Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02377/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02377-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02377-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN A. THYMES,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-02377-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 19, 21, 28, 41, 53

Pro se Plaintiff John A. Thymes (“Plaintiff”) initiated the present action asserting civil 

rights violations against a varied group of 70 defendants, including the State of California, 

Governor Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General Kamala Harris, members of the Attorney 

General’s Office, individual state employees, the County of Los Angeles, individual county 

employees, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, former Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, the 

Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, three Superior Court judges, former Los Angeles 

County District Attorney Steve Cooley, members of the District Attorney’s Office, attorneys of 

the California Appellate Project in Los Angeles, the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitations, three state prisons, individual state prison employees, Los Angeles County 

Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Dean C. Logan, former Los Angeles County Assessor John 

Noguez, members of the County Assessor’s Office, former Los Angeles County Treasurer and 

Tax Collector Mark Saladino, various real estate companies and individuals in Los Angeles, and 

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02377-EJD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

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various insurance and financial companies in New York (collectively, “Defendants”). In short, 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants engaged in numerous form of harassment, mistreatment and legal 

maneuvering in relation to a piece of real property located in Los Angeles that Plaintiff claims to 

still own, as well as in relation to a criminal case which led to Plaintiff’s conviction for assorted 

forms of fraud . 

Federal jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Presently before the Court are 

Defendants’ several motions to dismiss the complaint. The Court found these matters suitable for 

decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–1(b) and previously vacated the 

hearing. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefing, the court has determined that many of 

Defendants’ arguments are meritorious. Thus, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED for the 

reasons stated below. 

I. BACKGROUND

The allegations in Plaintiff’s 163-page complaint appear to arise from a 2008 conviction in 

Los Angeles Superior Court.

1

 The following is a summary of the salient portions: 

In 1973, Plaintiff purchased a three-unit apartment building on 107th Street in the County 

of Los Angeles, from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“the 

107th Street Property”). Dkt. No. 1, Compl. at ¶ 249. While Plaintiff claims that he still owns the 

107th Street Property, it appears that the property was actually sold at a trustee’s sale in the early 

1990s. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 249; Dkt. No. 20-1, Exh. A; Dkt. No. 20-2, Exh. B.2

In 1996, Plaintiff began receiving social security benefits, and in 2002, he began receiving 

social security retirement benefits. Compl. at ¶ 113. 

 

1

Since Plaintiff is proceeding without legal representation, the Court has liberally construed the 

complaint. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 

2

In a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents that are not physically attached to the 

complaint if “the documents’ authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily 

relies on them.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the Court 

takes judicial notice of the factual background provided in Thymes v. Metropolitan Life, 103 F.3d 

140 (9th Cir. 1996), and People v. Thymes, 2011 WL 2811318 (Cal. Ct. App. July 5, 2011), as 

well as the California Supreme Court order denying review. 

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In 2005, Plaintiff alleges that an investigator for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department and the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office notified Plaintiff that a criminal 

complaint had been filed against him for social services fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 115, 218. When Plaintiff 

contacted the social services agency, he was allegedly told that no complaint was filed against 

him. Id. at ¶¶ 116-17, 219-20. Nonetheless, felony charges were brought against Plaintiff for 

social services fraud, and Plaintiff was arrested. Id. at ¶¶ 79-81, 221-22. Plaintiff was later 

released on bail. Id. at ¶ 82. In 2006, Plaintiff alleges that felony charges were again brought 

against him for social services fraud, and again he was arrested and released on bail. Id. at ¶¶ 83-

86, 223. 

During pre-trial activities, Plaintiff filed a motion challenging the Superior Court’s 

jurisdiction over the case. Id. at ¶ 299. He argued that the charges brought against the 107th 

Street Property were improper because he had purchased this property from a federal agency, thus 

making it was a federal issue rather than an issue of state law. Id. at ¶ 227. Plaintiff also argued 

that the alleged social services fraud was not capable of being adjudicated at the time because 

administrative remedies has not been exhausted. Id. at ¶ 229. 

