Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00477/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00477-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN FRANKLIN TAYLOR,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-0477 MCE KJM P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his Sacramento County convictions for

attempted murder, murder and weapons enhancements. 

I. Facts

In May 1997 Robert Swafford was dating Rena Tabarez. RT 511-512. Through

Rena or her half-sister Maria Aguilar, Swafford had met their mother, Virginia Nuno, petitioner

and co-defendants Matt Michel (petitioner’s half-brother), Enrique (Rick) Carrillo and Michael

Brown. RT 514-515, 587-588. Carrillo called Nuno “mother” and referred to Aguilar and

Tabarez as his sisters. RT 617. 

Swafford spent Mother’s Day with Tabarez and Nuno at a barbecue at Folsom

Lake. RT 545. Michel and Brown were also there with Aguilar. RT 545-546, 590. Nuno’s van

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got a flat tire at the lake and Swafford offered to help Michel fix it. RT 547, 591. Michel said

something like “fool, grab the tire.” RT 547. This angered Swafford, but Michel retorted that

Swafford should not have called him “loke,” apparently short for “local.” RT 548. After this

exchange of words, Michel left. RT 548. 

On May 24, Swafford attended a family baptism with Tabarez. RT 515. On the

way to the baptism, they picked up Swafford’s friend Chris Guerrero. RT 516-517. Swafford

was driving his brown Cadillac. RT 518. The four defendants (including petitioner) also

attended the baptism. RT 521, 595. There were no problems between Swafford and any of the

defendants at the baptism. RT 564, 580. 

Nuno, Tabarez, Swafford and Aguilar eventually went to a bar, Yolanda’s

Lounge. RT 520. The defendants also went to Yolanda’s. RT 521. Again, there were no

problems between Swafford and Guerrerro and any of the defendants. RT 564, 580. Swafford’s

group left sometime after midnight; although Swafford was intoxicated, he drove anyway. 

RT 525. He made a U-turn at one point to head back to Yolanda’s but Tabarez told him to go to

Nuno’s, so he made another U-turn. RT 604. During one of the turns he went over the center

divider. Tabarez saw the defendants’ car next to them; Carrillo was yelling for them to pull over. 

RT 604, 605, 662.

When they arrived at Nuno’s house on Edinger Way, Swafford and Tabarez got

out to help Nuno out of the car. RT 532, 608. Before they could do so, Carrillo came up from

behind his car. RT 533, 608. Carrillo was angry about the way Swafford had been driving with

Nuno in the car. RT 535, 612. Swafford, intoxicated, “mouthed off back.” RT 535. Carrillo

then helped Nuno out of the car and into her house. RT 536. 

According to defense witness Rick Trejo, he arrived at Nuno’s house with Brown 1

and Aguilar in Aguilar’s car. RT 1493, 1498-1499. Aguilar was angry that Swafford had been

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driving recklessly with her mother in the car. RT 1496-1497, 1501. She hit Swafford, who hit

her back. RT 1502-1503. 

Swafford took his shirt off in preparation for a fight; he was, however, unarmed. 

RT 536, 550. Tabarez was able to get both men to back off. As she pushed Carrillo across the

street, Carrillo said “Fool, you hit my sister.” RT 536-537, 617. Swafford saw two shadows

come out of the car. RT 538. Tabarez saw Michel step forward, say something and then begin

firing a gun. RT 616. Tabarez ran forward to get out of the line of fire and crouched by a fence.

RT 625, 677. She heard more than ten shots. RT 680. 

Swafford was hit. He pulled himself into his car. RT 539. Michel walked around

the car, opened the door and shot at Swafford. RT 539, 633. Swafford fell out of the car onto a

pile of glass. RT 542. 

Neither Swafford nor Tabarez recalled seeing petitioner at the scene. RT 628,

694. Although Trejo testified he had not seen petitioner at the scene, his testimony was

impeached by a prior statement to investigator William Deasy, in which he identified petitioner

as one of those present. RT 1633-1634. 

 Sandra Luna, who lived three blocks south of Edinger Way, heard gunshots during

the early morning hours: a series of shots, then a pause and another series of shots, for about ten

total. RT 362-363. 

Around 1:30 a.m., Sacramento Police Sergeant David Torres heard a broadcast of

shots fired. RT 372. He arrived at 2634 Edinger Way and saw a brown Cadillac, parked the

wrong way in front of the house. RT 374. A man (Swafford) was hanging out of the passenger

side, unconscious, and one (Guerrero) was seated behind the steering wheel with a fatal bullet

wound to the back of his head. RT 375, 834-835. 

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While he was in the hospital, Swafford told his brother that Brown and Michel

“came out of the car just unloading on ‘em.” RT 726. Swafford told Detective Richard Overton

that “Luis, Matt and Mikey” were responsible for the shooting; later he said Luis, Matt, Mikey

and John. RT 736. 

Over the course of several days of testimony, several criminalists testified that at

least nineteen shots were fired at the Cadillac from four different guns, a ten-millimeter handgun,

a nine-millimeter handgun, a .380 automatic pistol, and a .357 Magnum or .38 special. RT 458-

459, 1042, 1084-1085. Among the many bullets and fragments recovered from the Cadillac were

two fired from the ten-millimeter gun seized during Michel’s arrest, one in the spare tire in the

trunk and one in the right rear tire. RT 900-901, 1095. This gun would not fire continuously

from pressure on the trigger, but rather required that the trigger be pulled and released with each

shot. RT 1033-1034. 

The bullet that killed Guerrero was probably fired from the nine-millimeter gun.

RT 1223-1224. One of the bullets passed through his head; this wound was fatal. RT 834-835. 

The two bullets left in Swafford’s body were probably .380 automatic bullets. RT 1403, 1439. 

