Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00022/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DANIEL SCOTT WEED, :

Petitioner, :

vs. CA 05-00022-BH-C

:

TERRANCE MCDONNELL,

:

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Daniel Scott Weed, a state prisoner presently in the custody of the

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is challenging the validity of his June 12, 2001

first-degree robbery and first-degree sodomy convictions in the Circuit Court

of Mobile County, Alabama. Weed entered counseled guilty pleas to the

charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. Weed

directly appealed his convictions and sentences; however, both convictions and

sentences were upheld on appeal by unpublished memorandum opinion. See

Weed v. State, 851 So.2d 639 (Ala.Crim.App. 2001) (table). Petitioner also

collaterally attacked his convictions and sentences via a Rule 32 petition filed

in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on December 24, 2002. The

petition was denied by the trial court in orders dated January 14, 2003, April 16,

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1 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

2

2003, and March 18, 2004. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

the denial of the petition by memorandum opinion dated August 27, 2004.

Weed’s application for rehearing was denied by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on September 17, 2004, and his petition for writ of certiorari to the

Alabama Supreme Court was denied on January 7, 2005.

In his petition before this Court, filed on January 11, 2005 (Doc. 1),

Weed raises the following grounds which he claims entitle him to relief:

(1) the trial court committed reversible error by dismissing his Brady

v. Maryland1 violation claim based on the “open file” discovery rule without

allowing any discovery or presentation of facts in support of the claim;

(2) the trial court committed reversible error by denying his due

process and equal protection violations based on the failure to allow him

sufficient funds for interpreters to assure him, as a deaf mute, to the same

process and protection of the laws afforded non-deaf persons;

(3) the trial court committed reversible error by denying his right to

know the evidence, to have sufficient time to evaluate the evidence, to have

sufficient funds for interpreters, and by effectively upholding the State’s

withholding of exculpatory DNA evidence;

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2 Petitioner contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in the following

instances: (1) he failed to reserve the right to appeal the recusal issue; (2) he waived petitioner’s right to

a bifurcated trial on the competency issue and to petitioner’s presence at the recusal hearing; (3) he did

not sufficiently confer with petitioner prior to trial because he at no time met with petitioner to discuss

the case when an interpreter was present; (4) he allowed petitioner to plead guilty to a sexual offense

even though the DNA evidence indicated petitioner could not have committed the crime; (5) he did not

object to or reserve for appeal petitioner’s right to have his criminal prosecutions assigned to a judge by

the usual lottery system; (6) he failed to confer with petitioner at a location away from the courthouse

and did not reserve this issue on appeal; (7) he failed to request the services of interpreters in a timely

manner; and (8) he did not challenge the constitutionality of Alabama law regarding the appointment of

interpreters for deaf mutes in criminal prosecutions and/or its failure to satisfy constitutional standards.

3 Petitioner contends that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in the

following instances: (1) he failed to raise trial counsel’s effectiveness on appeal; (2) he failed to raise the

Brady violation on appeal; (3) he failed to raise on appeal the issue of a due process and equal

protection violation; (4) he failed to raise the issue regarding petitioner’s right to assist in his defense, to

know the evidence, and to have sufficient time to evaluate the evidence as a result of being denied

sufficient funds for interpreters and the withholding of exculpatory evidence; and (5) he failed to raise on

appeal the issue of the unconstitutionality of Alabama law regarding the appointment of interpreters to

deaf mutes in criminal prosecution and/or its failure to satisfy constitutional standards.

3

(4) the trial court committed reversible error in denying his claims

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel;2 and 

(5) the trial court committed reversible error by denying his claims

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.3

Respondent admits that petitioner has presented all of these claims to the

state courts of Alabama and that they are therefore exhausted for federal habeas

corpus purposes. Therefore, this case is ripe for a decision by this

Court. Respondent does contend, however, that this Court is procedurally

barred from reaching the merits of grounds one through three of the petition and

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4

that petitioner has not shown himself entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) & (2) with respect to his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel.

This cause is before the Court on the petition and memorandum in

support thereof, respondent’s answer with attachments, petitioner’s response to

the Court’s March 10, 2005 procedural default order, respondent’s response to

the Court’s March 10, 2005 order, and the respondent’s response to the Court’s

May 19, 2005 order. The Magistrate Judge has made a careful review of the

record and finds that it contains sufficient facts upon which the issues under

consideration may be properly resolved. Therefore, no evidentiary hearing is

required.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On September 29, 2000, Dr. LeRoy Riddick, Mobile County’s

Deputy Medical Examiner, mailed his department’s forensics report to Corporal

J. Dannelley with the Mobile Police Department and also copied John Tyson,

Jr., Esquire with the report. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, September 29,

2000 Letter from Dr. LeRoy Riddick to Corporal J. Dannelley) The laboratory

results from August 1, 2000, or thereabouts, reveal the following: 

On July 5, 2000 this laboratory received evidence from James

Dannelley of the Mobile Police Department pertaining to the

investigation of the above described case. A description of these

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5

items and laboratory results follows:

1. One sealed sexual assault examination kit identified as from

the subject, Shannon Snow. The kit contained the following items:

A. Blood. A stain was made of this item.

B. Fingernail scrapings[,] known head hair, known pubic

hair, pubic hair combings, foreign material. These items were

retained with the evidence.

C. Two oral swabs. No seminal fluid was detected.

D. Four vaginal swabs. Seminal fluid was detected.

E. Dried secretions (location unknown). No seminal fluid

was detected.

F. Genital swabbings. Seminal fluid was detected.

G. One oral smear slide. No spermatozoa were observed.

H. One vaginal smear slide. Spermatozoa were observed.

2. Clothing identified as from the subject, Shannon Snow. The

clothing consisted of a pair of panties, a bra, a shirt, and a pair of

shorts. Laboratory examination disclosed the presence of seminal

fluid on the panties and shorts. no seminal fluid was detected on

the bra or shirt.

The following items were received from Lawrence Jernigan of

the Mobile Police on July 6, 2000:

3. One cardboard box sealed with tape identified as containing

items recovered from the scene, items recovered from the

suspect[’]s vehicle and clothing from the suspect identified as

recovered at Headquarters. Laboratory examination of a piece of

cardboard identified as from the crime scene disclosed the

presence of semen. Laboratory examination of a piece of

chewing gum identified as from the crime scene failed to

disclose the presence of seminal fluid. The remaining items were

retained with the evidence.

If DNA comparisons to a suspect are requested, please submit a

known blood sample from the subject.

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6

The evidence will be returned to the submitting agency.

(Id., August 1, 2000 Letter Penned by Forensic Scientist Faron Brewer) 

2. The October, 2000 session of the Mobile County Grand Jury

indicted Weed on one count of first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree

sodomy, and one count of attempted rape in the first degree. (Doc. 9,

Respondent’s Exhibit 1, INDICTMENTS) 

3. On October 31, 2000, Faron Brewer detailed his DNA-PCR

testing of certain items in a memorandum. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5,

October 31, 2000 Memorandum Penned by Faron Brewer) 

The following items were examined by DNA-PCR testing:

1a. Blood sample identified as from Shannon Snow.

1d. Vaginal swab identified as from Shannon Snow.

3a. Semen stain from piece of cardboard identified as recovered

from the crime scene.

5. Blood sample identified as from Daniel S. Weed and received

from James Dannelley of the Mobile Police Department on

August 10, 2000.

6. Blood sample identified as from Jason Snow and received

from James Dannelley on August 24, 2000.

Results:

The items above were examined using the following systems:

CSF1PO, TPOX, AME, TH01, vWA, D16S539, D7S820,

D13S317, and D5S818.

These results indicate that Daniel S. Weed could be the source of

the DNA contained in item 3a (cardboard).

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4 There is no indication from the record that the foregoing forensic evidence was

disclosed to Weed’s trial counsel at arraignment. 

7

The probability of a random, unrelated individual having this set

of genetic traits is approximately 1 of 167,000,000 caucasian

individuals and 1 of 330,000,000 black individuals.

These results further indicate that the source of the DNA

contained in item 3a (cardboard) is a male.

The results further indicate that Jason Snow could have

contributed the foreign DNA detected on item 1d (vaginal swabs).

Daniel S. Webb is excluded as a contributor to the foreign DNA

detected on item 1d (vaginal swabs).

The evidence will be returned to the submitting agency.

(Id.)

4. The trial court entered an order on November 14, 2000, directing

the State to make available certain documents to the defendant at arraignment,

including any and all evidence tending to exculpate his guilt. (Doc. 9,

Respondent’s Exhibit 1, November 14, 2000 ORDER) 

5. Petitioner was arraigned on all charges on December 12, 2000

(Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, CASE ACTION SUMMARY SHEETS)4and,

on December 29, 2000, he filed a motion for a psychological evaluation based

upon his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (id.; see also

Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, MOTION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL

EVALUATION). The motion was granted and the trial court ordered that an

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evaluation be conducted by Dr. Van Rosen. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1,

CASE ACTION SUMMARY SHEETS) 

6. On January 24, 2001, Circuit Judge Roderick Stout ordered that

Weed’s cases be transferred to the docket of Circuit Judge Joseph Johnston.

(Id.)

7. Weed was examined by Dr. Van Rosen on March 23, 2001. (Doc.

9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, Rosen’s Outpatient Forensic Evaluation Report) Dr.

Rosen gave an advisory opinion about petitioner’s competency to stand trial and

mental state at the time of the alleged offenses in light of his recognition that

“the determinations of a defendant’s Competency to Stand Trial and Mental State

at the Time of an Alleged Offense are properly matters for the court to decide.”

(Id., at 7)

Competency to Stand Trial:

Mr. Weed was interviewed at length regarding his understanding

of his charges as well as his general ability to cooperate with his

attorney in his forthcoming criminal trial. As an aid in

determining the depth of his knowledge, he was administered the

Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument. This is a

semi-structured interview type protocol used nationally to help

determine an individual’s knowledge of various areas of criminal

procedures deemed necessary to adequately defend himself.

Mr. Weed was quite aware of his charges and appeared to be

knowledgeable in general about his situation and his attorney. He

was able to describe his charges, the potential penalties if

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9

convicted and where he would be imprisoned if sentenced. He

was, however, quite reluctant to give estimations of his chances

of being convicted or the strength of the state’s case. Mr. Weed

also provided good explanations of the roles of such courtroom

participants as the defense attorney, prosecuting attorney, judge,

jury and witnesses for the prosecution. He understood his right to

remain silent and was also able to describe relatively accurately

the flow of a criminal court case. He showed considerable

confidence in his attorney and stated quite explicitly that he

would do as he was directed, deferring to his attorney’s

experience in these matters. He was aware of plea-bargaining and

seemed willing to discuss the matter with his attorney, although

[he] would not commit to what he would do until he had seen a

real offer. 

Mr. Weed was initially quite unwilling to discuss any details

revolving around his charges, claiming that he had a right to

remain silent. When reminded that the purpose of the evaluation

was to determine his mental state and emotion condition at the

time of the alleged criminal act[s], he then volunteered that he had

been high on crack cocaine at the time of the incident.

Based on the overall evaluation, Mr. Weed seems quite capable

of cooperating with his attorney in any forthcoming criminal

case. [Cooperation with] [h]is attorney and participation in the

court procedure w[i]ll, of course, require the use of an interpreter

as used in this assessment. 

Mental State at Time of the Offense:

As noted above, the defendant was very reluctant to discuss his

actions or thoughts during any aspect of the alleged crime[s]. He

claimed essentially th[at] his actions have been the result of being

under the influence of crack cocaine and then attempted to state

that he simply did not remember any aspects of such behaviors.

At the same time, however, he also attempted to strongly imply

that he was innocent of the charges and thus he essentially was

trying to both deny and explain his actions. During his

conversation, his explanation of his actions and his confused

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account of so-called “memory loss” appeared to be quite

suspicious. It was noted that Mr. Weed could easily recall certain

aspects of his behavior, at the same time stating that he

remembered nothing. In this examiner’s strong opinion, the

defendant is simply making a false claim[] of a lack of memory.

In my view, at the time of the alleged crime[s], Mr. Weed was

well able to understand the difference between right and wrong

and did not suffer from any serious mental disorder rendering

him out of touch with reality. It may be that his possible use of

substances (e.g., cocaine) contributed to his impulsivity in part,

although in general I believe this is a manufactured excuse. Based

on this assessment, my forensic opinion is that he does not have

a so-called mental state [defense] and requires normal

d[i]sposition through the criminal justice system.

(Id. at 5-6) 

8. The docket sheets contain entries dated February 21, 2001 setting

the case for trial on June 11, 2001 and ordering defense counsel to prepare an

order authorizing the interpreter to be paid by the State of Alabama and an order

to transport petitioner to the doctor. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, CASE

ACTION SUMMARY SHEETS)

9. On March 19, 2001, Circuit Judge Johnston signed an order that

Weed be transported to the doctor’s office on March 20, 2001 for evaluation.

(Id.) Weed was evaluated by Dr. James F. Chudy, a clinical psychologist, whose

conclusions and recommendations are detailed hereinafter:

Scott Weed presents with an extremely painful life to this point.

The losses and traumas include deafness for which he blames

God, total rejection by his father to the point his father was

almost sadistic about it, the death of his grandfather, who was the

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only significant male in his life, rejection from all relatives,

Tourette’s Syndrome that led to extreme teasing, rejection by the

only institute that could have helped in the important age in his

life (Talladega), abuse at the alternative school (The Learning

Tree), and finally the misrepresentation by the Regional School

where he ended up with a diploma that was of no use.

Throughout all of this, Scott became progressively more

despondent and angry as he went into early adolescence and then

on to mid-adolescence. He began acting out his anger at times in

rageful ways. His mother asked for help from various agencies

such as the local mental health agencies and Strickland Youth

Center, but did not receive any assistance. After he was charged

the first time with possession of burglary tools and public

drunkenness there was a very strong and sound plea made for him

to be referred to an appropriate treatment center for the deaf in

Florida. The deaf very much need to be treated in an environment

where they are understood. Their conception of life and their

understanding of simple things such as feelings and emotions, are

completely different from those of the hearing. Unfortunately,

this recommendation was never seriously considered. As a result,

Scott has never been provided any type of appropriate,

professionally sound psychological treatment. Instead, his life

has just progressively become, in his opinion, more out of

control and hopeless, with less and less options. If his act is

viewed as the act of a serial rapist, it will mean throwing Scott’s

life away. On the other hand, Scott has never been given a chance

to work through the many problems he has. The testing and the

other people [] involved in his life on a more regular basis feel

strongly that the prognosis would be very good if he were given

a chance to be in a treatment facility for the deaf that would

provide a Dual Diagnosis treatment. This means that it would

certainly treat his substance abuse, but also all of his

psychological, emotional and cognitive problems that have

resulted from a very difficult past and the serious criminal

problems in his present life.

If Scott is sentenced to prison long-term without any form of

treatment he definitely needs to be put on suicide watch.

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(Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION by Dr.

James F. Chudy, at 11-12)

10. On May 29, 2001, Dr. Leroy Riddick, the Legal Custodian of

Record for the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, sent to the District

Attorney’s Office the following certification: “I LeRoy Riddick, M.D. Director,

hereby certify that the attached document(s) is a true and complete copy of the

report(s) of our findings pertaining to the above case which is on file in my

custody in the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, Mobile, Alabama, and

that I am the legal custodian of said report(s). I further certify that it was in the

regular course of business of said Department for such report(s) to be made at

the time of the events, transactions or occurrences to which they refer or within

a reasonable time thereafter. This includes the other requested information

according to your subpoena/court order.” (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5,

Defendant’s Exhibit 3 to September 3, 2003 Rule 32 Hearing)

11. On June 5, 2001, defense counsel filed a motion for interpreter

funds (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, MOTION FOR INTERPRETER FUNDS)

and, on June 6, 2001, he filed a motion seeking the recusal of Circuit Judge

Joseph Johnston (id., MOTION TO RECUSE). A hearing was conducted by the

trial court on June 8, 2001 as to these motions and with respect to Weed’s

competence to stand trial. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, Supplement, June

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5 The following colloquy preceded the court’s denial of the motion to recuse:

THE COURT: . . . I’ve looked at [the motion to recuse] and have actually

looked through the -- we’re all given a -- from the Judicial Inquiry Commission, which

I’m holding up here, all the opinions they issue and I went on line and other than, I

guess, making an interesting motion, this is something we just do all the time. I have

judges frequently to come to me, you got somebody on your docket that I’ve handled

cases in the past for them, not for them I guess, dealing with them. Do you mind

transferring them to me? It’s just something that we do all the time. I think as long as a

judge feels as if he can be fair it’s left to the individual judge’s discretion and I think I

can certainly be fair in the case. I don’t find any case, any opinions from the Judicial

Inquiry Commission either in this jurisdiction or anything issued by any other jurisdiction

that says the mere fact that you ask a judge to transfer a case to you creates some kind

of impression that you can’t be fair. But, John, you can certainly enlighten me if you

want.

