Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-56739/USCOURTS-ca9-10-56739-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II; JOHN DOE

III, individually and on behalf of

proposed class members; GLOBAL

EXCHANGE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

NESTLE USA, INC.; ARCHER

DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY;

CARGILL INCORPORATED COMPANY;

CARGILL COCOA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-56739

D.C. No.

2:05-CV-05133-

SVW-JTL

ORDER AND

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 2, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed September 4, 2014

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Order;

Opinion by Judge D.W. Nelson;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge

Rawlinson

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2 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

SUMMARY*

Alien Tort Statute

The panel withdrew its order filed December 19, 2013,

and appearing at 738 F.3d 1048, and replaced the order with

an opinion reversing and vacating the district court’s

dismissal of an action under the Alien Tort Statute.

The action was brought by former child slaves who were

forced to harvest cocoa in the Ivory Coast. They alleged that

the defendant corporations aided and abetted child slavery by

providing assistance to Ivorian farmers.

Reaffirming the corporate liability analysis reached by an

en banc court in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th

Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 1995

(2013), the panel held that there is no categorical rule of

corporate immunity or liability. Rather, for each ATS claim

asserted by the plaintiffs, a court should look to international

law and determine whether corporations are subject to the

norms underlying that claim. The panel held that the

prohibition against slavery was universal and could be

asserted against the corporate defendants in this case. The

panel held that determining when a corporation can be held

liable requires a court to apply customary international law to

determine the nature and scope of the norm underlying the

plaintiffs’ claim, and domestic tort law to determine whether

recovery from the corporation is permissible. The panel left

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 3

domestic law issues related to corporate liability to be

addressed by the district court in the first instance.

The panel next addressed the issue whether the complaint

alleged the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting

slavery. Applying customary international law, the panel

declined to decide whether the required mens rea was

knowledge, or whether an ATS defendant must act with the

purpose of facilitating the criminal act. The panel concluded

that the plaintiffs’ allegations satisfied the more stringent

“purpose” standard by suggesting that a myopic focus on

profit over human welfare drove the defendants to act with

the purpose of obtaining the cheapest cocoa possible, even if

it meant facilitating child slavery. 

The panel held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting

was providing assistance or other forms of support to the

commission of a crime, and that international law further

required that the assistance offered must be substantial. The

panel declined to decide whether the assistance must also be

specifically directed towards the commission of the crime. 

Instead, it remanded to the district court with instructions to

allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of recent

decisions of international criminal tribunals addressing the

“specific direction” requirement.

The panel also declined to decide whether the plaintiffs’

ATS claim sought an extraterritorial application of federal

law that was barred by the Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659

(2013). The panel remanded to allow the plaintiffs to amend

their complaint in light of Kiobel.

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4 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge

Rawlinson wrote that she did not object to remanding to

allow the plaintiffs to further amend their complaint in an

attempt to state a cause of action under the ATS, as recently

interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kiobel. She also agreed

that corporations are not per se excluded from liability under

the ATS. Unlike the majority, Judge Rawlinson, agreeing

with the Second and Fourth Circuits, would definitely and

unequivocally decide that the purpose standard applies to the

pleading of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. She

dissented from any holding that the plaintiffs had adequately

stated a claim under the ATS.

COUNSEL

Paul Hoffman (argued), Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris

Hoffman & Harrison, LLP, Venice, California; Terrence

Patrick Collingsworth, Conrad & Scherer, LLP, Washington,

D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellants.

Andrew John Pincus (argued), Mayer Brown LLP,

Washington, DC; Craig A. Hoover and Christopher Todd

Handman, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, D.C.; Julie

A. Shepard, Jenner & Block, LLP, Los Angeles, California;

Jonathan H. Blavin and Kristin LinsleyMyles, Munger Tolles

& Olson, LLP, San Francisco, California; Brad D. Brian and

Daniel Paul Collins, Munger Tolles & Olson, LLP, Los

Angeles, California; Lee H. Rubin, Mayer Brown LLP, Palo

Alto, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

Susan Hannah Farbstein, International Human Rights Clinic,

Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, for Amicus

Curiae Professors of Legal History.

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 5

Marco Simons, Earthrights International, Washington, D.C.,

for Amicus Curiae Earthrights International.

Jennifer M. Green, Director, Human Rights Litigation and

International Advocacy Clinic University of Minnesota Law

School, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Amici Curiae

Nuremberg Scholars.

David J. Scheffer, Northwestern University School of Law

Bluhm Legal Clinic, Center for International Human Rights,

Chicago, Illinois, for Amicus Curiae David J. Scheffer.

Peter Bowman Rutledge, Athens, Georgia, for Amici Curiae

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and

the National Foreign Trade Council.

Meir Feder, Jones Day, New York, New York, for Amici

Curiae National Association of Manufacturers and Professors

of International and Foreign Relations Law and Federal

Jurisdiction.

James Evan Berger and Charlene Sun, King & Spalding,

LLP, New York, New York; Rebecca Kelder Myers,

Vandenberg& Feliu LLP, New York, New York; Todd Tyler

Williams, Paul Hastings LLP, New York, New York, for

Amicus Curiae United States Council for International

Business.

William Aceves, California Western School of Law, San

Diego, California, for Amicus Curiae International Law

Scholars.

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6 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

Jonathan Massey, Massey&Gail LLP, Washington, D.C., for

Amicus Curiae Nuremberg Historians and International

Lawyers.

ORDER

The order filed December 19, 2013, and appearing at

738 F.3d 1048, is withdrawn, Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d

869, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009), and is replaced by the opinion

filed concurrently with this order. Our prior order may not be

cited as precedent to any court. Moreover, with the original

order withdrawn, we deem the petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc moot. The parties may file a petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc with respect to the opinion

filed together with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs in this case are former child slaves who

were forced to harvest cocoa in the Ivory Coast. They filed

claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) against defendants

Nestle USA, Inc., Archer Daniels Midland Company, Cargill

Incorporated Company, and Cargill Cocoa, alleging that the

defendants aided and abetted child slavery by providing

assistance to Ivorian farmers.

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 7

The district court dismissed their complaint, finding that

the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. We reverse, vacate, and remand for further

proceedings.

I. Background1

The use of child slave labor in the Ivory Coast is a

humanitarian tragedy. Studies by International Labour

Organization, UNICEF, the Department of State, and

numerous other organizations have confirmed that thousands

of children are forced to work without pay in the Ivorian

economy. Besides the obvious moral implications, this

widespread use of child slavery contributes to poverty in the

Ivory Coast, degrades its victims by treating them as

commodities, and causes long-term mental and physical

trauma.

The plaintiffs in this case are three victims of child

slavery. They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa

plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six days a week,

given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by

overseers. They were locked in small rooms at night and not

permitted to leave the plantations, knowing that children who

tried to escape would be beaten or tortured. Plaintiff John

Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who

attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards

forced failed escapees to drink urine.

1 The facts set forth in our background section are drawn from the

allegations in the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, which we must

accept as true for purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss. Seven Arts

Filmed Entm’t Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254

(9th Cir. 2013).

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8 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

Though tarnished by these atrocities, the Ivory Coast

remains a critical part of the international chocolate industry,

producing seventy percent of the world’s supply of cocoa. 

