Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08184/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08184-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jeffrey D. Woods, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-08184-PCT-NVW

ORDER 

Plaintiff Jeffrey D. Woods seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied 

him disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security 

Act. Because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by 

substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, the Commissioner’s decision will be 

affirmed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

Woods was born in October 1957. He has at least a high school education and is 

able to communicate in English. His past relevant work includes roofer and carpenter. 

In February 2003, Woods fell off a roof while working, sustaining a head injury 

and fractures of his face, right hip, and both arms. Although he underwent hip 

replacement surgery, he continued to experience pain in his hip. He received disability 

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benefits for his physical injuries for the period from February 2003 to November 2004. 

For parts of 2005 and 2006 he answered phones for a roofing company. 

In January 2007, Woods entered a court-ordered substance abuse treatment 

program for inhalant abuse. He has been treated for depression, memory loss, auditory 

hallucinations, nerve palsy, and migraine headaches. In 2009, Woods was diagnosed 

with diabetes. 

Woods is able to drive a car and a motorcycle. He does his own grocery shopping 

and laundry and prepares his own meals. He socializes with friends and sees his mother 

on a regular basis. He testified that he is unable to work because he cannot climb ladders, 

lift and carry, and go on roofs like he used to and because he does not remember things 

and has difficulty concentrating. 

B. Procedural History 

On November 26, 2008, Woods applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging 

disability beginning September 6, 2006. On March 31, 2011, he appeared with his 

attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert also testified. 

On May 27, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision that Woods was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Woods’s request 

for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final 

decision. On September 13, 2012, Woods sought review by this Court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

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to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995). In reviewing the ALJ’s reasoning, the court is “not deprived of [its] faculties for 

drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion.” Magallanes v. 

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989). 

III. FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be 

disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity and determines whether the claimant is still 

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capable of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, 

where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

The ALJ found that Woods meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through June 30, 2011, and that he has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since September 6, 2006. At step two, the ALJ found that Woods has the 

following severe impairments: history of substance abuse with inhalant-induced 

dementia and psychotic symptoms, mood disorder, history of total hip replacement, and 

asthma. At step three, the ALJ found that Woods does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments 

in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 

404.1526). 

At step four, the ALJ found that: 

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform 

the following: light exertion; no more than occasional 

postural functions but never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds; no work environments with hazards or concentrated 

exposure to heat; and no limitations for unskilled work but 

moderate limitations in the ability to understand, remember, 

and carry out detailed instructions (or difficulties with such 

activity but possessing the ability to perform it satisfactorily). 

The vocational expert testified that a person with Woods’ age, education, and work 

experience and the foregoing limitations would have skills transferable to the job of 

hardware sales representative. At step five, the ALJ concluded that: 

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Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, the claimant has acquired 

work skills from past relevant work that are transferable to 

other occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in 

the national economy (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), and 

404.1568(d)). 

A. The ALJ Did Not Err in Weighing Medical Source Evidence. 

1. Legal Standard 

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, the Ninth Circuit 

distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat 

the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and 

(3) non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight should be given to the 

opinion of a treating physician than to the opinions of non-treating physicians. Id. 

Where a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, it may be 

rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons, and where it is contradicted, it may not 

be rejected without “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. Id. Moreover, the Commissioner must give weight to the treating physician’s 

subjective judgments in addition to his clinical findings and interpretation of test results. 

Id. at 832-33. 

Further, an examining physician’s opinion generally must be given greater weight 

than that of a non-examining physician. Id. at 830. As with a treating physician, there 

must be clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an 

examining physician, and specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence in the record, for rejecting an examining physician’s contradicted opinion. Id.

at 830-31. 

The opinion of a non-examining physician is not itself substantial evidence that 

justifies the rejection of the opinion of either a treating physician or an examining 

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physician. Id. at 831. “The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may 

also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent 

clinical findings or other evidence in the record.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. Factors that 

an ALJ may consider when evaluating any medical opinion include “the amount of 

relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided; 

the consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole; [and] the specialty of 

the physician providing the opinion.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. 

