Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00902-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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`

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LIONEL HARPER and DANIEL 

SINCLAIR, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly 

situated and all aggrieved 

employees,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

TO MODIFY THE SCHEDULING 

ORDER AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE A 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Lionel Harper and Daniel Sinclair brought 

this putative class action against their former employer, Charter 

Communications, alleging various violations of the California 

Labor Code. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that Charter 

misclassified them and other California employees as “outside 

salespersons,” failed to pay them overtime wages, failed to 

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provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages in lieu 

thereof), and provided inaccurate wage statements. (See

generally First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Docket No. 45).) 

Plaintiffs now move to modify the scheduling order and for leave 

to amend their complaint. (Mot. for Leave to Amend (Docket No. 

121).) 

I. Factual Background

Charter is a broadband connectivity company and cable 

operator serving business and residential customers under the 

Spectrum brand, among others. Harper and Sinclair worked as 

small/medium sized business Account Executives (“AEs”) at 

Charter’s Redding, California location. Charter classifies AEs 

as “exempt” employees. 

Plaintiffs claim that Charter erroneously classified 

them as exempt employees by mistakenly classifying them as

“outside salespersons.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 11070. 

Under California law, “outside salespersons” are exempt from 

overtime, minimum wage, meal period, and rest period 

requirements. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1171. Importantly, under 

California case law, employees are only subject to the outside 

salesperson exception if their employer actually had an 

expectation that they spend more than half their time outside the 

office engaged in sales activities, and if that expectation was 

reasonable. See Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 

790 (Cal. 1999). Plaintiffs’ claim is essentially that Charter 

did not have an expectation that they spend 50% of their time 

outside of the office both during and after their training weeks, 

and even if it did, that expectation was unreasonable given the 

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number of tasks Charter expected them to complete that required 

them to be in the office. (See generally FAC.)

Plaintiffs’ claims of failure to pay overtime wages, 

failure to provide meal periods or rest breaks (or premium wages 

in lieu thereof), and failure to provide accurate wage statements 

are derivative of their misclassification claim. Because Charter 

misclassified them, plaintiffs contend, Charter necessarily 

failed to pay them overtime and failed to provide necessary rest 

and meal breaks. (See generally FAC.) Plaintiffs further claim 

that Charter failed to pay them commission wages to which they 

were entitled, and provided them with inaccurate and misleading

wage statements.1 (Id.) 

Plaintiffs seek to represent two classes of Charter 

employees: all California employees who were classified as exempt 

outside salespersons, and all persons employed by Charter in 

California who were paid commission wages. (See FAC ¶ 12.) 

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Harper filed his initial complaint in Shasta 

County Superior Court on May 3, 2019. Charter removed the case 

to this court on May 17, 2019. (Docket No. 1.) Harper sought 

leave to amend his complaint and add another named plaintiff, 

Daniel Sinclair, on October 30, 2019. The court granted Harper’s 

request on December 13, 2019. (See FAC (Docket No. 45).) 

The court issued a pretrial scheduling order on October 

9, 2019. (Docket No. 34.) The parties amended the scheduling 

1 Plaintiffs also claim that Charter failed to pay them 

all wages owed upon termination, failed to provide them with 

employment records, and violated the California UCL and PAGA. 

(See generally FAC.) 

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order via stipulation on six occasions: on January 29, May 4, 

June 25, September 17, and December 11, 2020, and again on 

January 29, 2021. (Docket Nos. 49, 59, 69, 82, 91, 102.) On 

December 18, 2020, Charter filed a motion for summary judgment. 

The court denied most of Charter’s motion on February 16, 2021, 

holding that triable issues of fact existed as to the majority of 

plaintiffs’ claims, including whether plaintiffs were 

misclassified as “outside salespersons.” 

