Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00232/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00232-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 On February 12, 2007, Michael J. Astrue replaced Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the

Commissioner of Social Security. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 1 n.1. Pursuant to Rule

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court therefore substitutes

Michael J. Astrue as the Defendant in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1); see also

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 23], GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 29-

1, 29-2] AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

AS MOOT [Doc. No. 29-4]

Daniel Hernandez brought this action to obtain judicial review of

the Social Security Commissioner’s final decision partially denying his

claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33. Before the Court are

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant’s1

 cross-motion for

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2 Defendant also filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

his motion to dismiss the complaint. However, Defendant did not file an accompanying

notice. Moreover, the memorandum of points and authorities in support of his motion

to dismiss the complaint is identical to the memorandum of points and authorities in

support of his motion for summary judgment. As a result, the Court will consider

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s motion to

dismiss be DENIED as moot. 

2 06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

summary judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion2, and Plaintiff’s

opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion. 

The motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Major for the

issuance of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(2) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This

Court found the motions appropriate for submission on the papers and

without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Doc. No. 19.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment be GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2003, Plaintiff filed an application for disability

insurance benefits, alleging disability due to plantar fasciitis, a torn

anterior cruciate ligament, a torn meniscus, arthritis, and severe leg

and foot pain. Administrative Record (hereinafter “AR”) at 52-59. On

October 28, 2004, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Bernard A. Trembly

issued a partially favorable decision for Plaintiff, finding that

Plaintiff was under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,

from June 23, 2002 through July 30, 2003, but not thereafter. AR at 21-

27. 

Plaintiff then filed a request for the Appeals Council to review

the ALJ’s decision. AR at 16-17. On June 29, 2005, the Appeals Council

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3 The transmission report attached to Plaintiff’s motion shows that the

document was not successfully transmitted until January 10, 2006. See Letter attached

to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 23]. 

4 This declaration is referenced in Def.’s Cross-Motion but is attached to

Defendant’s April 10, 2006 Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 6].

3 06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

declined to grant review but notified Plaintiff that he could file a

civil action within 60 days from the date of receipt of the notice. AR

at 9-12. On November 9, 2005, Plaintiff requested an extension of time

to file a civil action, claiming that he had been misinformed and had

sent his paperwork to the wrong department. AR at 4. On December 16,

2005, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff an additional 30 days from

the date of receipt in which to file a civil action. AR at 3. 

On January 9, 2006, Plaintiff attempted to fax a letter requesting

“additional time” to file a civil action to “Branch 16" of the Social

Security Administration’s Office of Hearings and Appeals.3 See Letter

attached to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 23]. The Appeals Council

has no record of receiving Plaintiff’s second request. See Decl. of

Rose Ray, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Soc. Sec. Admin. (“Ray Decl.”)4

at 3.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court on January 31, 2006.

Doc. No. 1. On April 10, 2006, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint

as barred by the sixty-day statute of limitations set forth in 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Doc. No. 6. On June 20, 2006, this Court issued a Report and

Recommendation, wherein the Court recommended that the motion to dismiss

be denied. Doc. No. 11. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiff’s

complaint was untimely but concluded that the motion to dismiss was

premature because Plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to

provide evidence establishing grounds for equitable tolling. Id.

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5 The memoranda accompanying these three pleadings are identical. For

purposes of consistency, the Court will cite only to the memorandum accompanying

Defendant’s Cross-Motion (“Def.’s Cross-Mot.”). 

4 06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

Neither party filed objections to the Report and Recommendation and on

August 24, 2007, the District Judge adopted this Court’s Report and

Recommendation in its entirety. Doc. No. 12. In the same order, the

District Judge ordered Defendant to file an answer within thirty days.

Id.

On September 7, 2007, Defendant answered the Complaint and lodged

the administrative record. Doc. No. 13. Pursuant to a scheduling order

issued by this Court, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s SJ Mot.”) on January 12, 2007. Doc.

No. 23. Defendant opposed the motion on February 20, 2007, and also

filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Dismiss on the

same day5. Doc. Nos. 29-1, 29-2, 29-3, 29-4. On March 2, 2007,

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Cross-Motion. Doc. No. 32. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Educational and Employment History

Born on April 18, 1958, Plaintiff was forty-six years old at the

time of the ALJ’s decision. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 1; AR at 52, 211.

Plaintiff has a high school education and has completed one year of

collegiate study. AR at 65. Prior to the onset of his disability,

Plaintiff worked as a correctional officer. AR at 65, 212. 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History

1. Records from June 23, 2002 Until July 30, 2003

Because it is undisputed that the ALJ ultimately awarded disability

benefits for the period from June 23, 2002 until July 30, 2003, and

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because Plaintiff only disputes the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff

medically improved after July 30, 2003, this Court addresses Plaintiff’s

pre-July 30, 2003 medical records only briefly. 

