Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00105/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00105-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LEE JOHNSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RUSH ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00105-JLT-SAB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PAPE 

TRUCKS INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

(ECF Nos. 106, 107, 108, 109, 111)

I.

INTRODUCTION

This is a California state law product liability action1arising out of the personal injuries 

sustained by Plaintiff William Johnson (“William”) on December 21, 2018, as a result of an 

explosion that occurred during the refueling of a compressed natural gas cylinder that was part of 

the fueling system for a commercial vehicle. William, by and through his guardian ad litem 

Jerrad Johnson (“Jerrad”) (see ECF No. 12), as well as Plaintiffs Joan Johnson and B&N 

Trucking, Inc. (“B&N”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) initiated this action on January 24, 2019. (ECF 

1 The action is before this Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, which is not disputed by any of the parties. 

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No. 1.) 

Presently before this Court is Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Pape 

Trucks, Inc.’s (“Pape”) motion for summary judgment.2 (ECF No. 106.) The motion has been 

opposed by Plaintiffs (ECF No 107), Defendant/Cross-Complainant/Cross-Defendant Carleton 

Technologies, Inc. dba Cobham Mission Systems (“Carleton”)/Cobham PLC,3(ECF No. 108), 

and Intervenor Plaintiff Markel American Insurance Company (“Markel”) (ECF No. 109). Pape 

has replied. (ECF No. 111.) A hearing on the motion was held on July 19, 2023. (ECF No. 115.) 

Counsel Christopher J. Dow appeared via videoconference for Pape. Counsel Matthew C. Clark 

and Thomas C Seabaugh appeared by videoconference for Plaintiffs. Counsel Vijay J. Patel 

appeared via videoconference for Carleton. Counsel Timothy E. Cary appeared by 

videoconference for Markel. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the motion for summary judgment shall be denied. 

II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations 

Plaintiffs initiated this action on January 24, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed the 

operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on February 14, 2019. (ECF No 13.) The operative 

first amended complaint proceeds against Defendants Carleton, Pape Trucks, and Natural Gas 

Fuel Systems, Inc. dba Momentum Fuel Technology (“Momentum”) (collectively, “Defendants”). 

(ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff B&N purchased a Kenworth tractor with Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) 

1NKYD39X3KJ294692, the subject commercial vehicle (“subject vehicle”), which was outfitted 

with a compressed natural gas (“CNG”) fueling system affixed to the rear and passenger-side of 

2

 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge and this action has been 

assigned to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone for purposes of final disposition of the instant motion for summary 

judgment only. (See ECF Nos. 112, 113.)

3 Various filings interchangeably refer to Carleton dba Cobham Missions Systems as “Carleton” or “Cobham.” (See

ECF No. 22, 24, 33.) For consistency and ease of reference, the Court shall refer to this party herein as “Carleton.” 

Carleton subsequently indicated that “Cobham PLC” indirectly owns 10% or more of Cobham Mission Systems 

(formerly Carleton). (ECF No. 50.) Cobham PLC was voluntarily dismissed on August 30, 2019. (ECF Nos. 51, 

52.) 

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the passenger cabin (“CNG System” or “subject fuel system”). (FAC ¶ 16.) The CNG System 

was comprised of three carbon fiber cylinders stacked vertically in a rack affixed to the rear of the 

passenger cabin. (Id. at ¶ 17.) These cylinders were enclosed in a metal box, and were connected 

with various lines, valves, and pressure relief devices. (Id.) This system also included a sidebelly cylinder affixed to the passenger side of the subject vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiffs allege 

the subject vehicle and CNG System were purchased only days before the December 21, 2018 

incident. (Id. at ¶ 16.) 

Defendant Momentum is a CNG fuel system manufacturer. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs allege 

Momentum designed and manufactured the CNG system, including the mounting rack, manifold, 

and control panel that were installed onto the subject vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21.) Plaintiffs further 

allege Momentum employees installed the CNG System onto the subject vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

Defendant Carleton is a designer and manufacturer of pressure vessels.4 (FAC ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiffs allege Carleton designed and manufactured the carbon fiber cylinders used in the CNG 

System, including the cylinder that ruptured/exploded on December 21, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 20.) 

Defendant Pape was, at all relevant times, a commercial vehicle manufacturer. (Id. at ¶ 

11.) Plaintiffs allege the aforementioned installation took place at Pape’s Kenworth dealership. 

(Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs further allege Pape sold B&N the subject vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21.) The 

subject vehicle and CNG System were brand new at the time of the incident. (Id. at ¶ 22.) B&N 

made one payment to Pape Trucks, that included the cost of the subject vehicle and the CNG 

system. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs also allege B&N purchased a second Kenworth tractor (“sister 

vehicle”), which was outfitted with the same Momentum-designed and manufactured natural gas 

fueling system and Carleton-designed cylinders concurrently with the subject vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 

29.) 

On the date of the incident, William was fueling the subject vehicle for the very first time 

at a CNG facility in Buttonwillow, California. (Id. at ¶ 23.) While fueling, all four cylinders 

were filled simultaneously. (Id. at ¶ 27.) At that time, Plaintiffs allege that one of the cylinders 

4 The Court notes all allegations and claims asserted against Carleton were also asserted against Defendant Cobham 

PLC, which was voluntarily dismissed on August 30, 2019. (ECF Nos. 51, 52.)

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located behind the passenger cabin (the “Subject Cylinder”) ruptured. (Id. at ¶ 23.) A 

“catastrophic” release of pressure occurred, causing a shock wave to emanate outward. (Id. at ¶ 

24.) The shock wave caused portions of the subject vehicle and CNG System to fly hundreds of 

feet in every direction, the subject vehicle was destroyed and the surrounding CNG fueling 

facility sustained major structural damage. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs allege the cylinders were not 

fully filled and therefore had not yet reached capacity at the time of rupture. (Id. at ¶ 28.) 

William was standing within a few feet of the CNG System and subject cylinder at the 

time of the rupture and was severely injured. (Id. at ¶ 25.) William sustained personal injuries 

including brain damage and multiple fractures. (Id.) 

Plaintiff B&N brings this action based upon economic losses, including lost profits, 

sustained as a result of both specialized tractors—the subject vehicle and the sister vehicle—

becoming unusable as a result of the incident.5 (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiffs William and B&N assert causes of action against Defendants Momentum, 

Carleton, and Pape for: (1) strict products liability–manufacturing/design defect; (2) strict 

products liability–failure to warn; (3) negligent products liability; (4) breach of implied warranty 

of merchantability; and (5) general negligence (id. at ¶¶ 31–69); they assert cause of action (6) 

against Momentum for negligent hiring, training and/or supervision (id. at ¶¶ 70–77); and 

William’s wife, Joan (“Joan”), asserts cause of action (7) against Momentum, Carleton, and Pape 

for loss of consortium damages she sustained resulting from William’s injuries (id. at ¶¶ 3, 78–

82). 

B. Defendant Carleton’s Answer and Crossclaim 

On April 19, 2019, Defendant Carleton answered the FAC. (ECF No. 22.) Carleton 

admits it designed and manufactured the cylinders used in the CNG System, including the 

cylinder that ruptured/exploded, but that it did so pursuant to Momentum’s requirements. (Id. at

4.) 

