Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02273/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02273-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner also purports to bring this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Reply to 1

Motion,” p.5), however, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exclusive avenue for a state court prisoner

challenging the constitutionality of his detention. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir.

2004). Section 2254 is the proper vehicle even if petitioner is not challenging the underlying

conviction itself, but administrative decisions. Id. at 1007. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER HENRY YOUNG,

Petitioner, No. CIV 05-2273 FCD GGH P

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, Director of

California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Respondent.

 /

Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed a motion for summary dismissal of the petition or, 1

alternatively, for a more definite statement. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion and also

filed a document entitled “petitioner’s more definite statement,” apparently intended as an

amended petition. After a careful review of the record, this court must recommend granting

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respondent’s motion for summary dismissal.

Petition/Amended Petition

Petitioner is serving a sentence of nine years and four months pursuant two

separate convictions, one arising in Stanislaus County, on July 17, 2003, and one from Tuolumne

County, on December 17, 2003. Petition, p. 1; Motion to Dismiss (MTD), p. 3, Exhibit (Exh.) A,

Abstracts of Judgment; Classification Chrono dated December 7, 2005. His Stanislaus County

conviction, resulting in a prison term of six years and eight months, arose from one count of

assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 245(c)), and one count of

evading a peace officer (Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.2), including a two-year sentence enhancement

as to the assault charge. MTD, Exh. A, pp. 2, 4. His Tuolumne County conviction, for one count

of auto theft (Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a)), and one count of attempted auto theft (Cal. Veh. Code

664/10851(a)), including a two-year enhancement on the auto theft charge, resulting in a twoyear and eight-month sentence. Petitioner was sentenced to the nine-year, four-month term

pursuant to an apparent agreement and guilty plea. MTD, Exh. A, p. 4. 

In his original petition, petitioner set forth the following as the sole ground of his

petition, concluding it with a reference to his attached memorandum:

Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Violation to Increase a

Determinate Sentence by Imposing Parole After a Completed

Sentence, Rather Than “Part Of” Sentence [:]

In violation of the Separation of Powers, prison officials are using the “early 

release” of parole as a sentence extension. Under state law and the

U.S. Supreme Court, parole is an administrative transfer as “part

of” the sentence; yet prison officials have informed petitioner he

will serve his entire 9-year and 4-month sentence (with time and

credits) and then serve four more years on parole after sentence.

Petition, p. 4. 

Respondent objects to petitioner’s lack of clarity in framing his claim or any facts

in support of it. Motion to Dismiss (MTD), pp. 4-7. The court’s review of petitioner’s

supporting memorandum to the original petition makes relatively clear that the gravamen of his

claim is that he has been informed by prison officials that he will be compelled to serve the full

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nine-year, four-month term in prison, as well as a three or four-year period of parole, taking into 

account earned time credits that should be applied to reduce his term of incarceration but not

considering the early release to which he believes himself to be entitled. Petition Mem., pp. 21-

42. 

The court has also reviewed petitioner’s later filed “more definite statement,”

submitted in evident response to one ground of respondent’s motion, and his opposition to the

motion, which further clarifies that he is claiming that the future anticipated action of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), that would require him to

serve his prison term as well as a period of parole, violates the terms of his plea bargain, the state

Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL), specifically, Cal. Penal Code § 1170(c), and the federal

constitution. “Reply to motion,” pp. 2-4. Petitioner asserts that state law makes parole a part of

and included in the sentence and that parole counts toward the sentence, such that parole cannot

be imposed after petitioner has actually served the prison term (including the application of time

credits). Id., at p. 4. Petitioner claims that it violates, inter alia, his constitutional rights to

compel him to agree to a sentence with the possibility of parole pursuant to “unambiguous

statutes,” and then refuse to release him early on parole (or to force him to complete a prison

term and then to release him on a parole). Id., at 5.

