Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15362/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARGARET RUDIN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN MYLES; ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 12-15362

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-00643-

RLH-GWF

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 11, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed September 10, 2014

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Mary H. Murguia,

Circuit Judges, and Lynn S. Adelman, District Judge.

*

Opinion by Judge Murguia;

Dissent by Judge Adelman

* The Honorable Lynn S. Adelman, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 1 of 39
2 RUDIN V. MYLES

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing as

untimely Nevada state prisoner Margaret Rudin’s 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging her conviction of

murder with the deadly use of a weapon and unauthorized

surreptitious intrusion of privacy by listening device.

The panel held that because the Nevada State Supreme

Court concluded that Rudin’s state post-conviction petition

was untimely under state law, Rudin is not entitled to

statutory tolling under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for the duration

of her state post-conviction proceedings.

The panel held that extraordinary circumstances

preventedRudin from filing her application for federal habeas

relief, and that she is therefore entitled to equitable tolling of

the AEDPA statute of limitations, between November 10,

2004, and August 22, 2007—during which period the first

attorney appointed to represent Rudin in collateral review

proceedings abandoned her, and during which period she was

diligent in pursuing her rights.

The panel held that Rudin is not entitled to equitable

tolling after the point, August 22, 2007, at which the parties

and her subsequent appointed counsel first became aware that

prior counsel had never filed a post-conviction petition in

state court, through April 25, 2011, when counsel applied for

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 2 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 3

habeas relief in federal court, during which period Rudin

failed to act diligently to protect her rights.

Dissenting, District JudgeAdelman concluded that, on the

egregious facts of this case, the doctrine of equitable tolling

is sufficiently expansive to provide Rudin with access to the

federal courts.

COUNSEL

Christopher Oram, Las Vegas, Nevada, for PetitionerAppellant.

Jamie J. Resch (argued), Senior Deputy Attorney General,

and Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Office of the

Attorney General, Las Vegas, Nevada, for RespondentsAppellees.

OPINION

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA) establishes a one-year period of limitation

within which an individual seeking relief must file an

application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). Once that one-year period begins to run, it may

be tolled only in certain circumstances. See id. § 2244(d)(2)

(providing for statutory tolling); Holland v. Florida, 130 S.

Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010) (providing for equitable tolling). The

question this case presents is whether Petitioner Margaret

Rudin is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 3 of 39
4 RUDIN V. MYLES

AEDPA limitations period, excusing her six-year delay in

filing her application. We conclude, albeit not without pause,

that she is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling

sufficient to excuse her delay. We therefore affirm the

district court’s order dismissing Rudin’s application as

untimely.

I. FACTS

The facts giving rise to this appeal are essential to our

tolling analysis. We therefore describe those facts in more

detail than we otherwise might.

A. Rudin’s Criminal Trial and Direct Appeal Proceedings

In April 1997, Petitioner Margaret Rudin was charged

with murder with the use of a deadly weapon and

unauthorized surreptitious intrusion of privacy by listening

device, both in violation of Nevada state law. See Nev. Rev.

Stat. §§ 200.010; 193.165; 200.650. Those charges arose out

of the death of Rudin’s husband Ron, whose charred remains

had been discovered in Lake Mojave a few years earlier. See

Rudin v. State, 86 P.3d 572, 577 (Nev. 2004). After pleading

not guilty to both charges, Rudin retained the services of a

private attorney, Michael Amador, to represent her at trial. 

Her trial began in the Eighth Judicial District Court of the

State of Nevada (the “trial court” or the “court”) on March 2,

2001.

Two-and-a-half weeks before trial commenced, it became

clear to the court that Amador alone could not adequately

defend Rudin. After a series of pretrial delays, the court

appointed attorney Thomas Pitaro to assist Amador with

Rudin’s defense. Pitaro quickly realized that Amador had not

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 4 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 5

yet reviewed “thousands of pages of discovery,” and Pitaro

soon became “concerned about the preparation that had been

done for the trial.” Amador had not, for example,

interviewed critical witnesses. As a result, the defense team

would learn, for the first time at trial, the content of various

witnesses’ testimony. In at least one instance, when a witness

was called to the stand, Pitaro “went to get from Mr. Amador

the [witness’s] file and found nothing inside.” As Pitaro

would later describe, “the preparation that [one] would hope

normally would be done before trial starts was being done

during the trial.”

But even with Pitaro’s help, Rudin’s trial was replete with

alleged errors and professional misconduct on the part of the

defense team. Amador, for example, began with an opening

statement that had “no cohesive theme.” Over the course of

trial, Amador was accused of creating a prejudicial conflict of

interest by allegedly negotiating agreements for the literary

and media rights to his representation. Rudin, 86 P.3d at

587–88. His general lack of preparation prompted Rudin

twice to move for a mistrial, but both of her motions were

denied. Id. at 579–80, 585–86. Pitaro, who was appointed

after Amador’s opening statement, described the

representation as “ ‘a farce, and that disturbs me as an

attorney. . . . This has become a sham, a farce and a

mockery.’ ”1 Id. at 590 (Rose, J., dissenting).

A jury convicted Rudin on both charges. For her

conviction for murder with the use of a deadly weapon, the

trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with a

1 By the time Rudin’s trial ended, the court had actually appointed a

third attorney, John Momot, to assist with the defense. Rudin, 86 P.3d at

580.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 5 of 39
6 RUDIN V. MYLES

possibility of parole after twenty years. For her conviction

for unauthorized surreptitious intrusion of privacy by a

listening device, the court imposed a one-year sentence, to

run concurrently with Rudin’s life sentence. Rudin’s

judgment of conviction was entered on September 17, 2001.

On April 1, 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed

both of Rudin’s convictions on direct appeal. See Rudin v.

State, 86 P.3d 572 (Nev. 2004). The court concluded that

Amador’s alleged conflict of interest and ineffectiveness,

while sufficient to cause “concern,” “must be examined in a

separate post-conviction proceeding at which time Rudin’s

post-conviction attorney will examine the entire record,

interview all relevant witnesses and present the matter to the

district court for a full and complete airing and decision.” Id.

at 588.2 The Nevada Supreme Court’s remittitur issued on

April 27, 2004, and Rudin did not seek a writ of certiorari

from the U.S. Supreme Court. The deadline for her to do so

was June 30, 2004.3

 

2

 Two of the six justices dissented. They concluded that

there is sufficient evidence in the record, without the

necessity of post-trial proceedings, to establish that the

defense was totally unprepared to try this case and that

Amador had a substantial conflict of interest with his

client. This was prejudicial to Rudin, and the result

reached was unreliable.

