Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05156/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-05156-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The fiduciary shield doctrine provides that “a person’s mere association with a corporation that

causes injury in the forum state is not sufficient in itself to permit that forum to assert jurisdiction over

the person.” Davis v. Metro Prod., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989). It is not clear that this

doctrine still has force in the Ninth Circuit. See Kukui Gardens Corporation v. Holco Capital Group,

Inc., No-08-00049, 2008 WL 6965851, at *5 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2008). 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLINGLET, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AMBER ALERT SAFETY CENTERS, INC.,

KAI D. PATTERSON, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-05156 SI

ORDER

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court found defendant Kai Patterson’s Rule 12(b)(2)

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction appropriate for resolution without oral argument.

Having considered the papers submitted, and for good cause shown, the Court DENIES the motion.

Patterson asserts that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him based on the fiduciary shield

doctrine, because at all times relevant to this action he acted in his capacity as an officer of a corporation

and on behalf of Amber Alert, and his only contacts with California were in that capacity.1 However,

the Supreme Court determined in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) that to establish personal

jurisdiction, courts do not look to the defendant’s status as a corporate officer, but rather individually

assess each defendant’s contact with the forum state regardless of whether that defendant was acting in

his or her official capacity. Therefore this Court need only apply the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test for

determining specific jurisdiction over Patterson: purposeful availment, causation, and reasonableness.

Case 3:09-cv-05156-SI Document 26 Filed 02/06/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Using these tests, the Court clearly has specific jurisdiction over Patterson.

Patterson’s actions, while apparently carried out on behalf of Amber Alert, were directly related

to the dispute before this court. According to the complaint, Patterson made fraudulent promises and

assurances to induce plaintiff to create an application which defendants then reverse-engineered and

subsequently terminated its agreement with plaintiff while never providing proper compensation.

Compl. ¶ 67. Patterson signed the letter of intent setting forth the terms of the parties’ agreement on

behalf of Amber Alert, which specified ownership over copyrighted material developed by each

company. Compl. ¶ 25. The complaint asserts that Patterson represented to his investors that Amber

Ready had developed the software without reference to Blinglet, and that he took concrete steps to

prevent plaintiff from capturing the portion of revenues to which it was contractually entitled based

upon the number of mobile downloads. Compl. ¶ 61-62. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that Patterson sent

a new Memorandum of Understanding to plaintiff after the business relationship deteriorated, after

which plaintiff began to believe that the code of the software had been reverse-engineered. Compl. ¶

63, 67. Plaintiff maintains that Patterson’s fraudulent promises were meant to “absorb the time and cost

necessary to develop and implement the mobile application” without ever intending to properly

compensate the plaintiff for its work. Compl. ¶ 95. 

Taking plaintiff’s complaint at face value, although Patterson did not come to California during

the relevant time, there are sufficient facts which demonstrate purposeful availment and causation, since

the claims arise directly from Patterson’s forum-related activities. Further, assertion of jurisdiction is

reasonable under the tests set out in Bancroft & Masters Inc. V. Augusta Nat. Inc, 223 F.3d 1082, 1088

(citing Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

(Docket No. 3)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-05156-SI Document 26 Filed 02/06/10 Page 2 of 2