Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01614/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01614-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARILYN MAY SHIELDS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPUTY SHERIFF TRACY, in his

individual capacity; DEPUTY

SHERIFF BIALORUCKI, in his

individual capacity; COUNTY OF

EL DORADO, DOES 1-100, 

Defendants. 

 CIV-S-03-1614 DFL-PAN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION 

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Marilyn Shields brings this § 1983 lawsuit against

Deputy Sheriff Nolan Tracy, Deputy Sheriff Carl Bialorucki, and

the County of El Dorado. She alleges that she was unlawfully

seized, searched, and arrested by defendants without reasonable

suspicion or probable cause and that, in so doing, defendants

used excessive force. She asserts several constitutional

violations, as well as state-law claims for violation of the

Unruh Act, assault and battery, and illegal imprisonment. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. 

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26 Because this is defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 1

the court presents the evidence in the light most favorable to

Shields.

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I. 

On Saturday, December 14, 2002, Shields, a law student, was

walking near her house while studying flashcards for an upcoming

law school exam. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at 55.) Her walking path 1

that day was “somewhat remote,” taking her along a dirt path and

through an open field which lead to a main road. (Gumpert Decl.

Ex. 1 at 112-13.) There were few people in the area on the day

in question. (Id.) 

It was a cloudy and slightly windy day. (Jones Decl. Ex. A

at 49, 121.) Shields was wearing a short-sleeved cotton shirt,

an unzipped jacket with outside pockets, blue jeans, and tennis

shoes, and was carrying her law-school flashcards in her hand. 

(Defs.’ SUF ¶ 2.) She was not carrying identification. (Jones

Decl. Ex. A at 55.) Nor was she carrying a weapon or other

protective device (such as pepper spray). (Id. at 61.)

As Shields started to return home, walking toward the dirt

path and open field, Deputy Sheriff Tracy noticed Shields for the

first time. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 6.) Tracy was on patrol in that area

checking on office buildings where power outages and alarms had

been reported. (Gumpert Decl. Ex. 2 at 48.) Tracy claims he

noticed Shields because he thought it odd that a lone girl,

dressed in light clothes, was walking into an open field in the

middle of what he described as a “severe storm.” (Id. at 49-51.) 

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After first spotting Shields, Tracy checked on a few more

businesses. (Id.) About five minutes later, he saw her again

and decided to approach her. (Id.) 

Tracy drove towards her, parked his car, got out of the car,

and started following Shields. (Gumpert Decl. Ex. 2 at 52-53.) 

Shields heard the car stop and footsteps approach, looked back,

and saw Tracy and his patrol car. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at 68-69.) 

Tracy asked Shields what she was doing. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 8.) After

Shields replied that she was taking a walk, Tracy asked Shields

to show some identification. (Gumpert Decl. Ex. A at 73.) 

Shields refused, stating that Tracy had no right to ask for

identification. (Id.) 

Following this initial exchange, Tracy asked her where she

lived. (Id. at 80-81.) Shields told him that she did not have

to answer his questions, citing her rights under the Privileges

and Immunities Clause to take a walk without an ID. (Id. at 81;

Defs.’ SUF ¶ 10.) Following this remark by Shields, the two

engaged in a short discourse on constitutional law. (Jones Decl.

Ex. A at 86-87.) 

Toward the end of this conversation, Tracy announced that he

needed to search Shields. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 13.) Shields refused. 

(Jones Decl. Ex. A at 98.) Tracy did not inform Shields why he

wanted to search her, or what his motivation was; rather, he

simply ordered Shields to put her flashcards down. (Id.) 

Shields complied, putting her flashcards in her coat pocket. 

(Id.) Shields and Tracy continued to talk for several minutes,

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with Shields telling Tracy that he did not have probable cause to

search her. (Id. at 99; Defs.’ SUF ¶ 14.) 

Eventually, Tracy told Shields again that he needed to

search her. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at 108; Gumpert Decl. Ex. 2 at

60.) Shields again refused, stating that if a search was

necessary, she wanted a female officer. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at

109.) When Tracy replied that no women officers were on duty

that day, Shields insisted that a supervisor be called. (Id. at

110.) During this portion of the event, Shields contends she did

not have her hands in her pockets. (Gumpert Decl. Ex. 1 at 102.) 

At most, Shields states she rested her right thumb in her right

jeans pocket. (Id.) Shields also denies Tracy ever told her to

keep her hands where he could see them. (Id. at 109.) 

