Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00116/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KALI ORFF, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF IMPERIAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-0116 W (AGS)

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT 

ANDREW SMITHSON’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS [DOC. 8]; AND

(2) GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 

CITY OF IMPERIAL AND 

MICHAEL COLON’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS [DOC. 7]

Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant Andrew Smithson’s Motion to 

Dismiss [Doc. 8]; and (2) Defendant City of Imperial and Michael Colon’s Motion to 

Dismiss. [Doc. 7.] The first motion is unopposed. [Doc. 9.] The second is opposed. 

[Doc. 10.] The Court decides the matters on the papers submitted and without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that follow, the Court 

GRANTS the first motion and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the 

second.

//

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kali Orff is a Detective with the Brawley Police Department. (Compl.

[Doc. 1] ¶ 12.) Her wife, Plaintiff Michelle Kristol, is a Detective with the Ventura 

County Sheriff’s Office. (Id.) 

According to the Complaint, “[o]n or about January 31, 2016,” Detective Orff 

attended a birthday party at a friend’s home. (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 13.) Along with several 

acquaintances, she stayed the night at that home. (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 13–14.) The Complaint 

alleges that Defendant Andrew Smithson, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agent 

who was dating one of her friends at the time, sexually assaulted Orff several hours after 

she went to bed. (See id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 14.) It alleges that upon being awakened by the 

assault, “Detective Orff punched her attacker in the face, called 911, and reported the 

sexual battery to the responding officers of [the Imperial Police Department].” 

(Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 15.) Orff was then evaluated at Pioneers Memorial Hospital. (Id. [Doc. 1] 

¶ 16.)

The Complaint alleges that Defendant Smithson confessed to the assault. (Compl.

[Doc. 1] ¶ 19.) Nevertheless, it alleges, “[the Imperial Police Department] made no 

attempt to determine the assailant’s blood alcohol content or to gather any biological 

evidence” from him. (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 18.) Moreover, the Complaint alleges that 

“[f]ollowing the assault, [the Imperial Police Department] failed to submit Detective 

Orff’s case to the District Attorney’s office for over 100 days.” (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 20.) 

Ultimately, according to the Complaint, “the District Attorney’s Office declined to 

prosecute, citing an unknown level of intoxication of the assailant.” (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 25.) 

It alleges, “[t]o date, . . . Smithson has not been charged with any crime, and [he] remains 

free to work in a position of authority on the United States border[.]” (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 19.)

The Complaint further alleges that Defendant Michael Colon, Chief of the Imperial 

Police Department, “made an active effort to interfere with the case.” (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 

20.) According to the Complaint, “[s]hortly after the assault,” Chief Colon “called 

Detective Orff’s boss at the Brawley Police Department . . . and gave him the details of 

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Orff’s sexual assault.” (Id. [Doc. 1] ¶ 21.) During that call, Chief Colon allegedly 

“blamed Orff for being victimized” and “accused Orff of being immoral because of her 

sexual orientation.” (Id.) Thereafter, “on or about May 16, 2016, Detective Orff’s wife, 

Detective Kristol, contacted [the Imperial Police Department] to get an explanation as to 

why Detective Orff’s case had not been submitted to the District Attorney.” (Id. [Doc. 1] 

¶ 22.) “In response, Chief Colon contacted Detective Kristol’s boss, and began to 

divulge details of Detective Orff’s assault to him and to attack Detective Orff’s character 

and fitness as an officer.” (Id.)

The Complaint asserts eleven causes of action: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against Chief Colon and Doe Defendants; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 

Imperial Police Department and the City of Imperial; (3) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 

51(b) and 52(a); (4) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; (5) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress; (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) public disclosure of 

private facts; (8) false light; (9) defamation; (10) sexual battery; and (11) battery. 

(Compl. [Doc. 1].) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

The Court must dismiss a cause of action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “The party asserting federal subject matter jurisdiction bears the 

burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 

1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994)). Article III of the United States Constitution limits the subject matter 

jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” See Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). This limitation forms “the core component of 

standing[,]” a doctrine that ensures federal courts decide only those cases “that are of the 

justiciable sort referred to in Article III[,]” those that are “ ‘appropriately resolved 

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through the judicial process[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 

(1990)). 

