Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04092/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-04092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LaQuint Cherry,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-18-4092-PHX-DWL (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 15, 2019 (Doc. 11). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe 

for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings 

of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 

72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A probation violation report in a related case summarized the facts in this case as 

follows:

On October 4th 2014, the defendant made [E.P.] drive him around 

after holding him at gunpoint. A short time later the defendant told 

him he was taking the car. He threatened to shoot him if he did not 

comply and began counting down from thirty. When the defendant 

got out, and walked around to the driver's side of the vehicle [E.P.] 

sped off and called police. Police responded and apprehended the 

defendant a short time later, still in the area. Officers found a hoodie 

and a firearm in the defendant's backpack. Positive identification was 

made of the suspect by both [E.P.] and his female acquaintance. 

While in custody the defendant refused to give his true name until the 

jail would not take him due to medical concerns, when taken to the 

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hospital an anonymous source gave police his name. After being 

released from the hospital officers were transporting the defendant 

back to the jail at which time he escaped. but was caught a short time 

later.

(Exh. N, Prob. Viol. Rep. at 1.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are referenced herein as 

“Exh. ___.”) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, kidnapping, attempted 

auto theft, attempted armed robbery, criminal damage, weapons misconduct, refusing to 

provide a name, and escape. (Exh. B, Indictment, CR2014-148219-001.) 

Petitioner, being represented by counsel, eventually entered into a written Plea 

Agreement (Exh. C) on July 24, 2015. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to the aggravated 

assault and an amended (re-designated as non-dangerous) kidnapping charge, in exchange 

for the dismissal of the other charges, allegations of prior convictions and commission 

while on probation, and allegations of dangerousness on the kidnapping, and a stipulation 

to a mitigated term of seven years on the aggravated assault and probation (with “Mental 

Health Terms”) on the kidnapping. Petitioner entered his guilty plea pursuant to the plea 

agreement on the same date. 

On August 13, 2015, Petitioner filed pro per a motion to represent himself based 

on the assertion that he was intoxicated on “jail hooch liquor” at the time of his plea. (Exh. 

E.) A similar motion, also arguing “duress” and “verbal threats” by counsel, was filed 

October 8, 2015. (Exh. F.) 

Petitioner was eventually referred for a mental evaluation to determine his 

competency to represent himself. (Exh. G, M.E. 1/7/16.) Two evaluators developed 

conflicting opinions, and a third was appointed. (Exh. I, M.E. 3/24/16.) The parties 

eventually entered into a stipulation (Exh. J) that the Court could determine competency 

based on the three reports. On April 21, 2016, the trial court concluded that Petitioner was 

competent and set the matter for sentencing. (Exh. K, M.E. 4/21/16.) 

Petitioner wrote several letters to the Court, including one in which he asserted he 

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had not read the plea agreement, did not understand the plea, was intoxicated at the time 

of his plea, and had not signed the plea agreement. He asked to withdraw from the plea. 

(Exh. L, Letter; Exh. M, Letter.) 

On May 3, 2016, Petitioner was sentenced to the stipulated seven years on Count 1 

and three years of probation on Count 2. (Exh. O, Sentence.) Petitioner was provided a 

Notice of Rights of Review (Exh. P). 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition at 2-3.) Moreover, as a pleading 

defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and 

Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (1995).

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

First PCR Proceeding - On August 11, 2016 Petitioner filed a PCR Notice (Exh. 

Q) and PCR Petition (Exh. R) in the instant case (CR2014-148219-001) and an earlier case 

(CR2013-420956-001), which the PCR court deemed a single PCR Notice, and dismissed 

in the instant case as untimely by 10 days. (Exh. T, M.E. 11/7/16.) The PCR court rejected 

claims that the untimeliness should be excused, including a finding that Petitioner “fails 

to provide any facts showing a basis for relying on counsel to act.” (Id. at 2.) 

The PCR court also rejected arguments that Petitioner’s claims qualified for 

untimely consideration, including a claim of new discovered material facts under Arizona 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(e) based on “precinct video footage wrong suspect.” 

Thus the Court found no basis for appointment of counsel and dismissed the Petition. (Id.)

Second PCR Proceeding – On October 26, 2018, Petitioner filed a “Notice of Rule 

32 Counsel Requested” (Exh. U, Notice 10/26/18) which the PCR court treated as a second 

PCR proceeding and dismissed as untimely and barred as successive. (Exh. V, M.E. 

11/15/18.) 

