Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00403/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-00403-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN E. DANNENBERG,

Petitioner,

v.

STEVEN ORNOSKI, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS; and 

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor,

Real Parties in Interest

 /

No. C 06-0403 CW

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND STAYING

PETITION

In this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner John E. Dannenberg, a California State

prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, alleges that his

right to due process was violated when he was denied parole. 

Respondent Steven Ornoski moves to dismiss this action, or,

alternatively, to strike portions of the petition, the supporting

memorandum of points and authorities, and the exhibits. Petitioner

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opposes this motion. The matter was heard on May 12, 2006. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties and oral

argument, the Court grants Respondent's motion.

BACKGROUND

In 1986, a jury acquitted Petitioner of the first-degree

murder of his wife, but found him guilty of second-degree murder. 

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life. He

has now been incarcerated for over nineteen years.

In 1999, as on two prior occasions, the Board of Parole

Hearings (Board) declined to grant Petitioner a parole release

date. The Board noted that Petitioner had no previous record, that

his behavior while incarcerated had been commendable, that there

were no psychiatric factors to consider and that he had viable

parole plans. Nonetheless, the Board concluded that Petitioner's

crime demonstrated a continuing public danger, thus making him

unsuitable for parole, because the murder was “especially callous

and cruel” and was committed for a trivial reason. 

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Marin County

Superior Court based on this denial of parole. The court granted

the petition and ordered the Board to hold another parole

suitability hearing within thirty days, noting that it anticipated

that, absent changed circumstances or evidence not presented, the

Board would set a parole date. See In re Dannenberg, 102 Cal. App.

4th 95 (2002), rev'd, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005). On appeal, the

court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Board had

proceeded incorrectly. Id. The appellate court ruled that once a

prisoner with an indeterminate life sentence reaches minimum parole

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eligibility, the Board must set a fixed date for parole release,

pursuant to the principle of “uniform terms” for crimes of similar

gravity, and with due regard for the statutory minimum term for the

inmate's offense, unless it finds the prisoner's crime

“particularly egregious” in comparison to other offenses of the

same class. It directed the superior court to order that the Board

hold a new parole hearing, under the proper standards, as

expeditiously as possible.

The California Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate

court's judgment. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005). It

held, in part, that the "Board's conclusion that Dannenberg remains

too dangerous for parole because his offense was especially callous

and cruel, and was committed for a trivial reason, relied upon

facts beyond the minimum elements of second degree murder, and was

supported by some evidence. The Board's decision to deny parole

thus comports with the law." Id. at 1071.

Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court.

DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that this action must be dismissed for two

reasons. First, because Petitioner does not have a liberty

interest in early release on parole that is protected by federal

due process, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Second,

Petitioner failed to exhaust his State judicial remedies. If the

Court fails to dismiss this action, Respondent argues, the Court

should strike portions of the habeas petition and attachments

because they contain misleading and irrelevant information.

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I. Federally Protected Interest

Although a convicted person has no inherent or constitutional

right to early release on parole, a State's statutory parole scheme

may create "a presumption that parole release will be granted" if

it uses mandatory language. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska

Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). This presumption of

parole release gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty

interest that cannot be denied without adequate due process

protection. Id. at 11-16; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987).

In Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that Montana's

statutory parole scheme, which instructed that the parole board

"shall" release a prisoner on parole absent certain conditions,

used mandatory language such that it created a constitutionally

protected right that parole would be granted if those conditions

were not found to exist. Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-78. Also, in

Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that Nebraska's parole statute,

which instructed that the parole board "shall" release the prisoner

on parole absent certain conditions, created a liberty interest in

release on parole if those conditions were found not to exist. 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.

California's parole scheme largely parallels the Montana and

Nebraska schemes. California Penal Code § 3041 instructs that the

Board "shall set a release date" unless it decides this is

inadvisable based on the nature and timing of the offense and in

consideration of public safety: 

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[a] One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole

release date a panel of two or more commissioners or deputy

commissioners shall . . . meet with the inmate and shall

normally set a parole release date . . . . The release date

shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform terms for

offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their

threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing

rules that the Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing

information relevant to the setting of parole release dates. 

The board shall establish criteria for the setting of parole

release dates and in doing so shall consider the number of

victims of the crime for which the inmate was sentenced and

other factors in mitigation or aggravation of the crime . . .

[b] The panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a

release date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is

such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that

a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a), (b).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the California parole scheme

"gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole"

under the Allen and Greenholtz standards because it "'creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted' unless the

statutorily defined determinations [set forth in § 3041(b)] are

made." McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir.

2002)(quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12); see also Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003)(stating that § 3041

creates a liberty interest in parole that is protected by the due

process clause, but holding that parole can be denied based on the

gravity of the commitment offense). Thus, under Ninth Circuit

authority, the mandatory language of California's parole scheme

creates a federally protected liberty interest such that an inmate

has a federal right to due process in parole proceedings. Ninth

Circuit authority is binding on this Court. Respondent's argument

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that the Court is not bound by previous Ninth Circuit decisions is

incorrect.

