Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01822/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01822-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Plaintiff also alleges that Officer Roberts used excessive force against him on October 7, 2005. However, Officer

Roberts was never served with the complaint and is thus not a party in these proceedings.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TED DARNELL DANIELS, Civil No. 07-cv-1822-JM (POR)

Plaintiff, REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE DENIED 

[Document No. 37]

[Document No. 44]

v.

O ALVARADO, Correctional Officer; M

HARRIS, Correction Officer; A ROBERTS,

Correction Officer; W MITCHELL, Correction

Officer-Sergeant;

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ted Daniels (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an action filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. The case is before the undersigned pursuant to S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

72.1(c)(1)(c) for Report and Recommendation on the parties’ respective Motions for Summary

Judgment. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Alvarado and Harris violated his civil rights by using

excessive force against him on October 7, 2005 while he was an inmate at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility.1

 Defendants assert defendant Alvarado only used de minimis force against

plaintiff and defendant Harris did not apply any force to plaintiff. Based upon the documents and

Case 3:07-cv-01822-JM-POR Document 52 Filed 04/26/10 Page 1 of 16
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evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff initially filed a Complaint against defendants on September 17, 2007. The

Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller sua sponte dismissed the Complaint on November 1, 2007 for failure to

state a claim and granted plaintiff leave to amend. (Doc. 3.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) on December 21, 2007, the operative pleading here, alleging an Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim, Fourteenth Amendment denial of due process claim and

conspiracy to violate constitutional rights claim. (Doc. 5.) Upon review of plaintiff’s FAC, the

Court dismissed plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment and Conspiracy claims without leave to amend. 

Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on July 3, 2008. 

(Doc. 12.) Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter issued a Report recommending that defendants’

motion be denied with respect to Defendants Alvarado and Harris and granted for defendant W.

Mitchell. (Doc. 24.) The Report did not address the claim of excessive force against Defendant

Roberts because he was never served. Plaintiff objected to the Report because it did not compel the

Attorney General to provide plaintiff with an address for Defendant Roberts. (Doc. 25.) Defendants

did not object to the Report. On March 9, 2009, the District Court adopted the Report in its entirety. 

The remaining defendants, O. Alvarado and M. Harris filed an Answer to plaintiff’s FAC on

March 27, 2009. (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff filed his first Motion for Summary Judgment on April 13,

2009. (Doc. 29.) In that motion, plaintiff claimed there is no genuine issue of material fact because

defendants did not object to the finding in Magistrate Porter’s Report that plaintiff had pled

sufficient facts to make out an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Plaintiff supported his

motion with an affidavit stating he had been physically and emotionally scared by defendants’

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Defendants attached a Rand/Klingele notice to their Motion to inform plaintiff of the requirements and

consequences of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 44-5)

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conduct. (Doc. 29-1.) Plaintiff also attached excerpts from the Report and the Order adopting the

Report. (Doc. 29-2.) Defendants filed an Opposition on May 8, 2009. (Doc. 31.) Plaintiff did not

file a Reply. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion on August 6, 2009 for failure to submit any

evidence in support thereof. (Doc. 32.)

Plaintiff filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on September 2, 2009 on the same

ground as his previous motion. (Doc. No. 37.) In this motion, plaintiff also listed the injuries he

suffered as a result of defendants’ conduct and attached medical records and an excerpt from a

medical journal in support. Plaintiff also filed a statement of undisputed facts. (Doc. 37-2.)

Defendants filed an Opposition on October 15, 2009 stating that plaintiff had not produced

admissible evidence to show defendants used excessive force against him or caused the injuries

described in the summary judgment motion. (Doc. 39.) Defendants also filed evidentiary objections

to the exhibits plaintiff attached to his Motion for Summary Judgment stating there was no

foundation for the exhibits, the exhibits were not properly authenticated and contained hearsay. 

Plaintiff filed a Reply on October 30, 2009. (Doc. 43.)

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on November 4, 2009 and attached

declarations from defendants Alvarado and Harris, and Frederick Smith, plaintiff’s cellmate at the

time of the incident. (Doc. 44.) In their motion defendants contend Officer Harris did not apply any

force to plaintiff and Officer Alvarado only applied de minimis force. Defendants further contend

they are both entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 44.)2

 Plaintiff filed an Opposition on

December 23, 2009 disputing defendants’ version of the facts. (Doc No. 50) Defendants filed a

Reply on December 30, 2009. (Doc. No. 51.) 

B. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed: In October of 2005, Plaintiff was a prisoner at the

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and housed in a cell with another inmate, Frederick Smith. 

(Doc. 5 at 3.) Plaintiff stated he had problems with Mr. Smith and requested a transfer to another

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cell. The prison administrator subsequently granted plaintiff’s transfer request. Id. at 4. On the

morning of the transfer, plaintiff gathered his belongings from his cell and waited at a table located

in a prison common area. Id. Before plaintiff could be transferred, the prison started to conduct its

daily inmate count. Id. Defendant Harris asked plaintiff to follow protocol and return to his cell for

the inmate count. Id. Plaintiff refused on the ground that he was supposed to be transferred to

another cell. Defendant Alvarado then told plaintiff he would be transferred later that day but first

needed to return to his original cell for the daily count. Id. Plaintiff refused again and told

Defendant Alvarado that he would remain at the table for the inmate count. Id. at 5. Defendant

Alvarado then threatened to send plaintiff to the Hold for his refusal to return to his cell. Id. 

Ultimately, Officer Roberts handcuffed Plaintiff and, along with Defendant Harris, escorted plaintiff

to his cell. Id.

The remaining facts are disputed between the parties. According to plaintiff, when he

arrived at his cell he observed his cellmate Frederick Smith inside “looking crazy.” Id. Afraid that

a fight between him and Mr. Smith would ensue once he entered the cell, plaintiff asked Officer

Roberts to remove his handcuffs. Id. Officer Roberts denied plaintiff’s request and told plaintiff to

follow the proper routine, which plaintiff describes as entering the cell and standing with his back

against the cell door. Id. That procedure allows officers to remove the handcuffs through the food

slot located on the cell door. Id. Plaintiff became concerned that Mr. Smith would attack him

before the officers could intervene and refused to enter the cell. Id. At that point, Officer Roberts

“violently” grabbed plaintiff by the collar, threw him down onto the concrete floor and put his knee

into plaintiff’s neck. Defendant Harris then jumped down onto plaintiff and put his knee into

plaintiff’s back. Id. at 6. Although plaintiff could not see Defendant Alvarado, plaintiff claims he

felt her standing on his legs. Id. Throughout the entire incident, plaintiff remained handcuffed and

motionless.

In contrast to plaintiff’s assertions, Mr. Smith states he was never violent toward plaintiff nor

did he make any threats to plaintiff. Smith Decl ¶ 3-4. Moreover, when the officers brought

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According to Mr. Smith, he does not remember viewing any altercation between the officers and plaintiff that took

place outside of his cell. Smith Decl ¶¶6-7. In addition, because of Mr. Smith’s classification at the time of the incident Mr.

Smith claims he was not required to be in his cell for the inmate count. Id. ¶7. 

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plaintiff to his cell, Mr. Smith was not there. Harris Decl. ¶ 6.3 Officer Roberts initially ordered

plaintiff to enter his cell and plaintiff refused. Alvarado Decl. ¶ 10. After Officer Roberts ordered

plaintiff to enter the cell again, plaintiff took two steps towards the cell then “suddenly shot

backwards out of the cell, colliding into [] Officer Roberts, almost pushing him over the second-tier

railing.” Id. Officer Roberts then grabbed plaintiff and ordered him to get on the ground. Id. ¶ 11. 

After plaintiff refused, Officer Roberts pulled plaintiff to the ground and pressed his body weight

against him in order to regain control. Id; Harris Decl ¶ 8. While on the ground, plaintiff began

kicking his legs repeatedly. Alvarado Decl ¶11. Because plaintiff, with a height of six feet, four

inches and weight of 220-240 pounds at the time of the incident, was significantly larger than

Officer Roberts, who is five feet, two inches tall, Defendant Alvarado went to assist Officer Roberts

by sitting on plaintiff’s legs. Id. ¶11-12. As Officer Roberts and Defendant Alvarado were able to

control the plaintiff, Defendant Harris did not get involved. Id; Harris Decl ¶9. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.C.P. 56(c). “[T]he substantive law

will identify which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact

exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may meet this burden

either by producing evidence to demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact or by showing

that the non- moving party does not have enough evidence to support its case. Id. “If the nonmoving

party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial would be useless and the moving

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party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 331.

