Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05092/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05092-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 Defendant Aguillar had not been served at that time. 1

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREVOR JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. HENSON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’

RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST BE GRANTED

(Doc. 62) 

I. Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Trevor Johnson (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s amended complaint filed April 16, 2004, against defendants Henson, Aguillar, Arline, and

Adams (“defendants”) for depriving him of his property without due process of law, in violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

On October 13, 2004, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), defendants Henson,

Arline, and Adams filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted and for failure to exhaust the available administrative remedies. (Doc. 20.) Plaintiff filed 1

///

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion 2

on November 18, 2004. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. 5.)

 Defendants’ contention in their January 12, 2007, reply that the court did not reach the argument made in 3

their original motion to dismiss that they were entitled to dismissal for failure to state a claim is incorrect. (Reply,

Doc. 80, 6:15-7:11.) Following Judge Ishii’s July 18, 2005, order declining to adopt the Findings and

Recommendations (F&R) recommending dismissal for failure to exhaust, the undersigned issued an F&R on July 22,

2005, recommending that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be denied. (Doc. 35.) Judge Ishii adopted

the F&R and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on September 13, 2005. (Doc. 42.) 

Because the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, defendants’ argument in their

reply that they are also entitled to dismissal on that ground is disregarded.

2

an opposition on November 10, 2004, and defendants filed a reply on November 19, 2004. (Docs. 2

22, 23.) 

On February 22, 2005, the undersigned issued a Findings and Recommendations

recommending that defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust be granted, thus concluding

this action in its entirety. (Doc. 27.) On July 18, 2005, the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii issued an

order declining to adopt the Findings and Recommendations in light of the intervening decision Ngo

v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005), and denying defendants’ motion. 

In 2006, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision in Ngo, Woodford v. Ngo,

126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006), and defendants, now joined by Aguilar, renewed their motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust on July 5, 2006. (Doc. 62.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on January

3

10, 2007, and defendants filed a reply on January 12, 2007. (Docs. 78-80.) In issuing this Findings

and Recommendations, which is largely identical to the Findings and Recommendations issued on

February 22, 2005, the undersigned has considered the original motion, opposition, and reply, and

the renewed motion, opposition, and reply. 

B. Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement

applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the

prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

“Proper exhaustion[, which] demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules . . . .” is required, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006), and may not be

satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective . . . appeal,” id. at 2382.

Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.

2002).

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust nonjudicial

administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion,

rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)). In

deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the Court

concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

C. Discussion

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1 (2006). The process is initiated by submitting

a CDC Form 602. Id. at § 3084.2(a). Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal

level, first formal level, second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the “Director’s

Level.” Id. at § 3084.5. Appeals must be submitted within fifteen working days of the event being

appealed, and the process is initiated by submission of the appeal to the informal level, or in some

circumstances, the first formal level. Id. at §§ 3084.5, 3084.6(c). In order to satisfy section

1997e(a), California state prisoners are required to use this process to exhaust their claims prior to

filing suit. Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2383; McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201. 

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on February 25, 2002, Associate Warden Moncayo and

Captain Cuevas approved a memorandum stating that general population inmates were going to be

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This date is inconsistent with plaintiff’s other allegations. Based on the appeal form itself, plaintiff 4

submitted the appeal on May 4, 2002.

4

transferred to other facilities and anyquarterly packages received would be packed with the inmates’

property and forwarded. Plaintiff alleges that he was a general population inmate. 

On February 27, 2002, Officer Guevara rejected a thirty-pound package mailed to plaintiff.

On March 5, 2002, plaintiff filed an inmate appeal (CDC 602 form) stating that a quarterly package

had been sent to him and pursuant to the memo, it should have been placed with his property. On

March 6, 2002, defendant Aguillar denied plaintiff’s appeal at the informal level and stated that per

the warden, quarterly packages were to be returned to sender. On March 7, 2002, plaintiff submitted

his appeal at the formal level of review. Defendant Arline completed an inmate appeal assignment

notice setting the due date for the response for April 24, 2002. On May 3, 2002, after plaintiff was

transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison, plaintiff received a first level response from defendant

Henson. On May 24, 2002, plaintiff submitted his appeal to the second level of review. On May

4

10, 2002, defendant Arline completed an inmate appeal assignment notice setting the due date for

the response for June 10, 2002. On June 25, 2002, after receiving no response to his appeal at the

second level, plaintiff requested a Director’s Level review of his appeal. On July 2, 2002, plaintiff’s

appeal was returned to him. On August 6, 2002, plaintiff filed case number CV-F-02-5952 OWW

HGB P Johnson v. Henson. On August 7, 2002, plaintiff received the second level response to his

appeal. On September 15, 2002, plaintiff was allowed to dismiss his case without prejudice, and on

September 24, 2002, plaintiff submitted his appeal to the Director’s Level of review. The appeal was

rejected on October 22, 2002, on the ground that it was untimely. 

Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of this action because plaintiff failed to

exhaust the available administrative remedy process. Defendants contend that plaintiff filed an

inmate appeal on March 5, 2002, complaining about non-receipt of his quarterly package. (Doc. 20,

Motion, Exhibit A, ¶ 10 & Attach. B, p. 3.) The appeal was denied at the informal level of review

on March 6, 2002, partially granted at the first formal level of review on April 10, 2002, and denied

at the second formal level of review on June 10, 2002. (Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 11 & Attach. B, p. 3.)

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s appeal was not received at the third and final level of review until

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 The court takes judicial notice of the fact that on August 15, 2002, in case number CV-F-02-5952 OWW

HGB P Johnson v. Henson, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under section 1983.

 The court takes judicial notice of the fact that on September 5, 2002, in case number CV-F-02-5952 6

OWW HGB P Johnson v. Henson, based on plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal, the court issued Findings and

Recommendations recommending the action be dismissed.

5

September 26, 2002, at which time it was almost three and a half months late. (Id., Exhibit A, ¶ 12

& Attach. B, p. 3.) Plaintiff’s appeal was screened out and returned to plaintiff as untimely. (Id.)

In his opposition, plaintiff contends that the second formal level response to his appeal was

due on June 10, 2002, but defendant Arline failed to meet that deadline. (Doc. 22, 2:7-12 & Exhibit

at p. 13.) Plaintiff contends that on June 25, 2002, he submitted a request for review at the

Director’s Level based on Arline’s failure to timely respond to his appeal, but the request was

returned on July 8, 2002. (Id., 2:13-21 & Exhibit at p. 16.) On August 6, 2002, plaintiff filed case

number CV-F-02-5952 OWW HGB P Johnson v. Henson because defendants denied his right to

redress by failing to complete the grievance process. (Id., 2:22-27.) 

Plaintiff contends that on August 7, 2002, defendant Arline forwarded him the second level

response, which was backdated to June 10, 2002. (Id., 3:1-5 7 Exhibit at p. 21.) Plaintiff contends

that on August 15, 2002, the court granted him leave to amend in case number CV-F-02-5952, and 5

on August 24, 2002, plaintiff moved for dismissal pending exhaustion of his grievance. (Id., 3:6-13

& Exhibit at p. 23.) Plaintiff contends that on September 5, 2002, the court issued a Finding and

Recommendations recommending dismissal of the action, and on September 24, 2002, plaintiff 6

submitted his appeal to the Director’s Level of review. (Id., 3:14-21.) The appeal was returned to

plaintiff on October 22, 2002. (Id., 3:22-24 & Exhibit at p. 27.) Plaintiff contends that defendant

Arline intentionally withheld his second level appeal response until it was too late for him to appeal

to the next level, and that all the irregularities in the appeals process are attributable to defendants.

(Id., 4:1-7.)

In their reply, defendants argue that plaintiff’s attempt to argue substantial compliance must

fail. Defendants contend that plaintiff filed suit when his premature appeal to the third level was

returned and that plaintiff overlooks the fact that his appeal was processed, although not quickly 

///

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

enough to suit him. (Doc. 23, Reply, 3:12-14.) Defendants contend that because plaintiff filed suit

before receiving a third level response, plaintiff filed suit before exhaustion occurred.

Although there are no Ninth Circuit Court cases on point, other Circuit Courts have

addressed the issue of the effect of prison officials’ failure to respond to grievances in a timely

manner, and held that exhaustion occurs when prison officials fail to respond to a grievance within

the policy time limits. Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of America, 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004)

(administrative remedies are exhausted when prison officials fail to timely respond to properly filed

grievance); Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (the failure to respond to a

grievance within the policy time limits renders remedy unavailable); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d

829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (when prison officials fail to respond, the remedy becomes unavailable, and

exhaustion occurs); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir. 2001) (district court did not err

when it declined to dismiss claim for failure to exhaust where prison failed to respond to grievance);

Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (when a valid grievance has been filed and the

state’s time for responding has expired, the remedies are deemed exhausted); Underwood v. Wilson,

151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 1998) (when time limit for prison’s response has expired, the remedies

are exhausted); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a

remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy); Brown v.

Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2002) (formal grievance procedure not available where prison

officials told prisoner to wait for termination of investigation before filing formal grievance and then

never informed prisoner of termination of investigation); Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th

Cir. 2001) (a remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy).

In joining the Eighth and Fifth Circuits with respect to this issue, the Seventh Circuit Court stated

that it “refuse[d] to interpret the PLRA ‘so narrowly as to . . . permit [prison officials] to exploit the

exhaustion requirement through indefinite delay in responding to the grievances.’” Lewis v.

Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Goodman v. Carter, No. 2000 C 948, 2001

WL 755137, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 2, 2001)).

