Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00589/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00589-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT BAKER, )

) 2:05-cv-589-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., )

)

Defendants, )

)

v. )

)

NARCISO MORALES, )

)

Cross-Defendant. )

)

Plaintiff moves to strike the testimony of experts that

Defendants characterize as non-retained. Defendants Delwin Brown,

Linda Bridges, Daniel Torres, and Robert Dutra (collectively referred

to as “Moving Defendants”) move for summary judgment on all claims

asserted against them. In addition, Defendants Roderick Hickman,

Walter Allen, and Tim Mahoney (collectively referred to as “Supervisor

Defendants”) move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against

them. These motions were argued on December 11, 2006.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Narciso Morales were wards

at the N.A. Chaderjian facility (“Chad”) of the California Youth

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Authority (“CYA”). They were asked to sign a Staff and Offender

Interaction Contract (“Contract”) as a prerequisite for integrating

into normal programs at Chad. (Supervisor Defs.’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“Sup. Defs.’ SUF”) ¶¶ 1, 4.) The Contract sought

assurances from wards that “they would refrain from engaging in

violent behavior [so] they could be integrated with other wards who

may be of different ethnicity or gang affiliation.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Both

refused to sign the Contract and were brought to the Senior Youth

Correctional Counselor’s office (“SYCC Office”) in Pajaro Hall to

discuss the Contract. (Moving Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(“Mov. Defs.’ SUF”) ¶ 3.) While in the SYCC Office an altercation

began between Defendant Brown and Morales. (Id. ¶ 6.) At the same

time an altercation began between Defendant Marcel Berry and

Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 7.) Both the Brown-Morales and the Berry-Plaintiff

altercations eventually moved outside of the SYCC Office where the

altercations were captured on a security video. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

At the time of Plaintiff’s altercation with Berry, Defendant

Mahoney was the Assistant Superintendent at Chad, Defendant Allen was

the Director for the Department of Youth Authority, and Defendant

Hickman was the Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency. 

(Sup. Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 9, 16, 19.) Mahoney heard about the altercation

over the radio transmission and responded to the scene to assess the

situation. (Id. ¶ 10.) Mahoney reported the event to Mark Gant,

Chief of the Internal Affairs Division for the Youth Authority. (Id.

¶ 15.) Mr. Gant informed Allen about the altercation. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

The incident was then reported to Hickman. (Id. ¶ 20.) 

Defendants Brown and Bridges, Senior Youth Correctional

Counselors (“SYCCs”), and Defendants Dutra and Torres, Youth

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Correctional Counselors, were all on duty at the time of the

altercations. (Mov. Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 2, 14, 21, 31.) Prior to the

altercations, Brown was seated at his desk in the SYCC Office where

Plaintiff and Morales were present to discuss the Contract. (Pl.’s

RMSUF ¶¶ 3-4.) Bridges was on duty in another hall at Chad overseeing

wards when she heard the unit alarm indicating an emergency in Pajaro

Hall. (Id. ¶ 21.) Bridges responded to the alarm and upon entry into

Pajaro Hall she saw Brown engaged in an altercation with Morales and

saw Berry standing above Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 26.) Dutra arrived

on the scene after Bridges, following which he witnessed the BrownMorales altercation. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.) Torres was in the control

tower above the SYCC Office at the time of the altercations. (Id. ¶

14.) Torres witnessed both the Brown-Morales and the Berry-Plaintiff

altercations once they moved outside the SYCC Office. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Strike

Plaintiff moves “for an order . . . strik[ing] the testimony

of [D]efendants’ . . . ‘non-retained’ experts (specifically Bob

Gallano, Donald Nickerson and ‘One or more medical personnel’).” 

(Mot. to Strike at 2.) Defendants’ opposition notes, however, that

“none of the designated non-retained experts has as yet testified” and

suggests that the “designated non-retained experts” may not ultimately

be called to testify at trial. (Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 1 n.1, 3.) 

Since it is unclear at this time whether any of these characterized

non-retained experts will be designated in a pretrial statement,

Plaintiff’s motion to strike their testimony is not yet ripe for

judicial determination and is therefore denied without prejudice.

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II. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standard

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d

1059, 1065 n.4 (9th Cir. 2006). 

[W]hen the non-moving party bears the burden of

proving the claim or defense, the moving party can

meet its burden by pointing out the absence of

evidence from the non-moving party. The moving

party need not disprove the other party’s case. 

