Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00958/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00958-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHANIE HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF NAPA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-00958 JSW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for partial summary judgment by Defendants City of

Napa (the “City”), Officer Debbie Peecook (“Peecook”) and Officer Brent Potter (“Potter”)

(collectively, “Defendants”). Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the relevant

legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS IN

PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Plaintiff’s arrest after an alleged incident of domestic violence

between her and her then husband, John Harringon (“Harrington”). In May 2003, Peecook and

Potter responded to a 911 call by Harrington, reporting that Plaintiff hit him with a telephone. 

(Defendants’ Ex. B (Harrington Deposition at 12:10-13:1.) Harrington asked to have Plaintiff

arrested. Id. Harrington also told Peecook that Plaintiff threw a telephone receiver at him and

hit him in the upper right arm with it. Harrington further told Peecook, both orally and in

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 Harrington testified in his deposition that Plaintiff scratched him, but then he later

testified that he was not sure if it was Plaintiff who caused the scratch on his chest. Compare

Defendant’s Ex. B (Harringon Depo. at 19:16-20:11) with Plaintiff’s Ex. A (Harrington

Depo. at 154:2-20). Because Plaintiff presented evidence disputing whether Harrington told

Peecook that Plaintiff caused the scratch on his chest, the Court will not consider this fact in

analyzing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

2

 Plaintiff presents evidence of and argues over what Potter observed in photographs

of Harrington taken at the scene, but what Potter may or may not have seen in photographs

does not contradict the evidence of what Harrington told Peecook and what marks Peecook

personally observed on Harrington. (Plaintiff’s Opp. at 14.) 

2

writing, that Plaintiff struck him with her fists. (Id. (Harrington Depo. at 17:20-20:11.)1

Harrington showed Peecook the red marks on him that he claimed Plaintiff caused. (Id.;

Plaintiff’s Opp. at 2 (“When the police arrived [Harrington] claimed [Plaintiff] had thrown a

telephone, it had hit him, and that this allegedly caused some pink or redness on his skin, and

may have caused a single faint scratch.”)2

According to Plaintiff’s own statement given to the police department: “[Peecook] went

into the house and called for [Harrington] to come out of the bedroom. [Harrington] did not

want to come out of the bedroom. When he came down the hall, he was holding his arm. He

told her that I had done something to hurt him.” (Defendants’ Ex. F.)

After Plaintiff learned that the officers were going to arrest her, she walked out of the

front door to her house using her crutches, and quickly walked to the back of her house and

through her back yard over to her grandmothers’ house. Plaintiff then walked back quickly into

her house, still using her crutches. (Defendants’ Ex. A (Plaintiff’s Deposition at 57:10-62:8);

Declaration of Brent Potter (“Potter Decl.”), ¶ 5; Declaration of Debbie Peecook (“Peecook

Decl.”), ¶ 11). Peecook then handcuffed and arrested Plaintiff. (Peecook Decl., ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff called and spoke to Sergeant Steve LaVoy to lodge a complaint concerning the

way she was treated when she was arrested. Sergeant LaVoy documented Plaintiff’s comments

to him and asked her to submit a written statement. (Defendants’ Ex. F (Investigation Report).) 

Plaintiff submitted a written statement which provided: 

I hung up on my mom, and told [Peecook] to give me a minute because I am

disabled. I open the door and sat on the bed. I told both of the officers that I was trying

to find my shirt. [Peecook] then looked at the other officer and said she didn’t have

handcuffs and asked if she could use his. He handed her the handcuffs. [Peecook] then

grabbed my hand and squeezed it very hard taking the handcuffs and hitting them on my

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wrist making them swing around and lock. I screamed loud, and went to grab my hand

because it hurt. [Peecook] told the other officer “she strong.” I gave her my other hand

very fast because it hurt so badly. [Peecook] then told the other officer to grab my arm

that they were going to walk me out.

When they pulled me up I felt my back crack between my shoulders [sic] blades

and screamed because it hurt. About half way down the hall, my hip popped out of place

causing my lower back to twist real fast. ... When I got to the front step, I could not take

the pain anymore. I just went limp, telling the officers that I had to sit and that I hurt

really badly. The male officer told her to let me sit for a minute. I felt like my whole

back was out. Then they pick [sic] me back up and put me in her car. 

...

I was never asked about my medical condition, whether or not it would injure me

being taken out with my hands behind my back. I had my wheelchair in the kitchen in

clear sight if they needed to move me. I do not feel that [Peecook] needed to hit my

wrist with the handcuffs in order to put them on me.”

(Defendants’ Ex. F.)

