Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01682/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01682-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER WAYNE CURTIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. PADUA, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01682-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

(ECF No. 1)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE 

WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is before the Court for 

screening. (ECF No. 1.)

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is an inmate at Valley State Prison (“VSP”) in Chowchilla, California. He 

names as Defendants Correctional Officer (“CO”) C. Padua, Pharmacist F. Lopez, 

Correctional Lieutenant (“CL”) R. Warren, and John and Jane Does 1-15. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

Within a one week period, Plaintiff was given a urinalysis test twice, suggesting it 

was not random. His urine was then sent to “an unknown, unauthorized testing 

laboratory” without Plaintiff’s consent. These acts were in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth 

and Eighth Amendment rights and in violation of HIPAA. 

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Pharmacists J. Zhu (not named in this action) and F. Lopez provided Plaintiff’s 

confidential medical information to VSP custody staff and investigative services (“ISU”), 

in violation of Plaintiff’s HIPAA and privacy rights. These pharmacists also falsely 

reported that Plaintiff was not prescribed any medication that would result in a positive 

test for morphine even though they knew that Plaintiff was prescribed codeine for pain 

and that codeine metabolizes in the human liver as morphine. (The complaint suggests, 

but does not explicitly say, that Plaintiff’s tests results came back positive for morphine.)

The Court infers from the complaint that the positive test results and the 

pharmacists’ statements precipitated a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) and a finding that 

Plaintiff was guilty of unspecified charges. Unidentified hearing officers wrongfully found 

Plaintiff guilty despite access to evidence that would prove his innocence. Plaintiff’s 

guilty charge was later overturned.

Plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 in damages, punitive damages, injunctive relief 

ordering the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to stop random 

urinalysis testing; declaratory relief that random urinalysis testing is illegal; and attorney’s 

costs and fees. 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Linkage

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional 

or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 

580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a 

claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff’s complaint does not include any charging 

allegations as to CO Padua and CL Warren. Therefore, these Defendants will be 

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dismissed. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to amend to assert factual allegations 

demonstrating that each personally participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. 

B. Claims Related to Urinalysis Testing

1. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against 

unreasonable searches, and its protections extend to incarcerated prisoners. Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). A urine test is a “search” for Fourth Amendment 

purposes. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). “When 

a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79

(1987). In determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment, 

“[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is 

conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell, 

441 U.S. at 559. The Ninth Circuit has held that urine tests to search for drugs are 

reasonably related to the prison officials' legitimate penological interest in keeping drugs 

out of prison. Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s claim that urine-testing violates the Fourth Amendment has already 

been considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Thompson. Insofar as the complaint 

can be construed to allege that the testing was not random, there are no facts alleged to 

indicate that the testing of Plaintiff twice in one month was either unreasonable or 

anything more than chance. Finally, Plaintiff has not linked any Defendant’s conduct to 

this claim. Accordingly, it will be dismissed. 

2. Eighth Amendment

To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on a deprivation of humane 

conditions of confinement, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to satisfy two 

requirements. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “First, the deprivation 

alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’“ Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

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294, 298 (1991)); see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). Prison 

conditions are not objectively serious unless they amount to “unquestioned and serious 

deprivations of basic human needs,” or of the “minimal civilized measure of life's 

necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-

300. “[A]fter incarceration only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.

2001) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 

319 (1986)). “[A]mong ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are 

‘totally without penological justification.’“ Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) 

(quotations omitted).

Second, a prisoner must also demonstrate that prison officials acted with a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind, that of “deliberate indifference.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 

303. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to the prisoner's health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994) In other words, the prison official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [to the inmate], 

and [the prison official] must also draw the inference.” Id.

Plaintiff’s challenge to the urine testing as violative of the Eighth Amendment fails 

because there is no suggestion that the testing is, objectively, sufficiently serious to 

satisfy the first prong of an Eighth Amendment analysis. Even if Plaintiff could satisfy the 

first prong, there are no facts alleged that any Defendant knew of and disregarded a 

substantial risk of physical or mental harm to Plaintiff when he was selected for random 

urine testing. See also Hinkley v. Warner, 616 Fed. App'x 255, 255 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 

2015) (finding district court properly dismissed prisoner's random urinalysis drug testing 

claim as violation of Eighth Amendment for failing to state a claim). This claim will also 

be dismissed.

