Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00249/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00249-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dwayne Pitre,

Petitioner

-vsTara Diaz, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-0249-PHX-PGR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Buckeye, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on February 6, 2012 (Doc.1). On June 28, 2012, Respondents filed their Answer 

(Docs. 10-14). Petitioner has not replied.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was charged with five counts of armed robbery, five counts of 

kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault and one count of theft of a means of

transportation. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 2/7/06 at 2.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 11 are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) The charges arose out of the armed robbery of a 

grocery store in Phoenix, Arizona on January 20, 2002. (Exhibit G, PCR Pet. at Exhibit 

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F, Craig Affidavit.)

The state offered a plea agreement which would have allowed Petitioner to plead 

to two Class 2, dangerous felonies, with sentences up to 21 years, to be served 

concurrently. Petitioner rejected the offer. (Exhibit G, PCR Pet. at Exhibit B, Joint 

Pretrial Statement.) 

The state sought to impeach Petitioner with: (1) a 1994 conviction for possession 

of narcotic drugs; (2) a 1989 conviction for resisting arrest; (3) a 1987 conviction for 

solicitation to possess cocaine; and (4) a 1986 conviction for theft. The trial court ruled 

that all four convictions could be used for impeachment, and that the nature of the 

convictions would not be sanitized. Petitioner did not testify at trial, and therefore the 

priors were not admitted. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 2/7/06 at 2-3.) The state agreed that 

none of the priors constituted dangerous offenses.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of all fourteen counts. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 

2/7/06 at 3.) The jury found the armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault 

offenses to be “dangerous offenses.” (Exhibit U, R.T. 9/10/2 at 2-5.) 

At sentencing, the state “elected” to treat the dangerous offenses as nondangerous” for sentencing purposes. (Exhibit V, R.T. 5/23/03 at 3-5.) This “election” 

arose from an anomaly in the applicable sentencing statutes, which provided that 

“dangerous offenses” could be sentenced at a higher repeat offender level, only if the 

priors were themselves “dangerous.” In contrast, if the same crime was treated as a 

“non-dangerous” offense, then “non-dangerous” priors could be used for enhancement. 

Because all of Petitioner’s priors were “non-dangerous”, his highest possible sentence 

for a “Class 2” “dangerous” offense was 21 years. On the other hand, if the same “Class 

2” offense was deemed “non-dangerous,” and the multiple “non-dangerous” priors were 

used to enhance the sentence, then the maximum sentence increased to 28 years. See 

State v. Knorr, 186 Ariz. 300, 921 P.2d 704 (App. 1996). (See also Exhibit W, 2001 

Criminal Code, Sentencing Ranges at 3.)

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Petitioner was sentenced to a combined sentence of 160 years in prison. (Id.; 

Exhibit A, Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion 

and violated Petitioner’s state and Federal rights to testify by its ruling on the use of his 

prior convictions. (Exhibit B, Opening Brief). In a Supplemental Brief (Exhibit C), 

Petitioner argued that his sentence violated the recent decision in Blakely.

In a published decision, State v. Pitre, 107 P.3d 939, 210 Ariz. 93 (App. 2005), 

the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, found Petitioner’s attack 

on the ruling on the prior convictions, but vacated the sentence, and remanded the case 

or re-sentencing in light of Blakely. 

The Arizona Supreme Court summarily granted the state’s petition for review, 

and remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of intervening 

opinions. (Exhibit E, Order 11/30/05.)

On remand, the Arizona Court of Appeals again rejected the prior convictions 

claim, and found the sentence complied with Blakely because at least one factor (prior 

convictions) relied upon to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence was admitted by Petitioner, 

and the reliance upon addition judge-determined facts to select an aggravated sentence 

was not prohibited by Blakely. Consequently, the court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences. (Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. 2/7/06.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On February 28, 2006, Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. 

