Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07081/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 1999 Decided June 18, 1999

No. 98-7068

Elizabeth A. Martini,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

v.

Federal National Mortgage Association, et al.,

Appellants/Cross-Appellees

Consolidated with

No. 98-7081

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv01341)

(No. 95cv03141)

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Paul J. Mode, Jr., argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants/cross-appellees.

Michael H. Gottesman argued the cause for appellee/crossappellant. With him on the briefs were David E. Schreiber

and Larry S. Greenberg.

Philip B. Sklover, Associate General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Lorraine C. Davis, Assistant General Counsel, and Caren I. Friedman, Attorney,

were on the brief for amicus curiae Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission.

Before: Williams, Rogers and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: A jury found the Federal National

Mortgage Association liable under Title VII and the District

of Columbia Human Rights Act for sexual harassment and

retaliation against one of its employees, Elizabeth Martini,

and awarded nearly $7 million in damages. The district court

reduced her damages to $903,500. In this appeal, Fannie

Mae claims that Martini's Title VII suit was untimely because

she initiated it less than 180 days after she filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In her cross-appeal, Martini challenges several legal

conclusions underlying the district court's reduction of her

damages. Finding that Title VII requires complainants to

wait 180 days before suing in federal court so that the

Commission may informally resolve as many charges as possible, we reverse the judgment in her favor and remand with

instructions to dismiss her untimely suit without prejudice.

Since Martini's claims on cross-appeal are fully briefed and

likely to arise again in a new trial, we decide them as well,

holding first that frontpay is not subject to Title VII's cap on

compensatory damages, second that the district court should

have reallocated the portion of Title VII damages above the

statutory cap to Martini's recovery under D.C. law, and third

that D.C. law permits Martini to recover punitive damages on

a given claim as long as she has proven a basis for actual

damages.

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I

Appellee Elizabeth Martini went to work for appellant

Federal National Mortgage Association as a debt manager in

1988. By 1995, she was earning $71,000 a year and held

valuable stock options. In early 1994, she alleged, one of her

co-workers, Forrest Kobayashi, began harassing her because

of her sex, humiliating her with abusive comments in the

presence of colleagues and subordinates, and excluding her

from meetings to which she should have been invited. Martini complained to her supervisor, Linda Knight, who also

supervised Kobayashi, but Knight failed to come up with a

solution. Despite Martini's complaints to Fannie Mae's Office

of Diversity, Knight recommended Kobayashi for a promotion. Once promoted, Kobayashi was asked by Knight to

reorganize his department. Designed by Kobayashi and approved by Knight, the reorganization eliminated only one job:

Martini's. In March 1995, Knight fired Martini, telling her

that Fannie Mae would give prospective employers no information about her job performance. Martini applied to five

firms with positions similar to the one she held at Fannie

Mae, but received no offers. She eventually abandoned her

job search, enrolling in a two-year course to become a financial planner.

On April 10, 1995, Martini filed a sexual harassment and

retaliation charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission. Twenty-one days later, at her request, the

EEOC issued a "right-to-sue" letter authorizing her to bring

a private action in federal court. In doing so, the EEOC

acted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. s 1601.28(a)(2) (1998), which

provides that the Commission may, upon a complainant's

request, authorize a private suit "at any time prior to the

expiration of 180 days from the date of filing the charge with

the Commission; provided, that [an appropriate Commission

official] has determined that it is probable that the Commission will be unable to complete its administrative processing

of the charge within 180 days from the filing of the charge."

Issuance of the right-to-sue letter terminated further EEOC

processing of Martini's charge. See id. s 1601.28(a)(3); Oral

Arg. Tr. at 22 (quoting Martini's right-to-sue letter). On July

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20, 101 days after filing the EEOC charge, Martini sued

Kobayashi, Knight, and Fannie Mae in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging sexual

harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the

D.C. Human Rights Act. Although Fannie Mae offered

Martini a new position one month later, she rejected it

because it would have put her in close contact with Kobayashi

and Knight, and because Fannie Mae offered her no protection from further harassment.

Before trial, Fannie Mae moved to dismiss, arguing that

the EEOC's early right-to-sue regulation, 29 C.F.R.

s 1601.28(a)(2), violates the 180-day waiting period for private suits established by 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994),

which says:

If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by

the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty

days from the filing of such charge ... the Commission

has not filed a civil action ... or the Commission has not

entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person

aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify

the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the

giving of such notice a civil action may be brought

against the respondent named in the charge....

The district court denied the motion.

After an eleven-day trial, the district court gave the jury a

single set of instructions for both the Title VII and the D.C.

Human Rights Act claims. Finding the defendants liable for

harassment and retaliation, the jury awarded Martini nearly

$7 million in damages--$153,500 in backpay, $1,894,000 in

frontpay and benefits, and $3,000,000 in punitive damages

under Title VII, as well as $615,000 in compensatory damages

and $1,286,000 in punitive damages under the D.C. Human

Rights Act.

