Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00026/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00026-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS B. CASTANEDA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

D. FOSTON, et al.,

 Defendants.

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1:12-cv-00026-AWI-BAM (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

(ECF No. 28)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Jesus B. Castaneda (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis 

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 29, 2012, the Court appointed 

counsel for Plaintiff for the limited purpose of drafting and filing an amended complaint. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on November 4, 2012, is currently before the Court for 

screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); 

Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 

of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

This action is brought against eleven named defendants and 80 Doe defendants for 

incidents at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) in violation of the First, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleges as follows: 

On February 7, 2010, Plaintiff was placed in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“AdSeg”) at PVSP. The following day, Defendants Quezada and Lopez photographed, inventoried 

and boxed all of Plaintiff’s personal property, including Plaintiff’s prescribed medical appliance 

– PARASTEP, which is a microcomputer controlled functional neuromuscular stimulation 

system that enables independent, un-braced ambulation by people with a spinal cord injury. 

While in Ad-Seg, Plaintiff spoke with Defendants Reeves and John Doe and requested 

return of the PARASTEP. Plaintiff advised them that it was imperative the PARASTEP be 

provided because of the danger of aggravating his condition and developing complications, such 

as the loss of muscle tone and the development of pressure sores. Defendants Reeves and Doe 

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refused to provide Plaintiff with the PARASTEP. Plaintiff suffered pressure sores and 

subsequently was treated for them at PVSP.

On March 16, 2010, Plaintiff again explained his reasons for the PARASTEP and asked 

unidentified treating personnel to provide him with the PARASTEP. PVSP staff failed to 

provide the apparatus and Plaintiff’s condition worsened. 

On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to the California Medical Facility, where 

treatment for his pressure sores continued.

On August 30, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison.

On June 17, 2011, Plaintiff was returned to Pleasant Valley State Prison.

On June 22, 2011, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to recover the PARASTEP. Plaintiff’s 

appeal was improperly screened, delayed, screened out and untimely rejected by Defendants 

Foreman and A. Nesbit.

On September 14, 2011, Plaintiff informed Defendant Trimble that custody personnel 

were interfering with his prescribed medical care by failing to provide Plaintiff with the 

PARASTEP. Plaintiff described the need for the device and the damage that prolonged 

deprivation could cause. Defendant Trimble refused to act or address Plaintiff’s issues in any 

meaningful way.

On several occasions between June 7, 2011 and October 5, 2011, Plaintiff informed 

Lieutenant Nelson, a non-party, that custody personnel were denying Plaintiff’s access to 

prescribed medical care. Lieutenant Nelson refused to address Plaintiff’s issues in any 

meaningful way.

On July 31, 2011, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Rowe in the D-4 Satellite clinic. Dr. Rowe 

was presented with documentation regarding the PARASTEP. Dr. Rowe spoke with Defendant 

Martinez about the reason that the PARASTEP was being denied. Defendant Martinez 

responded that the reason for the denial was Plaintiff’s filing of multiple appeals against the staff 

and that the PARASTEP would continue to be denied until all the appeals were resolved or 

dismissed.

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Defendant Duenas failed to review Plaintiff’s medical file and the denial of the 

PARASTEP until November 1, 2011. By not reviewing the file, Defendant Duenas exhibited 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant Duenas admitted that the physiological 

damage sustained by Plaintiff was such that standing and walking was no longer possible. 

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the deprivation of the PARASTEP he has suffered 

circulation problems, spasms in the extremities, muscle atrophy, osteoporosis, contractures and 

fractures. He has not been able to stand and will never regain that ability. He is a quadriplegic 

and had been able to move with the assistance of the PARASTEP and a wheelchair. Once the 

PARASTEP was removed, the muscles and bones degenerated to a level where walking and 

standing was not possible. He also has suffered emotional and psychological injuries. 

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 

III. Discussion

A. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendants Yates, Foston, Hammond and Supervisory 

Custodial Does 41-60 liable based upon their supervisory positions. Liability may not be 

imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the 

theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Supervisors may be held liable 

only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Preschooler II v. Clark County School Board of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff has not alleged that these defendants participated in or directed the violations or 

knew of the violations involving Plaintiff and failed to prevent them. Accordingly, the Court 

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recommends that Defendants Yates, Foston, Hammond and Supervisory Custodial Does 41-60

be dismissed from this action.

B. Review of Grievances

Plaintiff complains that Defendants Foreman and Nesbit improperly screened, delayed 

and rejected his appeals requesting the PARASTEP. Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally 

protected right to have his appeals accepted or processed. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). The prison grievance 

procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals 

cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 

(8th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against Defendants 

Foreman and Nesbit arising out of their screening of Plaintiff’s administrative appeals. 

C. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff has identified several doe defendants, including Defendant John Doe. 

Unidentified, or “John Doe,” defendants must be named or otherwise identified before service 

can go forward. “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” 

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe or 

Jane Doe defendants cannot be served by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified 

them as actual individuals and amended his complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane 

Doe. 

D. Linkage Requirement

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). To state a claim, Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21. 

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Plaintiff has identified Custody Defendant Does 1-20, Medical Defendant Does 21-40

and Defendants Foston and Hammond. However, Plaintiff fails to link these defendants to any 

alleged violation of his rights. 

