Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_12-cv-03492/USCOURTS-alnd-7_12-cv-03492-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

DARYL ARCHIBALD,

Plaintiff;

vs.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO

INC., et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

7:12-cv-03492-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Plaintiff Daryl Archibald (“Archibald”) brought this civilrights action against

Defendants United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) and Jaime Diaz (“Diaz”), alleging

various types ofracially discriminatory and retaliatory conduct in violation ofTitle VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 et seq. (“Title VII”), and 42

U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”). Specifically, Archibald contends that UPS and Diaz

(collectively, the “Defendants”) made a series of decisions to either discipline him or

passhim over for various assignments that constitute racial discrimination, retaliation,

and harassment. Both UPS and Diaz have moved for summary judgment on all claims

against them (Doc. 23), and in addition to opposing summary judgment, Archibald has

Page 1 of 43

FILED

 2014 Jul-15 PM 02:51

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 1 of 43
filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 27.) For the reasons

stated below, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgmentis due to be granted, and

Archibald’s motion for leave to amend is due to be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

1

A. Employment History

UPS hired Archibald on January 3, 2005, to work at its package center in

Tuscaloosa, Alabama (the “Package Center”). Initially, he worked as a preloader, a

part-time, hourly position where employees load packages onto UPS package cars in 2

the early morning hours. Archibald’s general preload schedule required him to work

from 3:00 AM until 8:30 or 9:00 AM, though the start time varied with the volume of

the load at the Package Center. 

Some time after he started as a preloader, Archibald sought work as a temporary

cover driver (“TCD”) for UPS. Although UPS package cars were regularly driven by

Archibald failed to include a statement responding to any of the Defendants’ undisputed 1 

facts, in numbered paragraphs or otherwise. Additionally, he failed to include his own statement of

disputed or undisputed facts in a discrete section of his brief and instead dispersed various facts

throughout his brief opposing summary judgment. As such, Archibald did not comply with the

Uniform Initial Order the Court entered in this case on February 7, 2013. (Doc. 12 at 16–17.) When

a party fails to properly address another party’s statement of facts, the Court may treat these facts

as undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The Court thus accepts the Defendants’ statement of

material facts, but it has also reviewed the Plaintiff’s various factual statements placed throughout

his brief and notes that they are generally consistent with the Defendants’ facts. 

The “package car” is the brown delivery truck that UPS uses to make local deliveries. 2 

Page 2 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 2 of 43
full-time package car drivers, the TCDs received the same training and certification

as package car drivers, were subject to the same rules, and filled in for package car

drivers when they were absent. In order to become a TCD, Archibald bid for the

position, and after he was selected in October 2010 he attended UPS’s five-day driver

training course.Nick Spain, Jacob Mathis (“Mathis”), and Matthew Syx (“Syx”) also

attended the training course from the Package Center at the same time as Archibald.

Upon returning from the course, Archibald, like all other drivers, was required to

deliver ground packages for 30 days over a 120-day period to qualify as a driver.

During this period, he had to avoid any accidents or injuries and pass a “qualification

ride.” Archibald ultimately completed these requirements and was qualified as a

driver. Among the drivers who attended driving school on this occasion, Archibald

qualified first. 

Once Archibald was qualified as a TCD, he could be dispatched to drive a

package car as needed.However, Archibald continued to work primarily as a preloader

for UPS. After several years of working as a preloader and TCD, Archibald was

promoted to a full-time position as a package car driver in March 2013, and he

continues to hold that position at UPS.

B. Purported Wrongful Conduct

Page 3 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 3 of 43
At all times throughout his employment, Archibald has been a member of the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Teamsters”) union, and the terms and

conditions of his employment have been governed by a collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”) between UPS and Teamsters. Both parties admit that Archibald

has filed a large number of grievances under the CBA against UPS. Archibald asserts

that many of these issues stem from his difficult relationship with Diaz, who began

working as the Package Center’s business manager in May 2010, and he claims that

many ofthese issues have improved since Diaz left the Package Center in March 2014.

Archibald contends that the inappropriate conduct began after he expressed

interest in becoming a TCD and continued as he sought to become a package car

driver. First, he notes that he was required to memorize and was regularly quizzed at

work on UPS’s “5 Seeing Habits” and “10 Point Commentary” describing proper

driving procedures before attending driving school. UPS claims that Diaz and others

at the Package Center quizzed Archibald so that he could pass the written and verbal

tests at driving school, but Archibald contends that other prospective drivers were not

required to memorize these documents before attending the school. 

After he began to work as a TCD, Archibald indicates that he was passed over

for driving routes in favor of less senior TCDs. In response to these assignments,

Page 4 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 4 of 43
Archibald filed several grievances based on purported violations of seniority. On

October 3, 2011, Archibald filed a grievance complaining about TCD work

assignments. UPS ultimately resolved the grievance by paying him for five days of

time that he allegedly missed and agreeing to abide by the rules ofseniority in making

driving decisions. Subsequently, Archibald filed additional grievances regarding TCD

assignments, each based on a single day, on March 4, 2012, July 6, 2012, and

September 18, 2012. UPS compensated Archibald for the March and September

grievances, but the July grievance was resolved in UPS’s favor. Each grievance

contains a section where the employee should list the article or articles of the CBA

that UPS allegedly violated. Although Archibald included both the articles for

nondiscrimination and seniority in his October 2011 grievance, he only referenced the

article pertaining to seniority in his other grievances. 

Archibald now claims that UPS made TCD assignments on the basis of race.

However, UPS indicates that it selected drivers based on non-discriminatory factors.

For example, UPS stated that it sometimes chose drivers over Archibald based on the

driver’s route knowledge. In other cases, UPS needed to assign a driver so that he

could be qualified as a TCD. Finally, UPS noted that it was often difficult to schedule

Archibald due to his primary job as a preloader. Only one other TCD, Syx, worked

Page 5 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 5 of 43
primarily as a preloader. Both UPS and Department of Transportation (“DOT”)

Regulations prohibit drivers from working over 12 consecutive hours. Because 3

Archibald had to show up early in the morning for the preload, UPS would often not

know that a route was open until Archibald would be ineligible due to these

restrictions. 

