Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00787/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00787-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

TIMOTHY RIDDLE, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:12-cv-787-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Timothy Riddle, protectively applied for child insurance benefits, 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. His application was 

denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a 

decision in which she found Plaintiff not disabled at any time through the date of the 

decision. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 1 of 15
405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 7); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 6). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 An applicant for childhood disability benefits (“CDB”) has the burden of proving 

their eligibility by establishing several factors. First, the applicant must prove they are 

under a disability, as defined by § 216(I) and § 223(d) of the Social Security Act. 42 

U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). Second, the applicant must be a child of the wage earner under 

whose insurance they are applying. Id. The applicant must be under the age of 18, or 

under a disability before they reach the age of 22. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B). Finally, the 

applicant must prove they were dependent on the wage earner under whose insurance 

they are claiming. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350. 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).1

 

1 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques. 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 2 of 15
 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of 

Impairments] 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).2

 

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

 

2 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income 

case (SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title 

II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 

408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 3 of 15
1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines3

 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 

3

 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 4 of 15
5 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

Plaintiff had not attained the age of 22 as of October 1, 2006, the alleged onset 

date. Tr. 16. Plaintiff previously worked as a kitchen helper and industrial cleaner. Tr. 

23. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. 

Tr. 16. At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe 

impairments: “borderline intellectual functioning; attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder 

(‘ADHD’); mood disorder and psychotic disorder.” Tr. 17. The ALJ then found that 

Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals one of the listed impairments.” (Step 3) Id. Next, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff 

has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but the claimant is limited to work which will only require 

the claimant to: perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks; maintain 

attention and concentration for up to 2 hours at [a] time (with normal 

breaks throughout the workday); have brief, superficial contact with the 

public; work independently (although he can work in close proximity to 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 5 of 15
6 

others); have supportive, non-threatening supervision; and adapt to minimal 

changes in the work setting. 

Tr. 19. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff “has been capable of performing past relevant 

work as a kitchen helper and/or industrial cleaner,” as such work “does not require 

performance of work-related activities precluded by [Plaintiff]’s [RFC].” (Step 4) Tr. 23. 

Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . from 

October 1, 2006, through the date of this decision.” Tr. 24. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents three issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: (1) whether the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because “the ALJ 

failed to comply with [SSRs] 82-59 and 96-7 in finding that Plaintiff has been noncompliant with prescribed treatment”; (2) whether the Commissioner’s decision should 

be reversed because “the ALJ failed to consider the Global Assessment of Functioning 

(GAF) scores assigned to Plaintiff by his treating and examining medical sources”; and 

(3) whether the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because “the Vocational 

Expert’s (VE’s) testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), 

and the ALJ failed to resolve the conflict, as required by SSR 00-4p.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 16) 

at 7. The court will address each argument below. 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 6 of 15
7 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Whether the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 82-59 and 96-7 in finding 

that Plaintiff has been non-compliant with prescribed treatment. 

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by not considering the “valid justifications” of 

Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment, “including psychological impairments, 

borderline intellectual functioning and side effects of medications,” as is required by 

SSRs 82-59 and 96-7. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 5. Plaintiff asserts “[t]he ALJ stated that she 

couldn’t find [Plaintiff] disabled because of non-compliance with prescribed treatment.” 

Id. If the ALJ ended his statement there, it likely would be error. However, Plaintiff has 

cut this quote short. The ALJ’s full statement was “Furthermore, because [Plaintiff] is 

non-compliant with prescribed treatment, the [ALJ] could not find [Plaintiff] to be 

disabled (even if his impairments were otherwise disabling, which they are not).” Tr. 

23 (emphasis added). 

 Under SSRs 82-59 and 96-7, an ALJ is required to consider whether a claimant 

has “justifiable cause” to excuse a finding of noncompliance with prescribed treatment 

and whether the prescribed treatment would have made the claimant capable of 

maintaining employment; however, these SSRs “only apply to claimants who would 

otherwise be disabled within the meaning of the Act.” Mack v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 420 

F. App’x 881, 883 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Further, Plaintiff’s reliance upon 

Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211 (11th Cir. 1988), as support for the ALJ’s alleged error 

is misguided. In Dawkins, the Eleventh Circuit remanded a case to the ALJ to determine 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 7 of 15
8 

“whether appellant was disabled, without reference to her failure to follow prescribed 

medical treatment.” 420 F. App’x at 1214. The Dawkins court then specified, “if the 

ALJ determines that [the claimant] is disabled,” the ALJ must then consider whether 

good cause excused any noncompliance. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, a 

finding of disability serves as the trigger to the applicability of SSRs 82-59 and 96-7. 

 Here, the ALJ did not deny Plaintiff benefits on the basis of non-compliance. 

Rather, it is clear that the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled, with or 

without the non-compliance. Therefore, SSRs 82-59 and 96-7 were never triggered as to 

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not comply with those rulings fails. 

