Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07093/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 14, 2014 Decided December 16, 2014

No. 13-7093

MICHAEL H. HOLLAND, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

BIBEAU CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

VALLEY SERVICES, INC., A CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-00178)

John R. Woodrum argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants.

Kathleen B. Burns argued the cause for appellees. With

her on the briefs were David W. Allen and Larry D. Newsome.

Before: ROGERS, GRIFFITH and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Coal Industry Retiree Health

Benefit Act of 1992 (“the Coal Act”), 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701–9722,

created multiemployer benefit plans to provide health care to

USCA Case #13-7093 Document #1527460 Filed: 12/16/2014 Page 1 of 17
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retired and disabled coal miners and to collect premiums from

their former employers. Bibeau Construction Company, Inc.

(“Bibeau”) appeals the grant of summary judgment and order

directing it, as a “related person” to a disabled miner’s former

employer, to pay health insurance premiums, interest, and

liquidated damages to the United Mine Workers of America

1992 Benefit Plan (“the Plan”). Bibeau contends that the district

court erred in ruling that the equitable doctrine of laches did not

apply even though it received no notice of its payment

obligation until nine years after premiums started to accrue. 

Whatever merit Bibeau’s laches claim might have had when it

filed its notice of appeal, it is now precluded under Petrella v.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), because

each premium installment gives rise to a separate cause of action

for legal relief for which Congress has enacted a statute of

limitations to govern timeliness. Bibeau also contends the

district court should not have awarded interest and liquidated

damages, but the statutory damages provision plainly requires

otherwise. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

The history of the Coal Act is well documented elsewhere. 

See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998);

Holland v. Williams Mountain Coal Co., 256 F.3d 819, 821

(D.C. Cir. 2001); Penn Allegh Coal Co., Inc. v. Holland, 183

F.3d 860, 861–62 (D.C. Cir. 1999). From the turn of the 20th

century until the 1940s, health care for coal miners was largely

provided by “company doctors” in rural settings where care was

often deficient. The efforts of their union, the United Mine

Workers of America (“UMWA”), to obtain better health care

proved unsatisfactory, and a nationwide strike was called in

1946. The strike ended when the UMWA president, John L.

Lewis, and the Secretary of Interior, Julius Krug, agreed to fund

miners’ health care and pensions through national trust funds. 

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Similar trust funds were part of collective bargaining agreements

between miners and coal mine operators signed in 1947 and

1950. 

In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.

829, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Based on ERISA’s

funding and vesting requirements, the UMWA and the mining

companies entered into a new collective bargaining agreement

in 1974, which provided for retirees’ health benefits. The 1974

benefit plan also provided benefits for spouses and widows,

which significantly expanded the number of beneficiaries, and

quickly imperiled the financial health of the plan. To remedy

the funding shortfall, the 1978 collective bargaining agreement

departed from the royalty funding model. Instead of requiring

a defined contribution based on coal production, signatory coal

operators were made responsible for providing defined benefits

for all of their current and former employees. The 1978

agreement also included “guarantee” and “evergreen” clauses by

which operators promised to fund health care benefits as long as

they stayed in the coal industry. 

Valley Services, Inc., operated a strip mine in Wyoming

County, West Virginia, beginning in the late 1960s. Ovila

Bibeau, the owner of Bibeau Construction, Inc., acquired Valley

Services in 1975. Valley Services was a signatory to the 1974

and 1978 collective bargaining agreements. It ceased operations

in 1979, and by 1982 had paid off its debts and dissolved. A

number of other mining companies also ceased operations in the

1980s. See Penn Allegh Coal, 183 F.3d at 861. To address the

resulting shortfall in funding for miners’ health care and

pensions, the Secretary of Labor appointed a commission to

conduct a study of health care in the coal industry and develop

a “solution for assuring that orphan retirees . . . will continue to

receive promised medical care.” Report of the Coal Advisory

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Comm’n on UMWA Retiree Health Benefits 2 (1990). Based

on the Commission’s recommendations, Congress enacted the

Coal Act, which mandated the creation of the UMWA 1992

Benefit Plan to pay health care benefits and collect premiums

from former employers and their successors. See Pub. L. No.

102-486, 106 Stat. 3036, codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701–9722;

Penn Allegh Coal, 183 F.3d at 861–62.