Carleton asserts crossclaims against Momentum and Pape for: (1) indemnity and 

5 Plaintiffs allege that the sister vehicle was also intended to be utilized in conducting B&N Trucking’s business in 

the foreseeable future, but that it was deemed unusable as a result of the December 21, 2018 incident. (Id. at ¶ 30.) 

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contribution; and (2) declaratory relief. (Id. at 18–20.) 

On May 16, 2019, Momentum answered Carleton’s crossclaim. (ECF No. 34.) Pape did 

not file an answer to Carleton’s crossclaim.

C. Momentum’s Answer and Crossclaim 

On April 23, 2019, Momentum answered the FAC. (ECF No. 28.) Momentum admits 

that it manufactures a variety of compressed natural gas fuel storage system configurations which 

integrate with multiple body “OEMs,” that it designed and manufactured the CNG fuel storage 

system (minus the carbon fiber cylinders) installed on the subject vehicle, and that it contracted 

with Carleton to manufacture the carbon fiber cylinders used in the CNG fuel storage system 

installed on the subject vehicle. (Id. at 3, 5, 7.) 

Momentum asserts a crossclaim against Carleton for: (1) express indemnity; (2) breach of 

contract; (3) total equitable indemnity; (4) contribution; and (5) declaratory relief. (Id. at 25–29.) 

On May 14, 2019, Carleton answered Momentum’s crossclaim. (ECF No. 33.) 

D. Pape’s Answer and Crossclaim 

On May 20, 2019, Pape answered the FAC. (ECF No. 36.) Pape denies that it was a 

designer, manufacturer, or installer of the CNG System and subject cylinder. (Id. at 6.) 

Further, Pape brings a crossclaim against Defendants Carleton (Cobham) and Momentum 

on the basis that, should liability be established, any and all damages are the result of the actions 

of Momentum and Carleton. (Id. at 15–19.) Pape asserts crossclaims against Momentum and 

Carleton for (1) total equitable indemnity; (2) contribution; (3) negligence (regarding the design, 

construction, installation and distribution of the CNG system sold to Pape and installed in the 

vehicles sold to B&N); and (4) declaratory relief. (Id. at 16–18.) 

On June 10, 2019, Carleton and Momentum each answered Pape’s crossclaim. (ECF Nos. 

39, 40.) 

E. Markel’s Intervenor’s Complaint 

On November 12, 2019, Markel filed a motion to intervene as subrogee of American 

Natural Gas, LLC (the owner of the gas station at which the incident occurred). (ECF No. 53.) 

Markle alleges it is subrogee of American Natural Gas, LLC (“American,” or the “Insured”), 

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which owned the gas station (the “subject property”) at which the incident occurred. (Intervenor 

Compl. ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 69.) American was insured by Markle at the time of the incident. (Id. at 

¶ 6.) The cylinder rupture/explosion that is the subject of the instant lawsuit caused substantial 

damage to the Insured’s property, which required Markle to pay policy benefits in the amount of 

$498,921.33. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Markle asserts the following causes of action on behalf of the Insured 

against Defendants Momentum, Carleton, and Pape Trucks: (1) negligence; (2) strict productions 

liability–manufacturing defect; (3) strict products liability–design defect; and (4) strict products 

liability–failure to warn. (Id. at ¶¶ 23–51.) Markle seeks to recover damages in the amount of 

policy benefits paid to the Insured ($498,921.33) as a result of the subject incident. (Id. at 9.) 

Pape Trucks, Momentum, Plaintiffs, and Carleton all filed statements of non-opposition to 

Markel’s motion to intervene. (ECF Nos. 54, 57, 58, 59.) The Court granted Markel’s motion on 

June 3, 2020 (ECF No. 68); on June 5, 2020, Markel filed its intervenor complaint against all 

Defendants. (ECF No. 69.) 

On June 26, 2020 and July 9, 2020, respectively, Pape and Momentum answered the 

complaint in intervention. (ECF Nos. 70, 71.) Carleton did not file an answer to the intervenor 

complaint. 

F. Pape’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

On June 1, 2023, Pape filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 106.) 

The motion addresses the issue of whether Pape can be held jointly and severally liable to 

Plaintiffs, or liable in contribution or indemnification to any other party under a strict products 

liability theory based on California law. Thus, Pape seeks summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs

and Intervenor Markle’s strict products liability claims and Defendant/Cross-Defendant/CrossPlaintiff Carleton’s strict products liability crossclaims. (See id. at 9.) 

On June 15, 2023, oppositions were filed by Plaintiffs (ECF No. 107); Carleton (ECF No. 

108); and Markel (ECF No. 109). In addition to objecting to and disputing certain facts in their 

response to Pape’s statement of undisputed facts (see ECF No. 107-1 at 1–45), Plaintiffs also 

submitted a statement of disputed facts in support of their opposition to summary judgment (Pls.’ 

statement of disputed facts (“Pls-SDF”), ECF No. 107-1 at 45–55). 

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On June 26, 2023, Pape filed a reply brief. (ECF No. 111.) Pape did not file any response 

to Plaintiffs’ statement of disputed facts, or otherwise dispute or object to the facts asserted 

therein. (See id.) 

On June 27, 2023, the parties stipulated for the motion for summary judgment to be heard 

and decided by U.S. Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone. (ECF No. 112.) The district judge 

assigned this matter to the Magistrate Judge for final disposition the same day. (ECF No. 113.) 

On July 19, 2023, the parties appeared for the hearing on the motion, as previously 

detailed. (See ECF No. 115.) The matter was deemed submitted. 

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in 

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp. (Matsushita), 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when the 

moving party demonstrates no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 

U.S. 144, 157 (1970). “In cases that involve . . . multiple causes of action, summary judgment 

may be proper as to some causes of action but not as to others, or as to some issues but not as to 

others, or as to some parties, but not as to others.” Conte v. Jakks Pac., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 895, 

902 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also

Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1990); Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue 

Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1989). A court “may grant summary adjudication as to specific 

issues if it will narrow the issues for trial.” First Nat’l Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 977 F. Supp. 1051, 

1055 (S.D. Cal. 1977). 

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those 

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together 

with affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (Celotex), 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To carry its burden of 

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production on summary judgment, a moving party “must either produce evidence negating an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party 

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion 

at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc. (Nissan Fire), 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 

(9th Cir. 2000). “If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmoving 

party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate 

burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1102–03; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160. 

If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585–87. 

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the nonmoving party need 

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor but need only show the claimed 

factual dispute “require[s] a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). Nevertheless, 

“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will 

be insufficient.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Similarly, the 

nonmoving party may not merely rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings or 

“show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” but must instead tender 

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or admissible discovery material, in 

support of its contention that the dispute exists. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Est. of Tucker v. 

Interscope Records, 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)). 

Finally, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact 

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, and 

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52. 

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable 

affidavits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 

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1982). In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 

F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The evidence of the nonmoving party is to be 

believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts pleaded before the court 

must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Comite de 

Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Thus, the Court determines only whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 

F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, mere disagreement as to legal 

implications of the material facts does not bar summary judgment. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 

521, 530 (2006). Rather, the inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement 

to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter 

of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. “If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough 

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins the motion for 

summary judgment.” Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 

In arriving at this order, the Court carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points 

and authorities, declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if 

any, objections, and other papers filed by the parties, the arguments presented at the July 19, 2023

hearing, as well as the Court’s file. Omission of reference to an argument, document, paper, or 

objection is not to be construed to the effect that this Court did not consider the argument, 

document, paper, or objection. This Court thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence it 

deemed admissible, material, and appropriate. 

