Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04800/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-04800-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXEY GENNADYEVICH KHARIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFERSON B SESSIONS, III, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-04800-JST 

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

MOTION TO SEAL

Re: ECF No. 1, 3

Before the Court is Petitioner Alexey Kharis’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Kharis is currently in detention while he awaits the conclusion 

of asylum and removal proceedings. Kharis asks the Court to order his immediate release from 

custody, arguing that the immigration judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 

committed legal and constitutional errors in determining that Kharis did not merit release on bond. 

In addition, Kharis has filed a motion to file under seal certain documents in support of his 

petition. ECF No. 3.

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants motion to seal, and the Court grants the 

petition in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Kharis is a 43-year-old Russian citizen who lawfully entered the United States on a B-2 

nonimmigrant visa on September 10, 2014. ECR No. 2 at 51. Kharis’s wife, Anna Tutckaia, and 

two children also entered the United States on B-2 nonimmigrant visas in September 2014. Id. at 

9. On March 14, 2015, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 

granted Tutckaia a change of status to F-1 nonimmigrant status (a student visa), allowing Kharis to 

obtain F-2 nonimmigrant status as a derivative spouse. Id. at 10. 

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In June 2015, the International Criminal Police Organization (“Interpol”) published a “Red 

Notice” at Russia’s request, stating that Kharis was a fugitive subject to a Russian arrest warrant 

for his participation in a criminal group that allegedly embezzled 4 billion roubles (approximately 

$114 million) from a state-owned shipyard construction project. ECF No. 4-1 at 7-8. Interpol 

publishes these notices at the request of member countries, distributing them to other member 

countries and their law enforcement agencies. ECF No. 4-4 at 22. “Once published by Interpol, 

each member country determines what effect to give to a Notice within its jurisdiction according 

to its national law and practice.” Id. It is undisputed that the United States does not consider a 

Red Notice an independent basis for an arrest because “it does not meet the requirements for arrest 

under the 4th Amendment.” Id. A few months later, the Russian government charged Kharis with 

various financial crimes in connection with the allegations contained in the Red Notice. ECF No. 

4-1 at 10.

On May 2, 2016, while still in lawful F-2 nonimmigrant status, Kharis filed an application 

for asylum and withholding of removal. ECF No. 2 at 17-30. In his asylum application, Kharis 

disclosed the nature of the charges against him and claimed a reasonable fear based on political 

persecution. ECF No. 2 at 32. According to Kharis, the Russian government initiated a criminal 

prosecution against his business partner, Igor Borbot, in retaliation for Borbot reporting 

government corruption related to the shipyard project. ECF No. 3-3 at 11. Kharis claimed that 

when he refused to give false testimony against Borbot and instead threatened to go public, he also 

became a target, leading to the issuance of the Red Notice and the subsequent criminal charges. 

Id. at 13.

While Kharis’s asylum application was still pending, USCIS revoked Tuckaia’s F-1 

nonimmigrant status, and with it, Kharis’s F-2 nonimmigrant status. ECF No. 2 at 9-15. USCIS 

cited the fact that Kharis was “wanted by the judicial authorities of Russia on charges of a large 

scale fraud” as one of the reasons Tuckaia could no longer establish admissibility. Id. at 10.

On August 16, 2017, Kharis attended an appointment to pick up a decision on his asylum 

application at the San Francisco Asylum Office. Id. at 50-51. There, the government served 

Kharis with a Notice to Appear for removal proceedings, charging him as removable under 8 

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U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visas. Id. at 41-42. The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) determined that custody was necessary because Kharis was a “flight risk due to 

[the] warrant issued by Russia.” Id. at 46. Kharis sought review of that custody determination 

and received a bond hearing before an IJ on August 30, 2017. ECF No. 11 at 4-18.1 The IJ denied 

bond, concluding that Kharis was a flight risk because of the Red Notice. Id. at 15. 

Kharis appealed the IJ’s bond determination to the BIA on September 29, 2017. ECF No. 

14-1 ¶ 14. Pursuant to agency policy, the IJ issued a written memorandum explaining the bond 

determination. ECF No. 2 at 423-24. On January 5, 2018, the BIA affirmed the IJ. Id. at 427-28.

On March 2, 2018, Kharis filed a motion for a redetermination of custody status with the 

IJ. ECF No. 2-1 at 4-16. With his motion, Kharis submitted additional evidence disputing the 

reliability of the Red Notice, among other things. See id. at 20-21. Three days later, the IJ denied 

the motion in a minute order, finding no changed circumstances. ECF No. 4-4 at 5.

On May 7, 2018, the IJ denied Kharis’s asylum claim on the merits. See id. at 249. 