The Coal Act requires a “last signatory operator” — defined

as “a signatory to a coal wage agreement” who was a retiree’s

“most recent coal industry employer,” 26 U.S.C. § 9701(c)(1),

(4) — to pay a monthly premium for former employees who are

receiving benefits from the 1992 Plan. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9711,

9712(d)(1), (3). If a last signatory operator has gone out of

business, then a “related person” is jointly and severally liable

for premiums. 26 U.S.C. § 9712(d)(4). A “related person” is

defined to be, among other things, “a member of the controlled

group of corporations . . . which includes such signatory

operator.” Id. § 9701(c)(2)(A)(i). 

The Coal Act incorporates ERISA’s enforcement scheme,

providing that “[t]he provisions of [29 U.S.C. § 1451] shall

apply, in the same manner as any claim arising out of an

obligation to pay withdrawal liability under [ERISA], to any

claim — (1) arising out of an obligation to pay any amount

required to be paid by [the Coal Act] . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 9721. 

These ERISA provisions impose liability on employers for

delinquent contributions to a multiemployer plan, 29 U.S.C. §

1145, and provide for a civil action to recover unpaid

contributions, id. § 1451(a). A remedial section provides: 

[When] judgment in favor of the plan is awarded,

the court shall award the plan — (A) the unpaid

contributions, (B) interest on the unpaid

contributions, (C) an amount equal to the greater of

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[interest or contractual liquidated damages, if less

than 20% of unpaid contributions], (D) reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by

the defendant, and (E) such other legal or equitable

relief as the court deems appropriate.

Id. § 1132(g)(2). The cause of action is subject to a statute of

limitations: “the later of — (1) 6 years after the date on which

the cause of action arose, or (2) 3 years after the earliest date on

which the plaintiff acquired or should have acquired actual

knowledge of the existence of [the] cause of action.” Id. §

1451(f).

One of Valley Services’ employees was Arthur Marcum,

whose benefit premiums are the subject of this appeal. He

suffered a back injury on the job in 1979. His injury developed

into a permanent disability, and in 1991 he received a disability

determination from the Social Security Administration. In 1995,

the UMWA 1974 Pension Plan assigned him a disability

pension, and he was enrolled for health care benefits under the

Coal Act’s 1992 Plan, which determined that his eligibility for

health benefits dated back to 1993. The Plan discovered that

Valley Services — his last coal industry employer — was no

longer in business and determined in 2004 that Bibeau was a

“related person” to Valley Services. By letter of December 6,

2004 the Plan notified Bibeau it was a “related person” and

therefore jointly and severally liable for payment of monthly

per-beneficiary premiums for Valley Services’ eligible

beneficiaries; it requested payment for Marcum’s premiums for

the period beginning in 1993. When Bibeau did not pay, the

Plan, by letter of October 17, 2005 advised that a failure to pay

within fifteen days would be treated as a delinquency for which

the Plan would seek payment of all amounts owed, including

interest, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. When

Bibeau still did not pay, the Plan filed suit on February 1, 2006. 

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After discovery, Bibeau moved for summary judgment on the

grounds that the complaint was untimely and, alternatively, that

the doctrine of laches barred the lawsuit. The Plan also moved

for summary judgment. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the Plan for

premiums that became due after May 15, 2001. Holland v.

Valley Services, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.D.C. 2009). 

Ruling that Bibeau’s laches defense was unavailable under the

Coal Act, the district court explained that a new cause of action

accrued as each monthly premium became due. See id. at

79–80. The district court initially rejected as time-barred all

premiums due before 2001, but upon granting the Plan’s motion

to amend, calculated the limitations period by counting back six

years from the date the complaint was filed, to 2000. Holland

v. Valley Services, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223–24 (D.D.C.

2012). The district court awarded damages for the period 

February 1, 2000 through March 15, 2012, leaving to the parties

to resolve damages that had accrued since March 15, 2012 and

any other future liabilities. Order, May 23, 2013. Bibeau

appeals, and our review of the grant of summary judgment is de

novo, see CarrAmerica Realty Corp. v. Kaidanow, 321 F.3d 165,

170 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

II.

