Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01809/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01809-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ANGEL CHAVEZ, JR., No. 2:12-CV-1809-WBS-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Pending before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) and defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

1

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on August 11, 2009. In the

application, plaintiff claims that disability began on July 31, 2007. Plaintiff claims that disability

is caused by a combination of learning and reading impairments as well “mental problems, stress,

anxiety, panic attacks when I am in crowds.” Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied. Following

denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on

February 3, 2011, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Timothy S. Snelling. In an April

18, 2011, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on the following

relevant findings:

1. The claimant has the following severe impairment(s): anxiety disorder

with panic episodes; somatoform disorder, not otherwise specified;

personality disorder, not otherwise specified; bipolar disorder; learning

disorder; and developmental reading disorder;

2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;

3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: the claimant

can perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but the claimant is

unable to understand, remember, or complete detailed or complex job

tasks, and he is limited to no more than frequent interaction with the

general public; and

4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, the claimant is capable of performing his past relevant

work as a dishwasher and hotel housekeeper.

After the Appeals Council declined review on May 22, 2012, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

2

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ failed to

articulate sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion of the agency examining mental health

professionals; (2) the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for findings plaintiff not credible;

(3) the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for rejecting lay witness evidence; (4) the ALJ

failed to acknowledge evidence that all of plaintiff’s past relevant work was performed below

substantial gainful levels; and (5) the Appeals Council erred by failing to remand for

consideration of new evidence.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

3

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

A. Plaintiff’s Credibility

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the

[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce

objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that

the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or

another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship

be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon. 

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

4

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the

claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning

drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given

impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Regarding reliance on a claimant’s daily activities to find testimony of disabling

pain not credible, the Social Security Act does not require that disability claimants be utterly

incapacitated. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly held that the “. . . mere fact that a plaintiff has carried out certain daily activities . . .

does not . . .[necessarily] detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” See Orn v.

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Heller, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2001)); see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that a

claim of pain-induced disability is not necessarily gainsaid by a capacity to engage in periodic

restricted travel); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the

claimant was entitled to benefits based on constant leg and back pain despite the claimant’s

ability to cook meals and wash dishes); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (observing that “many home

activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication”). Daily

activities must be such that they show that the claimant is “. . .able to spend a substantial part of

his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable

to a work setting.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ must make specific findings in this regard

before relying on daily activities to find a claimant’s pain testimony not credible. See Burch v.

5

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

As to plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated:

The claimant, born on March 28, 1980, is currently thirty-one years old. 

He alleges an onset date of disability of July 31, 2007. His alleged

impairments include stress, anxiety, panic attacks, mental problems, and

the inability to read or write. The claimant lives in a house with his two

younger brothers, ages eighteen and sixteen. He alleges that he cares for

his two younger brothers, but he qualifies his answer, indicating that his

boyfriend does everything that his brothers need. Additionally, his

boyfriend assists him with everything in relation to reading and writing. 

His conditions affect his sleep. He claims that he requires encouragement

to complete tasks; otherwise, he gets angry or upset. The claimant alleges

that he only goes outside when it is necessary. He claims that his

condition affects his memory, concentration, and understanding as well as

his ability to complete tasks and get along with others [Exhibit 7E]. 

In an updated Disability Report, the claimant alleges that as of fall of

2009, he could no longer drive due to vision problems. Additionally, he is

experiencing pain in his wrists, severe memory loss, bowel problems, and

foot problems. He claims that he no longer leaves the house during the

daytime due to his aversion to crowds and his irritability around people. 

he claims that his significant other does all the chores because he has no

patience [Exhibit 9E]. In another updated Disability Report, the claimant

alleges that he is experiencing left leg pain. he claims that if someone

does not do his shopping and chores, then he does them at night when

there are not a lot of people around. He claims that he needs to be

evaluated for psych medications, but he had not yet gone to the mental

health place [Exhibit 11E]. 

* * * 

After careful consideration of the evidence, I find that the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the

above residual functional capacity assessment. 

