Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02645/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02645-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY L. BROWN,

Plaintiff, No. 2:02-cv-02645 ALA (PC)

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, et. al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff Gregory L. Brown is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se. 

Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his

rights guaranteed by the First and Eighth Amendments of the United States

Constitution and his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 

On May 5, 2008, Defendants Edward Alameda, L. Alexander, T. Bainbridge, D. J.

Blankenship, W. Brewer, T. Cole, D. Davey, J. Feliciano, T. Felker, A. Fiegener,

G. Harrison, G. Hibbits, T. Jackson, R. S. Johnson, T. Kopec, S. Leighton, G.

Lucas, J. Lynn, A. J. Malfi, A. Martin, J. Norlin, Quiggle, Linda L Rianda, D. L.

Runnels, T. Surges, R. Weeks, and M. Wright filed a motion to for summary

judgment (Doc. 146). The motion is presently before this Court.

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 1 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

I

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was a prisoner at High Desert

State Prison (“HDSP”) in Susanville, California. In 2004, Plaintiff was relocated

to the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility (“SATF”) in Corcoran,

California. 

On December 11, 2002, Plaintiff brought this civil rights action against 32

employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations

(“CDCR”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With the Court's permission, Plaintiff

amended his complaint on May 23, 2003 and then for a second time on December

12, 2004. The Second Amended Complaint names 48 defendants. All of the

individual Defendants are being sued in their individual and official capacities. 

Plaintiff alleges in the Second Amended Complaint that Defendants: (1)

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment; (2) violated his First Amendment Rights by retaliating against him for

filing grievances; and (3) violated his rights under the ADA.

On May 19, 2005, Magistrate Judge Kimberly J. Mueller screened the

Second Amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(A) and concluded that:

If the allegations of the amended complaint are proven, plaintiff has a

reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits of the following claims

against the following defendants:

1) Eight Amendment: Harrson, Lucas, Davey, Quiggle, Rohlfing,

Runnels, Martin, Johnson, Felker, Malfi, Surges, Alameida, Kopec,

Fleischman, Fiegner, Cole, Leighton, Brewer, Lynn, Wright, Braida,

Jackson, Bainbridge, Halsath, Weeks and Alexander;

2) ADA: Martin, Johnson, Felker, Malfi, Surges, Alameida, Rianda,

Runnels, Kopec, Fleischman, Fiegner and Cole; and

3) First Amendment Retaliation: Leighton, Brewer, Lynn, Wright,

Felker, Blankenship, Norlin, Fleischman, Kopec, Jackson, Hibbits,

Weeks, Alexander, Cole and Feliciano.

Magistrate Judge Mueller further held that: “With respect to the remainder of the

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 2 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

defendants and claims identified in plaintiff's second amended complaint,

plaintiff's second amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.”

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 8, 2007 (Doc. 97). This Court

granted the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendants Martin,

Johnson, Felker, Malfi, Surges, Alameida, Rianda, Runnels, Kopec, Fleischman,

Fiegner and Cole in their individual capacities. The Court denied Defendants’

motion to dismiss in all other respects.

Defendant Rohfling filed a motion for summary judgment on April 22,

2008. This Court granted defendant Rohfling’s motion for summary judgment on

June 18, 2008. 

II

Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment may be granted in favor of a party “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A party’s motion for summary judgment

must be granted “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

“On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts

contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 

“The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029,

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 3 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

1035 (9th Cir. 2007). “Once the moving party meets its initial burden, however,

the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise

provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Where the party resisting a motion for summary judgment is pro se, the

court “must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of

[his] contentions offered in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are

based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence, and where [he] attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the

motions or pleadings are true and correct.” See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923

(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that allegations contained in a pro se plaintiff's verified

pleadings must be considered as evidence for purposes of summary judgment).

III

 In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants contend that all claims

arising out of events after December 11, 2002 are barred because plaintiff filed this

action before he exhausted all of his administrative remedies. The Court agrees

and will dismiss any claims arising out of events after December 11, 2002 without

prejudice.

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies

to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 4 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. 

Jones v. Bock, _ U.S._, 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Defendants have the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Id. “In deciding a motion to dismiss for a

failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the pleadings

and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. “If the district court concludes

that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal of the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120.

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.”

Woodford v. Ngo, _ U.S. _, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). However, a prisoner

need not continue to pursue administrative remedies if “there is no further

possibility that corrective action will be taken in response to [the] grievance.” 

