Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00119/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00119-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Monty Earl Garland, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 13-119-TUC-CRP

ORDER

Plaintiff has filed the instant action seeking review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Magistrate Judge has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 21; see also Defendant’s

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand (“Memorandum”) (Doc. 22)) which Plaintiff

opposes (Doc. 27). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion in part

to the extent that Defendant seeks remand for further proceedings and the Court grants

Defendant’s Motion in part to the extent that this matter is remanded for an immediate

calculation and award of benefits.

BACKGROUND

On April 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning on October 1, 2008 due to

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meningitis, a stroke, dizziness, headaches, anxiety, high blood pressure, and aphasia. (AR.

61-67, 80, 447-53). Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, after

which he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR. 32-37, 39-

42, 451, 455-62). Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert

testified at the hearing before the ALJ. (AR 472-515). On June 13, 2011, the ALJ issued a

decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR. 18-31). The Appeals Council

subsequently denied Plaintiff’s request for review (AR. 7-14), thereby rendering the ALJ’s

June 13, 2011 decision the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.

On the date of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff was 42 years old. (AR. 61). He has a high

school education and attended three years of college. (AR. 86). His past relevant work is

as a border patrol agent, police inspector, “clean up supervisor”, and security officer. (AR.

508).

The medical evidence reflects that in May 2008, Plaintiff was hospitalized for multiple

small infarcts (ischemic strokes) of the brain. (AR. 256-364). He subsequently developed

expressive aphasia. (See AR. 181). In September 2008, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital

for meningitis. (AR. 127; see also A.R. 131 (Plaintiff’s strokes were attributed to vasculitis

from meningitis)).

In July 2009, Michael D. Rabara, Psy.D., performed a consultative examination of

Plaintiff. (AR. 379-85). Upon testing, Dr. Rabara found that: Plaintiff scored in the low

average range of intelligence; verbal comprehension skills were in the low average range;

verbal concept formation and reasoning were below average; ability to acquire, retain and

retrieve general factual knowledge was below average; capacity to combine parts into wholes

on a visual-spatial construction task was low average; capacity to analyze and synthesize

abstract visual stimuli was below average; short term rote auditory memory was low average;

and “processing speed is borderline and is relative weakness.” (AR. 381-82). Dr. Rabara

also stated that “these WAIS-IV scales are most sensitive to brain damage, and suggest

[Plaintiff] has difficulty processing new raw information. His borderline general memory

score further suggests he [sic] ability to acquire new information is impaired.” (A.R. 383).

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Dr. Rabara diagnosed Cognitive Disorder NOS. (Id.). Dr. Rabara further concluded that

Plaintiff: can remember simple instructions, but may have mild to moderate difficulty

remembering detailed instructions and work like procedures; can carry out simple

instructions and make simple decisions, but he may have moderate difficulty carrying out

detailed instructions, sustaining his concentration, performing tasks within a schedule,

working in coordination with others, responding appropriately to work setting changes,

responding appropriately to supervisory criticism, and completing a normal workday at a

consistent pace; may have mild to moderate difficulty sustaining a routine without special

supervision; and may have mild difficulty interacting with the general public and getting

along with coworkers. (AR. 385).

On July 29, 2009, Larry Waldman, Ph.D., a non-examining state agency psychologist,

concluded that Plaintiff was “moderately limited” in nine out of 20 areas of understanding

and memory, sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction, persistence and

pace, and adaptation. (AR. 387-89). Dr. Waldman also indicated that Plaintiff had mild

problems with memory for procedures and moderate problems with memory for complex

directions; moderate problems implementing complex instructions, sustaining his attention,

working at a normal pace and with reliability; mild problems in dealing with the public and

moderate problems receiving criticism from supervisors; and moderate problems dealing with

job changes. (AR. 389). 

At the hearing, the VE testified that a hypothetical individual with the limitations

assigned by Dr. Rabara would not be able to perform any jobs. (AR. 512-13 (“someone who

had moderate difficulty in that many areas, particularly the areas of being able to complete

a normal workday without interruption....A person fitting that profile just is not going to be

able to sustain employment.”). 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: fatigue, nausea,

high blood pressure, post stroke, depression, anxiety, and panic attacks. (AR. 23). With

regard to Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Rabara’s

opinion, citing “the objectivity of the exam, and the consistency of [Dr. Rabara’s] opinions

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with the overall objective medical evidence of record.” (AR. 29). The ALJ also pointed out

that “Dr. Rabara’s conclusions are generally consistent with the State agency-reviewing

psychologist, Larry Waldman, Ph.D., who also assessed the claimant capable of simple, basic

work.” (Id.). The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform less than the full range of light

work, with limitations on climbing, balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling and handling.