MR. WHITE: Judge, I’m speaking from the actual feelings of my client and

what he [h]as expressed to me.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. WHITE: Being that he’s deaf he’s expressed to me through notes and

also what his mother expresses to me through him.

THE COURT: Is it the fact that I’ve revoked him in the past?

MR. WHITE: Well, their feelings, Judge, and their position is, and this what’s

coming from them and by and through me as their attorney, is that being that the case

was assigned -- what I’d like to do for the record is, not only is this a rendition but

some sort of stipulation of the facts of what happened. If I say anything different from

what you recall happening please –

13

8, 2001 Hearing) During the hearing, a hearing at which defense counsel waived

Weed’s presence (id. at 3), the court denied the 

motion to recuse 5 and

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THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead.

MR. WHITE: But their feelings and problems is (sic) that the case was

assigned to Judge McDermott, then he retired and the whole docket fell upon Judge

Stout and they thought they were going to be assigned there. And they know who you

are being that you handled the case before for him and did revoke him beforehand and

they became aware that you went to Stout and asked him for this case and . . . the old

case was terminated and over with. Their feelings are that you have got some sort of

prejudgment or maybe your impartiality maybe is skewed by those actions of going and

getting the file and bringing it back down here . . . coupled with the fact not only of you

going and getting the case but refusing the settlement agreement that we had with the

State. She sees that too. I say she, Scott sees that too. That’s their feelings and their

position is [] that maybe your impartiality has been skewed in reference to what a

sentence should be for him. Basically, like I said, to go out of your way and go get the

case. That’s what their feelings are.

THE COURT: Well, I guess just to correct the record slightly, I inherited his

case from Judge Byrd who had actually taken the plea. If you recall the first time he

was up for revocation I think it was you down here and Scott and his mother and about

fifty people on the other side that wanted him revoked. I wouldn’t revoke him; gave him

another chance. Then I think he came up again for revocation a couple of months later

and I revoked him. At that point he served his sentence and then I read one of the

normal reports that we get about a year ago that this crime had been committed and

low (sic) and behold I saw that it was Scott who had been alleged to have committed it.

So I started looking for it to come through grand jury because the general rule around

here is that we’re assigned all criminal cases where we’ve previously had that

Defendant on our docket. I know you take issue with that where the case is concluded.

There’s no written rule one way or another. I know Pat Rose has told you one thing. Of

course, I don’t want to get into he said, she said. But the general rule of why we like to

have all criminal defendants’ cases, whether they’re over or not, is because we know a

little bit of the history. When I say I know a little bit of the history, he has somewhat of

a complicated history. If you looked at his prior case from four years ago, possession

of burglary tools, I’m not so sure really describes his offense. In fact, when I first got

that case and saw possession of burglary tools, II said, oh, come on. Burglary --

somebody’s arrested for that and convicted of that, it can be a screwdriver and you

know his burglary tools weren’t necessarily that. It was camouflage clothing, a mask,

you know, all this kind of stuff that at least the State contends his plans was to kidnap

14

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and rape women. I mean, that was the plan. He had a real detailed psychiatric report. I

think it was Van Rosen at the time, may have been someone else, that I think ended by

saying, unless he got psychiatric treatment in prison that he would surely carry through

on his fantasies of kidnapping and rape. And low (sic) and behold, that’s what he may

have in fact done if you believe the State’s case. So from that point of view it was

somewhat ominous that he had been released and the State had charged him with that

offense. So I started watching it way before the indictment.

We have gone since the time, four years ago to now, to a flat computer

distribution of the files. As you know, four years ago when these files were being

distributed Judge Johnstone actually assigned the cases. The reason for that was he

would attempt -- and there were always mistakes not because it was him but just

because of human error, to assign cases to each judge based on the fact that you

previously had that defendant. We finally decided just to do it by computer as he, as

you know, went to the Supreme Court and nobody else wanted to do that quite

frankly. The computer does it now and we are often trading cases around because it

becomes known, hey, you’ve gotten this guy for burglary one; he also has a robbery

case on my docket. Let’s put them altogether. Anyway I did go to Judge Stout and told

him I had a history of this fellow, exactly what it was. He said, listen, if you want it, it’s

going to be a problem to deal with because he does have a handicap, we’re going to

have an interpreter, he transferred it to me. We weren’t trying to hide that. I think we

were pretty straight with you. I think I can be fair in the case with all deference to your

client. I know how she feels. Loving mother I’m sure. Her son is charged with a pretty

serious offense. Mr. Naman, do you want to add anything?

MR. NAMAN: No, Judge, I will concur with you.

MR. WHITE: One other thing just for the record is about Pat Rose. Just as an

officer of the court what she’s basically told me, just for the record[’]s sake, is that

once a case is terminated, which in this situation it was because he was revoked, that it

doesn’t -- the next cases don’t follow to that judge.

THE COURT: And for the record, Judge Kendall has told me that that’s not

true.

MR. WHITE: And also for the record, before I filed this dad-gummed

motion, I went to Judge Kendall and let him know that I was doing this so he wouldn’t

15

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get -- chew me out for filing this.

THE COURT: Listen, you’ve got to do what you have to do. . . . My problem

is that anytime a defendant feels that I’m biased because I’ve revoked him in a previous

case, sooner or later I’m not going to be able to try any cases. That’s the problem I’ve

got. With all due respect I’m going to deny your motion.

(Id. at 3-5; see also Doc. 16, Exhibit B, Tr. 6-9)

6 The trial judge signed the following order regarding the interpreter issue on June 7,

2001: “It is hereby ordered that the State will provide the funding for an interpreter(s) for the Defendant

during trial proceedings and also his psychological evaluation by Dr. James Chudy.” (Doc. 9,

Respondent’s Exhibit 5, June 7, 2001 ORDER) Based upon the discussion among counsel and the

court during the June 6, 2001 hearing, it is clear that all involved anticipated the presence of two

interpreters for Weed’s trial (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, June 6, 2001 Hearing Transcript, at 12-

13)

7 Defense counsel admitted during the hearing that his own psychologist, Dr. Chudy, had

failed to indicate one way or another whether Weed was competent or incompetent to stand trial. (Id.

at 10) Counsel informed the court that he was going to get Chudy to supplement his report on the

question of competence, whereupon the court informed counsel that should the doctor determine Weed

to be incompetent “get with Edmond [the Assistant District Attorney] pretty quick and we’ll see what

we can do Monday in that regard.”(Id. at 11)

16

granted the motion for interpreter funds6(see Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1,

June 8, 2001 Hearing Tr., at 3-9 & 12-13).7It is also apparent from that hearing

that the parties were having ongoing plea discussions which could lead to

settlement of the case at some point in time. (Id. at 12-13)

12. On June 11, 2001, the date Weed’s trial was to begin (Doc. 9,

Respondent’s Exhibit 5, CASE ACTION SUMMARY SHEETS), a problem arose

regarding the interpreters. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, June 11 & 12, 2001

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 16 of 99
17

Proceedings) 

THE COURT: Let’s go on the record. Why don’t we

maybe kind of rehash what was done in chambers this morning?

MR. WHITE: Okay. . . . [F]or the record, Daniel Scott

Weed is one hundred percent deaf and communicates only

through sign. This past week I drafted up an order to have the

interpreters here which Your Honor signed. . . . [B]asically what

they wanted was an order saying that the State of Alabama was

going to be responsible for their fees and their funding which I

did and which Your Honor signed and sent it to them. What’s

happened is, and I have learned this morning, is they will not be

[]here unless their name was in particular on the order. . . . What

I’ve got here is I’ve got one interpreter here, Tim Godwin. He is

the counsel here so I can communicate with Scott at the table. If

there are any questions that Scott wants to ask me or vice versa.

I want to go to him. I need another interpreter[.] To cut to the

chase, the two people did not show up. They’re not here. The

Court wanted me to fix it; I can’t fix it because one of the two is

out of town and the other one will not come to court and do it

unless they have somebody to validate what they interpret. In

other words, they won’t do it by themselves. I don’t have an

interpreter here for what’s going on on the stand, what’s being

questioned and what’s being answered from the stand so Scott’s

not going to know what’s going on. I’m asking for a continuance

because even if I could get the one who’s in town -- What is her

name, Tim?

INTERPRETER: Lisa Gould.

MR. WHITE: Lisa Gould. She won’t come unless she’s got

somebody to validate her. Why they have that rule I don’t know

but they won’t do it. So I’ve got an interpreter here so I can

communicate with Scott who is our defense interpreter but we

don’t have anybody to interpret what’s being said on the stand and

I’d like to put Tim on the record.

THE COURT: . . . Are you telling me that during this

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trial we would need three sign language interpreters?

MR. WHITE: That’s what I’m telling you, Judge. . . . Tim,

who is here, he’s not going to do it by himself because . . . he

doesn’t want to put his credentials on the line for liability

purposes and he’s going to tell you that. But he is the one that’s

at our table so I can communicate with Scott. The other ones that

do the interpreting for the witnesses on the stand, they will not

come unless it’s two of them. That’s what I’m learning, and that’s

what Tim is going to put on the record, because they validate each

other. 

. . .

THE COURT: Frankly, I’m just not buying this. I

think it’s a lame excuse to get another continuance.

MR. WHITE: Judge, . . . I’m just learning this this

morning. I want Tim to explain it to you on the record what my

dilemma is. Is that okay?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Id. at 3-6) The “defense” interpreter, Tim Godwin, gave sworn testimony that

he considered it a conflict of interest for him to “interpret for the State attorney

and also it would be a conflict for me to try to interpret proceedings in the court

since I am for the defense.” (Id. at 6) Godwin also testified that two other

interpreters were not available to be in court; one interpreter he had been in

contact with from Atlanta would not make herself available because she was not

specifically identified on the order granting the motion for interpreter

assistance and that another local interpreter that he had lined up to help would

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not show up since the Atlanta interpreter was going to be a no-show. (Id. at 8)

The court continued the questioning of Godwin on the conflict of interest issue

in the following manner:

THE COURT: I want to stay on this subject. Let’s

say Mr. Naman called one of the victims . . . and . . . [was] asking

her to describe actions she claimed that the Defendant . . .

committed on her. Is Tim claiming that he would have a conflict

in interpreting that? Tim, I’m asking you.

MR. GODWIN: I can interpret what’s being asked and

the questions. The problem is that if I’m the only interpreter here

I have no one that’s going to be able to validate that I did not make

an error when I’m signing. . . . The conflict there comes in is for

Mr. Weed to know who is actually speaking and asking questions

and who’s answering the questions and for the fatigue part of this

that would happen with only one interpreter. . . . 

THE COURT: I’m hearing a couple of things. The

fatigue factor I understand because at one time I thought it was

for a fatigue factor that maybe every hour that you would change

with someone else. But we have all the time foreign language

interpreters here. We always have one person. . . . I have no idea

whether they’re being interpreted correctly. We don’t have two

people to validate or three people to validate or someone who is

a defense interpreter versus a state interpreter. Frankly, what

you’re telling me is incredible. I really don’t know whether I can

authorize the State of Alabama to pay these funds. When I was

initially approached – because Mr. Weed has not been declared

indigent – it was that his mother had scraped together just about

all of her funds to employ Mr. White as defense counsel and

could the State pay for an interpreter. If that’s the case, sure. The

next thing I know we’re talking about three interpreters and what

I’m hearing this morning is perhaps more . . . . Sure we want him

to know what’s going on. I think that’s a due process right[.] . . .

We had a case here that we just went to trial on. It was a Giardini

case. But we had an interpreter show up and maybe they weren’t,

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quote, certified that your organization requires but the Courts of

this state don’t require any certification. All that it requires is that

it be accurately done. I appreciate your groups striving to better

themselves but I can’t believe that we’re going to need three, four,

five people in here interpreting.

MR. WHITE: Judge, one thing I would like to ask Tim[.] .

. . Is he going to be able to competently interpret what’s going on

during the trial from all witnesses, all the direct and all of the

cross-examination and everything that’s going to happen and also

be able to communicate between Scott and myself, if we have any

discussions to go on[?] . . .

MR. GODWIN: I’d say no. With one interpreter . . .

the breakdown in communication is going to be too much of a

variable in this.

MR. WHITE: Are you not going to be able to relay the

information to Scott where he knows what’s being said from the

witness stand totally and keep up with everything?

MR. GODWIN: I wouldn’t say totally but I would say

that there’s going to be a percentage of lost information that’s

going to probably happen with only one interpreter. . . . To clarify,

there would not be a need for no more than three. The other two

interpreters would be specifically handling the State attorney’s

and this defense attorney’s questions being posed to the

witnesses and the responses from the witnesses. . . . Essentially

I would be the interpreter just for the defense so that they can

have their private conversations.

MR. WHITE: What my position, Judge, is is that Tim was

originally and has always been the person who was going to be our

interpreter to sit here at our table with Scott so if he has any

questions to tell me or whatever. . . .

THE COURT: Isn’t that what a notepad is for?

MR. WHITE: I can use that notepad [] [b]ut me listening to

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witnesses and writing notes back and forth to him, it would be a

lot more thorough . . . . And I’m not trying to come up with some

lame reason to continue this thing. . . .

THE COURT: It sounds like it to me. You

mentioned once or twice last week you wouldn’t mind a

continuance and then now here we are, we have some witnesses

that quite frankly probably spent the whole weekend dreading this

morning . . . . Well, we’re going. Bring the jury in. Do you have

anything else to say?

MR. WHITE: I would just like to put on record, Judge, that

Scott’s not going to be able to get all the information that’s

gathered through the interpreter here. He’s not going to be able

to hear the proceedings that are going on. He’s going to be denied

his civil rights. He’s going to be denied due process and . . . he’s

not going to know what’s going on during the trial.

THE COURT: Do your best and you can call for

another interpreter. You’ve got a couple of hours probably until

we get into the testimony. All right. Bring them in and line them

up.

(Defendant signing.)

THE INTERPRETER: You’re violating my rights.

(Id. at 9-13)

13. Following the jury selection process (id. at 13-54), however, the

court recessed for the day to allow the defense to garner another interpreter

(see id. at 54-60). 

THE COURT: My intention is to move forward in

the morning. One of the reasons that I wanted another interpreter

is for Tim’s benefit we would have to have very frequent breaks,

probably every half an hour. I think we can do that but it’s going

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22

to become very cumbersome to do that. With two interpreters

we’re going to be able to move a little more steadily. Tim, Mr.

Godwin, here may be able to find us somebody else that will help

him. As you can see it’s fairly exhausting work here and after four

or five hours of doing that it’s going to be tough to get a lot of

testimony in one day. So it’s an attempt to try to accommodate

him and also to avoid any problems in the future. We will get

started one way or another tomorrow at nine o’clock. We will see

you all then. 

(Id. at 60)

14. The following day, June 12, 2001, Weed changed his pleas of not

guilty to first-degree robbery and first-degree sodomy and entered counseled

guilty pleas to those charges. (Id. at 62-73)

THE COURT: Tim, you tell me if I’m going too fast;

all right? You are Daniel Scott Weed; is that correct?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes. Yes,

sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Weed, you are a deaf mute; is

that correct?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes.

THE COURT: And you can understand through sign

language; is that correct?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes.

THE COURT: And through Mr. Godwin you can

understand what I’m saying; is that correct?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: And you can read and write; is that

correct?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir, I

do.

THE COURT: And read and write in the English

language?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Um, yes,

sir.

THE COURT: I need to spend a few minutes with

you to make sure you understand all of your constitutional rights.

If there is something that you don’t understand I want you to stop

me and I’ll rephrase the question.

