Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01701/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01701-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM CONSIGLIO, )

) 2:05-cv-1701-GEB-GGH-P

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER*

v. )

) 

JEANNE WOODFORD, Director of )

the California Dept. of )

Corrections, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed

this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262. By an order

filed September 2, 2005, the Magistrate Judge construed a letter sent

by Plaintiff as a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). 

On September 20, 2005, the Magistrate Judge filed findings and

recommendations (“F&Rs”), which were served on all parties, on

Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO.

Case 2:05-cv-01701-GEB-GGH Document 28 Filed 09/30/05 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The F&Rs recommend granting Plaintiff’s TRO. But for the

reasons that follow it is denied.

Legal Standard

The standard for granting a TRO is similar to that for

granting a preliminary injunction. Cf. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist.

v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th

Cir. 1981) (standard for preliminary injunction is at least as strict

as that for a TRO) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit has

set forth the standard for granting a preliminary injunction, and

consequently a TRO, as follows: the moving party must show "either:

(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are

raised and the balance of hardships tips in [its] favor." Preminger

v. Principi, No. 04-16981, 2005 WL 2036914, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 25,

2005)(quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,

1013 (9th Cir. 2001))(internal quotation marks omitted).

The alternative formulations do not constitute two separate

tests, rather they "represent two points on a sliding scale in which

the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability

of success decreases." Miller v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449,

456 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse

Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1987))(internal quotation marks

omitted). Therefore, both formulations require the Court "to assess

the potential merits of the parties' positions and the harm or

hardship that they will face from a grant or denial of the [TRO]. 

Preminger, 2005 WL 2036914, at *4 (citing Sammartano v. First Judicial

Dist. Ct., 303 F.3d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 2002)). Along the sliding

scale, however, there is one irreducible minimum that every moving

Case 2:05-cv-01701-GEB-GGH Document 28 Filed 09/30/05 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

party must show--that "there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury." Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762

F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Discussion

 The pending application for a TRO stems from Plaintiff’s

letter filed September 1, 2005, wherein he requests that the court

“issue an emergency restraining order . . . to not transfer [him]

again, at least until all of [his] injuries are treated.” (Pl.’s

Sept. 1, 2005, Letter.) Plaintiff argues that transferring him to

another prison is a ploy by “prison staff . . . so they wont [sic]

have to treat [his] injuries . . . [and so that they can] save the

$100,000.00 it will cost for all [his] surgeries.” (Id.) But

Plaintiff has not shown a significant threat of irreparable injury if

his TRO motion is denied.

Plaintiff’s letter indicates that the transfer he

anticipates, and seeks to enjoin, remains uncertain and unscheduled. 

Plaintiff refers to the transfer as something the “prison staff are

planning.” (Pl.’s Sept. 1, 2005, Letter; Pl.’s Sept. 2, 2005,

Letter.) Although Plaintiff states “the Unit Classification Committee

(U.C.C.) ordered” his transfer, (Pl.’s Sept. 9, 2005, Letter), the

referenced “order” is a recommendation to transfer Plaintiff which has

been forwarded to the Classification Staff Representative (“CSR”). 

(Decl. Jodie A. Schwab at ¶ 12 and Attach. A.) Approval by the CSR is

required by prison regulations before Plaintiff can be transferred. 

(Id. at ¶ 13.) No evidence in the record indicates that the CSR has

approved, or will approve, his transfer. Nor is there evidence that

Plaintiff will be exposed to a significant threat of being transferred 

during the time that the TRO Plaintiff requests would be in effect. 

Case 2:05-cv-01701-GEB-GGH Document 28 Filed 09/30/05 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Since Plaintiff’s concern about a possible transfer has not

been shown to constitute a significant threat of irreparable harm, 

his request for a TRO is denied.

Dated: September 29, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-01701-GEB-GGH Document 28 Filed 09/30/05 Page 4 of 4