Detective Richard Overton interviewed petitioner; the jury saw the videotape and

read the transcript of that interview. RT 747. Petitioner initially said he saw Little Mike

[Brown] push Maria into the car, heard gunshots and saw the flames from the muzzle, grabbed

the ten-millimeter from under the seat, put the clip in and fired into the air. CT 1004. 

Overton told him they had found bullets from the ten-millimeter in Swafford’s car

and began again to ask petitioner about the incident. CT 1023. Petitioner conceded that

Swafford was “pissing everybody off” by his reckless driving and that his brother harbored a

grudge against Swafford as a result of the incident on Mother’s Day. CT 1036. After they

parked at Virginia’s and everybody got out, petitioner saw Swafford and his brother begin to

fight, so he ran back to the car; he heard gunshots and a lot of screaming as he ran. CT 1039. 

Petitioner got the ten-millimeter and began firing as he raised it into the air. CT 1042-1043. He

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 In Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 2

held in a § 2254 action that “any independent opinions we offer on the merits of constitutional

claims will have no determinative effect in the case before us . . . At best, it is constitutional

dicta.” However, to the extent Bell stands for the proposition that a § 2254 petitioner may obtain

relief simply by showing that § 2254(d) does not preclude his claim, this court disagrees. Title

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) still requires that a habeas petitioner show that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution before he or she may obtain habeas relief. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71;

Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 773-75. 

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heard two shells make a “ding-ding” sound and thought they hit the ground; he realized that they

may have hit Swafford’s car. CT 1043. Petitioner never saw Swafford or Guerrero with guns

that evening. CT 1044. 

II. Standards Under The AEDPA

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Federal habeas corpus relief also is not available for any

claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the

claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (referenced herein in as “§ 2254(d)” or “AEDPA). See Ramirez v. Castro,

365 F.3d 755, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ninth Circuit affirmed lower court’s grant of habeas relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that petitioner was in custody in violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights and that § 2254(d) does not preclude relief); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538

U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003) (Supreme Court found relief precluded under § 2254(d) and therefore did

not address the merits of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim). Courts are not required to 2

address the merits of a particular claim, but may simply deny a habeas application on the ground

that relief is precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (overruling Van Tran v.

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Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2000) in which the Ninth Circuit required district

courts to review state court decisions for error before determining whether relief is precluded by

§ 2254(d)). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show he is not precluded from obtaining relief

by § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1) are

different. As the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A state court does not apply a rule different from the

law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or unreasonably apply such law, if the state court simply

fails to cite or fails to indicate an awareness of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). 

The court will look to the last reasoned state court decision in determining

whether the law applied to a particular claim by the state courts was contrary to the law set forth

in the cases of the United States Supreme Court or whether an unreasonable application of such

law has occurred. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. dismissed, 538 U.S.

919 (2003). Where the state court fails to give any reasoning whatsoever in support of the denial

of a claim arising under Constitutional or federal law, the Ninth Circuit has held that this court

must perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). In other

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 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3

 Petitioner was on supervised release following a federal sentence for drug possession. 4

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words, the court assumes the state court applied the correct law, and analyzes whether the

decision of the state court was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that law. 

It is appropriate to look to lower federal court decisions to determine what law has

been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular

application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). 

III. The Admissibility Of Petitioner’s Statement To Overton

Petitioner argues that his statement to Overton should not have been admitted

because petitioner did not waive his Miranda rights initially and he requested counsel during the 3

course of the interview. He also argues that his statement was not voluntary because of

psychological trickery. Respondent counters that this court cannot reach the first and third

grounds because the Court of Appeal rejected them on procedural grounds and the decision on

the second ground was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. 

A. Factual Background

At the beginning of the interview, Overton gave petitioner the standard Miranda

advisement, asking after each sentence whether petitioner understood each one. CT 665-666. 

Petitioner then began his account of the events at the baptism and the bar, but claimed he had left

the bar with a woman named Nicole and learned of the shooting through some telephone calls

and the newspaper account. Overton noted that this was a murder investigation and “it’s pretty

serious.” CT 699. He asked petitioner how long he was facing for his supervised release

violation; petitioner talked about spending some time in the halfway house and getting his life 4

back together. CT 699-700. 

Overton left the room; when he came back, he said, “It’s not looking good. Uh,

you really need to be truthful with me, guy.” CT 700. He also commended petitioner for

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“having the balls to come down here.” Id. Petitioner revised his account, admitting to being

present during the shooting, but denying any part in the gunfire. Overton said that was closer to

the truth, but he wanted to hear the truth from petitioner. CT 733-735. Petitioner continued with

his account, continuing to deny that he had any part in the shooting. At one point, petitioner

asked:

Yeah. Well, what are – what – what charges am I looking at now

though?

OVERTON: Well, it’s kind of tough for me to answer that when I

haven’t got the whole truth here, yet, --

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: – John. Once we get the truth, --

TAYLOR: Well, can I speak to an attorney before I answer the

question of this one –

OVERTON: If –

TAYLOR: – to find out what he would –

OVERTON: If you want to stop–

TAYLOR: – have to tell me?

OVERTON: –right now and have an attorney, we can stop now. 

I’m not going to –

TAYLOR: Yeah, ‘cause I don’t want to dig myself into a hole

before coming out with a shovel. I don’t want to put myself into a

position to where – ‘cause I don’t mind telling you that, yeah, I

shot in the air. I shot – I shot how many–whatever you got on the

casings. I did that because I was scared ‘cause I seen my brother

getting ready to fight with that guy. And, um, after I heard all the

gunshots, you know, I turned around and came up. And, um, the

gun was under the seat. And I ran back, and I – and– and–

OVERTON: Hmm.

TAYLOR: –the clip was out of it. And I put the clip up . . . And,

you know, – and just fired it.

OVERTON: Uh-huh. 

