Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08434/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08434-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY L. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-08434-JSC 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO REMAND; DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 

PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 16, 19

Anthony L. Williams sued his prospective employer American Airlines, Inc. (“American

Airlines” or “Defendant”) in California state court asserting claims for race and age discrimination 

under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code 

§ 12900 et seq. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A.)1 Defendant removed the action to federal court based on 

diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441. (Dkt. No. 1.) Now before the Court 

are Plaintiff’s motion to remand, (Dkt. No. 16), and Defendant’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, (Dkt. No. 19).2 After careful consideration of the parties’ briefing, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion and GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

I. Complaint Allegations

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendant did not hire him due to his age and 

race. Plaintiff filed an online application for employment as a mechanic with Defendant’s 

1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

2 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 12 & 13.) 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 1 of 13
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

predecessor, US Airways, Inc. (“US Airways”),

3

in July 2015. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A at 11.) 

Plaintiff was qualified for the position at the time he applied and remains qualified. (Id. at 12.) 

Plaintiff emailed the airline in September 2015 requesting an update on the status of his 

application and received “a reasonable response” indicating that his file was “currently under 

review.” (Id. at 11, 35.) After receiving that response, Plaintiff noticed that the position had 

“simply disappeared.” (Id. at 11.) US Airways then “reposted and reclassified” the mechanic’s 

position in December 2015. (Id. (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff was not selected for the position 

nor offered an interview. (Id. at 32.) 

Plaintiff contacted the EEOC on December 27, 2015. (Id. at 12.) He then filed with the 

EEOC a formal “Charge of Discrimination” against US Airways in April 2016. (Id. at 32.) The 

form lists the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing (“DFEH”) as the state or 

local agency, and asserts race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 and age discrimination in violation of “The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 

1967.” (Id.) On June 27, 2017, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice. (Id. at 30.) 

II. Previous Action

On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against American Airlines and US Airways 

in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda asserting FEHA claims for employment 

discrimination based on race and age, pursuant to California Government Code § 12940(a). (See

Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. A at 8.)4 The complaint was based on the same factual allegations discussed 

above. (See id. at 9-15.) American Airlines timely removed the action to federal court, (see Dkt. 

No. 19-1, Ex. B), and the district court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to prosecute 

3 Defendant’s notice of removal states that US Airways merged with American Airlines in 

December 2016 and is no longer an entity. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 14.) Thus, American Airlines is the 

only defendant in the instant action and the Court has adjusted the caption of this case accordingly.

4

In conjunction with its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendant requests judicial notice 

of the filings in the previous action, Williams v. U.S. Airways, et al. (N.D. Cal. No. 3:17-cv05617-JD). (See Dkt. No. 19-1, Exs. A-F.) Judicial notice is appropriate for “undisputed matters 

of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 

682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the proffered 

documents. Defendant also requests judicial notice of a January 2020 certificate from the DFEH. 

(See Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. G.) Courts may take judicial notice of “[r]ecords and reports of 

administrative bodies.” Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, the Court 

takes judicial notice of Defendant’s exhibit G.

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 2 of 13
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

on November 14, 2017, (Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. C). Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration 

thereafter, and the district court modified its dismissal to “without prejudice” on November 28, 

2017. (Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. D.) Plaintiff petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus in 

March 2018, (Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. E), and the Ninth Circuit denied the petition on May 22, 2018, 

(Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex F). 

III. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant in the Superior Court of California, 

County of Alameda on May 21, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A.) The complaint is substantively 

identical to the complaint in the previous action, references the previous action as a “related case,”

and asserts the same FEHA claims for employment discrimination based on race and age, under 

California Government Code § 12940(a). (See id. at 6-15.) After the state court deemed 

Plaintiff’s multiple, previous attempts to serve Defendant with the summons and complaint 

procedurally improper,5 Plaintiff properly served Defendant on November 27, 2019. (See Dkt. 

No. 1-6, Ex. C at 153-54.) Defendant timely removed the case to federal court 30 days later on 

December 27, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446(b)(1). (See Dkt. No. 1.) 

