Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00029/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00029-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ERNEST ANAYA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0029 GEB GGH P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. This action is proceeding on the

original complaint filed January 5, 2007. He seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 

Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed August 23, 2007, on behalf of defendants Campbell,

Grannis, Smith, Tedder, Nale, Akintola, Huerta-Garcia, Johnson, Reaves, Reyes and Kennick. 

Also pending is the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed August 17, 2007, on behalf

of defendants Azcona and Cate. 

After carefully considering the record, the court orders that defendants’ motions

are granted in part and recommends that they be denied in part.

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II. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;”

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading

must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a

legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume

that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”

NOW, 510 U.S. at 256, 114 S. Ct. at 803, quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596

(1972).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also

consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other

papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. August 23, 2007, Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied adequate medical care in violation of the

Eighth Amendment for a variety of ailments. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated the

ADA. In particular, plaintiff alleges that he was denied knee surgery. Plaintiff also alleges that

his request for a walking cane, crutches and grab bars related to his knee problems were denied. 

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. 

Legal Standards for ADA and Eighth Amendment

Title II of the ADA applies to inmates in state prison. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124

F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997). In order to state a claim of disability discrimination under Title

II of the ADA plaintiff must allege four elements: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he

was otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services,

programs, or activities; 3) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

the public entity’s services...or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 4)

such exclusion, denial...or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” McGary v. City of

Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

In order to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on

inadequate medical care, plaintiff must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct.

285, 292 (1976). To prevail, plaintiff must show both that his medical needs were objectively

serious, and that defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991); McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.

1992) (on remand). The requisite state of mind for a medical claim is “deliberate indifference.” 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 112 S. Ct. 995, 998 (1992). 

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A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Indications

that a prisoner has a serious need for medical treatment are the following: the existence of an

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain. See, e.g., Wood v. Housewright, 900

F. 2d 1332, 1337-41 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing cases); Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200-01

(9th Cir. 1989). McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) the Supreme Court

defined a very strict standard which a plaintiff must meet in order to establish “deliberate

indifference.” Of course, negligence is insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. 

However, even civil recklessness (failure to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm

which is so obvious that it should be known) is insufficient. Id. at 836-37, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. 

Neither is it sufficient that a reasonable person would have known of the risk or that a defendant

should have known of the risk. Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.

It is nothing less than recklessness in the criminal sense – subjective standard –

disregard of a risk of harm of which the actor is actually aware. Id. at 838-842, 114 S. Ct. at

1979-1981. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837,

114 S. Ct. at 1979. Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces “a substantial risk

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at

847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981. If the risk was

obvious, the trier of fact may infer that a defendant knew of the risk. Id. at 840-42, 114 S. Ct. at

1981. However, obviousness per se will not impart knowledge as a matter of law. 

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Also significant to the analysis is the well established principle that mere

differences of opinion concerning the appropriate treatment cannot be the basis of an Eighth

Amendment violation. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1996); Franklin v. Oregon,

662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

Moreover, a physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate

that inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989). A failure to competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is

prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id.

Additionally, mere delay in medical treatment without more is insufficient to state

a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com’rs, 766

F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the delay in medical treatment must be harmful, there is

no requirement that the delay cause “substantial” harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060, citing

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1339-1340 (9th Cir. 1990) and Hudson, 112 S. Ct. at 998-

1000. A finding that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or inaction tends

to provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference; however, it does not end the

inquiry. McGuckin, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992). In summary, “the more serious the

medical needs of the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s actions in light of those

needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established deliberate indifference on the part of

the defendant.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1061. 

Analysis: ADA Claim

As to plaintiff’s ADA claim, the court first considers whether he has demonstrated

that he was denied access to a program because he was not provided with surgery, cane, crutches

or grab bars. Plaintiff alleges that he received a rules violation report for not reporting to his job

or education program. Complaint, p. 13. However, plaintiff does not specifically allege that he

could not attend his job and education program based on defendants’ failure to provide him with

surgery, a cane, crutches or grab bars. Accordingly, the ADA claim is dismissed with leave to

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amend so that plaintiff may clarify this matter.

Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Kinnick and Johnson failed to administer their

professional duties of placing grab bars in his bathroom. Complaint, p. 13. To demonstrate

deliberate indifference for the Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating

that defendants knew that to deny plaintiff these items would cause plaintiff to suffer serious

harm. Plaintiff had pled no facts demonstrating that these defendants were aware of his need for

grab bars. Accordingly, the claims against these defendants are dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff generally alleges that defendant Campbell failed to provide plaintiff with

the grab bars. Plaintiff has also plead no facts demonstrating that defendant Campbell was aware

of his need for grab bars. Accordingly, the claims against this defendant are dismissed with leave

to amend.

