Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02071/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUNNI ALI SHABAZZ,

Plaintiff,

v

OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

 /

No C 03-2071 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff Sunni Ali Shabazz alleges that defendant

Oakland Unified School District (OUSD) terminated him based on his

race and religion in violation of federal and California law. Doc

#13 (First Am Compl) (FAC). OUSD moves for summary judgment in its

favor on all of the claims alleged in the FAC. Doc #35 (MSJ). 

Shabazz opposes. Doc #40 (Opp). Because the court finds this

matter suitable for decision without oral argument, the hearing

scheduled for June 23, 2005, is VACATED. Civ L R 7-1(b). Based on

the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law, the court GRANTS

OUSD’s motion.

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I

Shabazz is an African-American Muslim. FAC at 2. On

January 21, 2001, OUSD hired Shabazz as a temporary teacher at

Stonehurst Elementary School (SES). Id at 3. Wilhelmina

Santamaria (Santamaria) became the SES principal in September 2001. 

Id. 

The heart of this case lies in the events that occurred

on December 4, 2001, at an SES school assembly. According to OUSD,

while Shabazz was in the SES auditorium, another teacher, Samuel

Martinez (Martinez), observed one of Shabazz’s students repeatedly

strike another student. Martinez took the student to Shabazz and

inquired whether Shabazz wanted to discipline the student. Shabazz

declined, stating that he had not witnessed the incident. MSJ at

2. Shabazz does not dispute these facts. Shabazz alleges,

however, that Martinez then took the student to the principal’s

office and as he walked away from Shabazz, Martinez stated that

Shabazz was “being a nigger.” Compl at 3; Doc #35 (Combs Decl) Ex

B (Shabazz Depo) at 113:15. Martinez vehemently denies that he

called Shabazz a nigger. MSJ at 2.

According to OUSD, after Martinez allegedly called

Shabazz a nigger, Shabazz followed Martinez into the school’s main

office where he confronted Martinez and began to raise his voice

and became “completely uncontrollable, volatile and threatening.” 

MSJ at 3. In front of parents, students and other SES staff,

Shabazz repeatedly said to Martinez: “I am not a nigger” and

“Don’t treat me like a nigger.” Id. A school security officer,

Gilbert Lane, arrived in the office during the altercation. Doc

#35 (Combs Decl), Ex I (Lane Depo) at 19:19-21. Lane states that

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he saw “Shabazz and Mr Martinez arguing with each other and one of

our teachers, Ms Jones, [was] in between them holding them back.” 

Id. Lane testified that Shabazz was “the most upset” of the two

men; he was “the loudest and had a little bit more body language.”. 

Id at 22:14-20. Lane described physically removing Shabazz from

the office:

Q: Were you able to remove Mr Shabazz from the office?

A: Yes, I was.

Q: Did you have to touch him or grab him to do that?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: He didn’t want to leave the office I take it?

A: True.

Q: How did you move him out of the office?

A: I grabbed him and I started pushing him back. He spun off 

 me and got away from me. And I grabbed him again and I 

 put my knee in his buttocks so I could push him forward 

 and then pushed him outside the door.

Id, Ex J, Tr at 23:4-18.

Following the December 4, 2001, incident, OUSD placed Shabazz on

paid administrative leave. An administrative investigation was

performed by Danny Shottenfeld, a labor relations analyst in OUSD’s

Human Resources Division; Shottenfeld recommended that Shabazz be

terminated. Pursuant to Shottenfeld’s recommendation, on January

15, 2002, Shabazz was terminated. MSJ at 3. While it is unclear

how (or if) Martinez was disciplined, it appears he is still

employed at OUSD.

Shabazz does not so much dispute OUSD’s version of the

facts as much as he attempts to mitigate or explain them. 

Specifically, Shabazz states that:

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4

Both [I] and Martinez argued in loud voices,

used profanity and racial epithets, and neither

one threatened or attempted to assault the

other. Although [OUSD] may claim that [my]

behavior was more volatile, this is to be

expected since Martinez initiated the incident

by calling [me] perhaps the most inflammatory

racial slur in the English language, whereas [I]

did not refer to Martinez with any epithets at

any time during the argument.

Opp at 10.

Accordingly, it appears undisputed that (1) Shabazz and Martinez

had an argument in the main office of SES, (2) Shabazz was the more

volatile of the two men during the altercation and (3) Shabazz was

escorted out of the office by a security officer. It appears the

only fact in dispute regarding the events of December 4, 2001, is

whether Martinez called Shabazz a “nigger” in the SES auditorium. 

