Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-11-05199/USCOURTS-ca2-11-05199-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

1 New York’s Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, citing his sole control over the

2 issuance of custom license plates in the State of New York, deems a proposed

3 custom plate depicting a sun and two smiling children, and bearing the words,

4 “Choose Life,” to be “patently offensive,” and thus prohibited under New York law. 

5 In its desire to uphold this surprising result, the majority downplays the broad

6 discretion afforded to the Commissioner, perceives content in a regulation without

7 it, and divines a long-standing practice from trivial and contradictory evidence. The

8 majority effectively shields New York’s custom plate program from judicial review

9 and does so in a manner out of line with our precedent and with similar cases from

10 around the country. Because I would find that New York State’s custom plate

11 program places no meaningful limit on the Commissioner’s discretion, thereby

12 inviting viewpoint discrimination, I respectfully dissent. 

13 I.

14 Since 1977, New York has empowered its Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to

15 issue “special number plates” in accordance with Department of Motor Vehicle

16 regulations. See N.Y.VEH.&TRAF.LAW § 404 (“section 404”). Section 404 lodges the

17 decision to issue such plates solely with the Commissioner, providing that

1

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1 “[n]othing contained in [the statute] shall be construed to require the

2 [C]ommissioner to issue a special number plate or plates.” Id. 404(4); see also id.

3 404(1) (“The [C]ommissioner may issue special number plates . . . .” (emphasis

4 added)). Beyond minimal fee requirements, the Commissioner’s discretion in

5 issuing the plates is impacted by only one regulation, 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5, which

6 states in relevant part that “[n]o plate shall be issued . . . which . . . is, in the

7 discretion of the [C]ommissioner, obscene, lewd, lascivious, derogatory to a

8 particular ethnic or other group, or patently offensive.” Id. §16.5(e). The 1

9 interpretation of these terms, as noted in the regulation, is entrusted to “the

10 discretion of the [C]ommissioner.” Id. Thus, by their plain terms, section 404 places

11 no limit on the Commissioner’s discretion in reviewing applications for special

12 number plates, and 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5 places at most a modest one, requiring the

 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5 states in full that: 1

No plate shall be issued under this Part which: (a) does not have at least one

letter. This provision shall not apply to plates issued to public officers; (b)

has numbers and letters, or any combination thereof, arranged in a format

reserved for issuance to specific classes of vehicles other than passenger

vehicles; (c) is assigned for issuance to historical motor vehicles; (d) consists

of six numbers followed by one letter; (e) is, in the discretion of the

commissioner, obscene, lewd, lascivious, derogatory to a particular ethnic or

other group, or patently offensive; or (f) would lead one to believe that the

owner of a particular vehicle is connected with or operating in an official

capacity for a governmental organization or function.

2

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1 Commissioner to deny applications that he determines run afoul of the regulation. 

2 The Commissioner’s discretion to approve applications is unlimited beyond the

3 scope of 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5, and his discretion to deny applications is entirely

4 unbounded. 

5 In 1992, in a bid to generate additional revenue, the New York State

6 legislature amended section 404 to approve the sale of “distinctive regional design

7 plates.” N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 404-l. Though the Department had long issued

8 individual “vanity” plates and other plates specifically authorized by statute, the

9 Commissioner relied on this amendment to institute the large-scale custom plate

10 program at issue here. Dubbed “Take Your Pride for a Ride,” the program

11 authorizes the issuance of customlicenseplate series on the application of non-profit

12 organizations that are registered in New York and fall within eight broad categories:

13 (1) Sports Teams; (2) Causes; (3) Organizations; (4) Counties and Regions of New

14 York; (5) Colleges, Fraternities, and Sororities; (6) Military and Veterans;

15 (7) Emergency Services; and (8) Professions. To apply, an organization is required

16 to submit a description of itself and its cause, a refundable deposit sufficient to

17 finance the initial manufacturing costs, a plate design, and marketing materials. No

18 statute or regulation specific to the program guides the Commissioner’s

3

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1 implementation of the program or provides objective criteria for his review of

2 applications. See id. 404-l(1) (providing for issuance of “license plate[s] with a

3 distinctive regional design approved by the [C]ommissioner”). Instead, only 15

4 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5 – in relevant part, prohibiting a subset of plates deemed “obscene,

5 lewd, lascivious, derogatory to a particular ethnic or other group, or patently

6 offensive” – applies. 

7 From 1992 to 2004, when the Department suspended the program, the

8 program issued dozens of custom plate series, spanning topics as diverse as sports,

9 pets, recycling, Freemasonry, the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt, motorcycle and

10 luxury car ownership,horse racing, military service, and professional memberships. 

