Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01907/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01907-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Asbestos Litigation

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 Joining are Goulds Pumps (doc. 50), DB Riley (doc. 59), Amchem Products (doc.

68), Certainteed (doc. 69), Union Carbide (doc. 70), Owens-Illinois (doc. 74), Ingersoll-Rand

(doc.76), Honeywell (doc. 77), Georgia Pacific (doc. 80), and Foster Wheeler (doc. 88).

2

 The following defendants joined in GE's response: Ingersoll-Rand (doc. 78),

Honeywell (doc. 79), Georgia Pacific (doc. 81), Certainteed (doc. 82), Amchem Products

(doc. 83), Union Carbide (doc. 84), Owens-Illinois (doc. 85), DB Riley (doc. 87), and Foster

Wheeler (doc. 89).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Linda Aguirre; Norma J. Garcia, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Amchem Products Inc.; Certainteed Corp.;

DB Riley Inc.; Foster Wheeler Corp.;

General Electric Co.; Georgia Pacific

Corp.; Goulds Pumps Inc.; Honeywell

International Inc.; Ingersoll-Rand Co.;

Owens-Illinois Inc.; Union Carbide Corp.,

Defendants. 

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CV 11-01907-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant General Electric’s (“GE”) motion to dismiss (doc.

46), plaintiffs' response (doc. 86), and GE's reply (doc. 92). All other defendants joined in

the motion to dismiss.1

 We also have before us plaintiffs' second motion for expedited

discovery (doc. 64), GE's response (doc. 75), and plaintiffs' reply (doc. 91).2 Although

Case 2:11-cv-01907-FJM Document 103 Filed 03/07/12 Page 1 of 5
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defendants originally objected to plaintiff’s motion, the parties recently filed a stipulation

asking us to permit plaintiffs to conduct early discovery and reschedule the Rule 16

scheduling conference, which is currently set for March 16, 2012 (doc. 101).

I

Plaintiffs are the children of Johnny Griego, who died on October 11, 2010. Griego

worked as a laborer in Arizona for several years. Plaintiffs filed this action on September

27, 2011, alleging that defendants sold or distributed asbestos products, and that Griego's

exposure to dust from asbestos products caused him to develop cancer and die. Plaintiffs

assert five counts for relief. The counts are not identified, but appear to be claims relating

to failure to test and to warn; products liability; allegations of conspiracy; and breach of

warranty.

II

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Plaintiffs filed their response two days late without first requesting an extension of time.

Defendants object to the late filing, but do not argue that they have been prejudiced by the

delay. We grant plaintiffs' request for leave to file their response after the deadline nunc pro

tunc.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., we accept

well-pleaded facts as true and "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff." Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). The complaint must

contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). A claim is facially plausible

if the facts pled permit a court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). If a complaint's allegations are merely consistent with liability, it stops short of being

plausible. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Defendants contend that the complaint fails under

Twombly and Iqbal. They argue that the causes of action are not identified, the only factual

allegations in the complaint refer to companies that are not defendants, and no information

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3

 Plaintiffs also argue that their action is timely. Because defendants did not argue that

the complaint was untimely, we do not address the issue of timeliness here.

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regarding the time period, location, or objects of Griego’s exposure is provided.

Plaintiffs argue that their allegations that each defendant placed asbestos products into

the stream of commerce and that Griego was exposed to these products, developed cancer,

and died render their claims plausible.3

 Plaintiffs argue that requiring more facts as to "when,

where and how" Griego was exposed to asbestos "would improperly impose burdensome and

hyper-technical requirements." Response at 5. We disagree. Although Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ.

P. does not require plaintiffs to plead every single factual detail, it nevertheless demands that

plaintiffs present enough information to "permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct." Iqbal at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Plaintiffs' complaint is factually

threadbare. They allege that their father worked as a laborer "at various locations" in

Arizona "for many years." Compl. at ¶ 5. They do not provide any additional detail, such

as what industries he worked in, what types of activities he performed, or even during what

decades their father worked. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Owens-Illinois did not advise

purchasers that its product, Kaylo, caused asbestosis in animals. Id. at ¶ 10(i). But plaintiffs

do not allege any link between Kaylo and Griego, and do not allege in their complaint that

Griego developed asbestosis. See id. at ¶ 5 (exposure to asbestos caused Griego "to develop

an asbestos-related disease, cancer").

Without any facts suggesting a temporal or geographic link between the asbestos

products that Griego was exposed to and the asbestos products manufactured and sold by

defendants, we cannot draw a reasonable inference that defendants - as distinguished from

any other asbestos manufacturers - are liable for Greigo's death. See Iqbal at __, 129 S. Ct.

at 1949. Although the facts pled are arguably consistent with liability, they stop short of

being plausible. See id.; see also Bulanda v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 11-C-1682, 2011 WL

2214010, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2011) (plaintiff's allegations that defendants sold asbestos

products that caused decedent's death failed to state a claim for products liability and

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wrongful death when the complaint only stated the names of two places decedent worked and

the years he worked there).

Plaintiffs' fourth count pleads facts outlining a conspiracy to cover up information

regarding the hazards of asbestos. Compl. at ¶¶ 18-21. Although plaintiffs make reference

to various corporations and individuals within this count, and claim that Griego "was exposed

to the asbestos products manufactured by one or more of the [d]efendants named in

paragraph 20," id. at ¶ 19, none of the "defendant conspirators" named in this paragraph

were sued by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not alleged any link between the actions of these

conspirators and the defendants they chose to sue. Thus, plaintiffs have also failed to state

a plausible claim for relief in count four. 

In sum, plaintiffs' complaint includes nothing more than "a sheer possibility" that

defendants acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The accusations fall

short of the plausibility required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id.

III

Plaintiffs request leave to file an amended complaint. They have not filed a formal

motion, but instead make their request within their response to the motion to dismiss. Under

Rule 15(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., a party may only amend its complaint, other than as a matter

of course, with an opposing party's written consent or with the court's leave. LRCiv 15.1

provides that a party seeking leave to amend must attach a copy of the proposed complaint

to the motion. An amendment must not prejudice an opposing party, be sought in bad faith,

produce undue delay, or be futile. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465

F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, plaintiffs have not properly sought leave to amend

because they have not filed a motion attaching a copy of the proposed amended pleading.

See LRCiv. 15.1. Absent that, we cannot evaluate whether amendment would be futile. 

Plaintiffs also move for expedited discovery in this case to discover the cause of

Griego's death. They renew a previous motion seeking pre-service discovery that was denied

without prejudice by the magistrate judge (doc. 7). The parties stipulate to allow plaintiffs

a period of sixty days to conduct limited discovery into the cause of decedent's death. 

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Given that the parties have stipulated to permit early discovery and that plaintiffs seek

an opportunity to amend their complaint, we grant plaintiffs' motion for expedited discovery

and dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Plaintiffs shall file a motion to amend the

complaint in accordance with the schedule set forth below. 

IV

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING General Electric Company’s motion to dismiss (doc.

46). The complaint is dismissed against all defendants without prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiffs’ motion for expedited discovery pursuant

to stipulation (doc. 64). Plaintiffs may immediately commence discovery limited to the cause

of death of the decedent, Johnny Griego. This limited period of discovery will close on May

11, 2012.

Plaintiffs shall have up to and including May 25, 2012 to file a motion to amend the

complaint that complies with LRCiv 15.1. If a motion to amend is not timely filed, this

action shall be dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED CONTINUING the Rule 16 scheduling conference

set for March 16, 2012 to July 13, 2012 at 2:00 p.m. 

DATED this 7th day of March, 2012.

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