Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_98-cv-04837/USCOURTS-cand-4_98-cv-04837-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILIP WAYNE HENDERSON,

Petitioner,

 v.

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, Warden,

 Respondent. ___________________________

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No. C 98-4837 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Philip Wayne Henderson, a prisoner of the State of

California who is incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, filed

this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. After granting in part and denying in part

Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition, the Court ordered

Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition and a memorandum of

points and authorities and exhibits in support thereof. 

Petitioner has filed a traverse to the answer. 

For the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES the petition

for a writ of habeas corpus on all claims.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 7, 1986, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of

first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder with

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special circumstances, one count of voluntary manslaughter, two

counts of robbery, and one count of auto theft. He was sentenced

to life without possibility of parole.

Petitioner's direct appeal was denied by the California Court

of Appeal on November 30, 1990. His petition for review to the

California Supreme Court was denied on February 25, 1991. 

Six years later, Petitioner commenced his first action before

this Court. See Henderson v. California, Case No. C 97-1505 CW

(PR). His case was opened on April 24, 1997, the date he

submitted to the Court a document entitled "Notice of Intent to

Timely File Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for

Extension of Time to File Completed Petition Or, in the Alternate,

Relaxation of Possible Time Constraints," which was signed on

April 21, 1997. In an Order dated July 2, 1997, the Court

dismissed the April, 1997 filing because it was not a recognizable

petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court gave Petitioner

until July 30, 1997 to file a proper petition. It notified

Petitioner of the time limits under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the possibility of

equitable tolling, noting, "If grounds to toll the limitations

period are found, the limitations period will be tolled nunc pro

tunc." Henderson, Case No. C 97-1505 CW (PR), July 2, 1997 Order

at 2. The Court postponed determination of equitable tolling

until "such time as a recognizable petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is before the Court." Id. at 3.

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On July 28, 1997, Petitioner filed an amended petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to present four claims: 

(1) illegal search and seizure of telephone billing records,

leading to subsequent derivative searches and arrest;

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel, based on violations of

attorney-client privilege; (3) prosecutorial misconduct, including

subornation of perjury and "inflammatory tactics"; and

(4) erroneous evidentiary rulings. 

On October 6, 1997, the Court dismissed the amended petition

without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, finding

that even under the "most liberal construction," Petitioner's

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial

misconduct were unexhausted. The Court did not inform Petitioner

that he could withdraw the unexhausted claims as an alternative to

dismissal. 

On December 8, 1997, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, which was

denied on June 24, 1998.

On December 1, 1998, Petitioner filed a new federal habeas

corpus petition challenging the same 1986 convictions. See

Henderson v. Newland, Case No. C 98-4837 CW (PR). According to

its index, that petition set forth at least ten claims for relief,

including: (1) actual innocence; (2) prosecutorial misconduct,

including unnecessary death qualification of the jury,

presentation of false, irrelevant and inflammatory evidence,

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witness tampering, subornation of perjury and erroneous

evidentiary rulings; (3) improper closing argument; (4) juror

misconduct and jury tampering; (5) evidence tampering;

(6) cumulative error; (7) insufficiency of evidence; (8) illegal

search and seizure; (9) violations of attorney-client privilege;

and (10) illegal arrest. 

In an Order dated March 15, 1999, the Court liberally

construed Plaintiff's April, 1997 filing as a timely first federal

petition with a filing date of April 21, 1997. Assuming tolling

of the statute of limitations during the pendency of the first

federal petition, the Court found that Petitioner would have had

only two days from the October 6, 1997 Order of Dismissal for

Failure to Exhaust in which to file a state habeas action that

would have continued to toll the running of the statute of

limitations. Moreover, even if the limitations period had not run

at that point, the Court found that Petitioner would have had only

two days from the denial of his state action in which to file a

renewed federal petition. However, he waited over four months to

do so. For these reasons, the Court dismissed the 1998 petition

as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Court found Petitioner

had presented no grounds warranting additional equitable tolling. 

The Court denied Petitioner's motions for a certificate of

appealability and for reconsideration. The Ninth Circuit also

denied a certificate of appealability. 

Petitioner then filed a third petition challenging the same

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1986 convictions. See Henderson v. California, Case No. C 01-3691

CW (PR). His 2001 petition was originally filed in the Eastern

District of California and subsequently transferred to the

Northern District. Petitioner alleged that the Court's Order

dismissing his 1998 petition as untimely was erroneous, and that

he was entitled to federal review of his claims. 

In an Order dated December 31, 2003, the Court construed the

2001 petition as a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the

March 8, 1999 Order of Dismissal in Case Number C 98-4837 CW (PR),

in light of subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions requiring that

district courts: (1) give pro se habeas petitioners the

opportunity to amend their petitions to delete unexhausted claims

before dismissal; (2) alert petitioners to the possible impact on

the one-year limitations period; and (3) inform petitioners if the

limitations period had already expired. See, e.g., James v.

Pliler, 269 F.3d 1124, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2001); Ford v. Hubbard,

330 F.3d 1086, 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), judgment vacated sub nom.

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004); Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d

1197, 1202 (9th Cir.), amended, 342 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2003),

cert. den. and judgment vacated, 542 U.S. 933 (2004), withdrawn,

404 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2005). Concluding that it had failed to

warn Petitioner in accordance with Ford and Brambles when his 1997

petition was dismissed as unexhausted, resulting in his subsequent

1998 petition being dismissed as untimely, the Court reopened Case

Number C 98-4837 CW (PR).

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On March 9, 2004, the Court granted Respondent's request for

a stay of proceedings in light of the grant of certiorari by the

United States Supreme Court in Pliler v. Ford. The Supreme Court

then held that federal courts had no obligation to give the

warnings that the Ninth Circuit had required regarding the

consequences of dismissal. Pliler, 542 U.S. at 231. Respondent

then moved to dismiss Petitioner's petition on the grounds that

the habeas petition filed in 1998 was untimely and the Court erred

in reinstating it; in the alternative, even if the 1998 petition

could be reinstated, those claims which did not relate back to the

1997 petition should be dismissed.

In an Order dated March 6, 2006, the Court reviewed

Petitioner's 1997 and 1998 petitions and granted Respondent's

motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The Court

determined which claims raised in his 1998 petition were similar

in time and type to allegations in his 1997 petition. Therefore,

the following claims were found to be timely under AEDPA:

(1) prosecutorial misconduct based on presentation of false,

irrelevant and inflammatory evidence; (2) prosecutorial misconduct

based on allegations of witness tampering and subornation of

perjury; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct based on violations of

attorney-client privilege. Petitioner was also allowed to proceed

with claims of actual innocence and cumulative error to the extent

they were based on the allegations related to his prosecutorial

misconduct claims.

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Respondent filed an answer to the petition addressing the

aforementioned claims, and Petitioner filed a traverse. The Court

now addresses the merits of Petitioner's claims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its written opinion, the California Court of Appeal

summarized the factual background as follows:

The victims, Ray Boggs, Angie Boggs, and Raymond Boggs,

Jr., lived in an apartment at 753 Webster Street in San

Francisco. At the time of her death, Angie was carrying

a 30-week-old fetus.

Ray Boggs was last seen alive on January 11, 1982. On

that day he went to his job at a glass company in

Redwood City and worked all day. Shortly before 5 p.m.

he made a telephone call, received a salary advance and

left for the day. The Boggses' landlord, Ilyas Absar,

received a telephone call from Angie Boggs on January

11, 1982. Angie had requested some help from Absar in

connection with problems she had with another tenant.

Absar had last seen Ray on January 8, 1982, when he

collected a portion of the rent due.

In response to Angie's call, Absar went to the Boggses'

apartment on January 13, 1982. No one answered the

door. When he returned a few days later, he still could

not locate the Boggs family. On January 25, Absar

contacted Ray's employer who thought Ray had probably

left town. Absar wanted to regain possession of the

apartment. Upon the advice of an attorney, he posted a

notice on the Boggses' apartment door, mailed copies of

the notice to them and to their emergency contacts. He

received no response to his notices.

On February 17, 1982, 18 days after posting the notice,

Absar entered the apartment. He observed that the

living room had the usual furniture and that the closet

in that room contained clothes. However, the bedroom

had no furniture and no clothes. Only a mattress lay on

the floor. There were chairs and a table in the

kitchen, but one of the chairs had been broken. Absar

saw no signs of a struggle or fight. He found no money

in the apartment.

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Prior to this occasion, he had last been in the

apartment in July 1981. At that time he had noticed a

rifle hanging on the living room wall. The rifle was

gone when he entered the apartment in February 1982.

Next to the telephone, Absar found what appeared to be a

good-bye note to the Boggses. It stated something to

the effect that they were sorry to have to leave like

this but that is the way it was. Absar threw the note away.

On February 28, in cleaning up junk in the backyard of

the apartment building, Absar came across the body of

Ray Boggs wrapped in a rug or cloth. The back of the

Webster Street apartment building was on stilts. There,

underneath the Boggses' apartment, in an area which is

exposed to the elements, he saw a large bundle. At

first Absar thought it contained old clothes. He and a

friend attempted to move it but it smelled so bad and it

weighed so much that Absar realized it could not be

clothes. Absar opened the bundle up a little and saw a

person's upper arm. He called the police.

Dr. Boyd Stephens, Chief Medical Examiner for the City

and County of San Francisco, conducted the autopsy. The

body was in an advanced state of decomposition at the

time of the autopsy. Ray Boggs's body had been wrapped

in a blanket, sheet and pillows. He had been hog-tied,

i.e., the hands were tied to the feet in the front. The

obvious injury was a gunshot wound to the forehead, with

the bullet lodged in the brain. The bullet recovered

from Ray's body was a .22-caliber round. There were

ligature marks on the areas of the body which had been

tied. The bullet had not penetrated any of the bedding

wrapped around the body. It was Dr. Stephens's opinion

that Ray had been shot in one location and transported

later. The degree of decomposition observed was

consistent with January 11 being the time of death.

