Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00730/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00730-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1. A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint

screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires

the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

QUENTIN WAGNER, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-CV-730-MHT

) [WO]

)

D. T. MARSHALL, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which Quentin Wagner [“Wagner], an inmate

confined in the Montgomery County Detention Facility, challenges the constitutionality of

the Alabama Community Notification Act, Ala. Code 1975 § 15-20-20 et seq. (1975, as

amended) [“the Act”]. Specifically, Wagner requests that the Act “be declared

unconstitutional” or “a provision be added to the . . . Act that set[s] out how Wagner is to

be notified how to register” upon his release from prison. Plaintiff’s Complaint at 4. 

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this case prior

to service of process is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

 

DISCUSSION

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The claims presented by Wagner arise from possible future application of the

Alabama Community Notification Act and, therefore, are not ripe for adjudication. Kirby

v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1999). 

As part of the “case or controversy” requirement of

Article III, a party must suffer injury or come into immediate

danger of suffering an injury before challenging a statute. See

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38

L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Essentially, the ripeness requirement

“prevent[s] the courts, through the avoidance of premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The ripeness

requirement prevents courts from interfering with legislative

enactments before it is necessary to do so, and enhances

judicial decision-making by ensuring that cases present courts

with an adequate record for effective review. Id. Ripeness

requires the weighing of two factors: (1) the hardship to the

parties of withholding court consideration; and (2) the fitness

of the issues for judicial review. Id. at 139, 87 S.Ct. 1507. 

In Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J., 81 F.3d

1235 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit thoroughly examined the

ripeness requirement as applied to New Jersey’s community

notification law. Artway involved a convicted sex offender

who sought an injunction against the enforcement of a New

Jersey statute requiring certain convicted sex offenders to

register with local law enforcement officials. Additionally, the

statute provided for community notification upon the release of

certain sex offenders. The district court upheld the registration

component of the statute, but enjoined enforcement of the

community notification provision. On appeal, the Third Circuit

held that the challenge to the notification aspects of the statute

was not ripe. We agree with the reasoning of the Third

Circuit....

195 F.3d at 1290. 

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Because Wagner is not scheduled for release from confinement at this time, he has

failed to set forth a claim which demonstrates that he has suffered an injury from the

Alabama Community Notification Act. Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that

the instant complaint is subject to summary dismissal in accordance with the directives of

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before September 5, 2006 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

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District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 23rd day of August, 2006.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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