Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05342/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-05342-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERYL A. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

 v.

D.K. SISTO, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 07-05342 CW

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Teryl Williams is a prisoner of the State of

California, incarcerated at California State Prison - Solano. On

October 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity

of his 2003 state conviction. Respondent filed an opposition on

March 24, 2008. Petitioner filed a traverse on July 22, 2008. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On September 19, 2003, a Sonoma County superior court jury

convicted Petitioner of one count of commercial burglary,

California Penal Code § 459, and one count of receiving stolen

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property, California Penal Code § 496(a). Petitioner subsequently

waived jury trial on the prior-conviction allegations against him,

and admitted that he had a prior “strike” conviction under

California’s “three strikes” law, California Penal Code § 1170.12,

and had served six prison terms, allowing a six-year sentence

enhancement under California Penal Code § 667.5(b). 

On October 16, 2003, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to

twelve years in prison by imposing the upper term of three years on

the burglary conviction, doubling it to six years because of the

prior “strike,” and imposing six consecutive one-year terms for

each of Petitioner’s prior prison terms. The court stayed a fouryear term on the receiving stolen property conviction.

Petitioner timely appealed to the California court of appeal

claiming that there were five reversible errors at trial. On

December 28, 2005, the court of appeal filed a written opinion

rejecting Petitioner’s claims and affirming the judgment. Resp.’s

Ex. F. Petitioner proceeded to the California Supreme Court, which

denied his petition in a one sentence order. Resp.’s Ex. I. On

September 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on April

11, 2007. Resp.’s Ex. K. 

II. Statement of Facts

In its written opinion on direct review, the California court

of appeal summarized the factual background as follows:

Arriving at work in the early morning, Brian Bailey saw a van

protruding into the roadway in front of the business across

the street. Bailey called the police. Officer Paul Gilman

responded to the dispatch, arriving at Dan’s Auto and Truck

Supply (Dan’s Auto) at approximately 5:30 a.m. As he

approached the van, it backed into the parking lot. Gilman

circled around and followed the van when it left the lot. 

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Gilman was unable to obtain information on the van’s owner

because the rear license plate was partially obscured.

Gilman pulled the van over, finding it suspicious that it was

parked outside a closed business. The driver, Ms. Rhone, gave

a name later determined to be false. The driver was only

partially clad; defendant was in the passenger’s seat,

sweating profusely. Neither had proper identification. When

Gilman asked what they were doing behind a closed business,

defendant replied: “We were doing the nasty.” In response to

Gilman’s repeated requests, Rhone turned off the van, donned a

pair of pants, and left the vehicle. Defendant meanwhile

repeatedly tried to move to the back of the van, contrary to

Gilman’s instructions. Gilman then asked defendant to leave

the van so he could search it for identification. Defendant

denied having anything illegal, and turned away from Gilman

with his arms out to his sides. During the ensuing search,

Gilman found wadded-up papers in defendant’s rear pocket that

he suspected might include identification.

Rhone told Gilman she was cold, and asked to get her jacket

from the van. Gilman offered to get it for her, and asked

where it was located. When defendant interjected that she had

no jacket, Rhone asked for a red sweater. Gilman opened the

side passenger doors and saw a black jacket sitting on top of

something behind the front seats. While both Rhone and

defendant denied owning the jacket, Rhone asked to wear it. 

When Rhone put the jacket on, Gilman noticed it was too big

for her.

Returning to the van, Gilman noticed the jacket had covered a

large safe. On top of the safe was a stack of blank checks

from Dan’s Auto. When Gilman examined the papers he had taken

from defendant’s back pocket, he found they were business

receipts from Dan’s Auto, along with currency. The owner of

Dan’s Auto later identified the safe and other items as his

property. The business premises showed signs of forced entry,

and the steps were gouged and smashed, consistent with a heavy

object hitting them. No identifiable fingerprints were found,

but a mark on a calculator appeared to have been made by a

coarse fabric consistent with the pattern on a glove found in

the van. Bolt cutters, tire irons, and pry bars were also

found in the van. Documents with defendant’s name were found

on the dashboard. Several weeks earlier, papers had been

signed transferring ownership of the van to Joyce Williams,

who lived at defendant’s address.

