Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06324/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06324-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD VARELA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DERRAL ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

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1:03-cv-06324 OWW LJO P

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION (Doc. 40) FOR

RECONSIDERATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER

DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff EDWARD VALERA (“Plaintiff”), a pro se prisoner,

moves for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s “Order

Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Stay of

Proceedings, and Requiring Plaintiff to File a Response to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Within Thirty Days” (Doc. 38,

“Magistrate Judge’s Order”)

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s allegation that he was

injured when thrown from a “golf cart type vehicle” while being

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transported from the Central Treatment Clinic to the California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility - State Prison (“CSATF-SP”) in

Corcoran, California, on November 9, 2001. (Doc. 16, First Am.

Compl. 1:22-23, 2:19-27) Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, moved for

appointment of counsel on June 3, 2005. (Doc. 37) Plaintiff

also requested a stay of proceedings. The magistrate judge

denied Plaintiff’s request for counsel and his request for a stay

and ordered Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

within thirty (30) days of service of the order. On July 25,

2005, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the order denying

his appointment of counsel. (Doc. 40) 

III. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Local Rule (“LR”) 72-303(f), a district court

applies the following standard in reconsidering a magistrate

court’s decision:

The standard that the assigned Judge shall use in all

such requests is the “clearly erroneous or contrary to

law” standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

LR 72-303(f) (emphasis added).

Section 636(b)(1)(A) sets forth the standard of review as

follows:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the

contrary...a judge may designate a magistrate [judge]

to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending

before the court, except a motion for injunctive

relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary

judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or

information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence

in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance

of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a

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claim upon which relief can be granted, and to

involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court

may reconsider any pretrial matter under this

subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the

magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) also sets forth the standard for a

district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s order: “The

district judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider [a

party’s] objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of

the magistrate judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.” Id. (emphasis added).

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action. Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir.

1997). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) allows a district court

to request an attorney to voluntarily represent a prisoner who is

unable to afford counsel in “exceptional circumstances.” Id.;

see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 

“To decide whether these exceptional circumstances exist, a

district court must evaluate ‘both the likelihood of success on

the merits [and] the ability of the petitioner to articulate his

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues

involved.’” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (quoting Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Having carefully reviewed the file and having considered

Plaintiff’s objections, the Court concludes that the magistrate

judge’s order denying appointment of counsel is not clearly

erroneous or contrary to law. First, despite his claims of

“‘brain damage’ from head injuries, drugs, and hearing voices,”

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Plaintiff has not submitted any corroborating evidence to justify

an evidentiary hearing, nor is there any indication Plaintiff

cannot adequately articulate his claims for violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Both Plaintiff’s original complaint and the

operative First Amended Complaint adequately describes the events

of November 9, 2001 that give rise to his claim. Plaintiff seems

to have had no trouble prosecuting another case he filed in this

court pro se. (Valera v. Calderon, et al., Case No. 1:01-05344

HGB) Second, the magistrate judge’s finding that it is too early

in the proceedings to determine whether he is likely to succeed

on the merits is also not clearly erroneous.

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration (Doc. 40) is DENIED. 

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 15___, 2005. 

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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