Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00250/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-00250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William E. Beckner, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-0250-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Plaintiff William E. Beckner applied for, and was denied, social security disability

benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. He filed a

complaint with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial. At issue are Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 6) and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 14).

I. BACKGROUND

On September 10, 2002, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income, alleging that he was unable to work due to back and neck

pain, herniated discs in the low back, middle back and neck, affective disorder, left shoulder

disorder and carpal tunnel syndrome. The alleged onset of these disabilities was July 5,

2002. At a hearing on May 10, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Cianci, Jr.

("ALJ") issued a decision denying benefits. 

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 sets forth a five-step scheme for determining if someone is

sufficiently "disabled" to collect disability insurance benefits. This scheme was summarized

in Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996):

"Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant

is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a 'severe' impairment? If so, proceed to step three.

If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meet or

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is

automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is

not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functioning capacity to perform any

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled."

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The ALJ followed the requisite five-step process to determine whether Plaintiff was

"disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act and its regulations.1

 At the first

step, neither party disputed that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

the onset of the disability. At the second and third steps, the ALJ found that the combination

of Plaintiff's alleged impairments was "severe" within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(b) and 416.920(b), but that these impairments did not meet or equal one of the

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Fourth and fifth, the ALJ found

that while Plaintiff was not capable of performing past work, he did retain the residual

functioning capacity ("RFC") to perform "a significant range of light work," within the

meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.967, and therefore, denied Plaintiff's claim. 

Plaintiff filed a timely appeal. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security for purposes of judicial review when the Appeals Council

declined to review the ALJ's determination. On January 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s denial of benefits.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

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Because the Social Security Act confines the scope of judicial review to evidence

within the administrative record, the Court will treat Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as a motion for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and the Defendant’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as a motion for affirmance. 42 U.S.C. § 405; Higgins

v. Shalala, 876 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (D. Utah 1994) (collecting cases and discussing the

appropriate treatment of summary judgment motions requesting review of administrative

decisions). Concerning such motions, the appropriate standard of review is whether the

hearing officer’s finding of facts are supported by substantial evidence and whether the

denial of benefits was free from legal error. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir.

1996); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance."

Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001). To determine whether an

administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court must “review the

administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from

the [hearing officer]’s conclusion.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)

(internal citations omitted). If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the

hearing officer’s decision, the court must uphold the decision. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d

521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995). Reviewing courts cannot accept post hoc rationalizations for

agency action. See, e.g., NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 441, 85 S. Ct. 1061,

1063 (1965); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, the decision must

be upheld, if at all, on the grounds articulated in the hearing officer's opinion. Pinto, 249

F.3d at 847.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ made six errors that require reversal of his decision and

a remand for an award of benefits. As the Court is persuaded by Plaintiff's argument as to

the first of those errors, the Court need not reach the remaining five.

A. Discounting of Dr. Borgaro's Opinion and Ignoring of Vocational Expert

Testimony

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinion of Susan R. Borgaro,

Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who examined Plaintiff and performed "psychometric testing."

(Court Transcript Index ("CTI"), at 5.) Also erroneous, according to Plaintiff, was the ALJ's

decision to ignore testimony by the Vocational Expert ("VE") that a person with the

limitations as described by Dr. Borgaro would not be able to perform any sustained work.

Defendant responds that the ALJ did not discount Borgaro's opinion, but in fact adopted it.

The Court looks first to Dr. Borgaro's assessment of Plaintiff's mental limitations. She

met with Plaintiff on June 2, 2003, and conducted an interview and a cognitive evaluation.

(CTI, at 323-29.) She reached the conclusion that Plaintiff had average to low intellectual

abilities, a memory that was in line with those abilities, and that he experienced

"longstanding symptoms of depression that are consistent with an Axis I diagnosis of

Dysthymic Disorder." (CTI, at 326.) Dr. Borgaro expressed the view that Plaintiff would

"do best at work-related activities that are repetitive and routine," and that while Plaintiff

"should be able to understand, process and carry out familiar tasks, . . . his ability to sustain

effort will likely be impacted by his physical discomfort and pain." (CTI, at 326.) 

Dr. Borgaro also filled out a form entitled, "Medical Source Statement of Ability to

Do Work-Related Activities (Mental)," in which she opined that Plaintiff was "seriously

limited, but not precluded" from dealing with "work stresses," and from "maintaining

attention [and] concentration." (CTI, at 328.) She also placed Plaintiff in the "seriously

limited" category in his ability to "behave in an emotionally stable manner" and "relate

predictabl[y] in social situation[s]." (CTI, at 329.) Dr. Borgaro rated Plaintiff "limited, but

satisfactory" in his ability to "follow work rules, relate to co-workers, deal with the public,

use judgment, interact with supervisors, function independently, maintain personal

appearance, [and] demonstrate reliability." (CTI, at 328-29.) Some of these limitations were

attributable, in Dr. Borgaro's opinion, to "pain and discomfort," presumably stemming from

the neck and back injuries he described to Dr. Borgaro during the interview segment of the

consultation, and from depression (CTI, at 328-29.)

