Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00109/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00109-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALMA MARIE TRICHE-WINSTON, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. No. CIV S-06-0109 MCE GGH PS

SANDRA SHEWRY, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiffs are proceeding in this action pro se. This proceeding was referred to this

court by Local Rule 72-302(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Presently before the court are motions to dismiss filed by defendant Shewry on

June 28, 2006, and by defendants Burton and Ting, filed June 29, 2006. Having determined that

oral argument was not necessary, but having reviewed the parties’ papers, the court now issues

the following findings and recommendations.

I. BACKGROUND

The complaint, filed January 17, 2006, alleges that plaintiffs, a same-sex couple

who are disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), have a marriage license

which is not void under Lockyer v. San Francisco, 33 Cal.4th 1055, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225 (2004)

because it is a required accommodation under the ADA. They claim that defendants Shewry, the

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Director of the California Department of Health Services, Burton, former County Clerk for the

City and County of San Francisco, and Ting, Assessor-Recorder for San Francisco, failed to

protect plaintiffs’ interest in their marriage license, which was issued by the City and County of

San Francisco on or around February 15, 2004, despite the fact that such licenses have been

declared void for other same-sex couples under the Lockyer decision. Plaintiffs claim that the

ADA preempts California law. Plaintiffs cite instances where they were discriminated against

because they were not married. In a case proceeding in Sacramento Superior Court, plaintiffs

claim that Alma Marie Triche-Winston was too ill to represent herself in a hearing, and therefore

Charel Winston attempted to appear telephonically on her behalf but was prevented from doing

so because they were not legally married. This action was later dismissed for failure to

prosecute. That decision is on appeal. In a separate lawsuit regarding a contract for purchase of

a home they shared, Charel Winston was prevented from participating in the suit because she was

not on the original sales contract. She was required to file a separate lawsuit. 

The complaint alleges equal protection, due process, and ADA violations.

Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory relief in the form of a finding that their marriage is not

annulled under Lockyer v. San Francisco, and injunctive relief. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard For Motion To Dismiss

A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims which would entitle

plaintiff to relief. NOW, Inc. v. Schiedler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S. Ct. 798, 803 (1994);

Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 1993). Dismissal may be based

either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support

cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of

California v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1984). The court construes the pleading in the light

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most favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks School of Business,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). General allegations are presumed to

include specific facts necessary to support the claim. NOW, 510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803,

quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). 

The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached

exhibits. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to

accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States

Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public

record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay

Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria

Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991). “The court

is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept unreasonable inferences, or

unwarranted deductions of fact. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

 Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972). Unless it is clear that no

amendment can cure its defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend

the complaint before dismissal. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir.2000) (en

banc); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

B. The Lockyer Decision

This decision, issued August 12, 2004, proclaimed marriage licenses issued to

same-sex couples by the city of San Francisco void from their inception. Lockyer v. City and

County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4 1055, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 225 (2004). The court began its

th

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discussion with the well settled view that the legislature is the sole body with authority to

regulate marriage. Id. at 1074, 235. It emphasized that local officials, such as the county clerk

and county recorder, have no discretion to issue a marriage license or register a marriage

certificate. Id. at 1082, 241 (emphasis added). The issue which the court decided in the negative

is whether such a ministerial official has the authority to disregard the law which the official

believes to be unconstitutional but which has not been judicially determined to be so. Id. at

1082, 241-42. This lack of authority applies to both state and federal law, and the supremacy

clause does not grant such authority. Id. at 1111, 266. The court’s finding that all same-sex

marriage licenses were void from their inception was based purely on the gender of the marriage

license applicants and was purely a question of law. Id. at 1115, 269. 

As a result of this decision, the court ordered the county clerk and county recorder

for the city and county of San Francisco, pursuant to the supervision of the California Director of

Health Services, to correct the records to reflect the nullity of the marriages. These officials were

also directed to:

(1) identify all same-sex couples to whom the officials issued

marriage licenses, solemnized marriage ceremonies, or registered

marriage certificates, (2) notify these couples that this court has

determined that same-sex marriages that have been performed in

California are void from their inception and a legal nullity, and that

these officials have been directed to correct their records to reflect

the invalidity of these marriage licenses and marriages, (3) provide

these couples an opportunity to demonstrate that their marriages

are not same-sex marriages and thus that the official records of

their marriage licenses and marriages should not be revised, (4)

offer to refund, upon request, all marriage related fees paid by or

on behalf of same-sex couples, and (5) make appropriate

corrections to all relevant records.

Id. at 1120, 273-74.

C. Burton and Ting’s Motion to Dismiss

These defendants contend that as former county clerk and assessor-recorder for

the city and county of San Francisco, respectively, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against

them because all of the allegations concern alleged violations by the state of California, not by

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 In their reply, defendants point to a pleading filed by plaintiffs seeking to intervene in a 1

pending superior court action in San Francisco, in which they admit to being a same-sex couple. 

