Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02150/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Roy, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

State of Arizona, Dora Schriro, Michael

Linderman, John Sabbagh, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-03-2150-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Plaintiff Kevin Roy, a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona Department of

Corrections ("ADOC"), commenced this action to challenge certain conditions of his

confinement; in particular, Plaintiff challenges under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") and the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause

the ADOC's policies concerning inmate possession of books and religious items. At issue

are the following: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84); Defendants' CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90); and Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's

Supplemental Argument and Authorities (Doc. 105).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the ADOC's Eyman Complex in Florence,

Arizona, a Security Level 3, controlled-movement prison facility. (Defs.’ Statement of Facts

(“DSOF”), ¶ 6.) At all times relevant to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant Dora Schriro was

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1

The other named defendant in this matter, Defendant Childs, has not been

served with the summons and complaint in this matter and, therefore, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Childs

must be dismissed.

2

For purposes of ADOC policy, a "book" is not included in the definition of a

"religious item." 

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the Director of the ADOC, Defendant John Sabbagh was an ADOC senior prison chaplain,

and Defendant Michael Linderman was the ADOC “Pastoral Administrator.” (DSOF, ¶ 12.)1

A. The Number of Religious Items an Inmate May Possess2

ADOC inmates have the option of formally declaring a religious preference. That

formal declaration enables them, among other things, to possess items approved for use in

their chosen religion. (DSOF, Ex. A., ¶ 6.) 

At the time Plaintiff initiated this action, ADOC policy permitted prisoners to possess

only seven religious items, and those seven items were required to fit in a box designated

solely for that purpose. (DSOF, Ex. A., ¶ 6.) The dimensions of that box were twelve inches

by nine inches by four inches. (DSOF, Ex. A., ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff initiated this action, in part, to seek modification of this policy. In his

Complaint, he seeks an order allowing him to possess as many religious items as can fit in

the twelve by nine by four inch box. (First Am. Compl. at 7.)

During the pendency of this litigation, on September 12, 2005, the ADOC modified

its policy concerning inmate possession of religious items. The new policy does not restrict

the number of religious items each inmate may possess. Rather, inmates are permitted to

possess as many religious items as can be fit in their religious-item boxes. (Defs.' Mot. to

Strike Pl.'s Supplemental Argument and Authorities ("Defs.' Mot. to Strike"), Ex. A.) This

box has been enlarged from its former size, and now measures seventeen and a half inches

by ten and a quarter inches by eleven and a half inches. (Defs.' Mot. to Strike, Ex. A.)

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B. The Method for Obtaining Religious Items

The ADOC's policy concerning the specific religious items inmates are authorized to

possess also appears to have changed. ADOC Departmental Order ("D.O.") 909, Attachment

A, which was effective as of November 1, 2002, stated that inmates could possess "religious

items documented as normally used in the practice of the inmate's chosen religion, not posing

a threat to the safe, secure and orderly operation of the institution." (PSOF, Ex. 7 at 14

(emphasis added).) It appears from the evidence before the Court that this policy, at least as

it was applied to Plaintiff, was not enforced as written. In determining whether to permit

Plaintiff to possess particular religious items, a prison chaplain asked that Plaintiff provide

documentation that the requested items were "tenet requirements" of his faith. (PSOF, Ex.

15. See also PSOF, Ex. 16 (a letter from Linderman to Plaintiff stating that "[t]he ADC has

a desire to allow inmates the tools necessary to accomplish the practice of their chosen

religion") (emphasis added)). Indeed, in his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asks that the

ADOC be forced to approve all religious items that are "motivated by a religious belief, not

mandated by it." (First. Am. Compl. at 7.)

At some point, this policy, at least as written, changed. In its current form, it

authorizes possession of religious items that are "consistent with the practices" of the

inmate's declared religion. (D.O. 909, Attachment A.) 

An inmate who wishes to purchase particular religious items must first declare a

religious preference, then submit a written request for the item to the chaplain. (DSOF, Ex.

A, ¶ 4.) Upon verification of the inmate's religious preference, the chaplain determines

whether the item should be approved or denied. He may do this by consulting with a list of

items that have already been approved for possession by other members of the inmate's

chosen religion. If the item does not appear on that list, the chaplain may do his own

research as to the role the item plays in the religion, or he may ask the inmate to provide

supporting documentation. (DSOF, Ex. A., ¶ 4, 14.) If an approved item is unavailable for

purchase through the approved sources, "the Warden, in consultation with the Pastoral

Activities Administrator, shall determine the method for obtaining the item." (DSOF, Ex.

