Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07027/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07027-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 9, 1997 Decided December 16, 1997 

No. 96-7027

ERNEST BROWN,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAM M. PLAUT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR INSTITUTIONS OF THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 93cv00672)

Daniel M. Schember argued the causes and filed the briefs 

for appellant. Alake Johnson-Ford entered an appearance.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued 

the cause for the District of Columbia, with whom Jo Anne 

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Robinson, Interim Corporation Counsel at the time the brief 

was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief.

Jonathan J. Frankel argued the cause for amicus curiae

American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, 

with whom Stephen H. Sachs and Arthur B. Spitzer were on 

the brief.

Before: WALD, HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: This case and its companion James 

Neal v. District of Columbia were argued on the same day 

and before the same panel because they raise similar issues.

Ernest Brown ("Brown"), a former inmate of the District of 

Columbia's (the "District's") prison at Lorton, seeks damages 

from the District for placing him in administrative segregation, a form of custody for prisoners who present an escape 

risk or pose a danger to themselves or others, for ten months 

allegedly without due process.1 The district court, citing 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), found that Brown had 

no liberty interest in remaining free of that deprivation, and 

dismissed his suit. On appeal, the District argues that we 

affirm on the ground cited by the district court, or on the 

alternative grounds that Brown should have brought this 

action as a habeas corpus petition or that Brown has received 

all the process that was due him.

The question of how to apply Sandin raises difficult and 

unsettled questions of constitutional law, which we find it 

unnecessary to reach. Instead, we remand to the district 

__________

1 William M. Plaut, whose name appears in the caption of this 

case as a defendant, is an official of the District of Columbia 

Department of Corrections. He is not named as a defendant in 

Brown's second amended complaint, which is the complaint that is 

at issue in this appeal; he was, however, named as a defendant in 

Brown's initial complaint. The defendants named in the present 

complaint include the District of Columbia and a number of other 

D.C. prison officials.

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court to decide the narrow factual issues relating to whether 

Brown received all the process he was due.

I. BACKGROUND

On the morning of October 12, 1992, Ernest Brown, then an 

inmate at the Occoquan medium-security facility of the District's Lorton prison, got into an argument with Corporal 

Parks, a prison guard, about cigarettes.2In the course of 

this dispute, he threw an "unknown substance," allegedly 

urine and feces, at Parks, and told him "I'm still going to get 

you." A search of Brown's cell disclosed a crude weapon 

fashioned out of a sharpened plastic toothbrush. Parks prepared a Disciplinary Report charging Brown with two offenses, Bodily Injury (presumably for throwing the "unknown 

substance"), and Threatening Conduct (for saying he would 

"get" Parks); a copy of this report was given to Brown. The 

following day, Brown was notified that a hearing of the 

Adjustment Board (Lorton's disciplinary body) would occur 

on October 16 on the charge of Threatening Conduct and on a 

charge of Possession of Major Contraband (the weapon). On 

that same day, Brown was transferred from Occoquan to 

administrative segregation at Lorton's Maximum Security 

Facility.

The Adjustment Board hearing apparently never occurred. 

Instead, on October 15, Brown was brought before Lorton's 

Housing Board, a body charged with determining whether 

prisoners are to be placed in administrative segregation. 

Brown received no advance notice of this hearing, and there 

is nothing in the record to show what occurred at the hearing. 

The only evidence in the record on this issue is a Housing 

Board Action Sheet, which states that the reason for the 

hearing was "[t]o determine appropriate housing for Resident 

Brown, Ernest ... who was placed in the Adjustment Unit as 

a result of a Disciplinary Report for Fighting on October 5, 

__________

2 Because we are considering an appeal from a motion by the 

District to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, 

what follows is an account of the undisputed facts, construed in the 

light most favorable to Brown.

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1992 and for the alleged incident involving staff on October 

12, 1992." The sheet lists Brown as stating: "I don't fear for 

my safety. I just want to be placed somewhere where I can 

have access to a Law Library." It states that the Board finds 

Brown "to be a threat to self and others due to the alleged 

incident involving correctional staff," and concludes by stating 

that "Resident Brown assaulted Cpl. Parks."

