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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United Stites C.ourt of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JEANETTE M. WILDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN o. MARSH, JR., Secretary of the 

Army, in his official capacity; 

THOMAS J.P. JONES, Major General 

Commander, U.S. Army, WSMR, in his 

official capacity; Department of the 

Army; and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

AUG 11991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-2272 

No. Civ 88-1183 HB) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Plaintiff-appellant, Jeanette M. Wilder, appeals three 

actions of the district court with regard to her complaint of 

racial discrimination in employment, intentional interference with 

the marital relationship, housing discrimination and retaliation 

for protected Title VII activity. Our review of the record in 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2272 Document: 010110130203 Date Filed: 08/01/1991 Page: 1 
this case and the application of the relevant legal standards 

1 confirms the district court in all respects. We affirm. 

Ms. Wilder is a black female with an undergraduate degree and 

a masters degree in elementary education who was employed at the 

Directorate for Personnel and Community Activities, Army Community 

Services Division, Child Development Services Branch, White Sands 

Missile Range, New Mexico (WSMR). In December 1987, after having 

been denied promotion to the position of Education Program 

Specialist, Ms. Wilder filed an informal complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Office at WSMR alleging discrimination on 

the basis of race by her supervisor, Ms. Denise Rodriguez, the 

person responsible for filling available job openings in the Child 

Development Services Branch. When Ms. Wilder was later 

unsuccessful in advancing to the position of School Age/Latch Key 

Program Specialist, she filed a formal complaint of 

discrimination. 

In March 1988, after her formal complaint was filed, 

Ms. Wilder applied for three other positions in the Child 

Development Services Branch: Child Development Services Director, 

Family Child Care Director, and Supplemental Outreach Director. 

Ms. Rodriguez' supervisor evaluated the applicants for these three 

positions and made the employment decisions. Ms. Wilder was not 

selected for any of the positions. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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While Ms. Wilder was engaged in trying to obtain a promotion, 

her husband was having difficulties on a different front. On 

January 11, 1988, Sergeant Theodore Wilder tested positive for 

marijuana use on a random urinalysis. When questioned, Sergeant 

Wilder admitted that he had used hashish while stationed in 

Germany and that he had recently been on vacation in Florida and 

Georgia but had not been around anyone who had been smoking 

marijuana. However, in appealing his nonjudicial punishment to 

the base commander, General Jones, Sergeant Wilder stated that he 

had never used an illegal drug and that he had, indeed, associated 

with friends while on his recent vacation who had been smoking 

marijuana. General Jones, who had previously partially suspended 

Sergeant Wilder's sentence, withdrew his partial suspension when 

he learned of the Sergeant's inconsistent statements and initiated 

an action to separate Sergeant Wilder from the Army for a pattern 

of misconduct. Sergeant Wilder was given a General Discharge 

Certificate and ordered to leave WSMR. In order to remain 

together following his separation from military sei:vice~ Ms. 

Wilder and her husband "cleared their quarters" and moved together 

to El Paso, Texas. 

On May 4, 1988, two days before General Jones withdrew his 

suspension of Sergeant Wilder's punishment, a hearing on 

Ms. Wilder's discrimination complaint was conducted by the 

U.S. Army Civilian Appellate Review Agency. On May 12, 1988, 

Ms. Wilder met with General Jones to complain of her alleged 

discriminatory treatment and to request his personal intervention. 

General Jones declined this request pending the outcome of the 

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formal EEO investigation. On June 8, 1988, the EEO advised Ms. 

Wilder that a preponderance of the evidence did not support her 

claim of discrimination and that relief would be denied. Ms. 

Wilder submitted a letter of resignation in September 1988 and 

filed her complaint in this matter in the district court in 

December of that year, naming as defendants John O. Marsh, Jr., 

the Secretary of the Army; Major General Thomas J.P. Jones, the 

commander at WSMR; the Department of the Army, and the United 

States. 

In response to General Jones' motion to dismiss, the district 

court held that Ms. Wilder's claims were all employment 

discrimination claims controlled by Title VII and, as such, the 

only proper defendant was John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the 

Army and head of the department for which Ms. Wilder worked. 

Wilder v. Marsh, CIV 88-1183 HB, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4 

(D.N.M., Aug. 23, 1989). The court thus dismissed the Title VII 

claims against General Jones. Id. at 6. Ms. Wilder, however, was 

granted ieave to amend her complaint to allege facts tending to 

show intentional interference with the marital relationship and a 

housing discrimination claim. Id. at 5-6. Ms. Wilder argues that 

her husband's discharge and their subsequent loss of government 

housing was retaliation against her for engaging in protected 

Title VII activity. 

The district court eventually dismissed all claims against 

General Jones, holding that Ms. Wilder had failed to allege facts 

sufficient to establish the elements required for a claim of 

intentional interference with the marital relationship or for 

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, 

housing discrimination and that, even if facts sufficient to 

constitute such constitutional violations had been alleged, 

General Jones had qualified immunity from prosecution. Wilder v. 

Marsh, CIV 88-1183 HB, Order at 2-4 (D.N.M., April 5, 1990). The 

court, however, refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the 

United States (or, more properly, in favor of defendant Marsh), 

and a bench trial on the merits resulted in a judgment denying 

relief to Ms. Wilder. It is from these three rulings of the 

district court that Ms. Wilder appeals. 

