Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00817/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00817-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1346t Tort Claim

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 The named Plaintiffs are: Oswaldo Enrique Tobar, Francisco Gabriel Yole Arteago, Fausto

Lupercio Arias Castaneda, Frabricio Bayron Cedeno, Joffre Johnny Cedeno, Lindon Cleofe Cedeno,

Ramon Eliades Ramon Velez Cedeno, Daniel David Quimi Chalen, Pablo Eduardo Lucas Conforme,

Ramon Eduardo Pilligua Conforme, Ciro Mariano Lopez Mero, Pedro Manuel Lopez Mero, Jose

Eduardo Lucas Mero, Luis Antonio Penafiel Mero, Pedro Jose Reyes Mero, Telmo Arcadio Chica

Obando, Luis Miguel Cedeno Pico, Jaime Gustavo Palma Pinargote, Yardy Klever Flores Segovia,

Pacho Hernandez Solorzano, Carlos Wilfrido Veliz Velez, Jose Luis Zambrano Zambrano, Carlos

Orlando Velez Zambrano, Rosa Carmelina Zambrano Lucas, Junior Ivan Pico Alava, Segundo Matias

Zambrano Alonzo. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSWALDO ENRIQUE TOBAR, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07cv817 WQH (WMc)

ORDER

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge: 

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction, filed by the United States. (Doc. # 10). 

Background

On May 4, 2007, Plaintiffs1 filed a Complaint against the United States in the 

Southern District of Texas. (Doc. # 1). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are residents

of Ecuador. Complaint, p. 2. The Complaint alleges that on October 5, 2005, in

international waters off the coast of Ecuador, the United States Coast Guard Law

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Enforcement Detachment (“Coast Guard”), which is owned and operated by the United

States, unlawfully and negligently “stopped, searched, arrested, detained and imprisoned

the Plaintiffs, seized the boat [and] destroyed the cargo and fish owned by Plaintiffs.” Id. 

The Complaint alleges that this incident arose out of suspicion that Plaintiffs were

possessing and smuggling drugs. Id. The Complaint alleges that the Coast Guard acted

carelessly, recklessly, negligently, or intentionally during the incident, and caused injury to

Plaintiffs and their vessel. Id. at 3. 

The Complaint alleges that this action “arises in part” under the Federal Tort Claims

Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2661, et seq., the Suits in Admiralty Act

(“SAA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918, and the Public Vessels Act (“PVA”), 46 U.S.C. §§

31101-31113. The Complaint also alleges that the Coast Guard’s conduct violated

“international law,” “treaty obligations with Ecuador,” and Plaintiffs’ rights as protected by

the United States Constitution. Complaint, p. 3-4. 

On May 4, 2007, the case was transferred from the Southern District of Texas to the

Southern District of California. (Doc. # 1). 

On August 31, 2007, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction (“Motion to Dismiss”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 10). The United States moves the Court to dismiss this action

with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that there has been no

waiver of its sovereign immunity under the FTCA, SAA or PVA, and Plaintiffs have failed

to establish any other basis for subject matter jurisdiction. 

On September 5, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. # 16),

which asserted the need for additional discovery in order to oppose the Motion to Dismiss. 

On November 7, 2007, United States Magistrate Judge McCurine issued an Order Denying

the Motion to Compel, concluding that discovery was not necessary for Plaintiffs to oppose

facts set out in the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. # 24). 

On November 13, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss. (Doc. # 25). Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Dismiss on grounds that sovereign

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immunity has been waived pursuant to the SAA, that the Complaint alleges violations of

Plaintiffs’ rights as protected by the United States Constitution and international law, and

that Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery. 

On November 26, 2007, the United States filed a Reply to the Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. # 26). 

