Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02355/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-02355-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN L UPSHER, Jr.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08-CV-02355-H (NLS)

ORDER: 

DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Respondent.

On December 18, 2008, Steven L. Upsher, Jr. (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his convictions alleging

constitutionally ineffective trial counsel. (Id.) On March 24, 2009, Matthew Cate

(“Respondent”) moved to dismiss the Petition for failure to state a claim and for failure to

exhaust the claims in state courts. (Doc. No. 9.) On July 15, 2009 the Court denied

Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.) On October 7, 2009 Respondent filed an

answer to the Petition. (Doc. No. 16.) On October 28, 2009 Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc.

No. 18.) On February 16, 2010, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) that the Court deny the Petition. (Doc. No. 19.) On March 8, 2010, Petitioner filed

an objection to the R&R. (Doc. No. 20.) 

The Court, pursuant to its discretion under Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), determines this matter

is appropriate for resolution without oral argument and submits the matter on the papers. After

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due consideration, the Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Petition.

Background

I. Procedural History

On May 3, 2006, a jury convicted Petitioner of dissuading a witness while having

previously been convicted of dissuading a witness under Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1);

attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime under Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1);

and battery upon a person with whom he was in a former or current dating relationship under

Cal. Penal Code § 243(e)(1). (Lodgment 13 at 62-64.) Petitioner received a nine year sentence

for the convictions. (Lodgment 13 at 123-26.)

Petitioner directly appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal.

(Lodgment 1.) Petitioner also filed a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal.

(Lodgment 4.) The appellate court consolidated the state habeas petition with the direct appeal.

(Lodgment 5.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part the

judgment and denied the habeas petition. (Lodgment 6.) Specifically, the appellate court

reversed Petitioner’s conviction on count 2 for violation of Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(1) and

directed the trial court to strike the stayed term imposed for that conviction. (Id. at 11.) The

California Court of Appeal also denied a petition for rehearing. (Lodgment 9.) 

Petitioner next filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court claiming (1)

ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) Cal Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1) lists sentencing factors and

not elements of a substantive offense; and (3) that the California Supreme Court should

determine whether increased punishment based on the recidivism of the offense in Cal. Penal

Code § 136.1 (c)(1) is a sentencing provision or an element of a separate offense. (Lodgments

10, 11.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review without comment or

citation. (Lodgment 12.)

Petitioner then filed this Petition claiming (1) ineffective assistance of counsel under

state and federal constitutions when his counsel failed to recognize Petitioner’s prior

conviction as sentencing factors and not as elements of the substantive offense under Cal.

Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1); and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel under the Federal

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Constitution when his attorney elicited inculpatory evidence and failed to move for an acquittal

on the battery charge. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Respondent asks this Court to deny Claim 1 on the merits and to determine that Claim

2 is procedurally barred, or alternatively, to deny that claim on the merits. 

II. Factual Background

Federal habeas courts presume the correctness of a state court’s determination of factual

issues unless Petitioner “rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006); see Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th

Cir. 2002). The parties do not challenge the accuracy of the California Court of Appeal’s

summary of the underlying facts adduced at trial. The court of appeal summarized the

underlying facts as follows: 

In the early morning of November 6, 2005, Cruz Alfaro

was at an AM/PM market on Oceanside Boulevard on his way

home from his job as a security officer, when he heard screaming

coming from a house across the street. Alfaro saw a woman,

Natasha Teague, running quickly from the house in his direction

screaming for help, with Upsher chasing after her. Alfaro watched

as Teague fell on the ground in the middle of the street; when

Upsher pulled her hair he screamed at Upsher to let her go.

Teague got up and started running towards Alfaro. Upsher came

after Alfaro, who had called 911, and began to scream at him,

saying, “You want to be a hero, mother fucker? You’re going to

die.” Upsher proceeded to chase Alfaro around his security

vehicle telling him to hang up the phone because he was known

by the FBI and the Oceanside Police Department. At some point,

Upsher told Alfaro to mind his own business, saying, “It’s none

of your fucking business what I do to my girl.” After Alfaro

abandoned his call to 911, Upsher returned to the house and got

into a car. Alfaro told Teague to get into the store. Upsher drove

the car behind Alfaro’s security vehicle and began to chase

Alfaro’s work partner, Alonso Resarias. Eventually, Upsher gave

up chasing the men and left in his car.

Oceanside Police Officer Michael Kos responded to a call

about the incident at approximately 4:30 a.m., and shortly

afterwards arrived at the AM/PM, where he contacted Teague and

eventually Alfaro and Upsher. Officer Kos already knew Upsher

and that he lived at 656 Crouch Street, nearby the AM/PM

market. Teague was visibly upset and appeared to have been

crying, and she was holding a paper towel to her mouth, which

was still bleeding. As Officer Kos was speaking to Teague,

Upsher pulled up in his car and parked it in front of the AM/PM.

