Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-00750/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-00750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT E. KING,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER K. WOODEN and AGENT 

RUSHBROOK,

Defendants.

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Case No. 5:16-cv-0750-RDP-JEO

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff has filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging violations of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

(Doc. 1). The plaintiff names the following defendants in the complaint: Officer 

K. Wooden; and Agent Rushbrook. (Id. at 3).1

 The plaintiff seeks unspecified 

compensatory damages. (Id. at 4). In accordance with the usual practices of this 

court and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the complaint was referred to the undersigned 

magistrate judge for a preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. 

Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991).

 1 The plaintiff also names the Huntsville Police Department as a defendant. However, a 

municipal police department is not a legal entity capable of being sued under § 1983. Error! 

Main Document Only.Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1992).

FILED

 2016 Aug-24 PM 04:34

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, as partially codified at 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, requires this court to screen complaints filed by prisoners against 

government officers or employees. The court must dismiss the complaint or any 

portion thereof that it finds frivolous, malicious, seeks monetary damages from a 

defendant immune from monetary relief, or which does not state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Id. Moreover, the court may sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s complaint prior to service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Under § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be dismissed as 

“frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter 

alia, the defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a legal

right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327.

Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A review on 

this ground is governed by the same standards as dismissals for failure to state a 

claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

Case 5:16-cv-00750-RDP-JEO Document 7 Filed 08/24/16 Page 2 of 14
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678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “[f]actual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be a 

“‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, (alteration incorporated). But 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Similarly, when a successful 

affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations, appears on the face of a 

complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is also warranted. Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007).

Pro se pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted 

by attorneys” and are liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 

(11th Cir. 2006). However, they still must allege factual allegations that “raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266

(11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Factual Allegations

The plaintiff is an inmate in the Madison County Jail in Huntsville, 

Alabama. His complaint alleges the defendant Wooden “profiled” him when he

conducted a traffic stop that apparently led to his eventual arrest. (Doc. 1).2

 He 

 2 The complaint does not specifically identify the events as a traffic stop, as opposed to an onthe-street encounter. In any event, that distinction has no bearing on the outcome of this report 

and recommendation. 

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states Officer Wooden followed him until there was no one else in the area, then 

stopped him and asked for identification. Id. at 3. He alleges he heard the police 

dispatcher radio “1029 All Clear” when his identification was checked, and 

contends Wooden then “should have allowed [him] to be on [his] way.” Id. at 3. 

Instead, Wooden allegedly “lied” by telling the plaintiff there was an outstanding 

warrant against him, and proceeded to search him. Id. at 4. Consequently, the 

plaintiff contends the search was illegal, and that Wooden’s actions were racially 

discriminatory. Id. at 4. 

No direct allegations are made against defendant Rushbrook, other than to 

allege that he and Wooden “conspired against [the plaintiff]” because of his race.3

Id. at 5. The plaintiff now seeks compensatory damages for “everyday [he’s] 

incarcerated,” and contends the defendants should be “reprimanded.” Id. at 4. 

III. Analysis

Fourth Amendment:

The plaintiff has failed to state a claim of constitutional proportion with 

regard to the events surrounding the initial stop itself. Without providing any 

factual detail to support his conclusion, the plaintiff makes the naked assertion that 

his detention was the result of “profiling.” However, with regard to the legality of 

the stop itself, and any Fourth Amendment claims asserted on the basis thereof, the 

 3 The plaintiff states he is African-American, and that Rushbrook and Wooden are Caucasian. 

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motives of the officer(s) involved are not relevant.4 Instead, the existence (or lack 

thereof) of reasonable suspicion or probable cause determines the constitutional 

validity of the police action. 

While it is true that “[t]raffic stops qualify as seizures under the Fourth 

Amendment[,] ... a routine traffic stop is only a limited form of seizure, [and] is 

more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest.” U.S. v. 

Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2007). “Therefore, we analyze the 

legality of these stops under the standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968).” Id. Under Terry, “law enforcement officers may briefly detain a person 

for an investigatory stop if they have reasonable, articulable suspicion based on 

objective facts that the person has engaged, or is about to engage, in criminal 

activity.” U.S. v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Accordingly, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police 

have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren, 517 

U.S. at 810. This is an objective standard, which “foreclose[s] any argument that 

the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations 

of the individual officers involved.” Id. at 813.

