Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01738/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1738

ALI GADELHAK, on behalf of himself 

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AT&T SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17-cv-1559 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2019 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 19, 2020

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and BARRETT, Circuit 

Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. The wording of the provision that 

we interpret today is enough to make a grammarian throw 

down her pen. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act bars 

certain uses of an “automatic telephone dialing system,” 

which it defines as equipment with the capacity “to store or 

produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or 

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2 No. 19-1738

sequential number generator,” as well as the capacity to dial 

those numbers. We must decide an issue that has split the circuits: what the phrase “using a random or sequential number 

generator” modifies.

We’ll save the intense grammatical parsing for the body of 

the opinion—here, we’ll just give the punchline. We hold that 

“using a random or sequential number generator” modifies

both “store” and “produce.” The system at issue in this case, 

AT&T’s “Customer Rules Feedback Tool,” neither stores nor 

produces numbers using a random or sequential number generator; instead, it exclusively dials numbers stored in a customer database. Thus, it is not an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by the Act—which means that AT&T 

did not violate the Act when it sent unwanted automated text 

messages to Ali Gadelhak.

I.

This dispute stems from AT&T’s “Customer Rules Feedback Tool,” a device that sends surveys to customers who 

have interacted with AT&T’s customer service department. 

Using this tool, AT&T sent Chicago resident Ali Gadelhak 

five text messages asking survey questions in Spanish. But 

Gadelhak is neither an AT&T customer nor a Spanish speaker,

and his number is on the national “Do Not Call Registry.” Annoyed by the texts, Gadelhak brought a putative class action 

against AT&T for violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which Congress enacted in 1991 to address the problem of intrusive telemarketing.

With some exceptions not relevant here, the Act prohibits 

the use of an “automatic telephone dialing system” to call or 

text any cellular phone without the prior consent of the 

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No. 19-1738 3

recipient, as well as to call certain hospital numbers. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1). An “automatic telephone dialing system” is defined as:

equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, using a random or sequential number generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.

Id. § 227(a)(1); see also Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 

663, 667 (2016) (clarifying that text messages are covered). The 

success of Gadelhak’s suit depends on whether AT&T’s feedback tool meets this definition. Unfortunately, the awkward 

statutory wording, combined with changes in technology, 

makes this a very difficult question.

At the time that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

was passed, telemarketers primarily used systems that randomly generated numbers and dialed them, and everyone 

agrees that such systems meet the statutory definition. But 

that’s not how AT&T’s customer feedback tool works. The 

system, like others commonly used today, pulls and dials

numbers from an existing database of customers rather than 

randomly generating them. (Given that its tool pulls exclusively from its customer database, AT&T posits that Gadelhak 

received messages because of a typographical error.) Determining whether such systems meet the statutory definition 

has forced courts to confront an awkwardness in the statutory 

language that apparently didn’t matter much when the statute was enacted: it’s not obvious what the phrase “using a 

random or sequential number generator” modifies. The answer to that question dictates whether the definition captures 

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only the technology that predominated in 1991 or is broad 

enough to encompass some of the modern, database-focused 

systems.

II.

Before we analyze the merits, though, we must address 

the preliminary matter of Gadelhak’s standing to bring this 

suit. The doctrine of standing is rooted in Article III of the U.S. 

Constitution, which limits the federal judicial power to resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 

To satisfy the standing requirement, the plaintiff must claim 

“to have suffered an injury that the defendant caused and the 

court can remedy.” Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., Inc., 926 

F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019). If a plaintiff lacks standing, a federal court lacks jurisdiction.

While AT&T does not challenge Gadelhak’s standing, we 

have an independent obligation to confirm our jurisdiction 

before adjudicating a case. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 

U.S. 215, 231 (1990). To be sure, the obligation to verify our 

jurisdiction in every case does not mean that we have to discuss it in every opinion. Here, though, the question whether 

plaintiffs like Gadelhak have standing is difficult enough to 

have divided the circuits. The Eleventh Circuit has held that 

the receipt of an unwanted automated text message is not a 

cognizable injury under Article III because it is insufficiently 

“concrete.” Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1172 (11th Cir. 

2019). The Second and Ninth Circuits have come out the other 

way. Melito v. Experian Mtkg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 92–93 (2d 

Cir. 2019); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 

1037, 1042–43 (9th Cir. 2017). Given the split, it is important 

for us to show our work.

