Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01910/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01910-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN E. EBERHARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01910-JD 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 60, 67

This lawsuit was brought by Stephen Eberhard, a photojournalist, who alleges that he was 

harassed and unlawfully arrested by officers of the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”). In 

addition to suing the CHP and the officers themselves, Eberhard also sued the California 

Department of Transportation (known as “Caltrans”), California Highway Patrol Chief Bridget 

Lott, and California Department of Transportation District 1 Director Charlie Fielder. The Court 

previously dismissed his allegations against the latter three defendants, but gave Eberhard an 

opportunity to amend his complaint to overcome the deficiencies the Court identified. See Dkt. 

No. 49. He did so in a second amended complaint, see Dkt. No. 51, and another round of motions 

to dismiss by the same three defendants followed. See Dkt. Nos. 60, 67. Because the Court finds 

that the newly-added allegations are not sufficient to save the repleaded claims, the Court again 

dismisses the allegations against Caltrans, Lott, and Fielder.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The main fact allegations in Eberhard’s lawsuit are summarized in the Court’s prior motion 

to dismiss order. See Dkt. No. 49 at 1-3. To recap briefly, Eberhard reported for The Willits 

News (“TWN”) newspaper on a construction project called the Willits Bypass Project. He alleges

that after a campaign of harassment against him by CHP officers, he was arrested early in the 

morning of July 23, 2013, after a protest took place on the project site. After his arrest was 

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condemned by a number of newspapers, CHP Chief Bridget Lott and Caltrans District 1 Director 

Charlie Fielder wrote a joint letter to the editor stating that Eberhard was arrested because he had 

“trespassed” and “refused a lawful order to exit.” They later published a modified letter stating 

that Eberhard was directed by an officer to leave and that he was arrested not because of his 

profession but because he refused to leave a construction site. Lott also wrote to a journalism 

organization called the Society of Environmental Journalists, defending the CHP’s actions in the 

Eberhard case. 

Eberhard’s second amended complaint is now the operative complaint in this case, and 

broadly speaking, it adds two new sets of allegations to patch up the claims the Court found 

insufficiently pleaded in its previous order. It alleges that Caltrans was responsible for CHP’s 

behavior because of a contractual relationship between Caltrans and CHP known as the 

“COZEEP” -- short for Construction Zone Enhanced Enforcement Program -- that provides for 

CHP security on or near the site of Caltrans projects. See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

¶¶ 28-37, Dkt. No. 51. Under the COZEEP contract, Caltrans is financially responsible for CHP’s 

personnel costs, see SAC ¶ 29, specifies tasks for CHP to perform, id. ¶ 30, and is required to 

prepare daily reports signed by the Caltrans project supervisor and the senior CHP officer assigned 

to the project site, id. ¶ 31.

The second amended complaint adds that Lott and Fielder were responsible not just for the 

post-arrest letters, but also for Eberhard’s arrest. The most specific allegations on this score are 

found at paragraphs 32 and 33 of the second amended complaint:

32. Under the COZEEP contractual arrangement, as soon as a 

month before Eberhard’s arrest, CHP Chief Lott specifically notified 

CALTRANS Director Fielder that CHP would not take action on the 

site against those individuals entering unauthorized on to the site 

until and unless the very head of CALTRANS, Director Malcolm 

Dougherty, provided direction to the very head of CHP, 

Commissioner Joseph Farrow.

33. In an email, dated June 20, 2013, to CHP Commissioner 

Warren Stanley, Chief Lott confirmed that CALTRANS had been 

informed that any direction from CALTRANS with respect to 

individuals trespassing on the bypass project site was to come 

directly to her from the Director level at CALTRANS, which is 

believed and thereon alleged to be a reference to Director Fielder.

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The second amended complaint also alleges that Lott told TWN’s editor about a week after the 

arrest that she had been made aware of a May 21, 2013 incident where Eberhard says he was 

shoved by a CHP officer. See id. ¶¶ 70, 47. Finally, the second amended complaint refers to 

emails indicating that on one occasion on June 27, 2013, Caltrans directed CHP to remove 

trespassers from the project right of way, and on another occasion, Lott and Fielder agreed that no 

action would be taken by CHP against a specific protester without direction from “the highest 

levels at CALTRANS.” See id. ¶¶ 34-35.

