Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03552/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03552-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD STICKNEY,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

CALIFORNIA GRAND CASINO, INC., LAMAR

V. “WILL” WILKINSON, and DOES 1-25,

inclusive,

 Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-3552 CW

ORDER REGARDING

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Plaintiff Richard Stickney moves for an award of attorneys’

fees in the amount of $68,364, a 1.5 multiplier and litigation

expenses and costs in the amount of $6,516. Defendants California

Grand Casino, Inc., and Lamar V. Wilkinson oppose the motion. The

matter was submitted on the papers. Having considered all of the

papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion in

part, awarding attorneys’ fees in the amount of $62,752 and

litigation expenses and costs in the amount of $6,516.

BACKGROUND

Defendants own and operate a casino in Pacheco, California. 

Plaintiff, a person with a disability who uses a wheelchair,

alleges that when he attempted to patronize the casino, he

discovered numerous aspects of the facility that were not

accessible to him, including the parking lot, entrance, bar area

and restroom. On August 25, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint, on

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 1 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

behalf of himself and others similarly situated, alleging

violations of (1) California Civil Code §§ 54 and 54.1;

(2) California Civil Code §§ 51 and 52; and (3) Title III of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On November 1, 2005,

Defendants filed an answer denying liability and pleading, in a

conclusory fashion, forty-seven affirmative defenses, including

that the casino was an historical landmark not subject to the ADA. 

The parties held a joint site inspection on March 7, 2005. 

Plaintiff’s expert Peter Margen prepared a report based on the

results of the inspection. 

After three settlement conferences with Magistrate Judge

Maria-Elena James which focused on the scope of injunctive relief,

the parties reached a settlement agreement. Defendants agreed to

pay Plaintiff a total of $15,000 in civil rights and personal

injury damages. Defendants also agreed to make various

modifications to their facility, including installation of

accessible parking spaces, an accessible path of travel from the

public sidewalk, wheelchair seating at the bar, a unisex accessible

restroom and a lower chip teller window and public phone. See Rein

Decl., Ex. 1, Consent Decree and Order, Attachment A. The

agreement provided that attorneys’ fees would be decided by further

negotiation or motion to the Court. The Court entered judgment on

September 13, 2005, reserving the issue of attorneys’ fees for a

post-judgment motion. 

Plaintiff now moves to recover attorneys’ fees in the amount

of $68,364 with a 1.5 multiplier. Thus, Plaintiff requests a total

of $102,546 in fees. In support of his request for fees, Plaintiff

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 2 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

submits declarations and time records indicating the hours billed

by his attorneys and their staff. The declarations also state each

attorney’s hourly billing rate and years of experience. In

particular, Mr. Rein and Ms. Barbosa have many years of experience

in the field of disability access litigation. The following is a

summary of this information:

Attorney/Staff Hours Worked Hourly Rate Total

Paul Rein 86.9 $435 $37,801

Patricia Barbosa 34.2 $375 $12,825

Julie McLean 65.2 $250 $16,300

Scott Holmes 11.5 $125 $1,438

In addition to these fees, Plaintiff requests reimbursement

for $6,516 in litigation expenses and costs. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs

as the prevailing party pursuant to the ADA. Under the ADA’s fee

shifting provision, Plaintiff may be awarded, in the Court’s

discretion, “a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation

expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Alternatively, Plaintiff

seeks fees, expenses and costs because he obtained a result in the

public interest pursuant to § 1021.5 of the California Code of

Civil Procedure and §§ 54.3 and 55 of the Califoria Disabled

Persons Act. The Court analyzes Plaintiffs’ motion under the ADA

standard, and discusses California law only where it provides for

recovery different than the ADA. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic

Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). 

If the district court determines that an applicant is a

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 3 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

prevailing party who should be awarded attorneys’ fees, it must

determine what fees are reasonable. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. In

the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys' fees are determined by

first calculating the "lodestar." Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). "The 'lodestar' is calculated by

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably

expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Morales

v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). There is

a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a

reasonable fee, Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262; however, the district

court may adjust the award from the lodestar figure upon

consideration of additional factors that may bear upon

reasonableness. Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975).

Determining a reasonable hourly rate is a critical inquiry. 

Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895

n.11). In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, the district

court should take into account (1) the novelty and complexity of

the issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel,

(3) the quality of representation, (4) the results obtained,

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir.

1988), and (5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement. City of

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1992). These factors

are subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation, and should not

serve as independent bases for adjusting fee awards. Morales, 96

F.3d at 363-64. Reasonable fees are generally calculated according

to the prevailing market rates in the forum district. Gates v.

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 4 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that, while it is appropriate

for the district court to exercise its discretion in determining an

award of attorneys' fees, it remains important for the district

court to provide "a concise but clear explanation of its reasons

for the fee award." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437

(1983); Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) (in

computing an award, the district court should provide a "detailed

account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for 'the number of

hours reasonably expended' and 'a reasonable hourly rate'")

(quoting Blum, supra, 465 U.S. at 898).

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable

attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party. Defendants object to the

amount of his proposed award as unreasonable and excessive. 

I. Number of Hours Billed

The Court begins by determining the number of hours reasonably

expended on this case. Plaintiff was represented by three

attorneys, Paul Rein, Patricia Barbosa and Julie McLean, with the

assistance of one senior paralegal, Scott Holmes. 

Defendants specifically object to the following time spent on

this case: (1) the 26.2 total hours spent by Mr. Rein, Ms. Barbosa

and Ms. McLean “conferencing” with one another; (2) the twelve

total hours spent by Ms. McLean drafting the complaint and by Mr.

Rein and Ms. Barbosa reviewing the complaint; and (3) the 5.2 hours

spent by Mr. Rein and the 8.1 hours spent by Ms. Barbosa in

connection with a settlement conference. 

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 5 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

With respect to the 26.2 hours spent in conference with one

another (including 10 hours by Ms. Barbosa, 8.4 hours by Mr. Rein

and 7.8 hours by Ms. McLean), the Court finds that the time billed

is not unreasonable considering the length of the case and the

amount of negotiation involved in reaching the settlement

agreement. Defendants’ objection to the amount of time spent by

Plaintiff’s attorneys in conference is overruled. 

With respect to the amount of time spent drafting and

reviewing the complaint, the Court finds that the six hours spent

by Ms. McLean is not excessive. The three hours each spent by Mr.

Rein and Ms. Barbosa in reviewing the complaint, however, is

somewhat duplicative and excessive. Therefore, the Court reduces

by 1.5 hours each the amount of time reasonably spent by Mr. Rein

and Ms. Barbosa reviewing the complaint. 

Finally, Defendants object to the amount of time spent on the

May 3, 2005 conference. According to the minute entry, this

meeting lasted just one and a half hours. See Docket No. 11. 

According to their declarations, Mr. Rein spent 5.2 hours and Ms.

Barbosa spent 5.1 hours traveling to San Francisco, holding a postconference meeting with their client, and returning to their

Oakland office. Rein Decl., Ex. 6, at 4; Barbosa Decl., Ex. 1, at

4. In addition, the day before, Ms. Barbosa spent three hours and

Mr. Rein spent at least two hours preparing for the settlement

conference (in addition to significant amounts of time spent

earlier to prepare the settlement proposal). According to counsel

for Defendants, the time spent at this settlement conference was

wasted because Plaintiff did not serve Defendants with a demand in

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 6 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

This order addresses the total fees to which Plaintiff is

entitled. Although the Court discusses each attorney’s

hours individually, it does so only to calculate the amount

of Plaintiff’s award. The Court does not decide how the

fees should be divided amongst Plaintiff’s attorneys. 

7

time for Defendants to review it ahead of time. Johnson Decl.

¶ 11. Plaintiff generally denies causing any unnecessary delay in

the case, but Mr. Rein and Ms. Barbosa do not deny failing to serve

Defendants with a demand in a timely manner. Under the

circumstances of the case, however, the Court finds that the amount

of time Ms. Barbosa and Mr. Rein spent preparing for the first

settlement conference, traveling to San Francisco, and meeting

afterwards with their client is reasonable. Nor does the fact that

two attorneys participated on Plaintiff’s behalf mean that their

hours were excessive. See McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d

248, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427,

1435 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989)) (“the participation of more than one

attorney does not necessarily constitute an unnecessary duplication

of effort”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the time spent in

connection with the May 5 settlement conference was reasonable. 

