Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00085/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00085-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SILVIA DIEGO, M.D., an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOLDEN VALLEY HEALTH CENTERS, 

a California non-profit 

corporation, ABC CORP.; and 

DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-00085-JAM-GSA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND 

COSTS

Plaintiff Silvia Diego (“Plaintiff”) sued her former 

employer Golden Valley Health Centers (“Defendant”) for breach of 

contract and violation of public policy under state law in state 

court. Defendant’s unwarranted removal of the case on the basis 

of federal question jurisdiction caused Plaintiff to incur 

unnecessary costs and fees in moving to remand. The Court now 

awards Plaintiff a portion of her requested attorneys’ fees at 

Defendant’s expense.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for June 17, 2015.

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked as Chief Medical Officer at Defendant’s 

clinic. Compl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that in her ninth year in 

her position, Defendant’s CEO initiated “a series of policy 

directives and procedural changes aimed at increasing the number 

of patients seen in the [] facilities without a corresponding 

increase in the number of medical providers.” Compl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff objected to these changes, because she felt that they 

would “reduce the quality of patient care that could be rendered 

for low income and indigent clients[.]” Compl. ¶ 7. Defendant 

then terminated Plaintiff’s employment due to of her “fail[ure] 

to support the CEO’s policies and his leadership team.” Compl. 

¶ 9.

Plaintiff sued Defendant in Stanislaus County Superior 

Court, asserting three causes of action: (1) “Discharge in 

Violation of Public Policy” under California Business and 

Professions Code sections 2056(b) and (c); (2) “Breach of 

Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing”; and (3) “Breach of 

Written Contract.”

Both Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of California. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 2-3. Defendant removed the action to federal court 

on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, asserting that

Plaintiff’s allegations could form claims under the Federal 

Constitution (Doc. #1). 

One week after removal, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. #4) and a motion to 

compel arbitration (Doc. #8). Four days later, Plaintiff filed a 

motion to remand (Doc. #14). Plaintiff sought a stipulation to 

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delay briefing on Defendant’s two motions until after a ruling on 

her remand request, which would render both of Defendant’s 

motions moot. See Channaveerappa Decl. ¶ 5. Defendant declined. 

Id. Plaintiff then filed a motion to continue Defendant’s two 

motions (Doc. #18). But before the magistrate judge issued a 

ruling on the continuance (Doc. #35), Plaintiff prepared and 

filed oppositions to Defendant’s motions so as to meet the 

briefing deadlines. See Channaveerappa Decl. ¶ 6.

The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for remand following a 

hearing (Doc. #48). Plaintiff now moves for attorney’s fees and 

costs incurred by her as a result of Defendant’s wrongful removal 

in the amount of $8,510 (Doc. #49). Defendant opposes the motion 

(Doc. #50). 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A court granting remand may award attorney’s fees incurred 

“as a result of” an improper removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). To 

award fees, the removing party must have lacked “an objectively 

reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin 

Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Upon finding no 

reasonable basis, a court has “wide discretion” in awarding fees. 

Fong v. Beehler, 2013 WL 5913612, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 

2013). Such an award of fees is not punitive, but rather is 

intended to “reimburse[] [] plaintiffs [for] wholly unnecessary 

litigation costs the defendant inflicted.” J.P. Morgan Chase 

Bank v. Peterson, 2005 WL 2334712, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 

2005) (quoting Moore v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 981 F.2d 

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443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Court applies the lodestar method 

of calculating fees. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 965 

(9th Cir. 2003).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees expended on preparing 

and arguing the motion to remand. Plaintiff also moves for fees 

related to two other motions filed in federal court: Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss and motion to compel arbitration. Defendant 

argues that an award of fees is not warranted because removal was 

reasonable. In the alternative, Defendant contends that any 

award should be limited strictly to those fees and costs accrued 

by Plaintiff in opposing Defendant’s removal and preparing 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 

The Court finds that Defendant did not have an objectively 

reasonable basis for seeking removal. Defendant’s theory of 

removal was that Plaintiff should have brought her claims under 

the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal 

Constitution, rather than under the California state laws that 

form the basis of her complaint. See Opp. at 2-3. As the Court 

explained in its ruling on the motion to remand, a plaintiff is 

the master of her complaint, and she may raise only theories of 

state law if she so chooses. Because Plaintiff here chose state 

law causes of action (that were not preempted by any federal 

law), there was no federal question. 

