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Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

United States Court of App~ls FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

JERRY L. EDWARDS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED 

PLANT GUARD WORKERS OF AMERICA 

(UPGWA) and its AFFILIATED 

LOCAL 796, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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JAN 31 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-7035 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-455-NJ) 

Jack Marwood Short, Tulsa, Oklahoma (R. Forney Sandlin, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Scott A. Brooks of Gregory, Moore, Jeakle, Heinen, Ellison & 

Brooks, P. c. , Detroit, Michigan (Lisa S. Lane with him on the 

brief), for Defendants-Appellees. 

BALDOCK * and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and KANE , Senior District 

Judge. 

KANE, Senior District Judge. 

* Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., 

District Judge for the District of 

designation. 

1 

Senior United States 

Colorado, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 94-7035 Document: 01019290316 Date Filed: 01/31/1995 Page: 1 
Jerry L. Edwards brought this action against his 

collective bargaining agent, United Plant Guard Workers of America 

and its affiliated Local 796 (collectively, the "Union"), alleging 

the Union breached its duty of fair representation by mishandling 

his wrongful discharge grievance against his former employer, 

Trover Security Svc. ("Trover"). The district court dismissed the 

action as barred by the six-month statute of limitations 

applicable to "hybrid" breach of collective-bargaining 

agreement/unfair representation claims under the rationale set 

forth in DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 u.s. 

151 (1983), and this appeal ensued. 

Edwards asserts the district court erred in 

characterizing his suit as a "hybrid" action and contends it more 

closely resembles one for legal malpractice to which Oklahoma's 

two-year statute of limitations should apply. Alternatively, 

Edwards argues the Union • s dilatory conduct in processing his 

grievance and responding to demand letters he sent after all 

grievance procedures were exhausted tolled the running of his 

unfair representation claim. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm. 

I. Background 

Jerry L. Edwards was an employee of Trover and a member 

of the Union until his discharge on June 28, 1991. The Union and 

Trover are parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering 

the terms and conditions of employment of all employees in the 

2 

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bargaining unit. The agreement incorporates Article VI, § 14 of 

the Constitution and By-Laws of UPGWA which describes and governs 

the grievance process and "irrevocably" designates the Union "to 

appear exclusively and act as [each member's] agent to represent 

and bind him in the presentation, prosecution, adjustment and 

settlement of all grievances, complaints or disputes of any kind or 

character arising out of the employer-employee relationship." 

On July 1, 1991, the Union timely filed a grievance on 

behalf of Edwards protesting his discharge. On July 23, 1991, the 

Union notified Trover of its intent to arbitrate but did not select 

an arbitrator until December 23, 1991. The Union justified the 

five month delay as having been "due to the grievance being 

reviewed by the regional and national union office • • . [and] then 

sent for review by counsel." (Apl t. 's App. at 14.) Trover agreed 

to the selection, but reserved an objection as to its timeliness. 

On March 26, 1992 the arbitrator dismissed Edwards' 

grievance as untimely in light of the delay between the time the 

Union notified Trover of its intent to arbitrate and the time the 

arbitrator was actually selected. On June 22, 1992, still acting 

exclusively on behalf of Edwards, the Union filed suit against 

Trover in the district court (Case No. 92-378-S) seeking an order 

vacating the arbitration award and requiring the arbitrator to 

consider Edwards' grievance on the merits. Trover moved for 

summary judgment and on October 28, 1992, the district court upheld 

the arbitrator's decision and dismissed the Union's suit. 

Edwards was notified of the district court's decision in 

3 

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early November, 1992 and retained legal counsel. On November 28, 

1992, counsel mailed the first of four letters to the Union, 

claiming money damages for Edwards' losses caused by the Union's 

mishandling of the arbitration process. (Aplt.•s App. at 48-49). 

The letter requested payment of a sum certain by December 21, 1992. 

Id. After receiving no response by the requested date, counsel 

mailed follow-up letters on December 23, 1992, March 29, 1993, and 

May 7, 1993. Edwards assumed the delay, like the delay in 

selecting the arbitrator, was the result of the intra-union review 

process. (Aplt. •s Br. at 6.) 

