Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01729/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01729-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Julio Cesar Morales, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01729-PHX-DJH (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Julio Cesar Morales has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Doc. 1.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because 

he has not shown that the state court’s resolution of these claims was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, or based on an 

unreasonable determination of federal law. (Doc. 11.) Petitioner has filed a reply in 

support of his Petition. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the 

Petition be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 In June 2010, Petitioner was arrested during a traffic stop. (Doc. 11, Ex. K at 1.) 

Petitioner was a passenger in a car that Ashley Botello was driving; the car had invalid 

license plates. (Id.) Botello consented to a search of the car, during which police officers 

discovered approximately forty-eight pounds of marijuana. (Id.) Botello and Petitioner 

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admitted knowing of the marijuana and that it was being transported from Douglas, 

Arizona to Phoenix, Arizona. (Id.) Petitioner stated that he was being paid $2,000.00 to 

transport the marijuana. (Id.) 

 Petitioner was indicted in the Pinal County Superior Court on one count of 

transportation of marijuana for sale (Count One), and one count of possession of 

marijuana for sale (Count Two), both class two felonies. (Doc. 11, Ex. A.) Petitioner 

was initially represented by Kent Volkmer. (Doc. 11, Ex. K at 1.) However, he was later 

represented by David Gregan, and then Matthew Brown. (Doc. 11, Ex. J at 3-4.) While 

represented by Brown, on October 11, 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of 

marijuana for sale pursuant to a plea agreement. (Doc. 11, Ex. F.) In exchange for 

Petitioner’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss Count One, allegations of prior felony 

convictions, and allegations that Petitioner committed the offense when he was on parole. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. H at 1-2.) The plea agreement stipulated to a sentence of eight years’ 

imprisonment. (Id. at 1.) At the change of plea hearing, the trial court found that 

Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and was not the result of 

force or threats. (Doc. 11, Ex. F at 15-16.) On November 7, 2011, the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to eight years’ imprisonment in accordance with the plea agreement. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. G at 7-8.) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On January 26, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in the trial 

court.1

 (Doc. 11, Ex. I.) On September 13, 2012, Petitioner, though counsel, filed a 

petition arguing that trial counsel Volkmer provided ineffective assistance by failing to 

correctly convey the terms of the plea offers. (Doc. 11, Ex. J at 6-7.) Petitioner also 

argued that his second attorney, Gregan, was ineffective for advising Petitioner to delay 

 

1

 By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B). Petitioner, however, retained the right to seek review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to Rule 32. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 

32.4. 

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accepting a plea offer that included a term of up to 3.5 years’ imprisonment and by 

promising Petitioner that he could obtain a more favorable plea offer. (Id. at 7.) 

 1. Evidentiary Hearing 

 On January 18, 2013, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to consider 

Petitioner’s claims. (Doc. 11, Ex. C.) During the hearing, Petitioner, his girlfriend 

Stephanie Arvayo, and the prosecutors and defense attorneys who participated in 

Petitioner’s criminal case testified. (Id.) Volkmer testified that during August and 

September 2010, he and prosecutor Mark Bennink discussed a possible guilty plea offer 

through email. (Id. at 13, 171-72.) Bennink testified that he initially offered a plea in 

Early Disposition Court for probation. (Id. at 9-10.) However, Bennink withdrew the 

offer after Volkmer informed him that Petitioner’s prior convictions disqualified him 

from this offer. (Id. at 9-10.) 

 Bennink later extended a short-term offer for Petitioner to plead guilty to a class 

four felony with a sentence capped at 2.5 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 11, 175.) Bennink 

made this offer orally and did not put it in writing. (Id. at 24, 175.) Volkmer testified 

that he could not remember if he conveyed this plea offer to Petitioner. (Id. at 175, 192.) 

He explained that his file included general references such as “reviewed pleas, jail visit,” 

but did not specifically state whether he told Petitioner about the plea offer for 2.5 years’ 

imprisonment. (Id.) Volkmer testified that his “practice” was “to convey an 

offer . . . once it [was] made.” (Id. at 183.) 

 Petitioner testified that he met with Volkmer on August 11, 2010 and that 

Volkmer told him about “the plea.” (Id. at 145.) Later that day, Petitioner called his 

mother on a monitored jail phone. (Id. at 146-47.) The recording of the telephone call, 

which was admitted as an exhibit at the evidentiary hearing (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 50-51), 

includes the following exchange between Petitioner and his mother. 