Brown remained in administrative segregation for a total of 

ten months. In the medium-security unit in which he had 

previously been confined, he had been able to go outdoors 

from 8 a.m. to dusk, was permitted to move about the 

dormitory and interact with other inmates at all hours of the 

day or night, and could participate in many prison programs. 

In the unit in which Brown spent the first four months of his 

administrative segregation, by contrast, he was in solitary 

confinement, and was allowed to leave his cell only to meet 

with visitors (while shackled, handcuffed, and belly-chained), 

and for two hours a week of exercise in a hallway. Brown 

spent the remainder of his administrative segregation in a 

unit in which he was in solitary confinement, but was allowed 

to leave his cell for two or three hours a day. At the end of 

this ten-month period, Brown was apparently returned to his 

previous custody status.

Brown filed his initial complaint in this case in April, 1993, 

alleging due process, free exercise, and Eighth Amendment 

violations. After Brown had moved successfully for appointment of counsel and for leave to file an amended complaint, 

the District moved to dismiss, or in the alternative for 

summary judgment, as to all three of Brown's claims. The 

district court granted the District's motion as to Brown's due 

process claim, but denied it as to his other two claims. 

(These claims, which involved Brown's rights to dental care 

and to attend religious services, have since been settled.) As 

to Brown's due process claim, the district court found that, 

under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), Brown did not 

have a liberty interest in remaining free of administrative 

segregation, because his confinement in administrative segregation did not amount to an "atypical and significant hardship." 515 U.S. at 484. Brown then sought to file a second 

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amended complaint in order to re-plead the due process claim 

and to add a related claim under District of Columbia law; 

the district court granted Brown leave to do so, but immediately dismissed the due process claim. Brown now appeals 

this dismissal.

II. ANALYSIS 

We first reject the District's contention that because success on Brown's due process claim would "necessarily imply" 

that the decision to place Brown in administrative segregation 

was invalid, Brown must bring his claim by way of habeas 

corpus. As to the merits of Brown's due process claim, we 

address first whether Brown had a liberty interest in avoiding 

his term in administrative segregation, and then whether he 

received the process he was due.3

Our review is de novo because we are considering an appeal 

from a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary 

judgment. National Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 

68 F.3d 1428, 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (dismissal); Tao v. Freeh,

27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (summary judgment).

A. Should This Action Have been Brought in Habeas Corpus?

The District argues that, if Brown prevails, this will "necessarily imply" that the District's decision to place him in 

administrative segregation was invalid, and claims that this 

means that, under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) 

__________

3 The District also makes several arguments directed at Brown's 

claim under D.C. law. Brown correctly points out, however, that 

the order from which he appeals dismissed only his due process 

claim, not his claim under D.C. law. The order specifically stated 

that Brown's due process claim is "separate" from his other claims 

and that "there is no just reason for delay of final judgment as to 

this claim," and directed the entry of final judgment as to that 

claim. The language of this order meets the standard of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for dismissal of fewer than all of the 

claims in a case, so that Brown's appeal is properly before us. But, 

because Brown's D.C. law claim was never dismissed by the district 

court, it is not at issue in this appeal.

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and its progeny, Brown's action must be brought in habeas 

corpus, not through section 1983. We conclude that the 

District reads the Preiser line of cases too broadly, and so 

decline to require that Brown's action be brought in habeas 

corpus.

In Preiser, the Supreme Court held that prisoners seeking 

the restoration of good-time credits which they claimed had 

been unconstitutionally withdrawn must do so through habeas 

corpus, not through section 1983. The Court observed that 

the prisoners' claims were "within the core of habeas corpus 

in attacking the very duration of their physical confinement 

itself." Id. at 487-88. Congress had required exhaustion of 

available state remedies as a prerequisite to habeas corpus 

relief, the Court explained, and it would "wholly frustrate" 

Congress's intent to permit this rule to be circumvented 

through the invocation of section 1983. Id. at 489-90. 

Preiser said that the same rule must apply to any challenge 

by a state prisoner to "the fact or duration of his confinement 

based, as here, upon the alleged unconstitutionality of state 

administrative action." Id. at 489. The Preiser Court set 

clear limits to this principle, however, expressly reaffirming 

its previous cases holding that a section 1983 action "is a 

proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to 

the fact or length of his custody," id. at 499, because such 

actions are not at the "heart" of habeas corpus, id. at 498.

