Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02104/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02104-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The Court sent the Notice required under Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120

n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. ##13, 19.)

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arthur Truman Thomas, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, et al.

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-2104-PHX-FJM (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Arthur Truman Thomas filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, Detention Officer Nyakondo, and Officer

Harring. (Doc. #1.) Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that (1) as to Counts I, II,

and III, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, (2) as to Count III, Plaintiff

cannot demonstrate deliberate indifference to his medical care, and (3) as to all Counts,

Plaintiff cannot prove that Arpaio is responsible in either his personal or official capacity.1

(Doc. #12.) The matter is fully briefed. (Doc. ##22, 25.) 

In addition, Plaintiff moves to strike the Motion to Dismiss and for summary

judgment. (Doc. #15, and contained in #22.) Plaintiff’s motions to strike Defendants’

motion are denied. The Court has already granted Defendants’ request to suspend the

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deadline to file a response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion until 30 days after a

ruling on the pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. #24.) We now grant the motion to dismiss

and therefore deny the summary judgment motion as moot.

I. Background 

Plaintiff raised three counts in his Complaint. In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that he was

handcuffed and in leg-irons at the courthouse when Harring grabbed Plaintiff by the throat,

forced him backwards and against a wall, grabbed him by the hair and jerked his head up and

back, and yelled at Plaintiff and insulted him. In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that he was

forced to spend several hours, on multiple occasions, in a holding cell that had “cock-roaches

everywhere.” In Count III, Plaintiff asserted that Nyakondo ignored Plaintiff’s requests for

a medical “tank order” so that Plaintiff could see medical personnel about his abscessed teeth

and the severe pain in his gums, delaying Plaintiff’s dental care. 

Plaintiff asserted that the acts in the three counts are “in accordance with [Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Office] policies, practices, customs [and] procedures” and are “in

compliance with guidelines written and authorized by [Defendant] Arpaio.” He also asserted

that Arpaio knew about his staff’s actions and had not taken steps to prevent those actions.

The Court directed Arpaio, Harring, and Nyakondo to answer the Complaint and dismissed

the remaining defendant.

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Counts I and II

1. Legal Standard—Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit

with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 unless all available administrative remedies

are exhausted. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050

(9th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2005). He must complete

the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison life,

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless the type of relief offered through the

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administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 919-21 (2007).

Defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Because exhaustion is a matter of abatement

in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. Further, a court has broad discretion as to the method

to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Union, 837 F.2d

365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). 

2. Count I

a. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

required by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Doc. #12.) In support, Defendants submit the

affidavit of Susan Fisher, a Sergeant assigned to the Inmate Hearing Unit. (Id., Ex. 1, Fisher

Aff. ¶ 1.) Fisher attests that her duties include receipt, processing, tracking, and storage of

inmate grievances. (Id. ¶ 2.) The grievance procedure at the jail is a three-tiered system that

includes (1) the initial grievance and decision by a Bureau Hearing Officer, (2) the

Institutional appeal, and (3) the External appeal. (Doc. #12, Ex. A, MCSO Inmate Grievance

Procedure Policy DJ-3.) Fisher asserts that the jail’s grievance policy does not restrict the

type of issues that an inmate may grieve. (Id. ¶ 3.) She further attests that according to the

Sheriff’s Office records, although Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the alleged altercation

with Harring, the grievance was resolved at the shift supervisor level. (Fisher Aff. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff did not pursue the grievance further by filing an Institutional appeal or appealing to

the External Referee. (Id. ) Defendants also submit the MCSO Rules and Regulations for

Inmates and a sample Inmate Grievance Form. (Id., Exs. B, C.)