IV.

DISCUSSION

Pape argues evaluation of the policy factors set forth in Bay Summit Community 

Association v. Shell Oil Company, 51 Cal. App. 4th 762 (1996), demonstrates it was not in the 

stream of commerce for purposes of strict liability. Further, Pape argues public policy 

considerations do not support imposition of strict liability. Accordingly, Pape seeks summary 

judgment as to the strict liability claims asserted against it by Plaintiffs, Carleton, and Markel in 

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the FAC and crossclaims.6 

A. Strict Liability/Stream of Commerce 

The California Supreme Court established the doctrine of strict products liability in 

Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., when it held “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort 

when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for 

defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.” Greenman, 59 Cal.2d 57, 

62 (1963). In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., the California Supreme Court extended the 

doctrine to retailers, reasoning

Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of 

distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the 

overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost 

of injuries resulting from defective products. In some cases the 

retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably 

available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself 

may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or 

may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that 

end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to 

safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords 

maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice 

to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection 

between them in the course of their continuing business 

relationship.

Vandemark, 61 Cal.2d 256, 262–63 (1964) (internal citations omitted).

Following these cases, courts have applied strict liability to those involved “in the vertical 

distribution of consumer goods, including lessors of personal property, developers of massproduced homes, wholesale and retail distributors, and licensors,” reasoning that “although these 

defendants were not necessarily involved in the manufacture or design of the final product, each 

was responsible for passing the product down the line to the consumer.” Bay Summit, 51 Cal. 

App. 4th at 773 (internal citations omitted). Liability of all such defendants is joint and several. 

Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC, 63 Cal. App. 5th 466, 477 (2021) (citation omitted). 

California courts may also extend the doctrine of strict liability to parties who were not in 

the actual vertical distribution chain. See Bay Summit, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 773. Doing so, 

6 The Court notes that, in limiting its summary judgment motion to the strict liability claims, Pape does not challenge 

other claims asserted against it by the parties, such as Plaintiffs’ negligence claims. 

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however, must be consistent with public policies such as enhancing product safety, maximizing 

protection to the injured plaintiff, and apportioning costs among the defendants. See Arriaga v. 

CitiCapital Commercial Corp., 167 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1535 (2008). Where such policies are 

satisfied, and an entity “is instrumental in placing a defective product ... into the stream of 

commerce, then liability [should] attach[] without regard to conduct (fault).” Bay Summit, 51 

Cal. App. 4th at 773. 

Under this “stream of commerce” theory, courts focus on the actual connection between 

the defendant’s activities and the defective product. Id. at 774 (citations omitted). In Bay

Summit, the court set forth three factors to determine whether “the facts establish a sufficient 

causative relationship or connection between the defendant and the product so as to establish that 

the policies underlying the strict liability doctrine are satisfied”: (1) the defendant received a 

direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant’s role 

was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in 

bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and (3) the defendant had control over, or a 

substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process. Id. at 776.

B. Analysis 

No party disputes that the explosion of the subject truck occurred due to a defective 

product. Rather, Pape moves for summary judgment on all strict liability claims asserted against 

it on the basis that the public policy considerations underlying strict liability are not met here, and 

that liability, therefore, may not be imposed under stream of commerce or chain of distribution 

theories. (ECF No. 106 at 9, 13–15.) Moreover, Pape argues it should not be considered to be in 

the stream of commerce for the subject fuel system because the Bay Summit factors are not met. 

(ECF No. 106 at 9–11 (citing Petitpas v. Ford Motor Co., 13 Cal. App. 5th 261, 266 (2017)).) 

Plaintiffs, Markel, and Carleton oppose the motion,7arguing that Pape is not a mere 

7 The Court notes the oppositional briefs, statements of disputed and undisputed facts, and evidentiary support 

submitted by Plaintiffs and Markel are essentially identical. Carleton joins Plaintiffs’ opposition. Accordingly, the 

Court may refer at times to an individual opposing party’s arguments, as appropriate, but will generally refer to 

Plaintiffs, Markel, and Carleton as the “opposing parties,” and reference the oppositional arguments as cited in 

Plaintiffs’ briefing. Further, Carleton proffers the additional argument that Pape is not entitled to summary judgment 

with respect to the claims Carleton asserts against it because Carleton does not assert any strict liability claims 

against Pape Trucks. Pape acknowledges this fact in its reply briefing and appears to concede this argument. (ECF 

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“passthrough” party with a tangential or attenuated connection to the defective product, but a 

retailer and seller of the subject truck and therefore a direct link in the distribution chain for strict 

liability purposes. (ECF No. 107 at 8–12; ECF No. 109 at 7–11 (citing Vandermark, 61 Cal.2d at 

256).) As such, the opposing parties argue the general rule—that there is strict joint and several 

liability for every entity in the chain of distribution—applies here, and that Pape does not fall into 

one of the limited exceptions of “new or novel territory” which require consideration of public 

policies under the stream of commerce theory. (ECF No. 107 at 14–15; ECF No. 109 at 12–14.) 

In reply, Pape argues the Bay Summit and Vandermark policy factors do not only apply to 

“new and novel” cases; but in any event, the facts of this care are unique. (ECF No. 111 at 9–11.) 

Further, Pape argues only the Momentum fuel system, and not the subject truck itself, is the 

alleged defective product, and the opposing parties have not presented any evidence that Pape did 

or failed to do anything to cause damage to the subject cylinder before it ruptured. (Id. at 7–8, 

12–14.) 

1. Whether Bay Summit Factors Apply to this Case

As an initial matter, the Court addresses the parties’ dispute as to which legal standard is 

to be applied to the circumstances of the instant case and whether the policy factors set forth in 

Bay Summit must always be evaluated, as Pape contends. Here, the Court finds the opposing 

parties have the better argument. 

As previously noted, the California Supreme Court held manufacturers are strictly liable 

for a defective product placed on the market that causes injury to a consumer. Greenman, 59 

Cal.2d at 62. In establishing the doctrine of strict liability, the court explained “[t]he purpose of 

such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by 

the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are 

powerless to protect themselves,” id. at 63, and concluded that, “[t]o establish the manufacturer’s 

liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the [product] in a 

way it was intended to be used [and was injured] as a result of a defect in design and manufacture 

No. 111 at 5 n.1.) Therefore, to the extent Pape moved for summary judgment against Carleton (see ECF No. 106 at 

1–2, 5), such motion shall be denied as moot. 

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of which plaintiff was not aware that made the [product] unsafe for its intended use,” id. at 64. 

The California Supreme Court extended the doctrine to include retailers and anyone 

identifiable as “an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise” in 

Vandermark. 61 Cal.2d at 262. In Vandermark, the plaintiffs purchased a new Ford motor 

vehicle from defendant Maywood Bell Ford, an authorized Ford dealership, and shortly thereafter 

sustained serious injuries resulting from a vehicle collision. Id. at 258–59. Prior to the accident, 

the plaintiffs took the car to Maywood for the regular 1,000-mile new car servicing. Id. at 259. 

