Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03112/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03112-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL GADDA,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

TRACEY McCORMICK (State Bar Counsel),

BETTY YOUNG (Client Security Fund, State

Bar), THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA, real party in interest, BOARD

OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, JENNIFER BARNES (EOIR

Counsel), MIRIAM HAYWARD

(Immigration Judge), ALBERTO GONZALEZ

(Immigration Judge), MIMI S. YAM

(Immigration Judge),

Defendants.

____________________________________/

No. C 05-3112 MHP

ORDER

Re: Motion for Recusal

Plaintiff Miguel Gadda brings this motion to recuse the Honorable Marilyn Hall Patel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 144 and 28 U.S.C. section 455. Plaintiff asserts that Judge Patel

demonstrated bias by writing a memorandum notifying plaintiff that he is disbarred from the practice

of law before this court. Plaintiff also alleges that the court committed error in directing the parties

to provide briefing on specific issues and in relating this action to another case plaintiff has before

this court. Having considered the submissions and arguments of the parties, and for the reasons set

forth below, the court denies plaintiff's motion to recuse.

The substantive standards for recusal under sections 144 and 455 are identical: "[w]hether a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might

reasonably be questioned." United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986). It is well
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recognized that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality

motion." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). The alleged bias and prejudice "must

stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than

what the judge learned from [her] participation in the case." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384

U.S. 563, 583 (1966). Furthermore, opinions or impressions "formed by the judge on the basis of

facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,

do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Therefore,

"judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,

counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge." Id.

Judicial expressions of "impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger" do not establish bias

or partiality. Id. at 555–56. "A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration . . . remain

immune." Id. at 556. 

 Plaintiff's principal argument in favor of recusal is that the Memorandum and Notice that

Respondent is Disbarred from Practice Before this Court ("Memo"), filed on August 9, 2005, evinces

bias against plaintiff and his claims. Despite plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, the Memo

undeniably originated within the scope of a judicial proceeding and relates to information

exclusively obtained in that proceeding. The court has already presided over a lawsuit relating to

plaintiff's disbarment, which is currently the subject of an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See In re

Miguel Gadda, No. 04-16829, filed 9th Cir., Sept. 20, 2004. The purpose of the Memo in the instant

action was twofold: to indicate the court's current lack of jurisdiction over the question of plaintiff's

right to practice before this court, which is on appeal; and, relatedly, to clarify that none of the

intervening administrative errors related to plaintiff's standing have resulted in his reinstatement. 

Unfortunately, the Memo does not appear to have had its intended effect, as plaintiff continues to

make arguments related to his original admission to the bar of this court and his current right to

reinstatement even though this court has been deprived of jurisdiction by reason of the pending

appeal. See, e.g., Answer to Memorandum and Notice That Respondent Is Disbarred from Practice
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Before This Court at 12, No. 02-0017 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2005) (restating the argument that

plaintiff's admission to practice before this court does not depend on his admission to the California

bar). The court's communication does not represent "extrajudicial" contact as it was made in order to

clarify the scope of the instant proceedings and involved the legal status of plaintiff.

Given that the Memo does not constitute extrajudicial contact, the only remaining inquiry is

whether it evinces a "deep seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment

impossible." Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556. It is well established that judicial criticism or expressions of

frustration do not constitute grounds for recusal. Id. at 555. The Memo in question is appropriately

critical of plaintiff's actions—which have been uniformly condemned by each judicial body before

which plaintiff has appeared—but it does not display any antagonism that would make rendering a

fair judgment impossible. The excerpts of the Memo that plaintiff cites are merely recitations of the

factual background surrounding plaintiff's case. These facts necessarily include plaintiff's

disbarment and, despite this, his contrived efforts to obtain a certificate of good standing from the

Clerk of Court. The court's Memo, therefore, provides no basis for recusal.

Plaintiff also argues that the Memo and other past orders contain several errors that "demean"

plaintiff and his claims. Each of the alleged errors, however, relates to the dates on which certain

undisputed events took place: plaintiff's disbarment, the issue of his erroneous certificate of good

standing, and his supposed "readmission" to the bar of this court. Without considering whether the

dates are erroneous, the court is at a loss to see how an error as to the date of an event shows bias

when the events themselves have bearing on plaintiff's right to practice law.

Plaintiff further argues that the relation of this action to In the matter of Gadda, 02-00017

MHP, is contrary to Local Rule 3-12(c) and demonstrates bias and prejudice against plaintiff. The

two cases both arise out of plaintiff's disbarment but seek different remedies—reinstatement in one

case, and protection from an obligation to pay fees in the other. Neither plaintiff nor this court can

provide an explanation as to how properly relating two actions can demonstrate bias. Also, a related

case order is necessarily a judicial order and is presumptively impartial unless it demonstrates "deep

seated and unequivocal favoritism or antagonism." Liteky, 410 U.S. at 555. With respect to
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plaintiff's argument under Local Rule 3-12(c), "[d]istrict courts have 'inherent power' to control their

dockets." Southern California Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2002). Civil Local

Rule 3-12(c) does not limit this power; rather, the rule provides a mechanism by which the judge in

the later-filed case can request that the judge in the earlier-filed case relate the two. See N.D. Cal.

Civil L.R. 3-12(c). Notwithstanding any such request, the judge in the earlier-filed case has the

power to relate the two. Local Rules 3-12(c) and (f) do not technically address the inherent power of

the court to properly relate cases. Furthermore, plaintiff has an obligation under Local Rule 3-12(b)

to file an Administrative Motion to Consider Whether Cases Should be Related whenever he knows

or learns that an action filed before this court is related to an action which is pending in this District. 

See N.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 3-12(b). Plaintiff failed to do so in this case. The court's proper exercise of

its inherent power does not demonstrate any partiality towards either party and, therefore, does not

justify recusal. 

Finally, plaintiff contends that this court's August 30, 2005 scheduling order requesting

briefing on the legal sufficiency of certain claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) has

the appearance of favoring the State Bar defendants. As stated previously, the court has the inherent

power to control its docket. Southern California Edison, 307 F.3d at 807. When faced with a similar

request for recusal based on a scheduling order, this court found that "[f]ar from demonstrating bias,

such scheduling orders are routinely entered to benefit both litigants and the court." Bismillah v.

Hennessey, No. C-92-0280, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1403, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Patel, J.). In fact,

"[a] meritorious claimant benefits from a scheduling order, which prevents his claim from

languishing on the docket and avoids the use of delaying tactics." Id. The fact that this court issued

a scheduling order does not in any way indicate the court's partiality toward one side or another.

Among other things, a request for briefing serves to inform the court regarding certain issues that

have not been fully briefed by the parties. Such a request cannot serve as "reasonable grounds for

finding that the judge could not try the case fairly, either because of the appearance or the fact of bias

or prejudice." United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to recuse the Honorable Marilyn Hall Patel is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26,2005

_______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California