Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00163/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00163-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MACON RICHARDS, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 1:07-cv-163-MEF

 )

LESAFFRE YEAST CORPORATION, ) (WO)

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 18, 2007, Macon and Jennifer Richards (“Plaintiffs’”) filed suit against 

Lesaffre Yeast Corporation (“Lesaffre”) and Dominique Ciboulet (collectively

“Defendants”) in the Circuit Court of Henry County, Alabama. On behalf of a class,

Plaintiffs sought an unspecified amount of punitive and compensatory damages for

injuries allegedly suffered by pollution from Lesaffre’s Henry County plant (“the Lesaffre

plant”). Plaintiffs bring claims for nuisance (Count I), negligence (Count II), and

wantonness (Count III) relating to the Lesaffre plant’s yeast production. On February 23,

2007, Defendants removed Plaintiffs’ suit to the Middle District of Alabama.

This cause is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. #59) filed on April 10, 2009. The Court has carefully considered the arguments

made in support of and in opposition to the motion, and for the reasons set forth below,

the Court finds that the motion is due to be GRANTED.

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II. JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because

Plaintiffs are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy requirement for

subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied. (Doc. #20). The parties do not contest personal

jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds a sufficient factual basis for each.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the

record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. 

An issue is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.”

Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by

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presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23. 

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving

party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the

nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment

must believe the evidence of the nonmovant and must draw all justifiable inferences from

the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After the

nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must

grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court has carefully considered all depositions, affidavits, and other documents

submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish the following facts.

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A. Facts

Defendants operate a liquid yeast plant on U.S. Highway 431 in Henry County,

Alabama. Lesaffre’s predessor, Columbia Yeast, originally built the plant and began

operating in 1990. During the yeast production process, Lesaffre collects an odorous

effluent separated from the yeast in holding ponds behind the plant. 

Plaintiffs own land adjacent to the plant and built a house on their property in

1977. They contend that the plant began emitting foul odors in 1990-1991. In 1992,

Macon Richards filed an official complaint with the Alabama Department of

Environmental Management (ADEM) about the odors. Plaintiffs describe the odors as

fluctuating in their frequency and strength over the years. At times, the smell is so strong

that they cannot go outdoors. Other times, the smell does not prevent them from outdoor

activities. Plaintiffs have not discerned a pattern to the occurrence or strength of the

odors. Instead, they describe the odors as fluctuating in various degrees since the plant

first operated in 1990.

B. Procedural History

In January of 2007, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit by filing a complaint in the

Circuit Court of Henry County. (Doc. #1). Defendants promptly removed the case to this

Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiffs moved to remand this action back to

state court on March 16, 2007, but the Court denied their motion in a Memorandum

Opinion and Order issued on August 1, 2007. (Docs. #7, 20). Plaintiffs bring claims for

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private nuisance, negligence, and wantonness under Alabama law. (Doc. # 1). They seek

compensatory and punitive damages for injuries allegedly suffered by the odors emitted

from Lesaffre’s plant. Id. 

V. DISCUSSION

Defendants seek summary judgment only on Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim. They

argue that the doctrine of prescription bars the nuisance claim because Plaintiffs filed suit

more than ten years after the nuisance began. In response, Plaintiffs argue that

prescription does not bar their nuisance claim because the nuisance was not continuous in

character or of the like kind and degree to satisfy the prescription doctrine. The Court

finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the nuisance claim because

they had acquired a prescriptive right.

A. Nuisance

Under Alabama law, a nuisance is 

anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage to another. The fact that

the act done may otherwise be lawful does not keep it from being a

nuisance. The inconvenience complained of must not be fanciful or such as

would affect only one of a fastidious taste, but it should be such as would

affect an ordinary reasonable man.

ALA. CODE § 6-5-120 (1975). The statutory definition of “nuisance” codifies Alabama’s

common law on the matter. Russell Corp. v. Sullivan, 790 So. 2d 940, 951 (Ala. 2001).

A nuisance can be public or private. 

A public nuisance is one which damages all persons who come within the

sphere of its operation, though it may vary in its effects on individuals. A

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private nuisance is one limited in its injurious effects to one or a few

individuals. Generally, a public nuisance gives no right of action to any

individual, but must be abated by a process instituted in the name of the

state. A private nuisance gives a right of action to the person injured.

ALA. CODE § 6-5-121. Nuisance law is premised on the theory that “every man must so

use his own property as not to interfere with that of his neighbor.” Union Cemetery Co. v.

Harrison, 101 So. 517, 519 (Ala. Ct. App. 1924). In other words, if a defendant’s actions

intrude on a plaintiff’s “interest in use and enjoyment of [his] property, the law of

nuisance applies.” Boyce v. Cassese, 941 So. 2d 932, 946 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Borland

v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979)); see also Rigsby v. Burton, 305 So.

