Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01801/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01801-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Perkins, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn w. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-12-01801-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the Administrative Law 

Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Plaintiff’s Title XVI application for supplemental security 

income based on disability. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Michael Perkins filed a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security 

Income benefits on February 13, 2008. (Record Transcript (“TR”) 129). Plaintiff listed 

his illnesses, injuries, or conditions on his application as cardio myopathy, bipolar 

disorder, and a head injury. (TR 162). Plaintiff’s application was denied initially. (TR 

47). On reconsideration, a hearing was held on August 24, 2010 before an ALJ, who 

issued an unfavorable decision on September 20, 2010. (TR 31; TR 12-22). The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the hearing decision on June 27, 2012. 

(TR 1-3). 

 On August 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Judicial Review of the 

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Administrative Determination of Claim, which is the subject of this appeal (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the Administrative Law Decision because: 

(1) the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians; (2) the ALJ 

improperly relied on grids when considering jobs that exist in the national economy and 

failed to consider non-exertional limitations; and (3) the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s 

symptom testimony in the absence of clear and convincing reasons for so doing. (Doc. 

13). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 The Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits will be overturned “only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is more 

than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 

720 (9th Cir. 1998). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a decision, this 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the 

administrative law judge’s conclusions and the evidence that detracts from the 

administrative law judge’s conclusions. Id. If there is sufficient evidence to support the 

Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination for that 

of the ALJ. Id. Additionally, the administrative law judge is responsible for resolving 

conflicts in medical testimony, determining credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, if on the whole record 

before this Court, substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, this Court 

must affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g).

 A. Definition of Disability 

 To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 

show, among other things, that he is “under a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). The 

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Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person is 

“under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such 

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his 

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 

which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). 

 B. Five-Step Evaluation Process 

 The Social Security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for 

evaluating disability claims. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721 

(describing the sequential process). A finding of “not disabled” at any step in the 

sequential process will end the ALJ’s inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant 

bears the burden of proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the ALJ at the 

final step. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. 

 The five steps are as follows: 

 1. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

 2. If the claimant is not gainfully employed, the ALJ next determines whether 

the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the 

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(c). Basic work activities means the “abilities and aptitudes to do most jobs.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). Further, the impairment must either be expected “to result in 

death” or “to last for a continuous period of twelve months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 

(incorporated by reference in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). The “step-two inquiry is a 

de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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 3. Having found a severe impairment, the ALJ next determines whether the 

impairment “meets or equals” one of the impairments specifically listed in the 

regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is found disabled without 

considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. at § 

404.1520(d). 

 4. At step four, the ALJ determines whether, despite the impairments, the 

claimant can still perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To 

make this determination, the ALJ compares the “residual functional capacity assessment . 

. . with the physical and mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can still perform the kind of work the claimant 

previously did, the claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final 

step. 

 5. At the final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant “can make an 

adjustment to other work” that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the ALJ considers the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, together with vocational factors (age, education, and work 

experience). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can make an adjustment to 

other work, then he is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform other work, he will be 

found disabled. As previously noted, the ALJ has the burden of proving the claimant can 

perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 

F.3d at 721. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since February 13, 2008, (2) had the following severe impairments: cognitive and 

short-term memory deficits related to a closed head injury sustained in December 2007, a 

history of cardiomyopathy, nicotine dependence, essential hypertension, and 

sensorineural hearing loss in the left ear, (3) did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments specifically listed in the regulations, (4) had the residual functional 

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capacity to perform the full range of sedentary, unskilled work and, because of moderate 

limitations/restrictions in his ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed and 

complex instructions due to cognitive/memory deficits, he is limited to unskilled work 

from a mental standpoint, (5) is unable to perform any past relevant work, and (6) can 

perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (TR 12-22). As a 

result of this analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the 

Social Security Act. (TR 22). 

 As referenced above, Plaintiff argues that the Court should vacate the 

Administrative Law Decision because: (1) the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of 

Plaintiff’s treating physicians; (2) the ALJ improperly relied on grids when considering 

jobs that exist in the national economy and failed to consider non-exertional limitations; 

and (3) the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony in the absence of clear 

and convincing reasons for so doing. (Doc. 13). The Court will address each of 

Plaintiff’s arguments in turn. 

