Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02302/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DESMOND BROWN,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 10cv2302 LAB (NLS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

Desmond Brown (“Petitioner”) is a California prisoner serving a term of 25 years to life with

the possibility of parole, plus 12 years for attempted murder, attempted robbery, and related offenses.

He filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner argues:

(1) newly discovered evidence shows that he was not the shooter; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to discover and present exculpatory evidence and for allowing damaging evidence related to

Petitioner’s credibility to be presented; (3) the newly discovered evidence requires that he receive a

new trial or an evidentiary hearing because it establishes his innocence. (Petition at 2-3.) 

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

(Resp.’s Mem. of P. & A. at 4.) Petitioner filed an Opposition. (“Opp’n.”) After thorough review,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion be GRANTED and that the Petition be

dismissed with prejudice. 

/ / /

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Conviction.

The San Diego County District Attorney filed an information charging Petitioner with

premeditated and deliberate attempted murder in count 1, attempted robbery in count 2, assault

with a deadly weapon in count 3, felon in possession of a firearm in count 4, felon in possession of

ammunition in count 5, and possession of marijuana in count 6. (Lodgment 1 at 2.) The

information also alleged that Petitioner used and discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury

or death during the commission of the crimes charged in counts 1 and 2, and Petitioner personally

used a dangerous and deadly weapon (glass bottle) during the commission of the crime charged in

count 3. (Lodgment 1 at 2-3.) 

On September 22, 2005, a jury found Petitioner guilty of all 6 counts and found all

allegations true, with the exception of the premeditation and deliberation allegations as to count 1.

(Lodgment 1 at 3.) On December 13, 2005, the court sentenced Petitioner to 25 years to life plus

12 years. (Lodgment 1 at 3-4.)

The Direct Appeal.

On June 20, 2006, Petitioner appealed the judgment, raising 4 claims: (1) the trial court

committed error by imposing prison time on each of the convictions for attempted murder,

attempted robbery, and assault in counts one through three; (2) the fact findings underlying the

imposition of prison time should have been made by the jury, not the judge; (3) the trial court

unlawfully imposed two separate firearm enhancements for the single act of firing a gun at the

victim; and (4) the trial court improperly denied a motion to dismiss because there was insufficient

evidence to prove Petitioner possessed ammunition “capable of being fired from a firearm with a

deadly consequence.” (Lodgment 1 at 1-2.) On March 21, 2007, in an unpublished, reasoned

opinion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in all respects. (Lodgment 6.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court, raising claims 2 and

3 above. (Lodgment 7 at 2.) On September 12, 2007, the California Supreme Court dismissed the

Petition. (Lodgment 8.) 

/ / /

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1

Under the mailbox rule, federal and state habeas petitions are deemed filed at the time they

are delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223

(9th Cir. 2001). Absent other proof, this Court adopts the date Petitioner signed the declaration of

mailing for the purpose of determining when a petition was filed in calculating the tolling period. See

Bui v. Hedgpeth, 516 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2007), citing Washington v. United States, 243

F.3d 1217, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000).

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Petitions for Collateral Review.

1. State Habeas Corpus Petition in Superior Court.

 On September 5, 2008, Petitioner filed his first habeas corpus petition in the State Superior

Court.1

 (Lodgment 9.) Petitioner presented two of the same claims presented in the current the

Petition. Specifically, Petitioner claimed: (1) newly discovered evidence exonerates him; and (2)

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate witnesses and failing to keep out

prejudicial evidence at trial. (Lodgment 9 at 1.) On October 29, 2008, the court denied the

petition. The court reasoned that the evidence Petitioner claimed exonerates him does not

undermine the entire structure of the case upon which the prosecution was based. It further found

that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective because (a) witnesses that Petitioner alleged his

counsel failed to investigate only would have provided cumulative testimony; and (b) the evidence

that Petitioner alleged should have been kept out appeared to be a tactical decision consistent with

a strategy to paint the Petitioner as reformed. (Lodgment 10 at 3-5.)

