Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02717/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02717-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JESSICA H. JORDAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:18-cv-02717-KJM-AC 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff alleges Nationstar serviced her mortgage loan and made false statements 

to plaintiff related to the loan modification process, drawing out the loan modification application 

process, and threatened plaintiff with foreclosure four times. Defendant now moves to dismiss 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint. As explained below, the court GRANTS the motion IN 

PART with respect to plaintiff’s claims under the California Civil Code section 2923.5 (formerly 

§ 2923.55), and negligence and negligence per se and DENIES the motion IN PART as to 

plaintiff’s claims under the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California 

Civil Code section 1788, et seq., and violation of California Business & Professions Code section 

17200 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Furthermore, the court STRIKES plaintiff’s claims for 

declaratory relief and slander of title. 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 1 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

I. BACKGROUND 

The court set forth the relevant facts in its order on the defendant’s first motion to 

dismiss and incorporates them by reference here. Order, ECF No. 26. 

In that order, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief, 

cancellation of instruments and slander of title, without leave to amend. Id. The court notes the 

plaintiff includes these claims in her first amended complaint. The court dismissed plaintiff’s 

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“RFDCPA”) claims under California Civil Code 

section 1788 et seq., with leave to amend. In its order on the first motion to dismiss, the court 

explained that the first amended complaint should clearly make factual allegations necessary to 

put defendant on notice of plaintiff’s claims and to allow this court to determine the sufficiency of 

her allegations. Id. The court dismissed plaintiff’s Negligence and Negligence Per Se claims with 

leave to amend if possible. Id. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s claim under California 

Business & Professions Code section 17200 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) with leave to 

amend if possible. Id. The court explained this latter claim could not proceed without the 

necessary causal connection between defendant’s alleged actions and plaintiff’s alleged financial 

injury. Id. 

 In her first amended complaint (“FAC”), plaintiff now alleges six claims, 

including claims for declaratory relief and slander of title despite the court’s prior dismissal of 

these claims without leave to amend: (1) declaratory relief, (2) slander of title, (3) violation of 

California Civil Code section 2923.5 (formerly § 2923.55), (4) violation of the California 

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code section 1788, et seq., (5) 

negligence and negligence per se, and (6) violation of California Business & Professions Code 

section 17200 (“UCL”). FAC, ECF No. 31. Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. 

Cooper, (Nationstar) moves to dismiss each of plaintiff Jessica H. Jordan’s claims in her first 

amended complaint. Mot., ECF No. 39. Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion to dismiss. Opp’n, 

ECF No. 47. Defendant replied to the opposition. Reply, ECF No. 50. Given the court’s prior 

dismissal of the declaratory relief and slander of title claims without leave to amend, it need not 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 2 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

reach the merits of defendant’s motion regarding those claims, which the court STRIKES from 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint. 

 The court also does not reach the merits of the motion as directed to plaintiff’s claims 

under the California Civil Code section 2923.5, negligence and negligence per se; because 

plaintiff has simply included them again here without curing the deficiencies identified in the 

court’s prior order, ECF No. 26, they are DISMISSED now without leave to amend. See DCD 

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] district court’s discretion 

over amendments is especially broad ‘where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more 

opportunities to amend his complaint....’”) (quoting Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 347 (9th Cir. 

1980)). 

 Defendant has also filed a request for judicial notice (ECF. No. 41). The court 

need not consider the documents covered by the request in resolving the pending motion and so 

declines to consider any exhibits beyond the complaint. 

II. ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (CLAIM 4) 

 Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the Rosenthal Act on the basis 

that plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails for lack of specificity. Reply at 2, 6-7. In other 

words, it says that plaintiff has failed to plead any conduct that was not part of the ordinary 

foreclosure process. Id. Plaintiff asserts that “the definition of ‘debt collector’ in the Rosenthal 

Act applies to home loan servicers who engage in debt collection practices in attempting to obtain 

repayment of home loan debt.” Opp’n at 6-7. Plaintiff relies on Davidson v. Seterus, Inc., 21 

Cal. App. 4th, 283, 284 (2018), where the court held that the Rosenthal Act, like other “civil 

statutes [,] for the protection of the public are, generally, broadly construed in favor of that 

protective purpose.” (quoting People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court 14 Cal.4th 294, 313 

(1996)). Opp’n at 6-7. In reply, defendant argues that “[t]he conduct at issue in Davidson was 

allegedly abusive telephone calls, not the act of foreclosure” and the Davidson court recognized 

“an exemption” for defendant as “a trustee under a deed of trust.” Reply at 6. 

