Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00304/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00304-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0282 Patent Infringement - Defenses

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBA INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

BLUE BOX OPCO LLC, doing business 

as INFANTINO, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 19-cv-00304-H-NLS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

COUNTERCLAIM AND TO STRIKE 

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

[Doc. No. 24.]

On April 4, 2019, Plaintiff Boba Inc. (“Boba”) filed a motion to dismiss Defendant 

Blue Box Opco LLC doing business as Infantino (“Infantino”)’s invalidity counterclaim 

and to strike Infantino’s invalidity affirmative defense. (Doc. No. 24.) On May 6, 2019, 

Infantino filed a response in opposition to Boba’s motion. (Doc. No. 36.) On May 13, 

2019, Boba filed its reply. (Doc. No. 44.) The Court took the matter under submission on 

May 14, 2019. (Doc. No. 48.) For the reasons below, the Court denies Boba’s motion to 

dismiss and to strike.

Background

The following facts are taken from the allegations set forth in the parties’ pleadings. 

Boba and Infantino are both manufacturers and distributors of baby carriers. (Doc. No. 8, 

Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4.) 

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On March 25, 2015, in response to assertions of patent infringement, Infantino, the 

Defendant in this action, filed a declaratory judgment action against non-party Caperon 

Designs, Inc. d/b/a BECO Baby Carrier, Inc. (“BECO”) in the Eastern District of Missouri, 

seeking to invalidate U.S. Patent No. 7,766,199.1

 (Doc. No. 24-3.) Shortly thereafter, 

Infantino and BECO resolved their dispute and entered into a Confidential Settlement 

Agreement, Patent License and Covenant Not to Sue (“Licensing Agreement”). (Doc. No. 

8 ¶ 6, Ex. B.) On August 20, 2015, Infantino voluntarily dismissed its claims in the 

Missouri action without prejudice. (Doc. No. 24-2.) 

On March 30, 2016, Boba acquired BECO. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 3.) Boba alleges that as 

part of that acquisition, it obtained all right, title and interest in the ’199 patent, including 

the rights contained in the Licensing Agreement. (Id. ¶ 3, 20.)

On February 12, 2019, Boba filed a complaint against Infantino, alleging a claim for 

breach of contract. (Doc. No. 8, Compl.) Specifically, Boba alleges that under the terms 

of the Licensing Agreement, Boba is owed royalties from Infantino for the sales of 

Infantino’s Flip 4-In-1TM carrier. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 24-30.) Boba alleges that Infantino has 

breached the Licensing Agreement by refusing to pay those royalties. (Id. ¶ 31.) 

On March 14, 2019, Infantino filed an answer to Boba’s complaint and a 

counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the ’199 patent is invalid. (Doc. No. 17.) On 

April 12, 2019, the Court issued a scheduled order in the action. (Doc. No. 30.) By the 

present motion, Boba moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 

dismiss Infantino’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity of the ’199 patent, 

and Boba moves pursuant to Rule 12(f) to strike Infantino’s affirmative defense of 

invalidity of the ’199 patent. (Doc. No. at 1.) 

///

 

1 The Court takes judicial notice of the filings in the Missouri action that were attached as exhibits 

to Boba’s motion to dismiss. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A 

court] may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in 

federal or state courts.” (citations omitted)); Rowland v. Paris Las Vegas, No. 3:13-CV-02630-GPC, 2014 

WL 769393, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (“Judicial notice of court records is routinely accepted.”).

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Discussion

I. Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 

646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that 

a pleading stating a claim for relief containing “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is 

to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading 

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint 

suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is 

proper where the claim “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 

(9th Cir. 2008).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true 

all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 

938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). But, a court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, it is improper for a court to assume the 

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claimant “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the 

. . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. 

Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

B. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to “strike from a pleading an 

insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of 

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those 

issues prior to trial.” Sidney–Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited 

importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as a delaying 

tactic.” Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003); 

accord Kohler v. Islands Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 563-64 (S.D. Cal. 2012); see also

Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“Motions to strike 

are disfavored and infrequently granted.”). In reviewing a motion to strike, the court must 

view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and accept the 

factual allegations as true. See Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 183 F.R.D. 550, 

554 (D. Haw. 1998); Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 516 (1959); PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. 

Clifton Wright Family Ins. Trust, No. 09CV2344 BTM (POR), 2010 WL 1445186, at *1 

(S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010).

“The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is 

whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank, 607 F.2d 

824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). “Fair notice generally requires that the defendant state 

the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense. It does not, however, require a detailed 

statement of facts.” Islands Restaurants, 280 F.R.D. at 564 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47). 

