Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00599/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00599-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Andrey Zubkov, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Health Care Cost Containment

System ("AHCCCS"), an Arizona state

agency, the State of Arizona, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-0599-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 51).

Plaintiff responded and Defendants replied. Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination under

the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Andrey Zubkov began working for Defendant Arizona Health Care Cost

Containment System ("AHCCCS") in 1991 (DSOF 1). As of September, 2003, Mr. Zubkov

worked on the Data Base Team as a Data Base Specialist II, supporting the Information

Services Division ("ISD") (DSOF 1). Earlier, on July 17, 2003, Mr. Zubkov made a

complaint to the Human Resources ("HR") department regarding discrimination based on his

age and national origin, and Mr. Zubkov renewed his allegation to HR on September 13,

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1

Mr. Zubkov filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on September 23, 2003,

regarding the same incidents about which he complained to HR in July and September of

2003 (DSOF, Ex. 6). Mr. Zubkov did not file a lawsuit regarding that alleged discrimination,

and on March 16, 2004, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on that particular

charge (DSOF 40, Ex. 16). 

2

After he initially told Mr. Chen of his inability to work on-call, Mr. Zubkov was

exempt from the on-call schedule until an agreement could be reached (DSOF 9, Ex. 1, p

133:12-19). During this time, September, 2003 through January, 2004, another Data Base

Team employee, Max Lee, provided coverage, and Mr. Zubkov's previous supervisor, Mr.

Kocher, also provided assistance (DSOF 10, 13). Mr. Chen was available for call escalation,

and two additional employees were in the process of training for on-call duties (DSOF 11,

PSOF 3, Ex. 3). 

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2003 (PSOF, Ex. 10, 11).1

 On September 15, 2003, Ming Chen became the new supervisor

of the Data Base Team, at which point he determined that all Data Base Team employees

should be placed on an "on-call" rotation schedule (DSOF 4). Although Mr. Zubkov had

performed on-call duties under his previous supervisor, Rich Kocher, he had not done so

since October, 2001 (DSOF 4, Ex. 5). 

After Mr. Chen's announcement, Mr. Zubkov told Mr. Chen he had a doctor's note

specifying that he could not work on-call hours, and between September 15 and 18, 2003,

the two discussed options regarding Mr. Zubkov's working hours (DSOF 8, 9).2

 Mr. Zubkov

suggested that he work "4-tens," or ten hours a day, four days a week, in order to provide

more after-hours on-call coverage, or to simply work past his normal work hours if an on-call

situation came up at the end of the workday (DSOF 16, Ex. 5, PSOF 12). Mr. Chen rejected

Mr. Zubkov's proposal on the grounds that it still did not provide 24-hour a day coverage,

and alternatively suggested that Mr. Zubkov flex his time spent on-call, reducing each

workday by the time spent performing on-call duties the previous night or that morning

(DSOF 15, Ex. 5). This proposal did not satisfy Mr. Zubkov because it still put him on-call

throughout the night (DSOF 15, Ex. 5). 

Mr. Zubkov objected to 24-hour availability on the grounds that he was diagnosed

with General Anxiety Disorder and Dysthymic Disorder by his physician, Dr. Todd Rowe

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3

The new position offered to Mr. Zubkov included "being available to respond to oncall situations," but AHCCCS indicated that other employees within the group could manage

the on-call responsibilities (DSOF 23, PSOF 13, Ex. 7, 8). 

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(DSOF 18, Ex. 7). On October 7, 2003, Dr. Rowe provided AHCCCS with an Essential Job

Functions Questionnaire, which listed Mr. Zubkov's diagnosis and indicated that Mr.

Zubkov's inability to work extended to "work hours (on-call) outside of normal daily routine"

(DSOF 18, Ex. 7). Dr. Rowe testified that Mr. Zubkov "is someone who has generalized

anxiety already and has trouble sleeping. If you get called in the middle of the night with

someone like that, it makes it very difficult for somebody to fall back asleep. So essentially

you go in the next day; you only have a few hours of sleep, then it just builds and escalates

over time." (PSOF 6, Ex. 5, p 39:7-12). 

