Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02947/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02947-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

WILLIAM GORE, et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 16-cv-02947-H-MDD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 23] 

 On December 1, 2016, Petitioner Pedro Rodriguez, a state prisoner, filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his November 10, 

2016 state court conviction. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 8, 2017, Respondent filed a 

motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 23.) On February 23, 2017, Petitioner filed an opposition 

to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 28.) After careful consideration, the Court grants the 

motion to dismiss and dismisses the petition without prejudice. 

Procedural History 

On November 10, 2016, Petitioner Pedro Rodriguez, a state prisoner, was convicted 

by a jury in San Diego County Superior Court of sodomy of a person under the age of 

eighteen in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 286(b)(1); oral copulation of a person under the 

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age of eighteen in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288a(b)(1); burglary in violation of Cal. 

Penal Code § 459; unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of eighteen in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(c); witness intimidation in violation of Cal. Penal 

Code § 136.1(b)(1); communication with a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense 

in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288.3(a); and meeting a minor with the intent to commit 

a sexual offense in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288.4(b). (Doc. No. 1 at 1–2.) The trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to thirteen years and eight months in state prison. (Doc. No. 1 

at 1.) 

 On December 1, 2016, Petitioner filed in federal court a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his November 10, 2016 state court 

conviction. (Doc. Nos. 1 at 1–2, 1-2 at 2–3.) On December 2, 2016, Petitioner filed a 

notice of appeal from his November 10, 2016 state court conviction in the Fourth District 

California Court of Appeal, Division One in case number D071405. (Doc. No. 23-1, Ex. 

A.) The record on appeal was filed on January 26, 2017, and the case is awaiting briefing. 

Id. By the present motion, Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the basis of 

Younger abstention. (Doc. No. 23.) 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards 

 Under traditional principles of comity and federalism, federal courts may not 

interfere with pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1971); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden 

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). These concerns are especially important in the 

habeas context where a state prisoner’s conviction may be reversed on appeal, thereby 

rendering the federal issue moot. Sherwood v. Tompkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 

1983). Absent extraordinary circumstances, abstention under the Younger principle is 

required when: (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing, (2) the state proceedings 

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implicate important state interests, and (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating 

federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding, and (4) the federal court action would 

enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the 

state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves. San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of 

Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 

2008). If Younger abstention applies, a court may not retain jurisdiction but should dismiss 

that action. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977); see H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 

203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When the case is one in which the Younger doctrine 

applies, the case must be dismissed.”). 

 When exceptions or extraordinary circumstances exist, a district court may exercise 

jurisdiction even when the criteria for Younger abstention are met. See Baffert v. 

California Horse Racing Board, 332 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2003). Exceptions to 

abstention under the Younger doctrine include state proceedings conducted in bad faith or 

to harass the litigant, and when the statute at issue flagrantly and patently violates express 

constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph. Id. (citing Younger, 

401 U.S. at 53). 

II. Analysis 

 Here all of the Younger criteria are satisfied. First, at the time Petitioner filed the 

instant Petition, his criminal case was and still is currently pending in state court. (Doc. 

No. 1 at 2.) Thus state judicial proceedings are ongoing. Second, state criminal 

proceedings involve important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 

(1986) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44–45) (“This Court has recognized that the States’ 

interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one 

of the most powerful of the consideration that should influence a court considering 

equitable types of relief.”) Third, Petitioner is not barred from litigating his federal 

constitutional issues in state court. Fourth, the present petition threatens to interfere with 

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the state criminal proceedings in a manner that Younger disapproves by inserting federal 

court oversight into an ongoing state criminal proceeding. 

Abstention is appropriate here because the present petition satisfies all four elements 

of Younger abstention. Further, Petitioner has failed to show that exceptions or 

extraordinary circumstances exist which would require interference.1 Because this is a case 

in which the Younger doctrine applies, the Court must dismiss the petition. See Juidice, 

430 U.S. at 337; see e.g., Espinoza v. Montgomery, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (dismissing petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis of Younger abstention 

where the petitioner’s direct appeal was pending in the state court). Accordingly, the Court 

grants the motion to dismiss, and dismisses the Petitioner’s § 2254 petition for habeas 

corpus without prejudice pursuant to Younger abstention. 2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 27, 2017 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

                                                                

1

 The standard for the bad faith exception to Younger abstention is that the prosecution was brought 

without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction. Baffert, 332 F.3d at 621. Petitioner cannot meet 

that standard. Furthermore, the Court notes that a claimed constitutional violation “does not, by itself, constitute 

an exception to the application of Younger abstention.” Id. 

2

 Additionally, a federal court shall not grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to a state court judgment unless “the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement in two ways: 

(1) by providing the highest state court with an opportunity to rule on the merits of the claim, or (2) by showing that 

at the time the petitioner files the habeas petition in federal court no state remedies are available to the petitioner. 

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In habeas corpus cases, “federal courts 

may consider sua sponte whether the defendant has exhausted state remedies.” Stone v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987)). 

Petitioner has not exhausted the remedies available to him in the state courts. Petitioner’s direct appeal is 

currently pending in state court. Petitioner has not provided the highest state court with an opportunity to rule on 

the merits of the claim nor has he shown that there are no state remedies available to him at this time. Accordingly, 

the petition is also dismissed for failure to exhaust. 

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