“[A]n affirmative defense is legally insufficient only if it clearly lacks merit ‘under any set 

of facts the defendant might allege.’” Id. (quoting McArdle v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 657 

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F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149-50 (N.D. Cal. 2009)); see also Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High 

Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1223–24 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Ordinarily a motion to strike 

will not be granted unless ‘the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible bearing 

on the subject of the litigation.’”). Further, if a defense is stricken, the court should freely 

give leave to amend, so long as there is no prejudice to the opposing party. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 826.2

II. Analysis

Boba argues that the Court should dismiss Infantino’s invalidity counterclaim and 

strike its invalidity defense because Infantino is contractually estopped from challenging 

the validity of the ’199 patent under the language of the Licensing Agreement. (Doc. No. 

26 at 3-5.) In response, Infantino argues that under the terms of the Licensing Agreement, 

it reserved all of its defenses, and it is not estopped from challenging the validity of the 

’199 patent in this action. (Doc. No. at 40 at 9-17.)

The Federal Circuit has explained that “consent decrees and settlement agreements 

may at one and the same time provide for a patent license while barring challenges to patent 

invalidity and unenforceability.” Baseload Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 619 F.3d 1357, 1361 

 

2 The Court notes that a split has developed among district courts within the Ninth Circuit after the 

United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), applying a “plausible on its face” standard to the allegations 

contained in a complaint. Some district courts have suggested that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility 

standard applies to affirmative defenses contained in an answer. See, e.g., Dion v. Fulton Friedman & 

Gullace LLP, No. 11-2727 SC, 2012 WL 160221, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012); Hernandez v. Cty. of 

Monterey, 306 F.R.D. 279, 283 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Other district courts have rejected the contention that 

Twombly and Iqbal altered the standard for evaluating the pleading sufficiency of affirmative defenses, 

and have held that the “fair notice” standard of Wyshak continues to apply. See, e.g., Kohler v. Staples 

the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 464, 468 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Pac. Dental Servs., LLC v. Homeland 

Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. SACV 13-749-JST JPRX, 2013 WL 3776337, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2013).

The Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard 

applies to affirmative defenses contained in an answer. However, the Ninth Circuit has continued to 

recognize the Wyshak fair notice standard in evaluating the pleading sufficiency of affirmative defenses 

even after Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 

2015); Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1023. Accordingly, the Court will also continue to apply the Wyshak fair 

notice standard in evaluating Boba’s Rule 12(f) motion to strike. 

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(Fed. Cir. 2010). But the Federal Circuit has clarified that provisions “asserted to preclude 

litigation of the issue of validity in connection with a new claim must be construed 

narrowly.” Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Thus, 

“invalidity and unenforceability claims may be released, but only if the language of the 

agreement or consent decree is clear and unambiguous.” Baseload Energy, 619 F.3d at 

1361; see also Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]

party does not waive its right to challenge the validity of a patent as to future accused 

products absent a clear intent to do so.”). If a settlement agreement following litigation 

contains such a “clear and unambiguous” release of the right to challenge the validity or 

enforceability of the patent-in-suit, then an “accused infringer is contractually estopped 

from raising any such challenge in any subsequent proceeding.” Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, 

Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The relevant provisions of the Licensing Agreement are as follows.

[2.b] Blue Box [d/b/a Infantino] hereby promises to, within five (5) days of 

the Effective Date, file a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the Lawsuit, 

each party to bear his or her own attorneys’ fees and costs. Blue Box [d/b/a 

Infantino] reserves the right to re-file, in any United States jurisdiction its 

claims for declaratory judgment upon any breach of Section 2.a, above, and 

reserves all defenses. Patent Owner reserves all claims resulting from a 

material breach of this Agreement.

[9.b] Likewise, Blue Box [d/b/a Infantino] hereby releases and forever 

discharges Patent Owner, its respective subsidiaries, parent companies, 

affiliates, officers, directors, members, employees, successors, and assigns 

from any and all known and unknown claims, causes, rights, actions, suits, 

proceedings, debts, dues, contracts, damages, claims, counterclaims, 

affirmative defenses, and demands, including any which it made or asserted, 

or could have made or asserted, prior to the Effective Date of this Agreement.

[9.c.] The Parties agree that the foregoing releases do not include the release 

of any rights or obligations that are created by or result from this Agreement, 

or that arise subsequent to the Effective Date of this Agreement. Nothing in 

this Agreement shall prevent a Party from asserting claims for breach of this

Agreement.

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(Doc. No. 8-1, Compl. Ex. B §§ 2.b, 9.b, 9.c.)

