Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02756/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02756-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gary Donahoe and Cherie Donahoe, 

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio, 

husband and wife; et al., 

Defendants.

CV10-02756-PHX-NVW

CONSOLIDATED WITH: 

Donald T. Stapley, Jr. and Kathleen 

Stapley, husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and Ava Arpaio, 

husband and wife; et al., 

Defendants.

CV11-00902-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Defendants Lisa Aubuchon and Andrew Thomas’s Joint 

Motion to Exclude Plaintiff Expert Terry Goddard (Doc. 1044). For the following 

reasons, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The factual allegations underlying this action have been stated sufficiently. See 

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Stapley 

v. Pestalozzi, Nos. 12-16145, 12-16146, 2013 WL 4266907 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2013). 

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Although Plaintiff Stapley initially included twelve counts in his Second Amended 

Complaint, his claims have been narrowed by this Court’s April 9, 2012 Order, 869 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1079 (Doc. 338), and by Plaintiff at oral argument. 

A. The remaining claims against Defendants Thomas and Aubuchon 

At oral argument, Stapley narrowed his claims, state and federal, against Thomas 

and Aubuchon to (1) wrongful institution of civil proceedings in the racketeering action, 

(2) retaliatory investigation, (3) false arrest, and (4) unlawful search. As to these 

Defendants, therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction 

of emotional distress, and unconstitutional policies, customs, failure to train, and 

negligent supervision are all withdrawn. 

 1. Wrongful institution of civil proceedings 

First, Stapley claims Thomas and Aubuchon are liable for wrongfully filing a 

federal racketeering action against him. See id. at 1054. To prove wrongful institution of 

civil proceedings, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants (1) instituted a civil action, (2) 

motivated by malice, (3) begun or maintained without probable cause, and which (4) 

terminated in Plaintiff’s favor and (5) damaged him. Id. at 1057 (citing Bradshaw v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 411, 416–17, 758 P.2d 1313, 1318–19 (1988)). 

2. Retaliatory investigation 

Second, Stapley alleges Thomas and Aubuchon investigated him in retaliation for 

“various statements made against [them] in the course of the political feud between the 

Board of Supervisors and the County Attorney and Sheriff’s Offices.” Id. at 1069. 

Consequently, Plaintiff alleges the investigations violated his “First Amendment right not 

to be investigated as a result of . . . valid free speech activity.” Oral Arg. Tr. 112:24–

113:2, 117:25–118:5. 

 “[T]the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an 

individual to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 

256 (2006). “[T]o demonstrate a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must provide 

evidence showing that ‘by his actions the defendant deterred or chilled the plaintiff’s 

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political speech and such deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in the 

defendant’s conduct.’” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 

banc) (alterations omitted) (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 

1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Plaintiff must prove Defendants’ “acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary 

firmness from future First Amendment activities,” but he need not demonstrate that “his 

speech was actually inhibited or suppressed.” Id. (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 

F.3d at 1300). Plaintiff “must allege facts ultimately enabling him to ‘prove the elements 

of retaliatory animus as the cause of injury,’ with causation being ‘understood to be butfor causation.’” Id. at 917 (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260). 

At the oral argument on October 4, 2013, Stapley withdrew any claim of 

actionable conduct regarding the manner in which the investigation was done. The other 

parties are entitled to rely on that narrowing of claims, and the Court holds Stapley to it. 

3. False arrest 

Third, Stapley claims Aubuchon encouraged and participated in his September 21, 

2009 arrest, which he asserts lacked probable cause and a warrant. Stapley thus claims 

Aubuchon is liable for false arrest. See Donahoe, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. 

To prove false arrest, Plaintiff must demonstrate “detention . . . without his 

consent and without lawful authority.” Id. at 1064 (quoting Reams v. City of Tucson, 145 

Ariz. 340, 343, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ct. App. 1985)). “The essential element necessary to 

constitute either false arrest or imprisonment is unlawful detention. . . . A detention that 

occurs pursuant to legal authority, such as an arrest based on probable cause, is not an 

unlawful detention.” Al-Asadi v. City of Phoenix, No. CV-09-47-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 

3419728, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975)). 

