Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01179/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01179-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL JAMES GOMEZ, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-01179 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

) 

BRIGADIER GENERAL KURT )

NEUBAUER, )

MAJOR MICHAEL BORDERS, )

) 

Respondents. )

____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

Mr. Michael Gomez (“Petitioner”), who is represented by

counsel in this matter, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) on June

3, 2010. Petitioner is in the custody of the Security Forces at

Luke Air Force Base in Glendale, Arizona. Respondents filed an

answer (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) to the petition on July 2, 2010.

Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 13) to the answer on August 16,

2010.

Background

Petitioner enlisted for a four-year term of service on

April 11, 2006. Answer, Exh. 1 & Exh. 2. In January 2010,

Petitioner was charged by the military with wrongful use of MDMA

(Ecstacy) and alprazolam (benzodiazapine), in violation of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id., Exh. 1. The charges

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were withdrawn several days after they were filed. Id., Exh. 1.

On February 2, 2010, Petitioner applied to separate from the Air

Force at the expiration of his term of service on April 10,

2010, by submitting a AF IMT 100, Request and Authorization for

Separation. Id., Exh. 5. 

 In early February of 2010, Petitioner presented a

copy of his separation orders to Master Sergeant John Alsvig,

who told Petitioner that the orders were invalid because of the

investigation for drug use and that charges would be preferred

against him prior to his date of separation. Id., Exh. 6. On

April 6, 2010, four days prior to the expiration of Petitioner’s

four-year term of service, the Air Force preferred charges

against Petitioner for wrongful use of MDMA and alprazolam.

Id., Exh. 2. On April 6, 2010, Petitioner’s status was placed

on administrative hold so that his separation processing would

cease pending court-martial. Id., Exh. 8.

On April 9, 2010, Petitioner was “out-processed” or

separated, he left base, and his final pay was deposited

directly into his bank account. Id., Exh.6, Exh. 12, Exh. 13.

On May 14, 2010, Petitioner was taken into custody in

California. Petitioner was transferred to the custody of

Security Forces at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. On May 21,

2010, an Air Force Colonel ordered Petitioner detained pending

court-martial. Id., Exh. 1. On May 28, 2010, the Air Force

charged Petitioner with fraudulently obtaining a discharge,

desertion, and wrongful use of clonazepam (benzodiazepine).

Id., Exh. 2 & Exh. 17.

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Petitioner seeks his release from the Air Force’s

custody and asserts he is no longer subject to the jurisdiction

of the military for a court-martial because he has been

discharged from service, citing 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a). Petitioner

argues that subjecting him to a court-martial is not authorized

because he does not fit into any category of individual listed

in 10 U.S.C. § 802(a).

Answering the petition, Respondents assert the Air

Force has lawful custody of Petitioner.

The Air Force contends that Petitioner never

received his discharge certificate, and thus

he was never lawfully discharged from the Air

Force. Further, the Air Force contends that

Petitioner attempted to fraudulently obtain

a discharge; therefore, even if Petitioner

had received his discharge certificate, the

discharge would be invalid. Finally, the Air

Force contends that the completion of most of

the Petitioner’s separation process was the

result of administrative error (induced by

fraud), and such error allows the discharge

to be revoked within a reasonable time. Since

Petitioner was not lawfully discharged from

the Air Force, his detention pending

court-martial is constitutional.

Answer at 2.

Respondents further allege:

At his final out-processing appointment on

April 9, 2010, Petitioner presented a

“Quality Force Check” (part of the

out-processing member checklist), which

requires the signature of an airman’s First

Sergeant to ensure that the member has not

received certain disciplinary actions within

sixty days of separation. The signature that

appeared on the checklist was MSgt David

Garcia’s, dated April 8, 2010. [] MSgt

Garcia, however, was not present at Luke Air

Force Base on April 8, 2010, and MSgt Garcia

has declared that the signature on

Petitioner’s out-processing checklist was not

his signature. []

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1 This section states:

A member of an armed force may not be discharged or

released from active duty until his discharge certificate

or certificate of release from active duty, respectively,

and his final pay or a substantial part of that pay, are

ready for delivery to him or his next of kin or legal

representative.