Respondent contends that, under Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472

(1995), although "states may under certain circumstances create

liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause, 

. . . these interests will be generally limited to freedom from

restraint" which "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id.

at 483-84. Because Petitioner can expect to be imprisoned for

life, Respondent claims, denial of parole is not an "atypical" or

"significant hardship," so § 3041 does not give rise to a Statecreated liberty interest.

However, Sandin did not foreclose the possibility that a State

parole scheme may create a protectable liberty interest; it did not

discuss parole at all. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Sandin as

applying "to internal disciplinary [prison] regulations" only. 

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 903. Furthermore, the fact that McQuillion

was decided after Sandin illustrates that the Ninth Circuit

considered Sandin when it held that § 3041 creates a liberty

interest in parole, and determined that Sandin did not preclude

this holding.

Respondent relies on the California Supreme Court's decision

in Petitioner's case, which determined that Petitioner's individual

parole suitability must be ascertained before the Board attempts to

set a term that would result in uniform parole dates for similar

crimes. 34 Cal. 4th at 1098. In other words, the California

Supreme Court determined that Penal Code § 3041(a)'s termCase 4:06-cv-00403-CW Document 19 Filed 08/11/06 Page 6 of 13
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uniformity concerns only arise if the inmate is found suitable

under § 3041(b). However, the court did not address whether

§ 3041(b) creates a federally protected liberty interest in parole. 

Indeed, the court used language that indicated it assumed such a

liberty interest exists: "the Board has always enjoyed broad parole

discretion with deferential judicial oversight. But these wellestablished principles do not deny due process. On the contrary,

they define and limit the expectancy in parole from a life sentence

to which due process interests attach." 34 Cal. 4th at 1095 n.16;

see also id. at 1094 ("sole reliance on the commitment offense

might . . . contravene the inmate's constitutionally protected

expectation of parole.") Thus, in its opinion in this case, the

California Supreme Court did not undermine the Ninth Circuit's

holding in McQuillion that § 3041 creates a federally protected

liberty interest in parole release absent the finding of certain

conditions.

After the California Supreme Court decided Petitioner's case,

several district courts have addressed how its opinion affects the

Ninth Circuit's holding in McQuillion. A court in the Eastern

District of California recently held that Dannenberg stands for the

proposition that California's parole scheme is not mandatory, and

thus it does not create a federally protected interest in parole

release. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d

975, 983 (2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-16455 (9th Cir. July 12,

2005). The majority of district courts, however, that have

addressed this issue have determined that Dannenberg did not address

the mandatory nature of the parole statute, and thus did not affect

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1

Unpublished cases in this district have reached the same

conclusion. See Lewis v. Solis, 2005 WL 3454137 (N.D.

Cal.)(unpublished); Mason v. Hamlet, No. C 02-5363 JF (N.D.

Cal.)(unpublished); Blankenship v. Kane, 2006 WL 515627

(N.D. Cal.)(unpublished).

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McQuillion's holding that California's statute creates a federally

protected liberty interest in parole release. See Guzman v. Kane,

2006 WL 83060 (N.D. Cal.); Chilchil v. Kane, 2006 WL 83057 (N.D.

Cal.); McCauley v. Brown, 2006 WL 83050 (N.D. Cal.); Machado v.

Kane, 2005 WL 3299885 (N.D. Cal.); Thompson v. Carey, 2005 WL

3287503 (E.D. Cal.).1

Because the Ninth Circuit specifically held in McQuillion that

California's parole scheme creates a federally protected liberty

interest, and because the California Supreme Court in Dannenberg did

not address this issue, the Court rejects Respondent's argument that

there is no protected liberty interest in parole for California

inmates. The Court has jurisdiction over this petition. 

II. Failure to Exhaust 

Respondent contends that Petitioner failed to exhaust his State

remedies for several of his claims. Specifically, he contends that

Petitioner failed fairly to present the following issues in State

court: the Board's regulations are unconstitutionally vague;

Petitioner's right to a jury trial was violated; the Board's denial

of parole violates Petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to be

protected from double jeopardy; and the Board's fact finding

procedure is defective.

Prisoners in State custody seeking federal habeas relief are

first required to exhaust State judicial remedies, either on direct

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appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest

State court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits

of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982);

McNeeley v. Arave, 842 F.2d 230, 231 (9th Cir. 1988). The State's

highest court must be given an opportunity to rule on the claims. 

See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (petitioner

must invoke “one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.”). However, exhaustion does not require repeated

assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at least once

on the merits by the State's highest court. See Castille v.

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081,

1086-87 (9th Cir. 2002). This is true even where alternative

avenues of review are still available in State court. See Castille,

489 U.S. at 350.

The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather a

matter of comity. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34

(1987). However, a district court may not grant an unexhausted

petition unless there are exceptional circumstances. See Edelbacher

v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring "extremely

unusual circumstances"); Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir.

