Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03746/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-03746-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

Although Petitioner cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b)(1) in the title of his motion, the body of his motion seeks

relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WONDIYRAD KABEDE,

Petitioner,

 v.

W. KNIPP, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

No. C 13-3746 TEH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner Wondiyrad Kabede, an inmate at Mule Creek State

Prison, has filed this pro se petition challenging his 1989 judgment

of conviction from San Francisco County Superior Court. This matter

is now before the court for consideration of Respondent's motion to

dismiss the petition as untimely, and Petitioner’s motion to grant

the petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)1

. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s

motion to dismiss (Docket No. 18) and denies Petitioner’s motion to

grant the petition (Docket No. 21). 

I 

On July 10, 1989, Petitioner pled guilty in San Francisco

County Superior Court to second degree murder, enhanced use of a

deadly weapon, and assault with a deadly weapon, enhanced for great

bodily injury. Docket No. 1-1 at 40-42; see Cal. Penal Code §§ 187,

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2

Petitioner also challenged the February 16, 2012 denial of

parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings but this claim

was dismissed as not cognizable. Docket No. 10, Order to Show

Cause.

2

245(a)(1), 12022(b), 12022.7. On August 9, 1989, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to sixteen years to life in prison. Id. On

August 13, 2013, over 24 years after his conviction, Petitioner

filed this instant habeas petition challenging his 1989 conviction

on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 

The record before the Court is unclear as to whether

Petitioner has previously challenged his 1989 conviction in state

court. Petitioner claims that he filed a state habeas petition in

the 1990s challenging his conviction that was denied, Docket No. 1

at 3 and Docket No. 18-1 at 10, but does not provide the Court with

a copy of the petition. The Court is therefore unable to confirm

Petitioner’s claim and unable to determine the specific claims in

that petition. In the record before the Court, there is only

evidence of two state habeas petitions. The first state habeas

petition was filed in 2008, and the second was filed in 2012. Both

petitions unsuccessfully challenged the denial of parole as a

violation of Petitioner’s plea bargain through the state postconviction review process. Docket No. 18, Exs. A-D and Docket No.

1-1 at 1-45. 

The record is also unclear as to whether Petitioner ever

filed any federal habeas petitions challenging his conviction. 

Petitioner does not allege that he has done so. Instead he claims

that he was prevented from filing due to “a very extraordinary thing

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3

The thirteen prior federal proceedings, including type of

case and general disposition, are as follows: Kabede v. Sneto, 91-

cv-00391 FMS (civil rights case dismissed by judge); Kabede v.

Folsom State Prison, et al., 91-cv-01085 FMS (civil rights case;

summary judgment granted in favor of defendants); Kabede v. Barrow,

et al., 91-cv-01224 FMS (civil rights case; dismissed for failure

to exhaust and without prejudice to refiling a habeas petition);

Kabede v. Marshall, 93-mc-00094 BAC (type of case, subject matter

of case, and general disposition unclear from docket); Kabede v.

Marshall, 93-cv-01933 FMS (habeas petition; dismissed summarily and

Pre-Filing order entered); Kabede v. State of Cal. Bd. of Prison

Term, 05-mc-80183 (civil rights case incorrectly opened based on

letter that should have been filed in Kabede v. State of Cal. Bd.

of Prison Term, 05-cv-3693 MJJ); Kabede v. State of Cal. Bd. of

Prison Term, 05-cv-3693 MJJ) (civil rights case challenging

discipline received for violating prison rules and seeking

immediate release from custody via deportation to another country;

dismissed without prejudice to re-filing a habeas petition); Kabede

v. Pelican Bay State Prison, et al., 07-cv-01224 MJJ (civil rights

case seeking single-cell housing; dismissed without prejudice to

filing amended complaint); Kabede v. Horel, 07-cv-03656 TEH (civil

rights case regarding housing and dental care; resolved through

mediation); Kabede v. Pelican Bay State Prison, 09-cv-00323 TEH

(civil rights case incorrectly opened based on letter that should

have been filed in Kabede v. Horel, 07-cv-03656 TEH); Kabede v.

