Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05024/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARCUS R. MILLER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

F.ILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

NOV 18 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

) No. 91-5024 

STANLEY GLANZ, Sheriff; ) 

BOB BATES, Deputy Sheriff; ) 

DAN CHERRY, Captain; ) 

LANCE RAMSEY, Deputy Sheriff; ) 

JERRY BAGBY, Deputy Sheriff; ) 

GEORGE ROGERS, Deputy Sheriff; ) 

DEWAYNE HARRIS, Deputy Sheriff;) 

DON P. HOLYFIELD, Director; ) 

CLENT DEDEK, Commissioner; ) 

JOHN DOE, Investigator; ) 

DR. BARNES; ) 

JOHN DOE, Deputy Sheriff; ) 

JANE DOE, Nurse #1; ) 

JANE DOE, Nurse #2; ) 

JOHNNY F. DIRCK; ) 

DIRECTOR OF COUNCIL ON LAW ) 

ENFORCEMENT EDUCATION AND ) 

TRAINING, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 90-C-526-B) 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Marcus R. Miller, Plaintiff-Appellant, prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, and Gay Abston Tudor, Assistant 

Attorney General, State of Oklahoma; David Moss, District 

Attorney, and M. Denise Graham, Assistant District Attorney, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma; and John K. Lindsey, Department of Public Safety, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Marcus R. Miller appeals from a district 

court order dismissing his 42 u.s.c. § 1983 claims for use of 

excessive force, deliberate indifference to medical needs, false 

imprisonment, malicious prosecution, cruel and unusual punishment, 

biased investigation, discriminatory acts to prolong 

incarceration, negligent failure to train and certify deputies, 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, 

Miller argues that the district court erred in granting 

defendants' motion to dismiss all of his claims under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In particular, he contends that his 

complaint, when examined under the less stringent standards 

afforded prose plaintiffs, alleges facts sufficient to state a 

claim, thus entitling him the right to offer evidence to support 

his claims. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291, and 

we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings. 1 

BACKGROUND 

Because we are reviewing a motion to dismiss granted by the 

district court under Rule 12(b)(6), the facts we consider on 

appeal are those contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint of 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 2 
August 8, 1990. 2 On December 13, 1989, Appellant Miller -- while 

incarcerated in the Tulsa City-County Jail3 -- became involved in 

an altercation with Deputy Sheriff Lance Ramsey. Miller had been 

doing research in the jail's law library and apparently had left 

the research room without permission. Deputy Ramsey informed 

Miller that his library privileges were terminated for the day and 

asked Miller to place his hands behind his back so that Ramsey 

could handcuff Miller and escort him back to his cell. When 

Miller refused to be handcuffed behind his back, Deputy Ramsey 

attempted to use force to handcuff Miller and apparently knocked 

Miller to the floor. A scuffle ensued and Deputy Ramsey 

subsequently was able to move Miller and lock him in a nearby 

holding cell. This scuffle was the subject of a criminal trial in 

Oklahoma state court in which Miller was convicted of assaulting 

Officer Ramsey. 

After placing Miller in the holding cell near the law 

library, Deputy Ramsey called Deputy Sheriffs Bob Bates and Jerry 

Bagby. When Bates, Bagby, and an unnamed officer (referred to as 

John Doe) arrived, they allegedly assaulted Miller, handcuffed his 

hands behind his back, cuffed his ankles, and beat, choked, kicked 

and stomped Miller. They also allegedly forced Miller to walk 

2 In his appellate brief, Miller contends that the district 

court should have allowed him to file an amended complaint. 

Because the district court did give leave for Miller to amend his 

complaint and because we are reviewing allegations in the amended 

complaint filed August 8, 1990, we agree with the district court 

that Miller's contention is moot. 

3 Miller was confined at the jail while awaiting trial on 

unrelated charges of larceny and unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 3 
barefoot to his cell, where they handcuffed Miller's arms to the 

bunk and cuffed his legs to the bars. Miller remained in what he 

claims was an awkward and painful position for almost two hours. 

Miller purportedly heard Deputy Bates claim that this form of 

cuffing inmates was part of the jail's normal policies and 

procedures. In his complaint, Miller claims that he suffered 

pain, bruises, internal injuries and emotional distress caused by 

the actions of these officers. 

