Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00771/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00771-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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28 1 Because some claims are asserted on behalf of the

children, the court refers to Fisher and her children,

collectively, as “plaintiffs.”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KIRSTEN FISHER, ON BEHALF OF

HERSELF AND AS GUARDIAN AD

LITEM FOR HER MINOR CHILDREN,

HALEY FISHER, MCKENSEY FISHERMATHIS,

Plaintiff, NO. CIV. S-05-771 FCD/DAD

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLACER COUNTY, TRACY MAE

ALVAREZ, ANTOINETTE FABELA,

KEVIN HENDERSON, DIANE ROSE,

GREG GEISLER,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Kirsten Fisher (“Fisher”), on behalf of herself

and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, Haley Fisher and

McKensey Fisher-Mathis (“children”)1, has filed claims for

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs.

E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230(h).

3 Unless otherwise stated, further references to a “Rule”

are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4 The facts of this case are largely undisputed. (See

Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts, filed Sept. 29,

2006 (“SUF”)).

Plaintiffs have also submitted a Separate Statement of

Additional Facts. (Pls.’ Separate Statement of Additional Facts,

filed Sept. 29, 2006 (”SAF”)). Many of these “facts,” primarily

those based upon the Declaration of Kirsten Fisher, are rife with

argument and legal conclusions. (See Decl. of Kirsten Fisher in

Opp’n of Mot. for Summ. J, filed Sept. 29, 2006 (“Fisher

Decl.”)). To the extent that the Separate Statement of

Additional Facts and Declaration of Kirsten Fisher recount actual

facts that have an appropriate foundation, the court considers

these facts. To the extent that these documents assert argument

and legal conclusions, the court does not consider these “facts.” 

 

2

violations of the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

state tort claims based on the removal of her children.2

Plaintiffs seek both monetary and injunctive relief. Defendants

Placer County, Tracy Mae Alvarez, Antoinette Fabela, Kevin

Henderson, Diane Rose, and Greg Geisler (collectively

“defendants”) now move for summary judgment, or in the

alternative, summary adjudication pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(b).3 Plaintiffs oppose the motion. For the

reasons stated herein, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND4

In December 2003, Dr. Mark Knoble, plaintiffs’ family

physician, contacted Placer County Health and Human Services

(“HHS”), Adult Systems of Care, and expressed concern about

Fisher’s ability to care for her two daughters. (SUF ¶ 1). 

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5 ACCESS social workers are responsible for emergency

intervention to deal with families in crisis. (Alvarez Decl. ¶

2).

6 Plaintiffs assert in their opposition that Ms. Nielsen

has a history of mental health problems and is not credible. 

However, plaintiffs present no evidence that defendants had

knowledge of any mental illness.

3

Specifically, Dr. Knoble was concerned about Fisher’s mental

states as manifested by her concerns about toxic mold. (SUF ¶

1). Defendant Tracy Mae Alvarez (“Alvarez”), an ACCESS5 social

worker for the Children’s Systems of Care division for Placer

County HHS, received the referral. (Decl. of Tracy Mae Alvarez

in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed Apr. 14, 2006,

(“Alvarez Decl.”) ¶ 3). Shortly thereafter, Jacklyn Nielsen,6

Fisher’s mother, reported to Alvarez what appeared to be

irrational behavior by Fisher and the potential effect on

Fisher’s daughters. (Alvarez Decl. ¶ 4). 

Alvarez’s role in the process was to make the preliminary

determination of Fisher’s mental and emotional functioning and to

determine whether intervention by the County for the sake of

Fisher’s children was required. (SUF ¶ 5). When it became clear

to Alvarez that the Fisher family required intervention, she

attempted to have Fisher agree to a voluntary plan of treatment. 

(SUF ¶ 6; Alvarez Decl. ¶ 7). However, Fisher was afraid that

would lead to her children being taken from her and failed to

appear for a meeting with Alvarez. (SUF ¶¶ 6-7). Based upon the

information that Alvarez had received from Fisher’s doctor, her

mother, and others, and given her refusal to meet to discuss a

voluntary plan, Alvarez obtained a warrant to take the minor

children into protective custody. (SUF ¶ 8; Alvarez Decl. ¶ 8). 