A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is

based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Schroeder v.

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff's verified complaint as opposing

affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. §1746, plaintiff stated

under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were not based purely on

his belief but on his personal knowledge). However, an unverified complaint is “insufficient to

counter a summary judgment motion supported by affidavits.” Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420,

1423 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Services, 834 F.2d 758,

762 (9th Cir. 1987) (opposition repeating “unsworn factual allegations” contained in unverified

complaint does not constitute evidence that can be used to counter summary judgment motion).

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court will draw all plausible inferences in favor of

the nonmoving party. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999). Moreover, “[w]here a plaintiff

is pro se in a civil rights case, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and afford

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.” Karim- Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623

(9th Cir. 1988). However, this does not exempt plaintiff from the responsibility of providing specific,

non-conclusory facts to defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267

F.3d 895, 907 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court need not “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)

IV. DISCUSSION

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue

of material fact with respect to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and even if a genuine issue of

material fact exists, they are entitled to qualified immunity. In their motion, defendants assert

defendant Alvarado used de minimis force that was “necessary and reasonable under the

circumstances” [Doc. 44-1 at 6] and defendant Harris did not apply any force to plaintiff. Id. at 11. 

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In her Report recommending the denial of defendant’s Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim,

Magistrate Judge Porter stated “Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to support an excessive force claim against Defendants

Alvarado and Harris.” (Doc. 24 at 9.) Judge Porter also stated that “[t]he court looks not at whether the plaintiff will

‘ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’” Id. at 4 (internal citation

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To support their contention, defendants attached three declarations to their summary judgment

motion. 

In opposition, plaintiff makes a blanket statement disputing defendants’ version of the facts. 

See Doc. 50 at 1 (“Plaintiff Object to Defendant’s following declaration in Support of Defendant’s

Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment and of ex-cellmate Frederick Smith . . . Plaintiff further

dispute and Objects and disagrees to all and any Opposing answers or theorys in their counteraffidavit or other evidence (sic).”). However, plaintiff did not attach any declarations or affidavits to

his opposition to support the allegations in his FAC. Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the

Magistrate Judge accepted plaintiff’s version of events when she issued her report recommending the

denial of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Because defendants did not object to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report, plaintiff contends defendants are now foreclosed from disputing plaintiff’s version of

events. Id. at 4 (“the Magistrate . . . found that the Defendants had in fact violated Plaintiff’s 8th

Amend Rights . . . The Defendants did not make Objections the Magistrates Report date February 6,

2009, which consequently waived their rights to Object later (sic).” ). 

The Court notes that plaintiff previously made this argument in his first Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 29 at 1.) (“Because the Honorable United States District Judge of this court also

Adopted the Magistrates Report and Recommendations makes it obviously Clear and Convincing that

the defendants cannot satisfy the Prerequisite for the existence of genuine material fact to support a

trial or a reason to Prohibit this Court from using its authority to grant Summary Judgment . . .

.(sic)”). Plaintiff also attached an affidavit to that motion for summary judgment. However, plaintiff

did not state any factual allegations in his affidavit. Instead, plaintiff stated he is “still Emotionally

and Physically scared and traumatized from being Physically abused and humiliated by the

defendants.” (Doc. 29-1 at 2.) The Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller denied plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment for “failure to submit any evidence in support of his motion.” (Doc. 32 at 2). 

Judge Miller also noted that the Court’s order denying defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and plaintiff’s

unverified complaint did not constitute evidence in support of a summary judgment motion.4

 Id. at 1. 

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omitted). Judge Porter did not make any factual findings with respect to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim that can be used

as evidence to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds plaintiff did not submit any evidence to

oppose defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, in order to prevail on summary

judgment, defendants must still meet their burden of demonstrating there is no genuine issue of

material fact.

A. Excessive Force

“To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges use of excessive force by defendants Alvarado and Harris in violation

of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 5.) Defendants assert the force used by Defendant Alvarado

was de minimis and proportionate under the circumstances. Defendants further assert Defendant

Harris did not use any force against plaintiff. 

