Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05061/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 508
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

 

2015-5057, 2015-5061

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-cv-00084-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: August 26, 2016

______________________ 

STEPHEN B. JUDLOWE, McElroy Deutsch Mulvaney & 

Carpenter, LLP, New York, NY, argued for plaintiff-crossappellant. Also represented by RIADH QUADIR; JOSEPH P.

LA SALA, MICHAEL RATO, Morristown, NJ; DANIEL F.

CORRIGAN, LAWRENCE E. BATHGATE II, Bathgate, Wegener 

& Wolf P.C., Lakewood, NJ.

WALTER WAYNE BROWN, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. 

Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JOHN J. FARGO,

CONRAD JOSEPH DEWITTE, JR. 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/26/2016
2 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge STOLL. 

Opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

The United States appeals the decision of the Court of 

Federal Claims that ammunition rounds used by the 

United States Army embody the claims of Liberty Ammunition, Inc.’s U.S. Patent No. 7,748,325 without authorization, violating 28 U.S.C. § 1498. The Government argues 

that the trial court erred in construing several claim 

terms and that, when these terms are construed correctly, 

the Army rounds do not embody the claimed invention. 

We agree with the Government that the trial court erred 

in two of its claim constructions because those constructions are unsupported by the intrinsic record. Because 

Liberty cannot prevail under the proper claim constructions, we reverse the decision of the trial court and hold 

that the Government does not practice the asserted 

claims of Liberty’s patent in violation of § 1498. 

Liberty cross-appeals the trial court’s disposal of its

breach of contract claim based on a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) signed by the named inventor of the ’325 

patent and an Army official. The trial court denied this 

claim, holding that no enforceable contract ever formed 

between the parties. We affirm because we find no clear 

error in the trial court’s factual determination that the 

Army official did not have authority to enter into an NDA

on behalf of the Government. 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 3

BACKGROUND

I. The ’325 Patent

Liberty is the assignee of the ’325 patent, issued July 6, 2010, and “directed to a projectile structured to be 

discharged from a firearm and designed to overcome the 

disadvantages and problems associated with conventional 

firearm projectiles such as, but not limited to lead or steel 

jacketed projectiles.” ’325 patent col. 2 ll. 34–38.

The ’325 patent grew out of the U.S. military’s “Green 

Ammunition Program,” or “Green Bullet” initiative, of the

1990s through 2000s. ’325 patent col. 1 ll. 15–30. This 

initiative developed in response to concerns that leadbased ammunition was polluting military training ranges 

throughout the United States. The program sought to 

eliminate lead from military ammunition, particularly the 

Army standard-issue 5.56 mm round,1 the M855. Around 

the same time as the Green Bullet initiative, the Army 

began receiving reports from soldiers that two of its 

standard-issue lead-based rounds—the M855 and the 

M80—were not exacting the desired lethality in softtissue targets, such as humans or animals. Reports 

indicated that these bullets would cause “through-andthrough” hits when striking at certain angles. Throughand-through hits are those in which a projectile completely passes through a soft-tissue target. When a projectile 

fails to lodge in a soft target’s tissue, incapacitation of the

target is compromised. The ’325 patent sought to address 

this problem with the conventional Army rounds in addi-

 

1 This opinion, consistent with the art, uses the 

term “projectile” to refer to what is commonly known as a 

bullet, without any casing. For a bullet provided with a 

ready-to-fire cartridge case, we reference the entire unit 

as a “round.” 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/26/2016
4 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

tion to providing a lead-free design. Id. col. 2 ll. 12–19, 

col. 3 ll. 1–7, col. 5 ll. 9–30.

Figure 1 of the ’325 patent, reproduced below, illustrates a preferred embodiment of the claimed projectile.

In this embodiment, an interface 18 “is disposed in interconnecting relation to both the nose portion 14 and the 

tail portion 16.” ’325 patent col. 4 ll. 63–64. The 

connection of nose 14 and tail 16 by the interface 18 can 

be fixed or removable, with either configuration allowing

for separation of all three components when the projectile 

strikes certain targets, such as soft-tissue targets. Id. col. 

5 ll. 9–30. This interface design “eliminates the use of 

lead and the provision of an outer jacket,” such as a

traditional full metal jacket, which completely surrounds 

a projectile. Id. col. 2 ll. 39–40. 

The ’325 patent specification describes that the invention’s design “significantly reduce[s] the area of contact of 

the projectile body with the rifling or interior surface of 

the barrel of the firearm,” id. col. 2 ll. 43–45, which means 

there is “a reduced contact area as compared to conventional projectiles,” id. col. 1 ll. 65–66. See also id. col. 2 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 4 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 5

ll. 4–6 (“[T]he design and structuring of a proposed projectile would result in a contact area thereon which would be 

significantly less than a traditional jacketed lead bullet.”). 

The reduction in contact area, the specification explains, 

“results in significantly reduced bore friction and heat 

buildup” and, thus, “barrel performance is improved 

during sustained fire of the firearm thereby increasing 

the barrel life and reducing the occurrence of fouling.” Id. 

col. 7 ll. 6–9.

At issue in this appeal are independent claims 1 and 

32, which recite:

1. A projectile structured to be discharged from 

a firearm, said projectile comprising:

a body including a nose portion and a tail portion,

said body further including an interface portion disposed in interconnecting relation to said 

nose and tail portions, said interface portion 

structured to provide controlled rupturing of said 

interface portion responsive to said projectile 

striking a predetermined target,

said interface portion disposed and dimensioned to define a reduced area of contact of said 

body with the rifling of the firearm, said interface 

portion maintaining the nose portion and tail portion in synchronized rotation while being fixedly 

secured to one another by said interface portion 

whereby upon said projectile striking said predetermined target said interface portion ruptures 

thereby separating said nose and tail portions of 

said projectile. 

