Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05688/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05688-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTONIO CORTEZ BUCKLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-05688-OWW-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER VACATING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

(Doc. 34)

ORDER DISMISSING CERTAIN CLAIMS

AND DEFENDANTS, AND REFERRING

MATTER BACK TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

FOR SERVICE OF THE THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 42)

I. Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Antonio Cortez Buckley (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”)). Plaintiff filed this

action on December 29, 2003, in the Sacramento Division of the Eastern District of California, and

it was transferred to this division on May 11, 2004. On October 26, 2004, the Magistrate Judge

dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to complywith Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a). (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 11, 2005. (Doc. 19.) 

On April 5, 2006, the Magistrate Judge issued an order finding that plaintiff’s amended

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complaint stated cognizable claims for relief against defendants Winett, Meadors, and Barker for

retaliation (incident 1), defendants Reed, Mack, and Traynham for violation of the Eighth

Amendment (incident 2), and defendants Barker and Chappel for violation of the Equal Protection

Clause (incident 4), but did not state any other claims upon which relief may be granted under

section 1983. (Doc. 24.) The Magistrate Judge ordered plaintiff to either file a second amended

complaint or notify theCourt of his willingness to proceed only on the claims found to be cognizable

by the Court. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on May 12, 2006. (Doc. 28.) On

December 4, 2006, the Magistrate Judge screened plaintiff’s second amended complaint and issued

a Findings and Recommendations recommending as follows:

1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed May 12,

2006, on plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendants Howard, Johnson,

Barker, Chappel, Papac, Meadors, and Winett arising out of excessive body

searches (Incident 1), retaliation claim against defendants Winett, Meadors,

Barker, and Woodley arising out of the confiscation of his kosher food

package (Incident 1), and equal protection claim against defendants Barker

and Chappel arising out of the disappearance of his religious property

(Incident 3);

2. Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief be dismissed from this action for

mootness, and this action proceed as one for damages only;

3. Plaintiff’s free exercise claim against defendants Winett, Meadors, Barker,

and Woodley alleged in Incident 1 be dismissed from this action, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

4. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against defendants alleged in Incident 1 be

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted;

5. Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against defendants Calderon, Winett, Meadors,

Barker, Woodley, Alameida, and Grannis alleged in Incident 1 be dismissed

from this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted;

6. Plaintiff’s retaliation, equal protection, Eighth Amendment, and conspiracy

claims alleged in Incident 2 be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state

any claims upon which relief may be granted; 

7. Plaintiff’s free exercise and retaliation claims alleged in Incident 3 be

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state any claims upon which relief

may be granted; and

8. Defendants Calderon, Alameida, Grannis, Vasquez, Vo, Ortiz, Reed, Kordan,

Traynham, Mack, and Doe x-ray tech be dismissed from this action based on

plaintiff’s failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted against

them.

(Doc. 34, 11:5-12:5.)

On December 14, 2006, plaintiff filed an Objection in which he contended that due to

confusion and grief following the deaths of his son and grandson in a car accident, he inadvertently

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submitted the wrong statement of claim, and that an attorney assisted him with amending his claim,

but he failed to submit that amendment. (Doc. 35.) The Court declined to vacate the Findings and

Recommendations at that juncture, but provided plaintiff with thirty days within which to file a third

amended complaint. (Doc. 36.) On March 23, 2007, after obtaining an extension of time, plaintiff

filed a third amended complaint, which is the subject of this Order. (Doc. 42.) 

B. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may

appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the

test.’” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)(“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a

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plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not

initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

C. Summary of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at the California Correctional Institution

(“CCI”) in Tehachapi, where plaintiff was incarcerated at the time. Plaintiff names Arthur Calderon,

Edward S. Alameida, Jr., Nola Grannis, P. L. Vasquez, T. Vo, M. Ortiz, T. W. Meadors, D. R. Reed,

Bernard Kordan, T. Traynham, R. L. Papac, David L. Winett, Paul F. Woodley, Dr. Kim, Dennis

Barker, M. Howard, M. Johnson, Mack, Chappel, and John Doe x-ray tech as defendants. Plaintiff

is seeking monetary damages and declaratory relief. 

1. Prayer for Declaratory Relief

“A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a

matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood

Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve

a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings

and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v.

Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). In the event that this action reaches trial and the

jury returns a verdict in favor of plaintiff, that verdict will be a finding that plaintiff’s constitutional

rights were violated. Accordingly, a declaration that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights is

unnecessary.

