Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02579/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02579-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTA DE LA TORRE, an individual, Civil No. 12-cv-2579-LAB (DHB)

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: DISCOVERY

DISPUTE

[ECF No. 64]

v.

LEGAL RECOVERY LAW OFFICE, a

corporation, and DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

On March 17, 2014, Plaintiff Marta De La Torre filed a document entitled Joint

Motion Regarding Discovery Dispute of Initial Disclosures. (ECF No. 64.) However,

as the Court recognized in its March 18, 2014 order (ECF No. 66), the document was not

filed jointly by both parties. Indeed, the document did not include Defendant Legal

Recovery Law Office’s position(s) with respect to the instant dispute. Accordingly, the

Court ordered Defendant to file a response to Plaintiff’s arguments no later than March

21, 2014. (Id.) Notwithstanding the Court’s order, Defendant did not file a response. 

The Court now issues the following order resolving the parties’ dispute concerning initial

disclosures.

I. BACKGROUND

As set forth in the operative Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 44), Plaintiff

brings this action for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and its state-law counterpart, the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

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Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s agents

attempted to collect a consumer credit card debt from Plaintiff using various unfair debt

collection methods, including “about a dozen calls” from Defendant’s agents that were

improper and abusive. 

On December 17, 2013, Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. held an Early

Neutral Evaluation Conference following which he issued an order setting Rule1

 26 dates

and scheduling a Case Management Conference. (ECF No. 47.) In that order, Judge

McCurine required Defendant to produce, as part of its Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures,

“account notes, collection logs, phone bills and practice and procedure manuals.” (Id. at

2:6-7.) The instant dispute concerns Defendant’s obligation to produce “phone bills” in

compliance with Judge McCurine’s order.

 This matter was transferred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge on January 31,

2014 due to Judge McCurine’s retirement. (ECF No. 62.)

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends Defendant has failed to comply with Judge McCurine’s order

requiring production of phone bills, despite several attempts to meet and confer. Plaintiff

contends Judge McCurine’s order did not require that a protective order be entered prior

to the production of phone bills, or that the phone bills be redacted. Plaintiff further

contends the phrase “phone bills” is not vague and ambiguous, as argued by Defendant’s

counsel during the meet and confer process.

Plaintiff seeks an order, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(3)(A)2

, compelling Defendant to

make the disclosure of phone bills previously ordered by the Court. Plaintiff also

contends the self-executing provisions of Rule 37(c)(1) are applicable and that Defendant

1 All references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless

otherwise noted.

2 Plaintiff actually cites to non-existent Rule 37(a)(2)(A). (See ECF No. 64 at 4:6-

8.) The Court interprets Plaintiff’s intent to be a reference to Rule 37(a)(3)(A), which states: “If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.” In addition, Plaintiff’s

reference to Rule 27(a) (see ECF No. 64 at 4:6-11) appears misplaced. The Court believes Plaintiff intended to refer to Rule 26(a). 

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should not be permitted to use any of the documents it has failed to produce to aide its

case. Plaintiff further contends additional sanctions are appropriate in the form of the

attorney’s fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the instant motion.

A. Document Production

The Court’s first task is to determine whether Defendant should be compelled to

produce the “phone bills” sought by Plaintiff. Contrary to the position taken by Plaintiff

in the meet and confer process and in the instant motion, the phrase “phone bills” is

ambiguous. On one hand, Defendant apparently interprets the phrase narrowly and

suggests that production of its monthly invoices from its phone providers would comply

with the Court’s order. (ECF No. 64-1 at 4.) On the other hand, Plaintiff interprets the

phrase much more broadly. Indeed, during the meet and confer process Plaintiff

referenced court orders in other cases requiring Capital One to provide two years of

phone bills, totaling 100,000’s of pages, and Chase to produce a year’s worth of phone

bills. (Id. at 4-5.) It is not readily apparent to the Court the intent of Judge McCurine’s

order. The Court’s order is also ambiguous as to the intended time period.

Given the ambiguity in Judge McCurine’s order, a proper starting point is to

determine the relevancy of the requested discovery. The threshold requirement for

discoverability under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is whether the information

sought is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). In

addition, “[f]or good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the

subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the

trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). The relevance standard is thus commonly

recognized as one that is necessarily broad in scope in order “to encompass any matter

that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue

that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351

(1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).

/ / /

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However broadly defined, relevancy is not without “ultimate and necessary

boundaries.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. Accordingly, district courts have broad

discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296

F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1305 (9th Cir.

1996)). The party resisting discovery bears the burden of demonstrating that the

requested discovery is not relevant. See Brady v. Grendene USA, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 173384, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012) (citing Henderson v. Holiday CVS, L.L.C.,

269 F.R.D. 682, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2010)).

Here, the Court concludes Defendant’s phone bills are only relevant to the extent

they contain evidence of Defendant’s telephone communications with Plaintiff. As stated

above, Plaintiff alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that Defendant’s agents made

“about a dozen calls” to Plaintiff that were abusive or otherwise improper. (ECF No. 44

at 6:21-22.) Thus, any portions of Defendant’s phone bills that identify incoming calls

from Plaintiff or outgoing calls to Plaintiff are relevant to these proceedings. However,

the Court sees no reasonable basis for requiring Defendant to produce phone records

pertaining to calls made to third parties where such calls have nothing to do with

Plaintiff’s allegations in this case which, the Court is quick to recognize, is not a putative

class action. Indeed, such third party calls are not “relevant to any party’s claim or

defense,” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), and Plaintiff has not demonstrated how they are

“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED.R.CIV. P.

26(b)(1).

