Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01491/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01491-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN WISHUM, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01491-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 59

Markise Wishum died of cancer. His parents, plaintiffs Melvin Wishum and Chrystal 

Tyler, assert that defendant Matthew Cate, the former Secretary of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), was deliberately indifferent to their son’s serious 

medical needs while he was incarcerated. Their complaint has been dismissed three times. See 

Dkt. Nos. 23, 37, 54. For reasons unexplained, Cate is the only defendant plaintiffs served with 

the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Despite the directions in my earlier Order that

dismissed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Cate and detailed the information 

needed to state a plausible claim, the SAC once again fails to adequately plead a causal connection 

between Cate’s actions and a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because plaintiffs’ counsel admitted 

at oral argument that he had no other allegations to add to the claim against Cate, I GRANT the 

motion to dismiss with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

I accept all statements of material fact presented in the SAC as true. See Davis v. HSBC 

Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F. 3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012). In my most recent Order, I discussed 

the factual background of this case, which is substantially the same as in the FAC. See Order at 1-

2 (Dkt. No. 54). The decedent was diagnosed with Metastatic Squamous Cell Carcinoma while he 

was incarcerated. SAC ¶ 3. He was treated for the cancer at the Natividad Medical Center and 

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went into remission between September 2009 and May 2010, at which point he was released into

the Salinas Valley State Prison. Id. ¶¶ 3, 13. 

The hospital administered a CT scan in May of 2010, which did not detect a new tumor 

that the decedent had developed near his eye. Id. ¶ 13. In the months following the CT scan, the 

decedent noticed swelling over his left eye, began complaining of headaches, and requested a 

change in medication. Id. He had been instructed to have another CT scan two to three months 

after the first CT scan, but did not see a physician until February 2, 2011, nearly eight months 

later. Id. Plaintiffs allege that defendants denied the decedent medical care during this eightmonth period, directly resulting in his death in August 2011. Id. ¶ 14. 

Plaintiffs filed the SAC after I dismissed the FAC against defendant Cate for failure to 

state a claim against him with leave to amend. Order at 5-6. I heard oral argument on June 17, 

2015.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 

when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(internal quotations omitted). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a 

plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court 

is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

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2008) (internal quotations omitted).

If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 

by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). In making 

this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue 

delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, 

undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” Moore v. Kayport 

Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

A prisoner alleging Eighth Amendment violations under section 1983 must show that (i) 

the alleged constitutional deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that it resulted in the denial of 

“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and that (ii) the prison official acted with

“deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference may be shown where 

“prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown 

by the way in which prison officials provide medical care.” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 

978 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

A supervisor may be found liable if the supervisor “acted, or failed to act, in a manner that 

was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2011). This requires that either (i) the supervisor was personally involved 

in the deprivation of rights, or (ii) there is a sufficient causal connection between the constitutional 

violation and the supervisor’s wrongful conduct. Id. at 1207. A causal connection may be 

established if the supervisor “set[] in motion a series of acts by others,” or “knowingly refus[ed] to 

terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known 

would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-08 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

As in the prior versions of the complaint, plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded specific 

facts establishing defendant Cate’s liability. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 

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2012) (holding that complaint alleging violation of section 1983 did not include sufficient facts to 

establish defendant’s liability because it was “based on conclusory allegations and generalities, 

without any allegation of the specific wrong-doing by each Defendant”). Although I described the 

type of allegations needed to support a plausible claim, plaintiffs did not allege them. See Order at 

4. 

The only updated allegations involving defendant Cate in the SAC state that (i) the 

decedent told Cate of the risk of serious harm to him, thus giving Cate “actual knowledge”; (ii)

“CATE and/or his office was contacted repeatedly by Plaintiffs having been advised by various 

prison staff that CATE had the authority and power to intervene and order to [sic] immediate 

health care for [decedent];” and (iii) “Plaintiffs’ [sic] were so desperate to obtain medical care that 

their persistence resulted in the actual contact and communication with [the current secretary of 

the CDCR] Beard at a time prior to the critical time of medical care.” See SAC ¶ 6. In addition, 

the SAC states that Markise Wishum spoke to the prison warden about his health issues and was 

“assured Defendant would look into the matter.” Id. ¶ 7. 

When I assume the truth of these allegations, I understand that Cate knew that Markise 

Wishum was ill. (It is worth noting that plaintiff’s counsel undercut those allegations at oral 

argument by admitting that plaintiffs did not know whether or not they actually spoke to Cate. See 

Oral Argument at 2:03:44-2:03:52 (June 17, 2015)). Even so, plaintiffs do not identify a specific 

wrongful act by Cate. An allegation that Cate knew of the decedent’s condition is not the same as 

an allegation that Cate set in motion a series of acts by others or refused to terminate the actions of 

others. See Order at 4-5. No new facts have been added regarding Cate’s alleged involvement in 

the alleged denial of medical care to the decedent or the specific denial of medical care that 

occurred. The SAC fails for the same reasons as the FAC, as set forth in my prior order. 

I inquired at the hearing if plaintiffs could allege any additional facts regarding Cate. Their 

counsel said that they could not. He argued that the defendants possessed all of the pertinent 

information about plaintiffs’ claims, see Oral Argument at 2:02:43-2:03:00 (June 17, 2015), but

that is not true. The plaintiffs, and not defendant Cate, are in the best position to know whether 

they contacted Cate and what actions the plaintiffs and the decedent took in attempting to obtain 

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medical care. In addition, plaintiffs have their son’s medical records. Counsel added that he did 

not have the needed information because his clients are “unsophisticated.” That is no excuse –

obtaining the necessary information to assert a plausible claim is the prosecuting attorney’s 

responsibility in drafting a complaint. Without it, the complaint cannot survive a motion to 

dismiss. 

Cate was the Secretary of CDCR, charged with overseeing more than 100,000 inmates in 

more than thirty adult facilities. See California Prisoners and Parolees, 2010, California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2011)

http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Annual/CalPri

s/CALPRISd2010.pdf. It is baffling to me why plaintiffs pursued him as a defendant rather than 

others more directly involved in Markise Wishum’s care. But that was the choice they made. 

Because plaintiffs are unable to allege particularized facts to establish that Cate was personally 

involved in the alleged Eighth Amendment violations, or that there was a causal connection 

between Cate’s conduct and the constitutional violation to support their claims, dismissing the 

complaint with leave to amend yet another time would be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129 

(“district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved”). 

Accordingly, the SAC fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, cannot be saved, and 

must be DISMISSED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Cate’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs 

previously abandoned their claims against Governor Brown and never served Warden Hedgepath. 

See Dkt. No. 37. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and judgment shall be entered 

accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2015

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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