Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01073/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CARLOS RIOS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO; J. BEHRA; E. 

BENYARD; M. CAVAZOS; ABAD; M. 

ZUNIGA; RUTLEDGE; E. ALVAREZ; 

K. SPENCE; A. ALLAMBY; ALAN 

HERNANDEZ; W. SUGLICH; A.A. 

JONES; E. CORTEZ; R. OLSON; J. 

RAMIREZ, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14cv1073-WQH (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

(1) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION [ECF No. 20]; 

(2) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 34]; AND 

(3) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS [ECF No. 35] 

 

 Plaintiff Carlos Rios, a state prisoner incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”), is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff commenced this action on April 28, 

2014 by filing a Complaint in which he asserts a variety of claims against sixteen RJD staff 

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members.1

 The following motions are currently pending before the Court: (1) Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 20); 

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34); and (3) Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35). 

 After a thorough review of the pleadings, the parties’ papers and all supporting 

documents, this Court hereby RECOMMENDS that (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction be DENIED; (2) Defendants’ Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and 

(3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History

 Plaintiff commenced this action on April 28, 2014 by filing a Complaint and motion 

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On August 14, 2014, the 

Honorable William Q. Hayes granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and, following an initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), directed U.S. Marshal service of the Complaint on Plaintiff’s 

behalf. (ECF No. 5.) 

 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

on October 8, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) Defendants opposed the motion on October 30, 2014. 

(ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff filed a reply on November 12, 2014. (ECF No. 31.) 

 Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on November 24, 2014 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 34.) Defendants contend “the 

                                                                

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint names the following RJD staff as Defendants: Warden Daniel 

Paramo; Correctional Officers J. Behra, E. Cortez, A.A. Jones, and M. Zuniga; 

Correctional Captain E. Benyard; Correctional Counselors Abad and M. Cavazos; 

Correctional Sergeants E. Alvarez and Rutledge; Correctional Lieutenants A. Allamby and 

K. Spence; Chief Deputy Warden Alan Hernandez; Associate Warden W. Suglich; and 

Appeals Coordinators R. Olson and J. Ramirez. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 2-17.) Plaintiff sues 

each Defendant in their individual and official capacities. (Id.) 

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undisputed facts show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to some 

of his claims, and Plaintiff was aware of the availability of the grievance process.” (Id. at 

2:1-3 (citing Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)).) Plaintiff filed an 

opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on December 15, 2014. 

(ECF No. 41.) Defendants filed a reply on December 19, 2014. (ECF No. 44.) On January 

7, 2015, Plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration in support of his opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 48.) Defendants filed an 

opposition to Plaintiff’s supplemental declaration on January 16, 2015. (ECF No. 53.) 

 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on November 24, 2014 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 35.) Defendants contend 

the Complaint should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

conspiracy, retaliation, due process, equal protection, or cruel and unusual punishment; 

(2) Plaintiff’s claims relating to his rules violation and hearing are barred by Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (3) Defendants are protected by absolute immunity under 

the Eleventh Amendment from liability for damages in their official capacities; and 

(4) Defendants are protected by qualified immunity from liability for damages in their 

individual capacities. (ECF No. 35 at 2:1-9.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss on December 19, 2014. (ECF No. 46.) Defendants filed a reply on 

January 13, 2015. (ECF No. 51.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

1. Introduction 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendants have engaged in an ongoing 

conspiracy to threaten and harass him, in violation of state and federal constitutional rights 

and privileges, in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a previous civil rights lawsuit2

 in this 

                                                                

2

 Plaintiff filed his prior civil rights lawsuit in this district, Rios v. Cate, et al., Case 

No. 10cv1064-PCL, asserting several claims including that the defendants, none of whom 

are Defendants in the instant action, violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and 

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district and prison grievances against Defendants and other RJD staff. Plaintiff’s 

“Statement of the Case” generally alleges the following: (a) Defendants abused their power 

in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit by wrongfully terminating Plaintiff from his job 

assignment without any legitimate penal justification or sufficient evidence; (b) the head 

of the Unit Classification Committee, the Facility Captain, issued a false misbehavior Rule 

Violation Report (“RVR”) in an effort to justify the wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s job 

assignment; (c) UCC officials conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his procedural due process 

rights during the wrongful termination hearing, including that the Facility Captain violated 

prison regulation by acting as a supervisory reviewer of the RVR despite having been 

responsible for terminating Plaintiff from his job assignment and issuing the RVR; 

(d) Defendants ordered other RJD staff to injure, intimidate, threaten, and conspire against 

Plaintiff by intentionally depriving Plaintiff of his personal property and otherwise 

subjecting Plaintiff to harassment; and (e) administrative remedies at RJD are futile, 

unavailable, or inadequate under the circumstances because the Appeals Coordinator 

officials conspired to cover up misconduct by refusing to process and erroneously 

cancelling Plaintiff’s grievances, including by claiming that Plaintiff had not submitted 

them, resulting in substantial interference with Plaintiff’s right of access to the court. (ECF 

No. 1 at 8:25-10:23.) 

 Plaintiff asserts federal legal claims under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments in addition to state law claims for intentional deprivation of personal property 

and negligence. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-59.) Plaintiff seeks money damages (including $700,000 in 

general damages, $100,000 in punitive damages) and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id.

                                                                

the Equal Protection Clause, by denying Plaintiff a pay raise for not having a general 

equivalency degree which he is unable to obtain due to a learning disability. (See generally

Second Amended Complaint in Case No. 10cv1064-PCL, ECF No. 45-2.) Plaintiff settled 

this lawsuit on October 18, 2012, and Plaintiff signed the settlement agreement on 

November 9, 2012. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 26; ECF No. 1-1 at 76; Joint Motion to Dismiss the 

Action with Prejudice in Case No. 10cv1064-PCL, ECF No. 136.) 

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at 7, 29:26-32:11.) 

The Court sets forth a detailed account of Plaintiff’s allegations, including an 

extensive chronology of prison administrative proceedings gleaned from the body of the 

Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, as they are relevant to each of the pending 

motions: 

2. Allegations Regarding May 16, 2012 Laundry Room Incident 

 On May 16, 2012, Defendant Behra and non-party officers T. Togafau and J. Cabrera 

conspired against Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed his prior civil rights 

lawsuit.3

 Specifically, Defendant Behra, Togafau, and Cabrera planted controlled 

contraband in the inmates’ open work area. During Plaintiff’s work hour in the prison 

laundry he found a partially opened envelope on the floor with some items around the 

envelope. Plaintiff thought it was trash. However, Defendant Behra simultaneously yelled 

at Plaintiff and ordered him to place his hands behind his back, whereupon he was 

handcuffed. Defendant Behra called other staff as Plaintiff tried to explain he had just 

noticed the envelope on the floor and was wondering what it was. Plaintiff was taken to 

the restroom and searched, although no contraband was found. Plaintiff tried to inform 

prison staff that he neither saw what was in the envelope nor had time to inform staff of 

the incident. Defendant Behra sent Plaintiff back to his housing unit until further review, 

stating “I told you I was going to get you,” in reference to a May 14, 2012 incident wherein 

Defendant Behra threatened Plaintiff by saying, “If you continue this crap law suite [sic] . 

. . I’ll make sure you get fired, and placed in AD-SEG and transferred out of R.J.” 

Defendant Behra also told Plaintiff on May 14, 2012, “I know a lot of people.” (ECF No. 

1-1 at 7.) 

/ / / 

                                                                

3 While none of the Defendants in the instant action were named as defendants in 

Plaintiff’s prior civil rights lawsuit, Togafau and Cabrera were two of the named 

defendants in the prior action. (See Second Amended Complaint in Case No. 10cv1064-

PCL, ECF No. 45-2 at 3-4.) 

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 Following the incident, Defendant Behra completed an incident report (a “CDC 

128A” form), dated May 16, 2012, stating: 

On May 16, 2012 at approximately 1205 hours while performing my duties 

as the PIA Laundry Rover, I was conducting a security check of the Laundry 

facility when I observed Inmate Rios in an OUT OF BOUNDS area under 

the Supervisor’s podium and going through an envelope Marked FDC, which 

contained unauthorized Personal Property that came in with the soiled laundry 

received from Fairview Developmental Hospital which was being returned. 

[A]ccording to Supervisor J Keema4

 this envelope was located on his desk 

when he went to lunch and somehow it was found under his podium. When I 

asked inmate Rios what he was doing under the Supervisor’s podium and he 

stated “I was just looking to see what was in the envelope”. I then informed 

Laundry Superintendent II Togafau of the discovery. Superintendent II 

Togafau determined that Inmate Rios was attempting to steal Fairview 

Hospital Personal Property, and requested to have inmate Rios removed 

pending classification review. 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 22.) 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra issued this “false disciplinary report” to justify 

Plaintiff’s wrongful termination from his job assignment in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior 

lawsuit. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.) 

 In addition, Togafau completed an incident report (a “CDC 128B” form), dated May 

16, 2012, stating: 

On May 16, 2012 inmate Rios received a 128A for being in an OUT OF 

BOUNDS area under the Supervisor’s podium going through an envelope 

marked FDC with unauthorized Personal Property from our outside State 

Hospital contract attending to steal contents located in the envelope. This type 

of behavior will not be tolerated in the PIA Laundry. I am requesting his 

removal from the PIA Laundry. 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 23.) 

/ / / 

                                                                

4

 Keema was a defendant in Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit (see Second Amended Complaint 

in Case No. 10cv1064-PCL, ECF No. 45-2 at 4) but is not named as a Defendant in the 

instant action. 

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 a. May 22, 2012 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

 On May 22, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Inmate/Parolee Appeal (a “CDCR Form 602”) 

alleging retaliation by Defendant Behra, Togafau, and Cabrera in connection with the May 

16, 2012 laundry floor incident. Plaintiff claimed he was improperly fired from his job 

assignment in retaliation for the civil rights lawsuit he had filed, and he requested that he 

be returned to his job assignment with back pay compensation and that Defendant Behra, 

Togafau, and Cabrera be reprimanded. Plaintiff attached to his appeal a statement from 

three other inmates stating they had observed Plaintiff on May 16, 2012 in his work area 

and that the controlled contraband he found should have been in a locked area rather than 

the floor. The witnesses also stated they observed that no contraband was found on Plaintiff 

when he was searched. Plaintiff alleges his May 22, 2012 appeal was never assigned a log 

number. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19; ECF No. 1-1 at 4-8.) 

 On June 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed an Inmate/Parolee Request for Interview, Item or 

Service (a “CDCR 22” form) addressed to non-party Appeals Coordinator R. Cobb seeking 

confirmation that his May 22, 2012 appeal had been received as he had not yet received a 

response to his complaint.5

 This request was delivered to Cobb on June 10, 2012. Plaintiff 

alleges he never received a response to either his May 22, 2012 appeal or his June 10, 2012 

request. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20; ECF No. 1-1 at 19.) 

 On June 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR 22 form in which he complained 

about the retaliation he had suffered for filing his prior civil rights lawsuit and stated that 

he had been “fired without any logical justification.” On June 22, 20126

, Defendant Behra 

                                                                

5

 Plaintiff’s June 10, 2012 request also sought information regarding the status of a 

second complaint, dated May 29, 2012, and four appeals identified by Log Nos. 12-00803, 

12-00503, 12-801, and 12-802. (ECF No. 1-1 at 19.) However, based on the record before 

the Court, it does not appear Plaintiff is contending these filings are related to his claims in 

this action. 

6

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra responded on June 18, 2012, but the response is 

actually dated June 22, 2012. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 21; ECF No. 1-1 at 21.) 

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responded to Plaintiff’s request by indicating that Plaintiff had been “found in an out-ofbounds area going through unauthorized property.” Defendant Behra attached to his 

response his May 16, 2012 CDC 128A form.7

 (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 21; ECF No. 1-1 at 21-22.) 

 On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR 22 form asking that the Appeals 

Coordinator respond to his appeals, including his May 22, 2012 complaint.8

 On July 23, 

2012, Defendant Olson responded by stating that “all appeals are processed in the order 

received.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 32.) 

 b. June 11, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-2146) 

 On June 11, 2012, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and eleven other inmates, filed 

another CDCR Form 602 appeal that was assigned Log No. 12-2146. Plaintiff claimed 

Cobb violated his right to appeal by conspiring, retaliating, delaying, and intentionally 

obstructing justice to cover-up the wrongdoing of other officials. Plaintiff claimed he and 

other inmates had filed appeals, grievances, and officer misconduct complaints but they 

never received any response from Cobb, and the inmates believed Cobb’s actions created 

an unsafe condition due to the unavailability or inadequacy of administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff requested a reprimand of Cobb and improvement of RJD’s administrative 

remedies following an investigation. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24; ECF No. 1-1 at 50-52.)9

/ / / 

                                                                

7

 It appears Plaintiff did not receive a copy of Defendant Behra’s May 16, 2012 CDC 

128A form until receiving Defendant Behra’s June 22, 2012 response. Indeed, Plaintiff 

alleges that he later filed a CDCR Form 602 on July 2, 2012 “within 10 days” of obtaining 

Defendant Behra’s response and CDC 128A. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 22.) 

8

 Plaintiff’s July 12, 2012 request also referenced the apparently unrelated inmate 

appeals identified in his June 10, 2012 request. See supra note 5. 

9

 Plaintiff initially sent his June 11, 2012 appeal to the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR”) Office of Internal Affairs, Headquarters in 

Sacramento. However, the appeal was returned to RJD upon a determination “that the 

issues raised require a response from the institutional level.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 53; see also 

ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) 

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 Although Plaintiff’s June 11, 2012 appeal complains of improper actions by Cobb 

only, Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that this appeal was made “against the [Appeals 

Coordinator Office (“ACO”)] staff, for the actual conspiracy and retaliatory bias against 

the Plaintiff, the proof of said conspiracy and retaliatory actions is that the ACO staff 

[Defendants] R. Olson and J. Ramirez refused to process plaintiff grievances and 

complaint[s] were [sic] it alleges misconduct by RJD-Correctional Facility staff including 

the ACO.” Plaintiff further alleges Defendants Olson and Ramirez acted in concert with 

other staff to cover up misconduct. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) 

 On October 6, 2012, Defendant Olson rejected Plaintiff’s appeal at the First Level 

of review for the following violations of California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b): 

(a) the “appeal involves multiple issues that do not derive from a single event, or are not 

directly related and cannot be reasonably addressed in a single response due to this fact;” 

(b) “[t]he matter under appeal requires a response to a specific set of facts which are not 

the same for all participants;” (c) the appeal attached dividers or tabs to the appeal forms 

and/or supporting documents; (d) “[l]etters attached to an appeal are not accepted;” (e) the 

appeal was missing necessary supporting documents (although the missing documents 

were not identified); and (f) the appeal made “a general allegation, but fail[ed] to state facts 

or specify an act or decision consistent with the allegation.” Defendant Olson advised 

Plaintiff of various ways to correct his deficiencies. (ECF No. 1-1 at 54-57.) 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendant Olson’s First Level review 

screening letters “intentionally interfered with the Plaintiff’s rights to petition the 

government for redress of grievances, conspired and retaliated against the Plaintiff for him 

filing grievances, complaint and civil right action against the institution staff, and because 

[Defendants Olson and Ramirez] act[ed] in concert with other staff to cover up misconduct, 

when they used there [sic] position, authority and influence to act in concert with other 

staff by refusing to process plaintiff grievances or complaint that alleges misconduct 

against RJD-Correctional Facility employees.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) 

/ / / 

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 On October 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed a CDCR 22 form indicating he had resubmitted 

appeal Log No. 12-2146 to the ACO “showing that the AC screening was an error” and 

requesting an investigation into the status of the appeal. Defendant Olson responded on 

October 30, 2012 that “[a]ll appeals are processed appropriately in the order received.” 

Following Plaintiff’s request for supervisor review of Defendant Olson’s response, nonparty officer Stratton responded on November 20, 2012 that “[t]he appeals are processed 

in the order received per policy.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 37.) 

 On December 11, 2012, Plaintiff received additional First Level review screening 

letters from Defendants Olson and Ramirez jointly rejecting appeal Log No. 12-2146 for 

the same reasons stated in Defendant Olson’s October 6, 2012 rejection letters, with the 

only differences being that the missing documents were now identified as the “appeals 

submitted.” Defendants Olson and Ramirez also sent Plaintiff a letter indicating his appeal 

was being cancelled because Plaintiff had “continue[d] to submit a rejected appeal while 

disregarding appeal staff’s previous instructions to correct the appeal.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24; 

ECF No. 1-1 at 58-62.) 

 c. July 2, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-1879) 

 On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 appeal that was assigned 

Log No. 12-1879. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 22; ECF No. 1-1 at 24-25.) In addition to reiterating 

the basic allegations contained in his May 22, 2012 appeal, Plaintiff also alleged that on 

the date of the incident (i.e., May 16, 2012), he was not out of bounds and the contraband 

was never in his possession, surveillance video would support these two claims, and there 

is no evidence to support the “false[], fictitious and fraudulent” allegation that Plaintiff was 

attempting to steal personal property. (ECF No. 1-1 at 25.) Plaintiff requested that (a) an 

investigation be conducted, including the disclosure of the video camera recording and the 

taking of inmate witness interviews; (b) Defendant Behra’s May 16, 2012 disciplinary 

report be dismissed; (c) Plaintiff be returned to his job assignment with back pay from the 

date of the wrongful termination; and (d) involved staff be reprimanded. (Id. at 24-25.) 

/ / / 

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 On August 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR 22 inmate request form seeking 

information related to the status of his May 22, 2012 and July 2, 2012 appeals since he had 

not yet received a response to either appeal. On August 22, 2012, Defendant Olson 

responded by stating: “You should have received a response by now on the first 602. The 

other one will be processed as soon as possible. There is currently a backlog of appeals 

due to a high volume of appeals and staffing shortage.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 34.) 

 On September 14, 2012, Defendant Olson cancelled appeal Log No. 12-1879 at the 

First Level of review for failure to submit the appeal in a timely fashion. Specifically, the 

incident occurred on May 16, 2012, but appeal Log No. 12-1879 was not submitted until 

July 2, 2012. (ECF No. 1-1 at 26.) Plaintiff alleges he timely submitted the appeal because 

he filed it within ten days of receiving a copy of Defendant Behra’s CDC 128A disciplinary 

report, and he alleges Defendant Olson erred in cancelling appeal Log No. 12-1879 “and 

failed to investigate[] the matter adequately.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 22.) 

 On September 20, 2012, Plaintiff requested a Supervisor Review of Defendant 

Olson’s August 22, 2012 response due to his dissatisfaction with the response. Plaintiff 

reiterated that he had still not received a response to his May 22, 2012 appeal nor any notice 

of a log number assigned to the appeal. Plaintiff admitted in his request for a Supervisor 

Review that he received a response to his second appeal (i.e., Log No. 12-1879, dated July 

2, 2012) on September 19, 2012. On September 27, 2012, Defendant Olson responded by 

stating: “All appeals received from May through July 2012 have been processed. You filed 

a staff misconduct appeal that was received on 6/13/12 regarding PIA staff. That is the 

only staff misconduct appeal we have received for that time period. We have not 

researched individual appeals noted above. Previous response was based on time frames 

only.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 34.)10

                                                                

10 Plaintiff also submitted two additional CDCR 22 requests, dated October 18 and 21, 

2012, seeking information regarding the status of numerous appeals and complaints for 

which he claimed he had not yet received a response. Defendant Olson responded to each 

request by stating that “[a]ll appeals are processed in the order received.” Each time, 

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d. September 20, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-2759) 

 On September 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 appeal, assigned 

Log No. 12-2759, alleging conspiracy to obstruct justice and access to the court. Plaintiff 

alleged that on May 22, 2012 he “filed a CDCR 602 complaint regarding conspiracy[y] 

and retaliation for inmate filing of a civil right action against the CALPIA officials. 

However, until this date I have not receive [sic] any response to this complaint in a timely 

manner.” Plaintiff requested “[t]hat an investigation be conducted into this matter, and that 

inmate 602’s be processed in accordance with the Administrative, State and Federal laws, 

and other relief as the reviewer find[s] appropriate[].” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 22; ECF No. 1-1 at 

27-28.) 

 On November 29, 2012, Defendant Olson rejected appeal Log No. 12-2759 at the 

First Level of review for several reasons. First, the appeal was missing necessary 

supporting documents, namely, the August 17, 2012 CDCR 22 to Defendant Suglich, in 

violation of California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b)(7).11 Second, the appeal was 

rejected for non-compliance with California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b)(8), which 

provides that an appeal may be rejected if it “involves multiple issues that do not derive 

from a single event, or are not directly related and cannot be reasonably addressed in a 

single response due to this fact.” Plaintiff was instructed he could resubmit the unrelated 

                                                                

Plaintiff requested a Supervisor Review addressed to Defendant Suglich, stating that 

Defendant Olson’s responses were “ambiguous, evasive, non-responsive and noncomplete.” Non-party officer Stratton responded to each request by stating that “[a]ppeals 

are processed in the order received per policy.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 35-36.) 

