Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56280/USCOURTS-ca9-12-56280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBIN FORTYUNE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF LOMITA,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-56280

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-06644-DDP-JCG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 13, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed September 5, 2014

Before: Richard A. Paez and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit

Judges, and J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Paez

* The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

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2 FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA

SUMMARY**

Americans with Disabilities Act

Affirming the district court’s denial of a motion to

dismiss, the panel held that Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act requires local governments to provide

accessible on-street parking in the absence of regulatory

design specifications for on-street parking facilities. 

The panel stated that the text of the ADA, the relevant

implementing regulations, and the Department of Justice’s

interpretation of its own regulations all led it to conclude that

public entities must ensure that all normal governmental

functions are reasonably accessible to disabled persons,

irrespective of whether the DOJ has adopted technical

specifications for the particular types of facilities involved. 

The panel held that the plaintiff had stated claims under the

ADA and the California Disabled Persons Act based on the

defendant city’s alleged failure to provide accessible on-street

diagonal stall parking.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 3

COUNSEL

Robert Brockman, Jr. (argued), Matthew Racine, and Lee H.

Roistacher, Daley & Heft LLP, Solana Beach, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Maria Michelle Uzeta (argued), Russell C. Handy, and Mark

D. Potter, Potter Handy LLP, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher

Chen-Hsin Wang (argued), and Mark Lenard Gross, United

States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington,

D.C., for Amicus Curiae the United States.

Alison Daly Alpert, Best, Best & Kreiger, San Diego,

California, for Amicus Curiae League of California Cities.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

In this case, we must decide whether Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requires local

governments to provide accessible on-street parking in the

absence of regulatory design specifications for on-street

parking facilities. We hold that it does. 

I. BACKGROUND

Robin Fortyune is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for

mobility. He filed suit against the City of Lomita (“City”) in

state court, alleging that he experiences “great difficulty,

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4 FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA

discomfort and, even[] fear for his safety” when frequenting

facilities in the City because none of the City’s public onstreet parking is accessible to people with disabilities. He

brought claims under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.,

and the California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), Cal. Civ.

Code §§ 54 et seq.

The City removed the case to federal court, and moved to

dismiss Fortyune’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). The City argued that, absent the

adoption of ADA implementing regulations specifically

targeted toward on-street parking, it is not required to provide

accessible on-street parking. The district court denied the

motion to dismiss, concluding that “the broad language of the

ADA requires public entities to ensure that all services,

including on-street parking, are reasonably accessible to and

usable by individuals with disabilities.”1 The City filed a

motion to certify the district court’s order for interlocutory

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which the district

court granted. The City then timely petitioned for leave to

appeal, and a motions panel of this court granted the petition.

 

1

 Fortyune’s complaint alleged that the City did not provide parallel or

diagonal stall on-street parking. However, before the district court issued

a ruling on the City’s motion to dismiss, Fortyune voluntarily dismissed

his claims with respect to parallel on-street parking. Consequently, the

district court’s order and this appeal concern only whether Fortyune has

stated claims based on the City’s failure to provide accessible diagonal

stall on-street parking.

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 5

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

2

We review de novo a district court order denying a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010);

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1079 (9th

Cir. 2005). The district court’s interpretation of the ADA and

the CDPA are questions of law subject to de novo review. 

Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832,

837 (9th Cir. 2007); Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard &

Winery, LLC, 531 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

“Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy

widespread discrimination against disabled individuals.” 

PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001). The

statute provides a “comprehensive,” “broad mandate” to

eliminate discrimination against disabled persons, addressing

both “outright intentional exclusion” as well as the “failure to

make modifications to existing facilities and practices.” Id.

at 675 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see

also Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694 (9th Cir.

2

“A non-final order may be certified for interlocutory appeal where it

‘involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion’ and where ‘an immediate appeal from

the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation.’” See Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681,

687–88 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). “A substantial

ground for difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might

disagree on an issue’s resolution . . . .” Id. at 688. We are satisfied that

the district court and the motions panel of this court correctly determined

that certification was appropriate in this case.

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6 FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA

2014); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). “We construe the language

of the ADA broadly to advance its remedial purpose.” 

Cohen, 754 F.3d at 695.

Title II of the ADA, the provision at issue in this case,

applies to state and local governments. Id. at 694; 42 U.S.C.

§ 12131. It provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The

ADA was modeled on the Rehabilitation Act, which

prohibited any “program or activity” that received federal

funds from discriminating against disabled individuals. 

