Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02562/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02562-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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“This Court” will refer to the referral court, and “the Court” will refer to the presiding

court.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alec Jordan Holtz,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 17-02562-PHX-JAT (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Alec Jordan Holtz, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex,

Huachuca Unit, Kingman, Arizona, has filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (hereinafter “habeas petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 12). Respondents

filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 17), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 23). On December 26,

2018, this Court1

 issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Petitioner’s

habeas petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice for the reason that it was untimely

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) statute of limitations.

(Doc. 33.) The Court sustained Petitioner’s objections to the Report and Recommendation,

and remanded the case back to this Court. (Doc. 42.) In so doing, the Court found that

Petitioner’s habeas petition was not barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations, but deferred

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Petitioner objects to Respondents’ Supplemental Answer, asserting that it exceeds

the 17 page limitation, and adds responses not permitted by this Court’s supplemental

briefing order. (Doc. 45.) Petitioner’s objection will be overruled. Rule 5, Rules Governing

Habeas Proceedings, does not provide a page limitation for an Answer, and, additionally

Petitioner was permitted to file a 40-page amended habeas petition along with 17 pages of

briefing. (Doc. 12.) Respondent’s original answer was limited to affirmative defenses,

which was permitted by the Court. (Doc. 19 at 4.) Understandably then, Respondents’

Supplemental answer, adding merits arguments to their procedural default arguments, is

lengthier, and contains no arguments precluded by the Court. Furthermore, Petitioner has

filed a 54 page response to Respondents’ Supplemental Answer. (Doc. 52.) 

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ruling on an argument advanced by Respondents that some of Petitioner’s habeas claims are

nonetheless untimely. (Id. at 2-3.) 

This Court issued an Order on March 19, 2019, indicating that it would consider, on

remand, Respondents’ argument that some habeas claims remain untimely, as well as the

following affirmative defenses asserted by Respondents in their Limited Answer: arguments

V and VI (as to grounds one, two, four, five and six). (Doc. 43.) This Court also indicated

it would consider the merits of any claims that Respondents are not arguing are still barred

by the statute of limitations. (Id.) This Court ordered Respondents to file a Supplemental

Answer, addressing the aforementioned issues on or before April 17, 2019, and Petitioner to

file a Supplemental Response on or before May 8, 2019. (Id.)

In Respondents’ Supplemental Answer, Respondents abandon their argument that

some of Petitioner’s claims are untimely, and proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s

claims.2

 (Doc. 44.) Petitioner filed a Response to Supplemental Answer on June 3, 2019.

(Doc. 52.)

BACKGROUND

This Court, in its previous Report and Recommendation limited its procedural

background to those occurrences relevant to the statute of limitations. As some of Petitioner’s

claims will be address on the merits, a more detailed discussion of the case background is

warranted. 

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STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

On July 23, 2019, Petitioner was indicted on charges of kidnapping (count 1), child

molestation (count 2), and two counts of sexual conduct with a minor (counts 3 and 4.) (Doc.

34-1 at 4-5.) The facts of the offenses were set forth by the trial court as follows:

On July 17, 2009, a 3-year-old female, JM, was playing with friends

outside of a laundry facility in an apartment complex while her mother was

inside doing the laundry. At approximately 10:30 p.m., the mother heard JM

scream and rushed out of the laundry. She could not find JM. With the help

of neighbors, she began to search the apartment complex and called the

Apache Junction Police Department. When JM was not immediately found,

a K-9 unit was called in to assist with the search. The dogs tracked the scent

to an alley which ran north and south just west of the laundry facility where

there was a large hole in the fence. The dogs then followed the scent south in

the alley where they lost the scent at Broadway Road.

While questioning the residents of the apartment complex the officers

found that a young man named Alec had been hanging around the apartments

for a couple of days. A records search revealed that an individual named Alec

Holtz had been a suspect in a molestation case in 2002. A copy of that

individual’s photograph was obtained and residents identified the photo as the

person who had been hanging around the park. One individual stated that

“Alec” had been asked to leave his home at approximately 10:30 p.m. on that

evening.

Officers proceeded to the residence of Alec Holtz and were admitted by

his aunt, Katrina Francis. She denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of

the girl and called the Petitioner from his room. The Petitioner then took the

officers into his bedroom where they found JM strapped into a stroller. The

Petitioner told the officers that he was just getting ready to take the girl to the

Apache Junction Police Department.

The Petitioner was arrested and taken to the Apache Junction Police

Department. He was eventually questioned by Detective Rollins. Petitioner

gave several stories as to how and when he encountered the girl

(Doc. 34-1 at 141-42.)

While his trial was pending, Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to determine

competency. (Doc. 44-1 at 3.) After a full examination pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 11, the

parties stipulated to allow the court to determine competency based upon the experts’

submitted reports. (Id. at 6.) The court found Petitioner competent to stand trial. (Id. at 16.)

Subsequently, Petitioner filed a motion to change counsel, in which he claimed that his

counsel was not assisting him, and that she had tried to get him to sign a plea agreement

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which he did not understand. (Id. at 18-19) The trial court heard the motion and denied the

request. (Id. at 28-29.)

Petitioner ultimately agreed to pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (Doc. 22-

1 at 29-34.) Petitioner plead guilty to the kidnapping charge and two counts of attempted

sexual conduct with a minor. (Id.) Petitioner agreed to a sentence of 24 years on count 1,

to be followed by lifetime probation on counts 2 and 3. (Id.) Subsequent to Petitioner’s

guilty plea, a presentence report was prepared, recounting additional facts:

On July 18, 2009, [JM], age 2 1⁄2 years old, was reported missing by her

mother, Minerva Murillo. Ms. Murillo advised that [JM] went missing near

the laundry facility at the trailer park. Ms. Murillo added that she heard her

daughter scream and when she ran outside of the laundry facility, she could not

locate [JM]. Ms. Murillo related that she summoned some relatives and

neighbors, and that they conducted a search of [the] trailer park for [JM], and

could not locate her.

Detectives Ramirez and Rollins conducted a search of the area and

contacted Daniel Kinnison and showed Mr. Kinnison a photograph of [JM]

Mr. Kinnison advised that he did not recognize [JM], but that he met a male

subject at the park three days ago who appeared to be transient. Mr. Kinnison

went on to provide the detectives with a description of the male subject, and

recalled that he said his name was “Alec.”

Detective Rollins contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a

records check of the name “Alec” was made, along with a general physical

description that Mr. Kinnison could recall. The records check revealed the

name of Alec Jordan Holtz, who Detective Ramirez recognized from numerous

previous investigations, and he obtained an Arizona Motor Vehicle

Department photograph of Mr. Holtz. Detectives Ramirez and Rollins went

to the last known address for Mr. Holtz and made contact at the residence. The

detectives knocked on the door and were met by Katrina Francis, who

identified herself as the homeowner. The detectives showed Ms. Francis a

photograph of [JM] and asked if she had seen her. Ms. Francis said that she

had not seen [JM], but offered that her nephew, Alec Holtz, who resided with

her, might know her.