Kharis’s appeal of the IJ’s asylum determination is currently pending with the BIA. Id. at 268.

On July 17, 2018, Kharis filed another motion for custody redetermination, id. at 7, 

accompanied by further evidence of the unreliability of Red Notices and abuse of the system by 

the Russian government. See id. at 17. DHS opposed the motion, arguing the Red Notice 

remained pending and that Kharis’s additional evidence did not constitute a material change in 

circumstances. Id. at 249-51. Further, DHS argued, Kharis presented a greater flight risk once the 

IJ denied his asylum claim. Id. at 250. On July 18, 2018, the IJ denied Kharis’s motion, adopting 

the reasons set forth in DHS’s opposition. Id. at 255. Kharis appealed that denial to the BIA on 

August 7, 2018. Id. at 259-61. It is currently pending.

One day later, on August 8, 2018, Kharis petitioned this Court for habeas corpus relief. 

ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). 

 

1 Although this is an unofficial transcript of the official audio recording, a review of both does not 

disclose any material difference. The Court refers to the unofficial transcript for the benefit of the 

reader. 

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II. MOTION TO SEAL

A party seeking to seal a document filed with the court must (1) comply with Civil Local 

Rule 79–5; and (2) rebut a “strong presumption in favor of access” that applies to all documents 

other than grand jury transcripts or pre-indictment warrant materials. Kamakana v. City & County 

of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

With respect to the first prong, Local Rule 79-5 requires, as a threshold, a request that (1) 

“establishes that the document, or portions thereof, are privileged, protectable as a trade secret or 

otherwise entitled to protection under the law”; and (2) is “narrowly tailored to seek sealing only 

of sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b). An administrative motion to seal must also fulfill the 

requirements of Local Rule 79-5(d). “Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a 

party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, 

or portions thereof, are sealable.” Civil L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A).

With respect to the second prong, the showing required for overcoming the strong 

presumption of access depends on the type of motion to which the document is attached. “[A] 

‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial records. This standard derives from the 

common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records 

and documents.’” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation 

omitted) (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). To overcome this strong presumption, the party 

seeking to seal a judicial record must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual 

findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure.” 

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

On the other hand, records attached to motions that are only “tangentially related to the 

merits of a case” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 

Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, a party need only make a 

showing under the good cause standard of Rule 26(c) to justify the sealing of the materials. Id. at 

1097. A court may, for good cause, keep documents confidential “to protect a party or person 

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

Because Kharis’s habeas petition is more than tangentially related to the merits of his case, 

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the compelling reasons standard applies. “‘[C]ompelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the 

public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might 

have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, 

promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 

F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)).

Here, Kharis has filed an unopposed motion to file under seal portions of his asylum 

application that pertain to other individuals’ applications. ECF No. 3; see also ECF No. 13. The 

first prong is met because the contents of asylum applications are generally confidential. See 8 

C.F.R. § 208.6. The Court also agrees with Kharis that there are compelling reasons to keep this 

particular information confidential, given the sensitive nature of asylum applications alleging fear 

of persecution or harassment. Accordingly, the motion to file under seal is granted.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The government has detained Kharis pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which authorizes his 

detention until judicial review of his application for asylum and withholding of removal is 

complete. See Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).

2

 In an initial bond 

determination under § 1226(a), the alien “must establish to the satisfaction of the [IJ] and the 

[BIA] that he or she does not present a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national 

 

2

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides in full:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested 

and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed 

from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and 

pending such decision, the Attorney General--

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on--

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, 

and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney 

General; or

(B) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an 

“employment authorized” endorsement or other appropriate work 

permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence 

or otherwise would (without regard to removal proceedings) be 

provided such authorization.

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security, and does not pose a risk of flight.” Matter of Guerra, 24 I & N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) 

(citing In Re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1112 (BIA 1999)); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) 

(permitting DHS to release an alien detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) if the alien “demonstrate[s] 

to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, 

and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding”).

Under the governing standards, the IJ should consider “any or all” of the following factors: 

(1) whether the immigrant has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the immigrant’s length of 

residence in the United States; (3) the immigrant’s family ties in the United States; (4) the 

immigrant’s employment history; (5) the immigrant’s record of appearance in court; (6) the 

immigrant’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such 

activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the immigrant’s history of immigration violations; 

(8) any attempts by the immigrant to flee prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) 

the immigrant’s manner of entry to the United States. Matter of Guerra, 24 I & N Dec. at 40; see 

also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Matter of Guerra to 

§ 1226(a)). But the IJ has “broad discretion in deciding the factors that he or she may consider” 

and “may choose to give greater weight to one factor over others, as long as the decision is 

reasonable.” Matter of Guerra, 24 I & N Dec. at 40.

