Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01086/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01086-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:881 Forfeiture Property-Drugs

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`

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUGER 9MM HANDGUN, 

SERIAL NO. 305-43453,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01086-AWI-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 16) 

In this civil forfeiture action, Plaintiff United States of America (“Government”) seeks (1)

default judgment against the interest of James Michael Walters in a Ruger 9 mm. handgun, serial

number 305-43453 (the “defendant property”) and (2) entry of a final forfeiture judgment to vest

in the Government all right, title and interest in the defendant property. The Government’s

motion has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule

72-302(c)(19) and is considered in accordance with Local Rule A-540(d). 

This Court has reviewed the papers and has determined that this matter is suitable for

decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). Having considered all written

materials submitted, the undersigned recommends that the District Court grant the Government

default judgment, enter final forfeiture judgment to vest in the Government all right, title and

interest in the defendant property, and order the Government, within ten (10) days of service of

an order adopting these findings and recommendations, to submit a proposed default and final

forfeiture judgment consistent with these findings and recommendations.

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I. Factual Background1

In January 2007, a confidential informant (“CI”) advised Fresno Police Department

officers of the narcotics trafficking activities of an individual known to CI as Alonso. Officers

later identified Alonso as Alonso Tellez. On January 19, 2007, on behalf of Fresno police

officers, CI arranged to buy sixteen pounds of methamphetamine from Alonso at the Denny’s

Restaurant at Parkway and Olive Avenues in Fresno. 

Thereafter, police surveillance units saw Alonso, Delfino Salazar, and Gilbert Garcia

arrive in the Denny’s parking lot in a green 1998 Ford Expedition. After Alonso introduced

Delfino to CI, they began negotiating the crystal meth purchase. Garcia remained in the car. CI

assured Alonso and Delfino that she had sufficient funds to complete her purchase, offering to

show them the money. 

CI then telephoned an undercover officer (“UO”) to bring the money to Denny’s parking

lot. Upon UO’s arrival, CI and Delfino walked to UO’s vehicle to see the money, then walked

away. Moments later, CI telephoned UO to advise that Delfino had placed a call to have an

unidentified person deliver the crystal meth.

Two hours later, surveillance units saw Felipe Serrano Salazar and Jesus Roberto Salazar

Sicairos drive a red Ford Explorer into Denny’s lot and park next to the Expedition. After CI,

Delfino, Alonso, and Garcia walked over to the Explorer, Delfino opened a yellow igloo [cooler],

revealing twelve to fifteen pounds of crystal meth. At CI’s prearranged signal, police moved in

and arrested Delfino, Alonso, Garcia, Felipe, and Sicairos.

After receiving Miranda warnings, Delfino gave police officers permission to search his

home, claiming that it contained four more pounds of crystal meth and drug profits totaling about

$30,000 cash. In the floor joints [sic] of Delfino’s basement, officers discovered the defendant

property wrapped in a towel, a pay-owe ledger, and a cereal box containing two bags of

suspected methamphetamine and a bag of suspected cocaine.

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These facts were derived from the Government’s application and from the Court’s records.

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II. Procedural Background

On June 19, 2009, the Government filed its complaint for forfeiture in rem, alleging that

the defendant property was subject to forfeiture to the Government under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)

because it constituted a firearm used or intended to be used to facilitate the transportation, sale,

receipt, possession or concealment of a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841, et seq., and was therefore subject to forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(11)

(Doc. 1). On June 26, 2009, based on the allegations set forth in the complaint (Doc. 1), the

Clerk of the Court issued a Warrant for Arrest of Articles In Rem for the defendant property

(Doc. 6).

On June 29, 2009, this Court authorized publication of the forfeiture action via the

internet forfeiture website www.forfeiture.gov for at least thirty days (Doc. 7). According to the

Government’s Declaration of Service by Publication (Doc. 11), a Notice of Civil Forfeiture was

published on the official government internet site (www.forfeiture.gov) for thirty days beginning

on July 8, 2009. On July 16, 2009, Walters was personally served with notice of this action by

the U.S. Marshals Service (Doc. 10). To date, no claim or answer has been filed by Walters or

on his behalf.

As part of the Government’s Request for Entry of Default (Doc. 12), FSA Paralegal

Autumn Magee declared under penalty of perjury that on information and belief, Walters was

neither in the military service nor was an infant or incapacitated person. Walters did not file an

answer or otherwise defended this action. The Clerk entered default as to Walters on August 20,

2009 (Doc. 13). The Government moved for Default Judgment on April 15, 2010 (Doc. 16).

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Complaint

The Government contends that the allegations set forth in the verified complaint for

Forfeiture In Rem and the cited facts provide ample grounds for forfeiture of the defendant

property. A complaint’s sufficiency is one factor for consideration in deciding whether to grant

default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9 Cir. 1986). A firearm is subject th

to forfeiture if it is used or intended to be used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,

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possession or concealment of a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841, et seq.. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(11). 

The Government’s verified complaint alleges that the defendant property is subject to

forfeiture since it constitutes a firearm used or intended to be used to facilitate the transportation,

sale, possession, or concealment of a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841 et seq. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1). As set forth above and in the verified complaint, the DEA

seized the defendant property on January 19, 2007, at 102 West 6 Street, Stockton, California, th

in the course of executing a search warrant (Doc. 1 at ¶ 2).

