Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02243/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-02243-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID JAMES DUNCAN,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

THOMAS A. COHEN, et al.,

Defendant(s).

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No. C 08-2243 BZ

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Plaintiff David James Duncan sued defendants Thomas A.

Cohen d/b/a Hammermark Productions and Kristi Denton Cohen

d/b/a Peloton Productions (“the Cohens”) and defendant Sierra

Club, incorrectly sued as Sierra Club Books (“Sierra Club”),

alleging violations of federal copyright laws and a variety of

claims based on state law, all arising from the Cohens’

attempts to make a film of Duncan’s novel, The River Why. The

Cohens have moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); to dismiss his

first, second, fourth, seventh, and eighth claims against the

Cohens pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute and for

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1 In view of this disposition, all of plaintiff’s

objections to evidence (Docs 27 and 34) are DENIED as moot.

2

sanctions and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute. For the

reasons set forth below, the Cohens’ motion is DENIED in its

entirety.1

The Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss

A strategic lawsuit against public participation

(“SLAPP”) “seeks to chill or punish a party's exercise of

constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the

government for redress of grievances.” Rusheen v. Cohen, 37

Cal.4th 1048, 1055 (2006). The California legislature enacted

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 “to allow early

dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling

expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.”

Metabolife Intern., Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839 (9th

Cir. 2001). The statute also provides for the imposition of

attorney’s fees and costs if the defendant’s motion to dismiss

is granted. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c). 

The Cohens contend that Duncan’s claims for copyright

infringement, declaratory relief, fraud, conspiracy to

defraud, false advertising and invasion of the right of

publicity should be dismissed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP

statute. 

As an initial matter, California’s anti-SLAPP statute

does not apply to Duncan’s federal claims for relief and the

Cohens do not provide any contrary authority. See e.g.,

Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, CA, 530 F.Supp.2d

1084, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma

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Cheese Factory, LLC, 2007 WL 2122638, at *4 (N.D. Cal.). The

anti-SLAPP motion is therefore DENIED as to the federal claims

for copyright infringement, declaratory relief and false

advertising.

Duncan’s state law claims for relief are not subject to

an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss because they do not arise out

of protected activity - the Cohens rights of free speech.

Courts follow a two step process in ruling on an anti-SLAPP

motion to dismiss. “First, the court decides whether the

defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged

cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity. (§

425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If the court finds such a showing has

been made, it then must consider whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” City

of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 76 (2002). A defendant

makes the threshold showing “by demonstrating that the act

underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories

spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e) ....” Id.

citing Braun v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 52 Cal.App.4th 1036,

1043 (1997). Section 425.16(e) provides that:

‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or

free speech under the United States or California

Constitution in connection with a public issue’

includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing

made before a legislative, executive, or judicial

proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized

by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing

made in connection with an issue under consideration or

review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body,

or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3)

any written or oral statement or writing made in a

place open to the public or a public forum in

connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any

other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the

constitutional right of petition or the constitutional

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right of free speech in connection with a public issue

or an issue of public interest.

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e). “When considering a section

425.16 motion, a court must consider the actual objective of

the suit and grant the motion if the true goal is to interfere

with and burden the defendant's exercise of his free speech

and petition rights.” Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Serv.s,

Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1064 (2005) citing Foothills

Townhome Assn. v. Christiansen, 65 Cal.App.4th 688, 696 (1998)

overruled in part on other grounds by Equilon Enter. v.

Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5 (2002).

As in City of Cotati, “the critical point is whether the

plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in

furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free

speech. 29 Cal.4th at 78. The Cohens contend that Duncan’s

suit is an attempt to limit the exercise of their rights of

free speech on a matter of public interest - the “message of

environmental activism set in a coming-of-age story” found in

Duncan’s book The River Why. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at p.

9.) However, Duncan’s suit in no way seeks limits the Cohens’

ability to spread their message of environmental activism

through film, or any other medium. “Copyright laws are not

restrictions on freedom of speech as copyright protects only

form of expression and not the ideas expressed.” Harper & Row

Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter.s, 471 U.S. 539, (1985)

citing New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 726, n.