Experts and circumstantial evidence indicated the collision was caused by a defective piston in 

the master cylinder or braking system resulting from negligence in the design, manufacture, 

assembly, and/or adjustment of the vehicle. Id. at 259–60. Because the damage to the vehicle 

precluded determining whether or not the master cylinder assembly had been properly installed 

and adjusted before the accident, the court held the circumstantial evidence was admissible for 

purposes of establishing the existence of a defect and the defendants’ responsibility. Id. at 260. 

Ford sought dismissal from the action, on the basis that there was no proof that the car was 

defective at the time Ford relinquished control over it. Id. The Supreme Court rejected this 

argument. Id. Elaborating on its ruling in Greenman, the court explained that Ford, the 

manufacturer, was strictly liable for the braking defects that caused the accident in this case: 

Since the liability is strict it encompasses defects regardless of their 

source, and therefore a manufacturer of a completed product cannot 

escape liability by tracing the defect to a component part supplied 

by another ... Moreover, even before such strict liability was 

recognized, the manufacturer of a completed product was subject to 

vicarious liability for the negligence of his suppliers or 

subcontractors that resulted in defects in the completed product ... 

These rules focus responsibility for defects, whether negligently or 

nonnegligently caused, on the manufacturer of the completed 

product, and they apply regardless of what part of the 

manufacturing process the manufacturer chooses to delegate to 

third parties. It appears in the present case that Ford delegates the 

final steps in that process to its authorized dealers. It does not 

deliver cars to its dealers that are ready to be driven away by the 

ultimate purchasers but relies on its dealers to make the final 

inspections, corrections, and adjustments necessary to make the 

cars ready for use. Since Ford, as the manufacturer of the 

completed product, cannot delegate its duty to have its cars 

delivered to the ultimate purchaser free from dangerous defects, it 

cannot escape liability on the ground that the defect in 

Vandermark’s car may have been caused by something one of its 

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authorized dealers did or failed to do. 

Id. at 261 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added). Furthermore, the court found the 

dealership Maywood Bell Ford was also strictly liable because it sold the completed vehicle to the 

plaintiffs. Id. at 261–62. In extending strict liability to retailers (here, the dealership Maywood 

Bell Ford), the court explained 

Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of 

distributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the 

overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost 

of injuries resulting from defective products ... In some cases the 

retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably 

available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself 

may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or 

may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that 

end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added incentive to 

safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords 

maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice 

to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection 

between them in the course of their continuing business 

relationship. Accordingly, as a retailer engaged in the business of 

distributing goods to the public, Maywood Bell is strictly liable in 

tort for personal injuries caused by defects in cars sold by it. 

Id. at 262–63. Finally, in holding the retailer strictly liable, the Vandermark court explained that, 

regardless of the contractual obligations or restrictions of liability that exist between the 

manufacturer and retailer, the retailer is subject to strict liability in tort “because it is in the 

business of selling automobiles, one of which proved to be defective and caused injury to human 

beings.” Id. at 263. 

Importantly, the California Supreme Court did not identify any policy factors that must be 

analyzed in order for strict liability to apply under the general doctrine of strict liability. Rather, 

once it is established that a party is in the vertical distribution chain of the defective completed 

product that caused harm to a consumer, strict liability attaches. Certainly, the court discussed its 

reasons for extending the new doctrine of strict liability to retailers in Vandermark, reasons which 

are rooted in public policy. See, generally, id. However, there is no indication in Vandermark, or 

subsequent strict liability cases, that the public policies discussed by the court were meant to 

create a new test or additional factors required to establish strict liability against a party within the 

vertical chain of distribution. Nor has Pape identified any California case which applies these soCase 1:19-cv-00105-SAB Document 118 Filed 08/11/23 Page 14 of 29
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called “Vandermark policy factors” to establish strict liability against such a party. 

Instead, the California Appellate Court in Bay Summit (and subsequent California cases) 

established a public policy-based factor test to be applied when a consumer sought to expand the 

strict liability doctrine to a party not within the vertical chain of distribution of the defective 

product. See, generally, Bay Summit, 51 Cal. App. 4th 762. This is the basis of the so-called 

“stream of commerce” or “marketing enterprise” theory. 

In Bay Summit, the plaintiffs (the Bay Summit Community Association and several 

individual homeowners) sued multiple parties relating to plumbing leaks that developed in a 

condominium development due to defective fittings used in a polybutylene plumbing system. 

The polybutylene plumbing system consisted of several parts—polybutylene pipes, T-shaped 

plastic fittings, metal rings, and installation tools; the pipes were made from polybutylene resin, 

whereas the fittings were made from a plastic material “Celcon.” Id. at 767–68. Defendants

included the condominium developer (Bay Summit), the polybutylene plumbing manufacturer 

(United States Brass Corporation), and the supplier of resin for the polybutylene pipes (Shell Oil 

Company). Id. at 766. 

Importantly, it was undisputed that Shell was not technically within the vertical chain of 

distribution of the defective product, as it did not design, manufacture, or sell the defective 

plumbing fittings that caused the leaks. See id. at 771. Further, the plaintiffs did not present any 

evidence of a defect in Shell’s resin or even that Shell’s resin was used in the defective fittings. 

Instead, the plaintiffs presented evidence that Shell played a prominent role in the marketing of 

polybutylene pipes and the polybutylene plumbing system for new homes, including providing 

substantial marketing assistance to polybutylene plumbing system manufacturers. Id. at 769. The 

purpose of assisting with such marketing was to create a market for polybutylene plumbing 

systems that would, in turn, seek application of Shell’s resin product for the pipes in the system. 

See id. at 769–71. Further, Shell was aware that the Celcon fittings were defective, but failed to 

disclose the defects. Id. at 768. Thus, the plaintiffs argued Shell was strictly liable based on its 

extensive involvement in the marketing of the polybutylene plumbing system. See id. at 771. As 

relevant here, the trial court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument, and the jury found Shell strictly 

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liable. Shell appealed this verdict, on the basis that it was merely an “upstream” supplier of a 

non-defective raw material/component part of the product (the resin), and was therefore not 

within the chain of distribution for purposes of the strict liability claim. See id. at 766–67. 

The appellate court, however, rejected Shell’s argument as flawed. Id. at 771–72. While 

it did not expressly confirm that Shell was outside of the vertical chain of distribution, it

explained that Shell was not being sued as strictly liable solely for its role as supplier of the resin, 

but also as promoter of the completed polybutylene plumbing system. Id. at 772. Thus, the issue 

was whether Shell should be held strictly liable under circumstances in which Shell “suppl[ied]

the nondefective resin, in combination with Shell’s marketing activities.” Id. (emphasis in 

original). Further, because the focus of the stream of commerce theory is the connection between 

the defendant’s activities and the defective product, such defendant need not have actual 

possession of the defective product or control over the manner in which the product was designed 

or manufactured; nor is the defendant’s legal status or formal relationship with the manufacturer 

or the consumer dispositive. Id. at 773. Finally, under the stream of commerce theory, the Bay 

Summit court articulated the aforementioned policy factors that must be satisfied for strict 

liability to attach; these factors focus on the actual connection between the defendant’s activities 

and the defective product.8 See id. at 774–76.

