Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eldon M. Schurz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, asking that the

Court reconsider it s January 13, 2006, Order which denied, in part, Petitioner’s renewed

motion to amend his habeas petition. (Dkt. 135.) 

LEGAL STANDARD-MOTION TO RECONSIDER

A district court’s reconsideration of an Order is appropriate under three

circumstances: (1) if the Court is presented with newly discovered evidence; (2) if t he Court

committed clear error or its initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) if there is an

intervening change in controlling law. See School Dist. No. 1J v. AC and S, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that the Court committed clear error in determining that Claim 8 was

meritless. (Dkt. 135 at 2.) In Claim 8, Petitioner argues that the state trial court violat ed his

Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process when the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and allowed Patrick

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1 “RT” refers to the reporter’s transcripts of Petitioner’s trial.

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Allison t o t estify regarding a statement Petitioner allegedly made to his girlfriend, Julie

Moore. (Id. at 2-7.) At trial, the court allowed co-defendant Patrick Allison to testify

regarding a statement Petitioner allegedly made to Moore:

Q: Okay. So what did you hear [Petitioner] say to Julie?

A: I believe it was, “He [the victim] wouldn’t give me the money or the beer

so I burned him.” 

(R.T. 6/6/90 at 107.)1 In his mot ion for reconsideration, Petitioner continues his argument

that the challenged out-of-court statement was unreliable hearsay, t he admission of which

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. (Dkt. 135 at 2-5.)

Initially, the Court reiterates that to the extent Petitioner is contending that the state

trial court improperly determined that these st at ements were admissible under Arizona law,

he is not entitled to relief on such a claim. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)

(stating that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions). A federal habeas court is not a state supreme

court of errors and, consequently, a habeas court does not review questions of st ate

evidence law. See Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). “A state

court ’s evidentiary ruling is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it renders the st at e

proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process.” Bueno v. Hallahan, 988

F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1993).

This Court did not clearly err in concluding that the trial court ’s admission of

Petitioner’s out-of-court statement did not render his trial so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process. The Court’s conclusion is but t ressed by the fact that Petitioner’s

statement was properly admitted as an admission of a p arty opponent, which is not

hearsay . See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.

1985) (concluding that letters and other documents signed by defendant were admissible

as admissions of a party opponent); Shuck v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc., 178 Ariz.

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2 “ROA” refers to documents in the five-volume record on appeal from t rial,

sentencing, and the first and second petitions for post-conviction relief. 

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295, 297-98, 872 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (App. 1994) (admitting statement made by unidentified

employee to plaintiff as an admission of a party opponent). 

Moreover, the Court did not clearly err in its evaluation of the stat e court factual

record on this issue. In Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth

Circuit described the deference owed t o state court fact finding under the AEDPA, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2): 

What the ‘unreasonable determination’ clause teaches us is that, in

conducting this kind of intrinsic review of a state court’s processes, we must

be particularly deferential to our state-court colleagues. For example, in

concluding that a state-court finding is unsupported by substantial evidence

in the state-court record, it is not enough that we would reverse in similar

circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision. Rather, we

must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal st andards of

appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that t he finding is

supported by the record. 

A particular deference to credibility findings was emphasized by the U.S. Supreme

Court in Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 444 (1983), where the Court commented that:

“28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license t o redetermine credibility of

witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them.”

The state court factual finding that Allison overheard Petitioner make this statement

to Moore is not an objectively unreasonable version of the facts; rather it is supported by

the record. Both the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court made this factual finding.

(See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 50, 859 P.2d 156, 160 (1993); ROA 137 at 4.)2

 The state

courts reasonably concluded that this finding is supported by the record.

Finally , Petitioner continues his objection that the state court violated his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation because he “was not afforded an opportunity to

challenge the validity of Julie Moore’s statement by cross-examining Julie Moore.” (Dkt.

135 at 5.) Petitioner cites Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) to argue that “a

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reasonable person would believe that Julie Moore’s statement would be available for use

at trial, as it goes to t he heart of the case against” Petitioner. (Id. at 6.) A habeas court

may only look at the holdings of the United States Supreme Court as t hey existed at the

time of the relevant state court decision to determine whether the state court decision was

contrary t o, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000) (const ruing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Thus, the relevant

time frame at issue here, 1990-1993, would exclude any consideration of Crawford. 

However, even if Crawford were applicable, it would not benefit Petitioner. In

Crawford, the Court concluded that a testimonial statement from a witness who does not

appear at trial is inadmissible against the accused unless t he witness is unavailable to

testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examinat ion of the witness. 541

U.S. at 68. Even though Petitioner continues his argument that he did not have an

opportunity to cross-examine Julie Moore, the declarant of the statement was Petitioner

himself, not Julie Moore. Patrick Allison overheard Petitioner’s statement and testified to

it at trial; Petitioner certainly had the opportunity and did cross-examine Allison at trial.

(R.T. 6/6/90 at 112-31.) Crawford does not allow a defendant to prevent his own statement

from being admitted against him. As this Court already stated, “the challenged out of court

st at ement was made by Petitioner himself, which makes the statement an admission of a

p art y opponent, which is not hearsay. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Since the out of

court statement was made by Petitioner himself, he can claim no confrontation violation.”

(Dkt. 133 at 24.) When out of court statement s made by a defendant are admitted at trial

as the admission of a party opponent, there is no violation of the Confront at ion Clause.

See Moran, 759 F.2d at 786.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED denying Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. (Dkt. 135.)

DATED this 29th day of March, 2006.

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