After Plaintiff lodged her complaint, Sergeant Gil Gallegos conducted an internal affairs

investigation. He reviewed Plaintiff’s statement, Sergeant LaVoy’s description of Plaintiff’s

oral complaint, a letter from Plaintiff’s doctor (Donald Hitchcock), and the arrest report, and

interviewed Sergeant LaVoy, Plaintiff, Dr. Hitchcock, Peecock, Potter, Harrington, Plaintiff’s

grandmother (Billie Grandgrath), and Plaintiff’s daughter (Elizabeth Danner). In a supplemental

investigation, Sergeant Gallegos interviewed Officer Rene Solis, Officer Ken Adkins, Tina

Kramer, and Darlene Abasta, R.N. (Id.)

According to Sergeant LaVoy’s written description of Plaintiff’s oral complaint, Plaintiff

complained that Peecook grabbed her wrists and twisted them behind her back. She said that

Peecook hit the handcuffs on her wrist, which later caused large bruising. Plaintiff said that she

was screaming because she was being hurt and Peecook said she was resisting arrest. When

Peecook walked Plaintiff to her car, Plaintiff asserted that she continually said “ow ... ow ...

ow.” Plaintiff thought Potter did not seem to agree with the way Peecook was treating her. 

Potter told Peecook to let Plaintiff sit for a moment, which Peecook refused to do. Plaintiff said

that her grandmother and her fourteen-year-old daughter were witnesses. (Id.) In Sergeant

LaVoy’s interview, he added that Plaintiff told him she had to seek medical attention from Dr.

Hitchcock for the injuries she sustained from Peecook. (Id. (Investigation Report, p. 10).)

In Plaintiff’s interview with Sergeant Gallegos, she said that she locked herself in her

bedroom. Peecook knocked on the door several times, asking Plaintiff to open the door, but

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Plaintiff refused until she was able to change her clothes. When Plaintiff finally opened the

door to let Peecook in, Plaintiff sat on the bed. Peecook attempted to convince Plaintiff to get

up off of the bed and follow her to the police car. Plaintiff said that she did not want to be

arrested, but that she did not physically resist arrest. Peecook then reached out and “grabbed”

Plaintiff’s left wrist and “hit” the handcuffs onto her wrist. Plaintiff reached over and grabbed

her left wrist with her right hand because it hurt, and did not do so in an effort to resist arrest. 

Peecook then grabbed Plaintiff’s right wrist. She instructed Plaintiff not to resist as she pulled

Plaintiff’s right hand away from the handcuffed left wrist. Plaintiff assumed Peecook thought

she was resisting arrest because Peecook made a comment to Potter about how strong she was. 

Plaintiff realized should could not delay being arrested any longer, so she relaxed her body and

put her hands behind her back. Peecook then moved Plaintiff’s crutches away and handcuffed

her two wrists together. Peecook and Potter helped her to stand up by each grabbing one of her

arms. (Id. (Investigation Report, pp. 12-14).)

Plaintiff further explained that as the officers walked her passed the kitchen on their way

out to the car, she saw Harrington, sitting there, “gloating” about her arrest. Plaintiff got

extremely upset, and began to yell at him. She wanted to break away from the officers to get at

him, but the officers would not let her go. She tried to get at him anyway, and in the process,

felt her hip “go out of socket.” (Id. (Investigation Report, pp. 13-14).) 

At the end of the interview, Sergeant Gallegos described that he revisited Plaintiff’s

points of concern with her and explained about citizen arrests and about why the officers may

have removed her crutches from her. He also discussed the method of handcuffing she had

described and told her that it sounded appropriate and consistent with department training. (Id.

(Investigation Report, pp. 16-18).) After Sergeant Gallegos discussed these matters with

Plaintiff, she acknowledged that she did not believe Peecook or Potter did anything wrong or

intended to hurt her. (Id. (Investigation Report, p. 18).)

Sergeant Gallegos interviewed Plaintiff’s grandmother, Billie Grandgrath, about the

incident, but she did not personally observe the alleged conduct in question. She was merely

told about it by Plaintiff a few days later. (Id. (Investigation Report, p. 20.) 

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Plaintiff’s daughter, Elizabeth Danner, also told Sergeant Gallegos that she did not

personally see any interactions between her mother and the officers, but she was able to describe

what she heard. She heard her mother lock herself in her room. She heard Peecook kept asking

her mother to open her door, and that her mother would not open it. She added that it was her

parents who were yelling at each other and that the officers were just trying to help. (Id.

(Investigation Report, p. 24).) 

Harrington, in his interview, reported that Peecook had been very patient with Plaintiff. 

After Plaintiff locked herself in her room, Peecook tried several times to get Plaintiff to open the

door. After several minutes, Peecook finally announced she was giving Plaintiff another 30

seconds to open the door. Another minute passed, and then Plaintiff opened the door. 

Harrington observed Plaintiff “thrashing around” as the officers tried to walk her out to the

police car. He did not believe the officers were abusive in any way. Harrington added that it

was Plaintiff who was “thrashing around,” especially when they went by the kitchen area where

he was sitting. (Id. (Investigation Report, pp. 22-23).) 

