Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01914/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01914-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEITH WAYNE SEKERKE, 

CDCR #V-15331, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

MARY ANN GLYNN; NGUYEN; 

L.D. ZAMORA; JODIE RIVERA; P. 

DUONG; PEREDA; B. ANTIOGUIA; 

TAMORIA; MARKIEWITZ; DUSTIN 

TIERNEY; SCOTT WALL; ROBERT 

MAZON; MICHAEL HAGEMAN, 

Defendants. 

Civil No. llcv1914 WQH (BLM) 

ORDER DISMISSING THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 

On August 19, 2011, Keith Wayne Sekerke ("Plaintiff'), a state prisoner currently 

incarcerated at the California Correctional Institution located in Tehachapi, California, and 

proceeding in pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, 

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") [ECF No.2]. 

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Case 3:11-cv-01914-WQH-BLM Document 18 Filed 03/20/13 Page 1 of 7
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•The Court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his 

Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Nov. 10, 2011 

Order at 5-6. Plaintiff was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint in order to correct 

the deficiencies ofpleading identified in the Court's Order. ld. On February 1,2012, the Court, 

once again, dismissed Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim. See Feb. 

1, 2012 Order at 5. Plaintiff was again given leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff sought an extension oftime to file his Second Amended Complaint which was granted 

by the Court. See Feb. 16,2012 Order at 1. Plaintiff was given until May 21, 2012 to file his 

Second Amended Complaint. 

lOOnMarch 20,2012, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). However, 

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Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint [ECF No.1 0] on the 

grounds that he did not receive the Court's previous Order granting him an extension oftime. 

As a result, Plaintiff claims that he would have used more time to conduct further legal research 

relating to his claims. Plaintiff requested that the Court "stay the filing ofthe Second Amended 

Complaint" in order that he may supplement it with additional research. 

The Court declined to "stay" the proceedings and instead dismissed Plaintiffs Second 

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff was permitted additional time to file a Third Amended Complaint 

that is complete in itself and abides by the Court's previous Orders. See Apr. 12,2012 Order at 

3. After receiving additional extensions of time, Plaintiff has now filed his Third Amended 

Complaint ("TAC"). (ECF No. 17.) 

I. 

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") obligates the Court to review complaints 

filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained 

in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 

program," ~~as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 19 I 5(e)(2) and 1915A(b). 

Under these provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any 

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portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages 

from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability 

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person 

acting under color ofstate law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived 

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws ofthe 

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

B. Eighth Amendment excessive force claims 

In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive 

force, while incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD"), on December 

11,2004 by Defendants Tierney, Wall, Mazon and Hageman. (See TAC at 5.) Plaintiff did not 

file this action until August 19,2011. 

Where the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face ofthe complaint, 

dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper. See Cervantes v. City o/San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 

1276 (9th Cir. 1993). Because section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, federal 

courts apply the forum state's statute oflimitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 

393 F3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F3d 945,954 (9th Cir. 2004); 

Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). The applicable statute of limitations in a 

Bivens action is also the state personal injury statute. See Matthews v. Macanas, 990 F .2d 467, 

468-69 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406,410 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Actions 

under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement ofa state actor under 

§ 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.")). Before 2003, California's statute oflimitations was 

one year. Jones, 393 F3dat 927. Effective January 1,2003, the limitations period was extended 

to two years. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). The two-years limitations period, 

however, does not apply retroactively. Canatella v. Van de Kamp, 486 F 3d 1128, 1132-22 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955). 

Unlike the length ofthe limitations period, however, "the accrual date ofa § 1983 cause 

ofaction is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." Wallace v. 

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Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Hardin v. Staub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989) (federal law 

governs when a § 1983 cause ofaction accrues). "Under the traditional rule ofaccrual ... the tort 

cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or 

omission results in damages." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955 

("Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the 

injury which is the basis ofthe action." ). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable for excessive force which was alleged to 

have occurred in 2004. (See TAC at 5.) Thus, Plaintiff would have reason to believe that his 

constitutional rights were violated seven years prior to the date he filed this action. Id.; see also 

Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955. However, Plaintiff did not file his Complaint in this case until 

August 19, 2011, which well exceeds California's statute of limitation. See CAL. CODE CIV. 

PROC. § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to show how or 

why California's two-year statute of limitations might be tolled for a period of time which 

would make his claims timely. See, e.g., CAL. CODECIV.P. §352.1 (tolling statute oflimitations 

"for a maximum of2 years" during a prisoner's incarceration); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 

916 (9th Cir. 1999)(findingthat CAL. CODECIV.P. §352.1 tolls a California prisoner's personal 

injury claims accruing before January 1, 1995 for two years, or until January 1, 1995, whichever 

occurs later, unless application ofthe statute would result in a "manifest injustice."). 

