Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02714/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02714-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUDESIA FLANAGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF RICHMOND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02714-EMC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket Nos. 39, 46, 55)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Loudesia Flanagan filed this lawsuit against Defendants City of Richmond and 

Police Chief Christopher Magnus, alleging that Defendants wrongfully terminated her 

employment out of religious discrimination and in retaliation for making workplace complaints. 

Docket No. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 36, 43, 49. Plaintiff also alleges that the termination process violated 

her due process rights. Compl. ¶ 35.

Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment came on for hearing before the Court on 

September 24, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants‟ motion for 

summary judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff‟s Employment with the Richmond Police Department

Starting in 1989, Plaintiff was employed by the City of Richmond as a Police Records 

Specialist (PRS), until the termination of her employment in October 2013. Docket No. 39-2 

(Flanagan Dep.) at 40:11-12, 45:3-14. Plaintiff was terminated based on the following charges: 

(1) discourteous and disrespectful treatment of a volunteer intern, Ms. Sequoia Taylor; (2) 

inappropriate comments and conduct regarding homosexuality; and (3) dishonesty during the 

administrative interview. Flanagan Dep., Exh. V at 2-3.

Prior to her termination, Plaintiff had received positive performance evaluations. In her 

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September 1999 performance evaluation, Plaintiff received “Above Standard” marks in five out of

six categories. Flanagan Dec. at Exh. B. In her September 2005 performance evaluation, Plaintiff 

received “Standard” marks - the highest rating - in five out of six categories. Flanagan Dec. at

Exh. C. No performance evaluations were conducted since, but in 2011, a draft evaluation gave 

Plaintiff “Standard” marks in most categories, but noted that Plaintiff‟s “conversations with coworkers and other department personnel were arduous at times,” and that while she “had 

pragmatic ideas[,] your methods of bringing them about may not have been appropriate, or yielded 

the desired results. (i.e. consulting other supervisors outside your chain of command.)” Docket 

No. 51 (Poore Dec.), at Exh. E. On July 19, 2012, Plaintiff received a positive e-mail from Police 

Chief Magnus, forwarding a citizen letter praising the Richmond Police Department, including 

Plaintiff. Flanagan Dec. at Exh. D.

At the same time, Plaintiff‟s employment was marked by disciplinary actions and 

complaints. On September 16, 2004, December 27, 2004, and January 5, 2005, Plaintiff received 

separate reprimands for leaving work without permission, failing to follow sick leave reporting 

procedures, and insubordination. Flanagan Dep., Exhs. A-C. In July 2006, Plaintiff received a 

three-month pay reduction for making false and misleading statements to a supervisor. Id., Exhs. 

D-F.

On May 16, 2008, Plaintiff filed a formal letter of complaint against Lieutenant Enos 

Johnson, contending that Lieutenant Enos had instructed someone to open her locker and “seize” a 

spiritual scripture that was taped inside her locker. Flanagan Dec. at Exh. E. The scripture in 

question read: “RPD, you meant it for evil, but God meant it for good and blessed it so that I may 

be a blessing.” Flanagan Dep. at 292:20-23. The scripture was a reference to the Biblical story of 

Joseph and his brothers, and how Joseph prospered despite the wrongs that his brother had done to 

him. Id. at 294:11-25. By adding “RPD,” Plaintiff meant to equate the Richmond Police 

Department to Joseph‟s brothers. Id. at 293:1-5, 14-20, 295:17-18. A subsequent Human 

Resources Investigation found that a female sergeant had approached Lieutenant Johnson, 

reporting that she found an open locker which was empty except for a handwritten note taped to 

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the door, the content of which the sergeant found “disturbing.” Docket No. 49-1 (Magnus Dep.), 

Exh. 4. Lieutenant Johnson asked the sergeant to bring him the note. Id. The following day, 

Plaintiff approached Lieutenant Johnson wanting to know who had searched the locker, to which 

Lieutenant Johnson replied that the locker was not searched but had been found open. Id. The 

note was returned to Plaintiff. Id. The investigation observed that Plaintiff was not told that she 

could not display the scripture in her locker, and concluded that there was no violation of her

constitutional rights. Id.

On December 7 or 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed a formal letter of complaint against Records 

Supervisor Lisa Everett, alleging harassment. Flanagan Dep., Exh. L. The complaint stemmed 

from a December 5, 2011 incident, in which Plaintiff wore a Santa hat while on-duty. Id. That 

day, Supervisor Everett informed Plaintiff multiple times that she could not wear the hat, as the 

hat would only be permitted on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. Id. However, Plaintiff refused 

to remove the hat, and ignored Supervisor Everett‟s attempts to speak to her about the hat. Id. 

The following day, Supervisor Everett and Plaintiff confronted each other, during which Plaintiff 

accused Supervisor Everett of harassing her. Id. When the Santa hat incident was subsequently 

investigated, the investigator recommended sustaining allegations of insubordination and violation 

of uniform requirements against Plaintiff. Id.

Finally, in December 2012, Plaintiff was suspended for two days without pay. Id., Exh. I. 

The charges were three incidents in which Plaintiff used disparaging and offensive language on 

May 3, May 4, and September 6, 2012. Id, Exh. J. Plaintiff appealed the suspension to 

arbitration, and the arbitrator found that Plaintiff‟s “account of what transpired lacks credibility. 

Plaintiff consistently attempted to justify or deny what she said or meant, while attacking the 

accusing witnesses as liars.” Id. The arbitrator concluded that there was just cause for Plaintiff‟s 

two-day suspension. Id.

B. Plaintiff‟s October 2013 Termination

In early 2012, Ms. Taylor became a volunteer with the Richmond Police Department. 

Docket No. 39-14 (Milam Dec.) at Exh. A. In approximately March 2012, Ms. Taylor notified 

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Volunteer Coordinator Michelle Milam that the PRS were not acknowledging her or allowing her 

into the secured areas, specifically identifying Plaintiff. Milam Dec. at ¶ 4. Although Volunteer 

Coordinator Milam sent an e-mail to the Records Unit reminding them to allow volunteers access 

into the building, in June 2012, Ms. Taylor again reported that she was having trouble being 

admitted into the building by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Volunteer Coordinator Milam then spoke to 

Supervisor Everett, informing her of Ms. Taylor‟s complaint and asking her to counsel Plaintiff 

about Ms. Taylor‟s right of access. Id. at ¶ 7. Volunteer Coordinator Milam subsequently emailed Ms. Taylor, assuring her that corrective action was taken and to let her know if there were 

further access issues with Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 7, Exh. C. Plaintiff denies that she was ever counseled 

for failing to buzz in volunteers in 2012. Flanagan Dec. at ¶ 21.

On April 18, 2013, an incident occurred between Ms. Taylor and Plaintiff. Defendants 

assert that Ms. Taylor was with another volunteer intern, Ms. Lorena Hernandez, and that upon 

Plaintiff granting them access, the following comments were exchanged:

Taylor: Oh, I‟m shocked you let me in.

Plaintiff: I didn‟t even see you out there... but had I known it 

was you, I probably wouldn‟t have opened the door 

anyway.

Docket No. 39-6 (Investigative Report) at 14.1

Following this incident, Ms. Taylor went to Ms. Vickie Riggins, the Executive Secretary 

for Police Chief Magnus. Id. at 13. Ms. Taylor allegedly told Ms. Riggins about her frustrations 

with Plaintiff, including the April 18 exchange and that Plaintiff “had unnecessarily and purposely 

 

1

Plaintiff objects to the Investigative Report on hearsay grounds. Docket No. 54 (Objections) at 

2-3. Yet, Plaintiff also asserts that the Investigative Report can be used by Plaintiff as admissions 

against Defendants. Objections at 3, n. 3. Defendants respond that the Investigative Report is not 

offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but to show the state of mind of the decision-makers 

who recommended termination. Docket No. 58 (Reply) at 9. The Court therefore overrules 

Plaintiff‟s objection, but limits its citations of the Investigative Report to Plaintiff‟s citations, 

Plaintiff‟s witness statement per Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), and to the extent necessary 

the entirety of the Report to show its effect on the minds of the decision-makers who 

recommended termination.

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made her wait in the lobby or just completely ignored her.” Id. Ms. Taylor purportedly attributed 

Plaintiff‟s dislike of her to the fact that Ms. Taylor is a lesbian. Id.; see also Docket No. 49-2 

(Curran Dep.) at 32:12-20.

Ms. Riggins informed Lieutenant Lori Curran about her conversation with Ms. Taylor. 

Curran Dep. at 32:20. Lieutenant Curran then notified Deputy Chief Ed Medina, who informed 

her that he would speak to Chief Magnus about what to do. Id. at 32:21-23. After speaking to 

Chief Magnus, Deputy Chief Medina told Lieutenant Curran to have the unit, Lieutenant Curran, 

or Records Supervisor Michael Schlemmer conduct an investigation. Id. at 32:23-33:1. 

Lieutenant Curran chose to act as the investigator, and had Records Supervisor Schlemmer assist, 

including conducting witness interviews. Id. at 34:4-9, 35:14-21. On May 9, 2013, Plaintiff was 

placed on administrative leave with pay, “pending further investigation of misconduct against a 

police department volunteer which occurred on April 18, 2013. The allegations included 

Discrimination and Conduct Unbecoming a Police Records Specialist.” Flanagan Dep., Exh. R.