In sum, the Court finds that Mr. Rein reasonably spent 85.4

hours, Ms. Barbosa reasonably spent 32.7 and Ms. McLean reasonably

spent 65.2 hours on this case.1 

II. Hourly Rate

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates are

unreasonable because this was not a complex case. 

This Court has previously found rates of $395, $345 and $125

per hour to be reasonable in the San Francisco Bay Area market for

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 7 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

Mr. Rein, Ms. Barbosa and Mr. Holmes, respectively, in light of

each attorney’s education, experience, knowledge and

qualifications, for work done in 2000 through 2004. See George v.

Bay Area Rapid Transit District, No. C 00-2206 CW (N.D. Cal., Mar.

18, 2004), Order Granting in Part Pls.’ Mot. for Att’ys Fees, 13-

17. 

Mr. Rein and Ms. Barbosa now state that their hourly rates

have increased in 2005 to $435 and $375, respectively. However,

they have not submitted any evidence to support these recent

increases. In fact, according to Plaintiff’s “Statement of Bases

for Public Interest Attorney Fee Rates for Years 2005-2006,” Rein

Decl., Ex. 5, it would appear that in another case also filed in

2004, Marvin Huezo v. Sizzler USA, Inc., No. CV 04-4868 (C.D. Cal

2005), Judge Audrey Collins approved rates of $395 and $345 for Mr.

Rein and Ms. Barbosa. 

Furthermore, as Defendants argue, this was a straightforward

case in which no motion practice was needed, in contrast to most of

the other cases cited by Plaintiff as evidence to support their

requested billing rates, and it presented no difficult or novel

issues that would warrant a higher hourly rate. Plaintiff disputes

this characterization, noting that, to Plaintiff’s counsel’s

knowledge, this is the first successful access case brought against

a California gambling casino. However, Plaintiff does not explain

how this made it more complex than any of the many other types of

access cases which Plaintiff’s counsel have litigated in the past. 

Nor does the fact that Defendants denied all liability render this

an especially complex or difficult case, in light of the parties’

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 8 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

ability to settle without motion practice. 

Therefore, the Court finds that $395 is still a reasonable

rate of compensation for Mr. Rein, and $345 is a reasonable rate of

compensation for Ms. Barbosa. 

Julie McLean is an associate attorney who has worked at the

Law Offices of Paul L. Rein since 2003. McLean Decl. ¶ 3. She

previously worked at the Deaf Women’s Legal Project at the Law

Center for Families in Oakland. Id. She is a 1997 graduate of

Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California at

Berkeley. Id. She states that her current billing rate of $250

per hour was approved by the court in Marvin Huezo v. Sizzler USA,

Inc., CV 04-4868 ABC (C.D. Cal.). Id. ¶ 10. The Court finds that

Ms. McLean’s $250 per hour billing rate is reasonable. 

III. Multiplier 

Plaintiff asks that the Court enhance the fee award by a 1.5

multiplier pursuant to California Civil Code § 1021.5. A

mupltiplier is available to recognize factors not already included

in the lodestar calculation, such as “extraordinary skill.” 

Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1138 (2001). Plaintiff’s

request is based on the risk incurred by pursuing this action on a

contingent basis, the public interest outcome of this case, the

results obtained and the preclusion of other employment while

working on this case. Although it is within the Court’s discretion

to award such an enhancement, the Court does not find that such a

multiplier is justified here. While Plaintiff’s counsel did take

this case on a contingent basis and were successful in litigating

it, their risks and results are not extraordinary. Therefore,

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier is denied. 

IV. Litigation Expenses and Costs

Recovery of reasonable litigation expenses and costs is

specifically authorized under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. These

expenses may include expert consultant fees. Plaintiff seeks

litigation expenses and costs in the amount of $6,516, including

$5,402 for Mr. Margen’s consulting fees. Mr. Margen surveyed the

casino and prepared a report on his findings, billed at a rate of

$185 per hour. The Court finds this amount to be reasonable. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and

costs (Docket No. 28). The Court awards Plaintiff $62,752 in

attorneys’ fees, and $6,516 in litigation expenses and costs. 

Defendants shall pay this amount forthwith unless the parties

stipulate otherwise. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/10/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-03552-CW Document 41 Filed 07/10/06 Page 10 of 10