Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00846/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00846-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 07cv846

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES HARRY FRANCK,

Petitioner,

v.

SUZAN L. HUBBARD, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.07cv846-J (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

James Harry Franck (“Petitioner”) is a California prisoner serving a thirteen year sentence for

residential burglary, being under the in fluence of cocaine, and resisting an officer. He has filed a First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 12] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing the

trial court violated his First Amendment right to free speech when it prohibited him from addressing the

court subsequent to closing arguments at his trial. Respondent filed an answer to the petition and

supporting documents [Doc. No. 14]. Petitioner did not file a traverse. After a thorough review, the

Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested, and RECOMMENDS that his petition

be DENIED.

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/ / /

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BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion denying Petitioner’s

direct appeal. This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539,

545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts).

“At about 3:30 p.m. on June 3, 2004, Franck broke into Todd Bradley’s

apartment when Bradley was not at home and stole a VCR, DVD player, and VHS

cassettes. Bradley’s neighbor, Alicia Ramos, heard breaking glass and saw Franck

leave the apartment with two plastic trash bags. Ramos summoned the police. Before

the police arrived, Franck obtained ice cream from an ice cream vendor on the street,

and then went to an alley and showed the stolen items in the bags to a man in a truck.

When the police arrived, Franck left the items on the tailgate of the man’s vehicle and

started walking slowly away. The police called out to him to stop and return for

questioning. At first Franck ignored their commands, but eventually he turned and

walked back to the police. Franck was detained and then arrested. 

Franck had broken through a sliding glass door to gain entry into Bradley’s

apartment. A brick from Bradley’s yard was found on the floor in the apartment.

Holes in the sliding screen and glass doors suggested that Franck threw the brick

through the screen and the glass door, and then reached his hand in and unlocked the

glass door. At the time of this arrest, Franck had no blood, cuts, or scratches on his

arms.

Blood tests showed that Franck tested positive for cocaine and

methamphetamine use. Neighbor Ramos noticed that Franck was staggering as he

was carrying the heavy bags away from the apartment, and when she saw his face it

appeared that he was either very drunk or under the influence of drugs. The police

ascertained that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol based on his

alcoholic smell, bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, fluttering eyelids, dry mouth, rapid

pulse, and profuse sweating. He appeared paranoid; he was constantly looking

around, acting nervous and fidgety, and asking the same questions over and over. At

one point he asked if he was “going to prison” or “going to hell.” However, the police

did not observe him staggering or having any other problems walking, and he

appeared aware of his surroundings. He spoke coherently, responsively, and without

slurring his words. 

Franck was initially cooperative with the police, but after he was arrested his

behavior became out of control and irrational. When he was in the police car, he was

yelling and cussing, hitting the protective cage with his shoulder or head and kicking

the car door, windows, and roof. Failing to heed police warnings to stop, the police

pepper-sprayed him and tied his feet. Because was telling police to kill him, the

police eventually took him to a county mental health facility. At county mental

health, Franck told the police that he had consumed seven 24-ounce malt liquor beers.

He told the police that he had told them to kill him because he was upset about being

arrested. After a county mental health evaluation, Franck was released back into

prison custody.

Based on Franck’s blood test results, toxicologist Dale Somers opined that

Franck had taken drugs many hours earlier and that the effects were wearing off. In

Somers’ view, the cocaine in Franck’s system had broken down to such a degree that

it would not have interfered with his functioning other than making him feel tired, and

the methamphetamine in his system would cause some impairment but would not

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cause extreme distortions of time or judgment. [footnote omitted] On crossexamination, Somers acknowledged that the use of cocaine, methamphetamine, and

alcohol in combination could seriously impair a person’s ability to be rational and

logical.

Rejecting Franck’s voluntary intoxication defense, the jury found him guilty

of residential burglary. It also found him guilty of the misdemeanors being under the

influence and resisting an officer. Franck admitted [a] prior prison term, serious

felony, and strike allegations, and was sentenced to 13 years in prison.” 

[Lodgment No. 3, People v. Franck, No. D045831, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal.Ct.App. October 14, 2005.).] 

The jury found Petitioner guilty of residential burglary (Cal.Penal Code § 459, 460), being under

the influence of cocaine (Cal.Health and Safety Code § 11550(a)), and resisting an officer (Cal.Penal

Code § 148 (a)(1)), after which the trial court sentenced him to a thirteen year term of incarceration. 

