Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00940/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00940-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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- 1 - 05cv0940

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW T. THOMASSON, REBECCA J.

THOMASSON, MACDONALD P.

TAYLOR JR., and CHENOA R. TAYLOR,

on behalf of themselves and all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05cv0940-LAB (CAB)

ORDER: 

1. GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT;

2. DENYING AS MOOT

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

LIMITATION ON

COMMUNICATIONS WITH

PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS;

AND

3. DENYING AS MOOT

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO

CERTIFY CLASS 

[Dkt Nos. 144, 133, 84]

vs.

GC SERVICES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on defendant GC Services' Motion For Summary Judgment

("Motion") in this putative class action alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collections

Practices Act and state privacy laws. Plaintiffs filed Opposition, and GC Services filed a Reply.

Pursuant to Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the issues appropriate for decision on the papers and

without oral argument. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED. Two other

pending motions are rendered moot by this Order and are, on that basis, DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs originally were two California residents and two Delaware residents purporting to

sue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and under the privacy laws of numerous

states and commonwealths on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, described as "a

Case 3:05-cv-00940-JAH-KSC Document 192 Filed 07/16/07 Page 1 of 52
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1

 The putative class period is alleged to be "one year prior to May 4, 2005" with respect to the

FDCPA claims, and with respect to the state law claims, the applicable "statute of limitations relevant to

[California's] statute concerning the recording and/or monitoring and/or eavesdropping upon telephone

conversations." FAC ¶ 42. In California, the applicable statute of limitations of CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2

is one year. GC Services pleads statute of limitations as its Second Affirmative Defense. FAC Ans. 8:2-4.

Plaintiffs contend any statute of limitations argument is "misplaced" because they characterize the conduct

giving rise to this action as "surreptitious," so the limitations period would not begin to run until the "claimant

know or has reason to know she has been subject to an unlawful act." Opp. p. 2, no. 2, citing Nodine v. Shiley,

Inc., 240 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the Motion addresses only the situation of the two

remaining named plaintiffs, so the only relevant trigger at this point is their discovery. As discussed below,

each of them learned of the potential calls might be monitored during their first conversation with GC Services.

2

 See Dkt No. 162, Joint Statement Of Undisputed Facts, Fact No. 1 ("None of the named plaintiffs

are asserting claims under the laws of Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,

Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Washington, or Puerto Rico." The laws of those states and

California are alleged to have been violated by GC Services conduct giving rise to this litigation, leaving only

California law (i.e., CIPA § 632) and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") as the legal

theories for relief. See FAC ¶ 2. For purposes of deciding this Motion, the court accordingly need not address

the parties' dispute at the time the briefing of the Motion occurred whether Kearney v. Solomon Smith Barney,

Inc., 39 Cal.4th 95 (2006) proscribes CIPA claims by non-Californians. See Opp. 23:5-24:27.

3

 Leave to file a Second Amended Complaint was previously denied. Dkt No. 154.

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class consisting of all persons who engaged in at least one telephone conversation with a person

employed by Defendant GC SERVICES participating therein and who have had said conversations

with a GC SERVICES employee recorded and/or monitored and/or eavesdropped upon."1 First

Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 41 (emphasis added). Only the California residents, Andrew T.

Thomasson and Rebecca J. Thomasson, remain named plaintiffs, and only the state law claims arising

under California law remain.2

The FAC3 alleges GC Services operates call centers located throughout the United States, each

staffed with debt collector employees of GC Services who initiate and receive telephone contacts with

persons located in each of the United States and Puerto Rico. GC Services contracts with creditor

companies in various industry sectors such as automotive, retail, telecommunications, and financial

for collections on behalf of banks, credit card companies,telecommunications companies, utilities, and

federal, state, and municipal governments, courts, and student loan programs, among others,to provide

collection or other services. FAC. ¶ 14; FAC Exh. A. GC Services identifies itself as "a Texas-based

company providing third-party debt collection services and an array of other 'teleservices' operations

apart from debt collection." Mot. P&A 3:11-13; Wojcicki Depo. citations, Mot. P&A 3:13-15. "GC

Services conducts third-party debt collection operations out of nineteen (19) facilitieslocated in twelve

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4

 Kearney is primarily a choice of law case, a putative class action lawsuit arising from the defendant

brokerage firm's recording of phone calls between the plaintiffs in California and its representatives located

in Georgia without plaintiffs' knowledge or consent, where California and George had conflicting privacy

statutes (California requires disclosure to all parties to the conversation, whereas Georgia is a non-party

consent state). Kearny's purported conflict with the CPUC General Order is immaterial to the result here

because the court declines to reach GC Services' CPUC preemption argument in deciding this Motion. 

- 3 - 05cv0940

(12) different States." Id. at 4:2-4, citing Wojcicki Decl. ¶ 4. It provides "collection services for

thousands of leading commercial companies and hundreds of state and federal government agencies

. . . ." Id. at 3:18-20, citing Wojcicki Decl. ¶ 2. "In California, GC Services operations are limited to

(1) two consumer debt collection facilities, in San Diego and Irwindale, and (2) a collection center

operated out of Irwindale for the Los Angeles County Superior Court." Mot. P&A 4:4-7, citing

Wojcicki Decl. ¶ 4. The special services for the Superior Court are not at issue here.

GC Services "admits that in the ordinary course of its business, GC Services periodically

monitors its own telephone conversations with debtors, for quality control purposes. . . ." FAC Ans.

¶ 58. Plaintiffs characterize GC Services' call monitoring practice as "eavesdrop[ing] on millions of

exchanges a year," while "[m]ost callers do not realize that they may be taped even while they are in

[sic] hold." FAC ¶ 12. The FAC identifies the "principal issue" in this case as "whether Defendant

GC Services violated the FDCPA and the laws of [California]. . . regarding recording and/or

monitoring and/or eavesdropping upon telephone calls." FAC ¶ 44. Plaintiffs' contend:

[T]his suit seeks to alter the conduct of GC Services in California

vis-a-vis residents of this state and others. The State of California has

an interest in ensuring that employees working within this state comply

with its laws. . . . . The simple fact is that companies operating in

California -- including GC Services -- are required to follow California

law, no matter the residence of the individual with whom they are

speaking.

Opp. 24:8-14 (emphasis added), relying on Kearney v. Solomon Smith Barney, Inc., 39 Cal.4th 95,

104 (2006).4

The FAC alleges putative class representative Rebecca Thomasson received a written debt

collection notice from GC Services in January 2005 representing she owed $25.00 to an entity doing

business as "Telecheck." FAC ¶ 29. She placed a telephone call to GC Services to discuss the

indebtedness and spoke with an unidentified female employee. The employee did not advise her at

any time the call might be recorded or monitored. FAC ¶ 30. 

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5

 "Q: Did the -- at any time during the January call, did this representative tell you that your call

might be recorded? A. No. I believe her exact words were you are being monitored, yes, someone is

listening." Shroth Decl. Exh. A, 36:5-8.

6

 She apparently obtained that number from Mr. Thomasson, who received a separate debt collection

notice from GC Services regarding an alleged MCI debt providing a different GC Services number.

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 Ms. Thomasson testified at her October 2006 deposition she had left voice messages in

January 2005 at the number provided in the collection notice. She also testified that thereafter she

called a different phone number for GC Services when she received no return phone call responsive

to her voice mail and spoke with a a woman representative to find out why she had received the

written notice. Schroth Decl. Exh. A, 29:1-30:7. The representative asked her for contact information

and a bank account number "if I wanted to take care of it right then." Id. 30:14-21. Ms. Thomasson

declined to give a bank account number. She testified she could hear "some background noise going

on" such as people talking, so she asked whether anyone was listening or if the call was being

recorded. "So she said yeah, that they do record, they do monitor," and that "someone [was] listening

in," then Ms. Thomasson ended the call.5 Id. 31:3-20, 32:12-13 (emphasis added).

Ms Thomasson testified she called GC Services again in February 2005, in response to

another written notice about the same Telecheck account, again using the number enabling her to

"bypass[] the whole voice mail deal" associated with the number provided in GC Services' written

notice to her.6 Shroth Decl. Exh. A, 32:17-33:9. Ms. Thomasson talked to a GC Services

representative, who asked for the same information as before. She gave the representative "my name,

address, phone number to verify who I [sic] was calling," but no bank account number. Id. 33:16-2.

Q. Did the representative tell you whether or not your call might be

monitored or recorded?

A. No. . . .[¶] Well, not until I said something.

Q. But your prior experience in January, you knew that your call

might be monitored or recorded because that is something GC

Services did?

A. Right.

Shroth Decl. Exh. A, 34:8-16.

Ms. Thomasson testified she ultimately paid the account. She did not call GC Services again

for several months, until July 2005, to follow up on her Telecheck account and her husband's MCI

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account, the subject of a different GC Services collection effort. Shroth Decl. Exh. A, 37:9-38:34.

The person who answered asked for her identifying information (name, phone number, address), and

she also gave them both the Telecheck and MCI account numbers. Id. 38:7-6. She was told her

account was cleared, and she thinks they gave her the amount of her husband's alleged MCI debt. She

did not receive any advisement that her call might be monitored, but based on her previous

conversations with GC Services, she knew of that possibility. Id. 38:23-39:11. She testified she does

not know whether GC Services actually monitors every telephone conversation. Id. 41:11-13. The July

2005 call was her last communication with GC Services. Id. 40:12-25. 

From her testimony, the evidence of Ms. Thomasson's conversations with a GC Services

representative consists of about three telephone calls, all of which she herself initiated in response

to two written notices, and the leaving of voice mail when she first called the number provided in her

written notice. She learned during the course of the first conversation of the company's policy to

monitor some of its telephonic communications with consumers. 

The FAC alleges GC Services engaged in actionable conduct with putative class representative

Andrew Thomasson in April 2005. The FAC alleges he received a written notice from GC Services

about a debt in the amount of $28.61 he purportedly owed to MCI Company. In response, he placed

a call to the toll-free number provided in the letter and spoke with a GC Services debt collector

employee named "Ashley." FAC ¶¶ 21-25. He testified at his deposition he called to let GC Services

"know that I had disputed it in writing" (apparently to MCI) and he "wanted to make sure that they

noted their file" so it would not go on his credit report. Shroth Decl. Exh. A, A. Thomasson Depo.

29:6-24. He testified Ashley "said something like she wouldn't talk to me about the debt until I

provided certain information to her to identify who I was or something like that," such as "contact

information," "address," "account number" and maybe telephone number. Id. 30:3-18. He gave her

that information. Id. 30:22-23. He told her he had been an MCI customer, but he did not think he

owed the money and asked her to send him some verification, such as an MCI record. He thinks she

said she would do so. Id. 31:2-33:1. Toward the middle or end of the call, Mr. Thomasson testified

he heard "something that made me think that someone was listening," like a "scratching or a clicking

or like a conversation, background." Id. 32:3-17. He asked Ashley if someone was listening in on the

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conversation. She said she did not know, but someone might be. Id. foll. p. 32, ll. 8-13. He said

goodbye and ended the call. Id. foll. p. 32, ll. 18-22; see FAC ¶¶ 26-28. He also testified he thought

Ashley said in the course of that conversation "they record or monitor all of them or . . . something to

that effect, that, you know, they have a policy of doing that." Id. 34:2-5. He testified he does not know

where Ashley was geographically located. Id. 34:16-21. He never received the verification from GC

Services about the alleged MCI debt (Id. 34:22-24), but nor does he contend GC Services ever

contacted him thereafter.

Mr. Thomasson testified he called GC Services a second time "a month or two later," but

does not recall with whom he spoke. Shroth Decl. Exh. A, A. Thomasson Depo. 34:6-15, 35:8-12.

He wanted to make sure nothing was being reported on his credit report, wanted to know what they

had done with the debt, and whether they were going to send him verification because he "had heard

nothing." Id. 35:16-19. He was told GC Services had "closed the account, or something like that."

Id. 35:14-23. "[T]hey didn't advise me they were going to monitor or record that conversation." Id.

Mr. Thomasson's deposition excerpts include a discussion of some prior testimony he provided.

Q. In Paragraph 9 you indicate that you were asked for certain

information from the GC Services employee, and you conclude

with the sentence, "I would not have consented to, or

participated in, this telephone call had I known that it was being

monitored or recorded by another individual" . . . . [Q.] My

question is simply, why not?

A. I just find it personally offensive that when you believe you're

talking to someone and you're sharing information that you

wouldn't ordinarily just call someone up out of the blue and

give, that if you have someone on the other line that's listening

to you, not telling you they're there, that to me is offensive. I

think that all parties to a conversation should announce

themselves.

Q. Any other reason?

A. I consider this information private.

Q. And so this is information that you were willing to give to the

GC Services employee with whom you were talking, correct,

Ashley?

A. No, that's not correct.

Q. Okay. Did you give this information to Ashley.

A. Yes.

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 There is no allegation in the FAC of actual identify theft or misuse of financial or other personal

consumer information obtained during the calls.

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Q. And is it your testimony that you would not have given the

information to Ashley if you had known that someone else from

GC Services was listening to the call?

