Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08001/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08001-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE SHARON L. GLEASON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Kenneth Eugene Shatzer, who is confined in the Central Arizona 

Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the 

petition be denied and dismissed. 

BACKGROUND 

 On November 14 2008, Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury in the Yavapai 

County Superior Court (“Superior Court”), Case No. CR 20081396, charging him with 

one count (Count I) of child molestation, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-1410, and ten counts 

(Counts II - XI) of sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3553. (Doc. 

12-1, Exh. A.) Each count of the indictment was charged as subject to enhanced 

punishment under A.R.S. § 13-604.01,1

 as a dangerous crime against children. (Id.) On 

 1

 Renumbered as A.R.S. § 13–705, Laws 2008, Ch. 97, § 1, Ch. 195, § 1. 

Kenneth Eugene Shatzer, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-08001-PCT-SLG (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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November 20, 2008, Petitioner was additionally charged by information in the Superior 

Court, Case No. CR 20081417, for one count of misconduct involving weapons 

(prohibited possessor), in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102. (Doc. 12-1, Exh. B.) Pursuant to 

a plea agreement, on June 8, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of child 

molestation, one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, two amended counts of 

attempted exploitation of a minor, and one count of misconduct involving weapons (as a 

prohibited possessor). (Doc. 12-1, Exhs. D-F.) In exchange for his plea, the remaining 

counts in the indictment were dismissed. On July 6, 2009, the Superior Court sentenced 

Petitioner to a 10-year term of imprisonment for the count of child molestation, a 

consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment for the count of sexual exploitation of a minor, 

and lifetime probation with sex offender conditions for the remaining counts. (Doc. 12-1, 

Exh. H, I.) 

 On August 19, 2009, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the 

Superior Court (Doc. 12-1, Exh. K), and counsel was appointed to represent him (Doc. 

12-1, Exh. L). Upon review of the record, counsel filed a notice to the Superior Court that 

he found no issues upon which to base a claim for relief, and requested an extension of 

time for Petitioner to file a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in propria persona. (Id.) 

The Superior Court ordered counsel to remain in an advisory capacity and granted 

Petitioner 45 days in which to file a petition. (Doc. 12-1, Exh. O.) Petitioner filed a Pro 

Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on January 14, 2010, in which he raised one 

grounds for relief: 

The trial court erred when it sentenced [Petitioner] under 

A.R.S. § 13-604.01 in violation of statutory instruction. This error violated [Petitioner’s] due process guarantees of the 

state and federal constitutions as well as his state and federal 

rights not to be excessively punished. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 130, Exh. P.) 

 On January 22, 2010, the Superior Court issued an order dismissing Petitioner’s 

post-conviction relief petition as follows: 

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The Defendant on August 19, 2009 filed his Notice of PostConviction Relief... 

The Court granted Defendant’s request for appointment of counsel on the Rule 32 matter. David Stoller, Esq. was appointed to represent Defendant. Counsel for Defendant, in a 

motion dated on December 21, 2009 filed a Notice of 

Completion pursuant to Rule 32. Counsel for Defendant 

concurrently filed a Motion to Withdraw and Motion for 

Leave for Defendant to File a Supplemental Memorandum. 

The Court granted the Motion to withdraw and on January 6, 2010 granted leave for Defendant to file a supplemental memorandum, giving the Defendant forty-five days to file a 

supplement if he desired. The Defendant, in pro per, did file a supplemental petition dated January 12, 2010; this was filed on January 14, 2010. The matter appears ripe for determination. 

Legal analysis: 

The Court has reviewed the petition and grounds for relief 

asserted. 

The Defendant alluded in his post-conviction relief notice to a 

possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to 

state any colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d. 674 

(1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 694 P.2d 222 (1985). A 

colorable claim of post-conviction relief is “one that, if the 

allegations are true, might have changed the outcome.” State 

v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 63, 859 P.2d 169, 173 (1993). 

The Defendant has not shown any effect on the outcome. 

The Court finds that the sentence was within the legal range. There was a factual basis for the plea. There was no evidence of compulsion, duress or coercion in entry of the Plea 

Agreement. The Defendant appeared competent at the time of entry of the Plea Agreement. 