The defendants in this case dominate the Ivorian cocoa

market. Although the defendants do not own cocoa farms

themselves, they maintain and protect a steady supply of

cocoa by forming exclusive buyer/seller relationships with

Ivorian farms. The defendants are largely in charge of the

work of buying and selling cocoa, and import most of the

Ivory Coast’s cocoa harvest into the United States. The

defendants’ involvement in the cocoa market gives them

economic leverage, and along with other large multinational

companies, the defendants effectively control the production

of Ivorian cocoa.

To maintain their relationships with Ivorian farms, the

defendants offer both financial assistance and technical

farming assistance designed to support cocoa agriculture. 

The financial assistance includes advanced paymentfor cocoa

and spending money for the farmers’ personal use. The

technical support includes equipment and training in growing

techniques, fermentation techniques, farm maintenance, and

appropriate labor practices. The technical support is meant to

expand the farms’ capacity and act as a quality control

mechanism, and either the defendants or their agents visit

farms several times per year as part of the defendants’

training and quality control efforts.

The defendants are well aware of the child slavery

problem in the Ivory Coast. They acquired this knowledge

firsthand through their numerous visits to Ivorian farms. 

Additionally, the defendants knew of the child slave labor

problems in the Ivorian cocoa sector due to the many reports

issued by domestic and international organizations.

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 9

Despite their knowledge of child slavery and their control

over the cocoa market, the defendants operate in the Ivory

Coast “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest sources

of cocoa.” The defendants continue to supply money,

equipment, and training to Ivorian farmers, knowing that

these provisions will facilitate the use of forced child labor. 

The defendants have also lobbied against congressional

efforts to curb the use of child slave labor. In 2001, the

House of Representatives passed a bill that would have

required United States importers and manufacturers to certify

and label their products “slave free.” The defendants and

others in the chocolate industry rallied against the bill, urging

instead the adoption of a private, voluntary enforcement

mechanism. A voluntary enforcement system was eventually

adopted, a result that, according to the plaintiffs, “in effect

guarantee[d] the continued use of the cheapest labor available

to produce [cocoa]—that of child slaves.”

The plaintiffs filed a proposed class action in the United

States District Court for the Central District of California,

alleging that the defendants were liable under the ATS for

aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The

district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in a

detailed opinion, which concluded that corporations cannot be

sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs

failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting

slave labor. The plaintiffs declined to amend their complaint,

and appeal the district court’s order.

II. Standard of Review

“A dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de

novo. All factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as

true, and the pleadings construed in the light most favorable

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10 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

to the nonmoving party.” Abagnin v. AMVAC Chemical

Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations

omitted).

III. Discussion

The ATS, quoted in full, reads:

The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for

a tort only, committed in violation of the law

of nations or a treaty of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1350. For nearly two hundred years, the ATS

was almost never invoked. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,

however, the Second Circuit breathed life into the statute by

construing it to allow two Paraguayan citizens to bring a civil

action against a Paraguayan police officer who had tortured

and killed their son. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980); Sosa

v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004)(describing

Filartiga as “the birth of the modern line of [ATS] cases.”). 

The Second Circuit in Filartiga reasoned that the ATS was

designed to “open[] the federal courts for adjudication of the

rights already recognized by international law,” and thus

permitted the plaintiffs to pursue their tort claim because

torture is prohibited by international law. Filartiga, 630 F.2d

at 885, 887–88. Filartiga concluded by observing that

modern history had led the nations of the world to recognize

the collective interest in protecting fundamental human

rights, and commented that its holding was “a small but

important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free

all people from brutal violence.” Id. at 890.

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 11

The Supreme Court reached a consonant result in Sosa v.

Alvarez-Machain, its first opinion addressing the ATS. The

Court first held that the text of the ATS is focused solely on

jurisdiction, and that the statute itself does not create a tort

cause of action arising out of violations of international law. 

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. After reviewing the ATS’s history,

however, the Court also observed that “the statute was

intended to have practical effect the moment it became law,”

and thus held that “[t]he jurisdictional grant is best read as

having been enacted on the understanding that the common

law would provide a cause of action for the modest number

of international law violations with a potential for personal

liability at the time.” Id. Thus, under Sosa, the federal courts

are available to hear tort claims based on violations of

international law. Specifically, Sosa held that federal

common law creates tort liability for violations of

international legal norms, and the ATS in turn provides

federal courts with jurisdiction to hear these hybrid common

law–international law tort claims. Id.; Khulumani v. Barclay

Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 265 (2d. Cir. 2007)

(Katzmann, J., concurring) (“Sosa makes clear that all [ATS]

litigation is in fact based on federal common law. . . .”).

At the time of its passage, the ATS was intended to grant

jurisdiction over tort claims seeking relief only for three

violations of international law: piracy, violation of safe

conducts, and infringement of the rights of ambassadors. 

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. The Court in Sosa held, however, that

contemporary ATS claims can invoke the rights created by

the “present-day law of nations,” and thus are not limited to

these “historical paradigms.” Id. at 725, 732. Under

contemporaryinternational law, federal courts have permitted

plaintiffs to pursue ATS claims based on a broad range of

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12 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

misconduct, including genocide, war crimes, torture, and

supporting terrorism.

While Sosa therefore permits the application of

contemporary international law in an ATS claim, federal

courts must exercise restraint when doing so. Sosa described

this restraint through a historically focused standard for

determining when an ATS claim may be based on

contemporary international law. Under this test, “federal

courts should not recognize private claims under federal

common law for violations of any international law norm

with less definite content and acceptance among civilized

nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350

was enacted.” Id. at 732. This standard “is suggestive rather

than precise,” and is perhaps “best understood as the

statement of a mood—and the mood is one of caution.” 

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013,

1016 (7th Cir. 2011). Applying this standard, courts focus on

whether a contemporary international legal norm underlying

a proposed ATS claim is “specific, universal, and obligatory.” 

In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,

1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing this

definition with approval).

Additionally, Sosa held that the decision to recognize a

new cause of action must “involve an element of judgment

about the practical consequences of making that cause

available to litigants in the federal courts.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at

732–33. This inquiry focuses on “the consequences that

might result from making the cause of action generally

available to all potential plaintiffs,” and permits courts “to

consider other prudential concerns consistent with Sosa’s

approach.” Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 268 (Katzmann, J.,

concurring).

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 13

The body of international law that supplies the norms

underlying an ATS claim is often referred to as “customary

international law,” which consists of “rules that States

universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal

obligation and mutual concern.” Id. at 267 (Katzmann, J.,

concurring) (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,

414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also The Paquete

Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 707–08 (1900); Abagninin, 545 F.3d

at 738. To determine the content of customary international

law, courts “look to the sources of law identified by the

Statute of the International Court of Justice.” Khulumani,

504 F.3d at 267 (Katzmann, J., concurring). These sources

include international conventions, international customs, “the

general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,”

“judicial decisions,” and the works of scholars. Id.; see also

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 102 (1987)

(identifying similar sources). Courts also consult authorities

that provide an authoritative expression of the views of the

international community even if, strictly speaking, the

authority is not meant to reflect customary international law. 

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 267 (Katzmann, J., concurring)

(relying on the Rome State of the International Criminal

Court).