A prison guard’s use of force against an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

of cruel and unusual punishment when it involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). However, “[t]he infliction of pain in the course of a

prison security measure . . . does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may

appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was

unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.” Id. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis

uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct 1275 (2010). Furthermore, physical force used by prison

staff against inmates does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation when it is used in proportion

to the requirements of a given situation. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1251 (9th Cir. 1982). 

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Prison officials should be accorded a certain degree of deference with respect to actions taken to

ensure the safety of prison personnel and inmates and to maintain order. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 547 (1979). That deference “does not insulate from review actions taken in bad faith and for no

legitimate purpose.” Id. at 322. “The core judicial inquiry is whether the [prison guard] administered

force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Force does not amount to a constitutional

violation in this respect if it is applied in a good faith effort to restore discipline and order and not

“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.

“Under the Eighth Amendment, we look for malicious and sadistic force, not merely objectively

unreasonable force.” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). The law makes clear

that a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably

superior alternatives does not amount to a triable issue of fact. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312. An

Eighth Amendment violation occurs when the officer uses force they “could not plausibly have

thought necessary.” McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1986) 

Furthermore, not every instance of the use of excessive force gives rise to a cause of action

under § 1983. To be actionable under § 1983, the alleged excessive force must rise to constitutional

dimensions. To determine if the constitutional line is crossed where the claim arises under the Eighth

Amendment the factors to be examined are (1) the need for application of force, (2) the relationship

between the need and amount of force that was used, (3) the extent of the injury inflicted, and (4)

whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

In White v. Roper, the ninth circuit addressed the need for force when a prisoner refuses to

return to his cell. 901 F.2d 1501(9th Cir. 1990). In White, three officers escorted the plaintiff, a

pretrial detainee, to a new cell. Upon arrival at the cell, the inmate currently residing there, Mr.

Shaw, blocked the entrance to the cell and stated he did not want a new cellmate. Despite Mr.

Shaw’s actions, the officers ordered plaintiff to go inside the cell. Plaintiff initially refused and told

one of the officers that Mr. Shaw had a weapon; however, the officers repeated their orders for

plaintiff to go inside the cell. The plaintiff then backed away from the cell and started proceeding

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back in the direction from whence he came. The three officers then forcibly subdued plaintiff

causing plaintiff to cut his wrist and sustain bruises all over his body. Immediately afterward, one of

the officers went inside the cell to resolve the issue of Mr. Shaw not wanting a new cellmate. Mr.

Shaw then attacked that officer with a weapon.

The White Court found that plaintiff’s refusal to enter his cell created the need for force from

the prison officials. The court found this was true even though plaintiff’s fears were substantiated

when Mr. Shaw attacked one of the officers with a weapon minutes after plaintiff refused to enter the

cell. In its opinion, the White Court acknowledged that while the parties dispute the amount of force

used, plaintiff did not show that “he required or even that he requested medical treatment for the cut

wrist and the bruises he allegedly suffered . . . that he lost consciousness at any time, or that he

suffered any permanent injury” and thus summary judgment was properly granted for defendants. 

901 F.2d at 1507. 

In the instant matter, it is undisputed that plaintiff disobeyed the orders of Officers Alvarado

and Harris to return to his cell and Officer Roberts’ order for plaintiff to enter his cell. Under White,

plaintiff’s refusal to enter his cell, even if based on fear of his cellmate, created the initial need for

force by Officer Roberts. 

Defendant Alvarado admits she also used force against plaintiff. Alvarado Decl ¶12. She

states in her declaration that a large size disparity existed between plaintiff and Officer Roberts, with

plaintiff weighing approximately 240 pounds and being over a foot taller than Officer Roberts. Id. at

¶11. Because of the size disparity, defendant Alvarado helped Officer Roberts bring plaintiff under

control. Id. As plaintiff did not submit any evidence to refute these statements, the Court will accept

these facts as true. Having observed a fellow officer begin to subdue a disobedient prisoner

significantly larger than himself, the Court finds it was reasonable for defendant Alvarado to perceive

that her assistance was necessary. 

The next inquiry is whether defendant Alvarado used a proportionate amount of force. 

