Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01986/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01986-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331cv Fed. Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALTON JONES, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

U.S. BORDER PATROL 

AGENT GERARDO 

HERNANDEZ et al., 

 Defendants. 

 Case No.: 16-CV-1986-W(WVG) 

ORDER ON DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

OVER DELIBERATIVE PROCESS 

PRIVILEGE ASSERTED BY 

DEFENDANTS

 Pending before the Court is the parties’ dispute over Plaintiff’s discovery request 

that Defendants disclose emails memorializing deliberations regarding their decision to 

not bring criminal charges against Plaintiff for his alleged assault on a federal officer. 

Defendants submitted the unredacted disputed emails to the Court for in camera review, 

and the Court convened an informal teleconference with the parties’ attorneys and heard 

argument on June 30, 2017. As explained below, the Court finds Defendants need not 

disclose the disputed emails. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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I. BACKGROUND

 On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him during a 

confrontation near the United States-Mexico border. (ECF. No. 1.) After the 

confrontation, Defendants placed Plaintiff in a patrol vehicle, transported him to the 

Imperial Beach Border Patrol station, and detained him overnight. While Plaintiff was 

in custody, the Imperial Beach Border Patrol Station management and members of the 

Smuggling Interdiction Group (“SIG”) discussed via email whether to recommend 

bringing criminal charges against Plaintiff and debated which of them had the authority 

to make that final determination. (Parties’ Informal Joint Submission (“PIJS”) at 7.)1

 

Plaintiff was held in custody until Patrol Agent-in-Charge (“AIC”) Bovino decided not 

to recommend charging Plaintiff with a criminal offense. (Id.) On April 10, 2017, 

Defendants filed an Amended Counter-Claim, alleging that Plaintiff had assaulted and 

battered one of the Border Patrol agents during the initial confrontation “in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1).” (ECF. No. 19.) 

 The United States’ initial disclosures indicate that Border Patrol agents in the 

agency’s internal prosecutions unit are “likely to have discoverable information that 

[Plaintiff] may use to support [his] claims and/or defenses.” (PIJS at 1.) On April 28, 

2017, Plaintiff sought production of all Border Patrol documents concerning the 

incident. (Id.) On May 30, 2017, Defendants responded to this request and asserted the 

deliberative process privilege to withhold portions of emails between the Imperial 

Beach Patrol Station, SIG, and AIC Bovino. (Id.) 

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/ / / 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Discovery in Civil Cases 

 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant 

to any party’s claim or defense, and for good cause, the Court may order discovery of 

any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1). Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery 

appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id.

 However, the Court must limit discovery if the burden of the proposed discovery 

outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). In such situations, the Court 

must limit discovery if it determines that: 

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can 

be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 

burdensome, or less expensive; 

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the 

information by discovery in the action; or 

(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 

26(b)(1). 

Id. “In each instance, the determination whether . . . information is discoverable 

because it is relevant to the claims or defenses depends on the circumstances of the 

pending action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Note (2000 Amendment) 

(Gap Report) (Subdivision (b)(1)). 

 Pursuant to Rule 37(a), a party propounding discovery may seek an order 

compelling disclosure when an opposing party objects or otherwise fails to respond or 

provides evasive or incomplete responses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). “[A]n evasive 

or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, 

 1

 Pursuant to this Court’s Chambers Rules, the parties submitted an informal joint brief 

for this discovery dispute. The joint brief initially was not filed on the public docket, 

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answer, or respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). 

 “The party opposing the discovery bears the burden of resisting disclosure.” 

Odyssey Wireless, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd, Nos. 15-cv-02738-H(RBB), 

15-cv-01743-H(RBB), 15-cv-01735-H(RBB), 2016 WL 7665898, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

September 20, 2016); Valenzuela v. City of Calexico, No. 14-cv-481-BAS(PCL), 2015 

WL 926149, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2015). However, the moving party is nevertheless 

required to inform the Court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to 

compel, and, for each disputed response, why the information sought is relevant and 

why the responding party’s objections are not meritorious. Valenzuela, 2015 WL 

926149, at *1; Womack v. Virga, No. CIV S-11-1030 MCE EFB P., 2011 WL 6703958, 

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011). 