Sergeant Gallegos’ interview with Potter further corroborated what the other interviews

revealed. Potter said that Plaintiff locked herself in a bedroom to prevent being arrested. 

Peecook kept knocking on the door and asking Plaintiff to open it until Plaintiff finally did. 

When he and Peecook entered the bedroom, Plaintiff was sitting on a bed holding onto her

crutches. Peecook told Plaintiff that she was being placed under arrest, but she would not

comply. After Plaintiff would not stand up, Peecock gave Plaintiff a choice of walking out or

being carried out. When Plaintiff did not respond, Peecock took out handcuffs and reached out

for one of Plaintiff’s wrists. Plaintiff said “I’m not going!” Potter said that Peecook then placed

a handcuff around one of Plaintiff’s wrists, and then the other. Peecook did not forcibly place

the handcuffs on Plaintiff’s wrists, but widened the cuffs as far as they would go and then put

them on Plaintiff. Potter and Peecook then each took one of Plaintiff’s upper arms and guided

her onto her feet. Plaintiff did not appear to have a problem walking until they reached the

kitchen where Harrington was sitting. Plaintiff then began to twist and thrash about as she

yelled obscenities at her husband. After Potter and Peecook were able to get Plaintiff out of the

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house, they let her sit for a few seconds on the front porch. (Id. (Investigation Report, pp. 28-

29).) Potter told Sergeant Gallegos that he though Peecook did not use excessive force, and

that the force used was reasonable considering the circumstances. He believed Peecook went

out of her way to be considerate of Plaintiff’s physical disability, that she was given the

opportunity to walk out on her own, unhandcuffed, but Plaintiff refused and said she would not

be arrested. (Id. (Investigation Report, p. 30).) Peecock, in her interview with Sergeant

Gallegos, gave a similar account. (Id. (Investigation Report, pp. 33-35).) 

The letter from Plaintiff’s doctor, Dr. Hitchcock, indicated that he saw Plaintiff on June

9, 2003 “for injuries sustained when she was arrested and restrained with handcuffs.” (Id.) Dr.

Hitchcock wrote that he took X-rays a week prior, which were “negative,” and that the areas she

complained of feeling pain did not show any deformity. Dr. Hitchcock diagnosed Plaintiff with

“strain and contusions to left wrist and back.” (Id.) When interviewed, Dr. Hitchcock said that

he did not see any signs of injury when he examined Plaintiff. Although she complained of pain

to her wrists and back area, such complaints were consistent with Plaintiff’s ongoing medical

history. Plaintiff also told Dr. Hitchcock that she had bruising around her wrists from the

handcuffing, but he did not see any bruising and the X-rays of her wrists did not show any signs

of injury. He explained that his diagnosis of “strain and contusions of the left wrist and back”

was based solely on Plaintiff’s account, not on any visible or medical evidence. (Id.

(Investigation Report, p. 25).) 

Based on these interviews, Sergeant Gallegos concluded that Peecook used reasonable

force to effect a legal and proper arrest. Peecook prolonged taking physical custody of Plaintiff

and attempted to obtain Plaintiff’s voluntary compliance. After repeated verbal and physical

refusals by Plaintiff, Peecook positioned the handcuffs on the last notch and pressed them onto

Plaintiff’s wrists, being aware and considerate of Plaintiff’s physical disability. (Id.

(Investigation Report, p. 43).) Sergeant Gallegos therefore exonerated Peecook. (Id.

(Investigation Report, p. 5).) 

Sergeant Gallegos then conducted a supplemental investigation regarding Plaintiff’s

booking. Officer Rene Solis reported to Sergeant Gallegos that she recalled seeing Peecook

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 Defendants objected to the admission of one page from the deposition transcript of

Van Blaircom, Plaintiff’s expert,. Because such testimony was not necessary to the

resolution of this motion, the Court need not rule on the admissibility of such evidence at this

time. 

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bring Plaintiff into the booking area unhandcuffed, allowing Plaintiff to walk in by using her

crutches. Solis did not recall Plaintiff complaining about her wrists hurting from Peecook’s

application of the handcuffs, and when Solis looked at Plaintiff’s wrists as part of the booking

process, she did not notice any injuries that would have been consistent with handcuffs being

applied too forcefully or too tight. (Id. (Supplemental Investigation, p. 2).) Solis further

recounted that Plaintiff “had a bad attitude” and was “belligerent.” (Id.)

In his interview, Officer Ken Adkins reported that he also did not recall Plaintiff making

any complaints that her wrists had been injured by Peecook. Adkins said he would have looked

at Plaintiff’s wrists as a normal part of the booking practice and did not recall seeing any

injuries. (Id. (Supplemental Investigation, p. 4).) Adkins also described Plaintiff as “belligerent

and argumentative.” (Id. (Supplemental Investigation, p. 5).)