Regarding TCD assignments, Archibald also complains that UPS employees

would often call him early in the morning to notify him about available TCD

assignments. He claims that this disrupted his sleep and work schedules. However,

UPS contends that the calls were merely a courtesy to maximize the number of driving

opportunities available to Archibald.

Additionally, Archibald was not promoted to the full-time position of package

car driver until 2013. He now claims that he should have been promoted in August

2010, when UPS promoted Jared Courington (“Courington”) and Kenny Jemison

(“Jemison”) to package car driving positions. Courington is white, but Jemison is

African-American. Archibald contends that he also bid for this position along with the

TCD position and that he should have been entitled to Courington’s promotion. 

Finally, Archibald complains about various forms of discipline and observation

It appears from the record that the DOT regulations prohibit 14 hours, and the UPS rules 3 

prohibit driving after 12 hours. 

Page 6 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 6 of 43
that he received throughout his employmentwith UPS. According to Archibald, Diaz 4

singled him out for discipline for violating UPS’s appearance policies. Specifically,

Diaz disciplined Archibald on various occasions for having a visible tattoo outside his

uniform or when he had his hair in braids that went below his collar. Although he

received notices evincing intent to suspend or discharge him on various occasions, all

but one of these notices were ultimately reduced to warnings. Additionally, Archibald

suggests that he was excessively observed on routes and written up for driving and

delivery methods violations. He also claims that UPS singled him out for violations of

its attendance policies. Archibald was disciplined on multiple occasions and was

ultimately suspended for one day in February 2012 due to his attendance. This oneday suspension for attendance issues was the only suspension that Archibald actually

received for disciplinary reasons.5

It is unclear from the record exactly when and to what extent Archibald received discipline 4 

for these various issues. For example, the Defendants indicate that Archibald received warnings for

appearance issues in November 2011, December 2011,April 2012, and July 2012, whereas Archibald

notes generally throughout his brief that he was repeatedly disciplined for these types of issues.

Given that Archibald neither responded to the Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts nor

prepared his own statement of undisputed facts in clearly numbered paragraphs, it is difficult to

ascertainwhen particular disciplinary actions occurred. For summary judgment purposes,the Court

accepts that Archibald was disciplined on multiple occasions throughout the period in question for

these categories of violations. 

There are several other incidents discussed in Archibald’s deposition that have been 5 

abandoned. First, Archibald referenced difficulty using UPS-issued cards that drivers used to

purchase fuel when necessary for their package car. (Doc. 25-1 at 397–99.) Additionally, he 

referenced an occasion where he was sent home from work for not having his shoes properly shined

Page 7 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 7 of 43
Along with his informal grievances, Archibald filed two charges with the Equal

Opportunity EmploymentCommission (“EEOC”). First, he filed a charge in October

2011, complaining that UPS discriminated on the basis of race when assigning TCD

opportunities from April 2011 through October 2011. He both sought and received a

right to sue letter regarding this charge in July 2012. Second, Archibald filed another

charge in August 2012 complaining about manyofthe disciplinary practices described

above. Archibald again requested and received a right to sue letter in May 2013. He

claims that the conduct described above also constitutes retaliation for filing these

charges. 

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After receiving the first right to sue letter from the EEOC but before obtaining

the second, Archibald filed suit in this Court on September 29, 2012. Upon

6

completion of discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on April 17,

but was subsequently called back when another driver was sent home. (Id. at 370–71.) Archibald also

alluded at his deposition to other instances where Diaz or another supervisor discussed a potential

disciplinary issue with him informally but never formally disciplined him. Even though UPS

referenced the gas card issue in its brief supporting summary judgment, Archibald has not made any

arguments regarding these issues in his brief opposing summary judgment. Thus, the Court

considers any arguments based on these incidents abandoned. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana

Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to brief and argue [an]

issue during the proceedings before the district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been

abandoned.”). 

Archibald never filed an amended complaint after receiving the second right to sue letter.

6 

Page 8 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 8 of 43
2014. Both parties agree that Archibald seeks recovery on theories of racial

discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and § 1981, but they disagree as to

whether Archibald has pursued a hostile work environment claim. This Court has

federal question jurisdiction over all claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the

outcome ofthe suit under the governing law.”Anderson v.Liberty Lobby,Inc., 477U.S.

242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986);see alsoAvenue CLO Fund, Ltd. v.Bank of Am.,

NA, 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). There is a “genuine dispute” as to a

material fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510. The trial judge

should not weigh the evidence but must simply determine whether there are any

genuine issues that should be resolved at trial. Id. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511.

In considering amotion for summary judgment, trial courts must give deference

to the non-moving party by “considering all of the evidence and the inferences it may

yield in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender

Page 9 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 9 of 43
Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d

1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)). However, “unsubstantiated assertions alone are not

enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833

F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the

moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the

nonmoving party’s case.” McGee, 719 F.3d at 1242.Although the trial courts must use

caution when granting motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment

procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as

an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole.”Celotex Corp. v.Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

327, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Racial Discrimination

Archibald claims that Diaz and UPS treated him differently from similarly

situated white employees and thus has brought disparate treatment racial

discrimination claims under both Title VII and § 1981. See Powers v. Ala. Dep’t of

Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988) (describing the difference between

disparate treatment and disparate impact claims and emphasizing that disparate

Page 10 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 10 of 43
treatment claims implicate both § 1981 and Title VII). Although Archibald’s

discrimination claims were brought under both Title VII and § 1981, “[b]oth of these

statutes have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework.”

Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, except

7

where otherwise indicated, the Court considers both the Title VII and § 1981 claims

under the common framework without distinguishing between the two. See id.

“A plaintiff may establish a claim of illegal disparate treatment through either

direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d

1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). However, “‘direct evidence is composed of only the most

blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis

of some impermissible factor.’” Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir.

2002) (quoting Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999)). In its

motion for summary judgment, the Defendants stated that Archibald’s race

discrimination claims are based only on circumstantial evidence. (Doc. 24 at 24.)

Archibald’s complaint could be read to allege a Title VII claim against both UPS and Diaz 7

in his individual capacity as Archibald’s supervisor. Diaz contends in his brief that Archibald cannot

recover against him in an individual capacity under Title VII. (Doc. 24 at 24 n.1.) The Eleventh

Circuit has established “that relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and not

against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act, regardless of

whether the employer is a public company or a private company.” Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931,

933 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). Insofar as Archibald attempts to bring Title VII claims

against Diaz in his individual capacity, summary judgment is due to be granted as to such claims. 

