Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01041/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01041-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED 

v. 

DONALD 

FI LED 

Uoited Statei Court of Appeajj 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

) 

) 

JACK PRIEST, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

AUG .. 9 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1041 

( D. C. No. 84-C-1637) 

(Dist. of Colorado) 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

In 1977 Donald Priest was convicted of possession of a 

firearm in violation of 26 u.s.c. § 5861(d) and 18 u.s.c. S 2, 

transfer of a firearm in violation of 26 u.s.c. § 586l(e) and 18 

U.S.C. § 2, and manufacture of a firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. 

S 5861 (f) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. After he was paroled and his parole 

revoked, Priest moved the district court to vacate, set aside, or 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1041 Document: 010110040755 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 1 
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Priest 

asserted three grounds for his motion: (1) nondisclosure of Brady 

material; (2) newly discovered evidence; and (3) ineffective 

assistance of counsel. All three arguments arise from a statement 

made by Priest's codefendant more than seven years after the 

conviction and after the codefendant had successfully completed a 

sentence of three years probation for the codefendant's involvement. According to his 1985 statement, the codefendant would 

testify that Priest was not involved in the gun sale. The 

district court denied the motion and this appeal followed. Priest 

renews these same three arguments on appeal. 

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the government 

must disclose any exculpatory evidence in its possession to the 

defendant. Priest contends, as he did below, that the government 

improperly delayed in advising Priest's attorney that Priest's 

codefendant had been arrested and was being held just prior to 

Priest's trial. The district court found that, as a factual matter, the government did disclose the arrest and detention of 

Priest's codefendant in sufficient time. We will not disturb this 

factual determination unless it is clearly erroneous. United 

States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 

109 s.ct. 1554 (1989). 

The record of the trial discloses the following exchange 

between the trial judge and Priest's attorney concerning the 

codefendant's possible testimony: 

THE COURT: I'll tell you what I'll do if you feel that 

this is important and if you feel there is a reasonable 

possibility of obtaining this testimony. I'll excuse 

the jury until 9:30 tomorrow morning, and that will give 

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Appellate Case: 90-1041 Document: 010110040755 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 2 
_.., 

you the time to interview the witness or have the witness interviewed. If you want it, I'll do it. 

Priest v. United States, No. 84-C-1637, slip op. at 3 (D. Colo. 

Jan. 23, 1990). The fact that the codefendant was available to be 

interviewed was abundantly clear to Priest's attorney. The trial 

court's offer to allow time to interview the codefendant demonstrates that Brady notification allowed defense counsel, had he 

chosen to do so, to use the codefendant's testimony, if any was 

forthcoming. The government in no way withheld information. 

Priest's second contention, that the codefendant's 1985 

statement constitutes "newly discovered evidence" warranting a 

retrial, fails for much the same reason as his Brady argument. 

"[A] new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with reasonable 

diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial." 

United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 403 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). If Priest's codefendant was indeed 

willing to testify that Priest had no part in the crime, Priest 

was expressly given the opportunity to discover that fact and to 

make use of the testimony. He and his attorney chose not to do 

so. This lack of diligence at time of trial renders Priest's 

second argument meritless. Furthermore, if the codefendant was 

not willing to testify to Priest's innocence at the time, then his 

new-found willingness to help Priest is of dubious probative value 

given that the codefendant has relatively little to lose by taking 

the blame at this late date. See Allen, 554 F.2d at 403 (to 

entitle a defendant to a new trial, newly discovered evidence must 

be such as to probably produce an acquittal). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1041 Document: 010110040755 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 3 
Priest's final argument, ineffective assistance of counsel, 

is meritless because Priest has failed to show that counsel's 

performance was flawed in any way. The fact that counsel did not 

pursue the opportunity afforded him by the trial court to interview Priest's codefendant is not, in itself, grounds for ineffective assistance. The record demonstrates that counsel conferred 

with Priest and that together they made a strategic choice not to 

delay the proceedings because of the slim probability that the 

codefendant would be willing to exculpate Priest. Thus counsel 

informed the court: 

Your Honor, I have discussed the matter with my client, 

Mr. Priest. I have advised him of the probable position 

that [the codefendant] would take, and Mr. Priest has 

elected to go forward at this time and not request a 

continuance until tomorrow morning. 

Priest v. United States, No. 84-C-1637, slip op. at 3 (D. Colo. 

Jan. 23, 1990) (emphasis added). Counsel's strategic choices such 

as the decision not to interview the codefendant in this case are 

virtually unchallengeable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 690-91 (1984). 

We reject Priest's assertion that the district court cannot 

consistently conclude that the codefendant's testimony was at once 

discoverable with due diligence and that defense counsel was not 

ineffective for deciding not to investigate it. Defense counsel 

made a principled judgment in advising Priest of the advantages 

and disadvantages of foregoing the interview with the codefendant. 

One of the disadvantages which Priest and his attorney voluntarily 

accepted was the risk, albeit a very slim one when viewed 

objectively at the time of the decision, that the codefendant 

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Appellate Case: 90-1041 Document: 010110040755 Date Filed: 08/09/1990 Page: 4 
would willingly testify that he, and he alone, was guilty --

thereby exculpating Priest. It is just such a choice between 

acceptable risks in formulating trial strategy which the Supreme 

Court has generally excepted from judicial review. Id. at 690-91. 

Moreover, as the district court found, Priest has failed 

entirely to demonstrate with reasonable probability that but for 

counsel's decision not to interview the codefendant, the result of 

the trial would have been different. See id. at 694. The trial 

court specifically noted that the codefendant's 1985 "affidavit 

indicates that he would testify now, but is silent regarding what 

his testimony would have been in 1977, five days after he was 

arrested." The district court went on to conclude that "it was 

highly unlikely that [the codefendant] would have been willing to 

exculpate Priest at his 1977 trial since [the codefendant] was 

then facing criminal charges stemming from the same incident." 

Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the district 

court that Priest has not demonstrated any degree of prejudice 

resulting from his own strategic decision, on advice of counsel, 

not to delay the trial in order to interview the codefendant. 

Accordingly, we reject Priest's ineffective assistance of counsel 

argument. 

The order of the district court is affirmed; the mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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