11 Notably, the Commissioner approved plates for both “Cop Shot,” an organization

12 providing monetary rewards for information concerning officers harmed in the line

13 of duty whose custom plate depicts a blood splatter, a cross-hair, and the words

14 “SUPPORTPOLICE,” andthe “Union Yes” campaign, with three separate pro-union

15 plates promoting the New York State AFL-CIO, New York State United Teachers

16 union, and unions generally.

17 Despite the broad array of messages approved for inclusion in the program,

18 the Commissioner thrice rejected Children First Foundation, Inc.’s (“CFF”)

4

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1 application for a “Choose Life” plate series. CFF first applied to the program in

2 December 2001, proposing a plate with the image of two smiling children, drawn in

3 crayon, positioned over the phrase “Choose Life.” Though CFF complied with the

4 program’s application requirements, the Commissioner denied its proposed plate

5 in February 2002. The only reason provided for the denial was that the Department

6 had rejected a similar “Choose Life” plate in 1998. After CFF requested a fuller

7 explanation, the Department replied that the proposed plate had been deemed

8 “patently offensive,” in contravention of 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e). In support of this

9 assertion, the Department cited its purported – albeit, unwritten – practice of

10 avoiding association with “either side” of a “political, religious[,] or social issue that

11 has proven to be . . . contentious and divisive.” J.A. 409. The Department averred 2

12 that notwithstanding CFF’s “laudable” pro-adoption goals, CFF’s “Choose Life”

13 slogan is “more commonly associated with the abortionrights debate” than the issue

14 of adoption, triggering the ban on “patently offensive” plates. The Department also

15 cited a purported risk of “road rage” should the plates be released to the public, as

The Department’s account of this “practice” has shifted during this litigation. While the 2

Department cited only a ban on “contentious” messages in its letter to CFF, in a subsequent

affirmation, the Deputy Commissioner and Counsel for the Department described the

practice as only approving applications that “refrain[ed] from espousing an[y] particular

religious, political or social position” (emphasis added). J.A. 1663. 

5

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1 well as a concern that the “Choose Life” plate series “would readily be perceived as

2 governmental support for one side of a controversy that has existed in this country

3 for several decades.” J.A. 409. 

3

4 In October 2003, CFF submitted a redesigned plate for consideration. Though

5 the plate, for the first time, promoted the website “Fund-Adoption.Org,” it retained

6 the “Choose Life” slogan. CFF stated in its application that the slogan was necessary

7 to appeal to pro-adoption, pro-life, and anti-death penalty advocates alike. The

8 Commissioner again rejected the proposed plate on the basis of the alleged policy

9 against “contentious” messages and, in an apparent effort to emphasize the finality

10 of the denial, cited to CFF his “sole[]” “control over the design, marketing, and

11 issuance of any custom plate series,” as well as the lack of any “legal requirement”

12 obliging him to approve applications. J.A. 439. CFF submitted another redesigned

13 plate in 2004 but the Commissioner deemed CFF’s application already denied. He

14 suspended the custom plate program altogether shortly thereafter.

Prior to the Commissioner’s denial of CFF’s custom plate applications, the Department 3

had issued several vanity plates to individuals associated with CFF and bearing messages

such as “CHSE LFE.” In addition, at the time the Commissioner denied CFF’s third and

final application, at least eleven other states offered custom “Choose Life” plates. See

Choose Life America, Inc., Newsletter, http://www.choose-life.org/ newsletter.php (last

visited April 18, 2015). In his deposition, the Commissioner admitted that he could not

recall a single instance of road rage spurred by a custom plate.

6

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1 Though the Department has denied four “Choose Life” plates pursuant to its

2 alleged policy deeming so-called “contentious” license plates to be “patently

3 offensive” (namely, CFF’s three submissions and the 1998 application), the

4 Department points to only one other custom plate application barred by this

5 asserted policy: a “Restore the Wolf” plate supporting repopulation of the Eastern

6 timber wolf in the Adirondacks.

7 II.

8 Before addressing the constitutionality of New York’s custom plate program,

9 it is necessary to determine the type of speech and forum at issue. I, along with the

10 majority and nearly every circuit to consider a similar program, conclude that the

11 speech is private and the forum nonpublic. See, e.g., Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46,

12 53-54 (2d Cir. 2010); Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2001); Ariz. Life

13 Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2008); Choose Life Ill., Inc., v. White,

14 547 F.3d 853, 864-65 (7th Cir. 2008). Both the purpose of the program and the

15 speakers involved compel a finding that the custom plates communicate private

16 speech. The program permits non-profit organizations the opportunity to convert

17 license plates into “‘mobile billboard[s]’” to promote their message while raising

18 revenue for their cause. See Choose Life Ill., Inc., 547 F.3d at 862 (quoting Wooley v.

7

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1 Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)). The fact that the message is imparted on

2 governmentpropertydoes not override its private provenance. While agovernment

3 officialmustapprove the custom plates, nonprofit organizations propose anddesign

4 them, and vehicle owners choose to display them on their cars. See Choose Life Ill.,

5 Inc., 547 F.3d at 863-64. Because “Take Your Pride for a Ride” therefore implicates

6 private and not government speech, the strictures of the First Amendment apply. 

