Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03460/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03460-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3460

CARL C. GILBERT, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DEBORAH MCCULLOUGH,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13 CV 00048 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 28, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. This petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus involves an individual with a pending civil commitment petition who violates his parole and receives a prison 

sentence for that violation. Carl C. Gilbert, Jr. had his parole 

revoked twice after he violated the conditions of his parole 

on two separate occasions. These violations occurred while a 

civil commitment petition was pending against him. At the 

trial on that petition, a jury found Gilbert to be a sexually viCase: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
2 No. 13-3460

olent person, and the court entered a civil commitment order. But because Gilbert was sentenced to prison after his

second parole revocation, he served that sentence before being transferred to a Wisconsin Department of Health Services (“DHS”) facility as a civilly committed person. Gilbert

maintains that his commitment is contrary to the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), because, in his view, there was not a “current” determination 

that he was a sexually violent person when he entered DHS 

care. Although the delay between the commitment verdict

and Gilbert’s entry into DHS care concerns us, we do not 

find the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Gilbert’s due process argument to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the facts that 

Gilbert’s own parole violation caused the delay and he has 

continued to be evaluated without any indication that his 

condition has improved. We therefore affirm the judgment 

of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Gilbert was convicted of second-degree sexual assault in 

Wisconsin state court on December 7, 1992 and sentenced to 

ten years in prison. On December 4, 2006, shortly before he 

completed his sentence (his sentence for sexual assault was 

consecutive to another sentence), the State of Wisconsin filed 

a petition seeking Gilbert’s commitment under Wisconsin 

Statute § 980.02 as a “sexually violent person.” The state circuit court reviewed the petition that day and found probable 

cause to believe that Gilbert was eligible for commitment. 

Gilbert completed the prison portion of his sentence the next 

day, but he was transferred to the Wisconsin Resource CenCase: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 3

ter, a facility operated by DHS, because of the pending 

commitment proceeding. He was still on parole. 

Less than ten days after his transfer to the Center, Gilbert 

violated the conditions of his parole. As a result, he was returned to a Wisconsin Department of Corrections (“DOC”) 

facility on January 19, 2007 pending a decision as to whether 

his parole would be revoked. The circuit court held a commitment petition hearing on March 22, 2007 and found 

probable cause to believe that Gilbert was a “sexually violent

person” within the meaning of chapter 980 of the Wisconsin 

Statutes. The court then ordered Gilbert transferred for evaluation to the Center “or such other authorized institution as 

may be determined by the [DHS].” However, on August 8, 

2007, Gilbert’s parole was revoked, and he was reincarcerated at a DOC-operated facility.

A few months later, on October 17, 2007, the DOC granted Gilbert parole for a second time. Gilbert was transferred 

back to the Center pending resolution of the chapter 980 

commitment petition. A little over a month after his transfer 

back to the Center, on November 25, 2007, Gilbert violated 

the terms of his second parole. He was reincarcerated at a 

DOC-operated facility pending the resolution of a parole 

revocation hearing. On December 28, 2007, his parole was 

revoked, and he began serving the resulting sentence.

Gilbert’s chapter 980 civil commitment trial began on 

February 4, 2008. At the end of a three-day trial, the jury 

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilbert was a “sexually violent person” within the meaning of Wisconsin Statute 

§ 980.06. The court entered a commitment order pursuant to 

§ 980.06 ordering him committed to DHS for control, care, 

and treatment until he was no longer a sexually violent perCase: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
4 No. 13-3460

son, and it ordered that his commitment was to institutional 

care in a secure facility. 

Gilbert was not transferred to a DHS facility at that point, 

however, because he was still serving his sentence for his 

second parole violation. Instead, Gilbert remained in a DOCoperated facility to serve out his sentence. He completed the 

sentence in August 2010. He was then transferred to a DHSoperated facility in light of the February 2008 commitment 

order.1

On January 15, 2009, about eight months before he completed his sentence, Gilbert filed a post-conviction motion 

asserting that his December 28, 2007 parole revocation meant

that the chapter 980 commitment petition must be dismissed. 