[Petitioner:] The attorney came with one of those for two 

years. 

[Mother:] What did he tell you? 

 * * * 

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[Petitioner:] He came with one for — for two years, seems like he wants me to do two years. 

[Mother:] They want you to . . . but no, but you haven’t had a 

hearing [yet] Julio. 

[Petitioner:] Ma, but they give me a plea mom. It’s one (inaudible) they make you a plea and I wasn’t going to sign it but I am going to sign it because you don’t have money to get 

me out at any rate. 

[Mother:] I don’t know, don’t give up, Morales. What do you mean you’re going to sign, man, don’t give up. 

 * * * 

[Mother:] But when do you have to sign it? 

 * * * 

[Petitioner:] Ma, but I have court this, this Monday, mom. This Monday is when I have to sign. This Monday. 

[Mother:] Why this Monday? Before court? 

[Petitioner:] I am going to court on Monday, mom . . . . [I]f I don’t sign, then I am going to trial . . 

[Petitioner:] So I don’t sign then, mom? 

[Mother]: Don’t sign, son. Wait until Monday and don’t 

worry, son. 

* * * 

[Petitioner]: I told my attorney today . . . you wanted to get 

me a private attorney. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. S at 3-6.) The first pretrial conference was Monday, August 16, 2010. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. C at 25.) Because Petitioner did not accept the plea offer, Bennink 

withdrew it. (Id. at 24.) 

 Bennink extended another plea offer for a stipulated, presumptive sentence of 4.5 

years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 21, 173.) Petitioner believed that his co-defendant Botello 

had accepted a plea offer that included a two-year prison sentence. (Id. at 125-26, 132.) 

Volkmer testified that Petitioner told him that he would not accept an offer that included 

a prison sentence longer than one year. (Id. at 184, 190-91, 195.) On August 18, 2010, 

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Volkmer asked Bennink if he would consider offering a plea that included a sentence of 

one to 1.5 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 174; Doc. 11, Ex. D.) On September 22, 2010, 

Bennink presented a modified, written plea offer. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 10 at 25, 173, 185.) 

The plea offer provided that Petitioner would plead guilty to attempted possession of over 

four pounds of marijuana for sale, a class three felony, with a prison term capped at the 

presumptive 3.5 year sentence (the 3.5-year offer). (Doc. 11, Ex. E.) The plea offer 

stated that it expired at the second pretrial conference. (Id.) However, Bennink testified 

that he and other prosecutors were “lenient” about such deadlines and sometimes 

reopened expired offers if the defendant accepted after the expiration date. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. C at 25.) Petitioner’s third attorney, Matthew Brown, also testified that prosecutors 

in Pinal County often made “open-ended” plea offers and if a plea offer had an expiration 

date, if “things were still being worked out,” the prosecutors would allow a defendant to 

enter a plea after the expiration date. (Id. at 60-61.) Because the second pretrial 

conference took place before Bennink presented the September 22, 2010 plea offer, 

Bennink testified that the language about the plea offer’s expiration date was “standard” 

language that he included in his plea offers and that the deadline in Petitioner’s case 

appeared “more flexible.” (Id. at 25.) 

 Although the written plea offer described the prison term as capped at 3.5 years, 

Volkmer testified that he could not remember whether he told Petitioner that the prison 

term was capped or stipulated. (Id. at 174-75.) Petitioner testified that Volkmer never 

showed him a written plea offer and that Volkmer described the plea offer as including a 

prison term of “three-and-a-half” without further explanation. (Id. at 124.) Petitioner 

continued asking about the possibility of probation. (Id. at 124, 129.) Petitioner testified 

that Volkmer told him it “wasn’t getting better than three-and-a-half” and that he told him 

to accept the plea offer. (Id. at 129, 142.) Petitioner stated that “that’s when he told 

[Volkmer he was] looking into hiring a new lawyer.” (Id.) Petitioner also testified that 

Volkmer told him that the plea offer did not have an expiration date, but that he should 

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not “take too long.” (Id. at 124.) Volkmer testified that Petitioner told him if could not 

get him a better deal, he would hire another lawyer who could. (Id. at 129, 178, 191.) 

 Petitioner testified that when he was in jail, he met an inmate who was represented 

by private attorney David Gregan and received probation for charges similar to 

Petitioner’s. (Id. at 126-27.) Sometime between fall 2010 and early 2011, Petitioner and 

his girlfriend Arvayo met with Gregan. (Id. at 69, 77, 128.) Gregan testified that 

Petitioner was unhappy with the 3.5-year offer. (Id. at 82, 83.) Gregan testified that he 

had practiced in Pinal County for “a number of years,” and based on the charges and the 

prosecutor, he believed he could obtain a more favorable plea offer. (Id. at 70.) 

