Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01062/USCOURTS-arwd-1_05-cv-01062-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

EUGENE WHITE PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-1062

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background:

The plaintiff, Eugene White, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration (hereinafter “Commissioner”), denying his application for

disability insurance benefits (hereinafter “DIB”), pursuant to §§ 216(i) and 223 of Title II of the

Social Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423. 

Plaintiff was 57 years of age at the time of the administrative hearing and has a twelfth

grade education (T. 198, 212, 89). He has past relevant work as a school bus driver, a supply

sergeant and a guard (T. 198, 68, 203, 58). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of December 1, 2001,

as the onset date for his disability (T. 43), due to: degenerative changes/bulging discs in the

lumbar spine; glaucoma; tendinitis; hiatal hernia; history of heel spur; bones spurs; joint

pain/arthritis; irregular heartbeat; gastroesophageal reflux disease (hereinafter “GERD”);

extremity numbness/tingling; and, reduced range of motion and pain in the shoulders,

bilaterally, more severe on the right. He filed his application on July 3, 2003 (T. 43-45).

 The Social Security Administration denied plaintiff’s application initially and on

reconsideration. He then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge

(hereinafter “ALJ”), which hearing was held on February 1, 2005 (T. 197-222). The ALJ

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rendered an unfavorable decision on April 8, 2005 (T. 11-15). By Order entered May 25, 2005,

the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff’s Request for Review of the hearing decision (T. 3-5),

thus making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks

judicial review of that decision. Both parties have filed appeal briefs (Doc. #5 & 6). 

Accordingly, this matter is now ready for consideration.

Applicable Law:

The ALJ evaluated the plaintiff’s claim according to the five-step sequential evaluation

analysis prescribed by the social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f); see

also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing five-step analysis). At the first

step, the ALJ found the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged

onset date (T. 14). In the next two steps, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has impairments

considered “severe”, in the form of a history of treatment for heel spurs, hiatal hernia, tendinitis

and lumbar/wrist pain (T. 15), but that he does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations

No. 4 (“Listing of Impairments”). The ALJ did not make a specific credibility finding with

respect to the plaintiff’s subjective complaints/nonexertional limitations, but it is apparent from

the decision that he finds plaintiff’s allegations not totally credible (T. 13-14). Next, the ALJ

determined that plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”), to

lift/carry up to 10 pounds; stand/walk two (2) hours in an eight hour; and, sit six (6) hours in an

eight hour day. The ALJ also found the plaintiff suffers from mild to moderate pain (T. 14). In

other words, the plaintiff was found to have the capacity to perform sedentary work. According

to the ALJ, based a hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert (hereinafter “VE”), the

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plaintiff does not remain capable of performing his past relevant work (hereinafter “PRW), but

retains skills from his job as a supply sergeant that are transferable (T. 15). Thus, the ALJ

determined that there is a significant number of jobs in the economy which the plaintiff

remains capable of performing, namely: benefit clerk; referral clerk; and lost card clerk (T. 15). 

Finally, the plaintiff was found “not disabled” at any time through the date of the decision (T.

15). 

Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th

Cir.2000). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable

mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Id. In determining

whether existing evidence is substantial, we consider evidence that detracts from the

Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433,

436 (8th Cir.2000). As long as substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's

decision, we may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in the record that would

have supported a contrary outcome, see id., or because we would have decided the case

differently. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993).

To establish entitlement to benefits, the plaintiff must show that he had been unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment

which had lasted or could have been expected to result in death or last for not less than 12

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

"While the claimant has the burden of proving that the disability results from a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment, direct evidence of the cause and effect

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relationship between the impairment and the degree of claimant's subjective complaints need

not be produced." Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). 

To determine whether the ALJ properly applied the factors listed in Polaski, we must

determine whether the ALJ took into account all the relevant evidence, and whether that

evidence contradicted the claimant's own testimony so that the ALJ could discount the

testimony for lack of credibility. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir.1987). The

ALJ's credibility assessment must be based on substantial evidence. Rautio v. Bowen, 862 F.2d

176, 179 (8th Cir.1988). 

Implicit in the ALJ’s task of making a credibility determination is the requirement that

he "discuss" the Polaski factors. Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 130 (the Polaski cases and the

Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984 require that the Commissioner set forth the

inconsistencies in the objective medical evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in

the Polaski settlement when making "credibility" determinations concerning claimant’s

subjective complaints of pain).

In summary, the ALJ must discuss and point out the inconsistencies in the record, in

order to make a credibility determination. Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir.1991)

("it is not enough that inconsistencies may be said to exist, the ALJ must set forth the

inconsistencies in the evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in Polaski when

making credibility determinations"); Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 131 (even though

evidence with respect to Polaski factors is in the record, those factors must be discussed in the

decision). 

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Residual functional capacity is what a plaintiff can do despite his limitations, and it

must be determined on the basis of all relevant evidence, including medical records, physician's

opinions, and the plaintiff’s description of his limitations. Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033,

1039 (8th Cir.2001); see also, Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir.1995); 20 C.F.R.

§§416.945(a). 

"Nonexertional limitations are limitations other than on strength but which nonetheless

reduce an individual's ability to work." Asher v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 825, 827 n. 2 (8th Cir.1988).

Examples include "mental, sensory, or skin impairments, as well as impairments which result in

postural and manipulative limitations or environmental restrictions." Id.; See 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§200.00(e).

