Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05346/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05346-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 21, 2003 Decided March 18, 2003

No. 01-5346

THE FUND FOR ANIMALS, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

NATURAL RESOURCES DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF

NATURE AND ENVIRONMENT OF MONGOLIA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv00813)

John J. Jackson III argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-5346 Document #738535 Filed: 03/18/2003 Page 1 of 15
2

Howard M. Crystal argued the cause for plaintiffsappellees. With him on the brief was Katherine A. Meyer.

Jonathan R. Lovvorn entered an appearance.

Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The Natural Resources Department of the Ministry of Nature and Environment of Mongolia

(NRD) appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene in a

case concerning the application of the Endangered Species

Act to argali sheep located within Mongolia’s borders. Because the NRD satisfies the requirements for intervention as

of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), we

reverse and direct that the NRD be allowed to intervene.

I

The Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et

seq., requires the Secretary of the Interior to determine

whether any species is ‘‘endangered’’ or ‘‘threatened,’’ id.

§ 1533(a)(1), a responsibility she has delegated to the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 50

C.F.R. § 402.01(b). A species is endangered if it ‘‘is in

danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of

its range,’’ 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), and is threatened if it ‘‘is

likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable

future,’’ id. § 1532(20). The ESA provides specified protections for endangered species, id. § 1538(a)(1), and instructs

the Secretary to issue such regulations as she ‘‘deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of’’ threatened species, id. § 1533(d).

The argali sheep, an Asian relative of the North American

bighorn sheep, is the largest species of wild sheep in the

world. Adult males weigh between 210 and 310 pounds and

possess enormous spiral horns. Addition of Argali to List of

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 57 Fed. Reg. 28,014,

28,014 (FWS, June 23, 1992). In 1992, the FWS listed the

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argali as endangered throughout most of its range. It listed

the species as threatened rather than endangered, however,

in Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Id. (codified at 50

C.F.R. pt. 17).

On April 16, 2001, The Fund for Animals, along with other

organizations and individuals dedicated to wildlife conservation in general and protection of argali sheep in particular

(collectively, the ‘‘Fund’’ or ‘‘plaintiffs’’), filed suit against the

Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the FWS. The

plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the ESA, the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and their own

regulations by failing to list the argali as an endangered

species in Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and by

issuing hundreds of permits for sport hunters to import killed

argali (or parts thereof) into the United States as ‘‘trophies.’’

The plaintiffs asked the court, inter alia, to direct the defendants to list the argali as an endangered species in those

countries, to declare unlawful all outstanding permits for the

import of argali sheep, and to enjoin the defendants from

issuing additional permits.

On April 27, 2001, the Foundation for North American Wild

Sheep, as well as other organizations and individuals dedicated to wild sheep hunting and conservation (collectively, the

‘‘FNAWS intervenors’’), filed a motion to intervene as defendants in the Fund’s lawsuit. On June 4, 2001, ‘‘the Country

of Mongolia, through its Natural Resources Department of

the Ministry of Nature and Environment,’’ sought to intervene as a defendant as well. Mot. to Add Intervenor at 1

(J.A. at 139).1

 The NRD, represented by the same counsel

who filed on behalf of the FNAWS intervenors, described

itself as the agency of the Mongolian government responsible

for ‘‘implement[ing] [the] policy and decision of [the] Government on rational utilization of natural resources, rehabilitation, and TTT protection,’’ including the country’s ‘‘tourist

hunting program.’’ Id. at 2 (J.A. at 140). Another pair of

organizations dedicated to hunting and conservation, the Sa1 The NRD sought intervention through a motion, filed by the

FNAWS intervenors, to add the NRD as an intervenor.

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fari Club International and the Wildlife Conservation Fund of

America (collectively, the ‘‘Safari Club intervenors’’), moved

to intervene on June 27, 2001.

On September 4, 2001, the district court granted the motions for intervention filed by both the FNAWS and Safari

Club intervenors, but denied the motion filed by the NRD.