11 Section 3084(b)(7) provides that appeals may be rejected where they are “missing 

necessary supporting documents as established in section 3084.3.” 15 CAL. CODE REGS. 

§ 3084(b)(7). Section 3084.3 provides, in part: “Failure to attach all necessary supporting 

documents may result in the appeal being rejected as specified in subsection 3084.6(b)(7). 

The appeals coordinator shall inform the inmate or parolee that the appeal is rejected 

because necessary supporting documents are missing. The appellant shall be allowed an 

additional 30 calendar days to secure any missing supporting documents and resubmit the 

appeal.” 15 CAL. CODE REGS. § 3084.3(c). 

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issues separately using separate appeals. Third, the appeal was rejected for noncompliance with California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b)(1), which provides that an 

appeal may be rejected if it “concerns an anticipated action or decision.” (ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 22; ECF No. 1-1 at 29-31.) 

 e. October 30, 2012 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned)

 Plaintiff alleges that because he was frustrated with the ACO’s “refusal to process 

or answer [his] grievances,” on October 30, 2012, he filed another CDCR Form 602 appeal 

requesting that Defendant Suglich assist Plaintiff to resolve the problem he experienced 

with the ACO staff. Plaintiff alleged this appeal was never assigned a log number nor did 

he receive a response by the ACO Supervisor. Plaintiff alleges the Appeals Coordinator 

obstructed Plaintiff’s access to the court and intentionally refused to process Plaintiff’s 

May 22, 2012 and June 11, 2012 appeals in retaliation for Plaintiff having exercised his 

First Amendment right and in violation of the First Amendment and CDCR rules and 

regulations. Plaintiff claimed in his appeal that on “several occassions [sic] [he] attempted 

to resolve this matter without the necessary [sic] of litigation without any results,” and he 

attached each of the seven CDCR 22 requests referenced above to support his argument 

that the administrative remedies at RJD are futile, ineffective, and unavailable. Plaintiff 

alleges in his Complaint that Defendant Suglich “personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional right, conspired and retaliated against the Plaintiff by refusing 

to process Plaintiff grievances in order to cover up misconduct, knew of the alleged 

deprivation and failed to act to prevent them, when thre [sic] is a duty to do so.” (ECF No. 

1 at ¶ 23; ECF No. 1-1 at 38-39.) 

f. November 19, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-3429) 

On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 appeal that was 

assigned Log No. 12-3429, alleging that on November 5, 2012, he notified Defendant Abad 

via a CDCR 22 form that Plaintiff was requesting a Classification Committee review to 

determine Plaintiff’s privileges and work assignment. Plaintiff alleged in this appeal that 

he had notified Defendant Abad during an October 2012 personal interview that Plaintiff 

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had “been waiting for over 6 months to be schedule[d] for a Classification Committee 

without any results.” The basis for Plaintiff’s request for a Classification Committee 

review was Plaintiff’s position that he had been removed from his job assignment based on 

a false, fabricated, and unsupported report charging him with being out-of-bounds and 

attempting to steal personal property. Plaintiff further alleged in this appeal that he did not 

receive a timely response from Defendant Abad. Plaintiff requested that he be scheduled 

for a Classification Committee review at the next reasonable opportunity and that he be 

ordered to return to his job assignment. (ECF No. 1-1 at 79-80, 83.) 

On December 28, 2012, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected appeal Log No. 12-

3429 at the First Level of review because the appeal was missing necessary supporting 

documents, including the “128 UCC Removal from job” and the “CDCR Form 22 complete 

through section D.” (Id. at 81.)12

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendants Abad, Benyard, and Cavazos13

“intentionally interfered with the Plaintiff[’s] due process of law and procedural protection 

which are afforded to prisoner[s] before they can be removed from a job assignment or 

deprived of any right or privileges.” Plaintiff alleges these Defendants not only conspired 

to deprive Plaintiff of his due process rights but they also failed for more than fourteen 

months to provide Plaintiff with a fair Classification Committee hearing to determine the 

appropriateness of Plaintiff’s job removal, despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests, in 

retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior civil rights lawsuit and administrative grievances against 

                                                                

12 Prior to filing appeal Log No. 12-3429, Plaintiff had filed two CDCR 22 forms 

asking for a Classification Committee Review. Plaintiff had not received a response to the 

first request, submitted on November 4, 2012, so on November 19, 2012 he requested a 

supervisor review, although no response is contained on the form. There is also no 

response to Plaintiff’s second request, submitted November 19, 2012. (ECF No. 1-1 at 83-

84.) 

13 Although appeal Log No. 12-3429 only mentions Defendant Abad (see ECF No. 1-

1 at 79-80), Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that the appeal was made against Defendants 

Abad, Benyard, and Cavazos. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 27.) 

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RJD officials. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 27.) 

 g. December 6, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 13-0108) 

 On December 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR 602 appeal that was assigned 

Log No. 13-0108, again alleging he never received a response to his May 22, 2012 appeal 

and setting forth his prior efforts to follow up regarding its status, including his filing of 

other CDCR Form 602 appeals and CDCR 22 requests. Plaintiff also alleged that the 

September 14, 2012 screening letter cancelling appeal Log No. 12-1879 as untimely, see 

supra Part I(B)(2)(c), was done in error because the incident that triggered his deadline to 

submit the appeal was his receipt of Defendant Behra’s CDC 128A and Togafau’s CDC 

128B on June 22, 2012, and not the May 12, 2012 incident date. Plaintiff requested that 

his May 22, 2012 appeal be assigned a log number, that he “receive a proper evaluation 

and analysis of [his] claim and redress,” and that the Appeals Coordinator “halt his 

practices of intentionally delaying inmate appeal and access to the court, because this 

matter has being [sic] delay [sic] for approsimately [sic] for 7 months now.” Plaintiff also 

requested that the CDC 128A and CDC 128B be overturned and removed from Plaintiff’s 

C-file because his due process rights were violated and he was denied the opportunity to 

present evidence in his behalf. (ECF No. 1-1 at 42-43.) 

On January 10, 2013, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected Plaintiff’s appeal at 

the First Level of review for the following violations of California Code of Regulations 

§ 3084.6(b): (a) the “appeal involves multiple issues that do not derive from a single event, 

or are not directly related and cannot be reasonably addressed in a single response due to 

this fact;” and (b) Plaintiff’s “appeal issue is obscured by pointless verbiage or voluminous 

unrelated documentation such that the reviewer cannot be reasonably expected to identify 

the issue under appeal.” (Id. at 40-41.) 

h. December 13, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 13-00372) 

On December 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 appeal that was 

assigned Log No. 13-00372, alleging that non-party officers Cobb and Stratton and 

Defendants Olson, Ramirez, and Suglich failed to provide reasonable and adequate 

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administrative remedies and failed to respond to inmates’ grievances within the time limits 

imposed by California Code of Regulations 3084.8(c).14 (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25; ECF No. 1-1 

at 64, 66.) Plaintiff alleged the failure to timely respond to his grievances was part of a 

conspiracy to retaliate against him, cause intentional delay, and obstruct Plaintiff’s ability 

to access the courts, and that these actions were done to cover-up the wrongdoing of other 

officers in connection with the May 22, 2012 incident. Plaintiff claimed that administrative 

remedies are futile, unavailable, and inadequate, and he requested that the grievances 

mentioned in his appeal be deemed exhausted. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25; ECF No. 1-1 at 64, 66.) 

Plaintiff included with his appeal a copy of a November 14, 2012 memorandum from 

an RJD official to “All Facility C Inmates and Housing Units” stating it would take “3 to 

4 months to catch up to the amount of 602s the [sic] have stacked up.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 

69.) 

                                                                

14 Section 3084.8(c) provides: 

All appeals shall be responded to and returned to the inmate or parolee by staff 

within the following time limits, unless exempted pursuant to the provisions 

of subsections 3084.8(f) and (g): 

(1) First level responses shall be completed within 30 working days from date 

of receipt by the appeals coordinator. 

(2) Second level responses shall be completed within 30 working days from 

date of receipt by the appeals coordinator. 

(3) Third level responses shall be completed within 60 working days from 

date of receipt by the third level Appeals Chief. 

15 CAL. CODE REGS. § 3084.8(c). 

 Deviation from these time limits is expressly authorized in certain circumstances, 

including the “[u]navailability of the inmate or parolee, or staff, or witnesses,” and where 

“[t]he complexity of the decision, action, or policy require[s] additional research.” Id. at 

§ 3084.8(d)(1), (2). 

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Plaintiff also included with his appeal a December 13, 2012 “Memorandum of 

Default Notice” directed to Defendant Paramo in which Plaintiff provided “notice that 

because CDC employees have failed/refused to comply with CDC regulations governing 

the prisoner grievance process, the grievance addressed herein [i.e., appeal Log No. 12-

1879, dated July 2, 2012] is now exhausted at the [second] leval [sic] of administrative 

review . . . because the appeals procedure in your institution is futile, unavailable, [and] 

inadequated [sic].” (Id. at 67.) 

On January 22, 2013, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected Plaintiff’s appeal at 

the First Level of review for the following violations of California Code of Regulations 

§ 3084.6(b): (a) the appeal was missing necessary supporting documents, specifically, the 

original CDCR Form 602’s are required in order to appeal them; (b) the “appeal involves 

multiple issues that do not derive from a single event, or are not directly related and cannot 

be reasonably addressed in a single response due to this fact” and “each appeal decision 

has to be appealed separately;” and (c) the appeal attached dividers or tabs to the appeal 

forms, and Plaintiff was instructed to remove attached letters. (Id. at 70-72.) 

On January 28, 2013, Defendant Paramo sent a letter to Plaintiff in response to 

Plaintiff’s correspondence concerning the timely processing of appeals and CDC 22 forms. 

Defendant Paramo’s letter stated: 

On January 28, 2013, you were interviewed by W. Suglich, Associate Warden 

(AW) in regards to these issues. During the interview, it was discussed that 

you have filed numerous appeals and you have not received any information 

regarding the status of your appeals. AW Suglich discussed with you the 

recent changes within the Inmate Appeals Office and that this has caused a 

slight delay in the processing of appeals. It was also explained to you that the 

Inmate Appeals Office is not ignoring any appeals and that all appeals are 

being processed in the order they are received. AW Suglich requested that 

you have patience while we are addressing the issues within Inmate Appeals 

Office and that you may contact him in the future when he makes his rounds 

within the housing units. 

(Id. at 68.) 

/ / / 

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 Plaintiff alleges that because he was “still experience[ing] problems with his 

administrative grievances,” on February 19, 2013, he submitted his appeal for Third Level 

review but that it was rejected on March 13, 2013 “citing an administrative rule.” (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 25; ECF No. 1-1 at 73.)15

3. Allegations Regarding January 18, 2013 Fight and Subsequent Discipline 

 On January 18, 2013, Plaintiff was sent to an outside hospital for surgery and 

treatment after having been beaten by another inmate (Mayorga) resulting in serious 

injuries including a fractured ankle. Upon his return to RJD on January 23, 2013, Plaintiff 

was placed in Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) because, according to the Ad-Seg 

Unit Placement Notice, staff had been unable to determine if there was a possibility of 

safety concerns as a result of the beating incident. Plaintiff participated in an Ad-Seg 

hearing conducted by Defendant Benyard on February 4, 2013 following which Defendant 

Benyard decided to retain Plaintiff in Ad-Seg pending action by the Classification 

Committee after concluding that Plaintiff endangered the institution’s security. Defendant 

Benyard stated in an RVR that Plaintiff admitted during the Ad-Seg hearing that he 

initiated the fight after putting on leather gloves and confronting Mayorga in an aggressive 

and physical manner. Defendant Benyard also relied on the incident reports indicating that 

both inmates suffered injuries consistent with fighting. 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Benyard’s decision to keep him in Ad-Seg was made 

“without penological justification” and that the reasons offered by Defendant Benyard were 

untrue and fabricated as “a mere pretext for the unlawful retaliation.” Defendant Benyard 

imposed a 90-day loss of behavioral time credits upon finding Plaintiff guilty of “Fighting 

Resulting in the Use of Force” in violation of California Code of Civil Procedure 

                                                                

15 Specifically, the appeal was rejected at the Third Level of review pursuant to 

California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b)(15) because Plaintiff “submitted the appeal for 

processing at an inappropriate level bypassing required lower level(s) of review.” (ECF 

No. 1-1 at 74.) The documents attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint reflect that Plaintiff never 

submitted appeal Log No. 13-00372 for a Second Level review. (See id. at 65.) 

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§ 3005(d)(1). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Benyard’s decision was done in retaliation for 

Plaintiff having formally complained to Defendant Paramo on January 13, 2013 that 

Defendant Benyard was discriminating against minority inmates with respect to job 

assignments for inmate-barbers. The Classification Committee eventually released 

Plaintiff from Ad-Seg on February 7, 2013 “with no enemy concerns.” (ECF No. 1 at 

¶¶ 29-31, 33-34, 42; ECF No. 1-1 at 120, 125; ECF No. 1-2 at 61, 65-67, 74-75, 118-119.) 

 On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before Defendant Spence, Senior Hearing 

Officer, for an RVR disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff notified Defendant Spence that the RVR 

was false and brought in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior civil rights lawsuit and grievances 

against RJD staff including Plaintiff’s employment discrimination complaint against 

Defendant Benyard. Plaintiff stated he never made any incriminating statements to 

Defendant Benyard. Plaintiff also informed Defendant Spence that some witnesses should 

be questioned, including the Staff Assistant assigned to Plaintiff during the Ad-Seg 

hearing, and that the videotape recording of the Ad-Seg hearing should be reviewed. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spence denied his requests and that no reasons for denying the 

requests were noted. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spence upheld Defendant Benyard’s 

guilty finding and punishment as part of a conspiracy to retaliate against Plaintiff. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 43; ECF No. 1-2 at 113-116.) 

 a. April 10, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-01319) 

 On April 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal that was assigned Log 

No. 13-01319, alleging that Defendants Benyard, Hernandez, and Spence violated his due 

process rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff 

claimed the evidence Defendant Spence relied on was illegally obtained in violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1966), that Defendant Spence deprived Plaintiff of his 

due process rights by refusing without explanation to call witnesses or present exculpatory 

evidence such as the video recording of the incident. Plaintiff requested that the RVR be 

dismissed and removed from his C-file, that the credit loss be restored, and that the 

involved officers halt their retaliatory actions. (ECF No. 1-2 at 107, 109.) 

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 Plaintiff’s appeal was bypassed at the First Level of review. At the Second Level of 

review, Defendant Paramo denied the appeal on June 22, 2013 after finding that no 

violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights had been violated. (Id. at 108, 111-112.) 

 On July 8, 2013, Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the Second Level review on 

grounds that the reviewer did not properly address all of Plaintiff’s claims cited in the 

appeal. On September 16, 2013, Plaintiff’s appeal was granted in part at the Third Level 

of review. Although the Third Level review concluded that Defendant Spence 

“appropriately found [Plaintiff] guilty” after “thoroughly articulat[ing] the evidence and 

the weight that was given said evidence,” it was “discover[ed] that a due process time 

constraints violation occurred.” Specifically, Plaintiff was provided the Medical Report of 

Injury or Unusual Occurrence forms for both Plaintiff and Mayorga less than twenty-four 

hours before the RVR hearing and there was no indication in the record that Plaintiff had 

waived time constraints. Therefore, Third Level intervention was warranted, the RVR was 

reissued, and the matter was remanded for a rehearing. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 43; ECF No. 1-2 

at 105-106, 109-110, 119.) 

 b. October 16, 2013 Rehearing 

 On October 16, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before Defendant Allamby for a rehearing 

of the RVR disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff reiterated his position that he never made 

incriminating statements to Defendant Benyard. Several officers were questioned. 

Defendants Cortez and Jones both stated they had observed Plaintiff and Mayorga fighting 

but neither concluded that Plaintiff was the victim. Defendant Cortez did not recall whether 

he provided Plaintiff Miranda warnings, and Defendant Jones stated that he did not. 

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendants Cortez and Jones conspired to change 

their version of the facts from their original testimony given on January 18, 2013 in order 

to cover up Defendant Benyard’s misconduct. Non-party officer Hodge stated he was 

present during the February 4, 2013 Ad-Seg hearing conducted by Defendant Benyard and 

that he did not hear Plaintiff make any statements admitting to instigating the fight. 

Defendant Benyard was also interviewed. Defendant Allamby denied Plaintiff’s request 

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that the videotape recording of the Ad-Seg hearing be reviewed because, according to 

Defendant Allamby, no such video exists. Defendant Allamby ultimately found that the 

preponderance of evidence supported a guilty finding, and he re-imposed the 90-day credit 

forfeiture. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44; ECF No. 1-2 at 77-81.) 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Allamby failed to provide any legitimate penological 

justification for denying Plaintiff’s requests, violated Plaintiff’s due process rights, 

arbitrarily and without substantial evidence found Plaintiff guilty of false charges, and 

conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff due to Plaintiff’s grievances against other officers 

and his prior lawsuit against RJD officials. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 45.) 

 c. November 7, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-3607) 

 On November 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal that was assigned 

Log No. 13-3607, alleging that Defendants Allamby, Benyard, Cortez, Hernandez, and 

Jones violated his due process rights. Plaintiff alleged Defendant Allamby wrongly denied 

his request that the Staff Assistant be interviewed and that the video recording be reviewed 

and, as a result, Plaintiff was deprived of a fair and impartial disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff 

also alleged Defendants Cortez and Jones made false statements during the October 16, 

2013 hearing. Plaintiff requested that the RVR be dismissed and removed from his C-file, 

that his credit loss be restored, and that the involved officers halt their retaliatory bias. 

(ECF No. 1-2 at 84-85) 

 On November 18, 2013, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected Plaintiff’s appeal 

at the First Level of review because it was missing required documents, specifically, a final 

copy of the RVR prepared by authorized personnel. (Id. at 88-89.) 

4. Allegations Regarding January-February 2013 Personal Property Loss 

During the February 4, 2013 Ad-Seg hearing following his return from the hospital, 

Plaintiff was provided with a copy of an Inmate Property Inventory prepared following a 

January 18, 2013 property inventory performed by Defendant Zuniga following the fight 

with Mayorga. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Benyard ordered Defendant Zuniga to transpack 

Plaintiff’s personal property and, while in control of Plaintiff’s property, Defendant Zuniga 

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lost the property.16 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Zuniga intentionally deprived Plaintiff of 

his personal property in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal, 

assigned Log No. 13-0326, on December 30, 2012 against Defendant Zuniga and several 

other officers alleging a delay in notifying Plaintiff that his mother was waiting for him in 

the visiting room and by the time Plaintiff was notified he was only permitted a sevenminute visit with his mother. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Benyard’s instruction to 

Defendant Zuniga was done in retaliation for Plaintiff having formally complained to 

Defendant Paramo on January 13, 2013 that Defendant Benyard was discriminating against 

minority inmates with respect to job assignments for inmate-barbers. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-

30, 32, 35; ECF No. 1-1 at 97-99, 112-17, 122.)17

Plaintiff alleges that while Defendant Zuniga was handling Plaintiff’s property on 

January 18, 2013, inmate Garcia observed Defendant Zuniga transpacking some of 

Plaintiff’s personal property and that he observed Defendant Zuniga set aside a large 

number of Plaintiff’s personal property items including an RCA television, a radio, hair 

clippers, a gold watch, a gold chain, a fan, a hot pot, “ear bugs,” a large amount of legal 

papers including trial transcripts, and numerous food items. Inmate Garcia asked 

Defendant Zuniga and non-party officer Jaramillo “why were these property items not 

being transpacked with inmate Rios[’] personal property.” Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

                                                                

16 Various online searches for the term “transpack” indicate the term refers to packing 

an inmate’s belonging for a transfer. 

17 After appeal Log No. 13-0326 was cancelled on May 16, 2013 (see ECF No. 1-1 at 

101), Plaintiff filed a second CDCR Form 602 appeal, assigned Log No. 13-1891, on June 

11, 2013, addressing the delayed visitation incident. (Id. at 105-07.) However, Plaintiff 

does not appear to assert a claim against Defendant Zuniga, or any other Defendant, based 

on the delayed visitation incident. Additionally, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a claim 

against Defendants Benyard and Paramo, or any other Defendant, based on the 

employment discrimination complaint. Rather, these complaint are mentioned in the 

Complaint as providing the background for Defendants’ alleged retaliatory actions 

involving the loss of Plaintiff’s personal property. 

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Zuniga responded, “No, fuck that, he [referring to Plaintiff] 602 us so we’re going to teach 

him a lesson.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 37; ECF No. 1-2 at 21.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on February 25, 2013, some of his personal property was 

returned to him but he was informed that the Release and Receive (“R&R”) staff could not 

locate Plaintiff’s television even though Defendant Zuniga’s Inmate Property Inventory 

had listed a television in operational condition. On March 19, 2013, Defendant Alvarez 

notified Plaintiff that his television had been located. However, Plaintiff claims Defendant 

Alvarez intentionally and arbitrarily deprived him of his television when Defendant 

Alvarez confiscated the television after claiming it had been altered from its original state.18 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 38; ECF No. 1-1 at 122.) 

