Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00332/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00332-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN FERRELL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BUCKINGHAM PROPERTY 

MANAGEMENT,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:19 -cv-00332-LJO-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING GRANTING 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS 

ACTION SETTLEMENT

(ECF No. 19)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

Plaintiffs Kevin Ferrell and Cheryl Baker bring this action on behalf of themselves and 

others similarly situated against Defendant Buckingham Property Management, alleging various 

wage and hour violations under California state law, and claims under the Fair Labor Standards 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for 

preliminary approval of a class action settlement and certification of the class for purposes of 

settlement. (ECF No. 19.) The Court, having reviewed the record, found this matter suitable for 

decision without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g), and the previously scheduled hearing 

set on January 15, 2020, was vacated. (ECF No. 23.) Having considered the moving papers, the 

declarations and exhibits attached thereto, as well as the Court’s file, the Court issues the 

following findings and recommendations recommending granting the motion for preliminary 

approval of settlement and conditionally certifying the class for purposes of settlement. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 1 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 

Defendant specializes in property management of residential real estate and manages 

thousands of units in the State of California. (Mot. Prelim. Approval Class Action Settle. 

(“Mot.”) 10, ECF No. 19; Decl. Rosemary Lynch (“Lynch Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 19-5, Ex. 

A.)1 Plaintiff Kevin Ferrell (“Ferrell”) was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt 

Maintenance/Painting Technician, and Plaintiff Cheryl Baker (“Baker”) was employed by 

Defendant as a non-exempt Community Manager. (Mot. 10; Decl. Kevin Ferrell (“Ferrell 

Decl.”), ¶ 2, ECF No. 19-4; Decl. Cheryl Baker (“Baker Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 19-3.) Plaintiffs’ 

principal allegations are that Defendant has violated the California Labor Code and the FLSA by, 

inter alia, failing to properly pay minimum and overtime wages, failing to provide compliant 

meal and rest periods or pay associated premiums, failing to timely pay wages upon termination, 

failing to provide compliant wage statements, failing to maintain requisite payroll records, and 

failing to reimburse necessary business-related expenses. (Mot. 10.) Plaintiffs contend that 

Defendant’s conduct constitutes unfair business practices under the California Business and 

Professions Code and gives rise to penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004,

California Labor Code § 2698, et seq. (“PAGA”). (Mot. 10.) As a result, Plaintiffs contend that 

they and the “Class Members” and “Proposed FLSA Collective Members” are entitled, inter 

alia, unpaid wages, penalties including but not limited to those available under the PAGA, and 

attorneys’ fees. (Mot. 10.) 

Defendant denies any liability of any kind associated with the claims and allegations, and 

further denies that Plaintiffs, the Class Members, or Proposed FLSA Collective Members are 

entitled to any relief. (Mot. 10.) Defendant also denies that this case is appropriate for class or 

representative treatment for any other purpose other than the proposed settlement. Defendant has

obtained release agreements and arbitration agreements for several Class Members. (Mot. 10; 

 

1

 All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 2 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Lynch Decl. ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. B, C.) 

This action proceeds on Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint filed with the state court on 

March 5, 2019. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 1-17.) The FAC brings the following 

causes of actions: (1) violation of California Labor Code §§ 510 & 1198 for unpaid overtime; (2) 

violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7 & 512(a) for unpaid meal premiums; (3) violation of 

California Labor Code § 226.7 for unpaid rest period premiums; (4) violation of California Labor 

Code §§ 1194, 1197, & 1197.1 for unpaid minimum wages; (5) violation of California Labor 

Code §§ 201 & 202 for final wages not timely paid; (6) violation of California Labor Code § 204 

for wages not timely paid during employment; (7) violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) 

for non-compliant wage statements; (8) violation of California Labor Code § 1174(d) for failure 

to keep requisite payroll records; (9) violation of California Labor Code § 1198 for unpaid 

reporting time pay; (10) violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 & 2802 for unreimbursed 

business expenses; (11) violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; 

(12) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 for unpaid overtime; (13) 

violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 for unpaid minimum wages; and (14) 

violation of the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. (Id.) 

B. Procedural History

On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff Ferrell filed a putative class action against Defendant in the 

Los Angeles Superior Court, on behalf of himself and all current and former California-based 

non-exempt individuals employed by Defendant since August 8, 2011. (Mot. 10; Decl. Edwin 

Aiwazian (“Aiwazian Decl.”) ¶ 10, ECF No. 19-1.) 

On December 4, 2014, the Los Angeles Superior Court entered an order approving the 

parties’ stipulation to transfer venue to Fresno County and the action was transferred to the 

Superior Court for the County of Fresno. (Mot. 11.) After engaging in discovery and 

investigation of the claims and defenses, on January 27, 2016, the parties engaged in a private 

mediation with Paul Grossman, “a well-respected mediator experienced in handling complex 

wage-and-hour matters.” (Mot. 11; Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 11.) The parties reached a settlement with 

the aid of the mediator’s evaluations and proposal. (Id.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 3 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

On February 22, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of settlement, 

that was denied without prejudice by the Fresno County Superior Court. (Mot. 11; Aiwazian 

Decl. ¶ 11.) On May 18, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for preliminary approval of 

settlement that was also denied without prejudice by the Fresno County Superior Court. (Id.) 

On March 5, 2019, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties and an order granting leave 

thereon, Plaintiff filed the first amended and operative complaint in this action. (Mot. 11.) On 

March 11, 2019, Defendant removed this action to this court, the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of California, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. (Mot. 11.) 

The parties engaged in additional negotiations regarding settlement, and ultimately 

reached a settlement to address points of concern raised by the Fresno County Superior Court. 

(Mot. 11; Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 11.) The changes included, but were not limited to: (1) narrowing 

the class to “Property Employees” only, who like the named Plaintiffs, predominately worked on 

properties managed by Defendant and thus had more common experiences and claims; (2)

adding a claim under the FLSA and allocating separate settlement amounts for FLSA and class 

claims; and (3) guaranteeing a higher minimum distribution floor for the class settlement 

amount. (Id.) On November 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the motion for preliminary approval of the 

proposed class settlement agreement and for certification of the class for purposes of settlement 

that is currently before the Court for consideration. (ECF No. 19.) On November 26, 2019, the 

Court issued a minute order resetting the hearing on the motion for January 15, 2020, and on 

January 13, 2020, the Court vacated the hearing after finding this matter suitable for decision 

without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). (ECF Nos. 20, 23.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a strong judicial policy favoring settlement, particularly

of complex class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Nevertheless, especially where settlement occurs prior to class certification, courts must 

scrutinize the proposed settlement to ensure the propriety of class certification and the fairness of 

the proposed settlement. Staton v Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 4 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

A. Certification of the Class 

To certify a class, a party must demonstrate that all of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and 

at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been 

met. Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 737 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2013). This requires courts

to “conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine whether the party seeking class certification has 

met the prerequisites of Rule 23.” Wright v. Linkus Enterprises, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. 

Cal. 2009). 

Under Rule 23(a), the four requirements that must be met for class certification are: “(1) 

the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of 

law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims for defenses of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 

adequately protect the interest of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4); Wright, 259 F.R.D. at 

471. Under Rule 23(b), a plaintiff must establish one of the following conditions is present: (1) 

that there is a risk of inconsistent adjudications from separate actions that would result in 

incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class or would be dispositive of the 

interests of members not parties to the actions or would substantially impair their ability to

protect their interests; (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that 

apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief is 

appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, 

and a class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating the controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(1)-(3); Wright, 259 F.R.D. at 471-72. In considering subsection three (3), “matters 

pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling 

the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation 

concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 

undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the 

likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). 

///

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 5 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

B. Court Approval of Class Settlement Agreements

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) mandates that any settlement in a class action 

may only be approved by the court after finding that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and 

adequate after considering whether:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the 

class;

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the 

class, including the method of processing class-member claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing 

of payment; and

(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)-(D). The role of the district court in evaluating the fairness of the 

settlement is not to assess the individual components, but to consider the settlement as a whole. 

Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2012) reh’g denied 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 

2013). In reviewing a proposed settlement, the court represents those class members who were 

not parties to the settlement negotiations and agreement. In re Toys R Us-Delaware, Inc.--Fair & 

Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., 295 F.R.D. 438, 448 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

III.

THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

The Court will now outline the relevant terms of the proposed settlement agreement (the 

“Agreement,” ECF No. 19-1 at 26), that Plaintiffs have submitted for preliminary approval. 

A. The Class and Proposed FLSA Collective for Settlement Purposes 

For settlement purposes only, Plaintiffs state in their moving papers that the parties agree 

to certification of the following class consisting of approximately 803 individuals: “All current 

and former non-exempt Property Employees of Defendant within the State of California from 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 6 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

August 10, 2010 to the date the Settlement is preliminarily approved by the Court (‘Class 

Members’ or ‘Class’).” (Mot. 12.) Class Members who submit a timely and valid “Class Claim 

Form,” which will be mailed after preliminary approval of the settlement and approval of the 

Class, will be bound by the settlement agreement and receive a share of the “Class Settlement.” 

For settlement purposes only, the Plaintiffs state in their moving papers that the parties 

agree to conditional certification of the “Proposed FLSA Collective” consisting of: “all current 

and former Property Employees of Defendant within the State of California during the period 

from August 8, 2010 to the date on which the Settlement is preliminarily approved by the Court 

(‘Settled Period’).” (Mot. 12.) Proposed FLSA Collective Members who submit a timely and 

valid “FLSA Opt-In Form,” which will be mailed after preliminary approval, will be bound by 

the “FLSA Settlement” and receive their share of the FLSA Settlement. (Mot. 12.) 

The Court notes that the Agreement itself provides a somewhat different definition of 

Class, defined as: “all current and former Property Employees of Defendant within the State of 

California during the Settled Period.” (Agreement ¶ 3.) The Agreement also contains a 

somewhat different definition of Proposed FLSA Collective: “all current and former Property 

Employees of Defendant within the State of California during the Settled Period.” (Agreement ¶ 

49.) The Agreement also provides a definition of Property Employees defined as: “non-exempt 

employees with the following job positions during the Settled Period: Area Relief Manager, 

Assistant Community Manager, Community Manager, Contact Assistant Manager, Grounds 

Keeper, Janitor, Maintenance Technician, Porter, Residential Service Coordinator, and Security.” 

(Agreement ¶ 48.) 

The proposed order appears to combine the essential substantive terms, including the 

definition of Property Employees, and this is what the Court shall utilize for purposes of 

certifying the Class and Proposed FLSA Collective: 

All current and former Property Employees of Defendant within the State of 

California from August 8, 2010 to the date this Order is signed by the Court 

(“Settled Period”). “Property Employees” means non-exempt employees with the 

following job positions during the Settled Period: Area Relief Manager, Assistant 

Community Manager, Community Manager, Contact Assistant Manager, Grounds 

Keeper, Janitor, Maintenance Technician, Porter, Residential Service Coordinator, 

and Security. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 7 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

(ECF No. 19-6 at 3.) 

B. The Monetary Settlement Amounts 

Defendant will pay a “Maximum Settlement Amount” of up to $600,000.00 on a claimsmade basis. (Mot 12; Agreement ¶¶ 34, 62.) The “Net Settlement Amount” is the amount 

remaining after deducting the following from the Maximum Settlement Amount: (1) attorneys’ 

fees of up to thirty-five percent (35%) of the Maximum Settlement Amount, for a total of 

$210,000.00, plus reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses up to $35,000.00, for a total of 

up to $245,000.00 (the “Fees and Costs Award”) to “Class/Collective Counsel”; (2) “Incentive 

Awards” of up to $3,000.00 each to Plaintiffs Kevin Ferrell and Cheryl Baker for a total of 

$6,000.00; (3) $3,750.00 to the Labor Workforce and Development Agency (“LWDA”) for its 

share of the “PAGA Settlement Amount”; and (4) “Settlement Administration Costs,” currently 

estimated to be $16,000.00. (Mot. 12-13; Agreement ¶¶ 19, 28, 33, 34, 36, 58.) Additionally, a

twenty-five percent (25%) portion of the PAGA Settlement Amount allocated to aggrieved 

employees ($1,250.00 of a total $5,000.00), will remain part of the Net Settlement Amount. 

