Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00485/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00485-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Donimic T. Brooks, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

State of Hawaii, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-485-PHC-RCB (BSB) 

 O R D E R 

I. Procedural History

 On January 10, 2013, Plaintiff Donimic T. Brooks, a State of Hawaii inmate who 

is confined in the Corrections Corporation of America's Saguaro Correctional Center, 

filed a document entitled “HRPP Rule 40(c)(2)(3) Form and content, (2) Nonconforming 

Petition, (3) Separate Cause of Action” (“Complaint”) and a Motion for Summary 

Judgment in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawaii. On January 18, 

2013, the Hawaii Circuit Court ordered all documents in the case to be reassigned as a 

civil proceeding and served on Defendant State of Hawaii Department of Public Safety. 

On March 4, 2013, Defendant State of Hawaii filed a Notice of Removal, removing the 

case to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. 

 In a March 7, 2013 Order, United States District Court Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi 

concluded that removal was appropriate because Plaintiff was alleging that Defendants 

had violated the United States Constitution and laws. Judge Kobayashi transferred the 

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case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1404(a). The case was assigned to the undersigned. 

 On March 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment. Defendant 

State of Hawaii filed a Response and Plaintiff filed a Reply. On April 18, 2013, Plaintiff 

filed a “Motion to Show Cause for Preliminary Injunction and or a Temporary 

Restraining Order.” Defendant State of Hawaii filed a Response and Plaintiff filed a 

Reply. 

 In a May 13, 2013 Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint because it was not 

filed on a court-approved form and denied the Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion 

for Default Judgment, and Motion to Show Cause. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to 

file an amended complaint on a court-approved form. 

 On May 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15). On June 

13, 2013, he filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) and a Memorandum of 

Law. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

. . . . 

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 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. First Amended Complaint 

 In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants Warden Todd 

Thomas, Assistant Warden Benjamin Griego, Administrator/Contract Monitor Shari 

Kimoto, and Segregation Unit Contract Monitor Scott Jinbo. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges violations of his First Amendment rights to free 

speech and the free exercise of religion. He claims that he studies both the Christian and 

Muslim religions and voluntarily participated in the “life principle/faith pod program,” 

which he knew at the outset was Christian-based but accepted inmates of all faiths. 

Plaintiff contends that he asked the program leader why the prison only offered a 

Christian-based program, but did not offer programs based on other faiths. Plaintiff 

states that the program leader did not know, but said that he would ask “the higher ups.” 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Griego told him that the curriculum came from the 

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Corrections Corporation of America, the program was voluntary, and Plaintiff could 

leave the program if he did not like it. Plaintiff did not leave the program. 

 Plaintiff contends that the following day, Defendant Thomas told Plaintiff that he 

had better stop asking questions or he would be kicked out of the program or thrown into 

segregation. Plaintiff alleges that he perceived this to be a personal threat to prevent 

Plaintiff from exercising his First Amendment rights, documented the incident, and then 

filed an inmate request, again inquiring as to why there were no faith-based programs for 

a myriad of other religions. 

 Plaintiff asserts that his unit manager responded to the inmate request, but the 

response was actually delivered by Defendant Griego, who handed Plaintiff the response 

and told Plaintiff that he was being kicked out of the faith pod and that Plaintiff was 

lucky he was not being placed into segregation. Plaintiff perceived this to be a personal 

threat and documented it. He then submitted an informal resolution form, claiming that 

his right to practice and study Islam was being hindered in the faith pod, that Defendant 

Griego had kicked him out of the pod, and that Defendants Griego and Thomas had 

threatened him. Unhappy with the grievance officer’s response, Plaintiff proceeded to 

the next step of the grievance process by filing a grievance. 

 Plaintiff states that while waiting for the response to his grievance, he met with 

Defendant Griego for an “interview.” At that time, Defendant Griego placed Plaintiff 

into segregation and charged him with hindering and “failure to follow” for attempting to 

provide false information and hindering the staff by lying. Plaintiff asserts that the 

charges stem from the contents of his grievance. 

