Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01253/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel J. Foschi, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Dennis M. Pennella, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-01253-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Conditionally as a Collective 

and Class Action (Doc. 22), Defendants’ Response (Doc. 28) and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 

29). Plaintiff asks the Court to certify a collective action brought under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging Defendants paid Plaintiff and fellow class members 

less than minimum wage and failed to pay increased wages for overtime work. In 

addition, Plaintiff seeks certification of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) class of 

workers to whom Defendant failed to provide minimum wage, as required by Arizona 

state law. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion will be granted in part and 

denied in part at this time. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Since October 2004, Plaintiff has worked as a delivery driver and dispatcher for 

Defendant Drivers Solutions, which describes itself as “a complete delivery service 

company that specializes in automotive parts distribution and comprehensive logistics.” 

Doc. 1-1 at 8 (quoting Defendant’s website). According to Defendant, it dispatches its 

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workers to auto dealerships, including dozens in the metropolitan Phoenix area, where 

they often negotiate the terms of their client relationships directly with the dealerships. 

Doc. 28 at 4. Defendant’s contracts with its workers, who have numbered up to 500 

since 2007, include “monthly contracts, daily contracts, special-day-rate contracts 

(usually for weekends) and per-delivery or Hot Shots contracts.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff’s 

responsibilities as a driver include participating in morning roll call with a supervisor, 

delivering parts from the dealership warehouse to vendors, transporting car parts from 

vendors or other dealerships to the warehouse, collecting payment from vendors and 

distributing parts among warehouse bins. Doc. 1-1 at 9. As a dispatcher, Plaintiff creates 

routes for other drivers, drafts manifests and distributes them to drivers, supervises a 

group of eight to ten drivers, and requests transfers for unsatisfactory drivers. Id. at 10. 

 Plaintiff alleges, “[u]pon information and belief,” that these duties are similar to 

the responsibilities of other drivers and dispatchers who work for Defendant. Id. 

Plaintiff further alleges that, in addition to imposing a $25 penalty for calling in sick, 

Defendant deducts $120 if he or “similarly situated drivers” miss work or leave early. Id.

at 11. In addition, Plaintiff—and, “[u]pon information and belief, other drivers”—must 

pay Defendant $20 semi-monthly to use a two-way radio, as well as $22 for each work 

shirt, which they are required to wear. Id. Plaintiff and other drivers are allegedly 

personally responsible for purchasing “items required by the company such as: a 

telephone, mapbook, car insurance, car maintenance, and straps/bungee cords.” Id. 

Finally, Defendant allegedly takes “standard paycheck deductions” for contractor 

insurance coverage, advances, and interest charged on advances. Id. at 10-11. The 

cumulative effect of these practices, according to Plaintiff, is that his gross pay usually 

falls below the minimum wage. Id. at 12. 

 Separately, Plaintiff alleges that since January 2007, he has regularly worked 

between 45 and 53 hours per week, including on about 80 percent of Saturdays. Id. 

Defendant allegedly failed to compensate Plaintiff for these overtime hours at one-and-ahalf times his normal hourly rate. Id. Plaintiff alleges in his Motion, for the first time, 

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that this failure owes to Defendant’s decision to misclassify him and other members of 

the potential class as independent contractors. Doc. 22 at 14. 

 In May 2014, Plaintiff filed suit in Maricopa County Superior Court against 

Defendants—Drivers Solutions and its owners, Dennis and Mary Pennella—for (1) 

willfully failing to compensate him for overtime work, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207, 

(2) willfully failing to pay him at least the federal minimum wage, as required by 29 

U.S.C. § 206, and (3) willfully failing to pay him at least the Arizona state minimum 

wage, as required by A.R.S. § 23-363(A). Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts that it is brought 

on behalf not only of Plaintiff, but also of “all other similarly situated employees who 

work, or have worked, for Defendants and who have not been paid the requisite overtime 

compensation” since January 1, 2007. Doc. 1-1 at 6. On June 6, 2014, Defendants 

removed the case to this Court, and Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 15, 2014, 

seeking certification of proposed collective and class actions and requesting that the 

Court order notice be sent to potential class members. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Fair Labor Standards Act

 1. Legal standard 

 “The FLSA provides that a covered employer shall not employ any employee ‘for 

a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his 

employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and onehalf times the regular rate at which he is employed.’” Wood v. TriVita, Inc., No. CV-08-

0765-PHX-SRB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64585, at *3-4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2009) (quoting 

29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)). The law also mandates that “[e]very employer shall pay to each 

of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of 

goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce, wages” that are “not less than” specified statutory 

rates. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). “Any employer who violates the provisions of [§ 206 or § 