(Mot. 13; Agreement ¶ 15.) 

Assuming that the allocations toward these payments are paid in full, the Net Settlement 

Amount that will be available for distribution to Class Members who submit timely and valid 

Class Claim Forms (“Claimants”), and Proposed FLSA Collective Members who submit timely 

and valid FLSA Opt-In Forms (“FLSA Collective Members”), is estimated to be $329,250.00. 

(Mot. 13; Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 17.) Ninety-five percent (95%) of the Net Settlement Amount, 

inclusive of the Employee’s PAGA portion, will be allocated to the Class Settlement and 

available to be distributed to Claimants (“Class Settlement Amount”), and the remaining five 

percent (5%) of the Net Settlement Amount will be allocated to the FLSA Settlement and 

distributed to FLSA Collective Members (“FLSA Settlement Amount”). (Mot. 13.) 

The Class Settlement Amount is estimated to be $312,787.50, and will be distributed to 

Claimants based upon the number of weeks they worked as Property Employees during the 

Settled Period (“Workweeks”). (Mot. 13; Agreement ¶ 44.) At least sixty-three percent (63%)

of the Class Settlement Amount will be distributed to Claimants (the “Minimum Distribution 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 8 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Floor”). (Mot. 13; Agreement ¶¶ 35, 67.) In the event that less than sixty-three percent (63%) of 

the Class Settlement Amount is claimed by Claimants, each Claimant’s share will be 

proportionately increased on a pro rata basis based on their number of Workweeks. (Mot. 13; 

Agreement ¶¶ 67, 69(a).) Any amount of the Class Settlement Amount over the Minimum 

Distribution Floor that is not claimed by the Claimants (“Remainder”) will be used to pay 

Defendant’s share of payroll taxes and contributions in connection with the wages portion of 

“Estimated Class Settlement Shares” and “Estimated FLSA Settlement Shares” (“Employers 

Taxes”), and the remaining amount (if any) will be retained by Defendant. (Mot. 13; Agreement 

¶ 67.) 

The FLSA Settlement Amount, which is five percent (5%) of the Net Settlement Amount, 

or approximately $16,462.50, will be distributed to FLSA Collective Members based upon their 

Workweeks compared to the number of Workweeks of all FLSA Collective Members. (Mot. 

13.) The entire FLSA Settlement Amount will be paid out to FLSA Collective Members. (Mot. 

13; Agreement ¶ 69(b).) 

C. Calculation of Estimated Class Settlement Shares 

The “Settlement Administrator” will calculate each Class Member’s Estimated Class 

Settlement Share by: (1) calculating the total number of Workweeks worked by each Class 

Member (Agreement ¶¶ 59, 71, 76); (2) dividing the Class Settlement Amount by the total 

number of Workweeks worked by all Class Members to yield the “Initial Class Workweek 

Amount” (Agreement ¶ 69(a)(i)); (3) multiplying the Initial Class Workweek Amount by each 

Class Member’s total number of individual Workweeks to determine their Estimated Class 

Settlement Share (Agreement ¶ 69(a)(ii)); (4) if the Estimated Class Settlement Shares that are 

actually claimed by Claimants equal less than the Minimum Distribution Floor, the Estimated 

Class Settlement Shares will be proportionately increased for each Claimant so that the total of 

all Estimated Class Settlement Shares equals no less than the Minimum Distribution Floor 

(Agreement ¶ 69(a)(iii)); and (5) Estimated Class Settlement Shares will be subject to reduction 

for the employee’s share of taxes and withholdings with respect to the portion of the payment 

that is deemed wages, and the payment to a Claimant that is net of these taxes and withholdings 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 9 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

is the “Individual Class Payment” (Agreement ¶ 69(a)(iii)-(iv)). (Mot. 14.) 

D. Calculation of Estimated FLSA Settlement Shares

The Settlement Administrator will calculate each Proposed FLSA Collective’s Estimated 

FLSA Settlement Share and each “Individual FLSA Payment” by: (1) dividing the FLSA 

Settlement Amount by the total number of Workweeks worked by the Proposed FLSA Collective 

to yield the “Initial FLSA Workweek Amount” (Agreement ¶ 69(b)(i)); (2) multiplying the 

Initial FLSA Workweek Amount by each FLSA Collective Member’s individual number of 

Workweeks to determine their Estimated FLSA Settlement Share (Agreement ¶ 69(b)(ii)); (3) if 

the amount claimed by the FLSA Collective Members is less than the FLSA Settlement Amount, 

the Settlement Administrator will increase each Estimated FLSA Settlement Share proportionally 

so that the sum of all Estimated FLSA Settlement Shares equals the FLSA Settlement Amount, 

and the final amount distributable to each FLSA Collective Member is the “Individual FLSA 

Payment” (Agreement ¶ 69(b)(iii)). (Mot. 14.) 

E. Taxes 

Individual Class Payments will be allocated as one-third wages and two-thirds penalties, 

interest, and non-wage damages. (Mot. 14; Agreement ¶ 85.) Individual FLSA Payments will 

be allocated as one-third wages and two-thirds penalties and non-wage damages. (Id.) The 

wages portion of these payments will be reported on an IRS From W-2, and the portions 

allocated to interest and penalties will be reported on an IRS Form-1099. (Id.) 

The Employer Taxes will be paid from the Remainder. (Mot. 14; Agreement ¶¶ 16, 31, 

52, 62(a).) If the Remainder is not sufficient to cover all the Employer Taxes Defendant will pay 

an additional amount sufficient to cover the Employer Taxes. (Mot. 14; Agreement ¶ 62(a).) 

F. Range of Estimated Settlement Shares for Class Settlement 

The Net Settlement Amount is currently estimated to be $329,250.00. (Mot. 15; 

Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 17.) Assuming a Class Settlement Amount of $312,787.50 (95% of 

$329,250.00), and a 100% claims rate, the range of Estimated Class Settlement Shares that 

individual Class Members could be credited with, based on their respect number of Workweeks 

ranges from $111.21 for a six-month period of Workweeks, to $1,779.36 for an eight-year period 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 10 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

of Workweeks: 

• 6 months: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 26 Workweeks] = $111.21

• 1 year: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 52 Workweeks] = $222.42

• 2 years: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 104 Workweeks] = $444.84

• 3 years: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 156 Workweeks] = $667.26

• 4 years: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 208 Workweeks] = $889.68

• 6 years: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 312 Workweeks] = $1,334.52

• 8 years: [($312,787.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 416 Workweeks] = $1,779.36

(Mot. 15.) 

G. Range of Estimated Settlement Shares for FLSA Collective 

Based on the current estimated Net Settlement Amount of $329,250.00, the FLSA 

Settlement Amount of $16,462.50 (5% of the Net Settlement Amount), and a 100% opt-in rate, 

the range of Estimated FLSA Settlement Shares that individual Proposed FLSA Collective 

Members could be credited with, based on their respective number of Workweeks, ranges from 

$5.85 for a six-month period of Workweeks, to $93.65 for an eight-year period of Workweeks: 

• 6 months: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 26 Workweeks] = $5.85

• 1 year: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 52 Workweeks] = $11.71

• 2 years: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 104 Workweeks] = $23.41

• 3 years: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 156 Workweeks] = $35.12

• 4 years: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 208 Workweeks] = $46.83

• 6 years: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 312 Workweeks] = $70.24

• 8 years: [($16,462.50 ÷ 73,127 total workweeks) x 416 Workweeks] = $93.65

(Mot. 15.) 

H. Settlement Opt-Out and Objection Procedures 

Class Members who wish to opt out from the Class Settlement must submit a written 

letter to the Settlement Administrator requesting to be excluded from the Class Settlement 

(“Request for Exclusion”). (Mot. 15; Agreement ¶¶ 53, 77.) The Request for Exclusion must: 

(a) state the case name and number; (b) contain the name, address, telephone number, signature, 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 11 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

and last four digits of the Social Security Number of the Class Member; (c) clearly state that the 

Class Member does not wish to be included in the Class Settlement; and (d) be returned to the 

Settlement Administrator, postmarked or fax-stamped within sixty (60) calendar days from the 

initial mailing of the “Notice Packet” (the “Response Deadline”). (Mot. 15; Agreement ¶¶ 53-

54.) In the event of a re-mailed Notice Packet, the Response Deadline will be extended ten (10) 

calendar days. (Mot. 15; Agreement ¶ 54.) 

Class Members who have not opted out of the Class Settlement (“Participating Class 

Member(s)”), may object to the Class Settlement by filing a “Notice of Objection” with the 

Court and serving copies upon counsel for the parties no later than the Response Deadline. (Mot. 

16; Agreement ¶ 81.) A Notice of Objection must include: (a) the case name and number of the 

action; (b) the objector’s full name, address, and telephone number; (c) a statement indicating the 

individual objects to the Class Settlement and an explanation of the legal and factual grounds for 

the objection; and (d) copies of any papers, briefs, or other documents upon which the objection

is based. (Mot. 16; Agreement ¶¶ 37, 81.) 

I. Scope of the Class Release 

The “Class Released Claims” that are the subject of the Settlement are “Released Claims” 

which do not arise under the FLSA. The Released Claims are:

Any and all claims, charges, complaints, obligations, promises, agreements, suits, 

rights, costs, losses, liens, penalties, fines, wages, liquidated damages, 

restitutionary amounts, interest, punitive damages, controversies, liabilities, debts, 

demands, money owed, guarantees, expenses, back wages, attorneys’ fees and 

costs, damages, actions or causes of action, of any nature, under state, federal, or 

local law, that were made or could have been made based on the facts alleged in 

the pleadings filed in the Action, which includes claims for failure to pay 

minimum, overtime, regular, and reporting time wages (California Labor Code, 

§§ 510, 1194, and 1198, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207), 

failure to provide compliant meal periods and associated premium pay (California 

Labor Code §§ 512 and 226.7), failure to provide compliant rest periods and 

associated premiums (California Labor Code § 226.7), failure to timely pay wages 

upon termination (California Labor Code §§ 201-203), failure to timely pay 

wages during employment (California Labor Code § 204), failure to provide 

accurate, itemized wage statements (California Labor Code § 226), failure to keep 

requisite payroll records (California Labor Code § 1174(d)), failure to reimburse 

business expenses (California Labor Code § 2800 and 2802), civil penalties under 

the Private Attorneys General Act (California Labor Code § 2698, et seq.) based 

on the aforementioned, and unfair business practices (California Business & 

Professions Code § 17200, et. seq.) based on the aforementioned, arising during 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 12 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

the Settled Period, excluding claims for workers’ compensation benefits or any of 

claims that may not be released by law. 

(Mot. 16; Agreement ¶¶ 8, 50.) 

Upon the “Effective Date,”

2 Plaintiffs and all Participating Class Members will release all 

Class Released Claims with respect to all of the “Released Parties.” (Mot. 16; Agreement ¶¶ 8, 

50, 51, 79.) Plaintiffs have also provided a general release of all claims with a waiver of 

California Civil Code § 1542. (Mot. 16; Agreement ¶ 90.) 

J. The FLSA Released Claims 

The “FLSA Released Claims” are those that are the subject of the Settlement and are 

Released Claims which arise under the FLSA. (Mot. 16; Agreement ¶¶ 25, 50.) Proposed FLSA 

Collective Members who submit a valid FLSA Opt-In Form (i.e., FLSA Collective Members), 

will be bound by the FLSA Settlement. (Mot. 16; Agreement ¶¶ 23, 78.) As of the Effective 

Date, Plaintiffs and all FLSA Collective Members will be deemed to have released any and all 

FLSA Released Claims with respect to all of the Released Parties. (Mot. 16; Agreement ¶¶ 78, 

80.) 

IV.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 

District courts review class action settlements in two stages. First, as here, plaintiffs file 

a motion described as a motion for preliminary approval, along with a motion to certify the class 

for purposes of settlement if certification has not occurred. If the district court grants 

preliminary approval and certifies the class, class members are then notified and given an 

opportunity to object to the settlement or opt-out of the settlement. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 176 

F. Supp. 3d 930, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Thereafter, plaintiffs typically file a motion for final 

approval, and after a final fairness hearing and considering any objections to the settlement, the 

district court determines whether to grant final approval. Id. 

