Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01513/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01513-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ALLIANCE 

OF PUBLICLY OWNED TREATMENT 

WORKS and CENTRAL VALLEY 

CLEAN WATER ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY; ALEXIS 

STRAUSS, ACTING REGIONAL 

ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY, REGION IX,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01513-MCE-DB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case was closed on May 15, 2015 after the Court determined that the action 

was moot. ECF No. 51. On June 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration 

based on newly discovered evidence. ECF No. 53. The Court granted that Motion for 

the limited purpose of obtaining further briefing as to an argument Plaintiffs had raised 

for the first time in their reply brief to that motion. ECF No. 61. After considering the 

additional briefing, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. 94. 

Plaintiffs now file for a Motion to Reopen Judgment so that they can amend their 

complaint. ECF No. 95. For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reopen 

Judgment is DENIED.

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BACKGROUND

The Southern California Alliance of Publically Owned Treatment Works (“SCAP”) 

and the Central Valley Clean Water Association (“CVCWA”) are organizations whose 

members treat and recycle wastewater. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, Plaintiffs’ 

members must obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) 

permits in order to release treated water into the environment. These permits are issued 

by the California Regional Water Quality Control Boards, the State Water Resources 

Control Board (“State Water Board”), and sometimes the United States Environmental 

Protection Agency (“EPA”). However, it is the EPA that promulgates formal test methods 

for determining whether discharged water is deemed “toxic.” The permits contain 

monitoring requirements that “must be conducted according to test procedures approved 

under 40 CFR part 136.” 40 CFR 122.41(j)(4). The formally approved test procedures 

include the whole effluent toxicity (“WET”) test methods, which measure the biological 

effects (survival, growth, and/or reproduction) on aquatic organisms exposed to 

environmental samples.

In 2002, the EPA ratified a number of biological WET test methods to be 

applicable for use in the NPDES program.1 67 Fed. Reg. 69,952, Nov. 19, 2002. As 

part of this modification, EPA added a section to each method’s test review manual that 

included recommended statistical methodologies for analyzing WET test biological data. 

The WET test manuals recommend, but do not require, select statistical analyses to be 

applied to WET test results.2 AR 002357.3

 1 “Beyond assessing WET data for the NPDES Program, WET tests are used to assess toxicity of 

receiving water . . . and stormwater samples.” AR001841.

2 Plaintiffs dispute this fact and argue that only “formally promulgated statistical method[s]” can be 

used. Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 57, at 4:6 (citing to the four specified statistical methods for hypothesis testing 

identified in the 2002 rule).

3 All citations to the Administrative Record in this Memorandum and Order will be denoted in this 

format and refer to the record with the Court on October 15, 2014. See ECF No. 22.

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In 2010, the EPA published a guidance document (“2010 Guidance”) regarding a 

new method of analyzing WET test data for the NPDES program—the Test of Significant 

Toxicity (“TST”). Pursuant to 40 CFR 136, all WET test methods must be conducted 

using five concentrations and a control.4 However, it is possible to conduct the TST 

statistical approach using only two concentrations: the effluent at the critical 

concentration and a control. If the effluent and the control differ by an unacceptable 

amount (the amount that would have a measured detrimental effect on the ability of 

aquatic organisms to thrive and survive), then the effluent sample is declared toxic.

In May 2013, the Deputy Regional Administrator of the EPA’s Region 9 sent a 

memorandum to EPA headquarters asking for clarification on the minimum number of 

test concentrations required to appropriately utilize the TST approach. AR 000030-32. 

In response, a headquarters representative stated that the two-concentration design was 

not acceptable as the promulgated WET methods require “a control plus five effluent 

concentrations under the methods’ test acceptability criteria.” AR000028.5 The 

response went on to state, however, that use of the two-concentrations TST approach 

could be accomplished by use of the Alternate Test Procedure (“ATP”) process laid out 

in 40 CFR parts 136.4 and 136.5. AR000028-29.

An ATP request can either be nationwide (40 CFR 136.4) or for limited use 

(40 CFR 136.5). While nationwide requests must be approved by the National 

Coordinator, a limited use request can be approved by the EPA’s Regional ATP 

Coordinator, who has the discretion to restrict the use of the ATP to a specific facility or 

“to all discharger[s] or facilities (and their associated laboratories) specified in the 

approval for the Region.” 40 CFR 136.5.

