Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02219/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02219-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A., AS TRUSTEE 

FOR LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION 

TRUST,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRENTON MCCORMICK AND 

MONIQUE MCCORMICK,

 Defendants.

Case No. 2:15-cv-2219-TLN-GGH

SUA SPONTE REMAND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Brenton McCormick and Monique 

McCormick’s (“Defendants”) Notice of Removal and Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. 

(ECF Nos. 1–2.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby remands the action to the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento, due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 4, 2015, Plaintiff U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF8 Master 

Participation Trust (“Plaintiff”) brought an action against Defendants for possession of the real 

property known as 108 Snow Bar Court, Folsom, California (“the Property”). (Notice of 

Removal, ECF No. 1 at 10.) The Complaint alleges that Defendants were the foreclosed upon 

Case 2:15-cv-02219-TLN-GGH Document 3 Filed 10/28/15 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

owners of the Property and continue to occupy the Property despite having no ownership or 

possessory interest in the Property. (ECF No. 1 at 11–12.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were

served a “Notice to Quit after Foreclosure Sale” and continue to occupy the property. (ECF No. 1 

at 11.) 

On October 26, 2015, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal removing this unlawful 

detainer action from the Sacramento County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW

28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the removal to federal court of any civil action over which “the 

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Removal is 

proper only if the court could have exercised jurisdiction over the action had it originally been 

filed in federal court.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

Courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “the 

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[i]f the district court at any time 

determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the 

improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” California ex rel. Lockyer 

v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838, as amended, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 

U.S. 974 (2005).

The “presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. 

Removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim raising a 

federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 

U.S. 49 (2009); Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2009). 

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants removed this case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 

Defendants argue that the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 (“PTFA”) gives rise to a 

federal question by identifying two ways in which the statute is drawn into controversy in the 

Case 2:15-cv-02219-TLN-GGH Document 3 Filed 10/28/15 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

instant case. 

Defendants state that Plaintiff’s claim is based upon a notice which expressly references 

and incorporates the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5220. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 8.) However, the Complaint itself contains only a single claim for unlawful detainer. 

(ECF No. 1 at 9–10.) Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal [question] jurisdiction 

exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 

complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 386. The instant Complaint relies solely on California state 

law and does not mention expressly or impliedly 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, et. seq. The Complaint does 

not state claims under the PTFA or any other federal law. The well-pleaded complaint rule makes 

the plaintiff the master of his claim, so he may avoid federal jurisdiction by basing his claim 

exclusively on state law, as is the case here. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

It seems Defendants mean to assert subject matter jurisdiction by alleging Plaintiff

violated the PTFA.1 However, removal cannot be based on a defense, counterclaim, cross-claim, 

or third party claim raising a federal question, whether filed in state court or federal court. See 

Vaden, 556 U.S. at 49; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d at 1042–43. While Defendants 

contend in the notice of removal that Plaintiff has violated a federal law, this assertion relates 

only to an affirmative defense or potential counterclaim, which is not considered in evaluating 

whether a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff’s complaint. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 

60-62. “[A] counterclaim – which appears as part of the defendant’s answer, not as part of the 

plaintiff’s complaint – cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” Holmes Group, 

Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).

In summary, the state court Complaint indicates that the only cause of action is one for 

unlawful detainer, which arises solely under state law and not under federal law. Thus, this action 

does not arise under federal law and no other grounds for federal jurisdiction are apparent. 

Therefore, it is appropriate to remand this case, sua sponte, for lack of federal jurisdiction. See 

 

1

In any event, the Ninth Circuit has held that no private right of action exists under the PTFA. Logan v. U.S. 

Nat. Assoc., 722 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2013). Further, “the PTFA is framed in terms of ‘protections’ for tenants, 

suggesting that it was intended to provide a defense in state eviction proceedings rather than a basis for offensive 

suits in federal courts.” Id. at 1173.

Case 2:15-cv-02219-TLN-GGH Document 3 Filed 10/28/15 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the 

district court ha[s] a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the removed action sua 

sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Thus for the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 

No. 2) is DENIED as moot, and the Court hereby remands this action to the Superior Court of 

California, County of Sacramento.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2015

Case 2:15-cv-02219-TLN-GGH Document 3 Filed 10/28/15 Page 4 of 4