 Plaintiff claims he was found guilty of the charges and, as a result, lost pay for six 

months and was placed in segregation for 60 days. Plaintiff appealed and the hearing 

officer upheld the findings and penalty. Plaintiff submitted to Defendant Thomas an 

appeal and a request that explained some the inconsistencies he believed were in the 

reports. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Thomas denied the request, stating that he had 

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spoken to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff had lied to him, and denied Plaintiff’s appeal. 

Plaintiff submitted a “second request,” which Defendant Thomas also denied. 

 Plaintiff claims he next wrote a letter to Defendant Kimoto about the situation, but 

Defendant Kimoto did not respond. Plaintiff asserts he subsequently requested that 

Defendant Kimoto answer his letter, but she has not responded to that request. 

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Griego violated Plaintiff’s rights to free speech and 

his right to “participate and or practice – exercise – a religious program.” 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights regarding disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff contends that Defendant 

Griego violated the grievance policy by placing Plaintiff in punitive segregation for 60 

days for submitting a grievance. Plaintiff claims that this was an “atypical environment.” 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Thomas violated his rights by failing to grant Plaintiff’s 

disciplinary appeal and that Defendants Kimoto and Jinbo are liable because of their 

“inaction.” In addition, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his “right to grievance 

the government for redress” and violated the prison’s disciplinary procedures. 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Griego and Thomas retaliated 

against him, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, “[d]ue to the actions stated in 

[Counts] (1) and (2).” Plaintiff appears to be asserting that Defendants Griego and 

Thomas retaliated against him for filing a grievance claiming they had threatened him. 

 In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. 

IV. Discussion of the First Amended Complaint

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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A. Count One

 It appears Plaintiff is alleging in Count One that he was denied his First 

Amendment right to free exercise and was retaliated against for the content of his 

grievance. 

 1. Free Exercise

 To state a First Amendment, free-exercise-of-religion claim, a plaintiff must allege 

that a defendant substantially burdened the practice of the plaintiff’s religion by 

preventing him from engaging in a sincerely held religious belief and that the defendant 

did so without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Plaintiff does not allege that the practice of his religion was burdened or that he 

was prevented from engaging in a sincerely held religious belief. Nor do his allegations 

support such a claim. At best, it appears that Plaintiff, who studied both Christianity and 

Islam, was removed from a voluntary, faith-based housing unit or a rehabilitation 

program that was Christian-based, yet accepted all faiths. Thus, the Court will dismiss 

without prejudice Plaintiff’s free exercise claim. 

 2. Free Speech/Retaliation

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a First Amendment retaliation claim 

against Defendants Griego and Thomas. The Court will require Defendants Griego and 

Thomas to answer the free speech/retaliation claim in Count One. 

 3. Defendant Kimoto

 Plaintiff’s reference to Defendant Kimoto in Count One does not state a First 

Amendment claim against her. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(defendants did not commit constitutional violations when they denied administrative 

grievances, failed to intervene on plaintiff’s behalf, and failed to remedy allegedly 

unconstitutional behavior). Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s 

claim in Count One against Defendant Kimoto. 

. . . . 

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 B. Count Two

 In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether Plaintiff was 

entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any constitutionally required 

procedural safeguard. Liberty interests that entitle an inmate to due process are 

“generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in 

such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its 

own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 

(1995) (internal citations omitted). 

 To determine whether an inmate is entitled to the procedural protections afforded 

by the Due Process Clause, the Court must look to the particular restrictions imposed and 

ask whether they “‘present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state 

might conceivably create a liberty interest.’” Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). “Atypicality” requires not merely an 

empirical comparison, but turns on the importance of the right taken away from the 

prisoner. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997). To determine 

whether the sanctions are atypical and a significant hardship, courts look to the prisoner’s 

conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the sanction will 

affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 

(9th Cir. 1996). 

