Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15694/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15694-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SYLVIA MAHACH-WATKINS, 

Individually & as the Successor in

Interest to the Estate of John

Joseph Wayne Watkins; PATRICIA No. 08-15694 ANN WATKINS,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, D.C. No.  3:05-cv-01143-SI

v.

OPINION LARRY DEPEE, a California

Highway Patrol Officer; STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, United States District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 14, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed February 1, 2010

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, William A. Fletcher and

Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge William A. Fletcher

1823

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 1 of 17
COUNSEL

David Warren Hamilton, S. Michelle Inan, OFFICE OF THE

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Oakland, California, for the appellants.

Tory M. Pankopf, LAW OFFICES OF TORY M. PANKOPF,

Reno, Nevada, Mary Helen Beatificato, BEATIFICATO &

ASSOCIATES, Rancho Santa Margarita, California, for the

appellees.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer Larry Depee

(“Depee”) shot and killed John Watkins (“Watkins”) while on

1826 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 2 of 17
duty in Crescent City, California. Watkins’s mother, Sylvia

Mahach-Watkins (“Mahach-Watkins”), filed suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and various provisions of state law on her own

behalf and on behalf of her son’s estate. A number of

Mahach-Watkins’s claims were dismissed before trial. Two

§ 1983 claims and a state-law wrongful death claim went to

trial. The jury returned a favorable verdict on one of the two

§ 1983 claims and on the wrongful death claim. The jury

awarded nominal damages of one dollar on each of these two

claims. 

Mahach-Watkins thereafter sought almost $700,000 in

attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court

awarded $136,687.35. The court reduced the amount of attorney’s fees because of the limited success achieved in MahachWatkins’s § 1983 claim. Depee appeals the award of attorney’s fees. He contends under Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103

(1992), that because of her limited success Mahach-Watkins

is entitled to no attorney’s fees at all. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. Background

CHP Officer Larry Depee shot and killed John Watkins

during a struggle on the night of December 9, 2003. Watkins

was unemployed and had a long history of schizophrenia,

accompanied by drug and alcohol abuse. He survived on

Social Security payments and support from his mother. 

In its order denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 and wrongful death claims, the district

court wrote:

The parties essentially agree that, Watkins, a

forty-year old American Yurok Indian man, was riding his bicycle down U.S. Highway 101 southbound

in the northbound lane. Defendant Depee observed

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1827

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 3 of 17
Watkins and saw that he was riding his bicycle without any lights. Depee tried to initiate a traffic stop of

Watkins twice that evening but could not do so

because Watkins rode away before defendant could

position his patrol car for the stop.

Later that evening, Depee saw Watkins a third

time, riding southbound on the sidewalk next to the

northbound lane of Highway 101. The parties agree

that Depee parked his patrol car directly in front of

Watkins. Plaintiff claims that Watkins collided with

the patrol car and fell from his bicycle onto the

ground, while defendants maintain that Watkins

stopped, straddled his bicycle and after Depee told

Watkins he could not ride the wrong way in the

roadway without lights, that Watkins either shoved

or threw the bicycle at Depee and started running.

The parties agree that at some point after Depee

stopped Watkins, Watkins ran away to a wooded

area behind a nearby Super 8 Motel, and Depee

chased him. According to Depee, he and Watkins

struggled, and at some point during the fight, Watkins began yelling that he needed to go home to take

his medications, and also told Depee he had a gun.

Also according to Depee, Watkins wrested Depee’s

flashlight away from him and swung at him twice

with the flashlight. After the second swing, Depee

drew his gun and shot Watkins several times, killing

him.

Based upon, inter alia, the declaration of forensic

pathologist John Cooper, plaintiff maintains that at

the time Depee shot Watkins, Watkins was lying on

his left side with his right arm raised up in a “warding off” gesture, and that Watkins could not have

been swinging the flashlight at the time of his death.

