Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-03007/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-03007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDGAR MARTINEZ, Civil No. 13cv3007-GPC (WVG)

Petitioner, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE DENYING PETITION FOR 

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

K. HOLLAND, Warden,

Respondent.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Gonzalo

P. Curiel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California.

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Edgar Martinez (hereinafter “Petitioner”), is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 9.) Petitioner was convicted by a San Diego County Superior Court

jury of robbery, assault with a firearm, making a criminal threat, burglary, and grand theft of a

firearm. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. [“CT”] at 332-36.) The jury also found that Petitioner

personally used a firearm during the commission of all five counts. (Id.) He was sentenced to

fifteen years in state prison, which consisted of the upper term of five years on the robbery count

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plus a ten-year term for the gun use enhancement on that count; concurrent terms were imposed

on the remaining counts and on their gun use enhancements. (CT 339.)

Petitioner alleges here, as he did in state court, that his federal constitutional rights were

violated because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in plea bargaining (Claim 1), and

the upper term sentence was imposed based on aggravating factors found by the judge rather

than the jury, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the sentence, and

appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise the claims presented here on

appeal (Claim 2). (First Amended Petition [“FAP”] at 5, 8-20.1

) 

Respondent has filed an Answer (“Ans.”) to the Petition along with an incorporated

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support (“Ans. Mem.”), and has lodged portions of

the state court record. (ECF Nos. 10-12.) Respondent argues that federal habeas relief is

unavailable because the adjudication by the state court of Petitioner’s claims did not involve an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (Ans. at 2; Ans. Mem.

at 4-8.) Petitioner has filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 13.)

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

because the adjudication of his claims by the state court is neither contrary to, nor involves an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. The Court also finds that any sentencing error is harmless. The Court

therefore RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

In a five-count amended Information filed in the San Diego County Superior Court on

March 16, 2011, Petitioner was charged with robbery in violation of California Penal Code

section 211, assault with a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 245(a)(2), making a

criminal threat in violation of Penal Code section 443, burglary in violation of Penal Code

section 245(a)(2), and grand theft of a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 487(d)(2). (CT

1

 When citing to documents filed with the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system, the

Court will refer to the pages assigned by that system.

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53-57.) The amended Information also alleged that Petitioner personally used a firearm during

all of the offenses and committed the offenses while on felony probation. (Id.) On March 24,

2011, Petitioner was convicted on all five counts in a jury trial with the jury returning true

findings on all of the firearm use allegations. (CT 332-36.) On September 9, 2011, Petitioner

was sentenced to fifteen years in state prison. (CT 339.)

Petitioner’s appointed appellate counsel filed an appeal raising a single claim, which is

not presented here, challenging the admission of an accomplice’s police statement. (Lodgment

No. 3.) Petitioner contemporaneously filed a pro se habeas petition in the state appellate court

raising the claims presented here. (Lodgment No. 9.) The state appellate court, in separate

opinions, affirmed the conviction and denied habeas relief. (Lodgment Nos. 6, 10.) A petition

for review presenting the claim which was raised on appeal was summarily denied by the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment Nos. 7-8.) Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the

state supreme court raising the same claims presented here, which was summarily denied without

a statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 11-12.)

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion affirming

Petitioner’s conviction on direct review. This Court gives deference to state court findings of

fact and presumes them to be correct. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981).

A. The People’s evidence

1. The robbery and the related offenses

In July 2010, Matthew Atencio worked at Super Canna, a medical

marijuana dispensary located in San Diego. On July 6, at around 11:00 a.m., a

man who Atencio later identified as Martinez entered the dispensary. Martinez

looked at some marijuana, said he did not want anything because he was in a

hurry, and left.

After Martinez left, Atencio noticed that his cell phone was missing. A

short time later, Martinez called the dispensary using Atencio’s cell phone.

Martinez apologized to Atencio and explained that he had taken Atencio’s cell

phone by mistake, thinking that it was his. About five minutes later, Martinez

returned to the dispensary with Atencio’s cell phone. Martinez said that he

wanted to look at the marijuana one more time.

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As Atencio was weighing some marijuana that Martinez had selected, he

felt a gun against his neck. He looked in Martinez’s direction. Martinez said,

“Don’t look at me. Look at the ground.” Martinez forced Atencio to lie face

down in a corner of a small nearby “grow room.” Martinez then opened the door

and let some other people into the dispensary. After a while, Martinez escorted

Atencio into the dispensary’s office. Martinez was still pointing a gun at Atencio.

Martinez asked Atencio if he had any weapons. Atencio replied that there was a

shotgun in the office, and handed the gun to Martinez.

Martinez also told Atencio that if he contacted the police or tried to get

Martinez in trouble, Martinez would find Atencio’s family, kill them, and kill

Atencio. Atencio begged Martinez not to kill him. Martinez said, “You’re not

going to call the police, right, if I don’t shoot you?” Atencio promised Martinez

that he would not call the police. Martinez said, “Well, you don’t call the police,

and I won’t come find you. And I’m going to take this ID to make sure.” 

