Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00005/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Baron Sylvester Green, II, 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Berry Larson, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV10-005-TUC-RCC (JM) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Baron Sylvester Green, II’s Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance 

with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge 

for report and recommendation. As explained below, the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, 

dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner was arrested for his role in the shootings of Ronald Otteson and 

Delores Hinogiante-Cox (respectively referred to as “R” and “D” in the excerpt from 

the Arizona Court of Appeals decision quoted below), and indicted on charges of 

attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault (deadly weapon), aggravated 

assault (serious physical injury), and kidnapping. After a jury trial, Petitioner was 

convicted of two counts of kidnapping involving a deadly weapon, two counts of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of aggravated assault 

causing serious physical injury. Answer, Ex. A., p. 2. Petitioner was sentenced to a 

7.5-year prison term for each conviction with the sentences involving one victim to 

be served consecutively to those involving the other victim. Id. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows: 

In November 2002, a Tucson police officer was dispatched to an 

apartment complex on a “911 hang-up call” and found two people, R. 

and D., with multiple gunshot wounds. Both victims told the officer 

that “TJ shot me.” D. and R. were hospitalized for an extended period 

of time as a result of their injuries. D. was shot in the head, abdomen, 

hip, and back. R. was shot in the stomach, arm, neck, and both legs and 

eventually lost a portion of one leg. 

 In December 2002, a .357 caliber handgun was found in a 

different apartment. Subsequent testing revealed that a bullet recovered 

from R.’s apartment matched that gun. Green and an associate, 

Jenkins, were at the apartment when the gun was discovered. Jenkins 

was later identified as “TJ.” Green, Jenkins and another associate, 

Perkins, were all arrested for the shooting. Both victims identified 

Green as a participant in the shootings. The charges against Perkins 

were dismissed without prejudice, although both victims had identified 

him as having been present when they were shot. Green was charged 

with attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon, aggravated assault causing serious physical injury, and 

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kidnapping involving each victim as well as prohibited possession of a 

weapon. 

Answer, Ex. A. 

 Petitioner raised five claims on direct appeal. He asserted that the trial court 

erred by (1) precluding a letter written by Jenkins in which he stated that Petitioner 

had no prior knowledge of the robbery and had left the apartment before the shooting 

began; (2) allowing Jenkins and Ron Perkins to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights 

against self-incrimination; (3) ordering the public defender to continue representation 

despite a conflict of interest; (4) finding aggravating factors that required the 

imposition of presumptive and consecutive sentences rather than mitigated and/or 

concurrent sentences; and (5) giving an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction to the 

jury. Id., Exhibit B. By Memorandum Decision filed September 27, 2005, the 

Arizona court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims. Id., Ex. A. Petitioner then 

sought review of the decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review 

by order dated September 27, 2006. Id., Ex. D (Petition for Review); Ex. F (Order). 

 On October 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. , 

Id., Ex. F. On August 28, 2007, Petitioner filed a Partial Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief wherein he alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) obtain 

the testimony of witness Ron Perkins; (2) adequately investigate and/or subpoena 

numerous witnesses; (3) meet the standard of care regarding significant aspects of 

the case; (4) present evidence and argue that victim Ronald Otteson had tacitly been 

granted immunity; (5) properly inform the trial court of new evidence and good 

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character supporting mitigation of Petitioner’s sentence. Id., Ex. G. In a ruling filed 

March 19, 2008, the trial court found Petitioner’s claims meritless and dismissed the 

petition. Id., Ex. H. Petitioner then sought a rehearing on the petition and, on May 

23, 2008, the trial court ruled that he was not entitled to relief. Id., Ex. I. Petitioner 

then sought review of his post-conviction petition in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Id., Ex. J. By Memorandum Decision filed January 7, 2009, the Court of Appeals 

granted review but denied relief. Id., Ex. K. 

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION 

 A. Exhaustion/Preclusion 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). Exhaustion 

occurs either when a claim has been fairly presented to the highest state court, Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971), or by establishing that a claim has been 

procedurally defaulted and that no state remedies remain available, Reed v. Ross, 468 

U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a "fair opportunity to act" upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). A claim has been 

“fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theories 

on which the claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. 

Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). The operative facts must be presented in 

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the appropriate context to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. The fair presentation 

requirement is not satisfied, for example, when a claim is presented in state court in a 

procedural context in which its merits will not be considered in the absence of special 

circumstances. Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. An exact correlation of the claims in both 

state and federal court is not required. Rice, 44 F.3d at 1403. The substance of the 

federal claim must have been fairly presented to the state courts. Chacon v. Wood, 

36 F.3d 1459, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 

 A petitioner may also exhaust his claims by either showing that a state court 

found his claims defaulted on procedural grounds or, if he never presented his claims 

in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to him. See Jackson v. Cupp, 

693 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1982). "To exhaust one's state court remedies in 

Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack 

his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32," Roettgen 

v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 1. Claims six and seven 

 In this case, Respondents assert that Petitioner did not exhaust claims six 

through eight of the Petition. In claims six and seven, Petitioner alleges due process 

violations resulted from the trial court’s denial of various discovery motions and 

hearings in his Rule 32 PCR proceeding. Respondents contend that these claims 

were presented as state law claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Answer, pp. 8-9. 

