Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00705/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00705-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS EUGENE SAUNDERS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-0705 FCD JFM P 

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1988, petitioner pled guilty to second

degree murder. (Pet., at 1.) In the instant action, petitioner contends respondents have

misinterpreted state sentencing laws in violation of petitioner’s right to due process and equal

protection. 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court on October 22, 2002. (Pet., Ex. A.) The petition was denied without comment on January

29, 2003. (Pet., Ex. A.) Petitioner filed the instant action on April 7, 2003. 

 ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner claims that officials with the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation and the Board of Prison Terms have converted his prison sentence from 15 years

to life to an “express life and or life without the possibility of parole.” (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner

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contends he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution because respondents failed

to release him on parole after his Minimum Eligible Parole Release Date passed. 

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Federal collateral review of a state criminal conviction is limited to determining

whether petitioner's federal constitutional or other federal rights have been violated and does not

extend to review a state's application of its own laws. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th

Cir.1990); see e.g. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1994) (recognizing that

the decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state

criminal procedure and is not within the purview of federal habeas corpus). Federal courts must

defer to the state courts' interpretation of state sentencing laws. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68 (1991); Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.1993). Absent a showing of

fundamental unfairness, a state court's application or misapplication of its own sentencing laws

does not generally justify federal habeas relief. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

Cir.1994). "So long as the type of punishment is not based upon any proscribed federal grounds

such as being cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the

penalties for violations of state statutes are matters of state concern." See Makal v. Arizona, 544

F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.1976).

In light of United States Supreme Court authority, this court cannot find that

petitioner's sentence was fundamentally unfair. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Bueno, 988 F.2d at 88. Similarly, the court cannot find that the sentence constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment. 

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the United States Supreme Court

made clear that, in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a prison sentence, the “only

relevant clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’

framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear,

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applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72 (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983);

and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). The Andrade Court concluded that two

consecutive 25-years-to- life sentences with the possibility of parole, imposed under California's

three-strikes law following two petty theft convictions with priors, did not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment. Id. at 77; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that a

sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under California's three-strikes law did

not violate the Eighth Amendment). “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” Rummel,

445 U.S. at 272.

The United States Supreme Court has cautioned federal courts to be “‘reluctan[t]

to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment.’” Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374

(1982) (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274). “Generally, as long as the sentence imposed upon

the defendant does not exceed statutory limits, [a federal court] will not overturn it on eighth

amendment grounds.” United States v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir. 1988). See

also Belgarde, 123 F.3d at 1215; United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir.

1990). “[A] sentence within the limits set by a valid statute may not be overturned on appeal as

cruel and unusual punishment unless the sentence is so ‘grossly out of proportion to the severity

of the crime’ as to shock our sense of justice.” United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 864 

(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1979)) (citing

United States v. Washington, 578 F.2d 256, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

In Andrade, the Supreme Court upheld imposition of two consecutive twenty-five

years to life sentences under California’s three strikes law after Andrade was convicted of petty

theft of $150.00 worth of videotapes, with several prior convictions for petty theft, burglary and

drug offenses. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 66-67. In Ewing, the Court upheld a sentence of twentyfive years to life imposed under the same law following a conviction for grand theft involving

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 This sentence is also documented within the minute order dated March 7, 1988, by the 2

Deputy Clerk for sentencing judge Bert B. Bailey. (Pet., Ex. A.) The judge did not sentence

petitioner to a determinate term of 15 years, but rather to a term of 15 years to life, which is an

indeterminate sentence. Cal. Penal Code §§ 187, 190. 

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three golf clubs valued at $399.00 each with four prior felony convictions for burglary and

robbery. Ewing, 538 U.S. 16-17. 

Under the decisions announced in Andrade and Ewing, petitioner’s case is not one

of those “exceedingly rare” sentences fitting within the contours of the “gross disproportionality”

principle, and thus does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In the instant action,

petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. Petitioner’s record renders his sentence

indistinguishable from those upheld in Andrade and Ewing. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment

claim must therefore be denied.

However, even assuming, arguendo, the court reviewed petitioner’s sentence, the

petition would fail. Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life in state prison. (Pet. at 1.)2

Petitioner has apparently confused the minimum term necessary to be served before parole could

be implemented at its earliest, the minimum eligible parole date (MEPD), with a determinate

sentence of fifteen years. Petitioner has already passed his MEPD, May 26, 1997, without any

finding of parole eligibility. The BPT is not required to find petitioner even eligible for a parole

setting within fifteen years. Petitioner could spend the rest of his life in prison without ever

becoming eligible for parole.

Section 3041 of the California Penal Code provides that one year prior to the

inmate’s minimum eligible parole release date a panel consisting of at least two commissioners

of the BPT shall meet with the inmate and shall normally set a parole release date. California’s

parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003). “In the parole context, the requirements of due process are

met if ‘some evidence’ supports the decision.” Id. If there is not some evidence to support a

decision denying parole, due process is violated. Therefore, even though California law states

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 Petitioner does not allege that he was denied parole based on the lack of “some 3

evidence.” Biggs, supra.

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that the BPT shall normally set parole release dates, due process does not require the BPT to state

a date where some evidence exists demonstrating that petitioner should not be paroled. 

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Petitioner’s allegation that he is being subjected to excessive punishment is

unsubstantiated and cannot form the basis for a due process claim. California Penal Code

§ 190(a) provides that “every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by

imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.” (Id.) Petitioner is being treated

as a prisoner who has been sentenced to a life sentence with the possibility of parole but who has

not yet been found suitable for parole. The BPT hearing that is the subject of this petition has

been conducted for the purpose of determining when and if petitioner will receive a parole

release date. Accordingly, he has not been treated as if parole were not possible. Further,

petitioner’s claim that the BPT is “required” to set a release date for him is not supported by the

law. The BPT is required to set a release date only after a prisoner has been found suitable for

parole. See Connor v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992)(per curiam); California Penal

Code § 3041(b). Petitioner has not yet been found suitable for parole; accordingly, the BPT is

not required to set a release date for him. 

Finally, petitioner alleges that classifying petitioner as a life prisoner violates

equal protection because he has been denied a date certain for parole and those inmates with

determinate term sentences have been given a parole date. However, petitioner is not similarlysituated to inmates with determinate term sentences. McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835

(9th Cir. 1991)(petitioner must prove that similarly-situated prisoners have systematically

received shorter sentences). Petitioner’s equal protection claim must also fail. 

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s application for habeas

corpus was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling principles of

United States Supreme Court precedent. The petition should be denied.

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For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 2, 2007.

/001;saun0705.157

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