Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00633/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00633-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0207 Fair Labor Standards Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JAMES PICKERING, JR., )

 )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-633-WKW

 ) [WO]

LORILLARD TOBACCO ) 

CO., INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff James Pickering Jr., a retired sales representative for Defendant

Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., brings this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, on behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated, alleging that his former employer violated the FLSA’s mandatory overtime

provisions. He movesthe court to certify this case conditionally as a collective action

under the FLSA and seeks nationwide notice. Alternatively, Mr. Pickering moves to

compel discovery. Lorillard opposes the motions and also movesthe court to exclude

the affidavit from Mr. Pickering’s expert, Lyndell L. Erwin, for failure of Mr.

Pickering to designate his expert within the time prescribed by the court’s scheduling

order.

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Before the court are (1) Mr. Pickering’s Motion for Conditional Class

Certification and for Judicial Notice (Doc. # 36), (2) Mr. Pickering’s Motion to

Compel (Doc. # 36-1), and (3) Lorillard’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Expert

Affidavit and Exclude Testimony from Plaintiff’s Expert (Doc. # 60). The motions

have been fully briefed. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the

relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that Mr. Pickering’s motions

are due to be denied, and that Lorillard’s motion is due to be granted.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Personal

jurisdiction and venue are not contested, and there are adequate allegations of both.

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Lorillard is the third largest cigarette manufacturer in the United States and

employs 770 full-time sales representatives nationwide. (Sparrow’s Decl. ¶ 3 (Doc.

# 45).) Sales representatives are part of Lorillard’s field sales operations, which are

divided into 4 geographic areas, which in turn comprise 20 regions, 122 divisions and

787 territories. (Gershengorn’s Decl. 13–14; Sparrow’s Decl. ¶ 4.) Each area is

supervised by an area vice president; each region is supervised by a regional sales

manager; and each division is supervised by a division manager. (Sparrow’s Decl.

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¶ 4.) Lorillard classifies its sales representatives as exempt from the FLSA-mandated

overtime compensation provisions. 

Mr. Pickering, the sole plaintiff, worked for Lorillard as a full-time, salaried

sales representative from June 9, 1979, until his retirement nearly three decades later

on December 31, 2008. (Pl.’s Dep. 10–11 (Ex. 7 to Doc. # 44).) His division

manager was Hugh Gordon Kirkham, and his regional sales manager was Glenn

Seger. (Pl.’s Dep. 12, 21; Kirkham’s Decl. ¶ 1 (Ex. C to Doc. # 36).) 

B. Evidence Pertaining to Mr. Pickering’s Job Duties as a Lorillard Sales

Representative

Mr. Pickering worked in the Montgomery/Prattville division (Division # 518),

and his territory consisted of eight or nine counties, primarily rural, in west central

Alabama. (Pl.’s Dep. 11–13; Gershengorn’s Decl., Ex. 1.) He traveled daily to retail

stores that carried Lorillard products, “work[ing] primarily as an account

representative” to “promot[e] [Lorillard’s] company products.” (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 2.) He

spent “most of [his] time . . . doing promotional type work,” such as “setting up

displays, posters, and points ofsales” to informcustomers about a retail store’s brand

availability. (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 2.) 

Mr. Pickering’s sales activities were limited because retailers generally

purchased Lorillard’s products through wholesalers. He carried a small amount of

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products in his vehicle, however, and provided them to Lorillard’s clients when

necessary “to maintain freshness” or to cover a retailer’s inventory shortage, and on

“rare occasions,” he “took presale orders . . . for new products.” (Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 7.) 

Hence, Mr. Pickering contends that his job entailed “primarily marketing and

merchandising of Lorillard products.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) 

Mr. Pickering wasscheduled to work “in the field” from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Monday through Friday, with the exceptions of an hour lunch break and an hour each

Friday for the completion of administrative tasks. (Pl.’s Dep. 36.) In addition to his

work in the field each day, Mr. Pickering, “[a]fter hours, had to write and answer emails and evaluate sales areas on [his] own time,” and, thus, he “routinely worked in

excess of forty hours in a week and was not paid overtime compensation.” (Pl.’s

Decl. ¶ 3; Pl. Dep. 107 (testifying that he had to complete “computer work after five

o’clock after [he] got home”).) Mr. Pickering typically spent six to eight hours every

week (one to two hours each work night) answering and responding to e-mails in the

evening after he got home from an 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. work day. (Pl.’s Dep.

109–10.) Responding to these e-mails, most of which were sent by his division

manager, Mr. Kirkham, required him to prepare spreadsheets and identify

“problem[ ]” stores. (Pl.’s Dep. 107, 109–10.) Mr. Pickering worked on his e-mail

4

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responses at home in the evening because he was “under the impression” that his

division manager “wanted those e-mails done when he sent them.” (Pl.’s Dep. 118.) 

As further support for his contention that Lorillard expected him to work more

than forty hours a week, Mr. Pickering cites Lorillard’s written policy that provides

as follows:

Field sales employees are hired on the basis of a 40-hour work week, 8

hours per day, not including a 1-hour lunch break (exclusive of a 1-hour

lunch period), with working hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 

However, operations may require a longer work day. The lunch period

naturally has to be scheduled into the operating requirements of the

assignment. 

(Pl.’s Reply 18 (citing Ex. C to Doc. # 59).) 

Lorillard contends, on the other hand, thatsales representatives are notrequired

to work more than forty hours a week. (Def.’s Br. 22 n.8.) Lorillard provides

declarations from current sales representatives working in Arizona, Georgia, New

Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Maine, Oregon and Rhode Island. Each sales

representative assertsthat he orshe has never been required or expected to work more

than forty hours a week, that he or she does not work more than forty hours a week,

and that Lorillard does not require its sales representatives to respond to e-mails on

their own time. Rather, each sales representative assertsthat Lorillard allots one hour

of administrative time on Fridays to complete paperwork and computer tasks and that

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the allotted hour is sufficient for the completion of those tasks. (Decls. (Docs.

