Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-01430/USCOURTS-ca6-14-01430-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0055p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

MICHAEL KELLER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MIRI MICROSYSTEMS LLC, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 14-1430 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. 

No. 2:12-cv-15492—Nancy G. Edmunds, District Judge. 

Argued: November 19, 2014 

Decided and Filed: March 26, 2015 

Before: NORRIS, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: David A. Hardesty, GOLD STAR LAW, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant. 

Aaron D. Graves, BODMAN PLC, Troy, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David A. 

Hardesty, Caitlin E. Malhiot, GOLD STAR LAW, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellant. Aaron 

D. Graves, Donald H. Scharg, BODMAN PLC, Troy, Michigan, for Appellee. 

 MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GIBBONS, J., joined. NORRIS, 

J. (pp. 20–24), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. 

 

>

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_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

 KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Miri Microsystems, LLC 

(“Miri”) is a satellite-internet-dish installation company. Michael Keller installed satelliteinternet dishes for Miri’s customers six days each week. Keller alleges that Miri did not 

compensate him adequately as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 

(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 et seq., by failing to pay him overtime compensation. Miri 

contends, in contrast, that Keller was an independent contractor, rather than an employee, and 

therefore not entitled to overtime pay. 

The FLSA’s definition of “employee” is strikingly broad and “stretches the meaning of 

‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of 

traditional agency law principles.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 

(1992). To effect Congress’s broad purpose, we must look to see whether a worker, even when 

labeled as an “independent contractor,” is, as a matter of “economic reality,” an employee. 

Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (“Where the work done, in its 

essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on an ‘independent contractor’ label does 

not take the worker from the protection of the Act.”). Ordinarily, it is the court’s job to 

determine whether a company has inappropriately classified a worker as an independent 

contractor. Werner v. Bell Family Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F. App’x 541, 543 (6th Cir. 2013). 

However, when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, reveals that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the worker is an employee or an independent 

contractor, then summary judgment is inappropriate. See Imars v. Contractors Mfg. Servs., Inc., 

No. 97-3543, 165 F.3d 27, 1998 WL 598778, at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1998). In those cases, it is 

the task of the trier of fact to review the evidence and weigh the factors to decide whether the 

plaintiff-worker is economically dependent upon the defendant-company. See Id. We believe 

that this is just such a case. 

We also must decide whether Keller has offered sufficient evidence that he worked more 

than forty hours each week based on his and Miri’s deposition testimony. We believe that Keller 

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has presented sufficient evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we 

VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the case for consideration by the trier of 

fact. 

I. BACKGROUND

Miri is a limited liability company that operates in Michigan and provides installation 

services for HughesNet and iDirect, nationwide providers of satellite internet systems and 

services. Keller was one of approximately ten satellite-internet technicians who installed 

satellite dishes for Miri. 

 Miri is one of many middlemen in the satellite-installation-services business. Customers 

purchase satellite internet services from HughesNet, and then HughesNet forwards those orders 

on to a distributor, Recreational Sports and Imports (“RS&I”).1

 Next, RS&I sends the 

installation order to Miri, which provides installation services for the upper part of the Lower 

Peninsula of Michigan. Customers may choose a time block during which a technician will 

install the satellite dish, and Miri assigns installation jobs to technicians who work in the territory 

where the customer resides. 

 Keller began installing satellite dishes for Miri as a technician while he was working for 

ABC Dishman, a subcontractor, after he attended a HughesNet satellite-dish-installation 

certification course given by Miri. After working for ABC Dishman for some time, Keller began 

installing satellite-internet dishes for Miri directly. 

Miri pays technicians by the job, not by the hour. HughesNet pays Miri $200 for each 

basic installation, $80 for repairs, $80 for de-installation, and between $130–145 for upgrades. 

Miri pays the technician the bulk of these fees, but keeps a percentage.2

Keller worked six days a week from 5:00 am to midnight, taking only Sunday off. Keller 

completed two to four installations per day, and he had to travel between jobs. Miri paid Keller 

 1

Miri sometimes operates as a sales agent for HughesNet, but the majority of Miri’s business comes from 

HughesNet’s referrals. 

2

The record does not establish what percentage of these fees Miri kept. 

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$110 per installation and $60 for each repair he performed. Miri did not withhold federal payroll 

taxes from Keller’s payments or provide Keller benefits. 

On November 23, 2012, Keller stopped working for Miri. Soon thereafter, he filed this 

lawsuit, alleging that Miri’s payment system violates the FLSA. Miri filed a motion for 

summary judgment, arguing that Keller was an independent contractor for Miri, and therefore he 

was not entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA. The district court granted Miri’s 

motion for summary judgment, holding that Keller was an independent contractor for Miri, not 

an employee. Keller appeals. Miri also argues that Keller has not produced evidence to 

substantiate his claim that he worked more than forty hours per week. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

 We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment, applying the 

standard set forth in Rule 56(a). Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 

2012). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When conducting a review of the evidence 

under Rule 56(a), we view the evidence, “and all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party”—Keller. Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. OPPCO, LLC, 

219 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is improper if Keller has produced 

evidence “‘such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict’” in his favor. Id. (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “The relevant inquiry is ‘whether 

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

251–52). 

 Whether a FLSA plaintiff is an employee is a mixed question of law and fact. Lilley v. 

BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.1 (6th Cir. 1992). “[W]here there is a genuine issue of fact or 

conflicting inferences can be drawn from the undisputed facts, . . . the question is to be resolved 

by the finder of fact in accordance with the appropriate rules of law.” Id. (holding that employee 

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status was an issue for a jury to resolve). We must therefore decide whether there is a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether Keller was an employee such that summary judgment is 

inappropriate. 

