Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02728/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02728-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Default

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 All references to the Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil 1

Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERIDIAN PROJECT SYSTEMS, INC., NO. CIV.S-04-2728 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

HARDIN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Meridian

Project Systems, Inc.’s (Meridian) motion to strike pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to defendants’ failure

to comply with the expert disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2).1

In particular, plaintiff Meridian moves to strike pages 1:17-2:3 and

2:7-8 of defendants Computer Methods International Corporation (CMIC)

and Hardin Construction Company, LLC’s (Hardin) expert witness

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disclosure and exclude any expert witness testimony by Messrs.

Rawlins, Cockshutt, Bensley, Traeger and Pinto. Scott W. Pink

appeared on behalf of plaintiff Meridian at the hearing on the

motion. Chris Gibson appeared on behalf of defendants CMIC and

Hardin. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will

recommend that the motion to strike be granted.

Applicable Legal Standards

Rule 26(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:

(A) ... [A] party shall disclose to other parties

the identity of any person who may be used at

trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703,

or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by

the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to

a witness who is retained or specially employed

to provide expert testimony in the case or whose

duties as an employee of the party regularly

involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied

by a written report prepared and signed by the

witness....

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A) & (B).

Rule 37 addresses a party’s failure to make such

disclosures and provides:

A party that without substantial justification

fails to disclose information required by Rule

26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response

to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is

not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted

to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or

on a motion any witness or information not so

disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this

sanction, the court, on motion and after

affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose

other appropriate sanctions. In addition to

requiring payment of reasonable expenses,

including attorney's fees, caused by the failure,

these sanctions may include any of the actions

authorized under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C)

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and may include informing the jury of the failure

to make the disclosure.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that “we

give particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion to

issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).” Yeti by Molly v. Deckers

Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Ortiz-Lopez

v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo Y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico,

248 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2001)). In Yeti by Molly the Ninth Circuit

upheld the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony where the

defendant disclosed the expert’s report outside the time provided by

Rule 26(a)(2). The court explained that subsection (c)(1) of Rule

37, which was implemented in the 1993 amendments to the Rules,

is a recognized broadening of the sanctioning

power. Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 269

(1st Cir. 1998) ("[T]he new rule clearly

contemplates stricter adherence to discovery

requirements, and harsher sanctions for breaches

of this rule...."). The Advisory Committee Notes

describe it as a "self-executing," "automatic"

sanction to "provide[ ] a strong inducement for

disclosure of material...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37

advisory committee's note (1993). Courts have

upheld the use of the sanction even when a

litigant's entire cause of action or defense has

been precluded. Ortiz-Lopez, 248 F.3d at 35

(although the exclusion of an expert would

prevent plaintiff from making out a case and was

"a harsh sanction to be sure," it was

"nevertheless within the wide latitude of" Rule

37(c)(1)).

Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106. 

The court further recognized that “[t]wo express exceptions

ameliorate the harshness of Rule 37(c)(1): The information may be

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introduced if the parties' failure to disclose the required

information is substantially justified or harmless.” Id. The party

facing sanctions bears the burden in this regard. Id. at 1107

(“Implicit in Rule 37(c)(1) is that the burden is on the party facing

sanctions to prove harmlessness.”); Wilson v. Bradlees of New

England, Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2001)(“[I]t is the

obligation of the party facing sanctions for belated disclosure to

show that its failure to comply with the Rule was either justified or

harmless and therefore deserving of some lesser sanction.”)

Also coming into play in this discovery dispute is the

Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order issued by the assigned district

judge, the Honorable Frank C. Damrell, Jr. That order required the

parties

to designate in writing, file with the court, and

serve upon all other parties the name, address,

and area of expertise of each expert that they

propose to tender at trial .... The designation

shall be accompanied by a written report prepared

and signed by the witness. The report shall

comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).

(Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed October 28, 2005, at 2)

(emphasis added.) The order provides the following definition with

respect to the term “expert”:

For purposes of this scheduling order, an

“expert” is any person who may be used at trial

to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, and 705

of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which include

both “percipient experts” (persons who, because

of their expertise, have rendered expert opinions

in the normal course of their work duties or

observations pertinent to the issues in the case)

and “retained experts” (persons specifically

designated by a party to be a testifying expert

for the purposes of litigation). Each party

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shall identify whether a disclosed expert is

percipient, retained, or both. It will be

assumed that a party designating a retained

expert has acquired the express permission of the

witness to be so listed. Parties designating

percipient experts must state in the designation

who is responsible for arranging the deposition

of such persons.