Even where a proposed settlement is unopposed, the Court must fully examine whether 

 

2

 The Effective Date is defined as: “the later of: (a) if no appeal is filed, the date that is thirty-five (35) calendar 

days after the date of entry of the Final Order, or (b) if the Final Order is appealed, the date on which any reviewing 

court issues a decision, the time for further appeal has expired, and the trial court has regained jurisdiction.” 

(Agreement ¶ 14.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 13 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

the proposed settlement class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s requirements of numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy of representation. Wright, 259 F.R.D. at 472 (citing Hanlon v. Chrysler 

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1998)). The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court have 

emphasized that Rule 23(e) governing settlement is an additional, not a superseding requirement, 

and thus “just because a settlement appears to be fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e) 

does not mean a class has met the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b).” In re Online 

DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–21 (1997)). 

This action is currently at the first stage where the Court shall consider whether 

preliminary approval of the proposed settlement is appropriate, and whether the class should be 

certified for purposes of settlement only. The Court now turns to determine whether certification 

of the class is appropriate for purposes of settlement. 

A. Certification of the Class for Purposes of Settlement 

As discussed above, the proposed order appears to combine the essential substantive 

terms from the Agreement, including the definition of Property Employees, and this is what the 

Court shall utilize for purposes of certifying the Class and Proposed FLSA Collective: 

All current and former Property Employees of Defendant within the State of 

California from August 8, 2010 to the date this Order is signed by the Court 

(“Settled Period”). “Property Employees” means non-exempt employees with the 

following job positions during the Settled Period: Area Relief Manager, Assistant 

Community Manager, Community Manager, Contact Assistant Manager, Grounds 

Keeper, Janitor, Maintenance Technician, Porter, Residential Service Coordinator, 

and Security. 

(ECF No. 19-6 at 3.) 

1. Numerosity 

Numerosity is met if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). There is no absolute number or cut-off for determining 

numerosity, and the specific facts of each case may be examined. Schwarm v. Craighead, 233 

F.R.D. 655, 660 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Cervantez v. Celestica Corp., 253 F.R.D. 562, 569 (C.D. Cal. 

2008). “A reasonable estimate of the number of purported class members satisfies the 

numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1).” In re Badger Mountain Irr. Dist. Sec. Litig., 143 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 14 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

F.R.D. 693, 696 (W.D. Wash. 1992); see also Cervantez, 253 F.R.D. at 569 (“Courts have not 

required evidence of specific class size or identity of class members to satisfy the requirements 

of Rule 23(a)(1).”)

As of December 31, 2018, the proposed class consisted of approximately 803 individuals. 

(Mot. 27; Lynch Decl. ¶ 6.) The Court finds the proposed class of 803 members satisfies the 

numerosity requirement as joinder of such members is impracticable. See Celano v. Marriott 

Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting “courts generally find that the 

numerosity factor is satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members and will find that it has 

not been satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer.”); Cervantez, 253 F.R.D. at 569 

(“Courts have held that numerosity is satisfied when there are as few as 39 potential class 

members.”) 

2. Commonality 

Commonality is satisfied where “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 23(a)(2) is construed 

permissively and that “[a]ll questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.” 

Staton v. Boeing Co., 313 F.3d 447, 462 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019). 

Indeed, “[t]he existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is 

a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id. 

“[T]he key inquiry is not whether the plaintiffs have raised common questions,” but “whether 

class treatment will ‘generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’ ” 

Arredondo v. Delano Farms Co., 301 F.R.D. 493, 503 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (citations 

omitted). Commonality is not required for all of the claims. It may sufficient if there is one 

single issue common to the proposed class. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 

(2011) (stating that even a single common question will satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)); True v. American 

Honda Motor Co., 749 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 

F.R.D. 643, 648 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Indeed, for the commonality requirement to be met, there 

must only be one single issue common to the proposed class.”); see also In re Paxil Litig., 212 

F.R.D. 539, 549 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that “the commonality requirement is interpreted to 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 15 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

require very little”). 

Plaintiffs argue that “the Class Members seek remedies under wage-and-hour laws for 

violations arising from common, uniform, and systematic practices which applied to all Class 

Members during the Settled Period.” (Mot. 27.) Plaintiffs’ principal allegations are that 

Defendant has violated the California labor laws and the FLSA by, inter alia, failing to properly 

pay minimum and overtime wages, failing to provide compliant meal and rest periods or pay 

associated premiums, failing to timely pay wages upon termination, failing to provide compliant 

wage statements, failing to maintain requisite payroll records, and failing to reimburse necessary 

business-related expenses. (Mot. 10.) Plaintiffs cite multiple paragraphs of the Aiwazian 

declaration in support of establishing commonality. (Mot. 27; Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 11, 28, 34, 39, 

47, 54, 59.) However, the declaration ends at paragraph 28, and even paragraphs 11 and 28 do 

not clearly support the arguments to establish commonality. No other declaration contains 

paragraphs corresponding to these numbers. Nonetheless, given the permissive standards for 

establishing commonality, the Court has found sufficient support in the moving papers overall, 

and particularly in the representative Plaintiffs’ declarations, which the Court will now

summarize the relevant portions of.

Plaintiff Cheryl Baker was employed as a non-exempt Community Manager for a period 

of weeks in October of 2013, as well as from November of 2013 until August of 2015. (Baker 

Decl. ¶ 2.) Kevin Ferrell was employed as a non-exempt Maintenance/Painting Technician from 

November 2011 until August of 2012. (Ferrell Decl. ¶ 2.) Both Baker and Ferrell received a 

monthly salary, an overtime per-hour rate, and both lived in apartments on-site and were 

attributed as receiving a certain amount of “Apartment Value” during their employment term. 

(Baker Decl. ¶ 2; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 2.) 

Baker’s job duties included showing and leasing units, responding to tenant inquiries and 

requests, communicating with other employees to determine how to respond to tenant inquiries, 

assisting in collecting rent, making bank deposits, tracking delinquent rents, inspecting and 

tidying the premises, running errands, and responding to emergencies. (Baker Decl. ¶ 4.) 

Ferrell’s job duties are described similarly and include communicating with other employees to 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 16 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

determine how to respond to tenant inquiries, inspecting and tidying the premises, responding to 

tenant inquiries and requests, performing repairs and maintenance-related tasks, running errands 

such as picking up supplies and driving to the bank, and responding to emergencies. (Ferrell 

Decl. ¶ 4.) Baker and Ferrell both state that the Defendant’s policies, practices, and procedures 

required then to maintain a high-level of customer service at all times. (Id.; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 4.) 

During the employment, Baker and Ferrell both state they “worked closely with other nonexempt employees, and we all, inter alia, responded to tenant and/or prospective tenant inquiries 

and requests, communicated with other employees to determine how to respond to tenant 

requests and inquiries, ran errands (e.g., to pick up supplies and go to the bank), inspected and 

tidied the premises, and responded to emergencies, among other tasks.” (Baker Decl. ¶ 5; Ferrell 

Decl. ¶ 5.) Baker states she was required to perform work off-the-clock before the start of her 

shift and after the end of the shift, including responding to tenant requests, communicating with 

other employees to determine how to respond to requests, inspecting and tidying the premises, 

showing and leasing units, and responding to emergencies. (Baker Decl. ¶ 6.) Ferrell makes an 

identical allegation, although the duties do not include showing and leasing units, but rather 

include performing repair and maintenance-related tasks instead. (Ferrell Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Specifically, both Ferrell and Baker argue they were required to carry a cell phone 24/7 

pursuant to a memorandum policy, and that they lived on-site where they were regularly 

approached by tenants before or after scheduled hours requesting assistance,3and they were not 

always compensated for such work outside of scheduled hours. (Baker Decl. ¶ 6; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 

6.) Overtime had to be preauthorized and therefore Baker and Ferrell were not permitted to 

record the hours worked early, late, or other times outside of scheduled hours. (Baker Decl. ¶ 7; 

Ferrell Decl. ¶ 7.) Baker and Ferrell also claim they were unable to take timely, uninterrupted 

breaks and rest periods due to the heavy workload, need to take work-related phone calls, and 

responding to emergencies (Baker Decl. ¶ 8.) As for Baker, this was impacted by the 

 

3

 While almost identically described, Ferrell provides one example of a task requested outside of a normal shift, 

namely helping tenants when locked out of their apartments, while Baker provides no specific example in this 

section. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 17 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

company’s customer service expectations and the need to respond to inquiries from tenants and 

prospective tenants, and inspecting/tidying the premises. (Baker Decl. ¶ 8.) As for Ferrell, 

maintenance requests impacted the ability to take full break periods. (Ferrell Decl. ¶ 8.) At 

times, breaks were interrupted, short, or missed entirely due to work needs and they were not 

compensated. (Baker Decl. ¶ 8; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 8.) During their employment, Baker and Ferrell 

incurred business-related expenses that were not reimbursed such as from using a personal 

vehicle for work-related purposes, and from purchasing and maintaining work attire required 

under the dress code policy. (Baker Decl. ¶ 9; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 9.) 

The facts and legal issues underlying this action are sufficiently similar for the Class 

Members. Therefore, given the permissive standard under the rule, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

have demonstrated commonality as they have sufficiently shown that they suffered common 

injuries that are capable of resolution on a class-wide basis. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. 

at 350; Millan v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 612 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

3. Typicality

Rule 23 also requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 

of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Under the rule’s permissive 

standard, claims “need not be substantially identical,” but are typical if the representative’s

claims are “reasonably co-extensive with those of the absent class members.” Parsons v. Ryan, 

754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020). Typicality is based on the 

“nature of the claim or defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from 

which it arose or the relief sought.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 685 (quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts, 

976 F.2d at 508). Typicality tests “whether other members have the same or similar injury, 

whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether 

other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Id. The requirements of 

commonality and typicality occasionally merge, and “[b]oth serve as guideposts for determining 

whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and 

whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of 

the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Parsons, 754 F.3d at 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 18 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

685 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 349 n.5). 

Plaintiffs argue that the typicality requirement is satisfied here because the cause of the 

injury is the same, and the injury claimed by the named plaintiffs is similar to that of the 

unnamed class members. (Mot. 19.) The named Plaintiffs emphasize that their claims are 

typical of those among the Class Members, and although some factual differences may exist, the 

claims arise from the same events or course of conduct and are based on the same legal theories. 

(Mot. 19.) Plaintiffs argue that named Plaintiffs Ferrell and Baker both worked predominantly 

on site, as do all of the “Property Employees” they seek to represent as class representatives. 

(Id.; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 2; Baker Decl. ¶2; Agreement ¶ 48.) 

The Court is not overly swayed by Plaintiffs’ argument that all Property Employees 

worked predominately “on-site,” as the fact that both Ferrell and Baker lived on-site seems to be 

a more significant factor that impacted their allegations of off-clock work and missed breaks than 

the simple fact that employees worked at the same locations. The Plaintiffs have not provided an 

abundance of information concerning the other types of employees contained in the definition of 

Property Employees, such as Contact Assistant Manager, Grounds Keeper, Janitor, Porter, 

Residential Service Coordinator, and Security, and whether these positions encompassed living 

on-site, or were subject to the same requirements for policies such as those related to carrying 

cell phones or dress code policies. Nonetheless, for purposes of preliminary certification and 

settlement, Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated there are claims that are typical to the class. 

See Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 605 (finding typicality satisfied based on the presence of at least one 

shared claim, the failure to pay overtime claim, and noting “[a]lthough potentially different in 

extent and frequency from the putative class members, Plaintiff appears to have suffered the 

same injury—under payment for overtime—as the putative class.”)4 The Court finds that the 

 

4

 The Court shares a similar concern as the Millan court: “The Court is concerned about the lack of information 

regarding the injuries that putative class members may have suffered. If putative class members suffered broader 

injuries than the named plaintiff, the compensation awarded may not justify the scope of the release. In other words, 

putative class members may be releasing claims that they are not compensated for by the settlement award. 

