Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00911/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00911-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE MANUEL GARCIA, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SCOTT KERNAN, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No. 16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND 

[Doc. No. 8.] 

(2) GRANTING PETITIONER 30 

DAYS TO FILE A MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION 

On April 14, 2016, Petitioner Jose Manuel Garcia, a state inmate incarcerated at 

Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his July 23, 2012 state 

court conviction. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 24, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss 

the petition on the grounds that all of the claims in the petition have been procedurally 

defaulted. (Doc. No. 8.) To date, Petitioner has not filed an opposition to Respondent’s 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 11
2 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion to dismiss.1

 For the reasons below, the Court grants Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss. 

Background 

 On November 16, 2011, a jury found Petitioner guilty of (1) conspiracy to commit 

murder in violation of California Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1) and 187; (2) attempted murder 

in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664 and 187; (3) solicitation of murder in violation 

of California Penal Code § 653f(b); and (4) assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner in 

violation of California Penal Code § 4501. (Doc. No. 8-2, Ex. A at CT 238-41.) See People 

v. Garcia, No. D062370, 2014 WL 630307, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014). For each 

crime, the jury found true an allegation that Petitioner committed the offense for the benefit 

of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent 

to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members within the meaning 

of California Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). (Id.) The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an 

aggregate prison term of 25 years to life plus 19 years on July 20, 2012, and the trial court 

                                                      

1

 Petitioner’s opposition to the motion to dismiss was originally due on September 23, 2016. 

(Doc. No. 9.) On September 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a motion for a 60-90 day extension of the time to 

file his opposition. (Doc. No. 11.) On October 19, 2016, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion and 

extended the deadline for his opposition to December 23, 2016. (Doc. No. 12.) 

 On December 15, 2016, Petitioner filed a second motion for a 30-90 day extension of time to file 

his opposition. (Doc. No. 19.) On December 21, 2016, the Court granted Petitioner’s second motion 

and extended the deadline for his opposition to January 23, 2017. (Doc. No. 20.) 

 After Petitioner failed to file an opposition by January 23, 2017, the Court sua sponte extended 

the deadline for Petitioner’s opposition to February 24, 2017. (Doc. No. 22.) In that order, the Court 

explained that this was the last extension of time that the Court would provide to Petitioner, and the 

Court cautioned Petitioner that if he did not file an opposition by February 24, 2017, the Court might 

rule on the pending motion to dismiss without the opposition. (Id.) 

 On February 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a document purporting to be a further extension of time. 

(Doc. No. 24.) But a review of the filing reveals that it is the exact same filing as Petitioner’s prior 

motion for extension of time. (Compare Doc. No. 19 with Doc. No. 24.) The Court previously granted 

this request for an extension time, extending the deadline to January 23, 2017 and later to February 24, 

2017. (Doc. Nos. 20, 22.) Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s current request for an extension of 

time as moot. 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 11
3 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

later entered judgment on July 23, 2012. (Doc. No. 8-3, Ex. B at CT 344-47.) Garcia, 

2014 WL 630307, at *1. 

 Petitioner appealed the trial court’s judgment to the California Court of Appeal. 

(Doc. No. 8-3, Ex. B at CT 348-53.) On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged his conviction 

and sentence on the following grounds: 

(1) the [trial] court’s clarifying instruction on the attempted murder charge, 

informing the jury in response to Jury Note No. 3 that the term “a person” in 

CALCRIM No. 600, referred to “a defendant,” deprived him of due process 

“when it effectively omitted the required finding of the actual perpetrator’s 

specific intent to kill for derivative culpability based on aiding and abetting 

and/or conspiracy”; (2) if [the appellate court] determines that his counsel 

invited the trial court’s erroneous clarifying instruction, counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (3) the 

[trial] court prejudicially erred when it failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on 

conspiracy to commit assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser included 

offense of conspiracy to commit murder (count 1); (4) the court erred when it 

imposed the count 1 consecutive 10–year gang enhancement under section 

186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) because Garcia was sentenced to a life term for 

his count 1 conviction of conspiracy to commit murder, and, thus, the [trial] 

court should have imposed—under the mandatory alternative sentencing 

provisions of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(5)—a minimum term of 15 years 

before Garcia may be considered for parole; (5) the [trial] court erred when it 

imposed 10–year gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision 

(b)(1)(C) as to count 3 (solicitation of murder) and count 4 (assault with a 

deadly weapon by a prisoner) because neither offense is a violent felony 

within the meaning of that subdivision’ and (6) the [trial] court erred when it 

failed to stay under section 654 the sentence imposed for his attempted murder 

conviction (count 2) because he was separately punished for his conviction of 

conspiracy to convict murder (count 1) and the attempted murder was the 

object of the conspiracy. 