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

The State of California provides its prisoners the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived

by those individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal Code Regs tit 15, §

3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this

system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: “(1) informal

resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second

level appeal to the institution head or designee, (4) third level appeal to the director

of the California Department of Corrections.” Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235,

1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). A final decision from the Director's level of review

satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 5 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

A prisoner “may initiate litigation in federal court only after the

administrative process ends and leaves his grievances unredressed.” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). In Vaden v. Summerhill, a

California state prisoner sent a complaint to the district court before he had

exhausted his administrative remedies within the state prison system. Id. at 1049. 

He did, however, exhaust those remedies by the time the district court granted him

permission to file his complaint in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id. 

The district court concluded that the prisoner satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion

requirement in those circumstances. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the

PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies before submitting

any papers to the federal courts. Id. at 1051. 

Here, Plaintiff could not have exhausted the inmate grievance process for

claims arising out of events after December 11, 2002, when this action was

initiated. Plaintiff contends that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement by

amending his complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), however,

the date of an amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint. 

Therefore, the operative date of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, for

purposes of exhaustion, is December 11, 2002. Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies as to claims thirteen through twenty-two before

December 11, 2002, those claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Vaden, 449

F.3d at 1051 (“Because Vaden did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

sending his complaint to the district court, the district court must dismiss his suit

without prejudice.”).

IV

 In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Alameida and Rianda

argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because the claims alleged

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 6 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 7

against them are based solely upon a theory of respondeat superior. The Court

agrees and grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims

alleged against Defendants Alameida and Rianda.

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the

defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of

rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles,

442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.2006). “A person deprives another of a

constitutional right, where that person does an affirmative act, participates in

another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Hydrick v.

Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted). “[T]he ‘requisite

causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by

others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to

inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44).

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel

for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the

named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. 

Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.1979). Plaintiff must demonstrate that

Defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 7 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 8

violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)(internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). 

As to Defendant Alameida's liability, Plaintiff states in his opposition to the

motion for summary judgment:

3.) Defendant Alameida did not work at HDSP. At all times

relevant to this suit, Alameida was the director of CDCR. (Ex. B 2-3.) 

 Alameida has never met, spoken to, or received any correspondence

from Plaintiff, who is suing Alameida based upon his role as a

supervisor. (Ex. B 4, 6-7; Ex. Y 48: 17-50: 23.) Alameida played no

role in Plaintiff's activities at HDSP, including but not limited to,

Plaintiff's medical care or condition, Plaintiff's ability to participate in

outdoor exercise, Plaintiff's property, or Plaintiff's housing

assignment. (Ex. B 5.)

Greg denies that he is suing defendant Alameida based upon his

role as a supervisor. Greg is suing defendant Alameida for being

deliberately indifferent to his Eighth Amendment Rights and his rights

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as set forth in the

second amended-complaint. At paragraphs 43-47 (See Exhibit – A;

Sec. Am. Complaint at 43-47; Also, See Greg's Declaration Attached

hereto at 3(C).

Plaintiff's Opp. to Motion for Summary Judgment, 9-10. First, Plaintiff alleges

that he is suing Defendant Alameida based upon his role as a supervisor. Plaintiff

then contradicts his earlier statement and “denies that he is suing defendant

Alameida based upon his role as a supervisor.” Plaintiff does not set forth any

other allegations against Defendant Alameida. 

As to Defendant Rianda's liability, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rianda was

deliberately indifferent to his rights under the Eighth Amendment and under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). From July 2001 to July 2002, Rianda

worked for the Inmate Appeals Branch (IAB) in Sacramento, California, but

Rianda did not review grievance HDSP-S-02-0980. (Ex. T 7; Ex. T 1.) Plaintiff

also states that Defendant Rianda had never met, spoken to, or received any

correspondence from Plaintiff and that he played no role in Plaintiff’s activities

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 8 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 9

there.

Plaintiff has asserted conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations that

Defenants Rianda and Alameida were deliberately indifferent to his Eighth

Amendment rights and his rights under the ADA. He has not demonstrated that

Defendants Rianda or Alameida knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or that they promulgated a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional

violation. Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646; Taylor , 880 F.2d at 1045. Thus, Defendants

Rianda and Alameida are entitled to summary judgment as to all claims brought

against them.