The entire confrontation, to this point, had lasted about 15

minutes. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 18.) After Shields demanded that Tracy

call a supervisor, there was a lull of approximately twenty

minutes while they waited for another officer to arrive. (Jones

Decl. Ex. A at 117-18.) Tracy stood near the front door of his

car, and Shields stood about two feet behind the back of the car. 

(Id. at 116.) During this period, Shields studied her

flashcards. (Id. at 119.) Tracy just stood there, sometimes

staring at Shields, and other times turning his back on her while

doing something else. (Id.) Shields states that she does not

remember Tracy telling her to take her hands out of her pockets

or away from her sides during this period. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at

117.) 

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After about twenty minutes, it started to rain. (Defs.’ SUF

¶ 19.) Tracy told Shields to get in his police car, but Shields

refused. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at 122-23.) Shields then told Tracy

that she was going to walk over to some buildings close by and

that Tracy could either walk with her or follow her in his car.

(Id. at 124; Defs.’ SUF ¶ 20.) At that point, she turned around

to start walking toward the buildings. 

As Shields started to turn, Tracy made a sudden movement to

grab Shields. (Jones Decl. Ex. A at 125.) Tracy grabbed Shields

in a “mummy grip” from behind, grabbed her left wrist, twisted

her left arm behind her back, swung her around and, in one

continuous movement, pushed her against the back of the car. 

(Id. at 128.) Once she was up against the car, while still

gripping her from behind, Tracy reached under Shields’s coat

(though not her shirt), grabbed her left breast and then her

right breast in succession, each for a second or less. (Gumpert

Decl. Ex. 1 at 135-37.) Following these actions, there was about

five seconds of calm. (Id.) Tracy then wrenched Shields’s arm

above her head, causing a loud popping sound. (Id. at 137-38.) 

Shields fell to the ground in pain. (Id. at 138-39.) 

 Shortly after Shields fell to the ground, a second deputy

sheriff, Carl Bialorucki, arrived at the scene. He was

responding to the various radio dispatches put out by Tracy. 

(Gumpert Decl. Ex. 3 at 36.) Upon his arrival, he attended to

Shields, assessing her medical condition and assuring her that he

was there to help. (Id. at 40-41.) After she stopped crying, he

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produced a tape recorder and camera to record his conversation

with her. (Id. at 41.) However, the paramedics arrived before

he got beyond asking her name. (Id.)

The paramedics transported Shields to the hospital, where

she was treated for a dislocated and fractured left elbow. 

(Pl.’s SUF ¶ 3.) Bialorucki did not accompany her to the

hospital, but arrived later to ask some follow-up questions. 

(Gumpert Decl. Ex. 3 at 68.) At the hospital, Bialorucki and his

supervisor, Sergeant Walski, talked with Shields and asked her

some additional questions. (Id.) Shortly after this

conversation, Bialorucki spoke with her again in the hospital and

gave her a citation under Cal. Penal Code § 148 for delaying a

police officer in his official business. (Pl.’s SUF ¶ 4.) 

He issued the citation at the direction of Walski and on

behalf of Tracy, who was the “arresting officer.” (Gumpert Decl.

Ex. 3 at 61, 68-69.) When he gave her the citation, he explained

that he was not arresting her, and that he was just the issuing

officer. (Id; Jones Decl. Ex. A at 168.) Shields was never

handcuffed, incarcerated, or required to post bond or bail, and

did not have criminal charges filed against her. (Defs.’ SUF ¶

32.) 

After Shields was released from the hospital, she contacted

the El Dorado Sheriff’s Department to make a complaint about the

incident and set up a meeting with an internal affairs

supervisor. (Gumpert Decl. Ex. A at 206.) However, she later

cancelled the meeting and never rescheduled it. (Id. at 208-09.) 

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Therefore, an internal investigation was never conducted, and

Tracy was not reprimanded or punished by the sheriff’s

department. (Jones Decl. Ex. B at 118-19.) 

Shields now brings this suit against Tracy, Bialorucki, and

the El Dorado County. She brings claims against Tracy and

Bialorucki under § 1983, alleging that they violated her Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by: (1) seizing, searching, and

arresting her without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and

(2) using excessive force to affect the same; and (3) sexually

assaulting her. She also brings state-law claims against the two

officers for violations the Unruh Act and illegal imprisonment. 

Additionally, she brings a state-law claim against Tracy for

assault and battery. Finally, she asserts a § 1983 claim against

El Dorado County for its failure to adequately train and

supervise its officers and to investigate excessive force cases. 