As an “irreducible constitutional minimum[,]” standing is a fundamental part of 

every federal case, a limitation on their subject matter jurisdiction. See Chandler, 598 

F.3d at 1122; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. It consists of three elements—all of which the 

party asserting federal jurisdiction must establish: (i) injury; (ii) causation; and (iii) 

redressability. See id. 

First, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered an “injury in fact”, i.e., an “invasion of a 

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”

Second, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection by proving that [his] injury is fairly 

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant.

Third, the plaintiff must show that [his] injury will likely be redressed by a favorable 

decision. 

Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122 (quoting and citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 

B. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The Court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either 

for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In ruling on the 

motion, a court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the 

complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. L.A. Cnty., 

487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has 

interpreted this rule to mean that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 

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relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). The allegations in the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

Well-pled allegations in the complaint are assumed true, but a court is not required 

to accept legal conclusions couched as facts, unwarranted deductions, or unreasonable 

inferences. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 275 

F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).

C. Motion to Strike Pursuant to Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) allows a court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The 

court may act . . . on its own[,] or . . . on motion made by a party either before responding 

to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the 

pleading.” Id. “ ‘The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of 

time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those 

issues prior to trial . . . .’ ” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d

on other grounds by 510 U.S. 517 (1994)). Motions to strike are generally disfavored

and are “usually . . . denied unless the allegations in the pleading have no possible 

relation to the controversy, and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” See Travelers 

Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Dunmore, 2010 WL 5200940, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

Redundant matter is the needless repetition of assertions. See Dunmore, 2010 WL 

5200940, at *3. “ ‘Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important 

relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being plead.’ ” Whittlestone, 618 F.3d 

at 974 (quoting Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527). “Impertinent matter consists of statements 

that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. (internal 

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quotation omitted). “Scandalous matters are allegations that unnecessarily reflect . . . on 

the moral character of an individual or state . . . anything in repulsive language that 

detracts from the dignity of the court.” Consumer Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. 

Supp. 2d 1002, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Corbell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 1, 5 

(D.D.C. 2004)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Smithson’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Will be Granted.

As a Preliminary matter, Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendant Andrew Smithson’s 

motion to dismiss the fifth and sixth causes of action against him as to Plaintiff Kristol, 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, respectively. (Smithson Mot. [Doc. 8]; Pls.’ Non-opp’n [Doc. 9].) Good cause 

appearing, Smithson’s motion will be granted.

B. Plaintiff Kristol and Article III Standing

Defendants City of Imperial and Miguel Colon contend that Plaintiff Kristol lacks 

standing to pursue her causes of action. (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 14:27–15:7.)

As noted above, to show the existence of Article III standing, “the plaintiff must 

prove that [she] suffered an ‘injury in fact’, i.e., an ‘invasion of a legally protected 

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122 (quoting and citing Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560–61).

The Complaint asserts the first and second causes of action, for violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, and the fifth and sixth causes of action, for intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, respectively, on behalf of Detective Kristol. (Compl.

[Doc. 1] ¶¶ 27–38, 52–67.) 

//

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1. First and Second Causes of Action

As to the first and second causes of action, for violation of § 1983, the Complaint 

does not allege a clear theory as to how Defendants’ conduct violated Detective Kristol’s 

constitutional rights, as opposed to those of her wife. Even the telephone call to 

Detective Kristol’s supervisor following her May 16, 2016 inquiry is alleged to have 

focused on the details of her wife’s assault, and on her wife’s “character and fitness as an 

officer”—not on her own. (See Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 22.) The Court does not decide at this 

time whether Detective Kristol suffered a constitutional injury that could confer standing 

to assert a § 1983 cause of action—only that the Complaint as drafted does not 

sufficiently allege facts to support such an injury.

The first and second causes of action will be dismissed with leave to amend as to 

Plaintiff Kristol for lack of Article III standing. 1

2. Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action

As to the fifth and sixth causes of action, for intentional and negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, respectively, Plaintiffs adequately allege that Detective Kristol 

suffered emotional harm as a result of Chief Colon’s discussion of the details of her 

wife’s sexual assault case with her own supervisor. (See Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 53, 62–63.) 

This is sufficient injury to confer Article III standing. See Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1122. 