B. The Deliberative Process Privilege 

 Additionally, the deliberative process privilege shields federal agencies from 

mandatory disclosure of “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which 

would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the 

agency . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). In order to assert the privilege, an agency must 

show that the information sought is (1) an inter-agency or intra-agency document, 

(2) pre-decisional, and (3) deliberative. Carter v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 307 F.3d 

1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). In this context, “agency” refers broadly to each authority of 

the United States government and includes any Executive department, military 

department, or other establishment in the Executive Branch, or any independent 

regulatory agency. Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 

U.S. 1, 9 (2001). “‘A document may be considered predecisional if it was ‘prepared in 

order to assist an agency decision maker in arriving at his decision.’” Carter, 307 F.3d 

at 1089 (quoting Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 

184 (1975)). Likewise, a document is deliberative if “the disclosure of [the] materials 

 

but will be filed with this Order. 

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would expose an agency’s decision making process in such a way as to discourage 

candid discussion within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to 

perform its functions.” Carter, 307 F.3d at 1089. 

 The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and is inapplicable if the 

litigant establishes that its need for the information outweighs the government’s interest 

in preventing disclosure of the information. FTC v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 F.2d 

1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). Among the factors to be considered in making this 

determination are: (1) the relevance of the evidence; (2) the availability of other 

evidence; (3) the government’s role in the litigation; and (4) the extent to which 

disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated 

policies and decisions. Id. In certain circumstances, the Court may deny the protection 

of the deliberative process privilege, regardless of the balancing test. These 

circumstances include the following: (1) when there is reason to believe that the 

documents sought may shed light on government misconduct, see id. at 1162; Lahr v. 

Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 569 F.3d 964, 980 (9th Cir. 2009); See also In Re Sealed Case

121 F.3d 729, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and (2) when the agency’s decision-making process 

is itself at issue, In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller 

of the Currency, 145 F.3d 1422, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

III. DISCUSSION AND RULINGS

 Plaintiff seeks production of emails sent between the Imperial Beach Border Patrol 

Station management, SIG, and AIC Bovino. Defendants have already produced a 

redacted version of these emails and have asserted the deliberative process privilege to 

withhold the redacted contents of these emails. The Court is satisfied that the disputed 

portions of these emails are properly subject to the deliberative process privilege. 

A. Defendants Satisfied the Elements of the Deliberative Process Privilege 

 The Court must first determine whether Defendants have properly asserted the 

privilege. Here, the Court finds that the documents are the type normally protected by 

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the deliberative process privilege. 

 First, the emails are intra-agency communications between the Imperial Beach 

Border Patrol Station, SIG, and AIC Bovino—all of which operate within the 

Department of Homeland Security, a federal agency. 

 Second, the communications were pre-decisional, meaning that, chronologically, 

they occurred prior to AIC Bovino’s decision not to recommend criminal charges. 

Further, the purpose of these communications was to determine who had the ultimate 

authority to make the decision to charge Plaintiff. 

 Finally, the communications were deliberative because they memorialized a 

candid conversation between agents who were discussing the mechanics of performing 

a discretionary function. In a broader sense, discussions pertaining to decisions to 

charge future individuals would be undermined if these communications were exposed 

through discovery because agents might not feel at liberty to present contrary opinions 

if those opinions would be subject to later scrutiny. 

 For these reasons, the Court find the Defendants have satisfied their initial burden 

of showing that these emails are subject to the deliberative process privilege. 

B. Plaintiff Did Not Establish that the Need to Disclose the Contents of the 

Emails Outweighs Defendants’ Privilege 

 Once all elements of the privilege have been shown by the governmental agency, 

the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to establish that its need for the 

information outweighs the interest of the government in preventing disclosure of the 

information. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because the 

deliberative process is a qualified privilege, the Court must next determine whether the 

litigant’s need for these emails outweighs the government’s interest in preventing their 

disclosure.