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207] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid 

minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an 

additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. § 216(b). An action to recover these 

damages “may be maintained against any employer ... in any Federal or State court of 

competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or 

themselves and other employees similarly situated.” Id. “The FLSA requires class 

members who are not named in the complaint to affirmatively opt in to the class by filing 

a written consent with the Court.” Wood, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64585, at *5 (citing 29 

U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 256). “The district court has discretion to determine whether a 

collective action is appropriate.” Id. at *6 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “Section 216(b) does not define ‘similarly situated,’ and the Ninth Circuit has not 

construed the term. Federal district courts have taken at least three approaches to 

determining whether plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of § 216(b): (1) a twotiered case-by-case approach, (2) the incorporation of the requirements of Rule 23 of the 

current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or (3) the incorporation of the requirements of 

the pre-1966 version of Rule 23 for ‘spurious’ class actions. However, district courts 

within the Ninth Circuit generally follow the two-tiered or two-step approach for making 

a collective action determination.” Colson v. Avnet, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925 (D. 

Ariz. 2010) (citations and most internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “Under the two-step approach, the court determines, on an ad hoc case-by-case 

basis, whether plaintiffs are similarly situated. This requires the court to first make an 

initial ‘notice stage’ determination of whether plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated.’ At this 

first stage, the court require[s] nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative 

class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan. If a plaintiff 

can survive this hurdle, the district court will conditionally certify the proposed class and 

the lawsuit will proceed to a period of notification, which will permit potential class 

members to opt-into the lawsuit. Once the notification period ends, the Court moves on to 

the second step of the certification process. At the second step, in response to a motion to 

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decertify the class filed by a defendant, the court makes yet another determination 

whether the proposed class members are similarly situated; this time, however, the court 

utilizes a much stricter standard to scrutinize the nature of the claims.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “While conditional certification at the first stage is by no means automatic, 

Plaintiffs’ burden is light. All that need be shown by the plaintiff is that some identifiable 

factual or legal nexus binds together the various claims of the class members in a way 

that hearing the claims together promotes judicial efficiency and comports with the broad 

remedial policies underlying the FLSA. Given the light burden, motions to conditionally 

certify a class for notification purposes are ‘typically’ granted. To proceed to the 

notification stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs’ allegations need neither be ‘strong [n]or 

conclusive.’” Id. at 925-26 (alteration in original) (citations and some internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Courts recognize that collective action notification normally occurs 

before the Parties have had the chance to engage in extensive fact discovery. That is why 

in making a determination in whether to conditionally certify a proposed class for 

notification purposes only, courts do not review the underlying merits of the action.” Id.

at 926 (citations omitted). The court’s determination at this first step is “based primarily 

on the pleadings and any affidavits submitted by the parties.” Hutton v. Bank of Am., No. 

CV 03-2262-PHX-ROS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97516, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2007) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 2. Plaintiff’s Case 

 Defendants urge the Court to assess Plaintiff’s “similarly situated” claim under the 

standard applicable to certifying Rule 23 class actions. Although Defendants are correct 

that this Court “cannot function as a rubber stamp for any and all claims that come its 

way under this statute,” Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 929-30, the Court will adopt the twostep approach that is “generally follow[ed]” by Ninth Circuit district courts, id. at 925. 

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 a. Overtime 

 With respect to Plaintiff’s FLSA overtime claim, he has failed to make any 

allegations, much less “substantial” allegations, that “the putative class members were 

together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Id. at 925 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s state court Complaint alleges that he regularly 

works between 45 and 53 hours per week and has never been compensated for these 

excess hours, but it does not allege that other drivers work similar hours. Nor does it 

allege that he and other drivers are subject to a uniform policy or plan regarding the 

number of hours they must work per week and their wages for overtime hours. The 

closest Plaintiff comes to alleging any such policy is his assertion that “[d]rivers are told 

they will work nine (9) hour days on the same work day schedule as the dealership where 

Drivers Solutions placed them.” Doc. 1-1 at 12. The Complaint’s prayer for relief states 

only that “Defendants have willfully failed to compensate [Plaintiff] for overtime hours 

he worked” and that “[Plaintiff] is entitled to receive compensation at a rate of one and 

one-half times (11⁄2 x) the regular wage rate for any hours worked for the Defendants in 

excess of forty hours in any week.” Id. Plaintiff does not pray relief for other workers. 

Similarly, the Declaration accompanying Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any 

allegation that Plaintiff, let alone Defendants’ other workers, was the victim of a policy to 

deny overtime pay. 

