Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05541/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05541-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLENE SANDERS and KEN

McDANIEL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD,

BAKERSFIELD POLICE

DEPARTMENT, ERIC MATLOCK,

GLEN DAVIS, SCOTT THATCHER

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

sued both in their individual and

official capacities 

Defendants.

_________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV-F 04-5541 AWI TAG

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

The matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the court’s

September 30, 2005 Order granting in part and denying in part cross motions for summary

adjudication. Doc. 53. Plaintiffs have not filed any opposition to the motion. The matter was

taken under submission without oral argument.

I. History

Plaintiffs in this case are Arlene Sanders and Ken McDaniel, who resided at 1905

California Street, Apt. #18; Bakersfield, CA in April 1999. Defendants are the City of

Bakersfield, the Bakersfield Police Department (“BPD”), Eric Matlock (Chief of BPD), Glenn

Davis (BPD officer), Scott Thatcher (BPD Officer), and Does 1 through 10, inclusive (additional

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BPD officers). On the evening of April 6, 1999, Davis and Thatcher responded to a report of a

disturbance at Plaintiffs’ apartment complex. At the scene, the apartment manager stated that

there was a fight going on inside Plaintiffs’ unit. As Davis and Thatcher approached the unit,

they claim to have heard loud shouting. They knocked on the door and identified themselves as

BPD officers. Sanders opened the door, revealing both herself and McDaniel in the living room;

Davis and Thatcher entered. Davis and Thatcher claim that Sanders had an abrasion on her

cheek and McDaniel put something behind the couch. Sanders demanded the officers leave and

began shouting. Davis and McDaniel used force to handcuff both Plaintiffs. Davis conducted a

sweep of the whole apartment. Davis found plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine

in the right shoe of a pair of work boots in a bedroom closet; the door to the closet was open. 

Davis asked McDaniel if he was on parole; McDaniel affirmed he was on parole for a drug

violation. He contacted the BPD to request a team to conduct a full search of the apartment. 

BPD officers soon arrived and seized the bags of cocaine in the course of a second search of the

apartment. Defendants also claim that Davis and Thatcher were informed by another BPD

officer, Orbin Love, on April 5, 1999 (the day before the arrests and searches) that McDaniel was

a parolee who was suspected of dealing drugs; Plaintiffs dispute the claim. 

Plaintiffs were charged with possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of California

Health and Safety Code § 11351.5 on May 17, 1999. Plaintiffs plead guilty. Before their plea,

they filed motions to suppress evidence pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5, arguing the initial

search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The motion was denied, but the Fifth District

Court of Appeal reversed the denial on two bases: the search extended beyond adjoining spaces

and a parole search is only valid when the officer is aware of the search condition. People v.

Sanders, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1211, 1220 and 1223 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). On review, the California

Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth District Court of Appeal on the parole search while expressing

no opinion as to the protective sweep. People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 324 n.2 (Cal. 2003). 

The California Supreme Court firmly held that when police are unaware an individual is subject

to a search condition, a search without probable cause can not be justified after the fact by the

search condition. 

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

On April 8, 2004, Plaintiffs filed this present suit. Broadly, Plaintiffs allege their Fourth

Amendment rights were violated by entry into their apartment and search without consent or

exigent circumstances. The parties filed opposing motions for summary adjudication. By Order

of September 30, 2005, the court determined “The initial entry of Officers Davis and Thatcher on

April 6, 1999 did not violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights....Whether the [initial search]

can be justified as a protective sweep incident to arrest is preserved for trial as the questions of

arrest and plain view have not been fully addressed.” Doc. 53, Order, at 39:22-28. Defendants

filed a this timely motion for reconsideration, which was not opposed. 

II. Legal Standards

Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(e), any motion to alter or amend judgment shall be filed no

later than ten days after entry of judgment. A motion for reconsideration of summary judgment

is appropriately brought under Rule 59(e). Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.

1985). A motion to alter or amend judgment is appropriate under limited circumstances, such as

where the court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, where the court “committed clear

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust,” or where there is an intervening change in

controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993).

