Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00723/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00723-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL WILLIAM JENSEN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

M.E. KNOWLES, Warden, et

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. CIV S-01-0723 (JKS)

O R D E R

Plaintiff Paul Jensen brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging that Defendants violated his various constitutional

rights while he was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison in

Ione, California. Two matters have been pending for some time. 

First, the State moves for summary judgment; a motion Jensen

opposes. See Docket Nos. 73 (Mot.); 74 (Def. stmt. of undisp.

facts); 75 (Opp’n). Second, Jensen moves to consolidate this case

with another case, Jensen v. Knowles, et al. , CIV S-02-2373 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 29, 2002), which is also before this Court. See Docket

Nos. 77 (Mot.); 78 (Opp’n); 79 (Reply). This Court has

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jensen’s allegations are, at best, difficult to parse through. 

His complaint is a long summary of conclusory legalistic language

alleging various constitutional wrongs committed against him by

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1 Jensen’s “oppositions” are usually nothing more than copies

of Defendants’ filings. Jensen will then white-out paragraphs,

sentences, or words with which he disagrees and hand-write his

version of the facts. His opposition to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is his amendment of Defendants’ preliminary

statement of issues. He includes no exhibits with his opposition

to support his allegations. Nonetheless, the Court has strived to

give his claims the broad reading they are entitled pursuant to

Eldridge v. Block , 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987).

ORDER 

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staff at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). Nonetheless, the Court

has endeavored to summarize the factual allegations leading to the

current dispute. While the following facts will be taken as true

for purposes of this motion, the majority of them are taken from

the exhibits accompanying Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed

Facts. See Docket No. 74. The Court has taken care to determine

which facts Jensen disputes, but this task is made difficult due to

the, at times, convoluted nature of Jensen’s filings. 1

The genesis of this suit is Jensen’s May 30, 2000, arrival at

MCSP from a substance abuse facility in Corcoran, California. 

Docket No. 75 at 2. Upon his arrival at MCSP’s Receiving and

Release (“R&R”) Facility, Jensen was apparently notified that he

was going to be housed with an inmate who smoked. I d . at 3–4. 

Because he has various pulmonary ailments, Jensen objected and

refused to proceed to the assigned housing facility. I d . at 3. 

Various officers were called to the R&R Facility in response to

Jensen’s refusal. Defendant Lt. M. Laguna told Jensen that he was

unable to locate any medical files documenting Jensen’s pulmonary

problems and justifying special housing needs. Docket No. 74, Ex.

C, Att. 1 at 15. 

Jensen’s response to the situation led to the allegations

eventually culminating in this suit. According to Defendants,

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2 Because the officer in charge of processing incoming

inmates’ property, Officer B. Grooms, thought Jensen was going to

administrative segregation per Jensen’s demands, he had not

processed Jensen’s property. Docket No. 74, Ex. C, Att. 1 at 11. 

Thus, it was not ready to accompany Jensen to Facility A. I d . 

ORDER 

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Jensen became irritated and told guards that they would “have to

lock [him] up, because I’m not going to house with anyone that

smokes.” I d . Jensen then became “boisterous and started flailing

his arms.” I d . Jensen does not dispute these allegations other

than to admit that he was “complaining vehemently.” Docket No. 75

at 3. Laguna told officers to place Jensen back into a R&R holding

cell pending Laguna’s further review of Jensen’s housing needs. 

Docket No. 74, Ex. C, Att. 1 at 15. After the remainder of the

arriving prisoners were housed, Laguna determined that there was an

empty cell in Building 3, which was apparently in Facility A. I d .

at 16. Laguna called Facility A staff to inform them that Jensen

was cleared to be housed in single-cell status for the night. I d .

Defendant Officer T. Remaley arrived at the R&R Facility to

escort Jensen and four other prisoners to Facility A. I d . at 17. 