The complaint contains other new allegations,1but the Court focuses on the ones 

summarized above, since they go to the deficiencies identified in the prior order.

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 

facially plausible when there are sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that 

the defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. While a court “must take all of the 

factual allegations in the complaint as true,” it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

DISCUSSION

The moving defendants seek to dismiss counts five (a First Amendment retaliation claim), 

six (a due process “stigma-plus” claim), eight (a state law false arrest and false imprisonment 

claim), and twelve (declaratory relief), with respect to Lott, Fielder, and Caltrans, as well as 

Eberhard’s request for injunctive relief against Caltrans.

 

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For example, the complaint details various pseudonymous comments on social media that were 

allegedly posted by a Caltrans employee, see id. ¶¶ 22-23, and an incident where Eberhard 

promised a place in a Caltrans press tour of the project site but was left behind in the parking lot, 

see id. ¶ 41.

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I. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM

Eberhard’s First Amendment retaliation claim is alleged against Lott and Fielder, but fails 

to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) with respect to both defendants because he has not adequately pleaded that 

they had a retaliatory motive or that their actions had a chilling effect on First Amendment 

activities.

A. Retaliatory Motive

A necessary element to any retaliation claim against a government official under the First 

Amendment is that deterring or chilling the plaintiff’s speech was a “substantial or motivating 

factor” in the official’s conduct. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(en banc). Eberhard correctly points out that this motive can be shown through circumstantial 

evidence, see Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300-01 (9th 

Cir. 1999), and circumstantial allegations are what he must rely on, since he does not allege the 

existence of any “smoking gun” statements from Lott or Fielder that reveal their animus against 

Eberhard’s reportage. But the allegations that Eberhard makes have alternative and more plausible

explanations than retaliatory intent. Under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, such alternative 

explanations fatally undermine the sufficiency of the pleadings. 550 U.S. 544, 567-68 (2007). 

Eberhard contends that the fact that Lott and Fielder published their initial statements 

about his arrest three days after the event shows retaliatory motive. But as the Court previously 

stated, this timing can be explained just as plausibly by a desire to make their point of view heard

before the end of the news cycle, rather than by animus against Eberhard. See Dkt. No. 49 at 6:16-

20. Eberhard also points to various instances of allegedly unfair treatment at the hands of Caltrans 

and CHP -- being excluded from the project site despite having an escort, and being treated more 

harshly than other protesters on the morning of July 23, 2013. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 48 at 22:1-11, 41 

at 15:1-9. The problem is that even if these actions were indicative of a desire to retaliate against 

Eberhard for his journalism, none of them are attributed to Lott and Fielder. Indeed, Eberhard 

concedes in his brief that Lott “did not personally engage in the persistent pattern of harassment 

and intimidation to which Eberhard was subjected in the months preceding his arrest.” See Dkt. 

No. 68 at 11:22-23. Eberhard goes on to contend that Lott’s letter to the Society of Environmental 

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Journalists falsely stated that he was “originally acting as part of a group of protesters” but 

remained after the other protesters had left the site as requested -- and that Lott should have known 

that this statement was false because she later acknowledged to Eberhard’s editor that he was a 

photojournalist, and because CHP’s arrest report noted that Eberhard was a member of the press 

and had “entered the site from a different area than w[h]ere the protesters were gathered.” See

SAC ¶¶ 71, 73. But Lott’s characterization of Eberhard in her letter is not necessarily inconsistent 

with the arrest report: the fact that he was a journalist and entered the site from a different area 

does not preclude “acting as part of a group of protesters.” Indeed, Lott’s letter itself implicitly 

acknowledges that Eberhard was a member of the media; it simply says that on that occasion he 

had assumed another role. See id. ¶ 71. In any event, it is simply implausible that writing a letter 

with a debatable characterization of the events set forth in Eberhard’s arrest record is evidence that 

Lott intended to retaliate against Eberhard for his speech. Finally, Eberhard states that Lott 

acknowledged being aware of one earlier incident involving Eberhard, and oversaw the officials at 

whose hands Eberhard suffered mistreatment. See SAC ¶¶ 70, 8. Neither of these allegations 

shows that she intended to retaliate against Eberhard.

