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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals Tent.li Circuit 

AUG 2 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

FLORENCE FISHER, JR., Clerk 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

RON CHAMPION, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 91-5014 

(D.C. No. 90-C-303-B) 

( N. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Petitioner-appellant Florence Fisher, Jr. appeals from the 

denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 u.s.c. § 2254. In a jury 

trial he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 

life imprisonment. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.?(A) (West 

1983 & 1991 Cum. Supp.). On direct appeal, he raised a single 

state law issue concerning an evidentiary ruling limiting the 

testimony of witness Carol Townsend. Fisher v. State, 761 P.2d 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 91-5014 Document: 010110041602 Date Filed: 08/28/1991 Page: 1 
900 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). He then sought postconviction relief 

raising several federal constitutional claims including: (1) the 

evidentiary issue rejected on direct appeal (as implicating 

fundamental fairness), (2) sufficiency of the evidence to convict, 

(3) an improper jury instruction shifting the burden of proof, (4) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (5) ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel. IR. doc. 3, exhibits. The 

state district court rejected the ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims on the merits and rejected all other claims as 

procedurally barred because they could have been raised at trial 

and on direct appeal, but were not. Fisher v. State, No. 

CRF-84-3763, unpub. order (Tulsa County D. Ct. Dec. 20, 1989). 

See also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1086 (West 1986); Jones v. 

State, 704 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). The 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed finding, inter alia, 

that those issues which could have been raised on direct appeal 

were waived. Fisher v. State, No. PC-90-79, unpub. order (Okla. 

Crim. App. Jan. 29, 1990). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 

the state district court's resolution of the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim. 

In his federal habeas petition, petitioner reasserted his 

five claims. IR. doc. 1. The State conceded that petitioner had 

exhausted his state remedies and answered the petition on the 

merits. Neither the district court nor the State considered 

whether rejection of the defaulted claims rested upon adequate and 

independent state grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 

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2546, 2553-57 (1991); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1382-84 

(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990). Assuming, 

without deciding, that we have the power to decide the defaulted 

claims, we reject them. We also find no merit to petitioner's 

ineffective assistance counsel claims. Accordingly, we affirm. 

In October 1984, petitioner fatally shot Ford Byrd while 

visiting his (petitioner's) former wife, Stella Fisher. According 

to petitioner, the purpose of the visit was to resolve child 

visitation problems. Petitioner testified that upon his arrival, 

his former wife was conversing with Byrd on the front porch. 

Petitioner ushered his former wife into the house to discuss the 

matter. He further testified that he shot Byrd in self-defense 

when Byrd burst into the house, shouted and ignored petitioner's 

warning not to approach him. 

Stella Fisher told a different story. She indicated that no 

child visitation problems existed, and that petitioner had not 

visited his son in several months. She indicated that petitioner 

parked across the street from her house, walked through her yard 

and, without provocation or words, shot Byrd while two to three 

feet away from him. No apparent reason motivated the shooting. 

Petitioner sought to impeach the testimony of Stella Fisher 

by offering the testimony of his girlfriend, Carol Townsend. Had 

she been allowed, Townsend would have testified that the contact 

between petitioner, Stella Fisher, and their son was more recent 

and frequent than Stella Fisher indicated. Petitioner also sought 

to introduce state court records concerning his divorce to prove 

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animosity on the part of his former wife. The state district 

court excluded the Townsend testimony and the documentary evidence 

as evidence pertaining to collateral matters. The Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals held that the proffered testimony was offered 

for impeachment and that the district court properly excluded the 

testimony as extrinsic evidence pertaining to a collateral matter. 

Fisher, 761 P.2d at 901. 

A federal habeas court does not review state court 

evidentiary rulings for error; rather, our review is limited to 

whether the evidentiary ruling affects the fundamental fairness of 

the trial so as to deny due process of law. Lisenba v. 