Rudin, 86 P.3d at 595 (Rose, J., dissenting).

3 Rudin had ninety days from the date of the Nevada Supreme Court’s

decision, which was issued on April 1, 2004, to petition for a writ of

certiorari. Sup. Ct. R. 13(3).

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 6 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 7

B. Rudin’s Petitions for Collateral Relief

Around the time that appellate review of Rudin’s

judgment of conviction concluded, two statutes of limitation

began to run, both relating to her ability to seek collateral

review of the errors that she alleged had affected her

underlying criminal trial. The first limitations period is

defined by state law and requires, except under certain

circumstances, that a state-court petition for post-conviction

relief be filed within one year of the Nevada Supreme Court

issuing its remittitur:

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a

petition that challenges the validity of a

judgment or sentence must be filed within 1

year after entry of the judgment of conviction

or, if an appeal has been taken from the

judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme

Court issues its remittitur. For the purposes of

this subsection, good cause for delay exists if

the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction

of the court:

(a) That the delay is not the fault of the

petitioner; and

(b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely

will unduly prejudice the petitioner.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1). The second limitations period is

defined by AEDPA, and it also establishes a one-year

deadline for a state prisoner seeking a federal writ of habeas

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The AEDPA limitations

period runs from the latest of four specified dates:

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 7 of 39
8 RUDIN V. MYLES

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases

on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

Id. The AEDPA limitations period may be tolled if a

petitioner “properly file[s]” a petition for post-conviction

relief in state court; where that occurs, the limitations period

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 8 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 9

will be tolled for the time during which the state-court

petition is pending. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

Thus, from the date on which the Nevada Supreme Court

issued its remittitur, which was April 27, 2004, Rudin had

one year, or until April 27, 2005, to file a petition for postconviction relief in state court. And from the date on which

the deadline passed for seeking a writ of certiorari from the

U.S. Supreme Court, which was June 30, 2004, she had one

year, or until June 30, 2005, to file an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in federal court. If Rudin were “properly” to

file her state post-conviction petition, the time for filing an

application for federal habeas relief would be statutorily

tolled.

With that statutory background in mind, we turn to the

series of events that occurred during each of those respective

one-year periods in this case.

1. Attorney Dayvid Figler’s Representation

On April 30, 2004, three days after the Nevada Supreme

Court issued its remittitur on direct appeal of Rudin’s

judgment of conviction, Rudin’s appellate counsel, Craig

Creel, moved to withdraw as counsel and asked the trial court

to appoint post-conviction counsel. The trial court granted

Creel’s motion on June 8, 2004. Rudin, proceeding pro per,

filed a similar motion on July 14, 2004, also seeking

appointment of post-conviction counsel.4 At a hearing on

4 We assume that the state court was required, under Nevada Rule of

Appellate Procedure 46(d)(3)(C), to wait to set a hearing date until after

Rudin had filed her pro per motion for appointment of post-conviction

counsel. Under that rule, in a post-conviction appeal, an attorney’s motion

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 9 of 39
10 RUDIN V. MYLES

November 10, 2004, after 197 days had passed since the state

supreme court issued its remittitur, the court granted Rudin’s

motion and appointed attorney Dayvid Figler to represent

her.5 Two weeks later, on November 24, 2004, the court

issued an order to that effect.6

At the November 2004 hearing at which the state court

appointed Figler to represent Rudin, Rudin attempted pro per

to file with the court a series of papers. In the district court

and on appeal, Rudin contends that those papers would have

constituted a “properlyfiled” post-conviction petition had the

court accepted them. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).7 Pursuant

to the applicable local rules, however, the court declined to

to withdraw as counsel “shall be accompanied by . . . a motion by

defendant to proceed in proper person or with substitute counsel.”

5 The record is not clear as to the reason, if any, that the post-conviction

court delayed four months in hearing Rudin’s pro per motion for

appointment of post-conviction counsel. Cf. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 34.740

(requiring “expeditious judicial examination” of petitions for postconviction relief); 34.726 (limiting the period for filing a petition to one

year). In the district court, Rudin argued in passing that the state court’s

four-month delay was “unnecessarily long” and was a part of the

“extraordinary circumstances” that gave rise to her filing delay. She does

not renew that argument on appeal.

6 We, like the district court, give Rudin every benefit of the doubt. We

therefore take November 10, 2004, not November 24, 2004, as the date on

which Figler’s representation commenced.

 

7

 We give Rudin every benefit of the doubt and assume her contention

is accurate.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 10 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 11

accept them and instead “turned [them] over to Mr. Figler.”8

But Figler never filed them with the court. One month later,

in December 2004, Judge Bonaventure, who had presided

over Rudin’s trial and post-conviction proceedings up until

that point, recused himself sua sponte, and Rudin’s case was

reassigned.9

When Rudin’s case was reassigned to another judge on

December 29, 2004, 246 days had passed since the Nevada

Supreme Court issued its remittitur. Rudin therefore had 119

days left to file a petition for post-conviction relief in state

court. With respect to AEDPA, 182 days had passed since

that limitations period had begun to run, leaving Rudin with

183 days to file an application for federal habeas relief. 

Again, the deadlines for filing those petitions were April 27,

2005, and June 30, 2005, respectively. And although Rudin

had once tried to file a petition for relief herself, the postconviction court rejected that effort because the local rules

prohibited Rudin from doing so when she had “counsel of

record.”

8 Rule 3.70 of the Rules of Practice for the Eighth Judicial District Court

of the State of Nevada provides that papers “delivered to the clerk of the

court by a defendant who has counsel of record will not be filed [but will

be] forwarded to that attorney for such consideration as counsel deems

appropriate.”

 

9

Judge Bonaventure recused himself as a result of personal biases that

he had against Rudin’s previous appellate counsel, Craig Creel. See Matt

Pordum, Bonaventure Won’t HearRudinAppeal, Las Vegas Sun, Dec. 28,

2004, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2004/dec/28/bonaventure-wonthear-rudin-appeal/ (“ ‘My blood boils every time I hear the name Craig

Creel. . . . Whether I look at him or think of him, my blood boils. I’m

getting a headache thinking of him right now.’ ” (quoting Bonaventure,

J.)).

