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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-51153

Summary Calendar

RON VALENTINE, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:14-CV-271

Before PRADO, OWEN, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ron Valentine’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was dismissed on the ground 

that the favorable-termination rule articulated in Heck v. Humphrey1 bars his 

suit. We do not reach this issue because we must dismiss Valentine’s suit 

because he lacks standing.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 13, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-51153

I

Valentine was convicted of disorderly conduct under Texas Penal Code

§ 42.01(a)(5), a provision that prohibits unreasonable noise in certain 

circumstances.2 Valentine appealed his conviction to the Seventh Court of 

Appeals of Texas, arguing, inter alia, that his right to free speech was violated.3 

The Seventh Court of Appeals indicated that the First Amendment issue was 

not preserved for review, overruled Valentine’s remaining issues, and affirmed 

the judgment.4 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Valentine’s 

petition for discretionary review.5

Valentine then filed suit in federal district court under § 1983, seeking a 

declaratory judgment that his conviction violated the First Amendment and 

that the Texas state courts afforded him inadequate processes to raise his First 

Amendment defense. Valentine attempted to proceed in forma pauperis, so a 

magistrate judge made recommendations on the merits of Valentine’s claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The magistrate concluded that Heck v. 

Humphrey’s favorable-termination rule barred Valentine’s suit. The district 

court agreed and dismissed the case. Valentine now appeals.

2 TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.01(a)(5) provides:

A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly . . . makes 

unreasonable noise in a public place other than a sport shooting range, as 

defined by Section 250.001, Local Government Code, or in or near a private 

residence that he has no right to occupy.

3 Valentine v. State, No. 07-12-0307-CR, 2013 WL 1800112, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

Apr. 25, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

4 Id. at *1-2.

5 In re Valentine, No. PD-0836-13, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 11, at *1 (Tex. Crim. 

App. Jan. 15, 2014) (not designated for publication).

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II

A federal court must, when necessary, raise the issue of Article III 

standing sua sponte.6 Article III standing requires a showing of “injury in fact, 

causation, and redressability.”7 We examine standing on a claim-by-claim 

basis; standing to bring a claim for damages does not confer standing to bring 

the case as a whole.8

Valentine requests only declaratory relief, seeking to establish that his 

conviction violated the First Amendment and that the Texas courts did not 

afford him adequate processes to raise his First Amendment defense. Even 

construing Valentine’s pro se pleadings liberally,9 he only seeks relief from his 

conviction, not prospective relief—i.e., relief from future applications of Texas 

Penal Code § 42.01(a)(5).

Valentine lacks standing because his suit does not meet the 

redressability requirement. “Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered 

cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the 

redressability requirement.”10 By itself, a declaration that Valentine’s First 

Amendment rights were violated by his conviction will afford Valentine no 

remedy. Valentine does not seek damages,11 so his only conceivable remedy 

6 Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 331-32 (5th Cir. 

2002) (citing SEC v. Forex Asset Mgmt., LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2001)).

7 Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 648 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).

8 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983) (holding that although 

the plaintiff likely had standing to bring a claim for damages for excessive force, the plaintiff 

lacked standing to seek an injunction that would prohibit police from using the tactics at 

issue in the excessive-force claim).

9 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

10 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107.

11 Id. at 103 (noting that redressability looks to the “likelihood that the requested relief 

will redress the alleged injury” (emphasis added)).

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would be having his conviction invalidated. Valentine is not in custody, so we 

cannot construe his suit as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.12 We have also 

held that a party cannot “use the Declaratory Judgment Act to appeal his 

criminal conviction.”13 Valentine’s suit will not remedy any injury stemming 

from his conviction. Because Valentine’s suit must be dismissed for lack of 

standing, we do not reach his argument that the district court misapplied 

Heck’s favorable-termination rule.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and 

REMAND for an entry of dismissal.14

12 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

13 Johnson v. Onion, 761 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1985); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (providing 

jurisdiction for the Supreme Court to review certain state-court judgments when a party 

petitions for writ of certiorari); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 

283-84 (2005) (holding that because of § 1257, the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to 

review and reject “state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced”).

14 See Friends of St. Frances Xavier Cabrini Church v. FEMA, 658 F.3d 460, 468 (5th 

Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

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