Further, when an inmate seeks injunctive or declaratory relief concerning the prison where

he is incarcerated, his claims for such relief become moot when he is no longer subjected to those

conditions. Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368

(9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991). Because the events at issue

in this action occurred in 2002 and 2003 at CCI and plaintiff is no longer incarcerated there,

plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is moot. 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief shall be dismissed and this

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action shall proceed as one for damages only.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Incident 1

Plaintiff alleges that he is a black Orthodox Jew, and was the only Jewish prisoner housed

in Unit 4 at CCI, which holds approximately one-thousand prisoners. Plaintiff alleges that he filed

a grievance against David S. Sutherland, a correctional officer, on February 27, 2002, and then filed

complaints with the Kings County Grand Jury, the Inspector General’s Office, the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, and the federal court. Plaintiff alleges that thereafter, defendants Howard, Johnson,

Barker, Chappel, Papac, Meadors, and Winett harassed plaintiff daily with threats and excessive

body searches, and yelled anti-Semitic slurs at plaintiff because he would not shave his beard and

stop wearing his kippah. 

Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2002, defendants Winett, Meadors, Barker, and

Woodley confiscated his kosher food package, in violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause.

Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his ability to eat kosher food for Hanukkah, which is

mandated by his faith. Plaintiff alleges that he served notice on defendants Calderon, Vazquez,

Grannis, and Alameida, but they refused to intervene and on February 6, 2003, concurred with the

confiscation of his package. 

a. Retaliation Claim

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Yelling, threats, and slurs do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Oltarzewski

v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987).

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However, in light of federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegation that defendants Howard,

Johnson, Barker, Chappel, Papac, Meadors, and Winett subjected him to excessive body searches

after he filed complaints is sufficient to state a claim for retaliation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

b. Free Exercise Claim

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make

no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. Const.,

amend. I. The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First Amendment

rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,

348 (1987). The Court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free exercise rights arise

from both the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives. Id.; McElyea v. Babbit,

833 F. 2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987). “In order to establish a free exercise violation, [plaintiff] must

show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in

conduct mandated by his faith.” Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Winett, Meadors, Barker, and Woodley for violation of the Free Exercise Clause, arising from the

confiscation of plaintiff’s kosher food package. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

c. RLUIPA Claim

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that defendants

substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,

994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff meets his burden, defendants must demonstrate that “any

substantial burden of [plaintiff’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of

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protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief against defendants

Winett, Meadors, Barker, and Woodley for violation of RLUIPA, arising from the confiscation of

plaintiff’s kosher food package. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

d. Claim Against Defendants Calderon, Vazquez, Grannis, and

Alameida

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the defendant acted under

color of state law and (2) that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or

federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). “[A prison]

grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the

inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568

F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no

liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure);

Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no

liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Actions in

reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983

action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Plaintiff was previously informed that consideration of plaintiff’s appeal of the confiscation

of his kosher package does not create a basis upon which to impose liability on defendants for the

actions that were taken by defendants Winett, Meadors, Barker, and Woodley. (Doc. 24, 6:23-7:16.)

There are no facts set forth in the third amended complaint which support a claim that defendants

Calderon, Vazquez, Grannis, and Alameida were responsible for the confiscation of plaintiff’s

kosher package, in violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. 

 2. Incident 2

Plaintiff alleges that on December 11, 2002, he and defendant Calderon got into an argument

concerning his grievance over the confiscation of his kosher food package. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Calderon slurred him by saying, “You people are always complaining.” (3rd Amend.

Comp., 15:17.) Plaintiff alleges he was taken to the medical clinic where defendants Calderon,

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Winett, Meadors, Papac, Howard, and Johnson forced him to have an unnecessary body x-ray in

retaliation for standing up for his right to exercise his religion. Plaintiff alleges defendants Vo,

Kordan, and Doe retaliated against him by falsifying the medical report to state that plaintiff had

rectal contraband. As a result, plaintiff alleges he was placed in punitive segregation on contraband

status. 

Defendant Reed forced plaintiff to remove his pants, shirt, and shoes, and placed plaintiff in

full mechanical restraints, a waist chain, handcuffs, and leg irons. Plaintiff alleges he was dressed

only in a t-shirt, boxer shorts, and shower shoes, and was placed in a holding cell the size of a

telephone booth and made of metal mesh. Plaintiff alleges he was freezing cold, and defendants

Mack, Reed, and Traynham denied his numerous requests for clothing and a blanket. Plaintiff

alleges he told defendant Mack he would commit suicide to stop the freezing cold.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Ortiz, a medical technical assistant, was summoned but denied

plaintiff medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges defendant Kim, a doctor, was called but he also denied

plaintiff medical treatment, and defendant Ortiz told him he was not going to “get shit” because he

disrespected the warden. (Id., 17:10.) 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Reed, Mack, and Traynham subsequently placed him in a

freezing strip cell with fecal matter on the walls, floor and bunks, and with no heat, no running

water, no mattress, no blanket, and no cleaning supplies for three days. Plaintiff alleges he went on

a hunger strike and on the third day was given another x-ray, which cleared him of having rectal

contraband. 

a. Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to claims for relief against defendants

Calderon, Winett, Meadors, Papac, Howard, Johnson, Vo, Kordan, and Doe for retaliation.

b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.

