Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01370/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01370-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH LYNN MOORE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KAMALA D. HARRIS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No C-14-1370 TEH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison – Solano,

filed this pro se civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking the

release and testing of potentially exculpatory biological evidence

in the possession and control of officers of the State of

California, Alameda County, and Santa Clara County. Plaintiff’s

original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and he has

filed an amended complaint. 

I

Plaintiff is currently serving a life sentence imposed by

the Alameda County Superior Court in 1980 after he and his brother,

David Moore, were convicted of serious crimes arising from ten

separate incidents that occurred in Northern California in August

1978. Among the offenses for which both Plaintiff and his brother

were convicted was the rape of “Linda S.” in a San Jose motel room

on August 11, 1978. Although Plaintiff now admits to having

committed one of the offenses for which he was tried and convicted,

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the theft of a pickup truck from a Los Altos, California auto

dealership, he maintains that he is innocent of the remaining

offenses, including the rape of Linda S.

Seeking to establish his innocence, Plaintiff brought a

prior action in this court, Moore v. Lockyer, Case No. C 04-1952

MHP, seeking the release of DNA evidence collected by Santa Clara

County during the course of the investigation into Linda S.’s rape. 

On September 23, 2005, this court dismissed the prior action under

California’s issue preclusion law, finding that the state court, in

2002, had already determined there was no reasonable probability

that access to DNA evidence would have affected the outcome of

Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed. Moore v. Brown, No. 06-15016, 2008 WL 4430338

(unpublished memorandum disposition).

Plaintiff states that he does not, by way of the instant

action, attempt to re-litigate the claims in his earlier federal

court action. Rather, Plaintiff states that the claims herein are

based on events that occurred subsequent to the conclusion of his

earlier action. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in early 2012 he

obtained pro bono counsel, Kelley Fleming. Ms. Fleming secured a

verbal agreement with the Santa Clara County Crime Laboratory

(“SCCCL”) to test a DNA swab collected from Linda S. in 1978,

following the rape. Plaintiff alleges the swab was tested in June

2012, revealing DNA from three individuals – two male, and one

female. When compared against the DNA samples extracted from

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Plaintiff, he was eliminated as a contributor; however, so was the

victim. 

Plaintiff alleges that these findings “created a dilemma”

for SCCCL and “sparked much debate between [Plaintiff’s counsel] and

SCCCL staff attorneys and lab technicians.” Plaintiff further

alleges that in the subsequent months, SCCCL refused to meet and

confer with Plaintiff’s counsel and “abruptly canceled any further

meetings.” According to the complaint, “defendants at SCCCL

verbally admitted [] that they tested the wrong evidence.” 

Plaintiff alleges that the only logical inference is that there has

been “tampering” or “falsification/fabrication” of the DNA swab.

Plaintiff also refers to requests for appointment of

counsel he made in Alameda County Superior Court in February 2013

and June 2013. Both were decided by Alameda County Superior Court

Judge Larry J. Goodman, who also decided Plaintiff’s 2002 state

court action seeking access to DNA evidence, as mentioned above. 

Plaintiff states that Judge Goodman approved his June 2013 request

for counsel in state court. Plaintiff offers no further information

on the status of any current state court proceedings.

Plaintiff alleges that the DNA testing that was done was

not properly done, that some evidence was lost or contaminated, and

that other pieces of evidence should have been tested. Plaintiff

claims that Defendants’ failure to properly test and/or release the

biological evidence in his criminal case violates his Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process and equal protection. Plaintiff also

alleges state law violations.

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The Court, in the initial review order, analyzed

Plaintiff’s due process and state law claims in detail and dismissed

the claims with prejudice. See Docket No. 6. Plaintiff’s equal

protection claim was dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff has

filed an amended complaint.

II

A

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of

cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or

officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint,

or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous,

malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by pro se

litigants, however, must be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler,

627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under

§ 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately

caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. Leer v.

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Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of

Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives

another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act

or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that

causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844

F.2d at 633. 

B

Plaintiff alleges an equal protection violation by asserting

that Defendants acted to deprive Plaintiff of access to evidence and

proper DNA testing specifically because Plaintiff is AfricanAmerican. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially

a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,

439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). A

plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection under section 1983,

therefore, must prove purposeful discrimination by demonstrating

that he “receiv[ed] different treatment from that received by others

similarly situated” and that the treatment complained of was under

color of state law. Van Pool v. City and County of San Francisco,

752 F. Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citations omitted).

 Plaintiff was provided leave to amend because he only

presented conclusory allegations of Defendants’ alleged race bias

and American racial history. There were no allegation or indication

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that Plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated

individuals. Plaintiff has failed to cure these deficiencies in the

amended complaint. Plaintiff again only presents brief conclusory

allegations that there was an equal protection violation because he

is African-American but fails to describe how other similarly

situated individuals were treated differently.

In order to state a claim a complaint "does not need

detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to

provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 

Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the

"plausible on its face" standard of Twombly: "While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

Plaintiff’s brief allegations without support do not plausibly

demonstrate an equal protection violation. Therefore, the claim is

dismissed. Because Plaintiff has already been provided leave to

amend and because allowing further amendment would be futile, this

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1

 The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice

of the articles attached to his supplemental brief. The articles do

no relate to his allegations of an equal protection violation

regarding the DNA testing. 

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claim is dismissed with prejudice.1

III

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The clerk

should deny all pending motions as moot and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 03/11/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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