Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-35389/USCOURTS-ca9-07-35389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 07-35389

v. D.C. Nos.  CV-05-00084-JLQ GABRIELE ELIZABETH LOPEZ, aka

CR-02-00127-JLQ Gabriele Elizabeth Koenig, Nee

Konig, OPINION

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Washington

Justin L. Quackenbush, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 8, 2008—Seattle, Washington

Filed July 16, 2008

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Ronald M. Gould and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

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COUNSEL

James A. McDevitt, United States Attorney; Stephanie

Whitaker (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Spokane, Washington, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

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Beth Mary Bollinger, Spokane, Washington, for the

defendant-appellant. 

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge: 

Gabriele Lopez, a.k.a. Gabriele Koenig (“Lopez”), filed a

federal habeas corpus motion in the district court seeking to

vacate her drug conviction because the government withheld

until long after her trial potentially damaging credibility information about one of the government’s principal witnesses, in

violation of the government’s disclosure obligations under

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court,

rejecting the government’s argument that the court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the motion because it was barred by 28

U.S.C. § 2255 as “second or successive,” denied the motion

on its merits. The appeal in this case thus presents a troublesome circumstance involving the interplay between the government’s failure to make a timely disclosure of Brady

information and the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255,

which, in the interest of finality, impose significant burdens

on defendants who try to raise claims that were not originally

raised on their direct appeal or first habeas motion.1

For the reasons that follow, we hold that Lopez’s motion

was a second or successive habeas motion that, under

§ 2255(h), required certification from this court before it

could be heard by the district court. Therefore, the district

court erred in reaching the merits because it lacked jurisdiction. Even though under the circumstances here we construe

Lopez’s appeal as a belated request to us for authorization to

file her motion, we must deny certification because the newly

1Hereinafter all statutory provisions cited, unless otherwise indicated,

refer to Title 28 of the United States Code. 

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discovered evidence would not be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder

would have found her guilty of the offense. See § 2255(h)(1).

We also conclude that the government’s conduct, albeit troublesome, was not “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as

to violate the universal sense of justice,” United States v.

Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), that her conviction must be

vacated and the indictment dismissed. 

I.

Lopez was indicted in May 2002 on several charges of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. She was tried

together with Elvis Singh and James Evans, with whom she

lived in a house in Spokane, Washington. Two informants,

David Palmer (“Palmer”) — who emerges as the central figure in this appeal — and Janie Arambula (“Arambula”), testified on behalf of the government.

Palmer testified about an occasion on April 9, 2002, when

he went to the defendants’ house in Spokane to buy crack

cocaine with two other participants. The jury heard Palmer’s

recorded conversations with these participants regarding their

drug purchase inside the house. Palmer testified that he did

not see Lopez on that occasion and had never met her at any

other time. Defense counsel cross-examined Palmer about a

variety of issues, such as whether he had used or presently

used drugs and the payment for his work as an informant. 

During the trial, a case agent testified that he had taken

Palmer’s Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) file to

the United States Attorney’s Office and that Assistant United

States Attorney Tom Rice (“Rice”) had spoken with Agent

Shelby Smith (“Agent Smith”) of the local DEA. The case

agent further testified that Rice had written a note to one of

the government’s trial attorneys that there was no Brady

material in the file. Counsel for one of the co-defendants told

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the court he was concerned about whether the government

had disclosed all Brady material about Palmer and requested

that the court review Palmer’s file for Brady material. The

court declined, saying it was the responsibility of the United

States Attorney’s Office, not the court, to do so. 

As Lopez learned several years later, on June 6, 2002 —

two months before her trial — Lieutenant Chandler Bailey

(“Lt. Bailey”) of the Spokane Police Department Drug Task

Force had called Agent Smith to tell him that the City and

County of Spokane would no longer be using Palmer as a

confidential source in controlled drug buys because he was

“unreliable.” Lt. Bailey had learned that Palmer had been sexually involved with at least one woman who was the subject

of a drug investigation conducted by the Spokane Police

Department, that some officers believed Palmer had used

investigative funds to buy services from prostitutes and that

Palmer usually sought out women when he chose his own targets for investigation. Although Lt. Bailey had prepared a

memorandum discussing the allegations that Palmer was “unreliable” (the “Bailey memorandum”), he had not sent a copy

to Agent Smith and the memorandum was not in the file at the

time Rice inspected it. There is no evidence that Agent Smith

relayed the information from the conversation he had with Lt.

