Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02111/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02111-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

RICKY CAGLE PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2111

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Ricky Cagle brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review

of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying

his claims for period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental

security income benefits (SSI) pursuant to §§ 216(i) and 223 of Title II of the Social Security Act

(hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423, and § 1602 of Title XVI, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1381a, respectively. In this judicial review, the court must determine whether there is

substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's decision. See

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Procedural and Factual Background

The plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSI on May 16, 2003, alleging an onset

date of December 1, 2002. (Tr. 59-61, 162-164.) The applications were initially denied (Tr. 30-

31, 165) and those denials were upheld upon reconsideration (Tr. 32-33, 171). Plaintiff then

made a request for a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 42.) 

On May 6, 2004, a hearing was held by the ALJ. The plaintiff was represented by

counsel at this hearing. (Tr. 174.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable ruling on September 8, 2004

deciding that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 16-28.) The

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plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing by the Appeals Council (Tr. 6-15), which denied

that request on May 25, 2005 (Tr. 3-5); thus, the ALJ's decision became the final action of the

Commissioner. The plaintiff filed his complaint with this court on July 27, 2005, seeking

judicial review of that decision. (Doc. 1.) Both parties have filed appeal briefs with the court.

(Docs. 10, 11.) This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (Doc.

4.) 

At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 38 years of age. He completed high school, and

he had training as a welder. (Tr. 81-82, 181-182.) Plaintiff worked as a welder/millwright from

1985 until December 2002, when he claims that the pain in his back and hip became such that

he could no longer work. (Tr. 183.) After December 2002, he received unemployment benefits

afterwards until sometime in 2003. (Tr. 184.) Plaintiff testified that he has trouble sleeping at

night because of the pain. (Tr. 186.) He takes hydrocodone before going to bed and takes

Tylenol during the day for the pain. He also takes Naprosyn, an anti-inflammatory. (Tr. 187,

190.) He testified that he no longer does yard work and spends his days watching TV or listening

to the radio. He visits with this parents and some friends during the day. He testified that he

does not grocery shop or cook. He testified that he was an avid hunter and fisherman, but since

he quit working he has not done any hunting or fishing because of the pain. Cagle further

testified that he lies down three to four hours per day and sits in a recliner the other hours of the

day. He testified that his wife does the housework, cooking, and most of the driving. Cagle said

that he sometime accompanies his wife to Wal-Mart and will walk with her until his back begins

to hurt too much, then he will find a place to sit and wait for her to finish shopping. His wife and

children carry bags into the house. Plaintiff testified that he no longer attends church because

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he is unable to sit for that length of time. Plaintiff stated that he is able to sit in a straight-backed

chair for up to 20 minutes before he needs to stand. Plaintiff says that he is able to walk

approximately 50 yards before stopping to rest. (Tr. 186-197.) 

In October 2000, plaintiff saw Dr. Michael Westbrook with complaints of hip and left

leg pain that had been hurting for eight months. At that time, Dr. Westbrook diagnosed plaintiff,

after obtaining x-rays, with grade II spondylolisthesis and prescribed Vioxx and Lorcet. 

Plaintiff reports that his treating physician is Dr. Carrick, who plaintiff see about once

a month and began seeing when he stopped working. (Tr. 193.) The record reflects that plaintiff

saw Dr. Carrick on April 9, 2003 for complaints of neck, back, hip, and leg pain. Upon

evaluation, Dr. Carrick noted that straight leg raising on the right was only to 60 degrees with

some pain and on the left to 20 degrees with pain. He also noted that plaintiff had "some sciatic

irritation." Dr. Carrick opined that plaintiff likely had sciatica, and ordered x-rays of his hip.

Dr. Carrick prescribed Naprosyn and Lorcet. (Tr. 143.) 

The April 9, 2003 x-ray results revealed a Grade I-II anterolisthesis of L5 and S1 with

a probable associated spondylolysis. (Tr. 144.) 

On April 16, 2003, Dr. Carrick diagnosed plaintiff with spondylolisthesis and

spondylolysis. Dr. Carrick noted that plaintiff needed to see a neurosurgeon, and Dr.Carrick

would make that appointment for Cagle. Plaintiff received regular refills on this prescriptions

for Lorcet. (Tr. 140.) 

