Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-05368/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-05368-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CARLOS ORTIZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ROBERT AYERS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 06-5368 RMW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

 Petitioner Carlos Ortiz, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a decision by the California Board of

Prison Terms (“Board”) that he is unsuitable for parole. The court directed respondent to show

cause why the cognizable claims should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer

addressing the merits of the petition, and petitioner has filed a traverse. Having reviewed the

briefs and the underlying record, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to relief based

on the claims presented and will deny the petition. 

BACKGROUND

The charges against petitioner arose from his murder of his cocaine dealer. The facts of

the commitment offense are as follows. The victim, Enrique Sanchez, house-sat for a friend in

San Jose, California in April 1985. Ans., Ex. 4 (Probation Officer’s Report, Oct. 1986) at 2. As

*E-FILED - 5/13/08*

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1. Respondent contends that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 

instant petition because California inmates have no federally protected due process right to

parole release. Ans. ¶ 14. Controlling Ninth Circuit authority, however, holds that petitioner has

a federally protected liberty interest in parole release and therefore this Court has subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th

Cir. 2002); see also Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir.

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part of this arrangement, Sanchez sold cocaine to the house-owner’s drug clientele. Id. In the

evening and early morning hours of April 13 and 14, petitioner bought small amounts of cocaine

on four occasions from Sanchez. Id. Sanchez’s corpse was found in the living room of the

house on April 14, having been stabbed approximately 60 times in the head, neck and back. Id.

Police officers found petitioner’s name and telephone number printed on a piece of paper in the

house. Id. 

Petitioner’s current version of the commitment offense is as follows. After a day of

heavy cocaine use, he visited the victim yet again that day to purchase more cocaine. Pet., Ex. C

(Mental Health Evaluation, Nov. 2005) at 2. Sanchez, irritated that petitioner had disturbed him

again, “verbally confronted” petitioner and physically shoved him. Id. Angered, petitioner

picked up a knife from a nearby table and stabbed Sanchez, who tried to protect himself from the

blows. Id. “I was under the influence [of drugs] that night . . . paranoid. I thought he was going

to hurt me. I wasn’t thinking.” Id. 

In 1986, a Santa Clara County Superior Court jury found petitioner, who is currently in

custody at San Quentin State Prison, guilty of second-degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187). 

Ans., Ex. 2 (Abstract of Judgment); Pet. at 4. The trial court sentenced petitioner to a total term

of fifteen years to life. Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. Pet. at 4. 

In December 2005, the Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole, citing as its reasons

that “[t]he offense was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner,” that resulted in the

death of a twenty-six year old man, for a motive that was “inexplicable or very trivial in relation

to the offense.” Pet., Ex. B at 73. Petitioner filed state habeas petitions, all later denied, in the

California superior, appellate, and supreme courts. Pet. at 6-7. Petitioner filed the instant federal

petition in 2006.1

 

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2006). 

2. The court dismissed petitioner’s third claim regarding the California Superior Court’s failure

to give a fair and meaningful review of his claims. OSC at 2. 

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As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner alleges that (1) the Board violated his

right to due process because its decision lacked “some evidence” to support it; (2) the Board’s

continued reliance on the circumstances of the commitment offense violates petitioner’s

constitutional rights; and (3) the regulations the Board used to make its decision contain

intolerable, vague criteria for determining suitability and directly violate his right to due process

and equal protection.2

 Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) at 2. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court

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may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively

unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision was objectively

unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method as well as its result. 

Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The standard for “objectively

unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss

of error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state

court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner contends that the Board’s denial of parole is not supported by “some

evidence.” OSC at 2. The Board complies with due process provided that there is “some

evidence” to support its decision. The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole

board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by

“some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison

Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary

hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)); see McQuillion v.

Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). Additionally, the evidence underlying the

Board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

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3. The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the commitment offense

was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) previous record of

violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5) psychological factors such

as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6) prison

misconduct. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The circumstances tending to show suitability are:

(1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense

was committed as a result of stress which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; 

(6) lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans

for future including development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate

ability to function within the law. Id. § 2402(d).

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Accordingly, if the Board’s determination of parole suitability is to satisfy due process, there

must be some evidence, with some indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v.

Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

In assessing whether there is “some evidence” to support the Board’s denial of parole,

this Court must consider the regulations that guide the Board in making its parole suitability

determinations. The Board is to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). Section 2402(a) states that “[t]he panel shall first determine whether the

life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life

prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” The

regulations enumerate various circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is

suitable for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)-(d).3

Applying these principles to the instant case, petitioner’s claim is without merit. The

court finds that there was some evidence to support the Board’s parole decision, based not only

on the circumstances of the commitment offense, but also on other relevant considerations. 

