Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07152/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 1997 Decided July 8, 1997 

No. 96-7152

LAWRENCE D. MUNGIN,

APPELLEE

v.

KATTEN MUCHIN & ZAVIS, A/K/A KATTEN MUCHIN ZAVIS &

WEITZMAN, F/D/B/A KATTEN

MUCHIN ZAVIS & DOMBROFF,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(94cv02286)

Andrew L. Frey argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was Donald M. Falk.

Abbey G. Hairston argued the cause for appellee. With 

her on the brief was Koteles Alexander.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and RANDOLPH, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Chief Judge EDWARDS.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: In July 1994, Mark Dombroff 

left the law firm that bore his nameKatten Muchin Zavis & 

Dombroffthe Washington, D.C., branch of Chicago's Katten 

Muchin & Zavis. Principally because of Dombroff's departure, defections and terminations reduced the number of 

lawyers in the D.C. office from 42 to 14. Lawrence Mungin, 

an associate in the D.C. office, was among the lawyers who 

left the firm. He departed on July 25, 1994.

In September 1994, Mungin filed a racial discrimination 

charge with the EEOC. The EEOC took no action on his 

claim. Mungin then sued the firm and several of its current 

and former partners, asserting violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1981, 

Title VII, and the D.C. Human Rights Act. Pretrial proceedings eliminated the individual defendants from all claims and 

narrowed Mungin's § 1981 claim (but not his coextensive 

claims under Title VII and the D.C. statute) to the firm's 

failure to consider him for partnership the year before his 

departure. By special verdict, a jury found for Mungin, 

imposing liability on the firm for (1) race-based constructive 

discharge; and (2) racially discriminatory treatment with 

respect to (a) Mungin's starting salary, (b) his 1994 salary, (c) 

his work assignments, and (d) his consideration for partnership.

The jury awarded Mungin $1 million in compensatory 

damages, and an additional $1.5 million in punitive damages. 

After the district court entered judgment, and denied Katten's motion for judgment as a matter of law, see Mungin v. 

Katten Muchin & Zavis, 941 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D.D.C. 1996), 

the firm filed this appeal.

I. Factual Background

A 1983 Harvard Law School graduate, Mungin had worked 

at several firms. Immediately before his move to Katten, he 

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1 Except where otherwise indicated, the facts presented in this 

introductory section are those that Mungin conveyed in his testimony at trial. 

was an associate in the D.C. office of Powell, Goldstein, 

Frazer & Murphy.1 When the Powell firm began experiencing financial difficulties it froze associate salaries. At the 

time, Mungin was making $87,000 per year. In February 

1992 Mungin informed the Powell firm of his plan to leave 

that May. In March 1992, a legal headhunter sent Mungin's 

résumé to Dombroff, who was both the hiring partner and 

managing partner of Katten in D.C. Accompanying the 

résumé was the headhunter's note pitching Mungin: not only 

would Mungin bring with him a $250,000 to $500,000 book of 

business, but "he is a minority." Letter from Peter Yenne, 

Keith Ross & Associates, Inc., to Mark Dombroff (Mar. 20, 

1992).

When he interviewed with Dombroff in April, Mungin said 

he was interested in bankruptcy work and "was looking for a 

law firm with an established practice, because," contrary to 

headhunter's note, he "didn't have a book of business of" his 

"own." Trial Transcript at 147. Mungin also wanted to be 

considered for partnership the following year. Dombroff 

allayed Mungin's concerns. He told Mungin that he, as the 

biggest rainmaker at the firm, generated work, as did a new 

partner in the D.C. office, Jeff Sherman. Combined with the 

possibility of doing work with Katten's offices in Chicago and 

Los Angeles, Mungin "would be more than busy." Id. On 

the spot, Dombroff offered Mungin a position as a sixth-year 

associate, with annual pay of $91,000. As was the firm's 

policy, Mungin could be considered for partnership the following year.

