Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-04871/USCOURTS-cand-4_09-cv-04871-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAI T. LE,

Plaintiff, No. C 09-4871 PJH

v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

HILTON HOTEL, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Pro se plaintiff Hai T. Le filed this action on October 9, 2009, and also filed an

application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). On November 18, 2009, plaintiff filed a

request to transfer the case from the Oakland division to the San Francisco division of this

court. 

Having reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court finds that it

must be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. The motion to transfer is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

This is a case alleging federal constitutional violations and also asserting state law

claims. According to plaintiff, it is 

a civil action seeking remedy from defendants for executive acts caused by

defendants under color law [sic], customs and usage which have denied to

plaintiff and the class of persons known as the holders of the inherent power

in California (as defined at Cal. const. art. 2 § 1, hereafter the “Holders” and

hereafter a “Holder” in designation of a member that was any member of the

Holders) the equal protection of the laws and deprived plaintiff and Holders of

procedural due process rights guaranteed to plaintiff and Holders by the 4th,

5th, 14th article in amendment to the federal Constitution and which have

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thereby violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §1985, § 1986, and § 1988. 

Cplt ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff’s claims are based on three separate incidents – the first occurring in Daly

City, California, on August 20, 2008; the second occurring in Redwood City, California, on

August 22, 2008; and the third occurring in San Francisco, California, on October 13, 2008. 

The following description is taken from the “Statement[s] of Facts” in the complaint. 

With regard to the first incident, plaintiff alleges that he was driving in Daly City on

August 20, 2008, at approximately 4:50 p.m., when his cell phone rang. He answered the

call, which he asserts was from an “advertising company.” He alleges that as soon as he

realized that the call was from an “advertising company,” he hung up the phone. Cplt ¶ 10.

Plaintiff asserts that a minute later, he noticed a Daly City police car behind him. A 

police officer (whom plaintiff does not identify in the statement of facts) pulled plaintiff over,

and asked for his driver’s license, registration, and insurance. The officer then issued

plaintiff a citation for violating California Vehicle Code § 23123(a) (unlawful to drive a motor

vehicle while using a wireless telephone not specifically designed and configured to allow

hands-free listening and talking). According to plaintiff, he initially refused to sign the ticket,

but after the police officer told him that if he didn’t sign, he would be arrested and his

vehicle seized, he signed it. Id.

A few weeks later, plaintiff received a letter from the Superior Court stating that he

owed $92.00. When he appeared in court, the judge (not identified in the statement of

facts) allegedly offered to reduce the $92.00 fine if plaintiff would plead guilty. However,

plaintiff instead “handed to the judge a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction,” which the judge allegedly refused to read. Plaintiff claims that he was under

the impression that the charge had been dismissed, but later discovered that he had one

“point” for the violation on his California Department of Motor Vehicles record. Id. 

 In the second incident, plaintiff, who works as a taxicab driver, was driving a

passenger in his cab from San Francisco International Airport to Redwood City on August

22, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that when he stopped at his passenger’s home, a San Mateo

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County transit police officer (not identified in the statement of facts) approached him and

asked for his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance. Cplt ¶ 11. 

According to plaintiff, the officer said that he had stopped plaintiff because plaintiff’s

cab had been stopped on a railroad track. Plaintiff alleges that “the rail track was about half

mile back,” and claims that “I didn’t stop on the track.” The officer then issued plaintiff a

citation for blocking a railroad crossing, in violation of California Vehicle Code § 22526(c),

which he allegedly “forced” plaintiff to sign. Id. 

Approximately two weeks later, plaintiff received a letter from the court saying he

owed $192.00. When he went to court, the judge (not identified in the statement of facts)

allegedly offered plaintiff a “discount” if he would plead guilty without going to trial. Plaintiff

pled not guilty, and handed the judge a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The judge set a court date for plaintiff to appear for the trial. Id. 

Plaintiff claims that the trial lasted only a few minutes, and that the judge found him

guilty without any explanation, and ordered him to pay the fine. Plaintiff claims that the

judge also refused to permit plaintiff to attend traffic school to remove the point from his

California Department of Motor Vehicles record, because plaintiff had not paid the fine in

full in the first place. Id.

Plaintiff contends that he then checked the list of Superior Court judges in San

Mateo County, but could not find the name of the judge (again, not identified in the

statement of facts) on the list. Thus, he asserts, “the judge didn’t have any right to hear or

decide my case.” He claims that the judge and the police officer were working together

“with only one purpose which is money by taking advantage of the color of law, using the

color of office, the color of process, custom, and usage to deprive money from people.” Id.

In the third incident, plaintiff became involved in an altercation with a doorman or

doormen in front of the Hilton Hotel in San Francisco on October 13, 2008. He claims that

the doorman or doormen were illegally diverting passengers to cabs other than plaintiff’s,

and that after he videotaped this alleged illegal activity, the doorman or doormen falsely

reported to “the police” that plaintiff had hit one of the doormen with his cab. Cplt ¶ 9.