After a full hearing, the Board concluded that petitioner was not suitable for parole and “would

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” Ans., Ex. 3 at 73. As its reasons for this decision, the Board stated that “[t]he offense

was carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner. The victim in this case, Enrique

Sanchez[,] . . . . was age 26 years at the time. The victim was alone and unarmed when they

apparently got into a scuffle and [petitioner] proceeded to stab Mr. Sanchez to death.” Id. at 73-

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4. Petitioner also contends that the Board disregarded California Penal Code section 3041, which

indicates that a grant of parole is the norm. The claim is without merit. Although section 3041

does state that “[t]he panel or the board . . . shall set a release date,” the statute goes on to say

that a release date shall not be set if “the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or

the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration.” 

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74. Furthermore, “[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering in that the victim sustained 66 stab wounds

to his heat, neck, chest and back.” Id. at 74. Also, the Board found that “the motive for the

crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense in that it was over the purchase

and use of illegal narcotics.” Id. 

In addition to the nature and circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board

considered other parole suitability factors, such as petitioner’s criminal history and the

opposition of the police and district attorney to petitioner’s release. Id. at 75. The Board found

petitioner’s criminal record of theft, vandalism, and possession of controlled substances

troubling. Id. The Board, though commending petitioner for his involvement in narcotics

addiction programs and other positive social organizations and for “being disciplinary-free,”

expressed deep concern that the crime was a “really violent act,” and that the Board “need[s] to

understand that [petitioner] know[s] the factors for that rage [that caused the act].” Id. at 76. 

“Until progress is made [petitioner] continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others.” Id.

The Board also noted that the District Attorney of Santa Clara County and the San Jose Police

Department voiced their opposition to parole. Id. Because some evidence exists to support the

Board’s finding of parole unsuitability, the Board’s decision has complied with the requirements

of due process.4

Petitioner also contends that the Board’s continued reliance on the circumstances of the

commitment offense has resulted in a deprivation of his right to due process. Pet., P. & A. at 6-

8. 

Ninth Circuit precedent holds that a continued reliance solely on the circumstances of the

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commitment offense may eventually result in a violation of due process. The Ninth Circuit has

reasoned that “[t]he Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful balancing

and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2003). In a recent

decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the continuing vitality of Biggs. See Irons v. Carey, 479

F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit stressed its hope that “the Board will come to

recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment

offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process,

given the liberty interest in parole that flows from relevant California statutes.” Id. at 664 (citing

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917). However, the Ninth Circuit has not set a standard as to when a

complete reliance on unchanging circumstances would amount to a due process violation. 

This court, as detailed above, finds some evidence to support the Board’s finding,

consonant with due process and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Biggs, that petitioner was

unsuitable for parole. While the circumstances of the commitment offense are long past, they

provide at this time some evidence to support the Board’s decision. Furthermore, the Board did

not rely solely on the circumstances of the commitment offense, but also on other relevant

considerations. 

Petitioner also contends that the regulations the Board uses to make its decision contain

intolerable and vague criteria for determining parole suitability and directly violate his right to

due process and equal protection. OSC at 2; Pet., P. & A. at 11. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. As an initial matter, “[t]he Due Process Clause does

not require the same precision in the drafting of parole release statutes as is required in the

drafting of penal laws.” Hess v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909,

913-14 (9th Cir. 2008). The language the Board uses regarding determining parole suitability

based on the commitment offense and to which petitioner objects echoes that of California Code

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of Regulations title 15, section 2404(c)(1), which states that a circumstance indicating parole

unsuitability is that the commitment offense was carried out “in an especially heinous, atrocious

or cruel manner.” Section 2404(c)(1) then provides a list of five factors to consider when

determining whether a crime was carried out in this manner, including the presence of multiple

victims, the abuse or mutilation of the victim and a trivial motive for the crime. See id. at

(A)-(E). Because the term “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is further limited by these

five detailed factors, it is not constitutionally vague. Cf. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470-78

(1993) (Idaho death penalty statute citing as an aggravating factor crimes carried out in an “utter

disregard for human life” was not impermissibly vague because limiting construction had been

adopted which defined factor as those crimes demonstrating “the utmost disregard for human

life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer”). Because the regulatory language from which the

Board derives its guidance and authority is sufficiently detailed to tether and focus the decisionmaking process of the Board, petitioner’s claim is without merit. 

CONCLUSION

Applying the highly deferential standard imposed by AEDPA, this court concludes that

the state court’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), (2). Accordingly, the court

concludes that petitioner has failed to show any violation of his federal constitutional rights in

the underlying state court proceedings and parole hearing. The petition for writ of habeas corpus

is DENIED. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: __________________ RONALD M. WHYTE 

United States District Judge

5/9/08

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