///// 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 3 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

 Plaintiff has pleaded conduct distinct from the ordinary foreclosure process. 

Specifically, plaintiff pleads that defendant used “false, deceptive and misleading statements in 

connection with their [sic] efforts to collect on a note and deed of trust.”1 FAC ¶ 80. Plaintiff 

alleges that “[s]tarting in 2013, Nationstar threatened Plaintiff with foreclosure four times.” Id. ¶ 

49. Plaintiff asserts she had been paying the homeowner’s insurance and property taxes and “was 

paid current” when defendant “began servicing her loan” and “paid for Plaintiff’s homeowner’s 

insurance and property taxes through an escrow account” because it was “[Nationstar’s] practice.” 

Id. ¶¶ 41-44. Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to those other courts have found sufficiently allege 

debt collection activities beyond the scope of the ordinary foreclosure process under the 

Rosenthal Act. See, e.g., Walters v. Fidelity Mortg. of CA, 730 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 

2010) (“plaintiff’s claim arises out of debt collection activities beyond the scope of the ordinary 

foreclosure process” where “the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is that [loan servicer] engaged in a 

pattern of improper misconduct in the course of servicing her loan”). Defendant’s reliance on this 

court’s decision in London v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2018, No. 2:17-cv-00687-KJM, 2018 WL 

621262, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018), is misplaced. This decision was superseded by London v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2018, No. 2:17-cv-00687-KJM, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018), in 

which the court found plaintiff’s “alleged debt collection practices by Wells Fargo [were] 

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. 

 Plaintiff also pleads similar allegations to those at least one other court has found 

persuasive under the Rosenthal Act. In Schrupp v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:16-00636 

WBS KJN, 2016 WL 3753326, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2016), the court reasoned multiple 

allegations in plaintiff’s complaint showed Wells Fargo “engaged in conduct beyond enforcing 

the original deed of trust.” Id. For instance, the plaintiff had alleged Wells Fargo made “false, 

deceptive, or misleading” statements to plaintiff about providing him a loan modification if he 

made trial period plan payments. Id. And plaintiff alleged Wells Fargo used “unfair or 

 

1

 Nationstar Mortgage LLC is the only remaining defendant in this case. The court notes 

that any reference to another party previously named as a defendant is for background 

information only. 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 4 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

unconscionable means to collect the debt” when it “provided mixed messages about whether the 

rejection of the modified payment in January 2012 was an error.” Id. The court held plaintiff had 

“stated a plausible claim under the Rosenthal Act” and denied Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss. 

Id.

 Here, plaintiff has pleaded defendant “were ‘debt collectors’ [sic] engaging in 

‘debt collection’ practices” under the Rosenthal Act. FAC ¶ 49. Starting in 2013, plaintiff 

alleged she paid “approximately $25,000” to reinstate the loan. Id. The second time, she made a 

“$21,000 payment to Nationstar to avoid foreclosure.” Id. The third time, in 2015, “Plaintiff 

borrowed $14,000 from a family member to reinstate.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges she contacted 

defendant’s “settlement monitor, Michael Bresnick” who “repeatedly indicated the possibility to 

Plaintiff of receiving relief in the form of a loan modification” because she “met the criteria for 

providing one.” Id. ¶¶ 51-52. The court finds these allegations similar to those in Schrupp, 2016 

WL 3753326, at *7. 