(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Duncan’s suit does not

prevent the Cohens from making a coming-of-age film about

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environmental activism, even if it includes a coming of age

story, as long as the film does not use the copyrighted story

or title from The River Why. The Cohens are not claiming

their rights to use material from The River Why are based on

free speech. Rather they contend their rights are based on a

contract purportedly signed by Sierra Club in 1984. This

action centers on copyright and contract claims, not protected

activity, and the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply. 

Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Data Base, Inc., 150

Cal.App.4th 941 (2007), does not require that Duncan’s right

of publicity claim be subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. 

Duncan alleges that the Cohens used his name to solicit funds

for the film and lists his name on their website. In

Kronemyer, the Court of Appeal found that a public website

www.imdb.com’s act of deciding whom to credit as a producer of

a film was an act in the furtherance of free speech. 150

Cal.App.4th at 947. Here, Duncan’s right of publicity claim

is based on the Cohens’ use of his name to solicit funds for

production of a film in violation of his claimed copyright; it

is not based in furtherance of their freedom of speech.

Similarly, the Cohens improperly suggest that the

California legislature’s enactment of California Code of Civil

Procedure section 425.17(d)(2) means that any suit involving

the creation or dissemination of films are subject to an antiSLAPP suit. If this was true, every suit for copyright

infringement or breach of contract involving a film or

television show would be subject to California’s anti-SLAPP

statute. Yet, section 425.17 was enacted to limit the antiCase 3:08-cv-02243-BZ Document 69 Filed 07/22/08 Page 5 of 15
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SLAPP statute’s application to public interest and class

action suits “brought solely in the public interest or on

behalf of the general public” in certain circumstances. Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b); see also Ingels, 129 Cal.App4th

at 1066. The section’s inclusion of public interest and class

action suits “against any person or entity based upon the

creation, dissemination, exhibition, advertisement, or other

similar promotion of any dramatic, literary, musical,

political, or artistic work, including, but not limited to, a

motion picture or television program . . .” as suits subject

to the anti-SLAPP statute, did not abrogate the requirement

that anti-SLAPP motions only be granted if the suit is an

attempt to limit the defendant’s constitutional right to free

expression. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(d)(2). 

For these reasons the Cohens’ motion to dismiss and for

attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP

statute, is DENIED.

12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss:

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim and

should be granted only if plaintiff’s complaint fails to set

forth facts sufficient to establish a plausible right of

recovery. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,

1974 (2007). For purposes of such a motion, the complaint is

construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all

properly pleaded factual allegations are taken as true. 

Aquino v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 1734752, at *1 (N.D.

Cal.); Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F.Supp. 2d 1113, 1124 (C.D. Cal.

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2 Both sides’ requests that I take judicial notice of

the stipulated judgment are granted.

7

2007) (discussing the post-Twombly standard).

Copyright Infringement Claim:

The Cohens move to dismiss the copyright claim on the

grounds that a state court has entered a “stipulated judgment”

in a case to which Duncan was not a party stating that Peloton

Productions, defendant Kristi Cohen’s company, is the owner of

the motion picture rights to The River Why.2 However, the

judgment expressly states that “[n]o judgment in this action

would bind David James Duncan” and that Peloton Productions

“takes the risk that Mr. Duncan will file a claim, but that is

the risk that [Peloton Productions] is willing to take.” Nor

is there any basis for asserting that the stipulated judgment

collaterally estops Duncan from asserting his copyright in

this action.

Collateral estoppel is appropriate when:

‘(1) there was a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue in the previous action; (2)

the issue was actually litigated in that action;

(3) the issue was lost as a result of a final

judgment in that action; and (4) the person

against whom collateral estoppel is asserted in

the present action was a party or in privity

with a party in the previous action.’

United States v. Real Prop. Located at 22 Santa Barbara Dr.,

264 F.3d 860, 873 (9th Cir. 2001) quoting In re Palmer, 207

F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 2000). Although “a stipulation may

meet the ‘fully litigated’ requirement where ‘it is clear that

the parties intended the stipulation of settlement and

judgment entered thereon to adjudicate once and for all the

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issues raised in that action,’” Judge Mahoney expressly found

that the decision would not bind Duncan. Id. quoting Green v.

Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Furthermore, “a person who was not a party to a suit generally

has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the

claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of

claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against

the ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have

his own day in court.’” Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161,

2171 (2008) quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S.

793, 798 (1996)). The Supreme Court has “often repeated the

general rule that ‘one is not bound by a judgment in personam

in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to

which he has not been made a party by service of process.’” 