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Okay.

THE COURT: Anything that requires an answer I

need you to tell Mr. Godwin here to answer for you because we

tape record these proceedings; all right?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You’re pleading guilty here today to

Robbery in the First Degree and Sodomy in the First Degree. Do

you understand that?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir, I

am pleading guilty.

THE COURT: Do you understand because you’ve

been convicted of a prior felony in each of these cases the

sentence range is ninety-nine years to life?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I may have said that wrong. It’s

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fifteen years to life. Do you understand that in each of these

cases?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand also the attempted

rape case is going to be nolle prossed or dismissed today? Do

you understand that, Mr. Weed?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand, Mr. Weed, you

don’t have to plead guilty here today?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir, I

do understand.

THE COURT: Do you understand that you can plead

not guilty or not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, I

understand that I can say that.

THE COURT: And in that case we would continue

with your jury trial?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir,

that’s correct.

THE COURT: And if your case were tried before a

jury you and your attorney would have the right to confront and

cross-examine your accusers?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Right, yes,

sir. I understand.

THE COURT: And if your case were tried before a

jury you and your attorney would also have the right to subpoena

witnesses to testify in your own behalf?

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THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Right.

THE COURT: Do you understand that in the eyes of

the law you are presumed innocent of these offenses and it’s the

burden of the State of Alabama to prove your guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if this case

were tried before a jury you could exercise your rights under the

U.S. Constitution not to testify and if you chose to do so that fact

could not be used against you by the State of Alabama?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Right, yes,

sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if this case

were tried before a jury and if you were convicted by a jury, you

would have the right to challenge the composition of the grand

jury that indicted you and also the composition of the twelveperson jury that convicted you?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you also understand that if this

case were tried before a jury and if you were convicted by that

jury you would have a right to appeal your conviction?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Right, yes,

sir.

THE COURT: Do you further understand that if you did

not have the money to appeal your conviction that I would appoint

you an attorney who would appeal the conviction for you free of

charge?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: Do you further understand that should

you be convicted by a jury you would have a right to ask for a presentence investigation, a suspended sentence or you would even

have the right to ask for probation?

. . .

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Weed, do you understand that

you’re giving up all these rights that I’ve told you about by

pleading guilty here today?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Mr. Naman, what

would you expect the State to be able to prove if this case were

tried?

MR. NAMAN: Judge, we expect that the evidence

would show that on June the 30th of the year 2000 at 2:15 p.m.

the Defendant in this case, Mr. Daniel Scott Weed, entered the

Acquisitions Gift Shop located at 1218 Hillcrest Road in Mobile

County. He was armed with a handgun and he approached the

victims in this case Mrs. Shannon Snow and Ms. Connie

Guggenbiller and at gunpoint, demanded them to go to the back of

the store. He handed Ms. Guggenbiller a three-by-five notepad

which stated the following[:] I will kill you if you don’t listen to

me. I want you to give me all of your money that you have. Ms.

Guggenbiller could tell from his actions and his grunts that he

was a deaf mute. He directed them next to the front of the store

and ordered Ms. Guggenbiller to lock the door. When she

couldn’t do it because of her nerves he took the keys from her and

locked them himself. He then brought Ms. Guggembiller and Ms.

Shannon Snow, the other victim in the case, to the cash register

and directed Ms. Guggenbiller to empty the cash register. She

took the white plastic sales bag and emptied the register of all its

contents. He then forced both the women back to the back store

room and demanded that they undress. They took off clothing and

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he demanded more and more until they were completely

undressed. He asked them to lie in the bathroom and then pulled

Ms. Shannon Snow from the bathroom and ordered her to lie on

the floor outside the store room. He attempted at that time to

have sex with Ms. Snow but he could not get an erection. He then

ordered Ms. Snow to perform oral sex on him. During this

time his gun remained aimed and touching her face. He

pulled out of Ms. Snow and ejaculated on the floor and some

of his semen landed on a cardboard box in the store room. He

then again attempted to rape Ms. Snow but again had a problem

with an erection. He again them ordered Ms. Snow to perform

oral sex on him. After having trouble gaining an erection he

became frustrated and ordered Ms. Snow back into the bathroom

with Ms. Guggenbiller. They heard the Defendant rummaging

through the store and later leaving the store, some five minutes

later. The ladies waited in the bathroom until some time had

passed and then came out after dressing and called the police. Ms.

Guggenbiller noticed first that the keys to her store had been

taken from the store and that her purse had been rummaged

through and her license was missing as well. As the police came

Ms. Guggenbiller [] and Ms. Snow described the Defendant

as being a white, deaf mute, five ten to sit foot tall, one

hundred and sixty-five to one hundred and seventy-five

pounds. They noticed him to be left handed, wearing blue

jeans and white tennis shoes. The gun that he used was

described as . . . resembling one from an old western movie.

The police also found that the note pad that . . . the Defendant

used to communicate with the victims and it was found behind the

counter in the store. The police then developed leads about a

possible suspect and then went to the home of Ms. Linda

Weed. . . . She told them that the Defendant had left the house

around seven a.m., he had stolen money from her and was

using drugs. She told the police that he would be driving a

white 1987 Chevy Chevette. The police asked about a gun or

a possible gun and she told police that they had one gun, that

it was [a] kit gun and that she kept it in a box in a back room.

She went to retrieve it and the box was empty. It was an old

western-style gun she told the police. A BOLO was placed for

the Defendant and at 8:40 [p.m.] on that day Sgt. Darryl Williams

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and Officer John Sprinkle with the Mobile Police Department

spotted the Defendant at the Exxon gas station on Government

Street and Azalea Road and called for marked police cars to

respond. Officers attempted to stop the Defendant but he fled

and on a high speed chase through neighborhoods in the

Cross Creek and Shortleaf Drive Subdivision, Officer Chad

Robbins and Officer Bobby Gechijian caught the Defendant

after the Defendant lost control of his car and led them on a

brief foot chase. At that scene a notepad similar to the one

left at the scene by the Defendant was found on Mr. Weed.

Identification Officer Lawrence Jernigan was called to the

scene where Mr. Weed was arrested. He found inside of the

car a white plastic bag with money taken from the crime. It

was the same white plastic bag that Ms. Guggenbiller had

filled with money. He found a gun matching the description

of the one used in the crime, a set of keys belonging to Ms.

Guggenbiller, a woman’s sports bra and panties, a piece of

paper with Acquisitions store hours on it was found inside

the Defendant’s ‘87 Chevette. . . . DNA evidence was collected

from the cardboard box at the store where the crime occurred and

. . . scientists matched the DNA to Mr. Weed . . . -- the report

would have stated that there was a chance of one in one hundred

and sixty-seven million white males actually sharing that same

DNA or one in three hundred and thirty million black males[.] . .

. Mr. Weed was charged with . . . Robbery First Degree,

Attempted Rape First and Sodomy First. All of this of course

occurred in Mobile County.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Naman. Mr. Weed, are you

pleading guilty to these offenses because you are in fact guilty?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Has anybody made any physical

threats against you in order to get you to plead guilty?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) No, sir, I’m

the one who made the decision.

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THE COURT: Has anyone made any offers of

monetary reward to you in order to get you to plead guilty?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) No, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand that since you’re

pleading guilty to two felonies the law requires an imposition of

a Victim’s Compensation Assessment in each case of a minimum

of fifty dollars?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) And what

does that mean? . . .

THE COURT: It’s a court cost tax of fifty dollars in

each case.

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Okay. I got

it. I understand now.

THE COURT: Mr. Weed, do you understand the

ramifications of pleading guilty to two felonies in light of the fact

that you have previously been convicted of one felony and also in

light of the fact that Alabama has an Habitual Offender Act?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Mr. Weed, I’m going to show you

what we have marked as Court’s Exhibit Number One. It is a

document that appears –

MR. WHITE: He signed the back of that front page, Judge.

THE COURT: Let’s see. Okay. It appears to be

signed by you, Mr. Weed. Did you in fact read and sign this

document that is entitled Explanation of Rights and Plea of

Guilty?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

Yes, I did.

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THE COURT: All right. And Court’s Exhibit Two,

Notice of Intent to plead guilty, did you read and sign that

document?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. For the record, how do you

wish to plead to the charges of Robbery in the First Degree and

Sodomy in the First Degree, guilty or not guilty?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) Guilty on

both charges.

THE COURT: All right. The Court accepts your plea

of guilty. Would you like to say anything before sentence is

imposed?

THE INTERPRETER: (After translating) No, sir.

THE COURT: The Court hereby sentences you to

life in the state penitentiary in each case, which will be

concurrent in each case, fifty dollars Victim’s Compensation

Assessment in each case plus court costs. This matter is hereby

concluded. Court is adjourned. The other case is nolle processed,

the attempted rape.

(Id. (emphasis supplied)) 

15. On June 22, 2001, Weed gave oral notice of appeal and on that

same date the trial court appointed Glenn Davidson, Esquire, to represent

petitioner on appeal. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, CASE ACTION

SUMMARY SHEETS) Weed filed written notice of appeal on June 26, 2001.

(Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 1, NOTICE OF APPEAL) 

16. On appeal, Weed raised the sole claim that the trial court erred in

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 30 of 99
31

failing to grant his motion to recuse. (Doc. 8, Respondent’s Exhibit 2, at 6) In

affirming Weed’s convictions and sentences, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals, by memorandum opinion dated August 27, 2004, rejected, on

procedural grounds, petitioner’s sole appellate issue. (See Doc. 8, Respondent’s

Exhibit 4)

“It is clear that by pleading guilty, a

defendant waives all nonjurisdictional defects

occurring before the plea. See, e.g., Martin v. State,

579 So.2d 69, 70 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991). Because ‘a

guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events

which has preceded it in the criminal process,’

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct.

1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), we have

required a defendant who wishes to appeal an

adverse ruling on an issue raised prior to the entry

of the plea to inform the trial court, at the time he

enters his plea, that he intends to reserve that issue

for appeal. See Sawyer v. State, 456 So.2d 110

(Ala. Cr. App. 1982), reversed after record

supplemented, 456 So.2d 112 (Ala. 1983). The

defendant’s plea is, in effect, conditioned on his

right to appeal the prior adverse ruling. See 2 W.

LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 20.6(b)

(1984). Recently, Justice Maddox summarized the

Alabama law on this point as follows:

“‘Ordinarily, a guilty plea

waives all nonjurisdictional matters,

including a trial court’s refusal to

suppress evidence, but this Court

has, by case law, permitted an

exception to that general rule when

a defendant specifically reserves his

or her right to appeal such a ruling

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on a motion to suppress, as this

petitioner did. Ex parte Sawyer, 456

So.2d 112 (Ala. 1983) (defendant

allowed to supplement record on

appeal to show that search and

seizure issue was reserved when the

plea of guilty was entered).’

“Ex parte Hergott, 588 So.2d 911, 916 (Ala. 1991)

(Maddox, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

“As Justice Maddox’s parenthetical

explanation of Sawyer indicates, a defendant must

reserve his right to appeal an adverse ruling on a[n]

issue arising before the plea ‘when the plea of

guilty [is] entered.’ The reason behind such a

requirement is clear: because a guilty plea waives

all nonjurisdictional defects in proceedings

occurring before the plea, Martin, supra, and ‘a

guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events

which has preceded it in the criminal process,’

Tollett, supra, an unconditional plea must be taken

to represent the defendant’s decision to forego any

challenge to events occurring before the plea. If

the defendant does not intend to forego such

challenges, he must make that intent clear before

he enters his plea.

“. . .

“. . . The timing of a ‘reserved plea’ is

significant not only because an ‘unreserved plea’

waives all nonjurisdictional defects prior to the

plea, but also because it is the policy in this state

for all parties to ‘lay their cards on the table’

before a guilty plea is accepted. See Rules 14.3(a)

and (b), A.R.Crim.P. (mandating that the terms of

a plea bargain agreement be disclosed ‘in open

court prior to the time a plea is offered’); Ex parte

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Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330 (Ala. 1983) (recognizing

that the terms of a plea agreement must be

presented to the trial court before the plea is

entered); Ex parte Cassady, 486 So.2d 453, 456

(Ala. 1986) (‘[i]f parties would reduce their plea

agreements to writing and present them to the trial

court prior to sentencing, rather than afterwards, .

. . resolution of cases questioning the existence or

contents of plea agreements would be greatly

facilitated’); Ex parte Swain, 527 So.2d 1279,

1280 (Ala. 1988) (same); Congo v. State, 455

So.2d 896, 897 (Ala. 1984) (Adams, J., dissenting)

(‘[s]ince Yarber, if the prosecution and the

defendant have reached an agreement, such

agreement must be submitted to the trial judge’).

When one party does not lay all his cards on the

table before pleading guilty, he cannot expect

either the trial court or a reviewing court to help

him achieve the expectations he did not express at

the time he pled guilty. See generally Yarber,

supra, and Bailey, supra.”

Prim v. State, 616 So.2d 381, 382-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)

(some emphasis added). The appellant did not specifically reserve

his right to appeal this issue when he entered his guilty plea.

Additionally, the written plea agreement does not contain the

provision that the appellant would reserve the right to appeal this

issue, and the record does not indicate that that was a condition

of the plea agreement. Therefore, the appellant’s argument is not

properly before this court, and we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

(Id.) Weed’s application for rehearing was overruled on December 14, 2001

(Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, Notice) and the certificate of final judgment

of affirmance was issued by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on January

2, 2002 (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT)

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34

17. On December 24, 2002, James Curenton, Esquire, entered his

notice of appearance as counsel for petitioner and concurrently therewith filed

a Rule 32 petition collaterally attacking Weed’s convictions and sentences.

(Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, CASE ACTION SUMMARY SHEETS) Weed

raised the following claims in his Rule 32 petition: (1) a Brady violation; (2) a

due process and equal protection violation due to Alabama’s failure to guarantee

that deaf mutes receive the same process and treatment afforded non-deaf

defendants; (3) a due process and equal protection violation on account of the

denial of his right to know the evidence against him, to have sufficient time to

evaluate that evidence, and to assist in his defense as a result of being denied

sufficient funds for interpreters and the withholding of exculpatory evidence;

(4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (5) ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, RULE 32 PETITION) The

State filed its response to the petition and a motion to dismiss on January 3,

2003. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, STATE’S RESPONSE TO RULE 32

PETITION AND MOTION TO DISMISS)

18. On January 14, 2003, the trial court entered an order disposing of

the Brady claim and setting issue two, one of the due process and equal

protection violation claims, for a hearing. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5,

January 14, 2003 ORDER)

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35

As to the Petitioner’s claim that a Brady violation

occurred the Court finds that this claim is merit less. The Court

takes judicial notice of the Court file which Ordered “open file”

discovery. Thus, the Petitioner and his attorney were invited to

make an appointment to view all forensic items, which are being

complained of in the instant petition. Thus, there can be no Brady

violation.

Even if there was any merit to the Petitioner’s Brady

claims, the Court finds that this is a constitutional claim which is

precluded in that it could have been raised at trial. Rule

32.2(a)(3). Furthermore, Petitioner’s plea waived all

nonjurisdictional defects. See Weed v. State, So.2d 

(Ala.Crim.App. 2001, No. CR-00-2025). Accordingly for the

foregoing reasons the Petitioner’s claims raised in “ISSUE 1:

BRADY VIOLATION” are hereby DISMISSED.

The Court hereby sets oral arguments for the Petitioner’s

claims of “ISSUE TWO: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION VIOLATION” on February 14, 2003 at 1:30 p.m.

As to the Petitioner’s request for a discovery scheduling order it

is henceforth DENIED. There is no automatic right to discovery

in a Rule 32 proceeding. Ex parte Land, 775 So.2d 847 (Ala.

2000). If the Petitioner needs any particular document or other

item that is not accessible, the Court will Order it to be produced

prior to the hearing. By separate Order the Court is ordering the

prisoner returned for the hearing.

(Id.) The trial court entertained oral arguments from counsel on the second

issue raised by Weed in his Rule 32 petition on February 14, 2003. (Doc. 9,

Respondent’s Exhibit 5, Rule 32 Hearing Transcript, at 4-33)

THE COURT: Mr. Curenton, interesting issue, the

interaction between the Americans with Disability Act and the

requirement in Alabama law regarding interpreters. Would you

like to address that?

