Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01549/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01549-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Amy Ferber, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-01549-TUC-CRP

ORDER 

Plaintiff has filed the instant action seeking review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Magistrate Judge 

has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the parties’ consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 16) (“Plaintiff’s Brief”), 

Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 18) (“Defendant’s Brief”), and 

Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 19). For the following reasons, the Court remands this matter for 

an immediate award of benefits. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff was 35 years of age on the August 25, 2006 alleged disability onset date, 

and 40 years of age on her date last insured, December 31, 2011. (AR. 70) Plaintiff has a 

high school education and worked in the past as an eligibility worker, retail store 

manager and receptionist. (AR. 154) 

 On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d), 

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alleging disability since August 25, 2006, due to two lumbar surgeries and continued 

back pain. (Administrative Record (“AR”), 153) The application was denied initially and 

upon reconsideration. (AR. 91-94, 100-102) Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at an administrative hearing on May 14, 

2012. (AR. 30-67) At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that she can walk for 

less than five minutes at a time before having to stop and shift. (AR. 43) Plaintiff can 

stand for about five minutes before having to shift her body. (AR. 43) Plaintiff also 

testified that she can sit for only five minutes at a time before needing to walk or move 

around before she can sit again. (AR 43) With her right arm, Plaintiff can lift in between 

five to ten pounds, and with her left arm, between five to six pounds. (AR. 43) Plaintiff 

testified that she is able to take care of her two small children, but that she has the 

flexibility to be able to stop and rest while caring for them at home. (AR. 45) On a scale 

or one to ten, Plaintiff stated that her pain is at a six to seven every day. (AR. 45) 

Plaintiff takes Celebrex, an anti-inflammatory, daily, and takes Percocet each night 

around the time her husband arrives home from work to manage pain. (AR. 46) 

 The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s earning statements with her during the hearing and 

Plaintiff agreed that she worked a full-time job with Sears & Roebuck for twelve years 

until 2002. (AR. 35) She was laid off from Sears and began working as a receptionist at 

Radiology, Ltd. for one year. (AR. 37) Plaintiff then worked for the Department of 

Economic Security (“DES”) as an eligibility worker for 11 months. (AR. 37) Plaintiff 

testified that she couldn’t perform her past job as a receptionist because her back pain and 

leg pain makes it difficult to sit for long periods of time and hinders her ability to 

concentrate on her work. (AR. 37) 

 A vocational expert (“VE”) testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as an 

eligibility worker is sedentary, with a specific vocational preparation level of 6, requiring 

one to two years of experience. (AR 59) The VE further stated that Plaintiff’s past 

relevant work as a receptionist is classified as sedentary and semi-skilled. (AR. 60) The 

VE testified that a hypothetical individual would be able to perform Plaintiff’s past 

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relevant work as an eligibility worker and as a receptionist when the ALJ posed the 

following hypothetical limitations: occasionally lift up to ten pounds; can stand or and 

walk four out of every eight hours; can sit six out of every eight hours, with a sit/stand 

option every hour; cannot climb ladders ropes or scaffolds; can occasionally ramps and 

stairs; can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl; can attend and concentrate 

for two hours, needing to take a 15 minute break or lunch break after every two hours; 

should not be exposed to concentrated levels of extreme cold or hazards. (AR. 59) 

 The VE testified that the ability to do even sedentary work would be eliminated if 

a person cannot attend and concentrate in two hour blocks of time throughout an eight 

hour work day. (AR. 61) The VE further testified that that the ability to do past relevant 

work as an eligibility worker or receptionist would not be an option if a person can work 

only three to four hours per day, three to four days per week. (AR. 62-63) 

 The ALJ issued a decision on June 18, 2012, finding Plaintiff not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR. 15-25) This decision became the 

Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. (AR 1-4). 

Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

(Doc. 16) 

STANDARD 

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner's 

decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner's decision, made 

through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is supported by 

substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1985); Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir.1999). “The [Commissioner's] determination that a 

plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir.1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 

F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9th Cir.1975), but less than a preponderance. McAllister v. 

Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601–02 (9th Cir.1989). Substantial evidence “means such 

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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences 

and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence” will 

also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir.1965). On review, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the 

Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Kornock v. 

Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir.1980)). 

 It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. 

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, 

the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d 

at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1984). Nevertheless, a decision 

supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were 

not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir.1987). Thus, if there is 

substantial evidence to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting 

evidence that will support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the 

Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229–30 (9th Cir.1987).

DISCUSSION 

 The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines disability as the “inability to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 

423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a plaintiff shall be determined 

to be under a disability only if any impairments are of such severity that a plaintiff is not 

only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering plaintiff's age, education and 

work experiences, engage in any other substantial work which exists in the national 

economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability 

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consists of both medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 

1152, 1156 (9th Cir.2001). 

 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for 

determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step one 

determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, benefits are 

denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the decision maker 

proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a medially severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 

416.920(a)(4)(ii). 

 If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the 

disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third 

step, which compares plaintiff's impairment with a number of listed impairments 

acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P 

App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, plaintiff is 

conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one conclusively 

presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines 

whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing work which was performed in 

the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work that plaintiff is deemed not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a) (4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff's 

residual functional capacity (RFC) is considered. If plaintiff cannot perform past relevant 

work, the fifth and final step in the process determines whether plaintiff is able to 

perform other work in the national economy in view of plaintiff's residual functional 

capacity, age, education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

416.920(a) (4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 

 The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 

entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir.1971); 

Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999). The initial burden is met once 

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plaintiff establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents the performance of 

previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) 

plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) a “significant number of 

jobs exist in the national economy” that plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 

1496, 1498 (9th Cir.1984). 

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS IN PERTINENT PART

The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not in engage is substantial work activity during 

the period from her alleged onset date of August 25, 2006 through her date last insured of 

December 31, 2011. (AR. 17) The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the following 

severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, status post two laminectomies 

with radiculopathy. (AR. 17). He determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the 

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR. 17) The ALJ found 

that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. §§404.1567(a) (AR. 18). The ALJ, after considering testimony from the VE, 

concluded that Plaintiff “was capable of performing past relevant work as an eligibility 

worker or a receptionist. This work did not require the performance of work related 

activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity....” (AR. 24). 

Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the 

Social Security Act at any time from August 25, 2006 through her date last insured, 

December 31, 2011. (AR. 25). 

THE ALJ’S REJECTION OF THE TREATING DOCTOR, DR. OSBORNE, WAS IMPROPER

 The record reflects that Robert C. Osborne, M.D., has been Plaintiff’s treating pain 

specialist since 2004. (See AR. 362). Dr. Osborne’s diagnoses includes: post-traumatic 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, lumbar facet arthropathy, and probable 

thoracic disc disease. (AR. 286, 277, 353). Plaintiff’s medications include Celebrex and 

Percocet. (AR. 486) Plaintiff suffered a back injury in 1992 and has undergone physical 

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therapy and two lumbar discectomy surgeries in 1994 and 2002 that were only 

temporarily beneficial. (See AR. 302, 327 328, 338, 372, 471). 

 On February 7, 2012, Dr. Osborne opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff could not work 

full-time but was limited to part-time sedentary work for three to four hours per day, and 

she would be expected to miss an average of 8 workdays per month as a result of 

disability and normal illnesses. (AR. 476). He also indicated that Plaintiff could sit in a 

clerical position only occasionally, thirty to forty minutes at a time, for a total of two to 

three hours per day, and could stand for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time for a total of 

one hour per day. (AR. 476) Dr. Osborne opined that Plaintiff should drive a car or light 

truck only 30 minutes at one time for a total of one and a half to two hours per day, and 

that Plaintiff could ride in a vehicle for one hour at a time for a total of two to three hours 

per day. (AR. 476) Dr. Osborne determined that Plaintiff should change positions 

frequently during the day from sitting to standing or walking at least once per hour and 

avoid bending, squatting, crouching or kneeling. (AR. 476-477). According to Dr. 