In April 2007, grand jury proceedings were held, resulting in a 30-count indictment against 

Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 90-93, 184, 229. The court issued an arrest warrant, and Plaintiff was 

arraigned. Id. at ¶ 93. At the arraignment, Plaintiff was charged with 30 counts under an amended 

indictment that included social services fraud and attempted theft of rental proceeds belonging to 

the 107th Street Property’s true owner. Id. at ¶¶ 129, 287. The court set bail and Plaintiff was 

remanded to the custody of the Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles. Id. at ¶¶ 94, 135, 212-14. 

In 2008, a jury trial was held in the criminal case. Id. at ¶¶ 249, 315. Plaintiff was 

convicted of defrauding several public agencies, including Crystal Stairs, which is “a governmentfunded child care resource and referral agency that pays child care providers for qualified working 

parents,” In-Home Supportive Services, which is a state program that “pays caretakers to provide 

assistance to the elderly, blind or disabled, so that these individuals may remain at home, instead 

of in a convalescent or residential facility,” and the Supplemental Security Income program, which 

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is “a federal and state funded cash-based assistance program for individuals who are disabled or 

legally blind and meet certain income restrictions, or who are over age 65.” People v. Thymes, 

2011 WL 2811318, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 5, 2011). Additionally, Plaintiff was convicted for 

receiving payments to which he was not entitled when he presented himself to be the owner of the 

107th Street Property, executed a deed conveying the property to himself, attempted to collect rent 

from the property’s tenants, served one tenant with a notice to pay rent or leave the property, and 

filed an unlawful detainer action against the tenant. Id. at *4. 

In 2009, Plaintiff was sentenced to nine years and four months in state prison. Id. at *1. 

Plaintiff appealed his conviction, which was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Second 

Appellate District. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff petitioned the California Supreme Court for review of 

the order affirming his conviction, but in 2011, the petition was denied. See Dkt. No. 22, Exh. 2. 

Currently, Plaintiff appears to have been released from incarceration and resides in Morgan 

Hill, California. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff commenced the instant action on May 22, 2014. See

id. He alleges that Defendants falsely imprisoned and kidnapped him, conspired against him to 

take the 107th Street Property by using false and manufactured documents, and concealed him in 

prison by using unknown case numbers that no one could find. Id. at ¶¶ 121, 129-31, 133, 140, 

149-50, 152, 205, 208, 210. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants used special courts and 

judges, and certain attorneys, to violate his civil rights and due process right including filing 

multiple charges against him for the same violations, imposing high bail amounts, and concealing 

him. Id. at ¶¶ 132, 154-55, 195-97, 211-16. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court 

did not have jurisdiction over issues related to the 107th Street Property, and did not have 

jurisdiction to convict him of social services fraud. Id. at ¶ 229. 

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following fourteen claims against all Defendants: 

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Claim Allegations

1 Violation of Civil Rights: Violation of 

Plaintiff’s Unalienable Rights Secured by the 

U.S. and California Constitutions; Violation of 

Civil Rights Under Color, False Imprisonment, 

Without Probable Cause, No Jurisdiction, 

Kidnapping

Briefly, Plaintiff alleges that his 

constitutional rights were violated when 

Defendants: conspired with each other 

against Plaintiff, planned to conceal 

information regarding Plaintiff and his 

property, embezzled rent from Plaintiff’s 

tenants, falsely indicted and convicted 

Plaintiff in order to take Plaintiff’s 

property, and kidnapped and concealed 

Plaintiff in prison in order to fraudulently 

convey Plaintiff’s property for their own 

use. Compl. at ¶¶ 284, 290-91, 294-97, 

311, 308, 320, 324-25. 

2 Violation of Civil Rights: Fraud, Aiding and 

Abetting, Civil Conspiracy, Civil Liability, 

Declaration by Perjury 

Briefly, Plaintiff alleges that the state court 

lacked jurisdiction because the issues 

raised were administrative, and Defendants 

devised a scheme and committed hate 

crimes against Plaintiff by providing false 

testimony in order to obtain Plaintiff’s 

property. Compl. at ¶¶ 328, 330. 