In a post-trial motion, Fannie Mae again challenged the

timeliness of Martini's suit under section 2000e-5(f)(1) of Title

VII. Finding pre-180 day private suits not prohibited by

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to-sue regulation. See Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage

Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 464, 471-72 (D.D.C. 1997). The district

court noted, however, that the D.C. Circuit "has not addressed this issue" and that "there is a split of authority"

among other courts. Id. at 471.

Fannie Mae also sought a reduction in damages, arguing

that the evidence was insufficient to justify the large awards,

that punitive damages unsupported by compensatory damages are impermissible under D.C. law, and that Title VII's

cap on compensatory damages, see 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3),

applied to Martini's frontpay award. Finding these arguments persuasive, the district court reduced the Title VII

damages to $453,500, see Martini, 977 F. Supp. at 469-71,

478-79, and reduced the D.C. Human Rights Act damages to

$450,000, see id. at 474-79. In order to avoid a new trial,

Martini agreed to a remittitur order prohibiting her from

challenging the reduction in damages based on evidence

insufficiency.

On appeal, Fannie Mae argues that the district court

wrongly rejected its challenge to the timeliness of Martini's

suit. Although Fannie Mae also claims that the jury verdict

should be set aside because it improperly resulted from

passion or prejudice, Fannie Mae waived that claim by failing

to object to allegedly inflammatory statements by Martini's

lawyer at trial. See Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp.,

578 F.2d 313, 316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Martini raises three

claims on cross-appeal: that Title VII's damages cap is

inapplicable to frontpay, that any Title VII damages exceeding the cap should be reallocated to her D.C. Human Rights

Act recovery, and that D.C. law allows punitive damages to be

awarded in the absence of compensatory damages.

II

The 1972 amendments to Title VII established "an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure" prescribing the powers

and duties of the EEOC once a discrimination charge has

been filed. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,

359 (1977) (discussing the Equal Employment Opportunity

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Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 104-07 (codified

at 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5)). The statute directs the EEOC to

notify the respondent of the charge within 10 days, to investigate the charge, and to determine "as promptly as possible

and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and

twenty days from the filing of the charge" whether there is

reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true. 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC finds no reasonable cause, then

it must dismiss the charge. See id. If it finds reasonable

cause, then it must attempt to resolve the dispute "by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id.

"If within thirty days after a charge is filed ... the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any [non-governmental]

respondent...." Id. s 2000e-5(f)(1).

In language lying at the heart of Fannie Mae's challenge to

the timeliness of Martini's suit, the statute further provides:

If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by

the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty

days from the filing of such charge ... the Commission

has not filed a civil action ... or the Commission has not

entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person

aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify

the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the

giving of such notice a civil action may be brought

against the respondent named in the charge....

Id. According to Fannie Mae, this sentence sets forth the

exclusive conditions under which a Title VII complainant may

sue: Either the Commission must dismiss the charge, or 180

days must elapse without informal resolution of the charge or

an EEOC lawsuit. Because section 2000e-5(f)(1) implicitly

prohibits a private suit within 180 days unless the charge is

dismissed, Fannie Mae argues, the EEOC's early right-to-sue

regulation is unlawful.

Defending the regulation, Martini, supported by the EEOC

as amicus curiae, points out that section 2000e-5(f)(1), while

establishing certain conditions giving rise to a private cause

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of action, nowhere makes those conditions exclusive. According to Martini, the 180-day provision specifies the maximum,

not minimum, time that Title VII complainants must wait

before going to court. Although she acknowledges a statutory policy favoring administrative over judicial processing

during the first 180 days after a charge is filed, Martini

argues that the early right-to-sue regulation, by allowing

complainants to sue immediately when the EEOC has determined that administrative processing likely will be futile (i.e.,

likely will not lead to dismissal, conciliation, or an EEOC

lawsuit within 180 days), furthers the goal of providing quick,

effective relief for aggrieved persons without frustrating the

competing goal of encouraging informal resolution of complaints.

Two of our sister circuits, the Ninth and Eleventh, have

squarely addressed this issue; both agree with Martini that

the early right-to-sue regulation comports with congressional

intent underlying section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day provision.

See Sims v. Trus Joist Macmillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th

Cir. 1994); Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship &

Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984); cf. Weise v.

Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 412 (2d Cir. 1975) (prior to

issuance of section 1601.28(a)(2), allowing EEOC to issue

early right-to-sue notice"[i]n the circumstances of this case").

Although many district courts also agree with Martini, a

comparable number agree with Fannie Mae and have dismissed complaints filed before expiration of the 180-day

period. Compare Montoya v. Valencia County, 872 F. Supp.