7 See Ariz. Life Coal. Inc., 515 F.3d at 963. Further, though the program permits an

8 array of speech, both the quantity of that speech (the text that can fit on a license

9 plate) and access to the program (with all license plate designs requiring approval

10 by the Commissioner) are limited. Because New York did not thus intend to open

11 its custom plate program to “general public discourse and debate,” it created a

12 nonpublic forum, permitting more stringent regulation of speech. SeeChoose Life Ill.,

13 Inc., 547 F.3d at 864-65.

14 At this point in the analysis, however, the majority and I diverge. Confronted

15 with an utterly standardless regime that interprets “patently offensive” to mean

16 “contentious” – and that then deems a “Union Yes” plate benign and “Choose Life”

17 and wolfrepopulationplates “especially” controversial – the majority concludes that

18 adequate standards guide the Commissioner’s discretion. Maj. Op. at 40. In light

8

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1 of our contrary precedent and the utter malleability of the regulatory regime at

2 issue, I cannot agree.

3 * * *

4 The danger of content and viewpoint discrimination in violation of First

5 Amendment rights “is at its zenith when the determination of who may speak and

6 who may not is left to the unbridled discretion of a government official.” City of

7 Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988); see Roach v. Stouffer, 560

8 F.3d 860, 869 (8th Cir. 2009) (discussing this danger in the context of a custom license

9 plate program). Accordingly,where a licensing restriction lacks “‘narrow, objective,

10 and definite standards to guide the licensing authority,’” it may be deemed

11 unconstitutional on its face. Amidon v. Student Ass’n of State Univ. of N.Y., 508 F.3d

12 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,

13 131 (1992)). This principle protects against two relevant risks: first, self-censorship

14 by “timid speakers who are worried that officials will discriminate against their

15 unorthodox views,” and second, that lacking governing standards, a government

16 official may “suppress viewpoints in surreptitious ways that are difficult to detect.” 

17 Id. at 103-04. In either scenario, the opportunity for meaningful judicial review is

18 virtually nil. Id.

9

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1 I agree with the majority that the prohibition against unbridled discretion

2 applies to a nonpublic forum. Maj. Op. at 27. This is because “the dangers posed

3 by unbridled discretion—particularly the ability to hide unconstitutional viewpoint

4 discrimination—are just as present” in these fora. Child Evangelism Fellowship of MD,

5 Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs., 457 F.3d 376, 386 (4 Cir. 2006). Thus, while th

6 government officials may be accorded greater latitude in restricting access to such

7 fora, policies that “permit[] officials to deny access for any reason, or that do[] not

8 provide sufficient criteria to prevent viewpoint discrimination” nonetheless

9 contravene the First Amendment. Id. at 387. The instant case illustrates the wisdom

10 of this principle. 

11 The customplate program here, including the relevant statute,regulation, and

12 supposed historical practice, lack any “narrow, objective, and definite standards”

13 to guide official discretion. See Amidon, 508 F.3d at 103. The Commissioner may

14 indiscriminately pick and choose among applicants for custom plates, despite

15 having opened the program broadly to any non-profit organization representing,

16 inter alia, a “Cause.” Because the regime at issue thus lacks criteria sufficient to

17 prevent viewpoint discrimination, the scheme is facially unconstitutional. See Lewis

18 v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1080 (8th Cir. 2001) (striking down custom plate program

10

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1 that permitted officials to reject applications that were “contrary to public policy”

2 because “there was nothing in the ordinance to prevent [government officials] from

3 denying . . . plate[s] because of [the applicant’s] viewpoint”). I reach this conclusion

4 for the following reasons.

5 First, as discussed above, the statute. Section 404 places literally no limit –

6 objective or otherwise – on the Commissioner’s discretion in reviewingapplications,

7 save for a requirement that he collect annual fees. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 404. 

8 Instead, section 404 provides only that the Commissioner “may” approve

9 applications and expressly provides that “[n]othing contained in [section 404] shall

10 be construed to require the [C]ommissioner to issue a special number plate or

11 plates.” Id. § 404(1), (4). Thus, the statute by its plain terms rejects the notion that 4

12 it may, in any way, be construed to limit the Commissioner’s unfettered discretion

13 over the program.

14 Further, while the Commissioner contends that 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) limits

15 his freewheeling discretion, the regulation in fact does nothing of the sort. As an

16 initial matter, the regulation (along with the Commissioner’s purported historical

Section 404-l(1) similarly provides merely for the issuance of custom plates bearing 4

designs “approved by the [C]ommissioner” without specification of any standards

for approval. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 404-l(1).