On May 5, 2003, Shabazz filed his original complaint in

pro per in this court. Doc #1. On September 29, 2003, newly

represented by counsel, Shabazz filed the FAC asserting seven

causes of action against OUSD stemming from his January 12, 2002,

termination. Specifically, Shabazz alleges that OUSD terminated

him on the basis of his race (African American) and his religion

(Muslim) in violation of (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq (Title VII), (2) 42 USC § 1983 (§

1983), (3) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §§

2000d et seq (Title VI), (4) the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, US Const, Amend XIV, § 2, (5) Article I §

7(a) of the California Constitution and (6) the California Fair

Housing and Employment Act, Cal Gov Code § 12980 et seq (FEHA). 

Additionally, Shabazz alleges intentional infliction of emotional

distress. 

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OUSD moves for summary judgment in its favor asserting

that there exists no genuine issue of material fact whether Shabazz

was terminated on the basis of his race and religion. MSJ at 1.

II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. And

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP

56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v

Pacific Elec Contractors Assn, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). 

The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 

Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

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determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979).

Accordingly, because all evidence offered by Shabazz is

to be believed, the court will assume that Martinez called Shabazz

a “nigger” in the SES auditorium. This assumption is of little

import, however, for even if Martinez used this offensive racial

epithet, the court concludes that OUSD is nonetheless entitled to

summary judgment on the issue whether Shabazz was terminated based

on his race and religion.

III

Title VII 

Title VII prohibits employers from terminating an

employee on the basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex

or national origin. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a). Shabazz asserts that

OUSD terminated him based on his religion and race and thus the

court will address each claim separately.

A

“A Title VII religious discrimination claim may be

brought under several possible theories, including disparate

treatment of religion or failure to accommodate religious beliefs.” 

Bodett v Coxcom, Inc, 366 F3d 736, 742 (9th Cir 2004) (citation

omitted). It is clear that Shabazz is pursuing a disparate

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treatment discrimination claim. 

“Disparate treatment [religious discrimination] claims

must proceed along the lines of the praxis laid out by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792 (1973), and its

progeny.” Id at 743. Under McDonnell Douglas, “a complainant must

first establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.” Id. 

“Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the

defendant to produce some evidence demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.” Id. If the

defendant meets this burden, any presumption of discrimination

“drops from the case” and the plaintiff must then show that the

defendant’s alleged reason for termination is merely a pretext for

discrimination. Id. “A plaintiff ‘may prove pretext either

directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more

likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the

employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Id

(quoting Raad v Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 323

F3d 1185, 1196 (9th Cir 2003)).

To establish a prima facie case of religious

discrimination, Shabazz is required to show that (1) he is a member

of a protected class, (2) he is qualified for his position, (3) he

experienced an adverse employment action and (4) other similarly

situated employees outside of the protected class were treated more

favorably. Bodett, 366 F3d at 743-44; see also Peterson v HewlettPackard Co, 358 F3d 599, 603 (9th Cir 2004). 

The court concludes that Shabazz has made out a prima

facie case of religious discrimination. First, Shabazz, as a

Muslim, is a member of a protected class. Pjetrovic v Merrill

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Lynch & Co, Inc, 2004 US Dist LEXIS 23883, *10 n1 (S D NY 2004). 

Next, OUSD does not assert that Shabazz was not qualified for the

position of temporary teacher. Next, termination is unquestionably

an adverse employment action. Finally, Martinez, a non-Muslim, was

treated more favorably than Shabazz; he was not terminated

following the December 4, 2001, altercation. 

The burden thus shifts to OUSD to offer a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Shabazz’s termination. OUSD has

clearly satisfied this requirement. OUSD states that Shabazz was

terminated based on the inappropriate conduct he exhibited on

December 4, 2001. MSJ at 3-4 (stating that Shabazz was “terminated

from his contract because of his outburst and * * * unprofessional

conduct in the office of [SES]”). OUSD’s proffered explanation is

supported by the deposition testimony of Shottenfeld, the labor

relations analyst who conducted the administrative investigation

into the December 4, 2001, incident. Shottenfeld states that he

recommended Shabazz’s termination based on his “investigation and

[] the statements put forth as a result of that investigation.” 

Doc #44 (Combs Supp Decl), Ex A (Shottenfeld Depo) at 47:18-20; see

also Doc #35 (Lemon-Thomas Decl), Ex B (12/4/01 Admin Leave Letter)

(informing Shabazz that he is being placed on administrative leave

“to provide [OUSD] time to conduct an investigation for improper

conduct” stemming from the December 4, 2001, incident). 

Because OUSD has produced evidence demonstrating a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Shabazz, the

burden shifts back to Shabazz to persuade the court that OUSD’s

proffered reason for termination is merely a pretext for religious

discrimination. The Ninth Circuit instructs that circumstantial

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evidence of pretext must be “specific” and “substantial” to survive

summary judgment. Bodett, 366 F3d at 743.

