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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

REBECCA PRICE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOUTHERN ALE HOUSE, LLC,

et al., 

Defendants.

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Case No.: 7:24-cv-00666-AMM

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANT PI KAPPA PHI 

FRATERNITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter comes before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendant 

Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity. Doc. 19. For the reasons explained below, this motion is 

GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

This dispute arises from incidents that took place at the Pi Kappa Phi fraternity 

house in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. The alleged facts viewed in the light most favorable 

to plaintiff Rebecca Price are as follows:

Ms. Price was employed by Southern Ale House, Pi Kappa Phi Omicron 

Chapter (“Omicron Chapter”), the Omicron Club, and Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity (“Pi 

Kappa Phi”) as a food preparer and server from August 2021 to August 2023. Doc. 

1 ¶¶ 15, 23 The “Omicron Club owns the fraternity house and furniture and 

FILED

 2024 Dec-27 AM 11:35

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:24-cv-00666-AMM Document 30 Filed 12/27/24 Page 1 of 11
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equipment, which it leases to the Omicron Chapter.” Id. ¶ 25. Members of the 

Omicron Club are Pi Kappa Phi alumni, and fraternity activities take place within 

the house leased by the Omicron Chapter. See id. ¶¶ 25–26, 29. 

The Omicron Chapter contracted with Southern Ale House for food services. 

Id. ¶ 26. Southern Ale House assigned Ms. Price and Jeff Wilson, a chef and manager 

at Southern Ale House, to work at the Pi Kappa Phi fraternity house. Id. ¶¶ 28–29, 

33. During Ms. Price’s tenure there, she “was sexually harassed and subjected to a 

hostile work environment.” Id. ¶ 29. The Omicron Chapter’s “members and their 

guests frequently and consistently behaved in a manner that was offensive and 

threatening.” Id. ¶ 30. Ms. Price “was afraid that she might be harmed.” Id. ¶ 31. 

“Omicron Chapter members would come through the buffet line for each meal and 

grab their crotches while they were waiting.” Id. ¶ 35. Some members destroyed 

furniture, while other members openly drank alcohol during dinner despite being 

under the legal drinking age. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. There were other instances of violence, 

drug use, and screaming that left Ms. Price feeling offended, intimidated, and 

threatened. Id. ¶¶ 45, 62, 66, 73, 39. 

Ms. Price expressed her concerns to Mr. Wilson, and both complained to 

Justin Holt, the owner of Southern Ale House and a member of the Omicron Club. 

Case 7:24-cv-00666-AMM Document 30 Filed 12/27/24 Page 2 of 11
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Id. ¶ 33. Mr. Holt “failed to take any action to correct the behavior of the Omicron 

Chapter members or to prevent future harassment.” Id. Ms. Price and Mr. Wilson 

also complained to Laura Armistead, the Omicron Chapter House Mother, but she 

too “failed to take any action.” Id. ¶ 34. Repeated complaints fell on deaf ears. See

id. ¶¶ 76, 83. 

Ms. Price was never criticized or disciplined by Mr. Holt for her “job 

performance” or “any misconduct” and was told that she “would continue to work 

at the fraternity house.” Id. ¶¶ 89–90, 92. But on August 10, 2023, Ms. Price learned 

that Mr. Holt informed Mr. Wilson that “[Ms. Price] was no longer welcome to work 

at the Omicron Chapter.” Id. ¶ 93. 

On November 10, 2023, Ms. Price filed a charge of discrimination with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that Pi Kappa Phi engaged 

in sex discrimination and retaliation by terminating her for objecting to inappropriate 

workplace conduct. Doc. 1-4 at 4. The EEOC dismissed Ms. Price’s charge and 

issued a right to sue letter on May 16, 2024. Doc. 1-5 at 1. Ms. Price then filed this 

lawsuit asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 

et seq. Doc. 1. 

Pi Kappa Phi filed this motion to dismiss, arguing that it is not an employer 

Case 7:24-cv-00666-AMM Document 30 Filed 12/27/24 Page 3 of 11
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subject to Title VII. Doc. 19 at 4. Ms. Price filed a response. Doc. 23. Pi Kappa Phi 

filed a reply. Doc. 28. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint need not 

make “detailed factual allegations”; its purpose is only to “‘give the defendant fair 

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 

(1957)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption 

that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. To test 

the complaint, the court discards any “conclusory allegations,” takes the facts 

alleged as true, McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018), and 

“draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 

701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). These facts and inferences must amount to a “plausible” 

claim for relief, a standard that “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

III. ANALYSIS

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Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against 

any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The term ‘employer’ [is defined as] a person 

engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . .

.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). But this definition has exceptions. “[A] bona fide private 

membership club . . . which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)” of the 

Internal Revenue Code is one such exception. Id. 

A. Private Membership Club 

Pi Kappa Phi asserts that it is “a bona fide private membership club . . . which 

is exempt from taxation under 501(c).” Doc. 19 at 6. Pi Kappa Phi asserts that “[i]t 

is undisputed that the [f]raternity is a private membership club.” Id. Additionally, Pi 

Kappa Phi asserts that “the [f]raternity is a federal tax-exempt, non-profit entity 

pursuant to Section 501(c).” Id.; Doc. 19-1 at 1; Doc. 28-1 at 2. Consequently, Pi 

Kappa Phi asserts that it is subject to the private membership club exception of Title 

VII and is not an employer. Doc. 19 at 7. 

Ms. Price responds that Pi Kappa Phi failed to establish that it is a “bona fide 

private membership club” within the meaning of Title VII. Doc. 23 at 2.

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the private membership club 

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exception applies to organizations that use “‘self-government and memberownership,’ . . . and pursue [] a ‘plan or purpose of exclusiveness,’ . . . by acting to 

ensure ‘seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship[s]’ between 

members at [their] facilities.” Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc., 4 F.4th 1149, 

1158 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “[A]n organization is not a private club if it 

allows outsiders easy access to its facilities through loose membership criteria or 

guest policies.” Id. at 1157. “[W]hether or not an institution is a ‘club’ within the 

meaning of the private-club exception is a question of law once the underlying facts 

have been determined.” Id. at 1158 (cleaned up). 

Although Pi Kappa Phi states that its status as a private membership club is 

“undisputed,” Doc. 19 at 6, Ms. Price disputes that status, Doc. 23 at 2. Ultimately, 

evidence will establish whether Pi Kappa Phi uses “‘self-government and memberownership,’ . . . and pursues a ‘plan or purpose of exclusiveness,’ . . . by acting to 

ensure ‘seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship[s]’ between 

members at its facilities.” Ring, 4 F.4th at 1158. Until that evidence is developed, 

the court cannot determine whether Pi Kappa Phi is a private membership club under 

Title VII. Pi Kappa Phi’s tax-exempt status is insufficient to trigger the private 

membership club exception to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 

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B. Employer Liability 

The court next turns to Pi Kappa Phi’s argument that it was not Ms. Price’s 

employer under Title VII. “A Title VII workplace discrimination claim can only be 

brought by an employee against his employer.” Peppers v. Cobb Cnty., 835 F.3d 

1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2016). “Among the basic factors” the court considers when 

determining whether an employment relationship existed are “(1) how much control 

the alleged employer exerted on the employee, and (2) whether the alleged employer 

had the power to hire, fire, or modify the terms and conditions of the employee’s 

employment.” Id. Controlling precedent recognizes that employers may be treated 

as “joint employers” when “two entities contract with each other for the performance 

of some task, and one company retains sufficient control over the terms and 

conditions of employment of the other company’s employees.” Lyes v. City of 

Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1341 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Ms. Price makes a conclusory allegation that Pi Kappa Phi is her employer.

Doc. 1 ¶ 19. But she alleges no facts that would support such a direct employment 

relationship. Alternatively, Ms. Price argues that Pi Kappa Phi and the other 

defendants are joint employers. Id. ¶ 20. But there are no allegations, conclusory or 

otherwise, about a contractual relationship between Pi Kappa Phi and the coCase 7:24-cv-00666-AMM Document 30 Filed 12/27/24 Page 7 of 11
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defendants that relates to Ms. Price’s employment. The only contractual relationship 

that Ms. Price alleges is one between the Omicron Chapter and Southern Ale House. 

Id. ¶ 26. Consequently, whether Pi Kappa Phi is Ms. Price’s employer depends on 

“how much control [Pi Kappa Phi] exerted on [Ms. Price]” and “whether [Pi Kappa 

Phi] had the power to hire, fire, or modify the terms and conditions of [Ms. Price’s] 

employment.” Peppers, 835 F.3d at 1297.