During the days following this incident, Miller submitted 

several sick call requests, but claims that no medical personnel 

responded. He claims that although Nurse Robbie Moore treated his 

cement burns and a Doctor Barnes saw him on December 19th and 

December 26th, neither the doctor nor the nurses properly examined 

him for bruises or for neck, shoulder, back and internal injuries. 

The district court, in an order filed January 29, 1991, 

dismissed several of appellant's claims on the basis that they 

were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and dismissed 

the remainder of the claims because they failed to state a claim 

for which relief could be granted. 

DISCUSSION 

We review de nova a district court's ruling on a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. Morgan Y..!.. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 

1986). Allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are presumed 

true. Curtis Ambulance of Fla., Inc. Y..!.. Board of County Comm'rs, 

811 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1987). The complaint will not be 

dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff cannot prove facts 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 4 
entitling him to relief. Id. at 1375 (citing Scheuer Y...!.. Rhodes, 

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). We construe a prose litigant's 

pleadings liberally. Haines Y...!.. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 

(1972); Gillihan Y...!.. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 

1989). 

Prior to addressing each of appellant's arguments on appeal, 

we examine the process under Rule 12(b) for ruling on a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court's function on a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the 

parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the 

plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim 

for which relief may be granted. In this case, we look to 

plaintiff's amended complaint filed pursuant to Rule 15(a) because 

the amended complaint supersedes the original. 

Rule 12(b) provides that if matters outside the complaint are 

presented to and not excluded by the court, then the court should 

treat the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 and not 

as a motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Carter Y...!.. 

Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671 (1972). Failure to convert to a 

summary judgment motion and to comply with Rule 56 when the court 

considers matters outside the plaintiff's complaint is reversible 

error. Ohio Y...!.. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber~ Ross, 585 F.2d 

454, 457 (10th Cir. 1978); Torres Y...!.. First State Bank of Sierra 

County, 550 F.2d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1977). A district court's 

review of "mere argument contained in a memorandum in opposition 

to dismiss" does not require conversion to a summary judgment 

motion. Peterson, 585 F.2d at 457. In Peterson, we also 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 5 
concluded that when a conversion to a Rule 56 motion is proper, 

"the trial court should give the parties notice of the changed 

status of the motion and thereby provide the parties to the 

proceeding the opportunity to present to the court all material 

made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56." Id. at 457. 

In this case, the district court clearly relied on materials 

outside of plaintiff's amended complaint to dispose of at least 

some of plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6). In its order, the 

court stated that plaintiff "had a full and fair opportunity to 

defend himself against the claim of assault and battery upon a 

police officer at trial"; the court also referred to certain 

defenses that plaintiff raised and that the jury rejected at the 

state court trial. From these references, it is clear that the 

court reviewed materials outside of plaintiff's amended complaint 

in determining whether to grant defendant's motion to dismiss. 

Additionally, in deciding to dismiss plaintiff's claims for 

deliberate indifference to medical needs, the district court 

stated that "the record indicates that the plaintiff was seen 

eleven (11) times by either a doctor or nurse between December 13, 

1989 and January 3, 1990." Because we do not find reference to 

these eleven visits in plaintiff's complaint or in plaintiff's 

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, we can 

only assume that "the record" refers to the state criminal trial 

record or to other evidentiary matters beyond plaintiff's 

pleadings. 

Finally, also in relation to plaintiff's deliberate 

indifference claim, the court cites to a medical chart and to an 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 6 
affidavit labeled as "Exhibit C to defendant's Motion to Dismiss." 

The district court's consideration of the medical chart, of the 

affidavit, and of other material outside of plaintiff's amended 

complaint was improper when considering whether to dismiss 

pursuant to a 12(b)(6) motion. Ryan Y..!.. Scoggin, 245 F.2d 54, 57 

(10th Cir. 1957) (motion should have been treated as one for 

summary judgment when transcript of trial court proceedings were 

presented to and not excluded by the court). 

The district court's order reveals that the court failed to 

convert defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment. In disposing of each of plaintiff's claims, the court 

specifically stated that defendants' "motion to dismiss" is 

granted. Thus, the court never informed plaintiff that the motion 

to dismiss had been converted into a summary judgment motion and 

never afforded plaintiff ten days to accumulate evidence 

demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

prior to a Rule 56 evidentiary hearing. However, despite the 

district court's consideration of matters outside plaintiff's 

complaint, the court's error in failing to convert the motion and 

to comply with Rule 56 is harmless if the dismissal can be 

justified under Rule 12(b)(6) standards without reference to 

matters outside of plaintiff's complaint. See R.J.R. Servs., Inc. 