III. Discussion

Defendants have asked for reconsideration on a number of issues. In relevant part, they

say “Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the undisputed facts show that they

reasonably believed exigent circumstances existed to justify the entry and search of plaintiffs’

apartment.” Doc. 56, Reconsideration, at 6:6-8. In the underlying papers in the motion,

Defendants asserted that they were “entitled to qualified immunity for the subsequent search of

plaintiffs’ apartment, because the undisputed facts support the officers reasonable belief that

theirs and other persons’ safety were at risk. Upon entry into the premises, the officers had not

yet determined who was the victim and who was the perpetrator of the reported crime.” Doc. 36,

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Defendants’ Brief, at 13:1-4. Plaintiffs’ opposition was brief: “Just because [the apartment

manager] told the officers there had been an argument is not justification for the entry....Here,

there was no report of any injury to any person. Moreover, before entry the officers saw and

heard nothing indicating a need for swift action...Thus, the entry cannot be justified even if one

accepts Thatcher’s version.” Doc. 44, Plaintiffs’ Opposition, at 4:21-3, citations omitted,

emphasis in the original. 

The original order granted summary adjudication in favor of Defendants on the issue of

entry and denied adjudication as to both parties on the issue of the apartment search. In order to

clarify, the court will revisit several of these topics from different perspectives. 

A. Initial Entry

Davis and Thatcher were responding to a domestic disturbance tip. The apartment

manager passed on information from the Plaintiffs’ neighbor that someone was being “beat up

by her boyfriend.” Doc. 41, Ex. F, Transcript, at 47:11-15. Thatcher claimed to have heard “male

and female voices in high argumentative tones” when approaching the apartment. Doc. 25,

Amended Thatcher Declaration, at 2:15-16. Thatcher claims “I knocked on the front door of

apartment #18 and identified Officer Davis and myself as the Bakersfield Police Department.

Approximately 15 seconds later, I observed Arlene Sanders peer out the vertical blinds on the

front window. The blinds were immediately shut and I heard someone inside the apartment come

to the door. I then heard the lock mechanism to the front door engage as if the occupants locked

the door. I again knocked and announced our presence. At this time, I again heard the lock

mechanism to the front door deadbolt engage, as if the occupants had now unlocked the door.”

Doc. 25, Amended Thatcher Declaration, at 2:19-25. While Plaintiffs argue that Davis and

Thatcher heard no argument upon approaching the apartment, they provide no evidence to

controvert Defendants’ declarations. Indeed, Sanders admitted to having an argument with

McDaniel and gave a nonresponsive reply when asked how loud their argument was. Doc. 41,

Ex. A, Sanders Deposition, at 21:14-23. Significantly, the partial deposition of Sanders (as part

of papers filed by the Plaintiffs) is missing key portions which discuss whether the argument was

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

ongoing at the time the police officers showed up. See Doc. 41, Ex. A, Sanders Deposition. The

partial deposition of McDaniel filed with the court provides even less detail regarding these

events. See Doc. 41, Ex. B, McDaniel Deposition. Davis and Thatcher claimed Sanders had an

abrasion or cut on her cheek. Defendants have provided a picture of Sanders taken on April 6,

1999, purporting to show the abrasion, but the quality of the photo is poor. Neither the presence

nor absence of an abrasion can be definitively determined from the photo. In her deposition,

Sanders said only that she “did not recall having an abrasion.” Doc. 41, Ex. A, Sanders

Deposition, at 23:6-7. Though the statement is indirect and equivocal, it must be interpreted as a

denial. As Plaintiffs have provided some evidence as to the alleged abrasion, the fact is disputed

and not relied upon to justify the entry. Sanders also states that she told Davis and Thatcher at

the door that she “didn’t need his assistance.” Doc. 41, Ex. A, Sanders Deposition, at 23:12-13. 

Defendants claim that Sanders demanded they leave and began shouting. 

In an analogous Section 1983 case, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the issue of probable

cause to enter and search a house to ensure the “welfare of the occupants.” Hopkins v. Sierra

Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991). The police made a forced entry after having “received

an anonymous telephone call reporting that a woman in apartment 728 of the Sinaloa Apartments

was ‘getting the shit beat out of her’ and that the violence had ‘been going on for hours.’”