Appointed counsel espoused an inability to find an issue for review. Retained counsel 

then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit K, Pet. Rev. at 4.) In his 

Petition (Exhibit G), Petitioner argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

because: (1) trial counsel failed to interview an exculpatory witness; (2) trial counsel 

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failed to inform Petitioner of the potential for consecutive sentencing; (3) trial counsel 

misinformed Petitioner as to the potential sentences on the Class 2, 3 and 4 felonies, a 

total of 40 years difference; and (4) trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge the 

imposition of a higher sentence for repetitive non-dangerous offenses despite the jury’s 

determination that the offenses were dangerous.

The PCR court summarily disposed of the last claim, citing State v. Knorr, and 

set an evidentiary hearing on the remainder of the petition. (Exhibit H, M.E. 11/24/08.) 

The hearing was held on February 27, 2009. (Exhibit I, M.E. 2/27/09; Exhibit W, R.T. 

2/27/09.)

On March 4, 2009, the PCR court granted the petition, finding: (1) a lack of 

prejudice, and thus no ineffective assistance, from failure to call the exculpatory witness; 

(2) ineffective assistance in failing to inform Petitioner of his sentencing exposure at 

trial, including the potential for a sentence beyond approximately 100 years, and the 

potential for an election to sentence under the non-dangerous repetitive offense statutes.

The PCR court ordered Petitioner’s convictions and sentences vacated, and remanded the 

case for a new trial.

The state filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit K), challenging the PCR court’s 

determination on both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the ineffective 

assistance standard. Petitioner filed a Cross-Petition for Review (Exhibit L), challenging 

the PCR court’s rejection of his challenge to the state’s election to treat the offenses as 

non-dangerous, as well as the ineffectiveness claim concerning the exculpatory witness.

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s objections, granted the State’s 

petition and vacated the PCR court’s grant of relief, finding that because of Petitioner’s 

adamancy against a plea with prison time, there was no prejudice from the failure to 

properly advise him on his sentencing exposure at trial. (Exhibit M, Order 5/18/10.) 

On February 8, 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review of the appellate court’s decision. (Exhibit N, M.E. 2/8/11.) 

/ /

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D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 6, 2012 (Doc.1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

(1) Blakely - he was sentenced in violation of the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments;

(2) IAC re Exculpatory Witness - he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

as a result of failure to call an exculpatory witness;

(3) IAC re Sentencing Election - he received ineffective assistance of counsel as 

a result of trial and appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the state’s election 

to sentence him for non-dangerous, repetitive offenses;

(4) IAC re Sentencing Exposure - he received ineffective assistance as a result 

of trial counsel’s failure to properly advise him on his sentencing exposure at 

trial.

Answer - On June 28, 2012, Respondents filed their Answer (Docs. 11-14). 

Respondents concede exhaustion and argue that Petitioner’s claims are without merit.1

Reply – The Court’s service Order provided that “Petitioner may file a reply 

within 30 days from the date of service of the answer.” (Doc. 7 at 4.) Petitioner has not 

filed a reply, and the time to do so has expired.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. HABEAS STANDARDS 

Federal Law Determinations - For state prisoners, habeas relief is only 

warranted if the state court's decision of a matter was “contrary to, or an unreasonable 

 

1

The undersigned notes that Doc. 12-5 and Doc. 13-main appear to be duplicates of each 

other, each providing pages 150-163 of Exhibit Q (R.T. 9/4/02) and pages 1-79 of 

Exhibit R (R.T. 9/5/02). The balance of Exhibit Q is provided in Docs. 12-3 and 12-4. 

The balance of Exhibit R is provided in Docs. 13-1 and 13-2. The undersigned strongly 

discourages combining split portions of multiple exhibits into a single attachment.

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application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).

The Supreme Court has instructed that a state court decision is “contrary to” 

clearly established federal law “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"A state court's decision can involve an "unreasonable application" of federal law 

if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of 

facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly 

established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable." 

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 578 (9th Cir. 2000).

Factual Determinations - Federal courts are also authorized to grant habeas 

relief to state prisoners in cases where the state-court decision “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Or, to put it conversely, a federal court 

may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the 

state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually 

unreasonable." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, a state prisoner is not free to attempt to retry the facts of his case in the 

federal courts. There is a well-established presumption of correctness of state court 

findings of fact. This presumption has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), which 

states that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to 

be correct” and the petitioner has the burden of proof to rebut the presumption by “clear 

and convincing evidence.” 

