Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00703/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00703-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SALVADOR ZAMUDIO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12cv703-BEN (MDD)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

FOLLOWING REMAND

[ECF No. 32.]

vs.

McEWAN, Warden, Respondent.

I. Introduction

This matter comes before the Court on remand following the

District Court’s Order Adopting in Part and Declining to Adopt in Part

this Court’s previous Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 32.) The

District Court remanded to this Court with direction to resolve two

questions: (1) When did Petitioner’s conviction become final? and (2) Is

equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations period for filing a

habeas petition warranted? (Id. at 9-10.)

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II. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted on September 4, 2008, of rape with a

foreign object, forcible oral copulation, two counts of burglary, robbery,

and kidnaping and sentenced to 25 years to life plus 14 years, 5 months. 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 20-21.) Petitioner appealed. (Id. at 20.) The California

Court of Appeal overturned the kidnaping charge, as well as several

related enhancements. (Id. at 21, 49). Petitioner appealed his remaining

convictions to the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) His

appeal was denied on April 20, 2010. (ECF No. 1-1 at 37.) On June 11,

2010, Petitioner was resentenced on the remaining counts to twenty five

years to life plus five years, four months. (Id. at 49.) Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) with this Court on March

21, 2012, while his state court petition was pending. (ECF No. 1.) 

Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance on the same day as well

as a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claim. 

(ECF Nos. 4-5.) Respondent filed an Opposition to the motions on May

23, 2012 (ECF No. 11) and Petitioner filed a Reply on July 5, 2012 (ECF

No. 17). 

This Court issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R)

recommending that Petitioner’s motions be denied, and sua sponte to

dismiss the Petition as untimely. (ECF No. 18.) District Judge Irma E.

Gonzalez adopted the R&R in part and declined in part, and remanded

for further briefing and recommendation on two issues: (1) when

Petitioner’s conviction became final and (2) the applicability of equitable

tolling. (ECF No. 32). 

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III. Discussion

A. Timing of Petitioner’s Final Conviction 

In its order remanding the R&R, the District Court requested

“[f]urther briefing on the issue of when Petitioner’s conviction became

final in light of California’s prison-delivery rule.” (ECF No. 32 at 4-5.) 

In California, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after

the rendition of the judgement.” Cal. Rules of Court R. 8.308(a). Absent

an appeal, after 60 days the conviction becomes final. Id. As noted by

the District Court, “a prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed timely if

delivered to prison officials within the filing period.” In re Jordan, 4 Cal.

4th 116 (1992); ECF No. 32 at 4. 

Petitioner was sentenced on June 11, 2010. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 

Thus, unless he timely filed an appeal, his conviction would be final on

August 10, 2010. Cal. Rules of Court R. 8.308(a). In his Petition,

Petitioner claims he handed a notice of appeal to one of the prison guards

on August 2, 2010. (ECF No. 1 at 30.) Petitioner attached as an exhibit

to his Petition a hand-written copy of his alleged notice of appeal and

proof of service, both dated August 2, 2010. (ECF No. 1-1 at 69-71.) 

Neither bear any indication that they were received by prison or court

officials. Petitioner contends that this notice initiated his appeal. (ECF

No. 1 at 35.) 

On September 26, 2011, Petitioner wrote a letter to the clerk of the

court of San Diego Superior Court requesting court papers related to his

case, including a copy of the notice of appeal purportedly filed on the date

of resentencing. (ECF No. 1-1 at 47.) The clerk responded, but did not

attach a copy of the alleged notice of appeal. (Id. at 48.) Petitioner then

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wrote a letter to the trial judge with another copy of the alleged notice of

appeal on October 18, 2011, and requested that the notice of appeal be

filed and dated August 2, 2010, the date he purportedly handed the

notice to prison guards. (Id. at 61-67.) There is no evidence of the court’s

response. Petitioner next filed his Petition with this Court on March 21,

2012. (ECF No. 1.) There is no evidence that the state court has ever

received the notice of appeal and Petitioner did not subsequently pursue

his appeal. 