 A. Whether the ALJ Erred in Rejecting the Opinions of Plaintiff’s 

 Treating Physicians 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Kelly and Dr. 

Gunnala because (1) even if those doctors were not entitled to controlling weight, the 

ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions entirely; (2) the ALJ erred in not using all of the 

factors in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927; and (3) Dr. Kelly and Dr. Gunnala’s opinions 

were supported by their records and consultative examination. 

 “The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical record.” Carmickle 

v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). Such conflicts may 

arise between a treating physician’s medical opinion and other evidence in the claimant’s 

record. A treating physician’s opinion is usually entitled to “substantial weight.” Bray v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Embrey v. 

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A treating physician’s opinion is given 

controlling weight when it is “well-supported by medically accepted clinical and 

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laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial 

evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). On the other 

hand, if a treating physician’s opinion “is not well-supported” or “is inconsistent with 

other substantial evidence in the record,” then it should not be given controlling weight. 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Substantial evidence that contradicts a treating physician’s opinion may consist of 

either (1) an examining physician’s opinion or (2) a nonexamining physician’s opinion 

combined with other evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). In 

the case of an examining physician, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same 

clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the 

conclusions of the examining physician are not substantial evidence.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 

632 (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1984)). To constitute 

substantial evidence, the examining physician must provide “independent clinical 

findings that differ from the findings of the treating physician.” Id. (citing Miller v. 

Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985)). Independent clinical findings can be either 

“diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are supported by 

substantial evidence, . . . or findings based on objective medical tests that the treating 

physician has not herself considered.” Id. (citing Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 

(9th Cir. 1984); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

 “The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Such an opinion is only substantial evidence 

if supported by “substantial record evidence.” Id.

 If the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with 

substantial evidence and is not to be given controlling weight, the opinion remains 

entitled to deference and should be weighed according to the factors provided in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Orn, 495 F.3d at 631; SSR 96–2p at 4. These factors include: (1) 

the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature 

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and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the extent to which the opinion is supported 

by relevant medical evidence; (4) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; 

and (5) whether the physician is a specialist giving an opinion within his specialty. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 

 If a treating physician’s opinion is not sufficiently supported by medical evidence 

and other substantial evidence in the case, however, the ALJ need not give the opinion 

controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. Furthermore, if the treating doctor’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may reject the treating doctor’s opinion by 

giving specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. Id. at 632. 

 In this case, after a discussion of the medical evidence in Plaintiff’s case, the ALJ 

rejected the opinions of Dr. Kelly and Dr. Gunnala as being: (1) unsupported by 

substantial medical evidence set forth with their own progress/treating notes, (2) 

inconsistent with the findings set forth within the progress/treating notes of more 

specialized physicians, and (3) inconsistent with the medical opinions of the consultative 

examiners and State Agency medical consultant. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of Dr. Kelly and Dr. 

Gunnala because (1) even if those doctors were not entitled to controlling weight, the 

ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions entirely; (2) the ALJ erred in not using all of the 

factors in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and 416.927; and (3) Dr. Kelly and Dr. Gunnala’s opinions 

were supported by their records and consultative examination. 

 To the extent that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Kelly and Dr. Gunnala’s opinions because those opinions were contradicted by other 

doctors, it was appropriate for the ALJ to reject those opinions. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. 

 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons 

for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Gunnala and Dr. Kelly. 

 Here, the ALJ noted that Dr. Gunnala’s opinion was not supported by his own 

progress/treating notes. In a hand-written statement dated December 17, 2008, Dr. 

Gunnala reported that Plaintiff was “unable to work” due to cardiomyopathy and chronic 

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fatigue, among other conditions” and that “his current disability may last up to 1 year 

until re-evaluated.” (TR 608). On February 2, 2009, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Gunnala 

that he was doing fine. (TR 592). On May 27, 2009, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Gunnala 

that he was not sleeping well and was not being attentive. Examination demonstrated 

that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, and demonstrated normal heart, lungs, and 

neurological functioning. (TR 699). Dr. Gunnala recommended that Plaintiff consult a 

psychiatrist about his racing mind, not sleeping well, and his history of bipolar disorder. 

(TR 698). Dr. Gunnala further recommended that Plaintiff continue his current 

medications. (Id.). 