On January 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed an “Ex Parte Petition for Permanent Injunction,” (Dkt. 

No. 7), which the Court denied as procedurally improper and deficient on the merits, (Dkt. No. 

14). Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand thereafter. (Dkt. No. 15). The motion is fully 

briefed. (See Dkt. Nos. 18 & 22.) Defendant filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings on 

February 4, 2020. (Dkt. No. 19.) The motion is also fully briefed. (See Dkt Nos. 23 & 24.) After 

reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court determined that oral argument was unnecessary and 

vacated the hearing scheduled for March 19, 2020. (Dkt. No. 26.) 

5 On August 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed in state court a “proof of service” and request for default 

judgment against American Airlines. (Dkt. No. 1-5, Ex. C at 106). The court denied the request, 

finding that Plaintiff failed to establish valid service. (Dkt. No. 1-6, Ex. C at 3.) Further, on 

October 9, 2018, the court granted American Airlines’ motion to quash service of summons and 

complaint, finding that plaintiff’s service on American Airlines “was procedurally defective for 

multiple reasons.” (Id. at 52.) Plaintiff appealed that ruling, and the court of appeal granted 

American Airlines’ motion to dismiss the appeal. (Id. at 105.) In orders dated September 17, 

2019 and November 9, 2019, the state court noted that Plaintiff had yet to properly serve 

American Airlines. (Id. at 127, 139.) Defendant was properly served on November 27, 2019. 

(See id. at 153-54.)

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 3 of 13
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Remand

A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Removal Generally

“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be 

removed to federal court by the defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987). Subject matter jurisdiction may arise from either “federal question jurisdiction” or 

diversity jurisdiction. Id. Here, Defendant does not assert that federal question jurisdiction exists, 

and instead based its removal on diversity jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Diversity 

jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in 

controversy exceeding $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Complete diversity means that “each 

defendant must be a citizen of a different state from each plaintiff.” In re Digimarc Corp. 

Derivative Litig., 549 F.3d 1223, 1234 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A defendant seeking removal to federal court “bears the burden of establishing that 

removal is proper,” and the “removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” 

Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at 

any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 

the case shall be remanded.”). Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction over this action turns on whether 

Defendant has demonstrated that all parties to the case are diverse and the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000. Defendant has done so. 

B. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

1. Diversity of Citizenship 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, as asserted in the notice of 

removal. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 11.) As for Defendant, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction “a 

corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been 

incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Defendant’s notice of removal includes the declaration of Corporate 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 4 of 13
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Secretary for American Airlines, Caroline B. Ray, who attests that American Airlines is a 

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. (Dkt. No. 1-7 at ¶ 1-3.) 

Plaintiff recognizes that Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and has its “Nerve Center” 

in Texas but asserts that American Airlines is also a citizen of California because it pays “wage, 

fuel and operational taxes” in California. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 2.) Plaintiff is wrong. A 

corporation is only a citizen of its state of incorporation and “where it has its principal place of 

business.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that “principal place of 

business” refers to a corporation’s “nerve center,” where its “officers direct, control, and 

coordinate the corporation’s activities.” See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010) 

(noting that “in practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its 

headquarters”). Here, Ms. Ray attests that most of Defendant’s “corporate officers and principal 

executives work from the . . . Texas headquarters” and “[m]ost of the corporate-wide decisions 

relating to its operations are made” from there, as well. (Dkt. No. 1-7 at ¶ 3.) 

Accordingly, diversity of citizenship exists because Plaintiff is a citizen of California and 

Defendant is a citizen of Delaware and Texas. 

2. Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff asserts that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. (Dkt. No. 16 at 

8-9.) Plaintiff’s state court complaint seeks monetary damages that include: back pay with interest 

“since July 17, 2015,” “front pay (future lost earnings),” “damages for emotional distress,” and 

punitive damages. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A at 17-18.) The complaint does not specify a total amount

of monetary damages. 

