Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02927/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02927-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 For convenience, the court refers to all plaintiffs collectively as “Teleshuttle.”

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TELESHUTTLE TECHNOLOGIES LLC,

TELESHUTTLE CORPORATION, and BTG

INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

/

No. C04-02927 JW (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING MICROSOFT’S

MOTION TO STRIKE IMPROPER

CHANGES TO THE DEPOSITION

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD REISMAN

[Re: Docket No. 134]

On November 29, 2005, this court heard the “Motion to Strike Improper Changes to the

Deposition Testimony of Richard Reisman” filed by defendant Microsoft Corporation. Plaintiff

Teleshuttle 1

 opposed the motion. Upon consideration of the papers presented, as well as the

arguments of counsel, the court issues the following order.

In this action, Teleshuttle claims that Microsoft infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 6,125,388;

6,658,464; and 6,611,862 (collectively, “patents-in-suit”). In April 2005, Microsoft served a notice

for the Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition of Teleshuttle on topics related to, among other things,

conception and reduction to practice of the claimed invention(s). Teleshuttle designated Richard

Reisman, the named inventor of all the patents-in-suit, to testify on its behalf. Reisman’s deposition

*E-FILED ON 11/29/05*

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For the Northern District of California

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28 2 Here, the thirtieth day fell on a Saturday. Thus, the period for compliance ran

through Monday, October 3, 2005. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a).

2

testimony was conducted over two days in August 2005. Microsoft now moves to strike forty-five of

the eighty-five changes Reisman later made to his testimony on grounds that they (1) are untimely and

(2) substantively change or contradict his original testimony.

Preliminarily, Teleshuttle argues that this court should deny the instant motion (or not entertain

it at all), asserting that Microsoft failed to adequately meet/confer on the disputed issues. The record

presented indicates that there was some meet/confer effort before the motion was filed, although those

negotiations appear to have been less than satisfactory. Indeed, it seems that those negotiations

consisted of little more than one brief telephone conversation and the exchange of a few voicemail

messages. Nevertheless, further meet/confer negotiations which took place after the motion was filed

did not resolve the dispute; and, based upon the parties’ stated positions, it seems that any further

meet/confer efforts now would be unavailing. Counsel are nonetheless reminded that the Civil Local

Rules contemplate meaningful meet/confer efforts to resolve disputes before seeking judicial

intervention. See CIV. L. R. 37-1(a); see also CIV. L. R. 1-5(n).

Microsoft first argues that Reisman’s changes to his deposition testimony are untimely and

therefore, procedurally improper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) states, in relevant part:

If requested by the deponent or a party before completion of the deposition,

the deponent shall have 30 days after being notified by the officer that the

transcript or recording is available in which to review the transcript or recording

and, if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement reciting such

changes and the reasons given by the deponent for making them.

FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, “[m]issing the thirty day deadline by a mere

day or two might not alone justify excluding the corrections in every case.” See Hambleton Bros.

Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the court has

discretion whether to strictly enforce the 30 day requirement). In the instant case, the deposition

transcript was made available on September 1, 2005, and Reisman’s changes were therefore due no

later than October 3, 2005.2 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e). Reisman apparently executed an errata sheet on

October 3, 2005. Teleshuttle represents to the court that (1) Reisman’s October 3, 2005 errata sheet

contained additional handwritten interlineations; (2) Teleshuttle’s counsel incorporated those

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handwritten changes into a typed version; and (3) Reisman re-executed the conformed errata sheet on

October 4, 2005. The record presented indicates that both the October 3, 2005 errata sheet and the

October 4, 2005 errata sheet were served on Microsoft on October 4, 2005. (Coyne Decl., Ex. A). 

The October 4, 2005 errata sheet submitted by Teleshuttle does not differ in substance from the

October 3, 2005 errata sheet. In any event, Microsoft has not been prejudiced by the delay. 

Accordingly, the court declines to strike Reisman’s changes as untimely.

Microsoft nonetheless argues that forty-five of Reisman’s changes are improper because they

substantively change or contradict his original testimony. While Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) permits

deponents to make “changes in form or substance,” the Ninth Circuit has held that “Rule 30(e) is to be

used for corrective, and not contradictory, changes.” Hambleton, 397 F.3d at 1225-26

(emphasis added). Teleshuttle argues that Hambleton should be construed narrowly and applied only

in the summary judgment context, where substantive changes to a deposition transcript might be used

as a “sham” to create an issue of fact. However, in concluding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) does not

permit substantive “changes offered solely to create a material factual dispute,” the Ninth Circuit

agreed with the reasoning of other courts that:

Rule [30(e)] cannot be interpreted to allow one to alter what was said under oath. 

If that were the case, one could merely answer the questions with no thought at all

then return home and plan artful responses. Depositions differ from interrogatories

in that regard. A deposition is not a take home examination.

