Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05352/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 2006 Decided December 15, 2006

No. 05-5352

THE FUND FOR ANIMALS, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv00777)

Joshua R. Stebbins argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Howard M. Crystal and Eric R.

Glitzenstein.

Kathryn E. Kovacs, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was Ellen

Durkee, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.

Douglas S. Burdin and Anna M. Seidman were on the brief

for appellees Safari Club International, Safari Club International

Foundation, and Ducks Unlimited.

USCA Case #05-5352 Document #1011390 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 1 of 19
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Before: ROGERS, GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge. The United States is a party

to international conventions with Canada and Mexico for the

protection of migratory birds. Congress has implemented those

conventions through the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, a statute

first passed in 1918. The statute makes it unlawful to hunt or

kill migratory birds “included in the terms of the conventions.”

16 U.S.C. § 703(a). In 2001, this Court concluded that the

migratory birds protected under the Act included the mute swan.

See Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

After the Hill decision, Congress enacted the Migratory

Bird Treaty Reform Act. The Reform Act amends the

Migratory Bird Treaty Act so that the statute applies “only to

migratory bird species that are native to the United States or its

territories.” 16 U.S.C. § 703(b)(1). As the parties here agree,

the mute swan is not native to the United States or its territories.

As a result, the amended statute by its terms no longer prohibits

the hunting or killing of the mute swan.

The plaintiffs in this case have advanced a variety of

arguments why the amended Migratory Bird Treaty Act

nonetheless continues to protect mute swans. We reject

plaintiffs’ contentions. The text of the statute is plain: The

amended Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not ban the hunting or

killing of non-native migratory bird species, including mute

swans. 

USCA Case #05-5352 Document #1011390 Filed: 12/15/2006 Page 2 of 19
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I

1. In 1916, the United States entered into a convention with

Canada for the protection of migratory birds; in 1936, the United

States entered into a similar convention with Mexico.

Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,

Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702; Convention for the Protection of

Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 7, 1936,

50 Stat. 1311. See generally Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 100-01

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (surveying those treaty provisions, as well as

two later conventions with Japan and the former Soviet Union).

The Canada and Mexico conventions expressly cover the family

Anatidae. Canada Convention, art. I, § 1(a), 39 Stat. at 1702;

Mexico Convention, art. IV, 50 Stat. at 1313. That family

includes the mute swan, thought to be a European species

originally brought to the United States for ornamental purposes.

Hill, 275 F.3d at 99; see Draft List of Bird Species to Which the

Migratory Bird Treaty Act Does Not Apply, 70 Fed. Reg. 372,

373-74 (Jan. 4, 2005) (surveying evidence of mute swan origin).

In 1918, Congress passed and President Wilson signed the

Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The Act’s prohibition has remained

largely the same since enactment. Unless authorized by

regulations administered by the Secretary of the Interior, 

it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in

any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt

to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell,

offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase,

deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be

shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for

transportation, transport or cause to be transported,

carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment,

transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird,

any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product,

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whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is

composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any

part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of the

conventions . . . .

16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (emphasis added); see Migratory Bird Treaty

Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, 755 (1918) (statute as originally

enacted).

Starting in the 1970s, the Secretary of the Interior regularly

published a list of species protected under the Act. The list did

not include the mute swan. A citizen eventually challenged the

Secretary’s decision not to protect the mute swan. In Hill, we

concluded that the Secretary’s interpretation of the Migratory

Bird Treaty Act was not reasonable when measured against the

statutory text: The statute covers birds “included in the terms of

the conventions” themselves, and we stated that the Canada

convention “undisputably include[s] mute swans.” Hill, 275

F.3d at 104. Although the Secretary argued that the mute swan

was not protected because it was not native to the United States,

we stated that the Secretary pointed to “nothing in the statute,

applicable treaties, or administrative record” to support an

exclusion for non-native species. Id. at 105-06. The text of the

Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Canada convention’s

references to “swans” weighed against such an exclusion and

meant that the Secretary’s interpretation was not reasonable. Id.

at 106. (The opinion focused solely on the Canada convention

because it imposed the strictest limitation on the hunting or

killing of migratory birds. Id. at 103-04.)

