Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06737/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06737-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED

SERVICES COMPANY, INC., a New

York corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

D&A CORPORATION d/b/a

BAKERSFIELD WHOLESALE FOODS, a

California Corporation, ABDO

AEZAH, an individual, MALAKA M. 

AEZAH, an individual, FAHD

AIZAH, an individual, DAVID

AEZAH, an individual, and DOES 1

THROUGH 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

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1:04-cv-6737 OWW TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION IN

SUPPORT OF DOC. 72 (ORDER

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR AN ORDER OF CONTEMPT).

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, American Express Travel Related Services Company,

Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “American Express”) moved for an order of

contempt against Defendant Abdo Aezah (“Defendant Abdo”), for

violation of a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 30, Pl.’s Mem.

6-7, filed Feb. 23, 2005). Defendant Abdo opposed the motion. 

(Doc. 34, Def.’s Response). Oral argument was heard and an

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1 The original complaint contained claims for Breach of

Contract against Bakersfield Wholesale, Account Stated against

Bakersfield Wholesale, Book Account against all defendants,

Unjust Enrichment against all defendants, Common Law Fraud

against all defendants, and Piercing the Corporate Veil. 

2 Plaintiff amended its claims as follows: Breach of

Contract against Bakersfield Wholesale, Account Stated Against

2

evidentiary hearing took place on April 4, 2005. Plaintiff’s

motion was granted on April 13, 2005. (Doc. 72). This is a

Memorandum Decision in support of the Order Granting Plaintiff’s

Motion for an Order of Contempt (Doc. 72).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause of action arises out of the non-payment of

approximately $3.68 million in credit card charges made to

Defendants’ American Express charge cards. American Express

filed its original complaint on December 21, 2004, against

D&A Corporation, d/b/a Bakersfield Wholesale Foods

(“Bakersfield Wholesale”); Defendant Abdo; Malaka M. Aezah

(“Defendant Malaka”); and Fahd Aizah (Defendant Fahd).1 (Doc. 1,

Compl.). Defendant Malaka is Defendant Abdo’s common law wife. 

(See Doc. 24, Def. Abdo’s Answer ¶ 7). Defendant Fahd was

dismissed as a defendant, without prejudice, on March 9, 2005. 

(Doc. 39, Order). Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) on March 22, 2005. (Doc. 44). Plaintiff added

David Aezah (“Defendant David”), who is either Defendant Abdo’s

brother or brother-in-law, as a defendant and amended its

claims.2

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Bakersfield Wholesale, Breach of Contract against the individual

defendants, Breach of Contract on Book Account against all

defendants except Defendant David, Unjust enrichment against all

defendants except Defendant David, common law fraud against all

defendants except Defendant David, Piercing the Corporate Veil,

and Fraudulent Conveyance against Bakersfield Wholesale,

Defendants Abdo and David. (Id.).

3

On the same day that Plaintiff filed its original Complaint,

December 12, 2004, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Writ of

Attachment, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. § 482.010 et seq.,

against property located at 402 California Avenue, Bakersfield,

California (“the Warehouse Property”) and against approximately

$700,000.00 worth of checks from retail outlets to whom

Bakersfield Wholesale sells cigarettes and groceries. (Doc. 3,

Declaration of Michael Samuelson in support of Motion for Writ of

Attachment (“M. Samuelson Decl.”) at 7; see also Doc. 2, 12/21/04

Motion for Writ of Attachment (“First Attachment Motion”) at 2). 