Noticing his vehicle, Teague became very scared and immediately

stood up and turned to leave toward Crouch Street. When Officer

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Kos told her to sit back down, she responded, “No, I don’t want

to get shot.” Upsher exited his car and approached Teague and

Officer Kos, who told him to sit down on the curb. After Alfaro

identified Upsher to Officer Kos as the man chasing Teague, the

officer arrested Upsher and placed him in the rear of his police

car. As Upsher entered the car, he called out to Teague, “You’re

going to do me like this, Tecia.” Teague did not testify at trial.

The parties stipulated that Upsher had previously been

convicted of dissuading a witness, the same offense charged in the

present case, and the trial court took judicial notice of certified

copies of documents showing the prior conviction (People v.

Upsher (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 1990, No. CRN18488)).

Upsher testified in his own defense. He admitted he had

been previously convicted of offenses in 1990, 1989 and 1993:

respectively, dissuading a witness in violation of section 136.1,

subdivision (c)(1); assault by means likely to produce great bodily

injury under section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and a federal offense

for distributing cocaine base. Upsher recounted the events that

morning; he was at home with Teague and Rochelle Ira, referring

to Teague as “a lady friend of mine.” According to Upsher, he,

Teague and Ira had been up drinking all night, and the women

remained awake drinking after he had gone to sleep at about 2:00

a.m. Upsher testified that the altercation between him and Teague

on the morning at issue began when he refused to let her and Ira

drive after they had been drinking. Screaming and arguing

occurred between Upsher and Teague for three or four minutes

until Teague left the house. Upsher explained he left his house

following Teague because she had car keys, and he walked into

the middle of the street trying to talk her into giving him the keys,

but she was screaming, hollering and crying. He was picking her

up when Alfaro saw them and began yelling at them. According

to Upsher, he told Alfaro, “Mind your own business. I’m trying to

stop them from drinking and driving.”

Upsher testified that when he saw Alfaro with his cell

phone and heard him threaten to call 911, he tried to get back

across the street: “So I’m trying to really get back across the street

to my spot here. When I’m looking at these two grown men here,

there’s no way I’m trying to - try to charge at you all to try to fight

with you, two grown men. I’m not concerned about you. I’m

concerned about my girl right here trying to drive, trying killing

herself [sic] or killing someone else. I’m concerned about getting

back to my spot because my door is wide open, 4:30 in the

morning.”

Upsher testified that he returned to his house to put a shirt

on, then got in his car to go looking for Teague. He went around

the corner and pulled back into the AM/PM when he saw the

police car. He explained that he pulled up because he knew he did

not do anything wrong.

(Lodgment 6 at 3-6.)

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Discussion

I. Scope of Review and Applicable Legal Standard.

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects to

any portion of a magistrate judge’s report, the district court “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id. The district

court must make a de novo review of all conclusions of law, even if no objection is made.

Avratin v. Bermudez, 420 F. Supp.2d 1121, 1122-23 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Barilla v. Irvin,

886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds). The Petitioner filed an

objection, but made no specific objections to any portion of the R&R. (Doc. No. 20.) Thus, the

Court will review all conclusions of law de novo. 

A federal court will not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court's decision was either (1) contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002) Mendez v. Knowles, 556 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2009).

State court rulings receive high deference and are thus given the benefit of the doubt.

See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007). A federal court may grant

habeas relief where the state court (1) decides a case “contrary to” federal law by applying a

rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases; or (2) decides a case

differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal court may also grant habeas relief where a state court’s

decision is an “unreasonable application” of federal law such as where the state court correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies

the principle to the facts at issue. Id. “Unreasonable application” must be objectively

unreasonable to the extent that the state court decision is more than merely incorrect or

erroneous. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

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1

 California Penal Code section 136.1 provides, in pertinent part: 

(b) [E]very person who attempts to prevent of dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or

who is a witness to a crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished

by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year. 

(c) Every person doing any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (b) knowingly or maliciously under any

one or more of the following circumstances, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison

for two, three, or four years...(3) where the act is committed by any person who has been convicted of any

violation of this section, any predecessor law hereto or any federal statute or statute of any other state which,

if the act prosecuted was committed in this state, would be a violation of this section. 

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Federal habeas courts look to the state court’s last reasoned decision to decide whether

the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. See

Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). The state court’s factual determinations

are presumed to be correct and Petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear

and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47

(1981). Here, the California Court of Appeal opinion is the last reasoned state court decision.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Based on Counsel’s Interpretation

of § 136.1. 

Petitioner asserts relief under § 2254(d)(1) because he alleges the state court’s decision

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal ineffective assistance of counsel law.

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 3.) Petitioner contends that his trial counsel misunderstood section 136.1 and

the tactical decisions based on that misunderstanding led to the ineffective assistance of

counsel.1

 (Id. at 7-13.) Respondent argues that the California Court of Appeals decision was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court Authority and did not

involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 9-12.) 

