Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02326/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02326-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL E. SCOTT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TIM VIRGA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-2326 KJM AC P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court is defendants’ fully briefed motion to dismiss. ECF 

No. 48. 

I. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

 This case proceeds on the second amended complaint. ECF No. 38. In the complaint, 

plaintiff alleges that defendants Virga, Nappi, Hamad, Shannon, Williams, and Kostecky violated 

his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of access to the courts. Id. Following the denial of 

his federal habeas corpus petition by the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California in case 3:06-cv-01147-JSW, and the denial of a certificate of appealability by the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiff sought to petition the United States Supreme Court for a nonfrivolous writ of certiorari. Id. at 4-56 ¶¶ 5, 7, 16. However, during the time plaintiff was 

attempting to prepare his petition for certiorari, the prison unit in which he was housed was 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 1 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

placed on lockdown/modified program which prevented him from visiting the law library to 

access materials to complete his petition. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 6-12. Plaintiff had no involvement in the 

incidents that caused the lockdown and prison officials were aware of his upcoming court 

deadline due to the “Inmate Appeal forms, Inmate Request for Interview forms” and other 

correspondence that plaintiff submitted advising them of that deadline. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 6, 7. There 

were no alternative means to obtain law library access because the paging system was inadequate 

and impossible to conduct legal research with. Id., ¶ 8. As a result, plaintiff was unable to timely 

file a certiorari petition with the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 13, 14. 

 The issue plaintiff sought to appeal to the Supreme Court dealt with whether Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), applied to his case. Id., ¶ 17. In his federal habeas petition 

plaintiff argued that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated because the out-ofcourt statements that he was the murderer, made by three non-testifying witnesses, were admitted 

into evidence through the testimony of Sergeant Louis Cruz. Id. at 6, ¶ 18A. Plaintiff claims that 

because his conviction was not finalized until after the decision in Crawford was issued, the 

district court was mistaken when it found that Crawford did not apply retroactively to his case. 

Id. at 5, 13-15, ¶¶ 17, 18. 

 Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, unspecified injunctive relief, and compensatory and 

punitive damages against defendants. Id. at 3, 8. 

II. Motion to Dismiss 

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a 

complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it 

must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). “The pleading must 

contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a 

legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure ' 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 2 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), and construe 

the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolve all doubts in 

the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421. The court will “‘presume that 

general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” Nat’l 

Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the 

form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 B. Legal Standard for Access to the Courts Claim 

Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, state inmates have a 

fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 

(1996); Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Hust 

v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150 (2009). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, 

and civil rights actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Prisoners do not, however, have a constitutional 

right to a law library. Id., 518 U.S. at 350-51. Law libraries are just one means of assuring 

prisoners meaningful access to the courts. Id. 

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a 

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a 

meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). For backward-looking claims, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a 

‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) 

a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” 

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076 (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14). 

To have standing to bring this claim, plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52; Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1994). To succeed, a 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 3 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

prisoner must have been denied the necessary tools to litigate a nonfrivolous claim attacking a 

conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.3. Plaintiff need not show that he would have been successful on the merits of 

his claims, but only that they were not frivolous. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1085 & n.12 (9th 

Cir. 1994). “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. 

Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has 

emphasized that “[a] prisoner need not show, ex post, that he would have been successful on the 

merits had his claim been considered. To hold otherwise would permit prison officials to 

substitute their judgment for the courts’ and to interfere with a prisoner’s right to court access on 

the chance that the prisoner’s claim would eventually be deemed frivolous.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 

1085. To properly plead a denial of access to the courts claim, “the complaint should state the 

underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), just as if it were being 

independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy available under the 

access claim and presently unique to it.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417-18. 

C. Discussion 

 Defendants argue that the second amended complaint should be dismissed because 

plaintiff has failed to adequately plead sufficient personal involvement by any of the defendants 

in the violation of his constitutional rights and because plaintiff has failed to allege that 

prohibiting access to the law library during a lockdown is a constitutional violation. ECF No. 48-

1. 

 1. Personal Involvement 

 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

causal connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). The second 

amended complaint alleges only that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated by “the 

defendants” generically. ECF No. 38. Plaintiff does not, at any time, identify the specific acts of 

any defendant. Id. However, the proposed third amended complaint, attached to plaintiff’s 

response to the motion to dismiss, demonstrates that plaintiff is capable of curing this deficiency 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 4 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

through amendment. ECF No. 51 at 5-13. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be 

granted on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement of the 

defendants and plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to file an amended complaint as set forth 

below in Section III. 

 2. Constitutional Violation 

 Defendants also argue that the second amended complaint should be dismissed because 

plaintiff fails to allege facts that would show the lockdown was not reasonably related to 

legitimate penological objectives. ECF No. 48-1 at 5-6. In support of their argument Defendants 

rely on Fosselman v. Hidalgo, 1:11-cv-00575-AWI-MJS (PC), 2012 WL 484699, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 14, 2012), in which the district court screened out the plaintiff’s access to the courts claim 

because the plaintiff had sufficiently meaningful access to the courts and alternatively did not 

present any “evidence demonstrating why the program lock-down was instituted, or that it was 

other than reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.” Id. at 6. Fosselman is not 

controlling, and even if it were, it is distinguishable from the instant case. 

