Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01071/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01071-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE KASSAB,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv1071 GPC

(WMC)

ORDER DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

[DKT. NO. 182]

vs.

SAN DIEGO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, a municipal

corporation, et al.,,

Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the Court Order

issued on January 11, 2013 granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss parties and limit

the issues to be tried. ECF No. 182. For the reasons set out below, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts several §1983 claims against

Defendants, including false arrest and false imprisonment, assault and intimidation,

and excessive force and battery. ECF No. 49. Plaintiff also alleged state law civil

rights violations and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. On September

9, 2009, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all of

Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

- 1 - 07cv1071 CAB (WMc)

Case 3:07-cv-01071-BAS-JLB Document 184 Filed 04/17/13 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s state law claims. Dkt. No. 123. Mr. Kassab appealed the Court’s ruling

to the Ninth Circuit. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in

part, and remanded. Kassab v. San Diego Police Department, 453 F. App’x 747, 748

(9 Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly granted

th

summary judgment on Mr. Kassab’s §1983 claims “concerning the searches of his

store, his arrest, and his prosecution because these claims are Heck-barred.” Id. at

*748. See also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Ninth Circuit

also upheld summary judgment on the excessive force claim “alleging that

defendant Nunez slammed a car door on his knee because Kassab failed to create a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Nunez acted intentionally.” Id. The

Ninth Circuit further upheld the excessive force claim against the “City of San

Diego defendants because there was no underlying constitutional violation as to the

car door incident, and Kassab failed to create a triable dispute as to whether the

exposure to excessive heat was the product of a city custom or practice or a failure

to train.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment on only one issue -

Kassab’s excessive force claim that “he was detained in a police car for more than

four hours, with the windows rolled up, no air conditioning, and an interior

temperature of 115 degrees.” Id. The Court of Appeals held that a genuine issue of

material fact existed as to whether the police used excessive force in leaving Kassab

in the hot police car. Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed summary

judgment on the claim “as to the individual officers” and remanded for further

proceedings. Id. 

On January 11, 2013, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss parties

and limit the issues to be tried. ECF No. 181. In that order, the Court dismissed all

but two Defendants, San Diego Police Officers Skinner and Hernandez, pursuant to

the Ninth Circuit ruling which affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the

case back to the district court. Kassab, 453 F. App’x 747. The Court further held

that the only issue to be presented at trial would be the one excessive force count

- 2 - 07cv1071 CAB (WMc)

Case 3:07-cv-01071-BAS-JLB Document 184 Filed 04/17/13 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that was reversed and remanded pursuant to the aforementioned Ninth Circuit

ruling. Id. 

Plaintiff asks this Court to set aside its ruling based on two arguments. First,

Plaintiff asserts that the Court improperly dismissed Officer Millet because she was

the arresting officer and therefore should remain a Defendant. ECF No. 182 at 2. 

Second, Plaintiff contends that the City of San Diego should also remain a

Defendant. Id. In opposition, Defendants point out that Plaintiff fails to

acknowledge the Ninth Circuit opinion affirming the District Court’s granting of

summary judgment as to all issues except one excessive force claim. ECF No. 183 at

2. Defendants further contend that the admissible evidence in the matter shows that

only Officers Skinner and Hernandez were involved in the arrest of the Plaintiff,

and that any allegations that Officer Millet was involved in the arrest are mere

conjecture or inadmissible evidence. Id. at 3. Defendants also assert that the City of

San Diego should not be a named Defendant in the matter because the claims

against the City are Heck-barred and the District Court’s findings dismissing those

claims were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 

DISCUSSION

A district court may reconsider an order under either Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59 (e) (motion to alter or amend a judgment) or Rule 60(b)(relief from

judgment). Under the local rules, a party that files a motion for reconsideration of

an order must set forth the material facts and circumstances surrounding the motion,

including any new or different facts and circumstances that are claimed to exist

which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application. L. Civ. R. 7.1.i.