B. Employee Status 

Congress passed the FLSA with broad remedial intent. See Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 

339 U.S. 497, 509–11, 515 (1950) (“[T]he primary purpose of Congress . . . was to eliminate, as 

rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions throughout the nation.”). The FLSA aimed 

to “correct ‘labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 

necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . . .’” Donovan v. Brandel, 

736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 143 

(6th Cir. 1977)). “The FLSA requires . . . employers to pay employees engaged in commerce a 

wage consistent with the minimum wage,” Ellington, 689 F.3d at 552 (citing 29 U.S.C. 

§ 206(a)), and instructs employers to pay employees overtime compensation, which must be no 

less than one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay, if the employee works more than forty 

hours in a week. Id. (citing Baden-Winterwood v. Life Time Fitness, Inc., 566 F.3d 618, 626 (6th 

Cir. 2009)). Courts interpreting the FLSA must consider Congress’s remedial purpose. See 

Lilley, 958 F.2d at 750. 

Under the FLSA, only employees are entitled to overtime and minimum-wage 

compensation. See Ellington, 689 F.3d at 553. Independent contractors do not enjoy FLSA’s 

protections. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that 

businesses are liable to workers for overtime wages even if the company “put[s] . . . an 

‘independent contractor’ label” on a worker whose duties “follow[] the usual path of an 

employee.” Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 729. To carry out the remedial purpose of the FLSA, we 

must examine whether a business has misclassified an employee as an independent contractor. 

The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” 

29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). According to the FLSA, “‘[e]mploy’ includes to suffer or permit to 

work.” Id. § 203(g). We have interpreted this framework, in light of the legislative purpose, to 

set forth a standard that “‘employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent 

upon the business to which they render service.’” Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116 (quoting Carriage 

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Carpet, 548 F.2d at 145). To assist our application of the economic-reality test, we have 

identified six factors to consider:3

1) the permanency of the relationship between the parties; 2) the degree of skill 

required for the rendering of the services; 3) the worker’s investment in 

equipment or materials for the task; 4) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, 

depending upon his skill; . . . 5) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to 

control the manner in which the work is performed[; and] . . . 

[6)] whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 

business. 

Id. at 1117 & n.5. We have also considered whether the business had “authority to hire or fire 

the plaintiff,” and whether the defendant-company “maintains the plaintiff’s employment 

records.” Ellington, 689 F.3d at 555. No one factor is determinative; “[a] central question is the 

worker’s economic dependence upon the business for which he is laboring.” Brandel, 736 F.2d 

at 1120. Accordingly, we address each factor in turn with an eye toward the ultimate question—

Keller’s economic dependence on or independence from Miri. 

1. The Permanency of the Relationship 

Generally, independent contractors have variable or impermanent working relationships 

with the principal company because they “often have fixed employment periods and transfer 

from place to place as particular work is offered to them, whereas ‘employees’ usually work for 

only one employer and such relationship is continuous and indefinite in duration.” Baker v. Flint 

Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

If a worker has multiple jobs for different companies, then that weighs in favor of finding that 

the worker is an independent contractor. See Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1117. We may look at the 

length and regularity of the working relationship between the parties, see Baker, 137 F.3d at 

1442, but even short, exclusive relationships between the worker and the company may be 

indicative of an employee-employer relationship. See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 

1529, 1537 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[H]owever temporary the relationship may be [between migrant 

workers and farm owner,] it is permanent and exclusive for the duration of that harvest season.”). 

 3

In Brandel, we considered whether the plaintiffs were employees under the FLSA on appeal from the 

district court’s denial of an injunction after the district court had made specific factual findings. See Brandel, 736 

F.2d at 1115, 1117. 

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The record before us establishes that there is a material dispute as to whether Keller and Miri had 

a de facto exclusive working relationship.

The district court used three facts to determine the permanence of Keller’s and Miri’s 

working relationship. First, Keller did not have a contract with Miri. This fact cannot inform 

our analysis, however, because we have rejected the argument that “contractual intention [is] a 

dispositive consideration in our analysis. The reason is simple: The FLSA is designed to defeat 

rather than implement contractual arrangements.” Imars, 1998 WL 598778, at *5 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we do not consider this fact in our analysis. 

Second, Miri and Keller did not have an exclusive relationship; Keller could work for 

other satellite-dish-installation companies. We agree with the Second Circuit and conclude that 

“employees may work for more than one employer without losing their benefits under the 

FLSA.” Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1060 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Walling v. 

Twyeffort, Inc., 158 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir. 1947)); 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (1987)). It is one factor of 

many to consider in determining whether a worker is economically dependent upon the 

defendant company. 

Third, the control Keller exercised over the number of days per week he worked and how 

many jobs he took each day informs our analysis of the permanency and exclusivity of the 

relationship. Schedule variability can serve as an indicator of independent-contractor status; 

however, “workers have been deemed employees where the lack of permanence is due to 

operational characteristics intrinsic to the industry rather than to the workers’ own business 

initiative.” Id. at 1060–61. 

There is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Miri and Keller had an 

exclusive working relationship. Keller worked for Miri for nearly twenty months. Appellant Br. 

at 16. Keller’s actions suggest that he treated Miri as his permanent employer: he never turned 

down an assignment, and he believed Miri could fire him for intransigence. On the other hand, 

the fact that Miri never explicitly prohibited Keller from performing installation services for 

other companies, and Keller could choose not to work some days, leaving free time to work for 

other companies, favor a finding that the relationship was impermanent. 

