Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02093/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02093-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA SOMMER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv2093 WQH (WMc)

ORDER

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ROB

TERWILLIGER, RICK RENDON,

MARK RIDLEY, S.D. ADAMS, JOSE

CENTENO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

MEDICAL EXAMINER’S OFFICE,

GLENN N. WAGNER, COUNTY OF

SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY’s

OFFICE, BONNIE DUMANIS, LAURA

GUNN, and DOES 1 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Objection to Order Denying Without Prejudice Ex

Parte Application to Amend Scheduling Order filed by Plaintiff Cynthia Sommer. (ECF No.

120).

I. Background

On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff Cynthia Sommer initiated this action by filing the

Complaint. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that her husband, Todd Sommer, a 23-year-old

Sergeant in the United States Marine Corps, died of a cardiac arrhythmia in February of 2002. 

Plaintiff alleges that the results of an autopsy showed that Todd Sommer died of natural causes. 

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Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants refused to accept those results and embarked upon an

investigation intended to find criminal conduct” by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges

Defendants “knew or should have known during the investigation ... that there was no evidence”

that Plaintiff killed Todd Sommer. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiff alleges that she was wrongfully tried

and convicted for murdering her husband. Plaintiff alleges that her conviction was overturned

and she was granted a new trial on November 30, 2007. Id. at 52. Plaintiff asserts a claim for

violation of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On December 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Modification of the

Court’s Scheduling Order to Permit Amending the Complaint. (ECF No. 107). Plaintiff

contends that the last depositions were completed on October 24, 2011, and “[d]uring the course

of deposition, Plaintiff learned for the first time about key evidence relating to the allegations

in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends that “[t]he proposed First Amended

Complaint alleges new facts to prove claims already made in the Complaint.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff

states that “Plaintiff has not named any new parties that will need to be served.” Id. Plaintiff

did not submit a copy of the proposed First Amended Complaint or identify the new facts to be

alleged. 

On December 21, 2011, the Honorable Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal issued an

Order Denying Without Prejudice Ex Parte Application to Amend Scheduling Order. (ECF No.

118). The Magistrate Judge did not find that Plaintiff showed good cause for modifying the

scheduling order. 

On December 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Order. 

(ECF No. 120). On January 18, 2012, Defendants Dumanis, Gunn and Wagner filed an

Opposition. (ECF No. 129). On January 18, 2012, the United States filed an Opposition. (ECF

No. 130). On January 25, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (ECF No. 132). 

II. Discussion

 Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Order denying her motion to modify the

scheduling order to allow her to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff

contends that she showed good cause for modifying the scheduling order. Plaintiff contends that

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Defendants will not be prejudiced by allowing a modification of the scheduling order because

the deadline for filing of dispositive motions could be extended as well and additional time could

be given for discovery.1/

 

“Where a magistrate is designated to hear a discovery motion, ‘[a] judge of the court may

reconsider any pretrial matter ... where it has been shown that the magistrate’s order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.’” Rockwell Int’l, Inc. v. Pos-A-Traction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d

1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)

(“[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections [to nondispositive matters] and

modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”). 

“Matters concerning discovery generally are considered ‘nondispositive’ of the litigation.” See

Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). “Review under the

clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust,

508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095,

1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). “[T]he magistrate judge’s decision ... is entitled to great deference

by the district court.” United States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 states that “A schedule may be modified only for good

cause and with the judge’s consent.” When the motion to extend time is made after time has

expired, “the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... if the party failed to act because of

excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P 6(b)(1). The determination of excusable neglect takes into

account: “(1) the danger of prejudice; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on

judicial proceedings; (3) the reasons for the delay which includes whether it was within the

reasonable control of the party seeking to show excusable neglect; and (4) whether that party

acted in good faith.” Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1234-35

(D. Kan. 2007).

1/

 On December 16, 2011, Defendants County of San Diego District Attorney's Office, County

of San Diego Medical Examiner's Office, Bonnie Dumanis, Laura Gunn, Glenn N Wagner filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 112). On December 16, 2011, the United States filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 114). 

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“When the proposed modification is an amendment to the pleadings, the moving party

may establish good cause by showing ‘(1) that [he or she] was diligent in assisting the court in

creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that [his or her] noncompliance with a rule 16 deadline

occurred or will occur, notwithstanding [his or her] diligent efforts to comply, because of the

development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time

of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and (3) that [he or she] was diligent in seeking amendment

of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that [he or she] could not comply with the order.’” 

Hood v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225-26 (citing Jackson v.

Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citations omitted)). 

The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff completed all fact witness depositions more

than three months before seeking to modify the scheduling order. The Magistrate Judge found

that Defendants may be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to amend the scheduling order after

discovery ended. The Magistrate Judge stated:

In order for the Court to determine that Plaintiff was diligent in seeking

amendment, Plaintiff must first specify what new and previously

unavailable facts she learned during depositions and the particular dates

these facts were learned. Plaintiff must also specify why the need to

amend the pleadings could not have been reasonably foreseen or

anticipated during any of the previous amendments to the scheduling

order. In addition, Plaintiff must adequately explain why she waited at

least three months after learning the new facts before filing her motion

to amend. Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has

established good cause to amend the schedule at this late stage in the

case.

(ECF No. 118 at 3-4). The Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s request to modify the scheduling

order without prejudice. The Court does not find that the Magistrate Judge’s order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objection to Order Denying Without Prejudice Ex

Parte Application to Amend Scheduling Order (ECF No. 120) filed by Plaintiff is DENIED. 

DATED: February 3, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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