Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01139/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01139-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 05cv1139 J (LSP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL ANTHONY SENO, SR.,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 05cv1139 J (LSP)

ORDER: 

1) ADOPTING, MODIFYING, AND

REJECTING, IN PART,

MAGISTRATE JUDGE PAPAS’

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; 

2) GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; 

3) DISMISSING GROUNDS TWO

AND THREE IN THEIR ENTIRETY,

AND GROUND FOUR IN PART,

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO

REFILING IN SEPARATE

PETITIONS; AND

4) DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §

2254

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas’ Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant the instant Motion to Dismiss and deny pro se

Petitioner Michael Anthony Seno, Sr.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 14.] On

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1 Petitioner had already twice filed federal habeas Petitions in this Court; each was dismissed without

prejudice upon the Court’s finding that Petitioner had failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial

remedies. [Doc. Nos. 1, 3, 6, 7.] While the original Petition would appear to have been brought pursuant

to Petitioner’s conviction for failure to appear, the Court CONSTRUES the instant Second Amended

2 05cv1139 J (LSP)

December 28, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No.

8.] On February 28, 2006, Respondent Robert J. Hernandez, Warden of the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility, where Petitioner is confined, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition [Doc.

No. 11]; Petitioner has not opposed the Motion. The Magistrate Judge issued the R&R on May

1, 2006. [Doc. No. 14.] To date, no objections have been filed. For the reasons discussed

below, the Court ADOPTS, MODIFIES, and REJECTS the R&R, in part, and GRANTS

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Background

Petitioner is in state custody pursuant to three unrelated convictions: 1) a conviction for

petty theft in May 2004; 2) a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender in July 2004; and

3) a conviction for failure to appear at a sentencing hearing in February 2005. (See R&R at 2.) 

On June 16, 2004, while serving time for petty theft, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the

San Diego Superior Court, alleging that the sentencing court had been provided false and

misleading information with regard to the status of his illness. (See id.) He argued that contrary

to the mistaken information the court had received to show that he was not terminally ill, he was,

in fact, terminally ill with renal cancer and had, he believed, only eight months to live. (See id.) 

Petitioner sought an evidentiary hearing and resentencing, stating that he did not want to die in

jail. (See id.) On July 13, 2004, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s requests. (See id.)

On July 6, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, and on

February 9, 2005, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of failure to appear. (See id. at 3.) On July

26, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition challenging the Superior Court’s award of presentence and

good-conduct credits in the petty-theft and failure-to-register cases. (See id.) On August 16,

2005, the Superior Court denied relief to Petitioner. (See id.) On December 28, 2005, Petitioner

filed the instant Petition, pertaining to his petty theft conviction, in this Court.1

 [Doc. No. 8.] In

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Petition as being brought pursuant to Petitioner’s conviction for petty theft. Compare Pet. at 1-2 (citing

February 9, 2005, as the date of judgment of conviction and “failure to appear for sentencing” as the

underlying offense) with Sec. Am. Pet. at 1-2 (citing May 5, 2004, as the date of judgment of conviction

and “petty theft with prior” as the underlying offense); see also, e.g., Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County,

339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that it is the court’s duty to construe pro se motions and

pleadings liberally).

3 05cv1139 J (LSP)

its second Order Dismissing Case without prejudice, the Court also found that Petitioner had

failed to state a cognizable federal claim. (See Sec. Order Dismissing Case w/out Prej. at 3-4.)

Legal Standard 

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report ... to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

Before a federal court may grant a petitioner habeas relief, the petitioner is required to

exhaust all available state court remedies with respect to all claims contained in the petition. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1996); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore,

exhaustion requires that the petitioner give the highest state court a “fair opportunity” to address

each claim before presenting the claims in a federal habeas petition. Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1066-69;

see also Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that to properly exhaust a

habeas claim, “a petitioner must present his claim to the state supreme court”). Moreover, the

petitioner “must describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal

theory on which his claim is based ‘so that the [court has] a “fair opportunity” to apply

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.’ ” Kelly, 315 F.3d

at 1066 (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). 

Once the state’s highest court considers the habeas petition, that court’s denial of the

petition without opinion or citation is sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Harris

v. Superior Court, 500 F. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d

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4 05cv1139 J (LSP)

344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the “California Supreme Court’s summary order denying

[the] petition was a denial on the merits”). Upon satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement, a

federal court may consider the merits of a petitioner’s habeas claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)

(1996). However, where a federal habeas petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted

claims, the court must dismiss the petition without prejudice. See id.; see Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 510 (1982). 