///

 4 Part 136.7 requires that “a permittee/laboratory shall use suitable [quality assurance and quality 

control] procedures when conducting compliance analyses . . . .” the promulgated 2002 Methods state 

that toxicity tests generally have “a minimum of five effluent concentrations.” AR002679, § 2.2.2.

5 The Court notes that this exchanged mimicked an informal email chain between Region 9 and 

EPA headquarters that took place in 2012. See AR000040-43.

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On February 12, 2014, the State Water Board asked the Regional ATP 

Coordinator to approve the two-concentration TST as an ATP for all of California. In 

error, the request referred to 40 CFR 136.4, despite the fact that the request did not ask 

for the approval of a nationwide ATP. On March 17, 2014, the EPA approved the twoconcentration TST test design as a limited use ATP for NPDES permits issued in 

California, finding that the two-concentration TST approach was an acceptable 

equivalent to the five-concentration test evaluated using NOEC-LOEC6 hypothesis 

testing.

On June 25, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that Defendants EPA and 

Jared Blumenfled, as the Regional Administrator of EPA Region 9, violated the 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, and regulations implementing the 

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–376.7 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

illegally and improperly approved the State Water Board’s request to use a newly 

formulated methodology as an ATP. Plaintiffs filed this action in order to overturn the 

ATP approval and to obtain a permanent injunction preventing the EPA from “mandating 

the use of the two-concentration TST or use of analytical results obtained using this nonpromulgated method for NPDES compliance determination or other Clean Water Act 

purposes.” First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), Prayer for Relief ¶ E, ECF No. 15. Concurrent 

with the filing of their original complaint, Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order 

from the Court, which was later denied due to delay. Because there was no restraining 

order in place, NPDES permits containing the two-concentration TST were issued while 

the parties litigated this case.

On February 11, 2015—just before Defendants’ Reply to its Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment was due—the EPA withdrew its ATP approval of the two-

 6 Traditionally, when hypothesis tests are used to analyze toxicity test data, the results of the test 

are given in two endpoints, the No-Observed-Effect-Concentration (NOEC) and the Lowest-ObservedEffect-Concentration (LOEC). AR002356.

7 Alexis Strauss has since been substituted in for Mr. Blumenfeld as the Acting Regional 

Administrator. ECF No. 91.

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concentration TST testing method “effective immediately.”8 McNaughton Decl., ECF 

No. 40-1, Ex. A, at 4. Defendants acknowledged that the withdrawal “arose because of 

this litigation.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 40, at 9:7. Because of this withdrawal, the Court 

determined the case to be moot on May 15, 2015.

The Court found that it was “highly unlikely that this exact situation will occur 

again in the future.” The Court also reasoned that any future case about the issuance of 

an ATP to approve the two-concentration TST approach would be based on a new 

record. ECF No. 51, at 4. Additionally, the Court stated the allegedly wrongful behavior 

could not reasonably be expected to reoccur because “[t]he EPA cannot initiate the ATP 

process . . . [a]nd there is no indication that the State Water Board will submit another 

ATP request to the EPA to use the two-concentration TST test method for all of 

California.” Id. at 6 (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court determined that “[e]ven if 

the State Water Board were to submit a new ATP request for this exact testing 

procedure, any decision on that request would be the result of a new proceeding on a 

new record.” Id. at 5. Finally, with respect to the permits containing the twoconcentration TST approach that had been issued while litigation was pending, the Court 

held that state court was the “appropriate venue to challenge the contents of an 

individual NPDES permit.” Id. at 7.

On June 4, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on newly 

discovered evidence in the form of a State Water Board internal memorandum (“the 

Memo”) discussing the effect of the EPA’s withdrawal of the State Water Board’s ATP 

request on future NPDES permitting. ECF No. 53-2, Ex. A. The Memo states that “[t]he 

three reasons for withdrawal, as described in the rejection letter, are clearly identified as 

procedural errors” and that the withdrawal was not based on “the substantive TST 

statistical analysis or the scientific validity of a two-concentration test design.” Id. The 

Memo goes on to state that once the EPA makes changes to the ATP regulations, 

 8 Due to the timing of the EPA’s withdrawal, the Court allowed additional briefing on the issue of 

mootness. See ECF No. 44.