Petitioner testified that Gregan told him he thought Bennink was “lazy” and that he could 

get a more favorable offer from him. (Id. at 139.) Gregan testified that he did not 

“promise” that he could obtain a better offer. (Id. at 83-85.) He explained that he 

“usually” tells his clients, “I can’t promise results, all I can promise is effort . . . .” (Id. at 

85.) On February 28, 2011, Gregan substituted as Petitioner’s counsel. (Id. at 77.) 

 Gregan testified that he told Petitioner to pursue a GED and get a job to improve 

his position during negotiations and sentencing. (Id. at 71.) He testified that “it was 

certainly possible” that he had told Petitioner he would continue the case to give 

Petitioner time develop his “track record.” (Id.) The case was continued several times. 

(Id. at 14.) Gregan testified that he had trouble reaching Bennink by telephone. (Id.

at 72-73.) Bennink agreed that Gregan left him at least one voice message to which he 

never responded. (Id. at 14, 43.) Gregan testified that he contacted Bennink by “hunting 

him down in court.” (Id. at 73.) 

 In March 2011, a trial date was set for July 26, 2011. (Id. at 48-49, 71, 79.) 

Because the date conflicted with Bennink’s schedule, he had the case transferred to 

another prosecutor, Jill Sosin. (Id. at 19, 39, 48.) Sosin testified that Bennink discussed 

the history of the plea offers and that he indicated that “his view was that he would leave 

the plea [for up to 3.5 years’ imprisonment] open until — I believe there was a time that 

Mr. Gregan and Defendant set the case for trial.” (Id. at 40.) Sosin stated at that point 

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Gregan believed the plea offer had been rejected. (Id.) Gregan met with Sosin about 

accepting the “original” plea offer [for 3.5 years’ imprisonment]. (Id. at 40, 42-43.) 

Sosin told Gregan that she and Bennink had assumed that Petitioner had rejected the 3.5-

year offer when Gregan set the case for trial and she refused to reinstate the offer. (Id. at 

43.) Gregan testified that he did not recall the circumstances under which trial was set, 

other than it was set “suddenly.” (Id. at 72.) Sosin testified that her practice was to 

“uphold the expiration date” of a plea offer. (Id. at 41.) Gregan tried to speak with 

Sosin’s supervisor about reinstating the plea offer, but was unsuccessful. (Id. at 76.) 

 Petitioner was unable to pay Gregan’s fee for taking the case to trial and Gregan 

withdrew from the case on July 25, 2011. (Id. at 49, 72.) Matthew Brown was appointed 

to represent Petitioner. (Id. at 52, 80.) Gregan testified that he contacted Brown about 

the case and gave him his file. (Id. at 80-81.) Sosin then extended a plea offer for eight 

years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 47, 58.) Brown testified that Petitioner indicated that 

previously he had been offered a better plea, which he rejected because he “believed he 

could get a better plea,” and that he had not wanted to take the plea offer that was 

presented to him when Volkmer represented him. (Id. at 64-65.) Petitioner accepted the 

plea offer for eight years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 47.) 

 2. The Trial Court’s Ruling 

 After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief on 

February 4, 2013. (Doc. 11, Ex. K.) In its minute entry, the court found that Volkmer’s 

testimony and the recorded jail call showed that Volkmer accurately communicated both 

the 2.5-year and 3.5-year plea offers to Petitioner and that Petitioner refused to accept 

them. (Id. at 3.) Instead, Petitioner hired private counsel to obtain a better deal. (Id.) 

The court further held that Gregan’s advice that Petitioner should delay accepting the 3.5-

year offer was not a guarantee that Gregan would obtain a better plea offer, but a 

reasonable strategy designed to obtain a better offer from Bennink, whom Gregan 

reasonably believed would not want to take the case to trial. (Id. at 3-4.) The court 

further noted that Gregan’s strategy no longer worked when Sosin took over the case. 

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(Id. at 3.) However, Gregan had no reason to believe that Sosin would take over the case. 

(Id.) Additionally, Gregan and Bennink both testified that the practice was to leave a 

plea offer “on the table” after its expiration date and there was no evidence that, after 

Sosin took over the case, she gave Gregan any notice that the plea would be withdrawn. 