11

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1 practice pursuant to this regulation of denying “contentious and divisive” plates as

2 “patently offensive”) merely delineates a subset of plates that the Commissioner

3 cannot issue. Section 16.5(e) and associated practice pursuant to it offer no direction

4 whatsoever for applications deemed to fall outside the regulation’s scope. In effect,

5 then, the Commissioner has discretion to deny applications pursuant to 15

6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) and his practice under that provision or for any other reason he

7 desires. As the Commissioner himself stated in his letter to CFF, he retains “sole[ ]”

8 “control over the . . . issuance of any custom plate series” and is under no “legal

9 requirement” to approve any application. J.A. 439. 

10 Consideration of the license plate applications supposedly falling within the

11 scope of 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e), moreover, does nothing to alleviate the infirmities

12 of this standardless regime. Section 16.5(e) is the only legal constraint on the

13 Commissioner’s discretion over custom plate applications relevant here, yet the

14 regulation merely directs that the Commissioner not issue plates that are, “in [his]

15 discretion[,] . . . , obscene, lewd, lascivious, derogatory to a particular ethnic or other

16 group, or patently offensive.” 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e). We may assume arguendo

17 that the prohibitions on plates that are “obscene, lewd, lascivious, [and] derogatory

18 to a particular ethnic or other group” provide adequate content to guide the

12

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1 Commissioner’s decisions, for these terms are not at issue. The term “patently

2 offensive,” however – the term that is at issue, because it is the term on which the

3 Commissioner relies in defending his decision to deny CFF’s application – is, as the

4 Supreme Court has said, inherently vague and open-ended. See Reno v. Am. Civil

5 Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997). And for this reason, the Supreme Court has

6 concluded that a prohibition on “patently offensive” speech must be limited in some

7 manner to address First Amendment concerns. See id. at 873-74. 

8 Section 16.5(e) contains no such limitation. At base, 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e)

9 and its bar on “patently offensive” material is a metric for any content deemed

10 objectionable by the Commissioner, imposing no discernible limit on his decision11 making process. The regulation is therefore “too vague and pliable to effectively

12 provide the constitutional protection of viewpoint neutrality.” See Amidon, 508 F.3d

13 at 104; see also Ariz. Life Coal., Inc., 515 F.3d at 973 (striking down Arizona’s custom

14 plate program and noting the “potential constitutional problems when government

15 officials are given unbridled discretion in regulating speech, even in limited public

16 fora”).5

Notably, two recent decisions have struck down custom plate programs for relying on 5

similarly vague language. See Matwyuk v. Johnson, 22 F. Supp. 3d 812, 824 (W.D. Mich.

2014) (striking Michigan’s custom plate program because the program’s bar against plates

that were “offensive to good taste and decency” “lack[ed] objective criteria, and thus

13

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1 Perhaps the majority is willing to go with me this far. It admits “that [the

2 statute and regulation] afford the commissioner broad discretion” and even

3 concedes that “[t]he ability of [the statute and regulation]—standing alone—to

4 provide an adequate safeguard against the Commissioner’s exercise of unbridled

5 authority is dubious.” Maj. Op. at 30. I could not agree more. If this is actually the

6 majority’s position, then our disagreement is confined to whether or not the

7 Commissioner’s supposed policy of denying applications on the basis of

8 “controversial” or “inflammatory” subject matter constitutes a “well-established”

9 and “uniformly applied” practice that has assumed the force of law and cabined his

10 discretion. However, the majority shifts position from page to page – thus

11 pronouncing its disagreement with CFF’s stance that “the statute . . . do[es] not

12 adequately bridle the Commissioner’s discretion” afteritself admitting as much nine

13 pages earlier. Maj. Op. at 39. The majority also defends the overall structure of the

14 New York regime, which limits the Commissioner’s ability to grant certain

15 applications, but permits him to deny one for any reason. Maj. Op. at 39-40. Most 6

confer[red] unbounded discretion on the decisionmaker”); Montenegro v. N.H. Div’n of

Motor Vehicles, 93 A.3d 290, 298 (N.H. 2014) (striking down vanity license plate regulation

prohibiting plates that are “offensive to good taste” as unconstitutionally vague).

 The majority, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 6

U.S. 316 (2002), and this Court’s decision in Perry, deems the “permissive nature of the

relevant statutory and regulatory provision (i.e., that the Commissioner ‘may’ issue custom

14

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1 pertinent here, moreover, and despite acknowledging that “the constraints [placed]

2 on the Commissioner” by 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) are “modest” at best, the majority

3 nonetheless concludes that these constraints “are sufficient to bridle his or her

4 discretion and thus to pass Constitutional muster.” Maj. Op. at 39. Before

5 addressing the majority’s claim that a well-established and uniformly enforced

6 policy of denying “politically sensitive” and “emotionally charged” custom plate

7 applications “render[s] the Commissioner’s discretion adequatelybridled,”Maj.Op.

