Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02741/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02741-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM GREEN,

Petitioner,

v.

D.K. SISTO, Warden,

Respondent. ________________________

Case No. CIV S-07-2741 VAP

(HC)

[Petition filed on December

19, 2007]

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED

BY A STATE PRISONER

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner William Green is a state prisoner

proceeding in pro se in a habeas corpus action filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition was filed on

December 19, 2007, Respondent filed an Answer on August

29, 2008, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on December 16,

2008. On January 5, 2009, the action was transferred to

this Court pursuant to an Order of Designation of Judge

to Serve in Another District within the Ninth Circuit. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the

Petition.

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1 The trial court found that Petitioner had served

four prior prison terms, and considered those terms as

"aggravating circumstances justifying the imposition of

an aggravated sentence" on one of the robbery counts. 

(Ct. of App. Op. at 13.) The trial court also imposed an

additional year of imprisonment for each of the four

prior prison terms, but stayed this enhancement. (Id.) 

The Court of Appeal found this to be an improper dual use

of the prior prison terms, and ordered the additional

four one-year enhancements stricken. (Id. at 14.) The

prior terms are not relevant to either of the claims in

the Petition.

2 The factual summaries of these events are based on

the July 7, 2006 opinion of the California Court of

Appeal, Third Appellate District. (Pet. Ex. 2; Lodged

Doc. 4 ("Ct. of App. Op.").) That court's factual

determinations are "presumed to be correct" and

Petitioner may only rebut this "presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(e)(1). Petitioner has not identified any such

evidence.

2

A. Statement of Facts

On November 2, 2004, a jury in the Superior Court of

California, Sacramento County, found Petitioner guilty of

two counts of second degree robbery, in violation of

California Penal Code § 211.1

 The convictions arose out

of two separate incidents on Monday mornings in December

2003.2

1. The December 8 Robbery

Chris Thomas was the assistant manager of a Taco Bell

restaurant in Sacramento. (Ct. of App. Op. at 2.) Every

day, he would go to a local Bank of America to deposit

the restaurant's previous day's receipts. (Id.) On

December 8, 2003, he arrived at the bank in his van

between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., and an African-American man

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wearing a black stocking cap approached his vehicle.

(Id.) Thomas initially waved him away, but the man then

tapped on the van window with a gun, and said "I know you

have the money from Taco Bell." (Id.) Thomas handed him

the money, and the man ran around the side of the bank,

and out of Thomas's view. (Id.)

A witness in the bank parking lot, Jeremiah Schotl,

then saw an African-American man walk around the side of

the bank, and get in the passenger seat of a parked gray

Toyota. (Id.) Another African-American man was waiting

in the vehicle, and promptly drove away. (Id.) Police

later recovered a Toyota sold by Petitioner at a salvage

yard, which Schotl identified as looking "exactly like"

the getaway car. (Id. at 2-3.)

2. The December 22 Robbery

Mohammed Awad was the assistant manager of a

Wienerschnitzel restaurant in Rancho Cordova. (Ct. of

App. Op. at 3.) Every weekday, between 9:00 and 10:00

a.m., Awad would drive to a nearby U.S. Bank and deposit

the previous day or days' receipts. (Id.) On December

22, 2003, Awad drove to the bank at about 9:30 a.m.,

parked his car, and started towards the bank. (Id.) He

soon was approached by an African-American man, dressed

in black and wearing a black mask, who Awad saw get out

of a dark red American car. (Id.) The man pulled a

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black gun from his jacket and said to Awad, "Don't move." 

(Id.) Awad threw the money he had intended to deposit to

the ground. (Id.) The man picked it up, ran toward the

red car, which was now moving slowly through the parking

lot, got into the passenger seat, and rode off. (Id.)

At around the same time, a witness, Kerry Freeman,

saw a man dressed in black running toward a red Cadillac

car with no license plates in a remote part of the

parking lot. (Id.) She saw the man get into the

passenger seat of the car, and also saw the driver, who

she identified as an African-American man in his mid or

late 20s. (Id. at 3-4.) Freeman followed the car as it

exited the lot and called 911. (Id. at 4.)

