Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00297/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST

COMPANY, as Trustee for DSLA

Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-AR4,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv297-LAB (BLM)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

REMAND

vs.

CELESTE LOUDON, DAVID LOUDON,

DefendantS.

On February 7, 2014, Defendants who are California citizens proceeding pro se,

removed this action from state court, citing diversity jurisdiction.

Plaintiff Deutsche Bank then on February 28 filed an ex parte motion for remand that

failed to comply with numerous provisions of this District’s Civil Local Rules and the Court’s

standing order. Most seriously, Deutsche Bank selected its own hearing date, and purported

to impose that hearing date on the Court. The hearing date given in the caption and notice

of motion was not obtained from the Court, and parties have no authority to control the

Court’s docket in this fashion. See Civil Local Rule 7.1(b) (“All hearing dates for any matters

on which a ruling is required must be obtained from the clerk of the judge to whom the case

is assigned.”); Kashin v. Kent, 342 Fed.Appx. 341, 342 (9 Cir. 2009) (holding that district th

court properly rejected application for filing, where application was filed in violation of this

District’s Civil Local Rule 7.2(b)).

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The notice of motion included a proposed order, in violation of § 2(h) of this District’s

Electronic Case Filing Administrative Policies & Procedures Manual (“Registered users

SHOULD NOT FILE OR SUBMIT proposed orders within the electronic filing system.”) No

proof of service was filed. See Civil Local Rule 83.3(h)(2) (in all but extraordinary

circumstances requiring proof by affidavit or declaration showing the opposing party was

informed that a movant would be seeking relief ex parte, and told when and where the

motion would be made); Standing Order, § 8 (“Any ex parte application filed with the Court

shall be served on the opposing counsel via facsimile or overnight mail.”) And Defendants,

because they are not registered CM/ECF users, would not receive electronic notification of

this document’s filing. It is uncertain they would even find out about the hearing, much less

have time to file an opposition or otherwise prepare for it. And even if the hearing were being

held and Defendants somehow found out about it, the notice of motion incorrectly gave the

state courthouse’s address as the hearing location. In these respects, the motion amounts

to an unfair ambush.

In addition, there is no reason why this motion should have been filed ex parte, rather

than as a regular noticed motion. See Standing Order, § 8 (directing parties to use noticed

motions, except when otherwise provided by rule or court order, or in extraordinary

circumstances). A noticed motion involves a 28-day briefing schedule and allows opposing

parties time to respond. See Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(1).

Finally, the motion to remand doesn’t address the basis for removal. The notice of

removal cites diversity as the basis for jurisdiction, and alleges the parties’ diverse citizenship

as well as an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. The motion for remand, however,

merely addresses the absence of a federal question. This argument is inapposite. The

motion (Docket no. 3) is therefore DENIED.

Deutsche Bank is not, however foreclosed from renewing its motion on some other

ground. For example, the removing Defendants are local, and therefore under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(b)(2), they had no right to remove this case from state court. See Spencer v. U.S.

Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Ca., 393 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b))

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(“It is . . . clear that the presence of a local defendant at the time removal is sought bars

removal.”) This bar is procedural rather than jurisdictional, though, and therefore can’t be

raised by the Court sua sponte. Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 942 (9 Cir. th

2006). But if Deutsche Bank were to make a timely motion for remand (that is, within 30

days of the removal date, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)), the Court sees no reason why it would

not be granted. If Deutsche Bank seeks remand on that basis, the Court GRANTS it leave

to file that motion ex parte; the Court will set a briefing schedule and may hold a hearing, if

appropriate.

It may also be that there are jurisdictional defects, and the 30-day time limit does not

apply to remand on that basis. See § 1447(c). Such defects can also be raised by the Court

sua sponte. Id.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 5, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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