Thus, summary judgment for a defendant is

appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to his case, and on which he

will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “To defeat summary

judgment the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its

own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. If the non-moving party fails to

make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185

(9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

 B. Supervisor Defendants

i. Statutory Immunity

Supervisor Defendants assert they are immune from all

liability in this lawsuit under California Government Code section

820.8. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 14.) This section states “a public

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28 1 Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify whether this claim is

under federal or state law, so both will be considered.

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employee is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of

another person.” Plaintiff rejoins since all claims are asserted

against the Supervisor Defendants on a direct theory of liability,

this section is inapplicable. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 13.) Since

Plaintiff’s claims assert direct liability against Supervisor

Defendants, their argument is unavailing.

ii. Undisputed Claims Against Hickman and Allen

Supervisor Defendants Hickman and Allen seek summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of fraud by concealment, conspiracy,

coercion under California Civil Code section 52.1, and failure to

summon medical care under California Government Code section 845.6. 

These Defendants argue Plaintiff has no evidence from which it could

be reasonably inferred that they could be liable for these claims. 

(Sup. Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Sup. Defs.’ Mot.”) at 8, 9,

12-14). Plaintiff’s opposition brief does not respond to these

contentions. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Sup. Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J.

“Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n” at 9-12.) Therefore, this portion of Hickman and

Allen’s motion is granted.

iii. Negligent Supervision and Training1

a. Supervision

Supervisor Defendants also seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claims, arguing there is no evidence

that they “had any knowledge of any alleged pattern of abuse of

wards.” (Sup.’ Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff rejoins that these

Defendants negligently supervised the employees at Chad “because they

failed to take any measures to correct the ‘culture of violence’ and

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the ‘code of silence’ which showed a callous disregard for others.” 

(Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 8.) 

A supervisor is liable under federal law “for his own

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control

of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional

deprivations of which the complaint is made; or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)

(internal quotations omitted). A supervisor is liable under

California law only if he has knowledge that the individual allegedly

not supervised properly “was a person who could not be trusted to act

properly without being supervised.” Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33

Cal. App. 3d 654, 664 (1973). 

Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence that Mahoney knew or

should have known of the alleged “code of silence” or “culture of

violence” prior to Plaintiff’s altercation with Berry. Nor has

Plaintiff presented evidence that Mahoney had knowledge that any of

the individuals involved in Plaintiff’s allegations could not be

trusted to act properly. Therefore, Mahoney is granted summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim under both federal

and California law.

 Plaintiff also fails to provide evidence that Allen knew or

should have known about the “code of silence” or “culture of violence”

allegedly existing at Chad. Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence that

Allen knew or should have known the individuals involved in the

present incident could not be trusted to act properly. Therefore,

Allen is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligent supervision

claim under both federal and California law.

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Plaintiff presents evidence that Hickman had knowledge that

a “culture of violence” and a “code of silence” existed at CYA

facilities, from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that

Hickman knew that individuals working at CYA facilities needed closer

supervision. (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts (“Pl.’s SDF”) ¶ 42.) 

Hickman presents uncontroverted evidence that he was appointed

Secretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency two months before

the Berry-Plaintiff altercation. (Sup. Defs.’ SUF ¶ 19.) Hickman

argues since he was hired merely two months before the incident, he

had insufficient time to implement changes in policy. (Sup. Defs.’

Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff rejoins that Hickman’s failure to take any

action to eliminate the “code of silence” and “culture of violence” at

CYA facilities makes him liable for the incident. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n

at 8.) 

Whether Hickman held his position as Secretary long enough

to initiate changes at CYA facilities presents a disputed issue of

material fact. That disputed factual issue defeats Hickman’s motion

under state law. However, Hickman argues that his qualified immunity

defense shields him from liability for Plaintiff’s federal claim that

he should have instituted systemic changes at CYA facilities in the

two months he held office. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 11.) The qualified

immunity analysis “turn[s] on whether [Hickman] violated [Plaintiff’s]

clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a

reasonable person would have known” in Hickman’s situation. Jensen v.

Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2000). A reasonable person

in Hickman’s situation would not have known that he was required to

institute systemic changes within two months of assuming the Secretary

position at CYA. Therefore, Hickman is entitled to qualified immunity

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and is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal negligent

supervision claim. 

b. Training

Supervisor Defendants argue they are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to train claims since staff at Chad is

“constantly attending training on all topics, including use of force.” 