Osborne, Plaintiff should also avoid sudden temperature or humidity changes, exhaust 

fumes, smoke or dust, strong odors and moving machinery. (AR. 477) Ultimately, if 

employment were available with all of the described restrictions, Dr. Osborne believes 

Plaintiff could work three to four hours per day and three to four days per week. (AR. 

477) 

 In April 2011, examining physician, Jerome Rothbaum, M.D., diagnosed Plaintiff 

with lumbar degenerative disc disease with left lumbar radiculopathy status post 

laminectomy (two). (AR. 305) Dr. Rothbaum opined that Plaintiff should be capable of 

standing and walking a total of four to five hours per day, one hour at a time, with a five 

minute break. (AR. 306) Additionally, Dr. Rothbaum found Plaintiff is limited to sitting 

for a total of four to five hours per day, shifting positions hourly. (AR. 306) Thus, Dr. 

Rothbaum’s determination of Plaintiff’s restrictions is largely in line with those of Dr. 

Osborne insofar as both doctors conclude that Plaintiff cannot sit, stand or walk for a full 

eight hour workday. (AR. 306, 476-477) 

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 In determining the Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ gave “very little weight” to the 

treating physician, Dr. Osborne. (AR. 22) The ALJ’s RFC assessment limiting Plaintiff 

to sedentary work is consistent with Dr. Osborne’s opinion; however, the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment deviated from Dr. Osborne’s findings, inter alia, in that that Plaintiff could 

not work full-time and could not sit for more than three to four hours in an eight-hour 

workday. The ALJ stated that Dr. Osborne’s 2012 opinion was “...internally 

inconsistent, not supported by the evidence of record, including his own objective clinical 

findings, and is inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations.” (AR. 22). 

 It is well-settled that the opinions of treating physicians, like Dr. Osborne, are 

entitled to greater weight than the opinions of examining or non-examining physicians. 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-1041 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight is 

given to the opinion of a treating source than the opinion of a doctor who did not treat the 

claimant. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010); 

Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). Medical opinions and conclusions 

of treating physicians are accorded special weight because treating physicians are in a 

unique position to know claimants as individuals, and because the continuity of their 

dealings with claimants enhances their ability to assess the claimants’ problems. See 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988); Winans, 853 F.2d at 647; see 

also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A 

treating physician’s opinion is entitled to ‘substantial weight.’”); Magallanes v. Bowen,

881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We afford greater weight to a treating physician's 

opinion because he is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and 

observe the patient as an individual.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 20 

C.F.R §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (generally, more weight is given to treating sources). 

 An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s uncontradicted opinion only after giving 

“‘clear and convincing reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick 

v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995)). “Even if the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, 

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the Commissioner may not reject this opinion without providing ‘specific and legitimate 

reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 

(citing Lester, 81 F.3d. At 830).

 “‘The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary 

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and 

making findings.’ ” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751). 

The Social Security Administration has explained that an ALJ's finding that a treating 

source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable evidence or is 

inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record means only that the opinion is not 

entitled to controlling weight, not that the opinion should be rejected. Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Treating source medical opinions are 

still entitled to deference and, “[i]n many cases, . . . will be entitled to the greatest weight 

and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.” Orn, 495 

F.3d at 632; see also Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983) (“If the ALJ 

wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating physician, he or she must make findings 

setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 

evidence in the record.”). 

 The ALJ took issue with Dr. Osborne’s determination that Plaintiff could not sit 

for more than thirty to forty minutes at a time when he also stated that she could ride in a 

vehicle for one hour at a time. (AR. 22) This assessment, according to the ALJ, lacks 

supporting evidence in the record, however, The fact that Plaintiff must shift frequently 

when sitting is well developed in the record (See AR. 313, 356, 476) Even the examining 

physician, Dr. Rothbaum, opined that Plaintiff would need to shift positions hourly when 

sitting. (AR. 306) As the Plaintiff correctly points out, riding in a car and driving a car 

are two different activities. (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 18-19) While riding in a car, Plaintiff is 

able to recline or otherwise shift positions in order to relieve pain. Whilst driving a car, 

