Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00467/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00467-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT MANIKAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

PACIFIC RIDGE NEIGHBORHOOD 

HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, N.N. 

JAESCHKE, INC., PETERS & 

FREEDMAN, L.L.P., AND DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-00467-BEN-BLM

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

REMAND

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to San Diego County Superior 

Court. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Notice of Removal filed by Defendants 

Pacific Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Association (“Pacific Ridge”) and N.N. 

Jaeschke, Inc. (“Jaeschke”) is procedurally defective, and that this Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants Pacific Ridge and Jaeschke 

contest both of these assertions. Defendant Peters & Freedman, L.L.P. (“Peters & 

Freedman”) did not join in the motion. Upon consideration of the arguments and law, the 

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.

/ / /

/ / /

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I. BACKGROUND1

On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a bankruptcy case in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 

for the Southern District of California. (Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 1). Plaintiff scheduled a 

claim held by Pacific Ridge in his bankruptcy case, with Pacific Ridge alleging arrears 

owed in the amount of $3,047.04. (Id. ¶ 22). Defendant Jaeschke filed a Proof of Claim 

in the bankruptcy case as a collection agent for Pacific Ridge. (Id. ¶ 25). On November 

24, 2015, the Chapter 13 Trustee in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case filed a Notice of Final 

Cure Payment and Completion of Payments Under the Plan, and the parties were notified 

that Plaintiff had repaid all arrears due. (Id. ¶ 28).

Plaintiff’s instant claims arise from one incident which took place on September 2, 

2016, when an unknown male process server broke through Plaintiff’s back gate and 

began pounding on the windows of Plaintiff’s house. (Id. ¶¶ 32-35). The police were 

called and, after their arrival, the unknown male identified himself as an off-duty police 

officer hired to serve Plaintiff with a Notice of Default (“NOD”) on behalf of Pacific 

Ridge. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37). The NOD had a stamped recordation date of April 9, 2012 and 

cited a balance owed of $2,597.04. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 40). Across the top of the document, the 

NOD identified Peters & Freedman as “acting in the function of a debt collector.” (Id. ¶ 

39). 

A few days later, Plaintiff spoke to a representative from Peters & Freedman. (Id.

¶ 42). Plaintiff explained that he had repaid all pre-bankruptcy arrears due to Pacific 

Ridge. (Id.) The representative explained that, according to her records, the arrears 

balance on the NOD was correct and that amount was still due to Pacific Ridge.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in San Diego County Superior Court on February 1, 

2017, alleging two claims for relief. The first claims alleges a violation of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., against Defendant Peters 

 

1 The Court is not making any findings of fact, merely summarizing the relevant factual 

and procedural information to evaluate the motion at hand.

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& Freedman. The second claim alleges a violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), California Civil Code §§ 1788-1788.32, against all 

Defendants. 

Defendants Pacific Ridge and Jaeschke filed a Notice of Removal on March 7, 

2017, based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446. Paragraph seven of the Notice states: 

“On information and belief, after conferring with counsel for Peters & Freedman, L.L.P. 

regarding the grounds for removal, Pacific Ridge and N.N. Jaeschke have no reason to 

believe that Peters & Freedman, L.L.P. opposes the instant notice of removal.” (Notice 

of Rem., ECF No. 1) (emphasis added).

On April 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Remand. Plaintiff argues

that Defendants’ Notice of Removal is defective because Peters & Freedman, L.L.P. did 

not affirmatively consent to the removal. Plaintiff further argues that this Court does not 

have original subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Pacific 

Ridge and Jaeschke because those claims were based in California law. Id. Defendants 

Pacific Ridge and Jaeschke oppose the motion. Defendants contend that the Notice of 

Removal is not defective because Peters & Freedman never objected to removal and have

implicitly consented to federal jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants further argue that this Court has original 

subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff included a federal claim in his complaint.

II. ANALYSIS

I. Procedural Defects in the Notice of Removal

The right of a defendant to remove a civil action to federal court is based in statute. 

Libhart v. Santa Monica Diary Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979). The removal 

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows defendants to remove when a case presents a federal 

question or is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b). However, 

the removing party must comply with certain procedural mandates. At issue here is the 

“rule of unanimity,” which requires that all properly served and joined defendants “must

join in or consent to the removal.” 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(2)(A). Where fewer than all the 

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defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing party has the burden under § 

1446(a) to explain affirmatively the absence of any co-defendants in the notice of 

removal. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999), 

superseded by statute on other grounds in Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 

681 (9th Cir. 2006). The party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of 

demonstrating that removal was proper. Prize Frize, 167 F.3d at 1266. The removal 

statute is strictly construed against removal, and all doubts regarding jurisdiction are 

resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

In Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009), the 

Ninth Circuit first considered how the unanimity requirement could be met. There, one 

defendant filed a timely notice a removal indicating that “[a]ll defendants consent to the 

removal of this action,” but the other defendant failed to timely file a written notice 

stating its joinder. The court noted that no federal rule or statute specifically explains the 

particular manner in which a co-defendants’ joinder must be expressed and, as such, it 

looked to the general principles that govern procedures for removal and attorney 

representations to district courts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Ninth 

Circuit concluded that “the filing of a notice of removal can be effective without 

individual consent documents on behalf of each defendant.” Id. at 1225. “One 

defendant’s timely removal notice containing an averment of the other defendants’ 

consent and signed by an attorney of record is sufficient.” Id.

