Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00309/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00309-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cheryl Wells, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Hon. Jan E. Kearney, et al., 

Defendants. ______________________________________

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CV 07-309 TUC FRZ (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules of Practice of the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona, this case was referred to the

Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings and report and recommendation. Now pending

before the Court are a second group of motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 46, 60, 62, 63, 68 and

69]. The Court previously issued a second warning to Plaintiff that the second group of

motions could be granted if she failed to respond by July 21, 2009. Docket No. 85. As of the

date of this report and recommendation, Plaintiff has not filed her response to the second

group of motions. Also pending are Defendant John Knox Village’s Motion for Sanctions

[Docket No. 86], Defendant Broad and Cassel’s Motion for Sanctions and Motion for

Summary Disposition [Doc. Nos. 94 and 95], Defendant Kevin Kinghorn’s Motion for

Summary Disposition [Doc. No. 97], and Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to

Respond [Doc. No. 96]. Each of these motions is addressed herein. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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I. Background

The background facts of this case were previously described in the Court’s Report and

Recommendation filed on June 29, 2009, and are hereby incorporated as if fully set-forth

herein. 

II. Discussion

A. Motion for Extension of Time to Respond [Doc. No. 96]

As was the case with her previous motion for an extension, Plaintiff’s request for

extension of time was filed late. This motion was filed nine days after the deadline of July

21, 2009, specifically set by the Court for the filing of her responses. See Order filed June

17, 2009 [Doc. No. 85]. Moreover, as also was the case previously, the Order setting the

deadline in effect granted Plaintiff an extension of time by providing additional time for her

tardy responses. The same order warned her that she was to comply with the Local Rules

and that she was to “timely respond to all motions,” and that her failure to respond could be

treated “as a consent to the granting of that Motion without further notice . . . .” 

The most recently filed motion to dismiss was filed on March 23, 2009. Thus, with

the extensions previously informally and formally granted by the Court, Plaintiff had nearly

four months to prepare and file her responses. Given her failure to do so and the warnings

issued informing her of the consequences of such a failure, the Court does not find good

cause for the requested extension and recommends that it be denied. 

B. Motions to Dismiss Legal Standards

1. Personal Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., a party may assert that the court lacks jurisdiction

over the person and that the claims against them must therefore be dismissed. Ordinarily,

federal courts have no broader power over person outside the state in which they sit than do

the local state courts. Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97,

104-105 (1987); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A). The forum state’s “long-arm” statute is the

federal court’s starting point in analyzing personal jurisdiction in federal cases. If the statute

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would not enable the plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction in a state court action, the

plaintiff generally will be unable to obtain personal jurisdiction in a federal court action.

Omni, 484 U.S. at 104-105. 

In Arizona, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can be exercised “to

the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution [of Arizona] and the Constitution of the

United States.” Az.R.Civ.P. 4.2(a). This means that personal jurisdiction can be exercised

when a defendant has “sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 3 (2000) (citing International Shoe Co., v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). Personal jurisdiction, whether general or specific,

requires a defendant to have “purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’” in Arizona. Id.

(quoting Berger King Corp. V. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).

General jurisdiction subjects a defendant to suit on virtually any claim and is available

when the defendant’s contacts with Arizona are “substantial” or “continuous and systematic.”

Rollin v. William V. Frankel & Co., Inc., 196 Ariz. 350, 353 (App. 2000). If general

jurisdiction is not available, specific jurisdiction may be exercised if: “(1) the defendant

purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum; (2) the claim

arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contact with the forum; and (3) the exercise of

jurisdiction is reasonable.” 199 Ariz. at 3.

2. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in a

complaint. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement

to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,

1964-65 (2007). “[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. at 1965.

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In considering a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true

all material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn

from them. Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be

read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480,

1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences or

conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at

988; W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Dismissal pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990).

Furthermore, unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for

summary judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the complaint. In re

American Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir.1996),

rev'd on other grounds sub nom Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,

523 U.S. 26 (1998). A court may, however, consider exhibits submitted with or alleged in

the complaint and matters that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.1999); Lee

v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir.2001). Under these standards, it is only

under extraordinary circumstances that dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6). United

States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.1981).

C. Motions to Dismiss

1. Defendants John Knox Village [Doc. No. 46] and Broad and Cassel

[Doc No. 62]

Defendant John Knox Village of Florida, Inc. (“John Knox”) moves for the dismissal

of the allegations against it in the First Amended Complaint, based on the Plaintiff’s failure

to state a Federal RICO claim, and failure to state claims for breach of fiduciary duty,

conversion, and for injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s allegations against Broad and Cassel, the law

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firm that represented John Knox in the Florida action, are that “Broad and Cassel is an agent

and attorney fro Defendant John Knox Village.” First Amended Complaint, p. 4. Both John

Knox and Broad and Cassel contend that, as a Florida residents, the Plaintiff cannot establish

personal jurisdiction over them, and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. As it is

clear that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over John Knox or Broad and Cassel,

dismissal of the claims against them must be granted.

