Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01088/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01088-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AIMEE HERNANDEZ,

NO. 2:07-CV-1088 FCD DAD 

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HARD ROCK CAFÉ INTERNATIONAL

(USA), INC., a corporation;

STEWART GARNETT; and DOES I

through XX, inclusive

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendant Hard Rock

Café International’s (“Hard Rock”) motion to dismiss five of

plaintiff Aimee Hernandez’s (“Hernandez”) eight claims for relief

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. For the reasons set forth below1, defendants’ motions

are DENIED. 

///

///

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2 The facts of this case are taken from plaintiffs’

allegations in the complaint. 

Defendant, relying on Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977 (9th

Cir. 2002), asks the court to consider extrinsic evidence in

support of its Motion. (Def’s. Reply Mot., filed Aug. 17, 2007

(“Reply Mot.”), at 7.) However, in Van Buskrik, neither party

challenged the court’s decision to review the proffered evidence. 

In this case, plaintiff objects to the court’s consideration of

defendant’s records. Therefore, in ruling on defendant’s motion

the court will only consider the allegations set forth in the

complaint. Cf. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.

1994) (considering documents “whose authenticity no party

questions” on a motion to dismiss) (overruled on other grounds by

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.

2002). 

2

BACKGROUND2

Hernandez was employed by Hard Rock in its Sacramento

location as a server, trainer, and rocker. (Pls.’ Compl., filed

June 5, 2007 (“Compl.), ¶ 4.) Almost immediately following her

hiring in June 2003, Hernandez’s co-worker, defendant Stewart

Garnett, began to make inappropriate and offensive comments to

Hernandez. (Id. ¶ 16.) Garnett’s sexually explicit comments

escalated to unwanted touching including, but not limited to,

grabbing Hernandez’s hand and placing it on his penis, grabbing

her buttocks and attempting to kiss her on the lips. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

In late May or early June of 2006, Hernandez and a female

co-worker, Jamie Evans (“Evans”), met with Hard Rock’s General

Manager Jim Borton (“Borton”) to complain about Garnett. (Id. ¶

19.) Hernandez and Evans informed Borton that Garnett’s actions

made them uncomfortable and provided examples of his harassment. 

(Id.) Borton assured Hernandez and Evans he would handle the

situation. (Id.) 

Garnett continued to make unwanted advances and sexually

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harass Hernandez. (Id. ¶ 20.) On July 4th, 2006, Garnett came

to Hard Rock despite not being schedule to work. (Id.) Garnett

drank at the bar and proceeded to follow both Hernandez and Evans

around the restaurant while they worked. (Id.) Hernandez

advised Hard Rock’s Manager Steve Romero (“Romero”) that

Garnett’s actions were making her extremely uncomfortable. (Id.) 

Romero responded that management had already spoken with Garnett

and the next time something happened, Garnett would be

immediately fired. (Id.) Nonetheless, Garnett was allowed to

remain in the restaurant. (Id.) 

On or about July 12, 2006, Hernandez attempted to give

Borton two weeks notice of her resignation. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

Hernandez informed Borton she was unable to work with Garnett any

longer and that her resignation was in response to Hard Rock’s

failure to resolve the situation. (Id.) Borton then assured

Hernandez that Garnett would be terminated if he continued to

engage in sexually harassing conduct. (Id.) 

Despite Borton’s assurance, Garnett continued to harass

Hernandez while she worked. (Id. ¶ 23.) On one occasion he

whispered “Wow! I guess I get to work with all the hot girls

today.” (Id.) On other occasions, Garnett persistently asked

Hernandez go on a date with him. (Id.) 

On July 27, 2006, Hernandez spoke with Hard Rock’s Director

of Operations, Kelly Marshall. (Id. ¶ 24.) Marshall stated the

issue with Garnett had been resolved. Hernandez then informed

Marshall she did not want to work with Garnett any longer, to

which Marshall responded that would be “impossible.” (Id.) 

Marshall advised Hernandez her only option was to quit. (Id.) 

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Hernandez also informed Marshall that Romero had made some

comments to employees about the complaint and that he had been

treating her rudely. (Id.) Marshall said she would speak with

Romero. (Id.)

