Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00802/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00802-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

A.K. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-00802-YNP PC

ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS

(Doc. 27)

Plaintiff Bobby Lee (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and is currently incarcerated at the

California State Prison in Lancaster, California. However, the events described in Plaintiff’s

complaint took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the California State Prison in Corcoran,

California (“CSP-Corcoran”). Plaintiff is suing under section 1983 for the violation of his rights

under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff names A.K. Scribner (warden), D. Ortiz

(associate warden), R. Beceara (counselor),M.C.Poulos(associatewarden), Stockman (chief deputy

warden), L. C. Chrones (chief deputy warden), Carriedo (counselor), Spriester (counselor), Mears

(counselor), Cordero (counselor), and Wagner (doctor) as defendants. Plaintiff has consented to

jurisdiction by U.S. Magistrate Judge and no other parties have made an appearance in this action.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint

states some cognizable claims. Plaintiff’s remaining claims will be dismissed without leave to

amend.

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I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Background

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on June 20, 2005. (Doc. #1.) On

November 19, 2007, Plaintiff’s original complaint was screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

(Doc. #16.) The Court found that Plaintiff’s original complaint failed to state any cognizable claims

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against any defendant. Plaintiff was given leave to file an amended complaint which cured the

deficiencies identified in the screening order. Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on

December 27, 2007. (Doc. #20.) On May 1, 2009, the Court screened Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint. The Court noted that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint did not complywith the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and failed to state any claims upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff

was given another opportunity to amend his complaint. On June 1, 2009, Plaintiff filed his second

amended complaint. (Doc. #27.) This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint.

B. Factual Background

On June 23, 2003, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP-Corcoran and housed in the secured

housing unit (“SHU”). Plaintiff was placed in the SHU based on Plaintiff’s possible participation

in an assault on a staff member at Salinas Valley State Prison.

On June 24, 2003, MTA Oneil was passing out medication. Plaintiff explained that he has

prescribed medication, Remron and Prozac, but Oneil ignored him.

On July 3, 2003, Plaintiff appeared before the “IV-B SHU ICC.” Plaintiff informed the

committee that he was being deprived of his medication “for retaliation from correctional officers.” 

From July to August 2003, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Wagner about being denied his

medication. Wagner failed to take the necessary steps to get Plaintiff back on his medication.

On August 15, 2003, Plaintiff spoke with an unidentified doctor about his medication.

Plaintiff told the doctor that the deprivation of his medications “was causing Plaintiff excruciating

side affects[sic] and driving him crazy.” Plaintiff complained that he was housed in a building which

was not fit for inmates with mental health needs. Plaintiff also complained about a loss in body

weight and that staff members were retaliating against him. The doctor informed Plaintiff that he

would look into the matter. The doctor returned later and arranged Plaintiff to be rehoused in

another building so that he could receive his prescribed medication.

III. Discussion

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wagner and Cordero violated Plaintiff’s rights under the

Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual

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punishments and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity

and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d

571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two

requirements are met: (1) the objective requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious”,

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991),

and (2) the subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind”,

Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). The objective requirement that the deprivation be

“sufficiently serious” is met where the prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities”. Id. (quotingRhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981)). The subjective requirement that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind” is met where the prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. 

Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when

he/she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”. Id. at 837. “[T]he

official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wagner violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment by ignoring Plaintiff’s requests for medication. “[D]eliberate indifference to a

prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on deficient medical treatment, a plaintiff must

show: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) a deliberately indifferent response by the defendant. Conn

v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096

(9th Cir. 2006)). A serious medical need is shown by alleging that the failure to treat the plaintiff’s

condition could result in furthersignificant injury, or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 

Id. A deliberately indifferent response by the defendant is shown by a purposeful act or failure to

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Id. In

order to constitute deliberate indifference, there must be an objective risk of harm and the defendant

must have subjective awareness of that harm. Id.

///

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Plaintiff alleges that Wagner knew that prison officials were not giving Plaintiff his

medication. Plaintiff further alleges that the denial of his medication caused excruciating side effects

and drove him crazy. Plaintiff claims that Wagner did nothing to address Plaintiff’s concerns. 

