Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00651/USCOURTS-almd-3_07-cv-00651-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

FELIX BENTLEY, )

)

PLAINTIFF, ) 

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:07-cv-651-MEF

)

GREEN TREE SERVICING LLC, et al., ) (WO-Not Recommended for Publication)

)

DEFENDANTS. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Remand (Doc. # 9) filed by Plaintiff

on August 15, 2007. This lawsuit was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Macon County,

Alabama. Arguing that Plaintiff had fraudulently joined Defendant Mandi Carter, (“Carter”)

in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction, Defendant Green Tree Servicing LLC (“Green Tree”)

removed the action to this Court. Plaintiff seeks remand of this action contending that Carter

was not fraudulently joined. For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and

Order, the Court finds that the Motion to Remand is due to be GRANTED because Carter

was not fraudulently joined. 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095

(11th Cir. 1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th

Cir. 1983). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been

authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. See Kokkonen,

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511 U.S. at 377. Because federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors

remand of removed cases when federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. See Burns, 31

F.3d at 1095.

Removal of a case from state to federal court is proper if the case could have been

brought originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removing defendant has

the burden of establishing that the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action.

See Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that the party seeking

removal to federal court has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction). 

Green Tree argues that removal was proper because the Court has jurisdiction over

this case due to diversity of citizenship. The diversity statute confers jurisdiction on the

federal courts in civil actions between citizens of different states, in which the jurisdictional

amount of greater than $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, is met. See 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a)(1). Diversity jurisdiction is defeated if any plaintiff shares the same state citizenship

with any defendant. See Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 292 F.3d 1334,

1337 (11th Cir. 2002). This rule is known as “complete diversity.” Id. at 1338.

From the face of the Complaint it appears that there is not complete diversity of

citizenship in this case because Carter and Plaintiff are both residents of Alabama. Green

Tree argues that, due to the fraudulent joinder of Carter, the Court should disregard the

citizenship of Carter for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and conclude that complete

diversity between the parties exists. See, e.g., Owens v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 289 F. Supp. 2d

Case 3:07-cv-00651-MEF-SRW Document 15 Filed 12/05/07 Page 2 of 6
 “The plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent 1

defendant; he [or she] need only have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order

for the joinder to be legitimate.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th

Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). 

3

1319, 1325 (M.D. Ala. 2003); Bullock v. United Benefit Ins. Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1247

(M.D. Ala. 2001) ((“When a defendant has been fraudulently joined, the court should

disregard his or her citizenship for purposes of determining whether a case is removable

based upon diversity of citizenship.”). Thus, in order to determine whether complete

diversity exists in this case, the Court must address the issue of fraudulent joinder.

As the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, a defendant’s “right to

removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a residential defendant having no real

connection to the controversy.” Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921).

The Eleventh Circuit has articulated that joinder may be deemed fraudulent in three

situations:

The first is when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can

prove a cause of action against the resident (non-diverse)

defendant . . . The second is when there is outright fraud in the 1

plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdictional facts . . . [A third situation

arises] where a diverse defendant is joined with a nondiverse

defendant as to whom there is no joint, several or alternative

liability and where the claims against the diverse defendant has

no real connection to the claim against the nondiverse

defendant.

Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. A removing defendant bears the burden of proving fraudulent

joinder. See Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

Case 3:07-cv-00651-MEF-SRW Document 15 Filed 12/05/07 Page 3 of 6
It is important to note that the Court should determine its jurisdiction over the case 2

“based upon the plaintiff’s pleadings at the time of removal,” Coker, 709 F.2d 1433, 1440

(11th Cir. 1983), supplemented by any affidavits or deposition transcripts filed by the parties.

“While ‘the proceeding appropriate for resolving a claim of fraudulent joinder is similar to

that used for ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b),’ the

jurisdictional inquiry ‘must not subsume substantive determination’. . . When considering

a motion for remand, federal courts are not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff’s claim beyond

determining whether it is an arguable one under state law.” Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d

1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

 Because of the Court’s conclusion that the diversity of citizenship requirement has 3

not been met, it need not and will not address the parties contentions about whether the

amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.

4

This burden on the defendant is a heavy one. It requires the court to evaluate the parties’

factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all uncertainties

about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff. See id. If there is a possibility that a

state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the

resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder is proper and remand the case

to the state court. See Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 1983). In 2

other words, a motion to remand should be denied only if the court is convinced that there

is “no possibility that the plaintiff can establish any cause of action against the resident

defendant.” See Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553,1561 (11th Cir. 1989). 

The Court has carefully reviewed the claims against the resident defendant and the

arguments of the parties, and it must conclude that Carter has not been fraudulently joined.3

According to the Complaint, his mobile home was seized on January 12, 2007 based upon

a writ of execution issued by the Circuit Court of Macon County directing the Sheriff to seize

Case 3:07-cv-00651-MEF-SRW Document 15 Filed 12/05/07 Page 4 of 6
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property belonging to Peggy Bentley. The Complaint further alleges that the Plaintiff has no

relationship with Peggy Bentley and that the mobile home was not the property of Peggy

Bentley. The writ was issued based upon Carter’s affidavit, which stated that the mobile

home was in the possession of Peggy Bentley, that Peggy Bentley had defaulted on payments

to Green Tree, and that Peggy Bentley had wrongfully refused to release the property to

Green Tree.

The state of Alabama recognizes that a party may be liable for a wrongful execution.

See C & S Financial Servs. v. Bradley, 501 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Ala. 1987). Furthermore, it

has been recognized that 

All persons who have anything to do with the wrongful issuance or levy of an

execution, including persons who procure, direct, or assist in the commission

of the wrongful act by the officer, are liable to the person injured thereby.

Even a stranger or person not a party to the suit who officiously directs an

officer in making a wrongful levy, or who accompanies an officer and assists

him in the commission of the wrongful act, is equally liable with the officer for

the injury sustained.

Mica Indus. v. Penland, 107 S.E.2d 120, 123-24 (N.C. 1959); see also 30 Am. Jur. 2d

Executions § 526 (“Generally, liability [for wrongful execution] is premised upon direct

participation in some way in a wrongful levy, as by inducing or directing it to be made or by

the subsequent ratification or adoption of the wrongful act.” (emphasis added)). Neither

party has cited, and this Court has not found, any binding authority, directly on point,

regarding whether a person can be liable for a wrongful execution based upon their affidavit

in support of obtaining a writ of execution. However, the burden is on the defendant who

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removed this case to federal court to show that the joinder was fraudulent. Accordingly,

because it appears that it is possible that Plaintiff could state a claim against Carter for her

participation in the seizure of Plaintiff’s motor home, this Court finds that Carter was not

fraudulently joined, and her citizenship must be taken into account for the purpose of

determining whether complete diversity exists. Because Carter and Plaintiff are both citizens

of Alabama, complete diversity does not exist and this Court lackssubject matter jurisdiction

over the cause of action.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. # 9) is GRANTED.

(2) This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama.

(3) The Clerk is DIRECTED to take appropriate steps to effect the remand.

(4) Any pending motions other than the motion to remand are left for resolution

by the Circuit Court of Macon County, Alabama.

DONE this the 5 day of December, 2007. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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