To demonstrate that OUSD’s legitimate reason for

terminating him was pretext for religious discrimination, Shabazz

asserts that on November 23, 2001, Santamaria verbally denied

Shabazz’s request that SES hold a Ramadan sharing assembly. Opp at

4. Ramadan is a Muslim holiday. Shabazz claims that in denying

his request to hold the Ramadan sharing assembly, Santamaria stated

that “[w]e cannot bring religion into this school.” Id. Shabazz

asserts that this statement evidences Santamaria’s bias against the

Muslim faith because a “Los Dios de Muerte [a Mexican religious

observance] assembly has recently taken place.” Id.

Assuming arguendo that this single encounter

substantially evidences an anti-Muslim bias on the part of

Santamaria (an assumption the court finds largely untenable),

Shabazz fails to demonstrate why Santamaria’s alleged bias shows

that OUSD’s “proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 

Bodett, 366 F3d at 743. Shabazz relies on Beregne v Salt Water

Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 272 F3d 1136

(9th Cir 2001), for the proposition that Santamaria’s putative

anti-Muslim bias can be imputed to OUSD human relations’ decision

to terminate Shabazz. Opp at 9-10. 

In Bergene, plaintiff alleged that she was not promoted

by her employer in retaliation for filing a lawsuit stemming from

her husband’s termination from the same employer. Id at 1141. In

attempting show that the employer’s proffered reason for not

promoting her was pretextual, the Bergene plaintiff offered direct

evidence that her former supervisor, Wilson, had informed her of

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his retaliatory intent towards her. Id. The employer countered

that Wilson was not the person ultimately responsible for

determining whether to promote plaintiff and thus his bias could

not negate the proffered legitimate reason for failure to promote

plaintiff.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that “[a]lthough

Pratt, [plaintiff’s] immediate supervisor, was ultimately

responsible for selecting the [employee to be promoted], there is

evidence that Wilson played an influential role in the selection

process. Even if a manager was not the ultimate decisionmaker,

that manager’s retaliatory motive may be imputed to the company if

the manager was involved in the hiring decision.” Id (emphasis

added) (citing Dey v Colt Construction & Development Co, 28 F3d

1446, 1459-60 (7th Cir 1994)).

The court finds Bergene distinguishable. In the present

case, Shabazz offers no evidence demonstrating that Santamaria

played an influential role in the decision to terminate Shabazz. 

The deposition of Yolanda Peeks, a former OUSD executive director

who reviewed the administrative investigation into the December 4,

2001, incident, demonstrates that Santamaria was involved in

Shottenfeld’s administrative investigation, not his decision. Doc

#41 (Ahmad Decl), Ex E (Peeks Depo). Specifically, it appears

Santamaria aided Shottenfeld in (1) framing the avenues for

investigation and (2) interviewing Martinez, Shabazz and other

witnesses to the December 4, 2001, event. Id at 35:17-21. But

there no evidence that Santamaria was involved in the decision to

terminate Shabazz. Indeed, Peeks’ deposition (which was offered by

Shabazz) clearly demonstrates that the review of the investigatory

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findings and the decision to terminate Shabazz was solely the

decision of Shottenfeld and the human resources department.

Id at 59:4-5 (stating that “Mr Shottenfeld would be the one

determining which actions would be taken” regarding Shabazz’s

employment); id at 59:13-15 (“The final determination is what

actions are taken at [the final] point * * *. And the final

decisions are made by the human resources department.”); Id at

59:16-21 (stating that Shottenfeld is in human resources and “he

makes the decisions”). 

In essence, Shabazz offers no evidence that Santamaria

was involved with Shottenfeld and the human resources department in

deciding whether to terminate Shabazz. While Shabazz conclusorily

states that “Santamaria was significantly involved in the * * *

decision-making process that culminated in [his] termination,” Opp

at 9, such speculations and conclusions do not suffice to create a

genuine issue of material fact. Thornhill Publishing Co, 594 F2d

at 738. There is no significant and probative evidence that

Santamaria was involved in the decision to terminate Shabazz or

that Shottenfeld even knew of her alleged refusal to hold a Ramadan

sharing assembly.

Accordingly, Shabazz has failed to demonstrate that

OUSD’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating him is mere pretext for religious discrimination and

thus OUSD is entitled to summary judgment.

B

Based on the above logic, Shabazz’s racial discrimination

claim also fails. Shabazz succeeds in establishing a prima facie

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case of racial discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. First, as

an African American, Shabazz is a member of a protected class. 

Rodriguez v General Motors Corp, 904 F2d 531, 533 (9th Cir 1990). 

Next, it in undisputed that Shabazz was qualified for his teaching

position and that he was terminated. Finally, Shabazz has

demonstrated that a non-African American employee that was

similarly situated, Martinez, was treated more favorably (i e,

Martinez was not terminated following the December 4, 2001,

incident). 