Page 11 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 11 of 43
Although Archibald’s responsive brief opposing summary judgment makes several

cursory statements about “direct evidence,” it is clear to the Court that he is basing

his claims on circumstantial evidence.8

Where, as here, “a plaintiff attempts to prove intentional discrimination . . .

using circumstantial evidence, [the Court applies] the now familiar shifting burden

framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.Green, 411

U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).” Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d

at 1267. First, the plaintiff must generally establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. Id.Ifthe plaintiff can meet this burden, an inference of discrimination 9

In a section entitled “Plaintiff’s Grievances,” Archibald claims that “[w]hile working at

8 

UPS, as direct evidence of the constant and continuous harassment, Plaintiff has had to file . . . an

unnecessary amount of grievances to deter and correct the alleged violations.” (Doc. 29 at 5.)

However, he makes no attempt to explain how this constitutes “evidence which, if believed, would

prove the existence of a fact without inference or presumption.” Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d

578, 581–82 (11th Cir. 1989). 

In some cases, a plaintiff may be able to establish an inference of discrimination without 9

satisfying the prima facie case. Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.

2012). Archibald claims at the conclusion of his brief that “[t]he constellation of events and the

evidence presented by Plaintiff in this case is sufficient to survive [summary judgment].” (Doc. 29

at 19.) However, this portion of his brief contains no citations to evidence in the record, and he

makes no attempt to explain how he can establish an inference of racial discrimination without

satisfying the prima facie case. Cf. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011)

(finding that there was circumstantial evidence of discrimination even if the prima facie case was not

satisfied because the plaintiff presented evidence of a significant investigation into other

discriminatory conduct that may have affected the employer’s willingness to terminate employees

for inappropriate conduct).Archibald’s unsubstantiated assertion that the conduct in this case allows

an inference of racial discrimination without establishing the prima facie case, without more, is

Page 12 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 12 of 43
arises thattheDefendant must refute by articulating “a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its action.” Id. The Defendant’s burden at this stage is light, as “[t]he

employer has a burden of production, not of persuasion, and thus does not have to

persuade a court that it was actually motivated by the reason advanced.” Hall v. Ala.

Assoc. of Sch. Bds., 326 F.3d 1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2003). If the employer can articulate

a legitimate reason, “then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

proffered reason is really pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Schoenfeld, 168 F.3d

at 1267. Upon reaching this stage of the analysis, the Plaintiff must show both that the

employer’s reason for the employment action is false and that discrimination is the

real reasonbehind the employment action. Springer v.Convergys CustomerMgmt. Grp.,

509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007). 

i. Failure to Promote

Archibald claims that UPS violated Title VII and § 1981 and Diaz violated §

1981 when they promoted Courington and Jemison to package car driver positions in

August 2010. In order to support a failure to promote claim, the plaintiff generally

must present circumstantial evidence to support the prima facie case of the McDonnell

insufficient to survive summary judgment. See Rollins, 833F.2d at 1529. Indeed, the record evidence

indicates that Archibald has premised his racial discrimination claims on comparisons to similarly

situated white employees. 

Page 13 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 13 of 43
Douglas framework: “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified and

applied for the position at issue, (3) was rejected, and (4) the position was filled by a

person outside the protected class.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d

955, 973 n.41 (11th Cir. 2008). As to the prima facie case, the Defendants apparently

concede that Archibald was a member of a protected class, that he was both qualified

and applied for the promotion, and that he was rejected. However, the Defendants 10

contend that he failed to show that the position was filled by a person outside the

protected class.

UPS had two package car driving positions open in August 2010, and it selected

Courington and Jemison for the positions. It is undisputed for purposes of summary

judgment that Courington is white but Jemison is African-American. UPS decided to

promote the two drivers at the same time, but the Defendants technically promoted

Courington on August 26, 2010, and Jemison on August 27, 2010. Diaz testified that

he proposed the different dates in order to prevent two drivers from having the same

seniority date and causing “confusion when we do vacation selections and annual

bids.” (Doc. 25-3 at 135–36.) 

There is some ambiguity in the record as to whether Archibald’s name was on the bid sheet 10

for the promotion, but the Defendants have not raised this issue. However, the Defendants have

raised several other issues, including that this claimwas never properly pleaded in the complaint and

that it is time-barred. Since the Court concludes that the Defendants are entitled to prevail on the

merits of the claim, it does not reach these additional issues. 

Page 14 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 14 of 43
It is undisputed that the proper order of seniority, from greatest to least, was

Archibald, Courington, and Jemison. Even if UPS had promoted Archibald, the 11

Defendants claim that UPSwould still have promoted Courington. Thus, they suggest

that Jemison was the only driver actually “promoted over” Archibald, and both of

these individuals were members of the same protected class. 

Here, the Court gives Archibald the benefit of the doubt that the trier of fact

could conclude that Courington is the proper comparator. Diaz admitted at his

deposition that he promoted Courington first to provide him with additional benefits

as a result of his seniority. Moreover, Diaz testified that seniority was the only relevant

consideration in making the promotions, and thus Courington is a similarly-situated

but less senior employee outside the protected class. See Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of

Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that comparators must be

“‘similarly situated in all relevant respects’” (quoting Holifield v.Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,

1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). The fact finder could conclude that Courington was promoted

over Archibald so that he could have superior benefits to the other African-American

driver, Jemison. Cf. McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting

At his deposition, Diaz testified ambiguously that “Daryl is senior and then Kenny and

11 

then Daryl.” (Doc. 25-3 at 110.) However, the Defendants attached an errata sheet at the end of the

deposition that makes clear that the order of seniority was Archibald, Courington, and Jemison.

Page 15 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 15 of 43
that the plaintiff could not make out a failure to promote claim because “[t]he only

evidence presented . . . demonstrates that the two candidates promoted were black”).

