Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05215/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05215-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

APRIL PERKINS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 06-5215

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

AMENDED O R D E R 

Plaintiff, April Perkins, appealed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to this court. On

October 4, 2007, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 12). Plaintiff now moves for an award of

$4,168.80 in attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 28.95 attorney hours for work before the

court at an hourly rate of $144.00 and $24.88 in costs. (Doc. # 13-4). The defendant has filed

a response, expressing no objection to this award. (Doc. # 16). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney’s fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the record, we find plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this matter. 

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An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

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counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.

1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the

absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th

Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $144.00 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour - the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

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(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index

as an exhibit and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore, the

undersigned believes his argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has

merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel has shown that she is entitled to an hourly

rate of $144.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel claimsshe spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 3.75 hours of attorney work

performed between September 12, 2006, and November 9, 2006. The Complaint was not filed

in this court until November 9, 2006. (Doc. # 1). We note that time spent at the administrative

level is not compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th

Cir. 1984). However, we do note that some of the time submitted was clearly in preparation for

the filing of the Complaint with this court and should be allowed. Therefore, we will deduct 1.75

hour. 

Likewise, counsel has requested .50 hour for preparing and reviewing summonses and

letters of service, .50 hour for preparing a letter to plaintiff enclosing the appeal brief, and ..75

hour for preparing a letter to the plaintiff at the conclusion of the case. The court finds that these

tasks could have been performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW,

813 F.2d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is

not compensable under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are not compensable under the EAJA.

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Accordingly, 1.75 attorney hour must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by

counsel.

Counsel has also requested 18.75 hours of compensation for the preparation of her appeal

brief. There were no unique or complex issues to be developed in this particular case. Plaintiff’s

counsel frequently represents social security plaintiff’s before this court and should be well

versed in social security law. Accordingly, we find that the time submitted for preparing this

brief to be excessive. Therefore we are reducing the number of hours submitted for the

preparation of plaintiff’s brief by 6.75 hours.

In addition, counsel for the plaintiff seeks reimbursement for .10 hour for receiving and

reviewing the notice of reassignment (a one line text only document), .25 hour for receiving and

reviewing the defendant’s answer (3 pages), .10 for receiving and reviewing the court’s briefing

schedule (1 page text only document), 1.00 hour for reviewing the defendant’s brief with

notation of cases (15 pages), and 1.25 hours for receiving and reviewing the memorandum

opinion (12 pages). This court concludes that it should not have taken an attorney experienced

in handling social security cases this amount of time to perform this task. Bowman v. Secretary

of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898 (E.D. Ark. 1989). Accordingly, we will reduce the total amount of

time sought by 1.44 hours. 

In addition to fees, counsel also seeks reimbursement for $24.88 in expenses incurred

with regard to the copying fees and postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and

we find $24.88 to be a reasonable award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

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Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 17.26

(28.95-11.69) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $144.00 per hour and $24.88 in costs for

a total attorney's fee award of $2510.32. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out

of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of January 2008.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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