Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00740/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00740-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 NORTHERN DIVISION

MICKEY COLIN, #207 739, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:10-CV-740-TMH 

) [WO]

LOUIS BOYD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff an inmate incarcerated at the Easterling

Correctional Facility [“Easterling”] located in Clio, Alabama, challenges the actions of

correctional officials with respect to his classification as a restricted offender. Plaintiff also

challenges the conditions of confinement to which he is subjected at Easterling as well as

the imposition of a $1.00 processing fee on money orders received by inmates. The named

defendants are Warden Louis Boyd, Deputy Warden Sconyers, Classification Supervisor

Sherry Seals, and Classification Specialist Tyrone Barrow. Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages, a transfer to another correctional facility, a court order that Defendants remove

him from the restricted offender classification, and an injunction prohibiting imposition of

the processing fee on incoming money orders. (Doc. No. 1.)

In accordance with the orders of the court, Defendants filed an answer, special

report, and supporting evidentiary material in response to the allegations contained in the

complaint. The court then informed Plaintiff that Defendants’ special report, may, at any

Case 2:10-cv-00740-TMH-CSC Document 33 Filed 05/14/12 Page 1 of 17
time, be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and the court explained to Plaintiff the

proper manner in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a

response to the special report filed by Defendants. This case is now pending on Defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, Plaintiff’s opposition to

the motion, and the supporting and opposing evidentiary materials, the court concludes that

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11 Cir. th

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 1

for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and 1

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,

“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c),

changing only one word – genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus

of a summary-judgment determination.“ Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant

summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the

same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current

rule. 

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discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of

material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-324. 

Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; th

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record

including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant summary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered undisputed

-- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail 

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on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive Defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiff is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which

would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

“If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not

significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere

‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must

be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v.

Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on th

subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and,

therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge

Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d th

1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of th

[admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summaryjudgment.”); Harris

v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where th

inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the

defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of th

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party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). 

Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the

plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in

favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) th

(If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require

submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the th

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only th

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude

entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11 Cir. 2003) th

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

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as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases where the

evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced to

admissible form indicates that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party

moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is

proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine dispute as to

a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (To establish a genuine dispute of

material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact

could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906

F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this

th

court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this

case, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to

preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Restricted Offender Classification

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to classify him as a restricted offender

in violation of his right to equal protection. Defendants deny Plaintiff’s claims and state

that they do not have responsibility for classifying inmates as restricted offenders, a task

which is assigned to the Alabama Department of Corrections’ [“ADOC”] Central Review

Board. The evidentiary material submitted in support of Defendants’ dispositive motion

further reflects that Plaintiff is imprisoned pursuant to his convictions for murder during

the course of a robbery. In accordance with the ADOC’s classification rules and

regulations, the details underlying Plaintiff’s crimes dictate his classification as a restricted

offender. (Doc. No. 18, Exhs. A-E.)

i. Equal Protection

Plaintiff complains that Defendants have denied him equal protection because they

have removed other inmates from restricted offender status while his requests for such

treatment have been denied. (Doc. Nos. 1, 20.) This claim entitles Plaintiff to no relief.

In order to establish a claim of discrimination cognizable under the Equal Protection

Clause, “a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who

received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination

against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected

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basis. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and th

Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986).” Sweet v. Secretary, Department of th

Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006). “[O]fficial action will not be held th

unconstitutional solely because it results in a ... disproportionate impact.... [An allegation]

of ... discriminatory intent or purpose [related to a constitutionally protected interest] is

required to [set forth] a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977). 

“‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of

consequences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected ... a particular course of action

at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable

group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)

(footnote and citation omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). 

In a case such as this one, where Plaintiff challenges actions of correctional officials,

exceptionally clear proof of discrimination is required. Fuller v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and

Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11 Cir. 1988). Moreover, mere differential treatment of th

similarly situated inmates, without more, fails to allege a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. E & T Realty Company v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11 Cir. 1987), cert. denied,

th

485 U.S. 961 (1988); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (claims of mere

disparity of treatment are insufficient to establish discrimination).