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4

Alvarez anticipated that Fisher’s instability would further

decompensate when her children were removed, and suggested that

another social worker accompany the one serving the warrant in

the event that Fisher needed to be placed on a three-day

psychiatric hold pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions

Code Section 5150 (“5150 hold”). (SUF ¶ 8; Alvarez Decl. ¶ 9).

On January 23, 2004, Defendant Diana Rose (“Rose”), a crisis

social worker, and peace officers came to the hotel room in which

plaintiffs were living. (SUF ¶ 10; SUF ¶ 33). Rose took custody

of the children and delivered them to their grandfather’s house. 

(SUF ¶ 33). Rose allegedly told the children’s grandfather that

the children could be there a “long time.” (SUF ¶ 34). Rose has

no other involvement in this case. (SUF ¶ 36). 

Fisher was taken into custody because she stated that she

would kill herself if Child Protective Services took her

children. (Discharge Summary, Ex. B to Decl. of David. K. Huskey

in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Huskey Decl.”), filed Apr.

14, 2006, at 1). She was placed in Heritage Oaks Hospital, a

psychiatric hospital, and Alvarez followed up on her care while

she was there. (SUF ¶ 11; Alvarez Decl. ¶ 11). Fisher was

discharged from Heritage Oaks Hospital on or about January 28,

2004. The discharge summary provided that the on-call physician

noted that she was “very anxious” and “obsessed about mold.” 

(Discharge Summary at 2). Her attending physician noted that

although she was not “deemed acute enough to be in inpatient

treatment,” she continued “to perserverate on the mold situation,

however, in a more appropriate way.” (Discharge Summary at 2). 

The Discharge Summary stated that Fisher did not “appear to be

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5

overtly delusional” at the time of her discharge. (Discharge

Summary at 2-3; SUF ¶ 13).

On January 29, 2004, Alvarez transferred the case to

defendant Antoinette Fabela (“Fabela”), the ongoing social worker

assigned to the case. (SUF ¶ 9). Alvarez did not have any

responsibility for the case once it was transferred to Fabela. 

(Alvarez Decl. ¶ 13). Once the transfer took place, Fabela had

responsibility for handling the Placer County Superior Court case

related to reunification of the Fisher family. (Decl. of

Antoinette Fabela in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., filed

Apr. 14, 2006, ¶ 1).

Shortly after taking over the case, Fabela familiarized

herself with the Discharge Summary as well as all other documents

in the file. (Fabela Decl. ¶ 2). Defendants present evidence

that the file information suggested to Fabela that Fisher was

behaving irrationally with respect to obtaining treatment for

alleged symptoms of toxic mold poisoning suffered by herself and

her children. (Fabela Decl. ¶ 4). Fabela contends that it was

not clear to her whether toxic mold or mental illness was causing

Fisher’s irrational behavior. Fisher provided Fabela with

material concerning the effects of toxic mold, which Fabela read

and considered. (Fabela Decl. ¶ 9). Fabela asserts that even if

the information provided by Fisher about toxic mold was true, she

believed that Fisher’s focus on toxic mold and expression of

concern about it in front of her children, both of whom were

under ten years old at the time, were inappropriate and harmful

to the children. (Fabela Decl. ¶ 10).

///// 

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6

On February 20, 2004, defendant Greg Geisler, a social

worker for the County of Placer, filed a Jurisdiction/Disposition

Report (“JDR”) with the Placer County Superior Court. (Decl. of

Greg Geisler in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Geisler

Decl.”), filed Apr. 14, 2004, ¶¶ 2-3). Geisler recommended that

the children be removed from Fisher and placed in the home of a

relative because he believed that there was a substantial danger

to the physical health or physical and emotional well-being of

the children if they were returned home. (Geisler Decl. ¶ 6). 