8 at 35, then, I elaborate on my reasons for finding 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) itself so

9 wanting.

10 As I have already explained, a prohibition on “patently offensive” speech,

11 without further definition or elaboration, lacks sufficient content to satisfy First

plates but is never required to do so)” irrelevant. Maj. Op. at 39-40. But neither the park

ordinance at issue in Thomas nor the Vermont vanity plate provision addressed in Perry

permitted a government official to prohibit speech, as here, in his or her unfettered

discretion. The ordinance in Thomas, which required individuals to obtain a permit before

conducting large-scale events in public parks, limited the Park District’s authority to deny

a permit to thirteen specified grounds and, as interpreted, permitted the District to waive

inadequacies in an application only when doing so would “do no harm to the policies

furthered by the application requirements.” 534 U.S. at 324-25. Similarly in Perry, we

recognized that a Vermont vehicle owner at the time was entitled to a vanity plate for an

additionalfee “as long as the requested combination of letters and/or numbers [met] certain

[specified] criteria.” 280 F.3d at 163. While a requested plate could be denied if “offensive

or confusing to the general public,” Vermont, unlike New York, enumerated specific

definitions of “offensive” or “confusing” – seven specific definitions, to be precise – to

channel its officers’ discretion. Id. at 172 n.9. Thus, neither Thomas nor Perry is apposite. 

15

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1 Amendment concerns. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870-71. The majority argues, to the

2 contrary, that “patently offensive”is a familiar term to those in the legal profession,

3 with a readily discernable meaning. Maj. Op. at 39. To the extent this is so,

4 however, such meaning is derived from statutes and regulations that employ the

5 term to refer to certain sexual and excretory content and not to core political

6 expression such as is embodied in CFF’s proposed plate depicting smiling children

7 and bearing the message, “Choose Life.” See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 7

8 726, 732 (1978). In the principal cases interpreting “patently offensive,” moreover,

9 the phrase has been textually limited to such sexual or excretory content, with the

10 bounds of the phrase clearly delimited by the language of the statute or regulation.

11 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 873 (noting that the test prescribed by Miller v. California, 413

12 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), “reduce[d] the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term

13 ‘patently offensive’” by requiring that the material deemed “patently offensive” be

14 “specifically defined by the applicable state law”); see also Denver Area Educ.

15 Telecomm. Consortium v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1996) (upholding statute that

It is notable – and ironic – that the majority is willing to permit the Commissioner to rely 7

on a phrase typically used to prohibit only the most peripheral speech under the First

Amendment to instead suppress core political expression. Compare F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found.,

438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (deeming vulgar utterances to be of “slight social value”), with

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (noting that advocacy of political

beliefs is “the essence of First Amendment expression”).

16

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1 permitted cable operators to block content that they “reasonably believe[d]

2 describe[d] or depict[ed] sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently

3 offensive manner” (internal quotation mark omitted)); see Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.

4 at 732 (permittingregulation of content that “describe[d], in terms patently offensive

5 as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,

6 sexual or excretory activities and organs”). 

7 No such explicit textual limit exists here: 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) applies to all

8 “patently offensive” material, even that outside of the sexual and excretory field. 

9 Neither can the canon of noscitur a sociis limit the reach of 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e). 

10 Although “obscene, lewd, [and] lascivious” suggest reference to sexual content, the

11 inclusion of the phrase “derogatory to a particular ethnic or other group” in the list

12 destroys any commonality that the prohibitions might otherwise have shared. See

13 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (stating that, pursuant to the canon

14 of noscitur a sociis, a word must be judged by the “company it keeps”); Harris v.

15 Allstate Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 72, 76 (1955)(same). I therefore see no textual way to limit

16 the regulation to this meaning. And apparently the Commissioner sees none either,

17 as he interprets “patently offensive” to cover speech regarding any “political,

18 religious[,] or social issue” that he deems “contentious and divisive.” J.A. 409.

17

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1 The majority attempts to distinguish the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Roach v.

2 Stouffer from the instant action. Maj. Op. at 38. There, the court struck a portion of

3 Missouri’s custom plate program that permitted a legislative committee to rule on

4 applications because there were “no standards or guidelines whatsoever” to guide

5 the committee’s discretion. Roach, 560 F.3d at 869. Seizing on this language, the

6 majority insists that Roach is inapposite because 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) provides

7 some limit to the Commissioner’s discretion. But the test of unbridled discretion is

8 not whether any limit has been placed on official discretion, but whether that limit

9 is “adequate.” See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323 (2002); Child Evangelism Fellowship of MD,

10 Inc., 457 F.3d at 384. And the majority’s insistence that an adequate legal limit may

11 be divined from the term “patently offensive” as used in 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) is

12 belied by the Supreme Court’s recognition in Reno that “patently offensive” alone

13 lacks sufficient content to stanch First Amendment concerns. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870- 8

14 71. 

