Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01982/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01982-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

United States Com·t of~ 

Tl>nth f:il'~nit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

LESLIE C. WASHINGTON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

TOM C. MARTIN, Warden of El Reno ) 

Federal Penal Institution; ) 

LEE KNOWLES, indivi dually and ) 

in his official capacity; ) 

H.S. KAHL, a/k/a STEVE KAHL, ) 

a/k/a HARVEY STEVEN KAHL, ) 

individually and in his official ) 

capacity; NORMAN CARLSON, in ) 

h i s official capacity, ) 

) 

Defendants/Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 86-1982 

87-2872 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

D.C. No. 85-1977 

Before ANDERSON and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR,** 

District Judge. 

Leslie c. Washington was terminated from his position as a 

cook foreman at the Federal Correctional Institution, El Reno, 

Oklahoma for "unsatisfactory performance." Subsequently, he filed 

this action against the director of the Bureau of Prisons, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** Hon. Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court, 

Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-1982 Document: 010110034961 Date Filed: 03/23/1989 Page: 1 
alleging that his discharge was racially motivated in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e, et seq. The case was tried to the district court which 

made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered judgment 

against Washington on May 29, 1986. Washington filed a timely 

appeal from that judgment on June 30, 1986. 

On May 27, 1987, one year after the entry of judgment, and 

during the pendency of this appeal, Washington filed in the 

district court a "Motion for Relief from Final Judgment" pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), in which he alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. 

was denied by the district court on August 11, 1987. 

That motion 

On August 

21, 1987 Washington filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 "Motion for New 

Trial" with respect to the court's adverse ruling on the Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion, and on September 8, 1987 he filed a motion 

seeking further discovery. On October 19, 1987 those motions were 

denied. Washington appealed from those denials on December 18, 

1987 and that appeal has been consolidated in this court with 

Washington's earlier appeal. 

Washington's appeal from the underlying judgment proceeds 

mostly on factual grounds. He strenuously asserts that the 

district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, among 

other things in that they are contradictory, one-sided, omit 

critical evidence, and fail to take into account differences in 

treatment between Washington and other employees. Washington 

develops this theme at length, including extensive attachments to 

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... 

his brief. In effect he retries his case to this court, 

repeatedly characterizing adverse testimony as self-serving, and 

complaining that his own testimony was not credited by the 

district court. In reviewing questions regarding fact findings by 

the trial court, we are limited by settled standards of review. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that: 

"Because a finding of intentional discrimination is 

a finding of fact, the standard governing appellate 

review of a district court's finding of discrimination 

is that set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

52(a): 'Findings of fact shall not set aside unless 

clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 

opportunity of the trial court to judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses.'" 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 s.ct. 

1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 

In reviewing whether or not the district court's finding of 

an absence of intentional discrimination was clearly erroneous, we 

are mindful of the following language from the Supreme Court's 

decision in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 

105 s.ct. at 1511-12: 

"Although the meaning of the phrase 'clearly 

erroneous' is not immediately apparent, certain general 

principles governing the exercise of the appellate 

court's power to overturn findings of a district court 

may be derived from our cases. The foremost of these 

principles ••• is that '[a] finding is "clearly 

erroneous" when although there is evidence to support 

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.' United States v. United States Gypsum 

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed 746 

(1948). This standard plainly does not entitle a 

reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of 

fact simply because it is convinced that it would have 

decided the case differently. The reviewing court 

oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it 

undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. 

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'In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the 

findings of a district court sitting without a jury, 

appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their 

function is not to decide factual issues de novo.' 

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,In~395 U.S. 

100, 123, (1969). If the district court's account of 

the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed 

in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it 

even though convinced that had it been sitting as the 

trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 

differently. Where there are two permissible views of 

the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them 

cannot be clearly erroneous." 