As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether it

has subject-matter jurisdiction of this appeal. See Citizens for

the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metro. Wash. Airports

Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 252

(1991). This court’s jurisdiction extends to “appeals from all

final decisions of the district courts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To

be “final,” a decision must determine not just liability, but also

remedies. See Franklin v. Dist. of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625,

628–30 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

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The district court’s Order of May 23, 2013 directed Bibeau

to pay $241,227.21 for the period February 1, 2000 through

March 15, 2012 for unpaid contributions, interest, liquidated

damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. For the period after March

15, 2012 the district court ordered: 

[T]he parties shall confer in good faith to resolve in

accordance with this Order any remaining damages

issues, including any necessary recalculation of

unpaid premiums, interest, liquidated damages,

attorney’s fees, and costs that have accrued since

March 15, 2012 and any other liabilities that may

accrue going forward. 

Id. Further, if “the parties desire to have a magistrate judge

assigned to assist with the resolution of the remaining

calculation of damages or for settlement purposes, the parties

shall file a . . . Joint Motion for Appointment of a Mediator.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The district court set a daily

interest payment of $13.12 to be applied to the remaining

calculations.

 

In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962),

which involved a government antitrust challenge to the merger

of two manufacturers and sellers of shoes, the Supreme Court

held that a district court order requiring divestiture was “final”

under 15 U.S.C. § 29 despite the order’s requirement that one

party “propose in the immediate future a plan for carrying into

effect the court’s order of divestiture.” Id. at 308. This left the

district court the “remaining task” of “acceptance of [the] plan”

and “administering its decree.” Id. The Court explained that the

order was final because any further rulings by the district court

would be “sufficiently independent of, and subordinate to, the

issues presented by this appeal.” Id. The issues presented on

appeal were “on an ‘all or nothing’ basis,” and “[r]epetitive

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judicial consideration of the same question in a single suit will

not occur here.” Id. at 309. This court has recognized the

possibility that a remedy decision that leaves open only

“mechanical and uncontroversial” calculations may be “final”

for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See A&S Council Oil Co.,

Inc. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Other circuit

courts of appeals have so held. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l

Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2010); Marshak v.

Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2001); Parks v.

Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397, 1401 (7th Cir. 1985).

Not all damages calculations under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)

will be “mechanical and uncontroversial.” See, e.g., Dieser v.

Continental Cas. Co., 440 F.3d 920, 924 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006). 

But here the district court addressed the Plan’s requested

remedies in detail and left for future resolution only the amount

of damages that had accrued since the parties filed their last

estimates in March 2012. The remaining dollar amounts are

predetermined by the Plan’s premium schedule, the

unchallenged rate of interest set by the district court, and the

statutory formula for liquidated damages, see 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(2)(C). The district court also prescribed, if needed, an

informal method for resolution of the remaining amounts. 

Bibeau’s contentions on appeal — the availability of laches as

a defense to liability, and the propriety of the awards of prenotice interest and liquidated damages — are separate from and

“subordinate to,” Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 308, the amount of

damages that has accrued since March 15, 2012.

Given the mechanical nature of the remaining calculations,

the danger of “[r]epetitive judicial consideration of the same

question[s],” id. at 309, appears remote at best, and any danger

that the remaining calculations will produce an appealable issue

is no greater than was true in Brown Shoe. The Order of May

23, 2013 is thus sufficiently final for this court to have subjectUSCA Case #13-7093 Document #1527460 Filed: 12/16/2014 Page 8 of 17
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matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

The defense of laches bars a suit filed within the statute of

limitations when a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing suit and

the defendant is prejudiced. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121–22 (2002). Nine years elapsed

between the time the Plan enrolled Marcum in 1995 and notified

Bibeau of its premium obligations in 2004. Bibeau maintains

that the Plan’s failure to search diligently for a “related person”

to Valley Services was prejudicial because, in the intervening

years, Valley Services’ records and other evidence by which

Bibeau might have been able to contest Marcum’s injury, or the

injury’s relation to his employment with Valley Services, were

destroyed by fire and flood. Consequently, it maintains, the

district court erred by not applying laches and dismissing the

Plan’s suit.

The Coal Act requires coal operators and “any related

person” to pay for miners’ health care in monthly installments. 

26 U.S.C. § 9712(d)(3), (4); see 29 U.S.C. § 1145. A cause of

action to collect such installment payments separately accrues

with each missed payment. In Bay Area Laundry and Dry

Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corporation of

California, Inc., 522 U.S. 192 (1997), a pension fund sued to

recover for withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer

Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (“MPPAA”), Pub. L.

