Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-02362/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-02362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARPRUBERTITO BONTILAO, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, Warden

Respondent. 

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No. C 03-2362 JF

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a pro se state prisoner, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. In its April 20, 2004 order to show cause, this Court found that the petition raised two

cognizable claims: (1) Petitioner’s guilty plea was involuntary, denying him his right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of

counsel because his trial attorney failed to use the services of an interpreter to explain the

elements of second degree murder. The Court dismissed Petitioner’s third claim because it

alleged only state law error and was not cognizable under § 2254. Respondent filed an answer

addressing the merits. Petitioner did not file a traverse. Upon review of the merits of the

petition, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the claims presented and

will deny the petition.

**Original filed 5/5/06**

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal found the relevant facts to be as follows:

On November 8, 1997, defendant’s four-month-old son Paul was taken to

the hospital where he was pronounced dead. The coroner’s report concluded that

Paul died from a depressed fracture to the left region of the skull and a massive

sub-dural hemorrhage. According to the medical examiner, who performed the

autopsy on Paul, it was highly unlikely that the injuries were caused by a fall onto

a flat surface due to the nature of the fracture. The medical examiner concluded

that Paul’s head was stationary when he received the injury and he was most

likely struck on his head by a hard object. 

Defendant gave the police conflicting versions of how Paul was injured. 

He eventually apologized to his wife for killing their son. Defendant told the

probation officer that “it was an accident and [he] accept[ed] punishment.”

Counsel represented the defendant at the plea hearing. The following

colloquy occurred: 

THE COURT: You have been represented by Mr. Mandel throughout these

proceedings, you’ve had enough time to spend with him going over possible

defenses and the elements of this offense, are you satisfied with his

representation? [¶] 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.

Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187).

Defendant did not seek to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing.

Respondent’s Exhibit A (Unpublished Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Sixth

Appellate District, People v. Bontilao, H020362, and In Re Bontilao, H021875, Nov. 3, 2000) at

2-3. 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifteen years-to-life in state prison. Id. at 1. The

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but issued an order to show cause why

a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted on the ground that the trial court failed to advise

Petitioner correctly as to the immigration consequences of his plea. Ex. A at 9. On February 21,

2001, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. On July 27, 2001,

the superior court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the habeas petition. 

Respondent’s Exhibit B (Reporter<s Transcript of Superior Court Evidentiary Hearing on Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus, People v. Bontilao, Santa Clara Superior Court, No. 206077) at 15. 

On April 15, 2002, the Sixth District Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition for writ of

habeas corpus. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for writ of habeas

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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corpus on March 26, 2003. Petitioner filed the instant federal action on May 20, 2003. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The “objectively unreasonable” standard does not equate to “clear

error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of clear error fails to give

proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (citation omitted). The court must presume correct

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Guilty Plea

Petitioner first claims that his guilty plea was involuntary and thus violated his

constitutional right to due process because he did not understand that second degree murder

requires an intent to kill or implied malice (a life-endangering act taken with awareness of the

danger to life). Petition at 7, Appendix A at 16-17 (citations omitted). The state appellate court

found that Petitioner failed to establish that his plea was not knowing and intelligent. Ex. A at 4. 

The court recognized that there is no constitutional requirement that the trial court explain the

elements of the offense before accepting a plea. The court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s

observation in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976): 

Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial

judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense

has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express

representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense

counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the

accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.

Here, before entering his plea, Petitioner acknowledged that he had discussed the elements of the

crime with his counsel, and expressed no confusion about the offense. Ex. A at 3-4. 

A guilty plea, comprising the waiver of a defendant’s right against self-incrimination and

right to a jury trial, must be knowing and voluntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748

(1970). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving that his plea was not knowing and

voluntary. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992). As the Supreme Court noted in Blackledge

v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977): 

[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a

[plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea,

constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent

presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to

summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the fact of the record are wholly

incredible. 

In this case, Petitioner has not overcome the presumption that his plea was knowingly

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1

 The California Superior Court waived the attorney-client privilege for purposes of the

evidentiary hearing. Ex. B at 5. See Cal. Evid. Code § 958 (“There is no privilege . . . as to a

communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out

of the lawyer-client relationship.”). See also People v. Tucker, 61 Cal.2d 828 (1964). 

