Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01001/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01001-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYLAND TO, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden, 

Respondent.

 

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No. C 05-1001 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, currently incarcerated at the 

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California, filed a habeas corpus petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the Board of Prison Terms’ (“BPT”) denial of

parole during parole suitability proceedings in 2004. This Court ordered Respondent to

show cause why a writ should not issue. After this Court denied Respondent’s motion to

dismiss the petition, Respondent filed an answer, memorandum and exhibits in support

thereof. Petitioner has not filed a traverse. This pro se habeas petition is now before the

Court for consideration of the merits. For the reasons stated below, the petition is denied

on the merits.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in Alameda County Superior

Court in 1986 and was sentenced to fifteen years-to-life in state prison. In this habeas

action, Petitioner does not challenge his conviction, but instead alleges that his due

process rights were violated by the denial of parole during his subsequent parole

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suitability hearing on May 26, 2004. Petitioner received a one year denial of parole at that

proceeding. Petitioner’s minimum parole eligibility date was March 29, 1995. 

At the May 26, 2004 hearing, Petitioner appeared with counsel before a BPT panel

for a subsequent parole consideration hearing. At the hearing, the Board relied upon the

Statement of Facts in the BPT’s July, 2003 report regarding Petitioner’s commitment

offense. Petitioner testified that the statement was an accurate reflection of what

happened, and the Court includes that summary here: 

About two months before the commitment offense, the prisoner met a man

named Ming Tran, age 22 [who] had a car and some money. At age 16, I’m

sorry, To, age 16, and his co-participant, Henry Ho, age 15, and Chi, age 18,

had been with Tran continuously for three or four days, driving around and

playing video games, cards and ping-pong. On the evening before the

commitment offense, on 1/4 of ‘86, Tran rented a hotel room in Oakland. 

Tran told the others that he was out of money since he had spent it all on

them. He told the others that they now had to help him out by doing [a]

robbery. They drove around and spotted Feng Yen, Restaurant in Albany. 

Tran went into the restaurant briefly, came out and said that it was quiet,

and directed the other three to go in and rob the establishment. The three

others entered the restaurant and ordered a meal. When they were nearly

through eating, Tran came out, came back in and indicated that he, that they

should start the robbery. At that point, the group took various positions in

the restaurant. All of the customers and workers were gathered and placed

in the back of the restaurant. Ho then shot the victim, a waiter, killing him,

apparently without provocation. Chi was armed with a knife and To had a

gun. The victim apparently died from the gunshot wound. 

(See Answer, Ex. 2 at 7:19-8:20). 

The BPT found that Petitioner was not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety. The presiding

Commissioner explained that, in deciding to deny parole, the panel considered Petitioner’s

commitment offense, prior criminal and social history, his programming and behavior

since commitment, including progress made and a new disciplinary finding since

Petitioner’s last hearing, and his parole plans. 

Petitioner challenged the BPT’s May 26, 2004 decision in the state superior,

appellate and supreme courts. The Alameda County Superior Court issued the last

reasoned opinion denying Petitioner’s claims. After the Supreme Court of California

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summarily denied his final state habeas petition on December 15, 2004, Petitioner filed

the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The parties do not dispute that

state judicial remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in this petition.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state

prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, this court may entertain a petition for habeas

relief on behalf of a California state inmate “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a).

The writ may not be granted unless the state court’s adjudication of any claim on

the merits: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

Id. at § 2254(d). Under this deferential standard, federal habeas relief will not be granted

“simply because [this] court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

While circuit law may provide persuasive authority in determining whether the

state court made an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the only

definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

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decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Legal Claims and Analysis

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief from the BPT’s May 26 2004 decision

finding him not suitable for parole, and denying him a subsequent hearing for one year, on

the ground that the decision does not comport with due process. Petitioner claims that the

BPT’s decision is not supported by some evidence in the record having an “indicia of

reliability” that Petitioner is currently a threat or unreasonable risk to society. See Petition

at 5. Petitioner also claims that the BPT possesses an “Anti-Parole Policy” which is

systemically biased, in violation of his constitutional rights. Because Petitioner’s petition

will not be granted here, Petitioner’s argument that the case should not be remanded to the

Governor for review, is moot and will not be addressed. 

California’s parole scheme provides that the board “shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a

parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). In

making this determination, the board considers various factors, including the prisoner’s

social history, past criminal history, and base and other commitment offenses, including

behavior before, during and after the crime. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(b) – (d). 

California's parole scheme “gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole” which cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process protections. 

Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The determination does not depend on

whether a parole release date has ever been set for the inmate because “[t]he liberty

interest is created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s due process rights require that “some evidence” support the parole

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board’s decision finding him unsuitable for parole. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 (holding that

the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), applies to parole decisions in § 2254 habeas petition);

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (same); McQuillion, 306 F.2d at 904 (same). The Ninth Circuit

has recently clarified that “California courts have made clear that the “findings that are

necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole are not that a particular factor or factors

indicating unsuitability exist, but that a prisoner’s release will unreasonably endanger

public safety.” Hayward v. Marshall, No. 06-55392, slip op. at *49 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2008)

(citations omitted). The relevant criteria under which the BPT ordinarily determines

whether a prisoner is too dangerous to be found suitable for parole are set forth in the

California Code of Regulations at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402. Id. This Court must

therefore determine whether the state court decision finding the BPT’s decision was

supported by “some evidence the parolee’s release unreasonably endangers public

safety.” Id. (citation omitted.)

The “some evidence” standard is minimally stringent and ensures that “the record

is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of [the BPT] were without support or

otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. Determining whether this requirement is

satisfied “does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455-56 (quoted in Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128). 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board’s decision

have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

Relevant in this inquiry “is whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear

before, and present evidence to, the board.” Morales v. California Dep't of Corrections,

16 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). In sum,

if the parole board’s determination of parole unsuitability is to satisfy due process, there

must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v.

