Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04118/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04118-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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Case No. 14-CV-04118-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GEORGE MCELROY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PACIFIC AUTISM CENTER FOR 

EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-04118-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 65

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants Pacific Autism 

Center for Education (“PACE”), Kurt Ohlfs, Kelly Montague, Megan Nolan, and the Board of 

Directors and Officers of PACE (collectively, the “PACE Defendants”). ECF No. 65-1 (“Mot.”). 

Having considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court 

GRANTS the PACE Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court begins by summarizing the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party, in this case Plaintiff G.J.M. (“Plaintiff”), as the Court must on summary 

judgment. See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (in evaluating a motion for summary 

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judgment, “a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff is a minor who has been diagnosed with autism, 

sometimes referred to by the parties as autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”). ECF No. 65-XX.1 

Autism is characterized “by difficulties in social interaction, communication deficits, and 

repetitive behaviors.” ECF No. 66 (“Opp.”) at 4 (citing ECF No. 67 (“Ivy Decl.”) ¶ 3).

Defendant PACE is a residential facility and school for individuals with developmental 

disabilities including autism. ECF No. 65-10 (“Ohlfs Decl.”) ¶ 4. PACE is incorporated as a 

private, non-profit 501(c)(3) organization in California. Id. Defendant Kurt Ohlfs has served as 

 

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The PACE Defendants have requested that the Court judicially notice Plaintiff’s FAC in the 

instant case and Plaintiff’s complaint in McElroy v. Tracy Unified School District, No. 2:07-cv00086-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal.). ECF No. 65-2. Plaintiff does not oppose the PACE Defendants’ 

request, and the Court finds these documents subject to judicial notice. See Reyn’s Pasta Vella, 

LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “court filings and other 

matters of public record” are subject to judicial notice). However, to the extent any of the factual 

allegations in these documents is disputed, the Court does not take judicial notice of these disputed 

allegations. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may 

take judicial notice of matters of public record . . . But a court may not take judicial notice of a fact 

that is subject to reasonable dispute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other 

grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the 

PACE Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Plaintiff has also requested that the Court judicially notice subpoenaed records from the custodian 

of records for the State of California Department of Social Services, Community Care Licensing 

Division, Central California Regional Offices pertaining to the Community Care Licensing 

Investigation of PACE. ECF No. 69. The PACE Defendants object to Plaintiff’s request for 

judicial notice on the grounds that the records contain disputed facts. ECF No. 71-1. The records 

for which Plaintiff requests judicial notice include allegations brought against PACE and 

summaries of interviews conducted in the course of the licensing investigation. Plaintiff appears 

to seek judicial notice not of the fact that the investigations took place but for the truth of the 

matters described in the investigation reports. The content of these investigation reports are not 

the sort of undisputed facts subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Corinthian 

Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (a court may take judicial notice of the existence of 

public reports, but the court may not “on the basis of these reports, draw inferences or take notice 

of facts that might reasonably be disputed”); United States v. $127,000 in U.S. Currency, 2012 

WL 2917467, *5 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2012) (“A court . . . may take judicial notice of undisputed 

facts . . ., but it may not take judicial notice of disputed ones.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request 

for judicial notice is DENIED.

Additionally, the PACE Defendants have filed a list of objections to the exhibits to Plaintiff’s 

opposition. ECF No. 71-1. The PACE Defendants’ objections fail to comply with Civil Local 

Rule 7-3(c), which provides that “[a]ny evidentiary and procedural objections to the opposition 

must be contained within the reply brief or memorandum.” The PACE Defendants should have 

included any evidentiary objections to Plaintiff’s exhibits in the PACE Defendants’ reply, not in a 

separate document. Because the PACE Defendants have failed to comply with Civil Local Rule 7-

3(c), the Court DENIES the PACE Defendants’ objections.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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PACE’s Executive Director since 2005. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 6. Defendant Kelly Montague is a Board 

Certified Behavioral Analyst (“BCBA”). ECF No. 65-9 (“Montague Decl.”) ¶ 1. Montague acted 

as the BCBA for PACE from October 2011 to March 2012. Id. ¶ 10. During Montague’s tenure 

with PACE, Montague also acted as the BCBA for FACES—a division of PACE that provides inhome behavioral services to developmentally disabled minors. Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Megan Nolan, 

Ph.D., is a psychologist who provided behavioral services through PACE beginning in March 

2012. ECF No. 65-18 (“Nolan Decl.”) ¶¶ 1-2.

1. Care Providers During Plaintiff’s Time at PACE

When Plaintiff arrived at PACE, PACE’s behaviorist was behavioral assistant Cairbe 

Fanslow. Mot. at 5; ECF No. 68-2, Exh. C.

In February 2011, Melissa Schulz, BCBA, took over for Fanslow as the behaviorist for 

PACE. Schultz was responsible for 36 PACE residents and 60 additional PACE students. ECF 

No. 68-1, Exh. B (“Schultz Depo.”) at 14:1-25. Schultz testified that her caseload at PACE was 

“unmanageable” because PACE lacked sufficient trained staff members to provide “quality 

services” to PACE’s clients. Id. at 28:3-29:8, 32:2-19. Schultz left PACE in October 2011. Id. at 

34:23-35:2.

After Schultz left PACE, Defendant Montague provided behavioral services at PACE 

while continuing to provide behavioral services at FACES. ECF No. 68-3, Exh. K (“Montague 

Depo.) at 16:23-17:8, 18:7-13. Like Schultz, Montague believed that PACE did not have 

sufficient behavioral support staff for the number of patients served by PACE. ECF No. 68-4, 

Exh. M (email from Montague to Ohlfs in January 2012 stating that “the residential program is in 

need of more support than I am able to provide”); ECF No. 68-5, Exh. R (email from Montague in 

January 2012 stating that she thought it was “accurate” that “substantial staff training and ongoing 

staff support are needed” for PACE).

