Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00641/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00641-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

THOMAS JOHN BURNS, JR., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-00641 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On April 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12) on August 6, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. 

I Procedural History

 On July 15, 2003, Petitioner was charged by a complaint

in state docket number CR2003-012254 with one count of burglary

in the second degree and one count of theft. Answer, Exh. A.

The complaint alleged the crimes were both committed on or about

June 30, 1996. Id., Exh. A. An information charging the same

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offenses was filed on July 24, 2003. Id., Exh. B.

Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

his criminal proceedings. Id., Exh. C. On July 24, 2003,

Petitioner signed a written plea agreement in state docket

number CR2003-012254. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement provided

Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of burglary and that

Petitioner would be sentenced to a term of supervised probation.

Id., Exh. C. On July 24, 2003, the state Superior Court

accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea. Id., Exh. D. On September

18, 2003, judgment was entered, the state trial court suspended

imposition of Petitioner’s sentence, and Petitioner was placed

on probation for three years Id., Exh. E.

In November of 2003 Petitioner initiated a state action

for post-conviction relief. The Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief cited Petitioner’s conviction in CR2003-012254. See id.,

Exh. F. Petitioner was appointed counsel to represent him in

this matter. Id., Exh. G. However, the brief filed by counsel

on March 23, 2004, did not discuss Petitioner’s burglary

conviction or reference the docket number of that case. Id.,

Exh. G. The brief asserted Petitioner was entitled to postconviction relief in state docket number CR2003-016472-001DT, a

case charging Petitioner had failed to register as a sex

offender. Id., Exh. G. The brief filed by counsel dealt only

with issues arising from Petitioner’s guilty plea to one count

of failure to register as a sex offender. Id., Exh. G. On May

4, 2004, relief in that matter was granted and Petitioner was

awarded an addition 23 days of pre-sentence incarceration in

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that matter. Id., Exh. H. 

On November 10, 2005, the state petitioned the Superior

Court to revoke Petitioner’s probation in his 2003 burglary

case. Id., Exh. L. The state alleged Petitioner failed to

report to his probation officer and that his probation officer

had not known where Petitioner was residing since October 4,

2005. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner moved to dismiss arguing, inter

alia, that he was being denied his right to due process. Id.,

Exh. M. The motion to dismiss was denied and, on March 8, 2006,

Petitioner admitted to the state court that he had violated a

term of probation. Id., Exh. BB. 

Prior to accepting Petitioner’s admission, the trial

court warned Petitioner that if he admitted a violation of the

terms of his probation, his probation could be revoked and that

he faced a presumptive term of 3.5 years imprisonment if his

probation was revoked. Id., Exh. BB. Nonetheless, Petitioner

made the admission. Id., Exh. BB. On April 6, 2006, the state

trial court ordered Petitioner’s probation be revoked and the

state trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 3.5 years

incarceration, the presumptive term for burglary. Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner filed an action for post-conviction relief

in the state Superior Court on May 31, 2006. See Docket No. O.

Petitioner sought post-conviction relief from the finding that

he had violated probation in CR2003-012254 and the resulting

prison sentence. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner was appointed counsel

to represent him in these proceedings. Id., Exh. P. In his

Rule 32 action Petitioner argued the state’s delay in

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prosecuting the 1996 burglary violated Petitioner’s right to due

process of law and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Id., Exh. Q & Exh. S. Petitioner argued he was entitled to the

dismissal of his 2003 conviction. In the alternative,

Petitioner asserted he was entitled to additional credit for

pre-sentence incarceration with regard to his 3.5 year sentence,

based on his confinement for other offenses committed between

1996 and 2003. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner argued his Rule 32

action with regard to his 2003 conviction was timely because his

Rule 32 counsel in his 2004 sex-offender-registration action was

incompetent for failing to raise the “obvious” error with

regard to his 2003 conviction. Id., Exh. Q.