On February 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal that was assigned 

Log No. 13-00777, in which he alleged he was missing numerous items Defendant Zuniga 

had inventoried on the Inmate Property Inventory form. Plaintiff’s appeal also alleged that 

on February 13, 2013, he was informed by other inmates that they had observed Defendant 

Zuniga giving away some of Plaintiff’s property to another inmate. Plaintiff alleges this 

was done in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a staff complaint against Defendant Zuniga 

and for having filed his prior civil rights lawsuit against other RJD officials. Plaintiff’s 

appeal requested, among other things, that Defendant Zuniga be reprimanded and held 

responsible for the loss of Plaintiff’s personal property and that Plaintiff be compensated 

in the amount of $1,500.00. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-1 at 128, 130.)19

                                                                

18 In response to a March 14, 2013 CDCR 22 request from Plaintiff, Defendant Alvarez 

stated on March 28, 2013 that “[a]fter an investigation into the missing TV, it was found 

and determined to be altered from it’s original state, which means it is contraband. It will 

not be issued to you and will be disposed of per institutional procedure. R&R staff also 

notes that the TV had an altered serial number on it.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 41.) 

19 On February 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR 22 inmate request reiterating the 

allegations in appeal Log No. 13-00777. Plaintiff claimed to have previously submitted a 

CDCR 22 on February 14, 2013 addressed to Defendant Zuniga but that he did not receive 

a timely response. On March 3, 2013, Defendant Zuniga responded: “This is the first time 

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On June 20, 2013, following Defendant Rutledge’s interview of Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s 

appeal Log No. 13-00777 was denied at the First Level of review20 after concluding that 

Defendant Zuniga properly inventoried Plaintiff’s property but that Plaintiff’s television 

was later confiscated on March 19, 2013. Plaintiff alleges he requested that Defendant 

Rutledge interview the inmate witnesses that observed Defendant Zuniga intentionally 

misplacing Plaintiff’s property. However, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rutledge, without 

advancing any legitimate penological goal and in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed 

grievances against other prison staff, “intentionally and in a conspiratorial fashion refused 

                                                                

this matter has been brought to my attention. The television was inventoried and sent to 

R&R. As far as the other items in question they were not in your property.” Plaintiff 

requested a supervisor review on March 4, 2013 claiming that Defendant Zuniga was lying 

in his response. On March 29, 2013, Defendant Rutledge responded: “Officer M. Zuniga 

adviced [sic] me inmate Rios’s television was inoperable at the time he conducted the 

inventory. I advised inmate Rios he has the right to appeal this issue.” (ECF No. 1-2 at 

13.) 

 In addition to his February 28, 2013 CDCR 22 request, Plaintiff submitted numerous 

other documents to prison officials reiterating his property loss allegations, complaining 

about alleged delays in processing appeal Log No. 13-00777, and/or claiming that 

administrative remedies at RJD are futile and inadequate, including: (1) a May 15, 2013 

notice to Defendant Paramo (ECF No. 1-2 at 25); (2) an August 6, 2013 letter to the 

CDCR’s chief of the Inmate Appeals Branch (id. at 26); (3) six CDCR Form 602 appeals, 

assigned Log Nos. 13-1365, 13-1467, 13-1753, 13-2132, 13-2528, and 13-2675 (id. at 28-

29, 32, 38-39, 44-45, 49-54); and (4) three CDCR 22 requests regarding the status of appeal 

Log No. 13-00777 (id. at 30, 41, 46). (See also ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 39-41.) 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that one of these appeals, Log No. 13-1365, dated 

April 17, 2013, was erroneously cancelled by the ACO staff as untimely based on 

“retaliatory biased [sic] to prevent the information contained in the CDC 602s from 

becoming known.” In this appeal Plaintiff had alleged that Defendants Alvarez, Benyard, 

Rutledge, and Zuniga retaliated against him and conspired to deprive him of his property 

without due process of law. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 39; ECF No. 1-2 at 38-39.) 

 

20 Defendants Olson and Ramirez initially rejected Plaintiff’s appeal on February 21, 

2013 and March 4, 2013 at the First Level of review for missing required documents. (See

ECF No. 1-2 at 11-12.) 

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to call or interview any of Plaintiff’s witness [sic] in order to cover up misconduct and took 

an adverse action of denied [sic] Plaintiff’s meritorious legal claims against Defendant M. 

Zuniga.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-2 at 10.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Benyard supervised Defendants Rutledge and Zuniga 

and that “he is the promoter of the retaliatory bias and conspiracy against the Plaintiff in 

this matter, he actually participated or order [sic] Defendant M. Zuniga to transpacking 

[sic] Plaintiff’s personal property, he and the other Defendants acted in concert to 

accomplish the unlawful objective of intentionally deprive [sic] the Plaintiff’s [sic] of his 

personal property.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 36.) 

On July 16, 2013, Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the First Level review on 

grounds that the reviewer denied Plaintiff’s right to call witnesses to support his allegation 

that Defendant Zuniga “intentionally and purposely misplaced [Plaintiff’s] personal 

property, as a retaliation for him filing a complaint against the correctional officer Zuniga.” 

Plaintiff also claims that during the administrative grievance process Defendant Zuniga 

issued a false statement about the condition of Plaintiff’s television at the time he 

transpacked Plaintiff’s property. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-1 at 135, 137; ECF No. 

1-2 at 10.) 

On July 16, 2013, Plaintiff requested a Second Level review based on his 

dissatisfaction with the First Level review. Plaintiff claimed he was denied of his right to 

call witnesses at the First Level review and he requested that four specific inmates be 

interviewed. Plaintiff also claimed the CDCR’s records and Defendant Zuniga’s testimony 

clearly showed that not only was Plaintiff’s television lost/damaged when the R&R staff 

located it two months after Defendant Zuniga claimed he inventoried the television, but the 

records also show that Defendant Zuniga lied when he said that the television was 

inoperable when he conducted the inventory. (ECF No. 1-1 at 129, 131.) 

On December 16, 2013, non-party officer K.A. Seibel, Chief Deputy Warden, denied 

Plaintiff’s appeal at the Second Level of review. Seibel concluded, after interviewing 

Plaintiff’s four inmate witnesses and Defendant Zuniga, that the only confirmed loss of 

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property was Plaintiff’s television which had been inventoried but was now unaccounted 

for. Seibel asked Plaintiff if he wanted a replacement television as compensation but 

Plaintiff indicated he had already received another television from family. When Seibel 

asked what items Plaintiff would consider as sufficient compensation Plaintiff mentioned 

a few items, including a trimmer, a hot pot, and maybe a radio. On December 23, 2013, 

Plaintiff was escorted to R&R and offered compensation for the value of the lost television, 

including a “one (1) New Bushy Creek Crock Pot, one (1) Sony AM/FM Radio CD Player, 

one (1) Norelco Trimmer, and one set of (1) Platinum Headphones.” Plaintiff declined the 

offer. Plaintiff also claimed that legal paperwork had been lost during the incident, but 

Seibel found this claim was unsubstantiated. Specifically, the interviews revealed that 

Plaintiff had authorized a fellow inmate to hold his legal paperwork at the time of the 

property inventory. (ECF No. 1-2 at 5-9.) 

 On February 25, 2014, Plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the Second Level 

review on grounds that “the SLR reviewer conspired against [Plaintiff] to cover up 

misconduct committed by their subordinate, when they refuse or intentionally deprive me 

of a fair and impartial investigation as to determine whether or not the correctional officer 

is liable under Cal. laws for the missing personal property and subjected [Plaintiff] to 

retaliatory bias.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 129, 131; ECF No. 1-2 at 5-8.) 

On February 25, 2014, Plaintiff requested a Third Level review based on his 

dissatisfaction with the Second Level review. Plaintiff claimed the reviewer “denied to 

[Plaintiff] the benefit of the law” and “conspired against [him] in order to cover up 

misconduct committed by their [sic] subordinate, when they [sic] refuse or intentionally 

deprive [Plaintiff] of a fair and impartial investigation as to determine whether or not the 

correctional officer [i.e., Defendant Zuniga] is liable under [California] laws for the 

missing personal property and subjected [Plaintiff] to retaliatory bias.” Plaintiff again 

argued that Defendant Zuniga had made a false statement regarding the condition of 

Plaintiff’s television during the inventory. (ECF No. 1-1 at 129, 131.) 

/ / / 

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5. Allegations Regarding July 23, 2013 Classification Committee Hearing

On July 23, 2013, Plaintiff finally appeared before the Unit Classification 

Committee (“UCC”) which was presided over by Defendant Benyard. Plaintiff advised 

Defendants Benyard and Cavazos that he had been waiting more than fourteen months for 

a UCC hearing so that he could address the wrongful termination of his job assignment. 

The UCC members informed Plaintiff they would not speak on that issue and they referred 

Plaintiff to use the appeal process for the matter. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 48.) 

 a. August 5, 2013 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

Dissatisfied with the refusal of the UCC to address his job termination issue, on 

August 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal alleging that several RJD officials, 

including Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo, discriminated, retaliated, and 

conspired against Plaintiff due to his filing of appeals and complaints against them and 

other “top officials.” Plaintiff alleged Defendants violated his due process rights and 

interfered with his liberty interest. As to the discrimination claim, Plaintiff claimed the 

UCC officials refused “to provide services and rehabilitative programs on the grounds that 

the inmates [sic] has developmental disabilities and INS hold.” Plaintiff requested that he 

be returned to his job assignment in the prison laundry facility, that the CDC 128A and 

128B issued on May 16, 2012, see supra Part I(B)(2), be removed from his C-file, and that 

he no longer be subject to retaliation for filing grievances against prison officials. (Id.; 

ECF No. 1-1 at 86-95) 

Plaintiff alleges he never received a response to his August 5, 2013 appeal within a 

reasonable time.21 Plaintiff also alleges he submitted a CDCR 22 request concurrently with 

the appeal asking that he be notified when the appeal had been received by the ACO, and 

that he also never received a response to the CDCR 22 request. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 48; ECF 

No. 1-1 at 88.) 

                                                                

21 The copy of this appeal attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain an appeal 

log number. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 86-87.) 

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 b. August 21, 2013 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

 On August 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 appeal alleging that 

several RJD officials, including Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo, discriminated, 

retaliated, and conspired against Plaintiff for “filing complaint and for maintaining a 

lawsuit.” Plaintiff alleged that at the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing he was found ineligible 

for re-entry programs “due to CSRA of low, ICE hold and time.” Plaintiff also alleged he 

was placed, without any penological justification, on an “unassigned list” relating to his 

prior laundry job. Plaintiff alleged the UCC officials failed to address his assignment 

concerns during the hearing including his desire to participate in available re-entry 

programs because his minimum eligible parole date was September 4, 2014 and the parole 

board had informed him he should participate in re-entry programs before he would be 

found eligible for parole. Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions as alleged in the Complaint 

were done with malice and the intent to prejudice Plaintiff’s parole eligibility. Plaintiff 

requested that he be returned to his prison laundry job, be permitted to participate in reentry programs, and that the May 16, 2012 CDC 128A and 128B be removed from his Cfile. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 46, 48; ECF No. 1-1 at 89-90.) 

Plaintiff alleges he never received a response to his August 21, 2013 appeal within 

a reasonable time or to a CDCR 22 request filed concurrently with his appeal asking that 

he be notified upon the ACO’s receipt of the appeal. Plaintiff contends RJD’s Legal Mail 

Program documents indicate these documents were delivered to the ACO but that the ACO 

“chose not to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances, render[ing] the administrative remedies as 

to that process futile, unavailable or inadequate.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 48; ECF No. 1-1 at 45-

48, 91.) 

6. Additional Allegations Regarding Improper Processing of Appeals 

 a. December 11, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 14-104) 

 On December 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal that was assigned 

Log No. 14-104, alleging that Defendants Benyard, Olson, Paramo, and Ramirez and their 

“agents” conspired to retaliate against Plaintiff by refusing to process his grievances and 

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depriving him of his ability to access the courts. Plaintiff identified several “overdue” 

grievances that he had unsuccessfully attempted to resolve, including: appeal Log No. 13-

3607, dated November 7, 2013, see supra Part I(B)(3)(c); appeal Log No. 13-00777, dated 

February 14, 2013, see supra Part I(B)(4); and Plaintiff’s unassigned appeals dated August 

5, 2013 and August 21, 2013, see supra Part I(B)(5).22 Plaintiff requested that the 

grievances be processed in a timely manner and that the involved Defendants halt their 

retaliatory bias and conspiracy against him. (ECF No. 1-2 at 90-94.) 

 On January 13, 2014, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected Plaintiff’s appeal at 

the First Level of review because the appeal involved multiple issues that did not derive 

from a single event, or are not directly related and cannot reasonably addressed in a single 

response due to this fact. Plaintiff was instructed to separate his issues with each appeal 

separately. (Id. at 92.) 

 On January 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a CDCR 22 request addressed to Defendant 

Hernandez and forwarded to Defendant Olson in which he stated: 

Take judicial notice that you have erred in your decision to reject [appeal Log 

No. 14-104], misconstrue the legal rules with regard to this matter, as I state 

in my staff complaint my claims involves multiple issues that derive from 

your act or omission to act, obstruction of justice, intentional delay, refusal to 

respond, or failure to process all of the grievances listed in this matter. . . . My 

allegations are directly related to the single fact that “you have retaliated and 

conspiracy [sic] against me by refusing to process grievances and by acting in 

concert with other staff in order to cover up misconduct. 

(Id. at 94.) 

 b. January 21, 2014 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

 On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 that was never 

assigned a log number. Plaintiff alleged in the appeal that the ACO failed to timely respond 

to his grievances rendering administrative remedies futile, unavailable, or inadequate. 

                                                                

22 The appeal also identified appeal Log No. 12-2398 concerning an “ADA issue,” 

although that appeal does not appear to be relevant to this lawsuit. 

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Plaintiff referenced his two prior attempts to address this issue, on November 7, 2013, 

appeal Log No. 13-3607, and on December 11, 2013, appeal Log No. 14-104. (ECF No. 

1-2 at 95-96.) 

 Having received no response to his appeal, on February 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed a 

CDCR 22 request in a “last attempt” at resolving his disputes before filing a civil rights 

lawsuit against Defendant Paramo and the ACO staff. Plaintiff claimed he had provided 

notice on multiple occasions that the ACO staff had refused to process or respond to 

Plaintiff’s appeals in retaliation for filing grievances against other RJD staff, and that this 

conspiracy was carried out to cover up misconduct. (ECF No. 1-2 at 98.) 

7. Concluding Allegations

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that the facts set forth above demonstrate that he 

has made a good faith effort to both informally and formally resolve disputes through the 

prison administrative process, but that the process is futile, unavailable, or inadequate. 

Therefore, Plaintiff contends the Court should deem that he exhausted all available 

administrative remedies. Plaintiff also alleges the ACO staff refused to properly process 

Plaintiff’s grievances by delaying the process, rejecting and cancelling Plaintiff’s appeals 

without proper justification, and conspiring to cover up the misconduct of other officials. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 49, 52.) 

 Plaintiff alleges: (1) his appeal regarding his wrongful termination from his job 

assignment was never addressed by either the UCC or the ACO; (2) his appeal regarding 

his personal property loss is still pending at the Third Level of review; (3) his appeal 

regarding the false RVR charges was never processed by the ACO; and (4) his complaints 

against ACO officials were never processed. (Id. at ¶ 51.) 

 Plaintiff alleges violations of his civil rights protected by the First, Fifth, Eighth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments including that Defendants conspired to retaliate against him for 

filing grievances, complaints, and a lawsuit against RJD officials; inflicted “unjustified and 

excessive abuse of power and . . . treated [him] cruelly or different from other similar[s] 

situate[d];” violated his procedural due process rights with regard to the wrongful 

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termination and RVR hearing; and violated his free speech rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-59.) 

 Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 30:1-31:19.) Plaintiff also 

seeks to recover compensatory damages in the following amounts: $150,000.00 each from 

Defendants Benyard, Olson, and Ramirez; $100,000.00 from Defendant Zuniga; 

$50,000.00 each from Defendants Abad, Allamby, Alvarez, Behra, Cavazos, Cortez, Jones, 

Paramo, and Rutledge; and $25,000.00 each from Defendants Hernandez, Spence, and 

Suglich. (Id. at 31:20-32:8.) Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages in the amount of 

$100,000, costs, and back pay for the wrongful termination of his job assignment. (Id. at 

7, 32:9-10.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction 

 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

on October 8, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion 

on October 30, 2014. (ECF No. 28.)23 Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants’ opposition on 

November 12, 2014. (ECF No. 31.) 

 Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction because it will prevent “irreparable injury or 

harm [to Plaintiff] while he awaits the final disposition of his case.” (ECF No. 20 at 1:25-

27.) Plaintiff contends “the Defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees 

and all other persons acting in concert and participation with them have engage[d] in an 

ongoing campaign of harassment [sic], threats and punishment towards the Plaintiff 

because the Plaintiff had filed this lawsuit against them, and because he continued to file 

                                                                

23 The Court issued a briefing schedule on Plaintiff’s motion because “[t]he court may 

issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” FED.R.CIV. P. 65(a)(1). 

(See ECF No. 22.) Although a temporary restraining order may issue “without written or 

oral notice to the adverse party,” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1), the Court also permitted 

Defendants an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining 

order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65 advisory committee’s notes (1966 Amendment) (“In view of 

the possibly drastic consequences of a temporary restraining order, the opposition should 

be heard, if feasible, before the order is granted.”).

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CDC 602 inmate appeals challenging the validity of their action.” (Id. at 2:5-9.) Plaintiff 

further contends “the Defendants had threatened him that they will continuing [sic] with 

their illegal action and their practices of intentionally provoking him in an attempt to get 

him into trouble and into Administrative Segregation, harassed, threatened, punish [sic], 

confi[s]cating his legal papers, and disregard his health and safety concerns.” (Id. at 2:11-

15.) Plaintiff alleges “he has been made a target of harassment” by RJD officers and that 

he “is in an actual and imminent danger of future violation of his constitutional rights.” 

(Id. at 2:15-21.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against “the Defendants, their successors 

in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concern [sic] and 

participation with them, to halt immediately with there [sic] ongoing conspiracy and 

retaliatory bias, such as harassment, threats, punishment, confiscation of legal papers or 

personal property.” (Id. at 10:21-24.) 

 Defendants generally oppose Plaintiff’s motion on that the grounds that (1) Plaintiff 

“has no likelihood of success on the merits of his case, the balance of equities does not 

weigh in his favor, and the requested injunction is not in the public interest,” and (2) “[t]he 

injunction he requests is overbroad and would extend to individuals who are not parties to 

this case and would enjoin conduct and claims that are not relevant to this case, including 

legal conduct.” (ECF No. 28 at 2:1-6.) 

 1. Applicable Legal Standards 

 “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” 

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quotations and citation 

omitted); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“A 

preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right.” (citing 

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008))); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) 

(injunctive relief should be used “sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case.” (quotations 

and citation omitted)). “A party seeking a temporary restraining order or preliminary 

injunction simply cannot prevail when that motion is unsupported by evidence.” 

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Armstrong v. Spearman, No. 1:13-cv-00246-AWI-SAB (PC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

79094, at *20 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2014). 

 “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munof, 553 U.S. at 689-90; Amoco 

Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 

305, 311-12 (1982)). 

 In prisoner cases, requests for preliminary injunctive relief are further limited by the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires courts to ensure the “relief [is] 

narrowly drawn, extend[s] no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds 

requires preliminary relief, and [is] the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. 

The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the 

operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the 

principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B)24 in tailoring any preliminary relief.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

“The same standards generally apply to temporary restraining orders and preliminary 

injunctions.” Porter v. Neotti, No. 11cv01050 BTM (BLM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

                                                                

24 Paragraph 1(B) provides: 

The court shall not order any prospective relief that requires or permits a 

government official to exceed his or her authority under State or local law or 

otherwise violates State or local law, unless— 

 (i) Federal law requires such relief to be ordered in violation of State 

or local law; 

 (ii) the relief is necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right; 

and 

 (iii) no other relief will correct the violation of the Federal right. 

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(B). 

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145280, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (citing Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. Pardini, 

726 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). 

2. Analysis 

a. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Likely Success on the Merits 

Plaintiff argues the Court’s sua sponte screening order (ECF No. 5) amounts to “a 

preliminary determination based on the face of the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a 

‘reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merit[s].” (ECF No. 20 at 4:5-10.) However, 

screening-stage satisfaction of the “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits” 

standard contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) is not equivalent to a demonstration that 

Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. 