Plaintiff fails to meet his pleading burden as he does not allege that Defendants

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subjected him to adverse treatment based on some constitutionally impermissible reason;

rather, he simply makes the conclusory assertion that differential treatment resulted in an

equal protection violation. To the extent Plaintiff relies on the fact that some inmates other

than himself have been removed from restricted offender status as the basis for this claim,

as explained, the law is well settled that the mere differential treatment of inmates fails to

constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. E & T Realty, supra. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

that his claim of discrimination amounts to an equal protection violation. Defendants are,

therefore, entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

ii. Due Process

To the extent Plaintiff complains that the classification level assigned to him at

Easterling is improper, he is likewise entitled to no relief. An inmate confined in the

Alabama prison systemhas no constitutionally protected interest in the procedure affecting

his classification level because the resulting restraint, without more, does not impose an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Because Plaintiff has no

constitutionally protected interest in the level of his custody classification, correctional

officials may assign him to any classification level without implicating the protections of

due process. Accordingly, Defendants are due to granted summary judgment on this

claim.

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iii. Conspiracy

Plaintiff contends that Defendants conspired to violate his equal protection rights by

classifying him as a restricted offender. In order to establish a § 1983 conspiracy claim, “a

plaintiff must show among other things, that Defendants ‘reached an understanding to violate

[his] rights.’ ” Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11 Cir. 2002) (citation th

omitted) (brackets in original). This requires that Plaintiff provide more than a label or a

conclusion. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[A] complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556, 570)). Plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported

speculation but must provide sufficient facts to show that an agreement was made. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. In addition to pleading facts to show that an agreement was

reached to deny Plaintiff's rights, an “underlying actual denial of [his] constitutional rights”

must be shown. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11 Cir. 2008). th

Here, Plaintiff’s claim of a conspiracy by the named defendants amounts to no more

than a purely conclusory allegation that fails to assert those material facts necessary to

establish a conspiracy by Defendants. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th

Cir. 1984) (holding that a conspiracy allegation that is vague and conclusory fails to state a

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claimupon which relief can be granted and is subject to dismissal). Accordingly, Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678-79; Fullman, 739 F.2d

at 556-557. 

B. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff describes a variety of conditions in existence at Easterling which he

maintains amount to a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Variously these conditions

and problems include an insufficient number of toilets, overcrowding, poor and inadequate

air quality, excessive noise, and the housing of mentally and physically ill inmates in

general population. (Doc. No. 1.)

Defendants Boyd and Sconyers deny that Plaintiff is subjected to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement at Easterling. They admit that Easterling is over its intended

inmate capacity but deny that such condition amounts to a violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Defendants Boyd affirms that Easterling is not unsanitary and that the 

restrooms are cleaned by assigned cleaners on a 24-hour basis. With regard to the

institution’s heating and ventilation system, Defendants Boyd and Sconyers state that there

are no heating or cooling problems but when problems do arise the maintenance department

is contacted and has adequate personnel to handle such issues. The dorms are also equipped

with exhaust, floor, and wall fans, windows may be opened, and vents may be opened and

closed. Finally, Defendants Boyd and Sconyers note that Easterling, like other institutions

throughout the state, houses physically ill inmates as well as mentally challenged inmates

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who qualify for residency. In sum, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff was exposed to neither

inhumane nor unsanitary conditions during his incarceration at Easterling. (Doc. No. 18,

Exhs. A, B.) 

The Constitution proscribes those conditions of confinement which involve the

wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). There

is no “static test” for determining which conditions violate the Constitution. Id. at 346. 

Whether a violation exists requires a fact intensive determination of what conditions exist

and whether objectivelyand subjectivelythe conditions offend theConstitution byamounting

to seriously sufficient deprivations to which officials were deliberately indifferent. See e.g.,

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). Only actions which deny inmates “the minimal

civilized measure of life's necessities,” are grave enough to establish constitutional

violations. Rhodes, 425 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)

(overcrowding, without more, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation). 

A prison official has a duty under the Eight Amendment to “provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526-27 (1984)); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). In order to demonstrate the

objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation with respect to conditions of

confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was denied the “minimal civilized measure of

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life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. The challenged prison condition must be

“extreme” and must pose “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.”

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289-90 (11 Cir. 2004). The subjective component th

requires a prisoner to prove that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” in

disregarding that risk by showing that an official knew the inmate faced a “substantial risk

ofserious harm” and with such knowledge, disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 834, 837. 

