Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00453/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00453-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARVIN K. LOCKE,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17-CV-453 JLS (JMA)

ORDER: (1) OVERRULING 

PETITIONER’S OBJECTION; (2) 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; (3) 

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (4) 

DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE 

PETITIONER’S PETITION

(ECF Nos. 8, 14.)

Presently before the Court is Petitioner Marvin K. Locke’s Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, (“Petition,” ECF No. 1), Respondent’s Response to the Petition, (“Opp’n,” 

ECF No. 5), and Petitioner’s Traverse, (“Traverse,” ECF No. 12). Magistrate Judge Jan 

M. Adler issued a Report and Recommendation, (“R&R,” ECF No. 13), recommending 

that the Court deny Petitioner’s Petition. While Petitioner did not file any objections to the 

R&R, he filed a Motion for Certificate of Appealability, which includes objections to the 

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R&R, (“CoA MTN,” ECF No. 17). The Court addresses Petitioner’s arguments in his 

Motion.

Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, as well as all supporting 

documents, the Court ADOPTS Judge Adler’s Report and Recommendation, DENIES 

Petitioner’s Motion for Certificate of Appealability, and DISMISSES WITH 

PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition.

BACKGROUND

Judge Adler’s Report and Recommendation contains a complete and accurate 

recitation of the relevant portions of the factual and procedural histories underlying the 

Petitioner’s Petition. (See R&R 1–7.)1 This Order incorporates by reference the 

background as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection, 

however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

ANALYSIS

In his Petition, Petitioner alleges (1) a petition for writ of habeas corpus review is an 

appropriate vehicle for a second or successive petition; and (2) his conviction for seconddegree murder is invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). (Petition 

 

1 Pin citations refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at the top of each page.

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6–7; Traverse 11–12.) Judge Adler recommends this Court find the first issue moot and

deny Petitioner’s claim on the second issue. (R&R 10, 13.) In his Motion for Certificate 

of Appealability, Petitioner states he is entitled to a Certificate of Appealability for various 

reasons. (CoA MTN 3.) Petitioner then objects to various portions of the R&R as to the 

second issue. This Court will review, de novo, those parts of the R&R to which Plaintiff 

objects and will review for clear error the parts of the R&R to which Plaintiff does not 

object.

I. Ground One

Petitioner argues “a petition for writ of habeas corpus review is appropriate [sic] 

vehicle for second or successive [sic] petition.” (Petition 6.) Judge Adler recommends 

denying this claim as moot because this is Petitioner’s first federal habeas petition. (R&R 

10.) The Court finds no error in this finding and ADOPTS the R&R as to this claim. The 

claim is DENIED AS MOOT.

II. Ground Two

A jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder and assault with a firearm. 

(See ECF No. 6-24.) A finding was also made that Petitioner committed the offense for 

the benefit of a street gang. (Id.) Petitioner challenges his conviction of second degree 

murder as invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). (See Traverse 

11–12.) In Johnson, the Supreme Court found a clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act

(“ACCA”) to be unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56. The ACCA increases 

one’s prison time if he has three or more earlier convictions for a “serious drug offense” or 

“violent felony.” Id. at 2555. One definition of “violent felony” is: “burglary, arson, or 

extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis 

added). The Court found the italicized clause in this definition to be unconstitutionally 

vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557.

Here, Petitioner argues the phrase “inherently dangerous to human life” in the 

second degree felony murder statute is unconstitutionally vague, like the clause in Johnson. 

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(Traverse 11.) Judge Adler found that Petitioner has no standing to bring this claim 

because he was not convicted for second degree felony murder. (R&R 11–12.) Judge 

Adler also determined there is no evidence the jury was given any instruction as to a felony 

murder charge. (Id. at 12.) Judge Adler recommends the Court deny this claim.

In response, Petitioner argues he was found guilty of express and implied malice, 

with a street gang allegation attached. (CoA MTN 3.) He argues the prosecutor “elevate[d] 

the criminality of murder” and the jury could not give “credence to a possible lesser 

charge.” (Id.)

