Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01431/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01431-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE

HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BAXTER INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________________

No. C 03-1431 SBA

 

ORDER

[Docket No. 487]

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Baxter International, Inc. and Baxter

Healthcare Corporation's (collectively, "Defendants" or "Baxter") Motion to Strike the Declaration of

Charles Ragsdale. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers

submitted to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The

Court hereby DENIES Baxter's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Charles Ragsdale [Docket No. 487].

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs and counter-defendants Fresenius USA, Inc. and Fresenius Medical Care Holdings,

Inc. (collectively "Fresenius") initiated this patent suit on April 4, 2003 by filing a Complaint for

Declaratory Judgment of Non-infringement and Invalidity against defendants and counter-plaintiffs

Baxter International, Inc. and Baxter Healthcare Corporation (collectively "Baxter"). Fresenius cited

five patents in its complaint: (1) U.S. Patent No. 5,247,434 ("'434 Patent"); (2) U.S. Patent No.

5,326,476 ("'476 Patent"); (3) U.S. Patent No. 6,284,131 B1 ("'131 Patent"); (4) U.S. Patent No.

5,486,286 ("'286 Patent"); and (5) U.S. Patent No. 5,744,027 ("'027 Patent") (collectively

"patents-in-suit"). 

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Seratronics was formed out of Cordis Dow in 1982. Parvin Decl. at Ex. B. 

2

The "Seratron System" is comprised of the Cordis Dow SeratronTM Dialysis Control System

("Seratron Dialysis System"), the SeratronTM Modeling Programmer ("Programmer"), and the

SeratronTM Patient Recording and Monitoring System ("PRSM"). Parvin Decl. at Ex. B. 

2

On May 14, 2003, Baxter answered and counterclaimed that Fresenius' 2008H and/or 2008K

hemodialysis machines infringe four of the five patents. On October 20, 2003, Baxter amended its

answer and counterclaims to assert infringement of the '286 Patent. 

On November 21, 2005, Fresenius disclosed to Baxter its intent to provide certain confidential

information to Charles Ragsdale in connection with its prosecution of this case. Parvin Decl. at Ex. A.

Fresenius also provided Baxter with a copy of Mr. Ragsdale's curriculum vitae. Id. As set forth in his

curriculum vitae, Mr. Ragsdale has worked as an electrical engineer for approximately forty years and

has been employed by Bio-Rad Laboratories in various capacities, including his present capacity as the

Robotics Engineering Manager, for the past twenty years. Id. He holds a bachelor of science degree

in electrical engineering from the University of Florida, which he received in 1966, and a masters degree

in bioengineering from the University of Wyoming, which he received in 1972. Id. Prior to his

employment with Bio-Rad Laboratories, Mr. Ragsdale was employed by Seratronics, Inc.

("Seratronics") from 1982 to 1983 and by Cordis Dow Corp. ("Cordis Dow") from 1979 to 1982.1

 Id.

In his role as the Manager of Research Electronics at Cordis Dow, Mr. Ragsdale supervised a group of

engineers and technicians in implementing substantial changes to the then-existing version of a

hemodialysis system known as the Seratron System.2 Parvin Decl. at Ex. B (Ragsdale Expert Report).

Mr. Ragsdale's responsibilities included conceiving and implementing the Patient Recoding and

Monitoring System ("PRSM"). Id. Mr. Ragsdale also designed the key computer hardware found in

the Seratron System. Id. Mr. Ragsdale is the named inventor on twenty issued United States Patents,

three pending United States Patent applications, and twenty-five issued foreign patents. Id. 

 On December 22, 2005, the Court-ordered deadline for filing expert reports, Fresenius submitted

the Opening Expert Witness Report of Charles Ragsdale Regarding the Invalidity of Certain Claims of

U.S. Patent No. 5,744,027. Parvin Decl. at Ex. B (Ragsdale Expert Report). In his report, Mr. Ragsdale

provides: (1) a background and review of the relevant technology and alleged prior art, i.e., the Seratron

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System; (2) a comparison of the prior art to the asserted claims of the '027 Patent; and (3) and a claim

chart comparing the prior art to the asserted claims of the '027 Patent. 

