Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04813/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04813-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Medical Malpractice

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sheila T. Roundtree, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Maricopa County Special Health District

Board of Directors, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-4813-PHX-DMF

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter is before the Court on its own review. After the filing of a Complaint

(Doc. 1), all Plaintiffs consented to proceeding before a United States Magistrate Judge 

(Doc. 8). Initially, Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree was the only plaintiff who filed an 

Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2). There 

were further filings thereafter, including by Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree who is not an 

attorney but was trying to appear on behalf of herself and other plaintiffs (see Doc. 15).

On October 7, 2019, this Court issued an Order which addressed the impropriety of 

a non-attorney appearing for other parties in this action:

It appears that the motion (Doc. 15) was prepared by Plaintiff Sheila 

Roundtree, see return address on first page of motion indicating “in propria 

persona” (Id.). It does not appear that Sheila Roundtree is a lawyer. 

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Although a nonattorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf, 

that privilege is personal to him. McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 

288 (9th Cir. 1966). “He has no authority to appear as an attorney for others 

than himself.” Id. See also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. U.S., 818 F.2d 696, 

697 (9th Cir. 1987). Section 1654, 28 U.S.C., provides that in federal court, 

“parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as,

by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct 

causes therein.” Significant is the language contained in the statute that 

limits the authorization of civil litigants to “plead and conduct their own 

cases personally.” (emphasis added). Courts have routinely adhered to the 

general rule prohibiting plaintiffs appearing in propria persona from pursuing 

claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. Any further filings 

will only be considered as to each Plaintiff who signed the filing.

(Doc. 16 at 1-2). The same Order addressed proceeding without prepaying costs and fees;

the Court wrote:

On August 27, 2019, this Court denied without prejudice the application to 

proceed without prepaying costs and fees filed solely by Plaintiff Sheila 

Roundtree because the affidavit sought waiver of the filing fee for all the 

named Plaintiffs (Doc. 10). No applications to proceed without prepaying 

costs and fees have been filed by any other Plaintiff besides Plaintiff Sheila 

Roundtree. In the motion to extend time for service, Plaintiffs state that the 

filing fee will be paid by October 23, 2019 (Doc. 15). Thus, the filing fee 

must be paid in full or applications to proceed without prepaying costs and 

fees by each Plaintiff seeking to proceed with the Complaint or First 

Amended Complaint must be filed by October 23, 2019. The case will be 

dismissed as to any Plaintiff not found to be entitled to proceed without the 

prepayment of costs and fees if the filing fee is not paid in full by October 

23, 2019. For purposes of such, the Court will consider, as to Plaintiff Sheila 

M. Roundtree, the application already filed at Doc. 2, from which the Court 

intends to find that Plaintiff qualifies for proceeding without the prepayment 

of costs and fees.

(Doc. 16 at 2).

On October 22, 2019, a First Amended Complaint signed by Sheila Roundtree and 

Sean Roundtree was filed (Doc. 17). Sean Roundtree also filed an Application to Proceed 

in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 18). Given the Plaintiffs’ consents

to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 8), undersigned has authority to 

rule on the Applications to Proceed in the District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs 

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(Docs. 2, 18), and has granted such applications (Doc. 21). Without consents to proceed

before a United States Magistrate Judge by all the defendants, undersigned lacks authority 

to screen the First Amended Complaint with the issuance of an order, and will instead 

proceed by report and recommendation herein. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th

Cir. 2017).

I. Screening/Review Pursuant to § 1915

Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims

which: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). See also

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 fn. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “applies to

all in forma pauperis complaints,” not merely those filed by prisoners). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint

that lacks such statement fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.

In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court assumes that all

factual allegations in the complaint are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480,

1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations

as true is inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). The pertinent question is whether the factual allegations, assumed to be true,

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Where a complaint contains the factual elements of a cause, but those elements are

scattered throughout the complaint without any meaningful organization, the complaint

does not set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim” for purposes of Rule 8, Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir.

1988). Further, a complaint may be dismissed where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, 

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lacks sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory, or contains allegations 

disclosing some absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, 

fn. 1 (9th Cir. 1997).