A detainee may appeal the IJ’s determination to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f). A 

detainee may also request a subsequent bond redetermination from the IJ, but the request “shall be 

considered only upon a showing that the alien’s circumstances have changed materially since the 

prior bond redetermination.” Id. § 1003.19(e).

IV. JURISDICTION

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment 

regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review.” Likewise, “[n]o court may 

set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention 

or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” Id.

Nevertheless, “a federal district court has habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to 

review [] bond hearing determinations for constitutional claims and legal error.” Singh, 638 F.3d 

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at 1200-01; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (8 U.S.C. “§ 1226(e) does 

not preclude ‘challenges [to] the statutory framework that permits [the alien’s] detention without 

bail.” (alterations in original) (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)). Section 

1226(e) “does not limit habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law,” which, 

as the Ninth Circuit has explained, “includ[e] ‘application of law to undisputed facts, sometimes 

referred to as mixed questions of law and fact.’” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Ramadan v. 

Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). 

Thus, a district court has jurisdiction to review an IJ’s discretionary bond denial where that 

bond denial is challenged as legally erroneous or unconstitutional. See De La Cruz Sales v. 

Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (concluding that immigrant’s claims were 

reviewable by district court where bond determination challenged as constitutionally flawed); 

Obregon v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-01463-WHO, 2017 WL 1407889, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 

2017) (same); Castaneda v. Aitken, No. 15-CV-01635-MEJ, 2015 WL 3882755, at *7-8 (N.D. 

Cal. June 23, 2015) (same); Espinoza v. Aitken, No. 5:13-CV-00512 EJD, 2013 WL 1087492, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) (same); see also, c.f., Saravia v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-03615-VC, 

2017 WL 5569838, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017), aff’d, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018)

(ordering bond hearings for unaccompanied minors previously determined not to be flight risks or 

dangerous but re-detained because of changed circumstances under procedural due process). 

While a district court has jurisdiction to review mixed questions of law and fact, it must be 

careful not to encroach upon “the IJ’s discretionary weighing of the evidence.” Slim v. Nielson, 

No. 18-CV-02816-DMR, 2018 WL 4110551, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2018); see also PrietoRomero, 534 F.3d at 1058 (“[D]iscretionary decisions granting or denying bond are not subject to 

judicial review.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)). Accordingly, where a habeas petitioner “asks the 

Court to second-guess the IJ’s weighing of the evidence, that claim is directed solely to the IJ’s 

discretion and is unreviewable.” Sales, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. But § 1226(e) does not bar 

courts from concluding that “[t]he evidence before the IJ failed, as a matter of law, to prove flight 

risk or danger.” Judulang v. Chertoff, 562 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1127 (S.D. Cal. 2008); see also 

Sales, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1141; cf. Slim, 2018 WL 4110551, at *5 (distinguishing between an 

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unreviewable challenge to “the IJ’s discretionary weighing of factors in reaching a bond 

determination” and permissible challenges to “whether the party bearing the burden of proof met 

the applicable quantum of evidence”). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence within the 

confines of § 1226(e), therefore, the question is not “whether this Court believes that the proof 

establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the petitioner] is a danger to the community” 

or a flight risk. Nguti v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-6703, 2017 WL 5891328, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 

2017). Rather, the Court must decide whether the IJ “relied upon proof that – as a matter of law –

could not establish” that conclusion. Id.; see also Judulang, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. Though 

Kharis bore the burden of proof in this case, the scope of the Court’s review remains the same. 

See Ortega-Rangel v. Sessions, 313 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1004-05 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (dangerousness 

finding violated due process where IJ relied solely on evidence that did not support that 

conclusion).

Though not expressly mentioned by the parties, the Court also addresses the threshold 

question of the appropriate focus of its review. Here, the BIA has already adjudicated Kharis’s 

appeal of the IJ’s August 30, 2017 bond determination under de novo review. ECF No. 2 at 427-

28. It is well-established outside of the habeas context that, where “the BIA conducts its own 

review of the evidence and law, [the court of appeals’] review is limited to the BIA’s decision, 

except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Villavicencio v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 

658, 663 (9th Cir. 2018). Similarly, in habeas claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts 

review the decision of the highest state court to have addressed the issue, although they may look 

through to a lower court’s decision in some instances. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 

1192 (2018). Accordingly, the Court concludes that, where applicable, the reasoning in the BIA’s 

decision provides the basis for its review. This is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s instruction 

that in the ordinary course, detainees challenging bond determinations should first appeal their 

claims to the BIA. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Of course, to 

the extent Kharis alleges procedural errors in the IJ’s hearing itself or errors in the adjudication of 

Kharis’s redetermination motions that have not yet been addressed by the BIA, the Court reviews 

the proceedings and the IJ’s decisions directly.