II. 

Defendants Shields and Bialorucki move for summary judgment

on all of plaintiff’s claims against them. They argue both that

plaintiff has not established a constitutional or state-law

violation and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The

County of El Dorado also moves for summary judgment on the claim

against it, on the ground that Shields has not established a

basis for imposing municipal liability. 

In deciding a claim of qualified immunity, the court must

first decide if a constitutional right has been violated on the

plaintiff’s alleged facts. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201,

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121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). If so, the court must then decide whether

this right was clearly established at the time of the

unconstitutional conduct. Id. A right is “clearly established”

if “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Id. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987)). “The relevant,

dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Id. 

A. Defendant Tracy

1. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Claim

The determination of whether a police officer’s detention

and search of an individual violates the Fourth Amendment

requires a three-part analysis. First, the court must determine

whether a “seizure” occurred. While the Fourth Amendment applies

to all “seizures,” not all encounters between a police officer

and an individual constitute a “seizure.” Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983). A seizure does not

occur “simply because a police officer approaches an individual,” 

“asks a few questions,” and wants to see some identification, so

long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the

police and go about her business. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.

429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991). A “stop and frisk,” however, is

a seizure. 

Second, if a seizure has occurred, the court must determine

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whether the seizure was reasonable. To be reasonable, seizures

must generally be supported by “probable cause.” Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). However, the Supreme Court

has created certain exceptions to this requirement. For example,

the Court ruled in Terry v. Ohio that officers can conduct a

short, investigative stop of an individual based on a reasonable

suspicion that the individual was engaged in criminal wrongdoing. 

Id. at 21-22. 

Relevant to the present case, courts have also recognized a

“community caretaker” exception to the probable cause

requirement. Courts have consistently recognized that “police

officers are not only permitted, but expected, to exercise what

the Supreme Court has termed ‘community caretaking functions,

totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal

statute.’” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir.

1993) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct.

2523 (1973)). 

Under this exception, a police officer may seize a person

“in order to ensure the safety of the public and/or the

individual, regardless of any suspected criminal activity.” 

King, 990 F.2d at 1560; see also Winters v. Adams, 254 F.3d 758,

763-64 (8th Cir. 2001). Like a Terry stop, a community

caretaking stop requires reasonable belief that the person poses

a danger to himself or the public. This reasonable belief must

be based on “specific articulable facts and requires a reviewing

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court to balance the governmental interest in the police

officer’s exercise of his or her ‘community caretaking function’

and the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary

government interference.” King, 990 F.2d at 1560.

Third, even if the court finds that the seizure was

reasonable, it must then determine whether a protective search of

the individual was warranted in the situation. Where an officer

is justified in making a Terry or community caretaking stop, the

officer may conduct a limited protective search of the individual

for concealed weapons if he reasonably believes the individual is

armed and presently dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. “An

officer need not be certain that the individual is armed; the

issue is whether a reasonably prudent man could believe, based on

‘specific and articulable facts,’ that his safety or that of

others is in danger.” United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572,

1574 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 

However, a Terry or community caretaking stop justifies “no

more than a brief interrogation and, under proper circumstances,

a brief check for weapons.” United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d

777, 780 (9th Cir. 1987). If the seizure goes beyond the allowed

“brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusion, an arrest occurs,

for which probable cause is required.” Id. This is often called

a “de facto arrest.” See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470

U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). “There is no bright-line

for determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and

becomes an arrest.” United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d

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1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). To determine

when that line has been crossed, a court must consider “all the

surrounding circumstances,” including “the extent to which

liberty of movement is curtailed” as well as “the type of force

or authority employed.” Id. In essence, this inquiry amounts to

a determination of whether the officer’s action was “reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place.” Id. 

Tracy argues that summary judgment is appropriate on

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure, search, and

arrest claim against him for several reasons. First, Tracy

asserts that his encounter with Shields was voluntary and did not

amount to a “seizure,” given that he approached Shields only to

inquire whether she needed assistance and to help her if

necessary. (Mot. at 7.) Second, to the extent the encounter

ceased to be voluntary, Tracy contends the seizure was an

objectively reasonable community caretaking stop. (Reply at

4-5.) Third, Tracy asserts that any “search” of Shields was

reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. (Mot. at 8.) 

Finally, Tracy argues that, even if there was a constitutional

violation, he is entitled to qualified immunity because the

constitutional right was not clearly established in these

circumstances. (Id. at 14-17.) 

