Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02080/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02080-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARJORIE C. PINO,

individually, and as a

representative of the estate

of decedent RONNIE PINO,

NO. CIV. S-05-2080 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO JUDGMENT

COUNTY, ALBERT NARJERA, LOU 

BLANAS, PSYCHIATRIC SOLUTIONS, 

INC., and DOES 1 through 75, 

inclusive, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Marjorie C. Pino, individually and as a

representative of her late son Ronnie Pino’s estate, alleges

seven causes of action, principally under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

against defendants City of Sacramento, Sacramento County, Police

Chief Albert Najera, County Sheriff Lou Blanas, and Psychiatric

Solutions, Inc., d/b/a Heritage Oaks Hospital (“Heritage Oaks”). 

Now before the court are three separate motions for summary

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Standard practice at Heritage Oaks entailed a 1

preliminary assessment, by “assessment and referral clinicians”

such as Ms. Koopman. This assessment was then to be presented to

2

judgment filed by defendants City of Sacramento and Albert Najera

(“City defendants”), County of Sacramento and Lou Blanas (“County

defendants”), and Heritage Oaks. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This action arises out of the death of Ronnie Pino

(“decedent” or “Ronnie”) on the morning of December 23, 2004. 

Ronnie was a thirty-one year old mentally-disabled man who

suffered from seizures, epilepsy, auditory and visual

hallucinations, and various other ailments stemming from the

removal of a brain tumor when he was fifteen years old. (Pl.’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts #4, 5, 8.) Decedent also had

difficulty hearing. (Id. #29.) In an effort to control his

seizure disorder, Ronnie regularly took various medications, and

had a nerve stimulator implanted in his body in 2003. (Id. #8,

9.) While the medications were relatively successful in

controlling the seizures, they appeared to exacerbate his

hallucinations. (Id. #9.)

A. Heritage Oaks Hospital Incident

On December 22, 2004, decedent’s mother, the plaintiff

in this action, and various other family members took Ronnie to

Heritage Oaks Hospital, a psychiatric facility, to seek treatment

for his hallucinations. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Upon arrival at the

hospital, plaintiff met with Marsha Koopman, R.N., in order for

Ronnie to undergo an assessment prior to admittance to the

hospital. (Heritage Oaks’ Statement of Undisputed Facts #4.) 1

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a psychiatrist, who would make the decision to admit the patient

to the hospital or not. (Id. #4, 5.)

3

Decedent was briefly in the assessment room during the interview,

but wandered in and out, and around the waiting area, while

plaintiff responded to Ms. Koopman’s questions. (Id. #7-11.) 

Throughout the assessment, decedent repeatedly asked to go outside

to smoke a cigarette. (Id. #12.) The front door of Heritage Oaks

Hospital remains locked at all times, and Ms. Koopman told

decedent that he could only go outside once they finished with the

questions. (Id. #13-14.)

Prior to completing the assessment, however, decedent

advised Heritage Oaks employees that if he were not allowed out,

he would break the window in order to get outside to smoke. 

(Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts #35.) As hospital employees

approached the waiting area where decedent was located, he kicked

out the glass entrance door and dove outside. (Id. #37.) In

response, hospital employees called the police to report the

incident. (Heritage Oaks’ Statement of Undisputed Facts #22.) 

Hospital employees then went outside to clean up the glass, and

see if decedent sustained any injuries requiring immediate medical

attention. (Id. #19.)

B. City of Sacramento Police

In response to the call, Sacramento Police Officers

Sherry Bell and Douglas Nguyen were dispatched to the scene. 

(City Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts #40.) Upon arrival,

decedent was standing in front of the broken window, smoking a

cigarette while bleeding from the arm and leg. (Id. #42, 43.) 

Officer Bell was informed by a Heritage Oaks employee of a prior

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 This indecent was communicated to Heritage Oaks 2

employees by plaintiff prior to the police officers’ arrival. 

(Heritage Oaks’ Statement of Undisputed Facts #24.)

4

incident involving decedent at Sutter General Hospital, where ten

people were required to restrain him after he become violent.2

(Id. #41.) 

After attempting to communicate with decedent, and

finding him non-responsive, the officers requested back-up. (Id.