The state circuit court denied the petition. The Wisconsin 

appellate court affirmed, finding Gilbert’s commitment authorized by the Wisconsin statutory scheme. In re Commitment of Gilbert, 798 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Wis. App. Ct. 2011)

(“Gilbert I”). The court concluded that Gilbert’s arguments 

relied on statutory interpretation and did not raise any developed constitutional arguments. Id. at 893 n.9. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, with two justices dissenting. In re Commitment of Gilbert, 

816 N.W.2d 215 (Wis. 2012) (“Gilbert II”). It agreed with the 

appellate court that Gilbert’s arguments were centered on 

the statutory interpretation of chapter 980. Id. at 220. The 

Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that chapter 980 did 

not require dismissal of Gilbert’s commitment petition because the chapter does not contain language allowing for 

1 The district court wrote that Gilbert was transferred to a DHS facility in 2009, but the parties agree that the correct date is August 2010.

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 5

dismissal in his circumstances, does not set a time period for 

execution of a commitment order, and provides that an individual may be simultaneously committed under chapter 980 

and incarcerated at a DOC facility. Id. at 222. Regarding the 

last point, the court pointed to § 980.07(6m), which states 

that “[i]f a person committed under § 980.06 is incarcerated 

at a county jail, state correctional institution, or federal correction institution for a new criminal charge or conviction or 

because his or her parole was revoked, any reporting requirement ... does not apply during the incarceration period.” Id. at 226 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 980.07(6m)). Although 

Gilbert had not yet been committed when his parole was revoked, the court found that the language in § 980.07(6m) offered insight into how chapter 980 should be applied as a 

whole, and it ruled that simultaneous incarceration at a DOC 

facility and commitment under chapter 980 is permissible. 

Id. at 226-27.2

While finding Gilbert’s constitutional arguments “poorly 

developed,” the Wisconsin Supreme Court nonetheless addressed them and found no constitutional infirmity in Gilbert’s commitment. Id. at 229-30. The court reasoned that 

nothing in its decision suggested that the State could forgo 

the statutory procedures for commitment set forth in chapter 

980 and that these procedures adequately ensured that at the 

issuance of the commitment order, the court has determined 

2 Gilbert refers to August 2010 as the date of his commitment, while 

the State notes that February 2008 is the date Gilbert was ordered committed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that simultaneous commitment and incarceration were possible under state law, and indeed Wisconsin Statute § 980.07(6m) refers to a “committed” person who is incarcerated.

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
6 No. 13-3460

that the committed person is at that moment a sexually violent person. Id. at 230. The court also stated that if a person 

serves his prison sentence and is then transferred to DHS 

custody, he will be subject to periodic reevaluation to determine whether he remains a sexually violent person. Id. 

(citing Wis. Stat. § 980.07). With these protections, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that sexually violent persons 

would “continue to be ‘held as long as [they are] both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.’” Id. (quoting Foucha, 

504 U.S. at 77). The court concluded that Gilbert’s commitment was constitutionally permissible. Id.

Gilbert filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus

with the federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

district court denied Gilbert’s request for habeas relief, and 

Gilbert appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A petitioner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment may receive a writ of habeas corpus “only on the 

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution 

or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

A violation of state law is not sufficient. Wilson v. Corcoran, 

562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (per curiam). Gilbert maintains he is entitled to habeas relief because, he contends, there was no 

“current” finding that he was a sexually violent person 

when he entered DHS care in August 2010. He argues that

his commitment therefore violates his right to due process 

guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and he requests his immediate release. 

To receive a writ of habeas corpus, Gilbert must demonstrate that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision ruling 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 7

against him was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Gilbert contends that the Wisconsin decision was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha v. Louisana, 504 

U.S. 71 (1992).

The Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are 

not to find lightly that a state court’s decision was “contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States.” For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 

“clearly established Federal law” “refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta,” in Supreme Court decisions. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004) (quotation 

omitted). In Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), for example, the Supreme Court overturned habeas relief granted on 

the basis that courtroom spectators had worn buttons with 

victim photographs. Id. at 72. The Court reasoned that “in

contrast to state-sponsored courtroom practices,” the effect 

of spectator conduct on fair-trial rights “is an open question 

in [the Court’s] jurisprudence” that the Court had never addressed. Id. at 76. “Given the lack of holdings from this 

Court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct of the kind involved here,” the Supreme Court stated, ”it cannot be said that the state court 

‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’” 

Id. at 77 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); see also Wright v. 

Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (per curiam) (reversing 

grant of habeas relief where lawyer participated in plea 

hearing by speakerphone because “[n]o decision of this 

Court ... squarely addresses the issue in this case”). 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
8 No. 13-3460

That said, the Supreme Court has also explained that

“the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical 

facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since ‘a general standard’ from [the Supreme Court’s] cases can supply such law.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664). And state courts “must reasonably 

apply the rules ‘squarely established’ by [the Supreme] 

Court’s holdings to the facts of each case.” White v. Woodall,

134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 

556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).

Even if there is clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court on point, habeas 

relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,” that federal law. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In this regard the Supreme Court has 

made clear that “[a] state court’s determination that a claim 

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 

(2011) (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664). Being merely 

wrong is not sufficient, nor is “clear error” enough. White, 

134 S. Ct. at 1702. Rather, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show 

that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. Moreover, “it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a 

state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 9

not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.” Mirzayance, 556 U.S. at 122 (internal quotations omitted). 

The Supreme Court has clearly established that a convicted felon has a liberty interest in not being civilly committed without appropriate procedures to prove that commitment is warranted. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1980). 

“A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual’s right to freedom from confinement for 

the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the State 

to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional 

due process protections.” Id. at 493-94. The Supreme Court 

has also clearly established that to satisfy due process guarantees, the State must be held to a burden of proof of at least 

“clear and convincing” evidence when it pursues civil commitment. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). Ordinarily, what must be proven is that the person sought to be 

committed is dangerous to himself or others, along with 

some additional factor such as “mental illness,” or “mental 

abnormality,” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997), or

a personality disorder that results in “serious difficulty in 

controlling behavior,” Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-12 

(2002).

Gilbert does not challenge the February 2008 determination that he was a “sexually violent person,” nor does he 

dispute that this determination meant Wisconsin could civilly commit him. Wisconsin has a comprehensive statutory 

scheme for the commitment of sexually violent persons, with 

provisions for, among other things, notice, Wis. Stat. 

§ 980.03(1); appointment of counsel for indigent persons, 

Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2)(a); the right to remain silent, Wis. Stat. 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
10 No. 13-3460

§ 980.03(2)(b); the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2)(c); and the right to a jury trial, 

Wis. Stat. § 980.03(3). Wisconsin also requires that the State

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject of the petition is a sexually violent person. Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a). 

There is no dispute that the State followed all these procedures in Gilbert’s case.

The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt at the commitment trial that Gilbert was a sexually violent person. A 

“sexually violent person” under Wisconsin law is

a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 

offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or 

not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness, 

and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from 

a mental disorder that makes it likely that the person 

will engage in one or more acts of sexual violence.

Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). A “mental disorder” under this provision means “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the 

emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to 

engage in acts of sexual violence.” Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2). Gilbert had been convicted of a sexually violent offense. The 

jury also found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilbert was 

dangerous because he suffers from a mental disorder that 

makes it likely that he will engage in one or more acts of 

sexual violence. 

So the burden of proof did not contravene Supreme 

Court precedent. Nor did the requirements for finding that 

Gilbert could be committed. The procedure by which Gilbert

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 11

was found to be a sexually violent person and therefore 

could be committed was in line with Supreme Court decisions, and Gilbert does not challenge it.

Instead, Gilbert’s position is that his commitment violates 

his federal right to due process because there was no “current” finding that he was a sexually violent person when he 

completed his prison sentence in August 2010 for his second 

parole revocation and was transferred to a DHS-operated 

facility. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this argument, and Gilbert maintains that decision is contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of the United States Supreme 

Court’s decision in Foucha.

Foucha involved a challenge by a person civilly committed under the then-Louisiana state process that “allow[ed] a 

person acquitted by reason of insanity to be committed to a 

mental institution until he is able to demonstrate that he is 

not dangerous to himself and others, even though he does 

not suffer from any mental illness.” 504 U.S. at 73. The Supreme Court held that Terry Foucha’s due process rights 

were violated. Id.

