Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03532/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03532-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The court did receive a letter from petitioner, filed March 2, 2007, stating that he

cannot show cause because of his “mental competence,” and because he has allegedly

been the target of reprisals in prison and deprived of necessary papers. Respondent, not

petitioner, the court notes, was ordered to show cause. 

Order Denying Petition

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERICK LOVINGS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

WARDEN RICHARD KIRKLAND, 

Respondent.

 

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No. C 05-3532 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Derick Lovings filed a petition in this court for a writ of habeas

corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of his no contest plea. 

The court ordered respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support

of it and lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner did not file a traverse.1

 For the

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reasons discussed below, the court DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a California state prisoner who is proceeding pro se, pleaded no

contest to the first degree murder of his sister, Regina Lovings, admitted to the

enhancements and was sentenced in 2001 to fifty-two years in prison. People v.

Lovings, 118 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1306-1307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The California

Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and the California Supreme Court denied

his petition for review. Id. at 1312; Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) at 1. Petitioner

has not filed any state habeas petitions. 

The facts of the case must be quoted at length:

In September 2000, the court granted appellant’s Faretta (Faretta v. California

(1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562) motion to represent

himself. In November 2000, the court granted his request for counsel, and

appointed Theodore Johnson to represent him. In February 2001, a section

1538.5 motion was set for March 16, 2001, and trial was set for April 2,

2001. Appellant appeared in court for the March 16 hearing but Johnson did

not. The court stated that it had received a call from Johnson the day before

advising that he would not be proceeding with the motion as scheduled, and

no motion papers were filed. On March 28, 2001, Johnson moved to continue

the April 2 trial date. The motion stated: “Counsel is currently in trial and has

been in trial since 2/13/01. Thus, Counsel has not had adequate time to

prepare for trial. Also there has been a break down in the attorney-client

relationship between attorney and defendant. On 3/14/01 attorney received a

letter from Defendant asking attorney to step down from his case.”

Appellant filed one of the Marsden motions at issue in this appeal on April 2,

2001. In it, he put check marks in boxes next to the following statements:

“Counsel has failed and/or refused to confer with declarent concerning the

preparation of the defense”; “Counsel has failed and/or refused to

communicate with declarent”; and “Counsel has failed and/or refused to

declare prejudice and/or conflict against declarent and due to said failure has

taken on the role of a surrogate prosecutor against declarent’s interest.” In an

attached statement, appellant indicated among other things that Johnson had

previously done work for him with his former counsel, Jane Doe, on civil

matters related to the criminal case, and appellant alleged that he and Johnson

had a conflict of interest because of the allegations he had made against Doe.

Appellant also attached documentation showing that he had filed a complaint

against Johnson with the California State Bar.

At the hearing on April 2, 2001, after listening to appellant’s grievances, and

responses from Johnson that the court treated as a motion to withdraw as

counsel, the court denied the Marsden and withdrawal motions, and

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continued the trial date to April 30, 2001. The court noted that “this is not the 

first time that [appellant] has made a motion to have his counsel relieved ...

there [were] a considerable number of letters to the judge concerning the

representation of [Jane Doe], then there were considerable complaints about

the representation of Mr. Harpham. At one point in September you made a

motion to have Mr. Harpham relieved as counsel of record. [¶] ... That was

granted. You represented yourself. You were ready to go to trial and then you

asked to have an attorney appointed and Mr. Johnson was appointed to

represent you. [¶] Now that was a full four or five months ago. This case is

now ready for trial. It is going to trial. I don’t play games and this is playing

games.”

Johnson moved again to withdraw as counsel on April 10, 2001; the motion

was heard and denied on that date. Appellant filed the other Marsden motion

at issue in this appeal on April 23, 2001. He checked the same boxes he had

checked in the prior motion, and additional boxes stating: “Counsel did fail

and/or refused to subpoena witnesses favorable to the defense and deprived

declarent of the testimony critical to the defense”; “Counsel has failed and/or

refused to perform and/or to have performed investigations(s) critical and

necessary to the defense”; “Counsel has failed and/or refused to secure and

present expert witness(es) critical to the defense”; “Counsel has failed and/or

refused to prepare and file motion(s) critical to the defense.”

On April 30, 2001, Johnson again moved to withdraw and the motion was

denied. Later that day, appellant asked the court whether it had “got[ten]

anything through the mail,” and the court said it “saw no new grounds on

which the Marsden should be reraised.” On May 2, the court reiterated that it

had received appellant’s renewed Marsden motion and that it “did not see

new factors there”; the motion was thus denied without a hearing.

