Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01436/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01436-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD A. GREEN,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 13cv1436-H (DHB)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REGARDING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

HILL, R., Warden,

Respondent.

On June 19, 2013, Petitioner Gerald A. Green (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (ECF No. 1.1

) Petitioner seeks relief from his 37 years to life sentence for first

degree residential burglary that was imposed under California’s “three strikes law.” 

Respondent filed an Answer opposing any habeas relief (ECF No. 13), and Petitioner

filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 17.) The Court has reviewed the parties’ pleadings, the

record, and controlling law, and for the reasons discussed below, hereby

RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those

imprinted by the Court’s electronic case filing (ECF) system.

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I. BACKGROUND

On August 30, 1984, Petitioner was convicted of first degree residential burglary. 

(ECF No. 1 at 23.) Approximately four years later, on July 11, 1988, Petitioner suffered

another conviction for first degree residential burglary. (Id. at 22.) Following these two

prior convictions, Petitoner was again convicted of first degree residential burglary in

1997. (Id. at 21.) On August 1, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate

term of 37 years to life under California’s three strikes law because the trial court found

Petitioner had committed two previous “serious” felonies. (Id.; Lodgment No. 7 at 1-2.) 

Petitioner is currently serving that prison sentence. 

On November 6, 2012, California’s three strikes statute was modified by ballot

proposition. See Cal. Penal Code §1170.126 (the “Three Strikes Reform Act”). The

modified law allowed individuals sentenced under the three strikes law to apply for

resentencing under certain circumstances. An individual could qualify for resentencing,

provided his or her current conviction was not for a serious or violent offense, as

defined by California Penal Code § 1192.7(c) or § 667.5(c). Cal. Penal Code

§1170.126; People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).

On January 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court seeking resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act.

(Lodgment No. 1.) On January 9, 2013, the Superior Court denied the petition on the

grounds that Petitioner’s commitment offense – first degree residential burglary – is

classified as a “serious” felony under California Penal Code section 1192.7(c)(18). 

Therefore, the court found Petitioner was ineligible for any sentence modification under

the Act. (Lodgment No. 2.) Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas petition in the Court

of Appeal on January 28, 2013. (Lodgment No. 3.) The Court of Appeal denied the

petition on February 22, 2013, on the same basis as the Superior Court’s denial. 

(Lodgment No. 4.) On March 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court, and the court summarily denied review on May 22, 2013. 

(Lodgment Nos. 5 and 6; ECF No. 1 at 30.)

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On June 19, 2013, Petitioner filed his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On October 7, 2013, Respondent filed an Answer. (ECF

No. 13.) On November 19, 2013, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 17.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”) controls review of this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In

deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide

whether it agrees with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an

extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was

objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v.

Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases,

or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions, but unreasonably applied

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable

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application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003). 

“Clearly established federal law” means the law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Circuit precedent may be pertinent to

the extent it illuminates the meaning and application of Supreme Court precedent, but

“[o]nly Supreme Court precedents are binding on state courts under AEDPA.” 

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). “[W]hen a Supreme Court

decision does not ‘squarely address[] the issue . . . it cannot be said, under AEDPA,

there is ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue,” and the

federal court “must defer to the state court’s decision.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

754 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (the lack of

holdings from the Supreme Court on the issue presented precludes relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

In applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), federal habeas courts must defer to

reasonable factual determinations made by the state courts, to which a statutory

presumption of correctness attaches. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007). To determine whether habeas relief is available under §

2254(d), the Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis

for its analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-8-3 (1991). If the dispositive

state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other

grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76; accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003). 

B. Evidentiary Hearing 

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As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner has not made any argument

that further factual development is necessary, such that an evidentiary hearing would

be warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (listing exceptions where evidentiary hearing

may be appropriate). Therefore, the Court finds an evidentiary hearing is not necessary

because the Petition can be resolved by reference to the record. Schriro v. Landrigan,

550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007).

C. Analysis 

1. Petitioner’s Request for Resentencing Under the Three Strikes Reform Act

Petitioner argues he is eligible for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform

Act. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent counters that Petitioner’s claim does not raise a federal

issue, and alternatively Petitioner is ineligible for a new sentencing hearing because his

conviction is considered a “serious” felony under California law. (ECF No. 13.) For

the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Respondent. 

Petitioner presented this claim to the California Supreme Court, and it was denied

without comment. (Lodgment Nos. 5 and 6.) The Court will therefore look through the

silent denial to the last reasoned decision, which is the Court of Appeal’s February 22,

2013 opinion denying Petitioner’s state habeas corpus petition. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim as follows:

Gerald Green states he is serving an indeterminate term of 37 years to life in prison on a 1997 conviction of “first degree residential burglary.” He filed a petition in the superior court for a recall of his sentence under

the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act) but without success. He suggests he should be eligible for relief because the circumstances did not

establish that he committed a serious crime. 