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To qualify as “concrete,” an injury must be “real” rather 

than “abstract”—that is, “it must actually exist.” Spokeo, Inc. 

v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). A “bare procedural violation” does not qualify, even if it gives rise to a statutory 

cause of action. Id. at 1549. That is so because Article III cabins 

Congress’s authority to create causes of action, and suits involving abstract injuries lie beyond “the judicial Power.” U.S.

CONST. art.III, § 1. Thus, Gadelhak’s standing to sue is not settled by the fact that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

authorizes his suit. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). It depends on 

whether the unwanted texts from AT&T caused him concrete 

harm or were merely a technical violation of the statute.

To determine whether the texts caused concrete harm, we 

look to both history and Congress’s judgment. As the Court 

has explained, “it is instructive to consider whether an alleged 

intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 

traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit 

in English or American courts.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. And 

because Congress is particularly suited “to identify intangible 

harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also instructive and important.” Id.

We’ll start with history. The common law has long recognized actions at law against defendants who invaded the private solitude of another by committing the tort of “intrusion 

upon seclusion.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B 

(AM. LAW INST. 1977). In rejecting standing in a similar case, 

the Eleventh Circuit suggested that the tort of intrusion upon 

seclusion addressed only invasions of privacy like eavesdropping and spying, which pose a different kind of harm altogether. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1171. We see things differently. 

Courts have also recognized liability for intrusion upon 

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seclusion for irritating intrusions—such as when “telephone 

calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to 

amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff.” RESTATEMENT

§ 652B cmt. d; see id. cmt. b, illus. 5; see also Carey v. Statewide 

Fin. Co., 223 A.2d 405, 406–07 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1966); Housh v. 

Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ohio 1956); Household Credit Servs., 

Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 84–85 (Tex. App. 1998). The harm 

posed by unwanted text messages is analogous to that type of 

intrusive invasion of privacy.

Now, for Congress’s judgment. In passing the Act, Congress decided that automated telemarketing can pose this 

same type of harm to privacy interests. Pub. L. No. 102-243,

§ 2, 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991) (explaining in the findings that 

“[u]nrestricted telemarketing ... can be an intrusive invasion 

of privacy” and characterizing telemarketing as a “nuisance”). While Congress cannot transform a non-injury into 

an injury on its say-so, that is hardly what it did here. Instead, 

Congress identified a modern relative of a harm with long 

common law roots. And Gadelhak claims to have suffered the 

very harm that the Act is designed to prevent. Cf. Melito, 923 

F.3d at 92–93 (reaching the same conclusion).1

1 The Eleventh Circuit maintains that Congress was concerned with

the harm posed by unwanted telephone calls, not text messages. Compare 

Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1172 (no standing in a TCPA suit over an unwanted 

text message), with Cordoba v. DirectTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 

2019) (finding injury-in-fact in a TCPA suit alleging unwanted calls). We 

don’t share the view that the two are “categorically distinct.” Salcedo, 936

F.3d at 1172. The undesired buzzing of a cell phone from a text message,

like the unwanted ringing of a phone from a call, is an intrusion into peace 

and quiet in a realm that is private and personal. This is the very harm that 

Congress addressed.

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The Eleventh Circuit treated the injury in its case as abstract partly because common law courts generally require a 

much more substantial imposition—typically, many calls—to 

support liability for intrusion upon seclusion. See, e.g., Sofka v. 

Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 511 (Mo. 1983). But when Spokeo instructs us to analogize to harms recognized by the common 

law, we are meant to look for a “close relationship” in kind, 

not degree. See 136 S. Ct. at 1549. In other words, while the 

common law offers guidance, it does not stake out the limits 

of Congress’s power to identify harms deserving a remedy. 

Congress’s power is greater than that: it may “elevat[e] to the 

status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries 

that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 

(1992)). A few unwanted automated text messages may be too 

minor an annoyance to be actionable at common law. But 

such texts nevertheless pose the same kind of harm that common law courts recognize—a concrete harm that Congress 

has chosen to make legally cognizable.2 Van Patten, 847 F.3d

at 1043.