At the first step of the analysis, the court finds that,

under plaintiff’s version of events, a “seizure” did occur at

some point during the encounter between Shields and Tracy. 

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Although the encounter may have started as a simple offer of

assistance, it evolved into a seizure. Specifically, a seizure

arose when Tracy insisted repeatedly, over a span of twenty

minutes, that he needed to search Shields, despite her strenuous

protestations. A reasonable person would not feel free to leave

in these circumstances. Moreover, a seizure undoubtedly occurred

when Tracy grabbed Shields, wrestled her to the car, and

conducted some sort of protective search.

Second, under Shields’s version of events, a jury could find

that the seizure was objectively unreasonable. Defendants

contend that Tracy reasonably believed that Shields posed a

danger to herself or the public based on the following alleged

facts: (1) Shields was walking alone near an open field in a

“somewhat remote” area during a “severe storm”; (2) she was

dressed inappropriately for such weather; and (3) she refused to

answer basic questions about her identity, acted in a boisterous

and erratic manner, and was pacing in a nervous fashion. (Id. at

8; Gumpert Decl. Ex. 2 at 49-51, 55-59.)

However, many of these “facts” are disputed by Shields and

cannot be considered on summary judgment. Based on Shields’s

version of the encounter, the only basis for Tracy’s community

caretaking stop was that: (1) she was a woman walking on somewhat

windy day near an open field in a “somewhat remote” area; (2)

upon being approached by an officer, she refused to give her

name, her address, or to show identification; and (3) she cited

to her constitutional rights in demanding to be left alone. 

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These facts do not create the necessary reasonable suspicion. 

See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98 (an individual’s refusal to listen

or answer questions, without more, does not create reasonable

suspicion). 

Courts that have upheld community-caretaking stops based on

a concern about drug use, intoxication, or other mental infirmity

have done so only where there was articulable evidence supporting

the officer’s suspicion, such as the odor of alcohol, incoherent

speech, physical infirmity, or bizarre actions. See, e.g.,

Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dep’t., 321 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1075

(N.D.Iowa 2004) (finding valid a community-caretaking stop where

individual walking along side a road was incapable of carrying on

coherent conversation and was acting “bonkers,” leading officers

to conclude he was on drugs or intoxicated); Gallegos v. City of

Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1029 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding

valid a community-caretaking stop where individual walking down

sidewalk in middle of night smelled of alcohol, was crying and

walking down street with eyes over hands, and was unsteady on his

feet); Adams, 254 F.3d at 764 (affirming community-caretaking

stop where officers received a dispatch concerning a possibly

intoxicated person, the individual refused to make eye contact

with officers, and was acting in highly agitated state). No such

undisputed facts are present in this case. 

Moreover, several other facts cut against Tracy’s argument. 

For instance, according to Shields, Tracy did not ask her

questions relating to her safety or to her mental state; rather,

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he only asked basic questions, such as, what she was doing, where

did she live, and did she have identification. Further, both

Tracy and Shields agree there was a significant period of

conversation before Tracy demanded to search her. During this

period, again based upon Shields’s version of events, any

questions about her mental competency should have been cleared

up, as a woman who is walking with flashcards (suggesting a

student studying) and quoting the constitution in a coherent

manner does not suggest a mentally unstable person. 

Additionally, neither Bialorucki nor Sergeant Walski believed

that Shields was mentally unstable, drunk, or on drugs after

their interaction with her. (Opp’n at 11.) 

Finally, Tracy’s “community caretaker” argument is belied by

the length of the encounter. A Terry or community caretaking

stop must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500;

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86 (stating that in considering length of

time of investigatory stop, courts must examine whether police

diligently pursued an investigation that was likely to confirm or

dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was

necessary to detain the individual). Here, the total length of

the encounter was almost forty minutes. Under plaintiff’s

version of events, this was much longer than necessary to

determine that she was stable and not a danger to herself or

others. Accordingly, the length of the detention weighs strongly

in favor of finding an unreasonable seizure. 

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Given that Tracy was not justified in “seizing” Shields, he

was also not justified in conducting a search for weapons. See

King, 990 F.2d at 1557 (“For a protective search to be ‘justified

at its inception,’ the officer must not only harbor an

articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and

dangerous, the officer must also be ‘entitled to make a forcible

stop.’”) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-48, 92

S.Ct. 1921 (1972)). Accordingly, under plaintiff’s version of

events, Tracy’s search of Shields for weapons constitutes an

unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 

Even if Tracy’s detention of Shields had been justified as a

community-caretaking stop, his search of Shields would still

violate the Fourth Amendment because on plaintiff’s facts, he did

not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Shields was armed

and dangerous. Defendants argue that the search was reasonable

because Shields was acting in a bizarre manner. (Reply at 6.) 