904, 906 (D.N.M. 1994) (finding early suits impermissible),

New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 675, 680

(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F.

Supp. 34, 35 (D. Colo. 1983) (same), Spencer v. Banco Real, 87

F.R.D. 739, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same), and Loney v. CarrLowrey Glass Co., 458 F.Supp. 1080, 1081 (D. Md. 1978)

(same), with Parker v. Noble Roman's, Inc., 1996 WL 453572,

at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 1996) (finding early suits permissible), Defranks v. Court of Common Pleas, Civ. A. No. 95-327,

1995 WL 606800, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1995) (same),

Rolark v. University of Chicago Hosps., 688 F. Supp. 401, 404

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(N.D. Ill. 1988) (same), Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc., 505

F. Supp. 617, 622 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (same), Vera v. Bethelem

Steel Corp., 448 F.Supp. 610, 614 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (same), and

Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Co., No. 74-417C(1),

1974 WL 302, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 1974).

Fannie Mae argues that Occidental Life Insurance Co. v.

EEOC forecloses any doubt about section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s

meaning. There the Supreme Court said that "a natural

reading of [section 2000e-5(f)(1)] can lead only to the conclusion that it simply provides that a complainant whose charge

is not dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the EEOC

may himself bring a lawsuit, but that he must wait 180 days

before doing so." 432 U.S. at 361. We agree with Martini

that the quoted language is dictum. Decided prior to the

EEOC's regulation authorizing early private suits, see 42 Fed.

Reg. 47,828 (1977), Occidental Life examined whether section

2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day provision functions as a statute of

limitations on the EEOC's power to bring a lawsuit where a

complainant chooses not to sue after 180 days. The Supreme

Court said no: "Nothing in [section 2000e-5(f)(1)] indicates

that EEOC enforcement powers cease if the complainant

decides to leave the case in the hands of the EEOC rather

than to pursue a private action." Id.; see also id. at 366

("The subsection imposes no limitation upon the power of the

EEOC to file suit in a federal court."). Although the Court

reached its conclusion by offering what it believed to be the

best reading of section 2000e-5(f)(1), its holding turned not on

that interpretation, but only on the narrower, negative conclusion that nothing in section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s text or legislative

history imposes a 180-day limitation on the EEOC's power to

sue. Equally significant, in Occidental Life the EEOC had

sought to continue enforcement proceedings both during and

beyond the 180-day period, whereas here the Commission

authorized the complainant to sue upon finding it unlikely

that administrative processing would resolve the charge within 180 days. The issue presented in this case--whether

Congress intended to impose a 180-day waiting period not

only in the first situation but also in the second--was neither

raised in Occidental Life nor addressed by the Supreme

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Court. Because the Court's "natural reading" of section

2000e-5(f)(1) was not essential to its holding, cf. Young v.

Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974, 980 (1986)

(finding ambiguity under Chevron even where one "reading of

the statute may seem to some to be the more natural

interpretation"), Occidental Life's interpretation of that provision does not dictate the result in this case. Like the Ninth

and Eleventh Circuits, we therefore undertake our own analysis of the statute.

In "review[ing] an agency's construction of the statute

which it administers," we must ask "[f]irst, always, ...

whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question

at issue." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). "If the intent of

Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,

as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. The "precise

question at issue" here is this: Does section 2000e-5(f)(1)

specify the exclusive conditions under which Title VII complainants may bring private lawsuits in federal court? Put

differently, did Congress clearly intend to prohibit private

suits within 180 days after a charge is filed as long as the

EEOC has not dismissed the charge? In discerning congressional intent, we owe no deference to the agency's views, see

id. at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of

statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent."),

and because we ultimately find congressional intent clear in

this case, we need not consider what level of deference would

govern EEOC interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, see EEOC v. Arabian-American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,

257 (1991).

We begin with the statutory text relied on by Fannie Mae.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) says that an aggrieved party may sue

under Title VII if the Commission dismisses the charge or if

it neither sues the respondent nor reaches an acceptable

conciliation agreement within 180 days after the filing of the

charge. See 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1). Although the statute

nowhere says that complainants may sue only if one of these

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conditions occurs, Fannie Mae--invoking the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the "[m]ention of one

thing implies exclusion of another," Black's Law Dictionary

581 (6th ed. 1990)--argues that the statute's explicit authorization of private suits after 180 days implies congressional

intent to prohibit such suits any earlier.

A non-binding rule of statutory interpretation, not a binding rule of law, the expressio unius maxim "is often misused."

Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility & Management Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

see Cheney R.R. Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 68-69 (D.C. Cir.