When police officers responded, Freeman directed them

to the car, which was parked outside an apartment

complex. (Id.) They found a black stocking mask on the

ground outside the car's passenger door. (Id.) Later,

they found packaging for a toy pistol inside the car. 

(Id.)

The officers traced the vehicle as belonging to Eric

Hayes, Petitioner's half-brother, and were directed to

Hayes's apartment. (Id.) There, they found Petitioner

and Hayes, a stack of currency on the bathroom floor, and

a toilet bowl full of wet money. (Id.)

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Parked next to the Cadillac was a Ford Bronco, also

owned by Hayes. (Id.) In the Bronco, the officers found

a black leather jacket, a pair of black leather gloves,

and a black toy pistol. (Id.)

Awad later identified the red Cadillac as the car

used in the robbery, and Hayes as the robber. (Id.) He

reported having seen Hayes "outside the restaurant almost

every day before the robbery." (Id.) Freeman also

repeated her identification of the car, but could not say

whether it was Hayes or Petitioner who was the driver of

the car. (Id.)

3. Hayes's Testimony at Trial

Hayes confessed to the December 22 robbery at the

scene of his arrest, pled guilty to both robberies and

testified against Petitioner at trial. (Ct. of Appeal

Op. at 5, 6.) At Petitioner's trial, Hayes admitted to

being the individual who took money from both Thomas and

Awad at gunpoint, and testified that Petitioner drove the

getaway cars on both occasions. (Id. at 5) Hayes

testified that Petitioner had originated the idea of

staking out fast food restaurants and, on Monday

mornings, following the employees responsible for taking

the weekend's receipts to the bank and robbing them when

they went to make the deposit. (Id.) Hayes explained

Petitioner wanted Hayes to be the actual "gunman," since,

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should they be caught, Petitioner faced harsher penalties

due to his prior criminal convictions. (Id.)

Hayes also testified that he and Petitioner purchased

the air pistols brandished in the robberies. (Id.) He

stated that Petitioner had owned the Toyota used in the

December 8 robbery, but later wrecked it and sold it for

salvage, and used the proceeds to purchase the Cadillac

used in the December 22 robbery. (Id.) This was

confirmed by the police's own investigation. (Id. at 3.)

According to Hayes, after the December 22 robbery,

Petitioner told Hayes to hide his jacket, gun, and gloves

in the Ford Bronco parked next to the Cadillac, and then

the men entered Hayes's apartment. (Id. at 5.) At that

point, Petitioner began counting the money taken from

Awad. (Id.) The men heard dogs barking, and, thinking

they were police dogs, Hayes unsuccessfully attempted to

flush the money down the toilet. (Id. at 5-6.)

B. Procedural History

On December 3, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to 17

years imprisonment for his role in the two crimes. (Pet.

Ex. 1.) Represented by counsel, he filed an appeal of

his sentence and conviction in the California Court of

Appeal, Third Appellate District, on November 21, 2005.

(Lodged Doc. 1.) The Court of Appeal modified and

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affirmed the judgment on July 7, 2006. (Ct. of App. Op.) 

On August 16, 2006, via counsel, Petitioner filed a

petition for review with the California Supreme Court,

which was summarily denied on September 20, 2006. (Lodged

Docs. 5-6.)

C. Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner filed this petition on December 19, 2007,

and asserts the following grounds for federal habeas

corpus relief:

1. The trial court's failure to sever the counts

against him was a violation of his rights under the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; and

2. There was insufficient evidence to corroborate

Hayes's testimony as to Petitioner's participation in the

December 8, 2003 robbery.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA") governs the Court's review of this

Petition, as the Petition was filed after AEDPA's

effective date. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), "a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States."