The Plea Agreement provided that the precise sentence was in the discretion of the Court (on Plea Agreement, paragraph 8) within the range provided by law (see Plea Agreement, 

paragraph 1). 

The Defendant has not shown manifest injustice which might 

permit the withdrawal from the Plea Agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea. 

The Court finds no colorable claim in connection with this 

petition. Much of what Defendant complains of is the alleged aggravation of sentence. The Court observes that mitigated 

sentences were, in fact, given. There was no enhancement of 

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sentence. 

Conclusion: 

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to present a 

colorable claim for relief in his Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief and that this matter is subject to dismissal without 

further hearing. 

IT IS ORDERED therefore that the Defendant’s Notice for 

Post-Conviction Relief is DISMISSED. 

 (Doc. 12-1, Exh. Q.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on February 10, 2010. (Doc. 12-2, Exh. R.) Petitioner raised four grounds for 

relief: 

Did the Court impose an illegal sentence, tantamount to four 

consecutive sentences, contrary to law, on [Petitioner] when it 

enhanced his sentence to A.R.S. § 13-604.01 absent the 

necessary elements or allegations to enhance within the Plea 

Agreement as required by statute and state and federal 

constitutions? 

Did the Court shift the burden of proof to the [Petitioner] to prove his innocence of the conduct necessary to enhance the sentence to A.R.S. § 13-604.01, when the Plea Agreement lacked any element for enhancement? 

Was the [Petitioner] denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, when his counsel failed to 

object to the imposition of an illegal enhancement to his sentence? 

Did the Court impose excessive punishment, when it 

enhanced [Petitioner’s] sentence 15 years beyond the presumptive sentence of A.R.S. § 13-701 without the element 

to enhance his sentence? 

(Doc. 12-2 at 4, 6, Exh. R.) On July 8, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily 

denied review. (Doc. 12-2, Exh. U.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court (Doc. 12-2, Exh. V), which was summarily denied on January 4, 2012 

(Doc. 12-2, Exh. X). 

 On January 2, 2013, Petitioner timely filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), a Memorandum in Support (Doc. 2), and 

subsequently, an Affidavit (Doc. 10). Respondents filed an Answer. (Doc. 12.) No reply 

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has been filed, and the time to do so has expired. 

DISCUSSION 

 In the petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: 

Ground One: The trial court failed to recognize that the Petitioner did not understand the nature of the accusation 

against him, a Sixth Amendment violation of the U.S. 

Constitution, and assumed critical elements of the crime 

(intentional and knowing conduct), even though the elements 

were absent and where no factual basis existed, a violation of 

Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of 

the U.S. Constitution. 

Ground Two: The trial counsel substantially violated his essential duty for failing to object when the court failed to comply with Ariz. R. of Crim. P., Rule 17.2.a. by not advising the Petitioner of the elements of his charge and when the court imposed an enhanced sentencing statute, in violation of the Sixth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution. 

Ground Three: Petitioner was sentenced to an illegal sentence in excess of the maximum allowed by law due to the court’s failure to comply with Rule 17.2.a. in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 

(Doc. 1.) In their answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to exhaust his claims 

and they are procedurally barred from review. Respondents further argue that Grounds 

One and Three fail on the merits. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with 

Respondents and finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from review and 

alternatively, fail on the merits. 

I. Applicable Law 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).2

 28 U.S.C. § 

2244. 

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 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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 A. Standard for Habeas Relief 

Under AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 It follows that, “[b]y its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated 

on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” 

Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). In applying this standard, 

the federal habeas court reviews “the last reasoned state court decision addressing the 

claim in question.” Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013); Barker v. 

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). A state court decision adjudicated a 

claim “on the merits” where it resolved the substance of the claim rather than relied on a 

procedural or other non-substantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2004). But see Johnson v. Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) (“When 

a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal 

habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—but that 

presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.”). “Where a state court’s 

decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be 

met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief” under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. “A state court’s determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786 (quoting Yarborough 

v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

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of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. 