Foucha had been found not guilty by reason of insanity 

of aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. Id. 

at 74. He was then committed. Several years later, the superintendent of Foucha’s facility recommended release. A threemember panel convened at the facility reported that there 

had been no evidence of mental illness in Foucha since his 

admission and recommended his conditional discharge. The 

state court trial judge then appointed a two-member commission consisting of the same two doctors who had examined Foucha before trial. The doctors’ written report stated 

that Foucha was presently in remission from mental illness 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
12 No. 13-3460

but that they could not say he would not be a danger to himself or others if released. Id. at 74-75. The doctor who testified at the hearing said that Foucha had probably suffered 

from a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the crime but 

had since recovered. Id. at 75. The doctor also testified that 

Foucha evidenced no present signs of psychosis or neurosis 

and was in “good shape” mentally, but that Foucha had an 

antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease. The doctor recounted that Foucha had been involved in 

several altercations at the facility, and the doctor stated he 

would not feel comfortable certifying that Foucha would not 

be a danger to himself or others. The trial court ruled that 

Foucha was dangerous to himself and others, and, based on

this determination, ordered Foucha’s commitment to continue. The Louisiana state appellate courts rejected Foucha’s 

argument that his federal due process and equal protection 

rights were violated by the statutory scheme that allowed 

confinement of an insanity acquittee based on dangerousness alone. Id.

The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court

explained that it had held in Addington that to civilly commit 

a person, the State must prove two things by clear and convincing evidence: first, that the person is mentally ill, and 

next, that he requires hospitalization for the protection of 

himself and others. Id., 504 U.S. at 76 (citing Addington, 441 

U.S. 418). But, it explained, when a person is found not 

guilty by reason of insanity (as Foucha had been), that determination establishes that the defendant committed an act 

constituting a criminal offense, and that he did so because of 

mental illness. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 

363 (1983)). As a result, the State in such a case need not go 

through the steps of making the Addington proof because it 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 13

can be inferred from the not guilty by reason of insanity 

verdict that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous at 

the time of the verdict and therefore could be committed. Id. 

The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that it had already held that a person committed because of an insanity 

verdict is entitled to release when he recovers his sanity or is 

no longer dangerous. Id. at 77 (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 368); 

see also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975) 

(unconstitutional to continue to confine a harmless, mentally 

ill person, even if original confinement was permissible, 

where initial basis no longer exists). The Court then stated: 

“In this case, Louisiana does not contend that Foucha was 

mentally ill at the time of the trial court’s hearing.” Foucha, 

504 U.S. at 78. As a result, “the basis for holding Foucha in a 

psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee has disappeared, 

and the State is no longer entitled to hold him on that basis.” 

Id.

The Court next refuted the State’s argument that it could 

continue to confine Foucha on the basis of his antisocial personality, which the trial court had found made him a danger 

to himself or others. Id. at 78. For one, the Court said, in a 

statement Gilbert emphasizes, “even if his continued confinement were constitutionally permissible, keeping Foucha 

against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a 

determination in civil commitment proceedings of current 

mental illness and dangerousness.” Id. at 79. The Court stated that due process requires that the nature of the commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which 

the individual is committed. Yet in the case before it, according to the testimony given at the hearing, “Foucha is not suffering from a mental disease or illness.” Id. That meant, said 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
14 No. 13-3460

the Court, that “[i]f he is to be held, he should not be held as 

a mentally ill person.” Id. The Court next stated that if 

Foucha could no longer be held simply by virtue of being an 

insanity acquittee, he is entitled to constitutionally adequate 

procedures to establish the grounds for his confinement. Id.

The Court recognized that in certain narrow circumstances 

persons may be subject to limited confinement on the sole 

basis that they pose a danger to themselves or others, but it 

found that principle inapplicable in Foucha’s case. Id. at 80-

81.

Justice O’Connor, the fifth vote in favor of finding that 

the Louisiana scheme violated Foucha’s right to due process, 

wrote separately “to emphasize that the Court’s opinion addresses only the specific statutory scheme before us, which 

broadly permits indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities.” Id. at 86-87 (O’Connor, J., 

concurring). She continued: “This case does not require us to

pass judgment on more narrowly drawn laws that provide 

for detention of insanity acquittees, or on statutes that provide for punishment of persons who commit crimes while 

mentally ill.” Id. at 87. She further stated that she did “not 

understand the Court to hold that [a state] may never confine dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain mental 

health.” Id.

