Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_22-cv-05121/USCOURTS-arwd-5_22-cv-05121-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

ABIGAIL FARELLA; LOGAN W. MURPHY; 

and All Others Similarly Situated PLAINTIFFS 

V. CASE NO. 5:22-CV-5121

DISTRICT JUDGE A.J. ANGLIN; 

GREGG PARRISH; and JAY SAXTON DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This litigation arises from a bail hearing procedure in Benton County District Court 

that Plaintiffs Abigail Farella and Logan W. Murphy maintain is constitutionally defective.

They argue under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments that indigent criminal 

defendants have a right to legal representation during the judicial officer’s determination 

of bail—and that Defendants violated that right by failing to timely appoint counsel before 

their bail was set. Defendants are Benton County District Judge A.J. Anglin; Gregg 

Parrish, Executive Director of the Arkansas Public Defender Commission; and Jay 

Saxton, Chief Benton County Public Defender—all sued in their official capacities. 

Plaintiffs contend that their injury was not an exception, but the rule. They now 

move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to certify a class of “those indigent 

individuals who will appear before Judge Anglin for a bail hearing and will not have 

appointed counsel present to represent them.” Doc. 87, p. 1 (cleaned up); see also Doc. 

34, ¶ 31. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 87) is fully briefed and ripe for 

review.

1 For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is GRANTED. 

1 See Doc. 86 (Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support); Docs. 90–91 (Defendants Parrish and Saxton’s 

Joint Response and Brief in Support); Doc. 92 (Judge Anglin’s Response); Doc. 93 

(Plaintiffs’ Reply to Judge Anglin).

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I. BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. 34) describes two nearly identical 

instances of the alleged procedural defect in Judge Anglin’s court. The first was set in 

motion on May 20, 2022, when Bentonville Police Department officers arrested Ms.

Farella for felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and misdemeanor shoplifting. She alleges that she was transported to the 

Benton County Jail and placed in a cell. Bentonville Police Corporal Kevin Albert filed a 

sworn probable cause affidavit later that day and attached a report indicating that the

State joined him in requesting that a $2,500 bond be set for Ms. Farella. On May 22, 

2022, Ms. Farella appeared before Judge Anglin pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 8.1 for an initial hearing, during which he set her bail at $10,000 cash or 

corporate surety and scheduled arraignment—Ms. Farella’s next court date—for June 27, 

2022. After bail was set and the arraignment scheduled, Judge Anglin found Ms. Farella 

indigent and appointed a public defender to represent her in subsequent proceedings. 

According to Plaintiffs, the procedural defect is as follows: Whereas the 

prosecutor’s recommendation as to bond amount and pretrial release conditions was 

considered at Ms. Farella’s bail hearing, she was not afforded a parallel opportunity to 

contest that recommendation; a public defender was not present at the hearing and was

not appointed until after Judge Anglin set her bond amount and pretrial release conditions. 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, the Plaintiffs and Judge Anglin agree on the following facts, 

and Defendants Parrish and Saxton lack information sufficient to admit or deny them. 

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Plaintiffs contend that this procedure violated Ms. Farella’s right to counsel under the 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

One month later, on June 20, 2022, Bentonville Police arrested Mr. Murphy for 

felony fleeing and misdemeanor reckless driving, and the alleged procedural defect

reoccurred. Bentonville Police submitted a sworn probable cause affidavit with a report 

from another officer stating that the State joined him in requesting that Mr. Murphy’s bond

be set at $25,000. During Mr. Murphy’s bail hearing the next day, Judge Anglin set bail at 

$40,000 cash or corporate surety, set arraignment for July 25, 2022, found Mr. Murphy 

indigent, and appointed a public defender to represent him at future proceedings. 

Plaintiffs allege that Judge Anglin again considered the prosecutor’s recommendation 

concerning Mr. Murphy’s bond amount and pretrial release conditions without allowing a

public defender a parallel opportunity to advocate on Mr. Murphy’s behalf. 

Plaintiffs maintain that Ms. Farella’s and Mr. Murphy’s experiences are the norm. 

