Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-02328/USCOURTS-alnd-1_14-cv-02328-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Torts to Land

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

CAROLYN DOGGETT, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL ENERGY SOLUTIONS, et 

al.,

 Defendants.

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 Case Number: 1:14-cv-02328-JHE

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

Defendants National Energy Solutions, Inc. (“NES”) and Terra-Gen Power, LLC (“TerraGen”) (collectively “Defendants”) removed this action from the Circuit Court of Cleburne 

County, Alabama, to this Court on December 3, 2014, asserting federal jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1332, based upon diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy.2 (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiffs, residents of Cleburne County, Alabama, seek a permanent injunction against 

Defendants building an electricity-generating wind turbine project along a ridge line in Cleburne 

 1 This action is governed by this Court’s General Order for Referral of Civil Matters to 

the United States Magistrate Judges dated January 14, 2013, nunc pro tunc August 28, 2012.

2 The allegations establish complete diversity of citizenship between the parties at the 

time of removal and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Plaintiffs are all residents of Alabama. Defendant NES is an Oklahoma corporation with its 

principal place of business in Oklahoma. (Doc. 1 at 6). Defendant Terra-Gen is a Delaware 

limited liability company whose members are ArcLight Capital, LLC (“Arclight” and Global 

Infrastructure Partners, LLC (“GIP”). (Id. at 7). All of the members of ArcLight, a Delaware 

limited liability company, are citizens of Massachusetts. (Id.). The members of GIP, a foreign 

limited liability company, are citizens of New York or other foreign states. (Id. at 8-9). None of 

GIP’s members are citizens of Alabama. (Id. at 9). “In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive 

relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object 

in litigation.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 532 U.S. 333 (1997). It 

is apparent from the face of the complaint that the cost of purchasing, constructing, and operating 

fifteen “huge” wind turbines exceeds the minimum amount in controversy requirement. 

FILED

 2015 Oct-16 PM 02:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:14-cv-02328-JHE Document 19 Filed 10/16/15 Page 1 of 9
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County, Alabama. (Doc. 1-1). 

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 12). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review.3 

(Docs. 12, 14 & 15). For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss, (doc. 12), is DENIED.

I. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard Rule 

8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint 

suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.” Id. (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557).

Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint states a 

facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

(citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must 

 3 Defendants request oral argument, (doc. 12 at 1); however, the undersigned does not 

believe oral argument would aid in the resolution of this motion. 

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be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). Ultimately, this inquiry is a 

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

II. Factual Background4

Plaintiffs are residents of Cleburne County, Alabama, each of whom “own real estate 

adjacent to land that is the site of Defendants’ proposed wind turbines.” (Doc. 1-1 at ¶1). 

Defendants have announced their intention “to build, own, and operate between fifteen (15) and 

thirty (30) wind turbines” that will be “approximately 570 feet tall” and “destroy some of 

Cleburne County’s most scenic areas, such as those of the Plaintiff property owners.” (Id. at ¶8). 

Plaintiffs further allege the huge wind turbines will produce very little electricity and are being 

built because of “huge government incentives” that benefit only the energy companies and the 

landowners who put the turbines on their property, with little or no benefit to the public. (Id. at 

¶¶10-11). Additionally, Plaintiffs contend there is no provision for the removal of nonoperational turbines. (Id. at ¶12).

As to the detriments involved, Plaintiffs allege that

the limited benefits of the proposed project must be measured against the 

following detriments to the Plaintiffs and other landowners similarly situated in 

Cleburne County: (a) the overwhelming negative impact to the scenic beauty; (b) 

the constant noise; (c) the adverse impact on tourism, recreation, and home 

construction because of noise, flashing of the blades when the sun strikes at a 

particular angle (“shadow flicker”) and adverse impact on wildlife resources; (d) 

disturbance of underground spring-fed lakes and ponds; and (e) a significant 

danger from broken blades, lightning strikes, forest fires and collapsing towers. 

All of these negative aspects to Defendants’ wind energy project will have a 

significant impact on the Plaintiffs’ property values.

 4 When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff=s complaint >are 

to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached 

thereto.=@ Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting GSW, 

Inc. v. Long Cnty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993)). In other words, the Afacts@ are taken 

directly from the complaint.

