Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02677/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02677-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenneth D. Meinhardt, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Laura Escapule, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02677-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Petitioner Kenneth D. Meinhardt’s (“Petitioner”) 

First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), (Doc. 8), and United 

States Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), 

(Doc. 20.) The R & R recommends that the Court dismiss the Petition without prejudice. 

(Doc. 8 at 9.) Petitioner filed a timely objection to the R & R. (Doc. 18.) Thus, the 

Court will make a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which an 

objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). For the following reasons, the Court accepts the R & R 

and dismisses the Petition without prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

 The R & R sets forth a detailed factual and procedural background of this case, to 

which neither party objected. The Court therefore adopts this background as an accurate 

recital, but will provide a brief summary here. 

/ / / 

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 Petitioner was convicted of three counts of armed robbery, and pled guilty to a 

fourth count on the same charge, in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2001. (Doc. 18-1 

at 79–80.) From the beginning, there appears to have been some confusion about the 

exact relationship of Petitioner’s sentences on each count. In July 2002, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals summarized the trial court’s sentence as “a presumptive 15.75-year 

term on Count 2 consecutive to the sentences on Counts 3 and 5 and a concurrent, 

aggravated 16-year term on Count 1.” (Id.) In a subsequent proceeding in August 2003, 

the Court of Appeals clarified that the sentences on Counts 1, 2, and 3 were concurrent, 

with the sentence on Count 5 to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count 3. (Id. 

at 130–37.) 

 Petitioner in 2011 filed a “Writ of Habeas Corpus for Collateral Relief and Motion 

to Issue Corrected Sentencing Order to the Arizona Department of Corrections” in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id. at 151–55.) Petitioner asserted that his inmate 

records incorrectly indicated that his sentences were all to be served consecutively, when 

in reality only one sentence should be consecutive to the three concurrent sentences. (Id. 

at 153.) In the resulting proceeding, the State asserted, apparently erroneously, that 

Petitioner’s sentences were all to be served concurrently, thus giving Petitioner a release 

date of September 13, 2014. (Id. at 161.) The court accepted the State’s assessment and 

ruled accordingly. (Id. at 164.) But at some point (alleged by Petitioner to be September 

5, 2014, (Doc. 8 at 15)), the State recalculated Petitioner’s sentence. In a “Notice of 

Sentence Recalculation” filed on November 5, 2014, the State informed the court that it 

had caught its prior error and that Petitioner’s release date should be April 26, 2027. 

(Doc. 18-1 at 167–68.) The court adopted the new sentencing structure. (Id. at 170.) 

 Petitioner challenged the sentence adjustment in the trial court on December 11, 

2014. (Id. at 172–93.) The following day, December 12, 2014, Petitioner filed his initial 

habeas petition in this Court. (Doc. 1.) As amended, the Petition asserts that Petitioner is 

entitled to relief based on res judicata, Fifth Amendment due process, double jeopardy, 

lack of jurisdiction, and the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 8 at 6–9.) 

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DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). District courts are not required to conduct “any 

review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 149 (1985). 

II. Analysis

 Petitioner does not specifically object to much of the R & R. He does not dispute 

what the magistrate judge found dispositive: that Petitioner has not exhausted his state 

court remedies. Petitioner does, however, specifically object to four particular points, 

about which the Court will therefore undertake a de novo review. 

 First, Petitioner argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the Petition 

was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner contends 

that because his sentence has (or should have) ended, he is no longer “a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” under § 2254. Instead, he argues, he is merely 

“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. In support of this, Petitioner cites Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880 

(9th Cir. 2004). In Stow, the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner in custody pending retrial 

after a vacated conviction was not “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” 

under § 2254. 389 F.3d at 886–88. The Ninth Circuit explained that after Stow’s 

conviction was vacated, Stow “had yet to be lawfully convicted of any . . . charged 

offense,” meaning there was no judgment to base his custody on. Id. at 888. Petitioner 

contends that he, likewise, is in custody in the “absence of [a] state court judgment” 

because of the “expiration” of his sentence. But Ninth Circuit precedent does not support 

equating the two. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1005–06 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting 

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that § 2254 applies so long as “‘the person is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

state court, and not in state custody for some other reason, such as pre-conviction 

custody, custody awaiting extradition, or other forms of custody that are possible without 

a conviction’” (quoting Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000))), 

overruled on other grounds by Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Petitioner is in custody as a result of a conviction, and the magistrate judge was correct in 

concluding that Petitioner’s petition is properly brought under § 2254. 

