Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02413/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02413-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAYDAR AL KHAFAJI aka HAYDAR 

AL KHAFATI,

1

Petitioner,

v. 

CRAIG KOENIG, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

Case No.: 19-cv-2413 MMA (LL) 

ORDER GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

[Doc. No. 6]

1 The Court takes judicial notice of Petitioner’s prior and separate habeas corpus 

proceeding in this district, in which his surname is listed as Al Khafaji. See S.D. Cal. 

Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL)); see also United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 

119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, 

as well as the records of an inferior court in other cases.”) The Court also takes judicial 

notice of the CDCR’s inmate locator website, where Petitioner’s name is listed as Haydar 

Al Khafati. See United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking 

judicial notice of publicly available information in Bureau of Prisons’ online inmate 

locator). In view of the surnames listed in Petitioner’s prior habeas proceeding and on 

the CDCR inmate locator, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s Office to amend the case 

caption to reflect Petitioner’s surname as Al Khafaji and that Petitioner is also known as

Haydar Al Khafati.

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Haydar Al Khafaji (“Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc.

No. 1. Petitioner challenges his San Diego County Superior Court convictions in case 

number SCD224380 of kidnapping for rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and 

robbery, for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life with the possibility 

of parole and a three-year determinate term in prison. Id. at 1–2. Petitioner articulates

two grounds for relief, including: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to 

present available mental state evidence at trial and sentencing and (2) entitlement to 

resentencing consideration based on assembly bill number 1812, which amended 

California Penal Code section 1170(d)(1). Id. at 6–7, 23–28. Respondent has filed a 

motion to dismiss which asserts that “[t]he Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition 

because it is second or successive within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B).” Doc No. 

6-1 at 1. Respondent has also filed two lodgments in support of the motion: (1) a Report 

and Recommendation and (2) Judgment, both previously filed in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

12cv2850 WQH (PCL). Doc. No. 7. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the Court DISMISSES the instant 

federal Petition without prejudice. 

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 7, 2010, in case number SCD224380, Petitioner was convicted by a San 

Diego County Superior Court jury of one count of kidnap for rape in violation of 

California Penal Code section 209(b)(1), one count of assault with intent to commit rape 

in violation of California Penal Code section 220(a), and one count of robbery in 

violation of California Penal Code section 211.2

 CT 73-75, Lodgment No. 1 in S.D. Cal. 

2 With respect to the dates of conviction, sentence, and state appellate and postconviction proceedings concerning Petitioner’s conviction and judgment in case number 

SCD224380, the Court takes judicial notice of lodgments filed in Petitioner’s prior and 

separate habeas corpus proceeding in this district. See Doc. No. 11 in S.D. Cal. Civil 

Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL)); see also Wilson, 631 F.2d at 119. 

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Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). On June 10, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to an 

indeterminate term of life in prison with the possibility of parole and an additional 

consecutive determinate term of three years in prison. CT 51-54, Lodgment No. 1 in S.D. 

Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). On June 9, 2011, the California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the judgment in a reasoned opinion, rejecting on the merits Petitioner’s 

claims that (1) insufficient evidence supported the kidnapping for rape conviction and (2) 

the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of simple 

kidnapping. Lodgment No. 7 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). On 

August 24, 2011, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

Lodgment No. 9 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). On January 3, 

2013, the California Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which 

Petitioner primarily contended that counsel was ineffective at the sentencing hearing. 

Lodgment Nos. 10-11 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). On November 

28, 2012, Petitioner filed a federal Petition in this Court challenging this 2010 judgment

in case number SCD224380 and raising claims alleging the following: (1) insufficient 

evidence to support the conviction of kidnapping for rape, (2) trial court error in failing to 

instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple kidnapping and (3) ineffective 

assistance of counsel in failing to investigate, prepare and present mitigating evidence at 

the sentencing hearing.3

 Doc. No. 1 at 6–8, 12–33 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 

WQH (PCL). In an order dated January 9, 2014, the Court adopted in its entirety a 

3 The Court also takes judicial notice of several other filings and orders issued in 

Petitioner’s prior and separate federal habeas corpus proceeding in this district, including

the November 28, 2012 federal Petition, December 10, 2013 Report and 

Recommendation, January 9, 2014 Order Adopting the Report and Recommendation, 

Denying the Petition and Denying a Certificate of Appealability, and January 10, 2014 

Clerk’s Judgment. See Doc. Nos. 1, 24–26 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH 

(PCL); see also Wilson, 631 F.2d at 119. 

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December 10, 2013 Report and Recommendation which recommended denying the 

Petition on the merits and denied a certificate of appealability. Doc. Nos. 24, 25 in S.D. 

Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL).

Petitioner indicates that he filed habeas corpus petitions in the California Superior 

Court, California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court, raising claims of 

“Ineffective Assistance of trial Counsel; and Petitioner is entitled for [sic] sentence recall 

to determine and allow the sentencing court judge to use its discretion to modify said

sentence,” notes that the state appellate court denied his petition on August 14, 2019, and 

the California Supreme Court also denied the petition. See Doc. No. 1 at 3–4, 6–7. 

