Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02816/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02816-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

We Are America/Somos America )

Coalition of Arizona, et al., ) No. CIV 06-2816 PHX RCB

)

Plaintiffs, ) O R D E R

)

vs. ) 

)

Maricopa County Board of )

Supervisors, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

On November 21, 2006, Plaintiffs filed this action against

Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas, Maricopa County Sheriff

Joseph Arpaio, the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors and its

individual members, challenging the County Attorney and Sheriff’s

policy of prosecuting individual undocumented immigrants for

conspiring to smuggle themselves in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 13-2319. Compl. (doc. # 1). Plaintiffs include five individual

taxpayers who challenge Defendants’ policy as an illegal diversion

of taxpayer funds; six Mexican nationals who have been arrested,

detained, and charged for conspiracy to violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

Case 2:06-cv-02816-DJH Document 43 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 17
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§ 13-2319 pursuant to Defendants’ policy; and four different

community-based organizations. Id. ¶¶ 5-15.

Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification (doc. # 20) and Defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. 

# 32). The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court finds

the matter suitable for decision without oral argument. Having

carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules. 

I. BACKGROUND

In review of a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material

fact in the complaint are accepted as true, with all reasonable

inferences drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Keams v. Tempe

Technical Inst., Inc., 39 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994); Everest &

Jennings, Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th

Cir. 1994). The relevant facts for purposes of Defendants’ motion

to dismiss are as follows:

Under Arizona law enacted in 2005 it is a felony to engage in

human trafficking that involves the smuggling of aliens. The

relevant statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

A. It is unlawful for a person to intentionally

engage in the smuggling of human beings for

profit or commercial purpose.

. . .

. . .

D. For purposes of this section:

. . . 

2. "Smuggling of human beings" means the

transportation or procurement of transportation

by a person or an entity that knows or has

reason to know that the person or persons

transported or to be transported are not United

States citizens, permanent resident aliens or

persons otherwise lawfully in this state.

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1

 The federal criminal offense of alien smuggling is defined in

more detailed terms at 8 U.S.C. § 1824.

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Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319.1 Defendant Thomas has issued a

statement declaring that, in his view, section 13-2319 applies not

only to the conduct of actual smugglers and human traffickers

accepting payment for transport, but also to individual

undocumented immigrants agreeing to pay for transport or on whose

behalf others have agreed to pay for transport. Compl. (doc. # 1)

¶ 40. Defendant Thomas has declared a policy that, as the Maricopa

County Attorney, he will prosecute individual undocumented

immigrants for conspiring to violate section 13-2319 if they have

been transported for gain by a third party. Id. This policy is

the subject of Plaintiffs’ action for declaratory and injunctive

relief. Id.

In Plaintiffs’ view, drawn from the legislative history and

subsequent public remarks by lawmakers, section 13-2319 was

intended only to criminalize the exploitative conduct of actual

smugglers, often referred to as “coyotes,” and was not intended to

apply to individual undocumented immigrants paying for transport. 

See id. ¶¶ 42-43. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the continued

implementation of Defendants’ policy, and assert four different

claims for relief: (1) Defendants’ policy is preempted by the

Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq. (the

“Act”), (2) Defendants’ policy violates their Fourth Amendment

rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, (3)

Defendants’ policy violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process of law, and (4) Defendants’ policy conflicts with Ariz.

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Rev. Stat. § 13-2319. Compl. (doc. # 1) ¶¶ 56-64.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

party to seek dismissal of a claim if the claimant failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), “dismissal for failure to state a

claim is improper unless ‘it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.’” Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics

Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Factual argument is

inappropriate in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which tests only the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Thus, in undertaking its analysis,

the Court must limit its “review to the contents of the complaint,

accepting the material factual allegations as true and construing

them in the light most favorable to the [non-movant].” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed on the

basis that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and, in the

alternative, urge the Court to refrain from hearing this matter

under the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971). Although the Younger abstention inquiry is

prudential in nature, it is appropriately considered as a basis for

decision prior to any determination regarding Article III standing. 

Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999).

Born out of principles of federalism and comity, the Younger

abstention doctrine is a jurisdictional issue requiring federal

courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over certain actions

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when proceedings are pending in state court. See Gartrell Constr.