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 11 of 39
12 RUDIN V. MYLES

* * * * *

The record suggests that, after Rudin’s case was

reassigned (and perhaps as a result of that reassignment),

substantial confusion arose between the parties and the court

about whether Rudin had already filed a petition for postconviction relief. On January 5, 2005, for example, the state

court held a status hearing on Rudin’s “opening brief.” The

court’s use of the term “opening brief” suggested that the

parties and the court believed that Rudin’s initial petition for

post-conviction relief had been filed but that Rudin had yet to

file a brief in support of that petition. See Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 34.735 (establishing the form of a petition). At the same

status hearing, the court granted Figler a continuance,

extending his time to file the “brief” and setting a second

status hearing for July 13, 2005. At the July 13 status

hearing, Figler again requested “an additional 90 days to file

his brief,” which the court granted the following week. By

that date, both of Petitioner’s one-year limitations periods for

filing her requests for collateral relief had run. But nobody–

neither Figler, nor the State, nor the court–recognized that to

have occurred. On January 18, 2006, the post-conviction

court again granted Figler an additional “45 days in which to

file his opening brief due to the voluminous record in this

case.” The State would later confirm that, at that time, the

State and the court were “under the mistaken impression” that

a petition had already been filed.

Meanwhile, Rudin became concerned–and we believe

rightfully so–that Figler was not adequately representing her

in her collateral review proceedings. According to Rudin, at

some point in 2005, she requested that Figler provide her with

copies of her file. Figler did not immediately respond. Figler

visited Rudin only a handful of times that year, but he did not

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 12 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 13

interview the witnesses she identified, and he never informed

her that he had requested a series of continuances on the basis

of the “complexity” of her case. Figler last visited Rudin in

May 2006, which was the first time in almost a year that he

had done so.

In November 2005, Rudin began to gather information in

support of her soon-to-be-filed motion to substitute counsel. 

First, she submitted an Inmate Request Form to the prison

staff asking for a summary of the attorney visits she had

received that past year. In a response dated a few weeks later,

the staff informed her that she had received four visits,

occurring on January 4, February 7, February 25, and June

17. In January 2006, after multiple failed attempts to contact

Figler, Rudin submitted a second Inmate Request Form

notifying prison staff that she had “not been able to call [her]

attorney since [December 15, 2005]” and requesting that the

staff fix the problem, which she was concerned was “at this

facility.” Three weeks later, the prison staff responded,

informing Rudin that Figler had a collect call block on his

office phone and that Rudin would need to send a letter to

Figler requesting that the block be removed. At the same

time, Rudin’s friend, who was not in prison, “repeatedly . . .

requested [that Figler] visit [Rudin]; have the telephone block

removed; not postpone [Rudin’s] post conviction brief filing;

and send her a copy of the opening brief,” all to no avail.

Figler never filed anything with the state post-conviction

court. On April 5, 2006, 511 days after Figler was appointed,

Rudin moved to substitute counsel. In her motion, she

described Figler’s inadequacies and expressed her “grea[t]

concer[n] thatshe [was] not receiving adequate representation

regarding her post conviction.” At a hearing on July 17,

2006, the court granted her motion and, at the same time,

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 13 of 39
14 RUDIN V. MYLES

appointed attorney Christopher Oram, who continues to

represent Rudin on appeal, to represent her.10 The court filed

an order to that effect on August 17, 2006.

To summarize the facts leading up to this point: By

August 17, 2006, the day that Figler was relieved from his

duties to represent Rudin, almost two years had passed since

the day he was appointed to represent her. Early on in the

course of Figler’s representation,Rudin’s case was reassigned

to a new judge, who granted at least three of Figler’s requests

for additional time to file an “opening brief.” At no point did

the court ever mention the one-year limitations period under

Nevada state law, and at no point did the State raise

timeliness concerns. And while Figler regularly attended the

court’s status hearings, he appears to have done nothing else

in support of his client’s request for post-conviction relief. 

Indeed, after June 2005, Figler stopped communicating with

his client altogether, by declining to visit her in prison and by

placing a collect call block on his office telephone. When

Figler’s representation ended, 842 days had passed since the

day Rudin’s one-year state limitations period began to run,

and 778 days had passed since the day her one-year AEDPA

limitations period began to run. Of those days, 645 and 581,

respectively, had run under Figler’s watch. And during that

time, Figler had filed nothing in either state or federal court.

10 Attached to Petitioner’s motion to substitute counsel was what she

called a “brief opening supplement,” presumably to her petition for postconviction relief. When the post-conviction court ruled on her motion,

however, it appears to have construed the filing solely as a motion to

substitute counsel, not as a petition for post-conviction relief.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 14 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 15

2. Attorney Christopher Oram’s Representation

Oram’s representation began on August 17, 2006,11and

has continued through the course of this appeal. Oram finally

filed a post-conviction petition in state court on August 21,

2007. Prior submissions or references to Rudin’s “opening

brief” notwithstanding, Oram’s August 21, 2007, submission

appears to have been the first and only petition for postconviction relief filed in the state court. It was filed three

years and 116 days after the state-law statute of limitations

began to run–or 846 days too late.

A colloquy between Oram, the post-conviction court, and

the State at a status conference on August 22, 2007,

demonstrates that, even at that late date, the parties were still

confused as to whether a petition for post-conviction relief

had actually been filed. Oram initially raised the issue by

suggesting that he re-label his most recent filing as a petition

for “a writ of habeas corpus” as opposed to a “supplement.” 

The post-conviction court agreed and proceeded to find

“extraordinary circumstances” to excuse the delay in filing:

12

MR. ORAM: [M]y fear is, as I look at the

statute, that – um – the one year deadline to

11 Oram technically was appointed at the hearing that took place on July

17, 2006. Again, however, we seek to give Rudin every benefit of the

doubt. We therefore consider Figler’s representation to have extended

until the date on which the court entered its order substituting counsel,

which was August 17, 2006.

12 We assume that the post-conviction court’s reference to “extraordinary

circumstances” is equivalent to, or was intended to mean, “good cause,”

which is the standard to excuse a filing delay under Nevada Revised

Statute section 34.726.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 15 of 39
16 RUDIN V. MYLES

file, I looked at it and it said that – uh – the

court can excuse it, and can delay the process,

which I assume was going on while Mr. Figler

was going through this. But perhaps I should

relabel the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

I may need to amend it today, just to say

where she’s located, because that’s what the

statute requires.

THE COURT: Okay. I may say you

should probably do that. Just do that as like a

one page sheet, like an errata to your deal.

MR. ORAM: Yes.

