Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00242/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00242-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 11-CV-242-WQH (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE MANLY BASKERVILLE, Civil No. 11-CV-242-WQH (BGS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, et al.,

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Bruce Manly Baskerville (“Baskerville”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria

State Prison, proceeds pro se in this action for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On April

11, 2011, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition is (1) barred by the statute

of limitations, and (2) procedurally defaulted. (Doc. No. 11 at 1.) Baskerville filed an opposition on May

19, 2011. (Doc. No. 19.) 

This matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation

pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 72.1(d). For the reasons set forth below, this Court recommends that

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Respondents’ motion to dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On September 9, 1988, Baskerville pled guilty to five counts of residential burglary in exchange for

a maximum sentence in state prison of eleven years, five months, and up to $100,000 in fines. (Lodgment

11.)

On November 25, 1997, a jury convicted Baskerville of one count of robbery and one count of

attempted robbery. (Lodgment 2.) In a 1998 bifurcated hearing, the court denied Baskerville’s motion to

dismiss the five previous convictions stemming from his 1988 case and pursuant to California’s “Three

Strike Law,” sentenced Baskerville to fifty years to life. (Lodgment 4.) 

On direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Baskerville argued his conviction was tainted

by an overly suggestive identification and that his waiver of jury trial on the prior convictions was not

voluntary and intelligent. (Lodgment 1.) The California Court of Appeals denied Baskerville’s appeal on

November 23, 1998. (Lodgment 4.) Baskerville then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court, raising only the claim of whether his waiver of a jury trial was voluntary and intelligent. (Lodgment

5.) In a summary order issued on February 3, 1999, the Supreme Court of California denied further

discretionary review. (Lodgment 6.)

 In 2000, Baskerville completed a full found of state habeas corpus actions. On January 8, 2000,

Baskerville filed a petition for writ of habeas corpusin the California Superior Court, raising three grounds

for relief: (1) the counts against him were improperly consolidated for trial; (2) he received ineffective

assistance oftrial counsel; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Case No. 00-CV2119-K (BEN), Doc. No. 1 at ¶14.) That petition was denied February 7, 2000. (Lodgment 7.) On March

17, 2000, Baskerville raised the same claims in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the California

Court of Appeal, which it denied on April 26, 2000. (Id.) On May 30, 2000, Baskerville filed a petition

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for writ of habeas corpusin the California Supreme Court, raising the same claims asthe previous petitions.

That petition was denied September 27, 2000. (Id.)

Baskerville, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court

on October 19, 2000, raising the following claims: (1) the photographic lineups used by the police were

suggestive, (2) his right to a jury trial on the allegations of prior convictions was violated, (3) the counts

against him were improperly consolidated for trial, (4) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

and (5) he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . (Lodgment 8.) That petition was assigned

case no. 00-CV-2119-K (BEN). (Id.) On July 6, 2001, following a warning that the first claim remained

unexhausted, the court dismissed the petition as mixed. (Id.) The court granted a certificate of

appealability, but there is no indication that Baskerville pursued an appeal in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

In April, 2008, Baskerville commenced another round of state collateral attacks, filing a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court. (Lodgment 10.) In that petition, Baskerville claims the

sentencing court improperly treated his convictions in the 1988 case as five prior convictions for purposes

of California’s “Three Strikes Law.” The Superior Court denied the petition in an order dated May 5, 2008,

holding that Baskerville failed to demonstrate that his 1988 plea bargain included a promise that his five

burglary convictions would be treated as a single prior conviction in future proceedings. (Lodgment 10.)

The court also determined this was an issue that Baskerville could have addressed in his direct appeal or

previous petition for writ of habeas corpus and was therefore untimely and successive. (Id.) 

On October 2, 2008, Baskerville asserted the same claim in California’s intermediate court.

(Lodgment 12.) The court denied the petition on November 10, 2008, finding that the petition was not only

procedurally defaulted as both untimely and successive, but also lacked merit. (Id.) 

On November 16, 2009, Baskerville filed a petition in the California Supreme Court, raising the

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same arguments. (Lodgment 13.) In an order dated May 20, 2010, the California Supreme Court summarily

denied the petition, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993) and In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (1998).

(Lodgment 14.) 

