Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01549/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01549-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1121 Trademark Infringement (jurisdiction)

---

1 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PROFIL INSTITUT FUR 

STOFFWECHSELFORSCHUNG GMBH, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

PROSCIENTO, INC., 

Defendant.

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS 

 Case No.: 16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

ORDER RE: PROPOSED PROTECTIVE 

ORDER 

[ECF No. 64] 

On June 12, 2017, the parties advised the Court that they had a dispute concerning the 

Protective Order that they were negotiating. The Court instructed the parties to lodge their 

letter briefs before the Telephonic Case Management Conference (“TCMC”) scheduled for June 

14, 2017. See ECF No. 65. The parties lodged the briefs as instructed by the Court but, due to 

the large number of disputes, the Court was not able to resolve the issues during the TCMC so 

the Court took the matter under submission. The Court has reviewed and considered Plaintiff’s 

letter brief concerning the Proposed Protective Order [Exh. A attached to this order (“Pl.’s 

Mot.”)], Defendant’s “Memorandum in Support of ProSciento’s Proposed Protective Order” [ECF 

No. 64 (“Def.’s Mot.”)], the Proposed Protective Order (“Proposed P.O.”) with the parties’ 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 14
2 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

proposed edits [Def.’s. Mot., Exh. B], Plaintiff’s “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

Opposition to ProSciento’s Proposed Protective Order” [ECF No. 70 (“Pl.’s Oppo.”)], and 

Defendant’s “Reply in Support of ProSciento’s Proposed Protective Order” [ECF No. 72 (“Def.’s 

Reply”)]. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure v. Foreign Data Privacy Laws [Paragraphs 1(g); 

21(f); 21(g)] 

The parties disagree on the applicability of foreign data privacy laws. Defendant seeks 

to include a clause in Paragraph 1(g) stating that foreign data privacy laws “shall not be asserted 

as[] grounds to deny or refuse to search for or produce any relevant discovery in these Actions, 

as the parties’ discovery obligations shall be governed by the United States Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” See Proposed P.O. at 43. Defendant also wants to add Paragraph 21(f), requiring 

that all disputes regarding the order “be governed by California law, without regard to California 

choice-of-law provisions,” and 21(g), requiring that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern 

the Actions.” See id. at 62-63. 

Plaintiff opposes the language proposed by Defendant. Pl.’s Mot. at 3-5. Plaintiff argues 

that as a German company it is required to comply with European Union (“EU”) and German 

data privacy laws. Id. at 1; Pl.’s Oppo. at 20. Plaintiff alleges that European data privacy laws 

impose strict guidelines for the collection and transfer of personal data outside the EU and 

broadly define “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 

person.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3 (citing Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 

of 24 October 1995 (“Directive”)); Pl.’s Oppo. at 20. Plaintiff further contends that 

noncompliance with these laws can result in serious liability, which may include criminal 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 14
3 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

penalties. Pl.’s Mot. At 3; Pl.’s Oppo. at 20. Plaintiff explains that there are three relevant 

exceptions for the legal transfer of personal data from Germany to the United States: (1) with 

consent of the data subject, (2) where all persons receiving transferred data agree to be bound 

by the Standard Contractual Clauses, and (3) where the data transfer is necessary for the 

establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims. Pl.’s Oppo. at 21; ECF NO. 70-1, Declaration 

of Mr. Andreas Endemann In Support of Profil’s Opposition to ProSciento’s Proposed Protective 

Order (“Endemann Decl.”) at 4. 

With respect to consent, Plaintiff states that it expects to obtain consent from all its key 

personnel, but is unsure it will be able to obtain consent “from all parties, including third-parties, 

located in the EU that may be implicated by [Defendant’s] discovery requests.” Pl.’s Oppo. at 

21. Plaintiff also warns that some of its employees may withdraw or refuse to give consent. Id. 

As to the third exception, Plaintiff asserts that personal data can be transferred if necessary for 

the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims and personal data is only “necessary” if 

it is the least severe means of achieving the purpose. Id. at 22; Edemann Decl. at 6. Plaintiff 

also explains that, pursuant to the second exception, it believes it is compelled by its obligations 

under EU law to ask the Court to require all recipients of personal data to be bound by the 

Standard Contractual Clauses. Pl.’s Oppo. at 22-23; Edemann Decl. at 5. 

