Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00653/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00653-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS LUCKY,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv653 IEG (NLS) 

ORDER:

 (1) ADOPTING THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

(Doc. No. 21);

(2) REJECTING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS (Doc. No. 22);

(3) DENYING THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

(Doc. No. 1);

(4) DENYING PETITIONER’S

REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY

HEARING; and 

(5) DENYING PETITIONER A

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden

Respondent.

Presently before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) filed by

Douglas Lucky (“Petitioner”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2004 conviction

for one count of the sale or furnishing of a controlled substance (cocaine base) and one count of

possession of cocaine base for sale. Petitioner requests habeas relief on two grounds: (1) prejudicial

error in the jury instruction and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel.

The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes. On April 25,

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2008, Magistrate Judge Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending

this Court deny Petitioner’s claims on the basis of harmless error with respect to the jury instruction

and deny the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 14, 2008, Petitioner filed objections

to the Report. The Court has considered the Report and Petitioner’s objections. This Court (1) adopts

Magistrate Judge Stormes’s Report and (2) dismisses Petitioner’s § 2254 petition with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

A. State Procedural Background

The court hereby incorporates by reference the magistrate judge’s accurate recitation of the

facts. A jury convicted Petitioner of selling cocaine and possessing cocaine base for sale. (Lodgment

1 at 60-61.) At a bifurcated proceeding, Petitioner admitted to having served time in custody for a

prior conviction in addition to a prior strike conviction. (Lodgment 1 at 123.) 

On January 27, 2005, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years in prison. He received

four years for count one, doubled to eight years under the “strike laws,” and three consecutive years

for one of the enhancement allegations; the court struck the second allegation from count one.

(Lodgment 1 at 125.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,

claiming that the trial court erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury regarding use of

circumstantial evidence to prove intent. (Lodgment 6.) While the appellate court found instructional

error, it affirmed the judgment because it held that such error was harmless. (Lodgment 8.) 

Petitioner then appealed to the California Supreme Court, reasserting his claim for prejudicial

instructional error. (Lodgment 9.) He also argued that his conviction should be reversed because at

the time of the offenses he was suffering from a mental defect or illness that rendered him incapable

of appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions. (Lodgment 9.) The California Supreme Court

summarily denied both claims. (Lodgment 10.) 

Next, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court.

In it, he claimed his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his appellate counsel on

direct appeal failed to raise a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel at trial based on the trial

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counsel’s failure to challenge the validity of prior convictions to which Petitioner admitted.

(Lodgment 11.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied this petition. (Lodgment 12.) 

B. Federal Procedural Background

Petitioner initially filed the instant petition in the Central District of California, but it was

transferred to this Court on jurisdictional grounds on April 10, 2007. (Doc. No. 1.) Initially,

Petitioner alleged three claims: (1) prejudicial instructional error, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel,

and (3) a claim that the trial court imposed a sentence that violated the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in California v. Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss,

asking that the Court dismiss the Petition because it was a “mixed” petition, that is, one that contained

both exhausted and unexhausted claims. The Court denied the motion to dismiss as moot because in

his opposition, Petitioner requested that the Court dismiss the unexhausted claim, the Cunningham

violation. The court ordered Respondent to file an answer to Petitioner’s two remaining exhausted

claims. (Doc. No. 15.)

Respondent filed an answer on March 14, 2008. (Doc. No. 19.) Petitioner filed a traverse on

April 1, 2008. (Doc. No. 20.)

On April 25, 2008, Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes issued the Report recommending that

the Petition be denied and Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing be denied. (Doc. No. 21.)

On May 14, 2008, Petitioner filed his objections claiming the Report of the Magistrate Judge was in

error and requesting review of the same claims. (Doc. No. 22.) The Court reviews de novo those

portions of the report to which Petitioner objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.”). 

LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this decision.