V

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It is well established that the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error

in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause.” Id.

What is needed to show unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain “varies

according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5(1992) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). The plaintiff

must show that objectively he suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation and that

subjectively each defendant had a culpable state of mind in allowing or causing the

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 9 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

plaintiff's deprivation to occur. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991).

Plaintiff alleges that certain Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, he alleges that:

(1) on April 22, 2002, Defendants Harrison and Lucas used excessive force against

him; (2) on November 7, 2002, Defendants Lynn, Brewer, and Leighton used

excessive force against him during a cell extraction; (3) Defendants Runnels,

Davey, and Quiggle were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; (4)

Defendants Alameida, L. Cole, Fiegener, Felker, Johnson, Kopec, Malfi, Martin,

Surges, and Rianda, and Runnels denied him outdoor exercise; and (5) Defendants

Briada, Leighton, and Wright denied him his basic human needs when he was

placed on “management control status.” Each of these claims will be addressed in

turn below.

1

Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was

applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. In determining whether the

use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or restoring discipline, or for the

malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm, a court may evaluate: (1) the need

for application of force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, (3) the extent of any injury inflicted, (4) the threat reasonably perceived

by the responsible officials, and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a

forceful response. Id. at 7. 

While the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one of the factors to be

considered in determining whether the use of force is wanton and unnecessary, the

absence of serious injury does not end the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id. 

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 10 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

Whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively “harmful enough” to establish a

constitutional violation is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of

decency. Id. at 8 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97(1976)). Such standards are

always violated when prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to

cause harm, whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

A

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2002,

Defendant Harrison, needlessly and without provocation, discharged pepper spray

into Plaintiff’s face and slammed his head against the concrete floor, causing

substantial injuries. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Lucas deliberately

failed to prevent Defendant Harrison’s assault. Defendants Harrison and Lucas

argue that Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force arising out of events occurring on

April 22, 2002, are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court

agrees that Plaintiff’s claims as to this incident are barred and that Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment.

Under Heck, if a favorable judgment on a § 1983 action would necessarily

imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction, the claim must be dismissed

unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction has already been invalidated. Id.

at 487. The methods by which a plaintiff may invalidate a conviction include

direct appeal, expungement by executive order, and issuance of a writ of habeas

corpus. Id.

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997), the Supreme Court applied

Heck specifically to prison inmates who have lost credits earned toward release as

a result of disciplinary proceedings. Balisok provides that, under such

circumstances, an inmate must obtain habeas corpus relief before proceeding with

an action for damages under § 1983 which would, if successful, necessarily imply

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 11 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

the invalidity of his conviction or length of sentence. Id.

Here, Plaintiff was found guilty after a disciplinary hearing of attempted

assault on a peace officer, after he attempted to strike defendant Harrison with his

cane on April 22, 2002. (Undisputed Fact 52; Exh. A, pp. 17). The decision from

the disciplinary hearing quoted a report prepared by Correctional Officer G. Lucas,

stating in part:

I asked Inmate BROWN for the food tray. Inmate BROWN stood up

a n d said “I’m not giving you the tray, I want to see the sergeant.” 

Correctional Officer G. Harrison stepped in front of the cell doorway,

and gave Inmate BROWN a direct order to give him the food tray,

twice. Inmate BROWN raised his cane in the air over his right

shoulder, holding the bottom of his cane with both hands. Inmate

BROWN stated “If you think you are man enough, come get it, you

punk bitch.” I then pulled my MK9 Pepper Spray from the holster,

holding it in my right hand, by my side. Correctional Officer G.

Harrison ordered Inmate BROWN to put the cane down, to turn

around and cuff up, three times. Inmate BROWN swung the cane at

Officer Harrison. C/O Harrison took one step backwards, to avoid the

cane. [T]he cane struck the wall opposite the sink. C/[O] Harrison

sprayed Inmate BROWN in the face with his MK-3 Pepper Spray. 

Inmate BROWN turned his back to us, and dropped his cane. C/o

Harrison and I were yelling get down to Inmate BROWN. C/O G.

Harrison entered the cell to place Inmate BROWN in hand restraints. 