Montague eventually resigned from PACE, and Defendant Nolan was hired as PACE’s 

replacement behaviorist in April 2012. Opp. at 14. PACE additionally hired Adrienne 

Granadosin-Deanes, a BCBA, to assist with implementing a behavior plan for Plaintiff. ECF No. 

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68-6, Exh. FF (“Granadosin-Deanes Depo.”) at 10:14-19.

2. Plaintiff’s Time at PACE

Plaintiff attended PACE as a resident and student from September 2010, when Plaintiff 

was 12, until July 2012, when Plaintiff was 14. FAC ¶¶ 23, 138; ECF No. 65-14 (“Lucey Decl.”) 

¶ 3. 

At various times prior to Plaintiff’s arrival at PACE, Plaintiff had engaged in disruptive 

behaviors including displaying aggression and engaging in self-injurious behaviors like headbanging. FAC ¶ 26; Lucey Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B. Plaintiff’s parents reported that Plaintiff’s headbanging behavior began when Plaintiff was 2 years old. Lucey Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B. By 2006, 

Plaintiff’s head-banging had caused him to develop a permanent knot in his head. Lucey Decl. 

¶ 8, Exh. F (pediatrician report from April 2006 recording Plaintiff’s mother’s report that 

Plaintiff’s head-banging had resulted in a permanent knot on Plaintiff’s head).2 In 2007, Plaintiff 

filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff’s prior school district and related individuals and entities alleging 

causes of action based in part upon Plaintiff’s severe head-banging. See McElroy v. Tracy Unified 

Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-00086-MCE (E.D. Cal.), ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s aggressive and selfinjurious behaviors resulted in multiple psychiatric hospitalizations prior to Plaintiff’s arrival at 

PACE. Lucey Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6, Exhs. B, D.

At the time Plaintiff arrived at PACE, the intake forms from PACE indicate that Plaintiff 

was not injuring himself, though Plaintiff did exhibit aggressive behaviors such as kicking, hitting, 

or spitting at others. ECF No. 68-2, Exh. D (Plaintiff’s 30-day intake form from PACE); 68-2, 

Exh. E (Plaintiff’s initial behavior support plan from PACE). 

Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors, including self-injurious behaviors, escalated beginning in 

early 2011, and in September 2011, Plaintiff’s mother described Plaintiff as going into rages and 

banging his head to the point of injury. Lucey Decl. ¶ 13, Exh. K (“Gia McElroy Depo.”) at 

 

2 Although not a focus of Plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint alleges that the PACE Defendants caused Plaintiff to develop this knot, even though 

Plaintiff did not attend PACE until 2010—4 years after Plaintiff developed the knot. See ECF No. 

42-1 ¶ 37.

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71:16-72:3; Lucey Decl. ¶ 19, Exh. Q (report from Plaintiff’s medical provider). At the time, 

Plaintiff’s mother stated that Plaintiff’s increased disruptive behaviors coincided with changes in 

Plaintiff’s seizure medication. Lucey Decl. ¶ 19, Exh. Q.

In October 2011, Schultz recommended to Ohlfs that Plaintiff receive a one-to-one aide to 

respond to the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors, including self-injurious behaviors, over 

the preceding four months. Schultz Depo. at 57:11-25. In October and November 2011, 

Plaintiff’s medical providers again altered Plaintiff’s seizure medication. Lucey Decl. ¶ 20, Exh. 

R (Bright Minds Institute record documenting report on Plaintiff’s status by Plaintiff’s mother). 

Some of Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors, particularly Plaintiff’s obsessive compulsive behaviors 

such as chewing paper, continued to increase through October and November 2011. Id. However, 

Plaintiff’s mood improved during this period and Plaintiff demonstrated “reduced agitation and 

aggression.” Id. Montague personally observed Plaintiff only once—in December 2011—

between October 2011 and February 2012. ECF No. 68-5, Exh. T (February 2012 email from 

Montague stating that she had observed Plaintiff only once).

In February and March 2012, Holly White, an outside contractor and BCBA, was brought 

in to evaluate Plaintiff and develop a behavior plan for Plaintiff. ECF No. 68-5, Exh. T (February 

2012 email from White explaining that she had been asked to complete an assessment of Plaintiff 

and make suggestions for his behavior plan); ECF No. 68-6, Exh. AA (White’s report on Plaintiff, 

dated March 5, 2012). 

PACE then hired Adrienne Granadosin-Deanes, a BCBA, to assist with implementing 

White’s behavior plan for Plaintiff. Granadosin-Deanes Depo. at 10:14-19. Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behaviors improved during this time period. Id. at 16:9-18, 20:7-12. Plaintiff left PACE at the 

end of July 2012. Mot. at 7; Opp. at 14.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff and his parents, George McElroy and Gia McElroy, filed the instant lawsuit 

against the PACE Defendants and the Santa Clara County Office of Education in state court on 

June 19, 2014. ECF No. 1. On September 11, 2014, the case was removed to the Northern 

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District of California. Id. The case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on September 18, 

2014. ECF No. 6. The PACE Defendants filed an answer on September 25, 2014. ECF No. 7. 

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, ECF No. 25, the PACE Defendants amended their answer on 

January 13, 2015. ECF No. 22. 

On January 22, 2015, the parties jointly filed a stipulation to stay the case pending 

resolution of a motion to disqualify the attorney for Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s parents. ECF No. 27. 