 Based on the Court’s analysis of Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

and Motion to Dismisss, see infra Parts II(B)-(C), the Court concludes Plaintiff is not likely 

to prevail on the merits of his claims. Indeed, many of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to 

summary judgment for failure to exhaust. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege 

facts sufficient to state any of his claims against eight of the sixteen Defendants (i.e., 

Defendants Abad, Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Hernandez, Jones, Rutledge, and Spence). 

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to state a due process or cruel and unusual punishment claim 

against any of the Defendants. Further, although Plaintiff states a retaliation claim against 

seven Defendants, a conspiracy claim against three Defendants, and an equal protection 

claim against two Defendants, he has failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the 

merits of those claims. He survives dismissal of these claims at the pleading stage because 

his Complaint contains enough factual content that, accepted as true, plausibly entitles 

Plaintiff to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”). 

However, plausibility is not the same as likelihood of success on the merits, and Plaintiff 

has not met his burden of demonstrating he is likely to prevail on the merits. 

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 b. Plaintiff Establishes Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 

 Plaintiff claims in his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 

Injunction that, as summarized above, see supra Part I(B), the Defendants and other 

officers “have conspired and subjected Plaintiff to retaliatory bias and continuing with an 

ongoing campaign of harassment, threats and punishment towards the Plaintiff because the 

Plaintiff had filed a lawsuit and grievances against them.” (ECF No. 20 at 4:11-14.) 

Plaintiff also contends that, in response to the instant lawsuit, “[t]he Defendants and their 

agents” have continued “to take adverse action which is so bad that it would stop an avarage 

[sic] person from continuing with their suit,” and that it “is likely that [he] will suffer 

another harm again soon, because the Defendants have engage[d] in an ongoing campaign 

of harassment and threatened to do it again.” (Id. at 4:16-24.) Plaintiff claims that “several 

officer[s] have harassed and intentionally provoke[ed] the Plaintiff in an attempt to get him 

into trouble and into Administrative Segregation,” and that this harassment is “because he 

ha[s] filed this present lawsuit against them and fellow officer[s].” (Id. at 7:2-7.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that, in response to this lawsuit, Defendants have “engage[d] in an 

ongoing conspiracy and retaliatory bias such as harassment, threats, punitive cell search, 

confiscation of Plaintiff’s legal papers/ personal property, denial of adequated [sic] health 

and safety or recklessly [sic] disregard to Plaintiff’s health and safety.” (Id. at 16:21-26.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on September 9, 2014, Defendant Behra pulled Plaintiff 

aside to a patio area and questioned Plaintiff about this lawsuit. Defendant Behra became 

angry and began yelling at Plaintiff in a loud and threatening manner, and he told Plaintiff 

he would “screw [Plaintiff] up” for having filed this lawsuit. (Id. at 5:16-20.) 

 Plaintiff also contends that on September 16, 2014, upon Plaintiff’s arrival at the 

health clinic, non-party officer Strayhorn refused Plaintiff’s request to sit and wait inside 

the clinic notwithstanding the ninety-four degree temperature and the fact that Plaintiff is 

a “heat risk inmate.” Due to the extreme temperature Plaintiff began feeling dizzy and 

disoriented, and he started having difficulty breathing. Plaintiff “attempted to use the 

facility water resort to drink and for other cooling measure to releive [sic] some of [his] 

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symptoms,” but Strayhorn yelled at Plaintiff to stop using the water. Plaintiff attempted to 

alert Defendant Rutledge about his condition but Defendant Rutledge refused to talk to 

Plaintiff. Strayhorn also threatened to write Plaintiff up with a disciplinary report for using 

the water resort. Plaintiff complains that Strayhorn and Defendant Rutledge’s actions 

recklessly disregard Plaintiff’s health and safety. (Id. at 5:22-6:14.) 

 Plaintiff also alleges that on September 24, 2014, upon his release from the housing 

unit for morning yard time, he witnessed Defendant Rutledge and non-party officer 

Romero speaking together by the unit door, although Officer Romero was not assigned to 

Plaintiff’s housing unit at this time. When Plaintiff returned to his cell he noticed the cell 

had been searched and was left a mess. Plaintiff inventoried his personal property items 

and discovered he was missing legal papers and a hot pot. Plaintiff was provided with a 

cell search worksheet that was “a complete lie about the overall condition of [his] cell and 

about the property confiscated of course because C/O Romero attempted to cover up his 

misconduct and retaliatory bias.” On September 25, 2014, Plaintiff attempted to get a 

formal response from Romero, but Romero declined to speak with Plaintiff, stating only 

that it is “only the beginning.” (Id. at 6:15-28.) 

 Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff fails to establish the likelihood of irreparable 

harm, and the Court believes Plaintiff has satisfied his burden as to this element. Plaintiff 

claims prison officials have threatened and harassed him as a result of his filing of this 

lawsuit, including disregarding his health and safety and confiscating his legal documents. 

“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 

constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (citing New York 

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). Thus, the fact that Plaintiff has 

introduced facts showing that he is being retaliated against due to his exercise of his First 

Amendment right to file this lawsuit is sufficient to establish the likelihood of irreparable 

harm. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 c. The Balance of Equities and the Public Interest Do Not Favor Plaintiff 

 Plaintiff argues that his “present suffering . . . and the potential suffering if the 

Defendants do not stop with their ongoing conspiracy and retaliatory bias, harrassment 

[sic], threats and illegal punishment are enormous. The Defendants will not experience 

any suffering if the Court grant[s] the order, because the Defendants are obligated to obey 

the law and the U.S. Constitution. The Defendants’ hardship amounts to no more than 

business as usual.” (ECF No. 20 at 9:3-8.) Plaintiff also argues granting injunctive relief 

“will serve the public interest because it is always in the public interest for prison officials 

to obey the law.” (Id. at 10:2-3.) 

 Defendants contend the balance of equities does not tip in Plaintiff’s favor because 

the injunction he seeks is broad and non-specific, and it would prohibit any actions by 

prison officials that Plaintiff deems retaliatory or harassing, even when such actions are 

lawful and justified. Defendants also contend the requested injunction would impinge on 

the prison’s ability to maintain order and safety. (ECF No. 28 at 4:26-5:27.) 

 The Court finds that the balance of equities and the public interest do not favor 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring “the Defendants, their successors in office, 

agents and employees and all other persons acting in concern [sic] and participation with 

them, to halt immediately with there [sic] ongoing conspiracy and retaliatory bias, such as 

harassment, threats, punishment, confiscation of legal papers or personal property.” (ECF 

No. 20 at 10:21-24.) This is improper for multiple reasons. First, the requested injunction 

improperly seeks to enjoin unidentified prison officers. “Generalized injunctive relief 

against unnamed prison officials is not permissible under the PLRA because such relief is 

not ‘narrowly drawn.’” Witkin v. Solis, No. 1:12-cv-01256-MJS (PC), 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 67070, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)); see also 

James v. Sweeny, No. 1:12-cv-01704-LJO-MJS (PC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558, at *6 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (“Generalized injunctive relief against unidentified California 

Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (‘CDCR’) staff is not permissible.”). 

/ / / 

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 Second, the requested injunction improperly infringes in prison officials’ ability to 

discipline Plaintiff, as necessary, and to maintain the security and safety of the prison. See 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded 

wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their 

judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional 

security.” (citations omitted)). “[A]bsent the existence of exceptional circumstances not 

present here, the Court will not intervene in the day-to-day management of prisons.” Lopez 

v. Shiesha, No. 1:12-cv-0076-MJS (PC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181872, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 21, 2012) (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (prison officials 

entitled to substantial deference); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995) 

(disapproving involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons)). 

 d. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that although Plaintiff is able to show the 

likelihood of irreparable harm, the weight of the other factors cautions against the issuance 

of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction should be DENIED. 

B. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust 

 Defendants have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asserting that 

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to some of his claims. (ECF No. 

34.) Defendants concede that Plaintiff exhausted the following claims: (1) his due process 

property deprivation claim against Defendant Zuniga; (2) his retaliation and conspiracy 

claims against Defendants Benyard, Hernandez, Olson, and Ramirez; and (3) his due 

process claim against Defendants Benyard and Hernandez. (Id. at 3:25-28.) However, 

Defendants argue in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust the following claims: (1) his retaliation and conspiracy claims against all 

Defendants except Defendants Benyard, Hernandez, Olson, and Ramirez; (2) his due 

process claim against all Defendants except Defendants Benyard and Hernandez; and (3) 

his equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment claims against all Defendants. (Id.

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at 3:3-13, 5:1-6:8.) In addition, Defendants contend “that the grievance process was fully 

available to Plaintiff, that he was thoroughly familiar with the procedures, and that, in fact, 

he successfully processed certain grievances through the Third Level of review.” (Id. at 

6:10-13.) In support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants present 

the declarations of R. Briggs, the Acting Chief of the CDCR’s Office of Appeals (ECF No. 

34-2), and B. Baenziger, the Appeals Coordinator at RJD (ECF No. 34-3). 

 Plaintiff contends in his opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment that the “undisputed facts show that Plaintiff adequately exhausted his 

administrative remedies to all of his claims.” (ECF No. 41 at 1:25-26.) Plaintiff 

alternatively contends that he should be excused from complying with the exhaustion 

requirement because Defendants failed to respond to his grievances in reasonable time 

frame, repeatedly rejected his grievances at the screening stage, and refused to respond or 

assign a log number to his appeals, thereby making administrative remedies effectively 

unavailable. (Id. at 5:9-12.) 

 Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition generally reiterating the arguments 

in their moving papers. (ECF No. 44.) 

 Following Defendants’ filing of their reply, on January 7, 2015 Plaintiff filed a 

supplemental declaration, dated January 1, 2015, in support of his opposition to the motion. 

(ECF No. 48.) Defendants filed an opposition on January 16, 2015 addressing the merits 

of the supplemental declaration but preliminarily arguing that the Court should disregard 

the declaration. (ECF No. 53.) First, Defendants contend the declaration fails to comply 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Rule 15(d) provides, in part, that, “[o]n motion 

and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental 

pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of 

the pleading to be supplemented.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(d). However, Rule 15(d) does not 

apply to Plaintiff’s filing of a supplemental declaration in opposition to Defendants’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, motions and oppositions to motions are 

not pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7; Parker v. United States, 110 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 

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1997). 

 Second, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s supplemental opposition amounts to an 

improper sur-reply. In Johnson v. Wennes, No. 08cv1798-L(JMA), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

36992 (S.D. Cal. April 28, 2009), the court recognized that neither the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure nor the Civil Local Rules expressly contemplate sur-replies: 

Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Civil Local Rules 

provides a right to file a sur-reply because a sur-reply is not part of the 

ordinary process for the briefing of motions. When a motion is filed, a 

respondent may file an opposition to it and the movant may file a reply to that 

opposition. The respondent may not file a sur-reply unless leave of court is 

granted. While the court may, in its discretion, permit additional briefing, 

including a sur-reply, it generally will not permit such additional briefing 

absent good cause. 

Id. at *5-6. Here, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s supplemental declaration. Although 

Plaintiff is required to follow proper procedural rules notwithstanding his status as a pro 

se prisoner, the Court finds it noteworthy that Plaintiff filed his supplemental declaration 

prior to his January 6, 2015 deadline to oppose Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment. Moreover, although the supplemental declaration permitted Plaintiff an 

opportunity to respond to Defendants’ reply, the Court permitted Defendants an 

opportunity to respond to the supplemental declaration. (See ECF No. 49.) While 

Plaintiff’s filing is procedurally irregular, the Court will consider the supplemental 

declaration as well as Defendants’ response thereto. 

 1. Applicable Law 

 The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 

conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 

any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is “mandatory.” Porter v. 

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)); 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002). Failure to exhaust is “an 

affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 

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204 (2007). “In a typical PLRA case, a defendant will have to present probative evidence 

[in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment] . . . that the prisoner has failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies under § 1997e(a).” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc).25 

 Under the burden-shifting analysis recognized in Albino, “a defendant must first 

prove that there was an available administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not 

exhaust that available remedy.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 767 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Once the defendant 

has carried that burden, the prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden shifts 

to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 

effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (citing Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 

n.5 (“Once the defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not been 

exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local remedies 

were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”)). “The 

ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the defendants, and the evidence must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Packnett v. Wingo, No. 09-cv-00327-

YGR (PR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42339, at *30 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 2015) (citing 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191). “If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable 

to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment 

                                                                

25 “[I]n . . . rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, 

a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215-16; Scott v. Kuhlmann, 

746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“[A]ffirmative defenses may not be 

raised by motion to dismiss, but this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed 

issues of fact.”); Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(“[O]nly in rare cases will a district court be able to conclude from the face of the complaint 

that a prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is without a valid 

excuse.”)). 

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under Rule 56. If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and 

the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

 The Supreme Court has “held that to properly exhaust administrative remedies 

prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 

applicable procedural rules,’ [citation] -- rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the 

prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). 

 The administrative appeal system for inmates in the California prison system is 

described in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations: “Any inmate . . . under the 

[CDCR’s] jurisdiction may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition or omission by 

the department or its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material adverse 

effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. § 3084.1(a). For 

appeals submitted after January 28, 201126, inmates must commence the appeals process 

by submitting a CDCR Form 602 to the facility’s appeals coordinator describing “the 

specific issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Id. at § 3084.2(a), (c). Among other 

requirements, the appeal must be “limited to one issue or related set of issues” and “list all 

staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue.” Id. at 

§ 3084.2(a)(1), (3). “To assist in the identification of staff members, the inmate . . . shall 

include the staff member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the dates 

of the staff member's involvement in the issue under appeal. If the inmate . . . does not 

have the requested identifying information about the staff member(s), he or she shall 

provide any other available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making 

a reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question.” Id. at § 3084.2(a)(3).27 

                                                                

26 California’s administrative appeal regulations were significantly revised effective 

January 28, 2011. (See ECF No. 34-2 at 2:17-4:2.) 

27 In Jones, the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that exhaustion is not per se inadequate 

simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” 549 U.S. at 

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“Administrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted relative to any new issue, 

information, or person later named by the appellant that was not included in the originally 

submitted CDCR Form 602 . . . and addressed through all required levels of administrative 

review up to and including the third level. In addition, a cancellation or rejection decision 

does not exhaust administrative remedies.” Id. at § 3084.1(b). 

 If a prisoner is not satisfied with the First Level response, he may submit a formal 

appeal for a Second Level review, which is “conducted by the hiring authority or designee 

at a level no lower than Chief Deputy Warden . . . or the equivalent. Id. at § 3084.7(d)(2). 

If the prisoner is not satisfied with the Second Level review, he may appeal to the Third 

Level of review by the chief of the Office of Appeals in Sacramento. Id. at § 3084.7(c), 

(d)(3). “The third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on an appeal, and . . . exhausts administrative 

remedies.” Id. at § 3084.7(d)(3). 

2. Analysis

 As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendants have established through 

undisputed admissible evidence that California allows prisoners to complain about their 

conditions of confinement through an administrative remedies system. As set forth in the 

Briggs and Baenziger declarations (see ECF No. 34-2 at 1:22-4:2; ECF No. 34-3 at 1:22-

10) and the California regulations identified therein, see 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. § 3084 et 

seq., this system provides for a three-level procedure by which inmates may assert nonmedical inmate grievances, or appeals, utilizing a CDCR Form 602. Thus, the Court 

initially finds that Defendants have satisfied part of their initial burden under Albino, 

namely, the existence of a generally available administrative remedy. Thus, the remainder 

of the Court’s exhaustion analysis determines whether Defendants have satisfied the 

                                                                

219. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures 

will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and 

not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 218.

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second part of their initial Albino burden, namely, whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust that 

available remedy, and, if not, whether Plaintiff is able to meet his burden of demonstrating 

“that there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him by ‘showing that the local remedies 

were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.’” 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n.5). 

 Next, the Court addresses Defendants’ argument “that the grievance process was 

fully available to Plaintiff, that he was thoroughly familiar with the procedures, and that, 

in fact, he successfully processed certain grievances through the Third Level of review.” 

(ECF No. 34-1 at 6:10-13.) In other words, Defendants suggest that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies as to certain claims because he was familiar with the 

administrative appeal process and he properly exhausted other appeals. The Ninth Circuit 

recently rejected this argument in Williams: 

This argument is a virtual non-sequitur because it does nothing to rebut 

[plaintiff’s] evidence that administrative remedies were not available to her at 

the time she tried to file the relevant grievance and appeal in this case. Other 

circuits have similarly concluded that defendants may not simply rely on the 

existence of an administrative process to overcome a prisoner’s showing that 

administrative remedies were not available to him. In Hemphill v. New York, 

for example, the Second Circuit held that merely showing that grievance 

mechanisms are in place does not end the inquiry into availability where the 

plaintiff claims that threats by prison officials made the remedy functionally 

unavailable to him. 380 F.3d 680, 687-88 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Dillon v. 

Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 268-69 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that records showing 

53 other inmates had filed grievances during the period in question did not 

demonstrate that administrative remedy was available to plaintiff). Moreover, 

permitting a defendant to show that remedies merely existed in a general sense 

where a plaintiff has specifically alleged that official action prevented her 

from filing a particular grievance would force a plaintiff to bear the burden of 

proof, a burden which the plaintiff does not bear. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 

775 F.3d at 1192. 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s familiarity with the administrative appeals process and successful 

utilization of that process through the Third Level of review as to some of his appeals are 

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insufficient to satisfy Defendants’ ultimate burden of proving that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies as to all of his appeals. See id. (“The evidence produced by the 

Defendants at most meets their burden of demonstrating a system of available 

administrative remedies at the initial step of the Albino burden-shifting inquiry, but 

Defendants have not carried their ultimate burden of proof in light of [plaintiff’s] factual 

allegations.”). In order to determine whether Defendants have satisfied their burden of 

proving failure to exhaust, the Court must apply the burden shifting-analysis to each appeal 

allegedly filed by Plaintiff. 

 a. May 22, 2012 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he filed a CDCR Form 602 alleging retaliation 

and conspiracy against Defendant Behra and other non-party officers in connection with 

the May 16, 2012 laundry floor incident and subsequent termination of Plaintiff’s job 

assignment. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19; ECF No. 1-1 at 4-8.) Although Defendants do not 

expressly address this appeal in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants 

rely on the Baenziger declaration which identifies all inmate appeals from Plaintiff 

received by RJD’s ACO from April 1, 2012 to the present against Defendants relating to 

the following allegations: (1) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; (2) violation 

of due process rights; (3) abuse of power in violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights 

and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) conspiracy to commit 

the above-listed constitutional violations. (ECF No. 34-3 at 3:11-7:17.) Defendants also 

rely on the Briggs declaration which identified all inmate appeals by Plaintiff against 

Defendants asserting the claims set forth above that were received by the CDCR’s Office 

of Appeals and adjudicated through the Third Level of review or received and screened out 

by that office. (ECF No. 34-2 at 4:3-6:14.) Neither the Baenziger nor Briggs declarations, 

nor the exhibits attached thereto, identify a May 22, 2012 appeal against Defendant Behra 

for retaliation and conspiracy. In other words, Defendants have demonstrated that Plaintiff 

did not exhaust his May 22, 2012 appeal through the Third Level of review. Thus, 

Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under Albino of demonstrating that an 

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available administrative remedy exists and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available 

remedy. 

 However, in his Complaint, which is sworn under penalty of perjury, Plaintiff claims 

that he filed a CDCR Form 602 appeal against Defendant Behra on May 22, 2012. (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 19; ECF No. 1-1 at 4-8.) Plaintiff also asserts in his Complaint and in the various 

CDCR 22’s he filed in June and July 2012 that he never received a response to his May 22, 

2012 appeal. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 20-21; ECF No. 1-1 at 19-, 21-22, 32.) Plaintiff’s sworn 

allegations that he filed the May 22, 2012 appeal but never received a response from prison 

officials, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, is 

sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating “that there is something particular 

in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 

effectively unavailable to him by ‘showing that the local remedies [as to this appeal] were 

ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.’” Williams, 

775 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172); see also Parks v. Chappell, No. C13-4048 EMC (pr), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70602, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2015) (“A 

verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence.” (citing 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995)). Moreover, 

Defendants have provided no evidence that Plaintiff “failed to follow prison procedures by 

attempting to file [his] grievance and appeal.” Id. at 1182 (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 

90-91). 

 The absence in the prison records of Plaintiff’s May 22, 2012 appeal is not sufficient 

evidence that Plaintiff failed to follow applicable prison procedures in attempting to file 

this appeal.28 Holding otherwise would provide prison officials with a perverse incentive 

                                                                

28 This is particularly true in this case where the Baenziger declaration fails to account 

for an appeal of which there is irrefutable evidence that Plaintiff filed an appeal alleging 

retaliation, conspiracy, and due process claims against Defendants Allamby, Benyard, 

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to “lose” an inmate’s appeal, thereby preventing it from ever being properly recorded in 

the prison’s files and setting up an unsurmountable exhaustion defense. Accord Sapp v. 

Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing an exception to exhaustion where 

prison officials improperly screen inmates’ appeals “promotes exhaustion benefits by 

removing any incentive prison officials might otherwise have to avoid meaningfully 

considering inmates’ grievances by screening them for improper purposes.”). At this stage 

of the litigation, the absence of evidence in the prison records coupled with Plaintiff’s 

sworn allegation that he filed the appeal raises a “genuine dispute as to [a] material fact,” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), precluding summary judgment as to this appeal. 

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s 

retaliation and conspiracy claims against Defendant Behra arising out of Plaintiff’s 

termination from his job assignment. 

 b. June 11, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-2146) 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that his June 11, 2012 appeal, Log No. 12-2146, 

asserted retaliation and conspiracy claims against the “ACO staff,” specifically Defendants 

Olson and Ramirez. Plaintiff alleged these two Defendants refused to process his 

grievances alleging misconduct by RJD staff. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 24.) 

 As an initial matter, contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, this appeal does not contain 

any allegations against Defendants Olson or Ramirez. Rather, the appeal alleges non-party 

officer Cobb violated Plaintiff’s right to appeal by conspiring, retaliating, delaying, and 

intentionally obstructing Plaintiff’s access to justice in order to cover up the misconduct of 

other prison officials. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 50-51.) Thus, this appeal does not serve to 

exhaust retaliation and conspiracy claims against Defendants Olson and Ramirez. See 15 

CAL. CODE. REGS. § 3084.2(a)(3) (requiring that inmate appeals “list all staff member(s) 

                                                                

Cortez, Hernandez, and Jones, that was later rejected at the First Level of review. See infra 

Part II(B)(2)(m). 

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involved and . . . describe their involvement in the issue. To assist in the identification of 

staff members, the inmate . . . shall include the staff member’s last name, first initial, title 

or position, if known, and the dates of the staff member's involvement in the issue under 

appeal. If the inmate . . . does not have the requested identifying information about the 

staff member(s), he or she shall provide any other available information that would assist 

the appeals coordinator in making a reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in 

question.”). 

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff had identified Defendants Olson and Ramirez in this 

appeal, Plaintiff did not proceed with the appeal through the Third Level of review. Indeed, 

on October 6, 2012, Defendant Olson properly rejected the appeal at the First Level of 

review due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with various appeal procedures. (See ECF No. 

1-1 at 54-57.) On December 11, 2012, following Plaintiff’s resubmittal of the appeal, 

Defendants Olson and Ramirez again rejected the appeal at the First Level of review for 

the same reasons stated in the October 6, 2012 screening letters. Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez also cancelled the appeal because Plaintiff had “continue[d] to submit a rejected 

appeal while disregarding appeal staff’s previous instructions to correct the appeal.” (ECF 

No. 1 at ¶ 24; ECF No. 1-1 at 54-62.) Plaintiff cannot show that administrative remedies 

were unavailable as to this appeal when Plaintiff failed to correct deficiencies in the appeal 

as instructed by the ACO staff. 

 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Olson and Ramirez appear to be based on their 

processing of the appeal against Cobb. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Olson’s screening 

letters “intentionally interfered with the Plaintiff’s rights to petition the government for 

redress of grievances [and] conspired and retaliated against the Plaintiff for him filing 

grievances, complaint and civil right action against the institution staff.” (ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 24.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Olson and Ramirez “refused to process Plaintiff 

grievances and complaint were [sic] it alleges misconduct by RJD-Correctional Facility 

staff including the ACO.” (Id.) However, to properly exhaust administrative remedies 

against Defendants Olson and Ramirez, Plaintiff was required to file a new appeal alleging 

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misconduct in their handling of appeal Log No. 12-2146. This Plaintiff did not do. 

 In conclusion, the evidence before the Court is sufficient to satisfy Defendants’ 

burden of showing that Plaintiff did not exhaust any claims against Defendants based on 

the allegations set forth in appeal Log No. 12-2146. 

 c. July 2, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-1879) 

 With respect to Plaintiff’s July 2, 2012 appeal, Log No. 12-1879, Defendants have 

satisfied their initial burden of showing that an available administrative remedy existed and 

that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Indeed, Plaintiff failed to proceed 

through the Third Level of review with appeal Log No. 12-1879. 

 However, Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of 

material fact concerning whether the local remedies were truly available as to this appeal. 

Specifically, Plaintiff’s appeal was rejected at the First Level of review as being untimely 

based on the finding that the laundry room incident occurred on May 16, 2012 and Plaintiff 

waited until July 2, 2012 to appeal. Inmate appeals must generally be submitted within 

thirty days of “[t]he occurrence of the event or decision being appealed.” 15 CAL. CODE.

REGS. § 3084.8(b)(1). However, Plaintiff alleges his July 2, 2012 appeal was based on his 

June 27, 2012 receipt of Defendant Behra’s CDC 128A disciplinary report stating that 

Plaintiff had been out of bounds at the time of the May 16, 2012 incident. Plaintiff alleged 

in appeal Log No. 12-1879 that he was not out of bounds, and that Defendant Behra’s 

statement to the contrary was false and made as part of a conspiracy to retaliate against 

Plaintiff for his prior lawsuit. (ECF No. 1-1 at 24-25.) Thus, the date triggering Plaintiff’s 

thirty-day appeal deadline was June 27, 2012 when he first obtained a copy of the allegedly 

false statements from Defendant Behra. See 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. § 3084.8(b)(2) (inmate 

appeals must be submitted within thirty days of “first having knowledge of the action or 

decision being appealed.”). Thus, Plaintiff has produced evidence (i.e., improper rejection 

of appeal as untimely) showing that “the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies [were] effectively unavailable to him” in connection with appeal Log No. 12-

1879. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (citing Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n.5). 

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 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative concerning Plaintiff’s retaliation and 

conspiracy claims against Defendant Behra arising out of the allegedly false statements 

contained in Defendant Behra’s CDC 128A disciplinary report. 

 d. September 20, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-2759) 

 Plaintiff’s September 20, 2012 appeal, Log No. 12-2759, generally alleges a delay 

in the processing of his earlier appeals as part of a conspiracy to obstruct justice and 

Plaintiff’s access to the courts. Plaintiff also complained that Defendant Olson’s response 

to a CDCR 22 request for a status update on his May 22, 2012 and July 2, 2012 appeals 

was erroneous. In his response, dated August 22, 2012, Defendant Olson stated that 

Plaintiff should have received a response to the May 22, 2012 appeal and that there was a 

backlog of appeals due to a high volume and staffing shortage. Plaintiff claimed in appeal 

Log No. 12-2759 that the evidence contradicted Defendant Olson’s response. (ECF No. 1-

1 at 27-28, 34.) 

 The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their initial burden of demonstrating 

that there was an available administrative remedy which Plaintiff failed to exhaust with 

respect to this appeal. As demonstrated by the Baenziger and Briggs declarations, Plaintiff 

did not proceed with appeal Log No. 12-2759 through the Third Level of review. That 

being said, however, the available evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff has met his burden 

of showing that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable regarding this appeal. 

California prison regulations prohibit the review of an inmate appeal by a staff person who 

. . . [p]articipated in the event or decision being appealed.” 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. 

§ 3084.7(d)(1)(A). Notwithstanding this prohibition, Defendant Olson screened out appeal 

Log No. 12-2759 which contained allegations against Defendant Olson. (ECF No. 1-1 at 

29-31.) While a “violation of this state regulation does not give rise to a federally protected 

due process interest,” Sylvester v. Alameido, No. 2:10-cv-2380 KJN P, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 130345, at *45 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012), it does mean that Plaintiff has met his 

burden of demonstrating there are genuine and material disputes over whether he should 

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be excused from the exhaustion requirement as to this appeal. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823 

(“[I]mproper screening of an inmate’s administrative grievances renders administrative 

remedies ‘effectively unavailable’ such that exhaustion is not required under the PLRA. If 

prison officials screen out an inmate’s appeals for improper reasons, the inmate cannot 

pursue the necessary sequence of appeals, and administrative remedies are therefore plainly 

unavailable.”). 

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative concerning Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim 

against Defendant Olson arising out of Defendant Olson’s August 22, 2012 CDCR 22 

response. 

 e. October 30, 2012 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

 In his October 30, 2012 appeal, which was never assigned a log number, Plaintiff 

alleged that in connection with his prior appeals, i.e., his May 22, 2012, June 11, 2012, and 

July 2, 2012 appeals, “the AC have Obstructed inmate access to the court and intentionally 

refuse to process inmate’s above mentioned grievances as required by law under the First 

Amendment of U.S. Constitution and CDCR Own rules and Regulations. Inmate contends 

that in [sic] several occasssions [sic] I have attempted to resolve this matter without the 

necessary [sic] of litigation without any results.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 38-39.) Although the 

appeal was addressed to Defendant Suglich, the appeal did not identify any specific 

individual as required by the applicable regulations. See 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. 

§ 3084.2(a)(3). Rather, the appeal only alleged misconduct by “the ACO staff.” However, 

the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff could have identified the name of the 

individuals engaging in misconduct because the appeal was based on administrative 

responses received by Plaintiff that specifically identified the responding officials. “By 

failing to provide this known bit of information, [Plaintiff] failed to provide sufficient 

information to allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive measures.” Parks, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70602, at *12. 

/ / / 

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 In addition, the fact that Plaintiff attached copies of the prior CDCR 22 requests is 

insufficient to comply with the applicable regulations. See Valencia v. Gipson, No. 1:12-

cv-01446-AWI-SAB (PC), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60793, at *27-28 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 

2015) (“As to Defendants Johnson and Smith, it is undisputed these Defendants were not 

named in the appeal and there is insufficient factual information to place prison officials 

on notice that Plaintiff sought relief based on their individual involvement in the gang 

validation process. Plaintiff’s claim that attachment of the supporting documents was 

sufficient to identify each individual is not persuasive because merely submitting several 

documents to an inmate appeal in order to identify and set forth the claims for relief does 

not meet the requirements of the applicable regulations.” (citing 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. 

§ 3084.2(a)(4) (“The inmate or parolee shall state all facts known and available to him/her 

regarding the issue being appealed at the time of submitted the Inmate/Parolee Appeal 

form, and if needed, the Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form Attachment.”)). 

 Further, Plaintiff’s allegation in the Complaint that Defendant Suglich “personally 

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional right, conspired and retaliated 

against the Plaintiff by refusing to process Plaintiff grievances in order to cover up 

misconduct, knew of the alleged deprivation and failed to act to prevent them, when thre 

[sic] is a duty to do so,” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23), is insufficient to establish that Plaintiff 

exhausted administrative remedies as to Defendant Suglich. The October 30, 2012 appeal, 

while addressed to Defendant Suglich, did not complain of any improper action by 

Defendant Suglich. Rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendant Suglich stems from 

his allegedly improper processing of this appeal. 

 In conclusion, Plaintiff’s October 30, 2012 appeal fails to adequately identify any 

individual Defendant and, therefore, this appeal is not properly exhausted.29

                                                                

29 The Court notes there is a material dispute as to whether Plaintiff ever submitted his 

October 30, 2012 appeal. The prison records do not reflect its existence. But Plaintiff 

alleges under penalty of perjury that he did. While this genuine factual dispute could 

preclude summary judgment as to this claim, see supra Part II(B)(2)(a), summary judgment 

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 f. November 19, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-3429) 

 In his November 19, 2012 appeal, Log No. 12-3429, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant 

Abad violated his due process rights by not provide a timely response to Plaintiff’s request 

for a Classification Committee review based on his contention that he was improperly 

removed from his job assignment. Plaintiff requested that he be scheduled for a 

Classification Committee review at the next reasonable opportunity and that he be ordered 

to return to his job assignment. (ECF No. 1-1 at 79-80, 83.) 

 Based on the evidence presented in the Baenziger and Briggs declarations showing 

that Plaintiff did not proceed with appeal Log No. 12-3429 through the Third Level of 

review, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under Albino. 

 Next, with the burden now shifted to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the generally 

available administrative remedies were effectively unavailable, the Court finds Plaintiff 

has satisfied his burden as to appeal Log No. 12-3429. Plaintiff alleges the First Level of 

review rejection of the appeal was improper and, therefore, administrative remedies were 

effectively unavailable. Defendants Olson and Ramirez sent Plaintiff a screening letter on 

December 28, 2012 rejecting the appeal because it was missing necessary supporting 

documents, namely, the “128 UCC Removal from job” and the “CDCR 22 complete 

through section D.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 81.) A genuine factual dispute exists regarding 

whether the appeal should have included the “CDCR 22 complete through section D.” As 

noted previously, see supra note 12, Plaintiff argues that he submitted two CDCR 22 forms 

in November 2012 asking for a Classification Committee review but that he never received 

a response to either request. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 83-84.) Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to Plaintiff, it is unreasonable to expect Plaintiff to attach a CDCR 22 

completed through section D, i.e., the supervisor’s response, when the evidence Plaintiff 

submits indicates that Plaintiff never received a response to his request. “To be available, 

                                                                

is nevertheless warranted because the appeal fails to identify any specific Defendant, in 

violation of the applicable prison appeal regulations. 

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a remedy must be available ‘as a practical matter’; it must be ‘capable of use; at hand.’” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002)). An 

administrative remedy is not available where a prison official directs an inmate to 

accomplish the impossible as a prerequisite to exhausting that remedy. Even assuming the 

appeal was properly rejected because it did not attach the “128 UCC Removal from job,” 

the Court finds a genuine material dispute exists as to whether Plaintiff should have been 

required to continue pursuing this appeal through the administrative process when he was 

instructed that he must attach a non-existent document to his appeal. Accord Nunez v. 

Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2010) (excusing inmate’s failure to exhaust 

“because he took reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust his . . . claim and was 

precluded from exhausting, not through his own fault but by the Warden’s mistake.”). 

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s due 

process claim against Defendant Abad arising out of Defendant Abad’s alleged delay in 

responding to Plaintiff’s request for a Classification Committee review.30

 g. December 6, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 13-0108) 

 Plaintiff’s December 6, 2012 appeal, Log No. 13-0108, alleged he never received a 

response to his May 22, 2012 appeal and set forth his prior efforts to follow up regarding 

its status, including his filing of other CDCR Form 602 appeals and CDCR 22 requests. 

Plaintiff also alleged that the September 14, 2012 cancellation of appeal Log No. 12-1879 

as untimely was improper. (ECF No. 1-1 at 42-43.) 

/ / / 

                                                                

30 Plaintiff alleges appeal Log No. 12-3429 addressed the actions of Defendants Abad, 

Benyard, and Cavazos. (ECF No. 48 at 5:2-4.) However, the undisputed evidence 

demonstrates that this appeal only identified Defendant Abad. Thus, Defendants have 

satisfied their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies as against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos based on his delayed 

Classification Committee review claim. 

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 Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected the appeal at the First Level of review on 

January 10, 2013 because it did not comply with certain provisions of California Code of 

Regulations § 3084.6(b). (Id. at 40-41; see also supra Part I(B)(2)(g).) The evidence 

before the Court fails to show that Plaintiff attempted to pursue this appeal beyond the First 

Level of review. Thus, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under 

Albino. In addition, Plaintiff makes no attempt to introduce evidence that administrative 

remedies were effectively unavailable as to this appeal. (See ECF No. 48 at 5:15-17.) 

Thus, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust available administrative remedies as to appeal Log No. 13-0108. 

 h. December 13, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 13-00372) 

 In his December 13, 2012 appeal, Log No. 13-00372, Plaintiff alleged that non-party 

officers Cobb and Stratton and Defendants Olson, Ramirez, and Suglich had failed to 

provide reasonable and adequate administrative remedies and failed to timely respond to 

his grievances as part of a conspiracy to retaliate against him, cause intentional delay, 

obstruct his access to the courts, and cover-up wrongdoing of other officers in connection 

with the May 22, 2012 incident. Plaintiff alleged that administrative remedies are futile, 

unavailable, and inadequate, and he requested that the prior grievances mentioned in appeal 

Log No. 13-0037231 be deemed exhausted. (ECF No. 1-1 at 64, 66.) 

 Based on the evidence presented in the Baenziger and Briggs declarations showing 

that Plaintiff did not proceed with appeal Log No. 13-00372 through the Third Level of 

review, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under Albino. 

Plaintiff’s contention that this appeal was denied at the Third Level of review on March 

13, 2013 (see ECF No. 48 at 22-28) misconstrues the evidence. The March 13, 2013 letter 

rejected the appeal pursuant to California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(b)(15) because 

                                                                

31 Appeal Log No. 13-00372 identified the following prior appeals: unassigned May 

22, 2012 appeal; July 2, 2012 appeal Log No. 12-1879; September 20, 2012 appeal Log 

No. 12-2759; and unassigned October 30, 2012 appeal. (ECF No. 1-1 at 64, 66.) 

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Plaintiff had bypassed a lower level of review and inappropriately submitted the appeal for 

processing at the Third Level of review. (ECF No. 1-1 at 74.) In fact, Plaintiff’s appeal 

was rejected at the First Level of review on January 22, 2013 (see id. at 71-72), and he did 

not resubmit the appeal at the First Level of review. Nor did he submit the appeal to the 

Second Level of review. Thus, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden of showing 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust appeal Log No. 13-00372. 

 However, Plaintiff has presented evidence showing that administrative remedies 

were effectively unavailable regarding this appeal. Specifically, despite the fact that the 

appeal alleged improper handling by Defendants Olson and Ramirez, among others, it was 

Defendants Olson and Ramirez that rejected the appeal at the First Level of review. As 

discussed above in connection with appeal Log No. 12-2759, see supra Part II(B)(2)(d), 

this violation of California Code of Civil Procedure § 3084.7(d)(1)(A)’s prohibition of 

appeal review performed by staff involved in the event or decision being appealed 

demonstrates a genuine and material factual dispute over whether Plaintiff should be 

excused from the exhaustion requirement as to this appeal. 

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendants Olson, Ramirez, and 

Suglich arising out of their handling of Plaintiff’s administrative appeals. 

 i. February 14, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-00777) 

 Plaintiff alleged a due process property deprivation and retaliation claim against 

Defendant Zuniga in his February 14, 2013 appeal, Log No. 13-00777. (ECF No. 1-1 at 

128, 130.) Defendants do not move for summary judgment as to the property deprivation 

claim against Defendant Zuniga, conceding in their motion that Plaintiff exhausted the 

claim. (ECF No. 34-1 at 3:25-26.) Interestingly, Defendants do move for summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Zuniga. 

 The evidence before the Court plainly demonstrates that Plaintiff did not exhaust his 

retaliation and due process property deprivation claims against Defendant Zuniga based on 

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appeal Log No. 13-00777 prior to filing suit. The Third Level Appeal Decision included 

as an exhibit to the Briggs declaration is dated July 25, 2014 (ECF No. 34-2 at 36-37), 

nearly three months after the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Baenziger and Briggs 

declarations also indicate the appeal was denied at the Thrid Level of review on July 25, 

2014. (ECF No. 34-2 at 5:14-17; ECF No. 34-3 at 4:22-23.) Although Plaintiff had 

requested consideration of this appeal at the Third Level of review on February 25, 2012 

prior to filing suit (see ECF No. 1-1 at 129), prisoners must exhaust administrative 

remedies before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect 

to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies 

as are available are exhausted.”); Jones, 549 U.S. at 211 (“There is no question that 

exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought 

in court.” (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524)); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171 (“The PLRA mandates 

that inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit 

challenging prison conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under § 1983.” (emphasis 

added) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85)); Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“The Ninth Circuit has explained that Congress purposely made exhaustion a 

precondition to suit, rather than to judgment, and this was done with the goal of affording 

corrections officials the opportunity to address complaints internally.” (citing McKinney v. 

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). 

 Plaintiff alleges in his supplemental declaration that appeal Log No. 13-00777 also 

“linked” Defendants Alvarez and Benyard “because they personally participated in the 

conspiracion [sic] and retaliatory bias to intentionally deprive the Plaintiff of his personal 

property.” (ECF No. 48 at 5:23-26.) However, this appeal made no mention of Defendants 

Alvarez and Benyard, nor did Plaintiff allege conspiracy against any of the Defendants. 