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3

Plaintiff’s request to possess religious items included only these specific items, and

Plaintiff has only exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his claim that he

is not allowed to possess these specific items. In his statement of facts in support of his

cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that he should also be allowed to

possess items necessary for “ritual magic” and ceremony, including “ESP cards,”

pebbles, dice, mirrors, crystals or “other gazing devices” for “skyring,” a means of

“inducing a trance state that allows spiritual visions to come through.” (PSOF, ¶ 191.)

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A., ¶ 5; Ex. B, ¶ 20.) It is undisputed that the outside donation of religious items to inmates

is not permitted.

Plaintiff’s stated religious preference is Occultist/Esoteric Christian. (Pl.’s Statement

of Facts (“PSOF”), ¶ 1.) On February 13, 2003, Plaintiff submitted a “Request for Approved

Religious Items” form, asking permission to possess seven items: a Rosicrucian-symbol

medallion, two sets of Tarot cards, a dream catcher, an altar cloth, incense, and an abalone

shell. (DSOF, ¶ 5, Ex. A; PSOF, Ex. 13.)3

 Plaintiff asserts that possession of these items is

necessary to the proper observance of his religious faith. (PSOF, Ex. 13.)

On February 28, 2003, Sabbagh wrote a letter to Plaintiff advising him that he needed

to provide the prison chaplain's office "with a valid documentation from the

Occultist/Esoteric Christian religious leadership. The documentation should address the

items which are the tenet requirements for this faith." (PSOF, Ex. 15.) That documentation

came in the form of a letter, dated March 24, 2003, from Abbot Richard Christiansen of the

"Brothers of Light, Religion of Ancient Ways, Western Mystery Tradition." (PSOF, Ex. 16.)

The letter concerned "those practices and religious articles which customarily constitute part

of the tenet requirements for those prisoners choosing to follow the 'Occult/Esoteric

Christian' path as propagated by the Brothers of Light-Esoteric Christian Order." (PSOF, Ex.

16.) The letter confirmed that the items requested by Plaintiff were central to the practice

of Plaintiff's avowed religion. (PSOF, Ex. 16.) Appended to the letter was a "Selected

Reading (Reference) List," alluding to what appear to be books about Plaintiff's religion.

(PSOF, Ex. 16.)

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On April 9, 2003, Plaintiff met with Defendant Childs, a prison chaplain, who asked

Plaintiff to submit additional documentation in support of his requested religious items.

(PSOF, Ex. 18.) According to Plaintiff, the meeting took place in the prison yard, and he

offered to take Childs to the housing unit and show him the documentation, but Childs

declined. (PSOF, ¶ 8.) 

About two weeks later, on April 28, 2003, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Linderman, asking

what form the additional documentation should take. (PSOF, Ex. 18.) Linderman responded

by letter on May 7, 2003, stating that, "[d]ocumentation should be in the form of printed

material regarding aspects of the religion and the ritual tools used in the practice. Letters

from individuals are not considered appropriate documentation. . . . A check of available

resource information on Esoteric Christian has failed to verify the normal usage of the items

you request." (PSOF, Ex. 19.) 

Plaintiff responded on May 19, 2003 in a letter to Sabbagh, stating that Plaintiff had

the required "printed materials . . . in my personal possession," and that he would provide

those materials at a meeting with prison chaplains. (PSOF, Ex. 20.) Plaintiff asked that

Sabbagh "please schedule a meeting with me so that I may demonstrate to you via 'printed

material,' the validity of my requests." (PSOF, Ex. 20.)

The same day, Plaintiff also wrote a letter to Linderman, in which Plaintiff alludes to

a conversation between "a member of my church" and Sabbagh, at which the church official

offered to show Sabbagh the requested documentation, but, according to Plaintiff, Sabbagh

replied only that he needed "more documentation." (PSOF, Ex. 21.) Plaintiff also made

reference to the fact that he had requested a meeting with Sabbagh to show him the requested

materials. (PSOF, Ex. 21.)

According to Sabbagh, he responded to Plaintiff's May 19 letter by referring the

matter to the "Unit Chaplain," who, according to Sabbagh, met with Plaintiff, but Plaintiff

refused to provide any documentation. (PSOF, Ex. 14, at 4-5.) Plaintiff does not specifically

deny that this meeting occurred, but he does state, for example, that, "Defendants refused to

retrieve a copy of [Plaintiff's] book documentation." (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 9.) Plaintiff

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also points to a general absence of evidence that the meeting occurred. For example, there

is no evidence of any written communication between Sabbagh and the Unit Chaplain

concerning the alleged meeting, nor did Defendants produce, among other things, the prison

logs which, according to Plaintiff, would contain a record of him leaving his cell to meet with

the Unit Chaplain. 

