Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-56212/USCOURTS-ca9-14-56212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MONICA BEAUCHAMP,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-56212

D.C. No.

8:13-cv-01965-

MWF-JC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 9, 2016—Pasadena, California

Filed March 16, 2016

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Sandra S. Ikuta,

Circuit Judges, and Robert W. Pratt, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Pratt

* The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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2 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

SUMMARY**

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act / 

Attorney Fees

The panel affirmed the district court’s award of attorney

fees to plaintiff, the parent of a child with a disability,

following administrative proceedings under the Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act.

The panel affirmed the district court’s decision not to

award fees for services performed subsequent to a written

settlement offer because the relief obtained at the

administrative hearing was not more favorable to the plaintiff

than the settlement offer, and the plaintiff was not

substantially justified in rejecting the offer.

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by lowering counsel’s requested rate. The panel

also held that an issue regarding paralegal fees was barred by

collateral estoppel.

COUNSEL

Tania L. Whiteleather (argued), Law Offices of Tania L.

Whiteleather, Lakewood, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan J. Mott (argued), Parker & Covert LLP, Tustin,

California, for Defendant-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 3

OPINION

PRATT, District Judge:

This case involves a due process complaint filed under the

Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”)

against Defendant-Appellee Anaheim Union High School

District (the “District”) by Petitioner-Appellant Monica

Beauchamp (“Beauchamp”) on behalf of her son, J.E. The

administrative process that followed was bifurcated into an

expedited and a non-expedited hearing. Beauchamp and J.E.

prevailed at both hearings. This appeal concerns the district

court’s award of attorney fees to Beauchamp’s attorney,

Tania Whiteleather (“Whiteleather”), following the nonexpedited hearing. The district court awarded $7,780 in fees,

substantially less than the $66,420 requested. The primary

rationale for the district court’s reduction was its conclusion

that Beauchamp had unreasonably rejected a timely

settlement offer. The district court also lowered

Whiteleather’s requested hourly rate from $450 to $400, and

rejected a request for paralegal fees. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the district court’s award in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

In early February 2012, J.E., then a sophomore in high

school, was involved in a disciplinary incident at Kennedy

High School (“Kennedy”) in the District. The District

instituted disciplinary procedures against J.E., removed him

from Kennedy, and placed him at a community day school. 

In late February 2012, Beauchamp requested that the District

evaluate J.E. for special education services; the District

performed an evaluation and J.E. was found eligible under the

categories of “emotional disturbance” and “other health

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4 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

impaired” based on a diagnosis of anxiety and attention

deficit disorder. Beauchamp subsequently filed an IDEA due

process complaint against the District on March 26, 2012,

arguing that the District had evidence of J.E.’s disability as

far back as March 2010, and that the District’s failure to

evaluate him until March 2012 violated IDEA and denied J.E.

a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for the two

intervening years.

Pursuant to IDEA, the administrative proceeding was

bifurcated. The first hearing was expedited and examined

whether the District had a “basis of knowledge” that J.E. was

a child with a disability at the time it removed him from

Kennedy. On May 9, 2012 the administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) issued a favorable decision for J.E. The District

appealed to the district court and the ALJ’s findings were

affirmed on May 21, 2013. The district court also awarded

attorney fees for Whiteleather’s work in the expedited

proceeding, but lowered her requested hourly rate, and

rejected a request for paralegal fees. That decision was

affirmed by this court in related appeal Anaheim Union High

School District v. J.E., No. 13-56738, 2016 WL 695979 (9th

Cir. Feb. 22, 2016).

While the expedited-hearing appeal was pending before

the district court, the parties engaged in settlement

discussions with regard to the non-expedited proceedings,

which focused on whether the District violated its “childfind” obligations under IDEA by failing to timely evaluate

J.E. for special education services. By letter dated September

28, 2012, the District made a settlement offer to Beauchamp

and J.E. that included the following relief: (1) 80 hours of

individual tutoring by a credentialed special education

teacher; (2) reimbursement of the costs of a private evaluation

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 5

conducted by Perry D. Passaro, Ph.D; (3) 20 hours of

compensatory counseling services by a credentialed school

psychologist; and (4) reimbursement of reasonable attorney

fees and costs. The offer was made with the understanding

that the District would not make an admission on the childfind issue or abandon its appeal from the expedited hearing. 

