Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01047/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01047-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN EPPS,

Petitioner, No. CIV-S-04-1047 MCE KJM P 

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently serving a term of nine years’

imprisonment after pleading guilty to embezzlement. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #7, Ex. B. One of

the factors that contributed to the length of petitioner’s sentence is a provision in the California

Penal Code requiring that a sentence be doubled if the person being sentenced has previously

been convicted of a felony. Cal. Penal Code § 667(e)(1). Petitioner asserts, in essence, this

doubling of the base term of his sentence violated his Constitutional rights. 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Also, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any 

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of appeal

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held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, the Fourth Circuit has erred. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

70-71; Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 1

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that he is not precluded from obtaining

relief by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

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The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court fails

to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial of a claim arising under Constitutional

or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court must perform and “independent review

of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable. Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, the court assumes the state

court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the decision of the state court was based on

an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Petitioner presented his grounds for relief to the California courts through

petitions for collateral review. The only court to issue a written decision concerning any of

petitioner’s claims was the Superior Court of Sacramento County. Pet., Ex. C; Resp’t’s Lodged

Doc. No. 4. 

Petitioner asserts that when he committed the crime of embezzlement, California

Penal Code § 667(e)(1) did not require that his sentence be enhanced due to his prior 1997

conviction for terrorist threats under California Penal Code § 422. Therefore, petitioner claims

that his being sentenced in accordance with §667(e)(1) violates the Constitution. See generally

Pet. at 7-11, 14-16.

When petitioner pled guilty to embezzlement, he admitted to committing that

crime between June 15, 1998 and March 8, 2000. Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #7, Ex. C at 2. On

March 8, 2000, the law changed with the passage of Proposition 21 on the March 7, 2000

primary ballot, so that from the March 8th date forward to the present, California Penal Code 

§ 667(e)(1) has required the doubling of a prison sentence if the person being sentenced had

previously been convicted of terrorist threats under California Penal Code § 422. Resp’t’s

Lodged Doc. #7, Ex. C at 1. Petitioner argues that this change cannot apply to him because he

did not commit the crime of embezzlement on or after March 8, 2000. Pet. at 8:11-25. However,

as noted above, petitioner admitted to committing embezzlement between June 15, 1998 and

March 8, 2000. His admission is reasonably construed to mean he admitted to commission of the

crime on the two dates defining the outer bounds of this time period, as well as during the

interval between them. 

Petitioner seems to suggest that the change in § 667(e)(1) could apply to him

only if it appears from the record that all of the acts necessary for a conviction for embezzlement

occurred on or after March 8, 2000. Id. With respect to this argument, the Superior Court of

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Sacramento County found as follows:

It is not an ex post facto violation of the law to apply a new law to

a continuing course of conduct, in which some of the requisite acts

are committed before the effective date of the statute, so long as

the last requisite act is committed after the effective date of the

statute. (People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150). 

Resp’t’s Lodged Doc. #7, Ex. C at 2. The conclusion reached by the Superior Court is in accord

with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in U.S. v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 365 (9th

Cir. 1975). To the extent the Superior Court implicitly determined that the time period covered

by petitioner’s plea included March 8, 2000, its determination is not unreasonable in light of the

factual record, nor is it contrary to federal law. Petitioner’s first claim must be rejected. 

Petitioner also claims that the redefinition of terrorist threats as a prior offense for

purposes of California Penal Code § 667(e)(1) after petitioner was convicted of terrorist threats

violates the Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws. Pet. at 9:1-11:14. However,

respondent is correct that as long as a sentence enhancement statute is in effect at the time the

offense triggering sentencing is committed, it is not an ex post facto violation to allow a sentence

to be enhanced under that statute by using an offense committed before enactment. See, e.g.,

U.S. v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1989). This claim must also be

rejected.

Petitioner further claims that Proposition 21, which added terrorist threats as a

prior offense under California Penal Code § 667(e)(1), was not actually enacted until January 21,

2001. Pet. at 11:16-13:2. Petitioner is incorrect. Under California law, initiatives and

referendums become effective the day after the election in which they were approved. Cal.