Linderman responded to Plaintiff's letter on June 30, 2003, stating that, "Apparently

from your letter, you still do not have documentation regarding the items you request and

claim are normally used in your religion. . . . ADC cannot purchase books from a book list

for each religion represented in our inmate population to verify an inmate's claim . . . . If you

have possession of validating information other than the solicited letters you indicate, contact

Chaplain Sabbagh so that he may secure a copy of it." (PSOF, Ex. 22.) Linderman does not

appear to have been aware of the alleged meeting between Plaintiff and the Unit Chaplain.

No meeting between Plaintiff and Sabbagh or Linderman occurred. Plaintiff attributes

this to their continual avoidance of a meeting with him. (PSOF, ¶¶ 8, 31, 37, 68, 69.)

Plaintiff also attests that the task of providing the necessary information was further

complicated by the fact that prison policy does not permit copies of religious materials to be

made, or attachments to be included with Inmate Letters. (PSOF, ¶ 72, Ex. 25.) In Plaintiff's

view, he complied with the requisite procedure for arranging a meeting with a chaplain,

which requires that the inmate "send an inmate letter to Eyman Complex Religious

Department and a chaplain will set a time to meet with [the inmate]." (PSOF, ¶ 76.) 

Plaintiff's request for the seven religious items was denied, as, according to

Defendants, he failed to provide them with the requisite documentation.

C. Inmate Possession of Religious Books

Inmates may possess seven books in their cell at any given moment. This restriction

is attributable to the following: the size of the inmate's cell, the need to minimize friction

between cellmates stemming from over-crowding of the cell by personal belongings, the fact

that random searches become more time-consuming and complicated as possessions increase,

and the need to comply with fire codes. (DSOF, Ex. B., ¶¶ 11-15.) Those books must be

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obtained either from the inmate store or directly from the publisher, in order to minimize the

introduction of contraband into the prison. (DSOF, Ex. B., ¶¶ 15-17.) Inmates may keep

additional books in storage, and may access those books upon request. (DSOF, Ex. B., ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff asserts that he requires more than seven books at one time because members

of his faith “should acquire a firm knowledge of the fundamentals of biology, physics, math,

history, and language,” and because adherents of his faith “should be well-read and

conversant with architecture, mythology, comparative religion, physiology and psychology.”

(PSOF, ¶ 137.) Plaintiff owns at least twenty religious books. (DSOF, ¶ 20.) 

D. Procedural History

On November 3, 2003, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights complaint seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 19, 2004, the Court ordered Defendants to answer

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to the free exercise of his religion

and that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights pursuant to the RLUIPA. Plaintiff amended

his complaint on June 16, 2004. 

The First Amended Complaint contains two counts. The first count alleges that

Defendants violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the RLUIPA, and Arizona

Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") § 41-1493.01 by denying Plaintiff the seven religious items that

he has requested, by restricting the number of religious items an inmate may possess to

seven, by requiring that he purchase religious items at the inmate store, rather than allowing

those items to be donated by or purchased from "an outside source," and by approving for

inmate possession only those religious items that are "mandated" by an inmate's chosen

religion. In the second count, Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the Free Exercise Clause,

the RLUIPA, and A.R.S. § 41-1493.01 are violated by restricting the number of books he can

possess in his cell at any given moment to seven.

On April 13, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, to which

Defendants' responded on May 20, 2005 with a cross-motion for summary judgment. On

June 17, 2005, Plaintiff filed a notice of supplemental authorities in support of his motion for

summary judgment, followed by, on October 6, 2005, a supplement to his motion for

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summary judgment. Defendants filed a motion to strike the latter document on October 19,

2005.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The standard for granting summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56(c), Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Under this rule, summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) no

genuine issues of material fact remain; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to

the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56 (2005); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552-53

(1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must regard as true the nonmoving party’s evidence if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2548; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. However, the

non-moving party may not merely rest on its pleadings, he must produce some significant

probative evidence tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a

material question of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 2513-14 (1986). 

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment

is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Id., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; see also Citadel Holding

Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The pleadings of a pro se litigant must be

liberally construed, however, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure. See United

States v. Seesting, 234 F.3d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 2000); Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th

Cir. 1995). To defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment a pro se plaintiff cannot

rely solely on his allegations but must support his claims by presenting significant and

probative evidence. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984).

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B. Possession of Religious Items

1. Mootness

Defendants argue that in light of the ADOC's new policy concerning the number of

religious items an inmate may possess, this aspect of Plaintiff's Complaint is now moot.

(Defs.' Mot. to Strike, at 2-3.) In particular, Defendants argue that because the new policy

essentially provides Plaintiff with even more than that which his Complaint seeks, this

portion of his Complaint has become moot.