A. Yes.

Shroth Decl. Exh. A, A. Thomasson Depo. 54:11-55:13.

Mr. Thomasson elaborated his concerns, in addition to personal offensiveness, to be the

increased potential for misuse or identity theft when information is given to more than one person.7

Shroth Decl. Exh. A, A. Thomasson Depo. 55:20-56:12. 

Q. Was it your understanding that Ashley would keep the

information that you were giving to herself?

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't know whether she was going to use the information

in order to help GC Services contact you in the future?

A. I mean, I -- I'm really not sure. I think my -- I can just say I'm

not sure what.

Q. Among the information that she asked you for and you provided

was contact information, correct?

A. That is among the information.

Q. What do you understand GC Services was going to do with that

contact information for you?

A. I don't know. 

. . . .

Q. Let me direct your attention to Paragraph 14, which is on the

following page of your declaration. In the . . . third sentence of

Paragraph 14 you make this statement, and I quote:

Specifically, I am very protective of my personal and private

information, and I am very unhappy that GC Services freely

shared that personal information with others without my

consent. [¶] Do you see that [quote]?

A. Yes.

Q. Who are the others with whom GC Services shared your

personal information without your consent?

A. Well, the other person that monitored that conversation, anyone

that listened to the recording. Others.

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 In the current posture of the case, the viability of the Second and Third causes of action are decided

under California law alone.

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Q. Do you know whether these others were or were not employees

of GC Services?

A. I have no idea who they shared the information with.

Shroth Decl. Exh. A, A. Thomasson Depo. 56:13-58:17. 

 GC Services denies it ever monitored or recorded a telephone conversation with Mr.

Thomasson and asserts "there is no evidence to the contrary." Mot. 7:6-8, citing Exhibit 7 at 15. GC

Services summarizes Mr. Thomasson's testimony: "The record shows that Andrew Thomasson had

telephone conversations with GC Services, but he admits that defendant advised him about its call

monitoring practices in the very first telephone call he had with the company." Mot. 7:2-6, citing

FAC ¶ 27; A. Thomasson Depo. dated July 18, 2006, at 33:11-13. 

Based on the Thomassons' telephone conversations with GC Services employees, the FAC

alleges as its First Cause of Action violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e: (1) using false,

deceptive, and misleading means in an attempt to collect alleged consumer debts, including among

other things not revealing "to consumers that telephone conversations with collectors might be

recorded and/or monitored and/or eavesdropped upon," so that "persons engaged in these

telephone conversations, . . . may have revealed personal financial information to debt collectors

employed by Defendant GC Services more freely, all to the economic benefit of Defendant GC

Services;" and (2) falsely representing the character and legal status of alleged consumer debts," in

particular violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). FAC ¶ 49 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs seek statutory

damages for the class and "for the plaintiff" pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

The Second Cause of Action alleges GC Services illegally records conversations between the

consumer putative class and GC Services' debt collection personnel, "in violation of applicable

state/commonwealth laws prohibiting the recording of telephone calls without two-party consent."8

FAC ¶ 52. The "surreptitiously recorded telephone calls were 'confidential communications,' within

the meaning of" the California statute criminalizing invasions of privacy, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630,

et seq.("CIPA"), and plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy and "an objectively reasonable

expectation that his or her call was not being recorded." FAC ¶ 54.

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9

 The court rejects this argument as a procedurally impermissible attempt to convert plaintiffs'

Opposition into their own summary judgment motion without proper notice and without observing the

formalities of motion practice in this court.

10

 To the extent this argument purports to support summary adjudication in plaintiffs' favor, and to

the extent it misconstrues opposition standards applicable to the court's ruling on the Motion, the court ignores

the showings as inappropriate and immaterial to this result.

11

 The court declines to revisit the extensive discovery disputes and rulings by the Magistrate Judge

associated with the discovery process in this case. It does not appear from the docket that plaintiffs have been

diligent in pursuing discovery. For example, defendant's counsel represented at the time this Motion was filed:

"Throughout the course of discovery in this case, plaintiffs[] have produced five pages of documents -- none

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The Third Cause of Action alleges GC Services illegally monitors or eavesdrops on its

telephone conversations with consumers without the consent of the participating putative class

member, in violation of California's statute. FAC ¶¶ 52-53. CIPA § 632(a) applies when a person

actually "eavesdrops upon or records" a confidential communication. Plaintiffs seek statutory damages

and injunctive relief under state law for alleged "illegal recording of conversations" (FAC 11:5-6) and

for alleged "illegal monitoring/eavesdropping of conversations" (FAC 12:14-15).

GC Services now moves for summary judgment, arguing: (1) plaintiffs have no evidence it

violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA; (2) plaintiffs have no evidence that GC Services recorded any

conversations with debtors in violation of CIPA; and (3) "[t]he fact that GC Services periodically

monitors its own business telephone conversations with consumer debtors for purposes of training and

quality assurance, in the normal course of business, is not a violation of California Penal Code section

632(a). . . ." Not. of Mot. 2:1-10. GC Services also argues preemption theories, contending inter alia

the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") provides the exclusive state law basis for pursuit

of plaintiffs' claims as CPUC has jurisdiction over the regulation of "business call monitoring." 

Plaintiffs oppose the Motion on grounds: "(1) genuine disputes of material facts exist,

precluding entry of summary judgment; (2) to the extent facts are not disputed, those facts would

require entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims[9]; (3) GC Services['] affirmative defenses

are alternatively inapposite to the case at bar or fail as a matter of law;[

10] and (4) Plaintiffs have been

stonewalled in discovery, a contention borne out by the record before the Court," accompanied by a

request for "leave to reopen discovery," with "the Defendant's motion denied or a continuance ordered.

. . ."11 Plaintiffs also urge the court to "set aside" GC Services's CPUC preemption argument on the

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of which relate to plaintiff Rebecca Thomasson." L'Estrange Decl. ¶ 12.

12

 Plaintiffs misstate the applicable standards. First, they contend "the trial court is required to

determine whether the evidence adduced through discovery presents sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury, or is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Op. 8:5-7 (emphasis

added). The court rejects plaintiffs' pretensions to summary judgment in its favor without bringing its own

motion. Second, defendant as the moving party is not required to "prove" anything it does not have the burden

of proof on at trial, contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion and their insinuation "pleadings" are evidence. Opp. 8:8-

10. Third, the "weight" of the evidence has no bearing on a Rule 56 determination. The court makes no

findings of fact nor assessment of "credibility." See Opp. 8:24-26.

13

 "POLICIES AND PRACTICES COMPLAINED OF. It is the policy and practice of Defendant

GC SERVICES to initiate telephone communications with persons, such as the Plaintiffs named herein,

and to accept telephone communications from persons, such as the Plaintiffs named herein, and to

record and/or monitor and/or eavesdrop upon said telephone calls, without advising these persons that

said telephone calls are being recorded and/or monitored and/or eavesdropped upon, all in violation of

the relevant state/commonwealth laws prohibiting same [now narrowed to California law only], and which

conduct otherwise constitutes false, deceptive and misleading debt collection means in violation oftheFDCPA.

Said false, deceptive, and misleading conduct occurs from the fact that persons engage in these telephone

conversations, wherein said persons may have revealed personal financial information, without knowing that

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CIPA claims on grounds it is an affirmative defense that should have been "asserted at an earlier date,"

or are "flawed" and "inapplicable" theories. Opp. P&A 18:4-11. On the latter issue, contrary to

Plaintiff's insinuation, GC Services expressly pled preemption as its Ninth Affirmative Defense (FAC

Ans. 8:6-12), so the court need not address any argument of belated assertion of that defense. 

The court confines this decision to application of the FED. R. CIV. P. ("Rule") 56 standards to

the record presented.12 The burdens on moving and non-moving parties differ in the summary

judgment context, and Plaintiffs have not proceeded with a cross-motion, but rather elected to simply

oppose GC Services' motion. Contrary to Plaintiffs' arguments, the court cannot conclude the

"evidence conclusively shows" anything requiring a finding that non-moving "Plaintiffs must prevail

as a matter of law." Opp. 9:19-22. The court makes no findings of fact in deciding the motion. In

addition, the court rejects any discovery-related or other requests for affirmative relief Plaintiffs

attempt to piggy-back on their Opposition as inappropriate, untimely, and obfuscating.

Cutting through the extensive and frequently extraneous argument, the court accepts Plaintiffs'

foundational statement distilling the alleged wrongdoing common to both the FDCPA and The CPIA

claims: "GC Services fails to provide such an advisement [i.e., "that calls to or from GC Services

may be monitored or recorded"] 'at the outset' of telephone calls it conducts with debtors (assuming

arguendo it does so at all), which constitutes the basis for liability in this case."

13 Opp. 1:25-27

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the telephone conversations may be recorded and/or monitored and/or eavesdropped upon." FAC ¶ 40

(emphasis added). The evidentiary record discussed below proves the contrary.

14

 "Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential

communication . . . eavesdrops upon or records such confidential communication," by its own terms, violates

CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.

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(emphasis added); see also Opp. 7:5-8 ( "GC Services' telephone calls with (to or from) consumers

are either monitored, or recorded, or both, and GC Services fails to inform these alleged debtors of the

surreptitious conduct." Plaintiffs represent: "[A]ll that would have been required for GC Services

to comply with the laws at issue in this case would be to provide an advisement at the outset of

conversations with consumers that calls to or from GC Services may be monitored or recorded."

Opp. 1:23-25 (emphasis added). Despite the indiscriminate and undisciplined scope of argument and

the parties' extravagant indulgence in sealing documents in this case, including facially innocuous

materials, Plaintiffs' burden to avoid summary judgment was simply to raise a discrete triable issue

of material fact through admissible evidence to defeat GC Services' evidentiary showing it does not

record debt collection calls, its policies regarding monitoring of debt collection calls is for its

employees, once they ascertain they are speaking to the alleged debtor, to give an advisement the calls

may be monitored, or GC Services' conduct with respect to the named Plaintiffs involved an

illegitimate collection practice.

B. Procedural Background

By Order entered May 30, 2006, this court denied GC Service's Rule 12(c) Motion For Partial

Judgment On The Pleadings seeking to eliminate the FAC claims of improper recording and

eavesdropping on calls under state law on grounds of: federal preemption by the Omnibus Crime

Control And Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq. ("Title III"); impossibility of "eavesdropping"

on one's own conversations; failure to allege "third party" eavesdropping; and failure of the named

plaintiffs to allege their own conversations were actually monitored or recorded, depriving them of

standing to seek vindication of the rights of those whose calls were actually monitored or recorded.

Dkt No. 52. Plaintiffs at that time confirmed their FAC does not seek recovery for "eavesdropping"

under CIPA section 631 (criminalizing wiretapping), but rather proceeds only under CIPA section

632.14 Dkt No. 15 3: 23-25, 6:11-12, 8:16. The court found it was unable to conclude as a matter of

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15

 Plaintiffs' contention this Rule 56 motion should be denied because of the court's purported

"agreement" with their positions at the time it denied GC Services' Rule 12(c) Motion For Partial Judgment

On The Pleadings (Dkt No. 52) with respect to statement of a FDCPA claim and a CIPA claim ignores the

wholly different standards applicable to those very different proceedings, and grievously misrepresents the

record. See Opp. 7:2-6, 7:13-18 ("certain of GC Services' legal arguments on summary judgment have already

been briefed and roundly rejected in its motion for judgment on the pleadings," forcing them "to prove what

has already been demonstrated: GC Services is not entitled to summary judgment"). Such a representation

ignores the court's expressed intention in ruling on that motion to await a fully developed evidentiary record

before making any such determination. Similarly, Plaintiffs' insistence the court must find GC Services is not

entitled to summary judgment in consideration of the "weight" of the evidence, the "credibility" of the

evidence, and the "amassed" volume of evidence takes no account of the prohibition under Rule 56 that the

court consider any of those things in deciding a Rule 56 motion, and that a defendant has no obligation to prove

anything as the moving party regarding issues on which the plaintiff retains the burden of proof at trial. 

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law the Second cause of action (alleging illegal recording of conversations) and the Third cause of

action (alleging illegal monitoring/eavesdropping) are necessarily preempted by federal law, or that

Plaintiffs could prove no set of facts under any of the multiple state and commonwealth laws asserted

in the FAC entitling them to relief based on GC Services business call monitoring practices. Similarly,

from the face of the FAC alone the court could not conclude the Thomassons could prove no set of

facts entitling them to relief on the allegations their conversations with a GC Services employee were

recorded/ monitored/eavesdropped upon without their consent. The procedural posture and applicable

standards of review on summary judgment are different from judgment on the pleadings standards, and

an evidentiary record now exists that may be considered..15

 A Protective Ordered issued in this case in March 2003 and has been invoked by the parties

to seal an extraordinary and -- in this court's view -- exaggerated volume of materials, most containing

information of either marginal or no sensitivity warranting a designation of "confidential," "trade

secret," "attorneys' eyes only," or the like. The excessive nature of the parties' wholesale approach to

sequester the evidence extended even to the sealing of their points and authorities briefing in their

entireties. The court declines to seal this Order as unnecessarily restrictive and finds the sealing

authorization accorded the parties' Motion papers was improvidently permitted. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards Re Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is properly entered if the pleadings, depositions, answersto interrogatories

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P.

