Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00812/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00812-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FRANCISCO CAMPOS GUERRERO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-0812 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

GREG FIZER and )

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On March 20, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) on August 3, 2006. Docket No. 11.

Respondents assert Petitioner’s federal habeas claims were not

properly exhausted in the Arizona state courts and are

procedurally defaulted and, therefore, that the petition must be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I Procedural History

On October 15, 2002, Petitioner was indicted on one

count of attempted sexual assault, a Class 3 felony, one count

of kidnapping, a Class 2 felony, and five counts of indecent

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exposure, Class 6 felonies. See Answer, Exh. A. The kidnapping

and attempted sexual assault charge were alleged as dangerous

crimes against children because the alleged victim was under

fifteen years of age. Id., Exh. B. 

Petitioner had not previously been arrested for or

convicted of any felonies. Id., Exh. E at 9. On February 25,

2003, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement. Id., Exh. B, C,

D. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to the count of attempted

sexual assault and the charge of kidnapping. See id., Exh. C at

3-22. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government dismissed

the five related counts of indecent exposure. Id., Exh. C at

17. The plea agreement also provided the crimes would be pled

as nondangerous, nonrepetitive offenses and not as dangerous

crimes against children, although the victim was under 15 years

of age. Id., Exh. A at 1 & Exh. C at 15. 

At the plea hearing, the trial judge was not willing to

approve the plea agreement after hearing defense counsel’s and

the government’s recitation of the events giving rise to the

indictment. Id., Exh. C at 6-7. The trial judge questioned

Petitioner about his exact actions; Petitioner agreed he had

pulled the victim toward his exposed penis and said: “Suck

this.” Id., Exh. C at 7. The trial court reviewed the Arizona

kidnapping statute and inquired whether the factual basis for

the plea was sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping.

Id., Exh. C at 9-10. The trial judge queried Petitioner

regarding his intent, and then concluded the requisite intent

was established by Petitioner’s answers to the court’s

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questions. Id., Exh. C at 9-10. The trial judge concluded

there was a factual basis on the record to support Petitioner’s

guilty plea. Id., Exh. C at 18-19.

The trial judge explained the range of sentences for

Petitioner’s conviction on the charges stated in the indictment,

with and without the plea agreement. Id., Exh. C at 10-16.

Petitioner indicated that he understood his options and the

sentencing ranges applicable with and without the plea

agreement. Id., Exh. C at 17. 

Petitioner told the court he had read the plea

agreement. Id., Exh. C at 17. Petitioner indicated he

understood the plea agreement and understood the rights he was

waiving by signing the plea agreement. Id., Exh. C at 17-18.

Petitioner stated he had discussed his case and his

“Constitutional rights” with his counsel. Id., Exh. C at 17.

When asked if anyone had forced or threatened Petitioner to

“make him” plead guilty, Petitioner responded “No.” Id., Exh.

C at 18. The court concluded Petitioner’s guilty pleas were

knowingly and intelligently made and accepted the plea agreement

and Petitioner’s guilty pleas. Id., Exh. C at 18-19.

A hearing was conducted regarding Petitioner’s

sentence. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner’s wife, father, and employer

spoke on Petitioner’s behalf at his sentencing hearing. Id.,

Exh. F. Petitioner spoke on his own behalf and stated he knew

what he “did was wrong.” Id., Exh. E at 12. On March 28, 2003,

Petitioner was sentenced to five years imprisonment on the

kidnapping conviction and to lifetime probation on the attempted

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sexual assault conviction. Id., Exh. F at 15-18.

Petitioner filed a timely action for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona Superior Court on June 9, 2003. Id., Exh.

G. Petitioner was appointed counsel, who informed the court he

could find no meritorious issues to raise on Petitioner’s

behalf. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for

post-conviction relief on January 23, 2004.

Petitioner asserted his trial counsel did not show an

interest in his case and that counsel did not properly

investigate disparities in the victims’ statements. Id., Exh.

J. Petitioner also asserted his lawyer 

scared [him] into signing a plea. He told me

its to risky to fight and to injoy my time I

have out... He said if I fight and loose I’ll

do 60 to 80 years or so. By signing I’ll get

five... My wife and I decided to play it

safe....(sic) 

Id., Exh. J. Petitioner asserted he was innocent of all of the

charges against him. Petitioner further averred:

To get the plea my lawyer had me admit to

things I never did.... As for fileing for R32 he said not to because the cops will

harass and treat me bad. Thats unprofecional

of him.... I’m not good at writing or reading

if I could call you it will be better. (sic)

Id., Exh. J. 

The Arizona Superior Court denied post-conviction

relief on April 4, 2004. See id., Exh. J & Exh. L. The trial

court concluded:

Defendant has not stated a colorable claim

for ineffective assistance of counsel. The

alleged facts that Defendant’s lawyer did not

return Defendant’s phone calls and viewed a

videotape a few days before an unspecified

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court date do not satisfy Defendant’s burden.

Defendant has not shown that his lawyer fell

below the standard of defense attorneys or

that the result of his case would have been

different. In Court, Defendant told the

judge that he agreed that he pulled the

victim toward his penis and said “suck this”.