 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had severe 

impairments, but found that Dr. Gunnala’s opinion as to the severity of those limitations 

was contradicted by his own treating notes and was inconsistent with the opinions of 

more specialized physicians, namely Dr. Schultz, a treating neurologist, Dr. Wolfson, a 

treating cardiologist, Dr. Oizumi, an examining licensed clinical psychologist, and Dr. 

Bliklen, an examining neurologist. Indeed, the opinions cited by the ALJ and the 

evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the 

opinion of Dr. Gunnala as to the severity and extent of Plaintiff’s limitations. 

 During a July 6, 2009 follow-up with Dr. Gunnala, Plaintiff reported that he 

continued to feel tired. (TR 696). Examination demonstrated that Plaintiff was alert and 

oriented, and demonstrated normal heart, lungs, and neurological functioning. (TR 695). 

Dr. Gunnala recommended that Plaintiff follow-up with a cardiologist and a psychiatrist. 

(TR 696). Also on July 6, 2009, Dr. Gunnala completed a medical assessment wherein 

he found that Plaintiff had significant physical limitations. (TR 688-690). On April 27, 

2010, Plaintiff requested a neurological referral from Dr. Gunnala for cognitive testing. 

(TR 694). Dr. Gunnala noted that Plaintiff’s significant other reported that Plaintiff had 

been noncompliant with blood pressure medications. (TR 694). On May 21, 2010, 

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Gunnala that he had been doing fine lately. (TR 691). 

Examination demonstrated that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, and demonstrated normal 

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heart, lungs, and neurological functioning. (TR 692). 

 The ALJ stated that Dr. Gunnala’s opinion as to the extent of Plaintiff’s functional 

limitations should be discounted because it was not supported by his own 

progress/treating notes. Indeed, Dr. Gunnala’s opinion was inconsistent with his repeated 

findings that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, and demonstrated normal heart, lungs, and 

neurological functioning and Plaintiff’s reports to Dr. Gunnala that he was doing fine. 

 Moreover, the ALJ also found that Dr. Gunnala’s opinion as to the extent of 

Plaintiff’s functional limitations was inconsistent with the findings set forth within the 

progress/treating notes of more specialized physicians and the medical opinions of the 

consultative examiners and State Agency medical consultant. Indeed, on April 16, 2008, 

Plaintiff’s treating neurologist, Dr. Schultz, reported that Plaintiff’s headaches were 

greatly diminished, his balance and walking were much improved, Plaintiff was still deaf 

in the left ear, Plaintiff was awake and alert with no aphasic error or major memory 

deficit and that his cranial nerves were intact with the exception of the deafness in the left 

ear. (TR 470). Dr. Schultz recommended that Plaintiff take Aleve and Tylenol for his 

residual headaches and to only use Vicodin as a back-up. (Id.). 

 Dr. Oizumi, a consultative licensed clinical psychologist, examined Plaintiff and 

found that Plaintiff might have difficult adhering to a schedule, had difficult adapting to 

changes in the environment, had mild memory deficits in several areas of memory 

functioning, unimpaired social functioning, could interact with the public, and could 

perform detailed and simple tasks, request assistance, respond to criticism, be aware of 

hazards, and use public transportation. (TR 499, 502-503). 

 On July 29, 2009, Dr. Wolfson, a treating cardiologist, reported that a recent 

echocardiogram revealed preserved left ventricular functions without significant valvular 

disease, a stress test revealed reversible defect, and Plaintiff was not having symptoms 

and did not require further intervention. (TR 643, 647-650). 

 On April 28, 2010, an examination by Dr. Bliklen, an examining neurologist 

revealed that Plaintiff was alert and oriented, demonstrated fluent speech, intact cranial 

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nerve functioning with the exception of hearing loss, intact cerebellar functioning, the 

ability to recall, the ability to perform “serial 7’s,” the ability to spell “world” backwards 

correctly, normal extremity muscle strength, bulk, and tone throughout, normal reflexes 

throughout, normal sensory functioning, and a normal gait. (TR 685-686). 

 Based on the facts as outlined above, the ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons 

for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Gunnala that are supported by the record. Although 

Plaintiff argues that the record can be read to support Dr. Gunnala’s conclusions, this 

Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Batson v. Comm’r of the 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Commissioner’s findings 

are upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record, and if evidence 

exists to support more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to the 

Commissioner’s decision.” (internal citations omitted). 