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V. DISCUSSION

Procedural Defects in the IJ’s First Bond Determination

The Court first addresses Kharis’s claims that procedural defects in his initial bond 

determination before the IJ deprived him of due process. Pet. ¶¶ 71-76.

The government argues that the Kharis has failed to exhaust two of the arguments 

supporting his claim that the IJ’s first bond hearing violated procedural due process. The 

government objects first to Kharis’s argument that the IJ violated due process by not allowing 

Kharis to orally testify at his hearing. ECF No. 14 at 12-13; Pet. ¶ 74. The government likewise 

objects to Kharis’s contention that the IJ’s post-hoc bond memorandum violated due process by 

including reasons not set forth in the IJ’s oral decision. ECF No. 14 at 14-15; Pet. ¶ 75.3 

“The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims” 

challenging bond determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 

988 (9th Cir. 2017). Applying the prudential exhaustion requirement is appropriate when:

(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to 

generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation 

of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 

administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to 

allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need 

for judicial review.

Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). But a court may nonetheless 

waive the exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, 

pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the 

administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 

(9th Cir. 2004)).

The Court first applies these principles to Kharis’s oral testimony claim. Kharis concedes 

that he did not raise this claim to the BIA but argues that he should be excused from exhaustion. 

ECF No. 16 at 5. Kharis reasons that the applicable Executive Office of Immigration Review 

 

3 The government does not object to any other claims as unexhausted. Because exhaustion is a 

prudential requirement in this context, see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988, the Court does not 

consider whether Kharis’s remaining claims are exhausted.

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(“EOIR”)4policy vests the IJ with discretion to allow or prohibit oral testimony, and so his 

constitutional challenge would have been futile. Id. The EOIR policy provides: “At the 

Immigration Judge’s discretion, witnesses may be placed under oath and testimony taken. 

However, parties should be mindful that bond hearings are generally briefer and less formal than 

hearings in removal proceedings.” Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Court 

Practice Manual § 9.3(e)(vi) (2017). The Court notes that the BIA “may review questions of law, 

discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of immigration judges de 

novo,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii), and applied that standard to Kharis’s appeal, ECF No. 2 at 427. 

To the extent Kharis argues that the IJ abused its discretion in denying oral testimony in his 

particular case, he could have raised that claim to the BIA. See Chettiar v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1375, 

1379 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (“There is no administrative exhaustion requirement for constitutional 

due process challenges, but this exception is available only where the due process claim involves 

more than mere procedural error that an administrative tribunal could remedy.”). The Court 

declines to waive the prudential exhaustion requirement for this “as-applied” argument because 

the BIA would have had the ability to correct this mistake and addressing it here would encourage 

petitioners to bypass the administrative scheme. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988.

The Court next turns to Kharis’s bond memorandum claim. Kharis argues that his brief to 

the BIA adequately put the BIA on notice of this claim by setting forth facts presented at the 

hearing that the IJ purportedly did not consider. ECF No. 16 at 5 (citing ECF No. 14-2 at 6). The 

Court disagrees. The stated thrust of Kharis’s claim for relief to this Court is that “the IJ erred by 

failing to give an accurate account of the basis for his oral bond decision in [the written] 

memorandum decision,” by relying on additional facts or conclusions not stated at the hearing. 

Pet. ¶ 75. Kharis’s brief to the BIA, however, did not argue that those conclusions were an 

inaccurate reflection of the reasons for the IJ’s oral decision, but rather that they were 

unreasonable conclusions in light of the record. ECF No. 14-2 at 3-4, 10-12. In other words, 

 

4 The BIA is a component of the EOIR. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a). The Director of the EOIR 

supervises and directs the BIA and may “[i]ssue operational instructions and policy” regarding the 

performance of its duties, id. § 1003.0(b)(1)(i), but has no authority to adjudicate cases or direct 

the result of an adjudication before the BIA, id. § 1003.0(c).

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Kharis challenged the merits of the IJ’s written memorandum, but gave no indication to the BIA 

that Kharis thought the memorandum was procedurally flawed based on a degree of dissonance 

with the IJ’s oral decision. This distinction is aptly demonstrated by Kharis’s habeas petition, 

which argues that inaccuracies in the bond memorandum deprived him of effective appellate 

review because the BIA applied a “reasonableness” standard of review to the IJ’s written findings. 

Pet. ¶ 75; ECF No. 16 at 6. But Kharis argued to the BIA that the IJ’s findings were unreasonable, 

not that they were undeserving of “reasonableness” review. See ECF No. 14-2 at 10-11. 