#45-46.) Among the officers to respond was Officer Paul Fong, who

activated his in-car camera upon receiving the call. (Id. #49;

Paul Fong Decl. Ex. A (“Videotape”).) Upon Fong’s arrival,

decedent indicated that the lights on top of the patrol car were

bothering him, so Officer Fong returned to his car and turned them

off. (Videotape.) Officer Fong then repeatedly, calmly, and

politely asked decedent if they could place him in handcuffs, so

that he could get medical attention for his injuries. (Id.) When

Officer Fong displayed his handcuffs to decedent, decedent tried

to take them out of Fong’s hands. (Id.) Decedent then resisted

the efforts of the officers to handcuff him, and punched Officer

Fong in the face. (Id.) At this point, Officer Bell discharged

her taser at decedent. (Id.) Decedent remained standing and

pulled one of the taser darts out, although he eventually got down

onto his hands and knees. (Id.) However, decedent failed to get

down onto his stomach as the officers were demanding, at which

point Officer Bell cycled her taser for an additional five

seconds. (Id.) Decedent then went down onto his stomach and was

handcuffed. (Id.)

Paramedics were then allowed to treat decedent, and

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Decedent was noted as taking: Clonazepam, Paxil, 3

Depakote, Haldol, Risperdal, Protonix, Lactulose, Keppra, and

Diltiazem.

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subsequent to treatment, he was transferred to the Sacramento

County Jail. (City Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts #68.) 

While in route to the jail, Officers’ Bell and Nguyen received a

list of decedent’s medications, which they provided to the booking

nurse at the jail upon arrival. (Id. #68, 69.) There is no

evidence that the officers, the City, or the County received the

medications or the prescriptions themselves.

C. County of Sacramento Jail

Upon arrival at Sacramento County Jail, decedent was

medically screened by Hank Carl, R.N. (County Defs.’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts #7, 8.) Mr. Carl received decedent’s list of

medications, took his blood pressure, assessed his breathing and 3

pulse, and treated his wounds. (Id. #9-15, 21, 26-27.) Mr. Carl

determined that decedent’s vital signs were all within normal

limits, and thus hospitalization was not required. (Id. #58-59.) 

Mr. Carl also attempted to determine medical history, but decedent

was generally uncommunicative and a poor historian. (Id. #18,

20.)

Mr. Carl concluded that a “jail psychiatric services”

(“JPS”) referral was required, pursuant to a jail policy that any

patient who had been using psychiatric medications and/or had an

active mental illness warranted such a referral. (Id. #38-40.) 

Mr. Carl was also aware of the common practice at the jail to

refer a Benzodiazepine user to the medical floor as soon as

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Clonazepam is a Benzodiazepine. 4

“When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a 5

danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled,

a peace officer, member of the attending staff, as defined by

regulation, of an evaluation facility designated by the county, 

. . . may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the

person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated

by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental

Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.” Cal.

Welfare & Inst. Code § 5150. The Sacramento County Jail is such

a facility.

6

possible, for potential Benzodiazepine withdrawal, and thus 4

indicated on the medical referral that “detox” might be a

consideration due to Benzodiazepine use. (Id. #37, 47, 65, 66.)

Decedent was then evaluated by Dan Clark, Senior

Psychiatric Technician, who interviewed him and placed him on a

seventy-two hour hold pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code §

5150, because he was having trouble following custody directions

and could not function in the general population. (Id. #69-73.) 5

As part of the admissions process to the in-patient unit, Mr.

Clark took decedent’s vital signs, and noted no abnormalities. 

(Id. #74.)

Decedent was placed in a psychiatric cell, equipped with

a window that allows for observation of the patients through the

door. (Id. #75.) Pursuant to departmental policy, regular

observations were made of decedent at thirty-minute intervals. 

(Id. #76.) It was noted that decedent slept until 5:00am, ate

most of his breakfast, and then slept again until 7:00am. (Id.

#77-81.) Later that morning, at approximately 9:00am, Dr. Cameron

Quanbeck entered decedent’s cell as part of his regular morning

rounds, but determined that decedent was just rousing from sleep,

and thus indicated that he would return shortly to conduct a full

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It is standard policy within the JPS that each patient 6

admitted to the in-patient unit be evaluated by a psychiatrist

within 24 hours of admission. (Id. #91.)