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36

MR. CURENTON: . . . [T]he Americans with Disability

Act of 1990, title two in particular, sets out federal law

concerning . . . what reasonable accommodation has to be given

to disabled persons in state courts and other governmental

entities. . . . And what is contained in there are standards of

accessibility. And our whole argument on this particular issue is

that if a deaf defendant in a criminal case cannot access the

information then he may as well not be in court at all because he

does not understand all that is going on. That’s not to say that a

deaf individual doesn’t get pieces of the information. But if he

cannot access, and I believe the language in the ADA is, the

language in court and the words that are spoken, he must access

it effectively, accurately and it must be interpreted impartially.

What that means is that he has to understand what’s said in all the

conversations and he must be able to have it expressed to him

accurately in order to understand it. Anything less than that is not

in compliance with ADA. . . . The code of ethics which Mr.

Godwin tried to bring up in the court proceedings makes it

impossible for him to interpret for the defendant and his attorney

and also interpret the court proceedings. He is subject to

attorney/client privilege information and it has to be strictly

confidential. He cannot interpret the broader proceedings. He

asked for two interpreters to be here and there were two as I

recall who would have done it but did not come for some reason

or another. I recall they didn’t get an approval for compensation.

THE COURT: That’s not true. It was reset a day or

two later and they couldn’t be obtained.

MR. CURENTON: Yes, and federal law says that it’s not

his burden to provide interpreters.

THE COURT: Where does it say that, Mr.

Curenton? Give me the cite. . . . And I also need the cite that it

applies to proceedings in state court.

MR. CURENTON: . . . What I’m looking at, Your Honor,

is a forty-three page publication title two Technical Assistance

Manual published by the Department of Justice interpreting the

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37

ADA as it applies to state and local government programs and

services. You will have to give me a second. I have a number of

places marked.

. . .

MR. CURENTON: . . . There are two sections in

particular. One is in title two in ADA section 3.5400, it’s entitled

surcharges. This particular section says that if compliance results

in additional costs the public entity may not place a surcharge

only on particular individuals with disabilities or groups of

individuals with disabilities to cover these expenses. Then in title

two section 4.3200 . . . [t]here’s a definition and examples of

reasonable accommodation[] . . . and after the definition . . . there

are some examples and . . . the fourth example is providing

readers or interpreters. And the other . . . manual that I managed

to get my hands on is a standard practice paper from the Registry

of Interpreters for the Deaf, Incorporated. The first page of this

three-page document [] states that State and local courts and

administrative agencies are subject to title two and neither courts

nor attorneys may pass along the cost of interpreting service to

the deaf or disabled person directly or indirectly. 

THE COURT: I understand that. I’m particularly

interested though in cases, particularly federal cases, where a

federal court would have determined that the Americans with

Disability Act applies to proceedings in State court. I don’t think

it’s there. . . .

MR. CURENTON: In the area of due process, I don’t

know of any cases. . . . My argument is that our constitution, state

and federal, says that the accused has to receive due process. Of

course we don’t get a definition. We’d have to hash that out over

years and through various cases and different factual

circumstances. And in this case where we have a deaf defendant,

in order to determine what is due process for that type of

individual I don’t know what to do other than to look at the

standards that were set in the ADA by [C]ongress and to listen to

experts and professionals in the field. 

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 37 of 99
38

. . .

I don’t think that any sign system can interpret language that we

use in court to a deaf person in the same way that we hear it. I

think it’s impossible. What they do is . . . they draw a picture of

it so-to-speak.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you there for a

minute. Couldn’t the same argument be made . . . where we have

a Cambodian defendant that the translation of legal terms into

maybe a particular dialect of Cambodian is practically

impossible? And as I understand our law it does not require . . .

that the defendant hear or understand every word but just

substantively be advised as to what the proceedings are, how

they’re progressing. They may not get every word. . . . 

MR. CURENTON: I think that’s an analogy that a lot of

people make and in some instances it may apply but I don’t think

it can be applied as a whole because interpreting is not translating

language. There’s a world of difference between the two. Every

word we use has not interpretive sign. In looking at what those

standards are for deaf people as far as what is due process, I think

we have to look at the ADA standards. I think we have to listen to

the professionals in the field who have dealt with these

disabilities far more than us and listen to them when they say that

one interpreter is needed in court for the attorney and his client

to preserve the privilege and that two interpreters are needed for

the proceeding itself for several reasons[:] one, because the one

doing the interpreting has a fatigue factor after twenty to thirty

minutes and, secondly, because the one not doing the interpreting

can verify the translation or the interpretation. . . .

THE COURT: Let me ask you. Why hasn’t that been

applied to, as you term them, translation cases where courts have

held in the past that a single interpreter was sufficient?

MR. CURENTON: I can’t answer that question. . . . I

guess the issue hasn’t been raised. []

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39

THE COURT: One case that I’ve got in my file and

I’ll share with you, . . . one translator to use your term, translated

for I think eight different defendants and that same issue was

raised that how could he be the translator for eight separate

defendants.

MR. CURENTON: I would just say there’s a difference

in translation and interpretation.

THE COURT: There may be but not on the argument

that you’re raising of privilege because it seemed if that was the

argument then how could that translator be involved in it when

there was a privilege between one defendant and the lawyer and

the other defendant and a lawyer?

. . .

MR. CURENTON: I don’t know what the code of ethics

is for translators. But I’ve been reading the code of ethics for

interpreters and they have a strict code of ethics and I don’t know

how we could require interpreters in the position that Mr. Godwin

found himself in this case, to interpret between the attorney and

his client, and hear things that are privileged, and then do the

proceeding itself. I mean, he’s bound by his code of ethics not to

do that. . . . [T]he state attorney and I were discussing this at the

break, and his question was . . . why should the court have to pay

just because the interpreters have a code of ethics and my

response was, well, what if they refuse to interpret. We wouldn’t

have any interpreters. I think we have to look to those standards.

And . . . in this case I think we have something that we can talk

about. . . . In this case my client entered a plea of guilty to a sex

crime that required sexual conduct when there were DNA test

results in the DA’s file that excluded him. . . . I know the court

says there’s an open [file] discovery rule but if you look at the

dates those test results were not sent to the DA until twenty-days

before the hearing started, the trial. Maybe Mr. White looked at

it prior to that time. Maybe the DA never saw it. But in any event

somehow in all the discussion that occurred on the day of the plea

my client pleaded to a sex crime requiring sexual contact when

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40

the DNA test said he was excluded.

THE COURT: Well, I’m not so sure you’re correct

about it. There was never any allegation of penetration. . . . [The]

[s]odomy that he pled guilty of was oral sodomy on him and the

forensics were vaginal swabs.

MR. CURENTON: No, they had an oral swab.

THE COURT: Did they?

MR. CURENTON: They had an oral swab too and it was

her husband. I don’t believe he would have pled guilty if [he]

would have known that which leads me to the point, I’m not sure

he understood the elements of that crime. I think somewhere in

all this process . . . he could not access the information and he

stands now convicted of a sex crime which is far different from

being just convicted of robbery. Not only is it different while he’s

in prison and in trying to accumulate time to be paroled but once

he is released it’s going to make a vast difference due to

registration and things like that. . . .

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. McGowin?

MR. MCGOWIN: Just something that struck me as odd

about the ethics of Mr. Godwin who interpreted at the original

trial, that how could he interpret between the defendant and Mr.

White and then interpret witnesses and other people. The simple

answer to that is he’s not testifying and he’s not giving any

information. He’s just repeating what others say and I don’t

understand the point. Also in sodomy[,] emission is not required.

The testimony of a witness alone is sufficient to convict

somebody for sodomy. . . . I researched and found several actual

federal habeas proceedings concerning state court proceedings

dealing with deaf defendants and interpreters. . . . [T]he [federal]

circuits say that the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that under

the U.S. Constitution a defendant has a right to an interpreter in

order to give them due process. They leave it within the sound

discretion of the trial court . . . . Specifically[,] . . . Phillips v.

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41

Miller[,] . . . a habeas proceeding concerning a New York State

conviction for rape, sodomy and robbery and sexual abuse by a

deaf defendant who claimed that he was denied the right to

confront witnesses against him at trial because he was hearing

impaired[.] . . . It goes on to state that the . . . decision of whether

or not to appoint an interpreter is a matter largely resting in the

discretion of the trial court. . . . I think the other thing he was

citing was some internal . . . professional agreement on how

things should be done in the best case scenario.

. . .

The Miller case goes on to talk about New York law, Illinois law

and then Alabama law and it cites the Terry case cited by Mr.

Curenton for the proposition that Alabama has ruled that a deaf

indigent defendant was entitled to a court-appointed interpreter

under the Alabama State Constitution. It says, since the federal

constitution is a floor and not a ceiling and there appears to be no

constitutional right to an interpreter, there is no violation to the

federal constitution hearing. The only possible violation would be

due process under the Alabama Constitution. But if you read the

cases cited by Mr. Curenton . . . it’s within the sound discretion

of the trial judge. . . . [I]t even alludes to the statute that he’s

saying that Mr. White should have . . . raised was

unconstitutional[] [f]or the fact that if the defendant doesn’t even

ask for an interpreter the court doesn’t have to appoint one. . . .

[I]t’s within the discretion of the court. There’s nothing there

about how many or anything like that. The Turner case . . . states

that . . . all the law contemplates is that the accused know and

understand the nature of the accusation he’s called upon to answer

when there is no request for an interpreter under section 12-21-

133 . . . it is immaterial how this constitutional requirement is

satisfied so long as it is actually satisfied.

. . .

So what I was saying is whether there was one interpreter or a

thousand as long as the court in its discretion with that particular

person standing there in court determined that this was sufficient,

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42

I think that’s all the law requires. In . . . the Turner case there was

no interpreter at all. This defendant was arraigned by the judge

reading the judge’s lips and the court said that is not a violation of

due process because from the circumstances the judge

determined that he underst[ood] what he told him. 

. . .

MR. CURENTON: . . . You were correct on something.

There was an oral swab and I believe I misstated. I said that it was

negative for my client and positive for Jason Snow. What that

actually showed was that the test result for the oral swabs, there

were two, showed no seminal fluid present.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you for that.

MR. MCGOWIN: . . . I don’t want to waive my previous

motion that this issue standing alone is precluded. 

THE COURT: No, your motion to dismiss is under

submission.

(Id. at 13-15, 16, 17-20, 21-27, 28, 29-30 & 31-32)

19. On April 16, 2003, the trial court entered an order dismissing a

number of other claims raised by Weed in his Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 9,

Respondent’s Exhibit 5, ORDER of April 16, 2003)

This Court inadvertently overlooked some of the claims

in making its ruling set out in this Court’s Order dated January 14,

2003. However, Petitioner filed no response to the State’s

Response and Motion to Dismiss. The State made an oral Motion

to Dismiss at the hearing of this matter on February 14, 2003.

Petitioner offered no rebuttal to the State’s oral Motion to

Dismiss other than the fact the Petitioner must raise the claims

he has raised in order to file a Federal Habeas petition. This Court

continued the hearing of this matter because of notice problems

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 42 of 99
43

created by this Court’s first Order and because Petitioner raised

an Americans With Disabilities Act claim for the first time at the

February 14 hearing. Petitioner has had until the date of this

Order to respond to both the oral and written motions to dismiss

filed by the State.

This Court will follow the form of the State’s Response

since it is legally and organizationally sound. Furthermore, this

Court judicially notices its files and the record as well as its

memory. Based upon the above, this Court finds as follows:

PETITIONER’S CLAIM II.

Petitioner contends that though he was provided an

interpreter by this Court, he was denied due process and equal

protection.

This constitutional claim, in one form, was raised, heard,

and ruled on at trial by this Court prior to Petitioner’s plea. See

Petitioner’s Brief, 8-12; trial transcript. It is precluded. Rule

32.2(a)(2). Furthermore, any different argument presented here

still could have been raised at trial and is precluded. Rule

32.2(a)(3). The claim is summarily dismissed.

PETITIONER’S CLAIM III.

Petitioner makes further claims of violations of due

process and equal protection.

These constitutional claims could have been raised at trial.

They are precluded. Rule 32.2(a)(3). They are summarily

dismissed.

PETITIONER’S CLAIM IV.

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He claims:

(A) & (E) For appeal, counsel did not preserve objection to

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44

this Court’s ruling on the recusal motion.

This claim will be heard at a later date.

(B) Counsel waived Petitioner’s right to a bifurcated trial

without Petitioner’s knowledge and waived Petitioner’s right to

be present at the recusal and discovery hearings.

These claims will be heard at a later date.

(C) & (F) Counsel did not “sufficiently confer” with

Petitioner pre-trial.

This claim will be heard at a later date.

(D) Counsel “. . . allowed [Petitioner] to enter a plea of guilty

to a sexual offense as described above, even though the DNA

evidence excluded the Petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.”

This claim is absolutely meritless considering the facts of

this case and the record. This claim is denied and dismissed.

(G) Counsel “. . . did not request the services of Interpreters in

a timely manner.”

This claim will be heard at a later date.

(H) Counsel did not challenge the constitutionality of

Alabama’s laws concerning the appointment of interpreters for

the deaf.

This claim has been partially litigated and this Court will

hear more on this claim at a later date.

PETITIONER’S CLAIM V.

Finally, Petitioner contends that appellate counsel was

ineffective. He claims:

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45

(A) Counsel should have raised the ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claims listed in section IV of Petitioner’s Brief.

This claim is meritless. Even if counsel could have raised

such claims, Petitioner can show no prejudice since ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claims may be raised for the first time

in a Rule 32 petition, as Petitioner has done here. These claims

will be heard and the result may be appealed for review.

Petitioner can not meet his burdens under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) and Rule 32.3.

This claim is denied and dismissed.

(B) Counsel should have raised the Brady claim.

This claim is meritless. Counsel did not act unreasonably

by failing to raise this claim on appeal. Counsel could not raise

this claim since it was waived by the plea of guilty. Furthermore,

Petitioner can show no prejudice since the items complained of

were produced. Petitioner can not meet his burdens under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984)

and Rule 32.3. This claim is denied and dismissed.

(C), (D) & (E) Counsel should have raised the due process

and equal protection claims listed in sections II and III of

Petitioner’s Brief, and should have raised the unconstitutionality

of Alabama’s “deaf interpreter laws.”

These claims are meritless. Counsel did not act

unreasonably by failing to raise these claims on appeal. Counsel

could not raise these claims since they were waived by the plea of

guilty. Also, these substantive claims will be heard and decided

incident to the trial counsel claims to be heard at a later date.

Petitioner can not meet his burdens under Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) and Rule 32.3.

These claims are denied and dismissed.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, a portion of the claims are hereby

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46

DENIED and DISMISSED as stated above. The remaining claims

will be argued orally and/or by brief at a later date to be

determined by this Court.

(Id.)

20. The trial court reconvened the Rule 32 hearing on September 3,

2003. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, September 3, 2003 Hearing Transcript,

at 34-112) The opening arguments of Weed’s attorney reveals the main bases

of his request for Rule 32 relief. (Id. at 39-44)

MR. CURENTON: . . . We believe that the brief we have

submitted and the State and Federal law argued in there is enough

to prevail on the claim that Mr. Weed was not afforded due

process by the minimum standards required by A.D.A. and also

required by the Alabama and United States constitutions as

interpreted by the courts and we would stand by and rely on the

cases we’ve cited. The reason I say this is because at the time of

the hearing when the jury was being selected, Mr. Weed’s

interpreter, Mr. Godwin in the record, he asked the Court to

appoint two interpreters for the trial and he informed Your Honor

that he was an interpreter for the attorney representing Mr. Weed

and also his services were subject to attorney/client privilege

because his code of ethics did not allow him to interpret for a

defendant and his attorney and also interpret for the proceeding

itself. Mr. White asked the Court to appoint two [more]

interpreters. That was not done. And it’s our position that the

A.D.A. is the minimum standard that State Courts and Federal

Courts must follow. That particular aspect of A.D.A. requires that

the public entity . . . honor the request of the handicapped person

regarding the accommodation he needs. . . . In this case Mr.

