Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00746/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00746-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Johnny G. Woods, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Department of Public Safety, 

Unknown Halliday, Unknown Bugenig, 

Unknown Maksimuk, 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-00746-PHX-JJT (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI: 

 Before the Court is Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 74). This matter is before the undersigned on referral from the District 

Judge (Doc. 83). Because a magistrate judge cannot decide a “matter dispositive of a 

claim or defense or a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement,” Rule 

72(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned recommends as follows. 

I. Background 

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s arrest on June 18, 2012, following a traffic stop. 

(Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bugenig stopped his vehicle, 

requested his identification, and then Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk pulled him out 

of his vehicle after he refused their request that he get out of the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 12–

13.) In his complaint, Plaintiff described his removal from the vehicle as follows: 

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[T]hen out of no[where] BANG, BANG, BANG, BANG, THEN I SEEN 

SPARKS IN MY EYES blood running down my face then the door came 

open then officers pulling on my hair, arm tryin[g] to pull me out the truck 

then one of the police said his seat belt is on. 

[O]ne of the police undid my seat belt then they pulled me and beat me up. 

[O]fficer [B]ugenig, [M]aksimuk, [C]overt and Peterson, kicked me kneed 

me punched me in my back, shoulder, legs etc. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 14–15.)1

 

 Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully stopped, that the officers who carried out 

the traffic stop assaulted him before improperly arresting him, and that the vehicle he was 

driving was improperly towed. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-17, 54.) The Court previously dismissed all 

claims against Defendants Robert Halliday and the Arizona Department of Public Safety 

(“DPS”), which eliminated Count Two in its entirety as well as other claims as they 

pertained to Defendants Halliday and DPS. (Doc. 20 at 2–3.) 

 Regarding Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk (“Defendant Officers”), Plaintiff 

alleges in Count One, that the Defendant Officers violated his constitutional rights by 

subjecting him to an illegal stop, search, and seizure. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Count Three alleges 

that the Defendant Officers used excessive force when ordering him out of the vehicle 

and arresting him, Count Four alleges that the Defendant Officers falsely arrested 

Plaintiff, and Count Five alleges that the Defendant Officers violated Plaintiff’s due 

process rights by towing his vehicle and “[t]he killing of Patton.” (Id. at ¶ 49, 52–54.)2

 

The remaining Counts (Six through Eleven) assert claims against the Defendant Officers 

under Arizona law (Id. ¶¶ 56–84), which were dismissed by the Court on June 12, 2014 

(Doc. 51 at 4–5). The Court also previously dismissed the portion of Count One relating 

to a search given that no search was alleged as well as the “Patton” allegation in Count 

Five. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest in Maricopa County Superior Court on 

 

1

 Officers Peterson and Covert were not named as defendants. 

2

 It is unclear who Patton is. 

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April 8, 2014. (Doc. 75 at 2, ¶4.) Plaintiff brought the present lawsuit before being 

convicted. (Doc. 1.) On May 16, 2014, Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk filed a 

motion to dismiss arguing that Plaintiff’s constitutional claims (his claims under 42 

U.S.C. §1983 in Counts One, Three, Four, and Five) are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994), because of Plaintiff’s conviction. (Doc. 44.) The Court denied the 

motion, stating, “[a]s unlikely as it appears to the Court that Plaintiff will succeed, 

Defendants have not convinced the Court that Plaintiff failed to meet the minimal burden 

placed on him at this early stage to allege facts sufficient to make his claim plausible.” 

(Doc. 51 at 5–6.) 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss filed on May 16, 2014 (Doc. 44) also argued that 

Plaintiff’s claim for deprivation of property without due process of law (Count Five) fails 

because the only property he was possibly deprived of was the vehicle when it was 

towed. Defendants argued that A.R.S. § 28-3511 required the vehicle to be impounded 

by the Defendant Officers. The Court denied the requested dismissal of Count Five: 

“Defendants’ argument that they were required to tow Plaintiff’s vehicle because he had 

an invalid driver’s license cannot succeed when the Complaint makes no mention of an 

invalid driver’s license and Defendants have pointed to no evidence in the record that the 

Court could take judicial notice of that proves the fact.” (Doc. 51 at 5.) 