Y..!.. Aetna Casualty~ Surety Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989); 

Ryder Energy Distrib. Corp. Y..!.. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 

748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984); Medina Y..!.. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244, 

247 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977). Keeping 

these principles in mind, we consider each of plaintiff's 

contentions on appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 7 
I. Use of Excessive Force and Battery 

Miller contends the district court erred in dismissing his 

§ 1983 claim for use of excessive force and his claim for battery. 

Because the court improperly reviewed matters outside of 

plaintiff's complaint when deciding to grant defendants' Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we must determine whether that error 

was harmless. The error is harmless if the allegations of 

Miller's amended complaint on their face are insufficient to state 

a claim under§ 1983. 

The use of excessive force by jail officials violates a 

prisoner's rights under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause when the prisoner is subjected to an 

"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Whitley~ Albers, 

475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Gregg~ Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 

(1976). This standard "should be applied with due regard for the 

differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth 

Amendment objection is lodged." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. 

Where (as in Whitley) officials act in response to a 

prison disturbance, their actions are necessarily taken 

"in haste, under pressure," and balanced against 

"competing institutional concerns for the safety of 

prison staff or other inmates." In such an emergency 

situation, wantonness consist[s] of acting 

"maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 

causing harm." 

Wilson~ Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991) (quoting Whitley, 

475 U.S. at 320-21). In contrast, in non-emergency situations or 

when the State's responsibility to the prisoner "does ... not 

clash with other equally important governmental responsibilities," 

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320, the Court has held that "deliberate 

indifference" is the appropriate Eighth Amendment standard. See 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 8 
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326; Estelle Y..!.. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 

(1976). We must examine Miller's allegations in light of this 

need to adjust the Eighth Amendment standard to the context of the 

prison officials' conduct. 

Miller first alleges that Officer Ramsey used excessive force 

in apprehending him and moving him to a holding cell. In his 

amended complaint, Miller concedes that he resisted Ramsey's 

instructions to place his hands behind his back; Miller also 

states that he "wrestled" with Ramsey. Given Miller's resistance, 

we conclude that this situation involved the type of emergency 

situation contemplated in Whitley, and we hold that Miller's 

allegations are insufficient to support a conclusion that Ramsey 

acted "maliciously and sadistically with the very purpose of 

causing harm." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21. 

Miller next alleges that he again was subjected to the use of 

excessive force after being placed in the holding cell, this time 

by three officers acting together. From Miller's amended 

complaint, we are unable to determine whether, at this point, 

Miller continued to pose a legitimate threat to the safety of the 

officers and other prisoners. Therefore, we cannot determine 

whether to apply the deliberate indifference standard or to apply 

the standard from Whitley. 

However, we conclude that Miller's amended complaint, taken 

as true, sufficiently states a claim under either standard. In 

his amended complaint, Miller alleges that "Deputy Sheriffs Lance 

Ramsey, Bob Bates, and Jerry Bagby kicked, choked, beat and 

stomped me, and almost choking (sic] me to the point of death." 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 9 
He also alleges that Ramsey "jumped on top of me and commenced 

beating me" and that the officers hit and kicked him in the sides, 

back of head, and stomach. Elsewhere in the complaint, Miller 

alleges that he was badly injured, could barely breathe, suffered 

numerous bruises, and excreted blood caused by internal injuries. 

These allegations are sufficient to state a claim even under the 

Whitley standard that the defendant officers acted "maliciously 

and sadistically with the very purpose of causing harm." On 

remand, in order to decide which standard should apply to further 

proceedings, the district court must make a factual determination 

as to whether Miller posed an emergency-type threat when the 

defendant officers entered the holding cell to subdue him. 

After reviewing the record of the state court criminal trial, 

the district court broadly applied the doctrine of collateral 

estoppel to dismiss Miller's claims for use of excessive force and 

battery. As mentioned above, the district court's review of that 

record on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion was premature. In any event, the 

transcript of the state court trial suggests that the altercation 

for which Miller was convicted of battery occurred before Miller 

was locked in the holding cell. It is necessary to view Miller's 

allegations as two separate excessive force claims -- one before 

Officer Ramsey placed Miller in the holding cell and the other 

later, when the other officers arrived. When considering the 

state court record on remand, the district court should make a 

separate determination of the collateral estoppel effect of 

Miller's conviction on the second of these two alleged incidents 

of use of excessive force. See Ridley Y..!.. Leavitt, 631 F.2d 358, 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 10 
359-60 (4th Cir. 1980); Williams Y.!.. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327-28 

(7th Cir. 1972); Basista Y.!.. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81-82 (3d Cir. 