Therefore, Kharis “did not give the BIA an opportunity to consider and remedy the particular 

procedural error[] he raises now.” Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008).5

Alternatively, Kharis argues that raising this claim would have been futile because the 

BIA’s written decision demonstrates that it did not review any other parts of the record beyond the 

IJ’s bond memorandum. ECF No. 16 at 5. As an initial matter, it is not clear why Kharis’s 

premise leads to his conclusion; if Kharis had argued that the bond memorandum was inaccurate, 

the logical inference would be that the BIA would scrutinize the other evidence more closely. 

Moreover, there is no dispute that Kharis presented that information to the BIA. See id.; ECF No. 

14-2 at 6-7. To the extent that the BIA’s written decision evidences a failure to consider this 

evidence, the Court addresses that distinct argument below. 

In declining to waive exhaustion for these two claims, the Court also takes note of the fact 

that Kharis was represented by counsel both in the initial bond hearing and on appeal to the BIA. 

Cf. Soto v. Sessions, 18-CV-02891-EMC, 2018 WL 3619727, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2018).

Finally, the government does not object on exhaustion grounds to Kharis’s related

contention that he was deprived of due process because the agency did not provide a transcript of 

the bond hearing. Pet. ¶ 76. The Court rejects this argument on the merits because the Ninth 

 

5 The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has expressed concern that a post-hoc bond memorandum 

alone is an inadequate record of the proceedings, because “once the court has entered judgment, it 

may become subject to the very natural weight of its conviction, tending to focus on that which 

supports its holding.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. But the Singh court held that such a post-hoc bond 

memorandum was permissible, provided that it was accompanied by a contemporaneous audio 

recording or transcript. Id. at 1209. Thus, while the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the potential for 

a post-hoc bond memorandum to distort the evidence before the IJ at the hearing, it concluded that 

a contemporaneous record provided an adequate check.

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Circuit has held that an audio recording of the hearing, which was provided here, satisfies due 

process. Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208.

Reliance on a Red Notice

The Court next turns to whether due process permits reliance on an Interpol Red Notice. 

Pet. ¶¶ 78-81. Kharis emphasizes – and the government does not dispute – that the Department of 

Justice’s (“DOJ”) own guidance states that “the United States does not consider a Red Notice 

alone to be a sufficient basis for the arrest of a subject because it does not meet the requirements 

for arrest under the 4th Amendment to the Constitution.” Pet. ¶ 79 (quoting ECF No. 4-4 at 22). 

The parties have not cited, nor has this Court located, any case law directly addressing the 

due process implications of relying on a Red Notice for a bond determination. Moreover, even the 

indirect authority the Court has been able to locate addresses the question of dangerousness, rather 

than the risk of flight that is at issue here. 

In Soto v. Sessions, the petitioner claimed that a Red Notice had been issued based on an 

interrogation in which she was tortured. No. 18-CV-02891-EMC, 2018 WL 3619727, at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. July 30, 2018). However, the district court did not directly address the validity of relying on 

the Red Notice because the petitioner sought only a new bond hearing with the burden of proof on 

the government, but did not provide any information that indicated that “the shift would make any 

difference to the outcome.” Id. at 4. In reaching this determination, the Soto court noted that it 

was “unclear, for example, if the government relied only on an international warrant (hearsay) to 

demonstrate danger to the community, and whether Ms. Soto offered any testimony under oath to 

challenge the warrant which was unrebutted.” Id. Soto thus suggests a concern with relying 

solely on the underlying conduct alleged in a Red Notice to determine dangerousness, particularly 

when rebuttal evidence is offered. 

The extent to which alleged conduct may form the basis for a finding of dangerousness is 

more settled in the context of domestic criminal charges. In Matter of Guerra, the BIA held that 

IJs “are not limited to considering only criminal convictions in assessing whether an alien is a 

danger to the community,” but rather could rely on “probative and specific” evidence of 

dangerousness contained in a criminal complaint. 24 I & N. Dec. at 40. Ortega-Rangel, on 

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which Kharis places great reliance, is not to the contrary. There, the court concluded that the IJ 

violated due process by finding that the petitioner “was a danger to the community solely because 

she was arrested for possession for sale of a controlled substance,” reasoning that “no court or 

grand jury had determined that there [wa]s probable cause to believe that she in fact had done so.” 