(Id.) The court stated that, although Sosin was not required to give Gregan such notice, 

her failure to do so deprived Gregan of the opportunity to notify Petitioner that if he did 

not accept the plea offer by a certain date, it would be withdrawn. (Id.) The court 

concluded that Volkmer’s and Gregan’s representation was not objectively unreasonable 

and, therefore, Petitioner had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Id.) On March 28, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. L.) On September 11, 2013, the court denied the motion. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. M.) 

 3. Higher State Court Review 

 On October 9, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro per petition for review in the Arizona 

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11, Ex. N.) Petitioner asserted that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying his two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 7.) The 

appellate court granted review but denied relief in a memorandum decision dated 

February 10, 2014. (Doc. 11, Ex. O.) The court agreed with the trial court’s finding that 

Volkmer accurately communicated both plea offers to Petitioner — one for a two-year 

prison term and the other capped at 3.5 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 2.) The court also 

affirmed the trial court’s finding that Gregan did not promise a better plea offer, but 

instead pursued a reasonable strategy of positioning his client for a better offer closer to 

trial. (Id. at 3.) 

 On April 1, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 11, Ex. P.) Petitioner challenged only the court of appeals’ denial of the 

ineffective assistance claim against Gregan. (Id.) On April 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a 

petition for sentence reduction in the Arizona Supreme Court, in which he raised a claim 

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regarding Gregan’s representation. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) On July 7, 2014, the Arizona 

Supreme Court summarily denied both petitions. (Doc. 11, Ex. R.) 

 C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts the following two 

grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel Gregan was ineffective for promising Petitioner a plea 

offer that was more favorable than the “original offer of 3.5 years” (Ground One); and 

(2) trial counsel Volkmer was ineffective for failing or refusing to accurately convey to 

Petitioner the “original plea offer” in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

(Doc. 1 at 6 − 7.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief 

because his claims lack merit and he has not shown that the state court’s rejection of 

these claims was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or that it was 

contrary to, or based on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.2

 

(Doc. 11 at 2, 9-10.) Petitioner disputes Respondents’ assertion. (Doc. 12.) 

II. Federal Review of Claims Adjudicated in State Court

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas corpus relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the 

state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings 

of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. 

Fisher, __ U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable 

application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts” based on the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). This standard is “difficult 

to meet.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating 

 

2

 Respondents state that Petitioner properly exhausted his claims by presenting them to the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 11 at 7 n.5); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that to exhaust a claim, a petitioner “must have presented his federal, constitutional issue before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his appellate briefing”). Thus, as Petitioner requests in his Reply (Doc. 12 at 2), the Court considers the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims under the applicable standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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state court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). When evaluating state court decisions on habeas review, 

federal courts look through summary or unexplained higher state court opinion to the last 

reasoned decision on the claim. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2004). Here, the last reasoned state court decision addressing Petitioner’s claims is the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. (Doc. 11, Ex. O.) 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

Federal courts may also grant habeas corpus relief when the state-court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it 

conversely, a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process 

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unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not 

merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th 

Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds, Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th 

Cir. 2014); see Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (the 

statutory presumption of correctness applies to findings by both trial courts and appellate 

courts). Additionally, state court findings of fact are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with “clear and convincing 

evidence.” Id. 

 When a state court decision is deemed to be contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless the erroneous state 

court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

 Here, because the pending petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard applies 

and the court does not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. See 

Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 

F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court “need not conduct harmless 

error review of Strickland violations under Brecht . . . because ‘[t]he; Strickland prejudice 

analysis is complete in itself; there is no place for additional harmless-error review.”)). 

III. Standards to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner 

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

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Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong 

presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is 

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The court 

need not address both Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient 

showing on one. See id. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should 

be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to 

satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other”) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, ___ 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 

(2010)). If counsel has misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea negotiation, 

or improperly coerced a defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s performance may 

be found deficient. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) 

(counsel’s erroneous legal advice about possibility of conviction that led to rejection of 

plea offer constituted deficient performance). “If a plea bargain has been offered, a 

defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept 

it.” Id. at 1387. 