He believed that the Fisher children were suffering from severe

emotional distress as indicated by extreme anxiety, depression,

withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior. (Geisler Decl. ¶

7). He also believed that Fisher’s mental status appeared to be

significantly compromised at the time that he interviewed her and

the children. (Geisler Decl. ¶ 12). In the JDR, Geisler

expressed his concerns about Fisher’s mental health as follows:

Regardless of whether or not Ms. Fisher is suffering

from toxic mold related illnesses, continuously

obsessing on her symptoms cannot be healthy for her or

her children. If one were afflicted with AIDS, cancer

or any other disease, one ought not to concern one’s

every hour with the subject. This would only bring

about despondent depressions, and distraction, and

worsen the situation. This seems to be happening in

Ms. Fisher’s case, and her children are suffering

because of this. Regardless of whether toxic mold or

other factors are responsible for her present mental

state and apparent mental illness, she is nonetheless

exhibiting symptoms of mental disorders that compromise

her ability to parent. These, combined with her

obsession with toxic mold, whether with a factual basis

or not, have rendered Ms. Fisher incapable of parenting

sufficiently to ensue [sic] her children’s safety. 

 

(Geisler Decl. ¶ 13). Fisher also told Geisler during the

interview that she was not functioning well mentally. (Geisler

Decl. ¶ 14). Fisher also admitted that she “had become obsessed

with doctors” for her mold concerns and that she had been having

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great difficulty getting things done in a timely manner. 

(Geisler Decl. ¶¶ 15-16). Geisler asserts that he was left with

an unclear picture regarding possible domestic violence in their

household. (Geisler Decl. ¶ 17). Geisler also asserts that

Fisher’s father confirmed most of the concerns that others had

expressed about her mental health and inability to care for her

children. (Geisler Decl. ¶ 18). Fisher contends that Geisler

obtained accurate information in his report, but misinterpreted

what it meant. (Dep. of Karen Fisher (“Fisher Dep.”), Ex. A to

Huskey Decl., 158:10-12).

Fisher and Fabela entered into a voluntary Unified Services

Plan (“USP”) on April 13, 2004. (SUF ¶ 25). The USP provided

that Fisher would be reunited with her children on condition that

she would not speak of toxic mold to her children, or to adults

in front of her children. (SUF ¶ 24). Fisher was free to

consult with doctors, lawyers or other professionals about mold

related issues outside the presence of her children. (SUF ¶ 24). 

The termination of the court proceeding occurred on April 14,

2005, and the Fisher family reunited that day. (SUF ¶ 26). The

term of the USP was from April 13, 2004 through July 14, 2004,

and Fisher believes that it was extended a month beyond that

date. (SUF ¶ 27).

Less than two weeks after Fisher agreed to the conditions of

the USP, Fabela received a telephone call from Mr. Haney, an

environmental specialist, who was in his office with Fisher. 

(Fabela Decl. ¶ 13; Decl. of Doug Haney in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.

for Summ. J. (“Haney Decl.”), filed Sept. 29, 2006, ¶¶ 2-3). In

response to Fisher’s further inquiry into the condition of the

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USP regarding not speaking about toxic mold in front of her

children, Fabela allegedly told Fisher over the phone, “if you

choose to pursue this any further, you know what this will mean!” 

(SUF ¶¶ 29-30). Fabela took no adverse action against plaintiff

following the exchange over the telephone. (SUF ¶ 31). However,

Fisher understood Fabela’s statement to be a threat that her

children would be taken away if she did not cooperate. (SAF ¶

54). 

Defendant Kevin Henderson (“Henderson”) was the supervisor

of the ACCESS p.m. program in December 2003 and January 2004. 

(SUF ¶ 42). He had been the caseworker for Fisher when her

children were taken away from her in 1999 because of her threat

to commit suicide and kill her older daughter. (SUF ¶ 42; Fisher

Dep. 77:22-78:3). From that contact, Henderson became aware that

she had a history of abuse of methamphetamines. (Decl. of Kevin

Henderson in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Henderson

Decl.”), filed Apr. 14, 2004, ¶ 3; Fisher Dep. 77:8-11). 