Throughout the record, Plaintiff complains that he suffers

persistent foot, leg, and back pain due to plantar fasciitis, a torn

anterior cruciate ligament (“ACL”), a torn meniscus, and arthritis. On

or around December 26, 2002, Plaintiff underwent surgery to repair the

torn ACL in his left knee. AR at 126, 214. On April 7, 2003, Plaintiff

elected surgical treatment and underwent a partial plantar fasciotomy on

his right foot. AR at 111-12. Overall, the administrative record

reflects that, although Plaintiff sought ongoing care from several

physicians at Kaiser Permanente, his primary treating physicians were

Daniel McDermott, D.P.M., Patricia Tsung, M.D., William Luetzow, M.D.,

and Bradley Williams, M.D. None of these physicians explicitly opined

during this time frame that Plaintiff was disabled.

Shortly after Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, George

Spellman, M.D., a board certified internist, reviewed Plaintiff’s

records and provided a consultative opinion. AR at 154-63. On June 20,

2003, Dr. Spellman opined that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk for

about six hours in an eight hour workday, sit for about six hours in an

eight hour workday, lift fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five

pounds frequently, and engage in any postural activities except for

ladder climbing. Id. 

2. Records After July 30, 2003

On August 28, 2003, Stephen Swan, M.D., provided a consultative

opinion after reviewing Plaintiff’s records. AR at 164-73. Dr. Swan

opined that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk for at least two hours in

an eight hour workday, sit for about six hours in an eight hour workday,

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6 06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and use foot

controls, but only occasionally. Id. Additionally, he added that

Plaintiff should be restricted to occasional postural activities. Id.

Plaintiff also provided the ALJ with records from Kaiser Permanente

reflecting treatment he received between September 2003 and June 2004.

AR at 175-99. These records, which will be discussed more thoroughly in

the Discussion section of this order, pertain to Plaintiff’s ongoing

issues with knee pain and plantar fasciitis, as well as his reports of

lower back pain. Id. 

After the ALJ rendered his decision, Plaintiff appealed to the

Appeals Council. In a letter dated April 29, 2005, Plaintiff asked the

Appeals Council to consider additional evidence. AR at 203-04. This

evidence consisted of (1) an opinion from Dr. Luetzow dated April 11,

2005, (2) an opinion from Dr. Ronald Kerr dated March 8, 2005, (3) an

opinion from Dr. McDermott dated February 24, 2005, (4) an opinion from

Dr. Tsung dated December 30, 2004, (5) a letter from Dr. Dana Maciunas

dated March 2, 1973, and (6) a Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”)

certification of disability form completed by Dr. Luetzow (related to

obtaining a disabled placard for Plaintiff’s car). AR at 204-07.

C. June 22, 2005 Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s wife Virginia, and a vocational expert

(“VE”) testified at the hearing. AR at 208. Plaintiff was not

represented by counsel and waived his right to additional time to retain

an attorney. AR at 210. 

The ALJ began by confirming that Plaintiff had undergone surgery

for his left knee as well as his right foot. AR at 214-15. Plaintiff

testified that his knee had deteriorated since the surgery, that it was

very unstable, and that he was in a lot of pain. AR at 214. He

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6 During this time, the VE testified very briefly that the job of

correctional officer is categorized as semi-skilled, medium work. AR at 218.

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explained that he wore a brace all the time because his knee had a

tendency to buckle. AR at 214-15. As for his feet, Plaintiff testified

that he had problems with both feet, but did not have surgery on the

left one since the surgery on his right foot was unsuccessful. AR at

215. His doctor prescribed him a cane, which he used to prevent himself

from veering off to the side. AR at 216. Otherwise, Plaintiff

testified that he understood his foot problems to be chronic and that

his doctor had not provided any other treatment options. AR at 216-17.

When the ALJ started discussing alternate jobs Plaintiff might be

able to perform6, Plaintiff testified that he could only sit for “a

certain amount of time.” AR at 220. He said he had a lower back

problem that had worsened with his leg problems, though he acknowledged

that he likely had aggravated the back problem by using improper posture

in an effort to compensate for the foot pain. Id. Plaintiff also

mentioned experiencing pain in his hip. Id.

As for day to day activities, Plaintiff said he could drive for

short periods of time, but had trouble sleeping and did not really

engage in any physical activities during the day. AR at 220-22. He

testified that he generally took Vicodin for the pain and ibuprofen for

the swelling, though he also had taken a few other medications in the

past. AR at 222-23. 

D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ issued his decision on October 28, 2004. AR at 21-27. He

concluded that Plaintiff was disabled from June 23, 2002 to July 30,

2003, but not thereafter. Id. The ALJ set forth the following

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explanation for his decision:

The undersigned has carefully considered the claimant’s

allegations of the nature, severity and functionally limiting

effects of his impairments and symptoms pursuant to the law of

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, SSRs 96-3p, 96-4p, 96-7p,

and pertinent regulations, and rejects those allegations

regarding the time period commencing on July 30, 2003, for the

following clear and convincing reasons. First, the claimant

has undergone minimal conservative treatment during the period

after July 2003. Second, in fact, there are significant gaps

in the treatment record during the period after July 30, 2003.

Third, moreover, clinical presentation after July 2003

indicates that the claimant’s condition is generally stable

and maintained on his medication and conservative regimen.

