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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

J.B. PEASE, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

F ILEP 

United Stat 5 (;;Qlltt ~f Appeals 

ientl Circuit 

FEB 8 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-6308 

) 

STEVE HARGETT, Warden; ROBERT H. ) 

HENRY, Attorney General, State of ) 

Oklahoma, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1156-A) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 1 
Mr. Pease appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas 

corpus. 

Mr. Pease was convicted in Oklahoma by a state court jury of 

three felonies. He was sentenced to a total of eighty years. Mr. 

Pease did not appeal these convictions, however, he subsequently 

filed an application for post-conviction relief and the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction 

relief in Pease v. State, Case No. PC-89-589 (Okla. Crim. App., 

filed July 10, 1989). The state appellate court also denied a 

subsequent petition filed by Mr. Pease seeking habeas relief. 

Pease v. State, Case No. H-89-716 (Okla. Crim. App., filed August 

7, 1989). 

Mr. Pease then filed nine separate pro se actions in the 

United States District Court, at least five of which have 

presented claims under either 42 u.s.c. § 1983 or 28 u.s.c. 

§ 2254, and stem from his state court conviction. In none of 

these cases was Mr. Pease successful. 

Mr. Pease then filed this case prose. His complaint, filed 

under 28 u.s.c. § 2254, set forth eleven grounds for relief, ten 

of which were raised in his first habeas petition. The only new 

claim raised by Mr. Pease in this action relates to the state 

court's ruling on his first post-conviction application. He 

alleges that the state court failed to follow its own rules. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 2 
The United States District Court, in a thorough and wellwritten opinion and order, found that the first ten claims for 

relief failed to allege new or different grounds for relief and 

the prior determination was on the merits. As to the eleventh 

claim, the district court found that Mr. Pease had failed to 

present any reasonable explanation for his prior failures to raise 

the issue and relying upon Bond v. Oklahoma, 546 F.2d 1369, 1377 

(10th Cir. 1976), noted that a claim that the state court erred in 

applying state rules or laws is not reviewable in federal court. 

The district court dismissed the petition. 

It is difficult to characterize Mr. Pease's brief to this 

court. It contains his autobiography, his version of the events 

leading up to his state court trial, and his reasons why the 

witnesses who testified against him could not have been telling 

the truth. What Mr. Pease fails to tell us is how we may now 

consider those issues as he raised them in his first habeas 

petition in federal court and which were then ruled upon. Mr. 

Pease also fails to support his eleventh claim. Mr. Pease is not 

entitled to relitigate his claims. 

We have reviewed the record on appeal and considered Mr. 

Pease's arguments. Having done so, we must affirm the judgment of 

the district court for substantially the same reasons set forth in 

the district court's opinion and order dated September 19, 1990, a 

copy of which is attached hereto. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 3 
While Mr. Pease did not appeal from the Order of the district 

court dated October 1, 1990, which places restrictions upon 

subsequent filings, we deem it of sufficient importance to attach 

a copy thereof to this order and judgment. 

Petitioner's motion for a certificate of probable cause is 

granted. 

Judgment AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 4 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA FI LED 

SEPT 1 9 90 

ROBERT n DENNIS 

J.B. PEASE, 

Petitioner, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CLERl(, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF CKLAHOMA 

BYo~un ) ______ _ 

v. CIV-90-1156-A 

STEVE HARGETT, 

Respondent. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing prose, has been allowed to proceed in forma 

pauperis in this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. 

Petitioner challenges his convictions for Lewd Molestation, First Degree Rape, and 

Indecent Exposure received in the District Court of Jackson County, Oklahoma, on 

November 14, 1988. Pursuant to these convictions, Petitioner is serving an aggregate 80-

year sentence (consecutive sentences of 20 years, 50 years, and 10 years, respectively). 

(CRF-86-108). 

The Court's records show that this is Petitioner's second federal habeas petition 

challenging the convictions in CRF-86-108. In the prior petition, Pease v. Hargett, CIV89-1493-A, appeal dismissed, Case No. 89-6403 (10th Cir. June 4, 1990), Petitioner 

asserted thirteen grounds for relief. Ten of the grounds were dismissed for failing to 

,..---'- / 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 5 
assert any supporting facts of constitutional violations and for failing to include a 

statement of exhaustion of state court remedies. The remaining three allegations were 

dismissed as barred by Petitioner's procedural default in state courts, upon the Court's 

finding that Petitioner had deliberately bypassed his direct appeal. 

In the instant Petition, Petitioner asserts eleven grounds for habeas relief. 