On January 23, 2015, the Court granted the stipulation to stay the case, ECF No. 28, and the 

PACE Defendants filed their motion to disqualify the attorney for Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s parents, 

ECF No. 29. Plaintiff and his parents filed an opposition to the motion on February 13, 2015. 

ECF No. 34. The PACE Defendants filed a reply on February 20, 2015. ECF No. 36. On May 

13, 2015, the Court denied the motion. ECF No. 38. The Court lifted the stay on May 21, 2015. 

ECF No. 39.

On July 21, 2015, Plaintiff and his parents filed an unopposed motion to file an amended 

complaint. ECF No. 42. On August 5, 2015, Plaintiff and his parents filed an unopposed motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s parents in their individual capacity from the lawsuit. ECF No. 45. On 

August 19, 2015, the Court granted the motion to file an amended complaint and granted the 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s parents’ individual claims. ECF No. 50. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 

parents remain in the case only as Plaintiff’s guardians ad litem. See First Amended Compl. 

(“FAC”), ECF No. 42-1.

The PACE Defendants filed an answer to the FAC on August 25, 2015. ECF No. 51. The 

Santa Clara County Office of Education filed an answer on January 20, 2016. ECF No. 56.

Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on March 4, 2016. 

ECF No. 58. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion on March 9, 2016. ECF No. 61.

The PACE Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on April 7, 2016. 

ECF No. 65. Plaintiff filed an opposition with supporting exhibits, including one expert 

declaration, on April 21, 2016, ECF Nos. 66-69, and an additional expert report in support of 

Plaintiff’s opposition on April 26, 2016, ECF No. 70. The PACE Defendants filed a reply on 

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April 28, 2016. ECF No. 71. On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed an administrative motion to replace 

the expert report filed on April 26. ECF No. 75. The same day, the PACE Defendants filed 

objections to Plaintiff’s administrative motion. ECF No. 76.

On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff and the Santa Clara County Office of Education filed a notice of 

settlement and proposed order approving the settlement. ECF Nos. 72-74.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of 

material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court 

“does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a 

genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559-60 (2006). A fact is “material” 

if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party, id. “If the 

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be 

granted.” Id. (citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, 

it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the 

moving party, but on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, 

the party moving for summary judgment need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence 

to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325; accord Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 

F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 

party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

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III. DISCUSSION

The FAC asserts the following causes of action against the PACE Defendants: (1) assault 

and battery under California law against Defendant Ohlfs; (2) false imprisonment under California 

law against Defendants PACE, Ohlfs, Montague, and Nolan; (3) negligence under California law 

against all PACE Defendants; (4) negligence per se under California law against all PACE 

Defendants; (5) fraud under California law against all PACE Defendants; (6) negligent infliction 

of emotional distress under California law against all PACE Defendants; (7) intentional infliction 

of emotional distress under California law against all PACE Defendants; (8) violation of the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, 52, 54 et seq., against all PACE Defendants; (9) 

violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1414 et seq., against 

PACE; (10) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, against all PACE 

Defendants; (11) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all PACE Defendants. See FAC ¶¶ 143-

264. The PACE Defendants move for summary judgment on all eleven causes of action brought 

against the PACE Defendants. 

Plaintiff concedes that summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s first cause of action 

for assault and battery and on Plaintiff’s second cause of action for false imprisonment. Plaintiff 

additionally concedes that summary judgment is appropriate as to all causes of action against 

Defendant Megan Nolan. Opp. at 2 n.1 (Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to assault and battery, false imprisonment, and Defendant Megan Nolan and 

merely states that “Plaintiff agrees to adjudication of his assault/battery and false imprisonment 

claims and all claims against defendant Megan Nolan.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action as to the PACE Defendants and 

on all of Plaintiff’s causes of action as to Defendant Megan Nolan.

Plaintiff disputes that summary judgment is appropriate as to the nine remaining causes of 

action against the PACE Defendants. The Court begins by addressing together Plaintiff’s 

California tort claims for negligence, negligence per se, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all of which share a common element of 

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causation. The Court then addresses each of Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action against the 

PACE Defendants in turn.

A. Causation for California Tort Claims

In California, the torts of negligence, negligence per se, fraud, negligent infliction of 

emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress all require a showing of 

causation as an element of the cause of action. See Ladd v. Cty. of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 

917-18 (1996) (the elements of negligence are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of 

such legal duty; and (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury” (italics 

and brackets omitted)); Daum v. SpineCare Med. Grp., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1306 (1997) 

(the elements of negligence per se are “(1) the defendant violated a statute or regulation; (2) the 

violation caused the plaintiff's injury; (3) the injury resulted from the kind of occurrence the 

statute or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the plaintiff was one of the class of persons 

the statute or regulation was intended to protect”); Beckwith v. Dahl, 205 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1062 

(2012) (“Thus, there are two causation elements in a fraud cause of action. First, the plaintiff's 

actual and justifiable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation must have caused him to take a 

detrimental course of action. Second, the detrimental action taken by the plaintiff must have 

caused his alleged damage.”); Faunce v. Cate, 222 Cal. App. 4th 166, 172 (2013) (the elements of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress are “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the 

defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual 

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct”); 

Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores Calif., Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 124, 129 (1993) (“Negligent infliction of

emotional distress is a form of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of 

duty, causation and damages apply.”). In the instant case, the damage allegedly caused by the 

PACE Defendants was injury to Plaintiff in the form of an increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behaviors, and emotional distress to Plaintiff as evidenced by the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behaviors. See generally FAC. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that PACE’s failure to properly 

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provide Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”) therapy—a therapy directed at “decreas[ing] harmful 

and maladaptive behavior, while increasing functional and adaptive skills” of patients with 

autism—caused the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors. Opp. at 5; ECF No. 67 ¶ 5.