Defendant Alvarado assisted Officer Roberts by sitting on plaintiff’s legs. Id. Defendant Alvarado

states she chose this method of force because plaintiff started kicking his legs after Officer Roberts

brought him to the ground and could have injured Officer Roberts or herself. Id. It is not alleged or

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stated that defendant Alvarado used any force besides sitting on plaintiff’s legs or that she sat on his

legs with the purpose of causing injury, rather than regaining control of plaintiff. Furthermore, while

the nature of the injury sustained is not determinative of whether excessive force was used, it is a

factor to be considered. Plaintiff has never alleged that his legs were injured in any manner during

the incident. Furthermore, immediately after the incident, plaintiff was able to walk to the MTA for

examination, verbalize the incident to the official in charge and, twenty minutes later, was able to

transport himself, and his property, to his new cell. (Doc. 5 at 6.) The Court thus finds the act of

sitting plaintiff’s legs was a proportionate response to the situation. 

The Court further finds that defendant Alvarado’s actions constituted a de minimis amount of

force. See, e.g., Moore v. Machado, 2009 WL 4051082, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2009)(throwing prisoner

against the wall then twisting and bending his arm is de minimis); Anthony v. Shackmann, 2009 WL

1065071, 5 (D.Or. 2009) (single open-handed blow to inmate’s temple is de minimis); Crow v. Leach,

1995 WL 456357, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 1995) (pushing inmate into chair that results in his

shoulder going through a window is de minimis); Jackson v. Hurley, 1993 WL 515688, at *2 (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 24, 1993)(striking prisoner in the back of his neck with forearm and kicking him in the

ankle is de minimus force). 

Plaintiff has produced no evidence to show that Defendant Alvarado’s actions were based on

malicious or sadistic motives. Instead the evidence demonstrates that defendant Alvarado acted with

the good faith intent of regaining control over a prisoner who repeatedly disobeyed orders. As a

result, her use of de minimis force was not “repugnant to the conscience of mankind” and did not

violate plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court recommends that summary

judgment be GRANTED with respect to defendant Alvarado.

The Court’s analysis differs slightly with respect to defendant Harris. The parties give widely

different versions about defendant Harris’ involvement in this incident. In his unverified FAC,

plaintiff claims that after Officer Roberts brought him to the ground, defendant Harris jumped on him

and then put his knee into plaintiff’s back, using the force of his entire body weight of approximately

285 pounds. In contrast, defendant Harris claims in his declaration that he did not get involved in the

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Defendants further claims that plaintiff never specifically accuses defendant Harris of excessive force but rather

states a male corrections officer injured his back. The Court notes, however, that plaintiff does mention defendant Harris

by name in his FAC when describing the incident. (See Doc. 5 at 5-6.)

6

Defendant Alvarado also states in her declaration that defendant Harris never applied any force to plaintiff.

Alvarado Decl ¶ 12.

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incident and never applied any force to plaintiff.5 

As mentioned previously, an unverified complaint is “insufficient to counter a summary

judgment motion supported by affidavits.” Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). 

While the Court is required to resolve all plausible inferences in plaintiff’s favor, the Court is not

required to use facts not supported by any evidence. In this instance, plaintiff has not offered any

evidence to refute defendant Harris’ sworn declaration that he did not apply any force to plaintiff.6

The use of force is an essential element of an excessive force claim. Thus, in the absence of any

evidence demonstrating that defendant Harris used force against plaintiff, the Court also recommends

that summary judgment be GRANTED for defendant Harris. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also contend they are entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of

qualified immunity. Qualified immunity will shield a prison official from civil liability when “their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct 808, 815 (2009). This doctrine applies

regardless of whether the official’s conduct is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based

on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)

(Kennedy, J., dissenting). In sum, this standard “protect[s] ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 229 (1991). 

Until recently, courts were required to undergo a two-step inquiry to determine whether a

defendant was entitled to qualified immunity in a particular situation. The first inquiry asks whether

“‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... the facts alleged show the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.”’ Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “A

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negative answer ends the analysis, with qualified immunity protecting the defendants from liability. 

If a constitutional violation occurred, a court must further inquire ‘whether the right was clearly

established. If the law did not put the [officials] on notice that [their] conduct would be clearly

unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.’” Clement v. Gomez, 298

F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 

In an excessive force case, “[q]ualified immunity operates . . . to protect officers from the

sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206 (citing

Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-927 (11th Cir. 2000). Even if an officer is mistaken in

their belief that a particular use of force is acceptable, “qualified immunity can apply in the event the

mistaken belief was reasonable.” Id.