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TAYLOR: Obvious – obviously, I unloaded the clip because that

was the first time I ever fired a gun, you know. I fired the gun in

the air because I was scared. I wanted everybody to stop. . . . By

then it was too late.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

OVERTON: Okay. Well, um, let’s– let’s– let’s deal with this. Uh,

five, ten seconds ago you said that before you talked about that you

wanted an attorney.

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: Okay. And –

TAYLOR: Well, it don’t matter now. ‘Cause I’d of told my

attorney, and he would have told you guys the same thing. 

So–. . . . That’s just a waste of time.

CT 781-783. Overton complimented petitioner on his desire to tell the truth, then said:

[L]et’s . . . do this because I want to make sure you understand the

whole picture here. . . . Okay, now, just a second ago, you told me

that, well, I don’t want to talk about this without an attorney. . . . If

that’s the way you feel, you’re perfectly within your right to . . . say

that.

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: And I have to stop. And I’ll just pack up my stuff. 

And I’m going to go out, and then we do the paperwork. And – . . .

and that’s it. And – and–and that’s all there is to be said about it.

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: Okay. On the other hand, if you want to get this out

in the open, you want me to be able to put down on paper and I can

go over with you to make sure that what I put down is – is what

you’re saying happened. . . then that way, like I said earlier, I can

go into a court of law, and I can say, yes. On this date we sat

down, and this is what he told me as opposed to somebody else

guessing. . . . But at . . . this point, you’ve kind of put a monkey on

my back. . . . You ... said that you wanted an attorney. And you’re

perfectly within your right to do that. But if on the other hand, you

want to say, no, forget that; I don’t want an attorney; I want to talk

about this, we can do that too.

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

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OVERTON: The ball’s in your court as to what you want to do

here.

TAYLOR: Um, --

OVERTON: I mean, I’ll be honest with you. I’d like to get your

side of the story. I mean, you just said that, yeah, you shot the gun

up in the air.

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: I mean, there’s some questions I’d like to ask you

about that and get a clear picture in my head.

TAYLOR: Well, yeah. I guess you can –

OVERTON: But –

TAYLOR: I don’t need an attorney here because –

OVERTON: Well, I don’t want you to guess. I – I want you to

think about this, you know. . . .I mean, you can have one, or you

can say, no, forget it. Let’s just work through this. . . . It’s up to

you.

TAYLOR: Yeah. I think I’ll have one just in case I don’t – if – if I

don’t – I don’t want to – I want to – before he – I would just want

him to overview things.

OVERTON: Okay. Well, he’s going to get a copy of everything.

TAYLOR: Hmm.

OVERTON: That – I mean, everything I write up, he’s going to get

a copy of it.

TAYLOR: Oh, okay. Well, then that will work then too.

OVERTON: Well, you know, I don’t want to put words in your

mouth. I’m a little confused –

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: – as to whether you want to talk to me –

TAYLOR: Well, yeah. As long as he –

OVERTON: – or not.

TAYLOR: But I know once I tell you something, it’s going to be

down on paper, and I won’t be able –

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OVERTON: It –

TAYLOR: – to change my statement, so I don’t want to change – I

don’t – I’ll just – in front of him, I’ll tell you the same thing. Yeah,

I shot the gun. And, as far as I know from what my brother says,

you know, he told me himself that he – he shot the guy that he shot

because he was scared. Now as far as me seeing that, you know, I

don’t know. I never seen him pull the gun out, but I heard all the

gunshots. And, you know, I kind of – I’m not stupid. I kind of

figured out it was coming from over there where they were arguing 

and fighting. And that’s when I just, you know, – I pulled the gun

out, and it went off. I shot it in the air because, um, you know, –

but I never shot anybody with the gun. I – you know, I’m not that

stupid. I didn’t point the gun at none–nobody there and shoot it in

the air or point it into their face.

CT 785-789. Petitioner continued his account, denying that he shot anybody. Overton said he

had more questions, but could not ask them “unless you want to talk to me.” CT 793.

OVERTON: Uh, but I want to know if it’s okay if we talk, or if

you want to say, no, I want an attorney.

TAYLOR: Oh. No. It’s okay that we talk.

OVERTON: Okay. Uh, bear with me on this. Okay. . . . Just

because I want to make sure that you don’t think that I’m trying to

trick you or anything here. . . . Okay. You said you wanted an

attorney. Now you’re saying, no, we can go ahead and talk and –

and–and get this all out on paper . . . and get your side of the story. 

And I appreciate that.

TAYLOR: Uh-huh.

OVERTON: That’s –that’s what I’d like to do is just get

everything you say down on paper, and that way I can tell

everything, well, this is what John told me. . . . But just to make

sure that everything, uh, looks right, . . . let me advise you of your

rights again.

TAYLOR: Okay. 

CT 793-794. Overton once again read the Miranda warnings to petitioner and asked if petitioner

wanted to talk to him. Petitioner began, “About the whole involvement?” CT 795. Overton

stopped him:

But, I mean, for me to – to ask you some more questions, that’s

okay?

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TAYLOR: Yeah, I –

OVERTON: Without an attorney?

TAYLOR: I don’t mind. Yeah.

CT 795-796.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s motion to exclude his

statement. RT 96. The only witness was detective Overton, who had interviewed petitioner. 

RT 96-97. Although he did not recall for certain, Overton believed he told petitioner that “his

name had come up in a shooting investigation,” though Overton acknowledged he may have been

a little vague initially about his interest in interviewing petitioner. RT 98, 121. Overton read

petitioner the Miranda warnings from a card and petitioner “indicate[d] that he wanted to talk.” 

RT 100. Overton had not threatened or manhandled petitioner. Id. 

