Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01955/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01955-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH BYFORD POLLARD, III, No. CIV S-09-1955-GEB-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

ANDERSON POLICE DEPT., et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 42).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

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In the previous amended complaint (Doc. 6) addressed in the court’s October 1

2009 screening order, plaintiff named Anderson Police Department and Officer Nevens. Plaintiff

no longer names Nevins as a defendant. The Clerk of the Court will be directed to terminate

Nevins and add Harper, Bailey, and Van Dyke as defendants. 

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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Anderson Police Department and

Officers Harper, Bailey, and Van Dyke. Plaintiff sets forth the following statement of facts: 1

On May 1, 2008, at approximately 10:00 p.m. Officer Harper of

Anderson Police Dept observed a green Geo Storm, which he had been

informed of earlier as a suspect vehicle in a domestic violence

investigation from a rumor. Officer Harper conducted a traffic stop on the

vehicle to conduct a (welfare check) in regards to the allege domestic

violence call. Officer Harper contacted Pollard advise Pollard he was a

suspect in a possible D-V and the officer was checking his (welfare). 

Harper smell alcohol on Pollard. A search and seizure of Pollard produce

a (7-inch knife) which violated Pollard parole. Pollard took a sobriety test

and allegedly failed. Police took Pollard to Anderson Police station. 

Pollard was assaulted after he use the bathroom. Police Harper, Van

Dyke, Bailey putting Pollard in a left wrist lock. Pollard had a prior wrist

injury before the arrest incident. Harper at the Shasta County Jail assisted

jail staff to force blood from Pollard to get a DUI conviction knowing the

illegal stop search and seizure unlawful arrest followed by unlawful

imprisonment. Pollard stayed in jail for 5 months base on a rumor. 

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Plaintiff states that Officer Nevens was involved in a subsequent arrest, apparently

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referring to the May 2009 arrest. 

Plaintiff’s apparent allegation that Anderson Police Department is a liable 3

municipal entity will be addressed by separate findings and recommendations. 

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The court notes that these allegations relate to a different incident than the one referred to in

plaintiff’s prior pleading. Specifically, in the court’s October 15, 2009, screening order

addressing the prior amended complaint, the court summarized the factual allegations as follows:

Plaintiff claims that, on May 19, 2009, he was arrested on

state drug charges by officers of the Anderson Police Department. 

According to plaintiff, the arresting officers placed him in the patrol car

“with the heat turned up with the windows up.” He states that, due to a

psychiatric condition for which he takes medication, he could not breath. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was then pulled out of the car, hobbled, and

choked by the officers. It can be reasonably inferred from the amended

complaint that plaintiff asserts that defendant Nevens was one of the

arresting officers. 

Next, plaintiff raises allegations which appear to relate to

court proceedings resulting from the May 19, 2009, arrest. First, he

mentions a competency proceeding he anticipates will be held due to his

psychiatric issues. He also references alleged destruction of evidence. He

states that he being improperly charged because “no contraband was found

on my person.” 

The current amended complaint relates to an arrest in May 2008 and not May 2009. Further,

there is no reference to Officer Nevens in the current amended complaint. In any event, the 2

current amended pleading supercedes all prior pleadings and it is the current allegations relating

to the May 2008 arrest that must form the basis of any legal claims plaintiff is raising in this

action. 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s current amended complaint raises facts that can be grouped as follows: 

(1) facts relating to his arrest by Officer Harper; (2) facts relating to his treatment at the police

station; and (3) facts relating to his treatment at the Shasta County Jail. For the reasons 3

discussed below, the court finds that plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted. 

A. Arrest by Officer Harper

Plaintiff alleges that he was pulled over by Officer Harper because his vehicle fit

the description of a vehicle related to a criminal investigation. Plaintiff states that Officer Harper

then smelled alcohol on plaintiff’s breath. According to plaintiff, Officer Harper administered a

field sobriety test which plaintiff failed. Plaintiff was then arrested and, upon a search conducted

incident to that arrest, a 7-inch knife was found, possession of which violated plaintiff’s parole. 

These facts simply to not suggest any wrong-doing on the part of Officer Harper with respect to

plaintiff’s arrest. To the contrary, the facts alleges by plaintiff show that Officer Harper had

probable cause to initially stop plaintiff because his car matched the description of a vehicle

related to a criminal investigation. The officer then acquired probable cause to administer the

sobriety test when he smelled alcohol on plaintiff’s breath. Plaintiff’s failure of that test

provided justification for plaintiff’s arrest. The arrest provided justification for the search of

plaintiff’s person and vehicle, which produced the knife. 

In sum, assuming plaintiff’s allegations to be true, as the court must at this stage

of the proceedings, plaintiff cannot state a claim against Officer Harper based on the officer’s

traffic stop, search, and arrest of plaintiff. 

B. Treatment at Police Department

Plaintiff claims that he was “assaulted” by Officers Harper, Van Dyke, and Bailey

while at the police station. Specifically, he alleges that the officers placed him in a wrist lock. 

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual

punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of

dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

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Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

When prison officials stand accused of using excessive force, the core judicial

inquiry is “. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992);

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). The “malicious and sadistic” standard, as

opposed to the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable to most Eighth Amendment claims,

is applied to excessive force claims because prison officials generally do not have time to reflect

on their actions in the face of risk of injury to inmates or prison employees. See Whitley, 475

U.S. at 320-21. In determining whether force was excessive, the court considers the following

factors: (1) the need for application of force; (2) the extent of injuries; (3) the relationship

between the need for force and the amount of force used; (4) the nature of the threat reasonably

perceived by prison officers; and (5) efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. 

See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The absence of an emergency situation is probative of whether force

was applied maliciously or sadistically. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir.

1993) (en banc). The lack of injuries is also probative. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-9. Finally,

because the use of force relates to the prison’s legitimate penological interest in maintaining

security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials. See Whitley,

475 U.S. at 321-22. 

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Here, the court cannot determine whether plaintiff states a cognizable claim. All

that plaintiff has alleged is that force was used on him. He has not described the situation giving

rise to the use of force or the nature and extent of the force used. Nor has plaintiff specified

which of the officers – Harper, Van Dyke, or Bailey – who applied force. Plaintiff will be

provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint in order to provide more factual detail to

this claim. 

C. Treatment at Shasta County Jail

Plaintiff alleges that, while at the Shasta County Jail, Officer Harper helped jail

staff forcibly collect a blood sample to be used as evidence against him in a DUI case. While

plaintiff does allege that he was forced to provide the blood sample, he does not allege that the

seizure of the blood sample was accomplished in the absence of a valid warrant for same. 

Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to provide more factual detail to this claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the

entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following

dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged

in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order

to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 15-220. An amended

complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by

amendment (specifically, plaintiff’s claim against Officer Harper relating to his May 2008 arrest),

plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claim(s). Plaintiff, therefore, now has the

following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the claims

identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and the court

will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which

continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and

recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders

and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to terminate

Nevens as a defendant and to add Harper, Van Dyke, and Bailey as defendants;

2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 42) is dismissed with leave to amend;

and

3. Plaintiff shall file a further amended complaint within 30 days of the date

of service of this order.

DATED: May 6, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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