Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00098/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00098-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to dismiss the

petition.

U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEBBIE ANN LOWE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

GLORIA HENRY, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:05-CV-0098 REC LJO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #16]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, imposed on March 12, 1999. 

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 187 and

sentenced to two concurrent terms of fifteen years to life plus two consecutive one-year sentences for

enhancements. See Lodged Document No. 1.

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 2

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “5th DCA”). On March 29, 2001, the 5th DCA affirmed the judgment in an unpublished

opinion. See Lodged Document No. 2.

On May 4, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. See

Lodged Document No. 3. On June 27, 2001, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. See

Lodged Document No. 4.

On July 23, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. See Lowe

v. Henry, Case No. 1:01-CV-5950-LJO-HC. On June 30, 2003, the petition was denied on the

merits.

On January 24, 2005, Petitioner filed her second petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

Court. On September 15, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as successive and 

filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner did not file an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)’s

proscription against successive petitions and 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. 

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California cd 3

Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a

formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under

Rule 4. 

B. Successive Petition

A federal court must dismiss a second or successive petition that raises the same grounds as a

prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The court must also dismiss a second or successive petition

raising a new ground unless the petitioner can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive,

constitutional right or 2) the factual basis of the claim was not previously discoverable through due

diligence, and these new facts establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying

offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). However, it is not the district court that decides whether a

second or successive petition meets these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or

successive petition. 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by this

section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an

order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words, Petitioner must

obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before she can file a second or successive petition in district

court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any second or

successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the petition because

a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive petition. Pratt v. United

States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Petitioner makes no showing that she has

obtained prior leave from the Ninth Circuit to file her successive petition attacking the conviction. 

That being so, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's renewed application for relief

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U.S . District Court

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from that conviction under Section 2254 and must dismiss the petition. See Greenawalt, 105 F.3d at

1277; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991. If Petitioner desires to proceed in bringing this petition for writ of

habeas corpus, she must file for leave to do so with the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(3).

C. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on January 24, 2005, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year period of limitation on petitioners

seeking to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended,

§ 2244, subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

Court on June 27, 2001. Thus, direct review would conclude on September 25, 2001, when the

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ninety (90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v.

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Petitioner had one year until September 25, 2002,

absent applicable tolling, in which to file her federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However,

Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until January 24, 2005, over two years beyond the due

date. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

D. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court recently held the statute of limitations is tolled where a

petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals

between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the

next level of the state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on September 25, 2001, and expired

on September 25, 2002. Petitioner did not file any post-conviction collateral challenges with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim in state court. Petitioner did file a prior petition for writ of habeas

corpus in federal court; however, that petition had no tolling consequences. Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167 (2001). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling, and the petition remains

untimely. 

E. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting

that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted

if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

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time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Id.; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would

give rise to tolling. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9th Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d

391, 395 (9th Cir.1993).

Petitioner does not argue that she was prevented in any way from timely filing the federal

petition. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the petition remains

untimely. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)’s

proscription against successive petitions.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Robert E. Coyle, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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