Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00600/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00600-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.A. MIRANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-0600 KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing 

fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will 

direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account 

and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly 

payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

Case 2:13-cv-00600-KJN Document 10 Filed 06/05/14 Page 1 of 7
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These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“a judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

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quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

Plaintiff claims that defendant Miranda willfully interfered and delayed “pain 

management,” and defendant Santana informed the primary care provider (“PCP”) not to order 

pain medication to anyone. Plaintiff saw defendant Santana telling the PCP “No.” (ECF No. 1 at 

3.) Plaintiff states that defendant Swingle is the CMO (Chief Medical Officer) that is “[illegible] 

the supervisor, and [defendant] Royston is the PCP on B yard that inform[ed] [plaintiff] that LVN 

Jackson told him not to issue any narcotic to [plaintiff] or any inmates.” Plaintiff alleges 

defendant Royston will not issue plaintiff pain medication.

To state a section 1983 claim for a constitutional violation based on inadequate medical 

care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To prevail, 

plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively serious, and that defendant 

possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991); 

McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1992). A serious medical need is one that 

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities, an injury or condition a reasonable doctor or 

patient would find worthy of comment or treatment, or the existence of chronic and substantial 

pain. See, e.g., McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 

grounds by WMX Techs. v. Miller, 104 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Deliberate indifference may be shown by the denial, delay or intentional interference with 

medical treatment or by the way in which medical care is provided. Hutchinson v. United States, 

838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, 

a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and 

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. “[I]t is enough 

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that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” 

Id. at 842. A physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). A 

failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may 

constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id. Deliberate indifference in the medical 

context may also be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or 

possible medical need. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 

However, it is important to differentiate common law negligence claims of malpractice 

from claims predicated on violations of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishment. In asserting the latter, “[m]ere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ 

will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th 

Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); see also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 

(9th Cir. 2004). It is well established that mere differences of opinion concerning the appropriate 

treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

In the instant complaint, plaintiff fails to address each element of a deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs claim. That is, plaintiff did not identify his serious medical need, and he 

did not provide specific factual allegations as to each named defendant. For example, it is unclear 

whether plaintiff names defendant Swingle solely in his capacity as Chief Medical Officer, or 

whether plaintiff alleges that defendant Swingle also denied plaintiff pain medication. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees 

under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must 

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) (no liability 

where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th 

Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert. denied, 442 

U.S. 941 (1979). Moreover, plaintiff set forth no dates as to the alleged violations, so the court 

cannot determine whether plaintiff’s allegations as to defendants Swingle and Medina may be 

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barred by the judgment entered in Ramirez v. Swingle, Case No. 2:11-cv-0045 LKK KJN P. 

Plaintiff does not allege why defendants allegedly refused plaintiff pain medications, if he knows, 

or allege facts demonstrating a culpable state of mind as to each named defendant. Although it 

may be possible to glean some of this information by reviewing the exhibits appended to the 

complaint, neither the court nor defendants are required to search exhibits in an effort to deduce 

plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff must address each element of his claim within the complaint.

Thus, the court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint so vague and conclusory that 

it is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. 

The court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as 

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, 

a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones 

v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least 

some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff’s claim. 

Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the 

complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rizzo v. 

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each 

named defendant is involved. Id. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is 

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Id.; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. 

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

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pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged.

Finally, plaintiff provided 29 pages of exhibits to his complaint. Plaintiff is not required 

to re-append such exhibits to his amended complaint. Such exhibits are retained in the court 

record and may be referenced by any party.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently 

herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

Dated: June 4, 2014

/rami0600.14

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.A. MIRANDA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-0600 KJN P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order

filed______________.

_____________ Amended Complaint

DATED: 

________________________________

Plaintiff

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