Tina Kramer was also present during Plaintiff’s booking, and confirmed officers Solis’

and Adkins’ accounts. She did not hear Plaintiff did not complain about her wrists and did not

observe any injuries there. (Id. (Supplemental Investigation, p. 6).) The same was true for

Darlene Abasta, R.N., the intake nurse at the Napa County Department of Corrections. Ms.

Abasta did not recall any complaints about Plaintiff’s wrists hurting or recall seeing any injuries

to Plaintiff’s wrists. (Id. (Supplemental Investigation, p. 7).) 

Sergeant Gallegos thus concluded that: “neither the correctional staff nor the intake

nurse at the Napa County Department of Corrections were appalled by the alleged injuries to

[Plaintiff’s] wrist reportedly caused by [Peecook] forcibly applying handcuffs too tight onto

[Plaintiff’s] wrists. There is no recollection of visible injuries to [Plaintiff’s] wrist, consistent

with [Peecook] forcibly applying the handcuffs too tight. There is no statement to support that

[Plaintiff] complained of pain or injury to her wrists. There is no evidence to suggest that

[Peecook] had to be admonished, by anyone, about her behavior and/or comments towards

[Plaintiff.]” (Id. (Supplemental Investigation, p. 9).)3

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ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure

is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323-24 (1986). 

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the

non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence “set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The non-moving

party must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary

judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richards v.

Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)) (stating that it is not a district court’s task

to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact”). If the non-moving party fails

to make this showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

1. Defendants’ are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Claim for False Arrest.

A law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights action if the

district court determines that, in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in

question at the time of the challenged conduct, the officer could reasonably have believed that

the conduct was lawful. Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994). This

determination requires a two-step analysis. First, the Court must determine whether the law

governing the official’s conduct was clearly established at the time the challenged conduct

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occurred. Id. Second, the Court must address whether, under that clearly established law, a

reasonable official would have believed the conduct to be unlawful. Id. However, even before

engaging in this inquiry, the Court must first consider the threshold question of whether the

facts viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury show the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “If no

constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), Plaintiff asserts a claim that she was

wrongfully arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To prevail

on her Section 1983 claim based on false arrest, Plaintiff must demonstrate that there was no

probable cause to arrest her. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th

Cir. 1998). “In evaluating a custodial arrest executed by state officials, federal courts must

determine the reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law governing the arrest.” United

States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993). Under California law, probable cause to

arrests exists when facts known to the arresting officer “would lead a man of ordinary care and

prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person

is guilty of a crime.” People v. Adams, 175 Cal. App. 3d 855, 861 (1985). The test under

California law “is very similar to the Fourth Amendment test applied by [the Ninth Circuit],

which provides that ‘[p]robable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances

known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair

probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.’” Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d

970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiff was arrested for violating California Penal Code § 273.5, which provides that: 

“Any person who willfully inflicts upon a person who is his or her spouse ... corporal injury

resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony.” Cal. Pen. Code § 273.5(a). A

“traumatic condition” is defined by the statute to mean “a condition of the body, such as a

wound or external or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical

force.” Cal. Pen. Code § 273.5(c). Thus, this statute “is violated when the defendant inflicts

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even ‘minor’ injury.” People v. Wilkins, 14 Cal. App. 4th 761, 771 (1993) (finding officer had

reasonable grounds to believe victim had suffered an injury resulting in a “traumatic condition”

where officer observed redness around victim’s face and nose and she complained of soreness). 

In essence, Plaintiff argues there was insufficient evidence of an injury under this penal

code to support probable cause for arrest. Putting aside the question of whether Plaintiff

scratched Harrington’s chest, it is undisputed Peecook observed red marks on Harrington in the

area where he told Peecook Plaintiff had hit him. Hearing that Plaintiff hit Harrington with a

telephone and her fists, and observing red marks on him, gave Peecook reasonable grounds to

believe Harrington suffered an injury, albeit a minor one, under § 273.5. Wilkins, 14 Cal. App.

4th at 771.

Even if the red marks do not qualify as an injury, Defendants have demonstrated the

existence of probable cause under another statute. The Court’s inquiry of whether there was

probable cause to make arrest is not limited to the offense actually invoked by the arresting

officer. Devenpeck v. Alford, -- U.S. --, 125 S. Ct. 588, 593-95 (2004). All that is required for a

warrantless arrest to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is that there be probable cause

to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed based on the facts known by

the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. Id. at 593. The officer’s “subjective reason for

making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable

cause.” Id. at 594. 

