Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00449/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00449-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Stewart, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Detention Officer A.M. Deans, 

Defendant.

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No. CV-03-449-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding

Anissa Dreas. Doc. #61. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.

Background

Plaintiff is a prisoner incarcerated with the Arizona Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff commenced this action more than three years ago on March 6, 2003. Doc. #1.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 8, 2003, alleging that detention officers

Schroeded and A.M. Deans denied Plaintiff medication while in “lockdown” status at a

County jail on September 26, 2002. Doc. #5.

On May 10, 2004, officers Jeffery Schroeder and R.M. Dean filed a motion for

summary judgment. Doc. #15. In response, Plaintiff did not dispute that Defendant

Schroeded’s name is actually Schroeder. Doc. #24. The Court granted summary judgment

with respect to Schroeder because Plaintiff presented no evidence that Schroeder worked at

the jail on September 26, 2002. Doc. #27 at 3. With respect to R.M. Dean, however, the

Court denied the motion for summary judgment as moot because Plaintiff did not sue a

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Defendant by that name, Plaintiff stated that Defendant A.M. Deans was female, not male,

and there was no argument that an officer A.M. Deans did not exist. Id.

On November 9, 2005, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and provided

evidence that an officer A.M. Deans does not exist. Doc. #37. The Court viewed the motion

as untimely. At the final pretrial conference on December 2, 2005, however, Plaintiff

admitted that he had no evidence that A.M. Deans existed. Doc. #45. As a result of a

discussion on the record, the Court concluded that the County should conduct a search for

information concerning the possible identification of the officers on duty during the events

in question and provide that information to Plaintiff, and that the parties and the Court should

then decide whether there is a triable issue in this case. The final pretrial conference was

continued to January 20, 2006 for this purpose.

At the January 20 conference, it became clear that there is no evidence of the

existence of an officer A.M. Deans. See Docs. ##47, 51. Plaintiff asserted, however, that

he saw the officer in question in the jail’s control tower on March 27, 2003. Records

provided by the County suggested that an Officer Anissa Dreas was the same individual

Plaintiff previously had described as A.M. Deans – the thin, African American woman with

short hair who denied him medication on September 26, 2002.

The Court subsequently ordered the County to investigate whether Anissa Dreas was

working in or around Plaintiff’s location on September 26, 2002, and whether she is the

individual Plaintiff has described. Doc. #59. The Court permitted Defendant to file a motion

for summary judgment if the results of the County’s investigation supported such a motion.

Id.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on February 15, 2006. Doc. #61.

Plaintiff has filed a response and Defendant has filed a reply. Docs. #67, 69. Plaintiff also

has filed a separate affidavit in support of his response. Doc. #70.

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible evidence, viewed in the light most

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favorable to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Substantive law

determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Similarly, to preclude summary judgment

the dispute must be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

II. Analysis.

The County does not dispute that officer Anissa Dreas was working around Plaintiff’s

location on September 26, 2002. The County argues, however, that Plaintiff should not be

permitted to add Dreas as a defendant at this late stage of the proceedings. Doc. #61 at 3-5.

The County further argues that Dreas did not take Plaintiff’s medication and that Plaintiff’s

claim does not rise to a constitutional violation. Id. at 6-9.

Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s assertion that Dreas was not the person who

took his medication. Rather, Plaintiff states that Dreas would not give him his medication

when he asked for it. Doc. #70 at 1-2. Plaintiff contends that Dreas’s failure to give him his

medication, which was prescribed to treat an ingrown toenail, constitutes deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Doc. #67

at 17.

The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s medication was confiscated when he was transported

to administrative segregation and placed on a “special meal program” for allegedly

threatening a detention officer. The undisputed evidence shows that under the County’s

formal guidelines, the officer who places an inmate on the special meal program is

responsible for the inmate’s property and is required to return any confiscated property to the

inmate after 48 hours. Doc. #67 at 26, 33. It is undisputed that Dreas did not place Plaintiff

on the special meal program or confiscate his medication. She was thus not responsible for

the medication or permitted to give it to Plaintiff when he asked for it. See id.

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See also Doc. #67 at 33-34 (external referee decision sustaining Plaintiff’s

administrative grievance because his medication should not have been confiscated under the

guidelines but concluding that Plaintiff “did not suffer any serious medical harm” as a result

of the temporary confiscation).

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Moreover, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s medication was returned to him on

September 29, 2001, three days after it was confiscated. Id. at 32. The temporary

confiscation of Plaintiff’s medication for an ingrown toenail does not constitute a deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05

(1976); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment in

favor of the defendants and holding that the confiscation of a sling and a two month delay

in medical treatment did not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff’s

condition did not require emergency attention and the delay did not cause substantial harm);

Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 745 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Eighth Amendment’s

cruel and unusual punishment standard is not an easy test for plaintiffs to satisfy because “the

Eighth Amendment proscribes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” such as

actions “that are ‘so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous

infliction of suffering’”) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)).1

The Court will grant the motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #61) is granted.

2. All other pending motions are denied as moot.

3. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

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