 

Garcia, 2014 WL 630307, at *1. (See Doc. No. 8-4, Ex. C at 22-87.) The California Court 

of Appeal noted that, on appeal, the government agreed with Petitioner’s three claims of 

sentencing error, and, therefore, the Court of Appeal ordered that Petitioner’s sentence 

must be modified and remanded the action for resentencing. Garcia, 2014 WL 630307, at 

*2. Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s challenges to the 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 11
4 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

validity his conviction and affirmed the judgment of conviction as modified. See id. at *2, 

14. 

 On March 24, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California 

Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 8-8, Ex. G.) On June 11, 2014, the California Supreme Court 

summarily denied the petition in an order stating: “The petition for review is denied.” 

(Doc. No. 8-9, Ex. H.) On remand, the trial court resentenced Petitioner to an aggregate 

term of 25 years to life plus nine years. (Doc. No. 8-11, Ex. J at 1.) 

 On December 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

California Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 136-37.) On January 12, 2015, the California 

Superior Court denied the habeas petition on the grounds that Petitioner failed to state a 

prima facie claim for relief. (Id. at 140-49.) 

 On February 4, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Court of Appeal, alleging the following grounds for relief: (1) insufficiency of 

the evidence; (2) entrapment; (3) juror bias and misconduct; (4) ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel; (5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (6) erroneous imposition of 

fines and fees; (7) a sentence that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (8) 

cumulative effect of error. (Doc. No. 8-10, Ex. I.) On March 5, 2015, the California Court 

of Appeal denied the habeas petition. (Doc. No. 8-11, Ex. J.) The California Court of 

Appeal held that all of the claims in the habeas petition were procedurally barred. (Id. at 

2.) The Court of Appeal explained: 

The claims are untimely because Garcia waited more than two years after he 

was sentenced to assert them, but has offered no explanation for the delay. (In 

re Reno (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 428,459; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302.) 

The claims (with the possible exception of those alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel) are also barred because they could have been asserted 

on appeal, but were not. “[A] litigant is not entitled to raise an issue on habeas 

corpus after having failed to raise the same issue on direct appeal.” (In re 

Reno, supra, at p. 490.) Indeed, the bulk of Garcia’s claims are of the type 

commonly asserted on appeal, a remedy he already pursued. “[H]abeas 

corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal.” (In re Waltreus (1965) 62 

Cal. 2d 218, 225.) 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 11
5 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

(Id.) The Court of Appeal also rejected all of the claims in the petition on the merits. (Id. 

at 2-4.) 

 On May 26, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the 

California Supreme Court, raising the same grounds for relief as his prior state habeas 

petition filed in the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 8-12, Ex. K; compare Doc. No. 

8-10, Ex. I at i-iv with Doc. No. 8-12 Ex. K at i-iv.) On October 14, 2015, the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the habeas petition. (Doc. No. 8-13, Ex. L.) 

 On April 14, 2016, Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court challenging his July 23, 2012 state court 

conviction. (Doc. No. 1.) In the present federal habeas petition, Petitioner alleges the same 

grounds for relief as contained in his prior state habeas petition that was filed in the 

California Court of Appeal: (1) insufficiency of the evidence; (2) entrapment; (3) juror bias 

and misconduct; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (5) ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel; (6) erroneous imposition of fines and fees; (7) a sentence that constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment; and (8) cumulative effect of error. (Compare Doc. No. 1 at 

ii-vi with Doc. No. 8-10, Ex. I at i-iv.) On April 21, 2016, the Court dismissed the habeas 

petition without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee or to move to proceed in forma 

pauperis. (Doc. No. 2.) On May 16, 2016, Petitioner paid the required filing fee, and the 

Court reopened the action. (Doc. No. 3.) 

 By the present motion, Respondent moves to dismiss the habeas petition. (Doc. No. 

8-1.) Specifically, Respondent argues that all of the claims in the present habeas petition 

should be dismissed, because they are all barred as procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 1.) 

Discussion 

I. Legal Standards Governing Procedural Default 

 “The question of whether a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on certain 

claims is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (‘AEDPA’).” Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 11
6 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“AEDPA mandates that habeas petitioners exhaust their claims in state court before raising 

them in federal court.” Id.; see also Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(“[B]efore a [§ 2254] petition may be heard, the petitioner must ‘seek full relief first from 

the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of 

constitutional error.’”). Exhaustion requires the petitioner to “fairly present” his claims to 

the highest court of the state “by invoking one complete round of the State’s established 

appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see Cooper, 

641 F.3d at 326. “This exhaustion requirement is . . . grounded in principles of comity; in 

a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged 

violations of state prisoner’s federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 

(1991). 

