Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02642/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02642-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONDALEE MORRIS, Civil No. 10-CV-2642-AJB (BGS)

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

(1) TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN

PART DEFENDANTS MILLS, BARRA,

WHITE, & JANDA’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S THIRD

AMENDED COMPLAINT;

(2) TO GRANT DEFENDANT HUBBEL’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT; &

(3) TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST

DEFENDANT HUBBEL

v.

M BARRA, Program Sergeant; et al.,

Defendants.

On April 12, 2012, Plaintiff Condalee Morris, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, filed a third amended

complaint. (“TAC,” Doc. No. 138.) Currently pending before the Court are several motions

regarding Plaintiff’s third amended complaint.

On May 2, 2012, Defendants M Barra, G J Janda, L Mills and D White filed a motion to

dismiss the third amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies as to claims against Mills and Barra and for failure to state a claim as to

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claims against White and Janda.1 (Doc. No. 151.) After some discovery and extensions of time,

Plaintiff Condalee Morris filed a response in opposition on December 7, 2012, nunc pro tunc to

November 15, 2012.2 (Doc. No. 221.) Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion on

November 30, 2012. (Doc. No. 213.) 

On July 31, 2012, Defendant Hubbel (erroneously sued as Hubble) filed a motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.3

 (Doc. No. 166.) Despite being given a generous extension of time to

file an opposition, Plaintiff has not filed a response in opposition to Defendant Hubbel’s motion to

dismiss. (See Doc. No. 198.) 

Also before the Court are three motions filed by Plaintiff for entry of default against

Defendant Hubbel, requesting the Court to enter a judgment against Defendant Hubbel for $48.6

million dollars. (Doc. Nos. 175, 177, & 210.) 

These matters have been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation (R&R). The Court determines that these matters are appropriate for resolution

without oral argument and submits the motions on the parties’ papers pursuant to Local Civil Rule

7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to

dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, Defendant Hubbel’s motion to dismiss be

GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment be DENIED. 

Background

Plaintiff Condalee Morris is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on his

Third Amended Complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (TAC at 1.4) In his TAC, Plaintiff

1

Defendants provided Plaintiff with a Wyatt notice informing Plaintiff of the requirements and

consequences of Defendants’ non-enumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. No. 151-2.) 

2

In light of discrepancies with Plaintiff’s opposition and his request to file excess pages, his

opposition was not docketed on the Court’s electronic filing system until after Defendants’

electronically filed their reply. (See Doc. Nos. 217, 218 & 220.) 

3

Defendant Hubbel also provided Plaintiff with a Wyatt notice. (Doc. No. 166-3.) 

4

For consistency and ease of reference, references to Plaintiff’s filings use the court-generated page

numbers. 

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alleges that Defendants Mills and Barra sexually assaulted Plaintiff and used excessive force in

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (TAC at 5-9.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants Barra, Mace,

and Hubbel violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. (TAC at 10-13.) 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants White and G J Janda violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process. (TAC at 14-17.) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants arise out of an encounter Plaintiff

had with Defendant Mills and Barra on August 12, 2010, the medical treatment Plaintiff received

following this encounter, and a disciplinary hearing regarding the encounter held on September 8,

2010. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Mills and Barra for excessive force5

According to Plaintiff’s TAC, on August 12, 2010 Plaintiff and inmate Garcia went to the

dining hall for dinner. (TAC at 5.) Upon walking into the dining hall, Defendant Mills asked

Plaintiff to go back out of the hall and tuck in his shirt. (Id.) Plaintiff complied, but untucked his

shirt again before he sat down at the table. (Id.) On his way out of the dining hall, Defendant Mills

stopped Plaintiff and asked for his i.d. card. (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Mills that he did not have

one. (Id.) Defendant Mills then searched Plaintiff for contraband or weapons, but did not find

anything. Plaintiff and inmate Garcia then went to the “B” yard clinic to get their medication. (Id.) 

While waiting at the “B” yard clinic for Garcia to get his medication, Defendant Mills asked

Plaintiff to walk with him back to the front of the dining hall. (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Mills

that he “was a coward and a follower and that he don’t have any guts.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff

returned to the front of the dining hall with Defendant Mills and inmate Garcia. (Id. at 6.) 

Defendant Barra was standing at the front of the dining hall when they arrived. (Id. at 6.) 

Defendant Mills again searched Plaintiff and grabbed and squeezed Plaintiff’s testicles. (Id. at 6.) 

Plaintiff alleges that during his encounter with Defendant Mills he did not resist or threaten the

officer in any fashion or break any prison rules. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges he suffered swollen

testicles and testicular dysfunction as a result of Defendant Mills’s excessive force. (Id. at 6.) 

5

The Court’s recitation of Plaintiff’s allegations mirror that in the Court’s Report and

Recommendation regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

because the Third Amended Complaint is identical except for the substitution of Jane Doe with

Defendant Hubbel and additional allegations with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Janda. 

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After Defendant Mills searched Plaintiff and grabbed his testicles, Plaintiff said to Defendant

Barra, “your [sic] a punk bitch, why don’t you do your own dirty work yourself.” (Id. at 7.) 

Defendant Barra then searched Plaintiff and grabbed and squeezed Plaintiff’s testicles. (Id. at 7.) 

Defendant Barra’s search of Plaintiff did not reveal any contraband or weapons. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Barra, in using excessive force during his search, caused a serious injury to

his testicles and infliction of pain. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that during his encounter with

Defendant Barra he did not resist or threaten the officer in any fashion or break any prison rules. 

(Id. at 8.) Plaintiff clenched his fist because he was in so much pain. (Id. at 7.) Defendant Barra

then ordered Plaintiff to turn around and “cuff up.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff complied, was placed in

handcuffs, and escorted to facility “B” medical clinic. (Id. at 7.)

 Upon arriving at the “B” yard medical clinic, Defendants placed Plaintiff in holding cell #1. 