In response to the First Attachment Motion, on

January 4, 2005, the Court issued an order for Defendants

Bakersfield Wholesale, Abdo, Malaka, and Fahd to show cause why a

writ of attachment should not issue. (Doc. 6, 01/04/05 Order to

Show Cause at 2-3). The 01/04/05 Order to Show Cause also

contained a Temporary Restraining Order (“01/04/05 TRO”) against

all Defendants. (Id. at 2). The 01/04/05 TRO is the subject of

this motion. The 01/04/05 TRO stated:

[I]t is further ORDERED that pending the hearing and

determination of this motion, defendants, all persons owing

any debt to defendants, and all other persons and

garnishees, be and hereby are restrained and prohibited from

transferring or paying any assets of the defendants or any

personal or real property in which the defendants have an

interest, or any debt owed to defendants to the following

extent: i) as to defendant Bakersfield Wholesale, to the

extent of $3,683,320.97; ii) as to defendant Abdo Aezah, to

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4

the extent of $351,384.38; iii) as to defendants Malaka

Aezah to the extent of $144,044.87; and iv) as to defendant

Fahd Aizah to the extent of $3,187,891.72....

(Id.). The amounts were based on amounts detailed in

American Express’ First Attachment Motion with respect to the

respective charge accounts of each Defendant. (Doc. 3, M.

Samuelson Decl. ¶¶ 10, 29). 

Defendants Abdo, Malaka, Bakersfield Wholesale, and Fahd

were served with the 01/04/05 TRO. (Docs. 16-18, 23 Certificates

of Service). The Certificate of Service for Defendant Abdo

states that he was served with the 01/04/05 TRO on

January 4, 2005, at 402 California Avenue, Bakersfield,

California (i.e., the Warehouse Property) by personal delivery to

Joseph Aezah, who is listed as “authorized to accept” service. 

(Doc. 17). At the contempt hearing, Defendant Abdo testified

that Joseph Aezah is his sixteen-year-old nephew. Defendant Abdo

also testified that he did not remember when his nephew Joseph

gave him the 01/04/05 TRO. Defendant contends that the

January 4, 2005, certificate of service shows only that the

01/04/05 TRO was served on someone other than Defendant Abdo. 

(Doc. 34, Defs.’ Response 4).

Plaintiff also asserts that it served Defendant Abdo with

the 01/04/05 TRO via facsimile and Federal Express on

January 5, 2005. (Id.). Defendant contends that there is no

foundational evidence in Plaintiff’s papers regarding the

facsimile number of D&A Corporation and that Plaintiff failed to

produce the Federal Express receipt. (Id.). Defendant Abdo

testified that he did not remember whether he received the

facsimile or the Federal Express of the 01/04/05 TRO. Abdo

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3 Defendant Fahd had not yet been dismissed from the case on

January 11, 2005.

4 One of the First Writs of Attachment was issued against

Defendant Abdo (Doc. 14) and the other was issued against

Defendant Bakersfield Wholesale (Doc. 15). Both of the First

Writs of Attachment were phrased generally, and ordered

attachment of “[a]ny asset of the defendant or any personal or

real property in which the defendant has an interest, or any debt

owed to defendant.” (Id.). The writ as to Defendant Abdo was

issued in the amount of $351,384.38, and the First Writ for

Defendant Bakersfield Wholesale was issued in the amount of

$3,683,320.97. (Id.; see also Doc. 13, Order Granting Writs of

Attachment 2). No writs of attachment were issued as to

Defendants Malaka and Fahd. (See id.).

5

testified that he received “a lot of papers.” Defendant Abdo

acknowledged that he was present at the January 11, 2005, hearing

(which the 01/04/05 Order to Show Cause noticed) and that he was

present at the hearing because his attorney told him to be there.

Oral argument regarding the 01/04/05 Order to Show Cause was

heard on January 11, 2005, in Courtroom 2. Defendant Abdo was

present at the hearing. Steven Koch and M. Monack appeared for

Plaintiff. Russell VanRozeboom appeared for Defendants D&A

Corporation, Abdo, and Malaka. (Doc. 12, Minutes; see also

01/11/05 Order Granting Writs of Attachment 1-2). Defendants

Malaka and Fahd did not appear.3 The parties reached agreement

as to the issuance of the writs of attachment, which were

subsequently issued on the same day.4 (Docs. 14, 15 (“First

Writs of Attachment”)). 

