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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILbD 

Unit.ed States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

MAY 4 1993 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

SCOTT WILLIAM SWOBODA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V. ) 

) 

JERRY K. DUBACH; STEVEN J. DAVIES; ) 

RAYMOND ROBERTS; DANA FOLEY; FRED ) 

CLUCK; RAYMOND GAUL; TOM KEYES; ) 

ROBERTA A. DUBACH; EDNA FAY REDER; PAM ) 

REMMERS; RHONDA (DUBACH) MILLER; JOI ) 

TRANT; TINA MCNEMEE; MARY TURNER; LISA ) 

BAURMAN; JODI COOK; JAMES RUSH; ROBERT ) 

ROOT; ROBERT MEYERS; DONIPHAN COUNTY, ) 

KANSAS BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 92-3156 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-CV-3550) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Scott William Swoboda, prose. 

Donald Patterson of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Topeka, 

Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees Jerry K. Dubach, Edna Fay Reder, 

Pam Remmers, Roberta A. Dubach, Rhonda (Dubach) Miller, Joi Trant, 

Tina McNemee, Mary Turner, Lisa Baurman, Jodi Cook, James Rush, 

Robert Root, and Doniphan County, Kansas Board of Commissioners, 

Dana Foley, Fred Cluck, and Raymond Gaul. 

Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General, and Terry D. Hamblin, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, 

Topeka, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees Steven J. Davies, Raymond 

Roberts, Tom Keyes, and Robert Meyers. 

Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and RUSSELL,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable David L. Russell, District 

District Court for the Western District of 

designation. 

RUSSELL, District Judge. 

Judge, United States 

Oklahoma, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff-appellant Scott William Swoboda, proceeding prose, 

brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging violation of various constitutional rights in connection 

with his arrest and subsequent confinement in the Doniphan County, 

Kansas jail. In the underlying state criminal case, Swoboda pled 

guilty to the felony offense of terroristic threat and to several 

misdemeanors, including obstructing official duty, disorderly 

conduct, and two charges of battery against a law enforcement 

officer. These offenses were based on Swoboda's conduct during 

his arrest and subsequent booking. 

In his civil rights complaint against defendants, Swoboda 

alleged that 1) defendant Dubach used excessive force in his 

arrest of Swoboda; 2) defendant Dubach, in concert with others, 

has and continues to threaten to kill Swoboda; 3) defendants 

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Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 2 
subjected Swoboda to numerous unconstitutional conditions during 

his confinement in Doniphan County jail; 4) defendants failed to 

inspect or report on the allegedly unconstitutional conditions at 

Doniphan County jail; 5) defendants Foley, Cluck, and Gaul, as 

County Cormnissioners of Doniphan County, failed to supervise and 

train the other county defendants, resulting in a violation of 

Swoboda's constitutional rights, and failed to protect Swoboda 

from Defendant Dubach; 6) defendants conspired and acted to 

intimidate Swoboda and to violate his constitutional rights; and 

7) defendants violated state law in connection with Swoboda's 

f . 1 con inement. Swoboda also alleged various state law claims. He 

sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. 2 

The district court ordered a review of the complaint and 

written report pursuant to Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th 

Cir. 1978) (the Martinez report). The Martinez report was filed 

and Swoboda filed his objections. Defendants filed motions to 

dismiss or, in the alternative, for surmnary judgment, and Swoboda 

responded. The district court, in an order dated March 30, 1992, 

dismissed the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), 

concluding that Swoboda's allegations failed to state a cause of 

action under § 1983. Swoboda filed a notice of appeal. The 

district court denied his application to proceed without 

prepayment of costs or fees; he reurges that motion before this 

court. 

1 Swoboda moved to dismiss the action against Defendant Reder. 

2 The district court dismissed Swoboda's claims for injunctive 

relief as moot. We agree, and Swoboda does not challenge that 

ruling on appeal. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 3 
This court noted a possible jurisdictional defect . because 

Swoboda's notice of appeal was received one day after the 

thirty-day appeal period following the filing of the district 

court's judgment. We asked the parties to brief the issue in 

light of this court's opinion in United States v. Leonard, 937 

F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1991), distinguishing Houston v. Lack, 487 

U.S. 266 (1988). In Houston, the Supreme Court held that a prose 

prisoner's notice of appeal was filed with the court when the 

prisoner gave it to prison authorities for mailing. 487 U.S. at 

276. This court declined to apply Houston where a prisoner placed 

his notice of appeal in the regular, as opposed to the legal, 

prison mail system. Leonard, 937 F.2d at 495. 

