Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02125/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER JUAREZ HERNANDEZ, CASE NO. CV F 09-2125 LJO GSA

Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ F.R.Civ.P. 12

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs. (Docs. 14.)

CITY OF FARMERSVILLE, et al,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Farmersville (“City”), its police chief and three of its police officers seek to

dismiss as vague, conclusory and lacking necessary elements plaintiff Javier Juarez Hernandez’ (“Mr.

Hernandez’”) excessive force and Monell claims arising from his home arrest. Mr. Hernandez filed no

papers to oppose dismissal of his claims. This Court considered defendants’ F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss on the record and VACATES the March 16, 2010 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 230(c), (g). 

For the reasons discussed below, this Court DISMISSES with prejudice this action.

BACKGROUND1

The Parties

Mr. Hernandez owns and resides in a Farmersville home, which his wife Ana Chavez (“Ms.

The factual recitation is derived generally from Mr. Hernandez’ complaint (“complaint”), the target of

1

defendants’ challenges.

1

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Chavez”) also occupies.2

Defendant Mario Kristic (“Chief Kristic”) is chief of the City’s police department. Defendant 3

Derrick Porter (“Sgt. Porter”) is a City police department sergeant. Defendants Daniel Villalobos

(“Officer Villalobos”) and Jereme Brogan (“Officer Brogan”) are City police department officers.4

Response To Vehicle Collision

During the late evening of December 5, 2008, Mr. Hernandez drove his vehicle and struck

another vehicle parked in the middle of the street a half block from Mr. Hernandez’ home. The vehicle’s

owner followed Mr. Hernandez home, telephoned the City police department, and entered Mr.

Hernandez’ home “arguably with his wife’s permission.”

Sgt. Porter and Officers Villalobos and Brogan were dispatched to the vicinityof Mr. Hernandez’

home regarding a hit and run and entered the home when Ms. Chavez “motioned with her hand

beckoning them to her and her husband’s bedroom some 50 feet from the doorway.” Ms. Chavez

“speaks no English, but has learned the meaning of some words.” Sgt. Porter and Officers Villalobos

and Brogan do not speak Spanish and “admitted” that Ms. Chavez “did not give the verbal permission

to enter.” The officers entered Mr. Hernandez’ home “under the assumption” that misdemeanor hit and

run driving had been committed.

When the officers entered Mr. Hernandez and Ms. Chavez’ bedroom, Mr. Hernandez “ordered

them out of his home.” Although the officers claim Ms. Chavez permitted their entry, such permission

“was withdrawn when the husband ordered the officer out of their bedroom and the home.” 

Use Of Force

The officers “placed the flashlight” on Mr. Hernandez, “forced” him out of bed and into the

living room where the officers “beat,” “kicked,” and “punched” Mr. Hernandez, “struck him with their

knees,” “shot him twice with a tazer [sic] gun,” and “humiliated him in front of his family.” The

Ms. Chavez is not a party to this action.

2

The complaint’s caption references the City’s police department but its body does not identify the

3

department as a defendant. The City claims it is erroneously sued as the department.

The City, Chief Kristic, Sgt. Porter and Officers Villalobos and Brogan will be referred to collectively as

4

“defendants.”

2

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

incident “left permanent scarring” on Mr. Hernandez, was “painful,” and required “medical attention.”

In an underlying Tulare County Superior Court criminal action (“underlying criminal action”),

Mr. Hernandez was convicted of resisting a police officer in performance of duties, felonydrunk driving,

and failure to provide written notice following a vehicle collision. The issue of the officer’s entry “has

been determined adversely” to Mr. Hernandez in the underlying criminal action which is on appeal

before the California Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

Mr. Hernandez’ Claims

The complaint has 22 paragraphs and lacks headings to denote causes of action or claims. The

complaint notes that this “Action arises under the United States Constitution, and in particular under the

Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under federal

law, particularly the Civil Rights Act, Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983 [(“section

1983")].” The complaint alleges that Sgt. Porter and Officers Villalobos and Brogan “had no right under

the circumstances . . . to brutally beat, tazer [sic] and punish” Mr. Hernandez and “the physical force was

far in excess of that authorized by law.”

The complaint’s paragraph 18 alleges:

Further during the course of the entry, the unlawful forcing the plaintiff herein

to get out of bed and to enter the living room and to deprive him of his constitutional

rights did conspire together and did in fact deprive the plaintiff of life, liberty, as would

shock the conscience in violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments of the United States Constitution, not to be deprived of life, liberty or

property without due process of law and guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. All rights of the plaintiff, herein, as set

forth, were violated by defendants and each of them but the use of brutal, excessive,

unreasonable and unnecessary physical force upon the plaintiff.