Attachment 1 to the instant federal Petition contains a copy of a habeas petition filed on 

August 29, 2019 in the California Supreme Court in Case No. S257721, which raised one 

articulated ground for relief, Petitioner’s request for resentencing consideration, but in 

doing so, also argued that Petitioner was entitled to reconsideration based at least in part 

on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to present mental state evidence at 

trial and sentencing. See Doc. No. 1 at 14–28. The California Supreme Court’s website 

reflects that habeas petition was denied on November 20, 2019. See Case No. S257721 at 

https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=0, last visited April 1, 2020. 

With respect to the instant federal proceedings, Petitioner indicated on the federal petition 

form that the instant Petition was not his first federal petition challenging this conviction, 

stating he filed a prior action in “Maybe Central Dist. or Southern?” and that the date of 

decision was “Unknown.” Doc. No. 1 at 5. On the same petition form, Petitioner 

checked the box next to a question asking if his prior action was dismissed for procedural 

reasons but did not answer a question asking: “If the prior case was denied on the merits, 

has the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals given you permission to file this second or 

successive petition?” Id. Instead, in a space on the petition form just below that 

question, Petitioner stated: “Not denied on the merits.” Id. 

II. DISCUSSION

“Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the 

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district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order 

authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see 

also Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007) (a petition is “second or successive” 

where the petitioner challenges “the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a 

state court” as in a prior petition). Moreover, “a successive application is permissible 

only if it rests on a new rule of constitutional law, facts that were previously unavailable, 

or facts that would be sufficient to show constitutional error in the petitioner’s 

conviction.” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(2)).

Respondent moves to dismiss the instant action, contending “[t]he Court lacks 

jurisdiction over the Petition because it is second or successive within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(B),” noting that the first federal petition was denied on the merits in 2014 

and the instant petition is the second federal petition. Doc. No. 6-1 at 1. He contends 

that “[b]ecause Al Khafaji could have included his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

in his earlier federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, and because he does not appear to 

have obtained authorization from the circuit court of appeals to file a second petition, the 

Court cannot consider the merits of the Petition.” Id. at 2. Respondent also contends that 

“Ground 2 does not render the Petition cognizable,” asserting that while “[c]hallenges to 

the denial of resentencing are typically permissible regardless of previously [sic] federal 

petitions if such claims could not have been previously presented to the federal court,” 

given that “Ground 1 could have been included in Al Khafaji’s first federal petition and 

where there has been no new judgment, inclusion of an otherwise permissible claim does 

not render the Petition cognizable.” Id. at 3.

It is first apparent that Petitioner’s indication that his prior federal habeas petition 

was “[n]ot denied on the merits” see Doc. No. 1 at 5, is refuted by the Court’s review of 

that proceeding. The prior federal petition raised three claims of error, including that: (1) 

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of kidnapping for rape; (2) the 

trial court erred in failing to instruct the jurors on the lesser included offense of simple 

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kidnapping; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate, prepare and 

present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. See Doc. No. 1 in S.D. Cal. Civil 

Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). The Report and Recommendation issued in that prior 

federal action, and subsequent order adopting it in full, clearly resulted in a judgment 

denying the previous federal Petition on the merits. See ECF Nos. 24–26 in S.D. Cal. 

Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH (PCL). It is also plain that at least with respect to 

Ground One, the instant petition and the prior petition both challenge the same judgment, 

and that the facts and events supporting Ground One, which concern counsel’s 

performance at trial, happened well before the time the prior federal petition was filed. 

See Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332–33 (2010) (“[B]oth § 2254(b)’s text and 

the relief it provides indicate that the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted 

with respect to the judgment challenged.”); see also Brown v. Muniz, 889 F.3d 661, 667 

(9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted) (first citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 

930, 945 (2007); and then citing Magwood, 561 U.S. at 333) (“It is now understood that a 

federal habeas petition is second or successive if the facts underlying the claim occurred 

by the time of the initial petition and if the petition challenges the same state court 

judgment as the initial petition.”). 

In the opposition to the instant motion to dismiss, Petitioner argues “the 

respondent’s motion must fail in that it specifically assumes that petitioner’s Federal 

Habeas filed approximately seven or eight years ago contains the same claims that 

petitioner is presenting in this court; here, the respondent is misstaken [sic] because 

petitioner’s first Federal petition did not challenge Ineffective Assistance of Counsel nor 

did that first petition make any challenges regarding the fact that petitioner had been 

hospitalized on several occasions prior to his arrest (in a Mental Hospital) and that 

counsel knew of this fact, but failed to raise this issue and defend petitioner in this 

regard.” Doc. No. 8 at 1. This argument is not supported by a review of the record, 

which reflects that the prior federal Petition indeed advanced a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See ECF No. 1 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv2850 WQH 