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Even so, there is a genuine dispute about whether Keller and Miri had a de facto 

exclusive relationship. See Keeton v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1085, 2011 WL 

2618926, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2011) (workers’ “work schedules ensured they only completed 

Time Warner installations on any given day.”). Keller asserts that he did not have time to work 

for any other company. Technicians, like Keller, work only when a customer needs HughesNet 

to install or repair his or her satellite dish. When Miri has assignments in counties where 

multiple technicians work, Miri assigns the installation jobs based on the technician’s availability 

and location. Where the customer lives, when the customer is available, and the amount of time 

needed to drive to the customer’s house—these factors are outside of the technician’s control and 

affect the technician’s ability to perform more than three or four installations each day. 

Moreover, the whole installation process takes approximately two-and-a-half hours to complete, 

but may take longer if the customer requires that the technician mount the dish onto a pole. 

Repairs may take less or more time depending on the customer’s needs. Even the most efficient 

technician could not finish four jobs in a day under eight hours, suggesting that technicians have 

slim control over their working hours and little ability to work for other companies. And the 

evidence is inconclusive whether technicians are able to engage in other economic ventures. 

Thus, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Keller and Miri had an exclusive, 

permanent relationship in practice.

2. The Degree of Skill Required 

The second factor we consider is Keller’s skill. “Skills are not the monopoly of 

independent contractors.” Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537. More important to our inquiry is 

whether Keller’s profits increased because of the “initiative, judgment[,] or foresight of the 

typical independent contractor,” or whether his work “was more like piecework.” Rutherford, 

331 U.S. at 730. 

There is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that satellite-dish-installation 

technicians are skilled workers. Before technicians can begin working for Miri, they must obtain 

a HughesNet certification. Technicians also need basic computer skills, such as the ability to use 

Windows, Macintosh iOS, and WARP, Miri’s scheduling software. In addition, technicians 

must be able to use basic hand and power tools, know National Electrical Code provisions, and 

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have the ability to identify whether the satellite was picking up a signal. Thus, Keller was a 

skilled worker. 

To a certain extent, however, every worker has and uses relevant skills to perform his or 

her job, but not everyone is an independent contractor. It is also important to ask how the worker 

acquired his skill. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(“The meaningfulness of this skill as indicating that plaintiffs were in business for themselves or 

economically independent, however, is undermined by the fact that Knight provided most 

technicians with their skills.”). If a worker learned his craft through formal education, an 

apprenticeship, or years of experience, then it is more likely that the worker’s compensation 

varies with his unique skill and talent. On the other hand, if the worker’s training period is short, 

or the company provides all workers with the skills necessary to perform the job, then that 

weighs in favor of finding that the worker is indistinguishable from an employee. See id.

Miri provided technicians a significant portion of the training required to obtain the 

HughesNet certification. First, HughesNet requires the future technician to take an online class. 

Next, the technician must attend a one-day, in-person class conducted by a HughesNet certified 

trainer. Miri’s employee, Rob Neal, conducted this training on Miri’s behalf. Thus, Miri 

provided Keller with the critical training necessary to do the work. 

Of course, a technician’s skill may affect his efficiency. But this is not the type of 

profession where success rises or falls on the worker’s special skill. In contrast with carpenters, 

for example, who have unique skill, craftsmanship, and artistic flourish, technicians’ success 

does not depend on unique skills: a pole mount is a pole mount, a roof mount is a roof mount, 

and the record suggests that it is easy to learn how to decide which is more appropriate and how 

to install each type of dish. Moreover, the record does not suggest that Miri, RS&I, or 

HughesNet selected technicians on the basis of anything other than availability and location, and 

therefore Miri did not select Keller for assignments because he was particularly skillful.4

Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the degree of skill 

required of Keller shows that he was an employee or an independent contractor. 

 4

Indeed, Miri simply stated that the company was “satisfied with the amount of work and [Keller’s] work 

performance for the most part until toward the end.” R. 24-2 at 26 (A. Miri Dep. at 91–92) (Page ID #349). 

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3. Keller’s Investment 

The next factor we weigh is whether the worker has made a significant capital 

investment. We have stated that “[t]he capital investment factor is most significant if it reveals 

that the worker performs a specialized service that requires a tool or application which he has 

mastered or that the worker is simply using implements of the [company] to accomplish the 

task.”5 Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1119. Keller argues that we should consider his investment in 

comparison with Miri’s investment. Other courts have compared the “worker’s individual 

investment to the employer’s investment in the overall operation.” Baker, 137 F.3d at 1442 

(citing Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1537); see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 344 

(5th Cir. 2008) (“In applying the relative-investment factor, we compare each worker’s 

individual investment to that of the alleged employer.”); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 810 (10th 

Cir. 1989) (“[T]he ‘investment’ which must be considered as a factor is the amount of large 

capital expenditures, such as risk capital and capital investments, not negligible items, or labor 

itself. The relative investment of the [cake] decorators in their own tools compared with the 

investment of the [defendants] simply does not qualify as an investment in this business.”); Doe 

v. Cin-Lan, Inc., No. 08-CV-12719, 2008 WL 4960170, at *13–14 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2008) 

(“As a result, this Court . . . concludes that whatever the precise size of Doe’s financial 

investment in her work may have been, it was minor enough in comparison with the overall costs 

of her business to suggest that she was an FLSA employee, and not an independent contractor.”). 

We agree that courts must compare the worker’s investment in the equipment to perform his job 

with the company’s total investment, including office rental space, advertising, software, phone 

systems, or insurance. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 344. 