2 The Eleventh Circuit arguably limited its holding to the receipt of 

one text message in violation of the Act, see Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1174

(J. Pryor, J., concurring in judgment only), suggesting that it might come 

out differently in a case in which a greater number of texts strengthened 

the analogy to the common law tort. The Second Circuit, by contrast, did 

not even mention the number of texts at issue in Melito, 923 F.3d at 92–93, 

and the Ninth Circuit held that standing existed in Van Patten when the 

defendant allegedly sent only two texts, 847 F.3d at 1041–43. For the reasons we’ve explained, we agree with the Second and Ninth Circuits that

the number of texts is irrelevant to the injury-in-fact analysis.

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We therefore agree with the Second and Ninth Circuits 

that unwanted text messages can constitute a concrete injuryin-fact for Article III purposes.

III.

With standing out of the way, we turn to the merits. We 

previously addressed the same provision in Blow v. Bijora, 

Inc., 855 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2017), but at that time, a 2015 FCC 

Order interpreting the Act was on the books. We held that 

“absent a direct appeal to review the 2015 FCC Order’s interpretation,” the Hobbs Act required us to adopt the FCC’s definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system.” Id. at 802; 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). But since we decided Blow, there has 

been just such a “a direct appeal to review” the FCC Order: 

the D.C. Circuit struck down the 2015 FCC interpretation in 

ACA International v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 

And contrary to Gadelhak’s assertion, ACA International did 

not leave prior FCC Orders intact. Instead, the D.C. Circuit 

clarified that its review also covered “the agency’s pertinent 

pronouncements”—its prior Orders. Id. at 701. Neither Blow

nor any FCC Order binds us in this case. See Glasser v. Hilton 

Grand Vacations Co., Nos. 18-14499 & 18-14586, 2020 WL 

415811, at *6 (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 2020); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2018); see also 

Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018) (implicitly reaching the same conclusion by declining to defer to 

any FCC Order). We therefore interpret the statute’s text as 

though for the first time.

There are at least four ways of reading the statutory definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system.” First, the 

phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” 

might modify both store and produce, which would mean that 

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No. 19-1738 9

a device must be capable of performing at least one of those 

functions using a random or sequential number generator to 

qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system.” This is 

how the Third and Eleventh Circuits interpret the statute. 

Dominguez, 894 F.3d at 119; Glasser, 2020 WL 415811, at *2.3

Second, the phrase might describe the telephone numbersthemselves, specifying that the definition captures only equipment 

that dials randomly or sequentially generated numbers. This 

is how the district court interpreted the provision. Third, the 

phrase might limit only the word produce, which would mean 

that the definition captures not only equipment that can produce numbers randomly or sequentially, but also any equipment that can simply store and dial numbers. This is the Ninth 

Circuit’s interpretation. Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052. Finally, the 

phrase could describe the manner in which the telephone 

numbers are to be called, regardless of how they are stored, 

produced, or generated. Some courts—including the district 

court in this case—have alluded to this possibility, although 

none has adopted it. See, e.g., Glasser, 2020 WL 415811, at *7.

3 In Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc. (Dominguez II), the Third Circuit explained that after ACA International, it would revert to the interpretation it 

had adopted before the 2015 FCC Order. 894 F.3d at 119. Before the Order, 

the court had held that the definition covered equipment that “may have 

the capacity to store or to produce the randomly or sequentially generated 

numbers to be dialed,” and then asked the district court on remand to consider how a number can be stored using a random number generator.

Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc. (Dominguez I), 629 F. App’x 369, 372 n.1 (3d Cir. 

2015) (emphasis omitted). Dominguez I is not perfectly clear about which 

interpretation it applies, but the remand suggests that it reads “using a 

random or sequential number generator” to describe how the numbers 

may be stored or produced—consistent with the first interpretation that 

we summarize.

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A.

We begin with the interpretation adopted by the Third 

and Eleventh Circuits. Under their reading, the phrase “using 

a random or sequential number generator” modifies both 

“store” and “produce,” defining the means by which either 

task must be completed for equipment to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system.” That is, the statute addresses:

equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, using a random or sequential number generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.

AT&T advocates this reading, which would exclude its customer feedback tool because the tool lacks the capacity either 

to store or to produce telephone numbers using a number 

generator. Instead, the tool dials numbers only from a customer database.