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("Rule") 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 323 (1986) (the moving party bears the

initial responsibility to inform the court of the basis of its motion and to identify those portions of

"'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,togetherwith the affidavits,

if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact"), quoting Rule

56(c). If the moving party shows there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s

claims, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to "set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). 

To successfully rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff "must

point to some facts in the record [beyond the pleadings] that demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact and, with all reasonable inference made in the plaintiff['s] favor, could convince a reasonable jury

to find for the plaintiff[]." Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000),

citing Rule 56, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, and Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The party opposing the motion "must present significant probative

evidence tending to support its claim. . . ." Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Idem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). A non-moving party may not rely on mere denials in

their own affidavits to create a genuine issue of material fact. Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137,

138 (9th Cir. 1993) ("When the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose summary

judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of

material fact"). "A party opposing summary judgment may not simply question the credibility of the

movant to foreclose summary judgment." Far Out Products v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir.

2001) (affirming summary judgment where appellant's affidavits submitted to defeat summary

judgment were conclusory).

"A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth." S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306

(9th Cir. 1982). "If reasonable minds could differ," judgment should not be entered in favor of the

moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-251. However, summary judgment must be entered "if,

under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Id. In deciding

the motion, the court does not make credibility determinations nor weigh conflicting evidence, as those

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16

 Plaintiffs again misstate the Rule 56 standards and ignore the respective burdens on a moving party

and on a non-moving party, and their Opposition suffers accordingly. See Opp. 8:14. A defendant as the

moving party need not "prove" there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The court does not sua sponte

decide on summary judgment whether "the evidence . . . is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter

of law." 

17

 The Motion To Certify Class was filed June 30, 2006. Dkt No. 84. Plaintiffs refer to and rely on

their "Second Amended Complaint" ("SAC") for their putative class description and for their statement of

allegations (see. e.g., Motion To Certify Class P&A 13:7-9), stating "[t]he remaining Plaintiffs' have, therefore,

moved this Court for leave to file the SAC referenced in this Motion." Mot. To Certify Class P&A 13:7-8.

However, Plaintiffs did not file their motion for leave to file a SAC until July 5, 2006. Dkt No. 90. Leave was

denied by Order entered November 2, 2006. Dkt No.154. 

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are determinations for the trier of fact and inappropriate for summary adjudication proceedings.16

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 

B. Standing And Representative Plaintiffs

The FAC is the operative pleading in this putative class action.17 It defines the putative class

as: "all persons who engaged in at least one telephone conversation with a person employed by

Defendant GC SERVICES participating therein and who have had said conversations with a GC

SERVICES employee recorded and/or monitored and/or eavesdropped upon." FAC ¶ 41 (emphasis

added). The only remaining putative class representatives are Andrew Thomasson and Rebecca

Thomasson. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to show one or more of their telephone calls to GC

Services was actually monitored or recorded, despite a prolonged and contentious discovery period,

including Orders compelling such discovery. 

A putative class action must have as representative plaintiffs persons who themselves have

Article III standing, that is, who can show the requisite case and controversy between themselves

personally and the defendant. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975) ("the plaintiff still must

allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other

possible litigants"). Otherwise, they have no standing to seek relief neither on their own behalf nor

on behalf of putative class members. Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022

(9th Cir. 2003) ("the named representatives must allege and show that they personally have been

injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they

belong and which they purport to represent"). 

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With respect to the essential element for standing that Plaintiffs' telephone calls to GC Services

were actually monitored or recorded, they offer only their suspicions. GC Services substantiates it

records no debt collection conversations and does not have the technical capability for such recording

at its California locations, and it "never monitored any of its telephone communications with the

Thomassons," with evidence identifying the telephone equipment at its California locations as well

as monitoring records it was ordered to produce in the course of this litigation. Mot. 24:21-22. In

particular, the magistrate judge had ordered GC Services to provide the name, address and phone

numbers of the approximate 200 individuals whose telephone calls had been monitored. Dkt No. 58.

"Neither Andrew nor Rebecca Thomasson was on the list." Mot. 24:20, citing Exh. 7 at 15. On that

basis, GC Services contends: "There is a complete evidentiary failure to support their individual

claims and, absent some real factual support, plaintiffs' 'beliefs' do not suffice to defeat summary

judgment." Mot. 24:22-25:2, citing, iter alia, FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168,

1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (a "conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting

evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact"). 

GC Services represents Ms. Thomasson could not have had a conversation with one of its

representatives about the Telecheck consumer debt by calling the number in her written notice. She

verifies defendant's representation through her testimony she had to call GC Services at a different

number to by pass the voice mail system because she received no response to the voice mail she left

at the number provided in her written notice. GC Services describes the nature and conduct of its

collection services for its Telecheck client:

GC Services sent her a letter in January 2005, indicating a $25.00 debt

on a Telecheck account. Wojcicki Declaration at ¶ 6. GC Services'

work for Telecheck is "mail order" only, meaning that GC Services

only sends letters for Telecheck and does not attempt to collect

Telecheck debts by telephone Id. These letters provide a telephone

number to a voicemail box maintained in Houston, Texas. Id.; Exhibit

7 at15. The Houston voicemail box invites callers to leave a message.

Wojcicki Declaration at ¶ 6; Exhibit 7 at 15. GC Services listens to

these recorded messages, but does not place or receive telephone calls

to or from Telecheck account debtors. Wojcicki Declaration at ¶ 6

Mot. 6:12-7:1.

The Motion attempts to discredit Ms. Thomasson's representations she spoke with a GC

Services representative about the Telecheck debt: 

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18 However, allegations and testimony with respect to Mr. Thomasson's claims suggest he had no

contact with GC Services before April 2005, about two months after Ms. Thomasson represents she placed her

January and February calls to GC Services using a number he gave her. If that is believed by a fact-finder, he

could not have given her a telephone number to bypass the Telecheck voicemail call-back in connection with

her January and February 2005 calls. 

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Both of the Thomassons claim to have talked on the telephone with GC

Services about an alleged consumer debt. [FAC ¶¶ 24, 30-31]. But GC

Services' records show that Rebecca Thomasson never had a

conversation with a GC Services Representative. Exhibit 7 at 15.. . . .

Of the five pages of documents that plaintiffs produced in this

litigation, none relate to Rebecca Thomasson. Declaration of John H.

L'Estrange Jr., dated September 28, 2006 at ¶ 12. Rebecca Thomasson

has no evidence that she ever talked to GC Services on the telephone,

let alone that GC Services recorded or monitored a conversation with

her.

Mot. 6:12-7:1.

The parties thus dispute whether Ms. Thomasson ever spoke with a GC Services representative

when she placed her calls. However, her sworn testimony is adequate evidence the court must accept

on summary judgment to support her contention she spoke with GC Services representatives in

January and February 2005 by using a different number.18 She represents her July 2005 call was

simply to verify her account was cleared after she paid the amount owing and to ascertain the status

of Mr. Thomassons' MCI account. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to substantiate

their allegations they have standing to represent a class of all persons whose calls were

recorded/monitored/eavesdropped upon, consisting of "all persons who engaged in at least one

telephone conversation with a person employed by Defendant GC SERVICES participating therein

and who have had said conversation with a GC SERVICES employee recorded and/or monitored

and/or eaves dropped upon." FAC ¶ 41; see also FAC ¶¶ 45, 59. A plaintiff's personal interest in

the litigation must exist at the beginning of the litigation (standing) and must continue throughout the

entire course of the litigation to avoid mootness. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d

986, 989 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghety, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980). "[A]t

the summary judgment level, the plaintiff must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts,'"

including a showing of standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citation

omitted. A party bearing the burden of proof on an issue cannot rely on mere speculation,

unsubstantiated beliefs, conclusory representations, or other representations lacking an evidentiary

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foundation adequate to raise a triable issue of material fact that requires resolution by a fact finder.

More than a "scintilla" of evidence is required to create a reasonable inference that could support a

result in plaintiffs' favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 256 (the non-moving party cannot oppose a

properly supported summary judgment motion by "rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials in his

pleadings"). From the record presented, as to themselves personally or as putative classrepresentatives

for others whose calls were monitored or recorded, these plaintiffs have failed to go beyond their own

"conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact," Id. The court

finds they have not carried their burden to successfully oppose summary judgment on that essential

component element of their claims. On that basis alone, summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds

is warranted in favor of GC Services. 

Moreover, even if a reviewing court were to find these named plaintiffs have standing to pursue

this action on their own behalf and as class representatives, for the reasons discussed below, the court

would GRANT summary judgment for GC Services.

C. Evidentiary Objections

1. Defendant's Evidence

The parties have filed most of their evidence and points and authorities "under seal." In

support of its Motion, GC Services provides, as authenticated by John H. L'Estrange, Esq.: 

Exh. 1: Wojcicki Deposition Excerpts

Exh. 2: McFarlane Deposition Excerpts

Exh. 3: Stevens Deposition Excerpts

Exh. 4: Macias Deposition Excerpts

Exh. 5: Andrew Thomasson Deposition Excerpts

Exh. 6: GC Services Answers to plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories

Exh. 7: GC Services Supplemental Responses to plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories

Exh. 8: Documents Produced by GC Services Bates numbered GC04621-GC04629 and 

GC04630-GC04664.

Exhs 9 - Exh. 11: CPUC's tariffs for GTE West Coast, Inc., Pacific Bell, and SBC California

Exh. 12: California Public Utilities Commission's General Order 107-B.

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19

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another round of commentary by "responding" to defendant's Opposition to Objections to evidence and

Additional Objections along with its Opposition to Objections to Plaintiff's evidence. Dkt No. 170. The

supplemental responses were not authorized, and are simply redundant of the original objections. 

20

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language "information, and belief" following the phrase "based on my personal knowledge." The court

accordingly considers only the Wojcicki Amended Declaration.

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GC Services filed additional Exhibits in support of its Reply to plaintiff's Motion Opposition,

authenticated by John H. L'Estrange, Jr. They are:

Exh. 13: Bond Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. 14: Undated letter from Robert E. Schroth, Jr., produced at the deposition of plaintiff

Andrew Thomasson in response to an Order from the Magistrate Judge that plaintiffs

turn over to GC Services the letter they sent to putative class members.

Exh. 15: A July 19, 2006 letter from defense counsel to plaintiff's counsel.

Exh. 16: Rebecca Thomasson's Answers to GC Services Second Set of Interrogatories.

Exh. 17: Plaintiffs' Objections and Responses to GC Services' Second Request For Production

of Documents.

Exh. 18: A November 9, 2006 letter from plaintiffs' counsel to defense counsel which Mr.

L'Estrange declares had third-party declarations attached that were later used by

plaintiffs as part of their Opposition to the Motion For Class Certification. L'Estrange

Decl. ¶ 13,

Exh. 19: A compilation "showing certain statements made in plaintiffs' memorandum in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the corresponding fact cite, and a

summary showing the actual statement of fact in the fact cite." L'Estrange Decl. ¶ 14,

2. Plaintiffs' Objections To Defendant's Evidence19

Objection No. 1: GC Services filed the Declaration of Dennis Wojcicki and his Amended

Declaration in support of the Motion. Mr. Wojcicki identifies himself as Senior Vice President of GC

Services and a GC Services employee since 1983 with personal knowledge of the conduct of GC

Services business activities and of the company's contact with Rebecca Thomasson by mail seeking

to collect a $25.00 debt on a Telecheck account. Wojcicki Amended Decl.20 Plaintiffs move to strike

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to respond," whereas the substance of the "new" declaration is the same as the old.

22

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presented in support of the Motion (i.e., lacking the certification) and the deposition transcripts should be

ignored by the court because they were initially "incomplete as a result of its failure to abide by the rules of

procedure and evidence." They argue the "were not required to rebut evidence which did not technically exist

as part of the record at the time of their opposition," a hyper-technical argument which makes short shrift of

an opposing party's burden in opposing a summary judgment motion, where the moving party is not required

to produce any evidence on an issue where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof. Dkt No. 170 3:18-

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the Wojcicki Declaration on grounds the original Declaration included the phrase based on

"information and belief," and only personal knowledge averments qualify as admissible evidence

adequate to support summary judgment. The defect was cured by the filing of the Amended Wojcicki

Declaration.21 Accordingly, the Objection is OVERRULED as moot.

Objection No. 2 - No. 4: Challenges to Mr. Wojcicki's personal knowledge of third-party debt

collection clients' time spent attempting to collect delinquent accounts before referring them to GC

Services, his personal knowledge of who the local and long-distance carriers are in San Diego, and his

personal knowledge of the type of business telephone system and how it operates in GC Services'

California call centers. Mr. Wojcicki testifies he has been with GC Services for well over twenty years

and currently holds a senior position with the company. The futility of insisting that he describe in his

Declaration how he came to have personal knowledge, for example, of the type of phone system in use

in the relevant market is shown by the parties' listing as an Undisputed Fact that GC Services'

California call centers utilize Nortel's "Meridian I" telephone system, the very testimony he provides

in his Declaration. The Objections are OVERRULED. Mr. Wojciki's familiarity with those technical

aspects of the telephone services and monitoring devicesis adequately supported by his averments and,

in addition, information such as which companies provide telephone services in this area do not appear

to be disputed nor are they material to this ruling.