The District’s offer further stated that “[t]he terms offered

above will be incorporated into an industry standard general

compromise and release agreement that will effectuate the

offer outlined and permit the District to provide the offered

reimbursements and services.”

Beauchamp rejected the offer and the non-expedited

hearing was held over seven days between January 14, 2013

and February 6, 2013. On March 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a

favorable ruling for J.E. and awarded: (1) six hours of

individual counseling by a credentialed mental health

professional; and (2) reimbursement for the cost of Dr.

Passaro’s examination. Neither party appealed the ALJ’s

decision. Thereafter, Beauchamp filed a motion in the district

court for an award of attorney fees at a rate of $450 per hour,

paralegal fees, and costs under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). 

The District moved for summary judgment, arguing in

relevant part that: (1) under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D),

Beauchamp was not entitled to fees incurred after she rejected

the District’s September 28, 2012 offer; (2) the requested

hourly rate was too high; and (3) an award of paralegal fees

was barred by collateral estoppel because the district court

had already ruled on the issue in the expedited-hearing

appeal. Beauchamp filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment, arguing that Whiteleather was entitled to fees

incurred both before and after the settlement offer at a rate of

$450 per hour, as well as paralegal fees. The district court

issued an order on June 26, 2014, awarding $7,780 in fees

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6 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

incurred before the District’s settlement offer at an hourly

rate of $400, and concluding that the issue of paralegal fees

was barred by collateral estoppel. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An award of attorney fees in an IDEA case is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch.

Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2015). “‘The district

court’s underlying factual determinations are reviewed for

clear error and its legal analysis relevant to the fee

determination is reviewed de novo.’” T.B. ex rel. Brenneise

v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 467 (9th Cir.

2015) (quoting Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 374 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2004)),

petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1059 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2016). We

review de novo the district court’s decision to deny an award

of fees incurred after the District’s settlement offer. Id. at

476. We also review de novo the district court’s application

of collateral estoppel to the issue of paralegal fees. See Pardo

v. Olson & Sons, Inc., 40 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Attorney Fees

Under IDEA, a court “may award reasonable attorneys’

fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent

of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). 

But fees and costs may not be awarded for services performed

subsequent to a written settlement offer if:

(I) the offer is made within the time

prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 7

Civil Procedure or, in the case of an

administrative proceeding, at any time more

than 10 days before the proceeding begins;

(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days;

and

(III) the court or administrative hearing

officer finds that the relief finally obtained by

the parents is not more favorable to the

parents than the offer of settlement.

Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(I)–(III). “Notwithstanding

subparagraph (D), an award of attorneys’ fees and related

costs may be made to a parent who is the prevailing party and

who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement

offer.” Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E).

1. The Settlement Agreement

There is no dispute that Beauchamp is a prevailing party

entitled to attorney fees. It is also undisputed that the

District’s offer was made more than ten days before the nonexpedited hearing, and that Beauchamp did not accept the

offer within ten days. Instead, Beauchamp argues that the

relief she obtained at the administrative hearing was more

favorable to her than the settlement offer because she

obtained a ruling that the District violated its child-find

obligations. Alternatively, Beauchamp argues that she was

substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer.

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8 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

a. The relief obtained at the administrative hearing

was not more favorable to Beauchamp than the

settlement offer.

The district court concluded that the outcome at the

administrative hearing was not more favorable to Beauchamp

than the relief offered in the District’s September 28, 2012

settlement letter. Beauchamp does not dispute that the

District’s offer contained more counseling and tutoring hours

for J.E. than what was awarded by the ALJ. Nonetheless,

Beauchamp argues that without a ruling from the ALJ on the

child-find issue in the non-expedited hearing, she risked

reversal in the pending expedited-hearing appeal. For the

reasons discussed below, we find Beauchamp’s argument to

be without merit because the two proceedings were not

legally dependent upon one another.