Henderson informed various social workers dealing with the case

of his experiences with the Fishers when he was a case worker

because he believed that Fisher’s mental health background and

history of drug use was potentially relevant to the issues

involving reunification with her children. (SUF ¶ 46). Fisher

agrees that Henderson’s information about the prior time that her

children were taken from her was relevant to the handling of her

case, but believes that Henderson improperly intervened in her

case from January 22, 2004 through April of 2004. (SUF ¶¶ 43,

45). Henderson did not supervise Fabela’s handling of the case 

/////

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9

and did not have any direct involvement in the Fisher case in

2003 and 2004. (Henderson Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5-6). 

On April 20, 2005, plaintiffs filed a complaint against

defendants, alleging federal civil rights violations and

asserting pendant state tort claims. On July 22, 2005, the court

issued an order, granting in part and denying in part defendants’

motion to dismiss. (Mem. & Order, filed July 22, 2005, Docket #

22). All of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and Monell claims against

Placer County were dismissed, except plaintiffs’ claims relating

to threatening comments by defendant Fabela. (Id.) Plaintiffs’

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress

claims for monetary relief were also dismissed, except to the

extent said claims are predicated on defendants’ alleged

malicious failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. (Id.) 

Therefore, the remaining claims at issue in this case are (1)

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims arising out of defendant Fabela’s

alleged threat; (2) plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against defendant

Placer County arising out of defendant Fabela’s alleged threat;

(3) plaintiffs’ state law claims predicated on defendants’

malicious failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; and (4)

plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief. 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

/////

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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

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exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

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7 Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is based solely on Fisher’s

claim that her rights were violated by defendant Fabela’s alleged

threat over the telephone. Plaintiffs present no evidence that

any of the other named individual defendants were involved in

this conduct. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against defendants Alvarez,

Henderson, Rose, and Geisler is GRANTED.

12

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

ANALYSIS

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim7

Plaintiffs assert that defendants violated their

constitutionally protected rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendment when defendant Fabela threatened “if you choose to

pursue this any further, you know what this will mean!” in

response to a telephone call by Fisher about the restrictions in

the USP. 

Plaintiffs contend that Fabela’s threat violated their

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts have analyzed

threats to remove a child from a family under the fundamental

right to familial relations, which includes the liberty interests

of parents in the care, custody and management of their children. 

Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 524 (7th Cir. 2003); King v. Olmsted

County, 117 F.3d 1065, 1066-68 (8th Cir. 1997). The liberty

interest in maintaining the family unit is guaranteed by the

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Fourteenth Amendment. See Heck, 117 F.3d at 523 n.29; King, 117

F.3d at 1066-68. However, plaintiffs also contend that the

threat also violated Fisher’s First Amendment rights by chilling

her speech about toxic mold. 

In general, “mere verbal threats made by a state-actor do

not constitute a § 1983 claim.” King, 117 F.3d at 1067 (quoting

Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992); see

also Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 875 (9th Cir.

1998). “The Constitution does not protect all intrusions on

one’s peace of mind. Fear or emotional injury which results

solely from verbal harassment or idle threats is generally not

sufficient to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty

interest.” King, 117 F.3d at 1067 (quoting Pittsley v. Warish,

927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that police officers

threat to children that “if we see your father on the streets

again, you’ll never see him again” did not constitute a 14th

Amendment violation)); see Lamar v. Steele, 698 F.2d 1286 (5th

Cir. 1983); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Courts have held that “a threat constitutes an actionable

constitutional violation only when the threat is so brutal or

wantonly cruel as to shock the conscience, or if the threat

exerts coercive pressure on the plaintiff and the plaintiff

suffers the deprivation of a constitutional right.” King, 117

F.3d at 1067 (citing Hopson, 961 F.2d at 1378-79; Bishop v.

Trace, 622 F.2d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 1980)); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr.

v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).

The alleged threats made by Fabela do not rise to the level

of a constitutional violation in regards to plaintiffs rights to

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familial relations. Fabela did not follow up on the alleged

verbal threat and plaintiffs suffered no further adverse actions

from Fabela. Fisher retained both legal and physical custody of

the children during the term of the USP. See King, 117 F.3d at

1067-68.