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that could be interpreted as establishing the Court’s

personal jurisdiction over Defendants John Knox and/or Broad and Cassel. Plaintiff alleges

in the Amended Complaint that John Knox “is the location where Elaine Wells resided for

over a decade before she was illegally removed from Florida by Cia Wells.” Amended

Complaint, p. 4. Plaintiff further alleges that:

Defendant John Knox aided and abetted defendants Cia Wells

and Kennedy in their unlawful removal of Elaine Wells, and the

surrender of her residence at John Knox, because John Knox

wanted to be in a position to resell Elaine Wells’ apartment to a

new owner.

Id., p. 11. In reference to Broad and Cassel, Plaintiff’s allegations, as quoted previously, are

even more brief.

Based on these allegations, and the facts asserted in the unopposed motions to dismiss

filed by John Knox and Broad and Cassel, it is apparent that John Knox and Broad and

Cassel are Florida corporations and is a residents of Florida. The activity that apparently

gives rise to Plaintiff’s allegations against them occurred entirely in Florida. Neither John

Knox nor Broad and Cassel conduct business or own property in Arizona. Further, nothing

in the record indicates either has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting

business in Arizona. John Knox and Broad and Cassel lack sufficient contact with Arizona

to establish general jurisdiction, and there is no indication in the record that this litigation

arises from any contacts they may have had with the State such that this Court may exercise

specific jurisdiction. As such, John Knox and Broad and Cassel’s contacts with the forum are

not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction over them by

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this Court would be unreasonable. As such, Defendants John Knox and Broad and Cassel’s

motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction should be

granted.

2. Defendants Lynne Tomasa [Doc. No. 60] and Kevin Kinghorn [Doc.

No. 68]

Defendants Lynne Tomasa and Kevin Kinghorn move for the dismissal of the claims

against them in the First Amended Complaint, asserting that Plaintiff has failed to state

claims against them upon which relief can be granted. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges on

information and belief that Tomasa is a court-appointed investigators who “claims to

represent Elaine Wells and should be bound by the proceedings and judgment herein.” First

Amended Complaint, p. 5. In the second and final mention of Tomasa and the only mention

of Kinghorn in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges:

Kevin Kinghorn and Lynne Tomasa are apparently courtappointed individuals who should have been bound by the

proceedings in Florida. Under established principles of comity

between state courts, the Florida Court, having acquired

jurisdiction first, should have been allowed to proceed first and

the Arizona matter should have been held in abeyance or

dismissed.

Id., p. 12.

As Tomasa and Kinghorn assert, these allegations fall far short of stating claims upon

which relief could potentially be based. As Plaintiff has specifically identified defendants

in claims two through eight, and none of them include Defendants Tomasa and/or Kinghorn,

the only claim in which they reasonably can be construed as named defendants is claim one,

the RICO claim. The Ninth Circuit has held that Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires that fraud and mistake be alleged with particularity, applies to civil

RICO fraud claims. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). The

Ninth Circuit has also recognized that Rule 9(b) may apply to claims that are “grounded” or

“sound” in fraud. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir.2003) (“In

some cases, the plaintiff may allege a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rely entirely

on that course of conduct as the basis of a claim. In that event, the claim is said to be

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‘grounded in fraud’ or ‘to sound in fraud,’ and the pleading of that claim as a whole must

satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).”). In this action, Plaintiffs' RICO claim

was “grounded” in fraud because it alleged a unified course of fraudulent conduct.

The specific provisions of Rule 9(b),in pertinent part, provide: “In all averments of

fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with

particularity.” Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. The rule “requires a pleader of fraud to detail with

particularity the time, place, and manner of each act of fraud, plus the role of each defendant

in each scheme.” Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405

(9th Cir. 1991); Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the

who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged”) (internal quotations omitted).

The RICO cause of action alleged here against Tomasa and Kinghorn clearly fails to

meet Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard. More than just omitting the “who, what,

when, where and how” of the misconduct alleged, Plaintiff has offered nothing that, if true,

would constitute wrongdoing on Tomasa or Kinghorn’s part. They apparently were

appointed by a court to represent Elaine Wells’ interests in some capacity. Plaintiff offers

nothing more and has failed to timely respond to the motion to dismiss. There are no

allegations of how, when and where Tomasa and/or Kinghorn committed any wrongful act.

The claim against them must therefore be dismissed.