The Court has twice since clarified the reach of Preiser.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court considered a section 1983 action that sought money damages, rather 

than the specific relief at issue in Preiser. The plaintiff in 

Heck claimed that the unconstitutional acts of the defendants, 

who were state officials, had led to his arrest and conviction. 

The Court found that the plaintiff's action was analogous to a 

common-law action for malicious prosecution, and that the 

favorable-termination requirement of such actions therefore 

applied to the plaintiff's section 1983 action. Heck thus held 

that a plaintiff who brings a claim under section 1983 that, if 

established, would "necessarily imply" that a criminal conviction or sentence was unlawful must demonstrate as an eleUSCA Case #96-7027 Document #316000 Filed: 12/16/1997 Page 6 of 16
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ment of his claim that the conviction or sentence has been 

reversed, expunged, invalidated, or "called into question by a 

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 

484-87. In Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997), the 

Court made clear that Heck applies in some cases in which 

the underlying proceeding is not a criminal conviction or 

sentence, applying Heck to an action by a prisoner who 

asserted that a prison disciplinary proceeding that had deprived him of good-time credits had been invalid because, 

inter alia, the decisionmaker had not been impartial. See id. 

at 1588-89.

We conclude, however, that Brown's suit, which challenges 

only his placement in administrative segregation, is not of the 

type to which it is appropriate to apply Preiser and its 

progeny.4 The Court has never deviated from Preiser's clear 

line between challenges to the fact or length of custody and 

challenges to the conditions of confinement. In Edwards, the 

Court was careful to respect the distinction drawn by Preiser,

repeatedly characterizing the plaintiff's claim as one that 

would "necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of 

his good-time credits" and therefore hasten his release. 117 

S. Ct. at 1588. Heck, too, observed that the damages action 

in that case was in effect an attack on " 'the fact or length of 

confinement.' " 512 U.S. at 482 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 

494). The Court also did not question the plaintiff's invocation of section 1983 in Sandin, a case in which the underlying 

prison disciplinary proceeding affected only the plaintiff's 

__________

4 Brown does assert that his placement in administrative segregation may have affected his opportunities for parole, and thus the 

length of his confinement. It is true that Brown was denied parole 

in August, 1993, near or shortly after the end of his term in 

administrative segregation. But there is no evidence that the 

Parole Board considered the fact that Brown had been in administrative segregation in making its decision. The Parole Board's 

explanation said only that Brown's "adjustment has been poor[,] he 

has received two Class II DRs [disciplinary reports] and been 

charged with assault." Thus, the Board seems to have considered 

only the charges of misconduct against Brown, not their consequences.

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conditions of confinement, not the duration of his sentence. 

See 515 U.S. at 487. See also McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 

136, 142 (1991) (drawing on Preiser 's distinction between 

challenges to the fact or length of custody and challenges to 

conditions of confinement in construing a statutory reference 

to the "conditions of confinement").5

Moreover, Heck's rationale for its favorable-termination 

requirement is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Brown's 

action may not properly be analogized to a suit for malicious 

prosecution, as the decision he is challenging bears little 

resemblance to a judicial proceeding. Decisions to place 

inmates in administrative segregation are subject to greatly 

relaxed procedural requirements, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 

U.S. 460, 476 (1983) ("An inmate must merely receive some 

notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to 

present his views to the prison official charged with deciding 

whether to transfer him to administrative segregation"), and 

the Court has recognized that they are often made fairly 

informally, on the basis of "subjective" and "intuitive" considerations, see id. at 474. Indeed, the administrative proceeding before the Housing Board entailed so little process that it 

would almost certainly be accorded no collateral estoppel 

effect. See Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801, 806-08 (D.C. Cir. 

1979) (holding that an administrative proceeding in which the 

parties were not permitted to present live witness testimony 

or to cross-examine opposing witnesses should not be accorded collateral estoppel effect); 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4475, at 766 (1981). One 

of the Court's principal concerns in Heck was to limit collater-

__________

5 We recognize that one court of appeals has applied Edwards to 

a case in which the prisoner was subject only to disciplinary 

segregation, and not to loss of good time or any other change in the 

length of confinement. See Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718, 721 

(7th Cir. 1997). We have found no other court of appeals decisions 

reaching this conclusion, and for the reasons set out in the text, we 

do not find its reasoning persuasive. See also Clarke v. Stalder, 121 

F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997) (Preiser and Edwards do not apply to 

actions in which "a favorable determination would not automatically 

entitle the prisoner to accelerated release").