 Based on the record before the Court, it appears Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust 

appeal Log No. 13-00777. However, summary judgment in favor of Defendant Zuniga as 

to the retaliation and due process property deprivation claims is not warranted because, as 

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set forth below, see supra Part II(B)(2)(k), triable issues of fact remain as to these claims 

against Defendant Zuniga based on a separate appeal, Log No. 13-1365. 

 j. April 10, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-01319) 

 In his April 10, 2013 appeal, Log No. 13-01319, Plaintiff claimed Defendants 

Benyard, Hernandez, and Spence, and non-party officer Smith, violated his rights under 

the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by conspiring to retaliate against 

Plaintiff and deprive him of due process protections. Defendants concede that Plaintiff 

exhausted his conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendants Benyard 

and Ramirez. (See ECF No. 34-1 at 3:25-28.) However, Defendants’ motion and the 

Baenziger and Briggs declarations overlook the fact that appeal Log No. 13-01319 raised 

these same claims against Defendant Spence. Indeed, the declarations only identify 

Defendants Benyard and Hernandez and non-party officer Smith as being named in this 

appeal. (ECF No. 34-2 at 4:27-5:3; ECF No. 34-3 at 4:25-5:4.) Not only does the appeal 

identify Defendant Spence, but the majority of the appeal is focused on alleged improper 

conduct by Defendant Spence. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 107, 109.) Because the appeal was 

processed through the Third Level of review (see ECF No. 1-2 at 105-06; ECF No. 34-2 at 

4:27-5:4; ECF No. 34-3 at 4:25-5:9), Plaintiff exhausted the claims asserted in this appeal.32

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendant Spence arising out of the 

March 18, 2012 RVR disciplinary hearing. 

 k. April 17, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-1365) 

 In his April 17, 2013 appeal, Log No. 13-1365, Plaintiff asserted claims against 

Defendants Alvarez, Benyard, Rutledge, and Zuniga for allegedly conspiring to retaliate 

                                                                

32 Although appeal Log No. 13-01319 was granted in part at the Third Level of review 

because Plaintiff had not been provided with medical reports sufficiently in advance of the 

RVR disciplinary hearing, and the RVR was reissued and reheard (see ECF No. 1-2 at 105-

06), Plaintiff nevertheless exhausted his claims asserted in the appeal. 

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against Plaintiff by depriving Plaintiff of his personal property without due process of law. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 39; ECF No. 1-2 at 38-39.) 

 On April 22, 2013, Defendants Olson and Ramirez cancelled appeal Log No. 13-

1365 as untimely because the February 25, 2013 date on which Plaintiff was informed by 

the R&R staff that his television could not be located was more than thirty days before he 

filed the appeal, in violation of California Code of Regulations § 3084.6(c)(4). (ECF No. 

1-2 at 40.) Based on this evidence, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under 

Albino of showing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the claims 

asserted in this appeal. 

 However, Plaintiff has presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable regarding this appeal. 

Specifically, the claims asserted in appeal Log No. 13-1365 were made less than three 

weeks after Plaintiff’s March 28, 2013 receipt of Defendant Alvarez’s response to a CDCR 

22 request in which Plaintiff was notified that his television, previously categorized as 

missing, was in fact determined to be altered from its original state meaning that it was 

contraband that would not be returned to Plaintiff. (Id. at 38-39, 41.) Thus, Plaintiff has 

introduced evidence suggesting that the appeal was improperly cancelled as untimely and, 

thus, whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable as to this appeal. 

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendants Alvarez, Benyard, 

Rutledge, and Zuniga based on the allegations set forth in appeal Log No. 13-1365. 

 l. August 5, 2013 and August 21, 2013 Appeals (Log Nos. Unassigned) 

 In his August 5, 2013 appeal, which was not assigned a log number, Plaintiff alleged 

equal protection, retaliation, and conspiracy claims against several RJD officials, including 

Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo for their refusal to consider Plaintiff’s job 

termination complaint during the July 23, 2013 UCC review. Plaintiff claims he never 

received a response to this appeal. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 48; ECF No. 1-1 at 86-95.) 

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 Similarly, in his August 21, 2013 appeal, which also was not assigned a log number, 

Plaintiff alleged discrimination, retaliation, and conspiracy by Defendants Benyard, 

Cavazos, and Paramo due to their refusal during the UCC review to permit Plaintiff to 

participate in re-entry programs. (ECF No. 1-1 at 89-90.) 

 Although Defendants do not expressly address these two appeals in their Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants rely on the Baenziger and Briggs declarations for 

the position that Plaintiff never filed the appeals, let alone exhausted the appeals through 

the Third Level of review. Thus, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under 

Albino of demonstrating that an available administrative remedy exists and that Plaintiff 

did not exhaust that available remedy. 

 However, Plaintiff has sworn under penalty of perjury that he filed his August 5, 

2015 and August 21, 2015 appeals but that he never received a response. Viewed in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden 

of demonstrating “that there is something particular in his case that made the existing and 

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him by ‘showing that 

the local remedies [as to this appeal] were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, 

inadequate, or obviously futile.’” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1172). Moreover, Defendants have provided no evidence that Plaintiff “failed to follow 

prison procedures by attempting to file [his] grievance and appeal[s].” Id. at 1182 (citing 

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91). 

 For the reasons discussed above in connection with Plaintiff’s unassigned May 22, 

2012 appeal, see supra Part II(B)(2)(a), the absence in the prison records of Plaintiff’s 

August 5, 2013 and August 21, 2013 appeals is not sufficient evidence that Plaintiff failed 

to follow applicable prison procedures in attempting to file these appeals, nor is it grounds 

for granting summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. 

 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s equal 

protection, retaliation, and conspiracy claims against Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and 

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Paramo arising out of the July 23, 2013 UCC review. 

 m. November 7, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-3607) 

 In his November 7, 2013 appeal, Log No. 13-3607, Plaintiff asserted retaliation, 

conspiracy, and due process claims against Defendants Allamby, Benyard, Cortez, 

Hernandez, and Jones. Plaintiff alleged that during the October 17, 2013 RVR disciplinary 

rehearing Defendant Allamby wrongly denied his request that a Staff Assistant be 

interviewed and that the video recording of Plaintiff’s February 4, 2013 Ad-Seg hearing 

with Defendant Benyard be reviewed, thus depriving Plaintiff of a fair and impartial 

disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff also alleged Defendants Cortez and Jones made false 

statements during the rehearing. (ECF No. 1-2 at 84-85.) 

 Surprisingly, the Baenziger declaration does not identify appeal Log No. 13-3607 as 

having been received by RJD’s Inmate Appeals Office for processing. However, the 

evidence attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates that the appeal was in fact 

submitted and was actually rejected at the First Level of review on November 18, 2013 

because it did not include a final copy of the RVR. (ECF No. 1-2 at 84-85, 88-89.) Plaintiff 

further claims that on November 25, 2013, he resubmitted his appeal after taking corrective 

measures and that he accompanied his appeal with a CDCR 22 form signed by non-party 

officer J. Delgado verifying receipt of the resubmitted appeal. Plaintiff claims he never 

received a response to his resubmitted appeal. (ECF No. 1-2 at 87; ECF No. 48 at 6:19-

25.) 

 While Plaintiff is unable to show that he exhausted this appeal to the Third Level of 

review, he has produced sufficient evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute 

concerning whether he ever filed this appeal in the first place, and if so, whether the 

prison’s failure to process the resubmitted appeal effectively made administrative remedies 

unavailable. Thus, Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to his retaliation, 

conspiracy, and due process claims against Defendants Allamby, Benyard, Cortez, 

Hernandez, and Jones arising from the October 17, 2013 RVR disciplinary hearing. 

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 n. December 11, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 14-104) 

 In his December 11, 2013 appeal, Log No. 14-104, Plaintiff asserted claims against 

Defendants Benyard, Olson, Paramo, and Ramirez and their unidentified “agents” for 

allegedly conspiring to retaliate against Plaintiff by refusing to process his grievances and 

depriving him of access to the courts. Plaintiff identified several “overdue” grievances that 

he had unsuccessfully tried to resolve, including: appeal Log No. 13-3607, dated November 

7, 2013, see supra Parts I(B)(3)(c) and II(B)(2)(m); appeal Log No. 00777, dated February 

14, 2013, see supra Parts I(B)(4) and II(B)(2)(i); and Plaintiff’s unassigned appeals dated 

August 5, 2013 and August 21, 2013, see supra Parts I(B)(5)(a)-(b) and II(B)(2)(l). (ECF 

No. 1-2 at 90-91.) On January 13, 2014, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected the appeal 

at the First Level of review for non-compliance with California Code of Regulations 

§ 3084.6(b)(8) and with instruction to address his issues with each appeal separately. (Id.

at 92.) 

 The Court finds that Defendants are unable to satisfy their burden of proving that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. First, as with appeal Log No. 

13-3607, see supra Part II(B)(2)(m), the Briggs declaration’s omission of appeal Log No. 

14-104 is problematic in that there is uncontroverted evidence that Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez rejected the appeal on January 13, 2014. The Court has serious concerns as to the 

reliability of the Briggs declaration as it fails to account for the existence of multiple 

appeals that RJD staff accepted, processed, and rejected at the First Level of review. 

Second, and more importantly, despite the fact that the appeal alleged improperly handling 

by Defendants Olson and Ramirez, among others, it was Defendants Olson and Ramirez 

that rejected the appeal at the First Level of review. As discussed above in connection with 

appeal Log Nos. 12-2759 and 13-00372, see supra Parts II(B)(2)(d) and II(B)(2)(h), this 

violation of California Code of Regulations § 3084.7(d)(1)(A)’s prohibition of appeal 

review performed by staff involved in the event or decision being appealed demonstrates a 

genuine and material factual dispute over whether Plaintiff should be excused from the 

exhaustion requirement as to this appeal. 

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 In conclusion, Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative concerning Plaintiff’s conspiracy and 

retaliation claims against Defendants Benyard, Olson, Paramo, and Ramirez arising out of 

their handling of Plaintiff’s administrative appeals identified in appeal Log No. 14-104. 

 o. January 21, 2014 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned) 

 On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed an appeal that was never assigned a log number 

in which he alleged the ACO failed to timely respond to his grievances rendering 

administrative remedies futile, unavailable, or inadequate. Plaintiff referenced his two 

prior attempts to address this issue, on November 7, 2013, appeal Log No. 13-3607, and 

on December 11, 2013, appeal Log No. 14-104. (ECF No. 1-2 at 95-96.) Plaintiff alleges 

he never received a response to his January 21, 2014 appeal. (ECF No. 48 at 7:14-15.) 

 Not only is Plaintiff unable to show that he exhausted this appeal to the Third Level 

of review, the appeal did not identify any specific individual as required by the applicable 

regulations. See 15 CAL. CODE. REGS. § 3084.2(a)(3). Rather, the appeal only made 

allegations against the ACO. However, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff 

could have identified the name of the individuals engaging in misconduct because the 

appeal was based on administrative responses received by Plaintiff that specifically 

identified the responding officials. See Parks, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70602, at *12. 

 In conclusion, Plaintiff’s January 21, 2014 appeal33 fails to adequately identify any 

individual Defendant and, therefore, this appeal is not properly exhausted. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

                                                                

33 The Court notes there is a material dispute as to whether Plaintiff ever submitted his 

October 30, 2012 appeal. The prison records do not reflect its existence. But Plaintiff 

alleges under penalty of perjury that he did. While this genuine factual dispute could 

preclude summary judgment as to this claim, see supra Part II(B)(2)(a), summary judgment 

is nevertheless warranted because the appeal fails to identify any specific Defendant, in 

violation of the applicable prison appeal regulations. 

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 p. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Specifically, the Court concludes that Defendants have satisfied their burden of providing 

undisputed evidence that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to 

the following: 

• Conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendant Abad; 

• Due process claims against Defendants Behra, Cavazos, and Paramo; 

• Equal protection claim against all Defendants except Defendants Benyard, 

Cavazos, and Paramo; and 

• Cruel and unusual punishment claim against all Defendants 

 Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted on these claims as against these 

Defendants only. As to all remaining claims and Defendants, genuine issues of material 

fact preclude summary judgment. 

C. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

conspiracy, retaliation, due process, equal protection, or cruel and unusual punishment; 

(2) Plaintiff’s claims related to his rules violation and hearing are barred by Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (3) Defendants are protected by absolute immunity under 

the Eleventh Amendment from liability for damages in their official capacities; and 

(4) Defendants are protected by qualified immunity from liability for damages in their 

individual capacities. (ECF No. 35 at 2:1-9.) 

1. Legal Standards 

 a. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 

 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive 

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merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion 

to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, courts may consider exhibits that are attached to the complaint. See FED. R. CIV.

P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the 

pleading for all purposes.”); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of 

the complaint may be considered” in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (citing 

Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978))). However, 

exhibits that contradict the allegations of a complaint may fatally undermine the 

complaint’s allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by including . . . details contrary 

to his claims.” (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 

1998) (“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are 

contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”))). 

 “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). This precludes consideration of 

“new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss 

brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (“The ‘new’ allegations contained in the inmates’ 

opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. In determining the 

propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a 

plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss.” (citations omitted)). 

 A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ 

[Citation omitted.] A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

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misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556, 570). 

 “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 

(citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986) (on motion to dismiss, court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.”). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). 

 Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 

a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 

to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 

of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when plaintiffs have 

not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must 

be dismissed.”)). 

 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual 

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 

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962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

 b. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions 

 “In a civil rights case where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim–Panahi 

v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may 

not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 

of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim 

under § 1983). 

 Nevertheless, a court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless 

it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights 

complaint may be dismissed, the Court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24. But where amendment of 

a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. James 

v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 

2. Analysis

 a. Conspiracy 

 i. Applicable Law

 To allege a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts with 

sufficient particularity to show an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) 

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(en banc); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998); Woodrum v. Woodward 

Cnty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “To be liable, each participant in the 

conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least 

share the common objective of the conspiracy.” United Steelworkers, 865 F.2d at 1540-

41. 

 Pleading a conspiracy requires more than a conclusory allegation that the defendants 

conspired to deprive a plaintiff’s civil rights. The Ninth Circuit applies a heightened 

pleading standard to conspiracy claims under § 1983 and has held that mere conclusory 

allegations of conspiracy (i.e., bare allegations that a defendant “conspired” with another) 

are insufficient to state a claim. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 

1997); Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, “[t]o 

state a claim for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under section 1983, the 

plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns 

v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & 

Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1987)); Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. A plaintiff can 

meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging “which defendants conspired, how they 

conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights even 

though he does not identify which officer said or did what at a particular time.” Harris, 

126 F.3d at 1196. Further, because conspiracies, by their very nature, are secret 

agreements, “[a] defendant’s knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be 

inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the defendant’s actions.” 

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States 

v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987)); cf. United Steelworkers, 865 F.2d at 

1547 (circumstantial evidence of “[t]he ability and opportunity to conspire” is, standing 

alone, insufficient). 

 ii. Analysis 

 Defendants contend that notwithstanding Plaintiff’s allegations that all Defendants 

engaged in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights, Plaintiff “fail[s] to allege the 

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kinds of facts that are required to establish a conspiracy. (ECF No. 35-1 at 14:26-28.) 

Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to allege facts (a) showing an agreement 

among the Defendants; (b) showing that Defendants ever met together; (c) from which an 

inference could be drawn that Defendants agreed to violate his rights; (d) showing that 

Defendants had a shared objective; or (e) that Defendants even had the ability or 

opportunity to conspire about anything. (Id. at 15:21-27.) Rather, Defendants allege 

Plaintiff “has done nothing more than allege a series of unrelated events, along with a 

conclusion, unsupported by any facts, that these unrelated events occurred because the 

Defendants conspired against him. That is not enough to establish a conspiracy.” (Id. at 

15:27-16:2.) 

 Plaintiff argues in his opposition that his Complaint adequately alleged a conspiracy 

claim against all of the Defendants because he alleged: (a) Defendants are law enforcement 

officials that held meetings to encourage an ongoing campaign of harassment and 

unauthorized punishment of Plaintiff; (b) Defendants shared a common objective to deny 

Plaintiff the full benefit of the law and they acted in concert to accomplish an unlawful 

objective; (c) Defendants’ actions were done with malice and the intent to injure Plaintiff’s 

parole hearing scheduled in 2014; and (d) circumstantial evidence exists allowing the Court 

to infer that Defendants had the ability and opportunity to conspire against Plaintiff. (ECF 

No. 46 at 19:16-21:14.) 

 In their reply, Defendants contend Plaintiff has done nothing more than reiterate the 

conclusory allegations contained within the Complaint. Defendants argue: 

Although [Plaintiff] claims that some (but not all) of the Defendants met with 

other, un-identified Defendants, he states no facts from which the Court could 

infer that all sixteen Defendants shared and carried out an agreement to violate 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not point to any allegations in 

his Complaint that show which Defendants met with which other Defendants, 

the dates of those meetings, or the subject of those meetings. He does not 

point to any non-conclusory allegations in his Complaint that established, as 

required, that each Defendant at least shared the common objective of 

violating Plaintiff’s rights. [Citation.] He falls back on asserting that because 

Defendants are all law enforcement officials and because adverse actions were 

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taken against him, Defendants must have conspired against him, because they 

had the opportunity to do so. 

(ECF No. 51 at 6:16-19.) 

 Defendants also contend that as discussed elsewhere in their Motion to Dismiss, 

“Plaintiff also fail[s] to allege facts showing any actual violation of his constitutional rights, 

as required for a conspiracy.” (Id. at 7:7-9.) 

 As an initial matter, for the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees with 

Defendants that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts showing an actual violation of 

his constitutional rights. In addition, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ apparent 

position that in order to state a claim for conspiracy Plaintiff is required to allege facts from 

which the inference can be drawn that each and every one of the sixteen Defendants shared 

and carried out an agreement to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Pleading 

conspiracy is not an “all or nothing” endeavor. Rather, it is possible to sufficiently allege 

a conspiracy among some, but not all, of the Defendants. Further, it is possible to 

sufficiently allege a conspiracy among one Defendant and other non-party prison officials, 

even if Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a conspiracy claim against all of the remaining 

Defendants. 

 Having recognized that a plaintiff is not required to sufficiently plead conspiracy 

among each and every Defendant in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the Court finds 

that for all but three of the Defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and devoid of 

any specific facts on which the Court can infer a meeting of the minds and, thus, the 

existence of a conspiracy. Except as to Defendants Behra, Olson, and Ramirez, Plaintiff’s 

allegations amount to conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts that the 

Defendants conspired with one another to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 

Harris, 126 F.3d at 1195; Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. Allegations that Defendants took 

actions in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights are insufficient absent specific factual 

allegations showing an agreement to violate those rights. However, the Court concludes 

Plaintiff has adequately alleged a conspiracy claim against Defendants Behra, Olson, and 

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Ramirez. 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra and non-party officers Togafau and Cabrera 

planted controlled contraband in Plaintiff’s work area that ultimately led to Plaintiff getting 

fired from his prison laundry job. Further, Defendant Behra made specific statements to 

Plaintiff that he was being punished for continuing his prior civil rights lawsuit against 

Togafau and Cabrera. See supra Part I(B)(2). Although Plaintiff does not allege specific 

facts showing that Defendant Behara and Togafau and Cabrera had agreed to violate 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, such an agreement “may be inferred from circumstantial 

evidence and from evidence of [the alleged conspirators’] actions.” Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 

856-57 (citing Calabrese, 825 F.2d at 1348). Indeed, “a showing that the alleged 

conspirators have committed acts that ‘are unlikely to have been undertaken without an 

agreement’ may allow a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. 

v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (1999) (quoting Kunik v. Racine Cnty., 946 F.2d 

1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1991)). Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra and two non-party 

officers (Togafau and Cabrera) planted contraband in Plaintiff’s work area two days after 

Defendant Behra had threatened Plaintiff for prosecuting his prior lawsuit against Togafau 

and Cabrera and threatened to get him fired from his prison laundry job. Plaintiff further 

alleges Defendant Behra immediately detained Plaintiff after he found the contraband, and 

that he then informed Togafau, who then requested that Plaintiff be removed from his 

prison laundry job. These factual allegations are sufficient to permit the inference of the 

existence of a conspiracy between the three to retaliate against Plaintiff. “Whether 

defendants were involved in an unlawful conspiracy is generally a factual issue and should 

be resolved by the jury, ‘so long as there is a possibility that the jury can infer from the 

circumstances (that the alleged conspirators) had a meeting of the minds and thus reached 

a[n] understanding’ to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.” Id. at 1301-02 (quoting 

Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 621 (7th Cir. 1970), reversed in part on other 

grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)). 

/ / / 

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 Plaintiff also alleges sufficient facts on which an inference can be drawn that 

Defendants Olson and Ramirez agreed to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s 

Complaint repeatedly alleges that Defendants Olson and Ramirez improperly rejected 

and/or cancelled Plaintiff’s administrative appeals in order to retaliate against Plaintiff’s 

exercise of his right to access the courts. Moreover, as the various screening letters 

demonstrate, Defendants Olson and Ramirez jointly screened out Plaintiff’s appeals. See, 

e.g., supra Parts I(B)(2)(f)-(g). Even absent any specific factual allegation of agreement, 

these joint actions are sufficient to permit the inference that Defendants Olson and Ramirez 

agreed to retaliate against Plaintiff. 

 In conclusion, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against Defendants Behra, Olson, and Ramirez should be 

DENIED, but that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against the 

other thirteen Defendants should be GRANTED with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1127 (pro se litigants entitled to leave to amend complaint “unless [the court] determines 

that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (citing Noll, 

809 F.2d at 1447)). 

 b. Retaliation 

 i. Applicable Law

 The Constitution provides protection against “[d]eliberate retaliation” by prison 

officials against an inmate’s exercise of his right to petition for redress of grievances. 

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Franco v. 

Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988) (intentional obstruction of the right to seek redress 

“is precisely the sort of oppression that . . . section 1983 [is] intended to remedy.”); 

Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm’n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986)). 

Indeed, “[o]f fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment ‘right[s] to file 

prison grievances,’ Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to ‘pursue civil 

rights litigation in the courts.’ Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995).” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Soranno’s Gasco, 874 

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F.2d at 1314 (“The right of access to the courts is subsumed under the first amendment 

right to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. 

v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); Harrison, 780 F.2d at 1427-28). 

“Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable 

mechanism to remedy prison injustices. And because purely retaliatory actions taken 

against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those 

protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying 

misconduct they are designed to shield.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 

65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment 

is ‘clearly established law’ in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes. That 

retaliatory actions by prison officials are cognizable under § 1983 has also been widely 

accepted in other circuits.”)). 

 Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his 

First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. 

Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000);

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“A prisoner suing 

prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against 

for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance 

legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.”)). 

 Because retaliation by prison officials may chill an inmate’s exercise of his 

legitimate First Amendment rights, such conduct is actionable even if it would not 

otherwise rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 

828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989). However, “[r]etaliation is not established simply by showing 

adverse activity by a defendant after protected speech; rather, Plaintiff must allege 

sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a nexus between the two.” Rojo v. Paramo, No. 

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13cv2237, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80156, at *12-13 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (citing 

Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest 

on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of 

this”)). “Thus, while ‘the timing and nature’ of an allegedly adverse action can ‘properly 

be considered’ as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent, the official alleged to have 

retaliated must also be alleged to have been aware of the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Id.

at *13 (quoting Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1315-16; Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“[T]iming 

can properly be considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.”); see also 

Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that “mere speculation that 

defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient” and affirming summary judgment 

where the record contained “nothing . . . to indicate [defendant] even knew about [an] 

earlier [law]suit.”)). Moreover, a plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a 

“substantial” or “motivating” factor in the defendant’s decision to act. Soranno’s Gasco, 

874 F.2d at 1314. 

 ii. Analysis

 (1) Defendant Behra 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra retaliated against him by planting controlled 

contraband in his work space and, after Plaintiff approached the contraband and was 

searched, Defendant Behra stated “I told you I was going to get you,” in reference to a 

threat made two days before when Defendant Behra stated, “If you continue this crap law 

suite [sic] . . . I’ll make sure you get fired, and placed in AD-SEG and transferred out of 

R.J,” and “I know a lot of people.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 7.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant 

Behra subsequently issued a disciplinary report falsely stating that Plaintiff was out of 

bounds and attempting to steal property and that Plaintiff was ultimately terminated from 

his prison laundry job as a result of this false disciplinary report. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra’s threats and harassment were done in retaliation for 

Plaintiff having filed his prior lawsuit and that the false disciplinary report was made in 

order to justify the wrongful termination. 

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 Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to allege “facts to show that Officer Behra wrote 

this report because of Plaintiff’s exercise of protected conduct, or that the report chilled his 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, or that Officer Behra did not have a legitimate 

correctional goal in writing the report, all of which have to be shown, under Rhodes.” (ECF 

No. 35-1 at 16:27-17:3.) Defendants also contend Plaintiff alleged no “facts to show why 

Officer Behra would be motivated by [Plaintiff’s prior] lawsuit to retaliate against 

Plaintiff.” (Id. at 17:7-8.) Although Defendants correctly note that Defendant Behra was 

not a defendant in Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, their argument ignores Plaintiff’s allegations. 

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, Defendant Behra 

expressly threatened to retaliate against Plaintiff for having brought his prior lawsuit. Thus, 

even though the lawsuit was not against Defendant Behra, and even though Plaintiff has 

not alleged why Defendant Behra would be motivated to retaliate against Plaintiff, Plaintiff 

has alleged sufficient facts showing that Defendant Behra did take adverse actions against 

Plaintiff because Plaintiff had engaged in protected conduct. 

 Defendants also contend “there is a more logical explanation of why Defendant 

Behra write the disciplinary report: because Plaintiff actually was out of bounds attempting 

to steal property.” (Id. at 17:14-16.) However, this argument ignores Plaintiff’s factual 

allegations and attempts to resolve a factual dispute at the pleading stage. In Parrish v. 

Solis, No. 11-CV-01438, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65827, *23-26 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014), 

the court addressed this same argument in a case where the plaintiff alleged the defendants 

had planted scissors in his legal file. The defendants argued in their motion to dismiss that 

“‘any alleged retaliatory motive could not have been the substantial motivating factor 

behind [defendant’s] decision to issue the disciplinary charge’ because Plaintiff’s very 

possession of the sharpened scissors is a ‘sufficient reason to issue the disciplinary 

charge.’” Id. at *24. The court concluded that this “argument fails because it is irrelevant 

at the motion to dismiss stage. In other words, Defendants’ argument ignores Plaintiff’s 

factual allegations and attempts solely to dispute the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, and factual disputes are not properly resolved in a motion to dismiss.” Id.

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(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility 

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”)). Here, Defendants are similarly 

attempting to resolve factual disputes in their favor at the motion to dismiss stage. 

Defendants argue that the documents attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint showing a logical 

alternative explanation for Defendant Behra’s disciplinary report contradict Plaintiff’s 

allegations and, thus, the Court should not assume the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations 

but, instead, should consider “obvious alternative explanations” for the conduct. However, 

at this stage of the litigation the Court should not disregard Plaintiff’s allegation that 

Defendant Behra’s report contained false statements simply because Defendants contend 

the statements are true. In addition, given Defendant Behra’s alleged threats toward 

Plaintiff, “judicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, does not compel 

the conclusion that Defendant Behra’s adverse actions are more likely the result of 

legitimate alternative explanations.34

 Defendants also argue Defendant “Behra had a legitimate correctional reason for 

writing the report: to make prison authorities aware of unlawful conduct by an inmate.” 

(ECF No. 35-1 at 18:8-10.) Again, however, the Court assumes the veracity of Plaintiff’s 

allegations that he was not out of bound or attempting to steal property and that Defendant 

Behra’s contrary statements in his report were false. These allegations are sufficient to 

                                                                

34 Defendants often cite to Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1056 

(9th Cir. 2011), in their analysis of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. However, that case did 

not involve retaliation claims by a prisoner against prison officials. As a result, it does not 

undergo an analysis of the elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context set forth in 

Rhodes. Because a prisoner’s “allegations of retaliation for [engaging in protected 

conduct] are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that [the prisoner] plead the absence of a 

legitimate penological purpose for the retaliatory action,” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 

1167, 1171 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289), the Court finds that 

Defendants’ repeated efforts to explain away alleged retaliatory conduct by arguing a 

logical explanation exists for Defendants’ allegedly improper actions are inappropriate at 

the pleading stage. 

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satisfy the final Rhodes requirement that the disputed actions did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. Allowing a prison official to make false accusations against 

an inmate as a pretext for wrongfully terminating the inmate’s job in no way advances a 

legitimate correctional goal. 

 Finally, Defendants argue “Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that his First 

Amendment rights were chilled in any way as a result of Officer Behra’s disciplinary 

report, or that as a result of Officer Behra’s report he was unable to file grievances. Indeed, 

the documents attached to his Complaint show that he liberally exercised his right to file 

grievances.” (Id. at 18:18-22.) Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive. “[A]t the pleading 

stage, [the Ninth Circuit has] never required a litigant, per impossibile, to demonstrate a 

total chilling of his First Amendment rights to file grievances and to pursue civil rights 

litigation in order to perfect a retaliation claim. Speech can be chilled even when not 

completely silenced.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. Rather, “the proper First Amendment 

inquiry asks ‘whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness 

from future First Amendment activities.’” Id. (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 

1300). “Because ‘it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability for a First 

Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his 

protected activity,’ [a plaintiff] does not have to demonstrate that his speech was ‘actually 

inhibited or suppressed.’” Id. at 569 (quoting Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1300). 

Instead, a plaintiff need only allege “that his First Amendment rights were chilled, though 

not necessarily silenced.” Id. The Court finds Plaintiff satisfies the “chilling effect” 

Rhodes element.35

 In conclusion, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra took an adverse action against him 

(i.e., issuing a false disciplinary report) because of Plaintiff’s protected conduct (i.e., 

                                                                

35 Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to plead this element as against most of the 

Defendants. The Court does not address this element each time it is raised, as the Court 

believes Plaintiff’s allegations of “chilling effect” are sufficiently plead as against all 

Defendants. 

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pursuing his prior civil rights lawsuit), that Defendant Behra’s actions would chill a person 

of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities, and that the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff has adequately plead a 

retaliation claim against Defendant Behra. 

 (2) Defendants Paramo and Suglich 

 Defendants contend Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendants Praramo and Suglich 

took any adverse action against Plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff alleges that, in connection with his unassigned October 30, 2012 appeal, 

Defendant Suglich “personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional 

right, conspired and retaliated against the Plaintiff by refusing to process Plaintiff 

grievances in order to cover up misconduct, knew of the alleged deprivation and failed to 

act to prevent them, when thre [sic] is a duty to do so.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff’s 

allegation that Defendant Suglich refused to process Plaintiff grievances is sufficient to 

satisfy Rhodes’ “adverse action” requirement. 

 Defendants contend Plaintiff’s Complaint and an accompanying document (see ECF 

No. 1-1 at 68) actually contradict his claim against Defendant Suglich because they 

demonstrate that Plaintiff met with Defendant Suglich to address Plaintiff’s concern about 

the timely processing of his grievances. However, that Plaintiff met with Defendant 

Suglich to discuss the untimely processing of Plaintiff’s grievances does not necessarily 

contradict Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Suglich refused to process Plaintiff’s 

grievances. Defendant Suglich explained there had been a slight delay in the processing 

of appeals due to changes within the Inmate Appeals Office, and he assured Plaintiff the 

Inmate Appeals Office was not ignoring any appeals and that the appeals are processed in 

the order they are received. (Id.) However, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Suglich 

stems from the alleged mishandling of his October 30, 2012 appeal. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 23.) 

That appeal was never processed. While the parties may dispute Plaintiff’s claim that this 

appeal was ever submitted, Plaintiff alleges it was and that Defendant Suglich refused to 

process it. 

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 As for Defendant Paramo, Defendants contend the only allegation against him 

relates to the letter he sent to Plaintiff in which he summarized Plaintiff’s meeting with 

Defendant Suglich, and that this letter does not amount to an adverse action. However, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint and the appeals attached thereto are replete with claims by Plaintiff 

that Defendant Paramo refused to properly process Plaintiff’s grievances. See, e.g., supra

Part I(B)(6)(a). These allegations are sufficient to meet the first element of the Rhodes test. 

 Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to meet the second through fifth elements under 

Rhodes simply because he fails to meet the first element. Having found Plaintiff satisfied 

the first element as to Defendants Paramo and Suglich, the Court is left with no argument 

from Defendants as to the remaining elements. Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim against Defendants Paramo and Suglich is unwarranted. 

 (3) Defendants Olson and Ramirez 

 Defendants do not contend Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez took adverse actions against them. Plaintiff’s extensive allegations that they 

screened out many of his grievances is sufficient to meet the first Rhodes element. Rather, 

Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that Plaintiff’s prior lawsuit was 

the substantial or motivating factor behind the screening letters. The Court agrees. 

“Retaliation is not established simply by showing adverse activity by a defendant after 

protected speech; rather, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a nexus 

between the two.” Rojo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80156, at *12-13. Here, Plaintiff alleges 

no facts suggesting any nexus between his prior lawsuit and Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez’s adverse actions. However, Defendants’ argument ignores the fact that the prior 

lawsuit is not the only protected activity Plaintiff engaged in that could serve as a 

substantial or motivating factor in Defendant Olson and Ramirez’s adverse actions. 

Plaintiff also alleges numerous instances where he filed prison appeals against Defendants 

Olson and Ramirez due to their alleged mishandling of prior appeals. Defendants Olson 

and Ramirez were surely aware of these appeals against them, as they were the ACO staff 

members that later screened them out. See id. at *13 (“[T]he official alleged to have 

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retaliated must also be alleged to have been aware of the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” 

(citations omitted)). This is sufficient to satisfy the “because of” element of the Rhodes

test. 

 Defendants also contend Plaintiff’s grievances were screened out for legitimate 

reasons and it was Plaintiff that failed to correct the deficiencies in his appeals. Thus, “if 

[Plaintiff’s] access to the grievance system was obstructed in any way, he was the one who 

obstructed it.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 20:9-21:16.) Defendants thus ask the Court to disregard 

Plaintiff’s conflicting allegations. However, while some of the reasons for rejecting the 

appeals may ultimately be proven to be based on furthering legitimate penological goals, 

as the Court’s earlier exhaustion analysis demonstrates, there are disputed issues as to 

whether several of Plaintiff’s appeals should have been rejected and whether certain 

instructions given to Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies were adequate. Plaintiff has alleged 

his appeals were rejected for an improper purpose and the Complaint contains enough facts 

to plausibly suggest they were. A prisoner’s “allegations of retaliation for the filing of 

grievances are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that [the prisoner] plead the absence of 

a legitimate penological purpose for the retaliatory action.” Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 n.3 

(citing Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289). 

 Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez is unwarranted. 

 (4) Defendant Benyard 

 Defendants concede that Plaintiff alleges Defendant Benyard took various adverse 

actions against him, including (1) as a member of the UCC, he declined to make a 

determination that Plaintiff had been wrongfully terminated from his job; (2) he retained 

Plaintiff in Ad-Seg following his return from the hospital; (3) he issued an allegedly false 

RVR against Plaintiff accusing Plaintiff of instigating the fight with Mayorga; and (4) as 

Defendants Rutledge and Zuniga’s supervisor, he participated with them in depriving 

Plaintiff of his personal property. (ECF No. 35-1 at 21:19-22:2.) In addition to these 

adverse actions recognized by Defendants, Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges Defendant 

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Benyard failed for more than fourteen months to provide him with a Classification 

Committee hearing, despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 27.) 

 Defendants initially argue Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to show his prior lawsuit 

was the substantial motivating factor behind any of Defendant Benyard’s actions. This is 

true. The Complaint lacks any facts suggesting a nexus between the prior lawsuit and 

Defendant Benyard’s actions. However, the prior lawsuit is not the only protected activity 

taken by Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that he filed an appeal alleging discrimination by 

Defendant Benyard against minority inmates with respect to job assignments for inmatebarbers. Plaintiff alleges this prior appeal was the reason Defendant Benyard decided to 

keep him in Ad-Seg and that the reasons offered by Defendant Benyard were “a mere 

pretext for the unlawful retaliation.” Similarly, Plaintiff alleged the discrimination 

complaint was the reason Defendant Benyard instructed Defendant Zuniga to deprive him 

of his personal property. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 29-30, 35; ECF No. 1-1 at 112-17.) Thus, the 

Court finds Plaintiff has adequately satisfied the “because of” element of the Rhodes

retaliation test. 

 Defendants next argue that Defendant Benyard had legitimate reasons for all of his 

actions. As noted, however, a prisoner’s “allegations of retaliation for the filing of 

grievances are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that [the prisoner] plead the absence of 

a legitimate penological purpose for the retaliatory action.” Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 n.3 

(citing Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289). Thus, while there may be legitimate reasons for 

Defendant Benyard’s actions, that matter should be resolved at summary judgment or trial 

rather than at the pleading stage.36 

                                                                

36 With respect to the RVR, Defendants contend the document actually refutes 

Plaintiff’s allegations because it states that Plaintiff admitted to instigating the fight with 

Mayorga and, thus, there is an obvious and logical alternative explanation for Defendant 

Benyard’s RVR. However, the explanation is not as obvious as Defendants would like. 

Plaintiff claims he never made any incriminating statement, and his exhibits support that 

position. Specifically, officer Hodge, who was present during the February 4, 2013 AdSeg hearing conducted by Defendant Benyard, testified that he did not hear Plaintiff make 

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 The Court does agree with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to state a retaliation 

claim against Defendant Benyard based on his instruction to Defendant Zuniga to pack 

Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Benyard ordered Defendant 

Zuniga to lose or otherwise mishandle Plaintiff’s property, and there are no factual 

allegations suggesting Defendant Benyard was aware of Defendant Zuniga’s allegedly 

improper conduct.37 That said, however, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is properly based on 

other conduct by Defendant Benyard, as discussed above. 

 Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Benyard is 

unwarranted. 

 (5) Defendants Abad and Cavazos 

 Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that his exercise 

of protected conduct was the substantial motivating factor behind the actions taken by 

Defendants Abad and Cavazos. (ECF No. 35-1 at 24:6-13.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff 

alleges Defendants Abad and Cavazos, as members of the UCC, declined to make a 

determination that Plaintiff had been wrongfully terminated from his job. (ECF No. 1 at 

¶ 27.) Plaintiff also alleges he had previously notified Defendant Abad of his request for 

a Classification Committee review but that Defendant Abad did not timely respond to this 

request. (ECF No. 1-1 at 79-80, 83.) However, the Complaint lacks any factual allegations 

that Defendants Abad or Cavazos took these allegedly adverse actions because of 

                                                                

any statements admitting to instigating the fight. (ECF No. 1-2 at 78-79.) This is a factual 

dispute unsuited for resolution at the pleading stage. 

37 As a result, Plaintiff cannot establish a retaliation claim against Defendant Benyard 

based on supervisor liability. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (the 

Ninth Circuit has “long permitted plaintiffs to hold supervisors individually liable in § 1983 

suits when culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.”); Redman v. Cnty. 

of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“The law clearly allows 

actions against supervisors under section 1983 as long as a sufficient causal connection is 

present and the plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally secured right.” 

(quoting McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 695 (10th Cir. 1979))). 

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Plaintiff’s exercise of protected activity. There is no factual allegation connecting these 

two Defendants to Plaintiff’s prior civil rights lawsuit, nor is there any factual allegation 

suggesting Plaintiff filed prior grievances against them. Although Plaintiff alleges he 

engaged in certain protected speech and that Defendants Abad and Cavazos later took 

adverse actions against him, Plaintiff fails to “allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a 

nexus between the two.” Rojo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80156, at *12-13. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Abad and 

Cavazos should be granted. 

 (6) Defendant Zuniga 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Zuniga performed an inventory of Plaintiff’s personal 

property on January 18, 2013 after Plaintiff was sent to the hospital following his fight with 

Mayorga, and that in the process of packing up Plaintiff’s property Defendant Zuniga lost 

and/or gave away some of his property. Plaintiff alleges inmate Garcia observed Defendant 

Zuniga set aside certain items and that when Garcia inquired why they were not being kept 

with Plaintiff’s other property Defendant Zuniga responded, “No fuck that, he [referring to 

Plaintiff] 602 us so we’re going to teach him a lesson.” Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

Zuniga’s actions were done in retaliation for Plaintiff previously filing a CDCR Form 602 

appeal against Defendant Zuniga and others alleging a delay in notifying that his mother 

was waiting for him in the visiting room resulting in only a seven-minute visit with his 

mother. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Zuniga’s description of his television on the 

inventory form is inconsistent with his later testimony that the television was inoperable. 

(ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 28-30, 32, 35, 37; ECF No. 1-1 at 97-99, 112-17, 122; ECF No. 1-2 at 

13, 21.) 

 Defendants contend the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not indicate what happened with 

the television after it left Plaintiff’s cell and, as a result, the Court would have to speculate 

that Defendant Zuniga intentionally and wrongfully confiscated the television. Defendants 

also contend a more obvious and logical explanation is that the television was simply lost 

when it was co-mingled with other inmates’ property in the R&R department. (ECF No. 

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35-1 at 25:22-27.) The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant 

Zuniga is not based solely on the allegations pertaining to the television, but also based on 

Defendant Zuniga allegedly losing and/or giving away some of Plaintiff’s personal items. 

Plaintiff also alleges that when Defendant Zuniga was questioned about not keeping all of 

his property together, he responded by stating he was going to teach Plaintiff a lesson for 

having submitted a prior appeal against Defendant Zuniga. These facts are sufficient to 

meet the Rhodes retaliation test. Moreover, even if the allegations regarding the television 

were the sole basis for Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Zuniga, Plaintiff has 

alleged facts showing Defendant initially indicated on the property inventory form that 

Plaintiff’s television was operable but that he later stated that it was inoperable when sent 

it to R&R. As noted above, Defendants’ effort to explain away their conduct by arguing 

there exists a more obvious and logical explanation38 is inappropriate where sufficient facts 

are alleged showing the absence of a legitimate penological purpose. 

 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against 

Defendant Zuniga should be denied. 

 (7) Defendant Rutledge 

 Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that his exercise 

of protected conduct was the substantial motivating factor behind the actions taken by 

Defendant Rutledge. (ECF No. 35-1 at 26:17-23.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant Rutledge interviewed him in connection with his claim that Defendant Zuniga 

deprived him of his personal property, but that Defendant Rutledge denied Plaintiff’s 

request that he interview the inmate witnesses that observed Defendant Zuniga 

intentionally misplacing Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff alleged this refusal was done to 

                                                                

38 Defendants’ “more obvious and logical explanation,” i.e., that Plaintiff’s television 

was simply lost, is neither obvious or logical in light of the conflicting evidence in the 

record that (a) the prison admitted to losing the television and (b) Defendant Alvarez’s 

representation that the television was being confiscated because it had been altered from 

its original state. 