Defendant testified in his own defense, admitting he had three

prior convictions for burglary, one for robbery, and one for

petty theft with a prior. He related that Rhone had paged

him, and he picked her up in Oakland. Defendant asked Rhone

to drive. They stopped at a service station where defendant

tried to repair a car belonging to a friend of Rhone. The

friend was then to take Rhone on to Santa Rosa. As defendant

worked, Rhone left in the van with another man “to do a liquor

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run.” Defendant began drinking and eventually fell asleep.

When defendant awoke, he saw his van being driven by someone

else. Not seeing Rhone, he was angry, assuming she had rented

out the van and “left [him] for dead out there.” Defendant

located the van in a parking lot with its lights on, “looking

kind of, you know, on the suspicious side, you know.” Finding

Rhone asleep inside, he demanded where she had been and

“slapped her all upside the head.” Defendant told Rhone to

“get [him] up out of here,” and she went to the front of the

van, wearing only a shirt. As Rhone drove, defendant kept an

eye on the back of the van, in case there was someone hiding

there who might attack him. Defendant pocketed some money he

found in the front of the van, feeling entitled to it because

of the way Rhone had treated him.

When police stopped the van, defendant thought Rhone would be

arrested for prostitution, so he tried to help her. He

testified he got “run up on a crime. That’s what happened.” 

The jacket covering the safe was not his. He had trouble with

his hands because of his previous injuries and high blood

pressure. When Gilman asked why he appeared sickly, defendant

told him he had arthritis.

Resp.’s Ex. F at 1-3. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a district court may not grant habeas

relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: 

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). The first prong applies both to

questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, id. at

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407-09, and the second prong applies to decisions based on factual

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court

authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1),

only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" 

Supreme Court authority, under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1),

if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The federal

court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the application

must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting the writ.

Id. at 409.

"Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct

absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Miller-El,

537 U.S. at 340. A petitioner must present clear and convincing

evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness under 

§ 2254(e)(1); conclusory assertions will not do. Id. Although

only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth Circuit

precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining

whether a state court decision is objectively unreasonable. Clark

v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

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If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993)).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court

to consider the petitioner's claims, the court looks to the last

reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the state

judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard,

234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). In the present case, the

California court of appeal is the highest court that addressed

Petitioner's claims.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner supports his petition for a writ for habeas corpus

with six separate claims: (1) the trial court wrongfully denied his

suppression motion; (2) the trial court forced him to represent

himself by denying his Marsden motion; (3) the trial court

prejudicially erred by instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.62;

(4) the trial court denied him a fair trial by erroneously

sustaining hearsay objections to his testimony; (5) the trial court

violated his right to a speedy trial; and (6) the trial court’s

decision to give him an upper term sentence violated Cunningham v.

California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).

I. Suppression Motion

On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court

erroneously denied his suppression motion and thus improperly

admitted evidence from an illegal search of the van and his person. 

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According to Petitioner, Officer Gilman had no legal basis for

stopping the van and, therefore, all evidence obtained as a result

of that stop comprised fruit of the poisonous tree. Furthermore,

Petitioner contends that even if the stop was legal, he did not

consent to a search of his person or the van, so the trial court

should not have admitted evidence from those searches, including

the safe, money and receipts. 

Stone v. Powell bars federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment

claims unless the state did not provide an opportunity for full and

fair litigation of those claims. 428 U.S. 465, 481-82, 494 (1976).

All that is required is the opportunity for a fair hearing. Id. at

494; see Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to

litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even

whether the claim was correctly decided.”) Such an opportunity for

a fair hearing forecloses a federal habeas court’s inquiry into the

trial court’s ruling, whether or not the trial court made any

express findings of fact. Caldwell v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th

Cir. 1986). Although Stone did not specify a test for determining

whether a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of a claim, factors to consider are the extent to which

the claims were briefed before and considered by the state trial

and appellate courts. Abell v. Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th

Cir. 1981); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (9th

Cir. 1990). 

