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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 16, 2000 Decided July 7, 2000

No. 99-5295

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,

AFL-CIO, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01926)

Reuben A. Guttman argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Daniel Guttman, Brian P. McCafferty, Charles V. Firth and Traci L. Buschner.

Scott S. Harris, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

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Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, and Evelyn S. Ying, Attorney.

Francis L. Casey, III, Kathy B. Houlihan, Charles P.

Groppe, Alex S. Karlin, Terry R. Yellig and Richard M.

Resnick were on the brief for appellee BNFL, Inc., et al.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Williams.

Williams, Circuit Judge: In 1997 the Department of Energy ("DOE") contracted to decontaminate and decommission

three buildings at its nuclear weapons facility in Oak Ridge,

Tennessee. The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO ("OCAW"), a labor union whose

members work at this facility, brought suit seeking to enjoin

execution of the contract. (Also suing were several of the

union's individual members, who will henceforth be disregarded.) OCAW's theories are twofold. First, it claims that DOE

and its contractors violated s 3161 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 42 U.S.C. s 7274h,

which it reads as requiring DOE to provide its members

continued employment and employment benefits after the

implementation of a major workforce restructuring. Second,

it argues that under s 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. s 4332(2)(C) the recycling

and sale of recovered metals from the project cannot proceed

unless an environmental impact statement is first prepared.

The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on

the first claim, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union,

AFL-CIO v. PeNa, 18 F. Supp.2d 6, 16 (D.D.C. 1998) ("OCAW

I"), and their motion for summary judgment on the second.

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v.

PeNa, 62 F. Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999) ("OCAW II").

On the s 3161 claim, OCAW made clear at oral argument

that its sole current claim is that DOE failed to enforce the

labor provisions of its contracts. Because nothing in the

statute provides a meaningful standard against which to

judge any such agency nonenforcement, we find the claim

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barred by the preclusion of review in 5 U.S.C. s 701(a)(2).

See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). As to the NEPA

claim, s 113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. s 9613(h), withholds federal court

jurisdiction (subject to irrelevant exceptions) over any "challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section

[104] of this title." Because the recycling activity provided

for in the contracts clearly qualifies as such a "removal"

action, we have no jurisdiction over the NEPA claim. Accordingly, we affirm.

* * *

For many years the Oak Ridge Reservation was used to

enrich uranium for nuclear weapons and nuclear power generation. In 1989 EPA placed it on the National Priority List

of contaminated sites. OCAW II, 62 F. Supp.2d at 2. Later,

acting under CERCLA s 120, 42 U.S.C. s 9620, EPA, DOE,

and the Tennessee Department of Education and Conservation entered into a Federal Facilities Agreement ("FFA") for

Oak Ridge, thereby scheduling the facility "for decontamination and decommissioning, waste management, and environmental remediation." In March 1997 they amended the FFA

to include a schedule for the cleanup of three buildings at Oak

Ridge's K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant, the cleanup in dispute

here. In August 1997 DOE awarded a contract to British

Nuclear Fuels, Inc. ("BNFL") to remove the equipment and

decontaminate the buildings. We turn first to the s 3161

issue, then to NEPA.

After determining that a large reduction in workforce

would result from closing the facility, DOE undertook workforce restructuring efforts. Section 3161 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 42 U.S.C.

s 7274h, requires that when "a change in the workforce at a

defense nuclear facility is necessary, the Secretary of Energy

... shall develop a plan for restructuring the workforce for

the defense nuclear facility." DOE's initial workforce restructuring plan ("WRP"), which was finalized on November

29, 1995, mimicked s 3161's stated objectives. It said, for

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instance, that hiring preferences would be provided to eligible

employees "to the extent practicable." Oak Ridge Operations

Work Force Restructuring Plan, at 5-1 (November 29, 1995).

The WRP also provided for medical benefits, outplacement

assistance, relocation assistance, training programs, and education assistance. Id. at 4-1 to 5-2.

The contract with BNFL effectively delegated to it the

fulfillment of the WRP's mandates. DOE/BNFL Contract, at

H-9 to H-10. BNFL then negotiated a Project Labor

Agreement ("PLA") with Knoxville Building and Construction

Trades Council, AFL-CIO ("Building Trades"), to address

how the construction workers for the project would be hired.

The PLA incorporated the hiring preference embodied in the

WRP: "[T]he Union shall recognize and select qualified applicants for referral in accordance with Section 3161 ... and/or

the Employer's contractual obligation to [DOE] relating to

3161." Project Agreement Between BNFL Inc. and Building

Trades (August 7, 1997), at 6.

We agree with the district court that review of the s 3161

claim is barred by s 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). (As such preclusion is jurisdictional,

Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we

may affirm dismissal of the claim without reaching the other

jurisdictional defenses--such as DOE's mootness contention.

See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584-85,

119 S. Ct. 1563, 1570 (1999).) APA judicial review is unavailable "to the extent that--(1) statutes preclude judicial review;

or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by

law." 5 U.S.C. s 701(a). Agency action falls within

s 701(a)(2) when "the statute is drawn so that a court would

have no meaningful standard against which to judge the

agency's exercise of discretion." Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.

