Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01451/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01451-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BARRY BROWN, JENNIFER BROWN, 

JANE DOE 1, and JANE DOE 2,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

JON ALEXANDER, DEAN WILSON, ED 

FLESHMAN, JULIE CAIN, CINDY 

SALATNAY, and COUNTY OF DEL 

NORTE, 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 13-cv-01451-SC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON 

THE PLEADINGS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for partial 

judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 73. The motion is fully 

briefed,1

 and the Court finds it suitable for disposition without 

 

1

 ECF Nos. 75 ("Opp'n"), 76 ("Reply"). Plaintiffs also filed an 

unauthorized sur-reply. ECF No. 77. The Civil Local Rules 

prohibit the parties from filing any "additional memoranda, papers 

or letters . . . without prior Court approval" except for 

objections to reply evidence or statements of recent decision. See 

Civ. L.R. 7-3(d). Plaintiffs' sur-reply is neither; it contains 

legal argument about the appointment of a guardian ad litem and 

attaches a declaration from Plaintiffs' attorney. Plaintiffs filed 

it without seeking leave of the Court, and for that reason it is 

STRICKEN. In the future, Plaintiffs should file a motion for leave 

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oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons 

set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court assumes 

the truth of Plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations. As a 

result, these facts are taken from Plaintiffs' second amended 

complaint, except where otherwise indicated. 

Plaintiff Jennifer Brown married Donald Crockett on July 9, 

2005. Mr. Crockett is a co-owner and operator of a flower bulb 

grower, one of Defendant Del Norte County's ("Del Norte") largest 

employers. Mr. Crockett and his family have contributed to a 

number of electoral campaigns for county officials. ECF No. 51 

("SAC") ¶ 8. On January 1, 2007, Ms. Brown and Mr. Crockett's two 

children, Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, were born. The 

children are now eight years old; the allegations in the second 

amended complaint focus on the time period when the children were 

between two and six years old. Ms. Brown and Mr. Crockett divorced 

shortly thereafter, with the two parents sharing custody of the 

children but with Ms. Brown as their primary caretaker. Id. ¶ 9. 

Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Crockett physically and sexually 

abused the children on several occasions. They allege, without 

providing details, that Mr. Crockett physically abused the children 

 

to file a sur-reply if they feel additional argument is warranted. 

However, consideration of Plaintiffs' unauthorized sur-reply would 

not affect this order; as described below, the Court DENIES 

Defendants' motion to the extent it relates to the minor 

plaintiffs' guardian ad litem. 

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on "a number of occasions" prior to 2009. Id. In June of 2009, 

Jane Doe 1 allegedly told Ms. Brown that Mr. Crockett had molested 

her. Id. ¶ 10. Ms. Brown called a county sheriff and reported her 

daughter's complaints, but the sheriff took no action. Id. Ms. 

Brown took Jane Doe 1 to the hospital, but hospital staff refused 

to perform a Sexual Assault Response Team ("SART") examination. 

Id. One week later, a SART exam was performed at the hospital, but 

no action or further investigation occurred; neither Mr. Crockett 

nor Jane Doe 1 were interviewed; and no prior complaints against 

Mr. Crockett were investigated. Id. 

Plaintiffs allege that several years later, around late 

November 2011, Jane Does 1 and 2 told Ms. Brown that Mr. Crockett 

showed them movies of naked men and women on television. Id. ¶ 11. 

Ms. Brown reported this to the county sheriff's department, after 

which a deputy took a taped statement from the daughters but 

allowed Mr. Crockett to pick them up for visitation. Id. No 

further investigation occurred. Ms. Brown asked Defendant Ed 

Fleshman, a county sheriff, and Defendant Jon Alexander, Del 

Norte's district attorney, as well as other county deputies and a 

city police officer, why no authorities had taken action. She was 

told that her daughters' interview tape had been destroyed and that 

showing pornography to children was not a criminal offense. Id. 

On January 27, 2012, Jane Does 1 and 2 returned to Ms. Brown's 

home after staying with their father for several days, after which 

the girls appeared physically ill and disheveled. Id. ¶ 12. Ms. 

Brown took them to the hospital, where Sutter Coast Hospital Urgent 

Care ("SCHUC") examined them and filed a report with Child Welfare 

Services ("CWS"), accusing Mr. Crockett of medical neglect. Id. ¶ 

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13. Two days later, on January 29, 2012, Jane Does 1 and 2 

returned to the hospital, where SCHUC filed another CWS report 

alleging that both children claimed that Mr. Crockett had recently 

sexually molested them. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs allege that all of 

the Defendants were made aware of these claims but chose not to 

investigate them because Mr. Crockett's family exerted so much 

political and personal influence in Del Norte. Id. 

On January 30, 2012, Plaintiff Barry Brown (Jennifer's father 

and the children's maternal grandfather) contacted the District 

Attorney of neighboring Humboldt County to obtain a SART exam of 

Jane Does 1 and 2. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs did so because they were 

concerned that Jane Does 1 and 2's complaints had gone ignored; 

Defendants had not investigated any claims of abuse; and because 

Mr. Crockett still had court-ordered visitations with his 

daughters, which Plaintiffs worried would provide opportunities for 

abuse. See id. Mr. Brown contacted Defendants via letter at this 

point, and also informed Mr. Alexander by phone that he would take 

Jane Does 1 and 2 out of Del Norte County for their safety. Id. 

