Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-md-02420/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-md-02420-46/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:15 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: LITHIUM ION BATTERIES 

ANTITRUST LITIGATION Case No.: 13-MD-2420 YGR

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 

CERTIFICATION OF ORDERS FOR 

INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) 

Re: Dkt. No. 541 

This Order Relates to: 

All Direct and Indirect Purchaser 

Actions

Now before the Court is defendants’ motion for certification under 28 U.S.C. section 

1292(b) for interlocutory appeal of this Court’s January 21, 2014 and October 2, 2014 Orders. 

(Dkt. No. 541 (“Mot.”); see also Dkt. No. 361 (“Jan. 21, 2014 Order”); Dkt. No. 512 (“Oct. 2, 2014 

Order”).) Plaintiffs oppose the motion. (Dkt. No. 594.) Having carefully considered the papers 

submitted and the record in this case,1 and for the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES

the motion. 

The procedural history of this multidistrict litigation has been recounted in previous orders. 

See, e.g., In re Lithium Ion Batteries Antitrust Litig., Case No. 13-MD-2420, 2014 WL 4955377 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014). Generally, the action relates to allegations of a multi-year conspiracy to 

fix prices of lithium ion battery cells, the chemical core of rechargeable batteries used in consumer 

electronics products. Two groups of plaintiffs, the direct purchaser plaintiffs (“DPPs”) and the 

indirect purchaser plaintiffs (“IPPs”), seek to represent putative classes injured by the alleged 

overcharge. The DPPs sue for injunctive relief and money damages under the federal antitrust 

 1

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court 

finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. 

Case 4:13-md-02420-YGR Document 642 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

laws, and seek to represent classes of purchasers who bought lithium ion batteries and products 

containing them for resale. The IPPs, by contrast, sue for injunctive relief under federal antitrust 

law, but seek money damages under state antitrust and consumer protection laws. The IPPs seek to 

represent classes of purchasers who bought lithium ion batteries and battery products for their own 

use. 

The Court instituted a phased approach for challenges to the DPPs’ and IPPs’ pleadings. 

On January 21, 2014, the Court issued a phase one order dismissing without prejudice the DPPs’ 

and IPPs’ respective Consolidated Amended Complaints. (Jan. 21, 2014 Order.) On October 2, 

2014, the Court issued a phase two and three order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ 

motions to dismiss the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint. (Oct. 2, 2014 Order.) 

Typically, a district court’s ruling is not appealable until after entry of final judgment. In re 

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., Case No. 02-MD-1486, 2008 WL 

863994, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). However, under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), the district 

court may certify appeal of an interlocutory order if: (1) the order involves a controlling question of 

law, (2) appealing the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, and 

(3) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to the question of law. James v. Price 

Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1292(b) is a departure from 

the normal rule that only final judgments are appealable, and therefore must be construed 

narrowly.” Id. Courts apply the statute’s requirements strictly, and grant motions for certification 

only when exceptional circumstances warrant it. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 

(1978). A party seeking certification to appeal an interlocutory order has the burden of establishing 

the existence of such exceptional circumstances. Id. A party must establish that all three 

requirements of section 1292(b) are met in order to seek an appeal of an interlocutory order. Couch 

v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Court is aware that, due to the importance of efficiency in the context of large and 

complex cases, certification may be more appropriate in the context of such cases. See In re 

Lloyd’s Am. Trust Fund Litig., Case No. 96-CIV-1262, 1997 WL 458739, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 

1997) (citing Bruce v. Martin, 712 F. Supp. 442, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

Here, defendants seek certification of the following questions: 

a. Whether, under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) 

and its progeny, purchasers of a non-price-fixed finished product 

containing an allegedly price-fixed component can seek damages 

under Section 4 of the Clayton Act; and 

b. Whether plaintiffs who purchased only non-price-fixed finished 

products that allegedly contained a price-fixed component can 

satisfy the market-participation requirement under Associated 

General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State 

Council of Carpenters (“AGC”), 459 U.S. 519 (1983) and its 

progeny, without pleading plausible allegations of reasonable 

interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand between 

the finished products and components. 

(Mot. at vi.) The Court finds that given the procedural posture of this case, these questions (i) do 

not involve controlling questions of law regarding which there are substantial grounds for 

differences of opinion and (ii) would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this 

litigation if addressed on interlocutory appeal at this time. 

First, the Court’s determinations at issue were based on well-established precedent. Second, 

the underlying issues, to be conclusively determined, will necessitate certain factual findings and 

therefore cannot be resolved by an appeal at this time and in light of the present factual record. 

Third, as for the AGC issue, defendants challenge only one of five non-dispositive factors. A 

substantial portion of both the DPPs’ and IPPs’ cases would remain even if defendants were to 

prevail on appeal. Indeed, certification would likely cause additional delay and complicate the 

discovery process, as defendants indirectly suggest they would seek to limit the matters subject to 

discovery in the meantime. (Dkt. No. 615 at 15.) 

 Accordingly, defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

 This Order terminates Docket No. 541. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2015 _______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:13-md-02420-YGR Document 642 Filed 01/26/15 Page 3 of 3