Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00530/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00530-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

IAN ANTHONY MASSEY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-530-WC

) [WO]

)

QUALITY CORRECTIONAL )

HEALTHCARE, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Ian Anthony Massey [“Massey”], a former county

inmate, challenges the medical treatment provided to him during his prior incarceration in

the Montgomery County Detention Facility. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 2-3. Specifically,

Massey alleges that the jail’s medical personnel acted with deliberate indifference to his

medical needs associated with a left knee injury suffered prior to his incarceration. Id. In

an amendment to the complaint, Massey challenges the fees assessed to inmates for

medical treatment. Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 14 at 2. Massey names

Quality Correctional Healthcare, Inc. [“QCHC”], Dr. Jerry Gurley and Nurse Tameika

Copelin as defendants in this cause of action. Massey seeks declaratory relief and

monetary damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights.

The defendants filed an answer, special reports, a supplement to the reports and

Case 2:12-cv-00530-WC Document 47 Filed 05/23/14 Page 1 of 18
supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing Massey’s allegations. In these documents, the

defendants adamantly deny they acted with deliberate indifference to Massey’s medical

needs and further argue that they are not responsible for the assessment/collection of

payments from inmates for medical treatment as these actions are undertaken by

Montgomery County. Upon receipt of all requisite documents from the defendants, the

court informed Massey that the defendants’ special reports may, at a future time, be treated

as a motion for summary judgment and explained to Massey the proper manner in which

to respond to a motion for summary judgment. September 7, 2012 Order - Doc. No. 33.

Massey filed his response to the defendants’ report on June 5, 2013. Doc. No. 43.

Pursuant to the aforementioned order, the court deems it appropriate to treat the

defendants’ reports as a motion for summary judgment. Thus, this case is now pending on

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s response, the court

concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

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(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute asto any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).

1

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the

[record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-24.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish,

with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats &Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 1

summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent

stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally

applicable to the current rule. 

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summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263.

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of [medical personnel]. Unless a prisoner can point

to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to

prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to

survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Massey is

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial

supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving

party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment

may be granted.” Id. at 249-50. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing

party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact]

could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct.

2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th

Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for

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summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A

plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . . , in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence,

are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916

(11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing

beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman

v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own

conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment . . . .”); Evers v.

General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations

without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails

to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden

of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Sw.

Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie

case the plaintiff presentsinsufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier

of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.).

For summaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74 Ave., Miami, Fla., 363

th

F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the substantive law

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applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children

and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual disputes that are

material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry of summary

judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary

judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the

case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there issome metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases

where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be

reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279

(11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving partymust

produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670

(11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s

disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case,

Massey failsto demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude

summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

III. DISCUSSION

2

A. Deliberate Indifference

Massey contends that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his

medical needs. To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate medical

treatment, an inmate must, at a minimum, show that the defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v.

Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.

1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d

The record indicates that Massey was a pre-trial detainee during the period of time that the alleged 2

constitutional violations occurred. Regardless of Massey’s status in the jail, either as a pre-trial detainee or convicted

inmate, the applicable standard of review remains the same. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Lancaster v. Monroe

Cnty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996)

(citations omitted) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’sCruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,

which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners. . . . However, the applicable standard is the same, so decisional

lawinvolving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees.”); Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty.,

774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986) (For analytical purposes, there is no

meaningful difference between the analysis required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth

Amendment.); Tittle v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (observing that “[w]hether the

alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”). 

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1052, 1058 (11th Cir.1986). Specifically, medical personnel may not subject an inmate to

“acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th Cir.

1995) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (As directed by Estelle, a plaintiff must

establish “not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary

treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary]

treatment.”

That medical malpractice-negligence by a physician-is insufficient to form

the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well settled. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-07, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976);

Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). Instead, something

more must be shown. Evidence must support a conclusion that . . . harmful

acts [of jail officials or medical personnel] were intentional or reckless. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977-79, 128 L.

