Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05422/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05422-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided November 2, 2001

No. 00-5422

Michael Bourke,

Appellee

v.

Kathleen M. Hawk-Sawyer,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv02960)

---------

On Motion for Summary Reversal

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Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the motion was

filed, and R. Craig Lawrence and W. Mark Nebeker, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the motion for summary reversal filed by appellant Kathleen M. Hawk-Sawyer.

Michael Bourke, pro se.

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Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge; Henderson and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Chief Judge: The question presented by this

appeal is whether a federal prisoner claiming the Bureau of

Prisons unlawfully declared him ineligible to be considered

for a reduction of sentence may challenge that determination

by a petition for mandamus. We hold that he may not; a

writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for such a

claim.

Appellee Michael Bourke was convicted in the United

States District Court for the District of Hawaii of violating 18

U.S.C. s 922(o)(1) (possession of a machine gun), and 21

U.S.C. s 841(a) (possession of a controlled substance).

Bourke is serving his sentence in a federal prison in Texas.

Bourke sought a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 18

U.S.C. s 3621(e)(2)(B), which authorizes the Bureau of Prisons to grant a one-year reduction of sentence to a nonviolent

offender who has successfully completed a qualified substance

abuse program. The BOP determined that Bourke was not

eligible to be considered for a sentence reduction because the

possession of a machine gun is, in its view, a crime of violence.

Bourke filed in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia a petition for writ of mandamus in which

he challenged the BOP's determination. In response the

Director of the Bureau argued that the case must be dismissed without prejudice or transferred to the United States

District Court for the Northern District of Texas because

Bourke is required to proceed by way of a habeas petition,

and must therefore file his petition in the jurisdiction of his

confinement. The district court held that Bourke need not

bring his claim in habeas because Bourke did not seek early

release but merely the opportunity to be considered for early

release. Accordingly, the district court addressed the merits

of Bourke's claim and granted judgment in his favor. The

Director appealed and moved this court for summary reversal

on the ground that, because Bourke's sole remedy is a habeas

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petition in the jurisdiction of his confinement, the district

court here lacked jurisdiction.

At the time the district court rendered its decision, the law

of this circuit was somewhat unclear regarding whether a

federal prisoner is required to proceed by a petition for

habeas corpus where a judgment in his favor would not

necessarily or immediately result in his earlier release, but

would set in motion a process that will have that consequence

if he prevails. In Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804,

808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc), this court had held that a

federal prisoner seeking to challenge his parole eligibility

date was required to proceed in habeas, even though success

upon his claims would not necessarily result in his earlier

release. Later, however, in Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151

F.3d 1053, 1055-57 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we permitted a District

of Columbia prisoner to challenge his parole eligibility date in

a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. s 1983. In the latter

case, we relied primarily upon two Supreme Court cases,

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (holding that a state

prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing

he would necessarily "prove the unlawfulness of his conviction

or confinement"), and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

(same). We distinguished Chatman-Bey as involving a federal prisoner--the court in Chatman-Bey had emphasized that

"what federal habeas corpus accomplishes for federal prisoners [is] having federal claims adjudicated in a federal forum,"

864 F.2d at 810--and we expressly reserved the question

whether Chatman-Bey was still valid in the light of Balisok

and Heck.

Shortly after the district court rendered judgment in favor

of Bourke, however, this court upheld the continuing vitality

of Chatman-Bey. See Razzoli v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,

230 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A federal prisoner had sought

declaratory relief and damages under the Privacy Act, arguing that the United States Parole Commission had wrongly

delayed the time at which he would be eligible for parole.

We adhered to the holding of Chatman-Bey that habeas

corpus is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner challenging his parole eligibility date. 230 F.3d at 375-76.

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Moreover, this court made clear that habeas is the exclusive

remedy for a federal prisoner bringing any claim that would

have a "probabilistic impact" upon the duration of his custody.

See id. at 373.

Clearly, therefore, if Bourke is to pursue his claim he must

seek a writ of habeas corpus. As in Razzoli and ChatmanBey, the crux of the appellant's claim is that he was illegally

denied the "chance to secure his release." Chatman-Bey, 864

F.2d at 809. Although Bourke's success on this claim would

not necessarily result in his being released any earlier, it

would raise that possibility and thus have a "probabilistic

impact" upon the duration of his custody. Accordingly, the

motion for summary reversal is granted and this matter is

remanded to the district court either to dismiss the case

without prejudice or to transfer it to the district court for the

district in which the appellant and his custodian are located.

See 28 U.S.C. ss 1404(a), 1406(a), 1631.

So 

ordered.

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