Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00617/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00617-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLE CHAKER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-617 LAB

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

vs.

BARBARA BOLLA, ANTHONY TROXEL,

and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

This case involves, at root, a property dispute between two neighbors. Now pending

is Ms. Chaker’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 

I. IFP Motion

All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, except for

habeas petitioners, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party is

excused from paying the fee, however, if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP pursuant to

28 U.S.C. 1915(a). Unfortunately, Ms. Chaker’s IFP Application is incomplete. Of the

eleven questions on the Application, Ms. Chaker has only answered three. All the Court

knows is that she is not incarcerated, not employed, and receives some form of public

assistance. Among other things, Ms. Chaker does not provide any information about when

she was last employed, whether she has a savings or investment account, whether she has

//

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any debts, and what her assets of value are. That is insufficient information. Her Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis is therefore DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. Initial Screening

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court must screen each civil action commenced

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss the action if the Court finds it is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief

from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 45

(9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”);

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state

a claim).

Even if Ms. Chaker could submit a complete IFP Application, the Court would find that

her complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Chaker filed this

action in federal court because her claims arise under federal law. Specifically, she alleges

violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988. 

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Ms. Chaker must plead two essential

elements: (1) that the individual defendants acted under color of state law; and (2) that they

caused [her] to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United

States.” Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997). Ms. Chaker alleges that

Defendants satisfied the first prong by placing her under citizen’s arrest. That reflects a

misunderstanding of what qualifies as state action. “Private conduct, including a citizen’s

arrest, without more does not qualify as state action for purposes of § 1983.” Kness v.

Phillips, 182 F.3d 926 at *1 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Collins v. WomanCare, 878 F.2d 1145,

1154–55 (9th Cir. 1989)). See also Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33 F.3d 62 at *3 (10th

Cir. 1994); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 243 (5th Cir. 1999) (“As in the case of

a citizen’s arrest . . . the statutory authorization of private acts does not transform such

conduct into state action.”); Jones v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., 519 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1169 (D.

Kan. 2007) (recognizing that “an individual does not act under color of law merely by

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 In that part of her complaint where she states the claim, Ms. Chaker alleges that it 1

arises under § 1988. It is § 1985, however, that concerns conspiracies to interfere with civil

rights. Section 1988 simply authorizes district courts to award attorney’s fees in actions

involving claims that arise under §§ 1983 and 1985. It does not give rise to any claims itself.

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reporting an alleged crime to police officers; nor does the making of a citizen’s arrest

constitute acting under color of state law”). 

Ms. Chaker’s other civil rights claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. But that statute

1

is a complete misfit on the facts alleged. Section 1985 ostensibly concerns conspiracies to

interfere with civil rights, but its three subsections substantially narrow the claims that can

arise under it. Subsection (1) prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to prevent state

officials from performing their duties. Subsection (2) prohibits two or more persons from

obstructing justice by intimidating or threatening witnesses or jurors. Subsection (3) prohibits

two or more persons from going in disguise on the highway or on the property of another to

deprive that person of equal protection of the laws. It also prohibits two or more persons

from conspiring to prevent someone who is lawfully entitled to vote “from giving his support

or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified

person as an elector for President or Vice President . . . .” Ms. Chaker’s allegation that

Defendants essentially framed her for damaging their property, and falsely accused her of

being a felon and possessing guns, does not state a claim under any of these subsections.

In light of the above, the Court would DISMISS Ms. Chaker’s federal civil rights

claims, and it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state

law claims. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Noyes v.

Kelly Svcs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007); Acri v. Varian, 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.

1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). For the above reasons, this action is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 23, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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