1990) (refusing to apply expressio unius). "The maxim's

force in particular situations," we have said, "depends entirely

on context, whether or not the draftsmen's mention of one

thing ... does really necessarily, or at least reasonably, imply

the preclusion of alternatives." Shook, 132 F.3d at 782. That

in turn depends on "whether, looking at the structure of the

statute and perhaps its legislative history, one can be confident that a normal draftsman when he expressed 'the one

thing' would have likely considered the alternatives that are

arguably precluded." Id. Here, as in Cheney, Clinchfield

Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d

773, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and Mobile Communications Corp.

of Am. v. FCC, 77 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the

expressio unius maxim, unsupported by arguments based on

the statute's structure or legislative history, " 'is simply too

thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress has

clearly resolved [the] issue.' " Id. at 1405 (citation omitted);

see Cheney, 902 F.2d at 69 (noting that expressio unius is "an

especially feeble helper in an administrative setting, where

Congress is presumed to have left to reasonable agency

discretion questions that it has not directly resolved").

In addition to relying on expressio unius, Fannie Mae

pointed out at oral argument that the language of section

2000e-5(f)(1)'s 180-day provision parallels the language of

section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s first sentence, which governs the timing of EEOC-initiated lawsuits: "If within thirty days after a

charge is filed ... the Commission has been unable to secure

from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to

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the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action

against any [non-governmental] respondent." 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-5(f)(1). Relying on Martini's concession that the 30-

day provision imposes a mandatory waiting period on suits by

the EEOC, see Appellee's Reply Br. at 3 n.1, Fannie Mae

argues that the 180-day provision imposes a similar mandatory waiting period on suits by private plaintiffs.

Like the 180-day provision, the 30-day provision specifies

one condition, not necessarily an exclusive condition, under

which the EEOC may sue. Fannie Mae's parallelism argument thus raises a question analogous to the one presented in

this case: May the EEOC sue within 30 days after a charge

is filed if a recalcitrant employer declares at the outset that it

will not accept any EEOC-negotiated conciliation agreement?

Not only have the parties not briefed this issue, but even if

the 30-day provision requires the EEOC to wait 30 days

before filing suit, the parallelism argument by itself still

would not compel Fannie Mae's interpretation of the statute.

To be sure, "there is a natural presumption that identical

words used in different parts of the same act are intended to

have the same meaning." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v.

United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). But that presumption "is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such

variation in the connection in which the words are used as

reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent." Id.

On numerous occasions, both the Supreme Court and this

court have determined, after examining statutory structure,

context, and legislative history, that identical words within a

single act have different meanings. See, e.g., Dewsnup v.

Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417-20 (1992) (relying on statutory

context and legislative history to give different meanings to

the words "allowed secured claim" in different subsections of

the same bankruptcy provision); Atlantic Cleaners, 286 U.S.

at 435 (relying on legislative history to give different meanings to the words "restraint of trade or commerce" in different sections of the Sherman Act); Weaver v. United States

Information Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(allowing the agency to give different meanings to the words

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"cleared" and "clearance" in different subsections of the same

regulation). Without inquiring further into Title VII's structure, context, and legislative history, we cannot conclude with

the certainty required under Chevron's first step that the

parallel sentences within section 2000e-5(f)(1) have parallel

meanings.

Like its use of the expressio unius maxim, Fannie Mae's

parallelism argument thus leaves the question before us

unanswered. Nothing in section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s language

forecloses Martini's view that the 180-day provision is simply

a maximum, not minimum, waiting period for complainants

seeking access to federal court. To show that Martini's view

unambiguously frustrates Congress's intent, Fannie Mae

must shore up its reading of the statute's text with independent arguments based on structure, context, or legislative

history.

Taking up this challenge, Fannie Mae observes that the

180-day provision governing private suits is part of an elaborate enforcement scheme detailing who may bring certain

actions and when. See 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1) to (2).

Relying on Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20

(1989), and Perot v. Federal Election Comm'n, 97 F.3d 553

(D.C. Cir. 1996), Fannie Mae says that courts have strictly

enforced statutory waiting periods designed to foster informal

resolution of complaints, notwithstanding the likely or even

certain futility of administrative dispute resolution. The

cases cited by Fannie Mae do not support its position. In

Hallstrom, the Supreme Court enforced a 60-day notice and

waiting period for plaintiffs wishing to file suit under the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. See 493 U.S. at

29. Noting that Congress imposed the 60-day period to

encourage administrative enforcement of environmental regulations, see id., the Court rejected the argument that where

government agencies had "explicitly declined to act, it would

be pointless to require the citizen to wait 60 days to commence suit," id. at 30. Although this appears to support

Fannie Mae, the statute at issue in Hallstrom differs from

Title VII in a critical respect: It expressly prohibits the filing

of a lawsuit within the 60-day notice period. After quoting

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42 U.S.C. s 6972(b)(1), the Court said: "The language of this

provision could not be clearer.... Actions commenced prior

to 60 days after notice are 'prohibited.' Because this language is expressly incorporated by reference into s 6972(a), it

acts as a specific limitation on a citizen's right to bring suit."