Under AEDPA, a federal court will not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on

the merits in state court unless the decision was (1) contrary to or involved an unreasonable

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1

The trial court instructed the jury with the language of CALJIC No. 2.01, which reads:

“However, a finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the

proved circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the

crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. [¶] Further, each fact which

is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may

be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which the

inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Also, if the circumstantial

evidence [as to any particular count] permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to

the defendant’s guilt and the other to his innocence, you must adopt that interpretation which points

to the defendant’s innocence, and reject that interpretation which points to his guilt. [¶] If, on the other

hand, one interpretation of this evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation

to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.”

(Lodgment 8 at 3, n.1.) 

CALJIC No. 2.02 provides: “The [specific intent] [or] [and] [mental state] with which an act

is done may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act. However, you

may not [find the defendant guilty of the crime charged . . . ] unless the proved circumstances are not

only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant had the required [specific intent] [or] [and]

[mental state] but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. [¶] Also, if the evidence

as to [any][specific intent] [or] [mental state] permits two reasonable interpretations, one of which

points to the existence of the [specific intent] [or] [mental state] and the other to its absence, you must

adopt the interpretation which points to its absence. If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the

evidence as to the [specific intent] [or] [mental state] appears to you to be reasonable and the other

interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the

unreasonable.” (CALJIC No. 2.02 (2005 ed.).) (Lodgment 8 at 4, n.2.)

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application of clearly established federal law, which means “the governing principle or principles set

forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision,” or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. (d); Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002).

DISCUSSION

A. Improper Jury Instruction 

Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims the trial court erred when it gave California Jury Instruction - Criminal

(“CALJIC”) No. 2.01 instead of CALJIC No. 2.02.1

 Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by the error

because “the error prevented the prosecution from having to prove its case beyond a reasonable

doubt.” (Doc. No. 22.) At trial, counsel for Petitioner argued that giving CALJIC 2.01 eased the

government’s burden of proof of mental state, because 2.01 provides only a general instruction

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regarding circumstantial evidence while 2.02 explains circumstantial evidence specifically in terms

of proving mental state. Petitioner’s trial counsel argued at the hearing on jury instruction, “the

important part of my case has to do with mental state . . . it has to do with specific intent, especially

in count two, and this jury instruction, 2.02 specifically addresses that.” (Lodgment 6 at 6.) Petitioner

believes the trial court’s failure to give instruction 2.02 was a violation of his right to due process.

Respondent argues the Court of Appeal correctly found that even if the trial court erred in not

giving instruction 2.02, the error had no prejudicial effect. (Doc. No. 19-2 at 7-12.) 

The Report of the Magistrate Judge

The magistrate judge properly recited the standard for federal habeas corpus relief. Habeas

relief is warranted based upon a claim of instructional error “where [the alleged error’s] impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Hines

v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980)).

The magistrate judge found that while the Court of Appeal opined the trial court should have

given CALJIC 2.02, the error did not “so infect” the process to warrant reversal. The magistrate judge

found the evidence summarized by the Court of Appeal to be convincing enough that the error did not

effect the outcome. Accordingly, the magistrate judge concluded Petitioner did not suffer a

miscarriage of justice. In addition the magistrate judge found: “Petitioner does not demonstrate in any

way that the instruction had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” (Doc. No. 21 at 9 citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).) 

Petitioner’s Objections

Petitioner contends the magistrate judge erred in concluding the error was harmless, arguing

the improper jury instruction was “especially egregious” and warrants habeas relief “even absent a

substantial influence on the verdict.” (Doc. No. 22 at 3 relying on Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

at 638 (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 769 (1987)).)

Further, Petitioner claims that there is at least “grave doubt” as to whether the error had

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” and as such the error

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was not harmless. (Doc. No. 22 at 3-4 relying on O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995).)

Discussion

The Ninth Circuit has held that the giving of CALJIC 2.01 in lieu of CALJIC 2.02 does not

rise to the level of constitutional error. McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1994)

(characterizing the argument that CALJIC 2.02 should have been given rather than 2.01 as “a

quibble”). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision did not involve an “unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). 

However, even assuming CALJIC 2.02 should have been given, viewing the instructions as

a whole, the failure did not “so infect” the process to warrant relief. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638. The trial

court instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense, and CALJIC 2.01 explained to the jury the

standard by which it should view circumstantial evidence. In closing arguments, defense counsel

highlighted the proper standard the jury should use to evaluate the circumstantial evidence.