This interpretation is certainly the most natural one based 

on sentence construction and grammar. As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[w]hen two conjoined verbs (‘to store or produce’) share a direct object (‘telephone numbers to be called’), 

a modifier following that object (‘using a random or sequential number generator’) customarily modifies both verbs.” 

Glasser, 2020 WL 415811, at *2. The placement of the comma 

before “using a random or sequential number generator” in 

the statute further suggests that the modifier is meant to apply to the entire preceding clause. See ANTONIN SCALIA &

BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 

LEGAL TEXTS 150 (2012). That clause is driven by the two 

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No. 19-1738 11

verbs, “to store or produce.” The sentence’s construction thus 

seems to encourage applying the phrase “using a random or 

sequential number generator” to both verbs.

But this first interpretation runs into a problem: as one district court wrote, “it is hard to see how a number generator 

could be used to ‘store’ telephone numbers.” Pinkus v. Sirius 

XM Radio, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 927, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2018). AT&T 

counters that a device that generates random numbers and 

then dials them does, technically, “store” such a number for 

the fleeting interval between those two functions. While that 

may be true as a technical matter, as a matter of ordinary usage it’s hard to say that the random number generator is “storing” in any notable way. More persuasive, however, is the 

point that some systems “store” randomly generated numbers for much longer than a few fleeting moments. The record 

before the FCC reveals that at the time of the statute’s enactment, devices existed with the capacity to generate random 

numbers and then store them in a file for a significant time 

before selecting them for dialing.4 See Noble Systems Corp., 

Comments in Response to the FCC’s Request for Comments 

of the Interpretation of the TCPA in Light of the 9th Circuit’s

Decision in Marks v. Crunch San Diego 12–15 (Oct. 16, 2018), 

https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1016271761504/Noble_System_Comments_FCC_DA18-1014_FINAL.pdf. The capacity 

for storage is more central to such a device’s function.

Gadelhak responds that if the Act had meant to capture 

random-generation devices defined by their storage 

4 For a more fulsome history of the statute and the FCC’s regulations 

interpreting it, see both Glasser, 2020 WL 415811, at *4–5, and Marks, 904 

F.3d at 1043–48.

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12 No. 19-1738

capacities, it needn’t have used the word “store” at all. After 

all, such a device also necessarily can “produce” numbers using a number generator, rendering the “store” option in the 

statute superfluous. That surplusage is not a deal-breaker. See 

SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 176–77 (“Sometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of 

substance, either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in 

the ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.”). Given the range of storage capacities among 

telemarketing devices at the time of enactment, it is plausible

that Congress chose some redundancy in order to cover “the 

waterfront.” Glasser, 2020 WL 415811, at *3.

Notwithstanding the difficulties posed by this interpretation, we think that the language bears it. But because of those 

difficulties, we proceed to consider whether any of the other 

possibilities fares better.

B.

The district court favored the next option: that “using a 

random or sequential number generator” modifies the “telephone numbers” that are dialed. Since the telephone numbers 

themselves obviously lack the capacity to “us[e]” a number 

generator, the phrase really describes the means by which telephone numbers are generated, as follows:

equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, [generated] using a random or sequential 

number generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.

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No. 19-1738 13

Under this interpretation, an “automatic telephone dialing 

system” is equipment with the capacity to store or produce 

telephone numbers generated using a random or sequential 

number generator as well as the capacity to dial those numbers. Because AT&T’s system cannot generate random strings 

of numbers for itself and instead dials only existing numbers 

from AT&T accounts, the district court held that it could not 

satisfy the statutory definition.

The district court’s interpretation avoids the problems associated with the word “store.” But it has a problem of its 

own: the grammatical structure of the sentence. The phrase 

“using a random or sequential number generator” is an adverbial phrase with an elided preposition—it means “[by] using a random or sequential number generator.” As an adverbial phrase that describes how something is to be done, it cannot modify a noun in this context. So, to arrive at its reading, 

the district court had to insert a significant word into the statute that simply isn’t there. Although the district court’s version of the statute is clearer and therefore tempting, “our task 

is to interpret the words of Congress, not add to them.” Evans 

v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 889 F.3d 337, 346 (7th Cir. 

2018) (citation omitted). The words of Congress, as written, 

do not permit this second interpretation.

C.