Inc. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1991); Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998). Younger

abstention is appropriate when “(1) there are ongoing state

judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state

interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide the plaintiff with

an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Meredith v.

Oregon, 321 F.3d 807, 816-17 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Middlesex

County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982)); accord Gartrell Constr. Inc., 940 F.2d at 441.

Plaintiffs argue that the Younger abstention doctrine is not

appropriate in this case, because (1) they do not seek to enjoin

preexisting state prosecutions, (2) the proceedings brought

pursuant to Defendants’ policy do not further vital state

interests, and (3) Plaintiffs do not have an adequate opportunity

to raise their federal defenses in the state proceedings. Resp.

(doc. # 38) at 9-15. Plaintiffs also claim that Younger abstention

should not apply, because the prosecutions brought pursuant to

Defendants’ policy are undertaken in bad faith. Id. at 15. The

Court does not find any indication that the state’s prosecutions

have been brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment. 

Accordingly, the Court will focus the balance of its inquiry on the

three elements required for Younger abstention. 

A. Ongoing Judicial Proceedings

The critical question for purposes of Younger abstention is

“whether the state proceedings were underway before initiation of

the federal proceedings.” Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341

(9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

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Although Plaintiffs now claim that the Court could fashion its

relief in such a way that would not require enjoining any currently

pending criminal cases, Defendants rightly point out that

Plaintiffs made no such distinction in their complaint. See Resp.

(doc. # 38) at 10-11; Reply (doc. # 42) at 6-8; see also Compl.

(doc. # 1) ¶ 55 (“If the relief prayed for is not granted,

plaintiffs . . . will continue to be . . . prosecuted pursuant to

an unconstitutional and unlawful policy.”). Plaintiffs’ assertion

that most of the putative class members were not subject to ongoing

state proceedings at the start of this litigation is similarly

unavailing. See Resp. (doc. # 38) at 10. It is evident from the

complaint that at least six of the individual plaintiffs had been

charged with violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319 prior to the

initiation of this action. See Compl. (doc. # 1) ¶¶ 9-10. 

Moreover, the prospective class that Plaintiffs seek to have

certified includes “[a]ll individuals stopped, detained, arrested,

incarcerated, prosecuted, or penalized for conspiring to transport

themselves, and themselves only, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 13-2319.” Id. ¶ 25 (emphasis added). As currently pled, the

relief sought by Plaintiffs will by necessity interfere with

prosecutions already underway at the time this action was filed.

B. Important State Interest Implicated

There can be little question that a state has a vital interest

in the enforcement of its criminal laws. See Pennzoil Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs

maintain that there are no important state interests served by

Defendants’ manner of interpreting and enforcing section 13-2319,

arguing that the policy of prosecuting individual migrants as

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conspirators under the statute is both contrary to the legislative

intent of its sponsors and preempted by federal law in a manner

that is readily apparent.

1. Ultra Vires Interpretation of State Law

Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants’ policy of prosecuting

migrants as conspirators under section 13-2319 constitutes an ultra

vires interpretation and enforcement of the state’s alien smuggling

law. See Resp. (doc. # 38) at 11-13. In support of this argument,

Plaintiffs cite to legislative history suggesting that the bill’s

sponsor intended for the law to provide an avenue for state

prosecutions of actual smugglers as distinguished from the persons

whom they transport. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiffs believe that their

view is also vindicated by the fact that Defendants are apparently

the only state law enforcement officers prosecuting migrants for

conspiracy to smuggle themselves in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §

13-2319.

While these arguments would be appropriately received in

adjudicating the merits of some of Plaintiffs’ claims, they do not

demonstrate such an abuse of prosecutorial discretion that would

impel the Court to conclude at this juncture that the state lacks

an important interest in Defendants’ enforcement of its alien

smuggling law. As Defendants point out, the actions of other state

law enforcement officials may be attributable to any number of

factors such as the availability of resources, and do not

exclusively lend themselves to the inferences Plaintiffs would draw

regarding the legality of Defendants’ policies. See Reply (doc. #

42) at 9 n.3. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has observed,

arguments such as those asserted by Plaintiffs could easily be

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raised “in any federal litigation in which a plaintiff seeks to

enjoin allegedly unconstitutional state proceedings, and, if

accepted, would render Younger a nullity.” See Worldwide Church of

God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d 613, 616 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Accordingly, the Court approaches Plaintiffs’ claim regarding

Defendants’ allegedly ultra vires interpretation and enforcement of

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319 with the same measured skepticism, and

finds it to be an insufficient basis to decline abstention.

