Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00509/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00509-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

MELISSA BELL o/b/o D.B., a minor, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-509-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Melissa Bell on behalf of her minor son, D.B., applied for supplemental 

security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The application was 

denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a 

decision in which he found D.B. not disabled since the date the application was filed. 

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. The 

ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). 

The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 2:12-cv-00509-WC Document 26 Filed 11/20/13 Page 1 of 8
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of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to 

Jurisdiction (Doc. 10); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9). Based on the court’s 

review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court REVERSES the decision of 

the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 

includes the standard for defining child disability under the Social Security Act. See 

PUB. L. NO. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2188 (1996). The statute provides that an 

individual under 18 shall be considered disabled “if that individual has a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe 

functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(C)(I) (1999). 

 The sequential analysis for determining whether a child claimant is disabled is as 

follows: 

1. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not 

disabled. 

2. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the 

Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a physical or mental 

impairment which, whether individually or in combination with one or 

more other impairments, is a severe impairment. If the claimant’s 

impairment is not severe, he is not disabled. 

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3. If the impairment is severe, the Commissioner determines whether the 

impairment meets the durational requirement and meets, medically equals, 

or functionally equals in severity an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If the impairment satisfies this requirement, 

the claimant is presumed disabled. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a)-(d) (1997). 

In determining whether an impairment functionally equals a listed 

impairment, the ALJ must consider the child’s ability to function in six 

different “domains”: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and 

completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about 

and manipulating objects; (5) “caring for yourself;” and (6) health and 

physical well-being. If the child has “marked” limitations in two of these 

domains, or an “extreme” limitation in any one domain, then his 

impairment functionally equals the listed impairments, and he will be found 

to be disabled. A “marked” limitation is one that seriously interferes with 

the child’s ability to initiate, sustain, or complete activities. An extreme 

limitation is one that “very seriously” interferes with the child’s ability to 

initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 

Coleman ex rel. J.K.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F. App’x 751, 752 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The Commissioner’s regulations provide that if a child’s impairment or 

impairments are not medically equal, or functionally equivalent in severity to a listed 

impairment, the child is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(2) (1997). In 

reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the court asks only whether the ALJ’s findings 

concerning the steps are supported by substantial evidence. “Under this limited standard 

of review, [the court] may not make fact-findings, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute 

[its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Bryant v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 478 F. App’x 644, 645 

(11th Cir. 2012) (citing Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)). 

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“Where substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s fact findings exists, [the court] cannot 

overturn those findings even if other substantial evidence exists that is contrary to the 

ALJ’s findings.” Id. (citing Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991)). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 D.B. was fourteen years old at the time of the hearing. See Tr. 21. Following the 

administrative hearing, the ALJ found that D.B. had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity at any time since the application date (Step 1). Id. The ALJ also found that D.B. 

had the following severe impairments under Step 2: “history of elevated lead level, 

obesity, history of headaches, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), disruptive 

behavior disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and borderline intellectual 

functioning (BIF).” Id. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that these impairments do not 

meet or equal in severity the criteria for any impairment in the Listing of Impairments, 

and that the claimant did not have an “extreme” limitation in any areas of functioning or 

“marked” limitation in two areas of functioning (Step 3). Tr. 21-30. Consequently, the 

ALJ found the claimant was not disabled. Tr. 30.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents three issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: (1) whether “[t]he ALJ committed reversible error by failing to find that D.B. 

meets Listing 112.05C and/or 112.05D”; (2) whether “[t]he ALJ committed reversible 

error by failing to find a ‘marked’ limitation in the domain of Acquiring and Using 

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Information”; and (3) whether “[t]he ALJ committed reversible error by failing to find a 

‘marked’ limitation in the domain of Attending and Completing Tasks.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 

15) at 6-15. Because the court determines the first issue requires remand for further 

proceedings, the court declines to address issues two and three at this time. 