Plaintiff responds that Defendants' contention, even assuming it is true, applies only

to the number of religious items Plaintiff may possess, and does not address the other aspects

of Plaintiff's claim, which include the allegedly wrongful denial of the particular seven items

that Plaintiff requested, Defendants' refusal to allow the donation of religious items, and the

requirement that Plaintiff purchase only those items sold in the inmate store. (Pl.'s Resp. to

Mot. to Strike, at 3.) With regard to the number of religious items an inmate may possess,

Plaintiff argues that the new policy does not moot his claim, as, according to Plaintiff, "a

claim does not become moot merely because policy changes are undertaken under pressure

of litigation." (Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. to Strike, at 4, citing Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504,

1507 (9th Cir. 1991).)

Plaintiff is correct that the new policy does not render moot the entirety of his

Complaint with regard to religious items. Plaintiff applied for, and was denied, permission

to possess seven specific religious items. The propriety of that denial is one of the subjects

of this lawsuit. That Plaintiff may now be permitted to possess additional items beyond those

seven already denied to him has no effect on whether the original seven items were properly

denied to him.

The new policy does, however, render moot the aspect of Plaintiff's claim concerning

the restriction on the number of religious items each inmate may possess. A case becomes

moot "when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable

interest in the outcome." Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1390 (2000)). These

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criteria are satisfied when "it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable

expectation . . . that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief or events have

completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation." Los Angeles

County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 630, 99 S. Ct. 1337, 1383 (1979) (citations, quotations and

some punctuation omitted). 

Plaintiff sought an order allowing him to possess as many religious items as could be

fit in a twelve by nine by four inch box. (First Am. Compl. at 7.) The new policy grants

Plaintiff his wish, and more. Under the new policy, Plaintiff may possess as many approved

religious items as can fit in a seventeen and a half by ten and a quarter by eleven and a half

inch box. (Defs.' Mot. to Strike, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff's reliance on the rule that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct

does not make a case moot is unavailing. Where "the possibility of recurrence of the

challenged conduct is only a speculative contingency," Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744,

748 (7th Cir. 1975), the case must still be dismissed as moot. The Court agrees with

Defendants that any suggestion that the ADOC will revert to the old policy once the threat

of litigation has been removed is but a "speculative contingency." See id.; Vieira v.

Woodford, 2002 WL 1226852, *2 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2002) (dismissing inmate's claim as

moot where prisoner sought modification of a particular prison guideline and, during

pendency of litigation, prison policy was so modified, and there was no indication that prison

would revert to prior policy). See, e.g., McCarthy v. Ozark Sch. Dist., 359 F.3d 1029, 1036

(8th Cir. 2004) ("A speculative possibility is not a basis for retaining jurisdiction over a moot

case."). Cf. Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72, 104 S. Ct. 373, 375-76

(1983) (concluding that, where the defendant university had publicly announced a policy

change, there was no reasonable likelihood that the defendant would return to the challenged

policy).

In sum, Plaintiff's claim is moot with respect to his ability to possess more than seven

religious items. His claim is not moot, however, with respect to the other aspects of his claim

concerning access to religious items.

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2. RLUIPA

RLUIPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2003 & Supp. 2005),

provides, in relevant part, that, "No government shall impose or implement a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution," unless

the burden furthers a "compelling governmental interest . . . [by] the least restrictive means."

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). The statute defines "religious exercise" to include "any

exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief."

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

These provisions of RLUIPA were recently upheld by the United States Supreme

Court, which noted that RLUIPA should not be read “to elevate accommodation of religious

observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety. . . . An accommodation

must be measured so that it does not override other significant interests.” Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2122-23 (2005).

Plaintiff contends that the ban on donations of religious items, the requirement that

all religious items be purchased from the inmate store, and the denial of the seven requested

religious items violate his rights under RLUIPA. Defendant responds that, as a matter of

law, none of the policies at issue impose a "substantial burden" on Plaintiff's religious

exercise.

Plaintiff bears the responsibility of making a prima facie showing that the restriction

placed upon his religious expression constitutes a "substantial burden." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc2(b); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). Should Plaintiff make this

prima facie showing, the burden shifts to Defendants to show that the substantial burden is

both "in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest," and "the least restrictive means

of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc2(b); Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. Congress has demanded that the courts construe these

provisions of RLUIPA "in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum

extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g);

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995.

