Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01121/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01121-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Andres Carmen Meza,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Deputy Warden Perkins, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV-05-1121-PHX-PGR (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by

Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (document # 5) Respondents argue that

the Court should deny the Petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. (document # 21)

Petitioner has filed several Replies. (documents # 22, # 26, # 29) 

BACKGROUND

The State of Arizona charged Petitioner in CR 2002-012645 with one count of

aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and one count of leaving the scene of an injury

accident. (Respondents' Exh. A at 1, 27) The State alleged one prior felony conviction.

(Respondents' Exh. A at 26, 50) 

The following incident gave rise to the foregoing charges. On November 4, 2000,

Petitioner failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with another vehicle injuring Martina Lopez.

(Respondents' Exh. A, Item 80 at 1) Petitioner fled the scene of the accident but witnesses

followed him and detained him until police arrived. (Id.) Petitioner was arrested and a blood

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 The Honorable Douglas L. Reyes presided. 

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sample, obtained pursuant to a search warrant, revealed that Petitioner had a blood alcohol

concentration of .256. (Id.) 

On August 16, 2002, Petitioner pleaded no contest to aggravated assault.1

(Respondents' Exh. A, Items 64-65) On September 18, 2002, the state trial court granted

Petitioner's request to withdraw from the plea. (Id. at Item 72) On November 6, 2002, Petitioner

pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and in exchange, the State dismissed the remaining charges

and the allegation of a prior felony conviction. (Respondents' Exh. A Items 77-78, Exh. B) On

November 13, 2002, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a presumptive term of six years

imprisonment, with credit for 427 days presentence incarceration, and with the sentence to run

concurrently with the sentence imposed in a different case, CR 2001-000877. (Respondents'

Exh. A, Item 81; Exh. C) 

On February 12, 2003, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief.

(Respondents' Exh. A, Item 85) On February 27, 2003, the trial court appointed post-conviction

counsel. (Id., Item 88) On June 23, 2003, post-conviction counsel filed a notice stating that he

could not find any colorable claims to raise. (Respondents' Exh. A, Item 97) On August 4,

2003, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief asserting that his trial counsel

was ineffective for: (1) forcing him to enter into a plea agreement; (2) failing to hire a private

investigator, (3) failing to request that the court consolidate CR 2001-012645 with CR 2001-

000877, (4) failing to prepare for trial, and (5) failing to interview the "real" witnesses against

him. (Respondents' Exh. A, Item 99) Petitioner also asserted that (6) the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress and that the court should grant post-conviction relief because

(7) Petitioner did not see the phlebotomist's certification, (8) there was a discrepancy in the

results of his blood tests, and (9) he was arrested on two outstanding warrants, not on the

charges later filed. (Respondents' Exh. A, Items 99, 107) On October 30, 2003, the trial court

issued a minute entry finding that Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel and scheduling a hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief.

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(document # 22, Exhibit) The court found that all of Petitioner's other claims were precluded

because he could have raised such claims during trial. The trial court also noted that

Respondent had not filed a response to Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.)

Thereafter, on January 26, 2004, the trial court found that after reviewing Respondent's

response, its earlier finding that Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel was erroneous. The court, therefore, dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief.

(Id., Items 101, 111) 

On March 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. (Respondents' Exh. D, E, F) On May 19, 2005, the appellate court denied review.

(Respondents' Exh. G) Thereafter, Petitioner filed the pending petition. 

Respondents contend that with the exception of Petitioner's sixth claim, the claims

in Petitioner's § 2254 Petition are procedurally barred because they were not fairly presented

to the state court. Respondents further argue that Petitioner's sixth claim for relief fails on the

merits. Petitioner has filed several replies arguing that he is entitled to habeas relief. 

EXHAUSTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), before a federal court may consider a state

prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner must have exhausted, in state

court, every claim raised in his petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts the opportunity

to rule upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by "fairly presenting" them to the

state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349

(1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(stating that "[t]o provide the State with the

necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court

. . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.")