29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190,

1216 n.27 (9th Cir. 2008); Bay Area Addiction Research &

Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch (“BAART”), 179 F.3d 725,

731–32 (9th Cir. 1999). The Rehabilitation Act defines

“program or activity” as “all of the operations of . . . a

department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State or of a local government.” 

29 U.S.C. § 794(b). We have recognized that the term

“services, programs, or activities” as used in the ADA is

similarly broad, “‘bringing within its scope anything a public

entity does.’” Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073,

1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (brackets omitted) (quoting Lee v. City

of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001)). Whether a

particular public function is covered by the ADA turns simply

on whether it is “‘a normal function of a government entity.’” 

Id. (quoting BAART, 179 F.3d at 731).

Recognizing the broad reach of the ADA, we have held

that Title II requires public entities to maintain accessible

public sidewalks, notwithstanding the fact that no

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 7

implementing regulations specifically addressed sidewalks. 

Id. at 1076–78. In Barden, we explained that local

governments must maintain accessible sidewalks because

“maintaining public sidewalks is a normal function of a city

and ‘without a doubt something that the City does.’” Id. at

1176 (brackets omitted) (quoting Hason v. Med. Bd.,

279 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002)). The same reasoning

leads us to conclude that local governments must maintain

accessible on-street public parking.

The City argues that Barden is distinguishable because,

in that case, existing regulations concerning curb ramps

clearly contemplated sidewalk accessibility. Here, however,

the City contends that no existing regulation implicates onstreet parking. The City’s argument fails for several reasons. 

First, although the Barden court noted that its conclusion was

“consistent with” an existing curb ramp regulation, its

holding was based on the text of the ADA. See id. at

1076–77 (interpreting the phrase “services, programs, or

activities” and considering similar text in the Rehabilitation

Act). Second, we have previously recognized that, as a

general matter, the lack of specific regulations cannot

eliminate a statutory obligation. See Reich v. Mont. Sulphur

& Chem. Co., 32 F.3d 440, 444–45 (9th Cir. 1994)

(explaining that although the Occupational Safety and Health

Act contemplated that the Secretary of Labor would

promulgate specific safety standards, such regulations could

only “amplify and augment” the statute’s general duty clause

and their absence did not “displace” the statutory mandate to

provide a safe workplace).

Third, existing regulations do require accessible on-street

parking. Two regulations in particular apply to public onstreet parking. The first is 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, which applies

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8 FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA

to all existing facilities.3 Pursuant to this regulation, public

entities must “operate each service, program, or activity so

that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its

entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals

with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). Because the

provision of public on-street parking is a “service, program,

or activity,” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) applies to it. Under the

regulation, however, public entities have some flexibility in

handling existing inaccessible facilities. For instance, they

are not required to make structural changes to all existing onstreet parking facilities if they can make public on-street

parking accessible by other means, such as by providing

accessible on-street parking at other nearby sites. 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.150(b)(1); cf. Cohen, 754 F.3d at 697 (noting that in

order to comply with 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, a public entity may

require disabled individuals to “take a marginally longer

route” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But, at bottom,

the regulation mandates program accessibility for all normal

governmental functions, including the provision of on-street

public parking.

The second regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.151, governs only

facilities that were constructed or modified after the ADA’s

3 The regulations define the term “facility” as “all or any portion of

buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other

conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or

personal property.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The United States Department

of Justice (“DOJ”), in its amicus brief, argues that on-street parking areas

are facilities because they constitute parking lots or portions of the road. 

We need not address these arguments because, if nothing else, on-street

parking areas qualify as “other real . . . property.” See Black’s Law

Dictionary 1412 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “real property” as “[l]and and

anything growing on, attached to, or erected on it, excluding anything that

may be severed without injury to the land”).

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 9

effective date. Unlike 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, it requires that

“each facility” constructed or altered after June 26, 1992 be

“readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a)(1), (b)(1). By its terms,

then, this regulation extends to newly constructed or altered

on-street parking facilities. The City seeks to avoid this

conclusion by pointing out that the technical specifications

governing newly constructed or altered facilities are silent

with respect to on-street parking. In addition to the general

mandate of accessibility set forth in subsections (a)(1) and

(b)(1), 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 also requires that newly

constructed or altered facilities meet the technical standards

set forth in the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards

(“UFAS”), the 1991 Standards for Accessible Design (“1991

Standards”), or the 2010 Standards for Accessible Design

(“2010 Standards”). See id. § 35.151(c).4 The UFAS, the

1991 Standards, and the 2010 Standards contain detailed

specifications for a range of different facilities, but none of

them address on-street parking.

