Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05327/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 16, 2005 Decided July 1, 2005

No. 04-5327

NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CRAIG MANSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE

AND PARKS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(03cv02330)

Abigail M. Dillen argued the cause for appellants. On the

briefs were Timothy J. Preso and Douglas L. Honnold.

Kathryn E. Kovacs, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

David C. Shilton and Eric G. Hostetler, Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH, and GARLAND, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 1 of 10
2

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The Bull Mountain Power

Company sought permission from a state agency to construct a

coal-fired, electric generating plant in Roundup, Montana, in the

vicinity of Yellowstone National Park and a federal wilderness

area. The state agency issued a permit after receiving a letter

from an official of the Department of the Interior stating that the

power plant would not adversely affect visibility in Yellowstone

Park or the wilderness area. The National Parks Conservation

Association and other environmental conservation organizations

(“National Parks”) sued in district court, claiming that the

Interior Department violated the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7401-7671q. The district court dismissed the suit on the

ground that plaintiffs lacked standing. We reverse.

I.

The proposed Roundup Plant lies between Yellowstone

National Park and the UL Bend Wilderness Area. Its proximity

to protected federal lands triggered the Prevention of Significant

Deterioration provisions of the Clean Air Act. Under these

provisions, which were designed “to preserve, protect, and

enhance the air quality in national parks [and] national

wilderness areas,” 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2), (3), EPA must forward

proposals for the construction of “major emitting facilities” to

the “Federal Land Manager” and to the “Federal official”

responsible for the areas potentially affected. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7475(d)(1), (2)(A). The National Park Service manages

Yellowstone. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible

for the UL Bend Wilderness Area. They are the Federal Land

Managers in this case. The federal official with oversight over

both bodies is the Secretary of the Interior.

The Clean Air Act does not give these federal officials

authority to issue or reject permit applications. But it charges

them with “an affirmative responsibility to protect the air

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 2 of 10
3

quality” in the protected areas, and requires them to

“consider . . . whether a proposed major emitting facility will

have an adverse impact.” § 7475(d)(2)(B). The federal officials

fulfill these responsibilities by transmitting to the state authority

their findings regarding the potential air-quality ramifications of

the proposed project. No permit shall issue if “the Federal Land

Manager demonstrates to the satisfaction of the State that the

emissions from such facility will have an adverse impact on the

air quality-related values (including visibility) of such lands.”

§ 7475(d)(2)(C)(ii). Although the state permitting authority thus

retains final decision-making authority, a federal impact report

is not purely advisory. If the state authority chooses to disregard

an adverse impact determination, it must -- in accordance with

federal requirements for state implementation plans -- explain its

decision in writing and publish the explanation. 40 C.F.R.

§ 51.307(a)(3); MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.8.1109(3).

The facts of this case are as follows. On January 14, 2002,

the Bull Mountain Power Company applied to the Montana

Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) for a permit for

the Roundup Plant. On August 12, the DEQ published a draft

permit for public comment, having furnished the National Park

Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service notice of the pending

application. On December 18, following statistical and

modeling analysis, the two Federal Land Managers sent a letter

and a report formally notifying the Montana DEQ that the

proposed Roundup Plant would “cause perceptible visibility

impairment at” Yellowstone and UL Bend. 

Two days later, Bull Mountain Power voiced its objection

to officials at the Interior Department. The company later

submitted written comments, arguing that the original federal

analysis was flawed because it failed to take into account

weather conditions at Yellowstone. (The comments did not

mention UL Bend.) In response, the Department’s Air

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 3 of 10
4

Resources Division conducted further analysis. This only

served to reaffirm the original adverse impact conclusion. On

January 7, 2003, Air Resources prepared a letter reiterating the

initial determination that the Roundup Plant would adversely

affect air quality at Yellowstone and UL Bend. On January 10,

Assistant Secretary Manson rejected the proposed staff letter and

prepared a new letter, withdrawing the December 18 finding of

adverse impact. Despite objections from Air Resources staff,

and officials of the National Park Service and the Fish and

Wildlife Service, the Assistant Secretary sent the withdrawal

letter, which represented the final federal action in the matter.

On January 31, relying on Interior’s reversal of positions, the

Montana DEQ approved the Roundup Plant permit application.

