Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00832/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00832-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

Captain G. LEWIS; Lieutenant J. J.

HUGHES, badge no. 49316; Sergeant

E. MOORE, badge no. 54056; Officer K.

PHAM, badge no. 55828; Officer

MARQUEZ; laundry staff R. DOMINGO,

id no. 2863454; and LVN M. GARCIA, 

Defendants. /

No. C 06-0832 PJH (PR)

ORDER RULING ON

PENDING MOTIONS AND

GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Plaintiff contends that

defendants Hughes, Moore, Pham and Lewis were deliberately indifferent to his safety at

the time of a riot at the prison, resulting in his suffering stab wounds, and that Garcia and

Marquez failed to provide treatment for his wounds. The claim against Domingo was

dismissed with prejudice in the initial review order.

Defendants Hughes, Pham, and Lewis have moved for summary judgment and, in a

motion combined with their summary judgment motion, Garcia and Marquez have moved to

dismiss the claims against them for failure to exhaust. Defendant Moore has filed a

separate motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has opposed the motions and filed

several motions of his own. For the reasons set out below, the dispositive motions will be

granted.

DISCUSSION

A. Nondispositive Motions

Plaintiff has moved to amend the caption to show defendant Moore’s correct initial,

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which is “E” rather than “C.” The motion will be granted.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel will be denied because he has not provided the

certificate required by Rule 37(a)(1), nor has he requested a waiver of that provision. 

Given that some inmates have been able to comply with this requirement, the court will not

presume that plaintiff cannot. The “Motion in Opposition” to the motion to compel filed by

defendants Hughes, Lewis and Pham is not actually a motion, but rather is an opposition. 

To the extent it is a motion, it will be denied as unnecessary. 

Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and attached the

proposed amended complaint. He does not need leave to amend because this is his first

amendment and no responsive pleading has been filed. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a). The

motion will be denied as unnecessary and the amended complaint will be deemed timely

filed.

Defendants Hughes, Lewis and Pham have requested that the court screen the

amended complaint. The motion will be granted.

In the original complaint plaintiff had alleged that he was held in a holding cage,

standing upright and only partly clothed, for fifteen hours, and that defendant Marquez saw

this but did nothing. Plaintiff makes only two small changes in the amendment; one is to

add on page VIII a conclusory statement that defendants Lewis, Hughes and Moore, who

are supervisors, “used excessive force in the unnecessarily excessive and cruel and

unusual use of the holding cage on Plaintiff,” and the other is to add in the “Relief” section a

contention that defendants use of excessive force is one basis for awarding damages. He

does not allege any facts linking Lewis, Hughes and Moore to the holding cage incident, for

instance that they ordered that he be kept there for fifteen hours or that they physically

placed him in the cage while using unnecessary physical force. As a result he has failed to

state an Eighth Amendment claim against them for the holding cage incident, and that

claim will be dismissed. The change to the “Relief” section to add excessive force as a

reason to award damages does not add a claim, so will not be reviewed. In short, the

amendment has not changed the complaint.

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B. Dispositive Motions

1. Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Garcia and Marquez

Defendants Garcia and Marquez contend that the claim against them for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need must be dismissed because plaintiff did not exhaust

his administrative remedies as to that claim.

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide

that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983],

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(a). Although once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in prisoner

cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988

(2002). All available remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies "need not meet

federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective.'" Id. (citation omitted). 

Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money

damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a prerequisite to all inmate suits about prison life, whether

they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege

excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 122 S. Ct. at 992. 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal

administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It

also provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by

correctional officers. See id. § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative

remedies within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1)

informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second

level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of

the California Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp.

1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). A final decision at the director’s level satisfies the exhaustion

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requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Wyatt v Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir 2003). It should be treated as a matter of abatement and brought

in an “unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than [in] a motion for summary judgment.” 

Id. (citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under § 1997e(a), the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed

issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted

California’s prison administrative process, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. 

Id. at 1120.

Garcia and Marquez have established that plaintiff did not administratively appeal

his medical care claim through the third and final level, and he does not dispute this. He

claims, however, that one grievance he submitted to the informal level at the time of the

incident, on January 30, 2005, was never answered, and that two other grievances, one

filed on May 4, 2005, and one on June 19, 2005, were screened out as untimely. Pl. Opp.

at 5-8. 

The grievances submitted in May and June were indeed untimely, given that inmate

grievances must be filed within fifteen days of the event giving rise to them, see Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.6(c), and thus were not sufficient to exhaust, see Woodford v. Ngo, 126

S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006) ("Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's

deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function

effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings."

(footnote omitted)). 

The remaining question is whether the grievance allegedly ignored at the informal

level was sufficient to exhaust. Plaintiff asserts that the lack of a response at the informal

level prevented him from proceeding further with his grievance, and thus that no more

administrative remedies were “available,” but he is incorrect. The regulations do provide

that a prisoner filing an administrative appeal must “attempt” to submit his grievance to 

“involved staff” at the informal level, but that regulation also says this is subject to the

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exceptions in sections 3084.5(a)(3) and 3084.7. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(b). 