Hopkins v. Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 525 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit stated:

When Officer Gerhardt arrived at apartment 728, he heard loud voices and other noises. It

is unclear, however, whether the sounds he heard were of an argument, or were simply

those of a loud, albeit late, social gathering. Sounds of an argument, or yelling, would be

consistent with a domestic disturbance. Gerhardt saw the door opened by a man he knew

had previously been involved in domestic disturbances, who had obviously been drinking

and who appeared not to want him to see into the apartment. Gerhardt’s experience, with

Hopkins in particular and with domestic problems in general, made these facts appear

consistent with the tip. In light of the fact that someone had suggested that domestic 

violence was taking place in that very apartment, Gerhardt might reasonably have

determined that there was a domestic disturbance going on if he heard loud sounds

consistent with a dispute. If not, Gerhardt’s determination of probable cause was based

only on an untested anonymous tip, his prior knowledge of Hopkins and the fact that

Hopkins had been drinking. It is questionable whether this would be enough to establish

probable cause.

Hopkins v. Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 528-9 (9th Cir. 1991), emphasis added. Summary

judgment was found to be inappropriate as the plaintiff disputed the nature of the sounds heard. 

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

The plain language of the opinion suggests that probable cause to search exists when there is an

anonymous tip of domestic violence plus sounds of argument heard from the outside. Here, the

police visit was a result of a tip from a neighbor and the police claim to have heard sounds of

arguing as they approached the apartment (a claim unopposed by any evidence, only

argumentation). This case appears to fit within the language of Hopkins, justifying entry and

search to ensure the safety of occupants. “Police officers responding to a domestic violence

report have a duty to ensure the present and continued safety and well-being of the

occupants.....the fact that the occupants appeared to be unharmed when the officers entered did

not guarantee that the disturbance had cooled to the point where their continued safety was

assured.” People v. Higgins, 26 Cal. App. 4th 247, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), quotations omitted.

B. Search Pursuant To Parole Condition

Defendants assert that qualified immunity should also apply to the search “because, at the

time of the subject incident, the law in California was not settled regarding whether a parolee’s

status can retroactively justify an otherwise unlawful search.” Doc. 56, Reconsideration, at 8:9-

12. Prior California case law had suggested that when police are unaware an individual is subject

to a search condition, a search without probable cause may be justified after the fact by the search

condition. See In re Tyrell J., 8 Cal. 4th 68 (Cal. 1994). While People v. Robles, 23 Cal. 4th 789

(Cal. 2000) and People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318 (Cal. 2003) greatly limited the Tyrell holding,

these cases had not yet been handed down at the time of the events underlying this case. 

While the law might not have been clear, qualified immunity does not apply in this

scenario. As stated in the original order, whether Davis and Thatcher were aware of McDaniel’s

parole status can not be determined as a matter of law. That question is one of the central

disputed facts in the case and must be determined by a jury. This analysis must assume that they

did not know McDaniel was subject to a search condition. The “concern of the immunity inquiry

is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made,” and that it is “often difficult for an

officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine will apply to the factual situation that he

faces.” Estate of Ford v. Rameriz-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002), citations omitted. 

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Here, Davis and Thatcher can not be said to have mistakenly applied legal doctrine to the factual

situation they faced. Regarding the search condition, there was no reasonable, but mistaken

belief, as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause. Not knowing anything about

McDaniel’s parole status, it would have been unreasonable, indeed outrageous, for them to have

consciously justified their search at the time by the supposition that a search condition might

apply. The rule of Tyrell J. pointedly applies after the fact; it does not, should not, affect police

actions at the time of search. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Accepting

Defendants’ qualified immunity argument would mean accepting the repugnant position that it

was objectively reasonable for police to search an individual without probable cause with the

hope in mind that the individual might be subject to an unknown search condition. As stated by

the California Supreme Court, “whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon

the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted [; this view] is consistent

with the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule--to deter police misconduct.” People v.

Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 332 (Cal. 2003). While California law concerning this issue was

unclear in 1999, qualified immunity simply does not apply in this sort of situation. 