Although the ALJ “bears the primary responsibility for assessing a claimant's residual

functional capacity based on all relevant evidence,” Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 469 (8th

Cir.2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also stated that a

“claimant's residual functional capacity is a medical question,” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700,

704 (8th Cir.2001). “[S]ome medical evidence,” Dykes v. Apfel, 223 F.3d 865, 867 (8th

Cir.2000) (per curiam), must support the determination of the claimant's RFC, and the ALJ

should obtain medical evidence that addresses the claimant's “ability to function in the

workplace[.]” Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.2000). Accordingly, in evaluating

a plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ is not limited to considering medical evidence, but is required to

consider at least some supporting evidence from a professional. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c);

Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 556 (internal citations omitted). Here, the ALJ did not do so. 

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When a plaintiff suffers from exertional and nonexertional impairments, as alleged

herein, and the exertional impairments alone do not warrant a finding of disability, the ALJ

must consider the extent to which the nonexertional impairments further diminish the plaintiff's

work capacity. Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1988). If the claimant's

characteristics do not differ significantly from those contemplated in the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, the ALJ may rely on the Guidelines alone to direct a finding of disabled or not

disabled. Id. That is to say, "an ALJ may use the Guidelines even though there is a

nonexertional impairment if the ALJ finds, and the record supports the finding, that the

nonexertional impairment does not diminish the claimant's residual functional capacity to

perform the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines." Id. at 349-50. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained as follows: 

In this context, "significant" refers to whether the claimant's nonexertional range

of activities listed in the Guidelines under the demands of day-to-day life. Under

this standard isolated occurrences will not preclude the use of the Guidelines,

however persistent nonexertional impairments which prevent the claimant from

engaging in the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines will preclude the

use of the Guidelines to direct a conclusion of disabled or not disabled.

Id. at 350. See also, Holz v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.1999); Foreman v. Callahan,

122 F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir.1997); Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir.1997). 

Discussion:

Overall, we conclude that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the

ALJ's decision as to the plaintiff’s RFC and his ability to perform work which exists in

significant numbers in the economy. Although this case proceeded to step five of the sequential

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 As stated previously, the plaintiff was 57 years of age at the time of the administrative 1

hearing (T. 198). 

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evaluation proceeding, the issue of transferability of skills from plaintiff’s PRW as a supply

sergeant, is in question.

The regulations provide:

(4) Transferability of skills for individuals of advanced age. If you are of

advanced age (age 55 or older), and you have a severe impairment(s) that limits

1

you to sedentary or light work, we will find that you cannot make an adjustment

to other work unless you have skills that you can transfer to other skilled or

semiskilled work (or you have recently completed education which provides for

direct entry into skilled work) that you can do despite your impairment(s). We

will decide if you have transferable skills as follows. If you are of advanced age

and you have a severe impairment(s) that limits you to no more than sedentary

work, we will find that you have skills that are transferable to skilled or

semiskilled sedentary work only if the sedentary work is so similar to your

previous work that you would need to make very little, if any, vocational

adjustment in terms of tools, work processes, work settings, or the industry. (See

§ 404.1567(a) and § 201.00(f) of appendix 2.)

20 C.F.R. § 404.1568 (d)(4).

And, further:

Work experience at its highest level of complexity was (as defined in the

regulations) skilled, semiskilled, unskilled, or none. Where the individual's past

relevant work included one or more skilled or semiskilled jobs and

transferability of skills is material, the finding of fact requires identification of

the work skills, examples of specific skilled or semiskilled occupations within

the person's RFC to which he or she can transfer skills (if any), and a statement

of the incidence of such jobs in the region in which the person lives or in several

regions of the country.

Social Security Ruling 83-11. (emphasis supplied) The undersigned concludes that the ALJ

failed to adequately comply with SSR 83-11.

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Specifically, the court cannot accurately conduct a de novo review of this matter,

particularly with respect to this issue, because the administrative record reflecting the colloquy

that took place between the ALJ and the VE, is riddled with notations of “[inaudible]”. In the

six (6) pages of testimonial exchange between the ALJ and the VE, there are 27 instances

wherein the transcriptionist was not able to understand either the ALJ’s or the VE’s testimony

(T. 215-221). Certain of those instances occurred in critical questioning. 

The ALJ specified in his hypothetical question to the VE, that plaintiff retained the RFC

to perform sedentary work, with mild to moderate pain (T. 219). In response, the VE testified

that the plaintiff, with a transfer of skills from his PRW as a supply sergeant, could work as a

clerk, as noted above. However, the testimony of a VE in response to a hypothetical question

which does not precisely state, to the expert, the plaintiff’s true condition, i.e., in this case, an

RFC evidentially supported by substantial evidence, cannot be accepted as such. Douglas v.

Bowen, 836 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir.1987). Accordingly, upon remand, the parties are directed

to take every precaution to obtain an accurate and audible record in order that, if necessary, this

court is able to properly consider such critical testimony. 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision denying benefits to the plaintiff is not supported by

substantial evidence and should be reversed. This matter should be remanded to the

Commissioner based upon the aforementioned reasons. The Court recognizes that the ALJ’s

decision may be the same after proper analysis on remand, but proper analysis is required. 

Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d at 1239. 

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ENTERED this 19 day of June, 2006. th

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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