 Second, Petitioner argues that “[e]ven if, in some hallucinogenic logic § 2254 

were to be applied, exhaustion and procedural bar would be found to be waivable as nonjurisdictional.” (Doc. 21 at 5.) Petitioner is correct in noting that exhaustion and 

procedural bar are not jurisdictional. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 

(1991). In some circumstances, as demonstrated by the cases Petitioner cites, courts will 

find that a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies when he has not explicitly re-pled 

his claims at every level of review, or that a prisoner is not procedurally barred thanks to 

action by the State. See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376–78 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(finding petitioner exhausted state remedies even without explicitly asserting federal 

claims in appellate proceedings); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 

2004) (finding no procedural bar when petitioner reasonably relied on government’s 

pleadings in choosing not to raise certain issues). But these cases do not apply to 

Petitioner’s situation. The issue is not whether he preserved his federal claims 

throughout the state post-conviction proceedings, or whether he had an excuse for not 

doing so; the issue is that he has not yet fully gone through state post-conviction 

proceedings at all. Petitioner does not dispute that further state proceedings are available 

to him, and provides no reason as to why he should be excused from pursuing them. 

 Third, Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s finding, based on Muhammad v. 

Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004), that Petitioner may not submit claims under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 as part of his habeas petition. (Doc. 21 at 5 n.8.) Muhammad involved a § 1983 

suit by a prisoner stemming from an altercation with a prison official and a subsequent 

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disciplinary proceeding. Generally, “where success in a prisoner’s § 1983 damages 

action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence,” the 

prisoner must first seek relief through a habeas challenge to the underlying conviction or 

sentence. 540 U.S. at 751 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)). The 

Supreme Court held that Muhammad’s suit could proceed as a § 1983 action rather than a 

habeas claim, because it “raised no claim on which habeas relief could have been 

granted.” Id. at 755. This was so, because the suit “could not be construed as seeking a 

judgment at odds with his conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be served 

in accordance with the underlying sentence.” Id. at 754–55 (emphasis added). Petitioner 

is therefore correct in describing Muhammad as holding that a prisoner may pursue 

§ 1983 claims “where the challenge to misconduct will have no bearing on the lawful 

sentence.” (Doc. 21 at 5 n.8.) But Petitioner’s claims do address his sentence, and 

specifically “the State’s calculation of time to be served.” See 540 U.S. at 755. 

Muhammad applies and prevents Petitioner from raising § 1983 claims in his habeas 

petition. 

 Finally, Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that Petitioner may not 

use his habeas petition to refer people to the U.S. Attorney for criminal charges. 

Petitioner’s First Amended Petition stated that “[g]rounds three and four are respectfully 

also submitted . . . for reference to the United States Attorney pursuant to 18 USC § 4 

under 18 USC § 1201.” As an initial matter, neither of these statutes provides a litigant 

with a private right of action. See Coats v. Mandarich Law Grp., LLP, No. 2:13-cv-246-

EFB PS, 2014 WL 545432, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014); Jianjun Xie v. Oakland 

Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 12-02950 CRB, 2012 WL 5899707, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 

2012). Petitioner argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4, which provides for criminal penalties against 

anyone who has “knowledge of the actual commission of a felony” and fails to “make 

known the same to some judge,” implicitly recognizes a private right to refer a felony1

 to 

the United States Attorney’s office for prosecution. This assertion finds no support in 

 

1

 In his case, he alleges, kidnapping, under 18 U.S.C. § 1201. 

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case law or in the text of the statute itself. 

 Petitioner makes no specific objections to the R & R besides the four discussed 

above. This relieves the Court of its obligation to review the remainder of the R & R. 

See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (“[Section 

636(b)(1)] does not . . . require any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of 

an objection.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any 

part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”). The Court 

has nonetheless reviewed the R & R and finds that it is well-taken. The Court will accept 

the R & R and dismiss the Petition without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (stating 

that the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge 

may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or 

return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett’s 

Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 20), is ADOPTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Kenneth D. Meinhardt’s First Amended 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Doc. 8), is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action and enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a 

certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s 

procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Dated this 27th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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