The claimant has described daily activities which are not limited to the

extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and

limitations. The claimant testified that he has been caring for his two

younger brothers since their mother passes away ten years ago. He claims

that he is able to care for his personal hygiene, prepare simple meals, and

shop in stores for household supplies. While he, additionally, alleges that

his boyfriend, Mr. Custer, cared for his brothers and performed most of the

household chores, he also testified that his boyfriend left him, implying

that his support is no longer available [Exhibit 7E]. Furthermore, the

claimant informed Dr. Wakefield that he was obsessive about cleaning the

house and that he cooked dinner and washed the dishes [Exhibit 2F]. 

6

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Overall, the claimant’s varied activities of daily living are inconsistent

with a complete inability to perform substantial gainful activity. 

The record reflects work activity after the alleged onset date. The County

Family Resource and Referral Center paid the claimant $6.00 an hour for

babysitting services, beginning in January of 2007. The claimant babysat

his brother’s two children in his home for approximately thirty-two hours a

week [Exhibit 1E]. Although that work activity did not constitute

disqualifying substantial gainful activity, it does indicate that the

claimant’s daily activities have been somewhat greater than the claimant

has generally reported. Additionally, the claimant completed the Cal

Works program in January of 2010 [Exhibit 9E]. Holding himself out as

ready, willing, and able to work contradicts the claimant’s allegations of

disability. 

According to Mr. Custer, the claimant’s allegedly disabling impairments

were present at approximately the same level of severity through the eight

years that he knew the claimant, which is prior to the alleged onset date

[Exhibit 5E].

Additionally, the claimant’s alleged onset date of July 31, 2007, is two

years prior to when he first sought out mental health treatment in

September of 2009 [Exhibit 8F]. The claimant’s lack of specialty

treatment is inconsistent with his allegations of disability. 

Lastly, while the claimant clearly has a learning disability and he did

participate in special education, school records also indicate that from

1985 to 1993 the claimant transferred schools seven times, was held back

a grade three times, and was dropped due to poor attendance twice. The

fact that he did not attend school regularly, was not properly administered

his medication as a child, and dropped out in the seventh grade added to

his inhibited ability to learn [Exhibits 21F and 22F]. 

Plaintiff argues that the reasons articulated by the ALJ are not supported by substantial evidence. 

The court does not agree. Here, the ALJ appropriately considered plaintiff’s

work records in noting that plaintiff worked after the alleged onset date. The ALJ also properly

considered plaintiff’s lack of treatment for any mental health impairment until September 2009 –

over two years after the alleged onset date. The ALJ also considered other inconsistencies in the

record. In particular, plaintiff’s boyfriend testified that plaintiff’s level of impairment was about

the same the entire time he knew the plaintiff, some of which preceded the alleged onset date. 

This suggests that plaintiff’s functioning was the same before and after the alleged onset date,

which is inconsistent with plaintiff’s claim of a disability beginning in July 2007. In other

7

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

words, if plaintiff was so severely limited as to be disabled the entire time he knew his boyfriend,

one would expect plaintiff to claim an earlier onset date. The ALJ appropriately resolved this

inconsistency, among others, in concluding that plaintiff’s claims of disabling symptoms is not

credible. 

B. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to articulate sufficient reasons for rejecting the

opinions contained in a single report prepared by James Wakefield, Jr., Ph.D., and Robert L.

Mattesich, LEP, agency examining mental health professionals. 

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

8

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

As to the report prepared by Dr. Wakefield and Mr. Mattesich, the ALJ stated:

. . . James A. Wakefield, Jr. Ph.D., State agency psychological consultant,

evaluated the claimant on September 11, 2009. The claimant drove

himself to the appointment. Dr. Wakefield observed that the claimant’s

mood varied throughout the examination. he was easily frustrated and had

a low threshold for stress. The claimant achieved a General Memory

Index of 60 on the Wechsler Memory Scale-III, indicating a significant

impairment in his memory skills. His Full-Scale IQ Score on the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV was a 63, placing him within the

mildly mentally retarded range. However, Dr. Wakefield viewed the

claimant’s results from the standardized tests as an under-estimation of his

potential due to the influences of his emotional impairment. In addition,

the claimant was able to compute simple math word problems and engage

in simple reasoning on an abstract level. Furthermore, he exhibited a

functional usage of language and was able to comprehend oral directives

and formulate verbal responses. Dr. Wakefield diagnosed anxiety disorder

with panic episodes, rule out bipolar disorder, learning disorder, and

cognitive disorder related to emotional impairment [Exhibit 2F]. 