3. Defendant Emeritus, Inc. [Doc No. 69]

The only mention of Defendant Emeritus is contained in the section of the First

Amended Complaint titled “parties,” and alleges as follows:

Defendant Emeritus, Inc. is a nursing home operator that is

aiding and abetting the other defendants by denying Elaine Well

[sic] medication and holding her in utterly unacceptable and

deteriorated conditions.

First Amended Complaint, p. 5. As is the case with Defendants Tomasa and Kinghorn, these

allegations do not begin to satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Again, there is no

who, what, when, where or how that is required to properly plead a RICO claim. The facts

might generously be construed as alleging a tort claim against Emeritus, but Plaintiff has

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neither alleged such a cause of action nor identified a basis for this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction over such a claim. As discussed in relation to Plaintiff’s motion for an extension

of time, Plaintiff has had four months to respond to Emeritus’s motion to dismiss and has

elected not to do so. The Court finds no reason to further delay the inevitable in this case and

recommends the dismissal of the claims against Emeritus. 

D. Motions for Rule 11 Sanctions [Doc. Nos. 86 and 94]

Defendant John Knox and Defendant Broad and Cassel request that the Court impose

sanctions against the Plaintiff in this action. One important purpose of Rule 11 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure is to deter abusive pretrial tactics by excluding baseless filings.

Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986).

Rule 11 sanctions can be awarded when a party asserts the same or similar claims in lawsuits

raising claims previously decided in another case. Chestnutt v. Horizon Air Industries, Inc.,

133 F.R.D. 154, 156 (E.D. Wash. 1990). 

John Knox has adequately established that its inclusion as a defendant in this action

is entirely baseless and abusive. John Knox was a defendant in the Florida action filed by

Plaintiff, which was dismissed with prejudice. The Florida court subsequently awarded John

Knox its attorney fees based on the finding that “Plaintiff’s purported cause of action against

John Knox was clearly devoid of any legal merit, was without legal support and Plaintiff

made no argument that it was an appropriate case for extension, modification or reversal of

existing law.” John Knox Motion for Sanctions, Ex. B. Plaintiff was thus informed at least

twice that the claims alleged against John Knox were unfounded. Nevertheless, she elected

to include John Knox as a defendant here. As discussed above, Plaintiff has again failed to

offer any factual or legal support for her claims against John Knox.

The deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint implicate several grounds

identified as bases for sanctions. The claims against John Knox lack in evidentiary support

or likely evidentiary support, the claims are frivolous and not warranted by existing law, and,

given that Plaintiff previously was made well aware that her claims were not warranted, were

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filed for an improper purpose. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2), (3). Additionally, John Knox has

satisfied the “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11 in that the motion for sanctions was served

more than 21 days prior to filing. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(1)(A). 

Defendant Broad and Cassel’s only relation to the underlying facts in this case are that

the law firm represented John Knox in the Florida litigation. Plaintiff has offered no basis

in law or fact to include it as a defendant in this action. As discussed in relation to the

motion to dismiss, the only allegations against Broad and Cassel are that it acted as “an agent

and attorney for Defendant John Knox Village.” Based on this allegation, the only liability

Plaintiff asserted against Broad and Cassel was derivative to that of John Knox. As she was

repeatedly informed, Plaintiff’s claims against John Knox were clearly devoid of any legal

merit. As such, not only are the claims alleged against John Knox in his case baseless and

abusive, so too are those alleged against its Florida attorneys, Broad and Cassel. 

Due process requires that the offending party be given notice of the grounds for

sanctions and the opportunity to be heard before the imposition of sanctions. Fed. R.Civ.P.

11(c); Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 64 (2nd Cir. 2000). Accordingly, it is recommended that

an order to show cause be issued that conforms with these requirements. 

E. Motions For Summary Disposition [Doc. Nos. 95 and 97]

Defendants Broad & Cassel and Kevin Kinghorn seek summary disposition of this

matter based on Plaintiff’s failure to timely respond to the pending motions. As discussed

in relation to Plaintiff’s motion for another extension to respond, this is one of the reasons

for the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the pending motions to dismiss be granted.

As such, these motions are granted as well.

III. Recommendation

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, issue an Order:

1. Granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants in the action [Doc. Nos.

46, 60, 62, 63, 68 and 69] without leave to amend;

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2. Granting Defendant Broad and Cassel’s [Doc. No. 95] and Defendant Kevin

Kinghorn’s [Doc. No. 97] Motions for Summary Disposition;

3. Issue an Order to Show Cause on Defendant John Knox Village’s Motion for

Sanctions [Docket No. 86], Defendant Broad and Cassel’s Motion for

Sanctions [Doc. No. 94]; and 

4. Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Respond [Doc. No. 96].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV 07-309-TUCFRZ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 11th day of August, 2009.

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