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate (1)

trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) trial

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1,

5 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show deficient performance,

Petitioner must demonstrate that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. In assessing counsel’s performance, the court employs a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. See

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Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The court’s review of counsel’s

performance is “doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas.”

Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5.

Here, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to recognize that his prior offense

constituted a sentencing provision and not a substantive element of any Penal Code section

136.1 offense. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 7.) Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s alleged error resulted

in deficient performance because counsel stipulated to the offense being presented to the jury

without sanitizing it to eliminate reference to the nature of the prior offense. (Id. at 9-12.)

Petitioner claims counsel’s error was inherently prejudicial because it was evidence of other

criminal conduct. (Id. at 11-12.)

The California Court of Appeal examined Petitioner’s claim and concluded that

Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his counsel had no tactical purpose for the omissions, and

found that trial counsel had potential reasonable tactical grounds for his actions. (Lodgment

6 at 20-25.) The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s unsupported contention that

the recidivist aspect of section 136.1(c)(3) is a sentencing factor as opposed to an element of

the offense. (Lodgment 6 at 21.) The court also noted that “unlike section 666, section 136.1,

subdivision (c) is not contained in the sentencing and punishment part of the Penal Code, and

it is structured to require proof of an element additional to those specified in subdivisions (a)

and (b).” (Lodgment 6 at 21-22.) The California Court of Appeal concluded that based on the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable personal

assistance noted in Strickland and the unsettled state of the law regarding the nature of section

136.1(c)(3), Petitioner’s trial counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective counsel by

treating Petitioner’s prior conviction as an element of the offense, and failing to either move

to bifurcate or sanitize the offense. (Lodgment 6 at 23.) 

The California Court of Appeal also concluded that Petitioner failed to show prejudice

caused by the alleged deficiency. (Lodgment 6 at 24.) In order to demonstrate prejudice,

Petitioner needs to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

been different absent the errors. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000); Strickland,

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2

 Since Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails on the merits, the Court declines to

address the procedural default. 

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466 U.S. at 694. The court considers the prejudice inquiry in light of the strength of the

prosecution’s case. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F. 3d 954, 966 (9th Cir.), amended, 311 F.3d 928 (9th

Cir. 2002). The court of appeal noted that the prosecution presented substantial evidence

regarding the knowing and willful witness dissuasion and the battery on a significant other.

(Lodgment 6 at 24.) The California Court of Appeal concluded that any alleged error of the

admission of the prior conviction was harmless. (Lodgment 6 at 24.) 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that

Petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s alleged

misunderstanding of section 136.1 was not unreasonable. The state appellate court correctly

analyzed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for both objective reasonableness

and prejudice to Petitioner in accordance with Strickland and Yarborough. As a result, the

California Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court, therefore, DENIES

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s interpretation of

section 136.1.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Based on the Battery Charge

Petitioner also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial

counsel elicited potentially inculpatory evidence and did not move for acquittal as to the

battery charge following the prosecution’s case. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 14.) Respondent argues that

the Court should deny this claim on the merits. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 13.) Alternatively,

Respondent contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner never

appealed it to the California Supreme Court. (Id.)

2

The Court will review the California Court of Appeal’s opinion denying Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to determine whether it was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). 

Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial

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counsel elicited a hearsay statement by Petitioner that referred to the battery victim as “my

girl” and because counsel failed to move for acquittal of the battery charge. (Doc. No. 1-1 at

14-17.) Specifically, Petitioner asserts that on direct examination, a witness testified that

Petitioner had told him to “mind his own business” without describing Petitioner’s relationship

to the victim. (Id. at 14.) When Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the witness, counsel asked

what Petitioner said in regard to “minding his own business.” (Id.) The witness responded that

Petitioner said, “It’s none of your business what I do with my girl.” (Id.)

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim for ineffective assistance of counsel

because it conclude that the question posed “was not one a reasonably competent counsel

would have known would elicit an incriminating response.” (Lodgment 6 at 25.) It also held

that Petitioner could not show prejudice because in light of the other evidence, there was no

reasonable probability that absent the question the jury would have reached a different result.

(Id. at 26.) The court concluded that the jury could have reasonably inferred a dating

relationship between Petitioner and the victim from the officer’s testimony and from “the

circumstances surrounding the incident, including the time of morning, the emotions involved,

and [Petitioner]’s statements to [the witness] during the incident about minding his own

business.” (Id.)

Based on the record, the Court concludes that the California Court of Appeal’s

conclusion that Petitioner failed to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of counsel

regarding the battery charge was not unreasonable. The record shows substantial other

admitted evidence upon which the jury could conclude that Petitioner and the victim were in

a dating relationship. (Lodgment 6 at 12-16.) The Court concludes that the California Court

of Appeal’s decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 5; Bell, 535 U.S. at

694. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

regarding the battery charge. 

///

///

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Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, DENIES the Petition, and

DENIES a Certificate of Appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 1, 2010

_________________________________

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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