Mr. Brown communicated with Mr. Alexander, the District Attorney -- 

per an exception to the California kidnapping statute for cases in 

which a person with a right to custody of a child who was the 

victim of domestic violence may take or conceal the child as a 

protective measure, provided that the person contact the district 

attorney of the county where the child resided. See Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 278.7. Barry and Jennifer then took Jane Does 1 and 2 to 

Humboldt County. Id. 

A Del Norte magistrate judge issued a warrant for Barry and 

Jennifer's arrest on February 8, 2012, at the request of Mr. 

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Alexander, Mr. Fleshman, and Dean Wilson (another Del Norte 

sheriff). Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs allege that the affidavit 

submitted in support of the warrant alleged that Barry and Jennifer 

had kidnapped Jane Does 1 and 2, even though Defendants knew that 

the Browns were legally transporting the children to a hospital in 

a neighboring county. Id. Defendants submitted the warrant and 

Mr. Brown's picture to interagency databases and issued an all 

points bulletin for Mr. Brown, but no attempt was made to contact 

him. Id. On February 9, 2012, Mr. Brown was arrested by Mr. 

Fleshman, who allegedly consulted Mr. Alexander at the time of the 

arrest. Id. Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Alexander and Mr. Fleshman 

agreed that no charges should be filed against Mr. Brown, but that 

Mr. Brown was nonetheless booked on felony child stealing charges, 

photographed, and fingerprinted. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants 

thus created a false felony arrest record for Mr. Brown. Id. ¶¶ 

16-17. 

Mr. Brown was released within hours of his arrest, and no 

charges were ever filed. However, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Brown 

suffered embarrassment and lost business in his job as a private 

investigator as a result. Id. ¶ 18. 

Upon her return to Del Norte, Ms. Brown spoke to CWS, which 

informed her that Mr. Fleshman had insisted that Jane Does 1 and 2 

be placed in foster care. Id. ¶ 19. Ms. Brown stayed in touch 

with CWS and prepared the children to move in with their foster 

family. On March 10, 2012 -- about one month after Mr. Brown's 

arrest -- Ms. Brown was waiting for the children to be moved into 

foster care, when county sheriffs, a SWAT team, and other local law 

enforcement officials arrived at her home. Id. ¶ 19. She was not 

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shown the arrest warrant, nor was she told why she was being 

arrested. According to Ms. Brown, six police officers used 

excessive force to subdue and arrest her, though she did not 

resist. Id. After handcuffing Ms. Brown's hands behind her back, 

the six officers allegedly punched and kicked Ms. Brown and slammed 

her head and body against a wall and wrought iron bed. Id. She 

was then jailed in a glass holding cell for two days and mocked by 

Del Norte County jail staff. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Ms. 

Brown was denied medication for various medical conditions during 

her incarceration. They further allege that Mr. Alexander and the 

county jail staff demeaned Ms. Brown by throwing a pizza party just 

outside the glass cell to taunt her and celebrate her arrest. Id. 

Plaintiffs assert that, as a result of Ms. Brown's arrest, 

Jane Does 1 and 2 were taken into CWS custody and placed in a 

foster home. Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Brown was told neither she nor Mr. 

Crockett would have access to the children there. Id. The foster 

home was run by a close friend of Mr. Crockett's girlfriend, who 

allowed Mr. Crockett access to the girls, while Ms. Brown was 

denied visitation. Id. Around June 15, 2012, Defendants Julie

Cain and Cindy Salatnay, both CWS employees, removed Jane Does 1 

and 2 from the foster home and transferred primary custody to Mr. 

Crockett. Id. ¶ 21. Ms. Brown was given only supervised 

visitation, and Mr. Crockett allegedly was able to approve the 

court-appointed monitors personally. Id. Deborah Cain (apparently 

not Defendant Julie Cain) was one such monitor. See id. In August 

2012, Deborah attempted to report one of the daughters' statements 

that someone they met at Mr. Crockett's house was going to take 

them away to Mexico. Id. ¶ 22. CWS apparently "laughed at her and 

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refused to document the report," leading Deborah to report the 

matter to a federal agency. Id. 

On January 17, 2013, Arlene Kasper, a non-defendant visitation 

monitor, reported seeing Ms. Salatnay (the assigned case worker) 

interview Jane Does 1 and 2, who told Ms. Salatnay of Mr. 

Crockett's history of molestations. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiffs allege 

that Ms. Kasper saw Defendant Salatnay examine Jane Doe 1's 

genitals and state that "there's something here." Id. Plaintiffs 

report that Ms. Kasper asked Defendant Salatnay what she would do 

at that point, in response to which Defendant Salatnay "said that 

there was nothing she could do, as she had been told by her 

supervisor, [Defendant Cain], that no matter what Jane Doe 1 or 2 

said, [Defendant Salatnay] was to come back with either an 

inconclusive or unsubstantiated report. [Defendant Salatnay] said 

also that her hands were tied because of her supervisor [Defendant 

Cain]." Id. 

Later, around February 21, 2013, Jane Does 1 and 2 were again 

taken into custody by CWS and placed into a foster home pursuant to 

California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 300, which grants 

the juvenile court jurisdiction over children adjudged to be 

dependents. Id. ¶ 24; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 300. CWS 

documented Jane Doe 2's January 17, 2013 report of molestation by 

Mr. Crockett. Id. ¶ 24. CWS also stated that it would not return 

custody of Jane Does 1 and 2 to Ms. Brown, because she had created 

stress on the children by reporting abuse and molestation. Id.

