Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00061/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KARLIS WRIGHT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civ. Case No. 2:11-cv-61-TFM

) (WO)

HYUNDAI MOTOR MANUFACTURING )

ALABAMA, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Karlis Wright (“Wright”), a former employee of defendant Hyundai

Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC (“HMMA”), brings this action pursuant to the

American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117, Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C. §

1981. Specifically, he asserts that HMMA failed to accommodate his disability and

wrongfully discharged him in violation of the ADA. In addition, he contends that the

defendant retaliated against him for filing a claim of discrimination against HMMA in

violation of Title VII and § 1981. Wright seeks front pay, damages, and injunctive relief. 

The court has jurisdiction of these claims pursuant to the jurisdictional grant in 42

U.S.C. § 12117 and federal question jurisdiction. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1, the parties have consented to a United States Magistrate

Case 2:11-cv-00061-TFM Document 30 Filed 07/10/12 Page 1 of 21
Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final judgment. On

April 30, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 17.) The court

has carefully reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment and the parties’ submissions and

concludes that the motion is due to be denied with respect to the wrongful termination claim

and granted with respect to the accommodation and retaliation claims. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of 1

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the court stated: 1

“[Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive

issue...Rule 56(e)...requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and

by...affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,”

designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. . . .We do not mean

that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial

in order to avoid summary judgment...Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment

motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materialslisted in Rule 56(c) except

the mere pleadings themselves. . . .

Id. at 324.

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affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Id. at 323. 

The movant maymeet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute

of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-324. If the movant succeeds in demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact, the

burden shifts to the non-movant to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a

genuine issue material to the non-movant’s case exists. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2

F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993)(“When a motion for summary judgment is made and

supported ... an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his]

pleading, but [his] response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). What is material is determined by the

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). 

A dispute of material fact “is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. The non-movant “must do

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the

non-movant must present “affirmative evidence” of material factual conflicts to defeat a

properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. If the

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non-movant's response consists of nothing more than conclusory allegations, the court must

enter summary judgment for the movant. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n. 6

(11th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995). 

However, if there is a conflict in the evidence, “the evidence of the non-movant is to

be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255; Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, 207 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir.

2000). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the

court must grant summary judgment if there remains no genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). With these

principles of law in mind, the court will determine now whether summary judgment is

appropriate and should be granted.

III. FACTS2

Wright began working at HMMA as a production team member on June 6, 2005. 

(Attach. to Doc. No. 19, Def’s Ex. A, Pl’s Dep., p. 41.) During his employment, Wright

worked in four different departments within the weld shop: (1) Moving Parts; (2) Body

Complete 1; (3) Body Complete 2; and (4) Body Floor and Side. (Pl’s Dep., pp. 41-48.) 

In August 2006, Wright filed an EEOC complaint against HMMA, complaining that

he was denied a promotion based on his race and age. (Id., p. 61; Def’s Ex. 4.) On

On a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the 2

non-movant. 

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September 5, 2007, the EEOC determined that, “[b]ased on its investigation, the EEOC is

unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.” 

(Def’s Ex. 5.) Wright subsequently filed a lawsuit in this court. On November 16, 2010, the

court granted summary judgment in favor of HMMA and dismissed the case. See Wright v.

Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC, Civ. Act. No. 2:08cv61-SRW.

Wright was assigned to the Body Floor and Side department between November 6,

2006 and May 4, 2009. During this time, Wright suffered from a variety of injuries and 3

medical conditions. On December 29, 2006, Dr. Warner Pinchback, an orthopedic surgeon,

diagnosed Wright as suffering fromimpingement syndrome ofthe right shoulder. (Pl’s Dep.,

pp. 64-66.) Shortly thereafter, Wright underwent surgery to treat his right shoulder

condition. (Id., p. 66.) During the recovery period, Wright took leave under the Family

Medical Leave Act and received short-term disability benefits. (Id., p. 64.) 

Shortly after his return to work in April 2007, Wright suffered two work-related

injuries. On April 26, 2007, Wright reported to HMMA that he injured his elbow. (Id., p.

66.) In July 2007, Wright also reported problems with his left shoulder. (Id., p. 69.) As both

the elbow and left shoulder conditions were work-related injuries, Wright went on leave from

HMMA and received Workers’ Compensation Benefits through October 2007. (Id., pp. 66-

67; Def’s Ex. 10.) 

Between April 26, 2007, through May 4, 2009, Wright was employed by HMMA but did not 3

actively work in the weld shop. 