* * *

Dr. Wakefield opined that at the time, the claimant did not appear capable

of understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions. The

doctor found that he was not capable of responding appropriately to

coworkers, supervisors, or the public. Additionally, he was not capable of

handling benefit payments in his best interests [Exhibit 2F]. Dr.

Wakefield’s opinion is given reduced weight because the claimant’s

activities of daily living show that he is able to function at home and earn

money and they do not support such severe mental limitations. 

Additionally, the doctor’s own evaluation showed positive objective

9

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

findings. Furthermore, Dr. Wakefield did not review the claimant’s file as

no evidence had yet been submitted and the claimant had not received any

mental health treatment until after this evaluation. 

The court finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis. Initially, the court notes that Dr.

Wakefield’s opinion is contradicted in that, while he opined that plaintiff has severe mental

limitations, Dr. Haroun – an agency psychiatric consultant – did not. As to the reasons provided

by the ALJ for rejecting Dr. Wakefield’s opinion, the court finds that they are specific and

legitimate and supported by substantial evidence. In particular, plaintiff’s daily activities

(discussed above) indeed indicate a level of functioning which would be precluded under Dr.

Wakefield’s assessment of plaintiff’s capabilities. As the ALJ noted, plaintiff took steps to

prepare for work by completing the Cal Works program in January 2010. Further, as the ALJ

1

also noted, Dr. Wakefield observed positive findings, such as plaintiff’s ability to compute

simple math word problems and engage in simple reasoning on an abstract level. Plaintiff also

exhibited a functional usage of language and was able to comprehend oral directives and

formulate verbal responses. The doctor himself noted that test results reflected an underestimation of plaintiff’s potential. Finally, it cannot be disputed that Dr. Wakefield did not have

access to any mental health treatment records at the time of his evaluation in early September

2009 because none existed. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

This fact is also notable in the general time line of plaintiff’s alleged mental 1

disability. Plaintiff claims that his disability began in July 2007. Given that he did not first seek

out mental health treatment until September 2009, mental limitations could not have been the

cause of his alleged disability, at least when plaintiff claims it began in July 2007. Thus, the

basis of plaintiff’s claim as to mental limitations must be that his mental condition became

disabling around September 2009 when he first sought treatment. However, plaintiff completed

the Cal Works program in January 2010, indicating that he had a functional level of mental

capability after September 2009. 

10

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

C. Lay Witness Evidence

Plaintiff argues: (1) while the ALJ summarized lay witness evidence from

plaintiff’s boyfriend, William Custer, the ALJ did not articulate specific reasons for rejecting his

statements; and (2) the ALJ completely ignored lay witness evidence in the form of a report

prepared by an agency interviewer, E. Gomez. 

In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ generally must consider lay

witness testimony concerning a claimant's ability to work. See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915,

919 (9th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d)(4) & (e), 416.913(d)(4) & (e). Indeed, “lay

testimony as to a claimant's symptoms or how an impairment affects ability to work is competent

evidence . . . and therefore cannot be disregarded without comment.” See Nguyen v. Chater, 100

F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). Consequently, “[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony

of lay witnesses, he must give reasons that are germane to each witness.” Dodrill, 12 F.3d at

919. The ALJ may cite same reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s statements to reject third-party

statements where the statements are similar. See Valentine v. Commissioner Soc. Sec. Admin.,

574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (approving rejection of a third-party family member’s

testimony, which was similar to the claimant’s, for the same reasons given for rejection of the

claimant’s complaints). 

The ALJ, however, need not discuss all evidence presented. See Vincent on

Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984). Rather, he must explain

why “significant probative evidence has been rejected.” Id. (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,

706 (3d Cir.1981). Applying this standard, the court held that the ALJ properly ignored evidence

which was neither significant nor probative. See id. at 1395. As to a letter from a treating

psychiatrist, the court reasoned that, because the ALJ must explain why he rejected

uncontroverted medical evidence, the ALJ did not err in ignoring the doctor’s letter which was

controverted by other medical evidence considered in the decision. See id. As to lay witness

testimony concerning the plaintiff’s mental functioning as a result of a second stroke, the court

11

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

concluded that the evidence was properly ignored because it “conflicted with the available

medical evidence” assessing the plaintiff’s mental capacity. Id.

