Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08217/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08217-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard Robert Romar, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-8217-PCT-JJT (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Richard Robert Romar filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 4, 

2013, challenging his convictions in Mojave County Superior Court for multiple felonies 

arising out of his sexual contact with a minor. His habeas petition raises three claims: 

ineffective assistance of counsel, cruel and unusual punishment, and a due process 

violation. As explained below, the Court recommends that Romar’s petition be denied 

and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 In 2006, Romar was indicted in Mohave County on four counts arising from his 

alleged sexual abuse of two different children. (Doc. 11, Ex. B) Romar’s counsel moved 

in limine to preclude the State from presenting evidence of his 1985 felony convictions 

for sexual abuse under Arizona Rule of Evidence 609. (Doc. 11, Ex. F) The Court 

granted this motion. (Doc. 11, Ex. G at 29-30) The State then moved in limine for 

permission to ask Romar’s character witnesses whether they knew about his 1985 

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convictions and that he was required to register as a sex offender. (Doc. 11, Ex. H) The 

State argued that these questions were permissible under Arizona Rules of Evidence 

404(a) and 405. (Id.) The Court denied the State’s motion on the question about 

Romar’s registration as a sex offender. (Doc. 11, Ex. J) The Court then ruled that if 

Romar’s character witnesses testified that Romar would not have committed the alleged 

crime, then the State could ask its proposed questions about Romar’s 1985 convictions. 

(Doc. 11, Exs. I, L) During trial, Romar did not testify and he did not call any character 

witnesses. (Doc. 11, Exs. M, O) 

 On December 5, 2007, at the conclusion of a two day trial in the Mojave County 

Superior Court, a jury found Romar guilty of three felonies arising out of his sexual 

contact with a minor. (Doc. 11, Ex. O) On January 3, 2008, Romar was sentenced to 

three mitigated, concurrent sentences; one sentence was 23 years and the other two 

sentences were 25 years each. (Doc. 11, Ex. P) At the time of his sentencing, Romar 

was 78 years old. (Id.) 

 Romar, through counsel, timely appealed and argued that the trial court should not 

have ruled that the State could cross examine his character witnesses about his 22 yearold convictions. (Doc. 11, Exs. R, S) After the issue was fully briefed, the Court of 

Appeals affirmed his conviction in State v. Romar, 212 P.3d 34 (Ariz. App. 2009). (Doc. 

11, Exs. T, U, V, W) The Court used Romar’s appeal to extend “the long-established 

rule that a defendant who chooses not to testify cannot claim error in a ruling allowing 

him to be impeached with his prior conviction” to include “a ruling on the use of prior 

convictions to rebut character witnesses.” Id. at 37, ¶ 6. The Court held that Romar 

“failed to preserve his claim of error” when he “fail[ed] to call his character witnesses.” 

Id. at ¶ 6. Romar petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review and, on September 

22, 2009, his petition was denied. (Doc. 11, Exs. X, Y, Z) 

 Romar, through appellate counsel, timely filed a Notice and Petition for PostConviction Relief arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he failed to 

honor Romar’s request to testify, (2) he failed to effectively cross-examine the State’s 

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witness, (3) he failed to object to the State’s leading questions during direct examination, 

(4) his defense theory was not supported by law, (5) he was inexperienced, and (6) of the 

cumulative effect of his errors.1

 (Doc. 11, Exs. CC, DD) At the conclusion of briefing, 

the Superior Court ordered an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from Romar’s 

trial counsel and an expert. (Doc. 11, Exs. EE, FF, GG, HH, II, JJ) Subsequently, the 

Court issued a thorough and detailed order denying Romar’s Petition. (Doc. 11, Ex. K) 

Romar petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review. (Doc. 11, Exs. LL, MM, NN) 

The Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. PP) Romar did not 

move for reconsideration and did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. QQ) 

 Romar timely filed a pro per Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. 

(Doc. 1) First, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. (Doc. 1 at 6) Next, he 

argues that, because of his age, his sentences amounts to a natural life term. (Id. at 7) 

His final argument is that his due process rights were violated when the Superior Court 

ruled that any character witnesses who testified at trial could be cross-examined about his 

prior convictions. (Id. at 8) Respondents contend that these arguments are all 

procedurally defaulted, without excuse. (Doc. 11) This Court recommends that this 

Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

 

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 Romar alleged, and then withdrew, a claim that his trial counsel had been 

ineffective for failing to preserve the record for appeal. (Doc. 11, Exs. DD, KK) 

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be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100.