32. A projectile structured to be discharged from 

a firearm, said projectile comprising:

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 5 Filed: 08/26/2016
6 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

a body including a nose portion and tail portion,

said body further including an interface portion disposed intermediate opposite ends of said 

body in interconnecting relation to said nose and 

tail portions, said interface portion structured to 

provide controlled rupturing of said interface portion responsive to said projectile striking a predetermined target, said interface portion 

maintaining said nose portion and tail portion in 

synchronized rotation while being fixedly secured 

to one another by said interface portion whereby 

upon said projectile striking said predetermined 

target said interface portion ruptures thereby 

separating said nose and tail portions of the projectile; and

said exterior surface of said interface portion 

disposed and structured to define a primary area 

of contact of said body with an interior barrel surface of said firearm.

Id. col. 7 l. 57 – col. 8 l. 5, col. 9 l. 55 – col. 10 l. 16 (disputed claim terms italicized).

II. Liberty Discussions with the Army

PJ Marx, named inventor of the ’325 patent, met with 

various Army personnel to demonstrate ammunition he

had developed related to the projectile claimed by the ’325 

patent. One such meeting occurred at Fort Benning on 

February 17, 2005, between Mr. Marx and Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Dean,2 serving as Chief of Small Arms 

for the U.S. Infantry Directorate of Combat Development

 

2 Lt. Col. Dean was a Major when he met with 

Mr. Marx in 2005, but had achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by the time of trial. 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 6 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 7

(“DCD”). DCD works with the Army infantry to determine its equipment needs and, in turn, works with private industry to develop and source desired equipment. 

Lt. Col. Dean, as Chief of Small Arms at DCD, developed 

requirements for arms acquisitions, including ammunition. As part of his role in developing suitable acquisition 

requirements, he met with industry representatives, like 

Mr. Marx, to see what they had available to sell and to 

keep apprised of new technology under development. 

Mr. Marx and Lt. Col. Dean signed an NDA before 

discussing Mr. Marx’s ammunition. After the agreement 

had been signed, Mr. Marx discussed his “EPIC” projectile 

prototype, which the parties agree is similar to the projectile claimed by the ’325 patent. Mr. Marx left fifty loaded 

EPIC rounds and one standalone EPIC projectile with 

Lt. Col. Dean at the conclusion of their meeting at 

Ft. Benning. Ultimately, the Army tested ten of those 

rounds in non-standard weapons with poor results. 

Mr. Marx, disappointed that the Army conducted tests 

using non-standard weaponry, requested that the Army 

return the remaining rounds, after which substantive

communication between him and DCD, including 

Lt. Col. Dean, ceased. 

III. The Present Suit

In February 2011, Liberty sued the Government. Liberty first claimed that the Army’s use of the M855A1 

5.56 mm (.223 caliber) and M80A1 7.62 mm (.308 caliber) 

rounds, which respectively succeeded the M855 and M80

rounds, practiced claims of the ’325 patent without a 

license from Liberty in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.3 

 

3 28 U.S.C. § 1498 waives the Government’s sovereign immunity and provides a remedy “[w]henever an 

invention described in and covered by a patent of the 

United States is used or manufactured by or for the 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 7 Filed: 08/26/2016
8 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

Liberty also claimed that the Army’s use of the M855A1 

and M80A1 rounds breached various contracts the Army 

entered into with Mr. Marx, including the NDA discussed 

above between Mr. Marx and Lt. Col. Dean. 

The trial court conducted a Markman hearing and issued a claim construction order construing fifteen disputed claim terms. Liberty Ammunition, LLC v. United 

States, 111 Fed. Cl. 365 (2013). Relevant here, the trial 

court construed the claim 1 term “reduced area of contact” 

to mean “the area of contact between the interface and 

the rifling of the firearm is less than that of a traditional 

jacketed lead bullet of calibers .17 through .50 BMG,” id.

at 375; and the claim 32 term “intermediate opposite 

ends” to mean that “the interface is positioned between or 

in the middle of the opposite ends of the forward end of 

the nose portion and the trailing end of the tail portion,” 

id. at 380. 

After holding a bench trial, the trial court issued an 

opinion finding that the Government practiced independent claims 1 and 32, claims 2–3, 7–11, 18–20, 22, 25, 28–

31, which depend from claim 1, and claims 38–41, which 

depend from claim 32. Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 368, 390, 392 (2014) (Trial Ct. Op.). 

The trial court also found all asserted claims valid over 

 

United States without license of the owner thereof or 

lawful right to use or manufacture the same.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1498(a); Astornet Techs. Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc., 802 F.3d 

1271, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Although this court has 

noted that a section 1498 action and a title 35 action are 

only parallel and not identical, the principles of claim 

construction and reading claims on accused devices and 

methods are the same for either type of action.” Lemelson 

v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

(citing Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 

(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 8 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 9

the prior art raised by the Government and it entered a 

damages award in Liberty’s favor. Id. at 392–98, 406. 

The trial court found against Liberty on its breach of 

contract claims, holding that the Government was not 

bound by the NDA signed by Lt. Col. Dean and Mr. Marx

because Lt. Col. Dean lacked the authority to bind the 

Government. Id. at 403–06.

The Government appeals several claim constructions 

the trial court entered, the trial court’s holding that the 

asserted patents are valid, and the trial court’s damages 

award; Liberty cross-appeals the trial court’s damages 

award and its holding that the NDA signed by 

Lt. Col. Dean and Mr. Marx is not enforceable. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I. Government Appeal

The Government challenges several of the trial court’s 

claim constructions, which we discuss in turn below. 