I holstered my Pepper Spray and drew my side handled baton, then

entered the cell. When C/o Harrison tried to grab Inmate BROWN’S

arm, inmate BROWN tried to hit C/O G. Harrison with a closed fist,

using his right hand, from a kneeling position. C/O G. Harrison

pushed Inmate Brown to the ground, using both of his hands. While

Inmate BROWN was on the ground, I held his legs down, while C/O

G. Harrison placed hand restraints on him. 

Exh. A., pp. 17. The Hearing Officer then stated, “Inmate BROWN failed to

provide any/additional evidence which could refute/mitigate the charge and the

evidence presented against him.” Id. Plaintiff was assessed a loss of 150 days of

good time credits. Id. 

Here, success on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his findings of guilt on the charge of attempted assault on an

officer. There is no dispute that on April 22, 2002, Defendant Harrison used

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 12 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

pepper spray against Plaintiff, and that he was briefly restrained to the floor by

Defendants Harrison and Lucas. Defendants Harrison and Lucas have

demonstrated that the force used against Plaintiff was solely to disarm him and to

gain control over him after he attempted to assault correctional staff with his cane. 

In his Opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendants acted “needlessly and

without any provocation.” Plaintiff’s Opp., 54. Defendants’ account, however,

must control because Plaintiff was found guilty of assaulting correctional staff. 

Under Balisok, Plaintiff cannot challenge whether Defendant Harrison’s use of

force served the legitimate penological interest of preventing Plaintiff from

assaulting correctional staff. A finding that Defendant Harrison was not acting in

self defense would undermine the finding at the disciplinary hearing that Plaintiff

attempted to assault him. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983

because it would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed at the

disciplinary hearing. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648 (“respondent's claim for

declaratory relief and money damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on

the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the

punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983" ). Further, there is no

evidence that Plaintiff sought to invalidate the finding of guilt or lengthening of his

sentence by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to filing this suit. 

While Plaintiff cannot challenge his conviction for attempted assault on a

peace officer, he may present evidence that the amount of force used on him by

Defendant Harrison to prevent the attempted assault was unjustified. There is no

dispute that: (1) Plaintiff swung his cane at Defendant Harrison with the intent of

injuring him; (2) Defendant Harrison used pepper spray on Plaintiff; (3) Defendant

Harrison restrained Plaintiff on the floor to prevent him from continuing his

assault. Based on these undisputed facts, no reasonable juror could find that

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 13 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

Defendant Harrison used more than the amount of force he believed was necessary

to disarm and retrain plaintiff. Thus, Defendant Lucas is entitled to summary

judgment on the excessive force claim against him. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot

support a claim against Defendant Lucas for failing to prevent Defendant Harrison

from using the pepper spray.

B

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Lynn,

Brewer, and Leighton “maliciously, sadistically, and vindictively” subjected him to

a cell extraction on November 7, 2002, spraying him with pepper spray. Plaintiff

asserts that during the cell extraction, he was “lying on the bunk in agonizing

pain.” Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 50. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

extracted him from his cell in retaliation for: (1) contacting the Attorney General’s

Office, regarding the scheduling of a deposition; and (2) requesting medical care. 

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Lynn, Brewer, and

Leighton contend that they had a legitimate penological interest in removing

Plaintiff from his cell. They assert:

Cell D7 117 had a capped sprinkler system [sic] designed to prevent

tampering by inmates. On November 7, 2002, Plaintiff was housed in

D7 117, and Plaintiff did not require a capped sprinkler system. (UF

61). It became necessary to house another inmate in cell D7 117,

when the inmate chose to break the fire-sprinkler inside his cell. 

Accordingly, Brewer was ordered to escort Plaintiff to another cell. 

(UF 61). 

Def’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 23. Further, Defendant Lynn alleges that

pepper spray was the least amount of force possible to remove Plaintiff from his

cell and that Defendant Lynn was advised that the use of pepper spray was

appropriate in light of Plaintiff’s condition. 

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that Defendants Lynn, Brewer, and Leighton

had any motivation for the cell extraction on November 7, 2002 other than to

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 14 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

15

satisfy a legitimate penalogical interest. Plaintiff does not present any specific,

nonconclusory factual allegations that Defendants possessed malicious and sadistic

intent when they extracted him from his cell. See Allen v. Bosley, 253 Fed. Appx.