When Remaley asked Jensen to exit the R&R holding cell, Jensen

refused, stating that he wanted to know who his cell mate was going

to be and asking what had happened to his property. 2 I d . Remaley

ordered Jensen out of the holding cell. I d . at 17. Jensen

initially complied with Remaley’s order. I d . However, when

Remaley informed Jensen that Jensen would receive his property at a

later time and that Remaley did not know who Jensen’s cell mate

would be, Jensen became argumentative with Remaley and attempted to

“brush past” Remaley on two different occasions. I d . Jensen

demanded that he be sent to administrative segregation. I d . 

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ORDER 

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At that point, Remaley decided to handcuff Jensen. In a June

6, 2000, memorandum describing the events of May 30, Remaley wrote:

I stepped in front of Jensen and told him that he was not

going back into R&R, and that he was going to building 3. 

Jensen became argumentitive [sic], repeated his demands

to go to ad-seg an[d] again attempted to brush past

myself and Officer T. Nelson. I felt it nessecary [sic]

to cuff up Jensen for staff saf[e]ty and to not let the

sititutatuon [sic] get out of control. Due to Jensen’s

close proximity to myself I informed him that he needed

to turn around and placed him in mechanical restraints,

he did not resist. I escorted Jensen to building 3 and

placed him into the lower B shower. I left him in the

restraints while building 3 staff processed him and

prepared his cell A3-147.

I d . Once Jensen’s cell was ready, Remaley escorted Jensen to the

cell, removed the restraints, and secured the door. I d . Jensen’s

opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment does not

dispute Remaley’s version of events other than to claim that

Remaley used “excessive force.” Docket No. 75 at 3.

Laguna was called back to Building 3 while Jensen was

handcuffed in the shower waiting for guards to prepare his cell. 

Laguna claims that Jensen was verbally abusive to staff, yelling

loudly at guards and other inmates, and threatening guards with

“problems” if they did not house him with a non-smoker. Docket No.

74, Ex. C, Att. 1 at 16. Laguna explained to Jensen that he would

be single-celled for the evening and that he could request singlecell status the next morning. I d . Jensen was “unreceptive” to

requesting single-cell status in the morning and continued to be

“disrespectful and disruptive.” I d . Therefore Laguna left him in

restraints until his cell was ready and supervised Jensen’s

subsequent placement in his cell. I d . Jensen admits that he

continued to yell and argue with officers and that he complained

loudly when he was escorted to his cell. Docket No. 75 at 4. 

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ORDER 

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Jensen claims that he told Laguna that Remaley used excessive force

and that Laguna ignored his claims. I d . 

The following day Jensen filed an administrative grievance,

complaining that Officers Ayala and Grooms failed to give him his

property, that Remaley assaulted him, and that Laguna and another

officer, L. Retzlaff, failed to “act in a responsible manner.” 

Docket No. 74, Ex. A, Att. 1 at 55. In response on June 1, 2000,

Warden R.Q. Hickman ordered staff to review Jensen’s claims and to

tape their interview with Jensen. I d . at 68. A subsequent medical

examination on June 7, 2000, revealed seven contusions of unknown

origin on Jensen’s arms. I d ., Ex. B, Att. 1 at 4. Defendant Dr.

Bulanon treated the bruises with first aid and told Jensen to

return if he had any further disabilities. I d . at 3. 

On the same day, Jensen was interviewed by Defendant Lt. D.

Brown. I d ., Ex. C, Att. 1 at 9. In a memorandum summarizing the

interview, Brown stated that Jensen was evasive about how he

obtained the bruises. I d . However, according to Brown, Jensen

“made inferences that he may have been beaten at the hands of staff

on May 30, 2000 while being escorted from [R&R] and the Facility A

gate.” I d . Jensen also apparently inferred that the beating was

retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed against certain

correctional officers at MCSP. I d . Because Jensen would not talk

with Brown about who caused the bruising, Jensen was placed in

administrative segregation to protect him “from an imminent and

immediate threat to his own personal safety by unknown person(s).” 

I d .

Jensen disputes the State’s accounting of the above events. 

He claims that Defendant Sgt. R. Carrillo visited him on June 7

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ORDER 

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prior to Jensen’s medical evaluation and his interview with Brown. 