3 Violation of Civil Rights: Discrimination, Hate 

Crimes, Bad Faith, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, 

Civil Liability, and Constructive Fraud 

Briefly, in addition to the aforementioned 

allegations, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants: defamed Plaintiff’s character 

and published libelous information in court 

documents, kidnapped Plaintiff for ransom, 

and set bail at an unconstitutional amount 

that constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment. Compl. at ¶¶ 334-36. 

4 Violation of Civil Rights: Malicious 

Prosecution, RICO, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, 

Constructive Fraud and Civil Conspiracy 

Briefly, in addition to the aforementioned 

allegations, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants brought false criminal charges 

against Plaintiff, maliciously arrested 

Plaintiff, and concealed information 

regarding Plaintiff’s incarceration, Compl. 

at ¶¶ 338-39, 346.

5 Violation of Civil Rights: Legal Malpractice, 

Civil Conspiracy, Fraud, Aiding and Abetting 

Fraud, RICO

Briefly, in addition to the aforementioned 

allegations, Plaintiff alleges that the 

District Attorney’s Office committed 

misconduct because there was no 

complaint or grand jury indictments filed 

against Plaintiff. Compl. at ¶¶ 355-57. 

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6 Violation of Civil Rights: Denial of Intangible 

Rights to Honest Services, Aiding and Abetting 

Fraud, Civil Conspiracy, Constructive Fraud, 

Kidnapping, False Imprisonment, 

Discrimination, RICO

Briefly, in addition to the aforementioned 

allegations, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants: falsely charged Plaintiff with 

crimes he did not commit, denied Plaintiff 

of due process, denied Plaintiff of his 

property and rental income, conducted 

unreasonable search and seizure, denied 

Plaintiff’s right to use witnesses in his 

favor. Compl. at ¶¶ 361, 363-67. 

7 Violation of Civil Rights: Violations of RICO, 

Aiding and Abetting Fraud, Civil Conspiracy, 

Kidnapping, False Imprisonment, Extortion, 

and Constructive Fraud

Briefly, in addition to the aforementioned 

allegations, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants’ acts were part of a scheme to 

wrongfully incarcerate Plaintiff, extort bail 

money from him, and convert his property, 

and that Defendants used their positions to 

incarcerate Plaintiff based on false charges 

and fabricated evidence. Compl. at ¶¶ 372-

75.

8 Violation of Civil Rights: Unjust Enrichment, 

Kidnapping, Constructive Fraud, False 

Imprisonment, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, 

Civil Conspiracy, and Redress 

Plaintiff reasserts his previous allegations. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 382-84. 

9 Violation of Civil Rights: Elder Abuse, 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 

Unjust Enrichment, Kidnapping, Constructive 

Fraud, False Imprisonment, Aiding and 

Abetting Fraud, Civil Conspiracy, Continuous 

Redress

Plaintiff reasserts his previous allegations. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 386-87.

10 Violation of Civil Rights: Declaratory and 

Injunctive Relief, Order to Show Cause for 

Unjust Enrichment, Kidnapping, Constructive 

Fraud, False Imprisonment, Aiding and 

Abetting Fraud, Obstruction of Justice, Civil 

Conspiracy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional 

Distress, Violations of RICO, Redress

Plaintiff reasserts his previous allegations. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 390-94.

11 Violation of Civil Rights: Concealment, 

Obstruction of Justice, Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress, Violation of Civil Rights, 

False Imprisonment, No Jurisdiction, Unjust 

Enrichment, Discrimination, Fraud, 

Constructive Fraud, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, 

Kidnapping, Elder Abuse

Plaintiff reasserts his previous allegations. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 397-99.

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12 Violation of Civil Rights: Double Jeopardy, 

Obstruction of Justice, Concealment, 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 

Violation of Civil Rights, False Imprisonment, 

Extortion, No Jurisdiction, Unjust Enrichment, 

Constructive Fraud, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, 

Kidnapping, Elder Abuse, Res Judicata, 

Collateral Estoppel, Redress

Briefly, in addition to Plaintiff’s 

aforementioned allegations, Plaintiff 

alleges that he was charged three times for 

the same offense based on false 

information. Compl. at ¶¶ 402-04.

