Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01201/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01201-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 EDC holds immigration detainees pursuant to contract with the Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See http://www.cca.com/facility/eloydetention-center (Last visited July 5, 2011).

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Emmanuel Ferron, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Department of Veterans Affairs, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 11-1201-PHX-GMS (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff John Emmanuel Ferron, who is confined in the Eloy Detention Center (EDC),

a Corrections Corporation of America facility1

 in Eloy, Arizona, has filed a pro se Complaint

and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 1, 2.) The Court will dismiss the

Complaint and this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. (Doc. 2.) This

action was opened as a “prisoner” civil rights case and referred to the Court’s staff for review

pursuant to LR Civ. 72.1(b). A “prisoner” is statutorily defined as “any person incarcerated

or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated

Case 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 On March 26, 2009, Plaintiff was sentenced to 39 months in prison followed by

three years on supervised release after he pleaded guilty to multiple counts of social security

fraud, identity theft, and aggravated identity theft in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)

and 18 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(7) and 1028A(a) in the District Court for the District of Alaska. See

United States v. Ferron, No. CR07-0142-JWS, doc. 50 (D. AK Mar. 26, 2009). Plaintiff was

released from prison in September 2010 to ICE custody on September 27, 2010. Id.,doc. 74

at 4, ex. 3. 

- 2 -

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation,

pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). That

is, a “prisoner” is a person who is “currently detained as a result of accusation, conviction,

or sentence for a criminal offense.” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000)). An alien pending

deportation proceedings, which are civil rather than criminal in nature, is not a “prisoner,”

so long as the alien is not also facing criminal charges. Id. at 885-87. 

At the time Plaintiff commenced this action, he was in the custody of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (ICE) as an immigration detainee and not in connection with pending

criminal proceedings.2

 Plaintiff is not, therefore, a “prisoner” within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(2), 1915A, or 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and he is not subject to the incremental

fee payment requirement of § 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff otherwise qualifies to proceed in forma

pauperis. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

II. Statutory Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantCase 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Because this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend and this case will

be dismissed. 

III. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges two counts concerning the termination of veteran benefits by the U.S.

Case 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Plaintiff apparently refers to the Health & Human Services Office of the Inspector

General, which investigates health care fraud. See http://www.oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/

about-us/index.asp (Last visited July 6, 2011). 

4

 Section 3.901(a) defines “fraud” as:

An act committed when a person knowingly makes or causes to be

made or conspires, combines, aids, or assists in, agrees to, arranges for, or in

any way procures the making or presentation of a false or fraudulent affidavit,

declaration, certificate, statement, voucher, or paper, concerning any claim for

benefits under any of the laws administered by the Department of Veterans

Affairs (except laws relating to insurance benefits).

(Emphasis added). Plaintiff contends that he did commit fraud concerning any claim for

benefits. However, 38 C.F.R. § 3.14(b) provides that:

Where an enlistment is voided by the service department because the person

did not have legal capacity to contract for a reason other than minority (as in

the case of an insane person) or because the enlistment was prohibited by

statute (a deserter or person convicted of a felony), benefits may not be paid

based on that service even though a disability was incurred during such

service. An undesirable discharge by reason of the fraudulent enlistment voids

the enlistment from the beginning.

(Emphasis added). See Rucker v. Secretary of the Army, 702 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983)

(enlistment under an assumed name was fraudulent); Haines v. United States, 453 F.2d 233

(3d Cir. 1971) (failure to disclose juvenile record basis for court martial for fraudulent

enlistment). 

- 4 -

Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). Plaintiff sues the DVA; the Secretary of the DVA;

Teri McArtor, a Service Center Manager at the DVA Office in Seattle, Washington; and

Monty E. Stokes, a Seattle Resident Agent of the “O.I.G.”3

 at the Seattle DVA Office.

Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of benefits retroactive to the date of termination.

Plaintiff indicates that his veteran benefits were terminated prior to his arrest and

prosecution discussed above. In Count I, he alleges that Defendant Stokes sent a letter to the

Department of the Navy informing it that Plaintiff had stolen the identity of Clyde Anthony

Steele and joined the Navy using that identity, which constituted fraud pursuant to 38 C.F.R.

3.901.4

 Plaintiff contends that Stokes’ letter was untrue and that Stokes wrongfully provided

Case 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

that information to the Navy, which resulted in the termination of benefits to him. In Ground

Two, Plaintiff alleges that his veteran benefits were terminated without “any notification,”

which he appealed, and that his letters concerning the appeal were ignored. 

IV. Lack of Jurisdiction

Plaintiff seeks relief with respect to the termination of veteran benefits. DVA

decisions affecting veteran benefits are subject to a specific process of judicial and appellate

review. In general, to challenge the denial or termination of benefits, a veteran must file a

claim with the regional office, or agency of original jurisdiction, within the DVA. If

dissatisfied with the resolution of his claim, the claimant may then appeal that decision to the

Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA). 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(a) & 7105(d). If dissatisfied after

review by the BVA, the veteran can then appeal the decision to the United States Court of

Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252 & 7261. The CAVC has

“exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the [BVA,]” and it has authority to “affirm,

modify, or reverse a decision of the [BVA] or to remand the matter, as appropriate.” 38

U.S.C. § 7252(a). In turn, a decision of the CAVC is subject to appellate review as provided

under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(c). Under § 7292, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit has “exclusive jurisdiction” to review decisions of the

CAVC, 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c), and is vested with the “power to affirm or, [ ... ] to modify or

reverse the decision of the [CAVC] or to remand the matter, as appropriate.” 38 U.S.C.

§ 7292(e)(1). Finally, a veteran can seek review of the final judgment of the Federal Circuit

by seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

38 U.S.C. § 7292(c).

Judicial review of DVA decisions concerning benefits are strictly limited to the appeal

procedures outlined above. Except for circumstances not at issue here, the Secretary’s

decisions “shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or by

any court” under 38 U.S.C. § 511. Section 511 “precludes judicial review in Article III

Case 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

courts of VA decisions affecting the provision of veterans’ benefits[.]” Price v. United

States, 228 F.3d 420, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff claims that the DVA wrongfully terminated his benefits and that his attempts

to appeal the termination, which he does not describe, were ignored. Because adjudication

of Plaintiff’s claims requires a determination whether the DVA acted properly in terminating

his benefits, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. 38 U.S.C.

§ 511; see Price, 228 F.3d at 421; Larrabee by Jones v. Derwinski, 968 F.2d 1497, 1499 (2d

Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Veterans Admin., 961 F.2d 1367, 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); see also

Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, No. 08-16728, 2011 WL 1770944, at *20-21, 29

(9th Cir. May 10, 2011) (finding suit brought by veterans organization seeking prospective

additional or substitute procedural safeguards in connection with scheduling mental health

care reviews fell outside the reach of § 511(a), unlike a claim brought by individual veteran

for denial of VA benefits). 

 Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the

Complaint and this action will be dismissed without prejudice. See Price, 228 F.3d at 422;

see also Broudy v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2006). As discussed above, there

is a process for seeking review of the termination of benefits by filing an appeal to the BVA.

If dissatisfied with the ruling of the BVA, a claimant may appeal to the CAVC pursuant to

38 U.S.C. § 7252. If dissatisfied with the CAVC decision, the claimant may appeal to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292. Finally,

a claimant may seek certiorari if he is dissatisfied with the decision of the Federal Circuit.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. (Doc. 2.)

(2) The Complaint (Doc. 1) and this action are dismissed without prejudice for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice.

(4) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

Case 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2011.

Case 2:11-cv-01201-GMS--MEA Document 5 Filed 07/27/11 Page 7 of 7