On July 10, 2015, remaining Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk filed a motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. 74) supported by a statement of facts (Doc. 75) regarding 

the remaining claims in the case, which are Counts One (absent the unlawful search 

allegation), Three, Four, and Five (absent “the killing of Patton”) of the Complaint 

against the Defendant Officers. Plaintiff responded (Doc. 80), supported by a statement 

of facts (Doc. 81), and the Defendant Officers have replied (Doc. 82). This motion is ripe 

for decision. 

II. Standard for Granting or Denying a Motion for Summary Judgment 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Disputed facts which are not material will not defeat summary judgment. “Only 

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 

242, 249 (1986). Substantive law determines which facts are material. Id. at 248. 

The dispute must also be genuine. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if 

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving 

party.” Id. at 249. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring 

the nonmoving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, 

summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50. 

Summary judgment is also appropriate against a party who “fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, 

and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the 

mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 

1049 (9th Cir. 1995). 

All assertions of fact in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary 

judgment must be clearly stated and supported. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Rules of 

Practice for the U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, provide a specific procedure for 

fulfilling the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). LRCiv 56.1(b) requires that the party 

opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a Controverting Statement of Facts, 

which sets forth: 

(1) for each paragraph of the moving party’s separate statement of facts, a 

correspondingly numbered paragraph indicating whether the party disputes 

the statement of fact set forth in that paragraph and a reference to the 

specific admissible portion of the record supporting the party’s position if 

the fact is disputed; and (2) any additional facts that establish a genuine 

issue of material fact or otherwise preclude judgment in favor of the 

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moving party. Each additional fact must be set forth in a separately 

numbered paragraph and must refer to a specific admissible portion of the 

record where the fact finds support. 

If a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c), the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the 

motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

Here, Plaintiff violated LRCiv 56.1(b) in that he did not number any paragraphs in 

his statement of facts or correspond paragraphs with Defendants’ numbered statement of 

facts; Defendants violated LRCiv 56.1(a) by putting too many statements of fact into 

several paragraphs (e.g., ¶¶6, 14) and including in their statement of facts “other 

undisputed facts (such as those providing background about the action or the parties).” 

See also infra note 4. Despite Plaintiff’s non-compliance with LRCiv 56.1(b), where 

Plaintiff has controverted a statement of fact by Defendants in his response filings (Docs. 

80, 81) and supports such with admissible evidence, the Court will consider the statement 

of fact disputed by Plaintiff.3

 Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court 

need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” 

Where indicated below, the Court will consider relevant, admissible materials that the 

parties have made part of the record as exhibits to their statements of facts. 

III. Facts for Purposes of this Motion 

The below facts are either undisputed, or, where indicated, disputed and viewed in 

light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. 

Events leading to the traffic stop 

On the day of Plaintiff Woods’ arrest, Defendant Bugenig pulled Plaintiff over 

approaching the 202 freeway and Santan because the vehicle being driven by Plaintiff 

displayed an expired temporary registration plate in the rear of the vehicle. (Doc. 75 at 2, 

¶ 9.) Plaintiff admits that he was driving a vehicle with an expired temporary registration 

 

3

 Plaintiff filed a sworn and notarized affidavit regarding Docs. 80 and 81. (Doc. 81 at 9.) 

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at its rear, and Plaintiff admits that Defendant Bugenig pulled over the vehicle for this 

reason. (Doc. 81 at 2.) 

