Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01144/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01144-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Hartford Life and Accident Insurance 

Company, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Norma A. Gomez, individually and as a 

next of friend of M.G. (a minor) and C.G. 

(a minor); Lizeth Gomez, 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01144-PHX-BSB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company (Plaintiff or Hartford) 

has filed an amended renewed motion for default judgment against Defendant Lizeth 

Gomez.1

 (Doc. 27.) This case concerns a dispute over the proceeds of a $20,000.00 

accidental death and dismemberment policy. Hartford properly served Lizeth Gomez. 

Lizeth Gomez executed a Wavier of Service and Hartford filed a Notice of Waiver of 

Service on July 23, 2013. (Doc. 7.) Lizeth Gomez’s answer was due on August 9, 2013. 

Based on Lizeth Gomez’s failure to appear or otherwise respond to the Complaint, the 

Clerk of Court entered default against her on August 26, 2013. (Doc. 13.) 

 On August 28, 2013, Hartford moved for default judgment against Lizeth Gomez 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). The Court denied that motion without 

 1

 Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for default judgment on November 1, 2013 

(Doc. 25) and filed the pending amended motion to correct a technical defect in the 

November 1, 2013 filing. (See Doc. 26.) 

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prejudice. (Doc. 16.) Thereafter, Hartford deposited with the Clerk of Court the 

insurance proceeds in the amount of $20,000.00 and filed an amended renewed motion 

for default judgment. (Docs. 22, 24, 27.) As set forth below, the Court recommends that 

Hartford’s request for default judgment be granted.2

 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 On June 3, 2007, Saul E. Gomez (Mr. Gomez) died. He was survived by his wife, 

Norma Gomez, his adult daughter, Lizeth Gomez, and minor children M.G and C.G. 

(Doc. 1 at 2-3.) Mr. Gomez was an employee of Einstein Moomjy, a rug and furniture 

dealer, and had coverage under a group accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) 

policy, Policy No. GL-680054 (the Policy), that Hartford issued to Einstein Moomjy. 

The Policy is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 - § 1461. Mr. Gomez had $20,000.00 in AD&D coverage 

under the Policy. Mr. Gomez designated his spouse, Norma Gomez, as the sole 

beneficiary under the Policy. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 

 The Policy provides that if no named beneficiary survives the insured, benefits 

will be paid to surviving relatives in the following order: (1) the surviving spouse; 

(2) surviving children, in equal shares; or (3) surviving parents, in equal shares. (Doc. 1 

at 3.) On July 3, 2007, Mr. Gomez was found dead. The Maricopa County Sherriff’s 

Office investigated and ruled Mr. Gomez’s death a homicide. (Id.) 

 Mr. Gomez’s death caused AD&D benefits to be due and payable under the 

Policy. The investigation of Mr. Gomez’s death is ongoing. Hartford asserts that Norma 

Gomez is considered a suspect in Mr. Gomez’s death, although she has not been charged 

with any crimes. If Norma Gomez were responsible for Mr. Gomez’s death, then she 

could be disqualified from receiving the AD&D benefit. If Norma Gomez were 

 2

 Because Defendant Lizeth Gomez has not appeared or consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, the Court proceeds by a Report and Recommendation to the Honorable Stephen M. McNamee. See General Order 11-03. 

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precluded from receiving the AD&D benefit, Defendants M.G., C.G., and Lizeth Gomez, 

Mr. Gomez’s surviving children, would be entitled to an equal distribution of the AD&D 

benefit. (Doc. 1 at 3.) 

 Hartford states it is ready to pay the $20,000.00 AD&D benefit. (Doc. 1.) 

However, Hartford asserts that because of the circumstances of the homicide 

investigation and the potential for conflicting claims, it filed a Complaint in interpleader 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 requesting that this 

Court determine the rightful beneficiary or beneficiaries of the Policy. (Doc. 1.) The 

Complaint also requests that the Court dismiss Hartford from the action, discharge it from 

all liability as to the AD&D benefit, and enjoin Defendants from commencing or 

prosecuting any other action regarding the AD&D benefit on the life of Mr. Gomez in 

any other federal or state court. Hartford further requests that the Court direct 

Defendants to interplead together concerning their adverse conflicting claims to the 

AD&D benefit. (Doc. 1 at 4.) 