5 However, nothing in 28

C.F.R. § 35.151 suggests that when technical specifications

do not exist for a particular type of facility, public entities

have no accessibility obligations. In fact, such an

interpretation of the regulation cannot be reconciled with

subsections (a)(1) and (b)(1), which mandate that “each”

4 The UFAS is available at http://www.access-board.gov/guidelinesand-standards/buildings-and-sites/about-the-aba-standards/ufas. The 1991

Standards are available at 28 C.F.R. § 36, App. D. The 2010 Standards

are available at http://www.access-board.gov/attachments/article/983/

ADAstandards.pdf. Which standard applies depends on the date of

construction or alteration.

5 They do contain specifications for parking lots and parking structures. 

See UFAS §§ 4.1.1, 4.6; 1991 Standards §§ 4.1.2, 4.6; 2010 Standards

§§ 208, 502.

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newly constructed or altered facility be readily accessible. 

Therefore, we read 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 to require that all

public on-street parking facilities constructed or altered after

the ADA’s effective date be accessible.

Our interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 is also consistent

with the DOJ’s interpretation. The DOJ issues a Technical

Assistance Manual (“TA Manual”) to assist individuals and

entities to understand their rights and obligations under the

ADA.6In a 1994 supplement to the TA Manual, the DOJ

offered the following guidance on complying with 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.151 when neither the UFAS nor the Americans with

Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and

Facilities (“ADAAG”)7contained specifications for a type of

facility:

In such cases the technical requirements of the

chosen standard should be applied to the

extent possible. If no standard exists for

particular features, those features need not

comply with a particular design standard. 

However, the facility must still be designed

6 The TA Manual for Title II of the ADA is available at

http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html.

7 The ADAAG contains the Architectural and Transportation Barriers

Compliance Board’s (“Access Board”) proposed accessibility. By statute,

the Access Board sets the floor for the DOJ’s ADA regulations. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12134(c). The ADAAG itself, however, is not one of the technical

specification standards listed in 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(c). The 1994

supplement to the TA Manual likely refers to the ADAAG because, even

though as a general matter the ADAAG does not define the governing

accessibility standards, the 1991 Standards adopted the ADAAG in full. 

See 28 C.F.R. § 36, App. D.

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 11

and operated to meet other title II

requirements, including programaccessibility.

1994 Supplement to TA Manual, II-6.2100 (citation

omitted).8 Moreover, the DOJ’s amicus brief also sets forth

this interpretation of 28 C.F.R. § 35.151.

An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is

entitled to deference. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461

(1997). The DOJ’s interpretation of its ADA implementing

regulations is entitled to “‘controlling weight unless it is

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” 

Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir.

2008) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,

325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). The TA Manual is such “‘an

interpretation[,] . . . and, as such, is entitled to significant

weight as to the meaning of the regulation[s].’” Id. (quoting

Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc.,

375 F.3d 861, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, an

agency’s interpretation of its own regulations as advanced in

an amicus brief is also entitled to deference. Chase Bank,

USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880–82 (2011); Auer,

519 U.S. at 461. Accordingly, even if we had doubts about

the applicability of 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 to facilities for which

no technical specifications exist, we would be bound to defer

to the DOJ’s interpretation of the regulation because it is not

“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 

Miller, 536 F.3d at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The City contends that another DOJ publication, an

informal guidance publication entitled “ADA Guide for Small

8 The 1994 supplement to the TA Manual is available at

http://www.ada.gov/taman2up.html.

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Towns,” supports its position.9 That publication states only

that “[t]he ADA Standards have technical requirements for

parking lots and garages but no technical requirements for the

design of on-street parking.” ADA Guide for Small Towns,

Part II.A. This statement does not support the City’s

argument that public on-street parking need not be accessible;

it provides only that no technical specifications exist for

public on-street parking facilities.

The City also points to certain text in “Using ADAAG,”

a 2003 Access Board technical bulletin, that supposedly

stands for the proposition that public entities have no

obligations under the ADA absent specific technical

guidelines.10 But like the “ADA Guide for Small Towns,”

“Using ADAAG” does not actually advance such a position. 

