Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00412/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

TAMARA JA’NET WHIMPER-SULLIVAN PLAINTIFF 

V. CASE NO. 4:19-CV-00412 LPR-JTK 

ANDREW SAUL, 

Commissioner of Social Security Administration1 DEFENDANT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

I. Procedures for filing Objections:

 This Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent to District Judge Lee 

P. Rudofsky. You may file written objections to this Recommendation. If you file objections, they 

must be specific and must include the factual or legal basis for your objection. 

Your objections must be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk 

within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. 

If no objections are filed, Judge Rudofksy can adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing the record. By not objecting, you may also waive any right to appeal 

questions of fact. 

II. Introduction:

 Plaintiff, Tamara Ja’net Whimper-Sullivan (“Whimper-Sullivan”), applied for disability 

benefits on April 12, 2016, alleging disability beginning on October 20, 2015. (Tr, at 14, 2364-

2376). After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (AALJ@) denied her application 

on February 28, 2017. (Tr. at 11-27). After filing a U.S. District Court complaint, WhimperSullivan’s case was remanded for a new hearing and for the ALJ to further consider the weight to 

 

1 On June 6, 2019, the United States Senate confirmed Mr. Saul’s nomination to lead the Social Security 

Administration. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Mr. Saul is automatically substituted as the Defendant. 

 

Case 4:19-cv-00412-LPR Document 13 Filed 03/23/20 Page 1 of 6
give to a VA rating of 70% disability for PTSD. (Tr. at 2420-2424). After a second hearing, the 

ALJ denied Whimper-Sullivan’s application. (Tr. at 2364-2376). The Appeals Council denied her 

request for review. (Tr. at 1). The ALJ=s decision now stands as the final decision of the 

Commissioner, and Whimper-Sullivan has requested judicial review. 

For the reasons stated below, this Court should affirm the decision of the Commissioner. 

III. The Commissioner=s Decision:

The ALJ found that Whimper-Sullivan had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

the alleged onset date of October 20, 2015. (Tr. at 2367). The ALJ found, at Step Two of the 

sequential five-step analysis, that Whimper-Sullivan had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder, major depressive 

disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Id. 

At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Whimper-Sullivan’s impairments did not meet or 

equal a listed impairment. Id. Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined that WhimperSullivan had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with restrictions: 1) 

she could not perform frequent stooping or crouching; 2) she could not work around unprotected 

heights, moving machinery, or dangerous equipment, and she could not drive a car at work; 3) she 

could perform work where interpersonal contact is routine but superficial; 4) she could perform 

work where the complexity of tasks is learned by experience and contains several variables and 

uses judgment within limits; and 5) the supervision required is little for routine, but detailed for 

non-routine tasks. (Tr. at 2369). 

Based on Whimper-Sullivan’s RFC and the testimony of a Vocational Expert, the ALJ 

found that Whimper-Sullivan could return to her past relevant work. (Tr. at 2375). Therefore, the 

ALJ found that Whimper-Sullivan was not disabled. Id. 

Case 4:19-cv-00412-LPR Document 13 Filed 03/23/20 Page 2 of 6
3 

IV. Discussion: 

A. Standard of Review 

The Court=s role is to determine whether the Commissioner=s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000). ASubstantial evidence@

in this context means less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla. Slusser v. Astrue, 557 

F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009). In other words, it is Aenough that a reasonable mind would find it 

adequate to support the ALJ=s decision.@ Id. (citation omitted). The Court must consider not only 

evidence that supports the Commissioner=s decision, but also evidence that supports a contrary 

outcome. The Court cannot reverse the decision, however, Amerely because substantial evidence 

exists for the opposite decision.@ Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996)). 

B. Whimper-Sullivan=s Arguments on Appeal 

Whimper-Sullivan argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ=s decision to 

deny benefits. She contends that the ALJ did not properly consider her 70% disability VA rating, 

that the ALJ did not give proper weight to medical opinions, and that the Appeals Council did not 

give full consideration to new evidence. 

Whimper-Sullivan alleged that her main problems were depression, anxiety, PTSD, and 

back pain. She did have a six-day inpatient psychiatric hospital stay in August 2015 based on 

depression and suicidal ideation. (Tr. at 817). Upon discharge she denied suicidal and homicidal 

ideations. (Tr. at 274). She planned on returning to work. (Tr. at 1680). She had logical thought 

process and no memory difficulties (Tr. at 1680-1682). 