Plaintiff also emphasizes the fact that a fingerprint

analysis of Depee’s flashlight only revealed one of

1828 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 4 of 17
Watkins’ fingerprints on the head area of the flashlight; plaintiff asserts that if Depee’s version of

events was true, there would be more of Watkins’

fingerprints on the flashlight, and that those fingerprints would be on the shaft of the flashlight.

The evidence at trial was largely consistent with this narrative. Depee testified at trial that he fired two shots and that he

was probably two or three feet away from Watkins when he

fired. When asked why he shot Watkins, Depee replied: 

A. Well, in the end [I] shot him because he was trying to hit me with the flashlight and I definitely felt

like he was trying to kill me. He said he had a gun.

I don’t know why else he would tell anybody you

have a gun you wanted the kill them or what-haveyou. The whole circumstances fighting, running,

assaulting my — and then ultimately the flashlight is

when I shot.

Q. Why did you believe, maybe it’s obvious, but tell

the jury why did you believe he was trying to kill

you?

A. That flashlight is no doubt, to me that’s a deadly

weapon when you[‘re] swinging that flashlight

somebody, to me it’s painfully obvious he was trying

to kill me.

After Watkins’s death, Mahach-Watkins filed suit against

Depee and several other defendants in state court under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and various provisions of California law.

Defendants removed to federal court. Mahach-Watkins filed

an amended complaint in federal court, pleading a number of

federal and state-law claims. Mahach-Watkins’s § 1983

claims were contained in her Sixth Cause of Action which

contained two “counts.” Count 1 included an allegation of

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1829

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 5 of 17
as allegations of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, on behalf of Mahach-Watkins and Watkins’s estate.

Count 2 was an allegation of a conspiracy to violate Watkins’s constitutional rights. In addition, in her Seventh Cause

of Action Mahach-Watkins brought a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3) alleging a failure to prevent civil rights violations

and a conspiracy to cover up such violations. MahachWatkins’s state-law claims included wrongful death, assault

and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent hiring, training and retention. 

After motions to dismiss, to strike, and for summary judgment, only three claims survived, as to which Depee was the

sole defendant. The claims were a § 1983 Fourth Amendment

claim by Mahach-Watkins, a § 1983 Fourth Amendment

claim by Watkins’s estate, and a state-law wrongful death

claim by Mahach-Watkins. The district court held a threeweek jury trial, divided into liability and damages phases. At

the conclusion of the liability phase, the jury returned a verdict against Depee on the estate’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment

excessive force claim and Mahach-Watkins’s state-law

wrongful death claim.

In the damages phase, the district court instructed the jury

that it could return an award of only one dollar in nominal

damages on the § 1983 claim, irrespective of what the evidence showed. The court instructed the jury that it could

return an award on the wrongful death claim in whatever

amount the evidence supported. At the conclusion of the damages phase, the jury awarded one dollar in nominal damages

on each of the two claims.

Mahach-Watkins moved for a new trial on the issue of

damages on the wrongful death claim. The district court

denied the motion, explaining that in its view the evidence in

support of damages was consistent with the jury’s verdict. In

the court’s words, the evidence showed a “complicated picture of the relationship” between Watkins and his mother.

1830 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 6 of 17
Although Mahach-Watkins testified that she and her son

“loved each other and had a close relationship,” the evidence

showed that Watkins had threatened his mother “on several

occasions,” that she was “afraid of him and periodically

requested police assistance with him,” that he “had difficulty

forming any meaningful relationships,” and that he “had a

serious history of poorly-managed psychiatric instability.” 

Mahach-Watkins moved for attorney’s fees and costs under

42 U.S.C. § 1988 based on the jury’s favorable verdict on the

§ 1983 claim. She sought $686,796.74 in attorney’s fees and

$117,654.68 in costs. The district court tolled the time for taking an appeal in order to consider the motion for fees. The

court awarded $136,687.35 in attorney’s fees, reducing the

requested amount due to Mahach-Watkins’s limited success

in her § 1983 suit. The court held that Mahach-Watkins was

entitled to recover costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, but wrote that it was unable to determine the amount

without more information. The court denied the motion for

costs and authorized Mahach-Watkins to file a renewed

motion after the clerk taxed costs.