Ed. 2d 811 (1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996)

(stating that deliberate indifference is equivalent of recklessly disregarding

substantial risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1543 (stating

that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to assert an Eighth

Amendment violation); Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Ctr., 40

F.3d 1176, 1191 n.28 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that Supreme Court has

defined “deliberate indifference” asrequiring more than mere negligence and

has adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from criminal law); Qian

v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir.1999) (stating “deliberate indifference”

is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and that “reckless” conduct

describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).

In order to properly establish “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need .

. . , Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate

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indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s

injury.” Mann v. TaserInt’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking

relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively

serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of

facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts.”

Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the official

must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Thus, deliberate

indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety; the [defendants] must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168

(4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a serious condition, not just

knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious condition to warrant finding of

deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk

that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under

our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate

indifference, . . . the Supreme Court has. . . emphasized that not ‘every claim

by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S. Ct. at

291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth

amendment onlywhen it is‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ 

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Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence

or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292 (‘Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.’);

Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not

sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor

does a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical

staff and the inmate asto the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatmentsupport

a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)).

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258

(citation and internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need, a plaintiff must demonstrate that [the] defendants’ response to the need was

more than “merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or treatment, or even

medical malpractice actionable under state law.”). Moreover, “as Estelle teaches, whether

government actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of

treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an

appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d

at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A difference of opinion

as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”);

Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (mere fact inmate desires

a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference violative

of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (prison

medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their opinions

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concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). Self-serving

statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory,

contemporaneously created medical records. See Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th

Cir. 1990).

In addition to the above described requisite elements, when an inmate’s deliberate

indifference claim alleges a delay in treatment, this court must also consider “(1) the

seriousness of the medical need;(2) whetherthe delayworsened the medical condition; and

(3) the reason for the delay.” Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007).

In a case alleging that delay in medical treatment shows deliberate indifference, the

plaintiff “must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental

effect of delay in medical treatment [on his medical condition] to succeed.” Hill v. DeKalb

Reg’l Youth Det. Cent., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on other

grounds, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 n.9 (2002); Mann, 588 F.3d at 1307.

Massey asserts that the jail’s medical personnel acted with deliberate indifference

to his knee condition because they failed to issue him a bottom bunk/bottom tier profile on

February 13, 2012 when he initially referenced his problems with using the stairs and

accessing a top bunk, denied him appropriate medication for his knee/back pain and failed

to provide appropriate treatment for his post-surgical knee. The defendants adamantly

deny they acted with deliberate indifference to Massey’s medical needs.

The evidentiary materials filed by the defendants address the allegations made by

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Massey. A thorough review of these documents demonstratesthat the affidavitssubmitted

by the medical defendants describing the treatment provided to Massey are corroborated

by the objective medical records contemporaneously compiled with such treatment. The

medical records and an affidavit from Dr. Gurley addresses the treatment provided to

Massey relevant to the claims presented in the complaint as follows:

The first contact QCHC and its employees had with the Plaintiff was

when an intake history and physical was conducted on February 9, 2012.

[During intake, Massey advised the screening nurse that he previously

underwent surgery on his left knee and further informed her that he was on

no medications at that time. Defendants’ Exhibit 2 to the Special Report -

Doc. No. 12-2 at 1-2. Upon receiving authorization from Massey,

Defendants’ Exhibit 3 to the Special Report - Doc. No. 12-3 at 13, QCHC

requested relevant medicalrecordsfromthe UABhealth systemand received

these records via fax on February 15, 2012. The medical records obtained

from UAB demonstrated that Massey] had knee surgery on July 13, 2011 at

UAB. The surgery consisted of a left knee arthroscopy, ACL reconstruction

with patellar tendon autograph, medial meniscal repair and lateral

meniscectomy. He was discharged from UAB on July 14, 2011with a hinged

knee brace.