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 When a petitioner has pleaded guilty, to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong he 

must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (citations omitted). To show that prejudice resulted from the 

ineffective assistance of counsel “where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because 

of counsel’s deficient performance, [a petitioner] must demonstrate a reasonable 

probability” that (1) he “would have accepted the earlier plea offer,” and (2) “the plea 

would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to 

accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law.” Frye, 132 

S. Ct. at 1409. 

IV. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

A. Ground One — Gregan’s Representation 

 In Ground One Petitioner asserts that trial counsel Gregan was ineffective because 

he promised Petitioner a plea offer more favorable than the plea offer that his prior 

counsel Volkmer had negotiated, which included up to 3.5 years’ imprisonment, and that 

after “months of delays and a lack of communication,” Gregan presented Petitioner with 

a plea offer for eight years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 1 at 6.) After holding an evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court rejected these claims. (Doc. 11, Exs. C, K.) The appellate court 

affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Doc. 11, Ex. O.) As discussed below, Petitioner has not 

shown that the state court’s decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or that it is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on the claims 

asserted in Ground One. 

 1. Promise to Obtain a More Favorable Plea Offer 

 Although a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law 

and fact, Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 2006), the resolution of 

Petitioner’s claim that Gregan was ineffective for promising to obtain a more favorable 

plea offer turns on a factual issue that the appellate court resolved against Petitioner. (See

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Doc. 11, Ex. O at 3.) The record supports the state court’s finding that Gregan did not 

unequivocally promise Petitioner that he would obtain a plea offer that would include a 

prison sentence of less than 3.5 years. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 11, Ex. O at 85.) During the 

evidentiary hearing on post-conviction review, Gregan, Arvayo, and Petitioner testified 

about their meeting to discuss Gregan’s representation of Petitioner. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 

69, 93-93, 128-29.) Arvayo and Petitioner testified that Gregan guaranteed them that he 

could obtain a plea offer that included a sentence of 1.5 years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 94, 

132.) Gregan testified that he believed he could obtain a plea offer that included less than 

3.5 years’ imprisonment, but that he did not promise that result. (Doc. 11, Ex. C, at 84-

85, 113, 165.) He testified that he followed his standard practice in Petitioner’s case, 

which included telling clients he could not promise results, only effort. (Id. at 85.) 

 After observing Gregan, Arvayo, and Petitioner testify, the trial court credited 

Gregan’s testimony. See Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(concluding that the trial court, which observed counsel during trial, did not make an 

unreasonable determination of the facts and deferring to the trial court’s rejection of trial 

counsel’s assertion of inadequate performance). On habeas corpus review, this Court 

may not “redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the 

state trial court.” Aiken v. Blodgett, 921 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Lonberger, 

459 U.S. at 434). 

 Petitioner disagrees with the trial court’s finding. (Docs. 1, 12.) He argues that 

“Gregan promised a better plea,” and states that his allegation that Gregan promised a 

better plea offer is supported by “sworn affidavits.” (Doc. 12 at 5.) Petitioner does not 

cite the affidavits to which he is referring. (Id.) However, he is likely referring to several 

affidavits he attached to his Petition. (Doc. 1 at 46-55, 60-63.) These include 

Petitioner’s affidavit (Doc. 1 at 46-49), and the affidavits of Arvayo (Id. at 50-52), Brown 

(Id. at 53-55), and post-conviction counsel Harriett Levitt (Id. at 60-63). These affidavits 

were submitted to the superior court on post-conviction review in 2012. These affidavits 

were before the trial court and the appellate court on post-conviction review and do not 

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constitute “clear and convincing evidence” to rebut the presumption that the state court’s 

determination of this factual issue was correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (providing 

that a state court’s determination of a factual issue is “presumed to be correct” and a 

petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 

convincing evidence.”). Although these affidavits lend support to Petitioner’s assertion 

that Gregan promised a better plea offer, they were considered by the post-conviction 

court which also considered Gregan’s testimony that he did not promise to obtain a better 

offer. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, a fact finder’s choice 

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 919 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 226 (1988)). 

 Thus, the record supports the state court’s finding that Gregan did not promise to 

obtain a more favorable plea offer from the State. Because this Court must defer to that 

finding, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance based on Gregan’s alleged promise 

fails because Petitioner has not offered clear and convincing evidence to rebut the 

presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 

943, 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that presumption of correctness applies to “state 

court findings of fact made in the course of resolving claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”); see also Miller v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 2013) (presuming 

correct the trial court’s finding that a defense attorney relayed the prosecutor’s rejection 

of a plea counteroffer to the petitioner because there was no clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary). “The presumption of correctness applies not only to express 

findings of fact, but also applies equally to unarticulated findings that are necessary to the 

state court’s conclusions of mixed questions of fact and law.” Cooper, 510 F.3d at 919 

(citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983) (applying the presumption of 

correctness to a credibility determination which was implicit in the court’s rejection of 

the defendant’s claim)). 

