Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00214/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00214-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRMA GARZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-214-KJN

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security

(“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”).1 In her motion for summary judgment, 

plaintiff principally contends that the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not 

disabled from January 27, 2012, the date on which plaintiff filed her SSI application, through the 

date of the final administrative decision. (ECF No. 15.) The Commissioner filed an opposition to 

plaintiff’s motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 19.) No optional reply 

brief was filed.

 

1

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c)(15), and both parties

voluntarily consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. (ECF 

Nos. 8, 10.) 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

2

For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRMS 

the final decision of the Commissioner. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on February 1, 1961; has an eighth grade education; is able to 

communicate in English; and previously worked as a laundry laborer. (Administrative Transcript 

(“AT”) 32, 59, 132, 150, 152.)2 On January 27, 2012, plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging that her 

disability began on April 7, 2011. (AT 71, 132.)3Plaintiff alleged that she was disabled 

primarily due to hand problems, bipolar disorder, arthritis, and tendonitis. (AT 151.) After 

plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing 

before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took place on May 23, 2013, and at which 

plaintiff, represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. (AT 28-62.) In a 

decision dated July 23, 2013, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Act, from January 27, 2012, the date that plaintiff’s SSI application was filed, 

through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 15-23.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on 

December 8, 2014. (AT 1-4.) Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court on January 

26, 2015, to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether the ALJ improperly evaluated 

the medical opinion evidence in concluding that plaintiff had no severe impairment or 

combination of impairments at step two of the sequential disability evaluation process; and (2) 

whether the ALJ erred in not further developing the record regarding plaintiff’s ankle injury.

 

2 Because the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, including plaintiff’s 

medical and mental health history, the court does not exhaustively relate those facts in this order. 

The facts related to plaintiff’s impairments and treatment will be addressed insofar as they are 

relevant to the issues presented by the parties’ respective motions.

3 Regardless of the alleged disability onset date, SSI is not payable prior to the month following 

the month in which the application was filed. 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

3

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The 

court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s entitlement to SSI pursuant to the Commissioner’s standard 

five-step analytical framework.4 At the first step, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not

 

4 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social 

Security program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to disabled 

persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in part, as 

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). A parallel 

five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-

42 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, the 

claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, proceed to step 

three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meet or 

equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the 

claimant is automatically determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past relevant work? If so, the 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

4

engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 27, 2012, the date that plaintiff’s SSI 

application was filed. (AT 17.) However, at step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have 

an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited (or was expected to 

significantly limit) plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive 

months; and that therefore, plaintiff did not have a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments. (Id.) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a 

disability, as defined in the Act, from January 27, 2012, the date that plaintiff’s SSI application 

was filed, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AT 22.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner’s Determinations

1. Whether the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence in

concluding that plaintiff had no severe impairment or combination of impairments at step two of 

the sequential disability evaluation process

5

Under the Commissioner’s regulations, an impairment or combination of impairments is 

deemed to be severe at step two if it “significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do 

basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a). As the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has explained, “the step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of 

groundless claims. An impairment or combination of impairments can be found not severe only 

if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an 

 

claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to perform any 

other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

5

Plaintiff actually raised the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence and the ALJ’s

non-severity finding at step two as separate issues. However, to review the propriety of the ALJ’s 

step two finding, the court must necessarily also review the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical 

opinion evidence. As such, the court considers both issues together. 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

5

individual’s ability to work.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In evaluating medical opinion evidence at step two, as well as at other steps in the 

sequential disability evaluation process, the weight given to medical opinions depends in part on 

whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. 

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995). Generally speaking, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 

physician’s opinion, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a nonexamining physician’s opinion. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202. 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons. Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion 

generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining 

professional’s opinion (supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may 

resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The regulations require the ALJ to weigh the 

contradicted treating physician opinion, Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157,6except that the ALJ in any 

event need not give it any weight if it is conclusory and supported by minimal clinical findings. 

Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, minimally 

supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a nonexamining professional, by itself, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining 

professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

 

6

The factors include: (1) length of the treatment relationship; (2) frequency of examination; (3) 

nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (4) supportability of diagnosis; (5) consistency; 

(6) specialization. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

6

In this case, the ALJ properly found at step two that plaintiff did not have a severe 

physical impairment. 