Inspectors Napolean Hendrix and Earl Sanders were in

charge of the Boggs homicide investigation. A few days

after the discovery of the body, the inspectors learned

that the decedent was Ray Boggs. The inspectors

interviewed the neighbors in the apartment building,

Absar, and Ray Boggs's employer, but failed to find any

leads as to possible suspects in the homicide. However,

the inspectors did learn from the neighbors or other

witnesses that the Boggs family had been missing for six

or seven weeks.

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On March 19, 1982, the inspectors received a call that

more bodies had been found at the 753 Webster Street

location. In cleaning the backyard area, one of the

residents of the apartment building came upon the bodies

of Angie Boggs and Raymond Boggs, Jr., behind a

headboard, in the filth and debris under the house. The

police had not entered that particular part of the

premises on February 28.

Angie's body had been wrapped in a blanket which one of

the neighbors recognized as belonging to the Boggs

family. She was wearing a nightie, panties and only one

slipper. The autopsy revealed that Angie's body was in

an advanced state of decomposition. A towel had been

wrapped tightly around her neck and knotted on one side.

Dr. Stephens determined Angie's death had been caused by

asphyxiation, even though any ligature marks from

strangulation had been destroyed by the decomposition

process. He also was of the opinion that she had been

killed in one location and transported to another.

Ray Boggs, Jr., was approximately one year old when he

died. He too had been wrapped in a blanket and was in

an advanced state of decomposition at the time of the

autopsy. Although Dr. Stephens classified the death as

a homicide, he could detect no apparent trauma and was

unable to determine the cause of death. He testified as

to the relative ease with which an individual could

asphyxiate a small child.

The fetus carried by Angie at the time of her death was

at approximately 30 weeks gestation and viable outside

the womb. In addition to analysis of physical

developments of the fetus, Dr. Stephens determined the

age of the fetus by comparison of X-rays taken during

the autopsy with sonograms taken during the course of

prenatal care received by Angie. The last sonogram

conducted upon Angie was on December 30, 1981, at which

time the fetus was between 27 and 28 weeks of

gestational age. In this case, information about the

fetus's age aided Dr. Stephens in establishing the time

of death for Angie. Dr. Stephens stated it was most

likely that mother and child were killed approximately

two weeks after December 30, 1981.

There was no visible sign of trauma to the fetus or to

the uterus of the mother. Dr. Stephens concluded the

fetus died because the mother died. He explained that

shortly after the death of a mother, the oxygen supply

to the fetus becomes inadequate and the fetus dies.

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 The telephone conversation with Philip Henderson was admitted

into evidence in his trial only.

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In conducting the investigation, the inspectors learned

that among the items missing from the Boggses' apartment

were Ray's rifle, a ring given to Angie by Ray for

Christmas 1981, and Ray's green panel truck. Inspector

Hendrix discovered the serial number of the rifle with

the assistance of the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms. The .22-caliber rifle had been purchased by

Ray from a sporting goods store in Redwood City.

Additionally, on March 20, 1982, the owner of a San

Francisco jewelry store contacted the police in

connection with the ring. After reading about the

homicides in the newspaper, the store owner believed he

might have sold the victim, Ray Boggs, a diamond ring

just before Christmas 1981. The address on the receipt

for the ring showed the 753 Webster Street address. The

proprietor loaned Inspector Hendrix a duplicate of the

ring. A friend of Ray's testified that Ray's father had

given him the green truck and that Ray never agreed to

let friends borrow it.

The inspectors requested from the telephone company the

telephone records for the Boggs apartment, beginning

with December 1981. After receiving the records,

Inspector Hendrix noticed that the party billed for the

Boggses' telephone was Philip Henderson. He did not

recognize the name and thought it was another alias of

Ray Boggs. The inspector knew that Ray Boggs had gone

by the name Ray Martinez in the past.

Inspector Hendrix began calling all the long-distance

and toll numbers listed on the record in order to speak

with anyone who might know the Boggs family. On April

6, 1982, Inspector Hendrix called a number in Riverview,

Florida, and spoke with Philip Henderson.1

 After

informing Henderson that he was calling in connection

with a homicide investigation, he asked whether he knew

Ray Boggs. Henderson answered that he did know a Ray

Boggs in Northern California, who had a wife or a

girlfriend. He was not sure if Ray had a baby or

whether he owned a green truck. Henderson stated that

he stayed with the Boggses in January 1982 and that he

left at the end of the first or second week of January

and hitchhiked back to Florida. He also stated that, on

Ray Boggs's request, he had deposited the money needed

with the telephone company in order to obtain a

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telephone for the apartment.

Henderson told the inspector that another couple, named

John and Pam, had also stayed with the Boggses. He

stated that this couple had left some belongings behind

which he placed in an area downstairs, the basement or

the alley. Inspector Hendrix informed Henderson of

Ray's murder and the location and manner in which the

bodies were found. He then said, "I'm sure you're

familiar with underneath the back stairs there."

Henderson replied, "Yeah, the alleyway, God." He stated

Ray had been a good friend.

Henderson also told Inspector Hendrix that he knew of

one person, Jimmy, a big, fat Black man, to whom Ray

owed money. Ray and Jimmy had an argument over the debt

shortly before Henderson left San Francisco.

Finally, Henderson agreed to call back with more

specific information about the date he left San

Francisco or any other helpful information.

The following day Inspector Sanders called again and

spoke to Philip's mother. He asked that Philip call him

back. Philip returned the call and in that

conversation, he recalled that he and his wife Velma

left San Francisco on January 11, 1982, in the evening.

Angie had left the apartment in the mid-afternoon with

the baby and had not returned. Ray returned home from

work, but left soon thereafter to look for Angie. Ray

came home without Angie before the Hendersons left the

apartment but then departed again.

In attempting to retrace the Hendersons' trip to

Florida, the inspectors contacted the Reno, Nevada,

police. Their investigation disclosed that on January

12, at 1:30 p.m., Philip Henderson had pawned Angie's

missing diamond ring in Reno. In Carlin, Nevada, the

inspectors located Ray's missing truck, which a man

identifying himself as "Wayne Henderson" had sold to the

owner of a garage in town. Also in Carlin, they spoke

with a motel owner who identified the Hendersons as a

couple to whom she had rented a room in January 1982 in

exchange for a parrot. She stated that the couple

related they were from San Francisco, had lost their

home in a mud slide and were on their way to Florida.

The truck they were driving needed some repair work and

the motel owner told Philip Henderson about a garage in

town.

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 Velma's statement was admitted into evidence at her trial.

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The inspectors learned that in Salt Lake City, Utah, the

Hendersons met a couple, Mark Koci and his girlfriend,

with whom they spent three or four days. The couple

gave the Hendersons a ride further east. Koci noticed

that the Hendersons had in their possession a bolt

action .22-caliber rifle. Some of the bullets for the

rifle had cross cuts on top. Philip Henderson told Koci

that they were on the run.

Inspectors Hendrix and Sanders arrested the Hendersons

on April 29, 1982, near Tampa, Florida, and transported

them separately to the United States Marshal's office

for processing. In an interview immediately thereafter,

Philip invoked his right to counsel and declined to

answer any questions.

After being advised of her Miranda rights (Miranda v.

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), Velma agreed to answer the

inspectors' questions.2 She stated that she and her

husband moved in with the Boggs family before Christmas

in December 1981 and left on a Monday in January 1982.

While living there, upon Ray's request, Philip Henderson

agreed to put up the cash needed to get a telephone for

the apartment.

As Philip had stated in the telephone conversation,

Velma said that Angie had left the apartment in the

afternoon with the baby and did not return. Ray came

home from work around 5 p.m., left a short while later,

returned and then left again.

According to Velma, the Hendersons packed only a portion

of their belongings, leaving the rest behind in the

Boggs apartment. Philip wrote the Boggses a note. The

two then took a bus to Berkeley where Philip had

arranged for some people to pick them up. Velma did not

recall the names of the man and woman but she stated

they drove them straight through to Salt Lake City.

Velma said she had just had a tooth pulled and was

distracted because of the pain.

The Hendersons worked in a thrift store in Salt Lake

City until they met another couple who took them to

Wyoming. Velma could not recall their names. From

Wyoming, they received a ride to Florida from a Keith

Tolzac. Velma did not recall stopping in any other

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cities, including Reno or Carlin, Nevada. She knew that

Philip had a rifle with him as they traveled across the

country but she did not know where he got it or where it

was at the time of the interrogation.

Finally, Velma stated that Angie always wore the diamond

ring Ray had given her. She also recalled that Ray had

a green parrot which he had received as a gift from Angie.

While in Florida, the inspectors learned that Philip had 

sold the rifle to Tim Beladeau, an acquaintance in

Riverview, Florida. Prior to 1982, Henderson and

Beladeau had talked about altering bullets by marking

around or across so as to shorten the projectile and

increase its expanded capacity.

A criminalist testified that the bullet retrieved from

Ray Boggs's brain was fired from a .22-caliber long

rifle. The bullet had mushroomed and was deformed. The

surface had been impacted and pushed back over the rest

of the bullet. The expert could not positively identify

the rifle taken from Beladeau as the one which had fired

the bullet. However, the identifying characteristics of

a bullet fired from the rifle were consistent with the

characteristics found on the bullet which killed Ray

Boggs. Additionally, the copper wash on the bullet

recovered from Boggs was similar to the copper wash on

the clips which were abandoned by the Hendersons in the

backseat of Koci's car.