Moreover, Social Security Rules expressly require a treating source’s opinion on 

an issue of a claimant’s impairment be given controlling weight if it is well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent 

with the other substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). If a 

treating source’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the weight that it will be given 

is determined by length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examination, nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship, relevant evidence supporting the opinion, 

consistency with the record as a whole, the source’s specialization, and other factors. Id. 

Where there is a conflict between the opinion of a treating physician and an examining 

physician, the ALJ may not reject the opinion of the treating physician without setting 

forth specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Orn, 

495 F.3d at 632. 

2. The ALJ Did Not Err by Giving Little Weight to the Assessment 

by Treating Psychiatrist Vasilios Kaperonis, M.D. 

Woods contends the ALJ erred by “rejecting” the opinion of treating psychiatrist 

Dr. Vasilios Kaperonis because his records are consistent regarding memory problems, 

auditory hallucinations, and cognitive problems, including concentration; because the 

industrial physician, Dr. Daniel T. Maletesta, stated a finding of memory and cognitive 

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problems after testing; and because treating neurologist Dr. Joshua Tobin’s November 2, 

2006 report discussed mild short-term memory loss and auditory hallucinations. 

On November 5, 2009, Dr. Kaperonis opined that Woods had serious impairment 

of his short term memory and ability to concentrate, was socially inept and withdrawn, 

was unable to adapt successfully to changing circumstances, and was especially 

vulnerable to stress. On September 20, 2010, Dr. Kaperonis opined that Woods had 

marked limitations in his abilities to understand and remember short, simple instructions; 

carry out short, simple instructions; and make judgments on simple work-related 

decisions. He further opined that Woods had extreme limitation in his abilities to 

understand and remember detailed instructions; interact appropriately with the public, 

supervisors, and co-workers; respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual work 

setting; and respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting. 

The ALJ provided clear, convincing, specific, and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, for giving “little weight” to Dr. Kaperonis’ 

assessments. The ALJ found that Dr. Kaperonis’ assessment was not substantiated by the 

evidence of record, including his own treatment records. The ALJ identified evidence of 

record showing: 

With respect to activities of daily living, the claimant is 

independent and is able to: prepare meals; do some house 

cleaning; drive a car and a motorcycle; shop for food; go out 

on dates; spend a weekend with his motorcycle club; attend 

his grandson’s Little League games; and do some fishing []. 

Despite Dr. Kaparonis’ characterization of the claimant as 

“socially inept and withdrawn” and having “limited social 

contacts,” the claimant spends time with others, including his 

parents and his son; has no problem getting along with 

family, friends, neighbors and others; gets along okay with 

authority figures; has talks with his neighbor; gets together 

with a couple of friends to have dinner or to watch television; 

goes out on dates; has friends who allow him to stay in their 

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homes; and spends weekends with his motorcycle club []. 

The undersigned notes that Dr. Kaperonis’ own treating 

records do not support the level of severity in social 

functioning indicated in the psychiatrist’s responses to the 

questionnaires []. 

In regard to concentration, persistence or pace, the claimant 

has recently been issued a Class D driver’s license, indicating 

that state licensing authorities and treating physicians do not 

consider his cognitive impairments significant enough to 

revoke his driving privileges []. He is able to drive both a car 

and a motorcycle []. Furthermore, while he claims to need 

someone with him when driving because he gets lost or 

disoriented, he was observed to drive, by himself, from his 

home to a gas station then to someone’s home several miles 

away, all the while obeying traffic laws, adhering to the 

posted speed limit, and properly using his turn signals []. 

The ALJ further noted that although Dr. Kaperonis reported throughout treatment Woods 

had “significant memory problems and auditory hallucinations (with varying degrees of 

impact),” he provided little basis for his assessment of extremely restrictive limitations in 

social interaction. 

The ALJ also found Dr. Kaperonis’ opinion inconsistent in other ways: 

Despite noting significant cognitive deficits, including 

memory and concentration difficulties, the treating 

psychiatrist finds the claimant capable of managing benefit 

payments in his own interest []. The record demonstrates, 

however, that the claimant cannot take care of his finances 

anymore; and, at the hearing, he testified that his mother pays 

his bills for him because of his problems handling money []. 