Martinez took Atencio’s wallet and left.

After the incident, Atencio looked through the dispensary to see what had

been taken. Atencio discovered that a television set, a few laptop computers, a

video game console and some games, approximately six pounds of marijuana, a

shotgun, and a taser were among the missing items.

2. The investigation

Video cameras located outside the dispensary captured portions of the

robbery. The video recording revealed that the vehicle used in the robbery

appeared to be a forest green Ford F–150 truck with an airbrush design on the

tailgate. Three days after the robbery, on July 9, 2010, a police officer saw a

similar truck traveling on a highway. The officer stopped the truck and detained

the driver, Brissa Floriano.

An officer transported Floriano to police headquarters. San Diego Police

Department Detective Maria Estrella interviewed Floriano... Floriano told

Detective Estrella that she had driven Martinez, who was her cousin, and his

friend Emilio Marquez, to the dispensary on the day of the robbery. Floriano said

that Martinez and Marquez entered the dispensary and stole some items from the

establishment while Floriano remained in the truck.

Police arrested Marquez at a friend’s house approximately a week later, and

recovered a laptop that had been stolen from Super Canna inside the friend’s

house. Police arrested Martinez a few months later.

B. The defense

Martinez’s mother testified that Martinez lived with her at the time of the

robbery. Martinez’s mother maintained that although Martinez had left the house

at various points during the day in question, he was never gone for more than a

half hour. Martinez’s mother had not seen any suspicious items in her house after

the robbery.

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Martinez, No. D060559, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal.App.Ct. Jul. 11, 2012).)

/ / /

IV.

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PETITIONER'S CLAIMS

(1) Petitioner’s right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments was violated because he would have accepted a plea offer of ten years and eight

months but for trial counsel’s deficient advice regarding the strength of the case and his sentence

exposure, and by counsel’s failure to negotiate a better plea bargain. (FAP at 5, 8-13.)

(2) Petitioner’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was

violated because an upper term sentence was imposed based on aggravating factors found by the

trial judge rather than the jury, and his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated

by trial counsel’s failure to object to the sentence and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the

claims presented here on direct appeal. (FAP at 5, 14-20.)

V.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that the adjudication by the state court of

Petitioner’s claims is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The

Court also finds that any sentencing error was harmless. The Court therefore RECOMMENDS

the Petition be DENIED.

A. Standard of Review

Because the claims presented here were adjudicated on their merits in the state court, in

order to obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must first demonstrate that the state court

adjudication of the claims: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). 

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

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indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law, “if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. Relief under the

“unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only if, it is so obvious that

a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no ‘fairminded

disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 2014 WL 1612424 at *8 (Apr.

23, 2014), quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United

States Supreme] Court’s decisions . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In order to satisfy section

2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the

facts, are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

B. Claim 2 

The Court will begin by addressing Petitioner’s sentencing claim because it informs the

analysis of the plea bargaining claim, Claim 1, which will follow. Petitioner alleges here, as he

did in the state court, that the imposition of the upper term on count one based on facts which

were found by the trial judge and not the jury, violated his right to a jury trial under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments as that right is articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000) (holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact used to increase a sentence

above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), and Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes

is the maximum sentence permitted to be imposed solely by the jury verdict or a defendant’s

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admission). (FAP at 5, 14-20.) Petitioner also alleges here, as he did in state court, that his trial

counsel was deficient not only in failing to bring the provisions of Blakely and Apprendi to the

trial court’s attention, but in failing to challenge the efficacy of the factors relied on by the trial

judge as well as the trial judge’s weighing of those factors, and that his appellate counsel was

deficient in failing to raise these claims on appeal. (Id.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to the upper term of five years on count one, robbery, and

received a ten-year consecutive enhancement for the jury’s gun-use finding on that count, for

a total term of fifteen years in prison. (Lodgment No. 2, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 725-25.) The

trial judge imposed the middle terms on the remaining counts, stating that “the real aggravating

factor of this case is the robbery with a gun,” and ordered those terms, along with the gun-use

enhancement terms on those counts, to run concurrent. (Id.) The trial judge had discretion to

sentence Petitioner on the robbery count to the low term (two years), the middle term (three

years), or the upper term (five years), and indicated that in making the decision to impose the

upper term he found a single mitigating factor, Petitioner’s “de minimus” criminal history (a

single prior felony conviction for possession of marijuana for sale), but found as aggravating

factors: (1) Petitioner was convicted of multiple counts, (2) the victim was vulnerable, (3) it was

a planned, sophisticated crime and Petitioner occupied a leadership role, (4) it was a very violent

act which showed Petitioner could be a serious danger to society, and (5) it involved a great deal

of merchandise, in excess of $20,000. (RT 724-25; CT 211.)

Petitioner presented Claim 2 to the state supreme court in his pro se habeas petition. 

