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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 2011 Decided August 16, 2011

No. 10-5097

GRANT ANDERSON,

APPELLANT

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01197)

Catherine H. Curlet, student counsel, argued the cause as 

appointed amicus curiae in support of appellant. On the briefs 

was Erica Hashimoto, appointed by the Court.

Grant Anderson, pro se, filed briefs for appellant.

Mary L. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, 

argued the cause for appellee District of Columbia. With her on 

the brief were Irvin B. Nathan, Acting Attorney General for the 

District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and 

Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General.

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Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s 

Office, argued the cause for federal appellees. With her on the

brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Kenneth A. Adebonojo, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: While Grant Anderson was in 

prison serving time for a violent sexual assault, the District of 

Columbia enacted the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). 

By its terms, SORA requires Anderson to register as a sex 

offender and authorizes the police to publicize his status. 

Anderson challenges SORA under various provisions of the 

U.S. Constitution, most notably the Ex Post Facto Clause. For 

the reasons set forth below, we reject his claims.

I

In 1988, a jury convicted Grant Anderson of assault with 

intent to commit rape while armed; assaulting, resisting, or 

interfering with a police officer with a dangerous weapon; and 

two counts of first-degree burglary while armed. He was 

sentenced to prison for 18 years to life. In 2000, the Council of 

the District of Columbia passed and the mayor signed into law 

SORA, D.C. CODE §§ 22-4001 to -4017, a registration and 

notification law similar to those enacted in each of the fifty 

states, see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90 (2003). SORA 

requires District residents convicted of certain crimes to 

register as sex offenders with the Court Services and Offender 

Supervision Agency (CSOSA), a federal agency that also

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administers the District’s parole and probation programs. 

SORA delegated to the agency authority to adopt regulations 

specifying the information offenders must submit, D.C. CODE

§ 22-4007(a), the frequency with which they must submit the 

information, id. § 22-4008(a)(1), and whether they must 

provide updates to CSOSA in person, id. § 22-4008(a)(3). A 

sex offender who knowingly fails to register and keep his 

information up to date is subject to 180 days’ imprisonment 

and a $1000 fine. Id. § 22-4015(a). Repeated failure to comply 

with the registration requirement may result in five years’

imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. Id. SORA also requires the 

Metropolitan Police to maintain a public internet database that 

provides information about sex offender registrants, id.

§ 22-4011(b)(1)(B), and permits the police to notify the public

about the registrants through “community meetings, flyers, 

telephone calls, door-to-door contacts, electronic notification, 

direct mailings, and media releases,” id. § 22-4011(b)(1)(A). 

Anderson was released from prison on lifetime parole in 

January 2009. SORA makes Anderson’s offense of assault 

with intent to commit rape a “lifetime registration offense,” id.

§ 22-4001(6)(D), meaning he must register as a sex offender

with CSOSA so long as he lives in the District, id.

§ 22-4002(b)(1), and he must also register with the authorities 

in any other state where he relocates, works, or goes to school, 

id. § 22-4014(5). On June 29, 2009, Anderson, proceeding pro 

se, sued the United States and the District of Columbia, 

contending that SORA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the 

Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Equal 

Protection Clause, and the D.C. Human Rights Act. The 

district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, 

holding that Anderson failed to state a claim under federal law,

and refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

claim under the D.C. Human Rights Act. Anderson v. Holder, 

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691 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2010). Anderson appealed, and we 

appointed an amicus, who ably argued in his support. 

II

Because Anderson’s conviction occurred before SORA 

became law, we must consider whether the statute’s 

application to him “constitutes retroactive punishment 

forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.

The Supreme Court described the framework that guides our 

analysis when it examined Alaska’s similar statute requiring 

sex offender registration:

If the intention of the legislature was to impose 

punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the 

intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil 

and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether 

the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose 

or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it 

‘civil.’” 