 Lizeth Gomez executed a waiver of service on July 23, 2013. After she failed to 

answer or otherwise appear, the Clerk of Court entered her default. (Doc. 13.) Hartford 

now seeks default judgment against Lizeth Gomez. Specifically, Hartford seeks a 

judgment permanently enjoining Lizeth Gomez, her attorney, and her agents from 

initiating any proceedings against Hartford in connection with the AD&D benefit at issue 

in this interpleader action. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that 

Hartford’s motion for default judgment as to Lizeth Gomez be granted. 

II. Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction 

 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Before considering the merits of Hartford’s motion for default judgment, the Court 

considers whether it has subjection matter jurisdiction over this matter and personal 

jurisdiction over Lizeth Gomez. The Court considers its subject matter jurisdiction over 

this statutory interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and concludes that it has 

original subject matter jurisdiction over this matter for the following reasons. First, 

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Hartford commenced this civil action because it has possession of money with a value of 

more than $500.00, the AD&D benefit of $20,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a). Second, 

at least two of the adverse claimants have diverse citizenship. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1). Norma Gomez and minors M.G. and C.G. are Arizona citizens, and 

Lizeth Gomez is a California citizen. See Blackmon Auctions, Inc. v. Van Buren Truck 

Ctr., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 287, 289 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (“The Federal Interpleader Act 

provides an independent basis for federal jurisdiction when there is minimal diversity 

between the claimants, i.e., when at least two of the claimants are citizens of different 

states.”). Third, Hartford deposited the insurance proceeds at issue into the registry of the 

Court on October 25, 2013. (Doc. 24.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(2). Therefore, the Court 

concludes that Hartford has satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1335. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction 

 The Court also considers whether it has personal jurisdiction over Lizeth Gomez. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2361, the nationwide service of process provision, “[i]n any civil 

action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a 

district court may issue its process for all claimants.” See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Probst, 

2009 WL 3740775, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2009) (acknowledging that section 2361, the 

nationwide service of process statute, applies to statutory interpleader actions); Valley 

Forge Life Ins. Co. v. Rockmore, 2008 WL 1805450, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2008) 

(“Personal jurisdiction over statutory interpleader claimants is available through the 

nationwide service of process provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2361.”). Therefore, the Court 

also concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Lizeth Gomez. 

III. Standards for the Entry of Default Judgment 

 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against whom 

a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as 

provided by these rules . . . the clerk shall enter the party’s default.” In general, after 

properly effecting service of process in an interpleader action, “[a] named interpleader 

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defendant who fails to answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res 

forfeits any claim of entitlement that might have been asserted.” Sun Life Assur. Co. of 

Canada, (U.S.) v. Conroy, 431 F. Supp. 2d 220, 226 (D.R.I. 2006); see also Wells Fargo 

Bank, Nat. Ass’n v Magellan Owners Ass’n, 2010 WL 3789327, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 

2010) (noting general rule that “where a stakeholder is served with process but then fails 

to appear and make a claim to the interpleaded funds, the stakeholder waives his rights to 

the funds making them available for equitable redistribution to the other stakeholders”). 

After a default has been entered and the defendant fails to appear or move to set aside the 

default, the court may, on the plaintiff’s motion, enter a default judgment. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Here, the Clerk of Court has entered Lizeth Gomez’s default. Thus, 

the Court may consider Hartford’s request for default judgment against her. 

B. The Eitel Factors 

 Granting default judgment is within the court’s discretion. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 

616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (considering lack of merit in plaintiff’s substantive 

claims, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter a default judgment). 

When deciding whether to grant default judgment, the court considers the following 

“Eitel” factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the 

plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at 

stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether 

the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 

1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Applying the Eitel factors, the Court finds that the 

factors weigh in favor of granting Hartford’s motion for default judgment against Lizeth 

Gomez. 

 1. Prejudice to Plaintiff 

 In view of Lizeth Gomez’s default, Harford has no alternative means by which to 

resolve her potential claim to the AD&D benefit. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 

238 F. Supp. 2d at 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Therefore, Hartford would be 

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prejudiced if a default judgment is not entered and the first Eitel factor weighs in favor of 

the entry of default judgment. 

 2. Merits of Plaintiff’s Claims and the Sufficiency of the Complaint 

 Considering the relationship between the second and third Eitel factors, the Court 

considers the merits of Hartford’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of the Complaint 

together. The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, when combined, these factors require a 

plaintiff to “state a claim on which the plaintiff may recover.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 

F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (citation omitted). 

