Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00383/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00383-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “Tr.” refers to the administrative

transcript. A certified copy of the administrative transcript was provided to this Court by the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on May 1, 2012. (See Doc. 9.)

2

 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because the parties have had an

adequate opportunity to present their written arguments, and oral argument will not aid the

Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Denna Rasho Hasso,

Plaintiff,

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of

Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-383-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Plaintiff Denna Hasso seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), which denied her

disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.)1 Plaintiff asks this

Court to vacate the Commissioner’s denial. (Doc. 17.) Defendant has responded, Plaintiff

has replied, and the matter is fully briefed. (Doc. 18; Doc. 19.) After reviewing the briefs,

and having determined that oral argument is unnecessary,2

 the Court finds that the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from harmful legal

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error. The Court will thus affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on February 22, 1964. (Tr. 20.) She has at least a high school

education and is able to communicate in English. (Id.) Plaintiff injured her spine while

lifting boxes in a workplace accident in April of 2008. (Doc. 17 at 3.) Plaintiff eventually

received worker’s compensation benefits as a result of this injury. (Tr. 35.) On September

26, 2007, a brain scan documented the presence of a meningioma: a benign, slow growing

tumor in the membranes of Plaintiff’s brain. (Doc. 17 at 3.) On July 30, 2010, Plaintiff

underwent brain surgery for the tumor. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security disability insurance benefits on July

25, 2009. (Tr. 9.) In her application, she alleged that she became disabled as of April 8,

2008, though this date was later amended to November 1, 2008 (otherwise referred to as

“disability onset date”). (Id.) Plaintiff has acquired sufficient quarters of coverage under

the Social Security Act to remain insured through December 31, 2013. (Id.)

When applying for disability, Plaintiff alleged inability to work due to the back injury

and the effects of the brain tumor. (Id. at 14.) She alleged a variety of resulting symptoms,

including chronic neck and back pain, severe headaches, blurred vision, inability to

concentrate, memory loss, nausea, anxiety, auditory hallucinations, agoraphobia, and severe

depression. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on July 13, 2010, and upon reconsideration

on July 13, 2010. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff sought a hearing before an administrative law judge

(“ALJ”), and the hearing was held on May 5, 2011. (Id.) On May 20, 2011, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled for the purpose of receiving disability insurance

benefits. (Id. at 20.) This decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the

Social Security Appeals Council denied review. (Id. at 1-3.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Social Security appeal, the Commissioner’s decision must be

affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and he applied the correct legal standards.

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See Batson v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004);

Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing the

Commissioner’s factual determinations, acting through the ALJ, this Court will affirm if

there is substantial evidence supporting those determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d

1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See

Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari,

276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion based on the entire

record. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,

599 (9th Cir. 1999). 

If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Commissioner’s conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075

(9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in

medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v.

Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s legal determinations are

reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable

statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.

2000).

COMMISSIONER’S DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

To qualify for Social Security disability benefits, Plaintiff must show that she suffers

from a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents her from

performing her prior work activities and any other substantial gainful employment that exists

in the national economy, and that the impairment “can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” See

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Further, Plaintiff’s disabled status must have existed on or before

her date last insured. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Tidwill v.

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3

Mental limitations, nonexertional capacity, considers all work-related limitations and

restrictions that do not depend on an individual’s physical strength, such as difficulties in

concentration. SSR 96-8p. 

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Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998); Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d

1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Social Security regulations prescribe a five-step evaluation process for an ALJ to

determine if a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1190, 1194; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ determines if

the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then he is not disabled.

If not, the ALJ moves to step two to determine if the claimant has impairments or a

combination of impairments that significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities and are thus “severe” within the meaning of the regulation. See

id. § 404.1520(c). 

At the third step, the ALJ evaluates if the claimant’s impairment meets or medically

equals the criteria of a listed impairment found in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation

No. 404. If yes, and the impairment meets the requirements for duration under 20 C.F.R. §

404.1509, the claimant is disabled. If the claimant fails to meet or equal the criteria or fails

the duration requirement, the ALJ’s analysis moves to step four. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(e). 

Under step four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”), which is the continued ability of the claimant to perform physical or mental work

activities despite his impairment or combination of impairments.3

 See id. The ALJ also

determines if the claimant’s RFC allows him to perform past relevant work. See id. §

404.1520(f). If yes, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the analysis proceeds to a fifth step

where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled

by presenting evidence that the claimant retains sufficient RFC to adjust to perform other

jobs that exist in significant numbers either in the region where the claimant lives or in

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several regions of the country. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). 

