Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01472/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01472-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Theodore M. Gomez, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-01472 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, Arizona Attorney)

General, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 26, 2011. Respondents

filed an answer to the petition on October 12, 2011. See Doc.

9. Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his petition and a

memorandum of law in support thereof on November 15, 2011. See

Doc. 13 & Doc. 14.

I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment issued December

27, 1995, charged Petitioner with six counts of sexual conduct

with a minor and one count of sexual abuse. See Answer, Exh. A.

All of the charges involved the same victim, a girl under the

age of fifteen. Id., Exh. A. In a written plea agreement

resolving these charges signed by Petitioner on March 6, 1996,

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Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to two counts of attempted

sexual conduct with a minor, designated as class 3 felonies and

dangerous crimes against children in the second degree. Id.,

Exh. B. In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea the state

dismissed the other counts of the indictment. See id., Exh. B.

The plea agreement specified that Petitioner would serve one

year of “flat” time for each conviction and also be sentenced to

serve a term of lifetime probation. The plea agreement

specified that whether the sentences of imprisonment would be

imposed consecutively or concurrently would be at the discretion

of the sentencing court. Id., Exh. B.

On April 3, 1996, the state trial court suspended the

imposition of sentence and placed Petitioner on lifetime

probation. Id., Exh. C. The court ordered that, as a term of

probation, Petitioner serve one year of flat time incarceration

in a Maricopa County Jail. Id., Exh. C. 

In April of 1999, following a finding that Petitioner

had violated the terms of his probation, the state court

reinstated Petitioner to lifetime probation. Id., Exh. D. In

December 1999, following a second finding that Petitioner had

committed a probation violation, the state court again

reinstated Petitioner to lifetime probation. Id., Exh. E.

On July 6, 2000, after a third finding of a probation

violation, the state court imposed a 10-year term of

imprisonment pursuant to Petitioner’s conviction on Count 1 of

the indictment. See id., Exh. F. With regard to Petitioner’s

conviction on Count 2, the state court reinstated a term of

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lifetime probation. Id., Exh. F.

On August 3, 2000, Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief. See id., Exh. G. On March 16,

2001, the Superior Court dismissed the action, citing

Petitioner’s failure to timely file a brief in support of his

action for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. H.

On December 14, 2007, apparently after Petitioner’s

release from prison pursuant to the sentence imposed in 2000,

probation violation proceedings were again commenced and

resulted in Petitioner’s admission of violation of probation.

Id., Exh. I & Exh. J. On February 4, 2008, the state court found

Petitioner had violated a term of probation imposed with regard

to his conviction on Count 2 of the 1995 indictment, and

sentenced Petitioner to a 10-year term of incarceration on Count

2. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner was given credit for 694 days of

pre-sentence incarceration. Id., Exh. K.

On March 17, 2008, Petitioner initiated an action for

post-conviction relief with regard to the revocation of his

probation and the imposition of the ten year sentence imposed on

December 17, 2007, pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. L. In this action Petitioner

asserted that, prior to 1997, the Arizona legislature had

specifically provided that defendants could not be sentenced to

a term of lifetime probation for an attempted or prepatory

crime. Id., Exh. M. Accordingly, Petitioner argued, he could

not be sentenced to a term of lifetime probation pursuant to his

conviction based on the 1996 plea agreement. Petitioner’s brief

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cites to state legislative history and state court decisions.

Petitioner also cited to a single United States Supreme Court

opinion and declared that his sentence violated his federal

constitutional right to be free of ex post facto laws. See id.,

Exh. M. Petitioner argued that his claim was timely because the

sentencing error was fundamental.

 The state court dismissed the post-conviction relief

proceedings as untimely. See id., Exh. P.

First, his claim is precluded as not timely

filed and not previously raised when it could

have been. Second, even if his claim is

legally valid, it does not apply to him as he

never served five years of probation when

time is subtracted for periods of absconding,

the other prison sentence being served,

pending court proceedings, etc.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on February 25,

2011. Id., Exh. Q & Exh. R. 

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief

because, he alleges, the sentence imposed with regard to his

conviction in 1996 for crimes occurring in 1995 was not

authorized by state statutes, i.e., he was sentenced to a term

of lifetime probation in violation of his right to due process

of law. 

Respondents allow that the habeas action is timely

filed but contend Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable

claim for relief and that Petitioner failed to properly exhaust

his claims in the state court because Petitioner did not assert

the same basis for relief to all levels of the state courts when

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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exhausting his claims.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007). 

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2 A petitioner must present to the state courts the

“substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th

Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007).

Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the

federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more

than present the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

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To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.2 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

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refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

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Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

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F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

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Petitioner presented the same legal argument raised in

his habeas petition in his state Rule 32 action. However,

Petitioner did not clearly present his claim as a violation of

his federal constitutional rights. In his action for state

post-conviction relief Petitioner did not use the term “due

process,” cite to any federal case or state case applying

federal law with regard to a violation of the right to due

process in sentencing. Petitioner summarily alleged a generic

violation of his federal as well as his state constitutional

rights. Petitioner alleged, without explication, that he had

been denied his right to be free of an ex post facto law.

Further in his brief in his state Rule 32 action Petitioner

mentioned that the sentencing violated his right to equal

protection. Because Petitioner did not properly exhaust his

federal habeas claim asserting a violation of his right to due

process of law, the Court may not grant relief on the merits of

the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Woods v.

Sinclair, 655 F.3d 886, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner does

not assert that he is actually innocent of the crimes of

conviction or that he did not commit the probation violations.

Petitioner does not assert that the plea agreement’s provision

of a sentence of lifetime probation was invalid, or that

entering into the plea agreement was other than a voluntary and

knowing act.

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E. Petitioner has failed to state a claim for relief

Additionally, Petitioner’s habeas claim may be denied

because Petitioner has failed to state a claim for relief

cognizable in a section 2254 action. Petitioner asserts that

the state court erred in imposing his sentence, citing state

statutes and state legislative history. Absent a showing of

fundamental unfairness, federal habeas corpus relief is not

available for a state court’s misapplication of its own

sentencing laws. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861

(2011); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct. 475,

479-80 (1991); Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.

2011); Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002);

Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994); Miller v.

Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1989) (claim that

prior conviction was not a “serious felony” under California

sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas corpus

proceeding). A petitioner does not “transform” a claim of error

in application of state law into a federal habeas claim simply

by asserting the error constitutes a violation of their right to

due process. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.

1997).

IV Conclusion

Petitioner failed to exhaust his federal habeas claim

in the state courts as a claim that his federal right to due

process of law was violated. Petitioner has not shown cause for

nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of the claim.

Additionally, the claim may be denied because Petitioner alleges

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the state erred in application of its sentencing laws, a claim

which, absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, does not

state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Gomez’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

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Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 21st day of November, 2011.

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