In sum, the Bay Summit court extended the strict liability doctrine to nonmanufacturing 

parties outside the vertical chain of distribution of a product, where such parties played “an 

integral role in the ‘producing and marketing enterprise’ of a defective product and profited from 

placing the product into the “stream of commerce.” Id. at 773. Establishing strict liability based 

on the “stream of commerce” or “marketing enterprise” theory requires satisfaction of the three 

aforementioned policy factors, (1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its 

activities and from the sale of the product, (2) the defendant’s role was integral to the business 

8 The Court additionally notes that the Bay Summit court found the plaintiffs’ evidence satisfied each of the factors 

as to Shell. Id. at 777. Therefore, the court rejected Shell’s contention that, as a matter of law, it could not be held 

strictly liable for defects in the polybutylene plumbing system. Id. Ultimately, however, because the trial court did 

not issue jury instructions as to the stream of commerce factors and there was conflicting evidence regarding Shell’s 

role in the manufacturing and distribution process, the appellate court reversed the judgments on the plaintiffs’ strict 

liability claims against Shell. Id. at 778–79. 

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enterprise such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the 

initial consumer market, and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to 

influence, the manufacturing or distribution process. Id. at 776. 

There is no indication in Bay Summit (or its progeny), however, that the identified policy 

factors are meant to be applied to strict liability cases in which the defendant plainly falls within 

the vertical chain of distribution. See Arriaga, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 1527 (explaining “[s]trict 

liability also applies where a nonmanufacturing party is outside the vertical chain of distribution 

of the product, but plays an integral role in the producing and marketing enterprise of a defective 

product and profit[s] from placing the product into the stream of commerce.”) (internal quotations 

and citation omitted). Indeed, in all of the cases upon which Pape relies for application of the 

Bay Summit policy factors, the purported defendant was outside of the vertical chain of 

distribution. See, e.g., Bruce v. Clark Equip. Co., No. CIV S-05-01766 WBS KJM, 2008 WL 

912927 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2008) (declining to extend strict liability under stream of commerce 

theory to defendant corporate shareholder of the company responsible for the design, assembly, 

manufacture and sale of the defective product); Fortman v. Hemco, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 3d 241 

(1989) (finding strict liability applied under stream of commerce theory against defendant 

maker/designer of the mold from which fiberglass custom car body top, including defective car 

door, was made); Arriaga, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 1527 (declining to extend strict liability under 

stream of commerce theory to defendant finance lessor and seller of glue spreading machine, who 

never came into contact with product but only executed the financial lease). 

Therefore, under Vandermark, the first question that must be addressed in determining 

whether strict liability attaches to a defendant is whether that defendant was within the vertical 

chain of distribution of the defective product that harmed the plaintiff-consumer. If this question 

is answered in the affirmative, the inquiry proceeds under the Greenman/Vandermark

requirements—i.e., an article is placed on the market, that is to be used without inspection for 

defects, and it proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being—and the Bay Summit

policy factors need not be evaluated to determine strict liability. If the defendant is not a 

manufacturer or within the vertical chain of distribution, however, the court must turn to the Bay 

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Summit policy factors to determine whether the defendant nonetheless played “an integral role in 

the ‘producing and marketing enterprise’ of a defective product and profited from placing the 

product into the “stream of commerce,” Bay Summit, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 773, such that the 

interests of the public are best served by imputing strict liability. Pape’s argument to the contrary 

is therefore unavailing. 

2. Whether Pape is a “Retailer” is a Disputed Issue of Material Fact

At the hearing on the motion, Pape acknowledged the chain of distribution rule set forth in 

Vandermark. It also acknowledged that “technically,” it would fall within the chain of 

distribution of the subject truck as a retailer. However, Pape argues that it falls within a narrower

category of special circumstances—specifically, the attenuated connection between Pape and the 

subject fuel system—therefore, the Bay Summit factors should be applied. Further, Pape argues 

that, under the Bay Summit factors, it should not be held strictly liable because, like the 

analogous defendant in Petitpas v. Ford Motor Co., Pape’s actions occurred outside of the “stream 

of commerce.” (ECF No. 106 at 9–11 (citing Petitpas, 13 Cal. App. 5th 261).) 

Again, the Court disagrees. For the foregoing reasons, the test for strict liability set forth 

in Greenman, as expanded to retailers by Vandermark, requires establishing the following for 

strict liability to attach: (1) a product (2) that is to be used without inspection for defects is (3) 

placed on the market (4) by someone within the chain of distribution (including manufacturers 

and retailers), and (5) the product proves to have a defect that (6) causes harm to the consumer. 

Greenman, 59 Cal.2d at 62; Vandermark, 61 Cal.2d at 206–61. The Bay Summit factors, by 

contrast, are applied to establish whether to apply strict liability to defendants who are neither 

involved in the manufacture or design of the final product, nor fall within this chain of 

distribution. 

Pape concedes it is a retailer in the sense that it sold the subject truck (inclusive of the 

subject fuel system) to B&N. Vandermark’s test for strict liability therefore applies, and the 

Court need not reach the Bay Summit policy factor analysis.9 Furthermore, as previously noted, 

9

Indeed, Pape’s situation is almost directly analogous to that of the defendant truck dealership in Vandermark

(Maywood Bell Ford), which was held strictly liable “because it is in the business of selling automobiles, one of 

which proved to be defective and caused injury to human beings.” Vandermark, 61 Cal.2d at 261–63. Like 

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the cases cited by Pape are factually inapposite, as they applied the stream of 

commerce/marketing enterprise analysis to defendants who were clearly outside of the vertical 

chain of distribution.10 Pape’s argument that it lacks a “sufficient connection” to the defective 

fuel system under the Bay Summit factors presupposes that such factors govern this case and is 

therefore unavailing. 

Furthermore, Pape’s attempts to redefine and narrow the definition of “retailer,” thus 

limiting the scope of strict liability to the defective subject fuel system rather than the subject 

truck as a completed product, are unavailing. First, Pape asserts the defect was limited to the 

subject fuel system (see Pape’s statement of undisputed facts (“PT-SUF”) ¶ 96, ECF No. 106-3); 

however, the opposing parties object to and dispute this fact by submitting evidence of Pape 

employees’ involvement with the installation (and inspection) of the subject fuel system onto the 

subject truck. (See ECF No. 107-1 ¶ 96 (opposing parties indicate that whether the installation 

process itself could not have created a defect that caused or contributed to the fuel system rupture 

is the proper subject of expert and not lay testimony); see also PT-SUF ¶ 83 (noting Pape did not 

have any experience with installing CNG systems); see also Pls-SDF ¶¶ 2–8.) The supplemental 

evidence Plaintiffs submit in support of their opposition (Pls-SDF ¶¶ 2–8)—which Pape does not 

directly address in its reply11—raises a triable issue as to whether Pape’s involvement in the 

Maywood Bell Ford, which sold the completed vehicle to the plaintiffs, Pape sold the completed subject truck to 

B&N. Also in Vandermark, the court concluded the damage to the vehicle prevented it from determining whether or 

not the master cylinder assembly had been properly installed and adjusted by Maywood before the accident; 

therefore, it could not determine whether the vehicle was defective at the time Ford relinquished control of it to 

Maywood, or if the defect in the vehicle was created during the installation of the component part. Similarly here, 

the opposing parties have raised a triable issue of fact for summary judgment purposes as to whether Pape’s 

involvement in the installation of the subject fuel system contributed to the defectiveness of the completed product, 

which is discussed in greater detail herein. 