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On October 30, 2007, Wright stepped off a curb and injured his right knee. (Pl’s

Dep., p. 71.) As a result of this non-work-related injury, Wright took medical leave from

HMMA and received short-term disability benefits. (Id., p. 72.) Due to the length of

incapacity, Hartford Life Insurance transitioned Wright’s short-term disability benefits to

long-term disability benefits on May 5, 2008. (Id., p. 73.) 

During the course of treatmentforWright’s physical impairments, Dr. McAlindon and

Dr. Pinchback issued a series of work profiles for Wright. On January 3, 2008, Dr. Robert

McAlindon, an orthopedic surgeon, released Wright to return to modified duty with no

lifting, pushing, or pulling more than five pounds and no outstretched reaching or work

above shoulder level. (Doc. No. 24, Pl’s Ex. Y.) On April 3, 2008, Dr. McAlindon issued

a work profile indicating that Wright could return to work modified duty with no lifting,

pushing, or pulling more than five pounds with each hand. (Id.)

On March 14, 2008, Dr. Pinchback noted that “Wright may return to work on

Wednesday March 19, 2008, with . . . minimal kneeling and squatting for the next 3

month[s].” (Def’s Ex. 6.) On October 8, 2008, Dr. Pinchback found that “Wright may return

to work on Friday, October 17, 2008, with . . . minimal kneeling, walking and squatting for

the next 6 weeks.” (Id.) On November 21, 2008, Dr. Pinchback determined that “Wright

may return to work on Monday, December 22, 2008 with the restrictions of he must wear his

knee brace at all times while working. He can only do minimal kneeling and bending.” (Id.) 

On February 23, 2009, Dr. Pinchback noted that “[Wright] may return to work with the

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following restriction: he must wear his knee brace at all times while working. He can only

do minimal kneeling and bending.” (Id.)

After each examination, Wright took his work profile to the We Care Facility, an

independent medical clinic which manages the transition of HMMA teammembers returning

to work from medical leave. (Id., pp. 70, 77-78.) Each time, after a We Care representative

contacted a production manager about Wright’s work restrictions, either a We Care

representative or human resources representative would advise Wright that HMMA was

unable to accommodate his restrictions. (Id., pp. 80-81.) According to Wright, We Care 4

staff members told him, “We already know about you already, we can’t let you go back to

work” and “reference[d] the fact that [he] had filed a lawsuit against Hyundai.” (Id., p. 82.) 

On February 27, 2009, Jamie Spaulding, a medical leave specialist at HMMA, sent

Wright a letter advising:

Consistent with past practice, HMMA administratively terminates the

employment of Team Members who have been on [long term disability] for

one year. If you remain on [long term disability] until May 2, 2009, HMMA

will administratively terminate your employment unless you return to your

previously assigned job in the Weld Shop by May 2, 2009 or you apply for

open jobs at HMMA by May 2, 2009. 

In order to return to your previously assigned job in the Weld Shop, you

must present a work release from your physician and receive the medical

clearance from We Care, which is HMMA’s on-site medical clinic. If you

wish to apply for open jobs at HMMA, please contact me. . . .

On one occasion, Wright went to the We Care Facility during a plant shutdown period. (Pl’s Dep., 4

p. 89.) An HMMA supervisor advised that “they couldn’t accommodate [him] then [and] to come back.” 

(Id.)

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(Doc. No. 19, Def’s Ex. 8.) Upon receiving the letter, Wright called the Human Resources

Department and told a representative that his physician had placed some restrictions on him

but that he was able to do his job and that he wanted to return to work. (Pl’s Dep., p. 92.) 

He also told the human resources representative that if there were any other jobs available,

he would be interested in applying. (Id.) The representative told him that “we don’t have

anything available, you have to try back again.” (Id., p. 93.) When Wright called a second

time, he was again advised that there were no jobs available. (Id.)

On May 4, 2009, an HMMA employment manager sent a letter which stated:

Regretfully, HMMA must administrativelyterminate your employment

because you have been on [long term disability] for over one (1) year, because

you have not reported to work at HMMA without restrictions related to your

LTD-related condition since May 2, 2008, and because you have not applied

for any open jobs at HMMA. The effective date of the termination of your

employment is today. Consequently, your employment benefits will cease on

May 31, 2009 at 11:59 p.m. 

(Doc. No. 19, Def’s Ex. 9.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Wrongful Termination Claim

Wright argues that the defendant wrongfully terminated him in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act. In an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff bears

the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination. Texas Dept. of Cmty Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). “For claims under the ADA, we apply the familiar

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McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.” Bennett v. Dominguez, 196 Fed. Appx.