Fourth, moreover, the claimant’s physicians have noted that

the claimant’s symptoms exceed objective clinical signs or

findings which could explain them. Fifth, regardless, no

physician of record has opined that the claimant’s continued

symptoms or impairments result in greater limitations than

found by the undersigned after July 30, 2003. Sixth, in fact,

the State Agency program physicians have found the claimant

capable of performing sedentary to light work, and the

claimant’s treating physicians imposed no lifting limitations

after July 2003, nor any restrictions in the capacity for full

time work after July 2003. Seventh, the claimant’s daily

activities are consistent with the residual functional

capacity for sedentary work after July 2003, with the claimant

himself reporting that he engages in a sedentary lifestyle as

compared with his pre-injury status.

From June 23, 2002, until July 30, 2003, the claimant’s

residual functional capacity was restricted to the point that

he was unable to perform a significant range of even sedentary

work in the competitive workplace on a regular and continuing

basis. As of July 30, 2003, the claimant’s condition

medically improved to the point that he retained the residual

functional capacity for the performance of sedentary work in

the competitive workplace on a regular and continuing basis,

the only additional limitation being a restriction to

occasional postural activities. 

Based upon the claimant’s residual functional capacity at all

times, the claimant is unable to perform his past relevant

work as a residential technician or correctional officer. The

claimant’s work activities in those positions were at the

medium level of exertion.

Based upon the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,

education and past relevant work experience, from June 23,

2002 until July 30, 2003, the claimant was unable to perform

any jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national

economy (20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Section

201.00(h)(3); SSRs 96-8p, 96-9p). As of July 30, 2003,

considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity and

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vocational profile, the claimant is able to perform other jobs

which exist in significant numbers in the national economy.

In fact, used as a framework for decision-making, based upon

the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education

and past relevant work experience, Medical-Vocational

Guideline Rule 201.21, Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4, recommends a conclusion that the claimant

is “not disabled.” 

AR at 24-5.

LEGAL STANDARD

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act,

an applicant must show that: (1) he suffers from a medically

determinable impairment that can be expected to result in death or that

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve

months or more; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable

of performing the work that he previously performed or any other

substantially gainful employment that exists in the national economy.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An applicant must meet both requirements to

be considered “disabled.” Id.

The Secretary of the SSA has established a five-step sequential

evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one determines whether the claimant

is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If he is, disability

benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is

not, the decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether

the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of

impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c)), 416.920(c)).

Where the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination

of impairments, the disability claim is denied. Where the impairment is

severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which determines

whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed

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impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20

C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the impairment meets or equals

one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to

be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed

to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which

determines whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing

work he has performed in the past. A claimant who is able to perform

his previous work is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),

416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his previous work, the fifth

and final step of the process determines whether he is able to perform

other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and

work experience. The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only

if he is not able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),

416.920(f).

Section 405(g) of the Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek

judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s final decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited. Review

must be sought within sixty days after the mailing of the final decision

and the Commissioner’s denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is

supported by substantial evidence and contains no legal error. Id.;

Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).

Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla but may be

less than a preponderance.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir.

2001) (citation omitted). It is “relevant evidence that, considering

the entire record, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Howard ex rel.

Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding

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substantial evidence in the record despite ALJ’s failure to discuss

every piece of evidence). Where the evidence can reasonably be

construed to support more than one rational interpretation, the court

must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. This

includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and

resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509.

Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if

the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the

evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at

1193. Section 405(g) permits a court to enter a judgment affirming,

modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). The reviewing court may also remand the matter to the SSA for

further proceedings. Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendant again argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be denied

as time-barred and that no circumstances exist to justify equitable

tolling of the time limit for Plaintiff’s action. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at

4-5. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision was based

upon substantial evidence and should be affirmed. Id. at 5-8. 

Plaintiff responds that the circumstances of his case justify

equitable tolling of the time period from the date his first extension

request was granted until he filed the instant Complaint. Pl.’s Opp’n

at 3. As to the merits of his Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

erred by limiting Plaintiff’s receipt of disability benefits to the

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7 Plaintiff repeatedly lists July 3, 2003 as the date his benefits expired,

but the ALJ’s decision provides for benefits until July 30, 2003. See AR at 21-7. 

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period from June 23, 2002 through July 3, 20037, because the ALJ

incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff’s condition had medically improved

after July 3, 2003. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 1. Plaintiff adds that his

condition has, in fact, deteriorated since the ALJ rendered his

decision. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-7.

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint was Filed Outside of the Time Period Provided

by the Commissioner

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint is untimely because

it was not brought within the sixty-day time limit for filing a civil

action after an adverse disability determination. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at

4-5. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act provides:

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner

of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a

party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain

a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within

sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision

or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social

Security may allow.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The sixty-day time limit is not jurisdictional, but

rather it is a statute of limitations which the agency may waive. Banta

v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). The decision of whether

to waive the sixty-day time limit is the Commissioner’s alone. Matlock

v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 20 C.F.R. §

416.1403(a)(8) (prohibiting judicial review of Commissioner’s refusal to

grant extension of time period for requesting review of decision).