In arguing that his commitment is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Foucha, Gilbert stresses one of the 

statements we quoted from that case—“keeping Foucha 

against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a 

determination in civil commitment proceedings of current 

mental illness and dangerousness.” Id. at 78. Gilbert contends that he must be released because, according to him, 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 15

there was not a “current” showing that he was a sexually violent person in August 2010 when he was transferred to a 

DHS facility. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the argument that Foucha’s “current mental illness and dangerousness” language meant Gilbert was entitled to release, and 

our question is whether that decision “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

Were the question presented to us an initial question of 

federal constitutional law, we might reach a different result.

The two-and-a-half year delay between the order of commitment and Gilbert’s entry into DHS care is certainly a concern for us. We are constrained, though, by the posture of 

this case and by the narrow scope of our habeas review. The 

Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that its statutory 

scheme allowed the simultaneous commitment and incarceration of a sexually violent person, and that Foucha did not

preclude such an interpretation. Gilbert II, 816 N.W.2d at 

229-30. The Wisconsin court emphasized that the State was 

still required to follow the commitment procedures in chapter 980 of the Wisconsin statutes, which it said ensured that 

the committed person was at the moment that determination 

was made a sexually violent person. Id. at 230. The court also 

stated that a person who serves a sentence of incarceration 

and is then transferred to DHS custody will be subject to periodic reevaluation once in DHS care to determine whether 

he remains a sexually violent person. Id. (citing Wis. Stat. 

§ 980.07). The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that 

these protections meant that sexually violent persons will 

continue to be “’held as long as [they are] both mentally ill 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
16 No. 13-3460

and dangerous, but no longer.’” Id. (quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. 

at 77).

Applying the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 standard of review as we 

must, we do not find the Wisconsin decision denying Gilbert 

relief to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

clearly established United States Supreme Court law. For 

one, unlike in Foucha, there is no suggestion that Gilbert no 

longer suffers from a mental disorder. That is significant. 

The State in Foucha conceded that the petitioner was no 

longer mentally ill yet it still wanted to hold him committed, 

and it wanted to do so even without assuming the burden of 

showing he is dangerous by clear and convincing evidence. 

Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86. The State of Wisconsin, in contrast, 

makes no concession that Gilbert no longer suffers from a 

mental disorder. Gilbert also does not argue that he no longer has a mental disorder. A jury found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Gilbert had a mental disorder that made it likely 

he would engage in sexual violence. There is no indication 

he longer has such a disorder, unlike the evidence from doctors and others in Foucha that the petitioner there was not 

suffering from a mental illness.3

3 Another difference between this case and Foucha is that a mental 

disorder and dangerousness were not inferred in Gilbert’s case. That 

Foucha was found not guilty by reason of insanity meant that it could be 

“inferred that at the time of the verdict, the defendant was still mentally 

ill and dangerous and hence could be committed.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76. 

In Gilbert’s case, in contrast, mental illness and dangerousness were not 

inferred. Rather, a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a 

mental disorder and was dangerous.

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 17

And the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not rule or intimate that Gilbert could be committed, or that his commitment could continue, if he no longer had a mental disorder. 

Cf. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77 (stating that a civilly committed 

person could “be held as long as he is both mentally ill and 

dangerous, but no longer”). Indeed, unlike the Louisiana 

statutory scheme in Foucha, Wisconsin’s statute only allows a 

person to be committed “until such time as the person is no 

longer a sexually violent person.” Wis. Stat. § 980.06. Recall 

that a “sexually violent person” requires that a person be 

“dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder 

that makes it likely that the person will engage in one or 

more acts of sexual violence.” Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). In the 

Louisiana scheme before the Court, whether a person was 

currently mentally ill was irrelevant; that is not true in Wisconsin because in Wisconsin a person cannot be held if he no 

longer suffers from a mental disorder making it likely the 

person will engage in sexual violence.

