Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08180/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08180-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

FR 160 LLC, 

Appellant, 

v. 

Flagstaff Ranch Golf Club, et al. 

Appellees.

No. CV-13-08180-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before this Court are the briefs in FR 160’s appeal from the bankruptcy 

court (Docs. 37, 43) and Flagstaff Ranch Golf Club’s cross appeal (Docs. 42, 44).1

 For 

the reasons set forth below, the appeal is denied, and the cross appeal is dismissed as 

moot. 

BACKGROUND 

 FR 160, LLC, owns 50 residential lots and a tract of land in Flagstaff, Arizona. Its 

largest creditor is the Flagstaff Ranch Golf Club (“Golf Club”). (Docs. 38–41, 44 

(collectively “AR”) 21–22.) Previous litigation between FR 160 and Golf Club produced 

a Settlement Agreement under which FR 160 delivered to Golf Club promissory notes 

totaling $5,310,000, secured by the real property. (Id.) In return, Golf Club placed certain 

golf club memberships in escrow. (AR 23.) FR 160 eventually ceased paying the money 

it owed to various entities including membership dues to Golf Club, dues to the Flagstaff 

 

1

 FR 160 requested oral argument on this motion. (Doc. 9.) The request is denied 

because the parties have had an adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence and 

oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp., 

Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Ranch Property Owners Association (“Owners Association”), and wastewater 

assessments to the Flagstaff Ranch Mutual Waste Water Company (“Waste Water 

Company”). (AR 79.) Golf Club sought to foreclose on the deeds of trust, but FR 160 

filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition on June 12, 2012. (AR 23, 79.) 

 The bankruptcy court rejected FR 160’s first plan of reorganization in January 

2013. FR 160 sought to amend its plan of reorganization and maintain the automatic stay 

under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) that prevented Golf Club from foreclosing on the real property. 

The bankruptcy court agreed to extend the stay but also entered an Adequate Protection 

Order. (AR 286–87.) 

 FR 160 filed an amended plan of reorganization on April 1, 2013. (AR 337–77.) 

On June 18, 2013, the bankruptcy court held a one-day trial, and on June 25 the court 

rejected the amended plan. (AR 8–19, 434–35.) In doing so, the court made four 

determinations, all of which are challenged by the parties on appeal and cross appeal. 

(AR 8–19.) First, the court determined “that a plan can be confirmed under 

1129(b)(2)(A)(i) that reinstates a lien release provision even if it terminated prepetition 

due to default or for that matter maturity of the debt without violating RadLAX.” (AR 10.) 

The remaining determinations were all reasons why the plan could not be confirmed. 

Two of the three involved the requirement for FR 160 to have an impaired accepted class 

under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). 

 In its second determination, the bankruptcy court found that Owners Association 

and Waste Water Company, Class 8, should have been included in the general unsecured 

creditor class, Class 12. (AR 11.) The court found that FR 160 had not met its burden to 

show how the claims of Owners Association and Waste Water Company are dissimilar 

from those other creditors. (AR 11–12.) It further concluded that the resulting combined 

class would not have accepted the plan. (AR 12.) 

 The bankruptcy court’s third determination was that NWRA Ventures I, LLC 

constituted “an insider, at least for purposes of 1129(a)(10).” (AR 12.) NWRA is the 

senior secured lender of Investors Mortgage Holdings Financial Corporation (“IMH”), 

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which is the parent company of FR 160. (AR 1003–07.) NWRA approved IMH’s annual 

budget and the annual budget of its subsidiaries including FR 160. (Id.) It also approved 

any variances to those budgets and was therefore involved in the approval of the amended 

plan at issue here. (Id.) The court found it was an insider “based upon the relative control 

that NWRA has over this plan of reorganization, which I think is the relevant issue, the 

Debtor argued, hey, NWRA doesn’t have any control over the day-to-day operation of 

the Debtor, and that’s undoubtedly true.” (AR 12.) It found that NWRA is a non-statutory 

insider because its dealings with FR 160 were not really arms-length. (AR 12–13.) 