Depee appealed the award of attorney’s fees. MahachWatkins did not file a timely cross-appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review an award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. Benton v. Or. Student Assistance Comm’n, 421 F.3d 901,

904 (9th Cir. 2005). A district court abuses its discretion if it

awards fees based on an erroneous view of the law or a

clearly erroneous finding of fact. Id.

III. Discussion

This appeal presents three issues. First, Mahach-Watkins

argues that because the district court had not fully resolved

her motion for attorney’s fees and costs when Depee filed his

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1831

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 7 of 17
notice of appeal, the appeal was premature. Second, Depee

argues that because Mahach-Watkins obtained only one dollar

in nominal damages on the § 1983 claim, she is not entitled

to attorney’s fees under Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103

(1992). Third, Mahach-Watkins argues that the district court

abused its discretion in reducing the amount of attorney’s

fees.

A. Timeliness of Appeal

Mahach-Watkins contends that Depee’s notice of appeal

was filed prematurely and that we therefore have no jurisdiction. We disagree. 

[1] Mahach-Watkins filed a motion for attorney’s fees and

costs on November 14, 2007. On November 20, 2007, she

requested, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(e),

that the district court extend the time for filing an appeal until

the motion was decided. The district court granted the motion.

Rule 58(e) provides:

Ordinarily, the entry of judgment may not be

delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order

to tax costs or award fees. But if a timely motion for

attorney’s fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the

court may act before a notice of appeal has been

filed and become effective to order that the motion

have the same effect under Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 59.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) provides:

If a party timely files in the district court any of the

following motions under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last

such remaining motion . . . .

1832 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 8 of 17
The motions referenced in Rule 4(a)(4) include a motion “for

attorney’s fees under Rule 54 if the district court extends the

time to appeal under Rule 58.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii).

Therefore, once the district court granted Mahach-Watkins’s

Rule 58(e) motion, the time to file the appeal ran from the

entry of the order disposing of the motion for attorney’s fees.

[2] The district court ruled on Mahach-Watkins’s motion

for attorney’s fees on February 25, 2008. At the same time,

it denied without prejudice her motion for costs, permitting

her to renew the motion after the clerk of the court had taxed

costs. The resolution of the costs motion could have no effect

on the resolution of the attorney’s fees motion. Because the

court’s February 25 ruling entirely disposed of MahachWatkins’s motion for attorney’s fees, the parties had 30 days

from that date to file their notices of appeal. See Fed. R. App.

P. 4(a)(1)(A). Depee timely filed his notice of appeal on

March 25, 2008. 

B. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees

[3] In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988(b). A plaintiff who receives a nominal damage award

for a § 1983 claim is a prevailing party under § 1988. Farrar,

506 U.S. at 112. However, under Farrar, “[i]n a civil rights

suit for damages . . . the awarding of nominal damages [ ]

highlights the plaintiff ’s failure to prove actual, compensable

injury.” Id. at 115. A nominal damages award often “accomplishe[s] little beyond giving petitioners ‘the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their]

rights had been violated’ in some unspecified way.” Id. at 114

(second alteration in original) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482

U.S. 755, 762 (1987)). Therefore, “[w]hen a plaintiff recovers

only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an

essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only

reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115 (internal

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1833

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 9 of 17
citation omitted). We follow the general rule, derived from

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Farrar, that “[i]f a district

court chooses to award fees after a judgment for only nominal

damages, it must point to some way in which the litigation

succeeded, in addition to obtaining a judgment for nominal

damage.” Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir.

1994) (emphasis in original).

[4] There are three factors a district court should consider

in determining whether a plaintiff succeeded in some way

beyond the judgment for nominal damages. First, the court

should consider “[t]he difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought,” which in most nominal damages cases will disfavor an award of fees. Farrar, 506 U.S. at

121 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Second, the court should consider “the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff

claims to have prevailed.” Id. Third, the court should consider

whether the plaintiff “accomplished some public goal.” Id.