Gadelhak presses the third option: that the phrase “using 

a random or sequential number generator” modifies only the 

equipment’s capacity to “produce.” With emphasis, the definition would read:

equipment which has the capacity—

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(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called, using a random or sequential number generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.

To Gadelhak, it doesn’t matter that AT&T’s system cannot 

generate random or sequential ten-digit numerical strings. As 

he sees it, the capacity to produce numbers using a random 

number generator is only one means of meeting the statutory 

definition. Gadelhak argues that the disjunctive “or” in “store 

or produce” means that an “automatic telephone dialing system” need not produce numbers at all. Since “using a random 

or sequential number generator” modifies only “produce,” 

Gadelhak argues that all equipment with the capacity to store 

telephone numbers to be called and to dial those numbers 

qualifies as an automatic telephone dialing system. This is the 

interpretation that the Ninth Circuit adopted in Marks v. 

Crunch San Diego.

This interpretation eliminates the problem of the first 

one—that the phrase is an admittedly imperfect fit for the 

verb “store.” And it does not require us to add a word to the 

statute as the second one does. But Gadelhak’s approach has 

a fatal flaw of its own: it requires us to contort the statutory 

text almost beyond recognition. Everyone agrees that “telephone numbers to be called” is the object of both “store” and 

“produce.” That makes sense because “produce” is not set off 

from “store” in the text, either with the infinitive “to” or with 

a comma. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 148–49. It would be 

unnatural, then, to splice “store” and “produce” to have the 

final phrase, “using a random or sequential number generator,” modify only the latter verb. Gadelhak asks us to reorder 

the sentence to separate “store” and “produce” but to clarify 

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No. 19-1738 15

that “telephone numbers” is the object of both. That would be 

a significant judicial rewrite.

Nonetheless, Gadelhak maintains that the statutory structure requires this reading. He emphasizes that the statute 

carves out a defense for recipients who have given their prior 

express consent. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the 

use of an automatic telephone dialing system for calls or texts 

“made with the prior express consent of the called party”). If 

an “automatic telephone dialing system” is defined by its capacity to generate numbers at random, Gadelhak says, it 

would be impossible for a party ever to take advantage of the 

consent defense except by coincidence. He explains that a 

caller could not know in advance whether the telephone number, having been randomly generated, would belong to a 

party who had previously consented to being called. See also 

Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051 (adopting this argument). But as another court explained, “it is possible to imagine a device that 

both has the capacity to generate numbers randomly or sequentially and can be programmed to avoid dialing certain 

numbers ....” Pinkus, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 939. Gadelhak’s rationale for choosing an atextual interpretation is therefore unpersuasive.

Gadelhak has one last card to play: he insists that Congress blessed his interpretation of the statute when it 

amended the Act in 2015. At that time, the D.C. Circuit had 

not yet struck down the 2015 FCC Order interpreting the statute in Gadelhak’s favor. Gadelhak asserts that Congress essentially ratified that interpretation when it amended the statute in 2015 to add an exception for government debt collection 

and declined to amend the definition in any other respect. See

Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 301, 129 Stat. 584, 588 (2015). We reject 

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this argument, as has every circuit to consider it. See Glasser, 

2020 WL 415811, at *6 (collecting cases). Congressional failure 

to act does not necessarily reflect approval of the status quo. 

See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001). And in any 

event, the FCC’s interpretation of the statute was hardly settled at the time of the congressional amendment—in 2015, the 

D.C. Circuit was already reviewing ACA International. It is 

therefore particularly difficult to attribute acquiescence to 

Congress’s actions that year.

Finally, it is worth noting the far-reaching consequences 

of Gadelhak’s ungrammatical interpretation: it would create 

liability for every text message sent from an iPhone. That is a 

sweeping restriction on private consumer conduct that is inconsistent with the statute’s narrower focus. Gadelhak argues 

that to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” a 

device need only have the “capacity ... to store ... telephone 

numbers” and then to call or text them automatically. Every 

iPhone today has that capacity right out of the box. An iPhone 

of course can store telephone numbers; it can also send text 

messages automatically, for example by using the “Do Not 

Disturb While Driving” function. See How to Use Do Not Disturb While Driving, APPLE (Sept. 19, 2019), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208090 (“If someone sends you a message 

[while this feature is turned on], they receive an automatic reply letting them know that you’re driving.”). Every iPhone, 

then, has the necessary capacities to meet the statutory definition. That means that under Gadelhak’s interpretation, 

every call or text message sent from an iPhone without the 

prior express consent of the recipient could subject the sender 

to a $500 fine. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Considering the 

statute as a whole, that result makes little sense. The Act’s 

other provisions address narrow conduct much more likely to 

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No. 19-1738 17

be performed by telemarketers than by private citizens—for 

example, the use of “an artificial or prerecorded voice.” Id.