[Lodgment No. 1, 61-63; 9.]

Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

Division One. [Lodgment No. 8.] Petitioner raised two claims before the appellate court. First,

Petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his burglary conviction, arguing that

because of his intoxication he lacked the specific intent to commit theft. Petitioner also claimed that the

trial court abused its discretion during sentencing in refusing to dismiss his strike prior under the Three

Strikes law. On October 14, 2005, the appellate court rejected his claims and affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentence. [Lodgment No. 11, 5-10.] Petitioner did not seek direct review by the

California Supreme Court. 

On March 15, 2006, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the San Diego Superior Court. [See Lodgment No. 12.] Petitioner raised four claims for relief: (1)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to use a defense of alcohol and drug-induced temporary

insanity or psychosis; (2) violation of his First Amendment right to free speech when he was not

allowed to address the court directly after the completion of closing arguments; (3) diminished capacity

at the time of the offense because he was not taking his psychiatric medication and therefore was

cognitively impaired; and (4) violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment based on the trial court’s refusal to dismiss his prior strike conviction. [Lodgment No. 12,

“Grounds for Relief,” 3-4 with supplemental pages attached.] On May 4, 2006, the Superior Court

denied the Petition in a written order. [Lodgment No. 13, 4.] On April 14, 2006, Petitioner filed an

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1

 Petitioner was presented with the standard options given pursuant to Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510,

520-21 (1982): (1) demonstrate exhaustion; (2) voluntarily dismiss the petition; (3) formally abandon his

unexhausted claim; or (4) file a motion to stay the federal proceedings while he exhausts his claims in state court. 

(See Order filed May 17, 2007, at 2-4.) 

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identical habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, alleging the same four claims. On December

20, 2006, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition without comment. [See Lodgment No. 15.] 

On May 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a federal petition alleging four grounds for relief: (1) violation

of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice based on the trial court denying his motion for a

Marsden hearing; (2) violation of his First and Sixth Amendment rights when he was refused the

opportunity to address the court directly at the completion of closing arguments; (3) violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights based on prosecutorial vindictiveness; and (4) trial court

sentencing error under Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). [See Lodgment No. 16,

“Grounds for Relief,” 6-9 with supplemental pages attached.] Petitioner filed a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis concurrently with his federal petition. The Court granted the motion, but stated that

Petitioner failed to allege exhaustion for his Cunningham claim. (See Order filed May 17, 2007, Doc.

No. 3, 2-4.) The Court instructed Petitioner regarding his options to proceed, given his failure to

exhaust at least one of his four claims, and set a July 5, 2007, deadline for Petitioner to choose an option

and file an appropriate pleading.1

 (See id.) 

On July 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a “Petition to Motion to Procede [sic] in Forma Pauperis to

Staying in Federal District and Getting a Favorable Decision in Supreme or Exhausting Remaining

Claims Simultaneously” [Doc. No. 4], as well as a Notice of Lodgment in Support [Doc. No. 7]. The

Court construed the motion as a request by Petitioner to stay and abey his petition in order to return to

state court to exhaust his Cunningham claim, and ordered Respondent to file a response to the motion

[Doc. No. 5]. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8], arguing that Petitioner failed to

exhaust all four of his claims properly, and thus his petition should be dismissed in its entirety. The

undersigned prepared a Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 9] for the presiding District Judge

finding that Petitioner properly exhausted only his First Amendment free speech claim. Petitioner

specifically pled his claim regarding the refusal to allow him to address the court directly during trial as

a violation of the First Amendment in both of his state habeas petitions, thus he “fairly presented” the

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issue to the California Supreme Court and the claim was properly exhausted. The undersigned further

recommended his motion for a stay be denied based on his failure to demonstrate good cause for not

exhausting his other three claims. Finally, the undersigned recommended that Respondent’s motion to

dismiss be granted, but that Petitioner be given an opportunity to file an amended petition deleting the

unexhausted claims and presenting only his exhausted First Amendment claim. 

On March 18, 2008, Judge Jones adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety [Doc.