(Lodgment No. 11 at 12-19.) The state supreme court summarily denied the petition without a

statement of reasoning or citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 12.) Petitioner previously

presented the same claim to the state appellate court in his pro se habeas petition. (Lodgment

No. 9 at 5, 7.) The state appellate court denied the claim, stating:

With respect to sentencing, Martinez contends that his attorney provided

ineffective assistance in failing to argue that under Blakely v. Washington (2004)

542 U.S. 296 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, the judge was

required to “impanel... a jury to find aggravating or mitigating factors” before

imposing an upper term sentence. Any argument that trial counsel might have

made in this regard would have been entirely without merit in light of the 2007

amendments to the Determinate Sentencing Law, which were fully applicable at 

the time of Martinez’s trial in March 2011. (Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2.) These

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amendments permit a trial court to impose an upper term sentence without

violating Blakely or Apprendi and their progeny. (See People v. Jones (2009) 178

Cal.App.4th 853, 866.)

(Lodgment No. 10, In re Martinez, No. D061989, order at 2 (Cal.App.Ct. July 11, 2012).)

Thus, the state appellate court denied the claim alleging the trial judge violated Apprendi

and Blakely on the basis that those cases no longer prohibit judicial factfinding with respect to

factors used to impose an upper term sentence, and denied the ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claim on the basis that it would have been futile for counsel to insist that the aggravating

factors be found by the jury. With respect to these two aspects of Claim 2, this Court will look

through the silent denial by the state supreme court and apply the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) to the appellate court opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991)

(“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained

orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.”) 

The appellate court did not address the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. 

With respect to that claim, this Court must presume that the silent denial by the state supreme

court was an adjudication on the merits of the constitutional claim presented, and must determine

what arguments or theories could have supported the state court’s decision, and then “ask

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of” the Supreme Court. Johnson v. Williams,

568 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1095 (2013); Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784-86. 

In Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007), the Supreme Court found that

California’s three-tiered determinate sentencing law violated the right to a jury trial to the extent

it permitted a judge to impose an upper term sentence in the absence of an aggravating factor

which is established by the jury’s verdict, a defendant’s admission, or a prior conviction. Id. at

288 (“In accord with Blakely . . . the middle term prescribed in California’s statutes, not the

upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum.”) As the appellate court here noted, however,

the California Legislature amended California’s Determinate Sentencing Law in 2007 in

response to Cunningham, well before Petitioner committed his offenses in 2010. People v.

Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825, 836 n.2 (2007). “Because of these amendments, trial courts now have

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discretion under [California Penal Code § 1170(b)] to select among the lower, middle, and upper

terms specified by statute without stating ultimate facts deemed to be aggravating or mitigating

under the circumstances and without weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 

People v. Jones, 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 867 (2009), citing Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 847. “[A] trial

court is free to base an upper term sentence upon any aggravating circumstance that the court

deems significant, subject to specific prohibitions.” Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 848 (noting that a

fact underlying an enhancement may not be used to impose the upper term unless the court

strikes the enhancement, and any fact that is an element of a crime may not be used to impose

an upper term). 

The new sentencing law was “passed in response to Cunningham [and] provides that:

‘when a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible

terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.’” 

Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 631 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting California Penal Code § 1170(b)

(2007). Because the trial judge here had discretion to impose the upper term without finding

aggravating factors, there was no violation of Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights when the

judge selected the upper term based on facts which were not found by a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) (“For when a trial judge exercises

his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to

a jury determination of the fact that the judge deems relevant.”) However, even if a Sixth

Amendment violation occurred as a result of the imposition of an upper term sentence, federal

habeas relief is not available if the error was harmless. Butler, 528 F.3d at 648. In conducting

a harmless error analysis, relief is only appropriate if the Court is “in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether

a jury would have found the relevant aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.” Butler,

528 F.3d at 648, quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995).

The trial judge here explained why he had selected the upper term on count one:

Looking at mitigating factors, the only mitigating factor is the defendant’s

lack of criminal history. I accept the fact that, overall, he has a prior 11359 but

pretty de minimus when you look at the serious nature of this particular crime. [¶]

I accept the representation that his family has made that he’s a good person. But

I’m not here to judge whether or not he’s a good person. I’m here to determine

what that the appropriate penalty is for the crime that he has lawfully been

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convicted of by 12 good people from the community. 

I do note they convicted him of multiple counts. That’s a part of the

aggravating factors. I’m not going to throw in the gun since he’s going to be

sentenced on the gun. I’m not using that as an aggravating factor.

The victim was very vulnerable. These types of dispensaries are, you

know, open game for and crimes of opportunity for people who want to steal

money, product, anything else. That’s what we have here. It was a fairly

sophisticated type of crime. Also, the defendant did occupy a position of

leadership during this crime.

As I indicated, there was – I wouldn’t say professionalism. But it was

certainly planned, and it was violent. It was a very, very violent act and the type

that shows the defendant can be a serious danger to society.

Also, as an aggravating factor, the fact is that a great deal of merchandise: shotgun, flat-screen TV, taser, laptops. All of this taken was in excess of $20,000. 

Again, an aggravating factor.

Based on weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court chooses

the upper term of 5 years. Consecutive to that will run 10 years consecutive on

the gun enhancement. Under 12022.53(B), prison term 15 years. 4 year term on

the 12022.5 is stayed per 654.

