Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05169/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05169-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUE ROSANNE TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, and DAVID LARSON,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-05169 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO HAVE

AVERMENTS DEEMED

ADMISSIONS, AND DENYING

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this civil rights action, plaintiff moves to have averments in defendant David Larson’s

answer deemed admissions and moves for partial summary judgment as to her claims against

Larson. Plaintiff has shown that some of the facts alleged in complaint were within defendant’s

sphere of knowledge, thus it was inappropriate for Larson to allege in his answer that he lacked

sufficient information. For plaintiff’s other allegations, those matters were not clearly within

Larson’s sphere of his knowledge, so denial for lack of information was consistent with his

obligations under Rule 11(b). As to plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff

has failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to her claims for malicious prosecution under

42 U.S.C. 1983. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to have averments deemed admissions is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment

is DENIED. 

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STATEMENT

This case began as an ordinary fender bender and ended as a nightmare for plaintiff,

according to the complaint. On April 5, 2004, plaintiff Sue Rosanne Taylor, a 57-year-old

woman, was involved in a minor, non-injury car accident in Oakland, California (Chanin Decl.

Exh. 2, ¶ 2). She declares that she pulled her vehicle over and attempted to exchange

information with the other driver involved, Salim Zahraoui (id. at ¶ 3). Taylor was unable to

get information from Zahraoui, so she called the City of Oakland police department using her

cellular phone (id. at ¶ 6). When calling the police dispatcher, Taylor reported that she had

been in a minor traffic accident and gave the dispatcher her cell phone number (id. at Exh. 2, ¶¶

5–8; Exh. 3). 

Taylor declared that there was a delay in the arrival of the Oakland police during which

time Zahraoui became increasingly hostile. She made several calls to the police department. 

Because Taylor reported that Zahraoui had been threatening and failed to exchange information,

the dispatcher advised Taylor to stay in her car, lock the doors, and wait for the police to arrive

(id. at Exh. 3, 9–10). In her fifth call, Taylor asked the dispatcher if she could leave because

she did not feel safe and had not gotten Zahraoui’s information. The dispatcher advised her as

follows (id. at 11–15):

Taylor: Do, uh, you have an officer on the way to 29th and

(inaudible), I’ve got a man who hit me as I was

trying to cross Harrison.

Dispatcher: 29th and Harrison?

Taylor: He refuses . . . 

Dispatcher: Hello . . . 

Taylor: Yeah, he refuses to give identification or insurance

information. (inaudible). Are you there?

Dispatcher: Yes.

Taylor: Yeah.

Dispatch: We have the call. We’re trying to get an extra

officer available; it’s real busy right now, so we’re

trying to get a unit.

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Taylor: Yeah, see I’m not safe sitting here with him close

by, locked in my car or not. He’s a real loose

cannon; trying to elicit neighbors to make witness

reports and there were no witnesses. He works for

a delivery service. He’s had somebody come from

his company and pick up things and drive away

with them. I, I just feel real unsafe.

***

Taylor: Alright, what damage do I do myself by getting my

Triple A on the phone and getting out of here. I

took some photographs of the location of his car,

of my car, of him because he refuses to identify

himself. I got a description of the man who picked

up his courier materials. He wouldn’t give me his

name because this man just came at us and shouted

“Don’t tell her anything.” Um.

Dispatch: Well.

Taylor: Can you, can you advise me on that?

Dispatch: Ma’am, if you don’t feel safe, you have to use your

judgment on that. If you don’t feel safe then you

might want to leave, is, as uh you go with the

information you have, but uh . . . 

Taylor: Okay, I don’t violate any law by getting out of

here, do I?

Dispatch: Well, well you’re supposed to exchange

information. If under the circumstances, he’s not

willing to exchange information . . . 

Taylor: Uh, huh . . . 

Dispatch: . . . then if you leave you can always, always make

a report at a later time.

Taylor: Oh, I could come down to you and make the

report, couldn’t I?

Dispatch: Yeah, yeah . . . police report is not required by law

unless there is a crime or injury involved.

***

Dispatch: So, are you gonna wait, or what?

Taylor: Well, I don’t know. I’m going to determine

whether I can move my car at all. I don’t know

that.

Dispatch: Yeah, if you, if you leave, then you call us back,

Okay?

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Taylor: Oh, I will do that, sure.

Taylor left, and then called the dispatcher again (id. at 16–17):

Taylor: Hi, I just spoke to an officer, I uh, was hit on

Harrison Street, and I told him I felt very unsafe. 

Was gonna try to get the man to identify himself

and he refused to and I have now left the scene. 

And he just asked me to call you back.

Dispatch: You left the scene?

Taylor: Yes, he told me it was alright. There was no

injury.