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In reply, Petitioner contends that the claims were presented properly and, in support 

of his contention, cites to portions of his petition filed with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. Traverse, p. 3. In that petition, in relation to claims six and seven, 

Petitioner cited two federal cases in support of the general assertion that: 

The denial of an evidentiary hearing also violated due process and the 

ability to prove his claims (i.e. subpoena all necessary witnesses to 

testify, and confirm the reliability and credibility of the noted 

witnesses). 

Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. J, p. 19. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee, 

such as due process, is insufficient to satisfy fair presentation requirements. 

Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). “Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, 

detached from any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.” Casitllo v. 

McFadden 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir.2005). Moreover, “mere similarity between a 

claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway, 

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted). Under these standards, claims six and seven 

were not exhausted. The context shows that Petitioner raised his due process claims 

as an afterthought, merely asserting that the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary 

hearing “also violated due process . . . .” Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. J, p. 19 (italics 

added). The cited cases are not explained or applied and Petitioner has not identified 

the specific facts supporting this claims. “It is not enough to make a general appeal 

to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the ‘substance of such 

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a claim to a state court.” Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987. Petitioner’s “drive-by” 

citations, without some explanation or argument, are insufficient to establish fair 

presentment. 

 Moreover, as Respondents contend and Petitioner does not contradict, 

Petitioner is procedurally barred from now raising these claims in State court. See 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (“A defendant shall be precluded from relief under [Rule 

32] based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any 

previous collateral proceeding.”) Because Petitioner did not present any of these 

claims to the Arizona courts, the claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from 

federal review. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 

987 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, the merits of the claims need not be addressed unless 

Petitioner establishes cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

has occurred. Petitioner has not attempted to do so, and the Court recommends that 

Petitioner’s non-exhausted claims be denied. 

 2. Claim eight 

 In claim eight, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel by denying his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw due to 

a conflict of interest. Petitioner’s Memo, p. 10. Respondents contend that Petitioner 

raised this claim only under state law, and not as a Sixth Amendment claim, before 

the trial court. Petitioner, in turn, argues that the claim was raised on direct appeal 

and was analyzed for fundamental error and denied. Traverse, p. 4. 

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 Petitioner is correct that the claim was denied under fundamental error 

standards but fails to address Respondents’ assertion that the claim was not raised in 

the trial court. In ruling on the claim, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated that 

Petitioner “did not raise this argument in the trial court, and has, therefore, waived 

this claim absent fundamental error.” Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. A, p. 11 (citations 

omitted). The court then noted that it found “no error, much less fundamental error.” 

Id. The impact of the failure to raise the claim in the trial court, but then raising it 

before the appeals court which then reviews for fundamental error, is not entirely 

clear. For example in Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736 (D.Ariz.2008), the 

petitioner failed to object at trial and then raised the claim on appeal where it was 

reviewed for fundamental error. The district court nevertheless found that “the 

Court of Appeals’ fundamental error review is sufficient to exhaust Petitioner’s . . .” 

claim. Id. at 774. In other cases, the district courts have reached the opposite 

conclusion. See, e.g., Lopez v. Ryan, 2009 WL 3294876, *11 (D.Ariz. Oct.14, 2009). 

However, Ninth Circuit authority more clearly supports reviewing such claims on the 

merits. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 474 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that 

review for plain error is a ruling on the merits of the claim); Huffman v. Ricketts, j750 

F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1984) (claim reviewed on the merits even though petitioner’s 

federal constitutional claim was not raised at trial and was reviewed by the court of 

appeals for fundamental error). Thus, this claim will be reviewed on the merits. 

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B. Merits

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect 

to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court's decision can be "contrary to" federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 1. Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Claims 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the Petition allege that Petitioner’s counsel was 

ineffective during the investigation, trial and sentencing in Petitioner’s case. The 

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operative legal standard applicable to these claims is a familiar one, addressed by the 

United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 

standards enunciated there by the Court are applied unless there is other Supreme 

Court precedent directly on point. See Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 

(2008). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show both deficient performance and 

prejudice in order to establish that counsel’s representation was ineffective. 466 U.S. 

at 687. In the context of habeas claims evaluated under § 2254(d)(1) standards, the 

question “is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was 

incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable– a substantially higher 

threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 

 a. Claim 2 

 As the Government suggests, a logical inquiry into Claims 1-2 and 4-5 begins 

with Claim 2. In Claim 2, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective because 

he failed to adequately argue the admissibility of Ron Perkins’ testimony and “free 

talk” with police. Ron Perkins was indicted along with Petitioner and Monte Jenkins. 

Perkins initially denied any involvement in the crimes and denied knowing Jenkins, 

Olden, and Petitioner. Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. A, pp. 3-4; Ex. B, pp. 11-12. 

