Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00581/USCOURTS-almd-1_11-cv-00581-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARLEAN MOSES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11cv581-CSC

) (WO)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

COMMISSIONER OF )

SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

On May 2, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal

Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Doc. # 23). The Commissioner objects to an award of

fees because his “position was substantially justified.” (Def’s Res., Doc. # 26, at 1). 

Plaintiff Arlean Moses (“Moses”) applied for and was denied disability insurance and

supplemental security income benefits by the Commissioner. After her application was

denied, she sought judicial review in this court. On February 29, 2012, the court concluded

that the ALJ erred as a matter of law and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A Social Security disability claimant is a prevailing party entitled to seek EAJA fees

when the claimant obtains a remand for reconsideration of her case by the Commissioner. 

See Shala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). Thus, the plaintiff is a prevailing party.

Under the EAJA, the court “shall award” attorney’s fees “unless the court finds that

the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances

Case 1:11-cv-00581-CSC Document 29 Filed 06/26/12 Page 1 of 4
make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). See also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535

U.S. 789, 796 (2002). “The government’s position is substantially justified under the EAJA

when it is justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person - i.e. when it has a

reasonable basis in both law and fact. The government bears the burden of showing that its

position was substantially justified.” United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11 Cir. th

1995) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

It has long been the law of this circuit that the ALJ has an obligation to state with

particularity the weight given to different medical evidence and the reasons therefor. 

Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11 Cir. 1987). A statement that the ALJ carefully th

considered all the testimony and exhibits is not sufficient. Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d

731, 735 (11 Cir. 1981). Without an explanation of the weight accorded by the ALJ to the th

various medical opinions and evidence, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine

whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by

substantial evidence. Id. In this case, the court concluded that “beyond the recitation of

some of the medical evidence, without explaining what specific evidence the ALJ relies on,

what weight the ALJ gives the evidence and why he relies on some evidence but not other

evidence, the court is unable to determine upon which evidence the ALJ actually relies to

reach his conclusion that Moses is not disabled.” (Doc. # 21 at 6). Because the ALJ failed

to comply with the legal requirement that he state with particularity the reasons for his

decision, the ALJ committed legal error requiring a remand for further proceedings. Thus,

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the Commissioner’s position in this litigation did not have a reasonable basis in law. Pierce

requires that the government’s position be reasonable both in fact and law to be substantially

justified. 

The Commissioner argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to fees because the

Commissioner’s “decision to find Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome not severe (Tr. 14) had

a reasonable basis in law.” (Doc. # 26 at 3 & 4). The Commissioner also argues that his

decision “to find Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . has

a reasonable basis in law.” (Id. at 4). Not only does the defendant’s articulation of the issues

miss the mark, the arguments presented by the Commissioner merely rehash his arguments

in support of the ALJ’s determination. The Commissioner offers potential rationales for the

ALJ’s findings but those rationales do not excuse the ALJ’s failure to properly delineate the

evidence upon which he actually relies to make those findings. 

The Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified because the ALJ failed

in his duties to properly evaluate all the evidence, and failed to state with particularity the

evidence upon which he relied as well as the weight given to the evidence. (Doc. # 21 at 6). 

Consequently, the Commissioner’s position was not reasonable in law, and the plaintiff is

entitled to an award of fees under EAJA.

The plaintiff seeks fees in the amount of $4160.35, and she seeks supplemental fees

in the amount of $365.94 for replying to the Commissioner’s response. See Doc. # 28 at 4-5. 

The Commissioner does not challenge any ofthe hours expended by counsel as unreasonable

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nor does he challenge the hourly rate. Accordingly, upon consideration of the motion, and

for good cause, it is

ORDERED that the motion for attorney’s fees (doc. # 23) be and is hereby

GRANTED to the extent that the plaintiff be and is hereby AWARDED fees in the amount

of $4,526.29.

2. To the extent that plaintiff’s counsel requests that fees be awarded directly to

counsel, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) authorizes the court to award fees to the prevailing

party. See 28 U.S.C. § (d)(2)(B). The motion that fees be paid directly to counsel be and 1

is hereby DENIED. 

Done this 26 day of June, 2012. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 On May 5, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732 1

(11 Cir. 2008) in which the Court unambiguously held that “attorney's fees are awarded to the prevailing th

party, not to the prevailing party's attorney.” Id. at 738. On June 14, 2010, the United States Supreme Court

decided Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010) in which the Court unambiguously held that attorney’s fees

are awarded to the prevailing litigant, not to prevailing litigant’s attorney. See also Reeves v. Astrue, 526

F.3d 732, 738 (11 Cir. 2008) (“attorney’s fees are awarded to the prevailing party, not to the prevailing th

party's attorney.”). 

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