Philip Henderson's Defense

Philip testified in his own defense at his trial. He

denied killing the Boggs family or being present when

they were killed.

According to Philip, Velma and he had recently arrived

in San Francisco when they met Angie at a Jack-In-TheBox restaurant on Market Street. They became friendly

with the Boggs family. The Hendersons were residing at

a hotel in the Tenderloin district and receiving general

assistance from the county at the time. The Boggses

asked them to move into the Webster Street apartment in

order to share living expenses. The Hendersons moved

into the Boggses' apartment on November 28, 1981.

Philip stated that the Boggses sold marijuana and

cocaine out of their apartment and that "7th Street

types," and "biker types" were often the customers. He

also testified that a man called "Hawaiian Jimmy,"

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accompanied by a large Black man, had a loud argument

with Ray over a debt owed by Ray. Jimmy beat Ray over

the head once or twice with his cane. Philip had heard

that Jimmy was associated with a motorcycle group called

the "Sons of Hawaii."

The Hendersons became frightened by the Boggses' drug

business and by the violence. Before Christmas, they

decided to leave and return to Florida where Philip's

mother resided. However, Ray asked them to stay a

little while longer until he could find another couple

to move into the apartment.

According to Philip, on January 11, 1982, he stayed home

with Velma who was suffering with a toothache. Angie

left the apartment at approximately 4:30 p.m. Ray

returned from work at about 5:30 p.m. and then left to

look for Angie. He returned an hour later and asked the

Hendersons to help him in searching for her. They

agreed and walked first to the Tenderloin district,

where Angie, a former prostitute, had some contacts.

They also searched the Jack-In-The-Box restaurant and

some nearby bars, without any luck.

When they returned to the Boggses' apartment, they found

things in disarray. No one was home. The lights were

off, but the television was on. Ray's rifle was off the

rack and leaning against the wall. His work shoes were

next to the couch. Philip walked around the block and

found Ray's green truck parked a block away. The

Hendersons became frightened by the circumstances and

decided this would be a good time to leave.

The Hendersons had little money so they decided to steal

the Boggses' property. They took Ray's truck, his

rifle, the gun pouch and clips, the parrot, and a

jewelry box. The good-bye note they left behind,

explaining that they were "skipping out" and upset about

the "situation," was meant to refer to their leaving and

the items they stole.

Philip admitted selling Angie's ring and providing a

false address when he sold her ring in Reno. He also

admitted telling false stories about being a victim of a

mud slide in order to gain sympathy. In selling Ray's

truck to the owner of a garage in Carlin, Philip lied

that his brother had title and that he would mail it

when he reached his brother's home back east. They also

traded the parrot in Carlin for three night's lodging

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and $75. He kept the rifle. He denied altering the

bullets but admitted having knowledge of how to do it.

From Carlin the Hendersons took a cab to Elko and then

caught a train to Ogden and then Salt Lake City. He

recalled meeting Koci and his girlfriend and receiving a

ride to Wyoming. However, Philip denied telling Koci

that he and Velma were in trouble.

As to his statements to Inspector Hendrix, Philip

testified he lied because he did not want to be

prosecuted for stealing Ray's truck or to be associated

with the type of people involved in this case. After

receiving the inspector's call, Philip informed Velma

that as a result of the theft they might be suspects in

the homicide investigation. He had no difficulty in

lying to Inspector Hendrix. He did not think the police

would follow him across the country for an auto theft.

Edward Ramos, also known as Hawaiian Jimmy, testified

for the prosecution on rebuttal. He admitted

threatening Ray with physical injury and explained it

concerned the failure to repay a debt. The two men had

agreed to a trade; Ramos would work on Ray's truck in

exchange for Ray fixing some windows. Ramos had

performed his part of the bargain but Ray had not. 

Ramos attempted to collect the cash value of his work. 

He did receive a $50 check from Ray on January 7, 1982. 

A few weeks later he went to the glass company to

collect the rest of the money owed. He did walk with a

cane but denied ever hitting anyone with it.

Velma Henderson's Defense

Velma did not testify in her own defense at her trial

and presented no witnesses.

People v. Henderson, A036290, 3-15 (Nov. 30, 1990) (Resp't

Ex. 4) (footnotes renumbered).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

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court unless the state court's adjudication of the claims: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under

the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The only definitive source of

clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in

the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant

state court decision. Id. at 412. 

If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson,

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532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 638 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

A. BACKGROUND

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct

by: (1) introducing false, irrelevant, and inflammatory evidence

throughout his trial; (2) committing witness tampering and

subornation of perjury; and (3) violating his attorney-client

privilege. 

His first claim regarding the introduction of false evidence

was raised on direct appeal and denied by the California Court of

Appeal in a reasoned decision. The remaining claims were raised

in his state habeas petition and were summarily denied.

B. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas

corpus. The appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of

due process and not the broad exercise of supervisory power. See

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). The right to due

process is violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a

trial "fundamentally unfair." See id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455

U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("the touchstone of due process analysis in

cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the

trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor"). A prosecutorial

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misconduct claim is decided "on the merits, examining the entire

proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d

926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1017 (1995).

When a prosecutor obtains a conviction by the use of

testimony which he or she knows or should know is perjured it has

been held consistently that such conviction must be set aside if

there is any reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have

affected the judgment of the jury. United States v. Agurs, 427

U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The same result obtains when the

prosecutor, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to

go uncorrected when it appears. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,

269 (1959). If the prosecutor knows that a witness has lied, the

prosecutor has a constitutional duty to correct the false

impression of the facts. United States v. LaPage, 231 F.3d 488,

492 (9th Cir. 2000). Prosecutors will not be held accountable

for discrepancies in testimony where there is no evidence from

which to infer prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v.

Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 945 (1995). A factual basis for attributing knowledge to

the government that the testimony was perjured must be

established. See Morales v. Woodford, 388 F.3d 1159, 1179 (9th

Cir. 2004).

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In sum, in order to prevail on a claim based on Agurs and

Napue, a petitioner must show that (1) the testimony (or

evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should

have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) the

false testimony was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339

F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269-71).

Generally, the appropriate standard, on federal habeas

corpus review of a state conviction, for determining whether a

prosecutor's misconduct requires relief is whether the error had

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury's verdict, rather than whether it was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 930. However, this

standard is inapplicable to habeas claims of a violation of a

prosecutor's duty not to present, or to correct, false evidence. 

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005). When the

prosecution allows false evidence to be presented during trial, 

the standard on habeas review is whether there is "any reasonable

likelihood" that the false evidence could have affected the

jury's judgment, that is, the standard set forth in Agurs. 

Hayes, 399 F.3d at 984. 

C. ANALYSIS

1. Claim Denied in Reasoned State Court Decision:

Prosecutorial Misconduct Based on the Presentation

of Allegedly False, Irrelevant and Inflammatory

Evidence

In determining whether the state court's decision is

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contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of

the highest state court to address the merits of a petitioner's

claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,

669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). It also looks to any lower court

decision examined or adopted by the highest state court to

address the merits. See Williams v. Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106

(9th Cir. 2004) (because state appellate court examined and

adopted some of the trial court's reasoning, the trial court's

ruling is also relevant). 

Petitioner's first prosecutorial misconduct claim relates to

the prosecutor's introduction of the following allegedly false,

irrelevant, and inflammatory evidence: (a) that Petitioner

yelled and cursed at a five-year-old African-American neighbor;

(b) that he had knowledge and possession of cross-cut bullets;

and (c) that he was involved in a white supremacist organization.

He alleges that the only value of such evidence was to help

portray him as a "violent psychopath who belongs to white

supremacists groups, engages in violent exchanges with black

children, and cross-cuts bullets to increase the amount of damage

they can do." (Pet. at 45.)

a. Testimony Regarding the Ashley Child

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct

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3

 In another section below, the Court addresses Petitioner's claim

that the Ashleys committed perjury when they testified about this

incident. See infra Discussion Part I.C.2.a.(1).

4

 California Evidence Code § 352 provides as follows: "The court

in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will

(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading

the jury." Cal. Evid. Code § 352.

California Evidence Code § 1101, provides as follows:

(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102,

1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a

trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an

opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific

instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when

offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.

(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of

evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or

other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a

prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful

sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that

the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to

commit such an act.

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by presenting the false3 and inflammatory evidence that he yelled

and "cussed out" the five-year-old child of the Boggses'

neighbors, an African-American couple named Carol and Ronald

Ashley. (Pet. at 31-34.)

The appellate court summarized the factual background of

this claim as follows:

The following circumstances surround the admission of

evidence of Philip's behavior in connection with the

Ashley child, the son of the Boggses' neighbor. Ronald

Ashley was asked by the prosecutor on redirect

examination whether he recalled an incident in which

Philip "cussed out your child and was angry at your

child, . . ." Defense counsel objected on grounds of

relevancy, and Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101.4

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(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of

evidence offered to support or attack the credibility of a

witness.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1101.

5

 The prosecutor only referred to the incident once during his

closing argument when he said, "Here's a man who earlier screams at a

five year old, then doesn't remember it. That's something you would

remember." RT 6416. 

22

The court sustained the objection on the basis that it

was beyond the scope of redirect. Then, during the

cross-examination of Philip, the prosecutor asked him

whether the incident occurred. Defense counsel's

Evidence Code section 352 objection was overruled and

he answered that he did not recall the incident. The

defense stated its continuing objection to this

testimony for the record. Thereafter, on crossexamination, the prosecutor asked Carol Ashley if she

recalled when Philip yelled at her five-year-old son. 

