Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00151/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard James Skaggs,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney General,

Respondents.

No. CV 14-00151 PHX JAT MEA

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about January 27, 2014. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on June 25, 2014. Petitioner 

filed a reply to the answer to his petition on October 9, 2014. See Doc. 15. 

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned November 1, 2004, charged 

Petitioner with one count of first-degree murder, alleged to have occurred on July 28, 

2002. See Answer, Exh. A. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts 

underlying Petitioner’s ultimate conviction: as follows

On July 28, 2002, [Skaggs] and two friends, Patrick H. and Oliver P., shot 

and killed their acquaintance, Mark B., in Patrick H.’s apartment and 

subsequently disposed of his body in a dumpster. The victim’s body was 

never found. The motive for the killing was either a disagreement between 

[Skaggs] and the victim caused by the victim’s conduct towards a woman 

employee of ... a strip club they both frequented, or the fact that [Skaggs] 

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needed money and decided to rob the victim.

***

In mid-August 2002, [Skaggs] and Patrick H. moved to Seattle, 

Washington, “[t]o get away from the cops.” Patrick H. was arrested there in 

December 2002 on a probation violation for leaving Arizona without 

permission. On October 1, 2004, Patrick H. eventually entered into a plea 

agreement in which he pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter, a Class 2 

non-dangerous felony, in exchange for his truthful testimony against 

[Skaggs] and Oliver P.

Id., Exh. I at 2 & 9.

On September 18, 2006, after a thirteen-day trial, a jury found Petitioner guilty of 

first-degree murder. Id., Exh. B. On January 12, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to serve 

a term of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to this conviction. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. Petitioner 

asserted in his direct appeal that: (1) the state wrongfully sequenced or “piecemealed” its 

prosecution of a criminal episode in order to impeach Petitioner with a conviction for a 

crime which occurred at the same time as the crime being tried; (2) Arizona should adopt 

California common law and prohibit long delays between the close of evidence and the 

start of the jury’s deliberations, such as the eleven-day delay in the instant case; (3) the

trial judge wrongfully dismissed a deliberating juror for juror misconduct without giving 

that juror a chance to be heard. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E.

At Petitioner’s request, the Arizona Court of Appeals held oral argument on the 

issues raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id., Exh. ZZ at 3. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence in a memorandum decision issued 

May 27, 2008. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., 

Exhs. K & L. In addition to the three issues presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

Petitioner presented an additional issue to the Arizona Supreme Court, alleging one of the

state’s witnesses gave false testimony and that the state should have corrected the 

testimony and the testimony “should have been excluded.” Id., Exh. L. The Arizona 

Supreme Court summarily denied review in Petitioner’s direct appeal on December 22, 

2008. Id., Exh. M.

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On December 28, 2008, Petitioner initiated a timely action for post-conviction 

relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner 

was appointed counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings. Id., Exh. P. In his 

Rule 32 action Petitioner alleged several ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. 

Id., Exh. R. In a decision entered March 30, 2010, the state trial court considered 

Petitioner’s claims and determined that Petitioner had not established that his trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency 

and, accordingly, the court found he was not denied his right to the effective assistance of 

counsel pursuant to the test stated in Strickland v. Washington. Id., Exh. W. Petitioner 

sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id., Exh. BB. The 

Arizona Court of Appeals denied review in a decision entered November 17, 2011. Id., 

Exh. FF.

Petitioner initiated a second Rule 32 action on March 24, 2012. Id., Exh. GG. 

Petitioner asserted he had newly discovered facts establishing his actual innocence. Id., 

Exh. GG. On April 20, 2012, the trial court dismissed the second Rule 32 action, stating:

The defendant claims, pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a), that his 

conviction and sentence were obtained in violation of his constitutional 

rights. Specifically, the defendant claims that the manner in which the state 

obtained an indictment against him was in violation of due process. The 

defendant cannot raise a claim of this nature in an untimely or successive 

notice of post-conviction relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Additionally, 

the defendant could have raised this issue on direct appeal but failed to do 

so. Therefore, the defendant is now procedurally precluded from raising the 

issue in Rule 32 proceedings. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(1).

Id., Exh. HH at 1–2. The state trial court concluded Petitioner had “fail[ed] to state a 

claim for which relief can be granted in an untimely or successive Rule 32 proceeding,” 

citing Rule 32.4(a), and dismissed the action as untimely and successive. Id., Exh. HH at 

2. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on January 14, 2014. Petitioner asserts,

as construed by Respondents: 

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Ground 1: Skaggs alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments, and Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 608. Skaggs 

generally alleges that he was “wrongfully accused” and “misrepresented by 

ineffective counselors.” Skaggs claims that someone else “openly admitted 

and confessed” to first-degree murder as part of plea agreements, and states 

neither the grand jury nor the trial jury was made aware of the confession. 

