Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-mc-80112/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-mc-80112-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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Case No.: 5:16-mc-80112-EJD

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO RECUSE;” DENYING “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER,” DENYING “REQUEST FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE”

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICES, INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:16-mc-80112-EJD 

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO 

RECUSE;” DENYING 

“ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER,” DENYING 

“REQUEST FOR MANDATORY 

JUDICIAL NOTICE”

Re: Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5

Plaintiff Fareed Sepehry-Fard (“Plaintiff”) has been declared a vexatious litigant and is 

subject to a pre-filing order which requires him to “obtain leave before filing any action in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of California related to the foreclosure of his

property located at 18314 Baylor Avenue, Saratoga, California 95070.” Order, Dkt. No. 58, Case 

No. 5:14-cv-051423-LHK. On May 18, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a “Verified Complaint” to this 

court, which was referred to the undersigned as a general duty matter pursuant to the pre-filing 

order. The court reviewed the pleading according to the pre-filing order, found the proposed 

action duplicative and frivolous, and denied Plaintiff leave to file it. Dkt. No. 2. 

Presently before the court are three subsequent matters filed by Plaintiff: (1) a document 

entitled “Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse - Bias or Prejudice,” (2) another document entitled 

“Administrative Motion to Vacate Void Order,” and (3) a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Request 

for Mandatory Judicial Notice.” Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5. These matters are suitable for decision without 

a hearing. Having reviewed them, the court finds, concludes and orders as follows: 

1. The “Motion to Recuse” appears to arise under 28 U.S.C. § 455. According to that 

Case 5:16-mc-80112-EJD Document 6 Filed 06/14/16 Page 1 of 3
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Case No.: 5:16-mc-80112-EJD

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO RECUSE;” DENYING “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER,” DENYING “REQUEST FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE”

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

statute, a district judge has a duty to disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which his 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or where “he has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). 

2. Notably, the standard employed to determine whether recusal is appropriate under 

§ 455 is an objective one. Clemens v. United States Dist. Ct., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 

2005). It asks “‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that 

the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 834 

F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 

1983)). “The ‘reasonable person’ in this context means a ‘well-informed, thoughtful observer,’ as 

opposed to a ‘hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.’” Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178 (citing In 

re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). 

3. “Since a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, the party seeking 

disqualification bears a substantial burden to show that the judge is biased.” Torres v. Chrysler 

Fin. Co., No. C 07-00915 JW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83154, at *4, 2007 WL 3165665 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 25, 2007) (citing Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021-22 (N.D. Cal. 

2001)). Indeed, “[f]ederal judges are obligated not to recuse themselves where there is no reason 

to question their impartiality.” New York City Housing Develop. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 

980 (7th Cir. 1986).

4. As the court understands it, Plaintiff’s motion is based on three primary allegations. 

First, he asserts the undersigned was “bribed” and was disqualified from determining whether his 

proposed action was barred by the prefiling order because of some purported partnership or 

conspiracy with Judge Lucy H. Koh “to aid and abet Defendants to continue to steal monies and 

properties from Plaintiff.” This speculative allegation is not sufficient to justify recusal under § 

455. See Clemens, 428 F.3d at 1178-79 (holding that “[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, 

innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters” are not ordinarily sufficient to 

require a § 455 recusal). Nor is the fact that Plaintiff attempted to sue another judge of this court. 

Case 5:16-mc-80112-EJD Document 6 Filed 06/14/16 Page 2 of 3
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Case No.: 5:16-mc-80112-EJD

ORDER DENYING “MOTION TO RECUSE;” DENYING “ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

VACATE VOID ORDER,” DENYING “REQUEST FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE”

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

See id. (holding that recusal is not required because of “mere familiarity with the defendant(s)”). 

5. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot seek the undersigned’s recusal based on rulings made in 

prior actions involving Plaintiff. To be sure, “[b]ias under 28 U.S.C. § 455 must derive from 

extrajudicial sources.” Herrington, 834 F.2d at 1502; accord Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994) (holding that judicial rulings alone are not a valid basis for a recusal motion as 

they do not establish reliance on an extrajudicial source). 

6. Furthermore, there is no legal basis for Plaintiff’s theory that the undersigned “gave 

tacit agreement” of a “lifetime bar” from presiding over cases involving Plaintiff. Instead, 

“[d]isqualification is case-specific; the statute does not put a whole subject matter out of bounds to 

a judge with no concrete investment in a particular dispute.” Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 950.80 

Acres of Land, 525 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Thus, for the reasons explained, the “Motion to Recuse” is DENIED. The “Administrative 

Motion to Vacate” is also DENIED because it is based on the same disqualification theory. The 

“Request for Mandatory Judicial Notice” is DENIED because the documents attached to that 

motion are not the proper subjects for such relief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 14, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:16-mc-80112-EJD Document 6 Filed 06/14/16 Page 3 of 3