C. Search As Protective Sweep

As a general matter, “the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the

rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement.” Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,

295 (1973), citations omitted. Once inside the apartment, Davis and Thatcher detained the

Plaintiffs and then conducted a search of areas where other individuals might be found. For the

purposes of summary judgment, there are effectively no undisputed facts that would affirmatively

support a belief that additional persons were present. Conversely, there are no facts that would

suggest Davis and Thatcher knew or should have known Sanders and McDaniel were the only

people in the apartment. In the criminal proceedings against Plaintiffs, Thatcher and Davis in

fact justified their search of apartment on the basis that they were making “a protective sweep of

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

the residence to make sure there is no one else in the residence that could endanger our safety.”

Doc. 29, Ex. B, Transcript, at 17:1-3. They did not justify the search based on suspicion that

there were other potential victims, instead saying that they were conducting a protective sweep

incident to an arrest. In domestic violence cases, even victims may in fact be hostile to police

involvement. “[W]here as here the ‘exigent circumstances’ rest on a claimed imminent threat of

danger to life and property, we hold the court is entitled to ask at least two questions. First, the

objective test: was the threat so imminent and serious a reasonable policeman would believe that

a warrantless, emergency entry was necessary to save lives and property? And, second, the

subjective test: was this officer indeed motivated primarily by a desire to save lives and

property?” People v. Dickson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1063 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The subjective

prong of the test was later modified as courts found the requirement to determine a primary

motive to be unrealistic: “It is unreasonable to expect an officer to be unconcerned with the

collection of evidence and the capture of criminals. While the trial court must find that the officer

believed an emergency to exist, reasonable actions taken by the officer should not preclude such

a finding....if the officers act in a manner inconsistent with a motive to preserve life or property,

the warrantless entry or search cannot be justified after the fact by employing the exigent

circumstances doctrine.” People v. Duncan, 42 Cal. 3d 91, 104 (Cal. 1986). 

The case law on whether the search can extend to unknown individuals given these

circumstances is mixed. The facts of one Ninth Circuit case were as follows:

In the early morning hours of May 13, 1977, two Clark County, Washington, deputy

sheriffs responded to a report of a fistfight at an apartment complex. The officers arrived

about one hour after the fight had ended and they interviewed the alleged victim of the

assault, one Larson. The officers then followed a trail of blood leading from Larson back

to Dugger’s apartment, where they observed blood on the front door and keys in the lock.

They rang the doorbell ‘two or three times,’ but heard no response from inside. Then, one

of the officers, uninvited, turned the key, pushed the door open, and stepped back away

from the open door. The officers then called to Dugger and identified themselves as being

from the sheriff’s department. They heard no immediate response. Then, a male within

the apartment called out that he was putting on his shoes and would be right out....the

District Court justified the warrantless entry on the grounds of exigent circumstances

arising out of the bloody fistfight and the need to determine if anyone needed immediate

medical attention.

United States v. Dugger, 603 F.2d 97, 97-8 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit found that “once

the officers heard Dugger respond from within that he was coming outside as soon as he put on

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

his shoes, any excuse of an emergency dissipated.” United States v. Dugger, 603 F.2d 97, 99-100

(9th Cir. 1979). A California state case dealt with a situation where a rape suspect surrendered

himself after being confronted by the police at his home, the site of the alleged crime. The police

had already interviewed the victim who made no mention of any other person at the suspect’s

home. The court found that reentry of the premises was justified based on a third party report

that a “second person had been heard inside the apartment....[in] each case the claim of exigent

circumstances must be evaluated on its particular facts. Where there is reasonable cause to

believe additional suspects or potential victims are in a residence, a warrantless entry is

permissible.” People v. Keener, 148 Cal. App. 3d 73, 76-7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 

In a case before the California Supreme Court:

On November 12, 1983, Officer Klein, a Newport Beach police officer with four years’

experience, received a radio call reporting a robbery at a particular address; a victim was

believed to be injured and bleeding. No description was given of either the robber or his

victim/victims. Klein and a fellow officer drove to the location and observed some blood

spots outside the building and on the walkway outside defendant Tamborino’s apartment.

A neighbor, Alvino Johnson, confirmed that an injured person was inside the apartment.