In California, “[t]he law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be 

proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” 

Miranda v. Bomel Const. Corp., 187 Cal. App. 4th 1326, 1336 (2010); see also Bockrath v. 

Aldritch Chemical Co., 21 Cal. 4th 71, 79 (1999) (holding that in cases that require resolving 

“complicated . . . medical causation issues, the standard of proof ordinarily required is a 

reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony that the defendant’s 

conduct contributed to the plaintiff’s injury” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 

“Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. . . . A possible cause only 

becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more 

likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.” Id. “Thus, proffering an expert opinion 

that there is some theoretical possibility the negligent act could have been a cause-in-fact of a 

particular injury is insufficient to establish causation.” Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health 

Sys., Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1118 (2003). Although the plaintiff’s expert “need not exclude 

all other possibilities before he or she can express an opinion that defendant's conduct or product 

caused the plaintiff's harm,” Cooper v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 555, 580 

(2015), “the plaintiff must offer an expert opinion that contains a reasoned explanation 

illuminating why the facts have convinced the expert, and therefore should convince the jury, that 

it is more probable than not the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury.” 

Jennings, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1118.

The PACE Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate as to each of 

Plaintiff’s tort causes of action because Plaintiff has not shown that Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors 

were caused by the PACE Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing. In support of their Motion, the PACE 

Defendants attach the declaration and expert report of Dr. Charles Scott. See ECF No. 65-4. Dr. 

Scott opines that the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors was caused by “changes in his 

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medications, a lack of sleep, residential placement changes, and the onset of puberty.” Id. ¶ 8. 

Accordingly to Dr. Scott, there is additionally evidence in the record that Plaintiff was not 

responsive to ABA interventions, such that Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors would have increased 

even if Plaintiff had received ABA interventions. Id. ¶ 9. Dr. Scott further opines that Plaintiff’s 

disruptive behaviors are not a form of injury at all but are instead Plaintiff’s “method of getting 

attention, his response to not getting what he wants and his method of showing frustration.” Id. 

Based on Dr. Scott’s expert opinion, the PACE Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that 

the PACE Defendants caused the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior.

Plaintiff’s Opposition counters that the opinions of two experts—Dr. Jonathan Ivy and Dr. 

Fernando Miranda—establish that there is a material factual dispute regarding whether the PACE 

Defendants caused the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior. The Court discusses each of 

Plaintiff’s proffered experts in turn. Ultimately, the Court concludes that neither expert offers “a 

reasoned explanation illuminating why the facts have convinced the expert, and therefore should 

convince the jury, that it is more probable than not that the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of the 

plaintiff’s injury.” Jennings, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1118 (emphasis omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs have 

not “proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony” that 

the inadequate staffing at PACE caused Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior. See Miranda, 187 Cal. 

App. 4th at 1336.

1. Dr. Ivy

Plaintiff attached to the Opposition a declaration from Dr. Ivy. See ECF No. 67. Dr. Ivy’s 

declaration is based solely upon reviewing Plaintiff’s records. Id. ¶¶ 3, 13. It appears that Dr. Ivy 

never met with or interviewed Plaintiff, and that Dr. Ivy never reviewed Plaintiff’s post-PACE

records. Id.; Lucey Decl., ¶ 29, Exh. AA at 16-17.

In his declaration, Dr. Ivy argues that many of the potential causes for Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behavior identified by Dr. Scott do not satisfactorily explain the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behavior. The Court addresses each in turn.

Specifically, Dr. Ivy opines that changes in medication do not explain the increase in 

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Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior because, according to Dr. Ivy, Plaintiff’s behavior changes began in 

May or June 2011 whereas Plaintiff’s medication did not change until September 2011. Id. ¶¶ 13-

14. However, Dr. Ivy fails to account for the fact that Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that 

Plaintiff’s medication changed as early as March 2011, not September 2011 as stated by Dr. Ivy. 

See ECF No. 71-2, Exh. A (Bright Minds Institute record documenting concerns raised by 

Plaintiff’s mother following changes in medication in March 2011). Additionally, Dr. Ivy does 

not address the fact that, according to Plaintiff’s medical records, Plaintiff’s mother believed 

Plaintiff’s changes in behavior were tied to the changes in Plaintiff’s seizure medications. Id.; 

Lucey Decl. ¶ 19, Exh. Q.

Dr. Ivy next opines that Plaintiff’s residential placement changes do not explain the change 

in Plaintiff’s behavior because Plaintiff’s residential placement changes occurred in March 2011 

and July 2012, whereas, accordingly to Dr. Ivy, Plaintiff’s increased disruptive behavior began in 

May 2011 at the earliest. Id. ¶ 15. Dr. Ivy additionally states that Plaintiff had successfully 

changed residential placement prior to his time at PACE, and suggests that the change in 

residential placement at PACE would not have affected Plaintiff’s behavior. Id. However, Dr. Ivy 

does not address the fact that Plaintiff’s residential placement change in March 2011 appears to 

coincide with the reports in Plaintiff’s records that Plaintiff’s behavior deteriorated in March and 

April 2011. Lucey Decl. ¶ 19, Exh. Q; ECF No. 71-2, Exh. A. Indeed, despite the evidence in the 

record to the contrary, Dr. Ivy does not appear to acknowledge any change in Plaintiff’s behavior 

prior to May 2011, and even so, Dr. Ivy’s declaration is inconsistent about when Dr. Ivy believes 

Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors began in May 2011, June 2011, or July 2011. Dr. Ivy states 

variously that Plaintiff’s records “show challenging behavior, namely SIB [self-injurious 

behavior], increasing in frequency as early as June 2011,” that Plaintiff had “increased selfinjurious behaviors that started in July 2011,” and that Plaintiff’s records show “[d]ata on selfinjury” beginning “on or about May 2011.” ECF No. 67 ¶ 14-15.

