Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00015/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00015-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY NAJOR and LINDA NAJOR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00015-H-AGS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

On January 10, 2019, Defendant Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (“Defendant”) filed a 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff Danny Najor’s and Plaintiff Linda Najor’s (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) complaint. (Doc. No. 3.) On January 25, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a response. 

(Doc. No. 5.) On February 4, 2019, Defendant filed a reply. (Doc. No. 7.) Also on 

February 4, 2019, the Court submitted the motion on the parties’ papers and vacated the 

hearing scheduled for February 11, 2019. (Doc. No. 6.) For the reasons below, the Court 

grants the motion to dismiss with leave to amend. 

Background

The following facts are taken from the allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Doc. 

No. 1-2.) Plaintiffs owned a home at Solana Beach. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant serviced the 

Plaintiffs’ home mortgage. (Id.) After Plaintiffs fell behind on payments, Defendant 

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initiated foreclosure proceedings. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendant 

contending that Defendant violated the law during the forfeiture proceedings. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

The parties settled. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that as part of the settlement agreement, 

Defendant “agreed to forbear on any foreclosure efforts until November 15, 2018 to allow 

[Plaintiffs] to sell the house.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs received an all-cash $2.8 million offer for the house that was due to release 

contingencies on August 4, 2018. (Id. ¶ 9.) On August 1, 2018, Defendant posted a notice 

of trustee sale on the property, set for September 10, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiffs received a $3.1 

million offer on August 6, 2018, with a finance contingency. (Id.) Knowing that the buyer 

could not satisfy the finance contingency due to the notice of trustee sale, Plaintiffs 

accepted the $2.8 million offer. (Id.) 

On November 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against Defendant 

in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 2.) On January 

3, 2019, Defendants filed a notice of removal with this Court. (Doc. No. 1.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standards

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 

646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s 

plausibility standard governs Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court has explained Rule 

8(a)(2) as follows:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. 

As the Court held in [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)], the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual 

allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of 

further factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets 

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omitted).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “[a] claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In addition, a court need not accept legal 

conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, it is improper for a court to assume 

that the plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have 

violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., 

Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Finally, a court may 

consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and items that are proper

subjects of judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it must then determine 

whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 

1995). “A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it determines that allegation 

of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the 

deficiency, or if the plaintiff had several opportunities to amend its complaint and 

repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies.” Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 

1003 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

II. Analysis

Defendant argues that the recordation of the notice of trustee’s sale did not constitute 

a breach of the release agreement. (Doc. Nos. 3-1 at 4–7; 7 at 2.) Plaintiffs argue that 

Defendant’s posting of the notice of trustee’s sale on August 1, 2018 contravened the

purpose of the release agreement restriction, which required that Defendant not hold a 

foreclosure sale until November 2018. (Doc. No. 5 at 2.) The Court agrees with Defendant.

“A court may resolve contractual claims on a motion to dismiss if the terms of the 

contract are unambiguous.” Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 868, 

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878–79 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Bedrosian v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 208 F.3d 220 (9th 

Cir. 2000)). Here, the terms of the contract unambiguously restrict a foreclosure sale, but 

do not restrict the posting of a notice of a trustee’s sale or its recordation: 

3.2 If Plaintiffs timely and fully comply with their obligations in 

Section 3.1 of this Agreement, Defendants agree to:

(a) Forbear from conducting a foreclosure sale of the Property 

for a period of six (6) months from May 15, 2018, such that no trustee’s 

sale of the Property will occur sooner than November 15, 2018, in order 

to allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to list, obtain an offer for, and

consummate a private sale of the Property. . . .

(Doc. 1-2 at 7.) The Court concludes that the terms of the contract unambiguously do not 

restrict Defendant’s ability to post a notice of a trustee’s sale or record such notice. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The 

Court will permit Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies 

identified in this order. However, Plaintiffs should note that the Court will only grant future 

opportunities to amend if Plaintiffs could “possibly cure the deficiency.” See Telesaurus, 

623 F.3d at 1003. The Court orders Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint on or before 

March 8, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2019

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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