The state trial court denied relief in Petitioner’s

Rule 32 action on July 3, 2007, citing Rule 32.6(c), Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. U. The state court

reasoned that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred

because the petition was not timely. Id., Exh. U. The state

court also concluded Petitioner’s speedy trial claim and his due

process claim were waived by Petitioner’s guilty plea. Id.,

Exh. U. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on May 9, 2008.

Id., Exh. X. 

Petitioner contends he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because his original conviction for burglary, entered

seven years after the crime was committed, violated his Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial. Petitioner also asserts he

was denied his right to due process of law during his criminal

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proceedings. Petitioner also asserts the sentence of

imprisonment imposed as a result of his probation violation

should be reduced by 356 days, arguing he is entitled to credit

for his pre-sentence incarcerations in other criminal matters.

Petitioner further contends he filed a timely state petition for

post-conviction relief with regard to the “original judgment of

sentence.”

II Analysis

Relevant statute of limitations

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). However, the AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 &

Supp. 2008). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.

Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053

(9th Cir. 2008).

Because Petitioner pled guilty and thereby waived his

right to a direct appeal, Petitioner’s burglary conviction and

sentence became final on or about December 18, 2003, ninety days

after his sentencing, when the time expired for timely seeking

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state post-conviction relief from the entry of judgment and

sentencing. See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir.

2007) (holding that, in Arizona, the statute of limitations

began to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right

proceeding and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the

expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.”).

Petitioner had one year from that date, i.e., until December 18,

2004, to seek federal habeas relief, not counting any time

during which the statute of limitations was statutorily tolled

by the pendency of a properly-filed state action for postconviction relief. Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not have any properly-filed state action

for post-conviction relief pending in the state courts from

December 18, 2003, through December 18, 2004. Petitioner’s

action for state post-conviction relief from his original 2003

burglary conviction, filed in May of 2006 and precipitated by

the conclusion he had violated his probation, could not and did

not re-start the expired statute of limitations regarding his

federal habeas action on his 2003 conviction. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v.

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson,

234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). A state-court petition

that is filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations

under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the limitations

period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001);

Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001);

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Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). 

Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas

action within the period specified by the AEDPA, his petition

for habeas relief may only be considered if the AEDPA’s time

limitation may be “equitably” tolled in his case. See Harris,

515 F.3d at 1053-54 & n.4; Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800

(9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

determined that equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a

federal habeas petition is available only if extraordinary

circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055-56

(discussing standard and holding equitable tolling was warranted

when the petitioner had relied on prior Circuit Court of Appeals

precedent regarding the timely filing of his petition); Malcom

v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2002). Equitable tolling

is only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely claim. See Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055 (stating a

petitioner’s “oversight, miscalculation,” or “negligence” would

not warrant equitable tolling); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

A federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling

must also act with “reasonable” diligence throughout the period

he seeks to toll. See e.g., Bryant v. Arizona Att’y Gen., 499

F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007); Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.

1999). It is Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable

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tolling is warranted in his case. See Bryant v. Arizona Atty

Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding the

petitioner must establish a causal connection between the cause

of his delay and the delay itself). 

Petitioner has not responded to the answer to his

petition within the thirty days specified by the Local Rule for

filing such a response. Petitioner has not met his burden of

establishing that there were extraordinary circumstances beyond

his control which made it impossible for him to file a timely

federal habeas petition, or that any state action was the cause

for his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See

Pace, 544 U.S. at 419; 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding that the

petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he was

misled or confused about timing of exhausting his state remedies

and filing his federal habeas petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases in which

equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful

conduct, either by state officials or, occasionally, by the

petitioner’s counsel.”). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed.

App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333

(2006); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002).

 Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

filing of his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

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tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations applicable to it pursuant

to the AEDPA. Petitioner has not shown that the circumstances

of his case warrant application of equitable tolling so that

this Court may address the merits of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Burns’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

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the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 11th day of September, 2008.

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