Ground One: "State violated Petitioner's right to face his acusers (sic) 

V Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment." 

Ground Two: "Petitioner was denied his Six (sic) and Fourteenth 

Amendment the right to have the assistant (sic) of counsel for his defense." 

Ground Three: "Petitioner was denied his VIII and Fourteenth Amendment; 

excessive bail was imposed upon Petitioner." 

Ground Four: "State violated Petitioners (sic) VI Amendment rights to 

wit: to be informed of the cause and accusations against him." 

Ground Five: "Petitioner's VIII Amendment Rights was violated and 

Fourteenth Amendment: Cruel and unusual punishment." 

Ground Six: "Petitioner was denied his VI Amendment rights to: have 

compulsory process for obtaining wittnesses (sic) in his favor." 

Ground Seven: "Petitioner was denied his V Amendment rights to wit: 

The State used unauthorized evidents (sic) against Petitioner. (intentionally 

and wrongfully)" 

Ground Eight: "State denied Petitioner his V Amendment rights to wit: 

(Fourteenth) State committed forgery in the first degree by making false 

entries on public books." 

Ground Nine: "State denied Petitioner his VI Amendment rights 

(Fourteenth) to wit: the right to be confronted with the witnesses against 

hi II m. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 6 
Ground Ten: "State violates Petitioner (sic) V Amendment Right to wit: 

Double Jeopardy (Fourteenth Amendment)" 

Ground Eleven: "Court of Criminal Appeals denied Petitioner V and 

Fourteenth Amendment Right to Wit: . Equal Protection and Due Process 

Clause to show cause why he bypassed his direct appeal." 

The legal grounds for the issues asserted in Grounds One through Ten were raised 

in the previous Petition, although factual bases for some of the issues were not included 

in the earlier petition. Ground Eleven was not raised in the prior Petition. Respondent 

urges that the Petition should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 9(b), Supreme Court Rules 

Governing §2254 Proceedings, as an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. 

Rule 9(b) provides that a second or successive habeas petition may be dismissed 

if it "fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was 

on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure 

of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constitutes an abuse of the 

writ." 

The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide federal courts the power to prevent "piece 

meal" litigation in habeas actions of claims that have been or could have been presented 

in earlier petitions. Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377 (1984)(Powell, J., concurring). 

See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). In explaining the application of 

Rule 9(b), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Shriner, 735 F.2d 1236 (11th 

Cir. 1984), stated: 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 7 
.. 

Under Rule 9(b) there are two grounds upon which subsequent petitions 

for habeas corpus may be denied. The first occurs when the petitioner 

raises essentially the same legal arguments that he put forth in his initial 

petition but merely alleges or presents new or different factual support for 

those claims. [citations omitted]. The second occurs when the petitioner 

presents new grounds for his relief but his failure to present those grounds 

in his first petition was the result of deliberate withholding or inexcusable 

neglect. [citations omitted]. Once the state alleges an abuse of the writ, 

the burden falls on the petitioner to demonstrate that his earlier failure to 

raise an issue was not the result of intent or neglect. 

Id. at 1239-1240. 

In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Petition under Rule 9(b), Petitioner 

asserts only that the "state" denied him access to "the state court records." Petitioner's 

assertion is directed to this Court's conclusion in the prior habeas proceeding that 

Petitioner had procedurally defaulted the issues raised therein. Petitioner has not 

presented any new evidence justifying a departure from the Court's previous opinion that 

Petitioner deliberately bypassed his right of appeal. Moreover, Petitioner's belated 

attempt to show an external "cause" for his procedural default is inappropriate. Cf. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)(failure to raise a particular claim on appeal 

requires showing of cause and prejudice) and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)(failure 

to appeal conviction at all requires showing of deliberate bypass of available state 

procedures for appeal). See Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624 (10th Cir. 

1988) ( the Fay standard continues to apply to decisions ultimately made by the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 8 
defendant/petitioner, including whether to file a direct appeal or a post-conviction 

appeal). 

An exception to Rule 9(b)'s bar to successive habeas petitions has been recognized 

where the petitioner presents a "colorable showing of factual innocence." Kuhlmann v. 

Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). However, Petitioner does not rely on the "ends of 

justice" to mandate consideration of his successive claims. Id. at 451. See Sanders v. 

