Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00691/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00691-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES L. ROBINSON, #121 865, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-691-WHA 

 ) [WO] 

 ) 

 ) 

MARY COOKS, WARDEN, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This case is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief filed 

on September 18, 2013, by Petitioner James L. Robinson, a state inmate.1 He challenges the 

constitutionality of his confinement under sentences imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of 

Houston County, Alabama, on May 4, 1999. Petitioner claims he finished service of the 1999 

sentences on January 10, 2010, following entry of an order by Judge Lawson Little purportedly 

granting Petitioner’s request for time served which he claims “end[ed] all cases Houston and Henry 

County, Alabama.” Doc. 1 at 3; see also Doc. 9. 

Respondents filed an answer to the petition, and amendment thereto, under Rule 5, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, in which they contend that 

                                                            

1 Although the Clerk stamped the instant habeas petition “received” on September 24, 2013, a pro se

inmate’s petition is deemed filed the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 

487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey 

v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1993). The petition indicates that Petitioner presented the petition 

to prison officials for mailing on September 18, 2013. Doc. #1 at 10. In light of the foregoing the court 

considers September 18, 2013, as the date of filing. 

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Petitioner is entitled to no relief on the issues presented. Doc. 13. Petitioner took advantage of the 

opportunity granted to respond to Respondents’ answer. Docs. 25, 26, 27, 29. After reviewing the 

petition, amendment thereto, Respondents’ answer, and Petitioner’s responses, the court concludes 

that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that the petition and amendment thereto are due to be 

denied and dismissed as discussed below. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Styling This Action as 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Habeas Petition 

To the extent Petitioner seeks review of his claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the court finds 

the petition is properly considered filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Malloy v. Riley, et al., Civil 

Action No. 4:02-79-IPJ (N.D. Ala. 2003), 82 F. App’x 222 (Aug. 26, 2003). In Malloy, the 

petitioner, a state inmate, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming interference with 

his ability to obtain a sentence reduction under Ala. Code § 13A-5-9.1. The district court 

considered the petition as one filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and summarily dismissed it as 

successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 

summary dismissal and held “that state prisoners seeking to challenge their sentence must proceed 

under § 2254 and may not invoke § 2241.” Malloy v. Riley, et al., Civil Action No. 4:02-79-IPJ 

(N.D. Ala. 2003), 82 F. App’x 222 (Aug. 26, 2003) - Doc. 23 at 3. See also Cook v. Baker, et al., 

139 F. App’x 167, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[E]xclusive remedy for [state prisoner’s] claim is to file 

a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 since his claim challenges the propriety of 

his . . . sentence, as well as the execution of his sentence[.]”). Accordingly, the instant petition is 

considered filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and is subject to the procedural requirements of the statute. 

 

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B. Res Judicata

Petitioner claims that on May 4,1999, he was sentenced to a “coterminate term” with 

sentences previously imposed on him by the Circuit Courts for Houston and/or Henry Counties 

resulting in termination of all of those sentences upon completion of a twenty-five-year term of 

imprisonment imposed on him by the Circuit Court for Houston County in criminal case CC-88-

125. To support his contention that the “coterminate” sentences ended at the same time the 

sentence imposed in CC-88-125 ended, Petitioner states he was released on parole in October 2009 

and subsequently filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Houston County on January 10, 2010, 

requesting entry of an order granting him time served on all sentences imposed on him by the 

Circuit Courts for Houston and/or Henry Counties. Petitioner maintains Judge Little granted his 

request for time served on January 10, 2010, “thereby ending all cases.” Petitioner asserts the State 

did not contest the order. In December 2010, Petitioner was arrested and returned to prison. He 

argues his current detention is illegal, however, because the State of Alabama has no evidence 

indicating he had any additional time left to serve because “all five May 4, 1999 sentences ended 

with CC 88-125” because those sentences were ordered to run “coterminate” with the twenty-fiveyear term imposed in CC 88-125 and for which Judge Little granted time served. Doc. 1 at 2-10; 

see also Docs. 9, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29. 