Here, defendants concede that "there was only [one mail] 

system and that was the system used." County Defendants' 

Jurisdictional Brief at 7. Therefore, the Leonard exception to 

Houston does not apply. Nonetheless, Defendants contend that 

Houston should not apply here either because the prison mail 

records indicate that Swoboda gave his notice of appeal to prison 

authorities on the day it was due in court. Defendants state: 

"No delay on the part of prison authorities here constituted the 

cause of a failure of petitioner to get his notice of appeal to 

the Clerk of the District Court within the time limit that defines 

the jurisdiction of this court." Id. at 8. Essentially, they 

argue that the reasoning of Houston, that incarceration should not 

adversely affect a prose prisoner's ability to get his notice of 

appeal to a court on time, 487 U.S. at 270-72, does not apply 

here. See also Leonard, 937 F.2d at 495 ("With the advantage of 

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• 

the special filing requirements established in Houston, [] a pro 

se prisoner arguably is in a better position than non-incarcerated 

individuals with respect to the filing requirements of Rule 4."). 

We hold that Swoboda's notice of appeal was timely. We 

decline to second-guess whether Swoboda, if not incarcerated, 

would have mailed his notice of appeal or made other efforts to 

insure that it was filed timely. We follow the Supreme Court's 

clear and straightforward ruling in Houston, that a pro se 

prisoner's notice of appeal is filed with the court "at the time 

petitioner delivered it to the prison authorities." 487 U.S. at 

276; see Hamm v. Moore, 984 F.2d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding 

jurisdiction where notice of appeal in§ 1983 suit given to prison 

officials on due date); see also Houston, 487 U.S. at 275 

(characterizing holding as "bright-line rule"); Leonard, 937 F.2d 

at 495 (same). Additionally, we grant Swoboda's motion to proceed 

without prepayment of costs or fees. 

Moving to the merits of the appeal, 

[w]e review de novo a district court's ruling on a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Allegations in the 

plaintiff's complaint are presumed true. The complaint 

will not be dismissed unless it appears that the 

plaintiff cannot prove facts entitling him to relief. 

Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations 

omitted). Additionally, because Swoboda filed his complaint pro 

se, and continues pro se on appeal, we interpret his pleadings 

liberally, as required by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972). See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th 

Cir. 1992). 

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Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 5 
Applying these standards, we hold that many of Swoboda's 

allegations fail to state a complaint cognizable in federal court 

under§ 1983, and we affirm the district court's order as to those 

claims. However, the district court went beyond the applicable 

legal standards in dismissing Swoboda's excessive force claim. 

For the reasons stated below, we reverse on that claim, and remand 

for further proceedings. 

We agree with the district court that the claims regarding 

conditions at Doniphan County jail must fail. Swoboda's complaint 

contains a myriad of allegations, which can be summarized into the 

following claims: a) conditions, restrictions, and constraints 

placed on pretrial detainees amounted to punishment, b) pretrial 

detainees were limited in their preparation of a legal defense by 

their inability to post bail, c) oppressive jail conditions 

limited inmates' ability to prepare or assist in their legal 

defense, d) restrictions placed on inmates' communications and 

access to law books amounted to a denial of access to the courts 

and counsel, e) conditions at the jail constituted cruel and 

unusual punishment, f) inmates received inadequate medical care, 

g) lack of access to exercise and recreation, h) lack of access to 

reading materials, i) inadequate diet at the jail, j) the jail's 

housing conditions, heating, ventilation and cooling, fire alarm, 

plumbing, and lighting systems,. were inadequate and posed health 

threats to inmates, k) failure to provide regular bathing, 

cleaning, and laundry services, 1) denial of the right to vote, 

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Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 6 
m) denial of the right to exercise religious freedom, n) failure 

to train and staff the jail to insure inmates' safety, and 

) f 'l . , . 3 o ai ure to protect inmates privacy. 

The majority of these claims fail either because Swoboda's 

allegations are conclusory or because he lacks standing to bring 

them. Many of Swoboda's contentions about the conditions at 

Doniphan County jail are simply general observations or complaints 

on behalf of other prisoners. He stated no specific facts 

connecting the allegedly unconstitutional conditions with his own 

experiences at Doniphan, or indicating how the conditions caused 

him injury. Without such facts, these claims are little more than 

conclusory allegations, which are insufficient to state a claim 

for relief. See Hall v. Bellmen, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 

1991). Additionally, Swoboda lacks standing to bring claims on 

behalf of others. See Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 125 

(10th Cir. 1990). 

As to the remaining claims regarding conditions, where 

Swoboda did allege more specific facts, none of them rise to the 

level of a constitutional deprivation such that they state a claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Shaw v. Neece, 727 F.2d 947, 949 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984). For example, 

Swoboda alleged that defendants violated his right to freedom of 

3 In his reply brief on appeal, Swoboda contends that he has 

been denied access to legal resources at El Dorado Correctional 

Facility. We decline to address this issue. Neither El Dorado 

nor any of its employees are parties to this lawsuit, and the 

district court obviously has not considered this allegation. See 

Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 7 
religion. However, the only specific fact he alleged in 

connection with his own exercise of religious freedom was that 

defendants refused to provide a minister of his faith. This 

allegation alone cannot support the denial of Swoboda's right to 

freedom of religion. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th 

Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990); see also Cruz v. 

Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (noting that a prison chaplain, 

priest, or minister need not be provided for every faith). 

