Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00678/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00678-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JACQUELINE SLATON, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:13cv678-MHT

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jacqueline Slaton (“Slaton”) is before the court on a pro se motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Doc. Nos. 2 & 4.1

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 5, 2012, Slaton pled guilty under a plea agreement to one count of filing false

claims against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287, and one count of aggravated

identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The plea agreement contained a waiver of

References to document numbers (“Doc. No.”) are to those assigned by the Clerk of Court 1

in the instant civil action. Page references are to those assigned byCM/ECF. References to exhibits

(“Gov. Ex.”) are to those filed by the Government with its response (Doc. No. 7).

Slaton titled her original pleading, which was filed on September 9, 2013, as “Defendant’s

Motion to Contest Applicability of Guidelines Enhancements.” Doc. No. 2. The court informed her

that the claims in her motion were properly presented in a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. No. 3. Additionally, in compliance with Castro v. United

States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), the court notified plaintiff of its intention to treat her filing as a § 2255

motion and directed her to advise the court whether she wished to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

on the claims in her original pleading, amend her motion to assert additional claims under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, or withdraw her motion. Id. On October 8, 2013, Slaton formally filed a § 2255 motion

asserting additional claims. Doc. No. 4. Therefore, this case proceeds under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on

the claims in Slaton’s original pleading (Doc. No. 2) and the claims in her formal motion of October

8, 2013 (Doc. No. 4).

Case 2:13-cv-00678-MHT-SRW Document 10 Filed 06/29/15 Page 1 of 9
Slaton’s right to appeal or collaterally challenge her conviction and sentence except on

grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Gov. Ex. 2 at 6-7. 

Following a sentencing hearing on October 23, 2012, the district court sentenced Slaton to

70 months in prison, comprising 46 months for the false-claims count and a consecutive 24-

month term for aggravated identity theft. Slaton took no direct appeal.

In her § 2255 motion, Slaton claims:

(1) the district court erred by applying a 10-level enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1), based on a finding that the

amount of loss attributable to her was between $120,000 and

$200,000, when the restitution amount ordered by the court was

only $102,573; and

(2) the facts of her case do not support a conviction for aggravated

identity theft because she did not “steal” the identification

information of the individuals under whose names she filed

fraudulent tax returns and she did not directly communicate with

those individuals in obtaining their identification information.

Doc. No. 2 at 1; Doc. No. 4 at 4-6.

The Government argues that Slaton’s claim that the district court attributed an

improper loss amount to her under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) is a nonconstitutional claim not

subject to collateral review and, in any event, lacks merit. Doc. No. 7 at 3-5. The Government

argues that Slaton’s claim that the aggravated identity theft charge was improper also lacks

merit. Id. at 5-7. 2

The Government also argues that Slaton’s § 2255 motion is barred in its entirety by the 2

provision in her plea agreement under which she waived her right to appeal or collaterally challenge

her conviction and sentence except on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial

(continued...)

2

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Based on the court’s consideration of the parties’ submissions, the record, and the

applicable law, the court concludes that an evidentiary hearing is not required and that,

pursuant to Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States

District Courts, Slaton’s § 2255 motion should be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. General Standard of Review

Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for

collateral attack on final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are limited. A prisoner is entitled

to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or

laws ofthe United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded themaximumauthorized

by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States

(...continued) 2

misconduct. Doc. No. 7 at 4-5. An appeal waiver or collateral-attack waiver is valid if a defendant

enters into it knowingly and voluntarily. Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11 Cir. th

2005); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350-55 (11 Cir. 1993). In this circuit, such th

waivers have been enforced consistentlyaccording to their terms. See United States v. Bascomb, 451

F.3d 1292, 1294 (11 Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). To enforce such a waiver, the Government must th

demonstrate either that (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver

during the change of plea colloquy, or (2) the record clearly shows that the defendant otherwise

understood the full significance of the waiver. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. Slaton took no direct

appeal. Because a transcript of the change of plea hearing was not generated in her case, and because

the claims in her § 2255 motion clearly are without merit and provide no basis for relief, the court

pretermits discussion of the Government’s argument that Slaton’s motion is barred by the waiver

provision in the plea agreement. The court notes, however, that Slaton does not allege that she did

not understand the terms of the waiver provision. Further, the written plea agreement – in which the

terms of the waiver provision are explicit (Gov. Ex. 2 at 6-7 – contains Slaton’s signature under

language acknowledging that she has read and understood the plea agreement and that the matters

and facts set forth in the written agreement accurately reflect all representations made to her and all

the terms reached (id. at 15).

