Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00165/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00165-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT RAFFAELLY and No. CIV.S-06-0165 FCD DAD PS 

CHARLES SCHNEPP,

Plaintiffs,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SISKIYOU COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

This matter came is before the court on a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by defendant Peg

Borman. At the hearing on the motion, Yoshinori H.T. Himel appeared

on behalf of defendant Borman. David E. Martinek appeared on behalf

of defendant Sierra Pacific Industries. Plaintiffs Robert Raffaelly

and Charles Schnepp, proceeding pro se, appeared on their own behalf. 

Plaintiffs also have filed opposition to the motion. Having

considered all written materials filed in connection with the motion,

and after hearing oral argument, for the reasons discussed more fully

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

on the record during the hearing, the undersigned will recommend that

the motion to dismiss be granted and defendant Borman be dismissed

from this action with prejudice.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578,

581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within

it, “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990). See also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d

530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint, or portion thereof, should only be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle

plaintiff to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept

as true the allegations of the complaint. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex

Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). Furthermore, the court

must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). In a case where the

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The FTRA was later amended by the California Timberland 1

Productivity Act of 1982 (“TPA”). See Cal. Gov’t Code § 51100. 

Therefore, today the provisions appearing at California Government

Code §§ 51100 et seq. are normally referred to as the TPA, rather

than the FTRA. See, e.g., Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San

Mateo, 31 Cal. App. 4th 418, 422 (1995).

3

plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation to construe the

pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal interpretation of

a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim that

are not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471

(9th Cir. 1982).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing their complaint

on January 25, 2006. Liberally construed, the complaint concerns

land zoned in the County of Siskiyou for commercial timber production

pursuant to the Forest Taxation Reform Act (“FTRA”) of 1976,

California Government Code §§ 51100 et seq. The complaint alleges 1

that the private defendants own thousands of acres of such Timber

Production Zone (“TPZ”) land and that the FTRA and related laws

entitle plaintiffs access to the TPZ land for “educational,

environmental, ecological, recreational and related ‘compatible’ uses

....” (Compl. ¶ 1.) The complaint alleges that plaintiffs “hold a

property interest ... to and from, and on” the TPZ land as well as

“across intermingled or checkerboard pattern Klamath Nat’l Forest,

U.S. Forest Service public administered land ....” (Compl. ¶ 2.) 

Defendant Borman is an employee of the United States Department of

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Agriculture Forest Service who has been sued in her official capacity

as the Forest Supervisor of the Klamath National Forest. According

to the complaint, defendants have deprived plaintiffs of access to

the land by constructing fencing and gates at entrances to the land.

Liberally construed, the complaint alleges three

discernible federal claims for relief against defendant Borman. One

of the federal claims is purportedly brought pursuant to the

Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and alleges that “USFS

posted locked gate road closures depriving plaintiffs’ and the

publics’ [sic] property interest ... is arbitrary and capricious, an

abuse of discretion, [and] inconsistent” with various local, state

and federal laws. (Compl. ¶ 95.) The second federal claim is a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that defendant has deprived plaintiffs

of their property interest in the subject lands without due process. 

The third federal claim is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 that

defendant Borman, along with all of the other defendants, conspired

in depriving plaintiffs of that property interest.

As discussed on the record during the hearing, the

allegation that TPZ land comes with any property interest which

entitles plaintiffs and the general public to access to TPZ land has

no merit. Plaintiffs’ perception of any property interest is based

on a strained reading of the California Constitution, the FTRA and

other state laws. The undersigned observed as much in detail in a

virtually identical prior action brought by plaintiff Raffaelly,

Raffaelly v. Sierra Pacific Industries, et al., No. CIV.S-02-2356 FCD

/////

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 In Raffaelly v. Sierra Pacific Industries, et al., No. CIV.S- 2

02-2356 FCD DAD PS, the undersigned recommended dismissal with

prejudice in findings and recommendations filed July 23, 2003. The

assigned district judge adopted that recommendation in full by order

filed August 21, 2003. This case and the first case also have been

related by order filed April 10, 2006. 

5

DAD PS, as well as in findings and recommendations issued earlier in 2

this case in connection with the other defendants’ motions to

dismiss. Thus, for the reasons set forth in the findings and

recommendations filed on July 23, 2003, in Raffaelly v. Sierra

Pacific Industries, et al., No. CIV.S-02-2356 FCD DAD PS, and the

earlier findings and recommendations in this case (Doc. no. 52),

which are hereby incorporated by reference, the undersigned will

recommend that plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Borman be

dismissed with prejudice.

In light of this recommendation, the undersigned does not

reach defendant’s other arguments in support of her motions to

dismiss or to quash service. The fact that plaintiffs have no

cognizable property interest in the land at issue is fatal to their

federal claims.

Finally, “[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) a district court

may elect, in its discretion, not to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state claims if it has dismissed the original

jurisdiction federal claims.” Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059,

1066 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000) (citing Fang

v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998) and Voight v.

Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995)). Where, as here, all

federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of relevant

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

factors points toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t,

40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994); Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac.

Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). Under these circumstances,

the undersigned will recommend that the district court decline to

exercise its supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’

state law claims against defendant Borman and that those claims be

dismissed without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Borman’s motion to dismiss be granted;

2. Plaintiffs’ federal claims against defendant Borman 

be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted; and 

3. Plaintiffs’ state law claims as to defendant Borman be

dismissed without prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within five (5) days after

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 29, 2006.

DAD:th

ddad1\orders.prose\raffaelly0165.f&r.borman

Case 2:06-cv-00165-FCD-DAD Document 90 Filed 11/29/06 Page 7 of 7