Jacquez, 09-cv-02092 TEH (habeas petition challenging March 6, 2008

denial of parole); In re Kabede, 10-cv-02584 TEH (civil rights case

challenging the denial of parole, seeking deportation, and

requesting single cell housing; dismissed for failure to file

complaint and for failure to pay filing fee or file in forma

pauperis application); and In re Kabede, 13-cv-03763 WHO (civil

rights case seeking single cell housing; closed for failure to file

complaint and for failure to pay filing fee or file in forma

pauperis application).

3

[that] was done to [his] physical body” justifying equitable

tolling. Docket No. 19 at 1. 

In reviewing the Court’s records, the Court has determined

that Petitioner has filed thirteen prior federal proceedings,

starting in 1991.3

 Of these thirteen prior proceedings, it appears

that only three were habeas petitions. The Court is unable to

review the pleadings in the cases prior to 2005, but can review the

docket. The first petition, filed in 1991, Kabede v. Barrow, et al,

91-cv-01224 FMS, was filed as a civil rights case but dismissed for

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failure to exhaust and without prejudice to refiling a habeas

petition. The pleadings are unavailable to the Court so it is

unclear if Petitioner challenged his conviction in this petition. 

The second petition, Kabede v. Marshall, 93-cv-01933 FMS, was

dismissed summarily and a Pre-Filing order entered. Again, it is

unclear whether this petition challenged his conviction. Finally,

the most recent prior habeas petition, Kabede v. Jacquez, 09-cv02092 TEH, challenged only the March 6, 2008 denial of parole and

did not challenge his conviction. 

II

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law and imposed for the first

time limitations on the filing of federal habeas petitions

challenging state court judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Pursuant to

AEDPA, courts are required to dismiss second or successive federal

habeas petitions except in certain limited circumstances. Id. at §

2244(b). In addition, AEDPA requires that all federal habeas

petitions must be filed within one year of the date on which the

state court judgment became final after the conclusion of direct

review or the time passed for seeking direct review. Id. at 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). For prisoners whose convictions were final prior

to the passage of AEDPA, as is the case with Petitioner, AEDPA

required them to file any remaining federal petition for which they

were otherwise eligible within one year of AEDPA’s effective date,

that is, by April 24, 1997. Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921

(9th Cir. 2003); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.

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2001). 

If Petitioner’s first two prior federal habeas petitions,

Kabede v. Barrow, et al, 91-cv-01224 FMS, and Kabede v. Marshall,

93-cv-01933 FMS, challenged his 1989 conviction, this instant

petition is successive and must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 

If Petitioner seeks to bring a second or successive petition, he

must first obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. Id. at § 2244(b)(3). Since Petitioner does not claim that

he has previously challenged his 1989 conviction, the Court examines

whether the instant petition is timely filed.

This instant petition was filed on August 13, 2013, over

16 years after the April 24, 1997 deadline AEDPA established for

filing federal petitions for relief from convictions that were final

prior to AEDPA’s passage. This petition is therefore untimely

unless Petitioner is entitled to delayed commencement of the tolling

period or equitable tolling or if failure to hear the merits of a

petition would be a miscarriage of justice.

 Delayed commencement of the tolling period is appropriate

in the following circumstances: (1) an unconstitutional state action

prevented a petitioner from timely filing, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(B); or (2) if the constitutional right asserted was

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases

on collateral review, id. at § 2244(d)(1)(C); or (3) the factual

predicate of the claim could not have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence, id. at § 2244(d)(1)(D); or (4) a properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

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4

Since Petitioner claims, among other things, that state

actors and an unnamed rich man were the cause of the extraordinary

thing done to his physical body, Docket No. 19 at 3, Petitioner

could arguably be entitled to delayed commencement of the

limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). However, the

delayed start of the limitations period is available only if the

impediment prevented the prisoner from filing his claims in any

form in any court. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th

Cir. 2009) (refusing to allow delayed commencement under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(B) when prisoner had filed three state petitions, a

state discovery motion, and a federal motion during the relevant

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review was pending, id. at § 2244(d)(2). Equitable tolling is

available if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that

would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. In addition, a

showing of actual innocence can, in certain circumstances, allow a

court to hear an otherwise untimely claim. See McQuiggin v.