Plaintiff also argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26 vests federal courts 

with discretion to limit discovery on the ground of international comity. Pl.’s Mot. at 4; Pl.’s 

Oppo. at 18. Plaintiff states that a court conducting a comity analysis is required to balance 

several factors related to the specific request and information at issue, including, inter alia, the 

importance of the documents to the litigation, the degree of specificity of the request, whether 

the information originated in the United States, the availability of alternative means of securing 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 14
4 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

the information, and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine 

important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine 

important interests of the state where the information is located. Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5; Pl.’s Oppo. 

at 19. Plaintiff argues that in this case and at this stage of litigation, such analysis is premature 

because “there is no actual request at issue.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5; see Pl.’s Oppo. at 19-20. 

Defendant argues that the Federal Rules should govern this action. Def.’s Mot. at 3-10; 

Def.’s Reply at 3-5. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff waived foreign procedures by suing in the 

U.S. under the U.S. law. Def.’s Mot. at 4-6; Def.’s Reply at 3. Defendant further contends that 

even if foreign law applied, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that foreign law bars production of 

relevant discovery in this case. Def.’s Mot. at 6-10; Def.’s Reply at 3-5. Defendant argues in 

support that (1) even under foreign law, exceptions allow Plaintiff to transfer purportedly 

protected “personal data,” (2) courts consistently have held that the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure do not conflict with EU and German data protection laws and have compelled German 

parties to produce discovery pursuant to the FRCP because compliance with U.S. discovery 

obligations does not create a genuine risk of liability under EU or German law, and (3) comity 

favors the application of the FRCP in light of the U.S.’ overriding interest in ensuring fair play for 

U.S. companies sued in the U.S. Def.’s Mot. at 6-10; Def.’s Reply at 3-5. Defendant emphasizes 

that it is not seeking the discovery of “personal data” that Plaintiff alleges is protected, and 

claims that it is entitled to discovery that “incidentally contains personal data, including relevant 

emails and text messages, which by virtue of their ‘to’ and ‘from’ fields, could theoretically fall 

under the aegis of foreign data protection laws.” Def.’s Mot. at 4 (emphasis in original) (citing 

Directive, Art. 2(a) (protecting “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 

person”). 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 14
5 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Because the issue currently before the Court is the appropriate language for a protective 

order governing the disclosure of confidential information and not a dispute regarding specific 

discovery, the Court declines to adopt the broad language requested by Defendant. In 

paragraph 1(g), the Court will include the following language: “Such rules shall not be asserted 

as grounds to refuse to search for any relevant discovery in these Actions.” While the Court 

declines to include in the protective order the additional language requested by Defendant, the 

Court notes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern discovery and case management in 

this action. If any party disagrees with respect to any specific piece or type of discovery, the 

party must file an appropriate motion seeking a modification or exemption. Moreover, if Plaintiff 

believes that it cannot produce relevant documents or information due to a privilege or other 

requirement, Plaintiff must notify Defendant in writing of the documents or information being 

withheld and the basis for the withholding. See Paragraphs 9(b) & 17. If Defendant disagrees, 

the parties must meet and confer in good faith in an effort to resolve the matter and if they are 

unable to do so, counsel must comply with the Court’s Chamber Rules regarding discovery 

disputes. 

B. Information that May be Designated as “Highly Confidential–Outside Counsel’s 

Eyes Only” (“OCEO”) [Paragraphs 9(a) & (b)] 

(1) Trade Secrets 

Plaintiff proposes to include the following language in Paragraph 9(a): “A Producing Party 

may designate Discovery Material as ‘HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL–OUTSIDE COUNSEL’S EYES 

ONLY’ if the Producing Party believes in good faith that it contains or reflects trade secret(s), as 

defined in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and California Civil Code 3426-3426.11, or that it 

contains or reflects information that is extremely confidential and/or sensitive in nature such 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 14
6 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

that the disclosure of such Discovery Material is likely to cause economic harm or significant 

competitive disadvantage to the Producing Party.” Proposed P.O. at 51-52; Pl.’s Oppo. at 9-11. 