The trial court provided Petitioner with a full and fair

opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. Petitioner

brought a written motion to suppress in the trial court. Resp.’s

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1In Marsden, the California Supreme Court held that the trial

court deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel when it denied his motion to

substitute new counsel without giving him an opportunity to state

specific examples of inadequate representation. 2 Cal. 3d 118, 124

(1970).

8

Ex. A-1 at 43-52. The trial court held a hearing on the motion,

heard witness testimony, and gave the parties an opportunity for

further briefing. Resp.’s Ex. B-1 at 5-33. In addition, the court

of appeal considered Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim and upheld

the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. Resp.’s Ex. F

at 4-5. Given that Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate this claim in both the state trial and appellate courts,

this claim is barred on federal habeas review.

II. Marsden Motion

Petitioner contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel by the trial court’s denial of his motion for

substitution of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d

118 (1970).1

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as

a claim of denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which

guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having

produced a just result. Id. 

To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must pass a twoprong test. First, the petitioner must show that counsel's

performance was deficient, falling below an objectively reasonable

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standard. Id. at 687-88. Second, the petitioner must show that

the deficiency prejudiced him. Id. at 687. The first prong of

Strickland requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance

must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689; Wildman v.

Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001). A difference of

opinion as to trial tactics does not constitute denial of effective

assistance, United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir.

1981), and tactical decisions are not ineffective assistance simply

because in retrospect better tactics are known to have been

available. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Tactical decisions of trial counsel deserve deference when: 

(1) counsel in fact bases trial conduct on strategic

considerations; (2) counsel makes an informed decision based upon

investigation; and (3) the decision appears reasonable under the

circumstances. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.

1994).

Under Strickland's second prong, the petitioner must show that

counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688. The test for prejudice is not outcome-determinative, i.e.,

the petitioner need not show that the deficient conduct more likely

than not altered the outcome of the case; however, a simple showing

that the defense was impaired is not sufficient. Id. at 693. The

petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that,

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2

 The record indicates that Petitioner made multiple Marsden

motions. Resp.’s Ex. B-3 at 24. However, the Court only received

a transcript for the Marsden motion made on April 30, 2003. Having

compared the transcript from that motion and Petitioner’s petition

and traverse, it appears that the trial court addressed all of

Petitioner’s complaints against defense counsel during the hearing

on April 30, 2003. 

3

 Petitioner wanted to file a Pitchess motion aimed at the

arresting officer because the officer made an inconsistent

statement; in his report, the officer said that he found receipts

from Dan’s Auto Parts in the back of the van, but at the

suppression motion and preliminary hearing, he testified that he

found the receipts in Petitioner’s back pocket. Pitchess v. Super.

Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 531 (1974). Responding to the trial court’s

questions, defense counsel explained that she did not file a

Pitchess motion because she felt that one inconsistent statement

did not qualify as grounds for a Pitchess motion, given that there

were no other indications that the officer was dishonest or used

excessive force against Petitioner. 

(continued...)

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but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different; a reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

at 694. It is unnecessary for a federal court considering an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to address the prejudice

prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot establish

incompetence under the first prong. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133

F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In his petition for habeas relief, Petitioner makes the same

complaints about his defense counsel as he did in his Marsden

motion and on direct appeal. During the hearing on his Marsden

motion,2 Petitioner explained to the trial court that he did not

trust defense counsel because he felt that she was not interested

in trying his case and believed he was guilty. He complained that

defense counsel did not file motions that he thought were important

for his defense3 and that she showed Rhone’s attorney a letter that

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3(...continued)

Petitioner also complained that defense counsel should have

filed a Brady or Trombetta motion to preserve evidence because the

prosecution planned to present photographs of the safe, checks, and

cash, instead of the actual items. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Petitioner

argued that such motions should have been made and granted because

he never had an opportunity to examine this evidence for

fingerprints. Defense counsel responded that she did not file

these motions because in order to file them she would have to show

that the evidence was exculpatory and that the police knew it and

nonetheless destroyed it. She explained that police had processed

the scene for fingerprints and found only prints made by gloves,

consistent with gloves that were found in the van. Because defense

counsel had nothing to support a claim that exculpatory evidence

had been concealed or knowingly destroyed, she decided not to file

the motions. She also said that she explained this to Petitioner

during one of their meetings.