Bailey to Agent Rice or Assistant United States Attorney Earl

Hicks, who was then in charge of the prosecution of Lopez

and her co-defendants. Nor is there evidence that the government attorneys involved in the cases asked the pertinent government agents whether they had any personal knowledge

concerning the credibility of the government witnesses, or any

other Brady information, as opposed to merely looking in

Palmer’s file. 

The defense completed its cross-examination of Palmer

without being informed that the City and County of Spokane

were no longer using Palmer because he was considered unreliable. Palmer’s testimony did not directly inculpate Lopez in

any drug transaction, and at the close of evidence the court

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instructed the jury that the testimony of an informant should

be examined with greater care than the testimony of an unpaid

witness. 

Another informant, Arambula, testified about a wirerecorded controlled purchase of cocaine base she made on

April 18, 2002 from Lopez’s co-defendant Singh, in which

Lopez participated. This was not the controlled purchase

about which Palmer testified. Arambula’s testimony was that

she placed a consensually monitored and recorded telephone

call to Singh to arrange to purchase a half ounce of crack

cocaine. When she arrived at the house, Lopez answered the

door and led her to a bedroom where Singh was on the bed.

Arambula asked to buy a half ounce of crack cocaine, she and

Singh discussed the price, and then Lopez retrieved and

weighed the crack cocaine for Arambula. Lopez gave her the

crack cocaine, and Arambula then laid the money on Singh’s

chest. Agent Beaumont testified about this transaction,

explaining that he was with Arambula during her telephone

call with Singh and that he conducted surveillance during the

controlled purchase. The tape of the telephone call and the

transmitter wire recording of the controlled buy were admitted

into evidence and played for the jury. 

The jury found the defendants guilty of the cocaine base

charges. Specifically, the jury found Lopez guilty of two

counts of violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 5 —

knowingly and unlawfully distributing a mixture or substance

containing more than five grams of cocaine base; and Count

6 — knowingly and unlawfully possessing with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing more than 50 grams

of cocaine base).

The district court acquitted Lopez on Count 6, finding

insufficient evidence. It found, however, there was clear and

convincing evidence to support the jury verdict on Count 5.

The court sentenced Lopez to the mandatory minimum term

of five years. On Lopez’s direct appeal, we affirmed her conUNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 8787

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viction and sentence in an unpublished disposition. See

United States v. Singh, 94 F. App’x 511, 514 (9th Cir. 2004).

In March 2005, Lopez filed her first motion to set aside,

vacate or correct her sentence under § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, a due process violation and a

sentence in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005). The district court denied the motion. 

Then, in 2006, the new Brady information regarding

Palmer came to light in a different case, United States v. Heit,

E. D. Wash. No. CR-05-6028-EFS, in which Palmer was an

informant-witness for the government. Upon learning about

the Bailey memorandum and its negative information about

Palmer, the government’s counsel in Heit disclosed it to the

defense counsel in that case, who in turn disclosed it to

Lopez’s counsel and her co-defendants’ counsel. At some

time during the prosecution of the Heit case, the Bailey memorandum was put in Palmer’s file. 

Meanwhile, the district court in Heit held extensive pretrial

evidentiary hearings on the defendant’s motion to dismiss

based on the government’s alleged outrageous behavior in

using Palmer as a confidential informant. Although the court

recognized that “Palmer’s testimony [was] critical to the Government as he [was] the only ‘government agent’ to have personally talked with [the defendant],” it nevertheless denied

Heit’s motion and precluded her from introducing evidence

about uncharged allegations of Palmer’s sexual misconduct

and being “black balled” by government agencies. The court

found that any relevance the alleged sexual incidents might

have had regarding Palmer’s credibility or motives was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial value, especially in

light of other information Heit could utilize to impeach

Palmer. 

In the case before us, Lopez filed her § 2255 motion in the

district court in November 2006 to vacate her conviction and

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dismiss the indictment with prejudice, based on the government’s alleged outrageous behavior in failing to furnish damaging impeachment information concerning Palmer as

required under Brady. Rejecting the government’s argument

that Lopez’s motion was an impermissible second or successive motion that had not been certified for filing by this court

as required by § 2255(h), the district court denied her motion

on the merits, finding that the impeachment evidence would

not have materially affected the guilty verdict on Count 5.

This appeal followed.

II.

