this is insufficient to satisfy even the liberal notice-pleading standards of the Federal

Rules. Those rules require the complaint to “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, and the

Court cannot say that the generic allegation in paragraph 129 is sufficient to satisfy this

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standard. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for

harassment is DENIED as to Plaintiff Higgins but GRANTED as to all other plaintiffs. 

Dismissal is without prejudice because it is not clear that none of the other plaintiffs could

state a harassment claim if given leave to amend.

IV. Retaliation Claim Against the Salvation Army (Ninth Cause of Action)

Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim against the Salvation Army is similar to their harassment

claim in that it is purportedly brought on behalf of all plaintiffs against the Salvation Army,

but only Plaintiffs Cousineau and Higgins allege that they were retaliated against. Compare

Compl. ¶¶ 28, 44 (alleging that Cousineau and Higgins were terminated because they

“objected to illegal discrimination and harassment” against older workers, in Higgins’s case,

or against older Asian female employees, in Cousineau’s case) with id. ¶¶ 52, 58, 62, 66, 70,

80, 83, 88 (alleging only that the other plaintiffs were “terminated and denied reinstatement”

based on age, race, national origin, sex, disability, or exercising a right to family leave, and

containing no allegations of retaliation). Similar to Plaintiffs’ harassment claim, the

retaliation claim also contains a generic paragraph alleging that “Defendant THE

SALVATION ARMY retaliated against Plaintiffs for opposing Defendants’ discriminatory

treatment and harassment, requesting accommodation for physical disability, and requesting

Family Leave by, among other things, terminating Plaintiffs’ employment.” Id. ¶ 139. 

However, the complaint alleges only that Plaintiffs Higgins and Cousineau expressed

complaints of illegal treatment before they were terminated.

Although Defendants object to the allegations as to Higgins and Cousineau as

insufficient, Defendants again rely on summary judgment cases or pre-Swierkiewicz motion

to dismiss cases to support their position, rather than relying on the relevant legal standard

for challenging the pleadings. Upon careful review, the Court finds the complaint to

adequately state a retaliation claim on behalf of Plaintiffs Higgins and Cousineau, but not on

behalf of any of the remaining plaintiffs. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the retaliation

claim against the Salvation Army is DENIED as to Plaintiffs Cousineau and Higgins but

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Defendants assert in their reply that Plaintiffs conceded this point. However,

Plaintiffs’ opposition states only that there is no need to consider the argument because the

complaint does not currently assert federal claims against the individual defendants.

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GRANTED as to all other plaintiffs. Dismissal is with prejudice because Plaintiffs’ counsel

stated at oral argument that no other plaintiffs objected to allegedly unlawful treatment prior

to being terminated.

V. Harassment and Retaliation Claims Against Individual Defendants (Eighth and

Tenth Causes of Action)

Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants’ assertion that the individual defendants, as

employees of the Salvation Army, a non-profit religious organization, are exempt from

harassment and retaliation claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). 

Taylor v. Beth Eden Baptist Church, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1082-85 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ eighth cause of

action for harassment under California Government Code section 12940(j) and Plaintiffs’

tenth cause of action for retaliation under California Government Code section 12940(h) with

prejudice.

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to allege “causes of action for harassment and

retaliation under federal law, including Title VII, ADEA, and ADA,” Opp’n at 9. However,

if Plaintiffs want to amend the complaint to assert new legal claims, they must file a properly

noticed motion seeking such leave. Moreover, if Plaintiffs intend to file such a motion, they

should carefully consider Defendants’ arguments that the federal anti-discrimination statutes

do not provide for individual liability.2

VI. Failure to Correct or Prevent Harassment Claim (Eleventh Cause of Action)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ eleventh cause of action for failure to correct

or prevent harassment on grounds that the Salvation Army, as a religious organization, is

exempt from the provisions of FEHA. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940(j)(4), 12926(d). Although

Plaintiffs failed to respond to this argument in their opposition papers, the complaint does not

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assert a failure to prevent discrimination claim under FEHA. Instead, the eleventh cause of

action is based on “violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Compl. ¶ 149. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion as to this claim is DENIED as moot.

VII. Unlawful Denial of Family Leave Claim (Twelfth Cause of Action)

Plaintiffs Alfonzo and Ramirez allege that they were unlawfully terminated for

exercising their rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Although neither

party discussed the relevant test for such a claim, the Ninth Circuit has explained that an

employer may not use “FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor in an employment

decision. In order to prevail on [their claims], therefore, [plaintiffs] need only prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that [their] taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a

negative factor in the decision to terminate [them].” Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259

F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001).

Defendants correctly observe that Alfonzo inconsistently alleges both that she was

terminated while she was on leave to care for her ill husband and that she was terminated

after returning from leave. Compl. ¶¶ 47-48, 155-56. At oral argument, Plaintiffs clarified

that Alfonzo was terminated while she was on leave.

