Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08163/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08163-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jason Lawrence Sharp, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-08163 PCT DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

June 24, 2013. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 12) on April 28, 2014.

Respondents allow that Petitioner’s habeas action is timely and

that Petitioner properly exhausted the only claim presented in

the state courts. As of June 9, 2014, Petitioner has not

docketed a reply to the answer to his petition for habeas

relief.

I Procedural History

An indictment issued November 29, 2006, in the Yavapai

County Superior Court charged Petitioner with four counts of

sexual assault, class 2 felonies (Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5), and

one count of attempted sexual assault, a class 3 felony (Count

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2). See Answer, Exh. B. Counts 1 and 2 were alleged to have

been committed on or about November 23, 2006, and Counts 3

through 5 were alleged to have been committed between August and

September 2006. Id., Exh. B. The alleged victim of all the

counts was the daughter of Petitioner’s live-in girlfriend, who

was 19 years of age at the time of the alleged assaults. Id.,

Exh. B. The state later alleged that Petitioner had one

historical prior felony conviction and that he had committed the

offenses while on probation. See id., Exh. C. The state also

alleged that Petitioner committed multiple offenses on different

occasions. Id., Exh. D. 

The alleged victim and Petitioner’s girlfriend and

Petitioner all testified at his trial. Petitioner testified

that he had sex with the victim, but that the sex was

consensual. He also admitted that he repeatedly lied to a

police officer and a police detective when asked whether he had

ever had sexual contact with the victim, admitting he had told

the detective, “I didn’t do nothing. I swear it,” and, “I’m

being honest with you.” Id. at 9-10, quoting Exh. G (a

videotape)and Exh. F at 168–69, 171. 

The jury found Petitioner guilty on Counts 1 and 2

(sexual assault and attempted sexual assault on November 23,

2006), and found him not guilty on Counts 3, 4, and 5 (the

sexual assaults alleged to have occurred between August and

September 2006). Id., Exh. H at 29–30. Petitioner admitted

that he had committed the offenses while on probation. Id. at

13 n.5, citing Exh. F at 143 & Exh. H at 24–28. 

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On May 7, 2007, the state trial court sentenced

Petitioner to concurrent terms of seven and six and one-half

years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the term of

imprisonment Petitioner was serving in CR 2006–1157. Id., Exh.

I, at 7–8.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner asserted

the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted

photographs of abrasions on the victim. Id., Exh. K. In a

decision issued November 4, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which denied review on April 16, 2009. Id., Exh. O. 

Petitioner initiated an action for state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on May 7, 2009. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner was

appointed counsel. In his Rule 32 action Petitioner alleged

that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for

failing to call as witnesses his girlfriend’s children and his

14-year-old niece, who were in the same room when it was alleged

Petitioner sexually assaulted the victim. Id., Exh. S. The

state trial court held that Petitioner had presented a colorable

claim for relief, and conducted an evidentiary hearing on

December 10, 2010. Id., Exh. W. 

Petitioner first called his trial counsel, Ray Hanna,

as a witness. Id., Exh. W at 5–6. Mr. Hanna testified that

prior to trial he had, inter alia, interviewed all the children

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who were at the home at the time of the sexual assaults. Id.,

Exh. W at 8, 16. Mr. Hanna testified that he had to “pry out

information from them,” and when he did, they all consistently

claimed they had not seen anything. 

The children allegedly present at the time of the

assault also testified at the evidentiary hearing. The various

children told contradictory stories about who was where when and

all stated they had not seen anything. Id., Exh. W. After

argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Id.,

Exh. W at 183.

In a decision issued December 20, 2010, the state trial

court thoroughly discussed the evidence presented at the hearing

and denied Petitioner’s claims for post-conviction relief. Id.,

Exh. X. The state court found Petitioner’s counsel’s

performance did not violate Petitioner’s right to the effective

assistance of counsel pursuant to the test stated in Strickland

v. Washington, finding that the “failure” to call the children

as witnesses was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial.

Id., Exh. X. The state trial court noted Petitioner’s counsel

had interviewed the children and that two of the children were

available to testify at the trial. 

The court also found that Hanna “did not

think the children were believable,” and

“assessed their presentation as disingenuous

and influenced by adults.” (Id.) Based on the

testimony of the children during the

evidentiary hearing, the court held that

Hanna’s observations were correct. (Id.) The

court found that “the children appeared to be

testifying truthfully” during the evidentiary

hearing, but “they were understandably led to

agree with whichever counsel was questioning

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them.” (Id.) The court also surmised that

Hanna may “very well have accurately assessed

that their testimony could appear to have

been influenced by family members to assist

their father and uncle and undermine the

defense theory of consent.” (Id.) The court

held that Hanna’s decision not to call the

children as witnesses “was not unreasonable,”

and not ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Id. at 3–4.) 

Id. at 21.