There is one additional wrinkle, however. When considering the worker’s capital 

investment in the equipment needed to perform his job, we must consider those investments in 

light of the broader question: whether that capital investment is evidence of economic 

independence. Accordingly, there are inherently some capital investments that do not 

necessarily evidence economic independence. For example, “investment of a vehicle is no small 

matter, [but] that investment is somewhat diluted when one considers that the vehicle is also used 

 5

The Brandel court concluded that this factor was not important to determine whether pickle pickers were 

employees under the FLSA because of the particular system of harvest the defendant used. 736 F.2d at 1119. 

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by most drivers for personal purposes.” Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery Serv., Inc., 

161 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1998). On the other hand, investment in something like welding 

equipment signals a greater degree of economic independence because it is not a common item 

that most people use daily. See id.; see also Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1317-18 (“[I]n light of the 

fact that most technicians will already own a vehicle suitable for the work and that many 

technicians purchased specialty tools from Knight directly via payroll withholdings, there seems 

to be little need for significant independent capital and very little difference from an employee's 

wages being increased in order to pay for tools and equipment.”). The same logic also applies to 

computer equipment and basic hand tools—tools many people have for personal use. 

With those guiding principles in mind, we turn to the evidence in this record, considering 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Keller. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Keller 

made some capital investment in his work. Keller drove to and from installation jobs in his 

wife’s van for which he held auto insurance.6 For the most part, technicians paid for gas. Twice, 

HughesNet provided a gas stipend of five dollars when gas prices were very high, which Miri 

passed along to technicians. Keller primarily used tools that he owned before he began working 

for Miri, such as drills and wrenches. He also used a few electronic devices to help collect 

payment and submit workorders to Miri: an application for his smartphone to charge credit cards, 

a printer, and a digital camera. He did not rent office space. 

Installation requires a dish, cable, transmitter, modem, some hardware, and materials for 

pole mounts. Keller provided some of these materials, but Miri did, too. Technicians are 

responsible for providing up to 125 feet of cable, which cost approximately eight cents per foot, 

to the customer at no cost. Keller purchased coaxial cable from Miri, which Miri deducted from 

his paycheck. In addition, technicians must provide F-adaptors, ground clamps, zip ties, and 

dielectric grease or electrical tape to ground and seal the wires. The record does not provide 

evidence about the cost of those materials, but Miri testified that the cost varies depending on the 

quality of the products the technician uses, and technicians are free to use cheaper materials 

provided they meet HughesNet’s specifications. Miri provided technicians with the dishes, 

transmitters, and modems, and reimbursed technicians for the cost of cement. We note, 

 6

Miri required that Keller’s policy list Miri as an additionally insured party. 

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however, that a reasonable factfinder might find that dishes, transmitters, and modems are 

products that the customers purchased from Miri. 

Miri made significant capital investments in its business. The company rents office 

space, which is open to the public six days a week. Moreover, Miri uses phones and computers 

to schedule installation appointments. 

 Thus, the record supports a finding that Keller and Miri invested capital in the equipment, 

tools, and facilities necessary for the satellite-dish-installation business. To the extent the record 

establishes that Keller made significant capital investments in the equipment he used on the job, 

it does so “weakly.” Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1317. Nearly all of the equipment Keller used is 

common in many households, and Keller used it for both personal and professional tasks. 

Because this question arises in the context of a motion for summary judgment, we believe the 

trier of fact should decide how Keller’s capital investments compared to Miri’s, and whether 

Keller’s capital investments demonstrate that Keller was economically independent.7

4. Keller’s Opportunity for Profit or Loss 

The next factor to consider is whether Keller had an opportunity for greater profits based 

on his management and technical skills. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1119. The district court made four 

observations relevant to determine the degree of control Keller had over his profitability: 

(1) Keller determined the geographical region where he worked; (2) he had control over how 

many jobs he took each day; (3) he could have hired other technicians to work for him; and 

(4) he earned some money from Dish Network television for selling routers. The district court 

concluded that this factor supports a finding that Keller was an independent contractor. We 

 7

We recognize that some circuit and district courts have found that investments in vans and hand tools 

favored independent-contractor status. See, e.g., Freund v. Hi-Tech Satellite, Inc., 185 F. App’x 782, 783–84 (11th 

Cir. 2006) (upholding a district court finding that a cable installer invested in the equipment necessary to perform 

installations because “[h]e drove his own vehicle and provided his own tools and supplies for each installation.”); 

Keeton, 2011 WL 2618926, at *5 (“Because the evidence . . . does not demonstrate that Time Warner made a 

significant capital investment into tools required to execute the [cable] installation process, a reasonable fact-finder 

would have to conclude that this factor does not support a finding that Plaintiffs were Time Warner employees.”); 

Scruggs v. Skylink, Ltd., No. 3:10–0789, 2011 WL 6026152, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (“This factor weighs 

in favor of finding independent contractor status as it is undisputed that Plaintiffs[, satellite-dish technicians,] were 

responsible for providing their own work equipment and vehicles.”). These divergent views support, rather than 

detract from, our conclusion that this factor weighs against granting Miri’s motion for summary judgment. That 

reasonable judges throughout the country disagree on this point strongly suggests that there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact about whether technicians’ use of personal cars, computers, and hand tools is evidence of economic 

independence. 

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disagree because a reasonable jury could also find that this factor weighs in favor of employee 

status. 