As to the onset of puberty, Dr. Ivy acknowledges that “[p]hysiological and biological 

changes can certainly impact how an individual interacts with the world around them,” and that 

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these changes can lead a child to stop responding to previously effective interventions. Id. ¶ 16. 

Thus, Dr. Ivy agrees with Dr. Scott that puberty can result in changes in behavior, and that 

strategies for managing disruptive behaviors that were effective prior to puberty may prove 

ineffective following the onset of puberty. Id. Nevertheless, Dr. Ivy argues that the changes in 

behavior associated with puberty can be managed by “more robust” interventions. Id. That 

changes in behavior can be managed, however, does not change the fact that the changes in 

behavior are caused by the onset of puberty. Dr. Ivy does not explain why such changes in 

behavior associated with puberty would not explain the increase in Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior, 

let alone why the PACE Defendants’ conduct is a more probable cause of Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behaviors than the onset of puberty. See id.; Jennings, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1118 (to prove 

causation, Plaintiff must provide competent expert testimony that “it is more probable than not 

that the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury”).

Furthermore, aside from Dr. Ivy’s conclusory assertion that “the behavioral programming 

developed and implemented (or not implemented) at PACE had the direct effect of increasing 

[Plaintiff’s] challenging behaviors,” id. ¶ 22, Dr. Ivy’s declaration does not provide any evidence 

that the PACE Defendants’ conduct caused Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior. See Nelson v. Matrixx 

Initiatives, Inc., No. C 09-02904 WHA, 2012 WL 4829327, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012)

(granting summary judgment to the defendant where the plaintiff “set forth no admissible expert 

testimony on the issue of specific causation, a necessary element for each of plaintiff’s claims”), 

aff’d 592 Fed. App’x 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Rather, as Dr. Ivy concedes, Plaintiff has a long history of “problem behaviors” dating 

back to when Plaintiff was a young boy. ECF No. 67 ¶ 17. Dr. Ivy attempts to link this long 

history of “problem behaviors” to the PACE Defendants by opining that it is possible that 

longstanding “problem behavior can be effectively managed and reduced with comprehensive 

quality programming,” namely ABA therapy. Id. Specifically, Dr. Ivy opines that ABA “is the 

most effective educational and treatment approach for individuals with ASD,” id. ¶ 5, and that 

ABA treatment would have been effective for Plaintiff because Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors 

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were effectively managed in 2008 when Plaintiff was participating in the “structured” program at 

Land Park. Id. ¶ 19. However, although Dr. Ivy opines that ABA therapy “is the most effective 

educational and treatment approach for individuals with ASD,” id. ¶ 5, Dr. Ivy does not discuss 

the success rate of ABA. Moreover, Dr. Ivy does not identify what behaviors Plaintiff would not 

exhibit if Plaintiff had received ABA. In fact, Dr. Ivy does not address the evidence cited by Dr. 

Scott that ABA treatment following Plaintiff’s time at PACE proved ineffective. Id. Indeed, Dr. 

Ivy does not discuss and appears not to have reviewed Plaintiff’s post-PACE records. Lucey Decl. 

¶ 29, Exh. AA at 16-17. Thus, Dr. Ivy does not address the efficacy of ABA therapy generally, 

Dr. Ivy did not review the specific evidence regarding Plaintiff’s reaction to ABA therapy 

following Plaintiff’s time at PACE, and Dr. Ivy does not explain how the PACE Defendants could 

have caused behaviors that date back to long before Plaintiff’s time at PACE. Therefore, Dr. Ivy’s 

testimony does not “prove[] within a reasonable medical probability” that the inadequate staffing 

at PACE caused Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior, as required by California law. See Miranda, 187 

Cal. App. 4th at 1336.

Finally, Dr. Ivy acknowledges in his declaration that Plaintiff’s disruptive behaviors are 

“purposeful and functional,” ECF No. 67 ¶ 7, that Plaintiff has exhibited disruptive behaviors 

since Plaintiff was “a young boy,” id. ¶ 17, and that “the behaviors exhibited by the Plaintiff are 

his method of getting attention, his response to not getting what he wants, and his method of 

showing frustration,” id. ¶ 20. In fact, Plaintiff’s parents report that Plaintiff’s head-banging 

began when Plaintiff was as young as 2 years old. Lucey Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B. By 2006—four years 

before Plaintiff enrolled at PACE in September 2010—Plaintiff’s head-banging resulted in a

permanent knot in Plaintiff’s head. Lucey Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. F. This evidence shows that Plaintiff’s 

disruptive behaviors are not a form of injury caused by the PACE Defendants’ conduct but instead 

are a method of communication developed by Plaintiff long before Plaintiff’s time with the PACE 

Defendants. See also Lucey Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B (psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff from 2005, five 

years prior to Plaintiff’s enrollment at PACE, describing Plaintiff’s aggressive and self-injurious 

behaviors). Dr. Ivy does not explain how PACE’s conduct could have caused these longstanding 

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behavioral problems. 

Given the numerous explanations supported by the record for Plaintiff’s disruptive 

behaviors that are unrelated to the PACE Defendants’ conduct, none of which Dr. Ivy’s 

declaration rebuts, the Court concludes that Dr. Ivy has not provided “a reasoned explanation 

illuminating why the facts have convinced the expert, and therefore should convince the jury, that 

it is more probable than not that the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury.” 

Jennings, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1118 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, Dr. Ivy’s declaration is 

legally insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation. See id. (“[P]roffering an 

expert opinion that there is some theoretical possibility the negligent act could have been a causein-fact of a particular injury is insufficient to establish causation.”); see also Miranda, 187 Cal. 