(RT 724-25.)

Rule 4.421 of the California Rules of Court governs the circumstances in aggravation

which justify an upper term. As applicable here, California Rules of Court, Rules 4.421(a) and

(b), at the time of sentencing, stated the following is a circumstance in aggravation:

(a) Factors relating to the crime, whether or not charged or chargeable as

enhancements include that: . . . .

(2) The defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the

commission of the crime;

(3) The victim was particularly vulnerable;

(4) The defendant induced others to participate in the commission of the crime or

occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants in its

commission; . . . .

(6) The defendant threatened witnesses, unlawfully prevented or dissuaded

witnesses from testifying, suborned perjury, or in any other way illegally

interfered with the judicial process;

(7) The defendant was convicted of other crimes for which consecutive sentences

could have been imposed but for which concurrent sentences are being imposed;

(8) The manner in which the crime was carried out indicates planning,

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sophistication, or professionalism;

(9) The crime involved an attempted or actual taking or damage of great monetary

value; . . . .

(b) Factors relating to the defendant include that:

(1) The defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger

to society; . . . .

(4) The defendant was on probation or parole when the crime was committed; and

(5) The defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory.

Cal. R. Ct. 4.421(a)-(b) (West 2011).

The trial judge indicated that he did not rely on Rule 4.421(a)(2), use of a weapon, despite

the fact that the jury found Petitioner had been armed during the commission of the offenses. 

See Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th at 848 (noting that a fact underlying an enhancement may not be used

to impose an upper term unless the court strikes the enhancement). The trial judge did, however,

rely on Rule 4.421(a)(3), the existence of a particularly vulnerable victim. The Ninth Circuit in

Butler declined to conclude that the victim was particularly vulnerable where the only evidence

of vulnerability was that the victim was attacked from behind. Butler, 528 F.3d at 649 (“In the

overwhelming majority of cases, ‘particularly vulnerable victims’ have had inherent personal

characteristics that, sometimes in combination with the manner in which the crime was

committed, render them more vulnerable than other victims.”) The Ninth Circuit has also noted,

with respect to a victim who was recovering from surgery, was unable to walk or stand because

he was changing the dressing on his leg, and was attacked in the early morning in an isolated

place without any warning, that: 

We recognize that, following Cunningham, the California Supreme Court

cautioned reviewing courts when it comes to concluding there was harmless error

due to the existence of aggravating circumstances that were not presented to the

jury. For example, whether a victim was particularly vulnerable may entail a

subjective assessment of the circumstances rather than a straightforward finding

of facts. . . . [¶] Unlike Sandoval and Butler, this is a case that offers a clear-cut,

obvious, and indisputable instance of victim vulnerability. Had the government 

presented to the jury the question, “Was Mr. Booker a particularly vulnerable

victim?,” we conclude that the jury would have answered “yes.” Because we are 

not in grave doubt as to whether the jury would have found the existence of an

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aggravating factor, we conclude that any trial court error in imposing the upper

term based on factors that were not presented to the jury was harmless.

Johnson v. Kane, 482 Fed.Appx. 227, 229-30 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished memorandum)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).2

It is not clear whether the jury here, had they been asked, would have agreed with the trial

judge that persons who work in marijuana dispensaries are by that very occupation particularly

vulnerable. Under California law, particularly “means in a special or unusual degree, to an

extent greater than in other cases. Vulnerability means defenseless, unguarded, unprotected,

accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.” People v.

DeHoyos, 57 Cal.4th 79, 155 (2013). The trial judge may have been correct to point out that

marijuana dispensaries make an inviting target due to the nature of their business, but it is not

obvious the jury would have agreed with the trial judge that that fact alone made the victim

particularly vulnerable. This is not a “clear-cut, obvious and indisputable instance of victim

vulnerability.” Kane, 482 Fed.Appx. at 230.

The next aggravating factor applicable to Petitioner, listed in Rule 4.421(a), which was

relied on by the trial judge, looks to whether Petitioner “induced others to participate in the

commission of the crime or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants

in its commission.” Cal. R. Ct. 4.421(a)(4) (West 2011). The evidence presented at trial

supports a finding that had the jury been asked to determine if Petitioner occupied a position of

leadership in connection to the crimes, they would have answered in the affirmative. The victim,

a “bud tender” at a medical marijuana dispensary, testified that the dispensary consists of three

very small rooms, a foyer open to the public, a room where the marijuana is displayed which is

separated from the foyer by a window and a locked door, and an office. (RT 212-15.) The

victim testified Petitioner entered the foyer and said he was a security guard who was in a hurry

because he was late for work. (RT 220-21.) Petitioner was a new patient, and after the victim

verified his medical recommendation through a computer, he “buzzed” Petitioner through the

2

 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions may be cited commencing with decisions issued in 2007. 

(See Ninth Cir. Rule 36-3.) Although still not binding precedent, unpublished decisions have persuasive

value and indicate how the Ninth Circuit applies binding authority.

