Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01923/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01923-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT BANUELOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLADYS SANDOVAL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01923---SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSING CERTAIN 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

(ECF No. 5)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY 

DAYS

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 4, 2014. On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff’s complaint was 

dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Currently before the Court is 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed December 22, 2014. (ECF No. 5.) 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a case if at any time the Court 

determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In 

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard 

used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

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“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . 

. . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as 

true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal 

conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Gladys Sandoval and the Kings County 

Board of Supervisors for incidents related to dependency proceedings for Plaintiff’s son, Stefan 

Banuelos. 

Plaintiff alleges that he filed for medical aid with the Kings County Human Services 

Department in December of 2009; and his intake case worker, Irene Hernandez, used the 

information to begin a sexual relationship with Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶ 6, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff 

complained of discrimination and threats to Lupe Vila, the Coordinator of Kings County in 

2011.1 (Id.)

Stefan was adjudged to be a dependent of the court pursuant to California Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Due to a condition of Plaintiff’s probation, he was 

prohibited from having contact with his mother, Gloria Rodriguez. (Id. at ¶ 10.) In March of 

2013, an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) meeting was conducted for Stefan; and Plaintiff 

and Ms. Rodriguez were given notice to appear. The IEP meeting was also attended by 

Defendant Sandoval, Ms. Herrera, and designated school officials. (Id. at ¶ 9.) The result of the 

meeting was that Stefan was placed on home study. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff refused to sign the 

IEP. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

On July 3, 2013, Stefan was removed from the home of his grandmother and placed in a 

 

1 To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to state a claim based upon these factual allegations, any viable claims would 

be improperly joined in this action as the incident is unrelated to the remaining allegations in the complaint. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 18, 20. 

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group home. (Id. at ¶ 13.) In August 2013, while in the group home, Stefan was assaulted by 

another teen. (Id. at ¶ 14.) 

Plaintiff was visiting his son and was informed by Defendant Sandoval that he could not 

use the outside recreation yard nor bring Stefan any gifts, although other parents used the outside 

recreation yard and brought their children gifts.2 (Id. at ¶ 7.) This continued until April 2014;

and Plaintiff complained about the discrimination to Defendant Sandoval’s supervisor, Kristie 

Herrera. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiff contends that in retaliation for his refusal to sign the IEP, Defendant Sandoval 

attempted to have his probation revoked, recommended to the juvenile court that his educational 

rights be revoked, stated that he had anger issues, attempted to stop visitation with Stefan, and

falsified information to the court that his probation could not be modified. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he relapsed and started using drugs due to the treatment he received 

from Defendant Sandoval. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff complained to the County about the treatment 

he was receiving by Defendant Sandoval and no corrective action was taken. (Id. at ¶ 19.) 

III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Sandoval and the Kings County Board of Supervisors 

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 

(“IDEA”), 20 USC §§ 1400 et al; and California Welfare and Institutions Code § 16010.6 by the 

acts alleged in the first amended complaint. 

A. Kings County Board of Supervisors

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations regarding the Kings County Board of 

Supervisors. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim based upon the failure of 

the Department of Human Services to take any action in regards to his complaints against 

Defendant Sandoval or the removal of Stefan from his grandmother’s home, a local government 

unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory 

 

2 The first amended complaint states this occurred “[i]n December.03/14/ 2013/”. (ECF No. 5 at ¶ 7.) 

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of liability. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a local 

government unit may only be held liable if it inflicts the injury complained of through a policy or 

custom. Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). Generally, 

to establish municipal liability, the plaintiff must show that a constitutional right was violated, 

the municipality had a policy, that policy was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights, “and the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Burke v. 

County of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that a policy or custom 

existed in the County or that such a policy violated his federal rights. Plaintiff has failed to state 

a claim against the Kings County Board of Supervisors. 

B. Absolute Immunity

As Plaintiff was previously informed in the December 12, 2014 order dismissing his 

complaint with leave to amend, Defendant Sandoval is entitled to immunity for those functions 

she performed that are closely associated with the judicial process. (Order Dismissing 

Complaint With Leave to Amend 7:22-8:6, ECF No. 4.) 

Individuals who perform functions that are an integral part of the judicial process are 

immune from liability. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 (1983) (witnesses testifying 

during judicial proceedings); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (1981) (parole board 

officials in considering parole applications); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970 

(probation officers and court-appointed psychiatrists in preparing and submitting reports to the 

court); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1985) (probation officer in investigating 

and preparing presentencing report for court); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Social 

Services, 812 F.2d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 1987) (child services workers in initiating and pursuing 

dependency proceedings); Todd v. Landrum, No. 2:12-cv-01770 LKK KJN PS, 2012 WL 

5187836, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (court appointed mediator). An individual’s immunity 

is dependent upon the particular function that he performs and not on whether his position had a 

general relationship to the judicial proceedings. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 

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2003). 