However, even if he satisfies the prima facie case, Archibald’s claim still fails,

as the Defendants have identified a non-pretextual reason for the promotions that

Archibald has failed to rebut. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564–65 (noting that the

defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employment

action but indicating that upon doing so the plaintiff must show that discrimination

was the real reason for the action). According to the Defendants, Diaz promoted

Courington and Jemison because the UPS human resources (“HR”) department

informed him that they were next in line to become package car drivers. Diaz indicated

that he was unable to review the bid sheet from which they were selected, had no

reason to question whether Courington and Jemison were the appropriate candidates,

and was unaware of the issue until Archibald filed a grievance in January 2013, over

two years after the promotions. (Doc. 25-4 at 15–16 ¶ 26.) 

Essentially, the Defendants’ non-discriminatory reason for the promotions is

that someone at UPS erred in calculating Archibald’s seniority. See McWilliams v.

Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The employer need not

persaude the district court that it was actually motivated by the reasons advanced,

Page 16 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 16 of 43
because the employer bears only the burden of production, not the burden of

persuasion.”). Diaz elaborated at his deposition that Archibald’s “seniority is not

where it should be [, but] [i]f he had sought remedy, we could have made him whole.

We would have dovetailed him in ahead of Courington and Jared, and he would have

been given 30 days to qualify as a driver then.” (Doc. 25-3 at 137.) A mistaken belief 12

can be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an employment action because even

a false reason for taking an action places the burden on the plaintiff to show that

race was the real reason for the employment action. See Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch.

Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Even if we believed, as the district court

did, that the Board was not bound by an old agreement . . . , that would only establish

the Board was mistaken, and an employer who treats two employees differently

because of a mistaken belief in the existence of a neutral reason does not violate Title

VII.”).

Archibald, in a section of his brief opposing summary judgment entitled

“Defendants’ Defense as a Pretext,” attempts to rebut the Defendants’ purportedly

neutral justification for the promotion. First, he points to a statement from K.J.

The use of the name “Jared” appears to be an error. It appears from the context that this 12 

statement is referring to Courington and Jemison. Either way the import is clear— Archibald would

have been given the first opportunity for the job. 

Page 17 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 17 of 43
Johnson(“Johnson”), a fellow UPSemployee, but Johnson’s statement only indicates

that he did not assign any employees full-time positions over Archibald. (Doc. 29-1 at

1.) He neither indicates who did make such decisions nor that any individuals who

played a part in that decision were motivated by race.Additionally, Archibald attached

a hand-written note from UPS employee Vincent Beverly (“Beverly”) to his brief

opposing summary judgment. Beverly indicates that Archibald “has been pass[ed]

over for favoritism by other employees through management by not going by proper

seniority.” (Doc. 29-3 at 1.) This statement does not suggest that race was the real

factor behind the promotions decisions. See Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc.,

683 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a plaintiff does not survive

summary judgment merely by showing that the defendant’s proffered neutral reason

is actually false). Moreover, neither of these statements provide any evidence from 13

personal knowledge as to how UPS made its promotions decisions. 

Additionally, Archibaldcannotrely upon his own testimony to establish pretext.

Archibald also pointed to a statement by Diaz. Apparently, another UPS employee told 13

Archibald that Diaz indicated that Archibald would not be able to afford his car if Diaz reduced his

hours. However, Archibald makes no attempt to explain how this vague statement was connected

to his race, and he admitted at his deposition that he was unaware of anyone at UPS making racebased comments about him. (Doc. 25-1 at 422.) Thus, Archibald himself admitted that this

ambiguous statement was not racial in nature. Even had he suggested otherwise, this lone

secondhand statement cannot survive summary judgment on a racial discrimination claim based on

the promotion. See Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 F. App’x 637, 647–48 (11th Cir. 2005). The other

facts Archibald listed relate to cover driving opportunities, which the Court discusses below.

Page 18 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 18 of 43
He acknowledged that he was unfamiliar with the process for reviewing the bid sheet:

Q. Do you know who put it up at UPS?

A. No.

Q. Do you know who took it down?

A. No.

Q. Do you know who reviewed the bid sheet to select

who would fill the driver positions available at the

time?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever talk to Mr. Diaz about that bid sheet?

A. No.

(Doc. 25-1 at 489.) During his deposition, Archibald speculated that he may have been

passed over because it looks “like it’s some kind of vendetta against either me, or like

I say, I’m a young black guy with braids and a tattoo.” (Doc. 25-1 at 403.) This

statement is insufficient to defeat summary judgment for two reasons. First, as

Archibald admitted, he had no personal knowledge of the bid and selection process,

making this statement purely speculative. Cordoba v.Dillard’s Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181

(11th Cir. 2005) (“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it

creates a false issue, the demolition ofwhich is a primary goal ofsummary judgment.”

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). Second, Diaz testified that he was

new to UPS at the time of the promotions in 2010, and he did not even know

Archibald personally. Archibald does not provide any evidence contesting this fact,

and Archibald’s earliest complaints about Diaz “singling him out” date to 2011, at

Page 19 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 19 of 43
least several months after the promotions.14

In sum, no reasonable trier of fact could find for Archibald on the ultimate

issue— that he was intentionally discriminated against due to his race when the

Defendants promoted Courington and Jemison. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1565.

Summary judgment is due to be granted on the failure to promote claim.

ii. Assignment of Cover Driving Opportunities15

Next, Archibald contends that the Defendants failed to provide him with

adequate cover driving opportunities. He also claims that UPS only notified him of

potential driving opportunities at the last minute, often calling him early in the

morning to notify him about open routes. In order to establish a prima facie case based

on his cover driving opportunities, Archibald must show:(1) he is a member of a racial

minority; (2) he suffered an adverse job action; (3) similarly situated employees were

Although many of Archibald’s dates are vague, the earliest reference to a problem with 14 

Diaz that the Court can locate in the record is April 2011. Archibald referenced this as the start date

for his EEOC allegations. 

Archibald references a recording of a meeting with Diaz regarding cover driving 15

assignments. He provided a copy of this recording on a compact disc (“CD”) to the Court with his

courtesy copy of his summary judgment materials. However, he never properly placed this material

in the record. Instead, he placed in the record a photocopy with an image of what appears to be a CD

on a page marked “CD of Jaime Diaz Meeting.” (Doc. 29-7.) A photocopy depiction of a CD on a

piece of paper does not constitute filing materials with the Court nor does sending physical materials

to the Court as a courtesy copy. Under Rule 56, the Court can only evaluate “particular parts of

materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court has not

reviewed the audio in ruling on summary judgment because it was never placed in the record. 