The complaint’s paragraph 21 alleges:

Additionally, the City of Farmersville knew that the defendant officers and

supervisory personnel had a history of abuse of its citizens, and failed to protect the

community, and in particular this plaintiff from such attacks. . . . Further, the city [sic]

of Farmersville, failed to select, and failed to perform sufficient background

investigations and psychological examinations to determine the officers [sic] ability to

act within the law even under stressful situations. And further the city failed to instruct

and [sic] officers and deputies concerning the physical affects of tazer [sic] guns and the

resulting helplessness of any human being who been [sic] subject to an [sic] the doses

of electricity forced into is [sic] or her body.

The complaint’s paragraph 22 alleges:

That as a result of the above described policies the defendant City and Chief of

3

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Police demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons

within the city, and were the cause of violations of plaintiff’s rights alleged herein.

The complaint seeks recovery of compensatory and punitive damages and attorney fees. 

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

Defendants challenge the complaint as “unclear” and “fatally flawed” and “replete with vague

conclusory statements and threadbare recitations of elements.”

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where

th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that aremerelyconclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court th

need not permit an attempt to amend if “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an

amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

4

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). th

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently

explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A

claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

. . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

After discussing Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized: “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret

Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). th

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address a motion to dismiss:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ challenges to the complaint.

5

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Failure To Satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8

The complaint meanders and jumps back and forth among the events at issue. The complaint

lacks headings to distinguish distinct claims against particular defendants. 

F.R.Civ.P. 8 requires a plaintiff to “plead a short and plain statement of the elements of his or

her claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the claim and the elements of the prima

facie case.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 840 (9 Cir. 2000). th

F.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1) requires each allegation to be “simple, concise, and direct.” This requirement

“applies to good claims as well as bad, and is the basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” 

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9 Cir. 1996). “Something labeled a complaint but written th

more as a press release, prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to

whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a complaint.” 

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. “Prolix, confusing complaints . . . impose unfair burdens on litigants and

judges.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179.

Moreover, a pleading may not simply allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief. 

The underlying requirement is that a pleading give “fair notice” of the claim being asserted and the

“grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103 (1957);

Yamaguchi v. United States Department of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9 Cir. 1997). Despite the th

flexible pleading policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d

646, 649 (9 Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt facts th

which defendant engaged in to support plaintiff’s claim. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649. A complaint does not

suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, __ U.S. __,

129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

The complaint fails to satisfy F.R.Civ.P. 8 requirements. The complaint makes vague,

conclusory allegations of constitutional violations, excessive force, knowledge of “a history of abuse,”

and “deliberate indifference.” The complaint lacks relevant facts to support valid, cognizable legal

theories as to defendants individually or collectively. The complaint appears to lump Sgt. Porter and

Officers Villalobos and Brogan as “officers” without attributing separate acts, wrongs or omissions to

6

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

each of them respectively. The complaint fails to give defendants fair notice of claims plainly and

succinctly to warrant its dismissal. 

Monell Claim

Defendants contend that a purported Monell claim against the City “is based upon threadbare

recitals of elements of a cause of action and, vague and conclusory statements.” Defendants point to the

lack of facts to support that the City “knew” that the “defendant officers” and “supervisory personnel”

had a history of abuse of citizens. Defendants point to the complaint’s failure to identify the officers,

supervisory personnel and purported abuse. Defendants fault the complaint’s lack of allegations how

the City’s training or hiring were deficient to cause Mr. Hernandez harm. Defendants lament the

absence of a connection between “physical affects of taser guns” and alleged wrongdoing or harm.

A local government unit may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018

(1978); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct.

th

275 (1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). “Federal case law th

has long barred respondeat superior liability against state actors in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.” Fed. of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Claimants suing state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “must establish that their alleged injury was the

result of a ‘policy or custom’ of that state actor.” African American Contractors, 96 F.3d at 1215. 

“[A] municipalitycannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell, 436 U.S.

at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2018. The local government unit “itself must cause the constitutional deprivation.” 

Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 th

(1993). Because liability of a local governmental unit must rest on its actions, not the actions of its

employees, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory and demonstrate that the alleged

constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). To maintain a civil rights claim against a local government,

a plaintiff must establish the requisite culpability (a “policy or custom” attributable to municipal

policymakers) and the requisite causation (the policy or custom as the “moving force” behind the

7

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

constitutional deprivation). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gable v. City of Chicago, 296

F.3d 531, 537 (7 Cir. 2002). th

An actionable policy or custom is demonstrated by:

1. An “express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation,” Baxter v.

Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735 (7 Cir. 1994); th

2. A “widespread practice that, although not authorized bywritten law or express municipal

policy, is so permanent and well settled to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force

of law,” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915 (1988)

(plurality opinion); or

3. Constitutional injurycaused bya person with “final policymaking authority,”Praprotnik,

485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. 915.

“The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional

violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Texas City,

Police. Dept., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5 Cir. 1997). “[E]xistence of a policy, without more, is insufficient th

to trigger local government liability.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9 Cir. 1992). However, th

“municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate

circumstances.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).

“More importantly, where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the

municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken

repeatedly.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Local government liability is based on

“whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or

on a particular issue.” McMillan v. Monroe County, Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734 (1997).