Because Swoboda failed to state cognizable claims regarding the 

conditions at Doniphan, his claims that defendants Foley, Cluck, 

and Gaul failed to supervise and train and failed to protect 

Swoboda from those conditions also fail. Additionally, Swoboda 

failed to make specific allegations showing how these 

alleged failures affected him during his stay at 

defendants' 

Doniphan. 

Similarly, Swoboda's claim that defendants violated various state 

laws during his incarceration at Doniphan County jail does not 

present a claim of constitutional dimension such that it supports 

a cause of action under§ 1983. See Johnson v. Clinton, 763 F.2d 

326, 327 (8th Cir. 1985). 

Swoboda's complaint 

inspect or report his 

County jail. However, 

contends that defendants failed to 

complaints of the conditions at Doniphan 

he does not state how this lack of 

inspection caused or contributed to any injury or violation of his 

constitutional rights. Therefore, this claim fails for lack of 

causation. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 

1991). Similarly, Swoboda's claims of conspiracy fail because he 

did not allege specific facts in support of these allegations. 

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,. 

See Ruark v. Solano. 928 F.2d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 1991); Durre v. 

Dempsey. 869 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir. 1989). Finally, Swoboda's 

allegations that Defendant Dubach and others threatened to kill 

him and continue to do so fail by themselves to state a 

constitutional claim cognizable under § 1983. See Hulsey v. 

Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating mere threat 

insufficient to demonstrate significant injury needed to sustain 

excessive force claim). 

In addition to dismissing the above claims, the district 

court also rejected Swoboda's allegations that Defendant Dubach, 

at that time the sheriff of Doniphan County, "assaulted, beat and 

disfigured" him during his arrest. Complaint at 2. 

order states: 

The court's 

The court finds no merit to plaintiff's claim that 

plaintiff, when arrested, was assaulted by the Sheriff 

and that excessive force was used .... Given the 

affidavits provided by others present during the arrest, 

and given the Sheriff's amended answer filed in that 

case, this court accepts the Sheriff's explanation ... 

that the plaintiff was the individual under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs when the arrest was made. 

District Court Order at 3. 

"The court's function on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion is not to 

weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, 

but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally 

sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." 

Miller, 948 F.2d at 1565 (emphasis added). In determining whether 

a plaintiff has stated a claim, the district court may not look to 

the Martinez report, or any other pleading outside the complaint 

itself, to refute facts specifically pled by a plaintiff, or to 

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Appellate Case: 92-3156 Document: 010110110040 Date Filed: 05/04/1993 Page: 9 
resolve factual disputes. See Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285, 287 

n.2 (10th Cir. 1990); Sampley v . Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 493 n.3 

(10th Cir. 1983). 

The court also concluded, without explanation, that Swoboda's 

excessive force claim was not of constitutional dimension. 

District Court Order at 3-4 . Excessive force during arrest 

violates a person's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 

searches and seizure. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 

(1989); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991) . 

Our review of Swoboda's complaint indicates that he has alleged 

sufficient and specific facts in support of his claim of excessive 

force. That claim is of constitutional dimension, and properly 

brought under§ 1983. Defendants' version of the facts cannot be 

used to reject the claim at this juncture in the proceedings. We 

express 

Swoboda's 

no opinion as to the merit or eventual disposition of 

excessive force claim. We hold simply that his 

complaint, interpreted liberally, states a claim for relief on 

that ground. 

Defendants argue on appeal that this court can affirm for 

reasons other than those relied on by the district court, as long 

as those reasons find support in the record. We agree. See Bath 

v. National Ass'n of Intercollegiate Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315, 

1317 (10th Cir. 1988). Defendants also contend that Swoboda 

received notice and an opportunity to respond to their motions to 

dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. Cf. Ketchum v. 

Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff must receive 

notice and opportunity to submit evidence where court converts 

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• 

motion to dismiss into motion for sununary judgment). Essentially, 

defendants seek a sununary judgment ruling from this court. We 

recognize that the parties moved for sununary judgment in the 

alternative, and that Swoboda apparently received notice of the 

motion and responded. Nonetheless, we remand Swoboda's surviving 

claim to the district court for its initial consideration of the 

remaining arguments in support of defendants' various motions to 

dismiss, 4 defendants' various arguments in support of sununary 

judgment, including qualified immunity, and what appear to be 

contested issues of fact surrounding the excessive force claim. 

Additionally, the district court should reexamine Swoboda's state 

law claims, and his motions for appointment of counsel. See 

Miller, 948 F.2d at 1567-68, 1572. 5 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

Swoboda's motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees is 

GRANTED; all outstanding motions are DENIED. The mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

4 For example, certain defendants moved to dismiss Swoboda's 

claims against them, contending that no factual allegations 

connect them to Swoboda's complaints. We recognize that, in 

affirming the district court's ruling on the majority of Swoboda's 

claims, numerous other defendants will be able to assert this same 

defense to the remaining claim. 

5 The district court dismissed these claims, concluding that, 

following its dismissal of Swoboda's § 1983 claims, the court 

lacked an independent basis for federal jurisdiction and, 

therefore, a basis to exercise pendent jurisdiction. 

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