Where findings of the trial court, as in the matter before 

us, are based in fairly significant part upon credibility determinations, the care with which we review such findings is 

heightened: 

"When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a} demands 

even greater deference to the trial court's findings; 

for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations 

in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on 

the listener's understanding of and belief in what is 

said. This is not to suggest that the trial judge may 

insulate his findings from review by denominating them 

credibility determinations, for factors other than 

demeanor and inflection go into the decision whether or 

not to believe a witness. Documents or objective 

evidence may contradict the witness' story; or the story 

itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible 

on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not 

credit it. Where such factors are present, the court of 

appeals may well find clear error even in a finding 

purportedly based on a credibility determination. But 

when a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to 

credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, 

each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible 

story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, 

that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can 

virtually never be clear error." 

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S. Ct. at 

1512 (citations omitted}. 

We have carefully reviewed the record in this case. Applying 

the standard of review by which we are bound, we conclude that the 

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~ . 

district court's findings and conclusions, and in particular the 

ultimate conclusion that Washington's discharge was not racially 

motivated, do have support in the record and are not clearly 

erroneous. 1 

On appeal Washington has discovered a new issue which he 

urges us to consider although it was not contained in his 

complaint or presented to the district court. For that matter, it 

was apparently not presented to the Merit System Protection Board 

in Washington's earlier, unsuccessful proceeding in that forum. 

He alleges that "[b]oth the manner in which defendants hired and 

terminated plaintiff Washington appear to be in violation of 

applicable Federal Statutes [sic] and applicable provisions of the 

Code of Federal Regulations," citing 5 U.S.C. § 3321, 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 315.502, 315.301, 315.201, 315.901, 315.907, and the Federal 

Personnel Manual, chapter 315, sub-chapter 8. Appellant's Brief 

in Chief at 31-34. He contends that the district court had a duty 

on its own motion to erect and consider the issues of fact and law 

raised by the circumstances of plaintiff's hiring and termination, 

as outlined above, and at least give those circumstances 

"substantial weight" in determining discriminatory intent. He 

argues that the district court's failure to do so constitutes 

1 Washington also argues that the district court erred as a 

matter of law in not finding that a prima facie case was made out. 

We need not resolve this issue since the district court proceeded 

with a trial on the merits. In such circumstances disputes about 

the prima facie case fall away. See,~, Kier v. Commercial 

Union Insurance Cos., 808 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); Morgan v. South Bend Community 

School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 1986). See also United 

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens~6ou.""s. 711, 

713-15, 103 s.ct. 1478, 1480-82, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). 

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fundamental error. We reject that argument. The plaintiff has 

both the responsibility and discretion to choose and delineate his 

cause or causes of action. The district court has no duty to make 

the plaintiff's case for him. Rather, the court's duty is to sit 

in judgment on the issues presented. No "fundamental error" was 

committed by the district court. 

Furthermore, we generally will not address on appeal issues 

which were not fairly raised at trial. Gundy v. United States, 

728 F.2d 484, 480 (10th Cir. 1984); Kenai Oil & Gas, Ins. v. Dept. 

of the Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 388 (10th Cir. 1982). 

Although the appellee calls into question (as did the 

district court) the jurisdictional aspects of Washington's Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 59(a) motion to reconsider the district court's ruling on 

Washington's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, including the issue of 

whether the time for appeal was tolled, we elect to assume 

jurisdiction and rule on the merits. We hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Washington's various 

post trial motions. As to Washington's complaints about his trial 

counsel, we find them unpersuasive and unavailing under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b). Additionally, this circuit has ruled that 

ineffective assistance of counsel is not a ground for a new trial 

in a civil case. MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733, 735-36 

(10th Cir. 1988). As for the "newly discovered evidence" 

consisting of a ''post-it" note referring to Washington's work, the 

district court fully explained in its August 11, 1987 order why 

the note did not furnish grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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4 • ' -

60(b). The court clearly did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Washington's motion. 

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Washington. 

While they are urgently and sincerely advanced, they are 

insufficient to overcome the decisions of the district court. The 

judgment and subsequent orders of the district court are AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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