Ms. Francis called for Mr. Holtz to come out of his bedroom. As Mr.

Holtz came out of his room to the entry way, Detective Ramirez recognized

him from previous investigations. The detectives showed Mr. Holtz a copy of

the picture of [JM] and asked him if he had seen her. Mr. Holtz replied that

he had found [JM] last night by herself, and had brought her home. Mr. Holtz

led the detectives into his bedroom where they observed [JM] buckled into a

stroller. The detectives placed Mr. Holtz in custody and had him transported

to the Apache Junction Police Station by patrol officers.

Detective Rollins interviewed Mr. Holtz at the police station. Mr. Holtz

told Detective Rollins that he had found [JM] last evening, near an apartment

building, sometime after midnight while he was jogging in the area. Mr. Holtz

added that he brought [JM] to his house because he did not think that the

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police station would be open that time of night. During the interview with

Detective Rollins, Mr. Holtz recalled that he had been sexually assaulted as a

child, and that he then admitted taking [JM] from the entrance of the trailer

park where she resided.

Mr. Holtz agreed to take a polygraph examination. During that

examination, he admitted to twice penetrating [JM]’s vagina while changing

her diaper. Mr. Holtz also related that [JM] screamed in pain during one of the

incidents. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Holtz was transported to the

Pinal County Adult Detention Center, and booked.

(Doc. 34-1 at 28-29.)

It was reported by police that Petitioner admitted to police that he had done a similar

thing to another 4-year old girl named Isabelle he had previously babysat for. (Doc. 34-1 at

67.) Petitioner complied with a request by FBI agent Fuller “to trace is hand on a piece of

paper, and to show how much of which finger was placed in [JM]’s vagina.” (Id. at 67, 73.)

Petitioner also signed the following typewritten statement:

I [,] Alec Holtz, changed that girl’s diaper. I laid her on the floor, took

the old diaper off to put a new one on. She was squirming around so I held her

down placing my hand on her stomach. I did not want to hurt her. She would

move up and down and my hand would move down and made contact with her

vaginal area. This happened with the palm of my bare hand for a brief second

over the front of her vaginal area. I also slid my finger between her vaginal

lips to clean her off using a wipe. I knew that this was wrong and I feed bad

about it. This is my statement that I give voluntarily.

(Id. at 53, 70.)

A camera found in Petitioner’s bedroom contained pictures of JM wearing only a diaper, and

a picture of the victim in a car seat without a shirt on. (Id. At 54.) A diaper found in

Petitioner’s bedroom was forensically tested and found to contain semen, and the DNA

profile of the semen matched Petitioner’s DNA profile. (Id.) 

On April 1, 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the aforementioned plea

agreement. (Doc. 22-1 at 29.) During the change-of-plea colloquy, Petitioner admitted that

he “took [JM] . . . from the area outside a Laundromat in Apache Junction without the

permission of her parent against her parent’s will. Took the child to the home where he was

living and on two occasions over the next day attempted to place his finger in her vagina.”

(Doc. 34-1 at 14-24.) On April 30, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with the

stipulations in plea agreement to 24 years in prison on count1 and lifetime probation on the

remaining two counts. (Doc. 34-1 at 33-37; 39-49.) 

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Petitioner’s petition was 63 pages in length. (Docs. 1-2, 1-3.) His reply to the state’s

response was 22 pages. (Doc. 1-10.)

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On July 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Doc.

22-1 at 10.) Appointed counsel subsequently filed a notice that she could not find a colorable

claim to raise. (Id. at 7.) On March 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro per PCR petition. (Id.)

Noting that Petitioner’s petition and reply are “lengthy3

,” the trial court summarized

Petitioner’s claims as follows: (1) petitioner was denied the constitutional right to both

conflict-free counsel and to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) petitioner’s conviction and

sentences are in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of law, equal

protection of the law and fundamental fairness; (3) petitioner can establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty of the

underlying offenses, and (4) petitioner was coerced by Judge Gooday and his counsel to enter

into the plea agreement. (Doc. 34-1 at 88.) As to Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel was

ineffective, the trial court listed 11 areas identified by Petitioner to support his claim:

1. Failing to file a Motion to Dismiss Count 2 and 4 of indictment.

2. Failure to file a Motion to Suppress the evidence based upon a double

illegal search.

3. Failure to file a Motion to Suppress the Confession.

4. Failure to file a Notice of Defenses and Disclosure as required by Rule

15.2.

5. Failure to listen to or consult with Alec as to his version of events, or

to consult with an expert on DNA.

6. Failure to investigate or interview witnesses.

7. Failure to inform Alec of potential defenses, of the corpus delecti rule,

of the possibility of a third-party suspect; and failure to follow through

on competency.

8. Failure to obtain exculpatory evidence, including Shell gas station and

Desert Fox surveillance videos, the identity of an alibi witness, Alec’s

cell phone records, DNA from the Blues Clues Diaper, the police

reports and identity for the police imposter.

9. Failure to obtain or request exculpatory evidence from the prosecution,

including the full reports of Detectives Rollins, Kempshall and

Newman, Alec’s cell phone records, affidavit for search warrant by

Detective Ramirez, an uncorrupted copy of the QT surveillance video,

the missing 57 minutes from Alec’s interview with FBI Fuller, the

information reports of the dog tracking team.

10. Failure to provide Alec with any discovery, despite his requests.

11. Failure to explain the terms of the plea agreement and its ramifications.

(Id. at 88-89.)

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On October 16, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s claims on the merits, ruling

as follows:

When a defendant pleads guilty he waives all non-jurisdictional defects,

including ineffective assistance of counsel, other than ineffectiveness in

connection with matters directly relating to the entry of the plea. The test is

whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded by

attorneys in criminal cases. In the instant case, the Petitioner was facing two

consecutive life imprisonment terms on the Sexual Conduct with a Minor

Charges and two mandatory consecutive terms of ten to twenty-four years.

The Petitioner is relatively young and counsel’s advice to accept a twenty-four

year plea agreement is certainly not outside of the range of competence

demanded by attorneys in criminal cases. Neither is Judge Gooday’s advising

him of the possible sentences he was facing coercive. It was, in fact, the

Judge’s responsibility to make sure that the Petitioner was fully advised of all

of the possibilities in the case.

As to the Petitioner’s claim that his counsel failed to explain the terms of the

plea agreement and its ramifications, Judge Gooday reviewed the agreement

with the Petitioner in open court, and the Petitioner stated that his counsel had

reviewed the agreement with him and that he had initialed each paragraph.

There is no support in the record for the claim that Petitioner’s conviction and

sentences are in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of

law, equal protection of the law and fundamental fairness.

As to the Petitioner’s claim that he can establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty of the

underlying offenses, the Petitioner has pointed out numerous items which

could have been used in the defense of the matter and there is no guarantee that

the State would have obtained a conviction. This, however, is not the test for

actual innocence. That test is that no reasonable fact-finder would have found

him guilty of the underlying offenses. In the instant case, the State had

witnesses to place him at the scene of JM’s disappearance. The girl was found

in his bedroom the next afternoon strapped into a stroller. The Petitioner told

differing stories about how he came in contact with the girl and made a

confession to the police. A reasonable trier of fact could certainly have found

the Petitioner guilty.

