Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01677/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01677-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The th

Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on th

other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOTERO SOTO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) 

CALIFORNIA, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:08-cv-01677-LJO-JLT HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

THE AMENDED PETITION (Doc. 21) 

ORDER DIRECTING OBJECTIONS TO BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

October 29, 2008, challenging his November 30, 2004 conviction in the Superior Court of Tulare

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earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal th

petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the original petition on October 29, 2008. (Doc. 1, p.

9). 

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County following a plea of no contest to first degree burglary and assault by means of force. (Doc.

22, Lodged Documents (“LD”) 1, 2; Doc. 16, pp. 1-2). Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of

seventeen years and eight months. (Id.). On April 20, 2009, Petitioner filed an amended petition

raising two claims: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his

no contest pleas; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to prove Petitioner committed a crime to

facilitate other criminal activity. (Doc. 16). On May 14, 2009, the Court ordered Respondent to file

a response. (Doc. 17). On July 13, 2009, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss the petition,

arguing that the petition is untimely. (Doc. 21). To date, Petitioner has not filed an opposition to the

motion to dismiss. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

As mentioned, Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one year limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from

the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondent’s to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule

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4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

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In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitation period. Because Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is similar in

procedural standing to a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default, and because Respondent has not yet filed a formal Answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on October 29, 2008, and thus, it is subject to the provisions

of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

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review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on November 30, 2004. Petitioner then

commenced his direct review of his conviction in the California appellate courts, including a petition

for review in the California Supreme Court that was denied on October 11, 2006. (LD 3-4). Thus,

direct review would have concluded on January 9, 2007, when the ninety day period for seeking

review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983);

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 th th

Cir.1998). Petitioner would then have one year from the following day, January 10, 2007, or until

January 9, 2008, absent applicable tolling, within which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus. 

As mentioned, the instant petition was filed on October 29, 2008, almost ten months after the

date the one-year period would have expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to either statutory or

equitable tolling, the instant petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

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because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the record establishes that Petitioner filed a single state court habeas petition, on

December 4, 2007, in the California Supreme Court, that was denied on June 11, 2008. (LD 5, 6). 

As can be seen from the foregoing chronology, the one-year period commenced on January

10, 2007, and ran unabated until Petitioner filed his lone state habeas petition on December 4, 2007. 

At that point, 328 of Petitioner’s 365 days had elapsed, leaving Petitioner with only 37 days

remaining within which to file his federal habeas petition. Assuming, without deciding, that

Petitioner’s single state court petition was “properly filed” within the meaning of the AEDPA such

that Petitioner would be entitled to statutory tolling during the pendency of that petition, the one-year

period would have re-commenced on the day following the California Supreme Court’s denial of that

petition on June 11, 2008, i.e., on June 12, 2008, and would have run unabated until the one-year

period expired 37 days later, on July 19, 2008. As discussed, the instant petition was not filed until

October 29, 2008, over three months after the one-year period had expired. Thus, unless Petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling, the petition should be dismissed as untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland,

410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When 

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Given the Court’s analysis of the timeliness issue and its Recommendation to dismiss the amended petition, the 2

Court need not address Respondent’s additional ground for dismissal, i.e., that Ground Two, relating to insufficiency of the

evidence, has not been exhausted in the California Supreme Court. 

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external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

Here, Petitioner has made no express or implied claim of entitlement to equitable tolling. 

Moreover, after reviewing the record now before this Court, the Court perceives no basis for

entitlement to equitable tolling. Therefore, the petition is untimely by more than three months and

should be dismissed.2

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 21), be GRANTED, and the amended habeas corpus petition (Doc. 16), be DISMISSED for

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

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appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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