Here, the parties look primarily to three sources of

customary international law. The first are decisions of the

post–World War II International Military Tribunal at

Nuremberg, which are widely recognized as a critical part of

customary international law and regularly invoked in ATS

litigation. See, e.g., Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 271 (Katzmann,

J., concurring). The second are decisions issued by the

International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former

Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY, respectively), which were

convened to prosecute violations of international

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14 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

humanitarian law committed in Rwanda during 1994 and war

crimes that took place in the Balkans during the 1990s. These

decisions are also recognized as authoritative sources of

customary international law. Id. at 278–79; Abagninin,

545 F.3d at 739. The third is a recent decision issued by the

Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which was convened

to address violations of international humanitarian law in

Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. Prosecutor v.

Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A (SCSL Sept. 26, 2013). We

consider this decision to be a proper source of international

law for ATS claims. The parties also cite the Rome Statute

of the International Criminal Court in their briefing, but, as

discussed in more detail below, dispute its relevance in this

case.

The specific norms underlying the plaintiffs’ ATS claim

are the norms against aiding and abetting slave labor, which

the defendants allegedly violated by providing financial and

non-financial assistance to cocoa farmers in the Ivory Coast. 

The defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed, for

three reasons. First, the defendants argue that there is no

specific, universal, and obligatory norm preventing

corporations—as opposed to individuals—from aiding and

abetting slave labor. Second, the defendants argue that the

plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege the actus reus and mens

rea elements of an aiding and abetting claim. Finally, the

defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ complaint improperly

seeks extraterritorial application of federal law contrary to the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch

Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (“Kiobel II”). We

consider each argument in turn.

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 15

A. Corporate Liability under the ATS

The primary focus of international law, although not its

exclusive focus, is the conduct of states. Kiobel v. Royal

Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 165 (2d. Cir. 2010)

(Leval, J., concurring) (“Kiobel I”). Many of its prohibitions

therefore only apply to state action, and an important issue in

ATS litigation can be determining whether the norm asserted

by the plaintiff is applicable to both state actors and private

actors. This issue is illustrated by the contrasting decisions

of the D.C. Circuit in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic and

the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadzic. In Tel-Oren, Judge

Edwards concluded that the plaintiffs’ ATS claim was barred

because there was no consensus that international law applied

to torture carried out by non-state actors. 726 F.2d 774,

791–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Kadic, by contrast, the Second

Circuit held that international law’s prohibition on genocide

applies regardless of whether the perpetrator is acting on

behalf of a state. 70 F.3d 232, 241–42 (2d. Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court’s only allusion to corporate liability

occurred in a footnote that referenced these discussions in

Tel-Oren and Kadic. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. In the

footnote, the Court directed federal courts contemplating the

recognition of new ATS claims to consider “whether

international law extends the scope of liability for a violation

of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant

is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.” Id.

(emphasis added).

The issue of corporate liability has been more thoroughly

examined in the circuit courts, which have disagreed about

whether and under what circumstances corporations can face

liability for ATS claims. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145; Doe v.

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16 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011),

vacated on other grounds by 527 F. App’x. 7 (D.C. Cir.

2013); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir.

2011) vacated on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013);

Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020–21. Here, we reaffirm the corporate

liability analysis reached by the en banc panel of our circuit

in Sarei v. Rio Tinto.

In Sarei, the plaintiffs sought to hold corporate defendants

liable for aiding and abetting genocide and war crimes. We

first rejected the defendants’ argument that corporations can

never be sued under the ATS. Rather than adopting a blanket

rule of immunity or liability, the Sarei court held that for each

ATS claim asserted by the plaintiffs, a court should look to

international law and determine whether corporations are

subject to the norms underlying that claim. Id. at 748 (“Sosa

expressly frames the relevant international-law inquiry to be

the scope of liability of private actors for a violation of the

‘given norm,’ i.e. an international-law inquiry specific to each

cause of action asserted.”). Thus, we adopted a norm-bynorm analysis of corporate liability.

The Sarei court then conducted corporate liability

analyses for the two norms underlying the plaintiffs’ claims,

the norm against genocide and the norm against war crimes. 

Id. at 759–61, 764–65. The en banc panel observed that both

norms apply to states, individuals, and groups, and that the

applicability of the norms turns on the “specific identity of

the victims rather than the identity of the perpetrators.” Id.

at 760, 764–65 (emphasis added). Thus, we concluded that

the norms were “universal” or applicable to “all actors,” and,

consequently, applicable to corporations. Id. at 760, 765. We

reasoned that allowing an actor to “avoid liability merely by

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DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC. 17

incorporating” would be inconsistent with the universal

quality of these norms. See id. at 760 (discussing genocide).

In Sarei we also explained that a norm could form the

basis for an ATS claim against a corporation even in the

absence of a decision from an international tribunal enforcing

that norm against a corporation. Id. at 761 (“We cannot be

bound to find liability only where international fora have

imposed liability.”); contra Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 131–45. We

explained that the absence of decisions finding corporations

liable does not imply that corporate liability is a legal

impossibility under international law, and also noted that the

lack of decisions holding corporations liable could be

explained by strategic considerations. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 761

(citing Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and

Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg

Really Said, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1094, 1149–68 (2009)). 

Rejecting an analysis that focuses on past enforcement, Sarei

reaffirmed that corporate liability ultimately turns on an

analysis of the norm underlying the ATS claim. Id. at 760–61

(“We . . . believe the proper inquiry is not whether there is a

specific precedent so holding, but whether international law

extends its prohibitions to the perpetrators in question.”).

We thus established three principles about corporate ATS

liability in Sarei, that we now reaffirm. First, the analysis

proceeds norm-by-norm; there is no categorical rule of

corporate immunity or liability. Id. at 747–48. Second,

corporate liability under an ATS claim does not depend on

the existence of international precedent enforcing legal norms

against corporations. Id. at 760–61. Third, norms that are

“universal and absolute,” or applicable to “all actors,” can

provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation. Id.

at 760. To determine whether a norm is universal, we

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18 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

consider, among other things, whether it is “limited to states”

and whether its application depends on the identity of the

perpetrator. Id. at 764–65.

We conclude that the prohibition against slavery is

universal and may be asserted against the corporate

defendants in this case. Private, non-state actors were held

liable at Nuremberg for slavery offenses. The Flick Case,

6 Trials of War Criminals (T.W.C.) 1194, 1202. Moreover,

the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for

Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are broadly phrased to

condemn “persons responsible” for enslavement of civilian

populations. ICTY Statute Art. 5(c), U.N. S/RES/827 (May

25, 1993); ICTR Statute Art. 3(c), U.N. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,

1994). The prohibition against slavery applies to state actors

and non-state actors alike, and there are no rules exempting

acts of enslavement carried out on behalf of a corporation. 

Indeed, it would be contrary to both the categorical nature of

the prohibition on slavery and the moral imperative

underlying that prohibition to conclude that incorporation

leads to legal absolution for acts of enslavement. Kiobel I,

621 F.3d at 155 (Leval, J., concurring) (“The majority’s

interpretation of international law, which accords to

corporations a free pass to act in contravention of

international law’s norms, conflicts with the humanitarian

objectives of that body of law.”).

A final point of clarification is in order about the role of

domestic and international law. Although international law

controls the threshold question of whether an international

legal norm provides the basis for an ATS claim against a

corporation, there remain several issues about corporate

liability which must be governed by domestic law. This

division of labor is dictated by international legal principles,

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because international law defines norms and determines their

scope, but delegates to domestic law the task of determining

the civil consequences of any given violation of these norms. 