Similarly, to succeed on a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

a lack of probable cause or of other sufficient justification. See id. at *9 (quoting Cabrera 

v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998)); Lacey, 693 F.3d at 918. 

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4. Unlawful search 

 Finally, Stapley alleges Thomas and Aubuchon approved or ratified a search 

warrant of his office, see Doc. 246 ¶ 306, which was “knowingly not based on probable 

cause.” Donahoe, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. Further, he “claims that Aubuchon acted 

dishonestly with regard to the probable cause basis for seeking the warrant,” id. at 1072, 

and that she “knew there was no probable cause for the search warrant and knew of and 

intended for the detectives presenting the warrant to the judicial officer to supply false 

and misleading information.” Doc. 246 ¶ 308. 

 As this Court noted in its April 9, 2012 Order (Doc. 338), “Stapley’s claim for 

Fourth Amendment violations is not well pled, challenged, or defended . . . .” Id. at 

1071. Stapley appears to claim that at least Aubuchon engaged in judicial deception to 

obtain the search warrant. 

“It is clearly established that judicial deception may not be employed to obtain a 

search warrant. . . . To support a § 1983 claim of judicial deception, a plaintiff must show 

that the defendant deliberately or recklessly made false statements or omissions that were 

material to the finding of probable cause. . . . The court determines the materiality of 

alleged false statements or omissions.” KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2004) (internal citations omitted). 

B. Expert witness 

Stapley has retained former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard as an expert 

witness to offer “objective and independent analysis” of Thomas and Aubuchon’s 

investigation and prosecution. Doc. 1044-1 at 2. Mr. Goddard summarizes his opinions 

on page 15 of his report: 

The actions of Andrew Thomas and Lisa Aubuchon in investigating 

and prosecuting Donald Stapley were not in accordance with accepted 

standards for prosecutorial procedure. Not only did they: 

1. ignore the statute of limitations, 

2. string together a very large number of unsustainable charges, 

3. charge as felonies crimes which the Legislature had 

determined should be misdemeanors, 

4. include Mr. Stapley in a civil RICO complaint which 

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maliciously repeated theories of a criminal conspiracy to 

build the Court Tower (which a judge had ruled could not be 

prosecuted by the MCAO due to its conflict of interest), 

5. repeatedly ignore the procedures traditionally followed by the 

County Attorney’s Offices before charging defendants, 

specifically the use of case charging reviews, 

they repeatedly ignored the advice of senior advisors within the County 

Attorney’s Office to use the services of private investigators. They also 

made every effort to take the case out of the courtroom and play it in the 

media to inflict maximum personal damage to Mr. Stapley. Individually 

and taken together, the actions of Mr. Thomas and Ms. Aubuchon were 

reprehensible and do not approach even the lowest standards for 

prosecutorial integrity. 

 Based on my experience, and review of the legal record and other 

reports of the investigation and prosecution of Donald Stapley, it is my 

opinion that Andrew Thomas and Lisa Aubuchon violated their ethical 

duties as lawyers, as officers of the court, and as prosecuting attorneys in 

order to pursue their personal and political vendetta against Mr. Stapley. In 

so doing, they discredited the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office and 

made a mockery of the role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system. 

Defendants object and move to exclude Mr. Goddard’s testimony. Doc. 1044 at 

1–2. As discussed below, Mr. Goddard’s opinions are permeated with foundation in the 

criminal prosecutions, for which Thomas and Aubuchon have absolute immunity. Mr. 

Goddard’s testimony therefore is inadmissible except to the extent specifically permitted 

in this Order. The testimony is admissible only insofar as it is separated from the 

criminal prosecutions, adequately disclosed with fair prior opportunity for discovery, 

helpful to the jury, and with probative value not outweighed by risk of prejudice or 

confusion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The party presenting the expert bears the burden of establishing admissibility by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Cloud v. Pfizer Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1129 (D. 

Ariz. 2001) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987)). 

The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of expert testimony: 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 

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(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue; 

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of 

the case. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. 

This Rule aims both to assist the trier of fact’s “search for truth by helping it to 

understand other evidence” and to preserve the trier of fact’s power to decide the 

meaning of evidence. 29 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 6262 (1997). It may be difficult to satisfy these two goals because “both the 

admission and exclusion of expert testimony can undermine the traditional powers of the 

trier of fact.” Id. Expert testimony can add to the jury’s knowledge or it can mislead it 

with unreliable assertions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), set forth “the guideposts” for achieving this balance 

and properly determining admissibility under Rule 702, Diviero v. Uniroyal Goodrich 

Tire Co., 919 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), extended Daubert to all expert 

testimony. Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010). 