On February 20, 2006, Baxter deposed Mr. Ragsdale.

On March 6, 2006, Fresenius filed its Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity of the

Asserted Claims of the '476 and '027 Patents and the accompanying Declaration of Charles Ragsdale

In Support of Fresenius' Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity of the Asserted Claims of U.S.

Patent Nos. 5,326,476 and 5,744,027 (referred to herein as the "Ragsdale Declaration"). 

On March 21, 2006, Baxter filed the instant Motion to Strike the Declaration of Charles Ragsdale

("Motion to Strike"). Baxter's Motion to Strike is purportedly premised on Federal Rule of Evidence

702 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) and 26.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2), a party is required to "disclose to other parties the identity of any

person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules

of Evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Further, under Rule 26(a)(2)(B):

[The] disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially

employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an

employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be

accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness. The report

shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis

and reasons therefor; the data or other information considered by the witness

in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for

the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all

publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the

compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other

cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition

within the preceding four years.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 

B. Federal Rule of Evidence 702

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the Federal Rule of Evidence, primarily

Rule 702. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Pursuant to Rule 702:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of

fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony

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is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable

principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and

methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Under Daubert, the district court acts as a "gatekeeper," excluding "junk science" that does not

meet the standards of reliability required under Rule 702. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142

(1997); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998). The court accomplishes

this goal through a preliminary determination that the proffered evidence is both relevant and reliable.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-95. Scientific evidence is deemed reliable if the principles and methodology

used by the expert proffering it are grounded in the methods of science. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 ("The

proponent need not prove that the expert's testimony is correct, but that the methodology used by the

expert was proper."). A trial court has broad latitude in determining whether an expert's testimony is

reliable and also in deciding how to determine the testimony's reliability. United States v. Hankey, 203

F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.2000). However, the Court's inquiry must "focus[] solely on [the] principles

and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." United States v. Prime, 431 F.3d 1147,

1153 (9th Cir. 2005). "Only if the expert's opinion is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no

assistance to the jury must such testimony be excluded." Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co.,

357 F.3d 860, 865 (8th Cir.2004) (citations omitted).

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) governs the submission of affidavits proffered in support

of, and in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment. In particular, Rule 56(e) provides that:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall

set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit

shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits

to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported

as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations

or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse

party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

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Conspicuously absent from Baxter's Motion is any citation to Daubert. 

6

ANALYSIS

In its Motion to Strike, Baxter contends that the Ragsdale Declaration must be stricken because:

(1) a number of Mr. Ragsdale's opinions are unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702; (2) portions

of the Ragsdale Declaration are not based on his personal knowledge and therefore violate Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(e); (3) some of Mr. Ragsdale's statements contradict his deposition testimony; and

(4) the Ragsdale Declaration offers "new" opinions in violation of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).

A. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)

The Court first notes that, although the Motion to Strike is purportedly premised on Federal Rule

of Evidence 702 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), Baxter's entire discussion of Rule 702 and

Rule 56(e), and the applicability of those rules to Fresenius' expert, is limited to one paragraph of its

thirteen-page Motion. This paragraph begins with the statement: "Accordingly, these declared opinions

must be stricken as merely [sic] conclusions unsupported by his personal knowledge, or the facts." See

Mot. at 9. The rest of the paragraph consists of a string cite to three published and four unpublished

cases that are completely inapposite to the case at bar.3

For example, in Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994), the first case

cited by Baxter in its brief, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of expert testimony

regarding toxic chemical injury causation because the district court had expressly found that: (1) the

toxicology discussion in the experts' affidavits omitted reference to the majority of the medical

conditions alleged by the plaintiffs; (2) neither expert had made any effort to rule out other possible

causes for the plaintiffs' alleged injuries; (3) both experts admitted that they had not read the relevant

medical literature before forming their opinions; (4) both experts admitted that they had not read or

considered relevant medical and personal records before making their diagnoses. Id. at 502. 