Defendants argue that Peecook had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because an officer

may arrest a suspect without a warrant “if a suspect commits an assault or battery upon a current

or former spouse.” Cal. Pen. Code § 836(d). At the hearing on this motion, Plaintiff made clear

that she does not dispute this proposition, but rather argues that Section 836(d) is

unconstitutional because it permits a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor that did not occur in

the officer’s presence. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit has spoken on this issue

and rejected Plaintiff’s position. In Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990), the

court held that the “[t]he requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer’s

presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment.” The Fourth

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 Plaintiff alleges that the City “as a matter of policy, practice and custom, have with

deliberate indifference failed to adequately train, instruct, monitor, supervise or otherwise

direct its officers and employees, including the individual Defendants herein, concerning the

rights of citizens, with deliberate indifference to citizens’ and to Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. (Complaint, ¶ 47.) Plaintiff further alleges under her Section 1983 claim against the

City that the City failed to use adequate hiring procedures, and that Potter’s and Peecook’s

unconstitutional acts were “ordered, approved, tolerated, directed, and/or ratified by policy

making officers for the City....” (Id., ¶¶ 48-49.) However, Plaintiff’s opposition brief only

opposes the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim against

the City based on the City’s alleged ratification of Peecook’s conduct by failing to discipline

her. (Plaintiff’s Opp. at 20-21.)

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Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend.

IV.) “Reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment, and thus, the constitutionality of a

warrantless arrest, requires the existence of probable cause to make an arrest. Id. “Thus, the

vitality of [the plaintiff’s] section 1983 action is not dependent on whether [the officer] was

present when [the plaintiff] committed the misdemeanor. Rather, the crucial inquiry is whether

[the officer] had probable cause to make the arrest.” Id. at 772. Based on the evidence in the

record, and in light of Plaintiff’s failure to dispute this point, the Court concludes that there was

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under California Penal Code § 836(d).

Therefore, the Court concludes that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, she has not shown that she was arrested without probable cause in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. The Court’s inquiry concerning qualified immunity thus ends here. See

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Even though there is no need for the Court to continue with the

qualified immunity analysis, the Court further concludes that even if Plaintiff did not actually

violate Sections 836(d) or 273.5, Peecook and Potter are entitled to qualified immunity because

a reasonable officer would have believed there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for either

offense. 

2. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against the City Fails as a Matter of Law.

Plaintiff contends that the City is liable under Section 1983 pursuant to Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because it ratified the underlying alleged

constitutional violations.4 Municipalities are only liable for injuries that arise from an official

policy or custom. Id. at 694. 

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As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the City must be limited to

ratification, if any, of the alleged excessive force claim. A municipality may not be held liable

under Section 1983 where no injury or constitutional violation has occurred. Jackson v. City of

Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court has already concluded that Plaintiff

cannot establish a constitutional violation based on her alleged arrest without probable cause,

and thus, Plaintiff’s Monell claim cannot be premised on this alleged underlying violation. 

However, Plaintiff also alleges a Section 1983 claim for excessive force and Defendants did not

move for summary judgment on this claim. Accordingly, the Court will analyze whether

Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City premised on the alleged ratification of excessive force

survives Defendants’ motion.

Ratification may form the basis for holding a municipality liable under Monell “[i]f the

authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it....” Haugen v.

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 875 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127

(1988)). However, a plaintiff must still “prove [] the existence of an unconstitutional policy.” 

Id. (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 128). While a single decision may be sufficient to trigger

Section 1983 liability, “the plaintiff must show that the triggering decision was the product of a

‘conscious, affirmative choice’ to ratify the conduct in question.” Id. (citing Gillette v.

Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1993)). While a single, post-event ratification may

provide the basis to hold a city liable under Monell, generally, the Ninth Circuit has done so

only when there were very clear instances of abuse and gross recklessness. See Siwiec v.

Thompson L, 2004 WL 2480516, *22 (D. Or. Nov. 3, 2004) (summarizing Ninth Circuit law on

this point); see also Estate of Escobedo v. City of Redwood City, 2005 WL 226158, *11 (N.D.

Cal. Jan. 28, 2005) (“the Ninth Circuit ... appears to require more than a failure to reprimand to

establish a municipal policy or ratification of unconstitutional conduct.”); Kane v. Hodson, 294

F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 (D. Haw. 2003) (same).

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.

1991), and Haugen illustrate the considerations courts must take into account to find a

municipal liable for a failure to reprimand after an investigation. In Larez, an expert testified as

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to the multiple deficiencies and improprieties regarding the police department’s procedures and

investigation. For example, the unit being investigated, as opposed to a separate internal affairs

unit, was given responsibility for passing upon the citizen’s complaint. Larez, 946 F.2d at 647. 