 Thus, the state court’s finding that Gregan did not promise to obtain a more 

favorable plea offer is a reasonable determination of the facts, and is entitled to deference 

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under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). Considering the state court’s presumably 

correct finding that Gregan did not promise to obtain a better plea offer, which is 

supported by the record, Petitioner has not shown that Gregan’s performance was 

deficient and, thus, has not met Strickland’s first requirement. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that the state court’s finding that 

Gregan’s performance was not deficient is based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). 

 2. Gregan’s Negotiation Strategy 

 In Ground Two, Plaintiff also challenges Gregan’s negotiation strategy. (Doc. 1 at 

6.) In his Reply, Petitioner expands this claim to allege that Gregan failed to inform the 

new prosecutor, Sosin, that the delay in responding the plea offer was Gregan’s fault. 

(Doc. 12 at 5.) The court of appeals determined that Gregan’s strategy — to delay 

accepting the 3.5-year plea offer and wait for Bennink to make a better offer — was a 

legitimate trial strategy and was not deficient performance. Petitioner has failed to show 

the appellate court’s determination was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts, or that it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 

U.S.C. § 22254(d). 

 “Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with uncertainty, 

and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in balancing opportunities and 

risks.” Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). There are “special difficulties in 

evaluating the basis for counsel’s judgment [in the context of plea negotiations]: An 

attorney often has insights borne of past dealings with the same prosecutor or court, and 

the record at the pretrial stage is never as full as it is after a trial.” Id. at 125. “[H]abeas 

courts must respect their limited role in determining whether there was manifest 

deficiency in light of information then available to counsel.” Id. (citing Lockhart v. 

Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)). 

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 Petitioner has not presented evidence sufficient to rebut the trial court’s conclusion 

that Gregan believed that his bargaining position would strengthen over time because 

Bennink would not want to take the case to trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. K at 3.) The record 

supports the state court’s determination. Gregan’s strategy failed when Sosin took over 

the case and refused to honor the plea offer for 3.5 years’ imprisonment. However, as the 

state court found, Gregan did not perform deficiently by advising Petitioner to delay in 

accepting the 3.5-year offer. (Doc. 11, Exs. K, O.) Gregan’s advice was based on the 

charges against Petitioner, his experience as a defense attorney in Pinal County, his 

familiarity with Pinal County prosecutors, including Bennink, and his belief — based on 

those factors — that he could obtain a better plea offer from Bennink closer to trial. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. C 68, 70, 87); see Premo, 562 U.S. at 125 (stating that “an attorney often 

has insights borne of past dealings with the same prosecutor or court,” that are relevant 

when assessing counsel’s performance). 

 Additionally, Gregan, Bennink, and Brown testified that the practice in Pinal 

County was to leave plea offers open even after a stated expiration date. (Doc. 11, Ex. C 

at 25, 60-61, 86-87.) Indeed, the 3.5-year plea offer in this case was made after the 

expiration date (the second pretrial conference) that was stated on the face of the offer. 

(Id. at 25; Doc. 11, Ex. E.) Bennink explained that the statement that the plea would 

expire at the second pretrial conference was standard language that he included in his 

plea offers, and that the deadline for Petitioner to accept the plea was “flexible.” 

(Doc. 11, Ex. C at 25.) 

 Prosecutor Sosin, who upheld plea expiration dates, took over Petitioner’s case 

from Bennink. (Id. at 41.) As the state court found, Gregan had no reason to expect that 

Sosin would take over the case. (Doc. 11, Ex. K at 3.) Additionally, although Sosin 

testified that she was familiar with Bennink’s practices regarding plea offers, there is no 

evidence that she notified Gregan that she would withdraw the 3.5-year plea offer unless 

Petitioner accepted it by a certain date. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 88.) Gregan testified that 

Sosin took over the case suddenly and “pulled the plea without notice.” (Id. at 89.) 

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Gregan testified that he “believ[ed]” he told Sosin that the delay in accepting the plea was 

not Petitioner’s fault. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 74.) 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s determination that 

Gregan’s performance was not objectively unreasonable is based on an unreasonable 

determination the facts, or that it is contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner has not established a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel based on Gregan’s strategy, including his alleged failure 

to tell the prosecutor that his delay strategy was not attributable to Petitioner. 