 In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled from her disability onset date,

November 8, 2008, the ALJ moved through steps one and two without finding that Plaintiff

was disabled, but finding that she had the following severe impairments: depression, anxiety,

chronic neck and back pain, and degenerative disc disease of the lumbosacral spine. (Tr.

11.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s meningioma, however, was non-severe. (Id.) Between

steps three and four, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC and found that she was limited to a

range of light work. (Id. at 13.) Based on Plaintiff’s RFC assessment, at step four the ALJ

found that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work due to her impairments. (Id.

at 19-20.) However, the ALJ found at step five that Plaintiff retained sufficient RFC to

adjust to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). (Id. at 20-21.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Meningioma

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that her meningioma was not a severe

impairment at Step Two of the sequential evaluation process. (Doc. 17 at 26.) According

to Plaintiff, the evidence showed the existence of an abnormality sufficient to have at least

a minimal effect on her ability to work, and thus the ALJ should have found that the residual

effects of her meningioma operation constituted a severe impairment. (Id.) The ALJ found

that this was not a severe impairment because Plaintiff successfully underwent surgery of

the benign tumor in July of 2012, and post-operative evaluation revealed no complications

or acute distress, nor any abnormalities in eye movement, sensation, or muscle strength. (Tr.

11-12.) A complete neurological exam of Plaintiff’s mental status, cranial nerves, motor,

sensory, and cerebellar systems was then conducted in October 2010, and results were

normal. (Id. at 12.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that the objective evidence of record, and

the lack of any evidence of worsening or deterioration related to the operation led to the

conclusion that this impairment was non-severe. (Id.)

The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device used to dispose of groundless

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claims. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1987). An impairment or

combination of impairments can be found “not severe” only if the medical evidence clearly

establishes a slight abnormality that has “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s

ability to work.” SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 at *3 (1985); see also Webb v. Barnhart, 433

F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996);

Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting SSR 85-28).

Here, the Court finds that the ALJ correctly reviewed the medical evidence and

properly concluded that the residual effects Plaintiff’s meningioma operation did not have

more than a minimal effect on her ability to work, and thus was not a severe impairment.

B. Step Five of the Sequential Evaluation Process

At the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Social Security Administration to

demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled and that he can engage in some type of

substantial gainful activity that exists in “significant numbers” in the national economy. The

ALJ considers the fact that the claimant cannot do the work that he has done in the past

because of a severe impairment, considers the claimant’s RFC, the claimant’s age, education,

and work experience, and determines whether the claimant can do any other work in the

national economy. The ALJ will find the claimant disabled if the claimant is unable to adjust

to any other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). See also Lockwood v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (where claimant

establishes that she suffers from a severe impairment that prevents her from doing past work,

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that she can perform some other work); Valentine

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009) (the burden shifts to

Commissioner at step five to show the claimant can do other kinds of work).

The step five analysis includes a detailed assessment of the medical evidence, the

claimant’s daily activities, prior work record, any functional restrictions and limitations,

medication and other treatment for relief of symptoms, and information and observations by

treating and examining physicians and third parties regarding the nature and extent of the

claimant’s symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. Credibility determinations are

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the province of the ALJ; however, the ALJ must make specific findings which support a

conclusion that the claimant’s allegations of severity are not credible. See Lingenfelter v.

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880,

883 (9th Cir. 2006).

C. ALJ Rationale

The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, finding it not credible.

(Tr. 14-17.) The ALJ also found conflicting opinion evidence in this case. (Id. at 17-19.)

The ALJ weighed the conflicting opinions and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.

(Id.) The ALJ found that although Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work, she

maintained a sufficient RFC to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. (Tr. 20-21.) 

1. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly refused to credit her testimony about the

severity of her subjective symptoms. (Doc. 17 at 19-26.) 

“Pain of sufficient severity caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a

claimant is disabled.” Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2006)). “Once a claimant produces objective medical evidence

of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints

based solely on [the] lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged

severity of [those symptoms].” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004).

“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he

or she may only find [the claimant] not credible by making specific findings as to credibility

and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d

880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). Specifically:

The ALJ may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility: [the] claimant’s reputation for truthfulness,

inconsistencies either in [the] claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her conduct, [the] claimant’s daily activities, her work record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity,

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and effect of the symptoms of which [the] claimant complains.

