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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN APODACA, Individually and as 

Personal Representative of the Estate 

of THERESA APODACA, Deceased; LORRAINE 

APODACA, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

RIO ARRIBA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; ) 

THE COUNTY OF RIO ARRIBA; THE RIO ) 

ARRIBA BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ) 

ADELINDA G. MARTINEZ, Personal Repre- ) 

sentative of the Estate of Benigno ) 

(Ben) F. Martinez; EMILIO NARANJO, ) 

Individually and in his Official ) 

Capacity as Rio Arriba County Manager; ) 

DELAINO ROMERO, Individually and in his ) 

Official Capacity as a Rio Arriba County) 

Deputy Sheriff, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

EARL APODACA; JANET APODACA, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

RIO ARRIBA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; ) 

THE COUNTY OF RIO ARRIBA; THE RIO ) 

ARRIBA BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ) 

ADELINDA G. MARTINEZ, Personal Repre- ) 

sentative of the Estate of Benigno ) 

(Ben) F. Marti~ez; EMILIO NARANJO, ) 

Individually and in his Official ) 

Capacity as Rio Arriba County Manager; ) 

DELAINO ROMERO, Individually and in his ) 

Official Capacity as a Rio Arriba County) 

Deputy Sheriff, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

FILED 

U-oited Stateii 0Jurt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 1 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 88-1595 

No. 88-1910 

Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 1 
Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. Civil Nos. 86-0005-BB and 87-0456-JC) 

Richard Rosenstock, Chama, New Mexico (Robert R. Rothstein of 

Rothstein, Bailey, Bennett, Daly & Donatelli, Santa Fe, New 

Mexico, with him on the briefs) for plaintiffs-appellants. 

Douglas A. Baker (Benjamin Silva, Jr., with him on the brief), and 

James H. Johansen of Butt, Thornton & Baehr, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for defendants-appellees Rio Arriba County Sheriff's 

Department, Rio Arriba -County, Rio Arriba Board of County 

Commissioners, Emilio Naranjo and Delaine Romero. 

M. Karen Kilgore and David F. Cunningham of White, 

McCarthy, Santa Fe, New Mexico, filed a brief 

defendant-appellee Adelinda G. Martinez, Personal 

of the Estate of Benigno (Ben) F. Martinez. 

Koch, Kelly & 

on behalf of 

Representative 

Before HOLLOWA¥, Chief Judge, LOGAN, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, 

District Judge. 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 2 
This is the consolidated appeal of two cases arising out of a 

collision between defendant Delaino Romero, a Rio Arriba County 

deputy sheriff, and plaintiffs' decedent Theresa Apodaca 

(Theresa). Theresa's parents, plaintiffs John and Lorraine 

Apodaca, filed an action pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 alleging 

that Romero, Rio Arriba County, and other county officers deprived 

Theresa of her life without due process of law, that Romero seized 

her unreasonably and with excessive force in violation of the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the plaintiff parents 

were deprived of their right to associate with their daughter 

guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 Plaintiffs 

Earl and Janet Apodaca, siblings of the decedent, allege only that 

they were deprived of their right to intimate familial 

association. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of the defendants on plaintiffs' due process claims, and dismissed 

plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment claims. 2 We affirm. 

We review the granting of summary judgment and dismissal de 

novo, applying the same standard as the district court. 

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 

1990); Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 

1986). Summary judgment is to be granted if no material issues of 

fact remain, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

1 The due process and illegal seizure claims were brought on 

behalf of Theresa's estate by John Apodaca, personal 

representative of the estate. The intimate familial association 

claim was brought by Theresa's parents in their own right. 

2 The district court's dismissal of pendent state claims was also 

originally on appeal to this court. By stipulation, however, the 

parties have dismissed that portion of the appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 3 
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We presume all allegations 

reasonably pleaded are true. In dealing with each kind of motion 

we resolve all conflicts in favor of the party resisting the 

motion. Morgan, 792 F.2d at 978; Abercrombie, 896 F.2d at 1230. 

I 

Deputy Romero was responding to a silent burglar alarm at an 

automobile dealership when his marked police car collided with 

Theresa's car, as she was leaving the parking lot of a 

restaurant. Accepting the plaintiffs' version of the facts, we 

assume that Romero was driving 55-65 miles per hour around a blind 

curve on which the regular speed limit was 35 miles per hour. It 

was after midnight, and had been raining and sleeting. Romero was 

not using his siren or flashing lights. Theresa was making a left 

turn out of the restaurant parking lot, when Romero rounded the 

curve and crashed into her car broadside. 

A 

Negligence and Due Process 

Plaintiffs assert that Romero's negligent driving, under 

color of state law, deprived Theresa of her right to life without 

due process. 3 There is no dispute that Romero was acting under 

3 Plaintiffs allege that Romero's actions exceeded bare 

negligence and were reckless and wanton. In whatever manner 

plaintiffs attempt to dress up their claims, their cases come down 

to allegations that Romero was driving too fast for the road and 

visibility conditions. At most, therefore, plaintiffs' 

allegations are grounded in negligence. 