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When considering a properly exhausted claim under

AEDPA, a federal court must defer to a state court's

holding unless it “'was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,' or if the state court decision 'was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'” 

Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009),

quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

"Clearly established Federal law" is defined as “the

governing legal principle or principles set forth by the

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its

decision." Curry, quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 71-72 (2003). "[I]t is not 'an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law' for a

state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule

that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme]

Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1419 (2009). However, "the Supreme Court need not

have addressed an identical fact pattern to qualify as

clearly established law, as 'even a general standard may

be applied in an unreasonable manner.'” Jones v. Ryan,

583 F.3d 626, 635 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioner's First Claim

Petitioner's first claim is that the trial court 

violated his constitutional right to a fair trial when it

denied his motion to "sever trial of count one from that

of count two, principally on the basis that a weak count

has been joined with a strong count." (Pet. at. 5.) 

Petitioner concedes that "there was significant evidence"

relating to his involvement in the December 22, 2004

robbery, but suggests that this evidence impermissibly

influenced the jury's findings as to his involvement in

the earlier robbery. (Id.)

The failure to sever trial of multiple counts in an

indictment only violates a defendant's federal

cosntitutional rights if it "actually rendered

petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and hence,

violative of due process," as shown by "a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict." Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). See also United States

v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n. 8 (1986) ("misjoinder would

rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if

it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant

his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial"). "In

evaluating prejudice, the Ninth Circuit focuses

particularly on cross-admissibility of evidence and the

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danger of 'spillover' from one charge to another,

especially where one charge or set of charges is weaker

than another." Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th

Cir. 2004). "[C]ross-admissibility dispels the

prejudicial impact of joining all counts in the same

trial." Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 773. 

The Court of Appeal concluded the motion to sever was

properly denied, as Petitioner failed to make "a clear

showing of potential prejudice." (Ct. of App. Op. at 7,

applying People v. Osband, 13 Cal. 4th 622, 666 (1996).) 

The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court and

found no prejudice since the evidence of the two crimes

would have been cross-admissible as facts tending to

establish a "common design or plan." (Ct. of App. Op. at

9-10, citing Cal. Evid. Code § 1101.) In finding that

the two robberies "had sufficient common features to

establish cross-admissibility based on common scheme or

plan," the Court of Appeal noted that both crimes

occurred on Monday mornings, only two weeks apart; that

both victims were fast food employees making deposits of

weekend receipts; and both crimes involved a gunman

approaching on foot while a second person waited in a

getaway car "far enough away from the victim that he

could not be seen." (Id. at 10.) 

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Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a state

law question, and state court interpretations of state

law are not reviewable on habeas by federal courts. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). While the

admissibility of some evidence could raise constitutional

due process questions, the Ninth Circuit has held that

the admission of propensity evidence does not entitle a

petitioner to habeas relief because there is no clearly

established Supreme Court precedent holding that the

admission of such evidence is a violation of due process.

Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008);

Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 863-67 (9th Cir.

2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1287 (2007). Accordingly,

this Court is bound by the California state court's

determination of cross-admissibility.

In light of the cross-admissibility of the evidence,

the Court of Appeal's determination that the failure to

sever did not cause undue prejudice was not objectively

unreasonable. 

B. Petitioner's Second Claim

Petitioner's second claim is that there was

insufficient "evidence to corroborate Hayes' accomplice

testimony" regarding his participation in the December 8

robbery. Although accomplice testimony must be

corroborated under California law (see Cal. Penal Code §

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1111), no such requirement exists under the United States

Constitution. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S.

348, 352-53 (1969); United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969,

973 (9th Cir. 1986); Bacon v. Clark, No. CV 09-4088-CAS

(RNB), 2009 WL 3459135, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009). 

Rather, "the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is

sufficient to sustain a conviction unless it is

incredible or insubstantial on its face." United States

v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993). 

There is no indication that Hayes' testimony was

either incredible or insubstantial, and, as such,

Petitioner's second claim fails to present a cognizable

federal question. See Taffolla v. Hedgpeth, No. SACV

07-916-DOC (OP), 2009 WL 5064788, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Dec.

22, 2009); George v. Almager, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, Civil

No. 07cv2215 J(POR), 2009 WL 3061983, at *13 (S.D. Cal.

Sept. 24, 2009).

 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is DENIED. 

 Dated: January 21, 2010 

VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS 

 United States District Judge

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