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The "particular document" is likely Dr. Borgaro's report. (CTI, at 323-29.)

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The ALJ ignored Dr. Borgaro's assessment of Plaintiff's mental limitations. His

decision to do so is best evidenced by his interaction at the hearing with the VE, Sandra

Richter, whose testimony the ALJ also chose to ignore.

The ALJ began by posing a hypothetical to the VE as to what jobs a person with

Plaintiff's physical characteristics and limitations could perform. (CTI, at 451.) In response

to that hypothetical, the VE ruled out a variety of occupations, (CTI, at 452) but did suggest

that Plaintiff could be employed as a parking lot attendant, a messenger, or a fast food

worker. (CTI, at 452-54.) The ALJ then asked whether those three employment possibilities

would be eliminated if the hypothetical employee could perform only "simple repetitive tasks

and lower stress work with no high production quotas, [and] . . . no confrontational role."

(CTI, at 455.) The VE answered in the negative. (CTI, at 455.)

At that point, the ALJ turned the questioning over to Plaintiff's counsel, who asked

the VE whether, in light of the limitations noted in Dr. Borgaro's report, "all sustained work

would be precluded." (CTI, at 458.) The VE responded: "I think the biggest problem with

this limitation is that he said he could not . . . maintain attention and concentration. It would

be seriously limited. And then he also states below that because of the pain and discomfort

[sic]. I think, based upon that limitation, it would be difficult to sustain work." (CTI, at

458.) The ALJ inquired further: "You're making the assumption that the individual could not

perform or could not complete assigned tasks?" (CTI, at 458). The VE answered: "If you

can't maintain attention and concentration on the job, I think . . . it's difficult to sustain work."

(CTI, at 458.) In an apparent attempt to clarify that statement, the ALJ asked, "But that

particular document you showed,2

 you said it was not precluded, it was just seriously

limited." (CTI, at 458.) The VE agreed. (CTI, at 458.) The ALJ asked a final question: "In

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The ALJ appears to be referring to the category to the right of "seriously limited but

not precluded," which is entitled "poor to none," meaning that an individual exhibits poor

ability to no ability in a particular area, such as behaving "in an emotionally stable manner."

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fact there was nothing in the non [sic] or poor category3

, correct?" (CTI, at 459.) The VE

again agreed. (CTI, at 459.)

As the Court understands this interaction, the VE expressed serious doubt as to

whether a person with the mental limitations as described in Dr. Borgaro's report was

employable. While the VE did not definitively state that such a person was not employable,

she did say that it would be "difficult" for such a person to sustain work. Rather than trying

to elicit a more precise answer, the ALJ sought to clarify whether the VE was aware that Dr.

Borgaro's report described Plaintiff's limitations as "seriously limited" as opposed to severe.

The VE was so aware, but did not distance herself from her conclusion that it would be

"difficult" for a person with Plaintiff's limitations to sustain work.

The VE's doubts, however, were ignored by the ALJ. The portion of his decision

devoted to the discussion of what jobs Plaintiff could perform omits entirely all of the VE's

reservations. The ALJ opines that Plaintiff could be a messenger, a parking lot attendant, or

a fast food worker. (CTI, at 28.) Yet these are all jobs that the VE said Plaintiff could

perform before the VE was asked about the mental limitations contained in Dr. Borgaro's

report. After the hypothetical was updated to include those limitations, the VE expressed

grave doubts, none of which are reflected in the ALJ's decision.

More specifically, the ALJ's decision states that, "[t]he [VE] testified that an

individual with the claimant's vocational characteristics and the limitations reported in this

decision could perform" the jobs of parking lot attendant, messenger, or fast food worker.

(CTI, at 28.) But that is an incomplete representation of the VE's testimony. While the VE

rendered that opinion with regard to Plaintiff's physical RFC, that opinion changed when the

VE was asked to consider Plaintiff's seriously limited ability to maintain concentration and

attention, yet the ALJ's decision does not reflect the change. (CTI, at 458-59.)

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Given that the ALJ ignored the testimony of the examining psychologist, the question

then becomes whether he had sufficient basis for doing so.

An ALJ is not required to accept the opinion of an examining psychologist. See, e.g.,

Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001); Regennitter v. Comm'r of the Soc.

Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1999); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (same rule

applies to examining physicians and other doctors). When an ALJ rejects the opinion of an

examining psychologist, that rejection must meet differing standards depending on whether

the opinion is controverted or uncontroverted. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1159; Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). If the examining psychologist's opinion is

uncontroverted, that opinion may only be rejected for "clear and convincing reasons" backed

by substantial evidence in the record. Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1158; Andrews, 53 F.3d at

1041(citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d. 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990)). If controverted, the ALJ

may reject the opinion only if he provides "'specific and legitimate reasons' supported by

substantial evidence in the record for so doing." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (citing Murray v.

Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)).

