Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05145/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05145-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2005 Decided March 18, 2005

No. 04-5145

SELECT MILK PRODUCERS, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

MIKE JOHANNS, SECRETARY,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv00060)

Michael E. Robinson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael Jay Singer, Attorney.

Susan K. Ullman, Attorney, entered an appearance.

Ryan K. Miltner argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were Benjamin F. Yale, Kristine H. Reed, and

Donald M. Barnes.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: The Secretary of Agriculture

(“Secretary”) appeals the District Court’s award of attorney’s

fees and costs to several milk marketing cooperatives under the

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).

The underlying litigation involved a dispute between the

cooperatives and the Secretary over the price of Class III

butterfat. The Secretary argues that the District Court erred in

concluding that the milk cooperatives were “prevailing parties”

under EAJA and in calculating the amount of the award. 

The price of raw milk and its component parts is governed

by a complex regulatory regime known as the Federal Milk

Marketing Orders (“FMMO”). The Secretary administers the

FMMO pursuant to authority under the Agricultural Marketing

Agreement Act (“AMAA”), 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (2000). Prior

to 2000, the price under the FMMO for Class III butterfat

(which is used to make hard cheeses) was the same as the price

for Class IV butterfat (which is used to make butter and nonfat

dry milk). In December of that year, the Secretary promulgated

a rule creating a separate price for Class III butterfat. The new

price, which was to be announced on February 2, 2001, would

have applied retroactively to transactions that had taken place in

January2001. See Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Veneman, 304

F. Supp. 2d 45, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2004). 

Select Milk Producers, Inc., Continental Dairy Products,

Inc., and Elite Milk Producers, Inc. (collectively “Milk

Producers”) are milk marketing cooperatives, which would have

been subject to an immediate loss of an estimated $5,000,000 if

the new price for Class III butterfat had taken effect. Id. at 53.

On January 31, 2001, the District Court granted Milk Producers’

motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary from

imposing a separate price for Class III butterfat. The

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Government did not appeal the preliminary injunction or

otherwise seek to defend its position. Instead, the Secretary

issued a new rule that did not include a separate price for Class

III butterfat. The parties then stipulated to dismissal of the case

as moot. See id. at 49-50.

On May 30, 2003, Milk Producers moved for an award of

attorney’s fees and costs under EAJA, which allows “prevailing

parties” to obtain expenses in litigation against the federal

government unless the Government’s position is substantially

justified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The District Court

concluded that Milk Producers were “prevailing parties” under

EAJA and that the Secretary’s position in seeking to implement

the separate price for Class III butterfat was not substantially

justified. Therefore, the court held that Milk Producers were

entitled to attorney’s fees and costs. See Select Milk, 304 F.

Supp. 2d at 50-54. The District Court also determined that two

of Milk Producers’ attorneys should be compensated for some

of their hours at rates above EAJA’s statutory cap, because the

attorneys’ expertise in the milk marketing regime was a “special

factor” that warranted an enhanced fee under the statute. See id.

at 55-57. 

On appeal, the Secretary argues that Milk Producers were

not “prevailing parties” under EAJA, and that, even if appellees

were “prevailing parties,” the District Court’s fee enhancement

award was an abuse of discretion. We affirm in part and reverse

in part. First, we find that the preliminary injunction at issue in

this case was a judgment that resulted in a court-ordered change

in the legal relationship between the parties and gave Milk

Producers the concrete and irreversible redress that they sought.

Given these circumstances, Milk Producers are “prevailing

parties” under EAJA. Second, we reverse the District Court’s

fee enhancement award. The established law of the circuit

makes it clear that legal expertise acquired through practice is

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not a “special factor” justifying an enhanced fee award under

EAJA. 

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is recited at length in

the District Court’s opinion. See Select Milk Producers, Inc. v.

Veneman, 304 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Select Milk”).

Therefore, there is no need here for a detailed statement of facts.

Rather, we will focus on the facts that are relevant to the

disposition of this appeal. 

The FMMO is a complex regulatory regime governing the

price of raw milk and its components. Id. at 48. In order to

amend market prices under the FMMO, the Secretary must

provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing. See 7 U.S.C. §

608c(3) (2000). Under agency regulations, before conducting

a hearing, the Secretary must first issue a Notice of Hearing,

which, among other things, delineates the scope of the hearing.

See 7 C.F.R. § 900.4(a) (2004). An Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) then presides over the hearing, and, following the

hearing, the Secretary issues a decision on the proposed

amendment. See id. §§ 900.6, 900.13a. To become effective,

the amendment must be ratified by a designated number of milk

producers. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(8), (9); 7 C.F.R. § 900.14. 

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L.

No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999), Congress directed the

Secretary to conduct emergency rulemaking to amend the

FMMO. The statute instructed the Secretary to issue amended

regulations by December 1, 2000, and implement the resulting

formulas for milk pricing by January 1, 2001. See id. Div. B.,

§ 1008(a)(8), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-518. In response to this

legislation, the Secretary published a Notice of Hearing in the

Federal Register in April 2000, listing various proposals to

amend the FMMO. See Milk in the Northeast and Other

Marketing Areas; Notice of Hearing on Class III and Class IV

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Milk Pricing Formulas, 65 Fed. Reg. 20,094 (Apr. 14, 2000)

(“April Notice”). Prior to the April Notice, the price for Class

III butterfat had been the same as the price for Class IV

butterfat, and the notice did not propose the creation of a

separate price for Class III butterfat. In May 2000, an ALJ

presided over a five-day hearing on the proposed amendments.

During the hearing, one of the participants sought to raise the

possibility of imposing a separate price for Class III butterfat.

However, with the agreement of the Secretary’s representative,

the ALJ concluded that the issue was beyond the scope of the

hearing. See Select Milk, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 48. 

Thus, it is uncontested that the Secretary never gave notice

of the possibility of a separate price for Class III butterfat, and

this matter was never pursued as an issue in the hearing before

the ALJ. Nonetheless, in December 2000, the Secretary issued

a tentative final decision that, inter alia, created a separate price

for Class III butterfat. See Milk in the Northeast and Other

Marketing Areas; Tentative Decision on Proposed Amendments

and Opportunity To File Written Exceptions to Tentative

Marketing Agreements and to Orders, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,832 (Dec.

7, 2000) (“Tentative Decision”). The new Class III butterfat

price was scheduled to be announced on February 2, 2001,

retroactive to January 1 of that year. See Select Milk, 304 F.

Supp. 2d at 49. After the Tentative Decision was approved by

more than the required number of dairy producers, the Secretary

promulgated an interim rule amending the FMMO in order to

implement the new prices. See Milk in the Northeast and Other

Marketing Areas; Interim Amendment of Orders, 65 Fed. Reg.

82,832 (Dec. 28, 2000) (“December 2000 rule”). 

Milk Producers sought a preliminary injunction in District

Court to prevent the implementation of the December 2000 rule,

arguing that the Secretary had failed to comply with the notice

and hearing procedures for amending the FMMO as mandated

by the AMAA and agency regulations. On January 31, 2001,

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the District Court granted Milk Producers the relief they

requested, entering a preliminary injunction that enjoined the

Secretary from imposing the separate Class III butterfat price.

Select Milk Producers, Inc. v.Glickman, No. 01-00060 (D.D.C.

Jan. 31, 2001) (“2001 preliminary injunction”), reprinted in

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 30. 

The consequences of the 2001 preliminary injunction were

significant. The District Court found that, absent the injunction,

“[t]he retroactive nature of the [Secretary’s] price announcement

meant that on February 2, 2001, [Milk Producers] would [have

been] subject to an immediate loss of an estimated $5,000,000.”

Select Milk, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 53. This loss would have

resulted from transactions between Milk Producers and third

parties that were consummated in January 2001. See id. The

District Court also found that, had the new Class III butterfat

price taken effect, Milk Producers’ loss could not have been

recovered. Thus, the trial court held that “a preliminary

injunction was the only effective relief [that Milk Producers]

could seek.” Id. And in avoiding the substantial monetary loss

that they had faced, Milk Producers received irreversible relief

by virtue of the preliminary injunction.

