Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00334/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Steven Spiker and Denise Spiker, husband 

and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Sanjivan PLLC, an Arizona professional 

limited liability company dba Buckeye 

Medical Clinic; Karen Padilla; John Doe 

Padilla; Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated, a 

Delaware corporation; Wal-Mart 

Transportation LLC, a foreign LLC; WalMart Associates Incorporated, a Delaware 

corporation; Stephen Kracht, D.O.; and 

EScreen Incorporated, a Delaware 

corporation, 

Defendants. 

No. CV-13-00334-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 All Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for failure 

to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docs. 19, 20, 21.) For the reasons specified 

below, the Motion of Defendant Wal-Mart is granted in part and denied in part, the 

Motion of Defendants BMC and Padilla is denied, and the Motion of Defendants eScreen 

and Dr. Kracht is granted in part and denied in part.1

 

1

 The request for oral argument by Defendants BMC and Padilla is denied because 

the Parties have had an adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence, and oral 

argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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BACKGROUND 

This case arises out of an employee drug test that revealed the existence of banned 

substances and led to the termination of the employee. Plaintiff Steven Spiker was 

employed as a truck driver for Defendant Wal-Mart for approximately seven years.2

 

(Doc. 14, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) Truck drivers are subject to the Federal Omnibus 

Transportation Employee Testing Act (the “FOTETA”) and the implementing 

Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations. 49 U.S.C. §§ 45101, et seq. 

Defendant eScreen, a Third-Party Administrator (“TPA”), provided bundled drug testing 

services to Wal-Mart. (Doc. 14 ¶ 8.) eScreen handled the selection, hiring, training, 

and/or supervision of collection sites and medical review officers (“MROs”). (Id. ¶¶ 10–

11.) 

 On September 2, 2011, Mr. Spiker was directed by Wal-Mart to submit to a 

random DOT drug test at a collection site, Defendant Buckeye Medical Clinic (“BMC”). 

(Id. ¶ 34.) Mr. Spiker reported to BMC and provided a urine specimen to BMC’s 

employee, Defendant Karen Padilla. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37–38.) At the time, the Complaint 

alleges that Padilla was not credentialed or trained pursuant to the DOT regulations. (Id. ¶ 

38.) Padilla affixed a tamper-evident seal on Mr. Spiker’s specimen bottle after Mr. 

Spiker initialed it. (Id. ¶ 37.) Padilla prepared the specimen, completed a Custody and 

Control Form (“CCF”) that Mr. Spiker certified, and sent the specimen and the CCF to a 

laboratory. Padilla’s handling of Mr. Spiker’s specimens led to them being contaminated 

or mistakenly identified. (Id. ¶ 69.) At the laboratory, the specimen tested positive for 

banned substances. (Id. ¶ 43; Doc. 20-1, Ex. 1.) Defendant Stephen Kracht, D.O., the 

MRO, reviewed the CCF and the laboratory’s findings but did not discover any flaws 

therein. (Doc. 14 ¶ 39.) 

 Upon receiving notice of the positive drug test report, Mr. Spiker complained 

 

2

 The Court takes as true the allegations contained in the Spikers’ Second Amended Complaint at this stage of the litigation. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

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about the report and the drug testing process to Defendants but they did not invalidate the 

report. (Id. ¶ 45.) As a result of the report, Wal-Mart terminated Mr. Spiker’s 

employment. (Id. ¶ 46.) Further, Mr. Spiker’s commercial driving record on file with the 

DOT was impacted negatively by the drug test. (Id. ¶ 48.) He is now subject to additional 

restrictions and requirements from the DOT. (Id. ¶ 50.) Prior to his termination, Spiker 

earned an annual salary of $92,500 with additional health and retirement benefits. (Id. ¶ 

31.) Following his termination, Mr. Spiker was unemployed for approximately eight 

weeks. (Id. ¶ 51.) Although he found new employment, it was at a lower salary of 

$45,000 and a lower level of health and retirement benefits. (Id. ¶ 52.) 

 Mr. Spiker and his wife, Denise Spiker, brought an action against Defendants in 

the Maricopa County Superior Court on April 6, 2012. (Doc. 1-3.) The Spikers had 

named Clinical Reference Laboratory as a Defendant in the original state court complaint 

but removed the party in their amended complaint. (Docs. 1-1, 1-3.) Dr. Kracht removed 

the action to this Court on February 14, 2013, and all Defendants stipulated to the 

removal. (Doc. 1.) On April 2, the Spikers filed a Second Amended Complaint (the 

“SAC”) alleging claims of negligence against all Defendants and negligent training and 

supervision against Wal-Mart, eScreen, and BMC. (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 58–80.) All Defendants 

now move to dismiss the SAC. 

DISCUSSION 

I. MEET AND CONFER 

 The Court ordered the Parties to “meet and confer prior to the filing of a motion to 

dismiss to determine whether it can be avoided.” (Doc. 3 at 1.) The Court further ordered 

that “motions to dismiss must contain a certification of conferral indicating that the 

parties have conferred to determine whether an amendment could cure a deficient 

pleading, and have been unable to agree that the pleading is curable by a permissible 

amendment. . . . Motions to dismiss that do not contain the required certification are 

subject to be stricken on the Court’s motion.” (Id. at 1–2.) 

 Defendants BMC, Padilla, eScreen, and Dr. Kracht did not attach a certification of 

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conferral to their Motions. After the Spikers alerted the Court to that deficiency in their 

Response, Defendants attached a joint certification to their Reply briefs. (Doc. 36-1, Ex. 

10.) In this circumstance, and because the requirement is new, the Court will review the 

adequacy of the certification. 

 In the certification, Defendants contend that they participated in “lengthy and 

numerous discussions with Plaintiffs’ counsel with respect to deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ 

[First Amended Complaint] prior to filing of their Motions to Dismiss.” (Id. at 2.) 

Defendants further contend that all parties participated in a conference call on March 2, 

2013, to discuss each party’s respective issues with the First Amended Complaint and 

whether any deficiencies could be cured through amendment. The Spikers argue, 

however, that at the time of the March 2 conference, Wal-Mart was the only party that 

had filed a Motion to Dismiss and only issues that pertained to that Motion were 

discussed at the conference; none of the issues presented in Defendants’ other Motions 

were raised at that time. 

 In addition to the March 2 conference, Defendants state that eScreen and Dr. 

Kracht have had “numerous other phone calls and exchanged multiple emails with 

Plaintiffs’ counsel on other deficiencies with Plaintiffs’ [First Amended Complaint].” 