 Because the record supports the state court’s finding that Gregan’s performance 

was not deficient, the Court need not reach Strickland’s prejudice prong. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697. Moreover, even assuming Gregan’s performance was deficient for advising 

Petitioner to delay in accepting the 3.5-year plea offer, Petitioner has not shown that he 

was prejudiced by that advice. To show that prejudice resulted from the ineffective 

assistance of counsel “where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s 

deficient performance, [a petitioner] must demonstrate a reasonable probability” that 

(1) he “would have accepted the earlier plea offer,” and (2) “the plea would have been 

entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they 

had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 

 The record includes evidence that Petitioner expressed to each of his attorneys that 

he would not be satisfied with a plea offer that included a sentence in excess of 1.5 years. 

(Doc. 64-65, 81-82, 83, 132, 184, 190-91); see Barnes v. Hammer, 765 F.3d 810, 814 

(8th Cir. 2014) (finding that the petitioner “did not turn down a legitimate plea offer due 

to incompetent advice” but instead “turned it down for a host of other personal reasons, 

including that he did not want to do jail time, and that he was trying to get a better deal 

for his friend”). Thus, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that but for 

Gregan’s alleged deficient performance he would have accepted the plea offer that 

included a 3.5-year prison sentence. 

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 Therefore, Petitioner cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

and, thus, cannot show that the state court’s rejection of this claim is based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts or that it is contrary to or based on an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 3. Whether Gregan Abandoned Petitioner 

 In his Reply, Petitioner argues that Gregan “abruptly abandoned [him] after we 

were unable to give Gregan additional money . . . .” (Doc. 12 at 2.) Petitioner did not 

include this claim in his Petition. (Doc. 1 at 6.) The Court need not consider this 

argument because it was raised for the first time in Petitioner’s reply. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (claim raised for first time in a reply will 

not be considered); Lewis v. Witek, 927 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (same). 

 Moreover, Petitioner did not present this specific claim to the trial and appellate 

courts on post-conviction review. In his petition for post-conviction relief and his 

petition for review, Petitioner stated that after the case was set for trial, Gregan withdrew 

as counsel because Petitioner could not pay his fee to take the case to trial. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. J at 4, Ex. N at 4.) However, Petitioner did not specifically argue that Gregan was 

ineffective for withdrawing as counsel, or for abandoning him. (Doc. 11, Exs. J, Ex. N.) 

Because Petitioner did not fairly present his abandonment claim to the state courts, 

habeas corpus review of his claim would likely be technically exhausted and procedurally 

barred. (Doc. 11, Exs. J, K, N, O); see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989) 

(stating that a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus 

review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claim to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a 

general rule, when [claims] are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 postconviction proceeding, subsequent claims [] will be deemed waived and precluded.”) 

(internal quotation omitted). 

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 Even assuming this claim were properly before the Court, Petitioner has not 

shown that Gregan was ineffective for withdrawing as counsel or that he abandoned 

Petitioner. The record reflects that Gregan withdrew as counsel because Petitioner was 

unable to pay his fee to take the case to trial. (Doc. 11, Ex. 49, 70.) Brown was 

appointed to represent Petitioner. (Id. at 52.) Immediately thereafter, Gregan contacted 

Brown about the case and gave him Petitioner’s file. (Id. at 80-81.) Although Gregan 

withdrew as counsel, the record reflects that he did not abandon Petitioner. Petitioner 

was appointed new counsel and Gregan provided him with Petitioner’s case file. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that Gregan’s performance was deficient and thus he 

has not established a claim of ineffective assistance based on Gregan’s withdrawal as 

counsel. See Rios, 299 F.3d at 805 (stating that “[f]ailure to satisfy either prong of the 

Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688). 

B. Ground Two — Volkmer’s Representation 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner claims that Volkmer failed to accurately convey the 

2.5-year plea offer to him. (Doc. 1 at 7.) He also asserts that Volkmer did not physically 

produce the 3.5-year plea offer and inaccurately told Petitioner that the plea offer was 

stipulated at 3.5 years instead of capped at 3.5 years. (Id.) On post-conviction review, 

the trial court rejected this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and the appellate 

court affirmed. (Doc. 11, Exs. K, O.) As discussed below, Petitioner has not shown that 

the state court’s resolution of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts, or that it was contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 As set forth above, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 

of law and fact. Lankford, 468 F.3d at 583. However, the resolution of Ground Two 

turns on a factual issue that the state court resolved against Petitioner, whether Volkmer 

accurately conveyed both plea offers to Petitioner. (See Doc. 11, Exs. K, O at 2-3.) The 

record supports the state court’s finding that Volkmer accurately conveyed the plea 

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offers. At the post-conviction hearing, Volkmer and Bennink testified that a two-year 

offer was made with a very short window. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 11, 175.) Volkmer did not 

specifically recall whether he conveyed that offer to Petitioner. (Id. at 175, 192.) 