(Id. at 8.) Defendant Barra instructed Plaintiff to walk to the back of the cage and face the wall,

which Plaintiff did. (Id. at 8.) Defendant Barra closed the door, locked it, stuck his hands into the

tray slot, and grabbed the handcuffs, causing Plaintiff to fall back against the door and injure his

wrist. (Id. at 8.) Defendant Barra pulled on the handcuffs again when Plaintiff tried to stand up,

causing Plaintiff to fall back into the door a second time. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges he suffered

swollen wrists as a result. (Id. at 8.) 

Plaintiffs allegations against Defendants Barra, Mace6

, and Hubbel for denial of medical care

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mace witnessed the assault by Defendant Barra on him in the

“B” yard clinic. (Id. at 10.) According to Plaintiff’s TAC, Plaintiff also complained to Defendant

Mace about the sexual assault on him committed by Defendants Mills and Barra. (Id. at 10.) 

Defendant Barra interfered with Defendant Mace’s job, causing Defendant Mace to not treat

Plaintiff’s swollen testicles, swollen wrist, and substantial pain. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff was denied and

delayed medical care for sixteen days. (Id. at 10.) Defendant Mace also allegedly fabricated

CDCR7219 in order to conceal Defendants Mills and Barra’s actions. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff was

placed in administrative segregation (“Ad-Seg”) on August 12, 2010. (Id. at 11.) 

6

Defendant Mace has not been served with the TAC and therefore has not answered or otherwise

responded. 

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After being placed in administrative segregation on August 12, Plaintiff complained to AdSeg medical staff Defendant D. Hubbel about the sexual assault by Defendants Mills and Barra and

about Defendant Barra’s assault in the “B” yard clinic. (Id. at 12.) Defendant Hubbel ignored and

failed to respond to Plaintiff’s medical complaints. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff wrote a 602 grievance

concerning the sexual assault by Defendant Mills and Barra on August 12, 2010. (Id. at 12.) On

August 13, 2010, Plaintiff wrote two sick call requests, seeking appointments for his wrist injury

and the sexual assault. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff received treatment for his wrist injury. (Id. at 12.) 

Plaintiff alleges that from August 12 to August 27, 2010, he suffered pain as a result of a

delay in treatment of his swollen testicles. (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff suffered swelling causing him

to be unable to sleep, walk, close his legs, or urinate without pain. (Id. at 13.) On August 27, 2010,

Plaintiff was removed from Ad-Seg and placed in central medical before being taken to Pioneers

Memorial Healthcare District for the examination of his testicles. (Id. at 13; id. at 47-49.) Plaintiff

was diagnosed with testicular swelling and dysfunction. (Id. at 13; id. at 47-49.) 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants White and Janda

Following his encounter with Defendants Mills and Barra, Plaintiff wrote a 602 grievance

stating that he was sexually assaulted by Mills and Barra and claiming that they were trying to cover

up the assault by saying Plaintiff committed an assault and battery on a peace officer. (Id. at 14.) 

On August 21, 2010, Plaintiff received a disciplinary charge for battery on a peace officer based on

his encounter with Mills and Barra. (Id. at 14.) The rules violation report (“RVR”) alleged that

Plaintiff began clenching hisfists afterstating to DefendantBarra that he is “a punk bitch, why don’t

you do your own dirty work yourself.” (Id. at 54.) Barra then ordered Plaintiff to cuff up and

escorted Plaintiff to holding cell #1 in the “B” yard clinic. (Id.) Barra instructed Plaintiff to turn

around in order to remove the handcuffs. (Id.) As Barra placed his handcuff key in the handcuffs

to remove them, Plaintiff turned his body to the left and pulled Barra forward into the cell cuff port,

causing Barra’s forearmsto strike the cuff port opening. (Id.) When Barra attempted to remove the

handcuff key, Plaintiff continued pulling Barra into the cuff port opening. (Id.) Plaintiff and Barra

were then evaluated by on duty medical staff, who documented the injuries Barra sustained as a

result of Plaintiff’s actions. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff had his disciplinary hearing on September 8, 2010 before Defendant White. (TAC

at 15.) Plaintiff requested that the disciplinary hearing officer call inmate Garcia, Defendant Mills,

Defendant Barra, Correctional Officer Coronado, Lieutenant Sigler, Defendant Mace, and

Registered Nurse Herrera as witnesses at the hearing. (Id. at 14-15.) Defendant White only called

Defendant Barra as a witness and failed to call the other six witnesses Plaintiff requested. (Id. at

15.) Defendant White stated that he was not going to call the other witnesses because they would

not provide any new or relevant information for the hearing. (Id. at 15.) Following the hearing,

Plaintiff received a written disposition finding him guilty as charged based on a preponderance of

the evidence submitted at the hearing. (Id. at 15.) The written disposition noted the evidence

included employees’ written reports and photographs taken of cell #1 in the “B” yard clinic. (Id.

at 15.) As a result of his being found guilty of a Division “D” offense, Plaintiff was originally

assessed ninety (90) days forfeiture of credit. (Id. at 70 & 72.) After the hearing officer’s finding

and disposition was re-reviewed by a Chief Disciplinary Officer (“CDO”), Defendant Janda, on

September 24, 2010, the CDO disallowed all credit loss initially assessed and reclassified the

offense as a Division “B” offense. (Id. at 87, 92 & 93.) 

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with Defendant Janda complaining that only one of

Plaintiff’s witnesses was called by Defendant White. (TAC at 16; see id. at 37-39, 98-100.) 

Defendant Janda denied Plaintiff’s appeal. (TAC at 16.) Plaintiff alleges in his TAC that Janda

should have ordered a remand and rehearing because Defendant White failed to call all of his

witnesses, the offense was reclassified as a Division “B” offense, a serious offense, and because

Plaintiff was assessed a twelve month segregated housing unit (“SHU”) term. (Id. at 16-17.) 