(Id.) At the end of this exchange, “the parties agreed to disagree as to some other issues 

of law with the understanding that each party would be filing motions to dismiss after 

[the SAC] was filed.” (Id.) 

 Although the Parties dispute what issues were raised in the March 2 conference, it 

is not disputed that Defendants have conferred with the Spikers regarding deficiencies in 

the First Amended Complaint and that the Spikers have once amended their Complaint in 

response to those conversations. Defendants may not have informally raised every issue 

pertinent to the Complaint that is raised in their Motions but the obligation to meet and 

confer does not include an obligation to assist the Spikers in carefully drafting a second 

amended complaint. The Court finds that the Defendants complied with their obligation 

to meet and confer with the Spikers prior to filing their Motions and will consider the 

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merits of Defendants’ arguments. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

 Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to “test the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. 

Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than 

“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; 

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a 

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 

534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility 

standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. 

 When analyzing a complaint for the failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 

“[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). 

However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of 

truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

III. EXHAUSTION 

The general rule is that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies 

before seeking relief from the federal courts. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144–

45 (1992) (internal citations omitted); Minor v. Cochise Cnty., 125 Ariz. 170, 172, 608 

P.2d 309, 311 (1980) (“It is a well recognized principle of law that a party must exhaust 

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his administrative remedies before appealing to the courts.”). The rule “is a salutary one 

allowing agencies to exercise their expertise, to correct their own errors, and to provide 

relief that may be both swifter and more satisfactory than relief available through more 

formal litigation.” Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. 

denied, 132 S. Ct. 1540, 182 L. Ed. 2d 161 (2012). “Notwithstanding these substantial 

institutional interests, federal courts are vested with a virtually unflagging obligation to 

exercise the jurisdiction given them. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Therefore, exhaustion may not be required “in some circumstances 

even where administrative and judicial interests would counsel otherwise.” Id. “In 

deciding a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may 

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 

F.3d 1108, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2003).

 Wal-Mart contends that Mr. Spiker did not exhaust his administrative remedies 

before seeking relief from this Court. One of these remedies is to complain to the Chief 

Safety Officer of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (the “FMCSA”) that a 

“substantial violation” of the FOTETA and the DOT regulations is occurring or has 

occurred within the preceding 60 days. See 49 C.F.R. § 386.12(a). A substantial violation 

is defined as “one which could reasonably lead to, or has resulted in, serious personal 

injury or death.” Id. The Officer has the discretion to initiate proceedings and investigate 

the complaint if it meets that standard. Id. § 386.12(b). The other administrative remedy 

is that an employee may request a test of the split specimen within 72 hours of being 

notified by the MRO that the employee has a verified positive drug test. Id. § 40.171(a). 

 The Supreme Court has recognized that the interests of the individual may weigh 

heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion before filing suit if “an administrative 

remedy may be inadequate because of some doubt as to whether the agency was 

empowered to grant effective relief.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 147. Mr. Spiker was not able 

to obtain relief from the FMCSA by filing a complaint pursuant to Section 386.12. WalMart’s alleged negligence did not amount to a “substantial violation” or relate to a “fatal 

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flaw” under Section 40.199 triggering cancellation of Mr. Spiker’s drug test. The remedy 

would not redress a complaint of negligence below that level. Further, even if Mr. Spiker 

had requested a split specimen test from the MRO it would not have accounted for the 

alleged flaws in his drug test that supposedly led to a positive result: the mislabeling or 

belated sealing of his specimens. Had Mr. Spiker pursued administrative remedies before 

filing suit rather than afterwards, they would have proven futile. 

 The inadequacy of the remedies to redress the alleged conduct are further 

evidenced by an FMCSA letter sent to Mr. Spiker in response to his July 8, 2012 request 

for an administrative hearing. An FMCA Associate Administrator replied on August 7 

that “the FMCSA does not offer administrative hearings to challenge positive drug test 

results.” (Doc. 29-1, Ex. A.) More importantly, he explained that “[t]he only person who 

can change the outcome of a DOT drug test is the [MRO]” but that “[Mr. Spiker’s] 

noncompliant allegations involving the collector are not sufficient, even if proven, to 

cancel the DOT positive drug test result.” Id. He advised Mr. Spiker to instead consider 

pursuing civil litigation if he had evidence to support his allegations. Id. On May 14, 

2013, the Office of the General Counsel of the DOT confirmed that Mr. Spiker had 

exhausted remedies provided by the DOT regulations. (Doc. 29-1, Ex. B.) 

 Because the administrative remedies were inadequate to address the Spikers’ 

negligence claims against Wal-Mart, Mr. Spiker was not required to exhaust them before 

filing this action. The Spikers may seek relief for Wal-Mart’s alleged negligence in this 

Court. 

IV. WRONGFUL TERMINATION 

Wal-Mart asserts that the Spikers’ claims of negligence and negligent training and 

supervision against it amount to a wrongful termination claim. The Spikers refer to 

wrongful termination in their SAC and Mr. Spiker’s termination is the alleged harm 

related to Wal-Mart’s conduct. Accordingly, Wal-Mart argues, the Spikers’ allegations 

should be considered under the Arizona Employment Protection Act (the “AEPA”) and 

the requirements to state an AEPA claim under A.R.S. § 23–1501. 

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 The Spikers do not base their claims on the circumstances in which Mr. Spiker 

was terminated. Instead, they allege that Wal-Mart was negligent in implementing a drug 

testing program and in supervising and training its service agents which led to a false 

positive drug test and Mr. Spiker’s termination. In other words, the Spikers allege that 

Mr. Spiker was terminated based on a wrongful drug test and that Wal-Mart’s negligent 

conduct was the cause of the wrongful drug test. Therefore, the Spikers’ negligence 

claims against Wal-Mart are just that. To the extent the Spikers allege wrongful 

termination in their SAC, (see Doc. 14 ¶ 31), they have disavowed such a claim in their 

Response to Wal-Mart’s Motion, (Doc. 29 at 21), and it is dismissed without prejudice. 

V. NEGLIGENCE 

 A. Preemption 

 The Supremacy Clause provides that the United States Constitution and the laws 

promulgated through its procedures are the supreme law of the land. See U.S. Const. Art. 

VI, cl. 2. Federal law may preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause in three ways: 

(1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) Congressional intent to preempt is inferred 

from the existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme; or (3) state law conflicts 

with federal law or its purposes. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 

“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.” 

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Federal regulations, such as those at issue here, have the same preemptive effect 

as federal statutes. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). 

Nevertheless, a presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations 

applies to state common law tort claims. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 

518 (1992). 