Regardless of whether Dr. Borgaro's conclusions were controverted or uncontroverted,

the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for ignoring them. The ALJ stated that he was not

"fully persuaded" by the report because Dr. Borgaro allegedly relied "primarily" upon

Plaintiff's "history of alcohol dependence." (CTI, at 27.) The ALJ also states that her

conclusion that "the claimant would not be able to behave in an emotionally stable manner

and relate predictably in social situations is incongruent with her evaluation and the record

when taken as a whole." (CTI, at 27.)

First, the Court is mystified by the ALJ's view that Dr. Borgaro relied "primarily"

upon Plaintiff's history of alcohol dependence in formulating her report. The Court has

reviewed Dr. Borgaro's report and while she mentions Plaintiff's history of alcohol abuse, she

does so only in her summary of his psychiatric symptoms and history. (CTI, at 324.) There

is no mention of Plaintiff's alcohol problems anywhere else in her report, including the

"summary and conclusions" section or in the "mental source statement of ability to do workCase 2:05-cv-00250-SRB Document 19 Filed 03/22/06 Page 7 of 10
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related activities" worksheet. Nor does Dr. Borgaro connect her conclusions as to Plaintiff's

limitations to his alcohol use.

Second, the Court does not believe that there is evidence to support the ALJ's view

that Dr. Borgaro's conclusions with respect to Plaintiff's ability to behave in "an emotionally

stable manner and relate predictably in social situations is incongruent with her evaluation."

Dr. Borgaro noted that Plaintiff has a history of alcohol abuse for which he has never

received rehabilitation, that he reported being depressed for "every day for most of his life,"

as evidenced by "dysphoria, fatigue, agitation, decreased motivation, and poor appetite with

weight loss." (CTI, at 324.) She also noted that he had attempted suicide following a drug

overdose. (CTI, at 324.) Back and neck pain cause Plaintiff problems showering, grooming,

preparing meals, cleaning, bending, lifting, walking short distances and down stairs, and

sitting for more than two hours at a time. (CTI, at 324-25.) This physical pain, according

to the report, may be traceable in part to injuries Plaintiff sustained in two separate car

accidents, in which he had a herniated disk "at three sides of his vertebrae [that] required

back surgery," and a pinched nerve in his neck and back. (CTI, at 323-24.) These

observations by Dr. Borgaro seem to lead quite logically to her conclusions concerning

Plaintiff's limitations.

The Court is unsure of what evidence in Dr. Borgaro's report could be considered

"incongruous with her conclusions," and indeed, the ALJ failed to point to any, in spite of

the fact that he is required to do so. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (noting that an ALJ must set forth

"specific and legitimate reasons" to reject the opinion of an examining physician) (citing

Murray, 722 F.2d at 502). Perhaps the ALJ relied on the fact that Plaintiff can occasionally

microwave meals for himself, help clean the house by "picking up objects from the floor,"

and fish "with minimal difficulty or pain." (CTI, at 324-25.) In any event, even if the ALJ

had cited this evidence, the Court does not believe that it undermines Dr. Borgaro's

conclusion.

Nor does the Court believe that the remainder of "the record when taken as a whole,"

(CTI, at 27) undercuts Dr. Borgaro's conclusion that Plaintiff cannot behave in an

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emotionally stable manner or relate predictably in social situations. As a preliminary matter,

a citation to "the record when taken as a whole" does not suffice as a "specific and

legitimate" reason for ignoring Dr. Borgaro's opinion. Also, the Court disagrees that the

weight of the evidence casts doubt on Dr. Borgaro's conclusions.

To summarize, the ALJ rejected Dr. Borgaro's opinion, and did so without "clear and

convincing" or "specific and legitimate" reasons. That rejection is most apparent in the ALJ's

interaction with the VE. When the VE asked whether a person with the limitations as

described by Dr. Borgaro could perform the work that the VE had previously alluded to, the

VE expressed serious reservations. The ALJ did not try to develop a more clear record (as

he was required to do), and the VE's reservations did not appear in the ALJ's decision.

The Court now turns to the remedy for this violation. When, as here, an ALJ

improperly rejects the opinion of an examining psychologist, the Court must credit as true

that opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.

1989)); Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1160.

Next, the Court must decide whether to remand the case for additional proceedings

or to award benefits, a choice that falls within the Court's discretion. A court should award

benefits "where the record has been fully developed and where further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose." Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (citing Swenson v.

Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 1999)). If there are "additional issues that must be

resolved before a determination of disability can be made," a court should remand for

additional evidence or testimony. Id.

The Court chooses to award benefits to Plaintiff, as there is no additional development

of the record that needs to occur. The VE was already asked whether a person with Plaintiff's

physical RFC and mental RFC as expressed by Dr. Borgaro is capable of performing work

that exists in significant numbers in the economy. The Court believes that she answered that

question in the negative. Because Plaintiff cannot perform such work, he is "disabled" within

the meaning of the Social Security Act and is therefore entitled to the requested benefits.

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IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 6) and

setting aside the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 14).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Social Security Administration award

disability benefits to Plaintiff William E. Beckner commencing from July 5, 2002.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2006.

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