Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02597/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02597-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARREN ALEXES HILTON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 10cv2597WQH (WMC)

ORDER

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, California

Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 12) of

Magistrate Judge William McCurine Jr. recommending that this Court deny the First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 4) filed by Darren Alexex Hilton.

I. Background

Hilton was convicted of forcible rape, pandering by encouragement, forcible oral

copulation, lewd acts upon a child 14 or 15 years of age, and oral copulation of a person under

18 years of age by a jury consisting of nine women and three men. 

Hilton appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeals on the grounds that

the trial court erred during jury voir dire by overruling his objection that the prosecutor

improperly used peremptory challenges to excuse four male prospective jurors in violation of

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978), and

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because the prosecutor improperly suggested that God was on the side of the alleged victims

in the case during closing argument. The Court of Appeal found that “the court did not err in

denying [Hilton’s] Wheeler/Batson motions, and the prosecutor did not commit reversible

misconduct.” (Lodgment No. 5 at 3). 

Hilton petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. The petition was summarily

denied. Hilton did not pursue collateral relief in state court.

On December 16, 2010, Hilton filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. 

(ECF No. 1). On January 17, 2011, Hilton filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (ECF No. 4). On February 14, 2011, Respondent filed an Answer. (ECF No. 8). On

June 6, 2011, Hilton filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 11).

On September 27, 2011, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. (ECF No. 12). The

Magistrate Judge performed a comparative juror analysis of the four male jurors struck by the

prosecution and found that Hilton had failed to offer a basis for the Court to disturb the state

appellate court’s findings and the state trial court’s determination that the prosecutor’s genderneutral explanations for exercising the peremptory challenges were credible. The Magistrate

Judge concluded that Hilton’s Batson/Wheeler challenges should be denied. The Magistrate

Judge found that the state court properly identified and applied the constitutional standard to

the facts of Hilton’s claim that the prosecutor improperly implied that God was on the side of

the alleged victim in the case. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the state court reached an

objectively reasonable result in denying the claim. 

On November 18, 2011, Hilton filed an Objection to the Report and Recommendation. 

(ECF No. 15). Hilton contends that the state court correctly identified the law but misapplied

the facts. Hilton contends that the “overall context” of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges

show that the his proffered explanations were pretextual. Id. at 6. Hilton contends that the

state appellate court made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

in the case by finding that the prosecutor’s error in referring to religion during closing

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argument was harmless. 

II. Standard of Review

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report ... to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); see also U.S.

v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court reviews the Petition and the Report

and Recommendation de novo. 

III. Discussion

A. Ground One: Batson/Wheeler

The right, purpose, and manner of exercising peremptory challenges is defined in state

law. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988). The California Supreme Court in Wheeler,

prohibited the use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude jurors based on such

characteristics as race, religion, or ethnicity. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 231.5. Clearly established

United States Supreme Court authority also prohibits systematic exclusions on such

characteristics. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84, 106; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 128-29

(1994) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of

gender, just as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of race”); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S.

472, 478 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a

discriminatory purpose.”) (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir.

1994)). Courts presume peremptory challenges are exercised in a constitutional manner. See

Batson, 476 U.S. at 89-98; Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d at 278.

There is a three-step “Batson framework [which] is designed to produce actual 

answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury

selection process.” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (citation omitted). To

satisfy step one, the defendant must first show he or she “is a member of a cognizable racial

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group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the

venire members of the defendant's race.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169 (quotation omitted). If

a defendant satisfies step one, the burden shifts to the prosecution at step two to rebut the

inference of bias by articulating a neutral reason for the peremptory strike. Purkett, 514

U.S. at 768. At step two, courts focus on the subjective genuineness of the asserted

nondiscriminatory motive rather than its reasonableness. Id. at 769. The issue is the facial

validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363. As long as the

reasons given are reasonably specific and neutral, even if the explanations are trivial, they

are not deemed invalid. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 (“even if the State produces only

frivolous or utterly nonsensical justifications for its strike, the case does not end – it merely

proceeds to step three”). 