(Doc. 34-1 at 89-90) (emphasis in original).

On December 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s

dismissal. (Doc. 34-1 at 92-140.) The court granted review, but on June 6, 2013, denied

relief. (Doc. 22-1 at 3-4.) The appellate court noted that “[i]n the first twenty pages of his

petition for review, [Petitioner] describes various circumstances and events that preceded the

change-of-plea proceeding, including [Petitioner]’s arrest, law enforcement officers’

questioning of him and various witnesses and the allegedly unlawful search of his home.”

(Id. at 1.) Petitioner also “contend[ed] the state failed to provide him with certain evidence,

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. . .criticize[d] the grand jury proceeding, and he point[ed] to the trial court’s rulings on

pretrial motions.” (Id.) The appellate court found that the trial court had not abused its

discretion, finding that “[n]o purpose would be served by restating the trial court’s thorough,

well-reasoned ruling.” (Id.) Additionally, the court noted that:

The court did not, as Holtz maintains, “ignore[] the transcript of the Change

of Plea hearing,” but made clear in its ruling that it relied on the transcript in

determining the court had not coerced Holtz and had reviewed the plea

agreement with him. Nor did the court misapply the law and “confuse []

several facts” or add facts that were not supported by the record as Holtz

suggests.

Rather, the trial court thoroughly addressed the claims Holtz has raised, which

Holtz essentially reasserts in his petition for review, resolving them correctly

based on the applicable law and the record before it. We note, too, that in

determining whether Holtz had entered knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

guilty pleas and in reviewing the claims in the post-conviction proceeding, the

court was entitled to rely on Holtz’s responses to the court’s questions at the

change-of-plea hearing and his assurances that he understood the agreement

and had not been threatened or coerced.

(Id. at 2.)

On October 23, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review of

Petitioner petition for review. (Exh. 22-1 at 14.) The Arizona Court of Appeals’ mandate

was issued on February 11, 2014. (Id. at 26.) In the interim, on January 21, 2014, between

the appellate court decision and the filing of its mandate, Petitioner filed a petition for writ

of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Review was denied on June 30, 2014.

(Doc. 29.) 

On July 17, 2014, Petitioner filed a second post-conviction relief notice. (Doc. 22-1

at 16.) Petitioner raised claims of newly discovered evidence and factual innocence, and

claimed excuse for his untimely PCR filing. (Id. at 2-3.) Petitioner retained counsel who

then filed a petition “‘claiming that trial and post-conviction counsel had been ineffective,

[Petitioner] was incompetent at the time of his plea, the state committed misconduct before

his plea and during his first post-conviction proceeding, the trial court coerced [Petitioner]

to plead guilty and improperly denied [Petitioner] disclosure during his first Rule 32

proceeding, and [Petitioner] ‘would obtain an acquittal if [Petitioner]’s case were to go to

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trial’ based on ‘recently discovered’ facts, citing Rule 32.1(e) and (h).” (Doc. 1-15 at 1-33.)

On December 21, 2015, the trial court dismissed the petition on the following basis:

Defendant entered a guilty plea in this matter on April 1, 2010 and

sentence was imposed twenty-nine days later. He filed a timely Notice of

Post-Conviction Relief on July 29, 2010 and was appointed counsel. On

February 7, 2011, defense counsel filed a notice indicating that she had found

no colorable claim for relief.

The Court set an April, 2011, deadline for Defendant to file a pro per

petition. Over the course of the ensuing year, Defendant requested and

received numerous extensions. In support of his requests, Defendant filed

hundreds of pages of documents, addressing many of the same issues that he

cites in his current Petition.

 Finally, on March 26, 2012, Defendant filed his first Rule 32 petition,

consisting of sixty-three pages and supported by a two hundred forty-one page

appendix. The State filed a response on May 15, 2012. On August 12, 2012,

after filing various motions, addenda, notice of errata and additions, Defendant

filed a Reply with over one hundred pages of supporting documentation. In

a detailed ruling, the Court denied Defendant’s petition, as well as a motion for

reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. The

Supreme Court denied Defendant’s Petition for Review.

Defendant filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on July 17,

2014. After reviewing the Notice, this Court concluded that his claims were

presumptively precluded. The Court also noted that Defendant had failed to

establish any likelihood that the evidence in question would probably affect

the outcome of his case in any way, much less establish a claim of actual

innocence. The Court noted that Defendant’s claims that the evidence he

sought to introduce as exculpatory was, for the most part, general and

conclusory. To the extent that he identified evidence with specificity, the

Court found the evidence to be merely impeaching, cumulative or both. Minor

discrepancies in timeliness, witness statements or police reports, the Court

concluded, simply do no rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence of

innocence.

Although it was not entirely clear from the Notice, the Court further

observed that Defendant might be seeking to raise a claim of ineffective

assistance of his first PCR counsel, which would not be precluded.

Accordingly, the Court appointed Defendant another attorney to represent him

with respect to the second Petition. That attorney filed a notice that she had

found no colorable claim. Accordingly, Defendant was granted leave to file

his own supplemental petition. That Petition, filed through counsel retained

by Defendant, is currently before the Court.

 Nearly all of the issues raised in the second supplemental Petition are

indistinguishable from those raised in the first, and are therefore precluded.

They include the following claims:

• Inaccuracies in grand jury evidence

• Defects in Rule 11 process due to failure to provide/consider prior mental health

records

• Inadmissibility of confession due to coercion/Miranda issues

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• Lack of disclosure of police reports (particularly Officer Newton)

• Involuntary nature of plea due to coercion by defense counsel & settlement judge

and Defendant’s intellectual limitations

• Lack of victim’s DNA evidence/failure to properly collect DNA evidence

• Ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise each of these issues as

well as general failure to investigate/failure to communicate with Defendant

• failed to consult with DNA expert.

 While Defendant contends that his claims should not be precluded due to newly

discovered evidence (cited in the pending Petition and set forth in the voluminous

appendices attached thereto), the Court finds that the proffered evidence is nearly

identical to that offered in support of his first supplemental Petition. To the extent

that the evidence has not already been considered by the Court in the previous

proceedings, the Court finds it to be merely cumulative or impeaching. Defendant

also fails to persuasively argue that the evidence could not have been timely

discovered and presented with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

 Defendant’s claims that the evidence at issue constitutes evidence of actual

innocence is also unpersuasive. Again, Defendant’s arguments are nearly identical

to those in his first supplemental Petition. Moreover, the evidence hardly constitutes

clear and convincing evidence that dogs used to track the victim’s scent led in a

direction other than the Defendant’s residence. While perhaps corroborating of

Defendant’s claim as to where he first encountered the victim [fn1: Defendant

reportedly made conflicting statements as to where he had first come into contact with

the victim.], the undisputed fact remains that Defendant was in the trailer park from

which the victim was abducted near the time of the abduction and the victim was

found in Defendant’s bedroom hours later. Evidence that another person was seen

loitering in the vicinity of the abduction or that another child had described another

suspect does not, under the facts of this case, constitute evidence of actual innocence.

