Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01676/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01676-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12102 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Disability Definition

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VAN J. ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

PADRES LP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-1676 JLS (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 16)

Presently before the Court is Defendants Padres, L.P., Christina Hall, and Ian 

Graham’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, (“MTD,” ECF No. 16). Also before 

the Court are Plaintiff Van J. Ross’s Response in Opposition to, (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 20),1

and Defendants’ Reply in Support of, (“Reply,” ECF No. 21), Defendants’ Motion. The 

Court vacated the hearing on the motion and took the matter under the submission pursuant 

 

1 Plaintiff filed a letter in lieu of a formal opposition brief. In the letter, Plaintiff, amongst other claims 

and requests, asks the Court to deny Defendant’s MTD. Therefore, the Court will construe the letter as 

Plaintiff’s Opposition brief. However, the Court does not address the other claims and allegations in the 

Opposition because they were not pleaded in the original Complaint. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 

794 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the review for a dismissal for failure to state a claim is “based on the

contents of the complaint”).

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to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 22.) After considering the parties’ arguments and 

the law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. 

BACKGROUND

This case arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Van J. Ross and his former 

employer Padres L.P. On August 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against 

Defendants Padres L.P., Christina Hall, and Ian Graham. (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1.)

2

 

Plaintiff was employed by the Padres for roughly eleven years as a Guest Service 

Representative (“GSR”). (MTD 2; “Compl. Ex.,” ECF No.1-2, at 6, 11.)3 In 2015, Plaintiff 

began using a cane during work. (Compl. Ex. 11.) Plaintiff claims that he was told by his 

supervisor, Christina Hall, to put the cane in his locker. (Id.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that 

Hall did not inform him of Defendant Padres’ policy that he could receive a reasonable 

accommodation to use his cane if he provided a physician’s note. (Id.) Plaintiff worked 

the remainder of the 2015 baseball season without his cane, which caused him pain. (Id.) 

The following season, Plaintiff was informed by another supervisor, Kameron Durham, 

that use of a cane during work was acceptable if an employee received medical 

authorization from a physician. (Id.) On April 15, 2016, the same day Durham informed 

Plaintiff of the policy, Plaintiff provided a medical authorization and was granted an 

accommodation to use his cane during work and to be placed in areas of the ballpark where 

the use of his cane would be safe. (Id.; MTD 2.) Immediately after the meeting in which 

Defendants granted Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff alleges that he was told 

by Hall not to tell other employees how he was able to receive a reasonable 

accommodation. (Compl. Ex. 19.) 

 

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of five pages. However, Plaintiff filed an additional sixty-two pages of 

supporting documentation with the original Complaint. The Court considers the additional exhibits as 

part of the Complaint per Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States v. Ritchie, 

342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that additional documents can be considered a part of the 

complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the 

plaintiff’s claim”).

3 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

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On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff requested a non-medical leave of absence for the 

remainder of the 2016 season, which was granted. (Id.) On November 1, 2016, Plaintiff 

was asked if he intended to resume his employment with the Padres after his leave of 

absence. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff indicated that he did. (Id.) On November 4, 2016, Plaintiff 

testified at an unemployment insurance hearing regarding his physical ability to work, 

where he was granted unemployment insurance. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff claims that he 

collected unemployment for the days that he did not work. (Opp’n 2.) Plaintiff alleges 

that Defendants challenged Plaintiff’s unemployment claims three times by filing three 

documents with the state Employment Development Department (“EDD”). (Compl. Ex.

43.) The EDD ruled in Plaintiff’s favor. (Id.)

4

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ efforts to 

challenge his unemployment were intended to make Plaintiff quit his employment with the 

Padres. (Id.) To that end, Plaintiff’s testimony at the unemployment hearing prompted 

Defendants Ian Graham and Christina Hall to request medical clearance from Plaintiff to 

ensure that he was healthy enough to fulfill his work duties when Plaintiff’s leave of 

absence was over. (Id. at 15.) Defendants informed Plaintiff that the need for medical 

clearance was company policy. (Id.)

5

 Unlike his April 2016 physician’s note, Plaintiff did 

not provide the required clearance. (Id.) On December 14, 2016, Defendants and Director 

of Human Resources, Sara Greenspan, called Plaintiff to determine whether Plaintiff would 

provide the medical clearance. (Id.) During the call, Plaintiff refused to provide a medical 

clearance. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the December 14, 2016 call from Defendants violated the 

dispute resolution provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between 

Defendant and Service Employees International Union-United Services Workers West 

(“SEIU”), where Plaintiff is a union member. (Compl. 2.) Plaintiff claims that the phone 

 

4 The facts do not provide the timeline of Defendants’ challenges to the EDD and if those challenges 

affected, in any way, the ruling on November 4, 2016 that granted Plaintiff unemployment. 