Page 20 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 20 of 43
treated differently; and (4) he was qualified for the work. Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of

Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003). As to his cover driving

opportunities, UPS contends that Archibald has failed to show that similarly situated

employees were treated differently. An employee is “similarly situated” if he or she

is similar to the minority employee in all relevant aspects but is treated differently. See

Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. 

Cover drivers must be qualified after completing the UPS driving course, and

Archibald admits that Diaz qualified him before any of the other white employees who

took the course with him. (Doc. 25-1 at 187.) Regarding his assignments, Archibald 16

identified a number of white cover drivers as possible comparators. However, the

Defendants claim that most of these comparators were assigned the primary duty of

working the afternoon sort shift. As a preloader, Archibald would often have to arrive

at work early, and UPS would not learn of an available driving slot until after he had

begun work. (Doc. 25-7 at 5–6 ¶ 10.) Additionally, DOT and UPS rules precluded a

Archibald indicated that at one point he informed Diaz that he was ready to qualify, and 16

Diaz told him that he would disqualify him because he was not yet ready. It is unclear to the Court

whether Archibald is advancing a claim based on such a statement. However, Archibald has not

shown how this statement amounts to an adverse employment action because he admitsthat he was

qualified first and points to no opportunities that he was denied as a result of any intervening delay

in his qualification. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that an employment action is only adverse for purposes of a discrimination suit if it has

a “real and demonstrable” impact on an employee’s job). 

Page 21 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 21 of 43
driver from working more than 12 consecutive hours, making it difficult to schedule

Archibald to drive after he worked the early preload shift. Since drivers working the

afternoon sort could regularly be scheduled to work routes that came open later in the

morning, the Defendants contend that these drivers are not proper comparators

because they are not “similarly situated in all relevant aspects.” Holifield, 115 F.3d at

1562. UPS points to Syx, the only other preloader who was also a cover driver, as the

only proper comparator, and Archibald does not offer any argument to the contrary.

17

Treating Syx as the proper comparator, the Court must consider whether Archibald

can survive summary judgment on his various claims about cover driving

opportunities. 

First, Archibald testified at his deposition that he was not given sufficient

training when he was first qualified as a TCD. He testified that he was trained only on

half a “cut-in” route and not trained on any additional routes. However, he did not

18

Upon its own review of the record, the Court found a statement in Archibald’s deposition 17

testimony where he indicated that he joined the afternoon sort shift for “[m]aybe six months to a

year.” (Doc. 25-1 at 146.) He indicated that this began in 2011, after he became a cover driver, but

he offered no particular dates. Archibald has not raised this issue to the Court, nor has he provided

any additional information in the record to suggest when Archibald worked in this position. Thus,

the issue is abandoned. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d

1301, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000)(“[F]ailure to brief and argue [an] issue during the proceedings before

the district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”). 

Archibald refers to the route as a “cut-in” route, or a route that was not run year-round. 18

However, Shelton indicated in an affidavit that the route was part of a regular unassigned route and

stated that other drivers had successfully trained on the route. Archibald has placed no evidence in

Page 22 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 22 of 43
advance any arguments about the extent of his training in his brief opposing summary

judgment. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.

1995) (en banc) (“[T]he onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed

abandoned.”). Indeed, Archibald makes repeated assertions to the superiority of his

training throughout his brief. Thus, any argument regarding proper variation in his 19

route assignments is abandoned. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v.

City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1310, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to brief and argue [an]

issue during the proceedings before the district court is grounds for finding that the

issue has been abandoned.”).

Archibald also contends generally that he was entitled to more frequent driving

opportunities. However, UPS has offered legitimate, non-discirminatory reasons for

this decision. Archibald concedes that on a number of occasions Syx was driving for

qualification and needed to drive more frequently. He also admits that the Package 20

the record to suggest that his route differs from routes where other drivers typically trained. 

For example, Archibald indicated that he “has obtained the adequate and necessary driver 19

training to be promoted and maintain a fulltime route position as a UPS driver.” (Doc. 29 at 4.)

Elsewhere, he claims that he should’ve been promoted because he was entitled to TCD assignments

because he “was most qualified through training and seniority.” (Id.) 

In order to be qualified, a driver needed to deliver packages for thirty days in a one hundred 20

twenty day period. (Doc. 25-1 at 193–94.) 

Page 23 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 23 of 43
Center needed more qualified cover drivers, and thus this is a legitimate, race-neutral

justification for the assignments. See Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030

(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Provided that the proferred reason is one that might

motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and

rebut it.”). Archibald has not even “quarrel[ed] with the wisdom of that reason,” and

thus summary judgment is due to be granted as to these claims. Id.

Although Archibald has placed several pages of handwritten notes into the

record when other TCDs, including Syx, drove over him, Archibald created this list

based solely on seniority. Neither the list nor any of the other evidence in the record

21

suggests that UPSmade an assignmentto Syx on a particular date for any reason other

than his route knowledge or a desire to get him training experience. Even though

Archibald indicated that he thought the assignments were based on race, he testified

that he was not present when routes were assigned and did not know the order in

which they were assigned. The dispatcher, Dave Shelton, stated that he always

attempted to assign routes based on seniority and route knowledge and never

indicated that he made such assignments based on race. Left with only the

The list contains a variety of dates from August and September 2011. According to this list, 21

Syx drove over him on 15 occasions in August and September 2011: August 8, August 9, August 10,

August 11, August 12, August 15, August 16, August 17, August 19, August 26, September 6,

September 21, September 22, September 23, and September 30. (Doc. 29-13 at 3–5.) Archibald has

not pointed the Court to any other records or dates when Syx drove over him. 

Page 24 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 24 of 43
inconclusive handwritten notes and Archibald’s speculation about how route

assignments were distributed, it would be impossible for a reasonable fact-finder to

infer that UPS’s assignments were pretexts for discrimination. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that to survive summary

judgment the plaintiff “must introduce significantly probative evidence showing that

the asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination”).

Finally, Archibald has also failed to produce evidence that similarly situated

employees were treated differently in terms of how they were notified of cover driving

opportunities. He has not indicated that he knows when particular rides came

available or when other drivers were informed, though he did note that generally

drivers would be told the day before. (Doc. 25-1 at 239.) There is also no evidence to

suggest that Syx, the appropriate comparator, was informed of routes without

receiving these phone calls. At one point, when discussing attendance issues and the

early phone calls, he indicated that he believed this was racially motivated “because

Matt Syx didn’t have to go through that.” (Id. at 364.) However, this conclusory

statement alone is not sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Rollins, 833 F.2d

at 1529 (noting that unsubstantiated assertions cannot defeat summary judgment).