The Act authorizes any person serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment on conviction of a felony not defined as a serious and/or violent felony by Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (c) or 1192.7, subdivision (c), to file a petition for resentencing. (§1170.126, subd. (b).) A “burglary in the first degree” is defined in section 1192.7, subdivision

(c)(18), as a “serious” felony. 

The petition is denied. 

(Lodgment No. 4.)

First, to the extent Petitioner is claiming the state courts improperly denied his

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requests for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act, the Court finds he has

not raised a cognizable federal claim. Federal habeas relief is not available for violation

of state law or for alleged errors in the interpretation or application of state law. Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas

court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). Here,

Petitioner’s claim that the he is qualified for resentencing under California Penal Code

§ 1170.126 concerns only state sentencing law and does not implicate a federal

constitutional right. Therefore, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See e.g.

Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal habeas challenge to the

denial of a Romero motion is a state law claim that is barred from review in a federal

habeas proceeding), vacated on other grounds, Mayle v. Brown, 538 U.S. 901 (2003);

Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2002) (petitioner’s challenge to trial

court’s exercise of discretion under state sentencing law fails to state federal habeas

claim); Makal v. Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Second, even assuming Petitioner’s allegations raise a cognizable claim, the state

courts reasonably rejected Petitioner’s request for resentencing. The Three Strikes

Reform Act, provides that a prisoner may be eligible for a new sentencing hearing, if

certain requirements are met. One key requirement is that the inmate must be serving

“an indeterminate term of life imprisonment...for a conviction of a felony or felonies

that are not defined as serious,” by California law. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.126(e)(1)

(emphasis added). In People v. Yearwood, the California Court of Appeal explained the

Act “created a postconviction release proceeding whereby a prisoner who is serving an

indeterminate life sentence imposed pursuant to the three strikes law for a crime that is

not a serious or violent felony and who is not disqualified, may have his or her sentence

recalled and be sentenced as a second strike offender unless the court determines that

resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety.” 

Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th at 167-68 (emphasis added). 

Here, Petitioner’s current commitment offense was for first degree residential

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burglary. California Penal Code §1192.7(c)(18) deems “any burglary of first degree”

to be a “serious” felony. Therefore, Petitioner’s current conviction is a “serious” felony

and thus, he is not eligible for a new sentencing hearing. Given the record, the Court

finds Petitioner cannot show that the state courts’ denial of his request for resentencing

was erroneous or warrants federal habeas relief.

2. Petitioner’s Challenge to His Underlying Conviction and Sentence 

Petitioner also argues that his prior convictions did not qualify as “serious”

offenses and therefore, he should not have been sentenced to an indeterminate life term

under the three strikes law for his 1997 conviction. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent contends

Petitioner’s claims regarding his prior convictions do not concern a federal issue and

alternatively are barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 13.) The Court agrees

with Respondent.

As previously discussed, matters relating to state sentencing are governed by state

law, and are generally not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-

68; Brown, 283 F.3d at 1040. This Court must defer to the state court’s interpretation

and application of state law, including the state court’s determination that his prior

burglary convictions qualified as “serious” offenses. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74,

76 (2005); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore,

the Court notes that Petitioner is precluded from challenging his prior convictions by

Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Cross, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In Lackawanna,

the Supreme Court held that where a state court conviction is no longer open to direct

or collateral attack, the conviction is regarded as conclusively valid. Id. at 403. “If that

conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not

challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2255 on the ground that the

prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.” Id. at 404.

/ / /

Even assuming Petitioner has presented a federal issue, any challenge to either

his prior offenses from 1984 and 1988 or his 1997 commitment offense are time barred. 

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Pursuant to AEDPA, a one-year period of limitation applies to an application for writ

of habeas corpus filed “by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins to run on “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). AEDPA’s statute of

limitations provision is subject to both statutory and equitable tolling. See § 2244(d)(2)

(the statute of limitations is tolled during the period of time a petitioner seeks postconviction relief in state court); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002)

(equitable tolling may be available if Petitioner can show he has been pursuing his

rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing

his petition on time). 

At the time Petitioner filed his federal Petition, his 1984 conviction was

approximately 28 years old, and his 1988 conviction was almost 25 years old. In

addition, nearly 16 years have elapsed between Petitioner’s 1997conviction and the date

he initiated this action. Petitioner has not made any showing that either statutory or

equitable tolling would apply to these decades-long time periods. Therefore, any direct

challenge to his underlying conviction and sentence, or to his prior convictions are

untimely under AEDPA. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. 

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Marilyn L. Huff under 28 §636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For all the foregoing

reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the habeas Petition be DENIED in

its entirety on the ground that the Petitioner’s custody violates no federal right. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Court issue an Order (1) approving

and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) directing the judgment be

entered denying the Petition. 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED no later than April 1, 2014 any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

shall be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendations.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than ten (10) days from service of

Petitioner’s filed Objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 27, 2014

DAVID H. BARTICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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