Before accepting the offer, Mungin met with Jeff Sherman, 

the only bankruptcy partner in Washington. Sherman told 

Mungin that "there was plenty of bankruptcy" work in Washington, generated by Sherman himself, as well as by Dombroff, and that he "was hoping to get work from Chicago." 

Id. at 151. Mungin accepted the position at the Katten firm, 

contingent on being able to visit the firm's home office. 

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Chicago was the headquarters of the firm's Finance and 

Reorganization department, the department encompassing 

the bankruptcy lawyers in Washington. Mungin joined the 

firm on May 1, 1992, and visited Chicago on June 3, 1992. In 

Chicago, Mungin met one of the two heads of the Finance 

Department, Laurie Goldstein; the other department head, 

Vince Sergi, was not available. Mungin's starting salary was 

$92,000, an amount he negotiated after the firm's initial offer 

of $91,000.

In the beginning, Mungin kept busy, receiving his work 

almost exclusively through Jeff Sherman and Mark Dombroff, 

with Sherman serving as Mungin's supervisor and mentor. 

Then the bankruptcy work started drying up. In February 

1993, Sherman left the firm along with Stuart Soberman, the 

only other bankruptcy associate in Katten's D.C. office. 

Mungin thus wound up as the only bankruptcy attorney in the 

D.C. office.

Concerned about his partnership chances in an office without the work he was trained to perform or attorneys to 

supervise him, Mungin traveled to Chicago in February 1993 

to meet more members of the Finance and Reorganization 

department. Mungin hoped his trip would result in the 

Chicago office referring more work to him. Although Vince 

Sergi was too busy to meet with Mungin, Mungin did meet 

with several attorneys and attended a department meeting 

where he was introduced to everyone.

The intra-firm marketing with the Chicago, as well as Los 

Angeles and Milan attorneys, proved unsuccessful. To keep 

Mungin busy, in April 1993 Sergi recommended that Mungin 

handle work then being done by a first-year associate in 

Chicago. Patricia Gilmore, a D.C. partner who worked closely with Dombroff, lowered Mungin's billing rate (which imperfectly reflected the level of responsibility with which he was 

entrusted) to $125 per hour, down from $185 per hour.

Meanwhile, it was coming time for Mungin's annual performance review. But at the designated timeOctober 1993

nothing happened. Mungin kept quiet, wanting to lie low 

while the firm accepted nominations for partnership. AlUSCA Case #96-7152 Document #283106 Filed: 07/08/1997 Page 4 of 19
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though there was a buzz in the office about who was being 

considered for partnership, no partners told Mungin they 

would sponsor him for partnership.

Also in autumn 1993, the firm made its compensation 

decisions. Mungin received an annual bonus, in the amount 

of $4,000. His base salary for 1994 remained unchanged from 

1993. Mungin asked the firm's human resources director 

why he had not received a raise; the director told him to talk 

to Sergi. If the firm's failure to give him a raise was not 

some sort of oversight, it made Mungin want the performance 

evaluation that much more: without an explanation of why 

the firm thought his performance sub-par, Mungin thought 

that he risked being denied a raise for the following year. 

Mungin scheduled a meeting for December 6, 1993, with 

Sergi and the new co-head of the department, David Heller.

When Mungin arrived in Chicago on December 6, Sergi 

was there, Heller was not. Sergi presented Mungin with the 

two performance reviews partners had prepared, one by 

Dombroff, the other by Gilmore; the other partners for 

whom Mungin had worked had not filled out the evaluation 

forms. Gilmore's evaluation was positive overall:

Much of Larry's time is consumed by routine tasks, such 

as drafting status letters to our client. Occasionally we 

receive a challenging assignment from AIG [a large 

client], which Larry accomplishes with great skill. AIG 

is a very difficult client and Larry's ongoing efforts to 

coordinate with me have made a potentially troublesome 

situation, relatively easy. I do not believe that, for the 

most part, AIG offers challenging work to Larry. Larry 

nonetheless accomplishes the tasks for AIG with a helpful attitude and a willingness to tackle the unique problems this client presents.