On February 23, 2005, American Express moved for the

following relief: (1) Expedited Discovery; (2) Order of Contempt

against Defendant Abdo; (3) Leave to Amend the Summons and

Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; (4) Order of Attachment

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5 The 02/28/05 Order ordered Defendants Bakersfield

Wholesale, Abdo, Malaka, and Fahd, and proposed Defendant David

Aezah, were ordered to show cause on March 3, 2005: 

i) why an order of contempt against Defendant Abdo should

not issue for violation of the temporary restraining order

signed January 4, 2005; 

ii) why American Express should not be granted leave to

amend the summons and complaint to assert attidional causes

of action against Defendants Abdo and Bakersfield Wholesale

and to name David as an additional defendant to the action

on a claim for fraudulent conveyance; 

iii) why an order of attachment should not be issued as to

the Warehouse Property and a property located at 11102

Coachlight Court, Bakersfield, California (“Coachlight

Property”); 

iv) why a preliminary injunction should not issue preventing

David from transferring the Coachlight Property and the

Warehouse Property pending further order of the Court, and

preventing Defendant Abdo from transferring, conveying, or

otherwise encumbering any assets in his possession; and 

v) why expedited discovery should not be ordered. 

6

against the properties located at 11102 Coachlight Court,

Bakersfield, California (“Coachlight Property”), and 402

California Avenue, Bakersfield, California (“Warehouse

Property”), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 64 and Cal. Civ. Proc.

§ 482.010; (5) Preliminary Injunction against Defendant Abdo and

against Defendant David pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc.

§ 3439.07(a)(3)(A). (Doc. 30, Pl.’s Mem.). 

The hearing on these motions was originally noticed for

April 4, 2005. (Id. at 1). On February 28, 2005, the Court

issued an Order to Show Cause and the hearing was rescheduled for

March 3, 2005.5 (Doc. 31, 02/28/05 Order to Show Cause).

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(Doc. 31, 02/28/05 Order to Show Cause 2).

The 02/28/05 Order to Show Cause also contained a temporary

protective order against proposed defendant David and against

Defendant Abdo: 

[I]t is further ORDERED that pending the hearing and

determination of this motion or pending further order of the

Court, David, be and hereby is restrained and prohibited

from transferring, conveying or otherwise encumbering the

Coachlight Property and the Warehouse Property; and Abdo is

restrained and prohibited from transferring, conveying or

otherwise encumbering any assets in his possession, whether

real property or chattels, except in the ordinary course of

business....

(Id. at 2). The February 28, 2005, temporary restraining order

is not the subject of this motion.

6 Writs of Attachment issued as to Defendant Bakersfield

Wholesale only. (Docs. 47, 48). One Writ was issued as to the

Coachlight Property and the other issued as to the Warehouse

Property. (Docs. 47, 48; see also Doc. 42, 03/16/05 Order

Granting Writs of Attachment and Other Relief 3). The writs were

not signed by the clerk of court. (See also Docs. 52 & 53).

7

Defendants were ordered to respond to the Order to Show Cause by

March 2, 2005, at 4:30 p.m. (Id. at 3). Defendants

Bakersfield Wholesale, Abdo, and Malaka responded by the

deadline. (Doc. 34, Defs.’ Response). 

On March 3, 2005, in Courtroom 2, oral argument was heard on

Plaintiff’s February 23, 2005, motion, with appearances by

Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ counsel. (Doc. 43, Minutes). 

Plaintiff’s motions for (1) Expedited Discovery; (2) Leave to

Amend; and (3) Writs of Attachment were granted.6 (Doc. 41,

03/15/05 Order Granting Expedited Discovery and Other Relief;

Doc. 42, 03/16/05 Order Granting Writs of Attachment and Other

Relief). 

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7 On April 20, 2005, an order issued informing the parties

that “[i]f injunctive relief is still sought, this subject needs

to be addressed.” (Doc. 76). No action by either party has been

taken to date.

