Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_95-cv-02342/USCOURTS-azd-2_95-cv-02342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gerald M. Moore, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et. al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 95-2342-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Gerald M. Moore’s (“Moore”) Motion to Reinstate

Habeas Corpus Proceedings. (Dkt.67.) Alternatively, Moore moves for leave to file a

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.)

BACKGROUND

A. Statement of Facts

Moore was indicted on four counts of aggravated driving under the influence (“DUI”)

and one count of false reporting to a police officer on September 4, 1992. In trial, Moore was

convicted of each count. Moore was then incarcerated for 3 years and thereafter released.

Since his conviction, Moore has sought post-conviction relief in the state courts and through

a habeas petition before this Court. 

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In compiling the Procedural History for this Order, the Court relied on the

“Procedural History” in the State’s Answering Brief to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

(Dkt. 70 Ex. C), the instant motion (Dkt. 67), and the “Procedural Background” of the State’s

Response to the instant motion. (Dkt 70.)

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B. Procedural History1

The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Moore’s original appeal of his conviction on

April 13, 1995. This appeal consisted of a single claim: the trial court abused its discretion

in failing to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test performed the night of Moore’s arrest.

Moore then filed a petition for review and a request for fundamental-error review to the

Arizona Supreme Court. There were six grounds for review in Moore’s appeal, none of

which was the claim from the filing in the lower court. The Arizona Supreme Court

summarily denied both the petition and the request on September 14, 1995.

On November 16, 1995, Moore filed a habeas petition with this Court. The Court

initially dismissed the petition on the grounds that the claims therein were procedurally

defaulted. This default occurred because the constitutional claims were not brought before

the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore were never properly before the Arizona Supreme

Court. After the Court denied a motion for consideration, Moore appealed to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit vacated this Court’s ruling and remanded the

matter back to this Court because Moore’s claims were unexhausted in state court. On

August 4, 1999, the habeas petition was dismissed without prejudice so Moore could pursue

state remedies. 

Thereafter, on December 30, 2005, Moore filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

with the Arizona Court of Appeals. The court found the original trial court’s refusal of a

post-conviction relief request had been an abuse of discretion, but it denied relief after its

review of the record. Moore appealed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The

instant motion was filed on February 7, 2008.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[A] habeas petition filed after the district court dismisses a previous petition without

prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies cannot relate back to the original habeas

petition.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006). Once the petition has

been dismissed, the relation back doctrine does not apply because “there is nothing to which

the new petition could relate back.” Id. (citing Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th

Cir. 1999)). The only exception to this rule occurs when the district court erred in dismissing

the earlier habeas petition and the petitioner fought its dismissal. See Anthony v. Cambra,

236 F.3d 568, 573-74 (9th Cir. 2000). Under those circumstances, a court can exercise its

nunc pro tunc power to relate a subsequent petition back to the first one filed. See Id.

DISCUSSION

Ninth Circuit precedent precludes Moore’s request to “reinstate” his habeas petition.

Moore contends, without citation, that there is “Ninth Circuit precedent holding that where

dismissal of the Petition proceeding will result in the Petitioner being out-of-court due to the

inability to meet the “in custody” requirement of 28 U.S.C. §2254, a District Court should

stay the proceedings rather than dismiss them.” The Court’s own research failed to locate

any support for this claim. Should such a precedent exist, it is inapplicable to the matter

before the Court. The language of the contention is forward-looking and gives advice on

what a court could do when faced with dismissing a habeas petition. This Court is being

asked to retroactively change the dismissal of the previous habeas claim into a stay or

abeyance. The Court finds no precedent permitting such an Order.

The State correctly distinguishes the matter before the Court from the situation in

Anthony. Moore agreed to the dismissal of his original habeas petition to pursue state court

remedies. The issue in Anthony arose when the district court failed to allow the petitioner

to amend his petition to remove unexhausted claims. Anthony, 236 F.3d at 574. When

Moore’s first petition was dismissed, there was no reason to amend it, as he had failed to

exhaust each of the claims. Thus, the exception allowing a court to relate back a subsequent

habeas petition in applicable to the instant motion.

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In its Response, the State took no position on this request. This is not to be construed

as an admission on its part on the merits of such a claim or a waiver of any defenses that

could be raised. Similarly, the Court takes no position on the claim’s validity until it has

been filed and reviewed.

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In the alternative, Moore requests leave to file a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

citing the collateral consequences presumed in Spencer v. Kemna as his damages. Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 10 (1998). The State does not oppose this request.2

 The Court will

therefore permit Moore to file the complaint according to the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

CONCLUSION

In light of the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED DENYING Moore’s Motion to Reinstate Habeas

Corpus Proceedings. (Dkt. 67.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Moore leave to file a complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2008.

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