Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00697/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00697-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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On screening, the Court dismissed Arpaio, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

(MCSO), the Maricopa County Jail Security/Hospital Scheduling Staff, and Correctional

Health Services (CHS) as Defendants (Doc. 9).

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cory Allen Hughes, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-0697-PHX-GMS (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Cory Allen Hughes brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Dr. Friedman, a physician at the Maricopa County Jail (Doc. 1).1

 Before the Court

are Dr. Friedman’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Participate in Discovery and Failure to

Prosecute (Doc. 63) and Motion for Ruling (Doc. 68).

The Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss, deny the Motion for Ruling as moot, and

terminate the action.

I. Background

Hughes’ claim arose during his confinement at the Fourth Avenue Jail in Phoenix,

Arizona (Doc. 1). He averred that when he entered the jail, there were orders from an

orthopedic surgeon for Hughes to return quickly to the Maricopa Medical Center for surgery

on his broken clavicle (id. at 3). Hughes alleged that Dr. Friedman was indifferent to Hughes

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medical needs because he did not follow the surgeon’s order and, as a result, during Hughes’

subsequent surgery, the surgeon had to remove bone growth, which caused excessive trauma

(id.). Hughes further alleged that Dr. Friedman refused to order the medications that were

prescribed by the surgeon (id.).

On July 23, 2013, Dr. Friedman filed his Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Participate

in Discovery and Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 63). Dr. Friedman asserts that Hughes has not

responded to various discovery requests that were propounded in May 2013, nor has he

provided a signed authorization for medical releases that was requested on June 21, 2013 (id.

at 2). Dr. Friedman states that he sent Hughes a good-faith effort letter in July 2013

requesting the status of the outstanding discovery responses and medical releases but has not

yet received a response (id.). Dr. Friedman further states that Hughes failed to appear

without explanation to a scheduled deposition in June 2013 and failed to respond to a

subsequent letter regarding his failure to appear (id. at 3). 

Dr. Friedman submits that Hughes’ failure to participate in discovery, to contact

defense counsel, or to prosecute this case in any way since his release from prison in May

2013 demonstrates that Hughes has abandoned this case (id. at 3-4; see Doc. 55). Dr.

Friedman moves the Court to dismiss the case with prejudice (Doc. 63 at 4).

On July 24, 2013, the Court issued an Order notifying Hughes of Dr. Friedman’s

motion and informing him that if the motion is granted, it will end his case (Doc. 65). This

Order directed Hughes to file a response by August 26, 2013, and informed him that a failure

to respond could be treated as a consent to the granting of the motion (id. at 2). Hughes did

not file a response.

Meanwhile, the Court granted Dr. Friedman’s request to extend the time in which to

depose Hughes, and a second deposition scheduled for August 30, 2013; Hughes was served

notice of the deposition on July 29, 2013 (Doc. 67). 

On September 6, 2013, Dr. Friedman filed a Motion for Ruling and stated that Hughes

did not appear for the August 30, 2013 deposition or otherwise explain his absence (Doc. 68

at 2). The Motion for Ruling renews the request to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute

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(id.).

To date, Hughes has not filed a response to the Motion for Ruling.

II. Governing Standard

Dr. Friedman moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) (Doc.

63). Under Rule 41(b), a district court has authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s action because

of his failure to prosecute or to comply with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v.

Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (a district court has the inherent power to

dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260

(9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order

of the court).

Before dismissal for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with court orders, the

Court must consider the following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution

of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the

defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the

availability of less drastic sanctions.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig.,

460 F.3d 1217, 1226-1228, 1234-1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing and applying the five

factors); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). If the court

does not consider these factors, the record may be reviewed independently on appeal for

abuse of discretion. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 

III. Analysis

Here, the first two factors favor dismissal. “[T]he public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation always favors dismissal,” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 1999), and the second factor favors dismissal in most cases. Wanderer v.

Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). Scheduling orders control the course of action

in a case, and disregard of a scheduling order “would undermine the court’s ability to control

its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the

cavalier.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992).

Hughes has ostensibly lost interest in prosecuting his action, and his failure to participate in

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discovery and litigation hinders the Court’s ability to move this case toward disposition. See

Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “resources

continue to be consumed by a case sitting idly on the court’s docket”); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

1261 (district courts have inherent power to manage their dockets without being subject to

noncompliant litigants).

The third factor also favors dismissal. There is no risk of prejudice to Dr. Friedman

in dismissing this action. Indeed, prejudice to the defendant is presumed from unreasonable

delay. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).

Hughes’ refusal to respond to discovery requests has prevented Dr. Friedman from accessing

material discoverable evidence, which prevents a decision on the merits if this case proceeds

to trial. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1097

(9th Cir. 2007).

Public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, so the fourth factor weighs

against dismissal. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 

The final factor requires the Court to consider the availability of less drastic sanctions.

Dismissal is a drastic sanction, see Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260, and dismissal for discovery

violations is authorized only in “extreme circumstances.” In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429,

432 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). When an adverse party fails to cooperate in

discovery, the party seeking discovery may move to compel disclosure or discovery. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). Dr. Friedman did not move to compel disclosure or discovery; instead,

he moves for dismissal—the harshest sanction available. Generally, a motion to dismiss

before an attempt to compel discovery would be premature. 

But when addressing Dr. Friedman’s request for dismissal under Rule 41(b), the Court

considers Hughes’ failure to respond to discovery requests in conjunction with his failure to

respond to Dr. Friedman’s motions and his failure to show any intent to litigate his claims.

Hughes was specifically warned that his failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss could

be treated as a consent to the granting of the motion and judgment against him (Doc. 65 at

2). Prior to this warning, the Screening Order notified Hughes that failure to comply with

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a Court order could lead to dismissal of the action (Doc. 9 at 7), and the Scheduling Order

explained to Hughes that responses to discovery must be filed within the time provided by

the Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 38 at 2). 

The Court finds that only one less drastic sanction is realistically available. Rule

41(b) provides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as an adjudication upon the

merits “[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise[.]” 

In summary, four of the five factors support dismissal. The Motion to Dismiss will

be granted except to the extent that Dr. Friedman seeks dismissal with prejudice. The

Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, and the Motion for Ruling will be denied as

moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant Dr.

Friedman’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63) and Motion for Ruling (Doc. 68).

(2) Defendant Dr. Friedman’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63) is granted; the Complaint

is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

(3) Defendant Dr. Friedman’s Motion for Ruling (Doc. 68) is denied as moot.

(4) The Clerk of Court must terminate the action.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2013.

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