1965). 

With regard to plaintiff's state law claim for battery, we 

note that a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a state 

law claim when a related federal claim is of sufficient substance 

to support federal jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. 

Y.!.. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Plott Y.!.. Griffiths, 938 F.2d 

164, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1991). 4 The district court dismissed the 

possibility of pendent state law claims because it held that none 

of plaintiff's federal claims were substantial. Because we hold 

that plaintiff's amended complaint states a federal claim under 

§ 1983, we remand for a determination whether to exercise 

jurisdiction over the pendent claim. 

Miller also alleges that Sheriff Stanley Glanz, Captain Dan 

Cherry, Director Don C. Holyfield of Oklahoma's Council on Law 

Enforcement Education and Training (CLEET), and Commissioner Clent 

Dedek are responsible for his injuries because they implemented 

policies and procedures that caused the deputy sheriffs to act 

unlawfully and because they failed to properly train and certify 

those deputy sheriffs. In addition, it appears that Johnny F. 

Dirck has been added as a party defendant due to his current 

4 Congress recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which governs the 

area of pendent claim jurisdiction and refers to such jurisdiction 

as "supplemental jurisdiction." However,§ 1367 applies only to 

civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. Because 

this action was commenced on June 27, 1990 before the effective 

date, we apply law in effect prior to§ 1367, namely United Mine 

Workers Y.!.. Gibbs and its progeny. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 11 
status as Director of CLEET. 5 The district court dismissed claims 

against these defendants after deciding to dismiss all underlying 

claims against the deputy sheriffs. Because we remand for the 

district court's consideration of plaintiff's excessive force 

claim, we also reinstate plaintiff's claims against defendants 

Glantz, Cherry, Holyfield and Dirck for consideration on remand. 

The district court dismissed all claims against Commissioner 

Dedek because he was improperly named as a party to the suit and 

has no affiliation with the Tulsa County Sheriff's Office, its 

deputies, its employees, or its jail. Miller did not argue on 

appeal that this dismissal was incorrect and, therefore, the 

district court's order is final as to that point. 

II. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 

Miller also argues on appeal that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. After reading plaintiff's amended complaint, we cannot 

determine whether plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress 

resulting from the constitutional deprivations he asserts or 

whether the complaint asserts a pendent state law claim for the 

tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In order to 

construe the complaint liberally, we examine both possibilities. 

We have held that "damages may be awarded for nonpecuniary 

injury, such as psychological harm, where plaintiff has been 

deprived of his substantive constitutional rights." Foster :Y:.!. MCI 

5 After reviewing the record on appeal, we are unable to 

determine whether the district court granted defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss on Behalf of Defendant Johnny F. Dirck, filed September 

26, 1990. Because the court apparently added Dirck as a party 

defendant, we assume that he continues to be a party to the suit. 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 12 
Telecommunications Corp., 773 F.2d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 1985); 

see also Carey Y..!.. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) ("mental and 

emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural due process 

itself is compensable under§ 1983"); Memphis Community Sch. Dist. 

Y..!.. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1986) (Carey stood for 

proposition that compensatory damages are available under§ 1983 

for constitutional violations, regardless of whether the 

constitutional right violated is procedural or substantive). We 

concluded above that Miller's amended complaint states a claim for 

violation of a substantive constitutional right -- the Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force. 

Therefore, if it is determined on remand that Miller's Eighth 

Amendment rights were violated, then he potentially may recover 

compensatory damages for emotional distress. 

Plaintiff's amended complaint may also state a pendent claim 

for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Again, the district court specifically refused to address pendent 

state law claims because it held that Miller failed to state a 

substantial federal claim. Because we hold that Miller's amended 

complaint states a§ 1983 claim for use of excessive force, we 

remand for a determination of whether to exercise pendent 

jurisdiction if a pendent claim exists. 

III. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs 

Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claim for deliberate indifference to his medical 

needs. Although the district court erred in reviewing matters 

outside the amended complaint, we hold that this error was 

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Appellate Case: 91-5024 Document: 010110097409 Date Filed: 11/18/1991 Page: 13 
harmless because Miller's amended complaint -- liberally construed 

and taken as true -- fails to state a claim rising to the level of 

deliberate indifference. 