Pursuant to Fink, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants, accruing in 2004, would be tolled 

for two years. California's two-year statute of limitations would then begin to run -- requiring 

Plaintiffto file this action against these Defendants no later than 2008. Generally, federal courts 

also apply the forum state's law regarding equitable tolling. Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City 

o/Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372,374 (9th Cir. 1988). Under California law, however, a plaintiff 

must meet three conditions to equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) he must have diligently 

pursued his claim; (2) his situation must be the product offorces beyond his control; and (3) the 

defendants must not be prejudiced by the application of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Central 

PathologyServ. Med. Clinic, 28 CaL App. 4th 1328,1335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Addison v. State 

o/California, 21 Cal.3d 313,316-17 (Cal. 1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. Here, however, 

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Plaintiffhas failed to plead sufficient facts which, ifproved, would support the equitable tolling 

ofhis claims. See Cervantes v. City o/San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff suggests that he delayed in filing this claim because Defendants threatened him 

if he filed an action against them while he was housed at RJD where the Defendants were 

employed. (See TAC at 5-6.) However, the Court takes judicial notice that, at the very least 

beginning in 2009, Plaintiff was housed in prison separate from the Defendants in this matter. 

A court '''may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal 

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue. '" Bias v. 

Moynihan, 508 F .3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 

801,803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff was housed at the 

California Correctional Institution on April 24, 2009. See Sekerke v. Hernandez, et al., 

09cv0360 JAH (JMA). Thus, Plaintiffs arguments that he felt threatened by Defendants 

because they were employed at the institution where he was housed is not supported by the 

record. The record demonstrates that at least as of 2009, he was no longer housed with 

Defendants and yet he still waited an additional two years to file this action. Plaintiff was also 

not incarcerated for several months in 2010 but he fails to inform the Court why he did not 

attempt to pursue this action prior to August of 2011. (See TAC at 7.) 

In addition, Plaintiff argues that because his administrative grievances, which he attaches 

as exhibits to his Third Amended Complaint, were accepted for filing despite the fact that they 

were untimely would allow him to file this untimely action. However, the administrative 

grievances attached to Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint relate only to his medical and dental 

care claims. There are no administrative grievances attached to Plaintiff s Third Amended 

Complaint which include any claims of excessive force in 2004. 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to support equitable tolling 

of his Eighth Amendment excessive force claims and therefore, these claims are dismissed as 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

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c. Eighth Amendment dental care claims 

Plaintiff again alleges that prison officials denied him adequate dental care when they 

extracted two teeth following the incident that occurred in December of2004. (See TAC at 6.) 

Plaintiff claims that he was told that he would be "fitted for an upper denture" and the front teeth 

would be "capped/repaired." (Id.) While Plaintiffs front teeth were given caps, Plaintiff claims 

that they should have repaired his teeth rather than opting to extract them. (ld.) 

In order to assert a claim for inadequate dental care, Plaintiff must allege facts which are 

sufficient to show that each person sued was "deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198,200 (9th Cir. 1989). To be liable, prison officials 

must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to Plaintiff s pain or medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 105-06. 

Thus, to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show both: (1) an 

objectively "serious" medical need, Le., one that a reasonable doctor would think worthy of 

comment, one which significantly affects his daily activities, or one which is chronic and 

accompanied by substantial pain, see Doty v. County ofLassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); 

and (2) a SUbjective, and "sufficiently culpable" state of mind on the part of each individual 

Defendant. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). In general, deliberate indifference 

may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with a prescribed 

course of medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison medical officials 

provide necessary care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Plaintiff attaches several exhibits to his Third Amended Complaint that appear to 

be medical records relating to the tooth extraction. (See TAC, Ex. C, Operative Report dated 

December 24, 2004). In this report, it states that while the doctors initially thought his teeth 

could be treated by a "restorative dentist," they later came to the medical conclusion that it "was 

not restorable" and the tooth needed to be extracted. (ld.) Here, Plaintiff alleges facts which 

simply show he disagreed with the course of treatment provided by the Defendants. However, 

a mere difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding 

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appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a deliberate indifference 

claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240,242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment inadequate dental care claims are 

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

n 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1) Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint [ECF No. 17] is DISMISSED without 

prejudice for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 I 5(e)(2)(b). In addition, the 

Court finds further amendment would be futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 

339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further 

amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd. ofPrison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 

1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Since plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an 

arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment 

would be futile.") (citing Newlandv. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

2) IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that an IFP appeal from this final order of 

dismissal would not appear to be taken "in good faith" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedgev. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardnerv. Pogue, 558F.2d 548, 550 (9th 

Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only ifappeal would not be 

frivolous). 

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 

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