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al attacks on final judgments, see 512 U.S. at 484; but a 

proceeding that is incapable of giving rise to collateral estoppel, like that at issue in this case, hardly needs to be insulated 

from collateral attack. Finally, were Brown required to 

invoke habeas corpus to challenge his placement in administrative segregation, then the same rule would presumably 

apply to a myriad of prison officials' other administrative 

decisions affecting conditions of confinement, such as visitation, mail, shower, or library privileges. Habeas corpus 

might conceivably be available to bring challenges to such 

prison conditions, as the Court observed in Preiser, 411 U.S. 

at 499, but requiring the use of habeas corpus in such cases 

would extend Preiser far beyond the "core" of the writ that 

Preiser set out to protect. Id. at 487.

B. Did Brown's Placement in Administrative Segregation 

Violate the Due Process Clause?

Brown's placement in administrative segregation violated 

the Due Process Clause only if two conditions are met: 

Brown had a liberty interest in avoiding that term of segregation, and Brown did not receive the process he was due. The 

first of these questions raises difficult issues of constitutional 

law; the second, only narrow questions of fact. We therefore 

discuss the first question only to the extent necessary to 

explain why we do not decide it, and focus on the second.

1. Did Brown Have a Liberty Interest?

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme 

Court reworked the framework for analyzing whether a prisoner has a state-created liberty interest in avoiding a particular deprivation. Before Sandin, this question was answered 

in much the same way as were questions about the existence 

of other liberty or property interests: if state laws or regulations contained language constraining the discretion of state 

officials, a liberty interest existed. See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. 

at 471-72. The Sandin Court found that this approach had 

given states "disincentives to ... codify prison management 

procedures" and led to the inappropriate "involvement of 

federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons." 

515 U.S. at 482. It therefore found that, although "States 

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may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 

which are protected by the Due Process Clause," "these 

interests will generally be limited to freedom from restraint 

which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 

Id. at 484.

Applying Sandin to this case presents a number of difficulties. First, although Sandin clearly dictates that we compare 

the hardship experienced by the inmate to "the ordinary 

incidents of prison life," it is not clear which prison or part of 

a prison is to provide the standard of comparison. At various 

points in Sandin, the Court compared the prisoner's conditions in disciplinary segregation in Hawaii's Halawa Correctional Facility to "administrative segregation and protective 

custody" in that prison, to the "general population" of that 

prison, and to an undefined "range of confinement to be 

normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of 

30 years to life." See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87.

The District suggests that, because the Attorney General 

has authority to transfer persons convicted in the District to 

any other prison nationwide, the appropriate baseline for our 

analysis is in fact the most rigorous prison in the nation.6

The parties have not addressed, however, what may be a 

prerequisite to such an argument: evidence that such transfers are "totally discretionary," a point the Sandin Court 

found important in determining that it was appropriate to use 

conditions in administrative segregation and protective custody at Halawa as a baseline for comparison. See 515 U.S. at 

486. At least one court has accepted a variant of this 

argument: the Seventh Circuit has found that, because inmates may be transferred within the Indiana prison system, 

the test of whether a deprivation is "atypical and significant" 

turns on a comparison with conditions in the state's most 

rigorous prison. Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1997 WL 

__________

6 The courts of the District of Columbia have construed sections 

24-402 and 24-425 of the D.C. Code to permit inmates to be 

transferred to state as well as to federal institutions. See Vaughn 

v. United States, 579 A.2d 170, 173 (D.C. 1990).

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695375 (7th Cir. 1997).7 The Wagner court also noted that, 

because Indiana can transfer its prisoners out of state, the 

proper standard of comparison may in fact be the most 

rigorous prison in the nation; it declined, however, to "decide 

whether logic should be pressed so far," and remanded the 

case for further fact-finding. Id. at *4.

