Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02194/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02194-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY KAY HILLS, et al. 

Plaintiffs,

v.

JACK C. HURST, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 03-2194 DFL GGH

ORDER

Plaintiffs seek wrongful death damages from defendant United

States of America for the death of Roger Hills. The United

States moves for summary judgment, arguing that it is immune from

liability under the discretionary function exception to the

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Alternatively, the United

States argues that plaintiffs’ proffered evidence fails to prove

negligence. For the reasons discussed below, the motion for

summary judgment is DENIED. 

I.

Plaintiffs’ wrongful death action arises out of a

construction site accident in which a dump truck full of asphalt

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backed over decedent Hills, who was an inspector on the project

employed by PBS&J Construction Services, Inc. (Compl. ¶ 10.) At

the time of the accident, the project was under the primary

control of Contri Construction Company (“Contri”), an independent

contractor hired by the Central Federal Lands Highway Division

(“CFLHD”) of the Federal Lands Highway Program (“FLH”). (Id. ¶¶

15, 16.) CFLHD’s administered the construction contract. (Id. ¶

11.) CFLHD’s primary onsite representative was its Project

Engineer, Orrin Lee (“Lee”). (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) As Project

Engineer, Lee had the duty to address actual safety hazards. 

(Greenwell Decl. ¶ 9.) He was to notify the Contractor in

writing if he “bec[a]me aware of hazardous conditions which

result from the Contractor’s known or possible violation of

either OSHA regulations, or reasonable standards of construction

safety practice, as determined by the Project Engineer.” (UMF ¶

76.) 

Lee was not at the project site when the accident occurred. 

(Id. ¶ 42.) Lee testified that he worked with Hills on a “dayto-day basis” and considered Hills a competent inspector. (Perez

Supplemental Decl. Ex. A, 24:10, 29:11-13.) Lee recognized that

Hills wore hearing aids and was missing an arm. (Id. at 29:14-

16, 85:11-12.) Nevertheless, Lee avers that he never considered

Hills a safety risk and never saw him act in an unsafe way. (Id.

at 34:17-19, 49:1-2.) He also states that no one ever told him

that Hills was a safety risk. (Id. at 34:10-16.) 

Plaintiffs present the testimony of six witnesses who worked

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with Hills. These witnesses testified that Hills was incompetent

and “always in the way.” (Pls.’s UMF ¶ 9.) Some witnesses also

testified that they informed Lee that Hills often parked his

truck in inappropriate, unsafe locations. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20;

Donahue Decl. Ex. 2, 13:10.) 

II.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides for

jurisdiction over “claims against the United States . . . for

injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by

the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or

employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, the United States

is immune from “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary

function or duty.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 

Plaintiffs allege that Lee, an employee of the United

States, created an unsafe work environment that caused Hills’

death, thereby violating the FTCA. (Compl. ¶ 16.) The United

States contends that its actions regarding safety on the project

are “immune from challenge because they implicate discretionary

judgments grounded in public policy.” (Mot. at 1.)

At oral argument, plaintiffs conceded that the United States

is not liable under the FTCA for contracting the work, selecting

Contri, or for improperly training its employees. Rather,

plaintiffs’ sole contention is that Lee was negligent because he

was aware that Hills was a safety hazard to himself and to

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others, and he failed to fulfill his duty to inform Contri of the

problem. Plaintiffs claim that Lee’s failure to deal with the

Hills problem was not a discretionary judgment grounded in

policy, and therefore, his conduct is not within the

discretionary function exception. (Opp’n at 8.) 

A. Discretionary Function Exception

The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test to determine

when the discretionary function exception applies. Whisnant v.

United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United

States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-25 (1991); Berkovitz v.

United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1998)). First, the United

States has the burden to prove that its actions were

discretionary and involved “an element of judgment or choice.” 

Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; Whisnant, 400 F.3d at 1181. Actions

are not discretionary if they violate “a mandatory statute,

policy, or regulation.” Id. at 1180-81. If the actions were

discretionary, courts then ask if the challenged action “involved

‘political, social [or] economic judgments’ that are the unique

province of the Government.” Marlys Bear Med. v. United States,

241 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S.

at 539). 

The Ninth Circuit has “generally held that the design of a

course of governmental action is shielded by the discretionary

function exception, whereas the implementation of that course of

action is not.” Id. at 1181. In addition, safety judgments “are

rarely considered to be susceptible to social, economic, or

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political policy.” Id. “[S]afety measures, once undertaken,

cannot be shortchanged in the name of policy.” Id. at 1182

(citing Bear Med., 241 F.3d at 1215, 126-17). 