Petitioner was provided with the opportunity to provide

supplemental briefing on this topic but contends that he is unable to

address the issue any further than already has. (ECF No. 37 at 2.) 

In their Supplemental Briefing, Respondents contend that the

prison delivery rule is inapplicable and that Petitioner’s conviction

became final on August 10, 2010, 60 days after Petitioner was sentenced,

pursuant to Cal. Rule of Court R 8.308(a). Respondents contend that the

prison delivery rule is inapplicable because “the court never received the

purported notice of appeal.” (ECF No. 36 at 3.) Respondents note that

the first time Petitioner mentioned a notice of appeal was on October 18,

2011, in a letter to the superior court, over a year after Petitioner

contends he submitted the notice of appeal to prison officials.1

 (Id.) 

1

Respondents also note that Petitioner’s account of filing a notice of appeal on August 2, 2010, is contradicted by other statements Petitioner has made. Specifically, Petitioner brought a claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel in his state petition on the grounds that his counsel had failed to file

a notice of appeal. (ECF No. 33 at 2; ECF No. 31, Ex. A.) The Court notes that Petitioner acknowledged in his Petition, “For all purposes, after the resentencing on June 11, 2010, this petitioner’s conviction became final 60-

days after that resentencing hearing. Thus this petitioner’s AEDPA limitations period began on August 10, 2010, 60-days after his

resentencing.” (ECF No. 1 at 32.)

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Respondents contend that the prison delivery rule of In re Jordan is not

triggered unless the court actually receives the notice of appeal at some

point. 

In In re Jordan, the California Supreme Court stated, 

We therefore hold that a prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed to have been filed in the office of the appropriate county clerk

on the date, within the filing period prescribed by rule 31(a), on which it was delivered to prison authorities. If the notice

of appeal is received by the county clerk following expiration

of the 60-day filing period, the prisoner who seeks to pursue his or her appellate rights has the burden of establishing that

the notice of appeal was delivered to prison authorities within the 60-day period. 4 Cal. 4th at 130. In re Jordan is a narrow holding that allows the

county clerk to accept a notice of appeal for filing even if it is received by

the clerk past the 60-day period, provided that the notice was handed to

prison authorities before the 60-day period expired. Id. It does not

purport to grant an irrebuttable presumption that such a document was

actually filed, nor does it purport to grant the court authority to extend

the 60-day filing deadline based on the prisoner’s mere claim that a

notice had been filed. 

The California Supreme Court explained that the purpose of the

prison delivery rule is to provide a prisoner an equal opportunity to file

an appeal “fully comparable to that provided to a defendant who is

represented by counsel or who is not confined.” Id. If a non-incarcerated

defendant claimed to have filed a notice of appeal without any record of

the notice being sent or received and the defendant did not follow up on

the notice of appeal for over a year, there is little question that appeal

would be deemed untimely. Interpreting In re Jordan as Petitioner urges

would fundamentally undermine Jordan’s equality principle. 

Accordingly, In re Jordan must be narrowly interpreted to allow for only

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the backdating of a notice of appeal that has been received by the county

clerk. 

Pursuant to that interpretation, the prison delivery rule does not

apply here. Although Petitioner claims he handed a notice of appeal to

prison guards on August 2, 2010, there is no corroborating, independent

evidence in the record. No court has a record of receiving this document

and Petitioner himself has been inconsistent in claiming that it was

actually filed. Petitioner’s failure to pursue the matter with any court for

more than one year further supports finding the Petition untimely. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction became final on August 2, 2010, 60

days after his sentencing. Cal. Rules of Court R. 8.308(a). 