Section 3084.5(a)(3)(F) allows for the situation where a prisoner is unable to get an answer

at the informal level by providing that the Appeals Coordinator can waive the informal

response requirement for “any action which the appeals coordinator determines cannot be

resolved informally,” id. at 3084.5(a)(3). 

Plaintiff does not allege that he asked the Appeals Coordinator to waive the informallevel requirement, and thus failed to avail himself of an administrative remedy that was

“available” to him. The motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust of defendants Garcia and

Marquez will be granted.

2. Summary Judgment Motions

Defendants Pham, Hughes and Lewis have moved for summary judgment, and

defendant Moore has filed a separate motion for summary judgment.

a. Standard

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

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b. Facts

The following facts are undisputed.

Defendant Lewis was the Facility Captain of D facility and defendant Hughes was

the Program Lieutenant of D facility at the time of the events which gave rise to this case. 

Defendant Pham was the Observation Officer on the D-facility yard. Defendant Moore was

“#2 Sergeant” on D Facility. Decl. Moore at ¶ 2.

On January 28, 2005, an inmate whose race was "other" stabbed an inmate

classified as "white" in the D-facility laundry area. Inmates classified as “other” are usually

Asian, Pacific Islander, or American Indian. The laundry area is separated from the

exercise yard, where plaintiff was, by a concrete wall. An alarm was sounded as a result of

the stabbing, which caused correctional officer Pham to order all of the inmates in the yard

to “get down,” meaning to lie prone on the ground. Hughes arrived at the laundry room first

and ordered that all the inmates in the laundry and patio area be handcuffed and returned

to their cells. Decl. Hughes ¶ 6. Defendant Lewis then arrived and, concerned that the

racial implications of the assault might lead to acts of reprisal, ordered Hughes to recall the

yard by race. Id. 

Shortly after the inmates in the yard had complied with the order to “get down,”

sergeant Moore told Pham to “resume normal yard,” which he did. Decl. Hughes ¶ 7; decl.

Pham ¶ 6. Hughes and Lewis did not know that normal yard had been resumed. Decl.

Hughes ¶ 7; decl. Lewis ¶ 7. 

Three "other" inmates who were being escorted from the patio area outside the

laundry area back to their housing unit were taken across the yard. While being escorted

across the yard, one of the inmates said something in his own language to a group of

“other” inmates. Shortly after the escort passed, a group of "other" inmates attacked the

white inmates on the yard with weapons. The combatants refused several orders to stop. 

Plaintiff Williams, who is classified as white, was injured in the riot. 

c. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Pham

In his opposition, plaintiff concedes that he is unable to counter the motion for

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summary judgment as to Pham. Because the papers supplied in support of the motion for

summary judgment do not reveal a genuine issue of material fact on their face, and do

show that Pham is entitled to summary judgment, his motion will be granted. See United

States v. Real Property at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (court may

grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the movant's papers are themselves

sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face reveal a genuine issue of material

fact). 

d. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Hughes and Lewis

Defendants Hughes and Lewis move for summary judgment on the grounds that

there is no genuine issue of material fact that they were not deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s safety. Their request for the court to take judicial notice of Wood v. Hughes, No.

C 05-4332 MHP (PR) (Order Mar. 20, 2007), in which summary judgment was granted for

Hughes and others on a safety claim arising out of the same riot, will be granted. 

Plaintiff’s claim against Hughes and Lewis is that they were deliberately indifferent to

his safety by allowing or causing the “other” inmates to be taken across the yard, where

they could tell their friends to attack the white inmates. 

The Eighth Amendment imposes the duty upon prison officials to provide all

prisoners with the basic necessities of life, including personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious,

and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834 (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 at 297- 98 (1991)). Here movants contend that there is no

genuine issue of material fact as to the second prong.

 The necessary state of mind for the second Farmer prong is one of "deliberate

indifference." Id. Neither negligence nor gross negligence constitutes deliberate

indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36 & n.4. Plaintiff must show that the standard for

criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which the

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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he or she must

also draw the inference. Id. An Eighth Amendment claimant need not show, however, that

a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it

is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of

serious harm. Id. at 842. 

There is no dispute as to the facts with respect to Hughes. He knew that when the

alarm sounded because of the laundry stabbing, the inmates on the yard would have gone

to the ground. Because he did not know that Sergeant Moore had ordered resumption of

normal yard activities, he assumed they were still in that position when he ordered that the

handcuffed inmates who were involved in the laundry fracas be escorted to their cells. 

Decl. Hughes ¶ 7. When he heard shots in the yard he ran there and took command to

subdue the riot. Id. at ¶ 8-9. 

Plaintiff’s argument as to Hughes is unclear, Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.