Although Keller controlled the size of his territory and the number of jobs he accepted 

each day, we cannot conclude that Keller could have earned greater profits had he expanded his 

territory or chosen to work elsewhere. Keller’s territory was quite large; it covered most of the 

“thumb” of Michigan and parts of a few surrounding counties. If Miri scheduled Keller at 

opposite ends of the territory, then Keller could spend most of his day driving. Moreover, if 

Keller chose to turn down a work assignment because it was too far away, there was no 

guarantee that there would be another installation to take its place. 

We recognize that Keller could have become a subcontractor, like ABC Dishman, and 

hired assistants.8

 By hiring assistants, Keller arguably could have accepted more jobs every day, 

and he could have accepted installation jobs in a broader territory. In fact, Keller admitted that 

he invited a helper, Kyle, and Keller’s wife to accompany him sometimes. Kyle and Mrs. Keller 

primarily provided companionship, but Kyle occasionally helped with the installations, and Mrs. 

Keller talked with customers and helped with paperwork. Keller finished his assigned jobs 

slightly faster than usual when he had company, but Kyle and Mrs. Keller did not net Keller 

more money. 

We note, however, that hiring employees carries additional costs that would have affected 

Keller’s ability to earn a greater profit. Wages, vehicles, gas, tools, and computers—these are 

just a few of the additional expenses Keller would have accrued had he hired assistants to 

increase the number of installations he could perform every day. Keller paid Kyle ten dollars for 

every installation and five dollars for every repair. In addition, Miri did not pay technicians an 

increased fee if the technicians employed assistants. Moreover, although satellite-dish 

technicians could hire helpers to increase efficiency, that hiring authority may be “illusory” if the 

defendant-company maintains control over the technicians’ hiring ability. See Scantland,

721 F.3d at 1317. Here, although Miri did not require that installation helpers contract with Miri 

directly, Miri exercised some control by adhering to HughesNet’s certification requirement. 

 8

We express no opinion as to whether subcontractors, like ABC Dishman, are also employers within the 

meaning of the FLSA, and therefore jointly liable for overtime wages. See Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1131 

(6th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 209(d)). The parties have not raised or briefed the issue. 

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Finally, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that Keller could improve his 

efficiency such that he could complete more than four installations each day. The two to three 

hours required for installation, travel time, and time spent preparing and submitting paperwork 

for each job amount to eight hours total at the very least. Accordingly, it is unlikely that Keller 

could have earned more if he had just become a bit more efficient. See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 

1317; Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 

evidence did not support a finding that managerial skill and business acumen could affect the 

plaintiffs’ profits when the employer dictated the rate of pay and schedule, and it was not 

possible to finish a job more efficiently in order to perform another job). 

Still, Keller profited from other ventures to some minor extent. Keller admitted that he 

earned money from Dish Network on two sales during his tenure at Miri. Two of Keller’s 

friends asked how to obtain satellite television; Keller connected those two friends with Dish 

Network and received commissions. Keller also helped a few customers configure routers for 

which he collected a $25–35 fee directly from the customer, which he did not turn over to Miri. 

And there were a few occasions when Keller sold customers routers that he had bought at WalMart, but he said that it was a “nightmare” to do, so he stopped. 

Keller’s profits also varied if the installation was more complex, but that was not 

something within his control. Ordinarily, technicians mount the satellite dish onto the 

customer’s roof; however, if a roof mount was not feasible or the customer requested a pole 

mount, then the technician would have to dig a hole, install a pipe, and put the satellite dish on 

top of the pipe for which he collected an additional $12. But whether a customer requested a 

pole mount was not within Keller’s control—that depended on Miri’s scheduling and on 

customer demand. 

In light of this record, we conclude that there is a material dispute as to whether Keller 

could have increased his profitability had he improved his efficiency or requested more 

assignments, and therefore a jury should consider this evidence.9

 9

We recognize that some other circuit courts have considered the employment status of cable and satellitedish technicians and concluded that technicians control their profitability. See, e.g., Freund, 185 F. App’x at 783; 

Chao v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App’x 104, 106–07 (4th Cir. 2001) (“An Installer’s net profit or loss 

depends on his skill in meeting technical specifications, thereby avoiding backcharges; on the business acumen with 

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No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 15

5. Miri’s Right to Control the Manner Keller Performed His Work 

The fifth factor is whether Miri exercised control over Keller’s work. The district court 

evaluated the following four considerations when analyzing the control Miri exercised: 

(1) Keller could refuse work assignments, (2) Miri never supervised or monitored how Keller 

performed the work, (3) Miri’s ability to control Keller’s day-to-day work, and (4) Keller could 

do work for other companies. 

Keller had some control over his schedule, but Miri also exercised control. In the event 

that Keller could not make a scheduled appointment, he could call the customer and reschedule 

the installation at a mutually agreeable time. Keller usually just followed the schedule he 

received from Miri, but he was free to reject an assignment or take vacation days. Miri 

scheduled the installations in blocks, and the technicians were expected to arrive at the 

customer’s house and finish their work within the scheduled time. But a worker’s ability to set 

his own hours and vacation schedule “is not sufficient to negate control.” Lilley, 958 F.2d at 

750. It is also relevant to consider whether “the hours [the worker] [is] required to work on a 

project . . . , coupled with driving time between home and often remote work sites each day, 

make it practically impossible for them to offer services to other employers.” Baker, 137 F.3d at 

1441. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that the way that Miri scheduled Keller’s 

installation appointments made it impossible for Keller to provide installation services for other 

companies. 

Miri did not exercise traditional control over how Keller performed his job. Miri never 

accompanied Keller during his installation appointments, except when he was in training. 

