Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01207/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01207-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Alan BENJAMIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

Tim COKER, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV-06-1207-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Thomas Alan Benjamin's ("Plaintiff") Motion

for Discovery Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). (Doc. No. 19). Plaintiff seeks leave to

conduct discovery to "adequately respond" to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. No. 19 at 2). Defendants Tim Coker and Sandra Hope ("Defendants") filed a Response

to Plaintiff's motion on July 12, 2006. (Doc. No. 21). After considering the arguments raised

in the written briefs, the Court now issues the following ruling.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) permits the Court to refuse an application for

summary judgment or order a continuance to allow the non-moving party to conduct

additional discovery in certain circumstances: “Should it appear from the affidavits of a party

opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts

essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment

or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or

discovery to be had . . . . ” Although a Rule 56(f) affidavit does not need to present evidence

Case 2:06-cv-01207-SMM Document 27 Filed 11/21/06 Page 1 of 3
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going to the merits of the case, the moving party “must show (1) that they have set forth in

affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the

facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are ‘essential’ to resist the summary

judgment motion.” State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.2d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 1998).

“Denial of a Rule 56(f) application is proper where it is clear that the evidence sought is

almost certainly nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991). "Where...a summary judgment motion is filed so early in the

case, district courts should grant any Rule 56(f) motions fairly freely." Burlington Northern

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. The Assiniboine, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants properly moved for summary judgment just over a month after the case

was filed. Plaintiff asserts that formal discovery is required to reveal the facts necessary to

determine Defendants' compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") and enable

Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. As the party opposing the

motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that additional

discovery is proper under Rule 56(f). 

1. Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel

Attached to Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) request is the affidavit of his counsel, Richard

Groves. Mr. Groves avers a number of specific facts that he hopes to elicit from further

discovery, including that he "needs...to determine....what specific business relationship

existed between Defendant Coker and Plaintiff that permitted him to obtain Plaintiff's

consumer report for 'collection' purposes" and "what 'permissible purpose' Defendant Coker

had for accessing Plaintiff's consumer report three times." (Doc. No. 19, Attachment 2, ¶ 4).

In addition, Mr. Groves declares that discovery will determine whether Defendant Hope had

a permissible purpose under the FCRA for obtaining Plaintiff's consumer report three times.

Additionally, Mr. Groves seeks to investigate the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's

authorization to Defendant Hope to obtain his reports. (Id. at ¶5). 

2. Existence of Facts Sought

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There is undisputed evidence that Defendant Hope, using Defendant Coker's Experian

subscription, obtained copies of Plaintiff's consumer report on three separate occasions and

that Plaintiff gave Defendant Hope written permission to retrieve his personal credit report.

However, the facts surrounding Defendant Coker's business relationship with Defendant

Hope and the nature of Plaintiff's written authorization to Defendant Hope, remain contested.

Thus, the Court finds that some of the facts sought by Plaintiff in this case are not the object

of pure speculation or non-existent and are capable of being discovered. 

3. Essentialness of Facts Sought

The nature of Plaintiff's written authorization to Defendant Hope, the business

relationship between Defendant Coker and Defendant Hope, and the propriety of Defendant

Hope's use of Defendant Coker's Experian subscription for her work as a private investigator,

are all essential to Plaintiff's ability to oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Rule 56(f)

of the Fed. R. of Civ. P. and will grant Plaintiff's motion for discovery. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery Pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (Doc. No. 19). The Court shall set a Preliminary Pretrial Conference

in this matter at which point a schedule for discovery and deadlines for responding to

pending dispositive motions will be established. 

DATED this 17th day of November, 2006.

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