The defense again objected on the basis of relevancy,

and Evidence Code section 352 and 1101, by the

objection was overruled. The witness answered that she

did recall Philip Henderson yelling at her son and that

the situation got to the point where her husband had to

tell him to stop screaming at the child.

Later, outside the jury's presence, the defense

indicated its intent to recall Ronald Ashley and asked

for a rule prohibiting any further examination about

this yelling incident. The prosecutor again argued

that it went to motive, and in any event some of this

evidence had been admitted without an objection. The

court ruled that enough had been said on the subject

and "since it [has] been asked and answered I don't

expect to hear anything more about it this morning."

Resp't Ex. 4 at 32 (footnote added).

Petitioner alleges that the testimony regarding the

Ashley child caused him to be seen by the jury as a

"violent, racist sociopath who is in the habit of screaming

uncontrollably at children."5

 (Pet. at 31.) He claims that

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he was not given prior notice of the prosecutor's intent to

present this evidence during his case-in-chief. He also

argues that he did not present any character evidence to

justify this irrelevant and highly prejudicial attack on his

character.

On direct appeal, Petitioner's argument was rejected by the

appellate court as follows:

Although character evidence is inadmissible to prove a

defendant's conduct on a specified occasion, a

defendant's conduct is admissible when relevant to

prove some fact other than his or her disposition to

commit such an act, such as motive, intent or

opportunity. (Evid. Code, § 1101.) The assertion of

an admissible purpose, such as motive, is not enough to

admit the evidence of an uncharged act. Such evidence

may only be admitted where the conduct in question

serves logically, naturally and by reasonable inference

to establish the material fact. (People v. Thompson

(1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315-316.) "The court 'must look

behind the label describing the kind of similarity or

relation between the [other conduct] and the charged

offense; it must examine the precise elements of

similarity between [these two] with respect to the

issue for which the evidence is proffered and satisfy

itself that the link of the chain of inference between

the former and the latter is reasonably strong.' 

[Citation.]" (Id., at p. 316, fn. omitted.) "The

inference of a criminal disposition may not be used to

establish any link in the chain of logic connecting the

uncharged [conduct] with a material fact." (Id., at p.

317.) 

The relevance of Philip's conduct toward the Ashley

child to prove motive in this case was too attenuated. 

While admission of this evidence was error under

Evidence Code Section 1101, it was harmless. (See

People v. Williams, (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 904-910,

cert. den. sub nom. Williams v. California (1988) 488

U.S. 900.) The testimony was brief and the judge

barred any further evidence on the subject. The other

properly admitted evidence of Philip's guilt was so

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overwhelming, there is no reasonable probability that

the admission of this evidence would have altered the

result in this case.

Resp't Ex. 4 at 32-33 (brackets in original). 

The Court need not decide whether the admission of the

testimony regarding the Ashley child was error under California

law. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (A state

court's evidentiary rulings are not subject to federal habeas

review unless they violate federal law, either by infringing upon

a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by

depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed

by due process.). Even if it was, to obtain habeas relief

Petitioner must show that the admission of such evidence "rendered

the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process." See

Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 766 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Windham

v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, it did

not. The other evidence against Petitioner was abundant: he and

Velma lived with the Boggses prior to the murder; they wanted to

return to Florida but had no means; in Petitioner's own testimony,

he admitted that they had no money so they decided to steal the

Boggses' property, including Mr. Boggs's truck, his rifle, the gun

pouch and clips, the parrot, and Ms. Boggs's jewelry; it was not

speculation for the jury to conclude that robbery was in fact the

motive for the murders of the Boggses; Petitioner and Velma's time

of departure was placed directly after the murder; they fled

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6

 Petitioner's possession and knowledge of how to cross-cut

bullets was brought out by the prosecution to support its theory that

the bullet retrieved from Mr. Boggs's body had been altered by crosscutting. A criminalist testified that the bullet had mushroomed and

that altered bullets display a mushroom effect upon impact.

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across the country by selling property they stole from the

Boggses; and it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that

Petitioner stole Mr. Boggs's .22-caliber rifle and used it to

shoot him because (1) the rifle typically hung on the apartment

wall, (2) Mr. Boggs's body had been found hog-tied with one bullet

wound to his head, and (3) the ballistics evidence was consistent

with the conclusion that the bullet retrieved from Mr. Boggs's

body came from that rifle.

The appellate court's determination was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Petitioner's

prosecutorial misconduct claim fails, and his claim for habeas

relief on this basis is denied.

b. Testimony Regarding Petitioner's Knowledge and

Possession of Cross-cut Bullets

Petitioner alleges that Mark Koci and Tim Beladeau's

testimony regarding his knowledge and alleged possession of crosscut bullets was false and irrelevant; therefore, the prosecutor

committed misconduct by allowing such evidence to be admitted.6

The appellate court summarized the factual basis for

Petitioner's claim as follows:

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Philip next charges the erroneous admission of evidence

that he possessed altered bullets and had knowledge of

how to alter bullets to increase their capacity to

expand. He had challenged the admission of this

evidence in an in limine motion denied by the trial

court. The evidence came in during the testimony of

Mark Koci who stated he had found some of these crosscut bullets in his car, left behind by appellants. It

was also admitted during the testimony of Tim Beladeau

who stated that Philip and he had discussed how to

alter bullets in this fashion. On Philip's crossexamination, he admitted his knowledge of altering

bullets and having such conversations with Beladeau.

Resp't Ex. 4 at 34.

Petitioner alleges that Mr. Koci falsely testified that

Petitioner was in possession of cross-cut bullets. He also

argues that the testimony was irrelevant because the

prosecution was unable to prove that the bullet retrieved

from Mr. Boggs's body had been cross-cut. 

The appellate court found the evidence admissible as

follows:

Evidence is relevant and therefore admissible only if

it tends logically and naturally to prove or disprove a

material disputed issue in the case. (Evid. Code,

§ 210.) Philip's argument is based on the

criminalist's testimony. Although the criminalist

could not state whether the bullet retrieved from Ray

had been altered by cross-cutting, he did state that it

had mushroomed and that altered bullets have a mushroom

effect upon impact. Because the bullet in this case

had been so damaged by the impact, the criminalist was

unable to state whether or not it had been cross-cut.

Evidence of Philip's knowledge and possession of crosscut bullets was clearly relevant to the question of the

perpetrator's identity, a disputed issue in this case. 

Philip had experience with cross-cut bullets and had

possessed such bullets on his cross-country flight to

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Florida. The evidence showed these altered bullets

mushroom upon impact and that the bullet which killed

Ray Boggs had in fact mushroomed. The poor condition

of the bullet prevented the criminalist from analyzing

whether it had been altered. The jury could infer that

the mushrooming had been caused by alteration of the

bullets.

Further, we find no merit in Philip's contention that

the prejudice was greater than the probative value of

this evidence. The 'prejudice' referred to in Evidence

Code section 352 is not synonymous with 'damaging.' It

means evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an

emotional bias against defendant which has very little

effect upon the issue. (People v. Yu (1983) 143

Cal.App.3d 358, 377 cert. den. sub nom. Yu v.

California (1984) 464 U.S. 1072.) The evidence here

had significant probative value, tending to show

Philip's commission of the offenses charged. Exclusion

under Evidence Code section 352 was not warranted.

Resp't Ex. 4 at 34-35.

Here, both the trial court and the appellate court found that

the testimony regarding Petitioner's knowledge and alleged

possession of cross-cut bullets was relevant and admissible

evidence. The appellate court concluded that the challenged

evidence was relevant to the issue of the identity of the

perpetrator who murdered the Boggses, and that the admission of

the evidence did not render the trial so fundamentally unfair as

to deny Petitioner due process of law. See Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 70-75 (1991) (due process rights not violated by

admission of relevant evidence). Although the criminalist could

not state for certain that the bullet retrieved from Mr. Boggs's

body had been cross-cut, he did testify that the bullet had

mushroomed and that altered bullets mushroom after impact. The

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evidence was not prejudicial because Petitioner had fair warning

the evidence was going to be presented and an adequate opportunity

to cross-examine the witnesses who presented the evidence.

Petitioner has not shown that the state court's admission of

the evidence of his knowledge and possession of cross-cut bullets

violated any federal constitutional right or denied him a

fundamentally fair trial. Furthermore, he has not shown that Mr.

Koci's or Mr. Beladeau's testimony was false. The appellate

court's rejection of his claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Petitioner's

request for habeas relief on this claim is denied.

c. Inspector Hendrix's Testimony Regarding

Petitioner's Involvement in a White

Supremacist Organization

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct

by allowing Inspector Hendrix, an investigator for the

prosecution, to falsely testify about Petitioner's alleged

involvement in a white supremacist organization. (Pet. at 38,

43.) He contends that this evidence was false, inflammatory and

irrelevant. (Id.) He adds that it was only presented to portray

him as a racist. (Id.) 

According to the appellate court, the factual background for

the basis of this claim is as follows:

The third evidentiary objection raised by Philip

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7

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often went by the name Wayne and also used the name Wayne Hendrix.

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concerned testimony to the effect that he had received

mail in his capacity as acting chairman of the "Free

World Party," a White supremacist group. The evidence

first came in under the following circumstances. 

First, during Inspector Hendrix's examination when he

was called as a witness by the defense, he was asked

about items found in the trunk which the Hendersons had

sold in Carlin. He related the various things

retrieved, including some letters addressed to a "Wayne

Hendrix" or "Phillip Henderson." Defense counsel

showed the inspector a photograph, marked as a defense

exhibit, and asked him to identify it. The inspector

testified it was a photographic enlargement of one of

the letters found in the truck and that it was

addressed to "Reverend Wayne Hendrix, Free World Party

Chairman, 2014 West Hills Avenue, Tampa, Florida." 