 The court takes judicial notice of its own records which reflects Petitioner filed a habeas 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 with this court in which he presented the same issue for review as 

he presents in this action.2

 See Robinson v. Womble, et al., Civil Action No. 1:14-CV-211-MHT 

                                                            

2 This court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of other federal courts. Nguyen v. 

United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1259 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 

(11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999) 

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(M.D. Ala. 2014). That is, Petitioner challenged the validity of his confinement on the same ground 

as he presents in the instant petition and this court adjudicated the claim adversely to him. Id. at 

Docs. 4, 8, 9. Specifically, Petitioner argued: 

[T]he terms of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court on May 4, 1999 

required that he merely serve “15 years of the 25 ..., to coterminate with CC-1988-

125 [thereby necessitating only service of] the time Robinson had remaining under 

CC-1988-125” and, “without any jail credit and or any orders of Judge C. Lawson 

Little,” termination of all sentences occurred on July 5, 2013. . . . In support of this 

claim, Robinson alleges that the trial court in issuing the 1999 sentences could not 

impose “a 15 year concurrent and a 10 year consecutive term” in a single sentence 

and, hence, he was required to serve only the concurrent portion of these sentences. 

. . . Robinson further argues that he is illegally imprisoned “after [being] granted 

full freedom on January 10, 2010” upon issuance of the order by Judge Little in the 

1988 burglary case. 

Robinson v. Womble, et al., supra –Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge – Doc. 4 at 5-6. 

 This court determined Petitioner’s claim entitled him to no relief. Specifically, this court 

found: 

 A review of the records of this court establishes that Robinson filed a 

previous habeas petition pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which 

he challenged the convictions and sentences imposed upon him by the Circuit Court 

of Houston County, Alabama on May 4, 1999. Robinson v. Reynolds, et al., Civil 

Action No. 1:08-CV-377-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. 2010). In this prior habeas action, 

the court denied Robinson relief from his 1999 Houston County 

convictions/sentences because he failed to file the petition within the one-year 

period of limitation established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Robinson did not appeal 

this judgment. 

 Robinson did, however, file a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 

60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., attacking the final judgment of the court. In this motion, 

Robinson raised the same coterminous sentence argument as presented herein. The 

District Judge issued an opinion and order denying this motion which reads, in 

pertinent part, as follows: 

 [Robinson’s] argument[s] ... [challenging his incarceration] 

hinge[] on the following patently erroneous factual assumptions: (1) 

the 1988 burglary sentence and the 1999 sentences ran concurrently 

during the entirety of his incarceration on the 1988 sentence, 

including time served prior to his 1999 convictions; and (2) the order 

with regard to the 1988 burglary sentence addressed the 1999 

sentences imposed against him.... 

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 (The argument[s] ... [are] likewise without merit as the 

record demonstrates that only the initial 15 years of the 1999 

sentences were to run concurrent with the time Robinson had yet to 

serve on the 1988 sentence. Furthermore, Robinson served the 

sentences concurrently only during the time that he was incarcerated 

pursuant to both the 1988 and 1999 sentences. That is, Robinson 

was not entitled to credit on his 1999 sentences for time served on 

the 1988 sentence prior to imposition of the 1999 sentences. 

Additionally, even allowing Robinson credit for all concurrent time 

served, once the 1988 sentence terminated, either by actual 

expiration of the sentence or an order granting time served, the 

remaining term of the 25-year sentences imposed upon Robinson in 

1999 remained in full force and effect. Finally, the order issued with 

regard to the 1988 burglary sentence granting Robinson’s request 

for time served did not reference or address any other sentence and, 

therefore, did not impact the remaining time of 25 years of the 1999 

sentences.”) 

Robinson v. Reynolds, et al., supra -- July 8, 2013 Opinion and Order – Doc. No. 

30 at 3-5. 

Additionally, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed by Robinson seeking relief 

from his 1999 sentences on the coterminous ground, the court noted that: 

 . . . [U]nder well established law the [Circuit Court of 

Houston County, Alabama in imposing sentence upon Robinson in 

May of 1999] had no authority to “back-date” the commencement 

of Robinson’s 1999 sentences by having these sentences commence 

the same date as his pre-existing sentence imposed in CC-88-125. 

