Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01627/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01627-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ENRIQUE DIAZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

STU SHERMAN, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01627-DAD-MJS (PC)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE; 

AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO:

(1) GRANT IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S

IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS; 

(2) REVOKE PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS;

(3) DIRECT PLAINTIFF TO PAY FILING 

FEE; AND

(4) GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

STAY DISCOVERY 

(ECF Nos. 33 & 36)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 9, 2014, Plaintiff was granted leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff has declined Magistrate 

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Judge jurisdiction. 

Before the Court is Defendants’ January 29, 2016, motion to revoke Plaintiff’s 

IFP status. (ECF No. 33.) Also before the Court is Defendants’ March 4, 2016, motion 

to stay all discovery for sixty (60) days pending this Court’s ruling on their motion to 

revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to both of 

Defendants’ motions on March 23, 2016. (ECF No. 37.) Defendants have not 

submitted a reply. This matter is submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

II. MOTION TO REVOKE IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

A. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits a federal court to authorize the commencement and 

prosecution of an action without prepayment of fees by an individual who submits an 

affidavit demonstrating that he is unable to pay the fees. However, 

[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under 

this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, 

while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an 

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The imminent danger exception applies if “the complaint makes a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 

interprets “imminent danger” to mean “ongoing danger,” meaning the prisoner must 

allege that prison officials have continued with a practice that has injured him or others 

similarly situated in the past. Id. at 1056-57. 

A prisoner seeking to invoke the imminent danger exception in § 1915(g) must 

make specific, credible allegations of imminent danger of serious physical harm. McNeil 

v. U.S., 2006 WL 581081 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2006) (citing Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 

1125, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001), and White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir.

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1998)). Vague, speculative, and non-specific allegations are insufficient. See Pauline v. 

Mishner, 2009 WL 1505672 (D. Haw. May 28, 2009) (plaintiff's vague and conclusory 

allegations of possible future harm to himself or others are insufficient to trigger the 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception to dismissal under § 1915(g)); 

Cooper v. Bush, 2006 WL 2054090 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2006) (plaintiff's allegations that 

he will commit suicide, or that he has already attempted suicide and will do so again, 

are insufficient to show imminent danger); Luedtke v. Bertrand, 32 F.Supp.2d 1074, 

1077 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (“[p]laintiff's vague allegation of a conspiracy among the 

defendants to beat, assault, injure, harass and retaliate against him are not enough. 

These allegations are insufficient and lack the specificity necessary to show an 

imminent threat of serious physical injury.”). 

B. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following cases: Diaz v. 

Vasquez, 1:12-cv-00732-SAB (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed on February 25, 2013, for failure to 

state a claim; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); Diaz v. Diaz, 1:12-cv-1296-AWISAB (E.D. Cal.) (dismissed on September 4, 2014, for failure to state a claim; appeal 

dismissed for failure to obey a court order); Diaz v. Diaz, 1:13-cv-00453-SKO (E.D. Cal.) 

(dismissed on July 28, 2014, for failure to state a claim; appeal filed, disposition 

pending); Diaz v. State of California, 2:04-cv-02375-MJS (E.D. Cal.) (appeal dismissed 

on December 19, 2007, as not in good faith). Since judicial notice may be taken of 

court records, Defendants’ request will be granted. Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 

F.R.D. 626, 635 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 

U.S. 1126 (1981).

C. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 9, 2013, and is proceeding on a First 

Amended Complaint filed November 6, 2014. (ECF No. 24.) On October 9, 2015, 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was screened and found to state claims against (1) 

Sgt. Lowther; (2) Sgt. Beltran; (3) Lt. Morales; (4) Lt. Popper; (5) Lt. Gallegher; (6) CO 

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Root; (7) CO Cavagnaro; (8) CO Mason; (9) CO Morales; (10) CO Boncore/Williams; 

(11) CO Childress; (12) Appeals Coordinator Heck; and (13) AW Ramirez.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ramirez, Lt. Morales, Popper, Beltran, Root, 

Cavagnaro, Mason, Lowther, and Heck retaliated against Plaintiff after he filed a 

number of appeals and lawsuits by denying him access to food and/or work 

assignments over the course of several months. He also alleges that Defendants CO 

Morales, Boncore/Williams and Childress denied Plaintiff access to all prison food

between the dates of August 25, 2013, and September 4, 2013, and this amounted to 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges 

the Defendant Gallegher denied Plaintiff the opportunity to call witnesses or present 

evidence at five disciplinary hearings where Plaintiff was ultimately found guilty, in 

violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights.

D. Analysis

Defendants move for the outright dismissal of this action on the grounds that 

Plaintiff has incurred three “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The 

Court agrees that Plaintiff has incurred three strikes. Nonetheless, outright dismissal 

would be premature without first determining whether the imminent danger exception 

might apply to this case. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055. Defendants do not address this 

point in their moving papers.

In his opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff alleges that the imminent danger 

exception applies here because the Defendants were denying him two meals a day for 

nine months. (ECF No. 37.) It is well settled that the sustained deprivation of food can 

be cruel and unusual punishment when it results in pain without any penological 

purpose. Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding an Eighth 

Amendment violation where prison official denied inmate 16 meals over a 23 day 

period). To decide whether Plaintiff was in imminent danger of serious harm from food 

deprivation, the Court must look at what, if any, danger Plaintiff faced at the time his 

complaint was filed. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1055. In the complaint filed on October 9, 

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2013, Plaintiff alleged that he was able to eat prison-supplied food as of October 5, 

2013. Plaintiff thus essentially admits that the Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct 

stopped before he filed this action.

Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide specific, credible allegations of imminent 

danger of serious physical harm caused by the past denial of food. He states only that 

the lack of food led him to have low blood sugar, which could have made it dangerous 

for him to receive the insulin injections he needed for his diabetes. He does not, 

however, allege that he in fact suffered a serious illness, had to be hospitalized, or 

actually experienced anything that could be considered “serious harm.” Compare

Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1050-51 (where prisoner alleged facts indicating that he had 

suffered a particular injury, that Defendants knew of a particular harm to him, and that 

they failed to act to address the harm.) 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the imminent danger exception does not 

apply to the facts of this case. Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status should 

be GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiff should be directed to pay the $400 filing fee 

before proceeding in this action. 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY

Defendants filed a motion on March 4, 2016, requesting that this Court stay all 

discovery for a period of sixty (60) days while their motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status 

and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint is pending. The Court may modify a scheduling order 

for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 

F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Good cause having been shown, the Court will 

recommend that this action be stayed pending resolution of this Court’s 

recommendation that Defendants’ motion to revoke be granted and Plaintiff be directed 

to pay the filing fee in full.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ request for 

judicial notice is granted; and

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status (ECF No. 33) be 

GRANTED IN PART;

2. Defendants’ motion to stay discovery (ECF No. 36) be GRANTED;

3. If the District Judge adopts these recommendations, Plaintiff be directed to 

pay the $400 filing fee in full within twenty-one (21) days of the District 

Judge’s order; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to timely pay the $400 filing fee in full, all pending motions be 

terminated and the action be dismissed without prejudice.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States 

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and 

Recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a 

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served 

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter 

v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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