Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00937/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00937-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE BUENOROSTRO,

Plaintiff

v

JOHN POTTER, Postmaster General,

Defendant. /

No C-04-0937 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff Jose Buenorostro (Buenorostro) has filed this

suit in pro per against John Potter (Potter) alleging retaliation

and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e et seq (Title VII) and age

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, 29 USC § 621 et seq (the ADEA). Doc #1 (Compl). Potter moves

for summary judgment on all claims. Doc #28 (MSJ). Buenorostro

opposes. Doc #39 (Opp). Based upon the parties’ memoranda and the

applicable federal law, the court GRANTS Potter’s motion. 

//

Case 3:04-cv-00937-VRW Document 46 Filed 06/22/05 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

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I

The following relevant facts are not in dispute. 

Buenorostro began his employment with the United States Postal

Service (USPS) in 1995 as a clerk and mail handler. On March 13,

1999, he was elevated to a part-time flexible letter carrier for a

90-day probationary period at the Santa Rosa post office. 

Buenorostro’s supervisor at the Santa Rosa post office, Joe

Machado, terminated Buenorostro on May 31, 1999, for unacceptable

work performance. On August 16, 1999, Buenorostro filed a

complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

alleging that Machado terminated him on the basis of age. Doc #34

(Rutter Decl), Ex A8 (EEOC Compl) at 1. Buenorostro’s EEOC

complaint appears to have been based on direct and circumstantial

evidence. As direct evidence, Buenorostro claimed that in

September 1998, when he first applied for a position as a letter

carrier, Terri Thomas, a USPS supervisor, informed Buenorostro that

he was “too old for a carrier position.” Id at A7 (Buen Stat) at

1. As circumstantial evidence, Buenorostro claims that three

younger letter carriers who were also on probationary periods were

hired full-time by USPS. Id. 

On May 8, 2001, Buenorostro and the USPS entered into a

negotiated settlement agreement whereby Buenorostro withdrew his

EEOC complaint and the USPS agreed to rehire/reinstate him at a

different post office -- the Petaluma post office –- as a letter

carrier subject to a new 90-day probationary period. Id at A1

(EEOC Sett Notice).

Buenorostro began his second probationary period as a

part-time letter carrier at the Petaluma post office on May 19,

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2001. His primary supervisors, Juli LoDolce and Todd Matthews,

provided Buenorostro with a normal five-day training period with an

experienced letter carrier, Dave Sartori. Doc #29 (Matthews Decl)

at 2. 

According to Matthews and LoDolce, it soon became

apparent that Buenorostro was not satisfactorily performing his

duties as a part-time flexible letter carrier. Buenorostro would

take double and sometimes triple the amount of expected time to

deliver mail. Doc #32 (LoDolce Decl) at 2; Mattehws Decl at 3. On

at least one occasion, Buenorostro did not call in by 3:00 pm as he

had been instructed to do if he was in danger of not completing his

delivery route. Matthews Decl at 3. Consequently, Matthews was

forced to send out another letter carrier to help Buenorostro

finish his route. Id. Matthews asserts that several times he was

unable to contact Buenorostro and would have to go out looking for

Buenorostro on his route. Matthews asserts that, on more than

occasion, Buenorostro failed to deliver the mail accurately,

leading to at least one customer complaint. Id. On June 18, 2001,

Matthews gave Buenorostro his 30-day job evaluation. In the

categories of work quantity, work quality and work methods,

Buenorostro received an “unacceptable” rating. In the categories

of work relations and personal conduct, Buenorostro received a

“satisfactory” rating. Id at 4.

Buenorostro’s performance did not improve; it got worse. 

Specifically, on July 11, 2001, Buenorostro was observed engaging

in unsafe driving practices. Id at 3, Ex A. Attempting to

pinpoint Buenorostro’s problems, Matthews and LoDolce had him

shadowed by an experienced letter carrier, Luis Molina, for two

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days to observe and inform Buenorostro regarding delivery errors

and suggest how to increase efficiency. Matthews Decl at 2' Doc

#31 (Molina Decl) at 2. Despite Molina’s observation that

Buenorostro was a nice, hard-working individual, Molina concluded

that Buenorostro “just didn’t have it in him” to be a letter

carrier based upon his “significant and repeated trouble delivering

the mail in a timely manner * * *.” Id. Molina characterizes

Buenorostro’s errors as “overwhelming and egregious.” Id.