Once the prosecutor gives his reasons, “[t]he trial court will then have the duty to

determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005) (quotation omitted); see also Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170 (having

“the benefit of all relevant circumstances, including the prosecutor's explanation,” the trial

judge decides “whether it was more likely than not that the challenge was improperly

motivated.”). “Step three of the Batson inquiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor's

credibility,... and ‘the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of

the attorney who exercises the challenge’ ....” Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hernandez,

500 U.S. at 364-65) (“In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question

will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be

believed.”). The reviewing Court is confined to ensuring the result was objectively

reasonable. See Rice, 546 U.S. at 341-42; see also Felkner v. Jackson, -- U.S. --, 131 S.Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding a grant of federal habeas relief

on a Batson challenge, applying the highly deferential AEDPA standards and giving the

state-court decisions the required “benefit of the doubt”).

Although Petitioner contends in his objections to the Report and Recommendation

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that the trial court “made no specific findings on demeanor of credibility” in this case, the

trial court stated that the prosecutor’s proffered explanation for the peremptory challenges

presented “justifiable reasons” and “very valid reasons.” (ECF No. 15 at 3). The trial court

did not find that the prosecutor demonstrated discriminatory intent in exercising the

peremptory challenges. The Magistrate Judge correctly stated: “A trial court’s finding of

no discriminatory intent is a factual determination accorded great deference by reviewing

courts because a finding “on the issue of discriminatory intent ... largely will turn on

evaluation of credibility.” (ECF No. 12 at 8) (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-65)

(quotation omitted). 

Petitioner also contends in his objections to the Report and Recommendation that

the general pattern of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges and the prosecutor’s initial

statement that he did not believe the exclusion of white men could be the basis for a Batson

challenge indicate that the strikes were based on gender discrimination. The order in which

jurors are stricken may assist in determining whether a challenged strike was based on

discrimination. See United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting

that government used its first peremptory challenge to strike the only Hispanic). However,

the Magistrate Judge conducted a comparative juror analysis. The Magistrate Judge

correctly found that the state courts reasonably applied controlling law and reasonably

determined the facts in rejecting Hilton’s Batson/Wheeler claims. 

With regard to prospective juror number one, the Magistrate Judge found that “[t]he

credibility of the prosecutor’s impressions [that prospective juror number one] would not

interact well with the group based on specific details associated with his lifestyle entails

demeanor and credibility evaluations allocated to the trial court.” (ECF No. 12 at 13). The

Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the state court’s determination that there was no

Baston error with respect to prospective juror number one was objectively reasonable. 

With regard to prospective juror number fourteen, the Magistrate Judge found that the state

court reasonably determined that the prosecutor’s explanation that he was concerned over

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prospective juror number fourteen answers to questions regarding his two adult children

including his failure to remember where his son worked or what type of work his daughter

did was credible. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the state court’s

determination that there was no Baston error with respect to prospective juror number

fourteen was objectively reasonable. With regard to prospective juror number twentythree, the Magistrate Judge found that the trial court performed the “unique role [of]

assessing from observation the credibility” of the prosecutor’s gender-neutral explanation

that prospective juror number twenty-three had a “bad attitude.” Id. at 16. The Magistrate

Judge correctly concluded that he state court’s determination that there was no Baston error

with respect to prospective juror number twenty-three was objectively reasonable. With

regard to prospective juror number thirty-six, the Magistrate Judge found that the

prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on a genuine mistake as to the juror’s

profession. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that he state court’s determination

that there was no Baston error with respect to prospective juror number thirty-six was

objectively reasonable. 

B. Ground Two: Prosecutor’s Closing Argument

A habeas petition will be granted for prosecutorial misconduct only when the

misconduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). “[T]he touchstone of due process

analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the

culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). To be found

unconstitutional, the prosecutorial misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result

in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

108 (1976).

The Magistrate Judge found that the state court correctly concluded that the

prosecutor’s reference to religion during closing argument did not amount to prosecutorial

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misconduct. The Magistrate Judge found that the state trial court instructed the jury four

times that the appropriate scope of the evidence, including immediately after the

prosecutor’s remark during closing argument. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded

that the “state courts identified and reasonably applied the proper constitutional standard to

the facts of this case to reach an objectively reasonable result” that Hilton’s constitutional

right to a fair trial was not violated. (ECF No. 12 at 23). 

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, “[t]he

district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability should be issued only where the

petition presents “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). “[A] [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows ... that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000).

Although the Court denied the Petition, the Court finds that Petitioner raised

colorable, nonfrivolous, constitutional arguments with respect the Petition. A certificate of

appealability is granted.

V. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 12) is

ADOPTED in its entirety. The First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF

No. 4) is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is GRANTED. 

DATED: April 24, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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