Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02209/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02209-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nathaniel Turner, Jr., ) CV 05-2209-PHX-SMM (MS) ) Petitioner, )) vs. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) Dora B. Schriro, et al., )) Respondents. ) ______________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner, while confined at the Arizona State Prison in Bucyeye, Arizona, filed

a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By A Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254" ("Petition") on July 26, 2005. [Doc. # 1]. The Petition contains four

grounds for relief:

Ground One: Petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause were violated because Petitioner is forced to serve additional time beyond the term of his court ordered sentence. 

Ground Two: Petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause were violated when one of Petitioner's post-conviction petitions was denied as procedurally barred. Further, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to the benefits of release

credits under prior Arizona law.

Ground Three: Petitioner challenges the state's calculation of good time credits as Petitioner argues his sentence has expired.

Ground Four: Petitioner argues that Respondents have not completed an accurate calculation of Petitioner's release date as he is entitled to "2 for 1" good time credits under prior Arizona law.

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1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

2 Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial. [Doc. # 9, Ex. B]. 

3 Petitioner again waived his right to a jury trial. [Doc. # 9, Ex. E]. 

2

In their Answer, Respondents contend that the Petition was not filed within the

one-year time limit imposed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA").1 [Doc. # 9]. Specifically, Respondents conclude that the Petition was

untimely because the statute of limitations expired on September 26, 1998, and

Petitioner's habeas petition was not filed until July 26, 2005. 

The Court directed Petitioner to file a Reply addressing Respondents' timeliness

argument by March 10, 2006 (Doc. # 10). Petitioner did not file a Reply. 

Upon consideration of the Petition, Answer, and record in this case, the Court

reports and recommends as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner's federal habeas petition challenges his sentences on a combination

of three state court convictions for robbery. Petitioner has challenged all three of his

convictions because of their cumulative effect on his sentence for his last conviction.

The procedural history of all of Petitioner's robbery convictions at issue are detailed

below.

On May 8, 1975, an information was filed in Maricopa County Superior Court,

case number CR-87707, charging Petitioner with one count of attempted burglary in the

first degree. [Doc. # 9, Ex. A]. Following a bench trial, Petitioner was found guilty,2

 and

on October 3, 1975 Petitioner was sentenced to a suspended sentence and placed on

probation for a period of two years. [Doc. # 9, Ex. C].

On December 29, 1975, an information was filed in Maricopa County Superior

Court, case number CR-90994, charging Petitioner with two counts of armed robbery.

[Doc. # 9, Ex. D]. Following a bench trial, Petitioner was found guilty,3

 and on March

24, 1976 Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment.

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3

[Doc. # 9, Ex. G]. Petitioner was also sentenced to 7 to 7.5 years' imprisonment for

violation of probation in case number CR-87708. This sentence was to run concurrently

with the sentences imposed in case number CR-90994. [Doc. # 9, Exs. F and G]. 

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") challenging his

convictions and sentences in both CR-87707 and CR-90994 on November 27, 1978.

[Doc. # 9, Ex. H]. The trial court denied relief on February 22, 1979. [Doc. # 9, Ex. I].

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals on March 28, 1979.

[Doc. # 9, Ex. J]. On March 4, 1980, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief. [Doc.

# 9, Ex. K]. The Order and Mandate issued on March 27, 1980. [Doc. # 9, Ex. L]. 

On April 11, 1983, an indictment was filed in Maricopa County Superior Court,

case number CR-132970, charging Petitioner with one count of armed robbery, a class

2 dangerous felony. [Doc. # 9, Ex. M]. Petitioner was found guilty following a jury trial

on July 1, 1983. [Doc. # 9, Ex. N]. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life

imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 25 years after the trial court determined

that Petitioner had committed the instant offense while on parole. [Doc. # 9, Ex. O]. The

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on May 9, 1984,

and the Order and Mandate issued on June 5, 1984. [Doc. # 9, Exs. P and Q].

Petitioner filed his second petition for post-conviction relief challenging all three

robbery convictions on July 6, 1988. The petition was dismissed on December 22,

1988. [Doc. # 9, Exs. R and S].

The Arizona Board of Executive Clemency recommended a commutation of

Petitioner's sentence from 99 years to 21 years on April 24, 1995. [Doc. # 9, Ex. T].

As a result, on March 24, 1997, Petitioner filed a third petition for post-conviction relief

averring that the sentence commutation became effective automatically when the

Governor did not act on the Arizona Board of Clemency's recommendation within 90

days. [Doc. # 9, Ex. U]. The trial court dismissed Petitioner's post-conviction petition

on September 25, 1997, articulating that Petitioner's reliance on State v. Tarango, 914

P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1996) was misplaced. The trial court further determined that it had no

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jurisdiction over the disproportionality review process, and therefore could not entertain

Petitioner's claims. [Doc. # 9, Ex. V].

Petitioner filed his fourth petition for post-conviction relief on January 14, 2002

alleging newly discovered evidence. [Doc. # 9, Ex. W]. Petitioner raised the same

argument proffered in his second PCR petition, that the Arizona Board of Executive

Clemency's recommendation to commute Petitioner's sentence became effective after

the Governor failed to act within 90 days of the recommendation. The trial court

dismissed Petitioner's petition on February 7, 2002, stating that Petitioner had already

raised this claim in a prior petition, and it had already been dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. [Doc. # 9, Ex. X].

Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 4, 2002 raising

the same argument regarding the commutation of his sentence as he had raised in

previous petitions for PCR. [Doc. # 9, Ex. Y]. The trial court recharacterized

Petitioner's state habeas petition as a special action, and granted the State's motion to

dismiss the action. [Doc. # 9, Ex. Z].