In this case, Plaintiff contends that paragraph seven of Pacific Ridge and 

Jaeschke’s Notice of Removal is insufficient to meet the Proctor standard. Plaintiff 

asserts that the Notice’s language stating that Pacific Ridge and Jaeschke have “no reason 

to believe that Peters & Freedman opposes the instant notice of removal” is not sufficient 

because it is not an affirmative statement that all defendants consent to removal. This 

argument is not without merit. 

Defendants Pacific Ridge and Jaeschke could have simply made the averment of 

consent in the language prescribed by the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiff also points out, and this 

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Court takes note, that Peters & Freedman have not joined in the instant motion or made 

any declarations to support its co-Defendants’ contention that Peters & Freedman 

consented to removal. An averment that the defendant has “no reason to believe” that its 

co-defendant objects is not an averment of consent. Accordingly, the Court finds that the 

Notice of Removal is facially deficient. This, however, is not the end of the analysis. 

Even where a notice of removal is technically deficient, remand is not 

automatically required. The rule of unanimity in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) is a 

procedural requirement, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Soliman v. Philip Morris, 

311 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1998). “Procedural requirements exist primarily for the 

protection of the parties.” Corona-Contreras v. Gruel, 857 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 

2017) (citing Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 

1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[A] procedural defect existing at the time of removal but 

cured prior to entry of judgment does not warrant reversal and remand of the matter to 

state court.” Soliman, 311 F.3d at 970-71 (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 703 

(9th Cir. 1998)).

Where consent is not explicit, courts have considered other indications of nonremoving defendants’ consent to removal. In Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, 

Inc., 688 F. Supp. 560, 562 (C.D. Cal. 1988), the district court found that by filing an 

answer to the complaint in federal court, the non-removing defendant “manifested its 

assent” to removal. In another case, the district court again took note that the nonremoving defendant filed an answer after removal, rather than oppose removal. Gerawan 

Farming, Inc., v. Worrel & Worell, No. 1:10-cv-02011, 2011 WL 202453, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Jan. 20, 2011). The non-removing defendant’s “consent to removal was further 

evidence[d] by discussions between counsel weeks prior to filing of the Notice of 

Removal,” in which its counsel notified removing defendant’s counsel that his client 

consented to removal. Id. at *3. Furthermore, in Cardroom International LLC v. 

Scheinberg, Inc., No. CV 12-02870, 2012 WL 263330, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2012), 

the district court did not find fault with the unanimity requirement where one of the nonCase 3:17-cv-00467-BEN-JLB Document 20 Filed 07/10/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
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removing defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion after removal. And, in Proctor, the 

Ninth Circuit considered the lack of objection from the non-removing defendant 

important in denying remand. Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225.

Here, Peters & Freedman did not join in the Notice of Removal, nor has it joined 

its co-Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Remand. However, Pacific Ridge and 

Jaeschke indicated in their Notice of Removal that they “conferred” with counsel from 

Peters & Freedman before filing their Notice of Removal and that Peters & Freedman did 

not oppose removal. Pacific Ridge and Jaeschke’s counsel signed that Notice under 

threat of Rule 11 sanctions. Furthermore, Peters & Freedman never objected to the 

removal and, instead, filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) within the time 

period given to oppose removal. Given these circumstances, Peters & Freedman has 

manifested its consent to removal. See Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225 (explaining that the 

availability of sanctions and opportunity to object to removal “mitigate concerns that one 

defendant might falsely state the other defendants’ consent, or that one defendant might 

game the system by silently allowing another to remove and, if the federal forum proves 

disadvantageous, belatedly object that he had not consented.”).

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

With the issue of consent resolved, the remaining issue is whether the Court has 

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the 

complaint does not allege any federal claims against removing Defendants Pacific Ridge 

and Jaeschke and, instead, only alleges claims against them based in California law. The 

Court disagrees and finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. 

The existence of federal question jurisdiction is determined from the face of the 

complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Federal courts hold

original jurisdiction over those cases in which the complaint establishes that federal law 

creates the cause of action for plaintiff’s claims, thereby conferring original jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust 

for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). Once federal court jurisdiction is established, 

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supplemental jurisdiction is also established over state law claims that are “so related to

the claims in the action within original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 

controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

Although Plaintiff rightfully argues that his California state law claims do not 

create subject matter jurisdiction, his claim based on federal law does. “The threshold

requirement for removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the 

complaint contains a cause of action that is within the original jurisdiction of the district 

court.” Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

plaintiff is the “master of his complaint” and may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying 

exclusively on state law. Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 

1106 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff alleges only two claims: one based in federal law under 

15 U.S.C. § 1692 and one based in California law under California Civil Code § 1788. 

Thus, this is a straightforward example of a complaint that “contains a cause of action 

that is within the original jurisdiction of the district court.” Ansley, 340 F.3d at 861. In 

turn, the Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 10, 2017

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