As to defendant Smith, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Kyle, an arthroscopic surgeon,

recommended that plaintiff have knee surgery. Defendant Smith refused to provide plaintiff with

surgery despite the recommendation. These allegations state a colorable Eighth Amendment

claim against defendant Smith. Defendants do not move to dismiss this claim. Rather, they

move to dismiss the ADA and state law claims against this defendant. As discussed above, the

ADA claims are dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Smith slandered him by writing a “frivolous”

diagnosis in plaintiff’s medical records. These allegations do not state a claim for slander. In

any event, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 612, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976), the Supreme Court held

that any harm or injury to an individuals reputation, even where inflicted by a government

official, does not result in a deprivation of “liberty” or “property” and does not invoke the

procedural protections of the due process clause. Accordingly, plaintiff’s slander claim is

dismissed.

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Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against

defendant Smith on grounds that medical malpractice does not state a cognizable federal claim. 

While this is true, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal district court may exercise supplemental or

pendent jurisdiction over state law claims “when the federal claim is sufficiently substantial to

confer federal jurisdiction, and there is a common nucleus of operative fact between the state and

federal claims.” Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816 (9th Cir. 1995). In the instant case, there is a

common nucleus of operative fact between plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim and his Eighth

Amendment claim against defendant Smith. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

medical malpractice claim against defendant Smith should be denied.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Reyes denied his request for knee surgery. In

particular, plaintiff alleges that on August 2, 2004, defendant Reyes, an appeals coordinator,

denied his appeal requesting knee surgery. In support of this claim, plaintiff refers to exhibit A-4

attached to the complaint. On August 2, 2004, defendant Reyes issued a memorandum stating,

The appeal you sent to the MCSP appeals office as possible ADA appeal has been

recategorized as a medical issue, based on your request for a new MRI and

another knee surgery. Your appeal has been forwarded to the medical department

for response at the first level of review. 

The recategorization of plaintiff’s appeal from an ADA to a medical appeal by

defendant Reyes does not constitute deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the Eighth

Amendment claim against defendant Reyes is dismissed with leave to amend.

Plaintiff allege that defendants Nale and Akintola neglected to provide plaintiff

with adequate medical care. Complaint, p. 14.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

The complaint includes no specific allegations against these defendants. In other

words, plaintiff does not allege how defendants Nale and Akintola provided him with inadequate

medical care. Accordingly, the court does not find that plaintiff has stated a colorable claim for

relief against defendants Nale and Akintola. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Garcia and Reaves are in a position of authority

over plaintiff. Complaint, p. 13. These allegations do not state a colorable claim against these

defendants. Accordingly, the claims against defendants Garcia and Reave are dismissed with

leave to amend. 

The only allegation against defendant Tedder, the medical appeals analyst, is that

she failed in her duty to administer any professional diagnosis of plaintiff’s medical condition. 

Complaint, p. 12. Because defendant Tedder is not a medical doctor, the court would not find

her liable based on her failure to provide a diagnosis of plaintiff’s medical problems. 

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Accordingly, the claims against defendant Tedder are dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Grannis denied his administrative appeal

requesting surgery, cane, crutches and grab bars. Defendants correctly argue that plaintiff has no

right to an administrative grievance procedure. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860

(2003).

Defendants sued in their individual capacity must be alleged to have: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed

to act to prevent them; or implemented a policy that repudiates constitutional rights and was the

moving force behind the alleged violations. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646

(9th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040

(9th Cir. 1989). “Although a § 1983 claim has been described as ‘a species of tort liability,’

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S. Ct. 984, 988, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, it is perfectly clear

that not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that

statute.” Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S. Ct. 553, 559 (1980). 

“Without proximate cause, there is no § 1983 liability.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d

831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996).

The search, which was performed in accordance with this constitutionally valid 

strip search policy, was subsequently ratified by the School Board when Mr. 

Williams filed a grievance. Therefore, Williams’ only grasp at evoking municipal

liability under § 1983 is to show that this subsequent ratification is sufficient to 

establish the necessary causation requirements. Based on the facts, the Board 

believed Ellington and his colleagues were justified in conducting the search of 

Williams. There was no history that the policy had been repeatedly or even 

sporadically misapplied by school board officials in the past. Consequently, the 

School Board cannot be held liable for the ratification of the search in question, 

because this single, isolated decision can hardly constitute the “moving force” 

behind the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884-885 (9th Cir. 1991).