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The first step in the analysis is whether the ADOC policies at issue place a substantial

burden on Plaintiff's ability to practice his religion. A "burden" is "substantial" under

RLUIPA if it is "oppressive to a significantly great extent," or if it imposes a "significantly

great restriction or onus upon [religious] exercise." Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994 (citing San

Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). The

Supreme Court has found a substantial burden "where the state . . . denies [an important

benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure

on an adherent to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs." Thomas Review Bd. of the

Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1436 (1981); see also

Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949 (interpreting the term “substantial burden” as used in the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, to include governmental

action which burdens an adherent’s practice of his religion “by preventing him [] from

engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates.”).

a. Requirement That Items Be Purchased at the Inmate Store

The Court turns first to the policy banning outside donation of religious items and

requiring that religious items be purchased in the inmate store. This policy is far from a

substantial burden on Plaintiff's practice of his religion because it does not actually prevent

Plaintiff from practicing his religion; it simply dictates the methods by which Plaintiff and

other inmates may obtain desired religious items. An inmate wishing to purchase an item

must purchase it from the inmate store if it is available there, and if not, must allow prison

officials to determine the appropriate method for obtaining the item. (DSOF, Ex. A.) While

it appears that Plaintiff desires the ability to simply obtain religious items from any source

he pleases through a manner of his choosing, RLUIPA does not mandate such flexibility.

See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "a government action

or regulation does not rise to the level of a substantial burden on religious exercise if it

merely prevents the adherent from either enjoying some benefit that is not otherwise

generally available or acting in a way that is not otherwise generally allowed"). Accordingly,

this aspect of Plaintiff's Complaint fails as a matter of law.

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b. Possession of Religious Items

Next, the Court looks to whether Defendants properly denied Plaintiff's request to

possess the seven religious items. This issue can be broken into two parts: first, whether the

ADOC administrative procedure for obtaining religious items is, in itself, substantially

burdensome, and second, whether the denial of the items, i.e., forcing Plaintiff to try to

practice his religion without those items, is substantially burdensome.

Turning to the first issue, Defendants argue that the procedure is not substantially

burdensome, as it simply requires inmates to provide documentation in support of their

requests, and the procedure only appeared burdensome to Plaintiff because he refused to

follow it - that is, he chose not to supply Defendants with proper documentation. 

In response, Plaintiff contends that while the procedure as written may not have been

burdensome, it was Defendants' refusal to follow it that has legal implications. In particular,

Plaintiff asserts that he was first asked for a letter from his "religious leadership," but when

he fulfilled that request by having Abbot Christiansen write a letter to Sabbagh, Plaintiff was

told that such letters were necessarily insufficient and that the documentation had to come

in the form of "printed material." According to Plaintiff, he had such materials in his cell,

but despite numerous attempts to set up meetings with members of the prison chaplaincy,

they refused. In other words, Defendants made it impossible for Plaintiff to comply with the

procedure.

The Court finds that there are questions of material fact as to whether the procedure,

as it was implemented by Defendants vis-à-vis Plaintiff's request for religious items, was

substantially burdensome. First, Defendants should not have asked for documentation from

Plaintiff's "religious leadership" if they were not prepared to accept it. Defendants claimed

that the letter from Abbot Christiansen was insufficient because "letters from individuals are

not considered as appropriate documentation." (PSOF, Ex. 19.) But if that was true,

Defendants should not have asked for "valid documentation from the Occultist/Esoteric

Christian leadership." (PSOF, Ex. 58.) In their brief, Defendants contend that the letter from

Abbot Christiansen was also insufficient because "there was no mention of Occultist/Esoteric

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Christian anywhere on the letterhead; the Abbot did not identify himself as an authority on

the Occultist/Esoteric Christian religion, [and] . . . [the letter] included no references or

citations or copies of authoritative works." (DSOF, at 4.) The Court rejects Defendants'

arguments. If Defendants wanted Plaintiff to provide documentation from religious

leadership that contained "references or citations or copies of authoritative works," their letter

to Plaintiff should have said as much. If Defendants wanted the letter from Plaintiff's

"religious leadership" to identify the religion in the letterhead, they should have said so. And

while Abbot Christiansen does not explicitly state that he is an authority on the

Occult/Esoteric Christian religion, it is not an unreasonable assumption that he is, given that

he purports to be an abbot at the Brothers of Light-Esoteric Christian Order. While

Defendants may be concerned about the authenticity or veracity of letters from "religious

leadership," Defendants should not ask for such letters if they are not prepared to accept

them. 

This contradiction in Defendants' policy is, by itself, insufficient to constitute a

substantial burden on Plaintiff's religious exercise, but it is probative on that issue. As soon

as it was made clear to Plaintiff that Abbot Christiansen's letter was insufficient, Plaintiff

wrote numerous letters to Sabbagh and Linderman requesting a meeting to provide them with

the requested materials. It appears that Plaintiff complied with ADOC policy as to how to

request such a meeting, as he sent Inmate Letters to the Eyman Complex Religious

Department. Following receipt of such letters, ADOC policy requires that "a chaplain will

set a time to meet with [the inmate]." (PSOF, ¶ 76.)