On October 30, 2003, Mr. Zubkov signed, under protest, a revised Position

Description Questionnaire ("PDQ") that included "Performs Data Base Systems production

on-call support" under the list of "Major Responsibilities" (DSOF, Ex. 4). Until January 14,

2004, a team, comprised of Mr. Chen, ISD management and HR representatives, discussed

options for Mr. Zubkov (DSOF 21). The group believed that on-call duties were essential

to the Data Base Specialist II position (DSOF 21, Plaintiff's Ex. 4). Additionally, the group

determined that Mr. Zubkov's suggestions for accommodation would "create undue hardship

on the team, the division and the agency." (DSOF 22, Plaintiff's Ex. 4). Instead, the group

presented Mr. Zubkov with two options on January 14, 2004: (1) he could continue his

current job tasks and perform on-call duties on a rotational basis, flexing the time actually

spent responding into the next work day, or (2) he could transfer to a different position within

AHCCCS (DSOF 23, PSOF 12, Ex. 4).3

 

On January 15, 2004, Mr. Zubkov called in sick and notified AHCCCS the next day

that he desired to select the first option and stay in his current role, subject to his physician's

approval (DSOF 27, 28). On January 21, 2004, Dr. Rowe completed a Family Medical

Leave Act ("FMLA") Certification of Physician or Practitioner indicating that Mr. Zubkov

could not perform work of any kind (DSOF, Ex. 10). On January 22, 2004, Mr. Zubkov

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applied for short-term disability and filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination based on

retaliation and disability (DSOF 35, 36, Ex. 12, 13). Standard Insurance Company approved

Mr. Zubkov's short-term disability claim on February 2, 2004, and Mr. Zubkov applied for

long-term disability benefits on April 20, 2004 (DSOF 38, 39, Ex. 14, 15). VPA Insurance

Company approved Mr. Zubkov's long-term disability claim on July 27, 2004 (DSOF 41, Ex.

17). On July 31, 2004, AHCCCS separated Mr. Zubkov from state service without prejudice

to apply for reinstatement within two years (DSOF 41, Ex. 18). Finally, the EEOC informed

Mr. Zubkov that he had the option to file a retaliation charge for his termination, and issued

a Determination based upon Mr. Zubkov's January 22, 2004 Charge (DSOF 44, 45, Ex. 19,

20). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is mandated,

"...against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be unable

to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant "must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" by "com[ing]

forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e)). A dispute about a fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). The non-movant's bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create

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a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48. However,

in the summary judgment context, the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.

2004).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Disability Claim

To establish a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) is a

disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) is qualified with or without a reasonable

accommodation to perform the essential functions of the job, and (3) suffered an adverse

employment action because of the disability. Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481

(9th Cir. 1996). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden (of

production) then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for its adverse employment action. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Finally, a

burden of persuasion reverts to the plaintiff to provide evidence that the reasons put forth by

the defendant constitute mere pretext. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In the context of a motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact that the

defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action was

pretextual. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001). Here,

the parties dispute all elements of the ADA claim, each of which is material to a finding of

discrimination. 

1. Disability within the meaning of the ADA

Under the ADA, "[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-- (A) a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities

of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such

an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Defendants argue that Mr. Zubkov was not disabled

within the meaning of the ADA prior to January 22, 2004 because he testified that his alleged

disability precluded him only from performing on-call duties, instead of precluding him from

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The ADA specifies that failure to make a reasonable accommodation can be

discrimination "unless . . . the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the

operation of the business . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(p)(2)(v) (factors to be considered in an assessment of undue hardship include "the

impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the

facility's ability to conduct business). 

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a broad class of jobs. Also, Defendants argue that Mr. Zubkov based his alleged disability

solely on his inability to work, and that Mr. Zubkov did not face substantial limitation of a

life activity, but only had trouble sleeping.

Mr. Zubkov contends that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA prior to

January 22, 2004 because he was substantially limited in the life activities of sleeping,

concentrating and thinking, based on the testimony of his psychiatrist, and that he was

precluded from a broad class of jobs that included on-call duties. The Court finds that

whether or not Mr. Zubkov was disabled within the meaning of the ADA prior to January 22,

2004 presents an issue of material fact for trial.

2. Qualification with or without reasonable accommodation to perform

essential job functions

 Defendants argue that even if Mr. Zubkov proves a disability within the meaning of

the ADA, his claim still fails because AHCCCS engaged in the interactive process with good

faith and offered him a reasonable accommodation, which Mr. Zubkov rejected. Defendants

argue that the essential functions of Mr. Zubkov's job included the ability to provide on-call

support, and since he could not perform an essential function of his job, AHCCCS offered

to reassign Mr. Zubkov to a vacant position for which he was qualified. Defendants insist

that granting Mr. Zubkov's request to stay in his then-current position without performing oncall duties would place an undue hardship on AHCCCS.4

 Defendants also argue that

AHCCCS has the liberty to change job descriptions as business requires, and claim that Mr.