The court did not explain its decision, other than to state that

denial of intervention was based ‘‘[u]pon consideration of [the

NRD’s motion], the opposition thereto, and the entire record

herein.’’ NRD Order at 1 (J.A. at 386). The instant appeal

followed.

II

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

for both permissive intervention and intervention as of right.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) & (b). The NRD’s motion relied on

both theories, and its briefs on appeal cite both. Because we

conclude that the NRD is entitled to intervene as of right, we

need not address the issue of permissive intervention. See

Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1323–24 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Rule 24(a)(2) states in relevant part:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action TTT when the applicant claims an

interest relating to the property or transaction which is

the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated

that the disposition of the action may as a practical

matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect

that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately

represented by existing parties.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Parsing the language of the rule, we

have held that qualification for intervention as of right depends on the following four factors:

(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) whether the applicant ‘‘claims an interest relating to the property or

transaction which is the subject of the action’’; (3) whether ‘‘the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the

action may as a practical matter impair or impede the

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applicant’s ability to protect that interest’’; and (4)

whether ‘‘the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.’’

Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1074 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)) (citations omitted).

We have further held that, in addition to establishing its

qualification for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), a party

seeking to intervene as of right must demonstrate that it has

standing under Article III of the Constitution. See Military

Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1074; Building & Constr. Trades

Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As we

have explained, ‘‘because a Rule 24 intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing with the original parties to the suit,

he must satisfy the standing requirements imposed on those

parties.’’ City of Cleveland v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

The denial of a motion for intervention as of right is an

appealable final order ‘‘because it is conclusive with respect to

the distinct interest asserted by the movant.’’ Smoke v.

Norton, 252 F.3d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see Alternative

Research & Dev. Found. v. Veneman, 262 F.3d 406, 409–10

(D.C. Cir. 2001). We have been somewhat inconsistent, however, in describing the standard of review for such appeals.2

As we have previously observed, that may be because we

have not always distinguished between the different kinds of

determinations necessary to establish the predicate for intervention. See Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc.

v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Not2 Compare Smoke, 252 F.3d at 470–71 (stating that the court

reviews denials of intervention as of right for clear error), and

Foster, 655 F.2d at 1324 (same), with Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at

1074 (explaining that ‘‘[t]o the extent that a district court’s ruling on

a motion to intervene as of right is based on questions of law, it is

reviewed de novo; to the extent that it is based on questions of fact,

it is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion’’), and Building &

Constr. Trades, 40 F.3d at 1282 (stating that denials are reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard).

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withstanding that Rule 24(a) is entitled ‘‘Intervention of

Right,’’ the determinations necessary to establish that predicate are of three different kinds. Some are pure issues of law

and hence are reviewed de novo. See Massachusetts School

of Law, 118 F.3d at 779; Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1074.

Others involve findings of fact and are reviewed for clear

error. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (providing that ‘‘[f]indings of

fact TTT shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous’’).

And some involve a measure of judicial discretion and hence

are reviewed for abuse of that discretion. See Massachusetts

School of Law, 118 F.3d at 779 (noting ‘‘the existence of

district court discretion over the timeliness and adequacy of

representation issues under Rule 24(a)(2)’’) (citing Hodgson v.

United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.26 (D.C. Cir.

1972)); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904,

907, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same).3

 Of course, where (as here)

the district court has not accompanied its decision with either

factual findings or explanation, there is nothing to which we

can defer regardless of which standard of review applies. See

Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Because a would-be intervenor’s Article III standing presents a question going to this court’s jurisdiction, see Sierra

Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we address it

first, in Part III below. In Part IV, we consider the four

factors set forth in Rule 24(a)(2).

III

To establish standing under Article III, a prospective intervenor — like any party — must show: (1) injury-in-fact, (2)

causation, and (3) redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Sierra Club, 292 F.3d

at 898. The NRD argues that it meets these requirements

3 Cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)

(prescribing a unitary abuse of discretion standard for reviewing

determinations made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, but

noting that a ‘‘district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if

it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly

erroneous assessment of the evidence’’).