Thus, while the design of a road without guardrails is “a

choice grounded in policy considerations . . . maintaining the

road [is] a safety responsibility not susceptible to policy

analysis.” Id. at 1181 (citing ARA Leisure Servs. v. United

States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1987)). Likewise, the

decision not to line an irrigation canal with concrete is a

policy choice, but failing to remove unsuitable materials during

construction is not. Id. (citing Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v.

United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1027-28, 1031 (9th Cir. 1989)). As

applied to the facts here, the analogous syllogism would be as

follows: the decision to accept certain safety responsibilities

and place them in the project engineer is discretionary; however,

the project engineer’s failure to adequately discharge these

responsibilities is not. 

Nevertheless, the United States argues that the facts of

this case are analogous to those in United States v. S.A. Empresa

De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797

(1984). In Varig, the FAA developed a certification process for

ensuring that aircraft manufacturers complied with minimum safety

standards. Under the certification process, aircraft

manufacturers had the duty to ensure that aircrafts conformed to

FAA safety regulations. Manufacturers were required to develop

plans and specifications and to perform necessary inspections and

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tests. The FAA then reviewed the data by conducting a “spot

check” of the manufacturers’ work. 

The Varig case arose from a fire that broke out on one of

the inspected airplanes. Plaintiffs alleged that the lavatory

trash receptacle did not satisfy applicable safety regulations. 

They further alleged that the United States was negligent in

certifying the airplane. The Supreme Court held that the United

States was immune from liability under the discretionary function

exception. Id. at 821. It reasoned that the FAA’s decision to

use a “spot-checking” program “best accomdate[d] the goal of air

transportation safety and the reality of finite agency

resources.” Id. at 820. To follow through with its goals, the

FAA necessarily had to choose which specific items to check in

the certification process. Id. The Court concluded that the

decision to exclude certain items from inspection was a

discretionary policy decision rather than a failure to implement

existing policy. Id. 

The United States argues that, in this case, the government

contracts created a “spot-check” system similar to that created

by the FAA in Varig. This contention fails, however, because the

FLH Construction Manual specifically required Lee to report

safety hazards when he became aware of them. (UMF ¶ 76.) It did

not create a spot-check system. Unlike the FAA investigator, Lee

did not have the discretion to choose which safety violations to

report. Rather, he was required to notify Contri of all possible

violations of reasonable construction practices of which he

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became aware. 

The case here is more analogous to Marlys Bear Medicine v.

United States. In Marlys Bear, plaintiffs alleged that the

Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) negligently supervised and

managed safety of its logging operation on an Indian reservation. 

The BIA contracted with an independent contractor to conduct the

logging operations. However, it retained the right to inspect

and suspend the operation if the contractor failed to comply with

the contract. The court found that safety monitoring was not a

discretionary function: “[t]he government cannot claim that both

the decision to take safety measures and the negligent

implementation of those measures are protected policy decisions.” 

Id. at 1215. 

Here, the FLH assumed a duty similar to the BIA’s. While

FLH employees were not required to inspect the site, FLH policy

instructed them to take specific action if they had actual

knowledge of a possibly hazardous condition. Based on Marlys

Bear, the United States is not immune from liability for failure

to fulfill this non-discretionary function. 

B. Disputed Issues of Material Fact

The United States argues alternatively that plaintiffs have

not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lee failed to

fulfill his duty. (Reply at 2.) The United States notes that

none of the witnesses indicated that Lee was actually aware of

the events they described. (Id. at 5-11.) Their discussions

with Lee related only to where Hills parked his truck rather than

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where Hills tended to walk. (Id.) The United States concludes

that if Lee was not specifically aware that Hills was careless

where he walked, he had no duty to take any action regarding any

hazard posed by Hills. (Id.) 

However, plaintiffs need not present facts relating to

Hills’ propensity to walk behind moving trucks to survive summary

judgment. The FLH policy states that Lee was obligated to notify

the contractor if he became aware of hazardous conditions. (UMF

¶ 76.) The circumstantial evidence presented by plaintiffs could

lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Lee was aware that

Hills posed a safety hazard in general and should have notified

Contri so that Contri could have Hills removed from the site. 

This is sufficient to establish both negligence and causation. 

III.

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES the United

States’ motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/30/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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