(bold in original). Plaintiff has confirmed that she understood that she was being investigated for 

the April 18, 2013 incident with Ms. Taylor. Flanagan Dep. at 134:13-16.

Prior to the investigation, Plaintiff had brought a complaint against Lieutenant Curran in 

December 2012 for calling her at home and yelling at her in front of her children. Flanagan Dec. 

at ¶ 12. The complaint stated that Lieutenant Curran had called Plaintiff at home, “falsely 

accus[ing] her of leaving the Records section below minimum staffing.” Flanagan Dec. at Exh. F. 

Plaintiff had replied that she thought that as long as there was one clerk on duty, that was 

sufficient. Id. She then asked why had she been “scolded and talked to as if I were a child,” and 

that the “situation/work option had been afforded to others. Why the disparity?” Id. 

After the investigation started, on May 21, 2013, Plaintiff brought a complaint against 

Records Supervisor Schlemmer, accusing her of showing “bias and hostility” during the 

investigation and that “[t]he response of Supervisor Michael S. and the Administration of 

allegations made against me are racially motivated.” Flanagan Dec. at Exh. H. A December 2013 

investigation into Plaintiff‟s allegations against Records Supervisor Schlemmer and Lieutenant 

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Curran “failed to produce any evidence that the conduct which Ms. Flanagan complaints was 

racially motivated.” Curran Dep., Exh. 4 at 2.

The investigation into the April 18, 2013 incident involved interviews with seventeen 

witnesses, including Plaintiff. Investigative Report at 3. Most of the witnesses were unaware of 

any disparaging comments by Plaintiff, but several recalled comments made by Plaintiff about Ms. 

Taylor or homosexuality in general. Id. at 4-17. For example, PRS Danette Aberson reported 

overhearing Plaintiff ask others if they thought Ms. Taylor was a lesbian, and when this was 

affirmed, commented that “she won‟t be going to heaven then because God does not like gays.” 

Id. at 8. Former PRS Saeda Drake also reported that she had personally heard Plaintiff inquiring 

about which bathroom Ms. Taylor used, and making multiple comments such as “[Chief] Magnus 

is cultivating a gay environment” and “God made Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve.” Id. at 11. 

She also stated that she alerted Volunteer Coordinator Milam that Plaintiff was biased towards Ms. 

Taylor because she was a lesbian. Id. PRS Harper and PRS Chandra Bryant also stated that they 

were aware of Plaintiff‟s negative views towards homosexuals. Id. at 7, 9.

During her interview, Plaintiff asserted that she did not recall making the homophobic 

comments reported by her colleagues. Id. at 15. With respect to the incident with Ms. Taylor, 

Plaintiff “admitted to being rude toward TAYLOR but justified it by saying that it was TAYLOR 

who was initially rude to her.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff also states that during her interview, she 

informed Lieutenant Curran that she thought it was unfair for Lieutenant Curran to conduct the 

investigation when Plaintiff had made a complaint against her. Flanagan Dep. at 141:22-142:2.

Based on the investigation, Lieutenant Curran‟s report determined that: (1) Plaintiff was 

discourteous and disrespectful to Ms. Taylor on April 18, 2013, (2) Plaintiff created a hostile work 

environment by speaking openly about her dislike for and bias towards homosexuals, and (3) 

Plaintiff was untruthful during her interview when she denied making discriminatory comments. 

Id. at 19-22. Deputy Chief Medina referred the report to Captain Anthony Williams, who 

reviewed the investigation and formulated a disciplinary recommendation. Docket No. 39-13 

(Medina Dec.) at ¶ 8. On September 30, 2013, Captain Williams recommended that Plaintiff be 

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terminated from employment. Id. at Exh. C. Deputy Chief Medina concurred in the 

recommendation, informed Chief Magnus of the recommendation, and sent the case to Human 

Resources to prepare a formal notice of discipline. Id. at ¶ 8.

Plaintiff received her Skelly Notice on October 9, 2013, informing her of the City‟s 

proposal to terminate her employment.2 Flanagan Dep., Exh. V at 1. The proposed termination 

was based on three charges: (1) discourteous and disrespectful treatment of a volunteer intern 

based on the April 18, 2013 event, (2) inappropriate comments and conduct regarding 

homosexuality, and (3) dishonesty during the administrative interview. Id. at 2-4. The Skelly 

Notice also cited Plaintiff‟s prior disciplinary actions. Id. at 5. Plaintiff was notified of her right 

to respond either orally and/or in writing, and how to schedule a Skelly hearing. Id. at 5. The 

Skelly Notice included a CD with the Investigative Report and all recorded interviews, which 

Plaintiff had the chance to review before the Skelly hearing. Flanagan Dep. at 191:5-192:2.

Plaintiff requested a Skelly hearing, which was held before Chief Magnus on October 25, 

2013. Flanagan Dep., Exh W. Plaintiff was accompanied by her union representatives. Id. 

Plaintiff contends that Chief Magnus should not have acted as the Skelly officer because she had 

made a complaint against him in February 2013. Flanagan Dec. at ¶ 17; see also Medina Dec., 

Exh. B. In this e-mail to Deputy Chief Medina, Plaintiff expressed her fear of returning to the 

“enemy‟s camp” following a vacation. After praising Deputy Chief Medina, Plaintiff noted that 

she “ha[s] no faith in our chief‟s ability to be right and fair.” Medina Dec., Exh. B. Plaintiff does 

not recall if she made her concerns about Chief Magnus‟s potential bias known, except possibly to 

her union representatives. Flanagan Dep. at 171:18-24, 172:14-21.

Following the Skelly hearing, Chief Magnus recommended that Plaintiff‟s employment be 

 

2

The Skelly notice and hearing provisions are derived from the California Supreme Court 

decision, Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975), which “recognize[d] a public 

employee‟s right to a pre-termination hearing.” Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 

F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2011). “At a minimum, these pre-removal safeguards must include notice 

of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the charges and materials upon which the 

action is based, and the right to respond, either orally or in writing, to the authority initially 

imposing discipline.” Id. (citations omitted).

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terminated. Magnus Dep., Exh. 6 at 1. In making his recommendation, Chief Magnus raised 

concerns that “based on her repeated and unflinching willingness to call her colleagues dishonest 

in this case, [Plaintiff] can no longer be trusted by her co-workers if she were to retain her position 

as Police Records Specialist.” Id. at 7. On October 29, 2013, Plaintiff‟s employment was 

terminated, and a copy of the termination letter placed in her official personnel file in the Human 

Resources Department. Flanagan Dep., Exh. W.

The termination letter informed Plaintiff of her two options to appeal. First, Plaintiff could 

appeal her termination to the City‟s Personnel Board, which would involve an adjudicatory 

hearing that included the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, be represented by counsel, 

obtain a transcript, and be issued written findings and recommendations. The City Council then 

had the authority to uphold or reject the Personnel Board‟s recommendation. Docket No. 39-10 

(Stephenson Dec.) at ¶ 4. Second, Plaintiff could appeal her termination in binding arbitration. 

The union and City would jointly select a neutral arbitrator, who would hold a hearing and render 

a final decision. Id. at ¶ 5.

Plaintiff demanded binding arbitration, and a neutral arbitrator was jointly selected. Id. at 

Exh. G. Although binding arbitration was scheduled, on August 21, 2014, the union informed the 

arbitrator that Plaintiff had decided not to go arbitration, but to instead file the instant action. Id.

at Exh. I; see also Flanagan Dep. at 207:17-208:2.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Motions

In connection with her opposition to the instant motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 

filed an administrative motion for a page extension and evidentiary objection. As Defendants 

correctly point out, both were filed in flagrant disregard of the local rules. However, because this 

is a dispositive motion, Plaintiff‟s administrative motion for a page extension is granted.

As to the evidentiary objections, Plaintiff‟s objection to paragraph 7 of the Stephenson 

Declaration is sustained for lack of personal knowledge. Plaintiff‟s objection to paragraph 6 of the 

Medina Declaration, which states “a[n] unpleasant conflict between PRS Flanagan and Taylor 

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over access was reported to me,” is sustained to the extent the statement is offered for its truth. 

However, like the Investigative Report, it is admissible for its effect on the listener. Defendants‟ 

objection to paragraph 8 of the Flanagan Declaration is sustained for lack of personal knowledge, 

as Plaintiff attempts to testify as to the knowledge of other people without providing a basis for 

her knowledge. Finally, Defendants‟ objection to paragraph 19 of the Flanagan Declaration is 

sustained for lack of foundation, as Plaintiff has no basis for her conclusion that Defendants‟ 

failure to appear before the Appeals Board was because they knew their case lacked merit. All 

other objections are overruled.3

B. Plaintiff‟s Ex Parte Application

Plaintiff brought an ex parte application to deny Defendants‟ motion for summary 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Docket No. 46 (Ex Parte 

Application). Like the evidentiary objections, this ex parte application is not procedurally proper. 

Local Rule 7-10 permits the filing of an ex parte motion “only if a statute, Federal Rule, local rule 

or Standing Order authorizes the filing of an ex parte motion in the circumstances . . . . The motion 

must include a citation to the statute, rule or order which permits the use of an ex parte motion to 

obtain the relief sought.” Plaintiff makes no such citation. Instead, Plaintiff cites to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 56(d) and Local Rules 6-1 and 6-3. Ex Parte Application at 2. Federal Rule 

56(d) makes no reference to ex parte applications, while Local Rules 6-1 and 6-3 concern motions 

to change time.4 Plaintiff‟s ex parte application appears to be an attempt to avoid the page limits.