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendant Wagner for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s

medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Cordero violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment by arranging to have Plaintiff transferred back to Salinas Valley State Prison where the

alleged assault against a staff member occurred. Plaintiff claims that this was done for retaliatory

reasons and placed Plaintiff’s life in danger. Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why being sent

back to Salinas Valley State Prison placed his life in danger. Plaintiff does not allege where the

danger came from--whetherit was from prison staff members who threatened Plaintiff’s life, or from

other inmates who threatened Plaintiff’s life. Plaintiff alleges that prison staff at Salinas ValleyState

Prison falsely accused Plaintiff of stabbing a staff member. Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegation as

true, it is unclear how Plaintiff’s life would be in danger if Plaintiff were to be sent back. Being

falsely accused of an assault is not “life threatening” in any obvious way and there is no indication

that Plaintiff would be falsely accused again if he were sent back to Salinas Valley State Prison. 

Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he was actually transferred back to Salinas ValleyState Prison. 

Plaintiff only alleges that arrangements were being made. Thus, Plaintiff’s life was never actually

placed in danger. Plaintiff fails to state any claims against Defendant Cordero for the violation of

Plaintiffs rights under the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff claims that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated when he was

placed in the SHU at CSP-Corcoran. Plaintiff fails to provide any allegations that demonstrate that

being placed in the SHU at CSP-Corcoran rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment under

the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff does not describe the conditions in the SHU at all. Prison

conditions only rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment if they amount to the deprivation

of adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or personal safety. See Toussaint v.

McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff must allege that he was denied “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that being

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housed in the SHU can be equated to the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 

Further, Plaintiff does not identifywhich Defendants placed him in the SHU and does not allege that

those Defendants acted with deliberate indifference by purposefully ignoring a known risk to

Plaintiff’s health or safety. Plaintiff fails to state any claims under the Eighth Amendment based on

his placement in the SHU at CSP-Corcoran.

Plaintiff was given the legal standards for stating Eighth Amendment claims in the Court’s

previous screening order. (Order Dismissing First Am. Compl. With Leave to Amend 10:7-12:23.) 

Plaintiff was also specifically informed of the deficiencies in his claims against Defendant Cordero. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint has done nothing to meaningfully address the deficiencies identified

by the Court. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are not capable of

being remedied by granting any further leave to amend.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Cordero violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment by arranging to have Plaintiff transferred back to Salinas Valley State Prison where the

alleged assault against a staff member occurred. Plaintiff claims that his rights under the Due

Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were violated by Defendant Cordero.

1. Due Process Claims

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for

which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or

from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Liberty interests created by state law

are generally limited to freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(1995). In determining whether a hardship is sufficiently significant enough to warrant due process

protection, the Court looks to (1) whether the challenged condition mirrored those conditions

imposed upon inmates imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody

and is thus within the prison’s discretionary authority to impose, (2) the duration of the condition and

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the degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state’s action will invariable affect the duration

of the prisoner’s sentence. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff fails to identify any protected liberty interest that he was deprived of. Plaintiff has

not alleged any facts that suggest he has a liberty interest in not being housed at Salinas Valley State

Prison. In order to rise to the level of a protected liberty interest, Plaintiff must allege facts that

demonstrate that transfer to Salinas ValleyState Prison would amount to an “atypical and significant

hardship” when compared to the ordinaryincidents of prison life. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.

209, 221-224 (2005) (finding liberty interest in avoiding transfer to state’s supermax prison because

conditions imposed an atypical and significant hardship). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that

demonstrate that prison life in Salinas Valley State Prison would be substantially different from

prison life in any other prison. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he was actually transferred to

Salinas Valley State Prison. Plaintiff is not entitled to any procedural protections under the Due

Process Clause that protect Plaintiff from prison officials “making arrangements” to transfer Plaintiff

to another prison. To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a liberty interest in personal safety, his

claim is more appropriately raised under the Eighth Amendment. See discussion supra Part III.A.

Plaintiff was given the appropriate legal standards for stating Fourteenth Amendment due

process claims in the Court’s prior screening order. (Order Dismissing First Am. Compl. With

Leave to Amend 6:5-9:4.) Plaintiff was specifically informed that he has no liberty interest in

staying at the prison of his choice. Plaintiff’s amended complaint has done nothing to meaningfully

address that deficiency. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s due process claims are not capable of being

remedied by granting further leave to amend.

