Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04326/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04326-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD K. BRIDGEFORTH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A.P. KANE, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. C 05-4326 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; FURTHER

SCHEDULING ORDER

(Docket No. 4)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the decision of the California Board of Prison

Terms (“Board”) denying him parole. The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why

the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. 

Petitioner has filed opposition, and Respondent has filed a reply. After reviewing the

papers submitted, the Court will DENY Respondent’s motion to dismiss (docket no. 4)

and issue a further scheduling order as set forth below. 

BACKGROUND

In 1989, Petitioner was sentenced to a state prison term of seven years-to-life after

his conviction for kidnap for robbery in Kern Superior Court. Petitioner challenges the

**Original filed 3/27/07**

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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Board’s decision to deny him parole following a suitability hearing in December 2003. 

Petitioner filed habeas petitions in the state superior court, state appellate court and state

supreme court, all of which were denied as of September 7, 2005. Petitioner filed the

instant federal habeas petition on October 25, 2005. 

Petitioner alleges that the Board’s denial of parole based on the unchanging

circumstances of his commitment offense was not supported by sufficient evidence and

violated the terms of his plea agreement, thereby depriving him of his reciprocal benefit

of lessened punishment and his state and federal due process rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments. 

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the instant petition on the grounds that Petitioner’s

claim is untimely, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and Petitioner in fact

received due process. The Court will discuss each of Respondent’s arguments in turn. 

A. Statute of Limitations under AEDPA

Respondent first contends that the instant petition is untimely pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of

limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Under

AEDPA, prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must file

petitions for relief within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment

became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct

review; (B) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action

was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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Section 2244’s one-year limitation period applies to all habeas petitions filed by

persons in “custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” even if the petition

challenges a pertinent administrative decision rather than a state court judgment. Shelby

v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). For

prisoners challenging administrative decisions such as the revocation of good time credits

or the denial of parole, § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies, and the one-year limitations period

begins to run on the date the administrative decision becomes final. See id. at 1066

(limitation period began to run the day after petitioner received timely notice of the denial

of his administrative appeal challenging disciplinary decision); Redd v. McGrath, 343

F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (limitations period began to run when Board of Prison

Terms denied prisoner’s administrative appeal challenging the Board’s decision that he

was unsuitable for parole). The “factual predicate” of the habeas claim is the

administrative appeal board’s denial of the administrative appeal rather than the denial of

the state habeas petition. See id. at 1082. A prisoner challenging an administrative

decision is, however, entitled to statutory tolling for the period when state habeas

petitions are pending. see id. at 1084. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) does not govern the

timeliness of challenges to administrative decisions because the word “judgment” in 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) refers to the judgment of conviction and sentence and the phrase “direct

review” refers to direct appellate review of that judgment. See id. at 1081.

Here, Respondent maintains that Petitioner’s claim concerning a violation of his

plea agreement is untimely. Petitioner alleges that his plea agreement provides that he

will serve no more than twelve years in prison. Petition at 11. Respondent alleges that

the “factual predicate” of Petitioner’s claim that his plea agreement was violated thus

arose in November 2001, when Petitioner was incarcerated beyond the twelve year

period. Petitioner did not raise this claim until November 4, 2004, in his habeas petition

to the state superior court. Petition, Exh. D. 

Petitioner contends that his claim concerning his plea agreement is timely under

2244(d)(1)(D), because he had to serve a determinate term of four years prior to the

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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commencement of the indeterminate term which he challenges here. Assuming that

Petitioner is correct, the twelve years began to run in November 1991. Petitioner also

claims that although the parole hearing at issue here was held on December 18, 2003, he

filed an administrative appeal challenging this decision on March 28, 2004, which was

not decided until several months later. See Pet.’s Opp. at 1-2. 

The Court concludes that the instant petition is timely under 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Although Petitioner challenges the Board’s denial of parole following his December 18,

2003 suitability hearing, the statute of limitations began to run only when Petitioner’s

administrative appeal challenging the Board’s decision became final. See Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d at 1084. As noted above, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition

in November 2004, prior to the date of the administrative appeal decision. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Next, Respondent alleges that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over the petition because California inmates have no federally protected due process right

to parole release. Respondent contends that the holding of In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

1061 (2005), establishes that California prisoners have no liberty interest in parole. 