In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court held that courts are not required to analyze qualified

immunity using the sequence set forth in Saucier. 129 S.Ct 808. Instead, courts are now “permitted

to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 129

S.Ct at 818. However, the Court noted the two- step Saucier protocol will still be beneficial in many

cases. Id. Accordingly, courts may analyze qualified immunity in that manner at their discretion.

At the time of the events alleged in the complaint, it was clearly established that prisoners

have an Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Martinez v. Sanford, 323 F.3d

1178, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2003)(“the law regarding a prison guard’s use of excessive force was clearly

established by 1994 . . .[t]he Court’s ‘settled rule [is] that ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”)(internal

citations omitted). However, the Court has already determined that the evidence presented does not

support a finding of excessive force. Because the defendants’ conduct did not violate plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights, the Court hereby recommends a finding that both defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force claim. 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff contends he should be granted summary judgment because the defendants’ failed to

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object to the Magistrate Judge’s Report recommending the denial of defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

Plaintiff cites ninth circuit law supporting the proposition that in the absence of objections, “the

district judge may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations.” 

(Doc. 37-1 at 5.) Because the Magistrate Judge determined plaintiff had pled sufficient facts to

support an excessive force claim, and defendants did not object, plaintiff contends defendants cannot

dispute the veracity of those facts here. Id. As a result, plaintiff argues there are no material facts in

dispute.

Plaintiff also provides a list of injuries he allegedly suffered as a result of defendants’ conduct

and exhibits containing health records and medical articles. The only factual allegation included in

plaintiff’s motion is that he experiences “Different Patterns of Leg weakness an numbness in

connection with Defendants jumping donw on Plaintiff and putting knee into the Lower part of

Plaintiff’s Back with hold Body pressure weighing nearness to 300 pounds a Big Man (sic).” Id. at 3.

Additionally, plaintiff attached a statement of undisputed facts to his summary judgment

motion. The two undisputed facts listed by plaintiff state he was incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional facility during the relevant period and defendants Alvarado, Harris and

Roberts were employed as corrections officers at that institution during the same period. (Doc. 37-2.)

In their opposition, defendants contend plaintiff has failed to produce admissible evidence

demonstrating he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 39 at 3.) Defendants further

contend plaintiff did not set forth his version of the facts in his motion and consequently fails to state

how defendants violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 4.

As mentioned previously, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating there is

no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323; F.R.C.P. 56 ( c). In order to meet that burden, plaintiff must either produce evidence to

demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact or show that the non- moving party does not

have enough evidence to support its case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

To prevail on an excessive force claim, plaintiff must show defendants used force against him

in a malicious and sadistic manner for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 7 (1992). Thus, to receive summary judgment on this claim, plaintiff must show that defendants’

subjective mindset, i.e. their malicious and sadistic intent, is not in dispute. 

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 Plaintiff primarily relies on Judge Miller’s order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report to

demonstrate there are no material facts in dispute. This Court has already discussed Judge Miller’s

previous ruling that his order does not constitute evidence that can be used in support of a summary

judgment motion. (Doc. 32 at 2.) Moreover, plaintiff’s listing of his various injuries, as well as the

attached exhibits describing and documenting the injuries, are insufficient to support a finding that

defendants acted in a malicious and sadistic manner. See generally Coverdell v. Department of

Social and Health Services, 834 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1987) (opposition repeating “unsworn factual

allegations” contained in unverified complaint does not constitute evidence that can be used to

counter summary judgment motion). Plaintiff does not state the circumstances surrounding his

injuries or when his injuries occurred. Although plaintiff asserts that defendants caused some of

those injuries, plaintiff fails to state how defendants’ conduct evinces maliciousness rather than a

good faith attempt to restore discipline after his persistent disobedience. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at

320-21.(“Force does not amount to a constitutional violation in this respect if it is applied in a good

faith effort to restore discipline and order and not “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose

of causing harm.”). In sum, plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence to support a finding of

excessive force. Accordingly, the Court recommends that plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

be DENIED.

. 

 VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment

be entered GRANTING Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and DENYING Plaintiff’s

Motion for Summary Judgment.

This report and recommendation by the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, the Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that, on or before June 1, 2010, any party to this action may file written

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties on or before June 11, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 26, 2010

LOUISA S PORTER

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: The Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller

All parties

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