As the Ninth Circuit has held:

[I]n cases where a plaintiff’s state court complaint does not specify a 

particular amount of damages, the removing defendant bears the 

burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 

amount in controversy exceeds $[75,000]. Under this burden, the 

defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is “more likely 

than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds that amount. 

Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). A defendant can satisfy 

its burden by presenting “summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 5 of 13
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

at the time of removal,” such as affidavits or declarations, in addition to the facts asserted in the 

removal petition. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In determining the amount in controversy, courts “must assume that the allegations of the 

complaint are true and that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the 

complaint.” Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008). 

“The ultimate inquiry is what amount is put ‘in controversy’ by the plaintiff's complaint, not what 

a defendant will actually owe.” Id. “It is well established that punitive damages are part of the 

amount in controversy in a civil action.” Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 

2001); see also Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that 

because punitive damages are available under FEHA, courts “may consider punitive damages 

when determining the amount in controversy”). Further, “emotional distress damages may be 

considered when calculating the amount in controversy even when they are not clearly pled in the 

complaint.” Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 

Here, Defendant has satisfied its burden by demonstrating that Plaintiff’s request for back 

pay alone exceeds the amount-in-controversy requirement. The notice of removal cites the 

declaration of Ms. Ray, who attests that: “The Mechanic A-P position for which Plaintiff . . . 

applied in July 2015 had a base salary of $21.79/hour, along with a potential shift differential of 

$0.51 to $0.61. The Mechanic A-P position was a full-time position, approximately 40 hours per 

week.” (Dkt. No. 1-7 at ¶ 5.) As Defendant states in the notice of removal, “the position paid 

approximately $45,000 per year ($21.79/hour x 40 hours x 52 weeks).” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 17.) 

Thus, at the time of removal in December 2019, “the current amount of lost wages claimed by 

Plaintiff exceed[ed] $200,000.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that the back pay accrued for only a seven-month period from July 2015 to 

February 3, 2016 based on Defendant’s “[d]efault to the EEOC,” and totals only $25,088.00. 

(Dkt. No. 16 at 9.) Plaintiff fails to explain how the purported “default” acts to cap the 

complaint’s request for back pay at seven months, and for a period that occurred more than two 

years before he filed his complaint. Indeed, the complaint does not allege that his request for back 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 6 of 13
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

pay is capped. (See generally Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A at 16 (demanding “Full Backpay with full 

Interest; and Benefits including Vacation, Pension Payments, Company and Union Seniority 

prorated since July 17, 2015 [sic]”).) 

In any event, Plaintiff’s argument fails because the notice of removal demonstrates that it 

is more likely than not that Plaintiff’s request for back pay, emotional distress damages, and 

punitive damages collectively exceed the jurisdictional threshold. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 18-19.) 

“To establish probable punitive damages, [a] defendant may introduce evidence of jury verdicts”

in similar cases. Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (noting that notwithstanding distinguishable 

facts, cited jury verdicts “amply demonstrate[d] the potential for large punitive damage awards in 

employment discrimination cases”). Defendant’s notice of removal cites a jury verdict in an 

employment discrimination case asserting claims under FEHA with a punitive damage award of

$1,905,000. (See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 19 (citing Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 719-20 

(2009)).) Similarly, Defendant’s notice of removal cites cases involving emotional distress 

damages in FEHA employment discrimination cases exceeding $500,000. (See id. at ¶ 18 (citing 

among others Massey v. City of Long Beach, JVR No. 1509220063, 2015 WL 5578119 (Cal. 

Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2015) (awarding $520,119 in compensatory damages for pain and suffering in 

FEHA race discrimination case); Beasley v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., JVR No. 1509250073, 2015 WL 

5678367 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015) (awarding $1,500,000 in compensatory damages for pain 

and suffering in FEHA race discrimination case)).) While the facts of those cases are not 

“perfectly analogous,” they indicate “that emotional distress damages in a successful employment 

discrimination case may be substantial.” See Simmons, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1034. 