Finally, a state prisoner may not introduce into the habeas court new evidence if 

he has failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in the state proceedings. 28 

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U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2) provides: 

 (2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a 

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-- 

 (A) the claim relies on-- 

 (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 

on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable; or 

 (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

 (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the 

applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 

B. GROUND ONE: BLAKELY

In his Ground One, Petitioner argues that his sentence was a violation of Blakely. 

Petitioner does not elucidate the factual support for his contention beyond pointing to his 

Attachment B, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ now-vacated, original Memorandum 

Decision.

Petitioner’s Blakely claim was rejected by the Arizona Supreme Court pursuant to 

its decisions in State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005) and State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2006). (Exhibit E, Order 11/30/05.) In those 

cases, the Arizona Supreme Court held that under Arizona law, the maximum sentence 

possible for a crime is the aggravated sentence, once any aggravating factor is found. A 

judicial finding of additional aggravating circumstances as a basis for selecting a 

particular actual sentence was deemed irrelevant for purposes of applying Blakely’s 

mandate that a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that is legally essential 

to the punishment. Once an aggravating circumstance was properly found (e.g. by 

admission, by a jury, or by a judicial finding of a prior conviction), “[t]he Sixth 

Amendment then allows a judge to find additional facts by a preponderance of the 

evidence, as long as the sentence imposed does not fall outside the statutorily prescribed 

sentencing range.” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 569, 115 P.3d at 609.

The federal courts have cited the Martinez analysis approvingly. For example, in 

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Van Norman v. Schriro, 616 F.Supp.2d 939 (D.Ariz. 2007), Judge Campbell concluded:

In this case, the trial court properly considered Petitioner's prior 

convictions as an aggravating circumstance that increased the 

maximum allowable sentence under Blakely. Once the new 

maximum was established, the court was free to consider the 

aggravating circumstances of harm to the victim and danger to the 

public in deciding where to sentence Petitioner within the new 

maximum range.

Id.at 944. See also Gonzalez v. Ryan, 2010 WL 8741428 (D.Ariz. 2010) (enumerating 

cases).

Similarly, in vacating its earlier decision in Petitioner’s case, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals relied on Martinez and concluded:

Here, the superior court properly used one of the factors to 

aggravate Pitre’s sentences: two prior non-dangerous felony 

convictions to which Pitre admitted. Pursuant to Martinez, the 

superior court’s aggravated sentences in reliance on other 

aggravating factors was not erroneous.

(Exhibit F, Mem. Dec. at 7-8 (citations omitted).)

Petitioner make no showing that this was in error. The undersigned finds no error. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground One is without merit and should be denied.

C. GROUND TWO: IAC RE EXCLUPATORY WITNESS

For his Ground Two for relief, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective 

assistance when trial counsel failed to call eyewitness Jenni Felix. Felix would have 

testified that the perpetrator had his face covered by a mask the entire time after leaving 

the store and absconding, thereby impeaching the testimony of other witnesses outside 

the store who identified Petitioner as the perpetrator. (See Exhibit G, PCR Pet. at Exhibit 

F, Affid. of Craig; and Exhibit W, R.T. 2/27/09 at 4-8.) 

The PCR court rejected this claim, finding: 

Ms. Felix was listed in the police report and purportedly would have

testified that the suspect in the robbery was wearing a ski mask as 

he exited the grocery store which prevented her from identifying the 

suspect. The Court finds the testimony of another eyewitness at 

trial, Officer Blackshear, conflicted with Felix's testimony on the 

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issue of the suspect wearing a ski mask as he exited the store. The 

Court further finds there were other eyewitnesses who identified the 

Defendant as the person who committed the robbery and other

offenses that night. Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to 

establish that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of 

the trial would have been different if Ms. Felix had been called as a 

witness in Defendant's case.

(Exhibit J, M.E. 3/4/09 at 1-2.)2 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily rejected the 

claim, stating: “The trial court clearly identified the issues presented and correctly ruled 

on the claims.” (Exhibit M, Order 5/18/10 at 6, n. 2.) 

