Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00313/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00313-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:0605 Communications Act of 1934

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc., )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:15-cv-00313 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

Juan Valencia Manzo, et al., ) [Re: Motions at Docket 26 and 27]

)

Defendants. )

)

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

At docket 17 the court entered a final default judgment in favor of plaintiff Joe

Hand Promotions, Inc. (“Plaintiff”). At docket 19 defendants Juan Valencia Manzo

(“Manzo”), Luz Valencia (“Valencia”), and Manzo Restaurants at Central, LLC

(collectively, “Defendants”) move pursuant to Rules 55(c) and 60(b) for an order setting

the judgment aside. Plaintiff opposes at docket 22. Defendants reply at docket 25.

Before the court are two motions related to the above filings. At docket 26

Plaintiff moves to strike portions of Defendants’ reply, and at docket 27 Plaintiff moves

for leave to file a surreply. At docket 29 Defendants oppose the motion to strike, but

not the motion for leave to file a surreply. Plaintiff has not filed a reply. 

Oral argument was not requested but would not assist the court. 

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II. BACKGROUND

“Ultimate Fighting Championship 157: Ronda Rousey v. Liz Carmouche” is a

televised fighting program (“the Program”) that aired in February 2013. Plaintiff sued

Defendants for showing the Program at their restaurant without authorization, in

violation of Plaintiff’s rights as the Program’s exclusive commercial domestic distributor.

On May 7, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a request for entry of default against all

Defendants.1

 This request was supported by proofs of service from James Menona

(“Menona”), a process server who declared that on April 9, 2015, at around 12:20 pm

he served a copy of the summons and complaint on all three defendants at Valencia

Produce, a separate business that Manzo runs.2

 Menona states that he served all

three defendants the same way: “by delivering [copies of the documents] to and leaving

[them] with” Manzo and Valencia, personally.

3

After a clerk’s entry of default was issued,4 Plaintiff moved the court to enter a

default judgment in its favor in the amount of $23,000.5 The court granted Plaintiff’s

motion on June 11, 2015.6 Exactly one year later, on June 11, 2016, Defendants filed

their motion to set aside the default judgment.

1Doc. 12.

2Docs. 9, 10, and 11.

3Docs. 9, 10, and 11. Menona states that service on Manzo Restaurants at Central, LLC

was effectuated through service on Valencia, the company’s registered agent for service of

process. Doc. 10.

4Doc. 13.

5Doc. 14.

6Doc. 16.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Leave to File a Surreply

Based on Defendants’ non-opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff will be

granted leave to file a surreply that responds to new arguments and evidence that

Defendants raised for the first time in reply, including but not limited to the declaration

of Linda J. Guzman (“Guzman”) at docket 25-1.7

B. Motion to Strike

Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“Local Rule”) 7.2(m) governs motions to strike. It

provides in pertinent part that a motion to strike may be filed “if it seeks to strike any

part of a filing or submission on the ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a

statute, rule, or court order.”8 The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is within

the court’s discretion.9

Plaintiff asks the court to strike two pieces of evidence and two arguments that, it

argues, Defendants raised for the first time in reply. Plaintiff relies on MJG Enterprises,

where the court struck certain arguments and evidence because they were raised for

the first time in reply and the plaintiff lacked an opportunity to respond to them.

10

 MJG

Enterprises can be differentiated from the case at bar, however, because here the non7Plaintiff’s surreply need not respond to the returns of service that Defendants submitted

as Exhibit B to their reply. The court agrees with Plaintiff that they are irrelevant.

8LRCiv 7.2(m)(1).

9Spencer v. Stapler, No. 04-1532 PHX SMM, 2006 WL 2052704, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 21,

2006).

10MJG Enterprises, Inc. v. Cloyd, No. CV-10-0086-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 3842222, at *6

n.1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2010) (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“[W]here new evidence is presented in a reply to a motion for summary judgment, the district

court should not consider the new evidence without giving the [non-]movant an opportunity to

respond.”) (internal quotation omitted)).

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moving party will have an opportunity to respond to the new arguments and evidence in

a surreply brief. Plaintiff’s motion to strike will be denied.11

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Plaintiff’s motion at docket 26 is DENIED

and Plaintiff’s motion at docket 27 is GRANTED. Plaintiff may file a surreply that is

consistent with this order within 7 days of today’s date. 

DATED this 21st day of September 2016.

/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11See, e.g., Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 256 F.R.D. 180, 201 (N.D. Cal. 2009)

(“To the extent Plaintiffs may have gone beyond the scope of the Opposition, RGIS was given

an opportunity to submit a sur-reply, as well as additional rebuttal declarations of its own.

Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to grant the relief requested by RGIS.”);

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1071 (D. Nev.

1998) (“Because this court issued a minute order (# 43) allowing defendants an opportunity to

respond with their own evidence, defendants’ objection on the delay in plaintiffs submission of

this evidence is no longer valid.”).

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