 Likewise, the opinions cited by the ALJ and the evidence in the records support 

the ALJ’s specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Kelly. The 

ALJ stated that Dr. Kelly’s opinion as to the extent of Plaintiff’s functional limitations 

should be discounted because it was not supported by his own progress/treating notes. 

Dr. Kelly conducted audiological testing on Plaintiff on December 29, 2008 and 

found almost no remaining hearing on the left, and right hearing loss with normal speech 

reception threshold (Tr. 682-683). Dr. Kelly concluded that Plaintiff's right hearing was 

probably better than it tested that date, and recommended further testing due to 

conflicting findings (Tr. 683). Thereafter, Dr. Kelly conducted audiological testing on 

Plaintiff on January 15, 2009 and found bilateral hearing loss (Tr. 680). Dr. Kelly 

recommended right ear amplification (Tr. 680). On April 19, 2010, Dr. Kelly stated that 

Plaintiff had bilateral hearing loss, but that Plaintiff had done well with a hearing aid on 

the right for amplification (Tr. 677). He also stated that Plaintiff was not able to be 

employed due to cognitive deficits, and that he should not work around heavy machinery 

or equipment (Tr. 677). 

 The Commissioner argues that Dr. Kelly’s conclusion that Plaintiff had done well 

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with a hearing aid on the right for amplification and would benefit from cognitive therapy 

is not consistent with his opinion that Plaintiff is not able to be employed full or part time 

because of hearing and cognitive deficits. (TR 676-677). In combination with the 

inconsistency between Dr. Kelly’s opinions and that of Plaintiff’s other doctors, the ALJ 

could have found that Dr. Kelly’s conclusion that Plaintiff could not work full or part 

time was not supported by his own medical findings. Moreover, Dr. Kelly specifically 

opined that he thought Plaintiff’s condition would improve and the ALJ could have 

properly found that, in light of such improvement, Dr. Kelly’s opinion could not serve as 

a basis for a finding of disability. Based on the facts as outlined above, the ALJ gave 

specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Kelly that are supported 

by the record. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Kelly and 

Dr. Gunnala. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

 B. Whether the ALJ Erred by Rejecting Plaintiff’s Symptom 

 Testimony in the Absence of Clear and Convincing Reasons 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons, 

supported by substantial evidence in the Record for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective 

symptom testimony. In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly 

considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and provided legally sufficient reasons for 

discounting them. 

Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying impairment that is 

reasonably likely to be the cause of some pain, the ALJ ‘may not discredit a claimant’s 

testimony of pain and deny disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged 

by the claimant is not supported by objective medical evidence.’” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 

F.3d 748, 749-750 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 

(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). The ALJ must make specific findings based on the record for 

discounting a claimant’s subjective complaints. See Savage v. Astrue, No. CV-11-2103-

PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 551461, at *7 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2013). In this case, there is no 

question that the ALJ found that there was medical evidence of underlying impairments 

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that would be reasonably likely to cause pain. See TR 17 (“the claimant’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably expect to cause the alleged symptoms; 

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the 

above residual functional capacity assessment.”). 

 The question then is whether the ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony of pain 

solely because such pain was not supported by objective medical evidence. “Although an 

ALJ ‘cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain,’ the ALJ cannot 

reject testimony of pain without making findings sufficiently specific to permit the 

reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s 

testimony.” Orteza, 50 F.3d at 750 (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46; Fair v. Bowen,

885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). Factors that the adjudicator should consider when 

making such credibility determinations include the nature, location, onset, duration, 

frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain, precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., 

movement, activity, environmental conditions), type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse 

side-effects of any pain medication, treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain, 

functional restrictions, and the claimant’s daily activities. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 

(citing SSR 88–13, 1988 WL 236011 (July 20, 1988)). 

 “[I]f the claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could 

be transferred to the workplace, an adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s allegations 

upon making specific findings relating to the claimant’s daily activities.” Id. (citing 

Fair, 885 F.2d at 603). “Another relevant factor may be ‘unexplained, or inadequately 

explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.’” Id. 

(internal citation omitted). “An adjudicator may also use ‘ordinary techniques of 

credibility evaluation’ to test a claimant’s credibility.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

“So long as the adjudicator makes specific findings that are supported by the record, the 

adjudicator may discredit the claimant’s allegations based on inconsistencies in the 

testimony or on relevant character evidence.” Id.