# 46–50, 53–54).) 

C. Evidence Pertaining to Job Duties of Other Lorillard Sales

Representatives

Mr. Pickering submits two declarations relevant to the job duties of other

Lorillard sales representatives. The first isfrom Brandon Lynum, who worked in the

same region as Mr. Pickering. Mr. Lynum was a full-time, salaried sales

1

representative for Lorillard for one year. (Lynum’s Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5 (Ex. F to Doc.

# 36).) He “spent the majority of [his] time calling on retailers and wholesalers and

servicing accounts” and was primarily involved in “promoting [Lorillard’s] company

products,” which included “setting up displays, posters, and points of sale.” 

(Lynum’s Decl. ¶ 2.) His sales activities were restricted in the same manner as Mr.

Pickering’s. Additionally, “[a]fter hours, [Mr. Lynum] had to write and answer emails and evaluate sales areas on [his] own time.” (Lynum’s Decl. ¶ 3.) He also

“routinely worked in excess of forty hours in a week and was not paid overtime.”2

(Lynum’s Decl. ¶ 3.) 

 Although Mr. Lynum’s Declaration does not indicate the geographical region in which 1

he worked, Mr. Pickering does not contest Lorillard’s representation that Mr. Lynum worked in

the same region as he. (Def.’s Br. 24.)

 Mr. Lynum is the only individual who has filed a written consent to participate in this 2

proposed collective action. (Consent (Doc. # 58).)

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The second declaration is from Mr. Kirkham, who worked for Lorillard as a

division manager from May 2001 until March 2010 and was Mr. Pickering’s direct

supervisor. In his declaration, Mr. Kirkham opines that the “job requirements,

responsibilities and duties” of a Lorillard sales representative “employed within the

Southeastern United States and within states located along the Atlantic coast” are

“essentially the same.” (Kirkham’s Decl. ¶ 2 (Ex. C to Doc. # 36).) He further

contendsthat Lorillard’s “job description for Sales Representatives . . . [is] consistent

among all regions.” (Kirkham’s Decl. ¶ 2.) In particular, Mr. Kirkham says that,

during his employment, “[t]he primary job duties of Lorillard Sales Representatives

w[ere] neither to conduct nor [to] execute any sales, exchanges, contracts to sell,

consignments for sale, or shipments for sale,” but rather “[t]he primary duty of a

Lorillard Sales Representative was promotional.” (Kirkham’s Decl. ¶¶ 3–4.) Mr.

Kirkham provides no specific statements about the work hours of sales

representatives, whether they typically work more than forty hours in a work week,

or whether he expected Mr. Kirkham to respond to e-mails off the clock (or knew that

Mr. Pickering would have to work more than forty hours a week to respond to e-mail

queries). 

Lorillard also maintains a position profile questionnaire, which is the

equivalent of a job description for Lorillard’s sales representatives. (Job Description

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(Ex. G to Doc. # 36 (enumerating “accountabilities” describing “the end results of job

duties”).) Mr. Seger, Lorillard’s Rule 30(b)(6) representative, testified that the

“accountabilities” are the same for all Lorillard’s sales representatives, but that “how

[those accountabilities] are implemented can vary depending” on location. (Seger’s

Dep. 12 (Ex. E to Doc. # 36).) The accountabilities do not include any discussion of

daily or weekly work hour requirements.

D. This Lawsuit

1. The Amended Complaint and the Answer

In the governing Amended Complaint, Mr. Pickering alleges that Lorillard

3

misclassified him as an FLSA-exempt employee and failed to pay him “overtime at

a rate of one and one-half his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of

forty . . . within a work week,” and that Lorillard has a “wrongful pattern or practice”

of improperly classifying its sales representatives as FLSA-exempt employees. (Am.

Compl. ¶ 13 (Doc. # 23).) Mr. Pickering seeks to recover, on behalf of himself and

all similarly situated employees, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,

prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, 24–25.)

 The original Complaint was dismissed because Mr. Pickering’s collective action 3

allegations lacked the level of factual specificity required to survive Lorillard’s Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. (Mem. Op. & Order 4 (Doc. # 20)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Mr. Pickering

subsequently filed the governing Amended Complaint in an effort to cure the pleading

deficiencies.

8

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Lorillard’s Answer raises a number of affirmative defenses. It asserts that

several statutory exemptions, including the outside salesperson exemption and the

administration exemption, exclude its sales representatives fromthe FLSA’s overtime

requirements. It also deniesthat any violations were willful. (Answer 5 (Doc. # 24).)

2. The Discovery Procedure

At the initial stages of this litigation, the parties jointly requested a two-phase,

discovery process, with the first phase focused on certification as a collective action

and the second phase focused on discovery related to the merits and damages. 

(Report of Parties’ Planning Meeting 1–2 (Doc. # 26).) Incorporating the parties’

request, the Uniform Scheduling Order allotted three months for the first phase of

discovery. (USO § 7 (Doc. # 27).) Also at the parties’ request, the USO set a

deadline one month after the close of the first phase of discovery for Mr. Pickering

to file his motion for conditional certification of a collective action and proposed

notice. (USO § 7.) Subsequently, the three-month discovery deadline was extended

to four months, and the deadline for Mr. Pickering to file his motion for conditional

certification of a collective action also was extended an additional month. (Parties’

Joint Mot. (Doc. # 29); Order Granting Joint Mot. (Doc. # 30).) With the extensions,

the first phase of discovery was to expire on August 1, 2011, and the motion for

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conditional certification as a collective action wasto be filed no later than September

1, 2011.