Interactions between Plaintiff and Defendant Bugenig before backup arrived 

Defendant Bugenig communicated with Plaintiff through the closed passenger 

window to obtain Plaintiff’s license and insurance. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he and 

Officer Bugenig “argued concerning constitutional rights.” (Doc. 80 at 3.) Plaintiff 

further describes the communications as follows: “Plaintiff was upset about being pulled 

over, but gave Officer Bugenig the information he asked for.” (Doc. 81 at 2.) Plaintiff’s 

exhibits to his statement of facts include Defendant Bugenig’s testimony from Plaintiff’s 

criminal trial which estimates that he and Plaintiff had communicated for “likely a minute 

or so” before Defendant Bugenig went back to his patrol vehicle during the stop. (Id. at 

12.) When Defendant Bugening returned to his patrol vehicle, he called for backup; he 

did so before running Plaintiff’s driver’s license information. (Id. at 2.) Defendant 

Bugenig further testified that he “called for backup because of [Plaintiff’s] demeanor. It 

was clear he wasn’t going to cooperate . . . .” (Id. at 13.) 

Plaintiff’s driving privileges were suspended at the time of the stop 

When Defendant Bugenig ran a records check on Plaintiff’s driver’s license after 

calling for backup and before arresting Plaintiff, he learned that Plaintiff’s license was 

suspended. (Doc. 75 at 4 ¶10.)4

 Plaintiff expressly admits this fact and submitted 

Defendant Bugenig’s trial testimony which reflects that Plaintiff’s driving privileges were 

suspended when Defendant Bugenig ran Plaintiff’s information through the MVD 

database. (Doc. 81 at 2, 13.) Further, “[w]hen backup arrived [including Officer 

Maksimuk], . . . Officer Bugenig told them that he was going to arrest Plaintiff for the 

misdemeanor charges.” (Id.) 

 

4

 Defendants’ statement of facts (Doc. 75) in several places, such as here, lacks sufficient reference to the record; for support for these facts, see Doc. 75 at 10. 

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Plaintiff’s refusal to exit vehicle 

There is no dispute that Defendant Bugenig told Plaintiff to exit the vehicle and 

Plaintiff did not comply. (Doc. 80 at 4.) According to Plaintiff’s statement of facts, the 

following occurred after backup arrived: 

The officers then went to each door of Woods’ truck. The case agent in 

charge (Officer Bugenig) and Officer Covert went to the passenger window 

– so Bugenig could talk to Woods. Officer Maksimuk and Officer Peterson 

went to the driver’s side door. Officer Bugenig asked Woods to step out 

of the vehicle and Woods asked . . . “am I under arrest?” Officer Bugenig 

decided to lie to Woods by telling him “no” you’re not under arrest . . . . 

(Doc. 81 at 2–3) (emphasis added). Plaintiff also asserts in his statement of facts that 

Officer Maksimuk did not tell Plaintiff he was under arrest before breaking the vehicle 

window. (Id. at 4.) In contrast, Officer’s Maksimuk’s testimony at Plaintiff’s trial was 

that he did tell Plaintiff that Plaintiff was under arrest before breaking the vehicle 

window. (Id. at 17–18.) 

For purposes of this motion, this Court will take as true that Officer Bugenig told 

Plaintiff that he was not under arrest. Further, for purposes of this motion, the Court will 

accept as true Plaintiff’s statement that at the time that Officer Bugenig told Plaintiff he 

was not under arrest, Officer Bugenig did not make any statement to Plaintiff that 

Plaintiff had the right to remain silent and that anything he said can and will be used 

against Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.) The Court will also accept as true for purposes of this motion 

that, as Plaintiff asserts, Defendant Maksimuk did not tell Plaintiff he was under arrest 

before Defendant Maksimuk broke the driver’s window. (Id. at 4.) The Court is not 

accepting as true or correct, though, Plaintiff’s implied legal conclusions that before the 

officers forcibly removed him from the vehicle, Plaintiff had the right to be informed that 

he was under arrest, that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said could 

and would be used against him. 

It is undisputed that, before Defendant Maksimuk broke the driver’s window, 

Plaintiff refused to get out of his vehicle when asked and told to do so several times by 

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the Defendant Officers. (Doc. 80 at 4; Doc. 75 at 17.) Plaintiff’s statement of facts 

includes criminal trial testimony of Defendant Maksimuk: “I made the decision at a 

certain point that we were going to forcefully remove him from the vehicle, and that’s 

when I asked Officer Covert to come to the driver side and to assist myself and Peterson 

to take him into custody.” (Doc. 81 at 89.) Defendant Maksimuk testified that he made 

the decision “[b]ecause it had gone on – in my opinion, it already gone past the point 

where there was no dialog between them that was eliciting a response of the driver that 

the driver was going to get out of the vehicle.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff submits a portion of a police report by Defendant Bugenig which states 

that Plaintiff “kept both doors locked and refused to roll down his windows.” (Id. at 49.) 