In sum, Defendant has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000. 

Plaintiff’s other arguments in support of remand are similarly unavailing. First, Plaintiff 

argues that removal was improper because federal question jurisdiction is lacking.6 (Dkt. No. 16 

6 Plaintiff’s complaint is captioned, in pertinent part: A Refiled Complaint For Injunctive Relief 

and Damages For Employment Discrimination, Pursuant to the California Fair Housing Act §§ 

12900-12996 “in re: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A at 2.) The 

complaint includes references to multiple federal statutes, including “the Equal Employment Act 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 7 of 13
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

at 5-8.) However, the lack of federal question jurisdiction is of no moment because Defendant 

based its removal solely on diversity jurisdiction and has satisfied its burden of showing that such 

jurisdiction exists. Second, Plaintiff’s reply brief asserts that remand is required because 

Defendant failed to timely remove this action. Not so. As previously discussed, the removal 

papers demonstrate that Defendant was properly served with the underlying state court complaint 

on November 27, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 1-6, Ex. C at 153-54.) Defendant timely removed the case 

to federal court 30 days later on December 27, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446(b)(1). 

(See Dkt. No. 1.) 

***

Defendant has met its burden of establishing that removal was proper and subject matter 

jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand.7 

II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early 

enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A court considering 

a Rule 12(c) motion must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe the complaint “in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th 

Cir. 1988). A court need not, however, accept conclusory allegations as true. Id. “Judgment on 

the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that 

no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In considering a Rule 12(c) motion, a court must limit its review to the complaint and attachments 

of 1991,” and “Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, [and] the EPA,” among others. (See id. at 4.) 

However, the complaint specifically asserts only FEHA claims for employment discrimination 

based on race and age, under California Government Code § 12940(a), (see id. at 6-7), requests 

relief under “California Government Code §§ 12926-12940,” and lists “remedies under California 

law” pursuant to DFEH authority, (see id. at 17-18). Further, Plaintiff’s motion to remand asserts 

that “[n]either on its face, nor in the text of the California complaint is a federal question ever 

evoked or argued.” (See Dkt. No. 16 at 5.)

7 The Court does not address Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the Due Process Clause of the United 

States Constitution and Defendant’s alleged “administrative default” regarding Plaintiff’s EEOC 

complaint because the arguments are incomprehensible as stated, (see Dkt. No. 16 at 8-16), and 

Defendant has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that diversity jurisdiction exists.

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 8 of 13
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference, and “facts that are contained in materials 

of which the court may take judicial notice.” See Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 

F.3d 971, 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies; and (2) Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 

A. Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did 

not receive a right-to-sue notice from the DFEH. The Court agrees. Under FEHA, the DFEH is 

the administrative agency tasked with “receiv[ing], investigat[ing,] and conciliat[ing] complaints 

of unlawful employment discrimination.” Kim v. Konad USA Distrib., Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 

1336, 1345 (2014). “Before filing a civil action alleging FEHA violations, a [complainant] must 

exhaust his or her administrative remedies with DFEH.” Wills v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 

4th 143, 153 (2011). “Exhaustion includes the timely filing of administrative complaints 

addressing the claims and parties at issue, as well as the procurement of right-to-sue letters.” Kim, 

226 Cal. App. 4th at 1345. “The purpose of FEHA’s administrative exhaustion requirement is to 

ensure DFEH is provided the opportunity to resolve disputes and eliminate unlawful employment 

practices through conciliation.” Wills, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 156. Thus, “[e]xhaustion of 

administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.” Johnson v. City of 

Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (2000). The plaintiff “bears the burden of pleading and proving 

timely filing of a sufficient complaint with the DFEH and obtaining a right-to-sue notice.” 

Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 4th 1390, 1402 (2015) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

As previously discussed, Plaintiff’s complaint includes as an attachment an EEOC “Charge 

of Discrimination” form received by the EEOC on April 5, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A at 32.) 