Judge Anglin conducts felony and misdemeanor bail hearings in multiple Benton County 

courts for thirteen calendar weeks per year throughout his four-year term. Roughly 

twenty-five percent of bail hearings in Benton County are conducted by Judge Anglin, 

translating to a total caseload upwards of one thousand cases annually. Plaintiffs, as well 

as Mr. Parrish and Mr. Saxton, agree that public defenders do not attend bail hearings 

before Judge Anglin; however, Judge Anglin denies that allegation. If Plaintiffs’ allegations 

are true, then indigent defendants’ bail amounts are set and pretrial release conditions 

are decided without attorney representation—despite the undisputed fact that State 

prosecutors are permitted to join police in requesting bond amounts. Ultimately, Plaintiffs 

seek a declaration from this Court that Judge Anglin’s bail hearing procedure violates the 

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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction that would require defense 

counsel’s presence and participation in the bail determination for indigent defendants—

though such relief reaches far beyond the present Motion. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. 

Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] decision to certify a class is far from a 

conclusive judgment on the merits . . . .”).

Here, Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of indigent, unrepresented criminal 

defendants, which they define as: “(1) pre-trial detainees; (2) who have or will appear 

before District Judge A.J. Anglin; (3) for a bail / pre-trial release hearing under Arkansas 

Rules of Criminal Procedure 8-9; (4) who are indigent; and (5) do not have appointed 

[public defender] representation at that hearing.” (Doc. 86, p. 3). Plaintiffs request that the 

Court designate Ms. Farella and Mr. Murphy as Class Representatives and Mr. Doug 

Norwood and Ms. Alison Lee of Norwood & Norwood P.A. as Lead Class Counsel. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proving that the 

requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied. See Walmart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 

(2011). Pursuant to Rule 23, certifying a class action requires two steps. First, under Rule 

23(a), a class action may be maintained if the following prerequisites are met: (1) the 

class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions 

of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Moreover, “[a]n implicit 

requirement for any class certification inquiry involves a court's assessment as to the 

ascertainability of the class.” Fochtman v. DARP, Inc., 2019 WL 406146, at *3 (W.D. Ark. 

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Jan. 31, 2019). To be ascertainable, the proposed class description must be sufficiently 

definite to identify class members by objective criteria. See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC 

v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2016). 

Second, the plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of one of Rule 23(b)’s three 

subsections. See In Re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 2005). At issue 

here, Rule 23(b)(2) applies where the opposing party acts or refuses to act on grounds

applying generally to the class, such that final injunctive relief or corresponding 

declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a whole and would provide relief to each 

member of the class. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 345–46, 360. Class claims under Rule 

23(b)(2) must be cohesive, “in that ‘the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class 

at once.’” Ebert v. General Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 480 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Dukes, 

564 U.S. at 361–62) (emphasis in original).

The district court retains “broad discretion in determining whether to certify a class, 

recognizing the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and . . . the district 

court’s inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.” In re Zurn Pex Plumbing 

Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d at 616 (cleaned up). Nevertheless, district courts must 

undertake “a rigorous analysis” to ensure that the requirements of Rule 23 are met. Gen. 

Tel. Co. Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). “Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will 

entail some overlap with the merits of plaintiffs’ underlying claim[s].” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 

351. The “preliminary inquiry of the class certification stage may require the court to 

resolve disputes going to the factual setting of the case.” Luiken v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 

705 F.3d 370, 372 (8th Cir. 2013).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

1. Numerosity and Ascertainability

The Court begins its discussion by assessing whether the class is so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that 

numerosity exists; however, “no arbitrary rules regarding the necessary size of classes 

have been established.” Belles v. Schweiker, 720 F.2d 509, 515 (8th Cir. 1983). Many 

factors are relevant to the numerosity inquiry: most obviously, the “number of persons in 

the proposed class” but also “the nature of the action, the size of individual claims, the 

inconvenience of trying individual suits, and any other factor relevant to the practicability 

of joining all putative class members.” Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 560–61 

(8th Cir. 1982). 

Plaintiffs allege that their experiences are representative of a class that meets the 

numerosity requirement because Judge Anglin’s bail hearing procedure will be replicated 

throughout his felony and misdemeanor caseload—which Judge Anglin admits is 

“upwards of one thousand cases per year.” Doc. 34, ¶ 23; see also Doc. 79, ¶ 22. 

Defendants counter that Plaintiffs’ conclusion—that there will thus be thousands of class 

members—is speculative, conclusory, and uncertain. See Doc. 91, p. 5; Doc. 92, p. 7. 

But given Judge Anglin’s admitted caseload, that position defies common sense. 