Defendants submit criminal trial testimony of Defendant Maksimuk regarding the door 

and window on the driver’s side. Defendant Maksimuk was asked, “on that side was the 

window up?” (Doc. 75 at 20.) To which he answered, “Yes.” (Id.) 

 During Plaintiff’s criminal trial testimony, he was asked, “[a]nd you had to be 

forcibly removed from the truck. Isn’t that fair to say? Yes or no.” (Doc. 75 at 17). To 

which Plaintiff answered, “Yes.” (Id.) 

Removal of Plaintiff from the vehicle 

Defendants assert that the passenger window was broken in order to open the 

vehicle and physically remove Plaintiff from the vehicle. (Doc. 75 at 3, ¶12.) Plaintiff 

correctly points out that the evidence undisputedly shows it was the driver’s side window, 

not the passenger’s, that was broken. (Doc. 81 at 4–5.) Further, Plaintiff states, “Officer 

Maksimuk made the decision to smash in the driver’s side window, which was inches 

from Plaintiff’s face.” (Id. at 4.) Defendant Maksimuk used an impact weapon, an 

expandable baton, to do so. (Doc. 80 at 4.) Plaintiff states the baton hit him in the head 

on his left cheek (Doc. 81 at 5). Defendant Maksimuk is sure the baton did not hit 

Plaintiff in the head. (Id. at 67.) 

In his response paperwork, Plaintiff describes what happened next: 

These three officers grabbed Plaintiff by his arm and hair (dreadlocks), and 

though [Plaintiff] Woods was seatbelted in, these (3) officers yanked 

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Plaintiff out of the truck and slammed him face down into broken glass. 

All three D.P.S. Officers pinned Plaintiff to the ground with knees in his 

neck and back. The fourth officer, Bugenig joined the other three officers 

and handcuffed him. 

(Doc. 80 at 4–5.) Plaintiff’s account is that had his seatlbelt on when the officers were 

trying to pull him from the vehicle and, therefore, could not be immediately pulled out of 

the vehicle. (Doc. 81 at 25.) 

In contrast, Defendants presented the criminal trial testimony of Defendant 

Maksimuk that Plaintiff pulled away from Defendant Maksimuk as soon as the officer 

grabbed onto his arm. (Doc. 75 at 22–23.) Defendant Maksimuk further testified, “[h]e 

pulled out of my grasp both hands . . . he leaned towards the passenger side. He 

struggled the whole time until I got him out of the vehicle.” (Doc. 75 at 23.) 

Q. So even when you had one hand on the top of his hair and one 

hand on his left arm and you were trying to pull him out, was he still trying 

to pull the other way? 

A. (By Maksimuk) Yes. Yes. He was not going to come out of 

the vehicle. 

(Doc. 75 at 23.) 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s resistance and use of force during the encounter with the 

officers and in support of his account of the events, Plaintiff attaches two DPS Use of 

Force Reporting Forms to his statement of facts, one apparently completed by Officer 

Peterson where the box of “non-responsive” is checked regarding Plaintiff’s resistance 

and “none” is checked regarding Plaintiff’s use of force (Doc. 81 at 32–33). The 

Peterson form also has the boxes checked for control holds used and impact weapons 

displayed. (Doc. 81 at 33.) There are no instructions for this form in either party’s 

motion papers, but Plaintiff attached one page of the DPS Use of Force Policy, discussed 

below (Doc. 81 at 76). The second use of force form Plaintiff attached appears to be 

incomplete; the first page appears to have been filled out by Defendant Maksimuk. (Doc. 