Id. at 26. Perot is equally inapplicable. In that case, our

enforcement of a 120-day waiting period for private suits

under the Federal Election Campaign Act, despite petitioner's claim that agency action would be futile, turned on the

fact that the Act explicitly provides for "exclusive" agency

jurisdiction during the 120-day period. See 97 F.3d at 558

(quoting 2 U.S.C. ss 437d(e), 437c(b)(1) (1994)). Because

Title VII contains no similar language prohibiting early private suits or making agency jurisdiction exclusive, neither

Hallstrom nor Perot provides a basis for us to conclude that

private suits within 180 days would impermissibly upset Title

VII's enforcement scheme in cases where timely EEOCnegotiated resolution is improbable.

Fannie Mae argues that the likely futility of administrative

processing does not defeat the statutory policy of encouraging

informal resolution of charges because Congress intended the

180-day period to serve as a mandatory "cooling off" period

during which the parties might voluntarily resolve their dispute, even in the absence of agency action. Not only does

Fannie Mae cite no legislative history to support this claim,

but the fact that the statute authorizes the EEOC to sue

within the 180-day period if it is unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement demonstrates that Congress could

not have intended to establish a mandatory "cooling off"

period. The statute even authorizes a complainant to sue

within 180 days if the EEOC dismisses the charge. Fannie

Mae nowhere explains why it makes sense to read a "cooling

off" period into the statute for cases where the EEOC cannot

complete administrative processing within 180 days, but not

for cases where the EEOC dismisses the charge or sues the

respondent within 180 days.

Next, Fannie Mae points to legislative history indicating

that Congress enacted the 180-day provision governing private suits with "an acute awareness of the enormous backlog

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of cases before the EEOC and the consequent delays of 18 to

24 months encountered by aggrieved persons awaiting administrative action on their complaints." Occidental Life, 432

U.S. at 369 (citing House and Senate hearings as well as floor

debate). By choosing a 180-day window for informal resolution of charges despite knowing that many charges would not

be resolved within 180 days, Fannie Mae argues, Congress

clearly intended the 180-day period to be the minimum time

complainants must wait before going to court, even if EEOC

processing would be futile. Again, we are unconvinced.

We have no doubt that when Congress wrote section

2000e-5(f)(1) in 1972, it knew all about the long delays in

EEOC processing of discrimination charges. See S. Rep. No.

92-415, at 23 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted

in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2147. Congress enacted the 180-

day provision as "a means by which [an aggrieved party] may

be able to escape from the administrative quagmire which

occasionally surrounds a case caught in an overloaded administrative process." 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2148; see S. Rep.

No. 92-415, at 23. After the House and Senate passed the

1972 amendments, the Conference Committee explained in a

statement accompanying the Conference Report:

[The 180-day provision] is designed to make sure that

the person aggrieved does not have to endure lengthy

delays if the Commission ... does not act with due

diligence and speed. Accordingly, the [180-day provision] allow[s] the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his

or her own remedy under this title in the courts where

there is agency inaction, dalliance or dismissal of the

charge, or unsatisfactory resolution.

118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of 1972

amendments). But this account of section 2000e-5(f)(1) contains the same ambiguity as the statutory language itself:

Did Congress simply intend to guarantee the right to sue

after 180 days, or did it further intend to prohibit private

suits within 180 days? To be sure, the right to sue after 180

days is the only means that Congress provided for escaping

the administrative process. But Martini argues--plausibly,

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we think--that authorizing early private suits in cases where

the EEOC likely will be unable to resolve the charge within

180 days furthers Congress's intent to "allow the person

aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy ... in the

courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance ... or unsatisfactory resolution." Id.

Thus, neither section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s language nor the legislative history cited by Fannie Mae reveals "the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" on "the precise question at

issue" in this case. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. If our inquiry

were to end here, we likely would agree with the Ninth and

Eleventh Circuits that the early right-to-sue regulation does

not violate section 2000e-5(f)(1). Under Chevron's first step,

however, we have a duty to conduct an "independent examination" of the statute in question, New York Shipping Ass'n

v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1355 (D.C. Cir.

1988), looking not only "to the particular statutory language

at issue," but also to "the language and design of the statute

as a whole," K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291

(1988); see also United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins.

Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993) ("Over and over

we have stressed that '[i]n expounding a statute, we must not

be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but

look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and

policy.' ") (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S.

(8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)). We thus turn to a provision of

Title VII not relied on by Fannie Mae that we asked the

parties to address at oral argument--a provision that we

think eliminates any ambiguity about the question before us.