The complaint meets the requirements of Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for

Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in

that it is verified; states the grounds for subject matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, and

venue; describes the property seized and the circumstance of its seizure; and identifies the

relevant statutes. In the absence of assertion of interests in the defendant property, this Court is

not in a position to question the facts supporting its forfeiture. As alleged, the facts set forth a

sufficient connection between the defendant property and illegal drug activity to support a

forfeiture.

II. Notice Requirements

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from taking

property without due process of law. Individuals whose property interests are at stake are

entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Government provided the required notice

to Walters.

A. Notice by Publication

Supplemental Rule G(4) provides that in lieu of newspaper publication, the Government

may publish notice “by posting notice on an official government forfeiture site for at least 30

consecutive days.” Local Admiralty and In Rem rules further provide that the Court shall

designate by order the appropriate vehicle for publication. Local Rules A-530 and 83-171. On

June 29, 2009, this Court authorized publication of the forfeiture action via the internet forfeiture

website www.forfeiture.gov for at least thirty days (Doc. 7). According to the Government’s

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Declaration of Service by Publication (Doc. 11), a Notice of Civil Forfeiture was published on

the official government internet site (www.forfeiture.gov) for thirty days beginning on July 8,

2009. Accordingly, the Government satisfied the requirements for notice to Walters by

publication.

B. Personal Notice

When the Government knows the identity of the property owner, due process requires

“the Government to make a greater effort to give him notice than otherwise would be mandated

by publication.” United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9 Cir. 1998). In such th

cases, the Government must attempt to provide actual notice by means reasonably calculated

under all circumstances to apprise the owner of the pendency of the forfeiture action. Dusenbery

v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (quotations omitted). See also Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (requiring such notice “as one desirous of

actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it”).

Supplemental Rule G(4)(b) mirrors this requirement, providing for notice to be sent by

means reasonably calculated to reach the potential claimant. Local Rule A-540 also requires that

a party seeking default judgment in an action in rem demonstrate to the Court’s satisfaction that

due notice of the arrest of the property has been given both by publication and by personal

service of the person having custody of the property, or if the property is in the hands of a law

enforcement officer, by personal service on the person who had custody of the property before its

possession by a law enforcement agency or officer. Notice must also be provided by personal

service or certified mail, return receipt requested, on every other person who has appeared in the

action and is known to have an interest in the property, provided that failure to give actual notice

to such other person may be excused upon a satisfactory showing of diligent efforts to provide

notice without success. L.R. A-540(a). Notwithstanding the Supplemental Rules and L.R. A540(a), the Government provides sufficient notice when the notice complies with the

requirements of F.R.Civ.P. 4. See F.R.Civ.P. 4(n)(1) (providing that when a federal statute

authorizes forfeiture, “[n]otice to claimants of the property shall then be sent in the manner

provided by statute or by service of a summons under this rule”). In this case, the Government

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personally served Walters with the complaint, arrest warrant, publication order, and other related

documents on July 16, 2009 (Doc. 10).

C. Failure to File Claim or Answer

Supplemental Rule G(5) requires any person who asserts an interest in or right against the

defendant property to file a claim with the Court within 35 days after service of the

Government’s complaint or 30 days after the final publication of notice. Supplemental R.

G(4)(b) & (5). Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for opposing the forfeiture

precludes a person from establishing standing as a party to the forfeiture action. Real Property,

135 F.3d at 1317. The Clerk of Court properly entered a default against Walters on August 20,

2009 (Doc. 13).

D. Default Judgment

The Government seeks judgment against the Walters’ interest in the defendant property,

and final forfeiture judgment to vest in the Government all right, title and interest in the

defendant property. The Supplemental Rules do not set forth a procedure to seek default

judgment in rem. Supplemental Rule A provides, “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also

apply to the foregoing proceedings except to the extent that they are inconsistent with these

Supplemental Rules.”

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, default entry is a prerequisite to default

judgment. “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to

plead or otherwise defend, and the failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter

the party’s default.” F.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Generally, the default entered by the clerk establishes a

defendant’s liability.

Rule 55 gives the court considerable leeway as to what it may require as a

prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment. The general rule of law is that

upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the

amount of damages, will be taken as true.

Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9 Cir. 1987) th

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As noted above, the Government properly obtained entry of default against Walters’

interest in the defendant property. There is no impediment to the default judgment sought by the

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Government against him. The Government properly seeks judgment against the interests of the

entire world, that is, a final forfeiture judgment to vest in the Government all right, title, and

interest in the defendant property. “A judgment in rem affect the interests of all persons in

designated property . . . . [T]he plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject

property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular

persons.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n. 12 (1958). Because of Walters’ default, the

Government is entitled to a final forfeiture judgment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the discussion above, this Court recommends that

1. The District Court grant Plaintiff United States of America default

judgment against the interest of James Michael Walters in the defendant

property;

2. The Clerk of Court enter final forfeiture judgment to vest in Plaintiff

United States of America all right, title and interest in the defendant

property; and

3. The District Court order Plaintiff United States of America, within ten

(10) days of service of an order adopting these findings and

recommendations, to submit a proposed default and final forfeiture

judgment consistent with the findings and recommendations and the order

adopting them.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to District Judge Anthony W. Ishii

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-304. Within fifteen (15) court days of

service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and

recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge will review these findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

///

///

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the right

to appeal the district judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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