Dispatch: Okay, but you’re gonna have to go to the Traffic

Division to make a report then. We don’t send

officers out. 

Taylor: Right.

Dispatch: Ok, do you know where the police station is at?

Taylor: I do. Yeah, now I’m gonna get home and address

the damage to my car first. So, is that alright with

you?

Dispatch: Yeah, that’s fine. I mean once you’ve left the

scene you have to go to the Traffic Division. I

mean, it could be a week later, a month later —

but, by law you don’t have to have a report. But

um . . . 

Taylor: Well . . . well, I think we’re going to want one. 

Dispatch: Yeah, if your insurance requires it, you could go

down the Traffic Division . . . and make a report in

person. 

 According to Larson’s supplemental report, he arrived at the scene after Taylor had left

(Chanin Decl. Exh. 5). Thereafter, Larson issued a broadcast that Taylor had been engaged in a

hit and run (ibid.). He then headed toward Taylor’s residence. While he was en route, Oakland

Police Officer Hoyle stopped Taylor and physically detained her in front of her residence (id. at

Exh. 2, ¶¶ 13–14). According to Larson’s supplemental police report, Taylor informed Hoyle

that she had been told by the police dispatcher that she could leave the scene of the accident (id.

at Exh. 5). Plaintiff declared that she sustained injuries to her shoulder, wrist and arm during

her arrest (id. at Exh. 2, ¶ 15). 

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Taylor was then placed under arrest by Officer Hoyle and Sergeant Larson and taken to

Alameda County Medical Center for treatment for her injuries (id. at ¶ 20). The officers then

took her to the City of Oakland jail, and she was booked and placed in a cell. She was released

the next day after she posted bond (id. at ¶ 20). 

According to his report, Officer Hoyle ultimately did not decide to issue a citation to

plaintiff on the day of the incident (id. at Exh. 8). Larson then wrote a supplemental report in 

which he described listening to the tapes of the phone calls between Taylor and the dispatcher,

determined they were inconclusive, and ordered that Taylor be arrested for resisting arrest, but

not for leaving the scene of a car accident (id. at Exh. 5). Taylor later asked for tapes of the

conversations between Taylor and police dispatch. The supplemental report that Larson made

later recommended prosecuting Taylor for leaving the scene of an accident (ibid.). William

Valladon, an employee of the Oakland Police Department, testified in his deposition that he

recalled that Larson had asked for records of all of the phone calls between Taylor and police

dispatch, but that he did not recall for certain whether or not he gave tapes of all of the

conversations to Larson (Treppa Decl. Exh. 3, 69:1–23). 

Taylor was criminally prosecuted for leaving the scene of an accident, and the case was

pending for nearly two years. On May 24, 2006, Taylor’s motion for acquittal was granted at

the close of evidence in her criminal trial (id. at Exh. 9). 

This action was filed on August 24, 2006. Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of her

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Larson and the City of Oakland and a Monell claim

against the City of Oakland. As he did in the prior criminal case, defendant Larson has asserted

his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff filed this motion to

have averments in Larson’s answer deemed admissions and for partial summary judgment as to

the claim against Larson on July 19, 2007. Trial in this action is set for December 3, 2007. 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves to have certain of defendant Larson’s averments in his answer deemed

admissions. Plaintiff also moves for partial summary judgment on her claims against defendant

Larson. This motion does not address any of Taylor’s claims against the City of Oakland.

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1. MOTION TO HAVE AVERMENTS IN ANSWER DEEMED ADMISSIONS.

Under Rule 8(b), a party must answer the allegations in the complaint. “When a pleader

intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, the pleader shall

specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(b). Denials of allegations are subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. Specifically,

“[b]y presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a

pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to

the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable

under the circumstances . . . the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or

if specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a lack of information or belief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b)(4). 

“An answer asserting want of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of

facts alleged in a complaint does not serve as a denial if the assertion of ignorance is obviously

a sham. In such circumstances the facts alleged in the complaint stand admitted.” Harvey

Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 757 (9th Cir. 1964) (holding that a company’s denial

of knowledge of common ownership and control was clearly a sham, so the allegation was

deemed admitted). Grant of a motion to consider an averment to be an admission is a severe

sanction that is best granted after a significant amount of discovery. Gallagher v. England,

2005 WL 3299509, *5 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Ishii, J.). 

Plaintiff seeks to have paragraphs 17–19, and 21–25 of Larson’s answer to be deemed

admissions because the defendant has not answered truthfully. At the hearing, plaintiff’s

counsel withdrew the motion as to paragraph 35, which Larson had denied in his answer. In all

of these disputed paragraphs, defendant alleges that he lacks sufficient knowledge. Plaintiff

argues that the facts alleged in these paragraphs were within Larson’s sphere of knowledge, so

he cannot plead that he lacks knowledge consistent with his obligations under Rule 11. 