The lack of any evidence of the victim’s DNA in the diaper in which Defendant’s

semen was found does nothing to refute the States claim that Defendant admitted to

digitally penetrating the child’s vagina. As noted in the Court’s minute entry

regarding the second PCR Notice, minor discrepancies in timeliness, police reports

and the like are not uncommon and are rarely sufficient to establish actual innocence.

 One claim raised by Defendant that is not precluded in his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel on his first PCR petition. Defendant contends that counsel was

deficient for having failed to raise the issues noted above. However, those issues

were raised and fully briefed by Defendant himself in his first supplemental Petition.

Defendant fails to offer any convincing explanation as to why the ruling on his first

Petition would have been any different had the issues been raised by counsel, rather

than by himself. Therefore, even if counsel’s representation had been deficient, he

has failed to establish prejudice such that he would be entitled to relief.

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that each of Defendant’s claims are

either precluded, or, to the extent not precluded, present no material issue of fact or

law which would entitle Defendant to relief. 

(Doc. 34-2 at 140-142.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review of that decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

(Doc. 34-3 at 2-29.) On May 31, 2016, the appellate court found that Petitioner’s claims that

were not raised pursuant to Rule 32.1(e) and (h) - that is, claims other than claims of newly

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discovered evidence or innocence - were precluded as being untimely, as they were not filed

within thirty days of the issuance of the court’s mandate in his first PCR proceeding. (Doc.

22-1 at 20-21.) The court addressed Petitioner’s contrary assertion that the proceedings were

timely because they were initiated within thirty days of the denial of Petitioner’s petition for

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. (Id. at 3, n 1.) The court disagreed, noting

that Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) requires that Petitioner’s second PCR notice be filed within 30

days of the issuance of the mandate in the first PCR proceeding, and that Rule 31.23(b)(2)

requires that a defendant obtain a stay of the mandate when filing a petition for certiorari

before the United States Supreme Court. (Id.)

The court then addressed Petitioner’s remaining claims, finding that they did not meet

the standard under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e) and (h) to allow the presentation of untimely

claims. As to Petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence, the court found that Petitioner

did not sufficiently allege that the evidence was newly discovered as contemplated by the

rule, and also did not identify the “newly discovered” evidence. As to Petitioner’s claim of

innocence, the court held that the claim was foreclosed by Petitioner’s guilty plea, had

already been raised in Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, and also fails “in light of

[Petitioner]’s confession to police that he abducted a two-year-old [sic] child and inserted

his finger in her vagina.” (Exh. 22-1 at 21.) The court declined to address Petitioner’s claim

that he could make a strong case that his statements to the police should have been

suppressed, as that claim was precluded by Petitioner’s guilty plea, had been raised and

rejected in his first PCR proceeding, and was untimely raised in his subsequent PCR

proceeding. (Id.) On November 15, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied

review of the appellate court decision. (Id. at 23.)

HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

On August 1, 2017, Petitioner filed his initial habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court

dismissed the petition after screening, but granted Petitioner the opportunity to correct its

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Since Petitioner’s amended habeas petition raises claims identical to his original

petition, his amended petition “relates back” to his original petition for purposes of

calculating statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).

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deficiencies, making Petitioner’s October 21, 2017 amended habeas petition the operative

filing4

. In his petition, Petitioner raises six grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner alleges that his “Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights were violated when the State ‘put forth a materially false

representation of his case, suppressed evidence of exculpatory value –

including videos, photography and approximately 1,500 pages of records – that

revealed its case was not only false but they had created false evidence to

convict or coerce a plea’”;

(2) Petitioner alleges his “fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when the trial court ‘assumed a conviction and sentenced him when

he did not enter a plea of guilty or no contest, nor did he admit to committing

an offense’”;

(3) Petitioner alleges that his “Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated because ‘if a plea was made it was NOT knowing, intelligent

and voluntary, because (a) [Petitioner] was not competent; (b) the trial court

coerced [Petitioner] utilizing extraneous documents; (c) trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness; and (d) the State’s withholding of exculpatory evidence and

falsifying its case’”;

(4) Petitioner alleges that he was “denied effective assistance of counsel, in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments”;

(5) Petitioner alleges that he was “denied effective assistance of appellate counsel,

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments,” and;

(6) Petitioner alleges that his “conviction violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights because he is actually innocent of the charges and ‘but for

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, the State’s concealment of exculpatory

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evidence, and the Constitutional violations, no reasonable juror would have

found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

(Docs. 19; 12 at 9-31.)

Respondents assert that grounds one, two, four and six are barred by Petitioner’s

guilty plea, that grounds one and six are not cognizable in federal habeas, and that grounds

three and five fail on the merits.

Plea Waiver.

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s guilty plea precludes review of grounds one, two,

four and six, and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Some

constitutional rights are automatically waived by entering an unconditional guilty plea. Such

rights include, among others, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s accusers, and

the right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, McCarthy v. United States, 394

U.S. 459, 466 (1969), as well as the right to challenge constitutional defects which occur

before entry of the plea, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1989). Once a

defendant enters a valid guilty plea, he can no longer raise a claim of violation of

constitutional rights that arose prior to the plea. Id. at 565. 

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact

guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d

635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). This rule “is predicated on the idea that a valid guilty plea removes

the issue of factual guilt from the case.” Lemke v. Ryan, 719 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citation and internal quotations omitted). The test for determining the validity of a guilty

plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative

courses of action open to the defendant,” which requires a review of the circumstances

surrounding the plea. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). There is no heightened standard for competency to plead guilty than

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competency to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (a trial court must

satisfy itself that the waiver is knowing and voluntary).

A plea colloquy that satisfies “Rule 11’s requirements will lead to a plea being

considered knowing and voluntary, unless some misrepresentation or gross

mischaracterization by counsel has tainted the plea.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

1149, 1157 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds in United States v. Castillo, 496

F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “A defendant may only attack the voluntary and

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel

was [deficient].” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. “Counsel’s failure to evaluate properly facts

giving rise to a constitutional claim, or his failure to properly inform himself of facts that

would have show the existence of a constitutional claim, might in particular fact situations

meet the standard of proof. Thus, while claims of prior constitutional deprivation may play

a part in evaluating the advise rendered by counsel, they are not themselves independent

grounds for federal collateral relief.” Id. at 266-67

In Petitioner’s plea agreement, he agreed to plead guilty to the crime of kidnapping,

and two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor. (Doc. 22-1 at 30.) Petitioner

agreed he understood the sentencing range for the offenses: from 10 to 24 years on count 1,

and 5 to 15 years on counts 2 and 3, and that count 4 would be dismissed. (Id.) Petitioner

accepted a sentence of 24 years in prison on count 1 - agreeing that the aggravated sentence

was justified due to the emotional harm to the victim and her family, and that the aggravating

factor outweighed all mitigating factors - and agreed to lifetime probation on counts 2 and

3. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner acknowledged that he was giving up his right to a jury trial on the

finding of guilty and aggravating factors, his right to confront witnesses, his right to present

evidence and call witnesses, his right to be presumed innocent and his right to appeal the

judgment and sentence to a higher court. (Id. at 3.) At the end of the agreement, he dated

and signed the agreement, stating that: “I have personally and voluntarily placed my initials

in each of the above boxes and lines and signed the signature line below to indicate that I

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have read and approved all of the previous paragraphs in this agreement, both individually

and as a total binding agreement.” (Id.)