Eight months after being notified of the district court • s 

order denying the Union's motion to vacate the award, and still 

having received no response from the Union to his demand letters, 

Edwards filed suit against the Union for breach of its duty of fair 

representation. See Complaint, No. 93-455-NJ (filed July 6, 

1993)(Aplt.•s App. at 1-4). Edwards asserted no claims against 

Trover in this second lawsuit, and Trover was not a named 

defendant. 

The Union moved to dismiss Edwards' suit on July 29, 

1993, asserting it was barred by the six-month statute of 

limitations prescribed by § 10 (b) of the Labor-Management Relations 

Act (LMRA), applicable to "hybrid" § 301/unfair representation 

actions under DelCostello. The district court agreed and entered 

its Order Granting Defendants• Motion to Dismiss on December 14, 

1993. (Aplt.•s App. at 59-64.) Edwards' Motion for 

Reconsideration was denied, and the present appeal ensued. 

4 

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II. Merits 

Edwards raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends 

the fact the Union filed, and lost, a separate § 301 suit against 

Trover on his behalf precluded him from filing a § 301 claim 

against Trover and distinguishes this from a "hybrid" § 301/unfair 

representation action subject to the LMRA's six-month statute of 

limitations. Instead, Edwards argues his suit more closely 

resembles a legal malpractice action to which Oklahoma's two-year 

statute of limitations applies. Second, Edwards claims the sixmonth limitations period, if applicable, was tolled by the Union's 

breach of its fiduciary duty (1) to inform him of his right to sue 

after his grievance was dismissed for untimely selection of the 

arbitrator; and (2) to respond to his four demand letters. 

We review the Union's motion to dismiss Edwards' claims 

under the same standard applied by the district court. We accept 

all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mascheroni v. 

Bd. of Regents, 28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (lOth Cir. 1994). We review the 

district court's determination of the applicable statute of 

limitations de novo. Trustees of Wyoming Laborers Health & Welfare 

Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Constr. Co., Inc., 850 F.2d 613, 617 (lOth 

Cir. 1988). Where, as here, the dates on which the pertinent acts 

occurred are not in dispute, the date a statute of limitations 

accrues is also a question of law reviewed de novo. Galindo v. 

Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986); see Lucas v. 

Mountain states, 909 F.2d 419 (lOth cir. 1990). 

5 

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A. 

Statute of Limitations 

1. 

Section 301 of the LMRA makes collective bargaining 

agreements enforceable in federal court, but provides no statute of 

limitations for claims brought under it. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 

(1988). Under these circumstances, courts generally infer Congress 

intended the most closely analogous state statute of limitations to 

apply. See generally Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 

Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147 (1987) (Rules of Decision Act 

usually requires application of statute of limitations and "[g) iven 

our longstanding practice of borrowing state law, and the 

congressional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume 

that congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law"). 

This general rule is neither rigid nor mechanically 

applied, however. Where state limitations periods are at odds with 

the purpose or operation of federal substantive law, or where they 

are determined to be unsatisfactory vehicles for its enforcement, 

federal courts may decline to borrow them and draw instead from 

federal law. DelCostello, 462 u.s. at 161-62. 1 In DelCostello, 

Illustrative examples of cases in which federal interests 

justified the application of a federal limitations period include 

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 u.s. 355, 367 (1977) 

(declining to apply state limitations periods to enforcement 

actions brought by the EEOC under Title VII, reasoning state 

periods may unduly hinder the policy of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 by placing too great a burden on the agency), McAllister v. 

Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 u.s. 221 (1958) (applying federal Jones 

Act limitations period to seaworthiness action, reasoning the 

relatedness of the claims and the practicalities of admiralty 

personal injury litigation made shorter state statute governing 

6 

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the Supreme Court determined federal labor policies and the 

practicalities of § 301 litigation supported the application of the 

six-month statute of limitations prescribed by § 10 (b) of the LMRA, 

29 u.s.c. § 160(b), to "hybrid"§ 301/unfair representation suits 

charging an employer breached a collective-bargaining agreement and 

the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. at 154-55. 

