Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01701/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01701-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The court does not necessarily accept that it has diversity subject matter 1

jurisdiction. Based on the dockets in plaintiff’s other cases in this district, the Court notes that,

while plaintiff asserts that he is a citizen of Oregon, he has lived continuously in Yreka,

California, for a number of years. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER T. HARRELL, No. CIV S-06-1701-LKK-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

BARBARA MURRAY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action for damages, invoking this

court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pending before the court is 1

plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1), filed on August 2, 2006.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court is also required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under these screening

Case 2:06-cv-01701-LKK -CMK Document 7 Filed 11/28/06 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

provisions, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B) and

1915A(b)(1), (2). Because no defendant in this case is a governmental entity or officer or

employee, and because plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court

will screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

Plaintiff recites the following factual “overview” in his complaint:

On or about May 20th, 2006, Plaintiff Harrell, while located in

Yreka, California, within the County of Siskiyou, and pursuant to this

contract with Kimberly Olson, was perusing the real estate section of the

local paper in search of improved housing for Ms. Olson. Therein he

located an advertisement by Defendant Murray for a “home” located in

Etna, CA, within the County of Siskiyou. 

Upon Plaintiff’s instruction, Olson called the number listed in the

advertisement, and arranged to meet with the owner (Defendant Murray),

for inspection of the premises and application to rent. 

Olson met with Defendant Murray at the rental premises, where

she was told by Murray that the property was Defendant Murray’s “family

home,” and was thus very important to Murray, that the dwelling had

recently undergone a great deal of remodeling and improvement to

improve its safety and habitability, and that numerous other defects,

including severely peeling paint, caulking, defective roofing, and other

problematic weatherization features, would be repaired in the near future. 

Defendant Murray also indicated that she would be providing yard care for

the property. Relying on these representations by Murray, Olson entered

into a rental agreement with her. 

Some weeks later, while moving Olson into the 305 Main St.,

Etna, CA premises, Plaintiff Harrell noted some defects in the wiring that

rendered the premises unsafe. Over the next several weeks, when his

contractual duties to Olson compelled his presence at the rental premises,

Plaintiff undertook to thoroughly inspect the property and premises,

finding numerous habitability defects, including severely decayed

foundation members; faulty wiring; permeable counter surfaces in the

kitchen; improper ventilation; broken window mechanisms, and lack of

screens in some windows; unsafe and collapsing flooring; infestations of

termites, carpenter ants, and other insects; a lack of garbage cans, and

several other substandard conditions and violations of the habitability

requirements for rentals as detailed in California Civil Code Sections

1941, et seq.

Plaintiff, pursuant to his contract with Olson, detailed some of his

findings in a letter to Defendant Murray, introducing himself as Olson’s

caregiver and agent, notifying her of the problems, and asking on Olson’s

behalf to have the habitability defects repaired. 

Case 2:06-cv-01701-LKK -CMK Document 7 Filed 11/28/06 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Defendant Murray’s response to this notification was to send Olson

emails, and leave a message on Olson’s answering machine to the effect

that Olson should vacate the premises immediately because “my family

home does not meed your needs.” 

Plaintiff’s response to Murray’s instruction to Olson to vacate the

premises was a detailed explanation of the legal obligations pursuant to

state law and contract that devolves upon landlords regarding habitability

issues of rentals. Plaintiff further advised Defendant Murray that he had

instructed Olson to file complaints with the Building and Health

Departments. 

Defendant Murray, in violation of those provisions of state law

prohibiting retaliatory acts and evictions against those making complaints

regarding the habitability of rental dwellings, then moved to terminate the

tenancy of Olson, and also served a 30-day notice pursuant to California

Civil Code Section 1946 upon Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff states that these facts give rise to the following state law claims: (1) unfair business and

trade practices; (2) intentional interference with performance of contract; (3) attempted and

actual interference with economic advantage; (4) willful infliction of emotional distress;

(5) willfully maintaining a nuisance; (6) breach of contract and warranty; and (7) willful

negligence. Plaintiff does not allege any federal law claims. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and

punitive damages. 

Based on the allegations in the complaint, it appears that plaintiff does not have

standing to pursue this action. Specifically, plaintiff states that Olson – not he – entered into the

rental agreement with defendant Murray. Plaintiff does not allege that he was a co-tenant or

otherwise a party to the rental agreement. Moreover, because plaintiff has not attached a copy of

the rental agreement, he cannot establish the existence of a contract for his breach of contract

claim. Finally, plaintiff has not attached any documents establishing any legal right to bring this

action on Olson’s behalf (such as, for example, an order appointing plaintiff Olson’s guardian or

conservator). To the extent plaintiff is attempting to represent Olson as her advisor or counsel,

pro se litigants may not represent anyone other than themselves. See McShane v. United States,

366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:06-cv-01701-LKK -CMK Document 7 Filed 11/28/06 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Plaintiff will be provided the opportunity to amend the complaint in light of the

foregoing observations. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an amended complaint may

result in dismissal of the entire action for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with court

rules and orders. See Local Rule 11-110. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Within 30 days of the date of this order, plaintiff shall file a first amended

complaint.

DATED: November 27, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-01701-LKK -CMK Document 7 Filed 11/28/06 Page 4 of 4