Id. at 1225 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although Teleshuttle urges

this court to follow a number of contrary decisions from other districts and circuits, none of those

decisions are binding upon this court.

Reisman characterizes the reasons for the disputed changes as: (1) “Clarification,” (2)

“Misspoke,” (3) “Misunderstood the question,” (4) “Speculative,” (5) “No basis to make the

additional statements,” (6) “Correction,” or (7) “Recalled additional information in reviewing

transcript.”

In thirty-five instances, Reisman “clarifies” his original testimony by:

(1) adding new answers; 

(2) limiting or qualifying his testimony either

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(a) with new phrases such as “in this context,” “at least in this example,”

or “in some cases,” or 

(b) by deleting parts of his original answer; or

(3) attempting to make his answers more vague by either 

(a) broadening them with phrases such as “in many situations” and 

 “as a way,” or 

(b) changing “same” to “pretty much the same,” “other than” to “in 

 addition to,” or “Yes” to “Yes, at the latest.”

(See Mot., App. A). Sometimes, in fact, the “clarification” outright contradicts his original answer by

changing (1) “Yes” to “No” or “In part”; (2) “No” or “[C]an’t recall” to “Yes”; (3) an actual or

affirmative answer to “I don’t recall” or “Not really”; or (4) one answer to another answer having the

opposite meaning. Accordingly, all thirty-five “[c]larifications” substantively change or contradict

Reisman’s original deposition testimony.

On four other occasions, Reisman claims that he “[m]isspoke.” In the first two instances,

Reisman changes his testimony about his relationship with a “business associate.” (Mot., App. A at 3). 

He now claims that the business associate was “also” his attorney. (Id.). In two other instances,

Reisman changes “Yes” to “No” or deletes part of his answer. Deleting part of an answer, on its face,

substantively changes the scope of an answer. Therefore, all these changes substantively change or

contradict Reisman’s original testimony.

Reisman also changes two additional answers, asserting that he “[m]isunderstood the

question.” In these two instances, Reisman changes his answer from “Yes” to “No” and “No” to

“Yes.” Such changes are blatantly contradictory and improper.

On the ground that his original answer was “[s]peculative” or that he had “[n]o basis to make

the additional statements” in his original testimony, Reisman deletes parts of two answers. Again, on

its face, deleting parts of an answer substantively changes the answer.

Finally, in two other instances, Reisman attempts to change answers because (1) it was a

“[c]orrection” or (2) he had “[r]ecalled additional information in reviewing [the] transcript.” These

changes are improper because they attempt to add substantive information pertaining to a particular

person’s status as an attorney or whether certain payments were made to Reisman.

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28 3 See Appendix.

5

Having carefully reviewed Reisman’s deposition testimony, this court finds that all forty-five of

the disputed changes are impermissible because they appear to substantively change or contradict

Reisman’s original testimony. Accordingly, Microsoft’s motion to strike these forty-five changes3

 is

GRANTED.

Dated:

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

November 29, 2005

/s/ Howard R. Lloyd

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Appendix

The forty-five disputed changes stricken are as follows:

Reisman August 18-19, 2005 Deposition

Transcript Page Number:Line Number(s)

33:4

35:9

43:8

44:17

47:24

50:6

50:10

59:16

65:15

65:18

83:20

94:13-14

97:2-3

98:22

100:6

103:14

109:5

109:25

114:12

117:24

152:9

160:16-18

161:19-20

209:21-22

259:6

261:2

261:10

266:13

266:17

266:24

279:11

279:22

282:9

296:3-4

298:2-4

313:24-25

328:18

329:5-6

350:19

350:21

365:2

367:19

368:22-23

369:17

375:22

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5:04-cv-2927 Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Jeffrey A. Berkowitz jeffrey.berkowitz@finnegan.com, Ashley.cheung@finnegan.com 

Michael J. Bettinger mikeb@prestongates.com, perryb@prestongates.com;

catherinep@prestongates.com; dinaf@prestongates.com 

Elaine Y. Chow echow@prestongates.com, perryb@prestongates.com;

catherinep@prestongates.com

Patrick J. Coyne patrick.coyne@finnegan.com, 

Christopher P. Isaac chris.isaac@finnegan.com, jeffrey.totten@finnegan.com 

Lionel M. Lavenue lionel.lavenue@finnegan.com, 

Robert F. McCauley robert.mccauley@finnegan.com, dawn.salazar@finnegan.com;

molly.melcher@finnegan.com; matthew.tueller@finnegan.com; karen.reimer@finnegan.com 

Samir N. Pandya samir.pandya@klarquist.com, elizabeth.super@klarquist.com 

Myra Pasek myrap@prestongates.com 

Timothy P. Walker timothyw@prestongates.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Case 5:04-cv-02927-JW Document 157 Filed 11/29/05 Page 7 of 7