Klein knocked on the door to the apartment and loudly identified himself as a police

officer. Receiving no response, Klein waited a minute or two and knocked again. The

officers heard some sounds of movement inside the apartment. Believing that the

situation required prompt action, Klein kicked in the door. He then saw defendant

Tamborino in the living room walking toward the front door. He was wearing a bathrobe,

was barefoot, and had quite a bit of blood on his head, neck and hands. He was holding

his head and seemed to be bleeding from the right side of his face, although not profusely.

Officer Klein testified that at that point he was not sure whether Tamborino was a suspect

or a victim and that, for his own safety, he brought Tamborino out of the apartment and

handcuffed him. After determining that the wound did not appear serious, Klein

immediately reentered the apartment. His main concern was to determine whether there

were any other injured persons inside; he did not stop to ask any questions of Tamborino

or to “try[] to figure out what had happened at that point.”

....

Defendants contend that the present search was invalid because Officer Klein could point

to no specific or articulable facts indicating that a second victim or suspect might be

present in the apartment. But the observation of Tamborino, wounded and bleeding,

coupled with the earlier report of a robbery, constituted ‘articulable facts’ that reasonably

could have led the officer to decide that an immediate, brief search of the apartment was

warranted to determine whether additional persons were present at the crime scene.

Officer Klein had no prior information indicating that only one victim was involved in the

robbery, and in light of the situation he confronted, ordinary, routine common sense and a

reasonable concern for human life justified him in conducting a walk-through search truly

limited in scope to determining the presence of other victims. Nothing in the record

suggests that the officer had any hidden additional motive, such as searching for drugs or

contraband, in conducting the search, and the trial court - after specifically questioning

the officer on this point -- was satisfied that the officer had no such ulterior motive.

Tamborino v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 3d 919, 922-3 (Cal. 1986). The California Supreme Court

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

specifically distinguished Dugger, noting “the officers were investigating a fistfight involving

only two men. After interviewing the first victim/participant, they followed a blood trail to the

apartment of the second man. The officers confronted and questioned him, but continued to

search his apartment ‘for other occupants.’ Under these facts, the court properly concluded that

the search exceeded the scope of the exigency once the second victim had been found.”

Tamborino v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 3d 919, 923 (Cal. 1986), emphasis in original. That is, the

police were aware after speaking with the first individual that only two people were involve in

the altercation; the police could not search further for other individuals. 

In Dugger and Keener, the police had information regarding identified (or at least

enumerated) individuals. Continuing a warrantless search after contact with those individuals

required some specific basis for believing additional persons might be present. With Tamborino,

the information the police had was less specific: the responding police officer received a report of

one injured person, a victim of a robbery. After finding an injured person, he continued looking

because he suspected that (1) there might be other injured persons and/or (2) the person he came

in initial contact with might be the robber and not the victim. The only additional information

learned upon entry was that the injured individual did not immediately respond and was walking

slowly toward the door when the officer forced entry. Given the fact that he was wounded, the

delay does not seem to be unreasonable. Fundamentally, the search appears to have been

justified by the police officer’s lack of firm information concerning the total number of persons

involved and the court found that the officer’s choice of continuing the search rather than

questioning the injured person was permissible. In that case, it is interesting to note that the

decision does not explain what information the officer gained in speaking to the neighbor

immediately prior to entering the house. There is no indication as to how the neighbor knew

someone injured was inside, whether the neighbor had spoken to the injured individual, or

whether the neighbor knew if the robber was still present. 

Here, Davis and Thatcher were told of a potential domestic disturbance involving a male

and a female. Approaching the apartment, they heard male and female voices in argument. 

Upon entry, they were faced with a situation akin to that in Tamborino: they saw individuals

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

whose characteristics were consistent with the tips they had received. There was no articulable

facts suggesting that anyone else might be present. Notwithstanding the substance of the analysis

undertaken in Tamborino, the court facially agreed with the other courts that “articulable facts”

are necessary. On that basis and solely relying on undisputed facts, the court can not say as a

matter of law that the search undertaken was within the scope of the exception to the warrant

requirement. 