On February 13, 2012, the Plaintiff placed a sick call [request] which

was received [by medical personnel] on February 15, 2012. He was seen by

a nurse [on the aforementioned date]. He complained ofscrews, anchors and

staples and said it was hard to get up and down from his top bunk. [Massey,

however, did not mention an alleged fall from the bunk on February 12, 2012

or any injuries allegedly suffered in such fall. Defendants’ Exhibit 2 to the

Special Report - Doc. No. 12-2 at 15. The nurse obtained Massey’ssignature

on an authorization form for release of his medical records and instructed

Massey to return to sick call if he had any further problems. Id. The nurse

also advised Massey that the physician would have to review his medical

records to determine whether to issue a bottom bunk profile. Id.] His

medical records were ordered to be reviewed by the doctor and, [on

November 21, 2012], Dr. Bates entered an order that [Massey] be placed in

a lower bunk/lower tier. [Massey also filed another sick call request on

February 20, 2012 seeking a bottom bunk profile. Id. at 14.] Dr. Bates’

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order [for a bottom bunk profile/bottom tier housing] was reviewed and

signed by me on February 27, 2012.

The Plaintiff . . . placed a sick call request on February 24, 2012 and

it was received [by medical personnel] on February 25, 2012. He stated that

he fell in his cell getting down from the top bunk on February 12, 2012.

There was no previous sick call [request mentioning the fall or any attendant

injuries to Massey’s knee] or knowledge [by medical personnel] of the fall.

[A nurse examined Massey on February 25, 2012 regarding his complaints

related to the alleged fall from his bunk. Defendants’ Exhibit 2 to the

Special Report - Doc. No. 12-2 at 13. After her examination, the nurse

referred Massey to the doctor for further assessment of his condition. Id.]

He refused medication and made insulting remarks about the doctors.

I saw the Plaintiff on February 27, 2012 regarding left knee pain and

right wrist pain. He stated that he had fallen from the top bunk [on February

12th]. His knee had minimalswelling, and he had full range of motion of the

knee. He walked with no difficulty and the knee was non-tender. His right

wrist had full range of motion and good function. I felt at that time that he

was malingering and was definitely . . . displaying manipulative and

threatening behavior. I ordered x-rays of the left knee and right wrist [and

prescribed Motrin 400 mg twice a day for four days and a warm compress

for his knee for four days. Defendants’ Exhibit 3 to the Special Report -

Doc. No. 12-3 at 18]. The left knee x-ray showed no fracture or dislocation.

There was evidence of previous ACL repair.

The Plaintiff placed a sick call request on March 29, 2012,

complaining of knee pain. However, he refused to be seen [by medical

personnel regarding this complaint]. He stated that he would buy Motrin or

deal with the pain on his own and that he would take care of it on the outside.

The Plaintiffsubsequently placed a sick call request on June 13, 2012,

which was received [by medical personnel] on June 15, 2012. He

complained that his knee was worse. He was now [also] complaining of

lower back pain and he thought he had nerve damage. He was evaluated by

a nurse and the doctor was called. He was placed on increased fluids and

orders were given for his knee to be elevated at bedtime.

The Plaintiff was seen June 18, 2012 complaining of knee pain and

swelling, and with muscle problems and back pain. He was noted to be able

to walk without difficulty. His left knee was swollen, but non-tender. His

motor and sensitivity function was within normal limits. He again appeared

to be exhibiting malingering and manipulative behavior. [An order to obtain

an appointment with an orthopedic specialist regarding evaluation of

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Massey’s left knee was entered and a 5-day prescription for Motrin was

issued for the inmate during this evaluation.]

An orthopedic follow up appointment [was scheduled with Dr.

Charles Hartzog of Alabama Orthopedic Specialists on July 31, 2012.

Defendants’ Exhibit 3 to the Special Report - Doc. No. 12-3 at 18.].

Defendants’ Exhibit 1 to the Special Report (Aff. of Dr. Jerry N. Gurley) - Doc. No. 12-1

at 1-3.

Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the course of

treatment undertaken by the defendants in addressing Massey’s complaints regarding his

knee and subsequent pain issues did not violate his constitutional rights. The care Massey

received was certainly not “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock

the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness.” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505.

