Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02937/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02937-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO TRUJILLO CRUZ,

CDCR #AA-2974,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Ms. ABRIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-2937-BTM-RBB

ORDER:

(1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[ECF No. 4]

AND

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff, GUILLERMO TRUJILLO CRUZ, currently incarcerated at Kern Valley 

State Prison (“KVSP”), in Delano, California, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 on December 28, 2015 (ECF No. 1). 

Plaintiff claims several San Diego County Sheriff’s Department officials retaliated 

against him while he was detained in the San Diego County Jail after he filed several 

inmate grievances again them in October 2012. See ECF No. 1 at 3-5. He seeks 

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages and 

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costs. Id. at 7. Plaintiff did not prepay the full civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a) when he filed his Complaint, see ECF No. 2, but in response to this Court’s 

OSC (ECF No. 4), he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 4).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

“[A] federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma 

pauperis. This means that the litigant may commence a civil action without prepaying 

fees or paying certain expenses.” Coleman v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1761 

(2015). “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). “Prisoners,” like Plaintiff, however, 

“face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to the requirement that they “pay the full 

amount of a filing fee,” in “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), 

Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter 

“Andrews”). 

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both 

before and after the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

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“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 

1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he alleges he is facing 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 

F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing.”).

II. Application to Plaintiff

As an initial matter, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and has 

ascertained that it does not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced 

‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Instead, Plaintiff claims San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department officials retaliated against him after he filed several inmate grievances 

against them while he was detained in the County Jail in October 2012. See ECF No. 1 at 

3-5. He does not claim that he faced any “imminent” or “on going danger” as a result of 

Defendants’ actions when he filed his Complaint from KVSP more than three years later 

in December 2015. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053 (“[T]he availability of [§ 1915(g)’s 

imminent danger] exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced at the time the 

complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.”); see also Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 

F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that “allegations that the prisoner faced imminent 

danger in the past” are insufficient to trigger section 1915(g)’s imminent and serious 

physical injury exception); see also Finley v. Silva, 2011 WL 4529669 at * 2 (S.D. Cal. 

Sept. 28, 2011) (unpublished) (finding plaintiff’s claims that prison officials “‘fabricated’

disciplinary charges against him, and damaged or confiscated several items of his 

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personal property in retaliation for his filing inmate grievances” insufficient to satisfy 

§ 1915(g)’s “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception); Gonzales v. Castro, 

2010 WL 2471030 at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (unpublished) (finding prisoner’s

allegations of retaliation insufficient to “constitute a real danger . . . or even an ongoing 

threat” of “serious physical injury” under § 1915(g)); Marshall v. Florida Dept. of 

Corrections, 2009 WL 1873745 at * 1 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2009) (finding “vague and 

non-specific threats and ‘danger’ at the hands of correctional officers ... in retaliation for 

[plaintiff's] persistent grievance filing,” insufficient to meet § 1915(g) “imminent danger 

of serious physical injury” exception).

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without 

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at 

issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. 

Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff, Guillermo Trujillo Cruz, 

identified as CDCR Inmate #AA-2974, while detained or incarcerated, has filed more 

than three civil actions which have been determined to be frivolous or malicious, or 

which have been dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

 They are: 

1) Trujillo v. Ruiz, et al., Civil Case No. 1:14-cv-00975-SAB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 

2016) (Order Dismissing Action for Failure to State a Claim upon which 

Relief Could be Granted) (ECF No. 22) (strike one);1

 

1 Plaintiff’s appeal of this dismissal, No. 16-15101, is still pending before the Ninth Circuit, 

see ECF Nos. 24-27. Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, however, Judge Boone’s 

Order of Dismissal still qualifies as a ‘strike’ against Plaintiff pursuant to § 1915(g). See 

Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1765 (“[W]e hold that a prisoner who has accumulated three prior 

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2) Trujillo v. Munoz, 2016 WL 2743206 at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) 

(unpublished) (Order Dismissing Complaint with Prejudice [for failing to 

state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A]), Civil Case 

No. 1:14-cv-00976-DLB (ECF No. 19) (strike two);

3) Trujillo v. Munoz, 2016 WL 2898405 at *1-3 (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2016) 

(unpublished) (Order Dismissing this Action for Failure to State a Claim 

Upon Which Relief Could be Granted (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

and 1915A)), Civil Case No. 1:14-cv-01215-SAB (ECF No. 21) (strike 

three); and 

4) Trujillo v. Sherman, Civil Case No. 1:14-cv-01401-BAM (E.D. Cal. April 

24, 2015) (Order Dismissing Action for Failing to State a Claim [pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A]) (ECF No. 22); aff’d Trujillo v. 

Sherman, 632 Fed. Appx. 426 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2016) (strike four).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated at least three 

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all 

prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing 

the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed 

IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

 

qualifying dismissals under § 1915(g) may not file an additional suit in forma pauperis

while his appeal of one such dismissal is pending.”).

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III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court: 

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 4) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

(2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to 

prepay the $400 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); and

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 7, 2016

HON. BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, CHIEF JUDGE

United States District Court

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