Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00123/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00123-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HERB N. COLLINS and REBECCA 

WILLIAMS COLLINS, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CITY OF SACRAMENTO; Sacramento 

City Police Detective KEVIN 

PATTON; Sacramento City Police 

Officer (retired) JOHN 

TREFETHEN; Sacramento City 

Police Officer MICHELLE SCHRUM;

Sacramento City Police Officer 

FRANK REYES; Sacramento City 

Police Detective PAUL 

SCHINDLER; Sacramento City 

Police Clerk PATRICIA CASSIDY; 

PATELCO CREDIT UNION; MELVIN 

BELL; Sacramento County 

District Attorney JAN SCULLY in 

her official capacity; 

Sacramento County Deputy 

District Attorney STEPHANIE 

LEONARD; and Sacramento City 

Police Detective JEFFREY 

BEEZLEY, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-06-123 RRB GGH 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

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Plaintiffs Herb Collins and Rebecca Collins (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) filed an action against the City of Sacramento, 

six police officers, a police clerk, the District Attorney and a 

deputy district attorney (collectively “Defendants”)1 alleging 

civil right violations and state law claims arising out of a 

search of Plaintiffs residence and a seizure of their property. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment/adjudication on the 

grounds that each and every claim alleged by Plaintiffs fails as 

a matter of law. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS 

the motion in part, and DENIES the motion in part.2 

// 

// 

 

1 The defendants include: (1) the City of Sacramento; (2) 

Kevin Patton (“Patton”) (police detective); (3) John Trefethen 

(“Trefethen”) (police officer); (4) Michelle Schrum (“Schrum”) 

(police detective); (5) Frank Reyes (“Reyes”) (police officer); 

(6) Paul Schindler (“Schindler”) (police detective); (7) 

Patricia Cassidy (“Cassidy”) (police clerk); Patelco Credit 

Union (“Patelco”); (8) Melvin Bell (“Bell”) (agent/employee of 

Patelco Credit Union); (9) Jan Scully (“Scully”) (District 

Attorney); (10) Stephanie Leonard (“Leonard”) (Deputy District 

Attorney); and (11) Jeffrey Beezley (“Beezley”) (police 

detective). 

2 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). As a result, the oral argument 

presently scheduled for Wednesday, August 8, 2007, at 10:00 

a.m., is hereby VACATED.

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I. BACKGROUND 

 On February 1, 2005, Sacramento police officers executed a 

search warrant on Plaintiffs’ home and seized several items. 

Compl. ¶¶ 27-28. During the search, Mrs. Collins was detained 

in handcuffs and instructed at gunpoint to lie on the ground 

wearing only a t-shirt and underwear. Def.’s Statement of 

Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) In Support of Summary 

Judgment/Adjudication (“MSJ/MSA”) ¶ 4; Compl. ¶ 27. 

The search of Plaintiffs’ premises was based on the 

suspicion that Mr. Collins was a member of a cocaine trafficking 

conspiracy. Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 5 & 7-10. This suspicion arose out 

of Mr. Collins’ association with known criminals, Rudolph Gibson 

(“Gibson”) and Charles Dossman (“Dossman”),3

 as well as police 

surveillance of Mr. Collins engaging in activities consistent 

with hand-to-hand narcotics sales. Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 5 & 7-9.4

 

 

3 Both Mr. Gibson and Mr. Dossman have various narcotic 

related convictions, including possession for sale. See 

Affidavit of Det. Patton in Support of Search Warrant, attached 

as Exh. 12, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

4 Mr. Collins considers Mr. Gibson to be his best friend and 

allowed him to use his boat. Dep. of Herb Collins at 51:6-20, 

attached as Exh. B, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. Mr. Collins 

considers Mr. Dossman to be an acquaintance. Dep. of Herb 

Collins at 68:13-24, attached as Exh. B, In Support of Def.’s 

MSJ/MSA. On the same day Plaintiffs’ residence was searched, 

significant quantities of powder and rock cocaine were 

discovered during searches at the residences of Mr. Dossman and 

Mr. Gibson. Def.’s UMF ¶ 20; Exh. 21, attached In Support of 

Def.’s MSJ/MSA.

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 During the search, the officers discovered the following 

items in the master bedroom: (1) a box of gallon plastic bags; 

(2) a box of clear plastic sandwich bags; (3) a digital scale; 

(4) four cell phones; (5) three computers; (6) a mobile harddrive; (7) multiple two-way radios; (8) a clear plastic sandwich 

bag containing white residue; and (9) a teal diary. Def.’s UMF 

¶¶ 12-13. The officers also discovered three additional cell 

phones in a 1997 Mercedes-Benz SL-500 (“Mercedes-Benz”) 

registered to Mr. Collins as well as three additional computer 

processing units located throughout the house. Def.’s UMF ¶ 14. 

Additionally, during a search of Mr. Collins’ boat, which he 

shared with his best friend Mr. Gibson, officers discovered a 

handgun. Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 21 & 23. Finally, during the search of 

Mr. Collins’ Mercedes-Benz, a narcotics canine showed interest 

in the passenger seat, indicating the possibility that a 

controlled substance was present. Def.’s UMF ¶ 19. The canine 

however did not “alert” to the presence of a controlled 

substance in either the house or the Mercedes-Benz. Pl.’s 

Separate Statement of Disputed Facts ¶ 4 (“SDF”), In Support of 

Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

Mr. Collins was arrested at approximately 8:30 a.m. on the 

morning of the search. Pl.’s SDF ¶ 34. On February 3, 2005, 

the District Attorney filed charges against, among others, Mr. 

Collins, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Dossman for conspiracy to sell rock 

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cocaine with an arming enhancement. Def.’s UMF ¶ 28. 

Mr. Collins was held in custody from February 1, 2005 until 

April 19, 2005, when the Sacramento County Superior Court 

declined to hold him to answer for the conspiracy charge. 

Def.’s UMF ¶¶ 27 & 54. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs allege the following civil rights claims under 

§ 1983: (1) unreasonable search and seizure; (2) unreasonable 

seizure/false arrest; (3) wrongful/malicious prosecution; (4) 

excessive bail; (5) unlawful taking of property; and (6) due 

process violation. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege the 

following state law claims: (1) false arrest; (2) false 

imprisonment; (3) conversion; (4) defamation; (5) 

entity/supervisory liability; and (6) negligence. Defendants 

now move for summary judgment/adjudication with respect to each 

and every claim. These claims are addressed individually below.5 

A. Legal Standard 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary 

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

 

5

 At the outset, the court concludes that there are no viable 

claims asserted against defendant Reyes. Plaintiffs conceded 

that “there has been insufficient evidence developed regarding 

Defendant Frank Reyes to maintain an action against him.”