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retaliate for Plaintiff having filed grievances against other prison staff and to cover up 

misconduct by other staff. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-2 at 10.) However, the 

Complaint lacks any factual allegations that Defendant Rutledge denied Plaintiff’s request 

to interview witnesses because of Plaintiff’s exercise of protected activity. Plaintiff’s 

allegations are wholly conclusory and insufficient. Although Plaintiff alleges he engaged 

in certain protected speech and that Defendant Rutledge later took an adverse action against 

him, Plaintiff fails to “allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a nexus between the two.” 

Rojo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80156, at *12-13. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendant Rutledge should be granted. 

(8) Defendants Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Jones, and Spence 

 Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Jones, 

and Spence fail for the same reasons as his retaliation claims against Defendants Abad, 

Cavazos, and Rutledge. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Allamby denied his request for certain 

witnesses and evidence during the RVR re-hearing pertaining to Defendant Benyard’s 

fighting RVR. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Alvarez improperly 

confiscated Plaintiff’s television after concluding that it had been altered from its original 

state and was therefore improper contraband. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

Cortez and Jones gave false testimony against Plaintiff at the RVR re-hearing conducted 

by Defendant Allamby. (ECF No. 2 at 84-85.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spence denied 

Plaintiff’s request for certain witnesses and evidence in connection with his hearing 

following Plaintiff’s fighting RVR issued by Defendant Benyard. (Id. at 107, 109.) 

However, there are no non-conclusory factual allegations suggesting why Defendants 

Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Jones, or Spence would have retaliated against Plaintiff. The 

Complaint lacks any facts plausibly suggesting a nexus between these Defendants’ conduct 

and Plaintiff’s exercise of protected activity. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Jones, and 

Spence should be granted. 

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 (9) Defendant Hernandez 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any specific factual allegations against Defendant 

Hernandez other than that Defendant Hernandez supervised and approved the wrongful 

conduct of others. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 50.) “A supervisory official . . . may be liable under 

Section 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there 

was a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.” Henry v. Sanchez, 923 F. Supp. 1266, 1272 (C.D. Cal. 1996) 

(citing Redman, 942 F.2d at 1446-47; Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any specific factual allegations against Defendant 

Hernandez that would permit a retaliation claim to proceed against him based on a theory 

of supervisory liability. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim against Defendant Hernandez should be granted. 

 (10) Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims should be (1) GRANTED as against Defendants 

Abad, Allamby, Alvarez, Cavazos, Cortez, Hernandez, Jones, Rutledge, and Spence, and 

(2) DENIED as against Defendants Behra, Benyard, Olson, Paramo, Ramirez, Suglich, 

and Zuniga. Because it is not apparent that amendment would be futile, denial should be 

without prejudice. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

 c. Due Process 

 i. Applicable Law

 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The 

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). “To state a procedural due process claim, [a 

plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.’” Wright v. 

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Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 

F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

 ii. Analysis 

 Defendants contend, and Plaintiff appears to concede in his opposition, that 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violation of his due process rights in connection with the 

following: (1) Classification Committee hearings concerning the termination from his job; 

(2) hearings on the fighting charge; and (3) deprivation of his personal property. (See ECF 

No. 35-1 at 31:10-34:25; ECF No. 46 at 36:15-19.) However, the Complaint also clearly 

alleges violations of Plaintiff’s due process rights in connection with certain Defendants’ 

processing of his inmate grievances. The Court will address this issue first before 

addressing the three issues briefed by the parties. 

 (1) Inmate Grievances 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants, including Defendants Olson and Ramirez, “refus[ed] to 

process Plaintiff’s grievances, using tactics of intentionally delaying process, rejecting 

without fundament [sic] grievances, cancel erroneously, claiming that they has [sic] not 

receive[d] grievances after submitted to there [sic] office.” (ECF No. 1 at 10:17-20.) 

 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that prisoners have no protected property 

interest in an inmate grievance procedure arising directly from the Due Process Clause. 

See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]nmates lack a separate 

constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” (citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the due process clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment creates “no legitimate claim of entitlement to a [prison] grievance 

procedure”))). In addition, “[t]he existence of an inmate appeals process does not create a 

protected liberty interest upon which Plaintiff may base a claim that he was denied a 

particular result or that the appeals process was deficient.” Moore v. Brown, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 55935, *8-9 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860; Mann, 855 

F.2d at 640). 

/ / / 

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 In Moten v. Adams, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 922131 (E.D. Cal. 2010), the plaintiff 

brought claims against prison officials arising out of their participation in the processing 

of his inmate grievances. Id. at *9-10. The plaintiff alleged that the manner in which 

defendants processed and/or answered his grievances violated his due process rights, 

denied him equal protection and failed to provide him unbiased review. Id. at *10. 

However, the court dismissed the complaint for failing to state a claim because “[a] prison’s 

grievance process ‘is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon 

the inmates.’” Id. at *10 (quoting Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)). 

“An improperly processed inmate grievance does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 

that implicates the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). 

 Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging a due process claim against any of the 

Defendants due to their processing of Plaintiff’s administrative grievances, Plaintiff fails 

to state a claim. 

(2) Classification Committee Hearings and Job Termination 

 Defendants first contend Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim based 

on the UCC’s decision to decline to address whether Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated 

from his job because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in his prison job. (ECF No. 35-1 at 

31:19-32:10.) The Court agrees. “[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

‘does not create a property or liberty interest in prison employment.’” Walker v. Gomez, 

370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th 

Cir. 1986) (per curiam)) (citing Baumann v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th 

Cir. 1985)). Thus, because Plaintiff has no property or liberty interest in prison 

employment, the Court need not reach the issue of what process is due. 

 Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a due process claim based on the UCC’s 

decision not to address whether Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from his job 

assignment. 

/ / / 

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 (3) Hearings on Fighting RVR 

 Defendants next contend Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim based 

on the fighting RVR hearing and re-hearing; specifically, Defendants Spence and 

Allamby’s refusal to question certain witnesses and consider certain evidence. (ECF No. 

35-1 at 32:20-34:2.) 

 As to the re-hearing conducted by Defendant Allamby, Defendants contend the 

report from the hearing demonstrates that Defendant Allamby allowed Plaintiff’s requested 

witnesses and he allowed Plaintiff to question them. Defendants also contend the report 

demonstrates that Defendant Allamby denied Plaintiff’s request that the video-recording 

of his Ad-Seg hearing with Defendant Benyard be reviewed because no such video existed. 

Finally, Defendants contend the report shows that Defendant Allamby “denied Plaintiff’s 

request for Captain Benyard’s personnel records [to support Plaintiff’s contention that 

Defendant Benyard’s credibility is suspect] because the proper forum for making a charge 

of staff misconduct is through the 602 grievance system; it cannot be presented in the 

context of an appeal of a rules violation charge.” (See ECF No. 1-2 at 77-81.) 

 Plaintiff argues in opposition that although Defendant Allamby permitted the 

presence of some of Plaintiff’s requested witnesses, Defendant Allamby was not justified 

in denying the presence of the Staff Assistant assigned to assist Plaintiff during the Ad-Seg 

hearing during which, according to Defendant Benyard, Plaintiff made incriminating 

statements that he instigated the fight with Mayorga. (ECF No. 46 at 38:3-8.) However, 

Defendant Benyard’s RVR indicates that Plaintiff was not assigned a Staff Assistant during 

the Ad-Seg hearing. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 76.) Plaintiff’s opposition argument that 

Defendant Allamby refused to explain his decision not to call a Staff Assistant is similarly 

contradicted by Defendant Allamby’s final disposition report in which he expressly noted 

that no Staff Assistant had been assigned for the Ad-Seg hearing. (See id. at 81.) Thus, 

Plaintiff’s opposition argument that Defendant Allamby failed to state a reason for refusing 

to call witnesses is contradicted by the exhibits attached to his Complaint and, as a result, 

this allegation cannot form the basis of a valid due process claim. Moreover, because 

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Defendant Allamby expressly stated his reason in his written report, Plaintiff received the 

due process to which he is entitled. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 492 (1985) 

(recognizing “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 

prison officials at some point state their reason for refusing to call witnesses requested by 

an inmate at a disciplinary hearing.”). 

 Plaintiff next argues he was denied due process because Defendant Benyard, the 

issuer of the allegedly false fighting RVR, was the supervisor reviewer of Defendant 

Allamby’s disposition and was the chairperson of the UCC that later confirmed his guilty 

finding. (ECF No. 46 at 38:26-39:12; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 85, ECF No. 1-2 at 75.) 

However, as Defendants’ correctly note in their reply, these allegations expand beyond the 

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint and are properly disregarded. “In 

determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum of points and authorities 

in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 (citing 

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

 With respect to the initial RVR hearing before Defendant Spence, Defendants 

contend that because Plaintiff was afforded due process at the re-hearing, “any problem he 

complained of about the first hearing that was correctable was in fact corrected in the 

second hearing.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 33:11-13.) The Court agrees. “[T]here is no due 

process violation when a procedural error is corrected through the administrative process.” 

Carrea v. California, No. EDCV 07-1148-CAS (MAN), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107902, 

at *52-53 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Morrisette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (“There is no denial of due process if the error the inmate complains of is 

corrected in the administrative appeal process.”); Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F. Supp. 1405, 

1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“The administrative appeal is considered part of the process 

afforded, and any error in the process can be corrected during that appeals process without 

necessarily subjecting prison officials to liability for procedural violations at lower 

levels.”); see also McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state 

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may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later procedural remedy; only when the 

state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a 

constitutional violation actionable under section 1983 arise.”). 

 Plaintiff’s due process claims related to his fighting RVR resulting in the imposition 

of a 90-day credit loss are also barred by the doctrine recognized in Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994). In that case, the Supreme Court held that: 

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would 

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks 

damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment 

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless 

the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been 

invalidated. 

Id. at 486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“Heck specifies that 

[one] cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the 

unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.”); Muhammad v. 

Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam) (“[W]here success in a prisoner’s § 1983 

damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, 

the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, 

opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”); Harvey v. Waldron, 

210 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under the Court’s holding in Heck, a § 1983 action 

that would call into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction or confinement is 

not cognizable[.]”); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 

(“Heck precludes a section 1983 claim based on actions which would ‘render a conviction 

or sentence invalid’ where that conviction has not been reversed, expunged or called into 

question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486)). 

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 In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court extended Heck’s 

favorable termination rule to prison disciplinary actions resulting in the loss of a prisoner’s 

good-time credits. In Edwards, the prisoner was found guilty of several prison infractions 

and sentenced to 10 days in isolation, 20 days in segregation, and he was deprived of 30 

days’ good-time credit he had previously earned toward his release. Id. at 643. The 

prisoner filed a § 1983 action requesting “a declaration that the procedures employed by 

state officials violated due process, compensatory and punitive damages for use of the 

unconstitutional procedures, an injunction to prevent future violations, and any other relief 

the court deems just and equitable.” Id. The Supreme Court held that his claim for 

declaratory and monetary relief necessarily implied the validity of the loss of good-time 

credits and, therefore, was not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 648. 

 Here, like in Edwards, “[t]he principal procedural defect complained of by [plaintiff] 

would, if established, necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time 

credits.” Id. at 646. Because Plaintiff has not established that this disciplinary finding has 

been invalidated, Plaintiff’s due process claims resulting from the fighting RVR hearing 

and re-hearing are barred.39

 Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a due process claim based on fighting RVR 

hearings. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

                                                                

39 Defendants argue that “to the extent that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim, retaliation 

claim, due-process claim, equal-protection claim, Eight[h] Amendment claim, or any of 

his claims arise out of the rules violation charge of fighting or out of the hearings on that 

charge, the claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 37:15-19.) The 

Court disagrees. Although Heck bars Plaintiff’s due process claim, Defendants have not 

explained why it should also bar the other claims arising from these facts when those claims 

do not raise procedural challenges. To put it differently, Defendants have not explained 

how Plaintiff’s success on the other claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of 

Plaintiff’s 90-day credit loss. 

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 (4) Deprivation of Personal Property 

Finally, Defendants contend Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Alvarez and 

Zuniga deprived him of his personal property, and that Defendant Rutledge refused to 

interview witnesses about the alleged property deprivation, fail to state a claim “because 

the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss of property.” (ECF 

No. 35-1 at 34:4-9.) 

 A claim of negligent or unauthorized deprivation of property by state officials does 

not state a federal cause of action under § 1983 if the plaintiff has an adequate postdeprivation state remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). California 

law provides that public employees are liable for injuries to prisoners proximately caused 

by the employees’ negligent or wrongful acts or omissions. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 844.6. 

California Government Code §§ 900-915 set out the procedure for making claims against 

public entities. California law thus provides an adequate state post-deprivation remedy for 

any personal property Plaintiff may have lost due to prison officials’ acts. Barnett, 31 F.3d 

at 817 (per curiam) (“California Law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for 

any property deprivations.” (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810-895)). 

 Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim based on his property deprivation 

allegations. 

 (5) Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims should be GRANTED. 

 d. Equal Protection 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint broadly asserts a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 

claim against all Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 56.) 

 i. Applicable Law 

 The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

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Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 

457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and 

arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its 

improper execution through duly constituted agents.’” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township 

of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)); see also Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 

U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). 

 Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to withstand a motion to 

dismiss, however, unless the plaintiff alleges facts which may prove invidious 

discriminatory intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 

252, 265 (1977). Therefore, when an equal protection violation is alleged, the plaintiff 

must plead facts to show “that the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner and that the 

discrimination was intentional.” FDIC. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(citing Stones v. Los Angeles Comm. College Dist., 796 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1986); 

Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended, 784 F.2d 1407 

(1986)). “‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as 

awareness of consequences. [Citation omitted]. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . 

selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely 

‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Massachusetts 

v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 

 ii. Analysis 

 Defendants contend Plaintiff fails to allege facts to show that he was treated 

differently than similarly situated inmates because “[h]e does not mention any treatment of 

any other inmate, and he does not compare the treatment he received with the treatment 

any other inmate received.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 35:16-19.) Plaintiff responds in his 

opposition that he alleged that the UCC officials discriminated against him when they 

denied services and rehabilitative programs on the grounds that he has developmental 

disabilities and an ICE hold, in violation of the ADA and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

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Equal Protection Clause. (ECF No. 46 at 40:12-16.) In so arguing, Plaintiff cites to an 

unassigned appeal, dated August 7, 2013, in which he complained that Defendants 

Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo, among other non-party officers, discriminated against him 

due to his developmental disabilities and ICE hold. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 86-87.) Plaintiff 

also cites to the UCC report, signed by Defendants Benyard and Cavazos, which noted 

Plaintiff was subject to an ICE hold. (See id. at 85.) 

 Based on the documents attached to the Complaint, which are properly considered 

in ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and viewing the Complaint in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately alleged a Fourteenth 

Amendment equal protection claim against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos. Indeed, 

Plaintiff has alleged negative treatment by the UCC officials due to his legal status in the 

United States. However, because Defendant Paramo is not a signatory of the UCC report 

and there are no factual, rather than conclusory, allegations against him, the Court 

concludes Plaintiff’s equal protection is insufficient. Finally, Plaintiff does not contend he 

has asserted an equal protection claim against any other Defendants. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim be DENIED as to Defendants 

Benyard and Cavazos and GRANTED with leave to amend as to all other Defendants. 

 e. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

 Plaintiff’s Complaint broadly asserts an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 

punishment claim against all Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 54-55.) 

 i. Applicable Law 

 Prison conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they amount to 

“unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs” or of the “minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the 

Eight Amendment. To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to 

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be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoners’ 

interest or safety.” Whitely v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). To assert an Eighth 

Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of confinement, a prisoner must 

allege facts sufficient to fulfill two requirements: one objective and one subjective. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 Under the objective requirement, the prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show 

that the prison official’s acts or omissions deprived him of the “minimal civilized measure 

of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This 

objective component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners 

with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; 

Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Under the subjective requirement, the prisoner must allege facts showing that the 

defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Allen, 48 F.3d at 

1087. “Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official “knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must be both aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-

303. 

 ii. Analysis

 Defendants contend Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails because he alleges no 

facts to indicate that his health or safety were ever in danger. (ECF No. 35-1 at 36:4-10.) 

The Court agrees. Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege facts plausibly 

suggesting that Defendants impacted or threatened his ability to maintain “adequate food, 

clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, [or] personal safety.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 

1246. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim should be GRANTED

with leave to amend. 

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 f. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 

 Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that he is suing all Defendants in both their official 

and individual capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Defendants contend that “[t]o the extent that 

he has asked for damages against Defendants in their official capacities, they are absolutely 

immune under the Eleventh Amendment.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 37:24-26.) 

 “The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from private damage actions brought 

in federal court.” Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997). The 

Eleventh Amendment also bars § 1983 suits for money damages against state officers in 

their official capacities unless the state waives such immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 

2007); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Here, Plaintiff sued all Defendants in both their official and individual capacities for 

money damages. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 2-17.) Since the State of California has not waived 

immunity, Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s suit for money damages in regard to 

actions taken in their official capacities as state officers. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claims for money damages 

against them in their official capacities be GRANTED. 

 g. Qualified Immunity 

 i. Applicable Law

 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing 

discretionary functions from liability for “civil damages unless their conduct violates 

‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement 

not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). “The privilege is ‘an 

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, 

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it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’” Id. at 200-01 (quoting 

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). 

 Claims of qualified immunity require a two-step analysis. Courts must consider 

whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, 

show the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right. See id. at 201, modified by 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (holding the order of Saucier’s two-step analysis 

should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement: “while the sequence set forth [in 

Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory”). If the 

allegations do not establish the violation of a constitutional right, “there is no necessity for 

further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id.; see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. 

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which 

the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has 

alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”). 

 If the allegations could make out a constitutional violation, however, courts must 

ask whether the right was clearly established – that is, whether “it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202 

(citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must 

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.” Id. The “salient question” is whether the state of the law at the time gives 

officials “fair warning” that their conduct is unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 740 (2002); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 2156-57 (“If the law did not put the officer 

on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity is appropriate.” (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) 

(qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law”))); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The relevant, 

dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). If an officer makes a reasonable mistake as 

to what the law requires, the officer is entitled to immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

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 ii. Analysis 

 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s entire Complaint should be dismissed because they are 

protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Here, as set forth above, Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim against Defendants Abad, Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Hernandez, 

Jones, Rutledge, and Spence. Thus, because the allegations against these Defendants do 

not establish the violation of a constitutional right, “there is no necessity for further 

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. at 201. As the Complaint is currently 

pleaded, these Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. This conclusion is made 

without prejudice to Plaintiff adequately asserting claims against these Defendants in an 

amended complaint. 

 As set forth above, Plaintiff has set forth at least one valid claim against Defendants 

Behra, Benyard, Cavazos, Olson, Paramo, Ramirez, Suglich, and Zuniga. Thus, the Court 

must consider whether the rights these Defendants allegedly violated were clearly 

established at the time of the alleged violations, that is, whether “it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201 

(citing Layne, 526 U.S. at 615). 

 The prohibition against retaliatory punishment against a prisoner for exercising his 

First Amendment rights is clearly established law for qualified immunity purposes. 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 569-70. Because Plaintiff has stated a retaliation claim against 

Defendants Behra, Benyard, Olson, Paramo, Ramirez, Suglich, and Zuniga for exercising 

his First Amendment rights, the Court declines to recommend that these Defendants are 

protected by qualified immunity at this time. As for Defendant Cavazos, the law is clearly 

established that the Equal Protection Clause protects prisoners from invidious 

discrimination because of their race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); 

Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995). Accepting as true Plaintiff’s 

allegations, “it would be clear to a reasonable officer” that the decision of the UCC 

officials, including Defendant Cavazos, to discriminate against him when they denied 

services and rehabilitative programs on the grounds that he has an ICE hold violated 

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Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant Cavazos is not 

entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s equal protection claim at this time.40

 Accordingly, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS Defendants Abad, Allamby, 

Alvarez, Cortez, Hernandez, Jones, Rutledge, and Spence’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis 

of qualified immunity be GRANTED, but that Defendants Behra, Benyard, Cavazos, 

Olson, Paramo, Ramirez, Suglich, and Zuniga’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis of qualified 

immunity be DENIED. 

III. CONCLUSION 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

William Q. Hayes pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.3. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an order: 

1. Approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; 

2. DENYING Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 20); 

3. GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34); and 

4. GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

(ECF No. 35). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than July 29, 2015, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the 

objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 12, 

2015. 

                                                                

40 Defendants are not precluded from raising their qualified immunity arguments in a 

motion for summary judgment if discovery into Plaintiff’s claims demonstrate that no 

violation of a clearly established right occurred. 

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 The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 29, 2015 

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