Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-06313/USCOURTS-cand-3_11-cv-06313-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MALIK JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. TYLER,

Defendant.

Case No. 11-cv-06313-WHO (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Dkt. No. 32

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Malik Jones seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on his claims that 

defendant Debora Tyler, a nurse at Salinas Valley State Prison, was deliberately indifferent 

to his serious medical needs by denying him the medication gabapentin to treat his 

neuropathic pain. Tyler moves for summary judgment, has presented supporting evidence, 

and has provided Jones with the required warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 

962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). A response to this motion was due more than a month 

ago, on September 21, 2015, and Jones has neither filed an opposition nor requested any 

extension of time to file one. It is undisputed that Tyler prescribed amitriptyline, the first 

line treatment suggested by prison healthcare guidelines for chronic pain, for Jones in 

place of gabapentin, whose use was curtailed by prison officials in 2011 after they had 

determined that it was both ineffective and abused by inmates. On this record, there are no 

Case 3:11-cv-06313-WHO Document 34 Filed 10/23/15 Page 1 of 5
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

material facts in dispute that could show deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits 

demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those 

which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 

moving party. On an issue for which the opposing party by contrast will have the burden 

of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out “that there is an 

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go 

beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court is 

concerned only with disputes over material facts and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant 

or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the 

court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with 

reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the 

nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 

a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted).

Case 3:11-cv-06313-WHO Document 34 Filed 10/23/15 Page 2 of 5
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jones alleges that Tyler violated his Eighth Amendment rights by withholding the 

medication gabapentin1that had formerly been prescribed for his neuropathic pain. (Am. 

Compl. at 9.) He also alleges that the replacement medications she prescribed (ibuprofen 

and Elavil2) caused unpleasant side effects. (Id.) 

The following factual assertions are undisputed on this record. Before his transfer 

to Salinas Valley State Prison in January 2011 from New Folsom State Prison, Jones had 

been prescribed gabapentin and ibuprofen for his back pain. (MSJ, Barnett Decl. at 4.) 

Upon arrival at Salinas Valley, he asked that his prescription be renewed. In February, Dr. 

Mack wrote an interim prescription for gabapentin until Jones’s primary physician could 

determine whether the drug was appropriate for his condition. (Id.) The prescription of 

gabapentin had been greatly restricted in 2011, owing to the drug’s ineffectiveness and its 

abuse by inmates. (Id. at 4-5.) 

In March, Tyler noted that Jones had to be further examined before gabapentin 

could be prescribed. (Id. at 5.) In April, Tyler determined that “no exam findings or 

diagnostics to explain” Jones’s chronic back pain. Because there was no medical need for 

gabapentin, Tyler decided against recommending it. It was decided to prescribe 

amitriptyline and to evaluate its effectiveness. This medication was suggested by prison 

healthcare guidelines as a first-line treatment for chronic pain. Not only is it more readily 

available than gabapentin, it provides excellent benefits: a single dosage a day, its sedative 

effects aid sleep, and it’s not as widely abused as gabapentin. (Id.) 

Efforts to monitor Jones’s progress on the new medication were thwarted by his 

refusal to attend clinic appointments in October and August and to be examined: “[Jones] 

 

1 Neurontin is the brand name. (MSJ, Barnett Decl. at 3 n.3.) 

2

Jones calls this drug “Nepotriptilin.” (Am. Compl., Docket No. 21, at 9.) Defendant 

asserts that Jones “undoubtedly” means amitriptyline (Elavil) as there is no drug called 

Nepotriptilin. (MSJ, Barnett Decl. at 4 n.4.) 

Case 3:11-cv-06313-WHO Document 34 Filed 10/23/15 Page 3 of 5
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

pleasant, but clearly uncooperative with exam --- declines all work-up.” (MSJ, Barnett 

Decl. at 6.) 

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds that she provided 

constitutionally ample and appropriate treatment for Jones’s medical needs. The motion is 

unopposed. A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because 

the opposing party has failed to file an opposition. See Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 

1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (unopposed motion may be granted only after court 

determines that there are no material issues of fact). This is so even if the failure to oppose 

violates a local rule. See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court may, however, grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the 

movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face 

reveal a genuine issue of material fact. See United States v. Real Property at Incline 

Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (local rule cannot mandate automatic entry of 

judgment for moving party without consideration of whether motion and supporting papers 

satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 56), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Degen v. United States, 517 

U.S. 820 (1996); Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).

A prison official is deliberately indifferent, and thereby violates the Eighth 

Amendment, if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and 

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but “must also 

draw the inference.” Id. Consequently, in order for deliberate indifference to be 

established, there must exist both a purposeful act, or a failure to act, on the part of the 

defendant and harm resulting therefrom. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060

(9th Cir. 1992). 

A difference of opinion between a prisoner patient and a medical doctor is not 

enough to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

Case 3:11-cv-06313-WHO Document 34 Filed 10/23/15 Page 4 of 5
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, a plaintiff must establish that the course of 

treatment the doctors chose was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and 

that they embarked on this course in “conscious disregard of an excessive risk to 

[plaintiff’s] health.” Id. at 1058 (citation omitted). Neither negligence, gross negligence, 

nor the inadvertent failure to provide medical care is sufficient to make out a violation of 

the Eighth Amendment. Id.; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 & n.4 (1994); 

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The evidence presented by defendant supports the motion for summary judgment. 

Tyler examined Jones and recommended a reasonable treatment for his pain. Her decision 

to recommend one pain medication rather than Jones’s preferred one is not sufficient to 

show a genuine dispute that defendant’s decision was “medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances” and that she embarked on this course in “conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk” to Jones’s health. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. “[A] showing of nothing 

more than a difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment 

over another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.” 

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, in light of the 

prison’s restrictions on the prescription of gabapentin, Tyler’s decision is entirely 

reasonable. Accordingly, defendant Tyler’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED 

in favor of defendant Tyler as to all claims. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 32) is GRANTED. The 

Clerk shall terminate Docket No. 32, enter judgment in favor of D. Tyler as to all claims, 

and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2015

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-06313-WHO Document 34 Filed 10/23/15 Page 5 of 5