The District Court’s order embodying the preliminary

injunction was subject to immediate appellate review. The

Secretary chose not to appeal, however. Instead of pursuing any

further litigation in the matter, the Secretary acceded to the

preliminary injunction and conducted a new rulemaking. The

Secretary then issued a new regulation that took effect on April

1, 2003, and did not include a separate price for Class III

butterfat. See Milk in the Northeast and Other Marketing Areas:

Order Amending the Orders, 68 Fed. Reg. 7063 (Feb. 12, 2003).

Following issuance of the new rule, the parties stipulated to

dismissal of the case as moot. Select Milk Producers, Inc. v.

Veneman, No. 01-00060 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2003), reprinted in

J.A. 86. 

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On May 20, 2003, Milk Producers moved for an award of

attorney’s fees and costs under EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).

The District Court concluded that the two key requirements for

awarding expenses under EAJA were satisfied: (1) Milk

Producers were “prevailing parties” under the statute, and (2) the

Secretary’s position in promulgating the separate Class III

butterfat price was not substantially justified. See Select Milk,

304 F. Supp. 2d at 50-54. 

In calculating the amount of the award, the District Court

compensated most of Milk Producers’ attorneys’ time at the

normal statutory maximum rate of $125/hour adjusted upward

for cost of living. However, relying on 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A), which allows fee awards at rates beyond the

normal statutory cap where a “special factor” exists, the District

Court compensated attorney Benjamin Yale at $325/hour and

attorney Donald Barnes at $385/hour for one-third of the hours

they spent working toward obtaining the preliminary injunction.

The District Court concluded that these hours met the “special

factor” exception, because Yale and Barnes had special

expertise in the federal milk marketing regime and that, with

regard to one-third of the hours the attorneys spent working

toward the preliminary injunction, their specialized skills were

necessary to advance the litigation. See Select Milk, 304 F.

Supp. 2d at 55-57. In reaching this conclusion, the District

Court rested solely on findings that Yale and Barnes had

acquired expertise in the complex milk marketing regime

through years of practice. See id. at 57. In total, the District

Court awarded Milk Producers $101,266.83 – comprising

$98,381.22 in attorney’s fees and $2,885.61 in costs. Id. at 60.

On appeal, the Secretary does not contest the District

Court’s conclusion that the separate price for Class III butterfat

was not substantially justified. Instead, the Secretary argues that

the District Court misconstrued EAJA when it concluded that

Milk Producers were “prevailing parties.” The Secretary also

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contends that, even if Milk Producers were prevailing parties,

the District Court erred in awarding enhanced fees to attorneys

Yale and Barnes. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. The “Prevailing Party” Requirement of EAJA 

EAJA provides, in relevant part, that 

a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the

United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that

party in any civil action . . . including proceedings for

judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the

United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action,

unless the court finds that the position of the United States

was substantially justified or that special circumstances

make an award unjust. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Secretary claims that the

District Court committed legal error in holding that Milk

Producers satisfied EAJA’s “prevailing party” requirement. We

review this claim de novo. See Truckers United for Safety v.

Mead, 329 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Nat’l Sci.

Found., 330 F.3d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Thomas”). 

1. Defining “Prevailing Parties” Under EAJA 

The Government’s argument in this case appears to be

premised on an assumption that, under the Supreme Court’s

decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West

Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S.

598 (2001) (“Buckhannon”), and this court’s subsequent

decision in Thomas, a preliminary injunction can never

transform a party in whose favor the injunction is issued into a

“prevailing party” under EAJA. See Appellant’s Br. at 10.

Indeed, in arguing that “[Milk Producers] received only a

preliminary injunction, but no ‘enforceable judgment on the

merits’ or ‘court-ordered consent decree,’” id. at 14 (emphasis

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added), the Government comes close to suggesting that we

should adopt a per se rule that a preliminary injunction can

never support a claim for fees under EAJA. We reject this view,

because it rests on faulty constructions of EAJA, Buckhannon,

and Thomas.

EAJA is one of a number of federal statutes that allows

courts to award attorney’s fees and costs to the “prevailing

party.” In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court considered whether

the term “prevailing party” in federal fee-shifting statutes

“includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the

merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless

achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a

voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 600. Prior to Buckhannon, most courts of appeals had

recognized the “catalyst theory,” pursuant to which such a

voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct was sufficient to

render the plaintiff a “prevailing party.” Id. at 601-02 & n.3

(citing cases). Buckhannon rejected this approach and explained

that a “‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded some

relief by the court.” Id. at 603. The Court thus held that the

“catalyst theory” improperly “allows an award when there is no

judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the

parties.” Id. at 605. Although the fee-shifting statutes at issue

in Buckhannon were provisions of the Fair Housing

Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, see id. at 603, it is now

clear that Buckhannon’s construction of “prevailing party” also

applies to fee claims arising under EAJA. See Thomas, 330 F.3d

at 492.

Although Buckhannon decisively rejected the “catalyst

theory,” the Court clearly did not adopt a rule that plaintiffs

could only be deemed “prevailing parties” for fee-shifting

purposes if they obtained a final judgment on the merits of a

suit. Indeed, as counsel for the Secretary correctly

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acknowledged at oral argument, see Recording of Oral

Argument at 27:51-29:22, the decision in Buckhannon left no

doubt that a plaintiff need not obtain a judicial determination on

the merits in order to be considered a “prevailing party.” On

this point, the Court explained:

In addition to judgments on the merits, we have held that

settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree

may serve as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees.

Although a consent decree does not always include an

admission of liability by the defendant, it nonetheless is a

court-ordered “chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between

[the plaintiff] and the defendant.”

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n

v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989))

(alterations in original) (additional citations omitted). In short,

the holding in Buckhannon embraces the possibility that, under

certain circumstances, a preliminary injunction, like a consent

decree, may result in a court-ordered change in the legal

relationship between the parties that is sufficient to make the

plaintiff a “prevailing party” under a fee-shifting statute like

EAJA. Therefore, Buckhannon surely does not endorse a per se

rule that a preliminary injunction can never transform a party in

whose favor the injunction is issued into a “prevailing party”

under EAJA. 

Likewise, the Government is wrong in suggesting that our

decision in Thomas holds that there are no circumstances under

which a preliminary injunction can serve as the basis for

deeming plaintiffs “prevailing parties” under federal fee-shifting

statutes. In Thomas, plaintiffs sued an independent federal

agency, the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), over Internet

domain registration fees. The District Court entered a

preliminary injunction prohibiting NSF from “‘crediting,

spending, obligating, or using any of the money collected for,

placed into, or taken from’” a fund that included the registration

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fees at issue, pending the final adjudication of the case. Thomas,

330 F.3d at 489 (quoting District Court’s preliminary

injunction). The District Court also awarded plaintiffs partial

summary judgment, determining that the collection of fees was

unconstitutional. However, before the District Court entered

final judgment or addressed plaintiffs’ claim for relief, Congress

passed a law that cured the constitutional violation in the

collection of the registration fees, and the District Court granted

NSF’s motion to dismiss the case as moot. See id. at 489-90. 

The Thomas plaintiffs then filed a request for expenses

under EAJA, and the District Court held that the plaintiffs were

“prevailing parties” entitled to fees. Id. at 488. This court

reversed, concluding that neither the preliminary injunction nor

the partial summary judgment at issue changed the legal

relationship between the parties so as to render the plaintiffs

“prevailing parties.” Id. at 493. We noted that

the sole effect of the preliminary injunction was to prevent

NSF from appropriating any money already collected from

the registration assessment . . . . In short, the preliminary

injunction did not change the legal relationship between the

parties in a way that afforded [plaintiffs] the relief they

sought in their lawsuit.

Id. 