We have followed DelCostello and applied § 10 (b) 's statute of 

limitations in Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l 

Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1472 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 

Ct. 880 (1994), Lucas v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 909 F.2d 419, 

420 (lOth Cir. 1990), and Rucker v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 

917 F.2d 1233, 1237-38 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

The "hybrid" suit is a judicially created exception to 

the general rule that an employee is bound by the result of 

grievance or arbitration remedial procedures provided in a 

collective-bargaining agreement. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 u.s. 171, 185-

86 (1967), discussed in DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163-64. Where an 

employee can prove he suffered a wrongful discharge in violation of 

a collective-bargaining agreement that would have been remedied 

through the grievance process had the union fulfilled its statutory 

duty to represent the employee fairly, federal law will provide a 

remedy. Vaca, 386 u.s. at 185-86, applied in Hines v. Anchor Motor 

Freight, Inc., 424 u.s. 554 (1976), United Parcel Service, Inc. v. 

personal injuries inappropriate), and Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 

U.S. 392, 396 (1946) (holding state limitations periods should not 

apply to federal causes of action lying only in equity because the 

principles of federal equity are hostile to the "mechanical rules" 

of statutes of limitations). See DelCostello 462 U.S. at 162. 

7 

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Mitchell, 451 u.s. 56 (1983), and Aguinaga, 993 F.2d at 1471-72 

("[i]n such instance, the union has effectively ceased to function 

as the employee's representative") . To leave the employee 

remediless under these circumstances would, in the words of the 

Supreme Court, "be a great injustice." Vaca, 386 u.s. at 185-86. 

Thus, federal law permits an employee to pursue a § 301 

action against his employer notwithstanding the outcome or finality 

of the grievance or arbitration process, provided the employee 

simultaneously proves he would have obtained a remedy under the 

agreement but for the union's misconduct. Vaca at 186 & n.11 

(citations omitted). It is under this theory of relief that 

Edwards brought his suit against the Union. 

2. 

Nevertheless, Edwards contends his suit against the Union 

is not a "hybrid" § 301/unfair representation action because it was 

brought against the Union alone after the Union pursued, and lost, 

Edwards' § 301 suit against Trover. We disagree. Under the 

exception to the finality rule set forth in Vaca, an employee's 

unfair representation claim against his union and the underlying 

§ 301 claim against his employer-are "inextricably interdependent." 

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65 (quoting Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 66-

67 (Stewart, J., concurring) and Hines, 424 u.s. at 570-71), 

applied in Aguinaga, 993 F.2d at 1471-72. This is true regardless 

of whether the employee sues the employer, the union, or both. 

As the Court explained in Del Costello, the case an 

employee must prove against any defendant is the same: 

8 

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"To prevail against either the company or the 

Union, • • . (employee-plaintiffs] must not 

only show that their discharge was contrary to 

the (collective-bargaining] contract but must 

also carry the burden of demonstrating breach 

of duty by the Union." 

DelCostello, 462 u.s. at 165 (internal quotes and citations 

omitted), applied in Quay v. Sheffield steel corp., 25 F.3d 1058, 

1994 WL 235543, *2 {lOth Cir. 1994) {unpublished opinion); Aguinaga, 

993 F.2d at 1469 n.l & 1471-72. As between the two, however, the 

ultimate wrong is that of the employer. Del Costello at 168. Thus, 

while employees may sue their union for unfair representation, the 

union may be held liable "only for 'increases if any in [the 

employee's] damages caused by the union's [wrongful conduct in] 

process ( ing] the grievance.'" Id. (emphasis original) (quoting 

Vaca, 386 u.s. at 197-98). The result is that a suit against the 

union is by definition a suit against the employer. 2 Because the 

employer cannot "hide behind the union's wrongful failure to 

act . • . the employer may be (and probably should be) joined as a 

2 Although he attempts to do so, Edwards cannot avoid this 

conclusion by characterizing his suit against the Union as a 

malpractice, rather than federal "hybrid," action. In any 

malpractice action alleging an attorney's negligence in allowing 

the statutory time limit to run resulted in the loss of a client's 

claim, it is the value of the underlying claim that provides the 

measure of the client's damages. See generally 7 Am. Jur. 2d 

Attorney Client § 226, n.50. If the underlying claim is 

unliquidated, the client must introduce evidence justifying his 

right to recover on the underlying claim thus undertaking "the 

proof of two actions in one. " Id. , n. 53. Oklahoma law is no 

exception. See Allred v. Rabon, 572 P.2d 979, 981 (Okla. 1977) (to 

prevail in malpractice action against attorney, client must prove 

he would have succeeded in the underlying action but for the 

attorney's negligence). Thus, Edwards' contention that his claim 

against the Union more closely resembles a legal malpractice action 

under Oklahoma law is unavailing. 