This pleading was filed in February, 2004, prior to plaintiffs’ December, 2004 request for a

hearing to determine that their marriage was not a same-sex marriage. (Reply, Exh. A.)

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any San Francisco official. 

Plaintiffs contend that they had a right to a hearing before their marriage license

was invalidated, and the fact that the city of San Francisco would not accept their disabilities, are

reasons to maintain the validity of their marriage license. They believe they had a right to a

hearing to determine if their marriage license was a reasonable accommodation for their

disabilities. 

The violations alleged in the complaint are focused on the California Supreme

Court’s decision in Lockyer. The order by the court that plaintiffs’ marriage was null and void

was not caused by defendants Burton and Ting. The portion of that order which required a

hearing to determine if couples issued licenses are not same-sex couples was followed by these

defendants as required by the state supreme court. Plaintiffs concede they received a letter from

the County Clerk informing them that they could notify the Clerk within thirty days if they

believed their “marriage should not be invalidated because it is not a same-sex marriage.” The

fact that plaintiffs admit they are a same-sex couple precludes them from claiming that failure to

give them a hearing is a violation of this supreme court opinion. Burton and Ting were merely

following the law when they declined to give plaintiffs a hearing. They are not responsible for

creating the requirement that a hearing is permitted only to prove a marriage is not a same-sex

marriage. The fact that plaintiffs are a same-sex couple, whether or not they admitted this fact in

their request for hearing, eliminates any requirement these defendants may have had. Therefore,

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the motion to dismiss brought by these defendants should be granted.

D. Shewry’s Motion to Dismiss

This defendant, as Director of the California Department of Health Services,

moves to dismiss, asserting that plaintiffs’ exclusion from marriage is not based on their

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disabilities, that validation of their same-sex marriage is not a reasonable accommodation under

the ADA, and that plaintiffs had no right to a hearing for the purpose of showing their marriage

was a reasonable accommodation because hearings were only permitted for couples to show they

were of the opposite sex. Shewry also asserts that the ADA does not permit suits against

individuals in their individual capacities; nor does it permit monetary damages against the state.

The American With Disabilities Act states in pertinent part: “Subject to the

provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §

12132. In order to state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff

must allege four elements: 

(1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is

otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some

public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff

was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was

otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of

the plaintiff’s disability.

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). The alleged violation

must have been committed by a public entity, and only the public entity can be sued. Alsbrook v.

City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005, n. 8 (8th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff also must allege such

discrimination was intentional. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-40 (9th

Cir. 2001) (to establish ADA claim, plaintiff must show he suffered intentional discrimination

due to a disability).

Plaintiffs fail to meet the second and fourth prongs necessary to state a claim

under the ADA. Plaintiffs are not qualified to be married under the laws of the state of

California or receive the benefits that those laws confer. Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (marriage is

only valid between man and woman in California); Lockyer, supra. The reason for their

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exclusion from marriage in the state of California is by virtue of their status as a same-sex

couple, not because of their physical or mental disabilities. See Lockyer, supra. Plaintiffs’

disabilities are not that they are of the same-sex and want to have a valid marriage, and claiming

such a status as a disability would not be recognized by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)

(disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of

the major life activities of such individual.”) Moreover, the ADA only protects individuals who

are excluded from a public benefit, service or program “by reason of such disability.” Plaintiffs

were not excluded from a marriage license by reason of their disabilities, and cannot use their

disabilities as a reason to obtain a status denied to all same sex couples.

Plaintiffs assert that their same-sex marriage is a reasonable accommodation

under the ADA. “When a state’s policies discriminate against the disabled in violation of the

ADA, the ADA’s regulations mandate reasonable modifications to those policies in order to

avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, at least when such modification would not

fundamentally alter the nature of the services provided by the state.” Townsend v. Quasim, 328

F.3d 511, 517 (9 Cir. 2003), citing Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1054 (9th Cir.2002). th

Nevertheless, where a reasonable accommodation would require violation of state law, it cannot

possibly be required. See Lockyer, supra. 

In regard to plaintiffs’ claim that they were not permitted a hearing in violation of

Lockyer, as addressed supra in regard to Ting’s and Burton’s motion, plaintiffs conceded that

their marriage was a same-sex marriage, and therefore a hearing was not mandated under

Lockyer. 

Because the court finds that plaintiffs have failed to state a violation of the ADA,

it will not address defendants’ arguments concerning suit against Shewry in her individual

capacity, or damages under the ADA. There is no point to recommending leave to amend. See

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1996).

\\\\\

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The motion to dismiss by defendants Burton and Ting, filed June 29, 2006, be

dismissed with prejudice.

2. The motion to dismiss filed by defendant Shewry on June 28, 2006, be

dismissed with prejudice.

3. This action be terminated.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 12/20/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076

Triche-Winston0109.mtd.wpd

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