The USO also governed the deadlines for expert disclosures. Mr. Pickering

was given until June 1, 2011, to identify any expert witnesses and provide the reports

of retained experts. Lorillard’s deadline was July 1, 2011. (USO § 8.) It is

undisputed that Mr. Pickering did not disclose the identity of his sole expert witness

until October 27, 2011, when he filed his reply brief in support of his motion for

conditional certification of a collective action. 

3. Mr. Pickering’s Motion for Conditional Class Certification and

Judicial Notice

Mr. Pickering timely filed his motion requesting conditional certification of a

collective action and that judicial notice be sent to putative class members. (Pl.’s

Mot. ¶¶ 1–2 (Doc. # 36).) Additionally, Mr. Pickering was permitted to file out-oftime his proposed judicial notice. The proposed notice includes within the class “all

current and former Lorillard . . . employees who were employed as Sales

Representatives for any length of time during the period July 22, 2007, to present.” 

(Proposed Notice 1 (Doc. # 38).)

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4. Mr. Pickering’s Motion to Compel

In his brief in support of his Motion for Conditional Class Certification, Mr.

Pickering contends that his attempts to obtain written declarations from other

Lorillard sales representatives concerning their job duties and pay have been stymied

by Lorillard’s policy that prohibits employees, under the threat of criminal and civil

liability, from disclosing to outsiders any “confidential businessinformation.” (Pl.’s

Br. 39–41; Policy (Ex. I to Doc. # 36).) In support of his contention, Mr. Pickering

submits a declaration from his counsel’s investigator, John R. Meek, who attests that,

“[w]hile interviewing current employees, [he] learned that they could not speak with

[him] because of a company policy prohibiting it.” (Meek’s Decl. ¶ 3 (Ex. J to Doc.

# 36).) Mr. Meek summarizes conversations he had with twelve current Lorillard

employees, between July 11 and July 14, 2011 (approximately two-and-a-half weeks

prior to the four-month discovery deadline). The majority ofthese employees refused

to speak with Mr. Meek on substantive matters pertaining to this lawsuit, stating

either that they had to “clear it” with a supervisor, that they had been instructed to

refer him to Lorillard’s legal department or simply that they could not talk with him

about this case. (Meek’s Decl. (Ex. J to Doc. # 36).) All told, Mr. Meek “was unable

to obtain a written declaration from any of these employees concerning job duties or

pay.” (Meek’s Decl. ¶ 6.) Mr. Pickering believes that because of this policy, which

11

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he contends is retaliatory, Lorillard’s employees “are afraid to exercise their legal

rights under the FLSA.” (Pl.’s Br. 35.) 

Mr. Pickering concedesthat he has “stopped short of amending his Complaint”

to allege an FLSA retaliation claim. (Pl.’s Reply 4 (Doc. # 59).) He also does not

refute Lorillard’s representation that he did not subpoena any of the sales

representatives contacted by Mr. Meek or attempt to take any depositions, other than

Lorillard’s Rule 30(b)(6) representative (Mr. Seger). Mr. Pickering argues, however,

that the court “certainly has the equitable authority to remedy” Lorillard’s alleged

retaliatory conduct. (Pl.’s Reply 4.) 

In the event the court finds that Mr. Pickering’s evidence is insufficient to

warrant conditional certification as a collective action, Mr. Pickering raises an

alternative motion to compel. The motion to compel, incorporated in his brief, seeks

an order that Lorillard “produce the names, addresses, telephone numbers and social

security numbers for all putative Plaintiffs who work or have worked for [Lorillard]

for the three (3) year period prior to the filing of this lawsuit.” (Pl.’s Br. 39.) The

motion to compel also contains a request for an Order instructing Lorillard to

“produce a letter stating thatsales representatives, if they choose to do so, may testify

or participate in this case without fear of retaliation,” and further requests that the

statute of limitations on all putative class members be tolled as of the filing date of

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this lawsuit, and that the time for filing a second motion for conditional certification

as a collective action be extended for ninety days. (Pl.’s Br. 41.) This alternative

motion to compel wasfiled three weeks after the close of the first phase of discovery.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Conditional Class Certification and for Judicial Notice

Mr. Pickering moves for conditional certification of a collective action of

current and former sales representatives employed by Lorillard nationwide within the

three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit and for court-authorized notice to

potential class members. He seeks overtime compensation for all time worked in

excess of forty hours per week for himself and to represent all “similarly situated”

current and former sales representatives subject to Lorillard’s uniform policy of

treating sales representatives as exempt employees. 

The FLSA requires employers to pay employees one and one-half times their

regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty in a work week if the

employees are not “exempt” under several recognized categories. 29 U.S.C. § 207.

Employees may be exempt from mandatory overtime compensation if they are

employed in an administrative capacity or as outside salespersons. See 29 U.S.C.

§ 213(a)(1) (administrative employee and outside salesperson exemptions); 29C.F.R.

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§ 541.200 (defining administrative employee exemption); 29 C.F.R. § 541.500

(defining outside salesperson exemption). 

Moreover, the FLSA’s collective action provision authorizes a plaintiff seeking

relief for unpaid overtime compensation to bring a collective action, provided that the

employees are “similarly situated” and opt into the suit by filing “written consent.” 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). When the requirements of § 216(b) are met, “[t]he judicial

system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law

and fact arising from the same alleged [unlawful] activity.” Hoffmann-LaRoche Inc.

v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989). 

As will be fleshed out below, the parties’ arguments require analysis of

(1) what is the standard of proof required to authorize conditional certification of a

collective action and judicial notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs, (2) whether further

discovery should be permitted, (3) whether there is evidence that Lorillard’s sales

representatives are similarly situated nationwide, and (4) whether there is evidence

that other sales representatives want to opt-in this proposed collective action.

1. The Standard of Proof

The initial issue is whether Mr. Pickering has made the requisite showing to

justify conditional certification of a nationwide collective action and court-authorized

notice. In Hipp v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.

