Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00126/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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FILED -----~ 

DEC l 8 2018 I 

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CLERK. u S. DIS rRICT COURT I 

SOUTHERN DiSTRiC"l OF CALll=ORNiA I 

BY ~ JEOUTYj 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

8 CHRIS LANGER, 

9 Plaintiff, 

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00126-BEN-KSC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

10 v. DISMISS 

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KAMADLLC; 

DOES 1-10, 

Defendants. 

[Doc. No. 6] 

Plaintiff Chris Langer brings this lawsuit against Defendant Kamad LLC, alleging 

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violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and California's Unruh Civil 

Rights Act ("UCRA"). 1 [Doc. l .] Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 

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18 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). [Doc. No. 6.] The Motion is 

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DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND2 

Broadway Greens is a retail business establishment open to the public. [Doc. 1, ifif 

8-9.] Kamad LLC has owned the real property at 1351 Broadway, El Cajon, California 

1 As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff Chris Langer has 76 currently pending ADA 

lawsuits in the Southern District of California. He has filed at least 139 lawsuits in this 

District, alone. 

27 2 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court accepts as true the 

28 allegations set forth in the Complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976). 

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1 since at least November of 2017. [Id. at ,-i,-i 2-3.] Broadway Greens offers parking spaces 

2 to patrons but has "no parking spaces marked and reserved for persons with disabilities." 

3 [Id. at ,-i,-i 10-12.] In addition, Broadway Greens's transaction counter is "42 inches high" 

4 with "no lowered, 36 inch portion ... for use by persons in wheelchairs." [Id. at i-!i-1 19-

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6 Plaintiff is a paraplegic who cannot walk and who uses a wheelchair for mobility. 

7 [Id. at ,-i I.] Plaintiff attempted to park in parking spaces offered by Broadway Greens to 

8 its patrons, but he could not find a parking space marked and reserved for persons with 

9 disabilities. [Id. at ,-i 11.] On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges a compliant parking 

10 space previously existed, but Defendant allowed the space to fade or to be paved over. [Id. 

11 at ,-i 13.] Consequently, Plaintiff had to shop elsewhere. [Id. at ,-i 17.] 

12 II. DISCUSSION 

13 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA claim under Rule 12(b)(l) for lack for 

14 standing and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 3 As a threshold matter, the 

15 Court first considers whether Plaintiff has standing. 

16 A. Rule 12(b )(1) 

17 To demonstrate Article III standing, Plaintiff must plead facts showing he suffered 

18 "an injury-in-fact, that the injury is traceable to the [defendant's] actions, and that the injury 

19 can be redressed by a favorable decision. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (US.) Inc., 631 F.3d 

20 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011 ). Because injunctive relief is the only remedy available to private 

21 plaintiffs alleging ADA violations, Plaintiff must also demonstrate a "real and immediate 

22 threat of repeated injury." Id. 

23 First, Defendant contends Plaintiff fails to allege an injury-in-fact. An injury in fact 

24 is "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and 

25 (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." D 'Lil v. Best Western Encina 

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3 Because Plaintiff's UCRA claim is predicated upon his ADA claim, Defendant 28 

moves to dismiss Plaintiff's UCRA claim on the same grounds. 

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1 Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008). In ADA cases, courts must "take a 

2 broad view of constitutional standing." Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th 

3 Cir. 2008). Thus, "[ e ]ven if a disabled plaintiff did not know about certain barriers when 

4 the plaintiff first filed suit, that plaintiff will have a 'personal stake in the outcome of the 

5 controversy' so long as his or her suit is limited to barriers related to that person's particular 

6 disability." Chapman, 631 F.3d at 951. "A rule limiting a plaintiff to challenging the 

7 barriers he had encountered . . . would burden businesses and other places of public 

8 accommodations with more ADA litigation [and] encourage piecemeal compliance with 

9 the ADA." Id. at 952. 