On May 7, 2001, the court denied appellant’s motion to suppress his

confession. Shortly after the prosecutor began his opening statement to the

jury on that date, appellant interjected, “I’d like to plead guilty right now. I

don’t want to hear this. I do not want to hear this at all. I wish to plead guilty

right now.” After the jury was excused, appellant pled no contest to murder in

the first degree, and admitted the allegations of the information.

Johnson refused to concur in the plea. Johnson indicated that he had “spent a

lot of time on [appellant’s] case,” and stated: “[Appellant] may find this hard

to believe, but I care about what happens to him. I have encouraged him to at

least read the opening argument [Johnson had prepared] ... once I got

involved in this case and really started reviewing the situation I know at the

very least that there are mitigating circumstances to this case at the very least

and maybe even justification at the top and a very good chance for

manslaughter somewhere in the middle. This plea, I will not take part in it

and I have advised him strongly not to do it.” Appellant confirmed that he

had discussed the case and all possible defenses with Johnson. Appellant said

that Johnson had “been very good” and had advised him “that I shouldn’t do

this.” The prosecutor asked appellant, “Also, sir, you are not playing

games with anyone, you’re not going to come back tomorrow or in the future

and say you changed your mind, that you have been railroaded. You’re in

essence today waiving all your appellate rights concerning this voluntary

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plea, correct?” Appellant answered, “Yes.”

About a week later, on May 15, 2001, appellant wrote a letter to the court

asking to withdraw his plea on the grounds that “I wasn’t in my right frame of

mind nor did I have legal representation at that time.... [¶] ... [¶] P.S. My

apologies to the court for any inconvenience.” When appellant’s motion to

withdraw the plea was heard on June 5, 2001, the court granted Johnson’s

request to initiate competency proceedings for appellant under section 1368,

but stated “for the record that having observed Mr. Lovings throughout ... all

the pretrial motions, having read all the paperwork that Mr. Lovings has

submitted, having reviewed all the motions that he’s submitted to me in

writing, having reviewed all the matters that were presented to this court

before the matter was assigned to me for trial and having reviewed also all

the paperwork that was submitted to the Court of Appeal, I personally do not

have a doubt as to Mr. Lovings’s competence to stand trial and his knowledge

of what was happening, his awareness of the proceedings, his knowledge of

the court proceedings and his ability to cooperate with counsel.” Criminal

proceedings were suspended for appointment of experts to determine whether

appellant was competent “to understand the proceedings before him ... at the

time of his entry of the plea.”

At a hearing on July 19, 2001, a date was set for trial of the competency

issue. At a hearing the next day, the court said it had been informed that

appellant had told deputies after the previous hearing that he had changed his

mind and did not want to have a competency trial. The court asked appellant

if that was, in fact, his decision. Appellant replied, “No,” and indicated that

he wanted to proceed with the trial. Another Marsden motion by appellant

was denied on December 3, 2001. On December 7, 2001, appellant was found

by a jury to be competent.

On December 10, 2001, the court denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his

plea. The court told appellant it found “that at the time that you made your

entry of the plea that you were informed fully of your rights. I find also that

you were competent, you were coherent, you were adamant, you were fully

knowing of the consequences of your plea and the ramifications of your plea,

and I found absolutely no sign in you of any waivers of your resolve to enter

this plea or as to any confusion or inability to understand precisely the

proceedings that were before you.” The court sentenced appellant on January

16, 2002, to the maximum term permitted by the plea.

On February 26, 2002, appellant filed an amended notice of appeal and

application for certificate of probable cause, which identified “ineffective

counsel-inadequate representation” among the grounds for review. In an

attached “certificate statement,” appellant complained among other things

about the court’s treatment of his request to fire Johnson as his attorney. On

the bottom of the first page of the notice and application the court wrote,

“Grant cert.”

On September 22, 2002, after counsel had been appointed for appellant on

appeal, appellant wrote a letter to this court saying, “From this point forward

I will be handling my own appeal.” On October 28, 2002, we filed an order

allowing appellant to proceed in pro. per. On November 1, 2002, we received

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2

 In its order to show cause, the court directed respondent to address two issues: 

the one just stated and a second one regarding whether petitioner was denied his right to

self-representation. OSC at 2. Upon further review, the court finds that the sole issue

before the court is whether petitioner was denied his right to effective assistance of

counsel.

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a letter from appellant saying, “I do not wish to appeal.”

On November 4, 2002, we received a letter from appellant withdrawing his

requests to proceed in pro. per. and to dismiss the appeal; new appellate

counsel for him was appointed on November 13, 2002.

Lovings, 118 Cal.App.4th at 1307-1310. 

The court directed respondent to address whether petitioner was denied his

right to effective assistance of counsel.2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may not grant a petition challenging a

state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits

in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 

461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2006). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls

under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state

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court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court authority,

falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” See Williams (Terry), 529

U.S. at 413. 