Plaintiffs cite to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Heck v.

Doe in support of their claim. 327 F.3d 492. However, the facts

of Heck are readily distinguishable from the facts of this case. 

There, the court held that threatening parents with removal of

their children, in the absence of any evidence giving rise to a

reasonable suspicion that the parent were abusing their children,

violated the parents’ constitutional rights. Id. at 520-21. In

Heck, the defendant left a message on the parents voice mail,

“stating that if she had not heard from the parents’ attorney

within 24 hours, ‘the Bureau will take steps to . . . protect the

children in your home . . . under Chapter 48' and that she was

‘not messing around anymore!’” Id. at 524. However, defendants

“had no basis to suspect the plaintiff parents of child abuse.” 

Id. at 525. Therefore, defendants had no reason to interfere

with their familial relationships by threatening removal. Id.

However, in this case, prior to the alleged threat, Fisher’s

children had been removed from her based upon reports by Fisher’s

family doctor and mother that they had concerns about Fisher’s

ability to care for her children and further investigation by

ACCESS social workers. Fisher had to be hospitalized after she

threatened to kill herself upon removal of the children. The

Summary Discharge reports reflect that she was “obsessed about

mold” and continued “to perseverate on the mold situation” upon

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8 Plaintiffs argue that all of the defendant social

workers had no basis for their conclusion that Fisher was unable

to care for her children. These arguments are not supported by

the evidence as defendants have provided evidence demonstrating

that they received references from sources that knew Fisher and

her children, conducted interviews, contacted other sources in

making their determination. Plaintiffs offer no evidence in

rebuttal, except for plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that

everyone else was wrong in their opinions. 

15

discharge. Geisler, a social worker with Placer County CPS,

interviewed Fisher, her children, and her father, and reached the

conclusion that Fisher’s mental state, including her obsession

with toxic mold, rendered her incapable of parenting sufficiently

to ensure her children’s safety. Geisler also concluded that

Fisher’s continuous obsession about the symptoms of toxic mold

was not healthy for her children. (JDR, Ex. A to Geisler Decl.,

at 26). Plaintiffs’ social worker, Fabela, agreed with this

conclusion. A USP was entered into by Fisher and Fabela

regarding conditions relating to the discussion of toxic mold in

front of her children. Not two weeks after entering into the

USP, plaintiff began questioning the conditions of the USP

relating to toxic mold, while she was at the office of an

environmental specialist seeking assistance in regards to toxic

mold. It was in response to this questioning that Fabela made

the alleged threat that if Fisher chose to pursue this any

further, she knew what it would mean. Under the circumstances,8

the statement made by defendant Fabela, which did not overtly

threaten removal and which was not acted upon, was not a

constitutional violation.

In regards to plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, the court

likewise finds that Fabela’s threat did not amount to a

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constitutional violation. Plaintiffs attempt to reassert a claim

that was already dismissed by this court based upon applicable

immunities. The court previously held that defendants could not

be held liable for drafting “the USP with parameters under which

the court would approve the children being returned to Fisher’s

custody . . . [b]ecause these actions were taken while in pursuit

of an outcome to the dependency proceedings.” (Mem. & Order,

filed July 22, 2005, Docket # 22, at 12). Plaintiffs, however,

continue to argue that the conditions of the USP violate Fisher’s

First Amendment rights. They argue that defendant Fabela’s

threat regarding Fisher’s compliance with the conditions of the

USP served to chill her right to free speech because the

conditions of the USP violate her right to free speech. This

argument is directly related to and intertwined with the

constitutionality of the provisions of the USP regarding Fisher

speaking about toxic mold in front of her children, a claim for

which the court has held that defendant Fabela has immunity. As

such, the court does not entertain plaintiffs’ attempt to make an

end-run around the court’s prior rulings. Defendant Fabela’s

alleged threat that Fisher needed to comply with the conditions

of the USP and not pursue her alleged obsession with toxic mold

while bound by the conditions of the USP did not, by itself,

chill Fisher’s First Amendment rights. 