Weed’s attorney and interpreter asked for two [more] interpreters

to be appointed which was required by the standards that the

interpreters follow. We believe that that request should have been

either honored, or . . . at that point the State had the burden . . . to

demonstrate one of two things, that another equally effective

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47

means of communication is available; or two, that use of the

means chosen would result in a fundamental alteration of the

service, program or activity or an undue financial and

administrative burden. The State never did that. There was never

any burden of proof shifted to the State to show why the deaf

person’s request for a particular type of accommodation couldn’t

be honored. In fact, the Court just denied the request out right and

at that point in time when the request was denied and never

considered, Mr. Weed was left to attend trial with his attorney

and an interpreter who could not interpret the proceedings but

only what was privileged between the lawyer and his client.

THE COURT: . . . You say the request was never

considered. In fact, I think the record reveals that Mr. Godwin was

allowed time to try to call interpreters to come over either that

day or the next day for the trial. Isn’t that correct?

MR. CURENTON: And they could be here the following

Monday. 

. . .

THE COURT: But you’re not considering the effort

that was made to try to arrange for another interpreter either that

day or the next day.

MR. CURENTON: That was not Mr. Weed or his

interpreter’s burden. At the point he made his request as he’s

allowed to do under the A.D.A. [the] State then had to show why

that request could not be accommodated.

THE COURT: Give me a case that says that.

MR. CURENTON: It’s in the language of the A.D.A.

itself. 

THE COURT: Well, I want a case that says it, a case

binding on this Court.

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48

. . .

MR. CURENTON: . . . The Supreme Court stated [in

Katcenbach v. Morgan] . . . that when Congress passes a Federal

law or if a state passes a law setting standards higher than the

constitution, then those standards become the minimum. . . . We

start out with the notion that the constitution of the United States

is the minimum . . . protection that citizens receive. But of course

any State or the Federal Government can make those standards

higher. It’s our contention that when Congress passed the A.D.A.

it raised the standards . . . for handicapped people. . . . And it’s our

position that he exercised his rights by asking for the

accommodation he needed and it was not provided to him. I think

that the State had a burden to show why those minimum standards

couldn’t be met. 

. . .

MR. CURENTON: And my second point is this little

remark is that we believe that those forensic reports, you can

look at this issue one or two ways. If I’m reading these correctly,

Mr. Tyson got a copy of a letter on September 29th with a

memorandum attached and that did not give the results. On

October 31 the memorandum was prepared giving results

excluding Scott Weed and on May 29th it appears from the

records I have, that Dr. Riddick certified the documents. Now, if

that is the time the D.A. received the D.N.A. evidence, the results

of the tests, it was a mere two weeks before trial. . . . If [Mr.

White] did know the results, then [he] let Mr. Weed plea[d] to

something when he had test results never revealed to Mr. Weed

which certainly could have changed his plea. So I think either way

you look at it either exculpatory evidence was withheld from Mr.

White or he had evidence that was not conveyed to Mr. Weed.

(Id. at 39-41, 42, 43-44 & 44-45)

21. The sole witnesses testifying at the Rule 32 hearing were Weed’s

trial attorney, John White, Esquire (id. at 47-84 & 96-107), and petitioner’s

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 48 of 99
8 White could not place a number on the times he visited Weed at the jail but stated that

“[i]t was several times.” (Id. at 47 & 48) White did not need an interpreter for the jail visits because he

could successfully communicate with petitioner through written notes. (See id. at 72-73)

9 White testified that he received the forensics reports a substantial time before trial,

inasmuch as he had discussions with the assistant district attorney that the reports were forthcoming.

(Id. at 53)

10 It was clear to White, however, that the victim was going to testify that Weed placed

his penis in her mouth. (Id. at 61)

49

mother, Linda Weed (id. at 85-95 & 107-111). White testified, in relevant part,

that he communicated with petitioner at the jail through written notes and, in

court, through an interpreter (id. at 47)8; that he reviewed the district attorney’s

file for the first time shortly after the December 12, 2000 arraignment (id. at

50) and that at this point the forensics reports were not attached but he got those

reports later (id. at 51-53)9; that he thoroughly read the forensics reports (id.

at 55) and knew substantially what the testimony of Faron Brewer would be at

trial (id. (“He was going to match the D.N.A. to Mr. Weed as far as the

cardboard box was going to go and it was not going to match as far as the swab

taken from Ms. Snow.”)); that Weed’s DNA was not on the two oral swabs (see

id. at 55 & 57-58) and, therefore, there was no direct DNA evidence supporting

the charge of deviate sexual intercourse under Alabama Code § 13A-6-43 (id.

at 58-59)10; that he could have attempted to impeach the victim’s testimony with

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11 The following testimony reveals White’s discussions with Weed about the DNA test

results:

A I know I discussed with him about the cardboard box. That was the major stick

in the whole case was what she said and the cardboard box, the semen that came back

and matched him. That was their case . . . as far as what was left at the scene. Now

they had all sorts of things in the car too once they stopped him that went back to the

scene like receipts and things of that nature.

Q For the robbery?

A But, yes, for purposes of the trial the semen on the box, the cardboard box and

her testimony was what we discussed.

(Id. at 80)

12 White testified that he believed Judge Johnston was “predisposed to make sure [Weed]

got prosecuted at the highest level.” (Id. at 70)

13 White testified that the reason he did not reserve the recusal issue for appeal was

because once the plea was entered he did not “see any reason to do it.” (Id. at 71; see also id. at 103

(White’s testimony that he could not say he consciously decided not to reserve this issue because he

was not thinking in terms of reserving or not reserving issues inasmuch as his main interest was “whether

Scott was voluntarily going to enter this plea and [he] wanted to make sure [Scott] understood what he

was doing . . . The issue of recusal was not even -- we were not even discussing that anymore.”))

50

the forensics reports (id. at 63);11 that he filed a motion to recuse12 and waived

his client’s appearance at the hearing on that motion (id. at 68)13; that he read the

psychological reports and determined from those that Weed was competent (id.

at 69 & 70), able to understand the proceedings and “knew what was going on[]”

(id. at 69; see id. at 77 (Dr. Chudy informed counsel during a telephone

conversation that he was not going to be able to help the defense on the

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14 White testified that he never told Weed’s mother that the State had a DNA match to

Weed from the victim’s body. (Id. at 99; but cf. id. at 108 (Ms. Weed’s testimony that she asked

White whether her son’s DNA was on the victim and that White answered in the affirmative and told

her that the State “had a match on everything”)) According to Ms. Weed, “[j]ust a few minutes before

trial started the [DA] gave [White] a thing of papers stapled together which was, I guess, all the

evidence or that type of evidence, and it was in there. I did not have an opportunity to closely read it

until this ordeal was behind us.” (Id. at 108) Linda Weed stated that she did not know that “that’s the

only copy[]” (id. at 110; see also id. at 111 (“Q And you do not know that Mr. White may not have

received a faxed copy of that report prior to trial, do you? A I believe I just said that I didn’t -- that I

have no way of knowing if that was the only copy or not.”)) and that she took the copy the DA gave to

White that Monday morning before the jury was struck because White tossed it on the table and “never

picked it up when we left for the day[.]” (Id. at 110)

15 In addition, White testified that he never told Ms. Weed that one jury would decide

both her son’s competency to stand trial and also the guilt phase of the proceedings. (Id. at 99; but cf.

id. at 91 (Ms. Weed’s testimony that White told her the competency trial would be held before the trial

on the charges her son faced and that the same jury would be used for both “trials”)) 

16 According to Linda Weed, petitioner was “terrified because he had been repeatedly

told that morning that if he did not enter this plea this Judge would give him three consecutive life

sentences. . . . It was not presented to him as a possibility. It was presented to him as a fact.” (Id. at

94)

51

competency issue)); and that he never considered challenging the Alabama

method of appointing interpreters (id. at 76).14 White informed petitioner, prior

to entry of his guilty pleas, that the potential sentences for the three Class A

felonies he was charged with were consecutive life sentences.15(Id. at 100 &

101-102)16

22. Linda Weed testified at the Rule 32 hearing that she spoke with

White every Friday afternoon after she hired him to represent her son. (Id. at

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17 Weed testified that she told White her son wanted to appeal the recusal ruling the

Monday morning before the trial started, that is, before entry of the guilty pleas. (Id. at 92-93) 

52

85) “He would tell me if there had been any new developments. I would relay

messages from my son to him. He would tell me what he wanted me to tell Mr.

White and then I would tell him.” (Id. at 85-86) Ms. Weed would also relay

messages from White to her son. (Id. at 86) According to Weed, her son

repeatedly asked her to ask White to visit him at the jail with an interpreter. (Id.

at 86-87) Ms. Weed testified, moreover, that her son reported to her that White

did not visit him at the jail. (Id. at 87; but cf. id. at 97-98 (White testified that

generally speaking he went and saw petitioner at the jail whenever Linda Weed

requested that he do so or when he needed to do so)) Weed also testified that

she informed White on numerous occasions that her son desired to be present

at the recusal hearing and to not waive his presence at the hearing. (Id. at 88; but

cf. id. at 98 (“They never told me I want to definitely be there when it happens

but they were very interested in the topic [of recusal], yes, and I had a reason for

not having Scott there. . . . Scott was very, very volatile to say the least. When

I would talk to him about the fact that Judge Johnston was on the case, he did not

want him on the case. And I sincerely thought that if I had any chance of

prevailing on my motion to recuse it would be without Scott here because I felt

pretty certain Scott was going to have outbursts.”))17 

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53

23. On March 18, 2004, the trial court entered a final order

dismissing Weed’s Rule 32 petition. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, March

18, 2004 ORDER)

On September 3, 2003 the court held a hearing on the

Petitioner’s remaining eight claims concerning the ineffective

assistance of counsel. A sign language interpreter was appointed

for the hearing and the Petitioner, who is hearing impaired,

indicated to the court that he did understand sign language.

Petitioner’s primary contention is that he was denied due

process by not being granted two interpreters at State expense for

trial on the charges, one to interpret the trial proceedings and one

to interpret communications between himself and his attorney.

Petitioner contends that there are ethical concerns when one

interpreter is provided for both the proceedings and the attorneyclient discussions.

The court finds that Petitioner’s trial attorney went to the

jail to meet with the Petitioner at least half a dozen times. He was

able to communicate in jail with Petitioner without an interpreter,

thus he did not ask for one and did not need one. He met with

Petitioner’s mother and he met with the Petitioner either before

or after those meetings. He communicated with his client by way

of written notes and, when in court, through an interpreter. On the

date of trial, there was an interpreter in court. He was able to

explain matters to the Petitioner and reviewed the State’s entire

file in preparation for the case. He was provided the DNA results

sufficiently in advance of trial, and while they were negative for

Petitioner’s DNA as to swabs taken from the victim, the forensic

tests were positive as to seminal fluid on a piece of cardboard

taken from the scene. This evidence was discussed with

Petitioner. This evidence was in addition to items seized from the

vehicle and to the victim’s testimony, with which he was familiar

prior to trial.

Petitioner’s mother testified that she too relayed

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54

information from the Petitioner’s attorney to her son and from

her son to the attorney. The attorney explained to her that the

tests were negative for Petitioner’s DNA on swabs taken from the

victim, but positive for his semen on the piece of cardboard from

the scene.

The attorney had represented the Petitioner previously and

had benefit of reports of his competency made both at the time of

the earlier representation and in connection with this case and

both the psychologist and his attorney were of the opinion that

Petitioner was competent. A second psychologist, who had

prepared a supplemental report on the question of competency,

suggested strongly to the trial attorney that competency would

not be an issue and that it would not be helpful to the defense to

call him as a witness. So long as there was an interpreter, the

Petitioner was able to understand the proceedings and knew what

was going on. While the question of Petitioner’s competency was

therefore not an issue, trial counsel did request that the court

provide additional interpreters.

The trial attorney determined that because of his volatile

behavior, Petitioner should not be present at a hearing on the

motion for recusal of the undersigned. Although interested in it,

Petitioner did not insist on being present. Petitioner was aware

that the motion to recuse had been denied and had no reservation

concerning this issue at the time that he entered his plea of guilty.

The Court concludes that the Petitioner’s counsel was not

ineffective for not preserving the question of recusal or of

Petitioner’s presence at the recusal hearing for appeal. No

prejudice has been demonstrated in light of the Petitioner’s guilty

plea. Further, the court finds that Petitioner never indicated his

desire to reserve this question for appeal. Nor did he prove to this

Court’s satisfaction grounds warranting recusal which would have

resulted in a favorable result on appeal.

The claim that Petitioner’s right to a bifurcated trial was

not preserved is without merit as the Petitioner has offered no

evidence of incompetency, and has thus failed to show prejudice.

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55

The claim that counsel did not sufficiently confer with the

Petitioner is unproven, thus without merit.

The claim that counsel allowed the Petitioner to enter a

plea of guilty to a sex offense even though the DNA evidence

excluded him as the perpetrator is patently without merit. The

record establishes that not only was his DNA found in seminal

fluid at the scene, but extensive and powerful evidence found in

the Petitioner’s possession, supported the charges against [] him,

including the gun described by the victims and by the Petitioner’s

mother, which his mother told the police was missing, notes he

wrote at the scene of the assault, matching notepaper found in the

Petitioner’s car, a plastic bag with money taken during the

robbery, keys belonging to one of the victims, and the victim’s

wallet. In addition, the victims had described the robber and

assailant as a deaf mute.

The contention that counsel failed to request the services

of an interpreter in a timely manner or challenge the

constitutionality of local laws concerning the appointment of

interpreters is contradicted by the record and, to the extent that

it was not raised, waived by the plea of guilty. The Petitioner does

not deny that he was provided an interpreter or that he was able to

communicate through the interpreter. The record shows that the

Court met the requirements under Alabama’s Constitution to

provide interpretive services. Terry v. State, 21 Ala. App. 100,

105 So. 386 (1925) (right to interpreter is guaranteed under Sec.

6 Ala. Const. which secures to a defendant the right to be heard by

himself and counsel, to demand the nature of the accusation, to be

confronted by the witnesses against him, and to testify if he

elects to do so). See also, Turner v. State, 429 So.2d 645 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1982) (no interpreter was provided at arraignment but

defendant understood the proceedings, thus no violation of

Alabama’s Constitution). With respect to guarantees under the

U.S. Constitution, “the Supreme Court ‘has yet to recognize the

right to a court-appointed interpreter as a constitutional one.’”

Phillips v. Miller, 2001 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 19793, p. 30

(S.D.N.Y.). Petitioner’s contention that he should have been

afforded multiple interpreters raises neither a State, nor a Federal

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56

Constitutional question. In Phillips v. Miller, the court, citing

another decision, recognized that “the Constitution does not

guarantee every defendant a perfect trial.” Id., at 34. So long as

the court in its discretion took reasonable measures to

accommodate the Petitioner’s disability, the Petitioner’s rights

were not violated. People v. Williams, 771 N.E.2d 1095, 1099

(Ill. App. 2002) (confrontation clause requires that reasonable

measures be taken to accommodate the disability); Shook v. State,

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8851 p.18 (N.D. Miss.); Meaders v.

Carroll, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 25899, p. 3 (9th Cir.) (“[a]s a

[U.S.] constitutional matter, the appointment of interpreters is

within the trial court’s discretion”). Finally, the costs associated

with providing interpretive services is also a consideration. Baker

v. Louisiana, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21599, p. 10 (W.D. La.)

(state court procedures insuring that interpretive services be

provided to defendants at a minimum cost to the public should be

afforded great respect). The Petitioner’s contentions, especially

the claim that the Americans With Disabilities Act’s (2 U.S.C.

Sec. 12131-12161) standards require that his conviction be set

aside do not raise a cognizable issue under Rule 32 and are

unfounded in law and fact.

The claim that appellate counsel failed to challenge trial

counsel’s effectiveness is likewise without merit. Inasmuch as

the claims of trial counsel are raised in the instant petition, no

prejudice has been shown.

The claim that appellate counsel should have raised the

Brady claim (that the State failed to disclose exculpatory

evidence -- i.e. the DNA results discussed above) is without merit

inasmuch as the claim is waived by the plea of guilty and is

substantively without merit. The evidence was not only produced,

but viewed in toto, can hardly be considered exculpatory.