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on June 28,

2002. [See CIV 02-1210-SMM-MS, Doc. # 1]. On July 9, 2002, this Court ordered that

Petitioner's petition be dismissed with leave to amend, and directed the Clerk to dismiss

the action without prejudice if Petitioner failed to file an amended petition as instructed

in the Court's Order. Petitioner failed to comply and the Clerk subsequently dismissed

Petitioner's habeas petition without prejudice on August 29, 2002. [CIV 02-1210-SMMMS, Doc. # 4]. 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief on June 16, 2005 challenging all

three of his robbery convictions, arguing that the Arizona Department of Corrections

miscalculated his good time jail credits and parole eligibility dates. [Doc. # 9, Ex. AA].

The trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition on August 4, 2005, stating that because

the Department of Corrections was not a party to his criminal case, he could not obtain

relief in a PCR proceeding based on arguments against the Department of Corrections.

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4 The Court is assuming that Petitioner's instant habeas petition does not

contravene AEDPA's prohibition of filing a second or successive petition without first

obtaining the authorization of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See §2244(b)(3)(A). 

Respondents have not raised this issue. 

5

The court further articulated that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was being held

in custody beyond the expiration of his sentence. [Doc. # 9, Ex. BB].

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on July 26, 2005. [Doc. # 1].4

II. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Statutory or Equitable Tolling Renders Petitioner's Federal

Habeas Petition Timely

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), state prisoners have one year from the date on

which their convictions become "final" to commence federal habeas corpus

proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because Petitioner's convictions were final

before the effective date of AEDPA, the 1 year statute of limitations did not begin to run

until April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 128

F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S.Dist.

Ct., 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), itself abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003).

Pursuant to section 2244(d)(2) of AEDPA, “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation.” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). An application for collateral review is pending during

all of the time in which a state prisoner is "attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state remedies. . . .” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

At the time AEDPA became effective, Petitioner's third Petition for post conviction

relief was pending in the trial court. [Doc. # 9, Ex. U]. As a result, the statute of

limitations was tolled while Petitioner's PCR petition was under consideration. When

the trial court dismissed Petitioner's petition on September 25, 1997, the statute of

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limitations began to run, and subsequently expired on September 26, 1998. Barring any

other tolling, Petitioner's instant habeas petition is untimely as it was filed on July 26,

2005, nearly seven years later.

Petitioner did not file a Reply to address any of the arguments advanced by

Respondents. However, there are no scenarios which would render Petitioner's petition

timely. Even if this Court tolled the 30 days within which Petitioner could have

petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review of the trial court's dismissal of

Petitioner's third PCR petition on September 25, 1997, Petitioner's instant habeas

petition would still be untimely by several years. 

Moreover, as Respondents note, Petitioner's subsequent PCR petitions, filed on

January 14, 2002 [Doc. # 9, Ex. W], April 4, 2002 [Doc. # 9, Ex. Y], and June 16, 2005

[Doc. # 9, Ex. AA], do not restart the federal habeas statute of limitations. Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 15-17

(2d Cir. 2000). Even if this Court determined that Petitioner's instant habeas petition

is an extension of the petition he filed on June 28, 2002, see CIV 02-1210-SMM-MS,

Doc. # 1, Petitioner's June 28, 2002 petition would still be untimely by nearly four years.

Ultimately, AEDPA's statute of limitation expired on September 26, 1998, and none of

Petitioner's actions after that date alter that determination. 

The outcome does not change even if this Court were to assume that Petitioner's

last PCR petition, which challenged the same issues being presented in the instant

habeas petition, could not have been filed before June 16, 2005 because Petitioner

could not have discovered the factual predicate of the claim through due diligence

before the date of filing. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Put another way, even if June 16,

2005 was the earliest possible date that Petitioner could have presented his claim on

his good time and copper time jail credits and the computation of his sentence,

Petitioner's claim still cannot be reviewed on its merits because Petitioner failed to

exhaust that claim in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). 

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Under the exhaustion doctrine, a petitioner must present his claims to the state

courts on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings before a federal court will

consider a habeas corpus petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Lindquist v.

Gardner, 770 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir. 1985). Specifically, exhaustion requires that a

petitioner either fairly present his or her claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)(stating that “except in habeas

petitions in capital cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes

of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them”), or show that

no state remedies remain available. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982). To satisfy the fair

presentation requirement, a petitioner must fairly present the “substance of federal

claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and to

correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995). See also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971); Casey v.

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the Maricopa County Superior Court

docket indicates that Petitioner failed to appeal the trial court's August 4, 2005 dismissal

of his notice of post-conviction relief. As a result, even if this Court were to determine

Petitioner's claim regarding good time and copper time jail credits was timely, it still

cannot be considered on its merits because of Petitioner's failure to exhaust. 

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to reply to Respondents' answer, and therefore

has not presented any argument in support of his habeas petition. Specifically,

Petitioner has failed to establish cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004). 

B. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner has not made any argument for equitable tolling. Gaston v. Palmer,

417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005) articulated that extraordinary circumstances must

be present in order for a court to find equitable tolling. Petitioner's failure to proffer any

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argument forecloses the possibility of equitable tolling, as the Petitioner bears the

burden of demonstrating extraordinary circumstances. Id. (citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing analysis,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By

A Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254" (Doc. # 1) be DENIED and

DISMISSED in its entirely as untimely filed.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment.

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties

shall have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties

have ten (10) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely

file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be

considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED this 27th day of April, 2006.

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