During the plea colloquy, the court confirmed that Petitioner had was not under the

influence of any drugs or alcohol, and that no one forced him, threatened him, or coerced him

to sign the plea agreement and that he was doing so of his own free will. (Doc. 34-1 at 14,

18.) The court confirmed with Petitioner the sentence that he had agreed to, and confirmed

with Petitioner the rights he was forfeiting by his plea agreement. (Id. at 16-17.) Petitioner

also confirmed that he had gone over the plea agreement with his attorney and that she had

answered all of his questions. (Id. at 19.) Petitioner then admitted that the following factual

basis: “[o]n the 17th of July of 2009, Alec Holtz took Jenifer [] Murillo, Jenifer Murillo from

the area outside a Laundromat in Apache Junction without the permission of her parent

against her parent’s will. Took the child to the home where he was living and on two

occasions over the next day attempted to place his finger in her vagina.” (Id.) The

prosecutor made a record that the victim was approximately 2 and a half years old. (Id.)

At Petitioner’s sentencing, he was given the opportunity to speak, but declined. (Doc.

34-1 at 45.) The court sentenced Petitioner consistent with the terms of his plea agreement.

At the conclusion of the proceeding Petitioner was advised of his right to file a Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief within 90 days. (Id. at 48.) The record before this Court establishes

that Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and the state court’s conclusion in

this regard was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

Petitioner’s pre-plea non-jurisdictional claims are therefore precluded, absent a showing that

Petitioner received constitutionally deficient advice from his attorney, which will be

addressed infra.

Merits

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s grounds 3 and 5 fail on the merits. Pursuant to

the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that

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was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court decision was

(1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard of review).

This standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). It is also

a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state

court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

(2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When applying these

standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .”

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must demonstrate

that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing professional standards, and that

he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. See id. at 687-88. To establish

deficient performance, a petitioner must show “that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 699. A petitioner’s allegations and supporting

evidence must withstand the court’s “highly deferential” scrutiny of counsel’s performance,

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and overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 689-90.

A petitioner bears the burden of showing that counsel’s assistance was “neither reasonable

nor the result of sound trial strategy,” Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 939 (9th Cir.

2001), and actions by counsel that “‘might be considered sound trial strategy’” do not

constitute ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana,

350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

at 694. A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. Courts should not presume prejudice. See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148,

1155 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, a petitioner must affirmatively prove actual prejudice, and the

possibility that a petitioner suffered prejudice is insufficient to establish Strickland’s

prejudice prong. See Cooper v. Calderon, 255 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A

petitioner] must ‘affirmatively prove prejudice.’ ... This requires showing more than the

possibility that he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors; he must demonstrate that the errors

actually prejudiced him.”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). However, the court need

not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the court can reject the claim

of ineffectiveness based on the lack of prejudice. See Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155 n.3 (the

court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong).

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

A. Ground One.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his federal constitutional right to due process

and the right to a fair trial based upon prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct.

Petitioner asserts a litany of facts he claims were withheld from the Grand Jury:

• suppression of evidence that another individual may have been the kidnapper.

• a forged signature on Petitioner’s confession.

• a tampered-with video confession.

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• suppressed statements by witnesses that Petitioner was with them until 11 p.m.

on the night of the kidnapping.

• that witnesses’ description of the suspect seen near the abduction did not

precisely match Petitioner.

• concealed the fact that there was no evidence that Petitioner sexually assaulted

the victim.

• did not reveal that no nude photographs of the victim were found on

Petitioner’s camera.

• did not reveal that Petitioner’s phone revealed a text sent at around 11:00 p.m.,

which would have been inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory that

Petitioner was carrying the victim at the time.

• that the prosecution claimed the diaper with Petitioner’s semen on it was the

victim’s diaper, when none of the victim’s DNA was found on the diaper.

Petitioner also claims the prosecutor concealed allegedly exculpatory evidence,

including:

• deleted footage from his video interview by police.

• radio communication during the search for the victim.

• information from a witness.

• Shoe impressions near the crime scene.

• Petitioner’s cell phone records.

• the fact that Petitioner’s signature was forged.

• the fact that none of the children Petitioner had cared for before when he

worked in his mother’s day-care business disclosed any abuse.

In sum, Petitioner claims as follows:

The state could not place [Petitioner] at the abduction site at 10:00 or

at 10:20 p.m. when the girl disappeared. He did not resemble the description

of the kidnapper, his shoes did not resemble the impressions left in the dirt,

and he did not use a vehicle that day. Three witnesses placed [Petitioner] in

their home until after he was asked to leave at 10:30 p.m. He didn’t leave the

second he was asked, but had to retrieve his CD, pack it in his case, and then

leave.

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5

Petitioner never called 911, or alerted his Aunt or anyone else, and claimed to have

not taken the child to the police station during the time he had her because he thought the

police station would be closed.

6

When police first arrived at his home, an audio tape of their entrance and encounter

with Petitioner recorded Petitioner first telling officers that he had found the victim walking

in the morning “up here at the road,” yet told law enforcement that he had found her near the

trailer park and got home around 11 p.m.. See, Doc. 1-16 at 17, 22, 24, 32.

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Two witnesses placed [Petitioner] in their presence from mere moments

after he left the party. The man - Jose Romero - stated he shared beers with

[Petitioner]. [Petitioner]’s affidavit of March 2012 set out these facts, but the

prosecutor’s office did not disclose Romero’s statement until nearly two years

later in January 2014. [Petitioner] didn’t know Romero’s identity and couldn’t

have known what he said to police. This evidence, held by the state proves

[Petitioner]’s alibi beyond doubt.

The K-9 unit had picked up a trail and it led directly to J[].D[]. The

state and police - in their disclosed reports - alleged the K-9's searched with

negative results.

The crime lab disproved the state’s claim that [Petitioner]’s DNA was

found on Yenifer’s diaper. The state admitted that [Petitioner] did not take

nude photographs of Yenifer.

(Doc. 12 at 15.)

Petitioner’s challenges are to the quality of the evidence gathered in the case, not to

his factual innocence or the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Much of the evidence, as the

trial court found, is merely impeaching, cumulative or both. The fact that there may have

been a witness who claimed he was with Petitioner until 11:00 p.m. the night the victim was

abducted, when the mother reported the child disappearing at around 10:30 p.m. or that a

canine search led police to another location, does little to change the damning import of the

fact that Petitioner had the child in his possession from late in the evening of the abduction

until approximately 5 p.m. the next day, approximately 18 hours, without alerting

authorities5

, and that Petitioner made inconsistent statements to law enforcement as to the

circumstances of his possessing the child6

. The fact that there were no nude photographs of

the child on Petitioner’s camera does little to change the damning import of the fact that

Petitioner had taken some pictures of the victim, one without a shirt on in a car seat, that

were on his camera along with pictures of other children in various stages of undress. The

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fact that the state may not have been able to prove that the diaper containing Petitioner’s

semen was worn by her does little to change the damning import of the fact that Petitioner’s

semen was found in one of the diapers in the room. 