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through a proposed rulemaking, the State Water Board “will resubmit the ATP request in 

the proper format.” Id. The Memo provides a table showing that the five-concentration 

test design must be used for effluent testing, but that the two-concentration method can 

be used for storm water and receiving water as those water sources are not subject to 

the same five-concentration test requirements found in 40 CFR 136.3.9 The Memo 

concludes by stating:

With the withdrawal of the two-concentration test design 

approval, an NPDES permit can still require the TST for 

statistical analyses, but only the biological responses from 

the permitted Instream Waste Concentration (IWC) and the 

control (effluent concentration of zero) are utilized.

Id.

After Plaintiffs’ filing of the original Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs acquired 

more documentation from a previous Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request.10 

Pls.’ RJN, ECF No. 58. Plaintiffs argued that these documents showed that the “EPA 

has demonstrated a clear pattern and practice of utilizing, and encouraging the State to 

utilize, the 2010 guidance documents to set chronic toxicity permit limits and monitoring 

requirements.” Pls.’ Reply 3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs urged the Court to retain jurisdiction 

over this case, and to determine whether the EPA can do so without formally 

promulgating the TST approach as a recommended WET test statistical analysis 

approach, like those listed in the 2002 rule. The Test approach had only been discussed 

in the 2010 Guidance, and while the EPA was in the process of updating 40 CFR 136, 

the proposed rule did not contain a reference to the TST approach. See Clean Water 

///

 9 This is because the methods manuals for receiving water and storm water recommended a twoconcentration experimental design.

10 The documents include: recently issued permits that contain the TST statistical analysis 

(Exhibits A and C); a letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the FOIA request (Exhibit B); an email chain 

between EPA Region 9 staff members about the withdrawal of the ATP approval (Exhibit D); three orders 

requiring the use of the TST (Exhibits E, I, and J); two email chains regarding how the TST approach 

should be utilized in NPDES permits (Exhibits F and G); a PowerPoint presentation about the TST 

approach (Exhibit H); a permit quality review form the State of Hawaii (Exhibit K); and a permit fact sheet 

for the Guam Waterworks Authority (Exhibit L).

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Act Methods Update Rule for the Analysis of Effluent; Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.8956 

(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-19/pdf/2015-02841.pdf.

Based on this newly raised argument, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Reconsideration for the limited purpose of permitting simultaneous further briefing on the 

impact of the evidence Plaintiffs had identified on the issues raised in this case. In that 

Order, however, the Court made clear that because the case “centered entirely around 

the ATP request and its approval, . . . that issue was now moot” given the EPA’s 

withdrawal of the approval.11 ECF No. 61, at 10. It nonetheless went on to conclude 

that Plaintiffs’ new argument “that the TST is not an approved Part 136 method that can 

be utilized in NPDES permits, and cannot be lawfully approved as an ATP” was not fully 

briefed and it permitted the parties the opportunity to do so. Id.

After considering those simultaneous briefs, additional further briefing, and an 

amicus brief, the Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on its merits. ECF No. 94. 

The Court found that the newly discovered evidence had “no impact on Plaintiffs’ 

challenge to the ATP approval.” Id. at 9. Instead, “Plaintiffs ha[d] dramatically switched 

tactics” to focus on the use of the TST method as a whole. Id. at 9–10. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs alleged that the 2010 Guidance, not the ATP, was being used impermissibly to 

implement the TST method. Id. at 10. Plaintiffs now file a Motion to Reopen the 

Judgment so that they can amend their complaint to include this new claim.

STANDARD

A motion to reopen judgment is properly brought under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 59(e) or 60(b).12 Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1996). 

///

 11 The Court’s initial decision on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is incorporated in its entirety 

here. ECF No. 61.

12 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless 

otherwise noted.

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After final judgment has been entered, a complaint can be amended only after the 

judgment is reopened under either of those two rules. Id.

Under Rule 59(e), three grounds may justify reconsideration: (1) an intervening 

change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct 

clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma 

GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, such a motion “must be 

filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

Rule 60(b) provides:

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its 

legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could 

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 

under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called 

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 

opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 

been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an 

earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or 

applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any 

other reason that justifies relief.

Such a motion can only be made “within a reasonable time.” Id. 60(c)(1). Furthermore, 

“for reasons (1), (2), and (3)” the motion can be made “no more than a year after the 

entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Id.