Plaintiff's Exhibit II, reprinted in Joint Appendix 213. Sergi 

saw this not as a substantive evaluationthat is, a description 

of Mungin's skills and weaknessesbut as a testament to his 

affability. Sergi also stated that Gilmore was not respected 

by the firm, and that her opinions would not help Mungin 

achieve partnership. Dombroff's evaluation said that he was 

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"not in a position to judge the quality of Larry's work," but 

that Mungin "has always appeared cooperative and willing to 

get the job done." Plaintiff's Exhibit HH, reprinted in Joint 

Appendix 209. Mungin gave Sergi the names of the other 

partners for whom he had worked so that Sergi could solicit 

evaluations from clients with whom Mungin had contact.

Mungin asked Sergi why he had not received a raise. 

Sergi responded that his name just had not come up in 

connection with compensation discussions or, for that matter, 

partnership considerations. Sergi told Mungin that although 

he had not been considered for partnership in 1993, he would 

still be eligible the following year. Mungin also asked Sergi 

for a marketing allowance, a perquisite usually reserved for 

partners seeking to recruit clients. Mungin never received 

the allowance. After the meeting the quality of work assigned to Mungin did not improve. He found himself still 

doing work he believed less-experienced attorneys could have 

performed. But on December 10, 1993, the firm did raise 

Mungin's salary to $108,000, retroactive to October 1, 1993.

Effective July 15, 1994, Dombroff and Gilmore would leave 

the Katten firm to form their own firm, Dombroff & Gilmore, 

P.C. In May 1994, Sergi called Mungin and asked him what 

he expected to do in the wake of Dombroff's and Gilmore's 

departure. Mungin was surprised by Sergi's question since 

he had assumed that in light of the departures, the firm 

would, as a matter of course, more closely integrate him into 

the Chicago bankruptcy practice. Instead, Sergi asked Mungin if he would consider moving to Katten's New York office. 

Mungin did not find this option appealing because the firm 

had no bankruptcy lawyers in New York. Mungin did not 

reject the New York option outright. Instead, he asked 

about the firm's severance policies so that he could compare 

the benefits and drawbacks of leaving the firm with the 

alternative of moving to New York.

Shortly thereafter, Mungin spoke with Dick Waller, an 

attorney who had become an administrator in the Chicago 

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cating to Chicago. Mungin felt this option was not attractive 

since Sergi, in whose department Mungin would be working 

in Chicago, did not advance that option himself. On July 7, 

1994, Mungin sent the following electronic mail message to 

Waller:

Unfortunately, due to personal constraints and other 

considerations I cannot possibly move to New York or 

Chicago at this time. Because you have made it clear 

that there is not enough work in the D.C. office to keep 

me busy and that my only alternative is to be laid off, I 

would like to discuss an appropriate amount of time to 

search for a job and an appropriate departure date.

Electronic Mail Message from Lawrence Mungin to Richard 

Waller (July 7, 1994). Mungin arranged his severance with 

Waller: he would be terminated on July 25, 1994, and would 

receive severance pay through October 25, 1994.

After the EEOC failed to pursue Mungin's claim, on October 19, 1994, the firm reiterated its offer to transfer Mungin 

to either Chicago or New York, and for the first time offered 

to transfer him to Katten's Los Angeles office. The firm 

made clear that it would reimburse Mungin for any costs 

incurred in connection with a transfer, and that he would 

"continue to be considered for salary increases and partnership on the same basis as other associates." Letter from 

Allan B. Muchin, Managing Partner, Katten Muchin & Zavis, 

to Lawrence D. Mungin 1 (Oct. 19, 1994). The firm anticipated "that the work available in any of the other three offices" 

would put it "in a position to consider [Mungin] for partnership within a year." Id. at 2. Mungin thought these were 

not bona fide offers, and pursued the litigation that is now 

before us.

