Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00228/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00228-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TONY CURTIS BROACH, #136351, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06cv228-WHA

 ) (WO)

BOB RILEY, et al., )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Tony Broach, a

state inmate, in which he challenges a delay in his parole consideration and decisions to deny

him parole. A Recommendation was entered by the Magistrate Judge that summary judgment be

granted in favor of the Defendants on each of Broach’s claims for relief. The Plaintiff has filed

an objection to the Recommendation.

Initially, with respect to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that claims arising from actions

which occurred on or before March 5, 2004 were barred by the applicable two-year period of

limitation, Broach argues that the court failed to toll the limitation period under the provisions of

Ala. Code §6-2-8(b), which allows for tolling of the limitation period when the plaintiff is either

under 19 years of age or insane. Broach is neither insane nor under 19 but argues tolling is

required because he was imprisoned at the time the actions accrued and family members

contacted the parole board seeking information and were told by the parole board there was a

backlog of cases. These conditions clearly do not warrant tolling under the provisions of Ala.

Code § 6-2-8. On May 17, 1996, the Alabama legislature rescinded that portion of the tolling

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provision which previously applied to convicted prisoners. See Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a) (1975, as

amended). Thus, as noted in the Recommendation, the tolling provision of Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a)

is therefore unavailing. Since Broach fails to meet either disability referenced in Ala. Code § 6-

2-8(a), his claim of entitlement to tolling under Ala. Code § 6-2-8(b) is patently frivolous, as this

provision merely allows tolling of the limitation period only "when both disabilities [listed in

Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a)] exist ...." 

Broach further argues that the limitation period for the instant action should be 6 years

because it is "founded on promises in writing not under seal...." Objection at 3. Again, this

assertion is without merit. First, there has been no promise made to the plaintiff relative to his

consideration for release on parole. Additionally, "[a]ll constitutional claims brought under §

1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions in the

state where the § 1983 action has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76, 105

S.Ct. 1938, 1946-47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). [The plaintiff’s] claim was brought in Alabama

where the governing limitations period is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit &

Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order to have his claim

heard, [the plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the date the limitations period

began to run." McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Broach challenges the finding that his claims against Governor Riley are based on the

impermissible theory of respondeat superior. Broach continues to argue that Riley's appointment

of parole board members renders him responsible for all actions taken by such members. This

assertion is simply incorrect. 

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Broach also attacks the determination that he was not denied due process in the parole

consideration process. He reiterates his argument that the applicable administrative rules

"created a liberty interest in a specific parole consideration (hearing) date upon the denial of

parole in September of 1999, and that such hearing date 'shall' not exceed three (3) years from

the denial of parole." Objection at 6. The due process claim is thoroughly and appropriately

addressed in the Recommendation. Recommendation at 10-15. 

 Broach next presents a list of inmates he alleges have been granted parole despite having

convictions similar to or worse than the conviction for which he is incarcerated, to show that

"'[a]rbitrary and discriminatory application could or have been attached....'" Exhibit D to

Objection - Court Doc. No. 38-5 at 1-2. Apparently, this information, not previously submitted

to the court, is intended to support plaintiff's equal protection claim and also show that the parole

board acted arbitrarily in denying him parole. Since this information was not previously

provided, it is not appropriate as a basis for plaintiff's objection. Nevertheless, this information

fails to establish a violation of Broach's equal protection rights and likewise fails to show

arbitrary or capricious action by the parole board. Assuming plaintiff is similarly situated with

these other violent offenders who received the purported differential favorable treatment of

release on parole, such information fails to show that the differential treatment was based on

some constitutionally protected interest as is required to succeed on an equal protection claim. 

"Evidence which merely indicates disparity of treatment is insufficient to show discriminatory

intent. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)." Recommendation at 17-18. "Furthermore, it

is clear from the undisputed evidentiary materials that the defendants delayed Broach’s parole

consideration date solely in an effort to comply with mandatory directives of state law and

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refused to grant Broach parole based on their determination, after reviewing his record, that he

did not warrant release into society. Parole Defendants’ Exhibits 4-6 - Court Doc. No. 14-5 at 4-

9 (review of Broach’s file failed to establish fitness for release on parole)." Recommendation at

18. 

Finally, Broach argues the court should have deemed the statute governing discretionary

parole review unconstitutional. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the statute is neither facially

invalid nor vague. See Recommendation at 19-21.

Therefore, after an independent evaluation and de novo review, the Plaintiff’s objection is

overruled, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is adopted, and it is hereby ORDERED

as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motions of Summary Judgment are GRANTED, and this case is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Costs are taxed against the Plaintiff.

3. Final Judgment will be entered in accordance with this order.

DONE this 20th day of January, 2009.

 /s/ W. Harold Albritton 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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