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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐2558

DAN DAVIES,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

KARLEN BENBENEK, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CV 0045 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 3, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Dan Davies sued Chicago

police officer Karlen Benbenek for using excessive force when

responding to a domestic disturbance at Davies’ home in the

summer of 2010. A trial was held and the jury found for Of‐

ficer Benbenek. On appeal Davies challenges several of the

district court’s evidentiary rulings, but his arguments are

without merit. Because the evidence challenged by Davies

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was used for a permissible purpose and was not unduly prej‐

udicial, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment for

Officer Benbenek.  

I. BACKGROUND

On June 24, 2010, Dan Davies and his then‐girlfriend Lu‐

cille Whitehead got into a physical altercation in Davies’ bed‐

room. Whitehead managed to call 911 and reported that she

and Davies had gotten into an argument and that he had

“pulled a gun” on her. Several Chicago police officers, includ‐

ing Officer Karlen Benbenek, responded to the call. The offic‐

ers kicked down the door to Davies’ home because no one an‐

swered after they knocked and announced their presence.

When the officers entered they encountered Davies, who is

paralyzed from the waist down, sitting in his wheelchair.1 Da‐

vies’ nephew was also there.  

According to the police, Davies was very angry with them

for being in his house. He used profanity, yelled at them, told

them to get out, and talked about suing them. The officers

proceeded to search the house and discovered illegal items in

Davies’ bedroom. Davies asked the police if his nephew could

“take the rap” for the items, but the police declined the re‐

quest. Davies then became increasingly agitated and again

threatened to sue the officers and told them he had “sued be‐

fore.” He also spat on Officer Benbenek and made a foul com‐

ment about a tongue‐piercing she had at the time. When Of‐

ficer Benbenek told Davies he would be charged for spitting

on her, Davies threw himself from his wheelchair onto the

                                                  1 Davies has been a paraplegic since 1992.

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No. 14‐2558 3

floor, where he continued telling the officers that he would

sue.  

Davies paints a markedly different picture of his encoun‐

ter with Officer Benbenek. He testified that, once he com‐

mented on her tongue‐piercing, she grabbed him by the hair

and punched him in the face multiple times, and that he later

“w[o]ke up” on the floor choking on his own blood.

After Davies ended up on the ground, the officers called

for an ambulance and Davies was taken to the hospital. The

attending physician testified that Davies had sustained a frac‐

tured femur that was consistent with a fall. He also testified

that Davies had severe osteoporosis which made his bones

more susceptible to breaking through minor trauma.

Davies subsequently brought this civil action against Of‐

ficer Benbenek under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she used

excessive force during the disputed encounter of June 24,

2010. Before trial, the parties filed motions in limine seeking a

ruling on whether Officer Benbenek could offer testimony

that Davies, in the course of threatening to sue the responding

officers, told them that he had sued before. The defense also

sought to present testimony that certain unidentified “items”

were recovered from Davies’ home, and that Davies was dis‐

traught when the police declined his request to pin possession

of the items on his nephew. Over Davies’ objection, the court

ultimately admitted the proposed testimony at trial. The ad‐

mitted testimony was not offered to prove that Davies had a

prior history of litigation, nor did it include any description

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of the items found in Davies’ home.2 Following trial the jury

rendered a verdict for Officer Benbenek, and the district court

entered judgment accordingly.

II. DISCUSSION

Davies’ appeal focuses on the district court’s evidentiary

rulings. He argues that the district court erred by allowing the

responding officers to testify (1) that he told them he had sued

before, and (2) that he became upset when they refused to

hold his nephew responsible for the items that were discov‐

ered in his home. Davies contends that this testimony should

have been excluded as impermissible character evidence un‐

der Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and as unfairly prejudi‐

cial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  

We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for

abuse of discretion and will reverse only if “no reasonable

person could take the view adopted by the trial court.” United

States v. Causey, 748 F.3d 310, 315–16 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal

marks omitted). Under Rule 404(b), evidence of a crime,

wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s char‐

acter or propensity to act a certain way. Fed. R. Evid.

404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admissible, however, for an‐

other purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, orintent.

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Under Rule 403, the district court is

allowed to exclude evidence whose probative value is sub‐

stantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R.