As to causes of action grounded in violations of California state tort law, “[t]he doctrine 

of respondeat superior applies to public and private employers alike.” Mary M. v. City of 

Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 209 (1991). Thus, Plaintiffs have also alleged causation 

and redressability against all defendants as to these causes of action. See id.; Chandler, 

598 F.3d at 1122.

 

1

“The court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth and sixth causes of action as to Plaintiff 

Kristol for lack of standing is denied.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants City of Imperial and Miguel Colon move to dismiss the first and 

second causes of action, for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 3:4–

7:2.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Pls.’ Opp’n [Doc. 10] 3:21–8:1.)

1. The First Cause of Action—Defendant Colon

a) Discrimination

First, Defendants contend that the Complaint does not adequately allege a violation 

of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments because “there is no constitutional right to an adequate police 

investigation.” (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 3:4–5:4 (citing Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005 

(9th Cir. 1985).) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that their § 1983 Due Process and 

Equal Protection causes of action are not grounded in inadequate investigation, but rather 

a theory of discrimination on the basis of Detective Orff’s sexual preferences. (Pls.’ 

Opp’n [Doc. 10] 3:22–6:3.)

There is no constitutional right to an adequate police investigation. See Gomez v. 

Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). “There is a constitutional right, however, 

to have police services administered in a nondiscriminatory manner—a right that is 

violated when a state actor denies . . . protection to disfavored persons.” See Estate of 

Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted).

The Complaint does not clearly allege a discrimination theory. Rather, it seems to 

ground its allegations of wrongdoing as to Chief Colon’s official duties in terms of his

interference with the course of the investigation and prosecution of the Orff matter. (See, 

e.g., Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 29 (“Officer Defendants . . . deprived Plaintiffs of rights . . . by 

interfering with the prosecution of the sexual assault to which Detective Orff was

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subjected . . . .”).) Plaintiffs urge the Court to read a discrimination theory between the 

lines—based on the slow pace of the investigation, combined with allegedly

discriminatory remarks Chief Colon made in two phone calls. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n

[Doc. 10] 5:2–17.) This the Court cannot do. The Complaint simply does not allege the 

relevant theory. Defendants are entitled to “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. If Plaintiffs’ theory is 

that discrimination caused the investigatory delay, the Complaint must allege as much. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (summarizing the relevant 

pleading standards). 

The Complaint does not allege a viable claim as to how Chief Colon’s alleged 

interference with either the investigation or the prosecution of Detective Orff’s case 

amounts to a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Due Process and Equal Protection 

claims within the first cause of action will be dismissed with leave to amend as to 

Plaintiff Orff.

b) Violation of Privacy

Second, Defendants contend that the “the alleged acts of Chief Colon [do not] 

amount to a violation of any right of privacy.” (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 5:5–7:2.) This 

line of argument is misguided.

The Fourteenth Amendment protects “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure 

of personal matters.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 599 n.25 (1977). “[T]he 

security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society 

and is therefore ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ embraced within the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1963) (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled on other grounds 

by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). The Constitution shields the privacy of one’s 

sexual activities. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983) 

(internal citations omitted). “The desire to shield one’s unclothed figured from view of 

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strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary selfrespect and personal dignity.” York, 324 F.2d at 455.

[A] historic social stigma has attached to victims of sexual violence. In particular, a 

tradition of “blaming the victim” of sexual violence sets these victims apart from 

those of other violent crimes. Releasing the intimate details of rape will therefore not 

only dissect a particularly painful sexual experience, but often will subject a victim 

to criticism and scrutiny concerning her sexuality and personal choices regarding 

sex.

Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir. 1998).

Defendants analogize to Davis v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1988), in arguing 

that the Complaint implicates no privacy issue of constitutional import. (Compl. [Doc. 7-

1] 5:5–7:2.) In Davis, an inmate in the custody of Washington state sued a state 

correctional officer for violation of § 1983. The inmate had brought several nude 

photographs of his wife into the prison. Upon a move from one part of the prison to 

another, the inmate’s possessions were inventoried. At that point, the correctional officer 

found the photographs and “exhibited [them] to at least two inmates before replacing 

them.” Id. at 719. He later made remarks to the desk sergeant about the inmate’s wife’s 

anatomy, which at least one guard and one inmate overheard. Id.