2. Federal Preemption that is Readily Apparent

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ policy cannot serve an

important state interest, because it “intrude[s] into an area

reserved to the federal government by the United States

Constitution.” Id. at 13. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that

no significant state interest is served, and therefore Younger

abstention is unnecessary, where the state law at issue is

preempted by federal law in a manner that is “readily apparent.” 

Woodfeathers, Inc. v. Washington County, 180 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th

Cir. 1999); Gartrell Constr. Inc., 940 F.2d at 441. However,

because questions of federal preemption frequently abound in cases

where Younger abstention is sought, it is important for a court to

refuse to abstain only when the preemptive force of the federal law

at issue is readily discernable from the pleadings. See Fresh

Int’l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th

Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

Defendants believe that Plaintiffs’ “charge of preemption is

attenuated at best,” and are quick to point out that neither the

United States Department of Justice nor any federal agency has

sought intervention. Reply (doc. # 42) at 9. Much like

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Plaintiffs’ effort to portray Defendants’ policies as being

unlawful by comparison to the conduct of other state law

enforcement officials, the Court does not see any significant

inferences that may be drawn from the apparent inaction of the

federal government to intervene in this case. The decision of any

federal agency not to intervene in this case may be attributable to

a lack of resources-- just as Defendants have said in response to

Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the conduct of other state law

enforcement officials-- or may simply reflect other political

motivations that are not relevant here. But it does not bear upon

the question of federal preemption that the Court must address in

deciding whether it may decline to exercise jurisdiction under the

Younger abstention doctrine.

The supremacy of federal power in the field of immigration is

made clear by the Constitution and has been repeatedly recognized

by the Supreme Court. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 and art.

II, cl. 6; De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); Hines v.

Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941). However, it is equally well

settled that, “standing alone, the fact that aliens are the subject

of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration”

that is “per se preempted by th[e] [federal] constitutional power,

whether latent or exercised.” De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in De Canas, federal

preemption of immigration-related state statutes and policies may

be shown in three ways. First, federal law preempts any state

statute or policy that constitutes a regulation of immigration,

“which is essentially a determination of who should or should not

be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a

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legal entrant may remain . . . .” Id. Second, even if the state

law or policy does not regulate immigration, it may be preempted if

Congress intended to “occupy the field” the state has attempted to

regulate, i.e., if it was “the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress” to effect a “complete ouster of state power” that would

“preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in

general.” Id. at 357. Third, a state law or policy is preempted

if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of

the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 363.

I. First De Canas Test

Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants, through their policy of

charging and prosecuting individual migrants for conspiring to

smuggle themselves in violation of section 13-2319, “ha[ve]

intruded into an area reserved to the federal government by the

United States Constitution.” Resp. (doc. # 38) at 13. As an

initial matter, it should be repeated that the Constitution does

not of its own force require the preemption of all state laws

dealing with aliens. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. The thrust of

Plaintiffs’ argument appears to be that Defendants’ manner of

enforcing the state’s alien smuggling law constitutes an

impermissible regulation of immigration. To support this position,

Plaintiffs cite to statements allegedly made by Defendants to the

media, expressing “frustrat[ion] . . . [with the] problem of

illegal immigration that the government [of Mexico] is directly

fomenting,” and presenting the view that “[t]here are many illegals

trying to make it into [Maricopa] [C]ounty.” Resp. (doc. # 38) at

9; Compl. (doc. # 1) ¶ 48. Regardless of Defendants’ subjective

views, their opinions alone do not transform their policies and

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2

 Under the statute, it is a felony “for a person to

intentionally engage in the smuggling of human beings for profit or

commercial purpose.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319(A)-(C). For

purposes of the statute, the “[s]muggling of human beings” is defined

as “the transportation or procurement of transportation by a person

or an entity that knows or has reason to know that the person or

persons transported or to be transported are not United States

citizens, permanent resident aliens or persons otherwise lawfully in

this state.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319(D)(2).