(Sup.’ Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) Plaintiff counters that “Defendants are

liable for negligent training because they failed to provide selfdefense training to staff.” (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 7.) 

“A cause of action for negligent training requires a showing

that [Defendants] negligently trained [an individual] and as a result

of such negligent instruction [that individual] caused injury or

damage to another.” State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Keenan, 171

Cal. App. 3d 1, 23 (1985). Supervisors are liable under federal law

“for [their] own culpable action or inaction in the training [of]

subordinates; for [their] acquiescence in the constitutional

deprivations of which the complaint is made; or for conduct that

showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 

Larez, 946 F.2d at 646 (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff submits evidence that no self-defense training was

offered to Chad employees, but presents no evidence that either

Mahoney or Hickman had a duty to implement self-defense training. 

Therefore, Mahoney and Hickman’s motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claims that they failed to provide training under both

federal and California law is granted.

Plaintiff presents evidence that Allen, as the Director of

CYA, was “responsible for any and all training.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Sup.

Defs.’ SUF (“Pl.’s RSSUF”) ¶ 21.) Allen had been appointed to the

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Director position one month prior to the altercation. (Sup. Defs.’

SUF ¶ 16.) Allen argues he had insufficient time in that position to

implement changes in CYA policy. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) Whether

Allen held this position long enough to implement changes is a factual

dispute. That factual dispute defeats his motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s negligent training claim under California law. 

However, Allen asserts he is shielded from liability on Plaintiff’s

federal negligent training claim based on qualified immunity. (Sup.

Defs.’ Mot. at 11.)

A reasonable person in Allen’s situation would not have

known that he was required to address the “code of silence” and

“culture of violence” within one month of assuming the Director

position at CYA. Therefore, Allen is entitled to qualified immunity

and is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal negligent

training claim.

iv. Fraud by Concealment

Mahoney seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fraud claim

arguing there is no evidence he attempted to conceal any of the events

associated with the Berry-Plaintiff altercation. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot.

at 8.) Plaintiff rejoins that Mahoney knowingly gave the District

Attorney false information while concealing exculpatory evidence

regarding the Berry-Plaintiff altercation which resulted in Plaintiff

being charged with a crime and held at the county jail. (Pl.’s Sup.

Opp’n at 9.)

Fraud by concealment requires “1) suppression of a material

fact; 2) by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information

of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication

of that fact; 3) with intent to deceive a person unaware of the

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concealed fact and who would not have acted had he known of the fact.” 

Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709, 1710). Plaintiff argues that by

concealing the security videotape of the altercation from the District

attorney, Mahoney’s actions satisfy the elements of fraud under

California law. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 9.) But as Plaintiff’s counsel

conceded at oral argument, Plaintiff has provided no supporting

authority for this novel fraud claim by a Plaintiff who was not the

subject of the alleged fraud. Since Plaintiff has neither presented

evidence Mahoney concealed information from Plaintiff, nor shown that

Plaintiff’s fraud theory of liability based on concealment of a

material fact from a third party is viable under California law,

Mahoney’s motion on this claim is granted.

v. Conspiracy

Mahoney also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim, arguing there is no evidence he was involved in an

agreement to violate Plaintiff’s rights. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) 

Plaintiff counters that Mahoney and Brown conspired to force Plaintiff

to sign the Contract and the assault was a direct result of this

conspiracy. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 10.) Plaintiff further contends the

“code of silence” at CYA facilities is evidence of a conspiracy to

cover up all incidents of excessive force. (Id. at 11.) 

The essentials to the existence of a conspiracy

are defined as follows: concert of action between

the conspirators to accomplish the purpose of the

conspiracy, the taking of illegal actions in

furtherance of a common scheme or design to

achieve the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy,

and knowledge on the part of the alleged

conspirators of the conspiracy and its unlawful

purpose. 