4 Rhone sent Petitioner a letter in which she stated that she

knew that he was innocent. Petitioner showed the letter to defense

counsel, who then showed it to Rhone’s attorney. By showing the

letter to Rhone’s attorney, Petitioner argued, defense counsel

impaired his defense and breached his attorney-client privilege. 

Defense counsel explained that she made a tactical decision to show

the letter to Rhone’s attorney. Defense counsel hoped that if

Rhone’s attorney knew that Rhone wrote a letter that was

inconsistent with what Rhone told the police, she would advise

Rhone to not testify against Petitioner. The letter was not

privileged because it was a communication between Rhone and

Petitioner, not defense counsel and Petitioner. 

11

Rhone wrote to Petitioner.4

 Resp.’s Ex. B-3 at 3-20. At the

hearing, counsel provided reasons for not filing the motions

Petitioner wanted and for the other action of which he complained. 

Both the trial court and court of appeal found that defense counsel

had valid tactical reasons for not filing the motions and for

showing Rhone’s letter to Rhone’s attorney. Resp.’s Ex. B at 32-

34, Ex. F at 6-7. The court of appeal denied Petitioner’s claim,

noting that under People v. Lucky, a defendant does not have a

right to an attorney who will conduct the defense in accordance

with his wishes. 45 Cal. 3d 259, 281-282 (1988). 

 Petitioner does not meet his burden under Strickland. 

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Petitioner’s complaints regarding defense counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance relate to her strategic decisions. This does

not constitute ineffective assistance under the first prong of the

Strickland test. This claim fails. 

Petitioner also argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated because the trial court forced him to represent himself by

failing to provide him with adequate counsel. He relies on

Crandell v. Bunnell, which states “defendant cannot be forced to

choose between incompetent counsel and no counsel at all.” 144

F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by

Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025. However, in Crandell the trial court

refused to hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant’s

complaints against his counsel had merit, thus forcing the

defendant to represent himself. Id. Here, the trial court held a

hearing and determined that Petitioner had adequate counsel. After

the trial court made its ruling, Petitioner decided to represent

himself. Petitioner was not forced to choose between inadequate

counsel and no counsel, but between counsel he disliked and

representing himself. This is not a denial of the right to

counsel.

The court of appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s claim is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The

Court rejects this claim. 

III. Erroneous Jury Instructions

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due

process rights by erroneously instructing the jury about his

failure during his testimony to explain the evidence against him. 

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A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state

law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus

proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To

obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a

petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by itself so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates

due process. Id. at 72 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147

(1973)). “[I]t must be established not merely that the instruction

is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but

that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant

by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cupp at 146. The instruction may

not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in

the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. 

Id. at 147. In other words, the district court must evaluate the

challenged jury instruction in the context of the overall charge to

the jury and as a component of the entire process. United States

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982).

Petitioner objects to California Jury Instruction 2.62, which

states:

In this case defendant has testified to certain matters.

If you find that the defendant failed to explain or deny any

evidence against him introduced by the prosecution which he

can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts

within his knowledge, you may take that failure into

consideration as tending to indicate the truth of this

evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may

reasonably be drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the

defendant are the most probable. 

The failure of a defendant to deny or explain evidence against

him does not, by itself, warrant an inference of guilt, nor

does it relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every

essential element of the crime and the guilt of the defendant

beyond a reasonable doubt.

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If a defendant does not have the knowledge that he would need

to deny or to explain evidence against him it would be

unreasonable to draw an inference unfavorable to him because

of his failure to deny or explain this evidence.