E. Eighth Amendment – Deliberate Indifference

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 

inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291

(1976)). The two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious 

medical need’ by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s 

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is shown where the official is aware of a serious medical need and 

fails to adequately respond. Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1018. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal 

standard.” Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1019; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The prison official must be aware of facts from which he could make an inference that “a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he must make the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994). 

Defendants Quezada and Lopez

Plaintiff fails to set forth factual allegations to show that Defendants Quezada or Lopez 

were aware that Plaintiff had a serious medical need and that he was at a substantial risk of 

serious injury when they inventoried and boxed up his PARASTEP. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. The 

Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for 

deliberate indifference against them. 

Defendants Reeves, John Doe, Warden Trimble and Martinez

Based upon the amended complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable 

Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference against Defendants Reeves, John Doe and 

Warden Trimble. Plaintiff also has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate 

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indifference against Defendant Martinez arising out of removal of the PARASTEP from Plaintiff 

and the failure to return it. 

Defendant Duenas

Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against Defendant Duenas for failure to review 

Plaintiff’s medical file and authorize the return of the PARASTEP. Plaintiff fails to set forth 

factual allegations that Defendant Duenas was aware that Plaintiff had a serious medical need for 

the device and that he was at a substantial risk of serious injury. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment 

claim against Defendant Duenas.

Lt. Nelson

Plaintiff includes allegations in his Eighth Amendment claim involving an individual 

identified as Lt. Nelson. However, Plaintiff has not identified Lt. Nelson as a defendant in this 

action. 

F. Fourteenth Amendment

1. Denial of Due Process – Deprivation of Property

While an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable under the Due 

Process Clause, neither a negligent nor intentional unauthorized deprivation of property by a 

prison official is actionable if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available for the loss. 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 

1984). To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that his property confiscated as a retaliatory act to 

punish Plaintiff, this would be an unauthorized deprivation and Due Process is satisfied if there is 

a meaningful post-deprivation remedy available to Plaintiff. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. Plaintiff 

has an adequate post-deprivation remedy available under California law. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). Therefore, Plaintiff has 

failed to state a cognizable claim.

Plaintiff alleges that he was denied his PARASTEP without a post deprivation hearing 

after he was placed in administrative segregation. As the confiscation of Plaintiff’s personal 

property allegedly was the direct result of his being placed in administrative segregation, 

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Plaintiff fails to state a claim based upon the deprivation of his property. See Barnett, 31 F.3d at 

816; Owens v. Ayers, 2002 WL 73226, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2002) (inmate does not have right 

to due process before he could be temporarily deprived of property he was not permitted to 

possess in administrative segregation).

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Duenas violated Due Process because he failed to 

review the denial of Plaintiff’s medical appliance in violation of the Armstrong remedial plan. 

To the extent Plaintiff wishes to seek relief pursuant to the Armstrong remedial plan, he “must 

pursue his requests via the consent decree or through class counsel.” Crayton v. Terhune, 2002 

WL 31093590, *4 (N.D.Cal. Sept.17, 2002). “[R]emedial orders ... do not create ‘rights, 

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws' of the United States.” Hart v. 

Cambra, 1997 WL 564059, *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug.22, 1997) (quoting Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 

1116, 1123-24 (5th Cir.1986). Plaintiff may not state a section 1983 claim against Defendant 

Duenas based on the failure to comply with the Armstrong remedial plan.

2. Retaliation

Although Plaintiff has identified his claim for retaliation as one arising under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff has stated a claim for retaliation in violation of the First 

Amendment. Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation consists 

of five elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); accord 

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 

(9th Cir. 2009).

A plaintiff suing for retaliation under section 1983 must allege that “he was retaliated 

against for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance 

legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.” Barnett, 31 

F.3d at 816. The plaintiff does not need to show actual inhibited or suppressed speech, but that 

there was a chilling effect upon his speech. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 569. The burden is on the 

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plaintiff to plead and prove the absence of any legitimate correctional goals for the alleged 

conduct. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to his PARASTEP by Defendants Quezada, 

Lopez and Martinez in retaliation for filing grievances against staff and for being charged with a 

staff assault. Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for retaliation in violation of the First 

Amendment against Defendants Quezada, Lopez and Martinez. 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim 

for deliberate indifference against Defendants Reeves, John Doe, Trimble and Martinez, and a 

cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Quezada, Lopez and Martinez. 

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants Yates, 

Foston, Hammond, Foreman, Nesbit, Duenas, Custody Defendant Does 1-20, Medical Defendant 

Does 21-40, and Supervisory Custody Does 41-60, and that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable 

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. 

As Plaintiff was provided with the relevant legal standards and was given an opportunity 

to file an amended complaint through limited-purpose legal counsel, the Court does not 

recommend granting further leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on November 4, 

2012, against Defendants Reeves, John Doe, Trimble and Martinez for deliberate 

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and against Defendants Quezada, 

Lopez and Martinez for retaliation in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

2. Defendants Yates, Foston, Hammond, Foreman, Nesbit, Duenas, Custody Defendant 

Does 1-20, Medical Defendant Does 21-40, and Supervisory Custody Does 41-60 be 

DISMISSED from this action based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a cognizable claim 

against them; and

3. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim be DISMISSED. 

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

thirty (30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the plaintiff may 

file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2013 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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