Defendants also argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for the initial search on the

basis of protective sweep: “Defendant officers are also entitled to qualified immunity for the

subsequent search of plaintiffs’ apartment, because the undisputed facts support the officers

reasonable belief that theirs and other persons’ safety were at risk. Upon entry into the premises,

the officers had not yet determined who was the victim and who was the perpetrator of the

reported crime.” Doc. 56, Reconsideration, at 7:20-23. For qualified immunity analysis, the right

that was violated “must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official

action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been

held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be

apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), citations omitted. The events in

this case took place in 1999. The case law in that time specified that “Where there is reasonable

cause to believe additional suspects or potential victims are in a residence, a warrantless entry [or

protective search] is permissible.” People v. Keener, 148 Cal. App. 3d 73, 76-7 (Cal. Ct. App.

1983). Given what the apartment manager told Davis and Thatcher, they had no reason to

suspect that there were any other individuals involved besides Sanders and McDaniel, who were

accounted for upon entry. Relying solely on the undisputed material facts, the court can not grant

qualified immunity at this time. The issue of search as a protective sweep must go to the jury. 

D. Search Incident To Arrest

“There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

‘within his immediate control’ - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he

might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,

762-63 (1969) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has also said officers may “as a

precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and

other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be

immediately launched” and further “is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those

places in which a person might be hiding.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 327 (1990). 

These two cases demonstrate that protective sweeps are designed to prevent harm to police from

two distinct sources: the arrestee using a weapon close at hand (Chimel) and an antagonistic third

party located nearby (Buie). 

In the previous Order, the court stated that “a protective sweep can only be undertaken

incident to an arrest.” Doc. 53, Order, at 28:20-21, citing United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendants argue the court has read the holding in Reid too broadly. Upon

further reflection, the court agrees. In Reid, the Ninth Circuit noted that police said the criminal

defendant was not under arrest and there was no probable cause for arrest at the time the sweep

was undertaken. United States v. Reid, 226 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000). In an earlier Ninth

Circuit case, the court found “Once Officer Schabert had probable cause to arrest Potter, he was

entitled to search him before formally making the arrest. A search incident to an arrest is valid

whether it occurs immediately before or after the arrest.” United States v. Potter, 895 F.2d 1231,

1234 (9th Cir. 1990). The U.S. Supreme Court has said “Where the formal arrest followed

quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it

particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.” Rawlings v.

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). Though both of these cases deal with searches of the person

(Chimel) and not searches of adjoining areas (Buie), the rationale holds. The key fact becomes

whether there was probable cause at the time the sweep was undertaken as opposed to whether an

individual was in fact arrested at the time. 

Defendants assert that “Davis and Thatcher had probable cause to arrest for domestic

violence.” Doc. 56, Reconsideration, at 3:24-25. However, probable cause for arrest can not be

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

established from the undisputed facts. When faced with material factual dispute, “the question of

probable cause in a section 1983 case is usually one for the jury.” Hopkins v. Sierra Vista, 931

F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1991). Defendants’ key assertion is that “Defendant officers knocked on

the front door of the subject apartment and entered therein only after observing a cut on the right

cheek of plaintiff Sanders’s face. This fact led the defendant officers to reasonably believe that

plaintiff Sanders was a probable victim to the reported criminal conduct. Therefore, the

defendant officers had probable cause to believe that a crime was in progress or had been

committed against either plaintiff Sanders or some other third person within the apartment.” Doc.

24, Defendants’ Opposition, at 16:9-14. As stated earlier, Plaintiffs appear to dispute the

assertion that Sanders’s cheek was cut or bruised. Defendants have affirmatively stated that “the

plaintiffs were under arrest at the time they were handcuffed and subdued immediately after the

officers’ entry of the subject residence.” Doc. 56, Reconsideration, at 4:1-3. The arrests appear

to have been based upon the information the Defendants gathered before entry and upon meeting

Sanders at the door to the apartment. It is up to a jury to determine if the facts justify the arrests. 

Similarly, qualified immunity can not be determined at this time due to disputed facts. 

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05541-AWI-JLT Document 59 Filed 03/13/07 Page 13 of 13