2

 It is unclear what Petitioner is arguing and how this relates to Judge Adler’s 

finding. It is true Petitioner’s charge was enhanced by the finding he committed the offense 

for the benefit of a street gang. To the extent Petitioner is making new arguments beyond 

those in his Petition, the Court does not consider them. See Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 

1421, 1426–27 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.”); see also United States v. 

Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court, in reviewing 

objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, is not required to consider 

evidence that was not presented to the magistrate judge). 

Petitioner also argues an ambiguous jury instruction was given. (CoA MTN 4.) His 

argument is unclear; he may be arguing the jury instruction for the street gang allegation 

should not list crimes, or, he may be arguing it is “unreasonable” for the jury instruction to 

list the crimes listed in California Penal Code section 189. (Id.; see ECF No. 6-12, at 147 

(jury instruction for Street Gang Allegation).) First, Petitioner has never before argued the 

jury instructions were ambiguous, so the Court does not consider the argument here. To 

the extent Petitioner argues the Street Gang Allegation jury instruction was improperly 

given, the Court disagrees. Evidence was presented that Petitioner killed the victim 

 

2 Petitioner also refers to CALJIC 3.31 as evidence the jury could not consider a lesser charge. (CoA 

MTN 3 (citing ECF No. 6-12, at 116).) But this jury instruction, “Concurrence of Act and Specific 

Intent,” has nothing to do with felony murder.

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because Petitioner stated the victim made gang-related comments and gestures. (ECF No. 

6-18, at 2–6.) An expert testified that Petitioner was a gang member and Petitioner killed 

the victim for the purpose of enhancing the reputation of himself and his gang. (Id. at 4.)

Petitioner argues Judge Adler erred in finding that “inherently dangerous to human 

life” was not part of the jury instructions. (CoA MTN 5.) In his Petition, Petitioner 

references an appendix which contains all the jury instructions given to the jury at this trial. 

(ECF No. 6-12, at 77–160.) Two of the instructions given were Jury Instruction 8.30 and 

8.31, which pertain to second degree murder, not felony murder. (Id. at 121–22.)3 The 

Court agrees with Judge Adler: “there is simply no mention of the felony murder rule 

anywhere in the jury instructions” given to the jury in Petitioner’s case. (R&R 13 (citing 

ECF No. 6-12, at 77–160).) There is also no reference to “inherently dangerous to human 

life.” Thus, because the felony-murder rule has nothing to do with Petitioner’s case, he has 

no standing to argue the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional.

Petitioner further objects to the R&R, stating the elements of his case “proved that 

the facts as interpreted amount to ‘inherently dangerous to human life.’” (CoA MTN 5.) 

While this may be true, and while the jury may have deemed Petitioner’s actions dangerous 

when they convicted Petitioner of second degree murder, this does not elevate Petitioner’s 

conviction to felony murder, and he was not convicted of felony murder. Thus, the Court 

DENIES Petitioner’s second claim WITH PREJUDICE.

III. Certificate of Appealability

In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, 

if a court denies a petition, a certificate of appealability may only be issued “if jurists of 

reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that 

jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

 

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Jury Instruction 8.32 pertains to felony murder; there is no indication this instruction was given at 

Petitioner’s trial. (See ECF No. 1-3, at 9 (Superior Court Judge Rodriguez finding the same).)

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proceed further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); see also Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Petitioner argues jurists could disagree with the Court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims and that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further. (CoA MTN 6 (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. 327).) 

The Court finds that Petitioner did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right, the issues are not debatable among jurists of reason, and a court could 

not resolve the issues in a different manner. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. The Court 

therefore DENIES a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

Given the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, (ECF No. 13), OVERRULES

Petitioner’s Objections, (ECF No. 17), and DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for a Certificate 

of Appealability, (id.). Because this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk 

SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2018

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