Const. Art. 2, § 10(a). As noted, Proposition 21 was approved by the voters on March 7, 2000

and so became effective the next day. See, e.g., In re Melvin J, 81 Cal.App.4th 742, 744 (Cal.

App. 2d Dist. 2000), disapproved on other grounds, John L. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 158

(2004). 

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 Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has found that Proposition 21 does not 2

violate the “single subject rule.” Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 (2002). This court

generally must leave questions of state law to state courts. See, e.g., Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d

964, 972 (9thCir. 2000). 

 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a guilty plea be 3

both voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 

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Petitioner claims that all of the specific provisions of Proposition 21 are invalid

because that proposition violates California’s “single subject rule.” Pet. at 13:3-14:8. However,

a writ of habeas corpus is available only for violations of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Petitioner has not described how violation of California’s “single subject rule” constitutes a

violation of federal law. 

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Petitioner claims that the doubling of his sentence for embezzlement based upon

the fact that he was convicted of terrorist threats in 1997 violates petitioner’s plea agreement with

respect to his terrorist threats conviction. Pet. at 14:13-15:19. In other words, it is petitioner’s

argument that it was part of his 1997 plea agreement that, providing the law were to change

regarding how his 1997 conviction could be used to enhance a subsequent sentence, this change

could not apply to any future sentence imposed upon petitioner. However, petitioner fails to

point to any language in his 1997 plea agreement giving rise to this condition; nothing in the

record before the court supports petitioner’s argument in this regard.

Conversely, petitioner seems to suggest that his 1997 plea agreement should not

be construed to contemplate that the law could be changed with respect to his 1997 plea being

used to enhance a subsequent sentence, and that if such a change could apply to a subsequent

sentence imposed upon petitioner, petitioner’s plea was either not knowing or involuntary. See 3

Pet. at 10:8-11:6. The court finds this argument to be disingenuous. Under any set of objective

criteria, an awareness of these terms would not have been a deciding factor in petitioner’s

pleading guilty. In any case, there is no legal authority that would support the proposition that a

defendant pleading guilty must be informed how the resulting conviction might be used to

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 In his traverse, petitioner asserts that his sentence enhancement under California Penal

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Code § 667(e)(1) violates the Constitution because that enhancement was found to be applicable

by a judge rather than a jury. This argument should be rejected as it is not appropriate to raise

new arguments in a traverse. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Furthermore, it does not appear petitioner has exhausted state court remedies with respect to this

claim as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

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enhance a future sentence associated with a crime for which the defendant had not yet been

charged, or that the law with respect to how the resulting conviction could be used to enhance a

future sentence associated with a crime for which the defendant had not yet been charged could

change. See U.S. v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1990) (defendant need only be

informed of direct consequences of plea; the possibility that the defendant will be convicted of

another offense in the future and will receive an enhanced sentence is a not a direct

consequence). 

Petitioner’s final claim is that his prior conviction for terrorist threats cannot be

considered a prior offense under California Penal Code § 667(e)(1) because the elements of

§ 422 changed after he pled guilty to terrorist threats and before he pled guilty to embezzlement.

Pet. at 15:20-16:11. In 1999, § 422 was amended, but only to include electronic devices as a

means through which a “terrorist threat” could be made. See Cal. Penal Code § 422 (1998 &

1999). This amendment did not serve to eliminate petitioner as a person who had been convicted

of terrorist threats by the time he committed the offense of embezzlement in 2000. Petitioner’s

final claim must be rejected.4

For all the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s

application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

The court notes that on June 1, 2004, petitioner requested that the court take

judicial notice of the “Voter Information Guide” for the statewide election that occurred on

March 7, 2000. Petitioner fails to establish any need for the court to judicially notice any aspect

of the “Voter Information Guide.” Petitioner’s request will be denied.

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s June

1, 2004 request that the court take judicial notice is denied; and 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for writ of habeas

corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 21, 2007.

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epps2319.157

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