Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02728/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02728-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 444
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Welfare
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2728

___________

Terry Skelton, *

*

 Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Michael Henry; William R. Rapps, *

*

 Appellees. *

Appeals from the United States

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

William R. Rapps; Michael Henry; *

Missouri Division of Child Support *

Enforcement *

*

 Cross Claimants *

*

v. *

*

Terry Skelton *

*

Counter Defendant *

Appellate Case: 03-2728 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/30/2004 Entry ID: 1839102 
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___________

No. 03-2751

___________

Glenda Jackson, Individually; *

Terry Skelton, *

*

 Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

William R. Rapps, Individually; *

Michael R. Henry; Bill Larue, *

*

 Appellees. *

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

William R. Rapps; Michael Henry; *

Bill Larue *

*

 Third Party Plaintiffs *

*

v. *

*

United States of America; Health & *

Human Services; Tommy G. *

Thompson, Secretary of the United *

States Department of Health and *

Human Services, *

*

 Third Party Defendants *

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 The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri. 

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___________

Submitted: September 16, 2004

Filed: November 30, 2004

___________

Before COLLOTON, HEANEY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated cases challenge Missouri’s practice of calculating debt

owed by non-custodial parents in a manner inconsistent with federal regulations. The

plaintiffs requested refunds of money collected pursuant to the improper scheme. The

district court1

 granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants, holding

that the claim for retroactive refunds was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and

that, with respect to the named plaintiffs, dismissal was appropriate because of a

failure to prosecute. The plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Glenda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class, and Terry Skelton

individually, challenged the state of Missouri’s method of calculating non-custodial

parents’ obligation to reimburse the state for payments made to custodial spouses

under the Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) program. These cases

have been consolidated for appeal. In August 1990, the district court held that

Missouri’s calculation of this “state debt” was contrary to the applicable provisions

of the Social Security Act and federal implementing regulations. The court granted

class certification to the plaintiffs, declared all administrative judgments fixing such

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 We note the five dollar discrepancy in these figures, less than 0.0005% of the

total collected. 

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debt null and void, and enjoined the defendants from further debt collection pursuant

to this scheme. The Eighth Circuit affirmed this order in Jackson v. Rapps, 947 F.2d

332 (8th Cir. 1991). The parties then entered into negotiations to fix the amount of

refunds due to the plaintiffs. 

Missouri continued to collect state debt in violation of the court’s injunction

after the August 1990 order. Collections made after 1990 have since been returned

to the plaintiffs, or redistributed to custodial parents. In all, since the 1990 order, the

state collected $1,057,079. A total of $884,600 was refunded to class members and

the remaining $172,4742

 was paid to custodial parents as back child support. 

On February 3, 1994, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, requesting

refunds of all state debt collected prior to 1990. The defendants raised an Eleventh

Amendment immunity defense in their answer to the amended complaint, and

included a counterclaim for a set-off if refunds were awarded to the plaintiffs. The

defendants also filed a third party claim against the United States for contribution if

refunds were awarded to the plaintiffs. 

In June of 1998, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal

based on failure to prosecute. This court reversed and directed the plaintiffs to

promptly file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion to place all

disputed issues before the district court. Skelton v. Rapps, 187 F.3d 902 (8th Cir.

1999). No dispositive motion was filed until June 20, 2002, when the plaintiffs filed

a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Eleventh Amendment

immunity. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on September

25, 2002. 

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 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants in Jackson and

dismissed Skelton’s individual case for failure to prosecute. The district court held

that the Eleventh Amendment barred the refund of state debt collected before 1990,

and that the state had shown that all state debt collected after 1990 had been returned

to the plaintiffs or applied to legitimate debts. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether

the retroactive relief sought by the plaintiffs is barred by the Eleventh Amendment;

(2) whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the remaining

issues in the Jackson case; and (3) whether the court abused its discretion by

dismissing the Skelton case.

ANALYSIS

We review the district court’s Eleventh Amendment decision de novo. Union

Elec. Co. v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 366 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 2004); Santee

Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997).

The Eleventh Amendment provides that the “[j]udicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit . . . commenced or prosecuted

against one of the . . . States” by citizens of another State. U.S. Const. amend. XI.

It has been interpreted to provide a state with immunity from suit in federal court by

citizens of other states and by its own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10

(1890). State immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to awards for

prospective relief, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), but does bar the award of

any retroactive relief for violations of federal law that would require payment of

funds from a state treasury. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). In

their amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought refunds of monies collected by the

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We would reject this argument if it were raised. The relief the plaintiffs seek,

for past violations of federal regulations, would be paid out of the Missouri treasury

and falls squarely within the bar of the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974). 

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state in violation of federal law from 1984 to 1990. The plaintiffs do not contend that

their request is not subject to immunity,3

 but claim that the state waived its immunity.