Although Petitioner claims, without proof, that his signature on the typewritten

statement was forged, this claim is inconsequential given that Petitioner admitted to Agent

Fuller during his interview that his finger had slipped into the victim’s vagina while changing

her on one occasion, that she screamed, and that it may have happened again when changing

her on a second occasion. There is also no doubt that Petitioner was referring to the victim

during this exchange. (Doc. 1, Discs (five)- App. No. 243 at 11:41:47.)

None of “withheld” facts are exculpatory: at best, they may have provided

impeachment ammunition to Petitioner were he to go to trial. But, Petitioner elected not to

do so, and signed a plea agreement that made clear the various rights he would be giving up

by pleading guilty: “[a]ll motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or

raised, or could assert hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him and imposition

of a sentence upon him consistent with [the plea] agreement,” and the right to “confront the

witnesses against [him] and to cross-examine them,” and, “to present evidence, and call

witnesses in [his] defense, knowing the court will compel them to appear and testify at trial.”

(Doc. 22-1 at 32.) The trial court also reviewed these forfeited rights with Petitioner. (Doc.

34-1 at 17.)

Having knowingly and intelligently plead guilty in open court, Petitioner has waived

his right to challenge the prosecution’s evidence or evidence-gathering, or the grand jury

presentation, as these alleged violations occurred prior to his guilty plea. 

B. Ground Two.

In ground two, Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated as the trial

court sentenced him when he did not enter a plea of guilty and did not admit to committing

an offense. Petitioner also claims he was coerced into pleading guilty and that he was not

competent. Petitioner asserts that “nothing in the record indicated [he] understood the plea

offer, his rights, or the proceedings.” (Doc. 12, at 17-18.) To the contrary, the record reflects

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7

To the extent Petitioner claims that the factual basis for his plea was insufficient,

Petitioner admitted to taking the victim without permission, and admitted to placing his

finger twice into the victim’s vagina. These facts were sufficient to meet the elements of the

applicable Arizona statutes. See 13 A.R.S. §§ 1304(A)(3); 1401, 1404.

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that Petitioner understood the proceedings, and pled guilty to the charges. Additionally, after

his guilty plea and up to the time he was sentenced, Petitioner did not protest the proceeding

or attempt to withdraw his guilty plea. And, despite being given the opportunity to speak at

his sentencing, he remained silent.

During the plea proceeding, Petitioner advised the court that no one had forced him,

threatened him, or coerced him to sign the plea agreement, and that he was doing so of his

own free will. Furthermore, Petitioner acknowledged the factual basis, that he had taken the

victim without permission, and that he had sexual contact with her.7

 “Statements made by

a defendant during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity in subsequent

proceedings attacking the plea.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008);

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (solemn declarations in open court carry a

strong presumption of verity). Petitioner does not establish that the trial court coerced him

into pleading guilty. The trial court’s determination and the appellate court’s affirmation that

Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

 Petitioner claims he was not competent to enter his plea, but presents no evidence to

establish such. He claims to have a low IQ, but prior to his guilty plea, he stipulated to a

competency determination based upon reports from the examining psychiatrist and

psychologists that Petitioner was competent. (Doc. 44-1 at 6.) The examining psychiatrist

took into account Petitioner’s prior hospitalizations, learning disabilities and ADHD, but

determined him to be competent. (Id. at 8-10.) The examining psychologist performed

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various intelligence and competency tests, and found it likely that Petitioner had the capacity

to comprehend his circumstance and assist his counsel, but that it was “quite apparent that

[Petitioner] was malingering.” (Id. at 13-14.) 

 Petitioner claims that their opinions would have changed had the examiners had in

their possession for review Petitioner’s prior mental health records. (Doc. 1-10 at 29-51; 1-7

at 1-13; 1-2 at 12-20.) Petitioner also claims that, had the examiners or the trial court

reviewed an affidavit of Dr. Anne Bradford Stericker, he would not have been found

competent. Dr. Stericker was a clinical psychologist who supplied an affidavit on April 18,

2012, in which she avowed that she exclusively reviewed information received from two

psychologists, Dr. Flynn and Dr. Day, who were both of the opinion that a person with

ADHD, who is not on medication, may act impulsively. (Doc. 1-9 at 23-25.) Neither Dr.

Stericker or the psychologists met Petitioner or reviewed any of his medical records. (Id.)

Based upon her review of the information received from Doctors Flynn and Day, Dr.

Stericker concluded that “it is my professional opinion that if Petitioner does indeed have

ADHD, it is possible that if he was deprived of his ADHD medication, he could potentially

have confessed to a criminal offense he did not commit.” (Id. at 25.)

Petitioner also claims that an opinion of clinical psychologist Alicia Pellegrin, retained

prior to his second PCR petition, demonstrates his lack of competency. Doctor Pellegrin

reviewed Petitioner’s medical records and opined that a review of Petitioner’s medical

records showing that Petitioner showed early, marked and pervasive cognitive/language

deficits, may have influenced the two Rule 11 examiners’ conclusions regarding competency,

and that Petitioner’s deficits would have made him more susceptible to coercion, especially

if “events unfolded as described by [Petitioner].” (Doc. 1-31 at 8-10.) 

The opinions of Doctors Stericker and Pellegrin do not establish Petitioner’s lack of

competency, or that had the Rule 11 examiners received this information they would have

changed their opinions. Thus, even if Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective in not

obtaining this information, he can not demonstrate prejudice. Additionally, Petitioner’s pro

se filings in state court and in this court belie any claimed incompetency. See, Petitioner’s

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Pro Per Petition for PCR, Petitioner’s Pro Per Reply, Petitioner’s habeas petition, Petitioner’s

amended habeas petition, Petitioner’s miscellaneous filings. (Docs. 1; 1-1 to 1-35; 12; 52;

46; 48; 51; 53; 54.) The trial court’s determination that the newly-discovered evidence

presented by Petition in post-conviction proceedings was merely cumulative and impeaching

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. In any event,

Petitioner’s assertion that the judge and his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty is, as

previously stated, belied by his plea agreement and the record of his plea colloquy. 