No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1461,

which imposes “withdrawal liability” on employers who

withdraw from a multiemployer pension plan, in order to ensure

that those employers continue to fund their employees’

pensions. See id. § 1381(a). When an employer withdraws, the

plan must calculate the benefits due and notify the employer of

its withdrawal liability “[a]s soon as practicable,” id. §§

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1399(b)(1), 1382. The Supreme Court explained that under the

MPPAA, a “withdrawing employer’s basic responsibility . . . is

to make each withdrawal liability payment when due.” Bay

Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 208. Because “the plan generally

[must] wait until the employer misses a particular payment

before suing to collect that payment,” each missed payment

carries its own statute of limitations. Id. (emphasis in original).

 

Liability under the Coal Act works in a similar way. The

responsibility of the employer (or “any related person”) is to

“make [Plan] contributions,” 29 U.S.C. § 1145, as they become

due each month, 26 U.S.C. § 9712(d). Like the MPPAA

installment liability considered in Bay Area Laundry, Coal Act

installment liability separately accrues with each missed

payment. Bibeau suggests in its reply brief that the Plan’s right

to assert “related person” liability is a separate cause of action

that accrues on the date a miner is enrolled in the Plan. Under

this theory, because Marcum was enrolled in 1995, the Plan had

only “until 2001 to locate a ‘related person’ to Valley Services

and sue for a judicial declaration establishing its joint and

several responsibility.” Reply Br. 3. The court generally does

not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief. 

See, e.g., Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d

828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Bibeau offers no explanation for its

failure to include this argument in its opening brief, much less

suggests extraordinary circumstances as might excuse its failure.

In any event, Bibeau can point to no statutory reference to a

separate declaratory action to establish “related person” liability. 

The Coal Act instead provides that “any related person to any

[last signatory coal] operator shall be jointly and severally liable

with such operator for any amount required to be paid by such

operator under this section.” 26 U.S.C. § 9712(d)(4); see id. §

9712(d)(3). The incorporated provisions of ERISA regarding

the cause of action, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1145, 1451(a)(1), and

remedies, id. § 1132(g)(2), also do not include such a reference. 

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Bibeau thus offers no reason to conclude that the Coal Act’s

separate accrual works differently than the installment payments

held in Bay Area Laundry to accrue with each delinquency.

Because the claims that the district court ordered Bibeau to

pay were timely filed, the doctrine of laches cannot bar the suit

under the Supreme Court’s recent instruction in Petrella, 134 S.

Ct. 1962. In that case, the Supreme Court held that laches were

unavailable as a defense to copyright infringement claims filed

within the three-year statute of limitations, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b),

because “courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment

on the timeliness of suit.” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967. 

Although addressing a different statute, the Court’s reasoning as

to legal claims was categorical: “[W]e have never applied laches

to bar in their entirety claims for discrete wrongs occurring

within a federally prescribed limitations period.” Id. at 1975. 

The Court explained that a “statute of limitations . . . itself takes

account of delay,” because “a successful plaintiff can gain

retrospective relief only three years back from the time of suit.” 

Id. at 1973. Because Congress had provided “a right to sue for

infringement occurring no more than three years back from the

time of suit,” there was “little place for a doctrine that would

further limit the timeliness of a copyright owner’s suit.” Id. at

1977 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The circumstances of Petrella are analogous to Bibeau’s. 

There, the infringing movie studio had used a copyrighted

screenplay under assignment from the author. When the author

died, “renewal rights reverted to his heirs, who could renew the

copyrights unburdened by any assignment previously made by

the author.” Id. at 1971. The remaining heir, see id. at 1971 n.8, 

renewed the copyright in 1991 and sued in 2009, decades after

the screenplay was copyrighted (initially in 1963) and the movie

was released (in 1980). See id. at 1970–71. Citing Bay Area

Laundry, the Court held that the infringement cause of action reUSCA Case #13-7093 Document #1527460 Filed: 12/16/2014 Page 11 of 17
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accrued with each act of infringement. See id. at 1969. Under

the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), the studio could

therefore be sued for unauthorized reproduction or use of the

movie that had occurred within three years prior to suit. Id. at

1968–69. Dismissing concerns about the type of evidentiary

prejudice Bibeau claims, the Court explained that in enacting

rights exercisable by an author’s heirs decades after a work was

copyrighted, “Congress must have been aware that the passage

of time and the author’s death could cause a loss or dilution of

evidence. Congress chose, nonetheless, to give the author’s

family a second chance to obtain fair remuneration.” Id. at 1976

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court in Petrella distinguished the cases on which

