Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03684/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03684-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FLOYD H. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JEANNE WOODFORD; R.H.

DENNINGER; W.A. DUNCAN; DAVID

TRISTAN; WARDEN JOE McGRATH; N.

GRANNIS; M. NIMROD; P.T. SMITH; J.B.

WILLIAMS; J.COX; J. BARNENURG;

PAUL DILLARD; R. KIRKLAND; B.

SAMPLES; D. HEFFLICK; and E. REILLY,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-03684 CRB (PR)

ORDER

(Docs # 22 & 29)

Plaintiff, a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the director and various other officials/employees

of the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”), and against the warden and various

other officials/employees of PBSP. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have censored nonsexual literary magazines that contain “incidental” frontal nudity, sexually-explicit reading

novels and other communications that are not obscene, internet-generated materials, and

certain non-English or Spanish language materials that do not contain “coded” messages. He

claims that no legitimate penological interest exists for this censorship and “as such the

regulations used are overbroad, vague, inappropriately and inconsistently applied, thus

violating his First Amendment rights.” 

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Per order filed on January 18, 2005, the Court found that plaintiff’s allegations of

censorship state cognizable claims under section 1983 for violation of the First Amendment,

when liberally construed, and ordered the United States Marshal to serve the defendants. 

The Court denied plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)/preliminary

injunction for failure to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that there are no

material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They also

claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and

defendants have filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where

the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But

on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial the moving

party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving

party's case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond

the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to make

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this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 323.

B. Claims and Analysis

The allegations in the complaint and the attachments thereto reveal that plaintiff was

denied certain publications banned by PBSP policies enacted pursuant to California Code of

Regulations title 15, section 3006(c). First, plaintiff was denied the Star Distribution catalog,

and the September and October 2003 issues of Esquire magazines pursuant to a prison policy

banning full frontal nudity. See Watkins Decl. Ex. A, D and E (prohibition of frontal nudity,

California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(17)). Second, plaintiff was denied

The Best American Erotica and The Book pursuant to a prison policy banning obscenity. See

Watkins Decl. Ex. B and F (prohibition of obscenity, California Code of Regulations title 15,

section 3006(c)(15)). Lastly, plaintiff was denied Teach Yourself Swahili pursuant to a

prison policy restricting certain non-English and Spanish communications. See Watkins

Decl. Ex. C. (prohibition of publications and correspondence written in the languages of

Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic or Celtic, see Def. Ex. G; CDC-0009). Plaintiff claims that the

policies banning him from receiving these publications, and their application in the above

instances, violate his constitutional rights. 

Prisoners retain those First Amendment rights not inconsistent with their status as

prison inmates or with legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. See Pell

v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Regulations limiting prisoners’ access to

publications or other information are valid only if they are reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989) (citing Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1999). In

Turner, the Supreme Court identified four factors to consider when determining whether a

regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: (1) whether there is a

“valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental

interest put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the

right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted

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constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison

resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives”, or, in other words, whether

the rule at issue is an “exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. 

To defeat summary judgment, plaintiff must demonstrate that the regulations at issue are not

reasonably related to legitimate interests, or that there is a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the applicability of the regulations to the materials. Bahrampur v. Lampert, 356

F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Star Distribution Catalog and Esquire Magazine Claims

Plaintiff was denied the publications the Star Distribution catalog, and the September

and October 2003 issues of Esquire magazine because they contained frontal nudity. Plaint.

Decl. in opp. at 46-47. Initially plaintiff was also denied the August issue of Esquire

magazine; however, during the appeals process it was determined that the August 2003 issue

did not contain sexually explicit material banned by the prison’s policy, and plaintiff

ultimately received this magazine. Plaint. Ex. N. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly denied the Star Distribution catalog and the

September and October 2003 issues of Esquire. Watkins Decl. Ex. A, D, and E. He claims

that by denying him these publications, defendants violated his First Amendment rights by

denying him “non-sexual literary publications that contain ‘incidental’ frontal nudity.” He

further claims that defendants improperly applied California Code of Regulations title 15,

section 3006(c)(15)(A)-(C), subdivisions (1)-(6), when denying him these publications. 