Section 2000e-5(b) prescribes the EEOC's duties once a

charge is filed. See supra at 6. It says that the Commission

"shall" investigate the charge and "shall" make a reasonable

cause determination "as promptly as possible and, so far as

practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from

the filing of the charge." 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(b). Thus,

although the statute allows some flexibility in the timing of

reasonable cause determinations, the Commission's duty to

investigate is both mandatory and unqualified. Yet an early

right-to-sue notice typically terminates EEOC investigation of

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the charge, see 29 C.F.R. s 1601.28(a)(3), precisely what

happened in this case. Although the record nowhere contains

Martini's right-to-sue letter, her counsel read it to us at oral

argument: " 'With the issuance of this notice of right to sue,

the Commission is terminating [its] process with respect to

this charge.' " Oral Arg. Tr. at 22 (quoting Martini's right-tosue notice). We cannot square this early termination of the

process or the regulation authorizing it, see 29 C.F.R.

s 1601.28(a)(3), with section 2000e-5(b)'s express direction to

the Commission that it investigate all charges.

Of course, Fannie Mae does not challenge section

1601.28(a)(3), but we think section 1601.28(a)(2) alone violates

section 2000e-5(b) of the statute for the same reason. Even

in the absence of a regulation formally terminating administrative processing, issuance of an early right-to-sue letter

would have the same effect. We think it implausible that an

agency as chronically overworked as the EEOC would either

begin or continue to investigate charges for which it has

authorized an alternative avenue of relief. In most such

cases, the charge will simply go to the bottom of the pile.

Although after 180 days this result comports with congressional intent, see S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 23, prior to 180 days it

conflicts with section 2000e-5(b)'s unambiguous command.

Martini and the EEOC both argue that requiring a complainant to wait 180 days when the agency knows it will be

unable to investigate the charge would be futile. We disagree. Section 1601.28(a)(2) does not limit the issuance of

early right-to-sue letters to situations where the EEOC has

determined that it is impossible to investigate within 180

days. Rather, the regulation allows the Commission to authorize a private suit when it "has determined that it is

probable that [it] will be unable to complete its administrative

processing of the charge within 180 days." 29 C.F.R.

s 1601.28(a)(2) (emphasis added). If the term "probable"

means "more likely than not," then the regulation allows the

EEOC to authorize a private suit even when there is as much

as a 49 percent chance that it will complete administrative

processing within 180 days. And in this case, the Commission made that probability determination only 21 days after

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Martini filed her charge. We do not see how such a speculative prediction of futility can justify departure from section

2000e-5(b)'s express requirement that the Commission investigate every charge filed.

In any event, the regulation would violate section 2000e5(b) even if the Commission could say with certainty that it

cannot fully process a charge within 180 days. Congress well

understood that the EEOC's limited resources preclude it

from investigating every charge within 180 days, see supra at

14-15, but nevertheless "hoped that recourse to the private

lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule." 118 Cong.

Rec. 7168. Contrary to this congressional "hope," the early

right-to-sue regulation makes it less likely that "the vast

majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of

the EEOC." Id. Without authority to allow early suits, the

EEOC would face more internal pressure, along with external

pressure from complainants, to improve its investigatory capacities--for example, by streamlining its procedures for

handling charges, by setting higher case clearance goals, by

improving training, or by reallocating staff and other resources among regions or between national and regional

offices--so that it could resolve as many charges as possible

within 180 days. If such efforts proved inadequate to achieve

statutory compliance, then the Commission would be forced

to ask Congress to appropriate additional funds. Whether

authorizing early private suits is preferable to enlarging the

Commission's budget is a question for Congress, not the

EEOC or this court. We conclude only that greater compliance with the mandatory duties that Congress expressly

prescribed for the EEOC in section 2000e-5(b) will occur

when all complainants must wait 180 days before filing suit

than when the Commission may authorize them to sue earlier.

As we stated at the outset, the precise question at issue in

this case is whether Congress clearly intended to prohibit

private suits within 180 days after charges are filed. See

supra at 9. Because the power to authorize early private

suits inevitably and impermissibly allows the EEOC to relax

its aggregate effort to comply with its statutory duty to

investigate every charge filed, we think the answer is yes.

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This straightforward reading of section 2000e-5(b) finds

support in legislative history of section 2000e-5(f)(1) not cited

by either party. While the House version of the 1972 bill

containing what is now section 2000e-5(f)(1) authorized private actions after 180 days, see 117 Cong. Rec. 32,113 (1971);

118 Cong. Rec. 1510 (1972), the Senate version authorized

private actions after only 150 days, see 118 Cong. Rec. 4945

(1972). Noting this discrepancy, the conference committee

chose the 180-day period. See H.R. Rep. No. 92-899 (1972),

reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2179, 2182. Although this

alone does not unequivocally show that Congress was unwilling to permit private suits within 180 days--Congress simply

might have been unwilling to guarantee the right to sue

within 180 days--we note that at least two major sponsors of

the 1972 bill clearly understood the provision to prohibit early

suits. Senator Javits said that it required complainants

"necessarily [to] sit[ ] around awaiting 6 months." 118 Cong.