He also stated that no one forced him to

plead guilty. The fact that he plead guilty

to avoid a tougher sentence if convicted at

trial, is not coercion. Nor is it

ineffective representation for his lawyer to

recommend a plea in these circumstances.

Id., Exh. L.

With permission, Petitioner filed a timely action for

review of the decision denying post-conviction relief on July

23, 2004. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner asserted he did not

understand the plea agreement, that he had been in special

education classes throughout his school years and that he had a

“deficiency to comprehend.” Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner again

asserted his counsel had coerced him into signing the plea

agreement. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner asserted his counsel

“clearly” told him he would get only one or two years in prison

as a sentence pursuant to the plea agreement. Id., Exh. Q. The

Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on July 27, 2005. Id.,

Exh. S. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Supreme Court on September 14, 2005, which was denied on

February 14, 2006. Id., Exh. V & Exh. W.

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because:

1. He was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel. Petitioner asserts his counsel told him to admit he

had pulled the victim to him and said “suck this” when this

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1

 The Court will not address the merits of this claim

because the claim does not assert the denial of a federal

constitutional right. Petitioner does not have a federal statutory

or constitutional right to “venue” in the federal court for a crime

charged by the State of Arizona. 

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event never occurred. Petitioner also asserts he did not

understand the plea agreement because he has a reading

disability and because his attorney did not explain the plea

agreement to him. Petitioner also asserts his counsel was not

available to him prior to his plea hearing and that counsel did

not investigate a defense to the charges against Petitioner.

2. His crime occurred in the parking lot of a federal

post office and, therefore, he would like to “proceed” in

federal court.1

Respondents assert Petitioner procedurally defaulted

his federal habeas claims by failing to properly and completely

exhaust these claims in the Arizona state courts. 

II Discussion

The Court appreciates Respondents’ thorough argument

regarding Petitioner’s procedural default of his habeas claims

by not fairly presenting them to the state courts as federal

constitutional claims. However, the Court notes the Arizona

Superior Court, the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the Arizona

Supreme Court were presented with the opportunity to consider

the legal adequacy of the performance of Petitioner’s counsel

and the factual basis for Petitioner’s claim his counsel was

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2

 Petitioner asserts his counsel “pressured him into saying

things that never happened.” Petition at 5. In his action for postconviction relief, he asserted his attorney “scared” him into entering

a plea agreement and that his attorney made him admit things that he

did not do. Answer, Exh. Q & Exh. V. Petitioner arguably stated a

claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his

petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court in his Rule 32

action, notwithstanding his failure to cite to the United States

Constitution or federal law. See Laurore v. Spencer, 267 F. Supp. 2d

131, 135 (D. Mass. 2003). But see Glavan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1198, 1201-04 (9th Cir. 2005). Compare Sanders v. Ryder, 342

F.3d 991, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2003); Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d

260, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2002); Medley v. Gramley, 987 F. Supp. 1080, 1085

(N.D. Ill. 1997). Cf. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487, 120 S.

Ct. 1595, 1606 (2000) (concluding the purpose of the “complete

exhaustion rule” is not to “trap the unwary pro se prisoner.”), quoted

in Sanders, 342 F.3d at 999.

3

 See, e.g., Sanders, 342 F.3d at 999; Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.) (stating this principle while

concluding the petitioner did not adequately exhaust their claims),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 738 (2005).

4 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2005). 

-7-

constitutionally ineffective.2 Mindful of the admonition to

broadly construe habeas petitions,3 the Court will not address

the issues regarding exhaustion and procedural default but

instead address the merits of Petitioner’s claim he was deprived

of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.4

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are governed

by the doctrine of Strickland v. Washington. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985); Fields v.

Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992). The

Strickland standard requires a defendant to “show that his

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counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient

performance prejudiced him.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d

1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984). When a defendant

challenges a conviction resulting from a plea agreement the

“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is modified; the

defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty to

the charges against him, but instead would have insisted on

going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.

Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v. McCotter, 805 F.2d

538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986). 

Additionally, to succeed on a claim that his counsel

was constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.

Ct. at 369; Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th

Cir. 1990). A lawyer’s advice to plead guilty in the face of

strong inculpatory evidence does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Cassidy, 428 F.2d

383, 384 (9th Cir. 1970); Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 790

(8th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1028 (11th Cir.

1991); Hogan v. Ward, 998 F. Supp. 290, 294 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).

[A] defendant has the right to make a

reasonably informed decision whether to

accept a plea offer. In McMann v.