Plaintiff would be required to maintain a firm seated position not conducive the frequent 

adjustments necessary to manage her back pain. For these reasons, Dr. Osborne 

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determined that Plaintiff could ride in a car for one hour at a time but could drive a car 

for only thirty minutes at a time. (AR. 476) 

 Furthermore, the ALJ took issue with Dr. Osborne’s deduction that Plaintiff 

should be limited in the use of her hands and arms. (AR. 22) But Plaintiff’s restricted use 

of her hands and arms is well documented in that the treating physician, the examining 

physician and the reviewing physician all indicated that Plaintiff was limited in the 

amount of weight she could lift. (AR 85, 306, 476) The ALJ also agreed that Plaintiff’s 

ability to lift was limited to occasionally lifting up to ten pounds. (AR 18) Common sense 

dictates that when lifting one is utilizing hands and arms. Again, the Plaintiff 

persuasively argues that “just as lifting with the hands results in force on the spine so too 

does using the hands [and arms] for functions other than lifting.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 19) 

The ALJ fails to offer any other specific or legitimate reasoning for rejecting this 

contention. 

 The ALJ also found Dr. Osborne’s assessment debilitated in that it conflicted with 

Plaintiff’s own allegations: “[Plaintiff’s] allegations have been undermined by her 

physician’s opinion, and vice versa, which diminishes the credibility of the allegations in 

general.” (AR. 22) The ALJ provides no substantial justification for dismissing Dr. 

Osborne’s opinion on the basis that it does not comport, exactly, with Plaintiff’s own 

testimony. Where treating physician opinions have been discredited, in part, because of 

conflicting testimony by a claimant it has been a critical conflict, supported by other 

substantial evidence on the record. (See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F. 2d 747, 751-52 (9th

Cir. 1989) (upholding ALJ’s decision to reject treating physician’s opinion that conflicted 

with laboratory test results, reports from examining physicians and testimony from the 

claimant.) This case is distinguishable in that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Osborne’s 

objective opinion differing from Plaintiff’s subjective testimony is not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. 

 Equally unavailing is the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Osborne is not credible because 

Plaintiff did not exhibit upper and lower extremity loss of muscle tone, or atrophy, which 

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he contends are the expected side effects of Plaintiff’s limitations. (AR. 23) Neither the 

ALJ nor Defendant cite any statement by any medical provider of record indicating that 

loss of muscle tone, muscle atrophy, or the other side effects mentioned by the ALJ 

would necessarily accompany Plaintiff’s impairments. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed the 

denial of benefits where, inter alia, the plaintiff alleged she had to maintain a fetal 

position all day because of constant pain but she exhibited no physical signs including 

muscle atrophy of a totally incapacitated person. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 

(9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s case is distinguishable from Meanel. Plaintiff does not claim 

to be totally incapacitated. The instant record reflects, and the ALJ acknowledges, 

Plaintiff moves about her seeing to her personal needs and caring for her children. (See

AR. 19). Arguably, these activities forestalled loss of muscle tone or atrophy. There is 

simply no basis on this record to disbelieve Dr. Osborne because Plaintiff did not exhibit 

the side effects described by the ALJ. See Hardt v. Astrue, 2008 WL 349003, *3 (D.Ariz. 

Feb. 6, 2008) (finding no basis to disbelieve plaintiff who did not experience diffuse 

atrophy or muscle wasting where “[t]he record established (and the ALJ found) that [she] 

is able to perform some daily activities [and]...participated in treatments and a home 

stretching program.”) 

 Finally, the ALJ also rejected Dr. Lin’s opinion because he “only sees the 

[Plaintiff] twice a year for medication refills” and because the record does not reflect that 

a physical examination was performed at each visit. The applicable regulation, 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1502, defines a “treating source” as follows: 

“Treating source means your own physician, psychologist, or other 

acceptable medical source who provides you, or has provided you, with 

medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing 

treatment relationship with you. Generally, we will consider that you have 

an ongoing treatment relationship with an acceptable medical source when 

the medical evidence establishes that you see, or have seen, the source with 

a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of 

treatment and/or evaluation required for your medical condition(s). We may 

consider an acceptable medical source who has treated or evaluated you 

only a few times or only after long intervals (e.g., twice a year) to be your 

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treating source if the nature and frequency of the treatment or evaluation is 

typical for your condition(s).” 