Around March 5, 2013, Ms. Salatnay took Jane Does 1 and 2 to Napa 

County, where they were interviewed for a half-hour each by a male 

detective. Id. ¶ 25. The children apparently refused to 

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substantiate the molestation or abuse allegations, so CWS (through 

Ms. Cain and Ms. Salatnay) decided to return the girls to Mr. 

Crockett's custody, "without court authorization and in spite of 

the fact that a [Welfare and Institutions Code Section 300] 

petition hearing had been held and a subsequent jurisdictional 

hearing set for the following week." Id. ¶ 25. The children were 

back in Mr. Crockett's custody by March 8, 2013. Id. ¶ 26. After 

being denied access to the girls entirely, Ms. Brown was then 

allowed minimal, supervised visits. Id. A week later, Ms. 

Salatnay provided a jurisdictional report to the juvenile court in 

which she allegedly "intentionally lied and misled the court, 

arguing that [Jane Does 1 and 2] should be left in [Mr. Crockett's] 

custody." Id. 

B. State Court Proceedings 

California state courts have already reviewed and ruled upon 

many of the issues raised in the SAC. Those rulings were issued in 

the various divorce, custody, and juvenile dependency proceedings.2

 

What follows is a non-exhaustive summary of some of the relevant 

juvenile dependency proceedings in California Superior Court and 

the California Court of Appeal. 

At a jurisdictional hearing during the custody proceedings, 

the Del Norte Superior Court adopted the Del Norte Department of 

 

2

 Several of the state court opinions upon which Defendants rely 

are unpublished. Generally speaking, unpublished California Court 

of Appeal opinions "must not be cited or relied on by a court or a 

party in any other action." Cal. R. Ct. 8.1115(a). However, an 

exception exists "[w]hen the opinion is relevant under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral 

estoppel . . . ." Id. 8.1115(b)(1). Because these opinions are 

relevant under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Defendants may 

rely on them for the purposes of this motion. 

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Health and Human Services' disposition report, continuing the 

children in Mr. Crockett's custody. See In re N.C., No. A138503, 

2014 WL 1790395, at *1, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 6, 2014). Ms. Brown 

had the opportunity to testify, call witnesses, and present 

evidence of her allegations of abuse and neglect. Id. at *2-3. 

Ms. Brown also had the opportunity to argue that Mr. Crockett and 

his family "are very wealthy and influential members in Del Norte 

County (they are personal friends of the sheriff, his mother is a 

former county supervisor, and they have friends and family all 

working within the Department of social Services and Child Welfare 

Services in particular)." Id. at *5. She additionally moved to 

disqualify the judge initially assigned to the case for bias. The 

motion was granted and the case assigned to another judge. Id. at 

*2. Ms. Brown also argued that the County Department of Health and 

Human Services was biased against her because of Mr. Crockett's 

friends and influence. Id. at *5. Though the Superior Court 

declined to find that the alleged molestation never happened, it 

acknowledged "a substantial reservation . . . as to the truth of 

these alleged sexual molestation issues." Id. at *4. Ms. Brown 

appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The 

California Court of Appeal found that "[t]he allegations of sexual 

abuse by Father [Mr. Crockett] were unsubstantiated." Id. at *8. 

The Superior Court later considered a number of Ms. Brown's 

requests to modify the rules governing her visitation rights and 

custody of the children. It granted some and denied others, again 

adopting the Del Norte Department of Health and Human Services' 

recommendations. In re N.C., No. A140027, 2014 WL 2860915, at *1-4 

(Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 2014). The Superior Court found that the 

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evidence of sexual abuse of the children was "very 

unpersuasive . . . . The testimony was stilted and not persuasive. 

And I don't think that -- I did not find it [sex abuse] to be 

true." Id. at *4. Ms. Brown again appealed, and the California 

Court of Appeal again affirmed. Id. at *4. The Court of Appeal 

held that "the Department properly characterized the sex abuse 

allegations as 'unfounded,' 'untrue,' or 'inconclusive.'" Id. The 

Court of Appeal also noted that "Mother argues that the court had 

no substantial evidence from which to conclude that return to her 

custody would be detrimental to the Twins. But the CASA's report 

for the six-month review opined that returning the Twins to Mother 

'would jeopardize [them] significantly.'" Id. at *5. Ms. Brown 

also "contend[ed] that current orders must be reversed because the 

court 'considered and relied upon substantial factual and legal 

misrepresentations made by the Department.'" Id. at *4. The Court 

of Appeal found those arguments unavailing. 

In February of 2014, the Superior Court conducted an interim 

review of the children's status. It required Ms. Brown to 

participate in psychological counseling and restricted her 

visitation based on a psychologist's report. It also denied Ms. 

Brown's parents (the children's maternal grandparents, one of whom 

is Mr. Brown) de facto parent status. Ms. Brown and Mr. Brown 

appealed, "contend[ing] that the court made multiple errors at the 

interim review that adversely affected their interests . . . ." In 

re N.C. (N.C. IV), No. A141406, 2014 WL 7184749, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 

App. Dec. 17, 2014). The California Court of Appeal "conclude[d] 

that their arguments lack[ed] merit and affirm[ed]." Id. 

 After a series of hearings in April and May of 2014, the 

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Superior Court dismissed the children's juvenile dependency cases. 

It "gave Father and Mother joint legal custody of the Twins, and 

the Father sole physical custody." In re N.C. (N.C. V), No. 

A141846, 2014 WL 7190886, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2014). The 

Superior Court held that "[the children are] not being molested, 

period. And they weren't molested. So that I want set [aside]." 

