Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00536/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANGEL MENDOZA LOPEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 09-0536 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On or about March 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 9) on June 23, 2009. The

time allowed for Petitioner to file any reply to the answer

expired on or about July 24, 2009. 

I Procedural History

In June 2004, an Arizona Department of Corrections

(“ADOC”) officer searched Petitioner’s prison cell. The officer

discovered a prison-made weapon, or “shank,” encased in two

socks under Petitioner’s mattress toward the middle of the bunk.

The ADOC officer who discovered the shank testified at

Petitioner’s trial that Petitioner’s bunk was approximately six

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feet from the bars of Petitioner’s cell. Answer, Exh. E at 4.

Petitioner stated to an ADOC investigator that he was

“responsible for everything in his cell.” Id., Exh. A & Exh. E

at 3. Petitioner testified on his own behalf at his trial,

asserting the shank was not his and that someone else must have

placed the shank in his cell. Id., Exh. E at 3 & Exh. O.

A jury found Petitioner guilty of promoting prison

contraband, and the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term

of 15.75 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the

sentence Petitioner was serving at the time the shank was

discovered. Id., Exh. A, Exh. E, Exh. K.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of this conviction and

sentence. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for a directed verdict, i.e., that the state

presented insufficient evidence for rational jurors to find him

guilty. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner alleged the ADOC officer who

testified it was six feet between the edge of Petitioner’s

mattress to the bars of his cell committed perjury by so

testifying. Id., Exh. B & Exh. E. 

Petitioner also argued that the state violated his

constitutional rights as established by Brady v. Maryland by

failing to disclose the distance between the bars of

Petitioner’s cell and his bunk. Id., Exh. B at 21. Appended to

his opening brief on appeal was an affidavit and diagram of

Petitioner’s cell, indicating the distance between the cell bars

and his bunk was far shorter than shown by the evidence

presented by the prosecution at his trial and inferring that the

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shank could have been planted by someone outside Petitioner’s

cell. See id., Exh. B at App. A.

The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed Petitioner’s

Brady claim for fundamental error because Petitioner failed to

raise the issue at his trial, and affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence. Id., Exh. A. The appellate court

concluded Petitioner knew of the “evidence” at the time of his

trial and, accordingly, that the state had no duty to “disclose”

this information. Id., Exh. A at 5. Petitioner sought review

of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, see id., Exh. C,

which denied review. Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was appointed counsel to

represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings. In his petition for

post-conviction relief Petitioner argued that his trial counsel

was ineffective because he failed to produce evidence to support

Petitioner’s theory of the case, i.e., counsel failed to

establish that Petitioner’s bunk was 22 inches from the cell

bars and that the socks in which the shank was found were not

standard prison-issue socks, although they were available at the

prison store. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner also asserted counsel

failed to properly cross-examine the ADOC officer who discovered

the shank. Additionally, Petitioner alleged his trial counsel

failed to emphasize to the jury that ADOC personnel had not

found any of the materials used to make the shank in

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1

 The shank was constructed of thick gauge steel wire with

a handle manufactured from masking tape.

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Petitioner’s cell. Id., Exh. E at 5–7.1 Petitioner also alleged

his conviction was obtained through perjured testimony, in

violation of the United States and Arizona Constitutions. Id.,

Exh. E at 7–8.

The state trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

See id., Exh. F & Exh. J. The trial court concluded that, even

assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner

failed to demonstrate there was a reasonable probability that

the verdict would have been different. Id., Exh. F. The trial

court noted the “overwhelming” circumstantial evidence,

including the fact that Petitioner had been confined to his cell

for 23 out of 24 hours per day for the two months preceding the

discovery of the shank. Id., Exh. F. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, see id., Exh. G, which granted review

but denied relief. See id., Exh. H. Petitioner did not seek

review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Id., Exh.

I.

In his section 2254 petition, Petitioner argues that

his right to due process was violated because the state withheld

allegedly exculpatory evidence. Petitioner also alleges that he

was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

trial counsel. Respondents allow that the petition is timely

and that Petitioner exhausted his Brady claim in the state

courts. Respondents contend Petitioner did not properly exhaust

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his ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he failed to

present the claim to the Arizona Supreme Court in his Rule 32

action. 

II Analysis

Exhaustion

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Respondents argue that, because Petitioner did not

present his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the

Arizona Supreme Court, he has not presented the claim to the

state’s “highest court.” The Court disagrees. The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

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2 Since Baldwin the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

reaffirmed the holding of Swoopes. “In cases not carrying a life

sentence or the death penalty, claims of Arizona state prisoners are

exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them. ” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998

n.3 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotations from Swoopes omitted).

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2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what constitutes the

“highest court” in Arizona for purposes of exhausting a habeas

claim in the context of a conviction resulting in a non-capital

sentence). Although Respondents make a persuasive argument to

the contrary based on the opinion in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S.

27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1350 (2004), until the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals specifically concludes the contrary, the Court

is bound by Swoopes.2 

Additionally, although prior to 1996 the federal courts

were required to dismiss a habeas petition which included

unexhausted claims for federal habeas relief, section 2254 now

states: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2008).

