Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03733/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03733-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-3733 

DAVID RUBMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & 

IMMIGRATION SERVICES and

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 13 C 5129 — Charles P. Kocoras, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 23, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2015 

____________________ 

Before BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and REAGAN,

Chief District Judge.*

 

* Of the Southern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

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2 No. 14-3733 

SYKES, Circuit Judge. H-1B visas allow U.S. companies to 

hire noncitizen workers with specialized skills. The United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”), an 

agency within the Department of Homeland Security 

(“DHS”), is responsible for their issuance. David Rubman 

sent CIS a request under the Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”) seeking “copies of all documents reflecting statistics ... about H-1B visa applications” from the last four 

years. CIS responded with a single document: a data table 

that the agency had created to respond to his request. 

Rubman doubted the table’s accuracy and insisted that CIS 

provide the documents he originally asked for: “‘ALL documents reflecting statistics’” about H-1B visa applications, 

including internal statistical reports and e-mails. CIS refused, insisting that additional records would not be helpful 

and would “only create additional confusion.” Rubman 

sued, challenging the adequacy of the search that CIS performed in response to his FOIA request. The district court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the agency. 

We reverse. An adequate search is one that was both performed in good faith and reasonably designed to uncover 

the requested records. CIS failed to conduct an adequate 

search as required by law when it unilaterally narrowed 

Rubman’s request for “all documents” to a single, newly 

generated statistical table. 

I. Background 

A. The H-1B Visa Program 

The H-1B visa is a temporary, nonimmigrant visa for 

workers in “specialty occupations,” defined as those that 

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No. 14-3733 3

typically require at least a bachelor’s degree in a specific 

field of study. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i). Visa holders are able to 

work in the U.S. for three years (extendable to six), after 

which they must apply for a different visa or return to their 

home country (there’s no path to citizenship). By statute the 

number of H-1B visas that can be issued per fiscal year is 

capped at 65,000. See id. § 1184(g)(1)(A)(vii). An additional 

20,000 H-1B visas are available for workers with postgraduate degrees from American universities, and visas awarded 

to governmental, nonprofit, and educational research entities are not counted toward either limit. See id. 

§ 1184(g)(5)(A)–(C). Visa petitions are submitted by U.S. 

employers on behalf of the noncitizen workers they want to 

hire, and the employers must demonstrate that the visa 

recipients will enjoy the same working conditions and wages 

as comparable domestic employees. See id. § 1182(n)(1)(A). 

The H-1B visa program is controversial, and recent proposals to raise the cap have been hotly contested. See, e.g.,

Tim Henderson, States, Cities Call for Skilled Foreign Workers 

Amid Abuse Claims, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE

(June 8, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/6/08/states-cities-call-forskilled-foreign-workers-amid-abuse-claims. 

The process by which CIS administers the H-1B visa program is outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(8)(ii)(B). In short, the 

agency projects how many petitions it must process to issue 

a full complement of visas, taking into account historical 

rates of denials, withdrawals, and revocations. Employers 

submit petitions starting on April 1 of each year, and the 

filing period is closed once CIS receives its target number 

(which often takes just a few days). If the agency receives 

more petitions than it projects it will need, a lottery is conCase: 14-3733 Document: 21 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 20
4 No. 14-3733 

ducted; selected petitions are issued a receipt number while 

the others are rejected and returned, along with their filing 

fees. The receipted petitions are then processed and visas 

awarded. Recipients can start work on October 1. 

B. Rubman’s FOIA Request 

David Rubman is a retired immigration attorney and former adjunct law professor at Northwestern University. On 

May 10, 2012, he submitted a FOIA request to CIS for the 

following: 

[C]opies of all documents reflecting statistics 

(specified below) about H-1B visa applications 

that were assigned a receipt number for [fiscal 

years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012]. 

The requested statistics for each of the requested years are: 

(a) Number of H-1B visa applications for 

cap-subject initial employment; 

(b) Number of approved H-1B visa applications ... ; 

(c) Number of denied H-1B visa applications ... ; 

(d) Number of withdrawn H-1B visa applications ... . 

... . 

I am seeking documents which will show 

whether [CIS] is complying with the statutory 

mandate ... to issue no more than 65,000 capCase: 14-3733 Document: 21 Filed: 08/31/2015 Pages: 20
No. 14-3733 5

subject H-1B visas in each of the listed fiscal 

years. 

