Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02133/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02133-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stu Dvoret, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 03-2133 PHX VAM

)

Maricopa County Community )

Colleges, ) ORDER

)

 Defendant. )

Pending before the Court is defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Docs. 49, 50, 51 and 60). 

I. Summary Judgment Standard

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c),

Fed.R.Civ.P.; California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v.

Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988). There is a genuine issue of

material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party

bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no material fact

precluding summary judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Company,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 

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 Substantive law determines which facts are material. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Jessinger v. Nevada Federal Credit

Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). "Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

 A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and

dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corporation v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is

appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial." Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corporation

v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994).

 Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's]

pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P.;

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Lind Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or if not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, "the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

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II. Relevant Undisputed Facts ("UF")

1. The nursing program at MCC consists of four blocks, which

are equivalent to semesters. At the time of plaintiff's search

and suspension (October 31, 2002), plaintiff was a block four

student. (Doc. 1 at p. 7 (para. 26)).

2. On October 31, 2002, plaintiff went to the MCC library to

take the Health Education, Systems, Inc. ("HESI") test. (Doc. 1

at p. 8 (para. 28)).

3. The HESI test is administered to Block 4 (final semester)

nursing students and is indicative of how they will perform on the

nursing boards. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 3 at p. 74).

4. Prior to taking the HESI exam, plaintiff was on the brink

of failing the nursing program. He had a total score of 75.66 but

needed a score of 76 to pass and had already failed the program

before he took the HESI test. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 3 at p. 29;

Exhibit 1 at p. 103; Exhibit 4).

5. A passing grade on the HESI test could have elevated

plaintiff's overall grade in the nursing program to a passing

grade. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 3 at p. 30).

6. Plaintiff often dressed in "biker" attire. (Doc. 1 at p.

2 (para. 9)). 

7. On October 28, 2002, three days prior to the HESI test, a

disgruntled failing nursing student at the University of Arizona

murdered three members of the University's nursing faculty on

campus. (Doc. 50 at Exhibit 2).

8. Following the murders of the University of Arizona nursing

faculty members, plaintiff made statements indicating an

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understanding and/or sympathy for the actions of the murderer. 

(Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 123, 125; Exhibit 6 at pp. 22; Exhibit

3 at pp. 54-55). 

9. Plaintiff acknowledged making a statement indicating he

understood why the killer in Tucson did what he did. 

Specifically, he admitted telling other MCC nursing students, that

"if [the Tucson killer's] instructors screwed with him half as

much as ours have with me, I can understand why he did something,

..." (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at p. 125).

10. MCC student Bridget Allen also reported to Nursing

Department Chair Myrna Eschelman, that she heard plaintiff made

statements to the effect that plaintiff had a "list of three"

instructors like the killer down in Tucson. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 6

at p. 22).

11. Bridget Allen reported plaintiff's statements to other

students. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 6 at p. 24). 

12. Bridget Allen was contacted by Myrna Eschelman to verify

the statements she heard plaintiff make and Allen confirmed to

Eschelman that plaintiff made such a statement. (Doc. 50, Exhibit

6 at pp. 27-28).

13. On October 30, 2002, Myrna Eschelman sent an e-mail to

MCC Security Director Steve Corich raising concerns about

plaintiff because he was on the verge of failing and made

statements sympathetic to the Tucson killer. She also stated that

"[o]ther students have expressed concerns to their clinical

instructor about this student if he fails." (Doc. 50 at Exhibit

9). 

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14. On October 30, 2002, by e-mail Eschelman indicated to

Corich she had already alerted security and they would be present

in the area of the HESI test. (Doc. 50 at Exhibit 9).

15. In response to Myrna Eschelman's concerns in the e-mail

of October 30, 2002, MCC Director Corich made arrangements to have

"extra coverage" at the HESI test cite for October 31, 2002. 

(Doc. 50, Exhibit 7 at pp. 17-18).

16. On October 31, 2002, plaintiff arrived to take the HESI

test at the MCC library. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 115-17).

17. Plaintiff, and others near him, were each asked by

security officials, in particular MCC Security Director Steve

Corich, to submit to a search. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 116-

17).

18. Security officials informed plaintiff the search was

voluntary and they didn't have to comply with the request. (Doc.