However, for purposes of preliminary certification, the Court has seen no indication that the named plaintiff's 

injuries are atypical of the class.” Millan v. Cascade Water Servs., Inc., 310 F.R.D. 593, 606 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 

However here, given Baker and Ferrell lived on-site and likely had more duties subject to potential break and 

overtime violations than other Property Employees, the concern is somewhat flipped in this regard. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 19 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

typicality requirement has been met.

4. Adequacy of Representation

The Court must ensure “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In determining whether the named plaintiffs will 

adequately represent the class, the courts must resolve two questions: “(1) do the named 

plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will 

the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” 

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 

1020). “Adequate representation depends on, among other factors, an absence of antagonism 

between representatives and absentees, and a sharing of interest between representatives and 

absentees.” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985 (citing Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir.2003)). 

Class representatives “must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same 

injury as the class members.” Amchem Prod., 521 U.S. at 626 (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). This factor also tends to merge with the commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 

23. Id. at 626 n.20. 

The named Plaintiffs here ague their interests align with the other Class Members as all 

of them were employed by Defendant within the state of California, and the claims are typical as 

the Class Members are confined to a limited group of similarly situated employees (encompassed 

within defined term “Property Employees”), during the Settled Period. (Mot . 28; Baker Decl. ¶ 

2; Ferrell Decl. ¶ 2; Agreement ¶ 48.) 

Notwithstanding the concerns expressed regarding commonality and typicality discussed 

above, Plaintiffs share common injuries and possess the same interest as the unnamed class 

members. Plaintiffs do not appear to have any interests that are antagonistic to the class. 

Further, based on review of the submitted declarations, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ counsel have 

demonstrated that they have sufficient experience handling employment class actions and 

complex wage-and-hour litigation. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 3-7; Davis Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated they will adequately and 

fairly protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 20 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

5. Rule 23(b) Criteria

Plaintiffs must also meet one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b) to certify the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiffs argue the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 

23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3) a class action may proceed where “the court finds that the 

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 

only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Matters pertinent to this 

determination include: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 

the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability 

of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties 

in managing a class action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). The fact that the parties have 

reached a settlement is relevant to consideration of these factors and when “[c]onfronted with a 

request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, 

if tried, would present intractable management problems [under Rule 23(b)(3)(D)], for the 

proposal is that there be no trial.” Amchem Prod., 521 U.S. at 620. However, “other 

specifications of the Rule—those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or 

overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement 

context.” Id.

Plaintiffs argue that the class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant certification for 

settlement purposes, as common questions of fact and law affecting Class Members predominate 

over any questions that may affect only individual members. (Mot. 29.) In this regard, Plaintiffs 

emphasize that Defendant’s alleged failure to properly pay Class Members for all hours worked 

and to provide compliant meal and rest periods are alleged to arise from Defendant’s uniform 

policies, practices, and procedures. (Mot. 29; Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 28, 34, 39.)5 Plaintiffs also 

argue that class resolution is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

 

5

 Again, Plaintiffs cite to certain paragraphs of the Aiwazian Declaration that do not exist as filed. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 21 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

adjudication of the controversy as the individual resolution of class member claims would be 

uneconomical given the relatively small amount of damages for individuals, and thus class 

resolution is a superior method to pursue recovery. (Mot. 29.) 

Given the common claims pertaining to the Class Members as current and former 

Property Employees subject to the same employer policies, the Court finds questions of law or 

fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members. Given the difficulties of pursuing individual claims in this context, “the class 

members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions” is 

outweighed by the “desirability . . . of concentrating the litigation of the claims” in this forum, 

and there is no indication of other litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or 

against class members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(C). The Court need not weigh potential 

difficulties in managing the class action given the parties have reached settlement. Amchem 

Prod., 521 U.S. at 620. Therefore, the Court also finds that a class action is the superior method 

for adjudicating the claims in this action. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently met the requirements of Rule 

23(b)(3), and recommends the class be certified for purposes of settlement. 

B. Certification of the FLSA Collective Actions

Plaintiffs also request that this matter be certified as a collective action under the FLSA. 

(Mot. 29-30.) The FLSA provides the right of an employee to represent similarly situated 

employees in a suit against their employer for the failure to pay minimum wage or overtime 

compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Unlike a class action under Rule 23, to participate in the 

collective action, an employee is required to give his consent in writing to become a party. 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b); see Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989) (rights in a 

collective action under the FLSA are dependent on the employee receiving accurate and timely 

notice about the pendency of the collective action, so that the employee can make informed 

decisions about whether to participate). “If an employee does not file a written consent, then 

that employee is not bound by the outcome of the collective action.” Edwards v. City of Long 

Beach, 467 F.Supp.2d 986, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 22 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

Determining whether a collective action is appropriate is within the discretion of the 

district court. Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

However, “[n]either the FLSA, nor the Ninth Circuit, has defined the term ‘similarly situated’ 

for purposes of certifying a collective action.” Nen Thio v. Genji, LLC, 14 F.Supp.3d 1324, 

1340 (N.D. Cal. 2014). While it is unclear what standard should be used to determine if the 

employees are similarly situated under the FLSA, given that the employee consents to 

participating in the FLSA actions, courts do find that “[t]he requisite showing of similarity of 

claims under the FLSA is considerably less stringent than the requisite showing under Rule 23 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Hill v. R+L Carriers, Inc., 690 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1009 

(N.D. Cal. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 607.

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally utilized a two-step approach to determine 

whether to allow the collective action to proceed. Tijero v. Aaron Bros., Inc., 301 F.R.D. 314, 

323 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 607. Initially, the court determines whether the 

potential class members should receive notice of the action based on a finding that the plaintiffs 

are “similarly situated.” Id. “At this initial stage, plaintiffs can satisfy their burden to show that 

they are ‘similarly situated’ by making substantial allegations, supported by declarations or 

discovery, that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, 

or plan.” Nen Thio., 14 F.Supp.3d at 1340 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Such determination is “based on a fairly lenient standard, and typically results in conditional 

certification.” Id. The second certification decision is usually made at the close of discovery 

when the defendant brings a motion to decertify the class and the “courts apply a stricter 

standard for similarly situated employees and review several factors, including whether 

individual plaintiffs’ claims involve disparate factual or employment settings; the various 

defenses available to the defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; as well as 

fairness and procedural considerations.” Id. at 1341.

The Court finds that the Proposed FLSA Collective Members appear to be similarly 

situated because their alleged injuries arise from Defendant’s policies and practices with regard 

to overtime pay, meal and rest periods, and minimum wages. Under the FLSA’s lenient 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 23 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

standard the first step has been met. As Defendant will not seek decertification of the class, the 

Court need not consider the second step. See Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 607 (“As this Court now 

considers a settlement agreement, it is clear that Defendant will not seek decertification of the 

class conditionally certified for purposes of settlement. Absent an argument that the parties are 

not similarly situated, this Court need not look to the second step at all.”). 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the matter be certified as a collective action 

under the FLSA. 

C. Whether the Proposed Settlement is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

As stated above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) mandates that any settlement in 

a class action may only be approved by the court after finding that the settlement is fair, 

reasonable, and adequate after considering whether:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the 

class;

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the 

class, including the method of processing class-member claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing 

of payment; and

(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A)-(D); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 

The role of the district court in evaluating the fairness of the settlement is not to assess 

the individual components, but to consider the settlement as a whole. Lane v. Facebook, 696 

F.3d at 818-19. “Assessing a settlement proposal requires the district court to balance a number 

of factors: the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration 

of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount 

offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 24 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of 

the class members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citing Torrisi v.

Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993)).

“To determine whether a settlement falls within the range of possible approval, a court 

must focus on substantive fairness and adequacy, and “consider plaintiffs’ expected recovery 

balanced against the value of the settlement offer.” Lusby v. Gamestop, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 400, 

415 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 

(N.D. Cal. 2007)). “If the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, 

non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential 

treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, and falls within the range of possible 

approval, then the court should direct that the notice be given to the class members of a formal 

fairness hearing.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litigation, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079 (quoting Manual 

for Complex Litigation, Second § 30.44 (1985)).

When the settlement takes place before formal class certification, as it has in this 

instance, settlement approval requires a “higher standard of fairness.” Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 

696 F.3d at 819 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026). This more exacting review of class 

settlements reached before formal class certification is required to ensure that the class 

representatives and their counsel do not receive a disproportionate benefit “at the expense of the 

unnamed plaintiffs who class counsel had a duty to represent.” Id. As recently emphasized by 

the Ninth Circuit, this requires courts to apply “an even higher level of scrutiny for evidence of 

collusion or other conflicts of interest than is ordinarily required under Rule 23(e).” Roes, 1-2 v. 

SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 

946). When reviewing a district court’s final approval of a settlement negotiated prior to 

certification, the Ninth Circuit ensures the district court: (1) comprehensively explored all 

factors; (2) has given a reasoned response to all non-frivolous objections; (3) adequately 

developed the record to support its final approval decision; and (4) “looked for and scrutinized 

any subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests . . . to infect 

the negotiations.” Roes, 944 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 25 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

Cir. 2015)). 

1. The Class Representatives and Counsel have Adequately Represented the Class and 

the Proposal was Negotiated at Arm’s Length

Some courts have stated, and Plaintiffs argue, that “[a]n initial presumption of fairness is 

usually involved if the settlement is recommended by class counsel after arm’s-length 

bargaining.” Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., No. C-08-5198 EMC, 2011 WL 1627973, at *8 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2011) (citation omitted); see also Nat’l Rural Telecommunications Coop. v. 

DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“A settlement following sufficient 

discovery and genuine arms-length negotiation is presumed fair,” and “[g]reat weight is accorded 

to the recommendation of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the 

underlying litigation.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Ninth Circuit 

has recently emphasized that this is not a valid presumption, particularly where settlement is 

negotiated prior to class certification:

Nowhere in the final approval order, however, did the district court cite or 

otherwise acknowledge our longstanding precedent requiring a heightened 

fairness inquiry prior to class certification. To the contrary, the district court 

declared that, “[w]here a settlement is the product of arms-length negotiations 

conducted by capable and experienced counsel, the court begins its analysis with 

a presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable.” (Emphasis added.) But 

such a presumption of fairness is not supported by our precedent, and the district 

court cites no Ninth Circuit case which adopted this standard. Particularly in light 

of the fact that we not only have never endorsed applying a broad presumption of 

fairness, but have actually required that courts do the opposite—by employing 

extra caution and more rigorous scrutiny—when it comes to settlements 

negotiated prior to class certification, the district court's declaration that a 

presumption of fairness applied was erroneous, a misstatement of the applicable 

legal standard which governs analysis of the fairness of the settlement.

Roes, 944 F.3d at 1049. Thus, the Court’s review does not begin with a presumption of fairness

based on apparent arms-length negotiations. Nonetheless, it is still a factor in determining 

whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 

Plaintiffs emphasize the parties have actively litigated this case since August of 2014, and 

that Class/Collective Counsel conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the case, 

including, inter alia, interviews with Plaintiffs and many Class Members, and review of 

thousands of pages of data and documents including: (1) Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 26 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

employment records, including detailed time and pay records; (2) Defendant’s Employee 

Handbook which contains policies and procedures pertaining to meal and rest periods, 

timekeeping requirements, dress code standards, overtime, and reimbursements; (3) class-wide 

data regarding class-size, number of workweeks, pay periods, and terminations; (4) Defendant’s 

arbitration agreement; (5) Defendant’s standard employment agreement; (6) Defendant’s new 

employee checklist; (7) job descriptions for various positions; (8) Defendant’s memorandum 

pertaining to cell phones; (9) Defendant’s mileage expense report form; (10) Defendant’s 

Employee Handbook Acknowledgement form; (11) Defendant’s Business Mileage 

Reimbursement Policy; (12) a list of all current and former properties managed by Defendant; 

(13) agendas from internal meetings; (14) emails and internal memoranda; and (15) numerous 

other documents regarding Defendant’s employment policies, practices, and procedures. (Mot. 