785, 791 (11th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-10867). Under the “McDonnell Douglas burden shifting

framework,” Valentine must first demonstrate a prima facie case of disabilitydiscrimination.

Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004). 

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, Valentine must show that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise

qualified to perform the job; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of

his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193. See also D’Angelo v.

ConAgra Foods, Inc, 422 F.2d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d

1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d

1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997). 

First, the court concludes that Wright has established a prima facie case of disability. 

“A person has a disability if he: (1) has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;” (2) has “a record of such

an impairment;” or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.’” Maynard v. Pneumatic

Prods. Corp., 233 F.3d 1344, 1346 (11 Cir. 2000) quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102. th

In 2008, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, which became

effective January 1, 2009. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122

Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008). Among the Amendments, Congress changed the definition of

“disability” such that being “regarded as” having a disability no longer requires a showing

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that the employer perceived the individual to be substantially limited in a major life activity. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). Therefore, “[a]n individual meets the requirement of ‘being

regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been

subjected to an action prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical

or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major

life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). 5

The court’s function is not to weigh evidence and determine the truth of the matter but

to determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 249-50. With this caveat as its guiding principle, the court concludes that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact which precludes the granting of summary judgment in this

case. Wright asserts that HMMA refused to allow him to return to work after a physician

imposed restrictions on him. The medical records indicate that Wright suffers from a history

of shoulder surgery, right medial and primary left lateral epicondylitis, and knee surgery. It

is undisputed that Wright submitted a medical profile to We Care on each occasion he

received a medical profile indicating he could work with limited restrictions. Wright alleges

that, on one or more occasion and while in his presence, a We Care representative called a

production supervisor over the radio and the following conversation occurred:

Section 12102(3)(B) provides that an individual does not meet the requirement of “being regarded 5

as having such impairment” if the individual’s impairment is transitory and minor. The statute further

provides that “a transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or

less.” Id. At this stage of the proceedings, the court concludes that the facts as alleged do not demonstrate

that the duration of Wright’s impairment lasted or was expected to last less than six months. 

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Theywould call and saywe’ve got up one of your members here

ready to come back to work. They would ask, well, who is it. 

They would tell them. They would say, does he have

restrictions? And they would say, yes. What are they? No, we

can’t use him. 

(Doc. No. 19, Pl’s Dep., p. 80.) On another occasion, a human resources representative

advised Wright that there were no jobs available for him because HMMA could not

accommodate his restrictions. (Id., p. 81-82.) Thus, at this stage of the proceedings,

Wright’s argument that HMMA regarded him as having “an actual or perceived physical ...

impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A), sufficiently demonstrates a prima facie case of

disability.

HMMA argues that Wright’s sworn statement to the Social Security Administration,

as well as his representations during a deposition in his Worker’s Compensation case,

indicating that Wright was unable to perform any work at the time of his termination is

contrary to his claim that he is a qualified individual with a disability. To qualify for social

security benefits, an applicant must establish that he is “not only unable to do his previous

work but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy. “ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In his applications for disability insurance

benefits and supplemental securityincome, Wright states that his disability began on October

17, 2007. (Doc. No. 24-18, Ex. R.) He subsequently amended his applications to reflect the

date of the onset of disability as March 31, 2007. (Doc. No. 19-2, Ex. B.) 

The pursuit of social security benefits does not automatically estop a recipient from

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pursuing an ADA claim. To survive a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff

who receives social security benefits “must explain why that SSDI contention is consistent

with [his] ADA claim that [he] could ‘perform the essential functions’ of [his] previous job

at least with ‘reasonable accommodation.’” Id. at 798. First, the court notes that there is no

evidence indicating that Wright’s application for social security benefits was granted. In

addition, Wright’s sworn declaration indicates that he represented to the Social Security

Administration that he was unable to work because HMMA would not allow him to return

to his previous job. (Attach. to Doc. No. 24.) The court therefore concludes that Wright is

not estopped from pursuing his ADA claim on the basis that he filed an application for social

security benefits.

The court likewise concludes that Wright’s deposition testimony in his Workers’

Compensation case that he did not feel like he could work because of his shoulder, elbow and

knee pain will not prevent Wright from pursuing his ADA claim in this case. Wright argues

that the statements made during his Workers’ Compensation case should be taken in context. 

