Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01914/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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K:\COMMON\CHMB_Hayes\SIGNED ORDERS\11cv1914-grt IFP & dsm.wpd 1 11cv1914 WQH (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WAYNE SEKERKE,

CDCR #V-15331,

Civil No. 11cv1914 WQH (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING 

NO PARTIAL FILING FEE AND

GARNISHING $ 350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); and

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

MARY ANN GLYNN; NGUYEN;

L.D. ZAMORA; JODIE RIVERA,

Defendants.

Keith Wayne Sekerke (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the California

Correctional Institution located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed a

civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a Motion

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) [ECF No. 2]. Plaintiff claims that his constitutional rights

were violated when he was housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”)

in 2010. (See Compl. at 3.) 

/ / /

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I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However,

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

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1

 Plaintiff also brings the same allegations as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

However, where a particular provision of the Constitution “‘provides an explicit source of constitutional

protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,” that provision must be the guide for

analyzing Plaintiff’s claims. Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Albright v.

Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994)). Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claims relating

to inadequate dental care as arising under the Eighth Amendment.

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which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care Claims1

Plaintiff claims that he was assaulted by prison officials when he was previously housed

at an unnamed institution in 2004. (See Compl. at 3.) As a result, Plaintiff claims that “several

of [his] teeth were broken,” as well as his jaw. (Id.) While it is not entirely clear, it appears that

Plaintiff was released from prison but returned to prison on November 15, 2010. (Id.) At that

time, while housed at Donovan, Plaintiff claims that he sought treatment for his teeth but prison

officials refused. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges prison officials told him that he was only going to be

housed at Donovan for a short time and he would have to seek treatment following his transfer.

(Id.) 

In order to assert a claim for inadequate dental care, Plaintiff must allege facts which are

sufficient to show that each person sued was “deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989). To be liable, prison officials

must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to Plaintiff’s pain or medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 105-06. 

Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show both: (1) an

objectively “serious” medical need, i.e., one that a reasonable doctor would think worthy of

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comment, one which significantly affects his daily activities, or one which is chronic and

accompanied by substantial pain, see Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994);

and (2) a subjective, and “sufficiently culpable” state of mind on the part of each individual

Defendant. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). 

First, it is far from clear whether Plaintiff suffers from a serious dental need. Plaintiff

seeks to have his “teeth fixed” but fails to offer any specific factual details regarding his dental

condition. Thus, there are simply no facts to construe a claim of deliberate indifference by the

named Defendants to Plaintiff’s alleged serious dental needs. Plaintiff claims that he was housed

at Donovan for a period of approximately six (6) months and during that time prison officials

allegedly refused to “fix his teeth.” (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that he was told that he

would receive dental treatment after he was transferred from the reception center at Donovan.

(Id.) Plaintiff is now housed at the California Correctional Institution. (Id. at 1.) If Plaintiff

is attempting to allege that there was a delay in treatment, there are no facts in the Complaint

from which the Court can determine whether he has suffered any injury as a result of the

Defendants alleged delay in providing treatment. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison

Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (a prisoner can make “no claim for deliberate

medical indifference unless the denial was harmful.”) 

C. Equal Protection

Plaintiff also alleges that he has been discriminated against in violation of his Equal

Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Compl. at 6.) The “Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473

U.S. 432, 439 (1985). In order to state a claim under § 1983 alleging violations of the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate

that he is a member of a protected class. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980)

(indigents); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)

(listing suspect classes). In this matter, Plaintiff has neither sufficiently plead that he is a

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member of a suspect class nor has he plead adequate facts to demonstrate that Defendants acted

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his membership in a protected

class. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

1154 (1999). 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to prove invidious

discriminatory intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted , and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

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Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 10, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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