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 Officers Ozol, Cesari, McCloskey, and Sullivan are collectively referred to herein as

the “San Francisco Police Officer defendants.”

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Plaintiff was arrested, handcuffed, and taken into custody by unidentified “police.” 

He alleges that he was subsequently strip-searched at the County Jail. He asserts that he

was charged with a misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1) (assault

with a deadly weapon - not a firearm), and that three days later, he was brought before a

judge, who issued a restraining order. Id. 

Plaintiff was then released from custody – the documents submitted by plaintiff with

the complaint indicate that the misdemeanor charge was dismissed – but he claims that

when he got outside, he discovered that “the police” had not returned all the personal

belongings that had been taken from him at the time of his arrest. However, the police did

eventually return all the items. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has had a hard time making a living since this incident. 

According to plaintiff, when he attempted to pull up in his cab in front of “the hotel,” the

doormen refused to permit him to do so. Id. 

Plaintiff filed the present action against nine defendants – Hilton Hotel; City and

County of San Francisco (“CCSF”); San Mateo County Transit Officer Bruce McKay #848;

San Mateo County Superior Court Commissioner Stephanie Garratt; Daly City Police

Officer Victor Schianterlli #151; San Francisco Police Officer Jonathan T. Ozol #2358; San

Francisco Police Officer Cesari #155; San Francisco Police Officer McCloskey #2151; and

San Francisco Police Officer Sullivan #571.1 Commissioner Garratt and Officers McKay,

Schianterlli, Ozol, Cesari, McCloskey, and Sullivan are sued in their individual capacities

only. 

Plaintiff alleges 29 causes of action: 

(1) abuse of procedural due process, against Officer McKay, Commissioner Garratt,

and Officer Schianterlli; 

(2) abuse of process, against Officer McKay, Commissioner Garratt, and Officer

Schianterlli; 

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(3) extortion, against Officer McKay, Commissioner Garratt, and Officer Schianterlli; 

(4) violation of substantive due process, against all defendants; 

(5) imposition of excessive fines, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, against all defendants; 

(6) violation of Article IV of the United States Constitution, against all defendants; 

(7) conspiracy against rights, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, against Hilton Hotel, the

San Francisco Police Officer defendants, Officer McKay, Commissioner Garratt, and

Officer Schianterlli; 

(8) deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, against all

defendants; 

(9) impairment of right to enjoy life and pursue happiness, against CCSF; 

(10) impairment of constitutional right to procedural due process, against all

defendants; 

(11) conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights, liberty, and privileges, against all

defendants; 

(12) conspiracy to deprive personal rights and liberty, against all defendants; 

(13) taking advantage of color of law to deprive constitutional rights, against all

defendants; 

(14) excessive force, against CCSF, and the San Francisco Police Officer

defendants; 

(15) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, retaliation for petitioning, against Hilton Hotel; 

(16) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(3), conspiracy, against Hilton Hotel, the

San Francisco Police Officer defendants, Commissioner Garratt, and Officer McKay; 

(17) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, refusing or neglecting to prevent illegal activities,

against CCSF; 

(18) malicious prosecution, against Hilton Hotel, and the San Francisco Police

Officer defendants; 

(19) malicious abuse of process, against all defendants;

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(20) intentional infliction of emotional distress, against all defendants;

(21) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: arrest, against all defendants;

(22) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: detention and confinement, against Officers

McKay and Schianterlli;

(23) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: strip search, against CCSF; 

(24) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983: conspiracy, against all defendants;

(25) false arrest and imprisonment, against all defendants;

(26) conspiracy, against Hilton Hotel, and the San Francisco Police Officer

defendants; 

(27) intentional infliction of emotional distress (defendants not listed);

(28) “proceed to trial and render judgment without jurisdiction,” against

Commissioner Garratt, Officer McKay, and Officer Schianterlli; and 

(29) “delay the equal protection of the law,” against all defendants.

Plaintiff seeks $1,550,000 in compensatory damages and $14,000,000 in punitive

damages, and also seeks injunctive relief “to prevent the defendants from depriving the

plaintiff’s rights, liberty and property again in the future.” Cplt ¶ 88. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “[a]ny court of the United States may authorize the

commencement . . . of any suit . . . without prepayment of fees and costs or security

therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give

security therefor.” In reviewing an application to proceed IFP, the court may dismiss a case

sua sponte if the court determines that the party applying for IFP status has filed a frivolous

action, or that the complaint fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from

defendants who are immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Jackson v. Arizona,

885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (9th Cir.

1984). 

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a frivolous claim is one that lacks an arguable

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basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint

lacks an arguable basis in facts or law if controlling authority requires a finding that the

facts alleged fail to establish an arguable legal claim. Guti v. INS, 908 F.2d 495, 496 (9th

Cir. 1990). Thus, a court may dismiss as frivolous complaints that recite bare legal

conclusions without any supporting facts. Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1228; see also Tripati v.