To survive dismissal, a complaint must give each defendant “fair notice of what the

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). In the absence of fair 

notice, a defendant “should not be required to expend legal resources to guess which claims 

are asserted against her or to defend all claims ‘just in case.’” Gregory v. Ariz. Div. of 

Child Support Enforcement, No. CV11-0372-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 3203097, at *1 

(D.Ariz. July 27, 2011).

Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts

must “construe the pleadings liberally ... to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Under the pleading

standard set by the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint

without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint

could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).

When the court dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to amend, the

“court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to

ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Id. (quoting Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Without the benefit of a statement of

deficiencies, the pro se litigant will likely repeat previous errors.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A.

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446,

1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the

defects; this type of advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial

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decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231, 124 S.Ct. 2441, 159 L.Ed.2d 338

(2004).

II. Jurisdiction of this Court

This Court is a limited jurisdiction court; this federal court has no jurisdiction 

beyond that conferred upon it by statute. Brandt v. Bay City Super Mkt., 182 F.Supp. 937, 

939 (N.D. Cal. 1960). Unlike state courts, federal courts only have jurisdiction over a 

limited number of cases, and those cases involve either a question of federal law (federal 

question jurisdiction) or a controversy between citizens of different states meeting a 

threshold amount in controversy (diversity jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; see 

also 28 U.S.C. § 1343. “As for diversity jurisdiction, federal district courts have 

jurisdiction over suits for more than $75,000 where the citizenship of each plaintiff is 

different from that of each defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 

582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). This requirement is referred to as “complete 

diversity.” Id.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement 

of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” Further, the party asserting jurisdiction bears 

the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a federal court must not disregard or evade 

the limits on its subject matter jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 

U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Thus, the Court is obligated to evaluate its subject matter jurisdiction 

in each case and to dismiss a case when such jurisdiction is lacking. See Valdez v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

III. Deficiencies in the First Amended Complaint

The First Amended Complaint alleges twenty-three claims against multiple 

defendants (Doc. 17). While the First Amended Complaint cites both the federal question

jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. 

§1332, as basis for jurisdiction, Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree and all of the defendants are 

alleged to be citizens of Arizona (Doc. 17 at 4-10), which does not meet the “complete 

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diversity” requirement of diversity jurisdiction. Because it is impossible for this Court to 

have diversity jurisdiction based on state law claims in the First Amended Complaint, if

the First Amended Complaint does not state a claim that invokes federal question 

jurisdiction, this Court must dismiss the First Amended Complaint.

The First Amended Complaint is based on allegations regarding medical care that 

Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree received and did not receive from various medical providers and 

entities. See Doc. 17. There are detailed factual allegations in the First Amended 

Complaint regarding alleged medical care deficits. Id. The First Amended Complaint 

makes clear that Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree was not incarcerated during the provision or 

lack of provision of medical care. Id. Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree complains in the First 

Amended Complaint that she was not provided adequate and appropriate health care

regarding a wound because Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree did not have insurance and pays for 

her medical care out of pocket. See Doc. 17 at 2, 11, 14, 15.

Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree asserts that the defendants “conspired to act deliberately 

indifferent to her symptoms of infection because she lacked insurance” (Doc. 17 at 15). 

Plaintiff Sean Rountree is Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree’s adult brother, and Plaintiff Sheila 

Roundtree asserts she is appearing for her two minor grandchildren. See Doc. 17 at 5, 40. 

The First Amended Complaint asserts loss of consortium claims on behalf of Plaintiff 

Sheila Roundtree, Plaintiff Sean Roundtree, and Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree’s two minor 

grandchildren. See Doc. 17 at 30-31. Plaintiffs Sheila Roundtree and Sean Roundtree also 

complain of First Amendment retaliation due to interactions when Plaintiff Sean Roundtree 

delivered notices of claim to various defendants. See Doc. 17 at 3 7-50.

All of the counts in the First Amended Complaint other than Counts XV through 

XXIII are state law claims.

1

 See Doc. 17 at 32-50. As discussed below, none of the counts 

purportedly alleging a federal claim state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 

 

1 Count XXIII is actually an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim that 

references First Amendment Retaliation in the subtitle, but for purposes of this report and 

recommendation, undersigned will evaluate such for stating a federal civil rights claim due 

to the reference to First Amendment Retaliation in the subtitle. See Doc. 17 at 49-50.