2. State Habeas Corpus Petition in California Court of Appeal.

On November 17, 2008, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal,

case number D054101, repeating the claims made in his habeas corpus petition in Superior Court.

(Lodgment 11 at 2-3.) On December 26, 2008, the court summarily denied the petition and noted

that Petitioner referenced exhibits in his Petition, however no exhibits were provided. (Lodgment

12). 

On January 8, 2009, Petitioner’s previous direct appeal counsel filed a letter with the

California Court of Appeal referencing the court’s December 26, 2008, denial. Counsel informed

the court that Petitioner sent him a copy of the petition in mid-November, which included copies

of all three exhibits. Counsel attached the exhibits to the letter. (Lodgment 13.)

On January 20, 2009, Petitioner re-filed the same habeas petition, in conjunction with a

motion for rehearing, marking it “refiled.” The court assigned new case number D054459 to the

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petition. (Lodgment 14.) On May 20, 2009, the court denied the “motion for rehearing” for lack of

jurisdiction in case number D054101. (Lodgment 15.) On May 21, 2009, the court adopted the

reasoning of the Superior court’s October 29, 2008, order, and denied habeas relief in case number

D054459. (Lodgment 16.) 

3. State Habeas Corpus Petition in California Supreme Court.

 On August 31, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme

Court. Petitioner raised the same two claims as in the previous petition, as well as a third, in

which he claimed the trial court’s failure to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered

evidence violated his Due Process rights. (Lodgment 17 at 1.) On February 24, 2010, the court

denied the petition without comment. (Lodgment 18.) 

4. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition in Federal District Court.

On November 1, 2010, Petitioner filed the Petition now before this Court. The Petition

raises the same three claims pursued on habeas in the state courts: (1) newly discovered evidence

exonerates him; (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and for allowing

damaging evidence to be presented at trial; and (3) the denial of a new trial, based upon newly

discovered evidence, violates his Due Process rights. (Petition at 2-3.) On February 28, 2011,

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Petition is barred by the statute of

limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d), and therefore, should be dismissed with prejudice.

(Memo. of P.& A. at 4.) Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion, in which he argues that the

factual predicate for his current claims was not known by the time his conviction was final, and

therefore he is entitled to a later start date of the statute of limitations. Further, Petitioner argues

that his Petition is timely because he is entitled to statutory and equitable tolling. Finally,

Petitioner argues in the alternative that his Petition should not be barred, regardless of the statute

of limitations, because he is actually innocent. (Opp’n at 1.)

DISCUSSION

I. Statute of Limitations.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this

Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-37 (1997). AEDPA imposes a one-year period

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of limitation on petitioners to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The relevant section reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action. 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

A. Discovery of Factual Predicate for Claim.

Petitioner first argues he is entitled to a later start of the limitations period because he did

not discover the factual predicate of his current claims until August 2008. He contends that

through a “post conviction investigation,” conducted with the help of his family, he discovered

evidence showing the identification and location of the actual assailant in the instant case. (Petition

at 12.) The evidence consists of two declarations; one from a friend who was present on the night

of the shootings and one from a family friend who allegedly encountered the actual assailant. 

Respondent argues that the factual predicates underlying the claims in the Petition concern pretrial

or trial issues that Petitioner would have or could have been aware of at that time.

After the state court judgment became final, the following string of events led Petitioner to

finding the alleged “new” evidence: (1) Petitioner began an investigation after his conviction; (2)

he found Marco Velasquez; (3) Velasquez told Petitioner that the name of the alleged true shooter

is Julio Dulay and said that Dulay told him, on the night of the shooting, that he was looking for

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someone to rob (Petition at Ex. A); (4) On August 14, 2008, Obrion Thomas provided Petitioner

with a declaration saying that on October 20, 2005, he ran into Dulay, and Dulay confessed to him

(Petition at Ex. C). (Petition at 11.). 

These facts could have been discovered before trial, or at least before he was sentenced. 