50, Exhibit 1 at p. 117).

19. Plaintiff voiced no objection to the search, placed his

bag on a table to be searched and opened his vest to permit

security officials to see what was inside his jacket. (Doc. 50,

Exhibit 1 at p. 118).

20. When plaintiff opened his jacket, a security official

noticed he had a knife clip. Plaintiff was then "patted-down" and

a collapsible baton was also discovered in plaintiff's back

pocket. 

21. The knife and collapsible baton were confiscated by

security officials and plaintiff was permitted to enter the

library to take the test. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 118-19; Doc.

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57, Exhibit 1 at p. 22).

22. Eschelman sent an e-mail to Corich stating that after

plaintiff sat down to take the test, Myrna Eschelman heard

plaintiff say "they searched my bags. I think they thought I was

going to do the Tucson thing, even though there are people here

that deserve it." (Doc. 50, Exhibit 3 at pp. 54-55)

23. Plaintiff took the HESI exam but did not pass. (Doc. 50,

Exhibit 1 at p. 107).

24. Plaintiff was informed before leaving the test site that

he had not passed the test. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 104-07).

25. Shortly after the HESI test ended, and after receiving

another e-mail from Eschelman reporting plaintiff's statement made

at the test site, Director Corich e-mailed Dean Johnson and

attached the second e-mail from Myrna Eschelman. Corich

recommended that plaintiff be suspended from campus for security

reasons. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 11 at p. 00019).

26. On October 31, 2002, the same day as the test, Dean

Johnson, based on Corich's recommendation, sent plaintiff a letter

notifying him he was barred from the MCC campus for one year

effective immediately. The suspension cited, among other

provisions, plaintiff's possession of illegal or unauthorized

weapons. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 11 at pp. 1 and 00016).

27. The next day, November 1, 2002, plaintiff met with MCC

Security Director Corich. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at p. 134; Exhibit

7 at p. 24; Exhibit 8 at p. 00021).

28. At the meeting with Corich, plaintiff explained the

circumstances of the statements he made regarding the Tucson

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incident. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at p. 134; Exhibit 8 at pp. 00021-

00022). 

29. After the meeting, Corich sent an e-mail to Dean Johnson

saying he did not believe plaintiff posed a danger to students or

faculty and did not have any "anger control issues." (Doc. 50,

Exhibit 8 at pp. 00021-00022). 

30. Sometime within the next three weeks, plaintiff met with

Dean Johnson personally. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at p. 108; Exhibit

11).

31. On December 5, 2002, as a result of the meeting with

plaintiff and in light of Security Director Corich's e-mail of

November 1, 2002, Dean Johnson lifted plaintiff's suspension,

effective January 1, 2003. (Doc. 50 at Exhibit 13). 

32. Plaintiff never applied for re-admission to the Nursing

Program nor did he contact MCC officials to see if he could retake the HESI exam. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 37-38).

33. At no time did anyone at MCC (faculty or administrators)

criticize, reprimand or make derogatory comments to him for

wearing "biker" attire. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 69-70, 74).

34. At no time did anyone at MCC (faculty or administrators)

criticize, reprimand or make derogatory comments about plaintiff's

"biker" associations. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 69-70, 74). 

35. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim against MCC on 

April 14, 2003. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 16 at p. 1).

36. The notice of claim cites A.R.S. § 12-821.01 and makes

claims alleging MCC violated his "civil and due process rights"

and "his First Amendment right to free speech under the Fourteenth

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1

Plaintiff is now represented by counsel. (Doc. 8). However,

the pro se complaint is still operative and no amended complaint,

or leave to file an amended complaint, has been sought.

8

Amendment ..." (Doc. 50, Exhibit 16 at p. 1).

37. The notice alleges the cause of action accrued on 

October 31, 2002, "when MCC wrongfully suspended [plaintiff] from

the [MCC] campus ..." (Doc. 50, Exhibit 16 at p. 1).

III. Plaintiff's Complaint

The only claims raised in the pro se complaint1 allege,

first, that plaintiff was wrongfully searched prior to taking the

Health Education Systems, Inc. ("HESI") test on October 31, 2002,

and wrongfully suspended from being a nursing student at Maricopa

Community College ("MCC") in violation of his federal

constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiff alleges he was

suspended from MCC in violation of the rules governing suspensions

contained in the Student Handbook in violation of his right to due

process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at p. 15

(para. 60)). 