Boba argues the above language represents a clear and unambiguous waiver of any 

future challenge to the ’199 patent’s validity by Infantino. (Doc. No. 26 at 4-5.) The Court 

disagrees, in particular at this stage in the proceedings where all inferences must be drawn 

in the favor of Infantino. See Retail Prop. Trust, 768 F.3d at 945. In arguing that the 

Licensing Agreement contains a clear and unambiguous release, Boba focuses on the 

following sentence from section 2.b of the agreement: “Blue Box [d/b/a Infantino] reserves 

the right to re-file, in any United States jurisdiction its claims for declaratory judgment 

upon any breach of Section 2.a, above, and reserves all defenses.” (Doc. No. 8-1, Compl. 

Ex. B § 2.b.) But this sentence contains a clause expressly stating that Infantino “reserves 

all defenses,” which would include a defense that the patent-in-suit is invalid. (Id.) 

In response, Boba argues that under the language of the agreement, Infantino only 

reserved its defenses in the event that Boba breached the contract, which is not alleged in 

this action. (Doc. No. at 3-4.) But in the sentence above, the clause stating that Infantino 

reserves its right to refile its declaratory judgment action “upon any breach of Section 2.a” 

of the contract, is separated by comma from the separate clause stating that Infantino 

“reserves all defenses.” (Doc. No. 8-1, Compl. Ex. B § 2.b.) In light of this comma, at 

best, it is ambiguous whether Infantino’s right to assert “all defenses” is dependent upon a 

breach by Boba. This is insufficient to demonstrate a clear and unambiguous release of 

Infantino’s invalidity defenses. 

Boba argues that to interpret this clause to allow Infantino to reserve all of its 

defenses regardless of whether there is a breach renders the preceding phrase in the 

sentence meaningless. (Doc. No. 47 at 4.) Boba is incorrect. Under this interpretation, 

the first clause of the sentence still has meaning. Under this interpretation, the first clause 

of the sentence would still prohibit Infantino from initiating and filing a declaratory 

judgment action challenging the validity of the ’199 patent absent a breach by Boba. But, 

under this interpretation, Infantino would not be prohibited from challenging the validity 

of the ’199 patent in defense to a claim of patent infringement, as is the case here.

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Further, to support its argument that there was a clear and unambiguous release, 

Boba attempts to rely on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 

F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001), where the Federal Circuit found that an accused infringer 

was contractually estopped from challenging the validity of the relevant patents. (Doc. No. 

26 at 3-4.) But the Flex-Foot decision is easily distinguishable from the present case. 

Unlike in this case, the agreement at issue in Flex-Foot had clear express language stating 

that the licensee “waive[d] any and all invalidity and unenforceability defenses in any 

future litigation” and agreed “not to challenge or cause to be challenged, directly or 

indirectly, the validity or enforceability of the [patents].” Id. at 1364. The Licensing 

Agreement at issue here has no such similar language. (See generally Doc. No. 8-1, Ex. 

B.) Indeed, to the contrary, the Licensing Agreement in this case contains a provision 

expressly stating that Infantino “reserves all defenses.” (Id. § 2.b.) Further, Flex-Foot

involved a settlement agreement that was accompanied by a dismissal with prejudice. See

238 F.3d at 1367-68 (“[A] dismissal with prejudice and accompanying settlement 

agreement certainly gives rise to contractual estoppel of Springlite’s challenge to the ’363 

patent’s validity.”). In contrast, the Licensing Agreement in this case was accompanied by 

a dismissal without prejudice. (Doc. No. 24-2.) 

Finally, Boba argues that, in order for Infantino to reserve its right to challenge the 

validity of the ’199 patent, Infantino needed to include express language in the Licensing 

Agreement reserving such rights. (Doc. No. 47 at 1.) Boba is wrong. Under the standards 

set forth by the Federal Circuit, an accused infringer retains its right to challenge the 

validity of a patent unless the agreement contains a “clear and unambiguous” release of 

that right. Baseload Energy, 619 F.3d at 1361; see also Ecolab, 285 F.3d at 1376 (“[A]

party does not waive its right to challenge the validity of a patent as to future accused 

products absent a clear intent to do so.”). Thus, absent a clear and unambiguous release, 

an accused infringer retains the right to the challenge the validity of a patent in the future 

even if the agreement does not expressly state that the infringer is retaining that right. See

id.

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In sum, Boba has failed to demonstrate at this stage in the proceedings that the 

Licensing Agreement contains a clear and unambiguous release of Infantino’s invalidity 

claims and defenses. As a result, the Court denies Boba’s motion to dismiss Infantino’s 

invalidity counterclaim and to strike Infantino’s invalidity defense.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court denies Plaintiff Boba’s motion to dismiss and to 

strike. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 15, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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