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move

for dismissal on grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the court has subject matter

jurisdiction over an action. Assoc. of Medical Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770,

778-779 (9th Cir. 2000). In resolving an attack on a court’s jurisdiction, the court may go

outside the pleadings and consider evidence beyond the complaint relating to jurisdiction

without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Safe Air

For Everyone v. Doyle, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Discussion

I. Plaintiff’s Discovery Request

Plaintiffs contend that the Court should deny the Motion to Dismiss and allow

discovery because the Motion to Dismiss relies on jurisdictional issues which are so

intertwined with substantive issues that discovery is needed to “find out exactly what the

agreement was between the agents of the United States and the Ecuadorian government;

and what effect the violation of the Coast Guard’s regulations and agreement with the

Ecuadorian government had on the so-called discretionary function defense, or law

enforcement defense.” Response, p. 9.

The United States contends that the portion of Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to

the Motion to Dismiss which addresses discovery is irrelevant to the Motion to Dismiss,

and “for the most part [is] a verbatim repetition of plaintiffs’ supplemental brief in support

of the motion to compel, which was denied by Magistrate Judge McCurine.” Reply, p. 3. 

On November 7, 2007, Magistrate Judge McCurine issued an Order Denying

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Discovery. (Doc. # 24). The Magistrate Judge concluded

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that the discovery requested by Plaintiffs “is not necessary to demonstrate facts in

opposition to the jurisdictional issues raised in [the ] 12(b)(1) motion” and that the Motion

to Dismiss “is clearly noticed and written as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction,” not a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 3. 

Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss restates the arguments

made in Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief in Support of the Motion to Compel (Doc. # 21),

which the Magistrate Judge rejected. (Doc. # 24). The Court agrees with the Magistrate

Judge that discovery is not necessary to demonstrate facts in opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery to oppose facts

set out in the Motion to Dismiss. 

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Suits in

Admiralty Act and Public Vessels Act

The United States, as a sovereign, is immune from suit. United States v. Mitchell,

445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). A federal district court only has subject matter jurisdiction over

a suit against the United States when sovereign immunity has been waived. Argentine

Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 435 (1989). “It is axiomatic that

Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to any suit brought against

the United States.” Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1974). A waiver

of sovereign immunity as contained in any statute “will be strictly construed, in terms of its

scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act

The United States contends that the FTCA generally waives sovereign immunity for

tort claims against the United States in federal court, but excepts from its general waiver of

sovereign immunity claims cognizable in admiralty. The United States contends that the

FTCA does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiffs’

claims “sound solely in admiralty.” Mot. to Dismiss, p. 4. The United States also contends

that even if the FTCA applied to this action, its sovereign immunity would still be retained

because the discretionary function and foreign country exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of

sovereign immunity apply. 

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Plaintiffs appear to agree that this action is cognizable in admiralty and that the

FTCA does not apply, stating that the FTCA “despite being supplanted in maritime claims,

still is used for guidance since the scope of tort liability within the jurisdiction of admiralty

includes actions based on negligence, claims for damage to vessels or cargo, claims for

personal injuries on navigable waters, etc.” Response, p. 4. 

 The FTCA generally waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for its torts to

the same extent a private actor would be liable. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(b). However,

actions within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts are explicitly excluded from

the FTCA. Id. “Although the FTCA usually provides the waiver in tort actions, the FTCA

is inapplicable where an admiralty claim exists.” Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893

(9th Cir. 1983). A tort claim falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts if

(1) the tort occurs on or over navigable waters (the “locality” or “situs” test), and (2) the

actions giving rise to the tort claim “bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime

activity” (the “nexus” or “relationship” test). Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080,

1084 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the events giving rise to their claims occurred on

navigable waters and bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. 

The “locality” or “situs” test is satisfied because Plaintiffs’ claims derive from the

boarding, search and seizure of Plaintiffs’ vessel in navigable waters off the coast of

Ecuador. See Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1084. The “nexus” or “relationship” test is satisfied

because all of the claims alleged in the Complaint derive from Coast Guard operations of

stopping, boarding, searching and seizing Plaintiffs’ vessel. See Kelly v. United States, 531

F.2d 1144, 1148 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that operations of the Coast Guard bear a

significant relationship to traditional maritime activity). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs

have failed to meet their burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA

because this action falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Suits in Admiralty Act

The United States contends that the SAA generally waives sovereign immunity in

admiralty actions, but that the discretionary function exception retains sovereign immunity

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for conduct that involves an element of choice and is grounded in policy considerations. 