CALJIC No. 2.62. Petitioner argues that this instruction was not

justified and that it adversely impacted his due process rights to

put on a defense. Petitioner also contends that the trial court

erred by giving this instruction without discussing with Petitioner

and the prosecutor whether any aspect of his testimony merited the

instruction. In addition, Petitioner claims that the trial court

should have given him an opportunity to explain any matter that the

prosecution would argue constituted a “failure to deny or explain.” 

The court of appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim, noting that

Petitioner cited no authority to support any of his arguments

regarding CALJIC 2.62. Citing People v. Saddler and other

California cases, the court of appeal stated that CALJIC 2.62 does

not violate a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination,

deny him the presumption of innocence, or violate due process. 

24 Cal.3d 671, 678-80 (1979). The court of appeal also relied on

People v. Mask, to find that the instruction was proper when a

defendant gives a “bizarre or implausible” explanation for his

activities. 188 Cal. App. 3d 450, 455 (1986). Finally, the court

of appeal determined that even if the instruction was erroneous,

Petitioner failed to show that a different result would have been

reasonably probable absent the alleged error. 

The United States Supreme Court has upheld similar jury

instructions, finding that an accused who takes the stand “may not

stop short in his testimony by omitting and failing to explain

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incriminating circumstances and events already in evidence, in

which he participated and concerning which he is fully informed,

without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be naturally

drawn from it.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494

(1917). Thus, the court of appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s claim

was not an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court

authority. 

IV. Hearsay Objections

Petitioner argues that the trial court deprived him of due

process and a fair trial by excluding defense testimony as hearsay

on two occasions. The court of appeal described the circumstances

as follows:

While representing himself and testifying on his own behalf in

a narrative format, defendant tried to relate what Rhone said

when she asked him to drive her to Santa Rosa, where the

burglary occurred. Defendant testified Rhone had paged him,

and asked him to take her to Santa Rosa using her friend

Harris’s van. When defendant expressed reluctance, Rhone

reportedly persisted, saying: “Terry, I know somebody in Santa

Rosa. Terry, just come on. Take me to Santa Rosa, Terry. 

It’s going to be all good, okay?” The court sustained the

prosecutor’s hearsay objection, and struck the testimony. The

court explained to defendant that “you cannot give testimony

about what somebody else said outside the courtroom.” During

the subsequent testimony of his investigator, defendant asked

him what the owner of Dan’s Auto had told him about the

burglary. The court again sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay

objection.

Resp.’s Ex F at 7. The court of appeal’s denial of this claim was

based on Petitioner’s failure to raise it properly at the trial

court level:

On appeal, defendant contends Rhone’s statements were not

offered for their truth, but to show his innocent state of

mind. He contends he was entitled to impeach the owner of

Dan’s Auto with any inconsistent statements he had made to the

investigator. These theories were not presented to the trial

court, and were, therefore, waived. Although defendant

candidly admits “we are not in a position to state exactly

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5 The court of appeal did not specifically refer to California

Evidence Code section 354. However, both Petitioner and the state

referred to section 354 in their briefs to the court of appeal. 

Resp.’s Ex. C at 42-43; Resp.’s Ex. E at 10-11; Resp.’s Ex. D at

36, 38-40. The court of appeal used the language of section 354 in

its decision, stating that Petitioner’s claim that “an offer of

(continued...)

16

what facts would have been shown by the improperly excluded

testimony,” he contends the rulings are nevertheless

reviewable, because an offer of proof would have been futile,

and the evidence was clearly admissible. The record supports

no such conclusions.

Resp.’s Ex. F at 7. 

 A federal court will not review questions of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision also rests on a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to

support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30

(1991). For a state procedural rule to be independent, the state

law basis for the rule must not be interwoven with federal law. La

Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 703 (9th Cir. 2001). To be

"adequate," the state procedural rule must be "clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner's

purported default." Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Bean),

96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). In addition, to bar federal habeas review, the

state court must have clearly and expressly invoked the default

through a "plain statement." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265-66

(1989).