Id. at *4. Ms. Brown again appealed, and the California Court of 

Appeal once again affirmed. Id. at *6. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

"After the pleadings are closed -- but early enough not to 

delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when 

the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings 

that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, 

Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 

1989). Moreover, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject 

to the same standard of review as a motion to dismiss, and thus the 

pleading must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Johnson 

v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 43-44 (2d Cir. 2009); see also United 

States ex rel. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 

F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson). A claim is 

plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads "factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

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550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Defendants make several different arguments in their motion. 

First, they argue that the minor children's claims should be 

dismissed because Mr. Brown, who serves as their guardian ad litem, 

lacks standing to represent them. 

Next, Defendants argue that certain of Plaintiffs' claims 

should be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs 

bring several state or common law causes of action, including 

conspiracy, false imprisonment, defamation, abuse of process, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. They 

also bring claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that 

Defendants violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. The First Amendment claims are based on the allegation 

that Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of the right to associate with 

their family members (i.e. with their children, grandchildren, 

mother, or grandfather). Defendants argue that the First Amendment 

(and related Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983) claims, and 

those claims only, are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and 

collateral estoppel. Finally, Defendants argue that Defendants 

Cain and Saltanay should be dismissed if the Court grants their 

motion for judgment on Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment 

claims. 

A. The Minor Plaintiffs 

Defendants first argue that the minor plaintiffs' claims must 

be dismissed because their court-appointed guardian ad litem lacks 

standing to represent them. On April 17, 2013, on ex parte 

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application from Plaintiffs, the Court appointed Barry Brown (the 

children's paternal grandfather) to represent the children as their 

guardian ad litem. 

1. Elk Grove 

In support of their argument, Defendants cite only one case: 

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, a Supreme Court case 

decided in 2004. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). According to Defendants, Elk 

Grove stands for the proposition that a "noncustodial father could 

not bring an action on behalf of his minor child on a First 

Amendment challenge; under California law only the custodial mother 

had the exclusive right to litigate as the child's 'next of 

friend.'" See Opp'n at 13-14. 

That is not all the correct interpretation of Elk Grove. Elk 

Grove was a case in which a father sued to assert his own 

constitutional right to instruct his minor daughter on religious 

matters. The father, an atheist, objected to the practice of 

public schoolteachers leading his daughter's classes in the Pledge 

of Allegiance each day because the Pledge includes the phrase 

"under God." See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 4-5. The minor daughter 

was not a party to the lawsuit when it reached the Supreme Court, 

and the Court's only holding was that the father lacked standing to 

bring suit on his own behalf to preclude the school from leading 

the Pledge. The father lacked standing to "forestall his 

daughter's exposure to religious ideas that her mother, who wields 

a form of veto power [because she had been awarded sole legal 

custody of their daughter], endorses, and to use his parental 

status to challenge the influences to which his daughter may be 

exposed in school when he and [the mother] disagree." Id. at 17. 

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The father lacked standing to make such an "ambitious" claim 

because the mother had exclusive legal custody of the child. Id. 

at 10, 17. 

The Supreme Court did mention in Elk Grove that the father 

could not sue as his daughter's next friend. Defendants interpret 

that line as a broad holding that California law prohibits anyone 

other than a custodial parent from serving as a child's next friend 

or guardian ad litem. See Opp'n at 13-14. However, that is 

neither a correct statement of the holding from Elk Grove nor of 

California law. The father in Elk Grove could not act as his 

child's next friend (the case never mentions guardians ad litem at 

all) because the California Superior Court had awarded sole legal 

custody to her mother and the Superior Court entered an order 

specifically prohibiting the father from representing his daughter

in the Elk Grove lawsuit. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 

502 (9th Cir. 2002). Those facts are entirely inapplicable to this 

case; Ms. Brown and Mr. Crockett share legal custody of the 

children, and no state court has issued an order regarding Ms. 

Brown or Mr. Brown's ability to represent the children as a 

guardian ad litem. On the contrary, California law permits the 

Court to appoint a guardian ad litem who is not a parent when the 

parent's interests conflict with the child's. See Berg v. Traylor, 

148 Cal. App. 4th 809, 821 (2007). Moreover, this motion concerns 

the children's standing, while Elk Grove dealt with the father's 

standing. 

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) 

 The Court appointed Mr. Brown the children's guardian ad 

litem pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). That Rule 

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permits certain representatives, such as a general guardian, 

committee, conservator, or like fiduciary to sue or defend on 

behalf of a minor. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1). The Rule also 

provides for situations in which a minor does not have a duly 

appointed representative: 

A minor or an incompetent person who does not have a duly 

appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a 

guardian ad litem. The court must appoint a guardian ad 

litem -- or issue another appropriate order -- to protect 

a minor or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an 

action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). The Second Circuit has explained the Rule's 

effect: 

Rule 17(c) has always been viewed as permissive and not 

mandatory. It gives a federal court power to authorize 

someone other than a lawful representative to sue on 

behalf of an infant or incompetent person where that 

representative is unable, unwilling or refuses to act or 

has interests which conflict with those of the infant or 

incompetent. 

Ad Hoc Comm. of Concerned Teachers v. Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free 

Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1989). Indeed, "[f]ederal 

courts . . . have repeatedly affirmed a court's power to determine 

that the interests of a child or incompetent will be best 

represented by a 'next friend' or guardian ad litem and not by an 

authorized representative such as a parent or general guardian." 