Alternatively, Plaintiff requests the Court adopt language allowing the designation “. . . only if, 

in the good faith belief of such party and its counsel, the information is among that considered 

to be most sensitive by the party, including but not limited to trade secret or other confidential 

research, development, financial or other commercial information.” Pl.’s Oppo. at 10. Defendant 

proposes to define “Highly Confidential–OCEO” information as limited to “trade secret(s), as 

defined in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and California Civil Code 3426-3426.11” that have not 

been alleged to have been misappropriated by the other Party. Proposed P.O. at 51-52; Def.’s 

Mot. at 10-13. Defendant also proposes adding the following language: “To resolve any doubt: 

information that a party alleges was misappropriated will, if designated at all, be designated as 

‘Confidential,’ or ‘Highly Confidential,’ but may not be designated ‘Highly Confidential—Outside 

Counsel’s Eyes Only.” Id. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s proposed language is too narrow and would expose 

Plaintiff to competitive harm if it were forced to disclose extremely sensitive information to 

Defendant. Pl.’s Mot. at 5; Pl.’s Oppo. at 10. Plaintiff further asserts that its proposed language 

tracks the Court’s Model Protective Order for patent cases (“Model P.O.”), Paragraph 2.8, which 

states: “‘HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL–ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY’ information or Items: extremely 

sensitive ‘Confidential Information or Items,’ disclosure of which to another Party or Non-Party 

would create a substantial risk of serious harm that could not be avoided by less restrictive 

means.’” Pl.’s Mot. at 5; Pl.’s Oppo. at 10. Plaintiff contends that the parties are direct 

competitors, and that courts have recognized the danger of sharing trade secret information 

with employees of a direct competitor. Pl.’s Mot. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s proposed 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 14
7 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

language would allow Defendant’s employees, including competitive decision makers, to access 

Plaintiff’s “extremely valuable” trade secrets and deprive Plaintiff of its competitive advantage. 

Pl.’s Mot. at 6; see Pl.’s Oppo. at 12. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant may no longer 

have some of the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets in its possession, and may misuse 

trade secrets not already in its possession to compete against Plaintiff. Pl.’s Mot. at 6; Pl.’s 

Oppo. at 12. Plaintiff claims that its proposed language would only restrict Defendant’s access 

to documents produced under the appropriate designation, and that to the extent Defendant 

already has the alleged trade secrets in its possession, its employees would be able to review 

that information in assisting with the defense. Pl.’s Mot. at 6; Pl.’s Oppo. at 12-13. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s alleged trade secret information should not be 

designated as OCEO because it would prevent Defendant from accessing the case’s most 

essential information, the data that Defendant allegedly already has seen and used for years. 

Def.’s Mot. at 10-13; Def.’s Reply at 4-8. Defendant notes that Plaintiff alleges in this case that 

it “authorized” Defendant to use trade secret information during the period of 2009-2012, when 

the parties’ Cooperation Agreement was in effect, and that Defendant misappropriated the 

information after the parties started to compete against each other. Def.’s Mot. at 10-11. 

Defendant claims that it only wants to “carve out” the information that Plaintiff alleges forms 

the basis of its misappropriation claim, so that Defendant may know the claims asserted against 

it and meaningfully defend against such claims. Id. at 10, 12. Finally, Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden of proof to establish the need for this level of protection and 

that its due process rights would be violated by Plaintiff’s proposal. Def.’s Reply at 6-8. 

 The Court agrees with Defendant that information or data that Plaintiff claims Defendant 

misappropriated should not be designated OCEO. On the other hand, the Court agrees with 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 14
8 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Plaintiff that there may be extremely sensitive or confidential documents that need OCEO in this 

litigation between direct competitors. The Court therefore modifies paragraph 9(a) to 

incorporate both concerns. 

(2) “Protected Personal Data” 

The parties dispute whether the protective order should allow designation of 

protected personal information as OCEO. Plaintiff proposes the following language: 

Because Protected Personal Data constitutes highly sensitive materials requiring 

special protection, to the extent production of such Protected Personal Data 

becomes necessary to the prosecution or defense of the case, a Producing Party 

may designate such Protected Personal Data as “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL–

OUTSIDE COUNSEL’S EYES ONLY.” To facilitate the production of such Protected 

Personal Data, and ensure each Party’s compliance with European data privacy 

laws, prior to the production of Protected Personal Data, each Party will agree to 

be bound by, and execute a copy of, the European Commission’s “Standard 

contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data from the Community to third 

countries (controller to controller transfers)” attached hereto as Exhibit B. 

