Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01590/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01590-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jimmy Kelly Contreras, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-01590-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

 Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) recommending the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. Petitioner filed timely objections. The Court called for supplemental 

briefing, which Respondents submitted but Petitioner did not. For the following reasons, 

the R&R will be adopted in full. 

I. Standard of Review for R&R 

 A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). A district judge 

must review de novo the portions to which an objection is made but a judge need not 

review the portions to which no objection is made. See Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. 

Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“[D]e novo review of factual and legal issues is 

required if objections are made, but not otherwise.”) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

 

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II. Factual Background 

 Petitioner does not object to the factual and procedural background recited by the 

Magistrate Judge. Therefore, it will be adopted. In brief, Petitioner was convicted of 

sexually abusing his 14-year old stepdaughter as well as physically abusing and confining 

three other stepdaughters. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences totaling more than 

250 years. Petitioner pursued a direct appeal where all his convictions were affirmed. 

He then pursued state post-conviction relief. Petitioner was appointed counsel in 

connection with his post-conviction proceedings but that counsel was unable to find any 

grounds for relief. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief but the 

superior court concluded all claims raised in the petition were either “precluded, waived, 

or baseless.” 

 Petitioner appealed the denial of post-conviction relief. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals interpreted the appeal as asserting a variety of theories involving ineffective 

assistance of counsel (“IAC”) that Petitioner had not raised below. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals rejected all of Petitioner’s claims, finding them procedurally precluded. (Doc. 8-

4 at 108). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review and Petitioner then filed the 

present federal petition. 

III. Federal Petition and Objections 

 The federal petition raises five grounds for relief involving IAC of trial counsel 

and IAC of appellate counsel. (Doc. 4 at 2). The petition asserts all these claims were 

exhausted during state court proceedings. In their response, Respondents argue all the 

claims are procedurally defaulted. Petitioner’s reply reiterates he exhausted all of his 

claims during state-court proceedings. (Doc. 9 at 4) (“Petitioner has left none of his 

claims unexhausted in state court . . . .”). The reply also contains the following passage: 

Petitioner brings forth his federal habeas corpus claims to this court 

because of the violation of his secured constitutional rights. Petitioner[’s] 

claims of IAC are the legitimate reason as to why his claims were dropped 

and not waived by the Petitioner throughout the post-conviction relief 

efforts. Petitioner’s counsel failed to follow the state[’s] procedural rule 

and thus was ineffective, cause for a claim of not being reasonably 

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available to Petitioner is implied by the IAC claims brought before the 

court. 

(Doc. 9 at 9). 

It is not clear what this passage means. It may be an attempt by Petitioner to argue his 

post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective such that the default of his claims involving 

IAC of trial and appellate counsel should be excused. The Magistrate Judge, 

understandably, did not interpret this passage or any other aspect of Petitioner’s filings as 

making such an argument. Instead, the Magistrate Judge looked to the underlying record 

and determined Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims and the claims were all 

procedurally defaulted. 

 Petitioner filed objections to the R&R but those objections do not point out 

specific flaws in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. Instead, Petitioner made only general 

objections. Such objections have “the same effect as would a failure to object.” Warling 

v. Ryan, 2013 WL 5276367, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2013). That is, general 

objections—just like a failure to object—mean the Court need not conduct any review of 

the R&R. Despite the lack of appropriate objections, the Court called for supplemental 

briefing regarding Petitioner’s alleged default of all of his claims. (Doc. 14). In their 

supplemental brief, Respondents claim Petitioner failed “to plead and prove” a basis for 

excusing the procedural default of his claims. (Doc. 16 at 1). Thus, Respondents request 

the Court enforce the procedural default of all of the claims. Petitioner did not file a 

supplemental brief. 

IV. Analysis of Claims 

 The R&R concluded Petitioner did not properly exhaust his claims and, therefore, 

all his claims are procedurally defaulted. The R&R is correct but the Court differs 

slightly in the path it takes to reach this conclusion. 

 Petitioner did not present to the state courts the IAC theories he has set forth in his 

federal petition. Thus, the crucial issue is whether there are grounds for excusing 

Petitioner’s default of his current claims. The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have 

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created a special rule excusing the default of IAC claims. That rule states “[i]nadequate 

assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a 

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial” or on direct 

appeal. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012); Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 

1287, 1296 (extending Martinez to “appellate-counsel IAC”). To take advantage of this 

rule, a petitioner must “demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial [or 

appellate]-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the [petitioner] must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Thus, in a 

situation of alleged default, the Court must look to the merits of the claim to determine 

whether the default should be enforced. See Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157-58 

(9th Cir. 2012) (explaining court must look to trial counsel’s performance to determine 

whether post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise IAC-of-trial-counsel constituted IACof-post-conviction-counsel such that procedural default should be excused). If an 

examination of the merits shows the claim is “substantial,” the Court cannot enforce the 

procedural default. 

 Because the petition might have attempted to raise the rule outlined above, the 

Court will look to the merits of the underlying claims. The merits of Petitioner’s various 

IAC claims are subject to the same standard: “To establish an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim, [Petitioner] must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and 

(2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Sexton, 679 F.3d. at 1159. On 

the first prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was not 

deficient. Id. And on the second prong, there must be “a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. In other words, counsel’s failures “undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. 

A. IAC Regarding Trial Counsel 

 Petitioner presents four different theories of IAC of trial counsel. First, trial 

counsel was ineffective by not pursuing evidence that Petitioner’s “medical history [and] 

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extensive surgical procedures . . . prevented any sexual activity.” (Doc. 1 at 7). Second, 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing “to adequately impeach the victim’s testimony.” 