Id. at 30. "The minor's best interests are of paramount importance 

in deciding whether a Next Friend should be appointed, but the 

ultimate decision as to whether or not to appoint [a Next Friend or 

guardian ad litem] rests with the sound discretion of the district 

court and will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of 

its authority." Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 

85 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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 Contrary to Defendants' assertion that only a custodial parent 

may serve as a guardian ad litem, the rules permitting a court to 

appoint a guardian ad litem exist for precisely the situation in 

which the child's interests are best served if he or she is 

represented by someone other than a custodial parent or other 

general guardian. See Concerned Teachers, 873 F.2d at 30; Suits by 

or Against Infants and Incompetent Persons -- In General, 6A Fed. 

Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1570 (3d ed.) ("But what if the infant or 

incompetent has a general representative who refuses to act or 

whose own interests conflict with those of the person being 

represented? Courts, both state and federal, always have had the 

power to appoint special representatives under these circumstances, 

and the decided cases indicate that this power has been preserved 

by Rule 17(c)."). 

Because this suit was brought when Ms. Brown and Mr. Crockett 

were embroiled in an acrimonious custody dispute, and because Mr. 

Crockett was originally a named defendant, the Court deemed it 

prudent to appoint Mr. Brown the children's guardian ad litem for 

this action. Regardless, this is not a motion challenging Mr. 

Brown's suitability as a guardian ad litem. The only issue before 

the Court is whether Mr. Brown's appointment as guardian ad litem 

deprives the children of standing. The law is clear that it does 

not. Defendants' motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal 

of the minor plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. 

B. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

"Rooker–Feldman is a powerful doctrine that prevents federal 

courts from second-guessing state court decisions by barring the 

lower federal courts from hearing de facto appeals from state-court 

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judgments . . . ." Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th 

Cir. 2003). "If a plaintiff brings a de facto appeal from a state 

court judgment, Rooker–Feldman requires that the district court 

dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." 

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, the Supreme Court held that 

federal district courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from 

state court rulings. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 

415-16 (1923). That ruling was extended by District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, which held that district courts lack 

jurisdiction over allegations that are "inextricably intertwined" 

with state court decisions, "even if those challenges allege that 

the state court's action was unconstitutional." D.C. Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 487 (1983). 

At first blush, it seems that Defendants may be correct. 

Plaintiffs do ask the Court to evaluate whether Ms. Brown and Mr. 

Brown were improperly denied access to the children (and viceversa). That certainly demands that the Court consider issues very 

similar to those decided in the various state court custody cases. 

Indeed, one commentator has described cases like this one as a 

common application of Rooker-Feldman: "Often the federal plaintiff 

will allege that the judgment against him was the result of fraud 

or conspiracy; although principles of res judicata do not always 

bar such claims, courts have held that Rooker-Feldman precludes 

jurisdiction." Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the 

Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 Notre Dame L. 

Rev. 1085, 1093 (1999). 

In response, Plaintiffs cite almost no law at all. The only 

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effort Plaintiffs make at analyzing the law is to attempt to 

distinguish one of the cases Defendants cite. See Opp'n at 4-5. 

Instead, Plaintiffs rely primarily on the Court's previous order 

granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs' original complaint. One of Defendants' arguments in 

that motion was that the case should be dismissed under the 

doctrine of Younger abstention, which is related to but distinct 

from Rooker-Feldman. In that order, the Court wrote that the 

"ongoing state proceedings" were "not at all related to Plaintiffs' 

present claims." See ECF No. 52 ("MTD Order") at 16. However, the 

Court noted that the parties' explanations of the state court cases 

were "sparse", that "the record on these points is not entirely 

clear," and that the facts that form the basis of Plaintiffs' 

allegations in this case arose "long after the family dispute in 

state court." 

 That no longer appears to be the case. For one, the 

California Court of Appeal has now affirmed several of the verdicts 

in Defendants' favor, and, as Plaintiffs themselves point out, all 

of those decisions came after Plaintiffs filed this case. More 

importantly, the arguments Plaintiffs made in support of their 

custody and visitation rights in state court were based on many of 

the same factual allegations as the First Amendment claims in this 

case. See ECF No. 74 ("RJN") Ex. A at 1-4. The fact that 

Plaintiffs bring constitutional, rather than state family law, 

claims here does not save those claims from the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine. See Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 n.4 (9th 

Cir. 2003) ("The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal 

courts from exercising jurisdiction over any claim that is 

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'inextricably intertwined' with the decision of a state court, even 

where the party does not directly challenge the merits of the state 

court's decision but rather brings an indirect challenge based on 

constitutional principles."). It certainly seems that a First 

Amendment claim alleging that Barry and Jennifer Brown were 

wrongfully denied association with the children is intertwined with 

the state court decisions that denied them custody. 

That said, the Ninth Circuit has developed specific 

requirements for the application of Rooker-Feldman. The Ninth 

Circuit has held that "for Rooker–Feldman to apply, a plaintiff 

must seek not only to set aside a state court judgment; he or she 

must also allege a legal error by the state court as the basis for 

that relief." Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 2004). Put another way, 

[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an 

allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks 

relief from a state court judgment based on that 

decision, Rooker–Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction 

in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a 

federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 

illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker– Feldman does not bar jurisdiction. 

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 Plaintiffs do not allege any legal wrong on the part of the 

state courts. The only allegation even mentioning the state courts 

is that Defendant Salatnay "intentionally lied and misled the 

court" when she provided a report recommending that the children be 

left in Mr. Crockett's custody. See SAC ¶ 27. Rather, Plaintiffs 

allege wrongdoing only by Defendants, none of whom are state courts 

or judges. Nor do Plaintiffs seek relief from any state court 

order. Indeed, Plaintiffs' case was filed before many of the state 

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court decisions from Defendants accuse them of seeking relief. The 

state court orders defendants cite deal with the custody of the 

children and the rights of the parents and grandparents with 

respect the children. Plaintiffs do not seek any relief from those 

orders; they request only monetary damages. Id. at 21. 