B. Whether the ALJ failed to consider the GAF scores assigned to Plaintiff 

by his treating source. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the many GAF scores 

assigned to Plaintiff by his treating source and the Consultative Examiner (CE). 

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts, “Over the relevant time period of treatment, [Plaintiff] 

received 21 separate GAF scores . . . . These opinions of [Plaintiff]’s functioning were 

not discussed or even mentioned at any point during the decision.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 

8. However, the ALJ’s failure to mention Plaintiff’s GAF scores does not require 

remand. 

While it is true the ALJ did not mention Plaintiff’s GAF scores, it is also true the 

Social Security Administration is not bound by such scores. Sanders v. Astrue, 2013 WL 

5411271, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013) (“Failure to reference a GAF score is not, 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 8 of 15
9 

standing alone, sufficient ground to reverse a disability determination.” (citing Howard v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002)); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

2011 WL 6217110, at * 7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2011) (“[T]he ALJ did not err by failing to 

include the GAF scores in his decision or by failing to state the weight he gave to each 

score.”); Bailey v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3220302, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2010) (“The 

ALJ’s failure to refer specifically to the GAF scores does not render the ALJ’s decision 

unsupported by substantial evidence.”). The Social Security regulations provide that 

GAF scores have no “direct correlation to the severity requirements of the mental 

disorder listings.” Wind v. Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 692 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 

Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000)). Thus, a GAF score is not entitled to any 

specific weight and does not translate to a specific finding as to functional limitations. 

Ward v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1994978, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2008). 

Second, Plaintiff provides the range of GAF scores he received as evidence of his 

disability. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 7-8. However, GAF scores by themselves are not 

determinative of disability. Nichols v. Astrue, 2012 WL 3638827, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 

7, 2012) (“GAF scores are not a direct indication of an individual’s disability status, but 

rather are only recognized as a tool to assist the ALJ in forming a decision.”); Bailey, 

2010 WL 3220302, at *8 (“‘Standing alone, a low GAF Score does not necessarily 

evidence an impairment seriously interfering with a claimant’s ability to work.’”) 

(quoting Lee v. Barnhart, 117 F. App’x 674, 678 (10th Cir. 2004)). 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 9 of 15
10 

Third, as Defendant responds, “[a]lthough the ALJ did not specifically refer to 

Plaintiff’s GAF scores, the ALJ discussed the medical reports from Plaintiff’s treating 

mental health professionals at South Central Alabama Mental Health Center . . . and 

explained in detail the weight given to the medical source opinions.” Def.’s Br. (Doc 16) 

at 12. “[T]here is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of 

evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision . . . is not a broad rejection which 

is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that [the ALJ] considered [the 

claimant’s] medical condition as a whole.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). 

While the ALJ did not discuss the assignment of GAF scores, she did fully 

evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairments and thoroughly discuss the examinations of 

Plaintiff by Dr. Jordan and South Central Alabama Mental Health Center and the 

resulting medical opinions. Tr. 17-18, 21-23. As the ALJ notes, Dr. Jordan’s opined that 

Plaintiff “ha[d] no limitations in his activities of daily living,” “demonstrate[d] intact 

concentration abilities,” and had a “generally intact long-term memory,” and that 

Plaintiff’s “ability to carry out and remember instructions of a simple, one-step nature” 

and “ability to respond well to coworkers, supervision, and everyday work pressures [are] 

not compromised.” Id. The ALJ also discussed the medical evidence from South Central 

Alabama Mental Health, including the following: Plaintiff’s “bizarre” behavior, 

“depressed” mood, and “tangential” thought process during a September 2009 visit; 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 10 of 15
11 

Plaintiff’s “normal” behavior, “level” mood, and “goal[-]oriented” thought process 

during a November 2009 visit; Plaintiff’s failure to take his medication as prescribed “for 

no reason other than he doesn’t want to” at a December 2009 visit; and Plaintiff’s treating 

source adding the diagnoses of psychotic disorder and mild mental retardation without 

“provid[ing] an explanation for this diagnosis” at a May 2010 visit. Tr. 21-22. Thus, 

while the ALJ did not discuss the GAF scores assigned to Plaintiff by Dr. Jordan and 

South Central Alabama Mental Health, the ALJ did fully consider and discuss the 

opinions of the physicians who assigned Plaintiff those GAF scores and explained the 

weight given to the medical source opinions. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled after considering all of the evidence 

on Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments and the medical record does not indicate that 

Plaintiff had any greater limitations than found by the ALJ. Thus, the ALJ’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and the failure to refer specifically to the GAF scores 

does not provide “sufficient ground to reverse [the] disability determination.” Sanders, 

2013 WL 5411271, at *14. 

C. Whether the VE’s testimony conflict[ed] with the DOT requiring the ALJ 

to resolve the conflict as required by SSR 00-4p. 

 Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the 

ALJ did not comply with SSR 00-4p when the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between 

the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 9. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts 

that “[t]he VE testified that an individual with the [RFC] to understand, remember and 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 11 of 15
12 

carry out short, simple instructions could perform work as an industrial helper . . . and 

kitchen helper.” Id. at 9-10. The DOT states these two jobs “require ability to perform at 

a reasoning level of two.” Id. This is a conflict, Plaintiff asserts, because “the DOT 

indicates that individuals limited to understanding, remembering and carrying out only 

simple, short instructions can only perform at the GED reasoning level of one.” Id. at 12. 

The court does not agree. 

 First, Plaintiff has not established that a conflict does, in fact, exist between the 

VE’s testimony and the DOT. As Defendant points out, “several courts have held that 

jobs with a reasoning level of two are consistent with an ability to perform simple, 

routine, repetitive tasks.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 16) at 13. “Most courts which have addressed 

this issue have held that the requirement of Reasoning Level 2 or 3 is not inconsistent 

with the ability to perform only simple tasks.” Hurtado v. Astrue, 2010 WL 1850261, at 

*11 (S.D. Fla. April 14, 2010) (citing Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 246 F. App’x 660 

(11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (no remand where VE identified reasoning level 3 jobs for 

plaintiff who could do only simple, routine and repetitive work)); see also Terry v. 

Astrue, 580 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2009) (level 3 reasoning not inconsistent with plaintiff’s 

ability to perform only simple work); Lara v. Astrue, 305 F. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(plaintiff able to perform simple repetitive tasks capable of doing work at reasoning level 

2); Renfrew v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (reasoning level 3 not inconsistent 

with plaintiff’s inability to do complex work); Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168 (10th 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 12 of 15
13 

Cir. 2005) (“level two reasoning appears more consistent with [p]laintiff’s RFC” of 

“simple and routine work tasks”); Money v. Barhart, 91 F. App’x 210 (3d Cir. 2004) 

(“Working at reasoning level 2 would not contradict the mandate that her work be simple, 

routine and repetitive.”). 

Further, even if an actual conflict does exist, SSR 00-4p requires only that the ALJ 

resolve “apparent unresolved conflict.” Social Security Rulings 00-4p (emphasis 

added). In Leigh v. Commissioner of Social Security, the claimant argued the existence 

of a conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT based on a dispute over the 

reasoning level attached to “simple, routine, repetitive” instructions, as Plaintiff argues 

here. 496 F. App’x 973, 975 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). The Leigh court found no 

apparent inconsistency between the VE’s opinion and the DOT because “the ALJ asked 

the VE if there were any inconsistencies between his opinion and the DOT, and the VE 

responded that there were not” and the claimant “did not offer any evidence controverting 

the VE’s opinion, nor did she object to the opinion.” Id. In the present case, as in Leigh, 

the ALJ asked the VE at the hearing, “is your testimony today consistent with its shared 

occupational title?” to which the VE replied “Yes,” and Plaintiff’s counsel did not 

challenge or object to the opinion. Tr. 51. Thus, as in Leigh, there was no apparent 

conflict for the ALJ to resolve. 

If no apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT are raised at the 

hearing, the ALJ is not required to address SSR 00-4p. Gibson v. Astrue, 2010 WL 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 13 of 15
14 

3655857, at *15 (N.D. Ga. 2010). “[T]he ALJ need not independently corroborate the 

VE’s testimony and should be able to rely on such testimony where no apparent conflict 

exists with the DOT.” Brijbag v. Astrue, 2008 WL 276038, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 

2008) (citing Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446-47 (7th Cir. 2002); Martin v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2006 WL 509393, at *4-5 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); Haas v. 

Barnhart, 2004 WL 396982, at *5-6 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); Lembke v. Barnhart, 

2006 WL 3834104, at *14-15 (W.D. Wis. 2006)). 

Lastly, the court finds the ALJ did not error by relying on the VE’s testimony 

because, in the Eleventh Circuit, the VE’s testimony trumps any inconsistent provisions 

of the DOT. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen the VE’s 

testimony conflicts with the DOT, the VE’s testimony ‘trumps’ the DOT.”); see also 

Leigh, 496 F. App’x at 975; Hurtado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App’x 793, 796 

(11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 423 F. App’x 936, 939 & 

n.4 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“Social Security Rulings are not binding on this 

court. To the extent SSR 00-4p conflicts with Jones [v. Apfel], we are bound by Jones.” 

(internal citations omitted)); Miller, 246 F. App’x at 662 (“Our precedent establishes that 

the testimony of a [VE] ‘trumps’ an inconsistent provision of the DOT in this Circuit.”). 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 14 of 15
15 

VI. CONCLUSION

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 20th day of December, 2013. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:12-cv-00787-WC Document 18 Filed 12/20/13 Page 15 of 15