Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01893/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01893-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ANDREW CORTEZ CRATER,

NO. CIV. S 01-1893 MCE GGH P

Petitioner,

v. ORDER

GEORGE GALAZA, Warden

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner filed this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raised three procedural

issues which he believes denied him a fair trial: 1) The trial

court erred in failing to change venue; 2) The trial judge

exhibited bias on the facts of the case such that he should have

recused himself; and 3) The jury should have been instructed that

in order to find the special circumstance of murder during the

commission of a robbery, the murder must have been carried out to

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

advance the commission of the robbery. The matter was referred

to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.

On April 19, 2005, the magistrate judge filed findings and

recommendations herein which were served on all parties and which

contained notice to all parties that any objections to the

findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. 

Petitioner and Respondent have both filed objections.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-304, this Court has conducted a de

novo review of this case. The Court finds the magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by

proper analysis as to whether the trial court committed error in

failing to change venue and as to whether the jury should have

been given instructions on the special circumstance of murder

committed during a robbery. The court does not find, however,

that the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations support

a finding that the trial judge exhibited prejudicial bias and

should have recused himself. Given the detailed factual

summation provided in the findings and recommendations, which are

incorporated herein by reference, the court need not reiterate

the circumstances underlying this matter except as specifically

noted below.

//

//

//

//

//

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, AEDPA is not 1

unconstitutional despite the recent request by a three judge

panel in a case totally unrelated to this case to have the issue

briefed. See Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d 1165; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS

9224 (9 Cir., 2005). th

3

STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

governs Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition. Under the 1

relevant provision of the AEDPA, a federal court may grant relief

only if the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1).

The “contrary to” clause and the “unreasonable application”

clause have been accorded distinct meanings. See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). 

First, the Supreme Court has instructed that a state court

decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if the

state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set

forth in Supreme Court cases or if the state court confronts a

set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of the Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.

Ed. 2d 144 (2003). 

The Supreme Court has further explained that a state court

decision can constitute an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent only if such application is not just incorrect or

erroneous but also “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer, 538

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

U.S. at 75. Under this standard, it is not enough that a federal

habeas court, in its “independent review of the legal question”

is left with a “firm conviction” that the state court was

“erroneous.” Id. Rather, the application must be objectively

unreasonable. Id.

As applied here, the standard requires that this Court first

decide what constitutes “clearly established” Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Clearly

established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal

principle set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state

court rendered its decision. Id.

The parties agree that in order for a Petitioner to prevail

on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, he or she must show that

the trial judge exhibited either actual bias or an interest in

the outcome of the case but failed to recuse himself or herself. 

See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905; 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1797;

138 L. Ed. 2d 97, 104 (1997). The parties disagree, however, as

to whether an appearance of bias by a judge is likewise

sufficient to warrant recusal. 

Petitioner argues that both actual bias as well as an

appearance of bias demand recusal of a trial judge. Conversely,

Respondent argues that while actual bias is a ground for recusal,

an appearance of bias is not. In support of the latter argument, 

Respondent relies on a Seventh Circuit case which interpreted

Supreme Court precedent regarding judicial recusal. According to

Respondent, that case stands for the proposition that the mere

appearance of bias is insufficient to implicate the Due Process

Clause. See Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 31

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

F.3d 1363 (7th Cir., 1994). 

This court disagrees with Respondent’s position. The

Supreme Court, in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, has

unequivocally stated that the mere appearance of bias must be

avoided:

The Due Process Clause may sometimes bar trial by

judges who have no actual bias and who would do their

very best to weigh the scales of justice equally

between contending parties. But to perform its high

function in the best way, justice must satisfy the

appearance of justice.

475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)(emphasis added)(internal citations and

quotations omitted).

Clearly, if a Petitioner can show even the appearance of

bias (let alone any actual bias or an interest in the case) by a

judge who does not recuse himself or herself, a violation of due

process will have been established and relief should be granted.