658, 659 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Allen failed to raise a triable issue that the defendants

possessed malicious and sadistic intent when they administered pepper spray in an

effort to restore discipline after another inmate, Jacob Silverman, refused to

comply with orders to submit to standard handcuffing procedure and attempted to

block a cell extraction team from entering his cell.”); see also Jeffers v. Gomez,

267 F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (to survive summary judgment,

plaintiff must put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations that establish

defendants acted with improper motives). Thus, the undisputed evidence indicates

that Defendants Lynn, Brewer, and Leighton acted with a legitimate penalogical

interest. They are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

2

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Runnels, Davey, and Quiggle were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. “The unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain upon incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2004). “A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials

are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs.” Id. at 1057. 

“In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two

parts. First, the plaintiff must show a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that

‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or

the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ Second, the plaintiff must show

the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett v. Penner,

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). A plaintiff can show a

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 15 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

16

defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent by demonstrating “(a) a

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need

and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference ‘may appear when

prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it

may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.’” Id.

“A prison official acts with ‘deliberate indifference . . . only if [he or she]

knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi,

391 F.3d 1057. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). 

As to Defendant Davey, Plaintiff asserts that:

While en route to ad seg [Plaintiff] informed def. Davey of his need

for prescription eyeglasses and medically approved health-care

appliances to accommodate his severe avascular necrosis of the hips. 

Davey replied, “You should have thought about that before you

created this mess, so live with the pain.” 

Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 28.

Defendant Davey argues that he played no role in providing Plaintiff with

medical care at HDSP. Rather, Defendant Davey asserts that he was responsible

for only for escorting Plaintiff to the medical care clinic after Plaintiff’s incident

with Defendant Harrison. The undisputed facts indicate that Defendant Davey did

escort Plaintiff to the medical clinic for treatment, and therefore, was not

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff contends that

Defendant Davey made a harassing statement regarding Plaintiff’s need for

medical care. However, verbal harassment generally does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir.1987) (citations

omitted) (directing vulgar language at inmate does not state a constitutional claim). 

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 16 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

17

Therefore, Defendant Davey is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Defendant Quiggle was the medical technical assistant (MTA) who treated

Plaintiff at the medical care clinic after Plaintiff’s incident with Defendant

Harrison. Plaintiff alleges that:

On April 22, 2002, def MTA-Quiggle intentionally and maliciously

cleared [Plaintiff] for ad seg placement without any of his medically

approved health-care appliances despite the availability of health care

data and inconsistent with and contrary to CDC results. 

 Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 39. Defendant Quiggle alleges that he was not

responsible for determining the medical appliances that Plaintiff should possess in

administrative segregation. He asserts that only medical doctors were permitted to

provide or deprive an inmate of a medical appliance. As an MTA, he was not

authorized to provide or deprive inmates of medical appliances. The scope of

Plaintiff’s “medical clearance,” as determined by Defendant Quiggle, was limited

to determining whether Plaintiff: (1) was medically stable, or (2) required further

medical treatment. 

In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff admits that

“neither Davey nor Quiggle are medical doctors, and therefore, had no right to

exercise a professional medical judgment in depriving [Plaintiff\ of his properly

obtained medical appliances.” Opposition to motion for summary judgment at 58. 

Plaintiff maintains that nevertheless, Defendant Quiggle was deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. The undisputed facts indicate, however, that

Defendant Quiggle examined and treated Plaintiff’s injuries. Specifically,

Defendant Quiggle observed a lump above Plaintiff’s eye and applied ice ot the

injury to reduce swelling. Undisputed Facts, ¶ 33. Thus, the undisputed evidence

demonstrates that Defendant Quiggle was not deliberately indifferent.

 In his opposition, Plaintiff relies on California Code of Regulation, title 15

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 17 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

18

§ 3358, which provides in relevant part:

Possession of Appliance. No inmate shall be deprived of a prescribed

orthopedic or prosthetic appliance in the inmate's possession upon

arrival into the department's custody or properly obtained while in the

department's custody unless a department physician or dentist

determines the appliance is no longer needed and the inmate's

personal physician, if any, concurs in that opinion.

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Quiggle wrongfully deprived Plaintiff of

his medical appliances in violation of this statute. Rather, Plaintiff contends that

several hours after Defendant Quiggle examined him, unnamed correctional staff

wrongfully deprived Plaintiff of his medical appliances in ad seg. Defendant

Quiggle cannot be held responsible for the subsequent actions of unidentified

parties. Thus, Defendant Quiggle is entitled to summary judgement on this claim. 