Baskerville filed the instant federal habeas petition on January 28, 2011. (Doc. No. 1); see Houston

v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). In Ground One of his petition, Baskerville claims that the state court

presiding over his 1998 sentencing hearing violated hisright to due process when it construed his 1988 plea

bargain as five separate prior convictions, attributed two strikes to each of Baskerville’s 1997 counts, and

sentenced him to two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life, in accordance with California's Three

Strikes Law. More specifically, Baskerville asserts the state court’s sentence violated the terms of his 1988

plea bargain, which he interprets as an agreement that he would face a maximum five-year enhancement

penalty on any future conviction. Baskerville's current claim in this court is the same as that which the

California Supreme Court summarily denied in its order of May 20, 2010. (Lodgment 14.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

Respondents argue that Baskerville is precluded from obtaining federal habeas relief because the

California Supreme Court found his claims to be procedurally defaulted as untimely and successive. (Doc.

No. 11-1 at 5.) Respondents also argue that the current Petition is untimely under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) applicable statute of limitations. (Id. at 5-9.) In opposition,

Baskerville does not contest that his claim was denied pursuant to an independent and adequate state

procedural rule, but instead argues that he should be excused from procedural default because he can

demonstrate cause and prejudice. (Doc. No. 19 at 3-5.) Although not explicitly stated, in liberally

construing Baskerville opposition, he seemsto also argue for equitable tolling concerning AEDPA’sstatute

of limitations. 

//

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A. Procedural Default

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper pleading when “a state prisoner is challenging

the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is

entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment.” Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.

475, 500 (1973). “A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust the remedies available

in the courts of the state, thereby affording those courts the first opportunity to address and correct alleged

violations of the prisoner’s federal rights.” Walker v. Martin, – U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011). Under

the doctrine of procedural default, a petitioner who has defaulted on his claims in state court is barred from

raising them in federal court so long as the default is “pursuant to an independent and adequate state

procedural rule.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The state rule is only “adequate” if it

is “well-established and consistently applied.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir.2003). The

state rule must also be “independent” in that it is not “interwoven with the federal law.” Park v. California,

202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)). If the

federal court finds an independent and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas review is barred

unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate

that the failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson,

9 F.3d 802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

The California Supreme Court, citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993), and In re Robbins, 18

Cal.4th 770 (1998), denied Baskerville’s most recent petition in the state courts as untimely. See Walker,

131 S.Ct. at 1126 (“A summary denial citing Clark and Robbins means that the petition is rejected as

untimely.”). In Walker, the United States Supreme Court held that California’s time limitation requiring

the filing of petitions seeking habeas relief without “substantial delay,” as set forth by In re Clark and In

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1

The Supreme Court specifically held that California’s timeliness requirement is not rendered “inadequate” by the

mere fact that the California Supreme Court maintains the discretion to excuse a procedural default and consider a claim on

the merits. See Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1131 ( "We find no inadequacy in California's timeliness rule generally or as applied....").

2

Baskerville does cite to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Walker, 357 Fed. Appx. 793 (9th Cir. 2009), which

held that California’s timeliness bar was undefined and not consistently applied. This decision was reversed by the Supreme

Court in Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1131. 

6 11-CV-242-WQH (BGS)

re Robbins, is a basis independent of the federal questions and adequate to support a state court judgment.1

Id. at 1131. Baskerville has not alleged any facts to cast doubt on the adequacy or application of

California’s time limitation rule in 2009 when the California Supreme Court denied his petition.2 See

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003); Lee v. Almager, 2011 WL 2882148 at *7 (C.D.Cal.

June 7, 2011) (even assuming arguendo that the Bennett burden shifting scheme applies after the decision

in Walker, petitioner had not met his interim burden of demonstrating the inadequacy of the California

timeliness bar). Baskerville also fails to assert that the California Supreme Court exercised its discretion

in a “surprising or unfair” manner or in a way that “discriminates against claims of federal rights” when it

denied his state petition as untimely. See Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1130-31 (noting a state ground may be found

inadequate when a state court exercises its discretion in these ways). Accordingly, unless Baskerville

demonstrates “cause and actual prejudice,”or that failure to consider his claim would constitute a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice,” this Court may not entertain Baskerville’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus.

1. Cause for Default and Resulting Prejudice 

 A federal habeas court may review a state prisoner’s otherwise barred claim if the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the delay in asserting his claims and actual prejudice as a result of an alleged violation

of federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Establishing cause for procedural default in the state courts requires the petitioner to demonstrate

that his failure to raise the claim sooner was caused by an external factor. Id. An external factor is one

which the court cannot fairly attribute to the petitioner. Id. Examples of external factors include

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“interference by officials that makes compliance with the State’s procedural rule impracticable [and] ... the

factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available....” Id.; McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,

493-94 (1991). 