First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 ( 9th Cir.1987). The term “frivolous”

embraces “not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation."

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In reviewing a complaint for frivolity, a trial court may “pierce the veil of the

complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are

clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. In so doing, the assessment of the factual

allegations must be weighted in favor of the plaintiff. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32

(1992). 

Where a litigant is acting pro se and the court finds the litigant's complaint frivolous

within the meaning of § 1915(e)(2), the court must give the litigant notice of the deficiencies

of the complaint and an opportunity to amend before final dismissal, unless it is absolutely

clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-37

(9th Cir. 1987).

B. Analysis

1. Violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),

which requires that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief” contain the following:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new

jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief; and 

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative

or different types of relief.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,”

Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation

omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Here, plaintiff’s complaint qualifies as neither “short” nor “plain,” but is at the same

time deficient in the required factual allegations. The complaint consists of 24 pages – five

of which contain largely incomprehensible allegations regarding “null” and “void” statutes

and “executions,” “ratified execution[s],” the “rights” of “Holders,” and “public” vs. “private”

offenses, see Cplt ¶¶ 12-46 – plus 16 exhibits. 

Moreover, a number of the 29 causes of action are duplicative – i.e., (a) the first

cause of action for abuse of procedural due process, and the tenth cause of action for

impairment of constitutional right to procedural due process; (b) the second cause of action

for abuse of process, and the nineteenth cause of action for malicious abuse of process; (c)

the eleventh cause of action for conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights, liberty, and

privileges, the sixteenth cause of action for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1985(3), and the twenty-fourth cause of action for conspiracy under § 1983; and (d) the

twentieth and twenty-seventh causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

More of a problem, however, is plaintiff’s failure to connect specific defendants with

the various causes of action alleged. In particular (as noted above) the “Statement[s] of

Fact” do not identify a single defendant. It is left to the court to flip back and forth between

the factual allegations and the 29 causes of action to attempt to link up the various

defendants with the asserted violations. If the pleading were served in its present form it

would not give defendants fair notice of the claims against them. That alone provides a

sufficient basis for dismissal of the complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

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(2007) (complaint must be sufficient to give defendants “fair notice” of the claim and the

“grounds upon which it rests”).

Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930,

934 (9th Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a

plausible claim for relief as to each defendant. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that

an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of civil rights”). The mere possibility

of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50;

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

2. Misjoinder of defendants 

As indicated above, the claims asserted by plaintiff arise from three separate

incidents occurring in three different cities, involving nine different defendants. The Federal

Rules permit more than one claim against a single defendant to be joined in the same

action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). However, claims against different defendants may be

joined in the same action only if the claims asserted against them “aris[e] out of the same

transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 

While misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissing an action, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 21 permits the court “[o]n motion or on its own, . . . at any time, on just terms,

[to] add or drop a party” and to “sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 

Here, defendant Hilton Hotel and defendant CCSF the San Francisco Police Officer

defendants appear to have been involved only in the October 13, 2008 incident, while the

Daly City Police Officer (apparently Officer Schianterlli) was involved only in the August 20,

2008 incident, and the San Mateo Transit Police Officer (apparently Officer McKay) was

involved only in the August 22, 2008 incident. It is not entirely clear which incident(s)

Commissioner Garratt is alleged to have been involved in. 

The only factor that the three incidents have in common is that each occurred in

connection with plaintiff’s driving of a motor vehicle. In two of the incidents he was cited for

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 The court takes judicial notice of the fact that Stephanie G. Garratt is a San Mateo

County Superior Court Commissioner.

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Vehicle Code violations – albeit by officers from two different policing authorities – and in

the third incident he was arrested for assault by officers from yet a third policing authority. 

The three incidents were separate occurrences, and plaintiff has improperly joined all the

defendants in a single action. 

As the court has determined that the entire complaint must be dismissed for failure

to state a claim, the court will not attempt to sever parties or claims. But plaintiff is advised

that if he chooses to file an amended complaint, in accordance with this order, he may

allege claims against multiple defendants based on only a single transaction or occurrence

– i.e., either the August 20, 2008 incident, the August 22, 2008 incident, or the October 13,

2008 incident. If he wishes to file a complaint based on the remaining two transactions or

occurrences, he must file separate actions. 

3. Claims against Commissioner Stephanie Garratt

Although the basis for the claims asserted against Commissioner Garratt is not

entirely clear, it appears that the complaint challenges Commissioner Garratt’s decisions

regarding the disposition of one or both of the citations issued against plaintiff in San Mateo

County.2 This court does not have jurisdiction to review or alter the rulings of a state-court

judge. 

Federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, may not review the final

determinations of a state court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (district

courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts); see also Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (approving dismissal of “cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review

and rejection of those judgments”); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888,

890-91 (9th Cir. 1986) (forbidding the filing of suits seeking de facto review of state-court

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 Any suit for damages against Commissioner Garratt in her official capacity would be

subject to dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Greater Los Angeles Council on

Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (suit against Superior Court is suit

against State of California and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment). As a Commissioner

of the Superior Court, Commissioner Garratt is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and is immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits for damages in federal

court. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Pennhurst

State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).

