Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00332/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00332-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN ROBERT SILVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00332-LJO-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH

LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff John Robert Silvis (“plaintiff”) is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

February 28, 2007. (Doc. 1.) 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Pursuant to Rule 8(a),

a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at

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514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled

to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a

recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune,

367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the opposing party on

notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))).

However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union

Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)(quoting Ivey v.Bd. ofRegents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims

The basis for plaintiff’s claim is the medical care he received while he was a convicted

prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”).

Plaintiff is seeking money damages from CDCR, the Director of CDCR, and unnamed Doe

defendants. 

1. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

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1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

First, plaintiff’s allegations begin with events that occurred in September of 1995, when he

developed total hearing loss in his right ear while at California State Prison-Sacramento. Federal

law determines when a claim accrues, and “[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Maldonado v. Harris,

370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). For the

claims which accrued prior to January 1, 2003, plaintiff had three years within which to file suit, and

for the claims which accrued on or after January 1, 2003, plaintiff had four years within which to file

suit. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1 (West 2007); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (2004);

Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55. As a result, any claims which accrued prior to February 28, 2003,

are barred by the statute of limitations and may not be raised in this action.

Second, “[d]eliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that

person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison

official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). A difference of opinion between medical personnel regarding

treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference, Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.

1989), and “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim,” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that 

///

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they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v.

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

Although plaintiff sets forth his medical problems and the treatment he received, plaintiff has

not alleged any facts which would support a claim that CDCR personnel “[knew] of and

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Therefore,

plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983 for

violation of the Eighth Amendment.

2. CDCR as a Defendant

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an

unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996);

Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v.

State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural

Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brooks,

951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that Nevada

Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v.

Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because CDCR is a state

agency, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Plaintiff may not pursue a claim

against CDCR in this action.

3. CDCR Director as a Defendant

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under

color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). The Civil Rights Act

under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. .shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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Plaintiff may not impose liability on the unnamed Director under section 1983 based solely

on his or her position as the Director. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that the Director

personally participated in any alleged deprivations of constitutional rights; knew of any violations

and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the

policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional

violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim

against the unnamed Director.

C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section

1983. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the

deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983;

2 The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

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3 Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4 If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 2, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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