Bibeau relies. For example, the Court distinguished the Title

VII “hostile-work-environment claims” in National Railroad

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002), that are

“cumulative in effect and extend[] over long periods of time,”

where a laches defense was allowed, from “discrete wrongs, all

of them occurring within a federal limitations period,” like the

copyright infringement claims before it. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at

1975 n.16; see id. at 1970 n.7. The Court also addressed a

suggestion in Bay Area Laundry, 522 U.S. at 205, that an

employer facing MPPAA withdrawal liability could raise a

laches defense in arbitration if the plan trustees “failed to

comply with their ‘as soon as practicable’ responsibility.” The

Court noted that the Bay Area Laundry “opinion considered

laches only in the context of a federal statute calling for action

‘[a]s soon as practicable.’” Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1975 n.16

(emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1)). The

Copyright Act, by contrast, contained no equivalent language. 

Neither does the Coal Act, which, consistent with its purpose “to

stabilize plan funding,” Ass’n of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v.

Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted),

permits imposition of liability on employers and related persons

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even though assignment of the beneficiaries to employers was

not performed in a timely manner, see Barnhart v. Peabody

Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 171 (2003).

Of the two circumstances identified in Petrella in which

delay might still serve as a defense when a claim is filed within

the statute of limitations, see Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1967 & n.1,

both concerned equitable relief, which is not at issue here. The

Coal Act damages awarded by the district court were legal (not

equitable) and mandatory. 

IV.

Bibeau also contends that the district court erred in

awarding interest and liquidated damages for the period prior to

the Plan’s December 2004 notice of Bibeau’s payment

obligations. Because the remedial provisions of the Coal Act

are mandatory, we find no error, much less an abuse of

discretion, by the district court. See Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels

Retirement Plan, 701 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Brayton

v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Kickapoo Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d

1491, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 

A.

Under the Coal Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9721 (incorporating

ERISA’s enforcement scheme), a “plan fiduciary . . . may bring

an action for appropriate legal or equitable relief,” 29 U.S.C. §

1451(a)(1), to enforce an employer’s “obligat[ion] to make

contributions to a multiemployer plan . . . ,” id. § 1145. The

damages provision mandates that “[i]n any action . . . to enforce

section 1145 . . . in which a judgment in favor of the plan is

awarded, the court shall award the plan . . . (B) interest on the

unpaid contributions.” Id. § 1132(g)(2) (emphasis added). By

its plain terms, the award of “interest on the unpaid

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contributions” is mandatory, and because the contributions for

which Bibeau was found to be liable dated back to 2000, the

district court ordered interest for that period.

Bibeau’s reasons for contending the district court erred are

unavailing. Bibeau maintains that it owes interest only on

delinquent contributions, and that it “could not have been

delinquent in payments to the Plan until it was provided notice

of its obligation and failed to pay.” Reply Br. 22–23; see

Appellant’s Br. 39–41. The remedial provision, 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(2), does not distinguish between unpaid contributions

and interest; the word “delinquent” appears only in § 1145,

which imposes the obligation to pay premiums, not interest. 

Accepting Bibeau’s approach would mean that if employers

were not “delinquent” for purposes of interest until they

received notice from the Plan, then they would also not be

“delinquent” for purposes of unpaid contributions. Yet Bibeau

acknowledges that its liability extends to pre-notice “unpaid

contributions,” see id. § 1132(g)(2)(A). See Reply Br. 22–23,

24.

Similarly, in relying on the phrase in the Coal Act that

liability shall apply “in the same manner as . . . withdrawal

liability,” 26 U.S.C. § 9721, Bibeau assumes that all aspects of

Coal Act liability work in the same way as withdrawal liability

under the MPPAA. The MPPAA provides that a failure to pay

“within the time prescribed shall be treated in the same manner

as a delinquent contribution [under § 1145].” 29 U.S.C. §

1451(b). Bibeau reasons that “within the time prescribed” in the

Coal Act context “necessarily means the time prescribed by the

1992 Benefit Plan,” which shows that “an employer cannot be

delinquent in the payment of an obligation that it did not and

could not know existed.” Appellant’s Br. 42. Again, this

reasoning would necessarily extend to pre-notice unpaid

contributions, and must be rejected. Furthermore, under the

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MPPAA, the multiemployer plan prescribes the time for

payment, see 29 U.S.C. § 1382, whereas under the Coal Act,

liability accrues without any action by the plan, see 26 U.S.C. §

9712(d). Bibeau fails to demonstrate that the structure of the

Coal Act’s enforcement scheme relieves it from paying prenotice interest.