In any case, Plaintiff‟s ex parte application lacks evidentiary support. Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(d) permits the court to defer consideration of a summary judgment motion “[i]f 

a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 

essential to justify its opposition . . . .” In such a case, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking 

additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought exists . . . and that 

 

3 Although overruled, the Court did not rely upon the objected to material in its ruling on this case.

4

Even if Local Rule 6-3 applied, Plaintiff‟s ex parte application would be in violation as Local 

Rule 6-3 limits the motion to enlarge or shorten time to “no more than 5 pages in length.”

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it would prevent summary judgment.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th 

Cir. 1996). To satisfy this burden, there must be a “basis or factual support that further discovery 

would lead to the facts and testimony . . . described in [the] affidavit.” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 

850, 854 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the burden was not satisfied where “a review of the record 

leads to the conclusion that Margolis‟ affidavit is based on nothing more than wild speculation.”). 

Here, Plaintiff‟s application is based on her inability to depose Ms. Taylor, whose 

complaint led to the investigation of Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Taylor is a key witness, 

and that her testimony could show that she made no complaints of discrimination or harassment by 

Plaintiff. Ex Parte Application at 7. Plaintiff also suggests that Ms. Taylor will testify that she 

only complained in early 2012, not in April 2013, when the incident leading to the investigation of 

Plaintiff occurred. Id. This would support Plaintiff‟s theory that Defendants “revived” Ms. 

Taylor‟s 2012 complaint only after Plaintiff made complaints about Lieutenant Curran and 

Captain Magnus in December 2012 and February 2013. Id. at 7-8. Finally, Plaintiff argues that 

Ms. Taylor could testify that she made complaints about other PRS not buzzing her in, which 

Defendants did not investigate. Id. at 8.

Plaintiff‟s argument that Ms. Taylor will corroborate her theories seems speculative at 

best. Plaintiff provides no evidence that Ms. Taylor will testify to any of this. Instead, the record 

shows that Ms. Taylor made complaints specifically about Plaintiff. Volunteer Coordinator 

Milam states that Ms. Taylor specifically identified Plaintiff in her 2012 complaints about denied 

access to secured areas. Milam Dec. at ¶ 4. Portions of the Investigative Report cited by Plaintiff 

also show that Ms. Taylor was specifically upset about Plaintiff‟s behavior during the April 18, 

2013 interaction, and had complained to Ms. Riggins that Plaintiff “had unnecessarily and 

purposely made her wait in the lobby or just completely ignored her.” Investigative Report at 13. 

Furthermore, the investigation into Plaintiff was not related to her failure to allow Ms. Taylor in, 

but her allegedly rude behavior towards Ms. Taylor on April 18, 2013, when she did in fact let Ms. 

Taylor in. Flanagan Dep., Exh. V. Because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of showing 

that there is a basis for deferring consideration of this motion to allow the deposition of Ms. 

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Taylor, the Court denies Plaintiff‟s ex parte application.

C. Defendants‟ Motion for Summary Judgment

The Court shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). An issue of fact is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248-49 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving 

party]‟s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for the [non-moving party].” Id. at 252. At the same time, “all reasonable inferences must be 

drawn in favor of the non-movant.” John v. City of El Monte, 515 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2008).

The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non-moving party 

has the ultimate burden of proof, the moving party may prevail on a motion for summary 

judgment by pointing to the non-moving party‟s failure “to make a showing sufficient to establish 

the existence of an element essential to that party‟s case.” Id. at 322.

1. Section 1983 Violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment

a. Deprivation of Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide her with a liberty interest hearing after 

accusing her of sexual orientation harassment, and that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with 

an unbiased pre-termination hearing. Compl. ¶ 35. “To obtain relief on § 1983 claims based upon 

procedural due process, the plaintiff must establish the existence of (1) a liberty or property 

interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) 

lack of process.” Gutay Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 983 (9th Cir. 

2011). Here, the parties dispute whether a liberty interest exists as a result of Defendants accusing 

Plaintiff of sexual orientation harassment, and whether there was adequate due process related to 

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the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s liberty and property5interests. Mot. at 9-10; Opp. at 26-27.

i. Liberty Interest

In the context of employment termination, a liberty interest is implicated “if the charge 

impairs a reputation for honesty or morality.” Matthews v. Harney Cnty., 819 F.2d 889, 892 (9th 

Cir. 1987). However, “injury to reputation standing alone does not violate the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment; one‟s „interest in reputation‟ standing alone is neither „liberty‟ nor 

„property‟ guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law.‟ Wenger v. Monroe, 

282 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Instead, the plaintiff must be “subjected to 

„stigma plus‟; i.e., if the state makes a charge against a plaintiff that might seriously damage his 

standing and associations in the community . . . .” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, due process 

protections apply if “the accuracy of the charge is contested, there is some public disclosure of the 

charge, and it is made in connection with the termination of employment or the alteration of some 

right or status recognized by state law.” Jones v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 702 F.2d 203, 206 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff argues that publication exists because the stigmatizing information (i.e., that 

Plaintiff was terminated for sexual orientation harassment) was placed in her official personnel 

file, which is subject to review when she applies for positions at other law agencies. Opp. at 26. 

In support, Plaintiff cites Cox v. Spokane County, in which the Ninth Circuit found that 

publication of stigmatizing information occurred when the termination letter was placed in the 

plaintiff‟s personnel file. 359 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the Ninth Circuit‟s 

decision was grounded in the “critical fact” that “once the stigmatizing information was placed 

into [the plaintiff‟s] personnel file, it became a public record under Washington law, mandating 

disclosure upon request.” Id. The termination letter, which articulated two reasons for 

terminating the plaintiff‟s employment - failure to meet his responsibilities and poor managerial 

judgment - was in fact disclosed to a local newspaper who filed a public records request, as 

 

5

There is no dispute that Plaintiff had a property interest in her continued employment. Mot. at 

10.

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Washington law mandated release. Id. at 1109.

Defendants argue that Cox is distinguishable because the California Public Records Act 

(CPRA) does not require disclosure of “personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of 

which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Cal. Gov. Code § 6254(c). 

Under California law, “[a]ll public records are subject to disclosure unless the Act expressly 

provides otherwise.” BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 4th 742, 751 (2006). However, 

the CPRA does not prohibit all disclosures of personnel files. First, the court must “determine 

whether disclosure of the information would compromise substantial privacy interests; if privacy 

interests in given information are de minimis[,] disclosure would not amount to a „clearly 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . .” Id. at 755 (citation omitted). Second, the court 

“must determine whether the potential harm to privacy interests from disclosure outweighs the 

public interest in disclosure.” Id. (citation omitted).

In BRV, Inc., the publisher of a local newspaper made a CPRA request for a report which 

contained the findings of an investigation of complaints that the school district‟s superintendent 

and high school principal, Robert Morris, had verbally abused students and sexually harassed 

female students. Id. at 747, 749. The school district would not produce the report, claiming that it 

was exempt from disclosure under the CPRA. Id. at 749. In its analysis, the California Court of 

Appeal found that while “[p]ublic employees have a legally protected interest in their personnel 

files,” Morris “had a significantly reduced expectation of privacy” because he was a public 

official. Id. at 756, 759. This expectation of privacy was then weighed against the public‟s 

interest in viewing the report, which was especially high given that the public was “greatly 

concerned about the behavior of the city‟s only high school superintendent and his governing 

board in responding to their complaints,” and that there were allegations that the school district 

had “entered into a „sweetheart deal‟ to buy out the superintendent from his employment without 

having to respond to the public accusations of misconduct.” Id. Thus, given “Morris‟s position of 

authority as a public official and the public nature of the allegations, the public‟s interest in 

disclosure outweighed Morris‟s interest in preventing disclosure of the . . . report.” Id.

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In contrast, the Court of Appeal found that the CPRA‟s exemption for personnel files 

applied where the plaintiff requested that a community college district disclose the personal 

performance goals of its former superintendent. Versaci v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 4th 805, 

810 (2005). The Court of Appeal concluded that disclosure of the personal performance goals 

would “compromise substantial privacy interests,” and that there was limited public interest in [the 

superintendent‟s] performance because she had already retired. Id. at 819-20. Thus, disclosure 

was not warranted. Id. at 822.

Here, the placement of the termination letter in Plaintiff‟s personnel file does not constitute 

public disclosure of stigmatizing information. Unlike Cox, a personnel file does not automatically 

become a public record under the CPRA, “mandating disclosure upon request.” See Cox, 359 F.3d 

at 1110. Instead, the CPRA generally exempts personnel files from disclosure, and requires that 

the privacy interest of the public employee be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. See 

BRV, Inc., 143 Cal. App. 4th. at 755. Plaintiff is not a public official, and has a significantly 

higher expectation of privacy. Unlike BRV, Inc., there is no evidence that her termination and the 

events leading to her termination are a matter of great public concern, limiting public interest in 

disclosure of her personnel file. It is therefore likely that Plaintiff‟s privacy interest would 

outweigh the public interest in disclosure, and the termination letter in Plaintiff‟s personnel file 

would not be disclosed as a public record under the CPRA.