10 In fact, the Court notes that Bay Summit is inapposite to the instant case in some crucial respects. Perhaps most 

importantly, in Bay Summit, Shell argued it was merely an “upstream” supplier of a non-defective raw 

material/component part of the product (the resin), and was therefore not within the chain of distribution for purposes 

of the strict liability claim. See Bay Summit, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 766–67. Pape, by contrast, was not an “upstream” 

supplier of a component part; it was the retail seller of the completed product, i.e., the commercial truck. That is, 

unlike Shell—which only supplied the non-defective resin that was later used to coat the defective polybutylene pipes 

in the defective plumbing systems, but bore no involvement in creating the finished plumbing systems—Pape 

purchased the subject fuel system and it was installed onto its commercial vehicle on Pape’s property, such that the 

completed product that it sold to B&N was defective at the time the subject truck left Pape’s lot.

11 Pape does discuss the expert testimony of Dr. Devinder Grewal and references statements purportedly made in his 

deposition which support Pape’s contention that Pape employees did not damage the subject cylinder of the 

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installation and inspection process contributed in any way to the defect in the subject fuel system 

that caused the explosion. 

Regardless, B&N did not merely contract Pape’s services to install the subject fuel system 

onto the subject truck, nor did B&N solely purchase the subject fuel system from Pape Trucks. 

Rather, B&N purchased the subject truck with a Momentum fuel system installed on it. (See PTSUF ¶ 100.) Thus, the subject fuel system was a component part that was installed onto the 

subject truck; that is, the completed product that Pape ultimately sold to B&N, which B&N 

ultimately drove off of Pape’s premises, was a commercial truck installed with a CNG fuel 

system. The California Supreme Court explained that strict liability encompasses all injures 

caused by a defective product, even those traceable to a defective component part that was 

supplied by another. Vandermark, 61 Cal.2d at 261. As noted in further detail herein, Pape does 

not cite any on-point legal authority for its argument to the contrary. 

Pape’s attempt to essentially redefine the term “retailer” for strict liability purposes also 

fails. Pape argues it is not a “retailer” with respect to the subject fuel system because it did not 

affix or charge a retail markup to the price of the Momentum fuel systems installed on the subject 

and sister trucks, but instead acted as a “passthrough” from Momentum to B&N as to cost. (PTSUF ¶ 82.) This factual assertion, however, is disputed extensively by the opposing parties. As 

noted by the opposing parties, Pape did not merely charge B&N an installation service charge for 

installing the subject fuel system onto the subject truck and the fuel system part “at cost”; rather, 

it charged a total price of $217,973.58, which was inclusive of the sale of the truck cab without 

the fuel system ($125,719.00), plus the component fuel system ($52,469.00), a document fee, and 

federal and state taxes and license fees, less $100,000.00 which was covered by a state grant. 

(ECF No. 107-1 ¶ 82; Jerrad Dep., Ex. 10, ECF No. 107-4 at 1–52.) On this record, reasonable 

jurors could conclude that the purpose of the transaction between Pape and B&N was the sale of a 

Momentum fuel system during installation so as to cause it to become defective and rupture. (See ECF No. 111 at 

13–14.) However, Pape does not attach the relevant pages of the deposition transcript to its reply briefing—indeed, a 

supporting declaration of counsel indicates that Dr. Grewal was not deposed until June 21, 2023, i.e., after the June 

15, 2023 filings of the oppositions to summary judgment, and that the transcript of Dr. Grewal’s deposition was not 

available to any party prior to the filing of the reply brief (see ECF No. 111-1 at ¶ 2). Consequently, the Court 

cannot verify the accuracy of Pape’s representations as to Dr. Grewal’s testimony, nor can it conclude the opposing 

parties had an opportunity to reasonably consider or respond to this newly-submitted evidence. 

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retail commercial truck containing a Momentum fuel system, not just the retail truck, upon which 

a Momentum fuel system was incidentally installed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. 

Pape also appears to argue it is not a traditional “retailer” because the transaction with 

B&N for the sale of the subject truck and sister truck was a one-time incident. (See PT-SUF ¶ 

77.) However, Pape’s “one-time” argument is unsupported by any on-point legal authority, and 

this Court declines to carve such a distinction out of California strict liability tort law at this 

time.12 The Restatement of Torts is further instructive. As to identifying “sellers of products” to 

whom strict liability may attach, the Restatement provides: 

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 

unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property 

is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 

ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, 

and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 

substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 

and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 

entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). 

Notably, rather than focusing on sales volume for establishing strict liability against the 

seller of a product, California courts look to the objectives of the parties. Hernandezcueva v. E.F. 

Brady Co., Inc., 233 Cal. App. 4th 249, 258, 260 (2015) (“The propriety of imposing strict 

liability on a party that both supplies and installs a defective component hinges on the 

12 Indeed, none of the parties identify legal authority which expressly defines a “retailer” for purposes of the strict 

liability analysis. To the extent Pape seeks to redefine this term based on the number of products sold by the 

defendant company, the Court declines to wade into the murky waters of sales and economics and substitute its own

judgment for that of an expert in the field in order to create the new standard Pape proposes. Nevertheless, for the 

reasons further discussed herein, even if such a standard applied to retailers, the opposing parties have submitted 

sufficient evidence in this case to identify a disputed issue as to whether Pape sold other CNG fuel systems and 

whether it was, in fact, expanding its business to sell such products in greater volume in the future. For this reason, 

as well, Pape’s argument is unavailing at the summary judgment stage. 

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circumstances of the transaction ... When the purchase of a product ‘is the primary objective or 

essence of the transaction, strict liability applies even to those who are mere conduits in 

distributing the product to the consumer.’ ”). Here, the circumstances of the transaction are that 

B&N bought a commercial truck from Pape Trucks. To the extent Pape argues it provided the 

service of installing the subject fuel system rather than selling it (see ECF No. 106 at 11–12 (Pape 

argues it “was never primarily in the business of selling Momentum fuel systems to customers”)), 

the finished product in this situation is the subject truck, and the fuel system was a component 

part. Indeed, the opposing parties submit evidence that they did not pay merely for a fuel system, 

but for the entire retail commercial truck. (ECF No. 107-1 ¶ 82; Jerrad Dep., Ex. 10.) 

Vandermark, therefore, governs the strict liability analysis in this situation. 