Another address in Riverview, Florida, was also written

on the envelope.

Then when examined by the prosecutor, Inspector Hendrix

was asked if he knew whom "Reverend Wayne Hendrix"

referred and the inspector replied that it referred to

Philip Henderson.7 He was then asked to what "Free

World Party" referred. The inspector stated that it

was a White supremacy group. The defense moved to

strike the statement and thereafter, outside the jury's

presence, moved for a mistrial. The court denied the

motion, noting that the address on this envelope,

including the name of the organization, was first

elicited on the defense's own examination. The court

stated that any favorable inference which the jury

might draw from the evidence that Philip was a reverend

could be countered by evidence of the nature of the

organization involved. (See Evid. Code, § 356.) After

a voir dire of the inspector on the basis of his

knowledge that this was white supremacist group, the

court ruled that there would be no further questioning

on this subject. Further, he stated an admonition to

disregard the reference to a White supremacist group

would leave the jury with the impression that Philip

was a reverend and therefore of high moral character.

Resp't Ex. 4 at 35-37 (footnote renumbered).

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 The appellate court found that the evidence should not have

been admitted by the trial court without foundation or a showing

of an exception to the hearsay rule:

In its brief, Philip's counsel suggests the court

should have denied admission of any evidence that he

was an ordained minister, and refused admission of the

defense exhibit, thereby precluding the prosecutor from

examining on the meaning of the Free World Party. We

agree that without any foundation or showing of any

exception to the hearsay rule, the reference to Philip

as a reverend should not have been admitted for the

truth of the matter.

Id. at 37. However, the appellate court concluded that

Petitioner was estopped from claiming any error on direct appeal,

and that, in any event, he was not prejudiced by the admission of

this evidence:

[A]s the evidence was introduced during Philip's own

examination of Inspector Hendrix, he is estopped from

charging error in its admission on appeal as it was

"invited" by him. (People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d

755, 762, citing Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966)

§ 1286, p. 1189.) In addition, the one sentence

reference to "White supremacy group" in a trial in

which race was not even a remote issue did not cause

prejudicial error.

Id.

In his federal petition, Petitioner alleges that the

prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing the evidence

because there was no independent evidence presented to

corroborate Inspector Hendrix's testimony. He claims that

Inspector Hendrix should not be believed because he committed

perjury during another portion of his testimony. Inspector

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Hendrix testified that the person he spoke to at the radio

station stated Petitioner was a regular caller. RT 6025. 

Petitioner attaches two letters from a radio station in Tampa,

Florida (WMNF 88.5). The first letter, dated June 16, 1991, was

written by Gregory E. Musselman, who stated that neither of the

two employees who worked at the station in 1982 recalled making

any allegations against Petitioner to any authorities. Pet'r Ex.

C6. The second letter, dated September 3, 1996, is from the same

radio station. Id. The letter states that from 1979 to 1986 the

station did not have a public call-in show because the necessary

equipment for such a show was not installed until 1987. Id.

Petitioner claims these letters prove that Inspector Hendrix

committed perjury. 

Even assuming that Inspector Hendrix committed perjury, the

Court finds that Petitioner fails to meet his burden to show that

habeas relief is warranted on this claim because there is no

reasonable likelihood that Inspector Hendrix's brief reference to

a "White supremacy group" could have affected the judgment of the

jury. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (conviction which prosecutor

obtained by knowing use of perjured testimony must be set aside

if there is any reasonable likelihood that testimony could have

affected the judgment of the jury). The appellate court found no

prejudice in the admission of Inspector Hendrix's testimony

because it was not likely that the evidence affected the jury's

verdict in that the race of Petitioner and the Boggses was not at

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issue. 

The appellate court's rejection of this claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Therefore, this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

2. Claims Denied Summarily by State Court

Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its

decision on a petitioner's federal claim and there is no reasoned

lower court decision on the claim, a review of the record is the

only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was

objectively reasonable. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853

(9th Cir. 2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir.

2002). When confronted with such a decision, a federal court

should conduct "an independent review of the record" to determine

whether the state court's decision was an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See Himes, 336

F.3d at 853; accord Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16

(9th Cir. 2004). The court need not otherwise defer to the state

court decision: "A state court's decision on the merits

concerning a question of law is, and should be, afforded respect. 

If there is no such decision on the merits, however, there is

nothing to which to defer." Greene, 288 F.3d at 1089. 

Nonetheless, "while we are not required to defer to a state

court's decision when that court gives us nothing to defer to, we

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must still focus primarily on Supreme Court cases in deciding

whether the state court's resolution of the case constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." 

Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2001). 

a. Prosecutorial Misconduct Based on Witness

Tampering and Subornation of Perjury

Petitioner's second claim of prosecutorial misconduct is

that the prosecutor "suborned perjury from witnesses whose

initial statements did not fit the prosecution's theory of the

case," including the testimony of: (1) Ronald and Carol Ashley;

(2) Ana Caquias, a defense witness; (3) Ilyas Absar, the Boggses'

landlord; and (4) Edward "Hawaiian Jimmy" Ramos. (Pet. at 56.) 

1) Ronald and Carol Ashley's Testimony

Petitioner alleges that the inspectors persuaded the Ashleys

to fabricate their testimony about Petitioner screaming at their

five-year-old child and to change their testimony about the date

they last saw the Boggses. (Id. at 52.) According to

Petitioner, the Ashleys did not mention the incident involving

their child during the preliminary hearing, and the fact that the

Ashleys' testimony changed in a manner favorable to the

prosecution was enough to make a "prima facie presupposition of

witness tampering." (Id. at 52, 56-57.) 

The record shows that the preliminary hearing testimony of

the Ashleys did not contain any mention of the incident between

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Petitioner and their child. Furthermore, they were more certain

about the last date they saw the Boggses when they testified

during the trial. However, such allegations are insufficient to

show that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suborning

perjury. First, the Ashleys were not specifically asked about

any incident involving Petitioner and their child during the

preliminary hearing. During the hearing, their testimony focused

on the last time they saw the Boggses alive. Although their

trial testimony differed somewhat from their testimony at the

preliminary hearing, Petitioner has not shown that their

testimony was actually false or that the prosecutor knew or

should have known that it was false. See Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at

889. Accordingly, this claim for habeas relief fails because the

Court finds that the state court's denial of his claim on this

issue was objectively reasonable. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

2) Ana Caquias's Testimony

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct

by tampering with defense witness Ana Caquias. (Pet. at 57-64.) 

Ms. Caquias lived with the Boggses in the summer of 1981, and she

moved out in October, 1981. (RT 5741-5742.) Petitioner claims

that Ms. Caquias's testimony significantly changed between the

time she gave her initial statement to the police and when she

testified during trial.

During her audio-taped interview with police right after Mr.

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Boggs's body was discovered, Ms. Caquias made several statements

about threats made to Mr. Boggs. She stated that she overheard

an argument between Mr. Boggs and a man named Sonny Barger, a

member of the Hell's Angels. Pet'r Ex. B2 at 1-3. She also

stated that Ms. Boggs felt that it would be better for her to

leave because she felt like "there was some danger" and that the

Boggses left town for a while because Mr. Boggs's life had been

threatened. Id. at 4, 6. During the interview, Ms. Caquias told

police that Mr. Boggs was threatened in her presence on at least

three occasions. Id. 

Ms. Caquias also testified about the altercation between Mr.

Boggs and Sonny Barger at preliminary hearings prior to trial. 

RT 5744-5745. However, she claimed that after the second

preliminary hearing a man named William Freeman "beat [her] up"

because of her testimony during the hearing. RT 5755-5756.

During Petitioner's trial, Ms. Caquias was called as a

defense witness. She testified that she lied about seeing Mr.

Barger threaten Mr. Boggs and that she fabricated everything she

said during the audio-taped interview with the police. RT 5743,

5746-5748, 5753, 5759-5764, 5778-5782, 5798. She also testified

that she was taking methamphetamine during the police interview. 

RT 5802. Even though Ms. Caquias was a defense witness, the

prosecutor agreed to give her immunity if she testified. RT

5739.

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8

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that he was "unavailable to commit the murders" after 1:32 p.m. on

January 12, 1982. (Traverse at 34.) The record shows that police

investigation revealed that Petitioner had pawned Ms. Boggs's ring in

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The Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that the

prosecutor committed misconduct by tampering with Ms. Caquias's

testimony at his trial. Ms. Caquias was a defense witness and

the prosecutor gave her immunity from any charges relating to her

testimony, including her methamphetamine use. RT 5802. 

Petitioner's defense attorney was allowed to thoroughly impeach

her using the tape she made when interviewed by police. The jury

was then able to judge her credibility for themselves based on

the evidence presented at trial.

Because Petitioner fails to show that the record supports

his assertion of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to Ms.

Caquias and her testimony, the Court finds that the state court's

denial of his claim on this issue was objectively reasonable. 

See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Therefore, Petitioner's claim for

habeas relief is denied to the extent it is based on this claim.

3) Dr. Ilyas Absar's Testimony

Petitioner alleges prosecutorial misconduct because the

prosecutor induced Dr. Absar, who owned the apartment rented by

the Boggses, to give false testimony at trial regarding the date

of his last contact with the Boggses. The date upon which Dr.

Absar last had contact with the Boggses was an important issue at

Petitioner's trial.8 Petitioner alleges that the police convinced

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Reno at 1:32 p.m. on January 12, 1982. RT 5119. 