In Stout v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit recently considered an ALJ’s silent

disregard of lay witness testimony. See 454 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2006). The lay witness

had testified about the plaintiff’s “inability to deal with the demands of work” due to alleged

back pain and mental impairments. Id. The witnesses, who were former co-workers testified

about the plaintiff’s frustration with simple tasks and uncommon need for supervision. See id. 

Noting that the lay witness testimony in question was “consistent with medical evidence,” the

court in Stout concluded that the “ALJ was required to consider and comment upon the

uncontradicted lay testimony, as it concerned how Stout’s impairments impact his ability to

work.” Id. at 1053. The Commissioner conceded that the ALJ's silent disregard of the lay

testimony contravened Ninth Circuit case law and the controlling regulations, and the Ninth

Circuit rejected the Commissioner’s request that the error be disregarded as harmless. See id. at

1054-55. The court concluded:

Because the ALJ failed to provide any reasons for rejecting competent lay

testimony, and because we conclude that error was not harmless,

substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision . . . 

Id. at 1056-67. 

From this case law, the court concludes that the rule for lay witness testimony

depends on whether the testimony in question is controverted or consistent with the medical

evidence. If it is controverted, then the ALJ does not err by ignoring it. See Vincent, 739 F.2d at

1395. If lay witness testimony is consistent with the medical evidence, then the ALJ must

consider and comment upon it. See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1053. However, the Commissioner’s

regulations require the ALJ consider lay witness testimony in certain types of cases. See Smolen

v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996); SSR 88-13. That ruling requires the ALJ to

consider third-party lay witness evidence where the plaintiff alleges pain or other symptoms that

are not shown by the medical evidence. See id. Thus, in cases where the plaintiff alleges

12

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

impairments, such as chronic fatigue or pain (which by their very nature do not always produce

clinical medical evidence), it is impossible for the court to conclude that lay witness evidence

concerning the plaintiff’s abilities is necessarily controverted such that it may be properly

ignored. Therefore, in these types of cases, the ALJ is required by the regulations and case law to

consider lay witness evidence.

Regarding evidence from plaintiff’s boyfriend, Mr. Custer, the ALJ stated:

William Custer, the claimant’s boyfriend, filled out a Third Party Function

Report on behalf of the claimant on August 26, 2009. Mr. Custer claimed

that the claimant cared for his two younger brothers with his help. He

claimed that he helped him with anything having to do with reading and

writing. Mr. Custer primarily corroborated the claimant’s allegations that

he was unable to handle stress well, he got angry easily, and he lacked the

ability to maintain concentration [Exhibit 5E]. 

* * *

According to Mr. Custer, the claimant’s allegedly disabling impairments

were present at approximately the same level of severity throughout the

eight years that he knew the claimant. . . . [Exhibit 5E]. 

Plaintiff argues: “While the ALJ referenced this [Third Party Function Report], he provided no

reasons whatsoever for his obvious rejection of this evidence.” The court does not find any error. 

The ALJ noted that Mr. Custer’s report corroborated plaintiff’s allegations of disabling

symptoms, which the ALJ found to be not credible. Thus, it is clear that the ALJ properly

rejected Mr. Custer’s statements for the same reasons.2

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to note plaintiff’s behavior

during a social security interview as documented by the interviewer, E. Gomez. The record

/ / /

Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ’s failure to specifically state that Mr. 2

Custer’s statements were being rejected for the same reasons as for rejecting plaintiff’s

statements constituted error. In any event, such error would be harmless. See Stout v.

Commissioner of Social Security, 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that error is

harmless if no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different

disability determination); see also Robbins v. Social Security Administration, 466 F.3d 880, 885

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056).