However, after he provided the police and prosecution a “free talk” during which he 

claimed an alibi during the shooting and explained what he knew about the shooting, 

the charges against Perkins were dismissed without prejudice. 

 In his free talk, Perkins explained that Olden, who was his roommate at the 

time of the shooting, told him that Olden and Jenkins had shot Cox and Otteson. 

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Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. G, p. 19. When asked who else was there, Perkins said that 

Olden “told me specifically that it was him and Monte [Jenkins].” Id., p. 25. He also 

stated that, “from the police reports, I guess [Petitioner] was there too,” and that 

Petitioner “told me that he was there, or he wasn’t, he was there and he left before 

they started shooting.” Id. 

 At trial, Petitioner’s counsel sought to present Perkins’ testimony, but Perkins 

invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify. 

Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. A, pp. 3-5. The trial court noted that Perkins had previously 

been charged in the case and that the charges had been dismissed without prejudice 

and stated that, “[h]e had invoked [his Fifth Amendment right], [and] he is therefore 

unavailable under the rules of evidence.” Id., p. 5. 

 In his habeas petition, Petitioner initially contends that the trial court 

improperly allowed Perkins to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights. In rejecting this 

claim in its order denying Petitioner’s PCR petition, the trial court noted that when 

the decision was made, both Petitioner’s counsel and the prosecutor had made 

arguments regarding the statement. The trial court explained that “[t]rial counsel’s 

decision not to make further arguments, after the court rendered its decision, cannot 

be characterized as deficient. To the contrary, it makes sense that arguments made 

against a decision that has already been rendered would be less effective.” Answer, 

Ex. H, pp. 2. The trial court explained further that: 

In this case, the court had heard opening statements, the testimony of 

the victims, and argument from both sides about the Perkins statement, 

when it found Perkins unavailable. Perkins’ Fifth Amendment 

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privilege was properly invoked because it was established that his 

charges had been dismissed without prejudice. If there is a “’a 

reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being 

compelled to answer,’ the defendant’s right to compulsory process 

must yield to the witness’s privilege not to incriminate himself.” State 

v. Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, 995 P.2d 705, 712 (App. 1999), quoting United 

States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976). The 

trial court’s decision to permit Perkins to invoke the Fifth Amendment 

has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Given all of the above 

information, Petitioner has failed to show that trial counsel’s 

performance prejudiced him to such a degree that it changed the 

outcome of the case. 

Answer, Ex. H, pp. 2-3. This decision was not unreasonable. 

 A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, including the right to 

compulsory process, do not necessarily include the right to compel a witness to waive 

the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Kastigar v. United 

States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1191-

92 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1166 (9th Cir.2008) (no 

Fifth Amendment right for defendant to demand “use immunity” for a co-defendant; 

courts must be “extremely hesitant” to intrude on the Executive's discretion to decide 

whom to prosecute). A witness’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment right is valid 

where he is “confronted by substantial and real, and not merely trifling or imaginary, 

hazards of incrimination.” United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) 

(citations omitted). 

 Addressing this claim on direct appeal, and without the overlay of Strickland

(which is discussed below), the Arizona Court of Appeals noted the applicable legal 

standards and concluded that “Perkins’s charges had been dismissed without 

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prejudice, the trial court was knowledgeable about the case as a result of the pretrial 

motions and hearings documented in the record, and it is clear the witnesses would 

not answer any relevant questions, the court did not abuse its discretion in upholding 

their invocation of the Fifth Amendment.” Answer, Ex. A, pp. 7-8. This conclusion, 

and that of the trial court in denying the PCR petition, is borne out by the record. 

The trial transcript reflects that Petitioner’s counsel, at the request of the trial court, 

informed the prosecutor in the presence of the trial judge that Perkins would testify 

that on the “afternoon of the shooting he saw Renaldo Olden, who he knew” and 

Renaldo Olden told him that he, Mr. Olden, and Mr. Jenkins had shot two people that 

night before, referring to the shooting that had taken place at the Los Arboles 

Apartments.” Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. B, p. 10. Thus, the trial court was aware of the 

nature and circumstances of Perkins’ testimony. It was also abundantly clear that the 

risk created to Perkins if he elected to testify was not merely trifling. He had been 

charged with the crimes and the charges had been dismissed without prejudice. The 

prosecution, at least at one time, obviously believed that Perkins was involved in the 

crimes. Testifying about a conversation with alleged perpetrators (Renaldo Olden 

and Petitioner) about the alleged crimes would certainly expose Perkins to 

questioning on cross-examination about his role in the crimes. 

 Petitioner contends that his counsel fell below the Strickland standard by 

failing to more vigorously describe to the trial court the contents to Perkins’ 

statement. This claim was also addressed by the trial court in its order denying 

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Petitioner’s PCR petition. In that order, the trial court first identified the standards 

for a finding of ineffective assistance, and then stated that: 

 Petitioner has not shown the at trial counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness by choosing not to make 

further arguments in support of either forcing Perkins to testify or 

admit his previous statements. At the point in which the court made its 

decision to permit Perkins to invoke the Fifth Amendment, both sides 

had already make arguments regarding the statement. Trial counsel’s 

decision not to make further arguments, after the court rendered its 

decision, cannot be characterized as deficient. To the contrary, it 

makes sense that arguments made against a decision that has already 

been rendered would be less effective. 