On April 30, 2003, a Lumbar Spine MRI was performed on Cagle. That MRI revealed

At L5-S1, there is grade I-II anterolisthesis of L5 on S1, end plate reactive

change/marrow edema with bilateral L5 pars defects and some fluid along the

facet joints, left more than right and along the pars defects at L5. Additionally,

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there is some asymmetric disc bulge/probable disc protrusion on the left with

some left greater than right foraminal stenosis at L5-S1. There is some right

posterolateral bulge as well at L5-S1. (Tr. 141.) 

On June 27, 2003, Cagle saw Dr. Larry G. Armstrong, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Armstrong

performed a physical examination of the plaintiff, and found that his strength was 5/5 in the

lower extremities without deficits noted, his sensory dermatomal distributions were intact to

pinprick and temperature throughout all dematomes except the left L5 which was diminished as

compared to the right. Further x-rays were performed with flexion and extension views. These

x-rays revealed pars in articularis defect at L5 bilaterally and anterolisthesis grade 2 of L5 on S1

which does not move significantly with flexion and extension. A further detailed review of the

MRI also supportsthe finding of "the bilateral pars defect at L5 with anterolisthesis, grade 2, L5

on S1 with significant neuroforaminal stenosis, left greater than right." Dr. Armstrong diagnosed

plaintiff with spondylolisthesis of L5-S1 and "intractable left lower extremity radiculopathy

secondary to anterolisthesis and neuroforaminal narrowing and scissoring of the nerve roots."

Dr. Armstrong recommended that plaintiff seek "lumbosacral fusion with instrumentation and

stabilization at L5-S1 utilizing interbody fusion if possible in addition to posterior spinal fusion

and instrumentation." It was noted that plaintiff would need to stop smoking for a fusion to be

successful. Dr. Armstrong noted that Cagle was applying for disability "and certainly, his

condition at this point is where he cannot work to his present job's capacity with his underlying

pathology." (Tr. 135-137.) 

On July 15, 2003, Cagle saw Dr. Carrick again. After reviewing Dr. Armstrong's

findings, Dr. Carrick noted that plaintiff would require surgery to repair his back and that he

would have to quit smoking before the surgery could occur. Dr. Carrick opined that plaintiff's

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condition ruled out "work of any kind at all" and that this fact "is something that he is going to

have to come to grips with." Dr. Carrick placed Cagle on a smoking cessation program in an

attempt to prepare him for surgery. (Tr. 139.) 

In March 2004, Cagle visited the Good Samaritan Clinic where he received a refill of his

Naprosyn medication. (Tr. 155.) 

On April 26, 2004, Dr. Carrick examined plaintiff. Dr. Carrick noted that plaintiff was

seeking disability and that "[t]here is no way that this guy will be able to do any type of work."

Dr. Carrick noted that plaintiff had pain and numbness radiating down his left leg which was

caused by an extruded disc. Dr. Carrick also noted that Cagle had "a little bit of spinal stenosis."

In referencing the x-ray films, Dr. Carrick remarked, "[h]e is a reasonably young guy and the

films were just amazing." (Tr. 159.) 

On May 4, 2004, Dr. Carrick completed a physical residual functional capacity evaluation

on Cagle. According to Dr. Carrick's evaluation, plaintiff could (1) sit for only 10-30 minutes

at a time, stand for 10-30 minutes at a time, and walk for 10-20 minutes at a time, (2) sit for 2-4

hours total, stand 1 hour total, and walk one hour total in an 8-hour workday, and (3)

occasionally lift and carry up to 5 pounds. Further, Dr. Carrick opined that plaintiff's abilities

to push and pull leg controls was limited in both right and left legs and plaintiff should not push

or pull or work above shoulder level, however plaintiff was not restricted in his abilities to

perform grasping or fingering motions. Dr. Carrick found that Cagle could occasionally reach

and stoop; but never bend, squat, crawl, climb, or crouch. Cagle was totally restricted from

activities involving unprotected heights, being around moving machinery, and vibrations and was

markedly restricted in activities involving exposure to dust, fumes, and gases, and driving. Dr.