The United States contends that the SAA does not provide a basis for subject matter

jurisdiction in this action because the discretionary function applies. 

Plaintiffs contend that the discretionary function exception does not apply to this

action because the Coast Guard’s acts involved the implementation of clear Coast Guard

mandates under objective criteria and were not grounded in social, economic or political

policy considerations. 

The SAA provides that “[i]n a case in which, if a vessel were privately owned or

operated, or if cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property

were involved, a civil action in admiralty could be maintained, a civil action in personam

may be brought against the United States or a federally-owned corporation.” 46 U.S.C. §

30903. However, a well-recognized exception to the SAA’s general waiver of the 

sovereign immunity is the “discretionary function” exception. Earles v. United States, 935

F.2d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court has articulated two factors (the

“Gaubert factors”) for courts to consider when determining whether the discretionary

function exception applies to a particular case: (1) whether the nature of the challenged

conduct involved “an element of judgment or choice,” and (2) whether “social, economic or

political policy” considerations are implicated. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,

322-23 (1991); see also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988).

In Mid-South Holding Company, Inc. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir.

2000), the Eleventh Circuit addressed “whether the ‘discretionary function’ exception to

the waiver of the sovereign immunity found in the [SAA] precludes a claim arising out of

the allegedly negligent performance of a search of a vessel by the [Coast Guard].” The

Eleventh Circuit noted 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) grants the Coast Guard authority to “make

inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and

waters over which the United States has jurisdiction for the prevention, detection, and

suppression of violations of the law of the United States [and] at any time go on board of

any vessel . . . and examine, inspect and search the vessel and use all necessary force to

compel compliance.” 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). The court concluded that the Coast Guard’s law

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enforcement authority, articulated in 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), leaves the Coast Guard “a great

deal of discretion . . . in deciding which vessels to board and search, thus satisfying the first

prong of the Gaubert analysis.” Id. at 1205-1206. The court went on to state that “the onsite decisions of the [government] agents concerning the manner in which to search the

vessel also fall within the scope of the discretionary function exception . . . [b]ecause no

statute or corresponding regulation prescribes the methodology for boarding or searching a

vessel.” Id. at 1206-1207. The court concluded that the second Gaubert factor was

satisfied because “the decision to board and search a vessel is the product of the balancing

of various compelling policy considerations.” Id. at 1205-06, fn. 6; see also B&F

Trawlers, Inc. v. United States, 841 F.2d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that “the

discretionary function exception in principle shields from tort liability the Coast Guard’s

apprehension and transportation of drug-running vessels”). 

Plaintiffs allege that the Coast Guard unlawfully stopped, searched and seized

Plaintiffs’ vessel suspected of drug smuggling. To support the contention that this

allegedly unlawful conduct was discretionary, the United States submitted the Declaration

of Brad J. Kieserman, the Chief of Operations Law at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, who

attests that “[a]t all times, the Coast Guard is operating under its authority in 14 U.S.C. § 89

whenever it conducts maritime law enforcement,” and that “the decision to conduct a

boarding, the personnel who shall comprise the boarding team, and the manner of

conducting the boarding is always left to the discretion of the on-scene Commander or

Officer in Charge and Boarding Officer.” Kieserman Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11. The first Gaubert

factor is satisfied because the only evidence in the record demonstrates that the decision to

stop, board, search and seize suspected drug smuggling vessels and the manner in which

government agents conduct such activity is discretionary. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a); MidSouth Holding Co., 225 F.3d at 1205; Kieserman Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11. The second Gaubert

factor is satisfied because the challenged conduct implicates “social, economic or political

policy considerations” in light of Congress’ declaration that “trafficking in controlled

substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and universally condemned”

and that “such trafficking presents a specific threat to the security and societal well-being

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of the United States.” See B&F Trawlers, Inc., 841 F.2d at 631 (quoting 46 U.S.C. §

1902). The Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction

under the SAA because the discretionary function exception applies, retaining sovereign

immunity. 

