Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01628/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01628-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) states, in relevant part, “a judge may also designate a 1

magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of

the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the

court . . . of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.”

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES T. DAVIS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1628 FCD PAN P

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, CDCR 

Director, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an action filed pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. On June 2, 2006, plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to refer his complaint to a

three-judge panel. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request will 1

be denied.

By order filed April 19, 2006, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with leave to

file an amended complaint. Plaintiff has now filed an amended complaint. 

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a complaint it found to be “argumentative, prolix, replete with

redundancy, and largely irrelevant. It consists largely of immaterial background information.” 

The court observed the Federal Rules require that a complaint consist of “simple, concise, and

direct” averments. Id. As a model of concise pleading, the court quoted the standard form

negligence complaint from the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

1. Allegation of jurisdiction.

2. On June 1, 1936, in a public highway, called Boylston Street, in Boston

Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against

plaintiff, who was then crossing said highway.

3. As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken, and was

otherwise injured, was prevented from transacting his business, suffered

great pain of body and mind, and incurred expenses for medical attention

and hospitalization in the sum of one thousand dollars.

Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defendant in the sum of one

thousand dollars.

Id. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is 34 pages in length and names 42 defendants. The

complaint suffers from many of the same problems as the pleading dismissed in McHenry: there

is much “‘narrative rambling[]’” yet a marked lack of “notice of what legal claims are asserted

against which defendants.” Id. at 1176. As in McHenry, “[p]rolix, confusing complaints such as

the ones plaintiff filed in this case impose unfair burdens on litigants and judges.” Id. at 1179. 

Plaintiff will be given one further opportunity to file an amended complaint,

limited to fifteen pages. Plaintiff may use the court’s form for filing a civil rights action, which

will be provided again. Plaintiff should refer to this order and the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure for guidance in drafting a further amended document or completing the court’s form

complaint. 

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If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate

how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional

rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended complaint

must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. The Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Plaintiff must eliminate from his second amended complaint all persons whom he

has named as defendants based solely on the theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff should only

name as defendants those persons directly involved in his actual claim.

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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that judges acting within the course and

scope of their judicial duties are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983. 

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). A judge is “subject to liability only when he has acted in

the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-7 (1978), quoting

Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351 (1872). A judge's jurisdiction is quite broad. The two-part

test of Stump v. Sparkman determines its scope:

The relevant cases demonstrates that the factors determining

whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to the nature of

the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a

judge and to the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt

with the judge in his judicial capacity.

Id. at 361. Plaintiff should eliminate from his second amended complaint all judges whom he

has named as defendants unless the judge acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.

Prosecutors are also absolutely immune from civil suits for damages under § 1983

which challenge activities related to the initiation and presentation of criminal prosecutions. 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Determining whether a prosecutor's actions are

immunized requires a functional analysis. The classification of the challenged acts, not the

motivation underlying them, determines whether absolute immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope,

793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986)(en banc). The prosecutor's quasi-judicial functions, rather than

administrative or investigative functions, are absolutely immune. Thus, even charges of

malicious prosecution, falsification of evidence, coercion of perjured testimony and concealment

of exculpatory evidence will be dismissed on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. See Stevens v.

Rifkin, 608 F.Supp. 710, 728 (N.D. Cal. 1984). Plaintiff should eliminate from his second

complaint any prosecutors or District Attorneys whom he has named as defendants based on any

activities relating to the initiation and presentation of any criminal prosecutions.

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff's second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that

an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

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because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended 

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must

be sufficiently alleged.

Finally, the court finds that plaintiff is engaging in excessive motions practice in

this case. Plaintiff's filings are taking up too much of the court's scarce time and limited

resources. The court is unable to address, in an orderly fashion, the motions he has previously

submitted before he files more. Plaintiff is cautioned that a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis

may suffer restricted access to the court where it is determined that he has filed excessive

motions in a pending action. DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s June 2, 2006 ex parte motion is denied;

2. Plaintiff’s May 3, 2006 amended complaint is dismissed, and the Clerk of the

Court is directed to send plaintiff another copy of the court’s form complaint for filing of civil

rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

second amended complaint that is limited to fifteen pages, that complies with the requirements

of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of Practice, and the

guidelines set forth in this order; the second amended complaint must bear the docket number

assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint;” and,

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4. Plaintiff must file an original and two copies of the second amended complaint

as the court previously has directed. Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance

with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

DATED: July 27, 2006.

17/001

davi1628.14amd.new

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