The second federal claim raised in the complaint alleges

plaintiff was discriminated against by MCC officials based on his

dress, appearance and lifestyle as a "motorcycle enthusiast" in

violation of his First Amendment rights to free expression and

free association. Specifically, plaintiff alleges Dean Johnson's

decision to suspend him from campus was based on his appearance

and his "biker" associations. (Doc. 1 at p. 15 (para. 61); Doc.

56 at pp. 7-8). Plaintiff also alleges his First Amendment rights

to freedom of expression and association were violated when "MCC

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2

Pursuant to concessions made by plaintiff at oral argument on

the summary judgment motion, plaintiff's claims concerning denial

of equal protection in failing to round up his grades, as well as

his state law claim alleging defamation were dismissed.

9

faculty conspired to stage a pretextual 'search' of [him] before

the test took place, for the purpose of interfering with his

ability to complete the test and to ultimately remove him from the

Nursing Program." (Doc. 1 at p. 9 (para. 34); see also Doc. 56 at

p. 8). Plaintiff further asserts that "[a]lthough the reason for

staging the 'search' was ostensibly because [plaintiff] had

allegedly made a vague and unsubstantiated threat in the wake of

the homicides at the University of Arizona, electronic

communications between MCC personnel the day before the test make

clear that [plaintiff] was actually being targeted for his

beliefs, his sex, his age, his veteran status and his appearance." 

(Id.). Plaintiff identified MCC Security Director Steve Corich as

the "final policymaker" with respect to the search in his response

to summary judgment and at oral argument. (Doc. 56 at p. 8).

Finally, plaintiff raises a pendant state law claim arguing

his suspension from MCC did not comply with the procedures

outlined in the MCC Student Handbook, and, thus, breached a

contract with him. (Doc. 1 at pp. 15-16 (paras. 64-67)).2

IV. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims

Defendant contends, as a threshold matter, it is entitled to

summary judgment because petitioner has not established that any

of the officials responsible for violating his federal

constitutional rights were "final policymakers." (See Doc. 49 at

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p. 11). 

In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court held "a local

government [entity] may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when

execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government

as an entity is responsible ..." Thus, "a municipality [or

government entity] cannot be held liable solely because it employs

a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436

U.S. at 490 (emphasis in original).

Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held that "[a] school

district's liability under Monell may be premised on any of three

theories: (1) that a district employee was acting pursuant to an

expressly adopted official policy; (2) that a district employee

was acting pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom; or (3)

that a district employee was a 'final policymaker.'" Lytle v.

Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff does not

contend that either of the first two categories in Lytle apply. 

Instead, he asserts that both Corich and Johnson were "final

policymakers" responsible for the search and suspension,

respectively.

The Lytle Court stated that "[w]hen determining whether an

individual has final policymaking authority, we ask whether he or

she has authority 'in a particular area, or on a particular

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issue.'" Lytle, 382 F.3d at 983 (emphasis in original). The court

went on to note a key inquiry in determining if a school district

superintendent was a "final policymaker" in regard to transfers of

subordinate employees is "whether the superintendent 'possessed

final policymaking authority in the area of employee transfers.'" 

See also Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1999)

(to determine whether an official is a final policymaker, "courts

consider whether the official's discretionary decisions are

'constrained by policies not of that official's making' and

whether the official's decisions are 'subject to review by the

municipality's authorized policymakers.'"). The question of

whether an official is a final policymaker is a question for the

court to decide based on state law. Id. at 1235. 

Regarding Student and Community Services Dean Johnson (whom

plaintiff contends was a "final policymaker" for defendant MCC in 

regard to the decision to suspend him from the MCC campus), the

undisputed facts and law show he is not a "final policymaker" as

defined in Lytle. The Student Handbook for MCC provides that the

Governing Board of MCC has the ultimate authority to suspend,

delete, restrict, supplement or change all "[p]olicies, courses,

programs, fees and requirements" for MCC. (See Doc. 50, Exhibit

14 (Student Handbook at p. 135). Section 2.5.2, Article IV,

Subsection C of The Student Handbook provides that in some

instances (such as safety) "... appropriate college/center

officials may impose an interim suspension prior to the hearing

before a judicial body." (Id. at p. 162). The very next

subsection of the Handbook discusses appeals from suspensions. 