10 U.S.C. § 1168(a) (2010). 

-4-

 On Monday, April 12, 2010, MSgt Alsvig left

a voice mail with Petitioner informing him he

had 24 hours to report for duty before being

AWOL. [] Also on Monday, Petitioner’s

separation orders were formally revoked

through an AF IMT 973. [] On Tuesday, April

13, 2010, the finance office sent a request

(which was unsuccessful) to Chase/JP Morgan

to return direct deposit of Petitioner’s

final pay check. [] Petition never received

his discharge certificate, DD Form 214. On

Monday, April 12, 2010, the DD Form 214

documentation office noticed the separation

on Petitioner had been canceled, and so

Petitioner’s DD Form 214 was not signed nor

put in the mail. A DD Form 214 worksheet

contains important information but no

signatures, and it is printed and completed

by an airman (not by the documentation

office) prior to separation. Although the

document appears the same as a DD Form 214,

the worksheet is not official, validated, or

reviewed. The official DD Form 214 is the

last step in separation, and is the official

record of service and separation.[]

Id. at 3 (citations to record omitted and emphasis added).

In response to the answer to his petition Petitioner

argues: “In 10 U.S.C. § 1168(a),1 Congress linked the discharge

of a servicemember to the moment at which the servicemember’s

discharge certificate and final pay are ‘ready for delivery’ to

him...” Doc. 13 at 4. Petitioner asserts his discharge was

complete notwithstanding the fact that he did not receive an

official DD Form 214. Petitioner contends section 1168(a)

“‘does not mandate actual receipt of discharge documents, but

rather that the documents be ready for delivery to service

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members on their separation date.’” Id. at 4, quoting Spehr v.

United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 69, 89 (Fed. Cl. 2001).

Petitioner argues:

The Air Force contends that, because it

failed to deliver Mr. Gomez’s DD Form 214

form to him as required by its regulations,

it retained court-martial jurisdiction over

him. (Dkt. #9 at 5-7) This contention rests

on the premise that this Court may in effect

replace the phrase “ready for delivery” in §

1168(a) with the phrase “actually delivered.”

... The ordinary, contemporary, and common

meaning of the phrase “ready for delivery” is

“ready for delivery,” not “actually

delivered.” The Air Force’s contrary

interpretation also overlooks the fact that,

as the Supreme Court stressed in Toth, statutory constructions that expand the

military’s court-martial jurisdiction over

ex-servicemembers are to be avoided, because

they tend to encroach upon the jurisdiction

of Article III courts, which afford

defendants “more constitutional safeguards”

than military courts. Toth, 350 U.S. at 15.

As the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

stressed in Smith v. Vanderbush, 47 M.J. 56

(C.A.A.F. 1997), the Toth decision set forth

the Supreme Court’s strong “admonition ...

that jurisdiction over former servicemembers

calls for exercise of ‘the least possible

power adequate to the end proposed.’” Id. at

61 (quoting Toth, 350 U.S. at 23 (second

internal quotation marks omitted)).

Id. at 6.

Analysis

The parties do not dispute that Petitioner was charged

with wrongful use of MDMA and alprazolam on April 6, 2010, and

that his term of service was to expire on April 10, 2010.

Neither do the parties dispute that a hold was placed on

Petitioner’s separation on April 6, 2010, and that Petition

never received a signed discharge certificate. Respondents aver

that on April 12, 2010, the military’s DD Form 214 documentation

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office noticed Petitioner’s separation from service had been

canceled. Respondents assert that, not only was Petitioner’s DD

Form 214 not received by Petitioner, it was never signed nor put

in the mail. 

Petitioner challenges only the military court-martial’s

jurisdiction to try him. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a

civilian may collaterally attack court-martial jurisdiction in

the District Court without first exhausting military remedies.

See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758-59, 95 S. Ct.