§ 227(b)(1)(A). The definition of an “automatic telephone dialing system” would be an outlier within the statutory 

scheme if it were to capture such a wide swath of everyday 

conduct.

D.

There is one final possibility: that “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies how the telephone 

numbers are “to be called.” On this reading, an “automatic 

telephone dialing system” is:

equipment which has the capacity—

(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be 

called[] using a random or sequential number generator; and

(B) to dial such numbers.

In other words, the definition captures devices with the capacity to store or to produce telephone numbers that will be 

dialed by a random or sequential number generator. The record does not fully explain whether AT&T’s system has the 

necessary capabilities to be considered an “automatic telephone dialing system” under this definition; neither party advanced this reading and other courts have only danced 

around it. See, e.g., Glasser, 2020 WL 415811, at *7 (identifying 

this interpretation as “plausible” but rejecting it without comment).

A close look convinces us that this fourth possibility is also 

inferior to the first interpretation. Congress chose to insert a 

comma between “to be called” and “using a random or 

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sequential number generator.” And “[a] qualifying phrase 

separated from antecedents by a comma is evidence that the 

qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents instead of 

only to the immediately preceding one.” WILLIAM N.

ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ 

STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 67–68 (2016) (citation omitted). The comma separating “to be called” and “using a random or sequential number generator” therefore indicates that 

the modifier refers to the entire clause that precedes it—a 

clause driven by the verbs “store” and “produce”—rather 

than the phrase immediately adjacent to it.

Of course, we are mindful that “a purported plain-meaning analysis based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a statute’s true meaning.” 

U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 

439, 454 (1993). We tread especially carefully here, since the 

comma seems to be ungrammatical under any interpretation. 

As mentioned above, “using a random or sequential number 

generator” is an adverbial phrase. To be more specific, it is a 

restrictive adverbial phrase, because it provides information 

that is essential to the meaning of the sentence. The grammar 

and style treatise of record dictates that a comma is inappropriate for a restrictive adverbial phrase found at the end of a 

sentence. THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 6.31 (17th ed. 

2017).

But we have reason to be confident that the comma before 

the modifier deliberately separates it from “to be called.” A 

modifying clause following a comma tends not to modify the 

very last antecedent before it when that antecedent is “integrated” into a singular unit. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. 

Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1077 (2018) (citation omitted). In the 

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No. 19-1738 19

context of autodialing, the phrase “telephone numbers to be 

called” has consistently been used as an integrated unit. A 

1986 patent for a method of randomizing telephone numbers, 

for example, contains five references to “numbers to be 

called.” U.S. Patent No. 4,741,028 (filed July 30, 1986). The 

phrase was also common in the state antitelemarketing statutes that preceded the federal legislation. Across statutes with 

different sentence structures and different scopes, the phrase 

“telephone numbers to be called” appears again and again. 

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 159 § 19B (1986); MISS. CODE 

ANN. § 77-3-451 (1989); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 399-p (1988). 

These uses suggest that “telephone numbers to be called” is a 

single noun unit characterized by the purpose of the numbers. 

The comma, therefore, seems to have been a deliberate drafting choice to separate the modifying clause from the words 

that immediately precede it.

Satisfied that “using a random or sequential number generator” does not describe how the numbers are “to be called,” 

we are left again with the first interpretation. It is admittedly 

imperfect. But it lacks the more significant problems of the 

other three interpretations and is thus our best reading of a 

thorny statutory provision. We therefore hold that the phrase 

“using a random or sequential number generator” describes 

how the telephone numbers must be “stored” or “produced.”

* * *

The district court held that AT&T’s system did not qualify 

as an “automatic telephone dialing system” because it lacked 

the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers. Although we adopt a different interpretation of the statute, under our reading, too, the capacity to generate random or 

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20 No. 19-1738

sequential numbers is necessary to the statutory definition. 

The district court’s judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.

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