(AR. 25). The ALJ also found that Plaintiff “can have occasional interaction with the public

and co-workers; with only occasional supervision; and is capable of simple, routine and

repetitive tasks.” (Id.). Citing VE testimony that did not take into account the limitations

imposed by Dr. Rabara, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to return to past work,

but he could perform other work such as a small product assembler and packing line worker.

(AR. 29-31). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR. 31).

STANDARD

The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g); see also

Garrison v. Colvin, __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 3397218, *19 (9th Cir. July 14, 2014).

DISCUSSION

Defendant concedes that absent from the ALJ’s decision is any discussion of the VE

testimony that a person falling within the limitations assessed by Dr. Rabara would not be

able to sustain employment. (Memorandum (Doc. 22), p. 4). Although Defendant agrees

that the ALJ’s error resulted in a decision that “is not supported by substantial evidence or

free of legal error, she disagrees that the appropriate remedy is reversal for payment of

benefits.” (Id. at pp. 5-6). According to Defendant, “[t]he Court should not ‘credit-as-true’

any of the evidence, but should instead remand for further proceedings.” (Id. at p. 6).

Defendant contends that the credit-as-true rule is inconsistent with the Social Security Act.

Further according to Defendant, “[j]ust because an ALJ has failed to articulate legally

sufficient reasons for his rejecting certain medical opinions does not mean that no such

reasons exist or that substantial evidence does not exist in the administrative record to

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support the denial.” (Id. at pp. 6-7). However, as Plaintiff points out, Defendant does not

assert that Dr. Rabara’s assessment is in any way insufficient. (Response, p. 6). Moreover,

the ALJ herself accorded “great weight” to Dr. Rabara’s opinion specifically finding that his

opinion was consistent with the overall objective medical evidence of record. (AR. 29). 

To reject the opinion of an examining doctor, when contradicted by another doctor,

the ALJ must state specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d. 821, 830-831 (9th Cir. 1996) (this standard also

applies when the ALJ rejects opinions from the examining physician in favor of the

nonexamining physician). Moreover, “‘[t]he opinion of a nonexamining physician [like Dr.

Waldman] cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the

opinion of either an examining or a treating physician.’” Ryan v. Commissioner of Social

Security, 528 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 831) (emphasis in

original). The ALJ set forth no reasons to reject Dr. Rabara’s opinion. Instead, she gave Dr.

Rabara’s opinion great weight and specifically found that his opinion was based upon an

objective examination and was consistent “with the overall objective medial evidence of

record.” (AR. 29). It is well-settled that “[w]here the Commissioner fails to provide

adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion of a treating or examining physician, we credit that

opinion as a matter of law.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (citation omitted); Hammock v. Bowen,

879 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying credit-as-true rule to medical opinion evidence). See

also Garrison, __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 3397281, *19-*22 (9th Cir. July 14, 2014) (reaffirming

the credit-as-true rule).

Further, although Defendant argues that the credit-as-true rule is not authorized under

the Social Security Act, the Ninth Circuit recently acknowledged out that “[t]he Social

Security Act...makes clear that courts are empowered to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision

with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.’ 42 U.S.C. §405(g)....Accordingly,

every Court of appeals has recognized that in appropriate circumstances courts are free to

reverse and remand a determination by the Commissioner with instructions to calculate and

award benefits.” Garrison, __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 3397281, at *19 (emphasis in original)

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1

Defendant argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d

871 (9th Cir. 2003) supports the conclusion that remand for benefits is not always appropriate

because that court remanded for further proceedings even though it determined that the ALJ’s

reasons for rejecting the claimant’s subjective evidence were legally insufficient.

(Memorandum, p. 7). Connett held that remand for further proceedings was appropriate

because “there are insufficient findings as to whether [the plaintiff’s] testimony should be

credited as true....” Connett, 340 F.3d at 874. The Ninth Circuit has since reconciled Connett

with cases “stat[ing] or impl[ying] that it would be an abuse of discretion for a district court

not to remand for an award of benefits when all of...[the] conditions [of the three-factor test]

are met[]” by explaining that “Connett allows flexibility to remand for further proceedings

when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact,

disabled.....” Garrison, __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 3397218 at *21. 

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(citations omitted) (providing history and rationale supporting remand for award of benefits

where evidence is credited as true). 

“Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the

record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593, (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)). Conversely, remand for an award of

benefits is appropriate where:

 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings

would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or

medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited

as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3397218 at *20 (footnote and citations omitted); see also 

Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593(citations omitted). The Garrison court also noted that the third

factor “naturally incorporates what we have sometimes described as a distinct requirement

of the credit-as-true rule, namely that there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved

before a determination of disability can be made.” Id. at *20 n. 26 (citing Smolen v. Chater,

80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (1996)). Thus, where the test is met, the Ninth Circuit“take[s] the

relevant testimony to be established as true and remand[s] for an award of benefits[,]"

Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593 (citations omitted), unless “the record as a whole creates serious

doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled with the meaning of the Social Security

Act.”1

 Garrison, __ F.3d. __, 2014 WL 3397281 at *21 (citations omitted).

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 Here, remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate. The record has been

fully developed and remand for further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose. The ALJ has accorded Dr. Rabara’s opinion great weight and found his opinion

was consistent with the overall objective medical evidence of record. (AR. 29). Moreover,

the ALJ did not set forth any reason to discount the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical

person in Plaintiff’s position who was subject to the limitations imposed by Dr. Rabara

would be precluded from working. See e.g. Garrison, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3397218 at *22

n. 28 (where the VE answered that a person with the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) would be unable to work, “we can conclude that [the plaintiff] is disabled without

remanding for further proceedings to determine anew her RFC.”). Whether this Court

credits Dr. Rabara’s opinion as true, or merely gives Dr. Rabara’s opinion the “great weight”

that the ALJ herself accorded it, the result is the same–that Plaintiff is disabled under the Act.

Nor, considering the record as a whole, is there reason for serious doubt as to whether

Plaintiff is disabled. Defendant argues that none of Plaintiff’s treating physicians assessed

limitations or stated he was disabled. However, Defendant does not point to opinions or

other assessments by treating physicians which would contradict Dr. Rabara’s findings.

Moreover, the ALJ considered the fact that there were no opinions from treating physicians

of record suggesting that Plaintiff was precluded from all work, nor were any work

restrictions imposed. (AR. 28-29). Nonetheless, the ALJ recognized Dr. Rabara’s findings

(AR. 28), and gave them great weight “[g]iven the objectivity of the exam, and the

consistency of these opinions with the overall objective medical evidence of record....” (AR.

29). Further, Defendant cites no reason why the ALJ would discount Dr. Rabara’s

assessment or the limitations he imposed. This is not a case where the ALJ failed to state

reasons for rejecting a doctor’s opinion. Instead, the ALJ found Dr. Rabara’s opinion was

consistent with the record. Defendant’s attempt to unravel the ALJ’s opinion is thwarted by

the ALJ’s specific findings on the instant record according great weight to Dr. Rabara’s

opinion.

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Defendant also argues that although Plaintiff claimed to be debilitated by difficulty

concentrating and completing tasks, he was able to do housework and yard work, shop, look

for a job, attend to personal hygiene and grooming, dress, prepare his meals, run errands, and

care for his pet dog. (Memorandum, p. 7). However, the Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly

asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities such as

grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract

from her credibility as to her overall disability. One does not need to be 'utterly

incapacitated' in order to be disabled." Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Vick v.

Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 57 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1086 (D. Or. 1999) ("If claimant's activity

is in harmony with her disability, the activity does not necessarily indicate an ability to

work.") “Engaging in activities, including household chores, is not necessarily inconsistent

with a finding of disability.” Vick, 57 F.Supp.2d at 1085. Plaintiff persuasively cites the

Honorable Richard Posner on this point:

The critical differences between activities of daily living and activities in a

full-time job are that a person has more flexibility in scheduling the former

than the latter, can get help from other persons..., and is not held to a minimum

standard of performance, as she would be by an employer. The failure to

recognize these differences is a recurrent, and deplorable, feature of opinions

by administrative law judges in social security disability cases.

(Response, p. 12 (quoting Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2011)). This

observation is consistent with Vertigan. Moreover, in the instant case, Plaintiff’s ability to

engage in the activities identified by Defendant do not negate Plaintiff’s claims of inability

to concentrate or other limitations found by Dr. Rabara. 

CONCLUSION

The record is fully developed: the VE testified that a person with the limitations

assessed by Dr. Rabara would not be able to sustain employment; the ALJ accorded Dr.

Rabara’s opinion great weight and did not discount his assessed limitations or the VE’s

testimony regarding the impact of such limitations; and Defendant concedes that the ALJ’s

error resulted in an erroneous decision. Nor is there serious doubt about whether Plaintiff

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is disabled given the VE’s testimony that a person with the limitations assessed by Dr.

Rabara would be precluded from working and given that the record as a whole does not

suggest otherwise. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 21) is DENIED IN

PART and GRANTED IN PART. The Motion is DENIED to the extent that Defendant

requests remand for further administrative proceedings. The Motion is GRANTED to the

extent that this action is REMANDED to the Commissioner for calculation and award of

benefits. 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly and to close its file

in this matter. 

DATED this 11th day of August, 2014.

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