The court held that the correctional officer’s “indiscretions [did] not constitute the 

type of governmental abuse which demands a constitutional response.” Davis, 853 F.2d 

at 721. It counseled discretion in circumscribing § 1983, lest the statute begin to displace 

state tort law—with courts branding every tort committed by a state actor as a 

constitutional harm. See id. at 720. The court noted the fact that the inmate himself had 

brought the photos into the prison environment, thereby “presenting an inherent risk of 

disclosure and a cognizable diminution in [the inmate’s] reasonable expectations of 

privacy.” Id. It characterized the correctional officer’s conduct as “two isolated 

instances of poor judgment”—“tasteless, unwise, and unwarranted[,]” but not an 

“aggravated abuse of authority . . . warranting the displacement of state tort law as the 

appropriate, and exclusive, vehicle of redress.” See id. at 720–21 (internal citations 

omitted).

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Several factors distinguish the instant case from Davis. First, whereas the inmate 

in Davis assumed some risk of disclosure by choosing to bring private images into a 

prison environment, the Complaint does not allege that Detective Orff took any 

analogous steps. She was the victim of a sexual assault. She is entitled to privacy 

surrounding the details of that assault, lest she suffer the “historic social stigma has 

attached to victims of sexual violence[,]” subjecting her to “criticism and scrutiny 

concerning her sexuality and personal choices regarding sex.” See Bloch, 156 F.3d at 

685. Second, the alleged disclosure of the details of Detective Orff’s assault was not 

limited to an enclosed environment like a prison, but was instead purposefully directed at 

the victim’s direct supervisor, and at the supervisor of the victim’s wife.2 (See Compl.

[Doc. 1] ¶¶ 21–22.) Third, and on a related note, the allegation that Chief Colon directed 

his disclosure at the supervisors of the victim and her spouse gives rise to an implication 

of malice, changing the character of the conduct alleged from isolated indiscretions to an 

“aggravated abuse of authority.” See Davis, 853 F.2d at 720–21.

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the violation of 

privacy claim within the first cause of action will be denied.

2. The Second Cause of Action—Monell Liability

Defendants move to dismiss the second cause of action, for violation 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 against the Imperial Police Department and the City of Imperial per Monell v. Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the ground that it does not meet 

the pleading standard of Rule 8. (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 12:11–14:25.)

The Complaint alleges the following, in relevant part, as to municipal § 1983 

liability:

 

2 Defendants urge the Court to construe “law enforcement” as a limited environment analogous to the 

prison in Davis, despite the fact that Chief Colon’s alleged disclosure spanned three such agencies 

across as many distinct jurisdictions. (See Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 6:16–7:2.) They present no authority 

that would support such an interpretation.

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Defendants City of Imperial and Imperial Police Department knowingly, with gross 

negligence, and in deliberate indifference to the Constitutional rights of citizens, 

maintain and permit and official policy and custom of permitting the occurrence of 

the types of wrongs set forth hereinabove and hereafter.

These policies and customs include, but are not limited to, the deliberately 

indifferent training of law enforcement officers in the mishandling of criminal cases 

to be prosecuted, the misuse of confidential information that officers come to know 

in the exercise of their law enforcement duties, the ratification of police misconduct, 

and the failure to conduct adequate unbiased investigations of police misconduct 

such that future violations do not occur.

(Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 34–35 (paragraph number omitted).) The Complaint does not allege 

in what manner the law enforcement officers are poorly trained, how confidential 

information is misused, how police misconduct is ratified, or how any of this alleged 

malfeasance caused injury to Detective Orff. This falls far short of satisfying Rule 8. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The second cause of action will be dismissed with leave to amend as to all 

defendants.

3

D. The Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b) Cause of Action

Defendants move to dismiss the third cause of action in the Complaint, for 

violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(b) and 52(a), on the ground that the statute does not 

apply because the Imperial Police Department does not fall within the statutory definition 

of “business establishment.” (See Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 7:3–12.)

(b) All persons within the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal, and no 

matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, 

medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, 

citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and 

equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 

establishments of every kind whatsoever.