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). The

ALJ’s findings must be “sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did

not arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant’s testimony.” Id. at 958.

Plaintiff alleged that she suffered from migraine headaches, blurred vision,

concentration problems, memory loss, nausea, agoraphobia, aural hallucinations, anxiety,

and depression. (Tr. 14.) She alleged further that due to her back injury she cannot sit,

stand, or lay down for long periods without taking pain medications. (Id.) 

The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments “could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” but concluded that her “statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms” were not

credible. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony was not

supported by the evidence as a whole, being generally inconsistent and unsupported by

objective findings, Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, her treatment history, and the

effectiveness of medications and treatment indicated in the record. (Id.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony was generally

inconsistent. (Id. at 16.) The record reflected that on numerous occasions Plaintiff failed

to mention to doctors any pain or symptoms associated with joint or musculoskeletal pain.

(Id.) The ALJ observed also that objective findings did not support Plaintiff’s subjective

testimony. (Id.) The ALJ noted that the objective medical diagnostic record “contained no

documentation of any clinical signs (e.g. muscle atrophy, unilateral reflex abnormality) of

nerve root impingement or other spinal pathology that could produce disabling pain,”

concluding that “[f]rankly, there is simply no evidence of a medical impairment which could

be expected to cause the alleged severity of the claimant’s symptoms and limitations.” (Id.)

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she can prepare simple meals, does dusting and

laundry, visits with family, pays on-line bills, goes shopping, cares for her dog, and watches

television. (Id. at 15.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activities showed that she had

the ability to sustain some level of activity if motivated to do so, suggesting that she had

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better physical and mental capacities than her subjective testimony indicated. (Id.)

The ALJ also took into account the fact that Plaintiff had been prescribed and took

appropriate medications for pain management, which appeared to have generally been

effective in controlling her symptoms. (Id.) Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had

never sought or received treatment from a mental health specialist, and had stopped taking

anti-depression medications despite allegations of worsening depression. (Id.) These factors

led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s testimony of subjective mental symptoms and

limitations was not fully credible. (Id.)

The ALJ also observed that Plaintiff’s work history similarly cast doubt upon her

claim of disabling symptoms, in that Plaintiff continued to work after her original alleged

onset date, and she held herself out as ready, willing, and able to work. (Id.) Indeed,

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she was willing to try to work, suggesting that she did

not herself believe that her impairments were completely debilitating. (Id. at 16.)

Finally, and most significantly, the ALJ was “convinced” that Plaintiff’s testimony

was not fully credible because “there was exaggeration and symptom magnification for

financial gain.” (Id.) The ALJ noted that all of Plaintiff’s basic needs were met with

unemployment benefits, and that she evinced little motivation for attempting to work if it

would result in loss of those benefits. (Id.) The ALJ emphasized also that evidence showed

that Plaintiff’s treating doctor “returned her to work with light restrictions and did not

consider [her] incapable of gainful employment” and informed Plaintiff that he would not

recommend that she be put on total disability – whereupon Plaintiff “requested to be referred

to another doctor who would recommend total disability.” (Id.)

Upon review, the Court finds that the ALJ’s findings are “sufficiently specific to

permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.”

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. The ALJ gave specific and substantial reasons for his

determination that Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony was not credible, especially that

the ALJ found evidence of malingering and explicitly found that Plaintiff’s subjective claims

were exaggerated for financial gain. (Tr. 45.) It is not the role of this Court to second-guess

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the ALJ’s determination. Thus, the ALJ did not err in the manner in which he discounted

Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony. 

2. Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ decision is based on reversible legal error and does not

rest upon substantial evidence. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) rejecting

the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Louis Cerato, who concluded that she was unable

to work; and (2) assigning improper weight to the opinions of non-treating and nonexamining state agency physicians who opined that she had only moderate physical

limitations and was able to work. (Doc. 17 at 15-19.)

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit

distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat the

claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3)

non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. See Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Generally, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating physician than to the

opinions of non-treating physicians because a treating physician is employed to cure and has

a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995). Where a treating physician’s opinion is not

contradicted by another physician, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing”

reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not be rejected without “specific and legitimate

reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. “When an

examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs

only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not

‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007).