 Second, Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s performance 

prejudiced him. The court’s decision to permit Perkins to invoke the 

Fifth Amendment was not made in error. A witness may be excused 

from testifying without violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 

to compulsory process, if the trial court determines that a witness could 

“legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.” State 

v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 194, 665 P.2d 70, 76 (1983). This 

exception is narrow and only applies when the trial court’s knowledge 

of the case is sufficient, and when the Fifth Amendment is properly 

invoked. Id. 

Answer, Ex. H, pp. 2-3. 

 The trial court appropriately identified and applied the familiar Strickland 

standards to evaluate Petitioner’s counsel’s performance. The trial court then cited to 

State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 665 P.2d 70 (1983), State v. Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, 

995 P.2d 705 (App. 1999), and United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042 (5th

Cir. 1976), to evaluate the underlying issue of the propriety and impact of Perkins’ 

invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The interplay between Petitioner’s Sixth 

Amendment right to call witnesses and the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is described in some detail in the cited cases, particularly in Mills, and 

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is the same as that applied by the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. 

Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) (citations omitted). As discussed above, it was 

reasonable for the trial court to find that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to 

compel witnesses was trumped by Perkins’ invocation of his Fifth Amendment 

rights. Petitioner offers nothing in his argument that potentially would have 

overcome the trial court’s determination. Thus, his counsel cannot be said to have 

been ineffective for pursuing a fruitless effort to compel Perkins’ testimony. James 

v. Borq, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir.1994) (failure of trial lawyer to pursue a meritless 

issue does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). 

 Petitioner next claims that trial counsel failed to see a grant of immunity for 

Perkins so that he would be available to testify without fear of incrimination. 

Generally, however, a defendant is not entitled to compel a prosecutor to grant 

immunity to a potential defense witness to get the witness to testify. See United 

States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 

582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.1978). The exception occurs where the fact-finding 

process is intentionally distorted by prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Lord, 

711 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.1983). 

 Here, Petitioner argues that the government granted immunity to Perkins 

during his free talk, and argues that immunity would have been granted for his trial 

testimony had Petitioner’s counsel requested such an extension of immunity. The 

record, however, contradicts Petitioner’s version of events. In the preamble to the 

free talk, the investigator expressly stated that: 

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At the present time, there is no agreement with you concerning any 

benefit you may receive as a result of this free talk. Moreover, the fact 

that this free talk is occurring, should not be construed by you as an 

agreement that you will receive any benefit. OK? 

 

Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. G., p. 1. Perkins was asked if he understood and responded, 

“Yeah.” Id. Thus, Perkins never had immunity and no indication that immunity 

would be available. Thus, Petitioner’s counsel cannot be found ineffective because 

he could not compel the government to grant immunity and, in any case, there was no 

indication that immunity was available. 

 b. Claim 1

 In Claim 1 of the Petition, Petitioner alleges that his rights to counsel, a fair 

trial and to compulsory process were violated when his counsel failed to subpoena 

five witnesses who would have testified that Ron Perkins had told them that 

Reynaldo Olden confessed that he and Monte Jenkins, and not Petitioner, were solely 

responsible for the kidnapping and assault. The trial court issued the last reasoned 

decision on this claim, which the Arizona Court of Appeals subsequently adopted. In 

its denial of Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, the trial court stated: 

The witnesses mentioned were not necessarily relevant to central issues 

in the case. None of the witnesses were actually at the scene of the 

crime. Rather, their testimony could have arguably corroborated the 

statement of Perkins, based on second-hand information that he 

received from someone who was at the scene. While some defense 

attorneys might conclude that the witnesses were sufficiently relevant 

to justify extending the length of the trial in order to hear their 

testimony, others might disagree. This is exactly the type of tactical 

decision that is left to the judgment of the individual defense counsel, 

and not an example of ineffectiveness. 

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Answer, Ex. H, p. 4. Review of the statements in question supports the 

reasonableness of the trial court’s decision. 

 The five witnesses Petitioner contends should have been presented at trial are 

Tiara Salters, Krystal Ward, Sharla Morgan, Nadine Rivera, and Reana Rodriguez. 

In her interview, Tiara Salters did say that Olden told her the morning following the 

shootings that “we beat somebody up or we killed some people or something . . . .” 

Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. H, p. 2. However, Olden did not tell her who he was with 

and she later heard from Sharla Morgan, Perkins’ mother, that it was Jenkins. Id., p. 

10. Sharla Morgan stated that Olden showed up at her apartment the morning 

following the shooting and told her that Jenkins had shot the victims. Petitioner’s 

Memo, Ex. J, p. 5. Nadine Rivera was also at Sharla Morgan’s house in the 

morning when Olden arrived and told them that he “fucked somebody up.” Id., Ex. 