The allegations presented by Massey simply fail to establish deliberate indifference by the

medical defendants. Garvin, 236 F.3d at 898 (difference of opinion regarding manner in

which condition should be treated fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation); Adams,

61 F.3d at 1545-46 (Whether medical personnel “should have employed additional

diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical

judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis” on which to ground constitutional

liability. Moreover, any allegation that health care personnel did not diligently pursue

alternative means of treating a condition “did not ‘rise beyond negligence’. . . to the level

of deliberate indifference.”); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (inmate’s desire forsome other form

of medical or dental treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative of the

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Constitution); Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple divergence of opinions between medical

personnel and inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment). Finally, to the extent

Massey bases his claims on purported malpractice by the defendants, Plaintiff’s Response -

Doc. No. 43 at 2, the law is well settled that medical malpractice does not establish

deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become

a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Taylor, 221 F.3d at

1258 (deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of medical malpractice);

Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice is “not sufficient” to

constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (medical malpractice does

not constitute deliberate indifference).

It is undisputed that Massey received treatment for his left knee and other alleged

associated pain while incarcerated in the Montgomery County Detention Facility.

Specifically, medical personnel evaluated each of his sick all requests, conducted physical

examinations when warranted, issued him a bottom bunk/bottom tier profile upon his

requestsforthese actions, prescribed himmedication, provided warmcompresstherapyand

referred him to a free-world orthopedic specialist for additional evaluation. All of the

3

treatment rendered bythe defendants occurred pursuant to their professional judgment after

their evaluation of Massey’s physical condition. In addition, Massey has failed to present

Massey composed the first request for a bottom bunk profile on February 13, 2012, a day after his alleged fall, 3

and medical personnel received this request on February 15, 2012. He did not mention his fall in this request. 

Defendants’ Exhibit 2 to the Special Report - Doc. No. 12-2 at 15. A lower bunk/bottom tier profile was issued to

Massey on February 21, 2012. Defendants’ Exhibit 3 to the Special Report - Doc. No. 12-3 at 19. 

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any evidence which indicates that the medical defendants knew that the manner in which

they provided treatment created a substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge

consciouslydisregarded such risk. The record istherefore devoid of evidence,significantly

probative or otherwise, showing that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to

Massey’s medical needs. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor

of the defendants on the deliberate indifference claim. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

B. Medical Fees

Massey complains that his constitutional rights were violated by the deduction of

feesfrom hisinmate account for partial payment of costs attendant to hisreceipt of medical

treatment. The defendants assert that neither QCHC nor any of its employees are

responsible for the assessment or collection of fees associated with medical treatment

provided to inmates. Defendants’ Exhibit 1 to the September 7, 2012 Supplemental Special

Report (Affidavit of Dr. Johnny E. Bates) - Doc. No. 32-1 at 1 (QCHC and its employees

“are compensated for our services solely pursuant to provisions of [a contract with

Montgomery County]. QCHC does not make any direct monetary charges to inmates. To

the extent that the charges are made to inmatesfor medicalservices,such charges are made

by Montgomery County.”). Massey presents no evidence to dispute the manner in which

charges are made and collected. Moreover, even if the defendants were responsible for

assessment and collection of medical fees, these actions, standing alone, do not violate the

Constitution. The mere fact that the plaintiff is charged a nominal fee or co-payment for

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medical treatment does not in any way deprive the plaintiff of a protected right, privilege

or immunity. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir.

1985) (imposition of fee for medical treatment provided to an inmate does not amount to

a constitutional violation); Bester v. Dr. Wilson, 2000 WL 1367984 at *8 (S.D. Ala.

August 18, 2000) (“[T]he charging of a fee to prisoners for medical treatment from their

funds has been held to be constitutional when challenged on several due process and

Eighth Amendment grounds.”). Massey does not allege that he was denied medical

treatment because he was unable to pay the fee; instead, the undisputed evidentiary

materials before the court indicate that Massey received medical treatment despite a

negative balance in his inmate account. See Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis(Resident Transaction Details)- Doc. No. 2-1 at 1-3. Since Massey has

failed to allege a violation of his constitutional rights with respect to the

assessment/collection offees associated with medical treatment, the defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

2. Judgment is GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

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4. No costs are taxed herein.

A separate Final Judgement will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Done this 23rd day of May, 2014.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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