Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01138/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01138-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADOLFO MENDOZA et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

SCOTT WHITEHOUSE et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-01138 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

TO DISMISS 

In three separate motions, Defendants Jorge Gil-Blanco, Aldo

Serrano, Jonathan Stephens, and Joe Reposa move, under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss, on the basis of qualified

immunity, Plaintiffs’ first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights in the third

amended civil rights complaint (TAC). Plaintiffs oppose the

motions. Having considered all the papers filed by the parties,

the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their complaint, on

April 19, 2007, they filed their First Amended Complaint and on

July 12, 2007, they filed their Second Amended Complaint. The

complaint arises from an operation involving officers from several

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police departments which resulted in the alleged forced entry by

officers into Plaintiffs’ home. Plaintiffs’ home had been

misidentified in the search warrant as the home of a suspect

involved in a narcotics investigation. On July 16, 2007,

Defendants Gil-Blanco and Serrano filed motions to dismiss. On

September 24, 2007, the Court issued an Order Granting with Leave

to Amend Gil-Blanco’s motion to dismiss and Granting in Part with

Leave to Amend Serrano’s motion to dismiss (September 24, 2007

Order). (Docket # 48).

In the September 24, 2007 Order, the Court noted that,

concerning Gil-Blanco, the complaint only alleged that, in the

company of other defendants, he drove by 53 Dimaggio Avenue, the

suspect’s residence, to verify that it was a yellow stucco house

with white trim. The Court ruled that this allegation was

insufficient to show that Gil-Blanco was the proximate cause of any

violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected rights. 

In regard to Serrano, the Court noted that the complaint only

alleged that he used a battering ram to open the door to

Plaintiffs’ residence. The Court noted that this was insufficient

to state a claim against Serrano for executing an invalid search

warrant, but that it was sufficient to state a claim against him

for a violation of the right not to have police officers break into

one’s home without first knocking and announcing. The Court

granted Serrano’s motion to dismiss the claim based upon the

execution of the search warrant and denied the motion to dismiss

the claim based upon the use of excessive force. 

In their TAC, Plaintiffs add the following relevant

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allegations. In ¶ 22, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Sergeant

Mike Wood followed the suspect to 53 Dimaggio Avenue and reported

to other Defendants that the house had a U-Haul truck parked

directly in front and a vehicle with a cloth cover parked in the

driveway. In ¶ 23, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Scott

Whitehouse arrived at 53 Dimaggio Avenue, parked across the street

from it and, from this position, could see that it was yellow

stucco with white trim and red brick facia. Whitehouse went to the

Pittsburgh Police Department to obtain a search warrant for 53

DiMaggio Avenue; he included the correct description, but

erroneously indicated the address was 41 DiMaggio Avenue instead of

the correct address of 53 DiMaggio Avenue. In ¶ 27, Plaintiffs add

that, prior to the execution of the search warrant, Sgt. Wood

returned to DiMaggio Avenue with Gil-Blanco, to whom he pointed out

53 Dimaggio Street as the suspect’s house. In ¶ 30, Plaintiffs

allege:

A pre-warrant briefing was held, which was attended by

all of the law enforcement officers who were to

participate in the search, including but not limited to

all of the Defendants. At the briefing, Defendants and

the other officers were informed that the residence they

had been authorized to search was a yellow stucco house

with white trim, a raised red brick porch, a U-Haul truck

parked directly in front, and a vehicle parked in the

driveway with a cloth cover. Defendants and the other

officers were told that the occupants of the residence

were a black male and a juvenile black female.

In ¶ 32, Plaintiffs allege that their residence, 41 Dimaggio,

is next door to 53 Dimaggio and that, at 1:48 a.m., when the

warrant was executed, the porch light was lit at 53 Dimaggio so

that the color of the residence and all the details mentioned above

were clearly visible. Also, Plaintiffs’ residence, which was

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painted peach with grey trim and had no U-Haul truck parked in

front or cloth-covered car in the driveway, could be seen from the

light of a nearby street light, and it could be seen that it did

not match the description in the warrant of a yellow stucco house

with white trim. Plaintiffs allege, “Thus, all of the Defendants

knew or should have known that Plaintiffs’ residence was not the

residence described in the warrant and, consequently, that they did

not have lawful authority to enter or search it.”

In ¶ 34, Plaintiffs allege that, inside the residence, GilBlanco pointed his gun at two of them and Stephens hit one of them

on the head.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate

only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of

a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).

In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a

claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION

I. Fourth Amendment Violation

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a cause of action for the

'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

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the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94

(1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda

County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The Fourth Amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and

seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The reasonableness of a search

or seizure also depends "on how it is carried out." Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (emphasis in original). The

Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that: “[N]o

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

Officers must discontinue a search of areas of a property that they

discover were erroneously included in a search warrant. Mena v.

City of Simi Valley, 226 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government

officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

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known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule

of qualified immunity protects "'all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law;'" defendants can have a

reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the

law requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001). "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if

the right asserted by the plaintiff was not 'clearly established'

or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d

624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an

actual constitutional right, then proceed to determine if the right

was “clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 

The threshold question must be: Taken in the light most favorable

to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201. “If no constitutional right would have been violated

were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. On the other hand,

if a violation could be made out on the allegations, the next

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established. Id. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. 