Plaintiff asserts that he filed a grievance on September 24, 2007, but he was not

questioned about this incident until October 31, 2007. (Doc. #22 at 4.) At that time,

Sergeants Morrison and McWilliams coerced Plaintiff into signing a form that states that the

grievance was resolved by a promise to investigate the matter to completion and to take

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proper action. (Id., Ex. A.) Plaintiff notes that he crossed out the “informally resolved”

language on the form. (Id.) He alleges that, later that day, he realized the two sergeants had

“coerced him to sign-off under duress.” (Id. at 5.) So he filed another grievance and asked

that it be sent to the hearing officer. (Id.) That grievance was returned with instructions to

re-write it. (Id.) Plaintiff wrote another grievance but never received an answer. (Id.) 

In their reply, Defendants argue that the additional grievances provided by Plaintiff

post-date the filing of the Complaint and demonstrate that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before bringing this action. (Doc. #25 at 2-3.) 

b. Analysis

Defendants have met their burden to show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies regarding his claim of excessive force by Harring. Even if Plaintiff

exhausted his remedies, the evidence shows that he did not do so before bringing this lawsuit.

The PLRA mandates that an inmate exhaust remedies before filing a lawsuit;

exhausting remedies during the course of the lawsuit does not comply with the requirement.

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002). The statute itself states that

“[n]o action shall be brought . . . until [the prisoner’s] administrative remedies . . . are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In addition, requiring dismissal where the inmate fails

to exhaust before filing provides a strong incentive that will promote the congressional

objectives behind the exhaustion requirement—affording officials time and opportunity to

address complaints internally, filtering out frivolous claims, and developing an administrative

record. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200-01. See also Holcomb v. Fleeman, 2007 WL 3231588,

at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (inmate’s concession that he did not obtain a Director’s level decision

until after the lawsuit was filed “is fatal to his action”) (citing Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2383;

McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201). 

Defendants provide evidence that an initial grievance was filed on September 24,

2007, and that on October 31, Plaintiff did not ask that it be forwarded to the hearing officer

as a formal grievance. Although Plaintiff argues that prison officials coerced him into a

resolution, he does not explain how they did so; he provides no specific allegations of

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2

 Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a complaint is deemed “filed” when handed by the

prisoner to a prison official for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988);

Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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conduct by Morrison and McWilliams. This is insufficient to show that prison officials

prevented Plaintiff from using the grievance system. See Brown, 422 F.3d at 937

(information provided to the prisoner is pertinent to the issue of the availability of an

administrative remedy); see also Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)

(a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from using is not an “available” remedy

under §1997e). More importantly, Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 22, 2007,2

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before any alleged coercion to resolve his grievance. (Doc. #1.) Plaintiff does not dispute

that he did not pursue the grievance appeal process prior to that time. The Grievance

Procedure permits an inmate to submit a grievance directly to the hearing officers if he has

not received a written response in four calendar days after submitting a grievance to a shift

supervisor. (Doc. #12, Ex. A at 8.) 

And although Plaintiff filed two more grievances on this matter—October 31 and

November 11—both grievances were filed after Plaintiff filed his federal action. Plaintiff’s

claim that a sergeant told him that filing the Institutional appeal on November 27, 2007,

exhausted his remedies is unavailing. (Doc. #22 at 6.) Even if that were correct, which does

not appear to be the case under the Grievance Procedure, Plaintiff must exhaust his remedies

before filing his civil rights case. Count I is dismissed.

3. Count II

a. Parties’ Contentions

Fisher attests that Plaintiff filed no grievances as to unsanitary conditions. (Fisher

Aff. ¶ 7.) In his response, Plaintiff submits evidence that on October 11, 2007, he submitted

a grievance complaining that on August 24, he was placed in a holding cell with hundreds

of cockroaches and that he was again placed in the holding cell on September 24. (Doc. #22,

Ex. B.) He submitted a Grievance appeal on November 14, 2007. (Id.) He also submitted

an External Grievance appeal on November 18. (Id.) 

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In their reply, Defendants acknowledge Plaintiff’s initial grievance on unsanitary

conditions but note that it was untimely and so he received no response. (Doc. #25 at 5.)