Plaint. Decl. at 12. Plaintiff presents both a facial constitutional challenge to section

3006(c)(15), and an as applied challenge to the denial of his publications. However, he cites

the regulation pertaining to obscenity, not frontal nudity, when making this claim. Id. 

Defendants claim that plaintiff was denied the Star Distribution catalog and the

specific issues of Esquire magazine not because they were deemed obscene under section

3006(c)(15), but because they contained frontal nudity in contravention of section

3006(c)(17). Def. Ex. A, and D.

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a. Regulation of Frontal Nudity

California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(17) is constitutional. The

regulation bans “Sexually explicit images that depict frontal nudity in the form of personal

photographs, drawings, magazines or other pictorial format.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 §

3006(c)(17)(2006). The regulation defines sexually explicit material as “material that shows

the frontal nudity of either gender, including the exposed female breast(s) and/or the genitalia

of either gender.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3006(c)(17)(A)(2006). 

The regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The en banc

court of the Ninth Circuit found a similar ban on nudity to be constitutional under all four

prongs of the Turner analysis set forth above. See Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059-63

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Like section 3006(c)(17), the policy at issue in Mauro

banned "sexually explicit material,” defined as “materials that show frontal nudity” including

“personal photographs, drawings, and magazines and pictorials that show frontal nudity.” Id.

at 1057. 

To meet the first Turner factor, the governmental interest underlying a regulation

restricting prisoners’ First Amendment rights must be legitimate and neutral, and the

regulation must be rationally related to that objective. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414;

Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1059. The objectives of section 3006(c)(17), like the objectives of the

policy at issue in Mauro, are to “aid in the legitimate penological interests of maintaining the

safety and security of the prisons, rehabilitating inmates, reducing sexual harassment of

correctional officers and preventing a hostile work environment.” See Initial Statement of

Reasons for the adoption of California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(17)

(“Initial Statement of Reasons”) Plaint. Ex. G.

A regulation restricting certain publications is “neutral” if prison administrators draw

distinctions between publications solely on the basis of their potential implications for prison

security. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415-16; see, e.g., Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1059-60 (ban on

"sexually explicit material . . . that show frontal nudity" expressly aimed at maintaining jail

security, rehabilitating inmates and reducing sexual harassment of female detention officers

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1 “Sexually explicit materials, within the institutions, have contributed to an increase of verbal

assault and have lead to intimidation of female correctional staff when attempting to perform cell

searches. Inmates subject female correctional staff to a daily barrage of unwarranted sexual

advances...[a]dditionally, unrestricted access to sexually explicit material could lead to bartering

between inmates and anatomical comparisons could lead to fights between inmates thereby jeopardizing

the safety of prison staff and other inmates.” Initial Statement of Reasons, September 30, 2002.

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found "neutral" because jail administrators drew distinction between materials solely on the

basis of the materials' potential effect on the jail's legitimate objectives). Like the policy at

issue in Mauro, section 3006(c)(17) is neutral. Accord Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1060 (holding

that “the relationship between the possession of sexually explicit materials and the problems

sought to be addressed by [such a] policy – sexual harassment of female officers, jail security

and rehabilitation of inmates – is clear.”) Like the policy at issue in Mauro, there is a “valid,

rational connection between [section 3006(c)(17)] and the legitimate governmental interest

put forward to justify it”. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. 

Section 3006(c)(17) also passes the second prong of the Turner test. Like the policy

at issue in Mauro, section 3006(c)(17) does not ban all sexually explicit materials from

inmates. See Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061; (policy “does not ban sexually explicit letters

between inmates and others, nor does it ban sexually explicit articles or photographs of

clothed females.”) Department of Corrections policy applies Section 3006(c)(17)(B) in

compliance with Mauro; an administrative bulletin advises prison staff that the ban on

sexually explicit materials “does not include sexually explicit letters, articles or photographs

of clothed person(s) . . . .” Plaint. Ex. F. Further, section 3006(c)(17)(B) expressly allows

certain sexually explicit educational, medical/scientific, and artistic materials. See Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15 § 3006(c)(17)(B)(2006). The regulation provides ample alternative means for

prisoners to exercise their First Amendment rights. 

