Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00988/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00988-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD GLASS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v.

CDCR, et al.,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1: 15-cv-00988-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM 

 (ECF No. 1)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 5.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail “to state a claim upon 

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which relief may be granted,” or that “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff identifies the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation –

Kern Valley State Prison, Warden Martin M. Biter, Sergeant J. McMahon, Correctional 

Counselors D. Tarnoff and S. Tallerico, Appeals Analyst K. Carter, Facility Captain W. 

Adams, Ombudsman Sonya Valle, and Trust/Accounting Correctional Officers W. 

Estrella, Mike Fres1, S. Pickering, J. Molly2, J. Calasin, and L. Sanchez as Defendants. 

Plaintiff’s allegations can be summarized essentially as follows:

Defendants violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a by failing to accurately maintain his trust 

account funds. From February 2011 to October 3, 2013, Defendants unlawfully 

deducted funds from Plaintiff’s trust account and deprived Plaintiff use of his funds to 

obtain an attorney, thereby preventing Plaintiff’s access to the courts. Defendants’ 

actions were in retaliation for Plaintiff filing prison grievances and petitioning the courts.

From January to May 2011, Defendant McMahon conspired with Defendants 

Estrella, Sanchez, Fres, Calasin, Molly, and Pickering and forged a CDC Form 193 Trust 

account withdrawal order to deduct $55 from Plaintiff’s account. 

In June 2011, $720 was deducted from Plaintiff’s settlement funds. Plaintiff did 

not authorize this deduction or deposit of the remaining settlement funds into his 

account. Defendants Biter, Estrella, Fres, Sanchez, Calasin, Molly, and Pickering 

“double dipped” by deducting filing fees that Plaintiff had already paid from his account.

 

1

It appears from Plaintiff’s complaint that he is unaware of this Defendant’s entire last name. 

2 Plaintiff spells this Defendant’s name as both “Molly” and “Motly.” The Court will use “Molly” 

throughout this Order to refer to this Defendant. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he should specify

which spelling is accurate and use only that spelling throughout his filings.

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In retaliation for appeals Plaintiff filed against Defendant Tarnoff, Defendant 

Tarnoff refused to process Plaintiff’s appeals regarding the mismanagement of his trust 

funds. On July 31, 2012, Defendants Tallerico and Carter admitted that they were 

maliciously screening out, cancelling, and/or rejecting Plaintiff’s grievances regarding his 

trust account.

Defendant Adams knew of and participated in the mismanagement of Plaintiff’s 

trust account.

In approximately 2012 - 2013, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Valle regarding the 

above violations, and she refused to investigate the matter.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and declaratory relief for the violation of his 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ketchum v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. 

B. State Agencies as Defendants

Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections – Kern Valley State 

Prison as a Defendant in this action. “State agencies . . . are not ‘persons' within the 

meaning of § 1983, and are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.” 

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)). The California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation is a state agency. Because a necessary element of a successful Section 

1983 claim is that a “person” violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and California 

Department of Corrections – Kern Valley State Prison is not a “person”, Plaintiff cannot 

state a Section 1983 claim against this Defendant.

In addition, “[i]n the absence of a waiver by the state or a valid congressional 

override, ‘under the [E]leventh [A]mendment, agencies of the state are immune from 

private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.’” Dittman v. 

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)). “The State of California has not waived its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal 

court . . . .” Id. at 1025-26; see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim 

against the California Department of Corrections – Kern Valley State Prison. Because 

amendment would be futile, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against this 

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Defendant without leave to amend. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 

1987).

C. Due Process – Property Deprivation

The Due Process Clause protects against property deprivation without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To the extent Plaintiff 

might allege the deprivation was not authorized by state law, Hudson precludes a 

procedural due process claim based upon an “unauthorized intentional deprivation of 

property by a state employee if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is 

available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). “California law provides an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816–17 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810–895). 

Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for relief for violation of the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the deprivation of his property. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Biter, McMahon, Estrella, Calasin, Mike Fres, Molly, 

Pickering, and Sanchez erroneously withdrew and deposited funds into his trust account

without his permission, indicating that the taking was unauthorized and intentionally 

done. Plaintiff has a post-deprivation remedy for said taking under California law. To 

the extent that Plaintiff alleges the taking was authorized, he will be given an opportunity

to amend. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he should allege true facts showing how and 

why an authorized deduction from his trust account deprived him of property without 

notice and opportunity to contest the deprivation and disposition of the property.