We have approved of the consideration of these factors in

nominal damages cases. Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936,

947 (9th Cir. 2005); Benton, 421 F.3d at 905-06. We have

held that “[w]here the district court properly has weighed

[these three] factors, the resulting award [of attorney’s fees]

is not an abuse of its discretion.” Cummings, 402 F.3d at 947.

In awarding attorney’s fees in this case, the district court

wrote a careful order emphasizing the second and third factors. The court wrote that a case resulting in a wrongful death

“involves significant legal issues, serves a public purpose, and

affirms important rights, regardless of the amount of damages

recovered.” It wrote, further, that “the constitutional rights at

stake in a wrongful death case are of a different magnitude

than those at issue in non-death cases, and . . . cases such as

the instant one present questions of vital importance to the

public.” Finally, the court found “that, in addition to obtaining

nominal damages, plaintiff achieved other ‘tangible results’ in

that the jury’s verdict will likely deter defendant Depee from

engaging in future unconstitutional conduct.”

1834 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 10 of 17
We consider the three factors below.

1. Amount of Damages Sought and Recovered

The first factor looks to the difference between the amount

of damages sought and recovered.

In her first amended complaint, Mahach-Watkins did not

specify an amount of damages. Relevant to the § 1983 excessive force claim, she sought only general and punitive damages “in an amount to be determined according to proof at

trial.” At the end of the damages phase trial, the court

instructed the jury on the § 1983 claim that, as a matter of

law, it “must award nominal damages of no more than one

dollar.” The jury returned a verdict of one dollar, the maximum allowed under the instruction. The court also instructed

the jury that it could award punitive damages on the § 1983

claim if it found that Depee’s conduct was “malicious,

oppressive or in reckless disregard” of Watkins’s rights. The

jury declined to award punitive damages.

Mahach-Watkins had argued for a jury instruction that

would have allowed the jury to award compensatory damages

to her son’s estate on the § 1983 excessive force claim for

pain and suffering between the time he was shot and the time

he died. In justifying its instruction allowing only nominal

damages, the district court wrote, “The Ninth Circuit has not

addressed the question of what damages are available under

a Section 1983 wrongful death claim.” In the absence of a

Ninth Circuit holding on the point, the district court concluded that the available damages on the § 1983 excessive

force claim were “those set forth in California’s survival statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34, [which] does not allow

recovery for the decedent’s loss of enjoyment of life, or the

decedent’s pain and suffering.” Mahach-Watkins has not

appealed that ruling. We therefore assume without deciding

that as a matter of law compensatory damages were not available to the estate on the § 1983 excessive force claim.

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1835

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 11 of 17
In Romberg v. Nichols, 48 F.3d 453, 454 (9th Cir. 1995),

plaintiffs had sought $2 million dollars in compensatory and

punitive damages. However, in closing argument to the jury,

plaintiffs requested only “some sum like one dollar.” Id. We

denied attorney’s fees. We wrote, “An attorney cannot avoid

Farrar’s mandate by waiting until the close of trial and then,

when he perceives that his clients have little chance of success, asking for only nominal damages to justify an attorney’s

fee award.” Id. at 455.

The case now before us is not on all fours with Romberg.

In Romberg, the plaintiffs’ problem was that their evidence

did not support their damages claim for $2 million dollars.

Here, by contrast, Mahach-Watkins did not seek a specified

amount of damages. Rather, she sought only an award of

compensatory damages “according to proof at trial.” Further,

and more important, the district court determined that evidence of actual harm was irrelevant to Mahach-Watkins’s

§ 1983 claim, instructing the jury as a matter of law that she

was entitled to nominal rather than compensatory damages. 