Even were we to reject the District's transfer argument, 

we would still face a number of unsettled questions about how 

to apply Sandin to this case. Caselaw from the Second and 

Ninth Circuits suggests that whether a term in segregation 

amounts to an "atypical and significant" deprivation turns on 

its length and on a comparison of conditions in segregation 

and in the prison's general population. See, e.g., Brooks v. 

DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1997); Keenan v. Hall, 83 

F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). Other courts have not 

adopted so structured an analysis; for instance, the Fifth 

Circuit has concluded that a term in administrative segregation was not "atypical and significant" without discussing 

conditions in the segregation unit or the length of the segregation at all. See Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1690 (1996). Were we to follow 

the approach of the Second and Ninth Circuits, we would 

then need to decide whether the length and severity of the 

deprivation Brown experienced sufficed to render that deprivation "atypical and significant," a close and difficult question. 

Compare Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1997) 

(remanding for specific findings on conditions of confinement 

in the case of an inmate held in administrative segregation for 

__________

7

Judge Posner, the author of Wagner, also observed that under 

the panel's reading of Sandin "the right to litigate disciplinary 

confinements has become vanishingly small." Id. at *3. He added 

that "[t]his is a harsh result and perhaps the Court did not actually 

intend it," and acknowledged that while the Sandin Court cited 

cases involving prison transfers, "it did not draw the logical inference [that the baseline should be a state's most rigorous prison] and 

may not have intended to push its approach to its logical extreme...." Id. at *4. And he further noted that "we would 

welcome clarification of the issue by the Court," id. at *3-4.

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six months) with Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 136 (1997) (finding that a sixmonth term in administrative segregation was not "atypical 

and significant," with no discussion of conditions in segregation). And, finally, we would need to decide whether Sandin's "atypical and significant" test merely supplements Hewitt's test for the existence of a liberty interest, or supersedes 

it altogether. See The Supreme Court, 1994 TermLeading 

Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 147-50 (1995) (discussing this 

question). We do not think it necessary or even useful to 

resolve so many complex and fact-specific issues in the context of this case which it may be possible to decide on far 

narrower grounds.

2. Did Brown Receive the Process He Was Due?

By contrast to the liberty-interest question, whether Brown 

received the process he was due turns on a few simple 

questions of fact. The decision to place an inmate who has a 

liberty interest in administrative segregation is subject to 

limited procedural safeguards. "An inmate must merely 

receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with 

deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation.... So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker 

reviews the charges and the then-available evidence against 

the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied." Hewitt,

459 U.S. at 476. This process may be conducted a reasonable 

time after the transfer, and may be done either orally or in 

writing; periodic reviews are required after the initial transfer. See id. at 476-77 & n.9.

Brown contends that, because his placement in administrative confinement was based on an express finding that he had 

assaulted a correctional officer, it was essentially disciplinary 

in nature, so that he is entitled to the more extensive procedural protections applied to disciplinary hearings in Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-71 (1974). Although Wolff

itself involved both discipline and the loss of good time, we 

have applied Wolff in cases in which only discipline was at 

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issue. See Crosby-Bey v. District of Columbia, 786 F.2d 

1182, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam). But Brown has not 

established that his treatment was disciplinary in nature. 

Prison officials may appropriately place an inmate in administrative segregation if she "represents a threat to the institution's security." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474. The fact that 

prison officials have made a finding that the inmate has 

committed an assault, rather than operating on the charge or 

suspicion that she has done so or will do so, does not trigger 

Wolff.8

We therefore conclude that only the procedures required in 

Hewitt"some notice," and an opportunity for the inmate to 

present his views, 459 U.S. at 476apply to this case.9

Hewitt 's requirements are not elaborate, but they are real, 

__________

8 Hewitt explained the lower procedural protections associated 

with administrative segregation by noting that no stigma is attached 

to such segregation, and that it has no significant effect on an 

inmate's parole opportunities. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473. If 

Brown had shown that the Housing Board's finding that he had 

assaulted a guard was treated for parole or other purposes as 

equivalent to a disciplinary finding to that effect, or that administrative segregation was so widely used as a substitute for punishment 

that it carried the same stigma as disciplinary segregation, this 

might indicate that more extensive procedural protections were 

warranted. He has made no such showing.