 The section of the Complaint that describes the parties to the suit does contain an 

assertion that “[Plaintiff’s] claims are typical of the claims of the class” and that the 

“claims asserted herein on behalf of [Plaintiff] and the class present questions of law and 

fact common to the class including, in particular, whether Defendants have failed to pay 

the requisite overtime and minimum wage compensation to their employees.” Id. at 7. 

But these vague and conclusory assertions are insufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden, 

“light” though it may be. Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 925. Plaintiff states in his Motion 

that his “Complaint further alleges that Defendants have a policy and practice of not 

paying overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty per week.” Doc. 

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22 at 3. The paragraphs in the Complaint that the Motion cites for this proposition, 

however, allege no such policy. 

 Finally, the Motion claims that “[b]ased upon his experience and observations, 

[Plaintiff] believes that Defendants also failed to pay overtime to other members of the 

proposed collective and class action group who worked more than forty hours in a given 

week.”1

 Id. at 5. Even if this sentence is construed to allege Defendants employ a 

uniform policy, it comes too late. The step-one determination in FLSA motions to certify 

is “based on the pleadings and any Declarations that have been submitted.” Anderson v. 

Ziprealty, Inc., No. CV 12-0332-PHX-JAT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *6 (D. 

Ariz. May 3, 2013) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). A plaintiff may meet his burden 

by making “detailed allegations supported by affidavits which successfully engage 

defendants’ affidavits to the contrary.” Id. at *7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff’s pleadings and declaration contain no allegations—and certainly no detailed 

allegations—that Defendants have a policy of not paying the required overtime wage. 

The Court has found no cases that address whether an allegation of a class-wide policy is 

sufficient if raised for the first time in a plaintiff’s motion to certify. Nevertheless, and 

notwithstanding the “lenient” standard that governs step one, id., Plaintiff has not yet 

satisfied the legal requirements for certifying a collective action on his overtime claim. 

 b. Minimum wage 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint and Declaration do, however, include sufficient allegations 

regarding policies pursuant to which Defendants pay drivers less than the federal 

minimum wage. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and “similarly situated drivers” are 

docked similar amounts for missing work or leaving early. It also lists numerous 

expenses that Plaintiff must personally incur in order to perform his work and then 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s Motion also states that “[Plaintiff] and members of the potential class were misclassified by Defendants as independent contractors,” Doc. 22 at 14, which under the FLSA would absolve Defendants of their responsibility to pay overtime wages at one-and-a-half times the regular rate. But this allegation, which is raised in the portion of the Motion addressing the Rule 23 class, apparently pertains only to Plaintiff’s claims under Arizona minimum wage law. See Doc. 22 at 14. The Court therefore will not 

consider this allegation when deciding on certification of the FLSA overtime claim. 

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alleges that “[u]pon information and belief, other drivers have similar financial 

responsibilities.” Doc. 1-1 at 11. In his Declaration, Plaintiff alleges that “according to 

[his] knowledge and experience, the pay is the same for all drivers” employed by 

Defendants, and that he and “[t]he other drivers ... are required to pay” for the same 

work-related insurance. Id. at 25. Nowhere does Plaintiff explicitly state that these 

policies push both his and other drivers’ pay below the minimum wage, but that 

conclusion is clearly implied in his pleadings. 

 But while the Complaint and Declaration can be read to plead a policy governing 

Defendants’ drivers, they contain no information at all about any policies with respect to 

dispatchers. At oral argument, Plaintiff informed the Court that, like drivers, dispatchers 

are subject to penalties and salary reductions for any days they miss work. But this 

information was not contained in the pleadings, and therefore it cannot form the basis for 

certifying a FLSA collective action. See Anderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *6-

7. 

 Defendants make two principal arguments against certifying the collective action, 

both of which lack merit. First, Defendants claim the factual circumstances of different 

class members’ employment are sufficiently varied that they cannot comprise a single 

class. But at step one of the certification process, a plaintiff is not required to present 

evidence that all class members are similarly situated in every way. See Adams v. InterCon Sec. Sys., 242 F.R.D. 530, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“For conditional certification, 

plaintiffs do not need to provide evidence that every facility relevant to the proposed 

class maintains an illegal policy.”). Rather, such a demanding standard is only 

appropriate, if at all, at stage two. See Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 925. Second, 

Defendants argue the collective action should not be certified because Plaintiff has not 

yet obtained opt-ins from any other potential class members. But the FLSA does not 

require plaintiffs to secure fellow class members before moving to certify a class, and 

district courts in the Ninth Circuit have not imposed such a requirement. Kiser v. Pride 

Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00165-JCM-LRL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96622, at *4-5 

