Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00036/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00036-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James L Ford,

Petitioner,

v. 

B. Von Blanckensee,

Respondent.

No. CV-19-00036-TUC-RM (EJM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner James L. Ford’s pro se Petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1). Petitioner alleges that the 

Designation/Sentence Computation Center (“DSCC) miscalculated his full-term release 

date by failing to give him jail time credit on both of his sentences. Id. Respondent filed a 

Return and Answer and requests that the Court deny the Petition. (Doc. 14). 

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Markovich for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 6).

For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny 

the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is incarcerated at USP-Tucson. (Doc. 14 Ex. A Attach. 1). On November 

28, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced by United States District Court Judge Cindy Jorgenson 

to a 24-month term of imprisonment for the offense of Felon in Possession of Firearms and 

Ammunition in CR-18-261-TUC-CKJ-LAB. (Doc. 14 Ex. A at ¶ 2). Petitioner was 

Case 4:19-cv-00036-RM Document 17 Filed 11/07/19 Page 1 of 5
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sentenced to a consecutive 12-month term of imprisonment for a supervised release 

revocation in CR-16-355-PHX-CKJ-LAB, for a total term of 36 months. Id. at ¶ 4. The 

judgments for both offenses stated that Petitioner was to receive credit for time served. 

(Doc. 14 Ex. A Attach. 3 & 4). Petitioner’s projected release date is September 4, 2020. 

(Doc. 14 Ex. A Attach. 1).

Petitioner filed his Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 24, 2019. (Doc. 1).

Petitioner contends that the DSCC failed to give him credit for time served on the 

supervised release revocation charge, and that his projected release date is therefore

miscalculated. Id. at 4.

On February 26, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion for Modification of Sentence in

CR-18-261 and CR-16-355, arguing that his sentences should have been concurrent and 

that the BOP failed to give him credit for time served on the supervised release violation. 

(CR-18-261 Doc. 46; CR-16-355 Doc. 103). On March 7, 2019, the government filed a 

Response contending that Petitioner was properly sentenced to consecutive terms, and 

further that if Petitioner wanted to challenge his sentence computation by the BOP, he first 

had to exhaust administrative remedies. (CR-18-261 Doc. 47; CR-16-355 Doc. 104). 

On July 16, 2019, the government filed a Motion to Correct Judgment and 

Commitment Upon Revocation of Supervised Release in CR-16-355. (CR-16-355 Doc. 

106). The government argued that there was a clerical error in the written judgment in CR16-355 incorrectly stating that Petitioner was supposed to receive credit for time served on 

the supervised release revocation charge, which was not what the District Court orally 

stated at sentence pronouncement. Id. at 3. The government further stated that Petitioner 

could not be given credit for time served in the 2016 revocation matter because he had 

already been given credit for time served in the 2018 matter, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3585(b), a defendant is only entitled to credit for time served prior to the commencement 

of his sentence if that time has not been credited against another sentence. Id. at n.2. 

On August 8, 2019, United States District Court Judge Cindy Jorgenson issued an 

Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Sentence Modification and granting the 

Case 4:19-cv-00036-RM Document 17 Filed 11/07/19 Page 2 of 5
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

government’s Motion to Correct Judgment and Commitment Upon Revocation of

Supervised Release. (CR-18-261 Doc. 49; CR-16-355 Doc. 108). Judge Jorgenson noted 

that a review of the sentencing transcript indicated that the Court did not state that 

Petitioner would receive credit for time served in the supervised release revocation matter. 

(CR-16-355 Doc. 108 at 4). Judge Jorgenson further stated that “the Court’s failure to 

orally state Ford was entitled to credit for time served in CR 16-355 was deliberate and 

consistent with controlling law[,]” and that “[c]ontrary to Ford’s assertion, the Court was 

not required to specifically state credit for time served would not be applied in CR 16-355.”

Id. The District Court issued an Amended Judgment specifying that “with credit for time 

served” was removed from the judgment and commitment on the supervised release 

violation. (CR-16-355 Doc. 111).

On August 15, 2019, Respondent filed a Return and Answer to the § 2241 Petition

requesting that the Court dismiss the petition because the written judgment contained a 

clerical error incorrectly stating that Petitioner was to receive prior custody credit on both 

offenses. (Doc. 14 at 2). Respondent further stated that the oral pronouncement of sentence 

specified that Petitioner was to receive prior custody credit for time served only on the 

substantive offense, but not the supervised release revocation, and noted that the District 

Court had issued an amended judgment correcting the clerical error. Id.

On August 22, 2019, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Ninth Circuit of the 

District Court’s Order in CR-16-355 denying his motion for sentence modification and 

granting the government’s motion to correct judgment. (CR-16-355 Doc. 109). Petitioner 

simultaneously filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the § 2241 action pending the 

outcome of his criminal appeal. (Doc. 15). 

II. ANALYSIS

“Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction,’ . . . and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting FW/PBS, 

Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by City 

Case 4:19-cv-00036-RM Document 17 Filed 11/07/19 Page 3 of 5
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). Additionally, the judicial 

power of this and all federal courts is limited to actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. 

art. III; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). “The ripeness and mootness 

doctrines are based in part upon the Article III requirement that courts decide only cases or 

controversies.” W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Sonoma Cty., 905 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“An action is unripe when the issues are not sufficiently concrete for judicial resolution.”

Id. Conversely, “[a]n action is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the 

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he ripeness inquiry asks ‘whether there yet is any 

need for the court to act,’ while the mootness inquiry asks ‘whether there is anything left 

for the court to do.’” Id. (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and 

Procedure, § 3532.1 (2d ed. 1984)).

Here, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s Petition under § 2241 is not yet ripe for 

this Court’s review. When Petitioner initially filed his § 2241 petition, the written 

judgments in CR-18-261 and CR-16-355 both stated that Petitioner was to receive credit 

for time served. The District Court subsequently issued an Amended Judgment specifying 

that “with credit for time served” was removed from the judgment in CR-16-355. Petitioner 

has now appealed that order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has not issued a 

decision on Petitioner’s appeal. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims in the § 2241 petition are 

unripe because the Court of Appeals has not issued a final order on Petitioner’s appeal. See

Sanchez-Alanis v. Apker, 739 F. App’x 388, 389 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing § 2241 as 

unripe where it was “based on speculation of what action the BOP may take in the future 

rather than on any actual loss of GCT” (citing Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300

(1998) (stating that “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future 

events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all”))); Singh v. 

Gonzales, 2007 WL 1108875 (D. Ariz. Apr. 13, 2007) (adopting R&R and finding that § 

2241 was premature and petitioner’s claims were unripe for review where petitioner had a 

case pending before the Ninth Circuit and no final order had been issued). Thus, there is 

Case 4:19-cv-00036-RM Document 17 Filed 11/07/19 Page 4 of 5
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not yet any need for this Court to act. W. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 905 F.2d at 1290. 

III. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

that the District Judge enter an order:

(1) DENYING Petitioner’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus without prejudice and with leave to refile (Doc. 1);

(2) DENYING Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 13) as moot; and

(3) DENYING Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Proceedings. (Doc. 15). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Court. 

If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-19-036-TUCRM

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court shall 

send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties.

Dated this 7th day of November, 2019.

Case 4:19-cv-00036-RM Document 17 Filed 11/07/19 Page 5 of 5