5 The facts are unclear as to when Defendants asked Plaintiff for the medical clearance after the EDD 

hearing and when Plaintiff refused to provide the clearance. 

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call amounted to a “formal hearing,” which he was unaware could result in losing his job. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was neither given prior notice of the “hearing,” nor given an 

opportunity to be represented by a union member as required by the CBA. (Id.) 

Immediately after the phone call, Plaintiff sent a “cease and desist” letter to Defendant Ian 

Graham, in which Plaintiff asked Graham to stop “negative and frivolous activities to cause 

[him] to quit [his] job,” and to stop the “elder abuse.” (Compl. Ex. 42.) Two days later, 

on December 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”) complaint against Defendant, citing employment discrimination. (Compl. 2.) 

On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendants informing him 

that his failure to provide a medical clearance resulted in the termination of his 

employment. (Compl. Ex. 15.) On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed an incident report with 

SEIU outlining his grievance with Defendants. (Id. at 11). On January 20, 2017, Plaintiff 

was issued a medical clearance by his physician, and four days later provided a copy of the 

clearance to Greenspan. (Id. at 21.) Defendants did not offer to rehire him and told Plaintiff 

that it was “too late,” despite the fact Plaintiff provided the note “several months before 

baseball season.” (Opp’n 3.) In May 2017, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a 90-day right to 

sue notice. On July 20, 2017, Plaintiff wrote two letters to SEIU stating that he did not 

receive any union assistance with his grievance and that there was a lack of support by the 

union. (Id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff does not provide the outcome of the grievance that he filed 

with SEIU in January 2017. Based on these events, Plaintiff alleges that the termination 

of his employment violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).6 (Compl. 2.) Plaintiff seeks to return 

to his employment with Defendants. (Compl. Ex. 20.) 

/ / /

 

6 Plaintiff provides additional allegations and claims in a letter titled “Supportive Evidence and Facts.” 

(ECF No. 24.) The Court does not address the allegations in that letter because the additional claims 

against Defendant that were not in the original Complaint and only claims alleged in a complaint are 

allowed under Rule 7. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7; Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Rule 12(b)(6) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the 

defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” 

generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint 

states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and 

a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555 (alteration in original). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ 

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible 

when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to 

say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[F]acts that are 

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to 

relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true 

“legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). This review requires “context-specific” analysis involving the Court’s “judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit 

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the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). The Court will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified 

contention “consistent with the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto 

v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schriber Distrib. 

Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).

A. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions

“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, 

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). 

Particularly in civil rights cases, courts have an obligation to construe the pleadings 

liberally and to afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d

1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 

646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)). However, in giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights 

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In the Ninth Circuit, a court should grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his 

complaint “‘unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Before a complaint is 

dismissed, a court must give the pro se plaintiff some notice of the complaint’s 

deficiencies. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as 

stated in Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–30). However, when amendment of a pro se litigant’s 

complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. James v. Giles, 221 

F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448).

/ / /

/ / /

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ANALYSIS

I. CBA Claim Against Defendants 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s CBA claim because they assert it is a “hybrid 

301 claim” under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and the applicable 

statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s hybrid § 301 claim. (MTD 5.) A hybrid section 301 

claim requires a brief detour into the broader LMRA framework. 

Section 301 of the LMRA applies to claims “founded directly on rights created by

collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims substantially dependent on analysis of a 

collective-bargaining agreement.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1983); 

see Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 857 (1987) (“The 

ordinary § 301 case is a contract claim in which a party to the collective-bargaining 

agreement expressly asserts that a provision of the agreement has been violated.”); see 

generally 29 U.S.C. § 185. Moreover, if the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, the 

claim is preempted by § 301, which overrides any state breach of contract claim and 

subjects the claim exclusively to federal law. See Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 

1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, both parties agree that the CBA applies in some respect. Plaintiff expressly 

asserts that Defendants violated a right created by a provision within the CBA, (see Compl.