1300, 1313-14 (1975); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13 n.3, 76

S. Ct. 1, 3 n.3 (1955); Machado v. Commanding Officer,

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, 860 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1988).

“‘Courts-martial are tribunals of special and limited

jurisdiction whose judgments, so far as questions relating to

their jurisdiction are concerned, are always open to collateral

attack.’” Fricke v. Secretary of the Navy, 509 F.3d 1287, 1289

(10th Cir. Cir. 2007), quoting Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11,

19, 41 S. Ct. 227, 228-29 (1927). Petitioner bears the burden

of establishing that the Air Force lacks jurisdiction over him

regarding the charges proffered on April 6, 2010. See Machado,

860 F.2d at 544 (“Possession of the original [discharge]

certificate in apparently proper form is obviously helpful to

Machado on the issue of delivery. However, on a petition for the

civil remedy of habeas corpus, petitioner bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to

relief.”), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69, 58 S.

Ct. 1019, 1024-25 (1938). 

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The military’s ability to exercise court-martial

jurisdiction over an offense is predicated on one factor: “the

military status of the accused.” Solorio v. United States, 483

U.S. 435, 439, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2927 (1987). “It is black

letter law that in personam jurisdiction over a military person

is lost upon his discharge from the service, absent some saving

circumstance or statutory authorization.” United States v.

Howard, 20 M.J. 353, 354 (C.M.A. 1985). However, the military’s

jurisdiction over a servicemember, once established while he is

still a member of the military, may continue past the scheduled

expiration of his military commitment. See Smith v. Vanderbush,

47 M.J. 56, 57-58 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

Subject to certain narrow exceptions ... a

court-martial does not have jurisdiction over

persons lawfully discharged from the armed

forces, including cases involving offenses

allegedly committed prior to discharge. Smith

v. Vanderbush, 47 MJ 56 (1997); see United

States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11,

76 S. Ct. 1, 100 L.Ed. 8 (1955). A

servicemember will not be considered to have

been lawfully discharged, however, unless:

(1) the member received a valid discharge

certificate or a certificate of release from

active duty, such as a Department of Defense

Form (DD Form) 214; (2) the member’s “final

pay” or “a substantial part of that pay” is

“ready for delivery” to the member; and (3)

the member has completed the administrative

clearance process required by the Secretary

of the service of which he or she is a

member. United States v. King, 27 MJ 327, 329

(CMA 1989); accord United States v. King, 42

MJ 79, 80 (1995); see 10 USC §§ 1168 and

1169.

 Under paragraph 1-31d of Department of the

Army Regulation (AR) 635-200 (26 June 1996),

a discharge takes effect at “2400 [hours] on

the date of notice of discharge to the

soldier.” Even if a discharge certificate and

separation orders are delivered to a member

earlier in the day as an administrative

convenience for the unit or the

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servicemember, the discharge is not effective

upon such a delivery unless it is clear that

it was intended to be effective at the

earlier time. Compare United States v.

Batchelder, 41 MJ 337 (1994), with United

States v. Howard, 20 MJ 353 (CMA 1985 ); see

also United States v. Guest, 46 MJ 778 (Army

Ct. Crim. App. 1997).

United States v. Melanson, 53 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2000)

(emphasis added).

The record in this matter indicates that the military

exerted lawful jurisdiction over Petitioner prior to the time he

asserts he was “discharged.” Charges were proffered against

Petitioner on April 6, 2010, prior to the time his military

service was set to expire, i.e., at 2400 hours on April 10,

2010. 

Court-martial jurisdiction attaches when

“action with a view to trial” takes place.

RCM 202(c)(1); Allen, 759 F.2d at 1471. RCM

202(c)(2) states that “[a]ctions by which

court-martial jurisdiction attaches include:

apprehension; imposition of restraint, such

as restriction, arrest, or confinement; and

preferral of charges.” Charges were preferred

against Williams on September 20, 2001,

before his ETS of December 29, 2001. Def.’s

Judgment Mot.App. at 28-29. Consequently,

because of the court-martial charges pending

against then-Staff Sergeant Williams, the Air

Force had authority to retain jurisdiction

over him after his term of service had

expired. 