C. Ground Three.

Petitioner alleges that his right to Due Process was violated when he entered a plea

that was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, because (1) he was not competent; (2) the

trial court coerced Petitioner utilizing extraneous documents; (3) his counsel was ineffective;

and (4) the state withheld exculpatory evidence and falsified its case against him. (Doc. 12,

at 17.) This Court has already addressed Petitioner’s claims regarding his competence to

enter his plea and the trial court coercion. As to Petitioner’s claim that the state withheld

exculpatory evidence and falsified its case, this Court has already determined that these

claims are waived by Petitioner’s plea agreement. With respect to Petitioner’s claim that his

counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty, Petitioner bears the burden of

establishing that the advice he received “was not within the standards set forth in McMann

v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (citation

omitted). IAC claims following a guilty plea are cognizable in federal habeas “when the

action, or inaction, of counsel prevents petitioner from making an informed choice whether

to plead.” Mahrt v. Beard, 849 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017).

Petitioner claims that his counsel did not investigate his case or move to suppress his

confession. He claims that, had counsel done so, she would not have advised him to plead

guilty. The Ninth Circuit has held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the

failure to file a motion to suppress are precluded under Tollett. See, e.g., United States v.

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This Court presumes the “missing footage” Petitioner repeatedly refers to is the time

period between when FBI agent Fuller stopped the first video recording and started the

second. It is clear, however, within the context of the interrogation, that this was the time

period agent Fuller was administrating a polygraph examination. At the beginning of the

second recording, agent Fuller refers to deceptive answers given by Petition to questions

regarding his touching the victim. (Doc. 1, Discs (five)- App. No. 243.)

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Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005); Moran v. Godinez, 40 F.3d 1567, 1577 (9th

Cir. 1994), amended on other grounds by Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1992). The constitution does not require

the pre-plea disclosure of impeachment information. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,

629.

With respect to his failure to investigate claim, Petitioner asserts that, had counsel

investigated his case, she would have discovered: that Petitioner was not competent, that his

confession was involuntary, that the video tape of his confession contained missing footage8

,

that there was evidence another individual committed the crime, that expert witnesses would

have refuted the forensic evidence, that witnesses would have provided exculpatory

information, that video surveillance from the Desert Fox Tobacco & Liquor Store would

have proved exculpatory, and that his signature on “confession” was forged. 

With respect to these other claims of ineffective assistance, the import of the evidence

either missed or ignored is either speculative, or impeaching, and does not establish that

Petitioner would have been acquitted at trial or, stated another way, so undermine his case

to call into question his guilty plea. “The Constitution insists, among other things, that the

defendant enter a guilty plea that is ‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” Brady v. United States,

397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (citation omitted). “Solemn declarations in open court carry a

strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.

Had Petitioner gone to trial, he faced two consecutive life imprisonment terms on the

sexual conduct with a minor charges and two mandatory consecutive terms of ten to twentyfour years on the kidnapping and child molestation counts. (Doc. 34-1 at 57.) Petitioner’s

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counsel negotiated a 24 year sentence which was far less that what Petitioner could have

received had he been convicted at trial. 

The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claim that his guilty plea was coerced, that he was

incompetent and that his trial and PCR counsel were ineffective. The trial found that, given

that Petitioner was facing two consecutive life imprisonment terms and two mandatory

consecutive 10-24 year terms, that, “counsel’s advice to accept a twenty-four year plea

agreement is certainly not outside of the range of competence demanded by attorneys in

criminal cases.” (Exh. 34-1 at 89.) The trial court also fount that the trial court judge’s

advising Petitioner of the potential sentence he faced was not coercive. (Id.) As for

Petitioner’s claim that numerous evidentiary issues could have been used in his defense, the

trial court ruled that this “is not the test for actual innocence.” (Id.) Petitioner must show

that “no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty of the underlying offenses,” and

the trial court determined that Petitioner had not shown that. (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed on appeal, noting that the trial court’s finding

that Petitioner’s claims of pre-plea error were waived was “well-reasoned,” and that as to

Petitioner’s claim that his guilty plea was coerced, the trial court “thoroughly addressed the

claims [Petitioner] [] raised,” and was entitled to rely on the transcript of the plea proceeding

and Petitioner’s assertions that he understood the agreement and was not coerced. (Doc. 22-1

at 3-4.)

As to Petitioner’s claim of innocence, the trial court found that Petitioner failed to

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty of the underlying

offenses, in light of the fact that “the State had witnesses to place him at the scene of JM’s

disappearance. The girl was found in his bedroom the next afternoon strapped into a stroller.

The Petitioner told differing stories about how he came in contact with the girl and made a

confession to the police.” (Doc. 34-1 at 89.) With respect to counsel’s advise to accept a

plea agreement with a 24 year sentence, the trial court found it not outside the realm of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal proceedings, given the weight of the evidence

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and sentence Petitioner faced if convicted on all charges. The appellate court found no abuse

of discretion.

A defendant’s post-conviction claim “asserting that a coerced confession induced his

plea is at most a claim that the admissibility of his confession was mistakenly assessed, and

that since he was erroneously advised, . . ., his plea was unintelligent and a voidable act. The

Constitution, however, does not render pleas of guilty so vulnerable.” McMann, 397 U.S.

at 769. See also, Promo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 744 (2011) (“A defendant who accepts a

plea bargain on counsel’s advise does not necessarily suffer prejudice when his counsel fails

to seek suppression of evidence, even if it were to be reversible error for the court to admit

it.”).

This Court finds that the trial and appellate court decision as to Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea waives all pre-plea

jurisdictional defects. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267

D. Ground Four.

Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, including the right

to conflict-free counsel. Petitioner claims his initial counsel, Paula Cook, had a personal

relationship with Petitioner and his mother, and Petitioner’s mother babysat for Ms. Cook’s

granddaughter. (Doc. 12 at 19.) Petitioner asserts that attorney Cook withdrew from

representation when disclosure in the case indicated that the victim was similar in age to her

granddaughter. (Id.) Petitioner asserts that Ms. Cook filed “nothing” in his case. As

Petitioner fails to identify any action that Ms. Cook should have taken in his defense, or

allege any prejudice, he fails to state a claim regarding his right to conflict-free counsel.

 Petitioner claims that his successor counsel was ineffective because she (1) refused

to listen to him (2) pressured him to sign the plea offer (3) failed to realize that investigation

records were not provided (4) failed to realize that nearly an hour of the video tape of

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Petitioner’s interrogation were missing (5) did not interview a single witness and (6) failed

to question or request any records relating to witness Jay Garee or to the K-9 unit’s negative

results. (Doc. 12, at 20.) 

If trial counsel had been effective, Petitioner claims she would have known that there

were no nude photos of the victim on his camera, that the victim had not been molested, that

there was no evidence of Petitioner’s DNA on the victim, that Jay Garee was a viable thirdparty suspect, and that Petitioner did not confess. Petitioner also claims that if his counsel

had consulted a sexual abuse expert, the expert would have opined that based upon “the time

of the exam and the allegations,” that there would have been “some indication found” that

Petitioner sexually abused the victim. He also claims that a DNA expert would have found

that he had not touched the victim, and that she had not touched the diaper with Petitioner’s

semen on it. Additionally, Petitioner clams that a K-9 expert would have opined that the lack

of the victim’s scent found by the law enforcement K-9 meant that the victim was taken in

a vehicle, and since Petitioner did not operate a vehicle that evening, this would have

supported the conclusion that Jay Garee kidnapped the victim. 