 Defendant relies on cases that stand for the general proposition that “foreclosure 

pursuant to a deed of trust does not constitute debt collection under the [Rosenthal Act]” (Reply 

at 6) which does not address the conduct at issue here: conduct distinct from the ordinary 

foreclosure process. See, e.g., Gardner v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 

1192, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Morgera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 

209CV01476MCEGGH, 2010 WL 160348, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2010). The court is not 

persuaded by these cases. In Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-10-01667 JCS, 2011 WL 

30759, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011), the court rejected the contention that defendant Wells 

Fargo, as a mortgage servicer, was not a debt collector under the Rosenthal Act. 2011 WL 30759, 

at *19-20. Although the Reyes court, as have many other district courts, reasoned the foreclosure 

process alone was “not actionable” under the Rosenthal Act, the court found allegations there 

were based “not on the mere act of foreclosure but rather, on allegedly deceptive statements” that 

were “beyond the scope of the ordinary foreclosure process.” Id. at 20. The court finds the Reyes

court’s reasoning persuasive. 

///// 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 5 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

 Defendant’s attempt to distinguish Davidson v. Seterus, Inc., 21 Cal. 

App. 5th, 283 (2018), as not involving the act of foreclosure, but rather allegedly abusive 

telephone calls, is unavailing. See Reply at 6-7; see also Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 728 

F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2013), amended on reh’g in part (9th Cir. 2013) (“The district court, 

while dismissing the claim on other grounds, correctly recognized that Wells Fargo was engaged 

in debt collection”). Here, plaintiff’s allegations fall under the statutory definition of “debt 

collection” under the Rosenthal Act. Under the Rosenthal Act, “debt collection” is “any act or 

practice in connection with the collection of consumer debts.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(b). 

“Consumer debt” is “money, property or their equivalent, due or owing or alleged to be due or 

owing from a natural person by reason of a consumer credit transaction.” Id. § 1788.2(f). And a 

“consumer credit transaction” is “a transaction between a natural person and another person in 

which property, services or money is acquired on credit by that natural person from such other 

person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 1788.2(e). Where the claim 

arises out of debt collection activities “beyond the scope of the ordinary foreclosure process,” a 

remedy may be available under the Rosenthal Act. Reyes, 2011 WL 30759, at *19 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 3, 2011) (citing Walters v. Fidelity Mortgage of California, Inc., 2010 WL 3069341, at *15 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (mortgage servicer that regularly billed plaintiff and collected payments 

on her mortgage debt was “debt collector” under Rosenthal Act and that plaintiff stated claim 

under the Act based on allegation that mortgage servicer engaged in pattern of improper conduct 

ultimately resulting in foreclosure). Further, a “debt collector’s failure to comply with ‘any 

provision’ of the federal FDCPA is sufficient to establish liability under that statute (and, by 

extension, California’s Rosenthal Act)”. Herrera v. LCS Fin. Servs. Corp., No. C09-02843 

TEH, 2009 WL 5062192, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009). 

 Plaintiff has alleged this case involves modification of her homeowner’s mortgage 

loan “on the real property commonly known as 9711 Mindy Lane, Wilton, CA 95693.” FAC ¶ 1. 

To survive dismissal, plaintiff needs only to plead a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiff has alleged debt collection 

practices by defendant sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 6 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7 

 The court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth claim for 

violations of the Rosenthal Act. 

III. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (CLAIM 6) 

 Defendant contends this claim fails as a matter of law because plaintiff has not 

suffered any injury in fact and therefore lacks standing under California’s Unfair Competition 

Law (“UCL”). Reply at 9 (citing FAC ¶¶ 113-115, 118). Defendant also argues, “Even if 

Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient for a determination that she has standing, . . . she fails to 

allege conduct by Nationstar that violated a statute, was ‘false and deceptive’ or which was likely 

to deceive the public” Id. at 9-10. According to defendant, plaintiff’s claim fails to allege any of 

the three statutory prongs sufficiently to state a UCL claim. Id. 