K, pp. 4-5. Krystal Ward had little to add except that she talked to Tiara after the 

shooting occurred and was told by Tiara Salters that Olden had done it. Id., Ex. I. 

 Taken together, these portions of the statements from Salters, Morgan and 

Rivera are certainly inculpatory as to Olden, however, they are only marginally 

helpful to Petitioner. Olden told Salters and Rivera that he had been involved, and 

only told Morgan that Jenkins was also involved. As Petitioner admits he was there 

during at least a portion of the events, Olden was not telling the complete story to any 

of these witnesses. Thus, the statements do not provide substantial exculpatory 

information for Petitioner. 

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 More important, though, is other testimony that would have been presented if 

these witnesses had testified. Tiara Salters’ explained that on the night of the 

shooting she, along with Petitioner and others, was at Perkins’ apartment when one 

of her friends, Crystal Ward, was “beat up” by Reynaldo Olden. Petitioner’s Memo, 

Ex. H, p. 2. She then went with Perkins, and her friends Nadine Rivera and Reana 

Rodriquez to drop-off Petitioner and Olden. The group then went to Tiara’s house, 

which is also where Perkins’ mother lives. Id., p. 3. Nadine Rivera also stated that 

the group dropped Petitioner and Olden off at Jenkins’ apartment. Id., Ex. K, p. 2.)1

 

These statements would have placed Petitioner in the company of Olden and Jenkins 

prior to the shootings. Given that Petitioner admitted to being present during the 

shootings, it was reasonable for his counsel to balance the value of these witnesses 

with the damages they could do. As trial counsel explained: 

And dumping on – basically trying to show Monte Jackson (should be 

Jenkins) and whoever else it was, were the worst people in the world, I 

can’t say that I thought necessarily this at the time but just my instinct 

reaction is, you had [Petitioner] hanging around with them. And that 

doesn’t strike me as being, um, the wisest way for [Petitioner] to be – 

to appear in front of the jury. I mean if you wound up showing these 

guys to be total losers, [Petitioner] is hanging around with them, and 

my hunch is that the jury is going to think, why was he hanging around 

with them? 

Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. F, p. 6. 

 

1

 Reana Rodriguez was in the car with Perkins, Olden, Rivera and Salters before the 

shooting and recalls dropping-off Olden, but did not remember Petitioner being 

dropped-off with him. Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. L, p. 3. Reana was then dropped-off 

at Krystal Ward’s house. Id., p. 4. 

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 Petitioner’s defense was that he knew nothing about the weapons and left 

when the shooting began. Although the jury ultimately believed he had a weapon, 

his counsel’s decision to forego presenting these five witnesses was quite reasonable. 

In doing so, he avoided lining up witnesses whose testimony would suggest a close 

relationship among Jenkins, Olden and Petitioner and would put them together at 

Jenkins’ apartment immediately prior to the shootings. This is the sort of reasonable 

strategic decision that deserves deference. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 

(9th Cir.1994); Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1998) (relevant 

inquiry is whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable). 

 c. Claim 3 

In May 2003, Monte Jenkins sent a letter to Petitioner’s counsel wherein he 

stated: 

This letter is in regards to your client Baron Green + his innocence 

involving the shootings of [R.] and [D.]. Im here to say + testify if 

needed that Baron Green left [R.’s] apartment before the shootings 

occurred + Baron Green had no prior knowledge that [R.] or [D.] were 

shot. This is not a forced confession or statement at all. 

Answer, Ex. A, p. 3. Petitioner sought to have the letter admitted at trial after Jenkins 

invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to testify. The trial court concluded 

that the letter was not a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3), Ariz. R. 

Evid., and ruled it inadmissible. Petitioner claims that the trial court’s ruling violated 

his right to present a defense. 

 In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 

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 Jenkins’s letter does not appear to be a statement against his 

interest. Although he stated that [Petitioner] had left the apartment 

“before the shootings occurred,” Jenkins did not place himself there 

during the shootings or claim any responsibility for the shootings. 

“Rule 804(b)(3) ‘does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory 

statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is 

generally self-inculpatory.’” State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 455, 924 

P.2d 453, 459 (App. 1996), quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 

U.S. 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2435, 129 L.Ed.2d 476, 483 (1994). 

Courts should evaluate individual statements separately to determine if 

they are against the declarant’s penal interest. Id. None of the 

statements in Jenkins’s letter clearly “subject[s] him to criminal 

liability such that a reasonable person would not have made the[m] 

unless he believed them to be true.” Id. Therefore, none of the 

statements in Jenkins’s letter was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), and 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit them. 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 4-5. The court then turned to the question of whether the ruling 

violated Petitioner’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by 

restricting his ability to present a defense: 

 In Chambers [v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 

L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)], the Supreme Court held that, when 

“constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are 

implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to 

defeat the ends of justice.” Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d at 

313. But the hearsay statements at issue in that case were offered 

“under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their 

reliability.” Id. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12. In 

contrast, our supreme court, in State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 734 

P.2d 563 (1987), found that applying the tests for admission under Rule 

804(b)(3) and excluding evidence did not violate the defendant’s 

constitutional right to due process. And, in State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 

174, 68 P.3d 127 (App. 2002), the court held that a defendant’s 

Fourteenth Amendment rights are not violated when evidence is 

properly excluded. We have already determined the trial court properly 

precluded Jenkins’s letter. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did 

not deprive [Petitioner] of any constitutional right. 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 4-6. 