National Parks brought suits challenging the permit in

Montana state court and in federal district court. In the federal

action it claimed that Assistant Secretary Manson violated the

Administrative Procedure Act when he withdrew the initial

report without adequately discharging his procedural obligation

to “consider” the potential adverse impact on air quality in

Yellowstone and UL Bend. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(2)(B). In the

state litigation, the Montana Supreme Court ruled in favor of

National Parks, vacated the Montana DEQ’s issuance of the

Roundup Plant permit and ordered the DEQ to revisit its

conclusions. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl.

Quality, 326 Mont. 502 (2005). The permit application is now

before the Montana DEQ on remand.

II.

In order to satisfy Article III’s standing requirements,

plaintiffs must demonstrate injury-in-fact (concrete and

particularized, actual or imminent), caused by the defendant and

capable of being redressed by a court order. Friends of the

Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000); Lujan v.

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 4 of 10
5

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The district

court assumed, without deciding, that National Parks had

suffered a cognizable injury. But the court determined that

National Parks had not satisfied the two other standing

requirements and entered a judgment dismissing the action, a

judgment we review de novo. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v.

Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

A.

National Parks’ complaint alleged that its members

regularly use and enjoy Yellowstone and UL Bend. It claims to

have suffered a “procedural injury” from the Assistant

Secretary’s failure to conduct a reasoned determination

regarding the proposed plant’s impact on air quality in these

areas. Interior does not deny that National Parks has alleged an

injury, but it takes issue with the proper characterization of that

injury, arguing that National Parks’ claim is simply a challenge

to the substance of Interior’s action. Regardless whether the

alleged injury is procedural or direct, it satisfies the first aspect

of the standing test. As an organization dedicated to the

conservation of, and whose members make use of, public lands,

National Parks suffers a cognizable injury from environmental

damage to those lands. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.

727, 734 (1972). In the alternative, if the Assistant Secretary’s

alleged inadequate consideration of air quality constitutes a

procedural injury, this would “cause a distinct risk to a

particularized interest of the plaintiff” -- that is, conservation of

those public lands plaintiffs’ members use. Fla. Audubon Soc’y

v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc);see also

Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 51

(D.C. Cir. 1999).

The procedural-substantive distinction may still seem to be

important because “‘[p]rocedural rights are special’: The person

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 5 of 10
6

who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete

interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal

standards for redressability and immedicacy.” Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 572 n.7. “A plaintiff who alleges a deprivation of a

procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to prove

that if he had received the procedure the substantive result

would have been altered. All that is necessary is to show that

the procedural step was connected to the substantive result.”

Sugar Cane Growers Coop. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94-95

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Thus, if we have before us a procedural

injury, this would appear to affect our analysis of causation and

redressability. But this case does not quite fit into the mold of

the major procedural rights standing cases. The hypothetical in

footnote 7 of Lujan represents the archetypal procedural injury:

an agency’s failure to prepare a statutorily required

environmental impact statement before taking action with

potential adverse consequences to the environment. Id. Our

decision in Florida Audubon involved a similar fact pattern. 94

F.3d at 662-63. A common element in those cases is that the

same actor was responsible for the procedural defect and the

injurious final agency action. Under those circumstances, the

case law relieves the plaintiff of the need to demonstrate that (1)

the agency action would have been different but for the

procedural violation, and (2) that court-ordered compliance with

the procedure would alter the final result. Lujan, 504 U.S. at

572 n.7. 

In this case the ultimate source of injury is two steps

removed from the alleged procedural defect. There is the intrafederal link between the Assistant Secretary’s alleged failure to

consider air quality impact and his decision to withdraw the

adverse impact letter, and there is the federal-state link between

withdrawal of the impact report and the Montana DEQ’s

decision to approve the Roundup Plant permit. The relaxation

of procedural standing requirements would excuse National

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 6 of 10
7

Parks from having to prove the causal relationship regarding the

Interior Department’s action, but its burden regarding the action

of the Montana authorities would not change. See Ctr. for Law

&Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(“[T]his Court assumes the causal relationship between the

procedural defect and the final agency action. Nonetheless,

[plaintiffs] still must demonstrate a causal relationship between

the final action and the alleged injuries.”). 

If the claim is that Interior’s withdrawal of its adverse

impact letter was arbitrary and capricious, then we need only

concern ourselves with the connection between the federal

action and the outcome of the permitting process in Montana.