 1. Express Preemption 

 “Because the FOTETA contains an express preemption clause, we focus in the 

first instance on the plain language of the statute, because it necessarily contains the best 

evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent.” Chapman v. Lab One, 390 F.3d 620, 625 (8th 

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Cir. 2004). The Act and the regulations implementing it contain express preemption 

clauses. The Act states, in relevant part: 

A state or local government may not prescribe or continue in effect a law, 

regulation, standard, or order that is inconsistent with regulations 

prescribed under this section. However, a regulation prescribed under this 

section may not be construed to preempt a State criminal law that imposes 

sanctions for reckless conduct leading to loss of life, injury, or damage to 

property. 

49 U.S.C. § 31306(g) (emphasis added). The DOT regulations provide: 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part preempts 

any State or local law, rule, regulation, or order to the extent that: 

(1) Compliance with both the State or local requirement in this part 

is not possible; or 

(2) Compliance with the State or local requirement is an obstacle to 

the accomplishment and execution of any requirement in this part. 

(b) This part shall not be construed to preempt provisions of State criminal 

law that impose sanctions for reckless conduct leading to actual loss of life, 

injury, or damage to property, whether the provisions apply specifically to 

transportation employees, employers, or the general public. 

49 C.F.R. § 382.109 (emphasis added). The Secretary of Transportation has stated that 

“the purpose of preemption is to avoid the confusion and expense of inconsistent 

requirements for employers or testing entities that operate in several States and to prevent 

interference with the functioning of the Federal program by extraneous, burdensome 

requirements that may defeat its purpose and benefits by making effective 

implementation difficult or impossible.” Rector v. LabOne, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 987, 

992 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (quoting Limitation on Alcohol Use by Transportation Workers, 59 

Fed. Reg. 7302, 7317 (Feb. 15, 1994)). “[A] party claiming preemption under this statute 

has the burden of demonstrating that the putatively preempted law is ‘inconsistent’ with 

the federal regulations.” Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 343 F.3d 1129, 1132, opinion 

amended on denial of reh’g, 350 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 The Spikers assert claims of negligence and negligent training and supervision 

against Wal-Mart. They contend that Wal-Mart breached its duty to exercise reasonable 

care during the process of implementing and administering a drug testing program, 

collecting urine samples, preserving a valid chain of custody, and/or otherwise ensuring 

accurate drug test results. Further, the Spikers allege that Wal-Mart breached its duty to 

exercise reasonable care during the course of training and supervising BMC and its 

employees, and ensuring that those employees were properly credentialed in accordance 

with the DOT regulations. In its Response to Wal-Mart’s Motion, the Spikers maintain 

that their claims “arise entirely out of negligence by Wal-Mart during the selection, 

training, and supervision of its collection site, BMC.”3

 (Doc. 29 at 21.) 

 The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether a state law tort claim brought against 

an employer based on a drug test conducted by a third party is preempted by the 

FOTETA.4

 The issue then is whether the Spikers’ negligence claims against Wal-Mart 

 3

 The Spikers contend that they are “merely seeking to hold Wal-Mart and the 

other Defendants accountable for their negligent failure to comply with specific federal regulations.” (Doc. 29 at 20.) But looking “only at the face of the Complaint”, Van 

Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002), the Spikers bring claims against Wal-Mart for negligence in conducting the drug testing process and for negligent selection, training, and supervision of the service agents that conducted the drug testing. Thus, the Court will not interpret the Spikers’ request as one for “relief under state law for [Wal-Mart’s] alleged violations of federal regulations.” Drake, 458 

F.3d at 65. 

4

 In suits maintained against laboratories conducting drug tests, the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions have held that negligence claims are not preempted. See, e.g., Ishikawa, 343 F.3d at 1133–34; Chapman, 390 F.3d at 627; cf. Drake v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir. 2006) (preempting claims based on substantive state common law standards but not claims requesting state law remedies for violations of 

federal law). In Ishikawa, an airline employee brought a negligence claim against a drug test laboratory for negligently handling her test specimen. 343 F.3d at 1130. The Ninth 

Circuit held that the FOTETA did not preempt the claim because its anti-waiver provision provides that “[t]he employee may not be required to waive liability with respect to negligence on the part of any person participating in the collection, handling, or analysis of the specimen.” Id. at 1133 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 40.25(f)(22)(ii) (1998)). The 

court reasoned that “[n]egligence is a state common law tort, and it would make no sense 

for the regulation to prohibit requiring the employee to waive negligence claims if those claims were preempted and could not be made. This [anti-waiver provision] implies that such claims exist and are not preempted.” Id. The court did not find implied preemption because “[d]espite the sensitivity and federal concern with urine testing, . . . . The common law duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid harming people by negligence applies [to such testing].” Id. at 1134. 

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seek to impose standards inconsistent with the DOT regulations or serve as an obstacle to 

the accomplishment and execution of their requirements. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 382.109(a)(2), 

31306(g). The Spikers’ claims are based on a theory that Wal-Mart was negligent in 

implementing and administering its drug testing program and in selecting, training, and 

supervising the specimen collection site, BMC, and its employees. The DOT regulations 

state that “[e]ach employer shall ensure that all alcohol or controlled substances testing 

conducted under this part complies with the procedures set forth in [Part 40].” Id. § 

382.105. The regulations, however, “expressly contemplate[] employer delegation of 

responsibility for many aspects of testing.” Carroll v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 113 F.3d 163, 166 

(9th Cir. 1997).5

 

 In that regard, an employer may discharge its responsibilities for ensuring its drug 

testing program comports with the regulations either by (1) administering its own 

program within the guidelines of 49 C.F.R. § 40 or (2) hiring qualified service agents to 

 The anti-waiver provision central to the Ninth Circuit’s preemption analysis in Ishikawa did not apply to an employer that delegates the drug testing process to a third party. The provision applied to “negligence on the part of any person participating in the 

collection, handling, or analysis of the specimen.” Id. at 1133 (internal citation omitted) 

(emphasis added). In 2001, the DOT amended the regulations to state that an employer could not require a waiver of liability “with respect to any part of the drug or alcohol testing process (including, but not limited to, collections, laboratory testing, MRO and SAP services).” 49 C.F.R. § 40.27. That provision, however, was enacted “to ensure that 

an employer, acting on behalf of a service agent, could not require such a waiver.” Chapman, 390 F.3d at 627. The Chapman court further noted that another court “had not 

take[n] into account the anti-waiver provision” in its analysis because that case involved an action against an employer and the provision “is directed to negligence on the part of others involved in the collection, handling, and analysis of specimens.” Id. at 628 

(emphasis added). Wal-Mart was not “involved in the process of collection and analysis”, id. at 627; the Spikers allege that BMC and eScreen conducted the drug test and reported the results to Wal-Mart. Thus the reasoning in Ishikawa, also followed by Chapman, that 

negligence claims are not preempted because of the anti-waiver provision, is inapposite as to the Spikers’ claims against Wal-Mart. 

