Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00529/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00529-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 152
Nature of Suit: Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Default of Student Loan

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Robert A. DeFazio, 

Defendant.

No. CV11-0529-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 In this action, the government seeks to collect more than $200,000 in loans made 

by the Department of Education. The government filed a motion for summary judgment 

on January 17, 2012, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Doc. 9. Defendant Robert A. DeFazio filed a motion requesting oral argument on the 

government’s motion. Doc. 11. The Court entered an order explaining to Defendant the 

requirements of Rule 56 and the relevant Local Rules of Civil Procedure, and ordered 

Defendant to file a response to the government’s motion for summary judgment by May 

11, 2012. Doc. 12. Defendant has not responded. For the reasons that follow, the Court 

will grant summary judgment in favor of the government.1

I. Legal Standard. 

A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

 

1

 Defendant’s request for oral argument (Doc. 11) is denied because the issues 

have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a 

party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome 

of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must 

be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

II. Preliminary Issue.

 The government filed its complaint on March 22, 2011. Doc. 1. The summons 

and complaint were returned to the Court unexecuted on June 10, 2011. Doc. 7. 

Defendant filed an answer on May 31, 2011. Doc. 6. In his answer, Defendant denied 

receiving formal service, but acknowledged that he was aware of the complaint and stated 

that he would return a request for waiver of service. Doc. 9, at 3 (citing Doc. 6, at 1). 

This history of the case raises a question about whether the Court may assert personal 

jurisdiction over Defendant. 

 A defendant waives the defenses of insufficiency of service of process and lack of 

personal jurisdiction by filing an answer without first raising the defenses. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(h); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982); Hays v. United 

Fireworks Mfg. Co., 420 F.2d 836, 844 (9th Cir. 1969). Defendant waived any issue of 

personal jurisdiction by appearing voluntarily and filing an answer. 

III. Discussion. 

Under LRCiv 7.2(i) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, if the opposing party to 

a motion “does not serve and file the required answering memoranda . . . such noncompliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and the 

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Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” LRCiv 7.2(i). The Ninth Circuit has held 

that it is an abuse of discretion to grant a motion pursuant to such a local rule where the 

movant’s papers are insufficient to support the motion or on their face reveal a genuine 

issue of material fact. Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 To recover on a promissory note, the government must establish that: (1) the 

defendant signed the note, (2) the government is the current owner or holder of the note, 

and (3) the note is in default. United States v. Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 

2009); United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2001). To make this prima 

facie showing, “the government may introduce evidence of the note and a sworn 

transcript of the account or certificate of indebtedness.” Petroff-Kline, 557 F.3d at 290. 

Once a prima facie case is established, the defendant has the burden of proving the 

nonexistence, extinguishment, or variance in payment of the obligation. Id.

 The government contends that it is entitled judgment “in the sum of $276,439.43 

consisting of $254,516.43 principal, plus $21,923 interest computed through January 21, 

2011, with interest continuing to accrue from January 21, 2011, plus interest from the 

date of judgment as provided by law and all costs in this action.” Doc. 9, at 5. To 

support its motion for summary judgment, the government has submitted the relevant 

loan applications and promissory notes (Doc. 10-2, at 2-7 (Ex. 1)), and a Certificate of 

Indebtedness, certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) under penalty of perjury 

(Doc. 10-2, at 9 (Ex. 2)). 

 The government’s evidence establishes that on or about May 15, 2003 and 

September 1, 2004, Defendant executed promissory notes to secure direct consolidation 

loans from the Department of Education. Doc. 10-2, at 2. Under the promissory notes, 

Defendant “promise[d] to pay to the U.S. Department of Education . . . all sums disbursed 

under the terms of this Promissory Note,” including interest and fees as well as collection 

of costs if Defendant failed to make payment on the note when due. See id. On 

October 8, 2004, the loan was disbursed in the amounts of $104,702.95 and $120,778.63, 

at 4.38 percent interest per annum. Doc. 10-2, at 9. On or about September 3, 2009, 

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Defendant defaulted on his loan obligation. Doc. 10, at 2, ¶ 9. Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. 

§ 685.202(b), a total of $29,072.14 in unpaid interest was capitalized and added to the 

principal balance. Id. The Department of Education has credited a total of $87.29 in 

payments from all sources, including Treasury Department offsets. Doc. 10-2, at 9. 

After application of these payments, Defendant owes the United States a total debt of 

$276,439.43 as of January 21, 2011, consisting of $254,516.43 in principal and $21,923 

in interest, with interest accruing on the principal at a rate of $30.52 per day. Id. 

 The government has shown that Defendant signed the promissory note, that the 

government currently holds the note, and that the note is in default. There is sufficient 

evidence for the government to recover on the note. 

IV. Conclusion. 

The time to respond to the government’s motion for summary judgment has 

expired, and Defendant has not filed a response. Review of the record indicates that the 

government’s motion is facially meritorious and demonstrates the absence of genuine 

issues of material fact. The motion is thus well taken and supports summary judgment 

pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 9) is granted. 

 2. Defendant’s request for oral argument (Doc. 11) is denied. 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Defendant for $254,516.43

in principal and $21,923.00 in interest through January 21, 2011, plus interest from 

January 22, 2012 through the date of judgment in the amount of $3,967.60, plus interest 

from the date of judgment at .21% compounded annually until the judgment is satisfied. 

Plaintiff is also entitled to costs incurred herein. 

 Dated this 31st day of May, 2012. 

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