As the ALJ observed, although plaintiff has alleged pain in multiple areas, including the 

neck, lower back, shoulders, arms, elbows, wrists, and knees, physical examinations by her 

treating providers have rendered little objective findings other than tenderness, no specific 

physical limitations were assessed, and she received primarily routine and conservative treatment 

with medication. (AT 20-22.) 

Nevertheless, out of abundance of caution, plaintiff also underwent a consultative 

evaluation by board certified orthopedist, Dr. David Osborne. (AT 331-35.) Dr. Osborne 

examined plaintiff on August 30, 2012, and noted her complaints of lower back, shoulder, arm,

hand, and right knee pain. (AT 331-32.)7 However, Dr. Osborne specifically noted that he did 

not find plaintiff credible, because, in his view, she exaggerated her symptoms. (AT 331.) He 

stated that plaintiff was able to get on and off the examination table without assistance, and sat on 

the examination table in apparent comfort throughout the interview and evaluation process, 

without being in acute or chronic distress. (AT 333.) Plaintiff had no muscle atrophy, normal 

posture, and no difficulty in rising on the toes and heels, although she ambulated around the 

room, without an assistive device, “with a somewhat exaggerated limp.” (Id.) A physical 

examination of plaintiff’s entire spine and extremities (including the shoulders, elbows, wrists, 

hands, knees, and feet) was unremarkable, with normal functioning and range of motion, and only 

some mild tenderness in the lower lumbar area. (AT 334-35.) Furthermore, plaintiff’s motor 

strength, sensation, and reflexes were all normal. (Id.) Dr. Osborne opined that plaintiff did not 

have a medically determinable impairment that would limit her functioning. (AT 335.) Because 

 

7

The court notes that Dr. Osborne was apparently not provided with plaintiff’s prior medical 

records. The regulations require that a consultative examiner be given any necessary background 

information about the plaintiff’s condition. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. However, in this case, failure 

to provide Dr. Osborne with the prior medical records was harmless, because the records do not 

contain any significant findings or diagnostic studies concerning plaintiff’s alleged physical 

impairments. As such, it is not plausible that Dr. Osborne would have rendered a different 

opinion had he reviewed such prior records. The issue of medical records that post-date Dr. 

Osborne’s opinion is addressed separately below. 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

7

Dr. Osborne personally examined plaintiff and made independent clinical findings, his opinion 

constitutes substantial evidence on which the ALJ was entitled to rely.

Additionally, as the ALJ noted, Dr. Osborne’s opinion is consistent with the opinion of 

the non-examining state agency physician, who reviewed plaintiff’s records and opined that 

plaintiff’s alleged physical impairments were non-severe. (AT 22, 78.)

Finally, plaintiff herself at times suggested that her alleged physical limitations were not 

severe. Notably, during her mental consultative evaluation on August 29, 2012, the day prior to 

her evaluation by Dr. Osborne, plaintiff actually denied any physical limitations attributable to 

medical conditions, and told the psychologist that she walked or used the public transportation 

system to get around, was independent for basic self-grooming, completed light household 

chores, and prepared simple meals. (AT 19, 323.)

Consequently, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff did not 

have a severe physical impairment.

The ALJ also reasonably found at step two that plaintiff did not have a severe mental 

impairment.

As part of making that determination, the ALJ legitimately discounted the opinion of one 

of plaintiff’s treating providers at the Genesis mental health program, marriage and family 

therapist intern Marji Miller. (AT 19-20.) On April 5, 2013, Ms. Miller completed a two-page

mental assessment form, indicating, inter alia, that plaintiff would have a poor ability to attend, 

concentrate, and work without supervision, and that plaintiff “would be very limited in the type of 

work she is able to perform. She would require a repetitive job, which included non-threatening 

supervision, and very little contact with customers or co-workers.” (AT 346-47.) Thereafter, on 

April 12, 2013, Ms. Miller submitted a letter, noting diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder 

and bipolar disorder, as well as treatment with psychotropic medications. (AT 348.) The letter 

continued as follows:

[Plaintiff] also reports being highly anxious in any social situation, 

she experiences flashbacks and is hypervigilant, all symptoms of 

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Her ability to concentrate is highly 

impaired, and she reports sleeping for days at a time. She also 

reports a generally depressed mood, decreased energy and the 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

8

inability to concentrate. She also reports hearing voices and has 

periods of involvement in activities with a high potential for painful 

consequences, symptoms of Bipolar Disorder. These symptoms 

would make it very difficult for her to function around people she 

does not know, or in situations that are unfamiliar. These 

symptoms impact her ability to learn, to follow instructions and to 

interact with coworkers and supervisors. These disorders would 

make it difficult for her to function in a competitive work 

environment. In my opinion, [plaintiff] is a poor candidate for 

employment at this time.

