Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01992/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01992-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dwight Guyot, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

C.J. DeRosa, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 04-1992-PHX-JWS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

BACKGROUND

Pending before the court is Petitioner Dwight Guyot's pro se Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner was convicted of a drug

offense on August 24, 2000 in the Northern District of Florida. He was sentenced to 180

months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. In September 2002, while

Petitioner was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI") in El Reno,

Oklahoma, he was charged with a disciplinary violation for using the telephone to further

criminal activity. After a hearing before a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on

September 26, 2002, the DHO found that Petitioner committed the prohibited act. As a

sanction, the DHO imposed disciplinary segregation for 60 days and the loss telephone

privileges for 365 days. Additionally, Petitioner lost 41 days of good conduct time, thus

affecting the length of his sentence. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, after which the

Case 2:04-cv-01992-JWS Document 20 Filed 09/22/05 Page 1 of 7
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 Petitioner later filed a Motion to Amend Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition

(Doc. #15) in which he contends that his due process rights were further violated when he

was not notified or permitted to attend the rehearing after the DHO was directed to reconsider

the evidence. The motion to amend will be addressed in a separate order. 

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DHO was directed to reconsider the evidence in the case and amend the DHO report to

further support the conclusion. The DHO reconsidered the evidence on June 12, 2003, and

again found Petitioner committed the prohibited act. The DHO issued an amended hearing

report and imposed the same sanctions. Petitioner's subsequent administrative appeals were

unsuccessful. Petitioner was transferred to FCI-Phoenix in December 2003. He filed the

instant habeas petition on September 22, 2004. 

DISCUSSION

In the petition, Petitioner alleges that his disciplinary proceeding violated the Due

Process Clause. Specifically, he alleges that because prison officials had information that

he was incompetent at the time of the disciplinary hearing, he should not have been subjected

to such a hearing. Petitioner further alleges that prison officials interfered with his ability to

seek administrative review of the disciplinary decision. Petitioner also filed a Memorandum

of Law in Support of Petition (Doc. #3) in which he further explains these allegations.

Petitioner also alleges in the memorandum that the DHO was not impartial because she

participated in the investigation of the charge against him.1

 Petitioner is seeking the

reinstatement of the 41 days of good conduct time that were taken from him. 

Respondent filed an Answer to Petitioner's Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.

#9) on November 15, 2004. Respondent first contends that the petition should be dismissed

because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Regarding the merits,

Respondent argues that Petitioner received the procedural protections required by the Due

Process Clause and that Petitioner has not established that he was not competent to

participate in the disciplinary proceedings.

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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before pursuing habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner must exhaust

administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons. Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1

F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993). "Exhaustion is not required if pursuing those remedies would

be futile." Id. Respondents argue that the futility holding in Fraley is undermined by Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), and Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). However,

Booth and Porter address exhaustion of administrative remedies under a provision in the

Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The PLRA provision requires exhaustion of

administrative remedies for actions "brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law...." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Ours is not a "prison

conditions" case and the exhaustion provision of the PLRA does not apply. See Carmona

v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, any cases interpreting

that provision are inapposite.

Here, Respondent's documents show that on July 23, 2003, Petitioner filed an

administrative appeal of the DHO's amended report. Doc. #9, Exh. 5 at 1-2. On September

23, 2003, a Regional Director denied Petitioner's appeal. Doc. #9, Exh. 5 at 3. Petitioner

states that he did not receive the denial of his appeal and he later learned that the staff had

given the response to an inmate in the general population. Doc. #3 at 4. After he was

transferred to FCI-Phoenix in December 2003, Petitioner sought assistance from prison staff

to find out what happened with his appeal. Id. Petitioner states he received no assistance,

only interference. Id. Petitioner presents documents showing he filed a Central Office

Appeal on August 2, 2004. Doc. #3, Exh. 2. The appeal was denied as untimely because it

was not filed within 30 days of the Regional Director's response. Id. Respondent presents

no information to refute Petitioner's contention that he did not receive the Regional Director's

response.

The court finds that Petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement. Petitioner

filed an appeal of the amended hearing report but did not receive a response. He was then

sent to a different federal prison in a different state. He requested assistance but was unable

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to learn about the status of his appeal. He then filed an appeal at the next level, the Central

Office, which was denied as untimely. Petitioner attempted to comply with the rules for

administrative exhaustion but due to factors outside his control, he was unable to fully

comply with those rules. Because he complied to the extent he could under the

circumstances, the court finds that he exhausted the administrative remedies that were

available to him and his claim will be addressed on the merits. 