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Public Vessels Act

The United States contends there is no waiver of sovereign immunity under PVA

because Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating “that a similar action in

plaintiffs’ national courts (Ecuador) would be allowed if a United States national were the

plaintiff there.” Mot. to Dismiss, p. 23. The United States contends that the PVA does not

provide subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate reciprocity,

which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the waiver of sovereign immunity under the PVA. 

The Complaint and the Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss generally

assert that this action arises pursuant to the PVA, but neither address reciprocity. 

 The PVA waives sovereign immunity in admiralty actions for “damages caused by

a public vessel of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. App. § 781. Pursuant to the “reciprocity”

provision of the PVA, nationals of a foreign country “may not maintain a civil action under

this chapter . . . unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is

brought that the government of that country, in similar circumstances, allows nationals of

the United States to sue in its courts.” 46 U.S.C. § 31111; see also United States v. United

Continental Tuna, 560 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff must demonstrate

reciprocity, which is required for sovereign immunity to be waived under the PVA. United

States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976). 

Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate reciprocity because they make no assertion in

the Complaint or Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss that the government of

Ecuador would allow United States nationals to sue in its courts under similar

circumstances. In failing to address reciprocity, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the

jurisdictional prerequisite to the waiver of sovereign immunity under the PVA. See United

Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. at 164. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to

establish subject matter jurisdiction under the PVA because there is no waiver of sovereign

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immunity under the PVA. 

III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the United States Constitution or

International Law

The United States contends that Plaintiffs have failed to establish subject matter

jurisdiction under the United States Constitution because “neither the Constitution nor the

laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our

own citizens,” Plaintiffs “admit they are all citizens of Equador, not the United States,” and

there “is no allegation that plaintiffs have any connection with the United States at all,

either geographically or legally.” Mot. to Dismiss, p. 23-24 (quoting United States v.

Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). The United States contends that

Plaintiffs have failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under international law because

they “neither identify any tenet of customary international law, or any treaty or bilateral

agreement which may have been abridged, much less provide a basis for jurisdiction.” 

Mot. to Dismiss, p. 24. 

Plaintiffs respond that “[h]ere we have the Ecuadorian fisherman subjected to nine

days at sea and then they were detained again on shore. The U.S. Constitution may not

apply four hundred miles out in the Pacific ocean, but international law and human decency

should still prevail despite the illusions of the U.S. Coast Guard.” Response, p. 24. 

“Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in

foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . . and operation of the nation in

such territory must be governed by treaties, international understandings and compacts, and

the principles of international law.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299

U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Absent authorizing legislation, “an individual has access to courts

for enforcement of a treaty’s provisions only when the treaty is self-executing, that is, when

it expressly or impliedly provides a private right of action.” Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab

Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,

598-99 (1884). 

The Complaint alleges that the Coast Guard’s conduct violated Plaintiffs rights as

protected by various amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs, however, do

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not assert that they are citizens of the United States, that their Constitutional claims arose in

the United States, or that they otherwise have any connection with the United States that

would grant them standing to sue under the United States Constitution in federal court. The

Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction under

the United States Constitution. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 318. 

The Complaint also alleges that the Coast Guard’s conduct violated “treaty

obligations with Equador” and “violated international law by boarding and seizing a

foreign flagged vessel in international waters.” Complaint, p. 3. Plaintiffs, however, fail to

identify any specific treaty or tenet of international law under which they are suing. The

Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ general allegations that the United States violated a treaty

with Ecuador and international law are insufficient to satisfy their burden of demonstrating

the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under international law. 

Conclusion

The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. # 10) filed by 

the United States is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. If

Plaintiffs wish to amend the Complaint, they must file and serve a First Amended

Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. 

DATED: January 15, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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