Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02137/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02137-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael E. Tennenbaum, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona City Sanitary District, a political 

subdivision of the State of Arizona, et al., 

 Defendants. 

NO. CV-10-2137-PHX-GMS 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 122). 

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion is denied in part and granted in 

part. 

BACKGROUND1

Defendant Arizona City Sanitary District is a public entity and political 

subdivision of the State of Arizona. Plaintiff Michael E. Tennenbaum alleges that on 

December 30, 2009, Defendant published a defamatory letter about him. Plaintiff further 

 

For a more detailed description of the background and facts, see the Court’s Order of 

August 7, 2012. (Doc. 119).

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alleges that this same letter was published in a local newspaper on January 13, 2010 and 

January 20, 2010, and that Defendant made additional defamatory comments regarding 

Plaintiff in a January 20, 2010 meeting. 

 On August 7, 2012, the Court issued an Order denying Defendant Arizona City 

Sanitary District’s motion for summary judgment regarding its notice of claim defense 

and granting Plaintiff Michael Tennenbaum’s cross motion for summary judgment 

against Defendant on that defense. (Doc. 119). On August 20, 2012, Defendant moved 

for reconsideration of the Court’s August 7th Order. (Doc. 122). On September 6, 2012, 

at the Court’s direction, Plaintiff responded to the motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 127). 

DISCUSSION 

 Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate only if the Court “(1) is presented 

with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. 

No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). In 

this case, Defendant contends that the Court committed clear error in its August 7, 2012 

Order because the Court stated that Defendant failed to raise its A.R.S. § 12-821.01 

notice of claim defense in its Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

The Court, indeed, mistakenly believed that Defendant had not raised its notice of 

claim defense until its summary judgment motion. (Doc. 119 at 7). In fact, Defendant had 

identified this defense on October 28, 2010 in its Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 

10, ¶ 2). “A party may assert an affirmative defense in its pleadings and still waive that 

defense by conduct.” Jones v. Cochise County, 218 Ariz. 372, 379, 187 P.3d 97, 104 (Ct. 

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App. 2008). The Court finds, however, contrary to its finding in the August 7, 2012 

Order, that Defendant did not waive its notice of claim defense. 

To be sure, Defendant waited nearly 15 months after identifying this defense in its 

Answer before seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on this basis. (Doc. 53). During this 

time Defendant provided Plaintiff with disclosure statements and accepted discovery 

requests from Plaintiff. (Doc. 119 at 7). Nonetheless, prior to bringing its motion for 

summary judgment, Defendant had not subpoenaed and deposed witnesses or otherwise 

actively engaged in discovery. (Doc. 72 at 2; Doc. 127 at 4). The instant case is therefore 

unlike the situation is Jones where the court not only noted that the defendant had failed 

to assert this defense in its initial answer, but found “[o]f particular importance” that the 

defendant “actively investigated and proactively defended the claim by subpoenaing and 

deposing witnesses.” 218 Ariz. at 380. Because Defendant in this case did not actively 

participate in the discovery process prior to filing its summary judgment motion, it did 

not “take[ ] substantial action to litigate the merits of the claim that would not have been 

necessary had [it] promptly raised the defense.” Id. at 380. (emphasis added). Defendant 

did not, therefore, waive its notice of claim defense. 

As the Court held in its August 7, 2012 Order, however, Plaintiff did serve a valid 

notice of claim on Defendant by July 12, 2010. (Docs. 119; 68 ¶ 29; 73 ¶ 29). 

Consequently, all Plaintiff’s claims which accrued within 180-days prior to that date—

namely the claims alleging publication of defamatory material on January 13, 2010 and 

January 20, 2010—are immune to the notice of claim defense. The Court will therefore 

not vacate its granting of Plaintiff’s motion in regards to those claims. 

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There is a genuine issue of material fact, however, whether Plaintiff knew of the 

December 2009 letter more than 180-days prior to Plaintiff’s service of the notice of 

claim. Although this letter was published in late December 2009—more than 180-days 

prior to July 12, 2010—it is not clear from the record at what point Plaintiff “realize[d] 

he . . . ha[d] been damaged and kn[ew] or reasonably should [have known] the cause, 

source act, event instrumentality or condition that caused or contributed to the damage.” 

A.R.S. § 12-821-01(B). Defendant will not, therefore, be precluded from litigating the 

issue of whether the notice of claim statute shields Defendant from Plaintiff’s claims 

insofar as they relate to Defendant’s initial publication of the letter in December 2009. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration 

(Doc. 122) is denied in part and granted in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s August 7, 2012 Order (Doc. 119) 

is vacated, but only to the extent that it is inconsistent with this order. 

 Dated this 14th day of September, 2012. 

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