2; Compl. Ex. 13),

7 which implicates a § 301 claim. See Hechler, 481 U.S. at 857; see also 

Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff’s claim arises out of 

the CBA. (See MTD 5.) The Court agrees with the parties that the CBA governs Plaintiff’s 

contract dispute with his former employer. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the CBA’s 

dispute resolution provision. Therefore, section 301 of the LMRA preempts Plaintiff’s

claim and federal law applies. 

 

7 Plaintiff provides a portion of the informal dispute resolution provision of the CBA in his complaint, 

(Compl. Ex. 13); however, he does not provide the remainder of the provision. 

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Next, Defendants state that Plaintiff’s claim is a “hybrid 301 claim.” (Id.) “As a 

general rule, members of a collective bargaining unit must first exhaust contractual 

grievance procedures before bringing an action for breach of the collective bargaining 

agreement.” Carr v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 904 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990); see Republic 

Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). “Subject to very limited judicial review, 

[an employee] will be bound by the result according to the finality provisions of the 

agreement.” DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). 

If, however, during the grievance procedure the union representing the employee 

“acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its 

duty of fair representation,” then “an employee may bring suit against both the employer 

and the union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration 

proceeding.” Id. (citing, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)). This is a “hybrid” § 301 

claim. A hybrid § 301 claim arises when an employee raises two causes of actions together: 

(1) a § 301 claim against an employer; and (2) a claim against a union for breach of the 

union’s duty of fair representation. Id. at 165; United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 

56, 66–67 (1981). In other words, an employee that claims a breach of a CBA must (1) 

exhaust the grievance procedure outlined in the CBA, where such procedures are final and 

binding; or (2) if a union member believes the union did not fulfill its duty of 

representation, file a hybrid § 301 claim against either the union, employer, or both. See 

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163–65.

The difficultly in this case is this: Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual matter 

for the Court to evaluate his claim. First, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual 

allegations that he has exhausted his grievance remedies provided by the CBA. The 

following facts are discernable from Plaintiff’s filings. On January 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed 

an incident report with SEIU. (Compl. Ex. 11.) In July 2017, Plaintiff sent letters to SEIU 

stating that he was not being helped or supported in his dispute with Defendants, (id. at 2–

4). Plaintiff provides no other information beyond those two letters. Did Plaintiff exhaust 

his CBA grievance? What was the result? The answers to these questions cannot be 

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answered from Plaintiff’s Complaint and exhibits. Until he exhausts his CBA remedies, 

Plaintiff cannot bring a claim in federal court. See Republic Steel, 379 U.S. at 652–53;

Carr, 904 F.2d at 1317. If the grievance procedure concluded, Plaintiff is bound by the 

result provided by the union.

8 The Ninth Circuit has summarized an employee’s choice in 

such circumstances as follows: 

If an employee pursues a grievance procedure under a collective 

bargaining agreement that the parties intended to be final, and 

receives an adverse determination, he may not challenge that 

determination under section 301 unless he shows that the union 

breached its duty of fair representation or that the procedure was 

otherwise infected. 

Dickeson v. DAW Forest Prods. Co., 827 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Vaca, 386 

U.S. 171; and Huffman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 752 F.2d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir.

1985); and Castaneda v. Dura-Vent Corp., 648 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

Construing Plaintiff’s filings liberally, the Court infers that Plaintiff began the 

grievance procedure, but without additional facts the Court cannot determine the status of 

his grievance.

Second, if Plaintiff’s theory is that his union has acted in a “discriminatory, 

dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion,” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164, such that the 

union has breached its duty of fair representation, then his claim is a hybrid § 301 claim. 

At the outset, it is unclear whether Plaintiff claims that SEIU violated its duty of fair 

representation because of its alleged lack of help or support. However, if Plaintiff claims

that SEIU’s lack of help and support hindered his ability to adjudicate his dispute, or that 

the representation caused an unfair outcome in the grievance procedure, then the claim is 

a hybrid § 301 claim. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164–65. The issue becomes when the 

statute of limitations accrued.

 

8 There is an exception to this rule when a CBA is unenforceable as contrary to public policy. See W.R. 

Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of 

Am., 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983). Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts meeting that narrow exception. 

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A hybrid § 301 claim has a six-month statute of limitations. Id. at 171–72 (holding 

that § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act and its 6-month statute of limitations

applies to hybrid § 301 claims). In DelCostello, the Supreme Court held that the statute of 

limitations began to run upon completion of the grievance procedures because the 

respective employee-plaintiffs were challenging the outcome of those procedures. Id. at 

172. Here, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts describing whether or when an official 

grievance procedure was exhausted or resolved. Plaintiff provides letters expressing his 

frustration with SEIU, but the letters are not indicative of when the cause of action accrued. 

