Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00030/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00030-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVORY FRANKLIN DANIELS aka

FRANK FULLER,

Booking #14705639,

Civil

No. 

15cv0030 BEN (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 2) AND 

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

MEDICAL SERVICES DIVISION;

ALFRED JOSHUA, M.D.; SAN DIEGO

COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T;

WILLIAM D. GORE, 

Defendants.

Ivory Franklin Daniels, also known as Frank Fuller, (“Plaintiff”), currently

incarcerated at George BaileyDetention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California and

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

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$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 1

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a

prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust

account statement shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial

partial filing fee. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

(ECF No. 2) and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the Court further orders the Watch Commander at George Bailey Detention

Facility to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and

forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

also obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under

these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all

other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013,

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must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), (b); Judicial Conference

Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1, 2013). However, the additional $50

administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000)

(§ 1915A).

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a rightsecured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color ofstate law.” 

Campbell v. Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)).

First, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the “San Diego County Sheriff’s

Department,” and the “Medical Services Division” have violated his constitutional

rights, his Complaintfailsto state a claimbecause these entities are not “persons” subject

to suit under § 1983. Neither a local law enforcement department (like the San Diego

County Sheriff’s Office), a jail (like the San Diego County Jail), or a state agency (like

the California Department of Corrections), are proper defendants under § 1983. See

Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a

municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983

action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F.

Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes liability on any ‘person’ who

violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook County Jail is not

a ‘person.’); 

While the County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore,

a proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978); Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988),

Plaintiff has not named the County as a Defendant. Moreover, as a municipality, the

County may be held liable under § 1983–but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to

show that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the implementation or execution

of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

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promulgated” by the County, or a “final decision maker” for the County. Monell, 436

U.S. at 690; Board of the CountyCommissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997);

Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words, “respondeatsuperior

and vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of recovery against a municipality.” 

Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). “Instead,

a Monell claim exists only where the alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted in

‘execution of a government’s policy or custom.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly suggest”

that either the County itself, or any individualCounty employee (a “person”), like Sheriff

Gore, violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)’s pleading

standards to Monell claims); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42

U.S.C. § 1983 provides for relief only against those who, through their personal

involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts,

or failure to perform legally required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s

constitutionally protected rights).

Plaintiff does make general allegations of refusal by unnamed medical staff to

provide him with medication he was receiving before he was incarcerated. Where an

inmate’s claim is one of inadequate medical care, the inmate must allege “acts or

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Such a claim has two elements:

“the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s

response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991),

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.

1997). A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious

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medical need include “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual’s daily activities.” Id. at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious

medical need, an inmate satisfies the objective requirement for proving an Eighth

Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny,

delay, or intentionally interfere with a prescribed course of medical treatment, or it may

be shown by the way in which prison medical officials provide necessary care. 

Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). Before it can be said

that a inmate’s civil rights have been abridged with regard to medical care, however, “the

indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’

or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter

Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See

also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

While Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to support an Eighth

Amendment claim against individually named medical staff, he currently only pleads

facts that demonstrate a difference of opinion. A mere difference of opinion between

an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and

treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild,

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a viable

section 1983 claim against any of the currently named Defendants, it istherefore subject

to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Because

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the Court having now provided himwith “notice

of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also provide him an opportunity to

“effectively” amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

/ / /

/ / /

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III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No.

2) is GRANTED. 

2. The Watch Commander of George Bailey Detention Facility, or his

designee, shall collectfrom Plaintiff’sinmate trust account the $350 balance ofthe filing

fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount

equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments

to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED

BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on the

WATCHCOMMANDER, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Suite 5300,

San Diego, California 92158.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from

the date this Order is filed in which to submit a First Amended Complaint which cures

all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be

considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved civil rights

complaint form to Plaintiff.

DATED: February 18, 2015

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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