(Hughes, Lewis and Pham) at 21-22, but he appears to be arguing that based on Moore’s

incident report, Hughes told Moore (possibly by radio, as that is how a previous order to

Moore had been transmitted) to recall the yard before the riot broke out, id.at ex. H. It is

true that the declaration from Hughes does not mention his having been told by Lewis to

recall the yard or his having passed that order on to Moore, whereas the incident report

says that Hughes ordered Moore to recall the yard and Lewis’ declaration says that Lewis

ordered Hughes to have the yard recalled. See id.; decl. Lewis ¶ 6. None of this, however,

generates a genuine issue of material fact, because it is not inconsistent for Hughes to

have ordered recall of the yard and still have been unaware that normal yard activities had

been resumed at the time he ordered that the “other” inmates be escorted to their cells. 

Summary judgment will be granted to Hughes.

Captain Lewis says that when he heard the alarm for the laundry incident he went

there immediately, saw that the incident might have racial implications, and ordered

Hughes to recall the yard by race. Decl. Lewis ¶ ¶ 5-6. He then “returned to my office.” Id.

at ¶ 6. On his way to his office he heard the announcement for the yard to resume normal

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activity, which was not consistent with his order to recall the yard, and “[s]hortly after

hearing the announcement for yard to resume,” heard the “get down” order and the alarm

occasioned by the riot. Id. at ¶ 8. He rushed to the yard and spoke with Hughes. Id. at 9. 

Plaintiff’s argument as to Captain Lewis is that there is a genuine issue of material

fact as to how long Lewis was in his office after he heard the announcement that normal

activities could be resumed on the yard and the announcement ordering the inmates to

again get down because of the riot. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12-13. As he points out, Pham’s

incident report says there was about five minutes between his announcing that normal yard

could resume and his order to recall the yard. Id. at ex. F. Plaintiff’s argument is that this is

inconsistent with Lewis’ declaration that he heard the order to get down on the yard

“shortly” after the order for yard to resume – the implication, plaintiff says, that Lewis had

enough time after hearing that normal yard was resuming to do something about it, to the

benefit of plaintiff’s safety.

There is not a genuine issue of material fact. “Shortly” and “five minutes” are not

inconsistent, particularly given the dramatic circumstances, the dangerous and chaotic

situation that ensued, and the inevitable confusion of memory. Furthermore, taking five

minutes as the correct interval, Captain Lewis’ failure to act for that brief time could not

amount to “criminal recklessness.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (defining “deliberate

indifference”). Summary judgment will be granted for Lewis. 

e. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Moore

Defendant Moore has filed a separate motion for summary judgment. 

After the incident in the laundry room was under control, Sergeant Moore ordered

that normal yard resume. Decl. Moore ¶ 2. Moore did this because the initial investigation

indicated that the situation was under control, that weapons were not involved, and that the

incident did not appear to be racial. Id. ¶ 2-3. Moore learned that a weapon had been

involved only after he had approved resumption of normal yard activities. Id. at ¶ 4. He

“promptly met with the available yard staff and informed them about the incident in the

laundry room. [He] directed the staff to pay close attention to the inmates that align

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themselves with the “Others” and “Whites . . . .” He then ordered defendant Pham to recall

the yard. Decl. Kenny at ex. 3 (Moore’s incident report). Moore asserts that there is no

genuine issue of material fact going to whether he was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s

safety, and that as a matter of law he was not.

Plaintiff’s argument is that Moore was deliberately indifferent in ordering resumption

of normal yard activities after the laundry incident. Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. Summ. J. (Moore) 4-

5. He claims to refute Moore’s explanations as why he thought that this was appropriate. 

Id. at 5. His refutations are, however, insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material

fact. For instance, he contends that Moore’s claim to have been unaware that a weapon

was involved when he allowed resumption of yard is refuted by a civilian laundry worker’s

statement that he saw an “object” in the hand of one of the combatants. This does not,

however, have any relevance to what Moore knew, because there is no evidence that the

laundry worker told him. It also does not prove that Moore knew there were weapons

involved that he told another officer to search for weapons, or that a weapon was found

“prior to the riot.” The point is what Moore knew when he ordered resumption of the yard,

not what he knew at the time the riot broke out; this is also true as to the actions by Lewis

and Hughes to recall the yard, which were taken after resumption of normal activity. 

It may be that Moore was careless in ordering resumption of yard activities. Still,

given his knowledge at the time, doing so did not amount to deliberate indifference. The

motion for summary judgment will be granted. 

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff’s motion to correct the caption (document number 19 on the docket) is

GRANTED. The correct caption is the one used on this order. Plaintiff’s motion to compel

(document 23) is DENIED. His motion for leave to amend (document 29) is DENIED as

unnecessary. 

2. Defendants’ request for judicial notice (document 58) and their motion to screen

the amended complaint (document 30) are GRANTED. The conclusory claim in the

amended complaint against Lewis, Hughes and Moore for the holding cage incident is

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DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s motion in opposition to the motion to

compel (document 24) is DENIED.

3. The motion to dismiss of defendants Garcia and Marquez (document 42) is

GRANTED. The motion for summary judgment by Moore (document 37) and that by

Lewis, Hughes, and Pham (document 42) are GRANTED. 

4. These rulings dispose of all claims and terminate all pending motions. The clerk

shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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