7

evaluation. (Id. #90.)6

During rounds, and before Dr. Quanbeck returned to

decedent’s cell, he was informed by the staff that decedent’s

mother had telephoned to inform them of decedent’s history of

seizure disorder. (Id. #95-96.) Accordingly, at approximately

9:30am, Dr. Quanbeck ordered that decedent be placed on video

camera observation, which allowed staff members to monitor

patients in cells. (Id. #98-101.)

Sometime between 9:35 a.m. and 9:45 a.m., staff members

saw decedent lying across his bed at an unusual angle. (Id.

#133.) Several staff members entered decedent’s cell, and noted a

very weak pulse, and no signs of respiration. (Id. #140-143.) 

The staff members then proceeded to administer CPR. (Id. #144.) 

At 10:02am, emergency medical personnel arrived and took over CPR,

but after fifteen minutes the fire captain determined that Mr.

Pino had died, and nothing more could be done. (Id. #167.)

On October 13, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint against

the named defendants, arguing that decedent’s death was a result

of improper medical care, improper training, excessive force, and

deliberate indifference to decedent’s special needs. (Compl. ¶¶

20-27.) Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on October 14,

2005, alleges five causes of actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a

deliberate indifference action against defendants City of

Sacramento, Sacramento County, Albert Najera (individually and in

his capacity as Chief of Police of the City of Sacramento), Lou

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8

Blanas (individually and in his capacity as Sacramento County

Sheriff). Plaintiff alleges a single cause of action against

defendant Heritage Oaks for negligence, negligent training, and

negligent supervision. 

Notably, on November 7, 2006, plaintiff moved to amend

her complaint by adding three additional defendants, adding an

intentional tort cause of action against PSI and augmenting the

facts of her complaint throughout. (Pl.’s Mot. to Amend.) On

December 13, 2006, this court denied the motion, based on

plaintiff’s failure to show good cause why such an amendment

should be allowed. (Dec. 13, 2006 Order.) Each of the defendants

(City defendants, County defendants, and Heritage Oaks) now brings

a motion for summary judgment.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit,

and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to

enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s favor. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving

for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact and can satisfy this

burden by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of

the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

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9

317, 322-23 (1986). Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate

that the non-moving party cannot provide evidence to support an

essential element upon which it will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ [and] designate ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

B. Heritage Oaks’ Motion

Heritage Oaks seeks summary judgment on the seventh

cause of action, the sole claim brought against them, which

alleges “negligence, negligent training, and negligent

supervision.” (Heritage Oaks’ Mot. for Summ. J. 6.) To prove a

case of negligence, plaintiff must show that Heritage Oaks owed “a

duty of care, which they breached by conduct falling below a

defined standard of care, plus causation and damages.” Hernandez

v. KWPH Enters., 116 Cal. App. 4th 170, 175 (2004) (citing Wright

v. City of Los Angeles 219 Cal. App. 3d 318, 344-345 (1990)).

“The existence of a duty of care is a question of law to

be determined by the court alone.” Id. at 176-177 (citing

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Plaintiff asserts that it is not bringing a medical 7

malpractice claim, but merely a “straight forward negligence

claim under general negligence law,” and thus the legal standard

of care regarding professional negligence is inapplicable. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Heritage Oaks’ Mot. for Summ. J. 8.) For the

purposes of this motion, however, “whether the cause of action is

denominated ‘ordinary’ or ‘professional’ negligence . . . is

immaterial to resolving a motion for summary judgment.” Flowers

v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 8 Cal.4th 992, 1000 (1994);

see also Cal. Civ. P. Code § 340.5. It is sufficient to note

that, under either theory, defendants had a duty to act with due

care.

10

Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 (1976)). 

“Under traditional tort law principles, one is ordinarily not

liable for the actions of another and is under no duty to protect

another from harm, in the absence of a special relationship of

custody or control.” Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal.3d 278,

293 (1988)). Heritage Oaks contends that there was no special

relationship because they were “not treating or providing

psychiatric care to decedent.” (Heritage Oaks’ Mot. for Summ. J.