(See Compl. Ex. 2–4.) 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s hybrid § 301 cause of action accrued when the 

phone call occurred on December 14, 2016. (MTD 5.) According to Defendants’ 

calculation, the limitations period ran on June 12, 2017. (Id. at 6.) The Court disagrees 

with Defendant’s calculation. A federal cause of action accrues when a plaintiff is aware 

of the wrong and can successfully bring a cause of action. Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists 

& Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). If Plaintiff 

was injured by the failure of the union to represent him, then his cause of action accrued

when he was aware SEIU breached its duty to him, not when the December 14, 2016 phone 

call occurred. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172; Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 

1509 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Thibodeaux v. Bay Area Bldg. Material Teamsters, No. 17-

CV-00188-MEJ, 2017 WL 1493280, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017) (“Where the dispute 

arises in the grievance procedure context, the claim typically accrues at the conclusion of 

the grievance proceedings; where the claim arises outside of that context, the claim accrues 

when the employee reasonably should have learned of the violation.”). Therefore, the 

Court does not have sufficient information to determine whether the potential hybrid § 301 

claim is time-barred. 

In sum, Plaintiff does not provide adequate facts for the Court to determine whether 

he exhausted the required grievance procedure. If he did not exhaust his grievance 

procedure, he cannot bring a civil action in federal court. If he did exhaust, then Plaintiff 

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is bound by SEIU’s determination as to the outcome. Moreover, the Court is unable to 

ascertain whether Plaintiff asserts a hybrid § 301 claim against SEIU and if he does, 

whether the Complaint is time-barred. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s CBA claim. 

II. Discrimination Claims Against Defendants Christina Hall and Ian Graham

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hall and Graham discriminated against him under 

Title VII and the ADA. (Compl. 2.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA

allegations against Hall and Graham are improper because individual employees cannot be 

held liable under Title VII or the ADA. (MTD 6.) Defendants are correct. Individual 

employees cannot be held liable for Title VII violations. Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 

F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, individual employees cannot be held liable under 

the ADA. Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006). As 

such, any claims against the individual employees for violation of Title VII or the ADA 

are invalid. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims against Hall and Graham for violating Title VII and the ADA. Plaintiff’s Title VII 

and ADA claims against Hall and Graham cannot be cured by amendment, therefore those 

claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

III. Title VII and ADA Claims Against Defendant Padres L.P.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Padres L.P. discriminated against him, violating Title 

VII and the ADA. (Compl. 2). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims

should be dismissed because the allegations are “ambiguous,” and, therefore, they are

unable to decipher Plaintiff’s allegations. (MTD 6–7.)

A. Title VII Violation

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or 

otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There are four elements 

a plaintiff must prove for a prima facie Title VII case: 

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(1) that the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons protected by Title VII; (2) 

that the plaintiff performed his or her job satisfactorily; (3) that the plaintiff 

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the plaintiff’s employer 

treated the plaintiff differently than a similarly situated employee who does 

not belong to the same protected class as the plaintiff.

Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to meet the first element because he does not allege that he

belongsto a class of persons protected by Title VII, i.e., race, color, religion, sex or national 

origin. Instead, he alleges that Defendants discriminated against him based on his medical 

status and age. (See Comp. Ex. 15, 42.) Medical status and age are not protected classes

under Title VII. Thus, Plaintiff fails to assert a valid Title VII claim against Defendants. 

B. ADA Violation

The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against “qualified individuals on 

the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). For a prima facie employment termination 

claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning 

of the ADA; (2) she is a qualified individual such that she can, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, perform the essential functions of her job; and (3) the employer 

terminated her because of her disability. See Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 

1481 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court considers each element in turn.

1. Disability Under the ADA 

The ADA defines “disability,” in relation to an individual, as “(A) a physical or 

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 

individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 

impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C); Walton v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 

1005 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants allowed him to use his cane

during work and they asked him for medical authorization to work with the case, which he

subsequently received from his physician. (See Compl. Ex. 11.) These alleged facts 

plausibly support that his physical impairment limits his ability to work, he has a record of 

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the impairment, and he is regarded as having an impairment. Therefore, Plaintiff plausibly 

states a claim that he classifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA. 

