Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06048/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff, CV F 03 6048 OWW WMW P

vs. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

A. SANTA CRUZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the second amended complaint. Plaintiff, an inmate in

the custody of the California Department of Corrections at CSP Lancaster, brings this civil rights

action against defendant correctional officials employed by the Department of Corrections at the

California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility at Corcoran. 

Plaintiff’s sole claim in this complaint is that defendants punished him on the

basis of his exercise of his religious beliefs. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was order to

shave his beard, which he refused to do on religious grounds. As a result, defendant Santa Cruz

“ordered that I be deprived of yard for 30 days on 2-6-03 for refusing to shave.”

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”)

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provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government

interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating that defendants

substantially burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d

989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff meets his burden, defendants must demonstrate that

“any substantial burden of [plaintiff’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor

of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. 

Assuming the facts of the amended complaint as true, Plaintiff has alleged that he

was not allowed to go to yard for 30 days. “‘[S]ome form of regular outdoor exercise is

extremely important to the psychological and physical well being of the inmates.’” Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th

Cir. 1979)). Thus, “[the] deprivation of outdoor exercise [can] constitute cruel and unusual

punishment.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. While the temporary denial of outdoor exercise with no

medical effects is not a substantial deprivation, May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir.

1997), in this Circuit, the deprivation of regular outdoor exercise for a period of almost ten

months is unquestionably sufficient to meet the objective requirement of the Eighth Amendment

analysis. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000) (denial of all outdoor exercise

for six weeks meets objective Eighth Amendment requirement); Allen, 48 F.3d at 1086-88

(forty-five minutes of outdoor exercise per week for six weeks meets objective Eighth

Amendment requirement). 

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Here, Plaintiff has alleged, at most, a denial of access to the yard for 30 days. 

There are no allegations that Plaintiff was denied exercise such that it constitutes a substantial

deprivation as described above. Further, there are no allegations that Plaintiff was deprived of

the religious exercise in question - the growing of his beard. 

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required

to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's complaint vague and conclusory. 

The court has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy,

a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support

plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

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there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

third amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "Third Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 30, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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