In this case, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory terms that he is subjected to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement at Easterling. All of the conditions or problems

identified by Plaintiff are unfortunately problems of prison life in general, a life which while

not comfortable must be humane. Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11 Cir. 2007). th

Defendants do not admit to any constitutional violation. While they concede that Easterling 

is over capacity, as noted, allegations of overcrowding alone are insufficient to state a claim

under the Eighth Amendment and overcrowding alone is not per se unconstitutional. Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 348; Castillo v. Cameron County, Tex., 238 F.3d 339 (5 Cir. 2001). th

Overcrowding conditions can be restrictive and even harsh; however, they do not violate the

Eighth Amendment unless they deprive the inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life's

necessities. Rhode, 452 U.S. at 348. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine dispute about whether the conditions

about which he complains deprive him of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities

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or cause him serious harm. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence which

shows that Defendants knew of an obvious risk of serious harm to him and disregarded that

risk, Farmer 511 U.S. at 837, or that Defendants’ actions resulted in the denial of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The mere fact that

the conditions and problems described by Plaintiff exist is insufficient to demonstrate a

constitutional violation. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s claims challenging the conditions of confinement at Easterling is due to be

granted.

C. The Processing Fee

Plaintiff challenges the Alabama Department of Corrections’ [“ADOC”] imposition

of a $1.00 processing fee for money orders sent to inmates. He contends that imposition of

the processing fee violates his constitutional rights. The ADOC provides the following 2

information regarding the collection of processing fees for money orders and cashier checks

sent to inmates: 

Effective September 1, 2010 the Alabama Department of Corrections began

collecting a $1.00 processing fee for each money order and cashier check

received through the U.S. Postal Service or other similar conveyance that is

processed and deposited into an inmate's PMOD account by the ADOC. The

Department elected to collect the $1.00 processing fee to partially offset the

costs associated with the substantial staff time required to manually open, sort,

and physically deposit money orders and cashier checks into the bank.

While Plaintiff argues that the processing fee is violative of his Eighth Amendment rights, it is

2

clear that this claim is more appropriately analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment which provides that no state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law." 

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Available at http://www.doc.state.al.us. (See also Doc. No. 18, Exh. B.) 

Although Plaintiff complains about being assessed a processing fee for money orders

he receives, the court finds that the Alabama Department of Corrections has a reasonable

interest in defraying the costs of incarceration which may include charging inmates for costs

associated with expenses incurred by the prison in housing inmates. Put another way,

Plaintiff has no constitutionally protected right to not pay the costs and/or fees associated

with his desire to have access to various prison privileges including the availability of an

inmate money account. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) ( “[T]he fact that

prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that these rights are

not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been

lawfully committed.”). Cf. Jensen v. Kleckler, 648 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8 Cir. 1981) (holding th

that there was no basis for a due process claim where deduction from prisoner accounts for

postage were “assessment[s] for value received” and plaintiffs did not contend that they did

not receive the services for which theywere charged); Slade v. Hampton Road Regional Jail,

407 F.3d 243, 251-53 (4 Cir. 2005) (holding that the imposition of an $1.00 per day room th

and board charge does not amount to a “punishment or fine” nor does the automatic

deduction of this fee from an inmate's trust fund account constitute an unconstitutional

interference with a property interest). Accordingly, the court concludes that the assessment

of a nominal fee on money orders sent to inmates for the purpose of defraying some of the

costs associated with processing such transactions, without more, fails to state a violation of

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an inmate’s federally protected constitutional rights. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 3

(1995). 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 18) be GRANTED; 

2. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff;

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; and

4. Costs be TAXED against Plaintiff for which execution may issue.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before May 29, 2012 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Certainly, the court is unaware of any basis under which an inmate should be afforded greater 3

protection under the Constitution from the assessment of fees and costs associated with the voluntary

consumption and/or utilization of what amounts to optional goods and services (not associated with the

provision of basic human needs) than is afforded an ordinary free-world citizen. Further, according to

the policy statement concerning fees associated with money orders, the $1.00 processing fee provides the

sender of the money order with an alternative to the higher costs associated with sending funds

electronically. (See Doc. No. 18, Exh. B.) 

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Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 14 day of May, 2012. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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