Objection No. 5: Motion to strike paragraph 2 of the L'Estrange Declaration, including

associated exhibits and any arguments based thereon, wherein he authenticates as "true and correct"

copies of selected pages from the Wojcicki Deposition, on grounds he is not competent to authenticate

a deposition or deposition extract in a summary judgment motion absent the reporter's certification

page.22 Plaintiffs argue attorney L'Estrange was not present for that deposition, so the exhibit excerpts

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"lacks foundation, authenticity, and fails as hearsay." Pl. Obj. To Evid. 5:14-6:3. The "form over

substance" of plaintiffs' objection is highlighted in GC Services' response: 

Plaintiffs themselves have authenticated the exact same transcript by

including the reporter's certification. See Exhibit A to the Declaration

of Robert L. Arleo. A writing may be authenticated by evidence that

the party against whom it was offered admitted its authenticity. Orr v.

Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2002).

Resp. To Pl. Evid'ry Obj.13:24-14:4. The Objection is OVERRULED.

Objection No. 6: Objection and Motion To Strike Mr. Wojcicki's deposition testimony at page

150 line 19 through page 151 line 8 (attached as "Exhibit 1" to the L'Estrange Declaration), and any

argument based thereon. Those portions of the deposition show Mr. Wojcicki answered "Yes" to the

questions whether GC Services employees are advised to tell persons who are engaged in telephone

conversations with them that the call could be monitored and whether they give that advisement.

Plaintiffs argue the deponent lacks personal knowledge because Mr. Wojcicki's testimony and the GC

Services website indicate GC Services employees more than 10,000 people, so there is "simply no way

Mr. Wojcicki could possibly know what each collector does day to day," and he also testified he

"rarely, if ever, visited the three collection sites in California." Pl. Evid'ry Obj. 6:26-7:5. GC Services

argues Mr. Wojcicki, as a senior vice president of the company, has knowledge and competency to

provide testimony regarding the company's policies, including that GC Services employees are

instructed to give the call monitoring advisement, and that knowledge and competency may be inferred

from his position and tenure with the company. Resp. To Pl's Evid'ry Obj. 14:13-16, citing

Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding "[t]hat Rule 56(e)'s

requirements of personal knowledge and competence to testify" were met as "may be inferred from

the affidavits themselves" by virtue of the persons' positions and participation in the matters "to which

they swore"). The Objection is OVERRULED with respect to the competency of Mr. Wojcicki's

testimony that GC Services employees are instructed to tell persons who are engaged in telephone

conversations with them that the call could be monitored, particularly as those issues are further

substantiated by other declarations provided by direct supervisors or quality control call monitors with

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direct knowledge and experience with the company's advisement implementation practices, including

Jeffrey Bond, a former GC Services employee whose testimony Plaintiffs heavily rely on.

Objection No. 7: Objection and motion to strike the selected pages and argument relying on

those excerpts of the McFarlane Deposition provided as an exhibit to the L'Estrange Declaration, on

the same technical grounds as plaintiffs' Objection to the Wojcicki deposition excerpts purportedly

authenticated by Mr. L'Estrange. For the same reasons as Objection No. 5 is overruled, this Objection

is OVERRULED. In addition, GC Services cures the alleged evidentiary defect by resubmitting the

same pages from the McFarlane deposition with the court reporter's certification. 

Objection No. 8: The same technical objections with respect to the excerpts of the Stevens

deposition attached to the L'Estrange Declaration are OVERRULED for the same reasons. 

Objection No. 10 (no Objection No. 9 is listed in plaintiffs' filing): The same technical

objections with respect to the excerpts of the Macias deposition attached to the L'Estrange Declaration

are OVERRULED for the same reasons. 

Objection No. 11: Plaintiffs object and move to strike the L'Estrange Declaration paragraph

nine, with associated exhibits and any argument based thereon, on grounds: the document exhibits

referenced there, produced by GC Services during discovery, lack foundation; Mr. L'Estrange has not

demonstrated he has personal knowledge of the contents of the documents, chain of custody, or other

indices they are ordinary course of business records, so they lack authentication; and they are hearsay

as to Mr. L'Estrange. GC Services remedies the authentication issue by providing a Reply Declaration

of Dennis Wojcicki, curing the omissions. The Objections are accordingly OVERRULED.

Objection No. 12: Objection and motion to strike the L'Estrange Declaration paragraph ten,

with associated exhibits and any argument based thereon, which recites Exhibits 9, 10, and 11 are true

and correct copies of the CPUC's tariffs for GTE West Coast, Inc, Pacific Bell, and SBC California,

on grounds of lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge of the declarant, no demonstration of

chain of custody or ordinary course of business documentary authenticity, and hearsay as to Mr.

L'Estrange. GC Services responds the documents are public records relating to the CPUC and require

no additional foundation on grounds of lack of personal knowledge, relying on FRE 902(4). See

United States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 36 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973). In the Reply L'Estrange Declaration,

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23 In a fashion emblematic of the multiplication of proceedings and filings that has characterized this

case, plaintiffs take the liberty of responding to GC Services' Opposition to their evidentiary objections, then

purport to treat themselves to another round of briefing by joining in that unauthorized filing "Additional

Objections To Evidence Submitted In Support Of GC Services' Motion For Summary Judgment." Dkt No. 170.

The court rejects the eight pages of argument plaintiffs present in order to have the last word. Dkt No. 170,

pp. 1-9. To the extent Plaintiffs object to GC Services' provision of curative declarations or evidence to satisfy

their hyper-technical objections, Plaintiffs' objections are OVERRULED. 

24

 The court finds no authoritative value in unpublished opinions of district courts in New York, even

those in which the same plaintiffs' attorney as in this case participated, particularly when the procedural posture

of the case is dissimilar. 

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they provide as Exhibits 9. 10, and 11 certified copies of the CPUC documents initially provided as

Exhibits 9, 10, and 11 to the Motion L'Estrange Declaration. The Objection is OVERRULED for that

reason.23 Moreover, the court does not rely on that evidence in deciding the Motion.

3. Plaintiffs' Evidence

In support of its Opposition, plaintiffs filed, as authenticated by Robert L. Arleo, Esq.:

Exh. A: Wojcicki Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. B: McFarlane Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. C: Swain Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. D: MacDonald Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. E: Andarde Deposition Excerpts. 

Exh. F: Macias Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. G: Stevens Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. H: Ruling in Cali v. Asset Acceptance Corp., Case No. 2:05cv04858-JS-AKT

(Sybert, J.)(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2006) (described in Arleo Decl. ¶ 11 as ruling "the Plaintiff had

stated a valid claim for relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by alleging that the Defendant's failure

to advise consumers that their telephone calls may be monitored or recorded was false and

deceptive conduct in an attempt to collect a debt").24

Mr. Arleo also represents: "During this litigation, GC Services has not produced a single

document that shows[:] the telephone conversations between Andrew Thomasson and Rebecca

Thomasson and GC Services were not monitored or recorded by the Defendant's employees[;]

. . . Andrew Thomasson and Rebecca Thomasson were ever advised that their telephone conversations

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 Counsel's representation neither named plaintiff was "ever advised of the potential for call

monitoring" is recklessly at odds with the evidence, including Plaintiffs' own testimony. Both Mr. Thomasson

and Ms. Thomasson admit they had actual knowledge from their first conversation with a GC Services

employee of the possible monitoring of their calls. Moreover, it is unreasonable to suppose any record would

be kept of the non-monitoring or non-recording of particular communications.

26

 Schroth, Jr.'s Declaration erroneously describes his Exhibit D and his Exhibit E as responses to

Requests For Admissions.

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with GC Services might be monitored or recorded for any reason[;]25 [or] any witnesses or documents

that have anything to do with their MCI or Telecheck accounts, and it has instead largely relied on

evidence from its Los Angeles Superior Court operations having nothing to do with either of the

Plaintiffs' claims in this case." Arleo Decl. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). However, that argument reverses

the burden with respect to Plaintiffs' obligations in opposing summary judgment. Plaintiffs have the

burden of proof at trial for each alleged cause of action. The moving party need only signal the

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Plaintiffs

have the burden of production beyond the pleadings to raise a triable issue of fact when challenged on

summary judgment. Reese, 208 F.3d at 738; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

Plaintiffs filed excerpts from the Andrew Thomasson Deposition, authenticated as Exhibit A

to the Robert E. Schroth, Sr., Esq. declaration. They also filed exhibits authenticated by Robert E.

Schroth, Jr., Esq.:

Exh. A: Rebecca Thomasson Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. B: Jeffrey Bond Deposition Excerpts.

Exh. C: GC Services' responses to plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories.

Exh. D: GC Services' responses to plaintiffs' First Set of Requests For Admissions.

Exh. E: GC Services Objections and Responses to plaintiffs' First Set of Requests For 

 Production of Documents.26

Exh. F: GC Services'Supplemental Responses to plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 20 and plaintiffs'

 RequestforDocument No. 17, identified as "GC35716-GC35727" identifying"several

 of the putative class members as defined in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint"

 (Schroth, Jr. Decl. ¶ 8). 

Exh. G: GC Services supplemental responses to certain of plaintiffs' interrogatories.

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 However, Mr. Albarracin executed his Declaration in Florida and establishes no connection to

California, marginalizing any probative value to the pared-down scope of this litigation and necessary

narrowing of the putative class. 

28

 Ms. Amici's Declaration was executed in Florida. See fn 11, above.

29

 Mr. Becks' Declaration was executed in Montana. See fn 11, above.

30

 Ms. Cater's Declaration was executed in Louisiana. See fn 11, above.

31

 Mr. Donelson's Declaration was executed in Texas. See fn 11, above.

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 Ms. Greenberg's Declaration was executed in New York. See fn 11, above.

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Exh. H: GC Services' supplemental responses to certain of plaintiffs' RequestsforAdmissions.

Material portions of the texts of each of eighteen Declarations from purported members of the

putative class, provided in support of Plaintiffs' Opposition, are virtually identical: 

Exh. I: Declaration of Luis E. Albarracin (identified by GC Services as a member of the 

 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.27

Exh. J: Declaration of Torey Amici (identified by GC Services as a member of the 

 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.28

Exh. K: Declaration of Gary A. Beck (identified by GC Services as a member of the 

 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.29

Exh. L: Declaration of Dana Cater (whose husband was identified by GC Services as a 

 member of the putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition

to the Motion.30

Exh. M: Declaration of James E. Donelson (identified by GC Services as a member of the

 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.31

Exh. N: Declaration of Stacey Gonzales (identified by GC Services as a member of the 

 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.

 Her Declaration was executed in Sacramento, California

Exh. O: Declaration of Amy Greenberg (identified by GC Services as a member of the 

 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.32

Exh. P: Declaration of Linda Harris (identified by GC Services as a member of the 

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33

 Ms. Harris' Declaration was executed in Nebraska. See fn 11, above.

34

 Ms. Cowan-Holzworth's Declaration was executed in Alaska. See fn 11, above.

35

 Ms. Langdon's Declaration was executed in North Carolina. See fn 11, above.

36

 Mr. Odenthal's Declaration was executed in Virginia. See fn 11, above.

37

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 putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.33

Exh. Q: Declaration of Carlyn L. Cowan-Holzworth (identified by GC Services as a member

 of the putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the

 Motion.34

Exh. R: Declaration of Anna Jenkins, identified in the Schroth, Jr. Declaration as a person

having had "telephone communications with GC Services's office located in Los

Angeles, California since the filing of Plaintiffs' complaint regarding an alleged

consumer debt that was monitored by the Defendant" without defendant or its

employees "ever advis[ing her] that her telephone conversations with the Defendant

might be monitored and/or recorded, and Ms. Jenkins never consented to having her

communications monitored or recorded by the Defendant and its employees." Schroth,

Jr. Decl. ¶ 20. Ms. Jenkins executed her Declaration in San Jose, California. 

Exh. S: Declaration of Bonnie W. Langdon (identified by GC Services as a member of the

putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.35

Exh. T: Declaration of Ted Odenthal(identified by GC Services as a member of the putative

class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.36

Exh. U: Declaration of Melissa K. Peppel (identified by GC Services as a member of the

putative class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.37

Exh. V: Declaration of Monica Rojas (identified by GC Services as a member of the putative

class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion. Ms. Rojas'

Declaration was executed in San Diego, California.

Exh. W: Declaration of Russell Roman (identified by GC Services as a member of the putative

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40

 Mr. Wood's Declaration was executed in Utah. See fn 11, above.

41

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Plaintiffs' objections to its evidence in support of the Motion. Like Plaintiffs responses to GC Services'

evidentiary objections, the supplemental argument was not authorized, and it is largely redundant of the

original evidentiary objections.

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class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.38

Exh. X: Declaration of Carla Venezia (identified by GC Services as a member of the putative

class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion. Ms.

Venezia's Declaration was executed in Palos Verdes Estates, California.