Docket No. 75 at 5. He claims that Carrillo told him that if

Jensen did not mention Remaley’s name in connection with the

alleged assault or if Jensen signed a waiver, then Jensen would not

be placed in administrative segregation and maybe “they could

forget about ‘the whole thing.’” I d . Jensen claims that this is

the reason that he did not mention Remaley’s name in both the

medical evaluation as well as the subsequent interview with Brown;

an interview that Carrillo apparently attended as well. Jensen

also claims that after Brown notified Jensen that Jensen was going

to go to administrative segregation for his safety, Jensen then

informed Brown that it was Remaley that caused his injuries but

Brown refused to change his report to reflect the new information. 

I d . at 6. Jensen also alleges that after his medical examination

was over, Jensen told Dr. Bulanon “off the record” that Remaley had

caused his injuries. I d . As a result, Dr. Bulanon listed the

cause of the bruising as unknown. I d . Related to this visit, on

June 20 Jensen filed another grievance complaining that when he

tried to have the medical report amended to reflect the fact that

Remaley had caused the bruising, Dr. Bulanon refused. Docket No.

74, Ex. A, Att. 1 at 84–85. The grievance also complained that the

prison form prepared by Brown was similarly flawed and that Brown

refused to amend it. I d . The grievance was denied.

Jensen was placed in administrative segregation shortly after

the initial interview with Brown. See Docket No. 74, Ex. C, Att. 1

at 6. However, due to Jensen’s complaints regarding Brown,

Defendant Captain R. Robinson conducted an administrative review of

Jensen’s administrative segregation placement. I d . In Robinson’s

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ORDER 

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report to the MCSP warden, Robinson stated that Jensen claimed that

Remaley “squeezed” Jensen’s arm when Remaley took Jensen from R&R

to Facility A. I d . Robinson also wrote that Jensen did not

cooperate with Brown because Jensen had included Brown as a

defendant in another lawsuit and that Jensen continued to complain

about staff, including the staff responsible for the administrative

segregation facility. I d . at 6–7. Because of the lawsuit,

Robinson ordered a second interview with Jensen. I d . at 6. 

Robinson concluded that it was Jensen’s “confrontational demeanor”

that was responsible for his many complaints. I d . at 7. He

recommended an administrative review, as well as Jensen’s transfer

from MCSP while the matter was being investigated. I d .

On June 12, 2000, Jensen filed another grievance, this time

complaining about his placement in administrative segregation. 

I d ., Ex. A, Att. 1 at 71. He requested to be moved out of

administrative segregation back into the prison population, to have

his work/privilege group status restored, and to have his property

returned. I d . The grievance was denied at each of the three

administrative levels. I d . at 75–81. 

Pursuant to Robinson’s order for a second interview, Defendant

Lt. E. Reyes conducted a second interview with Jensen on June 13,

2000. I d ., Ex. C, Att. 1 at 6. Reyes videotaped the interview. 

I d . at 8. In the interview Jensen complained that Remaley

physically and verbally assaulted him. I d . He claimed the

bruising was caused by Remaley “squeez[ing] the inside of

[Jensen’s] arm with excessive force.” I d .

On June 28, 2000, Jensen was approved for housing in Facility

A. I d ., Ex. A, Att. 1 at 94. He was also approved for double-cell

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ORDER 

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status. I d . Jensen requested a particular individual as a cell

mate, and the prison committee told him that arrangements would be

made to accommodate his request but that there were no guarantees. 

I d . 

Related to these incidents, as well as the current law suit,

Jensen complains to the Court about his work/privilege group

status. When Jensen was transferred to MCSP, he was in

Work/Privilege Group A-1-A. I d . at 53. An inmate in Group A-1

receives one day of time credits for each day served. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3044(b)(2). As a result of his placement in

administrative segregation, Jensen was placed in Work/Privilege

Group D-1-D, effective June 7, 2000. Docket No. 74, Ex. A, Att. 1

at 83. An inmate in Group D-1 earns one day of time credits for

every two days served. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3044(b)(6). The

June 28 committee reviewed Jensen’s D-1-D status upon their

approval of his housing in Facility A and placed him in

Work/Privilege Group A-2-B. Docket No. 74, Ex. A, Att. 1 at 94. 

