Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01235/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-01235-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AJANI IMAROGBE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

KEN CLARK, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

____________________________________)

1:10-cv-01235-JLT HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

(Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO FILE

A RESPONSE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

June 24, 2010. A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the may be untimely and 1

In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The

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Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on

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other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal

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petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

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should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By issuing this

Order to Show Cause, the Court is affording Petitioner the notice required by the Ninth Circuit in

Herbst.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on June 24, 2010, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of

the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the instant petition on June 24, 2010. (Doc. 1, p. 6).

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limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Here, Petitioner was convicted on April 16, 1996 in the Sacramento County Superior Court

of second degree murder and sentenced to a term of sixteen years to life. (Doc. 1, p. 1). However,

Petitioner does not challenge his 1996 conviction; instead, he is challenging the June 3, 2008

decision of the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) that he is not suitable for parole. (Doc. 1, p. 4). 

The AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations, as embodied in § 2244(d)(1), applies to habeas

petitions challenging an administrative decision in the context of a parole board determination. 

Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9 Cir. 2004); see Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1080 th

n. 4 (9 Cir. 2003). Under subsection (d), the limitation period begins to run on “the date on which th

the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 

In the context of a parole board decision, the factual basis for a claim challenging the parole

board’s decision is the parole board’s denial of a petitioner’s administrative appeal. Shelby, 391

F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082-1083. Thus, the statute of limitations begins to run the day

following a petitioner’s notification of the parole board’s decision. Id. Where the date Petitioner

received notice of the parole board’s hearing is not part of the record, Shelby rejected the notion that

remand for an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the date on which a petitioner found out

about the hearing, apparently establishing instead a presumption that an inmate will in fact receive

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notice on the day the denial is issued, and that date will be used to calculate the statute of limitations

unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption:

“Here, as in Redd, Shelby does not dispute that he received timely notice of the denial of his

administrative appeal on July 12, 2001, and he offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore,

the limitation period began running the next day.”

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066.

In this case, Petitioner has submitted a transcript of the BPH hearing held on June 3, 2008

that indicates that Petitioner was present at the hearing and was therefore aware of the BPH’s

decision, which was announced at the conclusion of the hearing. (Doc. 1, pp. 119-135). 

Accordingly, Petitioner knew the factual basis for his challenge to the BPH’s decision on June 3,

2008. Thus, the one-year period would have commenced the following day, i.e., on June 4, 2008,

and would have terminated 365 days later, i.e., on June 3, 2009, absent applicable statutory or

equitable tolling.

As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on June 24, 2010, over a year after the date the

one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or

equitable tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

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Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner indicates that he filed the following state habeas proceedings related to his

challenge of the BPH’s June 3, 2008 decision: (1) filed in the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District, on December 5, 2008, and denied on December 18, 2008; and (2) filed in the

California Supreme Court on March 6, 2009, and denied on August 5, 2009. (Doc. 1, p. 161; 164). 

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Assuming, without deciding, that both petitions were “properly filed” within the meaning of

the AEDPA such as to entitle Petitioner to statutory tolling during their pendency as well as during

the interval separating the two proceedings, the one-year period commenced on June 4, 2008 and

In determining the filing date for Petitioner’s first state petition, the Court has used the California courts’ electronic

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database. The court may take notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir.

1993). The record of state court proceeding is a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice

may be taken of court records. Mullis v. United States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987); Valerio v. Boise

Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 635 n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.); see also Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v.

Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th. Cir. 1980). As

such, the internet website for the California Courts, containing the court system’s records for filings in the Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court are subject to judicial notice.

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continued to run until Petitioner filed his first state petition on December 5, 2008, a period of 184

days. At that point, Petitioner would have had only 181 days remaining on his one-year period. 

After the California Supreme Court denied his last petition on August 5, 2009, the one-year period

would have resumed the following day, i.e., on August 6, 2009 and would have continued unabated

until it expired 181 days later on February 2, 2010. As mentioned, Petitioner did not file the instant

Petitioner until June 24, 2010, approximately 142 days after the one-year period had expired. Thus,

unless Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

D. Equitable Tolling

The running of the one-year limitation period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, __S.Ct.__, 2010 WL 2346549 *9

(U.S.S.C. June 14, 2010); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9 Cir. 1997). th

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F. 3d

1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim,

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing

two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland, 2010 WL 2346549 at *12; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under

AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” 

Miles, 187 F. 3d at 1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express claim of entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on

the record now before the Court, the Court sees no basis for such a claim. Accordingly, the Court’s

preliminary determination is that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. 

However, before dismissing the petition as untimely, the Court will, pursuant to the Ninth

Circuit’s admonition in Herbst, permit Petitioner to file a response to the Order to Show Cause in

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which he may provide any further allegations, arguments, evidence, or documentation to establish

that the petition is not untimely. 

 ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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