8.) However, Heritage Oaks also admits that, despite decedent’s

repeated requests to leave the facility, they would not unlock the

door or allow him to leave. (Heritage Oaks’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts #13-14.) Regardless of whether decedent had yet

to be admitted as a patient, once Heritage Oaks endeavored to

exercise control over him in this manner, they created a

sufficient relationship between themselves and decedent so as to

create a duty, obligating them to act with due care. Nally, 47

Cal.3d at 293. 

By contrast, the question of whether a duty has been

breached is normally a question of fact. Hernandez, 116 Cal. App.

4th at 175. However, while breach is generally a question of 7

fact, “it is one of law if no reasonable jury may conclude based

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upon the undisputed facts that liability exists.” Delfino v.

Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 818 (2006); Flowers

v. Torrance Mem’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 8 Cal.4th 992, 1000 (1994)

(“[If] evidence as to the requisite due care is uncontroverted,

the trial court may properly address the question as a matter of

law and proceed to a consideration of the defendant’s alleged

negligence.”) Under specific questioning by this court at oral

argument, plaintiff’s counsel narrowed the scope of the negligence

claim against Heritage Oaks to two specific issues: 1) whether

Heritage Oaks breached their duty of due care by refusing to allow

decedent to leave the facility to smoke a cigarette; and 2)

whether Heritage Oaks breached their duty of due care by informing

the police that decedent was violent.

1. Refusing to Allow Decedent to Leave

Defendant presents the expert testimony of Brad

Nicodemus, a registered nurse for over sixteen years, who has

worked in the field of psychiatric care for over twenty-two years. 

Mr. Nicodemus notes that: 1) when decedent was brought to the

hospital by his family, he confessed a lack of a desire to be

there, which meant that he was being considered for an involuntary

hold; and 2) before completing an initial assessment, Heritage

Oaks knew very little about decedent and how unpredictable and/or

uncontrollable his behavior might be. (Nicodemus Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5.) 

Overall, after a review of the relevant assessment records,

Heritage Oaks’ policies and procedures, as well as plaintiff’s

complaint, Mr. Nicodemus concludes that Heritage Oaks acted

appropriately in refusing to allow decedent to leave the facility. 

(Id.)

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However, Nicodemus’ declaration more than adequately 8

establishes his credentials, and the mere fact that he was

employed at one time by Heritage Oaks does not invalidate his

testimony regarding the proper standard of care. 

12

Plaintiff claims that Heritage Oaks was negligent

because they knowingly denied decedent a calming mechanism--but

this argument ignores the plain fact that when he was being

evaluated for a possible involuntary commitment, allowing him to

leave the premises would be akin to allowing him to escape. An

involuntary hold is premised on the fact that a person might be a

danger to himself or others. Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 5150. 

Thus, if defendant had any sort of duty of care or control over

decedent (as plaintiff asserts they did), they could be liable for

any harm that occurred if they did let him go free. See, e.g.,

Bragg v. Valdez, 111 Cal. App. 4th 421, 432 (2003) (holding that

defendants owed a duty to anyone injured by an involuntarily

committed person released for the wrong reasons).

More importantly, in response to the evidence provided

by Heritage Oaks regarding the standard of care, plaintiff offers

nothing more than an attempt to discredit Nicodemus’ testimony as

that of an “interested layman.” Plaintiff cannot merely rest 8

upon the bare denials of defendant’s motion or the allegations of

negligence contained in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

Upon a motion for summary judgment by defendant, plaintiff is

required to come forward with evidence supporting her claims. In

this case, plaintiff has failed to offer any such evidence to

demonstrate that a standard of care was breached, either by means

of affidavits, expert testimony, or even relevant analogous caseCase 2:05-cv-02080-WBS-DAD Document 75 Filed 01/26/07 Page 12 of 23
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At oral argument, counsel for plaintiff suggested that 9

there was an inside smoking area to which the Heritage Oaks

employees could easily have directed decedent rather than simply

refusing his request to go outside. It wasn’t that simple,

however. To the contrary, on page 29 of the deposition of Marsha

Koopman, the intake nurse, she gave the following answers:

Q. All right. Is there a place to smoke a cigarette

within the facility?

A. Go through the cafeteria to an outside patio.

Q. And how far away is that?

A. Well, it’s quite a distance, I’d say probably 100

feet to the cafeteria. And the distance of the cafeteria is

probably, I don’t know, another 200 feet and then outside on the

patio.

