Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00746/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00746-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joseph Giannantonio, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00746-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Joseph Giannantonio’s Application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social 

Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking 

judicial review of that denial, and the Court now considers Plaintiff’s Opening Brief 

(Doc. 12, “Pl.’s Br.”), Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner’s 

Opposition (Doc. 19, “Def.’s Br.”), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 20, “Reply”). 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff filed an Application on January 6, 2012, for a Period of Disability and 

Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Act beginning December 1, 2006. 

(Doc. 11, R. at 90, 93.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on May 17, 2012, (R. at 93-

95), and on reconsideration on November 26, 2012, (R. at 97-98). Plaintiff testified at a 

hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September 11, 2013. (R. at 

53-88.) On October 31, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. (R. at 

36-45.) The Appeals Council (“AC”) denied Plaintiff’s request for review on March 9, 

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2015, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. at 1-3.) The 

present appeal followed. 

 The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and provides a short 

summary here. In 2002, Plaintiff underwent surgery after he fell off a ladder and injured 

his lower back. (R. at 360.) After surgery, his condition improved and he returned to 

work. Plaintiff claims that at the end of 2006, he became disabled due to lower back pain, 

though he held several full-time jobs thereafter. In 2007, he worked for about six months 

as an auto body painter, and the owner terminated him “for no real reason.” (R. at 38, 58.) 

In 2009, he worked as a mail handler/delivery driver. (R. at 38, 83.) Though Plaintiff held 

both of these full-time jobs after his alleged onset date, the ALJ afforded Plaintiff “the 

benefit of the doubt” and did not consider the jobs to be substantial gainful activity under 

the Act. (R. at 38.) 

 Though Plaintiff requests a disability determination from December 1, 2006 on, 

the record does not contain any medical records for treatment before 2009. On August 24, 

2009, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Eric Feldman that he has experienced lower back pain for 

the past seven years, since his accident, and that he takes three to four Percocet per day 

for pain. (R. at 322.) Dr. Feldman observed that Plaintiff is obese, which the ALJ later 

included in her opinion as a severe impairment along with lumbar degenerative disc 

disease. (R. at 38, 322.) Dr. Feldman also noted that Plaintiff refused epidural steroid 

injections for his back pain and stated that he “had a long discussion” with Plaintiff about 

his pain management regimen—taking large quantities of Percocet—and that such a 

regimen has “no end in sight.” (R. at 322.) Dr. Feldman stated he would not be willing to 

take over prescribing pain medications to Plaintiff and “will not be continuing them.” 

(R. at 322.) Dr. Feldman opined that Plaintiff has a “great deal of deconditioning” and 

that “physical therapy would potentially do the most for him in the long run.” (R. at 322.) 

Dr. Feldman ordered a magnetic resonance imaging scan (MRI) of Plaintiff’s lower back. 

 A September 2009 MRI of Plaintiff’s lower spine showed moderate disc space 

narrowing at L4-L5 and mild disc space narrowing at L5-S1. (R. at 327.) Based on those 

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results and the fact that Plaintiff had no significant radicular leg pain but did experience 

lower back pain, Dr. Feldman explained to Plaintiff “that there is really no good 

treatment for this other than core strengthening exercises to help off load those discs.” 

(R. at 327.) Dr. Feldman repeated that he is “not comfortable with [Plaintiff’s] continued 

use of nonopioid analgesics as [Plaintiff] is young and really there is no end in sight.” 

(R. at 327.) Despite these findings, the record does not contain any evidence that Plaintiff 

sought physical therapy or pursued an exercise regimen. 