In addition, the expert concluded that the investigation contained holes and inconsistencies “that

should have been visible to any reasonable police administrator,” including improperly relying

on testimony from a sergeant who was not even present during some of the relevant incidents to

corroborate the defendant officers’ claims. Id. Moreover, the expert testified that based on his

review of the incidents, he would have disciplined the officers involved and taken steps to

prevent such violations in the future. Id. at 636. The conclusion that the department had a

policy of not reprimanding officers for use of excessive force was further corroborated by a twoyear study conducted by the expert which demonstrated that it was “almost impossible for a

police officer to suffer discipline as a result of a complaint lodged by a citizen” and that it was

as if “something had to be done on film for the department to buy the citizen’s story.” Id. at

647. In addition, a defendant officer told the plaintiff “I could blow your fucking head off right

here and nobody can prove you did not try to do something,” while he was pointing a gun in the

plaintiff’s face. In this context, the court held the city was liable under Section 1983 for failing

to discipline the defendant officers. Id. at 647-48.

On the other side of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit granted summary judgment against

the plaintiff in Haugen, because there were no facts indicating that the single failure to

discipline the officer rose to the level of a “ratification.” Haugen, 339 F.3d at 875 (citing with

approval Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that a failure to

discipline in two instances did not demonstrate a sufficiently widespread municipal policy to

hold the city liable under Monell)). Thus, the court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate

the decision not discipline the officer was a conscious, affirmative choice to ratify the alleged

use of excessive force. Id.

 Here, Plaintiff criticizes the investigation into Peecook’s alleged use of excessive force

as “patently flawed,” because the investigating officer tried to advocate for the department and

to talk Plaintiff out of her complaint. (Plaintiff’s Opp. at 20-21.) In support of this claim,

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 Plaintiff also points to a prior investigation and exoneration of an earlier complaint

against Peecook. However, the prior complaint was about Peecook’s decision to interview a

witness without an advocate present, and is completely unrelated to any claim of excessive

force. (Further Declaration of David M. Helbraun, Ex. A.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not

present any evidence or argument that the prior investigation was inadequate or improper. 

Thus, the prior “complaint” does not support Plaintiff’s claim that the city ratified Peecook’s

use of excessive force.

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Plaintiff relies on the expert testimony of Van Blaircom, who focuses on two pages of the

investigation report in which Sergeant Gallegos describes what he said to Plaintiff after she told

him what happened. (Plaintiff’s Ex. F (Blaircom Depo. at 102:14-16, 104:11-107:17).) 

Notably, Plaintiff does not submit evidence that Sergeant Gallegos failed to interview percipient

witnesses or that there were other gaping holes in the investigation. Nor does Plaintiff contend

that Sergeant Gallegos mischaracterized Plaintiff’s or any other witnesses’ statements. Plaintiff

does not submit any evidence demonstrating there were inconsistencies in the report, or that

there were any other instances of improper investigations by the City in which officers were

exonerated of complaints of excessive force.5 

In fact, Sergeant Gallegos interviewed eleven people other than Plaintiff, and none of

them corroborated Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force. Everyone who witnessed any portion of

the events reported that Peecook was patient with Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff was

argumentative and belligerent. Moreover, no one, including Plaintiff’s own doctor, was able to

corroborate that Plaintiff was injured by Peecock’s conduct. (Defendants’ Ex. F.) 

Moreover, in contrast to the expert in Larez, who concluded that based on what he

reviewed he would have disciplined all the officers involved and taken preventative steps for the

future, Plaintiff’s expert concluded that report would have supported a finding of not sustaining

Plaintiff’s complaint. His critique was that the report went too far by “exonerat[ing]” Peecook

and finding Plaintiff’s complaint “unfounded.” (Plaintiff’s Ex. F (Blaircom Depo. at pp. 94:12-

17).) Thus, Plaintiff’s expert’s testimony is far from sufficient to support a finding that the city

made a “conscious, affirmative choice” to ratify the alleged unconstitutional conduct in

question. See Haugen, 339 F.3d at 875. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the City’s

failure to reprimand Peecook does not amount to a policy of under Monell, and thus grants

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim.

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3. Plaintiff’s Has Not Presented Any Required Evidence of Intent to

Discriminate in Support of Her ADA Claim.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To recover damages pursuant to Title II of the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination by the defendant. Duvall v.

County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff can show intentional

discrimination if defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s disability. Id. at

1138-39. Proof of deliberate indifference “requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally

protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon the likelihood.” Id. at 1139. The

failure to act requires more than mere negligence; there must be an element of deliberateness. 

Id.

At the hearing, Plaintiff clarified that she does not dispute that she must demonstrate

intentional discrimination, but argued that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate this

necessary element. Here the evidence is undisputed that Peecook and Potter observed plaintiff

walking quickly with her crutches across her yard to her grandmother’s house and back. 

(Defendants’ Ex. A (Plaintiff’s Depo. at 57:10-62:8); Potter Decl., ¶ 5; Peecook Decl., ¶ 11). 

