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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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RUBEN GARCIA, 

v. 

Tn 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Plaintiff, 

Case No.: 3: 13-cv-0807 BEN (KSC) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

D. STRAYHORN, et ai.,·· 

Defendants. [Doc. No. 53] 

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants 

Strayhorn and Luna. (Docket No. 53.) For the reasons outlined below, the Court 

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Ruben Garcia, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First 

Amendment right to free speech. (Docket No.6.) This Court sua sponte dismissed the 

majority of Plaintiffs claims outlined in the operative Second Amended Complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b) on September 23, 2013. (Docket 

No.7.) The remaining two claims involve separate allegations of retaliation by Strayhorn 

and Luna. Defendants are correctional officers at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility. 

In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2011, Strayhorn 

and Luna violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for declaring 

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1 that he was going to file an official grievance against Officer Strayhorn. The second 

2 cause of action alleges that on April 26, 2012, Strayhorn and Luna violated his rights 

3 under the First Amendment by retaliating against him for filing a separate grievance 

4 against Strayhorn in March of2012. 

5 Plaintiff asserts that on the morning of October 24, 2011, he was attending an 

6 optometry appointment in the Triage and Treatment Area ("TTA") located adjacent to the 

7 prison's main plaza. 1 After his appointment, Plaintiff, escorted by a guard and 

8 accompanied by other inmates, proceeded to the walkway that led back to his housing 

9 unit. Plaintiff encountered Strayhorn at one of the security check points. Defendant 

10 Strayhorn and Plaintiff got into a verbal altercation. Plaintiff informed Defendant that 

11 due to his improper conduct he would be filing an official 602 grievance.2 Plaintiff then 

12 requested that Strayhorn either give him a direct order or allow him to continue about his 

13 way. Defendant Strayhorn opened the security gate and allowed Plaintiff to continue 

14 towards his housing unit. After securing the gate, Defendant allegedly continued to shout 

15 at Plaintiff: 

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17 

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"You punk b[****] don't get it. .. you six-o-two me and you gonna [sic] make 

me fI***] you up! I'm not like others you six-o-two, you hear! Coward, p.e} 

scary bird! Try me b[ ], try me b[** **], try me b[ ]! I know you hear 

me! Try me b[** **]! 

19 Defendant Strayhorn then reopened the gate and approached Plaintiff shouting "so what 

20 are you going to do? What's up? I'm right here." 

21 Seeing the confrontation, Strayhorn's superior officer, Defendant Luna, arrived on 

22 scene. Plaintiff informed Luna of his intention to file a 602 grievance against Strayhorn. 

23 

24 1 Defendants dispute Plaintiff's version of the facts and provide declarations of both defendants in 

25 support of their Motion. 

2 Grievances raised by prisoners are filed on California Department of Corrections and 

26 Rehabilitation Form 602. 

3 Defendants state that "P.C." is the acronym for inmates in protective custody. Plaintiff asserts 

27 that "P.C." is used in the prison community to denote someone who is an informant, colloquially 

referred to as a "snitch". 28 

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1 Defendant Luna allegedly told Plaintiff, "[if] you file [a grievance] against my Officer[, ] 

2 I'll lock you up in administrative segregation_" Plaintiff asserts that he told the 

3 defendants that threats of retaliation would not prevent him from filing a complaint 

4 against both officers_ Defendant Luna escorted Plaintiff back to his cell and placed him 

5 on a confined to quarters status ("CTQ,,).4 Plaintiff remained in CTQ status for 

6 approximately eight days-from October 24 to October 31. Plaintiff thereafter received a 

7 Form 128 written counseling chrono documenting the incident in his record. Plaintiff 

8 contends that the chrono contained false information regarding his conduct and left out 

9 the improper conduct of the officers. 

