Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00954/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00954-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AHMAD ALKAYALI,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv954-WQH-KSC

ORDER

vs.

ECLIPSE GROUP, LLP; EDWARD F.

O’CONNOR, and DOES 1-100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Eclipse

Group, LLP and Edward F. O’Connor. (ECF No. 11).

I. Background

On July 8, 2013, Plaintiff Ahmad Alkayali filed a First Amended Complaint,

which is the operative complaint. (ECF No. 10). The First Amended Complaint alleges

a single cause of action for legal malpractice. The First Amended Complaint alleges

that Plaintiff hired Defendants to represent him as a cross-defendant in an underlying

lawsuit involving allegations of trademark infringement. The First Amended Complaint

alleges that “[t]he cross-complaint filed against [Plaintiff] Alkayali alleged one core

issue and one core issue only which was that Alkayali had committed a fraud on the

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in procuring registration” of the trademark at issue. 

Id. ¶ 8. The First Amended Complaint alleges that, as a result of Defendants’

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negligence, Plaintiff lost the underlying action and suffered damages. The First

Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]his court is vested with jurisdiction of this matter

under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, since Plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on

resolution of a substantial question of federal trademark and patent law.” Id. ¶ 5.

On July 18, 2013, Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 11). 

Defendant moves for the dismissal of this action for, inter alia, lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

On July 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF

No. 16). Plaintiff contends that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) because “the underlying litigation was chiefly

concerned with patent and trademark matters.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that

“Defendants should be judicially estopped from arguing lack of subject matter

jurisdiction” because Defendants argued in a prior legal malpractice action in state court

that the “malpractice action, which turns on substantial patent questions in the elements

of causation and damages, should be adjudicated in federal court.” Id. at 7; ECF No.

11-2 at 22.

On August 12, 2013, Defendants filed a reply in support of the Motion to

Dismiss. (ECF No. 17).

II. Discussion

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree. 

It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Plaintiff

asserts jurisdiction based solely upon 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), alleging that “Plaintiff’s

right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal

trademark and patent law.” (ECF No. 10 ¶ 5).

Section 1338(a) provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of

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any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety

protection, copyrights and trademarks.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). A cause of action created

by state law may “aris[e] under” federal patent or trademark law, within the meaning

of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), only if it involves a patent or trademark law issue that is “(1)

necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution

in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” 

Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). In Gunn, the Supreme Court stated that

“state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever,

arise under federal patent law for purposes of § 1338(a).” Id. The Court held that while

specific malpractice claims may “necessarily raise disputed questions of patent law,”

those questions usually are “not substantial in the relevant sense.” Id. at 1066. The

Court stated that “the substantiality inquiry ... looks to the importance of the [patent]

issue to the federal system as a whole,” rather than to “the particular parties in the

immediate suit.” Id. Finding the patent law issues implicated in the malpractice claim

before it to be “hypothetical,” “backward-looking,” and lacking “broader effects,” the

Court concluded they were not sufficiently “substantial” to create federal jurisdiction

pursuant to § 1338(a). Id. at 1066-68.

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the resolution of this legal malpractice

action will involve a trademark or patent issue of sufficient “importance ... to the federal

system as a whole” to be “substantial.” Id. at 1066. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed

to demonstrate that this case “aris[es] under” federal trademark or patent law, within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

Plaintiff contends that Defendants should be judicially estopped from arguing

that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. However, “no action of the parties can

confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, ... principles of estoppel

do not apply.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456

U.S. 694, 702 (1982); see also id. (“Similarly, a court ... will raise lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction on its own motion. The rule, springing from the nature and limits of the

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judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without exception....”) (quotation

omitted). This action must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (ECF No.

11). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), this action is dismissed for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

DATED: August 26, 2013

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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