Quite clearly, Thomas established no per se rule that a

preliminary injunction can never serve as the basis for deeming

a plaintiff a “prevailing party” under EAJA. Rather, Thomas

held that, in the particular circumstances of that case, plaintiffs

could not satisfy the “prevailing party” requirement, because the

preliminary injunction at issue had not changed the legal

relationship between the parties. Thomas did not suggest that,

in a dispute such as the one now before us, where a preliminary

injunction effected a substantial change in the legal relationship

between the parties and provided plaintiffs with concrete and

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irreversible relief, plaintiffs could not be considered “prevailing

parties.” 

We are not alone in the view that Buckhannon does not

reject the possibility that preliminary injunctions may be

sufficient in some certain circumstances to render plaintiffs

“prevailing parties” under federal fee-shifting statutes. Both the

Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit adopted this position in

decisions issued after Buckhannon. See Dubuc v. Green Oak

Township, 312 F.3d 736, 753-54 & n.8 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting

Buckhannon’s rejection of the “catalyst theory,” but explaining

that preliminary injunctions can suffice to satisfy the “prevailing

party” requirement under certain circumstances); Watson v.

County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 923 (2003) (“A preliminary injunction issued

by a judge carries all the ‘judicial imprimatur’ necessary to

satisfy Buckhannon.”). But see Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268,

276-77 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2002) (apparently adopting a per se

rule). We think it is clear that neither Buckhannon nor Thomas

endorse a per se rule that a preliminary injunction can never

transform a party in whose favor the injunction is issued into a

“prevailing party” under EAJA. Such a position simply does not

follow logically from the Court’s indication in Buckhannon that

a plaintiff need not obtain a final judicial determination on the

merits in order to be considered a “prevailing party.” See

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.

2. Applying Buckhannon and Thomas to the Facts of this

Case

Our decision in Thomas relies on Buckhannon to develop a

framework for determining whether plaintiffs are “prevailing

parties.” Applying the Thomas framework to the facts of this

case, we conclude that Milk Producers were “prevailing parties”

under EAJA. 

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In Thomas, we explained that Buckhannon embraces three

core principles for construing the term “prevailing party” in

federal fee-shifting statutes: 

First, in order to be a prevailing party, a claimant must

show that there has been a court-ordered change in the legal

relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

(Citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.) 

Second, a prevailing party is a party in whose favor a

judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages

awarded. (Citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.)

Third, a claimant is not a prevailing party merely by virtue

of having acquired a judicial pronouncement

unaccompanied by judicial relief. (Citing Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 606.)

See Thomas, 330 F.3d at 492-93 (discussing these factors).

In this case, plaintiffs satisfy all three Thomas factors. First,

there was a court-ordered change in the legal relationship

between Milk Producers and the Secretary. The trial court’s

preliminary injunction blocked enforcement of the new

regulation that had been promulgated by the Secretary in

December 2000. As a result, Milk Producers were never

required to operate under a market regime with a separate price

for Class III butterfat. In addition, the court-ordered relief

secured by Milk Producers was concrete and irreversible as of

February 2, 2001. The District Court stated that, because the

2001 preliminary injunction vitiated the December 2000 rule,

Milk Producers saved an estimated $5,000,000 that they would

have otherwise been forced to pay when the new price for Class

III butterfat took effect on February 2, 2001, retroactive to

January 1, 2001. See Select Milk, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (citing

Milk Producers’ motion for preliminary injunction). 

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Neither the Secretary’s briefs nor oral argument to this court

purported to contradict the District Court’s conclusion that, as

a direct result of the 2001 preliminary injunction, Milk

Producers saved a substantial sum of money. See Recording of

Oral Argument at 2:37-3:57. The Secretary’s counsel also

conceded that any money Milk Producers saved was permanent.

See id. at 4:00-:09. Therefore, like the benefit plaintiffs receive

through court-approved consent decrees, the relief that Milk

Producers received in this case was “the product of, and bears

the sanction of, judicial action in the lawsuit.” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring). 

This case is similar to situations in which we have found

that the subsequent mootness of a case does not necessarily alter

the plaintiffs’ status as prevailing parties. See, e.g., Nat’l Black

Police Ass’n v. D.C. Bd. of Elections, 168 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C.

Cir. 1999); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir.

1986). As we noted in Thomas, 

[t]he specific relief granted in [Nat’l Black Police Ass’n and

Grano] was concrete and could not be reversed despite a

subsequent finding of mootness. In Grano, for example,

plaintiffs sought and won an injunction to delay the

demolition of a historical site until a public referendum was

held. 783 F.2d at 1108. That reprieve was unchanged when

the case was later declared moot, because the referendum in

question had already occurred. The injunction produced a

lasting change in the parties’ legal circumstances and gave

the plaintiffs the precise relief that they had sought. 

Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493. The plaintiffs in Thomas differed

from those in Nat’l Black Police Ass’n and Grano and were

found not to be “prevailing parties,” because the Thomas

plaintiffs “filed a lawsuit in order to obtain a refund from [the

National Science Foundation], but the preliminary injunction did

nothing to vindicate that claim.” Id. Here, however, just as was

the case for the plaintiffs in Grano, Milk Producers’ claim was

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fully vindicated by the court-ordered change in the parties’

relationship. And as Thomas noted in its discussion of Nat’l

Black Police Ass’n and Grano, it does not matter that this case

became moot after the court-ordered change in the parties’

relationship. Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493.

Nat’l Black Police Ass’n and Grano differ from this case in

that the plaintiffs in those cases received final judgments on the

merits of their claims, whereas the plaintiffs here secured relief

through a preliminary injunction. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy

here that, in awarding a preliminary injunction to Milk

Producers, the District Court found that 

plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their

claims [because] “the Secretary . . . clearly did not give fair

notice to the industry.”

Select Milk, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (quoting hearing on the 2001

preliminary injunction). Just as the Government did not appeal

from the District Court’s holding that the Secretary’s position in

imposing the separate Class III butterfat price was not

substantially justified, neither does the Government take issue

with the District Court’s finding that Milk Producers

undoubtedly would have succeeded on the merits. In other

words, this is not a case in which a preliminary injunction was

based less on the trial court’s view of the merits than on a

perceived hardship to the plaintiff. See Serono Labs., Inc. v.

Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing

the four factors that a court must balance on a sliding scale in

considering a request for a preliminary injunction). Rather,

Milk Producers secured a preliminary injunction in this case

largely because their likelihood of success on the merits was

never seriously in doubt.

The dissent disagrees with our holding that the 2001

preliminary injunction resulted in a court-ordered change in the

legal relationship between Milk Producers and the Secretary,

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because, according to the dissent, in this case the preliminary

injunction did “nothing more than preserv[e] the status quo.”

But, as we explained above, the 2001 preliminary injunction

provided concrete and irreversible judicial relief to Milk

Producers based on the District Court’s conclusion that Milk

Producers were likely to prevail on the merits. In these

circumstances, the dissent’s argument that the 2001 preliminary

injunction did not alter the status quo – based on its formalistic

resort to the definition of the status quo as “the last peaceable

uncontested status existing between the parties before the

dispute developed” – is beside the point. Whatever semantic

spin one wishes to put on it, the 2001 preliminary injunction

resulted in an irreversible and substantial monetary savings to

Milk Producers based on the District Court’s assessment of the

merits of Milk Producers’ claim. Clearly, then, the 2001

preliminary injunction was a court-ordered change in the legal

relationship between the parties. 

Having concluded that the 2001 preliminary injunction was

a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between Milk

Producers and the Secretary, as required by the first Thomas

factor, we turn to consider the second and third Thomas factors.

We hold that they too were satisfied in this case. 