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2001), the Eleventh Circuit “suggest[ed]” a “two-tiered approach to certification of

§ 216(b) opt-in classes” to assist district courts in resolving the similarly situated

inquiry. Id. at 1219. Under the first tier, which is labeled the “notice stage,” the

4

district court must decide, “usually based only on the pleadings and any affidavits

which have been submitted[,] . . . whether notice of the action should be given to

potential class members.” Id. at 1218 (quoting Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d

1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v.

Costa, 539 U.S. 90, (2003))). Before notice is given, a “district court should satisfy

itself that there are other employees of the [defendant-]employer who desire to ‘optin’ and are ‘similarly situated’ . . . .” Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 942

F.2d 1562, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1991). 

“Similarly situated” is not defined in the FLSA. The Eleventh Circuit also has

not “adopted a precise definition of the term”; however, it has provided some

guidance. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, 551 F.3d 1233, 1259–60 (11th Cir.

2008). Employees should be “‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job

requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.” Id. at 1259 (citing Dybach,

 The collective action in Hipp was brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment 4

Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Because the ADEA requires plaintiffs seeking to

certify a class to use the opt-in class mechanism provided in § 216(b), Hipp’s analysis is relevant

to FLSA collective actions. Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240,

1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1216).

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942 F.2d at 1568). And “similar” does not mean “identical.” Grayson v. K Mart

Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). At the same time, however, “a plaintiff must make some rudimentary

showing of commonality between the basis for his claims and that of the potential

claims of the proposed class, beyond the mere facts of duties and pay provisions.”

White v. Osmose, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (Albritton, J.),

cited with approval in Anderson v. Cagles’s , Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir.

2007). “Without such a requirement, it is doubtful that § 216(b) would further the

interests of judicial economy, and it would undoubtedly present a ready opportunity

for abuse.” Id.

The plaintiffs’ burden at the notice stage “is not heavy.” Grayson, 79 F.3d

at 1097. “The plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating a ‘reasonable basis’ for

their claim of class-wide discrimination.” Id. That burden may be satisfied by

“substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations

supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendants’ affidavits to the

contrary.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Hipp described this

standard as “fairly lenient,” given that generally the evidence is meager early in the

litigation. 252 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214). However,

notwithstanding thisfairly lenient standard, “there must be more than ‘only counsel’s

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unsupported assertions that FLSA violations [are] widespread and that additional

plaintiffs would come from other stores.’” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261. Additionally,

under the first step of the Hipp analysis, district courts “should treat the initial

decision to certify and the decision to notify potential collective action members

synonymous.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261 n.40.

The second stage generally is where the rubber meets the road. It is “‘typically

precipitated by a motion for decertification by the defendant usually filed after

discovery is largely complete and the matter is ready for trial.’” Hipp, 252 F.3d

at 1218 (quoting Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214). Armed with “‘much more information,’”

the court “‘makes a factual determination on the similarly situated question.’” Id.

(quoting Mooney, 54 F.3d at 1214). Factors that the court may consider are the

“(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the

various defenses available to defendants that appear to be individual to each plaintiff;

and (3) fairness and procedural considerations.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261 (citation,

alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). At thisstage, the similarities “must

extend beyond the mere facts of job duties and pay provisions and encompass the

defenses to some extent.” Id. at 1262 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Depending on the outcome of the similarly situated evidentiary analysis, the district

court either allows the collective action to proceed to trial, or decertifies the class,

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dismissing the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice and permitting the original plaintiffs

to go to trial on their individual claims. See id. (citing Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1314). 

5

Because Mr. Pickering contends that “very limited discovery has been

conducted,” he heavily relies upon the fairly lenient burden that an FLSA plaintiff

bears during the first stage of the Hipp analysis. (Pl.’s Reply 13; see also Pl.’s Reply

12 (“Plaintiff has taken only one deposition.”).) On the other hand, Lorillard

emphasizes that Mr. Pickering sought and the court approved a bifurcated discovery

schedule to allow three months (which was later extended to four months) of

discovery on the issue of conditional certification of a collective action. (Def.’s Br.

20.) Given that Mr. Pickering had the opportunity to conduct discovery, Lorillard

contends that a “more rigorous standard” for evaluating the appropriateness of

conditional certification should be applied, and that any shortage of discovery is Mr.

Pickering’s fault alone. (Def.’s Br. 20.) Lorillard also retortsthat, while it istrue that

Mr. Pickering “t[ook] one deposition,” this is so “only because . . . he elected . . . to

take one deposition.” (Def.’s Surreply 3.) 

 The Eleventh Circuit has declined to “specify how plaintiffs’ burden of demonstrating 5

that a collective action is warranted differs at the second stage.” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953. In

Anderson, the court explained: “It is sufficient to conclude . . . that at the second stage plaintiffs

may – the ultimate decision rests largely within the district court’s discretion – not succeed in

maintaining a collective action under § 216(b) based solely on allegations and affidavits,

depending upon the evidence presented by the party seeking decertification.” Id.

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Lorillard’s position finds support in the decisional law of district courts in this

circuit. Courts have departed from Hipp’s more lenient standard where a period of

discovery preceded the filing ofthe motion for conditional certification of a collective

action. In White, because there had been “extensive discovery,” the court “carefully

consider[ed] the submission of the parties with respect to the class allegations, rather

than merely relying on the handful of affidavits that support[ed] [the plaintiff’s]

position.” 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 n.2. In Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA) Inc.,

303 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.), the court also rejected the

plaintiffs’ argument for a Hipp first-stage review in favor of a more exacting review. 