Rubman closed his FOIA request by saying, “If you have any 

question about what documents I am seeking, please contact 

me so that we can both be on the same page about what I am 

asking for.” 

CIS replied by letter on September 17. The agency stated, 

“We have completed our search for records that are responsive to your request. The record consists of 4 pages of material and we have determined to release it in full.” In substance, the agency’s response consisted of a single statistical 

table purporting to show the data Rubman had requested. 

Beneath the table was a list of indecipherable database query 

“parameters” used to create the table. Also listed was the 

date the statistical table was generated: August 14, 2012, 

about three months after Rubman’s FOIA request. 

On October 1 Rubman wrote CIS, pointing out that the 

agency’s table did not classify receipts by fiscal year as he’d 

requested; if it had, the total number of receipted petitions 

per year would equal the sum of the approvals, denials, and 

withdrawals for that year (i.e., every receipted petition 

would be accounted for). CIS responded by e-mail on 

October 12. The agency “sincerely apologize[d] for any 

inconvenience our original response may have caused” and 

attached a revised table. 

Rubman wrote to CIS once more on October 22. He contended that the new table was “clearly inaccurate” and “cannot be reconciled” with either the first table CIS had provided or other publicly available data. For example, Rubman 

pointed out that the first table showed three-and-a-half times 

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as many denials as the second table. After explaining the 

apparent incongruities, Rubman concluded (and we quote 

him without alteration): 

In light of this serious discrepancy, I must 

insist that you provide me the documents I 

originally asked for: “ALL documents reflecting statistics ... about H-1B visas that were assigned a receipt number for (2009, 2010, 2011 

and 2012].” (emphasis added). I am sure there 

are, inter alia, weekly and monthly statistical reports as well as emails discussing the calculation of when the cap is reached. 

Jill Eggleston, CIS’s Director of FOIA Operations, responded on November 14 stating that the second table was 

“complete and accurate.” She explained that CIS created the 

table because it had interpreted Rubman’s initial request as 

one for statistics. Regarding his request for additional documents, Eggleston noted that “counting the cap is a very 

complex process.” She continued: 

Internal emails discussing the calculation of 

when the cap will be reached would not provide you with an accurate calculation of H-1B 

cap filings for fiscal years 2009 to 2012, as they 

represent ongoing calculations and monitoring 

of cap filings until the cap closed each fiscal 

year. Additionally, they would not alter the 

outcome of the results that were provided to 

you on October 12, 2012, but rather only create 

additional confusion. 

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No. 14-3733 7

Eggleston closed by reviewing in detail the alleged statistical 

discrepancies. In short, CIS’s position was that the “reports 

contain information based on different data points about 

different subsets of H-1B petitions,” and “[a]s a result, the 

data cannot be compared.” 

Rubman filed an administrative appeal with CIS, which 

was denied because the agency considers a request that has 

been “granted in full” unappealable. As permitted by FOIA, 

Rubman then filed this suit in federal court.1 

Settlement negotiations were tried and failed, and the 

case was submitted to the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The judge observed that “the facts of the 

case at bar are unique in that the produced records mainly 

consisted of a Table that allegedly conveyed the information 

requested, as opposed to a disclosure of purely internal 

documents, which is more common in FOIA cases.” The 

judge went on to hold, however, that Rubman’s initial FOIA 

request was “non-specific and unwieldy” and therefore CIS’s 

interpretation of the request as one for statistics was reasonable. The judge also concluded that Rubman’s October 22 

letter, which specifically requested internal reports and 

e-mails, was an impermissible “modification” of his original 

FOIA request to which CIS was not obliged to respond. The 

judge accordingly entered judgment for CIS, and Rubman 

appealed. 

 

1 A district court’s jurisdiction over a FOIA suit arises under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(B), which requires the court to “determine the matter de 

novo” (i.e., without deference to the agency’s disclosure decision) and 

puts “the burden ... on the agency to sustain its action.” If the court finds 

that the agency has unlawfully withheld records, it can enjoin the agency 

from withholding them and order their production. See id. 