Defendants Mills, Barra, White and Janda’s motion to dismiss

Defendants brought a non-enumerated Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b) and a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s TAC. (Doc. No. 151.) In their motion, Defendants seek dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force against Defendants Mills and Barra because the Court previously

dismissed the claim with prejudice for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 151-1

at 3.) Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim of denial of medical care against

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Defendant Barra, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies on this claim. (Id. at

4.) Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim of denial of due process against Defendant

White because it was previously dismissed without leave to amend. Finally, Defendants seek

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim of denial of due process against Defendant Janda for failure to state

a claim and because he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 6-11.)

Defendant Hubbel’s motion to dismiss

Defendant Hubbel has also filed a non-enumerated Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s TAC. (Doc. No. 166.) In her motion, Defendant Hubbel seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s

claim of denial of medical care, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies on these

claims. (Doc. No. 166-1.) 

Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment

Also pending before the Court are three motions for default judgment filed by Plaintiff asking

the Court to enter default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Hubbel for $48.6

million dollars. (Doc. Nos. 175, 177 & 210.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hubbel was served

with a copy of the TAC and summons on June 11, 2012, but failed to respond within twenty days. 

(Id. at 2.) 

Discussion

I. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

A. Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides that:

[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §

1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). “Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the quality

of prisoner suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). However, the prisoner is not required

to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his or her complaint because failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense under the PRLA. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).

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The proper vehicle for challenging a complaint based on failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is an unenumerated motion under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). Unlike under Rule 12(b)(6), “[i]n deciding

a motion to dismiss for a failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. If the district court concludes that the

prisoner has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the claim should be dismissed

without prejudice. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007);

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

Failure to exhaust may not be waived. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85-86 (2006)

(“[e]xhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is mandatory”). The United

States Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the

PRLA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. A prisoner

also cannot satisfy the PRLA’s exhaustion requirement by “filing an untimely or otherwise

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 584 U.S. at 83-84. Nor can

a prisoner who did not make any attempt to utilize the prison grievance system sidestep the

exhaustion requirement by arguing that it now would be futile to attempt to exhaust within the

prison system. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2002) (“we stressthe point . . . that we will

not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has

provided otherwise”); see also Woodford, 584 U.S. at 100 (“if the party never pursues all available

avenues of administrative review, the person will never be able to sue in federal court”).

As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Woodford, California has a “relatively simple”

grievance process for prisoners who seek to challenge the conditions of confinement. 584 U.S. at

85. Under the regulations in place at the time Plaintiff filed his 602 form in 20107

, to exhaust this

7

 The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation inmate formal administrative appeals

process underwent a major revision in 2011, including the discontinuation of the informal appeal process. See

2011 CA REG TEXT 248824 (NS). 

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process a prisoner had to proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution8; (2)

formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form (hereinafter “Form 602”) at the first level

of appeal9

; (3) second level of appeal to the institution head or designee10; and (4) third level appeal

to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (hereinafter the

“Director). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5; Woodford, 584 U.S. at 85-86; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A final decision from the Director’s level of review generally

satisfies the exhaustion requirement under §1997e(a). See Booth, 532 U.S. at 739-41.

When Plaintiffsubmitted his 602 formsin 2010, the prisoner had to submit the appeal within

fifteen working days from the date of the event or decision being appealed, or submit it to the next

level of review within fifteen working days of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal

decision. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c).11 Failure to timely submit an appeal could be grounds

for rejection if the inmate had the opportunity to submit the appeal within the prescribed time. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, §3084.3(c)(6). Additionally, an appeal alleging misconduct by a departmental

peace officer was to be accompanied by a Rights and Responsibilities Statement. Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 3084.1(e).12 Failure to submit the form was cause for rejecting the appeal. Id. An inmate’s

8 Under California Code of Regulations Title 15, § 3084.5(a)(3), the informal level of appeal was

bypassed for appeals of (1) classification committee actions; (2) serious disciplinary infractions; (3) classification

staff representative actions; (4) departmental regulations, policies, or operational procedures; (5) exceptional

circumstances defined in section 3084.7; (6) any action which the appeals coordinator determines cannot be

resolved informally; (7) alleged misconduct by a departmental peace officer; or (8) the denial of disabled inmate

or parolee requests for reasonable modification or accommodation filed on CDC Form 1824 (1/95), Reasonable

Modification Or Accommodation Request, pursuant to section 3085.

9

 The appeals coordinator could elect to bypass an appeal at the First Formal level and submit it directly

to the Second Formal Level for (1) a policy or procedure implemented by the institution head; (2) a policy,

procedure or regulation implemented by the department; (3) an issue which cannot be resolved at the division

head’s level; e.g., appeal of a regular transfer; (4) serious disciplinary infractions. Cal. Code Regs tit. 15,

§3084.5(b).

10 Only matters involving involuntary transfers to the California Medical Facility or Atascadero State

Hospital bypassed the Second Formal Level and were submitted directly to the Third Formal Level. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.5 (c); 3084.7(d)(4)(B).

11California Code of Regulations Title 15, §3084.8(b) now provides the time limits for submitting an

appeal. Inmates now must submit the appeal within 30 calendar days of the event or decision being appealed. 

12California Code of Regulations Title 15, §3084.1(e) was amended in 2011, deleting the requirement of a

Rights and Responsibility Statement. 

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refusal to be interviewed or cooperate with the reviewer would result in the cancellation of his

appeal. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3084.4(d). 

B. Sexual Assault and Excessive Force by Defendants Mills and Barra

On March 27, 2012, the Court, in its order regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for sexual assault and excessive

force against Defendants Mills and Barr for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No.

134 at 8-10.) The Court’s dismissal of these claims was with prejudice. (Id. at 17.) In his TAC,

Plaintiff’s claims for sexual assault and excessive force against Defendants Mills and Barra are

identical to those previously dismissed with prejudice. 