Subsequently and despite her requests to the contrary,

Hernandez continued to be scheduled to work with Garnett. (Id. ¶

25.) On August 11, 2006, Garnett asked Hernandez if he could

still “molest” her. (Id. ¶ 27.) Hernandez complained to Borton

about Garnett’s statement. (Id.) Borton requested Hernandez

write down what Garnett had said, and Hernandez did so. (Id.) 

On or about February 5, 2007, Garnett, clearly intoxicated,

entered the restaurant while plaintiff was working and began

loudly stating “f*** those bitches” in reference to Evans and

others whom he believed made the complaint about him. (Id. ¶

29.) 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

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Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Hard Rock’s conduct resulted

in her emotional distress, loss of employment opportunities and

mental anguish. Specifically, plaintiff brings claims for (1)

hostile work environment under Title VII and FEHA; (2) failure to

prevent sexual harassment under FEHA; (3) negligent hiring,

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supervision, training and retention; (4) negligence; (5) assault;

(6) battery; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for negligence,

negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring,

supervision, training, and retention as barred by California’s

Workers Compensation Act and her claims for assault and battery

as failing to establish the necessary nexus to hold Hard Rock

vicariously liable. 

A. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Hard Rock contends that the exclusive remedy clause of the

California Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) bars plaintiff’s

claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). 

(Mot. at 6) Plaintiff argues that claims for NIED are not subject

to the exclusivity provision of the WCA when it is premised on an

employer’s conduct that violates fundamental public policy. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n Mot., filed Aug. 7, 2007 (“Opp’n”) at 7.)

Where a plaintiff’s emotional distress claims result from a

defendant’s misconduct which exceeds the normal risks of the

employment relationship, a plaintiff’s claim is not preempted by

the WCA. Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478,

1492 (1999); see also Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of

California, 68 Cal. App. 4th 101, 112-13 (1998) (stating that

plaintiff’s emotional distress claim is not barred by WCA in suit

alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy). 

Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination and

fundamentally violates determinations of state public policy. 

Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions, 38 Cal. 4th 264, 277

(2006).

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In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant knew or

should have known that plaintiff was being subject to sexual

harassment and that Hard Rock’s failure to exercise due care in

preventing such harassment caused her emotional distress. (Compl.

¶ 70.) As such, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that her NIED

claim is based upon Garnett’s sexual harassment, conduct that

fundamentally violates California public policy and is thus,

beyond the normal risks of the employment relationship. 

Therefore, Hernandez’s NIED claim is not barred by the

exclusivity provision of the WCA. 

Defendant argues that while intentional emotional distress

may fall outside the exclusivity provision of the WCA, a claim

for NIED is barred by the same. (Def’s. Reply Mot., filed Aug.

17, 2007 (“Reply Mot.”), at 3-4.) However, in Maynard v. City of

San Jose, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that a plaintiff’s

claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress are not preempted. Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d

1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Smith v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec.

Workers, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1637, 1658 (2003) (holding that

plaintiff’s NIED claim was not barred by the WCA because it was

based on his employer’s violation of fundamental public

policies). Defendant argues that Maynard was incorrectly

decided, or alternatively that such a finding was merely dicta. 

The court finds neither of these arguments persuasive. In

Maynard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict for the

plaintiff regarding his claim for NIED, finding that such a claim

was not preempted by the WCA because it arose out of conduct that

implicates fundamental public policies. 73 F.3d at 1405-06. 

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Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the Maynard court’s finding

does not “border on dicta.” (Reply Mot. at 4.) As such, no

matter how strongly defendant contends Maynard was incorrectly

decided, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is binding on this court. 

Accordingly, Hard Rock’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s eighth

claim for NIED is DENIED. 

B. Negligence; Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training and

Retention

Similarly, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims for

negligence and negligent hiring, supervision, training and

retention are barred by the exclusivity doctrine of the WCA. 

(Mot. at 5, 7.) Plaintiff contends an exception to the

exclusivity rule applies when an employee suffers injury as a

result of discrimination. (Opp’n, at 7.) 