Section 3006(c)(17) meets the third prong of the Turner test. As contemplated in

Mauro, the impact of allowing inmates unrestricted access to sexually explicit materials

would be significant. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061. Unrestricted access could lead to the sexual

harassment of female officers and violence among inmates stemming from the possession or

use of such materials. See id.; see also Plaint. Ex. G (Initial Statement of Reasons).1

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The following sexually explicit material shall be allowed:

1. Departmentally purchased or acquired educational, medical/scientific, or artistic materials, such as

books or guides purchased by the department for inclusion in institution libraries and/or educational

areas; or

2. Educational, medical/scientific, or artistic materials, including, but not limited to, anatomy medical

reference books, general practitioner reference books and/or guides, National Geographic, or artistic

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Finally, section 3006(c)(17) meets the fourth prong of the Turner test; the regulation is

not an exaggerated response to the prison’s legitimate concerns. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91;

Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1062. The burden is on the plaintiff to show an alternative that fully

accommodates his rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. See Thornburgh,

490 U.S. at 418. Plaintiff proposes the addition of an exception to Section 3006 (c)(17)(B)

for “non sexual” literary materials that contain ‘incidental’ frontal nudity. The fourth Turner

factor is not a “least restrictive alternative” test, however. Prison officials are not required to

adopt the least restrictive means of achieving their legitimate objectives. See Mauro, 188

F.3d at 1063. The regulation already contains ample alternatives for plaintiff to acquire

sexually explicit materials, so his claim that the regulation is an “exaggerated response” must

fail. 

Because section 3006(c)(17) does not materially differ from the policy upheld in

Mauro, the complaint does not state a valid facial constitutional challenge to the regulation.

b. Application of Section 3006(c)(17) to the Star Distribution Catalog

and Esquire Magazines

The regulation prohibits frontal nudity as defined, including “the exposed female

breast.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3006(c)(17)(A)(2006). Plaintiff was denied the Star

Distribution Catalog because it contained “pictures of full frontal nudity” as prohibited by

section 3006(c)(17). See Def. Ex. A. The September and October 2003 issues of Esquire

magazine were denied because they contained depictions of exposed female breasts as

prohibited by section 3006(c)(17). See Def. Ex. D. There is no factual dispute as to the

nudity depicted in the publications. Contrary to plaintiff’s conclusory allegation, the

materials do not meet the exceptions articulated in section 3006(c)(17)(B)(1)(2).2

 Further,

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reference material depicting historical, modern, and/or post modern era art, purchased or possessed by

inmates and approved by the institution head or their designee on a case-by-case basis. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3006(c)(17)(B)(2006).

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defendants’ bans were directed towards specific publications, as opposed to a category of

publications. After closer scrutiny on appeal, defendants reversed their initial determination

and allowed plaintiff the August 2003 issue of Esquire magazine. See Plaint. Ex. N.

Regulations that provide for individualized determinations as opposed to

predetermined categorical exclusions are likely to pass constitutional muster. See

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416-17; see, e.g., Sherman v. MacDougall, 656 F.2d 527, 528 (9th

Cir. 1981) (banning individual issues of American Rifleman magazine constitutional when

each issue scrutinized and found to contain detailed information on guns). Conversely,

regulations to be viewed with caution include those which categorically prohibit access to a

broad range of materials, see Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d, 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996), amended,

135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., id. at 1093 (allowing challenge to prison’s

“publisher's only” rule and prisoners' general lack of access to reading materials to establish

whether ban is too broad); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1991) (rule

categorically excluding inmates from receiving soft-cover books and magazines not sent

directly from publisher must be scrutinized closely); Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 820 (9th

Cir. 1987) (objection on First Amendment grounds to total ban on prisoners' receipt of books

from sources other than publishers and bookstores not legally frivolous), or “fairly invite

prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as

standards for [] censorship,” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416 n.14 (citation omitted); see, e.g.,

Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1982) (prison officials may not capriciously

apply blanket regulation prohibiting sexually explicit magazines).

Rather than impose a blanket ban on all sexually explicit magazines, or even all issues

of Esquire magazine, defendants prohibited plaintiff from receiving only those issues of

Esquire that contained frontal nudity. Defendants’ decision to ban the publications was a

constitutional application of section 3006(c)(17). There remains no genuine issue for trial on 

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whether section 3006(c)(17) prohibits the receipt of the September and October 2003 issues

of Esquire magazine and the Star Distribution catalog because the sexually explicit content

contained in the publications fall clearly within the purview of the valid regulation.