(AT 348.)

As an initial matter, the court observes that plaintiff incorrectly argues that the ALJ was 

required to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Ms. Miller’s opinion. Ms. Miller, 

as a marriage and family therapist intern, is not an acceptable medical source for purposes of the 

regulations, and thus the ALJ was only required to provide reasons germane to that opinion. See

20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Furthermore, 

even if Ms. Miller qualified as an acceptable medical source, her opinion conflicts with the 

opinion of other mental health professionals in the record, and the ALJ would only be required to 

provide specific and legitimate, as opposed to clear and convincing reasons, to reject her opinion.

Regardless, even under the clear and convincing reasons standard, the ALJ properly 

rejected Ms. Miller’s conclusory and minimally supported opinion. The ALJ correctly observed 

that the mental status examinations at Genesis did not support Ms. Miller’s extreme limitations. 

(AT 20.) Indeed, although the treatment notes at times documented plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints of mental symptoms, the mental status examinations were consistently unremarkable, 

finding that plaintiff was cooperative and had an appropriate affect, normal mood, normal speech, 

normal thought processes, no hallucinations or delusions, normal memory, and normal judgment,

only once noting a disheveled appearance. (AT 341, 342.) 

Furthermore, as the ALJ noted, Ms. Miller’s April 12, 2013 report that plaintiff heard 

voices and was highly anxious in any social situation appears inconsistent with the record in 

several respects. (AT 20.) Notably, less than a month earlier, on March 22, 2013, plaintiff

actually denied hearing voices on her medication regimen. (AT 337.) In fact, during a prior 

mental health examination while incarcerated on December 1, 2011, plaintiff also denied 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

9

hallucinations, stating that she only heard voices when using drugs. (AT 18, 22, 212.) And on 

August 29, 2012, she told the consultative evaluating psychologist that she last heard voices “a 

couple of years ago.” (AT 324.) At the administrative hearing, plaintiff also testified that she 

generally got along well with her roommates, attended public barbecues, and was active in AA 

and NA meetings. (AT 20, 43-44, 46, 48.)

Thus, in light of the conclusory nature of Ms. Miller’s opinion, and its inconsistency with 

substantial portions of the record evidence, the ALJ did not err in rejecting that opinion. 

In declining to find a severe mental impairment, the ALJ reasonably relied on the opinion 

of consultative clinical psychologist, Dr. Deborah Lacy. (AT 18-20, 320-27.) Dr. Lacy reviewed 

plaintiff’s records and personally evaluated plaintiff on August 29, 2012. (AT 320.) Plaintiff 

reported a history of three prison terms and several arrests for domestic violence, sales and 

transportation of narcotics, and burglary. (AT 323.) She also described a history of heavy 

alcohol use, heroin addiction, and intravenous methamphetamine use until her most recent 

incarceration, after which she had been sober. (AT 322-23.) According to plaintiff, she 

previously worked in the laundry department at a hotel and got along well with her supervisors 

and co-workers, but left that job when the hotel moved and she could not secure transportation to 

the new location. (AT 322.) At the time of the evaluation, plaintiff noted that she was still on 

probation, homeless, and endorsed symptoms of depression, anxiety, decreased concentration, 

and difficulty falling asleep. (AT 321, 323.) However, she reported good relationships with 

family and friends. (AT 323.) 

Upon mental status examination, plaintiff was alert, oriented, clean, appropriately dressed, 

and adequately groomed; she interacted appropriately with good/fair eye contact and no bizarre 

behavior; and she had logical, linear, and goal-oriented thinking; normal speech and thought 

content, with no indicia of delusions or internal stimuli; a restricted and tearful affect at times;

average intelligence; at most some mild memory impairment; a normal fund of knowledge; a 

normal ability to perform simple calculations; normal concentration; intact abstract thinking and 

ability to differentiate; and intact insight and judgment. (AT 323-26.) Dr. Lacy diagnosed 

plaintiff with a mood disorder, personality disorder, and polysubstance dependence (in reported 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

10

full remission), noting that plaintiff’s symptom severity is in the mild-to-moderate range. (AT 

326.) Dr. Lacy opined that plaintiff was able to perform detailed and complex tasks, as well as 

simple and repetitive tasks. (AT 327.) She further found that plaintiff was only mildly impaired

in her ability to perform work activities on a consistent basis, perform work activities without 

special or additional supervision, complete a normal workday or work week without interruptions 

resulting from psychiatric conditions, and relate and interact with coworkers and the public. (Id.) 