They also note that Plaintiff filed an Institutional appeal on November 14, which was

approximately 16 days after Plaintiff filed his lawsuit. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed an External

Referee appeal on November 18, also after the filing of the lawsuit. (Id.) Thus, Defendants

contend that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding unsanitary

conditions prior to filing his lawsuit.

b. Analysis

For the reasons discussed concerning Count I, Defendants have met their burden to

show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Count II prior to filing

his case in federal court. The Court will dismiss Count II without prejudice.

B. Count III and Defendant Arpaio

1. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish deliberate indifference regarding the

alleged delay in receiving medical care and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Arpaio.

(Doc. #12 at 7-12.) First, Defendant claims that Plaintiff fails to show deliberate indifference

because Plaintiff was actively treated on several occasions for his abscessed teeth and his

gum pain. (Id. at 8.) They also assert that there is no evidence of harm as a result of any

delay. They refer to the report of the External Referee, which shows that Plaintiff was seen

at the clinic a day after his medical request for treatment of tooth pain and he did not

complain of pain. (Id., Ex. 2.) Plaintiff also fails to show that the delay caused harm because

the External Referee Report notes that the American Medical Association no longer

recommends routine antibiotics before dental procedures except for patients at the highest

level of risk for bacterial endocarditis. (Id.) 

Next, Defendants assert that Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations that

unconstitutional acts were in accordance with policies, practices, and customs of Arpaio. (Id.

at 10.) And they argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Arpaio for his official

conduct because he fails to show that Arpaio participated in creating a dangerous condition

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and acted with deliberate indifference to a known danger. (Id. at 11.)

In response, Plaintiff asserts that Count III is about Nyakondo’s deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs when Nyakondo walked away from Plaintiff and

would not bring him a tank order to request dental care for his abscessed tooth. (Doc. #22

at 7-8.) Plaintiff asserts that there was delay in treatment and that a 14-day waiting time is

too long. (Id. at 9.) As to Arpaio, Plaintiff argues that the Court has already determined that

the Complaint states a claim, and he points to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff was seen

within 14 days and that this is “within the general time frame provided by dental.” (Id. at

12.) Plaintiff asserts that Arpaio made that policy, custom or procedure. (Id. at 13.)

In their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative

remedies as to Count III because he did not specify that his grievance was about being

ignored by Nyakondo and, in the Complaint, Plaintiff failed to answer the question about

exhausting his remedies. (Doc. #25 at 6-7.) They also assert there is no record of Plaintiff

filing a grievance regarding Nyakondo. (Id. at 7.)

2. Analysis

The Court will dismiss Count III. Plaintiff’s Complaint survived the initial screening

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). (See Doc. #3.) However, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2), -(B)(ii), we shall dismiss at any time a case that fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. We now conclude that the Complaint fails to state a claim,

partly for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In his response brief, Plaintiff asserts that Count III is about Nyakondo’s deliberate

indifference when Nyakondo walked away without providing a tank order. (Doc. #22 at 7-

8.) However, there was nothing in Plaintiff’s grievance about this incident; therefore, he has

not exhausted administrative remedies with regard to this allegation. In any event, according

to Plaintiff’s allegations, a medical tank order was brought to Plaintiff “about an hour or two

later” by a different officer. (Doc. #1 at 5A). A delay of an hour or two in responding to a

non-urgent medical request does not amount to a constitutional violation.

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The remainder of count three, expressed in Plaintiff’s complaint and response alleges

that dental staff delayed too long to treat Plaintiff after he submitted the tank order. But

Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to this allegation. After all,

Plaintiff wrote the complaint only five days after submitting the tank order. (Doc. #1 at 5A).

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn. 

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #12) is granted for failure to exhaust

 administrative remedies.

(3) Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike (Doc. #15, and contained in #22) are denied, and

Plaintiff’s Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. #15, and contained in #22) are denied on

grounds of mootness.

DATED this 18th day of September, 2008.

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