Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01436/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01436-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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28 1 Magistrate Judge Voss referred the matter to this Court for consideration of these

issues. (Doc. 174.) 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Gregory G. McGill and Jane Doe McGill,

Defendants.

_________________________________

Gregory G. McGill and Jane Doe McGill,

Counterclaimants,

v.

M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank,

Counterdefendants. 

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No. 10-CV-1436-PHX-ECV

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Referral to Magistrate for District

Court Ruling on Constitutional Issue of Lack of Consent. (Doc. 183.) In an order dated June

21, 2011, the Court found that Defendants’ allegations of bias against Magistrate Judge Voss

were without merit and that Defendants had not shown extraordinary circumstances

permitting withdrawal of their consent to have the case heard by a magistrate.1

 (Doc. 180.)

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2 Defendants assert that the Court’s purported errors reflect the fact that it did not

receive or review their “Limited Objection,” filed June 17, 2001. Defendants are incorrect.

The Court reviewed the filing, which is docketed as Doc. 175.

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The pending motion, in which Defendants ask this Court to vacate the referral to a

magistrate judge and order the case randomly assigned to a district court judge, is in essence

a motion for reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and appropriate only

if the court is “presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there

is an intervening change in the controlling law.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255

(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665

(9th Cir. 1999)); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). None of these factors is present here.

In support of their motion, Defendants first cite a “new development” in the case,

namely, their filing of a complaint of judicial misconduct against Magistrate Judge Voss in

the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. 183 at 1; see id., Ex 1.) Defendants do not explain what bearing this

development has on the Court’s analysis of the issues in its prior order, and the Court rejects

it as a basis for reconsidering its ruling. See In re Mann, 229 F.3d 657, 658–59 (7th Cir.

2000) (explaining that if a judicial complaint alone were sufficient to disqualify a judge

litigants “could easily manipulate the system by filing a misconduct complaint”). 

The Court also rejects Defendants’ claim that it committed legal errors in its

interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).2

 As outlined in the prior order, the parties signed a

notice and consent form and the case was referred “to a United States magistrate judge to

conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.” (Doc. 30.) Magistrate Judge Aspey was randomly assigned

to the case but recused himself on April 11, 2011, upon which the case was randomly

assigned to Magistrate Judge Voss. (Doc. 102.) On June 2, 2011, Defendants moved that

Magistrate Judge Voss recuse himself and that the matter be assigned to a district court

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3

 Rule 73(b)(2) helps clarify these points: “A district judge, magistrate judge, or other

court official may remind the parties of the magistrate judge’s availability, but must also

advise them that they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive

consequences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). This passage self-evidently refers to a party’s initial

consent to have the matter referred to a magistrate judge, not the party’s subsequent desire

to withdraw its consent or remove a particular magistrate judge. 

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judge. (Doc. 143.) Magistrate Judge Voss denied the motion, ruling that “Defendants’

consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction was not limited to Judge Aspey” and that

“Defendants’ contention that reassignment is required based on a lack of consent is without

merit.” (Doc. 150 at 1–2; see Doc. 174.) This Court agreed with Magistrate Judge Voss’

conclusions. (Doc. 180.)

Defendants contend that under 28 U.S.C.§ 636(c), their express consent was required

when the matter was assigned to Magistrate Judge Voss following Magistrate Judge Aspey’s

recusal. In support of this argument, they cite § 636(c)(2), which provides, in relevant part:

If a magistrate judge is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under

paragraph (1) of this subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the time the action

is filed, notify the parties of the availability of a magistrate judge to exercise

such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the

clerk of court. Thereafter, either the district court judge or the magistrate judge

may again advise the parties of the availability of the magistrate judge, but in

so doing, shall also advise the parties that they are free to withhold consent

without adverse substantive consequences. Rules of court for the reference of

civil matters to magistrate judges shall include procedures to protect the

voluntariness of the parties’ consent.

According to Defendants, this provision, which “contemplates subsequent magistrate

appointments,” required Defendants to be advised that their consent was necessary for the

matter to be assigned to another magistrate judge. (Doc. 183 at 4.) This reading of the statute

is untenable on its face and finds no support in the case law.

Defendants voluntarily and expressly elected to have the matter heard by a magistrate

judge. This was sufficient to satisfy § 636(c)(2). The statute cannot reasonably be read as

requiring judges to continually monitor the voluntariness of the parties’ consent after it has

been provided.3

 “[P]rocedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent” refers to

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the initial consent given by the parties to try the matter before a magistrate. It does not

contemplate giving a party veto power over the selection of a magistrate judge. There is no

requirement for “continuing expressions of consent before a magistrate can exercise authority

under a valid reference.” Carter v. Sea Land Services, Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1020 (5th Cir.

1987) (further rejecting “the slippery-slope invitation to read into the statute a rule that would

allow a party to express conditional consent to a reference”). Nor does § 636(c)(2) alter the

“good cause” or “extraordinary circumstances requirements” for vacating the referral, as set

forth in § 636(c)(4). This provision would be meaningless under Defendants’ interpretation

of the statute, which allows a party to withdraw—or withhold—its consent at any point in

the proceedings. 

Aldritch v. Bowen, 130 F.3d 1364 (9th Cir. 1997), Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d

57879 (9th Cir. 1998), and Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 690 F.2d 717 (9th Cir.

1982), offer no support for Defendants’ arguments. In those cases, there was no written

consent to have the case heard by a magistrate; the courts held that consent must be explicit

and cannot be inferred from the parties’ failure to object. 

Here, by contrast, Defendants consented explicitly and in writing to have the matter

referred to a magistrate. While they now wish to withdraw that consent, they have no

“absolute right” to do so, Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993), but instead must

show “extraordinary circumstances” as provided by § 636(c)(4) and Rule 73(b)(3). As stated

in the prior order, Defendants have made no such showing. See United States v. Neville, 985

F.2d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Sea Land Services, Inc., 816 F.2d 1018, 1020–21

(5th Cir. 1987) (among the factors to consider is whether a motion to withdraw consent is

“made in good faith or is dilatory and contrived”). Allegations of impartiality do not

constitute “extraordinary circumstances” to vacate referral to a magistrate judge. See Manion

v. American Airlines, Inc., 251 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.D.C. 2003).

Defendants have not presented newly discovered evidence, shown that the Court

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committed clear error, or offered any other basis for reconsideration of the Court’s June 21

order. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Referral to

Magistrate for District Court Ruling on Constitutional Issue of Lack of Consent (Doc. 183).

DATED this 30th day of June, 2011.

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