Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00230/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00230-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUSTAVO VILLEGAS,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Respondent.

 /

1:07-cv-00230 AWI DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 RELEVANT BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation following his sentence of fifteen years to life in 1990 for second degree murder. 

(Exhibits 1 & 2, attached to Answer.) 

In the instant petition, Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his conviction or

sentence; rather, he challenges the 2005 Board of Parole Hearings’ (“BPH”) decision finding him

unsuitable for parole. 

On January 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition in the Superior Court

for the County of Butte. (Exhibit 5, attached to Answer.) The petition was denied on January

17, 2006. (Id.)

On February 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition in the California

Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. (Exhibit 6, attached to Answer.) On February 16,

2006, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition. (Id.)

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28 This statement of facts is taken from the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District 1

opinion, dated January 16, 1992, attached as Exhibit 2 to Answer.

2

On March 1, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Exhibit 7, attached to Answer.) The petition was denied on April 19, 2006. (Id.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 12, 2007. 

(Court Doc. 1.) Respondent filed an answer to the petition on August 1, 2007, and Petitioner

filed a traverse on September 26, 2007. (Court Doc. 8, 11.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

[Petitioner] initiated a verbal altercation with the victim. At the time

[Petitioner] had a handgun in his pocket and his friend was standing nearby

holding a rifle. There was no evidence the victim was armed. During the

argument [Petitioner] withdrew his gun from his pocket, cocked it, and then

returned it to his pocket. As the victim was bending over to enter his car

[Petitioner] shot him in the face from a very close distance. Immediately after the

shooting [Petitioner] prevented the victim’s friend from aiding him. [Petitioner]

fled but before doing so he removed the keys from the car in which the victim and

his friends had arrived.

[Petitioner] told the probation officer the victim had intimidated and

humiliated him for about two months prior to the shooting. He also stated in the

past the victim had threatened [Petitioner’s] life as well as his family.

[Petitioner’s] girlfriend said she was not aware of any prior disputes between

[Petitioner] and the victim. She also testified that shortly before the shooting she

heard the victim say he would kill [Petitioner] when he returned and that she had

told a police officer the victim had told [Petitioner] to kill him then because the

victim would kill [Petitioner] when he returned. [Petitioner’s] girlfriend’s sister

also heard the victim make the latter statement.

Exhibit 2, Opinion, at 1-2. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries

v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 th th

Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its

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provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state

court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction,

28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the

threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9 Cir.2006), citing White v. Lambert, 370 th

F.3d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir.2004) (“Section 2254 ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a th

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petition is not

challenging [her] underlying state court conviction.’”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this

Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as

of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other

words, 'clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or

principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

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Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at

409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the

states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a

state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th

Cir.2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied,

537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).

II. Review of Petition

A parole release determination is not subject to all the due process protections of an

adversary proceeding. Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396, 1398-99 (9 Cir. 1987); see th

also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (explaining that due process is flexible and calls for procedural

protections that particular situations demand). "[S]ince the setting of a minimum term is not part

of a criminal prosecution, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not

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constitutionally mandated, even when a protected liberty interest exists." Pedro, 825 F.2d at

1399; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). At a state parole

board proceeding, the only process to which an inmate is entitled is: 1) the inmate must receive

advance written notice of a hearing, Pedro, 825 F.2d at 1399; 2) the inmate must be afforded an

"opportunity to be heard," Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16; 3) if the inmate is denied parole, the

inmate must be told why "he falls short of qualifying for parole,” Id.; and 4) the decision of the

Board must be supported by "some evidence" having an indicia of reliability. Superintendent,

Mass. Correc. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th

Cir.1987).

“In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that ‘revocation of good time does not

comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the

prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record.’ 472 U.S. 445, 454

(1985), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. In

determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met, the Court need not examine the entire

record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh the evidence. Id. Rather,

the Court must determine whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the

conclusion of the disciplinary board. Id., citing Superintendent v. Hill, at 455-56. Although Hill

involved the accumulation of good time credits, the same standard applies to parole, as both

situations “directly affect the duration of the prison term.” Id., citing Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

In making a determination whether an inmate is suitable for parole, the BPH is guided by

the following regulations:

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for

release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for a denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall

include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state;

past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is

reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of

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 Pursuant to Title 15, of the California Code of Regulations, Section 2402(c)(1) sets forth circumstances 2

tending to demonstrate unsuitability for parole regarding the committed offense. The factors to be considered

include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution-style

murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.