A reviewing federal court may not issue the writ “simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the

application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at

409. 

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned

decision” of the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1991);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-1092 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no

reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the petitioner’s claims, the

court looks to the last reasoned opinion, in this case the opinion of the California

Court of Appeal. See Ylst at 801-806; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072,

1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s denial of his Marsden motions denied

him the right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Petition at 2; OSC 

at 2. 

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. Bland v.

California Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on

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other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The

Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial

complaint about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the

reasons for the defendant’s dissatisfaction. Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475-1476; United

States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d

826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982). The inquiry need only be as comprehensive as the

circumstances reasonably would permit, however. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d 1354,

1357 (9th Cir. 1992) (record may demonstrate that extensive inquiry was not

necessary). In California, a criminal defendant can request a change of appointed

counsel by making a Marsden motion. See People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (Cal.

1970). 

Regardless of whether the state court failed to rule on the motion to substitute

counsel or denied the motion, the ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is

whether the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell,

218 F.3d at 1024-1025. That is, the habeas court considers whether the trial court’s

denial of or failure to rule on the motion “actually violated [petitioner’s]

constitutional rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney had

become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of

that required by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1026.

Respondent contends that the court is barred from reviewing the petition

because petitioner entered a no contest plea. Ans. at 8. In general, a criminal

defendant, who, on the advice of counsel, pleads guilty to a charged offense, may

not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional

rights that antedated the plea. Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “[A]

guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the

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criminal process.” Id. A defendant having so pled “may only attack the voluntary

and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received

from counsel” was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases.” Id. at 266 (citation removed). 

The instant case is distinguishable from Tollet for several reasons, not the

least of which is that petitioner acted against, and not on, counsel’s advice when he

pleaded no contest. Accordingly, the court will disregard respondent’s contention. 

Petitioner’s claim is, however, without merit. As articulated by Schell, the

standard to determine whether there has been a Sixth Amendment violation in these

circumstances is very high, as the words “a total lack of communication” and “other

significant impediment” indicate. The record shows no evidence that any significant

impediment existed or that there was a total lack of communication. A short review

of the facts makes this clear. The trial court held a hearing to consider petitioner’s

Marsden motion, after trial counsel Theodore Johnson failed to attend a pre-trial

motion hearing and then moved to continue the trial date. Though it denied

petitioner’s Marsden motion, the trial court did continue the trial date for several

weeks, giving trial counsel time to prepare. The record shows that, despite his

several attempts to withdraw as trial counsel, Johnson was indeed ready to defend

petitioner by the time of trial. On the day of trial and in protest of his client’s

decision to enter a plea, Johnson stated that he had “spent a lot of time on [] [this]

case” and that “there are mitigating circumstances to this case at the very least

maybe even justification and maybe even justification at the top and a very good

chance for manslaughter somewhere in the middle.” On that same day, petitioner

told the court that he had “discussed the case and all possible defenses with

Johnson,” and that Johnson “had been very good.” Petitioner also said that Johnson

had advised him not to plead out. Petitioner disregarded this advice, pleaded no

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contest and admitted the allegations of the information. The court denied a second

Marsden motion because it “saw no new grounds on which the Marsden should be

reraised.” 

None of this supports petitioner’s contention that the trial court’s denials of

his Marsden motions violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. Rather, the

record indicates that the trial court carefully considered petitioner’s grievances and

that trial counsel prepared a defense as well as communicated thoroughly with, and

offered legal advice to, his client. 

Furthermore, to the extent that petitioner contends that Johnson provided

ineffective assistance, the court denies habeas relief. Claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel are examined under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, petitioner must

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was

deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under

prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-688. Second, he must establish that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

There is no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner rejected

Johnson’s advice when he decided to plead no contest and therefore the attorney’s

performance – deficient or not – did not result in prejudice to petitioner. In other

words, because petitioner caused the outcome – his no contest plea – after rejecting

trial counsel’s advice, he cannot logically contend that there is a reasonable

probability that but for trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance the outcome

would have been different.

Finally, insofar that petitioner’s claim is based on the notion that he was not

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competent at the time he entered his plea, the court denies the petition. A jury

determined that, after the state court held a trial on the issue, that petitioner was

competent. Lovings, 118 Cal.App.4th at 1310. The court drew upon this finding

when petitioner later moved to withdraw his plea: “you [petitioner] were competent,

you were coherent, you were adamant, you were fully knowing of the consequences

of your plea and the ramifications of your plea.” Id. 

Habeas relief on all grounds is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

The court concludes that the state court’s adjudication did not result in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The

court also concludes that its adjudication did not result in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES

the petition. 

The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Dated: September 21 , 2007

 JAMES WARE

 United States District Judge

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