First, a criminal defendant’s sentence begins to run, at the earliest, 

upon his being held in custody for the offense in question. Ala. Code 

§ 14-4-9 (1975) (“When it is specifically ordered in the judgment 

entry that sentences shall run concurrently, such sentences shall run 

from the date on which such convict is received ... for service of the 

[imposed] sentence.”). Moreover, “[a] sentence cannot commence 

prior to the date it is pronounced even if it is to be concurrent to a 

sentence already being served.” Wilson v. Henderson, 468 F.2d 582, 

584 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fiores, 616 F.2d 840, 841 (5th 

Cir. 1980) (same). Thus, the concurrent sentences imposed against 

Robinson on May 4, 1999 could not begin to run, concurrently with 

any prior sentences or otherwise, prior to their imposition. 

Robinson v. Moulton, et al., Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-766-WHA-WC (M.D. Ala. 

2014), Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge - Doc. No. 4 at 5-6, n.5, adopted 

as opinion of the court, Order of January 9, 2014 - Doc. No. 13. Consequently, 

under the precise terms of the sentences imposed by the trial court on May 4, 1999, 

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these sentences began to run on that date and ran concurrently with other prior 

sentences for only the first 15 years leaving the remaining 10 years to be served 

consecutively to the other sentences. As the court previously determined, 

“Robinson served the [1999 sentences concurrently with the 1988 sentence] only 

during the time that he was incarcerated pursuant to both the 1988 and 1999 

sentences. That is, Robinson was not entitled to credit on his 1999 sentences for 

time served on the 1988 sentence prior to imposition of the 1999 sentences. 

Additionally, even allowing Robinson credit for all concurrent time served, once 

the 1988 sentence terminated, either by actual expiration of the sentence or an order 

granting time served, the remaining term of the 25-year sentences imposed upon 

Robinson in 1999 remained in full force and effect.” Robinson v. Reynolds, et al., 

supra -- July 8, 2013 Opinion and Order - Doc. No. 30 at 4-5. 

Robinson v. Womble, et al., supra –Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge – Doc. 4 at 6-8. 

The foregoing reflects this court decided the claim for relief presented by Petitioner in the 

instant petition adversely to him. Under well settled federal law, 

[t]he preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue 

preclusion, which are collectively referred to as “res judicata.” Under the doctrine 

of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive litigation of the very 

same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the 

earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 

L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Issue preclusion, [often denoted as “collateral estoppel”,] in 

contrast, bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and 

resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,” even if the 

issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Id., at 748-749, 121 S.Ct. 1808. By 

“preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate,” these two doctrines protect against “the expense and 

vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] 

reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” 

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 

(1979). 

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2171 (2008). 

 “Our res judicata analysis has always required a consideration of the facts and legal theories 

of two causes of action as well as the rights and duties involved in each case.” Draper v. Atlanta 

Indep. Sch. Sys., 377 F. App’x 937, 940 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 

F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1992)). “We have consistently concluded that when the substance and 

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facts of each action are the same, res judicata bars the second suit.” Id. In I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. 

Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986), the Court summarized the doctrine of 

res judicata as follows: 

Res judicata . . . refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment in foreclosing 

relitigation of matters that were litigated or could have been litigated in an earlier 

suit. . . . In order for the doctrine of res judicata to bar a subsequent suit, four 

elements must be present: (1) there must be a final judgment on the merits; (2) the 

decision must be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or 

those in privity with them, must be identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause 

of action must be involved in both cases. 

Id. at 1549 (citations omitted). Each of the requisite elements for application of the bar of res 

judicata are present in this case. Based on the decision of this court in Robinson v. Womble, et al., 

Civil Action No. 1:14-CV-112-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. 2014), denying Petitioner’s challenge to the 

legality of his detention regarding his 1999 convictions and sentences, the court concludes that the 

instant petition wherein Petitioner seeks the same habeas relief is precluded from review by the 

doctrine of res judicata. 

D. Dismissal of Petition as Successive 

 This court dismissed Petitioner’s prior habeas action challenging the convictions and 

resulting sentences imposed against him in May of 1999.3 Although the court dismissed the 

petition on statute of limitations grounds, such dismissal constitutes an adjudication on the merits 

                                                            

3 In Robinson v. Reynolds, et al., Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-377-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. 2010), Petitioner 

challenged convictions/sentences entered against him on May 4, 1999. The record in Civil Action No. 