For instance, Velasquez was present the night of the shooting and he revealed the alleged true

shooter’s name. But Petitioner failed to call Velasquez as a witness or even obtain his declaration

at an earlier time. Additionally, Petitioner could have learned about the alleged October 20, 2005

confession of Dulay–relayed over two years before his conviction became final on December 11,

2007–through some investigation. At most, Petitioner’s proffered declarations offer “additional”

evidence as opposed to “new” evidence. 

Because it appears to the court that through the exercise of due diligence, Petitioner could

have discovered these facts before his conviction, Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date

under § 2244(d)(1)(D). These facts constitute additional evidence as opposed to new evidence that

could trigger the later start date of the statute of limitations. See Stringer v. Marshall, 2011 WL

666897, *4 (E.D.Cal. Feb 11, 2011) (“[p]etitioner knew the important facts undergirding his

general claim that Randy Russell, not petitioner, committed the murder at the time of trial”); Hunt

v. Hill, 2011 WL 1543045, *4 (C.D.Cal. Mar 10, 2011) (“[w]hile the arson reports may provide

additional evidence in support of Petitioner's claims, it does not change the contour of those claims

and is thus not a new factual predicate justifying a later start date under § 2244(d)(1)(D)”).

Additionally, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective counsel for failing to investigate and call

witnesses does not allow the limitations period to start at a later time under § 2244(d)(1)(D).

Petitioner was well aware, at the time of trial, of any witness his counsel planned to call or not call.

Further, Petitioner stated in his opposition that despite his demand, his various appointed counsel

never provided him with information about any type of investigation actually being pursued.

(Opp’n at 6.) Therefore according to Petitioner’s own statements, he was aware, before trial, of

any alleged lack of investigation. Thus, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective counsel cannot trigger a

later start date of the statute of limitations.

/ / /

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B. Date Conviction Became Final.

The statute of limitations started the date the judgment became final. Here, Petitioner’s

conviction became final on December 11, 2007, the last day he could have filed a petition for a

writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court following the September 12, 2007 denial by

the state supreme court of his petition for review. Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir.

2002). Petitioner had one year from the effective date--until December 10, 2008, absent tolling--

within which to file a petition in federal court. Petitioner did not file a federal habeas petition

under 28 § 2254 until November 1, 2010. Unless Petitioner can show he is entitled to 1,056 days

of tolling, his federal habeas petition is late under § 2244(d)(a)(A).

II. Tolling.

A. Statutory Tolling.

A petitioner’s statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus

petition is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions are properly filed and

pending that entire time. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The time between

the denial of one petition and the filing of the next is included in the tolling only if the next

petition is timely filed in a higher court. Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 818-19 (9th Cir.

2003). The petitioner is not entitled to tolling during the gap between filings in the same court.

Id., 821 n.3. Additionally, statutory tolling is not available for the period a petition is under

consideration if it is untimely filed. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413-14 (2005). In the

absence of a clear indication that the petition was timely, the federal court must examine the case

and determine whether the petition was filed within what California courts would consider a

“reasonable time.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006), citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214 (2002). A period of 30 to 60 days is reasonable, while a 6-month unexplained delay will

likely be deemed “unreasonable.” Id. at 201. 

In this case, Petitioner is entitled to some statutory tolling, though not enough to cover the

period of time necessary to find the federal petition timely filed. Here, the statutory limitation

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period started on December 11, 2007. Petitioner filed his first State Superior Court habeas corpus

petition on September 5, 2008, 269 days later. Once filed, 96 days remained in the limitations

period. The Superior Court denied the petition on October 29, 2008.

Petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal on

November 17, 2008. Tolling would have been proper during the period between the Superior

Court’s denial and the filing in the Court of Appeal because a period of about one month between

filings is reasonable.

The California Court of Appeal denied relief on May 21, 2009. Petitioner filed his

subsequent habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on August 31, 2009, 102 days later.

The California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Lodgment 18.) 