The procedural bar here arises from California Evidence Code

section 354, which requires that Petitioner make the “substance,

purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence” known to the trial

court to preserve the issue for appellate review.5 Petitioner

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5(...continued)

proof would have been futile” was not supported by the record. 

Resp.’s Ex. F at 7. Thus, the Court will consider section 354 in

its analysis of Petitioner’s claim. 

6 California Evidence Code section 354 states:

A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment

or decision based thereon be reversed by reason of the erroneous

exclusion of evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect

of the error of errors is of the opinion that:

(a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded

evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked,

an offer of proof, or by any other means;

(b) The rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision

(a) futile; or

(c) The evidence was sought by questions asked during crossexamination or recross-examination.

7 Fla. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 3.190(i)

17

could also satisfy section 354 by demonstrating that making an

offer of proof to the trial court would have been futile.6 Cal.

Evid. Code § 354(b). The court of appeal found that Petitioner did

not satisfy either of these requirements, and therefore found that

Petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim.

California Evidence Code section 354 is an adequate and

independent state procedural rule under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977). The Court in Wainwright found an adequate

and independent state procedural rule in a Florida rule7 similar to

the one here, holding that habeas review is not available for

“contentions of federal law which were not resolved on the merits

in the state proceeding due to respondent’s failure to raise them

there as required by state procedure.” Id. Furthermore, section

354 is well-established and has been consistently applied by the

California courts. See People v. Ramos, 15 Cal. 4th 1133, 1178

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(1997); People v. Rodriguez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 770, 777 (1969);

Rogan v. Henry, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8579, 7 (N.D. Cal.). 

A federal court may hear the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim only if the petitioner can demonstrate cause for

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The cause

standard requires a petitioner to show that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded his efforts to construct or raise

the claim. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991). To show

“actual prejudice” a petitioner must not merely show that the error

created a possibility of prejudice, but that it “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady,

456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982). Petitioner has not shown cause or actual

prejudice. 

“[E]ven if a state prisoner cannot meet the cause and

prejudice standard, a federal court may still hear the merits of a

procedurally defaulted claim if the failure to hear the claim would

constitute a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505

U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992). This exception only applies to habeas

petitioners who can show that a “constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). To show

actual innocence, a “petitioner must show that in light of all the

evidence, including new evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th

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Cir. 1997) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314). Petitioner contends

that if he had been allowed to explain his innocent state of mind,

the jury may have returned a different verdict. This conclusory

statement does not satisfy the “actual innocence” standard and

cannot overcome the fact that there was overwhelming physical

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. Rhone’s hearsay statements

indicating that she had persuaded Petitioner to drive her to Santa

Rosa were not exculpatory. And, although Petitioner argues that he

was entitled to impeach the owner of Dan’s Auto with any

inconsistent statements, he does not make a showing of what the

inconsistent statement was or how it would impeach the witness. 

Because Petitioner has failed to show actual innocence, his claim

is procedurally barred from the Court’s review. 

V. Right to a Speedy Trial

Petitioner claims that the trial court failed to bring him to

trial within sixty days of his arraignment which violated his right

to a speedy trial under California law. California requires a

trial court to dismiss a case, unless good cause to the contrary is

shown, “when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of

the defendant’s arraignment on an indictment or information, or

reinstatement of criminal proceedings . . . .” Cal. Penal Code 

§ 1382(a)(2). 

Petitioner was arraigned on March 13, 2003. On April 30,

2003, Petitioner’s counsel requested, under California Penal Code

section 1368, that the court suspend the criminal proceedings and

appoint a mental health professional to determine whether

Petitioner was competent to stand trial. The trial court granted

the motion. On May 29, 2003, after the mental health professional

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8

 In all of his state court pleadings, Petitioner framed his

speedy trial claim only as a violation of California Penal Code

section 1382(a)(2). Because Petitioner did not raise the Sixth

Amendment claim in his state petitions, it is unexhausted. 