By way of another example, in United States v. Various Slot Machines on Guam, 658 F.2d 697,

700-701 (9th Cir. 1981), the only other Ninth Circuit case Baxter relies upon in its Motion, the Ninth

Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of two expert affidavits because it was admitted that the

experts' opinions were based solely on the experts' interpretation of the facts presented in the opposing

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As for the unpublished cases that Baxter cites in its brief, while it is true that the cases support

the general proposition that affidavits lacking in factual support must be stricken, it is unclear why

Baxter believes that these cases are persuasive authorities, as the opinions are completely lacking in

either analogous facts or pertinent analysis. See FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15622

(N.D. Cal. 1982) (striking a declaration "pervaded by hearsay, contradiction of admissions, belief stated

without providing a basis therefor (such as declarations of others), and a failure to provide sworn or

certified copies of all papers referred to in the declaration") (emphasis added); Brand Management, Inc.

v. Mernard, Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 493 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (striking deposition testimony that

consisted only of expert's bare conclusions); Rome v. Galilean Seafood's, Inc., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS

20860 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (striking declaration due to absence of evidence that declarant had actually

observed the facts alleged in his declaration); Halo Management, LLC v. Interland, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15563 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (striking declarations containing only legal conclusions). 

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party's affidavits and were devoid of any of their own independent facts. See id. at 699 ("And when the

court remarked that the mere assertion that the machines are electronic point-makers is a conclusion,

and asked, 'where in the affidavit(s) do they present facts[?] . . . counsel's reply was, 'Well, we don't have

a specific description of exactly why they are point-makers.'"). In fact, due to the purported experts'

admitted lack of familiarity with the machines at issue, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the affidavits

consisted solely of pure "pettifoggery" or "quibble." Id. at 699. The Ninth Circuit also expressly noted

that the experts' affidavits were flatly contradicted by the pictures of the machines themselves. Id. at

701 (noting that "a court is not compelled to give weight to an allegation that is incontrovertibly

demonstrated to be false."). 

Similarly, in Digital Control Incorporated v. McLaughlin Mfg. Co., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1000,

1007 (W.D. Wash. 2002), the expert affidavit was stricken because the relevant testimony consisted of

one solitary, unsupported statement that was quite obviously contradicted by the patent specification.

Id. at 1007 (noting that the expert's affidavit was premised solely on the statement: "Based on my review

of the specification of the '025 patent, nowhere can I find any description that would teach a skilled

person how to [use] the receiver described in the '025 patent").4

 

In contrast, here, it is undisputed that Mr. Ragsdale: (1) has forty years of experience in electrical

engineering; (2) was employed by Cordis Dow, the company initially responsible for creating the

Seratron System; (3) was personally responsible for supervising the group of engineers and technicians

who developed the Seratron System; (4) was personally involved in the conception and development

of the machine; and (5) is the named inventor on twenty issued United States patents. In sum, Mr.

Ragsdale is providing testimony regarding the very system that he helped invent. Tellingly, and perhaps

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in light of these highly relevant, undisputed facts, Baxter's Motion to Strike does not provide the Court

with any analysis as to why Mr. Ragsdale is unqualified to provide expert testimony concerning the

Seratron System or the validity of the '027 Patent. In fact, Baxter concedes in its Reply brief that Mr.

Ragsdale is qualified by clarifying that Baxter is not seeking to strike Mr. Ragsdale's Expert Report

pursuant to Rule 702. See Reply at 2. Baxter also fails to provide the Court with any argument showing

that the methodology Mr. Ragsdale has employed in reaching his conclusions is unreliable. 