Fisher, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 

(2003); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal principle is ‘clearly 

established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding 

of this Court.”). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if 

(1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme 

Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a 

result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A 

state court decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but applies that rule to the facts of a particular case in an 

objectively unreasonable manner. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408; Lockyer v, 538 U.S. at 

75. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was 

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. 

at 786-87. 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state 

court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court 

proceeding[.]” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). See Maxwell v. Roe, 628 

F.3d 486, 500 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 611 (2012); Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). A federal court in a habeas corpus 

proceeding must accord a presumption of correctness to a state court’s factual findings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, “where the state courts plainly misapprehend or 

misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material 

factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension can fatally 

undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.” 

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Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 With regard to either exception under § 2254(d), “it is only noncompliance with 

federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the 

federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue 

a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. 

Corcoran, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (original emphasis) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a)). In other words, federal habeas corpus relief is not available for errors of state 

law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 

(1990). Federal courts accept a state court’s interpretation of state law “and alleged errors 

in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). A habeas petitioner also cannot “transform a 

state law issue into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland 

v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford, 110 F.3d at 1389). 

“[T]he Supreme Court has long settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure 

immunity from judicial error or uniformity of judicial decisions.” Little v. Crawford, 449 

F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 B. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant habeas relief under AEDPA if the petitioner has 

failed to exhaust his claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); see O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839 (1999). “[A] petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to 

the state court for purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the 

claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the 

proper factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

 First, a petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court in a 

procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. A petitioner “must give 

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the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Id. at 845. “[C]laims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them” either on direct appeal or through appropriate postconviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. 

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Second, if a petitioner fails to invoke the 

required procedure, exhaustion is not satisfied even if the petitioner raises the claim 

through an alternative procedure. See e.g., Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38 (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies when he presented claim in the state habeas petition 

instead of Arizona Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding).

In addition to presenting a claim in the proper forum and vehicle, to satisfy the 

exhaustion requirement, “a petitioner must ‘present the substance of his claim to the state 

courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts 

that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 1026, 1041 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582-83 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Bland v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other 

grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In presenting 

the factual basis of a claim, a petitioner need not present “every piece of evidence 

supporting his federal claims,” but must “provide the state court with the operative facts, 

that is, all of the facts necessary to give application to the constitutional principle upon 

which [the petitioner] relies.” Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 28 

(2004). In presenting the legal basis of a claim, a petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that he is asserting a federal claim and cite to the specific constitutional guarantee 

upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 

(9th Cir. 2001); Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Our rule is that a 

state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state 

court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal 

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law”) amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 

F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” 

such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial” is 

insufficient); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (finding a mere reference 

to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a federal claim). 

 If a petitioner fails to fairly and fully present his federal claim in state court, and 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state courts’ procedural rules would 

bar consideration of the claim, the claim is procedurally defaulted and is barred from 

federal review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (Ariz. 1996); Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); 32.9 (stating 

that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). A state 

post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, 

distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as 

“technical” exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state 

court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 732 (1991). 

 A claim may also be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review if it 

was actually raised in state court, but found by that court to be defaulted on an adequate 

and independent state procedural ground, such as waiver or preclusion. Beard v. Kindler, 

558 U.S. 53 (2009); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991). Arizona courts 

have been consistent in their application of procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and 

independent procedural bar); Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) is independent of federal law and has 

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been regularly and consistently applied, so it is adequate to bar federal review of a 

claim.”); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review “if the 

petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result 

of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as 

well as to those represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish 

that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the 

state’s procedural rules. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 488-89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional 

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish 

prejudice, a petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to establish either cause or 

prejudice, the court need not reach the other requirement. See Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 

1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 fn. 13. 

 Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 

298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

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eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

II. Petitioner’s Claims 

 A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

Petitioner failed to fairly and fully present his federal habeas claims to the state 

court and therefore, are they are barred from review. In his state pro per post-conviction 

relief petition, Petitioner presented one claim in which he argued that he was deprived of 

notice of the conduct necessary to enhance his sentence pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01, 

and he was entitled to a jury determination as to the elements of that enhancement. (Doc. 

