Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01697/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01697-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JDN 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tyson McDaniel, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Greg Fizer, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 12-1697-PHX-GMS (LOA) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Tyson McDaniel brought this pro se civil rights Complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) officials (Doc. 

7). Before the Court is McDaniel’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 30). 

 The Court will deny the motion without prejudice. 

I. Background 

McDaniel’s claim arose during his confinement at the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Florence (Doc. 7). He is a practicing Orthodox Muslim who fasts throughout 

the year to condition himself for fasting during Ramadan (id.). In Count I of his First 

Amended Complaint, McDaniel alleged that Chaplains Miser, Becker, and Mason 

refused to approve a kosher diet—which met McDaniel’s religious and dietary needs—on 

the ground that he was not sincere enough in his religious beliefs. McDaniel averred that 

the ADC Central Office ultimately granted his request for a kosher diet after finding no 

religious reason to deny the request. McDaniel alleged that the three Chaplain 

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Defendants violated his First Amendment free-exercise rights because their denial of a 

kosher diet was not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. 

 In Count II, McDaniel reasserted the facts in Count I and stated he began receiving 

a kosher diet; however, it was discontinued after just a few days because Miser said he 

had to go through the Chaplaincy Department for a religious diet, even though McDaniel 

provided the approval paperwork from Central Office to Miser, Deputy Warden Fizer, 

and Correctional Officer (CO) IV Zaborsky. McDaniel stated that these three Defendants 

refused to provide him a kosher diet although they knew that their actions burdened his 

religious exercise and was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 

McDaniel claimed that Miser, Mason, and Becker, along with CO IV Bohuszewicz, 

Fizer, and Zaborsky violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (id.). 

 In his pending motion, McDaniel requests an injunction directing Defendants to 

substitute the raw cabbage that is provided to him in his present kosher diet with an 

alternative, such as hot cereal, rice, tuna, or peanut butter and jelly, which he states are 

items already provided through the kosher diet (Doc. 30). McDaniel avers that the raw 

cabbage causes him gastrointestinal problems, which, in turn, interfere with his daily 

obligatory prayers (id. at 3). 

 Mason, Miser, Bohuszewicz, and Zaborsky respond to the motion and assert that 

McDaniel’s request should not be granted because he has not shown that any of the 

factors governing injunctive relief weigh in his favor, the named Defendants are not the 

officials who approve religious diets, and McDaniel’s claim that cabbage may affect his 

digestive system in the future is merely speculation (Doc. 32).1

 Defendants contend that 

 

1

 A footnote in Defendants’ response states that “Defendants served are Mason, 

Miser, Bohuszewicz, and Zaborsky” (Doc. 32 at 1 n. 1). The docket reflects that service 

was executed on Fizer on April 12, 2013 (Doc. 20), and service was executed on Becker 

on April 25, 2013 (Doc. 24) (sealed summons returned executed). On August 29, 2013, Fizer and Becker filed a Notice of Joinder to Defendants’ Amended Answer (Doc. 36). 

Thus, all named Defendants have appeared in this action. 

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McDaniel seeks substituted meal items for personal reasons and not for religious or 

medical needs. 

II. Preliminary Injunction 

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

show that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm without an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an 

injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only 

show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than 

likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the 

‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor,’ and the other two Winter

factors are satisfied.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2011)). Under this serious questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . 

must be balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker 

showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072. 

 Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each 

element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 

1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a 

mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law 

clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); see Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 

1403 (9th Cir. 1993) (“mandatory preliminary relief is subject to heightened scrutiny”). 

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 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner 

litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that 

any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct 

the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 

987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion 

 A. Injunctive Relief Related to Underlying Claim 

Before addressing the Winter factors, the Court considers Defendants’ argument 

that the allegations in McDaniel’s pending motion are “wholly outside” the underlying 

issue in this case (Doc. 32 at 2). A party seeking injunctive relief must show “a 

relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in 

the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming denial 

of an injunction request based on alleged retaliatory conduct unrelated to the basis of a 

prisoner’s § 1983 claim). A court should not grant an injunction “when the injunction in 

question is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the 

issues in the suit.” Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997). 

In his First Amended Complaint, McDaniel averred that he was originally 

provided a lacto-vegetarian diet, which met both his religious and dietary/health needs 

because he was able to maintain his weight and perform his obligatory prayers (Doc. 7 at 

5, 10). When that diet was discontinued, he was placed on the vegan diet; however, 

because the vegan diet was harmful to his digestive system, he sought medical assistance 

and was placed on the allergy-bland diet (id. at 6). But the allergy-bland diet included 

“unclean meat” not permitted under Muslim dietary laws (id.). It was for this reason that 

McDaniel sought the kosher diet (id. at 6, 11). 

 In his pending motion, McDaniel states that although he now receives the kosher 

diet, meals served to him twice a day contain raw cabbage, which causes him 

gastrointestinal problems and stomach pain, which in turn interfere with his ability to 

conduct his daily prayers (Doc. 30 at 3). He avers that he was seen by medical for his 

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digestive problems and advised to stop eating the raw cabbage (id. at 4). McDaniel 

indicates that he has since been losing weight; therefore, he seeks an injunction to 

substitute the cabbage for other available kosher foods so that he can maintain his weight 

and health for prayers and fasting (id. at 4, 6). 