In fact, Baxter's suggestion that Mr. Ragsdale does not has sufficient knowledge regarding the

Seratron System is decidedly strained. Contrary to Baxter's assertions, Mr. Ragsdale is a qualified

expert due to his personal knowledge of the Seratron System and his skill and experience in the

electrical engineering field. Further, Mr. Ragsdale's testimony is undisputedly relevant and provides

the type of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in

determining whether the Seratron System invalidates the '027 Patent. Accordingly, Baxter's Motion to

Strike, to the extent that it is premised on Rule 702, necessarily fails. For the same reasons, to the extent

that Baxter's Motion is premised on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), it is DENIED. See Bulthuis

v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an expert opinion is admissible "if

it appears the affiant is competent to give an expert opinion and the factual basis for the opinion is stated

in the affidavit, even though the underlying factual details and reasoning upon which the opinion is

based are not."). 

B. Deposition Testimony

In fact, considering the lack of any credible argument showing that Mr. Ragsdale's testimony

fails to meet the applicable Daubert standard, it is quite clear to the Court that Baxter's Motion to Strike

is actually premised on Baxter's assertion that this Court must strike the Ragsdale Declaration simply

because Mr. Ragsdale has, in Baxter's opinion, "renege[d] on his deposition testimony." With regard

to this particular issue, however, Baxter's Motion is inconsistent with established law. 

Although Baxter is correct that a party generally cannot create an issue of fact merely by

submitting an affidavit that contradicts his prior deposition testimony, see Foster v. Arcata Assocs., 772

F.2d 1453, 1462 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986) and Radobenko v. Automated Equip.

Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir.1975), the Ninth Circuit has held that the Foster-Radobenko

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The Eleventh Circuit has stressed that a court must exercise even greater caution when, as here,

it is asked to strike the declaration of a non-party witness. See Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526,

1530-31 (11th Cir. 1986); but see Adelman-Tremblay v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 859 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.

1988) (excluding contradictory expert affidavit). 

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doctrine must be applied with caution.5 Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th

Cir.1991). Indeed, although Baxter fails to bring this fact to the Court's attention, in Kennedy, the Ninth

Circuit expressly stated that "the Foster-Radobenko rule does not automatically dispose of every case

in which a contradictory affidavit is introduced to explain portions of earlier deposition testimony." Id.

Instead, the Foster-Radobenko rule is intended to prevent parties who are opposing summary judgment

from offering "sham" testimony that flatly contradicts earlier testimony in an attempt to "create" an issue

of fact. Id. at 266-67; see also Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085, 1090 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied,

Indiana v. Choudhry, 434 U.S. 997 (1977) (holding that summary judgment was improper even though

party's testimony was "not a paradigm of cogency or persuasiveness," since it was not a "transparent

sham"). 

The law is also clear that contradictory testimony is not a sham if it merely "elaborat[es] upon,

explain[s] or clarif[ies] prior testimony." Messick v. Horizon Indust., Inc., 62 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th

Cir.1995). Further, contradictory testimony from a witness is not a sham where it appears that the

witness was confused at the time of the earlier testimony, that he lacked the information necessary to

supply accurate testimony, or where the prior deposition testimony was equivocal. Kennedy, 952 F.2d

at 266 (citing Miller v. A.H. Robins Co., 766 F.2d 1102, 1104 (7th Cir.1985)); see also Lane v. Celotex,

782 F.2d 1526, 1532 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The earlier deposition testimony must consist of 'clear answers

to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.'"). 

Thus, under Kennedy, before a district court can disregard contradictory testimony, the court

must make a specific finding of fact that the testimony is a "sham." Id. at 267. Baxter has not provided

the Court with any basis for making such a finding. Instead, Baxter directs the Court's attention to

several excerpts from Mr. Ragsdale's deposition that Baxter's counsel contends are contradictory. With

respect to these excerpts, however, Fresenius argues that the deposition testimony does not contradict

the Ragsdale Declaration and that the alleged "contradiction" results from Baxter's own

misunderstanding of the relevant testimony. However, even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Ragsdale has,

