Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02963/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02963-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lori Jo Giddings,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Vison House Production, Inc., d/b/a

Designer Art Direct; Cindy Rarig,

individually and d/b/a Designer Art Direct;

Jonathan Rarig, individually and d/b/a

Designer Direct; John/Jane Does I

through V, 

Defendant. 

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CV 05-2963-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Defendants Vision House Production, Inc., and

its two principals, Cindy and Jonathan Rarig’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.

21). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (Doc. 22), which the Court construes as a Response, and Defendants filed a Reply

(Doc. 23). Having reviewed the papers submitted, the Court issues the following Order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Lori Jo Giddings filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants alleging

causes of action for copyright infringement, breach of contract, intentional infliction of

emotional distress and fraud (Doc. 19). Plaintiff is an artist who entered into a contract with

Defendants, giving them limited permission to reproduce and distribute Plaintiff's

Case 2:05-cv-02963-MHM Document 24 Filed 08/07/07 Page 1 of 6
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copyrighted artwork. Plaintiff claims that Defendants reproduced and distributed the art in

a way that violated the contract. For example, Plaintiff claims that Defendants forged

Plaintiff’s signature on prints and misrepresented limited editions of Plaintiff's art.

On November 7, 2005, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's emotional distress and

fraud claims (Doc. 11). On September 27, 2007, the Court denied the motion as to Plaintiff’s

emotional distress claim but granted the motion as to Plaintiff’s fraud claim, and granted

Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint (Doc. 16). Pursuant to the Court's Orders, Plaintiff

filed an Amended Complaint on October 11, 2006 (Doc. 19). On October 31, 2006,

Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 21). In their Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's common law claims for

breach of contract, emotional distress, and fraud, are preempted by Plaintiff’s federal

copyright infringement claim. Defendants also assert that the fraud claim is not valid

because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a claim. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on November 13, 2006

(Doc. 22). Plaintiff argues that none of her common law claims are preempted by her

copyright infringement claim because they each contain elements not found in the copyright

claim. Plaintiff also contends that she has standing to bring a fraud claim against Defendants

because she suffered damages to her artistic reputation as a result of the alleged

misrepresentation. On November 20, 2006, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of the

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, reiterating that Plaintiff's common law claims do not

contain elements not found in the copyright infringement claim, and, thus, are preempted

(Doc. 23). Defendants further state that Plaintiff does not have standing for the fraud claim

because Plaintiff did not rely upon the misrepresentation of her forged art. 

LEGAL STANDARD

After the pleadings are closed, a party may move for judgement on the pleadings if

no material facts remain at issue and the parties' dispute can be resolved on the pleadings.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). If, however, a material issue of fact remains in dispute, the court must

deny the motion. Id. Facts and evidence not presented in the pleadings are not considered

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by the court. See Robinson v. Fred Meyers Stores, Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 905, 910 (D. Ariz.

2002). Furthermore, the court accepts all well-pleaded material allegations of the non-moving

party as true. Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFF'S COMMON LAW CLAIMS

Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff's common law claims, namely breach of

contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud are preempted by her federal

copyright infringement claim. Federal copyright law protects the owner of a copyright from

another's unauthorized display, performance, reproduction, or distribution of the protected

work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. These protections preempt all other legal and equitable rights

provided by state common law or statutes. 17 U.S.C. § 301. A state law is preempted when

the rights and subject matter at issue fall under the general scope of the rights and subject

matter covered by the Copyright Act. Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138

(9th Cir. 2005). A state cause of action is not preempted if it consists of an extra element that

is not found within the copyright infringement cause of action. Id.

A. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM

Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted by her copyright infringement cause

of action. A breach of contract claim is preempted when the contract in question only

promises to protect the right to reproduce the work of the plaintiff. See Groso v. Miramax

Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a contract claim was not

preempted by the Copyright Act because it was based on a promise to pay the value of

copyrighted material and did not seek to protect the reproduction rights of the material);

Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457-458 (6th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, Plaintiff's contract with Defendants only promises to protect the rights to

reproduce and distribute Plaintiff's copyrighted artwork (Doc. 19, ¶ 10). These are exactly

the same rights that are covered by federal copyright law. Because there are no extra

elements present in the contract, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is preempted by her

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federal copyright infringement cause of action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim is dismissed. 

B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is also preempted by the

copyright infringement claim. In order to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional

distress cause of action, the plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that the conduct by the

defendant be extreme and outrageous; (2) that the defendant either intend to cause emotional

distress or recklessly disregard the near certainty that such distress will result from his

conduct, and (3) that severe emotional distress must result from defendant's conduct.

Thompson v. Paul, 402 F.Supp.2d 1110 (D. Ariz. 2005). Plaintiff asserts that these extra

elements distinguish the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim from the copyright

infringement claim. Although the Ninth Circuit has never ruled on this particular issue,

courts in other circuits have held that a claim is still preempted if the required extreme and

outrageous conduct is rooted in the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the

plaintiff's work. See Rainy v. Wayne State Univ., 26 F.Supp.2d 963, 969 (E.D. Mich. 1998);

Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

In Plaintiff's case, the extreme and outrageous conduct that Plaintiff relies upon to

establish her emotional distress claim is Defendants' unlawful reproduction, sales,

distribution, and forgery of Plaintiff's copyrighted art (Doc. 19, ¶¶ 24, 28). This behavior

also serves as the core of Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.

Since Plaintiff’s emotional distress claim does not consist of any extra elements not found

in the copyright infringement claim, Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress

cause of action is preempted. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim is dismissed. 

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C. FRAUD CLAIM

Plaintiff's fraud claim is preempted by the copyright infringement claim as well. A

fraud cause of action requires proof of misrepresentation. Valente-Kritzer Video v.

Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff argues that the requirement of

misrepresentation in fraud constitutes as an extra element that distinguishes the claim from

the copyright infringement cause of action. However, in order to survive preemption, the

misrepresentation must be based on a core of allegations dissimilar from those on which the

copyright infringement claim is based. See id. (holding that a fraud claim was not preempted

because the alleged misrepresentation was based on the intent to perform the parties'

contract). 

Plaintiff's fraud claim is rooted in Defendants' alleged misrepresentation of the artist's

signature and of limited-edition prints (Doc. 19, ¶¶ 34-41). These two allegations are derived

from Defendants' unauthorized reproduction and distribution of Plaintiff's artwork and, thus,

are not, in actuality, different from the copyright claim. As such, the fraud claim is

preempted by the copyright infringement cause of action.

II. PLAINTIFF'S STANDING TO BRING A FRAUD CLAIM

In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants also have argued that

Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a fraud claim. Under Arizona law, a plaintiff must plead

nine elements to sufficiently bring a fraud claim: "(1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its

materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the

speaker's intent that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably calculated;

(6) the recipient's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the recipient's reliance on its truth; (8) the right

to rely on it; and (9) a consequent and proximate injury." Arnold & Assoc., Inc. v. Misys

Healthcare Systems, 275 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1027 (D.Ariz. 2003). 

Plaintiff has not alleged many of the nine elements required for a valid fraud claim.

For example, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants’ actions were intended to cause

Plaintiff to act in any reasonably calculated manner. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that she relied

upon, nor had a right to rely upon, any statement or action by Defendants. Most importantly,

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Plaintiff has not alleged that she relied upon Defendants' alleged misrepresentations of her

art to her detriment. 

Instead, Plaintiff merely argues that she has a stake in the fraud claim because the

misrepresentations of her art damaged her reputation as an artist (Doc. 19, ¶ 42). This

allegation is insufficient to sustain a fraud cause of action. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing

to bring a fraud claim against Defendants. 

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 21)

is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is dismissed with

prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's fraud claim is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2007.

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