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(Id. at p. 162). 

In fact, an examination of the entire Section 2.5.2, Article

IV of the Student Handbook (outlining "Judicial Policies"),

reveals plaintiff has recourse to a formal process of notice and a

hearing after imposition of any interim suspension before taking

an appeal under subsection D. This process, outlined in

subsection A of Article IV, lays out an elaborate procedure

requiring timely notice followed by a timely hearing before a

"judicial body" and a decision in writing from that body. (See

Doc. 65, Attached Exhibit (Student Handbook at pp. 160-61)). 

Subsection B of Article IV outlines a list of potential

"sanctions" which may be imposed by the "judicial body" if it

determines a student has violated the Student Code. (See id. at

p. 161)). Subsection D then outlines a procedure to appeal any

determination of the judicial body under subsection A. (Doc. 50,

Exhibit 14 (Student Handbook at p. 162)).

In light of the "judicial" procedures contained in

subsections A, B and D of Article IV, any decision by Dean Johnson

to impose an interim suspension is followed by two levels of

process, namely, a formal hearing procedure before a "judicial

body," followed by an avenue to appeal any decision by that body

to an "appeal board." Because plaintiff had the right to a twotiered process for review of Dean Johnson's decision to suspend

him, Johnson is not a "final policymaker" as defined by Monell and

Lytle and plaintiff's § 1983 claims against defendant MCC fails as

a matter of law. See Lytle, 382 F.3d at 983.

In addition to the fact that Dean Johnson's actions may not

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be ascribed to defendant MCC as a matter of law, plaintiff's

claims predicated on Dean Johnson's action in suspending plaintiff

from the MCC campus on October 31, 2002, whether couched as a

denial of due process or a denial of his rights under the first

amendment to freedom of expression or association, fail on the

merits. Review of the record shows that plaintiff was afforded

all process due him under the law. Although plaintiff was

suspended prior to holding a hearing, case law on this question

has endorsed pre-hearing suspensions for "[s]tudents whose

presence poses a continuing danger to person or property or an

ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process ..." Goss v.

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). When this is done, "the

necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as

practicable." Id. This is consistent with the Student Handbook. 

(Doc. 50 at Exhibit 14). 

In this case, the letter sent by Dean Johnson on October 31,

2002, notifying plaintiff of his suspension from campus cited

security concerns, namely, the fact that plaintiff came to the

HESI test carrying weapons. (UF 26). This fact, and the further

undisputed fact that plaintiff made remarks which could reasonably

have been construed as sympathetic to the killer who murdered

nursing faculty at the University of Arizona just three days

before, were sufficient, as a matter of law to establish the kind

of security threat which permitted Dean Johnson to suspend

plaintiff prior to holding a hearing. 

Furthermore, in compliance with the criteria outlined in

Goss, it is not in dispute that plaintiff was permitted to make

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his case to MCC Security Director Corich the next day, and

Corich's recommendation, together with the meeting held three

weeks later between plaintiff and Dean Johnson, resulted in the

lifting of plaintiff's suspension from campus. (UF 27-31). In

short, the process worked, and the fact it occurred after

plaintiff's suspension was not contrary to law. As a result,

under the undisputed facts plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of

law.

Similarly, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that

Dean Johnson's decision to suspend him was based on his "biker"

appearance or associations. On the contrary, undisputed evidence

shows that Johnson's decision was based on security concerns. It

is undisputed that in light of plaintiff's statements and the fact

that he was found in possession of a knife and a collapsible baton

when he attempted to enter to take the HESI test that MCC Security

Director Corich recommended that Dean Johnson "not tread lightly"

in this matter. (UF 25, Doc. 50, Exhibit 11 at p. 00019). In

addition, Dean Johnson received additional information attached to

Corich's e-mail, including Myrna Eschelman's e-mail, indicating

plaintiff made statements sympathetic to the Tucson killer and

that plaintiff had been searched and found in possession of a

knife and a collapsible baton. (UF 25, Doc. 50, Exhibit 11 at pp.