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Carrick noted that his RFC findings were based on plaintiff's diagnosis of spinal stenosis,

protruded lumbar disc, degenerative disc disease, spondylolisthesis of L5-S1, and radiculopathy

of the left leg. (Tr. 156-158.)

In his remarks, Dr. Carrick adds, 

Having treated Mr. Cagle in reference to this discogenic disease, I have

established the physical limitations which I believe to be accurate to the best of

my professional judgment. I must add that his pain is real, chronic, and control

resistant. Any activity greater than the most sedentary acts of daily living could

not be performed on a sustained basis. These conditions have been confirmed by

objective findings including X-rays, MRI's, personal care and treatment, and

observation. Plus specific neurological testing including straight leg raising, etc.

I also believe that his chronic pain which I would rate at least marked to severe

most of the time would significantly affect his ability to perform non-exertional

functions including the ability to complete a normal work day or week, or

function without unacceptable numbers of frequency of rest periods. His

memory, concentration, stress tolerance, and ability to deal with others would

also be significantly affective [sic]. Without significant relief, surgically or

otherwise, this individual must be considered permanently and totally disabled.

(Tr. 158.) 

The ALJ found that plaintiff's spondylolisthesis of L5-S1 and intractable left lower

extremity radiculopathy, moderate disc protrusions in his thoracic spine and disc bulging and

spurring in his cervical spine were severe conditions, but not singularly or in combination of such

severity to meet or equal that listing in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. The ALJ

found that Cagle's allegations regarding his physical limitations was not credible. While the ALJ

found that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work, he found that plaintiff could

perform substantially all of the full range of light work, and thus is not disabled. (Tr. 26-27.) 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) plaintiff's impairments meet the listing for 1.04 in

Appendix 1, (2) the ALJ improperly discredits plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, (3) the

ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinions and inaccurately determined plaintiff's RFC, and

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(4) the ALJ improperly determined that there are other jobs that plaintiff could perform by

applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. (Doc. 10.) In response, the Commissioner argues

that plaintiff's condition did not meet the listing of 1.04A, (2) the ALJ properly evaluated the

medical opinions of plaintiff's treating physician, (3) the ALJ properly considered plaintiff's

subjective complaints of pain under Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir. 1984), and

(4) the ALJ properly relied on vocational expert testimony in finding that there are a significant

number of jobs in the national economy which plaintiff could perform. (Doc. 11.) 

Applicable Law

This court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALJ's decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner's decision, the court may not reverse it simplybecause substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other

words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ

must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one

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year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.

Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical ormental impairment” as “an impairment that results

from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),

1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for

at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner's regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial

gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or

mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whetherthe impairment(s) meet or equal

an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national

economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only

if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff's age, education, and work

experience in light of his residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138,

1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Discussion

On appeal, Plaintiff advances several arguments in support of his theory that the

Commissioner’s decision should be reversed. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in

improperly evaluating the medical opinions and inaccurately determining plaintiff's RFC has

merit.

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In finding that the plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform

substantially all of the requirements of light work, the ALJ had to disregard the opinions of

plaintiff’s treating physicians, and rely on the opinion of a physician who had merely reviewed

her medical records, and had neither treated nor examined plaintiff. 

Under the Commissioner's regulations, a treating physician's opinion is given "controlling

weight" if it "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence." See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2). Accordingly, an ALJ should "give good reasons" for discounting a treating

physician's opinion. Dolph v. Barnhart, 308 F.3d 876, 878 -879 (8th Cir.2002)..

The treating physician rule is premised, at least in part, on the notion that the treating

physician is usually more familiar with the plaintiff’s medical condition than are other

physicians. Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 n. 3 (8th Cir.1991); see 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1527(d)(2); 416.927(d)(2). Generally, more weight is given to the opinion of a specialist

about medical issues related to the area of the specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not

a specialist. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(5); 416.927(d)(5); see Hinchey v. Shalala, 29 F.3d

428 (8th Cir.1994). By contrast, "[t]he opinion of a consulting physician who examines a

claimant once or not at all does not generally constitute substantial evidence." Jenkins v. Apfel,

196 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir.1999), citing Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir.1998).