The “ultimate interpretation” of a claim term, as well 

as interpretations of “evidence intrinsic to the patent (the 

patent claims and specifications, along with the patent’s 

prosecution history),” are legal conclusions, which this 

court reviews de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). “Subsidiary factual 

determinations based on extrinsic evidence are reviewed 

for clear error.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. 

Corp., 783 F.3d 1262, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Teva, 

135 S. Ct. at 841).

Claim construction seeks to ascribe the “ordinary and

customary meaning” to claim terms as they would be 

understood to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the 

time of invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 

1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. 

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 

“[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 9 Filed: 08/26/2016
10 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

to the meaning of particular claim terms,” id. at 1314, and 

therefore “the context of the surrounding words of the 

claim also must be considered in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of those terms,” ACTV, Inc. 

v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

But “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to 

read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the 

context of the entire patent, including the specification.” 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Indeed, the specification is 

“the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term” 

and “[u]sually, it is dispositive.” Id. at 1315 (quoting 

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). Thus, claims “must be read in 

view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. 

(quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 

967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370

(1996)).

A. “Reduced Area of Contact”

Claim 1 recites an “interface portion disposed and dimensioned to define a reduced area of contact of said body 

with the rifling of the firearm.” ’325 patent col. 7 ll. 65–67 

(emphasis added). The trial court construed the claim 

term “reduced area of contact” to mean “the area of contact between the interface and the rifling of the firearm is 

less than that of a traditional jacketed lead bullet of 

calibers .17 through .50 BMG.” Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl.

at 390–91. The Government argues that the construction 

should explicitly include the M855 round as a baseline 

traditional jacketed lead bullet because the M855 is the 

only prior art projectile explicitly named in the specification. Specifically, the Government urges construing the 

term as: “the area of contact between the projectile and 

the rifling of the firearm is less than that of a traditional 

jacketed projectile, which includes the M855.” The trial 

court rejected this limitation as too restrictive, relying 

instead on the specification’s statement that the invention 

is enabled for “all calibers generally ranging from .17 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 10 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 11

through [.]50 BMG.” Id. at 391 (alteration in original) 

(quoting ’325 patent col. 2 ll. 27–28).

We begin our analysis by recognizing that the term 

“reduced area of contact” is one of degree, as it necessarily 

calls for a comparison against some baseline. Terms of 

degree are problematic if their baseline is unclear to those

of ordinary skill in the art. We especially take caution 

when presented with terms of degree following the Supreme Court’s decision in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014), which instructs that a 

claim must “inform those skilled in the art about the 

scope of the invention with reasonable certainty” to meet 

the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, id. at 

2129. While our post-Nautilus cases indicate that terms 

of degree are not “inherently indefinite” in light of the 

Supreme Court’s decision, we have recognized that claims 

having terms of degree will fail for indefiniteness unless 

they “provide objective boundaries for those of skill in the 

art” when read in light of the specification and the prosecution history. Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 

F.3d 1364, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 

S. Ct. 59 (2015). 

As the trial court correctly noted in this case, “[t]here 

are no clues within Claim 1 itself as to what the area of 

contact has been reduced from.” Trial Ct. Op. 119 

Fed. Cl. at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

’325 patent specification, however, saves the term “reduced area of contact” from indefiniteness. The Background of the Invention section first narrows the 

ambiguity by disclosing that the patent’s proposed projectile has “a reduced contact area as compared to conventional projectiles.” ’325 patent col. 1 ll. 65–66. The 

question then becomes: What constitutes a conventional 

projectile? Again, the specification guides. Discussing the 

industry need for a projectile capable of “assum[ing] 

various densities while distinguishing the weight of the 

projectile from its size,” the Background of the Invention

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 11 Filed: 08/26/2016
12 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

identifies the M855 round as a specific conventional 

projectile that the invention seeks to improve upon: 

Currently, NATO 5.56 mm M855(SS109) projectiles comprise a steel/lead core placed in a copper 

jacket which weighs 62 grains. Ideally, an improved projectile could be proposed and developed 

having the same physical dimensions but having 

an increased weight, of for example 107 grains or 

a 72 percent weight increase. In order to achieve 

the same weight utilizing the conventional jacketed lead projectile a significant change in the 

length of the projectile would have to be assumed.

’325 patent col. 1 ll. 35–43. This is the specification’s only 

mention of a specific conventional projectile, strongly 

suggesting that the M855 round is the point of comparison for the claims. Indeed, Liberty itself embraces the 

view that the patentee intended for the invention claimed 

in the ’325 patent to improve upon the M855 round. See 

Liberty Op. Br.4 4, 8 (having sequential fact sections 

entitled “Background: The Army’s M855 Standard Rifle 

Round – Its Deficiencies and the Quest to Replace It”; and 

“The ’325 Patented Solution”). 

Given the specification, the M855 round is the proper 

baseline for the claim limitation “reduced area of contact,”

at least for 5.56 mm projectiles. In other words, one of 

skill in the art would appreciate the M855 round as the 

standard for determining whether a 5.56 mm projectile’s 

area of contact has been reduced, as required by the claim 

limitation. We also recognize that the specification mentions the M855 round in conjunction with NATO. Indeed, 

at the time the ’325 patent application was filed, the 

 

4 “Liberty Op. Br.” refers to the first brief Liberty 

filed in this case, which responded to the Government’s 

opening brief and introduced Liberty’s counterclaims.

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 12 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 13

M855 round served as the 5.56 mm standard-issue round 

for NATO and the Army. Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 

375–77. Relying on the reference to NATO in the specification, we conclude that one of skill in the art would have 

looked to the NATO standard-issue round of corresponding caliber at the time of the ’325 patent to establish the 

baseline projectile. For a 7.62 mm projectile, this was the 

M80 round. Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 375–76. 

