Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00645/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00645-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN ROBERSON,

NO. CIV. S-03-645 LKK/JFM P

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

J. M. BRIDDLE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this

civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This

matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.

On December 20, 2004, the magistrate judge filed findings and

recommendations herein which were served on all parties and which

contained notice that any objections to the findings and

recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. Plaintiff has

timely filed objections.

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Case 2:03-cv-00645-JFM Document 106 Filed 05/19/05 Page 1 of 5
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The district court reviews de novo those portions of the

proposed findings of fact to which objections has been made, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore

Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982), and the magistrate judge’s conclusions

of law. Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989)

(citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452,

454 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court may, however, assume the

correctness of that portion of the proposed findings of fact to

which no objection has been made and decide the motion on

applicable law. See United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617

(9th Cir. 1989)(citing Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208

(9th Cir. 1979)).

The court is not bound to adopt the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendation; on the contrary, the court must

exercise “sound judicial discretion” in making its own

determination on the record. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at

675-76. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d at 617.

 Having carefully reviewed the entire file, and as explained

below, the court adopts the findings and recommendations with the

following modification. 

Plaintiff brought this action against numerous defendants 

alleging that they each violated his constitutional rights as

protected by the Eighth Amendment by requiring him to use a toxic

Case 2:03-cv-00645-JFM Document 106 Filed 05/19/05 Page 2 of 5
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substance to strip wax from his cell walls and by denying him

necessary medical care for the burns, nausea, and dizziness he

experienced as a result. The defendants brought a motion for

summary judgment. As to the first claim, the defendants contend

that neither defendants Huff or Hollingsworth acted with deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s safety. In the alternative, they

maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity from

liability. 

The magistrate judge first evaluated plaintiff’s claim

regarding the safety of requiring him to clean his cell with waxstripping chemicals. He concluded that summary judgment for the

defendants was warranted as to this claim because there are no

facts in the record giving rise to an inference that either

defendants Huff or Hollingsworth were deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s “safety by the manner in which the cell cleaning was

initiated.” Findings and Recommendations (“F&Rs”) at 8. 

The magistrate judge then explained that plaintiff raised a

second related, but distinct, claim, mainly that the defendants

acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety by

requiring him to continue working with toxic chemicals even after

he let defendants know that he had suffered chemical burns on his

arms and was dizzy from their odor. The defendants asserted the

defense of qualified immunity, however, and the magistrate judge

agreed that such immunity was warranted. As I explain below, I

cannot agree with this conclusion. 

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In examining defendants’ qualified immunity defense, the

magistrate judge first determined that the plaintiff met the

initial prong of the qualified immunity test, as established by the

Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). As the

magistrate judge explained, if proved, the facts and allegations

viewed in plaintiff’s favor “might establish an Eighth Amendment

violation.” F&Rs at 9. The magistrate judge determined, however,

that the plaintiff could not satisfy the second prong of the

Saucier test. 

The question under the second prong of Saucier is whether the

constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time

such that a reasonable officer in the defendants’ positions would

have known that the action complained of was unlawful. Id. at

201-02. The magistrate judge explained that, although an inmate’s

right to be free from deliberate indifference to a known risk of

harm to health and safety was clearly established, “a reasonable

correctional officer could have believed that requiring plaintiff

to wait 20 or 30 minutes to shower following notification of the

[chemical] burn was reasonable under the circumstances.” F&Rs at

10. Plaintiff’s complaint under this claim, however, does not

concern the amount of time that he was required to wait before

washing his burn. Rather, as the magistrate judge explained,

plaintiff’s complaint is that defendants Huff and Hollingsworth

were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety by requiring

him to continue to work with toxic chemicals for that amount of

time after they were notified that he suffered a chemical burn.

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The gravamen of his claim therefore concerns the defendants’

decision to expose him to the risk of suffering additional burns

for a duration of 20 or 30 minutes. The plaintiff’s evidence shows

that the defendants recognized the marks on his arm as burns

resulting from the chemicals they provided him to clean his cell.

Nevertheless, the defendants ordered him to continue using the

chemicals and to finish cleaning his cell within 20 or 30 minutes.

I agree with plaintiff that reasonable correctional officers could

not have believed that requiring plaintiff to continue to work with

chemicals that had already caused him harm was lawful. Therefore,

defendants Huff and Hollingsworth cannot be granted qualified

immunity from this claim. 

Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the magistrate judge

for further proceedings consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 18, 2005.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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