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 In support of his argument, Petitioner relies on United States v. Benveniste, 

564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.1977), for the proposition that for a statement to be admissible 

under Rule 804(b)(3) as a statement against penal interests it does not have to be “a 

direct confession.” Petitioner’s Memo, p. 22. In Benveniste, the statements which 

were found to be admissible directly implicated the declarant in criminal activity and 

were explicit admissions of criminal liability. As the court noted, the statements 

implicated the declarant “as a key participant in a major drug sale negotiation.” 564 

F.2d at 341. To qualify under the Rule 804(b)(3) hearsay exception, the Ninth 

Circuit requires that “the declarant’s statements must, in a real and tangible way, 

subject him to criminal liability.” United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th

Cir.1978). As the state court concluded, Jenkins letter simply did not subject him to 

criminal liability in a real and tangible way. The letter does not say, “I did it.” It 

says, “He didn’t do it.” These are not the sort of statements that bear the hallmark of 

reliability required for admission under the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 

 A defendant has the right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “to 

present and have considered by the jury all relevant evidence to rebut the State’s 

evidence on all elements of the offense charged.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 

41-42 (1996). However, “a defendant’s right to present relevant evidence is not 

unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions, such as evidentiary and 

procedural rules. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 2009 WL 213070, at *12 (9th

Cir.2009, as amended Jan. 30, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

To amount to a constitutional violation, a state court’s decision to exclude evidence 

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“must be so prejudicial as to jeopardize the defendant’s due process rights.” Tinsley 

v. Borq, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.1990). As discussed above, Jenkins letter was 

reasonably interpreted as offering nothing inculpatory as to Jenkins. Under both state 

and federal law, to be deemed reliable enough to qualify for admission as a statement 

against interest the statement must subject the declarant to a real and tangible 

possibility of criminal liability. As reasonably determined by the state court, this 

letter simply did not contain information meeting those criteria. The concern about 

the reliability of the statement is a reasonable restriction and, therefore, the Petitioner 

is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 d. Claim 4 

In Claim 4, Petitioner offers a list of trial counsel’s alleged errors and 

omissions and claims that in the aggregate they amount to ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that counsel errors included a lack of pretrial 

investigation, a lack of effort during voir dire, an inadequate opening statement, the 

mishandling the questioning of the victims, an inadequate closing argument, the 

failure to present a witness, the failure to request jury instructions, and the failure to 

suppress Petitioner’s statement, all of which were part of a “generally substandard 

approach” to representing Petitioner. 

 Cumulative error might violate a defendant’s constitutional rights if it had a 

“substantial and injurious effect” on the jury’s verdict. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 

U.S. 141, 145 (1998); Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir.1995). “[E]ven if 

no single error were prejudicial, where there are several substantial errors, ‘their 

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cumulative effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial as to require reversal.’” Killian 

v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. de Cruz, 82 

F.3d 856, 868 (9th Cir.1996)). Here, the cumulative impact of trial counsel’s alleged 

omissions and misjudgments did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. 

As the trial court explained in denying this claim, 

Petitioner has, at most, shown that defense counsel made unsuccessful 

decisions throughout the trial, However, a petitioner must “do more 

than show that his counsel was unsuccessful.” Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 

[464] at 467, 616 P.2d [924] at 927 [(App. 1980)]. Petitioner’s laundry 

list of ways defense counsel could have improved at trial, does not 

amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Answer, Ex. H, p. 5. An examination of these claims supports the trial court’s 

conclusion. 

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel should have more thoroughly investigated 

Jenkins and Olden. As discussed above, Jenkins invoked his Fifth Amendment rights 

and Olden had fled the state. Petitioner does not explain what further investigation 

could have been done or what it may have uncovered. Without some evidence of 

what helpful evidence would have been found, this claim is meritless. Villafuerte v. 

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir.1997). 

 Petitioner also asserts that his counsel showed a lack of effort during voir dire, 

and in his opening statement and closing argument. These arguments rely primarily 

on the assertion that counsel inadequately argued that Petitioner did not have a gun. 

The record establishes that Petitioner’s counsel effectively argued that only two guns 

were used by the assailants. He noted that Ron Otteson remembered three weapons, 

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two semi-automatics and a revolver, but that there were only shell casings from one 

semi-automatic found at the scene and that the revolver would not have ejected any 

casings. Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. C, p. 49. It was within the province of the jury, 

however, to believe Otteson’s testimony, as it apparently did, that all the assailants 

had weapons. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir.2002). 