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because fees paid by sport hunters are the primary source of

funding for its argali conservation program. If the Fund

succeeds in barring American hunters from bringing their

trophies home, some hunters will not travel to Mongolia to

hunt the argali, and the revenues that support the conservation program will decline.

The NRD’s argument is persuasive. The threatened loss

of tourist dollars, and the consequent reduction in funding for

Mongolia’s conservation program, constitute a concrete and

imminent injury. This injury is fairly traceable to the regulatory action — the placement of the argali on the endangered

list and the cancellation of import permits — that the Fund

seeks in the underlying lawsuit. And it is likely that a

decision favorable to the NRD would prevent that loss from

occurring.

In Military Toxics Project v. EPA, we considered a similar

set of circumstances. There, the Chemical Manufacturers

Association (CMA) sought to intervene on the side of the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in a lawsuit brought

by the Military Toxics Project, a coalition of citizens’ groups.

146 F.3d at 953. The Project sued to overturn an EPA rule

that declared that most military munitions at firing ranges

did not constitute ‘‘regulatory solid waste’’ for purposes of the

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901

et seq., when used for their ‘‘intended purpose.’’ Military

Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at 952. We concluded that the CMA

had standing to intervene because, inter alia, ‘‘some of its

members produce[d] military munitions,’’ those members

‘‘benefit[ed] from the EPA’s ‘intended use’ interpretation,’’

and they ‘‘would suffer concrete injury if the court grant[ed]

the relief the petitioners [sought].’’ Id. at 954. The parallels

to this case are clear: Mongolia’s sheep are the subject of the

disputed regulations, the country benefits from the FWS’s

current regulations, and Mongolia would suffer concrete injury if the court were to grant the relief the plaintiffs seek.

The Fund does not dispute the logic of the NRD’s reasoning. Instead, it contends that the agency has failed to

support its claims with evidence. Quoting our decision in

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Sierra Club v. EPA, the Fund insists that the NRD’s standing cannot rest on ‘‘mere allegations, but must set forth by

affidavit or other evidence specific facts.’’ 292 F.3d at 899

(quotation marks omitted). The Fund contends that the

NRD has offered neither affidavits nor other evidence sufficient to satisfy this requirement.4

Sierra Club, however, does not require parties to file

evidentiary submissions in support of standing in every case.

To the contrary, our decision made clear that ‘‘[i]n many if

not most cases the petitioner’s standing to seek review of

administrative action is self-evident.’’ Id. at 899–900. ‘‘In

particular, if the complainant is ‘an object of the action (or

forgone action) at issue’ — as is the case usually in review of

a rulemaking and nearly always in review of an adjudication — there should be ‘little question that the action or

inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.’ ’’ Id. at 900

(quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561–62). In this

case, while the NRD is not itself the object of the challenged

agency action, sheep that Mongolia regards as its national

property and natural resource plainly are its subject. And

for the purpose of determining whether standing is selfevident, we see no meaningful distinction between a regulation that directly regulates a party and one that directly

regulates the disposition of a party’s property.5

4 We note that the above quotations from Sierra Club refer to a

party’s obligations at the summary judgment stage, but not at ‘‘the

pleading stage’’ where ‘‘ ‘general factual allegations of injury TTT

may suffice.’ ’’ Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898–99 (quoting Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561). In light of our disposition, we need

not decide whether the NRD’s motion to intervene is closer to a

motion for summary judgment or to a pleading.

5 In fact, in some respects Mongolia is itself ‘‘an object of the

action TTT at issue,’’ Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900 (quotation marks

omitted), because the Fund’s complaint contends that the country’s

conservation program does not satisfy the statutory criteria for

issuing import permits under the ESA. See Pls.’ Second Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 41–57.

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But even if we were to harbor any doubts about NRD’s

standing, they would be dissipated by evidence in the district

court record. First, there are the Fund’s own pleadings,

which are admissible as evidence in support of its opponent’s

cause. See First Bank of Marietta v. Hogge, 161 F.3d 506,

510 (8th Cir. 1998); Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915

F.2d 1428, 1431–32 (10th Cir. 1990). In aid of the Fund’s

attack on the FWS’s import permit policy, but in complete

accord with the NRD’s standing contentions, the Fund’s

complaint declares:

A U.S. hunter who cannot import his ‘‘trophy’’ from the

country where it is killed is unlikely to spend the resources required to travel to that country to kill the

animal. Accordingly, the number of argali that are killed

by U.S. hunters is directly related to the number of

import permits the [FWS] issues.