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 In this case, the ALJ made specific findings to support his determination that 

Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his 

conditions were not fully credible and did not prevent him from performing unskilled 

work. Here, the ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff was not fully credible because of: 

(1) his sketchy work history, (2) his history of incarceration and/or other penalties 

received for fraudulent acts and/or illicit drug use until at least 2007, (3) his failure to quit 

smoking despite his physician’s advice to quit, (4) the fact that he had been found to be 

noncompliant with his doctor’s orders to take his blood pressure medications on at least 

one occasion despite the fact that taking those medications helped alleviate his 

symptoms, (5) his description of his normal activities, including caring for his own 

personal needs without difficulty or assistance, performing light housecleaning, preparing 

simple meals, tending dogs, working in the garage with his tools, working on bicycles, 

spraying for weeds, driving an automobile, and visiting others and shopping, (6) the lack 

of objective support for the opinions of Dr. Kelly and Dr. Gunnala, (7) the contradictory 

opinion of his treating cardiologist, (8) no evidence of routine treatment other than 

medications, and (8) records showing an improvement in Plaintiff’s conditions of severe 

and debilitating pain, fatigue, and shortness of breath since July 2005. (TR 17-18). 

 Although Plaintiff objects to a few of the factors listed by the ALJ, the ALJ 

properly made a number of “specific findings that are supported by the record” in finding 

that Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was not fully credible. 

 C. Whether the ALJ Improperly Relied on Grids and Failed to 

 Consider Non-Exertional Limitations at Step 5 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider non-exertional limitations and 

improperly relied on grids when considering jobs that exist in the national economy. In 

response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly relied on the grids pursuant to 

the regulations. 

 At step five of the disability evaluation process, the burden shifted to the 

Commissioner to show that Plaintiff could engage in gainful employment in the national 

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economy. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721. The Commissioner can make this showing in 

one of two ways. First, a vocational expert can be called to evaluate a factual scenario 

and testify about “what kinds of jobs the claimant still can perform and whether there is a 

sufficient number of those jobs available in the claimant’s region or in several other 

regions of the economy to support a finding of not disabled.” Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted). 

Second, the grids can be used to determine if a particular claimant is capable of 

performing certain kinds of work in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

The grids are an administrative tool the Secretary may rely on 

when considering claimants with substantially uniform levels 

of impairment. They may be used, however, only when the 

grids accurately and completely describe the claimant’s 

abilities and limitations. When a claimant’s non-exertional 

limitations are “sufficiently severe” so as to significantly limit 

the range of work permitted by the claimant’s exertional 

limitations, the grids are inapplicable. In such instances, the 

Secretary must take the testimony of a vocational expert, and 

identify specific jobs within the claimant’s capabilities. 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). Non-exertional limitations that are not covered by the Grids are those that 

limit an individual’s ability to work “without directly affecting his or her strength. . . . 

Examples of non-exertional limitations are mental, sensory, postural, manipulative, or 

environmental (e.g. [,] inability to tolerate dust or fumes) limitations.” Desrosiers, 846 

F.2d at 579. However, “[i]t is not necessary to permit a claimant to circumvent the 

guidelines simply by alleging the existence of a non-exertional impairment, such as pain, 

validated by a doctor’s opinion that such impairment exists. To do so frustrates the 

purpose of the guidelines.” Id. at 577. 

 Here, Plaintiff argues that he suffers from non-exertional limitations related to his 

cognitive impairments. Plaintiff points to the opinion of Dr. Oizumi, a consultative 

licensed clinical psychologist, who stated that Plaintiff would likely have trouble 

adhering to a consistent schedule and has difficult adapting to changes in his 

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environment. (TR 503). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also improperly omitted 

consideration of Mr. Perkins’ fatigue, memory and concentration limitations, which are 

non-exertional limitations requiring that the ALJ consult a vocational expert. The 

Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s limitations are consistent with the basic mental 

demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work. While this may be true, Plaintiff 

did have non-exertional limitations that were not considered by the ALJ. As such, the 

ALJ was required to take the testimony of a vocational expert. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, the ALJ erred at Step Five in failing to take the testimony of a 

vocational expert. 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that this case is REVERSED AND REMANDED to the 

Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this Order. The Clerk of the Court 

shall enter judgment. 

 Dated this 30th day of July, 2013. 

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