Outside Archibald’s deposition, there is no other evidence to suggest that he was

Page 25 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 25 of 43
assigned routes differently from other drivers. 

In sum, Archibald has failed to show that UPS’s methods for assigning TCD

work were a pretext for racial discrimination. He also failed to produce any evidence

to suggest that he should have been notified sooner about driving opportunities.

Summary judgment is due to be granted on all the claims regarding Archibald’s TCD

work assignments.

iii. Discriminatory Discipline

Finally, Archibald raises a series of disciplinary decisions that he contends were

racially discriminatory. He argues that UPS disciplined him unfairly for alleged

violations ofUPS’s attendance, appearance, and driving and delivery method policies.

Additionally, he complains that he was repeatedly quizzed on several UPS driving

instruction sheets before he left to attend driving school. 

In order to establish a prima facie case as to any of these claims, Archibald must

show: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) that he was subjected to an adverse job

action; (3) that his employer treated other similarly situated employees more

favorably; and (4) he was qualified for the job. See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364,

1368 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Brooks v. CSX Transp., Inc., 555 F. App’x 878, 883 (11th

Cir. 2014) (indicating that this statement of the prima facie case applies to

Page 26 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 26 of 43
discriminatory discipline claims). As with the other claims, it is undisputed that

Archibald is a member of a protected class. Moreover, neither party has disputed that

Archibald has been qualified for the various jobs he has performed for UPS. See Crapp

v.City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting in the related area

of termination cases that qualifications may often not be at issue and may be inferred

if the plaintiff has held a position for a significant period of time). However, Archibald

cannot show that he experienced an adverse employment action. 

An employee raising a discrimination claim under Title VII and § 1981 must

ultimately show that he was subjected to an “adverse employment action.” Butler v.

Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1215 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In order to satisfy this standard, “the employer’s action[s] must impact the

‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of the plaintiff’s job in a real and demonstrable

way.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). Such an

action need not have direct economic consequences, but “the asserted impact cannot

be speculative and must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s

employment.” Id. As with the other elements of the prima facie case, it is the

Plaintiff’s duty to establish that there was an adverse employment action. See Kidd v.

Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the plaintiff bears

Page 27 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 27 of 43
the burden to “establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of

discrimination”).

Although Archibald was disciplined onmultiple occasions for variousviolations

of UPS procedures, he was only actually suspended for one day. While he received

notices either to suspend or discharge him on various occasions, these notices were

never actually implemented against him. See Mitchell v.Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177,

182 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Mere threats of alleged adverse employment action are

generally not sufficient to satisfy the adverse action requirement.”). Archibald

successfully reduced all but one of the sanctions to a warning notice through UPS’s

grievance process, and he has not pointed to any adverse employment action based on

these notices. See Filius v. Potter, 176 F. App’x 8, 11 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that

there was no adverse employment action when a suspension was reduced to a

discussion about the conduct and the plaintiff had not pointed to any evidence to

suggest that this had any effect on his future job prospects). 

Turning next to the discipline that Archibald actually received, none of the

discipline amounts to an adverse employment action. Archibald has not produced any

evidence that suggests the disciplinary warnings had any adverse impact on his

employmentwith UPS. See Butler, 536 F.3d at 1216 (noting that various warnings and

Page 28 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 28 of 43
reprimands did not change the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s

employment). Additionally, his one-day suspension did not amount to an adverse

employment action, either. Embry v.CallahanEye Found. Hosp., 147 F. App’x 819, 829

(11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a one-day suspension was not an adverse

employment action under Title VII).22

Additionally, Archibald has failed to produce any evidence to suggest that

similarly situated employees were treated differently. Even ifArchibald did not violate

some of the rules in question (as he maintains), he must “point to someone similarly

situated (but outside the protected class) who disputed a violation of the rule and who

was, in fact, treated better.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311

n.6 (11th Cir. 1998) (replaced in part on other grounds in Jones v. Bessemer Carraway

Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998)). Even though Archibald testified that he had

seen some employees’ disciplinary files, he could not offer specific names or indicate

their contents at his deposition. Other than his assertions about the lack of discipline

that his coworkers received, he has not pointed to any other evidence to suggest that

As with many of the other claims, Archibald has made no response to UPS’s argument that

22

a one-day suspension is not an adverse employment action and made no attempt to distinguish his

claims from those made in Embry. Importantly, it is the plaintiff’s burden to show how an

employment action is adverse. See McCann, 526 F.3d at 1375 n.6 (noting that when the plaintiff

doesn’t make out a prima facie case, there is no need to reach the issue of pretext). Thus, Archibald

has abandoned this claim. See Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1326. 

Page 29 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 29 of 43
white employees were disciplined differently. See Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 F.

App’x 637, 647–48 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the plaintiff did not personally

witness anything that substantiated her position and instead relied only on statements

from co-workers). The Court cannot infer an intent to discriminate based solely on

Archibald’s conclusory assertion that he was disciplined more than other employees.

See Rollins, 833 F.2d at 1529.

Similarly, Archibald also failed to satisfy the prima facie case regarding his

preparations for driving school. Diaz required Archibald to learn UPS’s “5 Seeing

Habits” and “10 PointCommentary,” and UPS employees, including Diaz, regularly

quizzed Archibald on these two documents before he attended driving school. Even

if it is true, as Archibald suggests, that white employees did not have to memorize

these documents, he did not suffer an adverse employment action. Archibald learned

the documents, attended driving school, and graduated the school at the top of his

class. He admitted at his own deposition that his knowledge of these two documents

did not penalize him in any way. (Doc. 25-1 at 389.) Even though Archibald’s wife

produced a signed statement indicating that Archibald spent “countless hours

reviewing the packet of information,” he has not produced any evidence to show that

the studies undermined his ability to work in any way. See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239

Page 30 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 30 of 43
(noting that an action is only an adverse employment action if it is objectively

unreasonable). 

In sum, Archibald has failed to satisfy all elements of his prima facie case for his

disparate treatment claims based on discipline that he received as a UPS employee.

