Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03197/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03197-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT N. JOHNSON

Plaintiff, No. 2:09-cv-03197 KJN

vs.

PUBLIC STORAGE FRANCHISE,

INC., et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Presently before this court is defendants Public Storage Franchise, Inc., Public 

Storage Inc., PS Orangeco, Inc., Public Storage Properties, IV, LTD, Partners Preferred Yield III

Inc., and Public Storage Properties, V, LTD’s (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s first cause of action for injunctive relief from his first amended complaint and motion

to stay the proceedings (the “motions”). The motions were heard before the undersigned on May

6, 2010, at 10:00 a.m.

For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be denied without prejudice.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s “first cause of action for injunctive relief under the

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Americans with Disabilities Act, as alleged in the First Amended Complaint, for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 2.) A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a

challenge to the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. When ruling on a

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court takes

the allegations in the complaint as true. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). 

However, the court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings and “may review any evidence,

such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of

jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (collecting cases),

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d

1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may be made either

on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence.”). 

Defendants contend that plaintiff lacks standing to sue all seven storage facility

defendants because plaintiff’s “intention to patronize the facilities is plausible only as to the one

closest to his home.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 9.) Defendants argue, in essence, that (1) plaintiff has

apparent access to storage facilities that are closer to his home; (2) even if plaintiff wanted to rent

space from a “Public Storage” brand storage facility, it is implausible that plaintiff would not rent

from the Public Storage facility nearest his home and instead would rent from the seven others

named in the complaint; and (3) even if plaintiff had a need for seven self-storage units, it is

implausible that he would rent those units at seven different storage facilities. As alleged in the

first amended complaint, plaintiff has a need for various types of storage accommodations which

include climate controlled and non-climate controlled units, large, small or mid-sized units and

parking storage. (Dkt. No. 10 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that all seven Public Storage locations are

within fifteen minutes of his residence. Id. 

The law is clear that the court may not, on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss,

speculate as to the plausibility of plaintiff’s allegations. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d

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 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can be made as a speaking motion, also known as a factual 1

attack, when the defendant submits evidence challenging the jurisdiction along with its motion to

dismiss. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). In

ruling on this type of factual attack, the court may consider evidence outside the complaint

without converting the motion into a summary judgment motion. Safe Air for Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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862, 867 (9th Cir. 2002)). “On a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a district court must

accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint in the

nonmovant’s favor.” Id. Doing so here, plaintiff has alleged: that he needs various types of

storage facility accommodations; that he actually visited all of defendants’ storage facilities which

are located within fifteen minutes of his residence; that he found numerous architectural barriers;

and that he was deterred and had to forego additional visits to all of defendants’ locations. (Dkt.

No. 10.) 

Even construing defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion as a factual, rather than facial attack

on the complaint, see White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000), plaintiff has furnished 1

evidence necessary to satisfy his burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. St. Clair v.

City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to

defendants’ motions reiterates the aforementioned allegations of the first amended complaint. 

Plaintiff also explains in his declaration that he needs to return to all seven locations to take

advantage of Public Storage’s marketing discounts. (Dkt. No. 29-2 at 1.) Plaintiff has identified

specific reasons which support his attempt to visit and desire and intent to return to defendants’

businesses, and hence has alleged sufficient facts to show concrete, particularized injury. Pickern

v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a narrow

construction of the ADA). The authority cited by defendants does not warrant dismissal of the

first amended complaint for lack of standing. See Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040,

1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (“we accord standing to individuals who sue defendants that fail to provide

access to the disabled in public accommodations as required by the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) even if we suspect that such plaintiffs are hunting for violations just to file

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lawsuits.”) (citing Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

However, this motion will be denied without prejudice. Should it become apparent, at any point

in this litigation, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants, or the court sua

sponte, may raise this issue. 

Motion to Stay

Defendants also move to stay these proceedings “in light of a prior action pending

in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, David Singletary and

Jon Carpenter v. Public Storage, Case No. 3:09-cv-01533-DMS-POR.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 2.)

According to defendants, the Singletary plaintiffs allege that they went to several Public Storage

brand storage facility locations in San Diego and were denied access. Further, defendants state

that the Singletary plaintiffs propose to pursue their case as a class action on behalf of “[a]ll

persons who are currently being denied full and equal access or were being denied full and equal

access in the past 3 years from the date of filing of this action, under Title III of the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . and Regulations promulgated thereunder . . . to one or more of

defendant’s storage facilities in California because they are persons with disabilities who use

wheelchairs for mobility or are semi-ambulatory that have a disabled placard and are aggrieved by

the following access barrier at any such storage: Lack of wheelchair and/or semi-ambulatory

parking that meet access requirements.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 5.) Defendants state that the Singletary

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is set for hearing on July 9, 2010. (Dkt. No. 22 at 5.)

Defendants aver that the court should use its broad discretion to stay proceedings

in this case because to do so would promote judicial economy without negatively impacting the

plaintiff. Yet the necessity or even propriety of a stay at this stage is not clear. The witnesses in

the Southern California cases will be different, the factual basis for the denial of access claims are

presumably different because the Public Storage physical locations are different, and, notably,

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 Defendants’ counsel indicated at oral argument that the Singletary defendants may 2

oppose the motion for class certification. 

 The court will issue a separate status (pretrial scheduling) order following the status 3

conference held in this action on May 6, 2010. 

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class action certification may not even be granted in the Singletary action. The mere specter of a 2

class action in a similar case does not render the request for a stay ripe for adjudication. This

court declines to exercise its discretion to stay this action, particularly where it is unclear whether

the independent proceedings will indeed “bear upon the case.” See Leyva. v. Certified Grocers of

Calif., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979). Therefore, the motion to stay this action will

be denied without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss and motion for stay are DENIED without prejudice. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 6, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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