App. 4th at 1336 (“The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be 

proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.”).

2. Dr. Miranda

In addition to Dr. Ivy’s declaration, Plaintiff relies upon the expert report of Dr. Fernando 

Miranda. Plaintiff produced Dr. Miranda’s expert report to Defendants as a rebuttal report on 

April 18, 2016. ECF No. 76-1 ¶ 3. However, when Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s opposition to the 

PACE Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on April 21, 2016, Plaintiff failed to attach Dr. 

Miranda’s expert report, or a declaration from Dr. Miranda. Instead, Plaintiff filed Dr. Miranda’s 

expert report separately on April 26, 2016—five days after the deadline to oppose the PACE 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and two days prior to the PACE Defendants’ deadline 

to file their reply brief. See ECF No. 70. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to include a declaration 

authenticating the expert report filed on April 26. See id. The PACE Defendants in their reply 

brief identified these procedural faults in Plaintiff’s citation to Dr. Miranda’s expert report. See

ECF No. 71. Subsequently, on May 11, 2016—16 days after the close of expert discovery—

Plaintiff filed an administrative motion to replace the untimely and unauthenticated expert report 

filed on April 26 with a new expert report from Dr. Miranda. ECF No. 75. The newly proffered 

expert report contains the same opinions as Dr. Miranda’s original expert report but is presented in 

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the form of a signed declaration. See id. The PACE Defendants filed objections to Plaintiff’s 

administrative motion to file Dr. Miranda’s new expert report on May 11, 2016. ECF No. 76.

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s administrative motion to replace Dr. Miranda’s expert 

report. Expert discovery closed on April 25, 2016, and Plaintiff did not produce Dr. Miranda’s 

new report until May 11, 2016—16 days after the close of expert discovery. Accordingly, the new

expert report is untimely. Additionally, the Court agrees with the PACE Defendants that the 

expert report from Dr. Miranda filed with the Court on April 26, 2016 was both unauthenticated 

and untimely. See Civ. Local R. 7-3(a) (opposition to a motion must be filed not more than 14 

days after the motion was filed); Civ. Local R. 7-5(a) (documents supporting factual contentions 

made in opposition to a motion “must be appropriately authenticated by an affidavit or 

declaration”).

Moreover, Dr. Miranda’s expert report, like Dr. Ivy’s expert report, fails to provide “a 

reasoned explanation illuminating why the facts have convinced the expert, and therefore should 

convince the jury, that it is more probable than not that the negligent act was a cause-in-fact of the 

plaintiff’s injury.” Jennings, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1118 (emphasis omitted). Dr. Miranda never 

opines that Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior was caused by the PACE Defendants’ conduct. Instead, 

Dr. Miranda opines that “the failure of PACE to provide appropriate ABA therapy was irrevocably 

detrimental to [Plaintiff’s] development which will likely have long-lasting consequences” and 

that appropriate ABA therapy would have helped Plaintiff to “maximize his potential.” ECF No. 

70, Exh. 1 at 2-3. Dr. Miranda does not explain how the alleged failure to provide appropriate 

ABA therapy was detrimental to Plaintiff, in what way Plaintiff would have “maximize[d] his 

potential” with ABA therapy, nor how likely it is that ABA therapy would have permitted Plaintiff 

to achieve the unidentified benefits of ABA therapy. See id. Like Dr. Ivy, Dr. Miranda does not 

identify the efficacy of ABA therapy nor what behaviors Plaintiff would not have exhibited if 

Plaintiff had received ABA therapy. Dr. Miranda’s report contains no discussion of Plaintiff’s 

post-PACE behaviors and the fact that Plaintiff’s post-PACE ABA therapy was ineffective.

Thus, even if Dr. Miranda’s expert report were not untimely and unauthenticated, Dr. 

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Miranda’s expert report, like Dr. Ivy’s expert report, is legally insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s 

burden to show through expert evidence that it is more likely than not that the PACE Defendants’ 

conduct caused Plaintiff’s injury. See Miranda, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 1336 (“The law is well 

settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical 

probability based upon competent expert testimony.”). Because Plaintiff has not satisfied his 

burden to show causation, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff has produced sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the remaining elements of the California tort causes of action.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to the PACE Defendants on Plaintiff’s 

California tort claims for negligence, negligence per se, fraud, negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Nelson v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 

592 Fed. App’x at 592 (“Without any reliable expert witness testimony on specific causation, the 

district court correctly granted [the defendant’s] motion for summary judgment.”).

B. Unruh Act

California’s Unruh Act provides that:

All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, 

and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national 

origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital 

status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 

business establishments of every kind whatsoever.

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).

The PACE Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

Unruh Act claim because PACE is not a “business establishment” covered by the Unruh Act and 

because Plaintiff has not shown that the PACE Defendants violated the Unruh Act by 

discriminating against Plaintiff because of his disability.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown that the PACE Defendants discriminated 

against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s sole argument for why the PACE Defendants’ conduct was 

discriminatory in violation of the Unruh Act is that the PACE Defendants allegedly made an 

“intentional decision to withhold services from a resident whose disability proved more 

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troublesome” than the disabilities of PACE’s other residents. ECF No. 66 at 23. In essence, 

Plaintiff argues that the PACE Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff by allocating adequate 

resources to other PACE residents but not to Plaintiff. The only evidence Plaintiff cites to support 

Plaintiff’s argument that the PACE Defendants withheld services specifically from Plaintiff is that 

the PACE Defendants supposedly decided not to authorize further funding for Plaintiff’s care 

because the PACE Defendants believed they were already spending enough money on Plaintiff. 