Finally, Plaintiff does not assert any specific factual allegations that

demonstrate how Defendant Runnels was deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs. The only allegation Plaintiff makes against Defendant Runnels regarding

his medical care was that:

 “Dr. Rohlfing told [Plaintiff] that he was not allowed to prescribe

certain medications for [Plaintiff] per Def. Warden Runnels’ orders. . .

On information and belief, Dr. Rohlfing and Warden Runnels have

conspired to deprive [Plaintiff] of the right to be free from cruel and

unusual punishment.” 

Second Amended Complaint, ¶ 41. In Defendant Runnels asserts that he played no

role in Plaintiff’s medical care at HDSP. Plaintiff does not present any evidence to

refute Defendant Runnels’ argument. “Sweeping conclusory allegations will not

suffice to prevent summary judgment.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th

Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). “The prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each

individual defendant's deliberate indifference.” Id. (citation omitted). Because

Plaintiff does not present any evidence as to how Defendant Runnels was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, Defendant Runnels is entitled

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 18 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot maintain claims against Defendants Alameida or 1

Rianda based on a theory of respondeat superior. 

19

to summary judgment on this claim. 

3

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

Alameida, L. Cole, Fiegener, Felker, Johnson, Kopec, Malfi, Martin,Surges,

Rianda and Runnels denied him his Eighth Amendment right to outdoor exercise. 

He alleges that these Defendants refused to comply with the doctors’ orders to

modify his exercise schedule. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that because he has 1

bilateral avascular nercrosis of both hips, he cannot take a seated position on the

ground. He asserts that he needed both his cane and his “potty chair” in order to

engage in outdoor exercise. 

The deprivation of outdoor exercise by prison officials to prisoners can

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir.1979). “[S]ome form of regular outdoor

exercise is extremely important to the psychological and physical well being of the

inmates.” Id. at 199. Deprivation of necessities by a prison official violates the

Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged

must be, “objectively, sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison official possesses a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted)

(quotation omitted). In determining whether a deprivation of a basic necessity,

such as outdoor exercise, is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component,

a court must consider the circumstances, nature and duration of the deprivation. 

Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. To satisfy the subjective component, the requisite state of

mind depends on the nature of the claim. In prison-conditions cases, the necessary

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 19 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

20

state of mind is one of “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 

The evidence presented indicates that Defendants Cole, Fiegener, Felker,

Kopec, Martin, and Runnels reviewed Plaintiff's medical orders and exercise

program on three separate occasions. Each time Defendants modified Plaintiff's

exercise program to ensure it was appropriate. The last change occurred in June

2002, when Defendants assigned Plaintiff to walk alone in an exercise yard after he

indicated that he could not safely participate in group outdoor exercise. Defendants

order was designed to accommodate Plaintiff's need for a cane during outdoor

exercise. Therefore, it is undisputed that Cole, Fiegener, Felker, Kopec, Martin,

and Runnels modified Plaintiff's exercise program to ensure he would be permitted

to possess medical appliances, including his cane.

Plaintiff subsequently refused to attend outdoor exercise without his “potty

chair.” However, there is no dispute that: (1) Plaintiff did not have an order for a

seating apparatus during outdoor exercise; and (2) Defendants did not believe

Plaintiff required a seating apparatus in order to participate in outdoor exercise.

Accordingly, Defendants did not attempt to prevent Plaintiff from participating in

outdoor exercise.

Defendants Johnson, Malfi, and Surges conducted second level reviews of

each of Plaintiff's grievances regarding his outdoor exercise program. It is

undisputed that all of the information reviewed by Defendants Johnson, Malfi and

Surges indicated that Plaintiff's complaints were addressed previously, and his

exercise program was modified to comply with his needs.

4

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated while he

Defendant Wright placed him on “management control status” and he was denied

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 20 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

21

his basic human needs, such as eating utensils, tooth powder, clothes, paper, soap,

toothbrush, bed linens, and a mattress for ten consecutive days. He alleges that he

asked Defendants Braida and Leighton to provide him with these hygienic items,

and they refused to do so.

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment

imposes duties on prison officials to provide prisoners with the basic necessities of

life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “The

circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of [ ] necessities must be

considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred.”

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065,

121 S.Ct. 2215, 150 L.Ed.2d 209 (2001).

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Wright, Briada, and

Leighton allege that Plaintiff was able to regularly clean himself while confined in

management control status. They assert that during the ten days Plaintiff was on

management control status, he was provided a shower on the second, fifth , sixth,

seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth days. Additionally, Defendants Wright, Briada,

and Leighton contend that Plaintiff was provided clean clothing and linens on his

fifth day on management control status. As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that he

was denied sanitary items for all ten days that he was under management control

status. 