5

 In Carroll, the Ninth Circuit noted that under the regulations, an employer bears responsibility, inter alia, for the following: maintaining records for purposes of inspection by the Federal Highway Administrator, 49 C.F.R. § 382.401; testing a minimum annual percentage of drivers, id. § 382.305; testing a driver when the employer has reasonable suspicion he or she has violated the prohibitions on controlled substances, id. § 382.307; 

and testing driver-applicants before hiring or using them, id. § 382.301. 113 F.3d at 166 

n.2. (citing to prior versions of these provisions). 

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perform testing, see id. § 40.15. Carroll, 113 F.3d at 166 n.2 (citing to prior versions of 

these provisions). In 2001, the DOT revised Part 40 and added provisions regarding an 

employer’s responsibility to ensure that its service agents comply with the regulations. 

Section 40.11 states that an employer is “responsible for all actions of [its] officials, 

representatives, and agents (including service agents) in carrying out the requirements of 

the DOT agency regulations.” Further, the revised Part 40 states that an employer is 

“responsible for ensuring that the service agents [it] uses meet the qualifications set forth 

in this part (e.g., § 40.121 for MROs).” 49 C.F.R. § 40.15(b). It goes on to state that “[an 

employer] remain[s] responsible for compliance with all applicable requirements of this 

part and other DOT drug and alcohol testing regulations, even when [it] use[s] a service 

agent.” Id. § 40.15(c). But before publishing the revisions, the Secretary clarified that the 

new provisions do not require employers “to have active monitoring responsibilities with 

respect to service agents, though employers may choose to monitor their service agents’ 

performance.” Dept. of Transp., Procedures for Transp. Workplace Drug and Alcohol 

Testing Programs, 65 FR 79462-01 at 79484 (December 19, 2000). Rather, employers 

are required “simply to make sure that service agents meet regulatory qualifications. To 

this end, employers may ask to see documentation from service agents, who are obligated 

to provide it.” Id.

 Requiring an employer, through common law tort liability, to supervise and train 

service agents would thus be inconsistent with the DOT regulations. Further, the 

regulations set out a remedial process if a service agent does not comply with the same in 

which the DOT may impose sanctions on the employer. 49 C.F.R. § 40.15(c). “State law 

cannot ‘enlarg[e] or enhanc[e]’ the regulations to impose burdens more onerous than 

those of the federal requirements on matters addressed by the federal regulations.” Drake, 

458 F.3d at 65 (quoting American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995)) 

(preempting claims asserting that conduct addressed by drug testing regulations was 

“wrongful” under state law though that conduct did not violate the regulations). WalMart hired service agents to administer and conduct its drug testing program. To the 

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extent the Spikers seek to hold Wal-Mart liable for negligent supervision and training of 

those agents, such claims are expressly preempted by the FOTETA and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

 The Spikers also allege that Wal-Mart was negligent in failing to ensure that BMC 

was credentialed in accordance with the DOT regulations. As an employer, Wal-Mart is 

required to “ensur[e] that the service agents [it] uses meet the qualifications set forth in 

[the regulations].” 49 C.F.R. § 40.15(b). Wal-Mart acknowledges that it is obliged “to 

choose accredited service agents.” (Doc. 37 at 5.) Therefore, the Spikers’ claim that WalMart was negligent in fulfilling that requirement is not inconsistent with the regulations. 

That claim is not expressly preempted by the FOTETA. 

 2. Implied Preemption 

 Wal-Mart asserts that the Spikers’ claims are preempted due to extensive federal 

regulation in the arena of drug testing of transportation employees. “[P]reemption may be 

inferred when federal regulation in a particular field is so pervasive as to make reasonable 

the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. In such cases of 

field preemption, the mere volume and complexity of federal regulations demonstrate an 

implicit congressional intent to displace all state law.” Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 

912, 918 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 106, 184 L. Ed. 2d 23 (2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In its Motion, Wal-Mart largely argues for implied 

preemption regarding the Spikers’ claim that Wal-Mart was negligent in training and 

supervising BMC. (See Doc. 21 at 6–10.) But as stated above, those claims are expressly 

preempted by the FOTETA. The remaining claim against Wal-Mart is that it was 

negligent in verifying that BMC was qualified to serve as a drug testing agent. 

 “[O]rdinarily when Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has 

included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when 

the provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state 

authority there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the 

substantive provisions of the legislation.” Ishikawa, 343 F.3d at 1133 (internal alterations 

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and citation omitted). In Ishikawa, the Ninth Circuit stated that the FOTETA’s provision 

that expressly preempts state laws inconsistent with the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31306(g), 

“impl[ies] that Congress intentionally did not preempt state law generally.” Id. (internal 

citation. Id. Accordingly, the court held that the “common law duty to exercise 

reasonable care to avoid harming people by negligence applies” to drug testing of 

employees unless the imposition of such a duty is inconsistent with the FOTETA. 

Although Ishikawa involved the FAA’s implementing regulations, the same rationale 

applies to the DOT regulations at issue here. Therefore, there is no implied preemption of 

the Spikers’ claim that Wal-Mart was negligent in ensuring that BMC was a qualified 

service agent.6 7

B. PRIMA FACIE CASE 

 Defendants BMC and Padilla, Dr. Kracht, and eScreen move to dismiss the 

Spikers’ negligence claims against them. In Arizona, a plaintiff must prove four elements 

to state a prima facie case for negligence: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform 

to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal 

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual 

damages.” Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007) (internal 

citations omitted). The existence of a duty is a matter of law for the Court’s 

determination. Id. (internal citations omitted). The other elements, including breach and 

causation, are factual issues usually decided by the jury. Id. (internal citations omitted). 

 1. Duty

 “Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care is a threshold issue; 

 6

 In its Reply, Wal-Mart also argues that the Spikers’ claims are preempted by the AEPA, A.R.S. § 23–2501, et seq. But the Court need not consider that argument because it was not made in the Motion. See Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (“Arguments raised for the first time in [the] reply brief are deemed waived.”). 

7

 Wal-Mart contends, in its Reply, that to the extent the Spikers claim reputational damages against Wal-Mart based on the positive drug test result, that claim is preempted by the DOT regulations. The Court also declines to consider that contention because it 

was not included in the Motion. 