Q. Okay. Is there any reason why you didn’t want to

allow him to have a cigarette?

A. No, I didn’t - - there wasn’t - - I just wanted to

talk to him and find out what was going on before we stopped the

interview process. 

13

law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (holding that a motion for summary 9

judgment should be granted, even if the movant provides no

affidavits or evidence, if the movant demonstrates to the court

that the “nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has

the burden of proof”); Hutchinson v. U.S., 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th

Cir. 1988) (citing Willard v. Hagemeister, 121 Cal. App. 3d 406,

412 (1981)) (“When a defendant moves for summary judgment and

supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell

within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary

judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting

expert evidence.”) Accordingly, this court finds that no

reasonable jury could conclude that Heritage Oaks was negligent in

not allowing decedent to leave the building.

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Plaintiff makes a point of the fact that the police 10

report from the 911 call reported that the caller said decedent

“would be” violent, as if that should be understood as a

prediction rather than a description of past or present conduct. 

The court finds this to be no more than a semantic distinction. 

Whether the caller said that decedent “would be” violent, or

whether the caller said that decedent “was” or “had been”

violent, or whether the caller described decedent’s conduct and

the person preparing the report simply summarized it makes no

difference in the court’s analysis.

14

2. Informing Police Decedent Was Violent

Plaintiff also claims that Heritage Oaks acted

negligently when they called the police and informed them that

decedent was violent, thereby increasing the likelihood that the

police would react aggressively towards him. In this case, 10

however, Heritage Oaks employees simply reacted in a reasonable

and predictable manner to a person smashing the window of their

front door in order to exit the facility. It is beyond dispute

that such an action is violent in nature--Heritage Oaks employees

merely described what had happened. Plaintiff argues that

Heritage Oaks employees, upon informing the police of decedent’s

violent actions, were also duty-bound to communicate additional

information regarding decedent’s mental and physical condition. 

However, it is undisputed that decedent’s outburst occurred before

Heritage Oaks was able to complete their intake assessment of him. 

No reasonable jury could conclude that telephoning the police to

report such an incident was negligent. 

Moreover, the videotape clearly reveals that the police

officers, upon arriving at the scene, had ample time to assess the

situation on their own, without relying upon the description given

during the emergency call. Indeed, it was not until decedent

punched Officer Fong that Officer Bell fired her taser. Thus, it

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was not Heritage Oaks’ description of decedent as violent that led

the police to react the way they did--it was decedent’s violent

actions. Accordingly, this court holds that no reasonable jury

could find Heritage Oaks negligent for calling the police and

informing them that decedent was violent.

With regard to plaintiff’s claim of negligent training

and/or supervision, to “establish a negligent hiring claim,

plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known

the employee created a particular risk or hazard.” Evan F. v.

Hughson United Methodist Church, 8 Cal. App. 4th 828, 836-837

(1992). As with the negligence claim above, plaintiff has failed

to present a single piece evidence indicating that Heritage Oaks

knew or should have known of any insufficiently qualified or

trained employee. Plaintiff fails to articulate what policy or

procedures were inadequate, and even fails to indicate which

employees she believes were negligently trained and/or hired. 

Moreover, this court had found that no reasonable jury could find

the challenged actions to be negligent. Because plaintiff cannot

rest solely upon the broad and unsubstantiated allegations in her

complaint, Heritage Oaks’ motion for summary judgment must be

granted.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fifth, and sixth

causes of action, asserted against both the City defendants and

County defendants, all relate to alleged direct violations of

plaintiff’s and decedent’s constitutional rights under § 1983. 

(Compl.) Because these claims relate to conduct by City and

County employees, the only theory by which the City and County

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Although plaintiff named Police Chief Najera as a 11

defendant in his individual capacity, it is undisputed that

Najera was in no way directly involved with the apprehension and

arrest of decedent. Sheriff Blanas and Chief Najera are also

both named as defendants in their individual capacities, but it

is clear that each of them is sued solely in his capacity as the

head of his respective department. It is well established that

“an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,

to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

Because this court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend 12

the complaint, which sought to add Officers Bell and Nguyen, and

County Nurse Henry Carl, at oral argument and in her briefs,

plaintiff appears to concede that these five causes of action

must fail. (Pl.’s Opp’n to County Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 1-2

n.2) (“As a result of the Court’s ruling, plaintiff can no longer

maintain the first, second, third, fifth and sixth causes of

action in this matter, as each of these claims requires an

individual defendant to be maintained.”).