 An interpleader action serves two purposes: (1) protecting the stakeholder from 

problems caused by multiple claimants to a single fund; and (2) limiting litigation 

expenses. See Mack v. Kuckenmeister, 619 F.3d 1010, 1024 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, 

Hartford faces the risk of exposure to multiple liability and has averred that it is a 

disinterested party with no claim to the insurance proceeds. Because multiple parties 

could be entitled to the insurance proceeds that are due as a result of Mr. Gomez’s death, 

Hartford cannot distribute the proceeds without exposing itself to liability or litigation. 

Exposure to multiple claims for the proceeds of any ERISA benefit plan is a type of 

action for which interpleader is appropriate. See Trs of the Dirs. Guild of AmericaProducer Pension Benefits Plan v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, 

Hartford properly stated a claim for interpleader, and its actions properly protect the 

claims of the remaining Defendants. Further, there are no policy considerations that 

preclude the entry of default judgment against Lizeth Gomez under the circumstances in 

this case. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Accordingly, these factors weigh in favor of 

the entry of default judgment. 

 3. Sum of Money at Stake 

 The fourth Eitel factor, the sum of money at stake, weighs neither in favor nor 

against the entry of default judgment. In interpleader actions, the sum of money at stake 

is not dispositive, even if it is substantial, because the interpleading party is not asserting 

an interest in the interpleaded funds nor are they seeking damages. See Transamerica 

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Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Ward, 2011 WL 5241257, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (sum 

of money at stake in interpleader action was a neutral Eitel factor). Here, Hartford does 

not assert a claim to the funds, but is attempting to distribute the funds to the party 

entitled to the AD&D benefit. Thus, this factor is neutral. 

 4. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 

 Here, there is little possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts as to 

Lizeth Gomez. Lizeth Gomez has not made any effort to challenge the Complaint or 

otherwise appear in this case. Thus, the fifth Eitel factor weights in favor of the entry of 

default judgment. 

 5. Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect 

 The sixth Eitel factor considers whether the default was due to excusable neglect. 

There is no evidence that Lizeth Gomez’s failure to appear or otherwise defend was the 

result of excusable neglect. Rather, the record reflects that she failed to appear after 

executing a waiver of service of the Complaint. Additionally, Hartford’s counsel states 

that she spoke with Lizeth Gomez who indicated that she does not want to be involved in 

this litigation.3

 (Doc. 27 at 6.) Thus, the sixth Eitel factor weighs in favor of default 

judgment. 

 6. Policy Disfavoring Default Judgment 

 Under the seventh Eitel factor, the Court considers the policy that, whenever 

possible, cases should be tried on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The existence of 

Rule 55(b), however, indicates that the preference for resolving cases on the merits is not 

absolute. PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d. at 1177. Because Lizeth Gomez has neither 

appeared nor responded in this action, deciding this case on the merits is “impractical,” if 

not impossible. Id. Thus, the seventh Eitel factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 

/// 

/// 

 3

 Lizeth Gomez was served with the amended renewed motion for default 

judgment and has not responded. 

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IV. Conclusion 

 Because the Court has subjection matter jurisdiction over this action, personal 

jurisdiction over Lizeth Gomez, and the application of the Eitel factors weighs in favor of 

the entry of default judgment, the Court should exercise its discretion to grant Hartford’s 

motion for default judgment against Lizeth Gomez. See Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092; 

Protective Ins. Co. v. Mizioch, 2011 WL 587963, at * 2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2011) (entering 

default judgment in interpleader action). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Hartford Life and Accident Insurance 

Company’s Amended Renewed Motion for Default Judgment against Defendant Lizeth 

Gomez (Doc. 27) be GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court direct the Clerk of Court to 

enter judgment permanently enjoining Lizeth Gomez, her attorneys, and her agents from 

initiating any proceedings against Hartford in connection with the accidental death and 

dismemberment benefit at issue in this interpleader action. 

This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to respond to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Report and Recommendation may 

result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

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IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mail a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation to Lizeth Gomez at 111718 Cohasset Street, Apartment 4, North 

Hollywood, CA 91605. (See Doc. 27 at 7.) 

 Dated this 25th day of November, 2013. 

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