Defendants place special emphasis on Shields allegedly placing

her hands in her pockets repeatedly despite Tracy ordering her to

keep her hands visible at all times. (Id.) 

Again, however, on Shields’s version of events, a genuine

factual dispute exists on this issue. As noted above, much of

the evidence relating to the allegations of her “bizarre” actions

is in dispute. Most importantly, Shields contends that Tracy did

not repeatedly ask her to keep her hands visible and that she was

not continually placing her hands in her pockets. At most, she

admits she might have had her left thumb dangling in her left

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jeans pocket during some portions of her conversation with Tracy. 

Additionally, Shields presents evidence suggesting that

Tracy did not feel threatened during this encounter. For

instance, Tracy allowed Shields to study her flashcards for

twenty minutes without interference and turned his back on her

several times during that time period. Tracy never asked Shields

for permission to pat-down her pockets. Finally, Shields denies

making a sudden movement toward her pockets as she turned around

to leave; to the contrary, she claims she told Tracy specifically

what she was planning to do -- walk to some nearby buildings to

get out of the rain -- before making any movement to walk away. 

Under this version of the encounter, Tracy did not have

reasonable suspicion to believe that Shields was armed and

dangerous. Especially in cases where the person is stopped on

suspicion of a non-violent offense or for a community-caretaking

purpose, courts have generally required the presence of some

“other circumstances” suggesting the individual is armed and

dangerous to justify the further intrusion of a frisk for

weapons. See People v. Scott, 16 Cal.3d 242, 249, 128 Cal.Rptr.

39 (1976) (holding that officer was not justified in conducting a

pat-down search before allowing individual into his car where

officer had stopped to assist the individual who appeared to be

intoxicated while holding a child and offered to give the

individual a ride); Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise

on the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(a) at 256-57. Under Shields’s

version of events, there are no “other circumstances” justifying

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the search. 

Finally, Tracy is not entitled to qualified immunity for the

Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim. Under

Shields’s version of events, a reasonable officer would be on

notice that there was no reasonable belief that she posed a

threat to herself or others. Although the “reasonable suspicion”

analysis is highly contextual and fact-specific, cases where the

validity of a community caretaking stop is affirmed, as described

above, all involve situations where there were significant,

articulable facts supporting the officer’s belief that the

individual posed a danger to himself or the public. Tracy has

pointed to no such undisputed facts here that would lead a

reasonable officer to believe he had the right to seize Shields. 

 For similar reasons, Tracy is also not entitled to qualified

immunity for the weapons search. As an initial matter, the law

is clear that an officer must have legitimate grounds for

forcibly detaining or seizing an individual before a right to

search a person arises. E.g., King, 990 F.2d at 1560; 4 Search

and Seizure § 9.5(a). Here, given that there is a genuine

factual dispute over whether Tracy had any basis for seizing

Shields, summary judgment should also be denied on the allegedly

illegal protective search. Additionally, no reasonable officer

would believe he had the right to conduct a protective search

absent some “other circumstances” suggesting that the individual

was armed and dangerous. Tracy has identified no such undisputed 

articulable facts here. 

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For the above reasons, Tracy’s motion for summary judgment

on Shields’s Fourth Amendment seizure and search claim is DENIED. 

2. Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

For similar reasons, summary judgment is inappropriate on

plaintiff’s claim of excessive force. As in other Fourth

Amendment contexts, “the question is whether the officers’

actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S.

386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989). This reasonableness

determination “requires a careful balancing of the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests’ against the countervailing governmental interest at

stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotations omitted). 

To assess the gravity of a particular intrusion on

Fourth Amendment rights, the factfinder must evaluate

the type and amount of force inflicted. In weighing

the governmental interests involved the following

should be taken into account: (1) the severity of the

crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 

Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Here, a jury could find that the force used by Tracy was

objectively unreasonable. Regarding the gravity of the

intrusion, Tracy applied a wrist-lock technique with such force

that, according to Shields, her left arm was twisted back behind

her back and then wrenched above her head, resulting in a

dislocated and fractured left elbow. Thus, the level of force

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employed was significant. 

A reasonable jury could find that the force was used was

excessive. Defendants do not contend that Tracy suspected

Shields of having committed any crime. Additionally, under

Shields’s version of the incident, there was no reason to believe

that Shields had a weapon and was trying to use it. Finally,

according to Shields, she was not resisting Tracy’s use of force.