Finally, Dr. Kaperonis’ limitations and determination of 

disability are not supported by the claimant’s daily activities, 

including preparing meals; cleaning the house; driving both a 

car and a motorcycle and getting his driver’s license renewed 

recently; shopping for food; going out on dates; spending 

weekends with his motorcycle club; attending his grandson’s 

Little League games; and doing some fishing []. 

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On January 19, 2007, Dr. Malatesta performed a neuropsychological evaluation of 

Woods. Test results indicated that Woods’ general cognitive ability was in the extremely 

low range of intellectual functioning and, although he graduated from high school, he 

performed at a fourth grade level in reading, second grade level in spelling, and third 

grade level in arithmetic. His working memory, i.e., ability to receive verbally presented 

information, process the information in memory, and then formulate a response, was in 

the “far below average” to “below average” range. His visual-motor performance 

received a developmental age score of 8 years, 6 months. Test results also suggested a 

high probability that Woods had a substance dependent disorder; his responses indicated 

“significant and severe use of both alcohol and illegal drugs.” 

On an Objective Personality Measure of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 

Inventory, Dr. Malatesta reported that Woods obtained an Invalid Profile for the 

following reasons: 

He responded to the MMPI-2 items in an exaggerated 

manner, endorsing a wide variety of symptoms and attitudes. 

These results may stem from a number of factors, including 

indiscriminately claiming extreme psychological problems, a 

low reading level, a “plea for help,” or severe psychological 

deterioration or psychosis. His responses were probably not 

random because he was consistent in his item responses. The 

resulting MMPI-2 profile is not likely to be a valid indication 

of his personality and symptoms. . . . 

A severe psychosis should also be ruled out since he did not 

exhibit signs of psychopathology in his presentation during 

the course of this evaluation. He did not exhibit any 

behaviors, nor did he verbalize any comments that would 

suggest that he is out of touch with reality. There is also the 

possibility that Mr. Woods may have been consciously 

exaggerating or malingering in an attempt to obtain some 

desired goal, such as financial benefits from a supportive 

agency. 

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Dr. Malatesta concluded that Woods appeared to be “functioning at a level commensurate 

with an individual who would be considered mildly mentally retarded,” exhibited signs of 

organic impairment, and appeared to “have a significant substance abuse problem which 

has interfered with his treatment.” Dr. Malatesta emphasized that his testing of Woods’ 

social/emotional/personality functioning was invalid because Woods had “clearly 

exhibited an exaggeration of symptomatology in these findings that can, at the very least, 

be considered an extreme or desperate cry for help, and/or as malingering to obtain 

financial benefits.” Thus, Dr. Malatesta’s evaluation does not support Dr. Kaperonis’ 

assessment of extremely restrictive limitations in social interaction, nor did it require the 

ALJ to give more than little weight to Dr. Kaperonis’ opinions regarding Woods’ 

limitations in memory and concentration. 

Woods also contends that Dr. Kaperonis’ opinions regarding memory and 

concentration are consistent with those of Dr. Tobin. He cites to Dr. Tobin’s treatment 

notes, dated November 2, 2006, which state: “Memory remains mildly impaired for 

short-term but intact for longer-term.” Dr. Tobin’s observation of mild impairment of 

short-term memory does not support Dr. Kaperonis’ assessment of marked and severe 

limitations. 

Therefore, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for giving Dr. 

Kaperonis’ opinion little weight and did not err in weighing treating medical source 

evidence. 

3. The ALJ Did Not Err by Implicitly Rejecting Dr. Tobin’s 

Opinion. 

Woods contends the ALJ did not discuss Dr. Tobin’s opinion that Woods was 

unable to work. However, the ALJ expressly stated in a footnote: 

In November 2006, Dr. Tobin, the neurologist, determined 

that the claimant was unable to work from September 2006 to 

(presumably) March 2007, a period of less than one year []. 

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Dr. Tobin also indicated that the claimant “may never be able 

to” work again []. Because of the ambiguity in this opinion 

(and because determinations of disability are the exclusive 

province of the Commissioner), it is given little weight. 