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locked door into the room where the marijuana was displayed. (RT 220.) Petitioner looked

around but said he was in a rush and did not purchase anything; after Petitioner left, the victim

noticed his cell phone was missing. (RT 222-24.) The victim said he knew Petitioner had taken

his cell phone, so he called it from the dispensary phone; no one answered but Petitioner

immediately called back, apologized for taking it, came back to the dispensary, held it up to the

window so the victim could see it, and was “buzzed in” to the room with the marijuana. (Id.)

The victim testified that Petitioner then selected some marijuana to purchase, and as the

victim was weighing it, he felt a gun pressed to his neck; he started to look up but Petitioner told

him to look at the ground, not at Petitioner. (RT 224.) Petitioner escorted the victim at gunpoint

to a corner of the dispensary and made him crouch down; he told the victim that he was going

to let some friends in and warned the victim not to try anything. (RT 226.) Petitioner opened

the door and let someone in, and the victim heard items being taken; Petitioner asked the victim

where he kept the cash and if there was any more marijuana. (RT 226-30.) The victim testified

that Petitioner escorted him to the office holding the gun to his head, where he asked the victim

if Petitioner’s paperwork was on file, or if the victim had made any copies of Petitioner’s records

or identification, and was told no. (RT 231-32.) Petitioner asked if the victim had any weapons,

and the victim pointed to a shotgun and a taser, which were taken by Petitioner. (RT 232-33.)

Petitioner escorted the victim back to a corner, made him lie on the floor, placed a stool

on top of him, and said, “if this stool moves, you’re dead.” (RT 234.) Petitioner told the victim

that if he contacted the police he would find and kill the victim and his family. (RT 233.) After

the victim begged Petitioner not to kill him and promised not to call the police, Petitioner took

his wallet and said, “Well, you don’t call the police, and I won’t come find you. And I’m going

to take this I.D. to make sure.” (RT 233-34.) A television set, three laptop computers, an XBox, video games, a shotgun, a taser, and six pounds of marijuana were taken. (RT 238.)

Brissa Floriano testified, pursuant to a plea agreement, that she drove Petitioner, who was

her cousin, and Emilio Marquez, Petitioner’s friend, to the marijuana dispensary in her truck at

Petitioner’s request, parked nearby, and waited while Petitioner and Marquez walked away. (RT

325-31.) Marquez came back carrying a trash can, which he put in the truck; he came back twice

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more and placed a television, a duffel bag, an X-Box, and a shotgun in the truck. (RT 332-47.) 

After the third trip, Petitioner returned and they drove away; during the ride, Petitioner asked

Marquez if he had taken the cash box, and he said no because it contained no money. (RT 346.)

Thus, the evidence showed that Petitioner gained entry to the dispensary, looked around,

took the victim’s cell phone and used it as a pretext to re-enter, after which he held the victim

at gunpoint while he let in his friend, who then took the stolen items to the truck where

Petitioner’s cousin, who he had asked to drive, was waiting. The Court is not in grave doubt that

had the jury been asked if Petitioner had occupied a position of leadership, they would have

answered in the affirmative. 

The same is true regarding at last two of the four remaining aggravating factors relied on

by the trial judge, listed in Rule 4.421(a)(6)-(9) as: “(6) The defendant threatened witnesses,

unlawfully prevented or dissuaded witnesses from testifying, suborned perjury, or in any other

way illegally interfered with the judicial process; (7) The defendant was convicted of other

crimes for which consecutive sentences could have been imposed but for which concurrent

sentences are being imposed; (8) The manner in which the crime was carried out indicates

planning, sophistication, or professionalism; and (9) The crime involved an attempted or actual

taking or damage of great monetary value.” Cal. R. Ct. 4.421(a)(4) (West 2011). The evidence

clearly showed that Petitioner threatened the victim, even going so far as to take the victim’s

identification and threatening to kill his entire family if he identified Petitioner. In addition,

Petitioner was convicted of five separate counts, including robbery, assault with a firearm,

making a criminal threat, burglary, and grand theft of a firearm. (CT 53-57.) Concurrent

sentences were imposed on four of the five counts, at least one of which, the criminal threat

count, the trial judge indicated could have been run consecutively. (RT 726.) Finally, there was

no dispute that property with a great monetary value, over $20,000, was taken. Even if it is

unclear whether the jury would have found the crimes to have been planned, sophisticated and

carried out with professionalism, or if the trial judge had erred in finding that the sentence on

count three could have run consecutively, the Court is not in grave doubt that, if asked, the jury

would have found that Petitioner threatened a witness and took property of great monetary value

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within the meaning of Rule 4.421(a)(6) and (9). Any error in imposing the upper term on the

robbery count without submitting the aggregating factors relating to the crimes to the jury for

determination beyond a reasonable doubt was clearly harmless. See Butler, 528 F.3d at 648 (In

conducting a harmless error analysis, relief is only appropriate if the Court is “in ‘grave doubt’

as to whether a jury would have found the relevant aggravating factors beyond a reasonable

doubt.”), quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436. Because several aggravating factors relating to the

crime support imposition of the upper term, the Court need not address the factors relating to

Petitioner set forth in California Rule of Court Rule 4.421(b)(1), (4)-(5).

Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to

bring the provisions of Blakely and Apprendi to the trial court’s attention, failing to challenge

the efficacy of the factors relied on by the trial judge, and failing to challenge the trial judge’s

weighing of those factors. For ineffective assistance of counsel to provide a basis for habeas

relief, Petitioner must demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel’s performance

was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that “counsel’s errors were so

serious as to deprive [Petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. To show

prejudice, Petitioner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different absent the error. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability in

this context is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Petitioner

must establish both deficient performance and prejudice in order to establish constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 687. 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

356, 371 (2010). “The standards created by Strickland and section 2254(d) are both highly

deferential and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788

(citations omitted). These standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Federal habeas relief

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functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” and

not simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786, quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979). “Representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it ‘so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process’ that the defendant was denied a

fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

As quoted above, the state appellate court denied the ineffective assistance of counsel

aspect of the sentencing claim on the basis that: “Any argument that trial counsel might have

made in this regard would have been entirely without merit in light of the 2007 amendments to

the Determinate Sentencing Law, which were fully applicable at the time of Martinez’s trial in

March 2011.” (Lodgment No. 10, In re Martinez, No. D061989, order at 2.) Petitioner is unable

to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s failure to

request a jury find the aggravating factors rather than the judge because, as set forth above, state

law at the time of his sentencing did not require a jury determination as to aggravating factors. 

Thus, any such request would have been futile. With respect to Petitioner’s contention that

counsel was deficient in failing to challenge the trial judge’s weighing of the sentencing factors

or the efficacy of the factors themselves, his trial counsel argued at length at the sentencing

hearing that the trial judge should impose the low term. (RT 711-14.) Counsel pointed out that

Petitioner was a young man with support from family, teachers and coaches who believed in him

and held positive opinions of his character, that his pre-crime conduct was exemplary, including

a citation from the White House for his volunteer work, all while recovering from a serious

injury which necessitated his learning to walk again, and that his conduct and manner during the

crimes was intended to minimize the trauma, damage and harm inflicted on the victim. (Id.) 

That was in addition to a new trial motion where counsel argued there was insufficient evidence

to support the gun-use enhancement because the gun was never recovered, and the victim, a

chronic marijuana user who admitted to being “stoned” during the robbery and during his trial

testimony, contradicted himself regarding the color of the gun, and was reluctant to say that he

was positive about whether he even saw a gun because he was reluctant to look at it during the

robbery and had assumed it was gun that had been pressed against his neck. (RT 703-04; CT

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272-80.) Petitioner has not shown that counsel made any errors in connection to the sentencing

hearing, much less that he “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Furthermore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to bring Apprendi

and Blakely to the trial court’s attention, or the alleged failure to properly argue that any or all

of the aggravating factors relied on by the trial judge did not satisfy California Rule of Court

Rule 4.421(a)-(b), for the reasons set forth above, namely, that sufficient evidence exists in the

record to support several aggravating factors. The trial testimony outlined above supporting the

aggravating factors, coupled with counsel’s argument that the lower term was appropriate and

Petitioner’s plea for leniency (RT 719-24), and with the trial judge’s statement quoted above that

he was imposing the upper term due to the nature of Petitioner’s conduct even accepting the

representation that Petitioner is a good person, clearly show that trial counsel’s performance with

respect to challenging the imposition of the upper term sentence did not undermine the proper

functioning of the adversarial process to the point that Petitioner was denied a fair sentencing

hearing. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. For the same reasons, appellate counsel’s failure to raise

the claims on direct appeal was neither deficient nor prejudicial. See Turner v. Calderon, 281

F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the Strickland standard applies to claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th

Cir. 1982) (stating that an attorney’s failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not

constitute ineffective assistance); Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980)

(“There is no requirement that an attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”) 

The Court finds that the state supreme court’s silent denial of the ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel claim aspect of Claim 2, and the state appellate court’s opinion denying the

remaining aspects of Claim 2, are neither contrary to, nor involve an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, and are not based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. The Court also finds, to the extent a federal constitutional error arose from imposition of

an upper term sentence based on facts found by a judge rather than a jury, any error was

harmless. The Court therefore recommends denying habeas relief as to Claim 2. 

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C. Claim 1

Petitioner alleges in Claim 1 that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel in

connection to plea bargaining. (FAP at 5, 8-13.) Petitioner alleged in the appellate court:

After the preliminary hearing I appeared in court several times where the

D.A. presented several plea-bargain offers. Under the advice of my attorney we

did not agree to any offer. Finally, on the day of my jury selection the D.A.

offered a plea-bargain of ten years. I asked my attorney if he could try to get me

a better offer, since I only had 1 prior conviction which was non-violent and

because he had asked me before if I was willing to sign for 5 years. He just sat

there and told me it would get no better without even litigating with the District

attorney for a better offer. I asked him what the chances of impeaching the vicitm

and my cousin who testified against me were, being that they were the only key

witnesses. He told me that when the jury found out my cousin was gang related

and had signed an agreement with the D.A. stating that if she testified against me

she would expose herself to no more than 3 years in prison, the jury would most

likely believe she was just saying anything to get off easy. So supposedly the

chances were good to impeach her too. Because of this and because he said he

was ready we went ahead to trial. 