Ineffective Assistance Standard - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel are analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In 

order to prevail on such a claim, Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance -

counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) 

prejudice - there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the 

petitioner must prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that 

counsel's performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. 

at 697.

No Showing of Prejudice - Petitioner offers no explanation why the PCR court’s

finding of a lack of prejudice was in error. In his Cross-Petition for Review, he simply 

argued that “Officer Blackshear’s identification was the only unimpeached fact linking 

Mr. Pitre to the crimes,” and dismissed the other identifications as having “far lesser 

impact than Officer Blackshear.” (Exhibit L, Cross-Petition at 11.) 

Phoenix Police Officer Blackshear testified that upon responding to the robbery 

call, he pulled into the parking lot, and saw the suspect leaving the store carrying a bag. 

 

2 Respondents characterized the PCR court’s ruling as a finding of an absence of both

deficient performance and prejudice. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 19.) To the contrary, the PCR 

Court merely decided that “Defendant failed to demonstrate his counsel was ineffective,” 

(Exhibit J, M.E. 3/4/09 at 1) and explained that this determination was based on 

Petitioner’s failure “to establish that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome 

of the trial would have been different” (id. at 2). Thus, the PCR court, like the 

undersigned, did not address the deficient performance prong, but relied upon the 

absence of prejudice to reject the claim.

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Blackshear slammed on his breaks, causing his brakes to squeal. At that time, the 

suspect looked up at him, and then pulled a black ski mask over his face. At that time, 

the suspect was closer to Blackshear than Officer Dodd. He was 25 to 30 yards away, 

and saw the suspect who he identified as Petitioner. The suspect was carrying a gun. He 

saw Dodd chase Petitioner behind the store. Blackshear drove around the buildings and 

saw Petitioner jump over a fence into a residential back yard. Blackshear reversed and 

drove around and then saw Petitioner, with Dodd in pursuit. Petitioner was no longer 

wearing his jacket. Petitioner then entered an alleyway. Blackshear drove his car to cut 

him off, and entered the alleyway from the other end. He arrived as Officer Campbell 

was helping Petitioner up off the ground, handcuffed. He shined his flashlight on 

Petitioner and identified him as the perpetrator exiting the store. He then went to the 

residential yard and found the gun, ski mask and jacket and hood worn by the 

perpetrator. (Exhibit R, R.T. 9/5/02 at 132-153.) The defense attempted to impeach 

Officer Blackshear by suggesting that he was biased because of a claim that Blackshear 

had used excessive force claim by slapping Petitioner in the face after he had been 

subdued and handcuffed.

Clearly, Ms. Felix’s testimony contradicted Officer Blackshear’s on whether the 

perpetrator had his face uncovered outside the store. However, as noted by the PCR 

Court, there was a variety of other identifying evidence introduced at trial, albeit 

impeached in various ways. 

The store’s relief manager, victim Maria Ruelas, admitted that the perpetrator 

was wearing a mask the entire time, and that she only saw his eyes and mouth. 

Nonetheless, she identified Petitioner as the perpetrator, a regular customer who she had 

attended six times, and who was in the store as much as two or three times per day. She 

recognized his eyes which she described as “different.” (Exhibit P, R.T. 9/3/02 p.m., at 

150-153.) She also reported identifying Petitioner in a photo lineup. (Id. at 10.) The 

defense attempted to impeach Ruelas by suggesting that store personnel had convinced 

each other that Petitioner was the perpetrator.

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The store’s night cashier, victim Crystal Kingsley, described the perpetrator only 

as wearing a mask, an African-American, with a deep disgruntled voice. Nonetheless, 

she was able to identify Petitioner in a police photo lineup and at trial, because she had 

recognized him as a regular customer at the store from his eyes, his voice and the size of 

his lips. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 9/4/02 at 53-58, 67-68.)