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absent some duty, an action for negligence cannot be maintained.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). Whether a duty exists is a matter of law for the Court to decide. Lips v. 

Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., 224 Ariz. 266, 268, 229 P.3d 1008, 1010 (2010). If the 

Court holds that no duty exists, “the defendant is not liable even though he may have 

acted negligently in light of the foreseeable risks.” Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Bd., 146 

Ariz. 352, 356, 706 P.2d 364, 368 (1985); see Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143–44. In 

determining the whether a duty exists, “the question is whether the relationship of the 

parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use some care to avoid or 

prevent injury to the plaintiff.” Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356. 

 The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a duty of care may arise from, among 

other sources, special relationships based on contract, family relations, or conduct 

undertaken by the defendant, public policy to prevent future harm, or the existence of a 

statute criminalizing conduct. Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145–46 (internal citations omitted). 

Foreseeability of harm, however, is not a factor to be considered when making 

determinations of duty. Id. at 144; Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 298, 211 P.3d 1272, 

1282 (Ct. App. 2009). In determining the existence of a duty, “the requirement of a 

formalized relationship between the parties has been quietly eroding” in Arizona. Stanley 

v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, 221–22, 92 P.3d 849, 851–52 (2004) (internal citations 

omitted). “When public policy has supported the existence of a legal obligation, courts 

have imposed duties for the protection of persons with whom no preexisting relationship 

existed.” Id. In addition, courts may consider “the reasonable expectations of parties and 

society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like 

liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the 

expansion or limitation of new channels of liability.” Wertheim v. Pima Cnty., 211 Ariz. 

422, 427, 122 P.3d 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 Whether service agents, such as collectors and their employees, MROs, and thirdparty administrators, owe a duty of care to an employee whose specimen they collect and 

test at the request of an employer is an issue of first impression in Arizona. “In the 

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absence of controlling forum state law, a federal court sitting in diversity must use its 

own best judgment in predicting how the state’s highest court would decide the case.” 

Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal 

citations omitted). “In so doing, a federal court may be aided by looking to well-reasoned 

decisions from other jurisdictions.” (Id.) (internal citations omitted). While Arizona 

courts “are not bound by the law as announced in other jurisdictions, [they] may look to 

those jurisdictions for guidance on this issue.” State v. Emerson, 171 Ariz. 569, 571, 832 

P.2d 222, 224 (Ct. App. 1992); Shulansky v. Michaels, 14 Ariz. 402, 405, 484 P.2d 14, 17 

(Ct. App. 1971) (“[The court] may therefore look to decisions from sister states in search 

of commonlaw rules.”) (internal citations omitted). The Court will analyze the existence 

of a duty of reasonable care in relation to each type of service agent in turn. 

 i. BMC and Padilla

In their Motion, BMC and Padilla do not challenge the existence of a duty of care 

to Mr. Spiker. The existence of a duty, however, must be determined prior to addressing 

the question of whether there was a breach of that duty causing the alleged harm. 

Therefore, the Court considers whether BMC and Padilla owed a duty of care to Mr. 

Spiker. 

Upon receiving a specimen from an employee, a collector prepares the specimen 

for testing and completes a CCF to record the chain of custody until the specimen is sent 

to a laboratory for testing. See generally 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.41–40.73. Arizona courts have 

not addressed whether a collector owes a duty to an employee whose specimen it 

prepares. But other jurisdictions recognize a duty of care that extends either from a 

collector or laboratory to an employee even if that service agent performs its role at the 

request of an employer. See Cooper v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, Inc., 150 F.3d 376, 

379 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); Santiago v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 

144, 152 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Quisenberry v. Compass Vision, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 

1228–31 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Chapman v. Labone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1001 (S.D. Iowa 

2006). But see, e.g., Tricoski v. Laboratory Corp. of Amer., 216 F. Supp. 2d 444, 445–46 

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(E.D. Pa. 2002); Ney v. Axelrod, 723 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). 

 The rationale in cases that hold that a laboratory owes a duty of care to an 

employee is germane to the issue of whether a collector owes a similar duty. Both 

collectors and testers are required to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the drug testing 

process and must be qualified to do so. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.31, 40.81. In Ishikawa, an 

employee alleged that a laboratory’s negligence in conducting her drug test led to her 

termination. 343 F.3d at 1130–31. Importantly, after holding that the employee’s 

negligence claim was not preempted, the Ninth Circuit noted that the “common law duty 

to exercise reasonable care to avoid harming people by negligence” applied to a 

laboratory’s testing and reporting of results related to an employee’s specimen. Id. at 

1134. Along with authorities in other jurisdictions, Ishikawa demonstrates that in Arizona 

a collector owes a duty of care to an employee whose specimen it prepares. 

 Arizona courts consider the state’s public policy to prevent future harm in 

determining whether a duty of care exists. Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145 (citing Stanley, 208 

Ariz. at 221). Public policy warrants the imposition of a duty on collectors to prepare 

specimens with reasonable care. There is great risk of harm to an employee from a 

specimen that is prepared in a negligent manner. See Elliott v. Lab. Specialists, Inc., 588 

So.2d 175, 176 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that the “risk of harm in our society to an 

individual because of a false-positive drug test is so significant that any individual 

wrongfully accused of drug usage by his employer is within the scope of protection under 

the law”). As is the case for Mr. Spiker, an employee may be terminated if there is a false 

positive drug test report. The employee may also be significantly hindered in his or her 

efforts to find other employment because of the report. Further, a collector is in a better 

position “to guard against the injury” as it is solely responsible for the preparation of 

specimens. See Stinson v. Physicians Immediate Care, Ltd., 269 Ill. App. 3d 659, 664–65 

(Ill. Ct. App. 1995) (applying that rationale to a laboratory’s position in the process). In 

addition, the collector, which is compensated for preparing the specimens, “is better able 

to bear the burden financially than the individual wrongly maligned by a false positive 

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report.” Id. 

