Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01649/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01649-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lorraine Pimentel, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-01649-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal

Access to Justice Act (Doc. 29). 

I. Background

Pimentel has rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, hepatitis C, carpal tunnel

syndrome, and degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, among other

things. She applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits on

December 19, 2005, alleging disability beginning December 10, 2005. An administrative

hearing was held on August 21, 2008, and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued an

unfavorable decision on October 14, 2008. On November 19, 2010, the Court vacated the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and remanded the case for further

administrative proceedings. On January 18, 2011, Pimentel filed a notice of appeal,

seeking remand for award of benefits rather than for further administrative proceedings. 

Case 2:09-cv-01649-NVW Document 34 Filed 04/22/11 Page 1 of 4
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On February 9, 2011, an ALJ issued a fully favorable decision. On February 22, 2011,

the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal upon Plaintiff’s motion.

II. Legal Standard

On a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice

Act (“EAJA”), a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees “unless th[is] court finds

that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, the

government’s “position” includes both its litigating position and the action or failure to

act by the agency upon which the civil action is based. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). Here,

then, it includes the ALJ’s decision and the Commissioner’s arguments to this Court in

defense of the ALJ’s decision. 

The Supreme Court has defined “substantially justified” as “justified to a degree

that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 

The government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. 

Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. Analysis

The ALJ’s October 14, 2008 unfavorable decision included three distinct errors: 

(1) failure to identify specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence

for rejecting the opinion of treating rheumatologist Ravi Bhalla, M.D.; (2) failure to

identify specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Pimentel’s subjective

testimony; and (3) conceded error by failing to assess Pimentel’s work-related abilities on

a function-by-function basis before expressing her residual functional capacity in terms of

the exertional levels of work, i.e., light as sedentary. 

The first two errors flow from the ALJ assigning controlling evidentiary weight to

the opinions of treating physician Dale R. Schultz, D.O., and State agency reviewing

consultant Steven Otto, M.D., J.D., who relied on Dr. Schultz’s speculation that Pimentel

just wanted “to be on some supplemental income where she doesn’t have to work”

because her lack of education limited her job opportunities. Both the ALJ and Dr. Otto

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ignored Dr. Schultz’s observation that Pimentel’s low back and lower extremity pain “is

still problematic” and that some of her upper extremity pain was caused by recurrent

carpal tunnel syndrome. Instead, they focused on Dr. Schultz’s comment made two

weeks later that “I do not feel she is disabled by either her carpal tunnel syndrome or her

low back problem and have refused to make medical statements to that effect.” The ALJ

assigned controlling evidentiary weight to Dr. Otto’s opinion even though Dr. Otto did

not treat or examine Pimentel, Dr. Otto merely reviewed others’ observations and

opinions, and, as the ALJ stated, “Dr. Otto’s conclusions were far more critical of the

claimant’s subjective allegations than the opinions of many of the other specialists who

examined the claimant.”

Moreover, Dr. Schultz’s opinion was expressly limited to “her carpal tunnel

syndrome or her low back problem.” Therefore, it did not contradict Dr. Bhalla’s opinion

regarding Pimentel’s pain and fatigue caused by rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, and

related conditions. But even if it had, the ALJ was required to identify specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Bhalla’s opinion. The ALJ rejected Dr. Bhalla’s

opinion and Pimentel’s subjective testimony because of Dr. Schultz’s and Dr. Otto’s

opinions, primarily regarding Pimentel’s motives and credibility, but failed to identify

either “clear and convincing” or “specific and legitimate” reasons for doing so. This is

not a case where the ALJ met the lower standard, but did not quite satisfy the higher

standard. In this case, the ALJ did not come close. 

Further, the third error, failing to assess Pimentel’s work-related abilities on a

function-by-function basis, is not harmless, as the Commissioner contends, merely

because the ALJ ultimately relied on the vocational expert’s testimony regarding Dr.

Otto’s function-by-function assessment of Pimentel’s residual functional capacity. Dr.

Otto’s opinion was not entitled to be given controlling weight and cannot, therefore, serve

as a substitute for the ALJ’s function-by-function assessment. 

Thus, the Commissioner was not substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s

October 14, 2008 unfavorable decision, special circumstances do not make a fee award

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unjust, and the EAJA requires the Court to award Pimentel attorneys’ fees and other

expenses. However, Pimentel is not entitled to a fee award for attorneys’ fees incurred

related to her appeal because she was not a prevailing party on the appeal. Her fee

request for $6,831.87 will therefore be reduced by $822.78 for services related to the

appeal. In addition, Pimentel will be awarded $350.12 for the 2.0 hours expended in

preparing her reply brief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 29) is granted except for fees incurred on

appeal. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $6,359.21 and costs in the

amount of $350.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff in

the amount of $6,359.21 for attorneys’ fees and $350.00 for costs against Defendant, with

interest at the federal judgment rate from the date of entry of judgment.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-01649-NVW Document 34 Filed 04/22/11 Page 4 of 4