Zubkov admitted the essentiality of on-call duties on his short-term disability form. 

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See Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006) ("In addition, our

cases make clear that the [employer] bore an affirmative obligation to engage in an

interactive process in order to identify, if possible, a reasonable accommodation that would

permit [the employee] to retain his employment."); see also Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals

Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The interactive process requires communication

and good faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual

employees . . ."). 

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Mr. Zubkov insists that AHCCCS did not engage in the interactive process in good

faith,5

 and that on-call duties were not an essential function of his job. Mr. Zubkov also

argues that neither of the options presented by AHCCCS qualified as a reasonable

accommodation, and that allowing him to stay in his then-current position without

performing on-call duties would not place an undue hardship on AHCCCS. Assuming a jury

finds Mr. Zubkov disabled within the meaning of the ADA, the Court finds that whether or

not that disability prevented him from performing an essential function of his job presents

an issue of material fact as to whether being on-call was an essential function of Mr.

Zubkov's position. After determining the function of on-call duties, and assuming a disability

exists, the Court then finds that whether or not AHCCCS offered Mr. Zubkov a reasonable

accommodation presents an issue of material fact for trial. 

3. Adverse employment action

Defendants argue that Mr. Zubkov's "termination" does not qualify as an adverse

employment action because AHCCCS simply separated him from employment status as a

result of Mr. Zubkov's receipt of long-term disability benefits. Defendants also argue that

since AHCCCS provided Mr. Zubkov with a reasonable accommodation, no argument can

be made that failure to do so constituted an adverse action. Defendants claim that Mr.

Zubkov did not receive a "threat" of termination when he requested an accommodation, but

was informed that he would be "separated" from employment without prejudice if he failed

to choose one of the two options presented. Defendants also insists that the prior cancellation

of his flex-time and denial of his telecommuting request are outside the scope of this

litigation. Finally, Defendants argue that if AHCCCS did somehow worsen Mr. Zubkov's

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Defendants suggest in the Reply (Doc. # 59) that a failure to provide a reasonable

accommodation is not an adverse employment action. That assumption is misplaced,

however, given the statutory language of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) ("[T]he term

'discriminate' includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or

mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . ."). 

7

Defendants claim that Mr. Zubkov's argument should fail because AHCCCS did not

threaten to "terminate" him, but only to separate him from employment. The Court finds that

the technical distinction does not preclude Mr. Zubkov's argument that some sort of threat

to end his employment, termination or otherwise, could be an adverse employment action

from a jury's point of view. 

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Defendants argue that any deterioration in Mr. Zubkov's medical condition during

his employment at AHCCCS could only be remedied through worker's compensation. The

Court agrees that in a tort action for damages, injuries sustained at work typically find

remedy from the worker's compensation system. Mr. Zubkov, however, does not seek tort

damages, but only argues that poor treatment at work, exacerbating his medical condition,

could qualify as an adverse employment action. 

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medical condition during his employment, then he may only receive a remedy through

worker's compensation.

Mr. Zubkov argues that the failure to provide him with a reasonable accommodation

constitutes an adverse employment action,6

 and that AHCCCS threatened him with

termination when he requested an accommodation.7 He alleges that AHCCCS "in effect

terminated," or constructively discharged him when it failed to provide an adequate option

for Mr. Zubkov to continue his employment (Doc. # 57 at 12). Mr. Zubkov also claims that

AHCCCS's poor treatment of him worsened his medical condition such that he was forced

to take medical leave.8

 Assuming that the jury reaches this element of the ADA claim, the

Court finds that whether or not Mr. Zubkov suffered an adverse employment action presents

an issue of material fact for trial. 

4. McDonnell Douglas burden shifting - Discrimination

Despite Mr. Zubkov's prima facie case for discrimination under the ADA upon a

reading of the facts in a light most favorable to him, the Court finds that Defendants put forth

an alleged legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Mr. Zubkov's separation from

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Upon a careful inspection of the motions, the Court finds an alleged legitimate, nondiscriminatory action related only to Mr. Zubkov's separation from employment in July,

2004. None of Mr. Zubkov's other theories of adverse employment action were specifically

rebutted by Defendants as legitimate, non-discriminatory actions. 

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employment in July, 2004.9

 Defendants claim that AHCCCS's decision to separate Mr.

Zubkov from employment without prejudice resulted from his request for and receipt of longterm disability benefits, not because he had a disability, should one be found. Because Mr.