821, 830 (1985). Here, the statute says that "the Secretary

shall be guided by the following objectives," 42 U.S.C.

s 7274h(c), which include providing terminated employees

with hiring preferences "to the extent practicable," id. Noting that these provisions gave the Secretary "enormous disUSCA Case #99-5295 Document #528166 Filed: 07/07/2000 Page 4 of 7
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cretion," the district court held that s 3161 fell within Chaney's bar. OCAW I, 18 F. Supp.2d at 15-16.

In view of OCAW's present exclusive focus on enforcement

of the BNFL contract, we need not finally resolve whether

for every context the statute's language reaches Chaney

levels of discretion. Section 3161 requires the Secretary of

Energy to "develop a plan for restructuring the workforce,"

and the Secretary did so through the WRP, which incorporated the further mandates of s 3161. DOE then delegated the

statutory requirements in its contract with BNFL, which

were in turn subdelegated in part to Building Trades. Because DOE satisfied its requirement to develop a plan,

OCAW can now complain only of inadequate contract enforcement. It thereby brings its cause squarely within Heckler v.

Chaney's presumption of unreviewability for enforcement decisions: "[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce,

whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion." 470 U.S.

at 831. The Court justified this presumption on several

grounds. First, the agency has expertise in assessing whether a violation has occurred and whether it is a valuable use of

the agency's resources to commence enforcement proceedings. Second, "when an agency refuses to act it generally

does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's

liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon

areas that courts are often called upon to protect." Id. at

832.

Although Chaney did not explicitly address contract enforcement, it seems indistinguishable from civil enforcement

activities in the dimensions relevant to Chaney; certainly

OCAW offers no distinctions. Nor does the statute contain

any guidance on the Secretary's exercise of enforcement

power, such as might rebut the presumption. See id. at 833.

Nor, finally, can we find any such limits in DOE's Notice of

Interim Planning Guidance, Planning Guidance for Contractor Work Force Restructuring, 61 Fed. Reg. 8593, 8595/2,

8599/2 (1996), to which OCAW points in a search for the

needed non-discretionary backbone. Of course our decision

here says nothing about the possible ability of plaintiffs to sue

as third-party beneficiaries of the BNFL contract or the

PLA.

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We thus turn to the NEPA claim. CERCLA s 113(h), 42

U.S.C. s 9613(h), says that "[n]o Federal court shall have

jurisdiction under Federal law ... to review any challenges

to removal or remedial action selected under section [104] of

this title, or to review any order issued under section [106] of

this title." Although s 113(h) is subject to limited exceptions--e.g., for recovery of "response costs or damages or for

contribution," 42 U.S.C. s 9613(h)(1), and for reimbursement

of costs in response to a remedial order that was arbitrary

and capricious, id. s 9613(h)(3)--it otherwise effectuates a

"blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction," North Shore Gas

Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991), despite its

more limited rationale "that pre-enforcement review would be

a significant obstacle to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders." S. Rep. No. 11,

99th Cong. 1, 58 (1985).

The government here says that the cleanup plan constitutes

a "removal" action as the term is used in s 113(h). This is

defined in 42 U.S.C. s 9601(23) as:

the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances

from the environment, such actions as may be necessary

[sic] taken in the event of the threat of release of

hazardous substances into the environment, ... the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other

actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or

mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the

environment....

OCAW correctly points out that recycling is not explicitly

mentioned here, though it is in the definition of "remedial

action." 42 U.S.C. s 9601(24). But we agree with the district court that the broader language of s 9601(23), "disposal

of removed material," is properly understood to encompass

disposals that take the form of recycling. OCAW II, 62

F. Supp.2d at 6 n.5. Moreover, because "remedial actions"

are also protected by s 113(h), OCAW's argument would

prove pointless here, unless, for some unmentioned reason,

DOE's having said "removal" when it should have said "remedial action" were fatal to its invocation of s 113(h).

OCAW challenges the applicability of s 113(h) on the basis

that this recycling is not within the scope of DOE's "removal

action," largely because the decision to recycle is left to the

sole discretion of BNFL. Relying on the language of DOE's

Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (comparing the alternatives for addressing contamination at the K-25 facility),

however, the district court found that despite the allowance of

discretion, DOE and BNFL expressed a strong preference

for recycling. Because recycling was the "primary method of

waste disposal" contemplated by the parties, it was part of

the "removal action" for purposes of s 113(h). OCAW II, 62

F. Supp.2d at 6. Moreover, other documents "mad[e] abundantly clear that BNFL is absolutely required to dispose of

all waste whether by recycling or otherwise," id. at 7, and

such other "disposal of removed material" is explicitly within

the definition of a removal action. See 42 U.S.C. s 9601(23).

The second argument alone is decisive. As both options

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under the plan qualified as actions sheltered by s 113(h), the

case requires no theorizing as to whether the section might

apply to a non-sheltered practice that was somehow part of

an action otherwise protected by s 113(h). OCAW's claims

here are insubstantial.

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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