The expedited-hearing appeal focused on whether, on the

date J.E. was removed from Kennedy, the District had a basis

of knowledge that J.E. was a student with a disability. Under

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(A), a student like J.E., who has

violated a code of student conduct but has not yet been

identified for special education services, can claim protection

under IDEA if it can be shown that the school district “had

knowledge . . . that the child was a child with a disability

before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action

occurred.” In contrast, the non-expedited portion of the

hearing evaluated whether the District had complied with its

child-find obligations under IDEA. Child-find requires

school districts to develop a method to identify, locate, and

evaluate students with disabilities who are in need of special

education services. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). Specifically

with regard to J.E., the question was on which date the

District should have initiated the evaluation process, and what

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 9

remedywould compensate J.E. for the period of time when he

should have been receiving special education services under

IDEA.

A ruling that the District violated its child-find obligation

was not a prerequisite for the district court to conclude in the

expedited-hearing appeal that the District had a basis of

knowledge that J.E. was a student with a disability at the time

of his removal from Kennedy in February 2012. The very

fact that the issues were bifurcated with the basis-ofknowledge issue to be decided on an expedited timeline

largely undermines Beauchamp’s argument to the contrary. 

Had Beauchamp accepted the settlement offer, the district

court’s analysis of the expedited-hearing appeal would have

been unaffected. Beauchamp’s decision to reject the

settlement offer was purely strategic—she hoped that a

favorable ruling on the child-find issue would guarantee a

favorable ruling in the expedited-hearing appeal. But, as the

district court noted, a ruling is not relief. A favorable ruling

on either legal issue in this case would have provided no

practical relief to Beauchamp because, at the time of the

settlement offer, J.E. had already been evaluated for, and was

receiving, appropriate special education services from the

District. See Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 212, 217

(N.D. Ill. 1995) (explaining that because a student’s

educational placement was no longer at issue, favorable legal

rulings could not “be viewed as independent victories . . . nor

[could] they be understood as constituting independent

elements of relief”). The only question that remained was

whether J.E. was entitled to relief for the alleged delay in his

evaluation process, and Beauchamp agreed that the relief

offered by the District in the form of counseling, tutoring, and

reimbursement of fees and costs was acceptable to her. Thus,

from the parent’s perspective, there was nothing to be gained

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10 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

by rejecting the settlement offer and obtaining a ruling on the

child-find issue. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)(III)

(“Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded . . . if the court or

administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally

obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents

than the offer of settlement.”) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the outcome of the

administrative hearing was not more favorable to Beauchamp

than the District’s settlement offer.

b. Beauchamp was not substantially justified in

rejecting the settlement offer.

Beauchamp also argues that she was substantially

justified in rejecting the settlement offer. There is little

precedent interpreting the phrase “substantiallyjustified,” but

examples from other cases include situations where the offer

failed to cover the parents’ attorney fees, see Dicks v. Dist. of

Columbia, 109 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131–32 (D.D.C. 2015),

where the parent had a good faith, reasonable belief that their

eventual recovery would be higher than the offer, see J.P. ex

rel. Peterson v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Hanover Cnty., VA, 641 F.

Supp. 2d 499, 508–09 (E.D. Va. 2009), and where a relevant

pending court action could have affected the favorability of

the settlement terms, see B.L. ex rel. Lax v. Dist. of Columbia,

517 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 2007).

Beauchamp first argues that she was substantially

justified in rejecting the District’s offer because it was vague

and ambiguous. The offer stated that the terms would “be

incorporated into an industry standard general compromise

and release agreement that [would] effectuate the offer

outlined and permit the District to provide the offered

reimbursements and services.” Beauchamp argues that she

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 11

could not have accepted the offer without knowing what

those terms were, and particularly whether they included any

waiver of rights.

Beauchamp’s argument is premised on the contention that

the District’s settlement offer, like offers made under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 68, should have been construed as

non-negotiable. Rule 68 states, in relevant part:

(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an

Accepted Offer. At least 14 days before the

date set for trial, a party defending against a

claim may serve on an opposing party an offer

to allow judgment on specified terms, with the

costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after

being served, the opposing party serves

written notice accepting the offer, either party

may then file the offer and notice of

acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk

must then enter judgment.

. . .

(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted

Offer. If the judgment that the offeree finally

obtains is not more favorable than the

unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the

costs incurred after the offer was made.