9 

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defendant in the fair representation suit." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 197. 

Under the analysis in Vaca and DelCostello, it is clear 

Edwards' suit against the Union cannot exist independently of his 

underlying wrongful discharge grievance against Trover. We find 

the district court correctly held Edwards could not avoid the sixmonth statute of limitations applicable to both elements of a 

"hybrid" claim under DelCostello by suing only the Union. 

3. 

Edwards next contends he was precluded from bringing a 

DelCostello-type "hybrid" action because the Union • s action to 

vacate the arbitration award "was" his § 301 suit against Trover. 

Apl t. • s Reply at 2. Edwards provides no support for his contention 

and we reject it out of hand. The very purpose behind the creation 

of the "hybrid" cause of action in Vaca was to enable an employee 

to hold his employer accountable for breaching its collectivebargaining agreement notwithstanding a "final" result obtained for 

him by his exclusive bargaining agent. See DelCostello, 462 u.s. 

at 164-65 (discussing vaca and its progeny). 

Under Vaca, the district court's entry of summary 

judgment in favor of Trover merely marked the end of the Union's 

efforts on Edwards' behalf under the collective-bargaining 

agreement; it did not preclude Edwards from bringing a "hybrid" 

§ 301/unfair representation action against the Union, Trover or 

both. If Edwards could prove the Union's misconduct prevented him 

from obtaining a remedy against Trover for wrongful discharge under 

the terms of the agreement, he would be entitled to relief. See 

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vaca, 386 u.s. at 186. Edwards' contention that the Union's suit 

against Trover was somehow res judicata is therefore without merit. 

4. 

Even assuming his suit against the Union is a "hybrid" 

action, Edwards contends Oklahoma's two-year statute of limitations 

for legal malpractice actions should apply. In support of his 

position, Edwards relies on the Supreme Court's post-DelCostello 

opinion in Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 u.s. 319 

(1989), which limited DelCostello's scope and re-emphasized the 

general rule favoring application of state statutes of limitations 

to federal causes of action lacking express limitations periods of 

their own. We agree Reed narrowly circumscribed Del Costello's 

exception to the general rule favoring state statutes of 

limitation, but find Edwards' action against the Union nevertheless 

falls within its reach. 

In Reed, the Supreme Court rejected a union's contention 

that § 10 (b) 's six-month limitations period should apply to a 

member's free speech claim against it under § 102 (a) ( 2) of the 

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. The Court ruled the 

union's argument "fails to take seriously [the Court's] admonition 

that analogous state statutes of limitations are to be used unless 

they frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies." 

Reed, 488 u.s. at 327. It found the union member's claim more 

analogous to a civil rights action under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 than to 

an unfair competition claim under the NLRA, and applied the 

appropriate state statute of limitations for personal injury 

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actions pursuant to Wilson v. Garcia, 471 u.s. 261 (1985). Id. at 

326-27. 

The Court in Reed specifically reaffirmed its holding in 

DelCostello, however, explaining that unlike "hybrid" § 301/unfair 

representation claims, the relationship between§ 102(a) (2) claims 

and federal interests in stable bargaining relationships and 

private dispute resolution were "tangential and remote." Reed, 488 

U.S. at 330-31 & nn.4, 5. The Court found the fact§ 102(a)(2) 

claims "sometimes have some impact on economic relations between 

union and employer and on labor peace" insufficient to require the 

application of § 10 (b) 's six-month statute of limitations for 

unfair labor practice claims: 

"This is substantially less immediate and less 

significant an impact on bargaining and 

private dispute settlement than that which led 

us to apply the § 10 (b) statute to hybrid 

§ 301/fair representation claims, which 

directly challenge both the employer's 

adherence to the collective-bargaining 

agreement and the union's representation of 

the employee in grievance-and-arbitration 

procedures." 

Id. at 331. 