Plaintiff argues in his opposition that his appeal should not have been rejected because he

should not have been required to submit a Rights and Responsibility statement.13 (Doc. No. 221 at

3.) In support of this, Plaintiff has attached a memorandum dated September 8, 2006 that was issued

in response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). (Id.

at 31.) In Chaker, the Ninth Circuit held California Penal Code section 148.6 unconstitutional

because it discriminated based on viewpoint by making only false statements against a peace officer

a misdemeanor. 428 F.3d at 1228. 

In 2006, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 , 3084.1(e) provided that “Pursuant to Penal Code section

148.6, it is against the law to make a complaint against a departmental peace officer that the

complainant knows to be false. An appeal alleging misconduct by a departmental peace office . .

.shall be accompanied by a Rights and Responsibility Statement asshown in section 3391(d).” The

Rights and Responsibility Statement in 2006's version of section 3391(d) contained language

informing the inmate that he has the right to make a complaint against a peace officer, that

California law requires the agency to have a procedure to investigate inmate complaints, and that

13Plaintiff’s opposition also attempts to reargue that his appeal was exhausted and that it was

CDCR staff that prevented him from exhausting his remedies by not complying with timelines. The

Court discussed and analyzed at length Plaintiff’s administrative appeal of these claims in its Report and

Recommendation on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC and in its Order regarding the R

&R. (Doc. Nos. 119 & 134.) As Plaintiff provides no new evidence of exhaustion, the Court will not

revisit these arguments. 

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the inmate has a right to a written description of the procedure. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3391(d)

(2006). Section 3391(d)’s Rights and Responsibility Statement also included a warning that “it is

against the law to make a complaint that you know to be false. If you make a complaint against an

officer knowing it is false, you can be prosecuted on a misdemeanor charge.” Id. Following the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chaker, section 3084.1(e) was amended in November 2006 to remove

the citation to and language from Penal Code section 148.6. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 3084.1(e)

& (History ¶9) (2010). Section 3391(d) was amended at the same time to remove the language

warning an inmate making a complaint about the possibility of prosecution for a false complaint. 

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3391(d) & (History ¶7) (2010). The memorandum Plaintiff attaches

to his opposition even notes that “sections 3391(d) and 3084.1(e) are being modified to eliminate

references to the now unconstitutional law.” (Doc. No. 221 at 31.) Therefore, in 2010, at the time

Plaintifffiled his appeal, aRights andResponsibility statement wasstillrequired, but did not include

the language from Penal Code section 148.6 deemed unconstitutional in 2006. See Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, §3084.1(e) (2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to comply with the grievance procedures

for submitting his appeal and failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff’s opposition also argues that these claims should have been dismissed without

prejudice,14 as Ninth Circuit case law providesthat “[i]f the district court concludesthat the prisoner

has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the claim should be dismissed without

prejudice. (Doc. No. 221 at 2 (citing O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1059, 1063

(9th Cir. 2007)).) In light of this argument, Defendants in their reply brief request that the Court

dismiss these claims from the TAC without prejudice, but also without leave to amend. (Doc. No.

213 at 2.) As Plaintiff has not been able to cure the deficiencies of his allegations and evidence of

exhaustion with respect to his claims for excessive force and sexual assault against Defendants Mills

and Barra in the TAC, the Court recommends Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims be

14The undersigned, in finding these claims not procedurally exhausted, recommended the

dismissal of the excessive force and sexual assault claim from the SAC be without prejudice and without

leave to amend. (Doc. No. 119 at 15.) The Court, in its order on the Report and Recommendation,

dismissed the claims with prejudice. (Doc. No. 134 at 9, 10.) 

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GRANTED and these claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND. O’Guinn, 502 F.3d at 1059, 1063; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th

Cir.1987)). 

C. Denial of Medical Care by Defendants Barra and Hubbel

1. Defendants’ Evidence regarding Administrative Appeals

On November 6, 2010, Plaintiff filled out a Form 602 regarding medical care, alleging that

Defendant Barra interfered with Defendant Mace’s job on August 12, 2010 when Plaintiff

complained to Mace about the sexual assault by Defendants Barra and Mills. (Doc. No. 166-2,

Alaniz Decl., Ex. 2 at 7.) Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Mace witnessed the assault in the “B”

yard clinic and that Mace fabricated CDCR 7219 to conceal the Defendants’ actions. (Id.) In his

appeal, Plaintiff requested Defendants Mace, Barra, and Jane Doe15 be held liable for the physical

and emotional injury resulting from their failure to provide adequate medical care. (Id.) The appeal

was not given a Log Number. 

On November 18, 2010, Plaintiff’s first level appeal of the medical care he received was

screened out by the Calipatria Appeals Coordinator in a written notice. (Doc. No. 166-2, Alaniz

Decl., Ex. 3 at 10.) Plaintiff’s appeal was returned to him because “there [was] too great a time

lapse between when the action or decision occurred and when [Plaintiff] filed [his] appeal with no

explanation of why you did not or could not file in a timely fashion.” (Id.) The notice instructed

Plaintiff to submit an explanation and supporting documentation explaining why he did not or could

not file his appeal timely in order to further pursue his appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff was to do so within

fifteen working days. (Id.) 

In response to the screening at the first level, on December 6, 2010, Plaintiff submitted

Section D of Plaintiff’s unnumbered appeal, explaining why he did not timely submit the appeal. 

(Doc. No. 166-2, Alaniz Decl. ¶7 & Ex. 4.) In section D, Plaintiff explained that he was waiting on

all of the 115 hearing documents concerning battery on staff, which he received on September 20,

15Plaintiff has named Defendant Hubbel in place of Jane Doe in his Third Amended Complaint. 

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2010. (Id. Ex. 4 at 11.) Plaintiff also wrote that there was an investigation occurring at the same

time related to his appeal Log Number CAL-A-10-1870 and that he was waiting until the

investigation was over in order to support his medical care appeal. (Id. Ex. 4 at 11.) 