To impose Monell liability, a plaintiff “must identify the policy, connect the policy to the city

itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Plaintiff

must, of course, prove that his injury was caused by city policy.” Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d

762, 767 (5 Cir. 1984). th

At best, the complaint alleges respondeat superior, which is unsatisfactory to impose Monell

liability. The complaint fails to identify a specific policy or custom and to allege how a constitutional

8

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violation was a product of a policy or custom. The complaint fails to connect to the City a policy or

custom which causes alleged constitutional violation. Absence of Mr. Hernandez’ opposition suggests

his concession of a lack of a Monell claim.

Unreasonable Entry

Defendants challenge as lacking legal support an unreasonable entry claim in that Ms. Chavez,

a co-occupant of Mr. Hernandez’ home, consented to Sgt. Porter and Officers Villabobos and Brogan’s

entry into the home.

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9 Cir. 1988). th

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807,

811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). 

Section 1983 and other federal civil rights statutes address liability “in favor of persons who are deprived

of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.

247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 996

(1976)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of

a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689

(1979). Stated differently, the first step in a section 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional

right allegedly infringed. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. at 811. “Section 1983 imposes liability

for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of

tort law.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

“The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when

police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share,

authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so

obtained.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106,126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990)); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988 (1974)). 

9

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109, 94 S.Ct. 988, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

To the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a

person's house as unreasonable per se . . . one “jealously and carefully drawn” exception

. . . recognizes the validity of searches with the voluntary consent of an individual

possessing authority . . . That person might be the householder against whom evidence

is sought, . . . or a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when

the suspect is absent . . . and the exception for consent extends even to entries and

searches with the permission of a co-occupant whom the police reasonably, but

erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an occupant . . . (Citations omitted.)

The warrantless entry prohibition does not apply to “situations in which voluntary consent has

been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched . . . or from a third party who

possesses common authority over the premises.” Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793.

Defendants contend that Mr Hernandez’ “failure to be physically present at the time of consent

proves fatal to his claim of consent revocation.”

The complaint suggests that Ms. Chavez, Mr. Hernandez’ co-occupant, consented to Sgt. Porter

and Officers Villalobos and Brogan’s entry into the home. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, their

presence in the home is not subject to challenge or a viable claim to warrant dismissal of a purported

unreasonable entry claim.

Lack Of Direct Participation

Defendants fault the complaint’s failure “to specifywhich officer restrained plaintiff” and “who

allegedly deprived [Mr. Hernandez] of life and liberty without due process of law” to satisfy personal

participation requirements for a section 1983 claim. Defendants note the complaint’s suggestion that

Mr. Hernandez “was able to observe the officers” and “to specify which officers restrained him and

which conduct belonged to which officer.” Defendants criticize the impossibility “to ascertain what

happened during the restraint” and absence of “factual circumstances that would allow a determination

whether clearly established law proscribed the use of force” to render the complaint “so vague as to

which conduct belonged to which defendant.”

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault;

thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional

deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230, 117 S.Ct.

th

1822 (1997); see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9 Cir. 1989) (“Liability under section 1983 arises th

10

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”) “The inquiry into causation must be

individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Section

1983 requires that there be an actual connection or link between the defendant’s actions and the

deprivation allegedly suffered. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.

2018 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976). 

A plaintiff cannot hold an officer liable “because of his membership in a group without a

showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9 Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff must “establish the th

‘integral participation’ of the officers in the alleged constitutional violation.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 935. 

“‘[I]ntegral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9 Cir. 2004). Integral th

participation requires “some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the

violation.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481, n. 12 (9 Cir. 2007). “A person th

‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he

is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

(9 Cir. 1998). A section 1983 plaintiff “must state the allegations generally so as to provide notice to th

the defendants and alert the court as to what conduct violated clearly established law.” Preschooler II

v. Clark County School Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9 Cir. 2007). th

The complaint fails to connect a particular defendant to unlawful restraint of Mr. Hernandez. 

The complaint appears to rest on insufficient membership of a group of officers, not individual

participation in unlawful conduct. The complaint lacks allegations of fundamental involvement in

conduct that allegedly caused a constitutional deprivation. The complaint provides no notice to

defendants as to their individual purported wrongs. Defendants correctly characterize the complaint’s

11

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

paragraph 18 as “hodgepodge of incoherent sentences mixed and mashed together.”

Attempt At Amendment

This Court construes Mr. Hernandez’ failure to respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss as a

concession of inability to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. Thus, no grounds exist to warrant an

attempt to amend Mr. Hernandez’ indecipherable and barred claims.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES this action with prejudice; and 

2. DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment against plaintiff Javier Juarez Hernandez and in

favor of defendants City of Farmersville, Mario Kristic, Derrick Porter, Daniel Villalobos

and Jereme Brogan and to close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12

Case 1:09-cv-02125-LJO-GSA Document 15 Filed 03/03/10 Page 12 of 12