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Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record shows that the BPT panel afforded Petitioner and his counsel an

opportunity to speak and present their case at the hearing, gave them time to review

Petitioner’s central file, allowed them to present relevant documents and provided them

with a reasoned decision in denying parole. The panel concluded that Petitioner “is not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if released from prison.” May 26, 2004 Hearing Transcript at 38 (Answer

Ex. 2 at 38:10-12). The panel explained that it found that the offense involved “multiple

victims” and that the “offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner.”

Id. at 38:16-20. The panel also found that Petitioner had “an unstable social history and

prior criminality.” Id. at 39:11-12. Petitioner’s prior juvenile record included convictions

for burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, and trespass. The panel further found that

Petitioner had failed to profit from society's previous attempts to correct his criminality,

which included juvenile probation. Id. at 39:18-20.

The panel found that Petitioner had “failed to demonstrate evidence of positive

change. Misconduct while incarcerated includes one 115.” Id. at 39:20-23. Petitioner’s

most recent disciplinary finding occurred on October 28, 2003, seven months before the

hearing and involved possession of contraband. Id. at 39:23-25. Petitioner’s Life

Prisoner Evaluation Report notes that Petitioner’s disciplinary finding involved possession

of an electronic circuit board, resulting in a ten day loss of privileges. See Exhibit 3 in

Support of Answer, Life Prisoner: Postconviction Progress Report Addendum at 3. 

The panel further found that Petitioner needed to update his parole plans. Id. at

39:25-26, to provide more specific information regarding where he will reside and

establishing that a job was available to him upon his release. The panel commended

Petitioner for all of the positive things he has done while in prison, including participating

in self-help, including a five week introduction to stress and anger management, a sixweek course called Amer-I-Can, an eight week time and money management program, an

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eight week ethics and values class, a 26 week Alcoholics Anonymous 12-Step and 12-

Traditions, a 15 week Science of the Mind Foundation class, and a disease prevention

course. Id. at 40:20-41:10. The panel noted that Petitioner has a vocational certificate for

watch repair and has participated in machine shop and silk-screen.

The panel found, however, that “these positive aspects of his behavior, do not

outweigh his factors for unsuitability.” Id. at 41:13-15. The panel recommended that 

Petitioner “remain disciplinary-free, continue to participate in any self-help, and cooperate

with clinicians in the completion of a new clinical evaluation before the next hearing. Id.

at 4162:15-19. 

The state superior court reviewed and considered the decision of the BPT and

found that “there was certainly some evidence including, but not limited to, the

committing offense and Petitioner’s disciplinary record, to support the Board’s decision. 

There is nothing in the record that indicates that . . .Petitioner’s equal protection or due

process rights were violated.” See Exhibit 6 in Support of Answer. The California Court

of Appeal summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petition and the California Supreme

summarily denied his petition for review. 

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner's due process claim was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, the Hill standard, nor was it based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The BPT’s May 26, 2004 decision

to deny Petitioner parole is supported by some evidence in the record and that evidence

bears some indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232-33 (upholding denial

of parole based on gravity of offense and psychiatric reports); Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916

(upholding denial of parole based solely on gravity of offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment); Morales, 16 F.3d at 1005 (upholding denial of parole based on criminal

history, cruel nature of offense, and need for further psychiatric treatment). The inquiry

under Hill is simply “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion reached by the [BPT].” Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). In this

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case, there is evidence that the crime involved multiple victims (the decedent, as well as

other restaurant staff and patrons), which under California law suffices to show that the

crime was conducted in a cruel manner. The panel also found that the crime was

committed in a dispassionate and calculated manner. Petitioner was also found to have an

unstable social history and prior criminality . Cf. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) & (d)

(listing circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole and circumstances tending

to show suitability). Under California law, these are appropriate factors to consider in

determining whether Petitioner poses an unreasonable risk to public safety, and this Court

finds that the Alameda Superior Court’s determination that there was some evidence to

support the BPT’s decision is not contrary to established Supreme Court precedent. It is

not up to this Court to “reweigh the evidence.” Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir.

1994). However, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, continued reliance on the unchanging

factors of Petitioner’s commitment offense and prior history will “at some point violate

due process” unless the unchanging circumstances reliably establish that Petitioner

presents an unreasonably public safety risk. See, Hayward, slip op. at *53 (citing Irons).

Petitioner further argues that the BPT possesses an “Anti-Parole Policy” that is

biased and violates his constitutional rights. None of the state courts to consider

Petitioner’s claims explicitly ruled on this claim. Therefore, this Court now conducts “an

independent review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Plascencia v. Alameda, 467

F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner has set forth no evidentiary support for his bias claim. But even if he

had, there is no evidence in the record indicating that this alleged bias affected the BPT’s

decision or served as the basis for denying Petitioner parole. To the contrary, the

transcript from Petitioner’s May 26, 2004 parole hearing demonstrates that he received an

individualized assessment of his potential parole suitability. Petitioner’s reliance on the

high percentage of parole denials for life inmates provides no proof of the BPT’s alleged

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bias against parole. Cf. California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510-11

(1995) (citing that 90 percent of all California inmates are found unsuitable for parole as

evidence that deferring annual parole suitability hearings was lawful and reasonable) . 

The state courts' rejection of Petitioner's claims cannot be said to be objectively

unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 25, 2008 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10

TO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PEREZ et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-01001 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on January 25, 2008, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Brian G. Walsh

Elizabeth S. Kim

State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Wayland To

D48864

P.O. 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: January 25, 2008

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

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