Defendant’s meet and confer proposal to produce call logs for phone numbers

associated with Defendant is insufficient. Presumably, the calls logs will match the

phone bill records perfectly. However, production of the phone bills offers Plaintiff a

second, independent source of verifying the number of phone calls at issue.

The Court notes that the Second Amended Complaint alleges Defendant placed

phone calls to Plaintiff to more than one phone number. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff has

not already done so, Plaintiff shall provide Defendant with a list of all telephone numbers

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associated with phones on which Plaintiff received any calls from Defendant or made any

calls to Defendant.

Finally, only Defendant’s phone bills covering the period of January 2012 through

June 2012 shall be produced. As the Second Amended Complaint alleges, all relevant

calls occurred during this time period. Thus, Defendant should not be required to

produce phone records for periods of time during which Plaintiff admittedly did not

receive or make any calls.

The Court does not find persuasive Plaintiff’s argument during the meet and confer

process that in other cases Capital One was ordered to produce two years of phone bills

totaling 100,000’s of pages and Chase was ordered to produce a year’s worth of phone

bills. Plaintiff fails to identify these cases in the instant motion, which makes it

impossible for the Court to determine the applicability of those cases to the facts alleged

in this case. 

In addition, although Judge McCurine’s order did not discuss whether the phone

bills should be redacted, the Court finds that, prior to production, Defendant shall redact

all third party telephone numbers and other third party identifying information. As stated

above, such information is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims in this case. Plaintiff has

failed to justify her meet and confer demand for unredacted phone bills. In addition,

Defendant shall not be required to produce pages of phone bills that do not contain any

reference to calls to Plaintiff’s phone numbers. To require otherwise would force

Defendant to incur needless costs in redacting pages having no relevance to this case.

B. Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks two forms of sanctions. First, relying on Rule 37(c)(1), Plaintiff

seeks to exclude Defendant from using, in defending this case, any documents it has

failed to produce. Second, relying on Rule 37(a)(5)(a), Plaintiff seeks to recover $3,150

in attorney’s fees incurred in attempting to resolve the instant dispute.

/ / /

/ / /

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1. Exclusion of Evidence

Rule 37(c)(1) provides:

If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness

to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this

sanction, the court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:

(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure;

(B) may inform the jury of the party’s failure; and

(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi).

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).

“Rule 37 ‘gives teeth’ to Rule 26’s disclosure requirements by forbidding the use

at trial of any information that is not properly disclosed.” Goodman v. Staples The Office

Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yeti by Molly Ltd. v.

Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Rule 37(c)(1) is a ‘selfexecuting,’ ‘automatic’ sanction designed to provide a strong inducement for disclosure.” 

Id. (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 37 advisory committee’s note (1993)). “The only exceptions

to Rule 37(c)(1)’s exclusion sanction apply if the failure to disclose is substantially

justified or harmless.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)). “The burden to prove

harmlessness is on the party seeking to avoid Rule 37’s exclusionary sanction.” Id. at

827 (citing Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1107). Moreover, because of the automatic nature

of this sanction, courts are not required to make a finding of willfulness or bad faith prior

to excluding evidence. See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175,

1180 (9th Cir. 2008).

“[P]articularly wide latitude [is given] to the district court’s discretion to issue

sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106 (citing Ortiz-Lopez v.

Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 248 F.3d 29, 34

(1st Cir. 2001)).

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The Ninth Circuit has established a five-factor test for determining whether

sanctions are appropriate under Rule 37(c)(1): “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of

prejudice to [the party seeking sanctions]; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of

cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Wanderer v.

Johnston, 910 F.3d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Malone v. United States Postal

Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)).

The Court initially concludes that exclusionary sanctions are not warranted. 

Defendant’s failure to produce documents pursuant to Judge McCurine’s order was

substantially justified. Despite Defendant’s failure to address the merits of this issue in

the joint motion or in a subsequent response, a review of the exhibits attached to the

motion indicates that Defendant raised the same concerns, previously addressed by the

Court in this order, questioning the vagueness and ambiguity of Judge McCurine’s order. 

Because there were legitimate concerns regarding the scope of Judge McCurine’s order,

Defendant was substantially justified in failing to disclose the information. Thus,

preventing Defendant from utilizing its phone bills is not appropriate under these

circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court, in its discretion, DENIES Plaintiff’s Rule 37(c)(1) request

that Defendant be precluded from using its phone bills in defending this case.

2. Attorney’s Fees

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides:

If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an

opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct

necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion,

including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment if:

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;

(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or

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(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

As discussed above, judicial clarification of Judge McCurine’s order was necessary

to limit the disclosure of phone bills to only include those records pertaining to incoming

calls from Plaintiff and to outgoing calls to Plaintiff. In addition, the Court has imposed

a further limitation on the time period relevant for disclosure, as well as further guidance

regarding the necessity to redact third party information prior to the disclosure of

Defendant’s phone bills. Because of these legitimate issues which required further

refinement of Judge McCurine’s order, Defendant’s nondisclosure was substantially

justified, and the circumstances surrounding this dispute made an award of expenses

unjust. Thus, the Court, in its discretion, DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant to produce its phone bills is

GRANTED on the conditions set forth above. Defendant shall produce

redacted copies of those portions of its phone bills from January 2012

through June 2012 that identify incoming calls from Plaintiff or outgoing

calls to Plaintiff. Defendant’s production shall occur on or before April 11,

2014.

2. On or before April 4, 2014, Plaintiff shall provide Defendant with a list of

all telephone numbers associated with phones on which Plaintiff received

any calls from Defendant or made any calls to Defendant.

3. Plaintiff’s motions for exclusionary sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1) and for

attorney’s fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 27, 2014

DAVID H. BARTICK

United States Magistrate Judge

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