Viewing all facts alleged by both Plaintiff and Defendants Wright, Briada,

and Leighton in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. While prison officials must provide

inmates with adequate sanitation, not every inconvenience or de minimis injury

constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 21 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The screening order did not name Defendant Barron as a defendant against 2

which a First Amendment claim could be alleged. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain

a First Amendment claim against Defendant Barron. The screening order did,

however, recognize the First Amendment claims against Defendant Hibbits with

regard to the October 28, 2002 incident. 

22

U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (8th Amendment excludes from constitutional recognition de

minimis uses of force); Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988)

(allegation that inmate slept without mattress for one night is insufficient to state

Eighth Amendment violation and no amendment can alter that deficiency),

judgment vacated on other grounds , 493 U.S. 801 (1989). See also Shakka v.

Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1995) (no Eighth Amendment violation where

inmate given cleaning materials, but deprived of shower for three days after other

inmates threw urine and feces on him); Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1314-15 (9th Cir.) (temporary placement in safety cell that was dirty and smelled

bad did not constitute infliction of pain), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995);

DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1988) (correctional officer

spitting upon prisoner does not rise to level of constitutional violation); Holloway

v. Gunnell, 685 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1985) (no claim stated where prisoner forced to

spend two days in hot dirty cell with no water). Because Plaintiff’s claim does not

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, Defendants Wright, Briada,

and Leighton are entitled to summary judgment.

VI

Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against by certain Defendants for

exercising his First Amendment rights by filing grievances. Specifically he alleges

(1) on May 2, 2002, Defendants Felker, Blankenship, Norlin, Fleischman, and

Kopec conspired to remove Plaintiff from single cell status; (2) on October 28,

2002, Defendants Barron and Hibbits subjected Plaintiff to a cell move; (3) that he 2

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 22 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As discussed above, all claims regarding events after December 11, 2002 3

must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the remaining retaliation claims on the

grounds that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants' motion is granted with respect to these claims.

23

was subjected to a retaliatory cell move by Defendants Leighton, Brewer and Lynn

on November 7, 2002 for communicating with the Attorney General's Office; and

(4) that Defendant Wright placed Plaintiff on ten days of management control

status without access to “an eating utensil, toilet paper, soap, tooth brush and tooth

powder/paste, a mattress, bed linens, clothing etc.” (Pet. Second Am. Comp.

11-18.) Plaintiff also claims that he was retaliated against for filing the present

action on December 11, 2002. 

3

In Rhodes v. Robinson, the Ninth Circuit set forth the required elements for

establishing a prima facie retaliation claim:

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3)

that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, 11 and (5) the 

[*568] action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.

408 F.3d 559, 567-568 (9th Cir. 2005). “The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading

and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which

he complains.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). 

First, as to the claim that on May 2, 2002, Defendants Felker, Blankenship,

Norlin, Fleischman, and Kopec conspired to remove Plaintiff from single cell

status, Defendants have presented evidence of a legitimate penalogical goal. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff was moved from single cell status to double cell

status for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff met the criteria for double cell

housing; (2) double cell housing would be safe and appropriate for Plaintiff; (3)

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 23 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 24

double cell housing would serve the legitimate penalogical goal of maximizing bed

space. 

Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to refute Defendants assertions. 

Plaintiff does not present any evidence demonstrating absence of legitimate

penological purpose at any point in his second amended complaint (doc. 44) or his

response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 160). Instead,

Plaintiff repeats the statements in his second amended complaint, which statements

merely assert that he was retaliated against for filing a complaint. These

statements are legal conclusions and not are not sufficient to meet his evidentiary

burden. Because Plaintiff has not set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue with respect to the required element of absence of legitimate

penological purpose, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

this First Amendment retaliation claim.

Second, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim

that he was subject to a retaliatory cell move on October 28, 2002. Plaintiff fails to

provide any details about this incident. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to allege the

elements of a retaliation claim. 