California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941); Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 

770, 772 (5th Cir. 1988); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 851 

(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980). Here, the 

state district judge excluded the evidence in accordance with the 

bar on extrinsic evidence used solely to impeach a witness. Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2608(B) (West 1980); Woods v. State, 657 

P.2d 180, 182 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). The Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals rejected the notion that the testimonial evidence 

was indicative of bias. Fisher, 761 P.2d at 901. At best, the 

sole purpose of the Townsend testimony was to undermine the 

credibility of Stella Fisher by suggesting that she lied 

concerning the frequency of petitioner's visits. See 2 D. 

Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 129 (1985) (discussing 

exclusion of collateral evidence). This, however, was not the 

issue on which this case turned, rather the main issue before the 

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jury was whether petitioner shot the victim in self defense. As 

for the state divorce records, the state district court sustained 

an objection to their admissibility because the records simply did 

not reveal any inconsistency in Stella Fisher's testimony. 

Although petitioner claims the records would have shown animosity 

between himself and Stella Fisher, the state district court was 

well within the mark to exclude these records as truly collateral 

given that the jury was aware of the divorce. The state court 

evidentiary rulings on these points in no way rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair. 1 

Petitioner next argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction, specifically, that the State did not prove 

malice aforethought and thus violated his fourteenth amendment 

right to due process. The district court rejected this claim on 

two independent grounds: (1) a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence does not implicate a federal constitutional right and 

is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings, citing Sinclair 

v. Turner, 447 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 

U.S. 1048 (1972), (2) sufficient circumstantial evidence indicates 

1 Petitioner relies upon Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 

(1967), for the proposition that witness Townsend should have been 

allowed to testify concerning petitioner's frequency of contact 

with Stella Fisher and his son. In Washington v. Texas, the 

Supreme Court determined that an accused has a sixth amendment 

right to compulsory process to put on "a witness who was 

physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he 

had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been 

relevant and material to the defense." Id. at 23. This holding 

in no way describes the proffered testimony of witness Townsend. 

The proffer establishes that she would have testified to 

collateral matters concerning impeachment; she did not personally 

observe the incident in question. 

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that the petitioner acted with malice. The district court's first 

ground is erroneous. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), 

the Supreme Court, on federal habeas review, held that due process 

of law under the United States Constitution requires that 

sufficient evidence support a conviction. Id. at 318-19. See 

also Sanders/Miller v. Logan, 710 F.2d 645, 656 (10th Cir. 1983) 

(granting habeas relief based on insufficient evidence to support 

Oklahoma conviction for first degree murder). The constitutional 

standard "is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). 

In Oklahoma, malice is defined as "that deliberate intention 

unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is 

manifested by external circumstances capable of proof." 21 Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.7(A); Henderson v. State, 661 P.2d 68, 

69 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). "[M]alice aforethought requires 

nothing more than a deliberate intention to take the life of 

another without justification." Huckaby v. State, 804 P.2d 447, 

452 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). The fact of killing may provide an 

inference of a design to kill. Koonce v. State, 696 P.2d 501, 505 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. 

State, 772 P.2d 922, 924-25 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). "A design to 

effect death sufficient to constitute murder may be formed 

instantly before committing the act by which it is carried into 

execution." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 703. Thus, premeditation 

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does not require that the perpetrator know or harbor ill will 

toward the victim. Huckaby, 804 P.2d at 452. Finally, malice 

aforethought may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Barr v. 

State, 763 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1988). 

Applying these principles to the instant case, a rational 

jury could conclude that petitioner acted with premeditation. See 

Curtis v. State, 762 P.2d 981, 983 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 

Petitioner argues that because he had five or six rounds left in 

his pistol and immediately summoned help, he could not have formed 

a design to effect death. We disagree. Viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could 

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot his 

unknown and unarmed victim from a distance of two or three feet 

with a .38 caliber pistol for no apparent reason, other than the 

victim's visit to his former wife. The jury was entitled to weigh 

the inferences from these facts and could have concluded beyond a 

reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with malice aforethought. 

Petitioner's next contention is that jury instruction number 

seven

2 violates due process because it allowed the jury to presume 

2 The instruction provided: 

You are instructed that an intent to commit 

the crime charged in the information is an essential 

element of the offense with which the defendant is 

charge[d]. 

