Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01359/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01359-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 In its August 28 Order, the Court denied Claim 1 on the merits. (Dkt. 129.)

In an Order dated March 30, 2007, the Court had denied the remaining claims as procedurally

barred or meritless. (Dkt. 116.) The Court also denied Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration of that Order. (Dkt. 123.) 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Van Adams, )

) CV-04-1359-PHX-MHM

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

Dora Schriro, et al., ) 

)

Respondents. )

)

)

Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. (Dkt. 131.) The

motion is filed in response to this Court’s Order and Judgment of August 28, 2007, denying

Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkts. 129, 130.) Petitioner

challenges this Court’s denial of Claim 1, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at

sentencing.1

 Petitioner contends that the Court committed “manifest errors of law and fact”

when it concluded that habeas relief on Claim 1 was foreclosed by the holding in Schriro v.

Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007). (Dkt. 131 at 2.) Petitioner also challenges the Court’s

denial of his motion for a sleep evaluation. (Id. at 7-9.)

DISCUSSION

A motion to alter or amend judgement under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure is essentially a motion for reconsideration. Rule 59(e) offers an “extraordinary

Case 2:04-cv-01359-MHM Document 132 Filed 09/20/07 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial

resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). The

Ninth Circuit has consistently held that a motion brought pursuant to Rule 59(e) should only

be granted in “highly unusual circumstances.” Id.; see 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold,

179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). Reconsideration is appropriate only if the court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, if there is an intervening change in controlling

law, or if the court committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,

5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration is not a forum for the

moving party to make new arguments not raised in its original briefs, Northwest Acceptance

Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-926 (9th Cir. 1988), nor is it the time to

ask the court to “rethink what it has already thought through,” United States v. Rezzonico,

32 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quotation omitted).

Petitioner’s motion simply asks the Court to rethink what it has already thought

through. The Court will respond briefly to Petitioner’s arguments.

Petitioner criticizes both the Court’s determination that he instructed counsel not to

present a case in mitigation and the Court’s analysis of the holding in Landrigan.

Petitioner’s principal contentions are that he did not object to the presentation of all

mitigation evidence and that counsel had a duty to investigate mitigating evidence

notwithstanding any directive to the contrary. As the Court has already noted, Petitioner is

incorrect on both counts. First, the record clearly reveals, in Petitioner’s own words at the

presentencing hearing and again at sentencing, that he unambiguously instructed counsel not

to “put any mitigation evidence on.” (RT 10/17/97 at 40-41; see RT 11/12/97 at 4-5.) The

scope and clarity of Petitioner’s waiver is further supported by the fact that his decision

withstood the efforts of counsel and a mitigation specialist to change Petitioner’s mind and

persuade him to allow the presentation of mitigating evidence; Petitioner’s statements that

he wanted the death penalty rather than a life sentence; his directive to counsel that he would

Case 2:04-cv-01359-MHM Document 132 Filed 09/20/07 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

not cooperate with a mental health evaluation; and his refusal to allow family members to

participate in a mitigation investigation. Second, in Landrigan the Supreme Court explained

that “counsel’s failure to investigate further could not have been prejudicial under

Strickland” if the defendant instructed counsel not to offer any mitigating evidence. 127 S.

Ct. at 1941. Therefore, because Petitioner instructed counsel not to present any mitigating

evidence, counsel’s failure to investigate further was not prejudicial.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. Furthermore, because Petitioner has

not presented a colorable claim for relief under the AEDPA and the clearly-established law

set forth in Landrigan, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1940 (“if the record

refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court

is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing”). 

In its Order denying the habeas petition, the Court also denied as moot Petitioner’s

motion for a sleep evaluation. The Court alternatively noted that Petitioner had failed to

explain how such an evaluation would remedy any alleged inability on his part to assist

habeas counsel. The motion for a sleep evaluation was filed in February 2007, several

months after the completion of briefing on Petitioner’s motion for evidentiary development.

Beyond suggesting that he might be less ambivalent about seeking habeas relief if his mental

health were to improve, Petitioner has yet to specify how any potential improvement in his

ability to sleep – assuming that a sleep evaluation ultimately would have produced such a

result – would assist him in pursuing his habeas claims at this point in the proceedings.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

(Dkt. 131) is DENIED.

DATED this 19th day of September, 2007.

Case 2:04-cv-01359-MHM Document 132 Filed 09/20/07 Page 3 of 3