Exh. Y: Declaration of Jill Walton (identified by GC Services as a member of the putative

class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.39

Exh. Z: Declaration of Thomas Wood (identified by GC Services as a member of the putative

class defined in the FAC) in support of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion.40

4. Defendant's Objections To Plaintiffs' Evidence

GC Services filed under seal Objections to plaintiff's Opposition evidence.

41 In particular:

Objection No.1: Defendant objects to the Robert E. Schroth, Jr. Declaration, paragraphs 11

through 28, where he purports to authenticate and characterize 18 third-party witness declarations, on

grounds his statements in those paragraphs "are argument, not evidence, and therefore not relevant"

(Def.'s Evid. Obj. 1:7-2:1), where Mr. Schroth states: "The Defendant admits in its [supplemental

responses to interrogatories and admissions] that it monitored and/or recorded at least one of [name

of consumer] telephone conversations. . . ." The Objection is SUSTAINED to the extent Mr.

Schroth's affidavit purports to characterize or interpret the evidence of GC Services' discovery

responses. The discovery responses themselves are the evidence. For example, in response to

Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 6, GC Services states "it does not record telephone conversations it

conducts with alleged debtors in California." Schroth, Jr. Exh. C, 7:9-10. To the extent the Schroth

Declaration suggests otherwise, it must be disregarded because counsel's argument has no evidentiary

value on the merits. 

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 Plaintiffs rely on one case from this district and one case from a district court in New York for their

argument intentional failure to give an advisement to consumers so they "will mistaken believe they are not

being monitored or recorded" constitutes an FDCPA violation. Opp. 16:25-17:4. Both cases are factually and

procedurally distinguishable from this one. In Gibson v. Penn Credit Corp., S.D. Cal. Case No. 05cv1736-

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Objection No. 2: GC Services asks the court to reject all 18 third-party Declarations provided

in support of Plaintiffs' opposition. Each purports to be from an individual consumer who allegedly

had telephone conversations with GC Services debt collection representatives and was not given an

advisement their respective calls might be monitored. GC Services raises multiple objections to this

evidence, including: the use of stock paragraphs, repeated verbatim in most of the other declarations

and with only minor variations in others; the declarants allude to a list of consumer names GC Services

allegedly provided of persons whose monitored calls were made from or received by GC Services'

California Offices in a document that was marked "Confidential-Attorneys' Eyes Only," so the

declarant either lacks foundation for that statement, or a breach of the Protective Order occurred;

several remarks in the declarations are not relevant to any claim in the lawsuit (e.g., how the declarant

learned of the lawsuit and motivation for providing a declaration); whether the declarant was given

an advisement the call might be monitored is not relevant to whether the calls between GC Services

and the putative class representative plaintiffs were monitored or whether the plaintiffs were given an

advisement). GC Services also argues the declarations are inherently unbelievable because of their

form language. However, the court declines to make credibility findings with respect to the

believability of the factual merits of the third party witnesses' declarations, and those objections are

OVERRULED,

 Plaintiffs refute the objections to the 18 declarations on grounds they are relevant as evidence

of GC Services' practice regarding call monitoring and recording advisements. The recording

advisement issue is irrelevant to the remaining claims in this case. However, the monitoring issue

remains, and Defendant's objection on relevance grounds are OVERRULED and motion to strike

pertinent parts is DENIED. 

Objection No. 3: GC Services objects that the Arleo Declaration is argumentative and

mischaracterizes the Order in Cali v. Asset Acceptance LLC in his paragraph 11. He attached the Cali

opinion as Exhibit H to his Declaration.42 To the extent the court would consider that case for any

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H(CAB), the district judge granted in part and denied in part a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a putative

class action FDCPA claim arising from defendant's repeated automated telephone calls to the plaintiff asking

plaintiff to call an 800 number regarding the collection of an alleged debt owed by a person whose name

plaintiff did not know. He called the 800 number approximately 10 times to request his telephone number be

removed from defendant's call list and spoke to various employees who assured him his number would be

removed from their call list. Plaintiff alleged that during two of those calls, the collector's employees subjected

him to vulgar language. During his final conversation with a company supervisor, after he inquired, plaintiff

was told the conversation was being recorded and that it was the debt collector's policy to record all such

conversations. The district judge found on those facts plaintiff met his burden to state a set of facts that could

entitle him to relief under the FDCPA. Gibson, Dkt No. 9. Those facts are wholly distinguishable from the

facts of this case, where GC Services never contacted these plaintiffs again after the initial mailings simply

alerting them to a reported debt, and Rule 12(b)(6) standards are wholly distinguishable from Rule 56 standards

of review. In Cali v. Asset Acceptance Corp., a case from the Eastern District of New York, provided as

Exhibit H to the Arelo Declaration, the district court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings of

plaintiff's claim the debt collector's policy of recording telephone conversations without informing the

consumer at all or only near the end of the conversations in the collection of debts violated the FDCPA. Again,

the non-binding opinion of that court was that the non-disclosure of the recording of telephone conversations

"loosely satisfied" the definition of "deceptive" communication. Plaintiffs produce no evidence GC Services

recorded any conversation with either of them or with any similarly situated person they could have standing

to represent in this action. Like the Gibson case Cali cites, the Cali court found plaintiff "marginally" stated

a claim, and the court was hesitant to grant judgment on the pleadings. Here, the parties have had the

opportunity to develop and present an evidentiary record. The procedural posture of this case is distinguishable

from those. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate they were misled into disclosing more (or any) financial

information than they would have had they known of the possibility another GC Services employee might be

monitoring the call by listening in, so any "deception" or "falsity" or "misleading" inference loses any force

on so speculative a basis. 

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purpose, the court determines for itself the persuasiveness of its legal import as well as its scope,

irrespective of Mr. Arleo's characterizations.

Objection No. 4: GC Services objects to portions of the deposition of Jeffrey Bond, provided

as Exhibit B to the Schroth, Jr. Declaration on grounds most of the offered testimony is not relevant

to the claims in this action and should be stricken.

Mr. Bond testified about many aspects of GC Services' business that are

unique to specific clients and not relevant to the claims in this case.

According to Mr. Bond, those practices included first party teleservices

work and call monitoring by GC Services for the Los Angeles Times

newspaper and debt collection work for Providian Bank that ended in

November 2003. Plaintiffs in this case are complaining about GC

Services practices after May 4, 2004, that relate to GC Services' clients

MCI and Telecheck (FAC ¶¶ 21 (MCI), 29 (Telecheck) and 42 (class

period is one year prior to May 4, 2005)).

Def.'s Obj. To Evid. p. 11.

For those reasons, and with respect to consideration of those portions of the Bond testimony

for purposes of deciding this Motion, the Objections are SUSTAINED. The court also GRANTS the

"alternative" request under FRE 106 that the court admit additional portions of the Bond deposition

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addressing monitoring and recording and advisements he personally observed insofar as they include

germane observations he made on those questions not limited to the GC Services contractual work for

the Providian Bank and the Los Angeles Times, two GC Services clients whose service contracts are

unrelated to the claims of these plaintiffs associated with the company's debt collection agreements

with MCI and Telecheck.

Objection No. 5: GC Services contends Exhibit A to the FAC purporting to be a print of a GC

Services website page has not been authenticated and should not be considered by the court. The

objection is SUSTAINED.

D. Summary Judgment Is Warranted

Rather than run to ground the frequently extraneous arguments in Plaintiffs' Opposition, the

court attempts to extract those directly bearing on and dispositive of the merits of the Motion, in

consideration of Plaintiffs' own articulations of the basis for their claims as extracted above. Among

other things, the court disregards those GC Services business practices Plaintiffs criticize but which

are unrelated to their own circumstances or the particular type of debt collection service GC Services

provides for its MCI or Telecheck clients alleged in the FAC as giving rise to their specific claims. 

1. Evidence Of Call Monitoring Practices

The FAC pleads a "policy and practice" of undisclosed recording and monitoring of telephone

communications initiated or accepted by GC services (FAC ¶ 40), whereas the testimony of Jeffrey

Bond, a former GC Services collection manager who left GC Services employ in February 2004, as

well as the testimony of several other GC Services employees, actually substantiates company policy

is to advise consumers of the potential for call monitoring. Bond Depo. 27:13-14. Bond testified GC

Services monitors calls for quality control and training purposes and trains employees like himself

regarding disclosure issues. Bond Depo. 22:20-22, 138:15-18. He testified that he, "like every other

collection manager that plaintiffs deposed in this case" (Reply 7:17-19), would interrupt a call and

demand the advisement be given if he heard a collector fail to give the call monitoring disclosure.

Bond Depo. 57:21-58:2. He also testified he never witnessed any GC Services employee recording

a call, and no recording equipment is on site at the GC Services facility where he worked. Bond Depo.

20:14-17, 19:4-6; see Reply 7:20-22.. 

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 Mr. Bond himself testified he had never personally observed a GC Services manager record a

telephone call between a collector and a debtor. Bond. Depo. p. 20. Moreover, he testified as to specific

account practices, such as for GC Services client Providian , an account that was "out of" GC Services offices

at the end of 2003 (see, e.g., Bond Depo. pp. 13-22), not related to the MCI or Telecheck debt collection

services or practices the Thomassons place at issue.

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In its Opposition to summary adjudication of the FDCPA claim, Plaintiffs rely primarily on

argument and counsel's summaries of portions of the Bond testimony, referring the court to prior

sections of the Opposition but without citation to readily accessible portions of that evidentiary record.

The court is under no obligation to "scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact"

(Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)), nor need it "examine the entire file for evidence

establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with

adequate references so that it could be conveniently found" (Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch.

Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001)). For example, Plaintiffs summarily contend: 

Mr. Bond testified that monitoring by the Defendant is not always done

for the purpose of quality assurance. Bond also testified GC Services

knows that a substantial number of consumers will not acquiesce to

sharing their personal and private information while having their

telephone calls monitored or recorded. That is the reasons GC

Services chooses not to provide the advisement to consumers.

Opp. 16:12-16 (emphasis added). 

Turning from argument to evidence,Mr.Bond actually testified he worked as a supervisor from

GC Services' Irwindale facility. Leaving aside the issue of recorded phone calls, a process that the

evidence conclusively establishes does not occur in GC Services' California debt collection facilities

(as discussed below),43 Mr. Bond's testimony corroborates the testimony of other GC Services

managers about company policy to give notice regarding possible call monitoring for quality control:

Q. When you were monitoring a telephone call between a collector

and a consumer, and if, for example, you heard the collector say

something that was inappropriate or he had forgot [sic] to give

the mini-Miranda or something like that, was it your practice

to interrupt a collector and have him take corrective action?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you alert the collector that he should put the call with

the consumer on hold?

A. Personally I would walk up to the collector and just

immediately ask them to put the call on hold so that the

consumer could not hear our discussion. I would instruct the

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 "Q. So you had two different ways then of monitoring the phone call. One was to hit the observe

button on the phone, right? A. Correct. Q. And the other was to come up behind the collector with this

portable device? A. Correct." Bond Depo. p. 57.

45

 Mr. Bond also testified sometimes collectors would "make fun of the consumers" by putting them

on speaker phone so "the entire office could hear them bantering back and forth." Bond Decl. pp. 58-59.

"Q. That was against GC Services policy, right? A. Yes, it was. Q. As a manager that is something that

you would put a stop to if you observed it, correct? A. Absolutely." Bond. Depo. p. 59 (emphasis added). 

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collector of the scenario that just occurred to make sure that

they understood it and gave a corrective action as long as that

is what it dictated me to do, and give them a suggestion on how

to continue the call and then go from there.[44]

Q. The monitoring was used then for quality assurance; is that

right?

A. In this particular scenario that I just gave you, yes.

Bond Depo. pp. 57-58 (emphasis added).45

Mr. Bond also testified GC Services trained him on the monitoring of telephone calls.

Q. While you were at GC Services did you receive training

regarding he monitoring of telephone calls?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. While you were at GC services, were you tested periodically on

the FDCPA?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. And also did you have a familiarity with related state laws

concerning debt collection practices?

A. You had -- personally myself, you were in so many different

states that we did the best we can with the information that was

given to us by management on that.

Q. The test that you had periodically also covered state law; is that

correct?

A. That is correct.

. . . .

Q. While you were at GC Services did you ever believe that it was

illegal to monitor telephone calls between collectors and

debtors?

A. No.

\\

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uses to make sure they are hitting the points to make it a win-win call for both the consumer and the collector.

 Q. One of the elements of that is the mini-Miranda? A. Correct." Bond Depo. p. 28 (emphasis added).

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Q. Do you still have that belief as to monitoring, that it is not

illegal?

A. Yes.

. . . 

Q. And it was your belief and understanding for the

monitoring to be acceptable or legal you had to give the

mini-Miranda?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a comparable mini-Miranda for recording?

A. It was usually the same sentence. . . . [¶] "The call may be

monitored [or] recorded for quality assurance."

Q. Was that mini-Miranda that [sic] was given by all collectors to

all debtors to both incoming and outgoing calls?

. . . .

Q. . . . The mini-Miranda that you have just stated included both

monitoring and recording, right?