No. 11]. On May 1, 2008, Petitioner filed his first amended petition, in which he states only one ground

for relief, his First Amendment claim, as directed by the Court’s prior order. [First Amended Petition,

Doc. No. 12, 6]. Respondent filed an answer on May 29, 2008, arguing that Petitioner had no

constitutional right to address the court personally after his trial counsel’s closing argument, and thus his

claim should be denied. [Doc. No. 14]. 

LEGAL STANDARD

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). A federal habeas court may grant relief under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle

from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. 

Id. Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and the petitioner carries

the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

/ / /

/ / /

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ANALYSIS

Petitioner asserts one ground for relief in his first amended petition. Specifically, Petitioner

claims that his First Amendment right to free speech was violated when he was not permitted to address

the court directly after the completion of closing arguments at his trial. [First Amended Petition,

“Grounds for Relief,” 6 with supplemental pages attached.] In support of his claim, Petitioner states that

at the time of his arrest, he had $40 in his pocket and a brand new walkman for $20 that he could have

sold for money; but his trial counsel refused to present these facts to the jury in defense of the intent

element of the burglary charge, and therefore Petitioner tried to address the court after closing

arguments to explain those facts as his last “hope.” [Id.] Because he was denied the opportunity to

speak directly to the court, Petitioner claims a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. 

As mentioned previously, Petitioner asserted this claim in his state habeas petition before the

California Supreme Court. See Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a

habeas petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if the federal claim was presented to the

highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it). The high court denied the petition without comment. 

[See Lodgment No. 15.] Therefore, this Court is required to “look through” the high court’s summary

order to the last reasoned state court opinion. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir.

2004). The state superior court’s order denying his petition is the last reasoned state court decision. 

In denying the claim, the court stated:

“Here, Petitioner states his counsel was ineffective for: not presenting proof to the

jury that he possessed money when arrested, which would have proven he did not

commit the crime for money; not allowing him to testify at trial; and admitting his

guilt to the jury. However, as stated above, Petitioner has attached no evidence to his

petition supporting any of his claims. A petitioner’s unsubstantiated, self-serving

statements do not provide a sufficient basis upon which to prove his claims. [citation

omitted.] Petitioner has also not made any showing he suffered prejudice as a result

of her [sic] trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, and has not shown that a

reasonable probability exists that, but for his trial counsel’s failing, the result of his

case would have been more favorable to him. Accordingly, this Court need not reach

the issue of whether Petitioner’s counsel’s assistance fell outside the range of

reasonable professional assistance.”

[Lodgment No. 13, 3-4.] 

/ / /

/ / /

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2 The Pirtle court explained that when there is “no state court decision on an issue to which to accord

deference,”. . . “concerns about comity and federalism that arise when a state court reaches the merits of a petition

for post-conviction relief do not exist. [citation omitted.] Accordingly, following our sister circuits – the Third

and the Fifth – we hold that when it is clear that a state court has not reached the merits of a properly raised issue,

we must review it de novo. [footnote omitted.] See Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding

7 07cv846

In his state petitions, Petitioner presented an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect

to his trial counsel’s failure to put on a psychiatric defense at trial. [Lodgment No. 12, 3.] With respect

to his complaint about not being allowed to address the court after closing arguments, Petitioner

presented this claim as a violation of his First Amendment rights only; he did not reference the Sixth

Amendment, nor cite to any case law, state or federal, supporting a Sixth Amendment violation in

support of the claim. [Lodgment No. 12, 4.] Irrespective of this, the state superior court subsumed

Petitioner’s claim into a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as applied to the state

through the Fourteenth Amendment, and did not address the claim within the context of Petitioner’s

First Amendment right to free speech. It was not until Petitioner filed his original federal petition that

he presented this claim and the underlying facts as a violation of both his First and Sixth Amendment

rights. [Lodgment No. 16, 7.] The underlying facts in his federal petition were the same as those that he

presented to the state courts in support of his claim when he cast it only as a First Amendment violation. 