9 We do not agree with Brown's further contention that Hewitt

requires that an inmate receive advance notice of the charges 

against him. Advance notice is certainly valuable, and prison 

officials should provide it to inmates where possible; but Hewitt

calls only for "some notice."

The applicable regulations require that inmates receive written 

notice three days in advance of a housing hearing, D.C. Mun. Reg. 

tit. 28, § 523.1 (1987), a requirement that prison officials apparently 

did not comply with here. If the District did violate this requirement, that would not amount to a violation of the Due Process 

Clause. State law supplies only the substance of a liberty interest; 

federal constitutional law governs the procedures that are required 

when it is withdrawn. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 

(7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).

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and must be strictly complied with. The present record 

raises two questions as to whether Brown had fair notice of 

the purpose and implications of the Housing Board hearing.

Brown was initially told that he would receive a disciplinary 

hearing on October 16 on charges of Threatening Conduct 

and Possession of Major Contraband. Then, on October 15, 

he was brought before the Housing Board. It is not clear 

whether Brown was told that this hearing would be his only 

opportunity to respond to the charges against him. With 

certain exceptions, D.C. regulations prohibit inmates from 

being held in administrative segregation for more than three 

days without a hearing before the Housing Board. D.C. 

Mun. Regs. tit. 28, §§ 521.7, 531.10 (1987). Brown might thus 

have assumed that the Housing Board hearing was only 

intended to consider his temporary placement in administrative segregation pending the Adjustment Board's decision, 

and that he would have an opportunity to defend himself on 

any charges at the Adjustment Board hearing on the following day. On remand, the district court should determine 

whether Brown made this mistaken assumption, and if so 

whether it was reasonable for him to do so in light of what he 

was told about the purpose of the Housing Board hearing.

It is also not clear whether Brown knew that the Housing 

Board hearing was intended to address charges that he had 

assaulted a correctional officer. Brown had only been notified of an Adjustment Board hearing on charges of Threatening Conduct and Possession of Major Contraband. He had 

previously received a disciplinary report charging him with 

Bodily Injury; the fact that this charge was apparently not to 

be addressed at the Adjustment Board hearing could have 

reasonably led him to conclude that it had been dropped.10

Nor does the Housing Board Action Sheet that appears in the 

record provide any evidence as to whether Brown was told at 

the hearing that the Board would consider whether he had 

__________

10 Moreover, the D.C. regulations list Bodily Injury as a Class II 

offense, but Assault as a more serious Class I offense. D.C. Mun. 

Regs. tit. 28, §§ 502.4, 503.2 (1987).

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committed an assault. It records Brown only as saying that 

he does not fear for his safety and that he wants to have 

access to a law library, words that might suggest Brown 

thought that the hearing was about whether he himself was 

threatened and wished to be placed in voluntary protective 

custody.11

If Brown was not provided an accurate picture of what was 

at stake in the hearing, then he was not given his due 

process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); Memphis Light, Gas & Water 

Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978). On the other 

hand, if he was advised of the charges that would be considered against him and given "an opportunity to present his 

views," then he was given all the process he was due. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476. Because there is no record as to what 

occurred at the Housing Board hearing, we find it necessary 

to remand to the district court for further development of the 

facts surrounding this hearing.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we find that Preiser's distinction between challenges to the conditions of confinement and challenges to its 

fact or duration means that Brown's complaint was properly 

brought under section 1983, and need not have been brought 

as a habeas corpus petition. As to whether Brown's rights 

under the Due Process Clause were violated, we express no 

opinion at this time as to whether Brown had a liberty 

interest in remaining free of administrative segregation. Instead, we remand this case to the district court to decide, 

first, assuming that Brown had a liberty interest in avoiding 

administrative segregation, whether he received all the process that he was due under Hewitt. If he did, that will be the 

end of the matter. If he did not receive any such process, the 

__________

11 The sheet also states that Brown "has signed Non-Animosity 

and Waiver of Protective Custody forms"; the meaning of this is 

unclear, but it may again be a reference to voluntary protective 

custody. (Brown denies that he signed the latter form.)

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district court may proceed to consider whether a liberty 

interest existed, in light of the questions identified in this 

opinion.

We therefore vacate the decision of the district court, and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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