Id. at 172 (Leval, J., concurring); Exxon, 654 F.3d at 42–43;

Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020. Thus, when questions endemic to

tort litigation or civil liability arise in ATS litigation—such

as damages computation, joint and several liability, and

proximate causation—these issues must be governed by

domestic law. Many questions that surround corporate

liability fall into this category, including, most importantly,

the issue of when the actions of an individual can be

attributed to a corporation for purposes of tort liability. 

Determining when a corporation can be held liable therefore

requires a court to apply customary international law to

determine the nature and scope of the norm underlying the

plaintiffs’ claim, and domestic tort law to determine whether

recovery from the corporation is permissible.

Our holding that the norm against slavery is universal and

thus may be asserted against the defendants addresses only

the international legal issues related to corporate liability in

this case. We do not address other domestic law questions

related to corporate liability, and leave them to be addressed

by the district court in the first instance.

B. Aiding and Abetting Liability

We next consider whether the plaintiffs’ complaint

alleges the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting

slavery. Customary international law—not domestic

law—provides the legal standard for aiding and abetting ATS

claims. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 765–66. When choosing between

competing legal standards, we consider which one best

reflects a consensus of the well-developed democracies of the

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20 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

world. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (directing federal courts to

apply legal norms in ATS litigation that are accepted by

“civilized nations”); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 276 (Katzmann,

J., concurring) (consulting the Rome Statute’s aiding and

abetting legal standard in part due to its wide acceptance

among “most of the mature democracies of the world”).

1. Mens Rea

The plaintiffs argue that the required mens rea for aiding

and abetting is knowledge, specifically, knowledge that the

aider and abetter’s acts would facilitate the commission of the

underlying offense. This knowledge standard dates back to

the Nuremberg tribunals, and is well illustrated by the Zyklon

B Case, 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93

(1946). There, the defendants supplied poison gas to the

Nazis knowing that it would be used to murder innocent

people, and were convicted of aiding and abetting war crimes. 

Id. at 101. An analogous knowledge standard is applied in

The Flick Case, where a defendant was convicted of aiding

and abetting war crimes for donating money to the leader of

the SS, knowing that it would be used to support a criminal

organization. 6 T.W.C. 1216–17, 1220–21; see also The

Ministries Case, 14 T.W.C. 622 (concluding that the

defendant’s knowledge regarding the intended use of a loan

was sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement, but

declining to find that the defendant satisfied the actus reus

requirement).

As plaintiffs contend, this knowledge standard has also

been embraced by contemporary international criminal

tribunals. The International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda

and the former Yugoslavia consistently apply a knowledge

standard. In Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, for instance, the

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tribunal stated that “[t]he requisite mental element of aiding

and abetting is knowledge that the acts performed assist the

commission of the specific crime of the principal

perpetrator.” No. IT-02-60-A, ¶ 127 (ICTY, May 9, 2007)

(“Blagojevic”); see also Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR95-1-T, ¶ 205 (ICTR, May 21, 1999); Khulumani, 504 F.3d

at 277–79 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (observing that the

ICTY and ICTR decisions apply a knowledge standard);

Exxon, 654 F.3d at 33–34 (same). Additionally, after

conducting an extensive review of customary international

law, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra

Leone recently affirmed this knowledge standard, concluding

that “an accused’s knowledge of the consequence of his acts

or conduct—that is, an accused’s ‘knowing participation’ in

the crimes—is a culpable mens rea standard for individual

criminal liability.” Taylor, ¶ 483.

However, two of our sister circuits have concluded that

knowledge is insufficient and that an aiding and abetting ATS

defendant must act with the purpose of facilitating the

criminal act, relying on the Rome Statute of the International

Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) (“Rome Statute”)[FN

callout]. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399–400

(4th Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman

Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009). These

circuits have interpreted the Rome Statute to bar the use of a

knowledge standard because it uses the term “purpose” to

define aiding and abetting liability:

[A] person shall be criminally responsible and

liable for punishment for a crime within the

jurisdiction of the Court if that person . . .

[f]or the purpose of facilitating the

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22 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

commission of such a crime, aids, abets, or

otherwise assists in its commission . . . .

Rome Statute, art. 25(3)(c) (emphasis added). Taking this

text at face value, as the Second and Fourth Circuits did, it

appears that the Rome Statute rejects a knowledge standard

and requires the heightened mens rea of purpose, suggesting

that knowledge standard lacks the universal acceptance that

Sosa demands.

Here, we need not decide whether a purpose or

knowledge standard applies to aiding and abetting ATS

claims. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy

the more stringent purpose standard, and therefore state a

claim for aiding and abetting slavery. All international

authorities agree that “at least purposive action . . .

constitutes aiding and abetting[.]” Sarei, 671 F.3d at 765–66

(declining to determine whether the mens rea required for an

aiding and abetting claim is knowledge or purpose).

Reading the allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, one is led to the inference that the defendants

placed increased revenues before basic human welfare, and

intended to pursue all options available to reduce their cost

for purchasing cocoa. Driven by the goal to reduce costs in

any way possible, the defendants allegedly supported the use

of child slavery, the cheapest form of labor available. These

allegations explain how the use of child slavery benefitted the

defendants and furthered their operational goals in the Ivory

Coast, and therefore, the allegations support the inference that

the defendants acted with the purpose to facilitate child

slavery.

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The defendants’ alleged plan to benefit from the use of

child slave labor starkly distinguishes this case from other

ATS decisions where the purpose standard was not met. See

Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262–64; Aziz, 658 F.3d at 390–91, 401. 

According to the allegations here, the defendants have not

merely profited by doing business with known human rights

violators. Instead, they have allegedly sought to accomplish

their own goals by supporting violations of international law. 

In Talisman, by contrast, the defendant did not in any way

benefit from the underlying human rights atrocities carried

out by the Sudanese military, and in fact, those atrocities ran

contrary to the defendant’s goals in the area, and even forced

the defendant to abandon its operations. Talisman, 582 F.3d

at 262. Similarly, in Aziz, the plaintiffs alleged that the

defendants sold chemicals knowing they would be used to

murder Kurds in northern Iraq, but failed to allege that the

defendants had anything to gain from the use of chemical

weapons. Aziz, 658 F.3d at 394, 401. Thus, in Talisman and

Aziz, the purpose standard was not satisfied because the

defendants had nothing to gain from the violations of

international law, and in Talisman, the violations actually ran

counter to the defendants’ interest. Here, however, the

complaint alleges that the defendants obtained a direct benefit

from the commission of the violation of international law,

which bolsters the allegation that the defendants acted with

the purpose to support child slavery.

The defendants’ control over the Ivory Coast cocoa

market further supports the allegation that the defendants

acted with the purpose to facilitate slavery. According to the

complaint, the defendants had enough control over the

Ivorian cocoa market that they could have stopped or limited

the use of child slave labor by their suppliers. The defendants

did not use their control to stop the use of child slavery,

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24 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

however, but instead offered support that facilitated it. 

Viewed alongside the allegation that the defendants

benefitted from the use of child slavery, the defendants’

failure to stop or limit child slavery supports the inference

that they intended to keep that system in place. The

defendants had the means to stop or limit the use of child

slavery, and had they wanted the slave labor to end, they

could have used their leverage in the cocoa market to stop it. 