Id. quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). 

Moreover, Duncan does not satisfy any of the six exceptions to

the rule against nonparty preclusion set forth by the Supreme

Court in Taylor. First, Duncan is not “[a] person who agrees

to be bound by the determination of issues in an action

between others.” Id. at 2172. Second, Duncan was not

“adequately represented by someone with the same interests who

was a party to the suit.” Id. Third, Duncan did not assume

“control over the litigation in which that judgment was

rendered.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Fourth, Duncan

is not “the designated representative of a person who was a

party to the prior adjudication.” Id. at 2173. Fifth, there

is no “special statutory scheme” that “expressly foreclose[s]

successive litigation by nonlitigants.” Id. Sixth, a

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“pre-existing substantive legal relationship between [Duncan]

and the part[ies] to the judgment” does not exist. Id.

(internal quotations omitted). “Qualifying relationships

include, but are not limited to, preceding and succeeding

owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and

assignor.” Id. At the time of the state court suit, Sierra

Club was no longer Duncan's literary agent. (Compl., Ex. 14.)

Furthermore, in his complaint, Duncan denies any assignment of

rights to Cohen. Thus, no legal relationship between Duncan

and the parties existed at the time of the lawsuit. As a

result, Duncan's claim is not barred by the stipulated

judgment entered in state court.

The Cohens also argue that Duncan lacks standing to sue

because Sierra Club was the owner of the rights to develop the

film version of Duncan’s novel. In support of their claim,

the Cohens attach to their moving papers an unsigned copy of a

Publishing Agreement between Duncan and Sierra Club. The

Cohens contend that the Publishing Agreement conveyed the

motion picture rights to Sierra Club. The Cohens assert they

obtained those rights by way of a letter attached as Exhibit 2

of Duncan’s complaint referred to by the parties as the Rights

Agreement.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, if the court

“considers evidence outside the pleadings, it must normally

convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary

judgment, and it must give the nonmoving party an opportunity

to respond.” U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir.

2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). However, “documents whose

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contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the

pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th

Cir. 1994) overruled on other grounds in Galbraith v. County

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Duncan objects

to the authenticity of the Publishing Agreement attached to

the Cohens’ motion. As such, I cannot consider it when ruling

on the motion to dismiss. In any event, as the Complaint

alleges, the Publishing Agreement granted Sierra Club the

right to act as Duncan’s agent for the film rights (¶ 14). It

did not transfer ownership of the rights to the Sierra Club as

the Cohen defendants argue.

Under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), the “legal or beneficial owner

of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to

institute an action for any infringement of that particular

right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” Silvers

v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir.

2005). Thus, for the purposes of reviewing Duncan’s complaint

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Duncan’s allegations in

the complaint that he owns the motion picture rights and did

not grant Sierra Club authority to transfer those rights is

sufficient to provide standing for his copyright allegation.

Next, the Cohens argue that the three year statute of

limitations has run on Duncan’s copyright infringement claim. 

See 17 U.S.C § 507(b). A copyright infringement claim

“accrues when one has knowledge of a violation or is

chargeable with such knowledge.” Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d

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989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) abrogated on other grounds in Taylor,

128 S.Ct. at 2178. 

The Cohens argue that Duncan’s copyright claims are time

barred because he does not allege any specific acts of

infringement that occurred in the past three years. However,

in the complaint Duncan alleges that Kristi Cohen “is”

violating Duncan’s copyrights through “her efforts to produce

a film version of” The River Why. (Compl. at ¶ 44.) Any act

that is inconsistent with a copyright holder’s exclusive

rights constitutes infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). The

copyright holder has “the exclusive rights” to “reproduce” and

“prepare derivative works”. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) - (2). 

Duncan’s allegation that Kristi Cohen is infringing through

her efforts to prepare a derivative work of the novel is

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss the claim for

continuing infringement. Kourtis, 419 F.3d 999 - 1000. For

all these reasons, the Cohens’ motion to dismiss Duncan’s

claim for copyright infringement is DENIED.