Jensen was placed in Group A-2, which is the designation for

inmates awaiting a full-time work or training assignment,

apparently because the committee also placed him on the waiting

list for a support services position. I d . at 94. Inmates in Group

A-2 receive one day of time credits for every two days served. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3044(b)(3). However, the same committee

also granted Jensen S-time credits from May 30 to June 6, 2000. 

Docket No. 74, Ex. A, Att. 1 at 94. S-time credit may be awarded

to an inmate who is placed in administrative segregation after the

inmate has been held to not be responsible for the placement. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3045.3(b)(4). An inmate receiving S-time

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ORDER 

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credit earns one day of time credits for each day served as though

they were in Group A-1. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3045.3(a). A

subsequent annual review committee upheld Jensen’s Group A-2-B

status on July 26, 2000, because Jensen was appealing the

classification. Docket No. 74, Ex. A, Att. 1 at 95. The committee

noted that were Jensen’s appeal successful, then appropriate S-time

credit would be awarded to him. I d . Jensen’s appeal was

apparently unsuccessful, and a later annual review committee also

retained the Group A-2-B status in July 2001. I d . at 96.

And finally, in what appears to be an unrelated incident, in

June 2001 Jensen complained to Defendant R. Savage that he received

a half of a sheet at the laundry exchange. I d . at 100. When his

cell was searched, guards found two half sheets. I d . Jensen was

charged with a disciplinary violation for destruction of state

property. I d . at 101–02. However, the charge was reduced and

Jensen only “counseled and reprimanded” because there was no proof

that Jensen had actually torn the sheets. I d . He lost no time

credits as a result. I d .

Jensen’s allegations stem from the above incidents. First, he

claims that Remaley used excessive force in moving him from R&R to

Facility A. Second, he alleges cruel and unusual punishment

related to Remaley’s conduct and Jensen’s subsequent placement in

administrative segregation. Third, he alleges retaliation by a

number of Defendants as part of a large conspiracy against him. 

Fourth, he alleges a number of what are presumably due process

violations against various Defendants for loss of good-time

credits. Finally, he alleges that his constitutional rights were

violated when he was issued the disciplinary citation for

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ORDER 

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destruction of state property. Defendants move for summary

judgment on all of Jensen’s claims.

DISCUSSION

The standards for summary judgment are well settled. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56 dictates that “[a] party seeking to

recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a

declaratory judgment may . . . move with or without supporting

affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or

any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(b) (providing the same standard for parties defending a claim). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the Court finds that “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The Court will construe all evidence and draw all evidentiary

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 10A Charles Alan

Wright et al. , Federal Practice & Procedure § 2727, at 459 & n.5

(3d ed. 1998) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144

(1970)).

A dispute over a “genuine” material fact exists if the

evidence would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict

for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that

there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247–48. The

nonmoving party may defeat the summary judgment motion by producing

Case 2:01-cv-00723-JKS Document 80 Filed 08/10/05 Page 10 of 20
3 Jensen’s more precise claim of excessive force against

Remaley, viewed as an alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment,

will be addressed separately.

ORDER 

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sufficient specific facts to establish that there is a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). However, mere allegations of factual

dispute, without more, will not defeat an otherwise proper motion. 

Angel v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank , 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir.

1981) (“A motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated by mere

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data.”). With these

standards in mind, the Court will turn to Jensen’s claims. 

However, because the Court can resolve many of Jensen’s claims in

summary fashion, it will turn to those claims before it turns to

his claim of excessive force.

I. Cruel and unusual punishment

With regard to the broad claims of cruel and unusual

punishment, 3 Jensen has failed to allege conduct that meets the

standards under the Eighth Amendment as those standards are

currently described by relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent. The Supreme Court has outlined a two-part test to

determine if prison officials have violated a prisoner’s rights

under the Eighth Amendment:

[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation

alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious[;] a

prison official’s act or omission must result in the

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. . . . The second requirement follows from

the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment. To

violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a

prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state

of mind.