On December 13, 2010, Plaintiff’s unnumbered appeal was cancelled in a written letter. 

(Doc. No. 166-2, Alaniz Decl. Ex. 5 at 14.) The decision explained that “[y]our explanation for

submitting an untimely appeal is noted; however, it is not a valid or compelling argument to forward

your appeal. . . Your appeal remains untimely. DO NOT RESUBMIT THIS APPEAL. This appeal

has been cancelled and the original has been kept on file.” (Id.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Evidence of Exhaustion 

In his response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff includes the first

level screening of this appeal, his Section D response to the first level screening, and a redacted

copy ofthe “Confidential Supplement to Appeal‘AppealInquiry’” on his appealLog NumberCALA-10-1870.16 (See Doc. No. 221.) Plaintiff, however, concedes in his opposition that he did not

meet the formal requirements of the grievance system on this appeal. (Id. at 35.) Instead of trying

to show he exhausted his appeal, Plaintiff argues that he did not timely submit his medical care

appeal because he was told by ISU officer Garcia that he must wait for the completion of the ISU

investigation and receipt of the ISU report before filing a formal grievance. (Doc. No. 221 at 32.) 

Plaintiff also argues that prison regulations induced him to believe that he was required to wait for

completion of the ISU investigation prior to filing a formal grievance. (Id. at 34-35.) 

3. Analysis of Plaintiff’s claim

The Court finds Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his

claims against Defendants Barra and Hubbel for denial of medical care in violation of his Eighth

16 Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendant Hubbel’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s opposition

entails 161 pages of argument and exhibits intermixed. (See Doc. No. 221.) Despite explicit instructions with

citations to the Court’s local rules, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to comply with the required format. (See Doc. No.

185 at 10.) Many of the documents attached to Plaintiff’s opposition are prior court filings in this case

that the Court has already ruled upon, filings by other parties, including Defendant Hubbel’s motion to

dismiss, and other material that is irrelevant or inappropriate to Plaintiff’s proffer of evidence of

exhaustion on this claim. In order to move this case forward, the Court accepted Plaintiff’s opposition

despite the failure to comply with formatting requirements. 

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Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied medical care for his complaints of swollen

testicles from August 12, 2010 to August 27, 2010. (TAC at 10, 12.) Plaintiff filed his Form 602

regarding denial of medical care on November 6, 2010. (Doc. No. 166-2, Alaniz Decl., Ex. 2 at 7.) 

Pursuant to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c), Plaintiff had fifteen working days to submit his

appeal. His appeal was properly rejected for being untimely at the first level of review, as

November 6, 2010 was more than 15 working days after the event occurred, even if using August

27, 2010 as the date of the event. The rejection of his appeal instructed Plaintiff to submit an

explanation and supporting documentation explaining why he did not or could not file his appeal

timely. (Doc. No. 166-2, Alaniz Decl., Ex. 3 at 10.) While Plaintiff submitted Section D explaining

that he did not timely submit his appeal because he was waiting on the 115 hearing documents and

the results of the investigation into his appeal regarding the assault allegations, this explanation was

rejected and his appeal cancelled on December 13, 2010. (Id. at Ex. 5 at 14.) There is no evidence

that Plaintiff appealed the cancellation of this appeal or pursued his appeal further in the

administrative grievance system. Therefore, there is no final decision at the Director’s level. A

prisoner cannotsatisfy the exhaustion requirement by filing a procedurally defective administrative

appeal. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83-84. 

Plaintiff arguesin his opposition that hislate filing should be excused because an ISU officer

told him he had to wait until completion of the investigation to file his medical care grievance and

because prison regulations induced him to wait to file. (Doc. No. 221 at 32, 34-5.) Therefore, he

asserts that he exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. In its Order regarding the

Report andRecommendation, theCourtrejected this argument, noting that Plaintiff failed to provide

the name of the security officer who gave him this information, failed to provide an affidavit or

declaration stating these facts, and failed to point to a relevantregulation requiring an inmate to wait

before filing a formal grievance. (Doc. No. 134 at 11.) The Court concluded that “[w]ithout more

facts and/or evidence to excuse his late filing, . . . Plaintiff failed to meet the procedural

requirements for exhaustion regarding his claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs.” (Id.

at 12.) Additionally, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s citation to Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3084.1(a) as

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a basisto wait to file his grievance until after the completion of the ISU investigation. (Id. at 11-12.) 

The Court found that “it is not clear how this regulation induced Plaintiff to delay filing his

grievance.”17 (Id. at 12.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s medical care claims without prejudice. 

(Id. at 12.) 

 In his response in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff now asserts that

an officer Garcia and “others” told him he had to wait for the completion of the ISU investigation

into hisstaff complaint of excessive force and sexual assault. (Doc. No. 221 at 32.) Plaintiff alleges

that Garcia was one of the ISU security officers that told him he had to wait for a copy of the ISU

investigation before filing a formal grievance and provided an affidavit to this effect with his TAC.

(Id. at 34; Doc. No. 138 at 50-51.) In his affidavit attached to his TAC, Plaintiff avers that on

August 27, 2010, the “goon squad” came to his door in Ad/Seg and took him to a room and

questioned him about the sexual assault by Defendants Mills and Barra. (Id. at 50.) Plaintiff avers

that he requested a copy of the investigation report and the “goon squad officer” told him that after

the completion of the investigation, they would provide him with a copy of the report. (Id. at 50.) 

Plaintiff states that he asked the “goon squad officer” if he should file an inmate appeal regarding

being denied medical care and the officer told him to wait until the investigation was over and that

they would provide him with a complete investigation report that would support his allegation of

being denied medical care. (Id. at 50-51.) Plaintiff argues that the Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3005(b)18 requires inmates to obey verbal orders and instructions from departmental staff, and

17Plaintiff also asserts in his opposition, without any explanation or legal authority, that it is clear

how § 3084.1(a) induced him to believe that he had to wait for completion of the investigation of his

excessive force and sexual assault grievance prior to filing a formal medical care grievance. (Doc. No.