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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. § 56(c). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a “genuine issue of material fact for trial.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A 

fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material 

fact is “genuine,” if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The 

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond 

the pleadings, and by his or her own affidavits, or by the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 “[W]hen the non-moving party bears the burden of proving 

the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by 

pointing out the absence of evidence from the non-moving party. 

The moving party need not disprove the other party’s case.” 

Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Hence, summary 

judgment is properly granted in favor of a defendant where the 

plaintiff has failed to sufficiently establish the existence of 

an element essential to his or her case, and on which he or she 

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will bear the burden of proof at trial. Miller, 454 F.3d at 987 

(citing Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 

805-06 (1999)). 

When the moving party meets its burden, the “adverse party 

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse 

party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by 

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 

“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 

nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.” 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). “But the 

non-moving party must come forward with more than ‘the mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence.’” Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Thus, “‘[w]here the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 

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Where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn 

from the undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988. 

B. Unreasonable Search and Seizure 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because the officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity as they reasonably relied upon a facially 

valid search warrant when they searched Plaintiffs’ residence 

and seized their property.6

 In addition, Defendants argue that 

this claim fails as a matter of law with respect to detective 

Schindler because he did not participate in the search nor did 

he apply for the search warrant. 

1. Qualified Immunity 

 A private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19837

exists against law enforcement officers who, acting under the 

color of authority, violate federal constitutional or statutory 

rights of an individual. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 

(1999). Government officials sued in their individual 

 

6 This claim is only alleged against defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Schindler and Trefethen. 

7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that: 

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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capacities under § 1983 may raise the affirmative defenses of 

qualified or absolute immunity, which generally protects 

government officials in the course of performing the 

discretionary duties of their offices. Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 

1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2002); see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 

194, (2004) (per curiam) (the defense of qualified immunity 

operates to shield an officer from trial when the officer 

“reasonably mis-apprehends the law governing the circumstances 

she confronted,” even if the officer’s conduct was 

constitutionally deficient). “[P]olice officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless (1) their alleged 

conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was 

clearly established.” Edgerly v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 2007 WL 2034040, *6 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 In considering the qualified immunity issue, the threshold 

question is whether: “Taken in the light most favorable to the 

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the 

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “If no constitutional right 

would have been violated were the allegations established, there 

is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified 

immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out 

on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, 

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly 

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established.” Id. In determining whether a constitutional 

right is “clearly established,” as required for plaintiff to 

defeat a claim of qualified immunity, the relevant, dispositive 

inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official 

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Id. at 202. If the law does not place an officer on notice that 

his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity is appropriate. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 

(citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (qualified 

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 

knowingly violate the law”)); see Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d

1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (a right is clearly established if a 

reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing 

violated that right, i.e., an official is not protected by 

qualified immunity if in the light of pre-existing law the 

unlawfulness of their action is apparent). Finally, even if the 

violated right was clearly established, a police officer is 

entitled to immunity if the police officer does not fully 

appreciate how legal constraints apply to a specific situation 

and the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is 

reasonable. Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1077 (citing 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205). 

// 

// 

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2. Judicial Deception 

Plaintiffs argue that the search and seizure was invalid 

because the affidavit supporting the warrant contained 

“significant misstatements and omissions, resulting in the 

improper issuance of the warrant.” 

An official in a civil rights action that has submitted an 

affidavit containing statements they knew to be false or would 

have known were false had they not recklessly disregarded the 

truth, will not be protected by qualified immunity as they 

cannot be considered to have acted in an objectively reasonable 

manner. See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(a law enforcement officer’s conduct is objectively 

unreasonable, and therefore outside the protection of qualified 

immunity, when he or she deliberately or recklessly misstate 

facts material to the probable cause determination); Butler, 281 

F.3d at 1024 (if an official was reckless or deceitful in 

preparing the warrant affidavit, then he both violated 

plaintiff’s rights and is not entitled to qualified immunity). 

At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff alleging judicial 

deception must make a substantial showing of deliberate 

falsehood or reckless disregard for truth and establish that, 

but for the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have 

occurred. Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024; Hervey, 65 F.3d at 788-89. 

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In short, “a plaintiff can only survive summary judgment on 

a defense claim of qualified immunity if the plaintiff can both

establish a substantial showing of a deliberate falsehood or 

reckless disregard and establish that, without the dishonestly 

included or omitted information, the magistrate would not have 

issued the warrant. Put another way, the plaintiff must 

establish that the remaining information in the affidavit is 

insufficient to establish probable cause.” Hervey, 65 F.3d at 

789 (emphasis in original). 

In the instant action, Plaintiffs’ argue that detective 

Patton engaged in deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard in 

procuring the warrant by: (1) mischaracterizing Mr. Collins’ 

actions during surveillance; (2) omitting Mr. Collins’ lack of 

criminal record; and (3) deliberately “blurring” references 

between Mr. Collins, Mr. Dossman and Mr. Gibson. 

With respect to Patton’s alleged mischaracterization of 

Mr. Collins’ actions during surveillance, Plaintiffs’ point to 

several deposition passages where detective Patton states that 

he never observed any money or narcotics change hands between 

Mr. Collins and other individuals. Rather, he simply observed 

behavior consistent with narcotics trafficking, e.g., brief oneminute meetings inside Mr. Collins’ car between Mr. Collins and 

other individuals. Because a comparison of detective Patton’s 

affidavit with his deposition testimony does not reveal any 

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material differences, the court finds that detective Patton’s 

affidavit does not contain material misrepresentations or 

mischaracterizations regarding the surveillance of Mr. Collins. 

As such, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ have failed to 

demonstrate that Patton deliberately or recklessly misstated 

facts material to the probable cause determination in his 

affidavit. 

With respect to Patton’s omission of Mr. Collins’ criminal 

history from the affidavit, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ 

have failed to demonstrate that the omission was deceitful or 

that the inclusion of such information would have caused the 

warrant not to issue. A review of the affidavit reveals that it 

was sufficient to support probable cause, despite the omission 

of Mr. Collins’ lack of criminal history. Finally, with respect 

to Plaintiffs’ assertion that the affidavit was deceptive 

because it “blurred” the references between Mr. Collins, 

Mr. Dossman and Mr. Gibson, the court concludes that this 

assertion lacks merit. A review of the affidavit does not 

reveal any evidence of deliberate or reckless “blurring” of the 

conduct of Mr. Collins, Mr. Dossman and Mr. Gibson. The conduct 

described in the affidavit clearly references the individual it 

is attributed to. 

