Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-04696/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-04696-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 This disposition is not designated for publication in the official reports. 1

 The Court concludes that the application for TRO is appropriate for disposition without 2

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

Case No. C 09-4696 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

**E-Filed 3/22/2010**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOSE R. CARNERO, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 09-4696 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 1

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

AND DENYING APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER

[re: document nos. 14, 19]

Defendant Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (“Real Time”) moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs Jose and Marta

Carnero (“the Carneros”) seek a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) precluding Defendants

from going forward with a foreclosure sale of their home. The Court has considered the moving

and responding papers as well as the oral argument presented at the hearing on the motion to

dismiss on March 5, 2010. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to dismiss will be 2

Case 5:09-cv-04696-JF Document 21 Filed 03/22/10 Page 1 of 5
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Case No. C 09-4696 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

granted with leave to amend, and the application for TRO will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The Carneros, a married couple, filed their pro se complaint on October 1, 2009, alleging

twenty-two claims for relief arising out of the refinancing of their home located at 1558

Minnesota Avenue, San Jose, California. Although the complaint is forty-two pages in length

with an additional fifty-six pages of exhibits, it fails to explain clearly the sequence of events

giving rise to the instant lawsuit. The Carneros appear to be alleging that they purchased their

home in 2005, Complt. ¶ 32; that they subsequently refinanced their original mortgage loan, id. ¶

34; that non-party Bear Stearns was the lender on the refinancing transaction, id.; and that the

new loan was serviced by Defendant EMC Mortgage Group (“EMC”), id. ¶ 36. While the

allegations regarding the actual closing date of the refinancing transaction are unclear, the most

likely date appears to be November 22, 2008. Id. ¶ 42. The refinancing transaction allegedly

violated the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”). Id. Defendant Randy Miguel apparently was

involved in the refinancing transaction. Id. ¶¶ 4, 35. Defendant Chase Bank somehow is

involved. Id. ¶ 1. Defendant Real Time apparently is servicing the loan. Id. at ¶ 23. The

Carneros “demand to void the contract, that is, the plaintiffs terminate the contract with

Defendants and owe nothing.” Id. ¶ 50.

The Carneros unsuccessfully sought a TRO in October 2009. It is unclear from the record

whether the foreclosure sale has occurred or whether the Carneros remain in possession of the

property.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed

against a defendant for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against that

defendant. “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). For purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court “must

presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in

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Case No. C 09-4696 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987). 

However, mere conclusions couched in factual allegations are not sufficient to state a

cause of action. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chem.

Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.1988). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A

claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Thus, “for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. ” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962,

969 (9th Cir.2009). 

B. Analysis

As pointed out by moving party Real Time, the complaint does not allege any facts tying

Real Time to the refinancing transaction at issue. Accordingly, Real Time’s motion to dismiss

will be granted. In light of their pro se status, the Carneros will be given leave to amend so that

they may attempt to allege facts giving rise to liability on the part of Real Time. The Court has

reservations as to whether such facts may be alleged given the representations of Real Time that

it services a second loan on the property and never has had any involvement with the loan at

issue in the complaint. If the Carneros fail to allege a viable claim against Real Time or to

demonstrate that they might be able to allege such a claim, the claims against Real Time will be

dismissed without leave to amend.

III. APPLICATION FOR TRO

A. Legal Standard

“Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to

preliminary injunctions.” Aiello v. OneWest Bank, No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL

406092, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Mind’s Eye Interiors, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1154 (D. Hawaii

2002); Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323

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Case No. C 09-4696 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

(N.D. Cal. 1995). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be

awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 376 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d

644, 651 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374). The issuance of a preliminary

injunction is committed to the discretion of the District Court. Id. “To the extent that our cases

have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling, or even viable.” Am. Trucking

Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted).

Despite its length, the Carneros’ complaint fails to provide a clear recitation of the events

giving rise to the instant lawsuit and fails to set forth sufficient facts regarding each defendant’s

role in the subject transaction. For this reason, the Carneros have failed to demonstrate a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The Court has no doubt that the Carneros

may suffer irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief, because their home will be sold. 

However, in the absence of any showing to date that their suit has merit, they have failed to

demonstrate that the balance of equities tips in their favor or that issuance of a TRO is in the

public interest. Accordingly, the application for TRO will be denied.

IV. ORDER

(1) The motion to dismiss is GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any

amended complaint shall be filed and served within thirty (30) days after the date

of this Order;

(2) The application for TRO is DENIED.

DATED: 3/22/2010

__________________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 09-4696 JF (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND ETC.

(JFLC2)

Copies of Order served on:

Christopher Lee Peterson cpeterson@piteduncan.com, sames@piteduncan.com 

Robin Prema Wright rwright@wrightlegal.net, ggrant@wrightlegal.net 

Jose and Marta Carnero

1558 Minenesota Avenue 1/2

San Jose, CA 95125-4445

Case 5:09-cv-04696-JF Document 21 Filed 03/22/10 Page 5 of 5