Whimper-Sullivan actively engaged in group therapy for the next few months. In October 

Case 4:19-cv-00412-LPR Document 13 Filed 03/23/20 Page 3 of 6
4 

and November 2015, she had logical, goal-directed thoughts, good eye contact, and good 

communication, and she told her psychiatrist that she was doing well and was very happy. (Tr. at 

273-288, 1405, 1543, 1606). She was learning and mastering coping skills. (Tr. at 274). Her mood 

and sleep were stable at the end of November and she had plans to attend school. (Tr. at 867-873). 

There are not many health records for a few more years, but in November 2017, WhimperSullivan had a brief hospital stay for suicidal ideation, but she was discharged with no thoughts of 

self-harm. (Tr. at 2742-2750). She was alert, calm, and cooperative. (Tr. at 2754). She said she 

could calm herself with deep breathing exercises. (Tr. at 2766). Whimper-Sullivan had a negative 

depression screen in July 2018, and she said she was doing well for the most part. (Tr. at 2667-

2688). She said Bupropion was improving her energy level and her depression symptoms. (Tr. at 

2625-2627). In September 2018, she said she had no stress in her life. (Tr. at 2640-2643). In 

December 2018, she had a cooperative and pleasant affect and was doing “fine.” (Tr. at 2617). 

Whimper-Sullivan claims the ALJ should have given more weight to a January 2016 

psychological consultant’s opinion that she was markedly limited in her work-life function. (Tr. at 

813-837). However, the treatment record showed that Whimper-Sullivan improved over the 

relevant time-period after the date of that opinion, and that medication was effective. The opinion 

was therefore properly discounted as incongruent with the medical evidence. 

Whimper-Sullivan also asserts that the ALJ should have given more weight to the VA 

disability rating for PTSD: a 70% disability was assessed in December 2015. (Tr. at 173-176). 

Again, this rating predates the period of improvement that Whimper-Sullivan experienced, 

evidenced by generally normal mental status examinations. Group therapy helped her immensely. 

(Tr. at 929, 1680). Moreover, the Administration is not bound by the disability ratings of another 

Case 4:19-cv-00412-LPR Document 13 Filed 03/23/20 Page 4 of 6
5 

agency, especially when the record does not justify a disability finding. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 

F.3d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 2008); Morrison v. Apfel, 146 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1998). The ALJ did 

not go into much detail about the VA rating, but he noted that the evidence as a whole did not offer 

support for a disability rating, so he was not bound to draw a similar conclusion to that of the VA 

doctors. (Tr. at 2372). He properly considered the VA rating, and discounted it as not persuasive. 

Whimper-Sullivan also contends that her back impairment was disabling. However, 

treatment was conservative and no doctor placed any restrictions on her based on back pain. She 

said her back pain was managed by Toradol and improved as of October 2016. (Tr. at 2632, 2941). 

She said in June 2017 that treatment helped with back pain. (Tr. at 2887). Her pain was stable and 

improved after an ER visit in July 2018. (Tr. at 2667). She had normal range of motion on 

September 25, 2018. (Tr. at 2643). She had no loss of strength in her extremities in October 2018. 

(Tr. at 2632). The record does not show that back pain was disabling. Along the same lines, the 

ALJ properly discounted the opinion of Dr. Hashmi (he said Whimper-Sullivan would have 

moderate to severe limitations in bending, carrying, and walking). (Tr. at 685). Dr. Hashmi’s own 

notes found normal range of motion, no muscle weakness or atrophy, and intact sensation. (Tr. at 

683-684, 2373-2374). See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 803 (8th Cir. 2005)(“physician 

opinions that are internally inconsistent . . . are entitled to less deference than they would receive 

in the absence of inconsistencies.”) And Whimper-Sullivan’s positive response to conservative 

treatment conflicted with Dr. Hashmi’s report. Finally, Whimper-Sullivan said that she could 

maintain personal care, perform inside chores, and drive. (Tr. at 825-826, 2371). Such daily 

activities undermine her claims of disability. Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1995) 

Finally, Whimper-Sullivan’s argument that the Appeals Council failed to consider new 

Case 4:19-cv-00412-LPR Document 13 Filed 03/23/20 Page 5 of 6
6 

evidence fails. The evidence Whimper-Sullivan references is merely a cumulative report of the 

VA disability assessment, which did not offer any new justification for the Appeals Council to 

disturb the ALJ’s opinion. The Court explained above why the VA disability rating did not deserve 

more weight. 

V. Conclusion:

There is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner=s decision to deny benefits. 

The ALJ properly considered the medical opinions and the VA disability rating, and the Appeals 

Council’s decision was based on a complete review of the record. The finding that WhimperSullivan was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, therefore, should be 

affirmed. The case should be dismissed, with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of March, 2020. 

___________________________________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 4:19-cv-00412-LPR Document 13 Filed 03/23/20 Page 6 of 6