Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01342/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Reuben James Thompson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-01342-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 101), 

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 103), 

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts to Discredit Defendant’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 104) and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 112). For the reasons 

that follow, Defendant’s Motion will be granted. 

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

A motion for summary judgment tests whether the opposing party has sufficient 

evidence to merit a trial. At its core it questions whether sufficient evidence exists from 

which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the party opposing the motion. Summary 

judgment should be granted if the evidence reveals no genuine dispute about any material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law, and a factual issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

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a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). The nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense by 

more than simply showing “there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The Court 

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, must not weigh 

the evidence or assess its credibility, and must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 

475 U.S. at 587. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. Title VII 

 “In order to prevail in a Title VII case, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 

2003). “If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, then the burden shifts to the defendant to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory 

conduct.” Id. “If the defendant provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to the 

plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination.” Id. “The 

prima facie case may be based either on ... more direct evidence of discriminatory intent” 

or on “a presumption arising from” a four-factor test established by the Supreme Court in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): (1) the plaintiff belongs to a 

protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position, (3) he suffered an adverse 

employment action, and (4) “other employees with qualifications similar to [his] own 

were treated more favorably.” See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 

(9th Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Direct evidence is 

evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference 

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or presumption.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 Plaintiff has not adduced any direct evidence of discrimination regarding his 

termination. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges several of his co-workers and 

supervisors made racially insensitive comments during the course of his employment, 

such as expressing surprise that a black employee “could have so much education and 

experience” and telling Plaintiff, on his first day, that “he sounds white over the phone.” 

Doc. 26 at 2. But in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the “nonmoving party 

may not rely merely on the unsupported or conclusory allegations of [his] pleadings.” 

Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Rather, a “party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 

must support the assertion” either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” 

or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Plaintiff has done neither. Moreover, none of the 

comments Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint was made by Troy Olson, the 

supervisor who recommended Plaintiff’s termination, or Richard Fontanilla, who 

authored the Notice of Decision in Plaintiff’s case. See Doc. 26 at 2; Doc. 102-1 at 6-8. 

If Plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discrimination, then, it must be through 

reliance on the McDonnell Douglas factors. 

 Defendant concedes that Plaintiff satisfies the first three requirements of the 

McDonnell Douglas test. To satisfy the final requirement, Plaintiff must show that other 

employees, to whom he was “similarly situated ... in all material respects,” received 

more favorable treatment. See Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 554 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citation omitted). If Plaintiff cannot make such a showing, his prima facie case fails, and 

summary judgment is appropriate. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 756-57 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Plaintiff has brought forward no evidence from discovery that suggests—nor did he 

even allege in his Amended Complaint—that other of Defendant’s employees, who were 

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similarly situated to Plaintiff, received more favorable treatment. Indeed, the record is 

completely devoid of accounts of other employees whom Defendant treated differently 

under analogous circumstances. Because Plaintiff has not shown his treatment differed in 

any way from Defendant’s treatment of other employees, he has not established a prima 

facie case of discrimination. 

 Even if Plaintiff could make a prima facie showing, his Title VII claim still would 

not survive summary judgment. Defendant has “articulate[d] a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct,” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 

640, namely Plaintiff’s arrest for marijuana possession in February 2011 and his prior 

suspension for public intoxication in Afghanistan. Possession of marijuana is illegal 

under federal law, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), and Plaintiff does not dispute that, on 

numerous occasions between December 2010 and April 2011, he possessed the drug 

while driving a government vehicle, Doc. 102-2 at 91-92. It is irrelevant that Plaintiff 

claims to need marijuana for medical reasons. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law, 

which prohibits possession of marijuana without making any exception for medicinal use, 

trumps any state laws permitting a patient to possess marijuana when prescribed by a 

doctor. See United States v. $186,416.00 in United States Currency, 590 F.3d 942, 945 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“The federal government has not recognized a legitimate medical use for 

marijuana, however, and there is no exception for medical marijuana distribution or 

possession under the federal Controlled Substances Act.” (citations omitted)). Therefore 

neither Plaintiff’s California medical-marijuana card, nor his Arizona card—for which 

the requisite doctor’s recommendation was issued after his February 2011 arrest, Doc. 

102-1 at 20—renders illegitimate Defendant’s proffered explanation for Plaintiff’s 

adverse employment action. 

 Defendant having offered a nondiscriminatory reason for its termination of 

Plaintiff, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that Defendant’s explanation is a 

“pretext for discrimination.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. “[A] plaintiff can prove pretext 

in two ways: (1) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 

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‘unworthy of credence’ because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable, 

or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the 

employer.” Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration and 

emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not 

carried his burden. He has produced no direct evidence that Defendant acted out of 

discriminatory motive and has not shown that Defendant’s proffered explanation is 

“internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable.” As a result, Defendant is entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim. 

B. Disability Discrimination 

 Plaintiff also seeks damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which 

does not cover employees of federal agencies. See Daniels v. Chertoff, No. CV 06-2891-

PHX-JAT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28750, at *8-9 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2007) (“[F]ederal 

courts have concluded that the ADA provides no remedy to federal employees.” (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i))). Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim will therefore be 

treated as one arising under the Rehabilitation Act, which is “the exclusive remedy for 

handicap discrimination claims by federal employees.” Miller v. Olesiuk, No. C-13-

01856 EDL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121222, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (citing Johnston v. Horne, 875 F.2d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 

1989)). The nature of Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is unclear from the Amended 

Complaint. Because the Amended Complaint at no point suggests that Defendant failed 

to provide a requested reasonable accommodation, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim 

to “allege discrimination based on discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 

1330, 1339 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive summary judgment in such a case, the plaintiff 

must make a prima facie showing that he suffered an adverse employment action “under 

circumstances indicating discrimination on the basis of an impermissible factor.” See id.

at 1340 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Thereafter, the burden shifts to 

the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by coming forward with 

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evidence that the plaintiff [suffered the adverse employment action] for a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. “If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts back to 

the plaintiffs to demonstrate the proffered reason was not the true reason for the decision 

or that it encompassed unjustified consideration of the handicap itself, i.e., that the 

articulated reason is a pretext.” Id. (citation omitted). 

 Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the 

Rehabilitation Act, and that he can make out a prima facie case of discrimination, 

Defendant has nevertheless produced evidence that Plaintiff was terminated for a 

“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,” i.e., his possession of illegal narcotics and 

previous discipline in Afghanistan. Plaintiff has not carried his burden of demonstrating 

that Defendant’s stated reason is pretextual. Indeed, nothing in the record, or even in 

Plaintiff’s pleadings, suggests Defendant engaged in “discriminatory treatment caused by 

overt prejudices.” Id. at 1339. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 101) is granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of 

Defendants and that Plaintiff take nothing. 

 Dated this 17th day of October, 2014. 

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