ANALYSIS

The disposition of the issues raised herein turn on the

facts of the underlying case which are in some ways unique. By

way of background, Petitioner and a co-defendant were charged

with murder committed during the commission of a robbery. This

was charged as a “special circumstance” murder which would

subject Petitioner and his co-defendant to a possible sentence of

life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”).

During the preliminary stages of the state court

proceedings, the judge severed the co-defendants for trial.

Petitioner’s co-defendant was tried in the same court by the same

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

judge just weeks prior to Petitioner’s trial. During the trial

of the co-defendant, the trial judge was able to observe

virtually the same evidence and hear the same testimony that

would be presented against Petitioner. In addition to not only

hearing the testimony and observing the evidence, the trial judge

was also aware of a confession made by Petitioner and a letter of

apology written to the murder victim’s family which was published

in the local newspaper. Rarely, if ever, is a trial judge in a

position to have such detailed information about a case, the

defendant(s), the witnesses and the evidence prior to trial. 

Notwithstanding the appreciable evidence against him, the

District Attorney’s office offered Petitioner the opportunity to

plead guilty to the murder without admitting to the special

circumstance. By accepting the plea offer, Petitioner would no

longer face a possible sentence of LWOP.

The exact reason why the District Attorney made this offer

to Petitioner is not known. The District Attorney may have been

motivated by the fact that Petitioner’s co-defendant was

convicted of being the person who actually pulled the trigger. 

Moreover, as the state appellate court aptly explained,

Petitioner was not what one would consider the “usual” murder

suspect. He had no criminal record and enjoyed academic success

at the collegiate level. While formally educated, he was an

unsophisticated defendant as compared to those well versed in

navigating the criminal justice system. Petitioner was likely

unaware of the consequences of rejecting the state’s offer. 

Petitioner claims that the trial judge was biased in that he

predetermined Petitioner’s guilt and, therefore, was unable to

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

fairly preside over the trial. As evidence of bias, Petitioner

points to the judge’s pretrial statements wherein the judge

expressed his belief that Petitioner should accept the

prosecution’s offer of a plea bargain. 

In discussing the prosecution’s offer with Petitioner and

his counsel, the trial judge stated as follows: 

“Based upon what I know about this case - and I’m in a

very unique position in this case, because I’ve already

heard all of the witnesses. I know everything that

happened that night, and I have assessed everything

that the witnesses have said...and based upon what I’ve

heard about this case, I’m real sure that you’re going

to be convicted of all those robberies...and you’re

going to be found guilty of murder in the first

degree.”

(Resp’t Opp’n p. 3)

The trial judge went on to inform Petitioner that going to

trial would be a “stupid” decision and otherwise explained the

myriad risks of rejecting the prosecution’s offer.

By rejecting the prosecution's offer in the face of what

appeared to be overwhelming evidence against him, Petitioner

gambled the chance for eventual parole against a very real

possibility of LWOP if convicted. 

As the trial judge explained:

“...this is an offer which gives you, at some point in

your life, an opportunity to get out of prison. You

will die in prison if you are found guilty of the

special circumstance...I frankly, am having trouble

understanding your position, your state of mind on all

of this ... even if you succeed in beating the claim of

special circumstance, your sentence is probably going

to be what the District Attorney is offering you. So

to all of us, it seems like you’re taking a needless

risk with no advantages ... I hate to see somebody

twenty-one years old with your intelligence and

potential make what is in a word a stupid decision.” 

(Resp’t Opp’n p. 4)

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

After a thorough review of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 2

this Court finds no express rule of law that demands recusal

under the facts presented here. Similarly, this Court finds no

Supreme Court decisions factually indistinguishable from the case

at bar. Accordingly, the state court’s adjudication of the issue

did not violate the “contrary to” clause of the AEDPA.