Accordingly, the petition is dismissed for failure [to]

plead a right to relief, Rule 32.3, failure to state a claim, Rule

32.7(d), and for having raised no material issue of fact or law[,]

Rule 32.7(d).

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57

(Id.)

24. Weed filed written notice of appeal from the denial of his Rule

32 petition on April 6, 2004. (Doc. 9, Respondent’s Exhibit 5, NOTICE OF

APPEAL) In his appellate brief, petitioner raised the following five issues for

consideration by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals: (1) the State of

Alabama withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland; (2)

the trial court’s failure to grant him sufficient funds for additional interpreters

denied him due process and equal protection of the laws; (3) the trial court

committed reversible error by denying his due process and equal protection

claim since he was denied his right to know the evidence, denied sufficient time

to evaluate the evidence, and denied the right to assist in his defense as a

consequence of being denied sufficient funds for interpreters and on account of

the state withholding exculpatory evidence regarding the DNA test results; (4)

the trial court committed reversible error by denying his ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claim inasmuch as said performance was deficient and outside

the range of professionally competent assistance and he was prejudiced by the

deficient performance; and (5) the trial court committed reversible error by

denying his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel inasmuch as said

performance was deficient and his deficient performance caused him prejudice.

(Doc. 8, Respondent’s Exhibit 6, at 6; see also Doc. 16, Exhibit A)

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58

25. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

judgment denying Weed’s Rule 32 petition by memorandum opinion entered on

August 27, 2004. (Doc. 8, Respondent’s Exhibit 8)

On December 24, 2002, Weed filed the instant Rule 32

petition, wherein he claimed: (1) that the State violated the

mandates of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), based on its

failure to produce or make available to him any and all

exculpatory evidence, specifically, the results of DNA tests or

examinations which would be used against him at trial; (2) that his

due process rights and guarantee of equal protection under the

law were violated because the trial court failed to grant him

sufficient funds for interpreters; (3) that his due process rights

and guarantee of equal protection were violated because he had a

right to know the evidence against him and to know that evidence

in sufficient time for his counsel to evaluate the evidence to be

used against him; (4) that he was denied effective assistance of

trial counsel; and (5) that he was denied effective assistance of

appellate counsel. The State filed a response to Weed’s claims

and a motion to dismiss.

On January 14, 2003, the circuit court entered an order

denying relief as to Weed’s Brady claim. The Court ruled that the

claim was precluded from review because it could have been

raised at trial as required by Rule 32.2(a)(3), Ala. R. Crim. P. The

Court further ruled that Weed waived this claim when he entered

his guilty plea. In addition, the circuit court found that the Brady

claim was without merit because the State had an “open file”

discovery policy and Weed’s counsel could have made an

appointment to review all of the forensic evidence. The court then

set the remainder of Weed’s claims for a hearing and oral

argument at a later date.

On April 16, 2003, the circuit court entered rulings on

additional procedurally barred claims which it had overlooked at

the time the January 14, 2003, order was issued. The court ruled

that Weed’s claim that he was denied due process and equal

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59

protection because he was not provided with additional

interpreters was precluded from review pursuant to Rule

32.2(a)(2), because the claim was raised and heard at trial before

Weed entered his plea. The court ruled that Weed’s additional

claims of violations of due process and equal protection were

precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) because they could have been

raised at trial. The court further ruled that Weed’s claim that his

appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise the

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on appeal was

without merit because Weed suffered no prejudice. The court

ruled that Weed could properly raise the ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claim for the first time in a Rule 32 petition, as in

the instant case. The court found that Weed’s claim that his

appellate counsel should have raised the Brady claim on appeal

was without merit because the claim was waived when Weed

entered his guilty plea. The court also found that Weed’s

appellate counsel was not ineffective for failure to raise the due

process and equal protection claims listed in sections (2) and (3)

of his petition, and was not ineffective for failure to raise the

unconstitutionality of the State of Alabama’s deaf interpreter

laws, because these claims were also waived by the entry of the

guilty plea. Finally, the court ruled that the substantive claims

would be heard and decided as part of the ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claims that were set for oral argument.

On September 3, 2003, the circuit court held a hearing

where evidence was presented in support of Weed’s eight

remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On March

18, 2004, the circuit court entered its final order on Weed’s

petition. In that order, the court found that Weed’s trial attorney

met with Weed at least six times. The court found that Weed was

able to communicate with his attorney without an interpreter, and

that Weed’s mother also relayed information from counsel to

Weed and from Weed to his attorney. The court found that the

interpreter that was provided to Weed was able to adequately

explain the trial proceedings to Weed. Further, it found that, even

though Weed’s DNA was not found on any of the swabs taken

from the victim, his DNA was present in the seminal fluid that

was found on a piece of cardboard at the crime scene. The court

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60

found that this evidence, along with additional evidence seized

from Weed’s vehicle, was known to Weed before the entry of his

guilty plea. The trial court found that Weed’s competency to

stand trial was not at issue at trial because a psychologist, who

had prepared a supplemental report on Weed’s competency,

suggested that Weed was competent to stand trial. The trial court

found that trial counsel did request additional funds to obtain

additional interpreters for trial, however his request was denied.

The trial court found that Weed was aware of the hearing

setting on his motion for recusal, but did not insist on being

present. The court found that the trial attorney had expressly not

wanted Weed to be present at the hearing because of his

unpredictable and volatile behavior. The court found that Weed

was aware that the motion to recuse was denied at the time he

entered his guilty plea. Further, the trial court found that counsel

was not ineffective for failure to preserve for appeal the issue of

recusal, or Weed’s absence from the recusal hearing. The court

found that Weed had demonstrated no prejudice and further found

that Weed did not indicate a desire to reserve those particular

issues for appeal. The court also found that, in any event, Weed

was not likely to obtain relief on these claims even if he had

preserved them for appellate review.

The trial court found that trial counsel was not ineffective

for failure to preserve Weed’s right to a bifurcated trial because

Weed presented no evidence of incompetency. Thus, Weed failed

to show that he suffered prejudice by counsel’s failure to

preserve the claim.

The trial court denied relief on Weed’s claim that trial

counsel allowed him to enter a guilty plea to a sex offense even

though the DNA evidence excluded him as the perpetrator of the

crime. The trial court found that the presence of Weed’s DNA in

seminal fluid found at the scene of the crime, together with other

extensive material evidence, including the victims’ description of

Weed as the perpetrator, supported the charges against him.

The court also found that Weed’s claims that his trial

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61

counsel failed to request the services of an interpreter in a timely

fashion and failed to challenge the constitutionality of laws

concerning appointment of interpreters were waived when Weed

entered his guilty plea. Additionally, the court found that the

claims were without merit. The court denied Weed’s claim that

the Americans With Disabilities Act required that his convictions

be set aside because the claim did not recognize a cognizable

issue under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.

The court denied Weed’s claim that appellate counsel was

ineffective because counsel failed to raise on appeal a claim that

trial counsel was ineffective because the ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claim was cognizable under Rule 32 and raised in

this petition. The trial court also found that appellate counsel was

not ineffective for failing to raise the Brady claim because that

claim was waived when Weed entered his plea. This appeal

followed.

I.

On appeal, Weed contends that the trial court erred when

it denied relief as to his claim that the State withheld exculpatory

evidence. Specifically, Weed claims that the State failed to

produce the results of forensic examinations that showed his

DNA was not present on oral swabs taken from the victim, and

that no seminal fluid was found on vaginal swabs taken from the

victim.

We note that the specific claim he now raises on appeal is

based on newly discovered evidence. In his petition, however,

Weed raised the claim as a substantive Brady claim, claiming that

the State had failed to disclose the evidence. Because he did not

assert the newly-discovered evidence claim at the trial court

level, this claim is not properly before this Court for review. See

Kaska v. State, 740 So.2d 475, 477 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (“an

appellant cannot raise issues on appeal from the denial of a Rule

32 petition that were not raised in the original petition”). 

Moreover, Weed waived the claim because he pleaded

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62

guilty. It is well settled law that “by pleading guilty, a defendant

waives all nonjurisdictional defects occurring before the plea.”

Spears v. State, 647 So.2d 15, 20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (citing

Martin v. State, 579 So.2d 69, 70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)). A

defendant who wishes to appeal an adverse ruling on an issue

raised prior to the entry of the plea must inform the trial court, at

the time the plea is entered, that he intends to reserve the issue on

appeal. Spears, 647 So.2d at 21.

Moreover, the trial court correctly denied relief as to this

claim because it determined that no Brady violation had been

committed. At the Rule 32 hearing, defense counsel testified that

he viewed the State’s file after the arraignment and obtained

copies of the documents. He also admitted that he received

copies of the forensic documents in a substantial period of time

before the date of the trial. He understood that the results of the

DNA tests revealed that Weed was a match for the seminal fluid

found on a piece of cardboard and not for the DNA found on the

swabs taken from the victim. That knowledge could be imputed to

Weed and he had the option of reviewing the file at any time

before trial. The trial court properly denied relief as to this claim.

See Boyd v. State, [Ms. CR-02-0037 September 26, 2003] 

So.2d (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).

II.

Next, Weed argues that the trial court’s refusal to grant

him sufficient funds with which to hire additional interpreters

denied his rights to due process and equal protection. He also

contends that the denial constitutes a violation of the Americans

With Disabilities Act and applicable Alabama law. 

As stated herein, “by pleading guilty, a defendant waives all

nonjurisdictional defects occurring before the plea.” Spears v.

State, 647 So.2d 15, 20 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Martin v.

State, 579 So.2d 69, 70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991)). Also, this claim

was properly denied by the trial court because it was raised and

addressed at trial before the entry of Weed’s guilty plea. Thus it

was properly precluded from review pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)(2),

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Ala. R. Crim.P.

III.

Weed also claims that the trial court’s refusal to grant him

sufficient funds for interpreters denied him the right to have

sufficient time to evaluate the evidence against him and to

evaluate the evidence to assist in his own defense. Again, this

nonjurisdictional claim was waived by the entry of his guilty plea.

The trial court properly denied this claim. See Spears v. State,

supra.

IV.

Weed challenges the trial court’s denial of his claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He alleges several specific

grounds in support of his claims: (1) counsel failed to reserve the

right to appeal the recusal issue; (2) counsel waived Weed’s right

to a bifurcated trial on the issue of competency without Weed’s

knowledge and further waived Weed’s right to be at the recusal

hearing; (3) counsel did not sufficiently confer with Weed before

trial because an interpreter wasn’t present; (4) counsel allowed

Weed to enter a plea of guilty even though the DNA evidence

indicated Weed could not have committed the crime; (5) counsel

failed to object or reserve for appeal Weed’s right to have his

criminal prosecutions assigned by a judge by the usual lottery

system of docket assignments utilized by the Mobile Circuit

Court; (6) counsel did not confer with Weed at any location away

from the courthouse, nor did he object to his inability to confer

with Weed away from the courthouse[], nor did he reserve the

issue for appeal; (7) counsel did not request the services of

additional interpreters in a timely fashion; and (8) counsel did not

challenge the constitutionality of Alabama law regarding the

appointment of interpreters for deaf mutes in criminal

proceedings and/or its failure to satisfy constitutional

requirements.

We hold that the trial court did not err when it denied

Weed’s claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

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Weed has not met his burden of showing that counsel committed

errors so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial, or that those

alleged errors affected the outcome of his case.

It is well established that, to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) that

his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that he was

prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Ex parte Lawley, 512

So.2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. 1987). “The performance component

outlined in Strickland is an objective one: that is, whether

counsel’s assistance, judged under ‘prevailing professional

norms,’ was ‘reasonable considering all the circumstances.’”

Daniels v. State, 650 So.2d 544, 552 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1051 (1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688). “A court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must

judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the

facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In a Rule 32 proceeding,

the petitioner had “the burden of pleading and proving by a

preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the

petitioner to relief.” Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P. See Fortenberry

v. State, 659 So.2d 194 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516

U.S. 846 (1995); Elliott v. State, 601 So.2d 1118 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1992).

When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, this Court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct was appropriate and reasonable. Hallford v. State, 629

So.2d 6 (Ala. Crim. app. 1992); Luke v. State, 484 So.2d 531

(Ala. Crim. App. 1985).

None of Weed’s allegations are sufficient to show that

Weed’s counsel’s performance fell outside of the wide range of

professionally competent assistance, nor has he met his burden

of showing that he would not have been convicted if counsel had

done all the things that he alleges should have been done.

Therefore, the trial court properly denied relief as to this claim.

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Weed has not shown that he would have obtained relief as

to the issue of recusal on appeal if it had been properly preserved

for appellate review. He has not shown that he was prejudiced by

the waiver of the bifurcated trial regarding his competency to

stand trial because he cannot show that he would have been

declared legally incompetent. He has not shown that counsel’s

failure to confer with him more frequently about his case

prejudiced his defense. Nor has he shown that he had additional

information to impart to counsel that he would have shared if

counsel had met with him more frequently. It was not ineffective

assistance of trial counsel not to pursue the issue of additional

interpreters because the issue was raised and was denied by the

trial court. Failure to preserve the claim for appellate review does

not constitute professional error because, even if this issue had

been preserved, he would have obtained no relief on appeal.

It was not legal error for trial counsel to allow Weed to

plead guilty after realizing that some forensic evidence obtained

from the victim did not indicate the presence of Weed’s DNA,

because other inculpatory evidence existed, including other

evidence indicating that Weed’s DNA was found at the crime

scene, and the testimony of the victims that would have been used

to prove Weed’s guilt. He has not shown that the judge who heard

his case was biased against him; thus, his claim that he was

prejudiced because his case was not assigned through the lottery

system is without merit. He has not shown that meeting with his

trial counsel at the courthouse rather than another location would

have changed the outcome of his case, or that doing so

constituted professional error; therefore, failure to preserve the

issue for appellate review does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel.

Based on all of the above, we affirm the trial court’s ruling

that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance.

V.

Finally, Weed contends that his appellate counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. Specifically, he alleges that appellate

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66

counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: (1) counsel

failed to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial on

appeal; (2) counsel failed to raise the Brady issue on appeal; (3)

counsel failed to raise the due process violation and the issue of

equal protection as described in claim (2) on appeal; (4) counsel

failed to raise the issue of Weed’s denial of the right to assist in

his defense, the right to know the evidence, the right to evaluate

the evidence as a result of being denied sufficient funds to hire

interpreters and the withholding of exculpatory evidence; and (5)

counsel failed to raise the alleged unconstitutionality of

Alabama’s law regarding the appointment of interpreters for

hearing-impaired defendants and the law’s failure to meet

constitutional standards.

As stated herein in Section IV, to prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that

his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that he was

prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The standards for determining

whether appellate counsel was ineffective are the same as those

for determining whether trial counsel was ineffective. Ex parte

Dunn, 514 So.2d 1300, 1303 (Ala. 1987).

We note that Weed did not raise the ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claims at the trial court level; thus they were not

preserved for review by this Court on direct appeal. Because

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were not preserved

for appellate review, Weed’s appellate counsel was not

ineffective for not challenging trial counsel’s performance on

direct appeal. Alderman v. State, 647 So.2d 28, 31 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1994). Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a

meritless issue. See Patrick v. State, 680 So.2d 959, 963 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1996); Hope v. State, 521 So.2d 1383, 1386 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1988). Moreover, because Weed could still raise all

of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in a Rule 32

petition, he suffered no prejudice as a result of appellate

counsel’s decision not to raise this issue on direct appeal. Thus,

Weed has not met the requirements set forth in Strickland to

establish that appellate counsel was ineffective.

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67

The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a Rule

32 petition is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Elliot

v. State, 601 So.2d 1118, 1119 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). The trial

court’s findings are supported by the record. Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court denying Weed’s petition is affirmed.

(Id. at 2-10) 

26. Weed’s application for rehearing was denied by the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals on September 17, 2004 and his petition for writ of

certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was denied on January 7, 2005. (See

Doc. 6, Respondent’s ANSWER, at 3) 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Procedural Default.