THE COURT: And the court will find, as

a matter of finding today, that [your] filing of

the writ for post-conviction relief is timely,

based upon – um – the fact that – uh – Mr.

Figler had the case for so many years. I

believe it was years.

MR. ORAM: It was two years. Yes, it was

two years.

THE COURT: It was two years, and filed

nothing, even though we kept having status

checks. So – um – we’re going to find that it

was timely filed.

. . . .

Um – and it was an extensive trial. Didn’t it

take several weeks?

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 16 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 17

MR. ORAM: Ten weeks.

. . . .

THE COURT: Ten week trial. So that

would be the extraordinary circumstance that

we would find would allow the petition for

post-conviction relief be filed. That, plus the

fact that the first attorney didn’t do anything.

At that point, and for the very first time in two years, the

State became aware that no petition had been filed and

decided to speak up:

[THE STATE]: I think, Judge, that sets a

bad precedent, in light of the fact that we can

get multiple attorneys, and every attorney that

gets this says, well, he had it too long, he had

it too long. We’d like to at least address that,

before you make that finding.

The post-conviction court obliged, declining to make a

finding until the State had the opportunity to address the issue

in further briefing. It noted, however, that “I really think that

the court is going to find, not only this court, but the next

court, is going to find that there were extraordinary

circumstances in this case, which would allow the court to

extend the one year deadline.” The State never did brief the

timeliness question, nor did it ever move to dismiss Rudin’s

petition.

On December 19, 2008, the post-conviction court held a

hearing to consider the merits of Rudin’s petition for relief. 

At that hearing, the court questioned whether “the defense . . .

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 17 of 39
18 RUDIN V. MYLES

start[ed] out so far behind the starting line of this trial that no

matter how much time the [c]ourt gave them during the trial

. . . it ultimately [was] an unfair trial.” The post-conviction

court went on to state,

And there’s two standards for Strickland:

[13]

One is was counsel effective, and then the

second standard is even if counsel wasn’t

effective was the evidence so overwhelming

. . . against the defendant [that] it wouldn’t

make any difference who defended her and

how prepared they were and how many

experts they called because the decision

would always be guilty of murder.

In this case I can’t say that that is true. I

didn’t try the case, but in reviewing the writ

filed by Mr. Oram and reviewing the response

by the State, and I had commented on the

22nd of October that the case was full of a

cast of characters together with witnesses, and

the case had a lot of intrigue and spins and

loops, and there was a lot of ulterior motives

on people who testified.

. . . .

The experts couldn’t agree on much of

anything in this case as I read the dry record. 

The proof of guilt was not a slam dunk by any

stretch of the imagination for the State, so I

can’t say – I cannot say in this case that no

 

13 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 18 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 19

matter who had defended her that the verdict

would have been the same.

After hearing testimony from defense attorneys Pitaro and

Momot, the court granted Rudin’s request for post-conviction

relief and ordered her a new trial. The post-conviction court

described Rudin’s prior trial as a “mockery of our promise to

people who are in the criminal justice system that they will

have an adequate defense.”

The State appealed, arguing for the first time on appeal

that Rudin’s petition was untimely. In its brief, the State

confirmed what we think is suggested by the record: that “in

the proceedings below,” “the prosecution and the judge were

under the mistaken impression that an initial petition had

been timely filed.”

The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the post-conviction

court’s judgment. It concluded that neither of that court’s

stated reasons for excusing Rudin’s delay “affords a factual

or legal basis to find that Rudin’s claims were not reasonably

available to be raised in a timely manner.” Rudin sought en

banc reconsideration, which the Nevada Supreme Court

denied on January 20, 2011. It was only after the Nevada

Supreme Court denied en banc reconsideration of Rudin’s

state post-conviction appeal that Oram filed an application for

habeas relief in federal court.

* * * * *

On April 25, 2011, Rudin, still represented by Oram,

applied for habeas relief in federal court. By that time,

almost seven years had passed since the deadline for seeking

a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, see

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 19 of 39
20 RUDIN V. MYLES

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), making her application almost six

years too late under AEDPA. In her application, Rudin

contended that the Nevada Supreme Court erred in finding

her state-court petition for post-conviction relief time-barred

because either (1) the petition was timely, or (2) the State had

waived any argument to the contrary when it failed to make

a timeliness argument before taking its appeal. For those

reasons, according to Rudin, the federal district court should

have considered her state-court petition to be “properly filed”

and given her the benefit of statutory tolling of the AEDPA

limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In the

alternative, Rudin argued that equitable tolling pursuant to

Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010), also applied to

her case. The district court granted the State’s motion to

dismiss, dismissed Rudin’s petition with prejudice, and

denied the certificate of appealability. On October 24, 2012,

we granted Rudin’s request for a certificate of appealability

on the question “whether the district court properly

determined that the petition was barred by the statute of

limitations.” We turn now to that question.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the question whether a petitioner’s

application for federal habeas relief was timely filed. Noble

v. Adams, 676 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 2012). We also

review de novo the question whether AEDPA’s statute of

limitations should be tolled. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Unless the facts are undisputed, we

review the district court’s findings of fact underlying a claim

for equitable tolling for clear error. Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d

948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012). The petitioner bears the burden to

establish that she is entitled to tolling of the AEDPA

limitations period. Id.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 20 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 21

A. Statutory Tolling

We begin with Rudin’s argument that she is entitled to

statutory tolling of the AEDPA limitations period. On this

point, Rudin appears to argue that the Nevada Supreme Court

erred when it found her state post-conviction petition

untimely, and that had it not so erred, her petition would be

considered “properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),

entitling her to statutory tolling of the AEDPA limitations

period.

While we may not have made the same decision as the

Nevada Supreme Court, we are not at liberty to second guess

that court’s decision when it was acting on direct appeal of

the state post-conviction court’s judgment. The state supreme

court concluded that Rudin’s petition was untimely under

state law, and “[w]hen a postconviction petition is untimely

under state law, that [is] the end of the matter for purposes of

§ 2244(d)(2).” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414

(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration

in original); accord Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018

(9th Cir. 2009). In light of Pace, and because the Nevada

Supreme Court is the final arbiter of Nevada state law, that is

the end of the matter here. Rudin is not entitled to statutory

tolling under § 2244(d)(2) for the duration of her state postconviction proceedings.14

14 We likewise reject Rudin’s argument that she can claim the benefit of

equitable tolling in state court, thereby entitling her to statutory tolling in

federal court. Equitable tolling under Holland v. Florida is a federal

doctrine entirely separate from state law. See 130 S. Ct. at 2563

(“Equitable tolling [is] an inquiry that does not implicate a state court’s

interpretation of state law.”); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 732 (1991) (applying the independent and adequate state ground

doctrine to the habeas context).

