Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01160/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01160-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY DANIELS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

P. MANDEVILLE, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________

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No. C 04-1160 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO DISMISS AND MOTION

TO APPOINT COUNSEL;

GRANTING MOTIONS FOR

SERVICE OF PROCESS;

INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK

(Docket nos. 8, 10, 11, 12)

Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of California, currently incarcerated at California

State Prison-Lancaster, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

complaining of violations of his civil rights while incarcerated at Salinas Valley State

Prison ("SVSP"). Defendants Assuncion and Mohler ("Defendants") filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which is denied for the reasons set forth below

(docket no. 8). As further discussed below, Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel

(docket no. 10), which is denied; and motions for service of process (docket no. 11) and

for extension of time to file service (docket no. 12), which are granted. 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Section 1915(g), Defendants move for dismissal of this prisoner civil

rights action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the ground that Plaintiff cannot

proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") under § 1915 because he has had three or more

previous dismissals and is not under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The

motion is denied because Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff has three or more

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dismissals that qualify as “strikes” under § 1915(g).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") provides, among other

things, that a prisoner may not bring “a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action

or proceeding under [28 U.S.C. § 1915] if the prisoner has, on three or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner

is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

"[I]f defendants challenge a prisoner-plaintiff's IFP status, then the initial

production burden rests with the defendants. . . . [T]he defendants must produce

documentary evidence that allows the district court to conclude that the plaintiff has filed

at least three prior actions" that can be counted under § 1915(g). Andrews v. King, 398

F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). "Once the defendants have met this initial burden, the

burden then shifts to the prisoner, who must attempt to rebut the defendants' showing by

explaining why a prior dismissal should not count as a strike." Id. at 1120. 

Defendants claim Plaintiff suffered three or more qualifying strikes under Section

1915(g): (1) Daniels v. Marshall, No. C 92-2318 VRW (dismissed as frivolous); (2)

Daniels v. Pomerleau, No. C 93-1164 VRW (dismissed for failure to state a claim); (3)

Daniels v. Vaughn, No. CV-F-99-6611-AWI-SMS-P (dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies); (4) Daniels v. Schroeder, No. CV-F-99-6717 (voluntary

dismissal); (5) Daniels v. Vaughn, No. 02-15754 (voluntary dismissal of appeal); (6)

Daniels v. Long, No. 93-0506 VRW (dismissed for failure to timely amend complaint);

(7) Daniels v. Smalls, No. C 97-4713 (dismissed for failure to file timely IFP

application); (8) Daniels v. Moran, No. CV-F-98-5044-SMS-P (dismissed for failure to

comply with court order). (Def. Req. for Judicial Not., Exs. A-H.)

Of these previous dismissals, the Court finds that only the first two, Daniels v.

Marshall and Daniels v. Pomerleau, qualify as strikes to warrant IFP disqualification

within the meaning of Section 1915(g). None of the other actions cited by Defendants

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were dismissed on the basis of being frivolous, malicious or failing to state a claim. See

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. ("Not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under 

§ 1915(g). Rather, § 1915(g) should be used to deny a prisoner's IFP status only when,

after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other relevant information,

the district court determines that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous,

malicious or failed to state a claim.") The motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED

(docket no. 8).

II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff asks the court to appoint counsel for the purpose of serving the complaint

on Defendant Hildredge. See Mot. for Appointment of Counsel. However, there is no

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case unless an indigent litigant may lose his

physical liberty if he loses the litigation. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452

U.S. 18, 25 (1981); Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (no

constitutional right to counsel in § 1983 action), withdrawn in part on other grounds on

reh'g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). A court “may request an attorney

to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

The decision to request counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 is

within “the sound discretion of the trial court and is granted only in exceptional

circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). A finding of

the “exceptional circumstances” of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires an evaluation

of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the

plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved. See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103

(9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525; Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Both of these

factors must be viewed together before reaching a decision on a request for counsel

under § 1915. See id. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has neither established a

likelihood of success on the merits nor does it appear that the issues are particularly

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complex at this time. Furthermore, Plaintiff has established through the submission of

various documents in this case that he is more than capable of representing himself at

this time in the proceedings. As such, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED without prejudice

(docket no. 10).

III. MOTIONS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS

Plaintiff also requests "followup" service of process on Defendant Hildredge,

citing the United States Marshal's Notice of Service, dated October 13, 2004, which

states that SVSP "was unable to locate this individual." (Req. for Followup Service of

Process, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff contends that Hildredge is a sergeant and was employed at

SVSP. Plaintiff has identified this defendant as H. Hildredge in the complaint. With this

additional identifying information, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for service of

process and hereby orders service of the complaint on Defendant H. Hildredge, as set

forth below. (Docket no. 11.) The Court also grants Plaintiff's request for an extension

of time to serve Defendant Hildredge within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.

(Docket no. 12.)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown,

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED (docket no. 8).

2. Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED (docket no. 10).

3. Plaintiff's request for service of process on Defendant H. Hildredge is

GRANTED, and Plaintiff shall have an extension of thirty days from the date of this

order to complete service on Hildredge. (Docket nos. 11, 12.)

4. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshal

shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint and all attachments

thereto, and a copy of this order upon: Correctional Officer H. Hildredge of Salinas

Valley State Prison. The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff.

5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, Defendants

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shall either file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or a notice

to the Court that they are of the opinion that this matter cannot be resolved by dispositive

motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall

conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor

qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If defendant is of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so

inform the Court prior to the date their summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on the Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date Defendants’

motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to

Plaintiff:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment

by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose

a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of

material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact

that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked

for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly

supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you

cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you

must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as

provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that there

is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment,

if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary

judgment is granted in favor of defendants, your case will be

dismissed and there will be no trial.

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary

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judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

Plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

6. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be

granted. However, the party making the motion for an extension of time is not relieved

from his or her duty to comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having

made a motion for an extension of time. The party making the motion must still meet the

deadlines set by the Court until an order addressing the motion for an extension of time is

received. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than five days prior

to the deadline sought to be extended.

7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants,

or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the

document to Defendants or Defendants' counsel.

8. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 29, 2005

 

 

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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