10 Plaintiff asserts that on March 16,2012, he filed a 602 grievance against Officer 

11 Strayhorn for interfering with his medical care two days prior. On April 15, 2012, 

12 Plaintiff filed an inquiry as to the status of his March 16 grievance. On April 26, 2012, 

13 Plaintiff was scheduled for medical treatment at the Facility C Medical Clinic. Upon 

14 arriving at the clinic, Defendant Strayhorn placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and turned him 

15 over to a Sergeant for calling Strayhorn "a child molester in green." Plaintiff asserts this 

16 was a false accusation, and that he missed his appointment as a result.5 

17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 

18 The "purpose of summary judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the 

19 proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for triaL'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

20 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). "The court shall 

21 grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

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4 CTQ is "an authorized disciplinary hearing action whereby an inmate is restricted to their [sic 1 

24 assigned quarters for a period not to exceed five days for administrative rule violations and ten days for 

25 serious rule violations." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3000. 

5 The third party inmate 602 complaints provided in support of Plaintiff s Opposition, alleging 

26 separate incidents of retaliatory conduct by Defendant Strayhorn, are not admissible to demonstrate his 

character or propensity to engage in retaliatory conduct. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b )(1) ("Evidence of a crime, 

27 wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular 

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character."). Therefore the Court did not consider them. 

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1 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

2 56(a). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of 

3 the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, 

4 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' 

5 which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex 

6 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To meet the burden of proof, a moving 

7 defendant must either produce evidence negating an essential element ofthe plaintiffs 

8 claim or show that the plaintiff does not have enough evidence of an essential element to 

9 carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz 

10 Co., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

11 The party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there 

12 is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 

13 U.S. at 586. "[T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that 

14 there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 56 

15 requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by 

16 the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

17 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial on all matters as to which he has the 

18 burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks 

19 omitted). In deciding a summary judgment motion, it is not the role of the District Court 

20 to make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or draw legitimate inferences 

21 from the facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "The 

22 evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

23 drawn in his favor." Id. 

24 DISCUSSION 

25 To prevail on a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) 

26 that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue; and (2) that 

27 the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege or immunity conferred by the 

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1 Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell,541 

2 U.S. 637, 643 (2004).6 

3 "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

4 five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

5 an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

6 chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

7 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

8 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Action taken by a prison official against an inmate in retaliation 

9 for pursuing a grievance or litigation may violate an inmate's rights under the First 

10 Amendment. Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310,1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

11 To satisfy the causation element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff 

12 must show that "his protected conduct was the substantial or motivating factor behind the 

13 defendant's conduct." Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

14 citations and quotations omitted). A plaintiff s mere allegation or speculation that there 

15 is a causal link between protected activity and an adverse action does not create a factual 

16 dispute for purposes of summary judgment. Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coli., 83 F.3d 1075, 

17 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff must also show that he suffered an adverse action 

18 sufficient to cause an inmate of ordinary firmness to be chilled by it. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 

19 568-69. 

20 I. Plaintiff's October 24, 2011 Retaliation Claim 

21 Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff 

22 cannot satisfy the following three elements of a retaliation claim: causation, legitimate 

23 penological purpose, and adverse action. 

24 III 

25 III 

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27 6 The parties do not dispute that Defendants were acting under color oflaw. Thus, the only 

28 question here is whether Plaintiff was deprived of some constitutional right. 

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1 A. Causation 

2 Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not express his intent to file a grievance until 

3 the very end of the October 24, 2011 incident. 

4 The Ninth Circuit has explained that "[i]n the First Amendment context, a plaintiff 

5 creates a genuine issue of material fact on the question of retaliatory motive when he or 

6 she produces, in addition to evidence that the defendant knew of the protected speech, at 

7 least (1) evidence of proximity in time between the protected speech and the allegedly 

8 retaliatory decisions [or actions], (2) evidence that the defendant expressed opposition to 

9 the speech or (3) evidence that the defendant's proffered reason for the adverse action 

10 was false or pretextual." Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554,568 (9th Cir. 2009). 

11 "[T]iming can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent." 

12 Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995). However, timing alone is not enough 

13 and must be supported by more than "sheer speculation." Id. 