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(Doc. 1-1 at ¶14). More specifically, Plaintiffs allege they will sustain “great and irreparable 

injury” in the form of the following:

- shadow flicker

- low frequency noise

- flash and glint

- loss and/or diminution of property value

- reflections inside the home

- “wind turbine syndrome” 

- “space and motion discomfort”

- threat to the integrity of Native American surrounding sites

- blasting

- water run-off

- damage to existing water lines and water systems

- increase in traffic throughout the area

- flight path intrusions

- threat to nature wildlife

(Id. at ¶15). Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]he interference with the Plaintiffs’ use and 

enjoyment of their land is both substantial and unreasonable for the above-stated reasons.” (Id.

at ¶17). 

Finally, Plaintiffs state they “cannot be fully compensated in damages and are without an 

adequate remedy at law because the exact amount of damages the Plaintiffs will sustain will be 

difficult to determine, and the damages likely to be suffered are irreparable in nature.” (Id.at

¶19).

III. Analysis

Under Alabama law, a nuisance5 is “anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage 

 5 “Nuisances are either public or private. A public nuisance is one which damages all 

persons who come within the sphere of its operation, though it may vary in its effects on 

individuals. A private nuisance is one limited in its injurious effects to one or a few individuals. 

Generally, a public nuisance gives no right of action to any individual, but must be abated by a 

process instituted in the name of the state. A private nuisance gives a right of action to the person 

injured.” ALA. CODE § 6–5–121 (1975). Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for public nuisance. 

Case 1:14-cv-02328-JHE Document 19 Filed 10/16/15 Page 4 of 9
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to another.” ALA. CODE § 6-5-120 (1975). “The fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful 

does not keep it from being a nuisance. The inconvenience complained of must not be fanciful 

or such as would affect only one of a fastidious taste, but it should be such as would affect an 

ordinary reasonable man.” Id. On anticipatory nuisances, Alabama law provides that “[w]here 

the consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable damages 

and such consequences are not merely possible but to a reasonable degree certain, a court may 

interfere to arrest a nuisance before it is completed.” Id. § 6-5-125. The burden of proof to 

enjoin a proposed enterprise as an anticipated nuisance is higher than the burden of proof for 

seeking to enjoy an existing enterprise as a nuisance. See McCord v. Green, 555 So.2d 743 

(Ala.1989), overruled on other grounds by Parker v. Ashford, 661 So.2d 213 (Ala.1995). 

In response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argue that a motion to dismiss is 

not proper because they have a right to present evidence at trial that the proposed wind turbine 

project would destroy the scenic beauty of their property, create “shadow flicker” that “could 

possibly be seen within the[ir] residences,” and create noise. (Doc. 14 at 2). Specifically, 

Plaintiffs cite McCord v. Green, 555 So. 2d 743 (Ala. 1989), stating that the Alabama Supreme 

Court has “been exceedingly unwilling to enjoin a proposed enterprise until it has been proven at 

trial to be a nuisance.” (Doc. 14 at 1 citing McCord, 555 So. 2d at 745 (emphasis added by 

Plaintiffs)). While it is true that state courts generally do not enjoin an anticipatory nuisance 

prior to it being proven at trial, there is absolutely no indication that this alleviates a plaintiff 

from sufficiently stating a claim in these cases. See Jackson v. Downey, 42 So. 2d 246 (Ala. 

1949) (holding that “if the facts averred present such a situation that if proven equity will 

intervene to grant relief, the case should proceed to a hearing on the evidence . . . .”). The

Alabama Supreme Court was not “exceedingly unwilling to enjoin a proposed enterprise until it 

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has been proven at trial to be a nuisance” because all permanent injunction cases must go to trial. 

To the contrary, the court explained that the injunction of anticipatory nuisances is “an 

extraordinary power that must be cautiously and sparingly exercised.” McCord, 555 So. 2d at 

745. Plaintiffs must plead their claim by stating allegations, which, if proven true, show that, to 

a reasonable degree of certainty, the proposed wind turbine project will, in fact, constitute a 

nuisance, before proceeding to discovery and, if necessary, trial. See id. 

Specifically, the Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

Although § 6-5-125 authorizes the injunction of anticipated nuisances, such 

injunctions should be denied unless the plaintiff shows to a reasonable degree of 

certainty that the anticipated act or structure will, in fact, constitute a nuisance.

It is a general rule that an injunction will be denied in advance of the creation of 

an alleged nuisance, when the act complained of may or may not become a 

nuisance, according to the circumstances, or when the injury apprehended is 

doubtful, contingent or merely problematical. And so where an injunction is 

sought merely on the ground that a lawful erection will be put to a use that will 

constitute a nuisance, the court will ordinarily refuse to restrain the construction 

or completion of the erection, leaving the complainant free, however, to assert his 

rights thereafter in an appropriate manner if the contemplated use results in a 

nuisance.