The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that Plaintiff

filed his Complaint after the time period provided by the Commissioner.

On June 29, 2005, the Appeals Council mailed Plaintiff a notice that

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8 A Social Security Administration regulation provides that “the date of

receipt of notice . . . shall be presumed to be 5 days after the date of such notice,

unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary.” 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c). In the

instant case, Plaintiff submitted an uncontested pleading asserting that he did not

receive the letter until December 22, 2005. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Construing Plaintiff’s

pleadings liberally, as is required with pro se litigants, this Court finds that

Plaintiff has made the requisite reasonable showing that he did not receive the letter

until December 22, 2005 and will use this date to calculate the timeliness of

Plaintiff’s filing.

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Plaintiff could commence a civil action within sixty days of the date on

which he received the notice. AR at 9-12; Ray Decl. at 3. Plaintiff

did not do so. However, on November 9, 2005, Plaintiff requested an

extension of time to file a civil action, claiming that he “was

misinformed and submitted [his] paperwork to the wrong departments.” AR

at 4. On December 16, 2005, the Appeals Council granted Plaintiff’s

request and advised him that he had 30 days from the date of receipt of

the letter to file his civil action. AR at 3. Plaintiff asserts that

he received the extension notice on December 22, 2005. Pl.’s Opp’n at

3. Accepting this representation8, Plaintiff was required to commence

his civil action on or before January 23, 2006 (the thirtieth day fell

on January 21, 2006 — a Saturday). Plaintiff did not file his Complaint

until January 31, 2006. Thus, absent a showing that Plaintiff is

entitled to equitable tolling, Plaintiff’s Complaint is untimely. 

B. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling

Plaintiff argues that the circumstances of his case justify

equitable tolling of the time period from the date his first extension

request was granted until he filed the instant Complaint apparently on

the grounds that he diligently attempted to obtain a lawyer and, when

unsuccessful, contacted the Social Security Administration about another

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extension and followed their instructions. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he contacted several legal

agencies to obtain counsel and/or assistance in filing his complaint but

was unsuccessful. Id. Plaintiff claims that he then called “Sue Quick”

at the Social Security Administration, explained his “unfortunate

circumstances,” and was told to fax an explanation to “Branch 16.” Id.

Plaintiff further explains that he faxed a letter requesting “additional

time” to file a civil action to “Branch 16" of the Social Security

Administration’s Office of Hearings and Appeals on January 9, 2006

(see Letter attached to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. No. 23]).

Defendant refutes Plaintiff’s factual allegations and offers a

declaration affirming that the Appeals Council has no record of

receiving Plaintiff’s second request for additional time to file his

civil action (see Ray Decl. at 4). 

The Supreme Court has determined that the sixty day requirement of

§ 405(g) is subject to equitable tolling. Bowen v. City of New York,

476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986). However, equitable relief should only be

extended “sparingly.” Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,

96 (1990). For instance, equitable tolling may be appropriate “where

the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a

defective pleading during the statutory period or where the complainant

has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing

the filing deadline to pass,” but the principles of equitable tolling

“do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable

neglect.” Id.; see also Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d

584, 590-591 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding equitable tolling applicable only

where a government employee’s misleading statement rose to the level of

“wrongful conduct” or where “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the

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applicant’s control prevented timely filing). 

The justifications Plaintiff proffers for his delay fail to warrant

equitable tolling. Plaintiff does not contend that he was induced or

tricked into missing the deadline for filing a civil action. Irwin, 498

U.S. at 96; Foss, 161 F.3d at 590-591. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s

January 9, 2006 letter expressly demonstrates that he received the

Appeals Council’s December 16, 2005 letter and understood that the

Appeals Council had extended his deadline by only thirty days.

See Letter attached to Pl.’s SJ Mot. While Plaintiff claims he was

directed by a woman from the Office of Hearings and Appeals to “fax

Branch 16 with his explanation” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 3), this allegation does

not establish that he was tricked or induced into missing the deadline.

Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, there is no evidence

that the woman, or anyone else, told Plaintiff that he could ignore the

filing deadline, that the deadline would be extended for him or made any

other misleading statement indicating that Plaintiff could file his

civil action after the stated deadline. In fact, at best, the woman’s

instruction merely gave Plaintiff erroneous advise to fax, rather than

mail, his explanation to Branch 16. Given that Plaintiff previously had

properly submitted a successful extension request (AR at 3-4), there is

no reason to believe that the allegedly incorrect advice affected his

ability to timely file his civil action. Moreover, the allegedly

incorrect advice does not rise to the level of wrongful conduct,

extraordinary circumstances, or improper inducement or trickery.