2. In 2004, after the Hill decision, Congress passed and

President Bush signed the Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act.

See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-

447, Div. E, Title I, § 143, 118 Stat. 2809, 3071-72 (2004)

(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 703). The Reform Act amended the

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Migratory Bird Treaty Act’s prohibition on killing or hunting

migratory birds so that the statute “applies only to migratory

bird species that are native to the United States or its territories.”

16 U.S.C. § 703(b)(1). The Reform Act further defined the term

“native to the United States or its territories” to mean “occurring

in the United States or its territories as the result of natural

biological or ecological processes.” Id. § 703(b)(2)(A). And

subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, the Reform Act

provided that “a migratory bird species that occurs in the United

States or its territories solely as a result of intentional or

unintentional human-assisted introduction shall not be

considered native to the United States or its territories . . . .” Id.

§ 703(b)(2)(B). Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior

to issue within 90 days of the Reform Act’s enactment and after

public comment “a list of all nonnative, human-introduced bird

species to which the Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not apply.”

Consolidated Appropriations Act, Div. E, Title I, § 143(c)

(citation omitted). 

The Reform Act also expressed Congress’s apparent

disagreement with this Court’s Hill decision as to the meaning

of the migratory bird conventions: “It is the sense of Congress

that the language of this section is consistent with the intent and

language of the 4 bilateral treaties implemented by this section.”

Id. § 143(d). In other words, Congress indicated its belief that

the Canada convention and the other three migratory bird

conventions did not cover non-native species such as the mute

swan.

Consistent with the Reform Act, the Fish and Wildlife

Service, which is part of the Department of the Interior,

promptly published and sought comment on a draft list of nonnative species that would not be protected under the statute. See

Draft List of Bird Species to Which the Migratory Bird Treaty

Act Does Not Apply, 70 Fed. Reg. 372 (Jan. 4, 2005). The list

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excluded the mute swan from protection. Id. at 373-74. The

Service pointed to the scientific and historical evidence that the

species is not native to this continent. “All existing populations

of the mute swan in North America,” the Service noted, “are

derived from introduced stocks that were released or escaped at

different localities and in different years and eventually

established feral populations.” Id. at 373.

The Humane Society of the United States, an animal

welfare organization, submitted comments opposing the

Service’s designation. The Service treated those comments as

a petition for rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure

Act to change the mute swan’s designation, which the Service

denied. See Final List of Bird Species to Which the Migratory

Bird Treaty Act Does Not Apply, 70 Fed. Reg. 12,710, 12,713

(Mar. 15, 2005). The Service published its final rule in March

2005, and the list excluded mute swans. Id. at 12,714-15.

The Maryland Department of Natural Resources then

informed the Humane Society of its intention to begin killing

adult mute swans in the Chesapeake Bay in the spring of 2005.

Maryland had previously concluded that such killing was

necessary because the mute swan population, which had surged

“dramatically between 1986 and 1999,” now posed a danger to

the bay ecosystem. WILDLIFE & HERITAGE SERV., MD. DEP’T

OF NATURAL RES., MUTE SWANS IN MARYLAND: A STATEWIDE

MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (2003). Maryland determined that the

mute swan population consumed and disrupted large quantities

of underwater plants that “protect water quality . . . [,] prevent

erosion,” and provide food and shelter for fish, shellfish,

invertebrates, and other birds indigenous to the Bay. Id. at 10;

see also Hill, 275 F.3d at 99 (noting “information to suggest that

mute swans cause ecological damage”).

3. The Fund for Animals, Inc., is an affiliate of the Humane

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Society. In April 2005, the Fund and three individuals sued the

Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§

702, 706(2)(A). Plaintiffs conceded that the mute swan was not

native to the United States or its territories. The complaint

nonetheless challenged the Service’s decision not to list the

mute swan as protected, asserting that the statute continues to

require protection of the mute swan. Complaint at 12-13, Fund

for Animals v. Norton, 374 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2005) (No.