2. Qualified Individual 

To prove that he is a qualified individual with a disability, Plaintiff must show that 

he is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable 

accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999); Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d 1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A

plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that she can perform the essential functions of 

her job with or without reasonable accommodation.”).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege what the essential functions of his job were, or any 

details of what his work duties entailed. However, Defendants claim that as a GSR, 

Plaintiff was responsible for helping guests find their seat in a particular area of the 

ballpark, ensuring smooth flow of traffic, and ensuring a safe environment. (MTD 2.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was able to work while using his cane. (Compl. Ex. 6–7.) Further, 

Plaintiff received a reasonable accommodation from Defendants to use his cane and they

placed him in areas where he could safely use his cane; nothing in the record suggests he 

could not do his job. (Id. at 11; MTD 2.) Moreover, the facts suggest that Defendants 

would have allowed Plaintiff to continue working after his leave of absence as long he 

provided a medical clearance from his physician. (Compl. Ex. 15.) This implies that 

Plaintiff was able to fulfill the essential duties as a GSR, as long as he had a reasonable 

accommodation—his cane. 

Taking all the factual allegations together, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly

established that he could perform the essential functions of his job. Defendants granted 

Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation after Plaintiff provided a medical clearance to 

continue working. Presumably, Defendants would have allowed him to continue working 

had he submitted a renewed medical clearance on time.

/ / /

/ / /

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3. Discriminatory Employment Termination

Plaintiff must prove that his employment was terminated because of his disability. 

See Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481; see also Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 

994 (9th Cir. 2007) (“An employee bears the burden of proving that he was discriminated 

against ‘because of’ a disability.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a))). The ADA outlines

certain actions or inactions that constitute discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)–

(7). 

Here, Plaintiff does not assert that Defendants violated any of the discriminatory

conditions prohibited by the ADA. § 12112(b)(1)–(7). To the contrary, the alleged facts 

suggest that Defendants did not engage in discriminatory behavior under the ADA because 

they granted Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation. See § 12112(b)(5); (Compl. Ex. 11.) 

Additionally, Defendants gave Plaintiff multiple opportunities to submit his medical 

clearance. (Compl. Ex. 15.) Defendants also gave Plaintiff notice of the repercussions of 

not submitting the clearance. (Id.) Yet, Plaintiff refused to submit the clearance. By way 

of comparison, in April 2016, Defendants requested Plaintiff provide medical authorization 

if he wanted to use his cane during work, he did so, and his employment was unaffected 

by his disability.

The facts as pleaded suggest that Plaintiff’s employment termination was a result of 

his failure to provide Defendants with the medical clearance and not due to discriminatory 

animus. Plaintiff does not offer sufficient facts to connect his termination with the 

discriminatory actions prohibited by the ADA. Therefore, Plaintiff does not establish the 

third element required for a prima facie ADA case. 

Although the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Complaint’s 

multiple conclusory statements regarding Title VII and ADA violations as well as the lack 

of plausible factual matter do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims against Padres L.P., 

and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against Padres L.P. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

(ECF No. 16), and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF 

No. 1), except for his Title VII and ADA claims against individuals, which the Court 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE. If Plaintiff wishes to re-allege his claims against 

Defendants that are dismissed without prejudice, Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended 

complaint on or before thirty (30) days from the date which this Order is electronically 

filed. Plaintiff is cautioned that should he choose to file a First Amended Complaint, it 

must be complete by itself, comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that any 

claim, against any and all defendant not re-alleged will be considered waived. See Lacey 

v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (noting that claims 

dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be 

“considered waived if not repled”). Failure to file within the specified time period may 

result in this case being dismissed with prejudice. See Edwards v. Marin Park, 356 F.3d 

1058, 1065 (9th Cir, 2004) (“The failure of the plaintiff eventually to respond to the court’s 

ultimatum—either by amending the complaint or by indicating to the court that it will not 

do so—is properly met with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.”). 

Finally, the Court addresses two requests Plaintiff mentions in his Opposition brief. 

He seeks the appointment of counsel, (Opp’n 1), and to initiate discovery, (id.). The Court 

has already rejected Plaintiff’s previous request for counsel because he did not provide 

sufficient justification that his case constitutes as an exceptional circumstance. (See ECF 

No. 10, at 3.) Here, Plaintiff does not provide any new reasoning that meets the exceptional 

circumstance standard. For the same reasons outlined in the Court’s prior order, the Court 

DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request for counsel. See id. Additionally, 

discovery is improper at this stage in the proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (“A 

party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required 

by Rule 26(f) . . . .”). Plaintiff’s claim has not survived the motion to dismiss stage. 

/ / /

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The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2018

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