9

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inspectors asked Dr. Absar, "Angie had called you, but it was on a

Wednesday?" Pet'r Ex. B3 at 3. After Dr. Absar confirmed that as

correct, the inspector asked, "Could it have been Wednesday the 6th?"

Id. Dr. Absar responded, "No, it was either the 13th or the 20th,

more likely the 13th." Id. According to Petitioner, Dr. Absar also

told a defense investigator in November, 1982 that he was ninety

percent sure that the last time he spoke with Ms. Boggs was between

January 13th and the 20th. (Pet. at 48.)

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Dr. Absar to change his testimony and that the prosecutor

presented such testimony despite knowing it was false. He states,

"The likelihood that the prosecution had nothing to do with the

change, given the totality of the circumstances in this case, is

remote." (Pet. at 51.)

Dr. Absar first told police that he had last spoken with Ms.

Boggs on January 13, 1982, when she requested that he come and

speak with the Ashleys about leaving their son's tricycle in the

hallway.9

 (Pet. at 48.)

Dr. Absar's testimony changed when he testified during the

trial. On direct, he testified that when he had given the date of

January 13, 1982 as the last time he had spoken to Ms. Boggs, he

was basing that on the dates noted in his rent receipt book. RT

4161. He stated that when he got the call from Ms. Boggs he was

unable to go to the Webster Street apartment building until two

days after her call. RT 4161. He had rent receipts from other

tenants in the building showing that he was at the Webster Street

apartment building on January 15 and 22. RT 4161. Therefore, he

deduced that January 13 or 20 were the two possible days he could

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have spoken with Ms. Boggs. RT 4161. Dr. Absar testified that he

was informed by defense counsel that the precise date was "very

important," RT 4163, and he was extensively questioned about the

date during the preliminary hearing, RT 4166. Therefore, he

attempted to find ways to verify the date of Ms. Boggs's call. RT

4163-4166. He contacted the two people he had dinner with the

night of the phone call. RT 4167. After contacting them, he

changed his testimony to reflect that the date he got Ms. Boggs's

call was on January 11, 1982. RT 4167. The prosecutor

subsequently called Susan Moss, one of the individuals with whom

Dr. Absar had dinner, as a witness at trial. RT 4765. She

testified that she recalled the date of the dinner was January 11,

1982 because she had marked it in her datebook. RT 4766.

Petitioner's claim falls short because he has not established

that the testimony given by Dr. Absar was perjured. Although Dr.

Absar changed his testimony, Petitioner has offered no evidence

that Dr. Absar purposely fabricated his testimony. Dr. Absar gave

a reasonable explanation of how he determined the correct date he

received Ms. Boggs's call. There was no indication from the

record, or any evidence produced by Petitioner, that Dr. Absar

gave false trial testimony. Therefore, the Court finds no support

for Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim relating to the

prosecutor's tampering with Dr. Absar's testimony because "mere

inconsistencies in testimony by government witnesses do not

establish knowing use of false testimony." Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d

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320, 343 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d at 1423 (no

evidence of prosecutorial misconduct where discrepancies in

testimony could as easily flow from errors in recollection as from

lies). The Court finds that the state court's denial of

Petitioner's claim on this issue was objectively reasonable. See

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Accordingly, his claim for habeas relief

based on this claim is denied. 

4) Edward "Hawaiian Jimmy" Ramos's Testimony

Petitioner claims: (a) that Hawaiian Jimmy committed perjury

during his testimony; (b) that the prosecutor should not have been

allowed to make a "dramatic" demonstration during the trial with

Hawaiian Jimmy's cane; and (c) that the prosecutor erroneously

vouched for the credibility of Hawaiian Jimmy. 

a) Perjured Testimony

During his trial testimony, Hawaiian Jimmy admitted that he

threatened Mr. Boggs for failing to repay a debt. The prosecutor

called Hawaiian Jimmy during his rebuttal case. The following

exchange took place during his direct examination:

Q: Did you ever threaten to use physical force on him? 

A: Yes.

Q: Were you serious about it at the time?

A: Yes.

RT 6173. However, the part of his testimony that Petitioner

claims is perjured relates to whether Hawaiian Jimmy actually hit

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Mr. Boggs over the head with his cane. Petitioner had testified

that Hawaiian Jimmy not only threatened Mr. Boggs but he actually

hit him over the head with a cane. He stated that Hawaiian Jimmy

came over to Mr. Boggs's house and "during the course of [an]

argument, almost toward the end of the argument he beat Ray over

the head once or twice with his cane." RT 5223. During direct

examination, Hawaiian Jimmy stated that although he threatened to

use physical force on Mr. Boggs, he never hit him over the head

with his cane. RT 6174. 

Petitioner claims that Hawaiian Jimmy committed perjury when

he denied beating Mr. Boggs; however, Petitioner can only support

this claim with his own testimony that he had witnessed the

beating. The jury was able to consider the testimony of

Petitioner and compare it to that of Hawaiian Jimmy in order to

make a credibility determination as to whom to believe. 

Therefore, Petitioner fails to show that the record supports his

assertion of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to this issue.

b) Cane Demonstration

Hawaiian Jimmy testified that he had the cane he brought with

him to trial since approximately April, 1981. RT 6174. He stated

that he weighed about two-hundred and sixty pounds; therefore, he

used a cane that was made from one-inch galvanized pipe. RT 6174-

75. During Hawaiian Jimmy's testimony, the prosecutor "slammed

the cane down on one of the court's tables." RT 6175. The judge

stated that "it made a heck of a noise." RT 6175. The cane was

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not entered into evidence but it was passed to the jury. RT 6174. 

In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "That cane clearly

demonstrates Hawaiian Jimmy never banged anyone on the head." RT

6289. Petitioner alleges that there was no foundation offered for

the demonstration or to prove that the cane Hawaiian Jimmy had in

court was the only cane that he possessed. (Pet. at 54.) 

Petitioner fails to offer proof that the demonstration with

the cane was an error that denied him a fundamentally fair trial

as guaranteed by due process. Even if the demonstration was a

violation of state evidentiary rules, defense counsel failed to

object and a violation of state evidentiary rules does not

automatically render a trial fundamentally unfair. See Jammal v.

Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, Petitioner did not allege, and the Court does not find,

any constitutional right that was violated by the cane

demonstration. Furthermore, defense counsel had the opportunity

to cross-examine Hawaiian Jimmy about his cane. Therefore, the

Court finds that the cane demonstration, in itself, did not

preclude Petitioner from having a fair trial.

c) Prosecutorial Vouching

Petitioner alleges that during the prosecutor's closing

argument he erroneously vouched for the credibility of Hawaiian

Jimmy. 

A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness. 

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United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 1986)

(improper to suggest that witness found credible by the grand jury

should therefore be credible to the trial jury), cert. denied, 481

U.S. 1030 (1987). Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a

prosecutor vouches for the credibility of a witness by giving

personal assurances of the witness's truthfulness or suggesting

that there is information not presented to the jury which supports

the witness's testimony. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.

78, 86-88 (1935); see also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339,

359-60 n.15 (1958). Such vouching is misconduct because it poses

two dangers: it may lead the jury to convict on the basis of

evidence not presented, and it carries with it the imprimatur of

the government. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18

(1985). To warrant habeas relief, prosecutorial vouching must so

infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d

628, 644 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

During the prosecutor's closing argument he stated, 

Hawaiian Jimmy is the kind of guy that you might not take

home for dinner. He is the type of guy that you met in the

bar and he bought you a drink you would be, probably would

have a hell of a good time with him. He is honest, he is

forthright.

RT 6289.

The statements made by the prosecutor in this case are

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similar to the comments of the prosecutor in Johnson v. Sublett,

63 F.3d at 930. In Johnson, the prosecutor stated, "He . . . is a

credible witness. He was telling you the truth." Id. The

prosecutor in Johnson conceded that the vouching constituted an

error. Id. The only question before the Ninth Circuit was

whether or not the vouching constituted reversible error. The

Ninth Circuit stated:

If [the witness's] credibility were the linchpin of the

state's case, the prosecutor's unfortunate endorsement

of [the witness] would have constituted reversible

error in the Arizona courts. However, in the present

case, there was a great mass of evidence against the

defendant . . . . Considering the strength of the

state's case, the prosecutor's overreaching could not

have had the substantial impact on the verdict

necessary to establish reversible constitutional error.

Id. (citation omitted).

Even if the prosecutor erroneously vouched for the

credibility of Hawaiian Jimmy during his closing argument, the

Court must find that such an error so infected Petitioner's trial

that the resulting conviction was a denial of due process in order

to warrant habeas relief. Woodford, 384 F.3d at 644. As in

Johnson, the credibility of Hawaiian Jimmy was not the "linchpin"

of the prosecution's case, even though Petitioner claims that

Hawaiian Jimmy could be responsible for the murder of the Boggses.

The Court finds that Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the

prosecutor's endorsement of Hawaiian Jimmy's credibility resulted

in a denial of a fair trial.

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Accordingly, the state court's denial of Petitioner's

prosecutorial misconduct claim on the above issues relating to

Hawaiian Jimmy's testimony was not objectively unreasonable. See

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Thus, his claim for habeas relief based

on these claims is denied.

b. Prosecutorial Misconduct Based on the

Violation of Attorney-Client Privilege

Petitioner alleges that his right to a fair trial was

violated because the prosecution breached his attorney-client

privilege. He alleges that the prosecution: (1) had access to

the computer database of the Public Defender's Office and obtained

confidential information relating to his defense at trial; 

(2) used this access improperly to obtain his psychiatric records

and Children's Service Agency records; (3) seized letters that he

sent to Velma while in jail; and (4) monitored his conversations

with defense counsel at the jail. 

