Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00196/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Cesar Ramirez Ramirez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-00196-PHX-PGR (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Cesar Ramirez Ramirez (Petitioner), through counsel, has filed an Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2007 

conviction in the Maricopa County Superior Court (superior court). (Doc. 7.) 

Respondents assert that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides the statute of 

limitations applicable to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief. (Doc. 12.) 

Alternatively, Respondents argue that Ground Two does not state a cognizable claim (Id.

at 11), and that habeas corpus review of Petitioner’s claims is procedurally barred. (Id. at 

12.) Petitioner has not filed a reply in support of his Petition and the time to do so has 

passed. For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Guilty Plea and Sentencing 

On August 8, 2008, Petitioner pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a class two 

dangerous felony. (Doc. 12, Exs. D, E.) On November 14, 2008, the superior court 

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sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of eighteen years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 12, 

Ex. G.) 

B. First Post-Conviction Proceeding 

On October 9, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the 

superior court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Doc. 12, Ex. I.) 

Petitioner acknowledged that his notice was untimely, but argued that the court should 

consider it because newly discovered facts existed that would probably have changed the 

verdict or sentence, and that the failure to file a timely notice of post-conviction relief 

was not his fault. (Id.) On October 15, 2012, the court dismissed the notice of postconviction relief as untimely because it was due no later than February 14, 2009, and 

Petitioner failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted in an untimely or 

successive Rule 32 proceeding.1

 (Doc. 12, Ex. J.) 

 On November 8, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing in the superior court, 

arguing that the court had erred in its determination of the facts and applicable law. 

(Doc. 12 at 3 n.4, Ex. K.) On November 13, 2012, the court denied Petitioner’s motion. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. L.) It held that, although Petitioner had elaborated upon his claims that his 

constitutional rights were violated, his “arguments [were] still untimely under 

Rule 32.4(a).” (Id.) Petitioner did not petition for review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Doc. 12, Ex. A.) 

C. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On August 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. M.) Petitioner again argued that newly discovered material facts probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence, and that his failure to file a timely notice of 

post-conviction relief was not his fault. (Id. at 3.) 

 On August 15, 2013, the court dismissed Petitioner’s second notice of postconviction relief, finding that it both untimely and successive. (Doc. 12, Ex. N.) The 

 

1

 Rule 32.4 provides that “[a]ny notice not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant to 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h).” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. 

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court found that Petitioner was not entitled to relief under Rule 32.1(f) because his notice 

was not “of right.” (Id.) The court found that, pursuant to Rule 32.4(a), Petitioner failed 

to state a claim for which relief could be granted in an untimely or successive Rule 32 

proceeding. (Id.) 

 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals on August 30, 

2013, and a petition for review on September 16, 2013. (Doc. 12, Exs. O, P.) Petitioner 

argued that the superior court erred in denying relief without giving him an opportunity to 

file a petition summarizing the newly discovered material facts and claims that he 

asserted in his notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12, Ex. P.) He further argued that 

the superior court “mistook the core” of the issues he raised in his notice. (Id.) Finally, 

he argued that his petition should be granted because the mitigating circumstances 

outweighed the aggravating circumstances, and he did not understand his attorney due to 

the language barrier and, therefore, could not give consent to enter a guilty plea. (Id.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals has not ruled on the petition in this matter.2

 (Doc. 12, 

Ex. Q.) 

D. The Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On February 3, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Finding it illegible, the Court dismissed the petition without prejudice 

and granted Petitioner leave to amend. (Doc. 6.) On June 19, 2014, Petitioner filed the 

pending Amended Petition. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner asserts that: (1) he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Arizona Constitution 

because counsel did not object to his excessive sentence or preserve that issue for review; 

(2) his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by sentencing 

error; (3) his rights under the Fifth Amendment and Section Two of the Arizona 

Constitution were violated when his attorney failed to raise a claim or object during 

 

2

 Although Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of his second post- conviction proceeding is pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals, a stay of these proceedings is unnecessary because exhaustion of any claims in that proceeding cannot toll any time or reset the expired statute of limitations as discussed in Sections II.A and 

II.B. 

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Petitioner’s sentencing; and (4) “[a]ny other violations under the United States 

Constitution and the Arizona Constitution.” (Doc. 7.) The Court dismissed Ground Four 

on September 30, 2014. (Doc. 9.) Respondents assert that the Amended Petition should 

be dismissed as untimely. (Doc. 12.) 

II. Statute of Limitations 

The AEDPA provides a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That period 

generally commences on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents assert that the Amended Petition is untimely 

because it was not filed within one year of the date on which Petitioner’s challenged 

conviction “became final by the conclusion of direct review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), 

and because he has not established a basis for tolling the limitations period. As set forth 

below, the Court agrees and finds the Amended Petition untimely. 