B. Equitable Tolling 

The District Court also requested further briefing on the issue of

whether equitable tolling is warranted based on Petitioner’s claim that

he had no available assistance in drafting and filing a petition. (ECF

No. 32.) Specifically, the District Court noted:

Petitioner has raised several factors that he argues affected

his ability to timely file the Petitioner, including his status

as a sex offender and his inability to read and write in either

English or Spanish [. . .] Petitioner’s objection has raised the

question that the factors in combination, in addition to his continuing efforts to obtain assistance, may warrant equitable tolling for the period of time following the 6-month period after he gave his notice of appeal to prison officials. (Id. at 8-9.) 

The District Court ordered additional briefing on this topic

so that the matter would be squarely before the Court. The

District Court held that Petitioner is not entitled to tolling based

on Petitioner’s Counsel’s failure to file a notice or appeal, and that

Petitioner is not entitled to tolling from August 2, 2010 through

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February 2011. Thus, this R&R only addresses the narrow issue

of whether Petitioner is entitled to tolling from February 2011

through September 12, 2011 based on Petitioner’s language

limitations and status as a sex offender. (ECF No. 32.) 

The language limitations of a petitioner, without more, do

not justify equitable tolling. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065,

1070 (9th Cir. 2006). Where a non-English speaking petitioner

claims equitable tolling on the AEDPA time limitation because of

a language barrier, the petitioner “must, at a minimum,

demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA time

limitation, he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure

either legal materials in his own language or translation

assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other source.” Id.

(emphasis added.) Where a petitioner is able to find competent

assistance, equitable tolling is unavailable. Id. 

“The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th

Cir. 2000)). As a result, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most

cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: (1) he has been pursuing his rights

diligently; and, (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin

v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). The

petitioner has the burden of showing that “extraordinary

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circumstances” were the cause of any untimeliness, rather than

his lack of diligence. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.

2003); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner must diligently pursue his rights; ignorance of the law

does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance and a pro se

petitioner’s “lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitably tolling.” 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In his Supplemental Briefing, Petitioner reiterates that he

has no language skills and, once he learned that something was

wrong with his appeal, he diligently searched for someone to help

him. (ECF No. 37 at 2-3.) In their Supplemental Briefing,

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s language difficulties do not

justify equitable tolling because Petitioner had access to a

translator who was able to assist him in filing the Petition once he

decided to do so. (ECF No. 36 at 5.) 

After a thorough consideration of Petitioner’s reported

difficulties in filing his Petition, including his language difficulties

and status as a sex offender, the Court finds that Petitioner is not

entitled to equitable tolling. 

First, while Petitioner contends that he is illiterate and that

he did not have any competent legal help or translation assistance

available, he also states that his cellmate acted as a translator for

his conversations with the prison law clerk and between and with

other inmates. (ECF No. 31, Ex. B at 7, Ex. C.) Petitioner was

able to send a letter to his legal counsel on June 1, 2011, contrary

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to his claim that he lacked inmate assistance before September

2011. Further, he claims he was able to draft a notice of appeal. 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 57-58, 69.) Thus, although Petitioner struggles

with language issues, his filings demonstrate that he was able to

secure the services of a translator to file and receive legal

documents. This falls short of the high bar required for equitable

tolling. Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066 . 

Petitioner’s tolling argument also relies on Petitioner’s claim

that he was without legal assistance. He repeatedly references his

lack of access to “legal help” and his search for someone to perform

“legal work.” (ECF No. 31 at 8-9.) To the extent that Petitioner

contends that his lack of legal sophistication contributed to his

inability to prepare his Petition, that does not constitute

extraordinary circumstances. Bonin v. Vasquz, 999 F.2d 425, 430

(9th Cir. 1993); Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. Under Mendoza,

equitable tolling is unavailable if the inmate is able to procure

“translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other

source.” Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. Translation services do not

include legal advice. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. While

Petitioner often states that he lacked legal assistance, Petitioner

has not demonstrated in any of his pleadings that he was

incapable of timely filing his Petition because he lacked

translation services. Rather, his own pleadings show that he had

ready access to a translator, his cellmate, and that he was able to

file and receive legal documents prior to September 2011. While

his lack of language skills likely made it more difficult for

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Petitioner to file his Petition, given the availability of a translator,

Petitioner’s difficulties do not rise to the level of exceptional

circumstances. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. 