14 As the parties disagree over the sequence of events, the Court views the facts in the 

15 light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

16 According to Plaintiff, this case began when Officer Strayhorn overheard Plaintiff telling 

17 another inmate that someone was going to file a grievance7 against Strayhorn, and that 

18 everything would soon catch up to him. In response, Strayhorn confronted Plaintiff, 

19 challenging him to file a grievance; asserting that it would not matter because Plaintiff 

20 was "P.c." and no one would believe him. Plaintiff then told Strayhorn that he would 

21 file a grievance. According to these facts, Officer Strayhorn was aware of Plaintiff s 

22 intent to file a grievance at the beginning of the alleged episode. 

23 

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25 7 It is undisputed that filing a 602 grievance against prison officials is a protected activity under the 

First Amendment. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567. "Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, 

26 inmates would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices." Id. "And because purely 

retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those 

27 protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying misconduct they are 

designed to shield." !d. (citing Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 & n.4). 28 

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1 Strayhorn's subsequent threats and taunts to Plaintiff regarding the grievance 

2 occurred immediately afterwards. The same goes for Defendant Luna. Luna approached 

3 Strayhorn and Plaintiff during their altercation. Plaintiff informed Luna that he would be 

4 filing a grievance against Strayhorn for misconduct. Luna then responded that he would 

5 place Plaintiff in administrative segregation if he filed a grievance. Plaintiff again told 

6 them that he would still file a grievance. Luna then escorted Plaintiff back to his cell and 

7 placed him on CTQ status. Luna also wrote a memorandum documenting the incident 

8 and Strayhorn issued a Form 128 chrono. 

9 Plaintiff states that he expressed a clear intent to file a 602 grievance against 

10 Strayhorn and in response, both Defendants allegedly made threats to Plaintiffifhe took 

11 such an action. Additionally, as supported by the declaration ofL. Garcia, Plaintiff was 

12 held in CTQ status for approximately eight days directly following the incident. The 

13 timing of the events combined with alleged verbal opposition to Plaintiff s speech and 

14 Defendants' awareness at the outset of Plaintiffs intent to file a grievance, is sufficient to 

15 raise a triable issue of fact regarding Defendants' motives. See Bruce v. Y/Sf, 351 F.3d 

16 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendants' comments to prisoner along with suspect timing 

17 raised a triable issue offact as to whether defendants' motive behind plaintiffs gang 

18 affiliation classification were retaliatory). 

19 B. Penological Purpose 

20 The Court is required to "afford appropriate deference and flexibility" to prison 

21 officials when evaluating proffered legitimate correctional reasons for alleged retaliatory 

22 conduct. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. 

23 Defendants argue that Plaintiff was acting unruly, and their purpose of 

24 documenting the incident was to instill order. While maintaining order and security is a 

25 legitimate penological purpose, see Barnett v. Cenfoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994), 

26 Defendants' reasoning ignores Plaintiffs contentions completely. According to 

27 Plaintiffs version of the facts, as stated above, Defendants had no reason to taunt or 

28 threaten him or place him in handcuffs or in CTQ status. Plaintiff was walking from his 

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1 optometry appointment, escorted by a guard and accompanied by other inmates, when he 

2 needed to pass through the gate where Officer Strayhorn was stationed. Plaintiff was not 

3 behaving disorderly or harassing anyone. As such, Defendants had no legitimate 

4 penological purpose to reprimand Plaintiff in any way. 

5 C. Adverse Action 

6 Plaintiff must also show that he suffered a harm and that the adverse action was 

7 sufficient to cause an inmate of ordinary firmness8 to be chilled by defendants conduct. 

8 Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69. Plaintiff is not required to show that his First Amendment 

9 rights were actually chilled by defendants conduct.9 The test applied is not based on the 

10 subjective view of the particular plaintiff but rather an objective assessment from the 

11 perspective ofthe inmate of ordinary firmness. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 ("It would be 

12 unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely 

13 because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity.") 