Additionally, attorney error so grave that it amounts to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel may constitute cause for the default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754. The right to effective assistance

of counsel extends to a defendant’s first appeal. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755 (citing Douglas v. People of

State of Cal., 372 U.S. 353 (1963)). Prevailing on a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

requires the petitioner demonstrate: 1) his counsel’s performance was deficient (as measured by an objective

standard of reasonableness); and 2) resulting prejudice (meaning there exists a reasonable probability that

but-for the attorney’s error, the outcome would have been different). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). 

Baskerville asserts in his opposition that his procedural default in state court resulted from his

appellate counsel’s failure to raise the alleged discrepancy between his 1998 sentence and the terms of his

1988 plea bargain in his direct appeal following conviction. (Doc. No. 19 at 2.) This Court finds that

Baskerville’s appellate counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in failing to raise the alleged discrepancy

between the 1988 plea bargain and 1998 sentence did not constitute the cause for Baskerville’s procedural

default in California’s state courts. As previously mentioned, the California Court of Appeals denied

Baskerville’s direct appeal in 1998; the California Supreme Court denied further discretionary review in

1999. By the end of 2000, Baskerville completed his first round of state habeas petitions, none of which

raised his current claimrelating to hissentence and the 1988 plea agreement. The petition currently pending

before this Court, raising the claim that his 1998 sentence violatesthe terms of his 1988 plea bargain,stems

from a second round of state petitions initially filed in the California Superior Court in April 2008.

Following the final adjudication of his direct appeal in 1999, Baskerville delayed nearly a decade before

asserting the current habeas claim in state court. The California courts found the claim untimely, as

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3 The Court will not consider whether Baskerville exhausted his current claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel in state court and the merits of any such claim. When a federal habeas court can adjudicate the question of cause

without deciding an independent and unexhausted constitutional claim on the merits, the court need not apply the exhaustion

doctrine. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 (1986). 

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Baskerville did not present the claim without substantial delay.

Any failure of Baskerville’s appellate counsel to present the current claim on direct appeal would

causally relate to a state procedural bar preventing Baskerville from raising the claim for the first time in

a collateral attack. However, Baskerville has not explained why appellate counsel’s failure to present the

claim on direct appeal caused him to fail to timely state it in hisfirst round ofstate habeas petitions nor why

he waited nearly a decade after his conviction became final to assert it in a second round of state habeas

petitions. Accordingly, this Court determines that ineffective assistance of counsel cannot possibly

constitute the “cause” for the California Supreme Court’s determination that Baskerville’s second round

state petition was untimely.

3 See Ranieri v. Terhune, 366 F.Supp.2d 934, 943-44 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding

that where state petitions were denied as untimely filed in California Supreme Court, “the fact that

[petitioner] has asserted ineffective assistance claims in his present petition is irrelevant to whether either

trial or appellate counsel caused him to untimely file these petitions” ). 

Baskerville also offersthat he encountered difficulties acquiring the plea documents and transcripts

from his 1988 case, which he believed necessary to advance the current Petition. (Doc. No. 19 at 10-12,

Baskerville Decl. ¶¶4-11.) Liberally construing the Petition, the Court interprets this as a potential argument

that Baskerville’s cause for default was the result of an “external factor.” However, this argument carries

no weight, as Baskerville’s declaration reveals that he did not attempt to obtain the plea documents and

transcripts relating to his 1988 case until at least 2005, more than five years after his 1998 sentencing. (Id.

at 10-11, Baskerville Decl. ¶¶4-5.) Accordingly, while Baskerville might have encountered some difficulty

obtaining certain documentsrelating to his 1988 plea bargain, thisCourtfindsthat it must attribute the delay

from 1998 to 2005 to Baskerville’s lack of diligence. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

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Because this Court determines that Baskerville does not offer a valid justification for his delay in

asserting the current claim in his state habeas petitions, this Court need not determine whether actual

prejudice resulted. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43. (“Since we conclude that these respondents

lacked cause for their default, we do not consider whether they also suffered actual prejudice.”)

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice Exception

Despite a petitioner’s failure to demonstrate cause for procedural default, the federal courts may,

nonetheless, issue a writ of habeas corpus when a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” might otherwise

result. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986). However, the Supreme Court advises that the federal

habeas courts should reserve the application of this exception for “extraordinary instances” where a

constitutional violation likely caused the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Coleman, 501 U.S. at

748; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. 

Baskerville’s petition is notably devoid of any argument that he is actually innocent of the

underlying crime. Instead, Baskerville limits his objections to the duration of his sentence. Accordingly,

this Court determines that this case does not present circumstances warranting application of the

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception and recommendsthat the petition be dismissed for procedural

default. 