Williams v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 194, 201-02 (Fed. Cl.

2006).

The record also indicates that Petitioner was not

“discharged” from service on April 10, 2010. With regard to the

test stated in Melanson, Petitioner did not receive a valid DD

Form 214, although Petitioner’s final pay was ready for delivery

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to him and was delivered to him. It is at best arguable that

Petitioner completed the administrative clearance process

required by the Secretary of the Air Force prior to leaving

base.

A servicemember’s collection of their final pay,

without an accompanying delivery of a discharge certificate or

other valid notice of status termination, does not terminate the

service member’s military status. See United States v. Palumbo,

27 M.J. 565, 566-67 (A.C.M.R. 1988). Additionally, Petitioner’s

argument that he was discharged on April 10, 2010, is predicated

on section 1168, which provides a servicemember “may not be

released” until a discharge certificate and final pay are ready

for delivery; however, the statute does not say that the events

of readiness of the discharge certificate and final pay

constitute the service-member’s discharge in and of themselves.

See Machado, 860 F.2d at 544 (“Although the statute requires

that the certificate and final pay only be ‘ready for delivery,’

it is apparent that the key issues before us are whether they

actually were delivered, ...”). See also United States v. Hart,

66 M.J. 273, 275 (C.A.A.F.) (holding that, although the UCMJ

itself does not define when a discharge occurs, military courts

have looked to 10 U.S.C. §§ 1168(a)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.

310 (2008).

The relevant legal opinions indicate that, to be

entitled to relief, Petitioner must prove that his discharge

certificate was actually “delivered.” Machado, 860 F.2d at 545

(“The Court of Military Appeals, the civilian-composed court

that reviews military decisions, has said that “[d]ischarge is

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effective upon delivery of the discharge certificate[,]”);

Howard, 20 M.J. at 354, citing United States v. Scott, 29 C.M.R.

462 (1960). At least one military court has stated that, if

“delivery of the discharge certificate” is “accomplished by

fraud ... then the delivery loses its legal significance.”

Howard, 20 M.J. at 354. Additionally, while physical delivery

of a discharge certificate is generally considered the event

that ends a servicemember’s military status, “the discharge

authority must have intended the discharge to take effect.”

United States v. Harmon, 63 M.J. 98, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

Accordingly, a servicemember’s receipt of a discharge

certificate without the military’s requisite intent to discharge

him does not terminate court-martial jurisdiction. See United

States v. Guest, 46 M.J. 778, 780 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1997). See

also United States v. Brunton, 24 M.J. 566, 567-68 (N-M Ct. Crim

App. 1987). 

Therefore, given the clear evidence that the military

did not intend to relinquish jurisdiction over Petitioner and

that Master Sergeant Alsvig clearly informed Petitioner that

charges would be proffered against him and a hold had been

placed on his separation sufficient that generation of a signed

DD Form 214 was never accomplished, the Magistrate Judge

concludes that Petitioner was not discharged from service and

the military has proper jurisdiction to detain and court martial

Petitioner. See Harmon, 63 M.J. at 101 (holding discharge not

yet effective when commander placed a valid legal hold on the

defendant’s discharge); United States v. Williams, 53 M.J. 316,

317 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (concluding a valid legal hold had been

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placed on the separation before the individual’s discharge was

effective); Melanson, 53 M.J. at 4 (holding a discharge was

revoked before becoming effective).

Conclusion

Petitioner was charged with violation of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice prior to the date that his term of

service expired on April 10, 2010. Additionally, Petitioner was

not “discharged” from the military on April 10, 2010, as that

term is defined by the military courts and federal courts for

the purpose of determining if a habeas petitioner has properly

alleged the military’s exercise of jurisdiction violates their

constitutional rights or federal statutes.

 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Gomez’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

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of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 2nd day of September, 2010.

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