81 at 34.) As Plaintiff points out, the “non-responsive” and “passive physical” boxes are 

checked. (Id.) Like the Peterson use of force form, “none” is checked regarding 

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Plaintiff’s use of force. (Id. at 32–34) Neither “active physical” nor “aggressive 

physical” is checked on either form. (Id.) 

DPS policy regarding use of force 

Plaintiff attached to his statement of facts what appears to be part of the DPS Use 

of Force Policy. (Id. at 76). Plaintiff has attached one page, which introduces the 

concept of a “Use of Force Matrix” that does not appear to be part of the page attached; 

the page also defines varying “Subject Resistance Levels.” (Id.) Passive physical 

resistance is defined as follows: 

Slight potential for physical harm. A subject physically refuses to comply 

or respond to an officer’s command. The subject does not take any action to 

physically defeat the actions of the officer but forces the officer to employ 

other alternative force actions. 

(Id.) Active physical resistance is defined as follows: 

Slight to moderate potential for physical harm. A subject is aggressive or 

combative when the subject makes physically evasive movements to defeat 

an officer’s attempt at control, being taken into or retained in custody, or an 

officer reasonably believes that approaching an aggressive or combative 

subject is unsafe or would escalate the incident. The subject’s physical 

movements may include bracing or tensing, verbal resistance as in 

threatening the officer with physical harm, attempts to push/pull away, or 

not allowing the officer to get close to the subject. 

 (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that part of the DPS Use of Force Policy provides that “Impact 

weapons strikes may be used when facing the active aggression level of resistance;” this 

portion of the policy is not provided in support of the factual assertion about the contents 

of the policy. (Id. at 7; Doc. 80 at 6.) Plaintiff also asserts that the DPS Use of Force 

Policy provides that “Passive resistance or resistance such as a prisoner’s refusal to enter 

a police vehicle or housing room or to let go of a railing, is not sufficient in itself to 

justify the use of impact weapon strikes.” (Doc. 80 at 6). Again, this portion of the 

actual policy is not provided. Defendants’ expert report also references a DPS use of 

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force policy (Doc. 75 at 25, 34), but Defendants do not provide any of the actual policy in 

support of their motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff’s injuries following the encounter with Defendants 

After Plaintiff was arrested, the officers called the fire department to render 

medical aid to Plaintiff. (Id. at 17.) On his request, Plaintiff was taken to Mercy Gilbert 

Hospital. (Id. at 17, 38–46). Defendant has submitted the emergency room records for 

this visit. (Id. at 38–46.) Plaintiff’s exhibit 10 is missing (Doc. 81 at 74), which appears 

to be intended to be records of Plaintiff’s primary doctor documenting Plaintiff’s sworn 

statement that Plaintiff’s primary care doctor increased Plaintiff’s medication from the 

injuries Plaintiff received from the events (Doc. 81 at 6). The Court accepts as true, for 

purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff’s medications were increased by his primary doctor 

due to Plaintiff’s injuries from the events at issue in this case. Further, the Court accepts 

as true for purposes of this motion Plaintiff’s assertions about his injuries, which are 

consistent with the Mercy Gilbert Hospital Emergency records: Plaintiff Woods “was 

treated for . . . a 0.5 cm. laceration to the left side of [his] face, left shoulder strain, lower 

back strain, and hip pain. The doctor gave Woods [pain medication] . . . Plaintiff also 

had his medication increased by his primary doctor.” (Id. at 5–6.) The Court rejects the 

Defendants’ asserted fact that the only injury sustained by Plaintiff was the 

approximately .5 cm. cut on Plaintiff’s face. (Doc. 75 at 3, ¶ 15.) 

Plaintiff asserts that his facial laceration was caused by being hit with Defendant 

Maksimuk’s baton when Defendant Maksimuk broke the driver’s side window to remove 

Plaintiff from the vehicle. (Doc. 81 at 5.) Defendants assert that the .5 cm cut may have 

occurred due to Plaintiff being on the ground next to the vehicle and the broken glass 

from the window of the vehicle. (Doc. 75 at 3, ¶ 13.) Defendant Maksimuk testified at 

Plaintiff’s criminal trial that his baton did not cause the cut on Plaintiff’s face. (Doc. 81 

at 98.) The Court accepts as true that the facial laceration and the other injuries described 

above were sustained after Plaintiff refused to get out of the vehicle. 