With the benefit of hindsight one can see that I received ineffective

assistance of counsel during the plea-bargain stage and during my sentencing. A

violation of my constitutional right to competent counsel, which ultimately

prejudiced my defense. Had my attorney not failed to communicate terms and

conditions of the plea-bargain offer that would have been favorable, of course I

would have agreed to the more favorable outcome of the plea offer.

 (Lodgment No. 9 at 4-5.) The appellate court denied the claim, stating:

Martinez alleges that his trial counsel “failed to communicate (the) terms

and conditions of (a) plea-bargain offer that would have (been) more favorable”

than the 15-year sentence that Martinez received after he was convicted at a jury

trial. However, Martinez fails to support this bare allegation with any explanation

of facts that would justify relief. Martinez states that “on the day of my jury

selection the (district attorney) offered a plea-bargain of 10 years,” and indicates

that he discussed this offer with his attorney. Martinez does not allege that his

attorney failed to communicate any other plea offer. Martinez also suggests that

his attorney failed to attempt to negotiate a more favorable plea agreement with

the prosecutor and overestimated the likelihood that Martinez would be acquitted,

based on an irrational assessment of the evidence likely to be presented at trial. 

However, Martinez fails to allege specific facts that would substantiate these

allegations. Accordingly, we conclude that Martinez has failed to adequately

allege that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during plea bargaining. 

(See People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (“‘Conclusory allegations (in a

petition for habeas corpus) made without any explanation of the basis for the

allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.’ (Citation.)”.)

(Lodgment No. 10, In re Martinez, No. D061989, order at 1-2.)

In his subsequent habeas petition filed in the state supreme court, Petitioner augmented

his claim with his own declaration, which he also presents here, alleging that he was informed

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by his trial counsel that the prosecution had offered a plea bargain of ten years and eight months,

of which he would have to serve 85%, in exchange for a guilty plea, but decided not to accept

the offer based on his counsel’s representation that his maximum exposure if he went to trial was

no more than twelve years at 85%. (FAP at 22-23.) Petitioner went to trial and was sentenced

to fifteen years at 85%, and alleges here, as he did in the state supreme court (but not the state

appellate court), that if he knew he was going to “serve approximately 40 months more in state

prison. . . it is without question I would have accepted the ten year, eight month plea offer.” (Id.) 

The state supreme court summarily denied the habeas petition without citation of authority or

a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 12.)

Respondent contends that the state appellate court’s opinion reasonably recognized that

Petitioner had not alleged a violation of counsel’s duty to communicate plea offers, and that the

bare assertion that counsel could have tried harder to negotiate a more favorable plea offer is

insufficient to establish deficient performance. (Ans. Mem at 6.) Respondent also argues that

the silent denial of the claim by the state supreme court, which, unlike the appellate court, had

before it Petitioner’s declaration, was similarly reasonable because the veracity of Petitioner’s

contention that his counsel erroneously estimated his maximum exposure at twelve years is

questionable due to his allegation in the appellate court petition that he should have been

sentenced to thirteen years. (Id. at 7.) Respondent argues that at no point in the appellate court

habeas petition does Petitioner express surprise at being sentenced to more than twelve years,

and the self-serving, unsupported allegations made here and to the state supreme court are

insufficient to warrant relief. (Id.) Finally, Respondent contends that even if true, counsel’s

miscalculation of the sentencing exposure is at most a “mere inaccurate prediction,” which does

not constitute ineffective assistance, which requires a showing of a “gross mischaracterization

of the likely outcome of a plea bargain combined with . . . erroneous advice of the probable

effects of going to trial.” (Id.) 

Applying the provisions of § 2254(d) to the state appellate court opinion, it is clear that

federal habeas relief is unavailable because the appellate court opinion did not unreasonably

apply Strickland. Petitioner provided only a conclusory allegation that his trial counsel could

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have done a better job negotiating a plea offer, and a conclusory allegation that counsel failed

to communicate the terms and conditions of an offer. (Lodgment No. 9 at 4-5.) Speculative and

conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

However, Petitioner presented additional allegations in the state supreme court which

were not presented to the state appellate court, namely, that trial counsel misrepresented

Petitioner’s maximum exposure at twelve years, and that Petitioner would have accepted an offer

of ten years and eight months had he known he faced fifteen years rather then twelve. The

appellate court did not address those allegations because they were not presented there, and this

Court cannot look though the silent denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court

opinion. Rather, absent any indication otherwise, this Court must presume that the silent denial

by the state supreme court was an adjudication on the merits of the constitutional claim

presented. Johnson, 133 S.Ct. at 1095; Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 784. When reviewing such a claim,

this Court “must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have

supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists

could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior

decision of” the Supreme Court. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786.

