Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00902/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00902-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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 As the girls were aged ten and thirteen, the Court will refer to them only by their

initials. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Caroline Booker, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

State of Arizona, et al, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-00902-PHX-ROS

ORDER

Defendants the United States and the State of Arizona have filed separate motions to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. For the following reasons, the claims against the State of

Arizona will be remanded to state court, and Plaintiffs will be given an opportunity to

conduct discovery regarding the claims against the United States.

BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2007, two young girls–C.R.H. and R.J.H.1

–were riding an all-terrain

vehicle in the Windy Point Recreation Area near Chloride, Arizona. (Doc. 1-4 at 31).

Windy Point Recreation Area is managed by the United States Department of Interior and

the Bureau of Land Management (“Bureau”). As the girls were riding along a road

Case 2:09-cv-00902-ROS Document 29 Filed 05/05/10 Page 1 of 7
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 Arizona originally argued that all claims against it must be dismissed, (Doc. 14 at

2), but later conceded remand, not dismissal, is the appropriate remedy. (Doc. 24 at 10).

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maintained by the Bureau, the girls’ vehicle left the road and fell into an open and abandoned

mineshaft. R.J.H. was killed and C.R.H. suffered serious injuries. The mineshaft is part of

a patented claim known as the Brighter Days Mine owned by private individuals.

Plaintiff Caroline Booker, on behalf of herself and her daughters C.R.H. and R.J.H.,

filed suit against the State of Arizona and the owners of the mine in Maricopa County

Superior Court. Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint, naming the Bureau as an

additional defendant. According to the complaint, the State of Arizona knew of the Brighter

Days Mine and was aware that it was a relatively dangerous mine. Despite this knowledge,

“[n]o warning signs, fencing, or protective safety measures . . . [were] installed at the

Brighter Days Mine.” (Doc. 1-4 at 33). Moreover, there were no “signs or warnings

regarding abandoned mine hazards” nor any fencing or protective safety measures along the

Bureau-maintained road leading to the Brighter Days Mine. 

 On April 29, 2009, the Bureau removed the case to this Court. On December 23,

2009, the parties submitted a Proposed Case Management Plan. (Doc. 11). The State of

Arizona assisted in drafting that document. On December 28, 2009, the State of Arizona

moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. And on

January 7, 2010, the Bureau moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims as barred by sovereign

immunity. 

ANALYSIS

I. Claims Against State of Arizona Must be Remanded

The State of Arizona has moved to remand all claims against it on the basis that the

Eleventh Amendment prohibits Plaintiffs from proceeding against Arizona in this forum.2

Based on Plaintiff’s claims, and the history of this case, all claims against Arizona must be

remanded.

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“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a

state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dept. of

Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). This Amendment “plainly protects states

from being haled into federal courts as defendants.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375

F.3d 831, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2004). It is undisputed that Plaintiff pled claims for money

damages against Arizona. Thus, this suit is barred unless Arizona has waived its Eleventh

Amendment immunity. 

“The test employed to determine whether a state has waived immunity is a stringent

one.” In re Bliemeister, 296 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2002). A state waives its immunity if

it “voluntarily invokes [federal] jurisdiction or . . . makes a clear declaration that it intends

to submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction.” Id. For example, a state was found to have waived

its immunity “by participating in extensive pre-trial activities and waiting until the first day

of trial” to raise the immunity issue. Hill v. Blind Indus. and Servs. of Maryland, 179 F.3d

754, 756 (9th Cir. 1999). But a state was found not to have waived its immunity by

participating in the filing of a witness list and by filing a third-party complaint. Aholelei v.

Dept. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147-49 (9th Cir. 2007). 

With this law in mind, Plaintiff presents four arguments aimed at establishing waiver:

1) Arizona asserted a claim against the Bureau; 2) Arizona consented in the removal to

federal court; 3) Arizona waited eight months after removal to seek remand; and 4) Arizona

accepted federal funds. None of these contentions are convincing.

A. Arizona Has Not Sued the Bureau

Plaintiff’s first argument in support of waiver is that Arizona filed a claim against the

Bureau. Because a claim against the Bureau would have to be heard in federal court, filing

such a claim could be construed as voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction. Cal. ex rel.

Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 848 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] state that voluntarily brings

suit as a plaintiff in state court cannot invoke the Eleventh Amendment when the defendant

seeks removal to a federal court of competent jurisdiction.”). Thus, if Arizona had sued the

Bureau in state court, Arizona could not now claim the Eleventh Amendment bars this Court

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 Even if Arizona had asserted a cross-claim against the Bureau, it is not entirely clear

that such action would constitute a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment claim. Cf. Aholelei

v. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (state’s filing of third-party

complaint in federal court did not constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment).

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from hearing the case. But Arizona has not asserted a claim against the Bureau. (Doc. 24

at 4 “At no time did the State make a claim against or sue the [Bureau]; the State has not and

will not file a cross claim against the United States . . . .”). While Arizona did name the

Bureau as a non-party at fault, such action does not constitute asserting a claim against the

Bureau.3

 Arizona’s assertion that the Bureau is a non-party at fault does not support a

finding of waiver.