Because Eberhard has failed to show a retaliatory motive, his First Amendment retaliation 

claim fails. For the sake of completeness, the Court will also explain why he has not properly 

alleged that Lott and Fielder’s actions had a chilling effect, independently undermining the 

adequacy of the First Amendment retaliation claim.

B. Chilling Effect

A plaintiff alleging First Amendment retaliation must also show that the defendant’s 

actions had a chilling effect on the plaintiff or “would chill or silence a person of ordinary 

firmness from future First Amendment activities.” See Lacey, 693 F.3d at 916. Eberhard’s bases 

his claim that Lott and Fielder’s letters had a chilling effect mainly on his editor’s decision to take 

him off the Willits bypass story, the same argument he made and the Court rejected last time 

around. See Dkt. No. 49 at 9:9-18. He argues, as he must, that it is irrelevant to the First 

Amendment analysis that the actions taken against him were by his editor, rather than the 

government actor defendants. On the contrary, it is very relevant. Otherwise, there is no making 

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sense of Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, which held that defamation by a public official is 

insufficient to state a First Amendment retaliation claim unless the official knows or reasonably 

should have known that the defamation would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of a federallyprotected right. 40 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1994) (“For any defamation and damage flowing 

from it, Gini has a tort remedy under state law, not under the First Amendment.”). Eberhard 

presents no plausible allegations that a federally-protected right of his was infringed as a result of

Lott and Fielder’s statements, much less that they knew or reasonably should have known that 

their statements would have that result. Eberhard’s sole citation in support of his position, Cooper 

v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1535 n.28 (9th Cir. 1991), is dicta addressing the availability of 

damages for loss of employment and residence inflicted by third parties in the context of a stigmaplus claim, not liability under the First Amendment retaliation claim being considered here. If 

Lott and Fielder’s letters defamed Eberhard, his remedies lie in a defamation claim; the mere fact 

that they are public officials does not transform their actions into a constitutional violation.

Eberhard has added some additional allegations to bolster his claim of a chilling effect in 

paragraph 113 of the second amended complaint, which states in part that “[i]t is believed and 

thereon alleged that other CHP officers on the bypass project site similarly believe the false and 

defamatory implications from Eberhard’s arrest and the statements issued by Lott and Fielder in 

connection with that arrest, and consequently Eberhard ... has had undue time restrains placed on 

his access to newsworthy events while within the bypass project area ....” But even putting aside 

the adequacy of the confusing circumlocutions in which these allegations are couched, these acts 

cannot form the basis for Eberhard’s chilling effect because they were not committed by Lott or 

Fielder, and there is no plausible allegation that Lott and Fielder knew or reasonably should have 

known that they would result from their statements. Eberhard “must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Lott and Fielder are not automatically responsible for the actions of the 

CHP officers.

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II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT “STIGMA-PLUS” CLAIM

Although defamation by a government official alone does not constitute an actionable 

violation of the Constitution, a government action that combines the “stigma of a damaged 

reputation” with the deprivation of some “protected liberty or property interest or a status 

recognized by the state” can violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The latter deprivation is 

the “plus” in what has come to be referred to as a “stigma-plus” claim. At oral argument, 

Eberhard pointed to two alleged “pluses”: retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and his 

arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The previous section explained why the former 

theory is inadequately pleaded, and this section explains why the latter is as well.

Eberhard’s “stigma-plus” claim, which is alleged against Lott and Fielder, fails because the 

second amended complaint contains no plausible, non-conclusory allegations of actions taken by 

Lott or Fielder, as opposed to CHP’s officers, that violated Eberhard’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Eberhard alleges that Lott needed a green light from a Caltrans director in order to take action 

against unauthorized entrants, which at best might permit an inference (albeit a tenuous one) that 

Lott received authorization from Caltrans to proceed against Eberhard based on the fact that 

Eberhard was arrested. See SAC ¶¶ 32-33. But not all actions against unauthorized entrants are 

Fourth Amendment violations. That Lott personally authorized CHP action against Eberhard early 

the morning of July 23, 2013, stretches the bounds of what can plausibly be inferred from the 

complaint; that she or Fielder ordered (or even merely took some action that inexorably led to) an 

illegal arrest is neither adequately alleged nor inferable from what is alleged. It is the latter 

allegation that Eberhard needs to make out in order to successfully plead a “stigma-plus” claim 

against Lott and Fielder based on their violating his Fourth Amendment rights.

