Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03077/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-03077-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHLEEN GEISSE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE 

PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

PATRICIA YOUNG,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE 

PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

BETH WINKLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE 

PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE 

PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-07026-JD 

ORDER RE MOTIONS TO REMAND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 38 (17-7026); 24 (18-811);

19 (18-3077); 15 (18-4568); 23 (18-6015)

Case No. 18-cv-00811-JD

Case No.18-cv-03077-JD

Case No. 18-cv-04568-JD

Case 3:18-cv-03077-JD Document 36 Filed 03/18/19 Page 1 of 9
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Northern District of California

LINDA MANSOLILLO,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAYER HEALTHCARE 

PHARMACEUTICALS INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06015-JD

Plaintiffs originally filed these related product liability cases in California Superior Court 

after exposure to Magnevist, a medical contrast agent used to enhance MRI images. Defendant 

Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Bayer”) manufactures Magnevist and removed the cases 

to this Court on alleged diversity and “federal officer” grounds. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiffs seek a 

remand to state court. Dkt. Nos. 38 (17-7026); 24 (18-811); 19 (18-3077); 15 (18-4568); 

23 (18-6015). The parties stipulated to submit the remand question for all of the related cases on 

the arguments in Doe v. Bayer HealthCare Pharmaceuticals Inc., Case No. 18-cv-4568-JD. See 

Dkt. Nos. 59-61 in 17-7026.

1

 The Court concludes that these cases were removed improvidently 

and without jurisdiction, and remands them to the California Superior Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

Section 1447(c). 

BACKGROUND

As alleged in the complaints, Magnevist is formulated with gadolinium, a toxic heavy 

metal that is not normally present in the human body. Magnevist is marketed as a contrast agent 

that is injected intravenously to enhance and improve the quality of MRI images. Plaintiffs allege 

that they developed gadolinium deposition disease (“GDD”) from being injected with Magnevist. 

GDD is said to cause tremors and mental confusion, damage to kidneys, muscles and bone, and 

other serious health problems. It typically occurs in individuals who had normal kidney functions 

before injection, in contrast with another gadolinium-linked disease called Nephrogenic Systemic 

Fibrosis, which occurs mainly in patients who had pre-existing renal failure. The complaints 

 

1 All record citations are to Doe, Case No. 18-4568, unless stated otherwise. Plaintiff Doe filed 

under a pseudonym, although a request to proceed pseudonymously has not been filed or approved 

by the Court. 

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allege claims for strict product liability and negligence for defendants’ failure to warn patients and 

healthcare professionals about the risks of GDD and other complications caused by Magnevist. 

See generally Dkt. No. 1-1. 

Bayer and its affiliates manufactured, marketed and sold Magnevist throughout the United 

States and in California. Defendant McKesson Corporation (“McKesson”) and its affiliates 

distributed Magnevist in California. Plaintiffs are California residents, and allege that they were 

injected with Magnevist made by Bayer and distributed by McKesson to them in California. 

Plaintiffs sued in California Superior Court under California products liability law. They

alleged, with no opposition here, that McKesson and another defendant distributor, Merry X-Ray 

Chemical Corp., are incorporated or have a principal place of business in California. Bayer is an 

out-of-state entity, and removed the cases to federal court on diversity grounds. Bayer contends 

that complete diversity is present because McKesson was fraudulently joined and should be 

disregarded for removal purposes.

2

 Bayer also says that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. 

Section 1442(a), which permits removal of cases involving the United States and its agencies and 

officers, and those acting under the control of federal officials. 

DISCUSSION

As in all federal cases, the foundational principle here is that the jurisdiction of the federal 

courts is limited to what is authorized by the Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, removal is appropriate only when a case 

presents a federal question or involves diversity of citizenship and meets the statutory amount in 

controversy. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. There is a strong presumption against removal, and the 

removal statute is strictly construed against finding federal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d. 

564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Any doubts about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor 

of a remand to state court. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th 

Cir. 2003). Principles of federalism, comity, and respect for the state courts also counsel strongly 

 

2

 This order uses McKesson as a proxy for Merry X-Ray in light of the parties’ stipulation that the 

briefing in Doe, which refers only to McKesson, will resolve all the remand disputes. The two 

distributors are similarly situated factually. 

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in favor of scrupulously confining removal jurisdiction to the precise limits that Congress has 

defined. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). The defendant always 

bears the burden of demonstrating that removal was proper. Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

As a starting position, Bayer contends that removal was appropriate on the basis of

diversity under Section 1332. Diversity removal requires complete diversity, which means that 

each plaintiff must have a different citizenship from each defendant. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 

519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Since the complaints show on their face that plaintiffs and McKesson are 

non-diverse, Bayer can remove under Section 1332 only if it establishes that McKesson was 

fraudulently joined. Grancare, LLC, v. Thrower by and Through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 

Cir. 2018). If so, the presence of the non-diverse party can be disregarded and not counted against 

diversity. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: ‘(1) actual fraud in the pleading of 

jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the nondiverse party in state court.’” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris, USA, 

582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009)). Consequently, short of proving that the plaintiff committed 

actual fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts, a defendant urging fraudulent joinder must show that 

the non-diverse party who was “‘joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.’” Id. (quoting 

Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998)). Our circuit has emphasized 

that this inquiry is not the same as the Rule 12(b)(6) review for failure to state a plausible claim. 

