Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05202/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05202-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LYNN GAVIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-05202-EMC 

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS, (2) DENYING 

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER, (3) 

DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE, 

AND (4) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Docket Nos. 2, 4

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 13, 2015, Plaintiff Lynn Gavin filed the instant pro se suit against multiple 

defendants, alleging various federal and state law violations. Plaintiff has applied to proceed in 

forma pauperis, and also moves for a temporary restraining order (TRO) for emergency housing 

assistance at a hotel and retroactive reinstatement into the Housing Choice Voucher Program. See

Docket No. 2 (In Forma Pauperis Application) (IFP App.); Docket No. 4 (TRO Application) at 5.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis

application, DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the instant complaint, DENIES the TRO 

application as moot, and issues an ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as to why Plaintiff should not be 

deemed a vexatious litigant.

II. DISCUSSION

A. In Forma Pauperis Application

When presented with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must first 

determine if the applicant satisfies the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984). Section 1915(a) does not 

require an applicant to demonstrate absolute destitution. See McCone v. Holiday Inn Convention 

Case 3:15-cv-05202-EMC Document 7 Filed 11/18/15 Page 1 of 6
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Ctr., 797 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 

335 U.S. 331, 339).

In her application, Plaintiff states that she is currently unemployed and that her only source 

of money is social security, as she is disabled. IFP App. at 2; see Compl. at ¶ 107. Plaintiff does 

not specify the amount of social security received. Id. Plaintiff asserts that she lacks any assets, 

and does not own a home or a vehicle, or have any money in a bank account. Given this 

information, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

B. Allegations in Complaint

The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the Court determines 

that the allegation of poverty is untrue, the action is frivolous or malicious, or the action fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The determination of whether the litigant has 

stated a claim is decided under the same standard used in Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. 

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering such a motion, a court 

must take all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, although “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are 

insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The Court further notes that pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Court finds that dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is warranted. The instant 

suit is the tenth in a series of suits filed by Plaintiff and/or her son, Bamidele Hambolu in the 

Northern District of California. See Hambolu v. Parkmerced Investors Props., No. 12-cv-3824-

PJH; Gavin v. Murphy, No. 12-cv-5864-RS; Gavin v. Arntz, No. 13-56-PJH, Hambolu v. San 

Francisco Hous. Auth., No. 14-cv-3020-JSC; Gavin v. FCOF PM EQ LLC, No. 14-4582-RS; 

Gavin v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 14-cv-4583-RS; Hambolu v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., No. 14-

cv-4975-RS; Hambolu v. PCOF PM EQ, LLC, No. 15-cv-2780-RS; Gavin v. San Francisco Hous. 

Auth., No. 15-cv-4097-RS. Like those suits, this action alleges that Plaintiff was wrongfully 

evicted from the Parkmerced apartments in 2012, after she failed to pay allegedly usurious utility 

Case 3:15-cv-05202-EMC Document 7 Filed 11/18/15 Page 2 of 6
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

bills. Docket No. 1 (Compl.) at ¶¶ 99, 100; TRO Application at 12; see also Hambolu v. PCOF 

PM EQ, LLC, Nos. 15-cv-2780-RS and 15-cv-4097-RS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123876, at *1-2

(N.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2015).

Plaintiff’s cases have been dismissed on various grounds, including preclusion, statute of 

limitations, failure to prosecute, failure to state a viable claim, and failure to comply with 

administrative requirements such as the California Torts Claims Act. E.g., Hambolu v. FCOF PM 

EQ, LLC, No. 15-2780-JSW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82865, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015)

(finding that Plaintiffs’ federal law claims were likely time-barred); Gavin v. Arntz, No. 13-56-

PJH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730, at *8-9, 15-21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2013) (dismissing claims 

to the extent that they were previously raised against the Parkmerced defendants, and dismissing 

the remainder for failure to state a claim and comply with the California Tort Claims Act); Gavin 

v. Park Merced Investors Props. LLC, No. 12-5864-RS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60914, at *2-3 

(dismissing for failure to connect any of the named defendants to a legal violation). Most recently, 

in Hambolu v. PCOF PM EQ, LLC, the court dismissed the case with prejudice based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123876, at *3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). The court 

found that the complaints were “filled with unnecessary and improper argument and citations,” 

and that the “[i]nclusion of extraneous materials not only violates the spirit and letter of the rules,

it also renders it nearly impossible to determine whether any allegations of fact buried within the 

rhetoric might support a viable claim against at least some defendants.” Id. at *4. The court 

further found that “many of the[] theories are simply not viable (and may even be precluded).” Id.