The fiancée of Marie Ruelas, victim Robert Tristan, identified Petitioner as the 

perpetrator, who he described as removing his mask on two occasions for 20 to 30 

seconds. This occurred while the perpetrator was sitting next to Tristan in his car before 

entering the store. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 9/4/02 at 79-85.) He had previously identified 

Petitioner from a photo lineup. (Id. at 94-95.)3 The defense attempted to impeach Tristan 

by showing that he had not early on related to police officers that the perpetrator had 

raised his mask, and intimations that store personnel had convinced each other that 

Petitioner was the perpetrator.

Phoenix Police Officer Dodd described responding to a robbery call at the store 

and encountering a suspect exiting the store, carrying a bag, wearing a mask. He 

described ordering the perpetrator to stop, him dropping the bags and running around the 

store into the alley, and hopping a fence into a residential yard. Dodd waited a few 

seconds to follow, and after reaching the street saw a citizen pointing down the street, 

where he saw the suspect run into an alley. Dodd directed a patrol car down the alley, 

lost sight of the suspect for seconds, and then saw the suspect about to be arrested. The 

suspect, Petitioner, was arrested, approximately a quarter of a mile from the store. 

Despite having twice lost sight of the perpetrator, and never having seen his face, Dodd 

expressed no doubt that Petitioner was the same person who exited the grocery store and 

that he had chased to that location. They located a gun and black ski mask in the 

 

3

The store’s night cashier, victim Alejandra Arvizu, testified that she identified 

Petitioner from a photo lineup as a regular customer, but couldn’t identify him as the 

perpetrator. (Exhibit Q, R.T. 9/4/02 at 128-129.) The store’s bagger, victim Jose Flores, 

testified that the perpetrator who went inside the store was wearing a mask, that he could 

not identify the perpetrator, but recognized Petitioner as a regular customer at the store. 

(Exhibit R, R.T. 9/5/02 at 1-11.) He saw the perpetrator leaving the store, and saw the 

police tell him to stop. (Id. at 18-19.)

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residential yard in the area where the suspect had hopped the fence. A jacket was later 

found in the yard. Where the suspect had dropped the bags, there was money scattered. 

(Exhibit R, R.T. 9/5/02 at 31-48.) Officer Dodd conceded that the suspect exited the 

store with the ski mask on and he did not see the suspect without the mask while he was 

leaving the store. (Id. at 53-54; 85.) The defense attempted to impeach Officer Dodd by 

suggesting that he was biased because of a claim that Dodd had used excessive force 

claim by doing a “knee drop”on Petitioner’s back he had already been subdued. 

Phoenix Police Officer Campbell described responding to reports of the robbery, 

encountering Officer Dodd who directed him down an alleyway. He saw the Defendant 

going down the alleyway, out of breath, sweating profusely. Campbell pursued him, 

ordered him to put his hand in the air and get on the ground. When Officer Blackshear 

arrived, he directed his flashlight on Defendant and said “that’s him.” (Exhibit R, R.T. 

9/5/02 at 100-108.)

Phoenix Police Officer Aldredge testified that when interviewing victim Robert 

Tristan that Tristan did not report having seen the perpetrators face. (Exhibit S, R.T. 

9/6/02 at 54-57.) Aldredge did not ask if the perpetrator had lifted up his mask. (Id. at 

59.)

Phoenix Police Detective Salgado testified that victim Robert Tristan identified 

Petitioner from a photo lineup. (Exhibit S, R.T. 9/6/02 at 76-77.) However, his 

identification was based on the perpetrator’s eyes, and he did not report seeing the 

perpetrator’s face. (Id. at 88-89.) Victim Maria Rueleas also identified Petitioner from a 

photo lineup, basing her identification on the eyes of the perpetrator. (Id. at 79.) 

However, she had not recognized him until afterwards, even though he was a frequent 

customer. (Id. at 94-95.) Victim Crystal Kingsley identified Petitioner from the photo 

lineup as being a regular customer, but could not identify him as the perpetrator. (Id. at 

80.) She said she recalled the perpetrator as having full lips like two subjects in the 

photos, one of which was Petitioner. (Id. at 97-98.)

The jury was permitted to view the surveillance videotape of the robbery, and to 

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view Petitioner in the clothing recovered from the surrounding area. (Exhibit S, R.T. 

9/6/02 at 119-120.) 