To the extent the majority is attempting to impose its own construction of “patently 8

offensive” onto 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16-5(e) to salvage New York’s custom plate program,

moreover, “a federal court cannot supply a binding construction of a state or local

ordinance[;] the limiting construction . . . must come, if at all, from the [state agency] or a

state court.” See Beal v. Stern, 184 F.3d 117, 127 n.7 (2d Cir. 1999).

18

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1 That brings us to the Department’s purportedly well-established practice of

2 declining to issue plates on “either side” of a “political, religious[,] or social issue that

3 has proven to be . . . contentious and divisive.” J.A. 409. The majority attempts to

4 distinguish Roach on this ground as well, by stating summarily that not only the

5 regulation, but “the DMV’s well-established and consistently applied policy and

6 practice provide the guidelines that were lacking [there].” Maj. Op. at 38. But this

7 argument, too, is insubstantial. At the start, any practice pursuant to 15 N.Y.C.R.R.

8 § 16.5(e) speaks only to those applications the Commissioner must deny and not to

9 his broad discretion to deny other applications for any reason whatsoever. But even

10 if this were not the case, a limiting practice not to be found in the text of the relevant

11 statute or regulation may serve as a narrowing constructiononly when such practice

12 is “well-understood and uniformly applied” such that it has taken on “virtually the

13 force of a judicial construction.” City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 n.11. There is

14 nothing in this record – nothing – beyond the Commissioner’s self-serving

15 statements to support the conclusion that such a practice is present in this case. 

16 First, the Department itself lacks a coherent understanding of the scope of its

17 supposed practice. While the Commissioner stated in his letter to CFF that the

18 practice bars “contentious” speech on political, religious, and social issues, his

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1 Deputy Commissioner and Counsel described the practice as banning all

2 applications that espouse a “religious, political or social position,” whether or not

3 these positions are controversial or divisive. J.A. 1663. The majority disregards the

4 Commissioner’s deputies, reassuringly (albeit unconvincingly) intoning that the

5 Commissioner’s practice under 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) is “not a black box,” but is

6 robustly “transparen[t].” Maj. Op. at 36. It was wise to sweep the deputies under

7 the rug. For the deputies’ description of a supposedly well-understood practice of

8 denying applications that espouse any political or social position would doubtless

9 be a source of bemusement to many New Yorkers, particularly those lucky enough

10 to drive vehicles with custom license plates approved by the Commissioner and

11 espousing “political [and] social position[s]” in favor of such varied topics as

12 recycling, horse racing, and the ideals of Martin Luther King, Jr.

13 It is bad enough that the Commissioner and his deputies cannot consistently

14 describe the supposedly “well-understood and uniformlyapplied practice,” see City

15 of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 n.11, on which they rely to lend content to the concept

16 of “patently offensive.” Equally damning, however, the Commissioner’s

17 supposedly uniform practice of denying “controversial” custom plate applications

18 pursuant to his purported “policy” is limited to the spurned “Choose Life” and

20

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1 “Restore the Wolf” plates. The Commissioner’s denial of two plates on two narrow

2 topics, in light of his approval of dozens of other designs and the evident

3 contradictions in the record as to just what his policy is, hardly give rise to a well4 established practice sufficient to provide the public with notice of the parameters of

5 the program. In fact, on this record, it appears that the Department’s only well6 established practice is to reject license plates bearing the phrase “Choose Life.” 

7 The majority attempts to shore up the “well-established” nature of this

8 practice by pointing to the Commissioner’s denial of one vanity plate deemed

9 patently offensive, with the message “RU486.” Maj. Op. at 32. At the start, the sole

10 support for the proposition that the “RU486 ” plate was denied pursuant to this

11 particular policy comes from the Commissioner’s deposition – meaning there is no

12 contemporaneous documentary evidence citedto corroborate this claim.Regardless,

13 even assuming that this denial is properly considered to stem from the alleged

14 policy banning controversial speech, it does not affect the analysis. Given the

15 dozens of custom plate series approved by the Commissioner and the untold

16 number of vanity plates issued (including, tellingly, plates to individuals associated

17 with CFF and bearing messages such as “CHSE LFE”) the denial of four sequential

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1 “Choose Life” applications, a “Restore the Wolf” plate, and one vanity plate does

2 not a well-established practice make.

3 Moreover, even if the alleged practice were well-established – and it is not – 

4 it would still prove too vague to imbue section 404 and 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e) with

5 any content. For indefinite bans on “contentious” or “controversial” subject matter

6 have long been disdained by the courts. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc., 515 F.3d at 972

7 (“[A] ban on controversial speech may all too easily lend itself to viewpoint

8 discrimination.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); United Food &

9 Commercial Workers Union v. S.W. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 361 (6th Cir.

10 1998) (“We believe any prohibition against ‘controversial’ advertisements

11 unquestionably allows for viewpoint discrimination.”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v.