D. Retaliation 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

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reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

While Plaintiff names all Defendants under this cause of action for retaliation, he 

only alleges facts specific to Defendants Tarnoff, Tallerico, and Carter. Under Section 

1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each Defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). In 

other words, there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the 

Defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978). If Plaintiff wishes to allege a 

retaliation claim against any of the other Defendants, he must allege specific and true 

facts linking each Defendant to the alleged retaliation.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tarnoff refused to process Plaintiff’s appeals 

regarding the mismanagement of his trust funds because Plaintiff had filed other 

grievances against Defendant Tarnoff. Defendants Tallerico and Carter continued 

Defendant Tarnoff’s practice of refusing to properly process Plaintiff’s grievances.

Plaintiff fails to allege what protected conduct motivated Defendants’ Tallerico and 

Carter to deny his appeals. Plaintiff’s speculation that Defendant Tarnoff’s conduct was 

motivated by his filing of grievances against him is insufficient. Plaintiff must allege facts

to support each Defendant had a retaliatory mindset. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 

1289 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that a prisoner established a triable issue of fact regarding 

prison officials’ retaliatory motives by raising issues of suspect timing in addition to other 

evidence, including statements). Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege that his protected 

conduct was a “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant’s conduct” and 

that “‘the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the 

correctional institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc. v. 

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Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th 

Cir. 1985). Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to allege these elements.

E. Access to Courts

Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts, and prison officials may 

not actively interfere with his right to litigate. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 

(9th Cir. 2011). The right is limited to bringing complaints to federal court in direct 

criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 354 (1996). It is not a right to discover such claims or to litigate them effectively 

once filed with a court. Id. at 354-55. A plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual 

injury,” i.e. prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. Id. at 348-49. An 

“actual injury” is one that hinders the plaintiff’s ability to pursue a legal claim. Id. at 351. 

Plaintiff alleges that because of Defendants Biter, Estrella, Calasin, Mike Fres, 

Molly, Pickering, and Sanchez’s actions, he did not have sufficient funds in his trust 

account to pay the retainer fee for a lawyer to represent him at trial in his criminal case. 

Plaintiff cannot state a claim for access to the courts on these facts. Plaintiff’s original 

criminal case is not a direct criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights action, and 

the right to access to the courts does not extend to the ability to effectively litigate a case 

once it is filed. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege what, if any, injury he suffered by not 

being able to retain an attorney for his trial. Because Plaintiff cannot state a claim for 

access to the courts on these facts, leave to amend is denied as futile.

F. 5 U.S.C. § 552a

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants CDCR, Biter, Estrella, Calasin, Mike Fres, Molly, 

Pickering, Sanchez, and Adams violated the Privacy Act by failing to properly maintain

and manage his trust account. “The private right of civil action created by the [Privacy] 

Act is specifically limited to actions against agencies of the United States Government. 

The civil remedy provisions of the statute do not apply against private individuals, state 

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agencies, private entities, or state and local officials.” Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir.1985) (citations omitted); See also St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. 

v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that the Privacy Act provides 

no private right of action against “state agencies or bodies”). Defendants are all state 

agencies or state and local officials. Plaintiff cannot state a Privacy Act claim against 

these Defendants. Leave to amend is denied as futile.

G. Declaratory Relief

In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s claims for damages necessarily entail a determination of 

whether his rights were violated, and therefore, his separate request for declaratory relief 

is subsumed by those claims. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th Cir. 

2005). Should Plaintiff seek some other declaratory judgment, he must clearly specify 

what relief he seeks and how such relief would settle “a substantial and important 

question currently dividing the parties.” L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 703 

(9th Cir. 1992).

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to 

amend, it is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his 

efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general 

rule, an “amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

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alleged. Here, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1.) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his signed Complaint filed June 29, 2015; 

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service 

of this Order; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, 

failure to comply with a court order, and failure to prosecute, subject to the 

“three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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