Finally, there was ample circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. As the Court

of Appeal observed:

The lack of prejudice is also shown by the strength of the evidence against Lucky. The

prosecution’s evidence included the testimony of the police officers who observed the

transaction, the cocaine base Lucky gave Officer Hall in exchange for money, copies

of the prerecorded currency, and Officer Hall’s opinions the cocaine base was a usable

amount and Lucky possessed it for sale. Lucky’s possession with specific intent to sell

was shown by the fact that he indeed did sell the substance of the officer, and his

knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance was shown by the fact that he

personally handled it and was going to personally smoke it. Lucky did not call any

witnesses to refute the prosecution’s evidence. Given the compelling evidence of the

elements of the offenses, including his specific intent and knowledge, the failure to

give the circumstantial evidence instruction focusing on specific intent and mental

state was clearly harmless. 

(Lodgment 8 at 8.) 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim the trial court erred in failing to instruct

according to CALJIC 2.02.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner next claims appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise on

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direct appeal that trial counsel coerced Petitioner into admitting prior convictions. Petitioner argues

the prosecution was required to show the prior guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and trial

counsel should have advised him to challenge the validity of the prior convictions. (Doc. No. 1.)

Respondent argues there is no evidence of prejudice attributable to counsel since the record

indicates Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a trial on the priors and the court

took the proper steps to ensure Petitioner understood the rights he was giving up by admitting to his

prior convictions. (Doc. No. 19 citing Lodgment 3 at 213-219.)

The Report of the Magistrate Judge

The magistrate judge accurately determined the standard for review: for Petitioner “[t]o prevail

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [he] must show that (1) counsel’s representation was

deficient and (2) that deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the trial.” Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). It is Petitioner’s burden to prove the admission was involuntary. Little v.

Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006). The court can reject Petitioner’s claim on either prong

of the Strickland standard. There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate services.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

The magistrate judge gave the following accurate recitation of the facts as reviewed by this

court:

At the start of the second half of the bifurcated trial on December 23, 2004, Petitioner’s

counsel asked for time to show Petitioner some information and discuss it with him.

Lodgment 3 at 213. The court took a recess. Lodgment 3 at 213. When it went back

in session, Petitioner’s counsel notified the court that Petitioner was willing to admit

his priors. Lodgment 3 at 213. The Court then listed out the sentencing times for the

different violations and priors. Lodgment 3 at 214-215. Petitioner first said he

understood the impact of the priors on his sentence, then, in response to the court’s

repeated question of whether he understood the consequences of the priors, he said, “I

have no choice, ma’am.” Lodgment 3 at 215. The court again informed Petitioner of

the impact and consequences of admitting the priors:

The Court: Do you understand what I’m saying each of these priors does,

the impact of the priors? Do you understand that? 

Petitioner: Yes, they double. 

The Court: The impact of the strike is to double the prison term. The

prison term is three, four, or five years. The middle term is four

years. The upper term is five years. The lower term is three

years. The impact of the strike is to double that. The impact of

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each of the two 11370.2 (A) allegations, each one adds three

years in state prison, so that’s six years. 

***

Petitioner: So even though I did time for that, I do it again?

The Court: The law sets up that if you have a prior conviction it adds time,

this time, right, even though you served it before. 

Lodgment 3 at 215-216. The court again explained the impact of the priors. Lodgment

3 at 216. Petitioner again responded that he understood the impact. Lodgment 3 at

217. Then the court advised Petitioner of his rights:

The Court: I just need to make sure you understand what it does. So on

these, all of these priors that are alleged, you have a right to a

trial, you, the right to remain silent, and the right to present

evidence in your own behalf at no cost to you. Do you

understand those rights? 

Petitioner: Yes, ma’am. 

The Court: And do you want to give up those rights and admit to these

priors?

Petitioner: Well, I admit to my priors, your honor. 

***

The Court: Is that what you want to do, give up those rights and admit the

priors? I have to go through this. I have to ask you these

questions. 

Petitioner: Okay, well, I have obligations myself I need to get to, so I have

to say yes. 