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 21 of 39
22 RUDIN V. MYLES

B. Equitable Tolling

We turn, therefore, to Rudin’s argument that she is

entitled to equitable tolling under Holland v. Florida. A

petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if she can establish

that (1) she was pursuing her rights diligently, but (2) some

extraordinary circumstance stood in her way. Pace, 544 U.S.

at 418; Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013)

(“[E]quitable tolling is available ‘only when extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time and the extraordinary circumstances

were the cause of [the prisoner’s] untimeliness.’ ” (quoting

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (second

alteration in original))). Rudin bears a heavy burden to show

that she is entitled to equitable tolling, “lest the exceptions

swallow the rule,” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotation

marks omitted); however, the grounds for granting equitable

tolling are also highly fact-dependent, Sossa, 729 F.3d at

1229. At bottom, the purpose of equitable tolling is to

“soften the harsh impact of technical rules which might

otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from having [her] day

in court.” United States v. Buckles, 647 F.3d 883, 891 (9th

Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563 (“[W]e have followed a tradition

in which courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve hardships

which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast

adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly

applied, threaten the ‘evils of archaic rigidity.’ ” (quoting

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,

248 (1944))).

In Holland, the Supreme Court held that AEDPA’s

limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons. 130 S.

Ct. at 2562. In that case, the petitioner’s attorney had failed

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 22 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 23

to file a timely application despite the petitioner’s repeated

requests to do so, failed to inform the petitioner about crucial

facts related to his case, and failed to communicate altogether

with his client over a period of several years. Id. at 2564. 

The Supreme Court found those circumstances to constitute

more than a “garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” and

instead concluded that the attorney’s egregious misconduct

amounted to, in essence, abandonment. Id.; id. at 2568

(Alito, J., concurring); see also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct.

912, 923–24 (2012) (adopting Justice Alito’s reasoning in

Holland addressing attorneyabandonment).15 Because of that

abandonment, the petitioner’s delaycould be deemed to result

from misconduct that could not constructively be attributed

to him, and therefore the AEDPA limitations period could

potentially be tolled for the relevant period of time. Holland,

130 S. Ct. at 2564–65.

To be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA

limitations period, Rudin thus bears the burden to prove that

she has been pursuing her rights diligently but that

extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for her to file

her application on time. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Under

Holland, attorney abandonment may give rise to such

extraordinary circumstances. 130 S. Ct. at 2564. “The

diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is

15 Mere negligence on the part of a prisoner’s post-conviction counsel

does not warrant equitable tolling. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564. “That is

so . . . because the attorney is the prisoner’s agent, and under ‘well-settled

principles of agency law,’ the principal bears the risk of negligent conduct

on the part of his agent.” Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922 (quoting Coleman,

501 U.S. at 753–54). But when an attorney abandons his client, the

principal-agent relationship is severed, and the attorney’s “acts or

omissions therefore ‘cannot fairly be attributed to [the client].’ ” Id. at

923 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753) (alteration in original).

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 23 of 39
24 RUDIN V. MYLES

‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’ ” 

Id. at 2565 (citations and second and third internal quotation

marks omitted). We readily conclude that extraordinary

circumstances in part gave rise to Rudin’s delay in filing her

application for federal habeas relief.

1. July 1, 2004, Through November 10, 2004

Between July 1, 2004, the day the AEDPA limitation

period began to run, and November 10, 2004, the day that

Figler was appointed to represent Rudin, Rudin was not

represented by counsel. During that time, Rudin cannot

establish that “extraordinary circumstances” existed to

equitably toll the AEDPA limitation period. See Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[P]ro se status,

on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.”). 

Thus, during that time, 133 non-tolled days passed on

Rudin’s AEDPA clock.

2. November 10, 2004, Through August 22, 2007

On November 10, 2004, Figler was appointed to represent

Rudin in her collateral review proceedings.16 After Figler

was appointed, however, he abandoned her. Over the course

of his period of representation, Figler visited Rudin in prison

only a handful of times, and by mid-2005, those visits had

stopped. He had a collect call block placed on his office

phone, making him all but impossible to reach. And while

we acknowledge that Figler physically attended the postconviction court’s status hearings, the record makes clear that

16 It is significant that Figler’s representation commenced before June

30, 2005. That is so because extraordinary circumstances cannot toll a

statute of limitations that has already run.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 24 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 25

he did so with seemingly no intention to actually represent his

client. All the while, Figler failed to inform Rudin of the

reasons for his delay, providing her no clue of “any need to

protect [herself] pro se.” See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917. On

the record before us, it does not appear that anyone was

aware of Rudin’s need to protect herself until at least

August 22, 2007. We therefore conclude that extraordinary

circumstances prevented Rudin from filing her application

for federal habeas relief between November 10, 2004, and

August 22, 2007.

Rudin was also diligent in pursuing her rights during that

time, beginning with her attempt to file pro per a petition for

post-conviction relief on November 10, 2004. Over the

course of Figler’s representation, Rudin made repeated

attempts to contact him, provided him with witness

information relevant to her case, and requested that he

provide her with copies of her files so that she could take

additional steps on her own behalf. When Figler repeatedly

failed to respond, Rudin prepared and filed her own motion

to substitute counsel, which had a “brief opening supplement”

attached to it. Until she filed that motion, Rudin had done

everything short of filing her own “opening brief,” which, as

the state court had already made clear, the local rules

prohibited her from doing. We conclude that Rudin was

“reasonably diligent” during the period of Figler’s

representation, which is all that is required for equitable

tolling purposes. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.

Rudin is therefore entitled to equitable tolling of the

AEDPA statute of limitations during the time in which Figler

was representing her and up until the point at which Oram

became aware that Figler had never filed anything on Rudin’s

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 25 of 39
26 RUDIN V. MYLES

behalf. That period of time ran from November 10, 2004, to

August 22, 2007.

The State argues that Rudin cannot avail herself of the

benefit of equitable tolling during that time because Figler

represented Rudin only in state court, not in federal court. On

that point, the State contends that Figler’s inadequacies in

state court had no bearing on Rudin’s ability to file a timely

federal application for relief. It argues that, pursuant to Pace,

Rudin should have filed a “protective” application in federal

court and asked the court to stay and abey its habeas

proceedings while she exhausted her state-court remedies. 