Plaintiff’s actions also do not evince the level of diligence

necessary to justify equitable tolling. First, Plaintiff did not file

any sort of pleading in this Court on a timely basis, Irwin, 498 U.S. at

96, and any claim that he could not discover the procedure for doing so

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is belied by the fact that he successfully filed his civil complaint

approximately 8 days after the deadline. Second, Plaintiff did not even

attempt to submit his extension request until less than two weeks

remained before his filing deadline. Third, Plaintiff had been granted

an initial continuance in December 2005 based upon his allegation that

he “was misinformed and submitted [his] paperwork to the wrong

departments.” AR at 4. Because the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review of the ALJ’s decision on June 29, 2005, Plaintiff’s

initial extension provided him with approximately six months during

which he could have sought counsel and filed his civil complaint. The

Court, therefore, concludes that Plaintiff’s repeated delays are due to

his own lack of care and, as such, his allegations amount to nothing

more than “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” which does not

justify equitable tolling. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. 

With the filing of the administrative record and the opportunity

for additional briefing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has been

afforded ample opportunity to delineate a factual basis for equitable

tolling. See Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1987).

Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish that

he is entitled to equitable relief, the Court RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED on the basis

that the instant civil action was not timely filed.

C. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Even if Plaintiff had initiated the instant action in a timely

manner, he would not be entitled to relief. Plaintiff argues that the

ALJ improperly limited his receipt of disability benefits to the period

from June 2002 through July 2003 based on the erroneous assumption that

Plaintiff’s condition had improved (as evidenced by a lapse in doctor

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visits after July 3, 2003). Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 1. In response to the

ALJ’s “assumption”, Plaintiff explains that he did not cease visiting

physicians for that period because his condition had improved but

because his doctors had concluded that no other available medical

treatments would improve Plaintiff’s chronic conditions. Id. at 1-2.

Plaintiff also contends that his medical records dating back to March 2,

1973, support his claim that he has an ongoing lower back problem. Id.

at 4. As further evidence of his ongoing disability claims, Plaintiff

submits recent medical opinions to demonstrate that his medical problems

have in fact worsened since the ALJ rendered his decision on October 28,

2004. Id. at 2-5 (and attached documentation); Pl.’s Opp’n at 4-9 (and

attached documentation). 

Defendant responds that the overall record, including the

evaluations by Plaintiff’s own physicians, supports the ALJ’s finding

that after July 2003, Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity

for sedentary work with a limitation to occasional postural activities.

Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 6. Moreover, Defendant highlights the fact that

the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt rather than adopting the

less favorable evaluations of the state agency physicians. Id. To the

extent Plaintiff asks this Court to consider new evidence, Defendant

submits that Plaintiff has not met the requisite standard such that this

Court would be required to remand for consideration of the new evidence.

Id. at 7 n.4. 

1. The ALJ’s Limitation of Benefits to a Specific Time Frame

a. Record before the ALJ

Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was no

longer disabled as of July 2003. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 1. While the ALJ

offered several reasons for his disability conclusion, Plaintiff

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challenges only “the assumption that plaintiff’s condition had improved

since there was a lapse in medical visits.” Id. He urges that the

lapse was not due to any medical improvement but instead attributable to

his doctors’ conclusion that no other viable treatment options remained

available. Id. at 1-2. In response, Defendant argues that substantial

evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s decision. Def.’s Cross-Mot.

at 6-7.

As set forth previously, a reviewing court may not disturb a

decision by the Commissioner that is supported by substantial evidence.

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. In reviewing the record, the Court is

directed to defer to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and

resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509.

Where the evidence reasonably can be construed to support more than one

rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision.

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

The finding Plaintiff challenges is, in fact, one of the ALJ’s

seven grounds for rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations of the “nature,

severity and functionally limiting effects of his impairments and

symptoms.” See AR at 24. More precisely, Plaintiff finds fault with

the ALJ’s second reason for denying relief — that “there are significant

gaps in the treatment record during the period after July 30, 2003.”

Id. However, even if the Court accepts Plaintiff’s explanation for why

these gaps in treatment existed, Plaintiff’s argument does not overcome

the evidence in this case, which supports the ALJ’s conclusion that

after July 2003, Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity for

sedentary work.

As previously noted, Plaintiff contends that he stopped seeing his

physicians regularly because he was advised that nothing else could be

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done to treat him medically and that he would have to learn to live

with, and adapt to, the chronic pain. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 2. While

Plaintiff is correct that at least one physician, Dr. McDermott, noted

that he did not know what else he could do for Plaintiff (AR at 176,

182), nowhere in the records that were before the ALJ did any of

Plaintiff’s physicians, including Dr. McDermott, conclude that Plaintiff

was permanently disabled. Plaintiff’s medical condition may well be

stable level, such that further treatment is not likely to significantly

improve his condition, but the record still contains substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is able to work.

The ALJ’s thorough and reasoned decision sets forth substantial

evidence from Plaintiff’s own physicians, which supports his decision.

Because Plaintiff disputes only the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s

disability ceased as of July 2003, this Court focuses on the evidence

that was before the ALJ, which pertains to the period of time around

July 2003. 