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Again, as Fresenius correctly notes in its Opposition, if "faulty" memory is the basis for the

Motion to Strike, this argument should have been confined to Baxter's opposition to Fresenius' summary

judgment motion because it pertains to credibility and therefore creates an issue of fact. See Tippens

v. Celotex Corp, 805 F.2d 949, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[a]n opposing party's affidavit

should be considered although it differs from or varies from his evidence as given by deposition or

another affidavit and the two in conjunction may disclose an issue of credibility."). As stated in

Tippens, "Variations in a witness' testimony and any failure of memory through the course of discovery

create an issue of credibility as to which part of the testimony should be given the greatest weight if

credited at all . . . [such] [i]ssues . . . are questions of fact which require resolution by the trier of fact."

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in fact, contradicted himself, it is quite apparent that Mr. Ragsdale's deposition testimony was far from

unequivocal. In fact, Mr. Ragsdale stated on several times that he would "have to go back and look at

that part of the system," or "would like to reconfirm." Gemmell Decl. at Ex. B (Ragsdale Depo. at

139:16-24, 153:6-8, 157:14-20). Moreover, as Baxter concedes in a footnote to its Motion, any

inconsistencies, or lapses in memory during a deposition, are issues pertaining to credibility and do not

serve as a basis for striking a subsequently filed declaration.6

 See Mot. at 11 n. 12. 

Moreover, Baxter does not – and cannot – dispute that the opinions set forth in the Ragsdale

Declaration were also set forth in his Expert Report in great detail. The fact that the Ragsdale

Declaration is consistent with his Expert Report, which was authored prior to Mr. Ragsdale's deposition,

substantially reduces the likelihood that Mr. Ragsdale has "fabricated" a sham declaration in order to

help Fresenius' survive summary judgment and lends further support to Fresenius' position that the

declaration is admissible. See, e.g., Tippens, 805 F.2d at 954 n. 6 ("[I]t is much less likely that an

affidavit which precedes a weak deposition is . . . a transparent sham than is a discrediting affidavit

which is filed after a weak deposition which failed."). Similarly, the fact that Fresenius is relying on

a declaration prepared by a disinterested witness in order to support its own Motion for Summary

Judgment, instead of relying on the declaration to create a dispute of fact defeating summary judgment,

is relevant to this inquiry and further negates a finding that the Ragsdale Declaration is a sham. See, e.g.,

Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266 (noting that Radobenko and its progeny are intended to prevent a party from

"creating" an issue of fact to preclude summary judgment). Indeed, as stated by the Eleventh Circuit

in Lane:

Here there is little chance of sham factual issues. Ring is a disinterested

witness and it is our view that any inconsistency in his testimony is more likely

the result of his faulty memory than a predisposition to lie. Thus, while a

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Specifically, Baxter takes issue with the following statement, which is found at paragraph 55

of the Ragsdale Declaration: "I believe that it would have required only routine development to replace

the membranes of the prior art Seratron System with a display and touch screen overlay." See Gemmell

Decl. at Ex. C (Ragsdale Decl. at ¶ 55). 

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With respect to this argument, Baxter asserts that the Ragsdale Declaration "points to new

'evidence' in the form of a source code (presumably to the PRSM) to support his assertion that the

Seratron system anticipates the battery backup limitation of Claims 4 and 6 of the '027 Patent." Baxter

further contends that Mr. Ragsdale's statement "that the claims [of the '027 Patent] are invalid based on

'the rules of claim construction as I understand them' . . . and 'as these claims have been interpreted by

the Court' . . . contradict his contention in his expert report that 'neither of the Court's [Claim

Construction] Orders gave a meaning to any of the claim terms of the '027 patent." 

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district court may find that a party's contradictory affidavit constitutes a sham,

. . . we would be unable, absent great trepidation, to affirm a similar finding

with respect to a disinterested witness' contradictory affidavit.

782 F.2d at 1530-31 (emphasis in original). 

Accordingly, Baxter has not persuasively demonstrated that the Ragsdale Declaration is a

"sham." 