The Davis court explained that “[t]he rationale for the ‘fairly lenient standard’ . . .

disappears . . . once plaintiffs have had an opportunity to conduct discovery with

respect to defendant’s policies and procedures.” Id. at 1276 (internal citations

omitted); see also Ledbetter v. Pruitt Corp., No. 05cv329, 2007 WL 496451, at *2

(M.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2007) (Royal, J.) (finding that, because the motion for

certification was filed after the close of discovery, the case was “in a different

procedural posture than that envisioned by Hipp” and “therefore a more searching

standard of review [was] appropriate”); Holt v. Rite Aid Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265,

1274 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Albritton, J.) (considering the defendant’s evidence in

deciding whether to conditionally certifyanFLSAcollective action because there was

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“fairly extensive evidence on the issue of whether putative class members [were]

similarly situated”); Brooks v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 561,

566 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (Blackburn, J.) (analyzing the motion for conditional

certification of a collective action in light of the extensive discovery conducted by the

plaintiff).

The reasoning of the foregoing cases is persuasive. Hipp envisions that the 

certification process will begin early in the litigation prior to discovery and, thus,

gives plaintiffs some leeway in proof at the initial stage. When the parties have had

access to discovery and the opportunity to amass evidence in support of the

complaint’s collective action allegations, the protection provided by Hipp’s first stage

review is no longer needed. That is what happened in this case. The parties asked

the court to forego an initial decision on collective action certification, in favor of

first permitting discovery. The parties jointly requested, in all, four months to

conduct discovery, and Mr. Pickering requested permission to file his motion for

conditional certification of a collective action at the five-month mark. Those requests

were granted. The rationale for applying the fairly lenient standard in Hipp no longer

fits the procedural posture of this case. It is appropriate, therefore, to apply a stricter,

more searching, standard of review than that advocated in Hipp for a first-stage

review. Thus, Mr. Pickering will not be permitted to rely on the allegations in the

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Amended Complaint. Rather, he must rely on the evidence, and all the evidence will

be considered, not just Mr. Pickering’s. With that said, the court need not define

precisely where along the continuum of proof this case lies. If this case were at the

beginning stages, it is dubious that Mr. Pickering would satisfy Hipp’s fairly lenient

standard. Moreover, after four months of discovery,Mr. Pickering has produced only

limited evidence of the job duties of sales representatives in his region, and none of

the job duties of sales representatives outside his region, and he has submitted no

evidence that any other sales representative besides himself and one other regional

sales representative actually worked overtime. It is clear based upon this evidence,

standing alone and juxtaposed against Lorillard’s evidence of sales representatives’

duties outside Mr. Pickering’s region, that the evidence is insufficient to warrant

conditional certification of a nationwide collective action. 

2. Motion to Compel

Alternatively, Mr. Pickering asks for more time to conduct discovery and for

an order compelling Lorillard to produce discovery and to provide assurances to its

sales representatives that they can participate in this litigation without retaliation. 

These requests come too late.

Mr. Pickering did not suggest during the four-month, first-phase discovery

period that Lorillard was hampering his discovery efforts. Indeed, ten weeks into the

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discovery period, in a joint motion to extend the discovery period, the parties

represented that they had “in good faith cooperated,” that they were “engaged in

written discovery concerning conditional class certification (including serving and

responding to document requests, interrogatories, and deposition notices),” and that

they “[were] in the process of exchanging documents, and h[ad] agreed upon

depositions.” (Joint Mot. ¶ 2 (Doc. # 29).) No discord between the parties was cited

in that motion. 

Moreover, it appearsthat Mr. Pickering learned, at the latest, three weeks prior

to the close of the four-month discovery period about Lorillard’s policy that he now

contends prevented him from talking to Lorillard’s sales representatives. He did not

raise this alleged discovery barricade at that time. Instead, he waited until six weeks

later – more than three weeks after the close of discovery on conditional collective

action certification – to bring his discovery problems to the attention of the court and,

even then, only as an alternative request in his brief in support of his motion for

conditional certification.

Mr. Pickering does not explain why he did not file a motion to compel during

the discovery period, why he did not use available discovery tools to compel

testimony from the alleged recalcitrant witnesses, why he waited until he filed his

motion for conditional certification of a collective action to raise the issue, or why

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even then he styled his motion to compel as an alternative request. Absent any

explanation from Mr. Pickering, the court must conclude that he was dilatory in

waiting twenty-five days after the close of discovery on conditional certification to

raise the issue that Lorillard prevented him from obtaining the discovery needed to

support his motion for conditional certification as a collective action. On thisrecord,

permitting the parties to litigate the motion to compel would neither advance the

interests of justice nor further efficient use of judicial resources. Moreover, Lorillard

has protested that it would suffer prejudice from additional discovery at this late

stage.

In sum, no ground has been offered that warrants consideration of the untimely

motion to compel. The motion to compel, therefore, will be denied, and additional 6

discovery on the issue of conditional certification will not be permitted. See, e.g.,

Evans v. Boyd Rest. Group, LLC, 240 F. App’x 393, 397 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding

that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the request to

extend discovery, which was made the day before the end of the discovery period

with no explanation for the delay”). Mr. Pickering is stuck with the evidence he has. 

 An additional basis exists for denying the motion to compel; it does not contain the 6

certification required by Rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Written

communications between counsel do not constitute a conference. Discovery motions must be

accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer

with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.

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3. Similarly Situated

In support of his position that other Lorillard sales representatives are similarly

situated and in actuality non-exempt employees, Mr. Pickering relies upon the

declarations from Mr. Lynum, a one-time sales representative in his region, and from

Mr. Kirkham, Mr. Pickering’s former division manager. (Pl.’s Br. 36.) He also cites

Lorillard’s written job description and policy that a sales representative’s “operations

may require a longer work day” than 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Pl.’s Reply 18 (citing

Ex. C to Doc. # 59).) This evidence is insufficient to justify a nationwide collective

action. 