 If there was no duty of care imposed on a collector, numerous employees would 

be left without an opportunity to redress a drug test based on a negligently prepared 

specimen and the severe consequences for employees from a false positive report 

resulting from such a test. Importantly, the DOT regulations contemplate the existence of 

claims brought by employees against service agents such as collectors. Employers and 

service agents are prohibited from requiring an employee “to sign a consent, release, 

waiver of liability, or indemnification agreement with respect to any part of the drug or 

alcohol testing process covered by this part (including, but not limited to, collections, 

laboratory testing, MRO, and SAP services).” 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.27, 40.355(a). Thus, 

public policy supports holding a collector “accountable to the individuals whose 

specimens it [collects].” Quisenberry, 618 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (internal citation omitted). 

 ii. Dr. Kracht 

 As an MRO for eScreen, Dr. Kracht was responsible for reviewing Mr. Spiker’s 

specimen. Under the DOT regulations, an MRO provides a quality assurance review of 

the drug testing process for the specimens under the MRO’s purview. 49 C.F.R. § 

40.123(b). In that role, an MRO evaluates the CCF for each specimen to determine 

whether there is a flaw that may cause a test to be cancelled, determines whether there is 

a legitimate medical explanation for confirmed positive drug test results, and provides 

feedback to employers, collection sites and laboratories regarding performance issues 

where necessary. Id. § 40.123(b)(1)–(2), (c). 

Dr. Kracht contends that he did not owe a duty of care to Mr. Spiker because in 

reviewing Mr. Spiker’s positive drug test, he acted for the benefit of Mr. Spiker’s 

employer, Wal-Mart, and not for benefit of Mr. Spiker. In support, Dr. Kracht relies on 

Hafner v. Beck, 185 Ariz. 389, 916 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1995), in which the plaintiff 

brought a negligence claim against a psychologist that conducted an independent medical 

examination of the plaintiff on behalf of his employer’s workers’ compensation carrier. 

The court held that the psychologist did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because “a 

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medical malpractice suit such as this will lie only when there was a doctor/patient 

relationship creating a duty to act for the patient’s benefit.” Id. at 391. In Diggs v. 

Arizona Cardiologists, Ltd., however, the Arizona Court of Appeals characterized the 

holding in Hafner as on the “narrow basis” that “a doctor who conducts an independent 

medical examination and does not ‘intend to treat, care for or otherwise benefit the 

employee’ has no duty to that person.” 198 Ariz. 198, 201, 8 P.3d 386, 389 (Ct. App. 

2000) (quoting Hafner, 185 Ariz. at 392). The Court further noted that Hafner “states that 

because the defendant rendered no treatment, the relationship between the parties was so 

attenuated that, for policy reasons, the plaintiff was not entitled to protection.” Id. 

Hafner is inapposite in these circumstances. This case involves a termination 

based on a drug test that the Spikers claim was negligently reviewed by the MRO 

assigned with the responsibility to verify drug test results. Under the federal regulations, 

an MRO such as Dr. Kracht is to “act[] as an independent and impartial ‘gatekeeper’ and 

advocate for the accuracy and integrity of the drug testing process.” 49 C.F.R. § 

40.123(a). The MRO provides a conclusive check by validating all drug test results that 

he or she receives from the laboratory. In fact, an employer may not remove an employee 

from the performance of safety-sensitive functions until the MRO has completed 

verification of a positive drug test result. One of the reasons for requiring such 

verification is to avoid the “unfair stigmatization of an employee as a drug user.” Dep. of 

Transp., Procedures for Transp. Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs, 65 FR 

79462-01 at 79463. In mandating MRO review, the Secretary attempts to reach a 

“regulatory balance between safety interests and the protection of employees from unfair 

consequences of the process.” Id. at 79464. Thus, the MRO review process is in part for 

the benefit for the employee. 

 Even if it was not, there is a relationship between the MRO and an employee 

whose specimen the MRO reviews entitling the employee to protection under the law. 

Further, the Court has determined that a collection site owes a duty to an employee; there 

is no reason to distinguish a MRO that verifies a drug test based on the specimen from 

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the site that collects the specimen. Both types of service agents play a vital role in 

ensuring that test results are reported accurately to employers as such results are “often a 

pre-requisite to being hired, promoted, or even continuously employed.” Quisenberry, 

618 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (noting that in cases of inaccurate reporting, “[e]mployees can 

lose their jobs, and job applicants can miss out on an opportunity to be considered for a 

new position or a well-deserved promotion.”). Therefore, the Court concludes that an 

MRO owes a duty of care to an employee whose specimen the MRO reviews. 

 iii. eScreen 

 The Spikers assert that as a TPA of Wal-Mart’s drug testing program, eScreen was 

responsible for selecting, hiring, training, and/or supervising the site that collected the 

drug test specimens from employees, and the MROs that verified drug test results. The 

Spikers seek to hold eScreen primarily liable for failing to ensure that BMC and its 

employees were properly credentialed and trained pursuant to the DOT regulations and 

vicariously liable for Dr. Kracht’s allegedly negligent review and verification of the drug 

test results. 

 eScreen contends that any duty of care in selecting a collector that employed 

personnel who were properly credentialed and trained ran only to Wal-Mart and not Mr. 

Spiker. In administering the drug testing program on behalf of an employer, a TPA plays 

a critical role in ensuring that the service agents that conduct the tests comply with the 

DOT regulations. The regulations themselves do not make distinctions among service 

agents and state that “[a]s a service agent, the services you provide to transportation 

employers must meet the requirements of . . . the DOT agency drug and alcohol testing 

regulations.” 49 C.F.R. § 40.341. As discussed above, there are suffiecient reasons to 

hold service agents accountable to employees for proper drug testing even if they are 

serving employers. Thus, taking the allegations in the SAC as true, the Court holds that 

eScreen owed a duty of care to Mr. Spiker. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 2. Breach 

 i. Standard of Care 

“[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the 

protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” Restatement § 282. Even if a 

person owes a duty of care to another, it is a distinct issue whether the standard of 

reasonable care has been met in a particular case. That standard has been defined as 

“[w]hat the defendant must do, or must not do . . . to satisfy the duty.” Gipson v. Kasey, 

214 Ariz. 141, 143, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Whether the 

defendant has met the standard, or in other words, whether there has been a breach of 

duty, is an issue of fact determined by the specifics of the individual case. Id. The Court 

may, however, “rule as a matter of law when no reasonable juror could conclude that the 

standard of care was breached . . . .” Grafitti-Valenzuela ex rel. Grafitti v. City of 

Phoenix, 216 Ariz. 454, 458, 167 P.3d 711, 715 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). 

 The standard of reasonable care may be established by (1) statute or regulation; (2) 

adopted by the Court from a statute or regulation; (3) established by judicial decision; or 

(4) applied to the facts of the case. Restatement § 285. Here, the conduct of service 

agents is governed by the FOTETA and DOT regulations. The Restatement states that a 

court may adopt as the standard of care the requirements of a statute or regulation whose 

purpose is exclusively or in part: 

(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is 

invaded, and 

(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and 

(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and 

(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the 

harm results. 