Although Miri does not give technicians step-by-step guides about how to perform their jobs, 

Miri insists that all technicians perform their jobs in accordance with HughesNet’s 

specifications. Miri and HughesNet require that all technicians obtain a HughesNet certification 

to perform the repair and installation services. And Miri teaches the certification course. In 

addition, Miri supplies technicians with HughesNet’s and RS&I’s instructions about how to 

 which the Installer makes his required capital investments in tools, equipment, and a truck; and on the Installer’s 

decision whether to hire his own employees or to work alone.”). None of these out-of-circuit opinions bind us. 

United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 383 (6th Cir. 2009). We note that the analysis of this factor in the other 

circuits’ opinions is cursory, and therefore less persuasive. See Freund, 185 F. App’x at 783; Mid-Atl. Installation 

Servs., 16 F. App’x at 106–07. More to the point, reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about whether 

the record supports a finding that Keller was, in fact, economically dependent upon Miri. 

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install the dishes. A jury could therefore find that Miri controlled Keller’s job performance 

through its initial training and hiring practices. 

Moreover, Miri monitors the quality of installations remotely. HughesNet and RS&I 

require Miri to submit reports, documenting when technicians start and finish the installation or 

repair work. In turn, Miri mandates that technicians must submit those hours through WARP. 

Miri also requires that technicians take photographs of the installation and send those photos to 

HughesNet and RS&I along with the other post-installation paperwork. Keller stated that he felt 

pressure to submit paperwork to Miri as soon as possible. 

In addition, Miri guarantees the quality of technicians’ performance. HughesNet and 

Miri warrant that the technician would return to the customer’s home to fix any problems within 

thirty days of the installation. If a customer complains within the warranty time period, then the 

technician must return and fix the satellite dish without any additional compensation. 

Moreover, Miri controlled the amount customers paid Keller—and ultimately Miri—for 

installations or repairs. Miri told Keller when to collect additional fees from customers and how 

much to charge. 

Regardless of these mechanisms of control, Keller made some decisions free from Miri’s 

control. Miri did not object if Keller or any other technician rearranged their schedules to create 

the most convenient driving route. Miri stated, however, that had Keller missed appointments or 

arrived late routinely, then Miri would have severed ties with him. Miri did not require that 

Keller wear a uniform with Miri’s or HughesNet’s logo. When it came to how to complete every 

installation job, Keller was free to assess the customers’ needs and respond accordingly without 

checking with Miri so long as the installation met HughesNet’s specifications. Finally, Keller 

independently decided to bring Kyle and Mrs. Keller on some installation jobs to keep him 

company and improve his efficiency. 

There are genuine facts in dispute about whether and how Miri could discipline Keller. 

Miri asserted that the company has never disciplined a technician. Customers who were 

unhappy with an installation or repair would submit feedback to HughesNet, HughesNet would 

contact Miri, and then Miri would relay the complaints to the technicians. In these 

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conversations, Miri “would discuss . . . the issue and try to find and determine . . . if there was a 

particular problem on one job or . . . a particular habit that[] [was] being formed” in order to 

“correct that situation.” R. 24-2 at 19 (A. Miri Dep. at 64–65) (Page ID #342). Keller believed 

that Miri could or would fire him. The record offers reasons to believe this fear was not 

unfounded: when Keller told Miri that he wanted to “blow off” a customer’s complaint, Miri 

responded with a threatening email. See R. 21-8 at 2 (Email Nov. 7, 2012) (Page ID #108). 

Given the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could determine that Miri could, in fact, 

terminate Keller. 

We believe that reasonable minds can differ about whether these forms of remote control 

support a finding that Miri had the power to discipline and control technicians. Unlike in 

Brandel, the record may lead reasonable minds to different conclusions as to whether Miri 

“retain[ed] the right to dictate the manner in which the details of” how Keller installed satellite 

dishes. 736 F.2d at 1119. Rather, we believe that there is a genuine dispute as to whether 

Keller’s “whims or choices” affected his profitability, or whether “the demands of the business 

controlled” his ability to install more satellite dishes every day. Snell, 875 F.2d at 806. 

6. Keller’s Role in Miri’s Business 

The final inquiry is whether Keller rendered services that are “an integral part” of Miri’s 

business. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1119–20. The more integral the worker’s services are to the 

business, then the more likely it is that the parties have an employer-employee relationship. 

Keeton, 2011 WL 2618926, at *6. Miri is a satellite-dish installation provider for HughesNet 

and iDirect. The only services Miri provides are satellite-dish installation and repair. 

Accordingly, a reasonable jury would conclude that satellite-dish technicians are integral to 

Miri’s business—a factor that weighs in favor of finding that Keller was a Miri employee.

7. Other Factors 

 The economic-reality test is not an exclusive list of factors. We may and should look to 

other evidence in the record to determine whether the totality of the circumstances establishes 

that Miri employed Keller. See Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059. 

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A reasonable jury could find that one factor that supports a finding that Keller was an 

employee is that he held himself out to customers as a representative of HughesNet and not as an 

independent contractor, as evidenced by the way Keller interacted with customers. Keller never 

registered for a Federal Employer Identification number. He did not carry business cards or use 

signs to identify himself as a Miri employee or as an independent contractor. Keller put a 

HughesNet sticker on his van and wore a hat that read “Do more with Gen4”—HughesNet’s 

advertising campaign slogan. Id. at 24 (Keller Dep. at 87–88) (Page ID #380). And Miri offered 

these shirts, hats, and bumper stickers to technicians for purchase. A uniform can often be a sign 

of control, but the uniforms were not required, nor did they connect Keller to Miri. We are 

mindful that Miri never required that Keller do any of this, but we believe these considerations 

suggest that a jury could reasonably find that Keller was Miri’s employee. 