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 

U.S. 346, 361 (1997)). We conclude that, like the sex offender 

registration requirement in Smith, SORA’s registration 

requirement does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 

A

We are persuaded that the Council intended to create “a 

regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive.” In the first 

place, the Council drafted SORA to conform to a federal law 

encouraging states to require sex offender registration, see

Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually 

Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038, 2042 (codified as amended 

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at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000)) (conditioning certain federal 

funding on the states’ adoption of sex offender registration 

laws and setting minimum standards for state programs), 

repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 129(a), 120 Stat. 587, 600

(2006), and the overwhelming weight of authority treats such 

laws as civil and nonpunitive, see, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 96 

(Alaska); United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 936 (10th 

Cir. 2008) (federal registration requirement); Virsnieks v. 

Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 720 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wisconsin); Houston 

v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008) (Florida);

Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1007 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(Tennessee); Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 

1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (Arkansas); Hatton v. Bonner, 356 

F.3d 955, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (California); Doe v. Pataki, 120 

F.3d 1263, 1265 (2d Cir. 1997) (New York); Hayes v. Texas,

370 F. App’x 508, 509 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (Texas); 

Kirschenhunter v. Sheriff’s Office, Beauregard Parish, 165 F.

App’x 362, 363 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (Louisiana). But 

see United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 

2010) (holding that federal registration requirement was an ex 

post facto law when retroactively applied to those found guilty 

of sex crimes in juvenile proceedings), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 

2860 (2011). We see no reason to think that the Council’s aim 

with SORA was different from that of the many other 

legislatures that have passed similar laws. We note that the 

D.C. Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in its 

appraisal of SORA. In In re W.M., the court thought it the 

“clear and unequivocal” intention of the Council to impose 

only a civil and nonpunitive burden. 851 A.2d 431, 441 (D.C. 

2004). Though we are “not bound by the D.C. Court of 

Appeals’s interpretation of the Constitution,” Ellis v. District 

of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1996), “a federal 

court should hesitate before disavowing a state supreme court’s 

exposition of the purposes animating a state statute,” Allen v. 

Att’y Gen. of Me., 80 F.3d 569, 575 n.6 (1st Cir. 1996); see also

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Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 264 (2001) (construing 

Washington statute as civil in part because Washington 

Supreme Court had reached the same conclusion); Hatton, 356 

F.3d at 962 (citing California Supreme Court’s views on state 

sex offender registration requirement as “[f]urther supporting a 

nonpunitive interpretation of the legislature’s intent”). 

We also think it significant that the Council assigned the 

work of SORA to an administrative agency. That a statute 

authorizes an administrative agency to do its work “is prima 

facie evidence that [the legislature] intended to provide for a 

civil sanction.” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 

(1997); see also Hinckley, 550 F.3d at 937 (finding that federal 

sex offender registration requirement was civil and 

nonpunitive in part because of its enforcement procedures). 

That SORA lacks the procedural safeguards normally 

associated with criminal punishment is further evidence that 

the Council meant it to be civil. For example, SORA gives to

CSOSA the authority to decide whether someone convicted of 

a sex crime prior to the law’s enactment committed a 

registration offense. D.C. CODE § 22-4004(a). There is a thirty 

day statute of limitations for judicial review of the agency’s 

decisions, id. § 22-4004(a)(2)(B), but no guarantee of 

court-appointed counsel, id. § 22-4004(c)(1). In Smith, the 

statute’s use of an administrative agency to implement the 

registration scheme’s “distinctly civil procedures” suggested

“that the legislature envisioned the Act’s implementation to be 

civil and administrative,” not criminal. 538 U.S. at 96 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 

U.S. 391, 402 (1938) (concluding that Congress intended to 

impose a civil penalty in part because “the determination of the 

facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative 

agency instead of a jury”). The same is true here.

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The amicus counters that the use of CSOSA makes SORA 

punitive because the agency is involved with the 

administration of criminal justice. Cf. Bailey v. Drexel 

Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (concluding that 

statute’s purpose was to regulate labor rather than raise 

revenue in part because it gave inspection authority to the 

Department of Labor). But the Supreme Court rejected a 

similar argument in Smith, concluding that using a state agency 

that administers criminal punishment to register sex offenders

“does not render the statutory scheme itself punitive.” Smith, 

538 U.S. at 96. Rather, integrating the registration process into 

the criminal justice system may be nothing more than an 

effective way to ensure that those required to register receive 

“[t]imely and adequate notice” of their duties. Id. As 

Anderson’s case illustrates, many of those required to register 

under SORA are already on parole or supervised release. That 

the Council recognized that these programs would be most 

efficiently administered by a single agency does not make

SORA punitive. See In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 443 (“By virtue of 

their convictions in Superior Court, sex offenders become 

subject to SORA’s requirements, so it makes sense to 

coordinate the implementation of SORA with the criminal 

process.”). 