Petitioner has not established that counsel’s errors led them to do so. 

 Petitioner also complains about his counsel’s cross-examination of Otteson. 

Trial transcripts, however, reflect that trial counsel’s cross-examination was 

effective. Counsel initially established that Otteson could not positively identify 

Petitioner and that he could only remember “bits and pieces” of the incident. 

Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. B., pp. 214-217. Counsel also worked to undermine 

Otteson’s recollection that Petitioner had a weapon. Id., pp. 217-219. He established 

that Otteson was on drugs and had been drinking, having spent $200 on drugs, 

alcohol and gas. Id., pp. 222-223. “A fair assessment of attorney performance 

requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . 

.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The examination of Otteson by Petitioner’s counsel 

was effective and served the purposes of calling his credibility and memory into 

question. Petitioner’s criticisms are picayune when examined in light of the 

examination as it actually occurred at trial. This is not the sort of alleged error that 

would support a finding of Strickland error. 

Petitioner is also critical of his counsel because he did not “make a winning 

motion pursuant to the 5th/6th Amendments.” Petitioner contends that the statement 

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would have been found involuntary because Petitioner was a juvenile at the time he 

was questioned and he was not informed of his right to have his parents present. In 

support of this argument, Petitioner cites an Arizona case, In re Andre M., 207 Ariz. 

482, 88 P.3d 552 (2004), and cites to the statement itself. The issue of voluntariness 

is not a factual determination entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d), but is a legal question requiring independent consideration in a 

federal habeas proceeding. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1960); Collazo v. 

Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (concluding federal court is not 

bound by state court finding that confession is voluntary). 

Here, Petitioner offers little to establish that the statement was involuntary. 

The voluntariness of the statement is evaluated by reviewing the conduct of the 

police in extracting the confession and the effect of that conduct on the suspect. 

Miller, 474 U.S. at 116; Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir.1999). 

Without police misconduct related to the confession, there is no basis for the 

suppression of the statement. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S 157, 167 (1986); 

Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir.1987). While the fact that a 

defendant is a juvenile “is of critical importance in determining the voluntariness of 

his confession,” Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir.2011), without more, 

Petitioner cannot establish his age rendered his confession involuntary. For example, 

in Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.2004), the 16 year-old petitioner’s 

statement was found to be involuntary in part because of his age, but also because he 

was interrogated for three hours in the middle of the night without counsel or a parent 

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present, denied access to a telephone to contact counsel, and was threatened by the 

interrogating officer’s actions. Id. at 1015-16. Looking at the transcript of 

Petitioner’s interview discloses that, other than age, none of these factors was 

present. Petitioner’s Memo, Ex. Z. The facts of this case are simply not on par with 

those found sufficient to find involuntariness in Taylor. 

 e. Claim 5 

In Claim 5 of the Petition, Petitioner alleges that his counsel violated the 

Strickland standards during sentencing. Specifically, he alleges that his trial counsel 

failed to present additional evidence of Petitioner’s good character and “to provide a 

wealth of evidence and law to obtain lower sentences, or concurrent sentences, in 

light of actual innocence and residual doubt or an even lower level of involvement . . 

. .” Petitioner’s Memo, p. 28. 

In Strickland, the Supreme Court expressly declined to “consider the role of 

counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which . . . may require a different approach to the 

definition of constitutionally effective assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In 

Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit held that “since 

Strickland, the Supreme Court has not delineated a standard which should apply to 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in noncapital sentencing cases. Therefore, . . 

there is no clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in this 

context.” 443 F.3d at 1158; see also Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1326, 

1244 (9th Cir.2005) (“[I]n Strickland, the Court expressly declined to consider the 

role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which . . . may require a different approach 

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to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). As there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent that applies to 

this claim, Petitioner is not entitled to relief pursuant to the standards set forth in § 

2254(d). 

 2. Claim 8: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

 In Claim 8, Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 

violated because the trial court denied his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw based 

on a conflict of interest. The alleged conflict was that the Office of the Public 

Defender, by which Petitioner’s counsel was employed, had simultaneously 

represented Petitioner and Monte Jenkins in relation to the instant charges and had 

previously represented Monte Jenkins, Reynaldo Olden and Ron Perkins in other 

unrelated juvenile proceedings. In reviewing this claim on direct appeal, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied relief stating: 

 [Petitioner] first argues that Rule 1.7(a), Ariz. R. Prof’l. 

Conduct, Ariz. R.Sup.Ct. 42, 17A A.R.S., required the court to grant 

the withdrawal. That rule, however, addresses concurrent 

representation of clients. [Petitioner’s] attorney admitted at the hearing 

on the motion that his office had withdrawn its representation of 

Jenkins. [Petitioner] also relies on Okeani v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 

180, 871 P.2d 727 (App. 1993). In that case, a public defender’s office 

was actively representing one client who became the victim in the other 

client’s case. Division One of this court held that withdrawal was 

required because the office’s representing both parties would be 

adverse to the interests of each and because the defendant’s attorney 

would have had access to confidential information in the victim’s 

police report. This case is distinguishable. The record shows that, at 

the time [Petitioner’s] attorney moved to withdraw, the public 

defender’s office represented only [Petitioner], and there is no 

indication that the office gained any confidential information during its 

brief representation of Jenkins. 

