Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01729/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01729-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLEVELAND R. LOWMAN,

Petitioner,

Case No. 13-cv-1729-BAS(PCL)

ORDER:

(1) OVERRULING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS; 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; 

(3) GRANTING RESPONDENTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND

(4) DISMISSING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

[ECF Nos. 6, 9]

v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, et al.,

Respondents.

On July 24, 2013, Petitioner Cleveland R. Lowman, a state prisoner who is

represented by counsel, filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 seeking relief from his September 2000 convictions in which he pled guilty to:

(1) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs with injury; (2) false imprisonment;

and (3) possession of cocaine. A sentence of 43 yearsto life under the three-strikeslaw

followed. On March 17, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis issued

a Report and Recommendation (“report”) recommending that this Court: (1) grant

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Respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition as procedurally barred and dismiss this

action without prejudice; and (2) decline issuing a certificate of appealability. 

Petitioner filed objections to the report. 

For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections,

APPROVES and ADOPTS the report, GRANTS Respondents’ motion to dismiss,

dismissing this action without prejudice, and DECLINES to issue a certificate of

appealability. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which objections are

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. But “[t]he

statute [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c)] makes it clear that the district judge must review the

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not

otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (emphasis in original); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219,

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (concluding that where no objections were filed, the district court

had no obligation to review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the Constitution

nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d at 1121. This rule of law is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and this district. 

See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, de novo

review of a R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); Nelson

v. Giurbino, 395 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting report

in its entirety without review because neither party filed objections to the report despite

the opportunity to do so); see also Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (S.D.

Cal. 2004) (Benitez, J.). 

//

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II. ANALYSIS1

The magistrate judge makes three relevant findings in the report: (1) Petitioner

satisfied § 2254’s exhaustion requirements; (2) the petition was untimely; and (3)

equitable tolling does not apply. He also finds that Petitioner’s conviction was final

on March 12, 2001. (Report 8:12–13.) Petitioner does not challenge the magistrate’s

exhaustion and untimeliness findings in his objections. His objections focus squarely

on the issue of equitable tolling.

Equitable tolling has been deemed appropriate in cases arising under § 2244 if

the petitioner can show: (1) that he or she has been diligently pursuing his or her rights

and (2) that an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). The

petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstances actually caused the

untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] pro se

petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance

warranting equitable tolling.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006). That includes a petitioner’s inability to correctly calculate the limitations

period. Id. Consequently, equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases” and has a

“very high” threshold before it can be applied. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Diligence and Extraordinary Circumstances

Petitioner asserts that he “has diligently pursued his appeal rights but did so

absent effective counsel.” (Pet’r’s Objections 6:10–11.) However, he fails to produce

any evidence to support that proposition. Though Holland held that the diligence

required was “reasonable diligence” and not “maximum feasible diligence,” Petitioner

fails to adequately provide support to demonstrate that he meets even the reasonableThe Court adopts and incorporates by reference all portions of the report that Petitioner does 1

not object to. That includes the factual background presented in the report.

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diligence standard. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. Rather, the record before this Court

suggests the opposite.

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed on March 7, 2001 and denied

December 12, 2001; the second state habeas petition was filed on September 13, 2004

and denied September 27, 2005; and the third state habeas petition was filed on May

16, 2011 and denied on January 31, 2012. Contrary to Petitioner’s position on this

issue, the significant gaps in the time periods between the three aforementioned

petitions—totaling three and seven years, respectively—reflect the greater likelihood

that he did not pursue his rights diligently. The California Court of Appeals’

determination that Petitioner’s third state habeas petition was untimely only further

supports this Court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not diligent in pursuing his rights. 

Furthermore, Petitioner fails to specifically address any “extraordinary

circumstances” even though he references the requirement throughout his objections. 

Consequently, even if Petitioner had successfully demonstrated diligence, he would

have failed to satisfy the extraordinary-circumstancesrequirement for equitable tolling. 

See Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997. That, in turn, necessarily means that he would have

failed to show that the extraordinary circumstances actually caused the untimeliness. 

See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799.

Petitioner also argues that the habeas petition istimely because challengesto the

length ofsentence “are always reviewable despite the passage of time” and “regardless

of whether an objection or argument was raised in the trial and/or reviewing court.” 

(Pet’r’s Objections 6:19–25 (internal quotation marks omitted).) He string cites three

cases to support that proposition: People v. Smith, 29 Cal. 4th 849, 852 (2002); People

v. Scott, 9 Cal. 4th 331, 354 (1984); and In re Ricky H., 30 Cal. 3d 176, 191 (1991). 

Petitioner misreads these cases. These cases do not stand for the proposition that a

challenge to the length of a sentence may be raised whenever one pleases or beyond the

statute of limitations. Rather, these cases hold that challenges to the length of the

sentence are preserved on appeal—meaning they are not waived—regardless of

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whether an objection was made in the lower court. See Smith, 24 Cal. 4th at 852; In re

Rickey H., 30 Cal. 3d at 191; Scott, 9 Cal. 4th at 354.

In sum, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has diligently pursued his rights

and that an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing of his federal habeas

petition. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997.

B. Application of McQuiggin v. Perkins

Petitioner argues that the “miscarriage of justice” exception in McQuiggin v.

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013), entitles him to equitable tolling. (Pet’r’s Objections

9:3–8.) This Court disagrees. 

McQuiggin states, in pertinent part, that:

To invoke the miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA’s

statute of limitations . . . a petitioner “must show that it is

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Unexplained

delay in presenting new evidence bears on the determination

whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing. . . .

“[A] court may consider how the timing of the submission

and the likely credibility of [a petitioner’s] affiants bear on

the probable reliability of . . . evidence [of actual innocence].

McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1926 (citations omitted) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 327, 332 (1995)). Specifically, the United States Supreme Court held that “actual

innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether

the impediment is a procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” Id.

at 1928. However, the court cautioned that “tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas

are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades

the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would

have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.(citing Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 329; House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)) (emphasis added). In McQuiggin, the

defendant asserted actual innocence of the first-degree-murder conviction, and

presented newly discovered evidence in the form of three affidavits, each pointing to

an alternative alleged perpetrator as the murderer. Id. at 1930, 1936.

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Here, Petitioner claims “actual innocence of a crime alleged in a prior strike”

which was the product of another case prosecuted in New York, and not the crime for

which he was convicted of in this case. (Pet’r’s Objections 9:3–8.) That distinction

already removes this case from the scope of McQuiggin. 

However, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the circumstances ofthis

case fall within the scope of McQuiggin, Petitioner fails to provide new evidence to

indicate his actual innocence. He fails to provide or identify new evidence with his

petition or opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and certainly fails to do so

with his objections to the report. As a result, an essential threshold requirement to

invoke the miscarriage-of-justice exception is not present here—new evidence. 

Therefore, in failing to present any new evidence, Petitioner fails to satisfy the

requirements set forth in McQuiggin to entitle him to equitable tolling through the

miscarriage-of-justice exception. See McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1926-28. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

After considering Petitioner’s objections and conducting a de novo review, the

Court concludes that the magistrate judge’s reasoning in the report is sound. 

Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, is not entitled to equitable tolling, and is not

saved by the miscarriage-of-justice exception. In light of the foregoing, the Court

OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, APPROVES and ADOPTS the report in its

entirety, GRANTS Respondents’ motion to dismiss, and DISMISSES WITHOUT

PREJUDICE the petition. 

Moreover, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

Under this standard, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

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(2000)). Here, Petitioner has not made the requisite showing. Because reasonable

jurists would not find the Court’s assessment of the claims in the petition debatable or

wrong, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. See Slack, 529

U.S. at 484.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 22, 2014

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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