544 U.S. at 416 (“A prisoner seeking state postconviction

relief [may file] a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and

as[k] the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas

proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.”). Under the

specific circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded by

the State’s argument. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563

(“[S]pecific circumstances . . . could warrant special

treatment in an appropriate case.”).

For all Rudin knew–and, indeed, until August 22, 2007,

for all the State knew–Rudin’sstate-court petition had already

been filed, making her eligible for statutory tolling under

§ 2244(d)(2). During the period that Figler had represented

her, almost every reference to the pending filing was to an

“opening” or “supplemental brief,” suggesting that the court

had already received her initial petition. Even the State

concedes that it believed that to be the case. During the

period in which Rudin “lacked a clue” of any need to protect

herself, we decline to impute to her knowledge that neither

the State nor the court possessed. See Lott v. Mueller,

304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (declining to impute to a

petitioner knowledge that, “[e]ven with the benefit of legal

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 26 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 27

training, ready access to legal materials and the aid of four

years of additional case law, . . . evaded both [petitioner’s]

appointed counsel and the expertise of a federal magistrate

judge”).17

3. August 23, 2007, Through April 25, 2011

On August 22, 2007, at the status conference in the state

post-conviction court, the parties first became aware of the

fact that Figler had never filed a post-conviction petition in

state court. From that point forward, Rudin should have been

aware of the possibility that nothing had been “properlyfiled”

 

17 The State filed a motion in this court to expand the record on appeal

to include various state-court documents that it had not, for whatever

reason, made a part of the record in the district court. As a general rule,

documents not filed with the district court cannot be made part of the

record on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a) (“[T]he original papers and

exhibits filed in the district court; the transcript of proceedings, if any; and

a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk” . . .

“constitute the record on appeal.”); Kirschner v. Uniden Corp. of Am.,

842 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1988). There are of course narrow

exceptions to that general rule, which we may, in our discretion and in

“unusual circumstances,” invoke. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019,

1024–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing exceptions).

The State offers no compelling reason for its failure to make these

documents part of the record in the district court. Ironically, the reasons

it offers for doing so are the same reasons to which it objected when the

state post-conviction court found that Rudin had established good cause

for her filing delay: that “this is not a typical case,” that “Rudin’s trial was

one of the longest in Nevada history,” and that, overall, the proceedings

below were complex.

We do not need the documents that the State seeks to make part of the

record on appeal in order to decide this case. Thus, we decline to depart

from our general rule. The State’s motion to expand the record on appeal

is DENIED.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 27 of 39
28 RUDIN V. MYLES

in either state or federal court on her behalf. And at that time,

having been put on notice that her state-court petition may not

have been timely filed, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Rudin had

every reason to act diligently to protect her rights. Yet she

failed to do so.

Rudin offers no persuasive reason for her failure to act

diligently during that time, however. Although she could

have filed a protective federal habeas application while her

state-court post-conviction appeal was pending, she did not. 

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 416. After the State filed its notice of

appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court, it should have been

eminently clear to Rudin (and Oram, her counsel) that

Rudin’s eligibility for AEDPA statutory tolling was in

jeopardy. Absent any compelling reason for her failure to act

during this time, Rudin cannot satisfy her burden to establish

that she is entitled to equitable tolling after August 22, 2007.18

18 The dissent takes issue with our conclusion in this respect, pointing

out that by the time Rudin learned that Figler had never filed a postconviction petition on her behalf, the AEDPA limitations had already run. 

Therefore, the dissent argues, Rudin had nothing left to protect, and any

protective application for habeas relief would have been pointless.

But our caselaw still requires that Rudin show some degree of

diligence during that time. We cannot conclude that, simply because the

AEDPA statute of limitations had run, Rudin needn’t have filed anything

in federal court. Although a district court might have “dismissed [Rudin’s

application] because it was untimely,” Rudin would have had every right

to appeal such a decision and seek relief on equitable tolling grounds. In

any event, our cases do not permit us to resolve this appeal by speculating

as to what might have happened had Rudin been diligent; rather, those

cases required Rudin to show that she was diligent by filing something in

federal court. See White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam) (rejecting the argument that filing a protective application

after the AEDPA statute oflimitations had run would have been “pointless

or even detrimental” and concluding that failure to file demonstrated a

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 28 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 29

* * * * *

In sum, we conclude that Rudin has satisfied her burden

to show that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA

limitations period until August 22, 2007, when the

extraordinary circumstances making it impossible for her to

file on time were removed. See Sossa, 729 F.3d at 1229. 

After that date, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period

resumed, giving Rudin until April 10, 2008, at the latest to

file her application for federal habeas relief in the district

court.19 She waited until April 25, 2011, to do so. We must

therefore also conclude that Rudin’s application was, by our

calculations, over three years–or 1109 days–too late.

III. CONCLUSION

We are troubled by the outcome of this case for many

reasons. Margaret Rudin’s direct appeal and collateral review

proceedings have been pending in either state or federal court

for a combined total of 13 years. She has potentially

meritorious claims that she has suffered prejudice at the

hands of her own attorneys’ egregious misconduct. Yet she

has never had an opportunity to present those claims in court.

Rudin’s defense counsel, Amador, indisputably engaged

in egregious professional misconduct during the course of her

underlying criminal trial. On direct appeal of her judgment

lack of diligence). Unfortunately, Rudin did not. We are therefore

compelled to conclude that she is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

AEDPA statute of limitations after August 22, 2007.

19 Again, giving Rudin every benefit of the doubt, we assume that

equitable tolling preserves the remaining AEDPA limitations period.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 29 of 39
30 RUDIN V. MYLES

of conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that

Rudin’s trial was plagued not only with inadequacies on the

part of defense counsel, but also with prosecutorial

misconduct and legal error on the part of the State and the

court.20 Although two members of the Nevada Supreme

Court found the record sufficiently clear as to the “inherent

prejudice created by [trial counsel]” to require immediate

reversal of Rudin’s judgment of conviction, a majority of the

court declined to address the effect of those errors, finding

them more appropriate for resolution on collateral review.