On July 17, 2001, Buenorostro received his 60-day

evaluation from Matthews; the ratings were identical to the 30-day

ratings. Matthews Decl, Ex B. On August 1, 2001, Matthews

informed Buenorostro that he was being terminated for failing to

meet the requirements of a letter carrier position. Id, Ex C (Term

Letter). Matthews cited Buenorostro’s (1) failure to operate a

postal vehicle in a safe manner, (2) failure to phone at 3:00 pm if

in jeopardy of not meeting committed times and (3) failure to

deliver mail accurately. Id. 

On October 2, 2001, Buenorostro filed an EEOC complaint

alleging that he was terminated from the Petaluma post office based

on his age, national origin and in retaliation for his prior EEOC

complaint. An EEOC ALJ concluded that the USPS did not

discriminate against Buenorostro on any of these grounds; this

decision was affirmed on September 11, 2003, and reconsideration

was denied on December 11, 2003. On March 9, 2004, Buenorostro

filed the current complaint in this court alleging age, national

origin and retaliation discrimination against USPS arising from his

termination from the Petaluma post office. Doc #1 (Compl).

Potter currently moves for summary judgment in his favor

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on all of Buenorostro’s claims, asserting that no genuine issue of

material fact exists regarding the basis for Buenorostro’s

termination from the Petaluma post office. MSJ at 14. Buenorostro

opposes. Doc #39.

II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. And

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP

56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v

Pacific Elec Contractors Assn, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). 

The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 

Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to

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weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). 

III

The court addresses first Buenorostro’s claims of age

discrimination and national origin discrimination.

A

ADEA Claim

Although Buenorostro’s complaint alleges age

discrimination in violation of the ADEA, he conceded in his

deposition that no one at the Peataluma post office discriminated

against him based on his age. Doc #33 (Olsen Decl), Buenorostro

Depo (11/24/04) at 30:22-34:4. The following excerpts of the

deposition transcript will illustrate Buenorostro’s concession:

Q: Did Todd Matthews ever tell you [that] you

were too old to be a letter carrier?

A: No

Q: Did Todd Matthews ever raise any concerns

about your age?

A: No. On the contrary, he was a very good

friend of mine, and helped me a lot at work.

* * *

Q: * * *. Did you ever tell Todd Matthews how

old you were?

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A: No.

Q: And did you ever hear him make any comments

at all about your age?

A: No.

Q: How about any other supervisor at the

Petaluma Post Office, did they ever make any

comments about your age?

A: No. We all had a really good

relationship.

Q: Okay. How about Coper Dulin, did she ever

make any comments about your age?

A: No.

Q: So why do you believe that you were

discriminated against on the basis of your

age?

A: Because of my age, that is what Terr[i]

Thomas did. However, the reason I was

terminated –- the reason I was terminated in

Petaluma was because of my previous complaint. Because they didn’t have any other reason.

Q: Okay, so correct me if I am wrong. You’re

saying that Terr[i] Thomas, in Santa Rosa,

discriminated against you on the basis of your

age?

A: Yes.

Q: And that you were discriminated against in

Petaluma because of your prior EEO activity?

A: That’s right

Q: Did anyone in Petaluma discriminate

against you on the basis of your age?

A: No. No one.

Tr at 31:6-14, 32:24-34:4 (emphasis added). Buenorostro clearly testified that the reason (singular)

he was terminated from the Petaluma post office was his previous

EEOC complaint (i e, retaliation discrimination). He cannot

presently contradict this testimony to survive summary judgment by

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arguing that he was discriminated against based on his age. As

this court has stated, “‘[i]f a party who has been examined at

length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by

submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this

would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a

procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.’” Martinez v

Marin Sanitary Service, 349 F Supp 2d 1234, 1242 (N D Cal 2004)

(Walker, J) (quoting Kennedy v Allied Mutual Ins Co, 952 F2d 262,

266 (9th Cir 1991)). Buenorostro offers no explanation at all,

much less a sufficient explanation for this contradiction. Id. 

Moreover, Buenorostro’s original EEOC complaint was

premised on Terri Thomas’ alleged statements in 1998 at the Santa

Rosa post office that Buenorostro was “too old” to be a letter

carrier, Rutter Decl at A7, and thus Buenorostro is barred from

reasserting this claim pursuant to the settlement agreement he

entered into with the USPS on May 8, 2001. Under the terms of the

settlement agreement, Buenorostro, in exchange for being

rehired/reinstated with USPS, agreed “not to institute a lawsuit

under Title VII * * * or any other state or Federal law or

regulation regarding these issues.” Rutter Decl at A1 (EEOC Sett

Notice) at 2. Because Buenorostro’s first EEOC complaint was

premised on Thomas’ alleged statements, Buenorostro is now barred

from premising his current age discrimination claim on this issue. 

