Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02057/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02057-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

At the request of counsel, on April 17, 2015, the Court held an informal telephonic conference 

related to issues Plaintiff has raised related to the conduct of the depositions of Defendant Woessner 

and the Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deponent, Sherman.

At the conference, counsel noted that many times in the Woessner deposition, defense counsel 

instructed the witness not to answer questions despite that the instruction was not made to preserve a 

privilege or to allow time to seek a protective order. The Court agreed that such an instruction is 

appropriate only under those circumstances set forth by Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2) [“A person may 

instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation 

ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).”]. However, the Court reminded 

counsel that when confronted with whether a deposition should be reopened, the Court may limit the 

discovery sought by balancing factors such as the costs involved, whether the information could be 

obtained more efficiently from a different source and the importance of the discovery, among other 

R.D.G., et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-02057 JLT

ORDER AFTER SECOND INFORMAL 

TELEPHONIC CONFERENCE

(Doc. 44)

Case 1:13-cv-02057-JLT Document 46 Filed 04/20/15 Page 1 of 3
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factors. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). The Court directed the conversation toward these factors.

As to the deposition of Woessner, at the conference it was clear that answers had been given to 

several questions Plaintiffs contended had not been given. For example, Woessner testified he had no 

information whether decedent’s gun was jammed. Likewise, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Woessner 

testified that when he reached the breezeway while chasing the decedent, he saw the decedent had 

continued running and did not stop there. Thus, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the information as to 

whether the decedent ambuhsed Woessner, was addressed at the deposition.

At the deposition, Woessner did not provide responses to hypothetical questions posed by 

Plaintiffs’ counsel related to whether, if the circumstances were different—such as the officer being 

aware the decedent was not going to ambush him and the officer being aware the decedent was 

carrying an inoperable—he would have taken different actions. At the conference, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

argued that the answers to these questions would test the officer’s credibility as well as his training and 

experience and could impact the opinions of their expert; the Court disagrees—at least based upon the 

showing currently made. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel could not point to how the responses to the posed 

hypotheticals would be admissible at trial. For example, counsel made no showing that the responses 

did not call for speculation or did not constitute an expert opinion.

Though Plaintiffs’ counsel decided that they did not wish to discuss the other areas of their 

concern as to the Woessner deposition (specifically questions related to whether an AR-15 “has the 

ability to go through walls,” and the honesty of the officer when he did respond to the question by 

stating, “I’m not sure. I don’t know anything about plaster or anything, I’m sorry I don’t know”), the 

parties discussed whether Sherman was an appropriate deponent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). 

Plaintiffs’ chief concern was that Sherman lacked personal knowledge of much of the information 

about which he testified.

The Court reminded counsel that under this Rule 30(b)(6), the key issue is whether the person 

produced by the entity has the authority to bind it in the litigation. The entity’s designee need not have 

personal knowledge or have been witness to the events addressed at the deposition. United States v. 

Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 aff’d 166 F.R.D. 367 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York 

v. Vegas Const. Co., Inc., 251 F.R.D. 534, 539 (D.Nev. 2008). Rather the deponent must be sufficiently 

Case 1:13-cv-02057-JLT Document 46 Filed 04/20/15 Page 2 of 3
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prepared about information known by the entity or reasonably available to it, so he can address the 

topics raised at the deposition on behalf of the entity. Id. However, resolution of this issue was not 

achieved. 

Thus, after discussing the issues at the conference, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiffs are authorized to file a motion to compel the further deposition of Woessner. If 

they choose to file such a motion, in addition to addressing the specific deposition questions at issue, 

they must address the factors set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2(C) such to justify reopening the 

deposition. Likewise, they are directed to discuss the timeliness of the motion in light of the fact that 

the deposition occurred in January 2015. The motion SHALL comply with Local Rule 251(c);

2. Plaintiffs are authorized to file a motion to compel the further deposition of the entity. 

However, if they choose to file such a motion, in addition to addressing the specific deposition 

questions at issue, they must address the factors why they believe the deponent previously produced 

was inadequate under applicable federal authority. The motion SHALL comply with Local Rule 

251(c);

3. As to either motion, Plaintiffs are limited to the issues actually raised in meet and confer 

efforts with opposing counsel and actually discussed at the informal conference.

No modifications of the case schedule are authorized hereby.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-02057-JLT Document 46 Filed 04/20/15 Page 3 of 3