II. Standard of Review

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an 

unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 

or privileges of employment, because of," among other proUSCA Case #96-7152 Document #283106 Filed: 07/08/1997 Page 7 of 19
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tected categories, "such individual's race, [or] color." 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). District of Columbia law proscribes the 

same conduct. See D.C. CODE § 1-2512(a). If the firm 

discriminated against Mungin by not considering him for 

partnershipthus depriving him of the opportunity to enter a 

new contractual relationship with the firm, as partnerit 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), which guarantees that all persons within the United States shall have the same right "to 

make and enforce contracts." See Patterson v. McLean 

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989). The burdens of 

persuasion and production for claims raised under § 1981 or 

under the D.C. law are identical to those for claims alleging 

discriminatory treatment in violation of Title VII. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186-87 (42 U.S.C. § 1981); American 

Univ. v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 422 

(D.C. 1991) (D.C. CODE § 1-2512(a)(1)).

Under the Title VII scheme first described in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the burdens 

of production shift from employee to employer. The plaintiff 

"must first establish, by a preponderance of the evidence," a 

prima facie case of racial discrimination. St. Mary's Honor 

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). If the employee 

succeeds, the employer must introduce evidence of "some 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its purportedly discriminatory action, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 

evidence "legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the" 

employer, Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248, 255 (1981). If the employer does so, "the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted." Id. The 

burden of persuasion, having "at all times" been borne by the 

employee, then requires the employee to show that the employer's "proffered reason was not the true reason for the 

employment decision," Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256), "and that race was," Hicks, 509 U.S. at 

508. Thus, "[w]here the defendant has done everything that 

would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made 

out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no 

longer relevant." U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).

Once the case has been fully tried, and the plaintiff and 

defendant have satisfied their burdens of production, "the 

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McDonnell Douglas frameworkwith its presumptions and 

burdensis no longer relevant." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510. We 

therefore turn to the question whether Mungin met his 

burden of persuasionthat is, whether a reasonable juror 

could find that the firm discriminated against him on the 

basis of his race. See Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1276 

(D.C. Cir. 1995).

III. Mungin's Claims of Discrimination

We will examine each of Mungin's claims roughly in chronological order: first his 1992 salary; then his 1994 salary; 

the quality of his work assignments; partnership consideration; and finally, his discharge.

A. Starting Salary

In support of his argument that his $92,000 starting salary 

was discriminatorily low, Mungin demonstrated that every 

sixth-year associate enjoyed a salary ranging from $95,000 to 

$102,000, that they were white and that he is black. The 

evidence showed, however, that Katten offered to associates 

who are lateral hires from firms paying less, salaries midway 

between the associate's former salary and the salary Katten 

pays its current associates.

Mungin never carried his burden of explaining how the 

firm's actual decision in his case was based on race. Not "all 

of the relevant aspects of" his "employment situation were 

'nearly identical' to those" of the associates to whom he 

compared himself. Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks &

Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Pierce v. 

Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 

1994)); see also Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1032 (1st Cir. 

1995). Mungin's mistake was comparing himself to homegrown associates, rather than to lateral entries like himself. 

Mungin offered nothing to show that the firm's reason for 

hiring him at $92,000 was pretextual. On appeal, he argues 

that Katten "never demonstrated that such a policy was ever 

consistently and systematically enforced." Supplemental Final Brief of the Appellee at 17. If this were so, we would 

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2

In any event, as we shall soon see, by 1994 Mungin did catch 

up. 

ates to whom this policy was not enforced. He has not. 

Since it is Mungin's burden of persuasion, his argument 

without evidence fails to prove that the firm's reason was 

pretextual. 