He claims he did not receive a fair trial as a result.

Ground 2: Skaggs states his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment “rights [to] a 

speedy trial and due process of the law” were violated. He alleges his right 

to due process was violated because he was not allowed to be present at the 

Grand Jury hearing. He asserts that witnesses were “allowed to testify 

falsely against [him],” and the prosecutor used “perjured testimony.” He 

also seems to claim that his prior convictions were improperly used to 

“mislead the judge” and to cause “prejudice.”

Ground 3: Skaggs asserts his Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated. He claims he “did not receive a ‘fair trial’ when [he] 

constantly complained about the racial (make-up) of the jury” when there 

were no jurors of “Puerto Rican, Mexican, and African American” descent 

and Skaggs “is of Puerto Rican descent,” and the jurors “were all ‘whites.’” 

Skaggs also generally claims that his counsel was “solely committed [to] 

pleasing both the prosecution and the court” and his counsel persuaded him 

“to make decisions that [were] not in [his] best interest.”

Ground 4: Skaggs asserts violations of the Eighth Amendment and Rule 

33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Skaggs asserts he is 

innocent and claims others have confessed to committing the murder for 

which he was “indicted, tried, and convicted.” He claims witnesses “were 

intimated not to testify openly and honestly” on his behalf.

(Dkt. #1, at 5–9.)

Id. at 10-11.

Respondents contend the petition for federal habeas relief was not timely filed.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations found in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The 

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners seeking federal 

habeas relief from their state convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 

432 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the 

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date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration 

of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA provides 

that a petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a 

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also, e.g., Artuz 

v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 

1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

At the conclusion of Petitioner’s direct appeal, Petitioner filed a state action for 

state post-conviction relief, which tolled the running of the one-year statute of limitations. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of the trial court’s decision denying relief in

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action in a decision entered November 17, 2011. Petitioner did not 

seek review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore, the statute of 

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run on December 17, 2011, 

when the time expired to seek review, and expired on December 17, 2012. Petitioner’s 

second Rule 32 action for state post-conviction relief did not toll the statute of limitations 

because this action was not “properly filed. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414, 

125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2005); Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5–7, 128 S. Ct. 2 (2007) 

(holding that the Pace rule applies even where there are exceptions to the state-court 

filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state court’s rejection of a petition as untimely is 

“the end of the matter”); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(rejecting contention that state must prove that rules concerning time bars are “firmly 

established and regularly followed before noncompliance will render a petition 

improperly filed for AEDPA tolling”).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition may be equitably 

tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner 

from filing on time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010); Bills v. 

Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling 

must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418, 125 S. 

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Ct. at 1814-15. See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012); Porter v. 

Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical 

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while endorsing a flexible, “case-bycase” approach, drawing “upon decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” 

Bills, 628 F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined equitable tolling of the filing 

deadline for a federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances 

beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time. See Chaffer 

v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; WaldronRamsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2008. Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a 

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011. Equitable tolling is 

also available if the petitioner establishes their actual innocence of the crimes of 

conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 

1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases and “the threshold 

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions 

swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner 

must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and 

that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is 

warranted in his case. See, e.g., id., 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 

1026.

In reply to the answer to his habeas petition, Petitioner re-asserts that he is 

innocent and that a witness lied to grand jury and at trial. Petitioner states, with regard to 

the timeliness of his petition: “The instant Petitioner request for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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should be reconsidered for the seriousness of the matter, that this is an person is currently 

serving Natuaral-Life!! for crimes he didn’t committ.(sic)” Doc. 15.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations. Compare Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the 

circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A petitioner’s pro se status, 

ignorance of the law, and lack of legal representation during the applicable filing period 

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because such circumstances 

are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 

F.3d at 1011-14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Shoemate v. 

Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). The vicissitudes of prison life are not 

“extraordinary” circumstances that make it impossible to file a timely habeas petition. 

See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a petitioner is entitled to tolling 

of the statute of limitations if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the 

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner must show “it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence.” Id. at 938. Petitioner has not made a showing of any new evidence. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations based on the 

theory of actual innocence.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the statute of limitations and 

Petitioner has not stated a proper basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, 

the Court need not consider the merits of his claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one year of the date his state 

conviction became final. Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Skagg’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

Dated this 15th day of October, 2014.

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