Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00008/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MARIA HARRIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

COCHISE COUNTY, 

Defendant. 

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 No. CIV 08-008-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 163] and

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 162].

Procedural Background

 On or about September 21, 2006, Plaintiff Maria Harris (Harris) filed a complaint in

the Superior Court in and for the County of Cochise. On January 2, 2008, the matter was

removed to this Court. Harris’s Amended Complaint includes claims of defamation,

invasion of privacy, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress

(two claims), wrongful termination in violation of public, negligent training and supervision,

negligence (three claims), violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and violation

of the Family and Medical Leave Act. 

On December 15, 2008, Cochise County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and

Harris filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On September 30, 2009, this Court

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issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Harris’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment [Doc. # 132] and granting in part and denying in part Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of

Defendant and against Harris on Count II (false light invasion of privacy), Count III (false

light), Counts IV and V (intentional infliction of emotional distress), Count VI (wrongful

termination), Count VII (negligent training and supervision), Counts VIII, IX, and X

(negligence). The Court determined that Harris’s claims of defamation/slander and an ADA

violation remained pending. 

The parties filed motions for reconsideration and the Court directed the parties to file

responses and replies as to whether invasion of privacy and false light claims require any

proof of the publisher’s state of mind and whether the evidence created a genuine issue of

material fact as to Harris’s defamation claim. The parties have submitted responses and

replies.

September 30, 2009, Order

In its September 30, 2009, Order, the Court determined that the evidence did not

establish a genuine issue of a material fact that Brian Oertel (“Oertel”) had knowledge of the

falsity of his statement or that he acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity and that

Harris was a public official. Therefore, the Court found summary judgment in favor of

Cochise County on the invasion of privacy and false light invasion of privacy claims.

However, the Court also determined that there was no evidence that Oertel knew an

expert would testify that the medical condition was stress-related and, therefore, that there

was a genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to whether the statement was false. The

Court determined that summary judgment was not appropriate on the defamation claim.

Motion for Reconsideration

As the Court stated in its October 30, 2009, Order, the Court has discretion to

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reconsider and vacate an order. Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1992). “The purpose of a

motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly

discovered evidence. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986). However, motions for reconsideration are disfavored. See

generally Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26

(9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is not to be used to ask a court “to

rethink what the court had already thought through – rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt,

Inc. v. Mel Bohanan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.Va. 1983) (limiting motions for

reconsideration to cases where the court has patently misunderstood a party, where the court

has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court, where the court has

made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where there has been a controlling or

significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the court); see also

United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D.Ariz. 1998).

Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and False Light Invasion of Privacy

Cochise County argues that because the Court determined that Harris was a public

official and that the evidence did not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to actual

malice (i.e., that Oertel had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or that he acted in

reckless disregard of its truth or falsity), the Court’s determination that the invasion of

privacy and false light invasion of privacy claims were unsustainable was in accordance with

the law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383

U.S. 74 (1966). Because the Court determined there was no factual dispute as to malice,

Cochise County asserts that summary judgment of the defamation claim is also appropriate.

Harris asserts, however, that the Court’s determination that there was sufficient

evidence to create a disputed factual issue as to whether Oertel published the September 29,

2005, letter with actual malice warrants a denial of summary judgment as to the invasion of

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The Court notes that Harris sets forth additional evidence to support a determination

that a genuine issue of a material fact is in dispute.

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privacy and the false light invasion of privacy claims, in addition to the defamation claim.

In its September 30, 2009, Order, after discussing whether Harris was a public official,

the Court stated that “the evidence does not establish a genuine issue of a material factual

dispute that Oertel had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or that he acted in reckless

disregard of its truth or falsity[.]” Order, pp. 31-32. However, in reaching this conclusion,

the Court had not yet discussed the evidence presented by the parties as to this issue. The

Court subsequently stated that there was “a genuine issue of material fact in dispute as to

whether the statement was false.” Id. at p. 34. Additionally, the Court also subsequently

stated:

Cochise County also points out that Harris had a medical condition that has a

relationship to stress as opined by its expert; therefore, the “false statement” element

necessary for defamation and false light invasion of privacy is absent. Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 341-43, 783 P.2d at 787-89. Harris asserts, however, that Dr. Maddur

and Dr. Harris both testified at deposition that Harris’s h.pylori bacterial infection was

not caused by stress and that this raises a genuine issues of material fact. Nonetheless,

Cochise County argues that there is no material evidence of knowledge of falsity or

reckless disregard for the truth. There is no evidence before the Court that Oertel

knew an expert would testify that the medical condition was stress-related. The Court

finds that this issue presents a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.

Order, p. 34. The Court’s conclusions are inconsistent and, because one purpose of a motion

for reconsideration is to correct a manifest error of fact, Harsco Corp., reconsideration is

appropriate.

As the Court stated in it September 30, 2009, Order, there was no evidence before the

Court that Oertel knew an expert would testify that the medical condition was stress-related.

The crux of the Court’s determination was that Oertel did not know whether the medical

condition was stress related. This evidence alone presents a reasonable inference that Oertel

had knowledge of the falsity of his statement or that he acted in reckless disregard of its truth

or falsity.

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 Indeed, Cochise County points out that recklessness “amounting to actual malice

may be found where a publisher . . . deliberately ignores evidence that calls into question his

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Harris argues extensively that actual malice is not required for a “private facts”

invasion of privacy claim. However, this issue was not raised in Harris’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. See Motion, p. 4 (Harris is not a public official and qualified immunity

is not supported by fact or law). Similarly, this argument was not presented in her

Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. See Opposition, p. 18

(incorporating arguments and evidence presented in Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).

This issue is not before the Court, therefore, to reconsider.

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published statements.” Levesque v. Doocy, 560 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2009). Cochise County

further points out that Harris discussed experiencing stress, stomach problems, and headaches

in emails to Oertel. Yet, Oertel only mentioned a “stress-related” condition in his letter.

Further, in discussing Harris’ September 1, 2005, email, Cochise County asserts that Harris

related her work stress with her medical condition – the Court agrees that such an inference

is reasonable from the language of the email. However, the conflicting reasonable inferences

exhibit that there is a genuine issue of a material factual dispute. 

Moreover, Cochise County’s statement appears to acknowledge a distinction between

the two conditions. Harris’s September 1, 2005, email to Oertel in which she indicated she

had a terrible night and morning with vomiting, stomach pain and fever and indicated that

the doctor “told me it is in my best interest (health) to stay away from work until I have the

medical procedure (October the 4th)[,]” DSOF, Facts, Ex. F., also raises a reasonable

inference that the medical procedure is related to the stomach problems. A genuine issue of

material fact has been presented as to whether Oertel deliberately ignored this information

in attributing Harris’s medical condition solely to stress-related concerns. The Court finds

summary judgment on the issue of actual malice is not appropriate.2

 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 163] is GRANTED IN PART.

2. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. # 162] is DENIED.

3. The Court’s September 30, 2009, Order awarding summary judgment in favor

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of Cochise County and against Harris on Count II (false light invasion of

privacy) and Count III (false light) is VACATED.

4. The Joint Proposed Pretrial Order and any Motions in Limine shall be filed on

or before April 9, 2010.

DATED this 12th day of March, 2010.

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