Third PCR Proceeding – On February 12, 2019, Petitioner filed another “Notice 

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of Rule 32 Counsel Requested” (Exh. U, Notice 2/12/19), which the PCR court treated as 

a third PCR proceeding and dismissed as barred as successive. (Exh. V, M.E. 2/28/19.) 

Fourth PCR Proceeding – On April 16, 2019, Petitioner filed a final “Notice of 

Post-Conviction Relief (Counsel Requested)” (Exh. U, Notice 4/16/19) which the PCR 

court treated as a fourth PCR proceeding and dismissed as barred as successive. (Exh. V, 

M.E. 5/7/19.) 

Petitioner did not seek appellate court review in any of his PCR proceedings, and 

argues he “did not know how.” (Petition at 5.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his original Petition on 

November 15, 2018 (Doc. 1), following dismissal of his second PCR proceeding. Prior to 

a service order, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition (Doc. 7) on January 28, 2019. 

That Petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to adequately allege a 

constitutional violation. (Order 2/6/19, Doc. 9.) On February 15, 2019, Petitioner filed 

the instant, Second Amended Petition (Doc. 11). Petitioner’s Petition asserts one ground 

for relief, arguing that he was intoxicated at the time he signed the plea agreement and 

thus he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Response - On July 11, 2019 Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 31). 

Respondents argue that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations and Petitioner 

has procedurally defaulted on his state remedies.

Reply - On July 22, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 33). Petitioner argues 

counsel failed to file “a Rule 32” after being asked to do so, and Petitioner (having been 

diagnosed as mentally ill and with learning disabilities) failed to seek review from the state 

appellate courts because he did not know he could or how. He asserts prejudice against 

him based on his race, ties to ISIS, and terrorist activities. He asserts a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice based on the inability to now return to the state courts for relief. He 

also argues his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not read 

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his Miranda rights. He argues police precinct video footage would establish his actual 

innocence. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely under the one year 

limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions generally begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 

For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, “Arizona's Rule 32 of-right 

proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To 

bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to 

the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of conviction and sentencing in that court, 

notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing 

Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). Thus, the conviction of a pleading defendant becomes “final” 

at the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32, or the 

expiration of the time to do so. 

Because Petitioner was sentenced on May 3, 2016, his 90 days to file his of-right 

PCR petition expired on August 1, 2016. His first PCR Notice was dated August 5, 2016 

and filed August 11, 2016. Thus it was untimely. Accordingly, his conviction became 

final on August 1, 2016, and without any tolling expired one year later on August 1, 2017. 

/ /

/ /

 

1 Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly recognized 

constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply.

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2. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Here, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was commenced in August, 2016 while his 

one year was running. However, statutory tolling of the habeas limitations period only 

results from state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is 

never “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408 (2005). Even if the state court provides alternative grounds for disposing of the state 

application, a ruling that the application was untimely precludes it from being “properly 

filed” and tolling the limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002). 

Here, the PCR court concluded that Petitioner’s filing was “untimely.” (Exh. T, M.E. 

11/7/16.) Thus, it did not result in tolling of Petitioner’s limitations period, which thus 

expired August 1, 2017.

Petitioner’s next PCR proceeding, his second, was not commenced until October 

26, 2018, after his one year had expired. (See Exh. V, M.E. 11/15/18.) Once the statute 

has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset the running 

of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. 

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Petitioner has no statutory 

tolling resulting from his second PCR proceeding, or any of his subsequent PCR 

proceedings, and his limitations period expired on August 1, 2017.

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition (Doc. 11) was filed on February 16, 2019. 

“In determining when a pro se state or federal petition is filed, the ‘mailbox’ rule applies. 

A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands the petition to prison 

officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2010). Here 

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Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition asserts it was placed in prison mailing system on 

February 13, 2019 (Doc. 11 at 11), and thus it must be deemed “filed” as of that date.

Even so, this was over 18 months after the expiration of his limitations period. 

It is true that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides that an “amendment 

of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . (2) the claim or 

defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 

occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” This Rule has 

been applied to habeas petitions. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005). However, 

even this could be applied to relate Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition back to the filing 

of the original Petition (Doc. 1), that original Petition was not filed until November 15, 

2018, nor delivered to prison officials for mailing until November 13, 2018 (Doc. 1 at 11). 

By that time Petitioner’s limitations period had been expired for over 15 months.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available 

in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control 

make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were 

the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition on 

time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is 

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 

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(9th Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of 

limitations on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that 

equitable tolling is appropriate.”).

Ineffective Assistance - Petitioner argues his delinquency should be excused on 

the basis that trial counsel failed to file “a Rule 32” after being asked to do so. 