This court is unwilling to adopt a rule that anyone involved in adjudicating

grievances after the fact is per se potentially liable under a ratification theory. However, this is

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not to say that persons involved in adjudicating administrative disputes, or persons to whom

complaints are sometimes made can never be liable under a ratification theory. If, for example, a

reviewing official’s rejections of administrative grievances can be construed as an automatic

whitewash, which may have led other prison officials to have no concern of ever being

reprimanded, a ratifying official may be liable for having put a defective policy in place. 

The complaint contains no allegations suggesting that the rejection of plaintiff’s

administrative appeals by defendant Grannis was an automatic whitewash. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss the claims against defendant Grannis should be granted.

Plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from gastrointestinal problems which require

single cell status, cell meals, diet changes and use of a private restroom. Plaintiff alleges that his

request for single cell status was granted by Warden Bunnel. However, plaintiff does not allege

that any named defendant specifically denied his request for cell meals, diet changes and use of

private restrooms. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding these matters

are dismissed.

Finally, defendants construe the complaint to be stating an Equal Protection claim

because plaintiff alleges discrimination. The court finds that plaintiff’s discrimination

allegations are made in the context of his ADA claims. The court does not construe the

complaint to allege an Equal Protection claim. 

IV. August 17, 2007, Motion to Dismiss

The complaint contains no specific allegations against defendant Azcona. The

only specific claim against defendant Cate, who plaintiff alleges works at the Inspector General’s

Office, is that he failed to investigate plaintiff’s complaint made to that office.

According to defendants’ motion to dismiss, defendant Cate is the Inspector

General of the Office of the Inspector General. Defendant Azcona is a Deputy Inspector General.

Defendants first argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against state

officials acting in the official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for

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prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. Los Angeles

County Bar Ass’n. v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Ex Parte v. Young, 209 U.S.

123, 155-56, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68, 94 S. Ct. 1347

(1974)). Because plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief, the claims against defendants

Azcona and Cate in their official capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Defendants next argue that the claims against them should be dismissed because

plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against them. Defendants argue that they have no

statutory authority to act on plaintiff’s behalf. Defendants argue that no statute authorizes the

Office of the Inspector General to take any action in response to any complaint, including an

inmate’s. Defendants also argue that any authority to investigate and take action is discretionary.

The claim against defendant Cate is akin to the claim against defendant Grannis

above, i.e. defendant is liable for the alleged violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights

based on his failure to properly review plaintiff’s administrative appeal/complaint. As with

persons reviewing administrative appeals, the court is unwilling to adopt a rule that anyone

involved in reviewing a complaint to the Inspector General’s Office after the fact is per se

potentially liable under a ratification theory. Plaintiff makes no allegations demonstrating that

the rejection of his complaint or failure to investigate his complaint was akin to a whitewash that

may have led prison officials to have no concern of ever being reprimanded. Accordingly, the

claims against defendant Cate are dismissed.

Plaintiff’s complaint contains no specific allegations against defendant Azcona. 

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss defendant Azcona is granted based on plaintiff’s failure to

link this defendant to any alleged deprivation.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, all claims but for plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and medical

malpractice claims against defendant Smith are dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff is

granted thirty days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint. The amended

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complaint must include all claims against all defendants and contain a short and plain statement

of the claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. In other words, plaintiff’s complaint need not be lengthy. If

plaintiff’s amended complaint is excessively long, it may be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

Pl. 8. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, this action will proceed on the claims

against defendant Smith only.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The motion to dismiss filed August 17, 2007, on behalf of defendants Azcona

and Cate is granted with thirty days to file an amended complaint; if plaintiff files an amended

complaint, defendants’ response is due thirty days thereafter;

2. The motion to dismiss filed August 9, 2007, on behalf of defendants Campbell,

Grannis, Smith, Tedder, Nale, Akintola, Huerta-Garcia, Johnson, Reaves, Reyes and Kennick is

granted as to all claims but for the state law claim against defendant Smith; plaintiff is granted

thirty days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint; if plaintiff files an amended

complaint, defendants’ response is due thirty days thereafter; if plaintiff does not file an amended

complaint, defendant Smith shall file an answer to the Eighth Amendment and state law claims

within thirty days of the district court’s adoption of these findings and recommendations;

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ August 9, 2007, motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s medical practice claim against defendant Smith be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 12/4/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

an29.mtd

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