The WCA generally provides the exclusive remedy for an

employee’s work-related injury. 2 WITSUM Workers Compensation

Act § 24 (2005). However, incidents where the “defendant’s

misconduct exceeds the normal risk of the employment

relationship,” are excepted from the exclusivity provision. 

Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1492

(1999) (citing Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 756

(1992)). As such, claims of negligence are not necessarily

preempted by the WCA’s exclusivity provision. Scott v. Solano

County Health and Social Services, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 971 (E.D.

Cal. 2006). “[T]he [WCA] does not bar . . . allegations of a

negligent response to harassment or discrimination claims because

these claims are based on accusations of discrimination, which

‘is not a normal risk of the compensation bargain.’” Scott, 459

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F. Supp. 2d 971 (citing Fretland, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1492);

Doerflex-Casner v. Placer County Dep’t of Pub. Works, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 36066, 26-27 (2006); see Maynard, 37 F.3d at 1405

(“Personal injury claims that implicate fundamental public policy

considerations are not preempted by the Workers Compensation

Act.”). 

Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent hiring,

supervision, training and retention are based upon defendant’s

alleged failure to fulfill its duty to prevent sexual harassment,

(Compl. ¶¶ 51, 55), conduct that falls outside the normal risk of

the compensation bargain. Therefore, defendant’s motion to

dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims for

relief is DENIED. 

C. Assault and Battery

Finally, defendant argues it cannot be held vicariously

liable for Garnett’s actions because there is no nexus between

his employment with defendant Hard Rock and the alleged batteries

he inflicted on Hernandez. (Mot. at 8.) Plaintiff argues that

Garnett’s conduct was, at the very least, reasonably foreseeable

to Hard Rock and thus, Hard Rock should be held vicariously

liable for the torts committed by Garnett. (Opp’n at 9.) 

Vicarious liability is established when an employee acted

within the scope of his employment when he engaged in the

conduct. Farmers Ins. Group v. Santa Clara County, 11 Cal. 4th

992, 997 (1995). Determinations regarding scope of employment

are broadly construed. Id. at 1004. Furthermore, “an employer’s

vicarious liability may extend to willful and malicious torts of

an employee as well as negligence. . . . [A]n employee’s tortious

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act may be within the scope of the employment even if it

contravenes an express company rule and confers no benefit to the

employer.” Id. 

An employer may be vicariously liable if the employee’s act

was either required by the employer or incidental to the

employee’s duties. Yamaguchi v. Harsmut, 106 Cal. App. 4th 472,

482 (2003). Alternatively, an employer may be held liable if the

employee’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable to the employer. 

Id.; see also Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 12 Cal.

4th 291, 297-99 (1995). Conduct is reasonably foreseeable if the

incident leading to injury is an ‘outgrowth’ of the employment. 

Id. at 298 (citations omitted). “A sexual tort will not be

considered [as reasonably foreseeable] . . . unless its

motivating emotions were fairly attributable to work related

events or conditions.” Id. at 301. 

Plaintiff alleges that, on numerous occasions, Garnett had

engaged in offensive conduct during the course of her employment

with defendant, plaintiff had reported the conduct to defendant,

and subsequently, such conduct continued. Plaintiff also alleges

that she informed defendant that she could not work with Garnett. 

See Yamaguchi, 106 Cal. App. at 482 (noting that evidence of

previous work disputes and threats between co-workers that did

not socialize outside the work environment and threats by one coworker that he would strike plaintiff with a knife could give

rise to the imposition of vicarious liability upon employer for

the subsequent assault with a knife); cf. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at

302 (holding that an employer was not vicariously liable for a

sexual tort of its employee where there was no evidence that the

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employee’s conduct was foreseeable to the employer either due to

nature of the work or prior interactions between plaintiff and

employee). Giving the plaintiff every reasonable inference from

the allegations in her complaint, plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged that Garnett’s alleged tortious conduct were casually

attributable to his employment with defendant and an outgrowth of

workplace relationships, conditions and events. Therefore,

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for assault and

battery are DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 24, 2007

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