See Proposed P.O. at 52. Plaintiff claims that the European Commission has created guidelines 

for the permissible transfer of protected personal data, and that the parties’ protective order 

should thus require the parties to designate protected personal information as OCEO. Pl.’s Mot. 

at 7; Pl.’s Oppo. at 20-23; Endemann Decl. at 4-6. 

Defendant proposes to strike the above language and argues that the parties should not 

be allowed to designate protected personal information as OCEO. See Def.’s Mot. at 8; Proposed 

P.O. at 52; Def.’s Reply at 3-4. In support, Defendant contends that foreign law does not require 

the designation of all “protected data” as OCEO and that Plaintiff has not established the need 

for this designation as to all Protected Personal Data. Def.’s Mot. at 8; Def.’s Reply at 3-4. 

Defendant claims that Plaintiff could “hamstring [Defendant’s] defense by designating large 

swaths of discovery” as OCEO, thereby denying Defendant’s counsel “valuable insights from 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 14
9 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

[Defendant’s] personnel, who would not be permitted to view such documents, or to participate 

fully in their own defense.” Def.’s Mot. at 8. 

The Court agrees with Defendant, declines to adopt Plaintiff’s language, declines to 

require the parties to sign the European Commission’s “Standard contractual clauses for the 

transfer of personal data from the Community to third countries (controller to controller 

transfers)” as part of this United States litigation, and holds that Protected Personal Data should 

not be designated as OCEO. While Plaintiff’s opposition and Mr. Endemann’s declaration explain 

the limitations and requirements associated with the production of Protected Personal Data in 

the EU, they do not establish that all such data cannot be produced in this litigation absent an 

OCEO designation or that such a designation eliminates all production concerns. See Pl.’s Oppo. 

at 20-23; Entemann Decl. at 4-6. If Plaintiff subsequently determines that a particular piece of 

Protected Personal Data needs greater protection, Plaintiff must comply with paragraphs 9(b) 

and 17 of the Protective Order and the Court’s Chamber Rules and then file a motion seeking 

the additional protection. 

C. Identification of Employees and In-House Counsel with Access to Confidential 

Information [Paragraphs 10, 7(b), 8(b), and 9(d)] 

The parties dispute whether a Receiving Party should provide notice of the employee(s) 

to whom it will disclose the Protected Materials pursuant to the notice and right-to-object 

requirements in Paragraph 10. Plaintiff proposes that the notice and pre-authorization 

requirements apply to any disclosure of Protected Materials to a party’s employee(s). See Pl.’s 

Mot. at 8; Proposed P.O; Pl.’s Oppo. at 14. In support, Plaintiff contends that the parties have 

agreed to provide notice under Paragraph 10 before Protected Materials are disclosed to outside

consultants and experts, and that there is no reason to treat employees of a Receiving Party 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 14
10 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

differently from outside experts. Pl.’s Mot. at 8; Pl.’s Oppo. at 14. Plaintiff further asserts that 

because the parties are direct competitors, the danger that Protected Materials could be misused 

for competitive advantage is much greater with respect to employees of a direct competitor. 

Pl.’s Mot. at 8; Pl.’s Oppo. at 14. Plaintiff also maintains that the Court’s Model Protective Order 

contemplates that the parties will identify in-house counsel before they receive protected 

information by including a blank space for the identification of such individuals and does not 

contemplate that party employees would ever have access to OCEO information. Pl.’s Mot. at 8 

(citing Model P.O., Paragraph 3); Pl.’s Oppo. at 15. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests that if 

the court finds the employees of a Receiving Party “should under no circumstances be 

granted access to a Producing Party’s OCEO information . . . , then [Plaintiff] would consent to 

removing the notice requirements with respect to a Receiving Party’s employees as set forth in 

paragraph 7.b.ii-iii. and 8.b.ii.” Pl.’s Oppo. at 15 (emphasis in original). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s proposed notice and consent provision is unjustified and 

prejudicial. Def.’s Mot. at 14-16. Defendant acknowledges that it agreed to the provision 

requiring the parties to give notice and await consent before revealing protected materials to 

outsiders. Id. at 14. Defendant claims, however, that applying the same procedure to insiders, 

including the parties’ officers, employees, and designated party representatives, would allow 

Plaintiff to “control everyone that views its produced materials,” and unjustifiably interfere with 

Defendant’s litigation management and strategy. Id. Defendant also claims that the parties 

already have agreed to other less intrusive mechanisms for protecting confidential information, 

such as requiring a person to whom Protected Material is disclosed to agree in writing to be 

bound by the Protective Order and allowing disclosure of Protected Material to officers and 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 14
11 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

employees only to the extent reasonably “necessary” for the prosecution of the case. Id. at 15-

16 (citing Proposed P.O., Paragraphs 7(iii) & 8(ii)). 