Alternatively, to the extent Pape argues it was not significantly involved in the installation 

of the fuel system itself (see PT-SUF ¶ 74), this fact is also disputed by the parties. Namely, the 

opposing parties present evidence that Pape used a checklist described as the “PAPE TEAM” to 

assist with connecting the fuel connection lines in the subject truck, making electrical connections 

between the fuel system and the truck, lifting the fuel systems and placing them on the trucks, and 

drilling holes in the truck frames to secure the fuel system. (See ECF No. 107-1 ¶¶ 74–76; see 

also Pls-SDF ¶¶ 3–5; Jerrad Dep., Ex. 6; Culberson Dep., 87:5–9, Exs. J, K, ECF No. 107-3;

Jimerson Dep., 86:17–20, 87:4–6, ECF No. 107-5.) Opposing parties also present evidence that a

checklist titled “Fuel System–Component Final Inspection” indicates the final inspection was 

completed by Pape’s technicians. (Pls-SDF ¶ 5; Culberson Dep., Ex. K.) On December 13, 

2018, Pape completed a pre-delivery inspection of the subject truck. (Pls-SDF ¶ 43; Clark Decl.,

¶ 12, ECF No. 107-2; Ex. 11, ECF No. 107-13.) Further, the installation occurred at Pape’s

location. (Pls-SDF ¶ 2; Culberson Dep., 79:22–24.) Jerrad Johnson (of B&N ) also testified at 

deposition that he was merely cc’ed on the email exchanges between Doug Mayes (Pape Trucks) 

and Shannon Michaels of Momentum (“Michaels”), who were “primarily” handling things. (See

ECF No. 107-1 ¶ 80; Jerrad Dep., 39:4–11, 36:18–21.) 

For similar reasons, the Court finds Petitpas v. Ford Motor Co., the case upon which Pape 

heavily relies (see ECF No. 106 at 9, 11–13 (header of argument titled “Pape is not in the stream 

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of commerce for purposes of strict products liability because in a case similar to the instant matter 

[Petitpas], defendant obtained summary adjudication”) (all caps removed)) is also distinguishable 

from the instant matter. Petitpas is a case of asbestos exposure, in which the plaintiffs Marline 

and Joseph Petitpas claimed that first and secondhand exposure to asbestos-containing products 

caused Marline to develop mesothelioma. Petitpas, 13 Cal. App. 5th at 266. As relevant here, the 

plaintiffs alleged Marline was directly exposed to asbestos-containing dust when she visited 

Joseph at his job at an Enco service station and from Joseph’s work on Ford vehicles at the Enco 

station, and she was exposed indirectly at home by asbestos-containing dust emanating from 

Joseph’s work-clothes. Id. at 267. The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants, including Exxon 

Mobil Corporation (as owner of the Enco service station at which Joseph worked on vehicles 

containing component parts that contained asbestos), under theories of negligence, strict liability, 

and premises liability. Id. at 266–67.

Exxon challenged the strict products liability claim asserted against it, on the basis that the 

plaintiffs could not establish Marline was directly or indirectly exposed to asbestos-containing 

products “manufactured, distributed, or sold by Exxon” because none of the asbestos-containing 

products were manufactured by Exxon; rather, the asbestos-containing replacement clutches and 

gaskets Joseph worked with came from an independent auto parts store, and the asbestoscontaining replacement brakes with which he worked were supplied by the mobile brake service. 

Id. at 268. Further, Exxon argued it only supplied these parts through the provision of automotive 

services, not as a seller or retailer of parts, and was therefore not within the stream of commerce 

for automotive parts that may have exposed Marline to asbestos. Id. The court agreed with 

Exxon and affirmed Exxon’s summary adjudication as to the strict liability claim. Id. at 270–71. 

Importantly, in affirming the judgment, the appellate court explained that “services, even 

when provided commercially, are not products” for purposes of the stream of commerce theory of 

strict products liability, and there was no evidence that Exxon was in the business of selling such 

products. Id. at 272. The court further explained that 

When injury arises from a component integrated in another product, 

the imposition of strict liability on a party hinges on its role in the 

relevant transaction. Generally, manufacturers and suppliers of a 

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component to be integrated into a final product may be subject to 

strict liability when the component itself causes harm ... On the 

other hand, parties involved in passing a defective component to the 

ultimate user or consumer are not subject to strict products liability 

when their sole contribution to the pertinent transaction was a 

service, namely, the installation of the component into the pertinent 

final product ... Therefore, the propriety of imposing strict liability 

on a party that both supplies and installs a defective component 

hinges on the circumstances of the transaction. 

Id. (citing Hernandecueza, 243 Cal. App. 4th at 253–54, 257–60) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). The Petitpas court concluded Exxon was not within the stream of commerce 

for the asbestos-covered automotive parts because the evidence did not indicate that supplying 

asbestos-containing gaskets, clutches, and brakes was a central part of the Enco station’s 

business, nor did Exxon have any direct relationship with the parts manufacturers. Id. at 272–73. 

Rather, the court noted that if a customer needed a replacement gasket, clutch, etc., the Enco 

station needed to purchase one that fit the particular make and model of the customer’s vehicle; 

Enco thus had no control over which parts could be used to complete these repairs. Id. at 274. 

Finally, the court noted similar cases in which it was concluded that “a mere provider of 

[installation] services ... is not liable for defects in the product.” Id. (citing Endicott v. Nissan 

Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 930 (1977)). 

Pape argues Petitpas is analogous because, like Exxon, Pape “was never primarily in the 

business of selling Momentum fuel systems to customers,” Pape had no significant ongoing 

relationship with Momentum, and its installation of Momentum fuel systems on its retail trucks is 

limited to the events of December 2018. (ECF No. 106 at 11, 12.) The Court finds this argument 

still slightly misses the mark. Again, Pape is not a service provider, but admittedly a retailer of 

trucks. Unlike Exxon’s Enco station, Pape was not completing repairs on vehicles already owned 

by the customer and charging for a repair service that happened to include the cost of the 

defective parts used during the repair; rather, Pape sold brand new retail commercial trucks to 

B&N, which included installation (and sale) of the defective component part (the subject fuel 

systems). The main purpose of the transaction between Pape and B&N, therefore, was not to 

install a fuel system, but to sell a brand new CNG truck to B&N. Because Pape submits no 

evidence to establish it was “a mere provider of [installation] services,” Petitpas, 13 Cal. App. 5th 

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at 274, its reliance on Petitas and the stream of commerce analysis is unavailing. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court cannot conclude that Pape has met its burden to 

establish no rational trier of fact would find that it was not a “retailer” with respect to the 

circumstances of the December 2018 installation of the subject fuel system and sale of the subject 

truck to B&N as a matter of law. On this basis, summary judgment is not warranted. Matsushita, 

475 U.S. at 587. 

3. Application of the Bay Summit (Stream of Commerce) Policy Factors 

Furthermore, even if Pape was deemed to not, or only “technically,” constitute a “retailer”

within the chain of distribution for purposes of strict liability under Vandermark, based on its 

consideration of the policy factors set forth in Bay Summit, the Court cannot conclude Pape has 

met its burden to establish there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to Pape’s connection 

(or lack thereof) to Momentum and the subject fuel system. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

a. Whether Pape Received a Direct Financial Benefit 

Pape argues it did not receive a direct financial benefit from the sale of the Momentum 

fuel system to B&N. (ECF No. 106 at 10.) Pape argues it is not, and never was, a retailer of 

Momentum fuel systems; that it had no contact with Momentum or its products, and does not 

have a business relationship with Momentum; and that it “simply acted as a passthrough from 

Momentum to B&N as to cost” of the Kenworth trucks. (Id. at 6.) Thus, Pape argues it is not a 

retailer of Momentum fuel systems and did not receive a direct financial benefit from its activities 

and from the sale of the subject vehicle. (Id.) The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. 