United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963)(previous denial of petition bars review of later 

petition raising same claim if prior decision was on its merits and ends of justice would 

not be served by deciding merits of petition again). See also Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F .2d 

1377, 1380 (10th Cir. 1989)(factual innocence test only applies where petitioner is 

relying on "ends of justice" doctrine to mandate the subsequent consideration of habeas 

claims). Moreover, the factual innocence exception recognized in Kuhlmann is not 

applicable to Petitioner's claims because these claims were either not presented or decided 

on their merits in the previous habeas proceeding. See id. (need not apply "factual 

innocence" test to subsequent petitions raising new claims). 

Petitioner has presented no "reasonable explanation" for his failure to raise the 

issue in ground eleven in the earlier petition, Coleman v. Saffle, supra, and there is 

nothing in the record indicating Petitioner did not deliberately withhold the claim. 

Petitioner does not rely on any exceptions to Rule 9(b), ~ an intervening change of 

law the basis for which he reasonably should not have known at the time he filed the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 9 
earlier petition, or new factual or legal grounds that he was unaware of when he filed 

his earlier petition. Id. at 1380-1381. 

Petitioner has now filed ten cases in this court since 1988. 1 At least six of these 

cases, including CIV-88-1279, CIV-88-1937, CIV-88-1938, CIV-89-1493, CIV-90-438, and 

the instant Petition, have presented claims (under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or 28 U.S.C. §2254) 

stemming from the Petitioner's conviction in CRF-86-108. None of these cases has 

resulted in an award to Petitioner of monetary or other relief. In one of the § 1983 

cases, Pease v. Newland, CIV-88-1937, the Court entered an award of attorney's fees to 

the Defendant, who testified as a witness for the prosecution in Petitioner's trial. In 

§1983 actions, Petitioner has also sued the district attorney and assistant district attorney 

who prosecuted Petitioner in CRF-86-108. 

Petitioner was allowed to proceed in f onna paupens m the pnor habeas 

proceedings, CIV-89-1493, and in the instant proceeding. This court denied Petitioner's 

application for pauperis status in another habeas action, Pease v. Hargett, CIV-90-438. 

From this review of the Court's records, it is evident that Petitioner is pursuing 

needless piecemeal litigation designed to harass not only the State of Oklahoma but also 

many of the participants in his jury trial. 

Pease v. Suttle, CIV-88-1279; Pease v. Steen. CIV-88-1936; Pease v. Newland. CIV-88-1937; 

Pease v. Thomas, CIV-88-1938; Pease v. Boaldin. CIV-88-2244; Pease v. Gray, CIV-89-6; Pease v. Williams, 

CIV-89-612; Pease v. Hargett, CIV-89-1493; and Pease v. Hargett, CIV-90-438. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 10 
Based on a review of the Court's records, the pleadings, and in consideration of 

relevant authority, the Court fin~s the instant Petition constitutes an abuse of the writ. 

Petitioner's duplicative habeas filings reflect his refusal to acknowledge that his 

failure to follow the State of Oklahoma's procedural rules bars federal habeas review. 

The Petitioner's repeated habeas filings also reflect an intent to harass the State of 

Oklahoma and a disregard for court rules and procedures. It also appears that Petitioner 

is seeking to reopen the prior habeas proceeding in order to compel discovery of state 

court records. This is not a justification for filing a second habeas petition alleging 

substantially the same allegations as were presented in the first petition. 

Additionally, the only new claim presented by Petitioner relates to the state courts' 

ruling on Petitioner's post-conviction application. Petitioner alleges that the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it "refused to order up and exarnin (sic) transcript 

of challenge (sic) testimony, . . . by not making it's (sic) findings whether Petitioner 

deliberately bypassed his direct appeal, and whether Petitioner was given a special 

hearing to deterrnin (sic) his INDIGENCY as required." Petitioner's claim that the state 

court erred in applying state rules or laws is not reviewable in federal court. Bond v. 

Oklahoma, 546 F.2d 1369, 1377 (10th Cir. 1976). See Van Sickle v. Holloway. supra 

at 1436 (federal district court does not have authority to review final judgments of state 

court in judicial proceedings). 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 11 
The district court has the power to sanction litigants who abuse the judicial system 

by harassing_ their adversaries. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 

1989) (per curiam). There is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute 

an action that is frivolous, malicious, abusive, or harassing. Id.; Phillips v. Carey. 638 

F.2d 207, 208 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 985 (1981). Restrictions that are 

"carefully tailored" to "assist the district court in curbing the particular behavior involved" 

may be imposed under the inherent power of the federal courts. Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 

F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Petitioner has not responded to the suggestion put forth in Respondent's Motion 

to Dismiss that Petitioner be prohibited from filing future actions raising claims that were 

resolved in previous filings. 