The numerosity requirement asks whether joinder of all potential class members 

is impracticable. Here, Plaintiffs and Judge Anglin agree that he was elected to a fouryear term, which runs from January 1, 2021, to January 1, 2025. And they agree that 

Judge Anglin holds bail hearings for thirteen weeks each year, with seven hearings per 

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week (i.e., one per day). See Doc. 92, pp. 3-4. This amounts to more than ninety bail

hearings per year. 

The parties’ filings imply that multiple defendants appear at each bail hearing, and 

as many as eighty percent of criminal defendants are declared indigent, according to one 

Department of Justice estimate.

3 That estimate may not be precisely extensible to Judge 

Anglin’s Court; it is certainly possible that less than eighty percent of the criminal 

defendants that appear in his bail hearings are indigent. But even if Judge Anglin declares 

only one criminal defendant indigent per bail hearing, on average, that would amount to

more than 360 unrepresented indigent defendants during his four-year term. A class of 

360 (and likely many more) indigent criminal defendants is certainly too numerous for 

joinder to be practicable.

4 Fochtman v. DARP, Inc., 2019 WL 406146, at *4 (W.D. Ark. 

Jan. 31, 2019) (“It defies common sense to argue that 180 separate lawsuits brought by 

similarly-situated individuals”—half of the minimum estimated class size here—“litigating 

the same issues of liability, would somehow be more efficient and more cost-effective 

than a class action.”). Particularly because Plaintiffs seek an injunction and declaratory 

judgment, numerosity counsels that it will be far more administrable to litigate this matter 

on a class-wide basis than individually. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their 

3 See Caroline Wolf Harlow, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Defense Counsel 

in Criminal Cases 5 (2000) https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf

[https://perma.cc/YU7V-FS9P] (describing a 1992 and 1996 study, which found that about 

eighty percent of defendants charged with a felony in the Nation’s seventy-five most 

populous counties reported having public defenders or assigned counsel after being 

declared indigent).

4 To avoid confusion, the Court notes that its pleadings-based algebra is merely 

illustrative, and that the number 360 is only significant as an exemplar of the 

reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ logic. Similarly reasonable calculations would yield the same 

outcome: a class too numerous for joinder to be practicable.

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burden by showing evidence leading to the logical inference that a great many indigent 

criminal defendants will continue to appear before Judge Anglin at bail hearings without

counsel, thus satisfying the numerosity factor. Halbach v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. 

Co., 2007 WL 1018658, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2007) (Plaintiffs are not required to “specify 

an exact number or to prove the identity of each class member, rather, the plaintiffs must 

only show a reasonable estimate of the number of class members.”). 

Turning next to ascertainability, the Eighth Circuit, “unlike most other courts of 

appeals, has not outlined a . . . separate, preliminary requirement.” See Sandusky 

Wellness Ctr., 821 F.3d at 996. Rather, the Eighth Circuit “simply adheres to a rigorous 

analysis of the Rule 23 requirements, which includes that a class ‘must be adequately 

defined and clearly ascertainable.’” Id. (quoting Rule 23). The focus of this threshold 

inquiry is on whether the proposed class definition identifies class members by objective 

criteria. See id.; Fochtman, 2019 WL 406146, at *3 (citing Bynum v. Dist. of Columbia, 

214 F.R.D. 27, 31 (D.D.C. 2003)).

The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs’ proposed class is readily ascertainable. 

Plaintiffs’ class definition is comprised solely of objective criteria: “(1) pre-trial detainees, 

(2) who have or will appear before District Judge A.J. Anglin, (3) for a bail / pre-trial 

release hearing under Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 8-9, (4) who are indigent, 

and (5) do not have appointed (public defender) representation at that hearing.” (Doc. 86, 

p. 3). And in Postawko v. Missouri Department of Corrections, the Eighth Circuit upheld 

a similarly structured class of incarcerated plaintiffs. 910 F.3d 1030, 1036 (8th Cir. 2018)

(“[1] All those individuals in the custody of MDOC, [2] now or in the future, who have been, 

or will be, [3-4] diagnosed with chronic HCV, as that term is defined medically, [5] but who 

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are not provided treatment with direct acting antiviral drugs.”). Here, like in Postawko, the 

proposed criteria objectively define: (1) the broad group of plaintiffs from which the class

is drawn, (2) the class’s temporal parameters, (3-4) additional narrowing parameters, and 

(5) the constitutional injury suffered by class members. Using these criteria, the Court can 

easily determine who is a member of the proposed class and who is not. As the court 

reasoned in Fochtman, “In order to make a finding that a class will be so numerous that 

joinder will be impractical, the Court does not need to consult its crystal ball . . . .” 2019 

WL 406146, at *3. “The numerosity requirement asks, simply, how many individuals meet 

the class definition. Here, the number is [at least 360], and the class members’ identities 

are easily ascertainable” or will be as Judge Anglin’s term progresses. Id.