Restatement § 286; see Tellez v. Saban, 188 Ariz. 165, 169, 933 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Ct. 

App. 1996) (citing the Restatement elements). The purpose of a statute may be 

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determined by reference to its title, preamble, detailed provisions, or history, among other 

sources. Restatement § 286 cmt. f. The express purpose of the FOTETA is “to establish 

programs designed to help prevent accidents and injuries resulting from the misuse of 

alcohol or use of controlled substances by drivers of commercial motor vehicles.” 49 

C.F.R. § 382.101. Further, the implementing regulations were prescribed by the DOT 

“[i]n the interest of commercial motor vehicle safety.” Id. § 31306(b). As discussed 

above, the regulations aim to achieve a regulatory balance between safety interests and 

the protection of employees. The purpose of the regulations, however, is to protect the 

public at large and not to protect employees such as Mr. Spiker who are tested according 

to the requirements set out therein. The regulations do not set out the minimum standard 

of care to determine whether there has been a breach of the duty of care owed to an 

employee. See Drake, 458 F.3d at 57 (“Although they set out elaborate rules for 

conducting drug tests, the DOT regulations do not specifically address negligence on the 

part of drug-testing laboratories or otherwise establish the minimum standard of care to 

be exercised by laboratory personnel.”). 

Service agents generally “owe[] a duty of reasonable care to persons whose 

specimens [they] test[] for employers or prospective employers.” Stinson v. Physicians 

Immediate Care, Ltd., 269 Ill. App. 3d 659, 665 (1995); see Ishikawa, 343 F.3d at 1134 

(noting that “the “common law duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid harming people 

by negligence” applies to service agents). Further, for those with special skills or training, 

the standard of care imposes “the higher obligation to act in light of that skill, training, or 

knowledge.” Stanley, 208 Ariz. at 224. The DOT regulations state that service agents 

must ensure “the services [they] provide to transportation employers . . . meet the 

requirements of this part and the DOT agency drug and alcohol testing regulations.” 49 

C.F.R. § 40.341. The regulations also require service agents to be qualified and their 

personnel to meet training requirements as outlined therein. See, e.g., id §§ 40.33 

(collector), 40.41 (collection sites), 40.121 (MRO). Thus, service agents must act with 

reasonable care in light of that training when conducting drug tests. Although the DOT 

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regulations do not set out the minimum standard of care and a violation of their 

requirements is not negligence per se, the regulations provide guidance as to the standard 

of reasonable care. 

 ii. BMC and Padilla 

 In their SAC, the Spikers allege that BMC and Padilla failed “to ensure that Mr. 

Spiker’s sample was validly collected, labeled, stored, shipped, and/or tested.” (Doc. 14 ¶ 

36.) The factual allegations are (1) that Padilla did not place a tamper-evident seal onto 

Mr. Spiker’s specimen bottle before Mr. Spiker initialed it as required by Section 40.71, 

(id. ¶ 37), and (2) that Padilla was not properly credentialed and trained as collectors as 

required by Section 40.33, (id. ¶¶ 38, 75–77). 

 BMC and Padilla contend that the Spikers’ allegation that Padilla affixed the seal 

after Mr. Spiker initialed it is controverted by Mr. Spiker’s certification on a CCF. 

Defendants attach that CCF to their Motion. The certification on the signed CCF by Mr. 

Spiker states: “I certify that each specimen bottle used was sealed with a tamper-evident 

seal in my presence.” (Doc. 20-1, Ex. 1.) Even if the Court were to consider the CCF on a 

motion to dismiss, Mr. Spiker’s certification directly contradicts the Spikers’ allegation in 

the SAC that Padilla affixed the seal on the specimen after Mr. Spiker initialed it. Further, 

the SAC can be read to allege that regardless of the CCF certification, the seals were not 

affixed in Mr. Spiker’s presence. These factual disputes are not properly determined at 

this stage of the proceedings. 

 BMC and Padilla contend that even if Padilla did not follow the mandated 

procedure, the labeling and sealing were “substantially correct” so that her deviation does 

not amount to a breach. Defendants assert that incorrect sealing is a mere “procedural 

error” and is not one of the four “fatal flaws” the DOT regulations list that require a drug 

test to be cancelled. See 40 C.F.R. § 40.199.8

 Although the regulations are not dispositive 

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 The following are the fatal flaws: 

(1) There is no printed collector’s name and no collector’s signature; 

(2) The specimen ID numbers on the specimen bottle and the CCF do not 

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as to what conduct constitutes a breach, they are persuasive as to reasonable behavior in 

this highly regulated area of drug testing. A drug test is not cancelled even if the 

employee does not initial the tamper-evident seals at all; rather, the collector is required 

to note this failure to initial in the “Remarks” line of the CCF and complete the collection 

process. Id. § 40.71. The proper sealing of a specimen, however, is essential to the chain 

of custody process that ensures the integrity of the specimen. See § 40.199(3) (stating that 

one of the fatal flaws is a broken specimen bottle seal or evidence of tampering with the 

seal). The collector is held to the higher obligation to act in light of mandated training to 

properly seal drug test specimens. Further, the CCF requires the collector to attest to the 

fact that the specimen was sealed in accordance with the DOT regulations. (See Doc. 20-

1, Ex. 1.) If there is no such attestation, the test is cancelled by the MRO. Id. § 40.199(1). 

Because proper sealing procedure is important to maintain a reliable chain of custody and 

incorrect sealing is alleged in the SAC, the alleged facts thus state a breach of the duty of 

reasonable care. 

 The Spikers also allege that Padilla was not properly credentialed and trained as a 

collector as required by the DOT regulations. Only collectors that meet the training 

requirements set out in the regulations are authorized to collect specimens for DOT drug 

testing. Id. § 40.31(a)–(b). Section 40.33 lists several training requirements for collectors 

including qualification training, an initial proficiency demonstration, refresher training, 

error correction training, and documentation. In light of the public policy embodied in the 

 match; 

(3) The specimen bottle seal is broken or shows evidence of tampering (and a split specimen cannot be redesignated, see § 40.83(g)); and 

(4) Because of leakage or other causes, there is an insufficient amount of 

urine in the primary specimen bottle for analysis and the specimens cannot 

be redesignated (see § 40.83(g)). 