313 F. Supp. 3d at 1004. The court explained that an IJ may, consistent with due process, rely on 

pending criminal charges to make a dangerousness finding “if the evidence supporting the charge 

is specific and probative.” Id. at 1005 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I & N. Dec. at 40). But in 

Ortega-Rangel, the IJ had relied on the dangers to the community of selling drugs, while the 

underlying facts showed only that the petitioner was “aware that her boyfriend at the time sold 

drugs,” not that she herself had sold drugs. Id. at 1004-05. Conversely, even where convictions 

are involved, “criminal history alone will not always be sufficient to justify denial of bond on the 

basis of dangerousness.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1206.

Kharis’s main point, which is well taken, is that the constitutional problems of relying on 

criminal charges are compounded when a foreign nation can initiate those charges without 

satisfying a probable cause standard. ECF No. 4-4 at 22; see also Soto, 2018 WL 3619727, at *4 

(deeming a Red Notice “hearsay”). The Third Circuit recently decided the habeas appeal of 

Kharis’s business partner Borbot, but did not address these issues because “[t]he duration of 

Borbot’s detention [wa]s the sole basis for his due process challenge.” Borbot v. Warden Hudson 

Cty. Corr. Facility, -- F.3d --, 2018 WL 4997934, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2018).

6

 The Third 

Circuit denied that challenge, but in dissent, Judge Roth forcefully explained her view that “[i]t 

has become clear that the Russian government has been employing Interpol alerts or ‘Red Notices’ 

to pursue and harass opponents of the Russian regime” and that a new hearing was “necessary to 

prevent a foreign government from improperly influencing our immigration courts.” Id. at *5-6

(Roth, J., dissenting). 

Judge Roth expresses legitimate concerns, and the evidence Kharis has submitted

 

6

In Borbot’s case, the BIA issued an unpublished, non-precedential decision rejecting similar 

arguments that the IJ gave too much weight to the Red Notice in finding Borbot a danger to 

property. In Re: Igor Viktorovich Borbot A.K.A. Igor Borbot, 2016 WL 7655983, at *2 

(DCBABR Sept. 1, 2016). The Third Circuit did not address that aspect of the BIA’s decision. 

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regarding both Russia’s use of Red Notices generally and the specific use as to him, if true, cast 

doubt on whether the Red Notice here is a legitimate basis for concluding that Kharis committed a 

crime. Nonetheless, the Court cannot hold that a Red Notice – even one originating from Russia –

is entitled to no weight as a matter of law. Stated differently, it does not violate due process to 

give a Red Notice at least some weight in the context of determining whether a detainee poses a 

flight risk. The Court is aware of no authority holding to the contrary, and it comports with 

common sense that the existence and seriousness of pending criminal charges appropriately have

an impact on the flight risk analysis. Cf. United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 

2003) (reasoning that an increase in the severity of the penalty charged could reasonably increase 

a criminal defendant’s flight risk). Moreover, unlike in Ortega-Rangel, which dealt with the 

question of dangerousness, the allegations in the Red Notice are “specific and probative” of the 

question of flight risk. 313 F. Supp. 3d at 1005. If Kharis did in fact participate in a scheme to 

embezzle roughly $114 million, those resources are relevant to whether he has the means to flee, 

whether he has a motive to flee, and whether any amount of bond would provide a sufficient 

incentive to appear. 

Because the IJ and the BIA were entitled to place some weight on the Red Notice in their 

analysis of flight risk, the Court generally lacks jurisdiction to review whether they placed too 

much. See De La Cruz Sales, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. On the other hand, given the evidence of

the serious flaws in the Red Notice process, the Court has doubts regarding whether Kharis’s Red 

Notice alone is sufficient to support a flight risk finding as a matter of law. See Judulang, 562 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1127. But the Court need not reach that issue, as explained below.

Failure to Consider Evidence

Finally, the Court considers Kharis’s claims that the agency failed to meaningfully 

consider his evidence. Pet. ¶¶ 83-95. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause requirement of a full and fair hearing, mandates that the” BIA 

“review all relevant evidence submitted on appeal.” Larita-Martinez v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1092, 

1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Vilchez v. Holder, 

682 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying same standard to IJ decisions). However, “an alien 

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attempting to establish that the Board violated his right to due process by failing to consider 

relevant evidence must overcome the presumption that it did review the evidence.” LaritaMartinez, 220 F.3d at 1095-96. The agency’s failure to mention specific evidence, by itself, does 

not overcome this presumption. Id. at 1096; see also Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 

(9th Cir. 2006) (same). But where the agency’s discussion of the record demonstrates that it has 

not “adequately considered the full record,” due process requires the agency to reconsider its bond 

determination on a full record. Ramos, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1033; cf. Obregon v. Sessions, No. 17-

CV-01463-WHO, 2017 WL 1407889, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2017) (expressing concern that 