That impeachment should have included counsel calling “expert medical examiners” to 

testify about the lack of “tissue damage” to the sexual assault victim. Third, trial counsel 

was ineffective based on the failure to “prepare, find or otherwise procure an expert 

witness” to rebut the state’s expert witness. Petitioner believes an expert could have 

testified about his medical conditions that made it impossible for him to “tie up the 

children” or to sexually abuse one child. (Doc. 1 at 10). And fourth, trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to obtain an acquittal “in the face of false and perjured testimony 

and a complete lack of vaginal (hymen) injury or DNA evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 11). 

 The first prong of the IAC inquiry requires determining whether Petitioner has 

shown his counsel’s performance was deficient. Petitioner has not. In fact, the record 

contradicts most of Petitioner’s claims. During trial, Petitioner’s counsel did pursue a 

theory that Petitioner was unable to engage in sexual activity. Counsel called Petitioner’s 

physician who testified Petitioner had surgery around the time of certain alleged 

activities. According to the physician, the surgery would have prevented sexual activity 

for “two to three weeks.” (Doc. 16-3 at 182). But the evidence at trial was that some of 

the sexual activity occurred “four to five weeks” after Petitioner’s surgery. (Doc. 16-3 at 

205). Thus, according to the evidence, Petitioner was not incapacitated at the relevant 

time. 

 The record also establishes counsel did not perform deficiently in cross-examining 

a prosecution witness regarding the lack of tissue damage to the sexual assault victim. 

That witness testified that the lack of tissue damage did not prove Petitioner’s innocence. 

Petitioner has not explained what more counsel should have done in light of this 

testimony. Petitioner has not adequately explained or proffered the alleged “expert 

witness” testimony he believes his counsel should have used to rebut the prosecution’s 

witness. 

 Finally, the record establishes counsel did not perform deficiently in crossCase 2:13-cv-01590-ROS Document 17 Filed 11/25/14 Page 5 of 8
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examining the victims. That cross-examination was quite minimal. However, the limited 

cross-examination did highlight inconsistences in the testimony. And it could have been 

a reasonable trial strategy not to aggressively attack children testifying regarding sexual 

and physical abuse. See Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We 

must therefore begin any ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry with the premise that 

under the circumstances, the challenged action[s] might be considered sound trial 

strategy.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

 Petitioner has not established his trial counsel was deficient, meaning he cannot 

satisfy the first prong of the IAC standard. But even if the Court were to assume 

Petitioner had shown deficient performance, he has not shown he suffered prejudice as a 

result. When assessing prejudice, the Court must keep in mind that “a verdict or 

conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by 

errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 696 (1984). This case involved overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. As 

explained by the state trial court when denying Petitioner’s request to conduct post-trial 

DNA testing: 

[T]he jury was presented with evidence of [Petitioner’s] guilt that was 

overwhelming, compelling and credible regardless of [the lack of] any 

DNA results. The several young victims all testified convincingly, in detail 

and at length about [Petitioner’s] violent crimes against them. 

(Doc. 8-4 at 55). In addition to the children’s testimony, the children’s mother also 

testified about injuries she observed on the children after Petitioner “‘took over’ 

disciplining them.” (Doc. 8-1 at 99). The mother testified Petitioner hit the children with 

fly swatters, whipped them with electrical cords, and “beat them in the closet until they 

bled.” (Doc. 8-1 at 100). The mother also recounted witnessing Petitioner hit one child 

in the face “many times” and that Petitioner broke the child’s nose. Another non-victim 

child provided corroborating testimony that Petitioner was responsible for various 

injuries inflicted on the children. (Doc. 8-1 at 100). In light of this overwhelming 

evidence, the alleged deficiencies outlined by Petitioner do not provide any reasonable 

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basis to conclude the result of the proceeding might have been different if only counsel 

had done what Petitioner now believes counsel should have done. 

 Because neither prong of the Strickland inquiry has been met, Petitioner has not 

made a “substantial” showing that trial counsel was ineffective. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. 

Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012). Therefore, there is no basis for excusing the procedural default of 

the trial counsel IAC claims. 

B. IAC Regarding Appellate Counsel 

 Petitioner argues counsel on direct appeal was ineffective by failing to raise an 

argument regarding “prosecutorial misconduct.”1

 That misconduct allegedly occurred 

when the prosecutor allowed a police detective to testify about the children’s health and 

injuries despite that testimony being in conflict with medical reports. (Doc. 1 at 9). 

There is no plausible reason to conclude appellate counsel should have raised this 

argument as it has no legal basis. That is, the record does not establish that calling the 

detective to testify qualified as misconduct. Therefore, the failure to raise the issue could 

not have been deficient performance. Moreover, Petitioner could not have been 

prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failure; if the issue had been raised, the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been the same. Therefore, Petitioner has not made a “substantial” 

showing that appellate counsel was ineffective. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 

(2012). 

C. All Claims Are Procedurally Defaulted 

 Petitioner has not made a “substantial” showing that he was denied effective 

assistance of trial or appellate counsel. Therefore, there is no reason to excuse the 

procedural default of his claims. The conclusion by the Magistrate Judge that all the 

claims were procedurally defaulted will be adopted. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 10) is ADOPTED IN 

 

1

 It is only in the reply in support of his petition that Petitioner makes clear he is 

attempting to assert this as an IAC claim. (Doc. 9 at 8) (“Petitioner’s appellate counsel was ineffective . . . .”). 

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FULL and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal are DENIED because Petitioner has not made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 Dated this 25th day of November, 2014. 

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

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