Standing alone, the attorney-client privilege is merely a

rule of evidence; it has not been held a constitutional right. 

Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986). In some situations, however,

government interference with the confidential relationship between

a defendant and his counsel may implicate Sixth Amendment rights. 

See id. 

A petitioner must show, at a minimum, that the intrusion was

purposeful, that there was communication of defense strategy to

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the prosecution, or that the intrusion resulted in tainted

evidence. United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1067 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558

(1977)). Such an intrusion violates the Sixth Amendment only when

it substantially prejudices the defendant. Danielson, 325 F.3d at

1069; see also United States v. Green, 962 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir.

1992); United States v. Hernandez, 937 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir.

1991). Substantial prejudice results from the introduction of

evidence, gained through the intrusion, against the defendant at

trial, from the prosecution's use of confidential information

pertaining to defense plans and strategy, and from other actions

designed to give the prosecution an unfair advantage at trial. 

Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1069-70.

 1) Access to Confidential Information

Relating to His Defense at Trial

Petitioner alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct and

violated his Sixth Amendment rights by gaining access to

Petitioner's confidential files. These files were stored on the

computer database of the Public Defender's Office, which was part

of the Wang computer system shared by several criminal justice

agencies. This alleged violation of the attorney-client

relationship was raised in a motion to dismiss filed on February

25, 1985. Resp't Ex. 10 at 1674-1689. Specifically, the motion

asserts that:

. . . Lt. Thomas Sutmeyer of the [San Francisco] Police

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10 Lt. Suttmeier's last name was incorrectly spelled as "Sutmeyer"

in the motion to dismiss. Resp't Ex. 11 at 3.

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Department's Planning and Research Division secretly

gained access to the libraries containing all the

documents produced by the Public Defender's word

processing equipment. Lt. Sutmeyer did not inform the

Public Defender of the Hall of Justice Wang Committee

of this access. The Public Defender did not have an

opportunity to remove sensitive documents from the

system or to use another method of transcription.

Id. at 1676 (brackets added). At an in camera hearing in support

of the motion, defense counsel identified a number of documents

pertaining to Petitioner's case that may or may not have been in

the computer database of the Public Defender's Office at the time

Lt. Suttmeier10 conducted his investigation. Pet'r Ex. E1 at 1-77. 

However, while the motion raised concerns that communications

regarding Petitioner's trial tactics and defenses might have been

compromised, it failed to show actual proof that Lt. Suttmeier

accessed or allowed the prosecution access to any of Petitioner's

files:

At this point the defense does not yet know if Lt.

Sutmeyer in fact penetrated, or allowed anyone else to

penetrate, the Public Defender's libraries and whether

he or someone else read the files. However, we do know

that he either requested or at least did not object to

obtaining access to these files.

Resp't Ex. 10 at 1679.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Lt. Suttmeier

testified that he and two others that he supervised, Management

Assistant Richard Curtis and Officer Thomas Strong, had access to

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all of the libraries of the individual criminal justice agencies

in San Francisco, including the Public Defender's Office. Resp't

Ex. 11 at 5-6. He claimed that he was investigating "personal

abuse" and inappropriate use of the computer database. Id. at 9-

10. When asked about whether he investigated the library used by

the Public Defender's Office, he stated:

The allegations were that lawyers within the

Public Defender's Office were using [the computer

database] for their own personal use or legal staff so

doing the same, perhaps the District Attorney. The

rumors were quite pervasive. They were not of my

immediate concern. Me, not having supervision over

those functions.

The allegations that I was interested in was that

the police sergeant who created the system some four or

five years ago was using the system inappropriately. 

Id. (brackets added). Lt. Suttmeier denied accessing any files

from the Public Defender's Office stating, "I told you I didn't

look for any improprieties in the Public Defender's system. I did

absolutely nothing with none -- any of [their] data. I didn't

even read the titles." Id. at 14-15 (brackets added); see also

id. at 118 ("I have never ever looked into [the Public Defender's

Office's] files not anyone other than police department files.").

Joseph Campanella, the Wang computer system administrator,

testified that Lt. Suttmeier would have been unable, at the level

of training and experience he had then, to operate the word

processing system used to access any of the files in the computer

database. Id. at 214.

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The trial court denied the motion to dismiss upon finding Lt.

Suttmeier's lack of expertise prevented him from having access to

the files on the computer database of the Public Defender's

Office:

I believe Lieutenant Suttmeier when he testified

and I so find beyond a reasonable doubt -- that he

himself could not operate the computer with sufficient

expertise, not to do it without calling for his

assistants who, by any account, clearly did have that

technical ability.

Id. at 266.

In his federal petition, Petitioner alleges that Lt.

Suttmeier's unrestricted access to files from the Public

Defender's office violated his attorney-client relationship. He

argues that the trial court's determination of the facts was

erroneous by stating that "prosecutorial misconduct in the instant

case clearly shows that the prosecution illegally accessed, and

utilized, confidential information protected by attorney-client

privilege." (Traverse at 6.) 

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes

that the state court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Section 2254(d)(2) applies

to intrinsic review of a state court's process. Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). An unreasonable

determination of the facts occurs where the state court fails to

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consider and weigh highly probative, relevant evidence, central to

the petitioner's claim, that was properly presented and made part

of the state court record. Id. at 1005. The relevant question

under § 2254(d)(2) is whether an appellate panel, applying the

normal standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude

that the state court findings are supported by the record. 

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, the trial court addressed in detail Petitioner's claim

of a violation of his attorney-client privilege. After conducting

a hearing on the motion to dismiss with testimony by several

witnesses, it found no bad motive in Lt. Suttmeier's actions and

that he did not have sufficient expertise to access any files on

his own. Resp't Ex. 11 at 266. This Court has reviewed the

record upon which the trial court relied and finds that the

court's conclusion was not based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the motion to

dismiss and at the in camera hearing. Furthermore, even if

Petitioner were able to show that the attorney-client relationship

had been intruded upon, he made no showing of substantial

prejudice to his defense as a result of any such intrusion. See

Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1069. 

Because the state court's rejection of Petitioner's claim was

not objectively unreasonable, see Himes, 336 F.3d at 853, or based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings, 28 U.S.C.

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11 The Edgemeade School is a residential treatment center for

emotionally "disturbed" teenagers. Resp't Ex. 12 at 8.

12 The issue before the Court is not the legality of the search

for, or seizure of, Petitioner's records. These issues were fully

litigated by Petitioner in state court and "where the State has

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas

corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an

unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976). Here, Petitioner is

arguing that the prosecutor committed misconduct by accessing the

database and improperly obtaining Petitioner's records.

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§ 2254(d)(2), this claim for habeas corpus relief is denied.

2) Access to Petitioner's Records

Petitioner claims that because of Lt. Suttmeier's access to

the computer database of the Public Defender's Office, the

prosecution improperly obtained Petitioner's psychiatric records

and Children's Service Agency records. The records that related

to his mental health were obtained from the Edgemeade School11 in

Texas, and the other records came from the Children's Service

Agency in New Jersey.

Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the records, any

reports or memos made by the prosecution relating to the memos,

and a taped interview with Mr. Slater, an employee of the

Edgemeade School.12 At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the

prosecution's investigator testified that he became aware of the

possible existence of the records after Petitioner's mother was

deposed -- prior to the time Lt. Suttmeier had access to the

computer database of the Public Defender's Office. Resp't Ex. 12

at 23-24. The trial court suppressed the New Jersey records and

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"municipal Court subpoena signed by the District Attorney himself and

not by any court" to produce the Texas records. Resp't Ex. 12 at 145-

146.

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ordered them returned in their sealed condition. Id. at 146-154. 

The court also suppressed the Texas records upon finding that they

were privileged and that the privilege was violated by the manner

in which they were obtained.13 (Id. at 145-146, 153-155.) The

court also ordered that the taped interview with Mr. Slater be

suppressed as well as all copies or summaries of copies of the

records that the prosecution may have prepared from the records. 

(Id. at 153). Finally, the court ordered the prosecutor to

establish at trial that no questions asked of witnesses were

derived from knowledge of the suppressed records. (Id. at 155.)

Petitioner argues that Lt. Suttmeier's access to the computer

database of the Public Defender's Office led the prosecutor to

obtain his psychiatric records and Children's Service Agency

records. Even if such records were improperly obtained, the trial

court suppressed these records and thus there is no showing that

any evidence produced at trial was based on or derived from the

improperly obtained records. Moreover, there is no showing of

prejudice to Petitioner because, as defense counsel conceded

during the in camera hearing, the documents at issue and "most of

the documents" contained in the computer database of the Public

Defender's Office were relevant to the penalty phase strategy

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14 At the in camera hearing, Petitioner's defense counsel

suggested another option for the Court to consider if it chose not to

dismiss the entire case: 

I want to suggest to the Court, at this in camera

session, that one remedy which is appropriate in Mr.

Henderson's case would be if the Court is not going to

dismiss this case in its entirety is to dismiss the

special circumstance allegation because I would like to

represent to the Court that most of the documents, but

not all of them, a lot of the documents in there relate

to the penalty phase strategy. 

Pet'r Ex. E1 at 76.

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rather than to trial strategy.14 Pet'r Ex. E1 at 76.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the state court's

rejection of Petitioner's claim involving improper access to his

records was not objectively unreasonable. See Himes, 336 F.3d at

853. Accordingly, this claim for relief is denied. 

3) Seizure of Letters Between Petitioner and

Velma

Petitioner alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by

violating his attorney-client privilege when the San Francisco

Sheriff's Department (SFSD) monitored and photocopied letters

between Petitioner and Velma, his wife and co-defendant, while

they were in jail awaiting trial. He claims that photocopies of

these letters were passed on to the investigators for the

prosecution and eventually to the prosecutor.

