Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-02936/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-02936-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MAZEN ARAKJI,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02936 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

[Re: ECF 23]

Before the Court is Defendant Microchip Technology’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Mazen 

Arakji’s first amended complaint (“FAC”) alleging unlawful discrimination and harassment under 

the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code Section 12940 (“FEHA”). Mot., ECF 23. 

Pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-1(b), the Court finds Defendant’s motion to dismiss suitable for decision 

without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for April 16, 2020. For the 

reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 38-year-old male, who for “[M]uslim religious purposes,” wears a long beard. 

FAC ¶ 1, ECF 22. Plaintiff also has a “very obvious musculoskeletal disability which limits [his] 

ability to grip and lift heavy objects.” Id. Plaintiff’s “national origin is Lebanese, which is an Arab 

country in the Middle East” and has “Arabic ancestry and ethnic characteristics.” Id. Plaintiff’s 

first name “Mazen” is “known to be an Arabic name” and his surname “Arakji” is “known to be a 

[M]uslim surname.” Id.

Plaintiff holds two degrees from the University of Colorado, Boulder: (1) Bachelors 

Electrical and Computer Engineering and (2) Masters Computer Engineering. FAC ¶ 2. Plaintiff 

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has earned various certifications in his field. Id. ¶ 3-4. Plaintiff worked at Sun Microsystems (now 

Oracle), where he was promoted within 6 months and was accepted into the “selective Sun 

Engineering Enrichment & Development (SEED) program” on the technical tract—designed for 

individuals with a high potential to excel. Id. ¶ 5. He received a letter from a previous employer 

commending his performance and contributions. Id. Recently, Plaintiff developed three Android 

and two iOS applications. Id. Plaintiff also developed a “novel RTOS architecture for which he 

has a patent pending.” Id. 

Plaintiff applied for “several Firmware Engineer positions at Microsemi (later acquired by 

Defendant Microchip Technology) between January and April of 2017.” FAC ¶¶ 20, 21. On April 

14, 2017, Plaintiff applied for the “Senior Firmware Design Engineer Position (requisition number 

5244) . . . on the Microsemi careers website.” Id. ¶ 23. The requirements for the position as stated 

in the online job posting on the Microsemi website are as follows:

• Bachelors with 5 years of experience or Master with 3 years’ experience.

• Strong C-programming skills and product development experience.

• Strong background in Software methodology and full-cycle development (design, 

implementation, testing, and debugging).

• Must possess the ability to approach problems systematically.

• Must be able to interpret specification and standard documents well.

• Excellent written and oral communication skills.

Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff claims that he not only meets and exceeds the requirements but that he has 

focused on “embedded systems and firmware” throughout both his academic and professional 

careers. Id. ¶¶ 25, 33. 

On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff was telephonically interviewed by Srinivas Yelisetti (a hiring 

manager at Microsemi) and had a “positive experience.” FAC ¶ 26. Plaintiff was then contacted 

by Donna Vespe (a Senior Talent Acquisition Partner) and was offered an invitation for an on-site 

interview on May 10, 2017, in Sunnyvale, California. Id. Upon arrival, Plaintiff was told that his 

interview was cancelled. Id. ¶ 27. Nevertheless, he waited for several hours and proceeded with 

the interview, which was “another positive experience.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Plaintiff claims that he is 

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“clearly qualified” for the position because “his interview experiences were positive.” Id. ¶ 33. 

Several days later, Plaintiff was contacted and was informed that “the interview had been voided by 

HR.” Id. ¶ 28. On January 5, 2018, Plaintiff was contacted by Donna Vespe for another interview, 

which she then cancelled two days prior to the interview. Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff has since applied for 

“other positions at Microsemi,” but has received responses that the positions he applied for were 

cancelled. Id. ¶ 30. Later in 2018, “Microsemi was acquired by Microchip Technology.” Id. ¶ 21.

Plaintiff alleges the “repetitive intentional cancelling of scheduled appointments and

positions constitutes a form of harassment and uncivilized ridicule.” FAC ¶ 31. Plaintiff claims 

that “the set of possible reasons the Defendant has for denying [him] employment is limited” to the 

information that he provided through the online job application and what Defendant learned about 

Plaintiff by meeting with him in person during the onsite interview, including: Plaintiff’s first name 

(and thus his Arab ancestry by deduction), Plaintiff’s last name (and thus his religion by deduction), 

Plaintiff’s long beard (and thus his religiousness by deduction), Plaintiff’s disability, and Plaintiff’s 

qualifications. Id. ¶ 32. 

Based on these experiences, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated Cal. Gov’t Code Section 

12940 by (1) denying him employment and (2) harassing him, due to his religious creed, national 

origin, ancestry, and disability. FAC ¶¶ 36-37. Plaintiff claims that he obtained right-to-sue notices 

on both claims from the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) on March 3, 2018. 

Id. Plaintiff alleges that Microchip “intentionally wanted to deny [him] an opportunity for 

employment despite the fact that [he is] qualified.” Id. ¶ 35. According to Plaintiff, “Defendant 

discriminated because the Defendant is revolted by people of [his] religion, national origin, ancestry, 

ethnic characteristics and disability, and especially those with a combination of all of the above.” 

Id. 

On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed suit against Microchip in the Superior Court of 

California for the County of Santa Clara. See Compl., ECF 1-1. On May 28, 2019, Microchip 

removed this case on the basis of diversity of citizenship. ECF 1. On June 4, 2019, Defendant filed 

a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF 9. On November 1, 2019, the Court granted 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. ECF 21. The Court granted 

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Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the discrimination claim because the Complaint (1)

lacked any factual allegations to establish that Plaintiff was qualified for the positions he applied 

for, and (2) was devoid of any facts from which one can infer that Microchip/Microsemi did not hire 

him because he was a member of a protected class. ECF 21 at 5. Further, the Court granted 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to the harassment claim because Plaintiff failed to allege 

facts suggesting that “Plaintiff was subjected to any unwanted behavior by Microchip/Microsemi—

let alone severe or pervasive harassment.” Id. at 6. Additionally, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file 

with the Court the right-to-sue notice he filed with the DFEH. Id. at 6-7. The Court gave Plaintiff

leave to amend to cure the deficiencies in his Complaint. Id. at 7. On December 16, 2019, Plaintiff 

filed a first amended complaint (ECF 22) along with the right-to-sue notice he filed with DFEH 

(ECF 22-1). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” Conservation Force 

v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 

(9th Cir. 2001)). When determining whether a claim has been stated, the Court accepts as true all 

well-pled factual allegations and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Reese 

v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 690 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the Court need not 

“accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice” or “allegations 

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 

claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, since a pro se complaint, however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Entler 

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v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. FEHA-Based Discrimination Claim

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim because “[t]he [FAC] fails to 

allege any facts that might permit an inference that Defendant did not hire him because of an 

unlawful discriminatory motive.” Mot. at 6. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s conclusory 

allegations that Defendant is “revolted” by people in Plaintiff’s protected class (i.e., his religion, 

national origin, ancestry, ethnic characteristics and disability, or a combination of all of the above) 

are insufficient to state a claim for discrimination. Mot. at 7; see also FAC ¶ 35. Plaintiff responds 

that Defendant is required to “bring forth any nondiscriminatory information” about Plaintiff that 

caused Defendant not to hire him. Opp’n ¶ 3. Plaintiff appears to allege that because Defendant 

had no information about Plaintiff other than what he provided—in his job application and his onsite 

interview—and because he is “clearly qualified” for the position he applied for, Defendant must 

have declined to hire him for discriminatory reasons. See FAC ¶ 32, 33. Specifically, Plaintiff 

alleges:

[T]he set of possible reasons the Defendant has for denying me 

employment is (effectively) limited to the following: My first name 

(and thus my Arab ancestry by deduction), my last name (and thus my 

religion by deduction), my long beard (and thus my religiousness by 

deduction), my disability, and my qualifications.

FAC ¶ 32. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not establish a plausible claim for discrimination. 

Under FEHA, in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, as here, 

Plaintiff must establish a disparate treatment discrimination case using the framework outlined in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 

F.3d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to FEHA claim). If Plaintiff 

establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. If Defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason was a 

pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. In order to meet his pleading requirement, Plaintiff must 

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adequately allege facts supporting a prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination.

“[T]he precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context and 

were ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 535 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). Generally, 

in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member 

of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position(s) for which he applied; (3) he experienced 

an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class 

were “treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action 

give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Peterson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Similarly, to state a claim for disability discrimination, plaintiff must allege that (1) he suffers from 

a qualifying disability; (2) was qualified for the job, i.e., able to perform its essential functions with 

reasonable accommodation; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action (4) because of 

his disability. Brundage v. Hahn, 57 Cal. App. 4th 228, 236 (1997). 

There is no dispute that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that he is a member of more than 

one protected class based on his race, ethnic background, religion, and disability. There is also no 

dispute that Plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action – i.e., he was denied a job. In the 

FAC, Plaintiff also alleges sufficient facts that, when taken as true, establish that he was qualified 

for one of the positions he applied for – i.e., Senior Firmware Design Engineer Position (requisition 

number 5244). See FAC ¶¶ 23-24, 33. Thus, the only issue before the Court as to the discrimination 

claim, is whether Plaintiff properly alleges facts establishing a plausible claim for the fourth 

element: that similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class “were treated more 

favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an 

inference of discrimination.” See Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156. For the reasons below, the Court holds

that he does not.

Defendant argues that “[b]y not pleading facts that would support a reasonable inference that 

Defendant treated applicants outside his protected classes more favorably, the Complaint fails to 

allege a plausible unlawful discrimination claim.” Mot. at 7. The Court agrees. Plaintiff has failed 

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to allege any facts whatsoever supporting a plausible inference “that, after his rejection, the position 

remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 

qualifications.” McDonnel Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (establishing the elements for prima 

facie case of racial discrimination where plaintiff was denied employment). Courts routinely hold

that a prima facie case of discrimination under FEHA fails where the employee plaintiffs fail to

allege facts that similarly situated employees outside of plaintiffs’ protected class were treated more 

favorably. See Abdul-Haqq v. Kaiser Emergency in San Leandro, No. 16-CV-05454-PJH, 2017 

WL 1549480, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss FEHA-based 

discrimination claim without leave to amend where plaintiff failed to plausibly allege “that AfricanAmerican nurses were treated less favorably than similarly-situated nurses”); Ali v. Intel Corp., No. 

18-cv-03981-LHK, 2019 WL 1369926, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 25, 2019) (granting motion to 

dismiss FEHA-based discrimination claim with prejudice where “the FAC only [made] conclusory 

allegations” of racial discrimination); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(affirming district court grant of summary judgment where plaintiff “failed to establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination because he could not provide evidence that similarly situated employees were 

treated more favorably that Leong was treated.”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the positions 

he applied for remained open or that the employer continued to seek applications from persons of 

Plaintiff’s qualifications. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that he “received responses that the 

positions [he] applied to have been cancelled.” FAC ¶ 30. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting a plausible claim that “other 

circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action that would give rise to an inference of 

discrimination.” Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156 (citing Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603). In other words, 

Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting a claim that he was denied employment because of his 

religious creed, national origin, ancestry, and disability. See Abdul-Haqq, 2017 WL 1549480, at *8 

(“[I]t is nowhere plausibly alleged that these actions were taken by defendants because of AbdulHaqq’s PTSD.”). Plaintiff simply alleges that he is “clearly qualified” for the Senior Firmware 

Design Engineer position and that his “interview experiences were positive.” FAC ¶ 33. From 

these facts, Plaintiff proceeds to conclude that that “all remaining reasons” for denying him a job 

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are “illegal.” Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant is revolted by people of [his] religion, 

national origin, ancestry, ethnic characteristics and disability, and especially those with a 

combination of all of the above.” Id. ¶ 35. Such conclusory allegations do not satisfy the pleading 

requirement. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a 

plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”); see also Ali, 2019 WL 1369926, at *4-5 

(dismissing FEHA-based discrimination claims of a job applicant because the complaint made only 

conclusory allegations such as “[t]he Plaintiff is Pakistan [sic] and was not hired because of his ethic 

[sic] race,” and “[d]efendant’s perception of the Plaintiff’s race as a Pakistan [sic] was negative and 

therefore, they refused to hire him”). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is not plausible 

because it is not supported by facts.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the FAC fails to state a FEHA-based discrimination 

claim upon which relief may be granted.