We find Reed bolsters, rather than weakens, the holding 

in DelCostello and its application to Edwards' suit against the 

Union. Unless and until the Supreme Court or Congress reconsiders 

De1Costello, 3 we are bound to apply § 10(b) •s six-month statute of 

3 Various courts and commentators have suggested 

DelCostello be reconsidered. See, ~, Mark s. stein, lO(b) or 

Not 10 (b): A Critical Overview of court-Selected Limitations 

Periods in Labor Law, 6 Lab. Law. 331 (1990) (questioning propriety 

of applying§ 10(b)'s statute of limitations for administrative 

claims filed with the NLRB to civil claims filed in federal 

12 

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limitations to Vaca-type "hybrid" § 301/unfair representation 

claims such as the one before us. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's 

determination that a six-month statute of limitations applies to 

Edwards' suit against the Union for breach of the duty of fair 

representation. 

B. 

Accrual/Tolling of NLRA's Six-Month Statute of Limitations 

Should DelCostello' s six-month statute of limitations 

apply to his suit against the Union, Edwards contends the district 

court erred in refusing to toll the statute between the time he 

received notice summary judgment had been entered against him on 

October 28, 1992 and mid-May 1993, when the Union failed to respond 

to his fourth demand letter. Aplt.'s Br. at 13. Edwards argues 

the UPGWA's constitution imposed a fiduciary duty on the Union to 

"fully inform" him of his legal rights after the court refused to 

vacate the arbitrator's decision, as well as to respond to his 

demand letters. Edwards asserts the Union's failure in both 

regards supports an application of the federal equitable tolling 

doctrine and brings his suit within § 10 (b) 's six-month limitations 

district court). See also Bowdry v. United Air Lines, Inc., 956 

F.2d 999, 1005 (lOth Cir. 1992) (discussing split in circuit courts• 

application of Del Costello to former airline employees • claims 

under the Airline Deregulation Act's Employee Protection Program), 

cert. denied sub nom United Airlines, Inc. v. Hart, 113 s. ct. 97 

(1992). 

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. d 4 per1o . 

1. 

Before addressing the equitable tolling issue, we first 

determine when Edwards' cause of action against the Union accrued. 

We first addressed the question of what events signal the 

commencement of the six-month limitation period for "hybrid" 

§ 301/unfair representation actions in Lucas v. Mountain States 

Tel. & Tel., 909 F.2d 419 (lOth Cir. 1990). There we adopted the 

general rule that the limitation period begins to run when an 

employee "knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 

have known or discovered the acts constituting the union's alleged 

violations." Id. at 420-21 (citations omitted). 

Application of the general rule turns on the context in 

which the claim arose. When, as in Lucas, the union rejects or 

abandons an employee's claim during the grievance process, the sixmonth limitations period begins to run when the employee learns, or 

in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have learned of the 

union's action. Id. When, on the other hand, a union represents 

an employee throughout the grievance process, a claim challenging 

the adequacy of that union's representation does not accrue until 

the dispute resolution process has been completely exhausted. Id. 

at 421. Finally, when the union's alleged breach arises outside 

the context of processing a grievance, the employee's claim may be 

4 Edwards received notice of the district court's refusal 

to vacate the arbitration award dismissing his grievance in 

November 1992 and filed his action in July 1993. If the statute of 

limitations was tolled (or his claim against the Union did not 

accrue) until May 1993, Edwards' suit would have been timely filed. 

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tolled by the employee's good faith attempt to exhaust the 

grievance process. Id. at 421-22. 

Applying the principles set forth in Lucas, the district 

court determined Edwards' claim against the Union accrued on March 

26, 1992 -- the date the arbitrator dismissed his grievance based 

on the Union's untimely selection of the arbitrator. (Aplt.•s App. 

at 63.) As this was fifteen months before Edwards filed the 

instant action on July 6, 1993, the district court held Edwards' 

claim was time-barred. Id. The district court then opined 

Edwards' suit would have been time-barred even if the limitation 

period did not begin to run until the Union's request to vacate the 

arbitrator's decision was denied on October 28, 1992, as that order 

was issued eight months before Edwards filed suit. Id. 

The record in this case, viewed in the light most 

favorable to Edwards, does not conclusively demonstrate Edwards' 

cause of action against the Union accrued on March 26, 1992. 

