Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00969/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1441nr Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION

Plaintiff,

v.

GLORIA BERNICE GERMAN; and 

DOES 1-10 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-0969-GPC(KSC)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS;

(2) SUA SPONTE REMANDING 

ACTION TO STATE COURT

On May 23, 2019, Debra Bell (“Defendant” or “Bell”), proceeding pro se, filed a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a notice of removal of this unlawful 

detainer action from the Superior Court of the State of California for San Diego County.

Having reviewed the motion to proceed IFP, the Court GRANTS the motion. 

Additionally, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action to state court for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction.

Discussion

A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

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$400. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(a). Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The party must 

submit an affidavit demonstrating one’s inability to pay the filing fee, and the affidavit 

must include a complete statement of the plaintiff’s assets. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

The Court has reviewed Defendant’s declaration and finds that Defendant is unable 

to pay fees or post securities required to maintain this action. Defendant submitted an 

application, stating that Defendant receives a fixed income through California’s General 

Relief and SNAP programs at $560 per month. Defendant further stated that Defendant

has no assets, $32 in cash or in a checking or savings account, and expenses of $558 per 

month. Because Defendant’s monthly expenses nearly exceed her monthly income, the 

Court finds that Defendant is unable to pay the filing fee. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 

Defendant’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. 

B. Sua Sponte Remanding Action to State Court

Any action brought in state court may be “removed by the defendant or the 

defendants” to the district court. 28 U.S.C. §1441; see also 28 U.S.C. §1446 (“A 

defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file 

. . . a notice of removal . . . .”) The Court takes note that Bell is not a named defendant in 

the underlying state court complaint. The complaint only names Gloria Bernice German

as a defendant. Bell, however, claims to live at the real property at issue and removed the 

action to this Court. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) 1 The Court thus proceeds to adjudicate the matter 

presented on the assumption that Bell is a proper defendant.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 

limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party

 

1 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination.

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asserting jurisdiction.” Id. A federal court cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it 

confirms that it retains subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues presented.

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1988). Accordingly, 

federal courts are under a continuing duty to confirm their jurisdictional power and are 

“obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to [its] existence . . . .” Mt. 

Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977) (citations 

omitted).

Here, Defendant contends that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 

1441(a), 1443(1), 1446. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2–3.) Federal subject matter jurisdiction may be 

based on (1) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) diversity 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. For an action to be removed based on federal 

question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal law creates the 

cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution 

of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers 

Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1983). The presence or absence of federal 

question jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides 

that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of 

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 

(1987). It is well settled that a “case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of 

a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and 

even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”

Id. at 393. “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking 

removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.”

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). “Federal 

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first 

instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

A review of the state court complaint in this case shows that Bank of America, 

National Association (“Plaintiff”) alleges a single cause of action for unlawful detainer 

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under California state law. Defendant’s alleged federal “claims” are defenses or 

counterclaims against Plaintiff. Defenses and counterclaims, however, are not considered 

in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint. 

Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (federal question jurisdiction cannot 

“rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim”); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 

1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer 

jurisdiction on a federal court, even if the defense is that of federal preemption and is 

anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint.”). Because this complaint contains only a state

unlawful detainer action, no federal question is presented. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. 

Lissona, Case No. 12-CV-00477-CAB NLS, 2013 WL 12116596, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 

16, 2013) (“[A] single claim for unlawful detainer. . . is purely a matter of state law.”); 

Galileo Fin. v. Miin Sun Park, Case No. EDCV 09-1660 PSG, 2009 WL 3157411, at *1 

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009) (“Here, the complaint only asserts a claim for unlawful 

detainer, a cause of action that is purely a matter of state law. Thus, from the face of the 

complaint, it is clear that no basis for federal question jurisdiction exists.”). Accordingly, 

the Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over the matter.

Additionally, diversity jurisdiction is absent. Removal based on diversity 

jurisdiction requires that the parties be completely diverse and that the amount in 

controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Defendant has not alleged the 

citizenship of the parties. In unlawful detainer actions, “California courts have noted that 

‘the right to possession alone [is] involved,’ – not title to the property.” Litton Loan 

Servicing, L.P. v. Villegas, No. C 10-05478 PJH, 2011 WL 204322, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

21, 2011) (quoting Evans v. Superior Ct., 67 Cal. App. 3d 162, 168 (1977)). Thus, “the 

amount of damages sought in the complaint, not the value of the subject real property, 

determines the amount in controversy.” Id. Here, Plaintiff's complaint seeks damages 

not exceeding $10,000. (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1.) “[W]hen a state-court complaint 

affirmatively alleges that the amount in controversy is less than [$75,000], the ‘party 

seeking removal must prove with legal certainty that [the] jurisdictional amount is met.’”

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Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007)). Defendant 

has failed to prove that the amount in controversy requirement has been met. Therefore, 

diversity jurisdiction is lacking. 

Furthermore, Defendant has failed establish that 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) warrants 

removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(1) provides that a defendant may remove from the state 

court any action “[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of 

such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the 

United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof.” Defendant asserts that 

California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, which allows for certification of 

information contained in pleadings, has violated Defendant’s due process rights by 

prohibiting Defendant from presenting evidence to dispute the existence of a landlordtenant relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2–3.)

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 is interpreted narrowly and limited to “certain 

petitioners who claim federally secured rights as a defense to a state prosecution.”

California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir. 1970). A party petitioning for 

removal under § 1443 must meet a two-part test:

“First, the petitioners must assert, as a defense to the prosecution, rights that are 

given to them by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights 

. . . . Second, petitioners must assert that the state courts will not enforce that right, 

and that allegation must be supported by reference to a state statute or a 

constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to ignore the 

federal rights.”

Patel v. Del Taco, Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sandoval, 434 

F.2d at 636). Here, Defendant has not identified a state law or constitutional provision 

that directs state courts to ignore Defendant’s civil rights. Further, the right that 

Defendant asserts does not spring from specific statutory grants, but from the broad 

protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2–3.) “Such rights [under the 

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First and Fourteenth Amendments] are not within the coverage of section 1443.”

Sandoval, 434 F.2d at 636. Consequently, removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) is 

improper.

In sum, Defendant’s assertion of federal subject matter jurisdiction is without 

merit. Plaintiff’s state law unlawful detainer claim is not removable. The Court must

therefore remand the case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court (1) GRANTS Defendant’s motion to proceed IFP 

and (2) sua sponte REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of the State of California 

for San Diego County.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 4, 2019

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