Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01553/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01553-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY J. VALADEZ, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SIERRA, CALIFORNIA

SIERRA COUNTY JAIL, SIERRA COUNTY

SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, WESTERN SIERRA

MEDICAL CLINIC, JUDGE WILLIAM

PANGMAN, SHERIFF LELAND ADAMS,

CORPORAL LOU FOXWORTHY, LYNN

JAKOBS, FRANK J. LANG, DOES 1-20,

Defendants.

CIV S-03-1553 WBS PAN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

—NFN—

Plaintiff sues for redress for alleged violation of his

civil rights. Plaintiff alleges that on July 12, 2002, he was

sentenced to five days’ imprisonment in Sierra County jail for

contempt of court. He duly reported at 9:00 a.m., August 9, and

was released at 9:00 p.m., when he was told he had completed

serving one day and must return at 9:00 a.m., August 16. He did

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as instructed but after medical examination was found unfit and

told to return August 23. Plaintiff reported as instructed

August 23 when he was made to sit on a concrete bench in front of

the courthouse for 5 1/2 hours after which he was told to return

September 13. On September 13, plaintiff arrived late at 9:30

and at noon was imprisoned without medical examination and served

four days imprisonment, being released at noon, September 17. On

December 10, a judge vacated the sentence. Plaintiff alleges he

was wrongfully imprisoned and claims redress pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and state law.

Defendants move for summary judgment.

 A party may move, without or without supporting

affidavits, for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall

be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that here is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

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The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id., at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence

to support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on

an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

588 (1986). When the conduct alleged is implausible, stronger

evidence than otherwise required must be presented to defeat

summary judgment. Id., at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall

set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and

shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify

to the matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court

has held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form

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that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary

judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are

(1) whether the evidence could be submitted in admissible form

and (2) “if reduced to admissible evidence” would it be

sufficient to carry the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. 

Thus, in Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003),

objection to the opposing party’s reliance upon her diary upon

the ground it was hearsay was overruled because the party could

testify to all the relevant portions from personal knowledge or

read it into evidence as recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no motion

to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United States

Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979) (incompetent

medical evidence).

The only federal guarantee implicated by plaintiff’s

allegations is the Eighth Amendment, which protects prisoners

from cruel and unusual punishment during confinement. Punishment

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is cruel and unusual if it involves the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain but the Constitution does not require

comfortable prisons or jails. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337

(1981); McGuckin v. smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Only deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis for an

Eighth Amendment violation. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294

(1991). Failure to provide medical care may violate the Eighth

Amendment if prison officials demonstrate deliberate indifference

to serious medical conditions that cause pain. Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). A prison official acts with

“deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Id., Gibson v.

County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under this standard, the prison official must not only be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists but that person must also

draw the inference. Id., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). If a prison official should have been aware of the risk,

but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson, 290 F.3d at

1188. This subjective approach focuses only on what a

defendant’s mental attitude actually was. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

839. “Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth

Amendment rights.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (citation

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omitted). 

Deliberate indifference to medical needs may be shown by

circumstantial evidence when the facts are sufficient to

demonstrate that a defendant actually knew of a risk of harm. 

Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 421 (9 th Cir. 2003);

see also Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1197 (acknowledging a plaintiff may

demonstrate that officers “must have known” of a risk of harm by

showing the medical need was obvious and extreme).

In opposition to the pending motion, plaintiff avers that

in consequence of a bus accident in May 2002 he suffered

continuing pain in his neck, back and shoulder from an

undiagnosed condition. He avers that when he first reported to

the jail on August 9 he complained of the pain and was seen by a

nurse practitioner who determined he was fit, i.e., the jail

could provide care required to satisfy its constitutional duty. 

He avers he was seen twice more during the day and was provided

pain medicine in the afternoon before being released at 9:00 p.m. 

He avers that on September 13, a health care provider determined

he was fit to serve his sentence and recommended the jail provide

plaintiff with two mattresses on a bed, a padded chair and extra

pillows but the jail did not provide the extra mattress until

September 15 and never provided the other items. By increased

amounts of medicine, plaintiff avers his pain subsided to a

tolerable level by the afternoon of September 15 but the medicine

caused him to vomit that night. 

Plaintiff’s own account demonstrates defendants did not

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violate his federal civil rights and that defendants are entitled

to summary judgment upon their federal claims. If plaintiff’s

allegations state any claim for relief under state law, this

court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction

over them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). I recommend

defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

Honorable William B. Shubb, the United States District Judge

assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Written

objections may be filed within ten days after being served with

these findings and recommendations. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” The failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 20, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

 

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