 “In addition to the exhaustion requirement, a federal court may not hear a habeas 

claim if it runs afoul of the procedural bar doctrine.” Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. “Just as in 

those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner 

who has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims 

has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731–32. Further, federal courts “will not review a question of federal 

law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is 

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id. at 729. 

Thus, “[i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the 

claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to 

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 750. 

 “State procedural rules must be both independent and adequate in order to bar federal 

habeas review.” Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327. A state procedural rule “is independent unless 

it appears ‘to rest primarily on federal law or appears to be interwoven with federal law.’” 

Tong Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012). A state procedural rule is 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 11
7 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

adequate if it is “‘firmly established and regularly followed’.” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 

307, 316 (2011). 

II. Analysis 

 Respondent argues that all of the claims in the present habeas petition are 

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, are barred from federal habeas review and should be 

dismissed. (Doc. No. 8-1 at 3.) Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner previously 

raised all of the claims in the present federal habeas petition in a state habeas petition, but 

the California Court of Appeal denied all of the claims on state procedural grounds. (Id.) 

Respondent argues that because the California Court of Appeal’s decision rested on these 

independent and adequate state procedural rules, all of the claims are barred from federal 

habeas review unless Petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, which he has failed to do so. (Id. at 3-9.) 

 All of the claims in the present federal habeas petition were previously presented to 

the state courts through state habeas petitions. (Compare Doc. No. 1 at ii-vi with Doc. No. 

8-10, Ex. I at i-iv; Doc. No. 8-12 Ex. K at i-iv.) The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied all of these claims without citation to any authority. (Doc. No. 8-13, Ex. L.) Where 

there is an unexplained decision from the state’s highest court, a federal habeas court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes that the unexplained 

opinion rests upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991) 

(“Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later 

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same 

ground.”); see Reis-Campos v. Biter, 832 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, 

because the California Supreme Court summarily denied the claims at issue, the Court 

looks through that decision to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoned decision denying 

the claims as procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 & 

n.13 (9th Cir. 2005), amended, 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (looking through California 

Supreme Court’s summary denial of a state habeas petition to the lower state court’s 

reasoned decision denying the petition on state procedural grounds). 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 11
8 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The California Court of Appeal denied all of the habeas claims as untimely with 

citations to In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 459 (2012) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302 

(1949).2 (Doc. No. 8-11, Ex. J at 2 (“The claims are untimely because [Petitioner] waited 

more than two years after he was sentenced to assert them, but has offered no explanation 

for the delay.”).) See also Flores v. Cate, 534 F. App’x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 

that a citation to Swain indicates a determination that the state habeas petition was untimely 

under California law where the citation was accompanied by a reasoned determination that 

the petition was untimely as a matter of law”). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 

California’s timeliness rule for state habeas petitions constitutes an independent and 

adequate state procedural ground barring subsequent habeas relief in federal court. See 

Walker, 562 U.S. at 317; see also Ayala v. Chappell, 829 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(“Walker holds that California’s timeliness rule is an independent and adequate state law 

ground sufficient to bar federal habeas relief on untimely claims.”). Accordingly, the 

California Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas claims as untimely constitutes 

an independent and adequate procedural ground barring all the claims in the present federal 

habeas petition unless Petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. 

 The California Court of Appeal also denied all of the habeas claims, except for 

Petitioner’s IAC claims, as barred on the ground that they could have been asserted on 

direct appeal but were not, with a citation to Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 490.3

 (Doc. No. 8-11, 

Ex. J at 2 (“The claims (with the possible exception of those alleging ineffective assistance 

                                                      

2

 The cited portion of Reno provides: “A criminal defendant mounting a collateral attack on a final 

judgment of conviction must do so in a timely manner. ‘It has long been required that a petitioner 

explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief.’” 55 Cal. 4th at 459. The cited 

portion of Swain provides: “It is the practice of this court to require that one who belatedly presents a 

collateral attack such as this explain the delay in raising the question.” 34 Cal. 2d at 302. 