1981) (exhaustion requirement may be avoided by showing that it

would be futile in light of prevailing decisions of highest State

court).

Petitioner does not claim to have presented all of his claims

to the State courts. But he nonetheless contends that he has

properly exhausted his federal claims for relief. He notes that, in

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reviewing the appellate court's judgment granting him habeas relief,

the California Supreme Court limited briefing and argument to the

following issue:

At a parole suitability hearing that is held pursuant to

Penal Code section 3041, must the Board of Prison Terms

generally engage in a comparative proportionality analysis

with respect to offenses of similar gravity and magnitude

and consider base term matrices used by the Board in

setting release dates and deny a parole date solely on the

basis of the circumstances of the offense only when the

offense is particularly egregious, or may the Board first

determine whether the inmate is suitable for parole

because he or she is no longer a threat to public safety

and engage in a proportionality analysis only if it finds

the inmate suitable for parole?

In re Dannenberg, 63 P. 3d 212 (2003). The court's decision,

however, was much broader. Petitioner contends that his additional

claims come directly from the California Supreme Court's ruling in

his case. He claims that he did everything he could to present all

of his claims, but because the foundation for some of his claims is

based on the actions of the California Supreme Court itself, those

matters cannot be reviewed by a lower State court and must be

determined in this federal habeas petition.

Petitioner, however, is incorrect; he did not do everything he

could to present all his claims to the California Supreme Court. 

Although the grounds upon which the California Supreme Court

accepted review of his case were narrow, Petitioner raised at least

one argument that was not within the scope of the issues set forth

in the order granting review. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at

1099 n.19. The California Supreme Court addressed that issue,

noting that it was "reluctant to issue a straight reversal of the

Court of Appeal's judgment -- thus effectively reinstating the

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Board's order denying parole -- without examining all bases upon

which Dannenberg has claimed, both here and below, that the Board's

order is defective." Id. Thus, Petitioner could have presented his

unexhausted claims to the California Supreme Court, even though they

were outside of the specific scope of review. 

Petitioner's claims concerning his right to a jury trial and to

be protected from double jeopardy, and his claims under Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296 (2004), did not arise out of the California Supreme Court's

opinion, nor were those claims addressed in it. Furthermore,

Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing with the California

Supreme Court. That petition, however, did not contain Petitioner's

arguments that his right to a jury trial was violated or that the

Board's denial of parole violated his Fifth Amendment right to be

protected from double jeopardy, or his related argument, based on

Apprendi and Blakely, that the Board's denial of parole takes his

sentence outside the normal or standard sentencing range. Instead,

the only issues raised in the petition for rehearing were whether

the California Supreme Court's construction of § 3041 in In re

Dannenberg represents an unforeseeable judicial expansion of a penal

statute, and whether its retroactive application to Petitioner's

punishment for a 1985 offense violates due process, issues

Petitioner also raises in his habeas petition before this Court. 

See 2005 WL 916216 (Petition for Rehearing, February 7, 2006).

On the other hand, Petitioner's claim regarding the Board's

fact-finding was addressed by the California Supreme Court. In

addition, his unconstitutional vagueness claim is that the

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2

Respondent's ex parte request for extension of time to file

his reply (Docket No. 14) is GRANTED.

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California Supreme Court created the vagueness through its opinion

in In re Dannenberg; further exhaustion of these claims would be

futile. See Sweet, 640 F.2d at 236. 

Nonetheless, Petitioner presents new arguments in his habeas

petition before this Court that were not considered by any State

court. The highest court of California must have a fair opportunity

to address the merits of all of Petitioner's claims. It has not. 

Thus, Petitioner's petition must be dismissed. See Rose, 455 U.S.

at 522 ("a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing

both unexhausted and exhausted claims").

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Respondent's Motion

to Dismiss (Docket No. 9).2 Petitioner has not exhausted all of his

claims; specifically, he has not exhausted his claims that his right

to a jury trial was violated and that the Board's denial of parole

violates his Fifth Amendment right to be protected from double

jeopardy, nor his Apprendi and Blakely claims. His federal habeas

petition is stayed and held in abeyance so that he may exhaust in

State court his unexhausted claims. Because Petitioner is returning

to State court, he should, in an abundance of caution, exhaust all

of the claims that Respondent contends are unexhausted. Petitioner

must file his unexhausted claims in State court within thirty days

from the date of this order and he must file a motion to amend his

petition in federal court within thirty days after State court

exhaustion is completed. Petitioner's federal habeas petition will

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be held in abeyance until thirty days after the California Supreme

Court rules on his State petition. Petitioner is ordered to file

quarterly status reports of his State court habeas proceedings with

this Court beginning four months from the date of this order and to

notify this Court promptly when his exhaustion is completed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/11/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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