For these reasons, detective Patton is entitled to 

qualified immunity for his conduct in procuring the search 

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warrant. Plaintiffs’ failed to meet their burden of making a 

substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless 

disregard for the truth, and establishing that, but for 

detective Patton’s dishonesty, the warrant would not have 

issued. Additionally, because the other named defendants 

(Schrum, Schindler and Trefethen) did not participate in the 

execution of the affidavit, they cannot be liable for judicial 

deception in procuring the warrant. 

Accordingly, the court grants summary adjudication 

regarding this claim. 

3. Reasonableness of the Search 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because the search was conducted in a 

reasonable manner under the circumstances. 

 Officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the 

authority to “detain the occupants of the premises while a 

proper search is conducted.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 

705 (1981). In Summers, the Court reasoned that such detentions 

are appropriate because the character of the additional 

intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the 

justifications for detention are substantial. Id. at 701-05 

(observing that the detention of an occupant is “surely less 

intrusive than the search itself,” and the presence of a warrant 

assures that a neutral magistrate has determined that probable 

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cause exists to search the home). In Summers, the Court 

provided three legitimate law enforcement justifications for 

detaining the occupant of a residence during a search: (1) 

preventing flight in the event incriminating evidence is found; 

(2) minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and (3) 

facilitating the orderly completion of the search. Id. at 702-

03. 

Inherent in the officer’s authority to detain an occupant 

at the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable 

force to effectuate the detention, including the use of 

handcuffs. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005) 

(holding that a 2-to-3 hour detention of an occupant in 

handcuffs in a search for weapons where a wanted gang member 

resides was reasonable); cf. Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 

1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing that while the duration of 

a detention may be coextensive with the period of a search, and 

require no further justification, the police do not have 

unfettered authority to detain an occupant insofar as they must 

conduct the detention in a reasonable manner). 

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the officers 

searched Plaintiffs’ residence for drugs pursuant to a warrant 

with the knowledge that Mr. Collins was associated with 

individuals known to have been involved in selling narcotics, 

possessing weapons and engaging in violence toward law 

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enforcement. See Affidavit of Det. Patton in Support of Search 

Warrant, attached as Exh. 12, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA; 

Decl. of Craig Michaels (“Michaels”), attached as Exh. H, In 

Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. It is also undisputed that, while 

Mrs. Collins was initially detained at gunpoint during the 

search wearing only a t-shirt and underwear, she was provided 

sweat pants shortly thereafter. Dep. of Rebecca Collins at 

13:19-25, 14:1-4, 16:4-25, 17:1-12, attached as Exh. F, In 

Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. Finally, it is undisputed that Mrs. 

Collins was detained in handcuffs for the entire duration of the 

search, except for the last thirty minutes. Dep. of Rebecca 

Collins at 19:18-25, attached as Exh. F, In Support of Def.’s 

MSJ/MSA. 

 Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the search 

of Plaintiffs’ residence was reasonable. The officers acted 

within their authority in detaining Ms. Collins during the 

execution of a warrant to search for drugs. See Muehler, 544 

U.S. at 98 (“An officer’s authority to detain incident to a 

search is categorical; it does not depend on the ‘quantum of 

proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be 

imposed by the seizure’”); Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05 (“If the 

evidence that a citizen’s residence is harboring contraband is 

sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of 

privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to 

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require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute 

a valid warrant to search his home”). 

Additionally, the court concludes that the officer’s use of 

force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate the detention was 

reasonable because the government’s interest in: (1) preventing 

flight, (2) minimizing the risk of harm to officers, and (3) 

facilitating the orderly completion of the search, outweighs the 

marginal intrusion experienced by Mrs. Collins. See Muehler, 

544 U.S. at 99-100. Moreover, because the search may have given 

rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy 

evidence, the officers’ right to use handcuffs to detain 

Mrs. Collins was heightened as it minimized the harm to both the 

officers and her family. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03 

(noting that the execution of a warrant to search for drugs “may 

give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or 

destroy evidence”). 

 For these reasons, the officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity for the search of Plaintiffs’ residence and the 

detention of Mrs. Collins because it was reasonable for them 

officers to believe that the search and detention were lawful. 

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Accordingly, the Court grants summary adjudication regarding 

this claim.8 

C. Unreasonable Seizure/False Arrest 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because the arresting officers are 

entitled to qualified immunity as probable cause existed to 

 

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on alleged damage and destruction of property during the search, 

the court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists 

regarding this claim. Defendants failed to proffer sufficient 

evidence to rebut Plaintiffs testimony that the officers 

destroyed and damaged various personal items during the search, 

including laptop computers and Plaintiffs’ bed. Dep. of Rebecca 

Collins at 37:1-40:25, 46:1-20, attached as Exh. 28, In Support 

of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA; Dep. of Herb Collins at 116:9-

25, 118:1-121:14, attached as Exh. 3, In Support of Pl.’s Opp. 

to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. As such, Defendants failed to meet their 

burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact 

regarding the reasonableness of the search. See United States 

v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 446 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that while 

officers executing a search warrant must occasionally damage 

property in order to perform their duty, destruction of property 

during a search is not favored and may violate the Fourth 

Amendment if it is not reasonably necessary to effectively 

execute the search warrant). Additionally, the court concludes 

that summary adjudication is not warranted with respect to 

detective Patton because Defendants failed to sufficiently rebut 

Plaintiffs evidence indicating that detective Patton was present 

during the search and may have participated in the search. Dep. 

of Det. Patton at 93:18-23, 99:3-4, attached as Exh. 1, In 

Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. As such, a genuine 

issue of fact exists as to whether detective Patton’s conduct 

regarding the search was reasonable. Finally, the court 

concludes that summary adjudication is warranted with respect to 

detective Schindler because Plaintiffs failed to proffer 

sufficient evidence to rebut detective Schindler’s declaration 

stating that he did not participate in the search. Decl. of 

Det. Schindler at ¶ 2, attached as Exh. O, In Support of Def.’s 

MSJ/MSA. 

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arrest Mr. Collins.9 In addition, Defendants argue that this 

claim fails as a matter of law with respect to detective 

Schindler and officer Trefethen because they did not arrest 

Plaintiff. 