13

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 reflects that agency interviewer E. Gomez reported in August 2009 the following:

[Claimant] came into the office by himself, he was in tears because he was

late for his appointment. He stated that he was in a panic because he could

not wait in the lobby with all the people. He talked a lot, going over and

over about his problems. He stated that he was gay and his partner was

leaving him after about 6 years, he was upset because he helped him a lot. 

He stated he cared for two of his younger brothers and was overwhelmed

because he was going to have to care for them himself. He stated he has

had an eating disorder and throws up a lot. He was groomed and clean. 

He had to stand up two times during the interview and looked around. He

talked a lot. Sometimes I had to redirect him to answer the question. 

The court finds no error in the ALJ’s silent disregard of this evidence, which is neither significant

nor probative of plaintiff’s level of functioning given that it is a one-time observation made by

someone who is not a medical professional or who knows plaintiff. See Howard v. Barnhart, 341

F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). 

D. Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work

As to plaintiff’s ability to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ stated:

The claimant previously worked as a dishwasher. . ., which is a medium

exertion level job that has a specific vocational preparation level of 2 and

can be learned in one month. The claimant performed this job at a light

level for one year [Exhibit 4E] and was compensated at above SGA levels

during that time [Exhibit 3D]. Because the claimant performed this job

recently, did so long enough to learn it, and was compensated for it at

above SGA levels, it qualifies as past relevant work within the meaning of

20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965.

The claimant also previously worked as a hotel housekeeper. . ., which is a

heavy exertion level job that has a specific vocational preparation level of

2 and can be learned in one month. The claimant performed this job at a

medium level for one year [Exhibit 4E] and was compensated at above

SGA levels during that time [Exhibit 3D]. Because the claimant

performed this job recently, did so long enough to learn it, and was

compensated for it at above SGA levels, it qualifies as past relevant work

within the meaning of 20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965.

In comparing the claimant’s residual functional capacity with the physical

and mental demands of the work described above, I find that the claimant

is able to perform the jobs as actually and generally performed. The jobs

are performed at the medium and heavy exertional levels in the national

economy, and they were performed at the light and medium levels by the

claimant. As the claimant is capable of a full range of work with no

exertional limits, neither type of performance is precluded by the

14

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider evidence that, because he was allowed to

perform his past work under special conditions, the presumption that such work was performed

at the substantial gainful level is rebutted. 

The court finds no error. First, as defendant observes, the only evidence that

plaintiff performed his past work under special conditions which would rebut the presumption

that such work was performed at or above the substantial gainful level comes from his own

testimony which the ALJ appropriately found to be not credible. Second, even if believed,

plaintiff’s testimony on the issue of special conditions is insufficient given the he testified about

specific and limited instances, such as when his manager would have to “calm him down” at

times following his mother’s death, yet was able to hold his past jobs for years at a time. 

E. Newly Submitted Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council erred by failing to remand based on new

evidence. A case may be remanded to the agency for the consideration of new evidence if the 3

evidence is material and good cause exists for the absence of the evidence from the prior record. 

See Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d 509, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). In order for new evidence to be “material,” the court must find that,

had the agency considered this evidence, the decision might have been different. See Clem v.

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1990). The court need only find a reasonable possibility

that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the case. See Booz v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984). The new evidence,

however, must be probative of the claimant’s condition as it existed at or before the time of the

disability hearing. See Sanchez 812 F.2d at 511 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(G)). In Sanchez,

The new evidence – a 2011 report prepared by Robert L. Mattesich, a licensed 3

educational psychologist – was not made a part of the administrative record because it relates to a

time period following the ALJ’s decision. 

15

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the court concluded that the new evidence in question was not material because it indicated “at

most, mental deterioration after the hearing, which would be material to a new application, but

not probative of his condition at the hearing.” Id. at 512 (citing Ward v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d

762, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

The court finds no basis for a remand to consider the 2011 report because it is not

probative of plaintiff’s condition as it existed at or before the time of the administrative hearing. 

As the court noted in Sanchez, the 2011 report may be evidence to support a new application

based on mental deterioration. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, the

undersigned recommends that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) be denied; and;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 18) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 6, 2014

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16

Case 2:12-cv-01809-WBS-CMK Document 22 Filed 03/06/14 Page 16 of 16