 

3 The same reasoning applies to both the City of Imperial and the Imperial Police Department.

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Cal. Civ. Code § 51. Section 51 reaches “ ‘all business establishments of every kind 

whatsoever.’ ” Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 17 Cal. 4th 670, 696 

(1998) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 51). “[T]he term ‘business establishments’ must 

properly be interpreted ‘in the broadest sense reasonably possible.’ ” Id. (quoting Burks 

v. Poppy Const. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468 (1962)). However, the term is not to be 

interpreted to include organizations “whose formation and activities are unrelated to the 

promotion or advancement of the economic or business interests of its members.” See id.

at 697. A public entity “is not a business establishment within the meaning of section 51 

unless it engages in behavior involving sufficient ‘businesslike attributes.’ ” See Carter 

v. City of Los Angeles, 224 Cal. App. 4th 808, 825 (internal citation omitted). “[A]n 

entity providing sidewalks and curbs to its citizens does so as a public servant, not a 

commercial enterprise.” Id.; see also Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 187 

Cal. App. 4th 734, 765 (2010) (declining to apply section 51 to the actions of a city’s 

legislative body); Burnett v. San Francisco Police Dep’t, 36 Cal. App. 4th 1177, 1192 

(1995) (declining to apply section 51 to the ordinance of a city’s legislative body, or to

the allegedly age-discriminatory actions of a police chief and police department in 

enforcing that ordinance).

In Curran, the California Supreme Court declined to extend the contours of the 

Unruh Act to cover “the membership policies or decisions” of a Boy Scouts council, “an 

expressive social organization whose primary function is the inculcation of values in its 

youth members, and whose small social group structure and activities are not comparable 

to those of a traditional place of public accommodation or amusement.” See 17 Cal. 4th 

at 699. The Court focused on the limited scope of the commercial activity conducted by 

the group, emphasizing that “the business transactions with nonmembers engaged in by 

the Boy Scouts do not involve the sale of access to the basic activities or services offered 

by the organization.” Id. at 700. The Court held:

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[W]e have no doubt that the [Unruh Act] would apply to . . . the actual business 

transactions with nonmembers engaged in by the Boy Scouts in its retail stores and 

elsewhere . . . we conclude that such transactions do not render the Boy Scouts a 

business establishment so as to bring its membership within the reach of the [Unruh 

Act]. Those business transactions are distinct from the Scouts’ core functions and 

do not demonstrate that the organization has become a commercial purveyor of the 

primary incidents and benefits of membership in the organization.

Id. (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff urges the Court to construe a police department as a business 

establishment within the ambit of section 51. (See Pls.’ Opp’n [Doc. 10] 8:23–10:23.) 

Such a decision would contradict both the plain meaning of the statutory language and 

compelling authority from the California Supreme Court and the California Courts of 

Appeal interpreting that language. Curran, 17 Cal. 4th at 700; Carter, 224 Cal. App. 4th 

at 825; Qualified Patients Ass’n, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 765; Burnett, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 

1192. A police department is unrelated to the promotion or advancement of economic or 

business interests. See Curran, 17 Cal. 4th at 697. It is not a business establishment.

The third cause of action will be dismissed without leave to amend.

E. The Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 Cause of Action

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, for violation of the 

Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, on the ground that the Complaint does not allege the 

coercive conduct necessary to sustain such a cause of action. (Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 

7:13–26.)

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(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by 

threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or 

coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights 

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by 

the Constitution or laws of this state . . . .

(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or 

laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as 

described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and 

on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to, 

damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief 

to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured, 

including appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern or 

practice of conduct as described in subdivision (a).

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (emphasis added).

Coercion is “[c]ompulsion of a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or 

threat of physical force[.]” COERCION, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 

Moral coercion, or undue influence, is defined as “[t]he improper use of power or trust in 

a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective; the exercise 

of enough control over another person that a questioned act by this person would not 

have otherwise been performed, the person’s free agency having been overmastered.”

UNDUE INFLUENCE, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

Plaintiffs allege:

Defendant Chief Colon’s interference with Detective Orff’s rights violated Civil 

Code section 52.1 because (1) Defendant Chief Colon unfairly refused to forward 

Detective Orff’s case to the District Attorney in violation of Chief Colon’s duty as a 

law enforcement officer, and (2) because Defendant Chief Colon violated Detective 

Orff’s right to privacy and dignity by attempting to coerce Defendant Orff’s 

commanding officer into terminating Detective Orff through Defendant Chief 

Colon’s allegations that Detective Orff was unfit for duty.

(Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 50.) The Bane Act cause of action contains no further allegations as 

to coercive conduct, threats, intimidation, or attempts thereof, on the part of Chief Colon. 

In essence, the Complaint premises Bane Act liability on the basis that Chief Colon: (1) 

improperly refused to forward the case to the District Attorney; and (2) somehow tried to 

coerce the victim’s superior by calling him on the phone, disclosing details of the sexual 

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assault, and impugning Detective Orff’s moral character. (See id. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 21, 47–51.) 

None of these allegations add to a plausible theory as to how Chief Colon compelled “a 

free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical force.” See

COERCION, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

The fourth cause of action will be dismissed with leave to amend.

F. Remaining State-law Causes of Action and § 821.6 Immunity

Defendants argue that all remaining state-law causes of action against Chief Colon 

should be dismissed because Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6 immunizes him from liability. (See 

Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 7:27–10:2.)

“A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting 

any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he 

acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6. “Government 

tort immunity is jurisdictional[.]” Richardson-Tunnell v. Sch. Ins. Program for 

Employees (SIPE), 157 Cal. App. 4th 1056, 1061 (2007). “Section 821.6 immunity 

applies only to conduct within the scope of employment. An employee is acting in the 

course and scope of his employment when he is engaged in work he was employed to 

perform, or when the act is incident to his duty and is performed for the benefit of his 

employer, not to serve his own purposes or convenience.” Id. at 1062. “ ‘California 

courts construe section 821.6 broadly in furtherance of its purpose to protect public 

employees in the performance of their prosecutorial duties from the threat of harassment 

through civil suits.’ ” Id. (quoting Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 

1048 (2007)). 

“[S]ection 821.6 is not limited to suits for damages for malicious prosecution, 

although that is a principal use of the statute.” Kayfetz v. State of California, 156 Cal. 

App. 3d 491, 497 (1984). “ ‘[T]he test of immunity is not the timing of the publication 

[of allegedly defamatory statements] but whether there is a causal relationship between 

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the publication and the prosecution process. If the making and publication of . . . 

statements were part of the process, they [are] protected by the immunity in section 

821.6.’ ” Ciampi v. City of Palo Alto, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1108–09 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

(quoting Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1292–93 (1999)). “Under California 

law the immunity statute is given an ‘expansive interpretation’ in order to best further the 

rationale of the immunity, that is to allow the free exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion 

and protect public officers from harassment in the performance of their duties.” Ingram, 

74 Cal. App. 4th at 1292 (internal quotation omitted).

The fifth and sixth causes of action allege liability through interference with or a 

failure of the investigative process. (See Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 53, 62, 64.) Furthermore, all 

remaining state-law causes of action against Chief Colon contain an allegation that Colon 

disclosed details of Detective Orff’s sexual assault to her superior. (Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 

53, 63, 69, 76, 82.) These causes of action—the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth—

also incorporate paragraph 21 of the Complaint, which contains the following language:

Shortly after the sexual assault, Chief Colon called Detective Orff’s boss at the 

Brawley Police Department, and gave him the details of Orff’s sexual assault. 

During his conversation with Orff’s boss, Chief Colon also accused Orff of being 

immoral because of her sexual orientation. He further blamed Orff for being 

victimized . . . .

(Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 21.) 

As a preliminary matter, Chief Colon’s alleged interference with the Orff

investigation—and the resulting slow progress of that investigation—would appear to be

causally connected to the prosecution of her case. (See Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 53, 62, 64.) 

See Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6; Ciampi, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–09; Ingram, 74 Cal. App.

4th at 1292–93; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, Chief Colon is immune from resulting tort 

liability. See Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6. 

Claims within the fifth and sixth causes of action premised on Chief Colon’s 

interference with the prosecution of the Orff matter will be dismissed with leave to 

amend. 

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In order for Chief Colon to be liable for his call to Detective Orff’s supervisor, the 

call must have no causal link with the prosecution process. See Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6; 

Ciampi, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–09; Ingram, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1292–93. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. Chief Colon allegedly chose to call Detective Orff’s supervisor at work, 

to disclose intimate details of the sexual assault to which she had been subjected, to 

accuse her of being immoral because of her sexual preferences, and then to blame her for 

being the victim of a crime. (See Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶ 21.) The Court must assume these 

allegations true at this stage of the proceedings. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Given the 

foregoing, it is reasonable to infer that the call was not caused by the prosecution of the 

case. See id.; Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth 

causes of action will otherwise be denied.