The form lists the DFEH as the state or local agency and asserts race discrimination in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and age discrimination in violation of “The Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.” (Id.) The complaint also includes a right-to-sue 

notice from the EEOC dated June 27, 2017. (See id. at 30.) The complaint does not include a 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 9 of 13
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

right-to-sue notice from the DFEH regarding Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA. 

In support of its motion, Defendant submits a “Determination in Response to Public 

Records Request” issued by DFEH. (Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. G.) The response, dated January 2, 2020,

indicates that DFEH has no records responsive to Defendant’s request for “Records of: Anthony 

Williams/US Airways, American Airlines.” (Id. at 65.) Plaintiff’s opposition includes the April 

2016 EEOC Charge of Discrimination form listing DFEH, (see Dkt. No. 23 at 8), but Plaintiff 

does not address the lack of a DFEH issued right-to-sue notice as to his claims under FEHA. 

“An EEOC right-to-sue letter does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of exhaustion 

of administrative remedies as to FEHA actions.” Downs v. Dep’t of Water & Power, 58 Cal. App. 

4th 1093, 1099 n.2 (1997); see also Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 29 Cal. App. 4th 

1718, 1726 (1994) (“[A]n EEOC right-to-sue notice satisfies the requirement of exhaustion of 

administrative remedies only for purposes of an action based on Title VII.”). Indeed, courts in this 

Circuit have concluded that FEHA claims fail where the plaintiff obtained only an EEOC right-tosue notice. See, e.g., Harris v. Thomas, No. 15-cv-02510-JCS, 2015 WL 7015412, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Nov. 12, 2015); Castillo v. Garrett, No. 1:13-CV-00412-LJO-BAM, 2014 WL 4792585, at *8 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (citing Dang v. Solar Turbines Inc., 452 Fed. App’x 804 (9th Cir. 

2011)); Gordon v. The Bay Area Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. C08-3630 BZ, 2010 WL 147953, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010); Dang v. Solar Turbines Inc., No. 07cv520-MMA (POR), 2009 WL 

10671924, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2009); Prejean v. Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 07-

05053 DDP (CTx), 2008 WL 11340320, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2008); Chambers v. City of 

Berkeley, No. C 00-3845 SI, 2002 WL 433606, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2002). 

In the absence of a right-to-sue notice from the DFEH, Plaintiff has not met his burden of 

demonstrating exhaustion of administrative remedies as to his FEHA claims. Plaintiff’s 

opposition does not assert that he received a right-to-sue notice from the DFEH; instead, he 

appears to argue that the EEOC right-to-sue notice is sufficient. (See Dkt. No. 23 at 3-4.) Plaintiff 

is wrong. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion is procedurally improper because 

it purportedly conflicts with the Northern District’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 10 of 13
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Local Rules does not save his claims. Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that a 

defendant cannot file Rule 12(c) motion without first engaging in the ADR process; further, the 

parties have not yet been referred to the Court’s ADR process pursuant to ADR Local Rule 2-3. 

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Otherwise Time-Barred as to any Federal Claims

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claims must also be dismissed because they are time 

barred; specifically, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint outside the 90-day limitations period for 

civil actions based on an EEOC right-to-sue notice. (Dkt. No. 19 at 10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1)).) The Court need not address that argument, however, because the EEOC notice involves 

only federal claims. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 10 (“You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) 

under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be filed 

WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice[,] or your right to sue based on this charge will 

be lost. (The time limit for filing suit based on a claim under state law may be different.)”).) As 

previously discussed, the complaint specifically asserts only FEHA claims for employment 

discrimination based on race and age, under California Government Code § 12940(a), (see Dkt. 

No. 1-1, Ex. A at 6-7), requests relief under “California Government Code §§ 12926-12940,” and 

lists “remedies under California law” pursuant to California Department of Fair Employment & 

Housing authority, (see id. at 17-18). Further, Plaintiff’s motion to remand insists that his 

complaint does not assert federal claims. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 5 (“Neither on its face, nor in the 

text of the California complaint is a federal question ever evoked or argued.”).) Thus, the EEOC 

right-to-sue letter has no bearing on Plaintiff’s claims under FEHA. 