2. Best American Erotica and The Book Claims

Plaintiff was denied The Best American Erotica and The Book, pursuant to PBSP

policy because they were found to be obscene under California Code of Regulations title 15,

section 3006(c)(15). Def. Decl. Ex. B and F. Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his

First Amendment rights by denying him “sexually explicit non-obscene reading novels.”

Plaint. Compl. at 12. Plaintiff presents both a facial constitutional challenge to California

Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(15), and an as applied challenge to the denial of

the specific publications. Defendants claim that plaintiff was properly denied The Best

American Erotica and The Book because they contain obscene material prohibited by section

3006(c)(15), a valid regulation. 

a. Regulation of Obscenity

The challenged regulation prohibiting prisoners’ access to obscene materials is

constitutional. The relevant portions are as follows:

Except as authorized by the institution head, inmates shall not possess or have

under their control any matter which contains or concerns any of the following: . . . .

 (15) Obscene material and mail containing information concerning where, how,

or from whom obscene material may be obtained.

 (A) Obscene material means material taken as a whole, which to the average

person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient

interest; and is material which taken as a whole, depicts or describes sexual

conduct; and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or

scientific value. . . . .

 (C) Material subject to the tests in paragraphs (A) or (B) includes, but is not

limited to material that:

 (1) Depicts, displays, or describes penetration of the vagina or anus, or contact

between the mouth and the genitals.

Cal. Code of Regs. tit. 15, § 3006(c)(15)(2006). 

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Contrary to plaintiff’s allegations, the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests. Section 3006(c)(15) satisfies the first prong of Turner because it

facilitates the legitimate and neutral objectives of protecting the safety of staff and inmates,

and protecting staff from a hostile work environment encouraged by the dissemination of

these kinds of materials. See Plaint. Ex. B. (Initial Statement of Reasons for the adoption of

California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(15)). The prohibition of obscene

materials is intended to further the same legitimate penological objectives that the prohibition

of sexually explicit materials is designed to prohibit. Because the legitimacy of these

interests were established in Mauro, the first prong of the Turner test is met.

Section 3006(c)(15) also satisfies the second prong of the Turner test. The regulation

leaves ample alternative means for prisoners to exercise their First Amendment rights. The

provision only prohibits obscene materials, leaving open access to non-obscene, sexually

explicit literary materials and letters. 

Section 3006(c)(15) meets the third prong of the Turner test; allowing inmates

unrestricted access to obscene materials would have a significant impact on prison staff,

other inmates and the allocation of prison resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90; Mauro, 188

F.3d at 1061. Unrestricted access could lead to the sexual harassment of female officers and

violence among inmates stemming from the possession or use of such materials. See id.; see

also Plaint. Ex. B.

Finally, the fourth Turner factor is met because plaintiff points to no alternative that

fully accommodates his First Amendment rights at de minimis cost to valid penological

interests. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. The burden is on plaintiff to show an alternative that

fully accommodate his rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. See id.

Instead plaintiff maintains that the regulation at issue is an “exaggerated response to prison

concerns”, characterizing the ban as a restriction on sexually explicit “non-obscene” reading

novels. The regulation at issue only prohibits obscene materials. Further, the fourth Turner

factor is not a “least restrictive alternative” test. Prison officials are not required to adopt the

least restrictive means of achieving their legitimate objectives. See Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1063.

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California Code of Regulations title 15 section 3006(c)(15) is a constitutional facially

valid regulation because it is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests of

maintaining prison safety and protecting staff from a hostile work environment. 

b. The Best American Erotica 

The Best American Erotica is a collection of short stories edited by Susie Bright. See

Def. Ex. B. Some of these stories contain material that defendants found to be “explicitly

prurient” in violation of section 3006(c)(15). Id. For example, the book contains an explicit

description of oral sex. Id. Section 3006(c)(15)(C)(1) allows for the prohibition of

“[depictions], displays, or [descriptions of] penetration of the vagina or anus, or contact

between the mouth and the genitals.” Prison officials determined that The Best American

Erotica was obscene, and therefore denied plaintiff the publication. Plaintiff appealed this

determination.

