Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00982/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00982-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. VIGLER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00982-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER

FEDERAL LAW, WITH LEAVE TO FILE

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN THIRTY

DAYS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Alan Hamilton (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California tort law. Defendant Vigler removed the action

from Kings County Superior Court to this court on July 27, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at Avenal State Prison, where plaintiff

was housed at the time. Plaintiff names D. Vigler and J. Cota as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking

money damages.

Plaintiff’s claims arise from defendants’ refusal to allow plaintiff access to his vocational

assignment. Plaintiff alleges that he had a medical chrono permitting him to grow a beard, but

defendants disregarded the chrono and barred him from his assignment on the ground that he

presented a safety risk. Plaintiff alleges defendants issued him disciplinary violations on three

occasions for failing to report to class, and all three times the violation reports were investigated and

defendants were instructed to permit plaintiff entry to his assignment.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants belittled his medical condition, acted with deliberate

indifference to his right to due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 

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States Constitution, attempted to cause him to be placed in an adverse privilege group, and

selectively targeted African-American inmates. (Doc. 1, pgs. 5-6.) 

1. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff alleges defendants violated his right to due process. The Civil Rights Act under

which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due

Process Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the

protection is sought. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state

law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Due Process Clause itself does not

confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.”

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). Under state law, the

existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). Liberty interests created by state

law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Myron v. Terhune, No. 04-15770, 2007 WL 400759,

at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007). 

Although plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his due process rights by interfering with

his access to his vocational assignment, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in his

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vocational assignment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976);

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1985). Because plaintiff does not have a protected

liberty interest in his vocational assignment, plaintiff may not pursue a claim for relief based on

denial of due process arising from defendants’ interference with his access to his assignment. 

2. Eighth Amendment Claim

Because plaintiff alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference, it appears

plaintiff may be attempting to pursue a claim for relief for violation of the Eighth Amendment. To

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions

must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment]

conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citation omitted).

“Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities

are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide

prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint

v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.

1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison

officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate indifference

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must “know[] of and

disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of facts to support a claim that defendants acted with

deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Denying plaintiff access to his

vocational assignment does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, and mere verbal

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harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a claim for a constitutional violation. Oltarzewski

v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). 

3. Equal Protection Claim

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants selectively targeted African-American prisoners,

which suggests a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

“The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should

be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (citing Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a

protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren

v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). “Intentional discrimination means that a

defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345

F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.

1994)) (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff’s complaint does not set forth sufficient facts to support a claim that defendants

intentionally discriminated against him based on race. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim

for relief under for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

C. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims upon which relief may be

granted under federal law. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order.

Plaintiff is informed he must demonstrate in his complaint how the conditions complained

of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is

involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

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362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once

plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case.

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement

of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under federal law;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; and

4. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court

will recommend that this action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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