It is widely accepted that “[t]he [Rule 68] offer, once

made, is non-negotiable; it is either accepted, in which case

it is automatically entered by the clerk of court, or rejected,

in which case it stands as the marker by which the plaintiff’s

results are ultimatelymeasured.” Nusom v. Comh Woodburn,

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12 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, any

ambiguities in a Rule 68 offer are typically construed against

the offeror. Id. (“[D]efendants bear the brunt of

uncertainty.”); see also Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 623

(7th Cir. 1998) (stating that “the plaintiff should not be left in

the position of guessing what a court will later hold the offer

means”).

Beauchamp argues that her rejection of the offer was

substantially justified because it was unclear what rights she

waived upon acceptance, and that she should not have been

expected to seek clarification of what industry-standard terms

the District intended to incorporate. Beauchamp cites T.B.,

a recent IDEA case decided by this court, in support of her

argument. 806 F.3d 451. In that case, the district court

concluded that the parents of a disabled student unreasonably

rejected a settlement offer from the school district and

reduced its award of attorney fees to the parents. Id. at

465–66. This court reversed, in part because we found that

the school district had injected ambiguity into the offer. See

id. at 478. A cover letter dated two months prior to the offer

stated that the school district was “open to including”

reasonable attorney fees, but the offer itself stated that “each

party . . . shall bear . . . its own costs, expenses, and attorneys’

fees.” Id. at 477–78. This court found that the parents were

entitled to rely on what was explicitly written in the offer and

“should not have been required to assume” that the school

district was open to paying fees. Id. at 478.

This case is distinguishable from T.B. because the District

never contradicted itself, and the September 28, 2012 letter

was not ambiguous or vague. It explicitly stated the material

terms of the offer, and, as is customary in settlement

negotiations, explained that the terms would be incorporated

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 13

into a final document. Notably, while T.B. mentioned the

similarities between the IDEA settlement provisions and Rule

68, the case did not hold that an offer made under IDEA was

non-negotiable, nor did it hold that a parent could not seek

clarification of the terms of an offer. Indeed, the facts of T.B.

make clear that the school district and the parents in that case

engaged in ongoing oral settlement discussions and

exchanged at least one written offer and counter-offer. Id. at

459–60. No provision of IDEA prevented Beauchamp from

doing the same in this case—she could have sought

clarification of what the industry-standard terms would

include or she could have made a counter-offer. See Schaffer

ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (“The core

of [IDEA] . . . is the cooperative process that it establishes

between parents and schools.”). Thus, we conclude that

Beauchamp was not substantially justified in rejecting the

offer.1

1 Beauchamp also argues that she was substantially justified in rejecting

the offer because the expedited-hearing appeal was still pending. 

Beauchamp requests that we take judicial notice of a 1986 House of

Representatives Conference Report which states that a “relevant pending

court decision[] which could have an impact on the case in question”

could provide substantial justification for rejecting an IDEA settlement

offer. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 6 (1986) (Conf. Rep.). Although we

grant Beauchamp’s request for judicial notice because the Conference

Report is a matter of public record, we reject her argument for the same

reasons discussed supra in Section III.A.1.a. See McConnell v. Cnty. of

Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We may take judicial

notice of undisputed matters of public record.”). The outcome of the

expedited-hearing appeal had no legal bearing on the outcome of the nonexpedited hearing or vice versa; thus, such a rationale does not provide a

substantial justification for rejecting the District’s settlement offer.

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14 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

2. Hourly Rate

Beauchamp next argues that the district court abused its

discretion by lowering Whiteleather’s requested rate from

$450 to $400, and by not requiring the District to rebut her

evidence of the appropriate rate. IDEA requires that any fee

award “be based on rates prevailing in the community in

which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality

of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). 

“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys

regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate

determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate

for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“The district court must provide a concise but clear

explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Id. at 406

(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).

In support of her request for fees, Whiteleather submitted

her own declaration, the declarations of other attorneys

practicing education law in the Central District of California,

and two orders from recent IDEA cases where she was

awarded fees. Here, only fees for administrative hearing

work were at issue, but not all of the evidence Whiteleather

submitted acknowledged the distinction between

administrative hearing work and work in the district court or

court of appeals. The evidence that did explicitly reference

administrative work largely supported the district court’s

conclusion that “$400 is the prevailing market rate, and that

Ms. Whiteleather performed at a level of proficiency

commensurate with that rate.”

