Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_18-cv-01212/USCOURTS-alnd-1_18-cv-01212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

MILTON MINTER,

Petitioner,

v.

FCI TALLADEGA WARDEN, et al.,

Respondents.

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Case No.: 1:18-cv-1212-MHH-JHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Mr. 

Minter seeks recalculation of his federal sentence based on time spent in federal 

presentence custody on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Mr. Minter was 

held in custody pursuant to the writ from May 26, 2015 through January 23, 2017. 

(Doc. 1). The magistrate judge has recommended that the Court deny Mr. Minter’s 

habeas petition. (Doc. 9). Mr. Minter objects to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. (Doc. 12). 

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

When a party objects to a report and recommendation, the district court must “make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. The Court reviews 

for plain error proposed factual findings to which no objection is made, and the Court 

FILED

 2020 Jan-13 PM 12:01

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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reviews propositions of law de novo. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th 

Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (per 

curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984) (“The failure to object to the 

magistrate’s findings of fact prohibits an attack on appeal of the factual findings 

adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”) 

(internal citation omitted); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 

2006).

In his objections, Mr. Minter argues, as he did in his habeas petition, that when 

he was borrowed from state custody in Georgia pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus 

ad prosequendum, he had a legitimate expectation of parole, and, consequently, a

protected liberty interest in parole that should serve as the basis for federal credit for 

the months he served in custody on the writ. Mr. Minter explains that when he was 

taken into custody on the writ on May 26, 2015, he was housed at a transitional 

center, and he was able to leave the center to spend weekends with his family. (Doc. 

1, p. 17; Doc. 12, p. 9). Mr. Minter contends that as of May 2015, he had been living 

at the transitional center for approximately four months, and his tentative date for

state parole was November 30, 2015. (Doc. 12, p. 9). He argues that under 

Georgia’s parole guidelines, his “Tentative Parole Month” is “the month ‘during 

which the offender may expect to be released.’” (Doc. 12, p. 14) (citing Parole 

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Decision Guidelines System P 8-27.01). Thus, he contends he had a legitimate 

expectation of parole.

The law does not support Mr. Minter’s argument. As the magistrate judge 

explained, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a state parole system may create a 

legitimate expectation of parole. For purposes of a liberty interest analysis, a court’s 

evaluation of a parole system turns on the state statutes and regulations that establish 

the scope of state officials’ discretion when making parole decisions. Sultenfuss v. 

Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1499-1503 (11th Cir. 1994). An individual’s subjective 

expectation based on his particular status is not part of the liberty interest analysis. 

In Sultenfuss, the Eleventh Circuit held that “Georgia’s parole system in its entirety” 

does not create a protected liberty interest. 35 F.3d at 1502. The Eleventh Circuit 

found that Georgia’s parole system includes a statutory presumption against parole, 

and there is no meaningful statutory or regulatory limit on state officials’ discretion 

to make parole decisions. 35 F.3d at 1501. 

Mr. Minter contends that the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Sultenfuss is 

flawed (Doc. 12, pp. 14-25), but this Court is bound to apply Sultenfuss. Fox v. 

Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A] district court in this 

circuit is bound by this court’s decisions.”); Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs.’ Group 

Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 900 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he district court is bound 

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by controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent.”) (emphasis in Springer). If Mr. Minter 

wishes to challenge that decision, he must do so in the Court of Appeals.

In addition, as Mr. Minter recognizes, under Georgia’s parole guidelines, the 

“Tentative Parole Month” is the month an offender may expect to be released, 

“absent new information or other cause to cancel the Board’s tentative release 

decision.” (Doc. 12, p. 20). The caveat impacts the expectation. Here, there was 

information that likely would have affected the Georgia Parole Board’s release 

decision, namely the new federal charge. Thus, even if the liberty interest test were 

tied to an individual offender’s subjective expectation, Mr. Minter could not have 

reasonably relied on the date in the Parole Board’s tentative release decision after he 

learned of the federal charge against him. The Court does not mean to minimize the 

expectation that Mr. Minter had prior to the federal charge, and the Court recognizes 

that result in this case appears harsh because Mr. Minter seemed to be progressing 

well toward parole. See Curtis v. Billingsley, No. 16-CV-2558 (PGG) (JLC), 2017 

WL 1103005, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2017) (recognizing that “the application of 

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) produce[d] a seemingly harsh result” where, “[b]efore his 

transfer to federal custody,” the petitioner “was not incarcerated in a state prison or 

jail, but rather was participating in a residential drug-treatment program” where he 

“had only one week remaining in the program”). But the new federal charge made 

Mr. Minter’s expectation of a November 2015 parole date speculative. 

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Because Mr. Minter had no protected liberty interest in his tentative parole 

date, his federal presentence custody did not improperly prolong his state sentence 

in violation of the Due Process Clause. Therefore, the Court accepts the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation and denies Mr. Minter’s petition with prejudice as 

untimely. The Court will enter a separate final order. 

DONE this 13th day of January, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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