The Court: I don’t know what you mean by you have to say yes. You have

these rights. We can go through the trial if you want, and if you

want to admit the priors and give up the right to a trial, you can,

but you have the right to a trial. You are acting like you are

being coerced in some way. You are not coerced at all. 

Lodgment 3 at 217-218. After expressing some uncertainty, Petitioner ultimately

affirmed he would give up his right to a trial and admit the priors. Lodgment 3 at 219.

The trial court then went through each of the priors, and Petitioner admitted each of

them. Lodgment 3 at 220-22. The trial court then confirmed that Petitioner was

entering his plea volunarily:

The Court: Okay, and you are agreeing to this plea. It is my understanding

that you have had enough time to talk to your attorney about it

and review the facts; is that correct?

Petitioner: Yes, ma’am. 

The Court: Has anybody threatened you or anybody close to you to get you

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to enter this plea?

***

Petitioner: I’m getting an offer I can’t refuse here. Nobody has threatened

me. It just has to be done, whether I like it or not. 

The Court: So nobody has threatened you; is that correct?

Petitioner: Yes, ma’am. 

The Court: And have you had any liquor or drugs in the last 48 hours? 

Petitioner: No way. 

The Court: So you understand clearly what is going on?

Petitioner: Yes, ma’am I would like - - the doctor said I was very

competent; I knew what I was doing. 

***

The Court: So you feel like you understand what is going on?

Petitioner: I do know. 

The Court: Are you satisfieded [sic] with your attorneys through this time?

Petitioner: Everyone in the room, I’m satisfied with everybody. 

The Court: Then I will accept the plea, and I make all the findings, that the

defendant has made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his

rights, that he understands the nature of the priors and the

consequences of these, and you concur, Ms. Gilliam

[Petitioner’s counsel]? 

Ms. Gilliam: Yes, your honor. 

Lodgment 3 at 222-224.

The record shows that the trial court explained to Petitioner the impact and

consequences of admitting the priors several times. The court answered all of

Petitioner’s questions, especially when he expressed some confusion or uncertainty.

The court also repeatedly informed Petitioner of his rights, and of what he is giving up

by admitting the priors. The record also shows Petitioner conferred with his counsel

through the exchange with the court. Finally, Petitioner’s trial counsel concurred with

the court that Petitioner was making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights.

(Doc. No. 21 at 10-12.)

Petitioner’s Objections 

Petitioner did not raise any new arguments in his objections to the report of the magistrate

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judge. He simply reasserts his argument that his admission to his priors was not knowing and

voluntary. He claims his attorney coerced him to admit his prior convictions. (Doc. No. 22.) 

Discussion

After reviewing the record in full, the Court adopts the recommendation of the magistrate

judge. The colloquy between the judge and Petitioner at Lodgment 3 clearly demonstrates Petitioner

knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when he admitted his prior convictions. Trial counsel

did not coerce Petitioner into admitting his prior convictions, and accordingly appellate counsel was

not deficient in failing to make such a claim on direct appeal.

Furthermore, to the extent Petitioner argues his trial counsel should have attacked the

constitutionality of the prior convictions based upon the involuntariness of those prior guilty pleas,

such a claim is not cognizable under § 2254. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S.

394, 403-404 (2001) (holding that a petitioner cannot challenge a prior conviction used to enhance a

current sentence in a § 2254 petition when the prior conviction is no longer open to attack in its own

right). Petitioner has not shown the state court’s decision was “contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). 

C. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing in his original petition, traverse, and objections.

Petitioner can only receive an evidentiary hearing if Petitioner shows that the error “resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved in an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). In this case Petitioner has not met this burden. The request

is denied. 

D. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner complaining of detention arising from state court proceedings must obtain a

certificate of appealability to file an appeal of the final order in a federal habeas proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). The district court may issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner “has

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made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner has

not made a “substantial showing” as to any of the claims raised by his petition, and thus the Court sua

sponte denies a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court therefore ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s report, REJECTS Petitioner’s

objections, DENIES the Petition, DENIES the request for an evidentiary hearing, and DENIES

Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 19, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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