A [Yes].

. . .

Q. In connection with the collectors that you supervised, was

that two-part mini-Miranda that included both monitoring

and recording supposed to be given to every debtor?

A. Yes, it was supposed to be given to every debtor.

Q, Was it generally given?

A. To the best of my knowledge.

Q. One of your responsibilities was to make sure that it was given,

right?

A. Correct.

Bond Depo. pp.22-27 (emphasis added).

Q. In terms of the mini-Miranda, was that one of the things in the talk

off[46] that you would make sure was given, and if it was not you

would interrupt the collector and make sure that he did give it

before he continued with the call?

A. On the calls we monitored, yes.

Bond Depo. p. 59 (emphasis added).

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47

 "Q. Are you aware of any other clients that GC Services monitored calls for? A. With clients?

Q. Yes, other clients that required GC Services to monitor calls. A. Yes, Dish Network. Dish Network, L.A.

Times, Providian were the three that I am aware of. It would be in the client's contract for the clients that I

can't speak to whether that was a requirement of not." Bond Depo. pp. 106-107. 

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Q. All the monitoring that was done, whether it was for the

customer or for GC Services, was for quality assurance

purposes; is that right?

A. As far as I know.

Bond Depo. p. 138 (emphasis added). 

Despite that policy, Mr. Bond testified he saw one manager falsify call monitoring review

sheets, although it is not clear whether those sheets were prepared for a particular GC Services client

with particular contractual variations from standard debt collection practices such as those associated

with accounts like MCI and Telecheck. Mr. Bond identified Providian, Dish Network, and L.A. Times

as GC Services clients who engaged GC Services for the purpose of monitoring phone calls with

clients' customers. That is not conduct associated with GC Services' debt collection practices

implicated in this case. The only relevant evidence for purposes of this litigation involves GC

Services' practices with respect to its debt collection services for clients such as MCI and Telecheck,

not its call monitoring for quality control of its clients' workers or other special purpose services.47

The issues in this litigation relate to practices of GC Services supervisors to randomly monitor the

conversations of its own workers with putative debtors, conduct Mr. Bond and others substantiate was

for internal quality control purposes and entailed application of company policy to give an advisement

to the consumer to satisfy privacy laws.

Mr. Bond also testified he observed a manager put some consumers on speaker phone in the

office and making fun of them, "using them as an example, more or less." Bond Depo. pp.103-106.

The thrust of his testimony about such isolated incidents of misconduct permits only one reasonable

inference -- those examples reflect exceptional and disapproved improprieties. The Bond testimony,

and that of other GC Services supervisors, is evidence that speaks for itself. Plaintiffs' efforts to

repackage it to conform to its contrary and conclusory theory regarding GC Services' call monitoring

policy creates no triable issue of material fact. 

\\

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48

 Like the term "mini-Miranda," the "QMD" reference is to the call monitoring advisement GC

Services collectors are trained to give in the course of their communications with consumers. See McFarlane

Depo. pp. 38-39.

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The parties also rely on the deposition of Hugo Andrade, an assistant manager with GC

Services for two or three years, with eight debt collectors working under him. Andrade Depo. p. 16.

He described his role as to train those agents, motivate and develop them with the goal of reaching

monthly collection goals. Id. p. 17. He described the process for out-going calls placed to consumers.

When the person who answers the phone identifies himself as having the same name as the person

whose debt GC Services is trying to collect for its client, Mr. Andrade testified he immediately gives

his own name and states: " 'I'm calling from GC Services. Your call may be monitored. I'm just

calling to let you know' -- and then I go into the actual [sic]." Id. p. 26, pp. 26-29 (describing the

course of typical debt collection conversations). He testified he gives the monitoring advisement only

after he confirms he is actually speaking to the alleged debtor. Id. p. 28. Mr. Andarde testified he has

at times caught a collector falsifying the notes taken during consumer calls to add information that did

not occur. Id. p. 40. As with the Bond testimony, however, no reasonable inference can be drawn

from such anecdotal observations of occasional misconduct other than as deviations from company

policy.

Another GC Services employee, Jennifer MacDonald, testified at deposition she had been a

unit manager for GC Services for two years with duties to train and develop a group of eight persons.

MacDonald Depo. pp. 18-19. She testified she was trained to make debt collection calls: "I had to

identify myself, identify the collector, use the QMD,

48 update information, as in address, and proceed

with collecting the account." MacDonald Depo. p. 13 (emphasis added). She testified collectors had

to know certain information up front from the person to whom they were speaking, by verifying who

was on the phone, to be sure they were talking to the person they were seeking. Id. pp. 13-14. By

extension, the same safeguards to ensure a person's identity would apply to calls GC Services receives

from persons representing they are inquiring about a debt collection effort directed to themselves

before GC Services employees discuss any particular financial matter, presumably information GC

Services has already been provided by its creditor client. Ms. MacDonald testified such identifying

data included inquiring about name, license number, birth date, and address information. Id. p. 14.

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49

 GC Services produces evidence it maintains procedures intended to ensure its policies comply with

state and federal privacy and debt collection laws. Exhibit 8 to the L'Estrange Declaration is an approximately

40-page internal training manual entitled "Adhering to Federal and State Laws, Participant's Guide, Collection

Excellence Level I" with a copyright notation "December 2001 Universal Training prepared exclusively for

GC Services." The document recites it is the confidential and proprietary property of G. C. Services provided

to employees as a resource for learning and performing job responsibilities. L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 8. 

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She testified she gives the "call may be monitored for quality assurance" advisement as soon as

the person affirms his or her identity as the intended call recipient. Id. pp. 17-18. 

Ms. MacDonald also testified as a unit manager, she monitors her group's phone calls.

MacDonald Depo. p. 19. She acknowledged the two methods of call supervision also identified by

Mr. Bond: one where the manager actually listens in on a two-way conversation between the alleged

debtor and one of the GC Services collectors under her, and a second when the manager stands behind

the collector and only listens to the collector. Id. p. 19. She testified she does not consider standing

behind the collector to be "monitoring" a phone call. Her understanding of "monitoring" is when she

listens from her desk. Id. pp. 19-20. 

Q. Okay. And when you're listening to that telephone

conversation, what are you listening for?

A. Proper customer service, introduction Q.M.D., update of

information, address, what not; that the correct information is

being given on an account and the correct service is being given

as well.

MacDonald Depo. p. 20 (emphasis added). 

Ms. MacDonald testified she makes notes during her call monitoring. MacDonald Depo. p.

20; see also Wojcicki Depo. p. 152 (the managers monitoring telephone calls take notes to evaluate

the calls as they listen). Like other of the testifying employees, Ms. MacDonald attends classes GC

Services offers to ensure company compliance with Federal and State collection laws.49 MacDonald

Depo. p. 26.

The deposition testimony of Ricarco McFarlane, a GC Services debt collection services

manager at the Irwindale office supervising 37 employees, testified, among other things, regarding

collection calls and call monitoring functions. He testified calls are not recorded. Rather, managers

like himself use a special telephone, similar to the collector's phone but equipped with an "observe"

function only available on the managers' phones and which requires entry of a code to activate. 

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Q. Okay. What are your duties as a manager?

A. Well, we conduct file reviews. We handle second voices,

complaint calls, train. We conduct phone monitors. . . . [and]

make sure the company policies and procedures are being

followed.

Q. Do you listen in on telephone calls?

A. Do I listen in on telephone calls? I don't listen in on telephone

calls. I monitor calls.

Q. What do you mean by "monitor"?

A. That means for training purposes.

. . .

Q. So you listen to calls?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And who are those calls between?

A. It's between the collector and/or the consumer or defendant or

debtor.

Q. Does the consumer know you're listening in?

A. Yes. They know that the calls may be monitored for quality

assurance.

Q. And who tells them that?

A. The collector does.

Q. Do they always tell them that?

A. Always.

Q. Has there ever been a time when you listened in to a telephone

call and the advisement was not given?

A. No.

. . . .

Q. How is that advisement referred to? Is there a specific term

that you use by [sic] GC Services?

A. Q.M.D.

Q. Okay. How long have you been monitoring calls?

A. Roughly, nine years off and on.

. . . .

Q. . . . So how do you know you never heard a call that did not

give the Q,M.D.?

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50

 Mr. McFarlane was unable to provide an estimate in what number or percentage of GC Services'

monitored debt collection calls the advisement is not given. L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 2, p. 47.

51

 Mr. McFarlane then elaborated the process in circumstances where GC Services places the

collection call. Plaintiffs here were never called by GC Services.

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A. Usually, I would -- in a situation like that, I would jump on the

call right away to intervene. . . .

Q. So how would you intervene?

A. I would tell the collector to put the call on hold, advise him. . . .

[¶] And they would give the disclosure.

L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 2, pp. 40, 41, 46, pp. 37-39 (emphasis added).50

Mr. McFarlane described a typical debt collection call. First, the collector establishes the

identity of the purported debtor through asking name, address, date of birth to confirm the person on

the phone and the alleged debtor are the same person. L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 2, p. 57.

Q. Okay. So then after you've confirmed it's me, then what do you

do?

A. Then I give you the Q.M.D.

. . . .

Q. . . . Now, verbally, tell me the words that you would use next.

A. "I must inform you this call may be monitored for quality

assurance."

. . . .

THE WITNESS: We've been trained to give the quality assurance

disclosure and to treat the individual, you know, respectfully,

professionally, follow client standards.

L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 2, p. 42, 44.51

Cassandra Stevens, a GC Services debt collection supervisor, described in her deposition the

content and process of a typical telephone call she places. Once she ascertains she is speaking with

a person whose name is the same as the consumer she is trying to reach, her practice is to immediately

identify herself and give the advisement:

A. "This is Miss Stevens calling from GC Services. I'd like to

advise that [sic] you that this call may be monitored for quality

assurance."

Q. You tell them that as soon as he tells you it's John Smith?

A. Yes, I do.

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Q. Don't you have to confirm or ask him any questions to confirm

that it is John Smith?

A. I do that after I mention my quality monitor assurance.

. . .

Q. Now, there are times when you have to engage in a

conversation with them before you can confirm they are who

they are, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, when that conversation's going on, that's prior to the time

that you advise them that the call may be monitored or recorded

-- withdrawn -- that the call may be monitored?

A. Yes.

Q. . . . Does GC Services record telephone calls?

A. No.

L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 3 pp. 52, 54.

Ms. Stevens testified she supervises four persons, each of whom engages in an average of 30

telephonic collection conversations a day. She was unable to say how many of those approximately

200 calls per day she monitored, although she testified that she spends about an hour in an eight-hour

day listening to calls, with the rest of her time spent looking over the collectors' files to ensure their

"note lines are correct so I don't have to monitor." She only monitors if she thinks there is a problem

or she thinks the collector needs supervision. L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 3 pp. 57-59. However, she

testified even experienced callers are still periodically monitored "to make sure they are sticking to the

standard talk off." Id. p. 60.

Q. Okay. Now, when you're listening in to the telephone

conversation [as a monitor], does the debt collector know you're

listening in?

A. No.

Q. How do you know that?

A. I don't know. They don't hear -- we don't say anything.

Q. So in other words, you're listening in on that telephone

conversation, and there's no way for the collector to know that

you're listening?

A. No.

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 Mr. McFarlane also testified GC Services has a policy not to discuss monitored calls. L'Estrange

Decl. Exh. 2 p. 45; see also Andrade Depo. p. 40.

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Q. Is there any way for the person who's talking to the collector to

know that you're listening?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Let's say during the course of that conversation you

determine that the collector did not tell that person the call

could be monitored. What do you do?

A. I stop them and make sure they tell them that.

Q. How do you stop them?

A. I tell them to place that call on hold.

Q, Okay. And how will they place the call on hold?

A. By telling them to hold.

Q. All right. And then you'll engage in a separate dialog with the

collector?

A. Correct.

Q. And after the advise [sic] is given, are there ever circumstances

where the person on the other end will not want to speak to

them if the call is being listened to by somebody else?

A. No.

L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 3, pp. 54-55 (emphasis added).

Q. Now, you listen in to these telephone calls. Do you ever

discuss what you heard with anybody else?

A. No.

. . . .

Q. What were you instructed concerning disclosing that

information to anyone

A. That we're not able to discuss anything that does on with any

phone calls at GC Services.

L'Estrange Decl. Exh. 3, p. 57.52

GC Services has produced its call monitoring records for the relevant period in response to

court-ordered discovery. The Thomassons are not among the listed consumers whose calls were

monitored. 

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53

 The FDCPA provides, in pertinent part: "A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the

general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (2) The false

representation of -- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; . . . (10) The use of any false

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning

a consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (emphasis added).