Furthermore, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendants otherwise publicly disclosed 

the termination letter or any other stigmatizing information prior to the filing of this action. See

Flanagan Dep. at 245:21-24. Therefore, there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest, and 

the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff‟s Section 1983 due 

process claim with respect to a liberty interest.

ii. Pre-Termination Hearing Requirements

“Due process demands that one be given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 

and in a meaningful manner.” Jones, 702 F.2d at 206. In determining whether a defendant‟s 

procedure comported with due process, courts have considered the three factors articulated in 

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Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an 

erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used; and (3) the fiscal and 

administrative burdens entailed by additional procedural requirements. Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. 

Dist., 667 F.2d 773, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff argues that she was denied due process with respect to her property interest

(which exists even if there is no cognizable liberty interests) because the Skelly hearing was heard 

by Chief Magnus, who was allegedly biased against her because of her February 2013 complaint 

against him.6 Opp. at 27. In general, “[a] biased proceeding is not a procedurally adequate one. 

At a minimum, Due Process requires a hearing before an impartial tribunal.” Clements v. Airport 

Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 333 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the Ninth Circuit has also 

found that while due process requires that a hearing take place before termination, “the failure to 

provide an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination stage, of itself, does not create liability, 

so long as the decisionmaker at the post-termination hearing is impartial.” Walker v. City of 

Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 183 (9th Cir. 1991). The pre-termination hearing “need not be elaborate,” 

as it “serves only as an initial check against mistaken decisions - essentially a determination of 

whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges are true and support the proposed 

action. To that end, a plaintiff need only be accorded „oral or written notice of the charges against 

him, an explanation of the employer‟s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the 

story.” Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 985 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

 

6

Plaintiff also argues that pursuant to Vanelli, she was entitled to a hearing immediately after 

being accused of misconduct on May 9, 2013, and that the Skelly hearing took place five months 

later. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that she had a protected liberty interest 

because she has not shown that there was public disclosure of the stigmatizing information. 

Furthermore, Vanelli does not stand for Plaintiff‟s proposition that a hearing is required 

immediately after allegations of misconduct. In Vanelli, the plaintiff was deprived of the 

opportunity to appear before the school board prior to his termination. 667 F.2d at 776. The 

Ninth Circuit found that “a pre-termination hearing is constitutionally required” as “[t]he risk of an 

erroneous deprivation was substantial, since appellant was dismissed without an opportunity to 

confront the evidence and was denied the opportunity to respond to the charges at the school board 

meeting.” Id. at 779. In requiring a pre-termination hearing, the Vanelli court did not require that 

the hearing take place immediately after the accusation of misconduct.

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Applying Walker and Brewster, the district court in Zografos v. City & County of San 

Francisco found that the defendants complied with procedural due process requirements. Case 

No. C-05-3881 PJH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90101 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2006). There, the plaintiff 

lodged a number of complaints, including a complaint to Cal/OSHA regarding safety issues. Id. at 

*5. The plaintiff alleged that his filing of the complaint was known by management employees 

Kenneth Sapp and Don Gee. Id. at *6. Following a physical altercation with a co-worker, Gee 

and Sapp investigated the incident. Id. at *13. Gee then recommended that both the plaintiff and 

co-worker be terminated. Id. At the pre-termination Skelly hearing, Sapp and Gee were both 

present. Id. at *14. The plaintiff was represented, and had an opportunity to respond to questions. 

Id. at *14-15. After the hearing, Gee recommended termination, having found that the plaintiff 

fought on MUNI property and caused false statements to be entered into the investigation. Id. at 

*16. Following his termination, the plaintiff was offered the opportunity to appeal his dismissal 

with a hearing officer. Id. Although the plaintiff initially wished to appeal, he withdrew the 

appeal the day before the hearing was set, contending that he felt that the “hearing would not be 

fair.” Id. at *16-17.

In court, the plaintiff argued that he was denied a meaningful pre-termination hearing 

because the investigator and hearing officer were biased, pointing to a formal complaint that the 

plaintiff had filed against Sapp. Id. at *25. However, the district court granted summary 

judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiff “received the requisite procedural due 

process at the pre-termination hearing required by Ninth Circuit law. He received notice of the 

hearing, an explanation of [the defendants‟] evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the 

story. That is all that Ninth Circuit law required.” Id. at *28. Pursuant to Walker, the district 

court concluded that “even if the pre-termination hearing officer is not impartial, no liability 

attaches as long as the post-termination appeals adjudicator is impartial.” Id. at *29. As the 

plaintiff “was afforded the opportunity for a post-termination hearing before an impartial judge . . . 

but waived it,” there was no due process violation. Id. at *29-30; see also Dobbertin v. Town of 

Patagonia, No. CV 12-744-TUC-CRP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50420 at *33 (D. Ariz. Apr. 11, 

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2014) (finding no deprivation of due process where the plaintiff claimed that the pre-termination 

adjudicators were biased because the plaintiff alleged no bias on the part of the post-termination 

hearing‟s officer).

In the instant case, Plaintiff was given adequate due process. Plaintiff received her Skelly 

Notice on October 9, 2013, informing her of the three specific grounds supporting City‟s proposal 

to terminate her employment. Flanagan Dep., Exh. V at 3-8. The Skelly Notice also identified 

Plaintiff‟s past disciplinary problems, including disciplinary actions in September 2004, January 

2005, December 2011, and October 2012. Id. at 7. Plaintiff received the supporting evidence, as 

she acknowledges that she received a CD with the Investigative Report and all recorded 

interviews, and that she read the Investigative Report before the Skelly hearing. Flanagan Dep. at 

191:5-192:2. Regarding the Skelly hearing, while Plaintiff has stated that she felt like Chief 

Magnus had already made up his mind, she also admits that nobody in the meeting ever told her to 

stop talking or that they did not want to hear what she had to say. Flanagan Dep. at 168:25-169:2. 

Thus, as in Zografos, Plaintiff appears to have been granted the requisite procedural due process 

required by the Ninth Circuit at the pre-termination stage. See Walker, 951 F.2d at 183; Brewster, 

149 F.3d at 985.

Plaintiff contends that there is no indication that Walker was meant to apply to situations 

where the Skelly hearing officer has a conflict of interest due to an employee‟s workplace 

complaint. Opp. at 27. However, Zografos concerned a similar situation, as the plaintiff there had 

both previously testified against and filed a formal complaint against one of the Skelly hearing 

officers. See 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90101, at *25. This fact did not impact the conclusion that 

summary judgment was warranted where the plaintiff was afforded a post-termination appeal with 

an unbiased adjudicator. Id. at *29. Here, even assuming Chief Magnus was biased against her, 

Plaintiff was afforded post-termination procedures that would have given her the opportunity to 

present her case before an impartial hearing officer. Plaintiff did in fact select binding arbitration, 

and a neutral arbitrator was selected. Stephenson Dec. at Exh. G. However, Plaintiff then decided 

not to go to arbitration, but to instead file the instant action. Id. at Exh. I. As in Zografos, 

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Plaintiff‟s decision to forgo post-termination proceedings before an impartial decision-maker 

should not defeat the instant motion for summary judgment, especially where Plaintiff does not 

allege that the post-termination proceedings would have been biased. Contrast with Zografos, 

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90101, at *16-17, 29-30; see also Correa v. Nampa School Dist., 645 F.2d 

814, 817 (9th Cir. 1981) (“where adequate administrative procedures exist, a person cannot state a 

claim for denial of procedural rights when he has elected to forego a complete hearing”).

Because the pre-termination hearing comports with the Ninth Circuit‟s requirements in 

Brewster, and Plaintiff had the opportunity to have post-termination procedures before an 

impartial hearing officer, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on the entirety of 

Plaintiff‟s due process claims.

b. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her First Amendment rights by retaliating against 

her for: (1) her February 2013 complaint alleging departmental corruption, (2) her December 2012 

and May 2013 complaints against Lieutenant Curran and Records Supervisor Schlemmer for 

“disparate treatment,” and (3) her personal religious views that she expressed outside the 

workplace regarding Christianity and gay marriage. Opp. at 20.

As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, a First Amendment retaliation claim involves a fivestep analysis:

(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) 

whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; 

(3) whether the plaintiff‟s protected speech was a substantial or 

motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the 

state had an adequate justification for treating the employee 

differently from other members of the general public; and (5) 

whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action 

even absent the protected speech.

Eng. v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070.

The Court finds that in the instant case, there was no speech involving a public concern. 

Whether speech involves a public concern “is purely a question of law.” Id. at 1071. “Speech 

involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be considered to relate to any matter of 

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political, social, or other concern to the community.” Id. at 1070 (citations omitted). For 

example, “[s]peech that concerns issues about which information is needed or appropriate to 

enable the members of society to make informed decisions about the operation of their 

government merits the highest degree of first amendment protection.” Coszalter v. City of Salem, 

320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). In contrast, “speech that deals with 

individual personnel disputes and grievances and that would be of no relevance to the public‟s 

evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies is generally not of „public concern.‟” Id.

(citation omitted). The determination of whether the speech in question is of public concern must 

“be made with reference to the content, form, and context of the speech.” Id. at 973-74 (citation 

omitted). 

In Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, the Ninth Circuit found no protected speech. 572 

F.3d 703, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2009). There, four sergeants, including the plaintiffs, filed an informal 

grievance against their supervisor Lieutenant Kimball, concerned that the interaction between 

themselves and Lieutenant Kimball was impacting operational efficiency. Id. at 705-06. 

Lieutenant Kimball was transferred, and a new supervisor was put in place. Id. at 706. Believing 

that the police department had not taken adequate steps to resolve their concerns, the plaintiffs 

filed a formal grievance against Lieutenant Kimball, Chief of Police Bildt, and Captain Mankin. 

The plaintiffs alleged that Lieutenant Kimball had created a “hostile work environment,” and that 

Chief Bildt and Captain Mankin were “perpetuating this environment by „fail[ing] to take 

appropriate action.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the content of the speech, which is “the greatest single factor.” 

Id. at 710. Although the plaintiffs characterized their grievances as implicating issues such as 

competency, preparedness, efficiency, and morale, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded. Instead, 

it noted that it had “never held that a simple reference to government functioning automatically 

qualifies as speech on a matter of public concern. To the contrary . . . the fact that speech contains 

passing references to public safety, incidental to the message conveyed weighs against a finding of 

public concern.” Id. at 711 (citation omitted). In short, “[t]he reality that poor interpersonal 

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relationships amongst coworkers might hamper the work of a government office does not 

automatically transform speech on such issues into speech on a matter of public concern.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff points to four speech of public concern: her December 2012 complaint of 

disparate treatment by Lieutenant Curran, her February 2013 complaint of corruption under Chief 

Magnus, her May 2013 complaint of disparate treatment by Records Supervisor Schlemmer, and 

her religious views regarding Christianity and gay marriage. Opp. at 20.

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s December 2012 complaint against Lieutenant Curran 

does not involve a public concern. Plaintiff‟s complaint was on an internal personnel matter, 

concerning an incident where Lieutenant Curran called Plaintiff at home and yelled at her for 

leaving a shift early. Flanagan Dec., Exh. F. While Plaintiff asked “Why the disparity?”, there is 

no indication that she is complaining of disparate treatment based on a protected class. Instead, 

the complaint went on to note that Lieutenant Curran‟s behavior “go[es] hand in hand with the 

former confusion and havoc that has been in our Records section.” Id. Thus, the complaint is 

grounded in an internal dispute, and is not on a matter of public concern.

Second, Plaintiff‟s February 2013 complaint was also a workplace grievance, focused 

primarily on Plaintiff‟s concerns of “coming back into the enemy‟s camp,” where “there has been 

so much opposition, so much discord, unfairness and corruption in this department.” Flanagan 

Dec., Exh. G. Plaintiff‟s comments about Chief Magnus were limited to saying that she had “no 

faith in our chief‟s ability to be right and fair.” Plaintiff does not cite to any specific incidents of 

corruption in her complaint, or how Chief Magnus is responsible for the corruption. Again, the 

complaint was focused on internal management, rather than a breach of public trust that would be 

a matter of public concern. This complaint is also not on a matter of public concern.

Third, Plaintiff‟s May 2013 complaint against Records Supervisor Schlemmer was 

likewise a workplace grievance. While Plaintiff mentioned racial bias twice in the three-page email, her focus was primarily on the investigation into the April 18, 2013 incident with Ms. 

Taylor, which she alleged was a “vicious and malicious prosecution.” Flanagan Dec., Exh. H. 

Plaintiff‟s e-mail complaint almost exclusively focused on being put on administrative leave 

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without due process, specifically the opportunity to present her side of the story, and arguing that 

the investigation has involved “question[ing] people who clearly have had animosity against me 

and a motive to lie.” Id. Looked at as a whole, the May 2013 complaint does not appear to be a 

complaint about racial discrimination, but was a complaint that the investigation into the April 18, 

2013 incident was even occurring, and how it was being conducted. Thus, the Court finds that this 

complaint is also not on a matter of public concern.

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that her speech regarding Christianity and gay marriage is a matter 

of public concern. Plaintiff cites no case law in support of this proposition. Plaintiff‟s citation to 

Muhammad v. New York City Transit Authority is unavailing; Muhammad did not concern speech 

on a public concern but religious discrimination. Plaintiff‟s personal views about Christianity and 

gay marriage are not a matter of public concern.

Having found that there was no speech on a public concern, the Court grants summary 

judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff‟s First Amendment Retaliation claim.7

c. Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise Clause states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. 1. However, the courts 

have been clear that “[t]he right to exercise one‟s religion freely . . . does not relieve an individual 

of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that 

the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Stormans, 

Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

With respect to her Free Exercise claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants terminated her 

employment “as a direct result of her expressing her religious beliefs about gay marriage.” Opp. 

 

7

Even if Plaintiff‟s complaints were on a matter of public concern, there are serious questions 

about whether Plaintiff had sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact as to causation. 

Plaintiff‟s primary arguments that her termination was in retaliation for her complaints are that 

Defendants simply “revived” Ms. Taylor‟s 2012 complaints to justify an investigation and that the 

Investigative Report found that witnesses denied Plaintiff was rude to Ms. Taylor. As is more 

fully explained in Part III.C.2.c, Plaintiff presented no evidence that Ms. Taylor did not in fact 

complain about the April 18, 2013 incident, and Plaintiff herself admitted to being rude to Ms. 

Taylor during the investigation. See Investigative Report at 13, 14; Curran Dep. at 82:2-6. 

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at 18 (emphasis added). In general, the First Amendment “embraces two concepts, -- freedom to 

believe and freedom to act.” Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 301 (1940). But while “[t]he first 

is absolute . . . the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 

society.” Id. at 301-02.

While not directly on point, Good News Employee Association v. City of Oakland is 

instructive. No. C-03-3542 VRW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30371 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2004). 

There, the plaintiffs posted a flyer entitled “Preserve Our Workplace With Integrity,” and 

explained that their group “is a forum for people of Faith to express their views on the 

contemporary issues of the day. With respect for the Natural Family, Marriage and Family values. 

If you would like to be a part of preserving integrity in the Workplace call [the group] . . . .” Id. at 

*3. Following the posting, the City developed and distributed an antidiscrimination policy 

regarding employee conduct, pointing specifically to “flyers . . . placed in public view which 

contained statements of a homophobic nature and were determined to promote sexual orientation 

based harassment.” Id. at *5.

The plaintiffs challenged the policy as a violation of the First Amendment‟s free speech 

clause and free exercise clause, among other claims. Id. at *6. In analyzing the free speech claim 

and whether defendants had an interest in restricting discriminatory speech about homosexuals, 

the district court agreed with the plaintiffs that “the flyer is not outwardly discriminatory enough 

to cause likely disruption in the workplace.” Id. at *38. While the flyer “implicated” the issue of 

homosexuality, using terms such as “natural family” and “family” values, it at most “indicat[ed] 

disagreement with the message promoted by homosexual groups. . . . The flyer‟s indirect 

implication of disapproval of homosexuality simply is not the kind of blatant or offensive speech 

that on its face would cause disorder or controversy.” Id. at *39. The district court contrasted the 

flyer to cases where the courts had found that employee speech about homosexuality could be 

restricted, including a Seventh Circuit case Greer where the plaintiff had disparaged the fire chief 

based on her alleged sexual orientation, using speech that was “outwardly offensive, disrespectful 

and likely to create public controversy.” Id. at *39-40 (citing Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358 

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(7th Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds)). The district court also contrasted the flyer to 

Lumpkin v. Brown, in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment to the defendants 

where a Human Rights Commissioner was removed for calling the homosexual lifestyle “an 

abomination against God” and implicitly endorsing violence against homosexuals. See 109 F.3d 

1498, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1997). In contrast to such inflammatory speech which directly 

condemned homosexuality, the district court found that the plaintiffs‟ flyer used “no openly 

derogatory terms about homosexuals and have not specifically targeted particular individuals.” 

Good News Emp. Ass’n, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30371 at *40-41. Thus, with respect to the flyer, 

there was no evidence “that the flyer is so patently offensive that it would cause disruption in the 

workplace,” and the district court denied the motion to dismiss the free speech claim. Id. at *41-

42. 

However, the district court did grant the motion to dismiss the free exercise claim, finding 

that the “[p]laintiffs do not allege that defendants interfered with their religious beliefs per se, but 

rather that defendants interfered with their ability to express their religious beliefs. [Citation.] 

Without more facts that would establish how interference with expression unduly burdens their 

religious beliefs, plaintiffs‟ claim is insufficient as stated.” Id. at *50.

At issue here is Plaintiff‟s expression of her religious beliefs about gay marriage. During 

the investigation, several people reported that Plaintiff made disparaging remarks about 

homosexuals, including stating that Ms. Taylor would not go to heaven “because God does not 

like gays,” that PRS Aberson‟s mother would “go to hell” if she continued her relationship with 

another woman, and asking if Ms. Taylor used the men‟s or women‟s bathroom. Investigative 

Report at 8, 11. These statements were not simply expressions of disagreement with 

homosexuality, but were inflammatory and condemning of specific individuals like Ms. Taylor 

and PRS Aberson‟s mother. Thus, these comments were comparable to speech on which the 

courts have permitted restrictions. 