Consequently, reports of non-examining physicians deserve little weight in the overall evaluation

of disability, especially in light of evidence to the contrary. See Woodward v. Schweiker, 668

F.2d 370, at 374 (8th Cir.1981); Brand v. Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and

Welfare, 623 F.2d 523, 527 n.6 (8th Cir.1980). 

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 This approach is consistent with Social Security Regulations that grant controlling 1

weight to a treating physician's opinion if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial

evidence" in the case. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (1993) (effective Aug. 1, 1991); Nelson

v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 367-68 (8th Cir.1992) (recognizing that "the new regulation merely

codifies this circuit's law regarding the opinions of treating physicians").

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The fact that a physician is not trained in the statutes and regulations of the Social

Security Act does not preclude the physician from evaluating the plaintiff. The physician's

findings and conclusions constitute substantial evidence which must be carefully weighed by the

ALJ and the Commissioner. Unless there is medical evidence that contradicts or refutes the

physician's medical conclusion, the Commissioner is bound to treat the treating physician's

diagnosis and conclusion as substantial evidence. Morse v. Shalala, 16 F.3d 865, 872 -873 (8th 1

Cir.1994), citing Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir.1978); see also Whitney v.

Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 789 (7th Cir.1982) ("If the ALJ concludes that a treating physician's

evidence is credible, therefore, he should give it controlling weight in the absence of evidence

to the contrary because of the treating physician's greater familiarity with the plaintiff's

conditions and circumstances."

"[A] factfinder is not permitted to adopt the opinion of a consulting physician who

examined claimant only once over the opinion of claimant's treating physician." Robertson v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir. 1991), and the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit has consistently discounted the opinions of non-treating physicians who have seen

the patient only once, much less, not at all. Henderson v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 19, 21 (8th

Cir.1991); Riley v. Shalala, 849 F. Supp. 679, 682 (E.D. Ark. 1993).

In short, the ALJ is not required to believe the opinion of a treating physician when, on

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balance, the medical evidence convinces him otherwise. As but one example, a treating

physician's opinion is not entitled to its usual substantial weight when it is, essentially, a vague,

conclusory statement. Piepgras v. Chater, 76 F.3d 233, 236 (8th Cir.1996), citing Thomas v.

Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1991). Rather, conclusory opinions, which are rendered by

a treating physician, are not entitled to greater weight than any other physician's opinion. Id.;

Metz v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir.1995). 

The Code of Federal Regulations sets forth additional factors, to assist the ALJ in

determining what weight should be afforded to the opinion of a given physician, including a

treating physician. The Regulations encourage the ALJ to afford more weight to those opinions

which are "more consistent with the record as a whole." See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(4). More

weight is also to be extended to "the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his

or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist." See 20 C.F.R. §

416.927(d)(5). When presented with a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ is obligated to

examine the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, attributing weight to such an opinion

that is proportionate to the knowledge that the medical provider has about the plaintiff's

impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)(ii). Additionally, the ALJ must either attempt to

reconcile the medical reports of the treating physicians with those of the consulting physicians,

or direct interrogatories to each of the physicians to obtain a more substantiated opinion of the

plaintiff’s capabilities and the onset of his disabilities. See Smith v. Schweiker, 28 F.2d 1158,

1163 (8th Cir.1984); O'Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1342 (8th Cir.1983); Funderburg

v. Bowen, 666 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 -1299 (W.D. Ark. 1987). 

Here, the ALJ improperly discredits the opinions of Dr. Carrick, plaintiff's treating

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physician, based on a determination that (1) Dr. Carrick's opinions are not consistent with the

findings of Dr. Armstrong, a neurosurgeon, (2) plaintiff attended the hearing with a tan and what

appeared to be a welding burn, (3) plaintiff's reports that he is able to wash a car, mow the lawn,

do garden work, go the bank and post office, and drive, and (4) that he received unemployment

benefits for a time in 2003, which contradicts his claim of being disabled,. 

