Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-05550/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-05550-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD V. RAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. LEAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 11-cv-05550-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE ORDER GRANTING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a closed civil rights matter. Summary judgment was granted in favor of 

Defendants, and judgment entered on March 31, 2015. Dkts. 57, 58. On January 28, 2016, the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s ruling. Dkt. 66. On April 26, 2016, the 

Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for panel rehearing. Dkt. 69. The mandate issued on 

May 6, 2016. Dkt. 70. 

Plaintiff has filed a motion to vacate the order granting summary judgment for Defendants. 

Dkt. 67. Plaintiff again claims that the Court “failed and/or refused to afford [him] ‘equitable 

tolling’, with regards to the letter that Plaintiff mailed to the then Mayor of the City of Oakland, 

Ron Dellums.” Id. at 2. However, the argument Plaintiff makes in his motion is not new. The 

Court has already considered Plaintiff’s argument, and even after it found that he was entitled to 

an additional 418 days of equitable tolling to account for all of his attempts to obtain relief outside 

of the courts (including his aforementioned letter to former Mayor Dellums), his complaint was 

still untimely by 7 days. See Dkt. 57 10-14. The Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s argument that 

he is entitled to further equitable tolling during the time frame that Plaintiff failed to make “any 

further attempts to acquire a response from the [former] mayor’s office or from the [Oakland 

Citizens’ Police Review Board (“CPRB”)] about his second CPRB complaint.” See Dkt. 67 at 2

(brackets added). Plaintiff’s argument fails because he is not entitled to equitable tolling during 

periods of inaction. Under California law, equitable tolling “‘reliev[es] plaintiff from the bar of a 

limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith, 

pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.’” Cervantes v. City of San 

Case 4:11-cv-05550-YGR Document 72 Filed 07/29/16 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 

317 (1978)) (emphasis added). Here, the Court noted the time frames Plaintiff took no action, 

which are outlined in the following chart:

8/27/2006: Accrual date.

8/27/2006 - 7/26/2007: Pursuing administrative filings for 333 days.

7/27/2007 - 4/20/2009: NO ACTION for 633 days.

4/21/2009 - 7/15/2009: Pursuing administrative filings for 85 days.

7/16/2009 - 10/25/2011: NO ACTION for 831 days.

10/26/2011: Constructive filing date of federal complaint.

Dkt. 57 at 11. The Court noted the specific time frame Plaintiff took no action and failed to 

pursue the letter he sent to former Mayor Dellums, stating as follows: 

After sending the July 15, 2009 letter to Mayor Dellums, Plaintiff 

took no action for an additional 831 days until October 26, 2001, 

when he constructively filed his complaint in this Court. Therefore, 

even amidst pursuing his administrative filings, the record shows 

that Plaintiff arguably took no action, i.e., submits no evidence that 

he pursued any other administrative filings during this time, for a 

total of 1464 days (633 days plus 831 days).

Id. at 11-12. Prior to the its finding that Plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling, the Court had

determined that his complaint was already untimely by more than two years, stating:

Despite the fact that Plaintiff was allotted four years to file his 

excessive force claim relating to his arrest, he failed to do so until 

October 26, 2011—almost a year and two months after the two-year 

statute of limitations expired.

Id. at 9. As mentioned above, the Court granted Plaintiff an additional 418 days (333 days plus 85 

days) of equitable tolling during the time frame he pursued his administrative filings. Id. at 14. 

However, “despite liberally granting him equitable tolling during the time he pursued his 

administrative filings,” the complaint was still untimely by 7 days. Id. at 13 (emphasis in 

original). The Court did not grant Plaintiff equitable tolling during the 1464-day time frame of 

inaction because Plaintiff did not act reasonably or in good faith to pursue his administrative 

filings. See Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1275.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the action de novo and affirmed this Court’s ruling.

Case 4:11-cv-05550-YGR Document 72 Filed 07/29/16 Page 2 of 3
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Dkt. 66 at 1-2. The Ninth Circuit specifically stated that the “[d]ismissal of Ray’s action was 

proper because, even with the benefit of statutory and equitable tolling, Ray failed to file his action 

within the applicable statute of limitations.” Id. at 2. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief 

from the judgment under any subsection of Federal Rule of 60(b). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion 

to vacate the judgment is DENIED. Dkt. 67.

No further filings will be accepted in this case file as this particular action is closed. 

This Order terminates Docket No. 67.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

July 29, 2016

Case 4:11-cv-05550-YGR Document 72 Filed 07/29/16 Page 3 of 3