Mungin offers another reason for finding the firm's policy 

pretextual: "his base salary never caught up with the salary 

levels of Caucasian attorneys in his class." Supplemental 

Final Brief of the Appellee at 17. We fail to see what this 

has to do with his starting salary. While it is potentially 

evidence of the firm's later discriminationdiscrimination 

with respect to Mungin's 1994 salary, for instanceit brings 

nothing to bear on whether the firm engaged in racial discrimination by starting him at $92,000.2

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (noting that the 

"critical inquiry" is whether discrimination "was a factor in 

the employment decision at the moment it was made").

B. 1994 Salary

As to Mungin's 1994 salary, he not only asserts that 

$108,000 was discriminatorily low, but he also complains that 

he had to ask for a raise. The firm, he says, did not provide 

him with the compensation review which would have led to his 

salary being raised sua sponte. The problem for Mungin is 

that he introduced no evidence that he was underpaid relative 

to his peers. He claims to have shown that the average base 

salary in 1994 for the 1986 class was $116,000, while he 

ultimately received $108,000. Mungin does not explain where 

the $116,000 figure comes from and we understand why. 

When the average base salaries of all associates are calculatedthose in Washington, Chicago, and Los Angeleswe 

arrive at $116,000. But this calculation includes the mean 

salary in Los Angeles of $121,250, and in Chicago of $115,370. 

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, reprinted in Joint Appendix 142-45; 

Defendant's Exhibit K2, reprinted in Joint Appendix 228-31. 

The mean salary in Washington, excluding Mungin's, was 

$108,800. See id., reprinted in Joint Appendix 230. MunUSCA Case #96-7152 Document #283106 Filed: 07/08/1997 Page 10 of 19
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gin's unstated assumption must be that the firm's D.C. associates should receive the same salaries as those in the other 

cities. But he offered no proof of this and he did not give the 

jury any basis to conclude that these D.C. attorneys were 

similarly situated to their Chicago or Los Angeles counterparts.

Mungin also states that three of his colleagues in D.C., 

Dane Jacques, Jonathan Stern, and John Henderson, received 

base salaries of $120,000. Supplemental Final Brief of the 

Appellee at 11. Two of these individuals, Jacques and Stern, 

became partners during 1994, and their salaries were increased accordingly. Both made $120,000 in 1994. See Trial 

Transcript at 891. Mungin's situation is not comparable; he 

takes issue with his 1994 base salary as an associate, not a 

partner. Jacques's base salary as an associate was $115,000; 

Stern's was $117,000. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, reprinted in 

Joint Appendix 144; Defendant's Exhibit K2, reprinted in

Joint Appendix 230. As to Henderson, Mungin cites no 

evidence to back up his claim that Henderson made $120,000; 

the record indicates that Henderson received $104,000. Id.

When we use these salariesJacques's $115,000, Stern's 

$117,000, and Henderson's $104,000along with those of the 

two other associates in D.C., Judith Rayner and John Enerson (each earning $104,000), we arrive at the figure we 

mentioned earlier$108,800, nearly identical to the salary 

Mungin received.

Thus, Mungin's 1994 salary was not discriminatorily low, 

and the district court recognized as much, stating in its 

Memorandum Opinion that "with respect to his salary for 

1994, plaintiff has not shown and does not argue that his 1994 

salary level was below that of similarly situated white lawyers." Mungin, 941 F. Supp. at 155. The only possible basis 

for inferring discrimination, then, deals with Mungin's seeking (and getting) a raise for 1994. The firm's putting him in 

the position of having to ask for a salary increase, Mungin 

asserts, discriminated against him on account of race.