 “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as 

a violation of the Fourth Amendment provided that the arrest was 

made without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v.

City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 

2001). Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances 

within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had 

reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a 

prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed or 

was committing an offense.” Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1065-

66 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Police 

must only show that, under the totality of the circumstances, a 

prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair 

probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.” Id. at 

1066 (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause may be 

based on the collective knowledge of all the officers involved 

in an investigation and all the reasonable inferences that may 

be drawn therefrom. See Motley, 432 F.3d at 1081 (noting that 

 

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Schrum, Schindler and Trefethen.

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officers are entitled to rely on the observations and knowledge 

obtained by fellow officers). 

 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of 

unlawful arrest, which can be satisfied by showing that the 

arrest was conducted without a valid warrant. Dubner, 266 F.3d 

at 965. The burden then shifts to the defendant to provide some 

evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause for a 

warrantless arrest. Id. The plaintiff still bears the ultimate 

burden of proof, but the burden of production falls on the 

defendant. Id.

 In the instant case, Mr. Collins was arrested without a 

warrant. As such, Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating 

that probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest. The 

court concludes that the officers have satisfied their burden in 

this regard because they proffered sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate that probable cause existed at the time of arrest. 

Specifically, Defendants proffered the testimony of several 

officers who stated that they observed Mr. Collins engage in 

activities consistent with narcotic trafficking, including handto-hand sales. See Dep. of Det. Patton at 80:4-21, 86:16-25, 

87:8-16, attached as Exh. E, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA; Dep. 

of Det. Schrum at 32:23-25, 33:16, 98:3-25, 99:1-7, 100:3-5, 

100:22-28, 101:10, attached as Exh. D, In Support of Def.’s 

MSJ/MSA; Dep. of Det. Schindler at 14:12-21, attached as Exh. G, 

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In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA; Decl. of Michaels, attached as 

Exh. H, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. Additionally, Defendants 

proffered evidence demonstrating that the officers knew that Mr. 

Collins was associated with convicted criminals Mr. Gibson and 

Mr. Nossman, both of whom were found in possession of powder 

and/or rock cocaine on the day Plaintiffs’ residence was 

searched. Affidavit of Det. Patton in Support of Search 

Warrant, attached as Exh. 12, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA; 

Decl. of Michaels, attached as Exh. H, In Support of Def.’s 

MSJ/MSA; Ex. 21, attached In Support of Def’s MSJ/MSA. 

Finally, Defendants proffered evidence demonstrating that the 

officers found items consistent with narcotic trafficking, 

including, plastic bags, a digital scale, two-way radios, 

multiple phones and computers, a diary (perceived to be a “payowe” ledger) and a plastic bag with white residue. See Exh. 10, 

attached In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the 

officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Collins. Under the 

totality of the circumstances, a prudent person would have 

concluded that there was a fair probability Mr. Collins had 

committed a crime, e.g., possession of narcotics for sale and/or 

conspiracy to traffic narcotics. Mr. Collins was observed 

engaging in what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug trafficking, 

possessed items consistent with participating in a drug 

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trafficking conspiracy and was closely associated with 

individuals convicted of drug related offenses.10 

For these reasons, the officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity for the warrantless arrest of Mr. Collins. At the time 

of his arrest, the officers reasonably believed that there was 

probable cause that he had committed a crime, e.g., possession 

of narcotics for sale and/or conspiracy to traffic narcotics. 

See Edgerly, 2007 WL 2034040 at *6 (officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed 

that probable cause existed for the arrest under the 

circumstances).11 

 

10 While the white residue in the baggie discovered in 

Plaintiffs’ master bedroom was later determined to be 

prescription drugs, there is no evidence in the record showing 

that the officers knew at the time of the arrest that the white 

residue was anything other than illicit narcotics. 

11 “A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the 

defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or 

conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to 

commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the 

commission of an overt act ‘by one or more of the parties to 

such agreement’ in furtherance of the conspiracy.” People v.

Morante, 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 (1999) (footnote omitted). In 

Morante, the court noted that “[i]t is well established that one 

may become criminally liable for possession for sale or for 

transportation of a controlled substance, based upon either 

actual or constructive possession of the substance. Constructive 

possession exists where a defendant maintains some control or 

right to control contraband that is in the actual possession of 

another.” Id. at 417 (citation omitted). “Similarly, a 

defendant may be liable for constructive transportation of a 

controlled substance. A defendant also may be convicted of 

possession or transportation of a controlled substance when his 

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Accordingly, the court grants summary adjudication 

regarding this claim. 

D. Wrongful/Malicious Prosecution & Detention 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because there was no evidence in the 

record demonstrating that Mr. Collins was wrongfully prosecuted 

by any defendant.12 More particularly, Defendants argue that 

this claim fails as a matter of law as against detective 

Schindler because he did not commence or direct the criminal 

prosecution of Mr. Collins. Additionally, Defendants argue that 

this claim fails as a matter of law as against detectives Patton 

and Schrum and officer Trefethen because Plaintiffs cannot show 

that the criminal action was terminated in favor of Mr. Collins, 

that it was brought without probable cause, or that it was 

initiated with malice. 

 In the Ninth Circuit, the general rule is that a claim of 

malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

if process is available within the state judicial system to 

provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 

562 (9th Cir. 1987). An exception however exists where a 

malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a 

 

or her dominion and control are exercised through the acts of an 

agent.” Id. (citation omitted). 

12 This claim is only alleged against defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Trefethen and Schindler.

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person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended 

to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights. 

Usher, 828 F.2d at 562.13 Thus, “[i]n order to prevail on a 

§ 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must show 

that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without 

probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying 

[him] equal protection or another specific constitutional 

right.’” See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 

1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 incorporates 

the elements of the state common law tort of malicious 

prosecution. See Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066-68. Under California 

law, the elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) that a prior 

action was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant; 

(2) was pursued to a legal termination in plaintiff’s favor; (3) 

was brought without probable cause; and (4) was initiated with 

malice. Pattiz v. Minye, 61 Cal.App.4th 822, 826 (1998). 

 

13 The California Supreme Court has held that under California 

Government Code § 821.6, an officer who maliciously and 

knowingly provides a prosecutor with false information that 

leads to the filing of criminal charges enjoys absolute immunity 

from liability. Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744, 

759 (1997). As such, Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim is 

cognizable under § 1983. 