1. In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that it would "not review a

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests

on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to

support the judgment." Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2553-2554. This rule applies

whether the state law ground is procedural or substantive. Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct.

at 2554. The doctrine applies to bar federal habeas review when a state court

declines to address a petitioner's federal claims because the petitioner fails to

meet a state procedural requirement. Id. at 729-730, 111 S.Ct. at 2554; see also

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)

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68

(federal courts must honor legitimate state trial and appellate procedural rules

when enforced by state courts and must decline to review on the merits claims

that the state treats as barred absent a showing of cause for non-compliance with

such rules and resulting prejudice); Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549

(11th Cir.) ("Pursuant to the doctrine of procedural default, a state prisoner

seeking federal habeas corpus relief, who fails to raise his federal

constitution[al] claim in state court, or who attempts to raise it in a manner not

permitted by state procedural rules is barred from pursuing the same claim in

federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice from the

default."), cert. denied sub nom. Alderman v. Thomas, 513 U.S.1061, 115 S.Ct.

673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994). "In these cases, the state judgment rests on

independent and adequate state procedural grounds." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730,

111 S.Ct. at 2554 (citations omitted).

2. The application of the independent and adequate state ground

doctrine in the habeas context is grounded in concerns of federalism and

comity. Id.

Without the rule, a federal district court would be able to do in

habeas what this Court could not do on direct review; habeas

would offer state prisoners whose custody was supported by

independent and adequate state grounds an end run around the

limits of this Court's jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State's interest in enforcing its laws.

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69

Id. at 730-731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554.

3. An additional consideration comes to the fore when the

independent and adequate state ground supporting a petitioner's custody is a state

procedural default. Id. at 731, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. The Supreme Court has long

held

that a state prisoner's federal habeas petition

should be dismissed if the prisoner has not

exhausted available state remedies as to any of his

federal claims. (citations omitted) This

exhaustion requirement is also grounded in

principles of comity; in a federal system, the

States should have the opportunity to address and

correct alleged violations of state prisoners'

federal rights.

 . . .

[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the

State's procedural requirements for presenting his

federal claims has deprived the state courts of an

opportunity to address those claims in the first

instance. A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his

federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirement for exhaustion; there are no state

remedies any longer "available" to him. (citations

omitted) In the absence of the independent and

adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas,

habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the

exhaustion requirement by defaulting their federal

claims in state court. The independent and

adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the

States' interest in correcting their own mistakes is

respected in all federal habeas cases.

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70

Id. at 731, 732, 111 S.Ct. at 2554-2555, 2555.

4. In the habeas context, federal courts are to "presume that there is

no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the

decision 'fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with

the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state

law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.'" Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. at

2557 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469,

3476-3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263,

109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ("[A] procedural default does

not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless

the last state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and expressly' states

that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar."). In all other cases, the

presumption is not applicable. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739, 111 S.Ct. at

2559. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334

(1989), the Supreme Court held that the Harris v. Reed presumption is

inapplicable to a claim that is never presented to the state courts. Id. at 299,

109 S.Ct. at 1069 ("The rule announced in Harris v. Reed assumes that a state

court has had the opportunity to address a claim that is later raised in a federal

habeas proceeding."). Moreover, the presumption "looks through" unexplained

orders to the last reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804,

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71

111 S.Ct. 2590, 2595, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).

Where there has been one reasoned state judgment

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders

upholding that judgment or rejecting the same

claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier

opinion "fairly appear[s] to rest primarily upon

federal law," Coleman,[ U.S., at , 111 S.Ct., at

2559], we will presume that no procedural default

has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained

order that leaves the judgment or its consequences

in place. Similarly where . . . the last reasoned

opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a

procedural default, we will presume that a later

decision rejecting the claim did not silently

disregard that bar and consider the merits.

501 U.S. at 803, 111 S.Ct. at 2594. Also, the presumption may not be applied

in cases in which the state court opinion did not, at a minimum, discuss the

federal grounds at issue." Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 211 (11th Cir. 1993)

("Coleman and Ylst lead us to conclude that we may not assume that had the state

court issued an opinion, it would have ignored its own procedural rules and

reached the merits of this case. In fact, the most reasonable assumption is that

had the state court ruled, it would have enforced the procedural bar."). Finally,

"where a state court has ruled in the alternative, addressing both the independent

state procedural ground and the merits of the federal claim, the federal court

should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the

claim." Alderman v. Zant, supra, 22 F.3d at 1549.

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72

5. When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, a federal

court is barred from reaching the merits of that claim unless the petitioner "can

demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at

750, 111 S.Ct. at 2565. The cause and prejudice standard applies "uniformly to

all independent and adequate state procedural defaults." Id. at 750-751, 111

S.Ct. at 2565.

In procedural default cases, the cause

standard requires the petitioner to show that "some

objective factor external to the defense impeded

counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in state court.

(citation omitted). Objective factors that

constitute cause include "'interference by

officials'" that makes compliance with the state's

procedural rule impracticable, and "a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel." (citation

omitted). In addition, constitutionally

"[i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause."

(citation omitted). Attorney error short of

ineffective assistance of counsel, however, does

not constitute cause and will not excuse a

procedural default. (citation omitted). Once the

petitioner has established cause, he must show

"'actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of

which he complains." (citation omitted). 

 

Federal courts retain the authority to issue

the writ of habeas corpus in a further, narrow class

of cases despite a petitioner's failure to show

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73

cause for a procedural default. These are

extraordinary instances when a constitutional

violation probably has caused the conviction of one

innocent of the crime. We have described this

class of cases as implicating a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. (citation omitted).

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d

517 (1991).

6. Respondent contends that this Court is procedurally barred from

reaching the merits of the first three claims raised in the instant petition.

Specifically, respondent contends that petitioner’s Brady violation claim has

been defaulted both because the alleged violation occurred prior to entry of the

guilty pleas thereby resulting in waiver of the claim and also because he raised

this claim as a newly-discovered-evidence claim in the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals rather than a substantive Brady claim. In addition, respondent

contends that claims two and three raised in the instant petition have been

procedurally defaulted because both claims were waived with entry of the guilty

pleas. Although this Court disagrees with the conclusion of the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals that Weed failed to raise a substantive Brady claim on

appeal, it agrees with the Alabama appellate court that these three claims were

indeed waived by petitioner with entry of the guilty pleas. See Tollett v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 73 of 99
74

(“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it

in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in

open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he

may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”);

Stanley v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 379, 380 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Normally a

plea of guilty or nolo contendere, if intelligently and voluntarily made, prevents

a defendant from raising in a habeas corpus proceeding claims of constitutional

violations relating to events that occurred prior to the entry of the plea.”), cert.

denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3019, 65 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1980); cf. Horace v.

Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1986) (indicating only that a

petitioner cannot be barred by the procedural default rule from raising claims

of incompetency to stand trial, insanity at the time of the act, and unknowing and

involuntary guilty plea), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 235, 93 L.Ed.2d

160 (1986). While petitioner makes the argument, with respect to the first and

third claim, that he did not appreciate the nature of the evidence against him and

necessarily could not enter a voluntary and knowing plea to the sodomy charge,

the Court finds this argument specious in light of the evidence of record.

However, in order to reach this conclusion, the undersigned need address the

merits of these two claims. Those merits will be reached within the context of

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18 In Brady, supra, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material

75

a discussion of the cause and prejudice and actual innocence exceptions to the

procedural default doctrine since the undersigned must address those standards

in relation to the second claim which the respondent claims is procedurally

barred.

7. Petitioner contends that constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel and interference by state officials constitute cause for any procedural

default of his Brady claim and his claim that he was denied due process and

equal protection of the laws because he was denied his right to know the

evidence, evaluate that evidence and denied the right to assist in his defense by

being deprived sufficient funds for interpreters and by the State withholding

exculpatory DNA evidence. The undersigned finds that there was no interference

by state officials inasmuch as Weed’s trial attorney unequivocally testified that

he received the DNA test results well in advance of trial and that he informed the

petitioner that the State was going to be able to match his DNA to the scene, his

semen being on the cardboard box, and that the victim was going to testify that

petitioner placed his penis in her mouth. More importantly, petitioner’s trial

attorney, John White, was not deficient in failing to raise these issues on appeal

inasmuch as there was no Brady violation.18 Inasmuch as there was no Brady

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either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87,

83 S.Ct. at 1196-1197. In order to establish a Brady violation, a petitioner must establish these three

elements: “(1) suppression by the prosecution; (2) of exculpatory evidence; (3) material to the issues at

trial or sentencing.” Kennedy v. Herring, 54 F.3d 678, 682 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

The third element is satisfied “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.”

Id., quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481

(1985). 

In this case, petitioner has failed to establish that the prosecution suppressed evidence inasmuch

as it is clear from defense counsel’s Rule 32 hearing testimony that the forensic test results were

disclosed to him well in advance of trial. Moreover, the evidence is simply not exculpatory or of the

nature that would necessarily impeach the victim’s testimony, cf. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952,

961 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The duty to disclose covers both exculpatory evidence and evidence tending to

impeach a state witness.”), cert. denied sub nom. Breedlove v. Crosby, 537 U.S. 1204, 123 S.Ct.

1278, 154 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2003). Simply because Weed’s DNA was not found on the oral swabs

does not establish that petitioner did not place his penis in Shannon Snow’s mouth nor is it evidence

which would impeach the victim’s testimony that Weed placed his penis in her mouth. 

19 As reflected more fully in the Court’s consideration of petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel claims, because the State of Alabama did not withhold exculpatory evidence and

the trial court did not deny Weed sufficient funds for interpreters, Weed and his attorney were well

aware of the evidence against him and petitioner was well capable of participating in his defense.

Accordingly, his third basis for habeas relief has no merit.

76

violation, petitioner can establish neither that his guilty plea to the sodomy

charge was involuntarily and unknowingly entered nor cause for his procedural

default of these issues.19

8. With respect to petitioner’s ADA-related claim that the trial court

refused to grant Weed sufficient funds for interpreters to ensure that he receive

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77

the same due process and equal protection guarantees afforded non-deaf

persons, the cause argument made is that this is a unique constitutional claim

that had not been decided at the time the guilty pleas were entered. Even

assuming petitioner’s argument establishes cause for the procedural default of

this claim, see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2910, 82 L.Ed.2d

1 (1984) (“[W]here a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not

reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the

claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.”), he cannot establish

prejudice inasmuch as it is the undersigned’s opinion that the only way to show

prejudice in this regard is for petitioner to have gone through his entire trial

without a sufficient number of interpreters such that he was denied due process

of law and equal protection of the laws. In this case, the record makes clear that

the trial court took a half-day break, after the jury was struck, to enable defense

counsel to procure another interpreter to aid in the orderly process of Weed’s

trial. The record reveals that the following day, instead of proceeding to trial

with only one interpreter, petitioner entered counseled guilty pleas to firstdegree robbery and first-degree sodomy. Inasmuch as there is no indication of

a problem in one interpreter handling the guilty plea proceeding, petitioner

simply has no basis to assert a due process and equal protection violation in this

regard.

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78

9. The fundamental miscarriage of justice/actual innocence

exception does not apply in this case because petitioner has not satisfied the

standard set forth in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91

L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). That standard requires Weed to show that “a constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.” Id. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649-2650. To be credible, a claim of actual

innocence “requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error

with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not

presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, 865, 130

L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); see also id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867 (“To establish the

requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new

evidence.”). Weed has not come forward with any evidence which establishes

his actual innocence and thereby undermines his guilty pleas to first-degree

Case 1:05-cv-00022-BH-C Document 17 Filed 07/28/05 Page 78 of 99
20 Petitioner makes no argument that he is actually innocent of first-degree robbery. (See

Doc. 12, at 19-20 (“Weed contends the evidence shows his innocence of the sex crime to which he

entered a plea of guilty, and that his claim of innocence provides ‘a gateway through which a habeas

petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’”))

21 Stated differently, viewing all of the evidence proffered at petitioner’s guilty plea

proceeding in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the undersigned is of the opinion that any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first-degree sodomy beyond a

reasonable doubt if this case had gone to trial and, therefore, the facts of this case do not support a

conclusion that there will be a fundamental miscarriage of justice if this Court does not consider the

federal claims raised in the instant petition. See Murray v. Carrier, supra, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct.

at 2649. 

Under Alabama law, a person commits the crime of first-degree sodomy if “[h]e engages in

deviate sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion[.]” Ala.Code § 13A-6-63(a)(1).

“Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as ‘any act of sexual gratification between persons not married to

each other, involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.’” Chandler v.

State, 555 So.2d 1138, 1140 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989), quoting Ala.Code § 13A-6-60(2). Moreover,

“[t]he testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to establish the element of forcible compulsion[,]” Sartin

v. State, 615 So.2d 135, 137 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (citation omitted), and there is no requirement that

emission is an element of the crime or that the perpetrator’s DNA be present in the mouth of the victim,

see id. (no DNA evidence presented at trial; “the victim’s testimony that the appellant held a knife to

her neck and forced her to have both oral and vaginal sex with him was sufficient to support the jury’s

verdict[]”); cf. Perry v. State, 568 So.2d 873, 876 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990) (“‘[T]he absence of semen

or hair samples does not necessarily prove that sexual intercourse did not take place.’”). Given the

State’s proffer that the victim would testify that Weed, while armed with a pistol, forced her to perform

oral sex on him, it is clear to the undersigned that petitioner cannot establish that he is actually innocent

of the first-degree sodomy of Ms. Snow.

79

robbery20 and first-degree sodomy.21 Accordingly, this case is not one of those

rare cases in which the actual innocence exception is applicable.

B. Merits of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.

10. Weed filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in this

Court on January 11, 2005, and therefore, his case is governed by 28 U.S.C. §

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80

2254 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 530 (11th Cir. 2000),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357, 151 L.Ed.2d 270 (2001). As

amended, § 2254 now provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim— 

 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2) (footnote added). Moreover, the Act, as amended,

presumes as correct all determinations of factual issues made by a State court

and places the burden upon the petitioner of rebutting such a presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); Putman v.

Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A] state court’s factual findings

are presumed correct, unless rebutted by the petitioner with clear and

convincing evidence.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 870, 123 S.Ct. 278, 154 L.Ed.2d

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22 Based upon the facts as found by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama and the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in their pertinent decisions, it is clear that no argument can be

made that the decisions of those courts were based upon unreasonable determinations of the facts in

light of the contents of the record. More to the point, since this Court must presume as correct the

determinations of all factual issues made by the Alabama courts, petitioner simply cannot rebut that

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Putman, supra, 268 F.3d at 1241

(“Appellant does not dispute the factual findings of the Georgia courts. Therefore, neither § 2254(d)(2)

nor § 2254(e)(1) is relevant to our inquiry.”).

23 “Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation of our cases--indeed, it does not even

require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court

decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 L.Ed.2d 263

(2002).

81

119 (2002).22

11. In Williams v. Taylor, supra, the Supreme Court held that 

§ 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal

habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in

state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one

of the following two conditions is satisfied— the state-court

adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . .

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable

application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the “contrary

to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.23 Under the “unreasonable application”

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

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82

Id. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523 (footnote added); see also Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917, 924-925 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] court evaluating a habeas petition

under § 2254(d)(1) must engage in a three-step process: First, the court must

‘survey the legal landscape,’ . . . to ascertain the federal law applicable to the

petitioner’s claim that is ‘clearly established’ by the Supreme Court at the time

of the state court’s adjudication. Second, the court must determine whether the

state court adjudication was contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court

case law, either because the state court failed to apply the proper Supreme Court

precedent, or because the state court reached a different conclusion based on

substantially similar facts. If the state court’s decision is not contrary to law, the

reviewing court must then determine whether the state court unreasonably

applied the relevant Supreme Court authority. The state court decision must

stand unless it is not debatable among reasonable jurists that the result of which

petitioner complains is incorrect.”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1075, 119 S.Ct.

811, 142 L.Ed.2d 671 (1999); see Bottoson, supra, 234 F.3d at 531 (11th Cir.

2000) (“In addition, a state court decision involves an unreasonable application

of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state court either unreasonably extends a

legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should

not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.’”). 

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83

12. Recently, the Eleventh Circuit has restated those instances when

state courts will be determined to have unreasonably applied precedent of the

Supreme Court:

A state court conducts an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law if it identifies the correct legal

rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that

rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case. An unreasonable

application may also occur if a state court unreasonably extends,

or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from

Supreme Court law to a new context. Notably, an “unreasonable

application” is an “objectively unreasonable” application.