On April 4, 2021, pursuant to the deadline specified in 

the court’s operative pretrial scheduling order (Docket No. 104), 

plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, set for 

hearing on June 1, 2021. (See Motion for Class Certification 

(Docket No. 115).) This motion included declarations by three 

“Direct Sales Reps” (“DSRs”) who worked for Charter’s Irwindale, 

Bakersfield, and Anaheim locations--Hassan Turner, Luiz Vazquez, 

and Pedro Abascal. After receiving the motion, Charter requested 

plaintiffs provide available dates for Charter to depose the 

three DSRs. (Decl. of Jamin Soderstrom (“Soderstrom Decl.”) ¶ 9 

(Docket No. 121-1).) The parties agreed that the depositions of 

the DSRs would go forward on April 22 and 27, 2021. (Id.) 

On April 16, 2021, plaintiffs filed the instant motion 

to modify the scheduling order and for leave to file a Second 

Amended Complaint. (See Mot. for Leave to Amend.) Plaintiffs’ 

motion makes a number of changes to the complaint’s factual 

allegations, amends the class and subclass definitions, and seeks 

to add Turner, Vazquez, and Abascal as named plaintiffs. (See

generally id.) Plaintiffs emphasize that, though their proposed 

Second Amended Complaint adds three named plaintiffs, it does not 

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materially expand or change the scope of the operative 

complaint’s claims and allegations, as the putative class in the 

operative complaint already includes all California Charter 

employees classified as exempt outside salespersons (not just 

AEs). The proposed complaint adds additional allegations 

regarding the plaintiffs’ required tasks which indicate why they 

were misclassified as outside salespersons. (See Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Docket No. 121-2).) Evidence of most, 

if not all, of these tasks was collected in discovery and 

discussed in the parties’ briefs regarding Charter’s motion for 

summary judgment. (See Docket Nos. 93, 98, 103.) The Proposed 

Second Amended Complaint also offers two additional theories of 

liability for plaintiffs’ claim that Charter’s commission wage 

statements were defective, makes a number of changes to 

plaintiffs’ proposed subclasses, and focuses the outside 

salesperson class allegations on the employees’ training weeks. 

(See Proposed SAC.) 

Three days after plaintiffs filed their motion, Charter 

applied ex parte to stay the court’s consideration of plaintiffs’ 

motion for class certification until this motion has been 

decided. (Docket No. 123.) The court granted Charter’s ex parte

application, ordering that the hearing date for plaintiffs’ 

motion for class certification be vacated until the court rules 

on the instant motion. (Docket No. 127.) 

III. Discussion

Once the district court has filed a pretrial scheduling 

order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which 

establishes a timetable for amending pleadings, that rule’s 

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standards control the court’s analysis of whether leave to amend 

a pleading should be granted. See Johnson v. Mammoth 

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992). “A 

schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 

consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal 

amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party 

seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the 

opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard primarily 

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. See

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. If that party was not diligent, the 

inquiry should end. See id.

Plaintiffs argue that good cause exists to amend their 

complaint because they did not obtain evidence needed to confirm 

their allegations, as well as the legal and factual basis to join 

new employees who held different positions (such as DSRs), until 

recently. Plaintiffs represent that they needed to obtain 

additional evidence concerning Charter’s classification of other 

positions (including DSRs), training courses, commission 

agreements, wage statements, and applicable arbitration 

agreements in order to anticipate the arguments Charter would 

likely make in opposition to their motion for class 

certification. (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶ 5.) Because of a longrunning series of discovery disputes between the parties, which 

led to plaintiffs filing five motions to compel (Docket Nos. 47, 

57, 62, 78, 117) and one motion for sanctions (Docket No. 100), 

plaintiffs represent that they were unable to obtain documents 

from Charter related to positions other than Harper and Sinclair 

until the early part of 2021, and that plaintiffs were unable to 

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schedule depositions of Charter employees who could testify as to 

Charter’s classification of other positions, training, commission 

agreements, and wage statements until March 2021. (See

Soderstrom Decl. ¶¶ 6-9.)

Despite Charter’s prior representations that it did not 

possess any relevant documents, Charter finally produced (in 

response to an order by the magistrate judge) documents 

pertaining to its training materials and arbitration agreements 

with other employees, such as DSRs, in February 2021. (Id.; 

Supplemental Decl. of Jamin Soderstrom (“Soderstrom Supp. Decl.”) 