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decisions). This is so even when the state court judgment is not made by the highest state

court, see McNair, 805 F.2d at 893 n. 3, and when federal constitutional issues are at

stake, see Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1995); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d

789, 792 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Accordingly, any attempt by plaintiff to challenge Commissioner Garratt’s rulings

must be DISMISSED. If plaintiff is dissatisfied with a ruling by a state-court judge, his

remedy is to seek timely and appropriate review through the state court system, and then

review from the United States Supreme Court, to the extent it is available.

Furthermore, while plaintiff asserts that Commissioner Garratt is named as a

defendant in her individual capacity only,3

 she is nonetheless being sued for acts allegedly

performed in her judicial capacity. Judges are absolutely immune, under the doctrine of

judicial immunity, from suits for money damages for acts performed in their judicial

capacities. Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 & n.10 (1993); Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-60

(1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc). 

Judicial immunity bars suit even if a judge is accused of acting in bad faith,

maliciously, corruptly, erroneously, or in excess of jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-13. 

Judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of conspiracy. Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d

1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996); Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078.

4. Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985

Plaintiff alleges various constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and other

constitutional claims which the court interprets as being brought under § 1983. Section

1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

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secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n,

496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245

(9th Cir. 1987). 

A person acts under color of state law if he “exercise[s] power possessed by virtue

of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of

state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 49 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally,

a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while

exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114,

1117 (9th Cir. 1997). 

a. Claims against defendant Hilton Hotel

Plaintiff asserts a number of constitutional claims under § 1983 against defendant

Hilton Hotel, or against “all defendants,” which presumably includes Hilton Hotel – i.e., the

fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth, thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, twenty-first and twenty-ninth causes

of action. However, the complaint pleads no facts showing that Hilton Hotel acted under

color of state law in committing the acts of which plaintiff complains. Because plaintiff

pleads no facts showing that Hilton Hotel is a state actor, the constitutional claims asserted

against Hilton Hotel under § 1983 must be DISMISSED. This dismissal is with leave to

amend. 

b. Claims against City and County of San Francisco

 Plaintiff alleges a number of constitutional claims against CCSF or against “all

defendants,” which presumably includes CCSF. However, plaintiff pleads no facts

supporting a claim of municipal liability. Accordingly, the claims against CCSF are

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DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where

official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the

unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior. Board of

County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Fuller v. City

of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The dismissal is with leave to amend. To state a claim against CCSF under § 1983

for a violation of constitutional rights, plaintiff must allege facts showing that he possessed

a constitutional right of which he was deprived; that CCSF had a policy, amounting to

deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights; and that the policy was the moving force

behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. School Dist. No. 40, County of Yamhill,

130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-08; Monell, 436 U.S. at

691. 

c. Eighth Amendment claim

In the fifth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that “defendants” imposed “excessive

fines” on him “for no reason, for no violation of valid law, for violation of the null and void

law which doesn’t exist.” In addition, he asserts, 

Even if the defendants can prove that the law exists, the plaintiff didn’t violate

it. This is in violation of 8th Amendment. Even if a legislature enacts a law,

people don’t have to obey if the law is unconstitutional. The law will be just

like a piece of paper sitting in the office. 

Cplt ¶ 62. It is not entirely clear from these allegations, but the only fines mentioned in the

complaint are the $92.00 fine plaintiff was required to pay for the August 20, 2009 violation,

and the $192.00 fine he was required to pay for the August 22, 2009 violation. 

The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const., 8th

Amend. “The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments,

whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Austin v. United States, 509

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U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993). 

The Supreme Court long suggested that the Eighth Amendment applied primarily,

and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and punishments. Browning-Ferris Indus.

of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262-65 (1989). In Austin, however,

the Supreme Court stated there was nothing in the history of the Eighth Amendment which

indicated its limitation to criminal prosecutions. Austin, 509 U.S. at 608. “[T]he question is

not . . . whether [a fine] . . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.” Id. at

610. Even assuming a fine serves some remedial purpose, it will be considered

punishment if it also serves “either retributive or deterrent purposes.” Id. at 621. 

The Court in Austin declined to articulate a test for determining whether a fine is

excessive. However, the court finds it unnecessary to consider whether plaintiff has stated

facts sufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive fines, because plaintiff

cannot state such a claim against the defendants herein. The fines that plaintiff finds

objectionable were imposed by the Superior Court of California. Plaintiff cannot amend the

complaint to state an excessive fines claim against the State of California, because states

and their agencies are not persons under § 1983. Because plaintiff cannot state an Eighth

Amendment claim, the fifth cause of action must be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

d. Due process claims

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against

governmental deprivations of “life, liberty or property,” as those words have been

interpreted and given meaning over the life of our republic, without due process of law. 

Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). The due

process clause confers both procedural and substantive rights. See Armendariz v.

Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

The primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with

the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fuentes v. Shevin

(1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the

Constitution's command of due process. “The purpose of this requirement is not only to

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ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his

use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment – to minimize substantively

unfair or mistaken deprivations of property. . . .” United States v. James Daniel Good Real

Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993). 

Substantive due process refers to certain actions that the government may not

engage in, no matter how many procedural safeguards it employs. County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.

1988). Substantive due process protects against a State's interference with personal

decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child

rearing, and education, as well as with an individual's bodily integrity, see Armendariz, 75

F.3d at 1319; and against executive abuse of power that shocks the conscience, Chavez v.

Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 781 (2003).

i. Procedural due process claims

Plaintiff asserts three causes of action that can be interpreted as alleging procedural

due process violations. The first cause of action (“abuse of procedural due process”) and

second cause of action (“abuse of process”) are alleged against Officer McKay,

Commissioner Garratt, and Officer Schianterlli. The tenth cause of action (“impairment of

constitutional right to procedural due process”) is alleged against “all defendants.” 

Although it is not entirely clear from the complaint, it appears that Officer Schianterlli

may have been the officer that issued plaintiff the citation for talking on a cell phone while

driving in Daly City, while Officer McKay may have been the officer that issued plaintiff the

citation for blocking the railroad crossing in Redwood City. In the first cause of action,

plaintiff alleges that Officer McKay, Commissioner Garratt, and Officer Schianterlli 

used traffic Courts to pretend that the defendants did provide the due process

pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution, but the out come [sic] of the

judgment was already arranged between the defendants no matter what the

plaintiff say in the motion to dismiss and not matter what evidence they have

and even with no evidence at all.

In the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that the same three defendants “took

the advantage of the color of law to abuse the procedural process. Forcing the plaintiff to

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pay for the amount of money which does not exist as a matter of law.” 

In the tenth cause of action, “impairment of constitutional right to procedural due

process,” asserted against “all defendants,” plaintiff does not allege any facts. 

The court finds that all three of these causes of action must be DISMISSED for

failure to state a claim. To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must plead facts

showing 1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; 2) a deprivation of

that interest by the government; 3) lack of process. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir.1993). 

However, while “liberty” and “property” are “broad and majestic terms, . . . the range

of interest protected by procedural due process is not infinite.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71. 

The Fourteenth Amendment is not “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever

systems may already be administered by the States.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701

(1976). Here, plaintiff has not set forth a legitimate Fourteenth Amendment interest of

which he has been deprived. 

The term “liberty” denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the

individual’s right “to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire

useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God . . . ,

and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly

pursuit of happiness by free men.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (citation and quotation omitted). 

There is little doubt that “[i]n a Constitution for a free people, . . . the meaning of 'liberty'

must be broad indeed.” Id. Nevertheless, the court finds nothing asserted here that can

be considered a deprivation of a liberty interest, because plaintiff’s claim does not resemble

a loss of a “long-recognized privilege” that is “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.”

Thus, plaintiff must be claiming that he was deprived of a property interest in

violation of his procedural due process rights. The Fourteenth Amendment due process

guarantee extends only to property claims to which an individual has a “legitimate claim of

entitlement.” Id. at 577. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must

have more than an abstract need or desire for it.” Id.

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 In addition, the exercise of independent judgment by a judicial officer – here, the

decision(s) by Commissioner Garratt with regard to the disposition of the citations issued to

plaintiff – supercedes the chain of causation linking law enforcement personnel to the judicial

officer’s decision. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 663 (9th Cir. 2007). The

officers could be liable for any associated constitutional violations only if they deliberately or

recklessly misled Commissioner Garratt about the facts. Id.

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Here, plaintiff appears to be complaining of a lack of due process in connection with

the citation for talking on a cell phone while driving in Daly City, and the citation for stopping

his vehicle on a railroad crossing in Redwood City. However, from the facts alleged, it

further appears that plaintiff received the process that was due, as he received a hearing in

the Superior Court, where he was permitted to challenge the citations. That he disagrees

with the outcome of the hearing, or that he believes he should not have had to pay any

fines for the violations, is not sufficient to support a claim of deprivation of property without

due process of law.4

 

If this is the extent of plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, the dismissal is with

prejudice. If plaintiff intended some other basis for the claim of denial of procedural due

process, he must clarify the claim in an amended complaint. 

ii. Substantive due process claims

In the fourth cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of violation of substantive due

process, against “all defendants.” In this claim, it appears that plaintiff is reiterating his

claim of violation of procedural due process in connection with the citations issued in Daly

City and Redwood City. This part of the claim is dismissed for the reasons stated above

with regard to the procedural due process claim. 

It also appears that plaintiff may be challenging the arrest and criminal prosecution

in San Francisco resulting from the Hilton Hotel incident, and the restraining order

subsequently issued by the Superior Court. To the extent that plaintiff is challenging the

arrest, that claim must be asserted as a Fourth Amendment claim. 

Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be used to analyze such claims. 

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 Plaintiff also asserts, in the third cause of action, a claim of “extortion” in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that Officer McKay, Officer Schianterlli, and Commissioner

Garratt “force[d] plaintiff to sign the tickets for violating or even not violated the null, void

statute, the vehicle codes” and “used threat of suspend the driver license to force the plaintiff

to pay the quasi debt[,] . . . which the plaintiff never owes the defendants or cause damage to

the defendants or any other person.” Cplt ¶ 59. The court finds this claim substantially

incomprehensible, particularly given plaintiff’s failure to identify the constitutional right that he

believes has been violated. To the extent that plaintiff intends it as a substantive due process

claim, it is DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with the discussion herein. 

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Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Picray v. Sealock, 138 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir.

1998). Substantive due process does not extend to circumstances already addressed by

other constitutional provisions. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (constitutionality of arrest

may be challenged only under Fourth Amendment).

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to challenge the issuance of the restraining

order by the court in San Francisco, that claim is DISMISSED with prejudice, for the

reasons stated above with regard to the dismissal of the claims against Commissioner

Garratt. 

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to challenge the criminal prosecution, the

claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, as the allegations are too vague for the

court to be able to determine which defendants plaintiff intends to charge with this alleged

violation of substantive due process. See Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.5

e. Equal protection claim

In the twenty-ninth cause of action, plaintiff alleges what appears to be a Fourteenth

Amendment claim of denial of equal protection, against “all defendants.” Plaintiff does not

allege any facts in support of this cause of action, other than the allegation that “[t]he

defendants did not apply the law equally on all persons.” 

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no

State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which

is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457

U.S. 202, 216 (1982)); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005)

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(evidence of different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection

claim). 

It is not clear whether plaintiff is alleging a denial of equal protection under § 1983

based on race or other suspect classification, or whether he is alleging a “class of one”

claim. To state a claim for relief based on a suspect classification, the plaintiff must allege

that the defendant state actor acted at least in part because of plaintiff's membership in a

protected class. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). In

comparison, the “class of one” claim requires only that action be irrational and arbitrary,

rather than requiring discriminatory intent. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam). 

Nevertheless, because the complaint pleads no facts to support any claim of denial

of equal protection against any defendant, the court finds that the twenty-ninth cause of

action must be DISMISSED. The dismissal is with leave to amend.

f. Claim of violation of privileges and immunities clause

In the sixth cause of action, entitled “Violation of Article IV of the US Constitution,”

plaintiff alleges “[d]eprivation of privileges and immunity [sic] guaranteed by the US

Constitution without due process of law.” This claim is asserted against “all defendants.”

Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides, “The Citizens of each

State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” 

U.S. Const, Art IV, § 2; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). A right

secured under the privileges and immunities clause is the right of a citizen to “remove to

and carry on business in another [state] without being subjected in property or person to

taxes more onerous than the citizens of the latter state are subjected to.” Shaffer v. Carter,

252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920). Because the privileges and immunities clause is not absolute, it

does not preclude discrimination in all circumstances, but only where there is “no

substantial reason . . . beyond the mere fact that they [persons being discriminated

against] are citizens of other States.” Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396. 

The complaint alleges no facts supporting a claim of denial of privileges and

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 The Declaration of Independence states that all men are endowed certain unalienable

rights including “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” See Declaration of Independence,

¶ 1. However, the Declaration of Independence does not grant rights that may be pursued

through the judicial system. 

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immunities. Rather, the sixth cause of action appears to be yet another claim of denial of

procedural due process. Accordingly, the court finds that it must be DISMISSED for failure

to state a claim. As plaintiff has pled no facts showing that defendants violated any of his

fundamental rights, and as this case does not involve any claim that plaintiff was treated

differently than a resident of a state other than California, the court finds that amendment

will not cure the deficiencies of the sixth cause of action, and the dismissal is therefore with

prejudice.

g. General claim of deprivation of constitutional rights

In the thirteenth cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of taking advantage of color

of law to deprive constitutional rights, against all defendants. In the seventeenth cause of

action, plaintiff alleges a constitutional claim of “refusing or neglecting to prevent illegal

activities,” against CCSF. In both these causes of action, plaintiff simply pleads general 

§ 1983 claims of violation of unspecified constitutional rights. Neither of these causes of

action state a claim because plaintiff has not identified the alleged constitutional violation(s)

and has not alleged any facts as to particular defendants, and are therefore DISMISSED on

that basis. The dismissal is with prejudice.

h. Claim of impairment of right to enjoy life and pursue happiness

In the ninth cause of action plaintiff alleges a claim of impairment of right to enjoy life

and pursue happiness, against defendant CCSF. This claim is not cognizable, as a

constitutional claim or otherwise. Although the Constitution provides many important

protections, a specific guarantee for the pursuit of happiness is not among those granted by

the Constitution or its amendments.6

 Accordingly, this claim fails to state a cause of action

upon which relief may be granted. Further, the court finds that it would be futile for the

plaintiff to attempt to state a cognizable claim for the “right to enjoy life” or the "pursuit of

happiness" through repleading. Therefore, the ninth cause of action is DISMISSED with

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 The first clause of § 1985(3) pertains to conspiracy to deny equal protection of the

laws on the highway or on the premises of another; the second clause pertains to conspiracy

to prevent or hinder state officers from providing equal protection to all persons within the

state; and the third clause pertains to conspiracy to interfere with federal elections. See 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3). 