18-19; Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 11-14.) Class counsel deposed Defendant’s Person Most 

Knowledgeable (the President), over the course of two days, as well as Defendant’s Regional 

Director and a Class Member. (Id.) Both sides propounded and responded to multiple sets of 

written discovery requests. (Id.) The parties engaged in a Belaire-West notice administration,6

by which Class/Collective Counsel obtained the contact information of Class Members who did 

not opt-out of the disclosure of their information. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs contend the data and documents produced and reviewed allowed 

Class/Collective Counsel to prepare damages/valuation models in preparation for mediation and 

settlement negotiations, to determine the potential value and strength of the claims, as well as to 

estimate the potential claim of each Class Member. (Mot. 19; Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 25-28.) 

Significantly, the parties reached settlement after reviewing the above discussed data and 

documents and then participating in a mediation conducted by Paul Grossman, “a well-respected 

mediator experienced in handling complex wage-and-hour matters, and extensive negotiations 

thereafter.” (Mot. 19; Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 11.) During the negotiations, the parties exchanged 

 

6

 A Belaire-West notice is where putative class members are provided with a written notice informing them of the 

lawsuit and giving them an opportunity to opt-out of contact by plaintiffs’ counsel. See Austin v. Foodliner, Inc., 

No. 16CV07185HSGDMR, 2018 WL 1168694, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018); Belaire-W. Landscape, Inc. v. 

Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th 554, 557-58 (2007). 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 27 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

information and discussed various factors, including the risks and delays of further litigation, 

proceeding with class and collective certification, the law relating to the claims, the evidence, the 

possibility of appeals, the risks to recovery, and significantly, the “continued employment of 

current-employee Class Members in light of Defendant’s limited financial resources and 

precarious financial circumstances.” (Mot. 19-20; Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 12; Lynch Decl. ¶¶ 10-13.) 

Plaintiffs state that while they disagree over the merits and certifiability of Plaintiffs’ claims, the 

parties agree that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, as well as in the best interest of 

the Class and Proposed FLSA Collective Members, in light of all known facts and 

circumstances. (Mot. 20.) 

As for the class representatives, the Court has reviewed the declarations of Baker and 

Ferrell concerning the work and efforts they have put forth. Both Ferrell and Baker affirm they 

spent considerable time investigating law firms and class-actions prior to choosing counsel. 

(Ferrell Decl. ¶ 10; Baker Decl. ¶ 10.) Since becoming involved in the case, Baker and Ferrell 

indicate they spent over fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) hours, respectively, meeting with attorneys 

and assisting with the litigation, reviewing and collecting documents. (Baker Decl. ¶ 11; Ferrell 

Decl. ¶ 11.) Baker and Ferrell further declare they spent ten (10) and thirteen (13) additional 

hours, respectively, working with the attorneys on strategy and discovery, and an additional 

seven (7) and nine (9) hours, respectively, reviewing and working on the settlement agreement. 

(Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.) 

Based on review of the course of litigation in this matter, the mediation,7the counsel’s 

declarations describing settlement and valuation of the claims,8and the class representative’s

work, the Court finds that the class representatives and counsel have adequately represented the 

 

7

 The assistance of a mediator in negotiating the settlement supports a determination that the settlement was 

negotiated at arm’s length and is non-collusive. See Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 613 (stating participation in mediation 

supports determination that settlement process was not collusive); Villegas v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. CV 09-

00261 SBA EMC, 2012 WL 5878390, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012) (stating that the fact settlement was reached 

following two sessions with a private mediator experienced in wage and hour class action “tend[ed] to support the 

conclusion that the settlement process was not collusive.”); Satchell v. Fed. Express Corp., No. C 03 2878 SI, 2007 

WL 1114010, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007) (“The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement process 

confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.”). 

8

 The Court discusses the valuation of the claims in the following section. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 28 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

class and the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length and these factors weigh in favor of finding 

the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 

2. Whether the Relief Provided the Class is Adequate

In determining whether the relief provided to the class is adequate, the Court is to take 

into account: “(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any 

proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing classmember claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of 

payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(e)(2)(C)(i)-(iv). 

a. The Costs, Risks, and Delay of Trial and Appeal 

The Agreement provides for a Maximum Settlement Amount of $600,000.00 and a 

minimum distribution floor of 63%, whereby a minimum of 63% of the Class Settlement 

Amount will be distributed to Claimants, and the entire FLSA Settlement Amount will be 

distributed to the FLSA Collective Members. Plaintiffs contend the amount is reasonable 

considering the risks relating to certification, liability, and the ability to recover monetary relief 

on a class-wide, collective, or representative basis. (Mot. 20-21)

9

 Plaintiffs also emphasize 

settlement now guarantees a monetary recovery in a relatively short period of time compared to 

waiting additional years for the same or possibly no recovery if this matter proceeds to trial. 

(Mot. 20.) 

Through investigation, collection, and review of data and information, Plaintiffs argue 

Class/Collective Counsel was able to calculate the value of the claims and monetary recovery 

that could potentially be awarded, and used this information in negotiating a settlement that 

fairly compensated the Class Members and FLSA Collective Members. (Mot. 20-21.) Counsel 

considered the potential risks and rewards inherent in any case and particularly this one, and 

counsel performed a damages and valuation analysis based on the sampling of time and pay data 

 

9

 In their briefing, Plaintiffs again repeatedly cite to paragraphs of the Aiwazian declaration that do not exist, citing 

paragraphs up to number 80, where the declaration ends at paragraph 28. (Mot. 20-21, citing Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 12, 

25-80.) It is not clear if this is due to Plaintiffs’ counsel utilizing boilerplate language from another matter. 

Nonetheless, the Court is able to find support for the arguments within the declaration, particularly as to the 

calculation and devaluation of the potential claims. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 25-28.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 29 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

provided by Defendant. (Mot. 21; Aiwazian Decl. ¶¶ 16, 25.) 

The Court has reviewed the damages and valuation analysis. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 25(a)-

(l).) Counsel appears to have generally discounted the claims in a nearly uniform manner by 

reducing the value of each claim in three steps: (1) discounting the value of each claim by either 

50% or 75% to account for risks associated with obtaining and maintaining certification, without 

any explanation for the differing discount between the claims; then (2) further discounting the 

value of each claim by either 50% or 75% to account for the risks associated with succeeding on 

the merits and establishing liability, again with no explanation for the differing discounts 

between the claims; and then (3) discounting the value of each claim by either 50%, 60%, or 

75% to account for the risks associated with proving the extent of damages and obtaining an 

award thereof. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 25(a)-(k).) As for the PAGA claim, the calculation deviates in 

that: (1) the first discount is for 50% for the risks in proving manageability; (2) the second 

discount is for 33% to account for the risks associated with succeeding on the merits and 

establishing liability; and (3) the third discount is for 75% to account for the risks associated with 

obtaining an award of civil penalties and the Court’s discretion in reducing civil penalties. (Id. at 

¶ 25(l).) 

Applying these discounts, the claims valuations were reduced as follows: (a) the failure to 

pay overtime wages under California Labor Code § 510 from $1,026,334.45 to $102,633.45; (b) 

the FLSA overtime claim from $901,945.24 to $45,097.26; (c) the failure to pay minimum wages 

under California Labor Code from $684,103.09 to $42,756.44; (d) the failure to pay minimum 

wages under FLSA from $601,189.72 to $18,787.18; (e) the failure to provide compliant meal 

periods from $1,368,206.17 to $171,025.77; (f) the failure to provide compliant rest periods from 

$1,368,206.17 to $42,756.44; (g) the failure to timely pay wages after termination from 

$1,634,505.60 to $51,078.30; (h) the failure to provide compliant wage statements from 

$2,207,800.00 to $34,496.88; (i) the failure to maintain payroll records from $401,500 to 

$25,093.75; (j) the failure to reimburse necessary business expenses from $146,254 to $9,140.88; 

(k) the failure to pay reporting time pay from $684,103.09 to $21,378.22; and (l) the PAGA 

claim from $329,000 to $27,553.75. (Id. at ¶ 25(a)-(l).) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 30 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

The Court is concerned with the significant reductions from the original valuation 

calculations. As for the claims overall, the original valuation totals $11,353,147.53,

10 and the 

discounted valuation totals $591,798.32,

11 representing approximately 5.2% of the original 

valuation.12 The Maximum Settlement Amount of $600,000.00 based on this discounted 

valuation, is approximately 5.3% of the original valuation.13 After deducting attorneys’ fees

proposed at 35% of the Maximum Settlement Amount, costs, and other amounts described 

above, the Class Settlement Amount is estimated to be $312,787.50. (Mot. 13; Agreement ¶ 44.) 

The FLSA Settlement Amount is $16,462.50, and therefore the total maximum estimated payout 

to the Class Members and the FLSA Collective is approximately $329,250.00.14 This is less than 

3% of the original valuation.15 Further, the Class Settlement Amount, separate from the FLSA 

settlement amount that will be paid in total no matter the amount of opt-ins, is subject to a 63% 

minimum distribution floor, and thus potential recovery may be diminished further. 

The FLSA overtime claim has been discounted to approximately 5% of the original 

valuation,16 and the FLSA minimum wage claim has been discounted to approximately 3% of the 

original valuation.17 Significantly, the FLSA settlement amount under the proposed agreement is 

$16,462.50, and therefore as proposed, encompasses only 1% of the original $1,503,134.96 

valuation for the FLSA claims.

18

 

 

10

 $1,026,334.45 + $901,945.24 + $684,103.09 + $601,189.72 + 1,368,206.17 + 1,368,206.17 + 1,634,505.60 + 

$2,207,800.00 + $401,500 + $146,254.00 + $684,103.09 + $329,000.00 = $11,353,147.53. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 

25(a)-(l).) 

11

 $102,633.45 + 45,097.26 + $42,756.44 + $18,787.18 + $171,025.77 + $42,756.44 + $51,078.30 + $34,496.88 + 

$25,093.75 + $9,140.88 + $21,378.22 + $27,553.75 = $591,798.32. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 25(a)-(l).) 

12

 $591,798.32 ÷ $11,353,147.53 = 0.0521. 

13

 $600,000.00 ÷ $11,353,147.53 = 0.0528. 

14

 $312,787.50 + $16,462.50 = $329,250.00.

15

 $329,250.00 ÷ $11,353,147.53 = 0.0290. 

16

 $45,097.26 ÷ $901,945.24 = 0.0499. 

17

 $18,787.18 ÷ 601,189.72 = 0.0313. 

18

 $16,462.50 ÷ $1,503,134.96 = 0.0101. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 31 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

“To determine whether a settlement ‘falls within the range of possible approval’ a court 

must focus on ‘substantive fairness and adequacy,’ and ‘consider plaintiffs’ expected recovery 

balanced against the value of the settlement offer.’ ” Collins v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 274 

F.R.D. 294, 302 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F.Supp.2d at 

1080). While Plaintiffs put forth various reasoning for these steep discounts, (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 

22-28), counsel has not exhaustively explained the reasoning for the discounts, particularly as to 

the individual claims themselves. The Court highlights that given the amount the valuation has 

been discounted, some courts may not find such evidence sufficient, even at the preliminary 

approval stage. See Hunt v. VEP Healthcare, Inc., No. 16-CV-04790-VC, 2017 WL 3608297, at 

*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (Where proposed settlement of $1.41 million only amounted to 

4.3% of estimated $32.85 million estimated exposure, the court denied preliminary approval 

because if “defendant is to receive a discount of this magnitude, there must be good reasons why

. . . those reasons must be explained thoroughly at the preliminary approval stage . . . [and] 

Plaintiffs’ counsel has not come close to providing the information a court would need to decide 

whether a discount of this magnitude is appropriate [as the motion only] makes abstract gestures 

to the uncertainties of litigation, rather than offering a careful analysis of the claims and the 

strength or weakness of any potential defenses.”)19; Eddings v. DS Servs. of Am., Inc., No. 15-

CV-02576-VC, 2016 WL 3390477, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2016) (where value of settlement 

was asserted to be approximately 75% to 90% of the total unpaid overtime and over 50% of the 

total unpaid overtime and meal and rest premium pay, the court found it “need[ed] more than this 

 

19

 The parties here also have used the financial difficulties of the Defendant as an additional reason for the 

discounted valuations, partially to protect current employees from losing their job, in addition to being a reason for 

the necessity of funding the settlement in installment payments. (Aiwazian Decl. ¶ 26; Lynch Decl. ¶¶ 10-14.) Thus, 

also relevant to the justification given here, the Hunt court rejected the argument that defendant was experiencing 

financial difficulties noting and finding: “Courts should view such assertions with great caution, as employers tend 

to make threats about inability to pay more often than they are actually unable to pay. Therefore, if this sort of 

assertion is to be the basis for approval of a discounted class settlement, it must be supported with detailed evidence. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel has not done that here. There is one conclusory paragraph in a declaration from plaintiffs’

counsel, with parallel language in the proposed settlement, stating that VEP claims to be experiencing financial 

difficulty and that an accountant hired by plaintiffs’ counsel agrees with that claim. [citations] Such conclusory 

assertions are not enough—there should be a much stronger showing before a defendant’s financial hardship is taken 

into account.” Hunt, No. 16-CV-04790-VC, 2017 WL 3608297, at *1. The information provided here is more 

substantial than averred to in Hunt, but the parties are forewarned that more evidence, perhaps with support by an 

accountant’s analysis, may be necessary to address the valuation at the hearing for final approval. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 32 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

type of bare assertion [as] [p]laintiffs seeking preliminary approval should show their work by 

explaining the relative value of their claims in significant detail [and] in a wage-and-hour case . . 

