Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OBESITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 

LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 15-cv-595-BAS(MDD) 

ORDER OVERRULING ORI’S 

OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S MAY 12, 2016 ORDER 

[ECF No. 264] v. 

FIBER RESEARCH 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Obesity Research Institute, LLC’s 

(“ORI”) meritless objection to the magistrate judge’s May 12, 2016 Order. The 

objection specifically addresses Defendant Fiber Research International, LLC’s 

(“FRI”) First Amended Request for Admission (“RFA”) No. 19, which was worded 

as follows: 

Admit that YOUR ADVERTISING CLAIMS OF 

CLINICAL PROOF OF WEIGHT/FAT LOSS for 

Lipozene during the STATUTORY PERIOD were 

intended to influence consumers to purchase Lipozene. 

// 

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(Persinger Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 210-3.) ORI responded to RFA No. 19 with the 

following: 

ORI is unable to admit or deny the request as phrased 

because it is misleading to separate out a single statement 

from a larger or overall advertisement, or indeed from an 

overall advertising campaign. ORI admits that advertising 

by definition, including its own advertising, is intended to 

inform consumers[.] 

(Persinger Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 210-4.) The magistrate judge determined that ORI 

failed to answer the question posed, explaining that “[t]he question was whether the 

advertising was intended to ‘influence’ customers, not ‘inform.’” (May 12, 2016 

Order 4:14-21.) He ultimately concluded that the answer is evasive and insufficient 

under Rule 36(a)(4), and deemed the request admitted. (Id.) 

 For the following reasons, the Court OVERRULES ORI’s objection in its 

entirety. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge 

within fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The 

magistrate judge’s order will be upheld unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to 

law.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to 

factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive 

pretrial discovery matters. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 

378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 697 (S.D. Ga. 1996) 

(reviewing magistrate judge’s order addressing attorney-client issues in discovery for 

clear error). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & 

Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

// 

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 On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review 

of purely legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp., 

Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates plenary 

review as to matters of law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 

1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010 update). “Thus, [the district court] must

exercise its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal 

conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to law if it fails 

to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United 

States v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18,

2009). 

II. ANALYSIS1

ORI presents three general arguments in support of its objection: (1) RFA No. 

19 “impermissibly” seeks a legal conclusion under the contrary-to-law standard; (2) 

ORI’s response is “literally compliant”; and (3) ordering a further response was the 

appropriate remedy and not deeming the request admitted. The latter two arguments 

are brought under the clearly-erroneous standard. These arguments all lack merit. 

A. RFA No. 19 Does Not Seek a Legal Conclusion. 

In arguing RFA No. 19 seeks a legal conclusion, ORI explains that the request 

“attempt[s] to improperly use RFA No. 19 to establish an element of its [Section 

43(a)] claim [under the Lanham Act]—proving materiality by proxy.” (ORI’s 

Objection 5:24-7:14.) As ORI points out, one of the elements of a Section 43(a) claim 

for false advertising is that “the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence 

 

1 FRI presents a compelling argument that by failing to previously argue RFA No. 19 calls 

for a legal conclusion despite having at least four opportunities to do so, ORI waived its objection. 

See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992).

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the purchasing decision.” Skydrive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1110 

(9th Cir. 2012). 

Based on the text of RFA No. 19, the Court concludes that FRI seeks an 

admission of fact regarding ORI’s intent in using certain language in its advertising, 

not a legal conclusion regarding materiality. Intent and materiality are not 

synonymous here. “Intent” is not even mentioned in the definition of the materiality 

element of a Section 43(a) claim. See Skydrive, 673 F.3d at 1110. In Skydrive, a case 

ORI relies on, the Ninth Circuit noted that “materiality in [Lanham Act] false 

advertising claims is ‘typically’ proven through consumer surveys,” suggesting that 

an advertiser’s intent is not even the primary means of determining materiality. See 

Skydrive, 672 F.3d at 1110-11 (citing Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 

F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997)). At best, an advertiser’s intent may be evidence to 

support a finding of materiality. ORI appears to recognize as much in its brief where 

it states that “one court has implicitly held that evidence of intent to influence may 

be sufficient to support a finding of materiality[.]” (ORI’s Objection 5:9-22 (citing 

POM Wonderful, LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 55426, at *30-31 (C.D. 