Defendant Sandoval is “entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial 

functions connected with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings.” Meyers, 

812 F.2d at 1157. Defendant Sandoval acted as an advocate for the County in preparing reports 

to the juvenile court during the pendency of the juvenile proceedings and is entitled to immunity 

for the contents of the reports and the recommendations included in such reports. Id. at 1159. 

Plaintiff cannot state a claim against Defendant Sandoval for recommending that his educational 

rights be terminated, for testimony she provided in court proceedings, or for enforcing visitation 

orders imposed by the juvenile court. Miller, 335 F.3d at 896; Coverdell v. Dep’t of Social and 

Health Servs, 834 F.2d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1987). However, certain other actions alleged in the 

complaint are not clearly performed within the jurisdiction of prosecuting the action, such as 

communications with Plaintiff’s parole officer and refusing to allow Plaintiff to give gifts to 

Stefan or access to the recreation yard. These allegations shall be discussed below.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Liberally construed, the first amended complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff’s rights to 

due process, equal protection, to petition the government, and for retaliation. Section 1983 

provides a cause of action for the violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights by 

persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 

2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Williams, 

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a 

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Since a government official cannot be 

held liable under a theory of vicarious liability for section 1983 actions, Plaintiff must plead that 

the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); OSU Student 

Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012). In other words, to state a claim for relief 

under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or 

omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights. As discussed above, Plaintiff 

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has failed to state a section 1983 claim against the Board of Supervisors as the first amended 

complaint does not contain any factual allegations regarding these defendants.

1. Equal Protection

An equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant intentionally 

discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (2001); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 

(1998), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a 

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 

1167 (2005); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 

Plaintiff does not claim to be in a protected class, but alleges that Defendant Sandoval 

discriminated against him based upon his membership in a “lower class.” (ECF No. 5 at p. 5.) 

While a plaintiff can meet the burden to show that official action treats a certain class in a 

discriminatory matter or imposes different burdens on different classes of people, Lazy Y Ranch 

Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 2008), the first amended complaint does not contain

any allegations to identify what this “lower class” is or how he was treated differently than 

individuals of other classes. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that he is being discriminated 

against due to his membership in a lower class fails to state a plausible equal protection claim. 

Similarly, Plaintiff claims Defendant Sandoval informed him that he could not access the 

recreation yard and could not bring Stefan any gifts, but other parents used the recreation yard 

and brought their children gifts. However, it is unclear when this occurred. Further, Plaintiff 

had a stay away order preventing him from contact with Stefan, he failed to make the necessary 

behavioral changes in his court-ordered case plan, by his own admission he relapsed into drug 

use, family unification services were terminated, and Stefan was found to be eligible to be placed 

for adoption, appointment of a legal garden or permanently placed on February 11, 2013.

3

 (ECF 

 

3 Although Plaintiff has removed these facts from the first amended complaint, the Court incorporated them by 

reference in the initial screening order. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011); Lee 

v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 

All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

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No. 1 at 35-37, 47-49.) The Court cannot reasonably infer that Defendant Sandoval is liable for 

the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Plaintiff has not included allegations to show 

that the other parents who were granted access were similarly situated to him. Plaintiff fails to 

state a plausible equal protection claim.

2. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his right to due process. “It is well established that a parent 

has a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child and that 

the state's interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 685. Due process requires the observance of procedural 

protections before the state may interfere with the family relationship. Rogers v. County of San 

Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the interest in maintaining the family 

relationship is not absolute and the interest of the parent must be balanced against the interests of 

the state and, when conflicting, the interests of the children. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 

Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff’s parental rights were adjudicated by the state court and the school district 

conducted an IEP meeting which Plaintiff attended and participated. Plaintiff’s disagreement 

with the results of these proceedings is insufficient to state a claim that he was denied due 

process. Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify any due process that he was denied. Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim for a denial of his due process rights. 

3. Right to Petition the Government

Similarly, Plaintiff complains that he was denied his right to petition the government 

without stating any facts to support such a claim. The Petition Clause of the First Amendment 

protects the right of individuals to appeal to the courts and other government forums for 

resolution of legal disputes. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011). 