Plaintiff’s first basis for claiming an ongoing disability is the

pain and impairment caused by the damage to his left knee. As such, the

Court considers whether the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s knee

problems had improved by July 30, 2003, is supported by substantial

evidence. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. During a March 10, 2003, physical

therapy appointment, Plaintiff reported that he was riding his

stationary bike at home and that, while he was having good and bad days,

he was “overall improved.” AR at 117. The physical therapist noted

slight infra patellar swelling, but also observed that Plaintiff’s left

knee strength had improved, that riding the stationary bike was helpful,

and that Plaintiff’s left knee was “doing better.” AR at 116-17; see

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 (d) (allowing consideration of evidence from

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therapists “to show the severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) and

how it affects [the claimant’s] ability to work”). By July 14, 2003,

though Plaintiff was still reporting some knee pain, Dr. Williams, one

of Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeons, prescribed only a stabilization

brace or an off-the-shelf ACL brace and weight loss. AR at 108.

Moreover, Dr. Williams opined that Plaintiff could return to work on or

after July 1, 2003, and that Plaintiff’s only limitations would be that

he could not climb (except any stairs encountered when arriving at or

leaving from work), twist, or participate in sports and that he could

only stand and/or walk for five minutes per hour for a maximum of eight

hours in a work day. AR at 106. These clinical findings and opinions

are in keeping with the ALJ’s conclusion.

Plaintiff’s second allegedly disabling condition is his plantar

fasciitis. There is also substantial evidence in the record that

Plaintiff’s foot problems had improved. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

On February 10, 2003, Plaintiff reported to his treating podiatrist, Dr.

McDermott, that he suffered persistent pain in his right foot. AR at

121. Dr. McDermott diagnosed chronic plantar fasciitis and scheduled

surgery to release Plaintiff’s plantar fascia medial band. Id. This

surgery was conducted on April 7, 2003. AR at 111-12. On June 3, 2003,

Plaintiff still reported experiencing pain and problems with his right

foot. AR at 109. During his July 23, 2003 follow-up appointment, his

physician injected a mix of triamcinolone, marcaine, and lidocaine into

Plaintiff’s right foot, instructed him to wear an equalizer boot for one

more week, and directing him to then gradually transition into normal

footwear and start soaking his foot. AR at 107. On the same day, Dr.

McDermott opined that Plaintiff could not bend, climb, squat, twist or

participate in sports. AR at 105. However, the only other restriction

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Dr. McDermott placed on Plaintiff was that he not stand or walk more

than fifteen minutes per hour. Id. Dr. McDermott did not opine that

Plaintiff was unable to work. Id. 

Looking well beyond July 2003 to late 2003 and early 2004, the

Court notes that Plaintiff continued to seek medical attention for

ongoing knee and foot pain, but that nothing in the record contradicts

the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could engage in sedentary work. On

October 30, 2003, Dr. Tsung diagnosed pes planus in Plaintiff’s right

foot and neuropathic-type pain in his lower extremities, but recommended

only pain relief medication and custom orthotics to correct the pes

planus. AR 191. Dr. Luetzow opined on November 19, 2003, that

neuropathic pain was Plaintiff’s predominate problem and recommended a

new left knee brace. AR at 188. On March 16, 2004, Plaintiff told Dr.

Tsung that he had continuous right foot pain while standing, putting

pressure on his heel, and walking, but he denied feeling any pain while

sitting. AR at 178. 

In other words, while there is no doubt that Plaintiff continued to

experience left knee and right foot pain after July 2003, the records

support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff only received conservative care

for these problems and retained the residual functional capacity for

sedentary work. The Social Security Administration defines Sedentary

work as follows:

Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a

time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is

defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of

walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job

duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria met. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (West 2007). As set forth above, Plaintiff’s

own treating physicians only placed limitations on his ability to stand

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or walk for extended periods of time but did not limit his ability to

sit or lift items. See AR at 105-06. Plaintiff himself denied pain

while sitting. AR at 178. While Plaintiff undoubtedly finds it

frustrating that he is unable to ambulate nearly as well as he could

before or return to his past relevant work as a correctional officer,

Social Security regulations do not allow the Commissioner to adjudge an

applicant disabled and award benefits if that applicant retains the

ability to perform other work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(g), 416.920(g); Batson, 359 F.3d at 1194.

Accordingly, considering the entire record before the ALJ, the

Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was reasonable and based on

substantial evidence. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; Lewis, 236 F.3d at

509. The Court, therefore, recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment on this basis be DENIED. 

b. Additional Evidence Before the Appeals Council

Plaintiff also submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council after

the ALJ rendered his decision on October 28, 2004. AR 12-17, 200-07.

In this Circuit, the district court is directed to “consider on appeal

both the ALJ’s decision and the additional material submitted to the

Appeals Council.” Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir.

1993). This is the case even if the Appeals Council denied the

claimant’s request for review. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180

(9th Cir. 2000). 