“We review de novo a district court’s determination that a

habeas petition is ‘second or successive’ for purposes of

[AEDPA].” Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

Whether a habeas application is deemed second or successive can be critical because “AEDPA greatly restricts the

power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who

file second or successive habeas corpus applications.” Cooper

v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 2001) (per

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “AEDPA does not

define the terms ‘second or successive.’ ” Henderson, 396

F.3d at 1053 (quoting Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 897 (9th

Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section

2244(a) provides: 

No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to

inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a

judgment of a court of the United States if it appears

that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a

prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except

as provided in section 2255.

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§ 2244(a) (emphasis added). 

[1] Section 2255(h) in turn requires that a second or successive habeas application be certified by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to satisfy at least one of two conditions

before it may be filed in the district court — specifically, that

it is based on: 

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and

viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have

found the movant guilty of the offense; or 

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,

that was previously unavailable. 

§ 2255(h). Thus, if a petitioner seeks to assert a claim that was

not presented in her first habeas application, she must move

for authorization from this court to file a second or successive

application, and the motion will be denied unless it makes a

prima facie showing that it satisfies the requirements of one

of these narrow exceptions. See Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1273;

§ 2255(h); § 2244(a), (b)(3). If the petitioner does not first

obtain our authorization under § 2244(b)(3)(A), the district

court lacks jurisdiction to consider the second or successive

application. See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 127 S. Ct.

793, 796 (2007) (per curiam). 

Lopez argues that although she previously filed a § 2255

motion, her present motion is not second or successive

because she could not have discovered the Brady claim until

after her first habeas motion had already been denied. The

district court agreed with her argument and proceeded to

decide the motion on its merits. Although we understand the

district court’s reluctance to find Lopez’s motion barred as

second or successive when it was the government’s conduct

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that created the problem, we conclude that the court erred in

not doing so. 

[2] That Lopez did not have the information to formulate

her Brady claim until after her first habeas motion was denied

does not exempt her from fulfilling the prerequisites for a second or successive application that Congress has established by

the plain language of § 2255. See Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d

306, 322-25 (4th Cir. 2000). We therefore hold that Lopez

was required by § 2255(h) to move in this court for an order

authorizing the district court to consider her application,

because she had previously filed a § 2255 motion that was

fully adjudicated on the merits. See Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1274.

In light of Lopez’s failure to do so, the district court lacked

jurisdiction and should not have considered her motion on the

merits. 

III.

[3] Nonetheless, like the district court, given the circumstances of this case we are not inclined to allow the government in effect to profit from its failure to meet its obligations

under Brady. We therefore construe Lopez’s appeal as a

request that we authorize her to file a second or successive

habeas application. See Cooper, 274 F.3d at 1275; see also

Libby v. Magnusson, 177 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[N]o

useful purpose would be served by forcing the petitioner to

retreat to square one and wend his way anew through the

jurisdictional maze.”); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657, 661-62

(11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). We must deny her request,

however, because her claim does not fall within the

§ 2255(h)(1) or (2) exceptions. 

Lopez’s Brady claim obviously does not rely on “a new

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable,” as required by § 2255(h)(2). Rather she must

make a prima facie showing that she meets the requirements

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of § 2255(h)(1) by demonstrating “newly discovered evidence

that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the

movant guilty of the offense.” It is undisputed that the evidence was newly discovered, having been revealed to Lopez

only after her first habeas motion was denied. The question is

whether the negative information about Palmer would, if

proved, be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found Lopez

guilty of the offense when viewed in light of the evidence as

a whole. See § 2255(h)(1).

[4] In this case, because Lopez cannot carry the lesser burden of establishing a Brady violation, she cannot carry the

greater burden of making a prima facie case that no reasonable factfinder would have found Lopez guilty of the offense

had the negative information about Palmer been proven. In

determining whether there has been a Brady violation, we

consider whether the suppressed evidence was: (1) favorable

to the accused, (2) suppressed by the government and (3)

“material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” United

States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc). Here there is no issue as to the first two prongs, so we

look to the materiality of the withheld evidence in determining whether withheld Brady material was prejudicial. See

Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th Cir. 2006). A Brady

violation is material when “there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” United States

v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-36 (1995). “A ‘reasonable probability’

of a different result [exists] when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial.’ ” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at

678). The materiality of suppressed evidence is considered

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“collectively” and if materiality is established, no further

harmless error analysis is necessary. Id. at 436.2

The government argues that the Bailey memorandum characterizing Palmer as “unreliable” is not material because it

involved inadmissible impeachment evidence. The government also argues that even without the Bailey memorandum,

the defense was nevertheless able to cross-examine Palmer

extensively on impeachment and credibility issues, because

they were aware of a past conviction of Palmer’s and that

Palmer had been working with other law enforcement agencies. The government also notes that the district court

instructed the jury that the testimony of an informant should

be examined more carefully than that of a person not paid for

his testimony. 