05-cv-777). The complaint sought a court order that would,

among other things, direct the Service “to notify the State of

Maryland . . . that Mute Swans may not be killed” without a

permit from the Service. Id. at 13. Plaintiffs also moved for a

preliminary injunction. Three parties that aim to promote

hunting as a means of wildlife conservation moved to intervene

as defendants: the Safari Club International, the Safari Club

International Foundation, and Ducks Unlimited. Those

defendant-intervenors emphasized that the mute swans compete

with and behave aggressively toward birds indigenous to the

Chesapeake Bay – in other words, that the mute swans are

harmful to the environment. See Fund for Animals v. Norton,

374 F. Supp. 2d 91, 93-94 (D.D.C. 2005).

After a hearing, the District Court denied the preliminary

injunction. The District Court concluded that the “defendants’

overwhelming likelihood of success on the merits outweighs any

other equitable factors favoring plaintiffs.” Id. at 93. The

District Court stated that “nothing in the Reform Act itself

appears ambiguous,” and the Reform Act’s terms showed “that

Congress intended to modify the [Migratory Bird Treaty Act] to

exclude nonnative species.” Id. at 102. Even if the Reform Act

conflicted with the migratory bird conventions with Canada and

other nations, the District Court concluded the Reform Act

controlled because “Congress clearly has the power to abrogate

or modify a treaty or earlier legislation, and when it does so, that

is the final word.” Id. at 103.

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At the parties’ request, the District Court converted this

ruling into a final judgment on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(a)(2). This appeal followed. We review de novo the legal

question whether the Secretary’s decision to exclude mute swans

from protection was consistent with the Migratory Bird Treaty

Act.

II

Standing to sue is a threshold question. See

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006).

In Hill, we held that the plaintiff, a Maryland property owner

who enjoyed the presence of mute swans on her property,

satisfied the constitutional prerequisite for invoking federal

jurisdiction – namely, injury in fact fairly traceable to the

conduct of the defendants and redressable by judicial relief. 275

F.3d 98, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The same is true here. Two

of the individual plaintiffs are Maryland residents with mute

swans on their property. Under Hill, those plaintiffs suffer

injury in fact because of the Service’s designation of the mute

swan as a species not protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty

Act. That action freed Maryland to kill a portion of the

Chesapeake Bay mute swan population, which would include

the swans on those residents’ property. Judicial invalidation of

the designation would restore protection to the mute swan and

make Maryland’s plan unlawful. The Maryland plaintiffs have

standing. We therefore need not evaluate the standing of the

third individual plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident who makes

weekly visits to a pond inhabited by mute swans, or of the Fund

itself.

III

1. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act provides that, with

certain exceptions, “it shall be unlawful . . . [to] hunt . . . [or] kill

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. . . any migratory bird . . . included in the terms of the

conventions.” 16 U.S.C. § 703(a). Enacted in 2004, the

Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act amended this long-standing

statutory prohibition on hunting or killing migratory birds to

make clear that the statute “applies only to migratory bird

species that are native to the United States or its territories.” 16

U.S.C. § 703(b)(1). As the Secretary determined and the parties

here agree, the mute swan is not a native migratory bird species.

It follows, therefore, that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not

protect the mute swan.

Plaintiffs argue that this approach is too straightforward,

contending in essence that this provision of the Reform Act does

not mean what it says. Their argument relies on the separate

“sense of Congress” provision in the Reform Act, which states:

“It is the sense of Congress that the language of this section is

consistent with the intent and language of the 4 bilateral treaties

implemented by this section.” Consolidated Appropriations Act,

Div. E, Title I, § 143(d).

Plaintiffs’ creative attempt to weave ambiguity out of

clarity goes as follows: Plaintiffs state that this Court was

correct to conclude in Hill v. Norton that the migratory bird

conventions cover the mute swan. 275 F.3d 98, 104 (D.C. Cir.

2001). Although the Reform Act on its face excludes the mute

swan, plaintiffs point out that Congress also indicated its “sense”

that the amended statute is consistent with the conventions.

Given the apparent conflict between the conventions and the

amended statute, together with Congress’s stated belief that

there is no such conflict, plaintiffs contend that the statute must

be deemed ambiguous. And plaintiffs argue that we must

therefore apply the canon of construction that ambiguous

statutes should not be interpreted to abrogate a treaty (namely,

the conventions’ protection of the mute swan).