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-32 (2013) (holding that miscarriage

of justice (actual innocence) showing applies to claims filed after

the AEDPA statute of limitations has run, as well as to successive,

abusive and procedurally defaulted claims).

In his traverse, Petitioner appears to claim that his

petition should be considered timely for two reasons. First,

Petitioner claims that “a very extraordinary thing was done to [his]

physical body” which prevented him from filing in a timely fashion. 

Docket No. 19 at 1. Second, Petitioner claims that he is innocent

of the crimes for which he was convicted. Id. at 2. Neither of

these claims entitles Petitioner to a delayed commencement of the

tolling period.4 The Court therefore examines whether Petitioner’s

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time). Petitioner has ably and repeatedly accessed the courts to

protect his rights prior to 2013, see infra fn. 3. Petitioner’s

vague claim that state actors caused harm to his body does not

entitle him to a delayed commencement of the limitations period.

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first claim entitles him to equitable tolling and whether his second

claim establishes that it would be a miscarriage of justice if his

claims were not heard.

Petitioner first claims that a very extraordinary thing

was done to his body which entitles him to equitable tolling. 

Docket No. 19 at 1. Petitioner bears the burden of showing that

this “extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him. Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). He must show that “the

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and

that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Ramirez, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Petitioner does not explain what was done to his physical

body. Nor does he explain how this “very extraordinary thing”

prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition

challenging his conviction, but not from filing other federal

lawsuits. Petitioner’s vague assertion does not entitle him to

equitable tolling. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799

(9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner must show that extraordinary

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness). 

 Petitioner also claims that he is innocent and that he

was coerced into pleading guilty. A federal court may hear the

merits of successive, abusive, procedurally defaulted, or untimely

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claims if the failure to hear the claims would constitute a

“miscarriage of justice.” See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931-32; Lee

v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). However,

the Supreme Court limits the “miscarriage of justice” exception to

habeas petitioners who can present “evidence of innocence so strong

that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.” 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995); see Johnson v. Knowles,

541 F.3d 933, 936-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the miscarriage of justice

exception is limited to those extraordinary cases where the

petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes that the court

cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt.”). A

petitioner must support his claims “with new reliable evidence —

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not

presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Petitioner claims that the following proves his innocence: 

the blood alcohol test was tampered with, Docket No. 19 at 7; he has

no memory of the time period during which the crime took place due

to blacking out and intoxication, Docket No. 21 at 1; the palm print

on the gun is not his, id.; and it is implausible that he would have

touched the gun at a crime scene, id. None of these unsubstantiated

claims constitute new and reliable proof of Petitioner’s innocence. 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The Court therefore may not overlook the

untimeliness of the instant petition and is barred from reviewing

this petition on its merits. 

//

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III

Petitioner has also filed a motion requesting that the

Court grant the instant petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(6). It appears that Petitioner is seeking to set

aside his 1989 conviction via a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Rule 60(b)(6)

authorizes a court to set aside a final judgment, order, or

proceeding for any reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) applies only to federal proceedings and a

Rule 60(b)(6) motion should be filed in the same proceeding that

resulted in the judgment being challenged. Finally, assuming that

Petitioner seeks to set aside judgment in the instant case, this

Rule 60(b)(6) motion is premature since final judgment has not yet

been entered in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(c)(1) (Rule

60(b) motion must be made a reasonable time after the entry of the

judgment or order). Petitioner’s motion to grant the petition

(Docket No. 21) is DENIED.

IV

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown,

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (Docket No.

18) is GRANTED and Petitioner’s motion to grant the petition (Docket

No. 21) is DENIED. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial

showing that a reasonable jurist would find this Court’s denial of

his claims debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000). Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted

in this case. 

// 

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The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 02/02/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.13\Kabede 13-3746 Deny.wpd

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