Sabbagh and Linderman do not dispute that they never met with Plaintiff concerning

his religious items. Sabbagh does state, in a response to a request for admissions, that "I

referred this matter to the Unit Chaplain, and instructed him to meet with you and obtain the

documentation. The Unit Chaplain met with you and you failed or refused to provide any

documentation." (PSOF, Ex. 14.)

Even assuming that Sabbagh's statement constitutes admissible evidence, there is a

question of fact as to whether that meeting occurred. Plaintiff does not specifically deny that

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this meeting occurred, but viewing all of the evidence that he submitted in the light most

favorable to him, it is clear enough to the Court that Plaintiff disputes the occurrence of the

meeting. For example, Plaintiff states generally that "Defendants refused to retrieve a copy

of [Plaintiff's] book documentation," (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 9) and Plaintiff devotes

considerable space in his statement of facts to pointing out the utter absence of evidence that

the meeting occurred. For example, contrary to prison policy, once an inmate requests a

meeting with a prison chaplain, a chaplain will "set a time to meet with [the inmate]." Yet

there is no dispute that Plaintiff was not informed of the meeting prior to its alleged

occurrence. There is no evidence of any written communication between Sabbagh and the

Unit Chaplain concerning the alleged meeting, nor did Defendants produce, among other

things, the prison logs which, according to Plaintiff, would contain a record of him leaving

his cell to meet with the Unit Chaplain. Nor is there evidence from the "logs or records from

the Meadows Unit Chaplaincy which reflect the date, time, location and details of the

meeting between the Unit Chaplain and [Plaintiff] regarding the approval of [Plaintiff's]

religious items." (PSOF, ¶ 98.) Finally, the Unit Chaplain may have been Defendant Childs,

(PSOF, Ex. 18) yet he did not submit an affidavit as to whether he ever met with Plaintiff at

the request of Sabbagh, and whether, if that meeting did occur, Plaintiff refused to turn over

the validating documentation.

Also weighing in Plaintiff's favor is the fact that while Defendants requested that

Plaintiff transmit to them the required documentation, it appears that it would have been

difficult for Plaintiff to do so. ADOC policy does not permit the photocopying of religious

items, (PSOF, ¶ 72) so Plaintiff would have had to attach the actual religious books to an

inmate letter. Given that ADOC policy generally bars attachments to Inmate Letters, except

when requested by staff, Plaintiff's contention that he would have had considerable difficulty

had he attempted to "attach" religious books to an Inmate Letter does not appear

unreasonable. While Linderman states in an affidavit that, "[t]he ADC policy restricting the

copying of religious materials prohibits inmates from copying religious materials for

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distribution to other inmates, not as attachments to correspondence to staff," (DSOF, Ex. A,

¶ 18) there is no such allowance in the actual Departmental Order. (PSOF, Ex. 25.)

It is also worth noting that Defendants required of Plaintiff an illegally high standard

of proof as to the role the requested religious items must play in his religion. "In determining

whether a prisoner's religious freedom is substantially burdened, . . . the question is not

whether a particular practice is required by the prisoner's faith, but rather whether “the

practices in question are important to the votaries of the religion." Charles v. Verhagen, 220

F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

See Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2122-23. This view is supported by the language of the statute,

which defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)

(emphasis added).

As written, the policy then-in effect required that the religious items be "normally

used in the practice of the inmate's chosen religion." (PSOF, Ex. 7 at 14.) While even this

standard appears impermissibly high given RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise,"

Defendants required Plaintiff to show that the religious items he requested were "necessary"

to the practice of his religion, or were "tenet requirements" thereof. (PSOF, Ex. 15, 16.)

The policy as applied, in effect, prohibits the possession of non-essential religious

items. An obvious assumption of this policy is that as long as a religious item is nonessential, the denial of that item to an inmate cannot be substantially burdensome. That

assumption is wrong, given the RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise."

In sum, with regard to the issue of whether the procedure for obtaining religious items,

as it was applied to Plaintiff, was substantially burdensome, the Court concludes that genuine

issues of material fact remain. On one hand, there is evidence that Plaintiff refused to

provide the Unit Chaplain with the requested documentation at a meeting ordered by

Sabbagh for that specific purpose. On the other hand, Plaintiff appears to dispute the

existence of that meeting, and other than Sabbagh's response to an interrogatory propounded

by Plaintiff, there is no evidence that the meeting transpired. There is other evidence in

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Defendant also argues the applicable provisions of RLUIPA are unconstitutional, an

argument that is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Cutter. 125 S. Ct. at

2113 (upholding the constitutionality of provisions of RLUIPA pertaining to

institutionalized persons). 