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Plaintiffs’ argument is mistaken at each turn. The statute is

not ambiguous, and for that reason the canon against abrogation

does not apply.

2. Plaintiffs base their argument that the statute is

ambiguous on the sense of Congress provision in the Reform

Act. Indeed, plaintiffs recognize that the statute is clear but for

the sense of Congress provision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.

Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the sense of Congress provision is

incorrect. By setting forth its “sense” that the Reform Act is

“consistent with” the migratory bird conventions, Congress

merely suggested that it believes the conventions, as originally

adopted, covered only native species of migratory birds. Read

most naturally, the sense of Congress provision indicates

nothing more than Congress’s disagreement with this Court’s

2001 decision in Hill (which had concluded that the Canada

convention “undisputably include[s] mute swans,” 275 F.3d at

104). The sense of Congress provision makes clear that the

Reform Act was not an attempt to limit or back away from

America’s treaty obligations, but rather was a correction of what

Congress believed to be an erroneous judicial interpretation of

a treaty. In any event, Congress may or may not be correct in its

interpretation of the conventions’ original scope, but that is of

no moment in this case. The sense of Congress provision does

not in any way alter the plain text of the Reform Act’s other

provisions, which clearly and unambiguously provide that the

Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not protect non-native species

such as the mute swan.

Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the sense of Congress provision

would render the Reform Act meaningless, as plaintiffs candidly

acknowledge. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. Even accepting that

Congress on occasion may enact a statute that turns out to have

no effect, courts presume that Congress has used its scarce

legislative time to enact statutes that have some legal

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consequence. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,

216 (1995) (interpretation that would leave a statute “utterly

without effect” is “a result to be avoided if possible”); see also

2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000) (“A statute should be

construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no

part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and

so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision

is the result of obvious mistake or error.”) (footnotes omitted).

That plaintiffs interpret the Reform Act to be an empty gesture

is yet another indication that their submission is erroneous.

The Government also points out that plaintiffs’ position is

inconsistent with the Reform Act’s legislative history, which

contains evidence that Members of Congress specifically

intended to exclude the mute swan and other non-native birds

from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act’s coverage. See, e.g., S.

REP. NO. 108-313, at 2-3 (2004); H.R.REP. NO. 108-520, at 5-6

(2004). On that point, however, plaintiffs persuasively respond

that those legislative materials are of little value because the

version of the legislation under consideration when the Senate

and House reports were written did not yet include the sense of

Congress provision. In fact, the Government concedes that

“[n]o legislative history explains the addition of that provision

to the Reform Act.” Appellees’ Br. at 35. We agree with

plaintiffs that the legislative history cited by the Government is

not helpful in construing this statute. The Government’s

legislative history argument in this case – which relies on pieces

of legislative history unconnected to the key language in the

statute – is a good example of misusing snippets of legislative

history from a dynamic and evolving legislative drafting

process. Cf. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v.

Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 238 (1990).

Given our interpretation of the sense of Congress provision,

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we need not consider the Government’s argument that sense of

Congress provisions are generally considered to be no more than

non-binding statements of policy. See Yang v. Cal. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he courts

rely on the sense of Congress provisions to buttress

interpretations of other mandatory provisions and do not

interpret them as creating any rights or duties by themselves.”);

Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987,

994-95 (1st Cir. 1992); Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916

F.2d 903, 908-09 (3d Cir. 1990).

3. In the second part of their argument, plaintiffs cite the

canon of construction that ambiguous statutes should not be

construed to abrogate treaties. That argument lacks merit. The

canon applies only to ambiguous statutes (and as we have just

explained, this statute is not ambiguous).

The Constitution establishes that statutes enacted by

Congress with the concurrence of the President (or over his

veto) have no less weight than treaties made by the President

with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. See

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Foster

v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.).

Consistent with this doctrine, the Supreme Court has long

recognized that a later-enacted statute trumps an earlier-enacted

treaty to the extent the two conflict. This is known as the lastin-time rule. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194

(1888) (if self-executing treaty and statute “are inconsistent, the

one last in date will control the other”); see also Breard v.

Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); Kappus v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d

1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2003); S. African Airways v. Dole, 817

F.2d 119, 124-26 (D.C. Cir. 1987). At the same time, the

Supreme Court also has stated that an ambiguous statute should

be construed where fairly possible not to abrogate a treaty. See

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,

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252 (1984); see also Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333

F.3d 228, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2003); S. African Airways, 817 F.2d at

125. The combination of the last-in-time rule and the canon

against abrogation has produced a straightforward practice:

Courts apply a statute according to its terms even if the statute

conflicts with a prior treaty (the last-in-time rule), but where

fairly possible, courts tend to construe an ambiguous statute not

to conflict with a prior treaty (the canon against abrogation).

The canon against construing ambiguous statutes to

abrogate prior treaties does not help plaintiffs here, however,

because the amended Migratory Bird Treaty Act is

unambiguous, as we concluded above. To accept plaintiffs’

argument with respect to the canon, we would have to distort the

plain meaning of a statute in an attempt to make it consistent

with a prior treaty. The Supreme Court has not extended the

canon that far, and for good reason: Distorting statutory

language simply to avoid conflicts with treaties would elevate

treaties above statutes in contravention of the Constitution.

* * *

The Migratory Bird Treaty Act implements the migratory

bird conventions. The Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act

amends that earlier statute and makes clear that mute swans are

not protected by the Act. The canon against interpreting a

statute to abrogate a treaty does not apply because the amended

statute is plain. We affirm the District Court’s judgment.

So ordered.

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: Plaintiffs argue

that the amended Migratory Bird Treaty Act is ambiguous, and

they rely on the canon against construing an ambiguous statute

to abrogate a treaty. The Court concludes that the statute is

plain and that the canon therefore does not apply. I add this

concurrence because, even assuming the statute is ambiguous,

the canon should not apply in cases involving non-self-executing

treaties such as the migratory bird conventions.

1. The Supreme Court has stated that a self-executing

treaty is one that “operates of itself without the aid of any

legislative provision,” whereas a non-self-executing treaty

“addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and

the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a

rule for the Court.” Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314

(1829) (Marshall, C.J.); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United

States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124

U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99

(1884). Like statutes, self-executing treaties automatically

become part of domestic American law. By contrast, non-selfexecuting treaties have no effect or force as a matter of domestic

law (though Congress may choose to incorporate parts of nonself-executing treaties into domestic law by enacting

implementing statutes). See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (“When

the stipulations [of a treaty] are not self-executing, they can only

be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and

such legislation is as much subject to modification and repeal by

congress as legislation upon any other subject.”); see also 1

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987) (“[S]trictly, it is the

implementing legislation, rather than the agreement itself, that

is given effect as law in the United States. That is true even

when a non-self-executing agreement is ‘enacted’ by, or

incorporated in, implementing legislation.”).

The canon against interpreting ambiguous statutes to

abrogate treaties applies with respect to self-executing treaties,

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2

which have the force of American law. See Trans World

Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984);

Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-20 (1933). The canon

is quite similar to the familiar doctrine against implied repeal of

statutes – under which courts will not interpret an ambiguous

statute to repeal a prior statute. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.

Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 141-42 (2001); see

also S. African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 126 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (noting that Supreme Court has “compared the abrogation

of a treaty through an act of Congress to the repeal of one statute

by another . . . [because] ‘the rule is well settled that repeals by

implication are not favored . . . .’” (quoting Chew Heong v.

United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884))).

There is little authority squarely analyzing whether those

interpretive principles should extend to non-self-executing

treaties, which have no force as a matter of domestic law.

Courts have reason to be cautious about taking that step,

however. When the Legislative and Executive Branches have

chosen not to incorporate certain provisions of a non-selfexecuting treaty into domestic law, we must assume that they

acted intentionally. Given such a deliberate decision by the

Legislative and Executive Branches, basic principles of judicial

restraint counsel courts to refrain from bringing the non-selfexecuting treaty into domestic law through the back door (by

using the treaty to resolve questions of American law). In other

words, because non-self-executing treaties have no legal status

in American courts, there seems to be little justification for a

court to put a thumb on the scale in favor of a non-self-executing

treaty when interpreting a statute. Doing so would not reflect

the appropriate judicial deference to the Legislative and

Executive Branches in determining if, when, and how to

incorporate treaty obligations into domestic law.