 Plaintiff has not described the conditions of his confinement in punitive 

segregation or discussed whether being placed in punitive segregation affected the 

duration of his confinement. Simply being placed in punitive segregation for 60 days, in 

itself, is not an atypical and significant hardship and does not entitle Plaintiff to any due 

process procedural protections. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475-76, 487 (30 days’ 

disciplinary segregation is not atypical and significant); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 

641, 654 (3rd Cir. 2002) (seven months of disciplinary confinement “does not, on its 

own, violate a protected liberty interest”); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) 

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(two and one-half years’ administrative segregation is not atypical and significant); Rizzo 

v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (prison authorities may change a prisoner’s 

“place of confinement even though the degree of confinement may be different and 

prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in another” without violating 

a prisoner’s due process rights); Lucero v. Russell, 741 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(administrative transfer to maximum security without a hearing does not infringe on any 

protected liberty interest). 

 Even if Plaintiff had been subjected to an atypical and significant hardship, 

procedural due process safeguards in a prison disciplinary hearing require that the 

defendant receive: (1) written notice of the charges, no less than twenty-four hours prior 

to the hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and 

reasons for the disciplinary action and (3) a limited right to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence when it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals to allow the defendant to do so. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

565-66 (1974). Plaintiff does not claim that was denied any of these procedural 

safeguards. 

 In addition, “[t]here is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance 

procedure,” Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), and the failure to follow 

grievance procedures does not give rise to a due process claim. See Flournoy v. Fairman, 

897 F. Supp. 350, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (jail grievance procedures did not create a 

substantive right enforceable under § 1983); Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 

(E.D. Mo. 1986) (violations of grievance system procedures do not deprive inmates of 

constitutional rights). “[N]o constitutional right was violated by the defendants’ failure, 

if any, to process all of the grievances [plaintiff] submitted for consideration.” Buckley v. 

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). Moreover, “[t]he right to petition the 

government for redress of grievances . . . does not guarantee a favorable response, or 

indeed any response, from state officials. Moreover, the First Amendment’s right to 

redress of grievances is satisfied by the availability of a judicial remedy.” Baltoski v. 

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Pretorius, 291 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003); see also Ashann-Ra v. Virginia, 

112 F. Supp. 2d 559, 569 (W.D. Va. 2000) (failure to comply with state’s grievance 

procedure is not actionable under § 1983 and does not compromise an inmate’s right of 

access to the courts). 

 Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations based on Defendant Thomas’s failure to grant 

Plaintiff’s disciplinary appeal and Defendants Kimoto and Jinbo’s “inaction,” do not state 

a claim. See Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300. 

 Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Two. 

 C. Count Three 

 The Court will dismiss Count Three because it is duplicative of his more clearly 

pled allegations in Count One. 

V. Motion for Summary Judgment

 Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum of 

Law, but has failed to file a statement of facts as required by Local Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56.1(a). Local Rule 56.1(a) provides: 

Any party filing a motion for summary judgment must file a 

statement, separate from the motion and memorandum of law, 

setting forth each material fact on which the party relies in 

support of the motion. The separate statement should include 

only those facts that the Court needs to decide the motion. 

Other undisputed facts (such as those providing background 

about the action or the parties) may be included in the 

memorandum of law, but should not be included in the 

separate statement of facts. Each material fact in the separate 

statement must be set forth in a separately numbered 

paragraph and must refer to a specific admissible portion of 

the record where the fact finds support (for example, 

affidavit, deposition, discovery response, etc.). A failure to 

submit a separate statement of facts in this form may 

constitute grounds for the denial of the motion. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(a), the Court will 

deny without prejudice his Motion for Summary Judgment. 

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VI. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

B. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Counts Two and Three and the Free Exercise claim in Count One of the 

First Amended Complaint are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (2) Defendants Kimoto and Jinbo are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (3) Defendants Griego and Thomas must answer the free speech/retaliation 

claim in Count One of the First Amended Complaint. 

 (4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is denied without 

prejudice. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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 (5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 15), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver 

forms for Defendants Griego and Thomas. 

 (6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 

120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, 

whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First 

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, 

and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure; and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

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photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or 

this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

ordered by the Court. 

 (10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First 

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States 

Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

 (11) Defendants Griego and Thomas must answer the free speech/retaliation 

claim in Count One of the First Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate 

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 DATED this 8th day of September, 2013. 

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