12-1, Exh. P.) Comparatively here, Petitioner alleges that he was not informed of the 

nature of the charge of child molestation to which he pled guilty. 

 Although the constitutional basis of the claim presented to the Superior Court 

bares similarity to the claims in Grounds One and Three, it was “not sufficient to give a 

‘fair opportunity’ to the [Superior Court] to decide” them. Cook, 538 F.3d at 1029 (citing 

Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1159 (en banc) (9th Cir. 2003).3

 “‘[M]ere similarity’ 

between [the] state claim presented in state court and the federal claim made in th[is] 

habeas petition does not suffice to avoid procedural default.” Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1159-

60 (citing Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Beaty, 303 F.3d at 989-90 

(“While new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner 

may not “fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts”) 

(quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986)). 

 Further, while Petitioner checked the box indicating that he would raise a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction relief notice (Doc. 12-1, Exh. K), 

he did not present the claim in his pro per petition. See Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 

 3

 Because Petitioner did not fairly present his claims to the Superior Court in the first instance, the new claims presented on appeal did not invoke a presumption that they were adjudicated on the merits by the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Johnson v. 

Williams, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013) (“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits—but that presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.”). 

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1026, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (“a petitioner must ‘present the substance of his claim to the 

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of 

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.’”) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582-83 

(9th Cir. 2009). Consequently, because Petitioner did not fairly present his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim in Ground Two, Petitioner did not afford the state court an 

opportunity to decide it. This is evident by the Superior Court’s decision citing that he 

had only “alluded in his post-conviction relief notice to the possibility of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” 

 A return to state court to present Petitioner’s claims would be futile under 

Arizona’s procedural rules. The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state 

court under Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Petitioner has 

not shown that any of the exceptions under Rule 32.1 apply to him. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b). Therefore, because a return to state court would be futile, Petitioner’s claims are 

technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has not filed a reply and does 

not offer any reason to excuse the default, nor does the record plainly suggest otherwise.4

Further, although Petitioner summarily maintains that the sentence he received is unjust, 

he does not demonstrate that failure to review the merits of his claims would result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred from review.

 B. Merits 

 Alternatively, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims fail on their merits. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Henry, 720 F.3d at 1084 (court may deny the a habeas claim on the 

merits, even if petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 

F.3d 758, 777 fn. 10 (9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Terhune, 309 F.3d 614, 620-21 (9th Cir. 

 4

 Because the Court considers and concludes that the claim fails of its merits, the 

Court does not resolve whether the procedural default of Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim should be excused under the framework set forth by 

Martinez v. Ryan, __U.S__ 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). See also Detrich v. Ryan, 740 

F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013); Clabourne v. Ryan, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 866382 (9th Cir. 

Mar. 05, 2014). 

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2002); Gatlin v. Maddling, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 (1) Ground One - Character of Plea 

In Ground One, Petitioner first argues that his guilty plea was not knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary, because the Superior Court failed to explain the nature and the 

elements of the charge of child molestation, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

 “The Constitution requires that a plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” 

Loftis v. Almager, 704 F.3d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 

238, 244 (1969)). “The record must show that the defendant voluntarily relinquished his 

privilege against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury and his right to confront his 

accusers, and that he understood the nature of the charges and the consequences of his 

plea.” (Id.) (internal citations omitted). “Beyond these essentials, the Constitution ‘does 

not impose strict requirements on the mechanics of plea proceedings.’” Loftis, 704 F.3d at 

648 (quoting United States v. Escamilla-Rojas, 640 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011)). A 

challenge to the voluntary and intelligent character of a guilty plea is cognizable in 

federal habeas proceedings. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

However, “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in 

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise 

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior 

to the entry of the guilty plea.” See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. 