13 Violation of Civil Rights: California 

Government Code § 7.14 Rights Under 

Administrative Adjudication Bill of Rights and 

Due Process, California Government Code §§ 

11425.10-11425.60.

Plaintiff reasserts his previous allegations. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 406-09.

14 Violation of Civil Rights: Perjury, Theft, 

Destruction or Alteration of Court Records, 

Violations of RICO, False Declarations Before 

Grand Jury or Court, Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress, Concealment, Obstruction 

of Justice, Violation of Civil Rights, False 

Imprisonment, No Jurisdiction, Unjust 

Enrichment, Discrimination, Constructive 

Fraud, Aiding and Abetting Fraud, Kidnapping, 

Elder Abuse, Unjust Enrichment

Plaintiff reasserts his previous allegations. 

Compl. at ¶¶ 411-14. 

For relief, Plaintiff seeks damages of $300,000 per day, $300,000 to $5 million per 

Defendant, and/or $10 million to $30 million. Compl. at 154-157, 159-163. Moreover, Plaintiff 

seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to cease harassment, retaliation and reprisals against him; 

an injunction to file the grand jury indictment that should have been filed originally; a declaration 

that at the filing of the grand jury indictment, Plaintiff was current in payment of his property 

taxes; an order instructing the current property owners to cease their claims against Plaintiff; a 

declaration that Plaintiff is the current owner of the property; an order instructing the state court to 

hear Plaintiff’s eviction matter and to remove the current owner’s name from the property; enjoin 

the current property owners from collecting rent from the tenants residing in the property; 

reimbursement for the rent money collected by the current property owners; and a declaration that 

Defendants do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter set out in the indictment. Id. at 157-

159.

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Defendants have filed seven motions to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh Amendment immunity, judicial and prosecutorial 

immunity, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. See Dkt. Nos. 19, 21, 23, 27, 

28, 41, 53. Opposition and reply briefs have been filed. See Dkt. Nos. 87, 37, 97, 103, 39, 102, 

118, 93, 103, 44, 101, 103, 60, 99, 103, 98, 102. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges subject matter jurisdiction and may be either facial or 

factual. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.2004). A facial 12(b)(1) motion involves 

an inquiry confined to the allegations in the complaint, whereas a factual 12(b)(1) motion permits 

the court to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Id. When, as here, a defendant 

makes a facial challenge, all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the court 

must determine whether lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the complaint itself. 

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. Elec., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979). “A party invoking 

the federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir.1996).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient 

specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). A 

complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is 

appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Moreover, the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57.

When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court generally “may not consider 

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any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 

1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). However, the court may consider material submitted as part of 

the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also consider material subject to judicial 

notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–69 (9th Cir.2001).

In addition, the court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir.1988). 

However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Id.

III.DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. Nos. 19 at 7; 28 at 4; 41 at 5-6. Since the 

application of Rooker-Feldman is dispositive of all claims against all defendants, this argument 

will be addressed first. 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a federal district court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 

F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). “A party disappointed by a decision of a state court may seek 

reversal of that decision by appealing to a higher state court,” but may not “appeal to a federal 

district court, even if a federal question is present or if there is diversity of citizenship between the 

parties.” Id. at 1155. 

In addition to direct appeals, Rooker-Feldman also prohibits district courts from hearing de 

facto appeals of state-court decisions. A case can be classified as a de facto appeal “when a losing 

plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly 

erroneous legal rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that 

court.” Id. at 1156. Nor can the district court entertain issues which are “inextricably intertwined” 

with a de facto appeal. Id. at 1158. 

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Here, Plaintiff was convicted in a state court proceeding of defrauding three public 

agencies and of receiving payments from the 107th Street Property to which he was not entitled. 

He now presents in the instant federal complaint the facts and circumstances related to his

conviction and subsequent incarceration. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he discovered “major 

fraud” and “perjury by numerous defendants” and claims that this fraud and these perjured 

statements were used to obtain the indictment that led to this conviction. He further alleges 

through the complaint that the state court committed numerous errors while presiding over his 

criminal case, that the case was used to litigate “void issues, as a matter of law, pertaining to 

Plaintiff’s property,” and that the state court was “without any lawful jurisdiction” because some 

of the thirty charges against him asserted social services fraud. Compl. at ¶ 111. 