2. Commonality

The commonality inquiry “requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class 

members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349 (quoting Falcon, 457 

U.S. at 157). However, commonality does not require “that every question of law or fact 

be common to every member of the class.” Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561. In fact, as the 

Supreme Court noted in Dukes, “even a single common question will do.” 564 U.S. at 359 

(cleaned up). To establish commonality, class members’ “claims must depend upon a 

common contention” that must “be of such a nature that it is capable of class-wide 

resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that 

is central to the validity of each of the claims in one stroke.” Id. at 350. 

Here, both the facts and the law are common to the class. Factually, Plaintiffs and 

their proposed class members’ claims arise where there exist an arrest, 

recommendations as to bond and pretrial release conditions from the State, and an initial 

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appearance at bail hearing in which an indigent defendant is unaccompanied by 

appointed counsel. And legally, Plaintiffs and their proposed class members share

common claims: alleged violations of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses. There is thus a 

common question of law as to whether the right to counsel attaches under the Sixth 

Amendment at the bail hearing and subsequently whether the alleged denial of that right 

to counsel constitutes a due process or equal protection violation. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that the commonality requirement is satisfied.

3. Typicality

The typicality requirement is satisfied where the proposed class members’ claims 

“are based on the same legal or remedial theory.” Paxton, 688 F.2d at 561–62; see also 

Chaffin v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 904 F.2d 1269, 1275 (8th Cir. 1990) (similar). Put simply, 

“[t]he typicality inquiry asks whether the named Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of 

the rest of the class.” Fochtman, 2019 WL 406146, at *5. Here, Defendants argue that 

factual differences between Plaintiffs and potential class members’ claims are fatal to the 

typicality inquiry; specifically, that proposed class members will face different underlying 

charges in different courts, albeit in front of Judge Anglin. This argument misses the mark. 

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the proposed class shares similar factual and legal 

claims. And they have shown that their alleged harm is typical—indeed, identical—to the 

harm that will be visited upon their proposed class members, regardless of their 

respective charges or courts: the denial of their right to counsel under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. The Court finds that the typicality requirement is satisfied.

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4. Adequacy of Representation

i. Adequacy of Class Representatives

The inquiry as to the adequacy of the class representation under Rule 23(a)(4) is 

similar to the typicality inquiry. The Court must ask “whether the representative parties 

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 

Further, the Court must determine whether “(1) the class representatives have common 

interests with the members of the class, and (2) whether the class representatives will 

vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Paxton, 688 

F.2d at 562–63. 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of 

the class. Ms. Farella and Mr. Murphy both filed affidavits affirming their willingness to 

actively participate in this litigation through its conclusion and promising to actively and 

faithfully act as class representatives on behalf of all class members. See Docs. 93-1, 93-

2. They state clearly that:

I am a class representative because . . . Judge Anglin failed to provide 

me with an attorney at my pre-trial release hearing. The harm that was 

done to me needs to be prevented from happening to other indigents in 

the future. I have been an active participant in this litigation from the 

beginning and will be to its conclusion. I am in this case for the long haul 

. . . .

See id. Plaintiffs’ affidavits evince their willingness to “vigorously prosecute” Defendants’

alleged constitutional violations on behalf of the class. Consequently, the Court finds that 

Plaintiffs will adequately represent its interests. 

ii. Adequacy of Counsel

Next, Rule 23(g)’s class counsel requirement provides that the Court must 

consider: 

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(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential 

claims in the action;

(ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex 

litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;

(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and

(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). 

Relying on Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 253 F.R.D. 444 (N.D. Iowa 2008), 

aff'd sub nom., 614 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2010), Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ counsel are

inadequate to represent the class’s interests because they waited over a year to file for 

class certification. While Defendants’ argument is not without merit, the Court finds this 

case distinguishable. In Rattray, the court noted that delay in pursuing class certification 

had potential to prejudice the plaintiffs and potential class members and weighed such

prejudice against counsel’s ability, experience, and qualifications to conduct the litigation. 