 “[W]hen determining whether a defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary-in the 

sense that the defendant had ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against him’ - a 

court can look to the formal charges as well as to the record for evidence that the trial 

judge or defense counsel explained ‘the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give 

the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.’” Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 

1009 fnt. 16 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645-47 

(1976). See also Bargas v. Burns, 179 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999). In looking to the 

formal charges, the charging document must “state the elements of an offense charged 

with sufficient clarity to apprise a defendant of what he must be prepared to defend 

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against.’” Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1003 (quoting Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1380 

(9th Cir. 1986)). This requirement includes factors that enhance a sentence beyond the 

“statutory maximum.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488–90 (2000). In looking 

to record of the plea, the state court is not required to “explain the elements of each 

charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid 

plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge 

and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent 

counsel.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005). 

 Under Arizona law, a person commits the crime of molestation of a child by 

intentionally or knowingly engaging in or causing a person to engage in sexual contact 

with a child who is under fifteen years of age, and is a class 2 felony. A.R.S. § 13-1410. 

“‘Sexual contact’ means any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulating of any 

part of the genitals...” A.R.S. § 13-1401(2). A.R.S. § 13-604.01 requires enhanced 

penalties for persons convicted of a “dangerous crime against children,” which includes 

the crime of child molestation. The enhanced sentence carries a presumptive sentence of 

17-years, a minimum sentence of 10-years, and a maximum sentence of 24-years. A.R.S. 

§ 13–604.01. For the enhanced sentencing provision to apply, “the defendant’s conduct 

must be focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target a victim under the age of 

fifteen.” State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131, 136 (Ariz. 1993). 

 In the instant case, the indictment reads, in relevant part: 

COUNT I 

On or about November 2, 2008, KENNETH EUGENE 

SHATZER, intentionally or knowingly engaged in sexual 

contact with [C.S.], a person under the age of 15 years, in violation of AR.S. §§ 13-1410 and 13-604.01, a class 2 

felony, a dangerous crime against children. 

(Doc. 12-1, Exh. A.) The indictment apprised Petitioner of the elements of child 

molestation and the sentencing enhancement with sufficient clarity. See Gautt, 489 F.3d 

at 1007 (the indictment “sufficiently put[] the [petitioner] on notice of the need to defend 

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against both statutes”) (citing Salinas v. United States, 277 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 

1960)).

 Incorporating Count I of the indictment for child molestation, the plea agreement 

cites the statutory offense, the statutory definitions for the elements of the offense, and 

the sentencing statutes. The plea agreement also describes the consequences of entering a 

guilty plea to Count I. It reads, in relevant part: 

PLEA: The Defendant agrees to plead GUILTY to: 

CR 2008-1396 

Count I of the Indictment: CHILD MOLESTATION, 

committed on or about November 2, 2008, in violation of 

A.R.S. §§ 13-1410, 13-1401, 13-604.01, 13-701, 13-702, 13-

702.01, 13-801, a Class 2 felony. 

... 

Counts I and II of CR 2008–1396: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13–

604.01, each of these dangerous crimes against children 

carries a presumptive sentence of 17 years; a minimum sentence of 10 years; and a maximum sentence of 24 years. Prison is mandatory. 

... 

For Counts I and II of CR 2008–1396, probation is not available. 

... 

As to Count(s) I and II of CR 2008–1396, Defendant must 

receive a flat-time sentence. 

... 

The sentence imposed on a person by the court for a dangerous crime against children... involving child molestation or sexual abuse pursuant... may be served concurrently with other sentences if the offense involved only one victim. The sentence imposed on a person for any other dangerous crime against children in the first or second degree shall be consecutive to any other sentence imposed on the person at any time, including child molestation and sexual 

abuse of the same victim. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 15-17, Exh. D) The plea agreement provides that Petitioner read and 

understood the provisions of the plea agreement, and that he discussed his case with 

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counsel. (Doc. 12-1 at 22, Exh. D.) It further provides that Petitioner consented to judicial 

fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of the 

sentence. (Doc. 12-1 at 22, Exh. D.) 

 During the plea proceeding, the Superior Court advised Petitioner of his rights and 

discussed the rights that he would be waiving by entering in to a plea agreement. (Doc. 