Petitioner alleges a violation of attorney-client privilege

because information pertaining to his defense strategy was

communicated in those letters. Petitioner filed a motion to

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15 The Court notes that neither Petitioner nor Respondent has

provided the Court with the outcome of Petitioner's motion to suppress

the letters. Respondent's Exhibit 13 contains only excerpts of the

hearing on the motion. Resp't Ex. 13 at 93-119, 453-466, 484-488.

However, the issue before the Court is not the legality of the search

for, or seizure of, Petitioner's letters because a state prisoner may

not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was

introduced at his trial. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-95.

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suppress the letters.15 

During the hearing on the motion, SFSD Sergeant Keith A.

Thompson testified that they started intercepting Petitioner's

mail because some of the letters exchanged between Petitioner and

Velma were written in code and contained diagrams of the jail or a

jail cell, which raised concerns about jail and courthouse

security. Resp't Ex. 13. at 93, 97. Sergeant Thompson stated

that the jail did not have the facilities for deciphering the

code; therefore, he contacted Ron Huberman, an investigator for

the prosecution. Id. at 112. Sergeant Thompson testified that

Mr. Huberman asked for copies of Petitioner's letters to be sent

to him. Id. at 113. Sergeant Thompson estimated that he reviewed

three months of correspondence, which totaled about ninety

letters. Id. at 111. He testified that he forwarded copies of

all these letters to Mr. Huberman. Id. at 114. About a month or

two after they started intercepting Petitioner's mail, Sergeant

Thompson testified, he was informed that the "codes had been

broken down" by Mr. Huberman and that "there was nothing in the

coded sections that had anything to do with any county jail plans

for escape." Id. at 115-16. He ordered that the letters no

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longer be intercepted, and he stopped making copies for Mr.

Huberman. Id. at 116. 

Although the attorney-client privilege does not protect

communications between a defendant and his wife, Petitioner claims

that the letters contained information about their defense

strategies. (Pet. at 145.) A prosecutor's access to defense

strategies could amount to a violation of the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel. See Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1067 (holding that

defendant made a prima facie showing that his Sixth Amendment

right to counsel was threatened when the prosecution intentionally

obtained access to defense strategies). Here, however, Petitioner

has failed to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor

gained access to his defense strategies. 

Petitioner has not provided the Court with specific

information on what defense strategies were actually in the

letters. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491-92 (9th Cir.

1990) (a petitioner must state his claims with sufficient

specificity). Therefore, his conclusory allegations that the

prosecutor gained access to his defense strategies based on the

investigator's access to his letters are insufficient to warrant

habeas relief. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir.

1995) (conclusory allegations not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief).

Because Petitioner's conclusory allegations fail to establish

that there was any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor, the

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16 Petitioner's sworn statement does not contain any information

about his belief that the jail's attorney-client interview rooms were

also monitored.

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Court finds that the state court's denial of his prosecutorial

misconduct claim was not objectively unreasonable. See Himes, 336

F.3d at 853. Therefore, Petitioner's claim for relief on this

issue is denied.

4) Monitoring Attorney-Client Conversations

Petitioner alleges that his attorney-client privilege was

violated because the jail pay phones and the attorney-client

interview rooms were monitored. 

In a sworn affidavit attached to his petition, Petitioner

states his belief that the jail pay phones were monitored.16 Pet'r

Ex. E2 at 1-4. He states that he was told that a fellow inmate

made threatening comments while on one of the jail pay phones and

"within minutes of the conversation" SFSD officers arrived and

demanded that the inmate who made the threatening comments

surrender himself. Id. at 2. He claims that he asked one of the

officers about the incident and that he was informed that the

calls on jail pay phones were recorded. Id. at 2-3. 

The Court will assume, for the purposes of Petitioner's

claim, that the jail pay phones and the attorney-client interview

rooms were monitored. Petitioner's claim still fails. He has

provided the Court with no specific allegations as to how he was

prejudiced by such an intrusion. His claim is no more than a

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conclusory assertion lacking any factual detail or reference to

the record. See Hendricks, 908 F.2d at 491-92. He has alleged no

facts which demonstrate that his preparation for trial was

prejudiced by virtue of the monitored conversations, a necessary

element to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See

Smith, 455 U.S. at 219 ("the touchstone of due process analysis in

cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the

trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor"). 

Without the requisite showing of prejudice, Petitioner has

failed to substantiate his allegation of prosecutorial misconduct

based on a violation of his attorney-client relationship. 

Accordingly, the Court denies habeas relief as to this claim

because the state court's denial of this claim was objectively

reasonable. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853.

D. CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not shown that the prosecutor committed

misconduct which rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The

denial of his prosecutorial misconduct claims by the state court

was not objectively unreasonable. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

Accordingly, his claims for habeas relief based on prosecutorial

misconduct are denied. 

II. ACTUAL INNOCENCE

A. BACKGROUND

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In an Order dated March 6, 2006, the Court allowed Petitioner

to proceed with his claim of actual innocence only to the extent

that it was based on the allegations related to his prosecutorial

misconduct claims. (Mar. 6, 2006 Order at 15.) In his traverse,

Petitioner states that "an objective consideration of the

uncontroverted evidence, once purged of the fabrication and

perjury complained-of herein, clearly shows that Petitioner is

actually innocent of the charges against him, and is entitled to

issuance of the writ of habeas corpus." (Traverse at 6.) 

B. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW

Although actual innocence may be grounds to excuse a

procedural default, see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995),

in the absence of constitutional error it is not in itself

sufficient for federal habeas relief, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.

390, 404 (1993).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that after

Herrera there can be no habeas relief based solely on a

petitioner's claim of actual innocence of the crime. See Coley v.

Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995) (although actual

innocence is not itself a claim, it can be a gateway through which

a habeas petitioner may pass to have his otherwise procedurally

barred constitutional claim considered on the merits); Swan v.

Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 C. ANALYSIS

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In its prior Order, the Court allowed Petitioner to proceed

with all of his asserted claims that were not time-barred. 

However, while Petitioner's assertion that he is actually innocent

of the charges against him is not time-barred, it also does not

present a constitutionally cognizable claim for relief.

In deciding Herrera, the Supreme Court "assume[d], for the

sake of argument . . . , that in a capital case a truly persuasive

demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render

the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal

habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a

claim." 506 U.S. at 417. This is a "freestanding" actual

innocence claim, in which the petitioner argues that the evidence

sufficiently establishes his innocence, irrespective of any

constitutional error at trial or sentencing. See Carriger v.

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The

petitioner's burden in such a case is "'extraordinarily high,'"

and requires a showing that is "'truly persuasive.'" See id.

(quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417). However, Petitioner's case

is not a capital case; therefore, it does not come within the

limited exception mentioned in Herrera. 506 U.S. at 417.

Petitioner has not shown that the state court's denial of his

actual innocence claim was objectively unreasonable. See Himes,

336 F.3d at 853. Without a Supreme Court case establishing a

constitutional right, Petitioner cannot show that the state court

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17 In his traverse, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing and

appointment of counsel. However, an evidentiary hearing is not

necessary because Petitioner fails "to show what more an evidentiary

hearing might reveal of material import on his assertion of actual

innocence." Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)

(the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

an evidentiary hearing on actual innocence was unnecessary).

Furthermore, the Court has found that Petitioner's allegation that he

is actually innocent provides no independent basis for federal habeas

relief. Thus, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, and his

request is DENIED. In part because the Court has found that an

evidentiary hearing is not necessary, his request for appointment of

counsel is DENIED.

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denied him that right. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

the writ on this claim.17

III. CUMULATIVE ERROR

A. BACKGROUND

Petitioner claims that the cumulative effect of all of the

foregoing asserted errors caused his trial to be fundamentally

unfair in violation of his right to due process. This claim was

not raised on direct appeal, and the state supreme court summarily

denied the claim on habeas corpus review.

B. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW

Petitioner cites no Supreme Court precedent providing that

the cumulative effect of numerous alleged errors, no one of which

is of constitutional dimension, may violate a defendant's due

process right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court has, however,

long recognized that "given the myriad safeguards provided to

assure a fair trial, and taking into account the reality of the

human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing

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as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution does

not guarantee such a trial." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.

499, 508-509 (1983). It is the duty of a reviewing court to

consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are

harmless, including most constitutional violations. Id. As

explained above, AEDPA mandates that habeas relief may only be

granted if the state courts have acted contrary to or have

unreasonably applied federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 ("Section

2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the

Supreme] Court's jurisprudence."). In the absence of Supreme

Court precedent recognizing a claim of cumulative error,

therefore, habeas relief cannot be granted. 

Moreover, to the extent that such a claim has been recognized

by the Ninth Circuit, where there is no single constitutional

error there can be no cumulative error that rises to the level of

a due process violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939,

957 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. ANALYSIS

Petitioner cannot establish that the state court's rejection

of his cumulative error claim was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law because the Supreme

Court has never recognized a cumulative error claim. Further,

even if such a claim did have a basis in Supreme Court precedent,

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it would fail here because there were no constitutional errors and

thus no errors which could accumulate into a due process

violation. Accordingly, this claim for habeas relief is denied. 

//

//

//

//

//

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is denied. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/13/07

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENDERSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NEWLAND,

Defendant.

 /

Case Number: CV98-04837 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 13, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Dane R. Gillette

CA State Attorney General's Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Philip W. Henderson D36152

MCSP

P.O. Box 409000

Ione, CA 95640-9000

Dated: 3/13/07

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:98-cv-04837-CW Document 54 Filed 03/13/07 Page 62 of 62