Likewise, Tracy is not entitled to qualified immunity on

Shields’s excessive force claim. A reasonable officer would know

that it violates the Fourth Amendment to apply a wrist-lock grip

with such force as to dislocate a person’s elbow when the person

is suspected of no crime and is moving away from the officer for

the declared purpose of seeking shelter from the rain. 

3. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Shields also brings a substantive due process claim against

Tracy. For conduct to constitute a substantive due process

violation, the action must be “so egregious, so outrageous, that

it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” 

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8, 118 S.Ct.

1708 (1998). Shields alleges that Tracy grabbed her breasts and

sexually assaulted her while he was searching her, thereby

infringing on her liberty interest in being free from

state-imposed violations of her bodily integrity. (Opp’n at 31.)

Allegations of sexual assault by a governmental officer may,

in some circumstances, serve as the basis of a substantive due

process claim. Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 784 (8th Cir.

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2003). However, Shields’s claim is best analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment. “[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a

specific constitutional provision . . . the claim must be

analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific

provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” 

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.

259, 272 n.7, 117 S.Ct. 1219 (1997)). Noting this rule, the

Ninth Circuit has held that while sexual misconduct by a police

officer toward another is generally analyzed under the Fourteenth

Amendment, such allegations of sexual misconduct by a police

officer during a continuing seizure are more properly analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment. Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871,

881-82 (9th Cir. 2001). A pat-down search, even one that

involves private areas, such as the groin or breasts, does not

violate the Fourteenth Amendment, although it might violate the

Fourth Amendment as discussed above. See Greiner v. City of

Champlin, 816 F.Supp. 528, 543 (D.Minn. 1993), aff’d in part and

remanded in part on other grounds, 27 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1994)

(collecting cases). Summary judgment is GRANTED on Shields’s

substantive due process claim against Tracy. 

3. State-law claims

Shields also brings several corresponding state-law claims

against Tracy based on the allegations described above. For the

same reasons summary judgment is inappropriate on Shield’s Fourth

Amendment claims, summary judgment is likewise inappropriate on

these claims. First, summary judgment is inappropriate on

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Shields’s Unruh Act and assault and battery claims because the

analysis used for plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims also

applies to these claims. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a) (Unruh Act

statute); Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1274-75,

74 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 (1998) (holding that California courts apply

same “objective reasonableness” test used for analysis of Fourth

Amendment claims when analyzing the reasonableness of force used

by an officer under an assault and battery claim).

Likewise, summary judgment is inappropriate on Shields’s

false arrest and imprisonment claim. The tort of false

imprisonment is: “(1) the nonconsenual, intentional confinement

of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an

appreciable period of time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter

Coast Hosp., 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 (2000). 

The torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate

torts, as the arrest is “but one way of committing false

imprisonment.” Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744,

753 n.3, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 (1997). As with the other state-law

claims, the determination that summary judgment in favor of Tracy

is inappropriate on the Fourth Amendment claims precludes summary

judgment in favor of Tracy on this claim. 

Tracy’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. First,

Tracy contends that, even if his encounter with Shields did

constitute a seizure, she has no claim for false imprisonment

because the arrest was not followed by imprisonment. (Reply at

20.) However, “false imprisonment” is broadly defined to mean

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“the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 236. Even though Shields was never placed in

prison, she can still maintain a claim for false imprisonment. 

See Watts v. County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir.

2001) (finding false imprisonment where officers unlawfully

entered and detained individual in her home without warrant). 

Additionally, Tracy asserts that any “arrest” was authorized

because he had probable cause to suspect her of violating Cal.

Penal Code § 148(a), the penal code prohibiting resisting,

delaying, or obstructing a police officer in the discharge of his

duties. (Reply at 21.) However, § 148 only applies where the

officer is engaged in the performance of his duties. People v.

White, 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166, 161 Cal.Rptr. 541 (1980) 

California courts have held that a police officer is not

performing or discharging the duties of his office when he makes

an unlawful arrest or uses excessive force in effecting the

arrest or detention. Id. Given there is a genuine dispute as to

whether the arrest was lawful, the court cannot determine whether

Tracy had probable cause to suspect her of violating § 148(a). 

 Finally, Tracy asserts he is entitled to discretionary

immunity under Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2. (Mot. at 22.) However,

§ 820.2 does not provide immunity for false imprisonment claims. 

See Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2000);

Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.4. For the above reasons, Tracy’s motion

for summary judgment on all of Shields’s state law claims is

DENIED. 

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 Shields makes much of Tracy’s and Bialorucki’s admissions 2

in their answers that they “arrested” Shields and issued her a

notice to appear citation. (Opp’n at 2-3, 16.) However, whether

Shields was “arrested” or “seized” for purposes of the Fourth

Amendment is a legal conclusion, and judicial admissions are

limited to matters of fact. MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 110

F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1997). 

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B. Defendant Bialorucki

Shields also brings suit against Bialorucki for his role in

the incident. Although Shields admits that Bialorucki arrived on

the scene after Tracy dislocated and fractured Shields’s elbow

and, therefore, was not present for the seizure or use of

excessive force, she alleges that Bialorucki is liable on two

grounds: (1) citing her for a violation of Cal. Penal Code § 148

where there was no basis to support the citation; and (2) for

improperly continuing her arrest after arriving on the scene and

failing to intercede on her behalf. (Opp’n at 22-23.) Based on

these two theories, Shields alleges violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state-law claims under the

Unruh Act and for false arrest and imprisonment. 

Neither of these theories support liability against

Bialorucki on any of the above claims. Regarding the citation,

Bialorucki was not the one who authorized the citation. Rather,

on the undisputed facts, Tracy was the “authorizing” officer and

Sergeant Walski ordered Bialorucki to issue the citation because

Tracy was not at the hospital. Bialorucki’s only role was to

write the citation and hand it to Shields. Even if Bialorucki 2

authorized the citation, however, the outcome would be the same. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the issuance of a citation does

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not constitute the tort of false arrest, much less a

constitutional violation. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339

F.3d 828, 840 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Shields’s attempt to

hold Bialorucki liable for false imprisonment merely for issuing

the § 148(a) citation must fail. 

Nor does the issuance of the citation support Shields’s

constitutional claims. Shields was not “seized” by the issuance

of the citation and did not experience a loss of liberty or

property as a result of the citation, given that she was never

booked, taken into custody, or prosecuted. Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit has held that the issuance of a “bogus” citation does not

“shock the conscience” so as to support a substantive due process

claim. Johnson v. Barker, 799 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986)

(finding that filing and prosecuting plaintiff on “baseless”

charges did not “approach violating substantive due process”).

Likewise, Shields’s allegation that Bialorucki assisted in

continuing her arrest is insufficient to support Shields’s

state-law or constitutional claims. To be liable under § 1983,

Bialorucki must have been “personally involved” in the alleged

constitutional deprivations. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501

(2d Cir. 1994). Officers become “personally involved” for the

purposes of § 1983 liability if they fail to intercede “when

their fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a

suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271,

1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). However,

officers can only be liable for failing to intervene when they

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had a “realistic opportunity” to do so. Id. at 1290. 

Here, Bialorucki had no realistic opportunity to intervene

to end the “seizure.” Shields was “seized” long before

Bialorucki arrived. Therefore, Bialorucki had no opportunity to

prevent the original seizure. Moreover, from the time he arrived

on the scene to the time he issued her a citation Bialorucki had

no realistic opportunity to “un-arrest” her. Shields was injured

when he arrived and had to be sent to the hospital immediately. 

Bialorucki’s interaction with Shields at the hospital does

not alter this conclusion. Although Shields complains that

Bialorucki’s actions at the hospital effectively continued

Shields’s detention, this argument mischaracterizes Bialorucki’s

role. While at the hospital, Bialorucki asked Shields a few

questions as part of the investigation of the incident, was told

by his supervisor to issue a citation to Shields on behalf of

Tracy, and then issued her the citation. Shields was free to

leave after Bialroucki issued the citation. Bialorucki did

nothing to hold her at the hospital or anywhere else. 

Even assuming that Bialorucki’s alleged continuation of

Shields’s seizure was a constitutional violation, Bialorucki is

entitled to qualified immunity on the claim. Shields has not

cited, nor could the court find, a case applying the “duty to

intercede” requirement to a situation where an individual is

already “seized” and the late-arriving officer does not prolong

or exacerbate the detention. Accordingly, a reasonable officer

in Bialorucki’s situation would not be on notice that his actions

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were unconstitutional. 

For similar reasons, the alleged failure to intercede cannot

sustain either plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim or her claim for false

imprisonment. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Bialorucki’s motion

for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims against him. 

