Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02398/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02398-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ramon Adrian Espinoza-Cuamea, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 11-01185 PHX GMS

v. ) CIV 11-02398 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

United States of America, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Plaintiff/Respondent. )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

On or about December 6, 2011, Mr. Ramon Adrian

Espinoza-Cuamea (“Movant”) filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Movant

filed an amended motion on July 31, 2012. Respondent filed a

response (Doc. 11) to Movant’s motion to vacate or set aside his

sentence on September 28, 2012. As of November 7, 2012, Movant

had not filed a reply to the response to his motion, which was

due October 28, 2012. 

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned June 21, 2011,

charged Movant with one count of reentry of a removed alien, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). See Criminal Doc.

10. On August 26, 2011, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

Movant pled guilty to the charge stated in the indictment. See

Criminal Doc. 21, 22, 23. 

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The plea agreement provided that, if Movant’s crime was

classified as an offense level 20, Movant would receive a

three-level reduction in his base offense level for acceptance

of responsibility and a two-level reduction for the early

disposition of the charge, resulting in a sentencing guideline

range offense level of 15 and a potential sentencing range of

18-51 months imprisonment, depending on the determined criminal

history. See Criminal Doc. 26. In the written plea agreement

Movant expressly waived his rights to appeal or collaterally

attack, via a section 2255 motion, the conviction or any

sentence imposed provided his sentence was consistent with the

plea agreement. Id. 

During Movant’s change of plea colloquy he acknowledged

the sentencing range being discussed and provided for in the

plea agreement was only an estimate. See Criminal Doc. 33.

Movant acknowledge at the entry of his guilty plea that the

sentencing judge would calculate the applicable sentencing

guideline range and consider a number of factors after the

probation department produced a presentence investigation

report. Id. Movant was also advised that neither his lawyer

nor the judge could guarantee that he would receive a sentencing

benefit from entering into the plea agreement. Id.

Additionally, during the plea colloquy Movant acknowledged he

was waiving his rights to appeal or collaterally attack his

sentence.

On November 17, 2011, the District Court determined

Movant’s guideline offense level as 15 and his criminal history

category as five, resulting in a sentencing guidelines range of

Case 2:11-cv-02398-GMS Document 12 Filed 11/09/12 Page 2 of 10
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37-46 months imprisonment. See Criminal Doc. 34. Movant was

sentenced to a term of 42 months in prison. See Criminal Doc.

27 & 34.

In his section 2255 action Movant contends his sentence

should be reduced because he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel, i.e., counsel did not explain

the plea agreement properly because Movant understood that his

sentence would be a stipulated maximum sentence of 30 months.

Movant also asserts he is entitled to relief because he was

sentenced outside of the range stipulated to by the parties in

the plea agreement.

II Analysis

Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent asserts that this section 2255 action must

be dismissed because Movant waived his right to collaterally

attack his conviction and sentence in the written plea

agreement. The plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived

his right to collaterally attack any matter pertaining to

Movant’s conviction and sentence if the sentence imposed was

consistent with the written terms of the agreement. The

sentence imposed on Movant was consistent with the terms of the

plea agreement. Because the sentence imposed was in accordance

with the plea agreement, the plea agreement is valid.

Therefore, Movant is bound by the plea agreement’s waiver of his

right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

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2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

A defendant’s waiver of his right to a direct appeal

and a section 2255 action is enforceable if the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised,

and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. See United

States v. Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s right to

collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable if the

waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Washington v. Lampert, 422

F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. White, 307

F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). A collateral attack alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea

agreement may be brought notwithstanding a waiver of this right

in a plea agreement if the agreement was involuntary or

unknowing or where the agreement was otherwise unlawful. See

United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.

2001)(“[A] waiver of appeal may not be enforced against a

section 2255 petitioner who claims that ineffective assistance

of counsel rendered that waiver unknowing or involuntary.”);

Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

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Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th

Cir. 1998) (holding that “a straightforward and simple ‘Yes,

your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a Movant to [the] consequences

[of a plea agreement].”). Additionally, because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, Movant’s

guilty plea can be considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969).

The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and

made intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383

(9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994).

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

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probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.

2005).

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “a

reasonably competent attorney, whose advice is within the range

of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). In order to find that

Movant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and

grant him relief on this claim pursuant to section 2255 the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was deficient and that

the deficient performance prejudiced Movant. See United States

v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2011). Movant

bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the

Court can conclude his counsel’s representation was

unconstitutionally ineffective. Id. In the context of a

defendant who pleads guilty, to be entitled to relief, the

movant must establish that, but for his counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance, the movant would have chosen not to plead

guilty but to proceed to trial. See, e.g., Bethel v. United

States, 458 F.3d 711, 718 (9th Cir. 2006).

Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is

unreasonable, or not “within the range of competence demanded of

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attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104

S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must

be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at

2065. See also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th Cir.

2002). Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda,

815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina,

934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Movant has not established that his counsel’s advice

with regard to the potential sentence he faced if he accepted

the plea was unconstitutionally deficient or prejudicial.

Movant asserts that he believed the plea agreement required his

sentence be capped at 30 months imprisonment, however, this

assertions is belied by Movant’s statements at his change of

plea hearing. “To establish a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel based on alleged erroneous advice regarding a guilty

plea, a petitioner must demonstrate more than a ‘mere inaccurate

prediction.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868

(9th Cir. 2004), quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864-65 (9th

Cir. 1986). Defense counsel’s alleged erroneous predictions as

to the likely sentence following a guilty plea, “are deficient

only if they constitute ‘gross mischaracterization of the likely

outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with ... erroneous advice

on the probable effects of going to trial.’” Id., quoting

United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990).

Furthermore, if the defendant was informed prior to entering his

guilty plea of the potential sentence he could receive, he

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cannot establish prejudice from counsel’s incorrect prediction

as to his sentence. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998,

1003-4 (9th Cir. 2007). See also United States v. Garcia, 909

F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that an erroneous

sentence prediction “does not entitle a defendant to challenge

his guilty plea”); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162

(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that an inaccurate sentence prediction

was not prejudicial).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, in

the context of a defendant who pleads guilty, an attorney’s

performance may only deemed unconstitutionally deficient when

counsel “grossly” mischaracterizes the likely sentence to be

received when counseling the defendant to plead guilty. See

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990).

In cases where the Ninth Circuit has found gross

mischaracterization the sentence received by the defendant was

of a different order of magnitude than what Movant asserts in

this matter as constituting counsel’s deficient performance.

Compare Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Morris v.

Woodford, 229 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 2000) (three months

predicted; ten years imposed); Iaea, 800 F.2d at 865.

Accordingly, even if Movant’s counsel incorrectly

predicted his sentence, Movant was not prejudiced by any error

because he was informed of the consequences of entering the plea

agreement at the change of plea hearing and, at that time,

indicated he wished to enter into the plea agreement.

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III Conclusion

Movant waived his right to collaterally attack his

convictions and sentences in his plea agreement. Movant has not

established that his waiver of these rights was not knowing and

voluntary. Additionally, Movant has not established that he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because

his counsel allegedly misrepresented the length of the sentence

which was imposed.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Espinoza-Cuamea

motion for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

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objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. Should Movant seek a certificate of appealability, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the request be denied.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2012.

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