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3. HIPAA

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. 

104-191, 110 Stat.1936, restricts health care entities from disclosure of “protected health 

information” (“PHI”). Regulations authorized by the HIPAA, 42 USC § 1320d et seq., 

prohibit ex parte communications with health care providers regarding patients' medical 

condition without their consent or a “qualified protective order” (45 CFR § 164.512).

Insofar as Plaintiff attempts to state a cause of action under HIPAA, he is not 

entitled to do so. HIPAA does not provide for a private right of action. The law 

specifically states that the Department of Health and Human Services must pursue 

enforcement actions. Sconiers v. California Dept. of Social Services, 2008 WL 53231, at

*4 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 2, 2008) (citing O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 173 

F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1178 (D. Wyo. 2001)); see also University of Colorado Hospital v. 

Denver Publ'g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (D. Colo. 2004) (same). 

C. Claims Related to RVR Hearing

1. Medical Privacy

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitution protects a right to privacy 

regarding “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Whalen v. 

Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). An incarcerated individual “retains those [constitutional] 

rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 

penological objectives of the corrections system.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95

(1987) (quotation omitted).

The Ninth Circuit recognizes a constitutional right to the privacy of medical 

information in a variety of contexts.1 However, as to prisoner medical records, the Ninth 

Circuit recently explained that inmates “do not have a constitutionally protected 

 

1 Courts are required to “balance the following factors to determine whether the governmental interest in 

obtaining information outweighs the individual's privacy interest: (1) the type of information requested, (2) 

the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to 

prevent unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express 

statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access.” 

Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004).

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expectation of privacy in prison treatment records when the state has a legitimate 

penological interest in access to them.” Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th Cir.

2010). Examples of such an interest include the need “to protect prison staff and other 

prisoners from communicable diseases and violence, and to manage rehabilitative 

efforts.” Id. at 534-35.

In Seaton, the court affirmed dismissal of a civil rights action brought by a prisoner 

whose medical records were given to two psychologists for purposes of a civil 

commitment evaluation. The Seaton Court concluded that prison officials had a 

“substantial” penological interest in using the medical records to evaluate the prisoner to 

determine if he was a sexually violent predator to be detained under state law. 610 F.3d 

at 536. “Whatever constitutional right to privacy of medical information may exist” for 

California prisoners, the disclosure of information regarding sexually violent predators in 

commitment proceedings “falls outside it.” Id. at 539. The court also concluded that 

plaintiff's circumstances did not fall within the Tuscon Woman's Clinic factors given the 

need for the state to use this information to protect the community.

The Seaton Court put the burden on the prisoner to plead “facts to rebut the 

connection between disclosure of his prison treatment records and the State's legitimate 

penological objectives during his custody. 610 F.3d at 535. Viewing the facts as pled in 

the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has not done so in this case. The 

expressed purpose for the pharmacists’ communicate with VSP custody staff and ISU 

was to determine if Plaintiff was prescribed any medication that would explain a positive 

test for narcotics following a urinalysis. The disclosure to prison staff certainly can be 

justified as a means of promoting a drug-free institution. Accordingly, this claim will be 

dismissed. 

2. False Information and False Charges

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff brings a claim against the pharmacists for providing 

incorrect information to VSP custody staff and ISU and against any hearing officers for 

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finding him guilty as a result, he fails to state a claim. Plaintiff does not have a 

constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct 

that could result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Freeman v. Rideout, 

808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986). As long as he was afforded procedural due process in 

connection with the RVR proceedings, the allegations that the pharmacists provided 

false information or that the hearing officers improperly found him guilty fail to state a 

claim under Section 1983. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must 

demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a 

claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a 

deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff should 

carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set 

forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

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under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the service of this order, Plaintiff shall a first 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (a) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(b) a copy of his complaint, filed September 10, 2015;

3. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint, the Court will dismiss this 

action, with prejudice, for failure to comply with a court order and failure to 

prosecute, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g). Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1761 (2015).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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