12-1 at 26-33, Exh. E.) In response to the Superior Court’s questioning during the plea 

colloquy, Petitioner affirmed that he had read the entire plea agreement, discussed the 

entire agreement with counsel, and believed that as a result of that review and discussion, 

he understood the agreement. (Doc. 12-1 at 34-35, Exh. E.) Petitioner responded 

affirmatively that he understood that “Counts I and II – would have to [] run 

consecutively” such that he faced a term of imprisonment of “20 to 81-and-a-half” years. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 41, Exh. E.) See Little, 449 F.3d at 1080 (“The essential ingredient is notice 

of the maximum possible penalty provided by law.” (internal citation omitted).) 

Petitioner affirmatively and repeatedly responded that he had no unresolved questions 

and that he understood the terms of the plea agreement. (See Doc. 12-1 at 48-49, 51, Exh. 

E.) Petitioner further assented to a factual basis as follows: 

THE COURT: All right. Let’s talk about, I guess, in terms of time, the child molestation count. That is alleging against you a contact with [C.S.]. Do you know a [C.S.]? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 

 ... 

THE COURT: Okay. And did you know that she was a person under the age of 15 years as of November 2nd, 2008?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 

THE COURT: And did you intentionally or knowingly engage in some sexual contact with [C.S.]? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I did. 

 ... 

THE COURT: ...You touched her vaginal area? 

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THE DEFENDANT: I touched her buttocks with pants on. As 

I was touching the lower part of her buttocks, my intentions were not to touch anything else, but since the areas are so 

close together, she presumes that I did, and I am willing to accept that. 

THE COURT: So this is an indirect touching, in the sense that it was over the clothing, not skin to skin. 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor. 

 (Doc. 12-1 at 45, 54-55, Exh. E.) 

 Petitioner argues that his statements “regarding the unintentional touching of the 

victim’s vagina and not remembering the incident,” evidence that he lacked an 

appreciation of the nature of the charge against him. (Doc. 2 at 10) (emphasis in original). 

See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 (plea may be found involuntary because the accused “has 

such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an 

intelligent admission of guilt. Without adequate notice of the nature of the charge against 

him, or proof that he in fact understood the charge, the plea cannot be voluntary in this 

latter sense”) (citing Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941)); Hayes v. Kincheloe, 784 

F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986) (a guilty plea may be found involuntary where the record 

shows that a petitioner “did not possess an understanding of ‘the law in relation to the 

facts’”) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). Contrary to his 

assertion, nothing in the record of his plea colloquy reasonably suggests that Petitioner 

was confused, uninformed, or misunderstood the nature and elements of the child 

molestation charge. 

 Petitioner did not dispute or question whether the victim was under the age of 15 

at the time of the offense. Petitioner did not maintain that he accidentally touched the 

victim. See A.R.S. § 13-105 (10)(a) (“intentionally” is defined as “a person’s objective... 

to engage in th[e] conduct” required by the statute). Cf. Hayes, 784 F.2d at 1439 (finding 

defendant’s plea was involuntary where he pled to second-degree murder after stating he 

accidentally fired the gun). Nor did Petitioner contend at the time of the plea colloquy 

that he did not indirectly touch the victim’s genitals. See State v. Mendoza, __ P.3d __, 

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2014 WL 1007489, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (child molestation “may be committed... 

by the perpetrator indirectly touching the victim’s genitals.”); State v. Pennington, 717 

P.2d 471, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (indirect touching includes touching through 

clothing). Rather, Petitioner’s plea colloquy demonstrates that he had a sufficient 

appreciation of the elements and nature of the charge to which he pled. Petitioner 

understood the elements of the charge, affirmatively responding that he “intentionally or 

knowingly engage[d] in some sexual contact with [C.S.].” (Doc. 12-1 at 54, Exh. E.) 

Petitioner understood the alleged nature of the act giving rise to the charge, specifically, 

C.S.’s allegation that he intentionally touched her vagina. Petitioner affirmed during the 

plea colloquy that because the area between the buttocks and the vagina “are so close 

together,” he was “willing to accept” the facts alleged by the victim. (Doc. 12-1 at 55, 

Exh. E.) 

