Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00449/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00449-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fred Walter Gomoll, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al.,

 Respondents.

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No. CV-07-0449-PHX-PGR (JI)

 

 ORDER

Having reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Irwin in light of Petitioner’s Objection (doc. #16), the Court finds that the

petitioner’s objections should be overruled and that the Magistrate Judge

correctly concluded that the petitioner’s petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2554 should be dismissed.

First, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the petitioner

procedurally defaulted on the first and third grounds raised in his petition, which

the petitioner does not dispute, and that the petitioner failed to show cause

excusing the procedural defaults. Although the petitioner argues in his Objection

that the ineffective assistance he received from his post-conviction relief counsel

constitutes sufficient cause, the Court disagrees. As the Ninth Circuit case law

cited by the Magistrate Judge establishes, the petitioner cannot rely on the

Case 2:07-cv-00449-PGR Document 17 Filed 05/19/08 Page 1 of 3
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ineffectiveness of his post-conviction relief counsel to excuse his failure to

exhaust his claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective given that he has no

constitutional right to an attorney during post-conviction relief proceedings.

Second, the Court also rejects the petitioner’s argument raised in his

Objection that his actual innocence excuses his procedural defaults on his first

and third claims. While actual innocence serves as a gateway that allows a court

to consider a procedurally defaulted claim, a claim of actual innocence requires

factual innocence and the petitioner has not shown that, in light of all the

evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict him of

the relevant crime. See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 U.S. 1127, 1139-40 (9th Cir.2007)

(en banc).

Third, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that there is no merit to

the petitioner’s second ground, wherein he alleges that the imposition of an

aggravated sentence based on judicial factual findings was a violation of the

Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). As the Magistrate Judge properly

concluded, Blakely is not applicable here because the petitioner’s conviction has

final before Blakely was decided. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027

(9th Cir. 2005) (“We conclude that Blakely does not apply retroactively to

convictions that became final prior to its publication.”) 

While the petitioner argues in his Objection that the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Apprendi and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), both of which

were decided before his conviction became final, are sufficient to grant him relief

regardless of the non-retroactivity of Blakely, the Court disagrees. As established

by the Schardt decision, the trial judge’s imposition of a sentence on the

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petitioner greater than the presumptive sentence based on his factfinding

regarding aggravating factors did not violate clearly established federal law at the

time the petitioner’s sentence became final. See Devincentis v. Quinn, 2008 WL

399303, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2008) (Court, in rejecting prisoner’s argument that

his sentence violated Apprendi and Ring because his sentence was increased

based on facts found by the judge rather than a jury, noted that “[w]e held [in

Schardt] that prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely ..., it was not a

violation of clearly established federal law to impose a sentence greater than the

standard sentencing range but within the statutory maximum based on findings

made by a judge rather than a jury.”) The petitioner’s reliance on Harris v. Carter,

515 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008), does not change the outcome here because the

Harris decision does not apply to the issue raised in the petitioner’s second

ground. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

(doc. #15) is accepted and adopted by the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus by a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is denied in

its entirety and that this action is dismissed. The Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00449-PGR Document 17 Filed 05/19/08 Page 3 of 3