Lacking an indication regarding timeliness, this Court must examine the delay “and

determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” Evans, 546 U.S. at 198. 

Further, as instructed by the court in Evans, this Court must “keep in mind that, in Saffold, [the

Supreme Court] held that timely filings in California (as elsewhere) fell within the federal tolling

provision on the assumption that California law in this respect did not differ significantly from the

laws of other States,” which provide a time period of 30 to 60 days between filings. Id. at 199-200,

201 (emphasis in original).

Here, Petitioner’s delay to file in the California Supreme Court was more than 100 days.

This gap is longer than the 30 to 60 days, that most other states allow, and “far longer than the 10-

day period California gives a losing party to file a notice of appeal in the California Supreme

Court.” Id. at 201; see also Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (no statutory

tolling for 115 and 101 day gaps between habeas filings); Culver v. Dir. of Corr., 450 F.Supp.2d

1135, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (no statutory tolling for 71 and 97 day gaps). Further, Petitioner’s

habeas petition, filed in the California Supreme Court, offered no justification for the delay as

required under California law. In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949). Specifically, Petitioner

wrote nothing in the state petition form where he was required to explain any delay in raising his

claims within the meaning of Swain. (Lodgment 17 at 6 of petition form.) As a result, statutory

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2

Even if Petitioner’s 102 day delay was considered reasonable, allowing tolling to occur until

February, 24, 2010, when the California Supreme Court denied his petition, his statute of limitations

would have, nonetheless, expired on May 31, 2010, making his federal petition late by 5 months. 

3

Put another way, the total number of days elapsed between the conviction becoming final on

December 11, 2007, and the filing of the federal habeas petition on November 1, 2010, is 1,056 days.

In order to be timely, Petitioner would have had to show 691 days of statutory tolling. Counting all

tolling potentially available (including after the statute had run), Plaintiff has only 258 days of tolling,

which is 433 days short of the 691 days he would have needed. 

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tolling is unavailable anytime after May 21, 2009.2 At that time, Petitioner had 96 days remaining

in the limitations period. Therefore, he had until August 25, 2009, to file his federal petition.

However, the instant Petition was not filed until November 1, 2010, more than a year after the

limitations period expired. Thus, statutory tolling alone will not allow the Court to deem the

instant Petition as timely filed.3

B. Equitable Tolling.

The one-year limitations period under AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v.

Florida, 130 S.Ct 2549, 2554 (2010). Petitioner bears the burden to prove that equitable tolling is

appropriate, and must establish (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418

(2005); see Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). The

determination of whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling is “highly fact-dependent.”

Espinoza-Matthews, 432 F.3d at 102, citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir.

2000). Further, equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999).

 Here, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling from February 24, 2010, the

date his final state petition was denied, until November 1, 2010, the date he filed his federal

petition; a total of 250 days. (Opp’n at 17.) Petitioner argues that equitable tolling is appropriate

because his “...post conviction investigation... and [his effort to] file an adequately meaningful

federal petition, [demonstrate] both that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that statecreated impediments and other circumstances outside of himself delayed him in filing the

petition.” (Opp’n at 17.) Specifically, the extraordinary circumstances, which Petitioner claims

stood in his way, include: (1) limited library access; (2) mail communication with “jailhouse

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lawyer”; and (3) “routine incidents of prison life,” such as sudden lockdowns and medical

appointments. (Opp’n at 4.) Even if the Court assumes the above factors qualify as “extraordinary

circumstances” making it impossible for Petitioner to file his federal petition on time, “[P]etitioner

must also demonstrate that he exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file his habeas

petition after the extraordinary circumstances began, ‘otherwise the link of causation between the

extraordinary circumstance and the failure to file [is] broken.’” Vasquez v. Martel, 2011 WL

285045, *3 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 25, 2011), citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2003).

 Here, Petitioner points to his “post conviction investigation” to establish diligence.