15 Cal.Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E).

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treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may

safely be released to the community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner's suitability for release. Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly

establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.

15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 2402(a) and (b).

In this case, with regard to the procedural protections outlined in Greenholtz, Petitioner

was provided all that is required. Petitioner was given advance notice of the hearing, he was

offered representation by counsel at the hearing, he was granted an opportunity to submit

materials for the Board’s consideration and an opportunity to be heard during the hearing, and he

was provided a written decision explaining the reasons why parole was denied. See Answer,

Exhibit 4.

At the 2005 parole hearing, the BPH relied on several factors in denying parole including

Petitioner’s commitment offense and trivial motive, unstable social history, insufficient

programming and self-help therapy, and unfavorable psychological reports. (Exhibit 4, at 62-66.) 

 With regard to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the BPH found that it was

carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner, as the victim was shot at close range in the

face with a handgun. It was carried out in a dispassionate manner as Petitioner armed himself 2

with a gun, and had an opportunity to retreat prior to the shooting, but failed to do so. In

addition, Petitioner failed to seek medical assistance or obtain any aid to the victim. (Exhibit 4,

at 62-63.) 

The BPH noted that the motive for the offense was very trivial as it seemed to be the

result of an ongoing family dispute regarding child custody. (Exhibit 4, at 63.) Based upon these

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circumstances, “some evidence” supports the BPH’s finding that the circumstances of the

commitment offense demonstrate that Petitioner presents an unreasonable danger to public safety

if released. 

The BPH further stated that Petitioner had an unstable social history which may be

properly considered as a circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole. See Cal.Code

Reg. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(3). The BPH found that Petitioner clearly has an alcohol abuse problem,

of which he has not completely come to terms with. “Some evidence” clearly supports this

finding as Petitioner admitted that he was drinking of the day of the offense and although he has

participated in Alcoholics Anonymous for many years he could not identify or articulate the

Twelve Step progress of the program, which was of particular concern given Petitioner’s history

of alcohol abuse. 

The BPH also considered the unfavorable psychological report which opined that

Petitioner had not accepted full and complete responsibility for the crime. This information was

properly considered pursuant to § 2402(b) as the BPH is allowed to consider “[a]ll relevant,

reliable information available to the panel” which includes information on a prisoner’s “past and

present mental state.” See Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, § 2402(b). Psychological reports are relevant

evidence of which the Board is allowed to review and rely on in determining whether a prisoner

is suitable for parole. Rosa v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232-1233 (9 Cir. 2005) (per curiam). th

In addition, the BPH properly considered that Petitioner lacked sufficient parole plans in

that he did not have any solid proof or offers of employment. Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, §

2402(d)(8).

The BPH noted that the District Attorney opposed Petitioner’s release. This was properly

considered pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 3042(a) and (f)(3), and Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15, §

2402(b). 

In addition, the BPH considered the factors supporting Petitioner’s release including

completion of vocational printing, good work reports, no rules violation reports at all during

incarceration, and the last counseling chrono in 1993, attendance in AA and NA, and

development of English skills and preparation of G.E.D. exam. (Exhibit 4, at 65-66 Cal. Code

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Reg. tit. 15, § 2402(d).) However, on balance, these positive aspects did not outweigh the factors

of unsuitability. 

Petitioner’s claims in his traverse are based only on his disagreement with the BPH’s

assessment of the evidence, which is insufficient to demonstrate relief under § 2254. 

In sum, the Board thoroughly considered all relevant evidence in this case and carefully

balanced and assessed the various factors. Those BPH’s findings that Petitioner present poses an

unreasonable risk to public safety were supported by at least “some evidence” and it cannot be

said that the state court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court.” 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 24, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

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3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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