In the decision denying post-conviction relief the

state trial court also determined Petitioner was not prejudiced

by the alleged failure of counsel to call the children to

testify at Petitioner’s trial. Id., Exh. X. The state trial

court reasoned that, if the children had been called to testify

at trial, “they would have been inconsistent as to details

regarding the occupants’ activities and locations” at the time

and place alleged and that two of the children, including the

eldest who was subpoenaed to testify, “would have acknowledged

that [Petitioner] could have committed the sexual contacts in

the computer room without them seeing it.” Id., Exh. X. 

On May 25, 2011, Petitioner sought review of the trial

court’s denial of Rule 32 relief by Arizona Court of Appeals.

Id., Exh. Y. On August 7, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the court had

“clearly identified and thoroughly addressed each aspect of

[Petitioner’s] claim and resolved the issues in a manner

sufficient to permit this or any other court to conduct a

meaningful review,” as well as that “[a]mple evidence supported

the court’s findings.” Id., Exh. AA at 4. Petitioner sought

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review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which

denied review on February 15, 2013. Id., Exh. DD. 

In his habeas petition Petitioner alleges that his

counsel was constitutionally ineffective, in violation of his

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, for failing to call as

witnesses his three children, his nephew, and his cousin, who he

claims were “present in the room at the time” he committed the

sexual assault and attempted sexual assault.

II Analysis

A. Standard of review of exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Musladin v. Lamarque,

555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under AEDPA, a federal

court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

unless the state court’s adjudication on the merits was

‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.’” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.

1376, 1390 (2012), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of United States

Supreme Court opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that

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is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme

Court but reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v.

Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005);

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149

(2004); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 785 (9th Cir. 2012),

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2766 (2013). 

A state court decision involves an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law if it correctly

identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or

fails to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new

set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See

McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 2010). The

state court’s determination of a habeas claim may be set aside

under the unreasonable application prong if, under clearly

established federal law, the state court was “unreasonable in

refusing to extend [a] governing legal principle to a context in

which the principle should have controlled.” Ramdass v.

Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2120 (2000). See

also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010).

However, the state court’s decision is an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law only if it can be

considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett,

559 U.S. 766, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010); Runningeagle, 686

F.3d at 785. An unreasonable application of law is different

from an incorrect one. See Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1862; Cooks v.

Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). “That test is an

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objective one and does not permit a court to grant relief simply

because the state court might have incorrectly applied federal

law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v. Cathel, 633

F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Howard v. Clark, 608

F.3d 563, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2010).

 Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be

correct and can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when

the federal court is presented with clear and convincing

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller–El v. Dretke, 545

U.S. 231, 240–41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller–El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003);

Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 763 n.1; Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d

943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881; Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006). The “presumption

of correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate

court, as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of

fact.” Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303,

1304–05 (1982). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court

has held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits

in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to

the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

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violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the

Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

otherwise requires. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1389-90; Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953–54, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858–59

(2007); Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 785-86; Greenway v. Schriro,

653 F.3d 790, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011).

B. Petitioner’s claim for relief

Petitioner asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a habeas petitioner must show both that his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

outcome of his criminal proceedings. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

The petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct was within the range of reasonable

professional assistance required of attorneys in that

circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

Counsel’s performance will be held constitutionally deficient

only if the habeas petitioner proves counsel’s actions “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” as measured by

“prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d

987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2010). To establish prejudice, the

petitioner must establish that there is “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

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result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. See also,

e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-88 (2011). 

To meet the first prong the defendant must

show that counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness. This

inquiry is “highly deferential.” When

Strickland’s standards are coupled with the

provisions of AEDPA, review is “doubly

deferential.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788.

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary....” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691,

104 S.Ct. 2052. Reasonableness is viewed as

of the time of the conduct and against the

background of the facts of the case. See

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381, 125

S.Ct. 2456, [] (2005)....

 The second prong requires the defendant to

“show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The question for

a reviewing court applying Strickland

together with the § 2254(d) overlay is

whether there is a “reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential

standard,” such that the state court’s

rejection of the IAC claim was not an

unreasonable application of Strickland. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788. Relief is

warranted only if no reasonable jurist could

disagree that the state court erred. See

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1402.

Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014).

Because Petitioner’s counsel investigated the

children’s testimony and made a legitimate strategic decision

not to call the children to testify at trial, which decision was

not prejudicial to Petitioner, the Arizona courts’ determination

that Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient and

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that, assuming arguendo the performance was deficient,

Petitioner was not prejudiced thereby, was not an unreasonable

application of Strickland. Compare Vega v. Ryan, 735 F.3d 1093,

1095-97 (9th Cir. 2013); Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086,

1104-05 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1239 (2013)

(collecting cases regarding deficient performance prong of the

Strickland test).

III Conclusion

The Arizona state courts’ conclusion that Petitioner

was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel

because counsel did not call the children, called at the

evidentiary hearing, to testify at Petitioner’s trial, was not

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the

correct test stated in Strickland v. Washington. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Sharp’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

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parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 11th day of June, 2014.

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