 Trial courts must act as “gatekeepers” for expert testimony and “ensure that any 

and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” 

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. In its role as gatekeeper, however, the court does not “serve as 

a replacement for the adversary system.” United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated 

in Leflore County, Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996). Lower courts rely on 

“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction 

on the burden of proof . . . [to] attack[ ] shaky but admissible evidence.” 509 U.S. at 596. 

The trial court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, 

Salem v. United States, 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962), and must exclude testimony supported 

only by speculation or unfounded conjecture. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90. 

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 In sum, “it is the responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that an expert is 

sufficiently qualified to provide expert testimony that is relevant to the task at hand and 

to ensure that the testimony rests on a reliable basis.” Beaudette v. Louisville Ladder, 

Inc., 462 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2006). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 A. Mr. Goddard’s opinions are relevant in part and not relevant in part 

 Rule 702 requires testimony to be helpful to the trier of fact in understanding the 

evidence or determining a fact in issue. At a minimum, this requires that the testimony 

be relevant. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency 

to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and that “fact 

is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Notwithstanding its 

relevance, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

 As noted above, Stapley now asserts the following claims against Thomas and 

Aubuchon: (1) wrongful institution of civil proceedings, (2) retaliatory investigation, (3) 

false arrest, and (4) unlawful search. Whether Mr. Goddard’s testimony is admissible 

turns first on its relevance in light of these particular claims and the elements Plaintiff must 

prove. 

1. Mr. Goddard may not testify that the criminal prosecutions were 

wrongful 

Mr. Goddard may not offer testimony irrelevant to Stapley’s remaining causes of 

action. As indicated above, Thomas and Aubuchon have absolute immunity regarding 

the criminal prosecutions, and the claims arising from those prosecutions have been 

dismissed. See Donahoe, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. The manner in which Thomas and 

Aubuchon prosecuted Stapley is no longer sufficiently probative of any fact of consequence, 

and therefore Mr. Goddard’s evaluation of the criminal prosecutions is not relevant. 

Stapley also contends that Thomas and Aubuchon wrongfully investigated him in 

retaliation for protected conduct. Though in theory evidence of wrongful later 

prosecution might bear on the earlier retaliatory investigation, the prejudice would be too 

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great to allow opinions of wrongful prosecution, which includes presentation to the grand 

jury. As presented, however, Mr. Goddard’s testimony intermingles opinions as to the 

prosecutions and investigation. This taints his testimony and renders much of it 

inadmissible. Consequently, Mr. Goddard’s testimony will be excluded except as 

specifically allowed below. 

2. Mr. Goddard may testify to prosecutors’ usual investigative practices 

Although Mr. Goddard’s testimony is largely inadmissible, he may offer opinions 

for the limited purpose of comparing Thomas’s and Aubuchon’s actions to usual 

investigative practices. Testimony that they fell short of these usual practices will be 

insufficient to establish liability on any of Stapley’s causes of action. Nonetheless, such 

testimony is relevant at least to one remaining claim. 

Mr. Goddard may testify to prosecutors’ usual investigative practices and compare 

them to Thomas’s and Aubuchon’s conduct. Such testimony may assist the jury in 

concluding whether Thomas and Aubuchon’s investigatory conduct so far departed from 

fair-minded and good faith investigation that it demonstrates malice. 

 In Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004), 

the plaintiff sued her insurance carrier for bad faith and sough to recover damages in tort. 

Id. at 1009. “The key to a bad faith claim under California law is whether or not the 

insurer’s denial of coverage was reasonable. . . . The reasonableness of an insurer’s 

claims-handling conduct is ordinarily a question of fact.” Id. at 1009–10. 

To support her claim, the plaintiff called an expert witness to testify that the 

defendant insurance company’s letter terminating the plaintiff’s benefits was 

“misleading, deceptive, and fell below industry standards.” Id. at 1010. Over the 

defendant’s objection, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to admit the 

testimony: “While [the expert]’s testimony that Defendants deviated from industry 

standards supported a finding that they acted in bad faith, [he] never testified that he had 

reached a legal conclusion that Defendants actually acted in bad faith . . . .” Id. at 1016. 