Putman, supra, 268 F.3d at 1241 (internal citations omitted). “[I]n the habeas

context, clearly established federal law ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the

dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state

court decision.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

13. In this case, Alabama’s state trial court and intermediate appellate

court, in separate decisions, reached the merits of petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. The undersigned notes

generally that though petitioner has established that the Alabama courts did not

recognize all of the correct governing principles from the Supreme Court’s

decisions, specifically the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of

counsel test, it did correctly recognize the governing principle regarding the

deficiency prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard and, in this

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regard, the state court decisions’ are neither “contrary to” Supreme Court

precedent nor did the Alabama courts unreasonably apply that specific principle

to the facts in this case.

14. Once a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, he waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to the conviction’s constitutionality and only an attack

on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can be raised. See McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).

Stated differently, “a voluntary and intelligent plea made by an accused person,

who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.”

Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-2547, 81 L.Ed.2d

437 (1984) (emphasis supplied).

15. “In order for a guilty plea to be entered knowingly and

intelligently, the defendant must have not only the mental competence to

understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his plea but he also

must be reasonably informed of the charges against him, the factual basis

underlying those charges, and the legal options and alternatives that are

available.” LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 751 (11th Cir.) (citations

omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S.Ct. 397, 102 L.Ed.2d 386 (1988);

see also Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (11th Cir.) (“A reviewing

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federal court may set aside a state court guilty plea only for failure to satisfy

due process: If a defendant understands the charges against him, understands the

consequences of a guilty plea, and voluntarily chooses to plead guilty, without

being coerced, the guilty plea . . . will be upheld on federal review.”), cert.

denied sub nom. Stano v. Singletary, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 116, 116

L.Ed.2d 85 (1991), remanded on other grounds, 952 F.2d 1273 (11th Cir.

1992).

16. The defendant must have full knowledge of the consequences of

entering a plea of guilty to the charge to withstand challenge under the Due

Process Clause, see Mabry, supra, 467 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 2547, as a plea

of guilty is a waiver of several constitutional rights, including the privilege

against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and

the right to insist on a jury trial and to confront one’s accusers guaranteed by the

Sixth Amendment, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712,

23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). “Boykin stands for the proposition that a defendant is

constitutionally entitled to have information concerning the range of punishment

prescribed by act to which he may be sentenced and the consequences of the

conviction at the time he enters his plea.” Coleman v. Alabama, 827 F.2d

1469, 1473 (11th Cir. 1987).

17. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

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24 “When analyzing ineffective-assistance claims, reviewing courts must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance.” 

Smith v. Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

86

petitioner is required to show (1) that his attorney’s representation fell below

“an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that a reasonable probability

exists that but for counsel’s unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Strickland v. Washington standard for

evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was held applicable to

guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d

203 (1985). 

To succeed on such a claim, “the defendant must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning

as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).24 In addition, the

defendant must establish that “counsel’s constitutionally

ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea

process.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370. In other words,

. . . [a petitioner] “must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would . . . have pleaded [not]

guilty and would . . . have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474

U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370.

Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995) (footnote, brackets

and ellipses added), cert. denied sub nom. Coulter v. Jones, 516 U.S. 1122,

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116 S.Ct. 934, 133 L.Ed.2d 860 (1996). 

18. Here, the state courts correctly identified Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) as

controlling legal authority, but failed to recognize that Hill v. Lockhart, supra,

made Strickland applicable to guilty plea proceedings. Strickland and Hill are

identical regarding the first prong or deficiency prong of the legal standard but

the analysis is slightly different regarding the prejudice prong; therefore, the

State courts’ analysis cannot be found to be “contrary to” controlling Supreme

Court precedent to the extent the analysis rises and falls on the first prong of

Strickland and Hill, see Williams v. Taylor, supra, 529 U.S. at 405 & 406, 120

S.Ct. at 1519 & 1520 (“The word ‘contrary’ is commonly understood to mean

‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or nature,’ or ‘mutually

opposed.’ . . . [A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal

rule from our cases to the facts of a prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably

within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause. Assume, for example, that a statecourt decision on a prisoner’s ineffective-assistance claim correctly identifies

Strickland as the controlling legal authority and, applying that framework,

rejects the prisoner’s claim. Quite clearly, the state-court decision would be in

accord with our decision in Strickland as to the legal prerequisites for

establishing an ineffective-assistance claim, even assuming the federal court

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considering the prisoner’s habeas application might reach a different result

applying the Strickland framework itself. It is difficult, however, to describe

such a run-of-the-mill state-court decision as ‘diametrically different’ from,

‘opposite in character or nature’ from, or ‘mutually opposed’ to Strickland, our

clearly established precedent. Although the state-court decision may be contrary

to the federal court’s conception of how Strickland ought to be applied in that

particular case, the decision is not ‘mutually opposed’ to Strickland itself.”);

Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A state court’s

decision that applies the correct legal rule would not fit within the ‘contrary to’

clause even if the federal court might have reached a different result relying on

the same law. . . . In this case, the state court, by correctly identifying Strickland

as the controlling legal authority on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,

did not reach an opposite conclusion from the Supreme Court on a question of

law.”), but is technically “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent to the extent

the state courts’ analyses rises and falls on the prejudice prong of Strickland

since the proper prejudice analysis is set forth in Hill. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, petitioner has not and cannot establish that the Alabama

courts unreasonably applied the “deficiency” principle to the facts in this case,

Williams v. Taylor, supra, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522 (“Under §

2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, then, a federal habeas court may

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not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.”); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25, 123 S.Ct.

357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (“[I]t is the habeas applicant’s burden to show

that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively

unreasonable manner. An ‘unreasonable application of federal law is different

from an incorrect application of federal law.’”), but has, again, technically

established that the “prejudice” prong was unreasonably applied to the facts of

this case. Moreover, the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals is

quite cursory and, therefore, this Court looks at each specific instance of

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel alleged and considers

whether any of those claims have merit.

19. Weed contends in the present petition, as he contended in the

state courts, that trial counsel committed the following errors: (1) he failed to

reserve the right to appeal the recusal issue; (2) he waived petitioner’s right to

a bifurcated trial on the competency issue and to petitioner’s presence at the

recusal hearing; (3) he did not sufficiently confer with petitioner prior to trial

because he at no time met with petitioner to discuss the case when an interpreter

was present; (4) he allowed petitioner to plead guilty to a sexual offense even

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though the DNA evidence indicated petitioner could not have committed the

crime; (5) he did not object to or reserve for appeal petitioner’s right to have his

criminal prosecutions assigned to a judge by the usual lottery system; (6) he

failed to confer with petitioner at a location away from the courthouse and did

not reserve this issue on appeal; (7) he failed to request the services of

interpreters in a timely manner; and (8) he did not challenge the constitutionality

of Alabama law regarding the appointment of interpreters for deaf mutes in

criminal prosecutions and/or its failure to satisfy constitutional standards. 

20. White explained during his Rule 32 hearing testimony that he did

not reserve the recusal issue for appeal because he failed to perceive any reason

to take this course of action in light of Weed’s decision to plead guilty to two

of the charges lodged against him. In light of this testimony, and recognizing that

this Court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

a wide range of reasonably professional assistance, the undersigned cannot find

trial counsel deficient for failing to reserve the recusal issue for appeal.

Moreover, petitioner has made no showing whatsoever that had this issue been

reserved for appeal that he would have pled not guilty and insisted on going to

trial. It is clear to the undersigned that it very much behooved Weed to plead

guilty to two of the charges and be sentenced to concurrent life sentences as

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opposed to risking a trial on all three charges and, upon conviction, facing the

distinct possibility of three consecutive life sentences, regardless of the

identity of the presiding judge, given the heinous nature of the facts in this case.

21. Petitioner has not established that trial counsel was deficient in

waiving his right to a bifurcated trial on the competency issue and to his

presence at the recusal hearing. These actions of trial counsel were, in the

undersigned’s opinion, unassailable strategic decisions. White testified at the

Rule 32 hearing that he waived Weed’s presence at the recusal hearing because

of petitioner’s past penchant for outbursts in court; counsel explained that he

felt his only chance for convincing the trial judge to recuse himself was to make

those arguments outside Weed’s presence. When this testimony is combined

with the fact that the court only entertained oral argument on the recusal issue,

and no testimony from any witness, the undersigned cannot find that trial

counsel was deficient in waiving Weed’s presence at the recusal hearing. White

also testified at the Rule 32 hearing that he waived Weed’s right to a bifurcated

trial on the competency issue upon reading the psychological reports and

interpreting the results to establish his client’s competency to stand trial and

receiving an oral communication from Dr. James F. Chudy that he was not going

to be able to be of assistance on the competency issue. Based upon the

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foregoing, it is the undersigned’s opinion that White was not deficient in waiving

a bifurcated trial on the competency issue; the undersigned too has read the

psychological reports and finds that trial counsel correctly concluded that those

reports were not going to establish petitioner’s incompetency to stand trial.

22. Petitioner next contends that trial counsel did not sufficiently

confer with him prior to trial inasmuch as at no time did counsel meet with him

to discuss the case when an interpreter was present. It is clear from trial

counsel’s Rule 32 hearing testimony that he successfully communicated with

Weed prior to trial through written notes and through petitioner’s mother, who

relayed messages back and forth between counsel and petitioner, who was

incarcerated in the county jail. Inasmuch as the record makes clear that

petitioner is capable of communicating not only through sign language but also

through written language, this Court cannot find that White was deficient in

communicating with Weed through written notes when he visited him in jail

prior to his trial. 

23. Weed’s allegation that his trial attorney was ineffective for

allowing him to plead guilty to a sexual offense even though the DNA evidence

indicated that he could not have committed the crime is wholly specious. The

fact that Weed’s DNA was not found on the oral swabs does not establish that

petitioner did not sodomize Ms. Snow inasmuch as, under Alabama law, a

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victim’s testimony alone that a defendant by forcible compulsion placed his

penis in her mouth is sufficient to support a guilty verdict for first-degree

sodomy, and in this case the victim was prepared to give exactly that testimony.

The presence of Weed’s semen on a piece of cardboard in the room where Ms.

Snow was prepared to testify that she was sodomized by petitioner would have

simply been the crowning blow for the prosecution. It is clear from the

evidence, therefore, that White was not deficient in allowing Weed to plead

guilty to first-degree sodomy.

24. Weed next contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to

object to and reserve for appeal his right to have his criminal prosecutions

assigned to a judge by the usual lottery system. This claim is also specious

inasmuch as the record reveals that Weed’s criminal prosecutions were initially

assigned to a judge via the ususal lottery system and that at some point in time

after that assignment took place, Judge Joseph Johnston went to the lotteryassigned judge (or actually the judge who inherited the case from the retired,

lottery-assigned judge) and had the case transferred to his docket. The action of

Judge Johnston in requesting reassignment formed the basis of the motion to

recuse. Because Weed’s criminal cases were initially assigned to a judge by the

usual lottery system, White had no basis to assert the contrary; therefore, trial

counsel was obviously not deficient in this regard.

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25. Petitioner’s contention that trial counsel failed to confer with him

at a location away from the courthouse, and failed to reserve this issue for

appeal, is also specious. White’s Rule 32 hearing testimony unequivocally

establishes that he conferred with Weed at the county jail on several occasions

prior to trial. Because the record establishes that trial counsel conferred with

Weed at a location away from the courthouse, specifically the county jail, trial

counsel had no issue to reserve for appeal. Petitioner has failed to establish trial

counsel’s deficient performance in this regard.

26. Petitioner contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to

request the services of interpreters in a timely manner. The problem with this

argument is that timeliness was not the issue. The trial court granted the request

for services of interpreters the Friday before trial was to start on Monday.

Because petitioner has not shown and cannot show that White or any reasonable

attorney would have appreciated or should have anticipated that one interpreter

would balk at appearing in court because not enough interpreters were going to

show up for the trial or that the interpreter for the defense would voice an

ethical problem with interpreting for Weed any question or argument made by

the State, White was not deficient in any aspect of the way he handled the

request for the services of interpreters.

27. Petitioner’s final argument is that trial counsel was deficient in

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failing to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama law regarding the

appointment of interpreters for deaf mutes in criminal prosecutions and for its

failure to satisfy constitutional standards. This argument is the height of

Monday-morning quarterbacking and this Court will not find White deficient for

failing to make such a challenge to Alabama law particularly when it is clear to

the undersigned that Weed’s case could have been successfully tried to a jury

had the one additional interpreter shown up on the morning of trial, along with

the defense interpreter, and there having been no showing by petitioner that any

federal court, sitting on habeas review, has determined that deaf mute defendants

are entitled to at least three interpreters during the course of their criminal

prosecutions. 

28. Weed also contends that appellate counsel was deficient in the

following respects: (1) he failed to raise trial counsel’s effectiveness on appeal;

(2) he failed to raise the Brady violation on appeal; (3) he failed to raise on

appeal the issue of a due process and equal protection violation; (4) he failed to

raise the issue regarding petitioner’s right to assist in his defense, his right to

know the evidence, his right to evaluate the evidence as a result of being denied

sufficient funds to hire interpreters, and the withholding of exculpatory

evidence; and 5) he failed to raise on appeal the issue of the unconstitutionality

of Alabama law regarding the appointment of interpreters to deaf mutes in

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criminal prosecution and/or its failure to satisfy constitutional standards.

Inasmuch as this Court has specifically determined that trial counsel did not

provide ineffective assistance of counsel, appellate counsel obviously was not

deficient for failing to challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness on appeal nor was

appellate counsel deficient for challenging Alabama law regarding the

appointment of interpreters. 

29. Petitioner’s contention that appellate counsel was deficient in

failing to raise “the Brady violation” on appeal is specious since there was no

Brady violation in this case. As previously determined, petitioner’s trial counsel

was given the forensic test results in this case well in advance of trial and those

results simply did not and do not exculpate Weed of the first-degree sodomy of

Ms. Snow nor would they impeach the victim’s anticipated trial testimony.

Accordingly, appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise this nonissue on appeal. 

30. The foregoing “Brady conclusion” also informs this Court’s

discussion of petitioner’s claim that appellate counsel was deficient in failing

to raise the issue of petitioner’s right to assist in his defense, his right to know

the evidence and his right to evaluate the evidence as a result of being denied

sufficient funds to have interpreters and the withholding of exculpatory

evidence. As aforesaid, the State did not withhold exculpatory evidence. The

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25 In addition, petitioner clearly had the opportunity to evaluate the evidence with his

attorney through written notes.

26 Cf. Phillips v. Miller, 2000 WL 33650803, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he Supreme

Court ‘has yet to recognize the right to a court-appointed interpreter as a constitutional one.’ . . .

Rather, the Supreme Court has stated that the decision of whether or not to appoint an interpreter ‘is a

matter largely resting in the discretion of the trial court.’”)).

97

petitioner, through his attorney, was well aware of the evidence against him and

a defense interpreter was in court on the day Weed’s trial began to assist him in

evaluating that evidence.25 Finally, Weed was not denied sufficient funds to hire

interpreters. In fact, it is clear that the trial court would have authorized funds

for two interpreters to handle petitioner’s trial and because Weed has not shown

that a deaf mute has a constitutional right to have at least three interpreters at his

trial,26 petitioner has no argument in this regard. Accordingly, appellate counsel

was not deficient in failing to raise this convoluted and confusing “issue” on

appeal.

31. Petitioner’s final argument is that appellate counsel was deficient

in failing to raise on appeal the issue of a due process and equal protection

violation as a result of the trial court’s failure to grant him sufficient funds for

interpreters. Of course, as just determined, the trial court did not fail to grant

Weed sufficient funds for interpreters. Moreover, Weed entered counseled

guilty pleas to the charges of first-degree robbery and first-degree sodomy and

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27 The only way this issue could possibly have been viable was for petitioner to have

insisted on a trial and for there to have been insurmountable problems encountered at trial because only

one interpreter would show up for the proceedings.

98

there has never been any argument that the one interpreter used for the guilty

plea proceeding was insufficient. Therefore, appellate counsel did not have a

viable due process and equal protection violation to raise on appeal.27

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge is of the opinion that petitioner’s rights were not

violated in this cause and that his request for habeas corpus relief should be

denied.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 27th day of July, 2005.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and

original records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a

judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will

pay the cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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