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1. The Relevance of the Evidence 

 First, the Court considers the relevance of the evidence. In response to Plaintiff’s 

allegations, Defendants counterclaimed for assault, battery, and negligence for injuries 

that a federal agent sustained while taking Plaintiff into custody. (Am. Counterclaim, 

Doc. No. 19 at 6-7.) Plaintiff then asserted a “defense” of “retaliation,” asserting that 

“[o]n information and belief, Defendant/Counter-Claimant USA’s pursuit of a 

counterclaim in this case is equitably or otherwise barred because it is substantially 

motivated by retaliation against Mr. Jones’s exercise of his First Amendment rights to 

freedom of speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances, including 

but not limited to his pursuit of this action.” (Ans. to Am. Counterclaim, ECF. No. 32 

¶ 16.) Plaintiff now argues that the emails are relevant because they speak to the 

legitimacy of Defendants’ counterclaims. He argues that knowing the contents of the 

deliberations would help demonstrate that the counterclaims are groundless retaliation 

against him for bringing this suit. After reviewing the contents of the redacted emails, 

the Court finds this argument is unpersuasive, as the contents of the emails are not 

relevant to any issue or fact of consequence in this case. 

 Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining 

the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item 

of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter 

properly provable in the case.” Id., advisory committee’s notes. 

 Here, after in camera review of the subject emails, the Court finds they are not 

relevant to any fact of consequence in this case. The emails demonstrate an internal 

power struggle between different factions of the same federal agency as they debate 

which faction will make the ultimate decision to recommend charging Plaintiff with a 

crime. The emails certainly do not reveal any reasons behind the ultimate decision to 

not recommend charges against the Plaintiff. In other words, the email participants 

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were not debating or exchanging ideas about the merits of the charging decision. They 

were simply engaged in the process of determining who “the decider” would be, and it 

appears there may have been miscommunication and confusion during that discussion 

about who that person would be. As such, this email string has no relevance to any 

issue or fact of consequence in this case and certainly does not make it any more or less 

probable that the Government’s decision to counterclaim against Plaintiff now was, as 

Plaintiff asserts, “substantially motivated by retaliation.” Internal bickering and 

assertion of decision-making authority, without discussion about the merits of the 

charging decision, in no way makes it more or less probable that the Government is 

now retaliating against Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds the subject emails are not 

relevant, and this factor heavily favors the Government. 

2. The Availability of Other Evidence 

 The Court must next consider the availability of other evidence. Plaintiff argues 

that, because the emails are the only contemporaneous discussions on whether to 

recommend criminal charges, there is no other evidence available. However, because 

the emails do not contain substantive discussion about recommending criminal charges, 

the unavailability of other evidence is moot. Thus, this factor weighs neutrally as to 

whether disclosure is appropriate. Because the emails do not contain substantive 

discussions about the merits for or against charging Plaintiff with a crime, they would 

not assist in any cross-examination. AIC Bovino retains that information and may be 

questioned accordingly in a deposition. 

3. The Government’s Role in the Litigation 

 Third, the Court considers the government’s role in the litigation. Here, the 

Government is a party to the suit and, thus, is integrally involved in the litigation. This 

factor weighs in favor of disclosure. See Thomas v. Cate, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1044 

(E.D. Cal. 2010). 

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 4. The Extent to Which Disclosure Would Hinder Frank and 

Independent Discussion Regarding Contemplated Policies and 

Decisions 

 Finally, the Court considers the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and 

independent discussion regarding contemplated policies and decisions. As explained 

above, the emails do not contain substantive discussions about the merits of charging 

Plaintiff. However, this factor nonetheless favors Defendants because, in a broader 

sense, disclosure of these types of emails would hinder frank and independent 

discussion. Disclosure would prospectively discourage agents from voicing contrary 

opinions or pointing out weaknesses in certain discretionary decisions if the records of 

these discussions are to be made public. This is especially true here, where Plaintiff’s 

very purpose is to mine the substance of a law enforcement agency’s deliberations 

about its charging decision. Compelling disclosure under these circumstances would 

discourage agents from having frank and open discussions about charging decisions. 