 The bankruptcy court’s fourth and final determination was that the plan did not 

satisfy the absolute priority rule because the new value contribution was de minimis. (AR 

13–14.) IMH planned to provide $500,000 in cash to FR 160 as part of the plan, but the 

court found that “[m]ost of the money will go to payment of debts owed to NWRA and 

IMH, and that’s really not new capital in the sense of a recapitalization of the Debtor.” 

(Id.) The court treated that money as a forgiveness of a debt and did not consider it as 

new capital. (Id.) The bankruptcy court held that “the balance of the funds . . . are de 

minimis and, therefore, that this plan does not satisfy the new value corollary to the 

absolute priority rule.” (Id.) 

 FR 160 filed a motion seeking permission from this Court to appeal from that 

ruling, and Golf Club requested that it be allowed to cross appeal if the appeal was 

granted. (Doc. 2, 8.) This Court granted both the request for appeal and cross appeal. 

(Doc. 35.) The matter is now fully briefed. (Docs. 37–45.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Jurisdiction 

 District courts must accept appeals from final decisions of bankruptcy courts, and 

they have discretionary authority to accept interlocutory appeals. In re City of Desert Hot 

Springs, 339 F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2003). This Court explained in its order granting 

leave to appeal that in this matter it has either mandatory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

158(a)(1), or it accepts discretionary jurisdiction under § 158(a)(3). (Doc. 35.)

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II. Standard of Review 

 On appeal, courts review a “bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under the clearly 

erroneous standard and review its conclusions of law de novo.” See In re Johnston, 21 

F.3d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1994). “The bankruptcy court’s factual determination is clearly 

erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” See United 

States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 In general, a bankruptcy court makes a finding of fact when it determines whether 

claims are substantially similar, In re Barakat, 99 F.3d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1996), or the 

insider status of a third party, In re Friedman, 126 B.R. 63, 67 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991). 

Bankruptcy courts must have discretionary power and broad latitude to weigh the facts 

before them and the Ninth Circuit has reiterated that whether “a claim is or is not 

substantially similar to other claims, constitutes a finding of fact reviewable under the 

clearly erroneous standard.” In re Johnston, 21 F.3d at 327. 

 However, when an appeal focuses on a legal issue underlying the bankruptcy 

court’s otherwise factual determination, the legal issue is reviewed de novo. Id.

(addressing whether the law places “any limitation on the separate classification of 

similar unsecured claims”); cf. In re Loop 76, LLC, 465 B.R. 525, 536–41 (B.A.P. 9th 

Cir. 2012) (addressing whether the law allows the bankruptcy court to consider a thirdparty source for payment in determining the similarity of claims). Similarly, “whether the 

bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard” is a question of law that the courts 

review de novo. In re Welsh, 465 B.R. 843, 847 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) aff’d, 711 F.3d 

1120 (9th Cir. 2013). Finally, mixed questions, involving both law and fact, are reviewed 

de novo. In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). 

III. Issues on Appeal 

 A bankruptcy court can only approve a plan if it meets all of the requirements of 

the Bankruptcy Code. FR 160 appeals three determinations that the bankruptcy court 

made about why the plan did not meet those requirement and Golf Club cross appeals 

that the plan should have also been rejected for failing to meet another requirement. 

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 The first two issues on appeal concern the requirement from 11 U.S.C. § 

1129(a)(10) that when there are any impaired classes of claims in a plan, at least one 

impaired class must accept the plan and that class cannot be an insider. The Parties agree 

that the plan has impaired classes, and therefore, FR 160 needs to show that at least one 

impaired class accepted its plan and that the accepting class was not an insider. 

 The first issue is whether FR 160’s plan permissibly segregated the impaired 

claims of Owners Association and Waste Water Company, who rejected the plan, into a 

separate class from the class of similar unsecured creditors that accepted the plan. The 

second issue is whether the bankruptcy court properly determined that NWRA was an 

insider whose acceptance does not satisfy the requirement. 

 In order to merit a reversal and remand, FR 160 must prevail on one of these first 

two claims because it needs at least one qualified accepting vote. If it does, then it also 

must prevail on its third issue, that its plan does not violate the absolute priority rule. Golf 

Club’s cross appeal argues an independent basis upon which the plan could be rejected 

under RadLAX but that only become relevant if FR 160 prevails on its appeal. 