The Eighth Amendment, applied to the states through the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits infliction 

of cruel and unusual punishments on those convicted of crimes. In 

Estelle Y..!.. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court 

recognized that this prohibition applies to the inadequate 

provision of medical care to prison inmates. However, the Court 

held that because only the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain'" implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner advancing such 

a claim must allege "deliberate indifference" to "serious" medical 

needs. Id. at 104, 106 (quoting Gregg Y..!.. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 

173 (1976)). In Wilson Y..!.. Seiter, 111 s. Ct. 2321 (1991), the 

Court clarified that the Eighth Amendment's deliberate 

indifference standard under Estelle has two components: an 

objective component requiring that the pain or deprivation be 

sufficiently serious; and a subjective component requiring that 

the offending officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind. Id. at 2324. With regard to the subjective component, 

"allegations of 'inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical 

care' or of a 'negligent ••. diagnos[is]' simply fail to 

establish the requisite culpable state of mind." Id. at 2323; see 

also El'Amin Y..!.. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1984). 

Although the injuries and accompanying deprivation of medical 

care that Miller alleges in his amended complaint may be 

sufficiently "serious" to meet the objective component of the 

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deliberate indifference standard, the amended complaint fails to 

allege that any of the defendants acted with the state of mind 

required to meet the subjective or intent component of the 

standard. Therefore, based on the allegations in the amended 

complaint, we agree with the district court that Miller has failed 

to state a claim for which relief may be granted. The district 

court's failure to convert to a summary judgment motion on this 

claim is harmless error, and plaintiff's claim for deliberate 

indifference to his medical needs is dismissed. 

IV. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

Miller further contends that the district court incorrectly 

dismissed his separate claim that Officers Bagby, Bates, and John 

Doe violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from the 

infliction of cruel and unusual punishment when they cuffed his 

hands to a "bare bunk," cuffed his legs "to the bars," and caused 

him to be "stretched out in an awkward position ••• for almost 

two hours." The complaint also names Glanz, Holyfield, Dedek, and 

Cherry, claiming that this treatment was a result of their 

policies and procedures. Relying on Rhodes Y..!.. Chapman, 452 U.S. 

337, 346 (1981), and Whitley Y..!.. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986), 

the district court held that Miller's "claim does not rise to the 

level of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment." 

We agree. 

In analyzing Miller's deliberate indifference claim, we 

focused on the subjective or intent component of the Eighth 

Amendment standard; here, however, we look to the objective 

component -- whether Miller's pain or deprivation was sufficiently 

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serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment. In Rhodes Y..!.. Chapman, 452 U.S. 344, 345 (1981), 

the Supreme Court stated that conditions are not necessarily cruel 

and unusual simply because they are "restrictive and even harsh." 

This court has stated that the "pain" associated with an Eighth 

Amendment violation "means more than momentary discomfort; the 

attack must have resulted in either severe pain or a lasting 

injury." Sampley Y..!.. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 

1983); see also Brown Y..!.. Bigger, 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980) 

(no Eighth Amendment violation when prison guards forcibly put a 

prisoner suffering from a stab wound into his bed). We agree with 

the district court that cuffing Miller in an awkward position for 

almost two hours did not cause the severe pain or lasting injury 

required to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. The claim is 

dismissed. 

V. Perjury and Conspiracy to Present Perjured Testimony 

Miller also argues that the district court should not have 

dismissed several of his§ 1983 claims related to the prior state 

court proceeding in which he was convicted of criminal battery on 

Officer Ramsey. Miller's amended complaint entitles one of these 

claims "False Imprisonment and/or Malicious Prosecution." 

However, the complaint's language essentially alleges that 

defendants Ramsey, Bagby, Bates, Harris, Beasley, and Nurse Jane 

Doe procured plaintiff's battery conviction by giving false or 

contradictory testimony at trial. In Briscoe Y..!.. LaHue, 460 U.S. 

325 (1983), the Supreme Court established that all witnesses --

police officers as well as other lay witnesses -- are absolutely 

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immune from civil liability under§ 1983 based on their testimony 

in a prior trial. Therefore, Miller's amended complaint fails to 

state a cause of action based on the alleged perjury. 