 The record shows Plaintiff was under the care of West Valley Internal Medicine in 

2010 and 2011. On his first visit on June 15, 2010, Dr. Sudeep Punia saw Plaintiff and 

noted that Plaintiff reported lower back pain and claimed he needed a refill of his pain 

medication. (R. at 372.) On examination, Dr. Punia observed that Plaintiff had tenderness 

in his lumbar spine area and high blood pressure, but otherwise the physical examination 

was unremarkable. (R. at 373-74.) Dr. Punia prescribed oxycodone and blood pressure 

medication and referred Plaintiff for pain management. (R. at 375.) Plaintiff’s visits over 

the following year were largely the same. On July 14, 2011, Plaintiff went to West Valley 

Urgent Care, and the nurse practitioner noted that Plaintiff was “out of pain medication 

because they were stolen from the car,” that Plaintiff was “on pain medication for 10 

years,” that Plaintiff would not disclose who currently prescribed his pain medication, 

and that Plaintiff felt “nothing helps with pain but pain medication.” (R. at 405.) The 

nurse practitioner observed Plaintiff was not in obvious pain and his gait and station were 

normal, and she prescribed Tylenol with codeine and referred Plaintiff to a pain 

management specialist. (R. at 407.) 

 Eleven days later, on July 25, 2011, Plaintiff went to No Appointment MD and 

again stated his pain medications had been stolen, that he “fired his pain medication 

doctor,” and that he needed a prescription for oxycodone. (R. at 412.) The nurse 

practitioner pulled Plaintiff’s “dispense report,” and it showed “multiple doctors writing 

narcotics over the last 2 weeks.” (R. at 412.) The nurse practitioner advised Plaintiff to 

see a chronic pain management doctor and that “if he starts having withdrawal symptoms 

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to go to Banner Thunderbird or Phoenix St. Lukes [Hospitals].” (R. at 412.) In the blood 

test results associated with the visit, Plaintiff tested positive for oxycodone and opiates. 

(R. at 413.) 

 On August 3, 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Jerome J. Grove, a pain management 

specialist, who prescribed oxymorphone and oxycodone for Plaintiff’s pain. (R. at 417.) 

Dr. Grove “advocated a balanced approach with interventional therapy and physical 

therapy modalities and/or alternative approaches, essentially anything to minimize the 

opioid dependency.” (R. at 418.) Dr. Grove planned to “continue to try and wean down 

on the level of opioids” and observed Plaintiff “clearly has had excessive medications 

over the last few months.” (R. at 418.) Dr. Grove “had a long discussion with Plaintiff,” 

including “about the opioid agreement in terms of not [seeing] other pain management 

physicians and not taking more than what I prescribed.” (R. at 418.) 

 No evidence exists in the record that Plaintiff tried physical therapy or any other 

alternative approach to managing pain after his initial visit with Dr. Grove. On 

August 27, 2013, Dr. Grove completed a “Medical Opinion Re: Ability to Do WorkRelated Activities” form on behalf of Plaintiff. (R. at 519-26.) He opined that Plaintiff 

had certain functional restrictions on account of lower back pain, including a maximum 

ability to stand and walk for four hours and to sit for four hours in an eight-hour workday. 

(R. at 523.) He also opined that Plaintiff should never twist, stoop, crouch or climb 

ladders and rarely climb stairs. (R. at 524.) 

 Dr. Bill F. Payne reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and completed a “Physical 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) Assessment” form on May 16, 2012. (R. at 454-

461.) He noted that Plaintiff reported his condition “improved dramatically” in 

February 2012 and that medication provided “significant relief from pain” in April 2012. 

(R. at 461.) He concluded Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work, including standing 

or walking up to six hours and sitting up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. (R. at 

455, 461.) 

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II. ANALYSIS 

 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews 

only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 

F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside the Commissioner’s 

disability determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence 

or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial 

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence 

that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 

record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the 

court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 

“specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ 

determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether 

the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the 

ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and 

determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 

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C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If 

not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the 

claimant can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s 

RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

 A. The ALJ Assigned Proper Weight to the Assessment of Dr. Grove 

 and Properly Considered the Record as a Whole

 Plaintiff disputes the ALJ’s finding that when considering the combination of 

Plaintiff’s impairments, Plaintiff’s RFC allows him to perform light work. Plaintiff first 

argues the ALJ committed reversible error by assigning inadequate weight to the 

assessment of one of Plaintiff’s medical care providers, Dr. Grove. (Pl.’s Br. at 9-15.) An 

ALJ “may only reject a treating or examining physician’s uncontradicted medical opinion 

based on ‘clear and convincing reasons.’” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 

1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F. 3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996)).