221 at 34.) The Court previously discussed this contention and rejected it. Plaintiff’s current opposition

offers nothing to change this analysis and therefore the Court will not address it at length. 

18Plaintiff also asserts that Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3391(b) applies, as he is a citizen of the state

of California and therefore the same time limitations should govern his complaint concerning employee

conduct. (Doc. No. 221 at 33.) Section 3391(b) provides that “an allegation by a non-inmate of

misconduct by a departmental peace officer . . . is a citizen’s complaint pursuant to Penal Code section

832.5. Citizen’s complaints alleging misconduct of a departmental peace officer shall be filed within

twelve months of the alleged misconduct.” The Court rejects this argument. Plaintiff was an inmate at

the time of the alleged departmental peace officer misconduct, and therefore the citizen’s complaint time

limitations clearly do not apply to his inmate grievance regarding medical care received in prison. 

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therefore he was required to wait for the ISU report before filing his medical care grievance. (Doc.

No. 221 at 35.) 

Plaintiff submits no witness declarations or documentary evidence to support his account of

the ISU officer’s alleged statements that he had to wait to file a medical care grievance until he

received a copy of the ISU report. Plaintiff has attached to his opposition a redacted copy of the

Confidential Supplement to Appeal report on his excessive force and sexual assault grievance. 

(Doc. No. 221 at 42.) This report is dated September 27, 2010 and names R. Nelson, Correctional

Lieutenant as the only witness and Mills and Barra as the accused staff members. (Id.) The report

states the M. Carpio interviewed Lieutenant Nelson on September 23, 2010 regarding Plaintiff’s

staff complaint against Mills and Barra. (Id.) According to the report, once informed of Plaintiff’s

sexual assault allegations eighteen days after the fact, Nelson transported Plaintiff to Pioneers

Memorial Hospital19 and also interviewed Plaintiff. (Id.) The report does not mention any other

officers interviewing or speaking with Plaintiff about his medical care claim. The report does not

name or mention an officer Garcia and notes that it is “not for inmate distribution.” (Id.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff, at the latest, received his copy of the staff complaint response

following the investigation into his excessive force and sexual assault allegations on October 5,

2010. (See Doc. No. 221 at 24 (report dated October 1, 2010) & 21 (Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with

staff complaint response dated October 5, 2010).) The staff complaint response noted that a

“confidential inquiry” had been conducted, where Lieutenant Nelson, Sergeant Barra and Officer

Mills were questioned by Lieutenant Carpio. (Id. at 24.) The response also informed Plaintiff that

all staff personnel matters are confidential in nature, “the details of the any inquiry will not be

shared with staff, members of the public, or inmates,” and that “the inquiry is complete.” (Id. at 24.) 

At this point, Plaintiff was informed that the inquiry into his staff complaint was complete and that

he would not receive any further detailsregarding the investigation. Despite receiving a copy of the

response to his staff complaint on October 5, 2010, Plaintiff did not file his grievance until

19Although the report does not state a date when Plaintiff was transported to Pioneers Memorial

Hospital, his medical records show that he was evaluated at Pioneers on August 27, 2010. (See Doc.

No. 138 at 47-49.) 

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November 6, 2010, more than fifteen working days after receiving the document. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s medical care grievance was still untimely and fails to satisfy the PRLA’s exhaustion

requirement.20 See Woodford, 584 U.S. at 83-84. 

Because the Court finds Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies as

to his second cause of action against Defendant Barra and Defendant Hubbel for denial of medical

care in violation of his Eighth Amendment Rights, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motions

to dismiss be GRANTED and this claim be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Additionally, because the Court finds that amendment of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Barra

and Hubbel for denial of medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights would be futile

given his failure to exhaust, the Court recommends denying leave to amend as to this claim.21 See

James, 221 F.3d at 1077. 

II. Failure to State a Claim

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) Standards

The plaintiff’s complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

[he] is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

20Regardless of Plaintiff’s allegations that an officer Garcia told him he had to wait to file his

grievance, Plaintiff still failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appeal the

cancellation of his appeal. This administrative review was available to Plaintiff, as the cancellation of

his appeal informed him that he may file a separate appeal on the cancellation decision. (Doc. No. 166-

2, Alaniz Decl., Ex. 5 at 14); see 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”). 

21In his opposition, Plaintiff includes a request for a continuance of this matter so that he may

develop further information regarding who was assigned to ISU and told him to wait to file his

grievance in August 2010. The Court denies this request as Plaintiff received a copy of the staff

complaint response, at the latest, on October 5, 2010, was informed he would receive no details into the

inquiry, and failed to submit his grievance within fifteen working days. Further discovery on which

officers were working with the ISU team on August 27, 2010 does not change this timeline. 

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1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Id. “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be

considered in determining whether dismissal [i]s proper without converting the motion to one for

summary judgment.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n. 2 (9th Cir.1980)). The court may also consider

“documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the pleading....” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th

Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th

Cir.2002); Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313–14 (9th Cir.1996). “Such

consideration does not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiff has attached various exhibits to his TAC and the Court will

consider these exhibits in deciding the instant motion. Additionally, Plaintiff’s TAC contains

allegationsrelying on and referring to the contents of exhibitssubmitted with Plaintiff’s opposition. 

TheCourt will also considerthese exhibitsin deciding the instant motion, as no party has questioned

their authenticity.

2. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Factual allegations asserted by pro se plaintiffs, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held “to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

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520 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (reaffirming that this standard still

applies to pro se pleadings post-Twombly). Thus, where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In giving liberal interpretation

to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not

initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982).

“Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir.1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim

under §1983). “The plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation

omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v. Carlson,

809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir.1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed,

the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s deficiencies. Karim–Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623–24 (9th Cir. 1988). But where amendment of a pro

se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. See James, 221 F.3d

at 1077.

3. Stating a Claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)

(overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 (1986)); Flagg

Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 

B. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims

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1. Plaintiff’s Claim against Defendant White

TheCourt, in its Orderregarding Defendants’motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint, dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant White for violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment right to procedural due process without leave to amend. (Doc. No. 134 at 13-15.) 

Plaintiff’s allegationsin his TAC against Defendant White are identical to those alleged in his SAC. 

(See TAC at 14-15; c.f. SAC, Doc. No. 39 at 14-15.) Because Plaintiff was not given leave to

amend this claim and his allegations in the TAC are identical to those in the SAC, the Court

recommends Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim be GRANTED. Additionally, because

Plaintiff failed to cure the deficiencies of this claim in his TAC and amendment of this claim would

be futile, the Court recommends dismissing this claim WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

2. Plaintiff’s Claim against Defendant Janda

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action

for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty

interest for which the protection issought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause

itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–68 (1983). With respect to liberty

interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–84

(1995). Liberty interests created by state law or prison regulations are generally limited to freedom

from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484.

Plaintiff alleges in his TAC that Defendant Janda violated his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights by denying Plaintiff’s administrative appeal regarding Defendant White’s refusal to

call six of Plaintiff’s witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. (TAC at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Janda violated his due process rights by failing to remand and order a rehearing based

upon the failure of White to call six witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that White found him

guilty of a Division “D” offense, which Plaintiff alleges is an administrative violation, and

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DefendantJanda reclassified the RVR to a Division “B” offense, which Plaintiff allegesis a serious

offense, without a remand and rehearing.22 (Id. at 16-17.) As a result of this, Plaintiff alleges that

the classification of his RVR as a Division “B” offense, the credit loss, and a twelve month SHU

term assessment were all in error because he did not receive a remand and rehearing under Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, section 3313(c)(4)(A)(B)(C) & (5)23. (Id. at 17.) 

Defendant Janda’s review of Plaintiff’s appeal noted that the RVR for battery on a peace

officer was originally misclassified as a Division “D” offense, which error was not caught by the

Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”) at the time of his hearing, and consequently Plaintiff was found

guilty of a Division “D” offense. (Doc. No. 138 at 87.) Janda went on to note that a Chief

Disciplinary Officer (“CDO”), who was Janda himself, reviewed the SHO’s findings and the RVR

and noted the misclassification of the offense in his review. (Id. at 87 & 93.) The CDO, Janda, in

his review noted that the RVR’s classification of battery on a peace officer corresponded to a

Division “B” offense and disallowed all credit loss initially assessed. (Id. at 87.) Based on this

information, Defendant Janda at the appellate level determined that procedures were followed and

due process was afforded to Plaintiff in the processing of his RVR. (Id. at 87.) 

The Court previously found Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Defendant Janda for a

violation of due process based upon Janda’s denial of his appeal regarding the failure of White to

call six of his witnesses. (Doc. No. 134 at 16-17.) The Court noted that Plaintiff did not allege in

his SAC that Defendant Janda failed to investigate or consider his appeal, and therefore failed to

state a cause of action for a due process violation. (Id.) In his TAC, Plaintiff does not cure this

22When a prison inmate is charged with a serious rules violation that is believed to be a violation

of law, he is served with a CDCR 115 citation (“Rules Violation Report”). Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3312(a)(3); In re Johnson, 176 Cal.App.4th 290, 294 (Cal.App.2009). CDC 115 citations are either

“administrative,” resulting in a loss of various prison privileges and assignment of extra duty but no

credit loss, or “serious,” resulting, inter alia, in loss of credits of up to 360 days. Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3313(a); §§ 3314(e); 3315(f)(3); 3323(b)-(h).

23Section 3313(c)(4) provides that “After the disciplinary hearing, an administrative

classification shall not be changed to serious unless the chief disciplinary officer or director orders a

rehearing of the charges as a serious rule violation.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3313(c)(4). “When a

rehearing is ordered by the chief disciplinary officer or director, the inmate shall be provided all rights

and procedural safeguards of a serious rule violation hearing.” Id. §3313(c)(4)(A). 

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pleading deficiency as he again fails to allege that Janda failed to investigate or consider his appeal. 

(See Doc. No. 138 at 16-17.) Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff again fails to state a claim for a

due process violation against Janda for his denial of Plaintiff’s appeal regarding White’s refusal to

call witnesses. 

Plaintiff, however, includes new allegations in his TAC regarding Defendant Janda’s role in

reclassifying his RVR as a serious offense without ordering a rehearing as required by section

3313(c)(4). Defendant Janda, acting as a Chief Disciplinary Officer, reviewed White’s findings,

noted the misclassification of the RVR as a Division “D” offense, and restored all forfeited credits

on September 24, 2010. (Doc. No. 138 at 93.) Section 3313(c)(4) provides that “[a]fter the

disciplinary hearing, an administrative classification shall not be changed to serious unless the chief

disciplinary officer or director orders a rehearing of the charges as a serious rule violation.” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, §3313(c)(4). “When a rehearing is ordered by the chief disciplinary officer or

director, the inmate shall be provided all rights and procedural safeguards of a serious rule violation

hearing.” Id. §3313(c)(4)(A). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a violation of his due process rights

by Janda for failing to order a rehearing on the RVR once he reclassified it as a Division “B”

offense. Because Plaintiff alleges no deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest as

Janda restored the 90 days of forfeited credits assessed by White, Plaintiff fails to state a claim

against Janda for a due process violation. See, e.g., Womack v. Grannis, No. 10-17952, 2011 WL

4794939, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 2011) (affirming district court’s dismissal of due process claim

because good time credits had been restored). Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the

nature of his RVR are unsupported by documents he attaches to his TAC and by the prison

regulations. Plaintiff alleges that his RVR was initially for an administrative violation and

subsequently reclassified as a serious rule violation without Janda ordering the required rehearing. 

