Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01520/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01520-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 29:1801 Farmworker Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Demetrio Valdez-Banda, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

LBJ Farms, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. 08-1520-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it “Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion to Enforce Settlement

Agreement and for Entry of Consent Decree” (doc. 65), to which no response has been

received, counsel for defendants’ “Renewed Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for

Defendants” (doc. 66), “Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for

Defendants” (doc. 67), and “Plaintiffs’ Request for Status Conference” (doc. 68).

Some history is in order. On May 22, 2009, we denied defense counsel’s motion to

withdraw because it failed to comply with LRCiv 83.3(b)(3) and because an LLC cannot

appear in this court without counsel (doc. 44). On July 27, 2009, we denied plaintiffs’

motion to amend the scheduling order (doc. 54). Plaintiffs complained that the defendants

were delaying the case and we concluded that the remedy for delay was sanctions including

default, and not an amendment to the Rule 16 scheduling order.

On September 9, 2009, defense counsel filed a “Notice of Settlement” (doc. 62).

Once the parties settle a case, the underlying claims in the case are extinguished by the

accord. Any future disputes the parties may have over the transaction would have to be

Case 2:08-cv-01520-FJM Document 69 Filed 10/30/09 Page 1 of 3
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resolved by way of enforcement of the agreement, typically in a separate independent action.

As a result of receiving the Notice of Settlement, we entered our order on September 10,

2009, indicating that the case would be dismissed with prejudice unless the parties filed their

own stipulation to dismiss by October 10, 2009 (doc. 63). Instead of the stipulation to

dismiss, the court received the above three motions which are now ripe for ruling. 

 Plaintiffs contend that the parties’ settlement agreement was memorialized in a

writing, that defendants filed the Notice of Settlement and refused to participate in discovery

because the case had settled. Plaintiffs complain that defendants have failed to sign the

agreement that they entered into. Defendants have not controverted these assertions. LRCiv

7.2(i). Instead, defense counsel has renewed the motion to withdraw, but has still not

complied with LRCiv 83.3(b)(3), which provides that no lawyer shall be permitted to

withdraw once a case has been set for trial unless there is the signature of a lawyer stating

that the lawyer is advised of the trial date and will be prepared or the signature of the client

stating that the client is advised of the trial date and has made suitable arrangements to be

prepared. Although the motion refers to some other lawyer, no such lawyer has moved to

substitute. Moreover, the LLC defendants cannot appear in this court without a lawyer.

Defendants have been on notice of this at least since our order of May 21, 2009 (doc. 44).

It seems plain that defense counsel had the authority to settle this case and did so. The

defendants are manipulating not only their lawyer but this court. They have failed to respond

to the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and have even failed to respond to

counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw. They cannot abort our process by their nonparticipation.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED GRANTING “Plaintiffs’ Expedited Motion to

Enforce Settlement Agreement” (doc. 65) to this extent. The court finds that the settlement

agreement attached as Exhibit D to plaintiffs’ motion is a valid, binding agreement among

the parties to this case. The failure of the defendants to have signed it is no bar to its

enforcement. The filing of the Notice of Settlement by the defendants’ counsel is sufficient

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for their ratification of the agreement. We note that the Notice of Settlement was filed after

the plaintiffs had already signed the agreement.

However, the court notes that the parties’ agreement would involve the entry of a

consent decree such that if the agreement were breached, the court would retain jurisdiction

to enforce its provisions. This court does not retain jurisdiction in cases to enforce money

judgments. Instead, when a money judgment is entered, the parties must rely upon the usual

post-judgment enforcement remedies. Where, as here, the parties have not agreed upon the

entry of a money judgment, they will have to rely upon an independent action to enforce the

terms of their settlement agreement. Accordingly, “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Consent

Decree” is DENIED (doc. 65), but without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to bring an

independent action in a court of competent jurisdiction (unless there is diversity, a state

court) to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement which we have found to exist in this

case.

The claims in this case having been settled pursuant to the terms of the settlement

agreement, IT IS ORDERED dismissing this action with prejudice pursuant to the terms of

our order of September 10, 2009 (doc. 63). Pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement,

each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees. This, of course, is without prejudice

to the right of the plaintiffs to seek any attorneys fees they may incur in the future in order

to enforce the settlement agreement.

This case having been dismissed, the provisions of LRCiv 83.3(b)(3) are no longer

operative. There will be no trial. Accordingly, the “Renewed Motion for Leave to Withdraw

as Counsel for Defendants” is GRANTED (doc. 66).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING “Plaintiffs’ Request for Status Conference”

on grounds of mootness (doc. 68). 

DATED this 29th day of October, 2009.

 

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