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II. Discussion 

A. “Inadequate Search” FOIA Claims 

“The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors 

accountable to the governed.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber 

Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). Toward that end, FOIA provides 

that agencies “shall make ... records promptly available to 

any person” who submits a request that “(i) reasonably 

describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with 

[the agency’s] published rules.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). The 

Act is “broadly conceived,” and its “basic policy” is in favor 

of disclosure. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 220. Agencies are, 

however, permitted to withhold records under nine statutory exemptions and three special exclusions for lawenforcement records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)–(c). 

The withholding of records pursuant to a statutory exemption is a frequent source of litigation. But Rubman 

brings a different kind of FOIA suit: He challenges the 

adequacy of CIS’s records search. To prevail on summary 

judgment in this type of FOIA claim, the agency must show 

that there is no genuine issue of material fact about the 

adequacy of its records search. See Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398, 

405 (7th Cir. 1994); Steinberg v. DOJ, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994). To demonstrate that its search was adequate, “the 

agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct 

a search for the requested records, using methods which can 

be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 

1990). In other words, the search must have been a goodfaith effort and reasonable in light of the request. Good faith 

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is presumed, see SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 

1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and it can be bolstered by evidence of 

the agency’s efforts to satisfy the request. Reasonableness is a 

flexible and context-dependent standard. See Davis v. DOJ, 

460 F.3d 92, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he adequacy of an 

agency’s search is measured by a standard of reasonableness, 

and is dependent upon the circumstances of the case.”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Evidence that a search was reasonable and conducted in 

good faith generally comes in the form of “reasonably 

detailed nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good faith.” 

Matter of Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 249 n.11 (7th Cir. 1992). The 

affidavit requirement is important because 

[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth 

the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) 

were searched, is necessary to afford a FOIA 

requester an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the search and to allow the district 

court to determine if the search was adequate 

in order to grant summary judgment. 

Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. 

In response to an agency affidavit, the FOIA requester 

can present “‘countervailing evidence’ as to the adequacy of 

the agency’s search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 

315 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Once both parties have 

made their case, “if a review of the record raises substantial 

doubt [about the adequacy of the search], particularly in 

view of well defined requests and positive indications of 

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overlooked materials, summary judgment [in favor of the 

agency] is inappropriate.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). If the court finds the agency’s search inadequate, 

“the requester must show ‘some reason to think that the 

document would have turned up if the agency had looked 

for it,’” though since neither the requester nor the court 

know the content of the agency’s records, this is a low bar. 

Patterson v. IRS, 56 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Weisberg v. DOJ, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Importantly, the question at summary judgment is not whether 

the agency might have additional, unidentified responsive 

documents in its possession. See Wade, 969 F.2d at 249 n.11. 

Rather the court need only determine whether the search 

itself was performed reasonably and in good faith. 

Rubman believes CIS’s records search was inadequate 

because the agency never looked for the type of records he 

requested: He wanted a search of CIS’s preexisting “documents reflecting statistics,” while CIS interpreted his request 

as one for newly generated summary statistics. The district 

court held that CIS’s interpretation of his FOIA request, and 

the resulting search, were reasonable. We turn now to the 

degree of deference we should give that conclusion. 

B. Standard of Review 

Summary-judgment decisions are normally reviewed de 

novo. CIS argues that a more deferential standard would be 

appropriate, and it suggests that we borrow the two-tiered 

analysis used in FOIA exemption cases. But because appellate review of exemption cases implicates a unique set of 

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concerns that do not exist in an adequacy-of-the-search case, 

we conclude that de novo review is appropriate. 

When summary judgment is granted to an agency that 

has withheld documents under one of FOIA’s statutory 

exemptions, “the threshold inquiry in our review is to 

examine de novo the [agency’s] declarations in ‘considering 

whether the [district] court had an adequate factual basis for 

the decision rendered.’” Patterson, 56 F.3d at 836 (quoting 

Becker, 34 F.3d at 402) (second alteration in original). Whether the factual basis for a court’s decision was adequate 

depends on factors such as the specificity of the agency’s 

affidavit and the court’s use of tools like in camera review 

and so-called Vaughn indexes. See, e.g., id.; Solar Sources, 

Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998). If the 

factual basis was sufficient for the court to decide if the 

exemption applies, we review the court’s conclusion only for 

clear error. See Appleton Papers, Inc. v. EPA, 702 F.3d 1018, 

1022 (7th Cir. 2012); Enviro Tech Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 

373 (7th Cir. 2004).2 

We’ve explained that “the clearly erroneous standard [is] 

appropriate in light of the unique circumstances presented 

in FOIA exemption cases.” Solar Sources, 142 F.3d at 1039 n.5. 