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While the decision to file a criminal complaint is 

ordinarily presumed to result from an independent determination 

on the part of the prosecutor, and thus, precludes liability for 

those who participated in the investigation or filed a report 

that resulted in the initiation of proceedings, this presumption 

does not bar a subsequent § 1983 claim against state or local 

officials who improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, 

knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory 

evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct 

that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of 

legal proceedings. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. 

A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action bears the 

burden to prove facts overcoming the presumption that the 

district attorney acted according to law (i.e., exercised 

independent prosecutorial judgment in the charging decision). 

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th 

Cir. 2002) That is, the plaintiff has the burden to produce 

contrary evidence, e.g., that the district attorney was 

subjected to unreasonable pressure by the police officers, or 

that the officers knowingly withheld relevant information with 

the intent to harm plaintiff, or that the officers knowingly 

supplied false information. Id. If no evidence is produced to 

rebut the presumption, the presumption is sufficient to require 

summary judgment for the defendant. Id.

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 In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Trefethen and Schindler caused Mr. Collins’ malicious 

prosecution and/or continuing wrongful detention by illegally 

arresting him, mischaracterizing the seized evidence and 

suppressing exculpatory evidence. More particularly, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendants mischaracterized: (1) paperwork relating 

to vehicle sales as drug sales paperwork; (2) gallon plastic 

bags used for storing sewing supplies as drug packing materials; 

and (3) a BB gun as a firearm. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege 

that the officers: (1) failed to disclose that a drug sniffing 

canine did not detect illegal drugs at the premises; (2) 

withheld laboratory results confirming that the white residue 

found in a plastic bag was prescription medication; (3) withheld 

the forensic analysis of Plaintiffs’ computers; and (4) 

suppressed critical witness statements and investigative reports 

confirming the non-criminal nature of Mr. Collins’ monitored 

activities, including a statement from a witness providing 

exculpatory evidence. 

 In the instant case, the court concludes that Plaintiffs

failed to establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution. 

As discussed above, probable cause existed to arrest 

Mr. Collins. Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to present any 

evidence demonstrating that the action was initiated with 

malice. Finally, Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence 

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to overcome the presumption that the district attorney exercised 

independent prosecutorial judgment in her decision to charge 

Mr. Collins.14 There is no evidence in the record demonstrating 

that the district attorney was subjected to unreasonable 

pressure by the officers. Nor is there evidence in the record 

demonstrating that the officers knowingly withheld relevant 

information with the intent to harm plaintiff or that the 

officers knowingly supplied false information. 

In this regard, Plaintiffs have not shown that the white 

residue was tested prior to the preliminary examination or that 

the forensic computer analysis was complete prior to the 

preliminary examination. In fact, the evidence in the record 

indicates that the computer analysis was not completed until 

April 19, 2005, the date Mr. Collins was discharged. Exh. 4, 

attached In Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA; Dep. of 

Det. Richard Gilleland (“Gilleland”) at 9:10-15, 10:1-13, 

attached as Exh. EE, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA.15 

Additionally, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating 

that the polygraph of Mr. Doyle was taken prior to the 

 

14 The prosecutor testified that she did not dismiss the case 

because, based on her review of the evidence, she felt that 

Mr. Collins had committed a crime. See Dep. of Leslie Monahan 

at 59:7-20, attached as Exh. L, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

15 Detective Gilleland testified that he began examining the 

computers on April 12, 2005 and does not remember when he 

finished. Dep. of Det. Gilleland at 9:10-15, 10:1-13, attached 

as Exh. EE, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

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preliminary examination or that any officer knowingly withheld 

information regarding the results of such polygraph. In fact, 

there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that either 

detective Patton or detective Schindler possessed the results of 

this polygraph before the preliminary examination. See Dep. of 

Det. Patton at 56:11-58:24, attached as Exh. Z, In Support of 

Def.’s MSJ/MSA; Dep. of Det. Schindler at 50:23-25, 51:1-25, 

attached as Exh. 23, In Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

Finally, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that 

any officer knowingly withheld the fact that a drug sniffing 

canine was used at Plaintiffs’ residence or that any officer 

knowingly supplied false information regarding the seized 

evidence. 

For these reasons, the court grants summary adjudication 

regarding this claim. 

E. Excessive Bail 

Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because detective Schindler and 

officer Trefethen did not participate in the bail setting 

process and detectives Patton and Schrum are entitled to 

qualified immunity.16 

 

16 This claim is only alleged against defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Schindler and Trefethen.

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To determine whether the Excessive Bail Clause has been 

violated, courts look to the valid state interests bail is 

intended to serve for a particular individual and judge whether 

bail conditions are excessive for the purpose of achieving those 

interests. Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 660 

(9th Cir. 2007). The state may not set bail to achieve invalid 

interests or in an amount that is excessive in relation to the 

valid interests it seeks to achieve. Id. For non-capital 

defendants, courts may neither deny bail nor set it in a sum 

that is the functional equivalent of no bail. Id. at 661. 

In order to prevail on a claim that his bail enhancement 

violated the Excessive Bail Clause, a plaintiff alleging a 

§ 1983 violation bears the burden of demonstrating that his bail 

was enhanced for purposes unauthorized by California law or that 

the amount of bail was excessive in light of the valid purposes 

for which it was set. Galen, 477 F.3d at 661. 

In California, judicial officers are vested with exclusive 

authority to enhance or reduce bail and a judicial officer’s 

exercise of independent judgment in the course of his official 

duties is a superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation 

linking law enforcement personnel to the officer’s decision. 

Galen, 477 F.3d at 663. Thus, a police officer cannot be held 

liable under § 1983 for violating a plaintiff’s right to be free 

from excessive bail unless the plaintiff shows that the officers 

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deliberately or recklessly misled the judge, and that but for 

such misrepresentations, bail would not have been 

unconstitutionally excessive. Id. at 663-64.17

In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that the officers 

caused excessive bail by suppressing exculpatory evidence and 

mischaracterizing the seized evidence. As set forth above, the 

court disagrees. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that detective 

Schrum caused excessive bail by submitting a bail enhancement 

declaration containing reckless misstatements of fact, including 

that (1) Mr. Collins had been arrested for possession of 

narcotics, (2) was armed, and (3) was part of a motorcycle gang. 

Bail Enhancement Decl. of Det. Schrum, attached as Exh. 11, In 

Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. The court concludes 

that, while the foregoing statements were made by detective 

Schrum, these statements were not deliberate or reckless 

misstatements of fact. 

As discussed above, probable cause existed to arrest Mr. 