The 2001 preliminary injunction was a judgment rendered

in favor of Milk Producers, thus meeting the second Thomas

factor. The term “judgment” includes “a decree and any order

from which an appeal lies.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 846

(7th ed. 1999) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 54). And it is well

established that preliminary injunctions are appealable orders

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas

Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 482 (1999). Nothing in Thomas

indicates that we meant to depart from the ordinary definition of

“judgment” in determining whether plaintiffs have satisfied the

second part of the “prevailing party” framework. See Thomas,

330 F.3d at 493. The 2001 preliminary injunction meets the

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17

legal definition of a judgment, and there is no dispute that it was

rendered in Milk Producers’ favor. Therefore, Milk Producers

have satisfied the second Thomas factor.

Finally, the 2001 preliminary injunction surely provided

Milk Producers with “judicial relief,” as required by the third

Thomas factor. The same edition of Black’s Law Dictionary

that the Supreme Court cited in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603,

defines relief as “redress or benefit, esp. equitable in nature

(such as an injunction or specific performance) that a party asks

of a court.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra at 1293

(emphasis added). In this case, Milk Producers asked the

District Court for equitable relief in the form of a preliminary

injunction that would enjoin the implementation of the

December 2000 rule before the separate price for Class III

butterfat took retroactive effect. When the District Court issued

the injunction, it granted Milk Producers the precise relief that

they had requested. This satisfied the third Thomas factor.

In holding that Milk Producers were “prevailing parties”

under EAJA, we note that this is not a case in which the

Government voluntarily changed its ways before judicial action

was taken. If the Government had acted to moot this case

through voluntary cessation before there was a judicially

sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, Milk

Producers would not have been “prevailing parties.” This would

be so, because, as the Court noted in Buckhannon, a defendant’s

“voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing

what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the

necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Our precedents

thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing party’

authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding

alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.” 532 U.S. at

605. However, the record in this case demonstrates that the

District Court’s injunction, not the Secretary’s voluntary change

in conduct, afforded Milk Producers the relief they sought – a

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18

savings of an estimated $5,000,000 and an order barring the

Secretary from enforcing the new rule imposing a separate price

for Class III butterfat.

We also note that our decision comports with the wellrecognized principle that, normally, when a losing party is

blocked from appealing an adverse judgment or order because

the case becomes moot due to happenstance, the court will

vacate the disputed judgment or order. See U.S. Bancorp

Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)

(“Bancorp”). “A party who seeks review of the merits of an

adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance,

ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.”

Id. at 25. In applying this principle, however, the Supreme

Court has made it clear that “[t]he principal condition to which

[a court should look] is whether the party seeking relief from the

judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary action.” Id.

at 24. See also N. Cal. Power Agency v. Nuclear Regulatory

Comm’n, 393 F.3d 223, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (construing

Bancorp to mean that “vacatur in moot cases should be

determined by considerations of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’”). Thus,

“vacatur is usually inappropriate when ‘the party seeking relief

from the judgment below caused the mootness by voluntary

action.’” Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108

F.3d 346, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Bancorp, 513 U.S. at

24); N. Cal. Power Agency, 393 F.3d at 225. Indeed, the

Supreme Court has made it clear that even “[w]here mootness

results from settlement, . . . the losing party has voluntarily

forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or

certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable

remedy of vacatur.” Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25. Just as it is not

unfair to deny the remedy of vacatur to a party whose voluntary

action moots a case, it is not somehow unfair here to conclude

that Milk Producers were “prevailing parties” when the

Government voluntarily forfeited its right to appeal the

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19

injunction and voluntarily elected to moot the case after judicial

action was taken against the Government. 

In sum, we hold that the District Court correctly concluded

that Milk Producers were “prevailing parties” under EAJA. The

Secretary has not contested the District Court’s finding that the

Secretary’s position in creating a separate price for Class III

butterfat was not substantially justified. Therefore, we affirm

the District Court’s decision that Milk Producers are entitled to

attorney’s fees and costs. We now turn to the question as to

whether the District Court properly granted an enhancement in

the hourly fees awarded to two of Milk Producers’ attorneys.

B. The Fee Enhancement

EAJA provides that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in

excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).

Here, the District Court concluded that a “special factor”

justified an enhancement in the hourly rates awarded to

attorneys Yale and Barnes for one-third of the time they spent

working toward obtaining the preliminary injunction. We

review the District Court’s enhancement award for abuse of

discretion. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571 (1988).

We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in

awarding the enhanced fee, because Milk Producers failed to

establish that either Yale or Barnes had “‘some distinctive

knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in

question.’” Truckers United, 329 F.3d at 894 (quoting

Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572). 

In Underwood, the Supreme Court explained that the

reference to the “limited availability of qualified attorneys” in

§ 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) “must refer to attorneys ‘qualified for the

proceedings’ in some specialized sense, rather than just in their

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20

general legal competence.” Underwood, 487 U.S. at 572. To

qualify for compensation at enhanced hourly rates under this

standard, an attorney must possess “some distinctive knowledge

or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question,” which

can include “an identifiable practice specialty such as patent

law, or knowledge of foreign law or language.” Id. The Court

further explained that “the other ‘special factors’ envisioned by

the exception [to EAJA’s normal maximum hourly rate] must be

such as are not of broad and general application.” Id. at 573.

The difficulty or undesirability of the case, the work and ability

of counsel, and the results obtained do not qualify as “special

factors” under the statute. Id. 

Applying Underwood, we have made clear that an attorney

cannot be awarded enhanced fees under the “special factor”

exception based solely on expertise the lawyer acquired through

practice in a specific area of administrative law. As we stated in

F.J. Vollmer Co. v. Magaw, 102 F.3d 591, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1996),

while “lawyers practicing administrative law typically develop

expertise in a particular regulated industry, whether energy,

communications, railroads, or firearms . . . they usually gain this

expertise from experience, not from the specialized training

justifying fee enhancement.” Emphasizing that nothing in the

text or legislative history of EAJA suggests that Congress

intended to make “all lawyers practicing administrative law in

technical fields” eligible for a fee enhancement, we concluded

that “expertise acquired through practice” was not a “special

factor” that could warrant an enhanced fee. Id. at 598-99.

In this case, the District Court found that attorneys Yale and

Barnes had “specialized knowledge” of the “extremely

complex” federal milk marketing regime. Select Milk, 304 F.

Supp. 2d at 55-56. The District Court further found that this

specialized knowledge was “needful for the litigation in

question” with respect to one-third of the hours that Yale and

Barnes spent working toward obtaining the preliminary

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 20 of 41
21

injunction. The court thus held that Yale and Barnes were

entitled to compensation at enhanced rates for those hours. Id.

at 57. The fundamental flaw in this analysis is that the

justification the District Court offered for concluding that Yale

and Barnes had “specialized knowledge” was the expertise the

attorneys had acquired through practice. See id. at 57

(“Attorney Yale specializes in the representation of dairy farms

and dairy cooperatives . . . . Attorney Barnes has spent over

three decades representing dairy cooperatives on issues relating

to the AMAA.”). As explained above, under the clear precedent

of this circuit, such expertise acquired through practice in a

particular field of administrative law is insufficient to justify an

enhanced fee award under the “special factor” exception to

EAJA’s normal cap on attorney’s fees. See F.J. Vollmer, 102

F.3d at 598. 

The District Court did also note that Yale “worked in the

dairy industry prior to becoming an attorney.” Select Milk, 304

F. Supp. 2d at 57. But the District Court merely mentioned this

fact, failing to explain how any knowledge that Yale acquired

from his previous work in the dairy industry was needful for the

litigation in question – a precondition for a court to find that a

“special factor” exists warranting fee enhancement under EAJA.

See Truckers United, 329 F.3d at 896. Because the only relevant

expertise identified by the District Court was expertise Yale and

Barnes acquired through years of practice in a field of

administrative law, there was no justification for an enhanced

fee award under EAJA. The District Court’s contrary

conclusion was an abuse of discretion. See id. at 894.

III. CONCLUSION

The District Court’s judgment is affirmed in part and

reversed in part. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the

District Court’s conclusion that Milk Producers were “prevailing

parties” entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under EAJA.