Turning to plaintiff’s specific allegations, paragraph 17 alleged that Larson arrived on

the scene of the accident after plaintiff departed, that he was a sergeant at the time and the

senior officer on the scene. Larson admitted in his answer that he was a sergeant and denied the

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rest of the allegations for lack of information. Here, after discovery, it is quite obvious that

there can be no question that he was on the scene after plaintiff departed, and that he was the

senior officer on the scene. In his supplemental report, Larson wrote that he went to the scene

to assist Officer A. Coaston, another officer. Once there, he reported that Zahraoui told him

that the other driver, Taylor, had left three to four minutes earlier (Chanin Decl. Exh. 5). Thus,

plaintiff’s motion is granted as to this paragraph. 

In paragraphs 18 and 19, Taylor alleges that Larson did not make an adequate

investigation of the situation, ordered that Taylor should be arrested, and that as a result, Officer

Hoyle arrested Taylor outside of her home. These are not allegations that should be deemed

admitted particularly where they address the subjective motivations of Officer Hoyle. Larson’s

denial is not clearly a sham, so plaintiff’s motion is denied as to these allegations.

Paragraphs 21 through 25 address what happened during Taylor’s arrest. Taylor alleges

that she was subjected to excessive force, that she had been specifically told that she could

leave the scene by the police dispatcher, that plaintiff was exercising her First Amendment

rights by complaining about the officer’s use of excessive force. She also alleged that Larson

failed to prevent Officer Hoyle from using excessive force against her, and that Larson had

admitted that there was a “problem” with the facts surrounding Taylor’s arrest. Again, these are

not allegations that were absolutely within Larson’s sphere of knowledge, particularly since

they go to what Officer Hoyle did and believed. Plaintiff has not shown that Larson’s answers

were clearly a sham. Accordingly, the remedy of deeming these allegations admissions is not

warranted. Plaintiff’s motion to have averments deemed admissions is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. The allegations in paragraph 17 are deemed admitted. 

2. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits

show “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of

production to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Playboy

Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24

(1986). “If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and ‘set forth specific facts’ that show a genuine

issue for trial.” Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

Plaintiff contends that there are no triable issues of fact remaining in her claims for

malicious prosecution against defendant Larson. To prevail on a claim for malicious

prosecution, the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused her to be prosecuted with malice

and without probable case, and that he did so for the purpose of denying the plaintiff a specific

constitutional right. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A. Probable Cause.

Plaintiff first presents evidence that there was no triable issue of fact that she was

prosecuted without probable cause. Probable cause requires a fair probability or substantial

chance of criminal activity, as determined by the totality of the circumstances known to the

officer at the time. United States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002). Here,

plaintiff presents evidence that Larson admitted to Hoyle that there was a “problem” with

arresting Taylor for leaving the scene of the accident, and that the tapes of the conversations

between Taylor and the police dispatcher show conclusively that Taylor was told that she could

leave the scene of the accident without running afoul of the law. Specifically, Taylor told the

dispatcher that she intended to leave the scene of the accident, the dispatcher told her that she

could later fill out an accident report at the station, and that Taylor should call dispatch after she

had left the scene. Taylor did so. 

Defendant contends that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether he received all of

the tapes of Taylor’s calls to the police dispatcher, and thus whether he had all of the relevant

information available to him in making his decision to press charges. At best, Valladon, the

employee responsible for turning over the recordings, testified that he did not recall whether or

not he gave all of the relevant tapes to Larson. Moreover, in Larson’s supplemental report, he

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summarizes the portions of the tapes in which the dispatcher and Taylor discuss whether or not

she should leave. His report stated that Taylor did not call the dispatcher back after she left the

scene. He went on to conclude that she had already formed the intent to leave the scene, that

she did not sound like she really felt in danger because of the other driver, and that she wanted

to leave the scene because she feared being blamed for the accident. Even though Taylor has

presented convincing evidence that she did call the police back after she left the scene of the

accident, Larson’s report makes no mention of it. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to defendant, and based on the information he had at the time, a reasonable trier of fact could

conclude that Larson did not know Taylor had called police dispatch after leaving the scene of

the accident. 

Larson also argues that Zahraoui’s statements the Taylor was the one who refused to

exchange information create a triable issue of fact. Taylor declared that Zahraoui refused to

exchange information with her, thus their two versions of the story conflict. Plaintiff protests

that those statements are hearsay, but they are relevant to determining what Taylor believed

when he made his report. Accordingly, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Larson,

a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he had probable cause to recommend that Taylor

be brought up on charges. This is not to say that probable cause did exist; in fact, a jury could

find as well that Larson acted in bad faith with no probable cause. That, however, is for the jury

to decide. 