He has also produced no additional circumstantial evidence of discrimination, and

summary judgment is due to be granted on these claims.

B. Retaliation

Next, Archibald claims that the Defendants’ actions were done in retaliation for

his practice of filing grievances and complaining to the EEOC. The Defendants 23

moved for summary judgment, contending that Archibald had not satisfied the prima

facie case that must be satisfied when the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence.

See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). In a section

of his brief opposing summary judgment entitled “Retaliation,” Archibald indicates

that he is solely relying on “direct evidence” of retaliation. (Doc. 29 at 13–14.)

Direct evidence is “evidence which reflects a discriminatory or retaliatory

attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the

The Court notes that it is unclear exactly what employment actions are purportedly 23

retaliatory. It is clear that the 2010 promotion claim cannot be retaliatory because the described

grievances, discipline, and other issues referenced in the case occurred after the August 2010

promotions of Courington and Jemison. However, the Court will discuss the cover driving and

disciplinary claims in the context of retaliation. 

Page 31 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 31 of 43
employee.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla.,Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “One example of direct evidence would be

a management memorandum saying, ‘Fire [the plaintiff]—he is too old.’” Early v.

Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990) (describing an example of

direct evidence in the context of age discrimination). However, “only the most blatant

remarks” constitute direct evidence of retaliation. See Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.,

376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Archibald has not produced direct evidence of retaliation. First, he argues that

his regular filing of grievances coupled with the reduction in discipline establishes that 

the discipline was retaliatory. In most of these cases the discipline was only reduced

and not eliminated. Moreover, he has not pointed to any comments in the disciplinary

reports that provide blatant or obvious statements that either UPS or Diaz was

retaliating against him. See id. Additionally, Archibald contends that disciplinary

actions against him increased. These would provide, at most, only circumstantial

evidence of discrimination, and not direct evidence. Cf. Van Voorhis v. Hillsborough

Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 512 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that the

statement that an employer “didn’t want to hire any old pilots” was direct evidence

of age discrimination). 

Page 32 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 32 of 43
In his brief, Archibald only set out the standard for direct evidence and did not

even alternatively reference the standard for circumstantial evidence. (Doc. 29 at

13–14.) Although he did discuss circumstantial evidence in the context of his

discrimination and hostile work environment claims, he omitted any discussion of

circumstantial evidence when discussing retaliation. See Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“There is no burden upon

the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based upon the

materials before it on summary judgment.”). Accordingly, the Court can properly

grant summary judgment based on the lack of direct evidence and treat any claim

based on circumstantial evidence as abandoned. See Road Sprinkler FittersLocal Union

No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining

that a district court may “properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint

but not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”).

Alternatively, though, Archibald has not produced circumstantial evidence that

would allow him to survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim. In order to make

out a retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence, the Plaintiff must show: (1)

he engaged in protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;

and (3) there was a causal relation between the two. Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.,

Page 33 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 33 of 43
506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007). If the Plaintiff can establish the prima facie case,

the employer then must articulate anon-retaliatory reason for the conduct. Pennington,

261 F.3d at 1266. However, “[t]he ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of

the evidence that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited,

retaliatory conduct remains on the plaintiff.” Id.

Archibald’s first retaliation claim involves allegedly excessive observations by

supervisors. He suggests that UPS supervisors, including Diaz, observed him more

than they did other employees. In order to support his claim, he must produce

evidence from which the fact-finder could conclude that he was subjected to an

adverse action. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1363. “The antiretaliation provision protects

an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or

harm.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67, 126 S.Ct. 2405,

2414 (2006) (“Burlington”). While the provision does not protect an employee from

“petty slights or minor annoyances,” a plaintiff need only show “that a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this

context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Page 34 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 34 of 43
Although questions of adversity are generally left to the jury under the

Burlington standard, Archibald has failed to produce any evidence to show that the

observations were, in fact, excessive. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 n.13

(11th Cir. 2008). Archibald testified that he faced “obsessive observations by

management.” (Doc. 25-1 at 426.) Given the approximately forty drivers, he thought

it excessive that he was observed on his route roughly ten times over a year. (Id.)

However, he lacks any personal knowledge of UPS’s observation procedures:

Q. And did you ever speak to [UPS’s employees who

usually observed] about how they, it was decided

what observations they would do?

A. No.

Q. And do you have any personal knowledge, firsthand

knowledge of how many times [they] observed other

drivers in that —

A. No.

Q. — time-frame?

A. No.

Q. So, you’re just speculating that, that they were, they

observed you more than they, more than they

observed other people?

A. Yeah. You can say that.

(Id. at 427–28.) Moreover, the only testimony in the record based on personal

knowledge ofthe observations comes from Diaz and Yul Cochran (“Cochran”). Both

of them provided declarations that Archibald was never singled out for observation

and was observed consistently with all other drivers. (Doc. 25-4 at 13–14 ¶ 24; Doc.

Page 35 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 35 of 43
25-8 at 3 ¶ 6.) Ultimately, a plaintiff must show objectively that he was harmed in

retaliation for his protected activity. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.

Here, Archibald has not shown any injury or harm, and thus he cannot survive

summary judgment on his theory that these actions were retaliatory. 

Similarly, Archibald’s claims based on the discipline that he received also fail

because he cannot satisfy Burlington. The Supreme Court in Burlington effectively

established a different standard for retaliation claims than discrimination claims. See

Grimsley v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 284 F. App’x 604, 608 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008)

(declining to apply the Burlington decision to disparate treatment discrimination

claims and limiting the decision to Title VIIretaliation claims). For a retaliation claim,

“the type of employer conduct considered actionable has been broadened from that

which adverselyaffects the plaintiff’s conditions of employmentor employmentstatus

to that which has a materially adverse effect on the plaintiff, irrespective of whether

it is employment or workplace-related.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 973.

However, the Burlington standard does not excuse a plaintiff from his obligation

to actually show that the conduct at issue would objectively deter him from engaging

in statutorily protected activity. 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. Even though the

Court must consider context when determining whether an action is adverse, the

Page 36 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 36 of 43
employee bears the burden of placing evidence about that context into the record. See

id. at 69, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. Here, Archibald has only produced evidence that shows

that he and his wife were upset about UPS’s actions. However, he did not testify that

UPS’s discipline made him less likely to file grievances or complain to the EEOC.