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prejudice.

i. Claims of conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights

Plaintiff asserts a number of claims of “conspiracy.” In the eleventh cause of action,

plaintiff alleges a claim of conspiracy to “deprive constitutional rights, liberty and privileges,”

against “all defendants.” In the twelfth cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of

conspiracy to “deprive personal rights and liberty,” against “all defendants.” In the sixteenth

cause of action, plaintiff alleges a claim of “violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(3):

conspiracy,” against the Hilton Hotel, the San Francisco Police Officer defendants,

Commissioner Garratt, and Officer McKay. None of these causes of action is supported by

any recitation of facts. The court interprets these three causes of action as alleging that

defendants conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights, in violation of the first

clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 

Section 1985(3) provides a cause of action against state or private conspiracies. 

See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971).7

 A cause of action under 

§ 1985(3) requires a showing of some racial or class-based discrimination, but only the first

clause of § 1985(3) requires intent to deprive victims of the equal protections of the laws. 

See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724-26 (1983). Other than race-based classes, it is

unclear what classes may be protected; the class must be something more than a group of

individuals who all want to engage in conduct that the defendant disfavors, and federal

courts should exercise restraint in extending § 1985(3) beyond racial prejudice. Butler v.

Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The elements of a claim under the first clause of § 1985(3) are: (1) the existence of a

conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws; (2) an act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) a resulting injury. See Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,

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 “A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” Johnson

v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation omitted). 

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198 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).8

 Section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself;

it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it designates. See Great American

Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979).

The plaintiff asserting a claim under § 1985(3) must be a member of the class

discriminated against. RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1055-56 (9th 

Cir. 2002). This standing requirement may be satisfied if the plaintiff is a member of the

protected class or, alternatively, if the plaintiff can show that he is a member of a class that

the government has determined requires and warrants special federal assistance in

protecting their civil rights. See id. at 1056 (suggesting a white plaintiff may be able to

assert a claim under § 1985(3) for being discriminated against for providing music to a

predominately African American clientele). 

Specifically, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action under § 1985(3) must allege facts

showing that he is a member of a class that the courts have designated as suspect or

quasi-suspect “requiring more exacting scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through

legislation that the class required special protection.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d

1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Voight v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1564 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the complaint alleges no race- or class-based discriminatory animus on the

part of defendants, and does not identify any suspect class of which plaintiff is alleged to be

a member. Thus, plaintiff’s claim under § 1985 lacks an arguable basis in law. See Saint

Francis College v. Al-Kharraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,

1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

In addition, to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985, a plaintiff must first have a

cognizable claim under § 1983. Caldeira v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.

1989). Because the court has determined that the complaint must be dismissed for failure

to state a claim, plaintiff has no cognizable claim under § 1983. Thus, the eleventh, twelfth,

and sixteenth causes of action must be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

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The dismissal is with leave to amend, but only if plaintiff is able to plead a cognizable

claim against the same defendant(s) under § 1983, and is able to allege facts showing that

he is a member of a suspect class, and facts supporting the other elements of a claim

under the first clause of § 1985(3). 

5. Claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242

In the seventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges “conspiracy against rights” in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 241, against Hilton Hotel, the San Francisco Police Officer defendants,

Officer McKay, Commissioner Garratt, and Officer Schianterlli. He pleads no facts in

support of this cause of action. In the eighth cause of action, plaintiff alleges “deprivation of

rights under color of law” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, against “all defendants,” again

pleading no facts in support of the claim.

These claims are DISMISSED with prejudice, as §§ 241 and 242 provide a basis for

criminal prosecution, but do not provide a private right of action and cannot form the basis

for a civil suit. Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092; see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

320-21 & n.9 (1981). 

6. State law claims

The remaining claims alleged in the complaint appear to be state law claims. These

are the eighteenth cause of action for malicious prosecution, alleged against Hilton Hotel

and the San Francisco Police Officer defendants; the nineteenth cause of action for

malicious abuse of process, alleged against “all defendants;” the twentieth and twentyseventh causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleged against “all

defendants;” the twenty-fifth cause of action for false arrest and imprisonment, alleged

against “all defendants;” the twenty-sixth cause of action for conspiracy, alleged against

Hilton Hotel, the San Francisco Police Officer defendants, Commissioner Garratt, and

Officer McKay; and the twenty-eighth cause of action, entitled “proceed to trial and render

judgment without jurisdiction,” alleged against Commissioner Garratt, Officer McKay, and

Officer Schianterlli. 