 Further, Petitioner’s admission to being intoxicated at the time of the offense did 

not signal a lack of understanding of the child molestation charge,5

 because intoxication 

due to voluntary alcohol consumption is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite 

state of mind. See A.R.S. § 13-503. While intoxication may serve as an affirmative 

defense where a defendant contends that an act was not motivated by a sexual interest, 

see A.R.S. § 13–1407(E), here, Petitioner did not contend that he touched the victim 

innocently. See State v. Simpson, 173 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that 

child molestation under A.R.S. § 13-1410 does not require proof of sexual interest; 

rather, if defendant was not motivated by a sexual interest due to intoxication under 

 5

 The transcript of the plea proceeding provides in relevant part: 

THE COURT: ... The next—were you intoxicated at the time? I thought I had read something about that. 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor. 

THE COURT: So the precision of your touching may have been affected by the intoxication? 

THE DEFENDANT: I would say most certainly, sir. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 55, Exh. E.) 

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A.R.S. § 13–1407(E) it can serve as an affirmative defense). Instead, Petitioner averred 

only that his alcohol consumption impacted the precision of his intentional sexual 

touching. 

 Petitioner’s plea comported with due process standards, and there is nothing in the 

record to overcome the presumption that he pleaded voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently. Therefore, Petitioner has not met his burden to show that there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief based on the character of his plea. See 

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. 

 (2) Ground One - Factual Basis of Plea 

 Petitioner next argues in Ground One that his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated when the Superior Court failed to adequately establish 

that there was a factual basis for his child molestation offense.6

 

“Among the requirements imposed on trial judges by rule - but not the 

Constitution - is the finding of a factual basis. Accordingly, habeas courts have held that, 

unless a plea is accompanied by protestations of innocence or other special 

circumstances, the Constitution does not require state judges to find a factual basis.” 

Loftis, 704 F.3d at 648 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Rodriguez v. 

Ricketts, 777 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the circumstances presented here, the 

Superior Court was not constitutionally required to find a factual basis for the plea. 

Nothing in record reflects that Petitioner protested his innocence to the Superior Court at 

the time of his plea colloquy. Rather, Petitioner admitted to intentionally touching the 

minor victim. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met his burden to show that there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief based on the factual basis presented 

during the plea colloquy. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. 

Having considered the record of conviction, the Court finds that Petitioner has 

 6

 Petitioner additional asserts that the Superior Court violated Rule 17.3 of the 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure, which requires a factual basis for guilty pleas. However, any challenge to whether the State complied with that rule is a question of state law and is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See Little, 449 F.3d at 1083. 

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failed to establish that his guilty plea violated his Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. For these reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claim is without merit and fails 

to satisfy the high standard for habeas relief. The Court will therefore recommend that 

Ground One be denied. 

 (3) Ground Two – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial 

counsel. He argues that defense counsel failed to adequately explain to him the nature 

and material elements of the child molestation charge. 

 A defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel when considering 

whether to accept or reject a plea offer. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). To 

prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner must 

show that the state-court unreasonably applied the standard for ineffective-assistance-of 

counsel claims established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Saesee v. 

McDonald, 725 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Strickland, a petitioner must 

show: (1) deficient performance, in that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice, in that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Applying Strickland in the plea context, “the 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 

U.S. at 58. See also Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997); Sexton v. 

Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 In the instant case, undoubtedly, Petitioner would prefer a lesser sentence than the 

one he received. However, nothing in the record persuades that counsel’s performance 

was deficient or that had Petitioner been more fully informed of the nature of his changes 

and the terms of the plea offer, the outcome would have been different. Petitioner 

contends that he is innocent and he “did not touch [C.S.’s] vaginal area” (Doc. 10 at 2) 

(emphasis in original). He alternatively maintains that, even if the victim’s statements 

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were accepted as true, he is innocent because he touched the victim’s vagina 

unintentionally. (Doc. 2 at 12.) Petitioner contends that, but for his counsel’s deficient 

performance, he would not have pled guilty to child molestation. He asserts: 

Over the period of seven months of plea negotiations, my attorney NEVER discussed my plea agreement with me other than telling me that the prosecution insisted that I receive at 

least 20 years. The only discussion between us about my plea agreement, took place two or three minutes before the Plea 

Hearing... 