But then, in her collateral review proceedings, Rudin was

abandoned. Rudin’s first attorney filed nothing in any court

on her behalf, and he also failed entirely to investigate her

post-conviction claims. By the time Rudin requested and

obtained substitute counsel, her state and federal limitations

periods had already run, but nobody, not even the court, knew

that to be true. And although the state post-conviction court,

seeing the case as a “mockery of [its] promise to people who

are in the criminal justice system that they will have an

adequate defense,” initially granted Rudin relief, the Nevada

Supreme Court reversed that court’s judgment, finding

Rudin’s petition untimely and reinstating her criminal

convictions. Now, for reasons that completely escape us and

that remain unexplained by the record, Rudin’s current

counsel failed to file a protective habeas application in federal

20 On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that, at trial, the

State had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Nevada Supreme Court also noted

that the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard when it ruled on

Rudin’s requests for a mistrial. The state supreme court concluded,

however, that those errors were harmless.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 30 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 31

court to preserve Rudin’s right to any opportunity for review

that may have remained.

At this point, Rudin is still in prison, having served 13

years of her life sentence for murder. We know from the

state post-conviction court that the State’s “proof of guilt [at

that trial] was not a slam dunk by any stretch of the

imagination.” We also know from the post-conviction court

that, had Rudin been represented by competent counsel, the

jury’s verdict may have been different. Thus, what we do not

know is whether Rudin is lawfully imprisoned. And,

regrettably, that is something we may never know.

The prejudice that Rudin potentially suffered at trial has

only been compounded by the inadequacies of her attorneys

on collateral review, who have now precluded her from

having any chance at presenting her claims in federal court. 

Thus, if ever there were a case in which equitable tolling

should apply to soften the harsh impact of technical rules,

perhaps this is that case. However, we are bound by AEDPA

and the standards established under our caselaw and that of

the U.S. Supreme Court, which circumscribe our power to

grant relief to cases in which extraordinary circumstances–in

other words, abandonment–made it impossible for the

petitioner to file on time.

Applying those equitable tolling standards here, we are

unable to conclude that, during the time in which Rudin was

represented by her current counsel, Oram, extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible for her to file a protective

application for habeas relief in federal court. While we can

find no explanation for Oram’s conduct, we likewise cannot

conclude that he abandoned her in a way that, under Holland,

would constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 31 of 39
32 RUDIN V. MYLES

equitably toll the AEDPA limitations period. For that reason,

this case–this patent denial of the safeguards of our criminal

justice system–calls for a remedy that we, as a circuit court,

simply cannot provide.

Because that is so, we must AFFIRM the district court’s

dismissal with prejudice of Rudin’s application. For the

reasons explained earlier, we DENY the State’s motion to

expand the record on appeal.

ADELMAN, District Judge, dissenting:

No one can seriously dispute that Margaret Rudin

received ineffective assistance of counsel during her state

court homicide trial, reportedly the longest such trial in

Nevada history. Although two justices of the Nevada

Supreme Court were prepared to grant relief based on the

record on direct appeal, a majority directed her to follow the

usual procedure of developing her ineffective assistance

claim by bringing a post-conviction motion. Rudin attempted

to do so but, based on a constellation of circumstances none

of which are fairly attributable to her lack of diligence, she

was prevented both from properly filing a post-conviction

motion and from timely filing a federal habeas corpus

petition.

The majority finds unfairness but concludes that our

hands are tied. I disagree with the latter proposition and

conclude that, on the egregious facts of this case, the doctrine

of equitable tolling is sufficiently expansive to provide

petitioner with access to the federal courts. Thus, I

respectfully dissent.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 32 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 33

I.

Regarding the facts, I emphasize only a few key points. 

Rudin attempted to comply with the state supreme court’s

directive to present her ineffective assistance claim via a postconviction motion both by requesting the appointment of

post-conviction counsel and by attempting to file papers

which, according to her, raised the claim. In November 2004,

in response to Rudin’s request, the trial court appointed

Dayvid Figler as post-conviction counsel but declined to

accept Rudin’s pro se submission and instead gave it to

Figler. Figler did not file Rudin’s papers and, for almost two

years, did nothing except seek continuances. Justifiably fed

up, Rudin ultimately asked for and was provided new

counsel. By that time, however, both the state postconviction motion deadline and the federal habeas statute of

limitations had run.

In August 2007, Rudin’s new lawyer Christopher Oram

filed a brief in support of state post-conviction relief and

realized that no post-conviction motion had previously been

filed. He apprised the post-conviction court of this, and the

court found that because of the case’s extraordinary

circumstances, including the length and complexity of the

trial and Figler’s misconduct, the delay in filing was justified. 

The state’s counsel complained that the court’s ruling set “a

bad precedent” and asked permission to file a brief on the

timeliness issue. The post-conviction court granted the

request, but the state then failed to file such a brief and

instead chose to contest the merits of Rudin’s claim. In

December 2008, the post-conviction court granted Rudin

relief on her ineffective assistance claim.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 33 of 39
34 RUDIN V. MYLES

The state appealed to the state supreme court and,

notwithstanding having forgone the timeliness issue in the

post-conviction court, argued that Rudin’s post-conviction

motion was untimely. Remarkably, in view of the state’s

previous failure to contest the issue, the state supreme court

ruled that the post-conviction court had failed to make a

sufficient finding of cause for its timeliness ruling. The court

also refused to remand the case to enable Rudin to make a

record on the issue. On January 20, 2011, the state supreme

court concluded its consideration of the case when it denied

en banc review over a dissent which memorably noted, “If

this is justice then I must be dreaming.” On April 25, 2011,

Rudin filed her federal habeas petition.

II.

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling if she shows

that she has been pursuing her rights diligently and some

extraordinary circumstance stood in her way. Pace v.

DiGuglialmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The diligence

required for equitable tolling purposes is “reasonable

diligence,” not “maximum feasible diligence.” Ford v.

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012). While the

threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling is high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule, Waldron-Ramsey v.

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009), the grounds

for granting equitable tolling are highly fact-dependent,

Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 2012).

When considering whether to apply equitable tolling, the

Supreme Court has emphasized the need for flexibility and

for avoiding mechanical rules. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.

631, 650 (2010). A court reviewing a habeas petition should

adhere to a tradition in which courts of equity have sought to

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 34 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 35

relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard

and fast adherence to more absolute legal rules, and which, if

strictly applied, threaten the evils of archaic rigidity. Id.; see

also Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“We have stated that the purpose of the equitable tolling

doctrine ‘is to soften the harsh impact of technical rules

which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from

having a day in court.’”) (quoting Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d

918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004)).

Rudin presents a compelling case for equitable tolling. 