V. DISCUSSION 

 The structure of the listing for mental retardation, 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 

1, § 112.05, 2 is different from that of other mental disorders listings. The listing contains 

an introductory paragraph which states that an intellectual disability is “[c]haracterized 

by significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive 

functioning.” 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 112.05. Further, the introductory 

paragraph states that “[t]he required level of severity for this disorder is met when the 

requirements in A, B, C, D, E, or F are satisfied.” Id. Thus, if a plaintiff’s impairment 

satisfies the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph (i.e. significantly 

subaverage general intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive functioning), an ALJ 

may consider any one of the six paragraphs to determine if the impairment meets the 

listing for mental retardation. 

The ALJ’s determination here is insufficiently clear to allow the court to conduct 

its mandated review for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Gaskin v. Commissioner of Soc. 

 

2

 The ALJ repeatedly referred to 12.05 as the listing governing mental retardation. However, 12.05 

applies only to adults. Adolescent mental retardation is governed by 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, 

§ 112.05. The ALJ appears to be relying on 112.05, but cites to 12.05. 

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Sec., 2013 WL 4081321, *2 (11th Cir. Aug, 14, 2013) (remanding because the court was 

“unable to review correctly whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding”). 

On the one hand, the ALJ appears to make a finding that D.B. met the requirements of the 

introductory paragraph, when she went on to discuss whether D.B. satisfied the 

requirements of paragraphs C and D. On the other hand, after seemingly making a 

determination that D.B. met the requirements of paragraph D, the ALJ stated that D.B. 

“does not have the required deficits in adaptive functioning.” Tr. 22. The ALJ does not 

explain what she means by the “required deficits.” Indeed, on at least four occasions in 

the three paragraphs devoted to the listing 112.05 determination, the ALJ references 

“required” deficits in adaptive functioning, but fails to actually discuss any specific 

findings related to adaptive functioning. 

 This is troubling because the ALJ appears to have found that, outside of the 

“required” deficits in adaptive functioning, D.B. met the listing of paragraph D of 112.05, 

stating that “claimant has multiple impairments and received a full scale IQ score of 70.” 

Tr. 22. The ALJ’s decision to move past the introductory paragraph suggests that she 

found D.B. met the requirement of deficits in adaptive functioning, something the court 

would note appears supported by substantial evidence. But the ALJ’s later determination 

regarding adaptive functioning is in conflict with such a suggestion. The record is 

unclear due to the ALJ’s failure to discuss the introductory paragraph’s requirement of 

deficits in adaptive functioning. 

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 That there is confusion on this issue is evidenced by the Commissioner’s 

arguments in support of the ALJ. The Commissioner attempts to support the ALJ’s 

statement that D.B. lacked the “required” deficits in adaptive functioning by introducing 

the standards for a diagnosis of mental retardation under the DSM-IV, referring to the 

requirement of “significant deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning.” Def.’s Br. 

Doc. 18) at 9 (citing to DSM IV at 42). However, there is no such requirement of 

“significant deficits” in the introductory paragraph of listing 112.05. Instead, there is 

only a requirement of deficits. That is, because the tests for a diagnosis of mental 

retardation under the DSM-IV and the determination of “Intellectual Disability” in listing 

112.05 are distinct. The Commissioner’s arguments related to adaptive functioning are 

without merit, because the Commissioner attempts to apply a higher standard of 

“significant deficits,” rather than the listing requirement of deficits.3

 The 

Commissioner’s confusion on the matter is understandable, however, due to the ALJ’s 

inconsistent and unclear findings. 

 Accordingly, this court finds that remand is necessary for the ALJ to clarify the 

listing 112.05 determination. 

 

3

 The Commissioner’s confusion on the issue is further evidenced by this statement: “Thus, Dr. 

Jordan’s opinion supports the ALJ’s finding that D.B. did not have significant sub-average 

general intellectual deficits in adaptive functioning.” Def.’s Br. (Doc. 18) at 9. Again, the 

Commissioner incorrectly attempts to apply a “significant standard” to adaptive functioning by 

blending the prongs of intellectual deficits and adaptive functioning together. 

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VI. CONCLUSION

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and this 

case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 Done this 20th day of November, 2013. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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