10 Defendant argues that "Plaintiff never explicitly alleges which barrier he 

11 encountered," "how any barrier relates to his disability," or "how a barrier caused him 

12 difficulty, discomfort, or embarrassment." [Doc. 6 at 6 (emphasis in original)]. To the 

13 contrary, Plaintiff alleges that he encountered two barriers: (1) a parking lot with no parking 

14 spaces reserved for persons with disabilities and (2) a transaction counter with a height of 

15 42 inches. [Doc. 1 at ifif 11, 19.] With respect to parking, Plaintiff specifically alleges that 

16 he encountered the barrier-a parking lot without parking spaces reserved for disabled 

1 7 persons-and that this barrier caused him difficulty and frustration when he tried to shop 

18 at Broadway Greens, causing him to shop elsewhere. [Id. at ifif 8-17.] Plaintiff further 

19 alleges that he is a paraplegic who cannot walk, uses a wheelchair for mobility, and has a 

20 specially equipped van and a Disabled Person Parking Placard. [Id. at if l .] Accordingly, 

21 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that his disability is related to the alleged barrier. Because 

22 Plaintiff could not park without a parking space reserved for persons with disabilities, 

23 Plaintiff alleges he was denied full and equal access, causing him difficulty and frustration. 

24 [Id. at if 16.] Thus, Plaintiffs Complaint pleads an injury-in-fact. 

25 Unlike the parking lot barrier, Plaintiff does not allege that he personally 

26 encountered the transaction counter barrier. [Id. at if 19.] Nonetheless, Plaintiffs 

27 allegations that the transaction counter does not have a lowered 36-inch portion for use by 

28 persons with wheelchairs poses another barrier. [Id. at ifif 19-20.] To allege a personal 

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1 stake in the controversy, Plaintiff did not need to personally encounter or know about the 

2 alleged in-store barriers when he first filed suit. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 951-52. 

3 Further, Plaintiff alleged that the 42-inch transaction counter is a barrier, that a transaction 

4 counter higher than 36 inches impacts the ability of persons in wheelchairs to use the 

5 transaction counter, and that this deters him from patronizing Broadway Greens. [Id. at irir 

6 18-23.] Therefore, Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to establish injury-in-fact as to the 

7 transaction counter barrier, as well. 

8 Next, Defendant contends that Plaintiff "fails to explain how his injury ... is fairly 

9 traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant." [Doc. 6 at 6.] Specifically, 

10 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege Defendant's control over the parking lot or 

11 transaction counter, or that Defendant "has the legal authority to dictate to 'Broadway 

12 Greens' how it should maintain the parking lot or transaction counter." Id. "Subsection 

13 (a) of [42 U.S.C. § 12182] provides that the ADA's prohibitions against discrimination 

14 apply to 'any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 

15 accommodation."' Org. for the Advancement of Minorities v. Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. 

16 Supp. 2d 1120, 1126-27 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). Plaintiff alleges 

17 that Defendant owns the real property located at 1351 Broadway, El Cajon, California and 

18 that Plaintiff "went to the property to visit Broadway Greens" to shop. [Doc. 1 at ifif 2-3, 

19 8.] Thus, construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Complaint 

20 alleges that Defendant owns the real property housing Broadway Greens, which 

21 discriminated against him by failing to provide reserved parking spaces for disabled 

22 persons and a 36-inch transaction counter. [Doc. 1 at irir 2-3, 8-23.] Accordingly, 

23 Plaintiff's Complaint "establishes the second element of standing ... because it alleges 

24 that [Defendant] own[s] the real property that houses the [business] which discriminated 

25 against him." See Org. for the Advancement of Minorities, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. 

26 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege an injury likely to be redressed 

27 by a favorable judicial decision because he does not allege that Broadway Greens is still 

28 open, that he has an interest in the products sold there, or that he lives near Broadway 

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1 Greens. [Doc. 6 at 6.] A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show "a real and 

2 immediate threat of repeated injury." L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). In an ADA 

3 case, the plaintiff may establish this element in two ways: ( 1) by alleging that "he intends 

4 to return to a noncompliant accommodation and is therefore likely to reencounter a 

5 discriminatory architectural barrier[;]" and (2) by alleging the "discriminatory architectural 

6 barriers deter him from returning to a noncompliant accommodation." Chapman, 631 F.3d 

7 at 950. The Ninth Circuit has held that the plaintiff must show a legitimate intent to visit 

8 the public accommodation in question again. Civil Rights Educ. & Enforcement Ctr. v. 