IV. Classification of Parties 

 The Bankruptcy Code provides that claims may only be placed together in the 

same class if they are “substantially similar.” 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). Based on other 

provisions and purposes of the Code, Courts have implied a corollary edict that “thou 

shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on 

a reorganization plan.” In re Barakat, 99 F.3d at 1526. 

 The Ninth Circuit has a two-pronged analysis for determining whether claims have 

been permissibly separated into different classes. In re Loop 76, 465 B.R. at 536–37. The 

trial court should determine (1) whether the claims are substantially similar, and (2) if so, 

whether there is a business justification for separately classifying them. Id. If the claims 

are not substantially similar, their separate classification is not only permissible, but 

required under § 1122(a). If the claims are substantially similar, that implicates the 

gerrymandering concern, but the debtor may still separately classify them “if the debtor 

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can show a business or economic justification for doing so.” Id. (citing In re Bakarat, 99 

F.3d. at 1526). 

 Here, the bankruptcy court found that the claims of Owners Association and 

Waste Water Company in Class 8 were substantially similar to the other unsecured 

claims in Class 12, and therefore, they could not be separately classified. FR 160 first 

appeals that determination under the first prong that the claims are substantially similar. 

That determination is a finding of fact that this Court reviews for clear error. During the 

hearing, the bankruptcy court said that “there is no evidence or at least the plan proponent 

did not carry a burden of proving that the claims are dissimilar.” (AR 11.) FR 160 argues 

that it presented evidence showing that Owners Association and Waste Water Company 

had another source of recovery because they could get money from Golf Club. If the 

bankruptcy court had unequivocally held that there was “no evidence” of dissimilarity, 

that might have been in error, but here the court restated and clarified that FR 160 “did 

not carry a burden of proving” any dissimilarity. FR 160 presented its evidence and 

argument about the alternative source for recovery to the bankruptcy court and Golf Club 

presented its rebuttal. This Court finds, based on the record and the summary of those 

arguments presented here, that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in its factual 

determination that FR 160 did not carry its burden. 

 FR 160 next argues that the bankruptcy court made an error by stopping at the first 

prong of similarity. In its oral explanation of its ruling from the bench, the bankruptcy 

court did not separately address the second prong by making findings about whether there 

are business or economic justifications for the separate classification here. However, it 

repeatedly referenced Bakarat, and this Court will not assume that the bankruptcy court 

misapplied the legal test from that case. The proper question before this Court is whether 

it should reverse the bankruptcy court for failing to make factual findings for each of the 

prongs from Bakarat. 

 In bench trials, a court should “find the facts specially and state separately its 

conclusions of law thereon.” Vance v. Am. Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 789 F.2d 790, 792 (9th 

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Cir. 1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)); see also In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 919 (B.A.P. 

9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance and noting that Rule 52 applies in adversary bankruptcy 

proceedings by incorporation through the bankruptcy rules). The purpose is to “aid the 

appellate court’s understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision,” and that 

“purpose is achieved if the district court’s findings are sufficient to indicate the factual 

basis for its ultimate conclusions.” Vance, 789 F.2d at 792. The court in Vance held that 

failing to make such findings 

does not require reversal unless a full understanding of the 

question is not possible without the aid of separate findings. 

Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 454 F.2d 

442, 453 (9th Cir. 1972). We will affirm the district court if 

the findings are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to 

the issues to provide a basis for the decision, or if there can be 

no genuine dispute about omitted findings. Magna Weld Sales 

Co. v. Magna Alloys & Research Party, 545 F.2d 668, 671 

(9th Cir. 1976). 

Id. As the Ninth Circuit reiterated more recently, even “[c]onclusory and unhelpful 

findings of fact do not necessarily require reversal if the record supports the district 

court’s ultimate conclusion.” Simeonoff v. Hiner, 249 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2001); see 

also In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 919 (holding that appellate review may proceed based on the 

record as a whole even without formal findings). 

