Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01313/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01313-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Robert Alan Mann, II is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Plaintiff consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on September 8, 2015. Local Rule 302.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 27, 2015. On November 25, 2015, the Court 

screened and dismissed Plaintiff‟s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a cognizable 

claim for relief. (ECF No. 6.) 

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint, filed January 5, 2016. 

(ECF No. 9.) 

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ROBERT ALAN MANN, II,

 Plaintiff,

v.

R.N. P. NIXON,

Defendant.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-01313-SAB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION, WITH 

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF AND 

DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO CLOSE 

ACTION

[ECF No. 9]

Case 1:15-cv-01313-SAB Document 10 Filed 01/11/16 Page 1 of 6
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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely 

consistent with‟ a defendant‟s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III.

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi. 

Plaintiff names Registered Nurse (“RN”) P. Nixon as the sole Defendant in this action. 

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Plaintiff contends that on January 30, 2015, Defendant Nixon breached his duty in the Facility 

D medical clinic, at approximately 11:45 a.m., when he intentionally, knowingly, willfully, 

maliciously and callously subjected Plaintiff to extreme pain, suffering and mental anguish by failing 

to take basic vitals, ignoring Plaintiff‟s symptoms of nausea, dizziness, shortness of breath, extreme 

pain in abdomen and dismissed Plaintiff back to the dorm with a lay-in without providing any medical 

care. 

On January 31, 2015, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Plaintiff returned to Facility D medical clinic 

seeking immediate medical attention for extreme pain in his abdomen, nausea, projectile vomiting, 

dizziness, shortness of breath, and black tarry stool sample from last bowel movement. Defendant 

Nixon minimized Plaintiff‟s condition stating: “It‟s probably hemorrhoids,” without any examination, 

vitals, or testing of black tarry stool sample for blood. Defendant Nixon asked Plaintiff one question: 

“Have you ever had a history of ulcers?” and Plaintiff responded no. 

On January 31, 2015, Plaintiff returned to the medical clinic at approximately 6:15 p.m. and 

told correctional officer Rodriguez, “I‟m not gonna make it,” and almost passed out. 

RN E. Bwayiga immediately rendered aid by taking Plaintiff‟s vitals and then called the duty 

doctor and admitted Plaintiff by ambulance to Mercy Hospital for emergency endoscopy from major 

upper G.I. bleeding. 

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference to 

an inmate‟s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled 

in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) that 

“the defendant‟s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing 

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Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond 

to a prisoner‟s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective 

recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

“A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner - or between medical 

professionals - concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate 

indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-

83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. 

McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, Plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment 

the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose 

this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Snow, 681 F.3d at 988 (citing 

Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976). To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from delay in 

providing care, a plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 

732, 745-746 (9th Cir. 2002); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994). In this regard, 

“[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would provide additional support 

for the inmate‟s claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 

F.3d at 1096. 

The fact that RN Nixon may have misdiagnosed Plaintiff‟s pain and symptoms as hemorrhoids 

does not rise to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that 

Defendant Nixon acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Rather, Plaintiff‟s explains 

that after describing his symptoms to Nixon, Nixon explained it was probably hemorrhoids and issued 

a lay-in for Plaintiff to be restricted to his dorm/bed and mess hall from January 30, 2015 to January 

31, 2015. Plaintiff‟s allegations do not suggest that Defendant Nixon‟s actions rose to the level of 

deliberate indifference, which is more than an ordinary lack of due care or even gross negligence. 

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Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff‟s allegations, at most, amount of 

mere negligence on the part of RN Nixon. Because Plaintiff was previously advised of the applicable 

legal standard and granted leave to amend, further amendment is not warranted.

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 Plaintiff was 

previously notified of the applicable legal standard and the deficiencies in his pleading, and despite 

guidance from the Court Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint is largely identical to the original 

complaint. Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff‟s original and first amended complaint, the Court is 

persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to allege any additional facts that would support a claim for 

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by Defendant P. Nixon, and further amendment 

would be futile. See Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may 

deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”) 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint fails to sate any claims upon which relief may be granted 

under section 1983. Plaintiff was previously notified of the deficiencies in his claims and given leave 

to amend. Based on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the Court finds that further leave to amend 

is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 

1446, 1448-1449 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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Although Plaintiff‟s first amended complaint raises state law claims, such claims are not before the Court because 

Plaintiff has failed to set forth a cognizable constitutional violation for which pendant jurisdiction may be exercised over 

such state law claims. The “plain language” of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “makes clear that supplemental jurisdiction may only 

be invoked when the district court has the hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang it.” Herman Family Revocable 

Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the instant action is dismissed, with prejudice, for 

failure to state a cognizable claim for relief, and this dismissal is subject to the “three-strikes” 

provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098-1099 (9th Cir. 

2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

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