The use of a deferential standard of review in exemption 

cases has been justified because 

[t]he issue whether a document is exempt 

will often involve interpretation of the docu-

 

2 There is no consensus among the circuits about the appropriate 

standard of review for FOIA exemption cases. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 

GUIDE TO THE FOIA, Litigation Considerations, 130–33 (2013), 

http://www.justice.gov/oip/doj-guide-freedom-information-act-0. 

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ment vis-à-vis the standards for exemption and 

in the light of the background of the matter. 

The opportunity of the requesting party to argue that issue is limited by the fact that he or 

she does not know the contents of the document withheld or its redacted portion ... and 

he or she may not be familiar with some of the 

background facts. As a result, the real responsibility for appraisal of the issue is with the district court, and review by the appellate court is 

correspondingly limited. 

Becker, 34 F.3d at 402 n.11. Concern for the conservation of 

judicial resources also looms large in exemption cases. District courts sometimes face “the monumental task of reviewing the denial of ... FOIA request[s] comprising millions of 

pages of documents.” Solar Sources, 142 F.3d at 1038. And so 

while we closely scrutinize whether a court had adequate 

information from which to determine if an exemption applies, we don’t redo the entire review ourselves with the goal 

of reaching an independent (de novo) conclusion. See Vaughn 

v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“The scope of 

inquiry [in FOIA exemption cases] will not have been focused by the adverse parties and, if justice is to be done, the 

examination must be relatively comprehensive. Obviously 

an appellate court is even less suited to making this inquiry 

than is a trial court.”). 

The same considerations are not present in FOIA suits 

challenging the adequacy of an agency’s records search. 

These disputes turn on the good faith and reasonableness of 

the search. The inquiry requires an interpretation of the 

agency’s duties (under FOIA and related regulations) and 

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the record (including the FOIA request, subsequent correspondence between the agency and the requester, and 

affidavits). This kind of inquiry is manageable in scale, 

amenable to the adversarial process, and routinely subject to 

de novo appellate review. We conclude that summary judgment in a FOIA case challenging the adequacy of a search 

should be reviewed under the traditional de novo standard.3 

C. The Adequacy of CIS’s Search 

1. The Response to Rubman’s FOIA Request 

Rubman has not alleged bad faith by CIS. The agency 

proved responsive throughout the process, especially in its 

quick creation of the second data table. See Meeropol v. Meese, 

790 F.2d 942, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[A]dditional releases 

suggest a stronger, rather than a weaker, basis for accepting 

the integrity of the search ... .”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We therefore focus on the reasonableness of the 

search. 

The type and scope of CIS’s search was determined by its 

interpretation of Rubman’s FOIA request as one for statistics. 

In general, “an agency ... has a duty to construe a FOIA 

request liberally.” Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 

71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, DHS regulations require its subsidiary agencies to clarify ambiguous 

FOIA requests: 

 

3 We note that the D.C. Circuit now reviews all summary-judgment 

decisions in FOIA cases de novo. See, e.g., Petroleum Info. Corp. v. Dep’t of 

Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

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If a component determines that your request 

does not reasonably describe records, it shall 

tell you either what additional information is 

needed or why your request is otherwise insufficient. The component also shall give you an 

opportunity to discuss your request so that you 

may modify it to meet the requirements of this 

section. 

6 C.F.R. § 5.3(b). CIS did not consult Rubman because it 

found his request to be, unambiguously, a request for summary statistics. 

FOIA states that “an agency shall provide [a] record in 

any form or format requested by the person if the record is 

readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.”4

§ 552(a)(3)(B); see also 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(b)(3) (“Components 

shall honor a requester’s specified preference of form or 

format of disclosure ... .”); DeLorme Pub. Co. v. Nat’l Oceanic 

& Atmospheric Admin., 907 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Me. 1995) (“An 

agency’s duty is to disclose records, and records are formatted information. ... Nothing in the FOIA excuses an agency 

from disclosing a particular record because it has disclosed 

the content elsewhere in a different format.”). This means 

that agencies must be attentive not only to the content of the 

records sought by a FOIA request but also to their form. In 

 

4 This provision was added to FOIA in 1996 as part of the Electronic 

Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 

110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)). While it 

certainly indicates that a requester is entitled to electronic copies of 

documents if they’re “readily reproducible,” see Sample v. Bureau of 

Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the language of “form or 

format” clearly cuts more broadly than electronic documents alone. 

