Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01230/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01230-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARON DREVON DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. JACQUES, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-01230-DAD-JDP (PS)

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND DISMISSING 

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

(Doc. Nos. 21, 27, 29, 30, 31)

Plaintiff Earon Drevon Davis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this civil 

action on June 27, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On August 2, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations 

recommending that plaintiff’s second amended complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. No. 20) be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim and plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (Doc. 

No. 21) be denied. (Doc. No. 27.) In the findings and recommendations, the magistrate judge 

first found that plaintiff’s allegations challenging a state court child support order fall squarely 

within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. at 3) (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject 

Case 2:23-cv-01230-DAD-JDP Document 35 Filed 11/07/24 Page 1 of 5
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matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.”)). The 

magistrate judge next concluded that plaintiff had not stated a claim against defendants Jacques 

and the Placer County Department of Child Services in particular. (Doc. No. 27 at 3–4) (citing 

Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The general rule . . . is that judges are 

immune from suit for judicial acts within and even in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts 

were done maliciously or corruptly; the only exception to this sweeping cloak of immunity exists 

for acts done in ‘the clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”); Lawrie v. Garcia, No. 11-cv-2237-DMSBLM, 2011 WL 5036861, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (holding that the Department of Child 

Support Services for the County of San Diego was “not a proper defendant under § 1983”).) For 

these reasons, the magistrate judge concluded that the SAC should be dismissed, without further

leave to amend, because the claims are fundamentally deficient and that plaintiff’s motion for a 

TRO should be denied as he has made no showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits. 

(Doc. No. 27 at 4.) Those pending findings and recommendations were served on plaintiff and 

contained notice that any objections thereto were to be filed within fourteen (14) days after 

service. (Id.) On August 5, 2024, plaintiff filed objections to the pending findings and 

recommendations. (Doc. No. 28.)

In his objections, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge misapplied the RookerFeldman doctrine. (Doc. No. 28 at 2.) He argues that he is not seeking federal review of a state 

decision and instead asserts “independent federal claims based on violations . . . that occurred 

during the state court proceedings.” (Id.) However, the court has reviewed the allegations of

plaintiff’s SAC and notes that he alleges numerous times that the support order issued against him 

in the Placer County Superior Court is jurisdictionally invalid and that there has been fraud in the 

issuance and enforcement of the invalid support order. (Doc. No. 20-2 at 1–3.) Based on these 

allegations, the court concurs with the magistrate judge’s analysis that plaintiff’s challenge is 

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s ruling, and thus under the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine, this court is prohibited from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de 

facto appeal from a state court judgment. (Doc. No. 27 at 3) (citing Rucker v. Cnty. of Santa 

Clara, State of California, 2003 WL 21440151, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2003) (finding that the 

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plaintiff’s claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s rulings where the plaintiff 

“challenge[d] his original child support order on jurisdictional grounds, dispute[d] his total child 

support arrearages, and allege[d] that Santa Clara County’s garnishment order against his 

disability benefits payments is invalid”)). 

Plaintiff also argues in his objections that the actions of defendant Placer County 

Department of Child Services, defendant Placer County Superior Court, and defendant Jacques 

are “null and void” because of their “failure to communicate the voluntary nature of their 

programs.” (Doc. No. 28 at 5.) Plaintiff does not specify the programs he is referring to in this 

regard, but the undersigned observes that this argument appears to be yet another in support of a 

de facto appeal for relief from plaintiff’s state court child support judgment, and thus does not 

support any basis upon which to reject the pending findings and recommendations.

Next, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that defendant Jacques is

entitled to judicial immunity because plaintiff never gave consent “for Commissioner Jacques to 

act in the capacity of a judge over the support order.” (Doc. No. 28 at 3.) In support of this 

contention, plaintiff relies only on unrelated authority suggesting that a criminal defendant may 

waive their right to a jury trial or a bench trial by a Superior Court judge and instead have their 

matter heard by a commissioner. (Id.) (citing People v. Tijerina, 1 Cal. 3d 41, 46, n.3 (1969)). 

Accordingly, the court is not persuaded that plaintiff’s objection presents a basis upon which to 

reject the magistrate judge’s finding of judicial immunity. 

Plaintiff further argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the Placer County 

Department of Child Services is not a proper defendant under § 1983 because plaintiff intended to 

bring a Monell claim. (Doc. No. 28 at 4.) Plaintiff contends that his SAC “sufficiently alleges 

that the violations were a result of established practices and policies.” (Id.) However, this 

argument does not address the magistrate judge’s conclusion that “municipalities such as cities 

and counties are amenable to suit” but “departments or bureaus of municipalities” are “not 

generally considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.” (Doc. No. 27 at 3) (citing United 

States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 

F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an 

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appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality. . . . While the parties do 

not raise an objection, the Court finds, sua sponte, that suing the Santa Clara Department of 

Corrections is improper. The Department of Corrections is an agency of the County of Santa 

Clara. The County is a proper defendant in a § 1983 claim, an agency of the County is not.”). 

Accordingly, plaintiff presents no basis upon which to reject the magistrate judge’s finding that 

the Placer County Department of Child Services is not a proper defendant. 

Plaintiff’s other objections are conclusory and do not meaningfully address the pending 

findings and recommendations. He argues that his SAC should not be dismissed because he 

“articulated [his] claims and legal precedents clearly and receive [sic] no rebuttal” and his TRO 

should be granted because “the magistrate judge did not adequately consider the likelihood of 

success on the merits.” (Doc. No. 28 at 1–2.) The court finds that the claims plaintiff brings in 

his SAC have been adequately considered, and thus, these arguments do not present a basis upon 

which to reject the magistrate judge’s recommendations. 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this court has conducted a 

de novo review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the court concludes that the 

findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by proper analysis.

Accordingly, 

1. The findings and recommendations issued on August 2, 2024 (Doc. No. 27) are 

adopted in full; 

2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. No. 20) is dismissed, without leave to 

amend;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 21) is denied; 

4. Plaintiff’s motion for the court to review his objections (Doc. No. 29) is denied as 

moot, his objections having already been considered in this order;

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5. Plaintiff’s motions to disqualify the assigned magistrate judge (Doc. No. 30) and 

for default judgment (Doc. No. 31) are also denied as rendered moot by this order; 

and 

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2024 

DALE A. DROZD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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