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Plaintiffs have already filed an amended complaint. To allow further amendment would 

be futile because Plaintiffs have already presented detailed factual allegations in the First 

Amended Complaint.

Count XV of the First Amended Complaint is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff 

must allege two elements to state a section 1983 claim: 1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 2) that the alleged violation was 

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 

(1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). While 

governmental entities have an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to provide medical 

care for those whom the government punishes by incarceration, no such federal right to 

provision of medical care exists as to non-incarcerated persons. See Hutchinson v. United 

States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 

285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Thus, Count XV does not state a claim because Plaintiff 

Sheila Roundtree did not have a federal right to health care. For the same reasons, Count 

XVI alleging a “MONELL CLAIM” and Count XXI alleging Complication of Roundtree’s 

Injuries in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 also fail to state a claim.

Counts XXVII2through XX and Counts XXII through XXIII

3

attempt to allege First 

Amendment retaliation claims. See Doc. 17 at 37-50. In Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252 

(5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described the elements of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim in the context of ordinary citizen Plaintiffs, such as presents 

here, as follows:

 

2 Count XVII is labeled as a First Amendment Retaliation Claim but it mirrors the claims 

in Counts XV and XVII. See Doc. 17 at 37-39. In such claim, Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree 

complains of a purported “custom, policy, and procedure of retaliation i.e. complication of 

medical issues against [type 2 diabetes] patients who make too much money to qualify for 

insurance” (Doc. 17 at 38). Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree asserts that she expressed her “First 

Amendment right to free speech, to earn too much money to qualify for insurance” (Id.).

3 See footnote 1, supra.

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Unlike most of this circuit’s First Amendment retaliation cases, this case 

does not involve an employment or other contractual relationship between 

the plaintiffs and the governmental officials. The settled law of other 

circuits, which we endorse, holds that to establish a First Amendment 

retaliation claim against an ordinary citizen, Keenan and Przybylski must 

show that (1) they were engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the 

defendants' actions caused them to suffer an injury that would chill a person 

of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity, and (3) the 

defendants’ adverse actions were substantially motivated against the 

plaintiffs' exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Carroll v. Pfeffer, 

262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.2001); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th 

Cir.2001); Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 973 (6th Cir.2000).

290 F.3d at 258. For there to be retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a Plaintiff 

must allege that the defendants took action that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary 

firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 

1221, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 

1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, while the factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint regarding the 

First Amendment Retaliation claims are quite detailed, these factual allegations do not

allege defense action that would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future 

First Amendment activities. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation factual allegations 

center on interactions when Plaintiff Sean Roundtree personally delivered various 

defendants with notices of claim. See Doc. 17 at 37-50. According to the allegations in 

the First Amended Complaint, personal delivery of legal documents by Plaintiff Sean 

Roundtree was repeatedly accomplished. For example, Defendant Manning accepted 

service when Plaintiff Sean Roundtree “politely demanded” that Manning do so (Doc. 17 

at 41). The presence, at times, of armed security guards during Plaintiff Sean Roundtree’s 

legal deliveries (see Doc. 17 at 42-46) does not state a claim for First Amendment 

retaliation on the required element that the defendant’s action that would chill a silence of 

a person of ordinary firmness. Security guards are commonplace in public as well as 

private spaces. The presence of two armed security guards did not interfere with Plaintiff 

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Sean Roundtree accomplishing peaceful delivery of legal documents to non-defendant

Cornejo on behalf of several defendants (Doc. 17 at 43-44). Further, the alleged instruction 

by a security guard to a nurse to move away from Plaintiff Sean Roundtree as he was 

leaving the building after successfully delivering documents (Doc. 17 at 44-45) does not 

even allege a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.

As discussed above, none of claims in the First Amended Complaint based on 

federal law state a claim; nor does diversity jurisdiction exist for the state law claims. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) 

be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend because the First Amended 

Complaint fails to state a claim that establishes this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction

despite detailed factual allegations.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which

to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual

determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 14th day of November, 2019.

cc: SMM

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