Judging obscenity is a subjective determination, and outside the prison context there

might be a legitimate First Amendment challenge as to whether The Best American Erotica is

obscene. However, within the prison context officials are afforded a deferential level of

review. Defendants’ denial of The Best American Erotica was a reasonable application of

the valid obscenity regulation, section 3006(c)(15). The Best American Erotica contains a

graphic description of oral sex, the type of content specifically listed in the obscenity

regulation. In the prison context, regulations that apply to specific types of content due to

specific inherent risks or harms are considered to be content neutral. Bahrampour, 356 F.3d

at 975; (citing Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415, 416). Further, the evidence shows that

defendants denied The Best American Erotica not as part of a blanket ban on obscene

materials, but as the result of an individualized determination. See Def. Ex. B. 

The June 16, 2003 Warden Level Decision reviewed plaintiff’s appeal of the denial of

two books that had been prohibited due to obscene content: Notes of a dirty old man by

Charles Bukowski, and The Best American Erotica. Id. At this second level review,

defendants concluded that Notes of a dirty old man was not obscene despite “crude” language

and detailed descriptions of a sexual encounter. Id. Defendants determined that because the

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book did not focus exclusively on sex, that the intent of the book was not “prurient” in

nature, and thus not obscene. Id. Prisoner was allowed the book Notes of a dirty old man. 

Id. Defendants determined that in the case of The Best American Erotica, that the graphic

nature of the book outweighed any literary value, and that the “intent of [the] book is

explicitly prurient.” Id. 

As discussed above, individualized determinations as opposed to predetermined

categorical exclusions of publications are likely to pass constitutional muster. See

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416-17. The denial of The Best American Erotica in this case was

the result of an individualized determination that left plaintiff with ample access to other

“sexually explicit non-obscene reading materials.” It did not violate plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights. 

c. The Book 

Plaintiff was denied The Book because it “contains material depicting in graphic

detail, penetration of the vagina or anus or contact between the mouth and genitals and

includes acts of sexual bondage.” See Def. Ex. F; Feb. 18, 2004, Director’s Level Appeal

Decision. The Book was legitimately withheld due to its obscene content and not because it

was downloaded from the Internet as plaintiff claims. The permanent injunction issued in

Clement v. California Dep’t of Corrections, enjoins prison officials from “enforcing any

policy prohibiting California inmates from receiving mail because it contains Internetgenerated information.” 364 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s

claim that defendants acted in violation of the injunction has no merit. 

Plaintiff was legitimately denied the publications The Best American Erotica and The

Book due to their obscene contents in accordance with section 3006(c)(15). Despite

plaintiff’s conclusory claims to the contrary, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether

these materials may be banned under section 3006(c)(15). The publications were denied to

further the legitimate penological interests of maintaining prison safety and protecting staff

from a hostile work environment. Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated.

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3. Teach Yourself Swahili

On May 8, 2003 Plaintiff was issued a Notice of Disapproval, informing him that he

had been denied receipt of a dictionary he had ordered entitled Teach Yourself Swahili

pursuant to a prison policy banning “[p]ublications and correspondence written in the

languages of Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic or Celtic.” See Def. Ex. G; CDC-0009. The ban

extends to dictionaries in these languages. Id. The ban was instituted in an effort to combat

the use of foreign languages to communicate “coded messages” among prison-gangs. See

Lujan Decl. Plaintiff presents a facial constitutional challenge to the ban alleging that it is

overbroad in its censorship of non-English or Spanish materials that do not contain “coded

messages,” as well as a specific challenge to the denial of the dictionary, Teach Yourself

Swahili.

a. Policy Banning Publications and Correspondence Written in

Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic or Celtic 

On December 28, 2001, all staff were advised by a memorandum from Warden Joe

McGrath that publications and correspondence written in the languages of Swahili, Nahuatl,

Runic, or Celtic were disallowed at PBSP. Def. Ex. G, CDC-0009. The prohibition

extended to dictionaries written in these languages. The policy banning publications and

correspondence written in Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic or Celtic is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. 