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IV. Anaylsis 

A. Traffic stop and arrest 

Plaintiff claims in Count One that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by 

the traffic stop and by his removal from the vehicle he had been driving. An officer may 

conduct a traffic stop if the officer has “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 

has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); see also United States 

v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2015) (traffic stop constitutional when the officer 

observed an expired temporary operating permit on the car). Arizona law requires that 

current registration be displayed for the vehicle Plaintiff was driving, A.R.S. § 28-2532. 

Arizona law allows that a “peace officer may stop and detain a person as is reasonably 

necessary to investigate an actual or suspected violation of any traffic law committed in 

the officer’s presence.” A.R.S. § 13-3883(B). It is undisputed that Defendant Bugenig 

stopped the vehicle Plaintiff was driving due to an expired temporary registration 

displayed at the rear of the vehicle. Defendant Bugenig had probable cause to believe 

that a traffic violation had occurred and therefore to effectuate the traffic stop of the 

vehicle Plaintiff was driving. 

“[O]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the 

police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth 

Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” Pennsylvania v. 

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); see also Newell v. Oro Valley, 789 P.2d 394, 396 

(Ariz. App. 1990). This is so because an officer’s decision to order suspects from the 

vehicle “is a valid precautionary measure designed to afford a degree of protection to the 

investigating officer.” United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988); see 

United States v. Flores, 359 F. Supp. 2d 871, 876 (D. Ariz. 2005). Moreover, the 

“incremental intrusion” resulting from an officer’s request that an individual exit the 

vehicle is de minimus when compared to the legitimate concerns about the officer’s 

safety. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108–111. Thus, as a matter of law applied to undisputed 

facts, Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims based on the Fourth Amendment for the traffic 

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stop and orders to exit the vehicle fail. 

Plaintiff also claims in Count One that his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. “A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a crime committed in 

an officer’s presence violates the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is not supported by 

probable cause.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470–71 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Count Four is a Section 1983 false arrest claim; to prevail on a false arrest or false 

imprisonment claim, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for his arrest. 

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998). The existence of 

probable cause to arrest or detain is an absolute defense to any claim under § 1983 

against police officers for wrongful arrest or false imprisonment because the lack of 

probable cause is a necessary element of each. Lacy v. Cty. of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 

1183, 1193 (D. Ariz. 2008). Arizona law authorizes law enforcement officers to arrest a 

person without a warrant if an officer has probable cause to believe that a “misdemeanor 

has been committed in the officer’s presence and probable cause to believe the person to 

be arrested has committed the offense.” A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(2). 

Probable cause exists when “under the totality of circumstances known to the 

arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability 

that [the suspect] had committed a crime.” United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th 

Cir. 1986); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (examining “the 

events leading up to the arrest” and whether the “historical facts, viewed from the 

standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause”). 

It is undisputed that Defendant Bugenig saw Plaintiff driving a vehicle. It is also 

undisputed that when Defendant Bugenig ran Plaintiff’s license information through the 

MVD database, the result was that Plaintiff’s driving privileges had been suspended. 

Driving with a suspended license is a class 1 misdemeanor crime in Arizona, A.R.S. §28-

3473. The Defendant Officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and therefore, 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendant Officers for wrongful arrest fail as a matter of 

law. Alternatively, the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the 

arrest because a reasonable officer could properly but mistakenly believe that there was 

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probable cause for arresting Plaintiff for driving while privileges to drive are suspended. 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). 

For the reasons above, the Court recommends that Defendant Officers be granted 

summary judgment on Count One and Count Four of the Complaint. 