Richardson, the seminal decision on

ineffectiveness of counsel in plea

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situations, the Court described the question

as not whether “counsel’s advice [was] right

or wrong, but ... whether that advice was

within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397

U.S. at 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441. Thus, for [the

petitioner] to establish a claim of

ineffective assistance, he “must demonstrate

gross error on the part of counsel....” Id.

at 772, 90 S. Ct. 1441. The Third Circuit

has interpreted this standard as requiring a

defendant to demonstrate that the advice he

received was so incorrect and so insufficient

that it undermined his ability to make an

intelligent decision about whether to accept

the plea offer. 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Petitioner has not established his counsel’s advice as

to the consequences of the plea was not within the range of

competence demanded of criminal attorneys. Petitioner faced a

presumptive term of 10 years imprisonment if he went to trial

and was convicted only on the charge of attempted sexual assault

of a minor under the age of 15. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§

13-1001 & 13-604.1(I) (2003). Petitioner faced a presumptive

sentence of 17 years imprisonment if convicted of kidnapping a

minor under the age of 15. See id. § 13-604.1(D). 

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment

pursuant to his conviction for kidnapping, followed by lifetime

probation. The plea agreement negotiated by Petitioner’s

counsel resulted in a prison sentence greatly diminished from

that faced by Petitioner if he went to trial on all of the

charges against him. Had the government insisted Petitioner be

charged with dangerous crimes committed against a child,

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5

 See Arizona v. Hollenback, 126 P.3d 159, 164 (Ct. App.

2005); Arizona v. Kinslow, 165 Ariz. 503, 799 P.2d 844 (1990)

(concluding the statute applicable to kidnapping a child under fifteen

years of age required the court to sentence the defendant pursuant to

the dangerous crimes against children statute). The lenient crime

sentencing classification provided for in Petitioner’s plea agreement

was arguably contrary to Arizona law. See Arizona v. Rushton, 172

Ariz. 454, 837 P.2d 1189 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding a sentence was

illegal wherein the plea agreement permitted an attempted child

molestation defendant to be sentenced under § 13-701 instead of the

mandatory provisions of § 13-604.01). 

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Petitioner faced a presumptive sentence of 17 years imprisonment

just on the conviction for kidnapping, which sentence could have

been imposed consecutively to any sentence for attempted sexual

assault on a minor.5 

Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was competent with

regard to the terms of the plea agreement entered into by

Petitioner. Without the specific sentencing provisions

negotiated by counsel, Petitioner could have received more time

in prison for just the crimes he admitted pursuant to the plea

agreement, i.e., kidnapping and attempted sexual assault. At

the time of Petitioner’s crime, the presumed sentence for a

conviction for kidnapping a person over the age of 15 was 5

years imprisonment, and the maximum sentence for kidnapping was

10 years imprisonment. See id. §§ 13-701(c)(1)-(2) & 13-

1406(B). Petitioner faced a presumptive prison sentence of

three and one-half years imprisonment for a conviction for

attempted sexual assault. See id. §§ 13-701(C)(2) & 13-1001 &

13-1406.

Additionally, Petitioner offers no evidence he did not

understand or agree to the plea agreement. Petitioner was

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questioned by the trial court regarding the factual basis for

his plea and the trial court does not indicate Petitioner had

difficulty understanding its questions. At the time he entered

his plea, Petitioner indicated that he understood his options

and the sentencing ranges applicable with and without the plea

agreement. Answer, Exh. C at 17. Petitioner told the court he

had read the plea agreement. Id., Exh. C at 17. Petitioner

indicated he understood the plea agreement and understood the

rights he was waiving by signing the plea agreement. Id., Exh.

C at 17-18. Petitioner stated he had discussed his case and his

“Constitutional rights” with his counsel. Id., Exh. C at 17.

When asked if anyone had forced or threatened Petitioner to

“make him” plead guilty, Petitioner responded “No.” Id., Exh.

C at 18. The court concluded Petitioner’s guilty pleas were

knowingly and intelligently made and accepted the plea agreement

and Petitioner’s guilty pleas. Id., Exh. C at 18-19.

A state court’s factual finding that a plea was

voluntary and knowing is entitled to a presumption of

correctness by a federal habeas court. See Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 982 (9th Cir. 2004); Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92

F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Additionally, Petitioner’s

contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the

plea agreement carry substantial weight in determining if his

entry of a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629

(1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong

presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory

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allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary

dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are

wholly incredible”); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313

(9th Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section 2255 case);

Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D. Mass. 2003)

(collecting cases so holding). Because Petitioner stated at the

time of his guilty plea that the plea was knowing and voluntary,

the Court concludes that the plea was voluntary and made

intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th

Cir. 1986). 

Despite Petitioner’s protestations to the contrary,

Petitioner has not established that, absent his counsel’s

advice, he would have rejected the plea agreement and continued

to trial, facing a presumptive term of at least 17 years in

prison if convicted. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on the claim that he was not provided the

effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. Plaintiff has not established that his counsel’s

performance was deficient, nor has Plaintiff established that,

absent his counsel’s advice, he would have proceeded to trial.

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s claim that he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel may be denied on the merits.

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that, absent

his counsel’s advice, Petitioner would have continued to trial

on the charges against him. Petitioner has not established his

counsel’s advice as to the consequences of the plea was not

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within the range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys.

Therefore, Petitioner was not deprived of the effective

assistance of counsel and the state courts did not err in

denying relief from his conviction pursuant to this claim.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Guerrero’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

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law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 18th day of October, 2006.

 

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