Id. However, the record citation provided by Plaintiff in support Plaintiff’s theory that the PACE 

Defendants did not want to spend more money on Plaintiff is inapposite. Specifically, Plaintiff

cites to Schultz’s deposition for the proposition that the PACE Defendants had “an intentional 

unwillingness to spend the money necessary to care for [Plaintiff’s] unique needs.” See Opp. at 23 

(citing ECF No. 68, Exh. B at 63:15-64:16). In that portion of Schultz’s deposition, however, 

Schultz was asked whether Schultz had ever stated that “she [Schultz] was repeatedly told by 

executive director [sic] of the facility that the facility had already been spending enough money on 

behaviorist time with the child and likened his response to directives as, quote, trying to teach a 

turnip, closed quote, period.” Schultz responded only, “I don’t remember that.” ECF No. 68, 

Exh. B at 63:15-64:16. By citing Plaintiff’s attorney’s question instead of Schultz’s answer,

Plaintiff misrepresents Schultz’s testimony and the record in the case.

Moreover, the evidence presented by Plaintiff shows that Plaintiff did received extra

individualized services at PACE, thus undermining Plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that the 

PACE Defendants were unwilling to spend money to provide services to Plaintiff. For example, 

Plaintiff acknowledges that in February and March 2012 Plaintiff received an individual outside 

assessment by Holly White (an outside contractor and BCBA) and that Adrienne GranadosinDeanes, a BCBA, was subsequently hired as Plaintiff’s one-to-one aide at PACE to assist with 

implementing White’s behavior plan for Plaintiff. Opp. at 13-14; ECF No. 68-6, Exh. AA; 

Granadosin-Deanes Depo. at 10:14-19.

Because Plaintiff has not identified evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s theory that 

the PACE Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of the Unruh Act, the Court 

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GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim against the PACE Defendants.

C. IDEA Violation

The PACE Defendants next move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s cause of action 

based on alleged violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et 

seq. (the “IDEA”). The IDEA requires state and public agencies to provide disabled minors with a 

free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) and provides various procedural safeguards to 

ensure that disabled minors receive the required FAPE. One such procedural safeguard is the 

requirement that each disabled minor receive an individualized education program. By its terms, 

however, the IDEA applies only to a “State educational agency, State agency, or local educational 

agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).

The PACE Defendants argue that, as a private school, PACE and its employees are not 

subject to the IDEA. Mot. at 25. With the exception of the District of New Jersey, every court to 

have considered the issue has concluded that the IDEA does not apply to private schools because 

private schools are not a “State educational agency, State agency, or local educational agency.” 

See, e.g., St. Johnsburg Academy v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 

text of the IDEA and its implementing regulations all compel the conclusion that the IDEA does 

not apply to private schools); Ullmo v. Gilmour Academy, 273 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(holding that the IDEA does not apply to private schools); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 

1531 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the IDEA does not apply to private schools). However, a 

District of New Jersey case found that New Jersey state law requires that all private schools 

comply with the IDEA. See PN v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221, 234 (D.N.J. 2003). California has 

no comparable law requiring private schools to comply with the IDEA. Instead, California state 

law explicitly reserves responsibility for IDEA compliance to government educational agencies. 

Specifically, California Education Code § 56383 states that “even if a nonpublic, nonsectarian 

school implements a child’s individualized education program, responsibility for compliance with 

this part and with the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400 et 

seq.) and implementing regulations remains with the local educational agency pursuant to Section 

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300.325(c) of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”

Therefore, the Court concludes that in California, as in every jurisdiction except New 

Jersey, the IDEA does not apply to private schools. Accordingly, because PACE is a private 

school and not a “State educational agency, State agency, or local educational agency,” the Court 

GRANTS summary judgment for the PACE Defendants as to Plaintiff’s claim for IDEA 

violations.

D. Rehabilitation Act

The PACE Defendants next argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

claim that the PACE Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 

U.S.C. § 794. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 

States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by 

reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, 

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 

any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

29 U.S.C. § 794. The PACE Defendants argue that Section 504 does not apply to the PACE 

Defendants because the PACE Defendants do not receive federal financial assistance, and that the 

PACE Defendants did not violate Section 504.

The Court need not address the PACE Defendants’ argument that Section 504 does not 

apply to PACE because the Court concludes that even if Section 504 does apply to PACE, 

Plaintiff has not shown that PACE violated Section 504. The Rehabilitation Act is concerned 

primarily with whether disabled persons have opportunities comparable to non-disabled persons to 

participate in programs receiving federal financial assistance, but it does not guarantee equal 

results. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (stating that “the central purpose of 

§ 504” is “to assure that handicapped individuals receive ‘evenhanded treatment’ in relation to 

nonhandicapped individuals”); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985) (“Section 504 

seeks to assure evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals to 

participate in and benefit from programs receiving federal assistance . . . The Act does not, 

however, guarantee the handicapped equal results” from the federally-funded program). 

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Moreover, Section 504 does not require that all disabled individuals receive equal treatment. See 

id. at 549 (holding that “[t]here is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any benefit 

extended to one category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other categories of 

handicapped persons.”).