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(D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2011). With respect to the drivers employed by Defendants, Plaintiff 

has carried his burden of establishing that “some identifiable factual or legal nexus binds 

together the various claims of the class members.” Colson, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 925 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 3. Statute of Limitations 

 Any FLSA claim for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation 

“may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued ... except that a 

cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years 

after the cause of action accrued.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Because the parties have not yet 

produced enough discovery for the Court to determine whether Defendants’ alleged 

violations were willful, Plaintiff’s collective action with respect to his minimum wage 

claim will be certified for the period beginning three years before Plaintiff filed his 

Complaint. See Anderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *9-10 (preliminarily 

applying three-year statute of limitations, pending discovery). For any co-plaintiffs who 

opt in, the claim will cover the three years prior to the dates on which they opt in. See 29 

U.S.C. § 256(b). Should Defendants file a decertification motion in the future, the Court 

will then, in light of evidence produced during discovery, reassess whether the two- or 

three-year statute of limitations should apply to plaintiffs’ claims, unless that question 

should be decided at trial. See Anderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *10. 

B. Arizona Minimum Wage Law 

 Plaintiff has also moved to certify a Rule 23 class action seeking damages for 

failure to pay Arizona’s minimum wage. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the 

“party seeking class certification bears the burden of showing that each of Rule 23(a)’s 

requirements ... has been met.” Juvera v. Salcido, 294 F.R.D. 516, 520 (D. Ariz. 2013) 

(citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other 

grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)). Those requirements are as follows: “(1) the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or 

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fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 

typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly 

and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). If a class 

representative satisfies all four conditions, the class will be certified as long as at least 

one of the requirements in Rule 23(b) is also met. In this case, Plaintiff seeks 

certification on the basis that he satisfies Rule 23(b)(3), namely that “the questions of law 

or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 

individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for 

fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

 Determining whether Plaintiff can satisfy these more demanding requirements is 

difficult based on the scant record now before the Court, which contains only the 

declaration of a single plaintiff and his assertion, upon information and belief, that other 

employees are subject to similar policies. By the time Plaintiff seeks final certification of 

the FLSA collective action, however, he will know more about the size of his class, the 

extent to which his claim is common and typical of class members’, his ability adequately 

to represent the class, and whether common questions of law or fact predominate. The 

Court will therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion to certify a Rule 23 class action, without 

prejudice to refiling a similar motion based on a more complete factual record. 

C. Notice 

 Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendants to produce the names and 

addresses of all “similarly situated” employees so that he may notify them of the 

collective and class actions. Courts routinely grant this request as a matter of course. 

See, e.g., Anderson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63817, at *12-13. Defendants will be 

ordered to provide Plaintiff with the names and last known addresses of all drivers who 

have worked for Defendants in Arizona for the three years prior to the date of this Order. 

 Defendants object to the proposed Notice of Opportunity to Opt-in or Opt-out of a 

Lawsuit and Notice of Class Action that Plaintiff appended to his Motion. In particular, 

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Defendants maintain the Notice is deficient because it (1) “is silent as to potential class 

members’ right to seek their own counsel” and (2) “requires opt-in claimants to mail the 

consent form to Plaintiff’s counsel, not the Court.” Doc. 28 at 15. To remedy these 

defects, Defendants propose that the Court direct the parties to meet and confer so they 

can settle on an agreed form of Notice. Plaintiff does not object to this suggestion. The 

parties are therefore ordered to confer and submit to the Court by December 19, 2014, a 

revised proposed Notice to send to potential class members, unless by that date Plaintiff 

has filed a motion to amend the pleadings. When the parties confer, they should amend 

the Notice to reflect that Plaintiff’s FLSA overtime claim has not been certified as a 

collective action, and that the minimum wage claim has been certified only with respect 

to Defendants’ drivers. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to certify a collective 

action seeking unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA is denied. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to certify a collective action 

seeking unpaid minimum wages under the FLSA is granted, to the extent of any damages 

suffered within three years of the date on which each driver plaintiff opts in to the 

collective action. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to certify a Rule 23 class 

action seeking unpaid minimum wages under the Arizona state minimum wage law is 

denied without prejudice. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by December 19, 2014, Defendants shall 

provide Plaintiff with the names and last known addresses of all drivers who have worked 

for Defendants in Arizona for the three years prior to the date of this Order. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff and Defendants shall confer and 

submit to the Court by December 19, 2014, a revised proposed Notice to send to potential 

class members, unless by that date Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend the pleadings. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by December 19, 2014, the parties shall submit 

to the Court a proposed schedule for the mailing of notice to potential FLSA class 

members, unless by that date Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend the pleadings. 

 Dated this 9th day of December, 2014. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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