First, Mr. Pickering’s and Mr. Lynum’s declarations are too localized to

support a nationwide collective action. The declarations are limited to describing

their own specific job duties. Neither Mr. Pickering nor Mr. Lynum mentions the

duties of other sales representatives, contends that his job duties are typical of those

of sales representatives either within or outside his division, or claims to be familiar

with the job duties of other Lorillard sales representatives. Indeed, Mr. Pickering

admits that he has no knowledge of how other sales representatives outside his

division (of six to eight sales representatives) perform their work. (Pickering’s Dep.

88–89.) Hence, these two declarations do not provide a glimpse of what other

Lorillard’s sales representatives in other regions of the country do. 

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The third declaration from Mr. Kirkham does not fill the void left by Mr.

Pickering’s and Mr. Lynum’s declarations. Mr. Kirkham’s bare statements that the

job duties of sales representatives are “essentially the same” and “consistent among

all regions” are conclusory. (Kirkham’s Decl. ¶ 2.) Also, his conclusions that the

sales representatives’ job duties are not sales-oriented, but instead are “promotional,”

merely track the legal phrases cited in the relevant FLSA regulations, without any

supporting factual details. (Compare Kirkham’s Decl. ¶¶ 4–7 (using phrases

“primary duty” and lack of “discretion”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (defining the

“primary duty” of an administrative employee as encompassing the “exercise of

discretion”) and 29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (defining the “primary duty” of an outside

salesperson as “making sales”). The declaration lacks any factual particulars about

the job duties actually performed on a daily basis by sales representatives, the time

devoted each day to those duties, or the level of direct supervision exercised over

those duties. Not only is Mr. Kirkham’s declaration conclusory, but it is limited in

geographical scope to the Southeastern and Atlantic Coastal region and, thus,

neglects any information about the job duties of the rest of Lorillard’s sales

representatives in other parts of the United States. 

Second, there is a dearth of evidence that Lorillard’s alleged unlawful policy

of misclassifying its sales representatives as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime

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provisionsresulted in sales representatives being denied overtime pay. There isscant

evidence that Lorillard’s sales representatives were required or permitted to or in fact

did work more than forty hours a week. Mr. Kirkhamprovides no information about

7

the work hours of sales representatives, whether they typically work more than forty

hours in a work week, or whether they performed required administrative tasks in the

evening in addition to working a forty-hour week. Mr. Kirkham’s declaration also

is notably silent as to Mr. Pickering’s “impression” that he (Mr. Kirkham) expected

or knew that Mr. Pickering would have to respond to e-mails at home in the evening. 

(Pl.’s Dep. 118.) Furthermore, neither Mr. Pickering nor Mr. Lynum provides any

information relating to Lorillard’s employment practices pertaining to the number of

hours other sales representatives actually worked. 

8

This leaves Mr. Pickering’s belief that other sales representatives in his

division also were “spending a lot of time at night on e-mails,” but that belief by itself

carries no evidentiary weight. (Pl.’s Dep. 111, 124–25); cf. Pace v. Capobianco, 283

F.3d 1275, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n affidavit stating only that the affiant

‘believes’ a certain fact exists is insufficient to defeatsummary judgment by creating

See 29 C.F.R. § 785.11 (2008) (“Work not requested but suffered or permitted is work 7

time.”). 

 It should be noted that Lorillard’s employees who refused to talk to Mr. Meek appeared 8

to have worked in Mr. Pickering’s region and, thus, are not a representative cross-section of sales

representatives employed in other regions.

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a genuine issue of fact about the existence of that certain fact.”); see also Boyd v.

Alutiiq Global Solutions, LLC, No. 11cv753, 2011 WL 3511085, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug.

8, 2011) (“[D]eclarations filed in support of a motion for conditional certification

must be based on personal knowledge.”). Even if it did, his belief addressing the

duties of the six or eight sales representatives in his division would be of limited

utility for justifying nationwide certification. The only evidence supporting his

allegations that Lorillard’s sales representatives were required to work overtime

performing administrative tasks comes from Mr. Pickering himself and one other

sales representative in his region. Evidence consisting of declarationsfromtwo sales

representatives from the same region is insufficient to warrant nationwide collective

action certification for sales representatives in all of Lorillard’s 787 territories, 122

divisions, 20 regions, and 4 areas across the country. Cf. Ohsann v. L.V. Stabler

Hosp., No. 2:07cv875, 2008 WL 2468559, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (Watkins, J.)

(putative FLSA class members were subject to an automatic thirty-minute payroll

reduction for a meal break, but routinely were required to work a portion of that meal

period without being paid overtime).

Third, a standardized job description is insufficient to justify a nationwide

collective action based upon a claim that the employer improperly classified a

category of employees as exempt. In Holt v. Rite Aid Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265

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(M.D. Ala. 2004), for example, the plaintiffs attempted to conditionally certify an

FLSA collective action of all managers and assistant managers nationwide, who they

alleged had been improperly classified as exempt from overtime. Noting that it was

not a case where “janitors are being classified as exempt executives,” the court

declined to find that all managers were “similarly situated” based on the fact that they

were all classified as exempt and all had the same job description. Id. at 1271–73. 