B. Merits of the Claim

It is well-established that “[a] due process claim is cognizable only if there is a

recognized liberty or property interest at stake.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). Constitutionally

protected liberty interests for prisoners require an "atypical, significant deprivation" or a

deprivation that "will inevitably affect the duration of [their] sentence." Sandin v. Connor,

515 U.S. 472, 486-87 (1995). Although the Constitution itself does not create a liberty

interest in credit for good behavior, a statutory system authorizing good time credits creates

such an interest in the shortened prison sentence that results from those credits. Sandin, 515

U.S. at 477-78 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)). The minimum

requirements of procedural due process must therefore be observed to protect this interest.

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. 

Procedural due process safeguards in prison disciplinary proceedings require that the

prisoner receive: (1) written notice of the charges, no less than twenty-four hours prior to the

hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons

for the disciplinary action and (3) a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence when it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals

to allow the defendant to do so. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974). While

not an express holding, the Wolff Court also implied that a fair hearing requires an impartial

decisionmaker. Id. at 570-71. Moreover, the minimum requirements of procedural due

process do not permit the revocation of good time credits unless the disciplinary officer's

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 Petitioner states that the DHO was also his case manager and thus had access to all

the information in his central file. The DHO states in her affidavit that she has served as a

case manager at FCI - El Reno since 1989 but that she also completed the training and

certification required to serve as a DHO. She explains that she periodically serves as an

Alternate DHO as needed.

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findings are supported by "some evidence" in the record. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 454 (1985).

Here, Petitioner contends that prison officials violated his due process rights by

bringing disciplinary charges against him when he was incompetent. Petitioner argues that

the DHO had access to his "Inmate Central File" which contains information showing he has

a mental disability.2

 Doc. #3 at 6-7. Petitioner attached to his supporting memorandum a

document titled "Program Review Report." Doc. #3, Exh. 1. A statement at the end of the

document, which is dated July 28, 2004, provides that "[h]e is diagnosed as mentally

retarded." Id. Petitioner contends that based on his condition the DHO was required to refer

him to a mental health professional to determine if he was responsible for the charged

conduct. Doc. #3 at 7.

Respondent asserts that the only evidence of mental retardation is Petitioner's own

self-reporting to a probation officer during the preparation of his pre-sentence report.

Respondent contends that the pre-sentence report also reflects Petitioner earned his General

Equivalency Degree. Respondent, however, does not provide the court with a copy of the

report and thus the court is unable to verify the information asserted. 

Respondent further argues, however, that Petitioner never claimed he was mentally

retarded or incompetent at the time of the hearing. Doc. #9 at 6. Respondent presents a

declaration signed by the DHO stating that she was unaware Petitioner suffered from any

type of mental illness or mental retardation. Doc. #14 at ¶ 4. The DHO explained that she

had numerous contacts with Petitioner in her capacity as a case manager and that she never

witnessed any behavior that would suggest a mental illness. Id. Respondent argues that

prison staff are required to refer an inmate to mental health for a competency determination

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only if there is reason to believe the inmate is mentally ill during the disciplinary process.

Doc. #9 at 6 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.10(b)(6)).

The court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated a due process violation based on

his alleged incompetency. Petitioner points to one document that states he was diagnosed

with mental retardation. Neither that document, nor any other evidence, indicates when that

diagnosis was made or by whom. Most importantly, Petitioner has presented no evidence

of any specific functional limitations. There is nothing in the record to show that Petitioner

had any difficulty understanding or participating in the disciplinary proceedings. The DHO,

who also dealt with Petitioner in her capacity as a case manager, knew of no such limitations

and thus had no reason to refer Petitioner for a competency determination. Petitioner's sparse

evidence regarding incompetency fails to establish a due process violation.

Petitioner's contention that the DHO was not impartial is also unsupported. Petitioner

contends that the DHO was not impartial because she "participated in the investigation of the

matter as a member of his Unit Team and during previous conversations with the Special

Investigations Supervisor J. Knight." Doc. #3 at 6. Petitioner offers no evidence to support

this allegation. The DHO states in her declaration that she did not participate in any aspect

of the investigation. Doc. #14 at ¶ 3. Absent any support for Petitioner's claim beyond his

own refuted statement, the court will recommend that it be rejected.

C. Conclusion

The court finds that Petitioner satisfied the requirements of administrative exhaustion

and a decision on the merits is appropriate. Upon consideration of the merits, the court finds

that Petitioner has failed to establish a due process violation. Petitioner did not establish that

he should have been evaluated for incompetency or that the hearing officer was impartial.

For these reasons, the court will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

denied and dismissed.

 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

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That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2005.

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