We do not read Romberg to hold that in a § 1983 case in

which only nominal damages are available as a matter of law

a verdict awarding such damages is less than a complete success. See, e.g., Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115 (“When a plaintiff

recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to

prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief,

the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” (emphasis

added) (internal citation omitted)). But the case before us is

not one in which it was clear from the outset that only nominal damages would be available as a matter of law. First,

Mahach-Watkins brought several § 1983 claims. She obtained

a verdict on only the excessive force claim. Second, the district court believed that the law in the Ninth Circuit was

unclear as to the availability of compensatory damages to an

estate on a § 1983 excessive force claim resulting in death.

Mahach-Watkins sought to persuade the district court that

compensatory damages were available. She was unsuccessful

1836 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 12 of 17
in that attempt and has not appealed the district court’s

adverse ruling. 

[5] In sum, Mahach-Watkins sought an award of an indeterminate amount of compensatory and punitive damages on her

§ 1983 claims. She obtained a verdict on her § 1983 excessive

force claim and then obtained an award of only nominal damages. As we discuss below, her success in achieving a liability

verdict was significant, independent of any damage award.

But the first factor looks only to the difference between the

damages sought and obtained. In the circumstances of this

case, that factor somewhat disfavors an award of attorney’s

fees.

2. Significance of the Legal Issue on Which MahachWatkins Prevailed

The second factor looks to “the significance of the legal

issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed.” Farrar,

506 U.S. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

We have repeatedly noted the relevance of this second factor. See, e.g., Benton, 421 F.3d at 905; Morales v. City of San

Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Other circuits have

also done so. See, e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199,

206 (4th Cir. 2005) (“This factor is concerned with the general legal importance of the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed.”); Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145 (7th Cir. 1994)

(“[W]e understand the second Farrar factor to address the

legal import of the constitutional claim on which plaintiff prevailed.”); Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 110 (7th Cir.

1993) (“The second factor considers the significance of the

legal issue on which the plaintiffs prevailed. This factor looks

not at the relief obtained but to the extent the plaintiffs succeeded on their theory of liability.”). 

[6] The district court emphasized the importance of the

legal issue in this case, whether state-sanctioned force resultMAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1837

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 13 of 17
ing in death was excessive. The importance of the issue may

be assessed by comparing it to other issues that our sister circuits have held to qualify as important under this factor. See,

e.g., Mercer, 401 F.3d at 206 (right to be free from discrimination in school sponsored contact sports); Piper v. Oliver, 69

F.3d 875, 877 (8th Cir. 1995) (right to be free from illegal

detention); Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 424 (8th Cir.

1994) (right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment).

We have difficulty imagining a more important issue than the

legality of state-sanctioned force resulting in death. It is obviously of supreme importance to anyone who might be subject

to such force. But it is also of great importance to a law

enforcement officer who is placed in a situation where deadly

force may be appropriate. We therefore conclude that the second factor supports the award of attorney’s fees.

3. Public Goal

The third factor looks to whether the plaintiff accomplished

some public goal.

Depee contends that no public goal was accomplished

because his employer, the CHP, investigated the shooting and

concluded that his use of force was legally justified. Depee

relies on our opinion in Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550,

555 (9th Cir. 1994), where we wrote:

If the [§ 1983] lawsuit achieved other tangible

results—such as sparking a change in policy or

establishing a finding of fact with potential collateral

estoppel effects—such results will, in combination

with an enforceable judgment for a nominal sum,

support an award of fees.

In support of Depee’s opposition to an award of attorney’s

fees, the Chief of the CHP’s Northern Division provided a

sworn declaration to the district court. He stated, inter alia:

1838 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 14 of 17
Officer Larry Depee was not disciplined as a

result of the shooting on December 9, 2003 or this

litigation. The CHP investigation determined that

Officer Depee’s use of force was legally justified

and consistent with CHP’s use of force policy. . . .

Whether or not claims of excessive force are filed,

the CHP investigates every shooting incident involving an officer to review policies and practices and to

determine issues of employee misconduct. The CHP

investigated the shooting in this case. It did not alter

or change any of its law enforcement policies and

practices as a result of the investigation or this lawsuit. In its experience, the vast majority of excessive

force complaints are fact-specific claims which, like

the instant litigation, do not result in policy or practice changes.