When petitioner said that maybe he should have an attorney, Overton did not

respond right away, but rather let petitioner “talk[] for several minutes,” while saying things like

“uh-huh, all right. . .acknowledging what he was saying.” RT 101. During this period, Overton

did not ask petitioner any questions. RT 111. Overton thought that petitioner had not made an

unequivocal invocation at that point, particularly because petitioner said he wanted an attorney

“to overview things.” RT 115, 117-118. 

Eventually, Overton decided he should clarify whether petitioner did want

counsel. RT 101, 115. He asked if petitioner wanted to continue to talk without an attorney;

petitioner said yes. RT 101. 

Counsel argued that the entire statement should be excluded because Overton was

aware that petitioner was represented by counsel on the federal proceedings and was obliged to

ask petitioner whether he wanted counsel present. RT 128. He also argued that the interview

was a “sham,” because Overton led petitioner to believe that the interview was about the federal

warrant. RT 129. Finally, the statement should be excluded, counsel argued, because Overton

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did not make it clear that he was asking questions about anything but petitioner’s federal

troubles. RT 129. 

Counsel also argued that at least the portion of the statement after petitioner

mentioned his federal lawyer or after he asked for a lawyer should be excluded. RT 130-131. 

The trial court denied the motion, finding that petitioner was equivocal because

“he continued to talk to the detective in a narrative fashion” after he mentioned an attorney,

demonstrating his willingness to continue talking. RT 136-139. 

B. Court Of Appeal Decision 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s challenge to the admission of

his statement:

Defendant Taylor contends the admissions he made to Detective

Overton were admitted in violation of Miranda because he did not

waive his rights, they were coerced, and were made after he

requested an attorney. The People argue the first two claims have

been waived because Taylor failed to raise them below, and the

third claim has no merit because Taylor failed to unequivocally

assert his right to an attorney.

Defendant Taylor filed a motion for continuance that included a

statement alluding to a motion to suppress his statement in

violation of his constitutional rights, including but not limited to,

Miranda v. Arizona . . . and Edwards v. Arizona . . . . At the

hearing on the motion, . . . The defense . . .made the following

three arguments in support of the motion: (1) the whole statement

must be suppressed because Overton did not clarify Taylor’s

representation by a lawyer in the federal case, as required by

Edwards and Massiah v. United States . . . . ; (2) the interview was

“a ruse, or a disguise or a sham,” purporting to be about the federal

warrant but was in reality an interview about Taylor’s role in the

instant case; and (3) Overton failed to cease questioning after

Taylor requested an attorney.

Defendant failed to claim either in his written or oral presentations

to the court, that he did not waive his constitutional rights as

required by Miranda, or that his statements were coerced. He has

therefore waived those two issues on appeal. . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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Under Miranda, once a suspect effectively waives his right to

counsel, law enforcement officers are free to question him. (North

Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 372-276 [sic]. . . . 

However, if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of

the process, prior to or during questioning, that he or she wishes to

consult with an attorney, the suspect may not be interrogated. 

(Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485 . . .; People v.

Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 128.) This “‘rigid’ prophylactic

rule” of Edwards requires the court to “determine whether the

accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” (Smith v. Illinois

(1984) 469 U.S. 91, 95 . . . .) The inquiry is an objective one. 

(Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459 . . . . “[T]he

suspect must unambiguously request counsel” (ibid.) with

sufficient clarity “that a reasonable police officer in the

circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for

an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of

clarity, Edwards does not require that the officer stop questioning

the suspect.” (Ibid.; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p.

129.) 

In Davis, the suspect had waived his rights under Miranda, but an

hour and a half into the interview, said “[m]aybe I should talk to a

lawyer.” (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 455.) The lower court

found that remark was not a request for counsel and the Supreme

Court found no reason to disturb that conclusion. (Id. at p. 462

. . . .)

Moreover, a suspect “may indicate an unwillingness to discuss

certain subjects without manifesting a desire to terminate ‘an

interrogation already in progress.’” (People v. Silva (1988), 45

Cal.3d 604, 629-630.) Where a suspect refuses to answer

individual questions without seeking to halt the interview,

questioning may continue. (Id. at p. 630; Fare v. Michael C.

(1979) 442 U.S. 707, 727. . . .) 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Applying these principles, we conclude defendant Taylor did not

unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. Taylor was on federal

probation and was aware of his Miranda rights. Prior to

questioning, Overton advised him of his rights and asked whether

he felt like talking, whereupon defendant started to talk. When

Taylor asked “can I speak to an attorney before I answer the

question of this one -,” Overton attempted to clarify this

ambiguous statement, asking Taylor, “[i]f you want to stop right

now and have an attorney, we can stop now. I’m not going to –”

Taylor’s response was to cut Overton off and continue talking,

recounting in narrative form, and without any questions by

Overton, how he fired a gun into the air at the scene of the

shootings. When he finished this narrative, Overton again raised

the subject of Taylor’s ambiguous request for an attorney. Given

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another opportunity to request an attorney, Taylor did not do so,

but dismissed it as a waste of time. Overton asked Taylor two

more times whether he wanted an attorney and both times Taylor

indicated he did not. 

In sum, we find Taylor’s statement about speaking to an attorney

was not an unambiguous request for an attorney, but rather an

inquiry as to whether he could speak to an attorney before

answering a particular question. More importantly, Taylor did not

stop talking after making the inquiry, but continued to speak about

shooting into the air. Overton asked no questions until Taylor’s

narrative ceased, at which time Overton clarified several times that

Taylor did not wish to speak to an attorney and wished to continue

speaking to Overton. Thus, based on Taylor’s equivocal request to

speak to an attorney, Overton’s clarification of that right, Taylor’s

continued narration without being questioned, Overton’s repeated

reiteration of Taylor’s rights, and Taylor’s repeated desire to keep

talking without an attorney, we find, as did the trial court, that

Taylor did not “express [a] present lack of willingness to discuss

his case” and therefore did not invoke his right to counsel under

Edwards.