Petitioner’s claims may be rejected on the merits

notwithstanding any failure to properly or completely exhaust

his claims in the state courts.

Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

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contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct.

2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123

S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881

(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008); Anderson

v. Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006); Solis v.

Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000). The “presumption of

correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court,

as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.”

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05

(1982). 

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions or if it reaches a different result than a Supreme

Court case on the presentation of materially indistinguishable

facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1519 (2000). If the state court erroneously applied only

harmless error review to the Petitioner’s claims of

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constitutional error, the state court’s decision is considered

contrary to federal law. See Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

The state court’s decision is an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law only if it can be

considered objectively unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409,

120 S. Ct. at 1521. United States Supreme Court holdings at the

time of the state court’s decision are the source of “clearly

established federal law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable

application” prong of federal habeas review. Id., 529 U.S. at

412, 120 S. Ct. at 1523; Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093

(2005). 

Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has

clearly established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based

on a claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are

“without the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court

precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, if the Supreme Court has not addressed an

issue in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the

issue cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881, citing

Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006). If

the issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in the

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ

of habeas corpus on the basis that the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law by rejecting the precise

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claim presented by the petitioner. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d

1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1033

(2009); Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).

Petitioner’s Brady claim

The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v.

Maryland that a defendant’s right to due process of law is

violated when the government fails to disclose evidence that is

material to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. See 373 U.S.

83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963). In order to prevail on

a Brady claim in a federal habeas action, the petitioner must

demonstrate that: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the

petitioner, either because it was exculpatory or impeaching; (2)

the evidence was suppressed by the government, either willfully

or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice resulted. See, e.g.,

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948

(1999). If the petitioner was aware of the essential facts

enabling him to take advantage of any such evidence at the time

of his trial, however, the government does “not commit a Brady

violation by not bringing the evidence to the attention of the

defense.” United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir.

1978), quoted in Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir.

2006).

Petitioner raised a Brady claim in his direct appeal.

The Arizona Court of Appeals determined that the evidence in

question was known to Petitioner at the time of his trial and,

accordingly, that Brady had not been violated by the state’s

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“failure” to provide measurements of the cell or other

documentary evidence to the defense prior to trial.

The Court of Appeals’ decision was not clearly contrary

to federal law. The dimensions of Petitioner’s cell were known

to Petitioner prior to trial. Because Petitioner was aware of

the essential facts enabling him to take advantage of any

evidence regarding the measurements of his cell at the time of

his trial, the government did not commit a Brady violation by

not bringing the evidence to the attention of the defense.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his

Brady claim.

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id.

To prevail on the merits of a habeas claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s

burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. An

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

incorrect application of federal law.” Woodford, 537 U.S. at

25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal quotations omitted). “A fair

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assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually

unchallengeable....” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at

2066 (emphasis added).

To succeed on an assertion his counsel’s performance

was deficient because counsel failed to raise a particular

argument the petitioner must establish the argument was likely

to be successful, thereby establishing that he was prejudiced by

his counsel’s omission. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135,

1144 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 722 (2007); Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128

S. Ct. 177 (2007). A defendant has no constitutional right to

compel counsel to raise particular objections if counsel, as a

matter of professional judgment, decides not to raise those

objections. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct.

3308, 3312 (1983) (declining to promulgate “a per se rule that

the client, not the professional advocate, must be allowed to

decide what issues are to be pressed”).

Petitioner raised a claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel in his state action for post-conviction relief.

After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the state trial court

concluded that Petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance was

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arguably deficient with regard to his cross-examination of the

ADOC officer who found the shank in Petitioner’s cell. The

state trial court concluded that, nonetheless, the amount of

circumstantial evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming and,

accordingly, that even if counsel’s performance was deficient in

this regard the deficiency was not prejudicial. The state Court

of Appeals affirmed this decision.

The state courts’ decisions denying Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not clearly contrary

to federal law. Although counsel may not have sufficiently

cross-examined the ADOC officer regarding the distance between

the bars of the cell and the edge of Petitioner’s mattress,

Petitioner’s theory of the case was otherwise presented to the

jury. Petitioner testified that he did not know the shank was

in his cell and that he did not place the shank under his

mattress. The jury heard this testimony and testimony that

Petitioner had been housed alone in the cell for two months,

that Petitioner was in the cell for all but one hour a day, and

that Petitioner had admitted that he was “responsible” for what

was present in his cell.

Because the state court could reasonably conclude that

any failure to more strenuously cross-examine the ADOC officer

was not prejudicial given the circumstantial evidence against

Petitioner, the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland and Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

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III Conclusion

Respondents allow that the petition is timely and that

Petitioner properly exhausted his Brady claim in the Arizona

state courts. The Court concludes that the Arizona state

court’s decision denying Petitioner’s Brady claim was not an

unreasonable application of federal law. The Court concludes

that Petitioner properly exhausted his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim by fairly presenting it to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in his state action for post-conviction relief. The

state court’s decision denying Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not an unreasonable application

of Strickland and, accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on this basis. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Romero’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

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parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 5th day of August, 2009.

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