However, we reverse the District Court’s determination that

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 21 of 41
22

attorneys Yale and Barnes were entitled to enhanced fees for

one-third of the hours they worked toward obtaining the 2001

preliminary injunction. The case will be remanded to the

District Court so that it can adjust the attorney’s fees award as

required by this decision.

So ordered.

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 22 of 41
HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: As does the majority,

I believe that the district court erred by enhancing the attorney’s

fee award, made pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act

(EAJA), see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) & (d), to Select Milk

Producers, Inc., Continental Dairy Products, Inc. and Elite Milk

Producers, Inc. (collectively, Milk Producers) based on their

counsel’s familiarity with the arcana of the federal milk

regulations. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 172 (1969)

(observing “[o]nce again this Court must traverse the labyrinth

of the federal milk marketing regulation provisions”);

Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 974

(2d Cir. 1943) (“[T]he ‘milk problem’ is exquisitely

complicated.”). I would not reach this issue, however, because

I believe the district court erred in awarding any attorney’s fees

to the Milk Producers. Whether a party can be a “prevailing

party” under a fee-shifting statute by obtaining preliminary

injunctive relief is one that has divided the circuits—some say

yes, some say no. I do not think we need to give a categorical

answer to the question—even assuming preliminary injunctive

relief can support “prevailing party” status, the Milk Producers

do not qualify. Accordingly, because I would reverse the district

court’s award, I respectfully dissent. 

I.

In various fee-shifting statutes such as the EAJA, the Congress

has supplanted the American Rule—requiring a litigant to pay

his own way, win or lose—by authorizing the award of fees and

costs to the “prevailing party.” See generally Alyeska Pipeline

Serv.Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61 n.33 (1975)

(listing over 25 statutes authorizing attorney’s fees in favor of

prevailing party). The circuits that have considered whether this

term includes a party that obtains preliminary injunctive relief

have, with one exception, used as their polestar the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,

Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598

(2001) [hereinafter Buckhannon]. Interpreting two similar feeshifting statutes—section 3613 of the Fair Housing

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 23 of 41
2

1

In Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Dep’t of Energy,

288 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we held that “eligibility for an award

of attorney’s fees [under one fee-shifting statute] should be treated the

same as eligibility determinations made under other fee-shifting

statutes unless there is some good reason for doing otherwise.” Id. at

455; see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n.4 (noting “[w]e have

interpreted . . . fee-shifting provisions consistently” (citing Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983))). In Thomas v. Nat’l Sci.

Found., 330 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2003), we held that “Buckhannon

applies to the definition of ‘prevailing parties’ under the EAJA.” Id.

at 492 n.1 (citations omitted).

Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and section

12205 of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12205—the Supreme Court rejected the “catalyst theory”

under which several circuit courts had concluded that “a plaintiff

is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the

lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s

conduct.”1 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601-02. The Court first

observed that the Congress, in describing the type of litigant

eligible for an award, used a term—“prevailing party”—with a

well-known legal meaning, i.e., “one who has been awarded

some relief by the court.” Id. at 603. Noting that “ ‘[r]espect for

ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some

relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to

prevail,’ ” id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760

(1987)) (alteration in Buckhannon), it reaffirmed that its earlier

holdings had satisfied the test because the plaintiffs in those

cases had “received a judgment on the merits” or secured a

settlement agreement enforced by a consent decree. Id. at 605.

It also emphasized, however, that it had declined to award fees

“where the plaintiff ha[d] . . . acquired a judicial pronouncement

that the defendant has violated the Constitution unaccompanied

by ‘judicial relief,’ ” id. at 605-06 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at

760) (emphasis in Buckhannon), and had “[n]ever . . . awarded

attorney’s fees for a nonjudicial alteration of actual

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 24 of 41
3

circumstances.” Id. at 606 (internal quotation marks & citation

omitted). Regarding a “settlement agreement[] enforced through

a consent decree,” id. at 604, the Court explained that it

constituted “relief on the merits” because a consent decree is a

“ court-ordered ‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the

plaintiff] and the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Tex. State Teachers

Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989);

citing Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760-61; Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S.

1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam)) (alterations in Buckhannon). The

“catalyst” party did not meet the test, however, because “[a]

defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps

accomplishing what the plaintiffs sought to achieve by the

lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”

Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 

While the circuits have had differing views on whether a party

can prevail based on preliminary injunctive relief under

Buckhannon, compare JohnT. v.Del.CountyIntermediateUnit,

318 F.3d 545, 559-60 (3d Cir. 2003); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d

268, 276-77 & n.9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002),

with Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736, 753-54 &

n.8 (6th Cir. 2002); Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d

1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923 (2003),

no circuit has engaged in robust analysis. Those that have said

“no” have concluded that preliminary injunctive relief does not

make the recipient a “prevailing party” because the relief is not

based solely on the merits of the claims advanced in the lawsuit.

See John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60; Smyth, 282 F.3d at 276-77 &

n.9. The Third Circuit, for example, explained that the

preliminary injunction at issue was not “merits-based,” but

instead “was designed to maintain the status quo during the

course of proceedings.” John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59 (internal

quotation marks & citation omitted). Those in the opposing

camp, by contrast, have emphasized the specific relief that the

preliminary injunction in fact provided. The Ninth Circuit, for

example, concluded that the preliminary injunction at issue

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 25 of 41
4

carried a sufficient “ ‘judicial imprimatur’ ” because “[i]n this

case, the County was prohibited from introducing Watson’s

report at the termination hearing for one reason and for one

reason only: because Judge Timlin said so.” Watson, 300 F.3d

at 1096; cf. Dubuc, 312 F.3d at 754 (rejecting fee award based

on preliminary injunction because plaintiff’s “goal in this suit

[was] not to obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy, which

the injunction provided, but to seek damages for alleged

violations of [his] constitutional rights”).

For our part, we held last term that the Court in Buckhannon

did not simply reject the catalyst theory but established a

framework—built on three “core principles”—“for construing

and applying the ‘prevailing party’ requirement.” Thomas v.

Nat’l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The

first, and most central, principle is that a litigant must

demonstrate “a court-ordered chang[e] [in] the legal relationship

between [the plaintiff] and the defendant,” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 604 (internal quotation marks & citations omitted), in

order to qualify as a “prevailing party” under a fee-shifting

statute. See Thomas, 330 F.3d at 492. The second is that

“prevailing party” means “ ‘ “[a] party in whose favor a

judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages

awarded.” ’ ” Id. at 493 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603

(in turn quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed.

1999))) (alteration in Buckhannon). And the third is that a

litigant does not prevail “by virtue of having ‘acquired a judicial

pronouncement that the defendant has violated the Constitution

unaccompanied by “judicial relief.” ’ ” Thomas, 330 F.3d at

493 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (in turn quoting &

citing Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760)) (emphasis in Buckhannon). In

Thomas we concluded that, despite the plaintiffs having

obtained a preliminary injunction and a partial grant of summary

judgment, they failed to qualify as “prevailing parties” under the

EAJA because “neither the preliminary injunction nor the partial

summary judgment changed the legal relationship between

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5

appellees and [the National Science Foundation (NSF)] in a way

that afforded appellees the relief that they sought.” Thomas, 330

F.3d at 493. The preliminary injunction, which prevented the

NSF from “crediting, spending, obligating or using any of the

money collected for, placed into, or taken from” a certain

government fund, id. at 489 (internal quotation marks & citation

omitted), “merely preserved the status quo pending final

adjudication of the case” because it “did not change the legal

relationship between the parties in a way that afforded appellees

the relief they sought in their lawsuit.” Id. at 493. Its “sole

effect . . . was to prevent NSF from appropriating any money

already collected from the registration assessment.” Id. While

I have no quarrel with the methodology, I believe the majority

misapplies it here. 

II.

A. “Court-Ordered Change” in Parties’ 

Legal Relationship

Distinguishing Thomas, the majority concludes that “there was

a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between Milk

Producers and the Secretary” because the preliminary injunction

“blocked enforcement” of the Secretary’s regulation and,

therefore, the Milk Producers never had to “operate under a

market regime with a separate price for Class III butterfat.”