As part of his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks orders related to his theory that the criminal 

indictment was erroneous. Namely, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the state court did not have 

jurisdiction over the social services fraud charges, and an injunction requiring the state court to 

republish the indictment. In addition, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that he is the owner of the 107th 

Street Property, despite a criminal conviction that presumes he is not the true owner. But to obtain 

any of this relief based on the factual allegations, this Court would need to review whether or not 

the state court had jurisdiction or properly denied his motion on that topic, and would have to 

review the evidence that led the state court to operate under the premise that Plaintiff was not the 

owner of the 107th Street property. In essence, proceeding to the merits of this case would require 

a review of the correctness of the criminal proceeding the resulted in Plaintiff’s fraud conviction. 

As such, this action meets the definition of a de facto appeal. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s constitutional and civil rights claims are not properly before the 

district court because they are “inextricably intertwined” with the prohibited de facto appeal. See

Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158 (“Only when there is already a forbidden de facto appeal in federal court 

does the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into play . . . .”). A claim is “inextricably 

intertwined” with a state court judgment if “the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the 

state court wrongly decided the issues before it, or if the relief requested in the federal action 

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would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.” Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. 

City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In 

this case, Plaintiff asserts fourteen claims for civil rights violations that stem from his conviction 

and incarceration. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to first indict and 

then convict Plaintiff in order to take the 107th Street Property, provided false testimony for the 

same purpose, kidnapped him by putting him in prison, set high bail amounts constituting cruel 

and unusual punishment, and brought false criminal charges and maliciously prosecuted him. For 

rather obvious reasons, these alleged violations are inextricably intertwined with the de facto 

appeal of Plaintiff’s criminal conviction because the court cannot reach them without examining 

the correctness of the state court proceedings. In other words, to decide whether Plaintiff has 

asserted a valid civil rights claim, the Court would need to determine whether or not the state court 

criminal proceedings were properly instituted, maintained and decided. That inquiry is the 

province of the California appellate courts, not the federal district court. Thus, much like the 

portion of his complaint that renders this case a de facto appeal, the court lacks jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s inextricably-intertwined civil rights claims. 

Although only three of the seven motions to dismiss raise a Rooker-Feldman argument, 

this entire action against all Defendants falls within the purview of the doctrine because all claims 

against all Defendants depend on a review of the correctness of the criminal proceedings, and 

Plaintiff seeks the same monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief for all claims against all 

Defendants. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that close 

attention is paid to the relief sought by the plaintiff). That being the case, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine presents a threshold bar to federal subject matter jurisdiction over this entire case. 

For these reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed. 

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

Although application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is dispositive, the Court will address 

other reasons why this action cannot proceed. 

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Plaintiff’s claims against state actors also fail due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The 

Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 

Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. 

This language has been interpreted as a general bar to suits in federal court against a state 

government by that state’s own citizens, by citizens of another state, or by citizens of a foreign 

state, and bars both federal and pendant state claims. See Montana v. Goldin, 394 F.3d 1189, 

1195 (9th Cir.2005); see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21 

(1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity “applies . . . to state-law claims brought into 

federal court under pendent jurisdiction.”). In other words, unless sovereign immunity is clearly 

and unequivocally waived, the states are immune from suit in federal court. See Sossamon v. 

Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658 (2011).

Eleventh Amendment immunity is subject to a narrow exception “where the relief sought 

is prospective in nature and is based on an ongoing violation of the plaintiff’s federal

constitutional or statutory rights.” Cent. Reserve Life of N. Am. Ins. Co. v. Struve, 852 F.2d 

1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir.1988) (emphasis preserved); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. In order to invoke 

this exception, a plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation of federal law and seek prospective 

relief from a state official. See Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 490 (9th Cir.2003) (“Under the 

doctrine of Ex parte Young, suits against an official for prospective relief are generally cognizable, 

whereas claims for retrospective relief (such as damages) are not.”).