54

 GC Services summarizes the statute's list of sixteen representative types of conduct that violate the

Act, classifiable into four general categories: "(1) misrepresenting the identity or affiliation of the debt

collector; (2) misrepresenting the debt collector's function; (3) misrepresenting why the debt collector has

called the alleged debtor; and (4) misrepresenting the consequences of non-payment of debt." Mot. P&A

20:15-21:2. None of the other 16 enumerated types of conduct proscribed by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e is alleged or

inferrable from the facts of this case. The "false representations" component of the FDCPA claim against GC

Services is unsupported by any evidence. In particular, Ms. Thomasson testified she paid the $25.00 Telecheck

debt GC Services contacted her to collect based on information provided by its client, and Mr. Thomasson

testified GC Services never contacted him at all after the first written notice of its $28.61 collection effort on

behalf of MCI, and closed the account after he notified them he disputed the debt. Similarly, Plaintiffs

understandably do not rely on any provision of 15 U.S.C. 1692f proscribing particular types of "unfair

practices," as GC Services never called Plaintiffs on the phone or otherwise pursued any debt collection

measures after the initial written communications. 

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2. First Cause Of Action

The FAC alleges as its First Cause of Action violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.53

Plaintiffs rely on the provisions prohibiting the use of false, deceptive, and misleading means in an

attempt to collect alleged consumer debts. Plaintiffs contend the prohibition extends to not revealing

"to consumers that telephone conversations with collectors might be recorded and/or monitored and/or

eavesdropped upon," so that "persons engaged in these telephone conversations, . . . may have

revealed personal financial information to debt collectors employed by Defendant GC Services

more freely, all to the economic benefit of Defendant GC Services." FAC ¶ 49 (emphasis added).

They also rely on the FDCPA provision prohibiting the false representation of the character and legal

status of alleged consumer debts, a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).54 FAC ¶ 49. Plaintiffs here

raise no issue with respect to the written communications that caused them to call GC Services. 

"Legislative history indicates that Congress enacted the FDCPA to protect consumers from

'improper conduct' and illegitimate collection practices 'without imposing unnecessary restrictions on

ethical debt collectors.'" Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1169-70

(9th Cir. 2006), aff'd 198 Fed.Appx. 623 (9th Cir. (Or.) Aug. 24, 2006) (a case articulating a new

waiver of protections standard), quoting S.Rep. No. 95-382, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.

N. 1695, 1696, 1698-99. The legislative objective was "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices

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55

 The FDCPA targets only those debt collection practices that are intended to abuse, harass, or

oppress debtors in the course of collection efforts, such as: "obscene or profane language, threats of violence,

telephone calls at unreasonable hours, misrepresentation of a consumer's legal rights, disclosing a consumer's

personal affairs to friends, neighbors, or an employer, obtaining information about a consumer through false

pretense, impersonating public officials and attorneys, and simulating legal process." S. Rep. No. 95-382, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1695, 1696. Abusive practices targeted

by the FDCPA which give rise to the typical litigation by a debtor against a third-party debt collector to whom

a creditor's account has been turned over include such conduct as: the debt collector calling at unusual times;

threatening to contact and disclose information to the debtor's employer (or actually doing so), false threats

of filing a lawsuit (or actually filing one) against the debtor, false threats of garnishing the debtor's wages, false

threats of filing a bankruptcy action against the debtor, screaming abuse, and claiming amounts not owed by

the debtor. 82 AmJur PQF 3d335, Appendix A, Advisory Opinion (Mar. 31, 2000), § 4.

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by debt collectors . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The FDCPA both requires and proscribes specific

conduct by debt collectors. For example, the statute prohibits the use of any "false, deceptive, or

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt."55 15 U.S.C. §

1692(e) (emphasis added). In determining whether a debt collector has violated the FDCPA, courts

apply an objective standard measured by how the least sophisticated consumer would interpret the

collector's communication. Dunlap v. Credit Protection Ass'n L.P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir.

2005) (affirming dismissal of action and finding a collection agency's notice to a debtor of an

outstanding debt would not impermissibly mislead a least sophisticated debtor into believing that his

credit would be damaged by failure to pay a de minimus debt and therefore did not violate the

FDCPA). The emphasis is on the communication from the debt collector associated with the

collection of debt, to protect consumers from abusive tactics. As stated in a case relied on by

Plaintiffs, but in the context of written communications: 

It is the provisions of the FDCPA that by and of themselves determine

what debt collection activities are improper under federal law. If the

statute applies to [defendant's letter to plaintiff] and the letter does not

comply with the FDCPA's requirements, then by definition it

constitutes an improper debt collection activity under federal law. 

Romea v. Heilberger & Associates, 163 F.3d 111, 119 (2nd. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 

Ms. Thomasson acknowledged the validity of her debt by paying the Telecheck account

associated with GC Services' written notice. The record indicates after Mr. Thomasson called GC

Services in response to its one written notice of an MCI account balance to dispute his MCI account

had a balance owing, GC Services never contacted him again and closed the collection account.

Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to support an allegation that GC Services "falsely represented"

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any aspect of the MCI or Telecheck debts the company was engaged to collect from Plaintiffs, and

no reasonable factfinder could conclude on this record GC Services treated either named plaintiff in

an abusive or deceptive manner proscribed by the FDCPA with respect to the character or legal status

of the alleged consumer debts (FAC ¶ 49(b)), satisfying the summary judgment standard on that

FDCPA theory. Plaintiffs' produce no evidence to support the FAC's bare allegation GC Services

falsely represented the character and legal status of the alleged debts, eliminating that theory of

FDCPA recovery for failure to satisfy their shifted burden on summary judgment.

Accordingly, the only surviving allegation under this theory is that not revealing to consumers

a telephone conversation with a debt collector might be internally monitored in the normal course of

business by a collection company supervisor constitutes a per se violation of the FDCPA, irrespective

of the validity of the collection effort, the responsiveness of the collector to the purported debtor's

concerns, or any actual monitoring of the particular call(s). In order to prevail on a motion for

summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. GC Services disputes the practice of non-disclosure of possible monitoring

of conversations within the company can support a FDCPA violation allegation, arguing the failure

to make a disclosure of call monitoring polices is not the type of misconduct that the FDCPA is

designed to prevent. "Section 1692e is aimed at preventing deception in written and oral

communications made by debt collectors to consumers. . . ." Mot. 21:3-4. Plaintiffs rely on the

tenuous inference such "deception" might cause debtors "more freely" to provide information

necessary to establish the validity of the debt GC Services contracted to investigate and collect for its

clients than if they were alerted the debt collector's supervisor might also hear the conversation.

Plaintiffs cite no controlling legal authority to establish conduct alleged in their FAC falls

within the scope of the FDCPA's prohibition against the use of "false, deceptive, or misleading

representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. They

identify no particular statement or "representation" from GC Services as the foundation for the suit.

The court notes these Plaintiffs themselves initiated each of their telephone conversations with GC

Services, knowing they were calling a debt collection service and intending to clarify and resolve a

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particular alleged debt. Plaintiffs acknowledge they had accounts with the creditors on whose behalf

GC Services was acting. They appeared willing to speak to whoever answered the phone. The

obvious job of a collection agency's representative is to report the results of the collection effort to

the agency and the agency's clients on whose behalf the collector acts for that very purpose. Plaintiffs

allege no contact initiated by GC Services other than the initial mailing of apparently unobjectionable

written collection notices regarding their MCI and Telecheck accounts, providing information how to

respond to the creditor's claim. 

 Moreover, as traced above, GC Services produced evidence of its policy and instructions to

its agents to give the QMD/mini-Miranda disclosing its call monitoring policies to debtors in all

telephone conversations after they ascertain to whom they are speaking. The burden shifted to

Plaintiffs to produce evidence, not merely conclusory characterizations, that could convince a

reasonable factfinder GC Services fails to advise of call monitoring policies and that conduct

constitutes an abusive, harassing, or oppressive practice within the scope of the FDCPA. The burden

also shifted to Plaintiffs to provide evidentiary support for their allegations GC Services' conduct

causes consumers to be misled into revealing more personal information associated with the debt

collection activity to a GC Services employee they randomly reached by placing a call to the known

debt collection entity in response to a written notice than they otherwise would have had they known

a GC Services supervisor might internally monitor the call. The evidence here conclusively establishes

each of these Plaintiff acquired actual knowledge in the course of their first conversation of the

potential GC Services might monitor their calls. 

Without finding any facts on the merits, from the evidentiary record presented, the court

concludes no reasonable jury could find that any omission of the call monitoring advisement is other

than contrary to GC Services' policy or that such "misconduct" rises to the level of an FDCPA

violation. GC Services did not place any calls to these plaintiffs associated with its written debt

collection communications. Plaintiffs received an accurate answer to their inquiries regarding the

potential for call monitoring during the course of their initial conversations. 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded the FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Clark, 460 F.3d at

1176-77 (adopting the view the FDCPA is a strict liability statute on grounds "[r]equiring a violation

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 Although "the bona fide error defense will not shield a debt collector whose reliance on the

creditor's representation is unreasonable or who represents to the consumer a debt amount that is different from

the creditor's report" (Clark, 460 F.3d at 1177), no such facts are present here. 

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of § 1692e to be knowing or intentional needlessly renders superfluous § 1692k(c)," so that "intent is

only relevant to the determination of damages"); Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103

F.3d 1232, 1238, 1239 (5th Cir. 1997) ("the fact that violations were innocuous and not abusive may

be considered only in mitigating liability, and not as defenses under the Act"). The Clark court

endeavored "to adopt a construction of the FDCPA that recognizes 'there is room within the [FDCPA]

for ethical debt collectors to make occasional unavoidable errors,' and avoids imposing unreasonable

restrictions on the collection of debt." Clark, 460 F.3d at 1179, quoting Beattie v. D.M. Collections,

Inc., 745 F.Supp. 383, 392 (D. Del. 1991) (granting in part defendant debt collectors' summary

judgment motion ). The Beattie court pursued the two-step process to determine whether a violation

of the FDCPA occurred in circumstances where, among other things, plaintiffs alleged under specific

subsections of Sections 1692e, 1692d, and 1692g: the defendant agency failed to disclose in each

communication with them it was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would

be used for that purpose; mistaken attempts to collect from individuals not legally obligated to pay the

debt; threats to take actions not legally permissible and not intended to be taken; and conduct whose

natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt.

First, the court interpreted the pertinent sections of the statute as a matter of law. Then, the court made

the determination whether defendants' activities violated the statute as interpreted by the court. 

 In this case, the court finds as a matter of law the conduct Plaintiffs allege in this case on this

evidentiary record falls outside the scope of conduct targeted by the FDCPA, as they identify no abuse

or deception associated with GC Services' debt collection communications. Moreover: "Logically,

if a debt collector reasonably relies on the debt reported by the creditor, the debt collector will not be

liable for any errors."56 Clark, 460 F.3d at 1177. 

Even had Plaintiffs carried their burden to raise a triable issue of material fact associated with

their allegations of FDCPA violations, the statute recognizes a bona fide error defense to strict liability.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (defense available to debt collectors who demonstrate that the violation was

not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures

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 The issues associated with GC Services' contention CIPA is preempted by the federal Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Street Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq. ("Title III"), in pertinent part prohibiting the

interception of oral and wire communications (with certain exceptions), is discussed in the Order Denying

Motion For Partial Judgment On The Pleadings. See Dkt No. 52. Plaintiffs clarified at that time they are not

pursuing recovery for "eavesdropping" under CIPA § 631 (i.e., wiretapping), but rather are proceeding only

under CIPA § 632. Id. p.7, n.5. "Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a

confidential communication . . . eavesdrops upon or records such confidential communication," by its own

terms, violates CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.

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reasonably adapted to avoid such errors). GC Services pleads bone fide error as its Seventh

Affirmative Defense. FAC Ans. 7:23-27. Plaintiffs' reliance on 15 U.S.C. § 1692k for their statutory

damages relief, read in context and from the record before the court, permits a finding GC Services

met its burden to produce evidence to establish the elements of that affirmative defense.

A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this

subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence

that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error

notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to

avoid any such error. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (emphasis added); Clark, 460 F.3d at 1176-77.

In summary, Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to produce evidence sufficient to raise a

triable issue of material fact whether GC Services violated either the FDCPA prohibitions alleged or

failed to maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid errors resulting in FDCPA violations. Even

if they had, GC Services' formal procedures target avoidance or correction of any failure to inform the

consumer of the company's call monitoring policy, entitling it to benefit from the bona fide error

affirmative defense. Moreover, Plaintiffs produce no evidence their calls to GC Services were actually

monitored. The Motion for summary adjudication of the FDCPA claim is accordingly GRANTED.

3. Preemption

GC Services argues plaintiffs' reading of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, §§ 630 et seq.

("CIPA") conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted.57 Mot pp. 16-18. CIPA is privacy

legislation enacted, among other things, to prohibit recording or eavesdropping on confidential

communications without the consent of the parties to the communication. In the absence of a

developed evidentiary record, the court previously declined to find as a matter of law the Second and

Third causes of action (i.e., illegal recording and illegal monitoring of telephone communications,

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 The decision was also colored by the fact Plaintiffs at that time continued to invoke various and

potentially divergent privacy statutes from other states and commonwealths as part of their allegations

associated with the alleged privacy violations, whereas only the claims under California's CIPA remain viable

now. The court also declined to rule from the face of the pleadings alone whether GC Services actually

operates within an ordinary course of business exception to CIPA it contends exists, and noted resolution of

those issues would require elaboration of the facts associated with GC Services' actual conduct, equipment,

and manner of use in its debt collection business. Dkt No. 52, 19:8-11. 

