Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00314-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Erik Scott Maloney, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 13-314-PHX-RCB (BSB) 

 O R D E R 

Plaintiff Erik Scott Maloney, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(Doc. 2). The Court will order Defendants Ryan and Linderman to answer Counts One, 

Two, and Three; will order Defendant Mason to answer Count Two; and will dismiss the 

remaining Defendants without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $17.14. The remainder of the fee will 

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a 

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the 

fees according to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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III. Complaint 

 In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues Arizona Department of Corrections 

Director Charles L. Ryan, Administrator of Pastoral Activities Mike Linderman, 

Complex Warden Lance Hetmer, Former Deputy Warden Stephen Morris, and Chaplain 

Wayne Mason. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his First Amendment right to the free 

exercise of his religion. He contends that Defendants inhibited the exercise of his 

religion when they created, implemented, or enforced a regulation that inhibited his 

sincerely held religious beliefs by not accommodating his meal requirements during 

Ramadan. Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to a policy that permitted Defendant Linderman 

to make recommendations to Defendant Ryan regarding the religious issues, Defendants 

knowingly set the time for breakfast for Muslims during Ramadan for a time after the 

religiously mandated time for fasting had begun. Plaintiff asserts that the policy forced 

him to either forgo breakfast during Ramadan or violate the tenets of his religion. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Ryan implemented the breakfast policy, Defendant 

Linderman recommended the policy and directed others to follow it, Defendant Mason 

participated in and directed the constitutional violations, and Defendants Hetmer and 

Morris knew of the violations and failed to prevent them. 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and denied his Fourteenth Amendment 

rights to due process and equal protection because Defendants provided him with a 

nutritionally inadequate diet during Ramadan and knew that the diet was nutritionally 

inadequate and likely to cause pain and suffering. Plaintiff contends that in prior years 

during Ramadan, Muslims were provided a portion and a half of breakfast pre-dawn and 

a portion and a half of dinner, so that they received the same amount of food as general 

population inmates. Plaintiff asserts that in 2012, Defendants deliberately set the time for 

breakfast for Muslims during Ramadan at a time when they knew the Muslims would be 

prohibited from eating and did so with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and 

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wellbeing and without a penological justification. Because breakfast was provided after 

dawn, Plaintiff was prevented from eating breakfast. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that for 

three days, Defendant Mason instructed kitchen staff to withhold a lunch sack at dinner 

and did so with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and wellbeing and without a 

penological justification. Plaintiff asserts that as a result, he received only one of three 

meals on these days. He claims that he suffered abdominal pain, headaches, severe 

exhaustion, weight loss, and mental and emotional distress. 

 Plaintiff contends that Defendants are liable because Defendant Ryan 

implemented the breakfast policy, Defendant Linderman created and directed the 

implementation of the breakfast policy, Defendant Mason participated in and enforced 

the breakfast policy and acted with deliberate indifference in denying Plaintiff a lunch 

sack for three days, and Defendants Hetmer and Morris knew of the constitutional 

violations and failed to prevent them. 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He asserts that he sought to engage in Sahur, an 

obligatory Islamic exercise during Ramadan in which Muslims prepare to fast each day 

before dawn by eating breakfast, drinking water, and praising and glorifying God. 

Plaintiff contends that the exercise of his religion was substantially burdened and he was 

prohibited from practicing Sahur because Defendants knowingly and intentionally 

implemented a breakfast policy for Muslim inmates that provided breakfast after dawn. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Ryan knowingly implemented the policy, Defendant 

Linderman created and directed the implementation of the policy, Defendant Mason 

participated in and directed the enforcement of the policy, and Defendants Hetmer and 

Morris were aware of the constitutional violations and failed to prevent them. 

 In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and 

monetary damages. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated First Amendment and RLUIPA claims 

against Defendants Ryan and Linderman in Counts One and Three and has stated 

deliberate indifference and equal protection claims against Defendants Ryan, Linderman, 

and Mason in Count Two. The Court will require these Defendants to answer the 

Complaint 

V. Failure to State a Claim

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 

specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 

between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

371-72, 377 (1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and 

therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 

F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Hetmer and Morris are too vague to state 

a claim. At best, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Defendants Hetmer and Morris were 

aware of the breakfast policy and failed to act to prevent alleged constitutional violations. 

Plaintiff has presented nothing that would suggest either Defendant had any authority to 

override the policy and, moreover, Defendants Hetmer and Morris are not liable simply 

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because they failed to intervene or remedy allegedly unconstitutional behavior. See

Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations 

against Defendant Mason regarding the breakfast policy are insufficient to state a claim 

against him. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hetmer 

and Morris and will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims regarding the breakfast policy against 

Defendant Mason. 

VI. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

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Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $17.14. 

 (3) Defendants Hetmer and Morris are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (4) Defendants Ryan and Linderman must answer Counts One, Two, and Three 

of the Complaint and Defendant Mason must answer Count Two. 

 (5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for 

Defendants Ryan, Linderman, and Mason. 

 (6) Plaintiff must complete1

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); 

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

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If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central 

Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works 

there. 

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 (9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and 

Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 

the Plaintiff.

 (11) Defendants must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by 

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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 (12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or 

paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

 (13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 DATED this 6th day of June, 2013. 

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