In addition to the absence of a suggestion that Gilbert is 

not currently suffering from a mental illness, Gilbert’s parole 

revocations and resulting sentences make his circumstances 

unique. He was ordered committed after a jury found him to 

be a sexually violent person, and no one questions that he 

could be committed then. But Gilbert violated the conditions 

of his parole twice after the commitment petition had been 

filed. Only because he violated his parole did he stay in 

DOC custody as long as he did after the jury ruled he should 

be civilly committed. Neither Foucha nor any other United 

States Supreme Court decision speaks to this or an analogous situation. Cf. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 113 (2d 

Cir. 2000) (“It is arguable that the Supreme Court would 

have ruled in favor of Foucha if he had been mentally ill but 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
18 No. 13-3460

no longer dangerous, but the holding is only that civil commitment procedures are required for an insanity acquittee 

who is no longer mentally ill.”). No United States Supreme 

Court case has considered a delay between a commitment 

order and transfer of custody to a mental health facility, or a 

time period between examinations. Nor did Foucha or any 

other Supreme Court decision consider the effect of a new 

conviction or parole revocation on a civil commitment proceeding.4

We turn next to the fact that Gilbert did not receive 

treatment or annual reexaminations of his status while he 

was in the DOC serving his sentence for the second parole 

violation. After examining chapter 980 in detail, we are satisfied that Wisconsin’s statutory scheme means that Gilbert 

“has prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered.” Jones, 463 U.S. at 366. We say that recognizing that 

serving the parole revocation sentence meant there was a 

two-and-a-half year delay between Gilbert’s commitment 

4 While not directly relevant to our constitutional analysis, we also 

note that under Wisconsin law, a petition for civil commitment on the 

basis that the person is a sexually violent person must be filed before the 

person is released or discharged from custody for the sexually violent 

offense. Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1m); In re Commitment of Spaeth, 850 N.W.2d 

93, 98 (Wis. 2014). The State argues that means that if a person commits a 

crime that is not a sexually violent offense while in a DHS institution as a 

civilly committed person, is prosecuted, and serves a sentence, the State 

cannot file a petition again to have the person re-committed as a sexually 

violent person. That is a difficult proposition because it means that a person who would have otherwise remained civilly committed would instead be released as a result of his criminal conduct. That is, a person’s 

criminal acts would end an otherwise valid commitment even though no 

determination was made that the person was no longer a sexually violent 

person.

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 19

order and when he began receiving treatment. See Spaeth, 

850 N.W.2d at 101 (recognizing that primary goals of chapter 

980 are the treatment of sexually violent persons and protection of society).

Pursuant to Wisconsin law, a committed person is to be 

reexamined by a mental health professional at least every 

twelve months “to determine whether the patient has made 

sufficient progress for the court to consider whether the person should be placed on supervised released or discharged.” 

Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1). The person has the right at that time to 

also be examined by an independent examiner. Id.; In re 

Commitment of Arends, 784 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Wis. 2010). Consistent with Wisconsin state law, Gilbert did not receive annual reexaminations of his mental condition while he served 

his sentence in the DOC from February 2008 to August 2010. 

See Wis. Stat. § 980.07(6m) (“If a person committed ... is incarcerated ... for a new criminal charge or conviction or because his or her parole was revoked,” annual reexamination 

requirement does not apply during the incarceration period.). Gilbert does not contest, however, that he has been receiving the requisite reexaminations since his entry into DHS 

care. Cf. Wis. Stat. § 980.07(6m) (providing that reeexamination requirement resumes upon release from incarceration).5

In addition to the required annual reexaminations, the 

Wisconsin statutory scheme also allows a person civilly 

5 We note that many, but not all, of the states that allow civil commitment of sexually violent persons require an annual reexamination. 

See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/55. Virginia, for example, requires a 

yearly hearing regarding the continued need for secure inpatient treatment for the first five years, then only at biennial intervals thereafter. Va. 

Code. Ann. § 37.2-910(A). 

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
20 No. 13-3460

committed as a sexually violent person to “petition the 

committing court for discharge at any time.” Wis. Stat. 

§ 980.09(1). Wisconsin requires the court to refer a petition 

for discharge filed without counsel “as soon as circumstances permit” for indigency and appointment of counsel determinations. Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1m)(b) (citing Wis. Stat. 

§ 977.01(1) and § 977.05(4)(j)). Under Wisconsin Statute 

§ 980.09(1), a committed person who files a petition for discharge has the initial burden of alleging facts that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that he does not 

meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. Id.; Martin v. Bartow, 628 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2010); 

Arends, 784 N.W.2d at 514, 519. The court’s review of the petition at this point is only a “limited review,” where the

“standard is similar to that used in civil cases to decide a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under [the Wisconsin code].” Arends, 784 

N.W.2d at 520. 