12 Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1985) (“We question whether a

13 regulation of speech that has as its touchstone a government official’s subjective

14 view that the speech is ‘controversial’ could ever pass constitutional muster.”). 

15 Plainly, such subjective limitations provide little notice to applicants of what speech

16 may or may not be permitted, and too easily allow a ban on “contentious” material

17 to shift into a ban on “unpopular” speech. 

9

An article in the record that details the Commissioner’s denial of the “Restore the Wolf” 9

plate illustrates this concern. The article states that the idea for the plate originated after

22

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1 The Department’s own incoherent practice pursuant to its supposed policy

2 proves the point. Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) (“Exemptions from

3 an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech . . . may diminish the

4 credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.”);

5 Lewis, 253 F.3d at 1080 (finding that government’s shifting rationale for rejecting

6 plate applications supported unconstitutionality of program). Despite rejecting the

7 “Choose Life” and “Restore the Wolf” plates on the ground that they were

8 “contentious and divisive,” the Commissioner had no trouble approving three

9 separate “Union Yes” plates, along with a custom plate bearing the legend “Support

10 Police” and featuring a cross-hair and blood splatter. The Commissioner argues that

11 there is no inconsistency in these decisions, because abortion and wolf restoration

12 are in a different class, in terms of the societal debate that they provoke. But it will

13 no doubt come as a surprise to many that the national debate over right-to-work

the applicants noticed other “cute” license plates around New York. Residents of the

Adirondacks, hunters, interest groups, and local government officials, however, were

vocally opposed to the restoration cause, with many expressing their opposition in writing

to the Commissioner. Following the denial, the Commissioner explained only that the

custom plate program was not intended to “be bumper stickers for causes.” J.A. 1666. Of

course, the program was created to do precisely that: permit non-profit organizations

representing “Causes” to “Take [their] Pride for a Ride.” But while it was within the

Commissioner’s discretion to throw open the doors of the custom plate program to such

applicants, the First Amendment forbids him from now indiscriminately approving and

denying plates submitted by those who accept his invitation.

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1 laws,municipallabor contracts,public school reform, and union campaign spending

2 has fallen to the wayside – or that a license plate depicting a blood splatter and

3 urging support for law enforcement is devoid of controversy.

4 The Supreme Court, as City of Lakewood reminds, “has long been sensitive to

5 the special dangers inherent in a law placing unbridled discretion directly to license

6 speech . . . in the hands of a government official.” City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 767-

7 68. The majority faithfully intones City of Lakewood’s words – noting that courts will

8 read a statute or regulation in light of an unstated practice only when this practice

9 is “well-understood and uniformly applied” so as to have “virtually the force of a

10 judicial construction.” Maj. Op. at 28 (quoting City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 n.11). 

11 The majority faithfully recites the words, but somehow misses their meaning. 

12 Thus, it argues with regard to the “Union Yes” plates that “there is no basis

13 to conclude that the Department failed to apply [its] policy against creating plates

14 that touch upon contentious political issues” when considering the pro-union

15 designs “as opposed to having applied the policy and merely reaching a different

16 result than it did with the ‘Choose Life’ plate.” Maj. Op. at 33. This, however, is

17 precisely the point: that a policy that takes two issues of similar valence and rejects

18 one while blessing the other thrice over, based on agency employees’ subjective

24

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1 views that one is more divisive than the other, self-evidently places no meaningful

2 constraint on the Commissioner’s discretion. I do not need to show that the

3 Commissioner failed to apply his supposed policy against controversial issues to the

4 three applications for “Union Yes” plates—although, notably, there is no evidence

5 in the record that he did. The problem is that, even applying the policy, the

6 Commissioner was free to grant or deny those applications according to his whim.

7 The majority cautions that “[i]t is not our place to evaluate and weigh the various

8 hot button issues of our time against one another, assigning to each a specific place

9 in the landscape of public debate in this country.” Maj. Op. at 33. Indeed, it is not

10 our place – and neither should it be the Commissioner’s. The Constitution does not

11 permit it.

12 At base, the statute, regulation and practice here are so malleable as to defy

13 definition. To be clear, this is not to suggest that limits cannot be placed on the

14 content of custom license plates, as our decision in Perry makes clear. But the 10

As already noted, we determined in Perry that Vermont’s statutory ban on “offensive” 10

or “confusing” plates did not grant officials unfettered discretion because the regulation

governing the ban “limit[ed official] discretion by specifying content.” Perry, 280 F.3d at

172. Even the most cursory examination of the Vermont regulation – which prohibited,

inter alia, “[c]ombinations of letters, or numbers that connote, in any language”: “breast,

genitalia, pubic area, or buttocks,” “any illicit drug, narcotic, intoxicant, or related

paraphernalia,” “disability status,” “race,” or “political affiliation,” see id. at 172 n.9

(quoting VT.CODE.R. 14-050-025 I.(f)), is sufficient to suggest the infirmities in New York’s

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1 Commissioner may not pick and choose what custom plates to permit, based solely

2 on his subjective judgment regarding the degree to which any given political,

3 religious, or social issue is “inflammatory” at any given time. For nowhere do the

4 statute, regulation, or historical practice prohibit “inflammatory” custom plates. 