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official conduct into an impermissible regulatory scheme for

"determin[ing] . . . who should or should not be admitted into the

country." See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. Therefore, under the

first De Canas test, the Court cannot conclude that the preemption

of Defendants’ policies is so readily apparent as to render

abstention under Younger improper.

ii. Second De Canas Test

Under the second De Canas test, Defendants’ policies may still

be preempted if Congress intended to occupy the field that the

state has attempted to regulate. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357. 

Congressional intent to preclude state action may be inferred

"where the system of federal regulation is so pervasive that no

opportunity for state activity remains." Gonzales v. City of

Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other

grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.

1999) (en banc); De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357.

In the present case, preemption under the second De Canas test

should be considered in the context of the statute Defendants’

policy is intended to enforce. It is evident from the plain

language of section 13-2319 that the ambit of the state regulation

in question relates solely to the smuggling of aliens.2 Therefore,

the decisive inquiry is whether Congress intended to occupy the

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field of regulating criminal activities involving the smuggling of

aliens. This question should be distinguished from the issue

decided in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.

1983). In that case the Ninth Circuit held that state law

enforcement officers in Peoria, Arizona could enforce federal

criminal immigration statutes, provided they had the authority to

make such arrests under relevant state law. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at

474-75. The court concluded that Congress did not intend to occupy

the field of criminal immigration enforcement, relying on the

general rule that local police are not precluded from enforcing

federal crimes. Id. at 474. Moreover, it was clear from the

language and legislative history of the relevant federal statutes

that Congress did not intend to preclude state law enforcement

officers from enforcing federal criminal immigration statutes. Id.

at 475. By contrast, in the present case, the state is not

attempting to enforce any federal criminal immigration statutes--

instead, it has enacted its own criminal immigration statute, which

Defendants are enforcing pursuant to the policy challenged by

Plaintiffs.

In briefing the issue of federal preemption, the parties have

not addressed the important question raised by the second De Canas

test. Accordingly, the Court will retain Defendants’ motion to

dismiss under advisement pending the parties’ decision to submit

supplemental briefing on the issue as permitted by this Order.

iii. Third De Canas Test

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ policy “is also preempted

because it actually conflicts with federal law and policy.” Resp.

(doc. # 38) at 13 n.21. Under the third De Canas test, preemption

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is readily apparent if a state law “stands as an obstacle to the

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

Congress.” Id. at 363.

As Plaintiffs have noted, federal immigration law permits

multiple categories of migrants to remain in the United States

while applying for lawful status although they may have entered

without inspection or documentation. For example, aliens seeking

refugee or asylee status, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157, 1158,

may not be removed from the country if the United States Attorney

General determines that such removal would threaten the life or

freedom of that alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Similarly, the

Attorney General may adjust certain battered spouses and children

to lawful status and cancel their removal. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154,

1229b(b)(2).

In Plaintiffs’ view, Defendants’ policy of charging and

prosecuting migrants for conspiracy to smuggle themselves in

violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319, without regard to the

possibility of such status determinations, impedes the Attorney

General’s accomplishment and execution of the objectives set out by

Congress in the Immigration and Naturalization Act. To better

evaluate the merits of this argument it is necessary to elaborate

on the process by which an alien may become ineligible for those

favorable status determinations. Generally, the commission of an

“aggravated felony” renders an alien ineligible for the withholding

or cancellation of removal pursuant to a status determination by

the Attorney General. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229(b)(2)(A)(iii)-

(iv) and (C), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). For purposes of the Immigration

and Naturalization act, Congress has defined specific categories of

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offenses that qualify as “aggravated felonies,” including

[the] offense described in [8 USCS §

1324(a)(1)(A) or (2)] (relating to alien

smuggling), except in the case of a first

offense for which the alien has affirmatively

shown that the alien committed the offense for

the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding

only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and

no other individual) to violate a provision of

this Act.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) (emphasis added).