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could be directly liable is respondeat superior. However, the 11

Supreme Court has made it clear that “a municipality cannot be

held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 

Therefore, because no individual Sacramento police officer or

county employee is named as a defendant, these five claims must

fail as a matter of law. (Id.) 12

As per plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, a municipal

body may, however, be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when “the

action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In the alternative, the city may be

liable where the municipality’s failure to train employees amounts

to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons with whom

the police come into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388 (1989); Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29

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F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff bringing a Monell

claim must demonstrate both that a constitutional deprivation

occurred and that the municipality was the “moving force behind

the injury alleged.” Id. at 385; Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334,

1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

1. City Defendants’ Motion

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, as alleged against

the City defendants, asserts that decedent’s constitutional rights

were violated because: 1) the police officers failed to provide

adequate medical attention (by neglecting to immediately treat his

wounds, and by failing to later take him to a hospital); and 2)

Officer Bell cycled her taser a second time. Plaintiff is of

course correct that a failure to provide adequate necessary

medical care to a prisoner can constitute actionable “deliberate

indifference.” Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir.

1996). However, other than mere assertion, plaintiff has not

offered any evidence that the officers’ conduct in this case

constituted such a failure. 

Indeed, as noted by City defendants, the videotape of

the incident clearly shows that soon after decedent was adequately

restrained, emergency medical personnel were brought in to treat

his self-inflicted wounds. Moreover, plaintiff provides no

support, evidentiary or legal, for the assertion that, after being

cared for by the emergency medical personnel, decedent should have

nonetheless been taken to a hospital. Overall, plaintiff has not

offered any evidence, in the form of expert testimony or

affidavit, to indicate that the officers’ conduct was inadequate

or that any greater care could or should have been provided.

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With regard to Officer Bell’s second cycling of her

taser, the undisputed facts, as well as the video, confirm that

despite being shot with a taser once, decedent removed one of the

barbs and failed to adequately respond to the officers’ commands

to get down on his stomach. It was due to this failure that the

taser was cycled a second time. Plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that these actions nonetheless constitute a

violation of decedent’s rights, and plaintiff has again failed to

proffer any evidence to this effect. Plaintiff has not offered

any expert testimony, or even a single case, supporting the

assertion that Officer Bell’s conduct was anything but reasonable. 

See e.g. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 335 (9th Cir. 1988)

(upholding the constitutionality of the use of tasers, when they

are employed for a “reasonable security purpose”). Plaintiff

simply cannot rest solely on the allegations in the complaint. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thus, plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that the officer’s conduct constituted a

constitutional violation of decedent’s rights. 

Moreover, even assuming that an underlying

constitutional violation occurred, plaintiff has not shown that

any improper conduct on the part of the officers was the result of

a city policy or of the city’s deliberate indifference towards the

rights of individuals. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Indeed,

plaintiff has not pointed to a single police policy regarding the

provision of medical care, or the proper use of tasers, that

plaintiff claims is improper. 

The sole evidence plaintiff provides is in the form of

several depositions of the police officers’ involved in the

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incident, which serve to illustrate merely that these particular

officers did not receive training concerning: 1) administering

medical care to subjects who have received two short-duration

taser bursts; 2) “the use of tasers against subjects who may have

seizure disorders;” or 3) how to “communicate with subjects who

may be non-communicative.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to City Defs.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. 11.) However, in City of Canton the Supreme Court

established, in no uncertain terms, that this sort of evidence is

not sufficient to support a claim under Monell. 489 U.S. at 390-

91. As the court observed: 

That a particular officer may be

unsatisfactorily trained will not alone

suffice to fasten liability on the city, for

the officer’s shortcomings may have resulted

from factors other than a faulty training

program. . . . It may be, for example, that an

otherwise sound program has occasionally been

negligently administered. Neither will it

suffice to prove that an injury or accident

could have been avoided if an officer had had

better or more training, sufficient to equip

him to avoid the particular injury-causing

conduct. 

Id. 