Answer, Ex. C (Court of Appeal decision) at 16-23.

C. Procedural Default

A federal court will not review a claim of federal constitutional error raised by a

state habeas petitioner if the state court determination of the same issue “rests on a state law

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). This rule also applies when the state court’s

determination is based on the petitioner’s failure to comply with procedural requirements, so

long as the procedural rule is an adequate and independent basis for the denial of relief. Id. at

730. For the bar to be “adequate,” it must be “clear, consistently applied, and well-established at

the time of the [] purported default.” Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1997). For

the bar to be “independent,” it must not be “interwoven with the federal law.” Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). If an issue is procedurally defaulted, a federal court may not

consider it unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a

result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50. 

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In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Blanks

v. Bennett, 540 U.S. 938 (2003), the Ninth Circuit held:

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure,

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate

burden is the state's.

Respondent contends that California’s contemporaneous objection rule is an

adequate and independent state ground that prevents this court from reaching all but petitioner’s

Edwards claim. 

Under California law, a judgment may not be reversed by reason of the erroneous

admission of evidence unless "[t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or

to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of

the objection or motion." Cal. Evid. Code § 353(a). As the California Supreme Court has

explained:

What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court,

as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or

reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be

excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond

appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling. If the

court overrules the objection, the objecting party may argue on

appeal that the evidence should have been excluded for the reason

asserted at trial, but it may not argue on appeal that the court

should have excluded the evidence for a reason different from the

one stated at trial.

People v. Partida, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 (2005); see also People v. Kennedy, 36 Cal.4th 595, 612

(2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1781 (2006) (defendant forfeited his claim that

witness’s testimony was coerced by failing to object at trial). 

In Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held

that California’s contemporaneous objection doctrine is clear, well-established and has been

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consistently applied when a party has failed to make any objection to the admission of evidence. 

And in Jaiceris v. Fairman, 290 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2003), the district court found

that when an objection is made, but not on the grounds later urged on appeal, “for the purposes of

preserving the . . . claim there might as well have been no objection at all.” 

The Jaiceris court’s reasoning seems to square with the purpose behind Evidence

Code section 353 as it has been explained by the California courts: if the objection is not made

on the grounds later raised, it prevents the trial court and the parties from addressing the kernel of

the argument just as though no objection was made. Petitioner has made no showing of the

inadequacy of the bar nor has he provided any cause for trial counsel’s failure to raise these

particular challenges below. 

 Because the Ninth Circuit has found the contemporaneous objection rule to be an

adequate procedural bar, it operates to bar this court from addressing the merits of petitioner’s

claims that his statement was not preceded by an explicit Miranda waiver and was involuntary. 

D. Invocation Of The Right To Counsel

Beginning with the now-familiar Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the

Supreme Court has explored the impact of the Fifth Amendment’s right to remain silent on

police interrogation of a suspect. In Miranda, the court held that police must notify a suspect of

his right to remain silent and to secure the assistance of counsel before a custodial interrogation

and that if the accused requests the presence of a lawyer, “the interrogation must cease until an

attorney is present.” Id. at 474. 

In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Court considered the police

response to a suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel. In the first interrogation, Edwards, the

suspect asked for counsel and the police ended the interview. The next day, different officers

visited Edwards at the jail, Mirandized him again, and secured an inculpatory statement. He

unsuccessfully sought to suppress it, arguing that his Miranda rights had been violated. The

Court held:

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[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have

counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of

that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded

further to police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has

been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such

as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police

only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the

authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the

accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or

conversations with the police.

Id. at 484-85. The Court found that Edwards’ statement made in the absence of counsel did not

constitute a valid waiver. Id. at 487. 

The court revisited Edwards in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984). During the

Miranda advisement, the suspect told police that he had been advised to get a lawyer because the

police would railroad him; when told he had the right to counsel, he said “I’d like to do that;”

when asked if he wanted to talk without the presence of a lawyer, he said “yeah and no;” and

then finally agreed to talk without a lawyer. Id. at 93. The Supreme Court explained that the

Edwards inquiry had two steps: first, did the suspect actually invoke the right to counsel and

second, if there was an invocation, did the suspect thereafter initiate further conversation and

waive counsel. Smith, 469 U.S. at 95. The Illinois courts found his requests for counsel had

been ambiguous when considered in total. The Supreme Court reversed:

Where nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances

leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all

questioning must cease. In these circumstances, an accused’s

subsequent statements are relevant only to the question whether the

accused waived the right he had invoked. Invocation and waiver

are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by

merging them together. 

Id. at 98. The Court emphasized, however, that the decision “is a narrow one,” for it did not

decide the circumstances in which an accused’s request for counsel

may be characterized as ambiguous or equivocal as a result of

events preceding the request or of nuances inherent in the request

itself, nor do we decide the consequences of such ambiguity or

equivocation.

Id. at 99-100. 

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The impact of “ambiguity or equivocation” has been explored in two cases. In

Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 526 (1987), the suspect told police that he would not give a

written statement without the presence of his lawyer, but had no problem talking about the

incident. The Supreme Court found the use of the suspect’s oral statements at trial did not

violate his Fifth Amendment rights.

Barrett’s limited requests for counsel . . . were accompanied by

affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the

authorities. The fact that officials took the opportunity provided by

Barrett to obtain an oral confession is quite consistent with the

Fifth Amendment. Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose

between speech and silence, and Barrett chose to speak.

Id. at 529. The Court found that Barrett’s invocation was not ambiguous: “Barrett made clear

his intentions, and they were honored by police.” Id. 

Finally, in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454-55 (1994), Navy

investigators gave Davis Miranda warnings and began to question him about a homicide. About

an hour-and-a-half into the questioning, Davis said, “‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.’” The

investigators sought to clarify whether he was asking for a lawyer or just making a comment. 