We therefore construe the term “reduced area of contact” to mean “the area of contact between the interface 

and the rifling of the firearm is less than that of a conventional jacketed lead projectile, which derives from the 

corresponding caliber NATO standard-issue round as of 

October 21, 2005,” which we specifically note is the M855 

round for 5.56 mm projectiles and the M80 round for 

7.62 mm projectiles. 

The trial court’s construction to the contrary is incorrect because it does not properly capture the specification’s discussion of conventional projectiles, as discussed 

above. The trial court was correct to note that “the specification recites ‘a reduced contact area as compared to 

conventional projectiles.’” Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 

390 (citing ’325 patent col. 1 ll. 65–66). There is, however,

no reason to link, as the trial court did, the specification’s 

mention of conventional projectiles with its later discussion of enabling all calibers, which are distinct concepts. 

The correct link is the one we have drawn between the 

specification’s discussion of the NATO standard-issue 

M855 round and the mention several lines below of a 

conventional jacketed lead projectile, which harkens back 

to the M855. ’325 patent col. 1 ll. 34–43.

We also note that the trial court’s implicit determination that claim 1 satisfies the definiteness requirements of 

§ 112 ¶ 2 under its construction does not comport with our 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 13 Filed: 08/26/2016
14 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

decision in Interval.5 Claim 1 would not be definite had 

the trial court’s construction been correct because there 

would not be a sufficient objective boundary around the 

term of degree “reduced area of contact.” It is true that 

the trial court did objectively limit the claim language by 

including the “.17 through .50 BMG caliber” guidepost in 

its construction. This standard is objective in the sense 

that it defines a set range of calibers from which the 

baseline projectile may be drawn. Yet, even after limiting 

the field of baseline projectiles according to the trial 

court’s construction, a multitude of candidates for the

conventional baseline projectile would remain for each 

caliber within that range, making the claim indefinite 

under Interval. 

The trial court’s failure to properly apply the exacting 

“objective boundaries” standard from Interval is wellillustrated by the parties’ application of the trial court’s 

construction. Together, the parties’ experts examined a 

vast number of different 5.56 mm projectiles as baselines 

for the accused M855A1 round, twenty-six in total. Yet, 

 

5 While the trial court did not specifically rule on 

definiteness, the Government argued that a construction 

not specifically designating a baseline for the “reduced 

area of contact” limitation would be indefinite under § 112 

¶ 2. See Government’s Markman Brief, Joint Appendix 

(“J.A.”) 140; Transcript of Government’s Argument at 

Markman Hearing, J.A. 925–27. The trial court, adopting 

a construction which did not include a specifically designated baseline, nevertheless found that the Government 

practiced claim 1 of the ’325 patent. Trial Ct. Op., 119 

Fed. Cl. at 392. Because only a valid claim may be infringed, Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 

1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983), the trial court necessarily determined that the claim, as it construed it, satisfied § 112 ¶ 2 

and was valid.

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 14 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 15

Liberty’s expert did not include the accused M855A1

round’s predecessor—the M855—among the seven baselines that he tested, despite the M855 round being the 

only prior art projectile described in the ’325 patent and 

his own testimony that there is no reason not to use the 

M855 round for the baseline. For the accused M80A1 

round, the experts examined fifteen 7.62 mm baseline

projectiles, four coming from Liberty’s expert and eleven 

from the Government’s expert. Although Liberty’s expert 

did include the accused M80A1 round’s predecessor—the 

M80—as an M80A1 baseline in his expert report, he later 

acknowledged that his test of the M80 projectile was 

flawed. Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 392 n.36. He did 

not retest the M80 and did not testify about the comparison between the M80A1 and the M80 at trial. Id.

Based on his testing, Liberty’s expert found that the 

accused Army projectiles had a reduced area of contact as 

compared to “a number”—but not all—of the tested baselines. Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 392. The trial court

found these mixed results sufficient to show that the 

accused projectiles satisfy the “reduced area of contact” 

limitation. But a term of degree cannot be definite when 

construed in a manner that lends itself to this sort of 

scattershot infringement analysis because “a term of 

degree fails to provide sufficient notice of its scope if it 

depends ‘on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.’” Interval, 766 F.3d at 1371 (quoting 

Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 

1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds, Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2127). 

Turning to whether the accused projectiles read on 

claim 1 as properly construed, it is undisputed that the 

accused projectiles have an increased contact area when 

compared to the M855 and M80, respectively, based on 

the evidence presented at trial. An Army engineer involved in the development of the accused projectiles 

testified that the Army purposefully designed the projecCase: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 15 Filed: 08/26/2016
16 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

tiles to have a greater area of contact than their predecessor M855 and M80 projectiles. Indeed, the test results 

from the Government’s expert showed that the accused 

projectiles had a greater area of contact than their predecessor M855 and M80 projectiles. See Trial Ct. Op., 119 

Fed. Cl. at 391. 

We find it telling that Liberty did not test the accused 

M855A1 projectile against the predecessor M855 projectile and did not present testimony at trial comparing the 

area of contact of the accused M80A1 projectile with the

predecessor M80 projectile. It is important to note that 

while the trial court’s construction did not limit the baseline projectile to the M855 and M80, these rounds remained in play after the Markman hearing because they 

were within the scope of the trial court’s construction. 