It is a well-established maxim that a court should not revisit its own decisions 

unless extraordinary circumstances show that its prior decision was wrong. Christianson 

v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). Mere dissatisfaction with the 

court’s order, or belief that the court is wrong in its decision, is not grounds for relief. 

Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. b. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981); 

see also Sheets v. Terhune, No. 1:08-cv-1056-SRB, 2010 WL 1287078, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 30, 2010 (“Such motions should not be used for the purpose of asking a court ‘to 

rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.’”). Motions for 

reconsideration are therefore not intended to “give an unhappy litigant one additional 

chance to sway the judge.” Kilgore v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-1792-CKD, 2013 WL 

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5425313, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting Frito-Lay of P.R., Inv. v. Canas, 

92 F.R.D. 384, 390 (D.P.R. 1981)). A motion for reconsideration should not be used to 

raise arguments or present evidence that could have reasonably been raised or 

presented earlier. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 880 (citing Kona Enters., Inc. v. 

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). In order to succeed, a party 

making a motion for reconsideration must “set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing 

nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Pritchen v. McEwen, No. 1:10-

cv-02008-JLT HC, 2011 WL 2115647, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (citing Kern-Tulare 

Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Cal. 1986) aff’d in part, rev’d in 

part, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987)).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs bring this Motion to Reopen Judgment under both Rules 59 and 60, but 

any motion made under Rule 59 is untimely. Rule 59(e) requires that any such motion 

be made within 28 days of the entry of judgment. Final judgment was entered on 

May 15, 2015, ECF No. 52, and Plaintiffs brought this motion over a year later, on 

September 9, 2016, ECF No. 95. Thus, the Court has no authority to entertain a Rule 59 

motion, for the time limitation on Rule 59 motions cannot be waived by any court. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2); Carter v. United States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citing Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1978)).13

Plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion is grounded upon a claim of excusable neglect. Pls.’ 

Mot. to Reopen J., at 9:6–7. A Rule 60 motion brought on such a basis must be brought 

within a year of “the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. 

 13 Plaintiffs claim that the time available to file Rule 59(e) motions is measured from the denial of 

their original motion for reconsideration. Pls.’ Mot. to Reopen J. at 7:11–22. This is incorrect. To hold as 

such would be to allow parties to file unlimited successive motions for reconsideration, which makes little 

sense in the face of Rule 59’s strict, non-discretionary time limits. Cf. Wages v. I.R.S., 915 F.2d 1230, 

1234 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (analyzing successive Rule 59 motions in the context of finality for appeals 

purposes).

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R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). As with Rule 59 motions, the Court lacks discretion to extend the 

time for Rule 60 motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2). However, unlike Rule 59, Rule 60 

applies not only to final judgments, but also to orders and proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b). Thus, the Plaintiffs’ Rule 60 motion can only be interpreted as a motion for the 

Court to reconsider its original denial to reconsider the judgment.

It is unclear, however, exactly how excusable neglect could warrant reconsidering 

that order. Plaintiffs argue that their “failure to plead allegations concerning the use of 

the 2010 Guidance to the Court’s satisfaction was an inadvertent mistake based upon 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Court’s September 2015 order.” Pls.’ Mot. to Reopen J. at 9:6–

7. The Court had granted summary judgment based on Plaintiffs’ challenge to the ATP

becoming moot, and Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. The September 2015 order

allowing additional briefing on that motion clearly stated that the issue before the Court 

had only ever been the validity of the ATP, not a general “risk of obtaining permits under 

the TST testing method.” Mem. & Order, ECF No. 61, at 9:13–15. It further clarified that 

“[t]he Court was not under the illusion that withdrawal of the ATP approval would also 

withdraw the 2010 Guidance document that discussed the TST as an available statistical 

method.” Id. at 9:18–19. The September 2015 order granted Plaintiffs’ original motion 

for reconsideration for the limited purpose of whether their newly discovered evidence 

made the ATP challenge no longer moot. Id. at 10:10–12. That order made clear that

the Court considered the ATP’s validity the sole basis of Plaintiffs’ claims against the 

EPA.

Indeed, at no point prior to Plaintiffs’ reply brief on their motion to reconsider did 

they shift toward challenging the 2010 Guidance. Plaintiffs chose to litigate on the 

narrow issue of the ATP’s validity. Changing tactics in a reply brief on a motion to 

reconsider can in no way be construed as excusable neglect, much less blamed on the

Court’s September 2015 order. Plaintiffs’ tactical choice to narrow their focus to the ATP

approval provides no basis for this Court to reopen judgment more than a year after the 

granting of summary judgment.