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G. Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages Prayer

Defendants move to dismiss4 Plaintiffs’ punitive damages prayer on the ground 

that it does not comply with a particularity pleading standard followed by California 

courts interpreting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. This is not the standard applicable to pleading 

a cause of action in federal court.

(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is 

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of 

oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may 

recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.

Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. “ ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to 

cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant 

with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 

3294(c)(1).

Federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal 

procedural law. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76–80 (1938). Federal Rules 

 

4 Defendants do not specify the vehicle by which they challenge Plaintiffs’ punitive damages prayer. 

(Defs.’ Mot. [Doc. 7-1] 10:3–11:26.) The Ninth Circuit has held that a motion to strike per Rule 12(f) is 

not a proper means by which to seek to eliminate an improper damages prayer. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. 

Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2010).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows the Court to strike “immaterial” or “impertinent” matter 

appearing in a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

However, in Whittlestone, the Ninth Circuit lent these terms a narrow interpretation. See 618 F.3d at 

973–74. According to the Whittlestone court, not even a finding that state law precluded certain items

of damages would render a prayer for those items immaterial or impertinent so as to allow a court to 

strike it. Id. (“[T]he claim for [lost profits and consequential] damages is not immaterial, because 

whether these damages are recoverable relates directly to the plaintiff’s underlying claim for relief . . . . 

[T]he claim for [lost profits and consequential] damages is not impertinent, because whether these 

damages are recoverable pertains directly to the harm being alleged.”). Instead, the Whittlestone court 

interpreted a damages prayer as a “claim for relief” within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6), implying that

the availability of Rule 12(f) to strike such a “claim” would “be creating redundancies within the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.” See Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 974.

Per Whittlestone, the Court interprets Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages prayer as a 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

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of Civil Procedure 8 and 9 control how a plaintiff must plead a prayer for punitive 

damages pursuant to California law in United States District Court. “A pleading that 

states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. “Malice, intent, knowledge, and 

other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

California courts employ a different, heightened procedural requirement for 

pleading punitive damages per the substantive component of Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. See, 

e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1041–42 (1992). This requirement

“irreconcilably conflicts with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and 

does not apply in federal court. See Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 

1018–19 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Alejandro v. ST Micro Elecs., Inc, 129 F. Supp. 3d 898, 917 

(N.D. Cal. 2015); Rees v. PNC Bank, N.A., 308 F.R.D. 266, 273 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 

Plaintiffs allege that Chief Colon placed phone calls to the direct supervisor of a 

victim of a sexual assault—and to the direct supervisor of the victim’s wife—during 

which he divulged details of that assault and impugned the victim’s morality. (See 

Compl. [Doc. 1] ¶¶ 21–22.) This is sufficient to allow the Court to draw a plausible 

inference that Chief Colon intended to harm Detective Orff. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 

3294(c)(1) (defining malice); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages will be 

denied.

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Smithson’s unopposed motion to dismiss 

the fifth and sixth causes of action against him as to Plaintiff Kristol only is GRANTED. 

[Doc. 8.] Per the terms of that unopposed motion, the fifth and sixth causes of action 

against Defendant Smithson by Plaintiff Kristol are dismissed without leave to amend.

The motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Colon and City of Imperial is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. [Doc. 7.] Specifically:

The first and second causes of action are dismissed with leave to amend as to 

Plaintiff Kristol for lack of Article III standing. 

The Due Process and Equal Protection claims within the first cause of action are 

dismissed with leave to amend as to Plaintiff Orff.

The second cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend as to Plaintiff Orff.

The third cause of action is dismissed without leave to amend.

The fourth cause of action is dismissed with leave to amend.

Any claims within the fifth and sixth causes of action premised on Chief Colon’s 

interference with the prosecution of the Orff matter are dismissed with leave to amend. 

The motion filed by Defendants Colon and City of Imperial is otherwise denied.

Plaintiffs will have leave to amend, as described herein. If they elect to file an 

amended complaint in compliance with the terms of this order, they may do so on or 

before Monday, June 26, 2017.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2017

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