Pls.’ Second Am. Compl. ¶ 38. This point is further supported by affidavits filed by another set of parties to the

district court litigation — the Safari Club intervenors. Confirming both the NRD’s logic and the Fund’s pleadings, two

hunters aver that they will likely cancel their previously

scheduled hunting trips to Mongolia if they are unable to

obtain import permits. Jacklin Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5 (J.A. at 306);

Ward Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5 (J.A. at 308).

We therefore conclude that the NRD has established its

Article III standing, and that lack of standing is not a ground

for rejecting its motion to intervene as of right.6

6 The plaintiffs do not question the NRD’s prudential standing,

and rightly so. In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court held that

the broad language of the citizen-suit provision of the ESA — which

extends to departments of foreign governments, see 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1532(13), 1540(g)(1)(C), and on which the plaintiffs rely in the

present case — ‘‘negates the zone-of-interests test’’ and expands

standing ‘‘to the full extent permitted under Article III.’’ 520 U.S.

154, 164, 165 (1997). Even if that were not the case, the NRD’s

interests are ‘‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected

or regulated by the statute,’’ In re: Vitamins Antitrust Class

Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted),

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IV

Turning to the four-factor test of Rule 24(a)(2), see supra

Part II, we find the balance of our analysis not difficult at all.

First, the NRD’s motion was timely. The NRD moved to

intervene less than two months after the plaintiffs filed their

complaint and before the defendants filed an answer. Indeed, the NRD’s motion was filed three weeks before that of

the Safari Club intervenors — whose motion the district court

granted.

The second factor is also readily dispatched. Our conclusion that the NRD has constitutional standing is alone sufficient to establish that the NRD has ‘‘an interest relating to

the property or transaction which is the subject of the

action,’’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). See Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d

at 1076. In any event, because the relevant ‘‘property’’ is

Mongolia’s sheep and the relevant ‘‘transaction’’ is the FWS’s

decision to permit the importation of those sheep from Mongolia, there can be no question that the NRD has the requisite interest. See Foster, 655 F.2d at 1324 (‘‘An intervenor’s

interest is obvious when he asserts a claim to property that is

the subject matter of the suitTTTT’’); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1291–93 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(holding that a prospective intervenor possessed the requisite

interest in a database that another company sought from the

government, because the database had been prepared by the

intervenor).

Third, the NRD is ‘‘so situated that the disposition of the

action may as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability

to protect [its] interest.’’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Prior to

1966, Rule 24(a)(2) required the applicant to show that it

‘‘may be bound by a judgment in the action.’’ Fed. R. Civ. P.

because the ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to take into

account efforts ‘‘being made by any TTT foreign nation, or any

political subdivision of a TTT foreign nation, to protect [threatened

or endangered] species TTT within any area under its jurisdiction,’’

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).

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24(a)(2) (1966); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee’s note on 1966 amendment; Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d

694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But the 1966 amendments to Rule

24 eliminated that requirement and substituted the present

language, which we have read ‘‘as looking to the ‘practical

consequences’ of denying intervention, even where the possibility of future challenge to the regulation remain[s] available.’’ Natural Res. Def. Council, 561 F.2d at 909 (quoting

Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 702). Regardless of whether the NRD

could reverse an unfavorable ruling by bringing a separate

lawsuit, there is no question that the task of reestablishing

the status quo if the Fund succeeds in this case will be

difficult and burdensome. See id. at 910 (‘‘[I]t is not enough

to deny intervention under 24(a)(2) because applicants may

vindicate their interests in some later, albeit more burdensome, litigation.’’). Moreover, as the NRD further argues, its

loss of revenues during any interim period would be substantial and likely irreparable. Cf. Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at

1076 (holding that danger of loss of market share due to

denial of a preliminary injunction satisfied the third Rule

24(a)(2) factor).

This leaves only the question of whether the NRD’s interest is ‘‘adequately represented by existing parties.’’ Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that this

‘‘requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows

that representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and

the burden of making that showing should be treated as

minimal.’’ Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528,

538 n.10 (1972). Citing Trbovich, we have described this

requirement as ‘‘not onerous.’’ Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Foster, 655

F.2d at 1325; American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1293

(stating that a petitioner ‘‘ ‘ordinarily should be allowed to

intervene unless it is clear that the party will provide adequate representation for the absentee’ ’’ (quoting 7A CHARLES

ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1909 (1st ed. 1972))). Measured by that stanUSCA Case #01-5346 Document #738535 Filed: 03/18/2003 Page 11 of 15
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dard, we conclude that neither of the two groups of existing

parties in this case — the federal defendants and the other

intervenors — adequately represents the NRD’s interests.7

The NRD’s interests plainly are not adequately represented by the federal defendants. It is true, as the Fund notes,

that both the FWS and the NRD agree that the FWS’s

current rules and practices are lawful. But the FWS’s obligation is to represent the interests of the American people, as

expressed in the ESA, while the NRD’s concern is for Mongolia’s people and natural resources. There may be some

overlap, since the ESA requires the FWS — when determining whether a species is endangered or threatened — to

‘‘tak[e] into account those efforts, if any, being made by any

TTT foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a TTT foreign

nation, to protect such species TTT within any area under its

jurisdiction.’’ 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A). But taking the

NRD’s efforts ‘‘into account’’ does not mean giving them the

kind of primacy that the NRD would give them.8

 Nor must

the FWS’s appraisal of the NRD’s efforts necessarily match

the NRD’s self-appraisal. It is, therefore, not hard to imagine how the interests of the NRD and those of the FWS

might diverge during the course of litigation — when, for

7 Our cases are inconsistent as to who bears the burden with

respect to this factor. The language of some cases, particularly

those that quote the above passage from Trbovich, suggest that the

burden is on the aspiring intervenor. See Foster, 655 F.2d at 1325;

Dimond, 792 F.2d at 192. Others declare that the burden is on the

opponent of intervention, because Rule 24(a)(2) states that if its first

three factors are satisfied, intervention ‘‘shall’’ be permitted ‘‘unless’’ the applicant’s interest is already adequately represented.

See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d at 1293; Smuck v. Hobson,

408 F.2d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In any event, Trbovich makes

clear that the standard for measuring inadequacy of representation

is low, and in this case it is satisfied regardless of who bears the

burden.

8 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (requiring that determinations of

threatened or endangered status be made ‘‘solely on the basis of the

best scientific and commercial data available’’ after taking into

account the conservation efforts of a foreign nation).

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example, the FWS may be required to present its assessment

of the quality of Mongolia’s argali conservation program.

For just these reasons, we have often concluded that

governmental entities do not adequately represent the interests of aspiring intervenors.9

 For example, in holding that

the District of Columbia did not adequately represent the

interests of a private insurance company that wished to

intervene to support the District against a challenge to its nofault insurance law, we explained:

A government entity such as the District of Columbia is

charged by law with representing the public interest of

its citizens. [The insurance company], on the other hand,

is seeking to protect a more narrow and ‘‘parochial’’

financial interest not shared by the citizens of the District of Columbia. The District would be shirking its

duty were it to advance this narrower interest at the

expense of its representation of the general public interest.

9 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, 561 F.2d at 912–13 (allowing rubber and chemical companies to intervene in support of EPA

because their interest ‘‘is more narrow and focused than EPA’s’’

and, ‘‘[g]iven the acknowledged impact that regulation can be

expected to have upon their operations, appellants’ participation in

defense of EPA decisions that accord with their interest may also

be likely to serve as a vigorous and helpful supplement to EPA’s

defense’’); Smuck, 408 F.2d at 181 (holding that a school board did

not adequately represent the interests of intervening parents because the ‘‘board represents all parents,’’ while the intervenors

‘‘may have more parochial interests centering upon the education of

their own children’’). Similarly, in Trbovich the Supreme Court

authorized intervention by a union member who sought to participate in a suit that the Secretary of Labor had instituted against the

member’s union, upon the member’s own complaint. See 404 U.S.

at 529. The Court rejected the Secretary’s claim that he adequately represented the petitioner, because ‘‘the Secretary has an obligation to protect the vital public interest in assuring free and

democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of

the complaining union member.’’ Id. at 539 (quotation marks

omitted).