Discussion 

There being no objections to the findings contained in the R&R, the Court assumes the

correctness of the facts as set forth therein. Upon conducting a de novo review of the Magistrate

Judge’s conclusions of law, the Court FINDS that the R&R rightly concludes that Petitioner is

not entitled to habeas relief for three reasons: 1) Petitioner has failed to raise a cognizable federal

claim; 2) even if the Petition could be construed to present a cognizable federal claim, Petitioner

must bring those claims in separate petitions; and 3) Petitioner has failed to exhaust his claims. 

In addition, the Court FINDS that Petitioner will be procedurally barred from refiling the instant

Petition and that it therefore warrants dismissal with prejudice. The Court MODIFIES the R&R

by contributing this finding, and REJECTS the R&R with respect to its Recommendation only,

determining, in accordance with Respondent’s argument in his Motion to Dismiss, that a

dismissal, rather than a denial, of the Petition is warranted.

I. Petitioner Has Failed to Raise a Cognizable Federal Claim

The Magistrate Judge correctly finds that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of

raising a federal claim. (See R&R at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Petitioner raises four

grounds for relief: 1) that the trial court, prosecutor, and defense counsel knowingly permitted

the charge of failure to appear to be severed from the petty-theft case in violation of state law

barring double jeopardy; 2) that the trial court impermissibly imposed a two-year concurrent

sentence in his failure-to-register case; 3) that state law barring double jeopardy was violated in

the sentencing he received for failure to appear and a two-year consecutive enhancement; and 4)

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5 05cv1139 J (LSP)

that state law barring double jeopardy was violated for the trial court’s severing of the petty-theft

and failure-to-appear charges and for its failure to consider his deteriorating health. As the

Magistrate Judge correctly observes, on all four grounds for relief Petitioner invokes only state

law, rather than federal law. Petitioner thus fails to make the requisite showing of fundamental

unfairness or errors of federal constitutional magnitude. See Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d

1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state law

unless they rise to level of constitutional violation); see also Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461,

469 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir.1993)) (“Absent a

showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws

does not justify federal habeas relief.”). This Court thereby FINDS, in accordance with the

Magistrate Judge’s finding, that on these grounds alone, the Petition warrants dismissal.

II. Grounds Two and Three, and Part of Ground Four, Must Be Brought in Separate

Petitions as They Do Not Concern the Petty Theft Case

The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “of Petitioner’s four grounds

for relief, only the petty theft case raised in ground one and the failure to address medical

problems in sentencing allegation raised in ground four may be addressed in this Petition” and

that, therefore, “[t]he remaining claims in grounds two through four must be dismissed.” (R&R

at 6.) Ground two raises a challenge not to the petty-theft case, but to a separate failure-toregister case. (See id. at 5.) Likewise, ground three fails to raise a challenge to the petty-theft

case, but instead addresses the failure-to-appear case. (See id. at 5-6.) Ground four is in part a

restatement of the double jeopardy claims of grounds one and two. (See id. at 6.) As a result,

grounds two and three, and that part of ground four which restates ground two must be raised in

separate Petitions. (See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 2(e), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (“A

petitioner who seeks relief from judgments of more than one state court must file a separate

petition covering the judgment or judgments of each court.”) Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES these elements of the instant Petition without prejudice to Petitioner’s bringing

them again in separate federal habeas petitions upon their proper exhaustion in state court. 

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28 2 It is the finding of the Magistrate Judge and this Court that, in fact, Petitioner has not exhausted

any of the claims he presents in his Petition. (See R&R at 6-7.)

6 05cv1139 J (LSP)

III. Petitioner’s Claims Are Unexhausted

With grounds two and three dismissed in their entirety, and with ground four dismissed in

part, what survives in the instant Petition is ground one, in which Petitioner raises a challenge to

the petty-theft case, and one of Petitioner’s claims in ground four, alleging the sentencing court’s

impermissible showing of neglect for Petitioner’s deteriorating health. Yet there is no indication

in the record to suggest that Petitioner has presented any of his claims to the state courts.2

 The

Magistrate Judge duly cites to controlling case law in support of the proposition that in order to

“satisfy the exhaustion requirement a petitioner must first provide the state courts with a ‘fair

opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his [or her]

constitutional claim.” (R&R at 6 (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982.)) Since the

state courts have not had an opportunity to rule on the merits of any of Petitioner’s claims,

Petitioner’s surviving claims must also be dismissed. See, e.g., Rose, 455 U.S. at 520 (stating

that 28 U.S.C. 2254(b) “provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you

bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court”).