Collins for possession of narcotics and conspiracy to traffic 

narcotics. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 

demonstrating that detective Schrum knew that the baggie 

 

17 As an initial matter, the court concludes that because 

Plaintiffs failed to present evidence demonstrating that either 

detective Schindler or officer Trefethen participated in 

enhancing Mr. Collins’ bail, summary adjudication is warranted 

in their favor regarding this claim.

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containing the white residue was anything other than illicit 

narcotics prior to his bail enhancement request. Additionally, 

there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that, at the 

time detective Schrum requested bail enhancement, he knew that 

the handgun found on Mr. Collins’ boat was not his. Finally, 

Defendants submitted evidence demonstrating that detective 

Patton advised detective Schrum that he had been informed by 

other officers that Mr. Collins was associated with a motorcycle 

gang. Dep. of Det. Schrum at 156:1-15, 157:1-21, attached as 

Exh. 10, In Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. As such, a 

reasonable person in detective Schrum’s position would have 

believed his statements to be true. 

Accordingly, the court grants summary adjudication 

regarding this claim because Plaintiffs’ failed to demonstrate 

that either detective Schrum or detective Patton deliberately or 

recklessly misled the judge causing bail to be 

unconstitutionally excessive. 

F. Unlawful Taking of Property 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because there is no evidence 

demonstrating that the officers or Patricia Cassidy caused 

Mr. Collins’ Mercedes-Benz to be seized.18

 

18 This claim is alleged against all defendants.

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 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

provides, in relevant part, “Nor shall private property be taken 

for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend V 

(emphasis added). The Fifth Amendment applies to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Williamson County 

Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 

175, n.1 (1985). “If private property is taken but not taken 

for public use, the property owner does not have a claim for 

compensation under the Fifth Amendment but may have a claim 

under Section 1983 for deprivation of property without due 

process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jackson v. 

Placer County, 2007 WL 1429827, *9 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (citing 

Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 2000, n.26 (5th Cir. 

1981). 

In the instant case, Plaintiffs have neither alleged nor 

provided any evidence that their Mercedes-Benz was taken for 

public use. Instead, Plaintiffs have simply alleged that 

Defendants improperly seized their vehicle and released it to 

Patelco, a private lien-holder of the vehicle. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. 

Therefore, because Plaintiffs have not alleged, let alone 

demonstrated, that their property was taken for public use, they 

do not have a viable § 1983 claim based on a violation of their 

Fifth Amendment rights. Thus, the issue becomes whether 

Plaintiffs have a viable § 1983 claim for deprivation of 

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property without due process of law under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

“‘Loss of the use and enjoyment of a car deprives the owner 

of a property interest that may be taken from him only in 

accordance with the Due Process Clause.’” Schneider v. County 

of San Diego, 28 F.3d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 1994). Due process 

requires that Mr. Collins be given notice and an “‘opportunity 

to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” 

Id. “For the notice to satisfy due process, it must ‘be of such 

nature as reasonably to convey the required information.’” Id.

In California, a vehicle may be subject to forfeiture if it 

has been used as an instrument to facilitate the manufacture of, 

or possession for sale or sale of cocaine. Cal. Health & Safety 

Code § 11470(e). A police officer may lawfully seize any item 

subject to forfeiture under § 11470 subsequent to making an 

arrest for, among other things, selling or transporting cocaine 

or conspiring to engage in such conduct. Cal. Health & Safety 

Code § 11488(a). 

“The . . . district attorney of the county in which 

property is subject to forfeiture under Section 11470 may . . . 

order forfeiture of personal property not exceeding twenty-five 

thousand dollars ($25,000) in value. The . . . district 

attorney shall provide notice of proceedings under this 

subdivision . . . including: (1) A description of the 

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property[;] (2) The appraised value of the property[;] (3) The 

date and place of seizure or location of any property not seized 

but subject to forfeiture[;] (4) The violation of law alleged 

with respect to forfeiture of the property[;] (5) The 

instructions for filing and serving a claim with . . . the 

district attorney pursuant to Section 11488.519 and time limits 

for filing a claim and claim form.” Cal. Health & Safety Code 

§ 11488.4(j) (footnote added).20 “If no claims are timely filed, 

. . . the district attorney shall prepare a written declaration 

of forfeiture of the subject property to the state and dispose 

of the property in accordance with Section 11489.21 A written 

 

19 “Any person claiming an interest in the property seized 

pursuant to Section 11488 may . . . within 30 days after receipt 

of actual notice, file with the superior court of the county in 

which the defendant has been charged with the underlying or 

related criminal offense . . . a claim, verified in accordance 

with Section 446 of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating his or 

her interest in the property.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 

11488.5(a)(1). 

 

20 Section 11488.4(j) is an exception to the general rule 

which provides, in relevant part, “if . . . the local 

governmental entity determines that the factual circumstances do 

warrant that . . . things of value seized or subject to 

forfeiture come within the provisions of subdivisions (a) to 

(g), inclusive, of Section 11470, and are not automatically made 

forfeitable or subject to court order of forfeiture or 

destruction by another provision of this chapter, the . . . 

district attorney shall file a petition of forfeiture with the 

superior court of the county in which the defendant has been 

charged with the underlying criminal offense . . . ” Cal. 

Health & Safety Code § 11488.4(a). 

 

21 When property is forfeited to the state it shall be 

distributed “[t]o the bona fide or innocent purchaser, 

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declaration of forfeiture signed by the . . . district attorney 

under this subdivision shall be deemed to provide good and 

sufficient title to the forfeited property. The prosecuting 

agency ordering forfeiture pursuant to this subdivision shall 

provide a copy of the declaration of forfeiture to any person 

listed in the receipt given at the time of seizure and to any 

person personally served notice of the forfeiture proceedings.” 

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11488.4(j) (footnote added). 

In the instant case, Plaintiffs assert that their due 

process rights were violated because they were not afforded an 

opportunity to present their claim regarding the Mercedes-Benz 

before it was released. Defendants assert that the release of 

the Mercedes-Benz was statutorily authorized because Mr. Collins 

failed to file a timely claim contesting the seizure or a timely 

motion seeking return of his property. Additionally, Defendants 

assert that because the officers seized the Mercedes-Benz based 

on their reasonable belief that it had been used as an 

instrument to facilitate the manufacture of, or possession for 

sale or sale of cocaine, they are entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

 

conditional sales vendor, or mortgagee of the property, if any, 

up to the amount of his or her interest in the property, when 

the court declaring the forfeiture orders a distribution to that 

person.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11489(a).