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Holder v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Los Angeles, 267 Cal. App. 2d 91,

108 (1968). “[A] conspiracy may be inferred from circumstances, and

. . . need not be the result of an express agreement but may rest upon

tacit assent and acquiescence.” Id. However, “bare legal conclusions

. . . [i]nferences, generalities, [and] presumptions, are

insufficient.” 117 Sales Corp. v. Olsen, 80 Cal. App. 3d 645, 650

(1978). 

a. Conspiracy to Commit Assault & Battery

Mahoney argues Plaintiff presents no evidence from which a

reasonable inference could be drawn that an agreement existed between

Mahoney and Brown prior to the incident either to force Plaintiff to

sign the Contract or to assault Plaintiff. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) 

Plaintiff rejoins that Mahoney “took affirmative action by conspiring

to have [Plaintiff] sign a ‘gang’ contract against his will.” (Pl.’s

Sup. Opp’n at 11.) However, Plaintiff neither presents evidence

Mahoney entered into an agreement with Brown nor that Mahoney had

knowledge Plaintiff would be assaulted before it happened. Therefore,

Mahoney’s motion on Plaintiff’s conspiracy to commit an assault and

battery claim is granted.

b. Conspiracy to Cover up

Mahoney argues he is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s conspiracy to cover up claim because he reported the

incident to the appropriate person within the chain of command at the

CYA. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) Plaintiff rejoins Mahoney is liable

because he “supplied misleading information to the D.A. to punish

[Plaintiff].” (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 11.) It is undisputed that

Mahoney ordered the videotape of the incident not be shown without his

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2 Although the Supervisor Defendants deny this fact in their

response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts, (Sup. Defs.’ Resp.

to Pl.’s SDF ¶ 50), Defendants’ counsel conceded this fact at oral

argument.

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consent. (Pl.’s SDF ¶ 50.)2 The inference could be drawn that a

tacit agreement existed to cover up the incident. Therefore,

Mahoney’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s cover-up

conspiracy claim is denied.

vi. Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Constitutional and 

Civil Rights Violations

Supervisor Defendants move for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) for

violations of his constitutional and civil rights asserting Plaintiff

has presented no evidence that they violated his rights. (Sup. Defs.’

Mot. at 9-10.) Plaintiff does not specify in his opposition brief

which constitutional rights Supervisor Defendants allegedly violated. 

However, at oral argument Plaintiff specified that Supervisor

Defendants allegedly violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

a. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff’s counsel explained at the hearing that

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim for an alleged Fourth Amendment

violation is based on a custom and practice of excessive force and the

“code of silence” at CYA facilities. Supervisor Defendants seek

summary judgment on this claim, arguing they did not personally

participate in the altercation, were not present at the scene when it

occurred, and did not condone the alleged “code of silence.” (Sup.

Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 10, 17, 20.) Plaintiff counters that Defendants are

liable for Berry’s alleged use of excessive force because of their

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acquiescence in a “culture of violence” and “code of silence” existing

at Chad. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 11.) Essentially, Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim alleges that Berry used excessive force in assaulting

and battering Plaintiff, and that each Supervisor Defendant is liable

for that excessive force since they failed to eradicate the “culture

of violence” and “code of silence” at Chad. 

 “[A] supervisor is liable for the constitutional violations

of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Since nothing in the record indicates that either Mahoney or

Allen participated in or directed Berry’s use of excessive force or

that they were aware of the “culture of violence” or “code of silence”

prior to the Berry-Plaintiff altercation, Mahoney and Allen’s motion

for summary judgment is granted.

It is undisputed that part of Hickman’s job was to establish

policy at Chad. (Sup. Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SDF ¶ 46.) Hickman, who

was appointed to his position two months before the altercation,

presents no evidence that he took steps to address the “culture of

violence” or “code of silence” prior to the altercation. Therefore,

there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hickman

could be liable under Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim. 

But Hickman argues he is qualifiedly immune from exposure to liability

on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot.

at 12.) Plaintiff counters since the “law was clearly established

that the use of excessive force violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment,”

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Hickman is not entitled to qualified immunity. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at

12.) 

“[T]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether 

[Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment] right [was] clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that [Hickman’s]

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Walker v.

Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). The record does not indicate that Hickman

should have known his alleged failure to combat the “culture of

violence” and “code of silence,” alleged to be the basis of the

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right, within two months

after he assumed office was unlawful. Therefore, Hickman is entitled

to qualified immunity and is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim.

b. Eighth Amendment Claim

Supervisor Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

section 1983 claim fails because there is no causal connection between

Plaintiff’s alleged harm stemming from the filing of false criminal

charges against him and the Supervisor Defendants’ actions. (Sup.

Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff’s counsel specified at oral argument

that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on the allegation

Mahoney falsely pressed charges against Plaintiff because of

Plaintiff’s failure to sign the Contract. Further, Plaintiff’s

counsel stated the harm Plaintiff suffered was that Plaintiff was

incarcerated at the county jail for 13 days and was required to pay a

$25 fee to the court when the charges against him were filed. 

Defendants responded that Plaintiff has no evidence he paid a $25 fee

and Plaintiff was transferred to the county jail for his own safety. 

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Plaintiff also argue that the Supervisor Defendants are liable because

they “were deliberately indifferent to [his] rights . . . by failing

to remedy the known custom and practice of . . . cover ups.” (Pl.’s

Sup. Opp’n at 12.) 

Plaintiff submits no evidence that he was transferred to the

county jail or paid a $25 fee as a result of the false reports being

filed. In addition, each of the Supervisor Defendants held their

position no longer than four months before the Berry-Plaintiff

altercation occurred. (Sup. Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 9, 16, 19.) Therefore,

whether these Defendants could have remedied the alleged “code of

silence” within that time period is a disputed factual issue. But the

Supervisor Defendants assert they are qualifiedly immune from

liability on this claim because it was not clearly established that

their actions surrounding the Berry-Plaintiff altercation violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 11-12.) 

Plaintiff has not shown that Supervisor Defendants should

have known the alleged failure to combat the “code of silence” within

the time period after each of them assumed office was unlawful. 

Therefore, the Supervisor Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity and are granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment section 1983 claim. 

c. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument that there was

no precedent supporting his Fourteenth Amendment section 1983 claim

which is based on Supervisor Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiff

with an attorney who would have counseled Plaintiff as to whether he

should sign the Contract. Therefore, Supervisor Defendants’ motion

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for summary judgment is granted on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

section 1983 claim.

vii. California Civil Code Section 52.1

Supervisor Defendants assert they are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s California Civil Code section 52.1 (“section

52.1”) claim because there was no policy or practice of coercing wards

into signing the Contract. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 12.) Plaintiff

rejoins Mahoney is not entitled to summary judgment because he

required all wards to sign the Contract. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 12.) 

Section 52.1 proscribes “interfere[nce] by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats,

intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any

individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of this state.” 

Mahoney admits that “wards who refused to come out and meet

with staff and sign the contract remained on lockdown status.” (Pl.’s

RSSUF ¶ 1.) Whether this policy amounted to interference with

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by coercion is a question of fact

that cannot be determined on a motion for summary judgment. 

Therefore, Mahoney’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

section 52.1 claim is denied.

viii. Negligence Per Se

Supervisor Defendants also seek summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim. (Sup. Defs.’ Mot. at 13.) 

Plaintiff does not respond. This claim is based on alleged violations

of California Code of Regulations title 15, division 4, sections 4039

and 4040. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-39.) Section 4040 has been repealed. 

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Section 4039 states an “employee shall not use physical force in any

form as a disciplinary technique to direct or control a ward, except

to restrain him.” Plaintiff submits no evidence that Supervisor

Defendants used physical force against Plaintiff on the day of the

incident. Therefore, Supervisor Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is granted.

ix. California Government Code Section 845.6

Mahoney seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under

California Government Code section 845.6 (“section 845.6"), contending

there was nothing to indicate that he needed to personally summon

immediate medical care to the scene of the incident. (Sup. Defs.’

Mot. at 13-14.) Plaintiff responds Mahoney is liable because he saw a

cloud of mace when he approached the scene and failed to summon

medical care. (Pl.’s Sup. Opp’n at 13.) 

Section 845.6 states: 

[A] public employee is liable for injury

proximately caused by the failure of the employee

to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner

in his custody . . . if the employee knows or has

reason to know that the prisoner is in need of

immediate medical care and he fails to take

reasonable action to summon such medical care.

Nothing in this section indicates what level of medical care should be

provided.

