Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01813/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01813-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 385
Nature of Suit: Property Damage - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pd Diversity-Property Damage

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS W. PIGEON, an individual, 

TWP CONSULTING, INC., a California 

Corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WESTERN SKYWAYS, INC., a 

Colorado Corporation and DOES 1 to 100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-CV-1813 JLS (KSC)

ORDER (1) DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; (2) 

VACATING HEARING; (3) 

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; AND (4) 

SETTING SCHEDULE FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

(ECF Nos. 98, 104)

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Second Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment. (“Second MSJ,” ECF No. 104-2.) Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Response 

in Opposition to the Motion (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 107) and Defendant’s Reply in Support of 

the Motion. (“Reply,” ECF No. 108.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

The pending Motion is the second partial motion for summary judgment Defendant 

has filed in this matter. The Court summarized the factual background of this case in its 

previous order (see “Prior Order,” ECF No. 56, at 2–6) and does not repeat the background 

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here. As to the procedural background: in Defendant’s first motion for partial summary 

judgment, Defendant argued, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ recovery should be 

limited by the Gold Seal Warranty because the Gold Seal Warranty is a valid and 

enforceable part of the Parties’ contract. (“First MSJ,” ECF No. 46, at 4.) The Court denied 

Defendant’s motion, finding there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 

Gold Seal Warranty is part of the agreement between the Parties. (“Prior Order,” ECF No. 

56, at 12.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary 

judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is 

appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect 

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

genuine dispute of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When the Court considers the evidence 

presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 

falls on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden 

by identifying the “portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’” that show an absence of dispute 

regarding a material fact. Id. Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the 

nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for 

trial. Id. at 324. This requires “more than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 586 (1986). Rather, to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “by her 

own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ 

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designate ‘specific facts’” that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

ANALYSIS

In the present Motion, Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, 

negligence per se, and product liability are barred by the economic loss rule. (Second MSJ 

2.) The economic loss rule was adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in 2000. Town of 

Alma v. AZCO Const., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000). Under Colorado law, “a party 

suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty 

may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort 

law.” Id. There are “three factors that aid in determining whether the duty allegedly 

breached is independent of the parties’ contract: (1) whether the relief sought in tort is the 

same as the contractual relief; (2) whether there is a recognized common law duty of care; 

and (3) whether the tort duty differs in any way from the contractual duty.” BRW, Inc. v. 

Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 74 (Colo. 2004).

Defendant does not dispute it had a common law duty of care to Plaintiffs but argues 

this duty of care is the “precise duty encompassed in the Gold Seal Warranty or implied 

warranties between Plaintiffs and Defendant.” (Reply 5.) Defendant argues because the 

duties are the same under either the express warranty or the implied warranties of 

merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, the economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs’ 

tort claims. Plaintiffs argue, “whether [these] implied warranties were integrated into the 

contract turns on whether the Gold Seal Warranty, which purports to waive[] or exclude 

all implied warranties, is part of the contract. . . . [and] this issue is one for the jury to 

decide.” (Opp’n 3.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs.

As to the Gold Seal Warranty: The Court finds the issue of whether the economic 

loss doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ claims due to the duty in the Gold Seal Warranty requires the 

determination of the issue the Court has previously found to be for the jury: whether the 

Gold Seal Warranty is part of the Parties’ agreement. The Court cannot determine how the 

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Gold Seal Warranty applies to the economic loss doctrine if it has not yet been determined 

if the Gold Seal Warranty is even part of the Parties’ agreement.

As to the implied warranties: The warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 

particular purpose are implied in every contract for the sale of goods unless expressly 

excluded. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-2-314, 4-2-315, 4-2-316. “[T]o exclude or 

modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it, the language must mention 

merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify 

any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.” 

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-2-316.

The Gold Seal Warranty contains waivers of the very implied warranties on which 

Defendant, in part, bases its Motion. (See ECF No. 46-5, at 13 (“ALL IMPLIED 

WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED 

WARRANTIES OF FITNESS AND MERCHANTABILITY FOR A PARTICULAR 

PURPOSE ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED TO THE EXTENT LOCAL LAWS ALLOW 

DISCLAIMERS.”). Before the Court can determine whether or not the implied warranties

bar Plaintiffs’ claims under the economic loss rule, it would need to be determined whether 

or not these implied warranties have been effectively waived under Colorado law.1 And 

before this could even be determined, the jury would need to determine whether the Gold 

Seal Warranty is part of the Parties’ agreement in the first place. 

CONCLUSION

Thus, the Court determines Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment is 

not ripe for determination and DENIES Defendant’s Motion.

\ \ \

\ \ \

 

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In its Motion, Defendant does not ask the Court to determine whether these warranties have been 

effectively waived and only vaguely touches on the issue of whether the warranties are included at all. 

(See Second MSJ 3 (“To the extent that the contract included the implied warranties of merchantability 

and fitness for a particular purpose . . . .”). But Defendant’s Motion, by requesting the Court hold that the 

implied warranties bar Plaintiffs’ claims, seems to assume the implied warranties were not waived.

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Also presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice (“MJN,” 

ECF No. 98) and Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Opp’n to MJN,” ECF No. 

100.) Plaintiffs request the Court take judicial notice of various “legislative facts:” 49 

U.S.C § 40103; 5 U.S.C § 553; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel; 14 C.F.R. 

§§ 43.2, 43.9, 43.11, 43.13; 145.221, and 65.95; and 18 U.S.C. § 38. (MJN 1–8.)

This Court can consider legal authority without judicially noticing the opinions. 

McVey v. McVey, 26 F. Supp. 3d 980, 984–85 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Judicial notice is reserved 

for notice of adjudicative facts only. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judicial Notice. The Court will review and consider all legal 

authority the parties cite in their trial briefs.

SCHEDULE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

1. The Court VACATES the hearing set for October 26, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.

2. On or before November 20, 2017, the Parties MUST file with the Court:

a. One set of joint proposed jury instructions that complies with the Court’s 

direction from the August 10, 2017 pretrial conference. To the extent one party 

objects to a given jury instruction in the joint set, that party is to note its objection 

on the joint document;

b. One joint statement of the case;

c. One joint witness list;

d. One joint exhibit list;

e. One proposed verdict form;

f. Proposed voir dire questions (one per side).2

 

2 As the Court noted at the previous pretrial conference on December 1, 2016, voir dire of 20-30 minutes 

will be allowed per each side.

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3. The pre-trial conference scheduled for November 29, 2017 at 9:30 a.m. remains on 

calendar.

4. On or before December 20, 2017, each party must file its trial brief with the Court.

5. The jury trial scheduled for January 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, and 22, 2018 remains 

on calendar.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2017

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