Maj. Slip Op. at 13. But the injunction here simply served the

traditional “limited purpose” of a preliminary injunction, which

is to “merely preserve the relative positions of the parties until

a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch,

451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981);see Dist. 50, United Mine Workers of

Am. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 412 F.2d 165,

168 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see generally 11A CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (2d ed. 1992) (“[A]

preliminary injunction is an injunction to protect plaintiff from

irreparable injury and to preserve the court’s power to render a

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 27 of 41
6

meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.”) [hereinafter

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]. Such a preliminary

injunction preserves the trial court’s power to adjudicate the

underlying dispute by maintaining the status quo ante, see

Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395, or, simply, the status quo. See,

e.g., Consarc Corp. v. United States Treasury Dep’t, Office of

Foreign Assets Control, 71 F.3d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(terms used interchangeably). And the “legal definition” of

status quo ante has a “clear meaning” in our circuit. See

Consarc Corp., 71 F.3d at 913. 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines status quo to

mean “the existing state of things at any given

date” and offers the example “[s ]tatus quo ante

bellum” to mean “the state of things before the

war.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1264 (5th ed.

1979). Judicial precedent confirms that “[t]he

status quo is the last uncontested status which

preceded the pending controversy.”

Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Free Sewing

Machine Co., 256 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1958);

see also Litton Systems, Inc. v. Sundstrand

Corp., 750 F.2d 952, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Id. (alterations in Consarc Corp.); accord Dist. 50, United Mine

Workers of Am., 412 F.2d at 168. Had the district court intended

to give the Milk Producers “concrete and irreversible” relief,

Maj. Slip Op. at 13, rather than to preserve the status quo, it had

the procedure readily at hand to decide the merits by

consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with the merits

hearing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2); Camenisch, 451 U.S. at

395. It did not do so. 

The majority appears to disregard the temporary nature of the

injunctive relief by finding that it “saved” the Milk Producers a

“substantial sum of money.” Maj. Slip Op. at 14. It asserts that

the Secretary’s counsel conceded during oral argument that the

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7

2 Although the majority refers to the money involved as “savings,”

see Maj. Slip Op. at 13-14, in fact the Milk Producers, the sellers,

would have received reduced payments from their buyers had the

separate Class III Butterfat price gone into effect. See Memorandum

of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction & for Expedited

Hearing, Jan. 19, 2001, at 2, reprinted in J.A. at 29b. The Milk

Producers did not “save” five million dollars as a result of the

preliminary injunction; they did not lose five million dollars in

revenue.

Milk Producers’ savings were “permanent.” Id. at 14. Whether

or not the concession was made (a matter which, to me, is far

from certain), the savings were permanent only when viewed

from hindsight. The Milk Producers sought to enjoin

implementation of the separate Class III Butterfat price because

without an injunction, they asserted, they would suffer

irreparable injury in the form of lost revenue from butterfat.2

See Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or

Preliminary Injunction & for Expedited Hearing,Jan. 19, 2001,

at 2, reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 29b. The preliminary

injunction—which “enjoined the newly implemented amended

regulations, made affirmative changes to the order language

appearing [in the Federal Register], and restored the pricing

system in place prior to the implementation of the amended

regulations,” Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Veneman, 304 F.

Supp.2d 45, 53 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis added)—prevented an

immediate monetary loss. To view, as the majority does, an

order that “restored” the status quo as awarding “permanent”

relief, however, requires a “look back” for it became permanent

only in light of events that unfolded two years later—i.e., the

Department’s February 12, 2003 publication of the Final Rule

omitting a separate Class III Butterfat price and the Milk

Producers’ dismissal of their suit in April 2003. The

preliminary injunction thus kept the Milk Producers from losing

USCA Case #04-5145 Document #884747 Filed: 03/18/2005 Page 29 of 41
8

money by simply restoring the regulatory landscape that existed

before the Secretary’s Interim Final Order until their lawsuit

became moot. 

Nor does the subsequent mooting of the Milk Producers’

lawsuit—not by adjudication but by voluntary regulatory

change—bridge the gap between the preliminary relief granted

and the award of “irreversible” relief. Relying on our decisions

in Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. D.C. Bd. of Elections, 168 F.3d

525 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104 (D.C.

Cir. 1986), the majority asserts that this case is “similar to

situations in which we have found that the subsequent mootness

of a case does not necessarily alter the plaintiffs’ status as

prevailing parties.” Maj. Slip Op. at 14. But, as Thomas itself

noted, the “specific relief” granted in Nat’l Black Police Ass’n

and in Grano “was concrete and could not [have been] reversed

despite a subsequent finding of mootness.” 330 F.3d at 493. In

Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, we held that the plaintiffs qualified as

“prevailing parties” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because the district

court, after holding a five-day trial, “issued an injunction on the

grounds that the limitations [on campaign contributions]

unconstitutionally infringed the free speech rights of candidates

and the free association rights of contributors,” which, the court

said, constituted a “a real-world vindication of their First

Amendment rights.” 168 F.3d at 527-28. Similarly, in Grano,

we held that the plaintiffs qualified as “prevailing parties” under

42 U.S.C. § 1988 because their “success before the District

Court was clearly ‘on the merits’ ” and was in “no way

‘procedural’ ” in that the summary judgment they won had the

“external effect of postponing the razing of the tavern until the

election could be held.” 783 F.2d at 1109-10. Even more

recently, in Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962

(D.C. Cir. 2004), we held that the plaintiff, a non-profit

educational organization, qualified as a prevailing party under

the EAJA by obtaining a permanent injunction which

“postpon[ed] conveyance of Fort Ritchie until the Secretary

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9

3

See id. at 1109 (mootness followed referendum and therefore

“emphasize[d], rather than detract[ed] from, the practical substance of

the[ plaintiffs’] victory”). 

complie[d] with the relevant regulations.” Id. at 966. There we

distinguished Thomas on the ground that the plaintiff in Role

Models Am., unlike the Thomas plaintiff, obtained the “precise

relief it sought,” i.e., the “opportunity to compete for [the

property].” Id. The difference between Grano, Nat’l Black

Police Ass’n and Role Models Am., on the one hand, and

Thomas and this case, on the other, is easy to see: In Grano,

Nat’l Black Police Ass’n and Role Models Am., the plaintiffs

received relief on the merits, here as in Thomas, the plaintiffs

did not. Nor can it be said, as the majority does, that this case

is like Grano in that the “Milk Producers’ claim was fully

vindicated by the court-ordered change in the parties’

relationship.” Maj. Slip Op. at 14-15 (emphasis added). The

Grano plaintiffs’ claim was fully vindicated because the district

court, granting summary judgment in their favor, gave them

precisely what they sought: a delay. See 783 F.2d at 1107, 1109.

The Milk Producers, by contrast, did not sue the Secretary to

delay the regulation but to invalidate it. Thus, while the Grano

mootness resulted from the plaintiffs’ full vindication on the

merits—i.e., the ultimate passage of the initiative3—here the

mootness resulted from the Secretary’s voluntary action—i.e.,

a new regulation without the challenged Class III Butterfat price.

In short, “the change in the parties’ relationship” in Grano was

court-ordered; here it was not. 

The majority explicitly acknowledges the difference, see Maj.