Plaintiff concedes it is the duty of medical technician

assistants (“MTAs”) to provide medical care for wards at CYA

facilities. (Pl.’s Resp. to Mov. Defs.’ SUF (“Pl.’s RMSUF”) ¶ 39.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel also conceded at oral argument that an MTA was

within 10 feet of Plaintiff at the scene of the incident. Plaintiff

argued this was not sufficient to relieve Mahoney of liability because

the MTA did not treat Plaintiff in a satisfactory manner. However,

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statutory liability is based not on the quality of medical care

provided, but on summoning medical care when it is needed. Since

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Mahoney had reason to know

additional medical care needed to be summoned, Mahoney’s motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s section 845.6 claim is granted.

C. Moving Defendants

i. Assault & Battery

Moving Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

assault and battery claim, arguing they cannot be liable because none

of them touched Plaintiff or caused Plaintiff to be touched, and there

is no evidence showing they intended to cause Plaintiff harm or

threatened physical contact with Plaintiff. (Moving Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Mov. Defs.’ Mot.”) at 9.) Plaintiff rejoins Moving

Defendants are liable for assault and battery because they were

involved in a conspiracy with Berry who committed the assault and

battery. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Moving Defs.’ Mot. (“Pl.’s Mov. Opp’n”) at

7.) Moving Defendants also contend Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails

because they did not know about the assault before it happened. (Mov.

Defs.’ Mot. at 11-12.) 

To prove a civil conspiracy Plaintiff must show:

[T]hat each member of the conspiracy acted in

concert and came to a mutual understanding to

accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that

one or more of them committed an overt act to

further it. It is not enough that the conspiring

officers knew of an intended wrongful act, they

must agree-expressly or tacitly-to achieve it.

Unless there is such a meeting of the minds, the

independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not

amount to a conspiracy. 

Choate v. County of Orange, 86 Cal. App. 4th 312, 333 (2001) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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Plaintiff concedes Moving Defendants had no advance notice

of the incident, and has produced no evidence from which a reasonable

inference could be drawn that the Moving Defendants agreed - expressly

or tacitly - to assault or batter Plaintiff. (Pl.’s RMSUF ¶ 10.) 

Since Plaintiff has neither shown that Moving Defendants engaged

directly in committing an assault or battery against him, nor that

Moving Defendants were involved in a conspiracy to commit assault and

battery, Moving Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on

Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim and conspiracy to commit an

assault and battery claim.

ii. Negligent Supervision, Hiring, Training

Moving Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

negligent supervision, hiring, and training claim, arguing it is

applicable only to employers, and since none of the Moving Defendants

are employers they are not subject to liability for this claim. (Mov.

Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff rejoins that both Brown and Bridges

have supervisory duties because they are both SYCCs and therefore, had

a duty to intervene in the altercation between Berry and Plaintiff. 

(Pl.’s Mov. Opp’n at 8.) 

Supervisors possessing supervisory duties can be liable

under a theory of negligent supervision even when they are not

employers “if injury is inflicted upon [P]laintiff as a result of a

breach of the supervisor’s duty to train, supervise, or control the

actions of subordinates.” Hahn v. McLey, 737 F.2d 771, 773 (8th

Cir. 1984). SYCCs have supervisory duties. (Pl.’s RMSUF ¶ 1.) Both

Brown and Bridges were present during at least part of Plaintiff’s

altercation with Berry. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.) Whether Brown and Bridges, as

supervisors, could have intervened in the altercation to prevent

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Plaintiff’s injuries is a question of fact that cannot be decided on a

motion for summary judgment. Since Brown and Bridges had supervisory

duties, their motion is denied. Plaintiff presents no evidence that

Dutra or Torres had supervisory duties; therefore, their motion is

granted. 

iii. Fraud by Concealment

Moving Defendants contend Plaintiff’s fraud claim fails

because no fraud was perpetrated against Plaintiff. (Mov. Defs.’ Mot.

at 11.) Plaintiff rejoins he has satisfied the elements of fraud by

showing that false reports were given to the District Attorney, while

the exculpatory videotape was withheld. (Pl.’s Mov. Opp’n at 9.) But

since Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Moving Defendants

concealed information from Plaintiff, and he fails to support his

argument that concealment of a material fact from a third party -

here, the District Attorney - constitutes a viable fraud claim under

California law, Moving Defendants’ motion is granted.

iv. Conspiracy to Cover Up

Moving Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim

that they engaged in a conspiracy to cover up the incident. (Mov.