B. Arizona Did Not Consent to Removal 

Plaintiff’s second argument is that Arizona must have consented to the removal from

state court. Generally, removal requires the consent of all parties. Durham v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 2006). But 28 U.S.C. § 1442 allows a federal

officer or agency to remove a case from state court “without other defendants joining in the

petition.” Ely Valley Mines, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 644 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th

Cir. 1981). Arizona’s consent was not required prior to removal, and the record contains no

indication Arizona actually gave such consent. Thus, the removal does not support a finding

of waiver. 

C. Arizona’s Delay in Raising Immunity Does Not Constitute Waiver

Plaintiff’s next argument is that Arizona waited too long to raise immunity as a

defense. This case was removed from state court on April 29, 2009, and Arizona did not

raise the issue of immunity until December 29, 2009. While the delay is puzzling, the only

substantive action Arizona took between April and December was participating in the

drafting of the proposed case management plan. The cases finding waiver based on pretrial

activity have depended on the State engaging in extensive pretrial activity. See, e.g., Hill,

179 F.3d at 756 (state waited until first day of trial to raise immunity). Participating in the

drafting of a case management plan is not sufficient activity to establish waiver.

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 In these agreements, the Bureau agreed to provide funding “to locate, classify and

secure hazards associated with [inactive/abandoned mine sites].” (Doc. 20-1 at 4).

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D. Arizona’s Acceptance of Federal Funds Does Not Constitute Waiver

Finally, Plaintiff argues Arizona “accepted federal funds to inventory and remediate

abandoned mines.” (Doc. 20 at 6). According to Plaintiff, Arizona’s acceptance of these

funds waived immunity. But even assuming Arizona accepted federal funds, there is no

evidence that such acceptance required a waiver of immunity.

A state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting “federal funds

where the funding statute manifests a clear intent to condition participation in the programs

funded under the Act on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional immunity.” Clark v.

State of Cal., 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, one federal statute provides

“[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment” once a state accepts federal

funds for that particular program. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. If Plaintiff were able to show

Arizona accepted federal funds from a program containing such a waiver, the case could

proceed in federal court.

Plaintiff does not, however, cite to any statute showing an intent to require Arizona

waive its immunity in this context. Instead, Plaintiff cites to “Assistance Agreements”

between the Bureau and the Arizona State Mine Inspector.4

 The statutory basis for these

agreements was the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. (Doc. 20-1). That

statute contains no mention of the Eleventh Amendment, let alone the “unequivocal statutory

language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.” Atascadero State Hosp. v.

Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). Plaintiff has not established that Arizona’s acceptance

of federal funds waived the state’s immunity.

Having found no basis for a waiver of Arizona’s immunity, Plaintiff’s claims against

Arizona must be remanded to state court.

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 II. Discovery Regarding Discretionary Function Immunity

The United States seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims on the basis that they are barred

by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff asks the Court to stay consideration of this motion until

Plaintiff has been allowed discovery on the United States’ policies and procedures regarding

the Brighter Days Mine. Plaintiff will be granted sixty days in which to conduct discovery.

The United States’ motion to dismiss depends upon the “discretionary function

exception” to the Federal Tort Claims Act. This exception prevents liability for “[a]ny claim

based . . . upon the exercise of performance of the failure to exercise or perform a

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the

Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This

exception “marks the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability on the

United States and the desire to protect certain decision-making from judicial second

guessing.” Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 2006). 

There are two steps to application of this exception. “First, the question is whether

the action taken by the government is a matter of judgment.” Id. If the government is faced

with a “mandatory directive,” the exception does not apply. Id. Second, “the question is

whether the discretion is the type of decision-making that the discretionary function

exception was designed to protect.” Id. Decisions “grounded in social, economic, and

political policy” are protected. Id.

Application of the exception requires “a policy-specific and fact-driven inquiry.”

Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has

instructed that actual evidence of policy weighing is not required. United States v. Gaubert,

499 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1991) (“The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent

in exercising the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions

taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”). But the Ninth Circuit

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 In Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973, 974 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994), the court observed

the discretionary function exception “does not depend . . . on whether federal official actually

took policy considerations into account. All that is required is that the applicable statute or

regulation gave the government agent discretion to take policy goals into account.” And in

Terbush, the court stated “[o]f course, after Gaubert we do not need actual evidence that

policy-weighing was undertaken.” 516 F.3d at 1137. 

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 In Oberson v. United States Department of Agriculture, 514 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.

2008), the court found the exception did not apply based on the “absence of any evidence”

showing a “policy choice.” And in Soldano v. United States, 453 F.3d 1140, 1150 n.7 (9th

Cir. 2006), the court stated the government could not rely on “hypothetical justifications

indicative of a social, economic and political judgment.” 

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sometimes follows this ruling,5 and sometimes does not.6 Based on the conflict in the case

law, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to conduct discovery. That discovery should focus

on establishing a mandatory policy which the Bureau failed to follow or on establishing that

the Bureau’s failure to erect warnings or a barrier is not “susceptible to policy analysis.”

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. Plaintiff will be instructed to file a supplemental opposition to the

motion to dismiss after completing discovery.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. All claims against the State of Arizona are REMANDED TO STATE

COURT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to Stay (Doc. 21) is GRANTED. Plaintiff

shall file a supplemental opposition to the motion to dismiss no later than July 6, 2010. The

United States reply shall be filed no later than July 20, 2010.

DATED this 5th day of May, 2010.

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