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 

(1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986);

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

ROMAR’S CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REVIEW.

 Claim One: Ineffective Assistance. Romar alleges that he received ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. To support this claim, he makes vague and conclusory 

statements in his Petition without pointing to any specific examples. (Doc. 1 at 6) 

Because his Petition did not include any supporting facts, he has not complied with Rule 

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2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“bald assertions of ineffective assistance” and “conclusory allegations” are 

insufficient for habeas relief). 

 Romar attached a letter to his Petition along with some pages from motions that 

were filed by his Rule 32 counsel, and a page from the Superior Court’s ruling on his 

post-conviction proceedings. (Doc 1 at 14-28) It appears that this letter and the 

attachments were sent to the Mohave County Superior Court judges who presided over 

his case. (Doc. 1 at 15-16) Even giving these pages a liberal construction because of 

Romar’s pro se status, Romar does not establish the factual allegations necessary to 

review his claim. E.g., Hamilton v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(liberal construction given to pleadings filed by pro se petitioner); Boehme v. Maxwell, 

423 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 1970) (“Allegations of fact, rather than conclusions, are 

required.”). 

 Claim Two: Excessive Sentencing. Romar alleges that his sentence is the 

functional equivalent of a natural life term. As Romar acknowledges, he did not raise his 

excessive sentencing argument to the Arizona Court of Appeals or during Rule 32 

proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 7) And he can no longer do so because any Rule 32 petition 

raising this issue would not meet the requirements for timely or successive petitions 

under Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b), or 32.4(a). 

 Accordingly, even though his excessive sentencing argument is unexhausted, it is 

subject to an implied procedural bar. Further, because Romar has not demonstrated 

either a miscarriage of justice or cause and prejudice, this Court will not consider this 

claim. 

 Claim Three: Character Witness Testimony. Finally, Romar claims that the trial 

court violated his due process rights as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by 

ruling that any character witnesses who testified at trial could be cross-examined about 

his prior convictions. (Doc. 1 at 8) 

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 It appears that Romar’s claim is exhausted. In the briefing on this same issue at 

the Arizona Court of Appeals, Romar’s counsel argued that this ruling violated his right 

to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, violated his Sixth 

Amendment rights, and violated several articles of the Arizona Constitution. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. S at 6-7, Ex. U at 1) The Court of Appeals did not address Romar’s federal 

arguments and, instead, based its ruling on state law. Romar, 212 P.3d at 36-38. Thus, it 

appears that Romar exhausted this argument in the state courts by providing the operative 

facts and the federal basis for his claims. 

 It also appears that Romar’s claim is not subject to a procedural bar. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals used Romar’s appeal to extend an existing rule. This case may be the 

beginning of the state court’s strict and regular adherence to this rule of waiver but it 

cannot be said that “adequate” grounds existed when Romar appealed. Thus, it seems 

that a procedural bar does not apply to this claim. 

 Nevertheless, this Court declines to reach the merits of Romar’s claim for two 

reasons. First, the Arizona Court of Appeals decided this question on state law grounds, 

and “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Thus, even though Romar raises this as a question of federal law, review of this issue is 

not appropriate here. 

 Second, this Court will not reach the merits of Romar’s claim because “to raise 

and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a 

defendant must testify.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984). Romar “did not 

do so, and thus waived any federal constitutional claim he might otherwise have had.” 

Galindo v. Ylst, 971 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We, of course, understand that 

Luce was laid down as a federal rule of procedure, but it surely follows that its 

requirements do not violate the United States Constitution.”). See also United States v. 

Johnson, 903 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Johnson was given a choice—to testify 

and have possibly damaging prejudicial evidence come in, or not to testify and keep the 

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evidence out. Because Johnson did not even attempt to testify, he may not now challenge 

the ruling.”). Here, neither Romar nor his character witnesses testified and so he has 

waived any federal constitutional claims related to this issue. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Richard Robert Romar’s petition 

for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Dated this 4th day of May, 2015. 

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