¶ 5 (Docket No. 139-1).) Plaintiffs also obtained declarations 

from four DSRs in early April 2021 which supported plaintiffs’ 

allegations that DSRs were also subject to the same 

classification, training, and commission-related practices as AEs 

and “several other positions.” (See Soderstrom Decl. ¶¶ 6-9.) 

Plaintiffs contend that, because they filed their motion for 

leave to amend shortly thereafter, on April 16, 2021, they acted 

with sufficient diligence under Rule 16.

In response, Charter points out that plaintiff’s 

counsel has represented one of the proposed new named plaintiffs, 

Hassan Turner, since at least April 8, 2020, when counsel 

requested Turner’s employment records from Charter. As for the 

other proposed plaintiffs, Vazquez and Abascal, Charter argues 

that plaintiffs have known of their identities since at least 

December 2020, and their failure to move for leave to amend the 

complaint to add them as plaintiffs until April 2021, two weeks 

after filing a motion for class certification and after Charter 

had requested to depose the proposed named plaintiffs, 

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demonstrates a lack of diligence.

While Charter correctly suggests that plaintiffs should 

have moved to amend their complaint before moving to certify the 

class, the court has already delayed consideration of plaintiffs’ 

motion for class certification until this motion is resolved. 

Plaintiffs also point out that, had they moved to amend their 

complaint prior to the resolution of Charter’s motion for summary 

judgment (filed in December 2020, and decided on February 16, 

2021), they would have been subject to a higher standard under 

Ninth Circuit law. See PowerAgent Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 210 

F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 2000) (courts “may require a showing of 

substantial and convincing evidence supporting the proposed 

amendment before allowing leave to amend [while a motion for 

summary judgment is pending], because a court may be concerned 

that a plaintiff may simply be maneuvering to stave off 

termination of the lawsuit”). 

According to plaintiffs’ counsel, though he requested 

Turner’s employment records in April 2020, Turner did not want to 

join a publicly filed class action as a named plaintiff at that 

time, and did not agree to serve as a class representative until 

April 2021. (Soderstrom Supp. Decl. ¶ 8.) Because plaintiffs 

have only recently obtained documentary and testimonial evidence 

related to other positions at Charter, including DSRS, and 

represent that counsel was only recently able to obtain 

supporting declarations and agreement from the three proposed 

plaintiffs to represent them as class representatives, the court 

finds that plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence of their 

diligence to satisfy Rule 16’s good cause standard. See Johnson, 

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975 F.2d at 609. 

Charter next argues that plaintiffs cannot show that 

there is good cause to amend the complaint because their proposed 

amendments are unnecessary. Specifically, Charter argues that 

(1) amendments to allegations that are merely meant to “clarify” 

or “update” existing claims, without adding new substantive 

claims, are unnecessary, (2) amendments to the class definitions 

are unnecessary because the court will determine the proper class 

definition when evaluating plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification, and (3) that there is no need to add three 

additional class representatives when the two existing class 

representatives would suffice. 

In similar situations where a plaintiff’s proposed 

amendments would not add any additional claims against a 

defendant, but rather merely set forth additional evidence of 

existing claims, some courts have held that good cause to amend 

does not exist under Rule 16 because such amendments are 

“unnecessary.”2 See, e.g., In re Rocket Fuel Inc. Securities 

Litigation, No. 14-cv-03998-PJH, 2017 WL 344983, *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 24, 2017). Here, plaintiffs do not explain why or how the 

proposed amendments to their factual allegations would materially 

advance their case, besides stating that they have an obligation 

2 Other courts have considered the necessity of proposed 

amendments under Rule 15’s “futility” factor. See, e.g., 

Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosms., Inc., No. SACV 07-1316 JVS, 2012 

WL 12898000, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012). Regardless of which 

Rule the court considers necessity under, because both Rules 15 

and 16 must be satisfied to grant leave to amend, a showing that 

an amendment is unnecessary would be sufficient to deny leave to 

amend. See, e.g., In re Rocket Fuel, 2017 WL 344983, at *3; 

Allergan, 2012 WL 12898000, at *2. 