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ORDER 

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Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations and internal

quotations omitted); see also Wilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294,

299–300 (1991) (discussing subjective requirement); Johnson v.

Lewis , 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing two-part

test); Osolinski v. Kane , 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996) (same);

Wallis v. Baldwin , 70 F.3d 1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 1995) (same);

Allen v. Sakai , 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).

With regard to the first requirement, “[t]he circumstances,

nature, and duration of a deprivation of [shelter, food, clothing,

sanitation, medical care, and personal safety] must be considered .

. . .” Johnson , 217 F.3d at 731. “The more basic the need, the

shorter the time it can be withheld.” Hoptowit , 682 F.2d at 1259. 

Deprivation of basic necessities for even brief periods can

constitute a violation whereas more moderate deprivations must be

more lengthy or ongoing. Johnson , 217 F.3d at 731–32. 

As to the second requirement, the relevant state of mind is

“one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety . . .

.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834. To show deliberate indifference, the

inmate must prove that “the official knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” I d . at 837. “Thus, Farmer [] requires an inmate to

show that the official knew of the risk and that the official

inferred that substantial harm might result from the risk.” 

Wallis , 70 F.3d at 1077. The “prison official need not have acted

‘believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough

that the official acted . . . despite his knowledge of a

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ORDER 

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substantial risk of serious harm.’” I d . (quoting Farmer , 511 U.S.

at 842) (omission in original). The question of the official’s

knowledge is a question of fact. Farmer , 511 U.S. at 826.

Jensen’s claims fail to outline a violation of the Eighth

Amendment. He does not allege deprivations of life’s necessities

or a deprivation of anything that would be cognizable under the

Eighth Amendment. His placement in administrative segregation was

a product of his allegations against Remaley. When he was evasive

about who caused his injuries, it was reasonable for prison

officials to place him in administrative segregation. Moreover,

placement in administrative segregation, without more, does not

describe a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Simply put,

administrative segregation does not violate the per se rights of an

inmate. See Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Jensen

must establish that the conditions independently violate the Eighth

Amendment in that they did not meet “the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.” See Keenan v. Hall , 83 F.3d 1083, 1090

(9th Cir. 1996). His allegations fail to meet this standard.

II. Retaliation

Retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights is

itself a constitutional violation. See generally Rizzo v. Dawson ,

778 F.2d 527, 531–32 (9th Cir. 1985). To make out a claim of

retaliation, Jensen must “allege that he was retaliated against for

exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory

action does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as

preserving institutional order and discipline.” Barnett v.

Centoni , 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff must

further plead facts showing that retaliation for the exercise of

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ORDER 

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protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor

behind a defendant’s conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Such claims must be more

than speculative or hypothetical; a prisoner must “allege specific

facts showing retaliation because of the exercise of the prisoner’s

constitutional rights.” Frazier v. Dubois , 922 F.2d 560, 562 (10th

Cir. 1990). In evaluating the claimed retaliation, courts must

“‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials

in the evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for

conduct alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland , 65 F.3d 802,

807 (9th Cir. 1995).

Jensen’s allegations fail to outline a cause of action for

retaliation. He claims that Defendants placed him in

administrative segregation because he filed a grievance against

Remaley for excessive force. But Defendants convincingly point to

a legitimate penological goal—namely Jensen’s personal safety—as

the reason for Jensen’s placement. Jensen alleged that he was

assaulted. Prison officials responded with an official

investigation approved by MCSP’s warden. Initially, Jensen refused

to name who assaulted him, saying only that prison officials were

responsible. Defendants maintain that his placement in

administrative segregation under the circumstances was reasonable. 

The Court agrees. If indeed “unknown” prison officials assaulted

Jensen, then it is imminently reasonable that other officials

charged with his safety would want to isolate Jensen until the

matter was resolved.