49 C.F.R. § 40.199. 

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regulations to require all collectors to be qualified, Defendants’ duty of reasonable care 

obliges them to comply with those requirements. The SAC alleges facts to make the 

reasonable inference that Padilla did not comply with the training requirements. For 

example, the Spikers allege that Padilla did not follow the sealing procedure outlined in 

the regulations and that she was not properly credentialed and trained when she collected 

Mr. Spiker’s specimen. BMC was allegedly responsible for supervising and training 

Padilla. Therefore, the Spikers, at this point, have sufficiently alleged that BMC and 

Padilla breached their duties of care. 

 iii. Dr. Kracht 

As discussed above, the MRO serves an important role in ensuring the reliability 

of the drug testing program. The Spikers allege that Dr. Kracht breached his duty of care 

by not fulfilling his oversight function under the regulations as to Mr. Spiker’s specimen. 

Assuming Dr. Kracht’s duty to Mr. Spiker obligated him to fulfill that function, the 

Spikers’ allegations are conclusory and do not provide factual allegations to draw the 

inference that Dr. Kracht breached his duty. 

 The Spikers allege that Dr. Kracht (1) “failed to take reasonable steps to execute 

his duties as MRO and failed to ensure that Mr. Spiker’s urine sample was validly 

collected, labeled, stored, shipped and/or tested”, (Doc. 14 ¶ 39); (2) “did not satisfy the 

required credentials, basic knowledge, training, and responsibilities outlined in the 

federal regulations”, (id. ¶ 40); (3) “failed to act as an ‘independent and impartial 

gatekeeper and advocate for the accuracy and integrity of the drug testing process’”, (id. ¶ 

41) (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 40.123(a)); (4) “failed to properly investigate obvious 

discrepancies in the chain of custody of Mr. Spiker’s urine sample”, (id. ¶ 64); and (5) 

“failed to properly investigate obvious problems with the credentials and training of 

BMC’s employees, including Defendant Padilla”, (id. ¶ 65). But there are no allegations 

as to how Dr. Kracht failed in these respects. The Spikers do not state how Dr. Kracht 

lacked the requisite credentials or training and failed his gatekeeping role, what 

discrepancies he failed to investigate, or what “obvious problems” he overlooked as to 

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the qualifications of BMC’s employees. 

 The only plausible “discrepancy” in the chain of custody to which the Spikers may 

be referring is the incorrect sealing by Padilla discussed above. But during a quality 

assurance review of specimens, the MRO is charged only with reviewing the CCF “for 

the purposes of determining whether there is a problem that may cause a test to be 

cancelled.” 49 C.F.R. § 40.123(b)(1). The Spikers do not allege that Dr. Kracht failed to 

review the CCF, ignored one of the four fatal flaws that would require a test to be 

cancelled, or that the CCF was lacking in any respect. Although the regulations do not 

determine the standard of care, the MRO is their creation. They do not make the MRO 

responsible for reviewing any and all discrepancies in the chain of custody. Because the 

Spikers do not allege other facts that Dr. Kracht breached his duty, their negligence claim 

against him is dismissed with leave to amend. 

 iv. eScreen 

 The Spikers allege that eScreen was negligent in selecting, hiring, and training 

and/or supervising BMC, Padilla, and Dr. Kracht. The Spikers have alleged facts that 

BMC and Padilla breached their duties of reasonable care through incorrect sealing and 

lack of training. Because the Spikers also allege that eScreen handled the selection, 

hiring, training, and/or supervision of BMC, they allege facts that eScreen breached its 

duty of care to supervise and train BMC and Padilla. As to Dr. Kracht, however, the SAC 

does not sufficiently allege that he breached his duty of reasonable care; therefore, it does 

not state a negligence claim against eScreen for its supervision of Dr. Kracht. 

 3. Causation 

 Arizona law holds that causation exists “if the defendant’s act helped cause the 

final result and if that result would not have happened without the defendant’s act.” 

Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 505, 667 P.2d 200, 205 (1983) (internal citation 

omitted). Defendant’s act need not have been a “large” or “abundant” cause of the final 

result; there is liability if the result would not have occurred but for defendant’s conduct, 

even if that conduct contributed “only a little” to plaintiff’s injuries. Id. (internal citation 

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omitted). Plaintiff need only present probable facts from which the causal relationship 

reasonably may be inferred. Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 546, 

789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990) (internal citation omitted). 

 The Spikers allege causation. They allege that Padilla’s incorrect sealing and lack 

of training caused Mr. Spiker’s specimens to be contaminated or mistakenly identified, 

resulting in a false positive drug test. That test led to Mr. Spiker’s termination of 

employment. Further, eScreen’s and BMC’s alleged failure to properly supervise and 

train Padilla led to her misconduct. Because the Spikers allege causation, they state a 

prima facie case for negligence against eScreen, BMC, and Padilla. 

VI. OTHER PLEADED CLAIMS 

BMC and Padilla contend that the Spikers have not stated claims for defamation 

and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Spikers allege in their SAC that 

“Defendants’ negligence also . . . defamed Mr. Spiker’s public and professional 

reputation” and that “Defendants’ negligence has caused . . . emotional distress . . . .” 

(Doc. 14 ¶ 53–54.) In their Response, the Spikers state that they do not allege claims for 

defamation or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Those terms are alleged in the 

SAC as damages relating to Defendants’ negligent conduct and not as separate claims. To 

the extent the SAC purports to state claims for defamation and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, they are dismissed from this action. 

CONCLUSION 

 The FOTETA preempts the Spikers’ claims against Wal-Mart for negligent 

training and supervision but does not preempt their claim that Wal-Mart was negligent in 

selecting qualified service agents to implement its drug testing program. As to the 

negligence claims against the service agents, the agents owed a duty of reasonable care to 

Mr. Spiker. The SAC does not allege that Dr. Kracht breached his duty of care. It does 

allege that Padilla, eScreen, and BMC, through their deficient supervision and training of 

Padilla, breached that duty. Padilla did not follow the proper sealing procedure outlined 

in the DOT regulations and was not trained by eScreen and BMC pursuant to the 

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regulations. The SAC further alleges that the incorrect sealing and lack of training caused 

Mr. Spiker’s injury, namely, a false positive drug test report and subsequent termination 

from employment. The Spikers thus state claims of negligence against eScreen, BMC, 

and Padilla, but not against Dr. Kracht. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants 

Stephen Kracht, D.O., and eScreen (Doc. 19) is granted in part and denied in part. The 

claims against Defendant Kracht are dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiffs do not 

move to amend the Second Amended Complaint as to their allegations against Defendant 

Kracht within thirty (30) days, the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendant 

Kracht from this action. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 

Claim of Defendants Buckeye Medical Center and Padilla (Doc. 20) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 

Complaint of Wal-Mart (Doc. 21) is granted in part and denied in part. 

 Dated this 16th day of September, 2013. 

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