Lopez argues that even though Palmer did not directly testify against her, the evidence was still material to her case

because of the “spillover” effect of his testimony about her

co-defendants. Lopez also argues that others’ testimony

directly implicating her was subject to doubt because of

Arambula’s admitted drug use. 

[5] We are not persuaded there is a reasonable probability

that, had the Palmer evidence been disclosed to the defense,

the result of the trial would have been different. First, assuming the defense was allowed to use the information to impeach

Palmer, his testimony did not directly inculpate Lopez.3 He

2Habeas relief is usually warranted only if the alleged constitutional

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Certain types of claims are analyzed under their

own harmless error standards, however, which makes Brecht analysis

unnecessary. See, e.g., Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435; see also Jackson v. Brown,

513 F.3d 1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). 

3As the Heit case illustrates, the Bailey memorandum or its contents

might not have been allowed as impeachment evidence even if the government had disclosed the Palmer information to defense counsel before trial.

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did not testify about Lopez at all or about the drug transaction

at issue in Count 5. Thus the weight given his testimony

would not likely have affected the verdict against Lopez

regardless of whether he was impeached as thoroughly as possible or not. Second, the district court allowed extensive

cross-examination of Palmer that gave the jury information to

appraise his credibility and motivations. Third, even if there

was some kind of spillover effect as Lopez asserts, there was

strong evidence against Lopez on Count 5 in addition to

Arambula’s testimony, including the tape the jury heard

recording Lopez’s participation in the April 18, 2002 drug

transaction, supported by Agent Beaumont’s testimony. Consequently, although the prosecution erred in failing to disclose

the adverse information about Palmer during Lopez’s trial,

that alone does not undermine our confidence in the outcome

of the trial. 

[6] Because Lopez has not shown that “admission of the

suppressed evidence would have created a reasonable probability of a different result,” Jernigan, 492 F.3d at 1053 (internal quotation marks omitted), Lopez has not established the

existence of a Brady violation. Therefore, Lopez cannot meet

the higher threshold required by § 2255(h)(1) of showing that

the Brady material, “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have

found the movant guilty of the offense.” We therefore decline

to certify her request for authorization to file a second or successive habeas application. 

IV.

Finally, Lopez argues that the government’s conduct in

failing to disclose the Palmer information was “so grossly

shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense

of justice,” United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 712 (9th

Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),

thus violating due process and warranting outright dismissal

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of the indictment, see United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315,

1324-25 (9th Cir. 1993). We have already expressed our concerns about the government’s failure to discover and disclose

the information in a timely fashion, but the circumstances certainly do not rise to the level of outrageousness. There is no

evidence that the government wilfully withheld the Brady

material, lied about such material or was unwilling to own up

to the mistake once discovered. See id.; see also United States

v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1993). Lopez’s

claim certainly does not satisfy the requirements of

§ 2255(h)(1) or (2), and so does not provide an independent

basis for certifying her request for authorization to file a second or successive habeas application. Moreover, as we have

shown, Lopez ultimately was not prejudiced. Thus exercise of

the court’s supervisory powers to dismiss the indictment is

not warranted, even if we could certify Lopez’s request to file

a successive habeas petition, and even assuming the district

court could invoke such powers which are “not typically considered to be an independent basis for post-conviction

review.” See United States v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1107,

1110 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Because no government misconduct

prejudiced [defendant], dismissal of the indictment is not warranted.”); see also United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367

(9th Cir. 1978) (concluding district court did not err in denying motion to dismiss the indictment where defendant showed

no prejudice).

Although we find it troubling that the government’s failure

to disclose the Bailey memorandum to Lopez earlier had the

effect of imposing on her the burdens of complying with

§§ 2244 and 2255, particularly the strict standards governing

second or successive habeas applications, there is no evidence

that the prosecutors here were pursuing a strategy to put her

in such an unfavorable position. Were there such evidence,

this would be a different case. 

V.

For the reasons stated, we VACATE the district court’s

order denying Lopez’s motion, and REMAND with instrucUNITED STATES v. LOPEZ 8795

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tions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Lopez’s appeal, construed as a motion for authorization to file a second or

successive application, is DENIED. 

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