The text the City relies on merely states that “[t]he DOJ and

[the Department of Transportation] rules describe all of the

ADA obligations of covered entities arising from titles II and

III of the [ADA].” Access Board, “Using ADAAG,” 1

(2003).11 This statement says nothing about how the DOJ

regulations apply to facilities for which no specifications

exist. Furthermore, later in the bulletin, the Access Board

explains that when there are “no provisions in ADAAG for a

facility type, element, or feature,” such facilities are

9 The ADA Guide for Small Towns is available at

http://www.ada.gov/smtown.htm#anchor12335.

10 At the time the parties submitted their briefs, “Using ADAAG” was

available on the Access Board’s website. Since then, this document has

been removed from the website.

11 The Department of Transportation is responsible for administering

certain provisions of the ADA not at issue in this case. See, e.g.,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12149, 12164.

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 13

nevertheless subject to other ADA

requirements, including the duty to provide

equal opportunity. In many cases it will be

feasible to provide access by incorporating

basic elements specified in ADAAG, such as

ramps and other parameters of an accessible

route. . . . [I]n new construction and

alterations, a reasonable number, but at least

one of each type of element should be

designed to be accessible.

Id. at 8. Accordingly, the Access Board, like the DOJ,

understood the ADA to impose general accessibility

requirements on public entities even in the absence of

technical specifications for a particular facility. Moreover,

even if the bulletin did support the City’s position, the Access

Board’s understanding of the ADAAG is not entitled to any

deference. See Miller, 536 F.3d at 1031 (“Whatever the

Access Board thought of its own guidelines, the Department

of Justice adopted the text of the guidelines themselves, not

the Access Board’s interpretation of that text.”).

Nor are we persuaded that the City should be exempted

from the general mandate of the ADA and its implementing

regulations simply because the Access Board has proposed

guidelines that do contain technical specifications for onstreet parking.

12 We have previously interpreted existing

regulations to require certain accommodations even when the

Access Board was in the midst of addressing the specific

issue before us. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal

 

12 See Access Board, Proposed Accessibility Guidelines for Pedestrian

Facilities in the Public Right-of-Way (July 26, 2011),

http://www.access-board.gov/attachments/article/743/nprm.pdf.

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14 FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA

Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2003)

(deferring to the DOJ’s interpretation of how a regulation

applied in an unanticipated situation without reference to

ongoing Access Board rulemaking); id. at 1133–34

(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)(emphasizing that the Access Board

had promulgated directly on-point proposed guidelines). We

see no reason to conclude otherwise here.

Finally, the City’s due process argument is unavailing. 

The City contends that because it was not on notice that

accessible on-street parking was required until, at the earliest,

the DOJ’s amicus brief in this litigation, allowing Fortyune’s

claims to proceed would violate its right to due process. 

Entities regulated by administrative agencies have a due

process right to fair notice of regulators’ requirements. 

United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 768–70 (9th

Cir. 2008). Here, however, the DOJ made it known in 1994,

in a publicly available supplement to the TA Manual, that

public entities have a general obligation to ensure that

governmental services are reasonably accessible even when

no technical specifications exist for a particular type of

facility. 1994 Supplement to TA Manual, II-6.2100. In

AMC, we recognized that a significantly less public

announcement—the filing of an amicus brief in separate

litigation—could provide adequate prospective notice of

prohibited conduct. See id. at 770. Consequently, it is simply

untrue that the City lacked notice that the ADA’s general

mandate applied even absent technical specifications.13

13 Any further consideration of the City’s due process argument would

be premature because due process constrains the remedies that may be

imposed. See AMC, 549 F.3d at 768–70. If Fortyune prevails, when

crafting a remedy, the district court will have to consider carefully what

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FORTYUNE V. CITY OF LOMITA 15

IV. CONCLUSION

The text of the ADA, the relevant implementing

regulations, and the DOJ’s interpretation of its own

regulations all lead us to conclude that public entities must

ensure that all normal governmental functions are reasonably

accessible to disabled persons, irrespective of whether the

DOJ has adopted technical specifications for the particular

types of facilities involved. Accordingly, we hold that

Fortyune has stated claims under the ADA and the CDPA14

based on the City’s alleged failure to provide accessible onstreet diagonal stall parking.

AFFIRMED.

level of accessibility the City should have known was legally required for

diagonal stall on-street parking. See id.

14 A violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the CDPA. Cohen,

754 F.3d at 701; Hubbard v. SoBreck, LLC, 554 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir.

2008); Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c).

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