Although it is unexhausted, the Court has the authority to deny it

on the merits, "when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does

not raise even a colorable federal claim." Cassett v. Stewart, 406

F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

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found Petitioner competent to stand trial, the trial court

reinstated the criminal proceedings and set the jury trial for July

14, 2003. On June 19, 2003, Petitioner, by then representing

himself, made a motion to dismiss under California Penal Code

section 1382(a)(2). The trial court denied the motion on the

grounds that section 1382(a)(2) provides that the sixty-day speedy

trial period begins anew when a case is reinstated, which in

Petitioner’s case was on May 29, 2003. Resp.’s Ex. B-1 at 75-76.

“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; see also Pulley v. Harris,

465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ on

the basis of a perceived error of state law.”) Petitioner’s

argument is that the trial court misconstrued California law when

it denied his motion. Therefore, the Court rejects this claim. 

For the first time in his traverse, Petitioner argues that the

trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.8

To determine whether the speedy trial right has been violated,

courts must apply a flexible "functional analysis." Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). The courts must consider and

weigh the following factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the

reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right;

and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Doggett v. United States, 505

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9 The police did not lose this evidence but returned the items

to their owners. Resp.’s Ex. B-5 at 14-18, 23-24.

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U.S. 647, 651 (1992); Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; United States v.

Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 2001), amended, 262 F.3d 1033 (9th

Cir. 2001). None of the four factors is either a necessary or

sufficient condition for finding a speedy trial deprivation. 

Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. They are related and must be considered

together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Id.

However, the length of the delay is to some extent a threshold

question. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52. Unless it is long enough

to be considered "presumptively prejudicial," there is no necessity

for inquiry into the other factors. Id. Generally the trial

courts have found post-accusation delay presumptively prejudicial

at least if it approaches one year. Id. at 652. However, the

peculiar circumstances of each case, including the nature of the

charges, must be considered. Id. at 656-57. 

Petitioner’s trial started on September 15, 2003, about six

months after his arraignment. This six-month delay does not meet

the standard for a presumption of prejudice.

Although this delay does not raise a presumption of prejudice,

Petitioner claims that the delay resulted in actual prejudice in

that it affected his ability to examine the physical evidence in

his case because the government either lost or destroyed evidence -

- the safe, the money, and the van he was in at the time of his

arrest -- before he had a chance to search for fingerprints and

other proof of his innocence.9 The record refutes Petitioner’s

claim that the six-month delay caused any loss of evidence. 

Petitioner made this same argument regarding the loss of physical

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evidence at his Marsden hearing on April 30, 2003. Resp.’s Ex. B-3

at 14-19. If the evidence was gone on April 30, 2003, which was

less than two months after his arraignment, the six-month delay had

no effect on this loss. Thus, the delay did not cause prejudice to

Petitioner. The denial of this claim is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 

VI. Application of Cunningham v. California

As noted above, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to twelve

years. The court considered Petitioner’s criminal history

beginning in 1975 and noted that, since 1975, he had not spent a

long period of time out of custody. The trial court then

calculated Petitioner’s twelve year sentence in the following

manner:

In Count I, the 459, you’re sentenced to the aggravated term,

the factors in aggravation being the fact that the way the

crime was carried out indicates professionalism, in that there

were tools associated with burglaries utilized here. There

was planning that was evident, and because of the type of the

offense and also the plan to go into the store and get the

safe.

You have previously engaged in violent conduct, which

indicates you’re a serious danger to society. Your prior

convictions as an adult and sustained petitions as a juvenile

are numerous. You were on a grant of felony probation out of

Alameda County when the crime was committed, and your poor

performance on probation and state parole were unsatisfactory. 

Therefore, the court selects the aggravated term. That will

be a three-year term doubled by the presence of the strike

which was admitted, for six years.

As to Count II, the 496(a), the court will stay punishment

pursuant to 654 of the Penal Code.

