Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08044/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08044-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Since Petitioner failed to date his Petition, the Court relies on the date listed on the

date stamp.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Agwu Gibson,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 19-08044-PCT-DLR (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On February 11, 2019, Petitioner Agwu Gibson, who is confined in the Arizona State

Prison Complex, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 1).1

 Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 18), and Petitioner filed a Reply and

a Brief (Docs. 19, 20).

BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2014, Petitioner was convicted by jury trial in Mohave County

Superior Court, case #CR2013-00734, of promoting prison contraband and was sentenced

to a 15.75-year term of imprisonment. (Exhs. C, D.)

Petitioner filed a timely appeal, arguing: (1) the prosecutor acted vindictively by

refusing to negotiate a plea after he began representing himself, (2) the trial court abused its

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discretion in determining his sentence, and (3) the trial court’s sentence violated the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. (Exhs. H, I, J); State v.

Gibson, 2016 WL 395862 (Ariz. Ct. App. February 2, 2016).

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on

February 2, 2016. See Gibson, 2016 WL 395862. Petitioner then filed a petition for review

in the Arizona Supreme Court. The court denied review on August 3, 2016. (Exhs. L, M.)

Thereafter, on August 13, 2016, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief

(PCR). (Exh. O.) Appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion of Review stating that he

had completed review of the case and was unable to find any claims to raise in PCR

proceedings. Counsel requested an extension of time for Petitioner to file a pro per PCR

petition. (Exh. P.)

On April 13, 2017, Petitioner filed a pro per PCR petition, raising five claims. (Exh.

Q.) Petitioner argued that his conviction violated the Arizona Constitution because (a) the

promoting prison contraband statute did not require him to possess a threshold amount of

drugs before he faced prosecution, and (b) a department of corrections policy advised prison

officials to refer an inmate for prosecution only if the inmate possessed an amount of drugs

intended for distribution. Petitioner also argued that the State improperly delayed his case

before filing the indictment, and that the indictment insufficiently alleged a crime because

it did not state the essential elements of promoting prison contraband. Lastly, Petitioner

argued that newly discovered material evidence would have changed the verdict, and both

his trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective. (Exhs. Q, R.)

On September 5, 2017, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR petition, finding that

three of his claims were precluded because he could have presented them in his direct appeal.

(Exh. R.) The court also found that Petitioner’s newly-discovered evidence claim lacked

merit because Petitioner had “failed to demonstrate that an investigation into security lapses

and inadequate training three years after the offenses in this case falls within the category of

newly discovered facts which would probably have changed the verdict in this case.” (Exh.

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R.) Lastly, the court rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim finding that

Petitioner had not shown deficient performance or resulting prejudice. (Exh. R.)

On November 29, 2017, Petitioner moved for rehearing, arguing that counsel in his

direct appeal provided ineffective representation by not raising claims 1, 2, and 3 of his PCR

petition. (Exh. S.) Petitioner also re-argued his newly-discovered evidence claim and his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Exh. S.)

On December 12, 2017, the court denied Petitioner’s motion for rehearing. (Exh. T.)

The court found that Petitioner had waived his claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel

by not raising it in his PCR petition. The court also found that Petitioner’s motion “basically

repeated the arguments made previously regarding the newly-discovered evidence and

ineffective assistance of counsel.” The court found no basis for rehearing. (Exh. T.)

Petitioner failed to file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Instead, on March 6, 2018, Petitioner filed a motion for status asking for the status on

his motion for rehearing. (Exh. U.) On March 20, 2018, the court notified Petitioner that it

had denied his motion for rehearing on December 12, 2017. (Exh. V.)

Then, on March 28, 2018, Petitioner filed a motion for extension of time seeking an

extension of time to file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. W.) The

court granted Petitioner’s motion and set the due date for May 6, 2018. (Exh. X.) Petitioner

then filed a second motion for extension of time stating that he had not been able to work on

his petition due to a “disturbance” on March 1, 2018. (Exh. Y.) The court denied Petitioner’s

second request, stating, in pertinent part:

The Court notes that the defendant has filed three separate pleadings in this

case since March 1, 2018.

The petition for post-conviction relief was denied in this case on September 5,

2017. The motion for rehearing was denied on December 12, 2017. The

defendant claimed he did not receive the order denying the motion for hearing.

The Court affirmed the denial and granted an extension until May 7, 2018 to

file the petition for review. The defendant has had sufficient time to prepare

a petition for review in this case. The defendant has not presented a sufficient

basis to extend the time to file a petition for review.