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(PCL). Moreover, as the Report and Recommendation in that case recognized, the 

previous federal petition contained a claim alleging trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate and present available mitigating evidence at sentencing, including 

specifically asserting as follows: “Petitioner argues that his attorney should have 

presented to the court the facts that he did not have a prior criminal record and that he had 

mental issues.” Doc. No. 24 at 9 (citing Doc. No. 1 at 27 in S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

12cv2850 WQH (PCL). Given that both the prior and instant federal petitions contained 

claims challenging trial counsel’s alleged failure to present evidence of Petitioner’s 

mental health history and issues, even to the extent Petitioner raises a distinct claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the instant Petition, the fact remains that Ground One

challenges the same judgment as was challenged in the prior petition and relies on facts 

available at the time of the prior petition, rendering it second or successive. See Brown, 

889 F.3d at 667 (first citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945; and then citing Magwood, 561 U.S. 

at 333. 

Ground Two, meanwhile, suffers from a different and separate deficiency. 

Respondent correctly observes that “[c]hallenges to the denial of resentencing are 

typically permissible regardless of previously [sic] federal petitions if such claims could 

not have been previously presented to the federal court.” Doc. No. 6-1 at 3 (citing 

Benson v. Chappell, 2014 WL 6389443, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2014)). The Ninth Circuit has 

also previously held that a petition challenging the denial of a state court resentencing 

petition on due process grounds was not a second or successive petition. See Clayton v. 

Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2017). The Clayton Court reasoned that “under 

California law, a resentencing petition does not challenge the underlying conviction or 

sentence; rather, it seeks to obtain the benefits of [a new state law] and results in the entry 

of a new appealable order or judgment,” noting the denial of such a petition “therefore 

constitutes a new judgment.” Id. at 844. However, Petitioner does not present any

federal challenge to the denial of his resentencing petition. Instead, Petitioner simply 

restates and refers to the claim raised in state court and only asserts in this Court that 

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“Petitioner is Entitled to a Resentencing Consideration Based on the New Assembly Bill 

No. 1812.” Compare Doc. No. 1 at 7, with Doc. No. 1 at 16. “Prisoner pro se pleadings 

are given the benefit of liberal construction.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Yet even 

under a liberal construction, the Court cannot construe the instant Petition as raising a 

claim of federal error in Ground Two when it is obvious that Petitioner only asserts an

entitlement to resentencing consideration under state law. Doc. No. 1 at 7. Because

Petitioner simply argues that he is entitled to resentencing and does not assert, much less 

show, that the state court erred in denying his petition for resentencing, nor alleges any 

error of federal constitutional dimension arising from that denial, Ground Two is not 

cognizable on federal review. See Clayton, 868 F.3d at 845 (citing Park v. California, 

202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A petition may not be cognizable, for example, 

where the petitioner fails to allege a federal claim.”); see also Mills v. Marsh, 2020 WL 

1180433, at * 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2020) (citing Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication 

of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.”)) (collecting cases and 

recommending denial of federal petition seeking resentencing pursuant to Cal. Penal 

Code § 1170(d)(1), as amended by Assembly Bill 1812, for failing to state a federal claim 

for relief). Given that Ground Two is not cognizable on federal habeas review as 

pleaded, it must be dismissed from the instant Petition. See Clayton, 868 F.3d at 845

(reasoning that whether a claim is cognizable “plays no role” in the circuit court’s 

consideration of an application for permission to file a second or successive petition and 

“it is the province of the district court to consider cognizability of a habeas petition.”). 

This leaves only Ground One remaining in the instant Petition.

Yet, as previously discussed, Ground One is second or successive because it could 

have been raised in the original federal Petition. Even if Petitioner were able to 

demonstrate that his petition falls within the statutory provisions allowing for permission 

to file a second or successive habeas petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B), 

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Petitioner must still first obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to 

file a petition in this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Morales v. Sherman, 

949 F.3d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(b)(3)(A) is “a provision that bars district courts from entertaining a second or 

successive petition unless its filing has first been authorized by the court of appeals.”). 

Again, Petitioner did not provide an answer to the question on the federal petition form 

asking if the Ninth Circuit had given permission to file a second or successive petition

provided the prior petition was denied on the merits, instead writing below that inquiry: 

“Not denied on the merits.” Doc. No. 1 at 5. As discussed above, a review of the record 

reflects that Petitioner’s prior federal action was denied on the merits. Petitioner does not 

offer anything demonstrating that he has either sought or received permission from the 

Ninth Circuit to file the instant Petition, nor does a recent search of the Ninth Circuit 

docket reflect any such filing.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

As discussed above, because there is no indication that the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has granted Petitioner leave to file a successive petition with respect to Ground 

One and because Ground Two as pleaded is not cognizable on federal habeas review, the 

Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES this action without 

prejudice. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly and to 

close the case. Further, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to send Petitioner a 

blank Ninth Circuit Application for Leave to File a Second or Successive Petition Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 together with a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2020

 

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