The ALJ's decision that Dr. Carrick's opinions are contradicted by those of Dr. Armstrong

is simply not based on any objective reading of Dr. Armstrong's findings. While Dr. Armstrong

does note the negative straight leg test, lack of spasm, no significant S1 joint tenderness or sciatic

not tenderness, Dr. Armstrong also finds that forward flexion of the lumbar spine,

hyperextension, and side bending to either side causes low back pain and pain in the left leg. Dr.

Armstrong finds, upon reviewing additional x-rays and the MRI, that plaintiff does have

spondylolisthesis of L5-S1 and "intractable left lower extremity radiculopathy secondary to

anterolisthesis and neuroforaminal narrowing and scissoring of the nerve roots." Dr. Armstrong,

the neurosurgeon, recommended that plaintiff submit to surgical fusion to treat this condition.

The ALJ appears to rely heavily on Dr. Armstrong's comment that the plaintiff is not able to

perform is present job's capacity with the current condition as evidence that plaintiff would be

able to perform other, less strenuous work. Applying this opinion to Dr. Armstrong is simply

not supported by a plain reading of Dr. Armstrong's findings. Further, Dr. Carrick, upon

receiving Dr. Armstrong's findings does not alter his opinion concerning the severity of the

plaintiff's condition. The only other substantial medical evidence in the record that could

contradict Dr. Carrick's opinions are the findings of Dr. Armstrong, and Dr. Armstrong's findings

simply do not, as currently provided for in the record, contradict those of Dr. Carrick. The ALJ

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should have propounded interrogatories on Dr. Armstrong before assuming what his restrictions

would have been for the plaintiff. 

The ALJ also notes that at the hearing plaintiff has a tan and an apparent welding burn

on his arm. From this, the ALJ deduces that plaintiff's testimony that he spends most of his days

in a recliner must not be credible. The ALJ never questions plaintiff about his tan or the apparent

welding burn, and it is certainly a stretch for him to draw such a conclusion based on this

observation. Such evidence does not contradict the overwhelming and substantial evidence in

the record. 

The ALJ places much weight in the report from the plaintiff that he is still able to wash

a car, mow the lawn, do garden work, go the bank and post office, and drive as evidence that the

pain plaintiff alleges to suffer from is not as severe as he indicates at trial. The ALJ must be

referring to plaintiff's responses to May 2003 Disability Supplemental Interview Outline. (Tr.

84-88.) The ALJ does not appear to consider at all the Disability Supplemental Interview

Outline from August 2003, where the plaintiff gives much more descriptive detail about his

physical abilities. (Tr. 106-110.) In this August Outline, plaintiff does indicate that he can

sweep, take out the trash, wash the car, and mow the lawn, but he further notes "on some of these

I can do, but I have to stop & rest. I can't do these things like I use to do." (Tr. 106.) The ALJ

makes no reference to plaintiff's stated difficulties with these tasks, and thus the ALJ's reliance

on these responses as evidence that contradicts Dr. Carrick's opinions and plaintiff's subjective

complaints of pain is misplaced. 

Finally, the fact that plaintiff received unemployment benefits for a period of time in

2003 is not, in itself, a sufficient basis to negate plaintiff's credibility. See Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d

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1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1998), but see Salts v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 840, 846 n.8 (8th Cir. 1992)

(acceptance of unemployment benefits, which entails assertion of ability to work, is facially

inconsistent with claim of disability). Here, the ALJ fails to fully develop the record as to how

long the plaintiff received unemployment benefits. Plaintiff testified that he did receive the

benefits until some time in 2003, but it is unclear how long into the year he received the benefits.

While this fact certainly raises a question as to plaintiff's credibility, without further information

concerning the details of the benefits and the time frame in which the benefits were received and

in light of the overwhelming medical evidence to support plaintiff's subjective complaints of

pain, this discrepancy does not support the ALJ's decision. 

On remand, the ALJ should propound interrogatories to both Dr. Carrick and Dr.

Armstrong to fully develop their opinions concerning plaintiff's ability to perform work at both

the light and sedentary levels. 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the decision of the ALJ herein, denying benefits to the

Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence of record, and should be reversed. This matter

should be remanded to the Commissioner for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. 

DATED this 2nd day of June 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones

_________________________________________

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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