He took me aside and said to me, “Now the Judge is going to ask you... if you touched her vaginal area[.] You will answer, yes.[”] At that point, I said to him, “I am not going to say I did something that I didn’t do!” His reply was, “If you don’t say that, they will give you more than 20 years.” 

(Doc. 10 at 2.) 

 Petitioner’s allegations concerning counsel’s performance are less than 

convincing. Petitioner affirmed at the time of his plea that he had read the entire plea 

agreement, discussed the entire agreement with counsel, and understood the agreement. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 34-35, Exh. E.) Those “statements at the plea colloquy carry a strong 

presumption of truth.” Muth v. Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2012).7

 Petitioner 

did not request additional time to discuss his plea with counsel, nor is there any indication 

that he was coerced into entering the plea. Similarly, in the plea agreement, counsel 

affirmed: 

I have discussed this case with my client in detail and advised him/her of his/her constitutional rights and all possible defenses. I believe that the plea and disposition set forth herein are appropriate under the facts of this case. I concur in 

the entry of the plea as indicated above and on the terms and 

 7

 See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (“[T]he representations of the defendant [at a plea hearing]... constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008) ( “Statements made 

by a defendant during a guilty plea hearing carry a strong presumption of veracity in subsequent proceedings attacking the plea.”); United States v. Morrison, 113 F.3d 1020, 

1021 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Any attempt to contradict the factual basis of a valid plea must fail.”); United States v. Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Statements 

made by a criminal defendant contemporaneously with his plea should be accorded great weight because solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 

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conditions set forth herein. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 23, Exh. D.) Petitioner has not filed a reply, and his petition only advances 

that the plea colloquy is unreliable because he pled “assum[ing] and trust[ing] the legal 

professionals involved knew what they were doing.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) 

 Nonetheless, the record does not compel that different actions by counsel would 

likely have resulted in a different or more advantageous outcome. “[W]here the alleged 

error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to 

the crime charged, the resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on 

whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 

59. Here, as noted above, a defense of voluntary intoxication would have been weak, at 

best. A defense that Petitioner had only touched the victim’s buttocks, and not her vagina 

as she alleged, would have been equally weak. “In child molestation cases, the defendant 

can be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.” Mendoza, 2014 WL 

1007489, at * 2 (quoting State v. Jerousek, 590 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Ariz. 1979)). Further, 

the record does not demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that had counsel 

better explained the elements of and defenses to the charge, Petitioner would not have 

pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Rather, the record illustrates that 

Petitioner, aware of the victim’s allegations, tactically accepted the plea offer; 

Because I told the truth, I left no room for my lawyer... My sentence does not fit the crime. Even though my attorney and I agreed to the plea, it was not because we thought it was a fair plea, but because it was the best we were going to get. 

(Doc. 12-1 at 77, Exh. G.) In exchange for entering into the plea, seven of the 

indictment’s ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor were dismissed, and two were 

reduced to attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. Cf. United States v. Villalobos, 333 

F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding plea involuntary where defendant was not informed of 

an element which exposed him to a higher statutory maximum sentence than he would 

have otherwise faced). Because Petitioner’s suggested defense was unlikely to be 

successful, and there is no evidence that Petitioner would have decided to proceed to trial 

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otherwise, he cannot establish prejudice. 

 Petitioner therefore does not assert a viable claim for ineffective assistance of 

counsel and has not met his burden to show that there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. Accordingly, the Court will 

recommend that Ground Two be denied. 

 (4) Ground Three – Illegal Sentence 

 Lastly, in Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that he received an illegal sentence in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment due to those errors committed by trial counsel and the 

Superior Court. For the reasons above, Petitioner has not shown that his plea colloquy or 

the terms of his plea were “so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due 

process or Eighth Amendment violation.” Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 

2010) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 779 (1990)). See also Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642, 643, (1974) (absent a specific constitutional violation, 

federal habeas review of state law error is limited to whether the error “so infected the 

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”). 

Therefore, the Court will recommend that Ground Three be denied. 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred from review and alternatively fail on the merits. The Court will therefore 

recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

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leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 17th day of April, 2014. 

 

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