Defendant also argues that the ultimate decision to prosecute Taylor was made by the

prosecutor, not Larson himself. Liability for selective and malicious prosecution is not limited

to prosecutors; others who have wrongfully caused charges to be filed may be held liable. 

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2002). A defendant may

be held liable if the plaintiff can show that the defendant improperly exerted pressure on the

prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or

otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct actively instrumental in causing the

initiation of legal proceedings without probable cause. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067. Here,

Larson concluded in his report that there was probable cause to bring charges for leaving the

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scene of an accident against Taylor. Even though Larson may not have made the ultimate

decision to charge Taylor with leaving the scene of an accident, he still may be held liable for

malicious prosecution. 

B. Malice.

Plaintiff must next show that Larson caused her to be prosecuted with malice. Merely

showing that a plaintiff was ultimately acquitted is not sufficient to prove a claim of malicious

prosecution; evidence of malice or intent is required. See Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149

F.3d 951, 962–65 (9th Cir. 1998); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en

banc). Neither side disputes that Taylor was ultimately acquitted of leaving the scene of the

accident. 

Taylor contends that Larson listened to all of the calls that she had made to the

dispatcher, including the one where she called dispatch after she had left the scene of the

accident. His supplemental report specifically stated that Taylor did not call the police back

after leaving the scene of the accident (Chanin Decl. Exh. 5). Plaintiff contends that this means

that Larson deliberately omitted mention of that call. He then filed a false report in order to

bring her up on charges of leaving the scene of the accident. This order has already concluded

that a reasonable trier of fact could find that Larson had probable cause to recommend that

charges be brought against Taylor. Simply assuming that Larson filed a false report and

deliberately omitted Taylor’s last call is too much of a logical leap. Viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to defendant, as must be done, it is possible that a reasonable jury could

conclude that Larson did not receive the tape of that phone call or that he otherwise neglected to

note Taylor’s final call to the police dispatch. Accordingly, plaintiff has not eliminated all

triable issues of fact as to whether defendant acted with malice. 

C. Purpose of Denying a Constitutional Right.

Plaintiff argues that Larson undertook to have her prosecuted for the purpose of denying

her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff presents

little to no evidence that Larson’s actions were done with the purpose of denying her rights. 

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Indeed, her motion seems to merely recite some of the elements required without showing

evidence to support her claim. 

To show that defendant intended to deprive her of her First Amendment rights, plaintiff

must show that her protected speech was a motivating factor in defendant’s wrongful conduct. 

Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1071. A First Amendment malicious prosecution claim must be based on

something more than a speculative chilling of speech based on legitimate and generalized law

enforcement initiatives. A showing of specific, targeted police surveillance and action intended

to suppress protected speech is sufficient. Mendocino Environmental Ctr. v. Mendocino

County, 14 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 1994). Taylor’s showing falls far short of that. She merely

declared that she was exercising her First Amendment rights in protesting against Hoyle and

Larson’s alleged use of excessive force against her. Taylor presents no evidence that her speech

was protected, or that it motivated Larson to prosecute her. 

As to plaintiff’s theory under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that she

was subjected to a seizure, including an arrest or an incarceration. Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). Neither side disputes that Taylor was arrested. She

posted bond and was released, however, before she was charged with leaving the scene of an

accident. Larson’s allegedly filing a false report after Taylor was arrested and released is the

heart of her claim. Plaintiff presented no evidence that she was arrested or incarcerated after

Larson filed his supplemental report. Here, plaintiff simply has not met her burden of showing

that Larson caused her to be prosecuted for the purpose of depriving her of her Fourth

Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure. 

Malicious prosecution claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are rooted in principles

of equal protection. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). To prevail on a

malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove that members of an identifiable class were

singled out for enforcement of the law while nonmembers of the class were not prosecuted. Id.

at 465 (“The claimant must demonstrate that the . . . prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory

effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.”). In other words, the decision

whether to prosecute may not be “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as

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race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). On

the other hand, “[m]ere selectivity in prosecution creates no constitutional problem.” United

States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972). Here, plaintiff fails to identify both a

protected class on the basis of which she was prosecuted in contravention of equal protection,

and similarly situated persons who were not prosecuted. Taylor seems to argue that Zahraoui

was similarly situated to plaintiff, but he was never cited for leaving the scene of the accident. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to defendant, Taylor has not shown that she was

prosecuted in violation of equal protection principles. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to

eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Larson caused Taylor to be prosecuted in order

to deprive her of an identifiable constitutional right. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary

judgment is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, plaintiff’s motion to have averments deemed

admission is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment as to her claims against Larson for malicious prosecution is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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