Davis said he did not want a lawyer, the investigators Mirandized him again, and the

interrogation continued for another hour until Davis said, “‘I think I want a lawyer before I say

anything else.’” Id. at 455. His later motion to suppress the statements was denied. 

The Davis court thus focused on the first Edwards inquiry—whether the accused

has actually invoked his right to counsel–which it found to be an objective one. Id. at 459. The

Court observed:

[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or

equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances

would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the

right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of

questioning.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we have

observed, “a statement is such an assertion of the right to counsel

or it is not.”

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards

does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect.

Id. at 459 (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted). It upheld the lower courts’

determination that Davis’s statement was not an invocation of his right to counsel. 

What the Ninth Circuit has deemed ambiguous or equivocal are qualified

requests: “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer,” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003); “but, excuse me, if I am right, I can have a lawyer

present through all this, right?” United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In this case, petitioner’s second reference to a lawyer---- “I think I’ll have one just in case. . . .”

is equivocal, just as those in Davis, Clark, and Younger were. 

Petitioner’s first statement about counsel, however, is different: petitioner asked

“can I speak to an attorney,” an apparently unqualified request. However, this court has watched

the videotape of petitioner’s statement, Pretrial Exhibit A, lodged as part of the record in this

case. It reflects what the state Court of Appeal described: without giving Overton a chance to

respond to his question, petitioner continued talking about the events of the evening, conceding

that he had fired the gun in the air. See CT 781-783 & Pretrial Ex. A. When Overton reminded

him that “five, ten seconds ago,” petitioner had asked for a lawyer, petitioner said “it don’t matter

now.” CT 783. A minute or so later, petitioner said Overton could ask him questions because he

did not need an attorney but then said “I think I’ll have one just in case . . . .” CT 787. When

Overton said he was confused about petitioner’s desire to have a lawyer before everything was

“down on paper,” petitioner said “I’ll tell you the same thing” and returned to his account of the

incident. CT 788-789. Overton Mirandized petitioner once again and petitioner then said, “I

don’t mind” talking without the presence of counsel. CT 796. As the tape reflects, petitioner’s

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comments about a lawyer were followed immediately by his continued narration of his role in the

shooting. 

In James v. Marshall, 322 F.3d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 2003), James called police and

reported he may have killed someone during a fight. At the police station, Sergeant Craig read

James his Miranda rights; James said he would talk. Craig took him to a conference room and

asked to videotape the interview; James said “sure,” and he had “no problem” with that. As the

taped interview began, Craig again Mirandized James and asked “do you wish to make a

statement at this time?” James said “Nope.” Craig asked, “Can I talk to you about what

happened earlier tonight?” James replied, “Yup.” Thereafter, James was cooperative and signed

Craig’s notes after reviewing them for accuracy. Id.

James challenged the admissibility of the statement, which was upheld by the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. In his habeas petition, James argued that the state court’s

consideration of his conduct and answers after he said “nope” violated Smith v. Illinois, supra,

which noted the relevance of ambiguities that precede a request or are part of the request itself,

but held that a court could not use later answers to cast retrospective doubt on the initial request. 

469 U.S. at 100. 

The First Circuit disagreed. It found that the Supreme Judicial Court properly

considered James’s willingness to talk before and after saying “nope” to determine that this

answer had been in fact ambiguous and then considered Craig’s follow-up question, which was

not about the murder, as an appropriate way to determine whether James was in fact invoking his

right to counsel. James, 322 F.3d at 109. 

In Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1409 (4th Cir. 1992), after Poyner was

Mirandized and police described some of the information linking him to several murders, he

asked, “Didn’t you say I have a right to an attorney?” The officers confirmed this and began to

leave the room; Poyner then said, “Let me tell you about that car.” 

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The Fourth Circuit found that Poyner’s comment about his right to counsel was

equivocal, a finding “bolstered by Poyner’s actions.”

Poyner’s obvious desire to prevent the detectives from leaving the

room and to continue the questioning is wholly inconsistent with

his present contention that he wanted to have an attorney present

before further questioning.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

In this situation, the substance of the colloquy between police

officer and subject taken as a whole is clearly relevant to a

determination of whether the suspects’ fifth amendment rights have

been violated. Moreover, the interests sought to be protected by

the Smith decision–that the police should not be allowed to “wear

down” the accused by post-request badgering–simply are not

implicated where a request for clarification of the right to counsel

is immediately followed by both volunteered and responsive

incriminating statements. 

Id. at 1411-12.

As the James and Poyner courts observed, the determination as to whether a

suspect’s statement is an invocation of the right to counsel is an objective one, which includes a

consideration of the context in which the statement was made. In this case, petitioner’s question

about counsel was followed without interruption by his account of shooting in the air after the

melee began. Although petitioner’s question about counsel seems clear in isolation, his

immediate jump from the statement about counsel to the statement about the events shows that “a

reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect

might be invoking the right to counsel.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 

The state Court of Appeal’s reliance on the context to find that petitioner’s request

was equivocal was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

IV. Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel

Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Maria Aguilar as a

defense witness because Aguilar, who was like a sister to the four co-defendants, “would have

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substantiated the fact” that she attacked Swafford for his reckless driving, that Swafford

“knock[ed] her senseless.” The four defendants’ response to the attack on Aguilar, petitioner

reasons, would then be seen as imperfect defense of others. Pet. at 5i-5j.

The federal law on claims of attorney ineffectiveness is clear: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “[T]he performance inquiry must be

whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. at 688. 

