Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-00713/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-00713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff actually says that his claim is brought under the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act, RFRA. RFRA was declared unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521

U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Because the court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints

such as this, the claim will be treated as a RLUIPA claim, RLUIPA being the constitutional

successor to RFRA. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005). 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL RAYFEL WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

MENTAL HEALTH dba NAPA STATE

HOSPITAL, 

Defendant. /

No. C 08-0713 PJH (PR)

ORDER DISMISSING

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND

Plaintiff, who is a patient at Napa State hospital, has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint. He contends that his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) are being violated by the hospital.1

 He has been granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

Case 4:08-cv-00713-PJH Document 4 Filed 02/29/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1986-87. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1, provides: "No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997

[which includes state prisons, state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden

results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The statute applies to any "program or activity that

receives Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). 

Congress intended to distinguish RLUIPA from traditional First Amendment

Case 4:08-cv-00713-PJH Document 4 Filed 02/29/08 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

jurisprudence in at least two ways. First, it expanded the reach of the protection to include

“‘any religious exercise,’” including ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or

central to, a system of religious belief.’” Greene v. Solano County Jail, No. 06-16957, slip

op. 857, 863 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2008) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005)

and 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-5(7)(A)). RLUIPA “bars any inquiry into whether a particular belief

or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion.” Greene, slip op. at 863. Second, as

opposed to the deferential rational basis standard of Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90

(1987), RLUIPA requires the government to meet the much stricter burden of showing that

the burden it imposes on religious exercise is “‘in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.’” Greene, slip op. at 864 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)). 

Plaintiff alleges that he is a follower of a religion called “Magic,” which is pronounced

“mah-jeek.” He asserts that the hospital is interfering with his practice of his religion in the

following ways: (1) Refusing to supply a hookah and THC to smoke in it (THC and raw,

unprocessed opium are used by “Magi” for “spiritual divination, mediation, prayer and the

like”); (2) refusing to supply alcohol, which is used by Magi in “displays of drunken

merriment” to appease and honor the god Apollo; (3) refusing to supply tobacco, which is

used by Magi in prayer and meditation; (4) not allowing patients to use their laptops for

internet access, when the internet is used by Magi for spiritual divination; (5) not supplying

top hats and body wash (Magi use jasmine body wash in honor of the goddess Hera, and 

“top hats ... signify that we always think of what is higher and, because of that[,] our gods

think we are ‘tops’”); and (6) refusing to supply newspapers, CD’s, cassette tapes, and

listening devices (popular music is used by Magi as hymns). 

With the exception of the ban on internet access, all of these claims are about the

institution’s failure to provide free what plaintiff considers to be religious items. RLUIPA,

however, does not require government to provide the means of practicing one’s religion. 

See Cutter, 544 U.S. 720 n.8 (“RLUIPA does not require a State to pay for an inmate’s

devotional accessories.”). That is, while under RLUIPA the government cannot impose

Case 4:08-cv-00713-PJH Document 4 Filed 02/29/08 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

substantial burdens on religious practice, it is not required to positively facilitate it. The

allegations in claims one, two, three, five and six therefore are insufficient to state a

RLUIPA claim. 

In addition to the above, plaintiff alleges that caffeinated coffee is used by Magi “to

display an intention to do more than ‘sit around’ during the day ... [and] to display both

willingness and eagerness to serve.” He does not, however, allege that the institution

refuses to supply caffeinated coffee or that it is banned. He thus has failed to state a claim

as to coffee.

For the reasons set out above, the complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

1. For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend, as

indicated above, within thirty days from the date of this order. The amended complaint

must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely

replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to

present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not

incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the

designated time will result in the dismissal of these claims.

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 29, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.08\WILLIAMS0713.DWLTA.wpd 

Case 4:08-cv-00713-PJH Document 4 Filed 02/29/08 Page 4 of 4