A state may waive its immunity from suit in federal court by voluntarily

submitting its rights for judicial determination. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S.

613, 618-19 (2002). Waiver in litigation prevents states from selectively invoking

immunity to achieve litigation advantages. Id. at 620. We focus on whether the

state’s action in litigation clearly invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court, not on

the intention of the state to waive immunity. Id. 

A state voluntarily invokes the federal court’s jurisdiction by filing suit in a

federal court or agreeing as a defendant to remove the case to federal court. Id. This

court has held that a state waives immunity by defending a case on the merits through

final judgment and numerous appeals without raising an Eleventh Amendment

defense. In re SSDS, Inc., 225 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2000).

The claim for retroactive relief was first raised in the plaintiffs’ amended

complaint. The defendants raised the immunity issue in their response to the

amended complaint. The plaintiffs suggest that Missouri voluntarily invoked the

jurisdiction of the court by filing a counterclaim and third party complaint in the same

response, citing Hankins v. Finnell, 964 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1992). Hankins, however,

held more narrowly that the state, by agreeing to indemnify state employees and pay

a judgment on their behalf, waived its immunity with regard to the judgment. Id. at

858; accord Union Elec. Co. v. Mo. Dep’t of Conservation, 366 F.3d 655, 659 (8th

Cir. 2004) (recognizing the waiver in Hankins was based on the state’s payment of

judgment, and not on the state’s appearance in the federal court). We conclude that

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a counterclaim and third party complaint are not sufficient to waive a claim of

Eleventh Amendment immunity asserted in the very same document. A state is not

required to give up other valid defenses in order to preserve its immunity defense. 

 

We conclude that Missouri did not place itself in the federal forum. The state

did not voluntarily invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by filing a

counterclaim and third party claim. Missouri raised its Eleventh Amendment defense

promptly in its answer to the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and did not waive its

immunity. We thus affirm the district court’s decision that the Eleventh Amendment

barred recovery of past payments to the state. 

We next turn to the district court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to

the collection of monies after the district court issued its injunction. We review the

district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Turney v. Waterbury, 375 F.3d

756, 759 (8th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The parties do not dispute that the state continued to collect monies in violation

of the district court’s injunction. The state has shown that collections made after

August 1990 have been refunded to the class, or applied to other debts of the

plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are not entitled to interest under Missouri law unless there

is specific statutory authority for such payment. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. State Tax

Comm’n, 362 S.W.2d 635, 641 (Mo. 1962); Simmons Hardware Co. v. City of St.

Louis, 192 S.W. 394, 398-99 (Mo. 1916). No Missouri statute authorizes payment

of interest in this case. 

The plaintiffs’ claim to interest under the Fifth Amendment is similarly

unavailing. The state’s withholding of “state debt” here was neither a confiscation

of property, see United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989), nor a

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regulatory taking, United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378, 1383

(Fed. Cir. 2002). A reasonable fee imposed “for the reimbursement of the cost of

government services” is not a taking. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 63. Missouri’s state

debt collection statute was specifically intended to help recover the cost of providing

services under the AFDC program. This scheme, while contrary to federal guidelines,

did not rise to the level of a taking. 

While the plaintiffs question the accuracy of the defendant’s figures regarding

collection and repayment, there is no record evidence suggesting that the plaintiffs

have not been fully compensated. The plaintiffs have not developed their claims for

individual relief. The only measure of damages discussed is the amount collected by

the state. Because Missouri refunded “state debt” collected after August of 1990, and

the plaintiffs are not entitled to interest under Missouri law, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in Jackson. 

The district court sua sponte dismissed Skelton’s individual claim after

granting the state’s summary judgment motion in the class action, Jackson. Because

no summary judgment motion was made in this case, dismissal is based on failure to

prosecute. We review the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion,

recognizing that this is an “extremely harsh sanction,” justified only where there has

been a “clear record of delay” by the plaintiff. Skelton v. Rapps, 187 F.3d 902, 908

(8th Cir. 1999)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In 1999, this court held that while these cases “have lingered too long on the

district court’s docket” the delay was not caused by the plaintiffs alone. Id. This

court clearly directed on remand “in the event the plaintiffs wish to continue to

prosecute this action, they shall promptly file a motion for partial summary judgment

or other dispositive motion or motions in order to place before the district court all

disputed issues.” Id. Since this court issued its 1999 reversal, Skelton has not filed

any dispositive motion to resolve the case. The district court addressed the measure

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of damages in the grant of summary judgment in Jackson. The parties have not

developed any claim for damages above the amounts collected as state debt. In light

of our disposition of the Jackson case, we find no abuse of discretion by the district

court in dismissing Skelton’s individual claim for failure to prosecute. 

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________ 

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