8. Conclusion Regarding Employee Status 

We conclude that there are many genuine disputes of fact and reasonable inferences from 

which a jury could find that Keller was an employee. Summary judgment for the defendant is 

not appropriate when a factfinder could reasonably find that a FLSA plaintiff was an employee. 

See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1319 (“Because there are genuine issues of material fact, and because 

plaintiffs were ‘employees’ if . . . reasonable factual inferences are found in plaintiff’s favor, the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment . . . .”); Imars, 1998 WL 598778, at *6 (“The 

appropriate weight of the factors can be more properly assessed after a trial.”). We therefore 

hold that a jury could reasonably find that Keller was a Miri employee, and Miri is not entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law. 

C. Evidence of Overtime 

In the alternative, Miri argues that Keller has not introduced evidence that establishes that 

he worked more than forty hours a week, and therefore this court should affirm the grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Miri on that basis alone. Appellee Br. at 39–40. “[A] FLSA 

plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she performed work for which he 

or she was not properly compensated.” O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 602 

(6th Cir. 2009) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). The most common 

method of proof of undercompensation is discovery and analysis of the employer’s records. Id. 

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Keller has not introduced records that definitively establish the hours he worked, but he has 

testified that he worked more than forty hours a week. In the absence of those employer records, 

however, a plaintiff’s testimony is enough to create a genuine issue of fact. See Harris v. J.B. 

Robinson Jewelers, 627 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2010). 

 We do not need to rely on Keller’s testimony alone to find that Keller has met his burden 

to survive summary judgment. Miri’s testimony provides sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to believe that Keller worked more than forty hours each week. Miri’s deposition testimony 

confirms Keller’s claim that he worked six days a week. Miri also agreed that Keller completed 

four jobs a day as often as Miri had that many installation assignments. And Miri agreed that a 

satellite-dish installation usually took two-and-a-half hours to complete. If Keller accepted four 

jobs each day, six days a week, and he spent two and a half hours completing each job, then 

Keller worked sixty hours each week. This estimate does not even include the travel time, or the 

time Keller devoted to completing the paperwork. Thus, we hold that Keller’s and Miri’s 

testimony provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that Keller 

worked more than forty hours a week for which Miri did not compensate him.10

III. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and 

REMAND this case for trial. 

 

 10The record suggests that Miri has access to documents that might establish more precisely Keller’s hours 

worked, but those documents are not in the record. We note, however, that the FLSA places the burden of 

maintaining accurate timekeeping records on the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 

1132–33 (6th Cir. 1994). If Miri’s recordkeeping is inadequate, then Keller “carrie[s] out his burden if he proves 

that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence 

to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Anderson, 328 U.S. at 

687. 

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_________________ 

DISSENT

_________________ 

 ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. While I have never been a great fan of 

multi-factor tests, I agree with the Majority that the approach outlined in Donovan v. Brandel, 

736 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1984), remains the law of our circuit. Brandel requires us to consider six 

factors when determining whether an individual serves a company as an employee or as an 

independent contractor for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 

29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Although we are required to assess the individual considerations listed 

in Brandel, our task is not to focus on any single factor but rather to view the situation in its 

entirety so that we can answer this simple question: Is plaintiff’s role with the company more 

akin to that of an employee or that of an independent contractor? See Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116 

(“the employment relationship does not lend itself to a precise test, but is to be determined on a 

case-by-case basis upon the circumstances of the whole business activity”). Yes, the FLSA is 

remedial in nature, Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir. 2012); and, 

yes, the summary judgment posture of this appeal requires us to parse the record in a light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986). That said, we must consider the undisputed evidence and decide, as a matter of 

law, Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1116, whether plaintiff raised a material issue of fact respecting his 

claim to be an employee as defined by the FLSA. In my view, the district court correctly 

concluded that he did not. For that reason, I respectfully dissent. 

 In this particular appeal, I find it instructive to observe that the same district court judge 

who ruled in the employer’s favor in this appeal denied summary judgment to an employer in a 

similar case involving individuals who installed cable television services. Swinney v. AMcomm 

Telecomm., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 629 (E.D. Mich. 2014). These two cases highlight what Brandel

instructs: that every case must be evaluated on its own facts; it is not a precise test; and, as here, 

fair minds may differ when applying the law to the undisputed record. 

 With respect to the first Brandel factor—the degree of permanency in the working 

relationship—the district court concluded that the undisputed evidence favored a finding that 

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plaintiff worked as an independent contractor: he had no contract with Miri Microsystems, LLC; 

their working relationship was not exclusive inasmuch as he was able to work for other 

companies; and he arranged his own schedule. Keller v. Miri Microsystems, LLC, No. 12-15492, 

2014 WL 1118446, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2014). By contrast, in Swinney, the court 

observed that plaintiffs’ deposition testimony confirmed that they had “a long and arguably 

exclusive relationship with Defendant,” which supported a conclusion that they were employees 

despite the fact that they had “signed independent contract agreements.” Swinney, 30 F. Supp. 

3d at 634. In this case, the Majority focuses on plaintiff's contention that he had no time, due 

primarily to geography, to work for other companies. True, plaintiff lived in a rural part of 

Michigan where installation opportunities were limited. However, he was not obliged to accept 

every job offered by Miri. In short, he had sufficient control over his working relationship with 

Miri to render him an independent contractor. That he chose to accept a high number of jobs 

with the company speaks more to his own business decisions—where to live, how much money 

to earn—than those imposed by Miri. 