Furthermore, as in Good News, there is no evidence that Defendants have 

unconstitutionally interfered with Plaintiff‟s religious beliefs. Plaintiff in fact alleges that 

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Defendants terminated her employment “as a direct result of her expressing her religious beliefs 

about gay marriage,” and does not explain how interference with this expression would unduly 

burden her religious beliefs. See Opp. at 18 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence in the 

record, the termination of Plaintiff‟s employment was based not on her religious beliefs, but on 

whether her inflammatory comments about homosexual lifestyles was a violation of the Richmond 

Police Department‟s policies, including Policy 340.3.3(a), which prohibits “[d]iscriminating 

against any person because of age, race, color, creed, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national 

origin, ancestry, marital status, physical or mental disability or medical condition.” Flanagan 

Dep., Exh. V at 3 (quoting Policy 340.3.3(a)) (bold in original). As in Good News, this policy as 

restricting her expression of beliefs does not hinder her religious beliefs. The Court finds that 

summary judgment on Plaintiff‟s free exercise claim in favor of Defendant is appropriate.8

d. Monell Liability

With respect to Plaintiff‟s Section 1983 claim, summary judgment to the City of Richmond 

is also granted on the separate ground that Plaintiff has failed to establish municipal liability, as 

she has not identified a policy or practice that caused her constitutional deprivation. “A 

government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless a policy, practice, or 

custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional 

rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Municipal liability can be 

established in three ways:

First, the plaintiff may prove that a city employee committed the 

alleged constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental 

policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the 

standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity. 

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual who 

 

8

Plaintiff‟s reliance on Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark is 

incorrect. Fraternal Order concerned a policy that permitted officers to wear beards for medical 

reasons, but not religious beliefs. 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit applied 

strict scrutiny analysis to find that there was no legitimate interest in allowing officers to wear 

beards for medical reasons, but not religious reasons. The case had nothing to do with expression 

of religious beliefs about gay marriage, as Plaintiff implies. Opp. at 18.

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committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policymaking authority and that the challenged action itself thus 

constituted an act of official governmental policy. Whether a 

particular official has final policy-making authority is a question of 

state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove that an official with final 

policy making authority ratified a subordinate‟s unconstitutional 

decision or action and the basis for it.

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992).

First, Plaintiff argues that there was a custom and practice of the Richmond Police 

Department to appoint Skelly officers who are the subject of an employee‟s workplace complaint. 

Opp. at 10, fn. 1. Plaintiff provides no evidence that this is a custom and practice, which is in fact 

contradicted by Chief Magnus. See Magnus Dep. at 20:19-21:1 (stating that Chief Magnus is 

usually the Skelly officer for Richmond Police Department employee Skelly hearings unless there 

is “a compelling reason where I felt I could not be fair; where I would be available . . . within a 

reasonable period of time; or where there might be some other really extenuating circumstance.”) 

Even if this was the policy, it is unrelated to Plaintiff‟s claims for First Amendment retaliation and 

religious discrimination, and would only be the “cause” of a due process deprivation. However, 

per Walker, as long as the post-termination hearing officer is impartial, the fact that the pretermination hearing officer may be biased is not itself sufficient to show a due process violation. 

See 951 F.2d at 183.

Second, Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that “Plaintiff is informed and believes that 

Defendant City of Richmond has a custom, policy, pattern, or practice of retaliating against 

employees who make complaints of public concern.” Compl. at ¶ 37. However, Plaintiff provides 

no evidentiary support that such a policy exists. There is no evidence that similar dismissals had 

occurred, or how long such a policy of retaliation may have existed. Compare with Gillette, 979 

F.2d at 1349 (finding no evidence of an informal policy of disciplining or terminating employees 

who publicly criticized public safety operations where plaintiff failed to present evidence of 

similar dismissals or how long the informal policy existed).

Finally, Plaintiff does not allege in either her complaint or opposition that there was any 

policy or practice regarding religious discrimination. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has 

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not established municipal liability under Monell as to her Section 1983 claims, and that this is a 

separate reason for granting summary judgment to the City of Richmond on her first cause of 

action.

2. FEHA and Title VII Discrimination

Plaintiff‟s second cause of action alleges that Defendants violated the California Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Title VII‟s prohibitions on discrimination on the basis 

of religion. Compl. ¶ 43. FEHA and Title VII “operate under the same guiding principles,” and 

utilize the same three-step burden-shifting test established in McConnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Guz v. Bechtel National, 

Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (2000).

Under the McConnell Douglas test, a plaintiff alleging discrimination must first establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination. Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Service, 580 F.3d 1116, 1123. 

“Specifically, the plaintiff must show that (1) [s]he belongs to a protected class; (2) [s]he was 

qualified for the position; (3) [s]he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly 

situated individuals outside [her] protected class were treated more favorably.” Id. (citation 

omitted). At the summary judgment stage, “the requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a 

prima facie case for Title VII . . . is minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th 

Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “the order of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas does not permit [the 

court] to consider rebuttal evidence at the prima facie case stage.” Lowe v. Monrovia, 775 F.2d 

998, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).

Once a plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, “the 

burden of production -- but not persuasion -- then shifts to the employer to articulate some 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. 

Once the employer has done so, the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis puts the burden 

back on the plaintiff to show that the employer‟s articulated reason is “pretextual.” Id. Thus, “the 

plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally

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discriminated against the plaintiff.” Los Angeles Cnty Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Civil Serv. 

Comm’n, 8 Cal. App. 4th 273, 281 (1992) (emphasis added).

a. Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case. While Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate a prima facie case because “there is an absence of evidence that Plaintiff was 

performing her job satisfactorily at the time of termination,” the issue is not whether Plaintiff‟s 

performance was satisfactory, but whether she was qualified for the position. See Nicholson, 580 

F.3d at 1123; Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. In determining qualifications, the courts are required 

to look at objective criteria, not subjective criteria. See Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 

F.2d 1337, 1344. “To do otherwise would in many instances collapse the three step analysis into a 

single initial step at which all issues would be resolved. This would defeat the purpose underlying 

the McDonnell Douglas process.” Id. 

There is no real dispute that Plaintiff could satisfy the objective criteria of a position she 

has held for over twenty years. While Plaintiff had disciplinary issues, they are not related to her 

ability to perform the duties of her position, such as entering in computer entries and citations, 

pulling warrants, computer/data entry, and matron duties. See Flanagan Dep. at 40:19-41:5. Thus, 

Plaintiff can demonstrate that she is qualified for her position. As Defendants do not challenge 

Plaintiff‟s ability to satisfy the other criteria of the prima facie case of discrimination, the Court 

continues to step two of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

b. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason for Termination

Defendants have satisfied their burden to “produce” a nondiscriminatory reason, which in 

the instant case were: (1) the discourteous and disrespectful treatment of Ms. Taylor on April 18, 

2013, (2) inappropriate and derogatory comments in the workplace about homosexuality, and (3) 

dishonesty during an administrative interview. Mot. at 16. Plaintiff‟s arguments on this point are 

geared towards demonstrating that Defendants‟ reasons for terminating Plaintiff‟s employment 

were pretextual, not that Defendants lacked a reason to begin with. Thus, the Court finds that 

there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination, and moves to step three of the 

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McDonnell-Douglas analysis.

c. Pretext

“At the third step of the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff must show that the 

articulated reason is pretextual either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason 

more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer‟s proffered 

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1126-27. “To avoid summary 

judgment at this step . . . the plaintiff must only demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of 

material fact regarding pretext. The amount of evidence required to do so is minimal.” Id. at 

1127. The reasoning is that “the ultimate question is one that can be resolved through a searching 

inquiry -- one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder, upon a full record.” Id. at 

1128. A plaintiff may also “rely on circumstantial evidence to show pretext, [but] such evidence 

must be both specific and substantial.” However, “mere assertions that [an employer] had 

discriminatory motive and intent . . . [a]re inadequate, without substantial factual evidence, to raise 

an issue precluding summary judgment. Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 

1983).

In Nicholson, the court found that the female pilot “met her minimal burden” that her 

termination was the result of gender discrimination. Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1127. The pilot 

presented evidence that there were irregularities in the disciplinary proceedings, including a 

“cursory” investigation and the employer actively soliciting letters of complaint about the pilot

from other pilots. The pilot also presented evidence that the employer specifically wanted to 

remove her, such as when they prohibited her from flying planes that they acknowledged she 

could fly, as well as specific gender-related remarks. Id. at 1128. The pilot also provided 

evidence that two male pilots who failed portions of their training were given the opportunity to 

receive additional training to remedy their deficiencies, while she was not afforded the same 

opportunity. Id. Taken together, the Ninth Circuit concluded that she had “introduced the 

minimal evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the employer] 

suspended her because of her sex.” Id.

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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence of pretext in 

Villiarimo. There, the plaintiff was a ramp supervisor who was involved in an accident that 

resulted in damage to one of the defendant‟s airplanes. 281 F.3d at 1058. Her employment was 

terminated for a rule violation in connection with the accident, and for alleged dishonesty during 

the investigation of the accident. Id. The plaintiff contended that those reasons were pretextual, 

and that she was terminated because of gender discrimination. Id. at 1062-63. The Ninth Circuit 

rejected her argument that the reasons for her termination had changed over time, as the evidence 

showed that the employer‟s reasons had been consistent. Id. at 1063. The Ninth Circuit also 

rejected the plaintiff‟s attacks on the credibility of three witnesses whose account of the accident 

different from hers, holding that “[i]n judging whether Aloha‟s proffered justifications were 

„false,‟ it is not important whether they were objectively false (e.g., whether Villiarimo actually

lied). Rather, courts only require that an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, 

even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Id. (citation omitted). As the plaintiff 

failed to present evidence that the employer did not in fact “honestly believe its proffered 

reasons,” there was no evidence that the non-discriminatory reasons offered for her termination 

were pretextual, and her gender-based discrimination claim failed. Id.