If the petitioner alleges sufficient facts, the court will appoint an examiner upon request, unless one was already appointed for the current reexamination period. Wis. Stat.

§ 980.09(1m)(d). The court will later conduct another “limited” review to determine whether the record contains any 

facts that would allow a factfinder to grant relief at a discharge hearing; if so, then the court must set the matter for 

trial. Id. § 980.09(2); Arends, 784 N.W.2d at 521-23. The court 

may hold a hearing as it makes this determination, Wis. Stat. 

§ 980.09(2), but the Wisconsin Supreme Court has emphasized that “the standard is not whether the evidence more 

heavily favors the petitioner,” and that the petitioner “does 

not need to prove a change in status in order to be entitled to 

a discharge hearing.” Arends, 784 N.W.2d at 522. Rather, “If 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 21

any facts support a finding in favor of the petitioner, the 

court must order a discharge hearing on the petition.” Id. at 

523.

At trial, it is the State that has the burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that the person meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. Wis. Stat.

§ 980.09(3). If the State does not do so, the petitioner must be 

discharged. Id. § 980.09(4). This procedure that allows a person to petition for discharge at any time is in addition to the 

statutory requirement of a yearly reexamination, where the 

examiner is to use the criteria set forth in Wisconsin Statute

§ 980.09(3) when determining whether a person should be 

discharged. See Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1).6

In addition, the difference in the standard of proof between the initial commitment hearing and the discharge 

hearing does not mean a clearly established constitutional 

infirmity. Wisconsin has set the State’s burden of proof at a 

§ 980.09(3) discharge trial as a showing by clear and convincing evidence, while the State’s burden of proof at the initial 

commitment hearing is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a). The United States Supreme Court 

has not spoken to the level of proof required at a release 

hearing for a civilly committed person. Addington only requires the State to assume the burden at the initial commitment determination, and it only requires it to assume a burden of proof standard of clear and convincing evidence. 441 

6 Wisconsin also allows a committed person, or the director of the facility where the person is placed, to petition the court for supervised release. Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1). That procedure is discussed in detail in Wisconsin Statute § 980.08. We do not do so here in light of Gilbert’s requested relief of immediate release. 

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
22 No. 13-3460

U.S. at 443. That is the same burden that Wisconsin requires 

the State to assume at the discharge hearing, so even if Addington applied at discharge proceedings, the Wisconsin 

scheme would comply. See Milinich v. Ahlin, No. 09-2612, 

2014 WL 5793959, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2014) (denying habeas petition and stating Supreme Court has never held that 

prosecution must bear burden of proof at release hearing 

where person was initially civilly commitment at hearing 

where prosecution bore burden beyond a reasonable doubt).

We are satisfied that Wisconsin’s statutory procedures mean 

that Gilbert has the opportunity to obtain release if he has 

recovered, Jones, 463 U.S. at 366, and that the Wisconsin 

scheme only condones his commitment as long as he remains a sexually violent person, Wis. Stat. § 980.06. 

Again, Gilbert does not contest that he has been receiving 

annual reexaminations since his entry into DHS care in August 2010. Those reexaminations have not resulted in a determination that he is no longer a sexually violent person. In 

this regard there are similarities between the circumstances 

here and those in another Wisconsin Supreme Court case, 

State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 665 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2003), 

which we note while recognizing it is not controlling here. 

There a person civilly committed as a sexually violent person filed suit after he had not received a reexamination of his 

mental condition within the six months of his initial commitment, as was then required by Wisconsin statute. Id. at 

158 (citing Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (1998)). Although he received a court order directing reexamination, he did not receive his first reexamination until almost two years after his 

initial commitment. Id. at 158. Nonetheless, the Wisconsin 

Supreme Court unanimously declined his request for immediate release. See id. at 157; id. at 165 (Bradley, J., concurring). 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 23

The lead opinion ruled that while conducting timely reexaminations was mandatory, adequate remedies other than discharge existed including mandamus directing a reexamination, backed by contempt. Id. at 163. The opinion explained 

that release and discharge from commitment for failure to 

conduct a timely reexamination, without a determination 

that the person is no longer a sexually violent person, 

“would compromise both of Chapter 980’s principal purposes—treatment and public protection—because, until a circuit 

court finds otherwise, the committed person remains in need 

of treatment and at high risk to reoffend.” Id. at 164. The 

court also emphasized that at the time of the opinion, the petitioner had been reexamined three times, and according to 

each, he remained a sexually violent person. Id. at 158 n.2, 

165 n.11.