Ramirez alleges that she became incapacitated by a shoulder injury in August 2004

and was scheduled to return to work on November 22, 2004. Ramirez allegedly brought a

work order release from her doctor on that date, but Defendant Vickery allegedly sent

Ramirez home, claiming that Ramirez lacked a formal work order release. Ramirez’s doctor

then allegedly notified the Salvation Army by telephone that the form issued to Ramirez was

the proper document for Ramirez to return to work, but the Salvation Army allegedly

terminated Ramirez’s employment when she returned to work in early December 2004. 

Approximately one week after Ramirez’s termination, her doctor allegedly notified the

Salvation Army in writing that the form issued to Ramirez was the proper documentation for

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her to return to work, but the Salvation Army allegedly refused to reinstate her. Id. ¶¶ 72-78,

155, 157.

In their motion, Defendants rely on an Eleventh Circuit case, O’Connor v. PCA

Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000), to argue that employees who are

away on or returning from authorized medical or family leave need not be reinstated to their

former positions if those positions were eliminated during the leave. In O’Connor, which

was an appeal from a district court’s opinion following a bench trial and not a case

discussing pleading standards, the court held that an employer must be given an opportunity

to demonstrate that the plaintiff employee would have been terminated even if he or she not

been on leave. However, although Plaintiffs failed to respond to this issue in their opposition

papers, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that “[t]ermination within the context of a

reduction in force does not insulate the defendant from liability for violating FMLA. Where

a plaintiff alleges that she was terminated for unlawful reasons, courts will not accept a

reduction in force as the conclusory explanation for the employee’s termination.” Liu v.

Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1136 n.11 (9th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, although Plaintiffs also failed to raise this point in their opposition (in

which they simply summarized the allegations in the complaint and, without any citation to

legal authority, asserted that those allegations were sufficient to state a claim), Defendants

are incorrect when they state that paragraph 89 of the complaint concedes that Plaintiffs

“were terminated, and that their positions were eliminated, in favor of part-time jobs.” That

paragraph of the complaint states that after Plaintiffs’ termination, the Salvation Army

advertised job openings for “5 full-time positions and 8 part-time positions,” and it is not

clear whether the positions held by Ramirez and Alfonzo were re-classified as part-time or

were two of the five full-time positions advertised. Thus, when the allegations are viewed in

a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court cannot say that Plaintiffs concede that their

positions were eliminated in favor of part-time positions.

In sum, upon reviewing Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court concludes that they may have

been inartfully drafted but that they nonetheless adequately put Defendants on notice of

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Plaintiffs Alfonzo’s and Ramirez’s contention that their decisions to take family or medical

leave contributed to Defendants’ decision to terminate them. This is sufficient to survive

Defendants’ challenge to the pleadings, and the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion

to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful denial of family and medical leave.

VIII. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy Claim (Thirteenth Cause of

Action)

Defendants base their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy claim on Defendants’ arguments against Plaintiffs’ other claims. That is,

Defendants argue that “[b]ecause [Plaintiffs’] other claims fail, so too must their claim for

wrongful discharge.” Reply at 8. However, as explained above, Plaintiffs’ other claims do

not all fail, and the Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

wrongful discharge claim.

IX. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (Fourteenth Cause of Action)

On Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Defendants first argue

that such a claim is barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. In their reply papers,

however, Defendants acknowledge that “the workers[’] compensation exclusivity rule does

not apply where there is a claim for discrimination.” Reply at 4 n.1. Because, as discussed

above, the Court does not dismiss Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, it would be inappropriate

to dismiss Plaintiffs’ intentional inflection of emotional distress claim based on workers’

compensation exclusivity.

Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to satisfy the elements of a cause

of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. These elements are: “(1) extreme

and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard

of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or

extreme emotional distress; (3) and actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress

by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Cervantes v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593

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(1979). In their opposition, Plaintiffs cited portions of the complaint, albeit without citation

to specific paragraph numbers, alleging that Plaintiffs suffered damages and that Defendants

acted intentionally and with improper motive. Opp’n at 11. 

In their reply brief, Defendants do not argue that these allegations are insufficient. 

Instead, Defendants rely on their argument that Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to satisfy the first

element of extreme and outrageous conduct. As the court explained in Janken v. GM Hughes

Electronics:

Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the

bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the

welfare and prosperity of society. A simple pleading of

personnel management activity is insufficient to support a claim

of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper

motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions are

improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer

for discrimination.

46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996). Other courts, including this one, have followed Janken to

hold that termination for discriminatory or other improper reasons is insufficient to rise to the

level of outrageous conduct required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 

E.g., Romaneck v. Deutsche Asset Mgmt., No. C05-2473 TEH, 2005 WL 2171987, at *4-5

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2005); Walker v. Boeing Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190 (C.D. Cal.