 The Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Noel and 

Kougasian that Rooker-Feldman applies only where (1) a federal 

plaintiff asserts a legal error by the state court and (2) the 

relief sought is to set aside the erroneous state court order. 

Neither prerequisite is met here. Rooker-Feldman does not deprive 

the Court of jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs' claims. 

Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs' 

First and Fourteenth Amendment Section 1983 claims for lack of 

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is DENIED. 

C. Issue Preclusion 

As an alternative, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' First and 

related Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred by issue preclusion 

(also referred to as collateral estoppel). "In determining the 

collateral estoppel effect of a state court judgment, federal 

courts must, as a matter of full faith and credit, apply that 

state's law of collateral estoppel." In re Bugna, 33 F.3d 1054, 

1057 (9th Cir. 1994). "Accordingly, the collateral estoppel effect 

of the state court determination of fraud here is governed by 

California law." Id. For issue preclusion to bar a claim, six 

criteria must be met: "(1)the issue sought to be precluded from 

relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former 

proceeding; (2) the issue to be precluded must have been actually 

litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue to be precluded 

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must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding; (4) 

the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the 

merits; (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the 

same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding; 

and (6) application of issue preclusion must be consistent with the 

public policies of preservation of the integrity of the judicial 

system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants 

from harassment by vexatious litigation." White v. City of 

Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). 

1. Identical Issue 

"The 'identical issue' requirement addresses whether 

'identical factual allegations' are at stake in the two 

proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are 

the same." Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 511-12, 

207 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2009). 

Determining whether issues identical to Plaintiffs' First and 

Fourteenth Amendment claims were litigated in state court requires 

a precise definition of what those issues are. The Court begins 

with an overview of the legal basis for Plaintiffs' claims. "It is 

well established that a parent has a 'fundamental liberty interest' 

in 'the companionship and society of his or her child' and that 

'[t]he state's interference with that liberty interest without due 

process of law is remediable under [42 U.S.C. § ]1983.'" Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001). "[T]his 

constitutional interest in familial companionship and society 

logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state 

interference with their relationships with their parents." Id. 

"Moreover, the First Amendment protects those relationships, 

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including family relationships, that presuppose deep attachments 

and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom 

one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, 

and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

There appear to be four distinct bases for Ms. Brown's denial 

of familial association claims. First, Plaintiffs allege that the 

children were initially removed from Ms. Brown's custody and placed 

in foster care in March of 2012 "[a]s a result of [her] arrest and 

without benefit of due process hearings . . . ." See SAC ¶¶ 19-20. 

Second, Plaintiffs assert that the children were removed from 

foster care on June 15, 2012 and primary custody was wrongly 

awarded to Mr. Crockett in spite of the allegations that he abused 

and neglected the children. See id. ¶ 21. Third, the children 

were placed in foster care again in February of 2013, due again to 

molestation allegations against Mr. Crockett. Plaintiffs allege 

that the children were not sent back to their mother because of an 

unfounded allegation that Ms. Brown "had created stress on the 

children by reporting abuse and molest [sic]." Id. ¶¶ 24-25. 

Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that CWS wrongly returned the children to 

Mr. Crockett's custody on March 8, 2013. Related to that 

allegation, Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Brown was wrongly "denied 

access to any information regarding the girls . . . ." Id. ¶¶ 25-

26. 

It is undeniable that many of those precise issues have been 

litigated in the state courts. As described above, the parties 

have extensively litigated the truth of the allegations of abuse 

and neglect against Mr. Crockett. The parties have also 

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extensively litigated the relative suitability of Mr. Crockett and 

Ms. Brown to be the children's primary caretaker. The parties have 

even litigated Ms. Brown's claims that the state court relied on 

misrepresentations from Defendants in making its findings. The 

state court also heard Ms. Brown's allegations of corruption and 

cronyism within the Del Norte County bureaucracy. Except for the 

first, all of Ms. Brown and the children's First Amendment claims 

involve identical issues to those litigated in state court: the 

truth of the allegations against Mr. Crockett, the suitability of 

Mr. Crockett and Ms. Brown to have primary custody of the children, 

and the claim that Mr. Crockett and county officials made 

misrepresentations during the dependency proceedings. 

The Court finds that the denial of familial association claims 

premised on the state court's decisions to award Mr. Crockett 

primary custody on June 15, 2012; the placement of the children in 

foster care in February 2013; and the return of the children to Mr. 

Crockett's custody on March 8, 2013 are issues that have already 

been litigated in state court. Those, therefore present only 

identical issues to those previously litigated. However, the claim 

that the children were initially removed from Ms. Brown's custody 

and placed in foster care on the basis of Ms. Brown's allegedly 

unlawful arrest on in March of 2012 does not appear to have been 

litigated in the state courts. Neither the lawfulness of the 

arrest nor whether the arrest was a legitimate reason to remove the 

children from her care has previously been litigated. Therefore, 

Defendants' motion is DENIED as to Ms. Brown's and the children's 

First and Fourteenth Amendment claims premised on those events. 

Whether the children actually were removed from her custody for 

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that reason, and whether Ms. Brown or her children deserve monetary 

compensation (which is the only relief they seek in this action) 

for unconstitutional denial of familial association following Ms. 

Brown's arrest remain open questions. 