Therefore, because defendant Fabela’s alleged threat did not

violate plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to free speech or

Fourteenth Amendment right to familial relations, defendants’

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim

against defendant Fabela is GRANTED. 

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A. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Fabela argues that even if the alleged threat

violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, she is protected by

qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

from suit government officers who do not knowingly violate the

law. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Qualified immunity is a generous standard designed to protect

“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate

the law.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (citation

omitted). A government actor can establish qualified immunity by

demonstrating (1) that the law governing the actor’s conduct was

not clearly established at the time of the challenged actions, or

(2) that under the clearly established law, a government actor

could reasonably have believed that the alleged conduct was

lawful. See Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.

1999); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994).

The question of immunity generally is not one for the jury. 

Qualified immunity “‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability’ . . . . [Therefore,] [i]mmunity ordinarily

should be decided by the court long before trial.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (citation omitted). The initial

inquiry that the court must make to determine whether an official

is entitled to qualified immunity is whether, “[t]aken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the

facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)

(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). The next

inquiry is whether the constitutional right was clearly

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established. Id. This inquiry must be taken in the light of the

specific context of the case. The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right. Id. The salient

question is whether the law at the time of the disputed conduct

gave defendants “fair warning that their alleged treatment of

plaintiffs was unconstitutional.” See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 741 (2002). There must exist a clearly established rule so

that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 205-06. 

Even if defendant Fabela’s alleged threat gave rise to a

constitutional violation, Fabela did not have fair warning that

the alleged treatment of plaintiffs was unconstitutional. The

law is not established in California or the Ninth Circuit that

such conduct could give rise to a constitutional violation of the

First or Fourteenth Amendment. 

B. Monell Claim

Plaintiffs assert that defendant County is liable under §

1983 because the County allegedly maintained a policy, custom, or

practice that caused defendant Fabela to violate plaintiffs’

rights through her alleged threat to Fisher. Under Monell and

its progeny, a plaintiff may hold a municipality liable under

section 1983 if his injury was inflicted pursuant to city policy,

regulation, custom, or usage. Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694). The

existence of a county policy may be established in one of three

ways:

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First, the plaintiff may prove that a [county] employee

committed the alleged constitutional violation pursuant

to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding

practice or custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local governmental entity. 

Second, the plaintiff may establish that the individual

who committed the constitutional tort was an official

with final policy-making authority and that the

challenged action itself thus constituted an act of

official governmental policy. Whether a particular

official has final policy-making authority is a

question of state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove

that an official with final policy-making authority

ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or

action and the basis for it.

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citations and internal quotations omitted)). Assuming that a

plaintiff can establish one of these three circumstances, he must

then demonstrate that the municipal policy “caused” the

constitutional deprivation. Id. A municipal policy “causes”

injury where it is the “moving force” behind the violation. 

Chew, 27 F.3d at 1444 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694).

In this case, there is no evidence of a systemic failure to

train social workers, no evidence of negligent hiring of social

workers by Placer County, no evidence of routinely requesting

USPS that regulate the content of speech, and no evidence of a

policy of coercing families into unconstitutional USPs of any

type. There is also no evidence that defendant Fabela, the

social worker who made the alleged threat to Fisher, was an

official with final, policy-making authority. Finally, there is

no evidence that an official with final policy-making authority

ratified defendant Fabela’s conduct. 

Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment should be denied because plaintiffs’ Monell claim

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9 Plaintiffs also cite to Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d

583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989), in support of their claim for municipal

liability. Wood is inapplicable. There was no claim for, nor

discussion of municipal liability in that case.

10 Plaintiffs do not address the liability of defendants

Alvarez or Rose in their opposition. The court interprets this

(continued...)