Motions for reconsideration offer an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in

the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani,

342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir.2003). Reconsideration is appropriate if the district

court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or

- 3 - 07cv1071 CAB (WMc)

Case 3:07-cv-01071-BAS-JLB Document 184 Filed 04/17/13 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in

controlling law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff first argues that the Court wrongfully dismissed Officer Millet

because she assisted with his arrest. Plaintiff attaches to his declaration a statement

by Officer Hernandez that indicates he assisted Officer Millet in the execution of the

arrest warrant for Steven Kassab. ECF No. 182, Exhibit 2. The statement further

details a planning meeting between Officer Millet and Officers Hernandez and

Skinner prior to the operation taking place which lead to Plaintiff’s arrest. 

Defendants object to the submission of the statement as inadmissible evidence that

has never been brought forth before the Court. Defendants further contend that the

statement does not show that Officer Millet participated in the arrest of Mr. Kassab. 

Defendants remind the Court that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling affirmed the Courts

summary judgment on all counts with the exception of one excessive force claim by

Officers Hernandez and Skinner and, as such, Officer Millet was properly

dismissed. 

The Court will not rely on evidence that could have been made available to

the Court prior to the order granting summary judgment, which the Ninth Circuit

affirmed on all but one count. Although Plaintiff brings this motion for

reconsideration of the order dismissing defendants and limiting the issues at trial, it

appears that Plaintiff is also attempting to re-litigate the previous order granting

summary judgment. For example, Plaintiff states that he has the right to show that

Officer Millet is personally liable under 42 U.S. C section 1983. ECF No. 182 at 6. 

However, the allegations of a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 were dismissed by

the Court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that ruling. If the proffered evidence was

available before disposition of the motion for summary judgment, then as a matter

of law the movant is not entitled to reconsideration based upon that evidence. All

Hawaii Tours, Corp. v. Polynesian Cultural Ctr., 116 F.R.D. 645, 649 (D. Haw.

- 4 - 07cv1071 CAB (WMc)

Case 3:07-cv-01071-BAS-JLB Document 184 Filed 04/17/13 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1987) rev'd, 855 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1988)(citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac.

Aircraft Industries, 813 F.2d 1553, 1557–58 n. 4 (9th Cir.1987); Frederick S. Wyle

P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 764 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir.1985)). Here, Plaintiff failed to

demonstrate that the evidence could not have been obtained before the Court ruled

on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court now refuses to consider

the evidence after the Ninth Circuit has ruled upon the appeal of the order granting

summary judgment. The Court further refuses to review new evidence upon

reconsideration of a completely separate order seeking to implement the Ninth

Circuit’s decision. 

Plaintiff’s argument that the Court improperly dismissed the City of San

Diego also fails for similar reasons. Plaintiff again asserts 42 U.S.C. section 1983

claims against the City of San Diego, an issue that was dismissed by the Court and

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. ECF NO. 182 at 7. The Ninth Circuit found that Mr.

Kassab “failed to create a triable dispute as to whether the exposure to excessive

heat was the product of a city custom or practice or a failure to train.” Kassab, 453

F. App’x 747. As the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of this claim, and as Plaintiff

has not stated any other reason to support his argument, the Court refuses to

reconsider its decision dismissing the City of San Diego as a defendant. 

Plaintiff has not brought forth any other assertions that the Court has

committed clear error, that the decision was manifestly unjust or that there was an

intervening change in controlling law. For these reasons, the Court stands by its

January 11, 2013 order dismissing all defendants except San Diego Police Officers

Hernandez and Skinner, and limiting the issue to be tried to the one excessive force

claim. ECF No. 181. 

- 5 - 07cv1071 CAB (WMc)

Case 3:07-cv-01071-BAS-JLB Document 184 Filed 04/17/13 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is

DENIED. 

DATED: April 17, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

- 6 - 07cv1071 CAB (WMc)

Case 3:07-cv-01071-BAS-JLB Document 184 Filed 04/17/13 Page 6 of 6