Although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary circumstances 

required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is insufficient. 

Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). A “garden variety claim of 

excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing 

deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 651-652 

(2010). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary 

circumstances. Id. “Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable 

tolling, particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional 

right to counsel.” Lawrence v. Fla., 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007).

Moreover, Petitioner fails to explain how trial counsel’s failure to timely file his 

state PCR notice kept him from filing a timely federal petition. Petitioner was aware at 

least by the November 2016 dismissal of his first PCR petition of the facts that showed his 

limitations period was running since August 1, 2016 without any tolling. And yet he did 

not file a federal petition. 

Even it were assumed arguendo that trial counsel’s failure to timely file a state PCR 

notice established the requisite extraordinary circumstances to justify equitable tolling, the 

causal connection between that failure in the state proceedings and Petitioner’s untimely 

federal petition was broken by Petitioner’s failure to seek federal habeas relief in the 

ensuing time while his one year limitations period expired. “If the person seeking equitable 

tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary 

circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and 

the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent 

timely filing.” Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). 

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Petitioner’s Capacity - Petitioner points to his mental illness, learning disabilities, 

and lack of legal knowledge. 

With regard to the latter, Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of 

legal assistance do not toll the limitations period. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 

1154 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

In Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit articulated a twopart test to determine whether a mental impairment amounts to an “extraordinary 

circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. The impairment must have (1) been “so severe 

that the petitioner was unable personally...to understand the need to timely file...a habeas 

petition,” and (2) “made it impossible under the totality of the circumstances to meet the 

filing deadline despite petitioner’s diligence.” Id. at 1093.

Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he was incapable of understanding the need 

to timely file his federal petition. In his first PCR Notice he acknowledged the 

untimeliness of his state filing and asserted arguments as an excuse (Exh. Q at 2-3). 

Similarly, his original federal habeas Petition also addressed the timeliness issue and 

argued justifications for his delay. (Doc. 1 at 11.) This indicates that he was, and 

remained, capable of understanding the timeliness requirements for a federal petition. 

Petitioner also proffers nothing to show that under the totality of circumstances it 

was impossible for him to the meet the deadline despite diligence. Petitioner continued to 

make a variety of reasonably sophisticated (if not successful) state court filings over the 

years between his sentencing and his federal petition. Petitioner fails to suggest why his 

mental condition prevented him from filing a federal petition instead. 

Finally, at least as of the time of trial, Petitioner was deemed competent to stand 

trial and able to understand assist counsel with his defense. (Exh. K, M.E. 4/21/16.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds no grounds for equitable tolling.

/ /

/ /

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5. Actual Innocence 

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 

1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner 

“’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted 

him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies “only when a 

petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in 

the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of 

nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial. Because 

such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual 

innocence are rarely successful.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

Petitioner argues that video footage would show he was not at the Mountain View 

Precinct, and thus would prove he was not the perpetrator. (Reply, Doc. 33 at 2.) 

Petitioner fails to explain how such video footage would show his actual innocence of the 

crimes of conviction (i.e. aggravated assault and kidnapping). In his January 7, 2019 

Motion to Waive Counsel in the state court, Petitioner argued with regard to such video:

“I was never there refusing fingerprints, making statements, and booking process was 

claimed there.” (Exh. U, Motion 1/7/19 at 1.) It appears this relates primarily to the 

dismissed counts of refusing to provide a name and escape. (See also Motion to Produce, 

Doc. 5 (“I was not taken to a Mountain View Precinct. They mixed me up with someone 

else.”).) Petitioner fails to explain how, in light of the eyewitness identifications of him 

by the assault and kidnapping victims, this would preclude a reasonable juror from 

convicting him of those crimes. 

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6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Petitioner’s one year habeas limitations period commenced running on August 2, 

2016, and expired on August 1, 2017 making his Second Amended Petition (even if related 

back to his original Petition) almost 15 months delinquent. Petitioner has shown no basis 

for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual innocence to 

avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed with 

prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is plainly barred by 

the statute of limitations and resolution of the other defenses would involve addressing the 

merits of various claims to dispose of assertions of cause from ineffective assistance of 

counsel, Respondents other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that 

in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention 

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in 

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a 

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

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constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the reasoning 

set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as 

to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Second Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed November 15, 2019 (Doc. 11) be DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: January 24, 2020

18-4092r RR 20 01 14 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:18-cv-04092-DWL Document 36 Filed 01/24/20 Page 13 of 13