1 and 00016). 

Conversely, plaintiff has produced no evidence to support his

allegation that Dean Johnson's decision to suspend him was based

on his "biker" appearance or associations. (See Doc. 1 at p. 15

(para. 61); see also Doc. 56 at pp. 3-4, 6-7). Although, in one

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e-mail sent by Eschelman to Corich, Eschelman mentions plaintiff's

biker dress and associations, (see Doc. 50 at Exhibit 4), there is

no evidence that Dean Johnson was made aware of this prior to his

decision to suspend plaintiff. On the contrary, the e-mails

attached by Security Chief Corich to his recommendation that

Johnson "not tread lightly" made no mention of plaintiff's

appearance or associations, the only matters of concern presented

in these documents relate to security and it was solely on this

basis that Dean Johnson decided to suspend plaintiff. (See Doc.

50, Exhibits 11 and 12 and Doc. 51). Plaintiff has produced no

evidence to support his assertion that Dean Johnson's decision to

suspend him, pre-hearing, was motivated by plaintiff's "biker"

appearance and/or associations. Summary judgment on plaintiff's

First and Fourteenth Amendment claims pertaining to the actions of

Dean Johnson in suspending plaintiff prior to a hearing is

appropriate. 

With respect to the search conducted prior to taking the HESI

test, plaintiff asserts that MCC Security Director Steve Corich

was the "final policymaker." In his deposition, plaintiff asserts

that Corich was the one who requested he submit to a search when

he entered the library to take the test. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at

p. 116). Other than this statement in his deposition, plaintiff

has identified no evidence to support his claim that Corich was

the "final policymaker" with respect to the search as defined by

Monell and Lytle. In fact, review of other evidence shows that

security was present that day due to requests made by Nursing

Department Chair Myrna Eschelman. (UF 15; Doc. 57, Exhibit 1 at

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p. 15). 

Plaintiff has identified no provision in the Student Handbook

or any other document associated with MCC, which designates Corich

as having the power to initiate a search on behalf of MCC. The

evidence indicates the increased security measures, including the

search, were instigated by a request from Myrna Eschelman, Nursing

Department Chair, to "security" and Corich. (UF 15; Doc. 50 at

Exhibit 4; Doc. 57, Exhibit 1 at p. 15). 

However, even assuming a question of fact remains on whether

Corich was a final policymaker, this claim fails at a more basic

level. In spite of plaintiff's assertion in his complaint and in

his response to summary judgment, plaintiff has provided no

evidence to support his assertion that the search was coerced and

involuntary, let alone conducted as a "pretext" to interfere with

his ability to successfully complete the HESI test. (See Doc. 1

at p. 9 (para. 34)). On the contrary, in his own deposition,

plaintiff does not dispute that those who requested to search him

told him the search was voluntary and that he "didn't have to

comply with it." (UF 18; Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at pp. 116-17). 

Plaintiff also acknowledged he heard Corich make the exact same

request of other students. (UF 17, Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at p. 116). 

Plaintiff complains that unlike other students he was

physically patted down. This is true, but it is undisputed that

this did not happen until, on his own initiative, plaintiff opened

his jacket and an officer spotted a knife concealed underneath. 

Only at that point was plaintiff physically searched. (UF 19,

Doc. 50, Exhibit 1 at p. 118; Doc. 57, Exhibit 1 at pp. 21-22). 

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As a result, the initial search was voluntary and did not

violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover, once a

knife was discovered concealed under his jacket, the "pat-down"

search which followed, resulting in discovery of a collapsible

baton as well, was also reasonable. Plaintiff produced no

evidence to support his allegation that the search was based on

his "biker" dress or associations. On the contrary, defendant

produced a plethora of evidence that the search was voluntary and

based on security concerns. (See UF 7-15, 20). Plaintiff's claim

his rights were violated when he was searched prior to entering

the MCC library fails on the law and the undisputed facts. 

B. Plaintiff's Remaining State Law Claim (Breach of Contract)

Plaintiff also alleges that "[t]he rules, regulations and

policies promulgated by Defendant constitute a contract between

Defendant and its students" and that "[b]y failing to abide by the

terms and conditions of the [Student] Handbooks, and acting

arbitrarily, capriciously and in bad faith, Defendant breached its

contract with Plaintiff." (Doc. 1 at p. 15 (para. 65)). 