Jensen fails to plead facts that show retaliation was a

“substantial” or “motivating” factor behind any of Defendants’

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ORDER 

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conduct. He admits that in his initial interview with Brown, he

did not identify his attacker. It was only after the initial

interview that Jensen alleged that Remaley assaulted him. The

majority of Jensen’s allegations claiming retaliation describe a

vast conspiracy against him. But the only claims of any import, in

the Court’s view, are the alleged statements of Defendant Carrillo. 

Jensen claims that Carrillo told him that if Jensen did not mention

Remaley’s name in connection with the alleged assault or if Jensen

signed a waiver, then Jensen would not be placed in administrative

segregation and maybe “they could forget about ‘the whole thing.’” 

Even assuming Carrillo made such statements, it was not Carrillo

who was responsible for Jensen’s administrative segregation

placement. Instead, it was Defendants Brown and Robinson that were

responsible. And, there is no evidence or allegation that Carrillo

acted at Brown’s or Robinson’s behest. Brown simply interviewed

Jensen about the incident. When Jensen was evasive about his

alleged attacker’s identity, Brown recommended administrative

segregation. Robinson agreed and eventually had Reyes interview

Jensen. Based on the results of these interviews, as well as his

investigation, Robinson thought it prudent to keep Jensen in

administrative segregation.

Further, it is clear that the administrative segregation

lasted only as long as it took to sort out Jensen’s allegations. 

He was released after spending only twenty-one days in

administrative segregation. Jensen was placed in administrative

segregation when he refused to state who assaulted him. Once

prison officials were satisfied that his allegations were baseless,

he was approved for housing back in Facility A.

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ORDER 

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Equally unconvincing is Jensen’s allegations against Dr.

Bulanon and Lt. Brown. Jensen faults them for refusing to change

their earlier reports to reflect that he had identified Remaley as

his attacker. But he admits that he was evasive when asked about

the cause of his injuries. His claims against these Defendants are

frivolous.

III. Good-Time Credits

Jensen requests that any good-time credits he lost be

restored. He faults Defendants Johnson, Martinez, and Iturreria

for failing to correct his work/privilege group status. Docket No.

7 at 16. But as the State correctly points out, the Ninth Circuit

has made it clear that prisoners have no constitutional rights to a

work assignment or particular security classification. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy , 801 F.2d 1080, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 1986);

Coakley v. Murphy , 884 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 1989). Even

were he to have such a liberty interest, a claim as to the proper

accumulation of those credits must be brought in an action for

habeas corpus rather than a § 1983 civil rights suit. See Preiser

v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Young v. Kennyi ,

907 F.2d 874, 875–78 (9th Cir. 1990). His claims for good-time

credits will be dismissed without prejudice to their renewal in an

action for habeas corpus.

IV. Destruction of state property citation

Jensen alleges that Defendant Savage violated his

constitutional rights when Jensen was issued the citation for

destruction of state property. Docket No. 7 at 17. This claim is

frivolous. First, in his opposition Jensen admits that Savage was

not even the officer that issued the citation. Docket No. 75 at 9. 

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In fact, it appears that Officer K. Clendenin was the prison

official responsible for the citation. Docket No. 74, Ex. A, Att.

1 at 101. Second, Jensen suffered no disciplinary action as a

result of the filing. He does not dispute that the citation was

reduced to a verbal counseling chrono and that he lost no time

credits as a result. Finally, it is clear from Jensen’s complaint

that the genesis for Jensen’s grievances regarding Savage are not

in the citation but rather in other alleged comments by Savage that

portrayed Jensen as a “jerk” to other inmates such that other

inmates would not want Jensen as a cellmate. Docket No. 7 at 17. 

Jensen’s claims are frivolous and cannot form the basis for a

§ 1983 suit. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero , 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

Cir. 1987) (“[V]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient

to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”)

(quoting Collins v. Cundy , 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)).

V. Excessive Force

As related above, Jensen accuses Remaley of using excessive

force and other prison officials of not taking sufficient remedial

action. In examining Jensen’s claim, the Court must determine

whether the force used was such that it violated the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In

short, the Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from using

“excessive physical force against inmates.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at

832. The basis for determining liability is the same two-part test

outlined by the Farmer court and described above. However, in

excessive force cases, a higher degree of culpability is required. 