Liberty knew that the Government was testing against 

the M855 and M80 projectiles and had ample opportunity 

to rebut the Government’s expert’s findings for these 

projectiles, but failed to do so. Liberty’s own expert 

testified that there is no reason not to use the M855 

round as the baseline projectile, but that he chose not to 

include it among the twenty-six rounds that he tested. He 

also testified that he did not retest the M80 projectile 

after admittedly miscalculating the area of contact in his 

expert report. See id. at 392 n.36. With no evidence in its 

favor, we find that Liberty cannot carry its burden of 

showing the accused projectiles meet the “reduced area of 

contact” limitation and hold that the Government does 

not practice asserted claim 1, which includes this limitation, or the claims that depend from claim 1. See Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 1551 (explaining that in cases brought 

under § 1498 “[i]t is . . . well settled that each element of a 

claim is material and essential, and that in order for a 

court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the 

presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in 

the accused device”). 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 16 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 17

B. “Intermediate Opposite Ends”

Claim 32 recites “a body including a nose portion and 

tail portion, said body further including an interface 

portion disposed intermediate opposite ends of said body.” 

’325 patent col. 10 ll. 1–3 (emphasis added). The trial 

court construed the claim term “intermediate opposite 

ends” to mean “that the interface is positioned between or 

in the middle of the opposite ends of the forward end of 

the nose portion and the trailing end of the tail portion.” 

Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 389. The Government 

argues that the construction should be further limited, in 

relevant part, “such that the interface does not extend all 

of the way to the front or to the end of the projectile.” The 

trial court rejected this limitation, relying on our decision 

in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 

1200 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 390. 

The trial court interpreted Lucent to mean that because 

“including” precedes the term “intermediate opposite 

ends,” the claimed interface may cover more than just the 

middle portion of a round. Id. In other words, the trial 

court concluded that so long as the interface was positioned, in part, between the forward end and the trailing 

end of the projectile, it did not matter if the interface was 

also positioned outside of that prescribed area. 

We conclude that the Government’s proposed construction is fully supported by the plain claim language 

and specification. While the open-ended term “including” 

does precede “intermediate opposite ends,” our prior 

decisions have warned against using terms such as “comprising,” or “including,” as “weasel word[s] with which to 

abrogate claim limitations.” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 

476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Spectrum 

Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 

1998)). The trial court’s refusal to limit the projectile’s 

interface so that it does not extend all of the way to the 

forward or trailing ends of the projectile goes against this 

admonition and significantly diminishes the “intermediCase: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 17 Filed: 08/26/2016
18 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

ate opposite ends” limitation, almost to the point of rendering it a nullity. 

The very essence of the “intermediate opposite ends” 

limitation is to define a precise position for the interface: 

between the nose and tail ends of the projectile. The trial 

court’s construction chips away at this precision by permitting an interface that is not only between the opposing 

ends, but also outside that position to read on the claim

language. As such, the construction is broad enough to 

cover a traditional full metal jacket surrounding the 

entire projectile, a fact which Liberty’s counsel acknowledged and embraced at oral argument. Oral Argument at 

17:32–20:24, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.

uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-5057.mp3. This understanding, however, contradicts the ’325 patent specification, which unequivocally distinguishes the claimed 

invention from projectiles with such a jacketed design. 

’325 patent col. 1 ll. 62–63 (“[I]mproved projectile would 

preferably involve a proposal which eliminates the use of 

a jacketed projectile.”), col. 2 ll. 39–40 (“[T]he projectile of 

the present invention eliminates the use of lead and the 

provision of an outer jacket.”), col. 6 ll. 63–64 (“[I]t is 

emphasized that the projectile body[] is not jacketed as in 

conventional copper jacketed projectiles.”), col. 7 ll. 39–44 

(“[S]tructural and operative features of the projectile[], 

including the cooperative components of the nose portion[], tail portion[] and interface[], overcome many of the 

disadvantages and problems normally associated with 

conventional firearm projectiles through the provision of a 

non-jacketed structure and the elimination of lead.”). 

The trial court erred in its application of Lucent. In 

Lucent we held that when open-ended terms like “including” or “comprising” introduce a claim element(s), “other 

elements may be added” to the claimed element(s) and the 

resulting structure might still read on the claim at issue. 

Lucent, 525 F.3d at 1214 (emphasis added). An earlier 

case, Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 18 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 19

1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005), illuminates when the principle we 

discussed in Lucent applies. The patent at issue in Gillette claimed a razor “comprising” a first, second, and 

third razor blade. Id. at 1369. We held that this claim 

does not necessarily exclude a razor that has a fourth 

blade in addition to a first, second, and third blade. Id. at 

1374.

The factual scenario described in Gillette and applied 

in Lucent is readily distinguishable from the one before us 

now. The Government’s construction of “intermediate 

opposite ends” does not prevent, as Lucent and Gillette 

caution against, the claimed projectile from including 

additional non-claimed structural elements. Instead, the 

Government’s construction gives proper meaning to a 

structural element that is claimed—the projectile interface. We therefore construe the term “intermediate 

opposite ends” to mean “the interface is positioned between the front end and the rear end of the projectile body 

such that the interface does not extend all of the way to 

the front end or to the rear end of the projectile.” 

Under this construction, it is apparent that the accused Army rounds do not meet the “intermediate opposite ends” limitation. The accused M855A1 projectile, 

depicted in the trial court opinion’s principal findings of 

fact section and reproduced below, includes an interface 

that extends to, and covers, the rear end of the projectile. 

Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 383. The trial court described the M855A1 as comprising “a steel nose ogive with 

an exposed tip, a tail portion containing a copper slug, 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 19 Filed: 08/26/2016
20 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

and a surrounding thin jacket that connects the nose and 

tail.” Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 383 (footnote omitted). 

This explanation that the jacket surrounds a projectile

with an exposed tip adds to what is already made clear by 

the figure: only the front end is exposed and the rear end 

is covered by the jacket. The accused M80A1 projectile 

incorporates a similar interface.

Id. at 384. 

On these facts, the accused projectiles cannot satisfy 

the “intermediate opposite ends” limitation. Liberty has 

acquiesced to the trial court’s factual findings, so we need 

not remand for any further factual determinations. See 

Liberty Op. Br. 4 n.1. With the “intermediate opposite 

ends” limitation not met by the accused projectiles, we 

conclude that the Government does not practice asserted 

claim 32, which includes this limitation, or the claims 

that depend from claim 32. See Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 

1551. 