5 For this reason, the plaintiff’s 

 4 Of course, there is distinction between Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, and the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition against selective 

enforcement of laws based upon considerations such as race. See Whren v. U.S. 517 U.S. 806, 

813 (1996). The equal protection issue is addressed infra. 5 See also, U.S. v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 194 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he constitutional 

reasonableness of a traffic stop must be determined irrespective of intent, whether of the 

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assertion that Wooden’s traffic stop was the result of racial profiling does not, 

alone, state a claim under the Fourth Amendment’s provision prohibiting 

unreasonable searches and seizures. 

The question then becomes whether or not the plaintiff had pled facts 

sufficient to show that Wooden lacked sufficient objective justification for the 

traffic stop. In that regard, the Supreme Court decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), are 

illustrative. Under the “plausibility standard” outlined by the Court in those 

decisions, a complaint can avoid dismissal only if it states a claim for relief that is 

“plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. A complaint falls short of this standard when all it offers is “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions 

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id.

In this instance, the plaintiff has presented nothing but the naked assertions 

that he was “profiled” by Officer Wooden, and that Wooden and Rushbrook 

“conspired” against him. He presents no specific factual background which 

demonstrates the Officers violated the directives in Terry by detaining him “absent 

 

particular officers involved or of the theoretical reasonable officer”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

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a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Jackson v. Sauls,

206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000). In other words, the complaint fails to 

plausibly show that the defendants violated Fourth Amendment Standards with 

regard to the initial traffic stop.

6

The plaintiff also presents allegations which imply that Officer Wooden 

prolonged the traffic stop beyond the duration “necessary to effectuate the purpose 

of the stop.” U.S. v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff 

contends that Wooden should have “allowed me to be on my way” after the 

dispatcher notified him of the “all clear,” but instead “lied” about an outstanding 

warrant and conducted a “false search” of his person. (Doc. 1 at 3).7

 It is true that 

“an officer’s investigation of a traffic stop must be reasonably related in scope to 

the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Ramirez, 476 

F.3d at 1236 (quoting United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 

2003). Therefore, a detention which exceeds the duration necessary to address the 

reason for the stop may violate the Fourth Amendment. However, an officer can 

lengthen the duration of the detention outside the reasons related to the initial stop 

 6 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 

merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

7 The plaintiff alleges Wooden’s continued detention and search of his person was the result of 

“profiling” and “discrimination.”(Doc. 1 at 3 and 4). 

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if he has “objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has 

occurred or is occurring,” or the initial detention “has become a consensual 

encounter. U.S. v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). In that respect, 

our courts recognize that “[a] variety of factors may contribute to the formation of 

an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity,” including things such as 

“having no proof of ownership of the vehicle, having no proof of authority to 

operate the vehicle, and inconsistent statements about destination.” Id.

8

As with the initial stop, the standard by which an officer’s decision to 

prolong a traffic stop is an objective one – i.e. reasonable suspicion of illegal 

activity. Purcell, supra. It therefore seems clear that the plaintiff’s allegation 

Officer Wooden prolonged the duration of the stop on the basis of racial profiling 

fails for the same reasons his claim regarding the initial stop is not cognizable. 

Officer Wooden’s subjective intentions or motives are not relevant to the question 

of whether or not he had an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

which would justify continued detention of the plaintiff. 

However, the plaintiff has alleged facts, taken as true for the purposes of this 

initial review, which indicate Officer Wooden prolonged the detention and 

conducted a search of the plaintiff’s person under circumstances lacking 

 8 Furthermore, under Terry, a police officer who has properly conducted an investigatory stop

may, even in the absence of probable cause to arrest, conduct a limited search of a person for the 

purpose of “the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” 

392 U.S. at 1882-83. 

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objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. As noted above, the plaintiff 

states he heard the dispatcher notify Wooden of the “all clear” with regard to the 

background check, but that Wooden lied about him having an outstanding warrant 

and used that falsehood to justify an illegal search. (Doc. 1 at 4). The plaintiff 

contends he subsequently discovered there was no outstanding warrant at that time, 

and argues the search was illegal.