Consequently, the Court dismisses count six of the second amended complaint, which is 

alleged against Lott and Fielder.

III. FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT

The second amendment complaint also alleges state law false arrest and false 

imprisonment claims against CHP and Caltrans -- and, in contrast to the first amended complaint, 

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against Lott and Fielder. Lott and Fielder were added even though the Court prohibited adding 

new causes of action or parties in its prior order. See Dkt. No. 49 at 14:16-17 (“No new causes of 

action or parties may be added -- the amendments may seek to cure only the defects in the 

dismissed claims”). Even though this would be reason enough to dismiss these claims with 

respect to Lott and Fielder, the Court proceeds to dismiss them on the merits as well.

False imprisonment under California law is the “unlawful violation of the personal liberty 

of another.” Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 842, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). False 

arrest is not a different tort; it is merely “one way of committing a false imprisonment.” Collins v. 

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 123 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). With respect to Lott 

and Fielder, the claim clearly fails because Eberhard has not shown their personal involvement in 

his arrest. “[A] chief of police is not personally liable for the tortious acts of his subordinates 

‘unless he has directed such acts to be done or has personally co-operated therein,’” or if he has 

countenanced the tortious acts.” See Kangieser v. Zink, 134 Cal. App. 2d 559, 285 P.2d 950 (Cal. 

App. Ct. 1955). While Eberhard concedes the lack of any allegations that Caltrans, Fielder, or 

Lott actually ordered the CHP officers to arrest Eberhard, he claims that this can be reasonably 

inferred from the fact that a Caltrans employee witnessed Eberhard’s arrest, the existence of the 

COZEEP contract, and the emails suggesting that approval from Caltrans was needed before CHP 

would take action against unauthorized entrants to the project site. See SAC ¶¶ 28, 31-34, 37.

As discussed in the previous section, however, the allegations that Eberhard points to at 

most suggest that consent from Lott, Fielder, and Caltrans was needed before action would be 

taken against trespassers, but they do not suggest that any of those defendants ordered or 

countenanced Eberhard’s allegedly unlawful arrest the morning of July 23, 2013. Absent an 

allegation from which such an order or authorization can be inferred, the claim is inadequately 

pleaded and must be dismissed with respect to those three defendants.

IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

The Court’s rulings with respect to the substantive claims discussed above mean that the 

Court need not consider Lott and Fielder’s qualified immunity defenses, and that Eberhard’s 

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claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Caltrans, Lott, and Fielder fail for the reasons 

given in the Court’s prior order. See Dkt. No. 49 at 13:17-14:11.

CONCLUSION

After the hearing on the motions that are the subject of this order, Eberhard filed a motion 

to file a third amended complaint with additional allegations. See Dkt. No. 73. The Court is 

mindful that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2)’s instruction that “[t]he court should freely 

give leave when justice so requires” must be “applied with extreme liberality” in this circuit. See

C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)). As a result, 

Eberhard will be given one last opportunity to amend his claims with respect to Caltrans, Lott, and 

Fielder. The Court will not set a deadline, and suggests that Eberhard wait until discovery has 

progressed sufficiently for him to be confident that his amended allegations will not need further 

refinement. The Court provisionally denies his motion to file a third amended complaint with 

respect to the new allegations against Caltrans, Lott, and Fielder, so that Eberhard can evaluate its 

adequacy in light of the Court’s order, but if he chooses to, he is welcome to use his one remaining 

chance to amend by renewing the motion. The Court does not deny the motion to file a third 

amended complaint with respect to the new allegations against CHP Officer Epperson; that motion 

will be briefed and heard on the current schedule. Defendants’ motion to continue the hearing 

date and the deadline to file oppositions to the motion to file a third amended complaint is denied 

as moot. See Dkt. No. 76.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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