In this connection, you are instructed that 

the intent with which an act is done is a mental state 

of mind of the accused. Direct and positive proof of 

intent is not necessary, but the same may be, and 

usually is, proved by circumstantial evidence. If you 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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intent and consid~r other crimes. The district court rejected 

this claim on two independent grounds: (1) a challenge to a jury 

instruction is outside the scope of habeas relief, citing Ortiz v. 

Baker, 411 F.2d 263, 264 (10th Cir. 1969), and (2) the jury 

instruction was correct. Again, the first ground is erroneous. A 

federal habeas court may review a jury instruction in the context 

of the entire charge, but only for constitutional error which 

undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial. Henderson v. 

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 

146-47 (1973); Linebarger v. Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th 

Cir. 1968) (cited in Ortiz v. Baker, 411 F.2d at 264), cert. 

denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969). 

Without question, the jury may be instructed that it may 

consider circumstantial evidence of intent. See Holland v. United 

States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). Petitioner argues that when 

jurors are instructed that intent is usually proven by 

circumstantial evidence, they may reference other trials in which 

intent was proven circumstantially and then presume intent solely 

based on circumstantial evidence. He argues that the instruction 

is contrary to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 

We do not agree. Petitioner's reading of the instruction is 

not supported by its plain language. The instruction merely 

(footnote continued from next page) 

find that an act was done, the intent by which it was 

done is to be determined by you from all of the facts 

and circumstances as shown by the evidence presented in 

this case. 

IR. doc. 5 at 4 n.2. 

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• 

indicates, without reference to other cases, how intent is usually 

proven. Moreover, the instruction tells the jury that it must 

decide intent "by the evidence presented in this case." Unlike 

the instruction in Sandstrom v. Montana, this instruction does not 

establish a presumption or shift the burden of proof. See id., 

442 U.S. at 517. It does not bar consideration of direct 

evidence; rather, it requires that intent "be 

determined ... from all the facts and circumstances as shown by 

the evidence." Finally, the jury was instructed that the State 

had the burden to prove the defendant's guilt on each element of 

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. R. instr. no. 2, 4 & 23. 

Petitioner finally argues that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. To prevail on an 

ineffective assistance claim, petitioner must demonstrate (1) 

deficient performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The first element 

requires a showing that "the identified acts and omissions were 

outside the range of professionally competent assistance." Id. at 

690. Prejudice means a reasonable probability that the outcome 

would have been materially different but for counsel's alleged 

errors. See Id. at 694-95; United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 

997 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1472 

(10th Cir. 1990) (en bane). 

Our review of counsel's performance is highly deferential, 

and from the perspective of the circumstances confronting the 

defense at the time of trial and appeal. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 

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477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Petitioner suggests that counsel should 

have (1) made a better proffer concerning witness Townsend's 

testimony, (2) argued that Oklahoma's limitation on extrinsic 

evidence for impeachment is unconstitutional under Washington v. 

Texas, (3) moved for a continuance so an additional investigative 

report could have been incorporated into the defense strategy, (4) 

raised more than a single issue on appeal, instead of abandoning 

the other issues contained in the motion for a new trial, 

including a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

We are unable to find any prejudice from the alleged errors. 

Rejected on the merits are petitioner's arguments concerning the 

testimony of witness Townsend, the applicability of Washington v. 

Texas and the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction. Accordingly, these issues cannot support prejudice. 

Concerning the denial of a continuance, the claimed prejudice is a 

lack of evidence to impeach Stella Fisher's testimony concerning 

the location of the victim's car. See Appellant's Brief at 26. 

In the unlikely event that such extrinsic impeachment evidence 

would have been admitted, it is not the type of material evidence 

which could have made a difference in the outcome. Finally, 

counsel's failure to raise every argument contained in the motion 

for new trial is not per se prejudicial; the strategic choice of 

counsel to narrow arguments to those having a realistic 

probability of success does not constitute ineffectiveness. See 

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985). Having determined that 

petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice due to counsel's alleged 

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errors, the performance element of the test need not be addressed. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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