The right to petition and the right to free speech are not identical although they share substantial 

common ground. Borough of Duryea, Pa.,131 S.Ct. at 2494. “A petition conveys the special 

concerns of its author to the government and, in its usual form, requests action by the 

government to address those concerns.” Id. at 2495. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does 

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not state facts to show that he was denied his right to petition by any defendant named in this 

action.

To the extent that Plaintiff intended to allege a freedom of speech claim based upon the 

alleged retaliation due to his refusal to sign Stefan’s IEP, this shall be discussed below.

4. Retaliation

A claim for retaliation can be stated under section 1983 where a plaintiff alleges that a 

state actor retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the First Amendment. Mt. 

Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). To state a claim, the plaintiff 

must allege that he was engaged in protected activity, and that the protected conduct was a 

substantial or motivating factor for the retaliatory acts. Id. at 287. It is not sufficient to merely 

allege adverse action in proximity to the protected activity, a nexus between the protected 

activity and the adverse action must be shown. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Sandoval retaliated against him for his refusal to sign 

the IEP by 1) informing him the he could not use the outside recreation yard or bring gifts to 

Stefan; 2) attempting to have his probation revoked; 3) falsely stating he had anger issues, and 4) 

attempting to stop his visitation with Stefan. The first amended complaint identifies the October 

15, 2013 report to the juvenile court as Defendant Sandoval’s attempt to have his probation 

revoked, falsely stating he has anger issues, and attempting to stop his visitation with Stefan. 

(ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 15, 16.) To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging retaliation based upon the facts 

contained in the October 15, 2013 report to the juvenile court, Defendant Sandoval is entitled to 

absolute immunity as discussed above. Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim based 

upon these allegations. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sandoval retaliated against him for refusing to sign the 

IEP by refusing him access to the recreation yard and the ability to bring gifts to Stefan. 

However, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation fails to state a cognizable claim for retaliation. 

Plaintiff has not provided any factual allegations to create a nexus between the acts alleged and 

his refusal to sign the IEP. As discussed above, there was a stay away order in place at some 

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point that prevented Plaintiff from having contact with Stefan, the alleged acts could be based 

upon the restraining order, rather than any retaliatory act by Defendant Sandoval. 

Plaintiff should be granted one final opportunity to file an amended complaint in an 

attempt to cure the deficiencies of his retaliation claim. Plaintiff is advised that his amended 

complaint needs to clearly delineate when the alleged incidents occurred and provide a nexus 

between the acts alleged and his refusal to sign the IEP. Conclusory allegations of retaliation 

are not sufficient for the Court to reasonable infer that Defendant Sandoval’s actions were

motivated by his protected conduct. 

D. 28 U.S.C. § 1981

Plaintiff alleges a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1981. To establish a claim under section 1981, 

plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a racial minority; “(2) the defendant had an intent 

to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the 

activities enumerated in the statute (i.e., the making and enforcing of a contract).” Morris v. 

Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996). To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must 

“prove as an element of the cause of action some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, 

invidiously discriminatory animus behind the [official’s] action.” Dennis v. Thurman, 959 

F.Supp. 1253, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (internal punctuation and citations omitted); Hispanic Taco 

Vendors of Washington v. City of Pasco, 790 F.Supp. 1023, 1031 (E.D. Wash. 1991). Section 

1981 can only be violated by purposeful discrimination. General Bld. Contractor’s Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982).

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges that he was retaliated against for exercising his 

rights to free speech under the First Amendment. There are no facts alleged in the first amended 

complaint identifying Plaintiff’s race. Other than conclusory allegations of discrimination, the

first amended complaint contains no facts by which the Court can infer that Defendant Sandoval 

intended to discriminate against him based upon his membership in a “lower class” or for any 

other class-based reason. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination in violation of 28 U.S. 

§ 1981. 

///

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E. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Plaintiff alleges a violation of “U.S.C. 20. Education” which the Court construes to be a 

claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). “The IDEA provides 

states with federal funds to help educate children with disabilities if they provide every qualified 

child with a [free appropriate public education] that meets the federal statutory requirements.”

M.M. v. Lafayette School Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 851 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Amanda J. ex rel. 

Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2001)). The IDEA was enacted 

“to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 

education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 

needs. . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). “The IDEA provides for a cooperative process between 

parents and schools that culminates in the creation of an [Individualized Education Program 

(“IEP”)] for every disabled student.” Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d at 851. The IDEA is 

binding on each public agency in the state responsible for ensuring the education of students with 

disabilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b); St. Johnsbury Academy v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 173 (2d Cir. 

2001). 