Defendants assert that McDaniel now receives the kosher diet he requested in the 

underlying complaint (Doc. 30; see Doc. 7 at 22). But McDaniel alleges that the relief 

provided does not correct the harm; indeed, it has caused him additional harm. He is not 

required to file a separate lawsuit to challenge the adequacy of Defendants’ response to 

his complaint in this action. Moreover, the Court considers McDaniel’s allegations in his 

preliminary injunction motion to the extent that they clarify the claims set forth in his 

amended pleading. See Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008) (because the 

plaintiff was pro se, the complaint’s factual allegations and legal theories could be refined 

in subsequent filings); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting that 

the pro se litigant “bolstered his claim by making more specific allegations . . . in later 

filings”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that 

where a petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, courts must “construe the 

pleadings liberally and [ ] afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt”) (citation 

omitted). 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegations in McDaniel’s motion relate to 

the issue in this case, and the request for an injunction may be entertained. 

 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits and Irreparable Harm 

“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . including 

its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of 

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). To succeed on the merits of his 

First Amendment claim, McDaniel must show that Defendants have burdened the 

practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct—which he sincerely 

believes is consistent with his faith—without a justification reasonably related to 

legitimate penological interest. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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Whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests is 

determined by applying the four factors set out in Turner v. Safley. Id., citing 482 U.S. 

78, 89 (1987). 

 To succeed on the merits of his RLUIPA claim, McDaniel must show that the 

defendants imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). If he 

makes that showing, Defendants must prove that the burden both furthers a compelling 

governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995. 

 Based on the averments in his pleading and his motion, McDaniel is likely to 

succeed in establishing his sincere belief that eating a diet in accordance with Muslim 

dietary laws and conducting prayers and fasts are consistent with his faith. See Shakur, 

514 F.3d at 885 (to implicate the Free Exercise Clause, a belief must be “sincerely held” 

and “rooted in religious belief”). Thus, the Court turns to the likelihood of establishing 

that Defendants have burdened McDaniel’s religious practice. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates “have the right to be provided with food 

sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” 

Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “[A] prisoner’s 

religious dietary practice is substantially burdened when the prison forces him to choose 

between his religious practice and adequate nutrition.” Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 

869 (7th Cir. 2009); see Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996 (a prison policy that “intentionally 

puts significant pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious beliefs . . . imposes a 

substantial burden on [the inmate’s] religious practice”). McDaniel alleges that the rawcabbage-filled kosher diet causes him stomach problems which interfere with his prayers; 

thus, eating it would burden his religious practice but not eating it causes weight loss, 

thereby endangering his health (Doc. 30 at 9-10). His position is similar to the plaintiff in 

Shakur, who was faced with a “Hobson’s choice” of “eating the vegetarian diet that is 

Halal but disruptive to his religious activities, eating the regular diet that is Haram and 

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forbidden by his religion, or changing his religious designation to Jewish simply to obtain 

the desired kosher meat meals.” 514 F.3d at 889. 

 Defendants do not deny that the kosher diet provided to McDaniel includes raw 

cabbage twice a day, nor do they dispute McDaniel’s claims that he has been seen by 

medical personnel for gastrointestinal problems and that he has lost weight. Instead, they 

contend that McDaniel makes unsupported and vague assertions that his constitutional 

rights are violated due to the denial or delay of a religious diet (Doc. 32 at 5). But 

Defendants misconstrue the issue. Although Count I concerns an alleged prior denial of a 

kosher diet, in his motion, McDaniel is not alleging an unconstitutional denial or delay of 

a religious diet. Consistent with his First Amended Complaint, he is alleging denial of a 

diet that meets both his religious and dietary/health needs. McDaniel specifically alleges 

that the religious diet he is being provided is insufficient to sustain his health. As stated, 

if this is established, it would amount to a constitutional violation. Ward, 1 F.3d at 877. 

In failing to address the specific allegations raised in the motion, Defendants also fail to 

present any argument regarding how the Turner factors apply to McDaniel’s requested 

accommodation or whether the burden imposed furthers a compelling governmental 

interest. 

 Nonetheless, because McDaniel seeks mandatory relief—compelling Defendants 

to take action rather than precluding them from acting—he is subject to heightened 

scrutiny. McDaniel does not specify what his current medical/physical condition is or 

how his religious practice is being affected; i.e., exactly how much weight he has lost, 

how his health is affected, whether he is able to conduct prayers, whether he is able to 

fast in preparation for Ramadan, etc. More importantly, he does not support his motion 

with a sworn declaration. 

 Consequently, McDaniel is also unable to satisfy the heightened showing required 

to establish irreparable harm. See Ariz. Dream Act. Coalition v. Brewer, --- F. Supp. 

2d ----, 2013 WL 2128315, at *20 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2003) (“when seeking a mandatory 

injunction, . . . an even greater showing of injury is required); see also Marlyn 

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Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(mandatory injunctions generally are not granted unless the harm is extreme or very 

serious); but see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (the “loss of First Amendment 

freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable 

injury”); Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 483 (D. Ariz. 1995) (the “loss of an ability 

to practice a central tenet of one’s religion for any extended amount of time is clearly an 

irreparable injury”). Because McDaniel cannot satisfy his burden of showing a 

likelihood of irreparable harm, the remaining Winter factors need not be addressed. 

 In short, absent specific facts and supporting evidence, the Court cannot determine 

whether the facts and law clearly favor McDaniel, despite Defendants’ failure to argue a 

legitimate or compelling penological interest. See Dahl, 7 F.3d at 1403. A mandatory 

injunction is therefore not warranted, and the Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be 

denied without prejudice to refiling. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to 

McDaniel’s Motion for Preliminary injunction (Doc. 30), and the Motion is denied

without prejudice. 

 Dated this 29th day of October, 2013. 

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