2002); Bartalini v. Blockbuster Entm’t, Inc., No. C-98-3943-SC, 1999 WL 1012383, at *10

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999).

Although Defendants did not cite any of these cases, including Janken, until their

reply brief, Defendants did argue in their moving papers that the alleged acts by Defendants

do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to state a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants also specifically argued, albeit

without citing Janken, that “[i]nsults, indignities, threats and annoyances are insufficient to

support a cause of action for intentional infliction, and termination alone [is] similarly

insufficient.” Mot. at 15. Thus, the Court does not find it necessary to disregard Janken in

ruling on Defendants’ motion, particularly when the Court provided Plaintiffs with an

opportunity to respond at oral argument.

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When asked to respond to Janken at the hearing, Plaintiffs failed to distinguish any of

the above cases or present the Court with any authority holding that an employee may state a

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based solely on personnel management

decisions such as termination or failure to accommodate. Plaintiffs attempted to rely on Cole

v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 43 Cal. 3d 148 (1987), but that case is of no assistance

to Plaintiffs because the court there held that an intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim will not lie where the allegations are based on “matters which can be expected to occur

with substantial frequency in the working environment. Some harassment by superiors when

there is a clash of personality or values is not uncommon. Disciplinary hearings and

demotions and friction in negotiations as to grievances are also an inherent part of the

employment setting as are decisions to seek disability retirement and demands to appear at

meetings which interfere with personal arrangements.” Id. at 161. Such allegations are

therefore insufficient to recover in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at

160-61.

Plaintiffs here have failed to cite the Court to any specific paragraphs in the complaint

that allege more than personnel management activity as the basis for their intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim. Plaintiffs have thus failed to satisfy the requirement of

alleging extreme and outrageous conduct, and the Court accordingly GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dismissal

is without prejudice because Plaintiffs, if given leave to amend, may be able to allege

additional conduct by Defendants that falls outside of the type of conduct contemplated by

Janken and the other cases relied upon by Defendants..

X. Request for Punitive Damages

Finally, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages on

grounds that California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.14 prohibits claims for punitive

or exemplary damages against a religious corporation “unless the court enters an order

allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive or exemplary damages to be

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It is not clear that section 425.14 applies to California claims brought in federal court. 

However, the Court need not resolve this issue because Plaintiffs do not dispute it.

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filed.” Plaintiffs contend that the California Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable to

Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under federal law, apparently conceding that they do

not seek punitive damages under state law.3

 Instead, Plaintiffs state only that they are

entitled to seek punitive damages under Title VII, which is permissible under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a. In their reply, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive

damages under Title VII are proper. Based on the parties’ arguments, the Court therefore

DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims under Title VII

but GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under

state law.

At oral argument, Plaintiffs clarified that they were also seeking punitive damages

under the ADA and the ADEA. In addition, Defendants’ reply brief argues that Plaintiffs’

claim for punitive damages under the ADEA should be dismissed on grounds that the ADEA

does not authorize such awards. However, Defendants’ argument on the ADEA is a new

argument that was not included in Defendants’ opening brief, and the Court therefore need

not consider it. Eberle, 901 F.2d at 817-18. Likewise, the Court need not consider an issue,

such as Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages under the ADA, raised for the first time at oral

argument.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The motion is GRANTED as to the following claims and

DENIED as to all claims not specifically enumerated below:

1. The first cause of action for race discrimination, as to Plaintiff Pergamo only, with

prejudice;

2. The second cause of action for national origin discrimination, as to Plaintiff

Pergamo only, without prejudice;

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3. The sixth cause of action for failure to accommodate disability, as to Plaintiff

Ramirez only, with prejudice; 

4. The seventh cause of action for harassment against the Salvation Army, except as

to Plaintiff Higgins, without prejudice;

5. The eighth cause of action for harassment against the individual defendants, in its

entirety, with prejudice;

6. The ninth cause of action for retaliation against the Salvation Army, except as to

Plaintiffs Higgins and Cousineau, with prejudice;

7. The tenth cause of action for retaliation against the individual defendants, in its

entirety, with prejudice; 

8. The fourteenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, in its

entirety, without prejudice; and

9. Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages under state law, with prejudice.

As to all claims dismissed without prejudice, if Plaintiffs wish to amend their

complaint, they must do so on or before Monday, July 31, 2006. Failure to file a timely

amended complaint shall result in dismissal of all of the above claims with prejudice. 

Plaintiffs are advised that the Court fully expects any amended complaint to contain

allegations specific to the claims raised by each individual plaintiff rather than the generic

pleadings that Plaintiffs attempted to rely on in their original complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 07/06/06 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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