[7] We are unwilling to conclude that no public goal was

served by Mahach-Watkins’s § 1983 verdict merely because

the CHP disagreed with the jury’s conclusion that its officer

used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment,

and because the CHP has refused either to discipline the officer or to change its policies. The CHP has come to its own

conclusions about the legality of Depee’s use of force. But the

CHP’s exoneration of Depee does not mean that his action

was, in fact, appropriate. Indeed, we are bound to conclude

otherwise, given the unappealed jury verdict that Depee used

unconstitutionally excessive force in killing Watkins. 

[8] It is possible that the CHP will continue, as it has said

it will, to follow its current “policies and practices” concerning the use of force despite the jury’s conclusion that Officer

Depee acted unconstitutionally. However, this does not mean

that Mahach-Watkins’s § 1983 suit, and the jury’s verdict that

Depee used excessive force, accomplished no public goal.

With respect to Depee, the district court wrote: “The Court

. . . finds that, in addition to obtaining nominal damages,

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1839

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 15 of 17
plaintiff achieved other ‘tangible results’ in that the jury’s

verdict will likely deter defendant Depee from engaging in

future unconstitutional conduct.” Further, the verdict had the

deterrent effect we described in Morales, 96 F.3d at 364-65:

“[T]he verdict established a deterrent to . . . others who establish and implement official policies governing arrests of citizens. Thus, it served the public purpose of helping to protect

Morales and persons like him from being subjected to similar

unlawful treatment in the future.” The CHP’s stated choice to

ignore that deterrent does not minimize the importance of the

case to others. We therefore conclude that the third factor

favors the award of attorney’s fees.

4. Summary

[9] The core of Mahach-Watkins’s suit has always been her

contention that Depee acted improperly in killing her son. The

jury agreed with her, holding under § 1983 that Depee used

unconstitutionally excessive force. The jury’s liability verdict

on the § 1983 claim was hardly a hollow victory for a mother

suing for the death of her son. The jury did not give MahachWatkins everything she asked for, but it gave her enough to

entitle her to an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988.

C. Size of the Award

Mahach-Watkins did not file a timely cross appeal. Despite

her failure to cross-appeal, she seeks to argue that the district

court abused its discretion in reducing her attorney’s fees

request. In his appeal, Officer Depee argues only that

Mahach-Watkins is entitled to no attorney’s fees. He makes

no explicit argument, in the alternative, that if she is entitled

to fees the district court’s award is too high.

[10] We generally require a cross-appeal when a party

seeks to enlarge her substantive rights. Doherty v. Wireless

Broad. Sys., 151 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998). Under this

rule, “we have required a cross-appeal when a party seeks to

1840 MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 16 of 17
increase its monetary recovery or decrease its monetary liability.” Lee v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 245 F.3d 1102,

1107 (9th Cir. 2001). “Because the cross-appeal requirement

is a rule of practice and not a jurisdictional bar,” we have

“ ‘broad power to make such dispositions as justice

requires.’ ” Id. (quoting Bryant v. Technical Research Co.,

654 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981)). Because the issues

raised by Mahach-Watkins in challenging the district court’s

reduction of her fee award are interrelated to the issues properly on appeal, we can consider them. Id. at 1107.

[11] We are willing to consider Mahach-Watkins’s argument as to the amount of fees. Because we consider her argument, we construe Officer Depee’s appeal broadly to include

a challenge to the amount of fees. We therefore consider the

district court’s fee award from both directions. The court carefully considered the three factors derived from Farrar and

provided a written order justifying its conclusion that a substantial reduction of the fee request was appropriate in light

of Mahach-Watkins’s limited success. We hold that the district court acted within its discretion in awarding $136,687.35.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

award of attorney’s fees.

AFFIRMED. 

MAHACH-WATKINS v. DEPEE 1841

Case: 08-15694 02/01/2010 ID: 7214397 DktEntry: 37-1 Page: 17 of 17