Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01682/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01682-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331pl Fed. Question: Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEPHANIE BAUMAN, individually 

and on behalf of all similarly situated, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

AUSTRALIAN GOLD, LLC and DOES 

1-10, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-1682-L-BGS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. 9] 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Australian Gold, LLC (“AGL” or 

“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Stephanie Bauman’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and/or motion to strike portions of 

the complaint under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules. The Court decides the matter on the 

papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On November 16, 2015, Plaintiff purchased Defendant’s product, Australian Gold 

Spray Gel with Instant Bronzer. At the time of Plaintiff’s purchase, the purchase product 

was labeled “Made in U.S.A.” However, the product contained components made outside 

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the United States, consisting of more than ten percent (10%) of the final wholesale value 

of the product. Defendant manufactures, markets, sells various sun care products and label 

its products “Made in U.S.A.” Plaintiff purchased Defendant’s product in reliance on the 

representation that the product was “Made in [the] U.S.A.” 

 On July 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant. The Complaint 

alleged the following five causes of action: (1) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies 

Act (“CLRA”) – Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq.; (2) violation of Fair Advertising Law 

(“FAL”) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17533.7; (3) violation of Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”) – Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.; (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; and 

(5) Intentional Misrepresentation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on 

standing grounds and due to procedural shortfalls made by Plaintiff in filling her CLRA 

claim. Defendant also seeks to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief on standing 

grounds. Plaintiff opposes each of Defendant’s contentions but admits to failing to file an 

affidavit with her CLRA claim as required by California Civil Code section 1780(d). For 

that reason, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s CLRA claim without prejudice and addresses 

Defendant’s standing conditions below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the 

complaint’s sufficiency. See N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th 

Cir. 1983). The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and “construe them 

in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 

893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.2d 

1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Instead, the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. A complaint may be 

dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient 

facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

534 (9th Cir. 1984). 

 Rule 12(f) provides that a “Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense 

or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A 

Rule 12(f) motion to strike an affirmative defense is proper where (1) the defense is 

redundant; (2) the defense is not pleaded with adequate particularity to provide the Plaintiff 

with fair notice of what is being asserted; (3) the defense would lack merit under any facts 

the plaintiff might allege; and (4) where the defense attacks a claim for which the burden 

of proof belongs to the plaintiff. Id. (redundancy); Simmons v. Navajo Cnty. Arizona, 609 

F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (fair notice); Kohler v. Islands Rest., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 

564 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (legal insufficiency); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 

1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff’s burden of proof). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring class claims 

because Plaintiff failed to allege that the product she purchased was substantially similar 

to the unpurchased product made by Defendants. 

Proposition 64 restricts individual standing in UCL and FAL claims to persons who 

“ha[ve] suffered injury in fact and ha[ve] lost money or property as a result of the unfair 

competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17204, 17535; see Kwikset Cop. v. Superior 

Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 321 (2011) (recognizing Proposition 64 made UCL and FAL 

standing provisions identical). In order to bring an individual CLRA claim, a person must 

both be exposed to an unlawful practice and damage of some kind must result. Meyer v. 

Sprint Spectrum LP., 45 Cal.4th 634, 641 (2009). “In the Ninth Circuit, there is ‘no 

controlling authority’ on whether a plaintiff in a class action has standing to assert claims 

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based on products [she] did not purchase.” Morales v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 2014 WL 

1389613, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (quoting Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 

F.Supp.2d 861, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2012)). Nevertheless, “[t]he majority of the courts that have 

carefully analyzed the question hold that a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims for 

unnamed class members based on products he or she did not purchase as long as the 

products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar.” Id. “Factors that . . . 

courts have considered include whether the challenged products are the same kind, whether 

they are comprised of largely the same ingredients, and whether each of the challenged 

products bears the same alleged mislabeling.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., 

961 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1140-41 (N.D. Cal. 2013)). 

Plaintiff relies on three cases to assert that she has standing to pursue claims on the 

unpurchased AGL products: Brown v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc., 913 F.Supp.2d 881, 891 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring claims on unpurchased 

products the misrepresentation at the crux of plaintiffs’ case was identical across product 

lines); Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 

July 20, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss because Plaintiffs were mainly 

challenging the same basic mislabeling across different product flavors); Koh v. S.C. 

Johnson & Son, Inc., 2010 WL 94265, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010) (deferring its ruling 

on the standing issue until the class certification stage and denying defendant’s motion to 

dismiss). 

The instant case is distinguishable. While this case concerns allegedly identical 

mislabeling of the purchased and unpurchased products like the cases above, the Court 

finds that the essence of Plaintiff’s claims stems from where Defendant sources the 

ingredients for its products. Accordingly, this case is outside the Brown, Astiana, and Koh

sphere of jurisprudence. Notwithstanding, the Court reasons that those courts benefitted 

from enough detail in the allegations to draw comparisons between purchased and 

unpurchased products in order to make a standing determination. To that extent, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint falls short of providing sufficient detail for the Court to find that the product 

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Plaintiff purchased was substantially similar to the seventy plus (70+) unpurchased 

products Plaintiff attempts to include. For example, while Plaintiff specifically alleges the 

foreign ingredients contained in the purchased product [Doc. 1 at ¶ 32], the Complaint is 

devoid of any mention of the ingredients contained in the unpurchased products. Without 

allegations of the foreign ingredients contained in the unpurchased products, the Court 

must find the Complaint fails to demonstrate that the products are comprised of largely the 

same ingredients. 

Moreover, Plaintiff generally alleges that “Defendant manufactures, markets and/or 

sells various products[.]” Doc. 1 at ¶ 24. Plaintiff attaches a list of seventy-two (72) 

products sold under the AGL product lines to the Complaint [see Doc. 1-2] but fails to 

allege that these products are of the same type as the purchased product.1

 While Plaintiff 

contends that the products all represent sun care products, the Court speculates whether 

products serving different purposes (i.e. tanning vs. sunscreen) are similar enough 

chemically to call for similar ingredient sourcing. Plainly, certain AGL products could be 

“Made in [the] U.S.A.” because the ingredient composition calls for it, while others call 

for the use of foreign ingredients. In the Complaint, Plaintiff does not connect the products 

beyond their attachment to the Complaint. As such, the Court also finds Plaintiff failed to 

alleged whether the purchased product and the unpurchased products are of a similar type. 

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to 

bring class claims on the unpurchased products as the Complaint fails to allege substantial 

similarity between the purchased and unpurchased products. 

Lastly, Defendant contends Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief. The 

Court does not agree. As Plaintiff points out, “Injunctive relief focuses on the defendant’s 

conduct, and a plaintiff need only show defendant’s conduct is likely to ‘recur’ in order to 

                                               

1

 While Plaintiff alleged that she purchased Defendant’s product, Australian Gold Spray Gel with Instant 

Bronzer, the Court is unsure which spray gel she purchased as the attached product list contains five (5) 

spray gels with instant bronzer. See Doc. 1-2. 

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obtain injunctive relief under UCL, to further protect competitors and the public at large.” 

Doc. 10 at 25 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298, 320 (2009)). The Complaint 

alleges Defendant is currently using the challenged “Made in U.S.A.” representation on its 

products. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has standing to pursue injunctive relief 

because the Complaint alleges the possibility of recurrence of injury. 

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

 Given the liberal amendment policy enshrined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the Court 

will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, she 

is advised to make her allegations with greater clarity and particularity. 

V. CONCLUSION & ORDER

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Defendant’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 9]. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, 

she must do so within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 31, 2019 

 

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