(Id. at 2-3) (emphasis added).

ANALYSIS

Judge Damrell’s scheduling order is quite specific. The

court recognizes the apparently general rule that percipient expert

witnesses are not required to produce a written report. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993)(“The requirement of a

written report ... applies only to those experts who are retained or

specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or whose

duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of such

testimony.”); Navajo Nation v. Norris, 189 F.R.D. 610 (E.D. Wash.

1999) (denying motion to strike due to plain language of Rule

26(a)(2)(B) and because none of the expert employee witnesses had

been regularly used as expert witnesses or retained to provide expert

testimony). However, the scheduling order, which the parties have

been operating under for approximately one year, modifies that rule

in making no distinction between retained experts and percipient

experts. Moreover, the order expressly required expert reports from

both types of experts. Defendants disclosed Messrs. Rawlins,

Cockshutt, Bensley, Traeger and Pinto as percipient expert witnesses

but did not timely produce reports from them. Therefore, it appears

that the motion to strike must be granted.

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The court does not agree with defendants that they were

substantially justified in not producing the required reports because

of vagueness in the terms of Judge Damrell’s order. As discussed

above, the order clearly required reports from both percipient and

expert witnesses. Any suggestion to the contrary is belied by the

plain language of the order.

Nor was the failure to provide reports from percipient

experts harmless, as defendants contend, because the individuals at

issue have been deposed. Those depositions occurred before their

disclosure as experts and therefore before plaintiff had any

motivation to question the individuals on the scope of their expert

testimony.

Finally, the court is not persuaded by defendants’

suggestion at oral argument that the witnesses are not truly expert

witnesses, but only fact witnesses who happen to have expertise in

some areas. Even assuming defendants’ disclosure of the individuals

as experts was done out of an abundance of caution, as defendants

have represented, defendants have not yet demonstrated with any

certainty that the witnesses are not “persons who, because of their

expertise, have rendered expert opinions in the normal course of

their work duties or observations pertinent to the issues in the

case.” (Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order filed October 28, 2005,

at 2-3.)

For these reasons, the undersigned will recommend that the

motion to strike be granted. The undersigned will not, however,

recommend that each witness be precluded from testifying altogether.

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 The undersigned notes that this rationale espoused by 2

defendants is consistent with the general rule that the requirement

of written reports applies only to experts who are retained or

explicitly employed to provide such testimony. Nonetheless, this

default rule is trumped by a specific order by the trial judge. Such

appears to be the case here. 

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Rather, it is recommended only that each witness be precluded from

testifying as an “expert,” as that term is defined in Judge Damrell’s

order.

Finally, the undersigned recognizes that plaintiff’s motion

is brought pursuant to Rule 37. Such a discovery motion ordinarily

is resolved by way of order by the assigned magistrate judge. 

Nonetheless, the court is mindful of defendants’ contention that the

assigned district judge, in issuing his scheduling order, did not

actually intend to require the production of reports from both

percipient and retained expert witnesses. In support of this

contention, defendants point to their experience in litigating other

cases before Judge Damrell and assert that such a mandate would

require any testifying witness with any expertise in an area in which

he or she might testify to produce a report, an unwieldy requirement

according to defendants. The court also recognizes that the 2

disposition of plaintiff’s motion ultimately depends on the

interpretation of the Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order, which was

issued by Judge Damrell who therefore is in the best position to

interpret the order. For these reasons, the undersigned will

recommend, as opposed to order, that plaintiff’s motion be granted. 

As a result, the assigned district judge will have the opportunity to

conduct a de novo review of this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff Meridian’s motion to strike be granted; and

2. Pages 1:17-2:3 and 2:7-8 of defendants CMIC and

Hardin’s expert witness disclosure be stricken and Messrs. Rawlins,

Cockshutt, Bensley, Traeger and Pinto be precluded from offering

expert testimony.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within five (5) days after

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 31, 2006.

DAD:th

Ddad1\orders.civil\meridian2728.091506

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