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As an initial matter, the court finds that, to the extent 

that any officer was involved in the seizure of the MercedesBenz, they are entitled to qualified immunity because their 

actions were conducted pursuant to a state statute. With 

respect to the notice requirements of section 11488.4(j), the 

court finds that the notice sent by the district attorney was 

facially deficient as it did not contain the appraised value of 

the Mercedes-Benz. See Exh. 13, attached In Support of Pl.’s 

Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. Thus, because it fails to comply with 

the statutory notice requirements, it was improper. See Baca v. 

Minier, 229 Cal.App.3d 1253, 1265 (1991) (“Statutes imposing 

forfeitures are not favored and are to be strictly construed in 

favor of the persons against whom they are sought to be 

imposed”). Indeed, without evidence of the appraised value of 

the Mercedes-Benz at the time it was seized, it is unclear as to 

whether asset forfeiture procedures were lawfully initiated 

under § 11488.4(j). Section 11488.4(j) expressly states that 

asset forfeiture proceedings cannot be initiated under this 

section unless the property is valued at less than $25,000. 

Additionally, the court finds that Defendants have failed 

to demonstrate compliance with § 11488.4(j) insofar as they have 

failed to submit evidence demonstrating that the district 

attorney prepared a written declaration of forfeiture to the 

state or provided such declaration to Mr. Collins, an individual 

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personally served notice of the forfeiture proceedings. 

Finally, the court finds that Defendants have failed to 

demonstrate compliance with § 11488.5(a)(1) insofar as they have 

failed to demonstrate that they released the Mercedes-Benz 

thirty days after providing Mr. Collins with notice of 

forfeiture. Indeed, the evidence submitted indicates that 

Mr. Collins was given notice of forfeiture on February 1, 2005 

and the Mercedes-Benz was released on February 24, 2005, 

approximately one week before the thirty day time limit. Exh. 

13, attached In Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA; Exh 39, 

attached In Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

For these reasons, the court concludes that there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Collins’ due 

process rights were violated with respect to Defendants’ seizure 

and release of his Mercedes-Benz. Accordingly, the court denies 

summary adjudication regarding this claim in all respects, 

except that it grants summary judgment in favor of each and 

every officer on the ground that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

G. Violation of Due Process 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because there is no evidence 

demonstrating that any defendant published or disseminated false 

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information implicating Mr. Collins in drug trafficking.22 

Rather, according to Defendants, the evidence demonstrates that 

the news release published about Plaintiffs arrest was required 

by the California Public Records Act. Additionally, Defendants 

argue that this claim is not viable because a person’s 

reputation is not a protected liberty or property interest under 

the Fourteenth Amendment and cognizable under § 1983. 

“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental 

decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property 

interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.” Jackson, 2007 WL 1429827 at *9 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The procedural due process 

rights of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only when there is a 

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property 

interest. WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 373 

(9th Cir. 1999); see Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 

1032 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To establish a civil rights claim under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must assert more than a violation 

of state tort law - he must show that the defendant deprived him 

of an interest protected by the Constitution or federal law.”) 

A person’s interest in their reputation standing alone is not a 

 

22 This claim is only alleged against defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Schindler and Trefethen.

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constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. WMX 

Technologies, 197 F.3d at 374 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 

693). 

To state a claim for defamation under § 1983, a plaintiff 

must allege loss of a recognizable property or liberty interest 

in conjunction with the allegation of injury to reputation. 

Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1532 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff must show that either the defamatory communication 

caused the loss of a constitutionally protected right or that 

the injury to reputation occurred “in conjunction” with the loss 

of a recognizable property or liberty interest. See Stevens v. 

Rifkin, 608 F.Supp. 710, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (citations 

omitted); Gobel v. Maricopa, 867 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(holding that plaintiff sufficiently pled “defamation plus” 

where complaint alleged false statements were made in connection 

with illegal arrest), abrogated on other grounds by Merritt v. 

County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 In the instant case, Plaintiffs procedural due process 

claim alleges that Mr. Collins “suffered damages to his 

reputation” due to Defendants “dissemination of news releases 

falsely implicating [him] in drug trafficking” in violation of 

his rights under the Fourth through Fourteenth Amendments. 

Plaintiffs further allege that as a consequence of such 

disclosures he lost his job and numerous job opportunities. As 

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such, Mr. Collins’ “defamation plus” claim appears to be based 

on his assertion that Defendants deprived him of his Fourth 

Amendment rights by misstating and omitting exculpatory facts in 

the search warrant affidavit as well as by arresting him without 

probable cause. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to establish 

Defendants’ liability on these claims. Therefore, this claim 

does not survive the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Weiner,

210 F.3d at 1032 (summary judgment granted in favor of defendant 

on plaintiff's § 1983 claim predicated on defamation, where 

plaintiff failed to show right, privilege, or immunity protected 

by Constitution was violated in conjunction with alleged 

defamatory statement). 

Accordingly, the court grants summary adjudication 

regarding this claim. 

H. Monell Claims 

 The Plaintiffs have alleged the following Monell claims 

against the City of Sacramento: (1) unreasonable search and 

seizure; (2) false arrest; (3) malicious prosecution; (4) 

excessive bail; and (5) unlawful taking/due process violation. 

Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted with 

respect to each and every claims because Plaintiffs have not 

presented sufficient evidence to establish liability under 

Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

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 A plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim against a local 

government if he or she can demonstrate that an action pursuant 

to official municipal policy of some nature caused a 

constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To succeed on 

such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant’s 

policy, custom or practice was the “moving force” behind the 

alleged constitutional violation. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. 

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); Edgerly, 2007 WL 2034040 at 

*10; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) 

(a Monell plaintiff must show “a direct causal link between a 

municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional 

deprivation”). 

 In the instant action, summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to each and every Monell claim, except for the due 

process claim regarding the seizure and release of the MercedesBenz, because Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence 

demonstrating that an official municipal policy, custom or 

practice was the “moving force” behind the alleged 

constitutional violations. 

 With respect to the due process claim, Plaintiffs have 

submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact 

as to whether the City of Sacramento had a policy or custom that 

unlawfully deprived Mr. Collins of his Mercedes-Benz. 

Sacramento City police clerk Patricia Cassidy specifically 

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testified that the Mercedes-Benz was released to Patelco, the 

lien-holder, pursuant to a city policy. Dep. of Patricia 

Cassidy (“Cassidy”) at 17:9-19:25, 23:1-26:18, attached as Exh. 

48, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted regarding each 

and every Monell claim, except for the due process claim. 

I. State Law Claims 

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim for the same reasons that it was 

warranted for Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim under § 1983.23

 The tort of false imprisonment is: “(1) the nonconsenual, 

intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful 

privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however 

brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496 

(2000). “Under California law, the torts of false arrest and 

false imprisonment are not separate torts, as false arrest is 

‘but one way of committing a false imprisonment.’” Watts v. 

County of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.4th 744 (1997)). “A cause 

of action for false imprisonment based on unlawful arrest will 

lie where there was an arrest without process followed by 

 

23 These claims are only alleged against defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Schindler, Trefethen and the City of Sacramento.

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imprisonment.” Watts, 256 F.3d at 891 (citing City of Newport 

Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal.App.3d 803 (1970)). 

 In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Collins was 

falsely arrested without a warrant and without probable cause. 

Plaintiffs further allege that Mr. Collins was falsely 

imprisoned based on the officers suppression of exculpatory 

evidence and mischaracterization of seized evidence. Based on 

the discussion above, this claim cannot survive the summary 

judgment stage because the officers had probable cause to arrest 

Mr. Collins. Additionally, this claim fails as a matter of law 

because Plaintiffs did not establish a genuine issue of fact 

regarding whether Defendants improperly exerted pressure on the 

prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to her, concealed 

exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad 

faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the 

initiation of legal proceedings. 

Accordingly, the Court grants summary adjudication in favor 

of Defendants on this claim. 

2. Conversion 

Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because Plaintiffs cannot establish 

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that they had the right to possess the Mercedes-Benz or that 

Defendants wrongfully converted it.24

 Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the 

property of another. Mendoza v. Rast Produce Co., Inc., 140 

Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404-05 (2006). Under California law, the 

elements of conversion are: (1) plaintiff owns or has the right 

to possess property; (2) defendant wrongfully converts or 

disposes of the property; and (3) damages. Id. at 1405; PCO, 

Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & 

Shapiro LLP, 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395 (2007). “The gravamen of 

the tort is the defendant’s hostile act of dominion or control 

over a specific chattel to which the plaintiff has the right of 

immediate possession.” PCO, Inc., 150 Cal.App.4th at 395. 

Because conversion is a strict liability tort the foundation of 

the action rests neither in the knowledge nor the intent of the 

defendant. Mendoza, 140 Cal.App.4th at 1405. Therefore, 

questions of the defendant’s good faith, lack of knowledge, and 

motive are ordinarily immaterial. Id. 

 This claim survives summary judgment because Plaintiffs 

have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Mr. Collins had the right to possess the Mercedes-Benz at the 

time it was released and whether Defendants properly disposed of 

 

24 This claim is alleged against all defendants.

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the Mercedes-Benz, i.e., released it to Patelco. The evidence 

submitted indicates that at the time the Mercedes-Benz was 

released, Mr. Collins was the registered owner of the vehicle 

and was current with his payments. Dep. of Cassidy at 23:7-18, 

24:2-6, attached as Exh. 48, In Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s 

MSJ/MSA; Dep. of Melvin Bell at 10:7-19, 30:6-11, attached as 

Exh. U, In Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. Moreover, as discussed 

above, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

the City of Sacramento properly released the Mercedes-Benz 

pursuant to statutory forfeiture requirements. 

 Accordingly, the court denies summary adjudication 

regarding this claim. 

3. Defamation 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because there is no evidence 

demonstrating that any Defendant disseminated or published 

information about Mr. Collins’ and because the information 

regarding Mr. Collins’ arrest was required to be published under 

the California Public Records Act.25

 “‘Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. 

The tort involves the intentional publication of a statement of 

fact which is false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to 

 

25 This claim is only alleged against defendants Patton, 

Schrum, Schindler, Trefethen and the City of Sacramento.

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injure or which causes special damage.’” Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 

Cal.App.4th 13, 27 (2007). In order for a defamation claim to 

survive a First Amendment challenge, a plaintiff must present 

evidence of a statement of fact that is provably false. Id. 

The dispositive question is whether a reasonable trier of fact 

could conclude that the published statements imply a provably 

false factual assertion. Id. In the context of defamation, the 

truth of the allegedly defamatory communication is a complete 

defense against civil liability, regardless of bad faith or 

malicious purpose. Id. at 28. 

 In the instant case, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Collins was 

defamed by Defendants dissemination of news releases falsely 

implicating him in a drug trafficking conspiracy. The Court 

disagrees. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 

Mr. Collins was arrested based on probable cause and that the 

Sacramento Police Department issued a press release - as 

required by the California Public Records Act (see Cal. Gov. 

Code §§ 6250, 6254(f))26 - stating, among other things, that 

Mr. Collins was arrested and charged with conspiracy and 

 

26 See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 

4th 588 (1993) (observing that the Legislative intent in 

requiring disclosure under Public Records Act of arrest 

information was to continue common-law tradition of 

contemporaneous disclosure of individualized arrest information 

to prevent secret arrests and to mandate continued disclosure of 

customary and basic law enforcement information to the press). 

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possession of rock cocaine for sale. Exh. X, attached In 

Support of Def.’s MSJ/MSA. 

Accordingly, because the statement issued by the police was 

true, summary adjudication is warranted regarding this claim. 

4. Negligence 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is warranted 

with respect to this claim because they exercised due care in 

executing or enforcing the law.27

 California Government Code § 820.4 states: “A public 

employee is not liable for his act or omission, exercising due 

care, in the execution or enforcement of any law. Nothing in 

this section exonerates a public employee from liability for 

false arrest or false imprisonment.” 

 In the instant case, as discussed above, the officers had 

probable cause to arrest Mr. Collins. See Peng v. Mei Chin 

Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under California 

law, an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest ‘if 

the facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care 

and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest 

and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime’”). 

As such, the officers are immune from negligence liability 

because they exercised due care in enforcing the law. Likewise, 

 

27 This claim is alleged against all defendants.

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the City is immune from negligence liability because a public 

entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or 

omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee 

is immune from liability. See Cal. Gov’t Code 815.2(b); Adams 

v. City of Fremont, 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 264 (1998) (public 

entities are liable for the negligent acts or omissions of their 

employees acting within the scope of their employment except 

where either the employee or the public entity is immunized from 

liability by statute). 

 Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted regarding this 

claim. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the above stated reasons, the court GRANTS the motion 

for summary judgment/adjudication in part and DENIES it in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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