Id. at 549. It has a lower bar and requires only that “there is a ‘possibility that a state court would 

find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the [non-diverse] defendants.’” Id. 

(quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046) (emphasis added in Grancare). This means that the joinder of 

a non-diverse party will not necessarily be deemed fraudulent even if the claim could be 

dismissed. Id. In effect, the “possibility” standard is akin to the “wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous standard for dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(1).” Id. at 549-50 (quotation omitted). 

If there is any possibility above the trivial or frivolous that the plaintiff can state a claim against 

the non-diverse defendant, “the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the 

case to state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046 (quotation omitted). 

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There is a “‘general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder,’” which adds to the 

usual presumption against removal in all cases under Section 1332 and imposes a particularly 

heavy burden on the defendant to prove. Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 

1046). The defendant has some leeway to present facts outside the complaint, but the complaint is 

usually the best guide in determining whether joinder was fraudulent, and in any event the 

defendant must prove fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 549; Hamilton 

Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Bayer has not established fraudulent joinder under either of the dispositive tests. It appears 

to make a single, rather tentative stab at plaintiff Doe under the first test by suggesting that she 

actually resides in New York and not California. Dkt. No. 18 at 3-4. In response, Doe represented

that she does, in fact, reside in California, and indicated that Bayer appeared to be relying on 

outdated Internet information. Dkt. No. 19 at 4. Bayer has not proffered clear and convincing

evidence of actual jurisdictional fraud on Doe’s part, or that she is not a citizen of California. To 

the extent there are any doubts about removal under this prong, they are of course construed in 

favor of a remand. 

With respect to the second test, Bayer does not meaningfully dispute that plaintiffs’ claims 

against McKesson have at least a non-frivolous possibility of stating a cause of action in 

California state court. Plaintiffs allege that McKesson has its main office in San Francisco, 

California, and distributed and sold Magnevist generally throughout California, and specifically to 

plaintiffs. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 11-18, 36. Plaintiffs further allege that McKesson’s failure to 

warn about the risks associated with Magnevist was the legal cause of their injuries. See, e.g., id.

¶¶ 39-46, 73. California law does not, by any means, rule out plaintiffs’ strict liability and 

negligence claims against McKesson as a participant in the chain of distribution of the allegedly 

defective Magnevist product. See, e.g., Bostick v. Flex Equip. Co., 147 Cal. App. 4th 80, 88 

(2007). The vast majority of other district courts that have considered this question have reached 

the same conclusion. See Dodich v. Pfizer Inc., 18-cv-02764-WHA, 2018 WL 3584484, at *1 

(July 26, 2018 N.D. Cal. 2018) (collecting cases); Hatherley v. Pfizer, Inc., 2:13-00719 WBS, 

2013 WL 3354458, at *2 (July 3, 2013 E.D. Cal.) (same). The sound reasoning of these many

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courts in finding that a products liability claim in similar circumstances is, at a minimum, a 

possibility in California state court makes short work of Bayer’s suggestion to the contrary. 

Bayer’s mention of potential preemption, Dkt. No. 18 at 7, does not discount this 

conclusion in any way. Bayer does little more than flag preemption as a concept, and does not 

provide a meaningful discussion about how it might be germane to the removal question under 

governing law. It has an even bigger problem in that preemption goes to the merits of the 

plaintiff’s case and entails a degree of analysis that does not render a state law claim obviously 

barred or frivolous for fraudulent joinder purposes. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1045. Bayer does not 

identify a California case saying preemption would be obvious here, and the lone Supreme Court 

case it cites involved generic drug manufacturers and has not been extended in binding precedent 

to distributors like McKesson. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011). At best, Bayer 

merely says that preemption might be found, which necessarily admits that it might not be found, 

and so does not foreclose the possibility that plaintiffs have a viable claim in state court. 

Bayer devotes considerably more effort to attacking plaintiffs’ supposed motivation for 

joining McKesson as a defendant. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 18 at 8-10. Bayer points to other cases 

where it says McKesson was named as a defendant and subsequently dismissed or not seriously 

pursued for settlement or judgment. In Bayer’s view, this indicates that plaintiffs sued it here 

solely with the intent of defeating removal, and so its presence should be ignored. 