Nor do we credit the argument that SORA’s placement in

Title 22 of the D.C. Code, “Criminal Offenses and Penalties,”

suggests the Council had punishment in mind. It is true that the 

manner of codification may be “probative of the legislature’s 

intent,” Smith, 538 U.S. at 94, but the history of SORA’s 

location in the D.C. Code cuts against this argument. The

Council originally codified SORA as part of Title 24 of the 

D.C. Code, “Prisoners and Their Treatment,” which includes 

numerous nonpunitive provisions. See, e.g., 24 D.C. CODE ch. 

5 (“Insane Defendants”); id. ch. 6 (“Rehabilitation of 

Alcoholics”); id. ch. 14 (“Delivery of Health Care to 

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Inmates”). SORA was later moved to Title 22 as part of a 

“recodification of all the laws of the District of Columbia in 

2001 that was carried out not by the Council itself but by its 

Office of the General Counsel pursuant to a delegation of 

general authority.” In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 442 (citing District 

of Columbia Official Code, Preface, at VI (2001)). As the D.C. 

Court of Appeals explained in In re W.M., “this post-enactment 

administrative decision on which the Council did not even 

vote . . . says nothing about the intent of the legislature.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, the amicus points us to a snippet of legislative 

history in which a witness urged the Council to pass SORA in 

view of the need for “[a] comprehensive criminal justice 

response to sex offenders” that includes “incarceration, 

treatment, community supervision, and community 

notification.” Hearing on Bill 13-350 Before the Comm. on the 

Judiciary (D.C. Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of Joyce N. Thomas, 

President, Center for Child Protection and Family Support).

The amicus makes much of the witness’s characterization of 

registration as a “criminal justice response” to sex crimes, but

testimony by a witness before the Council reveals little, if 

anything, about the Council’s intent. See Indep. Bankers Ass’n

of Am. v. Farm Credit Admin., 164 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (observing that the testimony of witnesses at

congressional hearings “may not reflect [the views] of the 

legislators who actually voted on the bill”). In any event, not all 

of the actions the witness suggested were punitive: she also 

characterized “treatment” as part of a “criminal justice 

response” even though it is not normally regarded as 

punishment. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) 

(finding that statute was civil and nonpunitive, in part because 

the statute’s purpose was “treating rather than punishing 

sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an 

institution”). We note that the D.C. Court of Appeals found 

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what it considered a more reliable measure of the Council’s 

intent in a committee report that stated that “registration and 

notification are regulatory measures adopted for public safety 

purposes, and do not constitute criminal punishment.” D.C. 

Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Bill 13-350, at 6 (1999); 

see In re W.M., 851 A.2d at 441. SORA’s legislative history 

supports what its structure and text already tell us: the Council 

intended to create a civil and nonpunitive registration scheme. 

B

Having concluded that the Council intended SORA to be 

civil, we must next determine whether the law is “so punitive 

either in purpose or effect as to negate” that intent. Smith, 538 

U.S. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this 

assessment, we consider “whether, in its necessary operation, 

the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and 

traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or 

restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a 

rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive 

with respect to this purpose.” Id. at 97; see also Kennedy v. 

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). “[O]nly the 

clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and 

transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a 

criminal penalty.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (internal citations 

omitted).