As for Mr. Brown's claims, the only plausible denial of 

familial association claim comes from the decisions -- by both the 

county agencies and the state courts -- to award physical custody 

to Mr. Crockett and to limit or terminate the children's visits 

with their maternal grandparents. These issues, too, have already 

been litigated in the state courts. See N.C. IV at *3-7.3

Plaintiffs' primary argument against the application of 

collateral estoppel is that Defendants' arguments is "without 

factual basis" because "this Court has already ruled that it may 

not take judicial notice of 'facts' contained in other court 

proceedings concerning the parties in this case . . . ." Opp'n at 

5. That argument stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of the 

Court's previous order and the very basics of the rules of 

evidence. In its previous order, the Court took judicial notice of 

certain documents related to the state court proceedings. The 

Court noted that it took notice of "these documents' existence and 

the state court proceedings" but not "the truth of any fact from 

any of the RJNs' exhibits." MTD Order at 2-3. 

Plaintiffs apparently interpret that ruling to mean that the 

Court, even though it granted Defendants' request for judicial 

 

3

 The children's First and Fourteenth Amendment claims are merely 

the inverse of Mr. Brown's and Ms. Brown's claims; the children 

allege that they were denied free association with their 

grandfather and mother based on the same facts. Therefore those 

claims were litigated in state court to the same extent that Mr. 

Brown's and Ms. Brown's claims were. 

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notice of the documents produced in the state court proceedings, 

must ignore those documents and pretend the state court proceedings 

never occurred (even though it is undisputed that they did). That 

was not at all the effect of the Court's previous order. By 

declining to take judicial notice of "the truth of any fact" in the 

state court documents, the Court simply held that the state court's 

factual findings do not bind this Court. For example, that the 

state court determined the molestation allegations were baseless 

does not mean that this court has found those allegations to be 

baseless. However, this Court does notice the fact that the state 

court found the allegations to be baseless. That is, the Court 

takes notice of the state court's findings, even if those factual 

findings do not establish the same underlying facts for the 

purposes of this case. In the context of issue preclusion, notice 

of the state court findings is sufficient to establish that the 

issues litigated are identical, even though this Court does not 

adopt the state court's factual findings. 

2. Actually Litigated 

The second element of issue preclusion asks whether the 

identical issue was "actually litigated" in the former proceeding. 

Here, Ms. Brown raised the issue of the molestation and abuse 

allegations on multiple occasions before the Superior Court. The 

Superior Court repeatedly held that the allegations against Mr. 

Crockett were unpersuasive and did not create a concern that the 

children were unsafe with him. That process culminated in the 

court's determination that the children were not being molested and 

had not been molested, as well as the Court of Appeal's affirmance 

of that finding. See N.C. V, 2014 WL 7190886 at *4, 6. Similarly, 

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the custody dispute was extensively litigated and finally decided 

when the court awarded joint legal custody to Ms. Brown and Mr. 

Crockett and sole physical custody to Mr. Crockett. Again, that 

ruling was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. There can 

be no doubt that these issues were actually litigated in the state 

courts. 

3. Necessarily Decided 

The next element of issue preclusion is that the identical 

issue actually litigated in the former proceeding was necessarily 

decided in that proceeding. As described above, not only has the 

California Superior Court decided these issues, but the California 

Court of Appeal has affirmed those decisions. 

4. Final and on the Merits 

"[T]he determination of an issue by final judgment in a 

juvenile dependency proceeding is conclusive upon the parties or 

their privies in a subsequent suit." Kasdan v. Cnty. of Los 

Angeles, No. CV 12-06793 GAF JEMX, 2014 WL 6669354, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. Nov. 24, 2014); see also In re Joshua J., 39 Cal. App. 4th 

984, 993 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), as modified (Oct. 25, 1995) 

(juvenile dependency proceeding was a final judgment on the 

merits). Here, the Superior Court dismissed the juvenile 

dependency cases and made a final decision as to custody. See 

Kasdan, 2014 WL 6669354, at *5 (when "the dependency court 

expressly 'terminated jurisdiction over [Plaintiff's] children'" 

the decision became final on the merits). 

5. Party Against Whom Preclusion is Sought is the Same 

Party as in the Former Proceeding 

"[A]lthough the focus of a dependency proceeding is on the 

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child, a parent served with a notice of the proceeding has the 

status of a party in the juvenile dependency proceeding." Id. at 

*5. Ms. Brown and her children were therefore parties in the 

juvenile dependency proceeding. 

It is less clear that Mr. Brown was a party to the state court 

proceedings. He was not a party to the divorce proceedings. See 

ECF No. 27 ("RJN") Exs. B-C. During the dependency proceedings, 

the Superior Court judge told Mr. Brown: "You're not a party to the 

case. You're here as an accommodation." N.C. IV, 2014 WL 7184749, 

at *5. That, however, was before Mr. Brown filed a request for de 

facto parent status. See id. Once Mr. Brown's application was 

denied, Mr. Brown appealed, and he is listed as an appellant in the 

caption of N.C. IV. The Superior Court adjudicated his de facto 

parent status for the children, and he appealed that decision 

(unsuccessfully) to the California Court of Appeal. See N.C. IV at 

*3-7. The Court finds that Mr. Brown was sufficiently a party to 

the state court proceedings regarding his de facto parent status to 

support the application of issue preclusion based on those 

proceedings. 