On the other hand, if the claim should be viewed as a procedural

injury, we need not inquire into whether the procedural defect

influenced the final action of the Interior Department. Either

option leaves us in essentially the same place. Regardless

whether National Parks’ injury is procedural or substantive in

nature, the question of standing must turn on the strength of the

link between Interior’s action and the ultimate permitting

decision of the Montana DEQ. 

B.

To satisfy the causation requirement of Article III standing,

National Parks had to show a causal link between Interior’s

withdrawal of its adverse impact letter and the Montana DEQ’s

decision to issue the power plant permit. See Nat’l Wrestling

Coaches, 366 F.3d at 938 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). A

“substantial probability” that Interior’s action “created a

demonstrable risk, or caused a demonstrable increase in an

existing risk, of injury to the particularized interests of” National

Parks will suffice. Fla. Audubon, 94 F.3d at 669. 

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 7 of 10
8

The Montana DEQ has discretionary authority to conduct

an independent evaluation when it receives a federal adverse

impact report. MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.8.1109. But in this case it

did not do so. Interior’s withdrawal of its impact letter was

virtually dispositive of the state permitting decision. MONT.

DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PERMITTING & COMPLIANCE DIV.,

RECORD OF DECISION FOR ROUNDUP POWER PROJECT, Jan. 31,

2003, reprinted in App. 48-49 (“[T]he federal land managers

have withdrawn their finding of adverse visibility impact on

nearby mandatory federal Class I areas, so DEQ has not

determined that an adverse impact on visibility may result from

the proposed action.”). In addition, federal regulations and the

Montana air quality regulations are intertwined such that the

challenged federal action “alters the legal regime to which the

[local] agency action is subject.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154, 169 (1997). Had Interior not withdrawn its adverse impact

report, the Montana DEQ would have been bound to consider

that report before proceeding with its permitting decision and,

crucially, would have been required to justify its decision in

writing if it disagreed with the federal report. MONT. ADMIN. R.

17.8.1109. This regime is not specific to Montana. All states

must promulgate rules such as Montana’s in order to comply

with federal regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 51.307(a)(3) (“Where the

State finds that such an analysis does not demonstrate to the

satisfaction of the State that an adverse impact will result, . . .

the State must, in the notice of public hearing, either explain its

decision or give notice as to where the explanation can be

obtained.”). 

The existence of this formal legal relationship undermines

Interior’s suggested analogy to Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976), which

it uses to argue that the Montana DEQ is an independent actor

whose intervening action breaks the causal chain. In Simon a

class of indigents sued the Internal Revenue Service, claiming

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 8 of 10
9

that an IRS ruling reduced tax incentives for hospitals offering

free health care to indigents, and therefore would result in

indigents being deprived of free health care. The Court found

this to be too speculative and attenuated a connection between

federal agency action and the action of private parties, which

IRS could neither anticipate nor control. Id. By contrast, when

Interior acts in its capacity as Federal Land Manager, the agency

exerts legal authority over the Montana DEQ; in determining

whether to release an adverse impact report, Interior expects and

intends its decision to influence the permitting authority. The

Montana DEQ is therefore not the sort of truly independent actor

who could destroy the causation required for standing. Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560-61; Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42.

C.

As to redressability, although a federal district court ruling

in favor of National Parks would not directly determine whether

the Roundup Plant will get its permit, the effect of such a ruling

would not be far removed. The permitting decision remains

open and pending before the Montana DEQ. The Montana

Supreme Court has ordered DEQ to revisit its conclusions

regarding the Roundup Plant permit and to determine anew

whether “Bull Mountain established that emissions from its

proposed project will not cause or contribute to adverse impact

on visibility in the Class I areas at issue.” Mont. Envtl. Info.

Ctr., 326 Mont. 502, at ¶ 38. A district court order setting aside

Interior’s letter withdrawing its adverse impact determination

doubtless would significantly affect these ongoing proceedings.

That is enough to satisfy redressability. “A significant increase

in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that

directly redresses the injury suffered” will suffice for standing.

Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002).

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 9 of 10
10

We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court

dismissing the action for the lack of standing and remand the

case for further proceedings.

 So ordered.

USCA Case #04-5327 Document #903434 Filed: 07/01/2005 Page 10 of 10