There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Peecook and Potter knew that physically

supporting Plaintiff by holding her arms, rather than having Plaintiff support herself with her

crutches, would cause harm to a federally protected right. Plaintiff has not pointed to any

evidence in the record to demonstrate the requisite “deliberateness.” The Court thus grants

Defendant’s motion on Plaintiff’s ADA claim.

4. Plaintiff Failed to Submit the Requisite Claim for To Maintain Her State

Law Claims.

The California Tort Claims Act, California Government Code §§ 900 et seq., requires a

plaintiff to present a written claim to a public entity before he or she may bring a suit for money

or damages against such agency. Alliance Financial v. City and County of San Francisco, 64

Cal. App. 4th 635, 641 (1998) (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 905, 945.4). “[T]he purpose of the

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claims statutes ‘is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately

investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.’” Phillips

v. Desert Hospital District, 49 Cal. 3d 699, 705 (1989). “Compliance with the claims statutes is

mandatory . . . and failure to file a claim is fatal to [a] cause of action.” City of San Jose v.

Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974) (internal citation omitted).

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims, arguing that

Plaintiff failed to present her claim to the City before filing this action. Plaintiff counters that

her telephone conversations with Pat Thompson, the City Manager, substantially complied with

the notice requirement to constitute a claim. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that her telephone

conversations conveyed sufficient information to trigger the notice-waiver provisions of

California Government Code §§ 910.8, 911 and 911.3. Thus, according to Plaintiff, the City

waived its ability to assert Plaintiff’s failure to present a claim as a defense because it did not

notify Plaintiff and provide her an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies of her claim.

California only requires substantial, rather than strict compliance, with the requirements

of presenting a claim. City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 456-57; Alliance Financial, 64 Cal. App.

4th at 641. To meet the test for substantial compliance, there must be some compliance with all

of the statutory requirements. City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 456-57 (emphasis in original); see

also Del Real, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 769 (finding letter that did not provide claimant’s address, did

not describe injury or loss allegedly suffered, and did not state any amount claimed was not

insubstantial compliance). Plaintiff’s telephone calls do not meet the test for substantial

compliance. First, the statute requires the claim be delivered or mailed to the clerk, secretary or

auditor of the public entity, and that it be signed by the claimant or someone on his or her

behalf. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 915, 910.2. As a communication that was not even in writing,

Plaintiff’s telephone calls do not meet either of these two requirements. Second, there is no

indication that Plaintiff ever notified the City of the amount she claimed for compensation of her

alleged injuries. See Plaintiff’s Ex. M (Thompson Depo. at 51-72); see also Phillips, 49 Cal. 3d

at 708 n.7 (holding that notice which did not state the amount plaintiffs sought in damages

failed to comply substantially with statutory requirements of Cal. Gov. Code § 910).

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Nevertheless, if a plaintiff files a claim with the public entity which fails to substantially

comply with the Tort Claims Act, the public entity may still have a duty to notify the potential

claimant of the claim’s deficiencies. If the public entity fails to send such notification when it

was required, “the entity waives any defenses as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a

defect or omission.” Green v. State Center Community College, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1348, 1354

(1995) (emphasis omitted) (citing Cal. Gov. Code §§ 910.8, 911, and 911.3). The California

Supreme Court addressed these notice-waiver provisions in Phillips. A document constitutes a

“claim as presented,” giving rise to a duty to notify the potential claimant of any deficiencies if

it discloses the existence of a claim which will result in a lawsuit against the public entity if it is

not resolved. Phillips, 79 Cal. 3d at 707-09. “The content of the correspondence to the

recipient must be at least of such nature as to make it readily discernible by the entity that the

intended purpose thereof is to convey the assertion of a compensable claim against the entity

which, if not otherwise satisfied, will result in litigation.” Green, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 1358.

In Shaefer Dixon Associates v. Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority, 48 Cal. App. 4th

524 (1996), the court analyzed whether a letter sent by the plaintiff and two letters sent by his

attorney constituted a “claim as presented.” The letter from the plaintiff outlined the history of

his work for the public entity and its dispute regarding his fees, and asked the entity’s general

manager to get personally involved in resolving the fee dispute. Id. at 528. The letters from its

attorney recited the amount of fees the plaintiff contended was still outstanding and unpaid and

that the plaintiff was prepared to “pursue its remedies against the entity” and to “initiate

appropriate action for the collection of the outstanding amount.” Id. at 529. The court

concluded that plaintiff’s letter was insufficient because it merely provided information and

requested negotiation of an ongoing dispute, and did not advise of imminent litigation over a

“claim.” Id. at 534. While the letters from the attorney did advise the public entity of a demand

for monetary damages and threaten litigation if not resolved, there were insufficient to provide

notice because the time frame for responding provided for by the attorney did not adhere to the

procedures in the Tort Claims Act, and were never intended or treated as a claim. Id. at 535-37.