Third, as to the claim that Plaintiff was subjected to a retaliatory cell move

by Defendants Leighton, Brewer and Lynn on November 7, 2002, Defendants have

demonstrated that the act served a legitimate penalogical interest. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff was moved to from cell D7 117 because: (1) another inmate

required the capped sprinkler system in cell D7 117; (2) Plaintiff was living in cell

D7 117 and did not require a capped sprinkler system; and (3) Plaintiff refused to

exit cell D7 117. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to refute Defendants

assertions. Again, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the absence of legitimate

penological purpose at any point in his second amended complaint (doc. 44) or his

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 24 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 25

response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 160). 

Fourth, as to the claim against Defendant Wright that he placed Plaintiff on

ten days of management control status without access to “an eating utensil, toilet

paper, soap, tooth brush and tooth powder/paste, a mattress, bed linens, clothing

etc,” Defendant Wright contends that his actions were based upon a legitimate

penalogical interest. Defendant Wright contends that he placed Plaintiff on

management control status because he believed it would prevent disruptive,

destructive, or dangerous behavior. Plaintiff does not address this claim in his

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Thus, it is undisputed that

Defendant Wright was motivated by a legitimate penalogical interest. 

With respect to each of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

VII

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under the ADA

are moot because he is no longer housed at HDSP, and, therefore, the controversy

between Plaintiff and Defendants no longer exists. Plaintiff has failed to address

this argument in his response. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

the ADA claims because they are moot.

A case or controversy must subsist throughout all stages of litigation. 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citing Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,

494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990)) (holding that a former prisoner's release from prison

rendered his habeas petition moot because there was no longer a case or

controversy as required by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution). If at any time

during the course of litigation, the plaintiff ceases to suffer, or be threatened with,

“an actual injury [that is] traceable to the defendant,” and that is “likely to be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision,” the matter is moot. Spencer, 523 U.S.

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 25 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 26

at 7; see also Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a

prisoner's civil rights action seeking injunctive relief that was brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 was moot because, after having been transferred from state to

federal custody, he was no longer subject to the regulations that he sought relief

from). When a prisoner seeking injunctive relief from a certain prison's actions

ceases to be housed in that facility, the case or controversy then ceases to exist and

the matter is moot. Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519.

An exception to the mootness doctrine applies to claims that are “capable of

repetition, yet evading review.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18. A plaintiff attempting to

invoke this exception must make two showings. Id. First, that the challenged

action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or

expiration. Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that

twenty day and six month time limits were too short for full adjudication of

plaintiffs' claims and that longshoremen returning to work in a hazardous

occupation after having been injured was insufficient to establish a likelihood of

re-injury). Second, that there is a “demonstrated probability” that the plaintiff will

be subjected to the specific action at issue again. Id. at 1339-40 (quoting Weinstein

v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). In the case of a prisoner's claim for

injunctive relief based on civil rights where that prisoner is no longer housed at the

allegedly offending facility, that prisoner must demonstrate a reasonable

expectation of returning to that facility. Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519.

Plaintiff is not subject to any action or decisions of the staff at HSDP

because he is no longer an inmate at that prison. Furthermore, he has not alleged

any facts that provide a basis for a reasonable belief that he will ever be housed at

HDSP again in the future, nor does he allege that he is subject to similar treatment

at SATF. See Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519 (holding that a prisoner’s civil rights claim

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 26 of 27
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 27

for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was moot because he was no longer

housed at the offending facility, and that to except a claim from the mootness

doctrine, such a claimant must show that he has a reasonable expectation of

returning to that facility). The same standard applies for a plaintiff making an

ADA claim. See, e.g., Dufresne v. Veneman, 114 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1997)

(holding that an ADA claim for injuries sustained as a result of Medfly pesticide

use was moot because the state had eradicated the Medfly and the plaintiff could

not show that the pest's return was probable). Plaintiff makes no showing that

there is a demonstrated probability that he will be subjected to the specific action at

issue again.

No case or controversy, for which injunctive relief under the ADA can be

granted, currently exists between Plaintiff and Defendants. Furthermore, the

record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating a probability that Plaintiff will

again be subject to the care of any HDSP employee. Therefore, Defendants’

motion is granted with respect to this claim.

CONCLUSION

 It is ordered that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED

(Doc. No 146). Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. No 165), filed on July 11,

1008, is denied as moot. The trial date, January 6, 2009, is hereby VACATED. 

The clerk is ordered to file JUDGMENT in favor of the Defendants and close the

case.

DATED: August 13, 2008

/s/ Arthur L. Alarcón 

 ______________________________________

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

Case 2:02-cv-02645-ALA Document 168 Filed 08/13/08 Page 27 of 27