At oral argument (and somewhat less clearly in its briefs), 

the Katten firm argued that in light of Milton v. Weinberger,

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696 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the fact that Mungin 

ultimately received his raise eliminated any potential liability 

for discrimination. As Milton makes clear, however, the noharm no-foul rule discussed in the opinion, a rule derived 

from Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per 

curiam), "has nothing to do with whether a defendant is guilty 

of discrimination, but instead focuses on the question of 

remedy." Milton, 696 F.2d at 98. Furthermore, shortly 

after we decided Milton, we expressly rejected the application of Day v. Mathews to cases, such as this, alleging 

disparate treatment of an individual employee rather than of 

a group of employees pursuing litigation through a class 

action. See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 

1983) (Scalia, J.); see also Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219, 

224 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Katten is on more solid ground in observing that other 

circuits have reached the conclusion it seeks: that "interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon 

employment ... were not intended to fall within the direct 

proscriptions of ... Title VII." Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 

233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc); accord Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 

777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995). But see Hayes v. Shalala, 902 

F. Supp. 259, 266-67 (D.D.C. 1995); cf. Harris v. Forklift 

Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). We have never decided 

the issue, however, and we do not need to do so here.

Mungin never proved that in failing to receive a performance review or a raise the firm treated him differently than 

other associates. One year earlier, Stuart Soberman, the 

white bankruptcy associate in the D.C. office, failed to receive 

a raise, and had to pursue the same sort of recourse Mungin 

did. Mungin also never showed that the firm's failure to give 

him a substantive evaluation was unusual. Although it was 

the firm's formal "policy" to provide substantive reviews 

semiannually, see Katten Muchin & Zavis Firm Reference 

Manual § 2.5 (Aug. 1991), an "employer's failure 'to follow its 

own regulations and procedures, alone, may not be sufficient 

to support' the conclusion that its explanation for the challenged employment action is pretextual." Fischbach v. D.C. 

Dep't of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 

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(quoting Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 

1982)). When an employer's "departure from the prescribed 

procedure" has become "the norm," that departure "lends no 

support at all to the plaintiff's inference that" the employer's 

departure "is a pretext." Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183. Mungin presented no evidence that the firm ever consistently 

abided by its policy. The uncontroverted evidence in the 

record is that the firm at best sporadically provided substantive evaluations. The witnesseswhether put on the stand 

by Mungin or Kattenuniformly testified that they never 

received regular or formal reviews; the reviews they did 

receive amounted to no more than a pat on the back. See

Trial Transcript at 597 (testimony of defense witness Mark 

Thomas); id. at 735 (testimony of defense witness Stuart 

Soberman); id. at 799 (testimony of plaintiff's witness 

Charles Thomson). As against this, Mungin presented nothing. We suppose he could have offered testimony of finance 

and reorganization attorneys who received the sort of meaningful review Mungin claims he was denied. But Mungin 

directs our attention to no such testimony, and scouring the 

record, we find none. The only witness even arguably in 

Mungin's favor was Elaine Williams. She was a young 

partner who switched from Katten's corporate department to 

the finance and reorganization department in 1990. As an 

associate, she was never reviewed by anyone in the finance 

and reorganization department, and as a partner she could 

not recall Chicago lawyers ever reviewing D.C. attorneys. 

Having presented no evidence to cast doubt on the firm's 

legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, we conclude that no 

reasonable juror could find that the firm denied Mungin a 

review on the basis of his race.

C. Work Assignments

Mungin's next complaint is that the firm discriminated 

against him by providing him with unchallenging work on the 

basis of his race. Katten conceded that Mungin received 

"routine bankruptcy work," and not the more sophisticated 

work for which he was hired. Brief for the Appellant, Final 

Version, at 26. But the firm showed that after the D.C. 

office's bankruptcy work dried up, causing Sherman and 

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Soberman to depart in February 1993, it was left with no 

other bankruptcy lawyers in the D.C. office except Mungin, 

and with little bankruptcy work.

Mungin tells us that to show pretext, he presented evidence 

of "numerous occasions where complex bankruptcy work originated from" Katten's "D.C. office only to be assigned to 

other" Katten "offices around the country." Supplemental 

Final Brief of the Appellee at 22. No such evidence exists. 