In the instant case, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was granted admission to PACE, and 

that he was not denied admission based on his disability. As discussed above, Plaintiff has 

provided no evidence that Plaintiff was treated differently than any other students at PACE based 

on Plaintiff’s disability. Rather, the evidence identified by Plaintiff tends to show that PACE was 

understaffed in a way that affected PACE’s clients generally, not Plaintiff in particular. See, e.g.,

Schultz Depo. at 28:3-29:8, 32:2-19 (Schultz’s testimony that she felt her caseload was 

“unmanageable” due to insufficient staff at PACE); ECF No. 68-4, Exh. M (email from Montague

to Ohlfs in January 2012 stating that “the residential program is in need of more support than I am 

able to provide”); ECF No. 68-5, Exh. R (email from Montague in January 2012 stating that she 

thought it was “accurate” that “substantial staff training and ongoing staff support are needed” for 

PACE). Moreover, the evidence produced by Plaintiff shows that Plaintiff did receive an 

individual outside evaluation by Holly White (a consultant and BCBA), ECF No. 68-6, Exh. AA, 

and an individual one-to-one aide, Adrienne Granadosin-Deanes, Granadosin-Deanes Depo. at 

10:14-19.

Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that he was denied the opportunity to participate in programs 

at PACE, nor that the PACE Defendants treated Plaintiff differently because of Plaintiff’s 

disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for the 

PACE Defendants on Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim.

E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff’s final cause of action against the PACE Defendants is a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. A claim under Section 1983 requires “the 

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . committed by a 

person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The PACE 

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim fails because the PACE Defendants are not 

state actors.

Courts have held that a claim under Section 1983 may be brought against a private party 

only if the Plaintiff shows that one of four tests is satisfied. The tests are: “(1) public function; (2) 

joint action; (3) governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus.” Kirtley v. 

Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff argues that the PACE Defendants are state actors because 

“PACE contracted with the local district to provide education services to special education 

students consistent with the mandates of federal and state law.” Opp. at 28. Plaintiff argues that 

“[t]his is a traditionally [sic] state service that was provided by PACE.” Id. As Plaintiff does not 

specify which test for state action Plaintiff believes is met, the Court addresses each of the four 

tests in turn.

1. Public Function

“Under the public function test, when private individuals or groups are endowed by the 

State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities 

of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.” Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554-55 (9th 

Cir. 2002). A function is governmental in nature for purposes of the public function test only if 

the function is “both traditionally and exclusively governmental.” Id. at 555.

Here, Plaintiffs argue that the provision of education services to special education students 

is “a traditionally [sic] state service.” Opp. at 28. However, to satisfy the public function test, the 

function must be not only traditionally but also exclusively performed by the state. Lee, 276 F.3d 

at 555. In California, the care and education of developmentally disabled individuals is not 

traditionally and exclusively performed by the state; rather, California law explicitly contemplates 

that private entities will be involved in the care and education of such persons. See Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 4620(b) (“[T]he service provided to individuals and their families by regional centers 

is of such a special and unique nature that it cannot be satisfactorily provided by state agencies. 

Therefore, private nonprofit community agencies shall be utilized by the state for the purpose of 

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operating regional centers.”); Cal. Educ. Code § 56383 (law regarding the placement of a student 

with special needs in a “nonpublic, nonsectarian school”); McHone v. Far Northern Regional Ctr., 

14-cv-03385-EDL, 2015 WL 80676, at *5-8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (holding that in California a 

private residential facility for disabled persons was not a state actor).

Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown that the PACE Defendants are state 

actors under the public function test. The Court turns next to the joint action test.

2. Joint Action

The joint action test requires that the private entity be “a willful participant in joint activity 

with the State or its agents,” and that activity results in a constitutional violation. United States v. 

Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966). The Ninth Circuit has held that the “joint action” test is satisfied 

when the plaintiff shows that the government knowingly accepted a benefit derived from 

unconstitutional conduct. See Parks Sch. of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 

1995).

In the instant case, Plaintiff does not argue or point to any evidence that any governmental 

actor or agency knowingly accepted a benefit flowing from unconstitutional conduct. See 

generally Opp. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that the joint action test is satisfied, so the Court 

turns to the governmental compulsion test.

3. Governmental Compulsion

To satisfy the governmental compulsion test, a plaintiff must show “significant 

encouragement” or compulsion by the state on the private actors that goes beyond “a generally 

applicable law.” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 836-37, 841 (9th Cir. 

1999). “[T]he plaintiff must establish some other nexus sufficient to make it fair to attribute 

liability to the private entity. Typically, the nexus has consisted of participation by the state in an 

action ostensibly taken by the private entity, through conspiratorial agreement [], official 

cooperation with the private entity to achieve the private entity’s goal [], or enforcement and 

ratification of the private entity’s chosen action [].” Id. at 841 (citations omitted).

In the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged or cited to any evidence showing that any of 

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the allegedly wrongful actions taken by the PACE Defendants were done through conspiratorial 

agreement with, official cooperation with, or with the official ratification of the state. See 

generally Opp. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that the governmental compulsion test is 

satisfied. The Court turns to the final test, the governmental nexus test.

4. Governmental Nexus

The final test for whether the PACE Defendants are a state actor is the governmental nexus 

test. The governmental nexus test requires that “there is such a close nexus between the State and 

the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State 

itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that a private entity enters into a contract with the 

government to provide services on the government’s behalf does not satisfy the governmental 

nexus test. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982). “Acts of such private contractors 

do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in 

performing public contracts.” Id. at 841.

In the instant case, Plaintiff argues that “PACE contracted with the local district to provide 

education services to special education students consistent with the mandates of federal and state 

law.” Opp. at 28. Plaintiff makes no argument and points to no evidence supporting any further 

government involvement in PACE’s activities, beyond the existence of PACE’s contract with the 

local district. See generally id. This is insufficient to satisfy the governmental nexus test. See 

Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 (“Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the 

government by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public 

contracts.”).

Thus, Plaintiff has not satisfied any of the four state action tests. The PACE Defendants 

therefore may not be subject to a Section 1983 cause of action.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to the PACE Defendants on 

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the PACE Defendants motion for summary 

judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 27, 2016

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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