1:08-CV-377-MHT establishes that on the aforementioned “date, the trial court sentenced Robinson to 

twenty-five years imprisonment as a habitual offender and did not suspend any portion of the sentences 

imposed. Respondents’ Exhibit – Court Doc. No. 16-3 at 21, 62-63. The trial court did, however, order 

that a portion of the sentences imposed for the challenged convictions run concurrent with other prior 

convictions [including a 25-year sentence imposed upon Robinson for a burglary conviction in CC-88-125]. 

Id. (Robinson [was] sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a ‘term of 25 years under [Habitual 

Felony Offender Act], fifteen years thereof to run concurrent with’ sentences imposed in previous cases.).” 

Robinson v. Reynolds, et al., supra -- Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge - Doc. 26 at 1-2, adopted 

as opinion of the court, Order of April 7, 2010 - Doc. 27.  

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for the purposes of invoking the second or successive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). 

Jordan v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007) (requiring petitioner to 

obtain order from appellate court prior to filing second or successive § 2254 petition after first 

habeas petition was dismissed as untimely); Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 

2006) (after failed, untimely § 2254 petition, petitioner must “satisfy the requirements under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)” to receive requisite authorization from appellate court to file successive habeas 

petition in district court); Murray v. Grenier, 394 F.3d 78, 81 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“[D]ismissal of a 

§ 2254 petition for failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations constitutes an 

adjudication on the merits that renders [any] future petitions under § 2254 challenging the same 

conviction ‘second or successive’ petitions....”); Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003) 

(previous § 2254 petition dismissed as untimely constitutes a prior application adjudicated on the 

merits “because a statute of limitations bar is not a curable technical or procedural deficiency but 

rather operates as an irremediable defect barring consideration of the ... substantive claims[,]” and, 

therefore, the petitioner needs the appellate “court’s permission to file another petition.”); 

Villanueva v. United States, 346 F.3d 55, 59-61 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] habeas or § 2255 petition that 

is properly dismissed as time-barred under AEDPA constitutes an adjudication on the merits for 

successive purposes.”); Garrett v. Quarterman, 2008 WL 2168808 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (dismissal of 

previous habeas petition as untimely is the type of procedural ruling that renders later-filed habeas 

petition successive); Motley v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 938952 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (when previous habeas 

petition is dismissed as untimely, petitioner must first obtain permission from appropriate appellate 

court prior to filing a second or successive petition); Bridgewater v. Scriben, 2007 WL 2262760 

(S.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissal of prior habeas petition as untimely renders subsequent petition 

challenging same conviction second or successive); Reyes v. Vaughn, 276 F. Supp.2d 1027, 1029 

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(C.D. Cal. 2003) (dismissal of petition on limitations grounds “is considered an adjudication of 

the merits for purposes of determining whether a petition is successive under [28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)].”). 

 “Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district 

court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the 

district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). “A motion in the court of 

appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive application 

shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals” and may be granted “only if 

[the assigned panel of judges] determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that 

the application satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)].” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B) 

and (C). 

 It is clear from the pleadings that Petitioner has not received an order from a three-judge 

panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider a successive 

habeas application seeking relief from the 1999 convictions and sentences. “Because this 

undertaking [is Petitioner’s] [successive] habeas corpus petition [on this issue] and because he had 

no permission from [the Eleventh Circuit] to file a [successive] habeas petition, . . . the district 

court lack[s] jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.” Gilreath v. State Bd. of Pardons and 

Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2001). Consequently, the present petition for habeas corpus 

relief is due to be dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition. Id. at 934. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 

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1. The petition for habeas relief filed by Petitioner James Robinson be DENIED as the 

issue in this petition was previously decided adversely to Petitioner by this court in 

Robinson v. Womble, et al., Civil Action No. 1:14-CV-112-MHT (M.D. Ala. 2014); 

2. To the extent Petitioner challenges his convictions and sentences entered against him 

by the Circuit Court for Houston County in May of 1999, the petition be DISMISSED 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) as Petitioner has failed to obtain the requisite order 

from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to consider his 

successive habeas application. 

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before June 1, 2016, the parties may file objections to the 

Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in 

the Recommendation to which objection is made. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will 

not be considered by the District Court. 

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations 

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court 

of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to 

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions 

accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. 

Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Sec., 

Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc). 

 

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 Done this 18th day of May, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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