 A. Commencement of the Limitations Period 

 To assess the timeliness of the Amended Petition, the Court must first determine 

the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became “final by the conclusion of direct 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). By pleading guilty, Petitioner was precluded from 

pursuing a direct appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-

4033(B). Rather, Petitioner could seek review of his conviction and sentence in an “ofright” proceeding pursuant to Rule 32, the functional equivalent of a direct appeal. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4; Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 

2007) (noting that Arizona courts consider Rule 32 of-right proceedings a form of direct 

review). 

 The superior court sentenced Petitioner on November 14, 2008. Therefore, his 

notice of post-conviction relief to commence his Rule 32 “of-right” proceeding was due 

ninety days later, on February 14, 2009. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 

32 of-right proceeding, the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of 

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judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or 

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief 

proceeding.”). Because Petitioner did not file a timely notice of post-conviction relief, 

his conviction became final on February 14, 2009, upon “the expiration of the time for 

seeking [post-conviction] review.” See Summers, 481 F.3d at 711, 716-17; (Doc. 12, 

Ex. J (stating that Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief was due no later than 

February 14, 2009).) Accordingly, the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run the 

next day and expired one year later, on February 16, 2010. Thus, the Amended Petition 

filed more than three years later, is untimely absent statutory or equitable tolling.3

B. Statutory Tolling 

 Pursuant to the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is tolled during the time 

that a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino 

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that an application for collateral 

review is pending in State court for “all the time during which a state prisoner is 

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with 

regard to particular post-conviction proceedings.”). 

 After the limitations period had expired, Petitioner commenced post-conviction 

proceedings on October 9, 2012 and August 8, 2013. Because the AEDPA statute of 

limitations had expired by the time Petitioner commenced both post-conviction actions, 

they did not toll the limitations period. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a 

subsequently filed petition for post-conviction relief cannot restart the statute of 

limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). “Section 2244(d)(2) 

cannot ‘revive’ the limitation[ ] period (i.e., restart the clock at zero); it can only serve to 

pause a clock that has not yet fully run. Once the limitation[ ] period is expired, 

 3

 For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the Court assumes that the Amended Petition was filed as of February 3, 2014, the date the original Petition was filed. (Doc. 1.) 

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collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute of limitation[ ].’” Johnson v. 

Galaza, 2001 WL 125312, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2001) (quoting Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 

991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (modifications in original)). 

 Additionally, even if the AEDPA limitations period had not yet expired, the 

notices of post-conviction relief would not have tolled the limitations period because, as 

discussed in Sections I.B and I.C, they were untimely and thus not properly filed. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (stating that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection”) (emphasis added); see also Artuz 

v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (“An application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and 

acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”); 

Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-17 (2005) (holding that time limits are filing 

requirement and stating that, when a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, 

‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)). Accordingly, statutory 

tolling does not render the Amended Petition timely and the Court considers whether 

equitable tolling applies. 

 C. Equitable Tolling 

 The AEDPA limitations period may be equitably tolled because it is a statute of 

limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 

2560 (2010). However, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows: 

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “The diligence required for 

equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” 

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Whether to apply 

the doctrine of equitable tolling “‘is highly fact-dependent,’ and [the petitioner] ‘bears the 

burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate.’” Espinoza-Matthews v. 

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). “When 

considering whether to apply equitable tolling, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 

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need for ‘flexibility’ and for ‘avoiding mechanical rules.’” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 

777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563). 

 Petitioner does not assert any basis for the application of equitable tolling.4

 

(Doc. 7.) Additionally, the record does not reveal any extraordinary circumstance that 

prevented Petitioner from filing a timely federal habeas corpus petition. Petitioner’s lack 

of familiarity with the law and lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary 

circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations period. See Ballesteros v. Schriro, 2007 

WL 666927, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2007) (a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the 

law, lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity 

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

 Because Petitioner has not presented any circumstance that would justify equitably 

tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations, his Amended Petition should be denied as 

untimely and the Court will not consider Respondents’ alternative grounds for denying 

habeas corpus relief. 

III. Conclusion 

 Because Petitioner filed the pending Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

after the expiration of the statute of limitations and statutory and equitable tolling do not 

render the Petition timely, it should be dismissed as untimely. 

 Accordingly, 

 

4

 In the Amended Petition, Petitioner argues that he did not file an appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals challenging the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief because he did understand English and did not know what to do after he received the 

“notice” from the court. (Doc. 7 at 5.) This argument does not address Petitioner’s 

failure to file a timely § 2254 petition. However, even liberally construing this statement as an argument that equitable tolling should apply because Petitioner did not understand English, that argument fails. Assuming Petitioner does not understand (speak, read, or write) English, he is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not established that he 

engaged in reasonably diligent efforts throughout the time the limitations period was running as required by Pace. Petitioner has not alleged or shown that he made a diligent effort to file his petition, or to obtain help from a bilingual individual to help him file his petition. See Ramirez v. California, 2009 WL 6431926, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) 

(requiring non-English-speaking petitioner seeking equitable tolling to demonstrate “diligent efforts” in getting translation assistance); Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a petitioner “bears the burden of showing his own diligence” to prevail on equitable tolling argument). 

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IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 7) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 5th day of February, 2015. 

 

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