Although Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319, particularly as enforced

pursuant to Defendants’ policy, provides no such exception to the

imposition of state felony liability, the Court is not convinced

that the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of

the full purposes of the federal immigration laws. For the special

purpose of deciding whether an applicant has committed a

disqualifying “aggravated felony,” there is no reason that the

Attorney General’s status determination cannot take into account

the same exception set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), which is

merely a definitional statute, with respect to any alien smuggling

convictions under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319. Therefore, the Court

cannot find that Defendants’ policy is preempted in a manner that

is readily apparent on account of these perceived conflicts with

federal law and policy.

Although Plaintiffs have not succeeded in establishing federal

preemption under either the first or third De Canas tests, the

Court will retain the motion under advisement, as indicated above,

pending the parties’ decision to submit supplemental briefing on

the second De Canas test for federal preemption in the area of

immigration.

. . .

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C. Opportunity to Raise Federal Defenses in State Proceedings

Plaintiffs argue that Younger abstention is also

inappropriate, because they believe that state proceedings will not

provide an adequate opportunity to raise their federal defenses. 

Resp. (doc. # 38) at 14-15.

Plaintiffs fail to explain why the state courts would be

incompetent to adjudicate the merits of their federal defenses. 

They suggest that in the context of a putative class action such as

this the Court should be more willing to find the state proceedings

inadequate to eliminate the threat to the entire class. See id. at

14 (citing Riley v. Nev. Super. Ct., 763 F. Supp. 446, 451 (D. Nev.

1991)). However, the holding of the case on which Plaintiffs rely

was not predicated on the class action context. Rather, it was

based on unique circumstances, not applicable here, in which the

plaintiff class was challenging the rules of the Nevada courts. 

Riley, 763 F. Supp. at 451. In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not

challenge any rules of the Arizona courts that would render them an

inadequate forum for the resolution of their federal defenses. 

Plaintiffs also complain that the possibility of inconsistent

lower court rulings somehow denies them an adequate safeguard for

their federal constitutional rights. Resp. (doc. # 38) at 14. 

Plaintiffs have simply observed one reason that many judicial

systems have developed higher courts of review. It does not,

however, render the state courts inadequate or incompetent to hear

their federal defenses.

Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that, as a practical matter, many

members of the putative class may enter guilty pleas to end their

incarceration as they await trial. Id. at 15. The fact that

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 The Court notes that the case could not be dismissed in its

entirety solely on the basis of standing. For instance, the

municipal taxpayer plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the injury of

improper expenditures of municipal funds. See Cammack v. Waihee, 932

F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding “that municipal taxpayer

standing simply requires the ‘injury’ of an allegedly improper

expenditure of municipal funds.”). Plaintiffs have alleged that they

object to Defendant Maricopa County’s use of tax funds for the

arrest, detainment, prosecution, and imprisonment of migrants for

conspiracy to smuggle themselves in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §

13-2319. Compl. (doc. # 1) ¶¶ 11, 13-15. While Defendants may be

correct that arrests, detainments, and prosecutions will not increase

the fixed salary expenditures for the employees carrying out those

duties, the same cannot be said for the additional incremental costs

of housing and feeding individuals in the county jails. Therefore,

Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to demonstrate their standing

as municipal taxpayers.

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Plaintiffs may choose not to avail themselves of their federal

defenses in the state courts does not render them an inadequate

forum. In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any reason

why they could not adequately present their federal claims in the

state proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because it appears that Younger abstention may be required,

pending the parties’ decision to submit supplemental briefing on

federal preemption under the second De Canas test, the Court need

not address questions of Article III standing at this time.3 For

the same reason, it may prove unnecessary to resolve the issues of

class of certification that have been raised by Plaintiffs. 

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. # 32)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED permitting Plaintiffs, if they choose,

to file within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of entry of this

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Order a brief addressing the applicability of the second De Canas

test, discussed at Part III.B.2.ii, supra, to the issue of federal

preemption. If Plaintiffs file a supplemental brief on the second

De Canas test, Defendants may file a brief addressing the same

issue within 10 (ten) days from the date of filing of Plaintiffs’

supplemental brief. Further briefing is not permitted unless

hereafter allowed by the court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification (doc. # 20) is DENIED without prejudice.

DATED this 20th day of September, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:06-cv-02816-DJH Document 43 Filed 09/21/07 Page 17 of 17