Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02756/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02756-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gary Donahoe, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Joseph M Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-10-02756-PHX-NVW

CONSOLIDATED WITH: 

Donald T. Stapley, Jr., et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Joseph M Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-00902-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against 

Andrew Thomas (Doc. 1028). After Plaintiff Stapley filed his motion, this Court ordered 

him to brief whether bar discipline proceedings could establish collateral estoppel in a 

subsequent civil action (Doc. 1033). 

 Defendant Thomas was disbarred in part for his participation in investigating and 

prosecuting Stapley. Stapley asserts the disbarment order “conclusively establish[es] that 

Thomas, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, retaliated against [him] for exercising his First 

Amendment rights. The Disbarment Order also establishes Thomas’ liability on 

Supervisor Stapley’s § 1983 and state law claims for wrongful institution of civil 

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proceedings for his pursuit of the RICO Lawsuit.” Doc. 1028 at 2. Stapley argues that 

collateral estoppel precludes Thomas from relitigating the factual issues underlying these 

claims and that summary judgment is warranted. 

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, binds a party to a decision on an issue 

litigated in a previous lawsuit if the following factors are satisfied: (1) the issue was 

actually litigated in the previous proceeding, (2) the parties had a full and fair opportunity 

and motive to litigate the issue, (3) a valid and final decision on the merits was entered, 

(4) resolution of the issue was essential to the decision, and (5) there is common identity 

of the parties.” Campbell v. SZL Properties, Ltd., 204 Ariz. 221, 223, 62 P.3d 966, 968 

(Ct. App. 2003). 

Because Stapley was not a party to Thomas’s disbarment proceeding and cannot 

establish common identity, he relies on the doctrine of nonmutual offensive collateral 

estoppel. Doc. 1132 at 2. 

There is some uncertainty as to whether Arizona law on nonmutual offensive 

collateral estoppel is, in fact, uncertain. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 512 F. 

App’x 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing in dicta that “the law concerning offensive 

collateral estoppel in Arizona is unsettled”); Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 

519 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The anxiety is largely baseless. The great weight of Arizona authority prohibits 

private litigants from using the doctrine to seek affirmative relief. See Standage 

Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 484, 562 P.2d 360, 364 (1977) (“[A] party who is 

not bound by the judgment of an earlier lawsuit cannot take the initiative to invoke the 

judgment of the first suit, [i].e., rely on it offensively, to establish a necessary element of 

his case in a latter suit against one of the parties involved in the first litigation.”); see also 

Clancy, 512 F. App’x at 676 (noting in dicta that Standard Ventures, Inc. is Arizona’s 

“final word on offensive collateral estoppel” and prohibits its use). 

The Arizona Supreme Court has precluded a judge from relitigating findings 

supporting an out-of-state misdemeanor conviction when the Commission on Judicial 

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Conduct subsequently commenced disciplinary proceedings against him. In the Matter of 

Marquardt, 161 Ariz. 206, 213, 778 P.2d 241, 248 (1989). But “[j]udicial disciplinary 

proceedings, like attorney disciplinary proceedings, are neither criminal nor civil, but are 

sui generis,” and the “the goal of judicial discipline is not to punish the judge but to 

protect the public and the judiciary’s integrity.” Id. at 214, 778 P.2d at 249. 

Marquardt did not include a private litigant who relied on earlier findings to 

establish affirmative relief. Further, only one subsequent Arizona appellate decision has 

referenced Marquardt’s application of collateral estoppel. See Picaso v. Tucson Unified 

Sch. Dist., 214 Ariz. 462, 467, 154 P.3d 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2007) (determining that 

Marquardt provided no guidance on whether guilty pleas should be given preclusive 

effect), vacated, 217 Ariz. 178, 171 P.3d 1219 (2007). Indeed, post-Marquardt cases 

analyzing nonmutual collateral estoppel have not interpreted Marquardt to allow private 

litigants to use it offensively. 

To the contrary, the state court of appeals subsequently reaffirmed that Arizona 

does not generally allow nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. See Campbell, 204 

Ariz. at 223, 62 P.3d at 968 (“If the first four elements of collateral estoppel are present, 

Arizona permits defensive, but not offensive use of the doctrine.”). 

Any existing confusion arises from Wetzel v. Arizona State Real Estate Dep’t, 151 

Ariz. 330, 727 P.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1986). There, the court of appeals approved the state 

Department of Real Estate’s offensive use of factual matters established in a previous 

disbarment hearing to revoke Manfred Wetzel’s real estate license. Id. at 332–33, 727 

P.2d at 827–28. The court noted that its decision “depart[ed] from prior case law,” id. at 

333, 727 P.2d at 828, but considered it “appropriate under the circumstances” presented. 

Id. at 334, 727 P.2d at 829; see also id. at 333, 727 P.2d at 828 (“[T]he factual situation 

here calls for approval of the offensive use of the doctrine.”). 

The circumstances in Wetzel, however, involved one public licensing proceeding 

benefiting from the factual findings underlying another, in which both sought to protect 

the public from Wetzel’s dishonesty, cf. id. at 332, 727 P.2d at 827, and in which the 

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“procedural safeguards [were] comparable . . . .” Id. at 334, 727 P.2d at 829. Indeed, 

narrowly read, the court of appeals need not have invoked nonmutual collateral estoppel 

at all, given the commonality of interest between the two state agencies. Wetzel, like 

Marquardt, involved particular circumstances in which there was no risk of windfall to a 

private litigant. 

Thus, to the extent Wetzel endorsed the broader proposition that nonmutual 

offensive collateral estoppel applies generally—rather than specifically between state 

disciplinary agencies—it is dictum that contradicts the weight of Arizona authority. 

Ultimately, there is no factually similar authority for allowing nonmutual 

offensive collateral estoppel where private litigants seek affirmative recovery. Even if 

the Court were to accept the premise that there is no controlling Arizona case law, 

however, weighty policy considerations militate against such an aggressive expansion of 

collateral estoppel. Attorney disciplinary proceedings are intended to protect the public. 

Giving those proceedings preclusive effect in subsequent litigation would significantly 

burden the bar disciplinary process. The state must be free to protect the community 

unencumbered by collateral monetary windfalls for third parties. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment Against Andrew Thomas (Doc. 1028) is denied. 

Dated this 24th day of October, 2013. 

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