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Just as the Hangarter expert’s testimony supported a jury finding that the 

defendants acted in bad faith, Mr. Goddard’s comparisons support the inference that 

malice may have motivated Thomas or Aubuchon and thus are relevant to a remaining 

claim. 

Mr. Goddard may also apprise the jury of the ethical duties and conflict-of-interest 

rules applicable to prosecutors, and he may testify as to whether Defendants’ actions 

reflect a deviation from them. This includes testimony regarding prosecutors’ ethical 

duties with respect to filing a civil action against an investigative target. At oral 

argument, counsel clarified the purpose of Mr. Goddard’s testimony on this point: “It’s 

not whether or not the RICO lawsuit was valid or invalid. It was whether it’s ever 

appropriate [f]or a prosecutorial agency to have criminal charges outstanding and then 

simultaneously br[ing] a civil case.” Oral Arg. Tr. 119:24–120:2. Plaintiff also 

questioned the “propriety of bringing a civil action [concurrently] with the criminal 

action,” and stated “[t]here’s no way a jury can know whether or not that’s proper or not 

with[out] expert opinion.” Id. at 139:4–139:8. Conflicts of interest and violations of 

ethical duties would not be sufficient for liability. Nonetheless, they could support a 

finding of malice. This testimony is sufficiently relevant to be admissible under Rule 

702. 

Moreover, because only these opinions are allowed, Mr. Goddard’s testimony will 

be quite limited. As a result, its relevance is not substantially outweighed by the risk of 

unfair prejudice to Thomas or Aubuchon. These specific opinions were disclosed, and 

Thomas and Aubuchon have had adequate opportunity to depose Mr. Goddard 

concerning them. 

3. Mr. Goddard may not refer to prosecutors’ “standard of care” 

Thomas and Aubuchon express a legitimate concern, however, that references to a 

“standard of care” could well mislead the jury. As indicated above, none of Stapley’s 

remaining claims against Thomas or Aubuchon requires a showing of negligence. They 

therefore assert, “Repeated arguments that Aubuchon and Thomas violated a standard of 

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care wholly disconnected from any fact or legal theory in the case will cause confusion 

with the jury by allowing jurors to make a determination that the Defendants’ actions 

were ‘bad’ without considering the actual counts and elements needed to prove these 

counts.” Doc. 1087 at 6. That is correct. Although Mr. Goddard may compare 

Thomas’s and Aubuchon’s actions to usual investigative practices, he may not refer to 

those practices as representing a standard of care. 

4. Mr. Goddard may not testify to legal conclusions or Thomas’s or 

Aubuchon’s states of mind 

 In his report, Mr. Goddard draws conclusions properly left to the jury and opines 

on Thomas’s and Aubuchon’s states of mind. See, e.g., Doc. 1044-1 at 16 (stating the 

racketeering suit “maliciously repeated theories of a criminal conspiracy”); id. at 13 

(“Thomas and Aubuchon were motivated by motives other than success in court.”). Such 

testimony is inadmissible. 

Expert testimony that states legal conclusions usurps the court’s or the jury’s role 

and is not helpful. See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994) (“When 

an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, this does not aid the jury in 

making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute the expert’s judgment for the 

jury’s.”). Federal Rule of Evidence “704(a) provides that expert testimony that is 

‘otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 

decided by the trier of fact.’ That said, ‘an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to 

her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.’” Hangarter, 373 F.3d 

at 1016 (quoting Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 

n.10 (9th Cir. 2002), amended sub nom. Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 319 F.3d 

1073 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

 Moreover, testimony on mental states discernible by the jury is not helpful. See 

United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding district court 

abused discretion by admitting expert testimony on issues within “the common 

knowledge of the average layperson”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Consequently, although Mr. Goddard may compare Thomas’s and Aubuchon’s 

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actions to usual investigative practices and state the reasons for them, he may not go 

further and suggest any resulting legal conclusions or the mental states that ought to be 

inferred. The jury is competent on its own to draw conclusions and evaluate motivations 

in light of the evidence presented, including Mr. Goddard’s testimony regarding 

prosecutors’ normal investigative practices and ethical requirements. 