3

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v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11 Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 th

n.5 (11 Cir. 1999). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of th

constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been

raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” 

Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11 Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). th

B. Slaton’s Claims

1. Enhancement for Attributable Loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)

Slaton contends that the district court erred by applying a 10-level enhancement to her

offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1), based on a finding that the amount of loss

attributable to her was between $120,000 and $200,000, when the restitution amount ordered 3

by the court was only $102,573. Doc. No. 2 at 1; Doc. No. 4 at 4.

A claim that a sentencing guidelines provision was misapplied “is not a constitutional

claim.” Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1321 (11 Cir. 2011) (en banc). See also

th

Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (11 Cir. 1998). Further, an error in th

application of the sentencing guidelines does not constitute a “complete miscarriage of

justice.” See Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1139-44 (11 Cir. 2014); Burke, 152 th

F.3d at 1331-32. Consequently, a claim simply asserting an error in applying or calculating

the sentencing guidelines is not a matter that may be raised in a §2255 motion. Spencer, 773

Under §2B1.1(b)(1), the offense level for a defendant convicted of certain economic 3

offenses is enhanced if the loss exceeded $5,000, with the extent of the enhancement determined by

the amount of the loss. A 10-level enhancement is applied where the loss was more than $120,000

but less than $200,000. U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1)(F), (G).

4

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F.3d at 1142-44; Burke, 152 F.3d at 1331-32. See also, e.g., United States v. Pregent, 190

F.3d 279, 283-84 (4 Cir. 1999) (absent “extraordinary circumstances,” guidelines claims

th

cannot be brought in a § 2255 motion). Because Slaton merely asserts an error in application

of the sentencing guidelines – specifically, in the manner in which her attributable loss was

calculated under §2B1.1(b)(1) – her claim is not subject to review in this §2255 proceeding.4

In any event, Slaton’s claim would fail on the merits. She premises her claim on the

assumption that attributable loss under § 2B1.1(b)(1) cannot be greater than the amount of

restitution owed to victims of the offense. See Doc. No. 2 at 1; Doc. No. 4 at 4. Because the

district court ordered restitution in the amount of $102,573, she says, it erred in finding her

attributable loss under §2B1.1(b)(1) to be between $120,000 and $200,000. She contends that

if her attributable loss were limited to the restitution amount of $102,573, she would have

received an 8-level enhancement under §2B1.1(b)(1) instead of the 10-level enhancement

imposed by the court. See U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1)(E), (F).

Slaton is wrong on the law. Restitution is limited to actual loss that the defendant is

responsible for paying back. See United States v. Liss, 265 F.3d 1220, 1231 (11 Cir. 2001) th

(“An award of restitution must be based on the amount of loss actually caused by the

Errors in application of the sentencing guidelines are also subject to procedural default. See, 4

e.g., McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1196-1200 (11 Cir. 2011); Bido v. United States, 438 th

Fed. App’x 746, 748 (11 Cir. 2011). Slaton’s claim is procedurally defaulted because she failed th

to raise it on appeal and she makes no attempt to establish cause for her default. See Mills v. United

States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (11th Cir. 1994) (an available claim not advanced on direct appeal is

procedurally barred in a § 2255 proceeding); Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234 (petitioner seeking to avoid

procedural default must show cause for not raising claim on direct appeal and actual prejudice from

alleged error).

5

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defendant’s conduct”). However, when calculating loss for sentencing purposes under 

§ 2B1.1(b)(1), the loss is either the actual loss or the intended loss, whichever is greater.

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) cmt. n.3(A). Intended loss is “the pecuniary harm that was intended

to result from the offense” and it “includes intended pecuniary harm that would have been

impossible or unlikely to occur.” Id. at n.3(A)(ii). See United States v. Willis, 560 F.3d

1246, 1250-51 (11 Cir. 2011) (finding that intended loss included defendant’s fraudulent th

claims to FEMA that were not paid). In Slaton’s case, the intended loss, based on the total

federal and state tax refunds she requested, was $154,904. See Gov. Ex. 2 at 10. Therefore,

the 10-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1) was correct. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(F),

(G)

2. Facts to Support Conviction for Aggravated Identity Theft

Slaton seems to argue that the facts of her case do not support her conviction for

aggravated identity theft because she did not actually “steal” the identification information

of the individuals under whose names she filed fraudulent tax returns and she did not directly

communicate with those individuals in obtaining their identification information. Doc. No. 5

4 at 5-6.

