Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00945/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00945-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Jesus Humberto Rivera-Carrillo, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV-13-0945-PHX-ROS (DKD)

CR-13-0152-PHX-ROS

CR-12-50187-PHX-ROS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Jesus Humberto Rivera-Carrillo filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He raises four grounds for relief: (1) his plea was

involuntary; (2) his sentence enhancement for a prior conviction violated his protection

against double jeopardy; (3) trial counsel was ineffective; and (4) he did not voluntarily

waive his right to appeal. The government argues that Rivera-Carrillo knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to file a § 2255 motion and to challenge his sentence, and that

counsel was competent in his representation of Rivera-Carrillo. For the reasons stated below,

the Court recommends that his motion be denied.

BACKGROUND

While on supervised release from a sentence imposed in the District Court of Kansas,

Rivera-Carrillo was arrested in Arizona for illegal re-entry (CR 12-50187 , Doc. 5). The case

was transferred to the District of Arizona and a petition to revoke supervised release was

filed on December 19, 2012. On January 30, 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement, RiveraCase 2:13-cv-00945-ROS Document 6 Filed 01/10/14 Page 1 of 4
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Carrillo pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry and admitted violating his supervised release (Doc.

5, Exh D).

During the change of plea colloquy, the Court explained in detail the need for his plea

to be voluntarily made. Rivera-Carrillo agreed that the signature on the agreement was his,

that the plea agreement had previously been read to him in Spanish, that he understood

everything that was in the plea agreement, and that he was satisfied with counsel’s

representation. He also acknowledged that he understood what charges he would be pleading

guilty to, and assured the Court he had not been coerced into taking the plea: that no one had

forced him to plead guilty, made threats against him to make him plead guilty, or made any

unwritten promises to him to make him plead guilty. He also acknowledged that he

understood the elements the government would have to prove, and acknowledged his waiver

of the right to an appeal or to any collateral attacks on his sentence. (Id., Exh E, TR

1/30/2013). The Court found that Rivera-Carrillo knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

entered a guilty plea to the new charge and an admission to a violation of supervised release

(Id.). The district court sentenced Rivera-Carrillo to a 45-month term, within the respective

recommended guideline ranges (CR 12-50187, Doc. 19; CR 13-0152, Doc. 25).

DISCUSSION

As part of the written plea agreement, Rivera-Carrillo agreed to waive “any right to

file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ or motion that challenges ... any

aspect of the defendant’s sentence, including the manner in which the sentence is determined,

including ... motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255" (Doc 5., Exh E at 4). The government argues

that Rivera-Carrillo expressly waived his right to file a § 2255 petition as part of his plea

agreement. Courts will generally enforce the plain language of a plea agreement if it is clear

and unambiguous on its face, United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000), and

the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. United States v. Joyce, 357 F.3d 921, 922 (9th

Cir. 2004). However, “[a] plea agreement does not waive the right to bring a § 2255 motion

unless it does so expressly.” United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). The

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Ninth Circuit has expressed doubt that a defendant, by entering into a plea agreement, could

waive certain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought pursuant to a § 2255

motion, notwithstanding an express plea waiver that covered all of a defendant’s waivable

statutory rights to file a petition pursuant to § 2255 challenging his conviction or sentence.

However, those claims which are not waivable are limited to ones either challenging the

knowing and voluntary nature of the plea agreement, or the voluntariness of the waiver itself.

See United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156-57 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005), citing United

States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433.

Only one of Rivera-Carrillo’s claims is an ineffective assistance claim. The remaining

claims are not reviewable, as he expressly waived them as part of the plea agreement. Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433. The only aspects of Rivera-Carrillo’s ineffective assistance claim that the

Court can review concern the voluntariness of his waiver and the voluntariness of the

agreement itself. A review of the plea colloquy demonstrates that Rivera-Carrillo stated

under oath that the plea was read to him in Spanish, that he understood the terms, that he

understood everything that was in the plea agreement, that he was satisfied with the

representation of counsel, that he understood the charges against him, and that he had no

questions about the plea.

His claim that counsel spoke in “broken Spanish” is belied by the record. Counsel is

fluent in Spanish and was so at the time of the change of plea hearing (Doc. 5, Exh F).

Rivera-Carrillo also expressly stated that the agreement was read to him in Spanish, and that

he was satisfied with counsel’s representation. The record supports the Court’s finding of

a plea agreement entered into voluntarily and intelligently. A review of the change of plea

colloquy also supports the conclusion that his waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally

attack his sentence was knowingly made. Even if he may not have understood the alleged

“broken Spanish” of his lawyer, the plea’s appeal waiver was interpreted for him in open

court by the official court interpreter into the Spanish language. The advice he received was

within the range of competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

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at 1155. In any event, he has not demonstrated any resulting prejudice. The district court

sentenced him to 41 months for the new offense and four months for the supervised release

violation, both at the low-end of the guideline ranges. Therefore, the Court recommends that

Rivera-Carrillo’s motion be denied.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Jesus Humberto Rivera-Carrillo’s Motion to Vacate,

Set Aside or Correct Sentence be denied (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied either because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable,

or because Rivera-Carrillo has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 9th day of January, 2014.

Case 2:13-cv-00945-ROS Document 6 Filed 01/10/14 Page 4 of 4