Slip Op. at 15, but reconciles this case with Grano and Nat’l

Black Police Ass’n by declaring that “Milk Producers secured a

preliminary injunction in this case largely because their

likelihood of success on the merits was never seriously in

doubt.” Maj. Slip Op. at 15. But “likelihood of success on the

merits” does not equal “success on the merits.” See Camenisch,

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451 U.S. at 394. If “likelihood of” success on the merits

suffices here, why not in Thomas? While I agree that the

Secretary does appear to have faced an uphill battle on the

merits, the merits were never reached. And to rely only on the

plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, without regard to

the other relevant factors—i.e., irreparable harm, the interests of

other parties and the public interest, see, e.g., Cobell v. Norton,

391 F.3d 251, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2004)—in order to determine

whether the preliminary relief the Milk Producers obtained

effected a “court-ordered ‘chang[e] [in] the legal relationship

between [the plaintiff] and the defendant,’ ” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 604 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792)

(alterations in Buckhannon), seems a tricky proposition. How

much of a “likelihood of success” is enough? Will a 75 per cent

likelihood do? How about 50 per cent with a strong public

interest showing to boot? The majority had to first collapse the

standard four-factors test for granting preliminary injunctive

relief into one factor—likelihood of success—and then equate

likelihood of success with success in order to declare the Milk

Producers “prevailing parties.” But Buckhannon and, later,

Thomas, never contemplated such complicated footwork to

follow what was intended to be a clear-cut path. 

In a case similar to this one the Fourth Circuit held that a

preliminary injunction did not effect a court-ordered change in

the parties’ legal relationship. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268,

276-77 (4th Cir. 2002). In Smyth, the plaintiffs contended that

they were “prevailing parties” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because

they obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the Virginia

Department of Social Services from denying them welfare

benefits under a new paternity identification policy. Id. at 275.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed, explaining that a preliminary

injunction “is closely analogous . . . to the examples of judicial

relief deemed insufficient in Buckhannon.” Id. at 276. As to the

plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, the court

explained that “[a] district court’s determination that such a

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11

showing has been made is best understood as a prediction of a

probable, but necessarily uncertain, outcome” because “the

merits inquiry in the preliminary injunction context is

necessarily abbreviated.” Id. The court observed, moreover,

that the district court must be guided not only by the plaintiff’s

likelihood of success “but also by other considerations, notably

a balancing of likely harms.” Id. While the balance of interests

is “well suited to reconciling the practical, equitable, and legal

concerns that face a court determining whether to grant a party

interim relief, it renders such relief an unhelpful guide to the

legal determination of whether a party has prevailed.” Id. at 277

(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the court held that that

“interplay” as well as the “less stringent assessment of the

merits of claims that are part of the preliminary injunction

context belie the assertion that the district court’s decision to

grant a preliminary injunction was an ‘enforceable judgment[ ]

on the merits’ or something akin to one for prevailing party

purposes.” Id. (quoting & citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604)

(alteration in Smyth). 

B. “Party in Whose Favor . . . Judgment is Rendered”

Turning to the second Buckhannon principle, the majority also

finds this one satisfied, concluding, “[t]he 2001 preliminary

injunction meets the legal definition of a judgment, and there is

no dispute that it was rendered in Milk Producers’ favor.” Maj.

Slip Op. at 17. While the majority states that “the term

‘judgment’ includes ‘a decree and any order from which an

appeal lies,’ ” Maj. Slip Op. at 16 (quoting BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999)), the very first entry under

“judgment” in the same edition of the BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY used by the Buckhannon Court (as well as by my

colleagues) defines it as “[a] court’s final determination of the

rights and obligations of the parties in a case.” BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added). But there is

no need for dictionary one-upmanship to question the majority’s

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12

reformulation of Buckhannon’s second “core” principle. If “any

order from which an appeal lies” qualifies the recipient as “one

who has been awarded some relief by the court,” Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 603, and therefore a “prevailing party,” will a

favorable procedural ruling—say, a class certification under

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 23—suffice? This

is, after all, an “order from which an appeal lies.” See FED. R.

CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an

appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class

action certification under this rule if application is made to it

within ten days after entry of the order.”). In Hanrahan v.

Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), the Supreme Court indicated

that such an order will not do. In holding that the plaintiffs were

not “prevailing parties” based on the Seventh Circuit’s

“interlocutory dispositions, which affected only the extent of

discovery,” the Court explained that, “[a]s is true of other

procedural or evidentiary rulings, these determinations may

affect the disposition on the merits, but were themselves not

matters on which a party could ‘prevail’ for purposes of shifting

his counsel fees to the opposing party under § 1988.” Id. at 759

(citing Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1979)). 

Moreover, the Buckhannon Court itself gave the term

“judgment” a more precise (and limited) meaning. See 532 U.S.

at 603-04. It stated unequivocally that, before the plaintiff can

be said to “prevail,” “ ‘[r]espect for ordinary language requires

that [he] receive at least some relief on the merits of his

claim.’ ” Id. at 604 (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760) (alteration

in Buckhannon). “[T]aken together,” the Court explained, its

precedent “establish[es] that enforceable judgments on the

merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the ‘material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to

permit an award of attorney’s fees.” 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting

Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792-93). According to

Buckhannon, then, a favorable judgment is one that affords a

party some relief on the merits. See 532 U.S. at 603-04; but see

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13

4 The third Buckhannon factor is less a “core” principle than a

caveat. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (noting no attorney’s fees

if plaintiff “acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has

violated the constitution unaccompanied by ‘judicial relief’ ” (quoting

& citing Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760)) (emphasis in Buckhannon); see also

Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493 (“[A] claimant is not a ‘prevailing party’

merely by virtue of having ‘acquired a judicial pronouncement that the

defendant has violated the constitution unaccompanied by “judicial

relief.” ’ ” (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (in turn quoting

Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760))). 

Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Judgments and consent decrees are examples of [a

judicial imprimatur], but they are not the only examples.”), cert.

denied, 538 U.S. 923 (2003). Furthermore, our own Thomas

decision presents no conflict with this interpretation. See 330

F.3d at 493 (“ ‘[A] “prevailing party” is one who has been

awarded some relief by the court.’ ” (quoting Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 603)). The Milk Producers did not receive the merits

relief they sought—invalidation of the Class III Butterfat price

regulation—by judgment but, instead, by the Secretary’s

voluntary action. 

C. “Judicial Relief” Requirement

The majority explains that the Milk Producers received

“judicial relief” because they “asked the District Court for

equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction that

would enjoin the implementation of the December 2000 rule

before the separate price for Class III butterfat took retroactive

effect.”4 Maj. Slip Op. at 17. Accordingly, in the majority’s

view, “[w]hen the District Court issued the injunction, it granted

Milk Producers the precise relief that they had requested.” Id.

Not so. The sole effect of the preliminary injunction was to

preserve the status quo, not give the Milk Producers their

desired relief: to wit, a new and procedurally correct rulemaking

on the Class III Butterfat price. See Milk Producers’ Complaint

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14

for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Jan. 11, 2001, at 18-19,

reprinted in J.A. at 24-25. Ultimately, the Secretary, by

voluntary action, gave them the “precise relief” they sought.

The majority’s attempt to link the preliminary relief and the

final relief sounds suspiciously like the “catalyst theory”

jettisoned by the Buckhannon Court. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S.

at 605 (“A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although

perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by

the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the

change.”). That is, while the preliminary injunction no doubt

helped prompt the Secretary to abandon the separate Class III

Butterfat price, “judicial prompting,” Buckhannon made plain,

is not enough. 

The district court used similar reasoning, explaining that,

given the retroactive nature of the Secretary’s price

announcement, the Milk Producers’ interim victory “was the

only effective relief they could seek” and that “no subsequent

final judgment on the merits or consent decree could award

plaintiffs effective relief.” Select Milk Producers, 304 F.

Supp.2d at 53. But the fact that absent the preliminary

injunction the regulation would have imposed a retroactive Class

III Butterfat price does not alter its preliminary nature. The

district court could not have been clearer on this point. 

ORDERED that until the final determination of

this action, the Secretary, his officers, agents,

servants, employees and attorneys and those

persons in active concert or participation with

them who receive actual notice of this order by

personal service or otherwise are ENJOINED

from implementing the provisions of a new Class

III Butterfat Price in amended regulations found

at 7 C.F.R. Parts 1000-1135 and at [65] Fed.

Reg. 76832 (December 7, 2000) and 65 Fed.