B. Statute of Limitations

Because Baskerville’s conviction became final after 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies. AEDPA sets forth a one year statute of limitations for petitions for a writ

of habeas corpus. The limitations period begins to run from the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

 prevented from filing by such State action; 

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4

The mailbox rule holds that an incarcerated pro se prisoner’s pleading is deemed filed at the moment of delivery to

prison officials. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1106 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999).

5

To the extent that Baskerville’s asserted claim may be premised on Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.

2006), that decision does not qualify as the basis for a later start date under AEDPA, as Davis is a Ninth Circuit decision and

not one issued by the Supreme Court. See § 2244(d)(1)(C) (“The date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review.”) (emphasis added).

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the

 Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

 retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been

 discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).

The Supreme Court of California denied Baskerville’s petition for review on February 3, 1999.

(Lodgment 6.) Thereafter, Baskerville had ninety days to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, there is no indication that Baskerville did so. See Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a petitioner’s conviction becomes final upon the expiration of time during

which he may have sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court); see also S.Ct. R. 13

(providing that a petition for certiorari must be filed within ninety days following the state supreme court’s

denial of discretionary review). Therefore, for the purposes of the AEDPA, Baskerville’s conviction

became final on May 4, 1999, ninety days following the Supreme Court of California’s denial of his petition

for review. As Baskerville did not file this petition until January 28, 2011, the current petition is untimely

unless Baskerville qualifies for a latter commencement of the limitations period or is entitled to sufficient

tolling.4

1. Later Start Date 

Baskerville does not advance an argument that State action somehow impeded the timely filing of

his petition for habeas corpus, nor that his claim relies on a constitutional right newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.5

 In his opposition,

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Baskerville claims that he only recently acquired the transcripts and plea documents necessary to advance

his claim, classifying these documents as “newly discovered evidence.” (Doc. No. 19 at 4.) The Court

construes this as an argument for a later start date under § 2244 (d)(1)(D). The availability of the factual

predicate for a habeas claim is determined by an objective analysis, focusing on “when the prisoner knows

(or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal

significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, in the instant case, where

Baskerville knew, or should have known, the facts of his 1998 sentence and the trial court’s reliance on the

terms of his1988 plea bargain, i.e. the factual predicate of his claim when his conviction became final, this

exception cannot possibly apply. 

Accordingly, this Court determines that Baskerville does not qualify for a later start date to

AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

2. Statutory Tolling 

Under AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations is tolled during periods which a petitioner’s

properly filed petition for habeas corpus is pending before a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.”). A state petition is deemed “properly filed” when “its delivery and acceptance are in

compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).

Baskerville qualifies for statutory tolling from January 8, 2000 to September 27, 2000, the time

during which his first habeas petitions were pending in state court. (Lodgment 7.) However, Baskerville

does not qualify for statutory tolling during the time his initial habeas petition was pending in federal court.

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) (holding that an application for federal habeas corpus

review does not toll the statute of limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). When Baskerville filed

his first state petition on January 8, 2000, 248 days passed since Baskerville’s conviction became final on

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May 4, 1999. Applying statutory tolling while Baskerville exhausted state court remedies, the statute was

tolled through September 27, 2000, the date the California Supreme Court denied his state habeas petition.

The statute of limitations began running the following day, on September 28, 2000. Baskerville then had

117 days (365 minus 248) from September 28, 2000 to file his federal petition. Thus, the most generous

expiration date for AEDPA’s statute of limitations was January 22, 2001. However, Baskerville did not

commence this action until January 28, 2011, almost ten years past the statute of limitations deadline. 

As Baskerville’s subsequent state habeas petitions were filed beginning in 2008 and over seven years

after the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, they do not serve to further statutorily toll

the statute of limitations. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that habeas petitions filed after the expiration of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations do not serve to revive a previously expired claim). Accordingly, while Baskerville qualifies for

some statutory tolling, he does not qualify for nearly enough to make his 2011 federal petition timely.

Therefore, unless Baskerville qualifies for equitable tolling, his petition is barred under the provisions of

AEDPA. 

3. Equitable Tolling 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is also subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.1997) (overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court,

163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir.1998)). A petitioner may qualify for equitable tolling when “extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a timely petition.” Spitsyn v. Moore,

345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). “The threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). The petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

demonstrate: (1) he has diligently pursued his rights; and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. “Extraordinary circumstances exist when wrongful conduct prevents a prisoner

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from filing.” Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also, e.g.,

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 223 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying equitable tolling when the prison

library was inadequate); Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying equitable tolling where

the prisoner was denied access to his files). 