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Plaintiff's favor: the fact that Defendants asked Plaintiff for a letter from his "religious

leadership" and then refused to accept it, and the fact that Defendants asked Plaintiff to

transmit the requisite documentation, when ADOC policy barred photocopying of religious

material.

The Court now turns to the issue of whether it would be a substantial burden to force

Plaintiff to practice his religion without the requested items. The Court finds that there are

questions of fact as to this issue as well, as there is insufficient evidence in the record to

conclude as a matter of law that depriving Plaintiff of these items would substantially burden

his ability to practice his religion.

Even assuming that Defendants' above-described actions do constitute a substantial

burden on Plaintiff's ability to exercise his religion, Defendants may still be entitled to

summary judgment if they can show that the burden they imposed was the "least restrictive

means" of furthering a "compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2);

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995.

This analysis is somewhat complicated by the fact that, as discussed above, the policy

concerning religious items does not appear to be problematic, only the way that the policy

was applied to Plaintiff. Even so, the Court concludes that there are material issues of fact

concerning the compelling interest that motivated Defendants' action vis-a-vis Plaintiff, as

well as whether their actions were the least restrictive means of achieving those interests.4

3. First Amendment - Free Exercise Clause

Prison inmates “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its

directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987) (citation omitted). Prison

regulations that impinge on an inmate’s constitutional rights will be upheld if they are

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reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107

S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987); Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2004). See

Haley v. R.J. Donovan Corr. Facility, 152 Fed. Appx. 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that

Turner is the proper test to apply in a First Amendment Free Exercise claim). Cf. Marria v.

Broaddus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (distinguishing the “less demanding

First Amendment analysis” from that required by the RLUIPA).

In Turner, the Supreme Court provided four considerations to help determine whether

a challenged regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests:

First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison

regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to

justify it. Second, whether there are alternative means of exercising

the right that remain open to prison inmates must be assessed. Third,

the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will

have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison

resources generally must be determined. Fourth, the absence of ready

alternatives to the regulation must be explored. The existence of

obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not

reasonable.

Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348, 107 S. Ct.

at 2401; Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S. Ct. at 2261) (some punctuation omitted)).

In the context of a free exercise claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s

actions substantially burdened his practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging

in conduct mandated by his faith, i.e., conduct which is central to the religion’s doctrine,

without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Freeman

v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S. Ct. at

2261-62); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995); Sutton v. Stewart, 22 F. Supp.

2d 1097, 1101-02 (D. Ariz. 1998).

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The Court concludes that there are material questions of fact concerning the aspects

of Plaintiff's free exercise claim related to the denial of the seven requested religious items.

First, while there is surely a legitimate penological interest in controlling which items an

inmate may possess under the rubric of "religious items," there is no legitimate penological

purpose for refusing to meet with an inmate so that he may provide requested documentation

concerning his requested religious items. There is also no legitimate penological purpose for

demanding that an inmate provide documentation from "religious leadership," then refusing

to accept it. As there are questions of fact about some of these issues, this factor favors

neither party.

Second, Plaintiff does appear to have alternative means available to practice his

religion other than through the use of the requested items. He is served a diet in accordance

with his religious beliefs, and he has the opportunity to meditate and to possess religious

books. This factor appears to weigh in favor of Defendants, though not strongly so.

Third, it is unclear what impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right

will have on the guards, inmates and allocation of prison resources. Defendants point to the

fact that allowing inmates to possess undocumented religious items would have negative

effects on prison operation and security. Maybe so, but the effect of, for example, allowing

the photocopying of religious materials so that they can be transmitted to prison chaplain

members in order to satisfy requests for supplemental documentation is less certain. This

factor favors neither party.

Fourth, the existence of ready alternatives is unknown to the Court. If a fact finder

were to conclude that the meeting between the Unit Chaplain and Plaintiff never occurred,

the obvious, easy solution to Plaintiff's concern would be to order a prison chaplain to meet

with him to obtain the documentation, or to allow inmates to have religious materials

photocopied when such materials are explicitly requested by members of the chaplaincy.

Another obvious solution would be to refrain from asking inmates for letters from their

religious leadership when such letters do not suffice on the issue of whether a particular item

is appropriate for possession given the inmate's declared religion. However, as there are

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questions of fact as to whether the meeting occurred between Plaintiff and the Unit Chaplain,

this factor favors neither party.

It is clear from the discussion of the Turner factors that neither side is entitled to

summary judgment on this issue. Both motions for summary judgment are therefore denied

in this regard.