However, this post conviction investigation was finished in August 2008, when Petitioner received

the declarations. Because Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling from February

24, 2010 through November 1, 2010, the post conviction investigation does nothing to demonstrate

that Petitioner exercised reasonable diligence in 2010. Petitioner also states that “the lengths to

which he went in order to construct and file an adequately meaningful federal petition”

demonstrate diligence. (Oppostition at 17.) However, he fails to articulate exactly what those

“lengths” were. Because Petitioner fails to fulfill the diligence prong required by Pace, he is not

entitled to equitable tolling. 

C. Actual Innocence Claim.

Petitioner asks this Court to find his Petition to be an exception to the statute of limitations

because it would be “a miscarriage of justice to dismiss his petition on a non-jurisdictional

ground.” (Opp’n at 23.) Petitioner contends that his federal petition raises a claim of actual

innocence and a claim that the ineffectiveness of his counsel--for failing to investigate and call

witnesses--violated his fundamental Due Process rights. (Opp’n at 20-1.) To have his otherwise

barred claims be heard on the merits, Petitioner must show that his claim of actual innocence

meets the standard set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 307 (1995).

In Schlup, the petitioner claimed he was actually innocent of the murder for which he was

convicted, and that his conviction was obtained as a result of the of the withholding of evidence by

the prosecution in violation of Brady, and in violation of his right to the effective assistance of

counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Court noted that because the

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petitioner had failed to establish cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome a procedural default,

he would be able to “obtain review of his constitutional claims only if he falls within the ‘narrow

class of cases... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Id. at 314-15, quoting

McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991). The Schlup Court noted that because the claim for

relief at issue “depends critically on the validity of his Strickland and Brady claims, Schlup’s

claim of innocence is thus not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the

merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315, quoting Herra v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (recognizing

that the “body of our habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual innocence’ is not

itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to

have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”); see House v. Bell, 547

U.S. 518, 539 (2006) (noting that the case at hand involved a “federal habeas petition seeking

consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence.”) 

To show a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” the petitioner must show that a

constitutional violation probably caused the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Schlup,

513 U.S. at 324. Specifically, “a petitioner must show that, in light of all the evidence, including

evidence not introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-76 (9th Cir.

2003), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In applying this standard, “[a] petitioner need not show

that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was convicted of committing; instead, he must show

that “‘a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776,

quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9thCir. 1997) (en banc), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 316.

 “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513

U.S. at 324. The Supreme Court has noted that “[b]ecause such evidence is obviously unavailable

in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Id. 

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Here, Petitioner’s exculpatory evidence consists of two declarations, which Petitioner

maintains, reveal the identity of the actual shooter. The first declaration, produced by Marco

Velasquez, states that (1) on the night of the shooting he saw Petitioner leave in the direction of

the store and another man, known as Blue at the time, began walking behind him; (2) earlier that

evening Blue told Velasquez that he was looking for someone to rob; and (3) Velasquez later

learned that Blue’s real name is Julio Dulay. The second declaration, produced by Obrion

Thomas, states that on October 20, 2005, Julio Dulay confessed that he was the true shooter. If

these declarations are determined to be “new reliable evidence,” as required by Schlup, the

gateway may open and allow Petitioner’s otherwise barred claims to be heard on the merits. 

This Court has found that the evidence presented is “additional” evidence as opposed to

“new” evidence. It is also provided by two friends and cannot compare to the reliability of

scientific evidence, a trustworthy eyewitness account or critical physical evidence, as

contemplated in Schlup. The Court is not convinced that the consideration of this evidence would

undermine its confidence in the outcome of the trial. The Schlup gateway is unavailable in the

vast majority of cases, as claims of actual innocence are rarely successful. The Court finds that to

be the case here. Therefore, the Court recommends denying the actual innocence claim to the

extent it can be used as a gateway to bypass the procedural bar imposed by the statute of

limitations.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss; and, (3) dismissing the Petition with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 19, 2011, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than August 26, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

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Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 28, 2011

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:10-cv-02302-LAB-NLS Document 23 Filed 07/28/11 Page 13 of 13