Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01956/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01956-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darrell James Hill, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Premier Healthcare Services, LLC., et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV09-1956-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendants Kelly Johnson and Premier Healthcare Services, LLC (“the Premier

Defendants”) have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. #10. The motion is fully briefed. Dkt. ##13,

15. For reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Background.

Plaintiff alleges that his religious beliefs prohibit him from having or using a social

security number. Dkt. #6, ¶¶ 30-32. Premier is a private company that provides temporary

medical staffing services. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff worked for Premier for one month. Id. at ¶ 49.

During Plaintiff’s employment, Premier withheld federal and state taxes from Plaintiff’s

paychecks. Id. at ¶¶ 50-52. Plaintiff objected to the withholding and demanded that Premier

repay the taxes and never use his social security number in any manner. Id. Premier refused,

and notified Plaintiff that he could not work for Premier unless he allowed Premier to

withhold taxes and report the withholdings to the government using his social security

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number. Id. at ¶ 54. When Plaintiff refused to allow Premier to do so, Premier terminated

his employment. Id. at ¶ 65.

Plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against

Premier and its owner, Kelly Johnson. The claim was denied. Plaintiff then brought this

action against Premier, Johnson, the Commissioner for the Social Security Administration,

and the Secretary of the Treasury. Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the Premier

Defendants: three § 1983 claims for violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Counts I, II, &

XI), a § 1983 claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 405 for compelling Plaintiff to use a social

security number (Count III), a § 1983 claim for violation of 25 U.S.C. § 6109 for compelling

Plaintiff to use a social security number (Count IV), four § 1983 claims for violations of the

First Amendment (Counts V, VI, XII, & XIII), two claims for violation of the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (Count VII & XVII), two

claims for violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, (Counts VIII & XIX), three § 1983

claims for violations of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 2 (Count IX, X, & XIV), a § 1983

claim for violation of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 9 (Count XV), and two § 1983 claims

for violations of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, § 2 (Count XVI & XVII). Dkt. #6 at ¶¶

119-213.

II. Legal Standard.

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). “To avoid a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations; rather, it must

plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” demanding instead sufficient factual

allegations to allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,

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(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations

are not given a presumption of truthfulness and “conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C.,

139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

III. Analysis.

There are three primary categories of claims against the Premier Defendants, some of

which overlap: Title VII claims, RFRA claims, and § 1983 claims. The Premier Defendants

contend that any claims against them under these three categories are improper as a matter

of law and should be dismissed. The Court agrees.

A. Title VII Claims.

Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “to discharge any individual . . . because of

such individual’s . . . religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). If an employee makes out a

prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, the employer can avoid liability

by showing “that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue

hardship.” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1999)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). The Premier Defendants argue that even if

Plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of religious discrimination, they cannot be held liable

because they could not reasonably have accommodated Plaintiff’s beliefs without undue

hardship. Dkt. #10 at 6.

In Sutton, the plaintiff objected to the use of his social security number and the

withholding of taxes. Id. When the defendant refused to hire the plaintiff because of this

objection, the plaintiff filed suit under Title VII for religious discrimination. Id. The Ninth

Circuit held that even if the plaintiff stated a prima facie claim for discrimination, the

defendant was not liable under Title VII because it would be an undue hardship for an

employer to accommodate any objection that would require it to violate federal or state law,

including an objection to use of a social security number. Id. at 831-32 (“Under federal law,

all employers are required to withhold certain income taxes and social security taxes and file

a report with the Internal Revenue Service as to each individual employee. These reports

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require identification of the employee by social security number. Requiring Defendant to

violate these laws in order to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs would result in undue

hardship to Defendant.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). In this case, as in Sutton,

accommodation of Plaintiff’s beliefs would constitute an undue hardship to the Premier

Defendants. As a result, they cannot be found liable for violation of Title VII. The Court

will dismiss the Title VII claims against the Premier Defendants.

B. RFRA and § 1983 Claims.

The Premier Defendants also argue that the RFRA and § 1983 claims must be

dismissed because they can be brought against a private employer only when the employer

is acting under color of state law. They argue that they were not acting under color of state

law when they withheld taxes from Plaintiff’s check, used his social security number, and

terminated Plaintiff. The Court agrees.

Private parties generally do not act under color of state law. They must be dismissed

from a § 1983 or RFRA action unless the plaintiff establishes by more than conclusory

allegations that the private party was somehow a state actor. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702,

707-08 (9th Cir. 1991); see Sutton, 192 F.3d at 835-36. Plaintiff states in conclusory fashion

that the Premier Defendants were acting under color of state law, see, e.g., Dkt. #13, ¶¶ 13,

14, 16, 22, but fails to allege any facts supporting this allegation. See Price, 939 F.2d at 708;

Sutton, 192 F.3d at 841. Plaintiff seems to imply that the Premier Defendants acted under

color of law when they withheld taxes and used his social security number, but “in a case

involving a private defendant, the mere fact that the government compelled a result does not

suggest that the government’s action is fairly attributable to the private defendant. Indeed,

without some other nexus between the private entity and the government, we would expect

that the private defendant is not responsible for the government’s compulsion[.]” Sutton, 192

F.3d at 838 (internal citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). Because the

Premier Defendants were not acting under color of state law, all RFRA and § 1983 claims

against them will be dismissed.

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IV. Dismissal With Prejudice.

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is

clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, LLC v.

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). In this case, Plaintiff’s complaint against

the Premier Defendants clearly cannot be saved by amendment. The Ninth Circuit has held

that an employer in the position of the Premier Defendants does not violate Title VII, and

does not become a state actor for purposes of § 1983 and RFRA claims, when it complies

with state and federal withholding and reporting requirements. No allegations by Plaintiff

will alter this clear law. The Court therefore will dismiss the claims against the Premier

Defendants with prejudice.

V. Other Matters. 

On February 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time for delivery of his

summonses. Dkt. #8. The Court had previously granted Plaintiff until February 19, 2010

to serve his complaint. Dkt. #5. The summons sent to the Premier Defendants arrived on

February 10, 2010. Dkt. #9. The summonses sent to the Secretary of the Treasury and the

Commissioner of Social Security arrived on February 16, 2010. Id. Because these

summonses all arrived before February 19, 2010, the request for extension is moot and will

be denied. Dkt. #8.

Plaintiff also filed a “motion for judicial notice” of Premier’s admissions made in

support of its motion to dismiss. Dkt. #14. Because the Court has dismissed all claims

against the Premier Defendants, there is no need for the Court to take judicial notice of any

statements made by Premier. The Court will deny the motion for judicial notice as moot.

Dkt. #14.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Premier Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. #10) is granted with

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time (Dkt. #8) is denied as moot.

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3. Plaintiff’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. #14) is denied as moot.

DATED this 7th day of April, 2010.

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