Mungin only introduced proof of one assignment rerouted 

from D.C. to Chicagoa matter in Chicago bankruptcy court 

handled by a partner and associate in Chicago who already 

had successfully handled a major, similar matter for the same 

client. Trial Transcript at 600-01, 808-09. This single instance is grossly insufficient to constitute a plausible discrimination claim. In an analogous context, we recently noted that 

the factfinder "may not 'second-guess an employer's personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.' " 

Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Milton v. Weinberger,

696 F.2d at 100). Thus, when an employer makes a hiring 

decision, "[s]hort of finding that the employer's stated reason 

was indeed a pretext ... the court must respect the employer's unfettered discretion to choose among qualified candidates." Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183. The same standard 

holds true when an employer decides which of several qualified employees will work on a particular assignment. Perhaps in recognition of the judicial micromanagement of business practices that would result if we ruled otherwise, other 

circuits have held that changes in assignments or workrelated duties do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions if unaccompanied by a decrease in salary or 

work hour changes. See, e.g., Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt.,

97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1996); Crady v. Liberty Nat'l 

Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993); see also 

Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th 

Cir. 1996). An employer has discretion to assign work to 

equally qualified employees so long as "the decision is not 

based upon unlawful criteria." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. 

The jury had no basis for thinking the Chicago attorneys who 

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3 Katten also argued that Mungin's low billable hours explained 

why he was not considered for partnership. The facts on this 

subject were disputed, and we therefore assume that the jury did 

not credit the firm's explanation. 

fied than he, or that race played a factor in the firm's decision 

to staff the Chicago bankruptcy matter with attorneys in 

Chicago.

D. Partnership Consideration

Next comes Mungin's claim that the firm unlawfully failed 

to consider him for partnership in the summer of 1993 and 

thus deprived him of the remunerative and other rewards 

partnership brings. Mungin does not argue that the firm 

must make every eligible associate a member of the firm's 

partnership. Instead, he claims that he "was unquestionably 

qualified to at least be considered for partnership pursuant 

to" Katten's "procedures," and that "he was the only eligible 

associate who was not formally evaluated." Supplemental 

Final Brief of the Appellee at 24.

Mungin introduced evidence that department heads would 

confer with the other partners in their departments to recommend particular associates for partnership. The recommendations then passed through several more committeesthe 

committee comprised of all the department heads, the partnership review committee, the executive committee, and finally the board of directorswith names being screened out 

along the way.

The firm presented evidence to establish that Mungin's 

lack of sophisticated bankruptcy experience and that the 

disappearance of bankruptcy work for which he was hired 

precluded him from qualification for partnership.3 As in the 

case of Mungin's 1994 pay, we need not decide whether an 

"interlocutory or mediate decision[ ] having no immediate 

effect on employment"here the partnership nomination that 

would not have resulted in Mungin's becoming a partner

"fall[s] within the direct proscriptions of ... Title VII" or, for 

that matter, § 1981 or the D.C. statute. Page, 645 F.2d at 

233.

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Mungin never contested the fact that associates are 

screened out from consideration at the first round, when the 

department head and/or the partners in that department 

decide not to nominate certain associates to the committee of 

department heads. It was well within Sergi's authority to 

decline to recommend finance and reorganization department 

associates for partnership. Sergi testified that no one in his 

department could recommend Mungin for partnership, so no 

one did. Trial Transcript at 971. Mungin found himself in a 

bind. The insurance group headed by Dombroff tried to 

build a bankruptcy practice of its own, but failed. Mungin 

was left trying to secure partnership from a department in 

which no one had worked extensively with him. Mungin 

offered absolutely nothing that would have permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that the firm discriminated against 

him when it failed to consider him for partnership. He tried 

to establish that the insurance group headed by Dombroff 

had certain procedures for recommending partners. But the 

partnership decisions were made by departments, and in 

Mungin's case, by the finance and reorganization department, 

not the insurance department. Without any evidence that 

this departmentthe one that chose not to nominate him

acted discriminatorily, Mungin failed to prove a claim.