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In Green, the plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to the public entity stating that he had been

retained as an attorney for the plaintiff with respect to her injuries sustained from an accident. 

Green, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 1352. The court rejected plaintiff’s contention that this letter

constituted notice of a claim because it did not infer that a claim was being made on plaintiff’s

behalf or that litigation would follow if the matter was not resolved. Id. at 1356.

In Loehr v. Ventura County Community College, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071, 1077 (1983),

the plaintiff sent a letter requesting that the board of trustees reconsider its action discharging

him from office and seeking to be reinstated to his former position. At most, the letter stated a

demand that the board reinstate him or face possible legal action. The Court found this letter

insufficient to give the board notice because the letter did not state the plaintiff had a claim for

money damages, or even estimate the amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss. Id. at

1083. 

Plaintiff’s telephone calls to the City Manager do not amount to a “claim as presented”

triggering a duty to notify Plaintiff of any deficiencies for several reasons. First, her calls were

oral, rather than written communications. Plaintiff has not cited, and the Court has not found,

any cases in which oral communications triggered the notice and waiver provisions. Notably,

the cases in which the plaintiff had both oral and written communications with the public

agency, the courts did not even consider whether the oral communications could provide

sufficient notice to invoke the notice-waiver provisions. Shaefer Dixon Associates, 48 Cal.

App. 4th at 527; Alliance Financial, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 639. Second, similar to the

communications in Schaefer Dixon Associates, Green, and Loehr, the substance of Plaintiff’s

communications did not convey that she was making a claim for compensation for injuries, or

that failure to satisfy her claim could result in litigation. The only evidence Plaintiff submits of

her conversations with the City Manager is the transcript from the City Manager’s deposition. 

The City Manager testified that Plaintiff told her that “her back was hurting her and that she

needed to have rehab and wanted to know if the city would be willing to pay for that; that she

needed rehab.” (Plaintiff’s Ex. M (Thompson Depo. at 56:5-8).) Ms. Thompson took notes of

the conversation with Plaintiff, indicating that Plaintiff wanted physical therapy for her lower

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back. (Id. (Thompson Depo. at 59:18-20, 60:11-20).) There is no indication that Plaintiff

informed the City Manager how much she was requested for physical therapy, let alone whether

and how much she was seeking in compensation for her injuries. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence demonstrating that she informed the

City that she would pursue litigation if her claims were not resolved. Plaintiff told the City

Manager that she “was going to be taking it further.” The City Manager testified that she

interpreted this ambiguous statement to mean Plaintiff was going to sue the City for “improperly

handling her case.” (Plaintiff’s Ex. M (Thompson Depo. at 29:10-16).) Plaintiff’s comment

seems to address the City’s investigation of Plaintiff’s complaint, and not the initial incident

involving Plaintiff’s arrest, which is the basis for Plaintiff’s state law claims. Moreover, that

Plaintiff intended to be “taking it further” is too vague to put the City on notice that Plaintiff

would initiate litigation if her claim was not resolved. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she provided

sufficient notice to the City to trigger the notice-waiver provisions. Because the City has not

waived its ability to assert Plaintiff’s failure to file a claim as defense, the Court grants

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s state law claims.

5. Plaintiff’s Excessive Force Claim Against Potter Survives Summary

Judgment.

Defendants did not move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim

against Peecook premised her on alleged use of excessive force, but did move for summary

judgment on this claim as to Potter. Defendants argue that, at most, Potter observed, but did not

participate, in the alleged excessive force, and thus, cannot be held personally liable. Plaintiff

argues that Potter participated by handing handcuffs to Peecook and by assisting Peecook in

carrying out Plaintiff. At the hearing, Plaintiff cited United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447

n.25 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d in part and aff’d in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), for

the proposition that an officer may be liable to failing to intercede in another officer’s violation

of a person’s constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit explained in Koon, that:

[p]ursuant to a long line of civil cases, police officers have a duty to intercede when their

fellow officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen. ... In these

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cases, the constitutional right violated by the passive defendant is analytically the same

as the right violated by the person who strikes the blows. Thus an officer who failed to

intercede when his colleagues were depriving a victim of his Fourth Amendment right to

be free from unreasonable force in the course of an arrest would, like his colleagues, be

responsible for subjecting the victim to a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Id. It is undisputed that Potter was present when Peecook allegedly used excessive force. If

Peecook used excessive force, then Potter may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to

intercede. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion on this ground.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim to the extent it is premised on the arrest without probable cause,

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the City, Plaintiff’s ADA claim, and Plaintiff’s state law

claims. Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Potter to

the extent it is premised on excessive force. Thus, Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is her

Section 1983 claim against Potter and Peecook to the extent it is premised on excessive force.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 14, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey S. White 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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