5 (And, indeed, the Commissioner approved “Choose Life”-themed vanity plates

6 before denying CFF’s applications, only underscoring the incoherence that this

7 regime permits.) 

8 The scheme fails to provide the “narrow, objective, and definite” restraints

9 demanded by this Circuit’s First Amendment jurisprudence. See Amidon, 508 F.3d

10 at 103. An application for a license plate supporting the minimum wage, the flat tax,

11 or immigration reform would undoubtedly touch upon the sort of “contentious”

12 “political, religious[,] or social issue” thatthe Commissionerdeems potentially to fall

13 within the scope of 15 N.Y.C.R.R. § 16.5(e). But it would pervert First Amendment

14 principles (and signal too forgiving an attitude on the part of a reviewing court) to

15 uphold a scheme in which the Commissioner could, in his unfettered discretion,

16 deemsuchanapplication “patently offensive,” as compared to “SupportPolice” and

standardless ban on “patently offensive” speech.

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1 “Union Yes.” So, too, for a plate depicting two children, a beaming sun, and bearing

2 the message, “Choose Life.”

3 III.

4 Taking the Department at its word, the operation of its custom plate program 

5 looks something like this: First,the Commissioner deciphers how a proposed plate’s

6 message will be interpreted by public. Then, he determines whether the message

7 is sufficiently “offensive” to merit rejection. To do so, he estimates whether the

8 message will be greeted as “contentious” by members of the public. At no point in

9 this process is the Commissioner guided by objective criteria, nor need he be. As the

10 Commissioner reminded CFF, he retains “sole[]” “control over the . . . issuance of

11 any custom plate series” and is under no “legal requirement” to approve any

12 application. 

13 In sum, New York State has opened a forum for speech and permitted its

14 Commissioner unbridled discretion to censor messages therein, risking self15 censorship by applicants and shielding the Commissioner’s decisions from any

16 meaningful judicial review. While the legislature might permissibly limit the

17 content permitted on custom license plates, or even the Commissioner if his

18 authority were appropriately constrained, the Commissioner may not do so carte

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1 blanche. The current scheme, “involv[ing the] appraisal of facts, the exercise of

2 judgment, and the formation of an opinion, by the licensing authority, [presents a]

3 danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms

4 [that] is too great to be permitted.” See Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 131 (internal quotation

5 marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s

6 judgment on the ground that New York State’s custom plate program inadequately

7 restrains the Commissioner’s authority, and I would enjoin the Department from

8 issuing custom plate series under the program.

9 * * *

10 I have my doubts that “a regulation of speech that has as its touchstone a

11 government official’s subjective view that the speech is ‘controversial,’” Planned

12 Parenthood Ass’n, 767 F.2d at 1230, could ever result in a practice that is consistent

13 with the First Amendment. See also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv.

14 Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 548 n.9 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that use

15 of “the ‘controversial’ nature of speech as the touchstone for its regulation threatens

16 a value at the very core of the First Amendment”). Given my conclusion that New

17 York’s custom plate program fails to pass constitutional muster on its face, however,

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1 I need not and so do not consider this question further, nor the broader question

2 whether the Commissioner might permissibly deny “Choose Life” plates under

3 some different statutory or regulatory regime. 

4 The majority embraces the Commissioner’s claimthatit was principally safety

5 concerns that motivated his denial of CFF’s plate. The record contains scant (if any)

6 evidence supporting the reasonableness of such concerns. One need cast no

7 aspersion on the Commissioner, however, to realize that the true motivation for his

8 decision is impossible reliably to ascertain, given his free-wheeling authority over

9 the custom plate program. And this returns us to the basis for holding New York’s

10 program unconstitutional on its face. As the Supreme Court has said:

11 [T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish, “as

12 applied,” between a licensor’s legitimate denial of a permit and its

13 illegitimate abuse of censorial power. Standards provide the

14 guideposts that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily

15 to determine whether the licensoris discriminating against disfavored

16 speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the

17 licensing official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are far

18 too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in any particular

19 case whether the licensor is permitting favorable, and suppressing

20 unfavorable, expression.

21 City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 758. The Court in Lakewood warned that without

22 standards to limit discretion in the sensitive First Amendment context, “the

29

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1 licensor’s action[s] [are] in large measure effectively unreviewable.” Id. at 759. That

2 is the case here, and for this reason, I would deem New York’s custom plate regime

3 to be unconstitutional on its face.

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