Ms. Wilder first argues that because General Jones had wide 

ranging authority and control over activities at WSMR, he is a 

proper defendant in a Title VII action. This argument is without 

merit. Title VII is the -exclusive remedy for federal employment 

discrimination claims. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 

820, 835 (1976); Owens v. United States, 822 F.2d 408, 410 (3d 

Cir. 1987). The only proper defendant in such an action is the 

head of the agency or department in which the plaintiff is 

employed. 42 u.s.c. S 2000e-l&(c); Owens, 822 F.2d at 410. As 

tfie Secretary of the Armyr John O. Marsh, Jr., not General Jones, 

is the only appropriate defendant notwithstanding the scope of 

General Jones' actual authority over personnel and matters at 

WSMR. The district court was correct in dismissing all Title VII 

claims against General Jones. 

Ms. Wilder's claim of interference with the marital 

relationship and her housing discrimination claim, however, do not 

fall under the aegis of Title VII because they are not based on 

discrimination in the terms and condition of her employment. She, 

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therefore, could properly name General Jones as a defendant to 

these allegations. As noted above, the district court in ruling 

on General Jones' motion to dismiss the amended complaint or in 

the alternative for summary judgment held that Ms. Wilder had 

failed to allege the elements necessary to support a claim of 

intentional interference with the marital relationship or of 

housing discrimination. After a de novo review of the record, we 

agree. 

Whether framed as a common 

unconstitutional infringement of 

law tort or cast 

the freedom of 

as an 

intimate 

association required to state a claim under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

Ms. Wilder was required to allege facts sufficient to show that 

General Jones intended to interfere with her marriage. See 

Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1189 n.6, 1190 

(10th Cir. 1985). Because she has failed to make this showing, 

the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 

defendant on this claim was correct. 

With regard to Ms. Wilder's clam of intentional denial of 

access to government housing because of race, there is no evidence 

in the record that Ms. Wilder, as a civilian employee at WSMR, 

applied for and was denied access to base housing after her 

husband's separation from the Army. Summary judgment in favor of 

the defendant on this claim, therefore, was also proper. 

Ms. Wilder next argues that the district court erred in 

failing to find that she was the victim of both racial 

discrimination and retaliation for exercising protected activities 

under Title VII. No issues of law are raised on appeal. Our 

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review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the district 

court's factual findings of neither discrimination nor retaliation 

are clearly erroneous. Reyes v. Hoffman, 580 F.2d 393, 394 (10th 

Cir. 1978). We may reverse the district court only if, after 

review of the entire evidence, we are "left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Nulf v. 

International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1981) 

(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 

395 (1948)). 

Because Ms. Wilder alleged that she had been denied promotion 

because of her race, she has articulated a "disparate treatment" 

claim. In order to prevail, Ms. Wilder must first prove a prima 

facie case of race discrimination. Texas Dept. of Community 

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). If she is 

successful, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's rejection. 

Id. at 253. If the defendant is successful, the burden shifts 

back to the plaintiff who then must prove that the articulated 

reasons of defendant are mere pretext for discrimination. Id. It 

is at this third step in the shifting of burden that Ms. Wilder 

fails to make her case. 

In December 1987, Ms. Wilder applied for one of three 

positions as an Educational Program Specialist. She was among 

four candidates selected for an interview. The evidence showed 

that the final selections were based on the applicants' knowledge 

of the developmental approach to childhood development, experience 

in training adults and experience and knowledge of early childhood 

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I 

.., 

principles. Rec. Vol. I at 71-72. There is no evidence that 

racial discrimination played a role in these selections. In fact, 

one of the applicants chosen was a black woman. DefendantAppellee's Supplemental Appendix at 23. With regard to the 

position of School Age/Latch Key Program Specialist, the position 

was assigned to another applicant pursuant to the Army's mandatory 

spousal preference policy, for which Ms. Wilder did not qualify. 

Id. at 30. 

In April 1988, Ms. Wilder applied for three director 

positions with the Child Development Services Branch and failed to 

be selected for any of them. The defendant, however, offered 

uncontradicted evidence that all three selectees had more relevant 

experience for the positions than Ms. Wilder. Wilder v. Marsh, 

No. CIV 88-1183 HB, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 15 

(D.N.M. Nov. 6, 1990). 2 

As noted above, in response to defendant's evidence of the 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment 

decisions, Ms. Wilder was required to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that these reasons were eretextual. See Burdine, 450 

U.S. at 253. Because Ms. Wilder failed to sustain this burden, we 

affirm the district court on the issue of racial discrimination in 

employment. 

2 This evidence is referred to by the district court in its 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law but that portion of the 

trial transcript containing this testimony was not designated by 

Ms. Wilder or the appellees on appeal. The district court's 

factual findings regarding this evidence, therefore, must be 

accepted as correct. Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502, 504 

(10th Cir. 1976). 

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In addition to alleging overt discrimination, Ms. Wilder 

alleged that she was the victim of retaliation because she had 

filed an EEO complaint. In order to prevail on this claim, Ms. 

Wilder was required to prove that: 

(1) she engaged in protected opposition to Title VII 

discrimination or participated in a Title VII 

proceeding; (2) she was disadvantaged by an action of 

her employer subsequent to or contemporaneously with 

such opposition or participation; and (3) there is a 

causal connection between the protected activity and the 

adverse employment action. 

Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); accord Smalley v. City 

of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1981). As with a 

Title VII case, if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Burris, 683 F.2d 

at 343. As analyzed above, Ms. Wilder failed to prove that any of 

the reasons articulated by defendant for his treatment of her in 

the course of making employment decisions were mere pretexts for 

racial discrimination. Nor waa. there evidence that Ms. Wilder's 

husband was disciplined more harshly because his wife had filed an 

EEO complaint. 

After review of the record on appeal, we are not "left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed," see Nulf, 656 F.2d at 558, and therefore AFFIRM the 

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judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

New Mexico. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

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