Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00486/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00486-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANE CROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOSTON MARKET CORP., et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07cv486 J (LSP) 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION

Before the Court are Defendants Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz

Vista Two, LLC’s (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Motion to Strike. 

[Doc. No. 44] Plaintiff Diane Cross (“Plaintiff”) has filed an opposition. [Doc. No. 54.] The

issues presented are decided without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1.d.1 (2006). For

the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz Vista Two, LLC. 

Background

This is a disability discrimination case alleging that architectural barriers at various retail

establishments located within the North County Square Shopping Center (“Shopping Center”)

violate federal and state law by preventing Plaintiff, an alleged disabled individual, from

enjoying full and equal access to public accommodations. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff

brings claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the California Unruh

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Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), the California Disabled Persons Act (“DPA”), and the Health

and Safety Code. (See generally id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that she is a paraplegic and therefore “physically disabled” within the

meaning of federal and state law. (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendants Krausz Vista, LLC and Krausz Vista

Two, LLC owned portions of the Shopping Center from June 25, 2004, to January 26, 2007. 

(Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Defendants assigned their ownership interests in the Shopping Center to

ValVista South, LLC and Valvista North, LLC approximately two months before Plaintiff filed

this action on March 16, 2007. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants presently have no ownership interest in

the Shopping Center. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that during a visit to the Shopping Center, she encountered barriers that

prevented her from enjoying full and equal access to the facilities located thereon and deterred

her from returning. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of damages, injunctive and

declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. (See generally Compl.) 

Discussion

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA

claims because Plaintiff lacks standing. (Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Defendants contend that

because Plaintiff cannot establish that her injuries are redressable, Plaintiff has failed to establish

standing. (Id. at 6.) Specifically, Defendants assert that they cannot provide the injunctive relief

that Plaintiff seeks under the ADA because they no longer have ownership or control over the

property at issue. (Id.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants no longer own the property at

issue. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4.) However, Plaintiff argues that any dismissal of her

claims should be without prejudice. (Id.)

A. Legal Standard: Standing

Article III of the Constitution requires that litigants have standing to invoke the federal

court’s power. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (“In essence the question of

standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of

particular issues.”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Lack of Article III

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standing constitutes a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214,

1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A motion challenging standing is properly presented under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See id. (“Because standing . . . pertain[s] to a federal court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, [it is] properly raised in a motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6).”). 

The party invoking jurisdiction has the burden of establishing standing. See Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To have standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three

elements. First, the plaintiff must have “suffered an injury in fact–an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Second,

there must be a causal nexus between the alleged injury and the defendant’s challenged conduct. 

See id. Third, it must be likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury. See id. at 561.

B. Legal Standard: Injunctive Relief Under the ADA

The enforcement provisions of Title III of the ADA provide only for injunctive relief, and

damages are not available to individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Pickern v. Holiday Quality

Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). Injunctive relief typically takes the form of

“an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals

with disabilities to the extent required by [Title III].” See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). Such relief

“is available to ‘any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability’ or

who has ‘reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be subjected to

discrimination.’ ” Org. for the Advancement of Minorities v. Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d

1120, 1127 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)). 

C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that on May 29, 2007, the Court issued an order

granting co-defendants’ Valvista South, LLC and Valvista North, LLC’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c). [See Doc. No. 66.] The Court

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against the

Valvista Defendants because they presented novel and complex issues of state law. (See May

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29, 2007 Order at 6.) Based on the reasoning set forth in the May 29, 2007 Order, the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against

Defendants Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz Vista Two, LLC. The

Court thus DISMISSES without prejudice all of Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendants

Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz Vista Two, LLC. Accordingly, the

Court limits its standing inquiry to Plaintiff’s ADA claims.

D. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s standing to assert her ADA claims on the grounds that

she has failed to establish that her injuries are redressable by this Court. In deciding Plaintiff’s

Title III ADA claims, the Court “examines redressability in terms of whether any injunctive

relief it might award would remedy discrimination against a disabled plaintiff in the area of

public accommodations.” Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219

(S.D. Cal. 2007). Here, Plaintiff lacks standing regarding her ADA claims against Defendants

because she has failed to demonstrate that a favorable decision regarding these claims is likely to

redress her injuries. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The only remedy available to Plaintiff for her

ADA claims is “an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable

by individuals with disabilities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). However, because Defendants

no longer own or control the property at issue, the Court cannot order Defendants to alter the

property. Because the Court is unable to grant an injunction requiring Defendants to make the

property at issue accessible, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain her ADA

claims against Defendants. See Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]f the

court is unable to grant the relief that relates to the harm, the plaintiff lacks standing.”).

The Court next examines whether Plaintiff’s ADA claims should be dismissed with or

without prejudice. Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the claims with prejudice

because Defendants have “expended significant resources in defending this lawsuit.” (Reply at

3.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should dismiss the claims without prejudice because

California law provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a de facto violation of the Unruh

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Act and the DPA. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Plaintiff thus asserts that all of her claims

can be properly re-filed in state court. (Id.) 

A case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be dismissed without

prejudice “so that a plaintiff may reassert [his or her] claims in a competent court.” Freeman v.

Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999); Frigard v. United States, 862

F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988). However, when no other court has the power to hear the case, a

dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See Frigard, 862 F.2d at 204.

Defendants have failed to demonstrate that no other court has the power to hear Plaintiff’s

case. Unlike this Court, the California courts are not constrained by the case or controversy

requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution, or by the traditional prudential

barriers to standing. See Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. State of California, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d

360, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors,

271 Cal. Rptr. 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). As a result, Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that

her ADA claims are redressable by this Court does not automatically bar her from bringing these

claims in state court. Further, Defendants fail to specify the “significant resources” they have

expended in defending this lawsuit. Given that this case is still in the early stages of litigation, it

is unlikely that Defendants’ filing of the instant Motion to Dismiss required a significant expense

of resources. Because the Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s ADA claims, and

because it appears that the California courts have the power to hear these claims, the Court

DISMISSES these claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

The Court notes that Defendants have also filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, as well as a motion to strike portions of the Complaint. However,

because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims

and lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA claims, the Court need not address

these motions. 

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Krausz Companies, Inc., Krausz Vista, LLC, and Krausz

Vista Two, LLC in their entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 30, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Papas

 All Counsel of Record

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