 Defendant argues, “Plaintiff’s allegation that attorney’s fees qualify as ‘damages’ 

under the UCL is simply wrong.” Reply at 9. Defendant relies on a summary judgment case, 

Tamburri v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., No. C-11-02899-DMR, 2013 WL 4528447, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 26, 2013), in which the standard is not the same as that applicable to plaintiff’s UCL claim 

here, because the court in resolving the pending motion does not consider the ultimate question 

“whether a practice is deceptive” if the pleadings are adequate. See Kowalsky v. Hewlett-Packard 

Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“California case law clearly establishes that a 

UCL violation for fraudulent business practices is distinct from common law fraud and does not 

require a plaintiff to plead and prove the elements of a tort.”); London, 2018, No. 2:17-cv-00687-

KJM, 2018 WL 621262, at *8 (“In any event, whether a business practice is deceptive is usually a 

question of fact not appropriate for decision on a motion to dismiss”). 

 In opposition, plaintiff contends her “allegations of substantive statutory violations 

of the HBOR and RFDCPA are sufficient” to proceed on a claim of unlawful business act or 

practice under the UCL. Opp’n at 10. For the reasons stated above, the court has found that the 

first amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to show a violation of the Rosenthal Act. 

Therefore, the first amended complaint also states a claim under the UCL to the extent that claim 

is based on defendant’s alleged violation of the Rosenthal Act. See Reyes, 2011 WL 30759, at 

*21 (citing People v. McKale, 25 Cal.3d 626 (1979)). 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 7 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8 

 A claim for unfair competition under California’s UCL law may be brought “by a 

person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 

competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. “[O]ut-of-pocket expenses or money spent [is] a 

financial harm that constitute[s an] ‘injury in fact’ for purposes of standing under the UCL and in 

federal court.” Janti v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., No. 09CV1969 JLS (CAB), 2010 WL 

3058260, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (quoting Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. 171 Cal. App. 4th 

1305, 1346 (2009)); see also Khan v. K2 Pure Sols., LP, No. 12-CV-05526-WHO, 2013 WL 

6235572, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (“[T]he Court remains persuaded that the attorney’s fees 

the plaintiffs expended in defending against K2’s lawsuits is [sic] sufficient to give them standing 

under the UCL”). 

 Plaintiff sufficiently pleads her UCL claim, correcting the deficiencies in the 

original complaint. See ECF No. 26. Plaintiff alleges defendant “engaged in ‘unfair’ practices 

under the UCL by making the false statements to plaintiff related to the loan modification 

process, adding fees to the loan balance that were unwarranted after purposefully drawing out the 

loan modification application process and proceeding with foreclosure.” FAC ¶ 115. Plaintiff 

alleges similar facts to those in West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 214 Cal. App. 4th 780, 805 

(2013). There, the California Court of Appeal held plaintiff’s allegations, which included that 

defendant bank “made misrepresentations regarding a borrower’s right and ability to challenge 

the bank’s calculation of the [net present value],” “made misrepresentations about pending 

foreclosure sales” and “wrongfully had trustee’s sales conducted when the borrower was in 

compliance with a [trial payment plan],” were sufficient to allege the defendant bank “engaged in 

unfair business practices under any of the three definitions.” Id. Defendant’s assertion here that 

“Plaintiff’s attempt to attribute purported ‘harm to her credit’” “after she filed two bankruptcies” 

is “unreasonable in the extreme,” Reply at 8, does not undercut plaintiff’s allegations of postbankruptcy payments. See FAC ¶ 49. The court finds that plaintiff has standing based on her 

payments to defendant and that plaintiff states a claim based on her allegations of unfair, unlawful 

and fraudulent business practices. 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 8 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9 

 The court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sixth claim under the 

UCL. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The court STRIKES plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief and slander of title. 

The motion is GRANTED IN PART as to plaintiff’s third claim under California Civil Code 

section 2923.5 (formerly § 2923.55), and fifth claim for negligence and negligence per se, 

without leave to amend for failure to correct the deficiencies previously explained. See Order, 

ECF No. 26 at 6-9. The motion is DENIED IN PART as to plaintiff’s fourth claim for violation 

of the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil Code section 

1788, et seq., and sixth claim for violation of California Business & Professions Code section 

17200, California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Defendant shall file an answer to the 

claims that survive within fourteen (14) days. 

This order resolves ECF No. 39. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 24, 2020. 

Case 2:18-cv-02717-DAD-AC Document 65 Filed 01/27/20 Page 9 of 9