Claim for Declaratory Relief:

The Cohens’ motion to dismiss Duncan’s claim for

declaratory relief is based on their inaccurate contention

that Duncan is seeking a declaration that he has not violated

their asserted copyright rights. In fact, Duncan requests a

declaration that the Letter Agreement between Sierra Club and

the Cohens, upon which the Cohens rely, is invalid or

terminated and that he owns the motion picture rights to his

book. (Compl. at ¶ 58.) This central dispute over the

validity of the Letter Agreement is sufficiently concrete to

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satisfy the requirement that there be a case or controversy. 

“When presented with a claim for a declaratory judgment . . .

federal courts must take care to ensure the presence of an

actual case or controversy, such that the judgment does not

become an unconstitutional advisory opinion.” Rhoades v. Avon

Products, Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007). As such,

the motion to dismiss the declaratory relief claim is DENIED.

Fraud Claim

The Cohens argue that Duncan’s fraud claim is fatally

vague. Claims for “fraud must satisfy a heightened pleading

standard that requires circumstances constituting fraud be

pled with particularity.” Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 544

F.Supp.2d 964, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2008) citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b). “The pleadings must state precisely the time, place,

and nature of the misleading statements, misrepresentations,

and specific acts of fraud.” Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363,

1370 (9th Cir. 1994). “[T]he circumstances constituting the

alleged fraud [must] be specific enough to give defendants

notice of the particular misconduct ... so that they can

defend against the charge and not just deny that they have

done anything wrong.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) internal quotations omitted.

Duncan’s complaint sets forth sufficient information regarding

the allegedly fraudulent statements Thomas Cohen made in

inducing Sierra Club to enter the initial option agreement to

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3 Because I am reviewing the claim under Rule 12(b)(6),

I did not consider the budget submitted by the Cohens in

support of their motion. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 907;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 

4 Contrary to the Cohens’ allegations, Duncan does not

plead that the he was aware of the fraud in 1987. Rather he

merely alleges that he was aware of the request for the

extension of the option at that time. (Compl. at ¶ 28.)

13

make the film, in creating the allegedly sham budget3, and in

promising to commence production of the film to give the

Cohen’s sufficient notice to defend against the claim.

The Cohens’ contention that Duncan’s fraud claim fails

because he does not claim that he, rather than Sierra Club,

relied on the misrepresentations fails because a principal can

sue for fraud committed on his agent. Cal. Civ. Code § 2330. 

The Cohens also contend that the fraud claim must fail

because Duncan does not allege that he suffers pecuniary

damages. Actual damages are a requirement of a fraud claim. 

Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1239

(1995). However, I read plaintiff’s fraud claim as seeking

not damages but a declaration that the fraudulently induced

agreement is invalid, much like a claim for rescission based

on fraud. See Cal. Civil Code § 1689 (b)(1). If plaintiff is

seeking damages for fraud, he must amend his complaint by

August 1, 2008.

Finally, the Cohens contend that Duncan’s fraud claim is

barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Cal. Code

Civ. Proc. § 338(d). In his complaint filed on April 30,

2008, Duncan alleges that he only became aware of the alleged

fraud in late 2005 or early 2006.4 Under the delayed

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discovery rule, based on the allegations in the complaint,

Duncan’s fraud claim is timely. E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,

Inc. Servs., 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1318 (2007).

For all these reasons, the Cohens’ motion to dismiss

Duncan’s fraud claim is DENIED.

Conspiracy:

The Cohens motion to dismiss Duncan’s conspiracy claim is

also DENIED. Contrary to the Cohens’ argument, Duncan is not

required to plead his claim of conspiracy with the specificity

required of a fraud claim. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title

Guaranty Co., 19 Cal.4th 26, 47 -48 (1998).

False Advertising and Right of Publicity Claims:

In their moving papers, the Cohens contend that the

Letter Agreement between Sierra Club and the Cohens permits

them to use Duncan’s name on their website and to solicit

funds. However, Duncan’s complaint alleges that the Letter

Agreement is invalid and for the purposes of ruling on this

motion, I must accept Duncan’s allegations as true and DENY

the Cohen’s motion as to these claims. Aquino, 2008 WL

1734752, at *1. 

The Cohens also raise new arguments for the first time in

their reply papers that the nominative use of Duncan’s name is

permitted. I have not considered the nominative use

arguments. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir.

2007)( A “court need not consider arguments raised for the

first time in a reply brief.”) 

///

///

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For the reasons set forth above, the Cohens’ motion is

DENIED. The Cohens shall answer by August 4, 2008.

Dated: July 22, 2008

 Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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