2d 366, 367 (Ala. 1974) (finding that property owners must use their property in a way

that “is not a nuisance, nor otherwise a hazard to the safety and well-being of others”);

Fowler v. Fayco, Inc., 275 So. 2d 665, 669 (Ala. 1973) (stating that whether a

defendant’s activities are otherwise lawful and within the parameters set by regulatory

agencies does not necessarily preclude a successful nuisance claim).

B. Prescription

The right to maintain a private nuisance may be acquired by prescription. Stouts

Mountain Coal & Coke Co. v. Ballard, 70 So. 172, 174 (Ala. 1915). “A cause of action

for a private nuisance of like kind and degree, continuous in character, endured for ten

years without remedial action, is forever barred by prescription.” Beam v. Birmingham

Slag Co., 10 So. 2d 162, 165 (Ala. 1942). A defense grounded on the passage of time

must be judged from the date when the harmful results occurred, and a nuisance cause of

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action does not arise until the harmful consequences are felt. City of Birmingham v.

Leberte, 773 So. 2d 440 (Ala. 2000) (“For an abatable nuisance the cause of action does

not arise until the harmful consequences occur, and each occurrence or recurrence of such

damages constitutes a separate cause of action.”); City of Clanton v. Johnson, 17 So. 2d

669, 672 (Ala. 1944) (same); Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 101 So. 517 (Ala. Ct.

App. 1924) (“In cases of damages by nuisance it is considered that the injurious

consequences resulting from the nuisance, rather than the act which produces the

nuisance, is the cause of action, and hence it is held that the cause of action does not arise

until harmful consequences occur.”). To establish a prescriptive right to maintain a

nuisance, “the use must not only be open, adverse, and continuous, etc., but with the

knowledge and acquiescence of the person whose right is invaded ... [a]nd the use must

be such as to produce a uniform result during the period of adverse claim or holding.”

Stouts Mountain Coal & Coke Co. v. Ballard, 70 So. 172, 174 (Ala. 1915). 

C. Instant Case

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ actions created and maintained a nuisance under

Alabama law. (Doc. #1). They allege that the Lesaffre’s plant releases foul odors that

cause a “material, substantial, and unreasonable interference” with the use and enjoyment

of their property and that such damage would affect an ordinary, reasonable person. Id. at

7. Defendants do not dispute that the Lesaffre plant’s operation created a private

nuisance. Instead, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim is barred by the

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doctrine of prescription. 

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on January 18, 2007. To succeed on a prescription

defense, therefore, Defendants must show that the Lesaffre plant’s emissions were “open,

adverse, and continuous ... with the knowledge and acquiescence of the person whose

right is invaded” for a ten-year period beginning on or before January 17, 1997. Ballard,

70 So. at 174.

Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have not shown that the alleged prescription

was continuous and maintained in the same manner for a ten-year period. (Doc. #61, pg.

10). Defendants, however, presented the Court with evidence that Plaintiffs knew of the

nuisance since 1990. Plaintiffs testified that the foul odors bothered them “ever since it

[the Lesaffre plant] opened up” in 1990-1991. (Doc. #59, Exhibit C, pg. 72). In addition,

Macon Richards filed an official complaint with the ADEM about the odors in 1992. 

(Doc. #63, Exhibit A). Therefore, no reasonable fact finder could find that Plaintiffs first

experienced the nuisance after 1992. See Leberte, 773 So. 2d at 441 (a nuisance cause of

action arises when the harmful consequences are felt).

Defendants have also presented evidence that the harmful results were “of like

kind and degree” throughout the period of the emissions. See Beam, 10 So. 2d at 165. 

Although Plaintiffs describe the odors as fluctuating in their strength and frequency over

the years, they testified that the odors, when present, were as harmful in 1991 as they

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 The Court is unconvinced by Plaintiffs’ argument that it is “impossible” for them to 1

experience harm of the “like kind and degree” when they were unaffected by the odor on some

days and affected on others. The law does not require that the nuisance be of the “like kind and

degree” on a daily basis; it only requires that the nuisance be of the “like kind and degree” for a

ten-year period. 

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were in 2008. (Doc. #59, Exhibit C, pg. 76). The Court concludes that no reasonable 1

fact finder could find that the harmful effect of Defendants’ activity were not of the “like

kind and degree” for a ten-year period. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ private nuisance claim because Defendants acquired a

prescriptive right to maintain the alleged nuisance in 2002, ten years after Plaintiffs first

felt the harmful consequences of the nuisance.

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Doc. # 59) is GRANTED.

Done this the 11th day of August, 2009. 

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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