Their alleged failure to do so, coupled with the cost-cutting

benefit they allegedly receive from the use of child slaves,

strongly supports the inference that the defendants acted with

purpose.

The defendants’ alleged lobbying efforts also corroborate

the inference of purpose. According to the complaint, the

defendants participated in lobbying efforts designed to defeat

federal legislation that would have required chocolate

importers and manufacturers to certify and label their

chocolate as “slave free.” As an alternative to the proposed

legislation, the defendants, along with others from the

chocolate industry, supported a voluntarymechanism through

which the chocolate industry would police itself. The

complaint also alleges that when the voluntary enforcement

system was eventually put into practice instead of legislation,

it “in effect guaranteed the continued use of the cheapest

labor available to produce [cocoa]—that of child slaves.”

Despite these detailed allegations, the dissent contends

that the complaint should be dismissed as implausible under

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The allegation of

purpose is not, however, a bare and conclusory assertion that

is untethered from the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims. 

Instead, the complaint specifically ties the defendants’

alleged purpose to the defendants’ economic goals in the

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Ivory Coast, their control over the cocoa market, and their

lobbying efforts. The factual allegations concerning the

defendants’ goals and business operations give rise to a

reasonable inference that the defendants acted with purpose,

and that is enough to satisfy Iqbal. Id. at 678–79; Moss v.

U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In

sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences

from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim

entitling the plaintiff to relief.”).

We also disagree with the dissent’s assertion that the

plaintiffs have conceded that their allegations fail to satisfy

the purpose standard. The plaintiffs have maintained

throughout this appeal that the purpose standard has been

satisfied. They only conceded that the defendants did not

have the subjective motive to harm children. Indeed, the

complaint is clear that the defendants’ motive was finding

cheap sources of cocoa; there is no allegation that the

defendants supported child slavery due to an interest in

harming children in West Africa.

This is not to say that the purpose standard is satisfied

merely because the defendants intended to profit by doing

business in the Ivory Coast. Doing business with child slave

owners, however morally reprehensible that may be, does not

by itself demonstrate a purpose to support child slavery. 

Here, however, the defendants allegedly intended to support

the use of child slavery as a means of reducing their

production costs. In doing so, the defendants sought a

legitimate goal, profit, through illegitimate means,

purposefully supporting child slavery.

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Thus, the allegations suggest that a myopic focus on profit

over human welfare drove the defendants to act with the

purpose of obtaining the cheapest cocoa possible, even if it

meant facilitating child slavery. These allegations are

sufficient to satisfy the mens rea required of an aiding and

abetting claim under either a knowledge or purpose standard.

2. Actus Reus

We next consider whether the plaintiffs have alleged the

actus reus elements of an aiding and abetting claim. The

actus reus of aiding and abetting is providing assistance or

other forms of support to the commission of a crime. 

Blagojevic, ¶ 127; Taylor, ¶ 362; Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c). 

As both parties agree, international law further requires that

the assistance offered must be substantial. Blagojevic, ¶ 127;

Taylor, ¶ 362. The parties dispute, however, whether

international law imposes the additional requirement that the

assistance must be specifically directed towards the

commission of the crime.

The “specific direction” requirement appears to have

originated in decisions issued by the International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Tadic,

Case No. IT-94-1-A (ICTY July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v.

Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-A, (ICTY Feb. 28, 2013)

(“Perisic”). In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber used the phrase

“specifically directed” to distinguish joint criminal enterprise

liability from aiding and abetting liability. Tadic, ¶¶ 227–29. 

While joint criminal enterprise liability only requires an

individual to engage in conduct that “in some way” assisted

the commission of a crime, the Appeals Chamber stated that

aiding and abetting liability requires an individual to engage

in conduct that is “specifically directed” towards the

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commission of a crime. Id. ¶ 229(ii). In Perisic, a later panel

of the Appeals Chamber clarified that the specific direction

requirement relates to the “link” between the assistance

provided and the principal offense, and requires that

“assistance must be ‘specifically’—rather than ‘in some

way’—directed towards the relevant crimes.” Perisic ¶ 27,

37 (quoting Tadic, ¶ 229).

Some Appeals Chamber panels and other international

tribunals have explicitly rejected the specific direction

requirement. Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A,

¶ 159 (ICTY May 5, 2009) (“[T]he Appeals Chamber has

confirmed that ‘specific direction’ is not an essential

ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.”);

Blagojevic, ¶ 189 (“[S]pecific direction has not always been

included as an element of the actus reus of aiding and

abetting.”); Taylor, ¶ 481. Beneath this controversy,

however, there is widespread substantive agreement about the

actus reus of aiding and abetting. As the Special Court for

Sierra Leone Appeals Chambers recently affirmed, “[t]he

actus reus of aiding and abetting liability is established by

assistance that has a substantial effect on the crimes, not the

particular manner in which such assistance is provided.” 

Taylor, ¶ 475. What appears to have emerged is that there is

less focus on specific direction and more of an emphasis on

the existence of a causal link between the defendants and the

commission of the crime. However, we decline to adopt an

actus reus standard for aiding and abetting liability under the

ATS. Instead, we remand to the district court with

instructions to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint in

light of Perisic and Taylor, both of which were decided after

the complaint in this case was dismissed and this appeal had

been filed.

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28 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

C. Extraterritorial ATS Claims

The defendants’ final argument contends that the

plaintiffs’ ATS claim seeks an extraterritorial application of

federal law that is barred by the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. We decline to

resolve the extraterritoriality issue, and instead remand to

allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of

Kiobel II.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel II is concerned

with the application of the presumption against

extraterritoriality to ATS claims. The presumption against

extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction, and

embodies the default assumption that legislation of Congress

is only meant to apply within the territory of the United

States. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,

2877 (2010). Under this canon of construction, a statute

should be construed to reach only conduct within the United

States unless Congress affirmatively states that the statute

applies to conduct abroad. Id.(quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am.

Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). The

presumption is meant to provide “a stable background against

which Congress can legislate with predictable effects,”

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881, and also “protect against

unintended clashes between our laws and those of other

nations which could result in international discord,” Aramco,

499 U.S. at 248.

Since the presumption against extraterritorialityis a canon

of statutory construction, it has no direct application to ATS

claims, which, as discussed above, are claims created by

federal common law, not statutory claims created by the ATS

itself. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. In Kiobel II, however,

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the Supreme Court explained that the prudential concerns

about judicial interference in foreign policy are particularly

strong in ATS litigation, and concluded that “the principles

underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality thus

constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS.” Id.

The Court also concluded that nothing in the text, history, and

purpose of the ATS rebutted the presumption of

extraterritoriality. Id. at 1669.

Turning to the specific claims asserted by the Kiobel II

plaintiffs, the Court observed that “all the relevant conduct

took place outside the United States,” and that the defendants

were foreign corporations whose only connection to the

United States lay in their presence in this country. Id. The

Court held that these claims were therefore barred, reasoning

that they sought relief for violations of international law

occurring outside the United States, and did not “touch and

concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient

force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial

application.” Id.