The evidence Plaintiff provided to the Appeals Council consisted of

(a) opinions from Doctors Luetzow, Kerr, McDermott and Tsung, (b) an old

request for a mattress by Dr. Maciunas, and (c) Dr. Luetzow’s

certification of disability for purposes of obtaining a DMV placard for

Plaintiff. AR at 200-07. Of these opinions, only Dr. Luetzow concluded

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9 Because the other opinions submitted by Plaintiff do not conclude that he

is disabled, they do not further his claim. For instance, Dr. McDermott only noted

that he has tried both conservative and surgical treatment and reiterated his prior

conclusion that Plaintiff may have to live with his stated pain. AR at 203. Dr. Tsung

restated Plaintiff’s medical history and allegations of ongoing pain and summed up her

finding as being that (1) Plaintiff’s lower back pain is related to his altered gait

(which is secondary to his bilateral foot and knee pain) and (2) her examination that

day did not reveal definite nerve type symptoms explaining his lower back or hip pain.

AR at 204. On the DMV form, Dr. Luetzow found Plaintiff disabled as this term is

defined by California Vehicle Code 295.5, not Social Security Regulations. AR at 207.

Dr. Maciunas’ opinion will be addressed supra. 

23 06cv0232-WQH (BLM)

that Plaintiff was disabled.9 Specifically, on April 11, 2005, Dr.

Luetzow wrote on a prescription form:

Mr. Hernandez has reached a permanent & stationary disability

status for bilateral knee pain. He uses a cane full time and

can barely ambulate in the clinic today. He can stand & walk

only a few minutes each hour. 

AR at 202. Dr. Kerr’s March 8, 2005 opinion, also submitted on a

prescription form, stated only “I support Mr. Hernandez (sic) claim for

Medical Disability. Please see Letters from Dr. Tsung, Dr. Luetzow &

Dr. McDermott.” AR at 202. However, because only one of these three

physicians — Dr. Luetzow — opined that Plaintiff had reached a disabled

state, it is unclear whether Dr. Kerr concluded that Plaintiff was

disabled. 

Because none of this evidence was before the ALJ, the Court

considers the Appeals Council’s standard of review. When new and

material evidence is submitted for the first time on appeal, “[t]he

Appeals Council shall evaluate the entire record including the new and

material evidence submitted if it relates to the period on or before the

date of the administrative law judge hearing decision.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.970(b); Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1452. Review of the case is warranted

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10 Dr. Luetzow also does not provide any medical explanation for why

Plaintiff’s knee pain is now “bilateral.” Prior medical records, including those from

Dr. Luetzow, referenced only left knee pain. 

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only if the Appeals Council finds “that the administrative law judge’s

action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of the

evidence currently of record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). Here, the

Appeals Council notified Plaintiff that it had received his new evidence

and was making it part of the record. AR at 12. Subsequently, the

Appeals Counsel informed Plaintiff that it had considered the reasons he

disagreed with the ALJ’s decision and the additional evidence submitted,

but had concluded that this information did not provide a basis for

changing the ALJ’s decision. AR at 9-10. For this reason, the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. AR at 9. 

It is with this standard in mind that the Court evaluates the new

evidence of disability. Turning first to Dr. Luetzow’s opinion, his

assessment that Plaintiff can stand and walk for only a few minutes each

hour is consistent with Dr. Williams’ conclusion nearly two years

earlier. See AR at 106. Dr. Williams did not opine at that time that

Plaintiff was disabled and/or could not perform sedentary work and Dr.

Luetzow’s “prescription” offers no explanation for why the same

limitations now justify a disability finding. See Tonapetyan v. Halter,

242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (a treating physician’s conclusory

or unsupported medical findings need not be automatically accepted as

true in the face of contradictory clinical opinions). Nor does Dr.

Luetzow cite to any additional examination findings or other medical

evidence supporting his conclusion that Plaintiff’s condition had

deteriorated.10 In addition, Dr. Luetzow does not make any statements

or findings regarding Plaintiff’s ability to sit or otherwise perform

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sedentary work. 

Similarly, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that

Dr. Kerr ever examined or treated Plaintiff during the months or years

directly preceding his March 8, 2005 opinion. Without any explanation

as to how Dr. Kerr reached his conclusion or even what his ultimate

conclusion was (given the disparate opinions with which he purports to

agree), Dr. Kerr’s opinion is of little evidentiary value. See

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. As such, this Court finds that the

Appeals Council properly concluded that Dr. Kerr’s opinion, like Dr.

Luetzow’s opinion, did not justify granting Plaintiff’s request for

review because neither of these opinions demonstrated that the ALJ’s

decision was “contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of

record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). In other words, the additional

evidence Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council does not alter this

Court’s conclusion that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

Therefore, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment on this basis be DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s Lower Back Problem

Plaintiff also contends that his medical records dating back to

March 2, 1973, support his claim that he has an ongoing lower back

problem. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8. In 1973, Dr. Dana Maciunas wrote a letter

on Plaintiff’s behalf which stated “[i]t is most important that Daniel

Hernandez obtain a new extra firm mattress (because this partially

relieves his back pain which is due to Scheurermann’s disease).” AR at

206. To demonstrate the continuing nature of this problem, Plaintiff

points to a diagnostic imaging procedure performed on January 15, 2004,

which showed disc bulging and narrowing of the nerve root outlet at L4

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and L5. Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8. The latter records were before the ALJ but

Plaintiff did not submit Dr. Maciunas’ letter until he appealed the

ALJ’s decision. 

