Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01657/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01657-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 1 Although Plaintiff filed the action pro se, he has since then secured representation

by counsel.

08cv1657

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN PETERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VISTA

UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

Defendants.

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Civil No. 08cv1657-L(NLS)

ORDER GRANTING GUAJOME

ENTITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights

under federal and California law while he was a student at Guayome Park Academy Charter

School and Vista Unified School District.1

 Defendants Board of Trustees of Guajome Park

Academy and Guajome Park Academy Board Charter School (collectively “Guajome Entity

Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Defendants Board of Trustees of

the Vista Unified School District, Vista Unified School District, Jim Gibson, David Hubbard,

Dave Cowles and Chuck Cowles (collectively “Vista Defendants”) joined in Guajome Entity

Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff opposed the motion. For the reasons which follow, the motion is

GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED.

Plaintiff alleged six causes of action: (1) violation of his constitutional rights under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of California Government Code Section 44807; (3) violation of

California Constitution, Article I, Section 28; (4) violation of state and federal law based on

racial and disability harassment and retaliation; (5) discrimination and retaliation based on

disability; and (6) discrimination and retaliation based on race. It appears that Plaintiff’s fourth,

fifth and sixth causes of action are based on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12131 et seq. (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. Plaintiff alleged that while he was a student at Guayome

Park Academy Charter School and Vista Unified School District he was harassed based on his

race and disability, retaliated against for complaining about harassment, and was not provided

with a safe learning environment. Plaintiff requested compensatory and punitive damages. On

August 11, 2009 the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 2000d as

time-barred.

Guajome Entity Defendants seek to dismiss the remaining claims. Their motion is based

on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the

sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks,

brackets and citations omitted). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court

must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.

1996). Legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of

factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987); W. Mining

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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2 Elsewhere in the Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges he was removed from

Guayome Park Academy Charter School in 2003. (Am. Compl. at 14.)

3 08cv1657

Guajome Entity Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims based on the ADA and the

Rehabilitation Act are time-barred. “A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of

limitations period may be granted only ‘if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required

liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove the statute was tolled.’” Supermail Cargo, Inc.

v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1995), quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,

614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). The untimeliness must appear beyond doubt on the face of

the complaint before a claim will be dismissed as time-barred. See Supermail Cargo, 68 F.3d at

1206-07. 

According to the allegations in the amended complaint, the events giving rise to this

action started before February 2000 and continued until April 22, 2002, when Plaintiff’s parents

permanently removed him from Guayome Park Academy Charter School.2

 (Am. Compl. at 15-

21.) Neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act, the only remaining federal claims, includes its

own statute of limitations. When a federal statute does not contain a statute of limitations,

federal courts routinely borrow analogous statutes of limitations of the forum state. Hardin v.

Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538 (1989). The California statute which could be considered most

analogous to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act is the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil

Code Section 51, et seq. Kramer v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 81 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal.

1999). The longest statute of limitations which could apply to the Unruh Civil Rights act is the

three-year statute of limitations in California Civil Code Section 338. Olympic Club v. Those

Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 991 F.2d 497, 502 n.11 (9th Cir. 1993); but see W.

Shield Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Super Ct. (Eymil), 82 Cal.App.4th 935, 952-53

(2000); Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 754-59 (2002). 

The statute of limitations was tolled until Plaintiff reached the age of majority, which in

California is 18 years of age. (See discussion in the Aug. 11, 2009 order at 3-4 and authorities

cited therein.) Guajome Entity Defendants assert that this action was filed more than three years

after Plaintiff turned 18. Although Plaintiff’s birth date is not alleged in the amended complaint,

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the amended complaint references Dr. Jeanne Feldman’s November 17, 1997 evaluation, which

identifies Plaintiff’s date of birth as August 24, 1987. (Am. Compl. at 9 & Guajome Entity

Defs’ Ex. 1.) When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents referenced

in but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested. Branch v. Tunnell, 14

F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Gailbraith v. County of Santa

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1996). Plaintiff does not contest the authenticity of Dr. Feldman’s evaluation or dispute that

his date of birth is August 24, 1987. Accordingly, more than three years passed between the date

of Plaintiff’s majority and the filing of this action. 

Plaintiff argues that California’s three-year statute of limitations does not apply and that

his claims are timely pursuant to the four-year catch-all federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. §

1658. The federal statute provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of

Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be

commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.

28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are timely if they are

subject to the four-year statute of limitations. The statute applies if the claims arose under an

Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.

369, 372 (2004). Plaintiff maintains that his claims arise under the ADA Amendments Act of

2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325. The claims, however, are based on events occurring prior to 2003 –

years before the enactment of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. The act does not apply to

Plaintiff’s claims because it is not retroactive. Becerril v. Pima County Assessor’s Office, __

F.3d __, 2009 WL 4067450 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Because Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims do not arise under the ADA

Amendments Act of 2008, California’s three-year statute of limitations applies. As discussed

above, the claims are barred because the action was commenced after the expiration of the

three-year statute. Accordingly, the ADA and Rehabilitation claims are DISMISSED as timebarred.

With all claims arising under federal law dismissed as time-barred, the only claims

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remaining are state law claims. Guajome Entity Defendants contend that state law claims

against them are barred because Plaintiff did not commence this action within the time provided

by law for tort claims against public entities. They argue that Guajome Park Academy Charter

School, as a charter school, is a part of the California public school system. See Wilson v. State

Bd. of Educ., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (1999); Cal. Educ. Code § 47641. Plaintiff does not dispute

this. Accordingly, to the extent Guajome Park Academy Charter School is a public entity under

California law, Plaintiff’s state law claims against Guajome Entity Defendants are DISMISSED

as time-barred for the reasons stated in the August 11, 2009 Order Granting in Part and Denying

in Part Vista Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

To the extent any state law claims remain, the court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over them. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). They are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, this action is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 7, 2009

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. NITA L. STORMES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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