Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01400/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01400-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ALLEN ARNOLD,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07CV1400-LAB (POR)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

vs. AND RECOMMENDATION

DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONSREHABILITATION,

Respondent.

Richard Arnold, a prisoner in state custody, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in this Court challenging an October 2002 conviction for murder, attempted murder, and

related charges. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) and (d), the

petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Louisa Porter for a report and recommendation.

Judge Porter issued her R&R on March 24, 2010, and for the reasons given below, the Court

ADOPTS it in its entirety. 

I. Legal Standard

In reviewing an R&R, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the

magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district court may

accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return

the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” In other words, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,

Case 3:07-cv-01400-LAB-POR Document 66 Filed 01/18/11 Page 1 of 6
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but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Because Arnold is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and

affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621,

623 (9th Cir. 1988). That said, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure

that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

II. Discussion

Arnold’s habeas petition (or what remains of it) consists of three claims: (1) ineffective

assistance of counsel and the denial of an evidentiary hearing; (2) denial of the right to

confront adverse witnesses; and (3) denial of the right to present a complete defense. The

R&R reviews the legal standards for federal habeas relief, and there is no need to cover

them here. (See R&R at 3.) 

A. Request for Counsel

At the outset, the Court DENIES Arnold’s request for counsel to assist him with his

habeas petition. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas

corpus actions by state prisoners. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986);

see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756–57 (1991). It is true that financially

eligible habeas petitioners may obtain representation whenever the Court “determines that

the interests of justice so require,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), but the hurdle is a high one:

the facts of the particular case must indicate that “appointed counsel is necessary to prevent

due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196. Additionally, the appointment of

counsel may be necessary if the petitioner has such limited education that he or she is

incapable of presenting his or her claims. Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir.

1970). The Court finds that Arnold’s due process rights are not in jeopardy, and that he has

proven himself to be sufficiently capable of pursuing habeas relief on his own. His previous

requests for the appointment of counsel have been denied, and his present request is

DENIED as well. 

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B. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Arnold’s entitlement to an evidentiary hearing arises in two respects. First, he argues

that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing now, so that his habeas petition itself may be

adjudicated fairly. The R&R reasons that a hearing isn’t precluded by 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2), but that there is no basis for one under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

The Court agrees. An evidentiary hearing isn’t required “on issues that can be resolved by

reference to the state court record,” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998),

and, as the R&R concludes after a thorough review of the record in this case, “Arnold does

not explain how an evidentiary hearing would produce material facts not already presented

to the state courts.” (R&R at 6.) Arnold’s request for an evidentiary hearing is therefore

DENIED.

Second, Arnold argues that his post-trial denial of an evidentiary hearing was a

violation of his due process rights. The Court is again satisfied with the R&R’s treatment of

this argument. While predicated on Arnold’s due process rights, it appears to actually

implicate the trial court’s application of state law, and state law claims can’t be the basis of

federal habeas relief. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). Morever, even

if Arnold’s claim here does implicate his due process rights, there is no indication in the

record that the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing rose to the level of the deprivation

identified in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984), on which Arnold relies. The

Court therefore DENIES Arnold’s claim that his due process rights were violated by the trial

court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing.

C. Ground Two - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

While Arnold indicates in his objection to the R&R that he objects to its findings and

conclusions with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he does not specify

what those objections are. In any event, the Court is satisfied with the R&R’s analysis of this

claim. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), counsel is legally ineffective

only if his performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards and was

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plausibly the but-for cause of a prejudicial result at trial. The Court finds that Arnold, for the

reasons thoroughly given in the R&R, has failed to make this showing.

D. Ground Three - Violation of the Confrontation Clause

Arnold’s confrontation clause claim goes to the attempt of a victim-witness (his former

wife, Heather Olafson) to offer previously excluded hearsay testimony at trial. Arnold’s

counsel objected to the testimony, and the objections were quickly sustained, but only after

the jury heard the testimony. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides

that the accused in criminal trials “shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the

witnesses against [them],” U.S.CONST. amend. VI, and the Supreme Court held in Crawford

v. Washington that hearsay testimony can violate this right. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 

There is no doubt that the testimony at issue here violated Arnold’s rights under the

Confrontation Clause. But that’s not the end of the analysis. In order for the violation to

warrant habeas relief, the petitioner must suffer prejudice. Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d

1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the impermissible testimony must have had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). The state court found that the effect of

the testimony was “harmless under any standard,” and the Court agrees with the R&R that

this finding of the state court was not “contrary to . . . Supreme Court harmless error

precedent” such that habeas relief is warranted. Id. The evidence of a premeditated attack

by Arnold was overwhelming, and the hearsay testimony could not have had a prejudicial

effect on the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The Court therefore DENIES Arnold’s

claim that he is entitled to habeas relief because his rights under the Confrontation Clause

were violated.

Arnold also argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because he was

forbidden from presenting evidence of Heather’s “inappropriate sexual contact with both

Petitioner’s Son and Nephew.” (Obj. at 5.) This isn’t a Confrontation Clause issue as much

as one of Arnold’s ability to put on a complete defense, and is therefore implicated by his

final habeas claim, addressed below.

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E. Ground Four - Obstruction of Complete Defense

Arnold’s final claim is that the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that Olafson molested

his son and bore a child by his nephew prevented him from mounting a successful defense.

Arnold argues that these facts would have impeached Olafson’s credibility as a witness

against him and bolstered Arnold’s heat of passion defense. The trial court, as the R&R

observes, questioned the relevance of the molestation evidence to a heat of passion

defense because “this was not a situation where he was suddenly confronted with the

provocation and then initiated the attack.” (R&R at 16.) 

The trial court excluded the molestation evidence under section 352 of the California

Evidence Code, which is analogous to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It

did so on the ground that “the relevance is outweighed by time consumption and prejudice

against the victim.” (R&R at 17.) Arnold doesn’t argue, under United States v. Scheffer, 523

U.S. 303, 308 (1998), that section 352 is arbitrary or disproportionate to its intended

purpose, which means he must argue that the trial court lacked “any rational justification” for

the exclusion of the evidence. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986). The trial court

found that the alleged molestations were too far removed in time from Arnold’s crime to

plausibly support a heat of passion defense, and that any relevance of the charges would

have been outweighed by prejudice against Heather Olafson. The Court, following the R&R,

finds that these justifications are rational and persuasive, not arbitrary. There was no

constitutional error in the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence, and Arnold’s claim that he

was prevented from mounting a full defense is DENIED.

F. Certificate of Appealability

Arnold’s argument that denying him a certificate of appealability violates his First

Amendment right to petition the government is meritless. Under the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, a habeas petitioner “cannot take an appeal unless a circuit or district

judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).” Fed. R. App. P.

22(b)(1). The district court may issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner “has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 § 2253(c)(2). To make

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a “substantial showing,” the petitioner must“demonstrat[e] that ‘reasonable jurists would find

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable[.]’” Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

Judge Porter’s recommendation that a certificate of appealability should not issue is

reasonable, and the Court ADOPTS it.

III. Conclusion

Arnold’s request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. His request for counsel is also

DENIED. His habeas petition is DENIED in its entirety. A certificate of appealability is

DENIED. The Court therefore ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 18, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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