9 Therefore, to the extent Officer Wooden 

detained the plaintiff beyond the time necessary to effectuate the reasons for the 

initial stop, and that this further detention was unaccompanied by a reasonable 

suspicion of illegal activity, the prolonged detention potentially violated the 

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. In that regard, the complaint has minimally 

stated a claim against defendant Wooden under § 1983.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court “has emphasized that the mandate of the 

Fourth Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes ... and that searches 

conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to 

a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. U.S., 389 

U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citation, footnote, and parenthesis omitted). Here, the only 

indicated reason for the search of the plaintiff on the occasion in question was the 

allegedly false assertion that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest – a 

 9 The plaintiff states: “Come to find out I didn’t have a warrant at all.” (Doc. 1 at 4). 

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reason that clearly would not justify any of the exceptions permitting a warrantless 

search. To that extent, the plaintiff has at least minimally stated a claim against 

Officer Wooden for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable search and seizure.

Equal Protection:

“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based upon 

considerations such as race.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813; see also Wayte v. U.S., 470 

U.S. 598, 608 (1985). In that regard, “the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment provides citizens a degree of protection independent of the 

Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Farm 

Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 533 

(6th Cir. 2002); quoting United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 352 (6th Cir.1997). 

Therefore, if the plaintiff can show the he was “subjected to unequal treatment 

based upon [his] race or ethnicity during the course of an otherwise lawful traffic 

stop, that would be sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause.” Id. 

Unlike the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims, the subjective intent of the 

defendants is relevant to the extent the plaintiff asserts a selective enforcement 

claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whren, 

517 U.S. at 813. However, as with his Fourth Amendment claim, the plaintiff 

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cannot simply make the naked assertion, without factual support, that he was 

discriminated against on the basis of his race. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A 

pleading that offers labels and conclusion or a formulaic recitation of the elements 

of a cause of action will not do”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the 

plaintiff must present evidence that he was “singled out for prosecution although 

others similarly situated who have committed the same acts have not been 

prosecuted,” and he must show that “the government’s selective prosecution [was] 

motivated by constitutionally impermissible motives such as racial or religious 

discrimination or his exercise of constitutional rights.” Owen v. Wainwright, 806 

F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1986); see also U.S. v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 

1996) (“To establish discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show 

people of another race violated the law and the law was not enforced against 

them”). Absent such evidence, this court has “no basis for inferring racially 

selective law enforcement.” Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 1000 (11th 

Cir. 1995)

In this instance, the plaintiff presents no factual basis to support his claim 

that he was detained and searched because of his race. For purposes of a Rule 

12(b)(6) analysis, his bare allegations of discriminatory intent are not entitled to 

the usual assumption of truth and therefore fall short of asserting a “plausible” 

claim under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

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Conspiracy:

“Conspiracy to violate another person’s constitutional rights violates section 

1983.” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). 

“To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the 

defendants reached an understanding or agreement that they would deny the 

plaintiff one of his constitutional rights; and (2) the conspiracy resulted in an actual 

denial of one of his constitutional rights.” Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s 

Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015). However, the “naked assertion” of 

conspiracy without “supporting operative facts” is not sufficient to state a claim. 

See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Allegations of 

conspiracy must be specific and based upon facts rather than conclusions, and 

vague or general claims of conspiracy will not suffice. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 

F.2d 553, 556-557 (11th Cir. 1984). 

In this case, the plaintiff does nothing more than allege that the defendants 

conspired against him. He provides no factual basis to show how the defendants 

reached an understanding or agreement to violate his rights, much less that any 

agreement resulted in an actual denial of his constitutional rights. Under the 

complaint as presently pled, the court cannot reasonably infer that the defendants 

conspired with each other to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights. Iqbal, supra. 

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IV. Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that all 

claims in this action, except the Fourth Amendment claims against Officer 

Wooden arising from the continued detention and search of the plaintiff, be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is also 

RECOMMENDED that the remaining Fourth Amendment claims against 

Officer Wooden be referred to the undersigned for further proceedings. 

V. Notice of Right to Object

The plaintiff may file specific written objections to this report and 

recommendation. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 

fourteen (14) calendar days from the date the report and recommendation is 

entered. Objections should specifically identify all findings of fact and 

recommendations to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. 

Failure to object to factual findings will bar later review of those findings, except 

for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Objections also should specifically identify all claims 

contained in the complaint that the report and recommendation fails to address. 

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Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or 

repeat legal arguments.

Upon receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will make a de 

novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which 

specific objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, 

the findings of fact and recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The 

district judge also may refer this action back to the magistrate judge with 

instructions for further proceedings.

The plaintiff may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 

Circuit. The plaintiff may only appeal from a final judgment entered by a district 

judge.

DATED, this 24th day of August, 2016.

_________________________________

JOHN E. OTT

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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