Motion to Dismiss

Respondent avers that the same deficiencies that plagued petitioner’s claims

before the state courts in his petition are at issue in the instant petition. MTD, p. 5. Attached as

Exhs. B and C to the motion, are the Fifth Appellate District Court’s ruling that petitioner not

only failed to raise any issues on appeal but did not respond to that court’s invitation to

supplement his briefing; the Stanislaus County Superior Court, as to his habeas claims, raising

the same issues implicated herein, stated in relevant part:

Petitioner does not allege that he would be eligible for parole or

that he has earned any conduct credits pursuant to Penal Code

Section 2933. Petitioner does not provide any documentation from

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the Department of Corrections concerning his anticipated parole

eligibility date or denial of conduct credits. As such, the current

petition states insufficient grounds for relief.

MTD, Exh. C, p. 11. Further, respondents observe that Cal. Penal Code § 3000(a)(1) specifically 

requires, unless waived, a parole period for inmates upon their release from prison. MTD, p. 5. 

Noting further that “there is nothing in the petition indicating that a parole period was waived in

either of the above-mentioned felony convictions,” respondent argues soundly that no

constitutional violation is set forth. Id.

Opposition 

Petitioner is adamant that if he is required to serve a period of parole as well as his

full prison term that state statutes as well as his constitutional rights will have been violated. 

Reply to Motion, pp. 2-8; Petitioner’s More Definite Statement, pp. 2-9. “Petitioner is contesting

the transfer during a sentence as ‘early release...on parole by CDCR to a period after the

determinate sentence has been completed.” Id., at 2. He states that once his actual time served

and earned credits equal nine years and four months, prison officials will be extending his

sentence unconstitutionally by applying a period of parole. Id. 

Discussion

Petitioner claims that prison officials have told him that he will serve his entire

prison term, apparently only to be reduced by earned time credits. Petitioner, however, produces

no record or documentation in support of this claim. Further, the only documentation on which 

any specificity as to a potential early parole release date (presumably the term that is designated 

by the initials “EPRD”) is included in the Classification Review Report included by respondent,

not petitioner. MTD, Exh. B, p. 6. That date is set forth as “2/21/08 @ 1⁄2,” which appears to

suggest that with application of earned half-time credits petitioner’s projected earliest date to be

released on parole would not be for more than another year. However, the court will assume the

truth of the matter asserted.

\\\\\

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The petition suffers substantively from petitioner’s fundamental conceptual

miscue on the merits of his claims in that he does not view parole as part of his overall criminal

sentence. It certainly is. Under the Determinate Sentencing law, parole is not part of the prison

term, but is required to be served after release from prison. People v. Jefferson, 21 Cal. 4th 86,

95-96, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 893 (1999). Thus, in California a “sentence” in which a defendant is

sent to prison is comprised ofa prison term and a period of parole. Nothing in Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972), a case concerned with procedures to be used for

parole revocation, created a constitutionally defined parole definition which was then binding

upon the state. Rather, as background in reaching the procedure issues, the Supreme Court

generically described the practical effect of parole, i.e., it is generally granted prior to the time

one’s stated prison sentence (just a part of the overall sentence) has not been completely served. 

Morrissey, supra, was not attempting to constitutionally preclude parole from being part of one’s

criminal sentence, even one completely served. If petitioner had disclosed to his sentencing

judge that he would refuse to abide by parole conditions, the sentencing judge may well not have

accepted petitioner’s guilty plea and ultimately petitioner might have been subject to the statutory

maximum prison sentence. Moreover, nothing in the federal constitution would preclude a state

from mandating parole after service of a statutory maximum term. Indeed, that is how the federal

sentencing laws are presently set up. One serves a prison term (including a prison term that is a

statutory maximum), and one is also sentenced to supervised release with conditions (i.e., just

like a parole term). The court finds that respondent’s motion for summary dismissal should be

granted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s April 14,

2006, motion for summary dismissal of the petition be granted and this case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 2/7/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

GGH:009 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

youn2273.fr

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