Therefore, the ALJ did not implicitly reject Dr. Tobin’s opinion that Woods was unable 

to work. Moreover, the Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant 

meets the statutory definition of disability and does not give significance to a statement 

by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.927(d). Therefore, the ALJ did not err regarding Dr. Tobin’s opinion.1

B. The ALJ Did Not Clearly Misinterpret Evidence to Woods’ Detriment. 

Woods also contends that the ALJ committed legal error by giving weight to Dr. 

Desch’s opinion referenced by Dr. Kaperonis, failing to accept Dr. Malatesta’s GAF test 

results, and giving some weight to the opinion of Dr. Gallucci, a state agency 

psychological consultant. 

The ALJ identified and described Dr. Kaperonis’ September 30, 2009 treatment 

note, which referenced an evaluation by Dr. Mary Desch, a psychiatrist. The ALJ said 

she found Dr. Desch’s diagnosis of inhalant-induced persistent dementia more persuasive 

than Dr. Kaperonis’ position. Dr. Desch believed Woods’ psychotic symptoms and 

auditory hallucinations improved significantly because he had discontinued inhalant 

abuse; Dr. Kaperonis believed the improvement was due to the medications he had 

prescribed, and therefore the medications should be continued. The two psychiatrists 

disagreed as to the cause of and appropriate treatment for Woods’ psychotic symptoms 

 1

 Woods summarily states the ALJ erred by implicitly rejecting the opinion of the 

surgeon who performed his hip replacement “that his patient has limited on feet 

capacity.” The record cited shows that on April 12, 2006, before the alleged onset date of 

disability, the surgeon opined that Woods could sit for 4 hours at a time and could sit for 

8 hours in an 8-hour work day, but gave no opinion regarding the length of time Woods 

could stand or walk. The ALJ did not err by not commenting on the surgeon’s omission 

of an opinion. 

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and auditory hallucinations, and the ALJ found Dr. Desch’s reasoning more persuasive. 

However, the disagreement regarding the cause and treatment and the ALJ’s finding 

regarding which position was more persuasive is irrelevant to the disability determination 

because both psychiatrists agreed that Woods’s symptoms had improved. Although Dr. 

Desch’s report was not in the record and the ALJ found Dr. Desch’s diagnosis “more 

persuasive,” Dr. Desch’s opinion did not affect the disability determination. 

Woods also contends the ALJ should not have given any consideration to Dr. 

Desch’s opinion because it may have been made in 2003 and therefore not relevant. Dr. 

Kaperonis’ treatment note states that Woods was evaluated by Dr. Desch after his last 

visit with Dr. Kaperonis, which was July 21, 2009. Therefore, the timing does not make 

it irrelevant. 

Woods also contends the ALJ erred by not discussing Dr. Malatesta’s findings of a 

GAF score of 50, extremely low intellectual functioning, and extremely low working 

memory. The ALJ’s hearing decision does not indicate that she misinterpreted these 

findings. Rather, it states them and also that Dr. Malatesta determined, provisionally, that 

Woods was malingering. 

Finally, Woods contends the ALJ erred by giving some weight to Dr. Gallucci’s 

opinion and little weight to Dr. Kaperonis’ opinion when Dr. Gallucci did not include an 

assessment of Dr. Kaperonis’ records. In fact, the ALJ found that the evidence of record 

did not entirely support the severity of limitations found by either doctor, but Dr. 

Gallucci’s opinion was more consistent with the evidence and deserving of some weight. 

Dr. Kaperonis opined that Woods had extreme limitations in social functioning, Dr. 

Gallucci opined that Woods had moderate limitations in social functioning, and the ALJ 

found the record showed only mild difficulties in social functioning. Dr. Kaperonis 

opined that Woods had serious impairment of concentration, Dr. Galluci opined that 

Woods had moderate restrictions in maintaining concentration, and the ALJ found the 

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record showed moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace. As found 

above, the ALJ provided clear, convincing, specific, and legitimate reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence, for giving Dr. Kaparonis’ opinion little weight and did not err. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and shall 

terminate this case. 

Dated this 8th day of April, 2013. 

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