The wording of the definition of “treating source” has remained constant since 1991 and 

is recognized by the Ninth Circuit (See Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir.1989)) (It is 

not necessary, or even practical, to draw a bright line distinguishing a treating physician 

from a non-treating physician. Rather, the relationship is better viewed as a series of 

points on a continuum reflecting the duration of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency and nature of the contact.) It is evident from the record that Dr. Osborne, a 

pain specialist, has been treating Plaintiff since at least late 2004. As a matter of 

continuum of care and duration, Dr. Osborne clearly meets the regulatory standard for a 

treating source and the ALJ does not offer any evidence that bi-yearly visits to a pain 

specialist is atypical for Plaintiff’s specific condition. 

 Defendant’s reasoning in support of the ALJ’s decision is simply a regurgitation of 

the ALJ’s opinion without offering additional support from the record. The ALJ did not 

set out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

state his interpretation thereof, and make a finding based on such. For the above-stated 

reasons, the ALJ failed to set forth specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record to reject Dr. Osborne’s assessed restrictions. 

REMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE AWARD OF BENEFITS

 It is well-settled that “[w]here the Commissioner fails to provide adequate reasons 

for rejecting the opinion of a treating or examining physician, we credit that opinion as a 

matter of law.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (citation omitted); Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying credit-as-true rule to medical opinion evidence). See also 

Garrison, 759 F.3d 995, 1017-21 (9th Cir. 2014) (reaffirming the credit-as-true rule). 

 Remand for an award of benefits is appropriate where: 

 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant 

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testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited 

evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled on remand. 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (footnote and citations omitted); see also Benecke, 379 F.3d 

at 593(citations omitted). The Garrison court also noted that the third factor “naturally 

incorporates what we have sometimes described as a distinct requirement of the credit-astrue rule, namely that there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made.” Garrison, 759 at 1020 n. 26 (citing Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (1996)). Thus, where the test is met, the Ninth Circuit 

“take[s] the relevant testimony to be established as true and remand[s] for an award of 

benefits[,]" Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593 (citations omitted), unless “the record as a whole 

creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of 

the Social Security Act.” Garrison, 795 F.3d at 1021 (citations omitted). 

 Here, remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate. The record has 

been fully developed and remand for further administrative proceedings would serve no 

useful purpose. The VE testified that full-time work would be precluded if a person can 

only work three to four hours a day at the sedentary level. (AR. 62). See e.g. Garrison,

795 F.3d at 1022 n. 28 (where the VE answered that a person with the plaintiff’s RFC 

would be unable to work, “we can conclude that [the plaintiff] is disabled without 

remanding for further proceedings to determine anew her RFC.”). RFC is the individual’s 

maximum remaining ability to perform sustained work on a regular and continuing basis. 

SSR 96-8P. “A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or 

an equivalent work schedule.” (Id.) On this record, crediting Dr. Osboirne’s opinion as 

true results in the unquestionable conclusion that Plaintiff is disabled under the Act. The 

simple fact that Plaintiff cares for her children at home, while able to take the frequent 

adjustments or breaks necessary to manage her pain, does not create a serious doubt as to 

whether she is disabled within the meaning of the Act.

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CONCLUSION

 The record is fully developed and, when considering the record as a whole, there is 

no reason for serious doubt as to whether Plaintiff is disabled.2

 Plaintiff’s treating 

physician opined that she was restricted to part-time sedentary work. The ALJ failed to 

set forth specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting 

that opinion. The VE agreed that if Plaintiff would be precluded from full-time work if 

she were limited to sedentary work for three to four hours per day. Plaintiff is, therefore, 

entitled to benefits. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the Commissioner for 

immediate calculation and award of benefits. 

 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter Judgment accordingly and to close its 

file in this matter.

 Dated this 31st day of March, 2015 

 

 

2

Because Plaintiff has established that she is disabled under the Act in light of the ALJ’s 

erroneous rejection of Dr. Osborne’s opinion, there is no need to address Plaintiff’s alternative 

arguments. 

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