It is not enough that all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state court or that a "somewhat similar" state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S.

at 28 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to

federal nature of the claim.) Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific

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constitutional guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart,

249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles,

such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d

982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)(insufficient for prisoner to have made "a general appeal to a

constitutional guarantee," such as a naked reference to "due process," or to a "constitutional

error" or a "fair trial.") Similarly, a mere reference to the "Constitution of the United States"

does not preserve a claim. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Even if the

basis of a federal claim is "self-evident" or if the claim would be decided "on the same

considerations" under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the

claim "explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts . . . ." Lyons,

232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court if the court

must read beyond the petition or brief filed in that court to discover the federal claim. Baldwin,

541 U.S. at 27. 

Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the State courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, state court remedies may, nonetheless, be "exhausted." This type of

exhaustion is often referred to as "procedural default" or "procedural bar." See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two

categories of procedural default.

First, a state court may have applied a procedural bar when the prisoner attempted

to raise the claim in state court. See Nummemaker, 501 U.S. at 802-05. If the state court also

addressed the merits of the underlying federal claim, the "alternative" ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989); Carringer v.

Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(state supreme court found ineffective assistance of

counsel claims "barred under state law," but also discussed and rejected the claims on the

merits, en banc court held that the "on-the-merits" discussion was an "alternative ruling" and

the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review.) A higher court's

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subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court's application of a procedural bar.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

Second, the state prisoner may not have presented the claim to the state courts, but

pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, a return to state court would be "futile." Teague

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim not previously presented to the

Arizona courts is procedurally barred from federal review because any attempt to return to state

court to properly exhaust a current habeas claim would be "futile." See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1,

32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319,

322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3)(relief is precluded for

claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a), Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court's

decision). A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time barred. See Beaty, 303 F.3d

at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997)(recognizing untimeliness under

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction

relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley,

541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish cause,

a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts

to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). The

following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a

showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3)

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. To establish

prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Where petitioner fails to

establish cause, the court need not reach the prejudice prong. 

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To establish a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one

who is actually innocent, a state prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). 

I. Application of Law to Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner raises ten claims for relief. (document # 5) Respondents assert that

Petitioner's claims are unexhausted because he failed to present any of his claims to the Arizona

Supreme Court. Respondents argue that under Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004), to

exhaust claims in state court, an Arizona prisoner must petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court, the highest discretionary court of appeals in Arizona. See Peterson v. Lampert,

319 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Respondents argue that Baldwin overturns Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) where the court held that Arizona state prisoners

need not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court to exhaust state remedies. The Court

declines to decide this issue because in addition to failing to present his claims to the Arizona

Supreme Court, Petitioner failed to fairly present all of his claims except his sixth claim to either

to the trial court or the Arizona Court of Appeals (Respondents' Exh. A at 99) and Petitioner's

sixth claim fails on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)(stating that the court may deny

unexhausted claims on the merits). 

A. Petitioner's First-Fifth and Seventh-Tenth Claims

1. Claims One-Four and Seven-Ten 

In his first claim, Petitioner argues that his guilty plea violates the First Amendment

because of its "untruth." (document # 5 at 5-5(b)) In his second claim, Petitioner contends that

his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an illegal search and seizure. (Id. at 6(A)) In his

third claim, Petitioner asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the

prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. (Id. at 7) In his fourth claim, Petitioner

argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because he was "compelled . . .to be

witness against himself" by pleading guilty. (Id. at 8) In his seventh claim, Petitioner argues

that "judicial missteps" violated the Seventh Amendment. (Id. at 11) In his eighth claim

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Petitioner argues that the Eighth Amendment was violated because his sentence constitutes cruel

and unusual punishment. (Id. at 12) In his ninth claim, Petitioner argues that the Ninth