E. Constructive Discharge

Mungin's last ground to support the verdict is his alleged 

constructive discharge. He claims the firm's offers to transfer him to New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles, were not bona 

fide, and that he deserved a more genuine offer to transfer to 

those offices, and more information so that he could make an 

informed decision whether to move. With respect to the 

computation of back pay, however, the district court concluded that Mungin "had no reasonable expectation of continued 

employment in Katten Muchin's Washington office after October 1994." Mungin, 941 F. Supp. at 156. The court based 

this decision on the following reasons:

In July 1994, Katten, Muchin decided to close down the 

insurance practice that had provided work for plaintiff 

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and a number of other lawyers in its Washington office. 

Between July and November 1994, defections and terminations reduced the number of lawyers in Katten, Muchin's Washington office from 42 to 14. The firm terminated all five of the Washington office associates whose 

work had been supported by Mark Dombroff's insurance 

clients but who were left behind by Dombroff's departure.

Id. We agree with the district court that Mungin had no 

reasonable expectation of continued employment, but unlike 

the district court, we find that this prevents Mungin from 

having any basis for a constructive discharge claim.

Even without the district court's finding, we would conclude 

that there was no constructive discharge. Circuit law is clear 

that a "finding of constructive discharge depends on whether 

the employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable and drove the employee" out. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 

1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (internal citations and modifications omitted). Constructive discharge thus requires a finding of discrimination and the existence of certain "aggravating factors." Id. at 1174; see also Dashnaw v. Peña, 12 F.3d 

1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994). (These "aggravating factors" are 

those things that would force an employee to leave. Clark,

665 F.2d at 1174.) Having rejected all of Mungin's disparate 

treatment claims, we are left without any discriminatory acts 

upon which Mungin could rest his constructive discharge 

claim. And, as the district court said, Mungin ultimately was 

treated better than his peers, for unlike the four white 

associates who, after Dombroff's departure, were terminated 

without the opportunity to relocate, Mungin had a chance to 

stay with the firm. We therefore conclude that the jury had 

no basis for a finding of constructive discharge.

IV. Conclusion

Because the evidence was insufficient "for a reasonable 

jury to have reached the challenged verdict," the judgment of 

the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for 

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4 Our holding is not affected by this court's decision in Aka v. 

Washington Hospital Center, No. 96-7089 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 1997), 

slip op. at 9-12, which dealt with the question whether plaintiffs 

need to show more than pretext in rebutting an employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Aka held that no such extra 

showing is required. See id. In this case, however, Mungin either 

failed to establish a prima facie case or failed to offer any evidence 

showing that Katten's nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. 

entry of a judgment for the defendant.4 Barbour v. Merrill,

48 F.3d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kolstad v. American 

Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'g en 

banc granted (May 28, 1997) (Nos. 96-7030 & 96-7047).

Reversed and remanded.

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EDWARDS, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part: I dissent from the majority's reversal of the jury 

finding of discrimination. Although a close question, there 

was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have concluded that Katten Muchin intentionally discriminated against 

Mungin on the basis of race.

I agree, however, that there was insufficient evidence to 

support a finding of "constructive discharge." The vast majority of Mungin's time at Katten Muchin was spent doing 

work for Mark Dombroff's and Patricia Gilmore's clients. 

Dombroff and Gilmore left Katten Muchin in July 1994 to 

form their own firm, and there was no record evidence to 

indicate that there was sufficient work in the D.C. office after 

their departure to support Mungin's continued employment. 

Indeed, four other associates lost their jobs at the same time 

as Mungin. As such, Mungin had no reasonable expectation 

of employment in the D.C. office after Dombroff's and Gilmore's departure. In addition, Mungin turned down offers to 

move to Katten Muchin's Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles offices, and it is undisputed that there was bankruptcy 

work in the Chicago office. Thus, I would reverse on the 

basis that no reasonable jury could have found that Mungin 

was constructively discharged. Because the compensatory 

and punitive damages were based in part on this finding, I 

would remand the damage awards to the District Court.

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