B. Use of force 

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Officers used excessive force 

in ordering him out of the vehicle and in arresting him. The Fourth Amendment requires 

police officers making an arrest to use only an amount of force that is objectively 

reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 

7–8 (1985). In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that 

Tennessee v. Garner’s Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard applies to 

any force by a law enforcement officer during an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 

seizure. Considerations in applying the Garner objective reasonableness standard to uses 

of force include “the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 

of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 

arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. These factors are not intended to be exclusive in 

determining objective reasonableness. See George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 

2013) (that officers were responding to a domestic violence call is a factor to be 

considered). 

“Because [the excessive force inquiry] nearly always requires a jury to sift through 

disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many 

occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases 

should be granted sparingly.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(citations omitted). In this case before the Court, there are issues of fact which preclude 

determining on summary judgment the reasonableness of the Defendant Officers’ use of 

force. 

In their summary judgment argument regarding the excessive force claim, 

Defendants rely primarily on the opinion of an expert that the force used was reasonable 

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under the circumstances presented. (Doc. 75 at 24–37.) Defendants’ reliance on an 

expert’s report for its summary judgment motion is misplaced. See Billington v. Smith, 

292 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002). The expert report and opinion regarding the 

reasonableness of the Defendant Officers’ use of force relies on facts that this Court 

cannot consider for this motion from the materials presented in support for summary 

judgment. For example, the expert report states, among numerous other conclusions of 

fact, that Plaintiff was using profanity toward Defendant Bugenig, that the Plaintiff had 

the vehicle engine running after stopped, and that the interior of the vehicle was cluttered 

with multiple items making Defendant Bugenig unsure if there were any weapons inside 

(Doc. 75 at 27). Importantly, the expert report’s description of what occurred includes 

that Plaintiff “resisted getting out of the car by pulling his arm and body away from 

Officer Maksimuk’s grip.” In contrast, Plaintiff’s account in his summary judgment 

opposition papers is that he was seatbelted into the vehicle when the window was broken 

by Defendant Maksimuk. Plaintiff’s account is that he could not exit the vehicle once the 

officers were trying to pull him from the vehicle because of being seatbelted into the 

vehicle.5 Plaintiff has also raised a disputed material fact as to whether he was hit in the 

head by Defendant Maksimuk’s baton. 

The Defendants’ expert relied on materials not before this Court in reaching the 

opinions which the Defendants ask this Court to adopt in deciding this case as a matter of 

law, including the complete or majority of the transcript of Plaintiff’s criminal trial (Doc. 

75 at 25, 31, 34). In order to evaluate the reasonableness of the Defendant Officers’ 

conduct, Plaintiff’s resistance, both type(s) and degree, need to be considered. The Court 

declines to adopt the expert’s opinions, particularly given that Plaintiff’s account of his 

resistance (and lack thereof) differs in material respects to the facts that the Defendants’ 

expert relied upon, and given that Defendant Maksumik’s use of force form (Doc. 81 at 

34) seems to contradict his testimony at Plaintiff’s criminal trial about Plaintiff’s level of 

 

5

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resistance (Doc. 75 at 22–23). 

Further, the defense expert also appeared to rely upon or at least consider DPS Use 

of Force Policy which Defendants have not presented to this Court other than partially 

and in the body of the expert report. Plaintiff also has not presented the entire policy to 

the Court, but has attached a portion as well as an argument supported by his account that 

the policy was not followed by the Defendant Officers. Compliance (or lack thereof) 

with the DPS Use of Force Policy will not be dispositive on the issue of the 

reasonableness of the force by the Defendant Officers, but the parties seem to agree it is a 

factor to be considered. “Although such training materials are not dispositive, we may 

certainly consider a police department’s own guidelines when evaluating whether a 

particular use of force is constitutionally unreasonable.” Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. 

City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court cannot adequately 

examine the policy factor on the record presented for the pending motion. 