 There is no reason to assume error and reverse if the record as a whole and the 

findings the bankruptcy court did make support the ultimate conclusion. That ultimate 

legal conclusion here is that FR 160’s separate classification fails the Bakarat test 

because the claims are similar and there is not an adequate business or economic 

justification to separately classify them. FR 160 argues that the Owners Association can 

be separately classified because it has a third-party source of recovery. It also argues that 

the other claims can be separated because they are nonrecurring. Golf Club argues that 

there can be no business or economic justification for separate classification where the 

plan treats both classes the same. Golf Club also argues that FR 160 is wrong to 

characterize them as nonrecurring because FR 160’s parent and sister companies continue 

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to use those same trade debtors. 

 The bankruptcy court’s ultimate conclusion is supported by the record as a whole. 

That record shows that the judge ruled that “this plan . . . cannot be confirmed for lack of 

a proper accepting impaired class.” The judge went on to “elaborate a little bit” and 

briefly explained from the bench the issues that were key to his decision. FR 160’s 

proposed economic and business justifications parallel its arguments that the claims are 

not similar, and they were implicitly rejected by the court’s finding under the first prong. 

 The BAP has held that there is no business or economic justification for separate 

classification when the separately classified claims are otherwise treated the same under 

the plan. In re Montclair Retail Ctr., L.P., 177 B.R. 663, 665 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995). That 

is the case here and FR 160 fails to distinguish this case from Montclair or provide 

contrary authority. Its reference to a bankruptcy court in another circuit is not controlling. 

In re Loop 76, is not comparable to this case because the bank was allowed to choose its 

treatment under the plan. 

 Here, the bankruptcy court’s findings provide a basis for its decision. Further, 

there can be no dispute that the record establishes that the separate categories were not 

treated differently. Accordingly, no business or economic justification would have been 

served by their separate classification. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion 

in its explicit determination under the first prong or its implicit resolution at prong two. 

This Court finds no reversible error in the bankruptcy court’s legal determination that the 

plan failed to satisfy the test from Bakarat. 

V. Insider Status 

 An insider’s vote to confirm the plan does not fulfill the requirement of § 

1129(a)(10). The Bankruptcy Code provides a definition of insider that varies based on 

the type of debtor and includes different individuals who are insiders depending on 

whether the debtor is a person, corporation, partnership, or municipality. § 101(31). 

However, “the respective insider definitions do not attempt or purport to be all inclusive.” 

In re Friedman, 126 B.R. 63, 69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991). An insider can either fall into 

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one of these per se classifications listed in the statute, or be a non-statutory insider who 

has a “professional or business relationship with the debtor . . . where such relationship 

compels the conclusion that the individual or entity has a relationship with the debtor, 

close enough to gain an advantage attributable simply to affinity rather than to the course 

of business dealings between the parties.” Id. at 70. A creditor-debtor relationship that 

includes a degree of personal interaction does not automatically become an insider 

relationship “so long as the parties transact their business at arm’s length.” Id.

 Other courts have described various standards for identifying such non-statutory 

insiders. One of the cases cited by FR 160 notes that “courts generally focus on two 

factors: (1) the closeness of the relationship between the parties; and (2) whether the 

parties’ transactions were conducted at arm’s length.” In re Fourthstage Technologies, 

Inc., 355 B.R. 155, 159 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2006). Another case cited by FR 160 similarly 

notes that “[t]he relevant inquiry is into the closeness of the relationship between the 

parties, and whether the transactions at issue were conducted at arm’s length.” In re 

Greenwood Point, LP, 445 B.R. 885, 897 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2011). 

 Here, FR 160 argues that the bankruptcy court created a unique definition for an 

insider within the context of § 1129(a)(10) that differs from the one used by courts when 

identifying insiders in other portions of the Bankruptcy Code. FR 160 argues that this is 

contrary to the general canon of construction that words should have the same meaning 

whenever they are used by Congress, and particularly so when they are used repeatedly 

within the same set of statutes. See Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1142 

(9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, FR 160 argues that the bankruptcy court should have 

considered only the level of day-to-day control that NWRA had over FR 160, which FR 

160 describes as the standard test of insider status in other parts of the Bankruptcy Code. 

Instead the bankruptcy court considered the control that NWRA had over FR 160 in 

relation to the proposal and approval of the plan, which FR 160 describes as a new test 

that is specific to § 1129(a)(10). 

