Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-05121/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-05121-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner did not file a traverse, but in several filings he states he wishes to

“stipulate” that the petition be considered his traverse. Several of these filings

include attachments in which petitioner addresses his claims. The Court has

considered all of petitioner’s filings and attachments thereto in reaching the decision

set forth below. 

Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL C. COOK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A.K. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 04-05121 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro so, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner makes the following two claims for federal habeas

relief: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court

erred in failing to bifurcate the trial. This Court found these claims, liberally construed,

were cognizable and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause.1

BACKGROUND

In 2003, a jury found petitioner guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and/or by

means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and found true a sentence

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enhancement that he committed the offense while he was released from custody on his

own recognizance. The jury also found petitioner had a prior conviction that qualified as

a serious felony and a “strike.” Thereafter, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of

fifteen years in state prison. The California Court of Appeal set forth the following

summary of the evidence:

On the afternoon of September 19, 2002, Elizabeth Sanchez-Cheng

and her husband, Luis Garcia Blanco, stopped at a gas station. SanchezCheng obtained the key to the women’s room. As she passed the men’s

room, Cook emerged, encountered Sanchez-Cheng, and struck her in the

face with a radio cassette player. The blow cut Sanchez-Cheng’s nose and

eyebrow, causing profuse bleeding and loss of balance. Garcia Blanco

called the police, and he and Sanchez-Cheng waited for them inside the gas

station. Cook threw the radio cassette player away, then entered the gas

station and asked for another key to the men’s room. When the police

arrived, they arrested Cook.

An amended information charged Cook with assault with a deadly

weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (Pen.

Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1)-Count 1.) Central to this appeal, the information

alleged as an enhancement that the assault had occurred while Cook was out

on his own recognizance following his pleading guilty to a charge of

making criminal threats. (§§ 12022.1.) Finally, the information alleged the

criminal threat conviction as a prior strike and (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1))

and a serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)). 

(Resp. Ex. C at 1-2) (footnote omitted).

 On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, although it

remanded to a allow the trial court to address restitution and parole revocation fines and

to correct the abstract of judgment. The California Supreme Court denied review. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

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decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable

application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

A federal habeas court may grant the writ it if concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of

the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

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1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claims and Analysis

1. Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction,

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1), for assault with a deadly weapon or by means of

force likely to produce great bodily harm. The Due Process Clause “protects the accused

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary

to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364

(1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction

cannot fairly be characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief, see id. at

324.

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine

whether that court itself is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, the federal

court “determines only whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if

no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, may

the writ be granted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324.

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claim based on the following

reasoning:

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Finally, Cook argues that no substantial evidence supports his

conviction. The standard of review we apply is settled. We “must review

the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence – that is, evidence

which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – such that a reasonable

trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 678, internal quotations

omitted.)

Cook argues that at most he could be convicted of simple assault,

because he neither used a deadly weapon nor used force likely to produce

great bodily injury. (See §§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) “As used in section 245,

subdivision (a)(1), a “deadly weapon” is “any object, instrument, or weapon

which is used in such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to

produce, death or great bodily injury.” (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.

4th 1023, 1028.) Section 245, subdivision (a)(1) “punishes an assault

committed in any one of three ways: i.e., (1) with a weapon deadly per se,

or (2) with an object used in a way likely to produce great bodily injury, or

(3) by means of a force also likely to produce great bodily injury.” (Id. at p.

1038 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Thus, the only question is whether Cook

used an object or exerted force likely to produce great bodily injury. 

Because the statute focuses on whether the force used was “likely to

produce great bodily injury, whether the victim in fact suffers any harm is

immaterial.” (Id. at p. 1028.) The likelihood of great bodily injury is

evident here. 

Cook struck Sanchez-Cheng in the face with a radio cassette player. 

The force of the blow caused Sanchez-Cheng to lose her balance. She was

in pain for days afterwards. The object was sufficiently sharp to cause

significant bleeding. Cook narrowly missed striking Sanchez-Cheng in the

eye; a jury could conclude that had he struck her in the eye with the radio

cassette player, her vision would have been permanently affected. From

this evidence, a reasonable jury could find a likelihood of bodily injury that

was “significant or substantial, not insignificant, trivial or moderate.” 

(People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1066; see People v.

Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 108 [citing with approval cases finding great

bodily injury based on “multiple abrasions and lacerations” (People v.

Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718) and “bruising and swelling” (People

v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830)].)

(Resp. Ex. C at 9-10.) 

The standard used by the California Court of Appeal for evaluating petitioner’s

sufficiency of the evidence claim, from People v. Williams 16 Cal.4th 635, 678 (1997) is

equivalent to the governing federal standard announced in Jackson. See Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319 (there must be sufficient evidence that “any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); Williams, 16

Cal.4th at 678(there must be sufficient evidence “that a reasonable trier of fact could find

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the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”). Consequently, the state court’s

decision was not “contrary to” federal law within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s argument that there was

insufficient evidence he used a “deadly weapon” was also “objectively reasonable” within

the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). As explained by the state appellate court, under California

law, the defendant need not have used a weapon that is “per se deadly” in order to violate

California Penal Code § 245(a)(1). (Id. (quoting People v. Aguilar 16 Cal. 4th 1023,

1038 (1997)). Rather, the statute also applies to the use of an “object . . . in a way likely

to produce great bodily injury, or by means of a force also likely to produce great bodily

injury.” (Id.) See People v. Fierro, 1 Cal.4th 172, 251 (1991) (finding use of telephone

receiver to be a “deadly weapon” within the meaning of California Penal Code §

245(a)(1).) This determination of state law is binding on this Court. See Hicks v. Feiock,

485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988) (a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in

habeas corpus.) 