Certainly, one of counsel’s duties is investigation, but “the duty to investigate and prepare a

defense is not limitless: it does not necessarily require that every conceivable witness be

interviewed” and such claims “must be considered in light of the strength of the government’s

case.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088, as amended on denial of rehearing, 253 F.3d 1150

(9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations, citations omitted). Petitioner cannot bear his burden of

showing ineffective assistance of counsel by presenting “mere conclusory statements,” United

States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1984), but rather must tender affidavits from

the witnesses counsel neglected to interview or call, showing the “helpful testimony for the

defense” they could have presented. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 2000); Bragg,

242 F.3d at 1088. 

It is also petitioner’s burden to establish prejudice: “A defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Petitioner has not borne his burden of showing that trial counsel’s actions were

outside the range of professional competence, for he has not included a declaration or statement

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from Maria Aguilar. His speculation about what she would have said if called as a witness will

not suffice. 

V. Sufficiency Of The Evidence

Petitioner also argues that the evidence was insufficient to show he acted as an

aider and abettor or conspirator in the murder of Guerrero and the attempted murder of Swafford. 

The Court of Appeal rejected his argument:

Defendants were charged with the attempted murder of Robert

Swafford (Count 2) and the murder of Chris Guerrero (Count 1). It

was the prosecution’s theory that all three defendants conspired to

shoot Robert Swafford with the intent to kill him, and that one of

the bullets meant for Swafford hit Chris Guerrero in the head,

killing him while he was sitting in the driver’s seat of Swafford’s

car. Because the prosecutor was unable to prove who actually shot

the fatal bullet, he argued the jury could find defendants guilty of

murder and attempted murder on either a theory of aiding or

abetting or conspiracy.

We find there is substantial evidence that defendants aided and

abetted the attempted murder of Swafford and the murder of

Guerrero, and for that reason we review the evidence in the record

drawing the inferences which support that legal theory.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The jury found defendant Brown guilty of the second degree

murder of Chris Guerrero and the attempted murder of Robert

Swafford. . . . The night of the shooting, the defendants, including

Brown, attended a baptism celebration and a party at Yolanda’s

Lounge. The defendants then decided to follow Swafford to

Nuno’s residence.

Defendants drove to the Nuno residence in two cars. Brown drove

the Geo with Aguilar and Trejo as passengers, while Carrillo drove

his own car with Michel and Taylor as passengers, following

Swafford as agreed. Upon arrival at Nuno’s residence, Swafford

parked the Cadillac on the wrong side of the street, Carrillo parked

his car across the street from and to the rear of the Cadillac, and

Brown parked Aguilar’s car right behind the Cadillac.

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Carrillo rushed over to the Cadillac, urging Nuno to get out of the

car while berating Swafford for his driving. Once Nuno was out of

the car, Carrillo continued to argue with Swafford, at which time

defendant Michel exited Carrillo’s car, walked toward Swafford,

and shot at him with one gun. At about the same time, Swafford

also saw defendant Brown shoot at him. Meanwhile, hearing

gunfire, Taylor took the ten-millimeter . . . fitted it with a loaded

clip and began firing at the car, hitting the trunk and flattening the

right rear tire. . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The ballistics evidence established at least 19 shots were fired at

Swafford’s Cadillac. Of those 19 shots, at least four different

weapons were used to fire four different style bullets of different

calibers. . . . While the bullet that killed Guerrero was never

identified, expert testimony established Swafford was hit by at

least three different style bullets from three different caliber

weapons. . . .A diagram of the crime scene . . . shows that, with

two possible exceptions, none of the shots from different caliber

weapons were fired on parallel tracks, suggesting that each gun

was shot by a separate gunman rather than one gunman firing two

different caliber guns.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

As with Brown, the jury also found Taylor guilty of second degree

murder and attempted murder. . . . specific evidence relating to

Taylor established the following:

Taylor was Michel’s half-brother, and while he was not present at

the Folsom Lake barbecue, by his own admission, he had heard

about the argument and was of the belief that Swafford “had tried

to whoop on him [Michel] one time before. . . .” Swafford

identified Taylor as one of the shooters. In his interview with

Detective Overton, Taylor admitted the defendants had agreed to

follow Swafford to Nuno’s residence, he traveled to the scene of

the shooting in Carrillo’s car, he was present at the scene of the

shootings, and fired a gun into the air. According to Taylor, when

he heard “all the gunshots,” he grabbed the ten-millimeter gun

from under the seat of Carrillo’s car, put the clip in, and fired all

the bullets in the clip into the air because he was “scared” and he

“wanted everybody to stop.” However, after being told the

evidence established the gun he used was fired into the car, Taylor

changed his story and said he pointed the gun down at first and that

he must have hit the car as he raised the gun to shoot into the air. 

He thought he heard two bullets hit the ground but admitted they

may have hit the car. Moreover, Taylor described the gun he fired

as going “boom-boom-boom”, although the test-firing of the gun

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established the ten-millimeter . . .did not have a hair trigger firing

mechanism. Rather, expert testimony established it could be fired

either with a single action, requiring approximately a three-andone-half to four-pound trigger pull, or a double action, requiring

approximately an eight- to nine-pound trigger pull. Thus, the

weapon would only fire if the trigger was pulled and released with

each shot. Moreover, the ballistics evidence established that only

one ten-millimeter weapon was used . . . . 

Based upon all the evidence, the jury reasonably could have

determined that because of the close relationship between Taylor

and Michel, Taylor knew that Michel was very angry at Swafford,

that the three defendants and Carrillo agreed to follow Swafford to

Nuno’s residence, that between those four individuals, there were

at least four firearms, that Taylor knew the ten-millimeter gun was

in Carrillo’s car, that when he heard the shots being fired, he armed

himself with the ten-millimeter gun and began firing at the

Cadillac, emptying the clip and hitting the Cadillac twice, once in

the trunk and once in the back tire, disabling the car and preventing

an easy escape. He also showed a consciousness of guilt when he

initially lied to Detective Overton telling him that he only fired into

the air and when he described a rapid-fire action on the gun he

used.