. plaintiffs should show or estimate how many employees were allegedly shortchanged, calculate 

and explain to the Court the amount by which typical employees were allegedly shortchanged on 

an hourly or daily basis, and show or estimate the number of hours or days the employees were 

allegedly shortchanged [and the] parties [did not] give[] the Court enough information to 

evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs’ case [but rather] list[ed] legal issues that 

this case might present and positions that the defendants might take, but [didn’t] analyze those 

issues or evaluate the strength or weakness of defendants’ positions [and a] party moving for 

preliminary approval should cite case law and apply it to explain why each claim or defense in 

the case is more or less likely to prove meritorious.”). 

Nonetheless, the Court finds counsel’s explanations sufficient for purposes of preliminary 

approval, taken in the context of the risks of continued litigation and settlement as a whole, with 

the caveat that more extensive explanation and support for the discounting may be needed to 

demonstrate fairness at the final approval hearing. “It is well-settled law that a cash settlement 

amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery will not per se render the settlement 

inadequate or unfair,” and “[i]t is the complete package taken as a whole, rather than the 

individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” Officers for Justice v. 

Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1982); In re 

Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); City of Detroit v. 

Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 455 (2d Cir. 1974) (“In fact there is no reason, at least in theory, 

why a satisfactory settlement could not amount to a hundredth or even a thousandth part of a 

single percent of the potential recovery.”), abrogated by Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 

F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000). 

While on the lower end of approved settlements, the amount is not, on its face, outside 

the bounds or range of reasonableness.20 For purposes of preliminary approval, and again with 

 

20

 See Thomas v. Cognizant Tech. Sols. U.S. Corp., No. SACV111123JSTANX, 2013 WL 12371622, at *6 (C.D. 

Cal. June 24, 2013) (granting final approval in wage and hour action where settlement encompassed between 4.4% 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 33 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

 

and 5% of the maximum estimated liability figure); In re Uber FCRA Litig., No. 14-CV-05200-EMC, 2017 WL 

2806698, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) (granting preliminary approval of settlement of Fair Credit Reporting Act 

claims which encompassed as low as 0.75% to 7.5% of maximum valuation if willful violations were proved at 

trial); In re AT & T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (in securities fraud case, affirming class settlement 

approval where settlement was only 4% of original valuation, which was devalued after summary judgment); Rinky 

Dink Inc v. Elec. Merch. Sys. Inc., No. C13-1347 JCC, 2015 WL 11234156, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2015) 

(granting preliminary approval of settlement of $1,250,000 where “potential exposure under the negligence standard 

can easily exceed $90,000,00,” which is approximately 1.4% of the liability, based partially on proffered argument 

that defendant could not pay a large settlement, with caveat that “in their Final Approval Brief, the parties must 

present concrete facts in support of the assertion that they were ‘fully informed’ and could thereby reasonably 

conclude that it was doubtful whether Defendants would be able to pay a higher judgment.”); Stovall-Gusman v. 

W.W. Granger, Inc., No. 13-CV-02540-HSG, 2015 WL 3776765, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2015) (granting final 

approval in wage and hour action where total settlement amount represented approximately 10% of potential value, 

and net settlement amount represented 7.3% of valuation); Ma v. Covidien Holding, Inc., No. SACV 12-02161-

DOC, 2014 WL 360196, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (granting preliminary approval of wage and hour settlement 

for 9.1% as within “range of reasonableness”); In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., No. 13-CV-03072-EMC, 2019 

WL 1411510, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2019) (granting preliminary approval of settlement of consumer warranty 

claims for approximately 6% of valuation); Thompson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 14-CV-2778-CAB-WVG, 

2017 WL 1957552, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2017) (granting preliminary approval of settlement reflecting 

approximately 10% of exposure, based on Court’s experience with wage and hour class actions but stating at “the 

final approval hearing, the Court will give careful consideration to any objections from class members (or the lack 

thereof) when determining whether final approval is warranted.”); Deaver v. Compass Bank, No. 13-CV-00222-

JSC, 2015 WL 4999953, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015) (granting preliminary approval of wage and hour 

settlement representing 10.7% of liabilities and also noting concerns better addressed at final approval following 

claims administration process); In re Pool Prod. Distribution Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 310 F.R.D. 300, 316 (E.D. La. 

2015) (granting preliminary approval of settlement of 2.5% of valuation in antitrust action, as “best-case scenario”); 

Schuler v. Medicines Co., No. CV 14-1149 (CCC), 2016 WL 3457218, at *8 (D.N.J. June 24, 2016) (granting final 

approval in securities class action where settlement reflected approximately 4% of estimated recoverable damages); 

Balderas v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, No. 12-CV-06327 NC, 2014 WL 3610945, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 

2014) (granting preliminary approval of settlement of claims regarding failure to reimburse business expenses where 

gross settlement represented approximately 8% of liability and net settlement represented 5%, as within range of 

possible approval based on risks and expense of continued litigation, with caveat that “at the final approval hearing, 

the parties must be prepared to present evidence that the Court’s calculation of the percentage of the maximum 

recovery is incorrect, or to explain why the especially low recovery is warranted based on the circumstances of this 

case.”); Martin v. Sysco Corp., No. 116CV00990DADSAB, 2019 WL 3253878, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2019) 

(while granting preliminary approval of settlement encompassing approximately 11% of total value of meal and rest 

break claims, adding caveat that “the court does not presently have material before it sufficient to make a reasoned 

determination of whether the settlement amount proposed in the Agreement is adequate [but] [r]ather than denying 

preliminary approval of the Agreement in its entirety, however, the court finds that the most prudent course is to 

raise the issue for the parties’ awareness and invite them to provide additional argument and evidence in preparation 

for the final fairness hearing [as] [i]t may well be that in light of the serious litigation risks faced by plaintiff and the

class, settlement at such a dollar amount is warranted in this case.”); Cooley v. Indian River Transp. Co., No. 1:18-

CV-00491, 2019 WL 316634, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2019) (granting preliminary approval of wage and hour 

settlement at approximately 11% of liability and despite concerns regarding attorney’s fees award); Singh v. 

Roadrunner Intermodal Servs., LLC, No. 115CV01497DADBAM, 2018 WL 2412325, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 

2018) (granting preliminary approval of wage and hour settlement for approximately 12% of liability), modified,

No. 115CV01497DADBAM, 2018 WL 4382202 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2018); Custom LED, LLC v. eBay, Inc, No. 

12-CV-00350-JST, 2013 WL 6114379, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2013) (granting preliminary approval with range 

of recovery from 1.8% for one subclass, to 16% for another subclass of eBay sellers); Hendricks v. Starkist Co, No. 

13-CV-00729-HSG, 2016 WL 5462423, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016) (granting final approval in consumer class 

action and noting that while “[t]he $12,000,000 settlement amount, while constituting only a single-digit percentage 

of the maximum potential exposure, is reasonable given the stage of the proceedings and the defenses asserted in 

this action.”), aff’d sub nom. Hendricks v. Ference, 754 F. App’x 510 (9th Cir. 2018); Villegas v. J.P. Morgan Chase 

& Co., No. CV 09-00261 SBA EMC, 2012 WL 5878390, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012) (preliminarily 

approving settlement of approximately 15% of valuation despite concerns of such discount, noting the risks of 

pursuing trial and that counsel acknowledged that some of Plaintiff's claims were not as viable as they had originally 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 34 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

the caveat that more extensive explanation and support for the discounting from the original 

valuations may be needed for final approval, given the proffered strengths and weaknesses of the 

claims and defenses, the costs and risks of pursuing this litigation through trial, and the benefit of 

recovery now versus potentially no recovery, the Court finds the proposed recovery falls within

the range of possible approval and taken as a whole, weighs toward finding the Agreement fair,

reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of the Class Members in light of all known 

facts and circumstances.21 

b. The Effectiveness of the Proposed Method of Distributing Relief 

The Court is to consider “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief 

to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(e)(2)(C)(ii). The Court has reviewed the Class Claim Form that Class Members must submit. 

It is one page and laid out in an easy to understand layout. (ECF No. 19-1 at 84-87.) Further, 

each Class Member’s Class Claim Form and FLSA Opt-In Form will come prepopulated stating the 

number of Workweeks and Estimated Class Settlement Share or Estimated FLSA Settlement Share. 

(Mot. 31.) The method of processing claims also includes a procedure for claimants to dispute the 

presumptive number of Workweeks. As discussed in detail further below herein, the Court finds the 

method of notice and follow-up reminders are sufficient to provide the best notice practicable under 

the circumstances. Considering these facts, the Court finds the proposed method of distributing relief 

is effective, and weighs toward finding the Agreement is fair, reasonable and adequate. 

 

envisioned, fact that parties agreed to reduce proposed attorney’s fees proportion from 33% to 25%, and further 

stating that “[a]t any rate, issues concerning the amount of the settlement are better resolved at the final approval 

hearing,” as after claims process is completed the parties and court are in better position to accurately calculate the 

value of settlement.). 

21

 In evaluating the fairness of the proposed settlement amount, the Court has also reviewed the scope of the release 

of Defendant’s liability, summarized in greater detail above, supra Section III(I-J). While the release appears 

somewhat broad (Agreement ¶¶ 8, 50), it is permissible because it only encompasses claims that are based on the 

same facts underlying the claims asserted in the operative complaint, and does not release factually unrelated claims. 

See Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A settlement agreement may preclude a party from 

bringing a related claim in the future even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable 

in the class action, but only where the released claim is based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the 

claims in the settled class action.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Collins, 274 F.R.D. at 303 (“These 

released claims appropriately track the breadth of Plaintiffs’ allegations in the action and the settlement does not 

release unrelated claims that class members may have against defendants.”). Further, the release of FLSA claims 

only applies to those who opt-in to the collective. (Agreement ¶¶ 23, 25, 50, 78, 80.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 35 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that courts “must be particularly vigilant not only for 

explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their 

own self-interests and that of certain class members to infect the negotiations.” In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has identified 

that the following aspects may be such signs of collusion: (1) “when counsel receive a 

disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or when the class receives no monetary 

distribution but class counsel are amply rewarded”; (2) “when the parties negotiate a ‘clear 

sailing’ arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees separate and apart from class 

funds”; and (3) “when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants rather than 

be added to the class fund.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

First, counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of thirty-five percent (35%) 

of the Maximum Settlement Amount. This amount is not per se excessive, and as the Court 

discusses in the next section, the Court is not likely to approve an amount over the Ninth 

Circuit’s benchmark of twenty-five percent (25%) absent a showing that counsel achieved 

extraordinary results or otherwise prove they are entitled to such an amount. Given the Court’s 

inclination to reduce the fee award, the Court finds it significant that the Agreement explicitly 

provides that should the Court approve a fee award of less than thirty-five percent, the difference 

“shall become part of the Net Settlement Amount.” (Agreement ¶ 63(d).) Of further 

significance, the Agreement no longer contains an express clear sailing agreement. The state 

court previously voiced concerns with the previous settlement agreement’s fee provision which 

expressly stated that “Defendant will not oppose” an award of up to thirty-five percent (35%). 