As previously discussed, Pape’s attempt to limit the scope of the December 2018 

transaction to the sale of the subject fuel system is unavailing. For purposes of the strict liability 

analysis, the “final product” was not the subject fuel system, but the subject truck. The subject 

fuel system, therefore, is a component part of the completed product. Indeed, Plaintiffs submit 

evidence that B&N was required to use CNG trucks as part of its contract with a third party, and 

that it would not have purchased a truck from Pape that did not have a CNG fuel system. (PlsSDF ¶ 12; Jerrad Dep., 21:21—22:2.) Thus, Pape was able to complete its retail sale of the

subject commercial trucks to B&N because it installed the Momentum CNG fuel systems. But, in 

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any event, Pape’s objective was to sell B&N a truck. Consequently, Pape received a direct 

financial benefit from the sale of the subject vehicle, in the total amount of $217,973.58. (ECF 

No. 107-1 ¶ 82; Jerrad Dep., Ex. 10.) Furthermore, the opposing parties present evidence that the 

subject sale was considered a “pilot” initiative, in consideration of expanding the business into the 

CNG fuel system industry. (Pls-SDF ¶ 11; Jimerson Dep., 88:2–8; Culberson Dep., 173:13–16.) 

Pape’s expert also testified that Jerrad and Pape discussed the installation and considered it to be

an opportunity for Pape to “see if it was something that we wanted to do in the future as a—you 

know, we’re looking at growing our business or something.” (PT-SUF ¶ 79.) This evidence 

reasonably supports an inference that Pape intended to—and would have, but for the accident that 

is the subject of the instant lawsuit—become “a retailer of Momentum fuel systems,” which calls

into question Pape Truck’s assertion that its sale of a truck installed with a Momentum fuel 

system was a “one-time” event.13 As conflicting evidence must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving parties for purposes of summary judgment, the Court cannot 

conclude Pape has established the first factor weighs in its favor. 

b. Whether Pape’s Role was Integral to the Business Enterprise 

Pape argues its conduct was not the impetus in bringing the Momentum fuel system to 

B&N. (ECF No. 106 at 10.) That is, Pape argues it did not introduce Momentum fuel systems to 

Plaintiffs; rather, Momentum had a pre-existing relationship with B&N and Jerrad, its VicePresident. (Id. at 7.) Pape asserts it sold B&N the two Kenworth trucks, but that it was Jerrad’s 

idea and request to install the trucks with Momentum fuel systems, and that such installation was 

a “one-time deal.” (Id. at 7–8.) Further, this pre-existing business relationship was the product of 

Jerrad’s trust in Michaels, a Momentum employee, as his “go to” person for CNG fuel systems 

service. (Id. at 10.) The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. 

13 Opposing parties also submit evidence that the subject and sister trucks were not the first CNG vehicles B&N 

purchased from Pape Trucks. (Pls-SDF ¶ 22; Jimerson Dep., 25:12–13.) They also submit evidence that Shannon 

Michaels (of Momentum) worked with Doug Mayes (at Pape Trucks) on “one other occasion” in relation to a CNG 

fuel system. (Pls-SDF ¶¶ 33–34; Michaels Dep., 34:8–15, 41:15–18.) While this fact does not directly contradict 

Pape’s assertion that the subject truck represented the first installation of a Momentum CNG fuel system onto a 

commercial truck, it does lend support to Plaintiffs’ argument that Pape was seeking to expand its business to include 

the sale of trucks installed with CNG systems and therefore calls into question Pape’s argument that the installation 

of the subject fuel system was always meant to be a “one-time” event. 

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Regardless of the pre-existing B&N-Momentum relationship, Pape took action to install 

the subject fuel system onto the subject truck which, in turn, it sold to B&N. This action resulted 

in the sale of a Momentum fuel system unit, with the potential for additional sales. As previously 

discussed, the evidence submitted by the opposing parties indicates Pape was considering 

expanding its inventory to cater to customers in the CNG fuel system arena. Such evidence 

conflicts with Pape’s assertion that the Momentum fuel system installation was a “one-time deal.” 

Again, as conflicting evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

parties, the Court cannot conclude Pape has established this factor weighs in its favor.

c. Whether Defendant had Control Over the Manufacturing or Distribution 

Process

Pape argues it had no business or other relationship with Momentum outside of the events 

underlying this litigation, and no relationship with Carleton; thus, it had no leverage to enhance 

the safety of Momentum’s fuel systems or with Cobham to promote their products. More 

specifically, Pape asserts that, until the events relevant to the instant litigation, Pape did not use 

its facilities to install CNG fuel systems onto trucks for customers; rather, Paper Trucks would

order the truck for the customer from Kenworth, Kenworth would send the truck to a third-party 

company for installation of the CNG fuel system, and once the system was installed on the truck, 

it would be delivered to Pape for sale to the customer. (ECF No. 106 at 8.) Therefore, Pape 

argues it had no control over, and no substantial ability to influence, Momentum’s manufacturing 

or distribution process. (Id. at 10–11, 12–13.) 

First, the Court notes this argument appears unavailing. As previously discussed, the 

focus of the strict liability analysis with respect to a retailer is the objective of the parties and the 

circumstances of the at-issue transaction. Hernandezcueva., 233 Cal. App. 4th at 258, 260. Thus, 

the focus of the instant strict liability analysis is not Pape’s prior practices with respect to 

installation and ordering of CNG trucks, but its actions with respect to the instant transaction, 

here, the sale of a Kenworth commercial truck equipped with a Momentum CNG fuel system. 

Further, many of the supporting facts for Pape’s argument appear to be disputed. As discussed, 

the opposing parties argue and submit evidence that, regardless of Pape’s past practices, the 

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installation of the Momentum fuel system onto the subject truck was completed in furtherance of 

potentially expanding Pape’s business to include additional CNG-equipped sales. (PT-SUF ¶ 79; 

Pls-SDF ¶ 11; Jimerson Dep., 88:2–8; Culberson Dep., 173:13–16.) The opposing parties further

show the installation related to the subject vehicle took place on Pape’s premises and involved 

Pape’s employees. (See ECF No. 107-1 ¶¶ 74–76; see also Pls-SDF ¶¶ 2–5; Jerrad Dep., Ex. 6; 

Culberson Dep., 79:22–24, 87:5–9, Exs. J, K; Jimerson Dep., 86:17–20, 87:4–6.) The opposing

parties also submit evidence of the communications and collaboration between Pape’s employees 

and Momentum in completing the installation of the subject fuel system. (See ECF No. 107-1 ¶ 

80; Jerrad Dep., 39:4–11, 36:18–21.) This too, supports an inference that Pape was developing its

own relationship with Momentum in furtherance of its expansion plans. On this record, and 

viewing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, the Court 

cannot conclude Pape has established this factor weighs in its favor within the context of 

summary judgment. 

Thus, even though it need not reach the Bay Summit factors because Pape was the retail 

seller of the subject truck and therefore within the vertical line of distribution with respect to the 

sale of the completed subject truck, the Court finds Pape has not met its burden to establish there 

is no material dispute of fact that the Bay Summit factors weigh against a finding of strict liability 

for Pape Trucks. As such, summary judgment must be denied. 

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V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Pape Trucks, Inc.’s

motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication (ECF No. 106) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2023 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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