(Exh. Z.)

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Despite the court’s ruling, on June 7, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. BB.) Petitioner argued the five claims previously contained

in his PCR petition and his claim that his appellate counsel had been ineffective. Petitioner

also argued that he had been unable to work on his petition for review from March 7 to May

9, 2018, because he was in solitary confinement. The Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed

Petitioner’s petition as untimely. (Exh. CC.) The record reflects that Petitioner did not file

anything further.

In his Petition, Petitioner raises six grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner

asserts that his conviction should be reversed based upon prosecutorial vindictiveness. In

Ground Two, Petitioner alleges the trial court acted arbitrarily in imposing an excessive

sentence, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Ground Three, Petitioner

claims his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments. In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts that his conviction is a violation

of the Arizona Constitution and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments. In Ground Five, Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for causing a

favorable plea agreement to lapse, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. In Ground Six,

Petitioner asserts his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by

improper pre-indictment delay.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is

untimely and must be dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

“[T]he period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period

within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.” Bowen v. Roe,

188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending Petitioner not be counted toward” the limitations

period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A state

petition that is not filed, however, within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed”

and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is]

the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state court, but

before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th

Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction

relief is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department

of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See

Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048; see also King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (The petitioner

was “not entitled to tolling during the interval between the completion of one round of state

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collateral review and the commencement of a second round of review.”). Moreover, filing

a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended

before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003).

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for equitable tolling

to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2)

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented him from filing a

timely petition. See id. at 648-49 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely. After trial and

sentencing, Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arizona Court of Appeals

and the Arizona Supreme Court. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on August 3,

2016. Petitioner’s convictions became final 90 days later – on November 1, 2016 – when the

time expired for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (providing AEDPA statute of limitations begins “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the

time for seeking such review”); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“When, on direct appeal, review is sought in the state’s highest court but no petition for

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is filed, direct review is considered to be final

when the certiorari petition would have been due, which is 90 days after the decision of the

state’s highest court.”).

Petitioner, however, initiated post-conviction relief proceedings on August 13, 2016.

Petitioner’s PCR proceeding remained pending until December 12, 2017, when the court

denied his motion for rehearing. The statute of limitations began running the next day and

expired on December 13, 2018. Petitioner did not initiate his habeas proceedings until

February 11, 2019. Accordingly, absent any tolling, his habeas petition is untimely.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations period for any time his

proceedings were pending in state court after December 12, 2017 – when the court denied

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his motion for rehearing. As noted previously, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the

petition for review on June 13, 2018, as untimely. Thus, despite the fact that Petitioner was

granted an extension of time to file a petition for review, he nevertheless failed to file a

petition within the extended time allotted.

Having determined that the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s petition

for review as untimely, the petition for review was not “properly filed” for purposes of

tolling the limitations period and he “is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)”

for any time his petition for review was pending before the Arizona Court of Appeals. See

Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

As an excuse for his untimeliness, Petitioner cites his conditions of confinement as

an impediment to filing a timely habeas petition, stating, he is “a prisoner incarcerated in

state prison and must deal with numerous trials and tribulations” relating to his confinement.

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(Doc. 1 at 15.) Petitioner lists riots, lock-downs, segregation, as well as, trouble with legal

his materials, library access, and legal mail. Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations

“should have begun in June, 2018 when the AZ Court of Appeals issued [its] decision ... or

April 2018 when [Petitioner] was notified of [] the motion for rehearing.” Petitioner has also

filed a document entitled, “Brief” essentially arguing merits of his habeas petition.

Other than his general objections and conclusory list of alleged impediments,

Petitioner fails to identify demonstrate that he has been diligently pursuing his rights and that

an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way – or establish a “causal connection” between

an extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file a timely petition.

As noted by the appellate court, Petitioner filed at least three separate pleadings in his

case after the September 5, 2017 denial of his PCR petition – none of which was a petition

for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Even after Petitioner was granted an extension

of time to file a petition for review – he failed to do so. The general conditions unique to

prison confinement do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling. See,

e.g., Lind v. Lefever, 193 F.Supp. 2d 659, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)(“Transfers between prison

facilities, solitary confinement, lockdowns, restricted access to the law library and an

inability to secure court documents do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances.”). And,

a petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or lack

of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any equitable tolling. Petitioner’s habeas

petition is untimely.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72,

6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within

which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the

Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure timely

to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further review.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver

of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2019.

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