Concluding that the canon does not apply with respect to

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non-self-executing treaties “in no way disparages the

importance” of treaty obligations. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,

126 S. Ct. 2669, 2687 (2006). Rather, it respects the proper

limits and role of the Judiciary in relation to the Legislative and

Executive Branches. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3)

(1987) (“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to

international law and to international agreements of the United

States, except that a ‘non-self-executing’ agreement will not be

given effect as law in the absence of necessary

implementation.”).

To be sure, the canon has been referenced in passing in

some cases that may involve non-self-executing treaties. And

some have expressly concluded that the canon should apply

even with respect to non-self-executing treaties. See Ma v.

Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001); see also David

Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’

Rights, 37 COLUM.HUM.RTS.L.REV. 627, 647 (2006). But that

conclusion is questionable in light of the principles of judicial

restraint outlined above (even if one were to accept a more

limited proposition that non-self-executing treaties may warrant

“respectful consideration” in interpreting certain statutes, cf.

Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2685).

2. If the canon against abrogation does not apply with

respect to non-self-executing treaties, plaintiffs’ reliance on the

canon in this case necessarily rests on an assumption that the

migratory bird conventions are self-executing. The migratory

bird conventions, however, are non-self-executing.

Courts generally hold a treaty is non-self-executing when

one of the following conditions applies:

• the treaty itself contemplates implementing legislation,

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see Foster, 27 U.S. at 314; Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848,

851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Frolova v. Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985);

Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,

1298-99 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862,

876-77 (5th Cir. 1979);

• the treaty provides no private right of action, see Head

Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99; Argentine Republic v.

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1989);

Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d

929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,

726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); see

also Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968

(4th Cir. 1992);

• the Executive Branch or Senate indicates during the

treaty-making or treaty-ratifying process, for example, that the

treaty is non-self-executing, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542

U.S. 692, 728, 735 (2004); see also Renkel v. United States, 456

F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006); Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376;

• the treaty provisions are precatory, aspirational, or

otherwise too vague to be judicially enforceable, see INS v.

Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984); Diggs, 555 F.2d at 851;

see also Frolova, 761 F.2d at 374; or 

• the treaty imposes substantive obligations that would

contravene a provision of the Constitution, see Reid v. Covert,

354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality opinion).

In recent years, courts have hesitated to find a treaty selfexecuting – perhaps because the practical effect of finding a

treaty self-executing is to eliminate the House of

Representatives from the law-making process, even for laws

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that may have significant domestic impact. Cf. U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in

a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate

and House of Representatives.”); AKHIL REED AMAR,

AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 304 (2005) (“The

general intuition behind this doctrine [of non-self-execution] is

that some things cannot be done domestically unless the

people’s House concurs.”); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New

Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U.

COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1429 & n.126 (1999) (“In recent years

courts” have adopted approach that “presumes that a treaty is

non-self-executing.”); cf. also United States v. Emuegbunam,

268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourts presume that the

rights created by an international treaty belong to a state and

that a private individual cannot enforce them.”); Garza v.

Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A]s a general rule,

international agreements, even those benefitting private parties,

do not create private rights enforceable in domestic courts.”).

Applying the settled precedents and principles for

determining the status of treaties, the migratory bird

conventions plainly are non-self-executing. First, the text of the

migratory bird conventions contemplates implementing

legislation. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory

Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VIII, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702,

1704 (United States and Canada agreed “to take, or propose to

their respective appropriate law-making bodies, the necessary

measures for insuring the execution of the present

Convention.”); Convention for the Protection of Migratory

Birds and Game Mammals, U.S.-Mex., art. II, Feb. 7, 1936, 50

Stat. 1311, 1312 (United States and Mexico agreed “to establish

laws, regulations and provisions to satisfy the need” for

migratory bird protection). Second, the Canada and Mexico

conventions contain pledges to enact restrictions on hunting and

killing migratory birds; they do not create any private right of

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action.

* * *

In sum, even if the amended Migratory Bird Treaty Act is

ambiguous, the canon against interpreting an ambiguous statute

to abrogate a treaty should not apply here because the migratory

bird conventions are non-self-executing.

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