She indicated that plaintiff’s ability to deal with the usual stresses encountered in competitive 

work was moderately impaired. (Id.) Because Dr. Lacy, a mental health specialist, personally 

evaluated plaintiff and made independent clinical findings, her opinion constituted substantial 

evidence on which the ALJ was entitled to rely.

The court cannot say that it was unreasonable for the ALJ to interpret Dr. Lacy’s opinion 

as indicating that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment at step two. Indeed, Dr. 

Lacy’s mental status examination rendered largely normal findings, and she assessed only mild 

mental limitations, with the exception of one moderate limitation related to stress. The mere fact 

that plaintiff has diagnosed mental impairments for which she takes medications does not 

establish that her impairments are severe. Notably, the ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Lacy’s opinion

is also consistent with the opinion of the non-examining state agency psychologist, who reviewed 

plaintiff’s records and concluded that plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. (AT 78.)8

However, even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ technically erred by not finding 

a severe mental impairment at step two, such error was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111 

(“we may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless”). The record 

evidence, when properly weighed, establishes at most mild to moderate mental limitations, and 

the Ninth Circuit has already held that moderate mental limitations do not even require vocational 

expert testimony. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007). As such, had the ALJ 

 

8

Plaintiff’s reliance on medical records and low GAF scores dating back to 1992 to establish the

alleged severity of her mental impairments is misplaced, because such records significantly predate the relevant period (from January 27, 2012 onwards) and also relate to a period during which 

plaintiff admits she extensively abused alcohol, heroin, and/or methamphetamines.

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

11

proceeded past step two, the ALJ could have simply relied on the Grids to deny plaintiff’s claim 

at step five.9

In sum, the ALJ rationally concluded that plaintiff did not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments at step two. Even assuming, without deciding, that any technical

error exists, it was harmless. 

2. Whether the ALJ erred in not further developing the record regarding plaintiff’s 

ankle injury

On March 6, 2013, after Dr. Osborne’s August 30, 2012 opinion, plaintiff fell and 

sustained an ankle fracture. A splint was applied, plaintiff was fitted for crutches and prescribed 

pain medication for two days (with no refills), and she was discharged home that same day. (AT

437-41.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have further developed the record by requesting a 

supplemental opinion from Dr. Osborne, or another orthopedic specialist, in light of such 

additional evidence. That argument is unpersuasive. 

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously explained, “[t]he ALJ always has a 

‘special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are 

considered ... even when the claimant is represented by counsel.’” Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 

1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). “The 

ALJ may discharge this duty in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s physicians, 

submitting questions to the claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record 

open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 

1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). However, as some courts have persuasively observed, the ALJ “does 

not have to exhaust every possible line of inquiry in an attempt to pursue every potential line of 

questioning. The standard is one of reasonable good judgment.” Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 

1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

 

9 Moreover, in this case, even though the ALJ’s written decision never proceeded past step two, 

the ALJ solicited testimony from the VE that if plaintiff were limited to simple job instructions 

and tasks, with no public contact and only occasional contact with supervisors, plaintiff would 

still be able to perform her past work as a laundry laborer and other jobs, such as janitor, 

agricultural packer, and warehouse worker. (AT 59-60.) 

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 

12

Here, the ALJ’s decision specifically acknowledged and discussed plaintiff’s March 6, 

2013 ankle fracture, but legitimately found no evidence that the injury would persist, or result in 

any functional limitations, for 12 months or longer. (AT 22.) See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) 

(defining disability as an inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.”). Notably, at the May 23, 2013 hearing, the ALJ left the record open for an additional 

30 days to allow plaintiff’s attorney to submit additional records related to plaintiff’s ankle injury. 

(AT 52, 61.) However, other than the March 6, 2013 treatment records, no further medical 

records concerning the ankle injury were submitted to the ALJ, nor were any such records later

submitted to the Appeals Council.

The ALJ exercised reasonable good judgment by raising the issue of plaintiff’s ankle 

injury at the hearing and leaving the record open for a specified period of time. Plaintiff and her 

attorney did not submit additional medical records, nor did they request an extension of time to do

so. No further record development was required. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s decision is free from prejudicial error and supported 

by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is DENIED. 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is 

GRANTED.

3. The Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and judgment is entered for the 

Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 14, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-00214-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/15/16 Page 12 of 12