Zubkov alleged multiple adverse employment actions, not just the separation from

employment, this case will proceed to trial. Accordingly the Court cannot grant summary

judgment to Defendants based on Defendants' proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for the separation. Moreover, as indicated above, the Court has found a question of

fact as to how Plaintiff arrived at being separated from service. Only once that issue is

resolved can a jury determine whether discrimination was the motive for Plaintiff's ultimate

inability to work for AHCCCS.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds issues of material fact regarding Mr. Zubkov's

prima facie case. This question of fact arises from the facts specifically addressed by the

Court. In this Order, the Court offers no opinion as to whether any other facts might be

relevant to a claim or defense at trial. The Court simply finds that the foregoing disputed

elements are sufficient to overcome summary judgment on Mr. Zubkov's ADA

discrimination claim. 

C. Retaliation Claim

To establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) engagement in a protected

activity under the ADA, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the

two. Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of articulating a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action. Porter v. California Dep't of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 894

(9th Cir. 2005). Once the defendant has presented a purpose for the action, the plaintiff bears

the ultimate burden of providing evidence that the defendant's reason is "merely a pretext for

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a retaliatory motive." Id. A defendant's retaliatory intent may be inferred "from the

proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory discharge."

Miller v. Fairchild, 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986). Here the parties dispute the second

and third elements of the retaliation claim, each of which is material to a finding of

retaliation.

1. Engagement in a protected activity

The parties do not dispute that Mr. Zubkov engaged in a protected activity when he

filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination on September 23, 2003. Mr. Zubkov argues that

his complaints to HR on July 17, 2003 and September 13, 2003 also qualify as protected

activities. 

2. Adverse employment action

Defendants do not specifically dispute the legitimacy of Mr. Zubkov's allegations

regarding adverse employment action in the retaliation context, but only acknowledge that

he argues the requirement of on-call duties as an adverse employment action, as well as the

separation from employment in July, 2004. The Court, however, in an abundance of caution,

assumes Defendants to put forth the same objections as stated in the discrimination context.

Mr. Zubkov also argues that AHCCCS acted adversely when it required him to choose

between the performance of on-call duties and an "unreasonable accommodation," leaving

him with no options to continue his employment. He includes the threat of termination or

separation, a change in job description, and other theories advanced in his discrimination

claim as adverse employment actions that were retaliatory. As in the discrimination analysis,

the Court finds that whether or not Mr. Zubkov suffered an adverse employment action

presents an issue of material fact for trial. 

3. Causal link

Defendants, referencing only Mr. Zubkov's September 23, 2003 EEOC Charge, argue

that no causal link exists between any alleged adverse employment action and a protected

activity, since Mr. Zubkov filed the EEOC Charge after learning that AHCCCS planned to

add on-call duties to his job description. Also, Defendants claim that Mr. Zubkov's

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separation from employment in July, 2004 is not sufficiently close in time to the protected

activity to infer causation. Mr. Zubkov maintains that his complaints to HR qualify as a

protected activity, and a causal link exists, at least between his complaint dated September

13, 2003 and the time at which Mr. Chen informed him of the additional on-call duties during

the week of September 15, 2003. 

The Court finds that Mr. Zubkov's complaint to HR does qualify as a protected

activity under the ADA. See Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d

1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that an employee complaint to the Human Resources

department was a protected activity under Title VII); See also Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc.,

228 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("[W]e join our sister circuits in adopting the

Title VII retaliation framework for ADA retaliation claims."), vacated on other grounds, U.S.

Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). The nearness in time between the September 13,

2003 complaint and the change in employment duties September 15, 2003 through October,

2003 is sufficient to create an issue of material fact regarding the causal link between a

protected activity and an alleged adverse employment action. 

4. McDonnell Douglas burden shifting - Retaliation

Defendants offer a conclusory statement that "AHCCCS provided legitimate nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions," but the Court does not find any

specific discussion of the sort (Doc. # 59 at 11). Assuming that Defendants advance the

same argument as above, that Mr. Zubkov's ultimate separation from employment was

legitimate and non-discriminatory based on his long-term disability claim, the Court

acknowledges that argument and makes the same finding as above. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds issues of material fact regarding Mr. Zubkov's

prima facie case for retaliation and Defendants' proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason as to one alleged adverse employment action. The Court finds that the foregoing

disputed elements alone are sufficient to overcome summary judgment on Mr. Zubkov's

ADA retaliation claim. 

Based on the foregoing,

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IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) is

DENIED in its entirety. 

DATED this 9th day of August, 2007.

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