The responsibility of ensuring the disabled children receive a free and appropriate 

education under the IDEA lies with the state education agency (“SEA”). 20 U.S.C. §

1412(a)(11). The SEA receives funds and then distributes the majority of the funds it receives 

under the IDEA to the local education agency (“LEA”) that is directly responsible for providing 

a free and appropriate education to the disabled students. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(f)(2). An LEA is “a 

public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either 

administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary 

schools or secondary schools” or “any other public institution or agency having administrative 

control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school. . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401. 

Generally, the LEA develops the IEP for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14); 20 

U.S.C. § 1414(d). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sandoval was present at the IEP meeting in March of 

2013 in which Defendant Sandoval and school officials recommended that Stefan be placed on 

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home studies. (ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 9, 11.) The first amended complaint does not allege that 

Defendant Sandoval is employed by the school district, and the documents attached to the 

original complaint demonstrate that she is a Social Worker employed by the Human Services 

Agency. (ECF No. 1 at p. 49.) 

The few courts that have considered the issue of who is properly a defendant in IDEA 

actions have found that only the education agency bears the responsibility for providing a free 

appropriate education under the IDEA and the IDEA does not permit damages against individual 

defendants. Evertt H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary School, 5 F.Supp.3d 1167, 1180 (E.D. Cal. 

2014); see Ullmo v. Gilmour Academy, 273 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Although the IDEA 

does not specifically name the party against whom such an action may be brought, the ‘language 

and structure of [the] IDEA suggest that either or both entities [the SEA or LEA] may be held 

liable for the failure to provide a free appropriate public education....’ ”); Blanchard v. Morton 

Sch. Dist., No. C06-5166 FDB, 2006 WL 2459167, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2006) aff'd in 

part, rev'd in part sub nom. Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 260 F. App'x 992 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“defendants may not be sued in their individual capacities under the ADA, the Rehabilitation 

Act or the IDEA because these statutes do not provide for individual liability.”); Blanchard v. 

Morton Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-5101 FDB, 2006 WL 1075222, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2006) 

judgment corrected, No. CV 02-5101 FDB, 2006 WL 1419381 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2006) and

aff'd, 504 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2007) opinion amended and superseded, 509 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 

2007) and aff'd, 509 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2007) (“As noted by the Ninth Circuit, ‘[t]he remedies 

available under the IDEA include educational services for disabled children.’ ”).

In Everett H., the district court found that the individual administrators in the school 

district could not be sued under the IDEA as the cause of action would be against the school 

district itself and not the individual actors. Everett H., 5 F.Supp.3d at 1180 (only the LEA bears 

the responsibility for providing a free and appropriate public education under the IDEA). 

Neither Defendant Sandoval nor the Kings County Board of Supervisors are proper defendants

for a claim that the LEA failed to provide a free and public education to Stefan; and Plaintiff fails 

to state a cognizable claim under the IDEA.

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F. State Law Claim

Finally, Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 16010.6 was violated. California Welfare & Institution Code section 16010.6 provides 

that as soon as the placing agency makes a decision regarding placement or change in placement, 

but not later than the following day, the agency shall notify the child’s attorney. The complaint 

is again devoid of any allegations, other than that Stefan was removed from his grandmother’s 

home, to support a violation of the Welfare & Institution Code. Moreover, a violation of a state 

statute does not necessarily give rise to a private cause of action. Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens 

Casino, Inc., 50 Cal.4th 592, 596 (2010). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts from which the Court 

could infer that Stefan’s attorney was not timely notified of his placement. Plaintiff fails to state 

a claim for violation of section 16010.6.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of his federal rights upon which 

relief may be granted. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

‘shall be freely given when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and “[l]eave to amend 

should be granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect,” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). However, in this action 

Plaintiff has been granted an opportunity to amend the complaint, with guidance by the Court. 

The Court finds that, other than the retaliation claim as discussed, the deficiencies outlined above 

are not capable of being cured by amendment, and therefore further leave to amend should not be 

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants Kings County Board of Supervisors be dismissed from this action for 

Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against them; 

2. Plaintiff’s equal protection, due process, right to petition, 28 U.S.C. § 1981, and 

IDEA claims be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim; 

3. Plaintiff’s claim under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 16010.6 

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be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim;

4. Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the retaliation claim based upon Defendant 

Sandoval’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to bring Stefan gifts and access the recreation 

yard; and

5. The retaliation claims in regard to all other allegations be dismissed with 

prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within thirty (30) 

days of service of this recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections to these findings 

and recommendations with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the 

waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 30, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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