In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis 

of her religious beliefs. As Defendant has given a non-discriminatory reason for the termination 

of her employment, Plaintiff “retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that [s]he 

has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” USW Local 12-369 v. USW Int’l, 728 F.3d 

1107, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal modifications omitted). To survive summary 

judgment, Plaintiff must show there is a genuine issue of material fact that Defendants‟ decision to 

terminate her employment was the product of intentional discrimination against her religion.

Based on the record, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was intentionally terminated for her 

religious beliefs, rather than Defendants‟ honestly-held belief that she violated the rules of 

conduct. Plaintiff‟s challenge to Defendants‟ asserted non-discriminatory reasons for termination 

fail. 

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For example, Plaintiff argues that Defendants could not have terminated her based on her 

failure to allow Ms. Taylor in on April 18 or her alleged rude behavior towards Ms. Taylor; she 

contends the Investigative Report contradicts both these allegations. Opp. at 23 (citing 

Investigative Report at 4-7, 16-17). The evidence does not support Plaintiff‟s characterization of 

the report. Plaintiff theorizes that the investigation was itself a sham, as Ms. Taylor did not in fact 

complain about the April 18, 2013 incident, and that Defendants were simply reaching back to her 

2012 complaint to persecute her. Ex Parte Application at 7-8. However, Plaintiff lacks any 

supporting evidence of this; the record shows that Ms. Taylor did complain in April 2013. See

Investigative Report at 13. Lieutenant Curran further testified that she was not investigating the 

complaint in 2012, but “a complaint brought forward in April of 2013. That‟s what spawned the 

investigation, not the 2012 allegation that, you know, had allegedly been dropped.” Curran Dep. 

at 82:2-6. Plaintiff provides no contradictory evidence. In any event, even if the Investigative 

Report‟s findings regarding the April 18, 2013 are in fact inaccurate, that alone would not be

sufficient to support Plaintiff‟s claim of pretext. If Defendants honestly believed the Investigative 

Report‟s findings, then pretext would not be found absent evidence that Defendants “did not

honestly believe its proffered reasons.” See Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1063. As for the Investigative 

Report itself, while it is true that Plaintiff did not deny Ms. Taylor access on April 18, 2013, that 

was not the issue; the issue was whether she had been discourteous and disrespectful towards Ms. 

Taylor. Flanagan Dep., Exh. V at 2. Also contrary to Plaintiff‟s argument, the other volunteer and 

PRS on duty did not affirmatively state that Plaintiff was professional during the April 18, 2013 

incident. Opp. at 23. Instead, they stated that they did not know what was said between Ms. 

Taylor and Plaintiff. Id. at 6, 17. To the extent that Ms. Hernandez described the interaction as 

“polite and respectful,” she was clearly characterizing Ms. Taylor’s words, not Plaintiff‟s. Id. at 

17. Importantly, during her investigative interview and the Skelly hearing with Chief Magnus, 

Plaintiff admitted that she was rude to Ms. Taylor, but justified it by saying that Ms. Taylor was 

“nasty” to her first. Investigative Report at 14; Magnus Dep., Exh. 6. Thus, the Investigative 

Report was supported by substantial evidence (including Plaintiff‟s own words). Plaintiff has not 

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established evidence that Defendants did not honestly believe the report. 

Plaintiff also claims that nobody ever heard homophobic comments by her, which resulted 

in the City interviewing former and retired employees. However, PRS Harper and PRS Bryant 

both stated that they were aware of Plaintiff‟s disapproval of homosexuality, while PRS Aberson 

recalled specific homophobic comments made by Plaintiff. Id. at 7, 8, 9. Furthermore, even if 

Ms. Drake is a former employee, this fact alone does not undermine her statement that she heard 

Plaintiff make specific homophobic comments. Id. at 11. Because there were multiple witnesses 

who had observed such comments, Plaintiff failed to establish credible evidence that Defendants 

did not honestly believe the report. 

As to other evidence of pretext, Plaintiff argues that similarly-situated PRSs were not 

disciplined for engaging in similar conduct as Plaintiff, specifically the failure to allow Ms. Taylor 

into the building or making disrespectful comments about homosexuality. Opp. at 24. The Ninth 

Circuit has held that “individuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display 

similar conduct.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, 

Plaintiff cannot point to similar conduct. First, the investigation did not result from Plaintiff‟s 

failure to allow Ms. Taylor into the building. Rather, Plaintiff was investigated for being 

discourteous and disrespectful towards Ms. Taylor on April 18, 2013. Plaintiff does not point to 

any other PRS who had similarly been discourteous and disrespectful towards a volunteer, who 

were then not investigated or disciplined for their actions.

As to the inappropriate comment about homosexuality made by PRS Aberson, there are 

marked differences in the conduct for which Plaintiff was terminated. According to the 

declaration by Officer Dedrick Riley, in early 2013, Officer Riley had mentioned to another PRS 

that he did not receive a promotion to the position of Sergeant, when PRS Aberson interjected 

loudly, “Well, I guess you didn‟t go into Chief Magnus‟s office with your pants pulled down.” 

Docket No. 51 (Riley Dec.) at ¶ 3. Officer Riley took that as an apparent reference to the fact that 

Chief Magnus is an openly-gay man, and while he was extremely offended and filed a complaint, 

states that no action was ever taken against PRS Aberson. Id. In contrast, Plaintiff was 

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investigated because Ms. Taylor lodged a complaint after Plaintiff was rude to her on April 18, 

2013, following prior complaints by Ms. Taylor against Plaintiff in 2012. Curran Dep. at 82:2-6; 

Investigative Report at 5; Milam Dec. at ¶¶ 4, 6. During the course of the investigation, it was 

discovered that Plaintiff had made numerous inappropriate remarks about homosexuality, in 

contrast to PRS Aberson‟s single comment. Investigative Report at 8, 11. When asked about the 

events, Plaintiff denied she made the remarks and claimed that the other witnesses had been 

untruthful, leading to Chief Magnus‟s concerns about “her repeated and unflinching willingness to 

call her colleagues dishonest.” Magnus Dep., Exh. 6 at 7. Finally, the decision to terminate 

Plaintiff was based not only on her inappropriate comments about homosexuality, but her 

discourteous treatment of Ms. Taylor and dishonesty during the administrative interview. 

Flanagan Dep., Exh. V at 2-4. Termination was also deemed appropriate based on prior 

disciplinary actions, including Plaintiff‟s October 2012 two-day suspension, the December 2011 

Internal Affairs investigation into the Santa hat incident, and January 2005 and September 2004 

Letters of Reprimand. Viewed in context, PRS Aberson‟s conduct was very different from 

Plaintiff‟s, and thus PRS Aberson and Plaintiff were not similarly situated to lead to a reasonable 

inference that Defendants‟ articulated legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff‟s employment 

was pretextual.

Nor has Plaintiff presented any evidence that Defendants‟ actions were motivated by 

religious discrimination. While there was an incident regarding the removal of the scripture, there 

is no evidence that the scripture removal was itself due to religious discrimination. Instead, the 

investigation found that the scripture was not seized, but that a sergeant had become concerned 

because the locker was left open. Magnus Dep., Exh. 4. When the sergeant looked inside, she 

found that it was empty except for a note taped to the door, which read: “RPD, you meant it for 

evil, but God meant it for good and blessed it so that I may be a blessing.” Because the sergeant 

found the note disturbing, she reported it to Lieutenant Johnson, who asked her to bring him the 

note. When Plaintiff asked after the note, Lieutenant Johnson explained the situation, and returned 

the note. Id. The investigation further found that Plaintiff was not told that she could not display 

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the note, and Plaintiff has not alleged otherwise. Id. at 51. Plaintiff also claims specific incidents 

of bias against her religion, as Lieutenant Curran admitted she believed that Plaintiff was trying to 

impose her religious views on the workplace. Opp. at 24. However, Lieutenant Curran‟s 

comments that Plaintiff‟s homophobic comments were based on Plaintiff‟s religion do not show a 

bias against Plaintiff‟s religious beliefs; they simply explain that Lieutenant Curran thought there 

was a connection between Plaintiff‟s expressed views and her religious beliefs. See Curran Dep. 

at 74:5-14. In any event, Lieutenant Curran also stated that before the investigation, she had no 

idea about Plaintiff‟s religious views. Id. at 75:6-10. That statement is not contradicted by any 

evidence. Thus, any alleged bias on the part of Lieutenant Curran would not have influenced the 

decision to conduct the investigation in the first place. 

Plaintiff‟s argument that Chief Magnus was biased because he admitted that Plaintiff‟s 

religious beliefs were “odd” is also unavailing. Based on the record, it is clear that Chief Magnus 

was referring to the circumstance in which the scripture was found, specifically that it was found 

on an empty locker. Magnus Dep. at 54:13-21 (explaining that he had referred to the note as odd 

because “People don‟t leave notes on the outside of their lockers that are empty,” and explaining 

that “it‟s an odd set of circumstances”).