We emphasize that our decision is a narrow one. We 

need not get into the potential federal due process implications of Wisconsin Supreme Court statements that Gilbert 

emphasizes—that the Wisconsin statute “does not specify 

when the commitment must commence” and so the State 

could seek a civil commitment “at any time” after a person 

has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. Gilbert II, 

816 N.W.2d at 224-25 (construing Wis. Stat. § 980.06). Gilbert 

worries that this language means the State might seek and 

obtain a commitment order early into a person’s ten- or 

twenty-year sentence, and then a person would be committed based on a mental disorder determination made ten or 

twenty years earlier.7 But that is not what happened here. 

7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in another case that because 

Wisconsin Statute § 980.15 requires the agency with custody over a sexually violent offender to notify the State within ninety days of the pris-

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
24 No. 13-3460

Days before his release on parole for his second-degree sexual assault sentence, the State petitioned for Gilbert’s commitment. Only because Gilbert later violated his parole did 

the delay between the commitment order and Gilbert’s entry 

into a DHS facility occur. We decide today Gilbert’s case, 

and not any theoretical possibilities that he contemplates. 

Perhaps the Wisconsin Supreme Court would find a due 

process violation in his scenarios, making our review unnecessary; we do not know.

Concluding that habeas relief is not available to Gilbert is 

consistent with one of the few cases to have considered an 

analogous situation, Smith v. Richards, 569 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 

2009). There, Smith was released on parole in Alaska after 

serving a rape sentence but failed to report as directed. Id. at 

992. After his arrest in Washington for another rape, Alaska 

authorities filed a detainer and parole warrant. Smith was 

convicted in Washington. The day before his Washington 

sentence was to end, the State of Washington filed a petition 

to have him civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. 

A jury found Smith to be a sexually violent person, and the 

court entered an order of commitment. Smith filed a petition 

in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 

commitment order was unconstitutional because he would 

be transferred to prison in Alaska after his Washington sentence ended rather than being immediately committed. The 

Ninth Circuit rejected his argument, explaining that the state 

court reasonably concluded that Smith remained dangerous 

oner’s impending discharge or release, “the practical effect” is that the 

State will generally have a ninety-day window before release to file a 

commitment petition. Spaeth, 850 N.W.2d at 101 (citing Wis. Stat. 

§ 980.015(2)(a)).

 

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
No. 13-3460 25

because he might go to Alaska and serve his time but could 

return to Washington and reoffend. Id. at 994. In upholding 

the commitment order, the court reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court has not clearly spoken on the question of how, 

if at all, one state’s detainer affects another state’s application of its laws in this context. This silence alone is sufficient 

to uphold the Washington Court of Appeals decision under 

AEDPA.” Id. The court concluded that the state court reasonably applied federal law and that the civil commitment 

was constitutional, which meant that Smith could serve a 

scheduled 215-day prison sentence and then be civilly committed. Id. at 994-95.

We do not believe the Supreme Court has spoken to Gilbert’s circumstances either. There is no question that “civil 

commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 425. This is especially true for Gilbert because his civil commitment as a sexually violent person in 

Wisconsin is indeterminate. The delay between his commitment order and entry into DHS care concerns us, but our 

posture on habeas review constrains our inquiry. Significant 

in this regard is that Foucha involved a person who was no 

longer mentally ill. The Court also did not have to consider 

the effect of any new conviction or parole revocation on a 

civil commitment. Cf. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76 (finding open 

question in Supreme Court jurisprudence did not warrant 

habeas relief). In the circumstances here, we find that at the 

least “fairminded jurists could disagree” as to whether the 

Wisconsin decision was correct. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 

786. Therefore, we do not find the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court’s decision to be contrary to or an unreasonable appliCase: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26
26 No. 13-3460

cation of clearly established United States Supreme Court 

law. 

III. CONCLUSION

 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 13-3460 Document: 28 Filed: 01/12/2015 Pages: 26