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Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the Court should “liberally construe[ Rules] 59 

and 60 in order to ‘accomplish justice.’” Pls.’ Mot. to Reopen J. at 7:23–24 (quoting 

Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614–15 (1949)). In support of their claim that 

reopening the judgment would “accomplish justice,” Plaintiffs argue that leave to amend 

is “critical because . . . the statute of limitations for a direct challenge to the 2010 

Guidance ran in June 2016.” Pls.’ Mot. to Reopen J. at 7:2–4; see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2401(a) (setting out a six-year statute of limitations for “every civil action commenced 

against the United States”). This argument is unavailing.

As this Court noted in ultimately denying Plaintiffs’ original motion for 

reconsideration, a challenge in Plaintiffs’ FAC that alleged the EPA improperly relied on 

the 2010 Guidance to issue permits “would have been speculative and unripe at the 

time” of Plaintiffs’ FAC. Mem. & Order, ECF No. 94, at 11:17–18. That is because

Plaintiffs had only alleged that the EPA was impermissibly relying on the ATP to issue 

such permits, and not that permits were being issued based on the 2010 Guidance. If 

Plaintiffs are now alleging that the EPA is relying on the 2010 Guidance in a way that it 

was not when the ATP was in effect, then the statute of limitations on such allegations

would not have started running until that change occurred. This is because the statute 

of limitations only begins to run “after the right of action first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2401(a).14 Under Acri v. International Association of Machinists, 781 F.2d 1393 (9th 

Cir. 1986), any cause of action based on the EPA using the 2010 Guidance in a new 

way in response to the revocation of the ATP would likely have not accrued until—at the 

very earliest—the ATP was revoked in February 2015. The EPA cannot avoid review by 

shifting the bases of its actions until the statute of limitation on challenging the issuance

of its regulatory documents runs. The EPA’s actions can remain open to challenge on 

an “as applied” basis when regulations are used in new ways.

///

 14 For a more extensive discussion of the statute of limitations for challenges under the APA, see 

Utu Utu Gwaitu Paiute Tribe v. Dep’t of Interior, 766 F. Supp. 842, 844–47 (E.D. Cal. 1991). 

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If indeed Plaintiffs do allege that the EPA is relying on the 2010 Guidance in a 

new way, then Plaintiffs are free to file a new suit against the EPA. It makes no sense, 

however, to clumsily tack such a new claim to their original ATP challenge via a motion 

for reconsideration of a prior motion for reconsideration. Should Plaintiffs decide to file a 

new suit in this Court, they are hereby directed to file a Notice of Related Cases under 

Local Rule 123, which will ensure that the case is assigned to the undersigned Judge.

The parties are cautioned, however, not to rely on this ruling as actually disposing 

of a hypothetical statute of limitations question not yet before the Court. The Court is not 

now in a position to determine whether the statute of limitations bars any claims Plaintiffs 

may bring in a new suit. Since it is not clear exactly what allegations Plaintiffs’ new 

claims might contain and the statute of limitations issue has not been briefed before the 

Court, any such ruling would be premature.

For example, if, contrary to the Court’s understanding, Plaintiffs wish now to 

challenge the issuance of the 2010 Guidance in addition to their original challenge to the 

ATP, then they are likely correct that their claims are time-barred. As discussed above, 

the Court’s September 2015 order made clear that “[t]he Court was not under the illusion 

that withdrawal of the ATP approval would also withdraw the 2010 Guidance document 

that discussed the TST as an available statistical method.” Mem. & Order, ECF No. 61, 

at 9:18–20. That said, any strategic error is ultimately attributable to Plaintiffs, and they 

cannot now avoid the statute of limitations by expanding the scope of their challenge 

now that their tactical decision to take a narrow focus did not achieve everything they 

had hoped it might.

///

///

///

///

///

///

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reopen the Judgment, 

ECF No. 95, is DENIED. If Plaintiffs file a new suit based on the EPA’s reliance on the 

2010 Guidance, Plaintiffs shall file a Notice of Related Cases pursuant to Local 

Rule 123.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2016

Case 2:14-cv-01513-MCE-DB Document 102 Filed 10/21/16 Page 13 of 13