First, there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate

government interest put forward to justify it. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. In order to

determine whether there is a rational connection between a prison regulation and the

governmental interest put forward to justify it requires finding that: (1) the governmental

interest is legitimate; (2) the governmental interest is neutral; and (3) the logical connection

between the regulation and the interest is close enough to be rational and not arbitrary. Id. 

Maintaining institutional security is certainly a legitimate governmental interest. See

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415. Here, the policy is intended to maintain institutional security

by limiting inmates’ access to foreign language materials (including Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic

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and Celtic languages) because prison-gang members have used these languages in the past to

communicate coded messages to conceal the planning and execution of criminal activity. 

See Lujan Decl.; Def. Ex. C. 

Although regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights must operate in a

neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression, regulations are considered

neutral for purposes of a Turner analysis if prison administrators draw distinctions between

publications solely on the basis of their potential implications for prison security. 

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415-16. Preventing the communication of coded messages is a

neutral governmental interest aimed at enhancing prison security and not at the suppression

of expression as claimed by plaintiff. Id. 

Further, the connection between banning Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic and Celtic

languages and preventing the dissemination of coded messages is close enough to be logical. 

Plaintiff’s claims that English and Spanish are the primary languages used to disseminate

coded messages. He claims that because the policy does not ban English and Spanish

materials that it is discriminatory and unrelated to its stated purpose of preventing the

dissemination of coded messages. This claim is without merit. Plaintiff presents no evidence

that the majority of coded messages are written in English and Spanish. Further, one of the

reasons offered in support of the ban is that it would be “impossible [for prison officials] to

translate all documents at Pelican Bay that are written in Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic and Celtic.” 

See Lujan Decl. Prison officials do not face this challenge when monitoring communications

written in English or Spanish. 

 The second Turner factor – whether there are alternative means of exercising the right

that remain open to prison inmates – requires that the right in question be viewed sensibly

and expansively. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 417. In this case the second Turner factor is

satisfied because the ban leaves open alternative means for prisoners to exercise their First

Amendment rights. Inmates still have access to a “broad range of publications.” See

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418; Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1474 (9th Cir. 1996)

(even though prisoner banned from reading particular publication, alternative means of

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exercising First Amendment rights remain available where access to material which does not

violate prison security policy was unaffected). Plaintiff claims that the ban on the Swahili

language interferes with his ability to communicate with certain family members, leaving no

alternative means for him to exercise this right. However, plaintiff has offered no evidence

to support his claim that the ban has actually interfered with him communicating with family

members. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (conclusory allegations

insufficient to defeat summary judgment).

The third Turner factor – the impact of accommodating the asserted right--favors

upholding a regulation limiting access to certain publications if accommodating the asserted

right to receive the publications would threaten prison security and order. See Thornburgh,

490 U.S. at 418. Prison officials are given considerable deference when considering

regulations that are instituted to maintain prison security. Id. at 408. Here, prison officials

found that allowing prisoners to communicate in Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic, and Celtic had a

negative impact on prison safety and security. See Lujan Decl.; Def. Ex. C. Specifically,

prison officials found that prison gangs used these languages to communicate the planning of

criminal activities, including the use of Swahili to communicate coded communications in

planning and executing the murder of a correctional officer. See Lujan Decl. Plaintiff sets

forth no credible contradictory evidence.

Finally, the fourth Turner factor is met because plaintiff points to no alternative that

fully accommodates inmates’ First Amendment rights at a de minimis cost to valid

penological interests. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. The burden is on the inmate challenging

the regulation to show alternatives to the regulation; plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that the

regulation is an “exaggerated response” is insufficient to overcome the valid security

concerns motivating the policy.

The ban on materials written in Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic, and Celtic is rationally

related to the legitimate interest of maintaining the security and safety of PBSP. Plaintiff’s

facial constitutional challenge is without merit.

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b. Teach Yourself Swahili

The confiscation of the book Teach Yourself Swahili pursuant to the policy banning

materials written in Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic, and Celtic satisfies the Turner test. First, there

is a valid, rational connection between the application of the policy and the legitimate

governmental interest of maintaining prison security. The denial of the book Teach Yourself

Swahili was rationally connected to this interest because there is undisputed evidence that the

Swahili language has been used to communicate in coded messages among prison gang

members, and plaintiff is a validated member of a prison gang. See Lujan Decl.; Def. Ex. C. 