We note that, as a practical matter, any risks created by 

Romero for bystanders like Theresa are reciprocally created for 

himself. As such it is hard to imagine Romero being truly 

indifferent to the risks he was creating, which is a necessary 

characteristic of recklessness. See w. Keeton, D. Dobbs, 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 4 
color of state law when the accident occurred. 

We agree with the defendants that negligent operation of a 

vehicle by a police officer does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has drawn a 

distinction between constitutional violations and torts which just 

happen to be committed by public officials. See Paul v. Davis, I , 

424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976} (distinguishing between torts and 

constitutional violations}; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 

(1981) (same}; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-333 (1986) 

(same}. See also Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 

F.2d 1375, 1379-80 (10th Cir.} (negligent conduct not constituting 

abuse of official power); cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985). 

Collisions between police vehicles and others caused by police 

negligence clearly fall on the "tort" side of the line. Paul, 424 

U.S. at 698-99; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544. This holding comports 

with the views of other circuits. See Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d 

947, 949-50 (11th Cir. 1986} (police cruiser collides with 

bystander's car); see also Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 

F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989} and Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 

1102, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1987} (police chasing suspect whose car 

collides with bystander's car). 4 

Continued from previous page 

R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 34, 

at 213 (5th ed. 1984} (reckless act is one done "in disregard of a 

known or obvious risk" likely to result in harm}; Model Penal Code 

§ 2.02(2)(c) (1985} (defining recklessness as conscious disregard 

of substantial and unjustifiable risk). 

4 We note that New Mexico police officers are not shielded from 

tort liability for reckless driving. The same statute that 

permits officers to exceed the speed limit in the course of their 

Continued to next page 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 5 
B 

Illegal Seizure 

Plaintiffs argue that Romero's actions constituted an 

unlawful seizure of Theresa in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This 

argument misperceives the nature of what constitutes a "seizure" 

for Fourth Amendment purposes. The Supreme Court has recently 

clarified the issue in a manner favorable to the defendants' 

position. 

In Brower v. County of Inyo, U.S. , 109 s.ct. 1378 

(1989), the Supreme Court held that a seizure must be "willful" to 

be actionable under the Fourth Amendment. 109 S.Ct. at 1381. The 

Court carefully distinguished between accidental and intentional 

detentions. Only unreasonable intentional detentions violate the 

Constitution. Id. at 1382. An action may lie for one 

intentionally but wrongly seized, see Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 

1205, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1985) (passenger in car stopped by 

roadblock was seized for constitutional purposes because officers 

intended to stop car); however, one seized unintentionally does 

not have a constitutional complaint. Brower, 109 S.Ct. at 1381. 

There is no allegation here that Romero intended to stop either 

Continued from previous page 

duties, provides for liability for injury arising from unjustified 

risks caused by officers. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-6 (allowing 

an emergency vehicle to disregard posted speed limits but not 

protecting driver from "consequences of his reckless disregard for 

safety of others.") Thus the fact that officers are permitted to 

drive in excess of the speed limit does not constitute an 

arbitrary use of government authority; it is carefully circumscribed by state law. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 6 
Theresa or her car; therefore, she was not unlawfully seized for 

Fourth Amendment purposes. 

Because plaintiffs have alleged no federal constitutional 

violations, we need not address the plaintiffs' claims against the 

sheriff's department, county, and other officers in their official 

capacities. Roach, 882 F.2d at 297-98. When there is no 

underlying constitutional violation by a county officer, there 

cannot be an action for failing to train or supervise the officer. 

City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). 

II 

Plaintiffs urge us to reconsider our decision in Trujillo v. 

Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1985), 

which required evidence of an intent to interfere with a protected 

relationship before a relative of a person injured or killed by a 

state actor could sustain a§ 1983 claim premised on a violation 

of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association. In 

formulating its intent requirement, the Trujillo opinion expressly 

considered a situation like the one at bar, noting that without an 

intent requirement, state actors could be liable to a parent whose 

child is killed in an automobile accident resulting from the 

negligence of a state official. 768 F.2d at 1190. Contrary to 

plaintiffs' arguments, the Supreme Court's recent cases requiring 

proof of more than negligence to support a§ 1983 action premised 

on the Due Process Clause are harmonious with the precedent of 

this circuit, including Trujillo, and we do not reconsider it at 

this point. Indeed, we have recently followed and reapplied the 

principles of Trujillo. See Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 7 
(10th Cir. 1990); Bryson v. City of Edmond, 

6100 (10th Cir. June 12, 1990). 

F.2d , No. 89-

Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment 

on the issue of due process and its dismissal of the plaintiffs' 

claims premised on the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1910 Document: 01019867873 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 8