Petitioner also claims that a forensic document examiner would have opined that

Petitioner’s signature on his confession was a forgery. (Doc. 12 at 22.) He asserts that a law

enforcement expert would have opined that the interrogation of Petitioner was improper,

coercive and in violation of Miranda. (Id.) Petitioner also claims his counsel was ineffective

in not moving to suppress the evidence seized during the search of Petitioner’s home, and his

confession. (Id. at 28.) Petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective in not retaining the

aforementioned experts and in not filing motions to suppress and that, had she done so, her

advise would have changed. Petitioner would then not have taken the plea offer, would have

proceeded to trial, and would have been acquitted. (Id.) 

Petitioner has waived any ineffective assistance of counsel based upon failure to

investigate, failure to file motions, and failure to obtain experts by pleading guilty, as set

forth above. With respect to Petitioner’s claim that Petitioner’s counsel coerced him into

pleading guilty, the trial court’s determination of that claim was proper, as set forth above.

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Furthermore, even if Petitioner could demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective in not

retaining experts, Petitioner does not establish that any expert retained would directly refute

the court’s competency finding, or establish that no reasonable fact-finder would find

Petitioner guilty of the offense charged, and thus does not establish prejudice.

E. Ground Five.

Petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of post-conviction counsel

because she (1) filed a notice of completion of review indicating that she had thoroughly

reviewed the record, yet most of her statements about the case were inaccurate, to include

that Petitioner had a nude photo of the victim on his phone and the incorrect date and time

for the kidnapping, (2) initially sent his file to his parents out of concern for his safety in

prison, and (3) failed to review voluminous investigative records, that Petitioner eventually

obtained through other means before filing his first PCR petition. (Doc. 12 at 29-30.) After

initial PCR counsel filed a notice with the court indicated that she found no colorable claims

to raise, Petitioner filed a pro se First PCR petition, which was ultimately denied. In

Petitioner’s second PCR petition, because he raised a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel in the initial PCR proceeding, the court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner.

(Doc. 34-2 at 141.) That counsel then filed a notice that she found no colorable claim to

raise in the second PCR proceedings. (Id.) Petitioner then, through counsel, filed a

supplemental second PCR petition. (Doc. 1-15 at 1-33.)

The trial court found that Petitioner had raised the same issues in Petitioner’s first

PCR petition, and Petitioner failed “to offer any convincing explanation why the ruling on

his first Petitioner would have been any different had the issues been raised by counsel,

rather than himself.” (Doc. 34-2 at 142.) The court also held that, even if Petitioner’s PCR

counsel was deficient, Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. (Id.) .

Even if Petitioner could demonstrate deficient performance, he must also establish

prejudice under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. Petitioner raised the very

issues in his pro se PCR petition that he claims his initial PCR counsel failed to raise.

Petitioner also had sufficient time after PCR counsel filed her notice of no colorable claims

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to raise to file his pro se Petition. As the trial court noted in consideration of his claims,

Petitioner was originally given a deadline of April 2011, to file his supplemental brief, but

that Petitioner did not file it until March 26, 2012, after Petitioner had “requested and

received numerous extension.” (Doc. 34-2 at 140.) The court also noted that Petitioner had

filed “hundreds of pages of documents, addressing many of the same issues,” and that

Petitioner’s supplemental petition was sixty-three pages in length and was supported by a two

hundred forty-one page appendix. (Id.)

Petitioner claims his initial PCR counsel was ineffective in not obtaining all

investigative reports, initially sending his file to his parents, and misstating the facts and misidentifying the date of the offense. Even if Petitioner could establish that these acts of

malfeasance and misfeasance rise to the level of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, the

trial court’s determination that Petitioner failed to show prejudice was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

F. Ground Six.

Petitioner alleges that he is actually innocent of the charges, and that, but for

ineffective assistance of counsel, concealment of exculpatory evidence and constitutional

violations, no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty of the charges. Petitioner

pled guilty to one count of kidnapping and two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a

minor and, as discussed above, his affirmation is presumed true. See Blackledge, 431 U.S.

at 74.

The trial court addressed Petitioner’s claim of innocence in its ruling on Petitioner’s

first PCR petition, and found it to be without merit: “[i]n the instant case, the State had

witnesses to place him at the scene of JM’s disappearance. The girl was found in his

bedroom the next afternoon strapped into a stroller. The Petitioner told differing stories

about how he came in contact with the girl and made a confession to the police. A

reasonable trier of fact could certainly have found the Petitioner guilty.” (Doc. 34-1 at 89.)

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Petitioner’s claim of innocence in his second PCR petition was also found meritless by the

trial court, and the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that, as to Petitioner’s

claim of innocence, that the claim was foreclosed by Petitioner’s guilty plea, had already

been raised in Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding, and also fails “in light of [Petitioner]’s

confession to police that he abducted a two-year-old [sic] child and inserted his finger in her

vagina.” (Exh. 22-1 at 21.) 

The Supreme Court has not recognized a freestanding claim of actual innocence as

a basis for habeas relief. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-419 (1993); House v.

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006). If a free-standing claim of actual innocence was

cognizable, the threshold “would have to be extraordinarily high,” contemplat[ing] a stronger

showing than insufficiency of the evidence to convict.” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). “Evidence that merely undercuts

trial testimony or casts doubt on the petitioner’s guilty, but does not affirmatively prove

innocence, is insufficient to merit relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.” Jones

v. Taylor, 763 F. 3d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 2014). 

In post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner raised a claim of actual innocence pursuant

to Rule 32.1(f), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides relief if a defendant

“demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would

be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court and appellate courts rejected his claim, finding

that Petitioner did not establish that no reasonable fact-finder would find him guilty of the

charges, and that the many items of evidentiary issues repeatedly cited by Petitioner did not

alter that conclusion. Petitioner’s claimed “exculpatory evidence” did not disprove (1) the

evidence that Petitioner was in the vicinity of the trailer park around the time the victim was

abducted and admitted to such (2) the evidence that Petitioner took her to his bedroom, where

he kept her overnight and throughout the next day without alerting authorities and gave an

implausible account as to why he did not (3) the evidence that Petitioner’s semen was found

on a diaper in his room (4) the evidence that Petitioner took photos of the victim, one of

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which was of her in a car seat without a shirt on, and had pictures of other young children on

his camera (5) the evidence that Petitioner did not immediately surrender the victim until he

was shown her picture by police after they arrived at his house and (6) the evidence that

Petitioner drew his hand on a piece of paper and indicated how far his finger would have

been inserted into the victim’s vagina, as well the written statement he signed, in which he

affirmed that he knew it was “wrong” and he felt “bad about it.” 

The trial court determined that all of the evidence Petitioner cited that purportedly

undermined his conviction or demonstrated innocence was merely cumulative and

impeaching, and that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that the newly discovered facts were sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder

would find him guilty of the charges. The court’s determination was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United

States Supreme Court; or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s claims in his amended habeas petition fail on the

merits, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 12) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 12) be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

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within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2019.

Honorable Michelle H. Burns

United States Magistrate Judge

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