Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04711/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04711-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA A. DEMELLO

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant. /

No. C-06-4711 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Motion for Summary

Judgment

Plaintiff Cynthia A. Demello seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), of

the Commissioner of Social Security’s finding that plaintiff is not due benefits for her alleged

incapacity to work. Now before the court are plaintiff’s appeal of that decision and her motion for

summary judgment and defendant’s motion to remand.. This action was deemed submitted on the

papers. Having considered the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court

enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND1

I. Factual History

Plaintiff was severely injured on July 21, 2002 while cleaning her hot tub. Thereafter,

plaintiff began walking with a cane or walker and was taking various prescription medications,

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including Vicodin, anti-inflammatory medication, Paxil and Valium. She continued working for the

Sheriff’s Department for about a month after her fall before seeing a nurse practitioner at Kaiser

Permanente, who suggested that she take time off of work. Plaintiff returned to work and worked

half-days in January 2003. However, due to her medical issues, she was only able to continue

working until February 2003. 

On July 2, 2003, after numerous medical evaluations, plaintiff underwent lower back

surgery. Medical records indicate that plaintiff continued to suffer chronic lower back pain several

months after the surgery. In March 2004 plaintiff was granted disability retirement from the

Alameda County Sheriff’s Department. On December 2, 2004 plaintiff underwent a total left knee

replacement. Afterwards, medical records indicate that plaintiff’s knee pain persisted through at

least January 2, 2006. 

In an evaluation dated January 31, 2006, Dr. Wilcox of Kaiser Permanente Physical

Medicine and Rehabilitation found that plaintiff could not stand or sit for more than ten minutes at a

time.2

 Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Lim-Young confirmed in a letter dated March 30, 2006 that

plaintiff was unable to stand or sit long enough to maintain employment and the failed back surgery

left her permanently disabled. Additionally, plaintiff must lie down for a significant portion of the

afternoon and evening and is awakened by pain between ten and twenty times per night. 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff originally filed for social security benefits on September 25, 2003, and her request

was subsequently denied. That decision became final when the Appeals Council declined to review

a denial by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 30, 2006. Plaintiff timely filed for

review of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) proceedings with this court.

Before the ALJ, plaintiff testified to the facts described above. The testimony of plaintiff’s

domestic partner, Sharon Tamala, corroborated that of plaintiff. Tamala added that she had lived

with plaintiff for over twenty years and that plaintiff had been forced to significantly curtail her

physical activities after suffering the injuries at issue. Tamala further testified that the injuries and

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resulting pain have seriously altered hers and plaintiff’s lifestyles. The parties agree that the ALJ

discounted plaintiff’s testimony without specific, cogent reasons elucidated for doing so. 

Additionally, the ALJ simply failed to consider Tamala’s testimony in his denial of plaintiff’s

request for benefits. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party

will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all [claims] or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

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matters stated therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

In the context of social security hearings, failure to provide specific, cogent reasons for

discounting a witness’ testimony is reversible error. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th

Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2001). Such improperly discounted

evidence is “credited as a matter of law.” Moses v. Barnhart, 33 Fed. Appx. 888, 890 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)). This court has discretion to

remand such a case for either further development of the record or to remand for an award of

benefits. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). Remanding for an award of

benefits is proper where “(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting

such evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of

disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find that

claimant disabled were such evidence credited.” Id.; see also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887

(9th Cir. 2004); Schneider v. Commissioner, 223 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2000). Put simply, “We

may direct an award of benefits where the record has been fully developed and where further

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

The parties agree that the ALJ committed legal error in rejecting plaintiff’s testimony

without supplying specific, cogent reasons for discrediting the evidence. Plaintiff urges the court to

credit that evidence as a matter of law. Plaintiff further argues that crediting this testimony leaves

no issue for further determination by the ALJ. 

Both parties acknowledge the inconsistency in the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity is extremely limited but that she remains capable of performing her past relevant

work. However, the parties differ on how the court should reconcile these mutually exclusive

findings. Plaintiff would have the court affirm the ALJ’s finding regarding plaintiff’s limited

residual function capacity. Plaintiff also asks the court to reverse the ALJ’s finding that she can

perform her past relevant work due to an absence of substantial evidence in support thereof. Doing

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so would lead to plaintiff’s preferred remedy: remand to the ALJ with orders to calculate the

benefits that plaintiff is due. Defendant, however, asks the court to remand to the ALJ for further

evaluation of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. 

Absent specific, cogent reasons for discounting them, both the testimony of plaintiff and her

domestic partner are credited as a matter of law. See Moses, 33 Fed. Appx. at 890; Lester, 81 F.3d

at 834. That being so, there is no issue left for further adjudication. The evidence, including the

testimonies of plaintiff and Tamala, unequivocally establishes plaintiff’s difficulties engaging in

even the slightest physical exertion. Even viewing plaintiff’s extreme physical limitations in the

light most favorable to defendant, there is no question that plaintiff is entirely incapable of

performing her past relevant work. Defendant, rather than rebutting these facts, asks the court for

the opportunity to do so at further hearings before the ALJ. The court is confident that further

proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, defendant’s motion to

remand is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and this case is remanded for the calculation

and award of benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 30, 2007 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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1. All facts are taken from Pl.’s Mot., unless otherwise indicated.

2. The court notes that plaintiff testified that she can sit for twenty minutes at a time, somewhat

contradicting the letter from her physician. However, this difference is negligible in that,

whether capable of sitting for ten or twenty minutes at a time, the result is clear: plaintiff’s

ability to work is severely impacted. 

ENDNOTES

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