14 The threats to "f[*** Plaintiff] up" and put him in administrative segregation, and 

15 the actual placement on CTQ status for approximately eight days are independently 

16 sufficient to satisfy the adverse action element. Threats alone can be sufficient to satisfy 

17 this prong. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he mere threat of 

18 harm can be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out because the threat 

19 itself can have chilling effect.") (emphasis in original). The Court in Brodheim found 

20 that plaintiff need not establish a specific threat of discipline so long as a reasonable 

21 juror, from the record, could interpret the defendants' statements as intimating that some 

22 form of punishment or adverse action would follow. Id. at 1270-71 ("The power ofa 

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25 8 The definition of an "adverse action" is not static across all context. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 

F.3d 378, 398 (6th Cir. 1999). The "prisoner of ordinary finnness" standard is a recognition that given 

26 the normal adverse nature of incarceration, "prisoners may be required to tolerate more than average 

citizen before a retaliatory action taken against them is considered adverse." Id 

27 9 Plaintiff concedes in his Second Amended Complaint and Opposition that he was going to file a 

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602 complaint regardless of defendants' threats or planned retaliation. 

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• 

1 threat lies not in any negative actions eventually taken, but in the apprehension it creates 

2 in the recipient of the threat."). Unlike Brodheim, Plaintiff indicates clear threats by 

3 Defendants to harm Plaintiff and place him in solitary confinement. In addition to the 

4 threatening comments, Plaintiff was actually confined to his quarters from October 24 to 

5 October 31.10 

6 However, the Court agrees with Defendants that Strayhorn's counseling chrono 

7 and Luna's memorandum do not constitute adverse actions. See Jenkins v. Caplan, No. 

8 02-5603,2010 WL 3742659, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16,2010) (counseling chrono was not 

9 an adverse action because it was primarily used for informational purposes and caused no 

10 disciplinary consequences); Williams v. Woodford, No. 06cv1535, 2009 WL 3283916, *3 

11 (B.D. Cal. Nov. 13,2009) (same). 

12 In this case, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that a prisoner of ordinary 

13 firmness would not have been chilled in the exercise of his constitutional rights by 

14 Defendants' alleged threats and taunts, and the placement of Plaintiff on CTQ status. 

15 D. Conclusion 

16 Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the incidents on 

17 October 24,2011 is DENIED. 

18 II. Plaintiffs April 26, 2012 Retaliation Claim 

19 Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish the required causal link between 

20 the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action by defendants. The Court agrees. 

21 First, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that Defendant Luna was involved in 

22 the April 26, 2012 incident. Second, the only evidence of Strayhorn's retaliatory intent 

23 presented to the Court is the timing of the March 16,2012 grievance in relation to the 

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10 While Defendants do not argue that CTQ is not a disciplinary or adverse action, they do contend 

27 that Plaintiff was never placed in CTQ, which, at best, creates a genuine issue of material fact for the jury 

to decide. 

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1 April 26, 2012 adverse action. I I Timing alone is not enough to establish a causal link 

2 between the plaintiffs participation in protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory 

3 actions by prison officials. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808. 

4 There is no evidence in the record to indicate Strayhorn was aware of the March 16 

5 grievance. In addition, Defendants provide the Declaration ofB. Self, a Correctional 

6 Counselor and custodian of record at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility, which 

7 indicates that the grievance was not received by officials until after the April 26, 2012 

8 incident. Plaintiff presents no evidence that Strayhorn was aware of the grievance or that 

9 he informed Strayhorn of his intention to file a grievance during the alleged March 14 

10 incident. Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence sufficient to link his participation in a 

11 protected activity with Strayhorn's conduct on April 26, 2012. No genuine issue of 

12 material fact exists. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 

13 GRANTED as to the April 26 incident. 

14 CONCLUSION 

15 Upon consideration ofthe foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in 

16 part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 

17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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19 DATED: MarchfL-,2016 

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nited States District Judge 

27 11 The Court assumes without deciding that removal from a valid medical appointment before 

28 treatment can be administered is a sufficient adverse action such that a prisoner of ordinary firmness would 

be chilled in the exercise oftheir constitutional rights. 

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