 Although a repeated word in a statute is generally presumed to have the same 

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meaning, the word “insider” has been defined and interpreted in a way that takes into 

account both the parties involved and the transactions at issue. The statutory definition 

itself is not a one-size-fits-all definition, and it lists different insiders based on the 

identity of the debtor as an individual, corporation, partnership, or municipality. 

Therefore the first factor of the “relationship of the parties” is always a context-specific 

one which considers both the identity of the debtor and the identity of the potential 

insider. FR 160 does not contest the principle that the definition or standard for an insider 

varies based on the identity of the parties. 

 Instead, FR 160 argues that the bankruptcy court cannot change the definition or 

standard for an insider with respect to the second factor, the arm’s length nature of the 

transaction. FR 160 argues that the question should always be whether the parties’ 

general day-to-day dealings with each other are at arm’s length. Although FR 160 cites 

the decision of an Arkansas bankruptcy court in support of this position, In re Armstrong, 

231 B.R. 746, 749–50 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1999), FR 160 also cites other court decisions, 

including one by the BAP, which are not as limited. In In re Friedman, the BAP 

considered “[t]he transaction that formed the basis for Friedman’s preference claim” and 

found “[t]here is no indication that the parties negotiated and executed [that transaction] 

at anything other than arm’s length.” 126 B.R. at 70. The other opinions cited by FR 160 

and quoted above also involved a consideration of control over the specific transaction at 

issue and not only the general day-to-day control. See In re Fourthstage Techs., 355 B.R. 

at 160 (“With respect to . . . the challenged transfer” the alleged insider did not receive it 

“because of its affinity with the Debtor.”); In re Greenwood Point, 445 B.R. 885, 897 

(“whether the transactions at issue were conducted at arm’s length”). FR 160’s similar 

argument about the level of control that NWRA needs to have over FR 160 to constitute 

an insider is unavailing for the same reason. The court permissibly considered the level of 

control as to the transaction at issue rather than in general or on a day-to-day operational 

basis. 

 Further, it is not clear that the bankruptcy court created a new standard in this 

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context when it stated that NWRA was “an insider, at least for purposes of 1129(a)(10).” 

Courts often and prudentially limit their findings and holdings to avoid deciding matters 

that are not before them because of “the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single 

opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations.” Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 

416 (1992). In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court was asked to decide what “allowed secured 

claim” meant throughout the Bankruptcy Code, but it only determined what the phrase 

meant in the case before it, leaving further development and application to other parts of 

the Bankruptcy Code for another day. Id. The bankruptcy court’s limiting language here 

is not an affirmative statement that NWRA is only an insider for purposes of § 

1129(a)(10), but rather a note that the court was only deciding the issue before it. 

 Here, the bankruptcy court correctly considered the two primary factors for 

identifying insiders that have been discussed in case law: the relationship between the 

parties and the arm’s length nature of the transaction. The court’s consideration of the 

arm’s length nature of the specific transaction at issue, the creation and approval of the 

plan, is consistent with In re Friedman and the other cases noted. Therefore, the 

bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard in making its determination. 

 FR 160 states in its brief, that “FR 160’s issue on appeal is whether the 

Bankruptcy Court used the correct legal standard to evaluate the facts.” (Doc. 43 at 9–

10.) Nevertheless, the parties both present arguments about the facts and which facts the 

bankruptcy court relied upon in reaching its conclusion. The only issue that FR 160 raises 

is whether the correct legal standard was applied and therefore the Court need not 

consider whether the bankruptcy court made a clear error in its factual determination. 

CONCLUSION 

 The parties raised four issues on appeal and cross appeal but FR 160 needed to 

prevail on either issue one or two to show that it had an accepting class. This court found 

no reversible error as to the determination that the claims were improperly separated and 

that NWRA was an insider. Therefore, FR 160 does not prevail on either claim one or 

two and the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling is affirmed. 

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 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that FR 160’s appeal from the bankruptcy court is 

(Doc. 37) is DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Flagstaff Ranch Golf Club’s cross appeal 

(Doc. 42) is DISMISSED AS MOOT. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to terminate this 

action. 

 Dated this 18th day of July, 2014. 

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