Instead, he testified that he always filed a grievance when he disagreed with discipline,

and he filed an additional EEOC charge after his first charge. Indeed, the evidence

here suggests that UPS’s actions did not deter Archibald from engaging in statutorily

protected conduct. See Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 485 (5th Cir.

2008) (evaluating whether a job transfer was adverse in part by considering the

plaintiff’s testimony that she was not embarrassed by the transfer).

Apparently, Archibald attempts to argue that UPS’s assignments of cover

driving opportunities were retaliatory. Insofar as he has attempted to advance such a

claim, summary judgment is due to be granted for the same reasons as his racial

discrimination claims on this subject, discussed in Part III(A)(ii), supra. First,

Archibald failed to produce any facts to suggest that his training was different from

any other UPS employees, and he has failed to prove that his treatment was adverse

at all. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (recognizing that minor

trivialities are not regulated under the retaliation provision). Second, Archibald failed

Page 37 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 37 of 43
to rebut that UPS’s legitimate reasons for assigning cover driving opportunities, such

as the need to qualify more drivers, route knowledge, and Archibald’s limited

availability due to his preload schedule were not a pretext for retaliation. See Pina v.

Children’s Place, 740 F.3d 785, 796 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that, as in other cases

involving summary judgment, in retaliation cases “a nonmovant cannot rely merely

upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, summary judgment is due to be granted

on Archibald’s retaliation claims.

C. Hostile Work Environment

Finally, Archibald purports to bring a hostile work environment claim based on

the Defendants’ actions. A separate violation of Title VII or § 1981 occurs when “the

workplace is permeated with [racially] discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult[ ] that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s

employment and create an abusive working environment.” Jones v. UPS Ground

Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012). An employer can be held liable if the

employee proves that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to

unwelcomeharassment; (3) the harassment was based on the individual’s membership

in the protected class; (4) it altered the terms and conditions of employment and

Page 38 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 38 of 43
created a hostile environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for this

environment either directly or vicariously. Id.

Even though Archibald devoted several portions of his brief to discussions of

“harassment” or “hostile work environment,” he never cited to particular parts of

the record to support his claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (noting that a party

seeking to assert that a fact is in dispute must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in

the record). Instead, Archibald asserted generally that Diaz harassed him “because of

his African American hairstyle and . . . because of a single tattoo that was not visible

unless Plaintiff was called at an inopportune time to work or when Plaintiffwas not on

the clock and considered not working” without citing to any materials in the record.

(Doc. 29 at 13.) Elsewhere Archibald noted generally that his harassment claims are

supported by the grievances he has filed coupled with reductions in his discipline and

the statements from his wife and various co-workers. (Id. at 15–16.) However, he does

not indicate which portions of these materials support his claim. Thus, the Court can

properly grant summary judgment on this basis alone. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3)

(noting that the Court may grant summary judgment if a party fails to properly

support an assertion of fact if the motion and supporting materials indicate that the

movant is entitled to summary judgment).

Page 39 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 39 of 43
Moreover, Archibald has not provided any evidence to suggest that he was

subjected to a hostile work environment. Indeed, Archibald testified at his deposition

that UPS has not directed any comments toward him that would suggest that any of

its actions were based on race:

Q. Are you aware of any oral or written statement made

by any UPS supervisor or manager that pertains to

your race?

A. I don’t get what you mean by the question.

Q. Has anyone made any race based comments to you -

-

A. Oh, no.

Q. - - or any racial remark to you of any kind?

A. No.

(Doc. 25-1 at 422.) Thus, there is no indication in the record that the workplace was 24

permeated with racially hostile comments or actions. Cf. Jones, 683 F.3d at 1299–1301

(describing a hostile work environment based on ethnic slurs directed at the plaintiff,

banana peels left in the plaintiff’s vehicle, confederate apparel worn by co-workers,

and a confrontation between the plaintiff and several of these co-workers). Even if

Archibald could attempt to make a hostile work environment claim based on the

discipline that he received, as the Court noted at length above he has not successfully

Archibald cites various cases from the sexual harassment context to suggest that there is 24 

an independent claim for a supervisor’s harassment in certain cases where there is no tangible

employment action taken. Even assuming that this claim is applicable in the context of racial actions,

Archibald’s admission would preclude any such claim.

Page 40 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 40 of 43
tied this discipline to his race. Summary judgment is due to be granted on the hostile

work environment claim.

D. Amendment of the Complaint

In addition to opposing the motion for summary judgment, Archibald filed a

motion for leave to amend his complaint, supposedly to add “new facts that were

produced at [the] deposition of Defendant, Jaime Diaz.” (Doc. 27.) He made this

motion both after the close of discovery and after the Defendants had already filed

their motion for summary judgment. The Court directed Archibald to brief the motion

and attach a copy of his proposed amended complaint(Doc. 28), but Archibald never

filed any such response with the Court. Thus, he has abandoned any argument that he

is entitled to amend his complaint, and the motion is due to be denied. See Coal. forthe

Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1326 (11th Cir.

2000) (“[F]ailure to brief and argue [an] issue during the proceedings before the

district court is grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”).

From Archibald’s two-page motion, he has given no reason why the Court

should allow amendment at this late stage in the litigation. See Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962) (explaining that leave to amend should

generally be freely given but need not be allowed if there is a legitimate reason for

Page 41 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 41 of 43
disallowing it). Indeed, “[p]rejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment

asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have been filed,

briefed, and decided.” Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999).

Although Archibald filed his motion before the Court ruled on summary judgment,

he waited until well after the discovery period ended, dispositive motions were filed,

and the briefing period had begun. 

Moreover, even though the Defendants raised several issues regarding the

sufficiency of pleading on summary judgment, the Court ignored those arguments and

relied instead on the evidence in the record.Additional pleadingwould not rectify the

Plaintiff’s failure to uncover relevant facts through discovery that could withstand

summary judgment. Thus, the motion is due to be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 23) is due to be granted, and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 27) is

due to be denied. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Done this 15th day of July 2014.

Page 42 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 42 of 43
 

L. SCOTT COOGLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

174256

Page 43 of 43

Case 7:12-cv-03492-LSC Document 33 Filed 07/15/14 Page 43 of 43