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Most notably, Whiteleather’s own declaration states that

she has been representing students in special education

matters since 1996 and that “[r]ecently, the federal courts

have ordered payment of [her] due process work at $400 to

$425 per hour.” In two previous IDEA cases, Whiteleather

was awarded $425 per hour for administrative work and $400

for district court work. See Walhovd v. Bellflower Unified

Sch. Dist., CV 08-00394 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2011), aff’d,

526 Fed. App’x. 803 (9th Cir. 2013); C.B. ex rel. Baquerzio

v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., CV 08-1047 (C.D. Cal.

Jan. 18, 2012). The declaration of Patricia Cromer, an

attorney with 15 years of special education experience, stated

that her hourly rate for due process hearings is $350 to $425

per hour. Only one additional declaration, from an attorney

who has practiced law in southern California since 1986,

established a rate of $450 per hour for administrative work. 

The other declarations Whiteleather submitted as evidence

may have identified higher hourly rates, but they either

referenced district court and appellate work specifically or

did not specify whether the rates were charged for

administrative work.

Whiteleather argues that the District was required to rebut

her evidence of a reasonable fee with its own evidence. But

“[t]he [fee] applicant has an initial burden of production,” to

produce “satisfactory evidence” that the fee requested is

reasonable. United States v. $28,000 in U.S. Currency,

802 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2015). “[T]he applicant’s

initial duty of production is not excused by lack of

opposition.” Id. Here, the evidence Whiteleather herself

submitted supports the $400 rate. Accordingly, it was not an

abuse of discretion for the district court to apply that rate

without seeking additional rebuttal evidence from the

District. See id. (“A district court does not improperly

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16 BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.

shoulder defendant’s burden of challenging the fee petition in

finding that the applicant has failed to meet its initial burden

of production.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Beauchamp also argues that the district court did not

sufficiently explain its award. The district court “may make

general, across-the-board adjustments” to a request for

attorney fees, but fee cuts “‘beyond the safety zone of a

haircut’” must be accompanied by a “‘weightier and more

specific’” explanation. T.B., 806 F.3d at 486 (quoting

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir.

2008)). Here, while the district court could have said more,

its explanation was sufficient for a reduction of only $50 per

hour.

B. Paralegal Fees

Finally, Beauchamp argues that the district court erred by

rejecting her request for paralegal fees. Beauchamp argues

that Dr. Susan Burnett worked as a paralegal in this case, not

as an educational consultant, and that Beauchamp was

therefore entitled to reimbursement for her services. The

district court concluded that because it had already found that

Dr. Burnett was an educational consultant in the expeditedhearing appeal, the issue was barred by collateral estoppel.

“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the

relitigation of issues actually adjudicated in previous

litigation between the same parties.” Clark v. Bear Stearns

& Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992). For the

doctrine to apply: (1) the issue must be identical to one

alleged in prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been

“actually litigated” in the prior litigation; and (3) the

determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have

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BEAUCHAMP V. ANAHEIM UNION HIGH SCH. DIST. 17

been “critical and necessary” to the judgment. Id. The

parties to this action are identical to those in the expeditedhearing appeal. The issue is also identical—whether Dr.

Susan Burnett acted as a paralegal or as an educational

consultant in J.E.’s case. See Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist.,

2016 WL 695979 at *1. In the expedited-hearing appeal, the

parties presented arguments on the issue, and the district

court made a final ruling which was appealed and affirmed by

this court. See id. Accordingly, the issue was actually

litigated and adjudicated. Finally, the question of whether Dr.

Burnett was a paralegal or an educational consultant was

critical to the judgment because consultant fees are not

recoverable under IDEA. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd.

of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 (2006) (“[T]he terms

of the IDEA overwhelmingly support the conclusion that

prevailing parents may not recover the costs of experts or

consultants.”). Because all of the elements of collateral

estoppel are established, we conclude that the district court

did not err by applying the doctrine.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained herein, the district court’s order

is AFFIRMED.

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