She consistently sought to press her ineffective assistance

claim in the state courts, as she was required to do before

turning to the federal courts, yet due to impediments created

by others she was prevented from obtaining review on the

merits. She attempted to file a pro se submission challenging

the effectiveness of her trial counsel, but the post-conviction

court turned it over to Figler. Had the court accepted

Rudin’s filing, statutory tolling would likely have applied

throughout the state post-conviction process.

As the majority recognizes, Figler then abandoned Rudin. 

See, e.g., Holland, 560 U.S. at 651 (holding that

unprofessional attorney conduct, if sufficiently egregious,

may constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying

equitable tolling); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“We similarly conclude that the misconduct of

Spitsyn’s attorney was sufficiently egregious to justify

equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period under

AEDPA.”). And when Rudin realized that Figler was doing

nothing, she again demonstrated due diligence by asking the

post-conviction court to replace him.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 35 of 39
36 RUDIN V. MYLES

The state suggests that, notwithstanding Figler’s

misconduct, Rudin could have filed a protective petition in

federal court. But Rudin had no reason to know that a postconviction motion had not been docketed during the one year

limitation period set by state law such that she could not avail

herself of statutory tolling. Reasonable diligence did not

require her to file a protective federal petition based on the

possibility that the state post-conviction court would without

informing her refuse to file her pro se submission and that her

court-appointed lawyer would never file a post-conviction

motion in state court. As we stated in Harris, the fact that a

prisoner “could have filed a timely federal habeas petition at

a certain point in time is not dispositive.” 515 F.3d at 1055.

I part ways with the majority when it concludes that in

August 2007, after Rudin’s new lawyer advised the postconviction court that no state post-conviction motion had

been filed, Rudin failed to exercise reasonable diligence by

not filing a protective federal habeas petition. The facts do

not justify this conclusion. First, by August 2007 the federal

habeas statute of limitations had long since run. It would

have been pointless for Rudin to file a “protective” habeas

petition pursuant to Pace because, unlike in Pace, there was

nothing to protect. In Pace, the prisoner could have filed a

protective habeas petition before the federal habeas statute of

limitations had run and thus had a timely habeas petition on

file. In the present case, any protective petition that Rudin

might have filed in 2007 would have been untimely and

would not have protected anything. In all likelihood, it would

have been dismissed because it was untimely. See, e.g.,

Urrizaga v. Attorney General for Idaho, No. CV-07-434,

2008 WL 1701735, at *3 (D. Idaho Apr. 9, 2008) (dismissing

as untimely a petition that the prisoner apparently intended to

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 36 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 37

function as protective because by the time he filed it the

statute of limitations had already expired).

The second reason that Rudin had no reason to file a

protective habeas petition based on the proceedings in the

post-conviction court is that the state provided her with good

cause to believe that it had given up on the timeliness issue. 

As discussed, at the August 2007 hearing, the post-conviction

court found that, because of the extraordinary circumstances

of the case, the post-conviction submission by Rudin’s new

lawyer was timely. The state asked for and received

permission from the court to contest the timeliness issue but

then chose not to do so. The state essentially sandbagged

Rudin, lulling her into believing that it was not contesting the

post-conviction court’s conclusion that she had properly filed

a post-conviction motion which tolled the federal clock. See

Maghee v. Ault, 410 F.3d 473, 476 (8th Cir. 2005)

(“Equitable tolling is appropriate . . . where a defendant’s

conduct lulls the prisoner into inaction.”). The state’s failure

to raise the timeliness issue in the post-conviction court

certainly provided Rudin with a reasonable basis to believe

that she had no need to file a protective petition in federal

court; she was entitled to rely in good faith on the state’s

position. Cf. Harris, 515 F.3d at 1055 (finding equitable

tolling where the petitioner relied in good faith on thenbinding circuit precedent).

The majorityattempts to buttress its contention that Rudin

should have filed a protective petition by citing the state’s

challenge to the timeliness of her post-conviction motion in

the state supreme court after the post-conviction court had

granted her relief in December 2008. Surely by this time, the

majority concludes, Rudin should have known that her

eligibility for statutory tolling was in jeopardy. But

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 37 of 39
38 RUDIN V. MYLES

reasonable diligence did not require Rudin to file a protective

federal petition while the state appealed her victory. First, as

stated, the federal statute of limitations had long since run,

making a protective petition pointless. Second, a litigant in

Rudin’s position could have reasonably concluded that the

state had waived or forfeited its right to contest the timeliness

issue by not having done so in the post-conviction court.

Finally, at that point in the proceedings, Rudin had prevailed.

She had no reason to file a protective petition because she had

no claim to raise. She had won and, as a result, there was no

adverse decision for the federal courts to review. To

conclude that she is not entitled to equitable tolling because

she failed to file a protective petition after she had won her

case in state court seems extremely unfair.

And after she lost in the state supreme court in 2011, she

promptly filed in federal court.1

1 The majority cites White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 884–85 (9th Cir.

2010) (per curiam), for the proposition that a prisoner must file a

protective petition to show reasonable diligence even though the AEDPA

limitations period has already run. In White, however, the prisoner’s state

court petition was held untimely on January 6, 2006, but the prisoner had

until January 12, 2006 to timely file a federal habeas petition. See id. at

884; White v. Subia, No. 2:06-cv-02840, 2008 WL 2302534, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. May 30, 2008). White turned on the fact that the prisoner waited until

December 14, 2006, nearly a year after his state court motion was rejected,

to file in federal court.

The facts of the present case are not comparable. Here, on August 22,

2007 (about two years after the federal statute of limitations had run), the

parties first discovered that no state post-convictionmotion had been filed. 

On that same date, the post-conviction court accepted Rudin’s supporting

brief as a proper motion, a determination the state failed to challenge until

after it lost on the merits. As discussed in the text, reasonable diligence

did not require Rudin to file a protective petition while the state, having

forfeited a timeliness challenge, appealed her victory.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 38 of 39
RUDIN V. MYLES 39

III.

Commentators have noted that modern habeas corpus law

requires prisoners to run a procedural gauntlet before they can

even get their cases in front of an article III judge for review

of the merits. See John H. Blume, et al., In Defense of

Non-Capital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King,

96 Cornell L. Rev. 435, 442–43 (2011). Nevertheless, both

the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized that

equitable doctrines remain available to soften the harsh

impact of technical rules that prevent a good faith litigant

from having her day in court. If ever there was a case in

which the deadlines need to be relaxed to avoid a miscarriage

of justice, this is it.

 Case: 12-15362, 09/10/2014, ID: 9234499, DktEntry: 38-1, Page 39 of 39