IV. Petitioner Is Procedurally Barred from Refiling the Instant Petition

The question remaining for this Court is whether Petitioner’s surviving claims should be

dismissed with or without prejudice. The Magistrate Judge has declined to render a finding on

the question of timeliness of the instant Petition, concluding that he “need not address

Respondent’s argument as to the statute of limitations” in light of the fact that he has “found the

Petition to be unexhausted.” (R&R at 7.) However, the Court considers this question to be

central to the issue of whether the instant Petition may be brought in this Court at a later date. 

Thus, this Court MODIFIES the R&R, finding that for lack of conformity with the filing

requirements as set forth under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), the surviving claims in the instant Petition must be dismissed with prejudice.

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3 Although judgement was entered on May 10, 2004, pursuant to the California Rules of Court,

Petitioner had sixty days to file a notice of appeal after entry of judgment. See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule

30.1.

4 Petitioner submitted four applications for relief to the Superior Court, on June 16, 2004, and a fifth on

July 7, 2004, all of which were denied on July 13, 2004 (Ldgm’ts 7, 8, 9, 10), tolling the statute of

limitations from July 9, 2004, the date on which it started to run, to July 13, 2004. See Tillema v. Long,

253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001). The limitations period was then set to expire on July 13, 2005. 

However, Petitioner also submitted three requests for modification of sentence to the Superior Court on

August 2 and August 26, 2004, and July 20, 2005, respectively. (Ldgm’ts 11, 13, 15.) These requests

were respectively denied on August 16 and November 1, 2004, and August 16, 2005. (Ldgm’ts 12, 14,

16.) With constructive filing, these filings tolled the limitations period for fifteen, sixty-seven, and

7 05cv1139 J (LSP)

Petitioner filed the instant Petition in this Court on December 28, 2005. [Doc. No. 8.] It

is therefore subject to review under the AEDPA standards, which govern habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. A petitioner has a period of one year to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. §

2254. It is from the latest of four possible dates that the one-year period shall run:

A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; B) the date on which the

impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action; C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;

or D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1996).

Respondent correctly argues that the instant Petition is not timely. (See Mem. Supp. Mot.

Dismiss 6-9). Petitioner therefore confronts an absolute time bar to refiling his Petition, even

should he manage to exhaust his surviving claims. See Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482. 

Petitioner’s state-court judgment in the petty-theft case became final on July 9, 2004.3

 Pursuant

both to the mailbox rule and to statutory tolling, the AEDPA statute of limitations was scheduled

to expire on October 31, 2005.4

 Yet, Petitioner did not file the instant Petition until

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28 twenty-eight days respectively, postponing the date of expiration to October 31, 2005.

5 Petitioner has also failed to present any equitable tolling or equitable estoppel claims to this Court.

8 05cv1139 J (LSP)

approximately two months after his grace period had terminated. Petitioner has not shown cause

for such a delay.5

 Thus, in light of the fact that Petitioner has not complied with the applicable

rules governing the statute of limitations for federal habeas appeals, the Court FINDS that what

claims remain in his Petition may not be refiled and DISMISSES them with prejudice. See

Jimenez, 276 F.3d at 482-83 (holding that when all claims raised in petition are unexhausted and

petitioner has “exceeded the time for filing another federal petition ... dismissal with prejudice

[is] appropriate”). 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS, MODIFIES, and REJECTS, in part, the

R&R, and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss. The Court ADOPTS all of the Magistrate Judge’s

findings of grounds for dismissal. The Court augments these findings with the additional finding

that Petitioner is procedurally barred from refiling the instant Petition and thereby MODIFIES

the R&R. The Court REJECTS the R&R as to its Recommendation only: the Court

DETERMINES that dismissal, rather than denial, of the Petition is warranted. In accordance

with its partial adoption, modification, and rejection of the R&R, the Court DISMISSES

grounds two and three, and that part of ground four which restates ground two without

prejudice to Petitioner bringing them again in separate Petitions upon proper exhaustion in state

court, and DISMISSES the remainder of the Petition with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 27, 2006

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Papas

 All Counsel of Record

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