Phoenix Police Officer Ray described stopping Petitioner in the alleyway where 

Petitioner was walking. Petitioner was sweating and breathing heavily. (Exhibit S, R.T. 

9/6/02 at 123-124, 130.) 

Phoenix Police Officer Aronson testified that victim Robert Tristan approached 

him, described his involvement, and indicated he might be able to identify on or more 

suspects. He did not relate that a suspect had lifted up a mask, but the officer did not 

ask, and was speaking with Tristan while focusing on maintaining a perimeter looking 

for the suspects.. (Exhibit T, R.T. 9/9/02 at 11-12, 21-22.)

Summary re Identification - Thus, Petitioner had been directly identified as the 

perpetrator by not only Officer Blackshear, but also by victims Maria Ruelas, Crystal 

Kingsley, and Robert Tristan, and by Officer Dodd. In addition, the circumstances of 

Petitioner’s apprehension by Officers Campbell and Ray pointed to Petitioner’s 

involvement.

Further, the jury had the opportunity to compare the surveillance videotape to 

Petitioner in the clothes recovered from the scene. The circumstances of Petitioner’s 

apprehension bolstered the eyewitness identifications, including: his presence in a dark 

alleyway late at night in the vicinity of the robbery and ensuing pursuit, Dodd’s close 

(albeit not uninterrupted) pursuit, his heavy breathing and profuse sweating, and his lack 

of an explanation for his presence in the alleyway or heavy breathing and sweating.

Moreover, the un-presented testimony of Ms. Felix was cumulative to that of 

Officer Dodd, whose testimony reflected that Petitioner was wearing the mask from the 

time he exited the store until he scaled the wall into the residential yard.

Thus, despite the questions concerning the various identifications other than 

Officer Blackshear’s, the undersigned cannot find a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different had Ms. Felix been called to testify

and to further impeach Officer Blackshear’s testimony. 

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Even if the undersigned could find a reasonable probability that the outcome 

would have been different, the undersigned could not find that the PCR court’s finding to 

the contrary was an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable 

application of or contrary to federal law.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground Two is without merit and must be denied.

D. GROUND THREE: IAC RE SENTENCING ELECTION

Liberally construed, in his Ground Three for relief, Petitioner argues that his 

Constitutional rights were violated by the provision of ineffective assistance of counsel 

in failing to object to or appeal the imposition of sentencing for non-dangerous repetitive 

offenses. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) The jury found the armed robbery, kidnapping, and 

aggravated assault offenses to be “dangerous offenses.” (Exhibit U, R.T. 9/10/2 at 2-5.) 

Nonetheless, at sentencing, the state “elected” to treat the dangerous offenses as nondangerous” for sentencing purposes, resulting in a higher sentencing range under an 

anomaly under state law. (Exhibit V, R.T. 5/23/03 at 3-5.) The PCR court summarily 

disposed of this claim, citing State v. Knorr. 

Defendant fails to state a colorable claim that trial and 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial 

court sentencing Defendant as a non-dangerous repeat offender. 

Contrary to Defendant's claim, the Court can sentence a defendant 

as a repeat non-dangerous offender regardless of a jury's finding of 

dangerousness. See, e.g., State v. Knorr, 186 Ariz. 300, 305-06,921 

P.2d 703, 708-09 (App. 1996). Therefore, Defendant has not 

demonstrated that trial or appellate counsel's failure to raise this 

objection/issue fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or 

that but for the failure to raise this issue, the outcome probably 

would have been different.

(Exhibit H, M.E. 11/24/08.) Respondents argue that the PCR court properly rejected this 

claim by correctly applying state sentencing law. (Answer, Doc. 11 at 22.)

Petitioner offers nothing to show that the PCR court’s determination was 

erroneous. Indeed, in Knorr Division 2 of the Arizona Court of Appeals held that 

Arizona law does not prohibit the court from ignoring the jury’s determination that an 

offense was dangerous, and instead sentencing a defendant as a repeat, non-dangerous 

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offender. That was and remains the law in Arizona. See State v. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 314, 

321-322, 257 P.3d 1194, 1201-1202 (App. Div. 1 2011) (“In sum, the law allows a trial 

court to select between the dangerous and repetitive sentencing options, but does not 

require that if the court chooses to sentence a defendant as a repeat offender, it must void 

the jury's finding of dangerousness.”). 