This factor favors the Government. 

 5. Conclusion 

 Having weighed these four factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s need for these 

emails does not outweigh Defendants’ interest in preventing their disclosure. 

C. The Emails Do Not Shed Light on Government Misconduct 

 But the Court’s inquiry does not end there. When there is reason to believe that 

the documents sought may shed light on government misconduct, the deliberative 

process privilege is usually pierced, regardless of the strength of the government’s 

interest in preventing disclosure. See FTC, 742 F.2d at 1162; Lahr, 569 F.3d at 979. To 

invoke the government misconduct exception, the party seeking discovery must provide 

an adequate factual basis for the belief that the requested discovery would shed light on 

government misconduct. See Lahr, 569 F.3d at 979; see also Judicial Watch of Fla. v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 102 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2000); Am. Petroleum Tankers 

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Parent, LLC v. United States, 952 F. Supp. 2d 252, 268-69 (D.D.C. 2013). Here, based 

on the Court’s in camera review, the subject emails do not shed light on any government

misconduct, nor has Plaintiff provided even a scintilla of evidence to support such an 

allegation. 

D. The Agency’s Decision-Making Process is Not at Issue 

 The deliberative process privilege may be inapplicable if the agency’s decisionmaking process itself is at issue. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of 

the Comptroller of the Currency, 145 F.3d at 1424. Typically, this exception to the 

privilege applies to suits involving claims of discrimination or governmental 

malfeasance where the government agent’s subjective intent or deliberations are part of 

the alleged wrongdoing. Plaintiff has not brought claims of discrimination or 

governmental malfeasance, yet still argues the decision-making process, memorialized 

in the emails, is at issue in two ways. First, Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ delay in 

bringing the civil suit puts their decision not to prosecute Plaintiff at issue because it 

speaks to the legitimacy of the counterclaims. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants 

opened the door to the emails being at issue when they identified, in their initial 

disclosures, several agents as being “likely to have discoverable information that it may 

use to support its claims and/or defenses.” (PIJS at 3.) 

 The Court is unconvinced Defendants’ delay in bringing the counterclaims puts 

their earlier decision-making process at issue. Plaintiff has not claimed malicious 

prosecution, but rather an affirmative defense of retaliation. Even assuming this is a 

valid defense to the counterclaims, the discussion about whether to bring a criminal suit 

three years ago has marginal bearing on the decision to bring a civil counter-suit now. 

The standard of proof in a criminal case is far greater than in civil matters. The 

counterclaims’ legitimacy is therefore untethered from the decision to forgo charging a 

crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a unanimous jury. 

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 Similarly, the Defendants’ identification of agents on the prosecution unit in their 

initial disclosure does not put the contents of the emails at issue. As Defendants further 

explained at oral argument, the references to those agents in the initial disclosures 

related to Plaintiff’s claims of wrongful detainment. Those identified agents have 

discoverable material relevant to the process by which Plaintiff was detained and the 

time it took to determine whether to file charges against him. Indeed, the time-stamped 

emails reveal the length of the agents’ deliberations, which correspond with the length 

of Plaintiff’s detainment. Defendants already have produced this information in the 

redacted versions of the emails. The actual contents of these emails is not at issue here 

and, thus, further disclosure is unnecessary. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Defendants have shown the 

deliberative process privilege applies to the emails in dispute. Further, Plaintiff’s need 

for these emails does not outweigh Defendants’ interest in not disclosing them and the 

other exemptions to the privilege are not applicable. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Plaintiff’s request and declines to compel Defendants to disclose the redacted contents 

of the emails. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 14, 2017 

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