There are six additional one-year consecutive sentences

imposed pursuant to 667.5(b) of the Penal Code for the

convictions that were sustained on 1/3/97; September 14, ‘82;

September 17, ‘84; January 16, 1990; March 4, 1993; and

January 5th 1998. Adding those to the six years gives a total

commitment of six years -- excuse me -- 12 years.

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Resp.’s Ex. B-5 at 549-50. Petitioner claims that the imposition

of the upper term on the burglary conviction violated his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights under Blakey v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004), because the trial court, rather than the jury,

determined that there were aggravating circumstances. Petitioner

argues that he should have received the middle term of two years

for the burglary conviction. If the two years were doubled because

of the prior strike, his sentence would be four years, plus the six

one-year sentences, which would bring the total term to ten years,

instead of twelve years.

On direct review, the court of appeal upheld Petitioner’s

twelve year sentence. The court of appeal relied on People v.

Black, 35 Cal. 4th 1238, 1244 (2005) (Black I) (holding that

California’s Determinate Sentencing Law does not violate a criminal

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by assigning to the trial judge,

rather than the jury, the authority to make the factual findings

that subject the defendant to an upper-term sentence). 

Subsequently, in Cunningham v. California, the United States

Supreme Court overruled Black I and held that California's

determinate sentencing law was unconstitutional because it allowed

the judge, not the jury, to find the facts permitting the court to

impose an upper-term sentence. 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007).

In light of Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court

granted Petitioner certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded

to the state court of appeal for further consideration of

Petitioner’s sentence. Resp.’s Ex. J. After receiving

supplemental briefing from both parties, the court of appeal again

affirmed Petitioner’s sentence as follows:

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The People argue that no Cunningham error occurred, because

the court relied in part on factors related to defendant’s

prior convictions, as to which he had no right to a jury trial

under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, (1998) 523 U.S. 224. 

On this record we have no difficulty concluding beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the court would have imposed the same

sentence if it only considered defendant’s nine prior felony

convictions and status on parole at the time of the offense

and not the aggravating factors that Cunningham requires be

found by a jury. (Chapman v. California, (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Resp.’s Ex. N at 2-3. 

The court of appeal’s decision is not contrary to nor is it an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In

Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court held that,

"other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 

530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000). In Cunningham, the Court reaffirmed

the prior conviction exception, stating that the Sixth Amendment

jury trial requirement does not apply to the fact of “prior

conviction.” 549 U.S. at 282 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S.

224, 239-247 (1998)). Furthermore, the court of appeal’s

application of Chapman’s “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” test

was consistent with established federal law because the Supreme

Court has held that “failure to submit a sentencing factor to a

jury” is subject to Chapman’s harmless error rule. Washington v.

Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 213 (2006); see also Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637 (petitioner is entitled to relief only if the sentencing error

had a substantial and injurious effect on the sentence.) The court

of appeal reasonably decided that the trial court would have given

Petitioner the upper-term sentence based only on Petitioner’s prior

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10 After the court of appeal reached its decision in

Petitioner’s case, the California Supreme Court decided People v.

Black, 41 Cal. 4th 799 (2007) (Black II). The court held that as

“long as a defendant is eligible for the upper term by . . . facts

that have been established consistently with Sixth Amendment

principles” the trial court can also rely on aggravating factors

that have not been determined by a jury. Id. at 813. Petitioner

argues that Black II is inconsistent with Cunningham. Whether

Black II is inconsistent with Cunningham is not an issue that the

Court needs to address. The court of appeal reaffirmed

Petitioner’s sentence on remand before the California Supreme Court

decided Black II and therefore did not rely on it.

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convictions, which does not require a finding by a jury. 

Therefore, the court of appeal’s decision to affirm Petitioner’s

sentence is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court authority.10

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is denied. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and

close the file. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERYL A. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

D.K. SISTO et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-05342 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 8, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Teryl A. Williams V11316

California State Prison Solano

P.O. Box 4000

Vacaville, CA 95696-4000

Dated: February 8, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Ronnie Hersler, Deputy Clerk

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