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this case, unfortunately, CIS fixated on the former to the 

exclusion of the latter. 

Rubman’s initial request did not define the term “document,” but that’s hardly unusual. FOIA requesters often have 

no way to know exactly what type of records an agency has 

in its possession. But that doesn’t mean Rubman’s use of the 

word “document” could simply be ignored. A document 

may convey statistics, but it is not itself a statistic. Rubman’s 

FOIA request itself drew attention to this distinction when it 

asked for “documents reflecting statistics” and “documents 

that show the requested data.” (Emphases added.) See also 

Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185 (1980) (“The Freedom of 

Information Act deals with ‘agency records,’ not information 

in the abstract.”). 

Furthermore, while the statistics that CIS assembled for 

Rubman were ultimately relayed to him in document form 

(first a four-page printout, then an e-mail attachment), we 

think that a FOIA request for “documents” is reasonably 

understood (at least presumptively) as one for preexisting

internal agency records. “Records” for FOIA purposes are 

those that “the law requires the agency to prepare or which 

the agency has decided for its own reasons to create,” NLRB 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162 (1975), and that 

“have come into the agency’s possession in the legitimate 

conduct of its official duties,” DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 

136, 145 (1989). The data table that CIS created in response to 

Rubman’s request was not produced or used in the course of 

CIS’s administration of the H-1B program.5 

 

5 Additionally, “[t]he Act does not obligate agencies to create ... documents.” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 

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The idea that a FOIA request for “documents” refers 

(again, at least presumptively) to preexisting internal records 

is not only most consistent with the broad scope of the 

records that are subject to FOIA, it’s also most in line with 

FOIA’s purpose of showing requesters “what their government 

is up to.” DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 

489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). A preexisting internal document 

enjoys marks of authenticity and accuracy that are absent 

from one generated by a FOIA officer. Genuine agency 

records also foster transparency by revealing—even if indirectly—something about the way the agency operates. The 

context-free data table of indeterminate origin released to 

Rubman furthered none of these policy goals. 

CIS also failed to give due weight to Rubman’s request 

for “documents”—plural—and more specifically for “all 

documents” about H-1B visa receipts. Even if the term 

“documents” were ambiguous, Rubman’s request plainly 

envisioned something more than a single data table. In 

LaCedra v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the D.C. 

Circuit held that a FOIA request that opened by asking for 

“all documents” on a particular subject but later said it was 

“specifically” seeking records on two narrower topics should 

have been liberally construed as one for all documents. 

317 F.3d 345, 347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Rubman’s case is much 

easier—his request never implied that he wanted anything 

 

152 (1980). So FOIA would not have empowered Rubman to insist that 

CIS fulfill a request for a newly generated statistical table. This reinforces 

our conclusion that Rubman’s request for “documents” is best understood as one for preexisting internal documents rather than newly 

generated statistics. 

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less than “all documents” reflecting statistics on the H-1B 

visa cap. 

It’s possible that Rubman’s request was too “non-specific 

and unwieldy” to permit an effective search, as the district 

judge thought, though we note that CIS has never specifically lodged that objection, and the search was restricted to a 

four-year period. But if so, that’s the exact situation addressed by 6 C.F.R. § 5.3(b): If Rubman’s request did not 

“reasonably describe records,” CIS was required to “give 

[him] an opportunity to discuss [his] request” and clarify it.6 

We have no doubt that CIS believed in good faith that it 

was being helpful and efficient by generating a summary 

data table in response to Rubman’s FOIA request. We certainly don’t want to discourage agencies from providing raw 

data, database query results, or newly generated charts and 

tables when a FOIA request asks for them, when there are no 

other responsive records available, or when a requester 

consents to one of those formats. But when Rubman asked 

for “all documents reflecting statistics” and then objected to 

CIS’s decision to respond with a newly generated summary 

table, the agency was required to search for records in the 

form specified in the initial request. 

 

6 If the scope of the search was the problem, CIS was also probably 

required to consult with Rubman under 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(e), which says 

that if an agency projects that a search will cost more than $25 (requesters are generally billed for the cost of the search), then it must both 

receive the requester’s permission before proceeding and “offer the 

requester an opportunity to discuss the matter with Department personnel in order to reformulate the request to meet the requester’s needs at a 

lower cost.” 