8

The motions for preliminary injunction and contempt were not

heard at the hearing on March 3, 2005. Further oral argument was

continued until April 4, 2005. (Doc. 41, Order Granting

Expedited Discovery and Other Relief 3). Defendant Abdo was

directed to personally appear at the hearing to give testimony if

so required. (Id.). Neither party filed any further documents

or papers relating to the Plaintiff’s motions for contempt and

preliminary injunction. 

On April 4, 2005, oral argument was heard regarding

Plaintiff’s motion for contempt. The motion for preliminary

injunction was not discussed by the parties.7 Ira N. Glauber and

Steven M. Koch appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, and

Russell VanRozeboom and Gary L. Huss appeared on behalf of

Defendant. (Doc. 65, Minutes). An evidentiary hearing was held

and Defendant Abdo Azeh testified. 

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

This is an action for non-payment of approximately $3.68

million in credit card charges made to Defendants’ American

Express charge cards. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Bakersfield Wholesale, Abdo, and Malaka purchased from Costco

approximately $3.68 million worth of cigarettes using their

American Express corporate charge cards and that Defendants have

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failed to make payment on this amount. The subject of

Plaintiff’s motion for contempt is the allegation that Defendant

Abdo has transferred property he owned to his brother-in-law,

Defendant David, in violation of the TRO. 

A. Credit Card Charges.

In May 2004, Defendant Abdo applied for and was granted a

corporate credit card account (but no purchase card) on behalf of

“Bakersfield Wholesale.” (Doc. 30, Glauber Decl. ¶ 8a; Doc. 30,

Pl.’s Mem. 4). In September 2004, Abdo applied for and was

granted a corporate purchase card account on behalf of “D&A

Corporation.” (Id.). American Express then issued three

additional American Express corporate credit cards in the names

of Defendants Abdo, Malaka, and Fahd. (Id.). 

As of the end of October 2004, Plaintiff alleges there was a

balance of $109,762 owed with respect to the American Express

credit card account of Abdo Aezah/Bakersfield Wholesale (3794-

793179-41002). Plaintiff further alleges that, as of the end of

October 2004, there was a balance of $109,762 owed with respect

to the card issued in the name of Defendant Abdo; $46,834.26 owed

with respect to the card of Defendant Malaka; and $35,033.75 owed

with respect to the card of Defendant Fahd. (Id. at ¶ 8(b-c)). 

On November 5 and 7, 2004, American Express received electronic

payments by computer of those amounts for each account. (Id.). 

However, approximately one month later, on December 4, 2004, the

bank that issued these payments to American Express reversed the

payments due to insufficient funds. (Id.). American Express

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8 American Express does not explain why the accounts were

closed on December 2, 2004, even though the bank did not inform

it of the reversal until two days later, on December 4, 2004.

10

closed the accounts on December 2, 2004.8 (Id. at ¶ 8(e)).

As of December 15, 2004, the total unpaid balance on the

four American Express cards issued to defendants was

$3,683,320.97. (Id. at ¶ 8(f)). Plaintiff asserts that neither

Defendant Abdo nor Bakersfield Wholesale has disclosed the

location of the cigarettes they purchased using the credit. 

American Express suspects (but is unable to prove) that

Bakersfield Wholesale and Abdo have either secreted the

cigarettes or the proceeds from the sale of the cigarettes, or

have fraudulently transferred the cigarettes to parties unknown

to American Express at the time the brief was filed. (Id.). At

the hearing Defendant Abdo invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege

in response to questions about the whereabouts of the cigarettes

and his assets.

B. Defendant Abdo’s Alleged Conveyances of Property.

In its moving papers, American Express initially asserted

that Defendant Abdo violated the January 4, 2005, TRO by

transferring the Coachlight Property to his brother David. At

the April 4, 2005, contempt hearing, however, Plaintiff

acknowledged that there is no admissible evidence of the transfer

of the Coachlight Property, and that it does not believe that

Defendant Abdo transferred the Coachlight Property. Instead,

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Abdo violated the 01/04/05 TRO by

transferring his home residence. Plaintiff produced a certified

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9 The Grant Deed contains a technical description of the

property and omits the street address. Defendant Abdo did not

deny during his testimony that, through the Grant Deed (Pl.’s Ex.