(ECF No. 1-10 at 62, 213.) The Agreement now does not contain such language. (Agreement ¶¶ 

19; 63.) 

Turning to the reversionary aspect of the Agreement, Plaintiffs argue that the reversion to 

employer is fair in this case because this is not the case where there is a risk that Defendant will 

retain funds that correspond to an injury suffered by a Class Member, as the claims process 

allows all employees who claim an injury to recovery, and only those amounts that do not 

correspond to any injuries (i.e. unclaimed amounts) will revert to Defendant. Plaintiffs also 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 36 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

argue the reversion is fair because: (1) there is a high Minimum Distribution Floor of 63% of the 

Class Settlement Amount;22 (2) the parties have agreed to take steps to increase participation in 

the settlement, including by causing Notice Packets to be mailed to each Class Member and then 

following up with those who do not respond by sending reminder post cards; (3) the Class Notice 

fully informs Class Members about the potential for unclaimed Class Settlement Amounts to be 

retained by Defendant; (4) reversion was a factor during mediation and settlement negotiations 

which was the product of arms’ length non-collusive negotiations agreed upon by Plaintiffs and 

Class/Collective Counsel. (Mot. 23.) 

Weighing these considerations, the Court finds the reversion provision to be within the 

bounds of reasonableness. See Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 331 F. App’x 452, 456 (9th Cir. 

2009) (approving reversion clause that allowed any reduction in attorney’s fees to revert to 

defendant)23; Hightower v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV111802PSGPLAX, 2015 WL 

9664959, at *2, 6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015) (approving final approval of settlement agreement 

with reversion clause and 65% minimum distribution floor with amounts not awarded as 

attorney’s fees funneling back to net settlement amount and noting that while the “reversion 

clause certainly makes the Court suspicious, but in this instance, after reviewing the respective 

positions of the Parties, and considering the many weaknesses of Plaintiffs’ case, the Court is 

persuaded that the reversion clause does not make the Settlement Agreement unfair nor does it 

show collusion among the parties.”); Davis v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., No. 

113CV01211LJOBAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015) (recommending final 

approval where defendant retained approximately 58% of the unclaimed funds as class members 

were adequately notified of retention of unclaimed funds and had opportunity to participate, and 

 

22

 The Court notes that following denial of the proposed settlement by the state court, the parties have now raised 

the minimum distribution floor from 50% to 63%. (ECF No. 1-16 at 8; 1-10 at 61-62.) The Court finds this 

enhancement to be a significant change in favor of the Class Members. 

23

 Again, of significance here, the Agreement provides that in “the event the Court approves a lesser Fees and Costs 

Award than Class/Collective Counsel request, the difference between (i) the amount requested by Class/Collective 

Counsel and (ii) the amount actually awarded by the Court shall become part of the Net Settlement Amount.” 

(Agreement ¶ 63(d).) While such reduction in attorney’s fees may ultimately revert back to Defendant, it will not if 

sufficient claim forms are returned. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 37 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

no objections were filed, citing four cases in the Eastern District of California where reversions 

were approved in amounts ranging from 45% to 75% of the net settlement funds); Garcia v. City 

of King City, No. 14-CV-01126-BLF, 2017 WL 363257, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) 

(reversion approved in part because product of arm’s length, non-collusive negotiations and 

assistance of magistrate judge in settlement negotiations); Minor v. FedEx Office & Print Servs., 

Inc., No. C09-1375 TEH, 2013 WL 503268, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2013) (finding reversion 

clause not “inherently inadequate” for purposes of preliminary approval where there was a 

minimum distribution floor of 45%, a contention that reversion was essential for defendant to 

agree to settlement, and parties anticipated a relatively high claim rate).24 

Significantly as well, courts have voiced concern where portions of settlement funds 

relating to FLSA claims revert back to the defendant. See Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 612 (noting 

“that where a statute’s objectives include deterrence, as does the FLSA’s, it would contradict 

these goals to permit the defendant to retain unclaimed funds,” and denying preliminary approval 

in part because the settlement agreement failed to separate the settlement fund based on the 

FLSA claims and because the unclaimed FLSA portion was part of the reversion to defendant) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, although the portion of the settlement allocated 

to the FLSA claim is relatively small compared to the total portion (5%), it does not revert back 

to Defendant. (Mot. 13; Agreement ¶ 69(b).) 

Considering all of the factors discussed above, the Court finds the claims-made process is 

fair, reasonable and adequate. See Nur v. Tatitlek Support Servs., Inc., No. 

15CV00094SVWJPRX, 2016 WL 3039573, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) (approving claimsmade settlement with reversion of funds to the employer, and listing sixteen (16) cases wherein 

courts approved claims-made settlements with reversion of the unclaimed funds to the employer, 

described as “only a small sample” of such cases). 

 

24

 Plaintiffs cite Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 303 F.R.D. 326, 330 (N.D. Cal. 2014), in support of their 

argument that the reversion clause is fair. However, in Dyer, the court was unconcerned with the reversion because 

it was not a typical reversion clause “in which money allocated to a class member, but unclaimed by her, reverts to 

the Defendant,” but rather was one where the funds reverted back to defendant corresponding to those members who 

opted out of the class. 303 F.R.D. at 331 n.1. Therefore, the case does not strengthen Plaintiffs’ position here where 

the reversion corresponds to funds unclaimed by Class Members. 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 38 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

///

c. The Terms of the Proposed Award of Attorney’s Fees 

In assessing the whether the relief provided the class is adequate, the Court is to consider

“the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii). Here, the Agreement provides that Class/Collective Counsel may petition the 

Court for attorney’s fees up to thirty-five percent (35%) of the Maximum Settlement Amount 

($210,000.00 of $600,000.00), and up to $35,000.00 for reimbursement of actual litigation costs 

and expenses. (Agreement ¶ 19.) 

Federal Rule 23(h) provides that “[i]n a certified class action, the court may award 

attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” 

The Ninth Circuit has affirmed the use of two separate methods of calculating attorney’s fees, 

depending upon the case. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029. “In ‘common-fund’ cases where the 

settlement or award creates a large fund for distribution to the class, the district court has 

discretion to use either a percentage or ‘lodestar method.’ ” Id. In the Ninth Circuit, courts 

typically utilize twenty-five percent of the common fund as the “benchmark” for a reasonable fee 

award, with adjustments provided there is adequate explanation in the record for any special 

circumstances that justify departure. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. The usual range for 

common fund attorney fees are between twenty to thirty percent. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 

290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The “lodestar” method is typically used where the benefit received by the class is 

primarily injunctive in nature, and therefore, monetary benefit is not easily calculated. In re 

Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941. The “lodestar” approach calculates attorney fees by multiplying the 

number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Gonzalez v. City of 

Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 

978 (9th Cir. 2008). Since the benefit to the class is easily calculated in a common find case, 

courts may award a percentage of the common fund rather than engaging in a “lodestar” analysis 

to determine the reasonableness of the fee request. In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. When 

applying the percentage of the common fund method in calculating attorney fees, courts use the 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 39 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

“lodestar” method as a crosscheck to determine the reasonableness of the fee request. See

Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050. “This amount may be increased or decreased by a multiplier that 

reflects any factors not subsumed within the calculation, such as ‘the quality of representation, 

the benefit obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk 

of nonpayment.’ ” Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 964, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 

(quoting In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942).

Plaintiffs are forewarned that the Court will not grant an upward departure from the 25% 

“benchmark” for a reasonable fee award unless, at final approval, Plaintiffs present compelling 

evidence supporting such a departure. This case appears to be relatively straight forward case and 

lacks a complexity which may justify a higher than benchmark rate, and presently, counsel have 

not demonstrated the achievement of exceptional results that would justify a departure, particularly 

in light of the steep discounts from the original valuations discussed above. However, counsel can 

and should show otherwise at the final settlement proceeding if a greater rate is sought. In this 

regard, Class/Collective Counsel state that in advance of the final approval hearing, they will file 

an appropriate motion and submit supporting evidence and documents.

Therefore, given the award can be determined at the final approval hearing, given there is 

no longer any express clear sailing agreement, and given any reduction in the award will revert 

back to the funds available for the Class Members,25 the Court finds this aspect of the agreement 

is fair, reasonable, and adequate for purposes of preliminary approval. See Millan, 310 F.R.D. at 

613 (despite concerns regarding the anticipated request for attorney’s fees based on one-third of 

the net settlement fund despite the twenty-five percent (25%) benchmark, stating “the Court need 

not resolve this matter at the preliminary approval stage, since the propriety of the fee request is 

an issue that can be determined at the Final Fairness Hearing,” and that “Plaintiffs’ counsel 

should be mindful of this issue and should be prepared to present a lodestar calculation in 

 

25

 As discussed in the previous section, given the Court is disinclined to approve an amount over the Ninth Circuit’s 

benchmark of twenty-five percent (25%), the Court finds it significant that the Agreement explicitly provides that 

should the Court approve a fee award of less than thirty-five percent, the difference “shall become part of the Net 

Settlement Amount.” (Agreement ¶ 63(d).) Of further significance, the Agreement no longer contains an express 

clear sailing agreement after the state court previously voiced concerns with the previous settlement agreement’s fee 

provision which expressly stated that “Defendant will not oppose” an award of up to thirty-five percent (35%). 

(ECF No. 1-10 at 62, 213.) The Agreement now does not contain such language. (Agreement ¶¶ 19; 63.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 40 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

connection with their motion for attorneys’ fees and for final approval.”).

d. Any Agreement Required to be Identified under Rule 23(e)(3)

The Court is to consider any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv). “The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying 

any agreement made in connection with the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3). The parties 

have identified no such agreement and the Court is not aware of any such agreement. 

3. The Proposal Treats Class Members Equitably Relative To Each Other

The Court is also to consider whether “the proposal treats class members equitably 

relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In determining this, the Court determines

whether the settlement “improperly grant[s] preferential treatment to class representatives or 

segments of the class.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. In assessing 

the appropriateness of class representative enhancements or incentive payments, the Court may 

consider factors such as the actions the plaintiffs took to protect the interests of the class, the 

degree to which the class has benefitted, the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in 

pursuing litigation, and any notoriety or personal difficulties encountered by the representative 

plaintiff. Khanna v. Intercon Sec. Systems, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-2214 KJM EFB, 2014 WL 

1379861, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014); Reibstein v. Rite Aid Corp., 761 F. Supp. 2d 241, 257 

(E.D. Penn. 2011); see also Staton, 327 F.3d at 975-77 (9th Cir. 2003). “Incentive awards are 

particularly appropriate in wage-and-hour actions where plaintiffs undertake a significant 

‘reputational risk’ by bringing suit against their former employers.” Bellinghausen v. Tractor 

Supply Co., 306 F.R.D. 245, 267 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citation omitted). 

Based on the settlement proposal, Individual Class Payments and Individual FLSA 

Payments will be calculated on a pro rata basis based upon the number of Workweeks. 

(Agreement ¶¶ 69(a)-(b).) The Court finds this is a presumptively reasonable manner of 

equitably treating the Class Members for purposes of preliminary approval. 

Further, the incentive awards appear to be reasonable. Ferrell and Baker are allotted to 

each receive an incentive awards of $3,000.00, for a total of $6,000.00 to the class 

representatives, in addition to receiving their Individual Class Payments and Individual FLSA 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 41 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42

Payments. Of significance is the extensive declared amount of time and work the class 

representatives have put forth in assisting with this litigation as discussed above. (Ferrell Decl. 

¶¶ 10-13; Baker Decl. ¶ 10-13.) The Court finds that $3,000.00 each is reasonable compensation 

for the services provided by the class representatives in this action given the risks that they took 

in representing the class and the time spent adjudicating this action. 