Thus, any objection by counsel would have been futile. Failure to take futile 

action is never ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 

(9th Cir.1996). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th 

Cir. 1982). 

Petitioner’s Ground Three is without merit and must be denied.

E. GROUND FOUR: IAC RE SENTENCING EXPOSURE

Liberally construed, in his Ground Four for relief, Petitioner argues that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to adequately advise 

Petitioner as to his sentencing exposure at trial. 

The PCR court found that counsel performed deficiently when he failed “to 

inform Petitioner of his sentencing exposure at trial.” (Exhibit J, M.E. 3/4/09 at 2-3.) 

The PCR court rejected the state’s argument that there was no prejudice:

The State argues that the outcome would not have changed even if 

Defendant had been advised of the sentencing possibilities because 

Defendant testified that when presented with the plea, he was not 

interested in a plea that involved prison time. The Court is 

unpersuaded by this argument. The Court finds Defendant may have 

accepted a plea offer if he had been informed he could have been 

sentenced to 160 years.

(Id. at 2.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding:

In this case, even if we accept that counsel's performance was 

deficient, Pitre failed to establish prejudice, a reasonable probability 

that "absent his attorney's deficient advice, he would have accepted 

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the plea offer." This failure is reflected in the finding of the trial 

court that Pitre "may have accepted a plea offer. The burden is on 

the petitioner seeking post-conviction relief to show ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and the showing must be that of a provable 

reality, not mere speculation.

(Exhibit M, Order 5/18/10 at 7.) 

Petitioner makes no argument to show that this holding was incorrect.

As noted above, Petitioner was obligated to show both deficient performance and 

prejudice. In the context of a rejected plea offer, the latter requires a showing of a 

reasonable probability that but for the deficient performance “he would have accepted 

the plea offer.” Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9

th Cir. 2003). 

In these circumstances a defendant must show that but for the 

ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that 

the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the 

defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would 

not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the 

court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or 

sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less 

severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were 

imposed.

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385 (U.S.,2012)

Here, the PCR court did not find a reasonable probability that Petitioner would 

have accepted the plea offer, but merely that he “may have.” (Exhibit J, M.E. 3/4/09 at 

2.) That was insufficient under federal law to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Moreover, Petitioner offers nothing to show that the appellate court’s finding that 

there was no reasonable probability was erroneous or unreasonable. The court found:

Specifically, the State correctly notes that Pitre testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that he would not accept any plea offer that 

would require prison. His counsel also testified that Pitre 

unambiguously informed him that he was not interested in any plea 

agreement that required prison. Additionally, we note Pitre never 

testified at the evidentiary hearing that had he been properly advised 

about the maximum sentence, he would have accepted a plea 

agreement.

(Exhibit M, Order 5/18/10 at 7.) Petitioner makes no suggestion of any error in that 

finding. The only portion of the record he cites is his Attachment F, that same decision 

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. And indeed, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision 

reflects the record, including: (1) Petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing that he 

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would not accept any plea offer that would require prison (Exhibit W, R.T. 2/27/09 at 

24); (2) Petitioner’s counsel testified that Pitre unambiguously informed him that he was 

not interested in any plea agreement that required prison (id. at 36-37 (“Mr. Pitre was 

very adamant that he did not really want to discuss any particular plea offer”)); and (3) 

Petitioner never testified at the evidentiary hearing that had he been properly advised 

about the maximum sentence, he would have accepted a plea agreement (id. at 8-29).

Having failed to establish prejudice from any error by trial counsel in relating the 

potential sentencing at trial, Petitioner’s Ground Four is without merit and must be 

denied.

F. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s four grounds for relief are without merit. Accordingly, his Petition 

must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

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straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, the underlying constitutional claims are plainly without merit, and 

reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims debatable or wrong. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed February 6, 2012 (Doc.1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

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within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: October 1, 2012

12-0249r RR 12 09 18 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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