As explained above, OUSD succeeds in rebutting the

presumption of racial discrimination by offering a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for Shabazz’s termination: His behavior

on December 4, 2001. Hence, the burden shifts back to Shabazz to

demonstrate that the proffered reason is mere pretext for racial

discrimination. 

To show the legitimate reason proffered by OUSD is

pretext, Shabazz again relies on a single encounter between him and

Santamaria. According to Shabazz, on September 3, 2001, he

attended a staff meeting in the SES auditorium. Opp at 3. During

the staff meeting, Santamaria “referred to [Shabazz] as ‘this

Shaquille O’Neal fella here.” Id. Shabazz claims that he felt

“insulted and humiliated” by Santamaria’s comment and the laughter

it provoked. Id. Later that day, when Shabazz confronted

Santamaria in her office and asked for an apology, she refused,

stating that she was “not afraid of black men.” Id. 

Assuming that this incident evidences Santamaria’s racial

animus towards African Americans, as discussed above, there is no

evidence that Santamaria was involved in the decision to terminate

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Shabazz. Accordingly, Shabazz has failed to show that the

legitimate reason offered by OUSD is mere pretext for racial

discrimination and thus OUSD is entitled to summary judgment.

C

“Courts commonly use the Title VII discrimination proof

scheme to evaluate claims for intentional discrimination under

Title VI.” Escobar v Montgomery County Board of Education, 2001 US

Dist LEXIS 1069, *17-18 (D Md 2001) (citing cases). Hence, for the

reasoning announced above, OUSD is entitled to summary judgment on

Shabazz’s Title VI claim. 

IV

§ 1983 & Federal and California Constitutions

Shabazz alleges that OUSD violated § 1983 by terminating

him based on his race and religion in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Compl at 4. “A

plaintiff who fails to establish intentional discrimination for

purposes of Title VII * * * fails to establish intentional

discrimination for purposes of [a] § 1983” claim premised on a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sischo-Nownejad v Mercerd

Community College District, 934 F2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir 1991)

(Reinhardt, J) (citing Knight v Nassau County Civil Service

Commission, 649 F2d 157, 161-62 (9th Cir 1981)). Because the court

concludes that Shabazz has failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact on his Title VII claim, he cannot survive a motion

for summary judgment on his § 1983 claim. 

Inexplicably, Shabazz asserts a separate claim against

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OUSD for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compl at 6. Aside

from its redundancy, this claim fails as a matter of law because 

Shabazz has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on his

Title VII claim. Nownejad, 934 F2d at 1112. This logic applies to

Shabazz’s claim under the California Constitution as well, for it

is settled that “the California and federal tests for equal

protection are substantially the same.” Sail’er Inn, Inc v Kirby,

5 Cal 3d 1, 18n13 (1971). Accordingly, OUSD is entitled to summary

judgment on both of Shabazz’s constitutional claims. 

V

FEHA

Next, Shabazz asserts that OUSD violated FEHA in

terminating him based on his race and religion. Compl at 9. 

“‘California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test

established by the United States Supreme Court for trying claims of

discrimination * * * based on a theory of disparate treatment.’” 

Slatkin v University of Redlands, 88 Cal App 4th 1147, 1156 (2001)

(quoting Guz v Bechtel Nat’l, Inc, 24 Cal 4th 317, 354 (2000)). 

“This test is commonly known as the McDonnell Douglas test * * *.” 

Id. Accordingly, OUSD is entitled to summary judgment on Shabazz’s

FEHA claim for the same reasons described above in connection with

Title VII. See supra Part III.

VI

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

OUSD asserts that, as a public entity, it enjoys immunity

from claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. MSJ

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at 8. Shabazz’s opposition is silent regarding OUSD’s assertion of

immunity and thus the court assumes that Shabazz does not oppose

the granting of summary judgment to OUSD on this claim. 

For the sake of completeness, however, the court notes

that OUSD’s immunity argument appears to be well-supported by

California case law. See Wright v California, 122 Cal App 4th 659,

671 (2004) (dismissing with prejudice a plaintiff’s intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim against the state because

“public entit[ies][are] not liable for tortious injury unless the

liability is imposed by statute.”) (citing Zuniga v Housing

Authority, 41 Cal App 4th 82 (1995)). Shabazz has not offered, and

the court has not been able to find, a California statute exposing

public entities to intentional infliction of emotional distress

claims arising from alleged employment discrimination. 

Accordingly, OUSD is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

VII

In sum, the court GRANTS OUSD’s motion for summary

judgment (Doc #35). The clerk is directed to CLOSE the file and

TERMINATE all motions. 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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