Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02657/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02657-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COACHELLA VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

CHULA VISTA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

ALISAL UNION ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

TERRA BELLA UNION ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, PAJARO VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, OXNARD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, HAWTHORNE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

HAYWARD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,

SALINAS UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,

CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION FOR BILINGUAL

EDUCATION, CALIFORNIANS TOGETHER,

CALIFORNIA LEAGUE OF UNIFIED LATIN AMERICAN

CITIZENS, IVETTE ZAVALA, MELISSA ZAVALA, a

Minor, by IVETTE ZAVALA, her Guardian Ad Litem, LUIS

OCHOA, JAMILET OCHOA, by LUIS OCHOA, her

Guardian Ad Litem,

Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER, in his official capacity as Governor of

the State of California, CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD

OF EDUCATION, RUTH E. GREEN, GLEE JOHNSON,

ALAN BERSIN, RUTH BLOOM, YVONNE CHAN,

DONALD G. FISHER, KENNETH NOONAN, JOE NUNEZ,

BONNIE REISS, JONATHAN WILLIAMS, in their official

capacities as members of the Board of Education, JACK

O’CONNELL, in his official capacity as State Superintendent

of Public Instruction, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

EDUCATION, and DOES 1 through 30, inclusive,

Respondents/Defendants. /

No. C 05-02657 WHA

ORDER

(1) REMANDING CASE;

(2) FINDING MOTION

TO INTERVENE MOOT;

AND (3) VACATING

HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this education-rights action brought under California state law, plaintiffs move to

remand this case to the Superior Court of San Francisco due to lack of subject-matter
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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jurisdiction. Because the complaint does not raise a substantial issue of federal law, there was

no basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). Accordingly, this order GRANTS plaintiffs’

motion to remand the action.

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs are various public school districts, non-profit organizations, students and

parents challenging California’s failure to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act

(“NCLBA”)(20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.) with respect to students who are not yet proficient in

English. Defendants are collectively responsible for implementing education policies in

compliance with the NCLBA for California public schools.

The NCLBA is a comprehensive educational-reform statute enacted “to ensure that all

children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and

reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards and

state academic assessments.” 20 U.S.C. 6301. In furtherance of this goal, each state is required

to implement “a set of high-quality, yearly student academic assessments that include, at a

minimum, academic assessments in mathematics, reading or language arts, and science that will

be used as the primary means of determining the yearly performance” of schools within the

state. 20 U.S.C 6311(b)(3)(A). For students learning English as a second language, annual

assessments of English proficiency is also required. 20 U.S.C. 6311(b)(7). The NCLBA

specifically provides that “limited English proficient students . . . shall be assessed in a valid

and reliable manner and provided reasonable accommodations on assessments . . . including, to

the extent practicable, assessments in the language and form most likely to yield accurate data

on what such students know and can do in academic content areas, until such students have

achieved English language proficiency.” 20 U.S.C. 6311(b)(3)(C)(ix)(III). Academic

assessments in another language (other than English) are expressly permitted, although it is

presumed that students will develop English competency within three to five years. 20 U.S.C.

6311(b)(3)(C)(x).

Plaintiffs challenge defendants’ alleged refusal to provide reasonable accommodations

on assessments of students with limited English proficiency. In particular, plaintiffs argue that
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For the Northern District of California

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California, unlike fourteen other states, refuses to utilize a Spanish-language test or a

modified-English test which reduces unnecessary linguistic complexity (Br. 2). The complaint,

filed on June 1, 2005, (1) seeks a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 1085 to compel defendants to implement “valid and reliable” testing of students with limited

English proficiency; (2) alleges illegal expenditures of taxpayers’ funds in violation of

California Code of Civil Procedure § 526(a); (3) alleges a violation of plaintiffs’ right to

education under the California Constitution; and (4) seeks declaratory relief. This action was

removed by defendants on June 29, 2005. Plaintiffs now move for remand.

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD.

Removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) is permitted for actions involving a federal question

over which the district court would have had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. 

The removing party always bears the burden of establishing removal is proper. Emrich v.

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1990).

The “well-pleaded complaint rule” provides that federal jurisdiction only exists when a

federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint, unaided by

the answer or by the petition for removal. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109,

113 (1936)(further noting that the federal issue must not be “merely a possible or conjectural

one”). A federal defense, even if anticipated, is not part of a plaintiff’s cause of action. Rivet v.

Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998). This rule thus enables the plaintiff, as “master of the

complaint,” to have his action heard in state court “by eschewing claims based on federal law.” 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 385, 399 (1987).

Subject-matter jurisdiction clearly exists where federal law creates the cause of action. 

Where the plaintiff only asserts causes of action under state law, the case may nonetheless be

deemed to “arise under” federal law “where the vindication of a right under state law

necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.

Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). The mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of

action, however, does not automatically raise a federal question. Id. at 813. Indeed, the
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For the Northern District of California

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Supreme Court has explicitly found that “a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as

an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no

private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim ‘arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.’” Id. at 817. In other words, “if a federal

law does not provide a private right of action, then a state law action based on its violation

perforce does not raise a ‘substantial’ federal question.” Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d

1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1987).

2. PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT RAISES NO FEDERAL QUESTION.

There is no dispute that the complaint only alleges causes of action under California law. 

The issue, then, is whether this action nonetheless “arises under” federal law. In essence,

defendants argue that “one of the substantial federal questions posed by this case” is whether

the NCLBA creates a private cause of action, although defendants insist there is none (Opp. 11). 

The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. At least two other district courts, however,

have held that it does not. Ass’n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. New York City Dep’t

of Educ., 269 F. Supp.2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Fresh Start Academy v. Toledo Bd. of Educ.,

363 F. Supp.2d 910 (N.D. Ohio 2005). This Court agrees. Indeed, at the case management

conference, plaintiffs were willing to stipulate that they did not have a private cause of action

under the NCLBA. We thus have the curious situation in which everyone in this action agrees

that there is no private right of action under this statute. It would seem that defendants have

manufactured an issue out of thin air in a vain effort to bootstrap their own issues into federal

court. Plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants have failed to comply with the NCLBA do not

raise a substantial federal question. Utley, 811 F.2d at 1283.

Nor do plaintiffs appear to be challenging the validity or construction of the NCLBA

itself. Defendants argue that the Court should construe 20 U.S.C. 6311(b)(3)(C)(ix)(III)

because it “will be totally outcome determinative” (Opp. 7). Because subject-matter

jurisdiction is lacking, however, the undersigned declines to engage in any substantive

interpretation of the NCLBA. This case must be remanded. In any event, it may very well be,

as defendants argue, that California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 cannot create a right (but
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For the Northern District of California

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can only be used to enforce one), such that if plaintiffs have no private right of action under the

NCLBA, their first cause of action necessarily fails (Opp. 10). But this is for the state court to

decide.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED. This action is

immediately REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco. 

In light of this ruling, the pending motion to intervene is RENDERED MOOT. The hearing on

these two motions, currently scheduled for AUGUST 18, 2005 AT 8:00 A.M., is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2005 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE