Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08187/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08187-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Roberto Sheets,

Plaintiff,

v. 

City of Winslow,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-08187-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

At issue is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 26, Mot.), to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 30, Resp.) and Defendant filed 

a Reply (Doc. 31). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

After the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for failure 

to state a claim (Doc. 21, Order), Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint “(SAC”) 

(Doc. 23). The FAC contained five counts of race, religious, and age discrimination, and a 

claim for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The SAC asserts just 

two counts of race discrimination, one brought under the Arizona Civil Rights Act 

(“ACRA”) and one brought under Title VII.

The SAC makes the following allegations, which the Court construes as true for 

purposes of resolving Defendant’s Motion. Plaintiff, a Mexican man, was a police officer 

for Defendant, the City of Winslow, from 2007 until his termination in October 2015. In 

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October 2014, Plaintiff tested for and was awarded the rank of Corporal based on his test 

scores. (SAC ¶ 11.) The personnel action form that detailed his promotion listed his 

promotion date as November 3, 2014 and checked the box providing for a six-month 

probationary period. (SAC ¶ 13.) Sometime later, Plaintiff discovered the form contained 

handwritten alterations that scratched out the November 3 date and amended his effective 

promotion date to January 12, 2015. It also scratched out the six-month probationary period 

and checked the box requiring one year of probation for the Corporal position. (SAC ¶ 14.)

In May 2015, Winslow Police Lieutenant Arend recommended Plaintiff’s “position 

as Corporal be receded to Officer . . . for failure to successfully complete probation,” and

Plaintiff was subsequently demoted back to Officer. (SAC ¶ 15.) In October 2015, 

Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment for an alleged willful violation of policy that 

occurred in August 2015 and for failure to complete his probationary status. (SAC ¶ 16.) 

The termination recommendation was authored and signed by Arend and signed by the 

Chief of Police and the City Manager. (SAC ¶ 16.)

The SAC alleges that during and after the time Plaintiff was employed as an Officer 

and Corporal, a similarly situated white Officer, Austin Shipley, was treated more 

favorably. Shipley allegedly committed multiple policy violations and instances of 

misconduct from August 2013 until March 2016, including tampering with evidence, 

punching a nonaggressive intoxicated man in the face, targeting and harassing civilians, 

tasing a restrained man, tasing a 15-year-old, and shooting and killing a woman after 

responding to a shoplifting call. (SAC ¶ 18.) Shipley was not terminated from employment

after these events. (SAC ¶ 18.G)

Plaintiff alleges “Defendant, through its supervisors, agents, and employees, 

engaged in a pattern of discrimination based on race and directed against [Plaintiff], which

ultimately concluded with the termination of his employment.” (SAC ¶ 24.) He also alleges 

the delay in his promotion’s effective date and the extension to his probationary period 

constituted adverse employment actions, as did his demotion back to Officer. As already

noted, he asserts two claims against Defendant: (1) discrimination based on race in 

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violation of ACRA and (2) discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII. Defendant 

moves to dismiss both claims with prejudice. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is designed to “test[] the legal sufficiency 

of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim can be based on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica 

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When analyzing a complaint under Rule 

12(b)(6), the well-pled factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth, 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009), and therefore are insufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 

(9th Cir. 2010). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Rule 8(a) governs and requires that, to avoid 

dismissal of a claim, Plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

III. ANALYSIS

ACRA is “generally identical to Title VII, and therefore federal Title VII case law 

is persuasive” in interpreting ACRA. Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 

2004) (internal brackets omitted); Higdon v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc., 673 P.2d 907, 

909 n.3 (Ariz. 1983). The Court will therefore analyze both Counts 1 and 2 under the wellestablished Title VII framework. 

Under Title VII, it is illegal for an employer “to discharge any individual, or 

otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race[.]” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In analyzing Title VII disparate treatment claims, the Court utilizes 

the standard originally set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973). Plaintiff must state sufficient facts to show that “(1) he is a member of a protected 

class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment 

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action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more 

favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to 

an inference of discrimination.” Peterson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Defendant does not raise an 

argument as to the first three prongs; it argues the SAC fails to allege sufficient facts to 

establish the fourth element. (Mot. at 3.) The Court agrees. 

Plaintiff asserts he was terminated for allegedly willfully violating policy and for 

failing to complete his probationary status. Attempting to satisfy the similarly situated 

prong, the SAC alleges that Austin Shipley, a white Officer, committed various policy 

violations and was not terminated. As the Court stated in its Order dismissing the FAC, 

“[w]hen utilizing the similarly situated framework, Plaintiff must show that he and the 

individuals outside his protected class are similarly situated ‘in all material respects.’” 

(Order at 6, quoting Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2006).) It dismissed the 

FAC in part because it failed to provide facts as to how the unnamed white officer was 

similar to Plaintiff in all material respects. (Order at 6.)

This time the SAC identifies a white counterpart’s name (Shipley) and position

(Officer), but it again fails to demonstrate how Shipley and Plaintiff were similar in all 

material respects. Regarding the first basis for his termination, committing a willful policy 

violation, the SAC does not identify Plaintiff’s alleged violation, a detail that is crucial to 

raising an inference that he and Shipley were similarly situated, yet treated differently when 

they committed like policy violations. As to the second stated reason for Plaintiff’s

termination, failure to complete his probationary period, the SAC does not mention 

anything about Shipley’s employment status or whether he ever went through any type of 

probationary period.1

1To the extent the adverse employment action is Plaintiff’s demotion or the extended 

probationary period of one year, the claim fails for the same reason: no facts suggest that 

Shipley went through a shorter probationary period or was not demoted. Indeed, the SAC 

lists Shipley’s position as an Officer, rather than a Corporal, which raises only two 

possibilities: Shipley was either never promoted to Corporal and is therefore not similarly 

situated in that respect, or he was promoted and then later demoted, thereby suffering the 

same adverse action as Plaintiff.

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The Ninth Circuit recently addressed a markedly similar issue and fact pattern in 

Bastidas v. Good Samaritan Hosp. LP, 774 F. App’x 361, 364 (9th Cir. 2019). Although 

unpublished, the court’s analysis and conclusion are both persuasive and applicable here. 

The plaintiff in Bastidas was a member of a protected class and a surgeon at a hospital. His 

surgical protections were suspended and he was subjected to peer review after he 

performed a pancreatic procedure during which he removed the patient’s kidney and the 

patient died three days later. He alleged he suffered discrimination because two white 

physicians were not subjected to the same restrictions after they were involved in patient 

deaths. Bastidas, 774 F. App’x at 362.

The Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff failed to state a claim for discrimination because 

he did not adequately show that he and the two white physicians were similarly situated. 

Specifically, the plaintiff did not allege that (1) the three had similar jobs (i.e., performed 

similar types of surgeries); (2) the white doctors engaged in conduct similar to his (i.e., that 

those doctors’ patients’ deaths were the result, at least in part, of errors); (3) the hospital 

received complaints following the incidents involving the white doctors, as it did after the 

plaintiff’s incident; and (4) the mistakes of the white doctors were of comparable 

seriousness to the one made by the plaintiff. Bastidas, 774 F. App’x at 363–64.

Here, the SAC alleges only that Plaintiff and Shipley were Officers, and that the 

former was terminated for violating policy but the latter was not. The following 

information is unidentified: what Plaintiff’s policy violation was and whether the two 

“engaged in problematic conduct of comparable seriousness,” see Vasquez v. Cty. of Los 

Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003); whether Plaintiff and Shipley performed 

similar duties as Officers—officers could perform desk duties, investigative work, 

emergency response, or street patrol; how long Shipley had worked for Defendant and 

whether they had the same employment status; or whether they were subject to the same 

decision-maker. The Court recognizes that not all these factors may be necessary to state a 

claim, and a plaintiff alleging discrimination need not be identical to his comparator. Hawn 

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v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010).2 What is material “will 

depend on context and the facts of the case.” Id. However, Plaintiff has provided virtually 

no information to demonstrate similarity in what would be material in the context of a 

termination for committing policy violations, an extended probationary period, or a 

demotion.

3

In addition to the similarly situated paradigm, a plaintiff can also state a claim for 

discrimination by showing “other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment 

action [gave] rise to an inference of discrimination.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 603; see also 

Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156. Other than the fact that Plaintiff is Mexican, the SAC contains no 

facts that give rise to an inference that he was terminated or demoted based on his race or 

national origin. The Court addressed this deficiency in its Order dismissing the FAC, 

(Order at 7), but the SAC failed to cure it. 

In dismissing the FAC, the Court provided a framework for Plaintiff to allege a race 

discrimination claim, including the applicable legal standards and case law illustrating 

what level of factual detail is either sufficient or insufficient to state a claim. That the SAC 

was unable to meet this standard, despite the Court’s roadmap, leads the Court to conclude

that inclusion of the material facts would only show that he and Shipley were not 

sufficiently similarly situated. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff cannot state a 

plausible claim for discrimination against Defendant and therefore, pursuant to its Order 

on March 6, 2020, dismisses the SAC with prejudice.

2 To this point, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the “same supervisor” factor is not 

a strictly imposed condition in all cases. In Hawn, the fact that the plaintiffs did not have 

the same direct supervisor as the comparators was of little import because both groups had 

the same the ultimate decision-maker who treated them disparately. Thus, while not always 

necessary, whether they had the same supervisor or decision-maker can be relevant, and 

the Court finds that it is here. But even if it accepted Plaintiff’s assertion in the Response—

which was not alleged in the SAC—that Plaintiff and Shipley did have the same supervisor, 

the Court still concludes that the SAC is missing other pertinent facts that would show the 

two were similarly situated. 

3 Curiously, Plaintiff himself states, “In general, [meeting the similarly situated 

prong] requires evidence that the comparators had the same supervisor, were subject to the 

same standards, and engaged in the same conduct.” (Resp. at 9.) But as already noted, the 

FAC alleges none of these facts. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 26). Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. 

Dated this 12th day of June, 2020.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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