Amendment was violated because the grand jury was improperly impaneled. (document # 5 at

13) In his tenth claim, Petitioner argues that the Fourteenth Amendment was violated because

his conviction was obtained "by duress, misrepresentation, or fraud." (Id. at 14) 

As stated above, before a federal court may decide a petition for habeas corpus

relief, the state prisoner must have fairly presented every federal claim to the state courts in a

procedurally proper manner. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. For a claim to be fairly presented

in state court, petitioner must describe the operative facts and legal theories upon which his

claim is based. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29-30. The federal nature of the claim must be explicit

at all levels. Id. General appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal

protection, and the right to a fair trial are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal

constitutional claim. Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. 

Petitioner did not present any of the foregoing claims to the state courts. Petitioner's

failure to present his federal claims to the State courts results in a procedural bar because

Petitioner is time-barred from returning to State court to obtain review of such claims.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.4(a). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

review of his claims unless he establishes cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

justice which the Court will discuss in section three below. 

2. Double Jeopardy Claim - Claim Five

In his fifth claim for relief, Petitioner argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause was

violated because trial counsel failed to request consolidation of two cases brought against him,

CR 2001-012645 and CR 2001-000877. (document # 5 at 9) On post-conviction review,

Petitioner challenged counsel's failure to consolidate the aforementioned cases. However, he

did not raise a double jeopardy claim before the State courts. Even though Petitioner's claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel rested on essentially the same facts as his double jeopardy

claim, to satisfy the fair presentation requirement it is not enough that all of the facts necessary

to support a claim were before the state courts or that a "somewhat similar" claim was raised.

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Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (stating that a reference to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial does

not alert the court to a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). Thus, because

Petitioner did not raise the same double jeopardy claim in state court that he wishes to raise in

ground five of his § 2254 petition, he failed to fairly present that claim. Accordingly,

Petitioner's double jeopardy claim is procedurally defaulted. 

3. Cause and Prejudice or Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

Because Petitioner procedurally defaulted claims 1-5 and 7-10, federal habeas

review of those claims is barred absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Teague, 489 U.S. at 298; Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 321. Petitioner fails to make any of these showings. In his replies, Petitioner reiterates the

arguments which he raises in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which are

insufficient to establish cause. (documents ## 22, 26, 29) He further argues that his status as

a pro se petitioner constitutes cause for his failure to properly raise his claims. Contrary to

Petitioner's assertion, his lack of legal assistance and knowledge of the law does not amount to

cause for Petitioner’s failure properly to present his claims to the Arizona courts. Hughes v.

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that an illiterate pro

se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default).

 Petitioner also contends that a conflict of interest existed between the trial judge and the

prosecutor's office. Even if a conflict existed, Petitioner does not explain why such a conflict

constitutes cause for his failure properly to raise his claims before the state court. Moreover,

during the change of plea hearing, the trial court indicated that during the time of Petitioner's

offense, he was a prosecutor in the same unit as the prosecutor on Petitioner's case.

(Respondents' Exh. B at 10-11) However, the trial judge was not personally involved with

Petitioner's case. (Id.) The trial judge asked whether either side would like for him to recuse

himself from the case and both sides responded negatively. (Id.) Thus, to the extent that any

conflict of interest existed, Petitioner was aware of it during the criminal proceedings and could

have raised an objection at that time. There is no evidence that the alleged conflict prevented

Petitioner from properly presenting his claims to the State courts. 

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Additionally, Petitioner does not establish that failure to review his claims will result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321. In his replies, Petitioner

reiterates his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to hire an investigator to determine

whether Petitioner's fingerprints were on the steering wheel of the car. Petitioner, however,

does not point to any new evidence and, therefore, does not establish that it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of

new evidence. Schlup 513 U.S. at 327 ). Based on the foregoing, federal habeas review of

Petitioner's first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth claims is barred.