Bibeau’s reliance on Huber v. Casablanca Industries, Inc.,

916 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1990) (overruled on other grounds in

Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz

Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414 (1995)), is misplaced. Huber

involved an arbitrator’s denial of pre-notice interest on

withdrawal liability, and the Third Circuit reasoned that “[t]here

is no inequity in this result, as the delay in making the demand

was attributable to the Fund.” Id. at 99–100. The equity of an

arbitration award is not at issue in the instant case. Further, in

Huber, the interest was calculated under 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(1),

which addresses withdrawal liability, not 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(2), which damages calculations Bibeau challenges here. 

Huber does not address the scope of damages under the Coal

Act. 

Moreover, ordering Bibeau to pay pre-notice interest does

not create the unfairness that Bibeau suggests in maintaining

that “the loss of the use of money which interest aims to protect

properly falls on the 1992 Plan,” Appellant’s Br. 43, because

Bibeau “had no way of knowing it had an obligation to pay

premiums to the 1992 Plan until it received notice of the Plan’s

claim,” Reply Br. 24. Interest merely equalizes the time value

of money, making the same amount similarly valuable when

paid at different times. See Motion Picture Ass’n of America,

Inc. v. Oman, 969 F.2d 1154, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Oklahoma

Aerotronics, Inc. v. United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1348 (D.C.

Cir. 1991). Bibeau does not challenge the correctness of the

interest rate, which should therefore have made it indifferent

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between paying one amount in the past and the same amount

plus interest at a later date.

B.

Bibeau’s challenge to the award of liquidated damages

flounders on the plain text of section 1132(g)(2), which provides

that “the court shall award the plan . . . (C) an amount equal to

the greater of—(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or (ii)

liquidated damages provided for under the plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(2). The text admits of no exceptions, and the district

court awarded the Plan double interest on the unpaid premiums

within the limitations period. 

Bibeau emphasizes that the Plan initially demanded it pay 

premiums back to 1993, far overstating its actual liability, and

maintains that the Coal Act “does not address a situation where”

the initial demand overstates the liability. Appellant’s Br. 47. 

The text of § 1132(g)(2)(C) contains no such exception. The

purpose of the liquidated damages provision is to “enforce

prompt payment.” I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund, Benefit Plan A v.

Monal Mfg. Co., 607 F. Supp. 512, 514 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated

on other grounds, 1987 WL 12796 (D.D.C. June 10, 1987). 

That purpose was borne out here. Liquidated damages apply

only to the “unpaid contributions.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(c)

(emphasis added). After receiving the Plan’s December 2004

demand letter, Bibeau could have paid the premiums that fell

within the limitations period and challenged the Plan’s demand

for additional unpaid contributions if the Plan filed suit. Had

Bibeau done so, it could have cited authority from six other

circuit courts of appeals concluding that liquidated damages

apply only to contributions that are unpaid as of the time a plan

files suit, as well as another circuit concluding § 1132(g)(2)(B)

applies only if there are unpaid contributions as of the date of

the award. See United Automobile Workers Local 259 Social

Sec. Dep’t v. Metro Auto Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2007)

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(discussing cases). In any event, Bibeau explains that it did not

think it owed any premiums because of laches. See Oral Arg.

Rec. at 36:58–37:23. Yet the liquidated damages provision was

designed to prevent having “simple collection actions” turn into

“lengthy, costly and complex litigation concerning claims and

defenses unrelated to the employer’s promise and the plans’

entitlement to the contributions.” Senate Comm. on Labor and

Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., S. 1076, The

Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments of 1980: Summary

and Analysis of Consideration, at 45 (Comm. Print 1980).

Alternatively, Bibeau maintains that the district court

should not have awarded liquidated damages for the pre-notice

period because it “could not have been delinquent in any

obligation to the Plan” before it received notice. Appellant’s Br.

48. This argument fails for the same reason it failed as to prenotice interest. Bibeau further maintains that awarding

liquidated damages for the pre-notice period would “reward[]

the Plan” for its delay in notifying Bibeau of its obligations and

for overstating the amount that was owed. Id. Bibeau does not

suggest that the Plan intentionally delayed notification, and the

Plan gave Bibeau an opportunity to pay its obligations before

filing suit. Bibeau fails to demonstrate any error by the district

court in adhering to the plain text of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and the May 23, 2013

Order on damages.

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