The evidence in this case indicates that petitioner struck Ms. Sanchez-Cheng with

sufficient force to cause her to lose her balance, to cause cuts around her eye, and to cause

“a lot” of bleeding, including “nasal bleeding for several days.” (Reporter’s Transcript

(“RT”) at 110, 117 (attached as Resp. Ex. B, Vol. 2).) She required medical treatment

“several days” after the assault to stop the continued bleeding. (Id. at 117-18.) Ms.

Sanchez-Cheng’s loss of balance and the continuous bleeding indicate that petitioner used

a substantial amount of force when he hit her with an object that was both hard and sharp. 

Moreover, as the state appellate court indicated, petitioner hit Ms. Sanchez-Cheng in the

face, close to her eyes; and had petitioner struck or cut her eyes, she could well have lost

vision. In addition, as petitioner hit her in the head with enough force to lose her balance,

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he could well have knocked her out, either directly or by causing her to fall to the ground

and hit her head. Under these circumstances the jury could have reasonably found that

the amount of force petitioner used, and the manner in which he struck Ms. SanchezCheng with the radio cassette player, created a likelihood of great bodily injury within the

meaning of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

2. Bifurcate

Petitioner claims the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate his trial on the sentence

enhancement allegation, pursuant to California Penal Code § 12022.1, that at the time he

committed the offense he was out on his own recognizance following his pleading guilty

to a charge of making criminal threats. Petitioner does not allege the violation of any

federal constitutional right or federal law stemming from the trial court’s failure to

bifurcate the enhancement. A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court

can obtain a federal writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

In other words, a writ of habeas corpus is available under § 2254(a) "only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts." Middleton v. Cupp, 768

F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). It is

unavailable for violations of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or

application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). As petitioner

has failed to claim that the failure to bifurcate violated any federal law, there is no basis

for granting habeas relief on this claim. 

Moreover, the Court is unaware of any “clearly established” United States

Supreme Court authority, as is required for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1), and

petitioner cites none, providing that the failure to bifurcate implicates a criminal

defendant’s rights under the federal Constitution or any other federal law. Indeed, the

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2

There is circuit-based authority that the denial of severance of counts may

prejudice a defendant sufficiently to render his trial fundamentally unfair in

violation of due process. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997);

Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1986). Under § 2254(d)(1),

habeas relief is not available based simply on circuit-based law. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). In any event, in this case the failure to

bifurcate the enhancement did not render the trial fundamentally unfair because the

trial court issued a limiting instruction that the jury should only consider the

evidence of his prior conviction for purposes of the enhancement, and not for the

California Penal Code § 245 charges. (Clerk’s Transcript at 183 (attached as Resp.

Ex. A).) The jury is presumed to have followed this instruction. See Aguilar v.

Alexander, 125 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1997) (juries are presumed to follow a

court's limiting instructions with respect to the purposes for which evidence is

admitted). 

3

 Petitioner disputes the state court’s finding that he failed to request

severance of the California Penal Code § 12022.1 enhancement. The record reveals

that petitioner requested severance of the other sentence enhancements, pursuant to

California Penal Cod § 1170.12(c)(1), 667(a), for his prior “strike” and serious

felony conviction. (RT at 9-10.) With respect to the California Penal Code §

12022.1 enhancement, however, he did not ever request bifurcation or severance,

but rather he objected to his prosecution for the enhancement altogether on double

jeopardy grounds. (See id. at 47-49; see also id. at 7-8, 175-77; Resp. Ex. C at 3-5.)

In light of this record, the state court’s finding of waiver was reasonable within the

meaning of § 2254(d)(2).

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Supreme Court has found no constitutional right to a bifurcated criminal trial. See

Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).2

In any event, even if federal law were implicated by the failure to bifurcate, any

such claim is procedurally defaulted from federal habeas review. The California Court of

Appeal found petitioner waived his claim that the trial court failed to bifurcate the

California Penal Code § 12022.1 sentence enhancement because petitioner failed to make

a contemporaneous request to sever the enhancement at trial.3

 (Resp. Ex. C at 5.) A

federal court will not review questions of federal law decided by a state court if the

decision also rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30

(1991). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of

the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual

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prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate the failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See id. at 750. 

The rule cited here by the Court of Appeal, specifically, that a defendant must

make a contemporaneous objection at trial in order to preserve an issue on appeal, has

been found to be a sufficiently independent and adequate procedural rule to support the

denial of a federal petition on grounds of procedural default. See Paulino v. Castro, 371

F.3d 1083, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding claim procedurally defaulted based on

California’s contemporaneous objection rules). Because petitioner made no

contemporaneous objection to the failure to bifurcate the California Penal Code § 12022.1

enhancement, nor did he make a contemporaneous request to sever such enhancement, as

is required under California’s contemporaneous objection rule, his bifurcation claim is

procedurally defaulted. See id. Although a petitioner may avoid procedural default by

showing the requisite "cause and prejudice," see id., petitioner here has made no such

showing, or even an effort to do so. Accordingly, any claim for federal habeas relief

based on the failure to bifurcate is procedurally defaulted. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

October 24, 2007

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