Mr. Goddard’s opinions therefore are inadmissible except to the extent he testifies 

to prosecutors’ usual investigative practices and compares Thomas’s and Aubuchon’s 

conduct to them. He may not offer any opinions regarding the criminal prosecutions, and 

he may not refer to any prosecutorial standard of care, offer legal conclusions, or testify 

about states of mind. 

B. Mr. Goddard is sufficiently qualified

 Rule 702 requires that the witness be “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Because the Rule 

“contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications,” only a “minimal foundation

of knowledge, skill, and experience” is required. Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1015–16 

(quoting Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994)). See, e.g., 

Bd. of Regents of the Univ. and State Colls. of Ariz. v. Cannon, 86 Ariz. 176, 179, 342 

P.2d 207, 209–210 (1959) (real estate broker with no formal education in appraisal 

qualified to give valuation opinion based on experience with sales of real property). 

Moreover, “the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be 

qualified on the basis of experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if 

not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory 

committee’s notes. A lack of particularized expertise goes to the weight of the testimony, 

not its admissibility. United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Mr. Goddard has practiced law since 1976. He served as a prosecutor for ten 

years, first in the Special Prosecutions Section of the Criminal Division of the Arizona 

Attorney General’s Office and subsequently as Arizona Attorney General. See Doc. 

1044-1 at 2. Since leaving office, Mr. Goddard has served as a Fellow at both Columbia 

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Law School and Harvard Law School. Id. at 3. He has also prepared a Continuing Legal 

Education seminar “on ethical challenges facing public lawyers,” id., and he currently 

“advis[es] clients in connection with government investigation and prosecution.” Doc. 

1053 at 4. Mr. Goddard possesses the qualifications to offer expert testimony as to 

prosecutors’ normal investigative practices. 

Mr. Goddard has no direct experience with federal racketeering cases. However, 

his general experience in litigation and with the work of public prosecutors meets the 

“minimal foundation” to give opinions on this application of their work. An important 

part of the opinion is the predicate offenses of Arizona criminal law, on which he is well 

qualified. 

C. Mr. Goddard’s opinions are sufficiently reliable 

Finally, Rule 702 requires testimony to be reliable. The following nonexclusive 

factors go to reliability: (1) whether the expert’s method, theory, or technique is generally 

accepted within the relevant scientific community; (2) whether the method, theory, or 

technique can be (and has been) tested; (3) whether the method, theory, or technique has 

been subjected to peer review and publication; and (4) the known or potential rate of 

error of the method, theory, or technique. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94. 

“A trial court not only has broad latitude in determining whether an expert’s 

testimony is reliable,” however, “but also in deciding how to determine the testimony’s 

reliability.” Elsayed Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064. Indeed, the factors explicitly identified 

in Daubert for evaluating reliability may be inapplicable where an expert’s nonscientific 

testimony turns not on a particular methodology but on personal experiences and 

knowledge. Instead, the court may satisfy itself “by probing the extent” of both. See 

Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1017–18. 

Here, Stapley offers Mr. Goddard’s nonscientific opinions. His opinion turns on 

personal experiences and knowledge rather than on any particular methodology. His 

relevant professional experience is extensive. As Attorney General from 2003 through 

2011, Mr. Goddard served as the “final approving authority” for almost all charges his 

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office presented to state grand juries, including twenty prosecutions of public officials. 

See Doc. 1044-1 at 2. As a result, he has sufficient experience and knowledge to offer 

expert testimony on prosecutors’ normal investigative procedures. 

Thomas and Aubuchon challenge the sufficiency of the materials Mr. Goddard 

considered and his alleged bias against them. 

1. Mr. Goddard’s limited review of the underlying materials is not 

ground for exclusion 

Mr. Goddard has considered the decision in the disbarment proceedings against 

Thomas and Aubuchon, deposition testimony of Thomas and Aubuchon, statements and 

news releases issued by the County Attorney’s Office, and letters and articles authored by 

Thomas, among other documents. See id. at 19–20. Mr. Goddard states he then analyzed 

facts culled from those materials “against a backdrop of [his] own experience in law 

enforcement and the professional standards, practices, principles, and protocols 

recognized by Arizona law enforcement officials and employed in the criminal justice 

system . . . .” Id. at 4. 