Accordingly, Potter is entitled to summary judgment on

Buenorostro’s ADEA claim.

//

//

//

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B

National Origin Claim

Buenorostro’s national origin claim is similarly flawed. 

Aside from stating that the only reason for his termination from

the Petaluma post office was his prior EEOC complaint, Buenorostro

testified to the following regarding his national origin claim:

Q: Okay, so I don’t want to beat a dead horse. 

My understanding is that – may understanding is

that your claim is that you were discriminated

against for your prior EEO activity.

A: Yes.

Q: But do you believe that anyone in the

Petaluma facility, not Santa Rosa, but in the

Petaluma facility, do you believe that anyone

discriminated against you in Petaluma on the

basis of your national origin?

A: No.

Buenorostro Depo (11/24/04) at 36:9-18 (emphasis

added).

Buenorostro now claims that Todd Matthews and Copper Dulin at the

Petaluma post office discriminated against him on the basis of his

national origin. Doc #39 at 12. Again, Buenorostro offers no

explanation for this contradiction and thus he fails to raise a

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary

judgment on his national origin claim. Martinez, 349 F Supp 2d at

1242. 

IV

Unlike his ADEA claim and national origin Title VII

claim, Buenorostro has consistently maintained that he was

terminated from the Petaluma post office in retaliation for filing

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the original EEOC complaint stemming from his termination at the

Santa Rosa post office.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

Title VII, Buenorostro “must demonstrate that (1) [he] had engaged

in a protected activity; (2) [he] was thereafter subject by his

employer to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link

existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action.” Porter v California Dep’t of Corrections, 383 F3d 1018,

1029 (9th Cir 2004) (citing Ray v Henderson, 217 F3d 1234, 1239-40

(9th Cir 2000)). If Buenorostro makes out a prima facie case, the

burden shifts to Potter to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Buenorostro. Id. If

Potter sets forth such a reason, Buenorostro “bears the ultimate

burden of submitting evidence indicating that [Potter’s] proffered

reason is merely a pretext for a retaliatory motive.” Id. As to

circumstantial evidence, the Ninth Circuit instructs that a

plaintiff “must proffer ‘substantial’ and ‘specific’ evidence of

pretext to overcome [a defendant’s] motion for summary judgment.” 

Stegall v Citadel Broadcasting Co, 350 F3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir

2003) (quoting Manatt v Bank of America, 339 F3d 792, 801 (9th Cir

2003)). 

Potter does not dispute that Buenorostro engaged in a

protected activity in filing the original EEOC complaint after his

termination from the Santa Rosa post office. MSJ at 12. Moreover,

Potter concedes that Buenorotro was subject to an adverse

employment action: He was terminated. Id. Potter argues,

however, that Buenorotro has failed to demonstrate a causal link

between the prior EEOC complaint and his termination from the

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Petaluma post office. Id. The court agrees.

Buenorostro himself admits that he did not tell Matthews

about his original EEOC complaint until after Matthews had given

Buenorotro his negative 30- and 60-day evaluations. Opp at 14. 

Matthews asserts that he did not know of Buenorostro’s EEOC

complaint prior to Buenorostro telling him about it, Doc #29 (Matt

Decl) at 4, and Buenorostro offers no evidence to the contrary. 

Accordingly, the 30- and 60-day evaluations describing

Buenorostro’s work performance as unacceptable could not have been

the product of a retaliatory motive; Matthews did not even know

about the prior EEOC complaint.

Assuming arguendo that Buenorostro has made out a prima

facie case of retaliation (which he has not), Potter has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

Buenorostro: His unacceptable job performance (e g, unsafe

driving, mistakes in delivering mail, untimely mail delivery). 

Buenorostro has failed to submit specific and substantial evidence

indicating that this reason is a pretext for retaliation. Rather,

Buenorostro conclusorily states that he was “set-up to fail”

because he was “given too much mail and was unable to finish the

route” on time. Opp at 6, 15. Buenorostro provides no evidence in

support of this argument, much less specific and substantial

evidence; he simply offers his conclusions and speculations. 

Conclusory and speculative testimony is insufficient to raise

genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill

Publishing Co, 594 F2d at 738.

//

//

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V

In sum, the court GRANTS Potter’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc #28). The clerk is directed to CLOSE the file and

TERMINATE all motions.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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