Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03877/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03877-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 11/6/07*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ESTATE OF ZIAM BOJCIC, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C05 3877 RS

ORDER RE MOTIONS IN

LIMINE

On October 15, 2007, defendants filed, in one document, eight numbered motions in limine.

On October 18, 2007, plaintiffs filed a single motion in limine. Argument on the motions was

entertained at the pretrial conference held on October 24, 2007. There having been no objection to

defendants’ first, fifth, sixth, and seventh motions, those motions are all GRANTED. By separate

order, the Court previously denied defendants’ request to bifurcate, which was the subject of their

second motion. Also by prior separate order, plaintiffs’ fifth claim for relief was dismissed, thereby

effectively granting defendants’ third motion in limine. The parties stipulated that they would meet

and confer to resolve the issues raised in plaintiffs’ motion in limine.

Case 5:05-cv-03877-RS Document 65 Filed 11/06/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Accordingly, remaining to be decided are defendants’ fourth and eighth motions, both of

which relate to the appropriate scope of expert testimony. By their fourth motion, defendants seek to

preclude plaintiffs’ expert, D.P. Van Blaricom, from offering testimony similar to that submitted in

his declaration in opposition to the summary judgment motion that: (1) use of either oleoresin

capsicum (“OC”) spray or a baton would have been an appropriate response when Bojcic was

holding the chair, and (2) “considerably less force” could and should have been used by Officer

Guess in response to Bojcic’s subsequent attack. Defendants’ argument that such testimony should

be precluded is premised on the notion that “where deadly force is otherwise justified under the

Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first.” Plakas v. Drinski,

19 F.3d 1143, 1149.

For at least two reasons, defendants have failed to establish that Van Blaricom’s testimony

should be precluded. First, there is no dispute that at the time Bojcic was holding the chair, the

circumstances had not risen to a level that would warrant the use of deadly force by Officer Guess. 

While the principle that police officers are not constitutionally required to select the lowest level of

response to any situation remains applicable, the authorities cited by defendants all involved

situations where deadly force was as least arguably warranted. Although defendants may have some

basis to claim a lack of relevance for Van Blaricom’s opinions as to how Officer Guess should have

responded to the subsequent physical, they have made much less of a showing to preclude Van

Blaricom from testifying about options Officer Guess had at his disposal earlier in the encounter. 

Defendants, of course, will be entitled to have the jury instructed as to the applicable law, and will

be free to argue that the law did not require Officer Guess to act other than as he did.

Second, the only case cited by defendants that appears to relate to the admissibility of

evidence is Shultz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1995), which held that the trial court had not

abused its discretion in granting a motion to exclude evidence of alternative measures police officers

could have used when confronting an ax-wielding paranoid schizophrenic. In his declaration, Van

Blaricom does not appear to be advancing an opinion that Officer Guess should have used a degree

of force that was less than deadly upon being confronted with a situation presenting a significant

threat of death or serious physical injury. Rather, Van Blaricom seems to be offering an opinion

Case 5:05-cv-03877-RS Document 65 Filed 11/06/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiffs assert there is no evidence Bojcic ever attempted to obtain control of Officer

Guess’s firearm. That may be so, but it is not dispositive of the question of whether an armed

police officer, who some witnesses say was losing a fistfight, might reasonably assume he faced a

significant threat of death or serious physical injury.

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that the evidence, including the relatively minor extent of the physical injuries actually suffered by

Officer Guess, is inconsistent with a conclusion that there was ever a significant threat of death or

serious physical injury. That opinion may not be consistent with the testimony of some witnesses

that Officer Guess appeared to be “losing” the “fist-fight” and the fact that Officer Guess was

armed.1 It is for the jury, however, to resolve that conflict..

Thus, while defendants may be correct that it would not be an abuse of discretion to exclude

evidence of “less lethal alternatives” in a case where use of deadly force was plainly justified, they

have not shown that plaintiffs should be precluded from offering expert opinion that the

circumstances here did not warrant the use of deadly force at all. As reflected in the Court’s order

on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court was inclined to conclude from the record

presented that Officer Guess acted reasonably in exercising deadly force once the situation had

escalated to the point it did, and the motion was denied only because there were questions of fact as

to whether Office Guess had intentionally or recklessly committed a prior constitutional violation

that gave rise to the subsequent circumstances. Absent a conclusion that a partial directed verdict is

warranted, however, the jury must now decide not only whether there was such a prior independent

constitutional violation, but also whether Officer Guess was entitled to use deadly force even if he

committed no such prior wrong.

Defendants’ eighth motion in limine raises the question of the extent to which an expert may

be precluded from offering opinions on matters that lie within the province of the jury. Particularly

instructive here is Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1991), a case that has been

superceded by statute on other grounds, but in which the Ninth Circuit considered the admissibility

of similar testimony from D.P Van Blaricom.

The Davis court stated:

[Defendant] objected to plaintiffs’ police expert, Donald Van Blaricom, because he

testified that Sheriff Stairs was reckless in his failure to adequately train his deputies,

and that there was a causal link between this recklessness and plaintiffs’ injuries.

Case 5:05-cv-03877-RS Document 65 Filed 11/06/07 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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They contend that this was improper opinion testimony on a question of law.

This argument is without merit. Fed.R.Evid. 704 allows expert witnesses to express

an opinion on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. [Citation.] Moreover,

Fed.R.Evid. 702 permits expert testimony comparing conduct of parties to the

industry standard. [Citation]. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

Van Blaricom's testimony.

927 F.2d at 1484-85.

That noted, the Ninth Circuit has also made clear that the propriety of an expert opining on

“ultimate issues” does not go so far as to permit an expert to offer legal conclusions. The somewhat

subtle distinction has been explained as follows:

It is well-established, however, that expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue is

not per se improper . . . However, an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her

legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. E.g., McHugh v. United

Serv. Auto. Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d

97, 101 (2d Cir.1994) (“When an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to

reach, this does not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute

the expert’s judgment for the jury’s.”) (emphasis in original).

Muhktar v. California State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n. 10 (9th Cir.2002)

 Here, in his declaration offered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Van

Blaricom expressly disclaimed any intent to offer opinions as to questions of law. See Van Blaricom

declaration, ¶ 9 (“My use of certain [legal] terms . . . merely reflects my training, in applying

reasonable standards of care to officers’ conduct, and does not presume or imply a statement of any

legal opinion.”) At trial, Van Blaricom should similarly avoid offering any legal opinions, and

should do so by not stating his conclusions in terms that mirror the instructions that will be given to

the jury. Thus, while Van Blaricom may freely opine that Officer Guess should not have acted in the

manner that he did, or that he should have done something else, he should not be asked for or

volunteer an opinion that Office Guess acted unconstitutionally or exercised “excessive force.” This

order does not bar Van Blaricom from using the terms “reasonable” or “unreasonable” in his

testimony, but both the questions posed to him and his answers should avoid language in the form of 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a legal conclusion. Accordingly, defendants’ motion is granted to the extent reflected above and is

otherwise denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/6/07 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:05-cv-03877-RS Document 65 Filed 11/06/07 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Rebecca Connolly Rebecca.Connolly@grunskylaw.com, Alice.Wilkerson@grunskylaw.com

Clifford S. Greenberg cao.main@ci.sj.ca.us

Kevin Roy McLean krm@bellilaw.com, webmaster@bellilaw.com

Cal J. Potter , lll lpotter@potterlawoffices.com

Randall H. Scarlett rscarlett@scarlettlawgroup.com, reormiston@scarlettlawgroup.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 11/6/07 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

Case 5:05-cv-03877-RS Document 65 Filed 11/06/07 Page 6 of 6