Taken as a whole, there is simply insufficient evidence to infer that Defendants‟ nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff were pretextual, or that the termination of 

Plaintiff‟s employment was the result of religious discrimination. The Court therefore grants 

Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff‟s second cause of action.

3. FEHA and Title VII Retaliation

Plaintiff‟s third cause of action alleges that Defendants violated FEHA‟s and Title VII‟s 

prohibition on retaliating for engaging in a protected activity. Compl. at ¶ 49. To state a cause of 

action for retaliation, the plaintiff must show: “(1) involvement in protected activity opposing an 

unlawful employment practice, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between 

the protected activity and the adverse action.” Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 541 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To satisfy the protected activity requirement, the plaintiff must oppose conduct that 

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constitutes discrimination under the statute. See Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“the opposed conduct must fairly fall within the protection of Title VII to sustain 

a claim of unlawful retaliation”); Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h) (prohibiting retaliation because “the 

person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a 

complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part). 

However, the courts have declined to find a protected activity supporting a retaliation 

claim where the alleged protected activity at issue fails to state that it opposed discrimination. See 

Pieszak v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 112 F. Supp. 2d 970, 994 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding 

that a complaint about harassment which did not mention “„sex‟, „gender‟, or any incident that 

would have disclosed that [the] harassment had anything to do with sex or gender bias” could not 

support a retaliation claim); Jamal v. Wilshire Mgmt. Leasing Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1078-

79 (D. Ore. 2004) (finding no protected activity where the plaintiff‟s complaints did not mention 

age discrimination, and that “[t]here can be no inference that she meant illegal age discrimination 

when all she ever complained of was that she and anonymous other employees thought Magee was 

a bad manager”); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. 36 Cal. 4th 1028 (“Standing alone, an employee‟s 

unarticulated belief that an employer is engaging in discrimination will not suffice to establish 

protected conduct for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, where there is 

no evidence the employer knew that the employee‟s opposition was based upon a reasonable belief 

that the employer was engaging in discrimination.”).

Here, in Plaintiff‟s December 2012 complaint against Lieutenant Curran, the only 

indication of disparate treatment is where Plaintiff asks “Why the disparity?” Flanagan Dec., Exh. 

F. However, there is no indication as to what basis the disparate treatment is for, whether it is 

religion, race, or a personnel dispute where some employees are favored for reasons other than a 

protected class. Even in Plaintiff‟s declaration, Plaintiff does not identify what kind of 

discrimination she was alleging. She only states that she felt that “Lt. Curran improperly [] 

singled me out for unequal treatment by calling me at home and yelling at me, in front of my 

children . . . .” Flanagan Dec. ¶ 12. Plaintiff‟s December 2012 complaint did not put Defendants 

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on notice that she was making a complaint opposing group-based discrimination prohibited by 

FEHA or Title VII, and therefore Plaintiff likely cannot make a prima facie case for retaliation. 

The Court therefore grants Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment on this cause of action.9

4. California Constitutional Claims

The Court finds that for the same reasons that Plaintiff‟s federal constitutional claims fail, 

her state constitutional claims also fail. Plaintiff alleges violations of the California 

Constitution‟s free exercise clause (Art. I, § 4), due process protections (Art. I, § 7), and free 

speech clause (Art. I, § 2).

With respect to the free exercise clause, the Ninth Circuit has found that “[l]ike the First 

Amendment Free Exercise Clause . . . the free exercise clause in Article I, section 4 of the 

California Constitution protects against only governmental action that burdens religious freedom.” 

Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 992 fn. 12; see also Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385,

1392 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California case law suggests that analysis of a claim of the constitutional 

right to the free exercise of religion is generally similar under both federal and state constitutional 

law”). As Plaintiff cannot show that there was any governmental action burdening her religious 

freedom, Plaintiff‟s state constitutional claims for violations of her free exercise rights likewise 

fail.

 

9 While Plaintiff did make a May 21, 2013 complaint specifically alleging racial discrimination, 

this complaint came after Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave on May 9, 2013, and the 

investigation into the April 18, 2013 incident between Plaintiff and Ms. Taylor had already 

commenced. Flanagan Dep., Exh. R. Plaintiff does not allege that her termination was in 

retaliation to this complaint. Even if she did, she provides no evidence in support, and the Ninth 

Circuit has found that “[a] plaintiff‟s belief that a defendant acted from an unlawful motive, 

without evidence supporting that belief, is no more than speculation or unfounded accusation 

about whether the defendant really did act from an unlawful motive. To be cognizable on 

summary judgment, evidence must be competent.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 

237 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit found that a genuine issue of fact would 

have been established through the plaintiff‟s declaration where she quoted a vice president of the 

school board saying, “as long as [the plaintiff] continues to maintain legal proceedings against the 

District, [she] will be unable to obtain employment with the district.” Id. However, the plaintiff 

had not mentioned it in her summary judgment papers. Id. In the instant case, Plaintiff does not 

even allege that anyone had told her that the investigation of the April 18, 2013 incident or her 

termination was because of her complaints. Plaintiff‟s speculation that there is a causal link is 

insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

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As to the due process violations claim, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that California‟s 

due process protections are broader than its federal analogues. See Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San 

Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1050 (9th Cir. 2014) (“although California has looked to the United States 

Supreme Court‟s precedents for guidance in interpreting the contours of its own due process 

clause and has treated the state clause‟s prescriptions as substantially overlapping those of the 

federal Constitution, California‟s due process protections are, at times, broader than those imposed 

by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). However, California appellate courts have relied upon Supreme 

Court decisions which “determined that in circumstances providing for a full hearing 

posttermination, the pretermination hearing „should be an initial check against mistaken decisions-

-essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges 

against the employee are true and support the proposed action.‟” Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale, 130 

Cal. App. 4th 1264, 1277 (2005) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 

545-46). Specifically, “[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the 

charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his 

side of the story.” Id. (citation omitted). The California Court of Appeal thus rejected the 

plaintiff‟s argument that he was entitled to all documents identified in the notice of his disciplinary 

action prior to his pre-termination hearing, instead finding that the notice and other materials made 

available were adequate to provide an explanation of the employer‟s evidence. Id. at 1280. The 

California Court of Appeal noted that this was with the understanding that a “full and fair 

posttermination hearing” was also available. Id. Here, Plaintiff‟s Skelly hearing comports with 

the minimum requirements identified by Gilbert and Skelly, specifically that she received written 

notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to present her side of the 

story. Unlike the plaintiff in Gilbert, she also received the evidence itself, including the 

Investigative Report and a CD containing the recorded interviews, which she had the opportunity 

to review before the Skelly hearing. Flanagan Dep. at 191:5-192:2. Plaintiff also does not dispute 

that she had the opportunity to appeal to a full and fair post-termination hearing, whether before 

the Personnel Board or in binding arbitration, and she does not allege that either option was 

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inadequate to protect her procedural due process rights. Thus, Plaintiff‟s California Constitutional 

due process claim fails.

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that California‟s free speech protections are 

more protective than the First Amendment. See Rosembaum v. City & Cnty of San Francisco, 484 

F.3d 1142, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the California Court of Appeals have also found that 

although “[t]he California free speech clause is broader and more protective than the First 

Amendment free speech clause . . . the fact that our provision is worded more expansively and has 

been interpreted as being more protective than the First Amendment in some respects does not 

mean that it is broader in all its applications.” Kaye v. Board of Trustees, 179 Cal. App. 4th 48, 57 

(2009) (citation omitted). Instead, when the California courts are called upon to “interpret a 

provision of the California Constitution that is similar to a provision of the federal Constitution, 

we will not depart from the United States Supreme Court‟s construction of the similar federal 

provision unless we are given cogent reasons to do so.” Id. (citation omitted). Kaye concerned a 

plaintiff who alleged that he was discharged after sending a scathing e-mail criticizing his 

superiors. Id. at 52. The California Court of Appeal found, and the plaintiff agreed, that his claim 

would fail under the Supreme Court case Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, which held that a 

First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983 required that the public employee be 

speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. at 56-57. While the plaintiff argued that 

Garcetti should not apply, the Court of Appeal found no reason to depart, especially when 

“California courts have routinely followed Supreme Court precedents in addressing public 

employee free speech matters.” Id. at 58; see also Franklin v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 172 

Cal. App. 3d 322, 342 fn. 8 (“Plaintiff has invited us to find greater protection in the California 

constitutional free speech provisions (art. I, § 2). While this argument has prevailed in other cases, 

we observe federal law has been leading the way for California cases involving discipline of 

employees for free speech activities, and we see no reason to depart from its essential 

reasonableness.”). Thus, for the same reasons that Plaintiff‟s Section 1983 free speech retaliation 

claim fails, so does her free speech claim under the California Constitution. The Court therefore 

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grants Defendants‟ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff‟s California Constitutional claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff‟s motion for leave to file excess 

pages, DENIES Plaintiff‟s ex parte application to defer the motion for summary judgment 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), and GRANTS Defendants‟ motion for 

summary judgment.

The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment in accordance with the above and 

close the file in this case.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 39, 46, and 55.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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