The argument is not well taken. A plaintiff’s motives for joining a defendant play no role 

in the fraudulent joinder tests established by Grancare and Hunter, and Bayer has not shown 

otherwise. Its focus on motive is all the more doubtful because the Supreme Court has long held 

that a plaintiff has “an absolute right” to sue any and all joint tortfeasors it chooses, regardless of 

motive, and a charge of fraudulent joinder in that context “would be bad on its face.” Illinois 

Cent. R.R. Co. of Ill. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 316 (1909); see also Chicago, Rock Island & 

Pacific Railway Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1913) (motive of plaintiff irrelevant for 

removal purposes); Albi v. Street & Smith Publications, Inc., 140 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1944) 

(same). Even if an inquiry into a plaintiff’s subjective intent were appropriate, which is not the 

case, Bayer has not proffered clear and convincing evidence of bad intent, whatever that might be. 

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Plaintiffs have adduced facts indicating McKesson was actively litigated against in some of the 

other cases, and that some of the dismissals mentioned by Bayer happened because discovery 

showed that McKesson had not distributed the Magnevist used by the plaintiffs in those cases. See 

Dkt. No. 15-2 ¶¶ 3, 5; Dkt. No. 19 at 5. 

That resolves Bayer’s arguments for removal on the basis of fraudulent joinder and 

diversity. Bayer’s next argument is under 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a), which permits the removal 

of a state-court action against an officer, or a person acting under an officer, of the United States 

for an act under color of office. Bayer contends that plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims arise out of 

conduct Bayer took under the direction of the FDA, and so removal under Section 1442(a) was 

proper. Dkt. No. 18 at 12-14. 

This argument, too, is not well taken. As the plain language of Section 1442(a) indicates, 

it is intended to protect federal officers from interference with their official duties through statecourt litigation. Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1981). The statute “responds to 

three general concerns: (1) ‘State-court proceedings may reflect ‘local prejudice’ against 

unpopular federal laws or federal officials’; (2) ‘States hostile to the Federal Government may 

impede’ federal law; and (3) ‘States may deprive federal officials of a federal forum in which to 

assert federal immunity defenses.’” Fidelitad, Inc. v. Insitu, Inc., 904 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007)). Section 1442 is liberally 

construed to address these issues, but is not limitless in scope. Id. (citing Watson, 551 U.S. 

at 147). 

To remove under the section, Bayer must show “that (a) it is a ‘person’ within the meaning 

of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s 

directions, and plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a ‘colorable federal defense.’” Goncalves 

By & Through Goncalves v. Rady Children’s Hosp. San Diego, 865 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 

2017) (citation omitted). 

Bayer has not shown that any of this might justify removal here. Bayer, a global public 

pharmaceuticals company, is decidedly not an agency or officer of the United States. The linchpin 

of its removal theory under Section 1442(a) is that it was acting pursuant to the directions of a 

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federal officer in undertaking the actions that are the subject of this lawsuit. Dkt. No. 18 at 12-14. 

For a private entity to be “acting under” a federal officer, the private entity must be involved in 

“an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.” Watson, 551 

U.S. at 152) (emphasis omitted). “The paradigm is a private person acting under the direction of a 

federal law enforcement officer.” Fidelitad, 904 F.3d at 1099; see also Watson, 551 U.S. at 151 

(“That relationship typically involves ‘subjection, guidance, or control.’”) (quotation omitted). 

No federal officer directed Bayer not to warn patients or healthcare professionals about the 

potential risks of Magnevist and link to GDD. Bayer says its disclosures were made in accordance 

with FDA laws and regulations, Dkt. No. 18 at 13-14, but “‘simply complying with the law’ does 

not bring a private actor within the scope of the federal officer removal statute.” Fidelitad, 904 

F.3d at 1100 (quoting Watson, 551 U.S. at 152 (emphasis omitted)). Bayer’s heavy reliance on 

Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014), does not lead to a different result. In Leite, a 

military contractor was permitted to remove a state-court case alleging a failure to warn about 

asbestos hazards in naval equipment because senior officers in the United States Navy filed 

declarations stating that the Navy exercised complete control over the form and content of all 

warnings made by contractors, and that contractors could not include warnings unless specifically 

required and approved by the Navy. Id. at 1123. Bayer has not proffered any similar evidence 

here for its alleged failure to warn about Magnevist. The fact that Bayer and other pharmaceutical 

companies might be highly regulated also does not, it itself, constitute a basis for removal under 

Section 1442(a). Watson, 551 U.S. at 153; Fidelitad, 904 F.3d at 1100. To hold otherwise on any 

of these points, or to read Section 1442(a) as broadly as Bayer urges, would allow removal to 

federal court in circumstances far beyond anything Congress intended. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing 

Co., 792 F.3d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2015). 

So too for the fact that Bayer participated in certain FDA advisory committees. Its 

participation was entirely free and voluntary, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 56-63, and hardly to product 

of direction or compulsion by the FDA.

This is enough to end the Section 1442(a) analysis, but for the sake of completion, Bayer 

also has not shown a colorable federal defense of any import to removal. It claims to have 

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“numerous” such defenses but does nothing more than name-drop them with no discussion of 

whether and how they might apply here. See Dkt. No. 18 at 14-15.

CONCLUSION

The cases were removed improvidently and without jurisdiction. They are remanded to the 

California Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 

1447(c). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2019

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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