Rather, the court found that it must analyze the nature of each employee’s job duties,

and the degree to which evidence regarding the plaintiffs’ job duties can be applied

to all other employees. Id.; see also Forney v. TTX Co., No. 05cv6257, 2006 WL

1030194, at *3 (N.D. Ill. April 17, 2006) (“Whether similarly situated employees

exist depends on the employee’s actual qualifications and day-to-day duties, rather

than their job descriptions.” (collecting cases)). This rationale would appear to apply

equally to the written policy providing that a sales representative’s “operations may

require a longer work day” because the policy does not address any of the actual work

duties of individual sales representatives. (Ex. C to Doc. # 59.) 9

 Mr. Pickering also argues extensively that his actual job duties (i) disqualify him for the 9

administrative exemption because he did not exercise sufficient discretion and independent

judgment and (ii) disqualify him for the outside salesperson exemption because his job involved

primarily promotional, rather than sales, activities. (Pl.’s Br. 7–30, 35.) Lorillard contends that

whether its sales representatives are properly exempted involves a highly individualized inquiry

into job duties, further demonstrating that this action is ill suited for conditional certification as a

collective action. (Def.’s Br. 28–29.) These arguments need not be addressed now in light of the

court’s findings above that conditional certification is not warranted. Rather, these inquiries will

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In sum, there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Pickering and the broad class he

wishes to represent are similarly situated with respect to job duties. He fails to show

sufficient evidence ofsimilarly situated sales representatives or any basis fromwhich

to conclude that a pattern and practice of FLSA overtime violations permeates

nationwide, notwithstanding that he had four months to conduct discovery. This

conclusion can be reached without consideration of the declarations submitted by

Lorillard. These declarationssuggest, however, that Lorillard’s sales representatives

in regions outside Mr. Pickering’s have varied job duties, depending upon, for

example, whether the sales representative services independent or chain stores, the

volume of sales of these stores, whether the sales representatives interact with

wholesalers, and the size of the territory. In other words, Lorillard’s evidence lends

no support to Mr. Pickering’s contentions.10

4. Number of Opt-in Plaintiffs

Mr. Pickering also must demonstrate that there are other Lorillard sales

representatives who have an opt-in interest in this litigation. See Dybach, 942 F.2d

at 1567–68. “[U]nsupported expectationsthat additional plaintiffs will subsequently

be taken up on a merits examination of Mr. Pickering’s individual claims.

 The court is not making a credibility determination because Mr. Pickering has no 10

competent evidence addressing the job duties of sales representatives outside his region.

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come forward” are insufficient. Mackenzie v. Kindred Hosps. East, L.L.C., 276 F.

Supp. 2d 1211, 1220 (M.D. Fla. 2003).

Over the eighteen-month course of this litigation, only one plaintiff has filed

a consent form to join this action as an opt-in plaintiff. Mr. Pickering has no other

evidence that any other sales representative shares the same interest in this litigation

as he and Mr. Lynum. The only other evidence pertaining to interest comes from

Lorillard, whose declarants have represented that they have no desire to join this

lawsuit as opt-in Plaintiffs. Mr. Pickering’s failure to show that there are others who

want to opt in also precludes granting his motion for conditional certification of a

collective action.

5. Conclusion

Mr. Pickering’s evidence isinadequate for approving conditional certification

of a collective action and judicial notice. Accordingly, this lawsuit will proceed as

an FLSA lawsuit by a single employee against his former employer for alleged

violations of the FLSA’s overtime laws.11

 The court need not address Lorillard’s argument that the temporal scope of the 11

conditional class should be limited to the two years preceding the filing of this suit pursuant to 29

U.S.C. § 255(a) because the alleged violations were not willful.

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B. Lorillard’s Motion to Exclude Mr. Pickering’s Expert Testimony

In his reply brief, Mr. Pickering relies on an affidavit from his expert, Lyndel

L. Erwin, who was employed by the Wage and Hour Division of the United States

Department of Labor for more than thirty-five years. In that affidavit, Mr. Erwin

opines that Lorillard’s sales representatives are “similarly situated in job duties,” are

“subject to a common practice of being treated as exempt salaried employees in

violation of the FLSA,” and do not qualify for the administrative or outside

salesperson exemptions. (Pl.’s Reply 2, Ex. A.) It is undisputed that Mr. Pickering

disclosed the identity and affidavit of Mr. Erwin for the first time when he filed his

reply brief on October 27, 2011. 

Lorillard moves to exclude Mr. Erwin’s testimony for failure of Mr. Pickering

to comply with the June 1, 2011 deadline for disclosure of experts. (See USO § 8);

see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). It contends that at this late date, it will suffer

substantial prejudice if the affidavit is considered. Lorillard further asserts that Mr.

Erwin offers improper testimony regarding legal conclusions, namely whether Mr.

Pickering was exempt from the FLSA as an administrative employee or outside

salesperson and whether Lorillard’s sales representatives are similarly situated. 

(Def.’s Br. on Mot. Strike 10 (Doc. # 61).)

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Mr. Pickering responds that the USO’s June 1, 2011 deadline does not govern

the disclosure of Mr. Erwin’s expert opinions because his affidavit issubmitted solely

in rebuttal to Lorillard’s evidence, in particular declarations from four of Lorillard’s

divisionmanagers. Because these declarations allegedly “are repletewith testimony

12

that far exceed that of a lay opinion,” Mr. Pickering argues that he should be

permitted to counter Lorillard’s expert testimony with his own expert testimony, as

provided in Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Pl.’s

13

Resp. to Mot. Strike 3 (Doc. # 64).) Mr. Pickering concedes, however, that Mr.

Erwin cannot testify about legal conclusions and that “[a]ny statement within [Mr.

Erwin’s expert affidavit] . . . that this court finds as directing the court to a legal

conclusion should be stricken.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Strike 8.)

Lorillard repliesthat the declarationsfrom its employees do not contain expert

testimony, but rather contain testimony based upon knowledge garnered about

Lorillard’s business by virtue of their positions, as anticipated by Rule 701 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Def.’s Reply 3 (Doc. # 71).) Lorillard assertsthat

Mr. Pickering merely is attempting to evade the expert witness disclosure

 These division managers are Stacy Bradberry, Stacy Coligan, Hoon Kim, and Kevin 12

Sunderland. (Docs. # 48, 49, 52, 56.)

 Mr. Pickering has not argued that the declarations should be excluded for failure of 13

Lorillard to disclose the declarants’ identities by the July 1, 2011 expert disclosure deadline. 