Because the accused Army rounds meet neither the 

“intermediate opposite ends” limitation nor the “reduced 

area of conduct” limitation—one of which appears in all 

asserted claims—we hold that the Government has not 

violated Liberty’s patent rights under § 1498. Accordingly, we do not address the “controlled rupturing” construction challenged by the Government, as we need not decide 

more than is necessary to dispose of the case regarding 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 20 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 21

the ’325 patent. For the same reason, we do not address 

the Government’s invalidity argument or either party’s 

challenge to the trial court’s damages award, which we 

hereby vacate. 

II. Liberty Cross-Appeal

Liberty argues the M855A1 and M80A1 Army projectiles exploit technology protected by the NDA that

Lt. Col. Dean signed when he met with Liberty’s representative, Mr. Marx, in 2005. The trial court held that 

there is no enforceable agreement between the parties 

because it found that Lt. Col. Dean did not have the 

requisite authority to enter the NDA on the Government’s 

behalf. We find no clear error in the trial court’s factual 

determination regarding Lt. Col Dean’s lack of authority 

and affirm that the NDA is not enforceable.

A Government agent must have actual authority to 

bind the Government to a contract. Trauma Serv. Grp. v. 

United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

Although apparent authority—which exists when an 

agent with no actual authority holds himself out to have 

such authority to another’s detriment—can generally bind

a principal, the Government is immune to actions of its 

agents who merely possess apparent authority. Our past 

cases have elaborated on the precept that there must be 

actual authority for an agent to bind the Government: 

It is a well recognized principle of procurement 

law that the contracting officer, as agent of the 

executive department, has only that authority actually conferred upon him by statute or regulation. . . . The government is not bound by its 

agents acting beyond their authority and contrary 

to regulation. A contractor who enters into an arrangement with an agent of the government bears 

the risk that the agent is acting outside the 

bounds of his authority, even when the agent 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 21 Filed: 08/26/2016
22 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

himself was unaware of the limitations on his authority.

CACI, Inc. v. Stone, 990 F.2d 1233, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)

(internal citations omitted); see also H. Landau & Co. v. 

United States, 886 F.2d 322, 324 (Fed. Cir. 1989)

(“[A]pparent authority will not suffice to hold the government bound by the acts of its agents.”). Liberty recognizes this limit on Government contracting authority and

does not contend that Lt. Col. Dean possessed apparent 

authority to enter the NDA. Rather, Liberty asserts 

Lt. Col. Dean possessed actual authority.

Actual authority may be either express or implied. 

Salles v. United States, 156 F.3d 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (citing Landau, 886 F.2d at 324). On appeal, Liberty does not argue that Lt. Col. Dean had express actual 

authority to enter the NDA, but only that he had implied 

actual authority. An employee of the Government has 

implied actual authority to enter an agreement only when

that authority is an “integral part of the duties assigned 

to [the] government employee.” Landau, 886 F.2d at 324 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Authority is integral 

“when the government employee could not perform his or 

her assigned tasks without such authority.” Flexfab, LLC 

v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 139, 148 (2004), aff’d, 424 

F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Determination of one’s authority to enter an NDA is a question of fact that we 

review for clear error following a bench trial. See Monarch Assur. P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1362 

(Fed. Cir. 2001); City of El Centro v. United States, 

922 F.2d 816, 819–21 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Moriarty v. 

Glueckert Funeral Home, Ltd., 155 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 

1998); In re Nelson, 761 F.2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1985).

 The trial court’s determination that Lt. Col. Dean did 

not have implied actual authority is not clearly erroneous. 

As the Chief of Small Arms of DCS, Lt. Col. Dean testified 

that he met “literally on a weekly basis” with representaCase: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 22 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 23

tives from industry interested in pitching a product or 

idea to the Government. J.A. 10129 l. 21. Although many 

of the representatives with whom he met marked their 

materials confidential, Lt. Col. Dean also testified that he 

signed “very few” NDAs. J.A. 10131 l. 3. He clarified this 

statement to mean that he signed fewer than five NDAs 

in over two years working for the DCD at Fort Benning. 

Id. ll. 4–5. The infrequency with which Lt. Col. Dean 

signed NDAs supports the notion that Lt. Col. Dean could 

perform his tasks as Chief of Small Arms without signing 

NDAs. Thus, there is support for the trial court’s determination that signing NDAs was not integral to 

Lt. Col. Dean’s position. 

Liberty agrees that whether authority is integral to 

one’s position is the correct legal standard for implied 

actual authority and that the trial court recited this 

standard. Liberty argues instead that the trial court

misapplied the standard by looking to evidence that went 

to express actual authority rather than implied actual 

authority. Although the trial court did consider some 

evidence more probative to show Lt. Col. Dean’s lack of 

express authority, it also considered Lt. Col. Dean’s 

testimony regarding the relatively small number of NDAs

he signed. Trial Ct. Op., 119 Fed. Cl. at 404. This evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that Lt. Col. Dean lacked implied actual authority

to bind the Government to an NDA with Liberty under 

the clearly erroneous standard of review we apply for this 

issue. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court

erred when construing the “intermediate opposite ends” 

and “reduced area of conduct” claim terms and reverse its 

holding that the Government practiced the asserted 

claims of the ’325 patent and vacate its award of damages. 

We affirm the trial court’s holding that Liberty cannot 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 23 Filed: 08/26/2016
24 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

prevail on its breach of contract claim because the trial 

court’s determination that Lt. Col. Dean lacked the requisite authority to enter an NDA on the Government’s 

behalf is not clearly erroneous. 

REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART 

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 24 Filed: 08/26/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC.,

Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

 

2015-5057, 2015-5061

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-cv-00084-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in

part. 

The court today holds that the United States is not 

contractually bound by a nondisclosure agreement signed 

for the “United States Government, Department of Defense,” by Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Glenn Dean,1

in his position as Chief of the Small Arms Branch of the 

Directorate of Combat Development, United States Infantry. The purpose of the agreement was to receive disclo-

 

1 To conform with the government’s usage, we use 

the rank of Lt. Col., without the precision of earlier or 

later rank at any given time.

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 25 Filed: 08/26/2016
2 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

sure of proprietary information concerning the new ammunition invented by Mr. P.J. Marx.

Lt. Col. Dean testified in the Court of Federal Claims 

that he was the United States official responsible for this

subject matter, and that he had signed “about five” nondisclosure agreements in that role as Chief for small arms 

development. My colleagues hold that the United States 

is not bound by this agreement, finding that Lt. Col. Dean 

had no authority, either express or implied, to sign such 

agreements. There is no evidentiary support for this 

holding; indeed, even now the United States does not

appear to have criticized or reprimanded Lt. Col. Dean, 

despite the government’s insistence that he acted improperly and that his contractual promise is meaningless. 

Law and precedent establish that Lt. Col. Dean’s implicit authority sufficed to provide a valid nondisclosure 

agreement. The government’s position is not only contrary to law and precedent—it is also untenable as a matter

of the integrity of government practice. 

On the merits of the issue of infringement of the Liberty Ammunition U.S. Patent No. 7,748,325 (the ’325 

patent), I agree with the court that the claims are not 

literally infringed by the Army’s design of rounds in which

the base of the projectile is completely “jacketed” by the 

interface.

THE NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

Several nondisclosure agreements were signed by various government representatives in order to receive Mr. 

Marx’s technology. This case focuses primarily on the 

agreement signed by Lt. Col. Dean for the Department of 

Defense.2 The government argues, successfully, that Lt. 

 

2 The U.S. Special Forces Command representative 

also entered into a nondisclosure agreement with Mr. 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 26 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 3

Col. Dean had no authority to enter into a nondisclosure

agreement, and therefore that the agreement was void. 

The government’s position appears to be that it is entitled 

to disclose outside the government and use Mr. Marx’s 

proprietary information without obligation or license. 

In brief background: Mr. Marx developed experimental ammunition in response to the Army’s announced 

request for industrial assistance to develop improved 

ammunition and to comply with the “Green Ammunition 

Program” to remove lead on environmental grounds. 

Witnesses testified that early attempts to resolve these 

concerns by substituting tungsten for lead were expensive 

and ineffective. The record shows multiple failures until

receipt and review of the Marx technology provided the 

successful direction.

Mr. Marx, in undisputed testimony, explained that he 

was directed to Lt. Col. Dean at the Directorate of Combat 

Development (DCD) by the Project Management Engineer 

for the Green Ammunition Program. Trial Tr. at 351, ll. 

1–3, Liberty Ammunition v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 

368 (2014) (Dkt. 76). Mr. Marx testified that the Project 

Management Engineer stated that while he lacked the 

authority to sign an NDA, Lt. Col. Dean was authorized to 

execute such agreements. Id.

Prior to meeting with Lt. Col. Dean, Mr. Marx requested information on the government’s “procedure for 

receiving proprietary information,” and asked if the 

government had a “standard agreement of nondisclosure.” 

Trial Tr. at Ex. 5 (Dkt. 74) (Email exchange between Maj. 

Glenn Dean and P.J. Marx (November 18, 2004)). Lt. Col. 

Dean assured Mr. Marx that “[w]e’ll protect and secure 

 

Marx. This Command awarded Marx a development 

contract for other projectiles. Such projectiles are not 

here at issue.

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 27 Filed: 08/26/2016
4 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

anything you mark as proprietary information” and that 

if Mr. Marx had a nondisclosure agreement, “we can have 

anyone who would be in contact with specifics sign.” Id.

After Lt. Col. Dean executed the “Bilateral NonDisclosure Agreement” on behalf of the “United States 

Government, Department of Defense,” id. at Ex. 3, Mr. 

Marx provided the technical description, test information, 

and fifty sample rounds of his new ammunition. After 

receiving this information, Lt. Col. Dean reported to other 

Army research divisions that the Marx projectile is a 

“very promising technology that lines up well with our

lethality improvement effort.” Id. at Ex. 8 (Email from 

Maj. Glenn Dean (Feb. 17, 2005)). 

Lt. Col. Dean testified in the Court of Federal Claims 

that the Directorate of Combat Development is the “lead 

combat developer for all infantry and soldier systems.”

Trial Tr. at 46, ll. 5–6 (Dkt. 74). He testified that his 

assignment as Chief of the Small Arms Branch is to 

identify and develop new and improved technologies, and 

to work in collaboration with private industry. Id. at 48. 

However, the government now argues, and my colleagues 

agree, that Lt. Col. Dean had neither express actual 

authority nor implicit actual authority to sign the nondisclosure agreement. 

Precedent distinguishes among actual authority, implied actual authority, and apparent authority of government representatives. The panel majority recognizes that 

authority of government officials “is generally implied 

when such authority is considered to be an integral part 

of the duties assigned to a government employee,” H. 

Landau & Co. v. United States, 886 F.2d 322, 324 (1989), 

“when the government employee could not perform his or 

her assigned tasks without such authority,” Flexfab, LLC 

v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 139, 148 (2004), aff’d 424 

F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In H.F. Allen Orchards v. 

United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 28 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 5

court explained that “[a]lthough apparent authority will 

not suffice to hold the government bound by the acts of its 

agents, implied actual authority, like expressed actual 

authority, will suffice.” See also Fifth Third Bd. of W. 