According to Wright, on the day of the September 15, 2009, deposition, he testified that he

did not believe that he could work at that time because his medical benefits had expired after

his termination from HMMA, he was receiving different medication through the Veterans

Association which was not as effective, he had stopped exercising, and “the pain started

setting there.” (Doc. No. 24, Pl’s Ex. V, pp. 107-109.) Therefore, when taking the facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff as this court is required to do, it is reasonable to

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assume at this stage ofthe proceedings that Wright’s testimonyconcerning his ability to work

on the day of the deposition was not an admission that he was unable to work at HMMA on

the date of his termination. Consequently, Wright has established the essential elements of

his prima facie case on his ADA claim.

Under the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, the burden shifts to the

defendantto present a legitimate, non-discriminatoryreason for the employment action taken

against Wright. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In this circuit, “[t]o satisfy this

intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would

allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been

motivated by discriminatory animus.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1527-

28 (11 Cir. 1997). “To satisfy [its] burden of production, ‘[t]he defendant need not th

persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if

the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against

the plaintiff.’” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1528 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55). This

intermediate burden is “exceedingly light.” Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057,

1061 (11 Cir. 1994). th

To the extent HMMA contends that its refusal to allow Wright to return to work based

on his limited restrictions was justified because the Team Members Position Description and

Physical Demands Analysis demonstrate that a team member must stand up to two hours

continuously and eight or more hours a day; walk up to one hour continuously; and balance,

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stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb occasionally between 1% and 33% of the work day

(Attach. to. Pl’s Dep., Def’s Ex. 2), it is arguable that HMMA has offered a legitimate reason

for the adverse employment action. (Attach. to. Pl’s Dep., Def’s Ex. 2.) Thus, Wright must

show that the defendant’s proffered reason for terminating him was pretextual. Taylor, 175

F.3d at 868. Wright argues that the defendant’s proffered reason for terminating him is a

pretext for discrimination. Specifically, Wright asserts that his former job required less than

minimal kneeling, squatting, or bending and that his restrictions would not have impaired his

ability to return to work. As support, Wright presents the declaration of Jeffery Thomas,

another HMMA employee, stating that the job he shared with Wright “in the Body Floor and

Side department of the Weld Shop required very little, if any, walking, kneeling, crawling,

squatting, bending or stooping. Essentially, the job required standing, and using your arms

and shoulders to move parts form either racks or bins to either the body or a carrier arm for

placement.” (Doc. No. 24, Pl’s Ex. W.) 

HMMA further argues that it did not allow Wright to return to work and terminated

him because he failed to provide medical clearance to return to the Weld Shop. (Doc. No.

18, p. 19.) The medical profiles, however, indicate that both Dr. Pinchback and Dr.

McAlindon found that Wright is able to return to work with minimal restrictions. (Doc. No.

19, Def’s Ex. 6; Doc. No. 24, Pl’s Ex. Y.) In addition, there is no evidence indicating that

We Care or any other medical professional refused to provide Wright medical clearance to

work; rather, Wright’s deposition testimony indicates that We Care personnel merely relayed

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the information in his medical profiles to HMMA supervisors. 

There are genuine disputes of fact about whether HMMA terminated him because of

its perception that he suffered from a disability. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim is due to be denied. 

B. The Accommodation Claim

Wright contends that the defendant failed to accommodate him in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act. “The ADA defines “discrimination” to include “not

making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th

Cir. 1997). Consequently, the ADA imposes upon employers the duty to provide reasonable

accommodations for known disabilities unless doing so would result in an undue hardship

to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). See also Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257

F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). It is the plaintiff’s burden to identify an accommodation

and demonstrate thatthe accommodation would permit himto performthe essential functions

of his job. Id. at 1255-56. “Moreover, the burden of identifying an accommodation that

would allow a qualified individual to perform the job rests with that individual, as does the

ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to demonstrating that such an accommodation is

reasonable.” Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1286.

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An accommodation is reasonable only if it enables the employee to perform an

essential function of the job. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255. An employee with a disability is not

entitled to the accommodation of his choice, but only to a reasonable accommodation. See

Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). A reasonable accommodation

may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a

vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment

or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified

readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

Wright asserts that HMMA should have assigned him to another available position

within HMMA or otherwise accommodated his needs. Specifically, Wright contends that

by asking to return to work, he requested a reasonable accommodation. Simply requesting

to return to work is not a request for a reasonable accommodation for a disability. Wright

must demonstrate that he identified a reasonable accommodation, and that HMMA denied

that accommodation. This he fails to do. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that there exist genuine material issues of fact regarding whether he needed or

requested a reasonable accommodation. Thus, the defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on this claim.

