Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00953/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00953-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 11cv0953 DMS (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE WALLACE,

CDCR # P-48941 Civil

No. 

11cv0953 DMS (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; 

AND

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

P. COWAN; B. MORRIS; P.A. CORTEZ;

G. PEDERSON; J.S. VALASKANT,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights

First Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2], along with

a “Motion and Declaration for Appointment of Counsel” [ECF No. 3].

/ / /

/ / /

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2 11cv0953 DMS (JMA)

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [Doc. No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However,

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [ECF No. 3]

Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action.

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are

granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised only

under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). “A

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finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the ‘likelihood of success

on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be

viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d

1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Rule 8

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with

Rule 8. Specifically, Rule 8 provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it

must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P.

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8(a)(1) & (2). Plaintiff’s Complaint is rambling and incoherent at times. If Plaintiff chooses

to file an Amended Complaint, he must comply with Rule 8.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated during his disciplinary hearing

because several correctional officers falsified rules violation reports which led to Plaintiff being

sentenced to Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). “The requirements of procedural due

process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State

statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due

process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme

Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement

that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir.

1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his placement in Ad-Seg which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus

discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s

confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when

compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of

whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

D. Conspiracy Claims

Throughout Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleges that several correctional officers acted in

a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “To state a

cause of action under § 1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any

person or a class of persons the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and

immunities under the laws, (3) an act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy,

and (4) a personal injury, property damage or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen

of the United States.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Griffin

v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536

(9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he language requiring intent to deprive equal protection . . . means that

there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus

behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege membership in a protected class and fails to allege that any

Defendant acted with class-based animus, both of which are essential elements of a cause of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02; Schultz v. Sundberg, 759

F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conspiracy plaintiff must show membership in a

judicially-designated suspect or quasi-suspect class); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

IV

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. The case is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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6. Plaintiff is granted forty five (45) days from the date this Order is “Filed” in which

to file an amended complaint which addresses each deficiency of pleading noted above.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded

pleading. See S.D. CA. CIV.LR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the

Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

7. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

DATED: May 10, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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