That said, to the extent Plaintiff’s complaint could be liberally construed as asserting

federal claims based on its multiple references to Title VII, the ADEA, other federal statutes, and 

the EEOC investigation, the Court agrees that the complaint is time-barred. The timely filing of 

an initial, but later dismissed complaint does not toll or suspend the 90-day statute of limitations 

after receipt of an EEOC notice-to-sue letter. See O’Donnell v. Vencor, Inc., 465 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2006) (finding Title VII and ADEA claims untimely because plaintiff “filed her second 

complaint more than ninety days after the EEOC’s issuance of her right-to-sue letter”). Further, 

the complaint in this action does not “relate back” to the complaint in the first action because the 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 11 of 13
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“second complaint was not an ‘amendment’ to [the] first complaint, but rather a separate filing” in 

an entirely new action. See id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)). 

Plaintiff’s opposition does not assert that the doctrines of equitable tolling, equitable 

estoppel, or laches apply to save his complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff’s opposition does not even 

address Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Because Plaintiff is 

proceeding without an attorney, the Court sua sponte addresses the application of those doctrines 

and concludes that none apply. 

First, equitable tolling does not apply under these circumstances. See id. (“In instances 

where a complaint is timely filed and later dismissed, the timely filing of the complaint does not 

‘toll’ or suspend the ninety-day limitations period.”). Plaintiff filed his complaint in the previous 

action on August 25, 2017, 59 days after receiving the June 2017 EEOC right-to-sue notice. The 

court dismissed that action without prejudice 81 days later on November 14, 2017; 140 days after 

the issuance of the EEOC right-to-sue notice. In other words, at the time of dismissal “there was 

no longer any time left in the [90]-day limitations period to equitably toll.” See id. Even if the 

Court were to exclude the pendency of the prior action, which the Court need not do under 

O’Donnell, the complaint is outside the 90-day limitations period. Plaintiff filed his appeal in the 

previous action on March 7, 2018—99 days after the court responded to Plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration and modified its dismissal to “without prejudice.” (See Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex, D.) 

Thus, 158 days lapsed outside of the pendency of the prior action. 

Second, equitable estoppel does not apply because there is no “evidence of improper 

purpose on the part of the [D]efendant, or of the [D]efendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of 

the deceptive nature of its conduct” as related to the 90-day limitations period. See O’Donnell, 

465 F.3d at 1067. Indeed, the limitations period had run during the pendency of the prior action. 

Defendant timely removed the prior action on September 28, 2017 after service of the complaint 

and summons on August 29, 2017. (Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. B at ¶¶ 1-4.) Defendant then moved to 

dismiss the action on October 5, 2017, and the court granted dismissal for failure to prosecute on 

November 14, 2017. (Dkt. No. 19-1, Ex. C.) At that point, the limitations period had run. 

Finally, laches does not apply. “To successfully establish laches, a party must show that 

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 12 of 13
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(1) there was inexcusable delay in the assertion of a known right and (2) the party asserting laches 

has been prejudiced.” O’Donnell, 465 F.3d at 1067. Here, there is no showing of inexcusable 

delay by Defendant in asserting a statute of limitations grounds for dismissal. Plaintiff filed the 

instant action on May 21, 2018—over 320 days after the EEOC issued the right-to-sue notice. 

Plaintiff did not properly serve Defendant with summons and the complaint until November 27, 

2019, and Defendant timely removed the complaint to this Court 30 days later on December 27, 

2019. At that point, the 90-day limitations period had long since expired; thus, Defendant’s 

motion for judgment on the pleadings 40 days after removal does not evince “inexcusable delay.” 

Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings in Defendant’s favor is warranted because 

Plaintiff’s federal claims, if any are made, are time-barred as a matter of law. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand and grants

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 16 and 19.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2020

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:19-cv-08434-JSC Document 27 Filed 03/23/20 Page 13 of 13