In ruling that only Petitioner’s First Amendment claim had been exhausted properly, this Court

held that Petitioner specifically pled his claim before the state courts as a violation of the First

Amendment, thus Petitioner had “fairly presented” the First Amendment claim to the California

Supreme Court. (See District Court’s March 18, 2008 Order Adopting Report and Recommendation,

Doc. No. 11, 8-9.) When Petitioner filed his first amended petition with this Court, he abandoned his

unexhausted claims and presented his claim solely as a First Amendment claim. [First Amended

Petition, “Grounds for Relief,” 6.] Although the state superior court treated the First Amendment claim

as a part of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth

Amendment claim was not fairly presented by Petitioner in his state petition to the California supreme

court. As such, a unique situation results in which the last reasoned state court decision fails to address

Petitioner’s sole remaining claim in federal court, his First Amendment claim. As there is no state

decision on the merits of this claim, this Court reviews it de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).2

 Thus, the Court must independently determine whether Petitioner’s first

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28 that a federal habeas court must review de novo purely legal issues and mixed questions of law and fact when,

“although properly preserved by the defendant, the state court has not reached the merits of a claim thereafter

presented to a federal habeas court”).”

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amendment rights were violated at the close of his trial. 

Turning to a review of the record, the pertinent portion of the trial transcript indicates that

subsequent to the prosecution’s closing argument, the court ordered a ten minute recess and then

resumed, with Petitioner, both attorneys, and all members of the jury present in the courtroom. 

[Lodgment No. 4, Reporter’s Appeal Transcript (“RT” hereafter), 237.] Petitioner’s trial attorney then

addressed the jury for purposes of the defense’s summation and closing argument. [AR at 237-45.] The

prosecutor made his final rebuttal arguments. Immediately thereafter, Petitioner queried of the court:

[Petitioner]

Q: Your Honor, may I address the Court, please?

[The Court]

A: No, I’m afraid you can’t, Sir.

Q: I can’t?

A: There is not the time.

Q: On my own behalf?

A: I’m afraid not, Sir. You guys talk for a minute.

[Attorney-Client Discussion Held Off the Record]

[AR at 249.]

The above exchange provides the factual basis for Petitioner’s claim. 

“Clearly established federal law” with respect to an accused’s rights during his criminal trial is

far too voluminous to recount here. Federal jurisprudence repeatedly has upheld the protections

guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the Bill of Rights, and has established without deviation that

those protections extend to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment. An accused enjoys

multiple constitutional rights during the course of his trial. First and foremost, the Fifth Amendment

provides that a defendant cannot “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 

See U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment also guarantees the right not to be subjected to

prosecution for the same offense to “be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” id. The “confrontation

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3 Specifically considering a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as they apply to closing arguments

before a court, the most closely related situation to the case at bar, the Supreme Court has held that a denial of an

opportunity to make a closing argument violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. Herring v. New

York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (holding that statute authorizing trial judge in non-jury criminal case to refuse to

hear defense closing argument violated the Sixth Amendment); see also United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 602

(9th Cir. 2004) ( “It can hardly be doubted that a defendant has a right to a closing argument.” ).

9 07cv846

clause” of the Sixth Amendment gives defendants the right to confront witnesses against them. See U.S.

Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment also guarantees the right to a public trial, the right to be tried

by a jury of peers in most cases, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to effective assistance of

counsel for one’s defense.3 

The instant case is peculiar, in that Petitioner’s single claim remaining before the Court invokes

none of the protections mentioned above, and instead is based on the First Amendment guarantee of

freedom of speech. Respondent argues that Petitioner, who was represented by counsel throughout the

entire proceeding, had no constitutional right to address the court after final closing arguments because

he was represented by competent counsel who provided a summation and closing argument on

Petitioner’s behalf. [Answer, 7.] Respondent informs the Court that she was not able to find any

authority to support Petitioner’s contention that he has an independent First Amendment right to speak

to the court directly during his trial. [Id.] 

The Court now turns to its analysis of Petitioner’s claim within the context of the clearly

established federal law regarding the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides: “Congress

shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to

petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. There is no doubt that, as a

general matter, speaking in a courtroom in front of a judge and jury is an expressive activity. The

pertinent question in this case is whether a criminal defendant’s “speech” in that environment is

protected by the First Amendment, and if so, to what extent. 

In order to determine whether Petitioner can succeed on the merits of his First Amendment

claim, the Court must begin its inquiry by determining the nature of the relevant forum, in this case, the

courtroom in which his trial was held at the San Diego County Superior Courthouse. Courtrooms,

although accessible by the public, are not areas that traditionally have been made available for public

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4

 Other courts have addressed the issue of whether courthouses and/or their grounds constitute public

fora. None have so found. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Sammartano v. First Judicial

Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2002).