Plaintiff identified the "contract" as the Student Handbook.

Defendant contends this claim fails at many levels as a

matter of law. First they assert that plaintiff's Notice of Claim

is insufficient to permit him to raise this claim in the action. 

A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A) requires that any claim presented against a

governmental entity provide "facts sufficient to permit the public

entity or public employee to understand the basis upon which

liability is claimed." To satisfy this requirement, the notice of

claim "must at least contain enough information to allow the state

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to intelligently ascertain these purposes so it can

conscientiously allow or disallow the claim." Howland v. State,

169 Ariz. 293, 299, 818 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1991). The

penalty for failing to specify a claim is dismissal of the claim

in any subsequent legal action. See Hollingsworth v. City of

Phoenix, 164 Ariz. 462, 464, 793 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Ariz.Ct.App.

1990). 

Defendant argues that nowhere in the Notice of Claim does

plaintiff state MCC breached a contract with him. They contend

that the terms "contract" and "breach" are not mentioned in the

notice. The Court has reviewed the Notice of Claim. (Doc. Doc.

50 at Exhibit 16). Defendant's assertions are well-taken. 

Nothing in the notice can be read as indicating plaintiff is

raising a breach of contract claim based on MCC's alleged failure

to abide by its policies as enunciated in the Student Handbook. 

As such, the notice is deficient with respect to this claim and

summary judgment is appropriate.

In addition, as also urged by defendant, plaintiff's claim

that the Handbook constitutes a contract with him is without

merit. Under Arizona law, for a contract to exist, "there must be

an offer, an acceptance, consideration, and sufficient

specification of terms so that the obligations involved can be

ascertained." Savoca Masonry Company Inc. v. Homes and Son

Construction Company, Inc., 112 Ariz. 392, 394, 542 P.2d 817, 819

(Ariz. 1975). More particularly, with respect to provisions in a

handbook, such as an employment handbook, it has been held that

"not ... all ... terms create contractual promises." Demasse v.

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ITT Corp., 194 Ariz. 500, 984 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Ariz. 1999). A

statement is contractual only if it discloses "a promissory intent

or [is] one that [a party] could reasonably conclude constituted a

commitment by the [other party]. If the statement [in an

employment handbook] is merely a description of the employer's

present policies ... it is neither a promise nor a statement that

could reasonably be relied upon as a commitment." Demasse, 194

Ariz. at 505, 984 P.2d at 1143. In addition, "[o]nce a ...

contract is formed - whether the method of formation is

unilateral, bilateral, express, or implied - a party may no longer

unilaterally modify the terms of that relationship." Id.

Modification of contracts may occur only under the following

conditions: "(1) an offer to modify the contract; (2) assent to or

acceptance of that offer, and (3) consideration." Demasse, 194

Ariz. at 506; 984 P.2d at 1144.

Applying these principles of contract law, the MCC Student

Handbook is not a contract. By its own terms, the Handbook

permits MCC to modify its contents at will and without notice. 

(Doc. 50 at Exhibit 14 (Student Handbook: Section 2.1(A) at p.

135). Such power does not bespeak a desire to create, let alone

present the elements of, a contract. Plaintiff cited no authority

to support his contention that the MCC Student Handbook is an

enforceable contract between MCC and plaintiff.

Finally, even assuming the existence of a contract, plaintiff

cannot show a breach. Pre-hearing "interim" suspensions are

contemplated under Article IV, Subsection C of the Student

Handbook for reasons of security. (Doc. 50, Exhibit 14 at p.

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162). Under the undisputed facts (plaintiff's statements

concerning the Tucson murders and the fact that weapons were found

concealed on his person when he attempted to enter the MCC Library

to take the HESI test), MCC officials had a basis to suspend

plaintiff prior to granting him a hearing, either formal or

informal. As noted, this is contemplated under the terms of the

Handbook and plaintiff's pre-hearing suspension was not contrary

to its provisions. Summary Judgment on this issue is warranted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant MCC's Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment for defendant in this matter accordingly. 

DATED this 5th day of June, 2006.

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