C. County of El Dorado

 Shields asserts municipal liability against El Dorado

County based on the following two alleged “policies” of the

county. First, Shields claims that El Dorado County had a policy

of inadequately training and supervising its officers in “Officer

Presence” and “Tactical Communications” skills. (Opp’n at 24.) 

Second, Shields alleges that it was the policy and custom of El

Dorado County to inadequately and improperly investigate citizen

complaints of police officer misconduct. (Id. at 24-25.) To

support these claims, Shields submits the written opinions and

findings of her designated expert, Richard Clark. 

For claims of inadequate training and investigation to form

the basis of municipal liability, the inadequacy of the training

or investigation must amount to “deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989).

Additionally, the identified policy must be “closely related to

the ultimate injury.” Id. at 390. 

Shields has not presented sufficient evidence in support of

either alleged policy to avoid summary judgment on this claim. 

Regarding the “failure to train” claim, Shields contends that El

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Dorado County is liable because it failed to provide additional

training in tactical communications after the officers graduated

from the basic POST training. (Clark Decl. Ex. B at 2.) The

only evidence supporting Clark’s opinion, however, is that the

record in this case demonstrates that Tracy had lost or forgotten

this skill and the department had done nothing to see that it was

retained. (Id. at 18.) 

This is insufficient evidence of “deliberate indifference”

to survive summary judgment. As the Court in Harris held, 

[t]hat a particular officer may be unsatisfactorily

trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on

the city, for the officer’s shortcomings may have

resulted from factors other than a faulty training

program. . . . Neither will it suffice to prove that an

injury or accident could have been avoided if an

officer had had better or more training, sufficient to

equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing

conduct. 

Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. Shields must show a pattern of similar

tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees such that the

county’s continued failure to provide additional training can

reasonably be deemed to rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 407-08, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997). Shields has

presented no such evidence.

With regard to her “failure to investigate” argument,

Shields presents evidence that from 1997 to the present, there

were 34 excessive force/unlawful search and seizure/unlawful

detention complaints filed with the sheriff’s department and that

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 Defendants object to the admissibility of these 3

statistics, arguing that the declarant, Shields’s attorney, has

not established the factual and mathematical basis for his

conclusions. Given the court’s decision to grant summary

judgment in favor of defendants on this claim, there is no need

to reach this issue. 

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only one of these complaints was sustained. (Jones Decl. ¶ 7.) 3

In addition to these statistics, Shields points to several

alleged deficiencies in the investigation of her case --

including allegations that certain documents were mysteriously

lost or destroyed, that certain allegations were not sufficiently

investigated, and that no punishment was handed out. (Opp’n at

27-28.)

This evidence is insufficient to avoid summary judgment on

this issue. The allegations relating to the handling of her case

are insufficient to establish municipal liability. A plaintiff

must do more than point to the flaws in the handling of her own

case to establish a pattern of violations rising to the level of

deliberate indifference. Harris, 489 U.S. at 391. Moreover,

because plaintiff never pursued an administrative claim, there is

no suggestion that the county ratified or affirmed Tracy’s

conduct. The statistics Shields cites also do not create a

material question of fact. Plaintiff has not provided evidence

showing that these investigations were in any way incomplete or

biased; all she has shown is that complaints of excessive force

and unreasonable detentions are sustained one time out of thirtyfour. Whether this is a high or low number, for example, as

compared to other jurisdictions, does not appear from any of the

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evidence submitted. 

Finally, defendants’ evidence shows that there is a strong

policy in place regarding internal investigations. The policy

requires that an internal affairs investigation be initiated in

each case and that the investigation be completed unless the

complaining witness refuses to cooperate or the employee facing

the potential adverse action resigns. (Neves Decl. Ex. D.) 

Furthermore, the department had explicit policies requiring all

department employees to participate in, and cooperate honestly

and fully with, all internal affairs investigations. (Id. Ex.

E.) Failure to do so would result in the imposition of

discipline. (Id.) In sum, the evidence presented by Shields in

support of her municipal liability claim is insufficient to raise

a triable question of fact regarding the alleged “deliberate

indifference” of El Dorado County. Accordingly, the court GRANTS

summary judgment in favor of El Dorado County on plaintiff’s

municipal liability claim. 

///

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///

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III. 

The court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of defendants

Bialorucki and the County of El Dorado on all claims against

them. As to defendant Tracy, the court GRANTS summary judgment

in favor of Tracy on plaintiff’s substantive due process claim,

but DENIES summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s remaining

claims against Tracy. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/21/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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