2. Equal Protection Claims

Plaintiff also claims his rights under the Equal Protection Clause were violated. The Equal

Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne

v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A plaintiff may establish an equal

protection claim by showing that the plaintiff was intentionally discriminated against on the basis

of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d

668, 686 (9th Cir.2001). Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the

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defendants’ actions were a result of the plaintiff's membership in a suspect class, such as race.

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.2005). If the action in question does

not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish an equal protection claim by showing

that similarlysituated individuals were intentionallytreated differentlywithout a rational relationship

to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San

Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); Squaw Valley Development Co. v.

Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004); SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d

662, 679 (9th Cir.2002). To state an equal protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege

that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in

treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

There is no indication of any discriminatorytreatment in Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff does

not allege that he was intentionally treated differently based on his membership in any protected

class, or based on his membership in any identifiable class. Plaintiff does not identify any other

similarly situated individuals that were treated more favorably or any differently than he was. 

Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable equal protection claims.

Plaintiff was given the appropriate legal standards for stating Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection claims in the Court’s prior screening order. (Order Dismissing First Am. Compl. With

Leave to Amend 9:5-10:6.) Plaintiff was specifically informed that he had not stated any facts that

suggested anydiscriminatorymotive or treatment byDefendants. Plaintiff’s amended complaint has

not meaningfully addressed those deficiencies. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s equal protection

claims are not capable of being remedied by granting further leave to amend.

D. Claims Against Other Defendants

Plaintiff’s complaint references a number of other Defendants but it is unclear what

Plaintiff’s claims are against them. Plaintiff’s form complaint lists R. Beceara, M.C. Poulos,

Stockman, L. C. Chrones, Carriedo, Spriester, and Mears as Defendants. However, Plaintiff does

not mention these defendants elsewhere in his complaint. Under the section entitled “Parties,”

Plaintiff makes no mention of these Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-12.) Further, Plaintiff does not assert

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any claims against these Defendants in his “First Claim for Relief” or “Second Claim for Relief.” 

(Compl. ¶¶ 21-27.) Plaintiff does not allege any facts regarding these Defendants. Plaintiff fails to

state any cognizable claims against Defendants Beceara, Poulos, Stockman, Chrones, Carriedo,

Spriester, or Mears.

Plaintiff was previously informed that he must link each individual defendant to an alleged

deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. (Order Dismissing First Am. Compl. With Leave to Amend 4:14-

5:8.) Plaintiff was asked to clarify the factual basis for his claims against each named defendant and

demonstrate how they were responsible for any violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s

amended complaint fails to do that with respect to Defendants Beceara, Poulos, Stockman, Chrones,

Carriedo, Spriester, and Mears. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are

not capable of being remedied by granting further leave to amend.

Plaintiff also names D. Ortiz and A.K. Scribner as Defendants. Plaintiff alleges no facts

about what Ortiz and Scribner did or failed to do that resulted in the violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Plaintiff only alleges that Ortiz and Scribner were wardens and were in charge

of the supervision of subordinate personnel and were generally in charge of the safety and protection

of all inmates at CSP-Corcoran. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983

for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a

named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th

Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). 

To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, plaintiff must

allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is

a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

///

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Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that demonstrate that Ortiz or Scribner personally

participated in any alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, knew of the violations and

failed to act to prevent them, or promulgated or implemented a policy so deficient that the policy

itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and was the moving force behind any constitutional

violation. Plaintiff fails to state any cognizable claims against Defendant Ortiz or Scribner.

Plaintiff was previouslyinformed of the appropriate legal standards for stating claims against

supervisory personnel. (Order Dismissing First Am. Compl. With Leave to Amend 5:9-6:3.) 

Plaintiff was specifically informed that he may not hold supervisory personnel liable under section

1983 under a respondeat superior theory and that Plaintiff must allege a specific causal link between

a supervisor’s actions and an alleged constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails

to do that with respect to Defendants Ortiz and Scribner. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims

against these Defendants are not capable of being remedied by granting further leave to amend.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim under section 1983 against Defendant Wagner

for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’sseriousmedical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

However, Plaintiff does not state any other cognizable claims. Plaintiff was provided with the

opportunityto amend and his second amended complaint failed to remedythe deficiencies with these

claims. The court finds that the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s claims are not curable by further

amendment of his complaint. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed on June 1, 2009,

against Defendant Wagner for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and

2. Plaintiff’s remaining claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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