As a prerequisite for money damages litigation against a public entity, the California

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 The California Tort Claims Act does not apply to federal constitutional claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1240; Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 842

(1976).

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Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) requires presentation of the claim to that entity. See Cal. Gov.

Code § 945.4; State of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240-44 (2004)

(“Bodde”). Compliance with the CTCA is an element of a cause of action against a public

entity. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1969); Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1240.9

This requirement applies both to claims against CCSF, the sole public entity named as a

defendant, as well as to claims against the San Francisco Police Officer defendants and

against Officer McKay and Officer Schianterlli, all of whom were – per the allegations in the

complaint – acting in the scope of their employment as public employees at the time of the

incidents. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2; see also Williams, 16 Cal. 3d at 838; Neal v.

Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 875 (1973). 

“[C]ompliance with the claims statute is mandatory and failure to file a claim is fatal

to the cause of action.” Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487,

494 (9th Cir. 1992); City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 455 (1974); see also

Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1240. In federal court, the failure to allege facts that either 

demonstrate or excuse compliance with the CTCA will subject a state law claim to

dismissal. See Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Com'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.

1995). 

Here, the complaint alleges no facts showing that plaintiff has exhausted the

presentment requirements of the CTCA by submitting any of his damages claims to any

public entity. Accordingly, the state law claims asserted against all defendants with the

exception of defendant Hilton Hotel must be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

As for the claims asserted against the Hilton Hotel, the complaint pleads no facts

specific to the Hilton Hotel in any of the remaining five causes of action that could support a

claim. Accordingly, the state law claims asserted against the Hilton Hotel are also

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

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7. Claim for injunctive relief

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from violating his rights in

the future. However, he alleges no facts indicating that he faces an immediate threat of

irreparable injury with an inadequate remedy at law. Thus, he states no claim that would

warrant injunctive relief. See Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486,

1495-96 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1996).

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds that the complaint must be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim. The dismissal is with

leave to amend, except as to those claims that are dismissed “with prejudice.” In general,

plaintiff must allege facts to support each cause of action, and must allege which

defendant(s) committed which actions. 

Any amended complaint must be filed no later than February 16, 2010. In addition,

any amended complaint shall comport with the following: 

1. Any amended complaint may allege claims against multiple defendants based

only on a single transaction or occurrence. 

2. Any amended complaint may not allege claims against Commissioner

Stephanie Garratt in connection with her performance of her judicial duties. All claims

asserted against Commissioner Garratt are DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. All constitutional claims asserted against defendant Hilton Hotel under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED with leave to amend to state facts showing that defendant

Hilton Hotel is a state actor.

4. All constitutional claims asserted against defendant CCSF under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 are DISMISSED with leave to amend to state facts sufficient to support a claim of

municipal liability.

5. Any amended complaint may not allege an Eighth Amendment claim in

connection with the fines imposed by the San Mateo Superior Court for violations of the

Vehicle Code. The Eighth Amendment claim (fifth cause of action) is DISMISSED with

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prejudice. 

6. The procedural due process claims are DISMISSED with prejudice insofar as

they are premised on the issuance of citations and the court appearance(s) in the San

Mateo Superior Court. 

7. The substantive due process claim (fourth cause of action) is DISMISSED

with prejudice to the extent that it is premised on the issuance of the restraining order by

the San Francisco Superior Court. The claim is DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent

that it is premised on the issuance of citations for Vehicle Code violations in San Mateo

County. The claim is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend, insofar

as it is premised on the criminal prosecution in San Francisco County.

8. The equal protection claim (twenty-ninth cause of action) is DISMISSED for

failure to state a claim, with leave to amend.

9. The claim of violation of the privileges and immunities clause (sixth cause of

action) is DISMISSED with prejudice.

10. The general claim of deprivation of constitutional rights (thirteenth cause of

action) and the constitutional claim of “refusing or neglecting to prevent” illegal activities

(seventeenth cause of action) are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

11. The claim of impairment of the right to enjoy life and pursue happiness (tenth

cause of action) is DISMISSED with prejudice.

12. The claims of conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights are

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend as indicated. 

13. The claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 (seventh and eighth causes of

action) are DISMISSED with prejudice.

14. The state law claims are dismissed as to CCSF, the San Francisco Police

Officer defendants, Officer McKay, and Officer Schianterlli for failure to allege compliance

with the California Tort Claims Act. Any amended complaint must allege compliance with

the CTCA, which includes the requirement that the claim be submitted to the governmental

entity within 100 days of the accrual of the cause of action. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.2. 

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15. The state law claims asserted against defendant Hilton Hotel are DISMISSED

for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. 

16. The prayer for injunctive relief is DISMISSED.

Finally, plaintiff’s motion to “transfer” from Oakland to San Francisco is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2010 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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