Once again, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the ALJ’s

conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff appears

to suggest that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of his treating

physicians. It is true that an ALJ must afford greater weight to the

opinions of treating physicians and may not reject those opinions

without providing specific and legitimate reasons for doing so (if the

treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted, the ALJ’s reasons must

be clear and convincing). Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th

Cir. 1996). But here, the ALJ did not reject Plaintiff’s treating

physicians’ opinions. See AR at 25-27. To the contrary, the ALJ

explicitly cited the January 2004 diagnostic imaging results in his

decision but noted that progress notes thereafter reflected no

significant clinical changes in the claimant’s overall presentation. AR

at 24. This conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Dr. Luetzow, one of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, ordered

the January 15, 2004 diagnostic imagining. AR at 181. Just over four

months later, Dr. Luetzow opined that Plaintiff suffered from

osteoarthritis, bilateral plantar fasciitis, and left knee pain and

concluded that these conditions resulted in permanent restrictions, but

did not even mention back pain and did not conclude that Plaintiff was

permanently disabled. AR at 175. 

Similarly, the ALJ acknowledged without dispute the findings of

another of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, Dr. Tsung. AR at 24. Dr.

Tsung believed that Plaintiff’s back pain was “secondary to his

heel/foot pain causing improper body mechanics while ambulating.” AR at

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11 For the same reason, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s apparent argument that

the Appeals Council should have granted review based on Dr. Maciunas’ 1973 letter. The

Appeals Council will only grant review of the case if it finds “that the administrative

law judge’s action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence

currently of record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). Dr. Maciunas’ statement that Plaintiff

suffers from back pain and that this pain is partially relieved by an extra firm

mattress does not contradict the evidence relied on by the ALJ. In fact, Dr. Maciunas’

statement supports the ALJ’s conclusion that while Plaintiff suffers from back pain,

it is alleviated by conservative care (e.g. a firm mattress) and, therefore, is not

disabling. See AR at 23-27. 

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192. Dr. Tsung never opined that Plaintiff was permanently disabled.

In fact, the letter that Dr. Tsung provided over a year later, which

Plaintiff first submitted on appeal, reconfirms her prior opinion and

notes that “[s]ubsequent examination today reveals no definite nerve

type symptoms explaining his lower back pain.” AR at 204. Thus,

Plaintiff has offered no medical evidence that his back problems

rendered him permanently disabled or that the ALJ improperly rejected

any of his treating physicians’ findings regarding his back pain.11

In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the

evidence and opinions provided by Plaintiff’s treating physicians

regarding Plaintiff’s back pain and that the ALJ’s decision is supported

by substantial evidence in the record. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193.

Nothing in the record or Plaintiff’s briefing before this Court suggests

that Plaintiff experiences disabling back pain while sitting or that his

back condition otherwise prevents him from engaging in sedentary work.

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment on this basis be DENIED.

///

///

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3. New Medical Evidence

As a final basis for relief, Plaintiff submits recent medical

records to demonstrate that his medical problems have in fact worsened

since the ALJ rendered his decision on October 28, 2004, and the Appeals

Council declined review on June 29, 2005. However, these records are

not relevant to the determination of the instant motions because these

records were not before the ALJ or the Appeals Council. New evidence

may provide a basis for remanding the case for further review by the

ALJ, but only if the plaintiff shows that (1) the new evidence is

material and (2) there is good cause for the failure to incorporate the

new evidence into the record in a prior proceeding. 42 U.S.C.A. §

405(g) (2006). To demonstrate materiality, Plaintiff must show that the

new evidence bears “directly and substantially on the matter in dispute”

and that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the new evidence would

have changed the ALJ’s decision. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 462

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff has not specifically argued that the evidence is material

or that good cause exists. Nor does it appear that he could succeed on

either front. The Ninth Circuit has held that if the new evidence

merely shows that the claimant’s condition deteriorated after the

administrative hearing, then it is not material to the claimant’s

condition during the time at issue. Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and

Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1987). That is precisely the

claim that Plaintiff makes in this case and the medical opinions he

presents from February and March of 2006 only attest to his disability

status as of those dates, not before. Pl.’s SJ Mot. at 2-5 (and

attached exhibits). 

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Moreover, even assuming Plaintiff met the materiality requirement,

Plaintiff has not shown good cause for not having offered the evidence

earlier. “A claimant does not meet the good cause requirement by merely

obtaining a more favorable report once his or her claim has been

denied.” Mayes, 276 F.3d at 463. “To demonstrate good cause, the

claimant must demonstrate that the new evidence was unavailable

earlier.” Id. Plaintiff makes no such allegation. His new evidence

consists almost exclusively of more favorable reports from the same

physicians without any showing that new medical findings support these

altered disability conclusions. This does not justify review under

Mayes. Accordingly, while the new evidence may form the basis for a new

application for benefits, it cannot and does not form the basis for a

remand.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation; (2)denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; (3)

granting Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and (4) denying

Defendant’s motion to dismiss as moot.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 15, 2007, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than July 6,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998). 

 

DATED: May 24, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE WILLIAM Q. HAYES

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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