Cal. July 17, 2008)).) To state the obvious, evidence to support materiality is not the 

same as materiality itself. 

Accordingly, the Court rejects ORI’s argument that RFA No. 19 impermissibly 

seeks a legal conclusion. Furthermore, the Court cannot identify any legal 

determination by the magistrate judge that is contrary to law. See Cathcart, 2009 WL 

1764642, at *2. 

B. ORI’s Response Is Evasive. 

To determine whether the magistrate judge’s determination—that ORI’s 

response is evasive—is clearly erroneous, this Court should review that 

determination with significant deference, “requiring a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 623. This Court 

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does not need to review the May 12, 2016 Order with such deference to reach the 

same conclusion as the magistrate judge—ORI’s response is evasive. 

RFA No. 19 simply asks ORI for an admission whether it intended to influence 

consumers to purchase Lipozene with certain advertising claims, claims which FRI 

elaborately explained and defined in “Definitions & Instructions” portion its 

Amended Requests for Admission (see Persinger Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 210-3). 

Instead, FRI responded with a general statement about advertising, only specifying 

that “ORI admits that advertising by definition, including its own advertising, is 

intended to inform consumers.” (Persinger Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 210-4.) To reiterate 

the magistrate judge, “[t]he question was whether the advertising was intended to 

‘influence’ customers, not ‘inform.’” (May 12, 2016 Order 4:14-21.) ORI did not 

respond to the question posed, and was evasive in its response.2 See Asea, Inc. v. S. 

Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981). 

“Rule 36(a) provides that a matter may be deemed admitted if the answer ‘does 

not comply with the requirements of this rule.’” Asea, 669 F.2d at 1245. “[F]ailure 

to answer or object to a proper request for admission is itself an admission[.]” Id.

“[A]n evasive denial, one that does not ‘specifically deny the matter,’ or a response 

that does not set forth ‘in detail’ the reasons why the answering party cannot 

truthfully admit or deny the matter, may be deemed an admission.” Id. (emphasis 

added). “[T]he district court may, in its discretion, deem the matter admitted.” Id.

(emphasis added). 

The magistrate judge determined that ORI’s response was evasive. This Court 

also reached the same conclusion. Despite its protestation that the appropriate remedy 

was a further response, ORI provides no authority requiring that such a step be taken 

by the Court before deeming a request to which there is an evasive response as 

 

2 In arguing that its response was “literally compliant,” ORI curiously states that “[d]eeming 

such a request admitted incorrectly establishes specific intent when no such intent was ever 

formed.” (ORI’s Objection 9:7-8.) This statement—particularly, the clause that “when no such 

intent was ever formed”—suggests that ORI’s position is one of denying RFA No. 19.

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admitted. Rather, binding legal authority that ORI itself relies on, suggests that 

deeming admitted a request to which there is an evasive or non-responsive response 

is within the discretion of the Court. See Asea, 669 F.2d at 1245. Rule 36(a)(6) 

confirms as much—“On finding that an answer does not comply with this rule, the 

court may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 

served.” There is no preference in the rule itself as to which remedial measure should 

be employed first when a party does not comply with Rule 36(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(a)(6). 

The magistrate judge’s determination that ORI’s response was evasive coupled 

with the remedial measures authorized by Rule 36(a) permit the Court to deem RFA 

No. 19 as admitted. In this matter, the magistrate judge acted well within the scope 

of his discretionary authority. Consequently, the Court cannot reach a “definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” by the magistrate judge, and 

concludes that the magistrate judge’s May 12, 2016 Order is not clearly erroneous. 

See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 623. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES ORI’s objection to the 

magistrate judge’s May 12, 2016 Order. (ECF No. 264.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 23, 2017 

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