Kiobel II’s holding makes clear that the general principles

underlying the presumption against extraterritorialityapplyto

ATS claims, but it leaves important questions about

extraterritorial ATS claims unresolved. See id. (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (“The opinion for the Court is careful to leave

open a number of significant questions regarding the reach

and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”). In particular,

Kiobel II articulates a new “touch and concern” test for

determining when it is permissible for an ATS claim to seek

the extraterritorial application of federal law. Id. But the

opinion does not explain the nature of this test, except to say

that it is not met when an ATS plaintiff asserts a cause of

action against a foreign corporation based solely on foreign

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conduct. Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (observing that the

Court’s formulation of the touch and concern test “obviously

leaves much unanswered”); see also Tymoshenko v. Firtash,

2013 WL 4564646, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (“[T]he

Court failed to provide guidance regarding what is necessary

to satisfy the ‘touch and concern’ standard.”).

The defendants argue that the touch and concern test is

substantially the same as the “focus” test set out in Morrison

v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 

Morrison’s focus test is a tool of statutory interpretation. It

is used to determine when statutes without extraterritorial

application can be applied to a course of conduct that

occurred both domestically and abroad. Id. Under this test,

courts first determine the “focus of congressional concern”

for a statute, and allow the statute to be applied to a course of

conduct if the events coming within the statute’s focus

occurred domestically. Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). In Morrison, for example, the Court reasoned that

the focus of the Exchange Act is the purchase and sale of

securities, and therefore held that it applies only to

“transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and

domestic transactions in other securities.” Id. The Court then

held that the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act did

not apply to a foreign sale of securities that were listed on an

Australian exchange. Id. at 2888.

Morrisonmaybe informative precedent for discerning the

content of the touch and concern standard, but the opinion in

Kiobel II did not incorporate Morrison’s focus test. Kiobel II

did not explicitly adopt Morrison’s focus test, and chose to

use the phrase “touch and concern” rather than the term

“focus” when articulating the legal standard it did adopt. 

Moreover, the assertion that Kiobel II meant to direct lower

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courts to apply the familiar Morrison focus test is belied by

the concurring opinions, which note that the standard in

Kiobel II leaves “much unanswered.” Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at

1669 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. (Kennedy, J.,

concurring). Additionally, since the focus test turns on

discerningCongress’s intent when passing a statute, it cannot

sensibly be applied to ATS claims, which are common law

claims based on international legal norms.

Rather than attempt to apply the amorphous touch and

concern test on the record currently before us, we conclude

that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to amend their

complaint in light of Kiobel II. It is common practice to

allow plaintiffs to amend their pleadings to accommodate

changes in the law, unless it is clear that amendment would

be futile. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“Having initiated the present lawsuit without the

benefit of the Court’s latest pronouncements on pleadings,

Plaintiffs deserve a chance to supplement their complaint

. . .”). Here, the plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to

allege that some of the activity underlying their ATS claim

took place in the United States. On the record before us, we

are unable to conclude that amendment would be futile,

because unlike the claims at issue in Kiobel II, the plaintiffs

contend that part of the conduct underlying their claims

occurred within the United States. See Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct.

at 1669. Moreover, it would be imprudent to attempt to apply

and refine the touch and concern test where the pleadings

before us make no attempt to explain what portion of the

conduct underlying the plaintiffs claims took place within the

United States.

We therefore decline to determine, at present, whether the

plaintiffs’ ATS claim is barred by the Supreme Court’s

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32 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

holding in Kiobel II, and remand this case to allow the

plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

IV. Conclusion

The district court’s order is REVERSED, and we

VACATE for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part:

I do not object to remanding this case to afford the

Plaintiffs an opportunity to further amend their Complaint in

an attempt to state a cause of action under the Alien Tort

Statute (ATS), as recently interpreted by the United States

Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,

133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). I doubt that their effort will be

successful in view of their prior candid acknowledgment in

their Opening Brief on appeal that “they do not currently

possess facts sufficient to support the district court’s standard

that Defendants specifically intended the human rights

violations at issue in this case. . . .” Nevertheless, because I

cannot say with certitude that any attempt to further amend

the Complaint would be futile, I voice no objection to a

remand on that basis.

2 We need not reach the parties’ remaining arguments in light of our

decision to remand with instructions that the district court allow leave to

amend.

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We all agree that the practice of engaging in child slave

labor is reprehensible, indefensible, and morally abhorrent. 

Indeed, if that were the issue we were called upon to decide,

this would be an easy case. Instead, we must decide who

bears legal responsibility for the atrocities inflicted upon

these Plaintiffs, forced into slave labor as children. More

precisely, we must determine if the named Defendants in this

case may be held legally responsible for the injuries alleged

by the Plaintiffs.

I also agree that corporations are not per se excluded from

liability under the ATS. See Majority Opinion, pp. 16–18

(adopting the reasoning of our en banc decision in Sarei v.

Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated

for further consideration in light of Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1995

(2013); see also Romero v. Drummond Co. Inc., 552 F.3d

1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The text of the Alien Tort

Statute provides no express exception for corporations . . .”)

(citation omitted).

I.

Mens Rea Requirement of the ATS

Unlike the majority, I would definitely and unequivocally

decide that the purpose standard applies to the pleading of

aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. In other words,

Plaintiffs seeking to assert a claim against Defendants on an

aiding and abetting theory of liability must allege sufficient

facts to state a plausible claim for relief, i.e., that the

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34 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

defendants acted with the purpose1of causing the injuries

suffered by the Plaintiffs. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678–79 (2009) (delineating the pleading standard under

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

I am persuaded to this view in part by the rationale set

forth by our sister circuits in the cases of Presbyterian

Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259

(2d Cir. 2009) and Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 400–01

(4th Cir. 2011).

In Talisman, the Second Circuit considered the claims of

Sudanese citizens against the government of Sudan and

Talisman, a corporation that allegedly aided and abetted the

government of Sudan in its commission of human rights

abuses against the Plaintiffs. The Second Circuit expressly

relied upon the principles for “imposing accessorial liability

under the ATS” previously articulated by the United States

Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692

(2004), the first Supreme Court case interpreting the ATS. 

See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 248, 255. The Second Circuit

referenced the language in Sosa clarifying that the ATS was

enacted with an understanding that the number of actionable

international law violations would be “modest.” Id. at 255

(quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724). The Second Circuit also

1

I use the term “purpose” interchangeably with the phrase “specific

intent” because there is no material difference between the two. See

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“In general, ‘purpose’ corresponds to the concept of specific intent . . .”)

(citations omitted); see also United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814, 826

(9th Cir. 2012) (“Jury Instruction 52 defines willfully as an act done

voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something

the law forbids; that is to say with a purpose either to disobey or disregard

the law. . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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recounted the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in

Sosa for exercising “great caution” before recognizing

violations of international law that are not based on

international norms recognized in 1789. Id.

In Sosa, the Supreme Court first focused on the need for

exercising caution when considering the availabilityof claims

under the ATS, due to the marked difference between the

conception of the common law in 1789 when the ATS was

enacted, and the conception of the common law in more

modern times. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26. Prior to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64 (1938), the common law was conceived of as a

non-preemptive body of general (non-federal) common law. 

See Curtis Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal

System, 211 (Oxford University Press, 2013). Today,

judicially recognized claims under the ATS would be

considered preemptive federal common law, thereby

extending the reach of federal law. See id.