B. FEHA-Based Harassment Claim

Similarly, Plaintiff does not please a plausible harassment claim. The FEHA makes it 

unlawful for an employer to harass an employee for being a member of a protected group. Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12940(j). The elements for a harassment claim under FEHA are: “(1) the claimant belonged 

to a protected group; (2) the claimant was subjected to unwelcome harassment because of being a 

member of that group; and (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Landucci v. State Farm 

Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703 (N.D. Cal. 2014). To fulfill the “severe or pervasive” prong, a 

plaintiff must show a “concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or generalized nature.” 

Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 133 (1999). FEHA “forbids only behavior so 

objectively offensive as to . . . create a hostile or abusive work environment.” Landucci, 65 F. Supp. 

3d at 704. 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff belongs to at least one protected group. As for the remaining 

elements, Defendant argues that Plaintiff “has not alleged any facts that would allow the Court to 

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infer that he experienced unwelcome conduct or comments, based on one or more of his protected 

classes, and the comments or conduct was sufficiently pervasive or sever to constitute harassment 

under FEHA.” Mot. at 8. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to establish a plausible claim for 

harassment. In his opposition, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant harassed him “through repeatedly 

cancelling meetings and delaying them extensively.” Opp’n ¶ 2. Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s 

interactions with Defendant (the phone and onsite interview) do not amount to harassment under 

FEHA, especially since Plaintiff claims the interactions were “positive” experiences. Reply at 3

(citing Compl. ¶¶ 26-28), ECF 29. The Court agrees with Defendant. Plaintiff’s only factual 

allegations with respect to the harassment claim are that Defendant cancelled positions for which he 

applied, and cancelled two interviews and delayed one by several hours. Opp’n ¶ 1; FAC ¶ 26-30. 

Plaintiff claims that the “repetitive intentional cancelling of scheduled appointments and positions 

constitutes a form of harassment and uncivilized ridicule.” FAC ¶ 31. The cancellations of positions 

and interviews, although annoying and inconvenient, do not amount to harassment in violation of

FEHA. In fact, Plaintiff characterizes his interviews with Defendant as “positive experiences” and 

concedes that “Defendant did not make any discriminatory comments to [him]” – which do not 

support a claim for harassment. See FAC ¶¶ 26, 28, Opp’n ¶ 1; see also Lyle v. Warner Bros. 

Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 283, 132 P.3d 211, 223 (2006) (“[A]nnoying or ‘merely 

offensive’ comments in the workplace are not actionable[.]”). Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege facts 

that establish he was subject to any form of harassment (let alone severe or pervasive harassment)

because he is a member of a protected group. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the FAC fails to state a FEHA harassment claim upon 

which relief may be granted.

C. Leave to Amend

When a court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 

leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing amendment 

would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party 

has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court finds that granting leave to amend would be futile and unduly prejudicial to 

Defendant. Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532. In its November 1, 2019 Order, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s discrimination and harassment claims. ECF 21. In that Order, the Court warned that 

“failure to cure the deficiencies identified in this order will result in a dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims 

with prejudice.” Id. While Plaintiff cured some of the deficiencies noted by the Court (e.g., 

requirements of the job he applied for), Plaintiff failed to cure other deficiencies as noted in this 

order. Because any amendment would be futile, and it would be unduly prejudicial to Defendant to 

litigate a third motion to dismiss regarding the same deficiencies, leave to amend is DENIED.

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss at ECF 23 is GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2020

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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