Defs.’ Mot. at 11-12.) Moving Defendants assert there is no evidence

of a common plan or design to cover up the incident, and that

Plaintiff suffered no harm as a result of the false reports that were

filed. (Mov. Defs.’ Mot. at 12.) Plaintiff rejoins that the

falsification of the reports supports the inference of a conspiracy

and therefore, Moving Defendants are liable for Berry’s use of force

against Plaintiff. (Pl.’s Mov. Opp’n at 7-8.)

Based on the false reports filed by each of the Moving

Defendants a reasonable inference could be drawn that there was a

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tacit agreement to protect one another. Therefore, Moving Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of a conspiracy to

cover up is denied.

v. Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Constitutional and

Civil Rights Violations

Moving Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

section 1983 claim for violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s counsel specified at oral

argument that all of these claims asserted against the Moving

Defendants are based on the alleged conspiracy to cover up by filing

false reports with the District Attorney. Since the record lacks

evidence showing a causal connection between Plaintiff’s alleged harm

and the false reports, Moving Defendants’ motion is granted on

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim alleging these constitutional

violations.

vi. California Civil Code Section 52.1

Moving Defendants seek summary judgment of Plaintiff’s claim

under section 52.1, arguing that this claim must fail because there is

no evidence Moving Defendants threatened or committed violent acts

against Plaintiff. (Mov. Defs.’ Mot. at 14.) Plaintiff counters that

Brown attempted to coerce and intimidate Plaintiff into signing the

Contract. (Pl.’s Mov. Opp’ n at 13.) 

Plaintiff presents evidence Brown told Plaintiff “You will

sign the contract. You have to sign the contract.” (Pl.’s RMSUF ¶

2.) Whether this amounted to interference with Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights by coercion or intimidation is a question of

fact that cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment. 

Therefore, Brown’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s section

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52.1 claim is denied. Plaintiff presents no evidence that Bridges,

Dutra, or Torres coerced or intimidated him. Therefore, the motion of

Bridges, Dutra, and Torres is granted.

vii. Negligence Per Se

Moving Defendants contend Plaintiff’s negligence per se

claim based on California Code of Regulations title 15, division 4,

section 4039 fails because there is no evidence they used force

against Plaintiff. (Mov. Defs.’ Mot. at 15.) Plaintiff does not

respond to this argument. It is undisputed that the Moving Defendants

did not have any physical contact with Plaintiff on the day of the

incident. (RMSUF ¶¶ 9, 11, 19, 30, 36.) Therefore, Moving

Defendants’ motion is granted.

viii. California Government Code Section 845.6

Moving Defendants assert that they are not liable under

California Government Code section 845.6 because Plaintiff was treated

by an MTA at the scene. (Mov. Defs.’ Mot. at 16.) Plaintiff contends

Moving Defendants were aware Plaintiff needed medical care and did not

summon medical care. (Pl.’s Mov. Opp’n at 12.) Plaintiff conceded at

oral argument that it is the duty of an MTA to provide medical care

for wards and that an MTA was within 10 feet of him at the scene of

the incident. Since Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Moving

Defendants had reason to know additional medical care needed to be

summoned, Moving Defendants’ motion is granted.

ix. California Civil Code Section 51.7

Moving Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

claim under California Civil Code section 51.7. This section

proscribes violence and threats of violence based on “political

affiliation, or on account of [sex, race, color, religion, ancestry,

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national origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or

sexual orientation].” Moving Defendants argue this claim fails since

Plaintiff has not shown that he has any of the protected

characteristics. (Mov. Defs.’ Mot. at 17.) Plaintiff does not

respond to this argument. Since Plaintiff has shown neither that he

has any of the protected characteristics, nor that the altercation was

motivated because Moving Defendants perceived him as having any of

these characteristics, Moving Defendants’ motion is granted.

CONCLUSION

Since Plaintiff has not shown that his motion to strike

expert witness testimony is ripe for decision, this motion is denied.

The Supervisor Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

granted except on Plaintiff’s claims of: (1) negligent supervision

under California law asserted against Hickman, (2) negligent training

under California law asserted against Allen, (3) conspiracy to cover

up asserted against Mahoney, and (4) coercion under section 52.1

asserted against Mahoney. Moving Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is granted except on Plaintiff’s claims of: (1) negligent

supervision asserted against Bridges and Brown, (2) coercion under

section 52.1 asserted against Brown, and (3) conspiracy to cover up

claim asserted against each of the Moving Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 12, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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