Relatedly, the Supreme Court cautioned federal courts to

tread lightly when considering whether to further expand the

federal law in a manner “of particular importance to foreign

relations.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726. Rather than assuming an

“aggressive role” in recognizing claims under the ATS, a

statute “that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior

two centuries,” the Supreme Court suggested looking to

guidance from the legislative branch before embarking on

“innovative” substantive expansion of the ATS. Id.

Next, the Supreme Court expressed reluctance to create

a private right of action in the absence of an express

legislative provision addressing private rights of action,

particularly when the effect is to render international rules

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subject to private action, therebyimplicating the management

of foreign affairs that are generally best left to “the discretion

of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” Id. at 727. The

Supreme Court noted that international law “very much”

concerns itself with defining permissible limits on the power

of sovereign governments over their own citizens, a notion

that inherently merits the utmost trepidation. Id. at 727–28.

Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that it is

“particularly important” that the federal courts lack a

legislative “mandate to seek out and define new and

debatable violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 728. For

these reasons, the Supreme Court urged “great caution in

adapting the law of nations to private rights.” Id. Indeed, the

Supreme Court, in recognition of the potential negative

implications of construing the ATS too broadly, construed the

ATS as legislation “meant to underwrite litigation of a

narrow set of common law actions derived from the law of

nations . . .” Id. at 721 (emphasis added). The Supreme

Court instructed that judicial power should be exercised to

recognize causes of action under the ATS sparingly, “subject

to vigilant doorkeeping” by the federal courts. Id. at 729.

In Talisman, the Second Circuit absorbed the Supreme

Court’s repeated emphasis on the “modest” and “narrow”

nature of the claims that should be recognized under the ATS,

and rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument for a “broad and elastic”

principle of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. 

582 F.3d at 255, 259. Rather, in keeping with the “modest”

and “narrow” approach described with approval in Sosa, the

Second Circuit adopted the purpose standard as the applicable

mens rea test for aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. 

See id. at 259. As the Second Circuit noted, there is no

international consensus supporting the imposition of liability

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on individuals who act with knowledge of the violation of

international law, but who harbor no intent or purpose to aid

and abet the violation. See id.

In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit cited “the Supreme

Court’s admonitions in Sosa that we should exercise great

caution, before recognizing causes of action for violations of

international law” and agreed with the Second Circuit that

aiding and abetting liability under the ATS must be

predicated on a showing of purposeful facilitation of the

violation of international law. Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

I agree with the Second and Fourth Circuits that the

principles set forth in Sosa militate in favor of the application

of a mens rea of purpose or specific intent to impose aiding

and abetting liability under the ATA, and I would so hold.

Applying the proper mens rea standard of purpose, or

specific intent, I strongly disagree that the allegations in

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint satisfy that standard. The

contrary conclusion reached by the majority is particularly

curious in light of the Plaintiffs’ concession of their inability

to meet the standard. Nevertheless, the majority generally

relies upon allegations in the Amended Complaint as

sufficient to establish that Defendants acted with the purpose

to aid and abet child slavery. The majority focuses on

inferences rather than on any particular allegations in the

Amended Complaint that reflect the purpose mens rea. The

only allegation from the Amended Complaint that is

specifically referenced is the allegation that “[d]riven by the

goal to reduce costs in any way possible, the defendants

allegedly supported the use of child labor, the cheapest form

of labor available . . . .” Majority Opinion, p. 22. The

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majority concludes that “[r]eading the allegations in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs, one is led to the inference

that the defendants placed increased revenues before basic

human welfare, and intended to pursue all options available

to reduce their cost for purchasing cocoa.” Id. at 22 Piling

inference upon inference, the majority contends that the

allegations that the defendants placed increased revenues

before human welfare and acted with the intent to reduce the

cost of purchasing cocoa, “support the inference that the

defendants acted with the purpose to facilitate child slavery.”

Id. at 22. But is that inference plausible, as required by

Iqbal? I think not, because these allegations are remarkably

similar to those rejected by the Supreme Court in Iqbal.

The Plaintiff in Iqbal filed a Bivens2action against the

Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the

Federal Bureau of Investigations, asserting that the

defendants violated his constitutional rights bysubjecting him

to inhumane conditions of confinement due to his race,

national origin or religion. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668–69. 

Iqbal alleged that the Defendants “knew of, condoned, and

willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh

conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on

account of [Iqbal’s] religion, race, and/or national origin . . .” 

Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme

Court rejected this allegation as a “bare assertion [ ],

amount[ing] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a constitutional discrimination claim . . .” Id.

at 681 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

Supreme Court added that the allegation was “conclusory”

and “disentitle[d] . . . to the presumption of truth.” Id.

2 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971).

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The same can be easily said of the one specific allegation

relied on by the majority in this case. The allegation that

Defendants acted with the intent “to reduce costs in any way

possible” is at best a feeble attempt to set forth the required

mens rea of purpose, or specific intent. However, as the

Supreme Court noted in Iqbal, a conclusory statement of the

elements of a claim falls far short of stating a plausible claim. 

See id.

The statement that child slavery is the cheapest form of

labor available does not even implicate the Defendants. This

allegation in no way raises a plausible inference that the

Defendants acted with the purpose to aid and abet child slave

labor. It may well be true that child slave labor is the

cheapest form of labor for harvesting cocoa. But that

unvarnished statement in no way supports the inferential leap

that because child slave labor is the cheapest form of labor,

Defendants aided and abetted the cocoa farmers who

allegedly operated the child slave labor system.

To bolster the inferences discussed, the majority explains

that Defendants’ “use of child slavery benefitted the

defendants and furthered their operational goals in the Ivory

Coast . . . ” Majority Opinion, pp. 22–23. However, taking

advantage of a favorable existing market, while perhaps

morally repugnant, does not equate to the specific intent to

aid and abet child slave labor. In Aziz, 658 F.3d at 390–91,

the corporate defendant sold restricted chemicals that

ultimately reached Iraq and were used to manufacture

mustard gas. The mustard gas in turn was used to attack

Kurds. Thousand of Kurds were killed, maimed, or left with

“physical and psychological trauma.” Id. at 391. Plaintiffs,

individuals of Kurdish descent, were victims of mustard gas

attacks themselves, or family members of deceased victims. 

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They brought claims under the ATS, alleging that the

corporate defendant “aided and abetted the Iraqi regime’s use

of mustard gas to attack the Kurds. . . .” Id. at 395. Plaintiffs

specifically alleged that the corporate defendant “placed [the

restricted chemical] into the stream of international

commerce with the purpose of facilitating the use of said

chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons to be

used, among other things, against the Kurdish population in

northern Iraq.” Id. at 401 (citation omitted). Citing Iqbal, the

Fourth Circuit characterized the allegations as “cursory” and

“untethered to any supporting facts.” Id. Unfortunately, that

same characterization accurately describes the allegations

made by Plaintiffs in this case.

The aiding and abetting claims asserted under the ATS in

Talisman met a similar fate in the Second Circuit. Plaintiffs

alleged that Talisman, a corporation, provided “substantial

assistance” to the government of Sudan, which assistance

aided the government in “committing crimes against

humanity and war crimes . . .” 582 F.3d at 261. The

assistance provided byTalisman to the government included: 

1) upgrading airstrips; 2) designating areas for oil

exploration; 3) paying royalties to the government; and

“giving general logistical support to the Sudanese

military . . . .” Id. (citation and footnote reference omitted). 