2), he granted his residence located at 2516 El Portal to his

brother David on January 6, 2005.

10 Plaintiff also produced a Grant Deed dated March 21,

2005, whereby David granted the El Portal Property back to Abdo. 

(Pl.’s Ex. 3).

11

copy of a Grant Deed (dated January 6, 2005, and signed January

7, 2005), whereby Defendant Abdo transferred to Defendant David a

property located at 2516 El Portal, Bakersfield, California (“El

Portal Property”).9 (Pl.’s Ex. 2). During his testimony on

April 4, 2005, Defendant Abdo admitted that he granted the El

Portal Property, which is his home residence, to David and that

he “tried to transfer it for his kids.”10

Plaintiff also asserts that in August 2004, long before the

01/04/05 TRO was in effect, Defendant Abdo transferred the

Warehouse Property to his brother-in-law, Defendant David. (Id.

at ¶ 12). Plaintiff attaches a printout from Westlaw that

purports to document the transfer of property and that Defendant

Abdo conveyed the property to Defendant David without any

consideration. (See id. at Ex. F). During the April 4, 2005,

contempt hearing, Plaintiff produced a Grant Deed that was dated

and signed August 27, 2004, establishing the transfer of the

Warehouse Property from Defendant Abdo to Defendant David. 

(Pl.’s Ex. 4). Defendant Abdo did not deny that this Grant Deed

(i.e., Pl.’s Ex. 4) documented transfer of the Warehouse

Property.

At the contempt hearing, Plaintiff also produced a certified

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11 The Supreme Court has noted the distinction between civil

and criminal contempt is blurred. Int’l Union, United Mine

Workers of Amer. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n. 3 (1994). An

issue in contempt cases often addressed on appeal is whether the

sanctions for contempt issued by a district court are “civil” or

“criminal.” See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826-30; United

States v. Ayres, 166 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1999); Kirkland v.

Legion Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003); Portland

Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Live, Inc., 877

F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1989). Courts look to the nature of the

sanctions on appeal (i.e., after they have been imposed by the

12

copy of a Notice to Creditors of Bulk Sale, dated January 3,

2005. (Pl.’s Ex. 1). The notice stated that “a bulk sale is

about to be made,” and listed Bakersfield Wholesale as the seller

and David Aezah as the buyer. The notice described the assets

being sold as “inventory.” Plaintiff produced no evidence that

the bulk sale had actually been consummated. In response to

questions about this bulk sale at the April 4, 2005, hearing

(including but not limited to questions regarding the content of

the inventory, whether the bulk sale took place, whether the

inventory included the $3.68 million worth of cigarettes charged

to the American Express charge cards), Defendant Abdo invoked the

Fifth Amendment. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Contempt.

Contempt may be civil or criminal. The punishment for a

civil contempt is remedial (for the benefit of the complainant),

while the punishment for a criminal contempt is punitive (to

vindicate the Court's authority).11 Hicks ex rel. Feiock v.

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trial judge) to determine whether the purpose of the sanctions

was remedial or punitive, and whether the contemnor should have

been afforded the constitutional protections of a criminal

defendant.

13

Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988); Portland Feminist Women's

Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, 877 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.

1989); Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Amer. v. Bagwell, 512

U.S. 821, 827 (1994) (“whether a contempt is civil or criminal

turns on the ‘character and purpose’ of the sanction involved”).

Failure to comply with a court order is grounds for civil

contempt to induce compliance and to compensate the complainant

for the cost of the contempt proceeding, including attorney’s

fees. Perry v. O'Donnell, 759 F.2d 702, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1985). 