The record shows Petitioner has an abusive history of filing frivolous complaints 

against the participants in the trial of CRF-86-108 and successive petitions against the 

State of Oklahoma. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner must meet the following 

preconditions before a complaint or petition will be filed in this Court: (1) Petitioner 

must certify that the claims are new claims not previously asserted in petitions or 

complaints in this Court; (2) Petitioner must carry a stronger burden of proof that he is 

economically unable to pay filing fees; (3) Petitioner must demonstrate to the Court that 

his action is commenced in good faith and not malicious or "without arguable merit"; (4) 

Petitioner's pleadings must be certified as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; (5) Petitioner 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 12 
must include in every complaint/petition filed a list of every previous action filed; and 

(6) Petitioner must send all pleadings to the defendants and provide this Court with 

proof of service. See Cotner v. Hopkins. supra; Van Sickle v. Holloway. 791 F.2d 1431. 

1437 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Accordingly, judgment will issue dismissing this case. Petitioner's Motion for 

Evidentiary Hearing in regard to the adequacy of post-conviction proceedings, Motion to 

Compel Discovery of State Court Records, and Motion for Forensic Examination are 

denied. Petitioner's "Motion for State Court Records" is moot as the state court records, 

although not directly related to the issues pertinent to this decision, have been filed 

herein. 

It is further ordered that the Petitioner is granted 10 days from the filing of this 

Opinion to file a response as to why the above sanctions should not be imposed. If the 

response is not received within 10 days from the filing of this Opinion, the sanctions will 

be imposed as stated in this Opinion. 

Entered this ~ay of September, 1990. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 13 
( 

.. - ·• I _[ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

J.B. PEASE, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

STEVE HARGETT, 

Respondent(s). 

) 

) 

ooc}{ETED 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER 

CIV-90-1156-A \,,,,.-

and 

CIV-90-1594-A 

By Opinion and Order filed September 19, 1990 in CIV-90-1156-A, this Court 

allowed Petitioner 10 days to respond as to why the sanctions set forth therein should 

not be imposed upon Petitioner for abusive use of judicial process. Petitioner has now 

filed a "Response As To Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed." This Response provides 

no coherent reason for not imposing filing preconditions upon Petitioner, and the 

Response spuriously suggests that "This Court is going to do what ever it intends to do 

no matter what Petitioner puts before it." 

Consistent with Petitioner's previous pattern of abuse of process, Petitioner has 

submitted for filing in this Court a new complaint, Pease v. Hargett, CIV-90-1594-A, 

asserting allegations of civil rights violations based on Warden Hargett's "refus[al] to 

file state court records" in CIV-90-1156-A and in a prior habeas proceeding, Pease v. 

Hargett, CIV-89-1493-A. Petitioner has submitted with the complaint a Motion for Leave 

I 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 14 
to Proceed In Form.a Pauperis. Petitioner is granted leave to file in f orma pauperis but 

the new complaint must be dismissed because it does not satisfy the preconditions for 

filing set forth in the Opinion and Order entered September 19, 1990 and affirmed in this 

Order. Tb.is Order is being entered simultaneously in both of the captioned cases under 

consideration in view of their interrelationship. 

The district court has the power to sanction litigants who abuse the judicial system 

by harassing their adversaries. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 

1989) (per curiam). Petitioner's repeated filings of cases that are repetitive, harassing, 

and frivolous compel the Court to establish certain restrictions and preconditions before 

the Petitioner is permitted to file future actions, as follows: (1) Petitioner must certify 

that the claims are new claims not previously asserted in other causes of action in federal 

court; (2) Petitioner must carry a stronger burden of proof that he is economically unable 

to pay filing fees; (3) Petitioner must demonstrate in the in forma pauperis affidavit that 

any new action is commenced in good faith, is not harassing or frivolous, or "without 

arguable merit"; (4) Petitioner's pleadings must be certified as provided by Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 11; (5) Petitioner must include in any new action a list of every previous action filed; 

and (6) Petitioner must send all pleadings to the defendants and provide this Court with 

proof of service. See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986); Van Sickle 

v. Holloway. 795 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1986). 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6308 Document: 010110099906 Date Filed: 02/08/1991 Page: 15 
Accordingly, judgment will issue dismissing CIV-90-1594-A without prejudice and 

affirming the sanctions set forth herein as preconditions to future filings by Petitioner in 

CIV-90-1156-A. In view of the foregoing, leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis 

and a Certificate of Probable Cause are denied. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 

(1983). 

Entered this /.:it-day of s~ 1990. 

WAYNE E. ALLEY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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