The Smith Court considered these factors and concluded

that Alaska’s sex offender registration requirement was civil

and nonpunitive. 538 U.S. at 105-06. The government and the 

amicus agree—and Anderson does not dispute—that the

regulatory scheme at issue here has not been “regarded in our 

history and traditions as a punishment,” and that it “has a 

rational connection” to the nonpunitive purpose of protecting 

the public from recidivist sex offenders. See id. at 97. This

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leaves us to consider SORA’s “purpose or effect” in light of the 

remaining Smith factors. The amicus argues that SORA is 

different and more punitive than the Alaska statute at issue in 

Smith by pointing to three features of SORA that were not 

present in that case: the requirement that some sex offenders 

update their registrations in person, D.C. CODE § 22-4007(b);

the requirement that sex offenders register in other 

jurisdictions where they relocate, work, or attend school, id.

§ 22-4014(5); and SORA’s “active notification” provision, id.

§ 22-4011(a), (b)(1)(A) (authorizing police to “affirmatively 

inform[] persons or entities about sex offenders” via 

“community meetings, flyers, telephone calls, door-to-door 

contacts, electronic notification, direct mailings, and media 

releases”).

But Anderson lacks standing to challenge SORA’s 

in-person registration requirement because it imposes no 

additional burden on him. One of the conditions of Anderson’s 

parole is that he meet with an officer from CSOSA “at such 

times and in such a manner as that officer directs.” Certificate 

of Parole for Grant Anderson, General Conditions ¶ 3. The 

authority SORA gives CSOSA to require Anderson to meet 

with an agency official is redundant with the agency’s power to 

require him to appear in person as a condition of his parole. 

Anderson thus lacks an injury that is “fairly traceable” to 

SORA’s in-person registration requirement. Monsanto Co. v. 

Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010). Styling 

Anderson’s argument a facial challenge does not change the 

result. “The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute 

may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute 

on the ground that it may conceivably be applied 

unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.” 

L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 

32, 38 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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The amicus argues that SORA’s requirement that sex 

offenders register in other states where they relocate, work, or 

go to school, D.C. CODE § 22-4014(5), imposes an 

“affirmative disability or restraint” that is, by its very nature, 

punitive, Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. But Smith makes clear that 

requiring a sex offender to register in the jurisdiction where he

lives “does not restrain activities [he] may pursue but leaves 

[him] free to change jobs or residences” and is “less harsh than 

the sanctions of occupational debarment,” which the Supreme 

Court has held to be civil. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. Requiring 

Anderson to register in states where he is a student or employee 

imposes no greater burden on him than requiring him to 

register in the state where he lives. In fact, each requires the 

same: Anderson must register where he is. Restraints so “minor 

and indirect” are not punitive. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.

We also do not think this requirement makes SORA 

“excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose.” Smith, 538 

U.S. at 102. Because the states have “primary responsibility” 

for tracking sex offenders, the national system of registries is 

vulnerable to those who would evade registration by moving 

among jurisdictions. See Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 

2229, 2238 (2010). SORA’s requirement that Anderson 

register in other jurisdictions is a reasonable response to this 

problem, and it is not excessive. Federal law and the laws of 

each of the fifty states impose on Anderson redundant legal 

obligations to register where he relocates, works, or goes to 

school, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a); CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 290.002; 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3(a-5); MD. CODE ANN.,

CRIM. PROC. § 11-704(a)(4); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(c)(5), 

(6); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-905. This belt-and-suspenders 

approach makes it less likely that Anderson will be able to 

avoid registration by moving from one jurisdiction to another. 

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In a similar vein, we are not persuaded that allowing the 

police to notify the community of Anderson’s status makes 

SORA “excessive with respect to” its civil and nonpunitive

purpose. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Although we do not doubt that 

active notification makes SORA more burdensome to sex 

offenders than the passive notification scheme in Smith, “[t]he 

excessiveness inquiry of our ex post facto jurisprudence is not 

an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the 

best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to 

remedy.” Id. at 105. Rather, we ask “whether the regulatory 

means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive 

objective.” Id. The effectiveness of registration depends on 

making vulnerable people aware of the presence of sex 

offenders in their communities. Empowering the police to 

engage in active notification where they think appropriate is 

not excessive in view of this legitimate regulatory goal.