Madrid v. Gomez , 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The

core judicial inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith

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effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 7

(1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers , 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). 

Toward that end, it is “obduracy and wantonness,” as opposed to

“inadvertence or error in good faith,” that characterizes excessive

force in the prison context. Whitley , 475 U.S. at 319.

In performing the above analysis, the Court must take note

that decisions undertaken by prison officials, who are charged with

the safety of prison staff, other prisoners, and visitors, are

often “made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the

luxury of a second chance.” I d . at 320. To aid the analysis, the

Supreme Court has identified five factors courts should take into

consideration: “(1) the extent of the injury suffered, (2) the

need for the application of force, (3) the relationship between

that need and the amount of force used, (4) the threat reasonably

perceived by the responsible officials, and (5) any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Madrid , 889 F. Supp.

at 1247 (citing Hudson , 503 U.S. at 7, and Romano v. Howarth , 998

F.2d 101, 105 (2nd Cir. 1993)). The extent of a prisoner’s

injuries can only form the basis of dismissal if the injuries are

“ de minimis .” Hudson , 503 U.S. at 9–10.

Fortunately for the Court in this case, the facts leading to

Jensen’s injuries are not in dispute. Jensen and the State appear

to materially agree to the facts that lead up to Remaley’s

confrontation with Jensen; their disagreement centers more on the

legal characterization of Remaley’s actions. After examining the

parties’ respective positions, the Court is satisfied that Jensen’s

allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

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violation. Jensen does not dispute the State’s contention that he

was verbally belligerent with prison officials. He also does not

dispute that he refused to cooperate with officers after repeated

requests to do so or that he tried to push past Officer Remaley on

two occasions. According to the parties’ respective accounts,

Remaley then grabbed Jensen by the arms, spun Jensen around, and

placed handcuffs on him. 

Jensen’s claims then boil down to his allegations that Remaley

“squeezed” his arms too hard. While the Court can certainly

appreciate the fact that Remaley’s actions may have been painful,

they do not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Remaley

was acting in a fluid environment with an uncooperative prisoner. 

Jensen does not accuse Remaley of beating or hitting him. The

handcuffs Remaley placed on Jensen were apparently not tight enough

to cause injuries. The bruising on Jensen’s arms is consistent

with the facts in that there were no other injuries to Jensen’s

body that would indicate Remaley or anyone else struck Jensen.

The Court’s conclusion that Jensen’s claims do not rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation and that his injuries are d e

minimis is supported by the Supreme Court’s Hudson decision. In

that case, the prisoner was hit with blows that “caused bruises,

swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate.” Hudson , 503

U.S. at 10. The Supreme Court therefore held that the prisoner’s

injuries were not de minimis and reversed the Fifth Circuit’s

decision to the contrary. In this case, Jensen was not struck with

any blows. His injuries were caused by Remaley grabbing Jensen in

order to secure him. The injuries consisted of bruising located on

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Jensen’s arms. The Court is satisfied that such circumstances do

not describe a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Jensen’s

claims against Remaley. Because Jensen’s excessive force claims do

not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, it necessarily

follows that his claims against other prison officials for failing

to prevent what he terms Remaley’s excessive force must also fail. 

These claims will be dismissed as well.

In short the Court is persuaded, as outlined above, that all

of Jensen’s claims fall short of the required standards. 

Accordingly, the State is entitled to summary judgment. In

addition, the Court has already dismissed Jensen’s other case

before it, Jensen v. Knowles, et al. , CIV S-02-2373 (E.D. Cal. Oct.

29, 2002), in an order dated July 25, 2005. There being no case to

consolidate and given the Court’s decision in this case to grant

the State’s motion for summary judgment, Jensen’s motion to

consolidate will be denied as moot.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

The motion to consolidate at Docket No. 77 is DENIED AS MOOT . 

The motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 73 is GRANTED .

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 10th day of August 2005.

/s/ James K.

Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR. 

United States District Judge 

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