Rec. 1069 (1972) (Senate debate). Senator Dominick called it

a "180-day private filing restriction." Id. In any event, by

choosing 180 days instead of 150 days, Congress indicated its

belief that informal resolution of charges, even as late as the

180th day, would be preferable to allowing complainants to

sue earlier. Cf. 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(f)(1) (authorizing courts

to stay private suits for up to 60 days to allow "further efforts

of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance"). Allowing private suits within 180 days eases the pressure on the

EEOC to resolve charges informally, thus defeating the explicit congressional policy favoring EEOC-facilitated resolution up to the 180th day.

In sum, examining "the language and design of the statute

as a whole," K Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 291, and indulging all

plausible inferences from the legislative history, we conclude

that the EEOC's power to authorize private suits within 180

days undermines its express statutory duty to investigate

every charge filed, as well as Congress's unambiguous policy

of encouraging informal resolution of charges up to the 180th

day. We thus hold that Title VII complainants must wait 180

days after filing charges with the EEOC before they may sue

in federal court. We recognize that this conclusion runs

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counter to that reached by our sister circuits. See Sims, 22

F.3d at 1061; Brown, 732 F.2d at 729. But with all respect,

those courts did not read section 2000e-5(f)(1) in light of

section 2000e-5(b), nor did they consider the legislative history that we discovered.

This brings us to the question of relief. We agree with

both parties that the 180-day waiting period is not jurisdictional. As the Supreme Court said in Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., "filing a timely charge of discrimination with

the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal

court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is

subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." 455 U.S.

385, 393 (1982). But apart from the futility arguments that

we have found inadequate to relieve the EEOC of its statutory duty to process every charge for at least 180 days, Martini

suggests no equitable considerations that might warrant an

exception to the 180-day rule.

Finding Martini's suit untimely, we vacate the district

court's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss her

complaint without prejudice. Because the EEOC stopped

processing her charge 21 days after she filed it, Martini may

file a new complaint in district court only after the Commission has attempted to resolve her charge for an additional 159

days.

III

Although we have vacated the judgment in Martini's favor,

we proceed in the interest of judicial economy to address her

claims challenging the district court's reduction of her damages. See Committee of 100 on the Fed. City v. Hodel, 777

F.2d 711, 718-19 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The claims are fully

briefed and likely to arise again in a new trial. Contrary to

Fannie Mae's contention, moreover, Martini never waived

these claims when she agreed to remittitur; as we read the

record, the remittitur covered only the district court's reduction of damages against Fannie Mae on her D.C. law retaliation claim based on insufficient evidence of the scope of these

damages. See Martini, 977 F. Supp. at 478-79; Martini v.

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Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No. 95-1341, at 2 (D.D.C. Mar.

27, 1998) ("Martini Mem. Op."); see also William Inglis &

Sons Baking Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 942 F.2d 1332,

1343 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he waiver implicit in remittitur [is] a

narrow one that involves only the right to appeal the reduction of damages effected by the remittitur.").

Frontpay

Under Title VII, "[t]he sum of the amount of compensatory

damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary

losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary

losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under

this section, shall not exceed" $300,000 for an employer as

large as Fannie Mae. 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3). Martini

claims that the district court erred in applying Title VII's

damages cap to the frontpay award. According to Fannie

Mae, "future pecuniary losses" include frontpay. See

McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 116 (7th

Cir. 1990) (defining frontpay as "a lump sum ... representing

the discounted present value of the difference between the

earnings [an employee] would have received in [her] old

employment and the earnings [she] can be expected to receive

in [her] present and future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment"). We agree with Martini.

In the provision immediately preceding the damages cap,

the statute says: "Compensatory damages ... shall not

include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of

relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964." 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(2). Section 706(g) authorizes

district courts to order "reinstatement ... with or without

back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems

appropriate." Id. s 2000e-5(g)(1). Like the majority of circuits, we have regarded frontpay as an equitable remedy

available under section 706(g) both before and after the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 made compensatory damages available

under Title VII. See Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277-

78 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Group Hospitalization, Inc.,

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820 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Williams v.

Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1998); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir.

1996); Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1107 (1st Cir. 1995);

Hadley v. VAM P T S, 44 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 1995);

Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3

F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1993); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc.,

922 F.2d 1515, 1528 (11th Cir. 1991). Section 1981a(b)(2)

therefore excludes frontpay from the range of compensatory

damages subject to the damages cap under section

1981a(b)(3).