In Peppers, the plaintiff was employed by the district attorney’s office and 

paid by the county. Id. at 1293. The plaintiff sued the county, alleging that the 

county’s method of compensation violated Title VII. Id. The plaintiff alleged that 

the county was his joint employer because although he worked in the district 

attorney’s office, the county approved the district attorney’s budget and paid the 

plaintiff’s salary and benefits. Id. at 1292–93, 1297. The Eleventh Circuit held that 

the county was not the plaintiff’s joint employer, reasoning that the core employment 

functions of recruiting, hiring, creating a job title, establishing job responsibilities, 

regulating the work environment, and supervising, were performed by the district 

attorney’s office. Id. at 1300. Because the district attorney’s office “alone filled 

nearly all of the roles traditionally filled by an employer,” it was obvious that the 

district attorney’s office, not the county, was the employer. Id. 

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To determine whether Pi Kappa Phi was Ms. Price’s joint employer, this court 

turns to the factual allegations in the complaint. Ms. Price states that she was 

employed by Pi Kappa Phi and that Pi Kappa Phi “had authority and control over 

the workspace in which the illegal harassment [sic] occurred and participated in the 

employment decisions at issue in this lawsuit.” Doc. 1 ¶ 19. 

Pi Kappa Phi argues that Ms. Price “has made no factual allegations in the 

complaint showing how the [f]raternity exercised any control over fundamental 

aspects of [Ms. Price’s] employment.” Doc. 19 at 5 (cleaned up). Pi Kappa Phi 

argues that there are no allegations that the fraternity was involved in supervising 

Ms. Price, delegating responsibilities to her, compensating her in exchange for 

services provided, or ever communicating with her. Id. at 6. Pi Kappa Phi argues 

that in the absence of such factual allegations, Ms. Price’s claims against it are not

plausible. Id. 

Ms. Price responds that the alleged “facts and the reasonable inferences that 

can be drawn from them show that the decision to terminate [Ms.] Price was made 

or influenced by someone other than Southern Ale House.” Doc. 23 at 2. 

Additionally, Ms. Price asserts that “discovery directed to the allegations [Ms.] Price 

has made . . . will determine” whether an employment relationship existed between 

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her and Pi Kappa Phi. Id. at 3. 

This court finds that Ms. Price’s factual allegations are insufficient to plead a 

plausible employment relationship between Pi Kappa Phi and Ms. Price. The 

complaint does not contain factual allegations about how Pi Kappa Phi participated 

in Ms. Price’s employment decisions. It does not assert that Pi Kappa Phi recruited, 

hired, or supervised Ms. Price. It does not assert that Pi Kappa Phi disciplined Ms. 

Price or compensated her. It does not assert that Pi Kappa Phi had the power to fire 

Ms. Price or modify the terms of her employment. At most, it asserts that Pi Kappa 

Phi regulated Ms. Price’s work environment. See Doc. 1 ¶ 19. But this alone is 

insufficient to plead a plausible employment relationship, which requires asserting 

a combination of factors. See Peppers, 835 F.3d at 1300. 

Ms. Price’s allegation that “[Mr.] Holt never criticized [Ms. Price] or her job 

performance” and “never disciplined [Ms. Price] for any misconduct” is also 

insufficient to plead a plausible employment relationship. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 89–90. Ms. Price 

argues that because Mr. Holt never criticized or disciplined her, the decision to fire 

her must have been made by some entity other than Southern Ale House. Doc. 23 at 

2. But the court cannot construe an employment relationship between Pi Kappa Phi 

and Ms. Price from Mr. Holt’s silence.

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Finally, the statement that Mr. Holt informed Mr. Wilson that Ms. Price “was 

no longer welcome to work at the Omicron Chapter” does not plead an employment 

relationship between Pi Kappa Phi and Ms. Price. Doc. 1 ¶ 93. Taken as true, that 

allegation supports an inference that Southern Ale House, not Pi Kappa Phi, was Ms. 

Price’s employer.

Ms. Price’s allegations that Pi Kappa Phi was her employer fail to state a 

plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Pi Kappa Phi’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 19, 

is GRANTED and Ms. Price’s claims against it are DISMISSED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of December, 2024. 

 

 _________________________________

 ANNA M. MANASCO

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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