Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00526/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00526-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Oliver Michael Pryor,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-00526-TUC-BGM 

ORDER 

 On September 30, 2015, this Court entered its Amended Order denying Petitioner 

Oliver Michael Pryor’s pro se First Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty). Order 9/30/2015 

(Doc. 26). Upon review of the record on appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

remanded to this Court for the limited purpose of consideration of an issue of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel during pre-trial and plea proceedings that was not addressed in 

this Court’s initial order. See Order 1/19/2016 (Doc. 30). 

 . . . 

 . . . 

 . . . 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The factual and procedural backgrounds were outlined in this Court’s September 

30, 2015 Order (Doc. 26), and as such will be limited to information relevant to the 

additional claim. 

 Petitioner states that upon his “initial intake into the Pima County Jail, on or about 

August 25, 2007, he was required to surrender his CPAP[1] machine while incarcerated 

and was denied its usage throughout his incarceration in the Pima County Jail.” Petition 

(Doc. 11) at 10–10A. Petitioner further states that he did not have his CPAP for nearly 

fourteen (14) months, including through trial and sentencing. Id. at 10A. Petitioner 

asserts that “[o]nly after trial, was [trial] counsel (Lougee), made aware his client had 

such a medical condition[,] and not until reading the Defendant’s pre-sentencing report 

did Mr. Lougee investigate the Defendant’s condition.” Id. Petitioner further asserts that 

“[o]n the day before sentencing Lougee immediately requested a Motion to Continue 

Sentencing to determine the appropriate way to proceed.” Id. Petitioner states that 

“[w]ithout dispute, counsel probably conveyed the merits of the plea offer and discussed 

the benefits and consequences with the Defendant.” Id. Petitioner further acknowledges 

that “trial counsel immediately, upon learning of reasonable grounds regarding 

competency, brought to the court’s attention, the issue of the Defendant’s sleep 

deprivation.” Petition (Doc. 11) at 10B–10C. 

 Petitioner alleges that “[o]n May 16, 2012, Judge Richard D. Nichols denied relief 

on this issue ruling that while counsel was ineffective for failing to present the issue 

 1

 CPAP stands for Continuous Positive Airway Pressure. 

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regarding competency, it was now precluded because ‘ineffective assistance of postconviction relief counsel is not a valid claim for defendants [sic] who were convicted at 

trial.” Id. at 10C. A review of the Rule 32 court’s May 16, 2012 Ruling demonstrates 

that Petitioner’s allegation is not entirely accurate. See Answer (Doc. 17), In Chambers 

Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 5/17/2012 (Exh. “AA”). With regard to competency, the Rule 

32 court acknowledged that “[t]rial counsel bought up the competency issue at 

sentencing, and appellate counsel mentioned the issue of competency in a brief to the 

court of appeals, but did not present the issue of competency to the Court for 

determination.” Id., “Exh. AA” at 2. The court of appeals found that “Petitioner’s failure 

to fully raise the issue on direct appeal constitute[d] a waiver,” and Petitioner was 

precluded from bringing the issue on post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. “AA” at 3. The 

court further found that any claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel could 

have been raised in his initial PCR petition, but was not, and as such it was waived. Id., 

Exh. “AA” at 3. Finally, with regard to PCR counsel, the Rule 32 court stated that 

“[e]ven if Petitioner’s PCR counsel was ineffective, non-pleading defendants have no 

right to effective PCR counsel. . . . In other words, ineffective assistance of Post 

Conviction Relief counsel is not a valid claim for defendants who were convicted at 

trial.” Id., Exh. “AA” at 3 (citing State v. Krum, 183 Ariz. 288, 292 (1995)). 

 In reply, Petitioner states that his “trial attorney, Richard Lougee, should have 

counseled, advised, and given Petitioner a reasonable period of time to reflect and decide 

on Respondents’ last-minute plea offer, raising the sleep deprivation issue to support and 

bolster any request for a continuance of trial or extended recess.” Reply (Doc. 21) at 5–6.

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II. ANALYSIS 

 “The constitutional guarantee [of effective assistance of counsel] applies to pretrial 

critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding[.]” Lafler v. 

Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1387, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). Accordingly, “[i]f a plea bargain 

has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in 

considering whether to accept it.” Id. at 1387. 

 In order to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective, Petitioner must show 

that 1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and 2) that this performance prejudiced his 

defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 

674 (1984). Deficient performance requires a “showing that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.” Id. In the context of rejecting a plea offer, the question is “not 

whether ‘counsel’s advice [was] right or wrong, but . . . whether that advice was within 

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Turner v. Calderon, 

281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 

90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970)). 

 Here, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient. In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that “[o]nly after trial, was [trial] counsel 

(Lougee), made aware his client had such a medical condition[,] and not until reading the 

Defendant’s pre-sentencing report did Mr. Lougee investigate the Defendant’s 

condition.” Petition (Doc. 11) at 10A. Petitioner further asserts that “[o]n the day before 

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sentencing Lougee immediately requested a Motion to Continue Sentencing to determine 

the appropriate way to proceed.” Id. Petitioner states that “[w]ithout dispute, counsel 

probably conveyed the merits of the plea offer and discussed the benefits and 

consequences with the Defendant.” Id. Petitioner further acknowledges that “trial 

counsel immediately, upon learning of reasonable grounds regarding competency, 

brought to the court’s attention, the issue of the Defendant’s sleep deprivation.” Petition 

(Doc. 11) at 10B–10C. 

 As such, Petitioner’s version of the facts indicate that trial counsel did not learn of 

his alleged sleep deprivation until after trial, and immediately took steps to bring it to the 

court’s attention. Moreover, Petitioner acknowledges that trial counsel presented the 

details of the plea agreement to him and discussed its pros and cons. Furthermore, the 

trial court made its record pursuant to State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ct. 

App. 2000). Superior Ct. of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Pima, Case No. 

CR-20062087, Jury Trial Tr. 9/9/2008 (Doc. 18-2) 5:11–6:4. The purpose of a Donald

hearing is to ensure that the defendant is aware of the plea offer and the consequences of 

its rejection. See Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 10 P.3d 1193. At the Donald hearing, 

Petitioner confirmed that he discussed the plea offer with his attorney, as well as what 

might happen if he were to be convicted. Superior Ct. of the State of Arizona in and for 

the County of Pima, Case No. CR-20062087, Jury Trial Tr. 9/9/2008 (Doc. 18-2) 5:20–

6:1. Petitioner also confirmed that even with this knowledge, he was rejecting the State’s 

plea offer. Id. at 6:2–4. 

 In reply to the instant habeas petition, Petitioner states that trial counsel “should 

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have counseled, advised, and given Petitioner a reasonable period of time to reflect and 

decide on Respondents’ last-minute plea offer, raising the sleep deprivation issue to 

support and bolster any request for a continuance of trial or extended recess.” Reply 

(Doc. 21) at 6. The record made at trial, as well as Petitioner’s own assertions in the 

instant habeas demonstrate that trial counsel did counsel and advise him as to the plea 

agreement. Furthermore, counsel did not learn of Petitioner’s sleep deprivation issues 

until after trial. There is nothing in the record before this Court to suggest that Petitioner 

alerted either his counsel or the trial court to any issues regarding sleep deprivation or not 

having his CPAP prior to trial. Accordingly, the Court finds that trial counsel was not 

ineffective during pre-trial and plea negotiations in this case. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s First Amended Petition Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 11) is 

DENIED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED, 

because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s ruling debatable. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2253. 

 Dated this 19th day of December, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

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