Here, Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims against several state actors, including the Superior 

Court in Los Angeles County, three Superior Court judges, the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Governor Brown through his role as former California

Attorney General, current California Attorney General Harris, and the Los Angeles County 

District Attorney’s Office. It is well established that suits against these entities and their 

employees acting in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See

Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling that suits 

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against the Superior Court or its employees are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Brown v. Or. 

Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirmed that claims against the Department 

of Corrections and individual defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment); Weiner v. San Diego Cnty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1031 (holding that a district attorney is 

a state officer when deciding to prosecute an individual). Since Plaintiff’s claims seek monetary 

damages from these Defendants, the claims fall within the scope of the Eleventh Amendment bar 

and cannot be asserted in federal court. They must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot state a 

plausible damages claim against these state entities. 

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief also fails. The narrow exception to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity only applies where there is an ongoing violation of federal law. There is 

no such violation alleged in the complaint since Plaintiff relies on factual allegations that stem 

from a past indictment and conviction, and Plaintiff has since been released from incarceration. 

Thus, Plaintiff cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment exception. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s claims against state actors fail because they are barred by Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. 

C. Judicial Immunity 

An additional reason for dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against state court judges is judicial 

immunity. “A judge is generally immune from a civil action for damages,” as well as from actions 

for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th 

Cir. 1996). This immunity applies no matter how erroneous or injurious the alleged act, and is not 

lost through a judge’s grave procedural errors or acts in excess of jurisdiction. Id. at 1244. 

Furthermore, this immunity protects judges even when a conspiracy with one party against another 

is alleged. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges claims against Superior Court Judges Steven R. Van Sicklen, Curtis 

B. Rappe, and Ruffo Espinosa, Jr. Plaintiff’s allegations relate to actions each took in their 

official capacities as state court judges, such as presiding over Plaintiff’s indictment, arraignment, 

trial, and sentencing. Regardless of how injurious or incorrect Plaintiff believes their decisions to 

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be, the claims and requests for relief fall squarely within the scope of what is prohibited by judicial 

immunity. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation that the state court judges lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the indictment and conviction is barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

because this Court could not reach the issue without conducting a review of the decision denying 

his motion on that issue. Therefore, the Superior Court judges are immune from the claims 

asserted against them. 

D. Prosecutorial Immunity 

Plaintiff’s claims against the prosecutor Defendants also fail due to absolute prosecutorial 

immunity. This immunity applies when a prosecutor acts as an officer of the court, such as in

preparing to initiate a judicial proceeding, appearing in court to present evidence in support of a 

search warrant application, making statements at trial, use of evidence, and reliance on testimony. 

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009); Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 766-67 

(9th Cir. 2014). Immunity does not apply, however, when a prosecutor engages in investigative or 

administrative tasks, such as giving advice to police during a criminal investigation, making 

statements to the press, or acting as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application. 

Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342-43. 

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to state a claim against the County of Los Angeles and its

prosecutors, it is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

falsely accused and incarcerated him, and that they maliciously prosecuted him. Plaintiff’s claims 

arise from the prosecutors’ official acts of initiating and conducting judicial proceedings against 

Plaintiff. Therefore, the prosecutors involved in Plaintiff’s criminal case are immune from the 

claims asserted against them. 

E. Leave to Amend

The Court finally considers whether Plaintiff should be permitted leave to amend. 

Although leave should be freely given, dismissal without leave to amend is proper if “the 

complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of 

Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotations

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omitted). Such is the case here. Since the complaint makes clear that Plaintiff’s claims are based 

on conduct that could never support liability due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh 

Amendment immunity, and judicial and prosecutorial immunity, allowing for further amendment 

would be futile. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed without leave to amend. 

IV.CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. See Dkt. Nos. 

19, 21, 28, 41, 53. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. See Dkt. Nos. 23, 27, 64, 

74, 84, 134, 145, 146, 151, 162, 163. All claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. 

Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that dismissals for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction should be without prejudice). The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 31, 2015 

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge 

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