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Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237,

1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of

confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health orsafety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

Plaintiff’s allegations arising out of the conditions of the cell he was confined in are sufficient

to give rise to a claim for relief against defendants Reed, Mack, and Traynham for violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Fed.R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that defendants

Ortiz and Vo were summoned but did not provide medical care does not support a claim that either

defendant “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837.

3. Incident 3

Plaintiff alleges that on March 7, 2003, when he was at the property office, defendant Barker

told plaintiff he did not “give a shit about Jews.” (3rd Amend. Comp., 18:10-11.) Plaintiff alleges

that defendant Chappel agreed with Barker and told plaintiff that there is payback for inmates who

disrespect the warden. Plaintiff alleges that on March 12, 2003, defendants Barker and Chappel

retaliated and discriminated against him, and denied him his right to practice his religion by

confiscating his two menorahs, candles, and radio. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Barker assured

him that he and defendant Chappel had packed all of plaintiff’s property, and called plaintiff a “smart

ass Jew boy” as Barker was leaving the office. (Id., 20:5.) Plaintiff was subsequently transferred

to California State Prison-Corcoran, where he discovered that his menorahs, candles, and radio were

missing. 

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“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 1

treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.

202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination

means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis in

original). 

10

///

a. Free Exercise, Retaliation, and Equal Protection Claims

These claims suffer from the exact deficiencies as identified in plaintiff’s second amended

complaint by the Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s property was packed and plaintiff was transported to

another prison, whereupon he discovered the missing religious items. These allegations do not

support a free exercise claim against defendants Barker and Chappel. Further, plaintiff has not

alleged any facts that support a claim that he was retaliated against for exercising any rights protected

under the First Amendment. However, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support a claim that

defendants Barker and Chappel intentionally discriminated against him based on his religion. Fed. 1

R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

D. Conclusion

The Court has screened plaintiff’s third amended complaint and finds that it states cognizable

claims for relief against defendants Howard, Johnson, Barker, Chappel, Papac, Meadors, and Winett

for retaliation arising out of excessive body searches (Incident 1); against defendants Winett,

Meadors, Barker, and Woodley for violation of the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA arising out

of the confiscation of plaintiff’s kosher food package (Incident 1); against defendants Calderon,

Winett, Meadors, Papac, Howard, Johnson, Vo, Kordan, and Doe for retaliation (Incident 2); against

defendants Reed, Mack, and Traynham for violation of the Eighth Amendment arising out of the

condition of the cell plaintiff was housed in (Incident 2); and against defendants Barker and Chappel

for violation of the Equal Protection Clause arising out of the disappearance of plaintiff’s religious

property (Incident 3). However, plaintiff’s claim against defendants Howard, Johnson, Barker,

Chappel, Papac, Meadors, and Winett arising out of threats and anti-Semitic slurs is not cognizable

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(Incident 1), plaintiff’s claim against defendants Calderon, Alameida, Grannis, and Vasquez arising

from the confiscation of his kosher package is not cognizable (Incident 1), plaintiff’s claim against

defendants Ortiz and Kim arising from their failure to provide medical care is not cognizable

(Incident 2), and plaintiff’s free exercise claim and retaliation claims alleged in Incident 3 are not

cognizable. Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to amend and the claims which are not cognizable

shall be dismissed, with prejudice. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations, which addressed plaintiff’s second amended

complaint, filed December 4, 2006, is VACATED;

2. This action shall proceed on plaintiff’s third amended complaint, filed March 23,

2007, on:

a. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendants Howard, Johnson, Barker,

Chappel, Papac, Meadors, and Winett arising out of excessive body searches

(Incident 1);

b. Plaintiff’s free exercise and RLUIPA claims against defendants Winett,

Meadors, Barker, and Woodley arising out of the confiscation of plaintiff’s

kosher food package (Incident 1);

c. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against defendants Calderon, Winett, Meadors,

Papac, Howard, Johnson, Vo, Kordan, and Doe (Incident 2);

d. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Reed, Mack, and

Traynham arising out of the condition of the cell plaintiff was housed in

(Incident 2); and

e. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against defendants Barker and Chappel

arising out of the disappearance of his religious property (Incident 3);

2. Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief is dismissed, and this action shall proceed as

one for damages only;

3. Plaintiff’s claim against defendants Howard, Johnson, Barker, Chappel, Papac,

Meadors, and Winett arising out of threats and anti-Semitic slurs is dismissed, with

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prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 

4. Plaintiff’s claim against defendants Calderon, Alameida, Grannis, and Vasquez

arising from the confiscation of plaintiff’s kosher package is dismissed, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (Incident 1);

5. Plaintiff’s claim against defendants Ortiz and Kim arising from their failure to

provide medical care is dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted (Incident 2);

6. Plaintiff’s free exercise claim and retaliation claims alleged in Incident 3 are

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; and

7. Defendants Alameida, Grannis, Vasquez, Ortiz, and Kim dismissed from this action

based on plaintiff’s failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted

against them.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05688-SAB Document 44 Filed 04/11/07 Page 12 of 12