Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00889/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00889-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EVERETT H., a minor, by and through 

his Guardians Ad Litem REBECCA 

HAVEY and HEATH HAVEY; 

REBECCA HAVEY, an individual; and 

HEATH HAVEY, an individual, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

DRY CREEK JOINT ELEMENTARY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES OF DRY CREEK JOINT 

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 

MARK GEYER, individually and in his 

official capacity of Superintendent of 

Dry Creek Joint Elementary School 

District; EVONNE ROGERS, 

individually and in her official capacity 

as Assistant Superintendent of 

Educational Services; LYNN 

BARBARIA, individually and in her 

official capacity as Director of Special 

Education; ANDREW GIANNINI, 

individually and in his official capacity 

as Principal at Olive Grove Elementary 

School; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 

OF EDUCATION; and TOM 

TORLAKSON, individually and in his 

official capacity as State 

Superintendent of Public Instruction for 

the State of California, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DAD 

AMENDED ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION1

 1

 This Amended Order is identical to the original Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 

No. 88) except that it corrects a misstatement about the result of Defendant Torlakson’s Motion filed on 

June 9, 2014. That Motion was granted on August 6, 2014 (ECF No. 56), not denied as the original Order 

indicated. See infra, 2:26-28. 

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 90 Filed 09/15/15 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

 Through this action, Plaintiffs Heath and Rebecca Havey, both individually and on 

behalf of their son Everett H. (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”), allege educational harms based on 

purported violations of Everett’s right as a disabled student to a free and appropriate 

public education (“FAPE”) pursuant to the provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400m et seq. (“IDEA”) and various state 

statutes. Plaintiffs also assert associated violations of Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 

of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“§ 504”). Finally, Plaintiffs assert claims under the auspices of 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) which include both failure to accommodate claims and 

claims for civil rights discrimination and retaliation. By way of damages, Plaintiffs seek 

compensatory education and reimbursement, compensatory and punitive damages and 

attorneys’ fees. 

 The Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District, Everett’s local school district, is 

named as a Defendant by Plaintiffs, along with Dry Creek’s Board of Trustees and four 

individual Dry Creek administrators, Lynn Barbaria, Mark Geyer, Andrew Giannini and 

Evonne Rogers in their official capacities (the “Local Defendants”). In addition to the 

Local Defendants, the California Department of Education (the “CDE”) and State 

Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Torlakson are also named Defendants in the 

instant lawsuit (the “State Defendants”). 

 Both the Local and State Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on 

June 26, 2013 and July 15, 2013, respectively. By Memorandum and Order filed 

March 20, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Local Defendants’ 

Motion. Then, on March 26, 2014, the Court issued a second Order granting in part and 

denying in part the State Defendants’ Motion as well. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a First 

Amended Complaint on April 15, 2014, and by stipulation and order obtained leave to file 

the currently operative Second Amended Complaint on May 23, 2014. Defendant Tom 

Torlakson filed a motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on June 9, 2014; 

that motion was denied on August 6, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 90 Filed 09/15/15 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

 On April 2, 2015, more than a year after the Court denied portions of its Motion to 

Dismiss, the CDE filed the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court. That 

Motion is premised on the contention that two intervening Ninth Circuit decisions have 

made it clear that Plaintiffs lack any private right of action against the CDE under 

applicable special education law, and that Plaintiffs therefore have no standing to pursue 

the IDEA claims they assert against the CDE. Consequently, the CDE urges the Court 

to reconsider the denial of its dismissal requests as to the Second, Ninth and Tenth 

Causes of Action pled in Plaintiffs’ initial Complaint. Those causes of action assert 

various violations of the IDEA against the CDE, among other Defendants. Plaintiffs’ 

Motion in that regard is denied.2

 

 A court should not revisit its own decisions unless extraordinary circumstances 

show that its prior decision was wrong. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 

486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988). This principle is generally embodied in the law of the case 

doctrine. That doctrine counsels against reopening questions once resolved in ongoing 

litigation. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 

1989) (citing 18 Charles Aland Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 4478). Nonetheless, a court order resolving fewer than all of the claims among all of 

the parties is "subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 

the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Where 

reconsideration of a non-final order is sought, a court has "inherent jurisdiction to modify, 

alter or revoke it." United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000), 

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001). The major grounds that justify reconsideration 

involve an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the 

need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Pyramid, 882 F.2d at 369. 

 Despite the CDE’s contention otherwise, the intervening Ninth Circuit decisions it 

identifies are not dispositive of whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action against 

 2

 Because oral argument was not deemed of material assistance, this matter was submitted on the 

briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 90 Filed 09/15/15 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

the CDE. In M.M. v. Lafayette School District, 767 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth 

Circuit did find that neither §§ 1412(a) nor 1415(a) of the IDEA confer an express right of 

action on parents to sue the CDE for IDEA violations. Id. at 860-61. The Ninth Circuit 

carefully limited its finding, however, to whether those statutes directly conferred such a 

right. It did not make any decision about whether a legally cognizable right could be 

inferred, stating unequivocally that “we decline to reach whether a private right of action 

can be implied in §§ 1412 and 1415 of the IDEA.” Id. at 861 n.8 (emphasis added). 

 The second cited decision, Fairfield-Suisun Unified School District v. California 

Department of Education, 780 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015) is no more helpful to the CDE in 

ruling out Plaintiff’s IDEA claims. As a preliminary matter, Fairfield-Suisun is factually 

distinguishable from the present matter inasmuch it involves the right of local educational 

agencies, and not parents, to sue the CDE following disposition of complaint resolution 

proceedings. Moreover, while the case did find that the school district as a local 

educational agency had no implied right of action under § 1415 of the IDEA to sue the 

CDE, the Ninth Circuit limited any extension of its holding in that regard, stating as 

follows: 

Whether parents have an implied right of action to sue state 

educational agencies for violating the IDEA in the context of 

complaint resolution proceedings is a question we need not 

and do not decide. 

Id. at 971. 

Consequently, since neither Fairfield-Suisun nor M. M. foreclose the right of 

Plaintiffs herein as parents to sue the CDE for IDEA violations, Defendant CDE has 

failed to identify any intervening change in law mandating a different result than that 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 90 Filed 09/15/15 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

already reached by this Court in its prior March 26, 2014 Memorandum and Order. 

CDE’s Motion for Reconsideration of that Order (ECF No. 67) is accordingly DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 14, 2015 

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 90 Filed 09/15/15 Page 5 of 5