Hall v. North Montgomery Materials, LLC, 39 So. 3d 159, 171 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (quoting

McCord, 555 So.2d at 745) (quotations marks and citations omitted). Thus, a review of 

Plaintiffs’ complaint must show (1) a reasonable degree of certainty that the proposed project 

will cause (2) irreparable damages. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intend to construct fifteen to thirty wind turbines that 

will be approximately 570 feet tall. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶8). Due to the height of these turbines, 

Plaintiffs allege the scenic beauty of their property will be destroyed. (Id.). Plaintiffs also point 

to their allegation that the turbines will create “shadow flicker” – “flashing of the blades when 

the sun strikes at a particular angle” – that “could possibly be seen within the[ir] residences.” 

Case 1:14-cv-02328-JHE Document 19 Filed 10/16/15 Page 6 of 9
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(Doc. 14 at 2 (citing doc. 1-1 at ¶¶14-15)). Plaintiffs also allege that the wind turbines will 

create noise, specifically low frequency noise. (Id. (citing doc. 1-1 at ¶15)). Finally, Plaintiffs 

point to the allegation that the proposed turbines will diminish their property values. (Id. at 3 

(citing doc. 1-1 at §15)). Plaintiffs acknowledge that diminution of value of real estate without 

more is typically not enough for an injunction, but argue that this, factored in with all of the other 

allegations, “could allow the court to issue the injunction.”6 (Doc. 14 at 3). 

Neither party has presented the undersigned with Alabama case law addressing wind 

turbines as a nuisance. However, Alabama courts have addressed the alleged harms that 

Plaintiffs contend will result from the proposed project. First, Plaintiffs allege that, due to the 

proposed height of the wind turbines, the project will destroy their property’s scenic beauty. 

(Doc. 1-1 at ¶8). General unsightliness, however, does not constitute a nuisance. Ala. Power 

Co. v. Stringfellow, 153 So. 629, 631 (Ala. 1934) (“The trial court charged out, and properly so, 

the claim of unsightliness of the substation.”). Plaintiffs also complain about “shadow flicker” 

and the possibility it could be seen from inside their residences. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶14-15). The 

alleged possibility of a harm occurring is not enough to support an injunction of an anticipatory 

nuisance. Thus, the undersigned only considers the allegation that shadow flicker will occur and 

the implicit conclusion it will be seen from somewhere on Plaintiffs’ properties. There are no 

allegations as to how this will cause the level of irreparable harm required to support an 

injunction.

Next, Plaintiffs complain the proposed project will cause “constant noise” and “low 

frequency noise” that will interfere with their use and enjoyment of their land. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶14, 

 6 Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the “Wind Farm Lease and Easement Agreement” several 

residents were asked to sign, (doc. 14 at 3-4), is not relevant to the resolution of this motion, as it

is based on information from outside of the complaint. 

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15, 17). “Whether or not noise in itself, constitutes a nuisance is a question of fact dependent on 

the nature and character of the noise, its constancy or frequency, and the extent of the 

inconvenience caused by it.” Hall v. N. Montgomery Materials, LLC, 39 So. 3d 159, 173 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2008) (citations omitted). While some of Plaintiffs’ allegations describe the alleged 

harm in a speculative nature, the allegations regarding noise are stated in no uncertain terms. As 

property owners adjacent to a proposed project that will cause constant noise and low frequency 

noise, Plaintiffs have stated a claim for private nuisance. This is particularly true when 

considered in connection with the other allegations of injury. 

Although at one point Plaintiffs state that “damages . . . will be difficult to determine,” 

they otherwise allege their injury will be irreparable. (See doc. 1-1 at ¶19). Injunctive relief 

from an anticipatory nuisance is not available if legal damages can be calculated, even if that 

calculation becomes “difficult.” Despite Plaintiffs’ inconsistent statements regarding the nature 

of their injury, they clearly plead that they will be irreparably harmed if this project is allowed to 

proceed. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to move forward with their claim and present evidence 

to the court on the many fact issues, including, but not limited to, the nature of this noise and 

other alleged harms. 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for an injunction of an anticipatory private 

nuisance. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss, (doc. 12), is DENIED. The parties are reminded 

of their obligation to hold a Rule 26(f) meeting and submit a report to the court no later than

November 30, 2015.

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DONE this 16th day of October 2015. 

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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