Significantly, plaintiff fails to offer any evidentiary

support for why the existing procedures constitute a deliberate

indifference to individuals’ rights. Plaintiff has not provided

any evidence that city personnel knew these existing policies

represented a risk to suspects, nor has plaintiff shown that, had

such risks existed, they were nonetheless knowingly disregarded by

the city. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (“Only where a

municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant

respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its

inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a

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city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.”). 

Simply put, plaintiff’s showing, without more, cannot support the

existence of a well-established practice motivating alleged

constitutional deprivations by City police officers. Monell, 436

U.S. at 694. This court is bound by the standard in City of

Canton, and plaintiff has failed to offer any additional evidence

of a city policy exhibiting deliberate indifference towards the

rights of individuals. Accordingly, the City defendants’ motion

must be granted.

2. County Defendants’ Motion

Similar to her claim against the City, plaintiff’s

fourth cause of action against the County alleges that the

County’s policies resulted in decedent being deprived of his

medications from the time he was brought to the jail

(approximately 1:00 p.m. on December 22, 2004) until the time of

his death (approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 23, 2004), thereby

representing an unconstitutional deprivation of medical care. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to County Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. 12-14.) As noted

above, prisoners do indeed have a right to receive adequate

medical care while in custody, in so far as prison officials are

not “deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs.” See

Carnell, 74 F.3d at 979; City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463

U.S. 239, 244 (1983).

However, plaintiff has again failed to submit any

evidence indicative of the “deliberate indifference” purportedly

exhibited by the County’s policies. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at

389. By contrast, in this case, the undisputed facts demonstrate

County policies characterized by a constant level of attention to

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the evaluation and care of the prisoners. In this case, decedent

was brought in to the County jail in the afternoon of December 22,

2004, and, pursuant to County policy, evaluated by a registered

nurse, Mr. Carl. Carl’s physical examination found all of

decedent’s vital signs to be normal, and properly referred him to

JPS for psychiatric evaluation based on his history. JPS

evaluated decedent, again taking his vital signs, and determined

that because he was significantly mentally-disabled, a 72-hour

hold was warranted under Section 5150. Decedent was thus admitted

into the in-patient psychiatric unit, where he was observed

regularly throughout the night. At all times, decedent was under

constant supervision, and subjected to repeated mental and

physical evaluations prior to his scheduled complete psychiatric

examination. It is difficult to conceive, and indeed plaintiff

does not suggest, what more could have been done.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that courts “must

apply a deferential standard of review to challenges regarding

prison regulations and uphold the regulation ‘if it is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.’” Mauro v. Arpaio,

188 F.3d 1054, 1058 (1999) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,

84 (1987)). Plaintiff primarily takes issue with the fact that

decedent was not provided his medications quickly, upon arrival at

the jail. However, at oral argument plaintiff’s counsel conceded

that there is no evidence that anyone, including Heritage Oaks

employees, City of Sacramento police officers, and County

employees, had either a copy of decedent’s prescriptions or the

actual medicine he was to take. 

///

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The court also notes that registered nurses are 13

prohibited from prescribing medication. Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 11150 et seq..

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Although Mr. Carl was provided with a handwritten list

of decedent’s medications, without any physician verification of

the prescriptions and/or decedent’s medical records, there was no

way for him to verify the accuracy of the information provided.13

This problem was further compounded by decedent’s failure to

communicate. Only after a determination has been made that

psychiatric admission is proper, and a patient has subsequently

been evaluated by a trained psychiatrist, can the appropriateness

of administering medication be assessed. As shown by the

undisputed facts, the County’s policies provide for just such a

psychiatric evaluation, within 24 hours of admission. 

Plaintiff has provided no support, either evidentiary or

by analogy to relevant case law, for the notion that this level of

care provided by the County was constitutionally inadequate. 

Moreover, plaintiff has again failed to provide any evidence that

any County employee was aware that the existing policies

represented any appreciable risk to prisoners, and deliberately

proceeded in the face of this risk. Because mere allegations are

not sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment, County

defendants’ motion must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) Heritage Oaks’ motion for summary judgment be, and

the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(2) City of Sacramento and Albert Najera’s motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

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(3) Sacramento County and Lou Blanas’ motion for summary

judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

DATED: January 25, 2007

 

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