Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02980/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02980-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW CARR,

Plaintiff,

v.

BEVERLY HEALTH CARE AND

REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-12-2980 EMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

(Docket No. 67)

Plaintiff Andrew Carr filed suit against Defendant Beverly Health and Rehabilitation

Services, Inc. (“BHRS”), in which he asserted both individual claims and class/collective claims

related to his former employment with BHRS. On November 5, 2013, the Court granted BHRS’s

motion to dismiss on the basis of judicial estoppel, and a final judgment was entered in favor of

BHRS. See Docket Nos. 65-66 (order and final judgment). Mr. Carr subsequently filed a motion to

reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. That motion is now currently pending

before the Court. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the Court hereby DENIES Mr. Carr’s

motion.

“Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is appropriate ‘if (1) the district court is presented with

newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or made an initial decision

that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law.’” SEC v.

Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. Cal. 2010). Here, Mr. Carr is moving

for reconsideration on the basis of clear error or manifest injustice. The Court does not find Mr.

Carr’s arguments persuasive.

Case 3:12-cv-02980-EMC Document 74 Filed 01/03/14 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For example, Mr. Carr argues that the Court improperly decided the issue of judicial estoppel

at the 12(b)(6) phase (i.e., the issue should have been deferred until summary judgment). However,

many courts have in fact resolved the issue of judicial estoppel upon a 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g.,

Kimble v. Donahoe, 511 Fed. Appx. 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s 12(b)(6)

order finding, inter alia, judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context); Abuan v. JPMorgan Chase &

Co. No. 13cv1315 L (JMA), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143474, at *11-12 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (on

12(b)(6) motion, “find[ing] that Plaintiff’s claims that arose during the pendency of her bankruptcy

proceedings are judicially estopped”; giving plaintiff leave to amend only because she might “have

claims that arose after her bankruptcy discharge which are not subject to judicial estoppel”); Black v.

Midland Credit Mgmt., No. C13-5626 RBL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130787, at *4-8 (W.D. Wash.

Sept. 12, 2013) (on 12(b)(6) motion, concluding that plaintiff was judicially estopped from bringing

a FDCPA claim); Kaufman v. Capital Quest, Inc., No. C-11-1301 JCS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

134589, at *46-49 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (on 12(b)(6) motion, finding that plaintiff’s failure to

disclose claims to bankruptcy court resulted in judicial estoppel); Rose v. Beverly Health & Rehab.

Servs., No. CV F 06-0067 AWI DLB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91741, at *27-28 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8,

2006) (on 12(b)(6) motion, finding judicial estoppel applicable in bankruptcy context); cf. Oneida

Motor Freight Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that “[t]he

district court, although focusing primarily upon basic principles of res judicata, properly stressed the

debtor’s special duty of candid disclosure when it granted the bank’s motion to dismiss”). 

The fact that courts have also declined to resolve the issue on a 12(b)(6) motion is not

dispositive. For example, in Martinez v. Extra Space Storage, Inc., No. C 13-00319 WHA, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105079 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2013), Judge Alsup did deny a 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss on the basis of judicial estoppel because the plaintiff’s “intent in failing to list her claims

against defendants in her bankruptcy schedules is a disputed issue of material fact.” Id. at *7. But

here, Mr. Carr submitted a declaration which the Court took into account in deciding whether to give

leave to amend – and that declaration gave no basis for showing that judicial estoppel should not

apply or that the inadvertence/mistake exception to judicial estoppel should. See Docket No. 65

(Order at 6 n.2) (noting that, although the motion before it was a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court would

Case 3:12-cv-02980-EMC Document 74 Filed 01/03/14 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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“consider the declaration from Mr. Carr if only because, even taking into account the claims in the

declaration, Mr. Carr still cannot defeat the motion to dismiss[;] [i]t also demonstrates the futility of

amending the complaint”); cf. Krug v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 11-5190 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 143218, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2011) (on 12(b)(6) motion, giving plaintiff leave to

amend a TILA claim if he could, inter alia, allege “a basis for not having disclosed the claim in the

bankruptcy proceedings”).

Mr. Carr’s other arguments are equally unavailing. As the Court explained in its prior order,

“the mere fact of a discharge constitutes an unfair advantage (i.e., a court need not delve into the

issue of whether a disclosure would have affected the bankruptcy court’s decision to discharge).” 

Docket No. 65 (Order at 7). Therefore, Mr. Carr has no basis for suggesting that judicial estoppel

should not be applied to his class/collective claims (wage and hour). Moreover, Mr. Carr has failed

to articulate any basis for asserting that he inadvertently or mistakenly failed to disclose his

class/collective claims to the bankruptcy court. The Court’s prior order also addressed why Mr.

Carr’s previously submitted declaration failed to establish a basis for claiming inadvertence or

mistake. See Docket No. 65 (Order at 8-10).

Accordingly, Mr. Carr’s motion to reconsider is denied.

This order disposes of Docket No. 67. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2014

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:12-cv-02980-EMC Document 74 Filed 01/03/14 Page 3 of 3