Accordingly, the Court finds this factor demonstrates the Agreement is fair, reasonable 

and adequate, and weighs in favor of preliminary approval of the settlement. 

D. The Proposed Class Notice and Settlement Administration 

For proposed settlements under Rule 23, “the court must direct notice in a reasonable 

manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1); see 

also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1025 (“Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement 

under Rule 23(e).”). For a “class certified under Rule 23(b)(3)— or upon ordering notice under 

Rule 23(e)(1) to a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement under Rule 23(b)(3)—the 

court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 

including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The notice may be by one or more of the following methods: United States 

mail, electronic means, or other appropriate means. Id. The “notice must clearly and concisely state 

in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class 

certified; (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter an appearance

through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court will exclude from the class any 

member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the 

binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).” Id. A class action settlement 

notice “is satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert 

those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.” Churchill Vill., 

LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees that the substance of the Notice Packet is sufficient in 

that it provides information on: (1) the nature of the lawsuit; (2) the definition of the Class and 

Proposed FLSA Collective; (3) the terms of the settlement; (4) information regarding the hybrid 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 42 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43

nature of the action and the claims involved in the action; (5) the scope of the Class Released 

Claims and the FLSA Released Claims; (6) the binding effect of the settlement; (7) the 

consequences of opting into the FLSA Collective to participate in the FLSA Settlement and receive 

payment; and (8) the allocations for Fees and Costs Awards, Incentive Awards, and Settlement 

Administration Costs. (Mot. 30.) Further, each Class Member’s Class Claim Form and FLSA OptIn Form will state the number of Workweeks and Estimated Class Settlement Share or Estimated 

FLSA Settlement Share. (Mot. 31.) The Notice Packet also summarizes the proceedings and will 

provide the date, time, and place of the Final Approval Hearing. (Id.) Finally, the Court also 

agrees that the notice provides a brief, neutral explanation of the case from the perspective of 

both parties; recognizes that the Court has not granted final approval of the settlement; and sets 

forth the procedures and deadlines governing the submission of Class Claim Forms, FLSA OptIn Forms, Requests for Exclusion, Notices of Objections, and disputes regarding the number of 

Workweeks credited to Class Members and Proposed FLSA Collective Members. (Mot. 31.) 

The parties have selected Simpluris, Inc. (“Simpluris”) as the Settlement Administrator to 

handle the notice and administration of the settlement. Simpluris will format, print, and mail a 

Notice Packet to each Class Member and Proposed FLSA Collective Member; will receive, 

review, and process Claim Forms, FLSA Opt-In Forms, Requests for Exclusion, and written 

disputes regarding Workweeks; calculate Estimated Class Settlement Shares, Estimated FLSA 

Settlement Shares, Individual Class Payments, and Individual FLSA Payments; will withhold 

applicable taxes and withholdings; prepare and transmit necessary tax documentation and filings; 

and transmit all required payments. (Mot. 32; Agreement ¶ 71.) Settlement Administration 

Costs are currently estimated not to exceed $16,000.00, and will be paid out of the Maximum 

Settlement Amount. 

As for ensuring the greatest number of Class Members will receive notice, all Class 

Members will be identified by Defendant through a review of its business records, and after 

receiving the “Class List” regarding each Class Member and Proposed FLSA Collective 

Member, the Settlement Administrator will mail a Notice Packet to each of them. (Mot. 31; 

Agreement ¶¶ 72, 73.) Within fourteen (14) calendar days following preliminary approval, 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 43 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44

Defendant will provide Simpluris with a Class List. (Agreement ¶¶ 6, 72.) Within ten (10) 

calendar days of receipt of the Class List, Simpluris will mail a Notice Packet to each Class 

Member and Proposed FLSA Collective Member. (Agreement ¶ 73(a).) Prior to mailing the 

Notice Packets, Simpluris will attempt to locate updated addresses by a search of the National 

Change of Address Database or other similar service, such as Experian. (Id.) If a Notice Packet 

is returned as undeliverable, Simpluris will promptly re-mail it to a forwarding address, if 

provided, or to an updated address obtained from a skip-trace search. (Agreement ¶ 73(a)-(b).) 

Between twenty (20) and thirty (30) calendar days after initially mailing the Notice 

Packet, Simpluris will mail a reminder postcard to all Class Members and/or Proposed FLSA 

Collective Members who have not yet submitted both a Class Claim Form and FLSA Opt-In 

Form. (Agreement ¶ 73(c).) Class Claim Forms and FLSA Opt-In Forms must be mailed or 

faxed to Simpluris, post-marked or fax-marked by the Response Deadline or, in the event of a remailed Notice Packet, within ten (10) calendar days from the original Response Deadline. 

(Agreement ¶ 54.) If a defective Class Claim Form and/or FLSA Opt-In Form is submitted, 

Simpluris will notify the Class Member and/or Proposed FLSA Collective Member of the 

deficiency within three (3) business days of receipt of the defective form, and the individual will 

have until the Response Deadline, or fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of the cure letter, 

whichever is later, to submit a corrected form. (Agreement ¶ 75(b).) 

Requests for Exclusion must be submitted by the Response Deadline, or in the event of a 

re-mailed Notice Packet, within ten (10) calendar days of the original Response Deadline. 

(Agreement ¶ 77.) Disputes regarding Workweeks must be submitted, post-marked or faxstamped, by the Response Deadline. (Agreement ¶ 76.) Notices of Objection must be filed with 

the Court and served on counsel for the parties by the Response Deadline. (Id.) 

All settlement checks issued will remain valid and negotiable for one hundred and eighty

(180) calendar days from the date of issuance, and thereafter the checks will be cancelled, and 

the funds associated with any cancelled checks will be transmitted to Legal Aid at Work, a nonprofit legal services organization that advocates for the job-related rights of workers in 

California. (Agreement ¶ 83.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 44 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

45

The Court finds the notice and the method of delivery is appropriate and appears to be the 

“best notice that is practicable under the circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). However, the 

Court highlights that in a recent case, the Ninth Circuit held the single mailed notice, along with the 

placement of information posters in the buildings where employees worked, was not the best 

practicable under the circumstances, finding “it particularly problematic that, despite concerns that 

former employees in particular might be difficult to reach by mail, the settlement provided no 

other means of reaching former employees,” and “when at least 12% of the mailed notices were 

ultimately determined to be undeliverable—meaning those class members had not received 

notice—still no additional means of notice reasonably calculated to reach those class members 

was attempted.” Roes, 944 F.3d at 1046. The class members were former and current 

employees in adult entertainment clubs, and “[a]lthough the mailed notice was supplemented 

with posters that were hung in the defendant night clubs, those posters were likely to be seen 

only by class members who were still working at the nightclubs, and those class members are 

also the precise group of people for whom the defendants likely had a current address such that 

mail notice could successfully be effected.” Id. Further, “[a]s to those former employees for 

whom the claims administrator was able to identify a valid address, the lack of reminder notices 

is particularly relevant, given that the posters would serve no function.” Id. at 1047. The Ninth 

Circuit held that “[i]n sum, the notice process was not ‘reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances,’ to apprise all class members of the proposed settlement, because the 

‘circumstances’ included the district court’s and parties’ belief that class members were 

‘transient’ and thus might be difficult to reach by mail, and the posters also were not reasonably 

calculated to reach all of the absent class members who could not be notified by mail or to serve 

as a reminder to those who did receive the single mailed notice.” Id.

While only providing notice by U.S. mail, there are additional factors that show this 

method is not insufficient as found in Roes. See Roes, 944 F.3d at 1046-47. First, there is no 

indication that the former employees will be significantly difficult to locate addresses for, where 

in Roes the former employees were described as transient. Id. Second, prior to initially mailing 

the Notice Packets, Simpluris will attempt to locate updated addresses by a search of the 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 45 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

46

National Change of Address Database or other similar service. If a Notice Packet is returned as 

undeliverable, Simpluris will promptly re-mail it to a forwarding address, if provided, or to an 

updated address obtained from a skip-trace search. Additionally, Simpluris will mail a reminder 

postcard to all Class Members and/or Proposed FLSA Collective Members who have not yet 

submitted both a Class Claim Form and FLSA Opt-In Form. Also, if a defective Class Claim 

Form and/or FLSA Opt-In Form is submitted, Simpluris will notify the Class Member and/or 

Proposed FLSA Collective Member of the deficiency and the deadlines will be extended 

accordingly.26

Accordingly, the Court finds the notice and the method of delivery by U.S. mail, with an 

initial check for updated addresses with a national database, follow-up reminders for unreturned 

Claims Forms, and re-mailing of Notice Packets following return as undeliverable after a further 

database check for updated addresses, is appropriate, appears to be the “best notice that is 

practicable under the circumstances,” and therefore meets the requirements of Federal Civil 

Procedure Rule 23(c)(2)(B). 

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding attention to the concerns stated herein that may need to be further 

addressed at the final approval hearing, including but not limited to the proposed attorney’s fees 

award and valuation of the claims in light of the actual rate of claim forms submitted following 

notice, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the 

 

26

 In Roes, the Ninth Circuit also found the notice was not the best notice practicable under the circumstances 

because, “[f]or example, even if, as defendants suggest, e-mail notice was infeasible, information about the 

settlement could have been electronically disseminated through social media or postings on any relevant online 

message boards. To illustrate this possibility, the Union points out that, in another settlement involving sister 

entities of some of the defendants in this case, the parties disseminated notice not only via U.S. Mail and email, but 

also through ads targeting class members on social media, and by posting on StripperWeb.com, a website that has 

117,000 members and has forums dedicated to the exotic dancer community. Particularly here, where the parties 

knew the names and other identifying information of the class members—even if not all of their current addresses—

these types of supplemental notice methods appear practicable.” Roes, 944 F.3d at 1047. The Court does not feel 

the Ninth Circuit intended its holding to dictate that notice by U.S. mail without additional electronic notice is never 

sufficient, as this would eclipse the plain meaning of the Rule which states that “notice may be by one or more of the 

following: United States Mail, electronic means, or other appropriate means.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (emphasis 

added). 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 46 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

47

settlement. Considering the risks the plaintiffs would face in taking this case to trial, together 

with the value of all of the claims being released and the value of the proposed settlement to the 

class members in light of the apparent strengths and weakness of the claims and defenses, the 

Court concludes that the proposed settlement, on the current record, is “fair, reasonable, and 

adequate” within the meaning of Rule 23(e)(2). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement be GRANTED; 

2. The following Class and Proposed FLSA Collective be CERTIFIED for 

settlement purposes only:

All current and former Property Employees of Defendant within the State 

of California from August 8, 2010 to the date this Order is signed by the 

Court (“Settled Period”). “Property Employees” means non-exempt 

employees with the following job positions during the Settled Period: Area 

Relief Manager, Assistant Community Manager, Community Manager, 

Contact Assistant Manager, Grounds Keeper, Janitor, Maintenance 

Technician, Porter, Residential Service Coordinator, and Security. 

3. The Court find that, for purposes of the settlement, the above-defined Class meets 

all of the requirements for class certification. For purposes of the settlement, the 

requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) are satisfied;

4. Plaintiffs Cheryl Baker and Kevin Ferrell be appointed as the Class 

Representatives for the Class and Proposed FLSA Collective;

5. Edwin Aiwazian, Arby Aiwazian, and Joanna Ghosh of Lawyers for Justice, PC, 

and Amir Nayebdadash and Heather Davis of Protection Law Group LLP, be 

appointed as counsel for the Class and Proposed FLSA Collective;

6. The proposed language and manner of distributing the notice of settlement be 

approved as the best notice practicable under the circumstances; 

7. Simpluris, Inc., be appointed as the Settlement Administrator to administer the 

settlement pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement; and

8. The Court set a final approval and fairness hearing and schedule based upon the 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 47 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

48

schedule set forth in the motion for preliminary approval.

27

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen 

(14) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these 

findings and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The 

district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

27

 Plaintiffs request that a final approval hearing be scheduled approximately six (6) months after the motion for 

preliminary approval is granted. (Mot. 33.) 

Case 1:19-cv-00332-JLT-SAB Document 24 Filed 01/21/20 Page 48 of 48