Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00217/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00217-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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ASH 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Samuel Louis Fuller, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Ryan Donald Powell, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-0217-PHX-DGC (JFM) 

ORDER 

On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff Samuel Louis Fuller, who is confined in the 

Maricopa County Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint in the Superior 

Court of Maricopa County, Arizona. On February 5, 2014, Defendants Ryan D. Powell, 

Jordyn Raimondo, and Sergeant Gary Miller filed a Notice of Removal of the case from 

the Superior Court. By Order dated August 15, 2014, this Court accepted jurisdiction, 

but dismissed the Complaint because it was not on the Court’s approved form and 

because the Court was unable to determine the precise number and nature of Plaintiff’s 

claims. Plaintiff was granted 30 days in which to file an amended complaint that cured 

the deficiencies described in the Order. 

 On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. In a 

January 14, 2015 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because 

Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second 

amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 

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 On February 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15). The 

Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his two-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants: 

Sergeant De La Rosa, the central mailing unit supervisor at Fourth Avenue Jail; Joseph 

M. Arpaio, the Sheriff of Maricopa County; and “MCSO Sergeants, agents or policy, 

Administrative staff, regulation” at “Fourth Avenue Jail, LBJ, etc.” Plaintiff appears to 

seek declaratory and monetary relief. 

 Plaintiff describes Count One as relating to “inspect[ion] and examin[ation of] 

discover[y].” Plaintiff’s allegations are largely incomprehensible, but appear to suggest 

that the Fourth Avenue Jail maintains a “pro-per file” for each inmate. Plaintiff seems to 

allege that Jail staff will only verbally verify whether items are in the “pro per file,” but 

will not provide written verification. For reasons unclear, Plaintiff appears to allege that 

the failure to provide written verification has “prejudiced” Plaintiff and impeded his 

“rights to inspect and cross-examin[e] discover[y].” 

 Plaintiff describes Count Two as relating to mail. According to Plaintiff, the 

Fourth Avenue Jail has a “post card only” policy that prevents him from sending or 

receiving anything other than postcards. Plaintiff alleges that he has received non-post 

card letters from his bank on two previous occasions, but that the Jail – and Defendant De 

La Rosa in particular – no longer allow him to receive such letters. Plaintiff also alleges 

that he is no longer able to send anything other than postcards, and when he tries to send 

non-postcards to his bank, they are returned to him. Plaintiff states that he has no other 

way of contacting his bank because when he attempts to call the bank it “is normally 

rejected by any financial bank.” Plaintiff avers that he “need[s] to have continuous 

communication with his financial institution” in order to prosecute his cases, and that the 

“post card only” policy is preventing him from doing so. 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

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(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Defendants “MCSO Sergeants, agents or policy, Administrative staff, 

regulation” at “Fourth Avenue Jail, LBJ, etc.” 

 The Court is unable to determine who or what Plaintiff has attempted to name as 

the third Defendant in his Second Amended Complaint. To the extent Plaintiff is 

attempting to bring suit against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Plaintiff has been 

previously warned that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department is not a proper 

defendant. In Arizona, the responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is 

placed by law upon the sheriff. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 31-101. A sheriff’s office is simply an administrative creation of the county sheriff to 

allow him to carry out his statutory duties and not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to 

§ 1983. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring suit against any other individual or 

entity, he has not provided sufficient information to identify that individual or entity, or 

provided facts to support that such an individual or entity has violated his rights. 

Accordingly, the “MCSO Sergeants, agents or policy, Administrative staff, regulation” at 

“Fourth Avenue Jail, LBJ, etc.” will be dismissed. 

. . . . 

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B. Count One

 The Court is unable to determine the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One. 

Other than stating that his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth, and “Ex Post Facto” rights 

have been violated, Plaintiff has not explained exactly what he is complaining of, how his 

federal rights have been violated, or how any of the Defendants is responsible for that 

violation. Accordingly, Count One will be dismissed. 

C. Count Two

 As explained in its January 14 Order, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the “post 

card only” policy fail to state a claim. In Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 

(D. Ariz. 2009), the Court found that the same postcard policy at issue here had a rational 

connection to legitimate governmental interests to prevent or limit the smuggling of 

contraband -- such as drugs, handcuff keys, and weapons -- into the jails via incoming 

mail, particularly in light of the thousands of pieces of mail subject to inspection each 

day. Further, the Court found that inmates had alternative means of exercising the right 

at issue, such as telephone calls and visitation. Id. Finally, the Court found that the 

plaintiff had not identified obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation that would 

accommodate the right at de minimis cost to penological goals. Other cases have reached 

analogous conclusions concerning the postcard policy. See Gamble v. Arpaio, No. 

CV 12-790-PHX-GMS (LOA), 2013 WL 5890730, at *2, *3, *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2013); 

Gieck v. Arpaio, No. CV 07-1143-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 2604919, at *4-8 (D. Ariz. June 

23, 2008) (rejecting facial challenge to policy and finding policy constitutional); see also 

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1203 (D. Ariz. 2013) (one page limit 

on incoming mail to inmates was not unconstitutional where Prison Legal News had 

alternative avenues to communicate with inmates at the jail). Accordingly, to the extent 

Plaintiff again alleges that the “post card only” policy violates his First Amendment 

rights, he has failed to state a claim and Count Two will be dismissed. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the 

Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given 

if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 

whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

 Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable 

to do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 

opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) and this action are 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 (2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

 (3) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

 Dated this 13th day of April, 2015. 

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