The Second Circuit observed that there was nothing

inherently nefarious about these activities. Rather, such

activities “generally accompany any natural resource

development business or the creation of any industry. . . .” 

Id. (citation omitted). In essence, Plaintiffs argued that

Talisman should have made no financial investment in Sudan

at all, lest the financial wherewithal enable the government to

abuse its citizenry. However, as in Aziz, the allegations were

insufficient to support a plausible inference that Talisman

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acted with the required mens rea of purpose or specific intent. 

See id. at 263; see also Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401.

The majority seeks to distinguish Aziz and Talisman, but

no principled distinction can be made. The majority points to

the fact that Defendants in this case had sufficient control

over the cocoa market “that they could have stopped or

limited the use of child slave labor by their suppliers.” 

Majority Opinion, p. 23. Rather than doing so, the majority

concludes, Defendants “instead offered support that

facilitated” child slavery. Id. at 24. This reasoning mirrors

the argument rejected by the Second Circuit that Talisman

should never have made a financial investment in Sudan,

thereby enabling that country to oppress its people. See

Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262–63. Rejection of this argument is

particularly appropriate in the absence of evidence that

Defendants intended that the financial support be used for

child slavery. See id. at 262.

The majority also points to Defendants’ lobbying efforts

to “corroborate the inference of purpose.” Majority Opinion,

p. 24. “[T]he defendants participated in lobbying efforts

designed to defeat federal legislation that would have

required chocolate importers and manufacturers to certifyand

label their chocolate as slave free.” Id. at p. 24 (internal

quotation marks omitted). In the alternative, Defendants and

others with interest in the chocolate industry advocated for

the implementation of a voluntary compliance mechanism. 

See id. at p. 24. However, exercising their right to petition

the government does not reasonably support an inference that

Defendants acted with the purpose to aid and abet child

slavery. It is equally likely that Defendants sought to avoid

additional government regulation. As recognized by the

Second Circuit, if there is a benign explanation for the

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42 DOE V. NESTLE USA, INC.

corporation’s action, no plausible inference of purpose may

be drawn. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 262.

Plaintiffs and the majority concede that any and all

actions taken by Defendants were motivated by the desire for

profits rather than an intent to enslave children. See Majority

Opinion, pp. 22–24. This concession is fatal to the Amended

Complaint as presently couched. There is absolutely no

allegation that Defendants have violated any governing law

or regulation in their quest for profits. And profit-seeking is

the reason most corporations exist. To equate a profit-making

motive with the mens rea required for ATS aiding and

abetting liability would completely negate the constrained

concept of ATS liability contemplated by the Supreme Court

in Sosa. See 542 U.S. at 721, 724, 729 (construing the ATS

as encompassing a “modest” and “narrow” set of claims

“subject to vigilant doorkeeping by the federal courts”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

One would hope that corporations would operate their

businesses in a humanitarian and morallyresponsible manner. 

It is indeed unfortunate that many neglect to do so. However

regrettable that circumstance maybe, we cannot substitute the

lack of humanitarianism for the pleading requirements that

govern the ATS. Following the reasoning of Sosa, Aziz and

Talisman, I would not conclude that the Plaintiffs have stated

a claim under the ATS.

II.

Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS

As stated earlier, I do not object to a remand to allow

Plaintiffs to seek to further amend their Complaint in light of

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the Supreme Court’s recent Kiobel decision. However, in my

view, Plaintiffs face a substantial hurdle in their effort to

assert a viable claim that the ATS applies to the admittedly

extraterritorial child slave labor that is the basis of this case. 

As noted by the majority, Justice Kennedy observed that the

Kiobel opinion left open “a number of significant questions

regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort

Statute. . . .” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J.

concurring). But a question not left open regarding the reach

of the ATS was the presumption against extraterritorial

application of the statute. See id. at 1664–67.

In Kiobel, Plaintiffs sued corporate defendants who

participated in oil exploration and production in Nigeria. In

their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that after they protested

against the environmental effects of the corporation’s

practices, “Nigerian military and police forces attacked . . .

villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and

destroying or looting property.” Id. at 1662. According to

Plaintiffs, the corporate defendants aided and abetted their

tormentors “by, among other things, providing the Nigerian

forces with food, transportation and compensation, as well as

by allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’

property as a staging ground for attacks.” Id. at 1662–63.

The Supreme Court explained that the presumption

against extraterritorial application of federal statutes avoids

“unintended clashes between our laws and those of other

nations which could result in international discord.” Id. at

1664 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court noted that the

concern underlying the presumption is heightened in cases

brought under the ATS because those cases seek relief based

on court-created causes of action rather than for claims

expressly provided for by Congress. See id. Referring back

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to Sosa, the Supreme Court reiterated its emphasis on “the

need for judicial caution in considering which claims could

be brought under the ATS . . .” Id. Indeed, the foreign policy

implications of recognizing a claim under the ATS “are all

the more pressing when the question is whether a cause of

action under the ATS reaches conduct within the territory of

another sovereign.” Id. at 1665.

The Supreme Court observed that “nothing in the text of

the [ATS] suggests that Congress intended causes of action

recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach. . . .” Id. 

Similarly, nothing in the historical backdrop of the statute

overcomesthe presumption against extraterritorial application

of the ATS. See id. at 1666. Finally, the Supreme Court

emphasized that there was no indication that Congress

intended to make this country the forum “for the enforcement

of international norms. . . .” Id. at 1668.

Having articulated these underlying precepts, the

Supreme Court concluded that the ATS was subject to the

presumption against extraterritorial application and that

Plaintiffs’ “case seeking relief for violations of the law of

nations occurring outside the United States [was] barred . . .” 

Id. at 1669. On the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs, “all the

relevant conduct took place outside the United States.” Id.

(emphasis added). The Supreme Court further explained that

even in a case where the claims did “touch and concern the

territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient

force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial

application. . . .” Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank

Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264–73 (2010)).

In Morrison, the Supreme Court held, in no uncertain

terms, that when an allegation of domestic relationship is

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raised to defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality,

that domestic relationship must coincide with “the focus of

congressional concern . . .” Id. at 266 (citation omitted). I do

not agree with the majority that the Supreme Court “did not

incorporate Morrison’s focus test.” Majority Opinion, p. 30. 

Why else would the Supreme Court direct us to Morrison

precisely when it was discussing claims that allegedly “touch

and concern” the United States? Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 

In any event, at a minimum, the Supreme Court has made

clear that not any old domestic contact will do. Rather, the

Supreme Court has colorfully informed us that the burden of

showing sufficient domestic contact is substantial. See

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“[T]he presumption against

extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog

indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic

activity is involved in the case . . . .”) (emphasis in the

original).

In sum, I would affirm the district court’s ruling that the

Amended Complaint failed to state a claim under the ATS. 

In reviewing the next amended Complaint, the district court

should hew closely to the guidance that the Supreme Court

laid out in Morrison, Sosa and Kiobel that cautions federal

court judges to tread lightly both when determining whether

a claim has been stated under the ATS and whether the

presumption against extraterritorial application of a domestic

statute has been rebutted. These cases militate toward

contraction rather than expansion. Therefore, I concur in a

remand to allow Plaintiffs to further amend their Complaint

in an effort to state a claim under the ATS. I dissent from any

holding that they have adequately done so.

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