 The skill level possessed by an individual also affects our analysis: the greater the skill 

set, the more likely that a person is an independent contractor. As the Majority concedes, “There 

is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that satellite-dish-installation technicians are 

skilled workers.” Nevertheless, the Majority focuses upon the fact that the training required by 

HughesNet was brief and arranged by Miri. It then denigrates the skills required of an installer’s 

job, which it just conceded was “skilled”: “[T]his is not the type of profession where success 

rises or falls on the worker’s special skill . . . a pole mount is a pole mount, a roof mount is a roof 

mount . . . .” Perhaps the job lacks an opportunity for the “artistic flourish” that the Majority 

equates with skilled labor, but, in my view, the district court correctly concluded that the 

specialized technical training required coupled with “the transient nature of Plaintiff's 

employment history as an installer—working as an installer with ABC Dishman before doing so 

with Defendant LLC and continuing to provide HughesNet satellite installations after 

terminating those relationships—support the conclusion that he possessed ‘special skills’ that 

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gave him the opportunity and flexibility to choose when to begin or end a working relationship.” 

Keller, 2014 WL 1118446, at *6.1

 As the Majority rightly points out, the third Brandel factor contemplates the investment 

made by the worker in tools and other means of performing his job. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1118-

19. The more the worker personally invests in job-related equipment, the more likely it is that he 

is an independent contractor. In this case, plaintiff used his wife’s van when performing 

installations, a van that he had modified to accommodate computer equipment needed to track 

his jobs. In addition, he provided tools, a ladder, and his own cellular phone, which contained an 

“app” used for locating satellites and a credit card reader. He also, at Miri’s request, paid for 

general commercial liability insurance, which named Miri as an “additional insured.” See Keller, 

2014 WL 1118446, at *7 (summarizing equipment). 

 Despite the investment made by plaintiff, the Majority concludes that the evidence, 

rightly weighed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, tilts in favor of a finding—or at least a jury 

question—that he was an employee. First, it discounts the use of his wife’s van and his cell 

phone on the theory that those investments served purposes beyond the scope of his employment. 

Second, it observes that “Miri made significant capital investments in its business.” While this 

statement is true, I am unsure how it factors into the analysis. In short, I respectfully draw a 

different conclusion from this record: plaintiff's financial investment in work-related equipment 

was significant enough that he this factor weighs in favor of plaintiff being an independent 

contractor. 

 The fourth factor concerns the nature of the working relationship: how much control does 

the worker have over how he performs his job? As the district court noted, factors such as 

whether the company insists on a uniform, closely monitors the alleged employee’s performance, 

and the degree to which it, rather than the worker, controls scheduling, all contribute to the 

analysis of this issue. Keller, 2014 WL 1118446, at *7. In finding that this factor favored a 

conclusion that plaintiff was an independent contractor, the district court made the following 

observations: plaintiff could determine the number of jobs he would accept per day; the location 

 1

In contrast, the same judge found this factor far less compelling in Swinney because the plaintiffs came to 

their employer without training and were provided training in an “on the fly” manner. Swinney, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 

636. 

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of those jobs; and the manner in which he would perform the work as long as it conformed to the 

requirements of the satellite provider (which was not Miri). He could also change his schedule if 

necessary and decline to undertake jobs without adverse consequences for future jobs. In 

addition, he could, if he chose, employ helpers without the consent of Miri. In contrast to the 

instant case, the court in Swinney reached a different conclusion because “Defendant exercised 

substantial control over [plaintiffs’] days and . . . Defendant used [a] chargebacks system not 

only as a quality control measure, but also to punish Plaintiffs for noncompliance with 

Defendant's ‘rule’, e.g., arrival time, meetings, etc.” 30 F. Supp. 3d at 638. I cite Swinney

because it highlights how context-sensitive our inquiry is when trying to resolve the employer 

versus independent contractor question. As the two district court opinions discussed illustrate, 

the same judge can reach opposite conclusions when facts are sufficiently distinctive to call for a 

different result. 

 The fifth factor is whether plaintiff had an opportunity to control his profits. As 

mentioned earlier, plaintiff lived in a rural area and, by definition, installation jobs were often 

separated by some distance, making it difficult, if not impossible, for him to complete more jobs 

than he appears to have been doing. However, as the district court recognized, his decisions 

regarding his location and the jobs that he chose to take were his alone. In theory, at least, he 

could have relocated and hired additional helpers. That he did not does not indicate that Miri’s 

actions kept plaintiff from increasing his profit: he retained control over the decisions affecting 

the nature of his income and he was, in this respect, an independent contractor. 

 Despite our cataloging of the various factors that inform our decision, in the end we must 

take a common sense approach and look at the situation in its entirety. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 

1116. What does that show? Miri served as a middleman in the satellite installation business. 

The LLC had a single member: Anthony Miri. Its business plan was to work with individuals 

such as plaintiff who carry out the actual installations. Miri does not provide benefits to these 

individuals or withhold taxes. Nor does it enter into an employment contract with them. 

Plaintiff moved from providing installation services for another middleman, to Miri, and later to 

HugesNet directly, and provided additional products and services to customers directly while 

doing installations for Miri. It seems abundantly clear that both plaintiff and Miri intended that 

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plaintiff be an independent contractor and conducted themselves accordingly. It is not clear what 

more the parties could have done that would have satisfied the Majority that plaintiff was an 

independent contractor. While simply labeling someone an independent contractor does not 

make him one, Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947), for the reasons 

given by the district court and reiterated above, the record, which is not materially in dispute, 

indicates that plaintiff was an independent contractor as defined by the FLSA. 

 I respectfully dissent. 

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