However, a Division “D” offense is a serious rule violation and may lead to a credit forfeiture of 61-

90 days. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §3323(a) (“Upon a finding of guilt of a serious rule violation,

a credit forfeiture . . . shall be assessed within the ranges specified in (b) through (h) below”) & (f)

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(“Division ‘D’ offenses; credit forfeiture of 61-90 days.). A Division “B” offense, which includes

“[b]attery on a peace officer not involving the use of a weapon,” is also a serious rule violation and

may lead to a credit forfeiture of 121-150 days. Id. §3323(d)(1). White’s referral to a clinical

psychiatrist following the disciplinary hearing even notes that on September 8, 2010, Inmate Morris

appeared before him for “adjudication of this Serious Rules Violation Report.” (Doc. No. 138 at

71.) Because Janda’s reclassification of Plaintiff’s RVR from a Division “D” offense to a Division

“B” offense did not change an administrative classification to a serious classification as Plaintiff was

always charged with a serious rule violation, a rehearing was not required under the regulations and

Janda did not violate the regulations. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a violation of

a regulation amounting to an atypical and significant deprivation. 

Plaintiff also alleges that his twelve month Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) assessment was

also in error because of the failure of Janda to order a rehearing on the RVR. For the reasons set

forth above, a rehearing was not required on the RVR under the regulations because it was always

processed as a serious rule violation of battery on a peace officer. Furthermore, it is unclear from

Plaintiff’s TAC how Defendant Janda was associated with any subsequent SHU term assessment

following the RVR, as Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Janda participated in the assessment

process, reviewed any assessment, or denied Plaintiff any required procedural protections in

connection with a SHU assessment.24 Section 1983 requires that there be an actual connection or

link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

24The only document provided by Plaintiff that mentions a twelve month SHU term is a report of

an Initial ASU annual review that notes that Plaintiff was placed in ASU on 8/12/2010 for the offense of

battery on a peace officer and if found guilty Plaintiff could be assessed a twelve month SHU term. 

(Doc. No. 138 at 102.) The report was signed by D.G. Adams, J. Anaya, and lists the other Institutional

Classification Committee (“ICC”) members, none of which are Defendant Janda. (See id.) The only

other document that mentions a possible SHU term is a referral by White of Plaintiff to the Institutional

Clinical Psychiatrist for an evaluation per the Madrid decision before consideration by the ICC of a

possible Security Housing Unit ("SHU") term assessment following his decision finding Plaintiff guilty.

(Doc. No. 138 at 71 & 101.) Defendant Janda is not named in either document. 

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits

to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey

v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). As such, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to

sufficiently allege Defendant Janda personally participated in the SHU assessment to be held liable

for any alleged due process violation. 

As Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a due process violation against Defendant Janda for

his review of Plaintiff’s appeal or for his reclassification of the RVR as a Division “B” offense

without ordering a rehearing, the Court recommends Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim be

GRANTED. The Court further finds amendment of this claim would be futile as Plaintiff failed to

cure the deficiencies noted from his SAC, and therefore recommends this claim be DISMISSED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. See James, 221 F.3d at 1077. 

Because the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Janda be dismissed

without leave to amend for failing to state a claim, the Court need not reach Defendants’ motion to

dismiss this claim based upon qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 151-1 at 9-11.) Therefore, the Court

recommends Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity be DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the court is

usually “not equipped at this stage to determine whether qualified immunity will ultimately protect

[the defendant]. Those issues must be resolved at summary judgment or at trial.”); see also Groten

v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is not appropriate unless

[the court] can determine, based on the complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies.”) (citing

Jensen v. City of Oxford, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir.1998)).

III. Plaintiff’s Motions for Default Judgment Against Defendant Hubbel

Also pending before the Court are three motions for default judgment filed by Plaintiff asking

the Court to enter default judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Hubbel for $48.6

million dollars. (Doc. Nos. 175, 177 & 210.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hubbel was served

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with a copy of the TAC and summons on June 11, 2012, but failed to respond within twenty days. 

(Id. at 2.) When a defendant fails to timely answer a complaint, a plaintiff may move the court for

an entry of default judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). The district court’s decision whether to enter

a default judgment is discretionary. See Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980) (per

curiam).

 Plaintiff is correct that on June 11, 2012, a copy of the summons and complaint was mailed

to Defendant Hubbel. (See Doc. No. 160.) However, on June 29, 2012, the U.S. Marshal received

a waiver of service from Defendant Hubbel and sent a copy to the Court and to Plaintiff. (Id.) The

waiver of service, signed by counsel for Defendant Hubbel, states that judgment may be entered

against Defendant Hubbel if an answer or motion under Rule 12 is not served upon Plaintiff within

60 days after June 11, 2012. (Id. at 2.) This is in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) regarding

waiver of service. Defendant Hubbel filed a Rule 12 motion on July 31, 2012, less than 60 days

after June 11, 2012. (See Doc. No. 166.) Therefore, Defendant Hubbel did not fail to timely answer

a complaint and default judgment should not be entered against Defendant Hubbel. Furthermore,

the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Hubbel without prejudice

and without leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s motions for default

judgment be DENIED.

Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first claim against Defendants Mills and

Barra for sexual assault and excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights be GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND;

2. Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim against Defendant Barra for 

inadequate medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights be GRANTED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

/ / /

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/ / /

3. Defendant Hubbel’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim against Defendant

Hubbel for inadequate medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights be

GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim against Defendant White for

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; 

5. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim against Defendant Janda for

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights be GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; 

6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim against Defendant Janda based

upon qualified immunity be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

7. Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment against Defendant Hubbel be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than February 19, 2013, any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than March 5, 2013 of being served with the objections. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 31, 2013 BERNARD G. SKOMAL

United States Magistrate Judge

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