An order must be specific and definite to be enforceable through

contempt proceedings. United States v. Grant, 852 F.2d 1203,

1204 (9th Cir. 1988); Gifford v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 263, 265 (9th

Cir. 1984); Vertex Distrib., Inc. v. Falcon Foam Plastics, Inc.,

689 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Although a criminal contempt requires willful disobedience,

it is unclear whether willfulness is a requirement for civil

contempt. Compare Grant, 852 F.2d at 1204; Gifford, 741 F.2d at

265; Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1983)

(willfulness required), with In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette

Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993); General

Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir.

1986); Perry, 759 F.2d at 705 (willfulness not required). 

The party moving for contempt has the burden to show by

clear and convincing evidence that a specific court order was

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violated. Dual-Deck, 10 F.3d at 695; Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of

Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1989); Vertex, 689 F.2d

at 889. “The burden then shifts to the contemnors to demonstrate

why they were unable to comply.” Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Affordable

Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no

good faith exception to compliance with a court order. Peterson

v. Highland Music, 140 F.3d 1313, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998). “The

decision to hold a party in contempt of a court order rests with

the sound discretion of the trial court.” Transgro, Inc. v. Ajac

Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1023 (9th Cir. 1985). 

“[C]ivil contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to

compel future compliance with a court order, are considered to be

coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed

in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to

be heard.” Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827. 

B. Whether Plaintiff Was Required to Specify the Type of

Contempt it Seeks.

Defendants argue it cannot be ascertained from Plaintiff’s

brief and motion whether the contempt it seeks is civil or

criminal. Plaintiff did not state in its motion what relief it

is seeking. It stated that a number of different remedies are

allowed in contempt proceedings, without specifying which remedy

it believes is appropriate here. Plaintiff cites the following

cases to illustrate various remedies that can be awarded in

contempt cases: In re Crystal Palace Gambling Hall, Inc., 817

F.2d 1361, 1367-8 (9th Cir. 1987) (costs & fees); In re 2218

Bluebird Ltd. Partnership, 41 B.R. 540, 545-6 (S.D. Cal. 1984)

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(dismissal of pleadings); Hook v. Ariz. Dept. of Corrections,

107 F.3d 1397, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997); (coercive sanctions); Uphaus

v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 1046-7 (1959) (imprisonment to induce

compliance). All of the cases cited involve civil contempt.

Defendants did not cite, and the Court has not found, cases

requiring that a party seeking contempt specify that it is

seeking civil contempt. Where the contempt is criminal, the

contemnor must have actual notice of the criminal nature of the

proceedings. United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1004

(9th Cir. 1983) (contemnor held to have actual notice of criminal

contempt hearing despite that repeated attempts at personal

service failed; contemnor’s son appeared at hearing and read

statement that contemnor had dictated to him over the telephone);

see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(1)(A) (2005) (setting forth

notice requirements for criminal contempt proceedings). Criminal

contempt proceedings require procedural protections afforded

criminal defendants. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et

Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 800-1 (1987); Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826. 

It is not necessary for the party seeking contempt to request

punitive relief, and is often not even appropriate for the party

to do so. See Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Ironworkers Local

433, 169 F.3d 1217, 1219 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In exceptional

circumstances, the NLRB may request that the court initiate

criminal contempt proceedings.” citing Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.

v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1417 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Here, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff did not explicitly

state which type of contempt it seeks. All cases Plaintiff cited

in support of its motion deal with civil contempt. The decision

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whether to initiate criminal proceedings in a contempt case rests

solely with judges and grand juries. A-Plus Roofing, Inc.,

39 F.3d at 1417; see also Young, 481 U.S. at 800-1. It is not

within the discretion of a plaintiff to initiate criminal

contempt proceedings. Defendant Abdo did not receive notice that

the proceeding would be anything other than a civil one. This is

a civil contempt proceeding.

C. Defendants Argue that the Language of the TRO is Vague

and Ambiguous.

Defendants argue that it “is not entirely clear” how the

following language of the TRO is to be interpreted: “restrained

and prohibited from transferring or paying any assets of the

defendants or any personal or real property in which the

defendants have an interest...to the following extent: ... ii) as

to defendant Abdo Aezah, to the extent of $351,384.38....” 