Although a convicted person has no inherent or constitutional right to early release

on parole, a State’s statutory parole scheme may create “a presumption that parole release

will be granted” if it uses mandatory language. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal

& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). A presumption of parole release gives rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest that cannot be denied without adequate due

process protection. Id. at 11-16; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-

78 (1987).

In Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that Montana’s statutory parole

scheme, which instructed that the parole board “shall” release a prisoner on parole absent

certain conditions, used mandatory language that created a constitutionally protected right

to parole that would be granted if those conditions were found not to exist. Allen, 482

U.S. at 376-78. Similarly, in Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that Nebraska’s parole

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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statute, which instructed that the parole board “shall” release the prisoner on parole absent

certain conditions, created a liberty interest in release on parole if those conditions were

found not to exist. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.

California’s parole scheme is set forth in California Penal Code § 3041. Section

3041(b) states that the parole board “shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety

requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date,

therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Cal. Pen. Code § 3041(b). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the California parole scheme “gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole” under the Allen and Greenholtz standards

because it “‘creates a presumption that parole release will be granted’ unless the

statutorily defined determinations [set forth in § 3041(b)] are made.” McQuillion v.

Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12). Thus,

under Ninth Circuit authority, the mandatory language of California’s parole scheme

creates a federally protected liberty interest such that an inmate has a right to due process

in parole release absent the determinations set forth in § 3041(b).

Although Respondent argues that In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005),

establishes that California life term inmates have no federally protected liberty interest in

parole, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected this reading of Dannenberg. It held squarely 

that “California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole after In re

Dannenberg.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir.

2006). The Court observed that Dannenberg “addressed the narrow question whether the

Board must engage in a comparative proportionality analysis in setting parole dates

pursuant to section 3041(a) before determining whether an inmate is suitable for parole

pursuant to section 3041(b).” Id. at 1127-28. It did not “explicitly or implicitly hold that

there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 1128. In fact,

Dannenberg used language that indicated it assumed the existence of a liberty interest:

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 1 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court criticized the mandatory

language methodology described above and offered a new test; however, the Sandin test relates

to claims dealing with the day-to-day management of prisons and does not apply to parole

eligibility determinations. See McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902-03.

 2

 The Court declines to address Respondent’s additional argument to dismiss Petitioner’s

claims on the merits. Respondent may address the merits of Petitioner’s claims and renew its

arguments in its answer, as set forth below in the Court’s further scheduling order. 

Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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“the Board has always enjoyed broad parole discretion with deferential judicial oversight. 

But these well-established principles do not deny due process. On the contrary, they

define and limit the expectancy in parole from a life sentence to which due process

interests attach.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1095 n.16; see also id. at 1094 (“sole

reliance on the commitment offense might . . . contravene the inmate’s constitutionally

protected expectation of parole.”) 

Respondent also relies upon language in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

Sandin held that state-created liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause are

“generally limited to freedom from restraint” which “imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 483-84. 

Respondent argues that because Petitioner can expect to be imprisoned for life, denial of

parole is not an “atypical” or “significant hardship,” so § 3041 does not give rise to a

state-created liberty interest. This argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit in

both McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) and Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003), both of which are controlling here.1

 Because Petitioner

thus has a federally protected liberty interest in release on parole, this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 over the instant petition. Accordingly,

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (docket no. 4) is DENIED.2

 

In light of the denial of the motion to dismiss, Respondent shall serve an answer to

the Order to Show Cause within sixty days of the date of this order. Respondent shall

file with the answer and serve on Petitioner a copy of all portions of the state parole

record that have been transcribed previously and that are relevant to a determination of

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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the issues presented by the petition. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall

do so by filing a traverse with the Court and serving it on Respondent within thirty days

of his receipt of the answer.

 It is Petitioner’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner is reminded that 

all communications with the Court must be served on Respondent by mailing a true copy

of the document to Respondent’s counsel. Petitioner must keep the Court and all parties

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper captioned “Notice of Change

of Address.” He must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do

so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

3/26/07

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Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Further Scheduling Order

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A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

Richard K. Bridgeforth

D-19012

CTF

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Jessica N. Blonien

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

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