3

 The cited portion of Reno provides: “[A] litigant is not entitled to raise an issue on habeas corpus 

after having failed to raise the same issue on direct appeal.” 55 Cal. 4th at 490. 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 11
9 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of counsel) are also barred because they could have been asserted on appeal, but were 

not.”).) This ground for denial of a habeas claim by a California state court is commonly 

referred to as the Dixon bar, named after the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re 

Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 (1953).4 See Johnson v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 1802, 1804 (2016) 

(“Like all States, California requires criminal defendants to raise available claims on direct 

appeal. Under the so-called ‘Dixon bar,’ a defendant procedurally defaults a claim raised 

for the first time on state collateral review if he could have raised it earlier on direct 

appeal.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that California’s Dixon bar to state habeas 

claims constitutes an independent and adequate state procedural ground barring subsequent 

habeas relief in federal court. See id. at 1806 (“[The Dixon bar] qualifies as adequate to 

bar federal habeas review.”). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of 

Petitioner’s habeas claims, except for his IAC claims, for failure to raise them on direct 

appeal also constitutes an independent and adequate procedural ground barring those 

claims in the present federal habeas petition unless Petitioner can demonstrate cause and 

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.5

 

                                                      

4

 Although the California Court of Appeal did not directly cite to Dixon in its decision, the Court 

of Appeal cited to a portion of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reno discussing the Dixon 

bar. (Doc. No. 8-11, Ex. J. at 2 (citing Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 490 (“Closely related to the Waltreus rule is 

the analogous one set forth in In re Dixon . . . : ‘[T]he writ [of habeas corpus] will not lie where the 

claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of 

conviction.’ . . . Like the Waltreus rule, the Dixon rule is consistent with the concept of habeas corpus as 

an extraordinary remedy available in those infrequent and unusual situations in which regular appellate 

procedures prove inadequate. In short, a litigant is not entitled to raise an issue on habeas corpus after 

having failed to raise the same issue on direct appeal.”)).) 

5

 In addition, specific to ground two of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition – his sufficiency of the 

evidence claim – the California Court of Appeal also held that this claim is barred by what is commonly 

referred to as the Lindley rule, named after the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Lindley, 29 

Cal. 2d 709, 723 (1947). (Doc. No. 8-11, Ex. J at 2 (citing Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 505 (“[C]laims of the 

insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction are not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. (In 

re Lindley, supra, 29 Cal. 2d at p. 723, 177 P.2d 918.)”)).) The Ninth Circuit has held that the denial of 

a state habeas claim pursuant to Lindley represents an independent and adequate state procedural ground 

barring subsequent habeas relief in federal court. See Carter v. Giurbino, 385 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 

2004). Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s insufficiency of the 

evidence claim under the Lindley rule also constitutes an independent and adequate procedural ground 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 11
10 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Here, Petitioner has not attempted to demonstrate cause for the procedural default 

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violations of federal law. See Maples v. 

Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (explaining that for the bar to federal review to be lifted, 

the petitioner must demonstrate cause and prejudice). Indeed, Petitioner has not even filed 

an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. “Cause for a procedural default exists 

where ‘something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to 

him[,] . . . “impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.”’” Id. 

Petitioner has failed to identify anything extern to himself that impeded his ability to 

comply with the California’s timeliness rule for filing state habeas petitions. Accordingly, 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice. 

 In addition, Petitioner has not attempted to establish the fundamental miscarriage of 

justice exception to the procedural default bar. “To establish a ‘fundamental miscarriage 

of justice,’ [the petitioner] must show that ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted 

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1117 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Petitioner has failed 

to show that a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction a person who 

is actually innocent. Indeed, in his entrapment claim in the present petition, Petitioner 

appears to acknowledge that he committed the offenses at issue. (See Doc. No. 1 at 79-

81.) 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an exception to the procedural 

default rule applies. In sum, all of the claims in Petitioner’s § 2254 habeas petition are 

procedurally defaulted, and, therefore, these claims are barred from federal habeas review, 

and the Court must dismiss these claims.6

                                                      

barring that claim in the present federal habeas petition unless Petitioner can demonstrate an exception 

applies. 

6

 In addition, the Court notes that in Petitioner’s thirteenth ground for habeas relief in his federal 

habeas petition, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s restitution award. (Doc. No. 1 at v.) This claim 

fails on the merits because the Ninth Circuit has held that challenges to a restitution award are not 

cognizable through a § 2254 habeas petition. See Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010) 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 11
11 

16-cv-0911 H (PCL) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Conclusion 

 For the reasons above, the Court grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the 

Court dismisses Petitioner’s § 2254 habeas petition with prejudice. In light of the fact that 

Petitioner failed to file an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, the Court notifies 

Petitioner that he may file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss within thirty (30) days from the date this order is filed. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 6, 2017 

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff 

 United States District Judge 

                                                      

(“[T]he imposition of a fine, by itself, is not sufficient to meet § 2254’s jurisdictional requirements.”). 

Accordingly, the Court also dismisses Petitioner’s habeas claim challenging the trial court’s restitution 

award on the ground that that particular claim fails to state a cognizable ground for § 2254 habeas relief. 

Case 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL Document 25 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 11