According to Edwards, he had no reason to believe he had exhausted 

his remedies under the collective-bargaining agreement as of that 

date because the Union, as his exclusive bargaining agent, led him 

to believe it could obtain arbitration on the merits of his 

grievance. Under the standards applicable to a motion to dismiss, 

we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could find Edwards 

reasonably believed the arbitration process was not exhausted until 

he received notice in November 1992 of the district court's october 

28, 1992 decision. See Rucker, 917 F.2d at 1238 (summary judgment 

on unfair representation claim could not be predicated on § 10 (b) 's 

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statute of limitations where there was evidence to support 

employees • claim they were unaware union had abandoned their 

interests); King v. New York Tel. Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d 

Cir. 1985) (given the "special relationship" between a union and its 

members and the fact the union in that case continued to demand 

arbitration, record did not conclusively demonstrate employee 

failed to exercise reasonable diligence in learning union had made 

untimely demand for arbitration), cited favorably in Lucas, 909 

F.2d at 421. For the purposes of the motion to dismiss at issue 

here, we find Edwards' cause of action against the Union did not 

accrue until early November 1992. 

2. 

Edwards' suit against the Union is nevertheless timebarred unless the facts as alleged by Edwards support a tolling of 

the limitations period until at least January 6, 1993 -- six months 

before Edwards filed his suit. The district court concluded they 

do not (Aplt.•s App. at 64), and we agree. 

As set forth above, the timely filing of a hybrid 

§ 301/unfair representation claim may be tolled. See Lucas, 909 

F.2d at 421-22. In Frandsen v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & 

Steamship Clerks, 782 F.2d 674, 681 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh 

Circuit held a hybrid claim may be tolled "by the pursuit of 

internal union remedies, even where those remedies are ultimately 

determined to have been futile." In King, the Second Circuit held 

that in light of the union's control over the grievance process and 

employee and the employee's relative lack of expertise regarding 

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limitations periods, "it would be incongruous if the [u]nion's own 

dilatory conduct could provide it with a defense" to an unfair 

representation suit. 785 F.2d at 34-35. 

Though unclear, Edwards appears to argue the Union lulled 

him into inaction after the district court's October 28, 1992 order 

granting Trover summary judgment by failing to inform him he had 

six months to sue and by refusing to respond to his demand 

letters. 5 Edwards points out that in defending against Trover's 

claim that the Union had unreasonably delayed in selecting an 

arbitrator, the Union justified its conduct as the result of its 

time-consuming regional and national review process. Edwards 

explains his own inaction with respect to filing this suit by 

stating he assumed his November 1992 demand letter was receiving 

the same treatment. (Aplt.'s App. at 6.) 

Again construing the record in the light most favorable 

to Edwards, we find these facts do not rise to the level of "active 

deception" sufficient to invoke the powers of equity and toll the 

legal limitations period for hybrid actions set by the United 

States Supreme Court in DelCostello. Throughout the eight-month 

period between the district court's October 28, 1992 order and the 

date this suit was filed, Edwards was represented by counsel who, 

as evidenced by the content of his demand letter dated November 28, 

5 This we glean from Edwards' contention that the Union's 

failure to so inform him or to respond to his counsel's demand 

letters breached fiduciary duties owed him under the UPGWA 

Constitution. Because Edwards asserts no claim for breach of 

fiduciary duty against the Union, his contention would otherwise 

have no impact on the equitable tolling issue. 

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1992, was fully aware of the Union 1 s misconduct. Under these 

circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for Edwards to 

believe his remedies under the collective-bargaining agreement had 

not been exhausted or that his claim against the Union had not 

accrued. See King v. New York Tel. Co .. Inc., 873 F.2d 36, 38 (2d 

Cir. 1989) (reliance on Union's overtures to attempt arbitration 

unreasonable in light of representation by counsel), decided on 

appeal after remand from King v. New York Tel. co .. Inc., 785 F.2d 

31 (2d Cir. 1986). The most that can be said in these 

circumstances is the patience and deference shown an insentient 

bargaining agent are not warranted by a harsh reality. 

The application of equitable doctrines rests in the sound 

discretion of the district court. Purrington v. University of 

Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1030 (lOth Cir. 1993); State of Ohio v. 

Peterson. Lowry. Rall. Barber & Ross. et al., 651 F.2d 687, 694 & 

n.l5 (lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 u.s. 895 (1981). We find 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

apply the equitable tolling doctrine to Edwards' claims, and its 

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is therefore AFFIRMED. 

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