“the IJ may not have adequately considered all of the available evidence in assessing petitioner’s 

present dangerousness” based on inaccuracies and gaps in the IJ’s decision).7 “Such indications 

include misstating the record and failing to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive 

evidence.” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011).8 

1. BIA Review of August 30, 2017 Bond Determination

Kharis argues that the BIA ignored or did not meaningfully consider six pieces of 

evidence: (1) that a Red Notice restricts an individual’s ability to travel; (2) Russia’s track record 

of abusing Red Notices; (3) Kharis’s disclosure of the Red Notice in his asylum application; (4) 

Kharis’s role as primary caregiver to two children; (5) Kharis’s children’s pending asylum case; 

and (6) various other local ties, including a long-term lease, Kharis’s acceptance to the Stanford 

Graduate School of Business, and the enrollment of Kharis’s children in after-school programs in 

San Francisco. Pet. ¶¶ 84-89. 

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the BIA’s failure to mention each specific piece 

of evidence in its order or cite to the audio recording is not dispositive. See Larita-Martinez, 220 

F.3d at 1095-96. 

 

7 Because due process requires consideration of all relevant evidence, the Court need not 

determine the degree to which 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) does so as well.

8 The Ninth Circuit made this point in the context of a Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim, 

where the regulations provide that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be 

considered.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). But the Court concludes 

that same inference is appropriate here, where due process imposes the same obligation. See 

Larita-Martinez, 220 F.3d at 1095; Ramos, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1034.

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Kharis argues, though, that the BIA misstated the record because it erroneously 

characterized his application for asylum as speculative, see ECF No. 2 at 428, given that he had 

affirmatively applied for asylum while in lawful status and that the substance of his asylum claim 

was related to the Red Notice charges. ECF No. 16 at 11. The BIA has explained that a detainee 

“with a greater likelihood of being granted relief from deportation has a greater motivation to 

appear for a deportation hearing than one who, based on a criminal record or otherwise, has less 

potential of being granted such relief.” Matter of Andrade, 19 I. & N. Dec. 488, 490 (BIA 1987). 

If the BIA makes “an unambiguous misstatement of law” in describing the petitioner’s prospects 

of avoiding removal, this legal error may fatally infect a flight risk determination. Zabaleta v. 

Decker, No. 18-CV-1802 (JGK), 2018 WL 4473340, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018). In 

Zabaleta, for instance, the BIA had stated that the petitioner’s ongoing merits appeal was futile 

because he had “aged out of [Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”)] status,” but the relevant law 

“explicitly fr[oze] the age of an SIJ status applicant as of the date of the applicant’s filing of an SIJ 

status petition.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(6)).

But here, the BIA’s assessment of Kharis’s eligibility for relief from removal was not an 

objective misstatement of the law. Kharis’s bond proceedings are “separate and apart from, and 

shall form no part of, any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d), 

and his application for relief was still pending before the IJ. The BIA did not unambiguously 

misstate the law or the record in deeming Kharis’s eligibility speculative. In the context of 

Kharis’s argument that the BIA did not consider his evidence, the Court is not deciding whether 

the BIA’s assessment was accurate, but rather whether it was so wholly inconsistent with the 

record that it rebuts the presumption that the BIA considered all the evidence. See LaritaMartinez, 220 F.3d at 1095-96. The Court finds that the BIA’s statement does not meet that 

standard, particularly given that the IJ ultimately did deny Kharis’s application on the merits, and 

his merits appeal is pending before the BIA. ECF No. 4-4 at 268-69. This procedural posture also 

undermines Kharis’s ability to show prejudice at this stage, because the IJ’s merits denial 

generally weighs in favor of a flight risk finding. See Matter of D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 582 

(2003) (“The IJ’s denial of the respondent’s application for asylum increases the risk that the 

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respondent will flee if released from detention.”). 

However, the Court agrees with Kharis that the BIA’s decision does not mention “highly 

probative” evidence on which Kharis relied. Cole, 659 F.3d at 772. Notably, it treated the Red 

Notice and the underlying allegations as unambiguously supporting a flight risk finding, without 

any discussion of Kharis’s argument and supporting evidence that a Red Notice makes it 

significantly more difficult to travel internationally. ECF No. 14-2 at 10 (citing ECF No. 2 at 

314). Nor did the agency discuss Kharis’s evidence attacking the reliability of the process by 

which those notices are issued and Russia’s track record of abuse. See, e.g., ECF No. 2 at 301-02, 

384, 386-89, 391-92, 394-95. The Court has previously expressed its doubts that a Red Notice by 

itself could be sufficient to support a detention finding, given both the Justice Department’s stated 

concerns and the evidence submitted by Kharis. And because the BIA did not give adequate 

consideration to evidence undermining the reliability of the Red Notice allegations, its conclusion 

that the alleged embezzlement precluded any amount of bond rested on similarly shaky 

foundations. ECF No. 2 at 427-28.