In addition, Miller's amended complaint alleges that these 

same defendants -- as well as Captain Cherry -- violated his civil 

rights by conspiring to give false testimony. The First and 

Second Circuits have held that the immunity allowed in Briscoe 

should not extend to conspiracies to present false testimony. 

Malachowski :Y:..!. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704 (1st Cir.), cert. 

denied, 479 U.S. 828 (2d Cir. 1986); San Filippo :Y:..!. U.S. Trust Co. 

of New York, Inc., 737 F.2d 246 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 

1035 (1985). The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, 

have extended Briscoe immunity to alleged conspiracies to commit 

perjury. Wilkins :Y:..!. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 733 (1990); Alioto :Y:..!. City of Shively, 

Kentucky, 835 F.2d 1173, 1174 (6th Cir. 1987). We agree with the 

Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and we hold that Miller fails to state 

a conspiracy claim because defendants are absolutely immune from 

civil liability. 

When resolving issues of absolute immunity, we take a 

functional approach and consider factors such as "recognition of 

immunity at common law, the risk of vexatious litigation given the 

function involved, and the availability of checks other than civil 

litigation if absolute immunity was recognized." Robinson :Y:..!. 

Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1370-71 (10th Cir. 1991). At 

common law, no cause of action was available for conspiracy to 

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give or to procure perjured testimony. 6 Further, we find nothing 

in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 

suggesting that Congress intended to provide a cause of action for 

conspiracy to commit perjury in order to obtain a criminal 

conviction. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 340 (Civil Rights Act of 

1871 created federal claim for conspiracy to commit perjury aimed 

at procuring unjust acquittals). 

In Briscoe, the Court acknowledged that granting police 

officers immunity from civil liability might lead to occasional 

unjust convictions based on knowingly false testimony. Id. at 

344-45. However, the Court forced to find "'a balance between 

the evils inevitable in either alternative'" -- determined that 

immunity would better serve "the broader public interest." Id. at 

345 (quoting Gregoire Y..!. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), 

6 In Huneke! Y..!. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179 (1888), the Maryland Court 

of Appeals stated, 

Witnesses, like jurors appear in court in obedience to 

the authority of the law, and therefore may be 

considered, as well as jurors, to be acting in the 

discharge of a public duty; and, though convenience 

requires that they should be liable to a prosecution for 

perjury committed in the course of their evidence, or 

for conspiracy in case of a combination of two or more 

to give false evidence, they are not responsible in a 

civil action, for any reflections thrown out in 

delivering their testimony. 

Id. at 188 (quoting Starkie on Slander 242, 2 Inst. 228, 2 Roll. 

Rep. 198). See,~, Droppelman Y..!. Horsley, 372 F.2d 249 (10th 

Cir. 1967) (applying Oklahoma law); Kessler Y..!. Townsley, 182 So. 

232 (Fla. 1938); Hocker Y..!. Welti, 239 Ill. App. 392 (1926); Hermon 

Y..!. Jobes, 198 N.E. 316 (Ind. 1935); Siler Y..!. Proctor Coal Co., 272 

Ky. 477, 114 S.W.2d 749 (1938); Dunlap Y..!. Glidden, 31 Me. 435 

(1850); Schaub Y..!. O'Ferrall, 81 A. 789 (Md. 1911); Stevens Y..!. 

Rowe, 59 N.H. 578 (1880); Ginsburg Y..!. Halpern, 118 A.2d 201 (Pa. 

1955); L.B. Frantz, Annotation, Actionability of Conspiracy to 

Give or to Procure False Testimony or Other Evidence, 31 A.L.R.3d 

1423. 

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cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)). In particular, the Court 

reasoned that 

[p]olice officers testify in scores of cases every year, 

and defendants often will transform resentment at being 

convicted into allegations of perjury by the State's 

official witnesses ..•. [E]ven the processing of a 

complaint that is dismissed before trial consumes a 

considerable amount of time and resources. 

This category of§ 1983 litigation might well 

impose significant burdens on the judicial system and on 

law enforcement resources. As this Court noted when it 

recognized absolute immunity for prosecutors in Imbler, 

if the defendant official "could be made to answer in 

court each time [a disgruntled defendant] charged him 

with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be 

diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the 

criminal law.' 11 

Id. at 343-44 (quoting Imbler Y.!.. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 

(1976)) (alteration in original). Allowing criminal defendants to 

seek damages under§ 1983 for conspiracy among state witnesses to 

offer false testimony would give rise to the same systemic 

concerns noted in Briscoe. Instead of suing state witnesses for 

perjured testimony, a defendant could-simply transform the perjury 

complaint into an allegation of a conspiracy to do the same. 