“Where such an opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for specific and 

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id.

In this instance, the ALJ found that the “Medical Opinion Re: Ability to Do WorkRelated Activities” form completed by Plaintiff’s pain management physician, Dr. Grove 

(R. at 519-26), was contradicted by all the other medical evidence in the record, including 

some of Dr. Grove’s own treatment notes. (R. at 18, 22.) The Court must therefore 

examine whether the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting 

Dr. Grove’s assessment, supported by substantial evidence when examining the record as 

a whole. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. 

 The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Grove’s assessment because: (1) the restrictions 

he assigns to Plaintiff are unsupported by his own treatment notes, the objective medical 

record, and Plaintiff’s reports of activity; (2) Dr. Grove’s own treatment notes and other 

evidence show that medication provided Plaintiff with significant relief from pain 

without notable side effects; and (3) Dr. Grove appears sympathetic to Plaintiff and his 

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treatment notes are conclusory and provide little explanation of the evidence relied upon. 

(R. at 43.) The Court finds that all of these reasons are supported by substantial evidence 

in the record and that they form a proper basis to assign Dr. Grove’s RFC assessment of 

Plaintiff little weight. 

 Most importantly, while Dr. Grove assigned significant physical restrictions to 

Plaintiff in the RFC form he completed (R. at 519-26), they are not supported by his own 

treatment notes or by the objective medical record as a whole, as the ALJ explained in 

detail in her opinion. The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain credible 

in light of the medical and other evidence (R. at 40-41)—a finding that Plaintiff does not 

even challenge on appeal. See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1177 

n.8 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that arguments not raised by a party in its briefs on appeal are 

waived). Most of the medical evidence in this case is based on precisely that, Plaintiff’s 

subjective reports of pain, and if Plaintiff concedes to the ALJ’s finding that those reports 

are not credible, then evidence supporting a finding of significant functional limitations is 

almost non-existent here. 

 To begin with, there is no medical evidence in the record whatsoever of Plaintiff’s 

physical condition from 2006 to 2009, the first three years of Plaintiff’s alleged period of 

disability. The ALJ, and now the Court, thus have no basis on which to find Plaintiff’s 

RFC was limited during that period except for Plaintiff’s subjective reports made years 

later—reports that the ALJ effectively discredits in her decision. 

 Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff has not conceded to the ALJ’s finding 

that Plaintiff’s reports of disabling back pain are not credible, the evidence strongly 

supports that conclusion. While credibility is the province of the ALJ, an adverse 

credibility determination requires the ALJ to provide “specific, clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s 

symptoms.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). As the ALJ discussed 

(R. at 42), Plaintiff engaged in drug seeking behavior at least over the period from 2010 

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to 2012—virtually the entire period for which medical evidence exists in the record. This 

is an entirely appropriate basis to conclude that Plaintiff lacks credibility in his symptom 

testimony. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Anderson 

v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2003). As the Court touched on above, numerous 

healthcare providers, including Dr. Grove, discussed Plaintiff’s overuse of pain 

medication with him. (E.g., R. at 322, 327, 412, 418.) In July 2011, Plaintiff reported to 

at least two different healthcare providers that his pain medications had been stolen in 

order to obtain refills, and a pull of his “dispense report” showed multiple doctors had 

written him narcotics prescriptions over a two-week period. (R. at 405, 412.) The ALJ 

also noted that these providers advised Plaintiff that he needed to address his obesity and 

attend physical therapy, which he never did. (R. at 42.) The ALJ’s reasons for making an 

adverse credibility determination were specific, clear and convincing. See Edlund, 253 

F.3d at 1157. 