                                                  2 The responding officers also testified at trial that Davies told them

he had “won” an earlier lawsuit and “made money” that way, but the dis‐

trict court struck that testimony on grounds that it referenced the result of

Davies’ alleged earlier litigation.

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No. 14‐2558 5

Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial “only if it will in‐

duce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, com‐

monly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence pre‐

sented.” United States v. Bogan, 267 F.3d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 2001)

(internal marks omitted). We give “special deference” to the

district court’s admission of evidence under Rule 403. United

States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal

marks omitted).

A. Testimony that Davies said he had sued before

Davies argues that the responding officers’ testimony that

he told them he had “sued before” was inadmissible under

Rule 404(b) because it constituted other‐act evidence that was

used to tarnish his character. He also argues that the testi‐

mony should have been excluded under Rule 403 because it

resulted in severe prejudice with no corresponding probative

value. Neither argument has merit.

First, Rule 404(b) does not apply here because the chal‐

lenged testimony is not other‐act evidence that was used to

prove Davies’ character. The responding officers testified

only that Davies said he had sued before, not that he did sue

before. In doing so, the officers simply related what was said

and done in the critical moments surrounding Officer

Benbenek’s alleged use of excessive force. Davies’ words and

actions at that time are central to the disputed circumstances

underlying his claim of excessive force; they are not “other

acts” used to establish a propensity inference in violation of

Rule 404(b). See Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir.

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1999) (party’s statement made days before alleged use of ex‐

cessive force was nonetheless “part and parcel of the case at

hand and thus [] not covered by Rule 404(b)”).3

Davies has not made the required showing under Rule 403

either. Davies’ comments to the responding officers are highly

probative in evaluating the disputed encounter with Officer

Benbenek that lies at the heart of his claim for excessive force.

On the other side of the scale, there is nothing “inherently

emotional or incendiary” about the officers’ testimony that

Davies said he had previously sued, see United States v. Strong,

485 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 2007), nor has Davies explained

how the testimony would otherwise induce a jury to decide

the case on an improper basis. Accordingly, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the probative

value of this testimony was not substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice.4

                                                  3 Even if the testimony that Davies said he had sued before were con‐

strued as other‐act evidence, it still would not run afoul of Rule 404(b),

since there is no indication that it was used for an improper propensity

inference. Davies asserts that the testimony was used to show that he had

a propensity to file frivolous lawsuits. But the mere suggestion that Davies

may have “sued before” says nothing about the merits of the supposed

earlier litigation; in recounting Davies’ remarks at the scene, the officers

did not attest that Davies had filed any previous lawsuits at all, let alone

frivolous ones.  

4 Davies argues that he was further prejudiced by the officers’ testi‐

mony that he said he had won an earlier lawsuit and made money that

way, but that testimony was stricken, and in any event the suggestion that

Davies had previously filed a successful lawsuit is hardly prejudicial.

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B. Testimony that certain items were found by the police

Davies next argues that the district court erred by permit‐

ting the police to testify that they found certain items in his

home, and that he became increasingly frantic when they re‐

fused his request to hold his nephew accountable for the

items. We reject Davies’ argument that this testimony should

have been excluded under Rules 404(b) and 403.

Once again, the challenged testimony is not evidence of

other acts within the parameters of Rule 404(b). The testimony

centers on Davies’ interactions with the responding officers

just before his contested exchange with Officer Benbenek. Be‐

cause Davies’ remarks to the police at that time are an integral

part of the facts and circumstances forming the basis of his

case, Rule 404(b) does not apply. See Agushi, 196 F.3d at 761.

Turning to Rule 403’s balancing test, the items‐testimony

was clearly relevant to the pivotal question of how Davies ul‐

timately ended up on the floor (Davies’ escalating agitation

when confronted with the items makes it more likely that he

threw himself from his wheelchair in the heat of the moment),

while any resulting prejudice was mitigated by the fact that

the items were not described to the jury in any way. The dis‐

trict court did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting this

testimony at trial.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s evidentiary rulings were not an abuse

of discretion. The challenged testimony was not impermissi‐

ble character evidence under Rule 404(b), nor was it unduly

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prejudicial under Rule 403. Finding no error, we do not ad‐

dress Officer Benbenek’s alternative argument that any error

was harmless.

AFFIRMED.

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