Moreover, an extension of Briscoe prevents self-censorship on the 

part of witnesses due to the fear of civil liability. Id. at 333. 

Most importantly, in Briscoe, the Court pointed to various 

"truth-finding safeguards of the judicial process" that decrease 

the likelihood that perjured testimony will significantly harm or 

alter a just outcome at trial. Id. at 344-45. These safeguards 

also apply to attempted conspiracies to give perjured testimony. 

At trial, the co-conspirator witness subsequently must take an 

oath, be subjected to cross-examination, and be scrutinized for 

credibility by the trier of fact. See id. at 342. Therefore, 

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after employing the functional approach, we must conclude that the 

defendants are entitled to immunity under the circumstances of 

this case. 

Our holding does not change the fact that such conspirators 

may be liable criminally for conspiring to procure perjured 

testimony. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 421, 491; .§.§g also 

Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 339 n.22 ("witnesses were traditionally 

subject to a prosecution •.• 'for conspiracy in case of a 

combination of two or more to give false evidence'") (quoting M. 

Newell, Law of Defamation, Libel and Slander§ 44, at 450 (1890)). 

Further, although potential conspirators are immune from civil 

liability, a defendant still may challenge an allegedly unjust 

conviction in habeas corpus proceedings. 

In short, we conclude that the extension of absolute immunity 

from civil liability to those who allegedly conspire to present 

perjured testimony in furtherance of a criminal conviction serves 

the same important purposes of immunity to witnesses themselves. 

Confident in the safeguards inherent in the "'crucible of the 

judicial process,'" Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334 (quoting Imbler, 424 

U.S. at 440), we strike a difficult balance in favor of immunity. 

VI. Discriminatory Acts to Prevent the Posting of Bond 

and to Prolong Incarceration 

Miller also contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claim of deliberate, willful, discriminatory and 

prejudicial acts designed to keep him incarcerated and to deprive 

him of the paid counsel of his choice. In his amended complaint, 

Miller alleges that, at the time the altercation with Ramsey took 

place, he was ready to post bail on the two crimes for which he 

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had previously been arrested and that he had arranged for a 

particular lawyer to represent him on these two claims. The 

complaint further alleges that "(a]ctions and statements made by 

Officers Lance Ramsey, Bob Bates, Jerry Bagby, Dewayne Harris, and 

investigator Beasley or John Doe is what compelled the Judge to 

set me a Bond of $50,000 dollars for the purpose of keeping me 

incarcerated." The complaint alleges that Miller could not pay 

the increased bail and, as a result, was unable to hire and pay 

the attorney of his choice. 

Except for the broad accusation of defendants' "acts and 

statements" to the judge, plaintiff does not specifically allege 

that defendants did anything to cause the judge to set bail at 

$50,000. Although we liberally construe the complaint of a prose 

plaintiff, the liberal construction rule "does not relieve the 

plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a 

recognized legal claim could be heard·. 11 Hall Y.!.. Bellmen, 935 F. 2d 

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Because plaintiff's amended 

complaint does not point to any specific act besides the setting 

of bail by the state court judge (who is not a named defendant in 

this suit), we agree with the district court that these particular 

allegations fail to state a claim under§ 1983. 

VII. Appointment of Counsel 

In his appellate brief, Miller requests that counsel be 

appointed by the court. The federal statute that provides for 

proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 u.s.c. § 1915(d), states that 

"[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any such person 

unable to employ counsel .••• " The appointment of counsel 

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under section 1915(d) is within the sound discretion of the 

district court. Blankenship Y..!.. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741, 743 (10th 

Cir. 1988); McCarthy Y..!.. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1985). 

In McCarthy, we cited the observation of the Seventh Circuit "that 

'if it is apparent to the district court that a prose litigant 

has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it, the 

district court should appoint counsel to represent him.'" 753 

F.2d at 838. Because we hold that the complaint does state a 

claim for which relief can be granted, on remand the district 

court should consider whether to appoint counsel for plaintiff 

Miller. 

We REVERSE the district court's dismissal of Miller's Eighth 

Amendment claim arising from the use of excessive force; we AFFIRM 

the district court's dismissal of the remainder of plaintiff's 

federal claims; and we REMAND for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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