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to re-evaluate their pleadings in light of prior court orders 

that have been issued since their complaint was last amended (the 

court has not ordered plaintiffs to amend or alter their 

complaint in any way). (See Pls.’ Reply at 13 (Docket No. 139).) 

Nor do plaintiffs explain why their proposed amendments to their 

class definitions are necessary. However, for its part, Charter 

does not explain what harm there would be in allowing plaintiffs 

to amend their class definitions, when the question will 

ultimately be evaluated at the class certification stage anyway. 

As for the addition of the three proposed plaintiffs, 

Charter points to a statement from plaintiffs’ motion in which 

they seemingly admit that they “do not need to substitute class 

representatives in order for the court to certify their proposed 

classes and subclasses.” (See Mot. for Leave to Amend at 12

(emphasis in original).) Plaintiffs clarify in their reply, 

however, that evidence provided by Charter in February 2021 

showing certain differences in Charter’s training materials and 

wage statements for AEs and DSRs has revealed a “potential” need 

to add DSRs as class representatives. (See Soderstrom Supp. 

Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs’ counsel also noted at oral argument that 

the proposed DSR plaintiffs may be more typical representatives 

of certain members of the putative class because they were 

purportedly subject to different arbitration agreements than 

Harper and Sinclair. 

While Charter does not contend that Sinclair was 

subject to any arbitration agreements, and, as the court has 

previously held, Harper’s claims in this matter were governed by 

the JAMS arbitration agreement (Docket No. 24), Charter contends 

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that the proposed plaintiffs were subject to the “Solutions 

Channel” arbitration agreement. (See Charter’s Opp’n at 11, 23 

(Docket No. 138).) Therefore, although plaintiffs believe that 

they are adequate and typical class representatives, they contend 

that adding three additional DSR class representatives would 

allow them to prospectively address arguments Charter is likely

to raise in opposition to their class certification motion, 

including that Harper and Sinclair are not adequate or typical 

representatives of putative class members who were subject to the 

Solutions Channel arbitration agreement. See Morgan v. Laborers 

Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal., 81 F.R.D. 669, 673 (N.D. Cal. 

1979) (granting leave to amend to add additional class 

representatives “to provide the court with both a broader and a 

more representative sample of factual situations relating to the 

class allegations”). 

The court agrees with plaintiffs that adding the three 

proposed plaintiffs would seem to advance their case by allowing 

the court to evaluate whether the three proposed plaintiffs are 

adequate and typical representatives of the class. These 

amendments are therefore not “unnecessary,” see In re Rocket Fuel 

Inc. Securities Litigation, 2017 WL 344983, at *3, and good cause 

exists to amend the complaint by adding the three proposed named 

plaintiffs. Because Charter has not shown that plaintiffs’ other 

proposed amendments would prejudice it, the court will also 

permit plaintiffs to amend the complaint’s factual allegations 

and class definitions. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609 (“the 

existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the 

modification [to the scheduling order] might supply additional 

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reasons to deny a motion”). 

For the same reasons, discussed above, that the court 

finds good cause to allow the proposed amendments under Rule 16, 

the court also finds that the liberal standards set forth in 

Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education, 555 F.3d 1051,

1055 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009), support granting leave to amend under 

Rule 15. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to 

modify the scheduling order and for leave to file a Second 

Amended Complaint (Docket No. 121) be, and the same hereby is, 

GRANTED. Plaintiffs are directed to file the Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint attached to their motion (Docket No. 121-2) 

within five days of the issuance of this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiffs withdraw their 

motion for class certification (Docket No. 115) and file a new 

motion which reflects the addition of Hassan Turner, Luis 

Vazquez, and Pedro Abascal as named plaintiffs and class 

representatives on or before July 12, 2021. If the parties wish 

to stipulate to a briefing schedule and/or hearing date for 

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, as well as further 

modifications to the court’s Status (Pretrial Scheduling) Order 

(see Docket Nos. 34, 104), they may submit a stipulation for the 

court’s approval on or before June 28, 2021.

Dated: June 3, 2021

 

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