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Dimond, 792 F.2d at 192–93. Although it is true that the

NRD is itself a governmental entity, it is not an agency of our

government. Hence, examined from the perspective of the

FWS’s responsibilities, the NRD’s interests are ‘‘more narrow

and ‘parochial’ ’’ — just as the FWS’s interests may appear

when viewed from the perspective of Mongolia.

Finally, we also reject the Fund’s contention that the

NRD’s interest is adequately represented by the FNAWS

and Safari Club intervenors — non-Mongolian organizations

and individuals interested in sheep hunting and conservation.

We could no more regard the NRD’s interests as adequately

represented by those intervenors than we could regard the

FWS’s interests as adequately represented by a Mongolian —

or even an American — hunt club, however conservationminded the club might be. Although there may be a partial

congruence of interests, that does not guarantee the adequacy

of representation. As we have recognized, ‘‘interests need

not be wholly ‘adverse’ before there is a basis for concluding

that existing representation of a ‘different’ interest may be

inadequate.’’ Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 703. Moreover, even ‘‘a

shared general agreement TTT does not necessarily ensure

agreement in all particular respects,’’ Natural Res. Def.

Council, 561 F.2d at 912, and ‘‘[t]he tactical similarity of the

present legal contentions of the [parties] does not assure

adequacy of representation or necessarily preclude the [intervenor] from the opportunity to appear in [its] own behalf,’’

Nuesse, 385 F.2d at 703.

Nor does the fact that the NRD is represented by the same

counsel as the FNAWS intervenors establish the adequacy of

representation. Rule 24(a)(2) requires a showing that the

existing parties, not their lawyers, will adequately represent

the applicant. Sharing the same counsel does not guarantee

that the clients’ interests are congruent, and if there is a

divergence, it is counsel and not the clients who must bend.

We are satisfied that the NRD’s interests in this litigation are

not adequately represented as measured by the Trbovich

standard, and we therefore find that the last of the Rule

24(a)(2) requirements for intervention has been met.

USCA Case #01-5346 Document #738535 Filed: 03/18/2003 Page 14 of 15
15

V

Having concluded that the district court erred in denying

the NRD intervention as of right, we could remand this case

for reconsideration in light of the discussion set forth above.

In the past, however, we have not hesitated to direct that

intervention be allowed where we found denial to constitute

error.10 That disposition is appropriate where, as here, we

cannot envision a contrary determination that would withstand further appeal.11 Accordingly, we remand this case to

the district court with directions to grant the NRD’s motion

to intervene as of right.

So ordered.

10 See Mova Pharm., 140 F.3d at 1076–77; Dimond, 792 F.2d at

194; Foster, 655 F.2d at 1325; Natural Res. Def. Council, 561 F.2d

at 913; see also Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 539 (remanding with directions to the district court to allow intervention).

11 In opposing permissive intervention in the district court, the

Fund, quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), expressed

concern that the NRD would ‘‘unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication’’ by interjecting extraneous claims. At the oral argument of

this appeal, however, the Fund agreed that the district court had

shown itself able to prevent such delay or prejudice without denying

intervention: in granting the motions of the FNAWS and Safari

Club intervenors, the court limited their intervention to ‘‘the claims

raised by the original parties’’ and barred them from raising

‘‘collateral issues.’’ FNAWS Order at 1; Safari Club Order at 1.

The same option is available to the district court with respect to the

NRD. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) advisory committee’s note on 1966

amendment (‘‘An intervention of right under the amended rule may

be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive

among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the

proceedings.’’).

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