This remand issue was not a close one. Defendant’s argument 

was squarely foreclosed by longstanding and controlling 

authority. See Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 

(1987); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 

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804, 809 (1986); Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 

(9th Cir. 1996). Defendant therefore had no objectively 

reasonable basis for removing this action. Beauford v. E.W.H. 

Group Inc., 2009 WL 3162249, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2009) 

(“The court concludes Defendant’s removal was clearly foreclosed 

by well established case law and therefore Defendant did not have 

an objectively reasonable basis for removal.”). 

Based on Defendant’s unreasonable conduct in this case, the 

Court exercises its discretion to award fees to Plaintiff. But 

as to the scope of the award, the Court agrees with Defendant 

that the motions to dismiss and compel arbitration were not “a 

result of” the removal, because Defendant could have brought them 

in state court. Defendant cites Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, Inc., 

64 F.3d 487 (1995). While Baddie is not directly on point, as it 

dealt with the issue of whether section 1447(c) authorized an 

award where “initial removal was proper,” id. at 490 the case is 

instructive. The Baddie court stated that section 1447(c) 

authorizes fees associated with a motion to remand, but other 

fees “incurred in federal court after removal may be related only 

tenuously to the removal, as when they replace similar fees and 

costs that would have been incurred in state court if the 

litigation had proceeded there. Such fees and costs cannot be 

considered ‘incurred as a result of the removal.’” Baddie, 64 

F.3d at 490. Other courts have since agreed with this reasoning. 

See, e.g., Partners v. Gonzalez, 2010 WL 3447678, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 30, 2010). 

Here, the motions to dismiss and compel arbitration both 

argued that the Court should dismiss the case and “order the 

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parties to arbitration.” See Mot. to Compel at 2; Mot. to 

Dismiss at 6. Defendant could have – and, following remand, 

apparently did – bring a similar motion in state court. See

Reply at 4; Opp. at 5. These motions therefore are “related only 

tenuously to removal” and were not incurred “as a result of 

removal.”

The Court may, therefore, only consider the number of 

billable hours Plaintiff’s counsel and paralegal reasonably spent 

on securing remand. The Court awards fees for the tasks listed 

below. The Court finds reasonable the number of hours spent on 

each task (but one) as set forth in Plaintiff’s counsel’s 

declaration. See Channaveerappa Decl. Exh. A. Contrary to 

Defendant’s assertions, the declaration does not report improper 

“block billing,” see Opp. at 6; it sufficiently describes 

specific tasks. As to the hourly rate, Defendant has not 

objected to Plaintiff’s requested billing rate for paralegal time 

and the Court finds the $100/hour reasonable. Defendant does 

object to the attorney rate of $300/hour. Opp. at 7 n.2. The 

Court agrees, and finds $225/hour to be a reasonable rate for an 

attorney with five years of legal experience. See Lee-Tzu Lin v. 

Dignity Health-Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento, 2014 WL 5698448, at 

*3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2014).

TASKS RELATED TO REMAND

• “Receipt and review of electronically filed documents . . . 

i.e., Notice of Removal”2 (.5 hrs. @ $225/hr. -- $112.50);

 

2 Plaintiff’s counsel reports one hour for this task as well as

other tasks for which fees are not warranted (e.g., reviewing the 

motion to dismiss). The Court awards fees for half an hour of 

time for reviewing the notice of removal.

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• “Preparation of Plaintiff’s Motion To Remand” ... (4 hrs. --

$900.00);

• “Prepared Ex Parte Motion to Continue opposing party’s 

motions until Remand” (1.5 hrs. -- $337.50);

• “Prepared Re-Notice of Plaintiff’s Motion to Hear Remand” (1 

hr. -- $225.00);

• “Proofread and corrected Re-Notice of Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Hear Remand” (.6 hrs. @ $100/hr. -- $60.00);

• “Prepared for Court Appearance re Plaintiff’s Motion To 

Remand” (2 hrs. -- $450.00); 

• “Organized/indexed file” (1 hr. -- $100.00);

• “Court Appearance” ... on Plaintiff’s motion to remand (4.5 

hrs. -- $1,012.50); and

• “Prepared Order After Hearing to Remand” (.70 hrs. --

$157.50).

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART 

AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion and awards attorney’s fees 

and costs in the amount of $3,355.00. Defendant shall pay this 

amount to Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, within twenty 

days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 7, 2015

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