Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02824/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02824-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAVIN B. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-2824-BAS-AGS

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION AND 

MOTION TO RECUSE

[ECF No. 58]

v.

TIMOTHY G. O’CONNOR,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Gavin Davis’s case was low-numbered to this Court due to its 

similarities to Plaintiff’s prior case, 17-cv-1997-BAS-AGS. Plaintiff moved to have 

his case reassigned to Judge Barry T. Moskowitz. The Court denied the motion, 

finding Plaintiff’s case was properly transferred to this Court under this Court and 

Judge Burns’ discretion. (ECF No. 57.) Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of 

the order. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 58.) In the alternative, Plaintiff requests Judge Bashant

recuse herself from this case. (Id.) 

I. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

First, Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s prior order. District 

courts have the authority to entertain motions for reconsideration of interlocutory 

orders at any time before the entry of final judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); 

Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of 

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Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989). To determine the merits of a request to 

reconsider an interlocutory order, courts apply the standard required under a Rule 

59(e) reconsideration motion. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 

958, 968 (S.D. Cal. 2003). Reconsideration is appropriate under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59(e) if: (1) the district court “is presented with newly discovered 

evidence,” (2) the district court “committed clear error or the initial decision was 

manifestly unjust,” or (3) “there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. 

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see 

also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, Plaintiff argues the Court abused its discretion in low-numbering his 

case and then denying his motion to reassign the case. The Court disagrees. District 

court judges have “‘broad discretion” regarding the assignment or reassignment of 

cases.” Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. 

Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Court (and Judge Burns) properly 

determined Plaintiff’s case should be assigned to this Court pursuant to the lownumber rule of this district’s local rules. Plaintiff believes his case should have been 

transferred to Judge Moskowitz because of an earlier case Plaintiff filed. The Court 

finds the present case would not be properly low-numbered to Judge Moskowitz. See

Civ. L. R. 40.1(e). Further, Plaintiff argues he is prejudiced by the “consolidation” 

of the present case and his prior case, 17-cv-1997. (Mot. 12.) The two cases have 

not been consolidated. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds no clear error or 

abuse of discretion in its prior order and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion on this ground.

II. MOTION FOR RECUSAL

Plaintiff next moves for Judge Bashant to recuse herself from this case. Under 

the federal recusal statutes, “[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify [her]self in any 

proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S. C. 

§ 455(a). The judge shall also disqualify herself “[w]here [s]he has a personal bias 

or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 

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concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S. C. §455(b)(1). In addition, where a party files 

“a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending 

has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in favor of any adverse party,” then 

the judge shall assign the case to another judge to hear such proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 

144.

Under both federal statutes, the substantive standard is “whether a reasonable 

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality 

might reasonably be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted). A “reasonable person” is defined as a “well-informed, 

thoughtful observer,” as opposed to a “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.” 

Clemens v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 

(9th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted). “Rumor, speculation, beliefs, 

conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters” are not 

enough to require recusal.” Id. (citing Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 

1993)).

Ordinarily, the party must allege “facts that fairly support the contention that 

the judge exhibits bias or prejudice directed toward a party that stems from an 

extrajudicial source.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980). This 

“generally requires as the basis for recusal something other than rulings, opinions 

formed[,] or statements made by the judge during the course of the trial.” United 

States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914–15 (9th Cir. 2008). “[J]udicial rulings alone 

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United 

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). In addition, [i]t has long been established ... that 

a party cannot force a judge to recuse him [or her]self by engaging in personal attacks 

on the judge.” Standing Comm. On Discipline of the United States Dist. Court For 

Cent. Dist. Of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (9th Cir. 1995). “[I]n the absence 

of a legitimate reason to recuse [her]self, a judge should participate in cases 

assigned.” Holland, 519 F.3d at 912 (quotations and citations omitted).

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Here, Plaintiff alleges Judge Bashant is biased against him and towards 

Defendant Unruh. Plaintiff claims Judge Bashant has “intimate knowledge” of the 

“facts on Defendant Unruh, his accomplices, his crimes, [and] his plea bargains.” 

(Mot. 5, 15.) This is inaccurate. Judge Bashant has no such knowledge and harbors 

no bias for or against any party to this action.1

 Plaintiff appears to be unhappy with 

orders made in his prior case, 17-cv-1997. (Id. at 12.) But judicial rulings are not a 

basis for recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (holding “opinions formed by the judge 

on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring” in current or past proceedings 

“do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible”). The 

Court’s rulings in Plaintiff’s cases are not contrary to law, let alone the product of 

deep-seated favoritism.

Plaintiff attaches an affidavit to his Motion and claims it is sufficient to justify 

disqualification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. In the affidavit, Plaintiff declares under 

penalty of perjury that “the Facts and Factual Allegations” in his Motion “regarding

the bias, prejudice, favoritism, etc. of Judge Cynthia Bashant . . . are true and brought 

in good faith.” (Mot. at Affidavit.)2

 But Plaintiff’s allegations are pure speculation

and do not “fairly support the contention that [this Court] exhibits bias or prejudice 

directed toward [Plaintiff] that stems from an extrajudicial source.” United States v. 

Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff’s Motion and accompanying 

affidavit are legally insufficient and are another baseless attempt by Plaintiff to get 

his case reassigned to another judge. 

Upon examination of Plaintiff’s arguments, and in considering the facts of this 

 1 Further, Plaintiff’s claim that he plans to call Judge Bashant as a witness in his case is bizarre and 

has no basis. (Mot. 15.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Judge Bashant has no “intimate 

knowledge of several material elements of the controversy stemming from her time in the mid-90s 

with the Department of Justice as Chief Deputy of Narcotics.” (Id.)

2 The Affidavit is attached to the end of Plaintiff’s Motion and is page 23 per the CM/ECF pincite 

page numbers located at the top of the page.

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case, the Court concludes that there is no reason why a reasonable person with 

knowledge of all the facts would question the Court’s impartiality in this case. The

Court finds no basis for recusal and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion on this ground.

Finally, the Court cautions Plaintiff that all information presented in an 

affidavit signed under penalty of perjury must be accurate. Falsely signing under 

penalty of perjury can carry significant consequences and Plaintiff is not to make 

such declarations unless he has a factual basis to support the accusations.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. (ECF No. 

58.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 28, 2019

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