10 07cv846

assembly, debate, or speech. Nor is the primary purpose of a courtroom to provide a platform for

members of the public to espouse their views. The purpose, rather, is the impartial and efficient

administration of justice under the law. Given the traditional function of courtrooms, the Court

concludes that the courtroom which hosted Petitioner’s trial is a non-public forum.4

In a non-public forum, the government can control expression so long as the regulations used to

do so are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, and are viewpoint neutral. Cornelius v.

NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). The government is not required

to choose the least restrictive alternative, it need only choose one that reasonably fulfills a legitimate and

demonstrated need. Swarner v. United States, 937 F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1991). Regulation on

speech in a courtroom during a trial, even by a criminal defendant himself, is not an unreasonable means

to ensure the legitimate interest of ensuring the efficient and fair administration of justice, certainly a

legitimate governmental goal. Clearly established Supreme Court law confirms this. In Sheppard v.

Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966), the court noted that “Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the

accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court

should be permitted to frustrate its function.” (emphasis added.) The Supreme Court has fleshed out this

view of the First Amendment in the courtroom as it applies to counsel. In Gentile v. State Bar of

Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2743 (1991), the court stated as dicta: “[i]t is unquestionable

that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has

is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial

court beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal.” 

A traditional First Amendment analysis supports the conclusion that all participants in a

courtroom proceeding lack the First Amendment right to “speak freely” before the Court. Although

courtrooms always have involved the most important kind of speech and debate, it does not follow that

expression in the courtroom is without restraint. As mentioned previously, proceedings which take

place in a courtroom, which presumably involve speech by attorneys, clients, witnesses, jurors, and

court personnel, are presided over by a judge with the discretion to conduct and control the proceedings

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and therein are fundamentally inconsistent with the basic concept of “free” speech. Procedural rules,

evidentiary rules, and judicial discretion, operate to limit what anyone present at courtroom proceedings

may or may not say. For example, witnesses may only speak when called to the stand, and then they are

allowed to speak only within the parameters of the questions they are asked by the court or counsel. If a

witness strays outside of these confines, evidentiary objections by the attorneys and admonishments

from the court immediately restrict their speech. 

Thus, having reviewed the record in this case de novo, as well as the clearly established

applicable federal law, the Court finds that the limitation placed on Petitioner’s speech in the courtroom

during his trial was not unreasonable in light of the trial judge’s legitimate goal of ensuring an efficient

and fair trial for a defendant represented by competent counsel throughout the entirety of the

proceedings. 

Finally, even if the Court were to conclude that Petitioner held the First Amendment right to

speak freely and without restraint of any kind in the courtroom during his trial, and that the trial court

violated this right when it denied his request to speak after the completion of closing arguments, it is

worth noting that Petitioner ultimately was given the opportunity to express himself to the court prior to

his sentencing hearing, by way of a letter that he addressed and mailed directly to the trial judge. The

following excerpt from the hearing transcript confirms this:

[The Court]

Q: Any legal cause why sentencing should not be pronounced?

[Defense counsel]

A: No your honor. I also have a letter that my client is addressing to the

court, but I’m letting the other parties read that.

Q: I have one in my file that was written by Mr. Franck. Is that the same

letter?

A: Actually, it’s a new letter.

Q: This one is filed with the court January 12th.

[The Defendant]

A: I mailed it.

[Defense counsel]

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A: He mailed it.

[Prosecutor]

A: We’re reading a letter dated November 15, 2004.

[The Court]

Q: This could be different than this one?

[Defense counsel, addressing his client]

Q: Are they essentially saying the same thing?

[The Defendant]

A: Essentially, yes.

[The Court]

A: Then I have a statement in mitigation filed by Mr. Miller and the

probation officer’s report, and of course I heard the trial in this matter. I

read that letter. It came here a few days ago, I think.

[AR at 265.] 

Petitioner’s expression of his feelings, concerns, apologies, and promises for the future, although

regulated by the court, was by no means entirely prohibited, and in fact was given its due consideration

by the court at the appropriate time and under the correct procedural circumstances. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial court violated

his First Amendment right to free speech during the course of his trial in light of clearly established

federal law, and therefore RECOMMENDS that his petition be DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court RECOMMENDS that the petition be DENIED. This Report

and Recommendation is submitted by the undersigned Magistrate Judge to the United States District

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of Title 28, United States Code, section 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 5, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than September 12, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 5, 2008

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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