2. IJ Review of Motions for Redetermination

If the IJ had subsequently given Kharis’s evidence adequate review in his motions for 

redetermination under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e), it could possibly have cured these defects, as Kharis 

arguably would not have been prejudiced. The Court concludes, however, that the IJ failed to 

adequately consider the evidence supporting Kharis’s July 7, 2018 motion.9

In the IJ’s post hoc bond memorandum, the IJ explained that Kharis had presented 

“evidence to question the probative value of Interpol Red notices,” but concluded that the “new 

evidence is not material as similar evidence was considered” in the original bond hearing. ECF 

 

9 The Court does not determine the due process adequacy of the IJ’s ruling on the March 2, 2018 

motion, because the IJ did not issue a post-hoc bond memorandum that would permit such review. 

In this context, the IJ’s use of a form order does not by itself violate due process. Under EOIR 

policy, IJs do not prepare a written, reasoned statement of decision unless the bond determination 

is appealed. See Exec. Office of Immigration Review, Immigration Court Practice Manual

§ 9.3(e)(vii). Given this policy, the Court cannot conclude that the IJ’s cursory minute order 

violates Kharis’s due process rights or reflects a failure to consider evidence, when Kharis could 

have obtained a reasoned statement of decision by filing an appeal, as he did for the IJ’s denial of 

the July 7, 2018 motion for redetermination.

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No. 11 at 21. True, some of Kharis’s evidence was relatively similar, albeit stronger. For 

instance, that the DOJ does not consider a Red Notice a basis for arrest, Pet. ¶ 93, strengthens 

Kharis’s earlier argument that Red Notices in general are unreliable. Similarly, that Russia is a 

frequent abuser of Interpol’s lax procedural checks to obtaining a Red Notice, id. ¶ 94, builds on 

Kharis’s prior argument that Red Notices from Russia are especially unreliable. 

But Dr. Bromund’s report analyzed in detail why Kharis’s Red Notice, in particular, was 

likely fraudulent. ECF No. 4-4 at 49-53. This evidence was different in kind, not just in degree, 

and seemingly highly probative as to the agency’s primary rationale for Kharis’s ongoing 

detention. Due process obligated the IJ to mention such evidence and if the IJ concluded that 

§ 1003.19(e) was not satisfied, explain why the evidence did not demonstrate a material change.

Ultimately, at no point during Kharis’s motions for bond redeterminations or his appeal of 

his initial determination did the agency expressly grapple with a substantial, well-supported 

argument that Kharis’s Red Notice was at most minimally probative as to whether he was a flight 

risk. The constitutional guarantee of due process requires more. See Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 

F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Due process and [Ninth Circuit] precedent require a minimum 

degree of clarity in dispositive reasoning and in the treatment of a properly raised argument.”

(citation omitted)).10 

The Relief Due

Having concluded that Kharis did not receive due process in the adjudications of his prior 

bond determinations, the Court now decides what relief is due. The Court has identified due 

process errors in both the BIA’s adjudication of Kharis’s first appeal and in the IJ’s adjudication 

of Kharis’s subsequent § 1003.19(e) motions. Were the only motion at issue Kharis’s first appeal, 

“the appropriate remedy [would be] to vacate the decision of the BIA and to remand the 

petitioner’s bond revocation proceeding to the BIA for a determination of the petitioner’s bond 

 

10 Admittedly, this argument placed the IJ in a tough position with relatively imperfect 

information. But the IJ did himself no favors by exercising his discretion to exclude Kharis’s oral 

testimony. See Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“By precluding 

[the petitioner] from testifying about the critical events [at issue], the IJ short-circuited his ability 

to judge accurately [the petitioner’s] credibility.”). 

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revocation appeal and any other relief the BIA finds appropriate.” Zabaleta, 2018 WL 4473340, 

at *4. Since the BIA’s decision, however, Kharis has produced additional evidence that the IJ 

failed to properly consider. Given that the IJ is best positioned to develop the factual record and 

assess credibility, the Court concludes that the interests of justice are best served by requiring that 

the government provide a new bond hearing before the IJ which complies with due process within 

a certain amount of time. See, e.g., Ortega-Rangel, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 1005; Cortez v. Sessions, 

318 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Ramos v. Sessions, No. 18-CV-00413-JST, 2018 

WL 905922, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018). Kharis is ordered released unless the government 

holds a bond hearing which comports with due process within 24 days of the issuance of this 

order. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Kharis’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted in part. 

The government is enjoined from detaining Kharis unless it holds a bond hearing which comports 

with due process within 24 days from the issuance of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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