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2. The Response to Rubman’s October 22 Letter 

After initially misinterpreting Rubman’s FOIA request, 

CIS’s subsequent actions failed to cure—and in fact exacerbated—the error. In his October 22 letter, Rubman unambiguously requested preexisting internal documents such as 

“statistical reports” and “emails.” Eggleston, CIS’s Director 

of FOIA Operations, responded that the disclosure of e-mails 

(she didn’t address his request for reports) “would not 

provide you with an accurate calculation,” “would not alter 

the outcome of the results that were provided to you,” and 

“rather [would] only create additional confusion.” Although 

agencies are not required to provide “explanatory material” 

along with the records they disclose, see Sears, Roebuck & Co., 

421 U.S. at 162, the risk of confusion is not a legitimate basis 

for refusing to perform a FOIA search.7 

The district court thought that CIS was not required to 

perform a new search in response to Rubman’s October 22 

letter because it constituted a “modified” request. We recognize the importance of finality in the FOIA search process, 

and that “[r]equiring an additional search each time the 

agency receives a letter that clarifies a prior request could 

 

7 In her affidavit Eggleston insists that her statement that internal e-mails 

would confuse Rubman should not be interpreted as a concession that 

any responsive e-mails (or any other internal documents) exist. While we 

understand that CIS has not yet performed a search of preexisting 

internal documents, we are highly skeptical of CIS’s suggestion that it 

might not have any such documents given its statutory and regulatory 

obligations to issue H-1B visas subject to the 65,000 cap. CIS also 

acknowledges that if Rubman filed a new FOIA request demanding 

preexisting internal documents, it would be obligated to perform such a 

search. 

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extend indefinitely the delay in processing new requests.” 

Kowalcyzk v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 386, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But 

Rubman’s October 22 letter only requested “the documents 

[he] originally asked for” and then quoted the “all documents” language from his initial FOIA request. For the 

reasons discussed above, Rubman’s initial request was 

properly understood to have been for preexisting internal 

documents. Once he made clear that he was not satisfied 

with CIS’s counteroffer of a statistical table, the agency 

should have performed a search of its internal documents. 

The cases cited by CIS on this point are not relevant because they all involved modified requests well outside of the 

scope of the original request. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 

565 F.3d 857, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff’s] FOIA request 

gave no indication that she sought DOS documents regarding the agency’s previous responses to her 1995 FOIA request.”); Kowalcyzk, 73 F.3d at 389 (holding that a FOIA request sent to FBI headquarters and that made no reference to 

New York did not obligate the FBI to search records held in 

its New York field office). Agencies are entitled to make 

requesters refile (and go to the end of the queue) when they 

want to alter the parameters of their initial search request. 

But that’s not what happened here, and neither CIS nor 

Rubman treated his October 22 letter as a modified request. 

Finally, CIS argues that Rubman waived his objection to 

the data table when he failed to demand preexisting internal 

documents in his October 1 letter; instead he asked CIS to 

provide a “corrected response” that properly classified the 

visa receipts by year. We don’t see it that way. “A waiver is 

ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of 

a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 

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464 (1938). Rubman’s willingness to entertain the possibility 

that an (accurate) data table could meet his needs did not 

mean that he intentionally relinquished his right to have his 

original request answered, particularly given that he never 

expressly disclaimed his desire for documents. A strict 

waiver rule would be inappropriate in the FOIA context; the 

statute is supposed to be administered with minimal procedural formality and “in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing 

that ... agencies are servants of the public.” Memorandum 

for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 

74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 

III. Conclusion 

For these reasons, we hold that CIS failed to conduct an 

adequate search in response to Rubman’s FOIA request. 

Since CIS has never performed a responsive search (i.e., one 

of preexisting internal documents related to CIS’s calculation 

of the H-1B visa cap from fiscal years 2009 to 2012), it must 

now do so. Of course, Rubman’s request remains subject to 

the standard statutory and regulatory provisions related to 

FOIA searches; for example, CIS is entitled to withhold any 

records that fall under a statutory exemption, and it must 

consult with Rubman if it considers his request overbroad. 

We REVERSE the summary judgment in favor of CIS and 

REMAND for additional proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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