Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02692/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02692-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN M. PARK; and MICHELLE PARK,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10-cv-2692 - IEG (RBB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

[Doc. No. 27]

vs.

AURORA LOAN SERVICES; LEHMAN

BROTHERS BANK, FSB; QUALITY

LOAN SERVICES CORP.; CHICAGO

TITLE COMPANY; MORTGAGE

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION

SYSTEMS; MARC CARPENTER &

ASSOCIATES; ALLISON JAMES ESTATE

PROPERTIES; and DOES individual 1 to

100, inclusive; and ROES corporations 1 to

30, inclusive; and all other persons and

entities unknown claiming any right, title,

estate, lien, or interest in the real property

described in the complaint adverse to

Plaintiffs’ ownership, or any cloud upon

Plaintiffs’ title thereto, DOES,

Defendant.

On December 30, 2010, Plaintiffs Sean and Michelle Park (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se,

filed a complaint against the Defendants alleging eleven causes of action arising out of the

origination of their home mortgage loan and the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings related to the

property. [Doc. No. 1.] Of the eleven causes of action, only one claim–a claim for violation of the

Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.–was a federal cause

of action and the remaining ten claims arose out of state law. [Id.] 

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On March 16, 2011, Defendants Aurora Loan Services LLC (“Aurora”), Lehman Brothers

Bank, FSB (“Lehman Brothers”), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”)

filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. [Doc. No. 6.] On February 17, 2011, Defendant

Quality Loan Services Corp. (“Quality”) filed a notice of joinder in Defendants Aurora, Lehman

Brothers, and MERS’s motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 9.] 

On March 16, 2011, the Court granted Defendants Aurora, Lehman Brothers, and MERS’s

motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint as to those three Defendants. [Doc. No. 14.] 

Specifically, the Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim and dismissed without

prejudice Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. [Id. at 3-4.] In that

Order, the Court did not address Quality’s joinder in the motion. Therefore, on July 17, 2012, the

Court granted Defendant Quality’s motion to dismiss and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’

FDCPA claim and dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367 as to Defendant Quality. [Doc. No. 23.] By the present motion, Plaintiffs move

for reconsideration of the Court’s July 17, 2012 order. [Doc. No. 27]

DISCUSSION

The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[r]econsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is

presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). “A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted

merely because Plaintiff is unhappy with the judgment, frustrated by the Court’s application of the

facts to binding precedent or because he disagrees with the ultimate decision.” Lino v. Kellerman,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25501, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2012). Whether to grant or deny a motion

for reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Navajo Nation v.

Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) 

Plaintiffs first argue that their motion for reconsideration should be granted because the

Court’s Order did not mention that Quality had filed a joinder in the other three Defendants’

motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. at 27-1 at 2-3.] Plaintiffs are incorrect. The July 17, 2012 Order

acknowledged that Quality had filed a joinder in that motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 23 at 2.] In the

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prior order, the Court explained that although it had ruled on the motion with respect to

Defendants Aurora, Lehman Brothers, and MERS, the Court never ruled on the motion with

respect to Quality. [Id.] Therefore, it was appropriate to later rule on the motion with respect to

Defendant Quality. 

Plaintiffs appear to be confused as to how the Court could rule on the motion with respect

to Defendant Quality after Plaintiffs had filed a notice appealing the Court’s March 16, 2012 Order

granting Aurora, Lehman Brothers, and MERS’s motion to dismiss. The Court acknowledges that

“[o]nce a notice of appeal is filed, the district court is divested of jurisdiction over matters being

appealed.” Natural Res. Def. Counsel v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.

2001). However, because the Court’s March 16, 2012 order did not rule on the motion to dismiss

with respect to Quality, that part of the motion is not a matter being appealed. Therefore, it was

proper for the Court to rule on the motion to dismiss with respect to Quality despite Plaintiffs

filing a notice of appeal as to the Court’s March 16, 2012 Order.

Plaintiffs also argue that their motion for reconsideration should be granted because they

can demonstrate that Quality is a debt collector under the FDCPA. [Doc. No. 27-1 at 4.] 

However, as explained in the prior order, neither a consumer’s creditors, a mortgage servicing

company, nor any assignee of the mortgage debt may face liability under the FDCPA because they

are not considered “debt collectors” as defined by the act. Lal v. Am. Home Serv., Inc., 680 F.

Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Connors v. Home Loan Corp., 2009 WL 1615989, at *5

(S.D. Cal. June 9, 2009). Therefore, the Court’s prior order dismissing Plaintiffs’ FDCPA claim

against Quality was not made in clear error.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2012 ________________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge

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