Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00408/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00408-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSIE MOREHEAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

KERN VALLEY STATE PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:16-cv-0408- MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF NO. 6)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s February 12, 2016, complaint1is before the Court for 

screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

 

1 When Plaintiff initiated this action on January 27, 2016, he asserted a portion of his allegations on a 

“Trust Account Withdrawal Order” form. (See ECF No. 1.) As a result, he was directed by the Clerk’s office 

to file a complaint on the proper form, which he did on February 12, 2016. (ECF No. 6.) The Court screens 

this second, superseding complaint in this Order. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.

1997) (an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint).

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, who at all relevant times was an inmate housed at Kern Valley State 

Prison, brings suit against Defendants Officer Anderson, Officer Hough, Medical CO 

Cregular, and Medical Sergeant John Doe. 

Plaintiff’s claims can be summarized essentially as follows:

On December 10, 2015, Plaintiff was strip searched and placed on suicide watch

in Cage #3. At this time, his personal clothing was taken from him. Later that day, 

Plaintiff was transferred to a hearing by a peace officer. This unidentified officer, who 

was responsible for Plaintiff’s personal clothing, eventually lost or destroyed the clothing. 

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Each of the Defendants was present when Plaintiff’s clothing was taken. Plaintiff seeks a 

return of his personal clothing and/or $50 (the value of the clothing). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Linkage

Plaintiff claims that all of the Defendants were present when his personal clothing 

was taken from him. While this may be true, this bare assertion is insufficient to link the 

Defendants to any unconstitutional conduct. Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of hers rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77 (2009); Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 

1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must allege specific facts 

identifying the role of each Defendant in the confiscation of his personal clothing. If 

Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must link each named Defendant to 

his claim.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff does not clarify whether he is bringing suit against the Defendants in their 

official capacities. In the event that he is, Plaintiff’s claim for damages is barred. “The 

Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its 

agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 

488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the Eleventh 

Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in their personal 

capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 

(9th Cir. 2003), or suits for declaratory or injunctive relief brought against state officials in 

their official capacities, Austin v. State Indus. Ins. System, 939 F.2d 676, 680 fn.2 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

C. Due Process

Plaintiff’s complaint may be fairly read as asserting a due process claim. The Due 

Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of property without due process 

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of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and prisoners have a protected 

interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). 

However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the 

Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing 

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 

F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), “[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by 

a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation 

remedy for the loss is available,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.

Plaintiff claims that his personal clothing was confiscated while he was placed on 

suicide watch and that each of the Defendants was present when Plaintiff’s clothing was 

lost and/or destroyed. Plaintiff’s complaint, though, does not indicate whether the 

confiscation of his personal clothing was authorized and intentional or whether it was 

unauthorized. Allegations of essentially random and unauthorized deprivations of 

personal property do not allege a violation of a federal constitutional right. Although such 

unauthorized deprivations of personal property may amount to state law violations, they 

do not constitute federal due process violations. Plaintiff also fails to state whether there 

was a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss of his property. Without these 

critical allegations, the Court must conclude that the complaint does not state a claim. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against 

any of the named Defendants. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to amend. If 

Plaintiff files a first amended complaint, it must state what each named Defendant did 

that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. Plaintiff 

should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the 

deficiencies set forth above.

Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an 

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“amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s February 12, 2016, Complaint (ECF No. 6) is dismissed for failure 

to state a claim; 

2. Plaintiff shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty days from the 

date of this Order; and

3. Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint within thirty days will result in 

a recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute 

and failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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