59

 CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 provides, in pertinent part (emphasis added): "(a) Every person who,

intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic

amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication, whether the

communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph,

telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished . . . [¶] (b) The term "person" includes an

individual, business association, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity, and

an individual acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any government or subdivision thereof, whether

federal, state, or local, but excludes an individual known by all parties to a confidential communication to be

overhearing or recording the communication. [¶] (c) The term "confidential communication" includes any

communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication

desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made . . . in any other

circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may

be overheard or recorded. . . ."

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respectively) are necessarily preempted by federal law.58 Dkt No. 52, p. 13. The court concludes the

CIPA claims specific to the recording and monitoring of calls as presented in the FAC are not

preempted by the FDCPA prohibitions against false, deceptive, or abusive collection practices for the

reasons discussed above and the differing scope of those statutes. 

GC Services also argues Plaintiffs' CIPA claims are preempted by the California Public

Utilities Commission ("CPUC") regulations controlling business call monitoring, so Plaintiffs

purportedly cannot proceed under the CIPA for either of their state law claims: business "call

monitoring (as opposed to 'eavesdropping') is not prohibited by CIPA." Reply 3:12-13. The court

finds it need not reach the CPUC preemption argument. As noted by GC Services, the gravamen of

Plaintiffs' complaint is the issue of non-disclosure, under either CIPA or the CPUC:

If a disclosure is the linchpin of liability that plaintiffs claim it

to be -- under CIPA or the CPUC regulations that [purportedly]

actually govern this dispute -- GC Services is entitled to summary

judgment because the evidence in this case points in only one direction.

Mot. 16:6-8 (emphasis added).

4. Second Cause Of Action

Two of Plaintiffs' three causes of action rely on CIPA§ 632 as the basis for liability.59 The

Second Cause Of Action alleges "illegal recording of conversations" between the consumer putative

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60

 CIPA protects only California residents communications while they are in California, so the CIPA

claims of any non-residents initially proposed as putative class members could not proceed on that theory, even

if the action had not already been narrowed to a California resident putative class. See Kearney, 39 Cal.4th 95.

61

 The parties' Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts establishes GC Services' call centers in California

utilize Nortel's "Meridian 1" telephone system, a "commercially available business telephone system" which

does "not have the capacity to record telephone conversations," even though it "does provide for restricted

access by GC Services' managers to monitor its debt collection calls." Undisputed Facts 2-3.

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class members and GC Services' collection personnel, "in violation of applicable state/commonwealth

laws prohibiting the recording of telephone calls without two-party consent." FAC 11:5-6; FAC ¶ 52.

Only California law remains at issue.60 Plaintiffs seek statutory damages and injunctive relief for

alleged "illegal recording of conversations." FAC 11:5-6. The survival of this claim depends, at a

minimum, on a showing GC Services, through its employees, actually "surreptitiously" recorded

telephonic "confidential communications" with Plaintiffs. 

The evidence presented in support of the Motion conclusively establishes the tape recording

of communications does not occur at GC Services' California locations. For example, in response to

Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 6, GC Services states "it does not record telephone conversations it

conducts with alleged debtors in California." Schroth, Jr. Exh. C, 7:9-10. It identifies the make and

model of its telephone equipment and substantiates that equipment has no recording capability.

Wojcicki Depo. 101:1-7; Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts.61 GC Services employees testified no

recording of debt collection communications between consumers and GC Services occurs in

connection with its debt collection services for such clients as MCI and Telecheck. GC Services'

Interrogatory responses also substantiate it records no calls in California. 

Despite the Joint Statement, Plaintiffs unreasonably continue to emphatically argue: "GC

Services admits it monitored calls within the applicable time frame and the [unspecified] evidence

shows its calls were also recorded. Liability is conclusively established." Opp. 8:1-3 (emphasis

added). The court is directed to no such "evidence." Plaintiffs elsewhere state: "There can be no

question in law or fact that confidential communications between consumers and GC Services are

monitored and recorded (Opp. 13:3-4), again with no evidence for those categorical contentions. The

evidence, by Plaintiffs' own concession in the Joint Statement, conclusively establishes GC Services

does not have the capability to record monitored calls at its California locations. 

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In addition, GC Services produces unrefuted evidence it does not record conversations

associated with any of its debt collection services. Any recording of communications by GC Services

occurs only in the company's telemarketing call monitoring or customer care monitoring, not in GC

Services debt collection activities, which is a third and separate service the company offers. 

Q. Does GC Services record telephone conversations between debt

collectors employed by GC Services and any other persons? 

 A. No. 

Q. Ever? 

A. Not that I'm aware of. 

. . . 

Q. . . . How about debt collection conversations? Are any of those

recorded? 

A. No. 

Wojcicki Depo. pp. 53-59, 66.

The court finds GC Services is entitled to summary adjudication of this claim as a matter of

law, and the Motion accordingly is GRANTED with respect to the Second Cause of Action.

5. Third Cause Of Action

The Third Cause of Action alleges GC Services illegally monitors or eavesdrops on its own

telephone conversations without the consent of the participating putative class members, in violation

of California's CIPA statute criminalizing invasions of privacy. FAC ¶¶ 52-53. Plaintiffs seek

statutory damages and injunctive relief for alleged "illegal monitoring/eavesdropping of

conversations." FAC 12:14-15. The court construes the "eavesdropping" conduct and the

"monitoring" conduct to be co-extensive in this case, as no third-parties beyond GC Services'

employees and Plaintiffs are alleged to have participated, and Plaintiffs rely solely on CIPA § 632. 

Plaintiffs allege in support of this claim GC Services "has allowed, enabled and encouraged

certain of its personnel employed by Defendant GC SERVICES to secretly listen in on telephone

conversations between persons who are alleged to owe money and [other] individuals employed by

Defendant GC Services" and that conduct allegedly constitutes a violation of CIPA. FAC ¶ 58. GC

Services admits it randomly monitors some of the debt collection calls between its employees and

consumers transpiring in the normal course of its third-party debt collection business. GC Services

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62

 "Q. Are the GC Services employees advised to tell persons who are engaged in telephone

conversations with them that the call could be monitored? A. Yes. Q. Do they give that advisement? A.

Yes." Wojcicki Depo. 151:2-8. Mr. Wojcicki testified the monitoring forms evaluating calls records whether

the notice was not given; if there is no reference on the monitoring form, then the notice was given. Id. 151:10-

21. GC Services has written policies for the protection of personal/financial information. Id. 161:14-18.

63

 The evidence demonstrates that GC Services trains its collectors to deliver a "QMD" -- quality

monitoring disclosure -- in all business telephone calls. McFarlane Dep. at 79:4-16. GC Services' managers

monitor collector performance of this task and intervene in any telephone call where the QMD is not given

before business is conducted in the call. Id. at 25:21-26:5; Stevens Dep. at 26:10-17." Mot. 16:9-14. GC

Services "discloses its quality monitoring program to every in-bound and out-bound caller." Mot. 16:8-9. Any

failure to do so must be construed on the evidentiary record presented as contrary to company policy.

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has produced evidence of its policies with respect to that practice, substantiating its formal procedure

is for its employees to provide the advisement of possible call monitoring for quality control, as

discussed above. Wojcicki Depo 151:2-6;62 see the evidentiary foundation associated with the

discussion of the First Cause Of Action, above. 

The court has rejected Plaintiffs' conclusory representations that "there is no other conclusion

but that GC Services['] [alleged] failure to provide an advisement prior to its calls with consumers

being monitored or recorded is consciously false, deceptive, and misleading under the FDCPA." Opp.

17:4-7. The court also rejects their effort, based solely on the strength of argument and self-serving

affidavits, to defeat GC Services' evidentiary showing its established policies, practices, and

procedures entail a "mini-Miranda" or "QMD" advisement that telephone calls may be monitored.63

Nevertheless, "[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that business call 'monitoring' equates to

'eavesdropping' under CIPA, there can be no CIPA liability unless the plaintiff's calls were in fact

monitored." Mot. P&A 23:20-22. The FAC allegations go only so far as to say Plaintiffs' calls "may"

have been monitored. Plaintiffs remain unable at this late stage in the litigation to advance beyond that

speculative representation in the FAC, a deficiency affecting not only their standing to pursue relief

for a harm they are unable to prove they suffered but also their ability to prevail on the Third Cause

Of Action. On a shifted burden, Plaintiffs' obligation is to present "significant probative evidence

tending to support its claim. . . ." Intel Corp., 952 F.2d at 1558. They offer only the inadequate

conclusory allegations in their own affidavits, unsupported by factual data, an insufficient showing to

oppose summary adjudication of the claim in GC Services' favor. See Hansen, 7 F.3d at 138. 

\\

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64

 Plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge a difference between consumers solicited by phone and

consumers responding to a notice of alleged debt: "Individuals are called by GC Services in the search for

money . . . .With each such call, a GC Services employee -- a stranger to the person called -- is requesting

names, addresses, telephone number, and other private and confidential information." Opp. 12:22-24.

65

 Plaintiffs' Opposition obstinately insists, contrary to summary judgment review standards and the

evidentiary record, "[t]he Thomassons have provided enough evidence to prevail at trial and GC Services has

utterly failed to meet its burden in this motion by proffering statements based on admittedly falsified and

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Even if supervisory employees of GC Services could be deemed "third-parties" with respect

to conversations between other GC Services employees and consumer debtors (a dubious contention),

GC Services shifted the burden to Plaintiffs to produce evidence it monitored any of the Thomasson

conversations. In reliance on discovery responses it provided under court order to produce a list of

names, addresses, and telephone numbers of debtors whose conversations GC Services monitored, GC

Services denies it ever monitored any of the Thomassons' communications with the company.64 Mot.

P&A 24:17-22, citing Exh. 7 at p. 15. "There is a complete evidentiary failure to support their

individual claims and, absent some real factual support, plaintiffs' 'beliefs' do not suffice to defeat

summary judgment." Mot. P&A 24:22-25:2, citing FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d

1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any

supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact"); Stevens v. County of

San Mateo, 2006 WL 581092 at *9 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 7, 2006) (granting summary judgment to defendant

where defendant produced documents refuting plaintiff's claims, and plaintiff lacked any factual

support other than self-serving affidavit), citing FTC, 104 F.3d at 1171. 

Plaintiffs cite no evidentiary support for their conclusory allegation, contradicted by the

testimonial evidence: "The [monitoring] advisement, therefore, is often not given so that consumers

will mistakenly believe they are not being monitored or recorded." Opp. 16:25-26 (emphasis added).

The testifying GC Services supervisors all allude to the "mini-Miranda" or "QMD" advisement as a

required component of collection communications ("talk out"). Moreover,theThomassons knew from

the first call either placed to GC Services in response to the debt collection letters the conversation

might be internally monitored by the company because each asked and was told so. Any of their calls

thereafter must be construed as placed with knowledge of the potential for monitoring by company

representatives other than the individual who answered the phone at GC Services.65

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incomplete 'documentary evidence,'" in opposition to GC Services' contention Plaintiffs are unable "to

demonstrate [they were] monitored, save for [their] belief it is so." Opp. P&A 25:10-16. They argue the

"belief stems from an admission of a GC Services employee, an admission that GC Services has not disputed

in its moving papers despite its knowledge as to where the information emanates -- its own employees" (Opp.

P&A 25:11-13), alluding presumably to the isolated, abberational instances of oversight or misconduct Bond

and others testified would be stopped if detected by a supervisor. 

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The court is under no obligation to "scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable

fact," nor need it "examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the

evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate references so that it could be

conveniently found." See Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1278; Carmen, 237 F.3d at 1031. Plaintiffs argue from

their beliefs, suspicions, and bare allegations rather than identifying specific, admissible evidence in

the voluminous record presented that could permit a reasonable factfinder to find in their favor.

Absent a showing of personal injury, these plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue this claim or this

litigation, on their own behalf or as putative class representatives. Cook Treaty Tribes, 166 F.3d at

989. As with the First and Second causes of action, the court finds GC Services is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on its Third Cause of Action, and the Motion is GRANTED in its entirety.

E. Motion To Certify Class

In consideration of the ruling on GC Services' Motion For Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs'

Motion To Certify Class is DENIED AS MOOT. Even had this action survived summary judgment,

the court would have denied the motion on the merits as based on allegations and class descriptions

from an SAC that was not authorized to be filed and therefore irrelevant to the disposition of the class

certification issues in the operative pleading. 

F. Motion For Limitation On Communication With Putative Class Members And

Sanctions

The relief pursued in defendant's Motion For Limitation On Communication With Putative

Class Members is necessarily resolved by the grant of summary judgment on the merits of the claims

and rejection of the named plaintiffs' standing to represent the alleged class. Accordingly, this Motion

is DENIED AS MOOT.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

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2. Defendant's Motion For Limitation On Communications With Putative Class Members

is DENIED AS MOOT.

3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class is DENIED AS MOOT.

4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate the case.

5. The parties shall jointly and promptly arrange to pick up the chambers copy of the

exhibits filed under seal associated with these motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 13, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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