Next, the aspects of Plaintiff's free exercise claim concerning the prohibition on

donations of religious items and the requirement that items be purchased in the inmate store

can be decided at the summary judgment stage. These policies impose no burden on an

inmate's ability to practice his religion, as they do not prohibit an inmate from possessing

particular religious items; they simply prescribe the method by which inmates obtain

religious items. The practice of controlling the sources from which inmates obtain their

property serves the valid penological goal of limiting the amount of contraband that enters

the prison.

C. Possession of Religious Books

1. RLUIPA

The issue is whether restricting inmates to possessing seven books in their cells at any

given moment imposes a "substantial burden" on the inmates' ability to practice their religion.

As a matter of law, the Court finds that there is no substantial burden. As discussed above,

the policy does not limit the number of books that an inmate may own, or, as far as the Court

is aware, keep in prison storage. The policy simply affects the number of books that may be

in the possession of an inmate in his cell at any moment. An inmate who has completed

study of a particular book can follow prison procedure for substituting that book for another

book in prison storage. There is no dispute that Plaintiff himself owns twenty books, and he

had made no contention that the process of having a book transferred from prison storage is

substantially burdensome. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this point.

2. First Amendment - Free Exercise Clause

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This is especially true where, as here, the prisoner seeks a veritable library full of

books. Plaintiff contends that his religion requires him to be well-versed in the following

subjects: "music, geometry, psychology, anthropology, archaeology, languages, folk-lore,

physiology, physics, philosophy, comparative religion, natural science, history, mathematics,

mythology, biology and the Hebrew and Greek alphabets." (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 4-5.)

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Plaintiff complains that the ADOC policy of permitting inmates to have only seven

books at a time in their cells violates his right to freely exercise his religion under the First

Amendment. Plaintiff's contention fails for several reasons.

First, even assuming that the books Plaintiff seeks are mandated by his religion, the

practice of limiting the number of books an inmate may keep in his cell at any given moment

to seven does not impinge on Plaintiff's ability to practice his religion. As discussed above,

the policy does not limit the number of books inmates may keep in prison storage and access

through proper procedure; the policy simply limits the number of books inmates may keep

in their cell at one time. (DSOF, Ex. B.)

Second, the restriction on the number of books an inmate may possess in his cell at

any given moment clearly serves valid penological purposes.5

 The overcrowding of cells

with inmates' property would have a negative impact on security and safety: random searches

of cells become more time-consuming, complex, and costly; friction between cellmates could

increase as small cells become cluttered with property; and fire code compliance becomes

more difficult. (DSOF, Ex. B.) 

No genuine issues of material fact remain on this issue, and summary judgment in

Defendants' favor is therefore appropriate.

D. Miscellaneous

Defendants argue that the action should be dismissed because they are entitled to

qualified immunity. This argument fails, as qualified immunity is not a defense to an action,

like the present one, that does not seek monetary damages. Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969

(9th Cir. 2004); AFTC Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's supplemental argument and authorities in

support of his motion for summary judgment is denied. The Court has given due

consideration to the issues raised in Plaintiff's supplemental papers.

Plaintiff also brings claims under provisions of the Arizona Constitution and under

A.R.S. § 41-1493.01, which is Arizona's version of RLUIPA. Defendants argue that these

claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file the required statutory notice of claim

(DSOF, Ex. E), which, in Arizona, requires that:

Persons who have claims against a public entity or a public employee

shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service

for the public entity or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules

of civil procedure within one hundred eighty days after the cause of

action accrues. The claim shall contain facts sufficient to permit the

public entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which

liability is claimed. The claim shall also contain a specific amount for

which the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.

Any claim which is not filed within one hundred eighty days after the

cause of action accrues is barred and no action may be maintained

thereon.

A.R.S. § 12-821.01. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to file the requisite notice of claim, nor does

he dispute that his claims are entirely against public employees. Instead, Plaintiff argues that

because he brought his claim in federal court, he is not required to file a notice of claim with

the state. (Pl.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 16.) Plaintiff is mistaken, as federal

courts applying state laws are obligated to apply notice of claim provisions, where, as here,

such provisions are outcome determinative. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151, 108 S. Ct.

2302, 2313 (1988) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938)).

Accordingly, all of Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

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Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. Defendants' motion

for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. With regard to the decision to

deny to Plaintiff the seven religious items that he requested, summary judgment is

inappropriate. Summary judgment is also inappropriate on Defendants' qualified immunity

argument. With regard to all other portions of Defendants' motion, they are entitled to

summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 84).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 90).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's

Supplemental Argument and Authorities (Doc. 105).

DATED this 13th day of January, 2006.

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