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 [Petitioner] also contends the office’s representation of Jenkins 

required withdrawal, arguing “the briefest conference and consultation 

on a personal level precludes subsequent representation of an adverse 

party” and citing Foulke v. Knuck, 162 Ariz. 517, 784 P.2d 723 (App. 

1989), and Rule 1.9, Ariz. R. Prof’l Conduct. The rule addresses duties 

owned by attorneys to former clients and prohibits them from 

representing “another person in the same or a substantially related 

matter in which that person’s interest are materially adverse to the 

interest of the former client.” Rule 1.9 Ariz. R. Prof’l Conduct. In 

Foulke, a client consulted an attorney about a divorce and provided 

information about the case, but did not retain the attorney. Six months 

later, the client learned the same attorney intended to represent his 

estranged wife. This court held that withdrawal was required because 

the client had paid for a consultation, provided information about the 

case, and received legal advice about his rights, making him the former 

client of the attorney. Here, unlike in Foulke, [Petitioner] made no 

showing about the extent of the office’s representation of Jenkins, 

whether Jenkins had ever met and consulted with an assistant public 

defender, or whether he had provided any information to the office, 

confidential or otherwise. 

 Moreover, joint representation of criminal defendants is 

permissible unless and until a conflict arises from that representation. 

State v. Martinez-Serna, 166 Ariz. 423, 803 P.2d 416 (1990). Our 

supreme court held in Tucker that an attorney’s simultaneous 

representation for three weeks of a defendant and a potential witness 

was permissible because the witness was never called to testify and, 

thus, no actual conflict arose. See also State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 

917 P.2d 200 (1996) (no conflict of interest created when witness 

previously represented by public defender’s office not called to testify). 

That is the situation here. Of the four former clients of the public 

defender that [Petitioner] complains about, two were his codefendants 

Jenkins and Perkins, who both invoked their Fifth Amendment rights 

and did not testify. Neither of the other two witnesses was called at 

trial. Thus, no actual conflict ever arose. See Tucker, Jones, MartinezSerna. 

 [Petitioner] additionally urges that the appearance of impropriety 

required the withdrawal. He relies on Martinez-Serna, but that case is 

readily distinguishable. We note the court there addressed only Rule 

1.7(a), Ariz. R. Prof’l. Conduct, not the appearance of impropriety. 

Moreover, in that case, two codefendants were represented throughout 

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trial by the same attorney. Here, the record shows that the public 

defender’s office represented Jenkins “initially” and then withdrew. As 

noted above, the record contains no information about the extent of the 

representation or the reason for the withdrawal, but it is inferable that 

the office nominally represented Jenkins at his initial appearance before 

he obtained trial counsel, as the record shows he subsequently did. In 

any event, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

the motion to withdraw on this ground. See Tucker; Sustaita. 

Answer, Ex. A, pp. 8-11. The appeals court then noted that this analysis also 

supported the rejection of Petitioner’s claims under the Sixth Amendment. Id., p. 11. 

 In the instant Petition, rather than identify why the Court of Appeals decision 

constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts, Petitioner merely reiterates 

the argument that the appeals court rejected. Section 2254(d)(2) authorizes a federal 

court to grant habeas relief only where the state court decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Section 

2254(e)(1) provides that the state court’s determination of the facts is presumed to be 

correct, and may only be rebutted by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 

The Arizona court’s determination that there was no conflict of interest was not 

objectively unreasonable and Petitioner has not identified any evidence that would 

cause this court to disagree with its conclusion. 

 3. Claim 9: Jury Instruction

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s instruction on reasonable doubt 

“erroneously decreased the quantum of evidence required to convict by defining 

proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ as being ‘firmly convinced.’” Petitioner’s Memo, 

p. 33. The language used in the jury instruction is drawn from the reasonable doubt 

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instruction adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Portillo, 182 U.S. 592 

(1995). In summarily denying this claim in Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals relied on several then-recent Arizona Supreme Court cases which 

approved of the instruction: State v. Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 74 P.3d 231 (2003); State 

v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 72 P.3d 831 (2003); State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 72 P.3d 

564; and State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 984 P.2d 16 (1999). (Answer, Ex. A, p. 

13.) The appeals court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 

 It has been repeatedly noted that the jury instruction given in this matter is a 

nearly a verbatim copy of the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt adopted by 

the Federal Judicial Center. See Arizona v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 418, 984 P.2d 

16, 26 (1999) (noting instruction based on FJC instruction). The Ninth Circuit has 

upheld language that is identical or substantially similar to the FJC's pattern 

instruction. See Himes v. Thompson, 336. F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003). 

Accordingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals' decision denying this claim was not 

clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law and Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of this claim. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 10-005-TUC-RCC. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 31st day of May, 2012. 

 

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