See id. at 456–57. The court found that proposed class counsel’s ability and experience 

did not outweigh the prejudice because there was no sufficient reason for the delay, 

counsel had no experience litigating class actions, and the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the 

class was filed after an agreed-upon, court-mandated deadline. See id.

Analogous facts are absent here; any prejudice caused by delay in seeking 

certification is outweighed by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s experience and active engagement in 

this litigation. The affidavits from Doug Norwood and Alison Lee state that Norwood & 

Norwood P.A. has class action experience, complex litigation experience, and “unlimited 

financial resources to see this litigation to its logical conclusion.” See Docs. 86-1, 86-2. 

The Court’s deadline to file class certification motions was extended pursuant to a joint 

motion from the parties, and the present Motion for Class Certification was timely 

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submitted by the parties’ agreed-upon deadline. See Doc. 75 (Amended Case 

Management Order); Doc. 81 (Joint Motion to Extend Deadline for Class Certification); 

Doc. 85 (Text Only Order extending the deadline for class certification). Further, the Court 

believes that both Plaintiffs and Defendants were clear from the outset of litigation that 

Plaintiffs intended to pursue class certification. Even assuming, arguendo, that it would

have been prudent to seek certification earlier, delay in pursuing class certification is not 

per se fatal to adequacy of representation; delay can be reasonable in some 

circumstances. Cf. Eastwood v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 291 F.R.D. 273 (W.D. Ark. 

2013) (finding delay in seeking class certification reasonable when the plaintiffs were 

actively engaged in the litigation, specifically because the plaintiffs’ motion to certify class 

was on time per the 26(f) report and there was voluminous discovery during the delay 

period). The Court thus finds that Doug Norwood and Alison Lee of Norwood & Norwood 

P.A. satisfy Rule 23(g)’s class counsel requirements. 

B. Rule 23(b)(2) Requirements

“[S]ubdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 in part to make it clear that civilrights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be brought as class actions.” 7A Charles 

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1776 (4th ed.

2023). To certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), the party opposing the class must have 

“acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 

relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Eighth Circuit has held Rule 23(b)(2) certification appropriate 

where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief “on grounds generally applicable to the class.” 

Paxton, 688 F.2d at 563 (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 

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875 (8th Cir. 1978)); see also Ebert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 480 (8th Cir. 2016)

(holding that Rule 23(b)(2) class certification clearly applies only when a “single injunction 

or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class”). 

The Court finds that Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied here. Plaintiffs explicitly seek 

declaratory and injunctive relief and make no request for money damages. (Doc. 34, pp. 

16–17; Doc. 87, p. 1). If the Court granted that relief, e.g., by declaring Judge Anglin’s 

current bail hearing procedure unconstitutional and ordering an injunction mandating that 

indigent defendants at future bail hearings be represented by public defenders, such relief 

would apply cohesively to each proposed class member. Postawko, 2017 WL 3185155, 

at *13 (holding that a similar class “satisfies Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendants’ policies 

apply generally to the class so that the requested injunctive and declaratory relief would 

provide relief to all class members”). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claims and requested remedy are 

the “touchstone of a (b)(2) class.” See Ebert, 823 F.3d at 480; cf. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361 

(quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997)) (“‘Civil rights 

cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime 

examples’ of what (b)(2) is meant to capture.”); see generally 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, 

supra at § 1776.1 (“Rule 23(b)(2) has been utilized to protect a variety of constitutional 

rights” through declaratory and injunctive relief).

IV. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to the findings set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Abigail

Farella and Logan W. Murphy’s Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 87) is GRANTED. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

(1) The certified class is defined as: “(1) pretrial detainees, (2) who have or will 

appear before District Judge A.J. Anglin, (3) for a bail or pre-trial release 

hearing under Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 8–9, (4) who are indigent, 

and (5) do not have appointed (public defender) representation at that hearing.” 

(2) Plaintiffs Abigail Farella and Logan W. Murphy are designated as Class 

Representatives. 

(3) Norman Douglas Norwood and Allison Lee of Norwood & Norwood, P.A. are

appointed Class Counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED on this 7th day of May, 2024. 

_____________________________

TIMOTHY L. BROOKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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