 The Court finds that the notice and right to object requirements in paragraph 10 do not 

apply to current employees, however, current employees are required to sign the Exhibit A in 

which they agree to comply with the terms of the Protective Order. In accordance with this 

ruling, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to include the notice language in paragraphs 7(b)(ii)-

(iv) and 8(b)(ii). 

D. Designation of Party’s Employees as Experts or Consultants [Paragraphs 

7(b)(iv), 8(b)(iii), 9(c)(ii), 20(e)] 

The parties dispute whether they may designate their own employees as experts and 

consultants, and provide them with access to Protected Material under the protective 

order. Plaintiff proposes to add Paragraph 20(e) stating that “No designated expert or consultant 

given access to Protected Material under any provision(s) of this Order may be an employee of 

a Party.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8-9; Pl.’s Oppo. at 16. Plaintiff argues that permitting such disclosure 

to its direct competitor’s employees would create a substantial risk of competitive harm. Pl.’s 

Mot. at 9; Pl.’s Oppo. at 16. Plaintiff cites Paragraph 8(b)(ii) of the Proposed P.O., which would 

limit the number of corporate representatives given access to the other party’s Highly 

Confidential information to three or four, and argues that the requirement would be meaningless 

if a party could designate its employees as experts under Paragraph 8(b)(iii). Pl.’s Mot. at 9; 

Pl.’s Oppo. at 16. Plaintiff further asserts that the OCEO designation would be rendered 

meaningless if the parties could designate their own employees as experts. Pl.’s Mot. at 9; Pl.’s 

Oppo. at 16. Plaintiff contends that this will not impair Defendant’s defense because Defendant’s 

employees may testify as party employees, Defendant can find a suitable non-employee expert, 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 14
12 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

and Defendant may move to compel disclosure of specific confidential information if the need 

arises. Pl.’s Oppo. at 17. 

Defendant contends that select party employees should be permitted to offer expert 

opinions and that FRCP allow the use of in-house experts. Def.’s Mot. at 13-14 (citing FRCP 

26(a)(2)(B)); Def.’s Reply at 8-9. Defendant argues that this case involves a “small, highly 

specialized market” where the parties are key players, and that its in-house expertise is crucial 

to its defense. Def.’s Mot. at 13; Def.’s Reply at 8-9. Defendant alleges that its employees are 

experts on trade secrets, already have access to the alleged trade secrets, and possess highly 

specialized knowledge relevant to the instant litigation. Def.’s Mot. at 13. Defendant further 

contends that it is unlikely that it will be able to find an expert witness with equivalent 

knowledge, and even if it does, it will be forced to incur significant costs associated with retaining 

outside experts. Id. at 14. 

The Court finds Plaintiff has not provided justification to modify the FRCP and prevent 

employees from being designated as expert witnesses and the Court therefore declines to adopt 

the language proposed by Plaintiff. 

E. Additional Requested Modifications

 Defendant identified additional requested modifications in its red-lined protective order. 

The Court grants the modifications set forth in paragraphs 1(d), 8(a), 8(b)(ii), 10(a), 14, 15, 

15(c), 18, and 20(c) and denies the modifications set forth in paragraph 10(b). The Court denies 

the requested modifications set forth in paragraphs 20(a) and 21(f)-(h) on the grounds that the 

parties did not agree on the modifications and the requested modifications are premature and 

more appropriately resolved in the context of an actual discovery dispute, if one develops. 

/// 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 14
13 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters the Protective Order attached as Exhibit B to 

this Order. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 7/3/2017 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 14
14 

16cv1549-LAB (BLM) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

EXHIBIT A 

Case 3:16-cv-01549-LAB-BLM Document 73 Filed 07/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 14