 As the ALJ also stated, Plaintiff’s reports of symptoms do not stand up against the 

objective medical evidence, either. (R. at 41.) In contrast with Plaintiff’s subjective 

reports of disabling pain, a September 2009 MRI of Plaintiff’s spine revealed only 

moderate disc space narrowing at L4-L5 and mild disc space narrowing at L5-S1, and no 

evidence in the record supports a finding of severe nerve root impingement. (R. at 41, 

327.) Clinical visits from 2009 to 2012 repeatedly revealed that Plaintiff had normal 

posture and gait, no joint pain, stiffness, swelling or muscle weakness, only moderate 

tenderness in his lumbar spine region, and mild if any impairment of range of motion—

none of which were consistent with Plaintiff’s reports of intractable pain. (E.g., R. at 41, 

415-50.) As a result, with regard to Plaintiff’s argument on appeal that the ALJ 

underweighed the assessment of Dr. Grove, the ALJ properly considered the 

“longitudinal treatment history” to find that Dr. Grove’s assessment was not supported by 

substantial objective medical evidence.1

 (R. at 41.) 

 

1

 In the Reply, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ does not explain what she meant by “longitudinal evidence” in her opinion. (Reply at 8.) According to the Merriam- Webster dictionary, in terms of information collection, “longitudinal” data (or evidence) 

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 Plaintiff’s other arguments that the ALJ undervalued Dr. Grove’s assessment also 

fail. As the ALJ points out with specific citations to the record (R. at 41-43), Dr. Grove’s 

assessment of Plaintiff was not consistent with Plaintiff’s reports of activity or his 

repeated reports that medication took care of his pain without notable side effects. See 

Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court 

agrees with the ALJ that Plaintiff’s full-time jobs within the alleged period of disability 

are not consistent with Dr. Grove’s assessment. (R. at 40.) The ALJ also properly 

considered that Dr. Grove’s own treatment notes are cursory and conclusory and do not 

support his conclusions in the assessment. See Chaudry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th 

Cir. 2012); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2003). Whether or not all of 

these findings support an inference that Dr. Grove was “sympathetic” to Plaintiff is not 

dispositive here. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record to conclude that Dr. Grove’s assessment of Plaintiff’s physical 

limitations deserved little weight.2 See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. 

 B. The ALJ Properly Weighed Lay Testimony

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in her consideration of the statements of 

Plaintiff’s wife, mother and friend. (Pl.’s Br. at 16-19.) An ALJ must only give 

“germane” reasons for discrediting lay witness testimony. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the ALJ provided sufficient and germane reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. (R. at 43-44.) To the extent the lay 

witnesses assessed Plaintiff’s functional limitations under the Act—which goes beyond 

simple observations of Plaintiff’s activity—the witnesses were not qualified to make such 

an assessment and, more importantly, the assessments were not consistent with 

 refers to observations of the same subject repeatedly over a period of time. The Court does not agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred by not defining the word in her opinion. 

2

 As argued by Defendant (Def.’s Br. at 10-11), the Court finds meritless 

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly concluded that a restriction that Plaintiff 

take regularly scheduled breaks is consistent with her other findings; the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Grove’s assessment, including that Plaintiff had to change position “frequently.” 

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substantial objective medical evidence, as the ALJ found and the Court discussed above. 

These were germane reasons for the ALJ to discount the lay witness testimony, and thus 

the ALJ did not err. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114; Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 

1218 (9th Cir. 2005). 

III. CONCLUSION

 Plaintiff raises no error on the part of the ALJ, and the SSA’s decision denying 

Plaintiff’s Application for Disability Insurance Benefits under the Act was supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the October 31, 2013 decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge, (R. at 36-45), as upheld by the Appeals Council on March 9, 

2015 (R. at 1-3). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case. 

 Dated this 28th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

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