Id. at 202. The relevant inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

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officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted. Id. If the law did not put the officer on notice that

his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate. Id. The plaintiff bears the

burden of proving the existence of a "clearly established" right at

the time of the allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First

Interstate Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). If the law is

determined to be clearly established, the next question is, under

that law, could a reasonable official have believed his conduct was

lawful? Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir.

1993). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that his

actions were reasonable, even if he violated the plaintiff's

constitutional rights. Doe v. Petaluma City School Dist., 54 F.3d

1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995). Whether a reasonable official could

have believed the action taken was lawful is a mixed question of

law and fact: "It involves an objective test of whether a

reasonable official could have believed that his conduct was lawful

in light of what he knew and the action he took.” Sinaloa Lake

Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir.

1995). “If there are genuine issues of material fact in issue

relating to the historical facts of what the official knew or what

he did, it is clear that these are questions of fact for the jury

to determine." Id.

III. Defendant Gil-Blanco

The additional allegations in the TAC remedy the deficiencies

in the allegations against Gil-Blanco in the SAC. The TAC alleges

that: (1) Gil-Blanco attended a pre-warrant briefing where the

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description of the suspect’s residence was provided; (2) Gil-Blanco

pointed a gun at two Plaintiffs within Plaintiffs’ residence and

thus he participated in the execution of the warrant; (3) although

the warrant was executed at 1:48 a.m., the suspect’s residence and

Plaintiffs’ residence were clearly visible from a porch light and a

street light and the differences between them were readily

ascertainable; and (4) Gil-Blanco knew or should have known that

Plaintiffs’ residence was not the residence described in the

warrant.

Neither Gil-Blanco nor the other moving Defendants argue that

they did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to be free

from unreasonable searches nor do they argue that Fourth Amendment

jurisprudence is not clearly established law; rather, they argue

that they acted objectively reasonably in entering Plaintiffs’

residence because they relied on a facially valid warrant. 

In Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1987), a search

warrant was erroneously broad in that it failed to designate that

the third-floor of an apartment building contained two apartments

instead of one and the officers entered the apartment of a person

who was not a suspect. The Supreme Court stated, “If the officers

had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two

apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third

floor, and they had been aware of the error in the warrant, they

would have been obligated to limit their search to [the suspect’s]

apartment. Moreover, . . . they were required to discontinue the

search of respondents’ apartment as soon as they discovered that

there were two separate units on the third floor and therefore were

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put on notice of the risk that they might be in a unit erroneously

included within the terms of the warrant.” Id.

Taken as true, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to

establish that a reasonable officer in Gil-Blanco’s position would

have known that he was not entering the correct residence and,

thus, that his conduct was unlawful. 

Gil-Blanco cites several cases for the proposition that an

officer is entitled to qualified immunity as a defense to an action

where he is objectively reasonable in relying on a facially valid

warrant. See e.g., Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.

1991) (“A police officer generally has qualified immunity for

conducting an unconstitutional search if he is acting on the basis

of a facially valid warrant.”); Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012,

1029-30 (9th Cir. 1997) (it is not necessary for officers executing

the warrant to actually see it). However, the facts as alleged are

distinguishable from the facts in the cases cited by Gil-Blanco. 

Here, the issue is what Gil-Blanco actually knew about the

residence he forcibly entered and whether that knowledge would have

caused a reasonable officer to have known the entry into that

residence was illegal. In Marks, the court denied qualified

immunity to officers who searched persons on the premises during

the execution of the warrant because “regardless of the terms of

the warrant, the law was clearly established that the officers

could not search all persons present on the premises in the absence

of individualized probable cause.” Id. at 1025. Similarly, here

the law is clearly established that officers could not enter and

search a residence that they knew or should have known was not the

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suspect’s residence, no matter what the warrant indicated. 

Therefore, Gil-Blanco’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IV. Defendant Serrano

The analysis that applies to Gil-Blanco is equally applicable

to Serrano. Plaintiffs’ TAC alleges that Serrano was present at

the briefing at which the description of the suspect’s house was

provided, that outdoor lighting allowed Serrano to ascertain that

the house he was entering with a battering ram did not fit the

description of the suspect’s house and that, therefore, he knew or

should have known that he was forcibly entering the wrong

residence. As explained above, these allegations are sufficient to

defeat a qualified immunity defense on a motion to dismiss. 

Therefore, Serrano’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

V. Defendants Stephens and Reposa

Stephens and Reposa argue they are protected by qualified

immunity on the same grounds presented by Gil-Blanco and Serrano. 

The allegations in the TAC against Stephens and Reposa are that

they were present at the pre-execution meeting at which the

suspect’s house was described in detail and they were also part of

the group of officers who executed the warrant. As above, these

allegations are sufficient to defeat a qualified immunity defense

on a motion to dismiss. Stephens and Reposa’s motion to dismiss is

DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motions of Reposa and Stephens

(Docket # 53), Gil-Blanco (Docket # 59) and Serrano (Docket # 52)

are DENIED. If appropriate after discovery, Defendants may present

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these same issues in a motion for summary judgment. Defendants

must collaborate and submit one motion for summary judgment because

the issues presented, as well as the cases and analysis, are

identical for all Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/25/08 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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