Whether the vehicle was running or not, whether there was clutter in the vehicle 

which could have concealed a weapon, whether Plaintiff was seatbelted, whether Plaintiff 

pulled away from the officer trying to remove him from the vehicle, whether the DPS 

Use of Force Policy was violated or followed, and other undeveloped facts on this 

summary judgment record (facts which may not have been relevant to and admissible in 

Plaintiff’s criminal trial) as well as whether or not Plaintiff was hit in the head by 

Defendant Maksimuk’s batton are factors that should be weighed in determining whether 

or not the Defendant Officers used only objectively reasonable force given all of the 

circumstances. Given the record before the Court, including disputed material facts, the 

Court cannot rule on summary judgment that the Defendant Officers’ use of force was 

constitutionally reasonable. For similar reasons, Defendants’ argument for summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity fails. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), 

overruled in part, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). The Court recommends 

that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding use of excessive force, Count 

Three, be denied. 

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 C. Towing/impounding of the vehicle 

Plaintiff alleges in Count Five that the Defendant Officers violated his due process 

constitutional rights by “unlawfully towing of the plaintiff’s vehicle interrupting the 

plaintiff’s freedom of movement causing serious financial difficulties for me the 

plaintiff.” (Doc. 1 at 11, ¶ 54). 

Defendants cite A.R.S. § 28-3511 in support of their argument that summary 

judgment is appropriate regarding the count pertaining to the towing of the vehicle, Count 

Five. A.R.S. § 28-3511(A)(1)(a) states in pertinent part that a “peace officer shall cause 

the removal and either immobilization or impoundment of a vehicle if the peace officer 

determines that: 1. A person is driving the vehicle while . . . the person’s driving privilege 

is suspended or revoked for any reason.” Arizona law provides procedural protections 

regarding impounded vehicles under A.R.S. § 28-3511; the procedural protections are 

found at A.R.S. § 28-3514. 

A “procedural due process claim hinges on proof of two elements: (1) a 

protect[ed] liberty or property interest . . . ; and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 

protections.” Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Putting aside the first element, Plaintiff has not met even his initial burden on the second 

element. Plaintiff does not cite any law supporting his position that the impoundment 

was in any way unlawful. Plaintiff does not even refer to the procedural protections 

found at A.R.S. § 28-3514, let alone assert how or why he claims that the process and 

safeguards found at A.R.S. § 28-3514 are constitutionally defective. The Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated by the impounding of the vehicle. 

Alternatively, the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity regarding 

the towing of the vehicle. Defendants assert that Plaintiff admits his driver’s license was 

suspended at the time he was stopped by Defendant Bugenig. (Doc. 75 at 4, ¶ 18.) While 

the deposition testimony of Plaintiff appears to admit such, more important is the 

information that the officer had at the time of the stop. When Defendant Bugenig ran a 

records check on Plaintiff’s driver’s license at the time of the stop, he learned that 

Plaintiff’s license was suspended. (Doc. 75 at 4, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff has not controverted this 

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fact nor has Plaintiff submitted admissible evidence controverting this fact. 

This Court has already found that the Defendant Officers had probable cause to 

arrest Plaintiff for the misdemeanor of driving while privileges to drive are suspended. 

See supra pp. 12–14. This Court also has already found that the Defendant Officers are 

entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest because a reasonable officer could properly 

but mistakenly believe that there was probable cause for arresting Plaintiff for driving 

while privileges to drive are suspended. See supra p. 14. The Defendant Officers were 

following Arizona law when they impounded the vehicle Plaintiff had been driving with 

what objectively and reasonably appears to be with Plaintiff’s driving privileges 

suspended. A reasonable police officer could properly but mistakenly believe that having 

the vehicle towed would not violate a clearly established constitutional right. See 

Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 986 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

Thus, this Court recommends that Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk be granted 

summary judgment on Count Five of the Complaint as a matter of law based on the 

undisputed material facts underlying their summary judgment motion. 

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants Bugenig and Maksimuk’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 74) be granted in part and denied in part. It is 

recommended that summary judgment be granted for the Defendant Officers regarding 

Counts One, Four, and Five. It is further recommended that summary judgment be 

denied for Count Three, Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Defendant 

Officers violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force removing him from the 

vehicle and arresting him. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

 Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

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which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 

 Dated this 4th day of January, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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