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survived defendants’ motion to dismiss. This argument has no

merit. Plaintiffs also argue that they have a Monell claim

against the County because defendants were “deliberately

indifferent.” Such conclusory statements, which do not remotely

address the requirements for substantiating a Monell claim,

provide no basis for this court to find a triable issue of fact

as to the County’s liability.9 Plaintiffs point to no evidence

to support their Monell claim. (See Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. for

Summ. J. (“Opp’n”), filed Sept. 29, 2006, at 18-22). Further,

plaintiffs attempt to resurrect claims for which the court has

previously found the County immune. (See Opp’n at 18-22; Mem. &

Order, filed July 22, 2005, Docket # 22). Therefore, because

there is no evidence to support plaintiffs’ claim that defendant

Placer County is liable for a violation of their constitutional

rights, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. See

Mabe v. San Bernardino County, 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir.

2001) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment

where plaintiff “adduced no evidence that the County had a policy

that both amounted to deliberate indifference to [plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights and was the moving force behind a violation

of those rights”).

II. State Tort Claims

Plaintiffs allege state tort claims based upon defendants’10

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10(...continued)

silence as a non-opposition to defendants’ motion with respect to

these defendants. Further, Alvarez transferred the case to

defendant Fabela on July 29, 2004, one day after the allegedly

exculpatory report was issued, and had no further responsibility

for the case. Rose’s sole involvement in the case pertained to

the removal of the Fisher children in January 2004. Therefore,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’

state claim against defendants Alvarez and Rose is GRANTED. 

21

malicious failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence in the

form of her Discharge Summary from Heritage Oaks hospital. See

Cal. Govt. Code § 820.21 (excluding a social worker’s malicious

failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence from statutory

immunity). Defendants assert that even if the Discharge Summary

was exculpatory, defendants did not maliciously fail to disclose

known exculpatory evidence. For purposes of § 820.21, “‘malice’

means conduct that is intended . . . to cause injury to the

plaintiff or . . . conduct that is carried on . . . with a

willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of

others.” Cal. Govt. Code § 820.21.

A. Defendant Fabela

Defendants present evidence that Fabela did not believe the

Discharge Summary was exculpatory and would require unification. 

(Fabela Decl. ¶ 3). The fact that Dr. Hirschaut found that

Fisher was not delusional at the time of her discharge did not

suggest to Fabela that the reported behaviors toward her children

were acceptable. (Fabela Decl. ¶ 3). Further, Fisher had a copy

of the Discharge Summary within two to three weeks of her

discharge from Heritage Oaks hospital. (SUF ¶ 15). Fabela did

not attempt to hide the document from Fisher or her counsel. 

(Fabela Decl. ¶ 8). Finally, Fisher testified at her deposition

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that she liked Fabela because she believed that she has

integrity. (Fisher Dep. 150:2-4). She testified that she didn’t

think that Fabela intentionally tried to hurt her or her

children. (Fisher Dep. 150:8-9). Finally, Fisher also testifies

that “the only time that [she] felt that Toni Fabela acted with

malice” was when “she reminded [her] that the mold issue is to be

dropped entirely,” which Fisher perceived as a threat. (Fisher

Dep. 140:2-8) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs argue that Fabela took actions that had the

effect of hurting both Fisher and the children. (Fisher Decl. ¶

2). Plaintiffs also assert that Fabela knew or should have known

that Fisher was not delusional. (Fisher Decl. ¶ 3). However,

plaintiffs provide no evidence that Fabela withheld the allegedly

exculpatory Discharge Summary with the intent to injure plaintiff

or with willful or conscious disregard for the rights or safety

of others, i.e., with malice. Nor do plaintiffs present evidence

to rebut defendants evidence of good faith, particularly Fisher’s

own testimony that she did not think that Fabela intended to hurt

her or her children. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ state claim against defendant

Fabela is GRANTED.

B. Defendant Geisler 

Defendants present evidence that Geisler does not recall

whether he read the Discharge Summary prior to preparing the JDR. 

(Geisler Decl. ¶ 8). However, after having read the Discharge

Summary, Geisler does not believe that it ruled out a mental

disorder that would justify taking custody of the Fisher children

away from Fisher. (Geisler Decl. ¶ 8). Rather, in Geisler’s

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judgment, Fisher’s mental status appeared to be significantly

compromised at the time of the interviews. (Geisler Decl. ¶ 12). 

