Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00184/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OTIS THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

IMAM ABDUL MALIK SAAFIR, et

al.,

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 06-0184 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE; DIRECTING

DEFENDANTS TO FILE

DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE

REGARDING SUCH MOTION

Plaintiff, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison

(“SVSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against Imam Abdul Malik Saafir (“Saafir”), Sergeant M. J. Kircher (“Kircher”), and

Captain G. Ponder (“Ponder”), all SVSP officials. He alleges the three defendants denied

him “Jumah” religious services, which are mandated by his Muslim faith, between

November 19, 2004 and December 3, 2004.

By separate order filed concurrently herewith, plaintiff has been granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

The First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion is violated where a

defendant burdens the practice of a prisoner’s religion by preventing him from engaging in

conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). To reach

the level of a constitutional violation, "the interference with one's practice of religion 'must

be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a

tenet or belief that is central to religious doctrine.'" Id. at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822

F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)). A prisoner may be inconvenienced in the practice of his or

her faith so long as the governmental conduct does not prohibit the prisoner from

"participating in the mandates of his religion." See id. The mandates of a religion are not

merely what is minimally required of adherents of a religion but include that which "the

individual human being perceives to be the requirement of the transhuman Spirit to whom he

or she gives allegiance." Peterson v. Minidoka County School Dist., 118 F.3d 1351, 1357

(9th Cir. 1997). A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First Amendment rights is

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See O'Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants barred him from participating in Jumah services

states a cognizable claim for the violation of his First Amendment rights. See Mayweathers

v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding policy of disciplining inmates for

missing work assignment to attend Jumu’ah (Sabbath) services interfered with conduct

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mandated by Muslim faith and was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests).

Defendants’ alleged conduct may also constitute a violation of the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, provides: "No

government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in

or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which institutions include state

prisons, state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on

that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(a). The statute applies to any "program or activity that receives Federal financial

assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). Enactment of the RLUIPA was a legitimate

exercise of Congress’s spending power, and the statute does not run afoul of the First

Amendment Establishment Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the principle of separation of

powers. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (9th Cir. 2002); but see Resnick

v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 768 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (expressing “grave constitutional doubts”

about applying RLUIPA standards to “bare constitutional claims”) (dicta).

CONCLUSION

1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshall

shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint in this matter, all

attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Imam Abdul Malik Saafir, Sergeant M.

J. Kircher, and Captain G. Ponder at Salinas Valley State Prison. The Clerk shall also

mail a courtesy copy of this order to plaintiff and the California Attorney General’s Office.

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be

supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

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immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the opinion that

this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior

to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date defendants’

motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to

plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A

motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary

judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will

end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for

summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that

contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact

for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case

will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary judgment

must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on every essential

element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to defendants'

motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by plaintiff to the granting of

the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran,

46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir.

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1994). 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

2. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on

defendants, or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy

of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

3. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local

Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

4. It is plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a timely

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

5. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be

granted. However, the party making the motion for an extension of time is not relieved from

his or her duty to comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a

motion for an extension of time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines

set by the Court until an order addressing the motion for an extension of time is received. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be

extended.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 11, 2006 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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