Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00588/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-00588-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN MANUEL LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

NEXTERA ENERGY OPERATING 

SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-00588-MEJ 

ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR 

FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Juan Manuel Lopez brings this employment discrimination case against his former 

employer, Defendant NextEra Energy Operating Services, LLC (“NextEra”). On November 3, 

2015, the parties reached an agreement on the basic terms of settlement for this entire action. Joint 

Case Mgmnt. Stmnt. at 3, Dkt. No. 24. Lopez agreed to the settlement amount verbally, and his 

counsel communicated Lopez’s agreement to Next Era’s counsel. Id. However, Lopez

subsequently failed to sign the settlement agreement and has not communicated with his counsel 

for nearly five months, despite numerous efforts by email, voicemail, and U.S. mail. Id. at 3-4; 

Herron Weber Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 28. Based on this inaction, the Court ordered Lopez to show 

cause by May 2, 2016, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Order to 

Show Cause, Dkt. No. 25. The Court warned Lopez that it may dismiss the case if he failed to file 

a written response. Id. As of the date of this Order, Lopez has failed to respond. On May 2, 

2016, his counsel filed a declaration, stating that she has not had any communication with Lopez 

since December 17, 2015 and that she sent him the Court’s Order to Show Cause by email and 

U.S. mail with a cover letter requesting that he contact her office. Herron Weber Decl. ¶ 4. Based 

on this procedural history, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss this case for failure to 

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

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United States District Court

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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 41(b), “the district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any 

order of the court.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Oliva v. 

Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1992) (district court may dismiss sua sponte for failure to 

meet court deadline). “[T]he district court must weigh the following factors in determining 

whether a Rule 41(b) dismissal is warranted: ‘(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) 

the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less 

drastic sanctions.’” Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 594 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Henderson factors “are ‘not a 

series of conditions precedent before the judge can do anything,’ but a ‘way for a district judge to 

think about what to do.’” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig. (In re PPA), 460 

F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Valley Eng’rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 

1057 (9th Cir. 1998)). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal . . . 

or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 

F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998).

DISCUSSION

The first two Henderson factors strongly support dismissal. First, “the public’s interest in 

expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 

983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). Second, the Court’s need to manage its docket also weighs in favor of 

dismissal. Lopez has delayed adjudication of the claims in this case by failing to (1) execute or 

reject the proposed settlement agreement, (2) communicate with his counsel and NextEra, and (3) 

respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. Non-compliance with procedural rules and the 

Court’s orders wastes “valuable time that [the Court] could have devoted to other . . . criminal and 

civil cases on its docket.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261.

As for the third Henderson factor, the mere pendency of a lawsuit cannot constitute 

sufficient prejudice to require dismissal. Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991. However, “prejudice . . . may . 

. . consist of costs or burdens of litigation.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. Moreover, “a 

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presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute.” Laurino v. 

Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff has the burden of 

demonstrating a non-frivolous reason for failing to meet a court deadline. Id.; see also Yourish, 

191 F.3d at 991. Here, Lopez failed to respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, offered no

explanation for the failure to communicate with his counsel and NextEra, and has not otherwise 

appeared in this case in nearly five months. Therefore, the Court concludes the third Henderson

factor also supports dismissal.

The fourth Henderson factor, that public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits,

normally weighs strongly against dismissal. See, e.g., Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399. “At the same 

time, a case that is stalled or unreasonably delayed by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines . . 

. cannot move forward toward resolution on the merits.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. The Ninth 

Circuit has “recognized that this factor ‘lends little support’ to a party whose responsibility it is to 

move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that 

direction.” Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)). Thus, if the 

fourth Henderson factor weighs against dismissal here, it does so weakly. 

Finally, the Court has already attempted less drastic sanctions, without success, and 

therefore determines that trying them again would be inadequate or inappropriate. “Though there 

are a wide variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need not exhaust 

them all before finally dismissing a case.” Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 

(9th Cir. 1981). Here, the Court already attempted the lesser sanction of issuing an Order to Show 

Cause and giving Lopez an opportunity to explain his failure to prosecute this matter. As Lopez

failed to respond and has not communicated with his counsel or NextEra in nearly five months, 

another order requiring him to respond is likely to be futile. See, e.g., Gleason v. World Sav. 

Bank, FSB, 2013 WL 3927799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) (finding dismissal under Rule 

41(b) appropriate where the court previously attempted the lesser sanction of issuing an Order to 

Show Cause and giving the plaintiff an additional opportunity to re-plead). Further, the Order to 

Show Cause warned Lopez of the risk of dismissal; thus he cannot maintain the Court failed in its 

“obligation to warn the plaintiff that dismissal is imminent.” Oliva, 958 F.2d at 274. 

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Accordingly, the Court finds the fifth factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court finds at least four of the five Henderson factors 

weigh in favor of dismissal. Lopez has failed to communicate with his counsel or NextEra in 

nearly five months and failed to respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. Thus, Lopez has

failed to prosecute this case, and dismissal is appropriate. However, a less drastic alternative is to 

dismiss without prejudice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Dismissal will minimize prejudice to 

NextEra, but dismissing the case without prejudice will preserve the Lopez’s ability to seek relief. 

Thus, “[i]n an abundance—perhaps overabundance—of caution,” the Court finds dismissal 

without prejudice is appropriate. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 

2013) (remanding to the district court in order to consider whether dismissal should have been 

without prejudice). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE for 

failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s deadlines and orders. Judgment shall 

be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 5, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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