C. Baxter's Additional Reasons to Strike

To conclude its Motion, Baxter asserts three additional bases for striking the Ragsdale

Declaration: (1) that the Ragsdale Declaration must be stricken because Mr. Ragsdale fails to explain

the basis for his "obviousness" opinion7

; (2) that Mr. Ragsdale relies on inadmissible evidence; and (3)

that Mr. Ragsdale improperly opines on "new" evidence in violation of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).8

 None of these

arguments has merit.

First, as Fresenius makes clear in its Opposition brief, Mr. Ragsdale is not providing an expert

opinion on obviousness. Further, considering the fact that Mr. Ragsdale was personally responsible for

the development of the Seratron System, Baxter's assertion that Mr. Ragsdale "lacks personal

knowledge" to state that it "would have required only routine development to replace the membranes

of the prior art Seratron System with a display and touch screen overlay" strains credibility. 

Second, Baxter's unconvincing argument that Mr. Ragsdale is relying on "inadmissible" evidence

is already the basis for Baxter's Motion to Strike Exhibits 1 and 13 to Fresenius' Motion for Summary

Judgment of Invalidity of the Asserted Claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,326,476 and 5,744, 027. However,

as stated in the Order addressing this Motion, Fresenius has met its burden of proving that the PRSM

Specification is both authentic and admissible. Accordingly, this argument does not provide a valid

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reason for striking the Ragsdale Declaration.

Third, Baxter has not persuasively shown that Mr. Ragsdale is offering "new" opinions in his

Declaration based on "new evidence" that was not disclosed to Baxter by the relevant deadline. To the

contrary, as Fresenius points out in its Opposition, Mr. Ragsdale's opinion regarding the battery backup

limitation of Claims 4 and 6 of the '027 Patent were fully set forth in his Expert Report. Further, and

more importantly, Baxter had the source code prior to Mr. Ragsdale's deposition, and had a full

opportunity to depose Mr. Ragsdale with regard to the basis of his opinions during the deposition. In

fact, it is apparent from the deposition transcript that Baxter was aware, at the time of Mr. Ragsdale's

deposition, that Mr. Ragsdale was relying on the source code in forming his opinions. See Gemmell

Decl. at Ex. B (Ragsdale Depo. at 137:23-138:6) (Q: "And in particular you – on page 32 of Exhibit 1,

the middle paragraph, you state that in addition to reviewing the various Seratron system manuals and

other technical data and using your personal knowledge of these systems, you also reviewed the Seratron

system source code from the period of 1980 to 1983"); see also id. at Ex. B (Ragsdale Depo. at 156:19-

22) (Q: "Okay. I will move to the source code here in a minute or two. Don't worry. I'm not going to

pull out five boxes, Todd, and go through them." Mr Miller: "But I would."); see also id. at Ex. B

(Ragsdale Depo. at 162:9-21) (Q: "Let's turn real quickly to source code. I'll only take a couple minutes

on that, and then we can take a break . . . You reviewed the source code in preparing your opinion,

correct?" A: "Correct." Q: "And you have relied on the source code disclosures in forming your

opinions, correct?" A: "I've used the source code to help form the opinion." Q: "Okay."). 

Finally, Baxter's assertion that Mr. Ragsdale has provided a new "opinion" and contradicted his

Expert Report by stating "that the claims [of the '027 Patent] are invalid based on 'the rules of claim

construction as I understand them' . . . and 'as these claims have been interpreted by the Court'" is totally

unfounded. To the contrary, in his Declaration, Mr. Ragsdale clearly acknowledges that certain claims

have not been construed by the Court, and that the rules of claim construction apply to those claims.

See Gemmell Decl. at Ex. C (Ragsdale Decl. at ¶ 21). 

Thus, for all of the reasons set forth above, Baxter's Motion to Strike is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Baxter's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Charles

Ragsdale [Docket No. 487] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: 4/15/06 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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