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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and voluntarily made. Parke, 506 U.S. at 31. At his plea hearing, Petitioner indicated that he

was entering his plea without any mental impairment, reservation, or coercion; that he

understood the consequences of his plea; that he had spoken with his attorney about the elements

of the offense and possible defenses; and that he waived his rights to remain silent, to a jury trial,

cross-examination of State witnesses, and compulsory process for defense witnesses. 

Respondent’s Exhibit RT (Reporter’s Transcript of Guilty Plea Hearing, People v. Bontilao,

Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No. 206077, Apr. 30, 1999) at 4-7. Petitioner fails to allege

any facts related to specific conversations with counsel in which Petitioner failed to understand

the content of the conversations. At the evidentiary hearing in the state habeas proceedings,

Petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he explained the elements of the charged offense to

Petitioner prior to the plea.1 Ex. B at 9. Petitioner thus has failed to establish that the state

appellate court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor that

it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner next contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

because his trial attorney failed to use a Tagalog interpreter while explaining the elements of the

second degree murder charge to him. Petition at 8, Appendix A at 21-22. Petitioner concedes

that he “understand[s] and speak[s] English,” but states that he is “more comfortable

communicating in Tagalog,” especially when “legal terms” are explained. Respondent’s Exhibit

C (Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed in California Court of Appeal, In Re Bontilao, No.

H021875, Aug. 28, 2000), attached Ex. A at 1. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, Petitioner

must make two separate showings. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was

deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

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2

 “Any person who, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age,

assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great

bodily injury, resulting in the child’s death, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison

Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to provide a Tagalog interpreter

during his conversations with counsel fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. Petitioner’s trial counsel indicated that Petitioner spoke English

very well, and that there were “no serious problems” in his communications with Petitioner. Ex.

B at 8. There are no indications in the record that Petitioner did not understand the

conversations with his trial counsel, or that Petitioner requested and was denied the use of an

interpreter by counsel during his communications with counsel. While he claims he did not

understand the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty, Petitioner does not explain why

he went forward and entered the guilty plea under these circumstances. 

Petitioner’s reliance on Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) is misplaced. In

Chacon, the defendant was grossly misinformed by an interpreter of the sentencing consequences

of his plea when the interpreter translated defense counsel’s explanations. Id. at 1461. As a

result, the defendant pled guilty to an offense he believed would be punished by a three month

jail term, but was sentenced to the maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Id. The Ninth

Circuit found this misinformation to be prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Id. at 1464-65. Here, Petitioner does not claim that he received misinformation in his

communications with his attorney. Rather, he alleges merely that he would have been “more

comfortable communicating in Tagalog.” Ex. C, attached Ex. A at 1. 

Assuming arguendo that Petitioner has demonstrated counsel’s deficient performance,

Petitioner nonetheless fails to demonstrate any prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In

addition to the murder charge, Petitioner was initially charged with Cal. Penal Code § 273ab,2

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for 25 years to life. Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the applicability of

subdivision (a) of Section 187 or Section 189.” Cal. Penal Code § 273ab. 

3

 “Any person who willfully inflicts upon a person who is his or her spouse, former

spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or the mother or father of his or her child, corporal injury

resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be

punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for

not more than one year, or by a fine of up to six thousand dollars ($6,000) or by both fine and

imprisonment.” Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a). 

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which carries a sentence of twenty-five years-to-life, and Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a),3

 which

carries a maximum sentence of four years in state prison. As a result of Petitioner’s guilty plea

to the second degree murder charge, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss all other charges. Ex. B at

6. Petitioner claims that he pled guilty “because [his] lawyer told [him] [he] would face a longer

sentence if [he] was convicted.” Ex. C, attached Ex. A at 1. Petitioner has not demonstrated that

this advice was deficient, or resulted in any prejudice to him. Petitioner’s after the fact

declaration that he “did not really understand what [he] was admitting” does not indicate a

complete lack of understanding of what he was admitting to in his plea. Id. (emphasis added). 

Petitioner has not shown that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. 

In this respect as well, Petitioner fails to establish that the state appellate court’s decision

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor that it was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal

constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for

the writ of habeas corpus is denied. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _______________ 

 JEREMY FOGEL 

 United States District Judge

5/3/06

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

Arprubertito Bontilao

P-41537

High Desert State Prison

P.O. Box 3030

Susanville, CA 96130

Christopher W. Grove

CA State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

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