B. Fourth Amendment Claim 

Petitioner raises several Fourth Amendment claims. Even if those claims were not

barred from federal habeas review, they would fail because they are not cognizable on federal

habeas review. When the state provides an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth

Amendment claim at trial and on direct review, the federal court will not grant habeas corpus

relief on the ground that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure was

introduced at his trial. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); Mitchell v. Goldsmith, 878

F.2d 319, 323 (9th Cir. 1989); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). Stone

only requires the initial opportunity for a full and fair hearing. Caldwell, 781 F.2d at 715.

"Such an opportunity for a fair hearing forecloses this court's inquiry, upon habeas corpus

petition, into the trial court's subsequent course of action." Caldwell, 781 F.2d at 715. As long

as the state provides a state prisoner the opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim,

whether the prisoner actually did so, or whether the state court correctly decides the issue, is

irrelevant on federal habeas review. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Petitioner pleaded guilty and waived all nonjurisdictional defects in the prior

proceedings. Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). However, nothing prevented

Petitioner from raising his Fourth Amendment claims in State court. Accordingly, his Fourth

Amendment claims are not properly before the Court. 

II. Sixth Amendment Claim

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In his sixth ground for relief, which Petitioner properly raised on post-conviction

relief, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective because he forced Petitioner to enter a plea

agreement. (Respondents' Exh. A, Item 99; document # 5 at 10) 

On federal habeas review, the court may grant relief only if it determines that a state

court decision was contrary to, or rested on an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-13 (2000). The controlling Supreme Court precedent

governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984)

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a state prisoner must show

that: (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was

"outside the range of professionally competent assistance," and (2) that counsel's deficient

performance prejudiced petitioner by creating a "reasonable probability that absent the errors

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Strickland test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on

effective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 

When analyzing Strickland's performance prong, the court "indulge[s] a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,

the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d

985, 992 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The court must consider counsel's

performance from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged ineffectiveness and "every

effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioner must also establish prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. To establish

prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. A "reasonable probability" is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence

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in the outcome." Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong in the context of a guilty plea, petitioner

"must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865

(9th Cir. 1986). 

A court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance may opt to address only the prejudice prong,

"[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

In this case, during the change of plea hearing, the trial court asked Petitioner if he had

read the plea agreement, if he had discussed its terms with counsel, if he understood the

agreement, and if it contained all of the terms to which he had agreed. (Respondents' Exh. B,

Tr. 11/6/02 at 3-4) Petitioner answered all of the court's questions affirmatively. (Id.) He also

informed that court that he was neither threatened nor coerced into entering the plea and that

he was entering the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 4) The court advised Petitioner of the possible

sentence under the plea agreement and Petitioner indicated that he understood the consequences

of entering the plea. (Id. at 4-6) On the foregoing record, the trial court on post-conviction

review found that Petitioner failed to raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Respondents' Exh. A, Item 111) Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the state court's

decision is contrary to federal law or involves an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Moreover, even if counsel's performance was deficient, Petitioner has not shown that but

for counsel's error he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to

trial. Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865. Had Petitioner rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial,

he could have received a longer sentence that the one he received under the plea agreement. See

A.R.S. § 13-604(I); State v. Griffin, 148 Ariz. 82, 85-86; 713 P.2d 283, 286-87 (1986)(stating

that consecutive sentences were proper where defendant committed separate and distinct acts).

Courts have declined to find counsel ineffective for advising their clients to enter plea

agreements which reduce the likely sentence. See Hunter v. United States, 160 F.3d 1109, 1115

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(6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Farley, 72 F.3d 158, 165 (D.C.Cir. 1995); Magnum v. Hargett,

67 F.3d 80, 86-87 (5th Cir. 1995). 

In summary, Petitioner has not established that the state court, in denying his petition for

post-conviction relief, unreasonably applied Strickland. Petitioner has also failed to show that

the State court made an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (document # 5) be

DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The parties shall

have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(e),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna- Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 27th day of February, 2006.

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