Thomas and Aubuchon assert that, in forming his opinion, Mr. Goddard relied 

“almost exclusively on the summaries and conclusions of others” and not on “[t]he 

underlying investigations, subpoenas, search warrants, and reports at the heart of this 

matter . . . .” Doc. 1044 at 13–14; see also Doc. 1087 at 7. Additionally, they highlight 

that Mr. Goddard did not review the racketeering complaint. Doc. 1044 at 13. 

 This does not require excluding the limited opinion Mr. Goddard may give. It 

may, however, undermine the persuasiveness of his opinions that he took as true one set 

of disputed underlying facts or that he did not consider some facts. See Hangarter, 373 

F.3d at 1022 n.14 (“Although Defendants during voir dire argued that [the plaintiff’s 

expert witness]’s selection of documents to review went to the reliability of his 

‘methodology’ as an expert, the district court correctly surmised that questions regarding 

the nature of [the expert]’s evidence went more to the ‘weight’ of his testimony—an issue 

properly explored during direct and cross-examination.”). 

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 2. Mr. Goddard will not be excluded because of bias 

Thomas and Aubuchon further contend that Mr. Goddard’s testimony is unreliable 

because he is biased. They summarize his alleged bias thus: 

His Attorney General’s Office investigated Thomas and Aubuchon, and 

they investigated him and the Attorney General’s Office. Aubuchon has 

sued him. He was a central player in the Dowling dispute, which also 

involved Stapley. He is a close personal friend of a central target of the 

underlying Court Tower Dispute. Goddard has also been a long time 

opponent of Thomas on several levels, and has made numerous efforts to 

bring Thomas down . . . . 

For exclusion on this ground, Thomas and Aubuchon rely largely on Johnston v. United 

States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984), and Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 

F.R.D. 410 (D. Utah 1999). See Doc. 1087 at 9–10. 

In Haugen, the defendant sought to disqualify the plaintiff’s expert witness 

because the expert had previously “informally consulted” the defendant. 184 F.R.D. at 

411, 413. After noting “[i]t should be a rare situation where such a result is imposed,” id. 

at 413, the court inquired largely into the extent to which confidential information had 

passed between the defendant and the plaintiff’s expert and rejected disqualification. Id. 

at 413–14. 

In Johnston, the district court as the trier of fact “determine[d] which expert 

witnesses [were] more credible and trustworthy than others.” 597 F. Supp. at 415. “The 

findings [were] unreliably assessed and professed by the most partisan, unfair sorts [the] 

Court ha[d] ever observed.” Id. Though using some potentially misleading language, see 

id. at 410 (stating one expert’s “testimony [was] stricken” and the other’s was 

“ignore[d]”), the court rejected rather than excluded the relevant expert testimony. Id. at 

411 (“[The] testimony must be seen as lacking in credibility due to this obvious bias.”). 

These and other cases do not overcome the “general rule” that “bias is not a 

permissible reason for the exclusion of expert testimony.” United States v. Thompson, 

No. 05-50801, 2007 WL 2044725, at *2 (9th Cir. July 16, 2007) (citing United States v. 

Abonce–Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Assessing the potential bias of an 

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expert witness, as distinguished from his or her specialized training or knowledge or the 

validity of the scientific underpinning for the expert’s opinion, is a task that is ‘properly 

left to the jury.’” Cruz-Vazquez v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp., Inc., No. 09-1758, 2010 WL 

2898251, at *59 (1st Cir. July 26, 2010) (quoting United States v. Carbone, 798 F.2d 21, 

25 (1st Cir. 1986)). Mr. Goddard’s alleged bias does not require exclusion of his 

testimony. 

IT THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Exclude Plaintiff 

Expert Terry Goddard (Doc. 1044) is granted except that Mr. Goddard may testify to 

prosecutors’ usual investigative practices and ethical duties, and he may compare Thomas 

and Aubuchon’s investigation to them. He may not offer any opinions regarding the 

criminal prosecutions, and he may not refer to any prosecutorial standard of care, offer 

legal conclusions, or testify about Defendants’ states of mind. 

 Dated October 11, 2013. 

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