However, upon review of his notes, he believed he did. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 189.) 

Additionally, a recorded telephone call from Petitioner to his mother on August 11, 2010, 

indicated that Petitioner was aware of the approximately two-year offer and that he had 

less than a week to accept it. (Doc. 11, Ex. S; Doc. 11, Ex. C 125-26.) During that 

conversation, Petitioner stated that “the Attorney came up with one of these for two 

years.” (Doc. 11, Ex. S at 2-3.) Later during the conversation, Petitioner stated that he 

had to sign the agreement by his Monday court date. (Id. at 3-4.) After a long 

conversation with his mother during which she said don’t “give up,” “[d]on’t sign, son,” 

and to wait, he did not accept the plea. (Id. at 5-8.) 

 The state courts’ conclusion that Volkmer described the 3.5-year offer as including 

a sentence that was capped at 3.5 years’ imprisonment is supported by the text of the 

written plea agreement. (Doc. 11, Ex. E at 1-2.) Additionally, during the post-conviction 

evidentiary hearing, Petitioner did not testify that Volkmer described the plea offer as 

including a “stipulated” term of 3.5 years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 123-25.) 

Although Petitioner testified that Volkmer did not state that the prison term was 

“capped,” his testimony does not render the state court’s determination of the facts 

unreasonable. Rather, “[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, a fact 

finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Cooper, 510 F.3d at 919 

(citing Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 226). Additionally, on habeas corpus review, this Court may 

not “redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state 

trial court.” Aiken, 921 F.2d at 217 (citing Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 434). 

 Petitioner has not offered clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption 

of correctness that applies to the state court’s finding that Volkmer accurately conveyed 

the terms of the 2.5-year offer and the 3.5-year plea offer. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Lambert, 393 F.3d at 977, 978 (stating that presumption of correctness applies to “state 

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court findings of fact made in the course of resolving claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”); Miller, 714 F.3d at 902 (presuming correct the trial court’s finding that a 

defense attorney relayed the prosecutor’s rejection of a plea counteroffer to the petitioner 

because there was no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary). 

 Therefore, the state court’s finding that the Volkmer accurately conveyed the plea 

offers to Petitioner is a reasonable determination of the facts, and is entitled to deference 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). Considering the state court’s presumably 

correct finding that Volkmer accurately conveyed the plea offers, Petitioner’s has not 

shown that Volkmer’s performance was deficient and, thus, has not met Strickland’s first 

requirement. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, Petitioner has not 

established that the state court’s finding that Volkmer’s performance was not deficient is 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or is contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

 Because the record supports the State court’s finding that Volkmer’s performance 

was not deficient in failing to accurately convey the plea offers, the Court need not reach 

Strickland’s prejudice prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. However, assuming that 

Volkmer rendered deficient performance, Petitioner has not established prejudice. As set 

forth above, to show that prejudice “where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected 

because of counsel’s deficient performance,” a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable 

probability” that he “would have accepted the earlier plea offer,” and “the plea would 

have been entered.” Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. The record indicates that Petitioner 

rejected the various plea offers because he wanted a sentence that was similar to the 

sentence co-defendant Botello received. (Doc. 11, Ex. C at 125, 132, 184, 195.) 

Petitioner testified that Volkmer told him it “wasn’t getting better than three-and-a-half” 

and that Volkmer told him to accept the plea offer. (Id. at 129, 142.) Petitioner stated 

that “that’s when he told [Volkmer he was] looking into hiring a new lawyer.” (Id.) 

Volkmer also testified that Petitioner told him if could not get him a better deal, he would 

hire another lawyer who could. (Id. at 129, 178, 191.) Petitioner hired Gregan to obtain 

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a better offer, expressed his unhappiness with the 3.5-year offer, and never indicated that 

he had wanted to accept the 3.5 year offer. (Id. at 70, 80-83.) 

V. Conclusion

 Because Petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ rejection of his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, 

or that it contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, the Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of April, 2015. 

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