Reg. 82832 (December 28, 2000). In

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15

compliance with this Order, the Secretary is

directed to make necessary changes to the

Interim Final Order as specified in Attachment 1

hereto. 

Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Glickman, No. 01 CV 00060, at

2 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2001) (order granting preliminary injunction)

(emphasis added), reprinted in J.A. at 31. Preventing the

regulations from taking effect on February 2nd was thus a

necessary step toward obtaining the temporary relief the Milk

Producers sought—the “loss of an estimated $5,000,000,” Select

Milk Producers, 304 F. Supp.2d at 53—but it was not the final

relief they sought, i.e., to prevent regulations, which the Milk

Producers alleged were procedurally defective, from ever taking

effect. This required either a judgment on the merits or entry of

a court-ordered consent decree. Just as we concluded in Thomas

that the plaintiffs “filed a lawsuit in order to obtain a refund

from NSF, but the preliminary injunction did nothing to

vindicate that claim,” 330 F.3d at 493, the Milk Producers filed

their lawsuit in order to invalidate the rule containing the

separate Class III Butterfat price but the preliminary injunction

did not “vindicate that claim.” See id. 

The majority emphasizes that “this is not a case in which the

Government voluntarily changed its ways before judicial action

was taken.” Maj. Slip Op. at 17 (emphasis in original).

According to the majority, “[i]f the Government had acted to

moot this case through voluntary cessation before there was

judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the

parties, Milk Producers would not have been ‘prevailing

parties’ ” because “as the Court noted in Buckhannon, a

defendant’s ‘voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps

accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the

lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the

change.’ ” Id. at 17 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605).

This conclusion follows, of course, only if one accepts that the

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16

preliminary injunction effected a “judicially sanctioned change

in the legal relationship of the parties” à la Buckhannon. I do

not and neither did Buckhannon: 

[A “prevailing” party is n]ot the party that

ultimately gets his way because his adversary

dies before the suit comes to judgment; not the

party that gets his way because circumstances so

change that a victory on the legal point for the

other side turns out to be a practical victory for

him; and not the party that gets his way because

the other side ceases (for whatever reason) its

offensive conduct.

532 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 

And as the majority attempts to explain away one mootness

problem, it creates another. See Maj. Slip Op. at 18-19. It

acknowledges “the well-recognized principle that, normally,

when a losing party is blocked from appealing an adverse

judgment or order because the case becomes moot due to

happenstance, the court will vacate the disputed judgment or

order.” Id. at 18 (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner

Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994)). In United States v.

Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), for example, the

Supreme Court stated that “[t]he established practice of the

Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal

system which has become moot while on its way here or

pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the

judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.” Id. at

39. By following this procedure, the Court explained, “the

rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a

decision which . . . was only preliminary.” Id. at 40. The

majority correctly explains that “ ‘vacatur is usually

inappropriate when “the party seeking relief from the judgment

below caused the mootness by voluntary action.” ’ ” Maj. Slip

Op. at 18 (quoting Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. Dist. of Columbia,

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17

108 F.3d 346, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in turn quoting Bancorp,

513 U.S. at 24); citing N. Cal. Power Agency v. NRC, 393 F.3d

223, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2004))). It then concludes that it is “not

somehow unfair” to treat the Milk Producers as “prevailing

parties,” despite the mootness of their lawsuit, because the

Secretary failed to appeal and instead “voluntarily elected to

moot the case.” Maj. Slip Op. at 18-19. This might sound right

but for the majority’s conclusion that the Milk Producers

“prevailed” only because of the district court’s “likelihood of

success” finding and because the mooting of the case—effected

by the losing party’s action—turned “likelihood of success” into

“success.” See Maj. Slip Op. at 13-15. It is one thing to say that

vacatur of an adverse judgment is inappropriate if subsequent

mootness is caused by the losing party’s voluntary action but

quite another to prejudice the losing party based on its voluntary

action that creates the mootness. The majority offers no case to

support the latter and I cannot agree that the result it produces is

“not somehow unfair.” Maj. Slip Op. at 18. 

My disagreement with the majority’s disposition does not

necessarily mean that I believe a preliminary injunction may

never constitute the sort of judicial imprimatur meriting an

award of costs and fees under the EAJA. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV.

P. 65(a)(2) (allowing preliminary–cum–permanent relief after

consolidated hearing). All we need decide today is that the

preliminary injunction here, by doing nothing more than

preserving the status quo, did not make the Milk Producers

prevailing parties. Because the Secretary had disturbed the

status quo by promulgating a separate Class III Butterfat price,

it was necessary for the district court to order the Secretary to

restore it. This fits with the traditional office of a preliminary

injunction inasmuch as “ ‘[s]tatus quo’ does not mean the

situation existing at the moment the law suit is filed, but the

‘last peaceable uncontested status existing between the parties

before the dispute developed.’ ” O Centro Espirita

BeneficienteUniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389F.3d 973, 1013

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5

See John T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558

(3d Cir. 2003) (“The Preliminary Injunction is an insufficient basis on

which to award attorney’s fees . . . because it is interim relief not

based on the merits . . . .”); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 277 (4th

Cir.) (“[W]e hold that the preliminary injunction entered by the district

court does not satisfy the prevailing party standard . . . .”), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002); but see Dubuc v. Green Oak Township,

312 F.3d 736, 753 (6th Cir. 2002) (“With respect to a preliminary

injunction, there is only prevailing party status if the injunction

represents ‘an unambiguous indication of probable success on the

merits, and not merely a maintenance of the status quo ordered

because the balance of equities greatly favors the plaintiff.’ ” (quoting

Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir.1988))); Watson v.

County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A

preliminary injunction issued by a judge carries all the ‘judicial

imprimatur’ necessary to satisfy Buckhannon.”), cert. denied, 538 U.S.

923 (2003). 

(10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) (quoting 11A

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948). Accordingly,

while the preliminary injunction in Thomas restrained the

government from taking action in order to preserve an existing

fund and the district court here ordered the Secretary to take

action in order to prevent the Milk Producers from losing funds,

both preliminary injunctions operated—in different but

nonetheless straightforward ways—to maintain the status quo.

Our decision in Thomas, 330 F.3d at 493, manifests a

disinclination to join those circuits that have announced a per

se rule rejecting preliminary injunctive relief as support for a

“prevailing party” finding.5 If the majority means to hold that

the five million dollars that the Milk Producers did not lose

when the district court entered the preliminary injunction

comprises the “concrete and irreversible” relief which turned

the preliminary injunction into relief on the merits, then I

believe our circuit is endorsing a per se rule the other way. The

“retained” five million dollars resulted from the preliminary

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6

In responding to the dissent, the majority seems to have minimized

the significance of its limiting “concrete and irreversible” relief

rationale that depends on the “retained” five million dollars,

emphasizing instead that the “2001 preliminary injunction provided

concrete and irreversible judicialrelief . . . based on the . . . conclusion

that Milk Producers were likely to prevail on the merits.” Maj. Slip

Op. at 16. If my reading of its response is correct, the majority has in

fact embraced a per se rule for no preliminary injunction can be

granted without a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. 

enjoining of the regulation in the same way that preliminarily

enjoining, say, a change in licensing requirements would result

in the licensee not having to comply with them pendente lite.

If the preliminary injunction eventually becomes a permanent

one, the preliminary relief does too. But that is because the

eventual court order is a permanent (or final) one. The

preliminary relief does not transmogrify into permanent relief

without it. Much less should it do so when, as Buckhannon

spells out, 532 U.S. at 605, the controversy ends by other than

court order.6 

III.

The words “preliminary” and “prevailing” are not ones that

easily fit together. To make them do so in this case, the

majority has put together the EAJA, Buckhannon and Thomas

and produced a Rube Goldbergesque result. I fear it has

assumed the role Justice White warned against some time ago.

Through fee-shifting statutes like the EAJA the Congress did

not “extend[] any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow

counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might

deem them warranted.” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.

Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975). For the foregoing

reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

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