8

The trial judge stated what he believed would be the outcome

of the case based on his experience, not only as an experienced

judge in general, but also as one with intimate knowledge of this

very case. In fact, just as the trial judge had predicted, the

jury ultimately found Petitioner guilty of the crime of murder

and the special circumstance was found to be true-- resulting in

a sentence of LWOP which Petitioner is now serving.

This court must now determine whether the statements of the

trial judge nonetheless constituted sufficient judicial bias to

mandate recusal, and whether the trial judge’s failure to recuse

himself was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 2

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

The salient issue raised by Petitioner’s claim is whether

the state court violated the “unreasonable application” clause in

concluding that the trial judge’s statements did not reflect

actual bias, an interest in the outcome of the case or an

appearance of bias that would demand recusal. 

 With respect to actual bias, Petitioner is not claiming,

and the magistrate judge did not find, actual bias on the part of

the trial judge. In reviewing the record, this court has not

found any evidence of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. 

Similarly, this court has found no evidence in the record that

the trial judge had any interest in the outcome of this case. 

The issue now before this court is whether the judge’s statements

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

to the Petitioner prior to trial appear so biased as to have

mandated recusal. 

First of all, the statements made by the trial judge were

made on the record, with Petitioner’s attorney present. This

environment not only subjected the trial judge to subsequent

review but further insured that Petitioner was represented by

counsel, who did not register any objection(s) to the judge’s

statements. This is in stark contrast to a situation where a

judge could make statements to a defendant in a closed door

session, void of representation, where leverage could be unduly

applied without fear of reprisal. 

Moreover, the trial judge’s comments were made outside the

presence of the ultimate finder of fact, the jury. Much of the

concern about an otherwise inappropriate judicial act or remark

is neutralized by the absence of the jury. See United States v.

Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir., 1992). 

The trial judge’s direct and candid statements clearly

advised Petitioner of the gravity of the circumstances facing

him. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, in making the statements

at issue, the trial judge did not determine Petitioner’s guilt

expressly or otherwise. Indeed, the ultimate determination of

Petitioner’s guilt was made by the members of the jury who were

not privy to any of the statements made by the judge. The judge

repeatedly asserted his opinion that the “jury would find”

Petitioner guilty as charged. (Resp’t Opp’n p. 3-4)(emphasis

added). These prospective statements made to Petitioner in the

context of pretrial discussions while he was represented by

counsel did not deprive him of his right to due process. 

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide as follows: 3

“An attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or

the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a

plea agreement. The court must not participate in these

discussions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(emphasis added). 

This Court wishes to stress that its ruling in this case is 4

limited to the facts presented. As a general matter, we agree

with the magistrate judge that as judicial involvement increases,

scrutiny should likewise increase to assure that due process is

properly preserved. However, as explained in detail above, this

Court is firmly convinced that judicial involvement in and of

itself does not give rise to a claim of judicial bias. Rather,

when sparingly and deservedly applied, as in the case at bar, it

can enhance due process. 

10

Petitioner fails to cite any authority which precludes a

trial judge from honestly assessing the merits of a case before

him during pretrial discussions. While a federal judge may not

engage in discussions which may result in settlement of a

criminal case under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 3

same is not true of a state trial judge. Indeed, state trial

judges are not only permitted to engage in precisely the type of

dialogue as is at issue here, they must necessarily do so lest

the state criminal system grind to a halt.

The law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a

judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and

whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea. 

See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820 (citations and quotations omitted). 

To succeed on his claim of judicial bias, Petitioner is required

to overcome this presumption of honesty and integrity. 

Petitioner has failed to do so. Accordingly, this court finds

that the state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent was

objectively reasonable.4

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

CONCLUSION

The findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge

filed April 19, 2005, are adopted in full except as to

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court violated his due process

rights by exhibiting judicial bias during the pretrial settlement

discussions. In that regard, the findings and recommendations

are rejected.

For the reasons set forth in this Order, the petition for

writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 30, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:01-cv-01893-MCE -GGH Document 45 Filed 09/30/05 Page 11 of 11