Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-15310/USCOURTS-ca11-14-15310-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

---

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-15310

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-01581-AKK

RENEE PUGH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EL PASO CORPORATION PENSION PLAN, 

PENSION COMMITTEE OF EL PASO CORPORATION PENSION PLAN, 

THE,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(June 17, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 14-15310 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 1 of 5
2

Renee Pugh appeals the grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act case. Pugh made a claim for a 

survivor’s benefit after the death of her ex-husband, who was a participant in 

Defendants’ retirement plan. Defendants denied Pugh’s claim because the benefit 

was due only to surviving spouses, and Pugh and her husband had divorced shortly

before his death. The district court affirmed Defendants’ denial of the claim. We

affirm.

Renee Pugh’s then-husband was a participant in the El Paso Corporation 

Pension Plan, under which he received retirement benefits beginning in 1987. 

They divorced in 2011, and he died less than eight months later. After her exhusband’s death, Pugh made a claim for a “Retiree Survivor’s Benefit.” El Paso 

denied the claim. Pugh sued, and the district court granted summary judgment for 

El Paso. 

We review de novo the district court’s affirmance of El Paso’s decision to 

deny benefits under the plan, and we apply the same legal standards. See

Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam). We apply, as the district court did, a six-part analytical framework to 

review El Paso’s denial of benefits:

(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim 

administrator’s [i.e., El Paso’s] benefits-denial decision is “wrong” 

(i.e., the court disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not, 

then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.

USCA11 Case: 14-15310 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 2 of 5
3

(2) If the administrator’s decision in fact is “de novo wrong,” then 

determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims; 

if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.

(3) If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was 

vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine whether 

“reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his decision under 

the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).

(4) If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and reverse 

the administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do exist, then 

determine if he operated under a conflict of interest.

(5) If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.

(6) If there is a conflict, the conflict should merely be a factor for the 

court to take into account when determining whether an 

administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

Id. at 1355. Pugh admits that El Paso was vested with discretion (step 2), and that 

there was no conflict of interest (step 4). But she disputes the district court’s 

conclusions that El Paso’s decision was not “de novo wrong” (step 1), and, 

alternatively, that it was supported by reasonable grounds and thus not arbitrary 

and capricious (step 5). We see no need to decide whether El Paso’s decision was 

“de novo wrong”; either way, because it was not arbitrary and capricious, El Paso

was entitled to summary judgment.

The retirement plan owes the Retiree Survivor’s Benefit only to, as relevant 

here, an “Eligible Spouse.” The plan defines “Eligible Spouse” as:

The husband or wife of a deceased Participant, who (i) was married to 

the Participant under the laws of the State where the marriage was 

contracted at least one year prior to the date of his death, (ii) is not a 

party to a court action for judgment of separation or decree of divorce 

USCA11 Case: 14-15310 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 3 of 5
4

pending at the time of the Participant’s death, and (iii) subsequent to 

the Participant’s death has not remarried.

The crux of this dispute concerns the correct interpretation of clause (i).

Pugh reads it to define “Eligible Spouse” as one who was married to the plan 

participant for any one-year period before his death. El Paso, in denying her claim, 

read the clause to include only those spouses married to the plan participant for the

one-year period immediately preceding the participant’s death. Pugh qualifies as 

an Eligible Spouse under her reading, but not under El Paso’s: she was married to 

her husband for many years, but they divorced some seven months before he died.

We agree with the district court that El Paso’s interpretation was supported 

by reasonable grounds. Most notably, if Pugh’s interpretation were accepted, it 

would create incongruous outcomes. For one, the plan could owe this benefit to 

any number of ex-spouses who had been married to the plan participant for at least 

a year (and are neither presently a party to a divorce proceeding nor remarried).

1

 

For another, it would lead to absurd results with respect to clause (ii), because it 

would confer this benefit on ex-spouses but deny it to current spouses involved in 

divorce proceedings with the plan participant. Imagine a participant who was 

 1 Pugh argues that this could never happen, because the plan’s definition of the term 

“Spouse” eliminates the possibility of payment to multiple “Eligible Spouses.” [See Bl. Br. 20.] 

But the plan provides that the relevant benefit is owed to “Eligible Spouses,” a term that is 

explicitly defined without reference to the general definition of “Spouse” to which Pugh points. 

The term “Spouse” defines eligibility only for other benefits not relevant here. The definition of 

the term “Spouse” thus plays no part in the determination of who is an “Eligible Spouse,” and 

whatever limitations the former contains cannot affect the latter.

USCA11 Case: 14-15310 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 4 of 5
5

married to her first husband for at least one year, and who was divorcing her 

second husband (also of at least one year) at the time of her death. The first 

husband would qualify for the Retiree Survivor’s Benefit as an Eligible Spouse 

(because they were married for at least one year and he was not at that time a party 

to a divorce proceeding), but the second husband would not qualify (because he

was a party to a divorce proceeding). That, as El Paso explained, “makes no 

sense” and “is not contemplated by the Plan.”

El Paso’s interpretation of the definition of “Eligible Spouse” is reasonable. 

And because it is vested with discretion to interpret the terms of the plan, its 

reasonable interpretation must be afforded deference. See White v. Coca-Cola Co., 

542 F.3d 848, 856 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that where a plan provision is 

ambiguous, the plan administrator’s interpretation must be upheld “[a]s long as a 

reasonable basis appears” for its interpretation (quotation omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 14-15310 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 5 of 5