Plaintiffs argue that this factor militates against the 

application of issue preclusion because Defendants Alexander, 

Wilson, Fleshman, Cain, and Salatnay were not parties to the state 

court proceedings. Plaintiffs miss the fact that California's 

issue preclusion standard requires only that "the party against 

whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, 

the party to the former proceeding." Lucido v. Superior Ct., 51 

Cal. 3d 335, 341 (Cal. 1990) (emphasis added). All four plaintiffs 

in this case were parties to the state court proceedings, and issue 

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preclusion is sought only against those plaintiffs; it is not 

sought against any defendant who was not a party to the state court 

proceedings. This factor, too, favors the application of issue 

preclusion in this case. 

6. Public Policy Concerns 

The public policy concerns relevant to issue preclusion are 

"preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of 

judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by 

vexatious litigation." White, 671 F.3d at 927. In Kadsan, the 

Central District of California faced a similar situation to this 

one: the loser of a state court custody battle sought to recast his 

custody claims as federal constitutional claims. The Kadsan court 

explained the public policy concerns involved: 

(1) there are substantial protections afforded parents in 

child custody proceedings and both federalism and comity 

counsel against federal court's relitigating issues of 

credibility decided in a state forum; (2) allowing such 

collateral attacks would be contrary to judicial economy; 

and (3) allowing such attacks would potentially create 

infinite litigation, thereby undermining one of the main 

purposes of a judgment. As stated before, the doctrine 

of issue preclusion exists precisely to prevent such 

conduct. 

Kasdan, 2014 WL 6669354 at *6. Speaking more generally, domestic 

relations are paradigmatic examples of the sort of dispute properly 

handled by state courts. As the Supreme Court has observed, "[s]o 

strong is our deference to state law in this area that we have 

recognized a 'domestic relations exception' that 'divests the 

federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child 

custody decrees.'" Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12. That language dealt 

specifically with the domestic relations exception to federal 

jurisdiction, but it nonetheless illustrates the strong policy 

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preference for litigating child custody in state courts. The Court 

agrees and finds that the public policy concerns strongly favor the 

application of issue preclusion to bar relitigation of issues 

already decided in the state courts. 

7. Extrinsic Fraud 

Though neither party raises this issue, the Court notes that 

state court orders obtained by extrinsic fraud do not have 

collateral effect. See In re Lake, 202 B.R. 751, 758 (B.A.P. 9th 

Cir. 1996) ("A state court judgment is subject to collateral attack 

if the state court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or 

the parties, or the judgment was procured through extrinsic 

fraud."). "Extrinsic fraud is a broad concept which covers a 

number of situations. 'Its essential characteristic is that it has 

the effect of preventing a fair adversary hearing, the aggrieved 

party being deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or 

proceeding, or in some other way fraudulently prevented from 

presenting his claim or defense.'" Lovato v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 

151 Cal. App. 3d 549, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting 5 Witkin, 

Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971)). 

Plaintiffs allege numerous fraudulent actions by Defendants, 

including concealing or failing to report evidence and lying to the 

state court. However, none of those allegations amount to 

extrinsic fraud. "In order to be considered extrinsic fraud, the 

alleged fraud must be such that it prevents a party from having an 

opportunity to present his claim or defense in court." Green v. 

Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Though Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were dishonest in their 

reports and testimony, there are no allegations that Plaintiffs 

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were denied an opportunity to present their claims in court. On 

the contrary, the records of the state court proceedings 

demonstrate that Plaintiffs were given ample opportunities to 

present their evidence and arguments. Thus the Court finds that 

the extrinsic fraud exception does not apply in this case. 

8. Conclusion 

The Court finds that all six elements of issue preclusion 

favor the dismissal of Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment 

claims, except for the claims premised on Ms. Brown's allegedly 

unlawful arrest. Defendants' motion is accordingly DENIED with 

respect to the claim that Defendants unconstitutionally deprived 

Ms. Brown of the right to freely associate with her children (and 

vice versa) as a result of her arrest. The motion is GRANTED with 

respect to all of Plaintiffs' other First and Fourteenth Amendment 

claims. 

D. Defendants Cain and Salatnay 

Defendants argue that Defendants Cain and Saltanay should be 

dismissed if the Court grants their motion for judgment on 

Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Court 

granted that motion only in part. Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendants Cain and Salatnay were involved in the removal of the 

children from foster care in June of 2012 and the decision to 

return the children to Mr. Crockett's custody in March 2013. See 

SAC ¶¶ 21, 24. However, the only claim related to custody of the 

children that remains in this case is the claim premised on the 

children's removal to foster care after Ms. Brown's arrest in March 

of 2012. The SAC does not allege that either Ms. Cain or Ms. 

Salatnay was involved in that incident. See SAC ¶¶ 19-20. As a 

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result, Defendants' request is GRANTED and Defendants Cain and 

Salatnay are DISMISSED from this action. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons described above, Defendants' motion for 

judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

The motion is DENIED to the extent that Defendants seek dismissal 

of Jane Doe 1's and Jane Doe 2's claims for lack of standing. The 

motion is also DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal due to the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The motion is GRANTED on the grounds of 

issue preclusion as to all of Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth 

Amendment claims, except that the motion is DENIED as to Ms. 

Brown's and the children's claims that Defendants deprived them of 

the right to associate with one another as a result of Ms. Brown's 

arrest in March of 2012. The motion to dismiss Defendants Cain and 

Salatnay is GRANTED, and those defendants are DISMISSED. 

Plaintiffs' state and common law claims and Section 1983 claims 

premised on violations of their Fourth Amendment rights were not 

subjects of this motion and are unaffected by this Order. Those 

claims remain viable. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: April 15, 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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