Baskerville failsto show that he has been diligently pursuing his rights and thatsome extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way to filing the current Petition. Baskerville offers that he has diligently

attempted to acquire the documents necessary to advance his habeas claim, namely his 1988 plea agreement.

(Doc. 19 at 6.) Even without this document, if diligent, Baskerville could have prepared a basic form habeas

petition and filed it to satisfy the AEDPA deadline. Notably,Baskerville does not assert that he was unaware

of the terms of his 1998 sentence and its reliance on his 1988 plea agreement. Baskerville also argues that

he was granted a certificate of appealability in connection with the dismissal of hisfirst federal petition, and

the order did not specify a time limit or the issues on which it was granted. (Doc. No. 19 at 10, Baskerville

Decl. ¶2.) Baskerville states that he finally, at the end of 2005, wrote a letter to the clerk of court regarding

his certificate of appealability. (Id., ¶4.) However, Baskerville never pursued an appeal of the district

court’s dismissal, nor did he attempt to exhauststate remedies until 2008, when he initiated hissecond round

of state habeas petitions. Baskerville also states that in 2005 he also began attempting to get the plea

bargain documents and transcripts from the state courts. (Id. at 11, ¶5.) Waiting nearly five years to seek

clarification from the court, waiting over six years from when his conviction became final to attempt to

retrieve his documents, and waiting overseven yearsto attempt to exhauststate remedies after the dismissal

of his first federal petition does not show Baskerville was diligent in pursuing his rights. Accordingly,

Baskerville fails to satisfy the diligence prong of the equitable tolling test.

Baskerville has also not offered any exceptional circumstances standing in his way of filing the

instant Petition. Baskerville’s confusion over the certificate of appealability and results of his first federal

habeas petition do not qualify as an exceptional circumstance. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

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The Court further notes that upon dismissal of Baskerville’s first federal habeas action, Judge Keep explicitly

advised Baskerville that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations would prohibit his filing of an additional habeas petition in the

federal courts. (See Lodgment 8 (“All sides recognize that if the instant petition is dismissed, [Baskerville] would be barred

from bringing another federal habeas motion under the limitations of AEDPA.”).) 

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1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling). Baskerville could have asserted the current habeas claim at any

time and has not shown that any of the circumstances discussed actually prevented his timely filing of the

instant Petition. 

Although not raised by Baskerville, he is not entitled to equitable tolling based on his first federal

petition, which was timely filed. When a district court dismisses a timely-filed mixed petition without first

giving the petitioner the options provided in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), a petitioner may be

entitled to equitable tolling from the date the first habeas petition was dismissed until the date he files his

second habeas petition, ifthe petitionerreturnsto federal court within a reasonable period oftime. Jefferson

v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2005). Before dismissing Baskerville’s first federal petition

without prejudice for containing an unexhausted claim, the district court offered Baskerville the options

provided in Rose v. Lundy; the court further advised Baskerville that his election to dismiss the petition

might render his claims time-barred. 6 (Case No. 00- CV-2119-K (BEN), Doc. No. 4; Doc. No. 9; Doc. No.

12; & Doc. No. 16.) Baskerville also did not return to federal court within a reasonable period of time

following the dismissal, as his current Petition was filed over nine years after the district court’s dismissal

of his first petition. Therefore, the Court finds his timely-filed first federal petition is not an exceptional

circumstance warranting equitable tolling. 

In sum, the Court concludes that Baskerville failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to

any equitable tolling. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that habeas

petitioners have the burden of proof to show equitable tolling). Because Baskerville’s claim is not eligible

for sufficient statutory tolling or any equitable tolling, this Court finds that his claim is barred by AEDPA’s

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one-year statute of limitations and should be dismissed.

C. Leave to Amend

Upon dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district court must grant leave to amend

unless it appears “that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted.” Jarvis v. Nelson,

440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). Because a procedural default in the state court precludes this Court’s

review, this Court determines that further pleadings in this court would not benefit the petitioner.

Furthermore, as the current Petition is time barred under AEDPA, this Court determines that dismissal with

prejudice is appropriate as subsequent petitions would be untimely. Accordingly, this Court recommends

the District Court dismiss the petition without leave to amend. 

D. Certificate of Appealability

AEDPA provides that a “certificate of appealability” shall issue “only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

Underthisstandard, the petitionermust demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition

should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000).

Because the current Petition is both procedurally defaulted and time-barred under AEDPA, it does not

appear that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different

manner. Therefore, this Court recommends the District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Accordingly,

it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition be GRANTED;

/ / /

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2. The petition be DISMISSED without leave to amend; and

3. The court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 19, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than January 6, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 21, 2011 

BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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