In Fosselman, the plaintiff alleged only that the lockdown “only affected prisoners of 

Afrikan decent” and “caused many problems with the court” such as late filings. Fosselman, 

2012 WL 484699, at *2. While plaintiff in this case does allege that he was included in the 

lockdown or modified program based solely on his race, he also alleges that the paging system 

was inadequate, that he requested to be moved to another section of the prison where he would be 

allowed access to the law library, and that there is precedent for transferring inmates or escorting 

inmates to the law library. ECF No. 38 at 4-5, ¶¶ 6, 8, 10, 15. In determining whether a prison 

regulation affecting constitutional rights is reasonable, the policy must be analyzed under Turner 

v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The four factors that must be considered under Turner are (1) 

whether there is a “‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate 

governmental interest;” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that 

remain open;” (3) the impact of accommodating the constitutional right; and (4) “the absence of 

ready alternatives.” Id. at 89-90. Even if the court assumes there was a rational connection 

between the lockdown and a legitimate government interest, the additional allegations by plaintiff 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 5 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

implicate the second and fourth Turner factors, and, if true, would indicate those factors weigh in 

plaintiff’s favor. The court therefore finds that at the pleading stage, plaintiff has sufficiently 

alleged the restrictions he was subject to were not reasonable and therefore violated his rights. 

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s allegations regarding the adequacy of the paging 

system are insufficient (ECF No. 52 at 2) is without merit. Plaintiff alleges that “the paging 

system is inadequate, and impossible to conduct legal research, find case law regarding his issues 

without being able to check out the legal books.” “In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6), [the court] must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. Of 

Carpenters and Joinders of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Silvas v. E*Trade 

Mortg. Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008)). While additional facts regarding the 

specifics of the paging system would no doubt be beneficial, the facts as currently alleged are 

sufficient to support the reasonable inference that plaintiff is claiming that in order to conduct 

legal research using the paging system, he must first have access to the legal books to know what 

to request and that he cannot access the legal books without first going to the law library. 

D. Conclusion 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to 

allege sufficient personal involvement by the individual defendants. 

III. Leave to Amend 

Plaintiff has included a proposed third amended complaint with his response to 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 51 at 5-13. Because deficiencies remain with respect to 

the allegations against some defendants, the court will disregard the proposed third amended 

complaint and plaintiff shall be given leave to file a third amended complaint to cure the 

deficiencies. 

If plaintiff chooses to file a third amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the 

conditions about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo, 

423 U.S. at 371. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is 

involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 6 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “vague and conclusory allegations of 

official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). In other words, plaintiff must identify the specific 

actions of each defendant, not simply make claims against “the defendants” generically. 

Additionally, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Taylor v List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 

‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal 

participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 

Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 

(1970). Therefore, to the extent plaintiff seeks to bring claims against supervisors, he cannot 

simply rely on their position as supervisors and must identify the actions taken by the individuals 

that violated or led to the violation of his rights or identify the deficient policy the supervisor 

implemented. 

Finally, “inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 

procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance 

procedure.”)). Accordingly, the prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive 

constitutional rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing and denying inmate appeals generally 

do not serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. Id.; George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 

(7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has observed: 

Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are 

responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative 

complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 7 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

who stands and watches while another guard beats a prisoner 

violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an administrative 

complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not. 

George, 507 F.3d at 609-10. However, because prison administrators cannot willfully turn a 

blind eye to constitutional violations being committed by subordinates, an individual who denies 

an inmate appeal and who had the authority and opportunity to prevent an ongoing constitutional 

violation could potentially be subject to liability if the individual knew about an existing or 

impending violation and failed to prevent it. See e.g., Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 2006). So, to the extent plaintiff seeks to bring claims against defendants based on their 

involvement in the grievance process, he must allege sufficient facts to show that the individual 

was aware of an ongoing violation of his rights and had the authority and opportunity to intervene 

or take some other corrective action. 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make his third amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint 

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, 

“[t]he amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.” Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967), overruled in part by Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 929 (9th Cir. 2012) (claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to 

amend do not have to be re-pled in subsequent amended complaint to preserve appeal). Once 

plaintiff files a third amended complaint, the previous pleading no longer serves any function in 

the case. Therefore, in a third amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the 

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

IV. Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted and plaintiff 

shall be given leave to file a third amended complaint. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 48) is granted on the grounds that plaintiff 

has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement of the individual defendants and the second 

amended complaint (ECF No. 38) is dismissed. 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 8 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a third 

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the third amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”; plaintiff 

must file an original and two copies of the third amended complaint; failure to file a third 

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this action. 

DATED: September 9, 2015 

Case 2:12-cv-02326-KJM-AC Document 54 Filed 09/10/15 Page 9 of 9