An ALJ must accord “controlling weight” to a treating doctor’s opinion where

medically-approved diagnostic techniques support the opinion and the opinion is not

inconsistent with other substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Lingenfelter

v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1038 n.10 (9th Cir. 2007); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632-33. If the ALJ

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does not accord the opinion controlling weight, then the ALJ must look to a number of other

factors in determining how much weight to give it, such as the length of the treatment

relationship, frequency of examination, nature and extent of treatment relationship, evidence

supporting the treating doctor’s opinion, consistency of the opinion, and the doctor’s

specialization. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(d)(6). 

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit generally holds that greater weight is to be given to the

opinion of an examining physician over and above the opinion of a non-examining

physician. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. As with a treating physician, the ALJ may reject

the opinion of an examining physician, even if contradicted by a non-examining physician,

only by providing specific, legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in

the record. See Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002).

It is solely the duty of the ALJ to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts in the

record. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156. An ALJ need not accept the opinion of any

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and

inadequately supported by clinical findings. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957

(9th Cir. 2002). However, “an ALJ does not provide clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting an examining physician’s opinion by questioning the credibility of the patient’s

complaints where the doctor does not discredit those complaints and supports his ultimate

opinion with his own observations.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194,

1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Treating Physician Dr. Louis Cerato

Dr. Cerato was Plaintiff’s treating physician, and submitted a medical assessment and

pain residual functional capacity assessment in February of 2011. (Tr. 18.) Therein, Dr.

Cerato listed Plaintiff’s impairments as including: “lumbar thoracic, cervical pain, shooting

pains in head, depression/anxiety, and meningioma with headaches,” and opined that she was

limited to “less than sedentary” exertional levels, with “lifting/carry less than 10 pounds,

standing/walking less than 2 hours, and sitting for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday.”

(Id.) 

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The ALJ decision gave “minimal weight” to this opinion, finding that the Doctor’s

opinions were inconsistent with the greater medical evidence of record and Plaintiff’s

activities of daily living, unsupported by treating records, and appeared to be based heavily

on Plaintiff’s subjective reports of her symptoms and limitations, which the ALJ had already

noted were subject to considerable suspicion due to Plaintiff’s exaggeration for financial

benefit. (Id. at 18-19.) The issue before the Court is whether the ALJ provided specific and

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Cerato’s

opinion. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (stating that a treating physician’s opinion may not be

rejected without “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the

record). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not according full weight to the doctor’s

opinion, disagreeing with the ALJ’s contention that the opinion lacks the support of

objective clinical or laboratory diagnostic findings. (Doc. 17 at 15-16.) 

Here, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to provide specific and

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Cerato’s

opinion. The ALJ discounted this treating physician’s opinion primarily because the ALJ

found that the doctor’s notes mainly summarized Plaintiff’s subjective complaints,

diagnoses, and medications – and as discussed previously, the ALJ set forth specific, clear

and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Indeed,

the ALJ cited evidence that Plaintiff’s treating physician himself discredited Plaintiff’s

complaints by refusing to recommend total disability. (Tr. 45.) Thus, the ALJ provided

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for

discounting the doctor’s opinion.

In contrast to the opinions of Dr. Cerato, the ALJ accorded “significant weight” to the

opinions of the State agency’s reviewing physicians and psychologists, who completed RFC

assessments. (Tr. 19.) These physicians stated that Plaintiff was capable of performing “a

range of light-exertional work with occasional climbing ramps/stairs, stooping, kneeling,

crouching, and crawling; no climbing of ladders, ropes, scaffolds; frequently balancing; with

some environmental restrictions, and limited to simple, repetitive work with little stress and

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occasional interaction with public.” (Id.) The ALJ stated that he relied on these nonexaming doctors’ opinions because they were “soundly based on the objective findings,

progress notes and treating notes” and were “generally consistent with the consultative

examing physicians and with the overall medical evidence of record as a whole.” (Id.) 

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ improperly accorded more weight to

the State agency doctors’ opinions. As discussed above, the ALJ explicitly discussed his

rejection of the treating physician’s opinions, and set forth specific, supported reasons for

instead crediting the opinions of the non-examining state agency physicians. See Nguyen

v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the ALJ’s final decision that Plaintiff

was not disabled under the Social Security Act is supported by substantial evidence and

based on the correct legal standards. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED affirming the decision denying disability benefits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in

favor of Defendant and terminate this action.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2013.

Case 2:12-cv-00383-SMM Document 21 Filed 04/26/13 Page 13 of 13