Finally, the amicus argues that SORA promotes the 

“traditional aims of punishment,” Smith, 538 U.S. at 97, 

because it deters crime by requiring that Anderson register in 

places beyond the District and granting police authority to 

actively notify the public of his status. But the Supreme Court 

observed in Smith that “[a]ny number of governmental 

programs might deter crime without imposing punishment.” 

538 U.S. at 102. Thus, although SORA may deter crime, that is 

of little moment to the question of whether it is punitive in 

purpose or effect. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 

292 (1996) (“[T]hough . . . statutes may fairly be said to serve 

the purpose of deterrence, we have long held that this purpose 

may serve civil as well as criminal goals.”); cf. Hudson, 522 

U.S. at 105 (“To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent 

purpose renders . . . sanctions ‘criminal’ for double jeopardy 

purposes would severely undermine the Government’s ability 

to engage in effective regulation . . . .”). More significant to 

our consideration of whether a regulatory scheme promotes the 

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traditional aims of punishment is whether it is retributive, 

Smith, 538 U.S. at 102, but SORA exacts no greater retribution 

than the civil and nonpunitive statute at issue in Smith.

Anderson and his amicus have failed to show by “the 

clearest proof[] that the effects of the law negate [the 

Council’s] intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme.” 

Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. Following Smith, we conclude that 

neither the Council’s intent nor SORA’s effects are so punitive 

as to render SORA a form of punishment. 

III

We can dispose of Anderson’s remaining claims with 

dispatch. In his complaint, Anderson alleged that the 

defendants violated the Fifth Amendment by forcing him to 

“participate in polygraph examinations and psycho-therapy 

sessions,” which he argued “may be used to negate [his] claims 

of innocence while seeking federal habeas corpus 

proceedings.” Compl. ¶ 12. But apart from this bare assertion, 

Anderson never explained his claim. His complaint does not 

say that he was exposed to the threat of incrimination, that he 

was compelled to testify, or that he asserted his privilege

against self-incrimination—all elements he would need to 

prove for his claim to succeed. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 

U.S. 420, 426 n.7 (1984) (observing that the Fifth Amendment 

privilege only extends to a probationer if his answer could 

expose him to additional punishment); Lefkowitz v. 

Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) (“[T]he touchstone of 

the Fifth Amendment is compulsion . . . .”); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. 

Emps. v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(“Ordinarily, a person must invoke the privilege in order to 

gain its advantage.”). Without more, the district court correctly 

concluded that Anderson failed to “show[] that [he] is entitled 

to relief.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 8(a)(2); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 

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S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (instructing that a court should 

dismiss a complaint “where the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct”).

The amicus recognizes that Anderson failed to state a Fifth 

Amendment claim, but faults the district court for not 

explaining the standard for a motion to dismiss to a pro se 

plaintiff and then urging him to amend his complaint. We are 

unaware, however, of any authority that requires a district 

court to go to such lengths, and we decline to extend the district 

court’s responsibility so far in a case in which the pro se 

plaintiff did not need any such help. Anderson’s filings make 

clear that he understood what is needed to withstand a motion 

to dismiss. Anderson began his response by citing Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and observing that on a motion to 

dismiss “a court must construe all allegations contained in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Anderson’s Response to D.C. Mot. to Dismiss 2, No. 

1:09-cv-1197 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2009). Anderson’s knowledge 

of hornbook civil procedure is hardly surprising: he is a 

“prolific filer” who has initiated numerous suits in this circuit

and others. Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 208 F.3d 1032, 

1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing “Jibril Ibrahim, né Grant 

Anderson” as a frequent litigant).

Anderson also alleges that SORA denies him “equal 

protection and treatment of federal law” and “violates the 

Eighth Amendment.” Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16. But Anderson has never 

explained how SORA runs afoul of either constitutional 

provision, and the amicus offers no argument on the issue. 

Anderson’s “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation[s]” are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss, 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949, and the district court was correct to

reject them, see Anderson, 691 F. Supp. 2d at 61-63 & n.5.

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With no federal claims remaining in the case, the district court

also properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Anderson’s claim under the D.C. Human Rights Act. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the 

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction . . . .”); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 

343, 350 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all 

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of 

factors to be considered . . . will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).

IV

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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