Thus the jury could find Taylor was aware of a plan to shoot

Swafford, and that when he saw the developing confrontation

between Swafford and Carrillo and heard the gunshots, and chose

to join the fray, he intended to aid Michel in his plan to kill

Swafford. The jury could also have inferred from the ballistics

evidence alone–19 shots fired in close proximity by at least four

weapons wielded by four gunmen, that there was a plan to shoot

Swafford and that Taylor was aware of it. Moreover, the jury

could also reasonably find Taylor acted to facilitate the attempted

murder of Swafford by shooting into the air to raise the victims’

level of panic and confusion and to block their escape through the

barrage of bullets that was being rained upon them.

For the same reasons discussed above with respect to defendant

Brown, there is substantial evidence that Taylor shared the intent to

kill Swafford, that the murder of Chris Guerrero was a natural and

probable consequence of the attempted murder of Swafford by

shooting into the car occupied by Guerrero, and for that reason the

jury could find that he aided and abetted second degree murder. . . .

.

. . . Taylor argues the attempted murder conviction cannot stand

because he did not inflict any of the injuries on Swafford or

Guerrero and there is no evidence he intended to kill prior to or

during the time Swafford was shot. An aider and abettor need not

be the actual perpetrator and need not share the perpetrator’s

specific intent to commit the target offense. All that is required is

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proof the aider and abettor knew that a criminal act (here shooting

at Swafford or into an occupied vehicle) was intended and that he

acted to encourage or facilitate that criminal act. An aider and

abettor’s intent must be formed prior to or during the commission

of the offense. However, this principle does not require the

prosecution to prove Taylor fired the gun before either victim was

injured where, as here, there is substantial evidence he formed the

intent to aid and abet the target offense prior to or during the attack

and promoted the commission of that attack by firing his gun

during the attack.

Answer, Ex. C at 38-53 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court examined the role of a habeas court in

considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

The Court continued:

[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical

facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it

does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must

defer to that resolution.

Id. at 326. Constitutionally sufficient evidence need not rule out every hypothesis except that of

guilt. Id. This court must apply the Jackson standard with “explicit reference to the substantive

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324 & n.16. Moreover, this

court must apply Jackson with an extra layer of deference to the state court’s determination, as

mandated by the AEDPA. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274-75 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 1142 (2006). 

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In California, an aider and abettor’s liability for a crime arises in one of two ways: 

First, an aider and abettor with the necessary mental state is guilty

of the intended crime. Second, under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the

intended crime, but also “for any other offense that was ‘a natural

and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” Thus,

for example, if a person aids and abets only an intended assault, but

a murder results, that person may be guilty of that murder, even if

unintended, if it is a natural and probable consequence of the

intended assault.

People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117 (2001) (internal citation omitted). Thus, to be guilty of

attempted murder as an aider and abettor when the natural and probable consequences doctrine

does not apply, “a person must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct

perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s

accomplishment of the intended killing–which means that the person guilty of attempted murder

as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.” People v. Lee, 31 Cal.4th 613, 624 (2003). To be

guilty of second-degree murder as an aider and abettor when the natural and probable

consequences doctrine does not apply, a person must give aid and encouragement with the

knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s act with express malice (a deliberate intention unlawfully to

take away the life of a fellow creature) or implied malice (an intentional act, the consequence of

which is dangerous to life, deliberately performed with knowledge that the conduct endangers the

life of another and with conscious disregard for life) and with the purpose of facilitating that act. 

People v. Robertson, 34 Cal.4th 156, 164 (2004) (elements of second degree murder); People v.

Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 (1984) (aiding and abetting). 

In this case, the jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences of

aiding and abetting; the court identified the “target offense” as shooting into an occupied vehicle

in violation of California Penal Code § 246. CT 443. To be guilty of murder and attempted

murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine in this case,

a person must knowingly and intentionally have aided another in shooting at an occupied car and

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the other crimes must have been objectively foreseeable results of the underlying act. People v.

Mendoza, 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123 (1998); People v. Woods, 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1587 (1992). 

Whether this court agrees that reasonable inferences support the conclusion that

petitioner shared his brother’s intent to kill Swafford when he began to fire at Swafford’s car and

into the air is irrelevant; a rational jury could have found that petitioner shared his brother’s

intent to shoot into Swafford’s occupied car. California Penal Code § 246 is a general intent

crime, which is violated when a defendant intentionally discharges a firearm at an occupied car

or when a defendant shoots “in such close proximity to the target that he shows a conscious

indifference to the probable consequence that one or more bullets will strike the target or persons

in or around it.” People v. Overman, 126 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356 (2005). Petitioner’s response

to the gunfire was to get yet another gun and begin shooting in the direction of the Cadillac,

where the others were shooting as well. This supports the jury’s conclusion that petitioner shared

his brother’s intent to shoot into the car.

Moreover, a rational juror could conclude that the murder and attempted murder

were the natural and probable consequences of the target offense: a reasonable person could

foresee that injury and death could be the ultimate outcome of nineteen shots fired into a car in

which one person was sitting and one was seeking refuge. RT 458-459, 1042, 1084-1085. 

Accordingly, the state court did not fail to apply clearly established federal law in determining

that sufficient evidence supports petitioner’s convictions. 

VI. Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel

Finally, petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective by not challenging

trial counsel’s failure to call Maria Aguilar as a witness. 

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In order to demonstrate prejudice in this context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for

counsel’s errors, he probably would have prevailed on appeal. Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434 n.9. 

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Petitioner cannot bear his burden of showing prejudice; as noted above, he has not

presented Aguilar’s declaration or otherwise demonstrated that her testimony would have been

favorable to his cause. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 22, 2007.

2/fran0477.157

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