Further, the ban extends to all inmates. Id.

The second Turner factor is satisfied because plaintiff retains alternative means to

exercise his First Amendment rights. As noted earlier in this order, plaintiff still has access

to a “broad range of publications.” See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 418. 

The third Turner factor favors upholding the prison officials' actions because the

impact of accommodating plaintiff’s asserted right to receive the publications would threaten

prison security and order. Id.

Finally, the fourth Turner factor is satisfied because plaintiff points to no alternative

that fully accommodates his First Amendment rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological

interests. Id. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, there is no triable issue of fact as to whether

the dictionary was properly denied. The ban specifically prohibits Swahili language

dictionaries. It is not necessary for Swahili language material to actually contain coded

messages to fall within the range of prohibited materials covered by the policy. The threat to

institutional security is in the potential that the dictionary, Teach Yourself Swahili, will be

used to write or translate coded messages intended to communicate the planning of criminal

activities. The distribution of the book Teach Yourself Swahili to prison inmates risks

institutional security. 

The PBSP policy banning materials written in Swahili, Nahuatl, Runic, and Celtic is

reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of maintaining prison safety and

security. Plaintiff presents no evidence to support his claims that either the policy or its

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application are discriminatory and overbroad. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their decisions to

deny the publications at issue. Under Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the court must

undertake a two-step analysis when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion for

summary judgment. The court first faces “this threshold question: Taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right?” 533 U.S. at 201. If the court determines that the conduct did

not violate a constitutional right, the inquiry is over and the officer is entitled to qualified

immunity.

If the court determines that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, it then moves

to the second step and asks “whether the right was clearly established” such that “it would be

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Id. at 201-02. Even if the violated right was clearly established, qualified immunity shields

an officer from suit when he makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient,

reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he confronted. Brosseau v.

Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 599 (2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06. If “the officer's mistake as

to what the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id.

at 205.

The first step under Saucier here is to determine whether defendants’ conduct violated

plaintiff’s constitutional rights either through the application of valid prison regulations, or

by denying him the publications at issue, i.e., (1) Star Distribution catalog; (2) September and

October 2003 issues of Esquire magazine; (3) The Best American Erotica; (4) The Book; and

(5) Teach Yourself Swahili. But even if defendants’ actions violated plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to a

reasonable official that such actions were unlawful under the specific circumstances of this

case. See id. at 201-202.

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a. Denial of Materials Depicting Frontal Nudity

California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(17)(A) provides that

“[s]exually explicit material shall be defined as material that shows the frontal nudity of

either gender, including the exposed female breast(s) and/or the genitalia of either gender.” 

It would not have been clear to a reasonable official that denying plaintiff the publications

the Star Distribution catalog and the September and October 2003 issues of Esquire

magazine would have been unlawful where each publication depicted the exposed female

breast as prohibited by the regulation. Def. Ex. A, D, and E. Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity.

b. Denial of Obscene Materials

California Code of Regulations title 15, section 3006(c)(15)(C)(1) prohibits material

that “[d]epicts, displays, or describes penetration of the vagina or anus, or contact between

the mouth and genitals.” It would not have been clear to a reasonable official that denying

the plaintiff the publications The Best American Erotica, and The Book would have been

unlawful where The Best American Erotica contains an explicit description of oral sex, and

The Book contains detailed descriptions of the penetration of the vagina or anus, contact

between the mouth and genitals, and acts of sexual bondage, as prohibited by the regulation.

Def. Ex. B, F. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

c. Denial of Publication Written in Swahili

On December 28, 2001, all staff were advised by a memorandum from Warden Joe

McGrath that publications and correspondence written in the languages of Swahili, Nahuatl,

Runic, or Celtic were disallowed at PBSP because these languages were being used by

inmates to communicate in coded messages. Def. Ex. G, CDC-0009. The prohibition

extended to dictionaries written in these languages. Id. It would not have been clear to a

reasonable official that denying the dictionary, Teach Yourself Swahili was unlawful where it

was the type of publication specifically banned under the policy. Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. 

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G:\CRBALL\2004\3684\Nelson.sj.wpd 19

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc #29) is

GRANTED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, terminate all pending motions

(see, e.g., doc #22) as moot, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 2, 2006 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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