Defendants argue that the following language in one of

Plaintiff’s submissions is somehow more clear: “restrained and

prohibited from transferring, conveying or otherwise encumbering

any assets in his possession....” (Id. at 3). 

Contrary to Defendants’ conclusory assertion, the TRO

language is not vague and ambiguous. The language makes it very

clear that the defendants (including Abdo) are not to transfer

any “assets” or any “personal or real property in which [they]

have an interest” that is valued at certain specified amounts. 

As to Defendant Abdo, this amount is $351,384.38.

D. Whether Defendant Abdo Violated the 01/04/05 Temporary

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Restraining Order.

A civil contempt “may be imposed in an ordinary civil

proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Bagwell,

512 U.S. at 827. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) provides that TROs are

“binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers,

agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those

persons in active concert or participation with them who receive

actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.”

(emphasis added). Defendant Abdo does not admit nor deny that he

received actual notice of the January 4, 2005, TRO before

January 6, 2005, (the date on the El Portal Grant Deed), or

January 7, 2005 (the date the El Portal Grant Deed was signed). 

The certificate of service states that the 01/04/05 TRO was

served on Defendant Abdo on January 5, 2005, by personal delivery

to his sixteen year old nephew Joseph Aezah at 402 California

Avenue, Bakersfield, California. (Doc. 30, Glauber Decl.,

Ex. D). Defendant Abdo testified at the hearing on

April 4, 2005, that he “did not remember” when Joseph gave him

the 01/04/05 TRO and that he received “a lot of papers.” 

Defendant Abdo, however, was present at the January 11, 2005,

hearing and does not deny having received notice of the 01/04/05

TRO at some time before January 11, 2005. 

American Express also asserts it faxed a copy of the

01/04/05 TRO to Defendant Abdo on January 5, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 10,

Ex. E). Defendant argues that the fax is not proper service

because there is no foundation that the fax number used is the

correct fax number for Defendant Abdo. (Doc. 34, Def.’s Opp. 4). 

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12 Plaintiffs also produced a notice of bulk sale dated

January 3, 2005, as evidence of a violation of the TRO. This

document fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that

Defendant Abdo violated the TRO by a bulk sale. The notice

establishes only that a bulk sale was about to be made --

Plaintiffs produced no evidence that the sale actually occurred. 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt on the grounds of a bulk sale is

DENIED. The transfer of the Warehouse Property occurred months

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Defendant Abdo does not deny having received the fax. 

Furthermore, American Express asserts it sent a copy of the

01/04/05 TRO to Defendant Abdo overnight via Federal Express and

that Defendant Abdo received the package on January 6, 2005. 

(Doc. 30, Glauber Decl. ¶ 10). Defendant Abdo argues that

Plaintiffs failed to attach a Federal Express receipt, but does

not deny having received the Federal Express. He testified only

that he “didn’t remember” receiving the papers. 

Plaintiff has established by clear and convincing evidence

that it attempted service of the TRO on Defendant Abdo by three

means–personal delivery, facsimile, and Federal Express. 

The TRO prohibiting Defendant Abdo from transferring any of

his property up to an amount of $351,348.38 issued on

January 4, 2005. Defendant Abdo transferred his home residence

on January 7, 2005. He admitted at the April 4, 2005, hearing

that he transferred the property to his brother “for his kids,”

which establishes that it was a knowing transfer with the intent

to avoid creditors. 

Plaintiff has established by clear and convincing evidence

that Defendant Abdo violated the 01/04/05 TRO by transferring the

El Portal property to Defendant David via the El Portal Grant

Deed (Pl.’s Ex. 2).12

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before the TRO issued and Plaintiff does not (nor cannot) argue

that this transfer could be the basis for a contempt order. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for

contempt against Defendant Abdo is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are

awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in an amount to be

determined.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May _13__, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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