The Tenth and Eighth Circuits have recently reached the

same conclusion. See McCue v. Kansas Dep't of Human

Resources, 165 F.3d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 1999); Kramer v.

Logan County Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir.

1998). We respectfully disagree with the Sixth Circuit's

contrary holding, see Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1203-04

(6th Cir. 1997), on which the district court relied, see Martini

Mem. Op., No. 95-1341, at 3, since its assertion that frontpay

"is not authorized by the plain language of s 706(g) itself,"

Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1204, conflicts with our precedent.

Reallocation of Damages

The district court gave the jury a single set of instructions

applicable to Martini's claims under both Title VII and the

D.C. Human Rights Act. See 12/9/96 Trial Tr. at 33. As

required by law, the court never informed the jury about

Title VII's damages cap. See 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(c)(2). Over

the objections of both parties, the district court gave the jury

a verdict form with "special interrogatory questions" for

assessing damages for each type of claim (harassment or

retaliation) against each defendant (Fannie Mae, Kobayashi,

or Knight) under each statute (Title VII or D.C. Human

Rights Act). Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, No.

95-1341 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 1996) (entering judgment on the

verdict for plaintiff). The jury awarded Title VII damages

well in excess of the statutory cap. The district court limited

these damages (excluding backpay) to $300,000. See Martini,

977 F. Supp. at 471. Martini argues that the portion of Title

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VII damages exceeding the statutory cap should have been

reallocated to her recovery under the D.C. Human Rights

Act. Again, we agree.

Because the jury used exactly the same instructions in

evaluating Martini's Title VII and D.C. law claims, and because the jury had no knowledge of Title VII's damages cap,

it had no legal basis for distinguishing between the two

statutes. Thus, for any one claim against any one defendant,

distinguishing between damages that the jury awarded under

Title VII and damages that it awarded under the D.C.

Human Rights Act makes no sense. For example, although

the jury awarded punitive damages of $2 million under Title

VII and $1 million under D.C. law against Fannie Mae on

Martini's retaliation claim, there is no basis for saying that

the jury intended to impose a $2 million award specifically

under Title VII, plus a $1 million award specifically under

D.C. law. Instead, the most sensible inference is that the

jury sought to impose a total of $3 million in punitive damages against Fannie Mae for retaliation. To be sure, only

$300,000 of that amount may be awarded under Title VII.

But we see no reason why Martini should not be entitled to

the balance under the D.C. Human Rights Act, since the local

law contains the same standards of liability as Title VII but

imposes no cap on damages.

Were we not to treat damages under federal and local law

as fungible where the standards of liability are the same, we

would effectively limit the local jurisdiction's prerogative to

provide greater remedies for employment discrimination than

those Congress has afforded under Title VII. Such a result

would violate Title VII's express terms: "Nothing in [Title

VII] shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from

any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any

present or future law of any State...." 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-7;

see id. s 2000e(i) (defining "State" to include the District of

Columbia); see also Kimzey v. Walmart Stores, 107 F.3d 568,

576 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title VII damages cap does

not apply to discrimination claims under state law); Luciano

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v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663, 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (reallocating Title VII damages above the cap to plaintiff's state law

recovery on the ground that "Title VII does not relieve a

defendant from liability and the award of damages under

state law where a jury has found such a violation under both

laws"). Other than traditional judicial authority to reduce

damages due to excessiveness, the power to limit total damages in cases where plaintiffs sue under both federal and local

law belongs to Congress and the D.C. Council, not this court.

Availability of punitive damages under D.C. law

Turning finally to Martini's challenge to the district court's

holding that D.C. law prohibits the award of punitive damages where no compensatory damages have been awarded on

a particular legal claim, we think the controlling precedent is

Maxwell v. Gallagher, where the D.C. Court of Appeals said

that "[a] plaintiff must prove a basis for actual damages to

justify the imposition of punitive damages." 709 A.2d 100,

104 (D.C. 1998). Although the jury in this case assessed

punitive damages but no compensatory damages against

Knight and Fannie Mae on Martini's sexual harassment claim

under the D.C. Human Rights Act, it did assess compensatory damages against Fannie Mae on Martini's harassment

claim under Title VII. Since the court gave the jury a single

instruction for finding liability under both Title VII and D.C.

law, see supra at [23], we are inclined to believe that Martini

"prove[d] a basis for actual damages" against Fannie Mae--

but not against Knight--on her harassment claim under D.C.

law. Id.; see Dyer v. Bergman & Assocs., 657 A.2d 1132,

1139-40 (D.C. 1995) (affirming punitive damage award in the

absence of compensatory damage award where plaintiff had

proven actual injury and had accepted a compensatory arbitration award). Because we have dismissed Martini's complaint, however, we leave the proper application of Maxwell

to the district court should this issue arise again in a new

trial.

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IV

We vacate the district court's judgment and remand with

instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

So ordered.

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