9 Hosp. Properties Trust, 867 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, to be deterred from 

10 making use of the defendant's facility, the plaintiff must have a true desire to return to the 

11 facility but for the barriers. See Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949. 

12 According to Defendant, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has "any reason to return" 

13 to Broadway Greens. Defendant further argues that an injunction would "do [Plaintiff] no 

14 good" if Broadway Greens sells "something Plaintiff would never buy, like industrial 

15 cleaning supplies or parachutes." [Doc. 6 at 6-7.] The Court is unpersuaded that a 

16 plaintiffs failure to allege what products are sold at an establishment is sufficient to prove 

17 the plaintiff lacks standing to bring an ADA action. Further, Plaintiff has alleged his desire 

18 to return to Broadway Greens. Specifically, he pleads that he "would like to return and 

19 patronize Broadway Greens" and that he will "return to the business to assess ongoing 

20 compliance with the ADA." [Doc. 1 at iii! 8, 23, 27 .] Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has 

21 plausibly alleged an injury likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision and a real 

22 and immediate threat of repeated injury. Defendant's motion to dismiss based on lack of 

23 standing is DENIED. 

24 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 

25 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims made in the 

26 complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain 

27 "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. 

28 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, Plaintiff must also plead "enough facts to state a claim to 

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1 relief that is plausible on its face." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 

2 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume the truth of 

3 all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

4 party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5 "To prevail on a discrimination claim under Title III, a plaintiff must show that: (1) 

6 he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that 

7 owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied 

8 public accommodations by the defendant because of his disability." Ariz. ex rel. Goddard 

9 v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Molksi v. MJ 

10 Cable, Inc., 481 F .3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is 

11 disabled and that Plaintiff was denied public accommodations because of his disability. 

12 Rather, Defendant contends that Plaintiff insufficiently pleads that Defendant owns or 

13 operates a place of public accommodation. Construing the allegations in the light most 

14 favorable to Plaintiff, however, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owns the real property 

15 containing the alleged barriers. See Org. for the Advancement of Minorities, 406 F. Supp. 

16 2d at 1127. Plaintiff also sufficiently pleads that Broadway Greens is a place of public 

1 7 accommodation because he alleges Broadway Greens is a business establishment open to 

18 the public for shopping.4 [Doc. 1 at ,-r,-r 8-9.] Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's 

19 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim. 

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4 The Court is unpersuaded by Defendant's reliance on Strong v. Johnson, 2017 WL 

22 201737 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2017). In Strong, the plaintiff"vaguely refer[red] to 'elements 

23 and areas of the Store,"' but did not "say what or where they are, or how the barriers in 

24 those places interfere with his access," and merely alleged that "the Store's 'goods, 

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations' were unavailable to him." 

25 Id. at *2. Although the plaintiff sufficiently identified "a lack of signage at the disabled 

parking space, failure to designate a parking space as being van accessible; and an access 26 aisle that [the plaintiff] says is 'too steep," he did not "allege whether he thinks Defendant 

27 owns or leases the parking lot, or has any control over it." Id. 

28 In sharp contrast to Strong, Plaintiff identifies two barriers: (1) the lack of designated 

parking spaces for disabled persons; and (2) a transaction counter without a lowered, 36-

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1 III. CONCLUSION 

2 For the previous reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss, [Doc. 6], is DENIED. 

3 Defendant must file an answer to the Complaint within fourteen days from the date of this 

4 Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). 

5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

~ Date: Decemb;0-018 

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26 inch portion. [Doc. 1 at iii! 11, 20.] Moreover, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Defendant 

owns Broadway Greens and controls the parking lot. [Doc. 1 at iii! 2, 8-10 (alleging that 

27 Defendant owns the real property and that parking spaces are offered by Defendant to 

28 patrons of Broadway Greens).] Thus, Strong does not dictate a different result. 

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