(See USO § 8.)

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requirementsset forth in Rule 26(a)(2) by improperly characterizing the declarations

as containing expert testimony that required Mr. Erwin’s rebuttal. (Def.’s Reply 4.)

The disclosure of expert testimony and reportsis governed by Rule 26(a)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) provides that “a party must

disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present

evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” Rule 26(a)(2)(B) sets

forth additional requirements for an expert who is “retained or specially employed,”

such as requiring “a written report . . . prepared and signed by the witness.” Rule

26(a)(2) disclosures must be made “at the times and in the sequence that the court

orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D)(i). The court-ordered deadline for Mr. Pickering

to make his Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosures was June 1, 2011. (USO § 8.) 

Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) provides, however, that a party may identify a rebuttal

expert “if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same

subject matter identified by another party under 26(a)(2)(B) . . . .” Rule

26(a)(2)(D)(ii) thus focuses on rebutting evidence offered by another party’s expert

witness; it does not apply to testimony offered under Rule 701. See Fed. R. Evid. 701

(defining the limits of opinion testimony by lay witnesses). 

The initial inquiry is whether the declarations of Lorillard’s four division

managers consist of expert testimony. If they do not, then Mr. Pickering cannot rely

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on Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(ii) to excuse his failure to comply with the USO’s June 1, 2011

expert disclosure deadline. 

Rule 701 allows a lay witness to offer opinions or inferences if they are

“(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear

understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope

of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. In Tampa Bay Shipbuilding &Repair Co., 320 F.3d

1213 (11th Cir. 2003), relied upon by Lorillard, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an

argument that a company’s employees, who were involved in repairing the ship in

dispute, could not offer lay opinions about the reasonableness of the company’s

charges and hours expended to repair the ship. The argument was based upon the

then-new addition ofsubsection (c) to Rule 701. Relying on the AdvisoryCommittee

Notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 701, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that

“testimony by business owners and officers based on knowledge derived from their

positions is one of the prototypical areas intended to remain undisturbed” by Rule

701’s amendment. See id. at 1221-22; see Fed. R. Evid. 701, 2001 advisory

committee’s note (“[M]ost courts have permitted [owners and officers] to testify . . .

without the necessity of qualifying the witness as an . . . expert . . . based upon . . . the

particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his or her position in the

34

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business. The amendment does not purport to change this analysis.”); see also United

States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 841 (11th Cir. 2011) (“As the AdvisoryCommittee made

clear and as we have held, . . . Rule 701 does not prohibit lay witnesses from

testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own personal

experiences.” (citing Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 320 F.3d at 1221–22)).

Lorillard’s four division managers based theirtestimony on their particularized

knowledge gained from their years of experience working for Lorillard in its

managerial sales operations. Each has worked more than a decade supervising

Lorillard’s sales representatives. (Bradberry’s Decl. (eighteen years as a division

manager); Coligan’s Decl. (fourteen years as a division manager); Kim’s Decl.

(fourteen years as a divisionmanager); Sunderland’s Decl. (thirty years with Lorillard

in management positions).) These division managers possess firsthand knowledge

of the job duties ofsales representatives based upon their employment with Lorillard. 

Given their decades of experience, their testimony is rationally based on their

perceptions of what a sales representative does and does not do. That testimony is

helpful for resolving the similarly situated inquiry. As in Tampa Bay Shipbuilding,

their testimony is not based on expert knowledge, but is permissible under Rule 701.14

 It is worth noting that Mr. Pickering does not contend that the division manager 14

declaration submitted by him is governed by Rule 702.

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Because Rule 26(a)(2) does not apply to Lorillard’s division manager declarations,

the court rejects Mr. Pickering’s contention that the disclosure of Mr. Erwin is

controlled by Rule 26(a)(2)(c).

Lorillard moves to exclude Mr. Erwin’s affidavit based upon Rule 37(c)(1),

which provides, in pertinent part, that a party who “fails to provide information or

identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a)[,] . . . is not allowed to use that

information or witness to supply evidence on a motion . . . , unless the failure was

substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The failure to provide

notice was without substantial justification, for the reasons set out above, and that

failure was not harmless. The identity of Mr. Erwin was disclosed fifteen months

after this lawsuit’s filing, nearly three months after the expiration of discovery on

conditional class certification, almost five months after the deadline for Mr. Pickering

to disclose his expert witnesses, and almost four months after the deadline for

Lorillard to disclose its expert witnesses. The tardy disclosure deprived Lorillard of

the opportunity to depose Mr. Erwin, to conduct discovery to challenge Mr. Erwin’s

opinions and/or qualifications, and to prepare and submit a rebuttal expert report. 

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(Def.’s Br. on Mot. Strike 5–6 (Doc. # 61).) For these reasons, the court finds that

Lorillard’s motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. Erwin is due to be granted.

15

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Pickering fails to show that an order

conditionally certifying an FLSA collective action or an order compelling discovery

is warranted. Additionally, Mr. Pickering’s failure to disclose his expert witness

within the time prescribed by the USO is neither substantially justified nor harmless. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that (1) Mr. Pickering’s Motion for Conditional Class

Certification and for Judicial Notice (Doc. # 36) is DENIED, (2) Mr. Pickering’s

Motion to Compel (Doc. # 36-1) is DENIED, and (3) Lorillard’s Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s Expert Affidavit and Exclude Testimony from Plaintiff’s Expert (Doc.

# 60) is GRANTED, but Lorillard’s request for costs, expenses and attorney’s fees

incurred in connection with filing the motion is DENIED.

DONE this 30th day of January, 2012.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 In the court’s discretion, Lorillard’s request for costs, expenses and attorney’s fees 15

incurred in connection with filing the motion to exclude is due to be denied. 

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