In dismissing with prejudice, the court explained that “Plaintiffs’ lengthy and checkered history in 

this district, characterized by serial filings and a repeated failure to prosecute, demonstrates that 

leave to amend would be futile in these cases.” Id. at *5-6.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims were previously raised against the same defendants, the 

claims are precluded. See Knox v. Donahoe, No. C-11-cv-2596-EMC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

37719, at *8-13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012). Furthermore, like other courts in this district, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff’s 84-page complaint fails to provide a “short and plain statement of the 

Case 3:15-cv-05202-EMC Document 7 Filed 11/18/15 Page 3 of 6
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

claim,” but simply repeats the same, conclusory allegations. See Compl. at ¶¶ 77, 79, 114, 165, 

237, 295 (repeating allegation that Defendant Mayor Edwin M. Lee has “through a conflict of 

interest” injured Plaintiff by failing to act on the issuance of 700 three-day notices by Parkmerced 

for usurious utility fees). For her individual claims, Plaintiff repeats the same conclusory 

allegation against individual defendants, but fails to allege any facts supporting the cause of 

action. For example, with respect to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for 18 U.S.C. Section 241 

“conspiracy against rights,” Plaintiff simply repeats the allegation that the individual defendants 

through a “conflict of interest” injured her family by failing to act on the 700 three-day notices for 

usurious utility fees and “permitted discrimination” resulting in the loss of her subsidized housing, 

but never alleges what the individual defendant did specifically and how it constitutes a 

conspiracy. See Compl. at ¶¶ 114-157; see also id. at ¶¶ 165-223 (making same allegations with 

respect to fourth cause of action for 18 U.S.C. Section 242 “deprivation of rights under color of 

law”); ¶¶ 237-272 (making same allegations with respect to fifth cause of action for 18 U.S.C. 

Section 245 “federally protected rights”); ¶¶ 295-336 (making same allegations with respect to 

sixth cause of action for 42 U.S.C. Section 3631 “criminal interference with right to fair 

housing”).

In addition to this failure to provide specific facts that support her claims, Plaintiff’s claims

lack merit. For example, Plaintiff brings a Brown Act claim for the alleged failure to provide 

notice as to changes made in a May 24, 2011 Land Use Committee meeting of Parkmerced’s 

Development Agreement. Compl. at ¶ 403. To bring a Brown Act claim seeking the nullification 

of a prior action, an interested party must make a written demand to the legislative body to cure or 

correct the alleged violation within 90 days from the date of the action taken. Cal. Gov. Code § 

54960.1. The legislative body then has 30 days to act or decline to cure. If the legislative body 

declines to cure, the interested party has only 15 days to file suit. Given these strict deadlines, 

Plaintiff’s Brown Act claim is certainly time-barred. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s causes of action 

under federal criminal statutes cannot support a civil cause of action. See Todd v. Mukasey, Case 

No. C-14-1873 JCC-BAT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179629, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014) 

(finding that 18 U.S.C. Section 1031 (major fraud against the United States) could not be brought 

Case 3:15-cv-05202-EMC Document 7 Filed 11/18/15 Page 4 of 6
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

as civil action); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that 18 U.S.C. 

Sections 241 and 242 provide no basis for civil liability); Bey v. City of Oakland, No. 14-cv-1626-

JSC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118374, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2014) (finding no private right of 

action under 18 U.S.C. Section 245); Adams v. Easley, No. CIV S-11-0826 GEB CKD PS, 2011 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98568, at *3-4 (finding that 42 U.S.C. Section 3631 provides only for criminal 

penalties, not civil liability).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed with prejudice. While pro se

litigants are generally given the opportunity to amend deficient pleadings, leave may be denied 

where amendment would be futile. Given the legal deficiency in the vast majority of Plaintiff’s 

claims, as well as Plaintiff’s problematic history of litigation in this district, the Court finds that 

dismissal with prejudice is warranted in this case. In light of this dismissal, Plaintiff’s TRO 

Application is denied as moot.1

C. Vexatious Litigant

When a litigant has filed numerous harassing or frivolous lawsuits, courts have the power 

to declare him a vexatious litigant and enter an order requiring that any future complaints be 

subject to an initial review before they are filed. District courts have the power to enter pre-filing 

orders against vexatious litigants under the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see Molski v. 

Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir 2007). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned, 

however, that “such pre-filing orders are an extreme remedy that should rarely be used” because of 

the danger of “tread[ing] on a litigant’s due process right of access to the courts.” Id. 

Nevertheless, such pre-filing orders are sometimes appropriate because “[f]lagrant abuse of the 

judicial process . . . enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be 

used to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants.” De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 

1148 (9th Cir. 1990).

In De Long, the Ninth Circuit set out the requirements for entering pre-filing orders against 

vexatious litigants. First, the litigant must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before 

 

1

The Court also notes that the TRO Application is exactly the same as that denied on September 

16, 2015. See Hambolu, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123876, at *6 n.3.

Case 3:15-cv-05202-EMC Document 7 Filed 11/18/15 Page 5 of 6
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

the order is entered. Second, the Court must compile an adequate record for review, including a 

list of all filings and motions leading to the conclusion that the individual is a vexatious litigant. 

Third, the Court must make substantive findings that the litigant’s filings are frivolous or 

harassing. Finally, the pre-filing order may not be overly broad, and must be “narrowly tailored to 

closely fit the specific vice encountered.” See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48.

Since 2012, Plaintiff has filed ten similar lawsuits in this district, including this case. 

These lawsuits and their outcome are listed as Exhibit A hereto. The lawsuits are all based on 

Plaintiff’s eviction in 2012 from the Parkmerced apartments. Each of the cases has been 

dismissed, including multiple dismissals for failure to prosecute. Pursuant to the first DeLong

requirement, Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to show cause why she should not be declared a 

vexatious litigant and have a pre-filing order entered against her.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and her complaint is 

hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Further, she is ORDERED to show cause why she should 

not be declared a vexatious litigant; Plaintiff is directed to file her response to the order to show 

cause by December 18, 2015.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 2 and 4.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2015

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-05202-EMC Document 7 Filed 11/18/15 Page 6 of 6