Ohio v. United States, 402 F.3d 1221, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 

2009) (government representative had implied actual 

authority, and bound the government); Phila. Suburban 

Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct. Cl. 705, 707 (1978) (government is bound when the signing government official 

has implied authority or ratification).

The record contains extensive evidence that the receipt and protection of proprietary information from the 

private sector was integral to Lt. Col. Dean’s position as 

Chief of the Small Arms Branch. He testified that he met 

“literally on a weekly basis” with industry representatives 

with a product or idea related to small arms. Trial Tr. at 

129, l. 21–130, l. 3 (Dkt. 74) (“I mean literally on a weekly 

basis would have some company, contractor, person who 

had a good idea, a product they wanted to sell, who would 

come into my office . . . and give us their pitch on here’s 

our great idea and here’s why the U.S. Army should buy it 

and here’s why you specifically should give us a requirement to allow the PM to buy our product.”). 

Lt. Col. Dean estimated that these industry meetings 

alone consumed eight hours each week. Id. at 130, ll. 8-9. 

He testified that he served as the “user representative” in 

evaluating technology needs, the possibilities of new 

technologies, and deciding whether they would benefit 

soldiers in the field. Id. at 48. He testified that he had 

signed nondisclosure agreements in the past. Id. at 66, l. 

3. When asked if he had ever refused to sign a nondisclosure agreement, Lt. Col. Dean responded “Not to my 

knowledge.” Id. at 66, l. 5. Lt. Col. Dean also testified 

that it was “common” to receive proprietary information. 

Id. at 130, ll. 21-23. Other Directorate witnesses testified 

to the “policy” of the Small Arms Branch “to protect the 

privacy of the information provided” by industry repreCase: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 29 Filed: 08/26/2016
6 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

sentatives. Trial Tr. at 500, ll. 13–15 (Dkt. 76). No 

witness identified any other individual or entity with the 

authority to enter into nondisclosure agreements related 

to the Small Arms Branch responsibilities. See, e.g., Trial 

Tr. at 131, l. 25–132, l. 1 (Dkt. 74) (Testimony of Lt. Col. 

Dean) (“[T]he business development activity was—I never 

saw a contracting officer involved with that.”). Despite 

this extensive record, and no contrary evidence, the 

government’s position is that this agreement, by the

officer of the United States charged with the responsibility of advancing small arms development, is worthless—

and my colleagues on this panel agree. 

The majority holds that because Lt. Col. Dean signed

less than five nondisclosure agreements over his two 

years at the Directorate, he lacked authority to bind the 

government to a nondisclosure agreement with Liberty. 

Maj. Op. at 23. Does this mean that if an industry representative offers information under a nondisclosure 

agreement, and the government official agrees and signs 

the agreement, the industry representative must inquire 

how many nondisclosure agreements that official had

previously signed, and then guess how many would be

needed to support the official’s asserted authority?

The Court of Federal Claims relied additionally on Lt. 

Col. Dean’s lack of formal “contracting officer” status. A 

contracting officer “obligate[s] the Government to an 

expenditure of appropriated funds.” 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.602, 

2.101. Nondisclosure agreements need not incur expenditure; the issue here is disclosure of information, not

expenditure. Lt. Col. Dean testified that contracting 

officers were “never” involved in proprietary business 

development meetings with industry. Trial Tr. at 131, l. 

25–132, l. 1 (Dkt. 74). Also, precedent establishes that 

lack of a contracting officer’s signature on a contract with 

the government does not foreclose a breach of contract 

claim if implied authority was present. Phila. Suburban 

Corp., 217 Ct. Cl. at 707. 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 30 Filed: 08/26/2016
LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US 7

Thus I must, respectfully, dissent from the court’s ruling that the government is not bound by the nondisclosure 

agreement signed by its representative.

LIABILITY

The Court of Federal Claims held the ’325 patent valid, and infringed by the A1 modifications of the M855 and 

M80 projectiles. My colleagues hold that the patent is not 

infringed. I agree that the patent is not infringed by 

these A1 projectiles, for it was undisputed that the entire 

base of the A1 projectile is enclosed or “jacketed,” unlike 

the claimed ’325 projectile. The ’325 claims require that

the metal interface does not enclose the base of the projectile. Thus I join the court’s ruling of non-infringement.

There was evidence that the Marx invention showed 

the way to the design of the M855A1. Dr. Newill, who 

was the “Technical Lead” of the Green Ammunition

Program, a few months after receiving the Marx technology advised the Army that the problems of both lethality 

and the environment had been solved, referring to the A1 

modification. At trial, Dr. Newill could not point to any 

laboratory documentation of independent origin of the 

concepts embodied in the Marx projectile. Trial Tr. at 

1466, ll. 18–20 (Dkt. 84). Liberty points out that there 

were no entries in any government Laboratory Notebooks 

(required by Army Regulation 27-60), and no drawings or 

sketches or other evidence of conception. Id. at 1463–66. 

Mr. Campion, who reviewed the Marx information for the 

Special Services Command, confirmed that Marx led to 

this breakthrough, testifying that “[t]hey’ve been developing the green round for 17 years now.” Trial Tr. at 999, ll. 

7–8 (Dkt. 80). The government did not contradict these

witnesses. 

These aspects warrant resolution in connection with 

the disclosure conditions and to determine the consequences of any breach of the nondisclosure contract. I 

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 31 Filed: 08/26/2016
8 LIBERTY AMMUNITION, INC. v. US

would remand for this purpose. I respectfully dissent 

from my colleagues’ disposition of this aspect.

Case: 15-5061 Document: 3-2 Page: 32 Filed: 08/26/2016