Geisler asserts that “at no time did [he] do anything other than

discharge [his] duties as a social worker in a manner that I

believed to be in the best interests of the Fisher family, which,

based upon the information that [he] had, appeared to be an

unstable and harmful environment for the Fisher children.” 

(Geisler Decl. ¶ 20).

Plaintiffs argue that Geisler “is another county employee

whom simply rubber stamped the notion that [Fisher] was

delusional without ever having any substantial proof to back it

up.” This argument, if true, asserts that defendant Geisler

acted negligently by failing to properly investigate the matter,

not with the requisite malicious intent. However, plaintiffs

offer no evidence to substantiate the assertion that Geisler was

negligent or malicious in his conduct. Therefore, defendants’

motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ state claim

against defendant Geisler is GRANTED.

C. Defendant Henderson

Defendant Henderson had no direct involvement in the Fisher

case other than supervising defendants Rose and Alvarez during

the emergency intervention. Henderson did not supervise Fabela’s

handling of the case from January 29, 2004 onward. Plaintiffs do

not discuss a malicious failure to disclose known exculpatory

evidence in reference to Henderson’s potential liability. 

Rather, they assert that “it is clear that Mr. Henderson has a

bias against [Fisher] and acted in a malicious manner to [her]

detriment” based upon comments made by Henderson to Fabela about

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11 Under federal law, absolute and qualified immunity are

defenses to liability for damages only and do not bar actions for

declaratory or injunctive relief. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.

522, 539-40 (1984); American Fire, Theft & Collision Managers v.

Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1991); Shipp v. Todd, 568

F.2d 133. 134 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Supreme Ct of Va v.

Consumer Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980). Likewise, under

California law, immunity only shields public entities and

employees from claims for monetary damages. Cal. Govt Code §

814; Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District v. Armstrong, 49

Cal. App. 3d 992, 999-1000(5th Dist. 1975). Therefore, these

claims survived defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of

immunity.

24

Fisher’s prior drug use. (Opp’n at 26-17). All of plaintiffs’

state law claims, except those relating to a malicious failure to

disclose exculpatory evidence, were previously dismissed by this

court. (Mem. & Order, filed July 22, 2005, Docket # 22). 

Because plaintiffs offer no argument and no evidence regarding

the remaining state law claim as it applies to defendant

Henderson, defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding

plaintiffs’ state claim against defendant Henderson is GRANTED.

III. Injunctive Relief 

Plaintiffs also request injunctive relief “undoing [the]

unreasonable and illegal conditions, and protecting them from

further such conditions.”11 (Compl. ¶ 32). An injunction is an

equitable remedy. “[T]he basis for injunctive relief in the

federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the

inadequacy of legal remedies.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456

U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citations omitted). A plaintiff seeking an

injunction based on alleged past wrongs must demonstrate that

there is a real and immediate threat that they will be wronged

again. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03

(1983). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself

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12 Defendant object to this fact on the basis that it is

irrelevant. However, whether Fisher’s children are in her care

or in foster care is relevant to the need for the injunctive

relief sought by plaintiffs.

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show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief .

. . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” 

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).

In this case, defendants present undisputed evidence that

plaintiffs’ state law CPS case was terminated on April 14, 2004,

and that the USP was completed in July or August 2004. (SUF ¶¶

26-27). As such, plaintiffs are no longer subject to the

allegedly “unreasonable and illegal conditions” of the USP for

which they seek injunctive relief. Further, there is no evidence

that plaintiffs will be subjected to these same conditions in the

future. Rather, defendants present evidence that Fisher’s

children are presently in foster care because they were removed

from Fisher in February 2005, after officers found

methamphetamine paraphernalia in the trailer she was living in

with her boyfriend. (SUF ¶ 48). Fisher must complete counseling

and related conditions before she can be reunified with her

children. (SUF ¶ 48).12 Plaintiffs have presented no evidence

to dispute defendants’ evidence and make no arguments regarding

injunctive relief in their opposition brief. As such,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’

claims for injunctive relief is GRANTED.

/////

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close this file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 5, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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