Slaton appears to premise this claim on the assumption that she had to personally

“steal” identification information to be guilty of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C.

This claim, like Slaton’s previous claim, appears to be procedurally defaulted because 5

Slaton failed to raise it on appeal and she makes no attempt to establish cause for her default. In any

event, as discussed infra, the claim is meritless.

6

Case 2:13-cv-00678-MHT-SRW Document 10 Filed 06/29/15 Page 6 of 9
§ 1028A. However, the statute covers anyone who “transfers, possesses, or uses” a means

of identification in connection with certain crimes and does so “without lawful authority.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a). Actual theft is not an element of the statute. United States v. Hurtado,

508 F.3d 603, 607-08 (11 Cir. 2007), overruled in part on other grounds, Flores-Figueroa th

v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (conviction under statute does not require that

defendant stole another person’s actual means of identification). See also, e.g., United States

v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607-09 (4 Cir. 2010). th

Further, §1028A prohibits use of another person’s identification information in

connection with certain crimes even where the person whose identity is used gives

permission. As the Government observes:

[N]umerous courts have held, permission does not equal lawful authority. See,

e.g., United States v. Otuya, 720 F.3d 183, 189-90 (4 Cir. 2013) (permission th

of co-conspirator not lawful authority); United States v. Lumbard, 706 F.3d

716, 720-25 (6 Cir. 2013) (holding that permission to use identity unlawfully th

still without lawful authority); United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496,

500-01 (1 Cir. 2011) (holding that purchasing expired passport from st

legitimate passport holder still amounted to identity theft); United States v.

Retana, 641 F.3d 272, 273-75 (8 Cir. 2011) (father’s permission to use his th

social security number does not amount to “lawful authority”).

Doc. No. 7 at 6. Consequently, Slaton’s apparent suggestion that some of the individuals

whose identification information she used in filing fraudulent tax returns gave “permission”

for that information to be used is unavailing as support for her claim that the facts did not

support her conviction. Finally, her contention that she not directly communicate with those 6

As the Government notes (Doc. No. 7 at 6), Slaton seems to concede that the evidence

6

(continued...)

7

Case 2:13-cv-00678-MHT-SRW Document 10 Filed 06/29/15 Page 7 of 9
individuals in obtaining their identification information is not a defense to the charges against

her, when the facts showed that she conspired with others more directly in contact with the

individuals whose identification information was obtained and that her conspirators

forwarded the information to her, which she then used in filing fraudulent tax returns.

For the reasons indicated above, Slaton is not entitled to relief on this claim.

7

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed by Slaton be DENIED with prejudice.

It is further

(...continued) 6

showed at least two individuals who did not know her or give her any sort of permission to use their

identification information. See Doc. No. 4 at 5-6. Slaton pled guilty to a single count of aggravated

identity theft.

Although not listed as a separate Ground for Relief in her § 2255 motion, Slaton asserts, 7

perfunctorily, that she believed the mandatoryconsecutive two-yearsentence for aggravated identity

theft was “included in the 5 years that was stated in my plea agreement.” Doc. No. 4 at 7. However,

she undermines this assertion by saying:

Me and my lawyer never talked in detail about the mandatory time. He did say it to

me but I was so upset I just signed to get it over with.

Doc. No. 4 at 7. Thus, Slaton concedes she was advised of the consequences of her plea regarding

the mandatory sentence for aggravated identity theft. In an affidavit submitted to this court, her trial

counsel states that it was always clear to Slaton that the 24-month sentence for aggravated identity

theft would be added to any other sentence she received. Doc. No. 6 at 2. Morever, notwithstanding

Slaton’s allusion to the “5 years that was stated in my plea,” nowhere in the written plea agreement

is there any indication that her total sentence would be only 5 years, and the written plea agreement

plainly states that her conviction for aggravated identity theft would require a mandatory 24-month

sentence to run consecutively with any other sentence imposed. Gov. Ex. 2 at 2. To the extent that

Slaton attempts to raise an actual claim with her assertions about her consecutive 24-month sentence

for aggravated identity theft, it provides no basis for relief.

8

Case 2:13-cv-00678-MHT-SRW Document 10 Filed 06/29/15 Page 8 of 9
ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before July 13, 2015. A partymust specifically identify the findings in the Recommendation

to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be

considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal

factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. th

Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard,

th

DONE, this 29 day of June, 2015. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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