Clearly established federal law provides that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel “extends to the plea-bargaining process.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct.

1376, 1384 (2012) (“During plea negotiations defendants are entitled to the effective assistance

of competent counsel.”), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“This Court now holds that, as a

general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution

to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”) The Supreme

Court has held that the Strickland standard applies during plea negotiations, and “that counsel

should be ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgement.’” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ___,

134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In order to establish prejudice,

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Petitioner “must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent

advice.” Lafler, 131 S.Ct. at 1384. Because Petitioner rejected the plea offer, he “must show

that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer

would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and

the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court

would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s

terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were

imposed.” Id. at 1385.

The state supreme court may have reasonably rejected Petitioner’s claim on the basis that

under the facts alleged, even if true, it was not reasonably likely he would have accepted an offer

of ten years and eight months had he known his exposure was fifteen years rather than twelve

years. Petitioner alleged in the state court that:

After the preliminary hearing I appeared in court several times where the

D.A. presented several plea-bargain offers. Under the advice of my attorney we

did not agree to any offer. Finally, on the day of my jury selection the D.A.

offered a plea-bargain of 10 years. I asked my attorney if he could try to get me

a better offer, since I only had 1 prior conviction which was non-violent and

because he had asked me before if I was willing to sign for 5 years. He simply sat

there and told me it would get no better without even litigating with the District

Attorney for a better offer.

(Lodgment No. 9 at 4.) 

The state supreme court could have reasonably found that trial counsel informed

Petitioner that in counsel’s opinion five years was a fair offer, but that the prosecution, after

submitting several plea offers, would do no better than ten years, or as Petitioner states in his

later declaration, ten years and eight months. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the

state supreme court could have accepted as true Petitioner’s declaration that trial counsel

misrepresented his maximum exposure at twelve years rather than fifteen years, and still

reasonably found both that Petitioner’s declaration presented insufficient evidence to overcome

the strong presumption of competence of trial counsel, and that it was not reasonably probable

that the three-year difference would have prompted Petitioner to plead guilty. As Petitioner

points out, even the probation officer recommended to the trial judge that the middle term be

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imposed on count one. (CT 211.) His trial counsel asked the trial judge to impose the low term

(RT 712), which would have resulted in the twelve-year sentence which Petitioner indicates his

counsel told him was his exposure. 

Thus, Petitioner’s attorney argued for a sentence of twelve years (after seeking to strike

the ten-year gun enhancement altogether), the probation officer recommended thirteen years, and

the trial judge imposed fifteen years. Because the differences between the predicted sentences

and the actual sentence are not extreme, assuming the truth of Petitioner’s allegation that trial

counsel erroneously advised him that he would be exposed to twelve years if he went to trial

rather than fifteen years, the state court’s rejection of the claim that Petitioner would have

accepted the plea offer but for counsel’s erroneous exposure calculation is consistent with clearly

established federal law. See e.g. McMann, 397 U.S. at 770 (“That a guilty plea must be

intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant’s lawyer

withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing. Courts continue to have

serious differences among themselves . . . both with respect to the proper standard by which the

facts are to be judged and with respect to the application of that standard to particular facts.”);

see also Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial

counsel’s misrepresentation that petitioner would receive a sentence of not more than twelve

years but he was sentenced to fifteen years, did not constitute ineffective assistance), citing Iaea

v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an inaccurate prediction of a sentence

is not deficient performance unless the mistake constitutes a “gross mischaracterization of the

likely outcome.”) 

Federal habeas relief functions as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,” and not simply as a means of error correction. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at

786. Petitioner has not alleged an extreme malfunction in the state court in connection to his

ineffective assistance in plea bargaining claim. Rather, he has alleged that his counsel initially

asked him if he would be interested in accepting five years, and then advised Petitioner against

accepting an offer of ten years and eight months because if he went to trial the most he would

received would be twelve years, three years less than that to which he was actually exposed, and

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advised him regarding his chances of being convicted on the testimony of the getaway driver

who was a gang member, had cut a deal with the prosecution, and was willing to testify against

a family member. Petitioner followed his counsel’s advice, went to trial, was found guilty, and

although he could have been sentenced to twelve, thirteen or fifteen years depending on whether

a low, middle or upper term was imposed on count one, the trial judge imposed the upper term

against the recommendation for the middle term by the assigned probation officer and over trial

counsel’s lucid and well-supported argument for the low term. 

As set forth above, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” Padilla,

130 S.Ct. at 1485, and the standards of Strickland and § 2254(d) “are both highly deferential and

when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (citations

omitted). These standards are “difficult to meet” and “demands that state court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. In light of the doubly deferential

standards this Court must apply, the state supreme court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that his

trial counsel deficiently advised him, and that he was prejudiced by losing the opportunity to

accept an offer of ten years and eight months, is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788;

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398; Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Court

therefore recommends habeas relief be denied as to Claim 1.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing

that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 9, 2014, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than June 23, 2014. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 12, 2014

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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