Second, Petitioner’s access to a capable translator also

negates his claim that his status as a sex offender affected his

ability to timely file his Petition. While his status may have made

it more difficult for Petitioner to obtain legal advice or to find

someone to actually draft his Petition on his behalf, nothing in the

record suggests it affected his access to a translator. Rather,

Petitioner’s filings indicate that his cellmate translated for him on

numerous occasions despite his status as a sex offender. Even

considered along with Petitioner’s language difficulties,

Petitioner’s status as a sex offender does not constitute

extraordinary circumstances. Petitioner has not demonstrated

that he was incapable of timely filing his Petition. Rather,

Petitioner has shown that he had access to translation services. 

Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. While Petitioner may not have had

access to legal assistance, that does not constitute extraordinary

circumstances. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154. 

Finally, even if Petitioner was confronted with extraordinary

circumstances, he was not diligent in pursuing his rights. 

Petitioner has previously claimed that he did not begin to seek the

assistance of a translator to help look into his case until

September 2011, more than one year after he purportedly handed

the notice of appeal to prison guards. (ECF No. 5 at 3.) Upon

becoming concerned with the status of his appeal, according to

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Petitioner, he obtained the assistance of another inmate in and 

“began his research” into the status of his case also in September

2011. (Id.) The delay from August 2010, to September 2011, in

pursuing the status of his appeal does not reflect diligence and

bars equitable tolling. Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. 

More recently, Petitioner stated that he actually became

concerned about his Petition in February 2011, and began looking

for assistance at that time, finally getting translation help from a

cellmate in September 2011. Even if true, Petitioner has not

established that he diligently pursued his rights between

February 2011 and September 2011. Petitioner, despite his claim

that he was without assistance prior to September 2011, was able

to send a letter to his attorney in June 2011. (ECF No. 1, Ex. A at

56.) He received a response from his attorney on June 15, 2011. 

Petitioner does not explain why he continued to wait to file his

Petition despite being in correspondence with his attorney. Even

granting Petitioner tolling from February 2011, until June 15,

2011, his Petition is still untimely. There is no basis for tolling

from August 10, 2010, until February 2011. Granting four months

and fifteen days of tolling from February 2011 to June 15, 2011,

when Petitioner corresponded with his attorney, Petitioner would

have been required to file his Petition on January 3, 2012. 

Petitioner did not file until March 2012 and there appears no

reason to toll the time from January through March 2012. Thus,

even granting Petitioner some period of tolling based on his

language difficulties and status as a sex offender, the Petition is

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still untimely. 

Respondent also contends that no tolling is appropriate

because Petitioner was able to eventually find someone to prepare

his Petition on his behalf for $1,200. (ECF No. 36 at 6.) While the

Court agrees that Petitioner would not be entitled to tolling if he

had the option to pay for legal services at any time, it is not

apparent from the record that this option was available to

Petitioner throughout the process. Rather, Petitioner contends

that his previous attempts to pay for services were unsuccessful

because the inmate offering legal services was charging too much

money. (ECF No. 31.) The Court is not denying tolling on the

basis that Petitioner eventually was able to pay someone to assist

him. 

Pursuant to AEDPA, all federal habeas petitions are subject

to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). A

petitioner is only entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year

statute of limitations “if extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Stillman, 319 F.3d at 1202 (internal citations omitted.) Here,

Petitioner did not pursue his claim until over a year after his

conviction, despite available translation services, and did not file

his Petition until March 2012. Petitioner was not confronted with

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify equitable tolling.

Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1066. Accordingly, equitably tolling is not

warranted and Petitioner’s claim should be dismissed as untimely.

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V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s request for Equitable Tolling

be DENIED. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to

this Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties

no later than May 16, 2014. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the

objection shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no

later than May 30,2014. The parties are advised that the failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 24, 2014

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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