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C. Retaliation 

Wright asserts that he was retaliated against for filing an EEOC Charge of

Discrimination and a federal lawsuit in this court asserting that HMMA unlawfully

discriminated against him based on his race in violation of Title VII and age in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Wright argues that HMMA retaliated against him by issuing

a Serious Misconduct Letter against him and refusing to allow him to return to his

previously assigned job or other available jobs. 

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Wright must demonstrate that (1)

he participated in protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and

(3) there is some causal relationship between the two events. Gutpa v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,

212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000) abrogated on different grounds by Crawford v. Carroll,

529 F.3d 961, 970-71 (11th Cir. 2008); Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460

(11th Cir. 1998). The causal connection requirement must be construed broadly. See

generally E.E.O.C. v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1993) (“a

plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative employment action

are not completely unrelated”). Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation,

“the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of retaliation by producing

legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action.” Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc.,

120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997). If the defendant offers a legitimate reason for the

adverse employment action, the presumption ofretaliation disappears. Id. The plaintiff must

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then show that the employer’s proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually

a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. Olmsted, 141 F.3d at 1460. 

HMMA does not dispute that Wright engaged in a statutorily protected expression by

filing an EEOC complaint of discrimination and that his termination was an adverse

employment action. (Doc. No. 18, p. 22.) As is common in these types of cases, the real

issue with respect to Wright's prima facie showing on his retaliation claim is the third

element which requires a showing of a causal link between the alleged adverse employment

action and the protected activity. “The causal link element is construed broadly so that ‘a

plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative employment action

are not completely unrelated.’” Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th

Cir.2001) (citations omitted). One common method of establishing the causal link element

is close temporal proximity between the adverse employment action and the protected

activity. Of course, this is not the sole means of establishing the causal link element; rather

it is merely the most commonly used approach. Walton v. Neptune Technology Group, Inc.,

No. 2:08cv5-MEF, 2009 WL 3379912, *15 (M.D.Ala. Oct. 20, 2009).

Wright filed his EEOC charge of discrimination in August 2006, received a right-tosue letter from the EEOC in September 2007, and filed a federal lawsuit against HMMA in

January 2008. HMMA terminated Wright on May 4, 2009. Thus, two years and nine months

passed between the time Wright initiated EEOC proceedings against the defendant and his

termination. Similarly, one year and four months passed between the time Wright initiated

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federal proceedings against HMMA and the adverse employment action. In light of the delay

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, the timing of the events

does not constitute circumstantial evidence of a causal link. See Clark County School Dist.

v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (citing affirmatively several court of appeals

decisions for the proposition that a three to four month gap is insufficient to establish the

causal relation prong in a retaliation case). See also Burkette v. Montgomery County Bd. of

Education, No. 2:04cv1143-WKW, 2006 WL 3147435, *7 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 2006) (three

years between filing of EEOC complaint and failure to promote and one year between filing

of lawsuit and failure to promote) (unpublished). 

The court likewise concludes that Wright’s assertion that HMMA retaliated against

him by issuing a Serious Misconduct Letter does not demonstrate that he was subjected to

an adverse employment action. Wright argues that the placement of negative memoranda in

his file amounted to an adverse employment action. Title VII prohibits discrimination with

respect to an employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). However, not all conduct by an employer which negatively affects

an employee constitutes an adverse employment action. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park,

245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11 Cir. 2001). To prove the existence of an adverse employment th

action, “an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment.” Id. “Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of the

significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action

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must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. 

Employer criticism, like employer praise, is an ordinary and appropriate feature

of the workplace. Expanding the scope of Title VII to permit discrimination

lawsuits predicated only on unwelcome day-to-day critiques and assertedly

unjustified negative evaluations would threaten the flow of communication

between employees and supervisors and limit an employer’s to maintain and

improve job performance. Federal courts ought not be put in the position of

monitoring and second-guessing the feedback that an employer gives, and

should be encouraged to give, an employee. Simply put, the loss of prestige or

self-esteem felt by an employee who received what he believes to be

unwarranted job criticism or performance review will rarely – without more –

establish the adverse action necessary to pursue a claim under Title VII’s antidiscrimination clause. 

Davis, 245 F.3d at 1242. 

This court cannot conclude that the Serious Misconduct Letter included within

Wright’s personnel file constituted an adverse employment action. There is no evidence

indicating that, during Wright’s employment with HMMA, he lost any pay or benefits as a

result of the Serious Misconduct Letter. Wright fails to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation. For this reason, the motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim is due

to be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it be and is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. The Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the Title VII wrongful

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termination claim be DENIED.

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the accommodation and

retaliation claims be GRANTED and these claims be dismissed against

HMMA.

DONE this 10th day of July, 2012.

/s/Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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