Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00859/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00859-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERIC CHATMAN, 

CDCR #BI-6355, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

SADDAM HUSSIEN, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-00859-LAB-KSC 

ORDER: 

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 2] 

AND 

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 

Eric Chatman (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison and 

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Compl., ECF No. 1. Chatman seeks to sue the former, and now deceased, President of the 

Republic of Iraq, his wife, his kids, his grandkids, and all his allies and generals for 

“try[ing] to kill [him]” sometime around August 2018, because he is the son of a U.S. 

Marine, and after Chatman “read him his rights” at a McDonalds. Id. at 1-3. 

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Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). He has since filed two letters addressed to 

the Court which repeat and expand on the delusional allegations in his Complaint and 

express his thanks. See ECF Nos. 4, 7. Plaintiff’s letters were accepted for filing in light 

of his pro se status, and despite Local Civil Rule 83.9, which clearly prohibits such ex 

parte communications. See ECF Nos. 3, 6. 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

A. Standard of Review 

 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, 

“face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount 

of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP: 

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

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litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311. 

 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008); see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(noting that when court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, 

the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central 

question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure 

to state a claim.’”) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) 

from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he alleges he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing.”). 

B. Application to Plaintiff

 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and his letters, and concludes none 

of these pleadings contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent 

danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, as described above, Plaintiff seeks to sue the 

former President of Iraq for trying to posthumously kill him in a McDonalds restaurant. 

See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3; In re Gonzalez, 2008 WL 666465 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. March 

6, 2008) (finding prisoner with a “delusional tale” of having a “special genetic structure,” 

and being “irradiated ... by radioactive smoke” by “government scientists,” did not 

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plausibly allege “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Holz v. McFadden, 2010 

WL 3069745 at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (finding “imminent danger” exception to 

§ 1915(g) inapplicable where prisoner implausibly claimed the FBI and BOP were “going 

to kill him.”); Sierra v. Woodford, 2010 WL 1657493 at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) 

(finding “long, narrative, rambling statements regarding a cycle of violence, and vague 

references to motives to harm” insufficient to show Plaintiff faced an “ongoing danger” 

as required by Cervantes). 

If this were not enough, Plaintiff’s claims are clearly delusional and patently 

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (requiring sua sponte dismissal of prisoner 

complaints, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.”); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 

(2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious 

suits need not bear the expense of responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th 

Cir. 1990) (a complaint “is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in fact or law.”). 

And while Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court 

docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 

under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. That is the case here. 

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452–MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff, Eric Chatman, currently 

identified as CDCR Inmate #BI-6355, and formerly identified as CDCR Inmate #BD5474, has had at least four prior prisoner civil actions dismissed in this district alone on 

the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. They are: 

1) Chatman v. Toyota of Escondido, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01853-BAS 

JLB (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing 

Civil Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

without leave to amend) (ECF No. 18) (“strike one”); 

2) Chatman v. Cush Acura, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-01852-WQH-JLB 

(S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2017) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil 

Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and without 

leave to amend) (ECF No. 20) (“strike two”); 

3) Chatman v. Super 8 Motel, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-02517-DMS-JMA 

(S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil 

Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and without 

leave to amend) (ECF No. 6) (“strike three”); and 

4) Chatman v. Super 8 Motel Co., et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-00213-BASNLS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018) (Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing 

Civil Action for Failing to State a Claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

without leave to amend) (ECF No. 6) (“strike four”). 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a plausible allegation that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

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enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”). 

II. Conclusion and Orders 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

2) DISMISSES this action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay 

the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); 

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and 

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.1

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 1, 2019 

 Hon. Larry Alan Burns 

Chief United States District Judge

                                               

1

 While the Court has previously accepted Plaintiff’s letters for filing despite his failure to 

comply with the Court’s Local Rules, he is hereby cautioned that S.D. Cal. Local Civil 

Rule 83.9 provides that “attorneys or parties to any action must refrain from writing letters 

to the judge,” and that “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, any 

additional letter he attempts to file in this matter will be summarily rejected based on Local 

Rule 83.9, and because this Order terminates his case. 

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