While in their reply defendants accuse plaintiff of sidestepping the fact that he filed suit

without obtaining a third level response, defendants themselves sidestep the issue of the timeliness

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 The court takes judicial notice of the decision in De La Torre v. Johnson, CV-F-01-6046-AWI-LJO-P. 7

 The court takes judicial notice of the decision in Lundh v. Warden CV-F-02-6196-AWI-LJO-P. 8

7

of the second level response in their motion. Second level responses are required to be completed

within twenty working days. Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.6(b)(3) (2005). A “‘[w]orking day’

means a calendar day excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and official state holidays,” and “days are

computed by excluding the first days and including the last day.” Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, §

4003(j)(2), (3). “[I]f an exceptional delay prevents completion of the review within specified time

limits, the [inmate] shall be informed in writing of the reasons for the delay and the estimated

completion date.” Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.6(b)(6) (2005)

In this instance, pursuant to the appeal form, the appeal was assigned on May 10, 2002, and

the due date was June 10, 2002. Although the second level response bears the date June 10, 2002,

the date it was due, plaintiff alleges in his complaint and in his opposition that he did not receive the

response until August 7, 2002. The response itself bears a date and location stamp of June 14, 2002

at CSATF. Given that plaintiff alleges he was transferred to Pleasant Valley on April 9, 2002, it

appears that the appeal response was not forwarded to plaintiff until sometime after June 14, 2002.

Defendants do not dispute plaintiff’s assertion that he did not receive the response until August 7,

2002, and the court accepts it as true for the purpose of this motion.

At the time plaintiff filed his earlier suit, defendant Arline’s failure to provide plaintiff with

a timely response to his appeal may have ultimately resulted in a finding that the process was

rendered unavailable by prison officials’ failure to respond within their own time constraints.

Defendants’ apparent argument that suit absolutely cannot be filed until a Director’s Level decision

is issued, regardless of how they handle the appeal or how long it takes them to process the appeal

is unavailing and has been rejected by this court. In an instance where the Director’s Level response 7

was issued six months after it was due and three months after the plaintiff filed suit, the court found

that exhaustion had occurred. De La Torre v. Johnson, CV-F-01-6046-AWI-LJO-P. However, in

another case, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that exhaustion had occurred by virtue of the

untimely response on the ground that plaintiff was in possession of the untimely response before he

filed suit. The court stated 8

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

With respect to plaintiff’s contention that defendant is not entitled to dismissal

because the response to the appeal was untimely, plaintiff received a response to his

appeal before he filed suit. Although the response was untimely, plaintiff was in

possession of the response at the time plaintiff filed suit. Plaintiff could have

submitted the appeal to the next level, but chose to file suit instead. This situation

is clearly distinguishable from those situations in which prison officials fail to

respond within the applicable time limits and the prisoner is unaware of when, if

ever, he or she might receive a response.

Lundh v. Warden CV-F-02-6196-AWI-LJO-P (Doc. 23, 1:27-2:5).

However, what may or may have occurred if plaintiff had proceeded with his original suit

and defendants had raised the issue of exhaustion is purely speculative and is irrelevant to the motion

to dismiss in this action. The court must look at the facts as they were at the time this action was

filed in determining whether exhaustion occurred prior to filing suit. Inmates have fifteen working

days to submit their appeal to the next level of review. Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3084.6(c) (2006).

Assuming plaintiff did not receive the second level response until August 7, 2002, as he contends,

plaintiff needed to have submitted his appeal to the Director’s Level on or before August 28, 2002.

Plaintiff’s submission of his appeal to the Director’s Level on September 24, 2002, was in fact

untimely and the rejection of the appeal as untimely was not wrongful. Where an inmate’s appeal

is rejected as untimely because he failed to follow the applicable rules, the exhaustion requirement

is not satisfied. Woodford, 126 S.Ct. at 2382. 

In his January 10, 2007, opposition, plaintiff argues that his inmate appeal was granted at the

first level and he was not required to pursue it any further. The court rejects this argument.

Plaintiff’s inmate appeal was only partially granted at the first formal level of appeal. Plaintiff is

attempting to impose liability on defendants for depriving him of his property without due process

of law. Plaintiff’s inmate appeal was partially granted only in that packages were no longer being

refused by the prison’s post office. This response does not constitute a complete grant of plaintiff’s

appeal, thereby fully resolving his dispute that his package was wrongfully confiscated, and there

were levels of review left available, evidenced by the fact that plaintiff pursued his appeal to the next

level of review.

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are also rejected. Plaintiff could have timely submitted his

appeal to the third and final level of review after receiving it back from the second level on August

7, 2002, but did not do so. Plaintiff’s untimely submission of his appeal to the Director’s level of

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

review and its ultimate rejection for untimeliness do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement, and

plaintiff is precluded from proceeding with this suit. Id. at 2382.

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, filed July 5, 2006, be

GRANTED; and

2. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), this action be dismissed, without prejudice, based

on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05092-AWI-LJO Document 81 Filed 01/17/07 Page 9 of 9