Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00093/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SITUE SAVELIO TOLUAO,

Petitioner,

v.

SOTO, Warden, 

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 14cv00093 JAH(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Situe Savelio Toluao, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on January 13, 2014 [ECF Nos. 1, 2]. There, on several

bases, he challenges his conviction for first-degree murder and

attempted murder. (Pet. 2,1 ECF No. 1; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr.

vol. 2, 570-71, Nov. 20, 2009 (verdict).) In claim one, he alleges

that trial court erred by admitting gang evidence. (Pet. 7, ECF

No. 1.) Toluao maintains, in claim two, that his right to confront

1 All citations are to the page numbers assigned by the

Court’s electronic case filing system.

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witnesses was violated by the admission of his codefendant’s

statements about Toluao's involvement in the crimes. (Id. at 9.) 

Petitioner argues that his right to a fair trial was violated when

the trial court denied his severance request (claim three) and

allowed testimony that was inadmissible hearsay evidence

implicating Toluao in the crimes (claim four). (Id. at 11-12.) In

claim five, Petitioner alleges his constitutional rights were

violated when the trial court denied his request for an evidentiary

hearing and summarily denied his motion for a new trial. (Id. at

14.) Toluao argues in claim six that the trial court erred in

denying his petition for release of juror information. (Id. at

15.) In claim seven, Petitioner alleges the trial court failed to

dismiss the prior strike conviction allegation pursuant to People

v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). (Id. at 16.) Finally, in claim eight, Toluao

asserts that he “joins into arguments made by co-Petitioner that

would accrue to his benefit.” (Id. at 17.)

Respondent Soto filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus [ECF No. 5], along with a Notice of Lodgment [ECF No. 6]. 

Petitioner has not filed a Traverse. For the reasons discussed

below, the Petition should be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Toluao’s conviction arises out of a gang-related drive-by

shooting. The California Court of Appeal gave the following

recitation of the factual background as established at trial:

The Shooting

Defendants are members of the Deep Valley Bloods

(Bloods) criminal street gang in Oceanside, which

primarily consists of Samoan members. Their rival gang

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is the Deep Valley Crips (Crips), a predominantly

African–American gang.

In June 2005, other Bloods members, including

Patrick Johnson, Michael Linnan and Masi Toluao (Masi),

visited the gravesite of Rusty Seau, who had been killed

by a Crips member earlier that month. The gravesite had

been burned. The men were angry that Rusty was killed

and that his gravesite was desecrated. They discussed

retaliation, with Masi suggesting that they shoot Crips

members. Linnan offered the use of his car and Johnson

stated that he would be the driver because, as an

African–American, he could go into Crips territory

without raising suspicions.

Later that evening, many Bloods members congregated

at Masi's house on Arthur Avenue and continued discussing

plans for the retaliation. Masi arranged for Johnson to

obtain guns from another gang member. Johnson and

Defendants went to Linnan's house, picked up Linnan's

Ford Taurus, and then obtained the guns from another

house.

Johnson and Defendants drove into the Whelan Ranch

housing complex, a location where they were likely to

find Crips members. Johnson got out of the car,

approached a group of African–Americans and asked them

for directions. Based on their response, Johnson

believed they were Crips and returned to the car where he

informed Defendants that the group was “crab niggers.” 

Defendants “pump[ed] each other up.”

Johnson pulled the car around a corner and saw the

group of African–Americans approaching a Cadillac. 

Defendants then got out of the car and ran towards the

Cadillac's location. While Johnson was waiting for

Defendants, he heard gunshots. Defendants then ran back

and jumped in the car. Toluao exclaimed, “Go, go. We

just shot three people, and I kicked some girl in the

head and domed somebody.” Siulua stated that he shot the

driver.

Oates was in the driver's seat of the Cadillac that

night. He heard gunshots and then noticed that Pruitt,

who was standing in front of the car, had been shot. 

Oates observed that a man had his hands on the car and

was kicking underneath it. Oates was then shot through

the passenger side window. Pruitt died at the scene that

night, and Oates suffered a gunshot wound that fractured

his clavicle.

At trial, Oates was unsure if there was more than

one shooter; however, he previously told officers that

there were multiple perpetrators. He did not get a good

look because he was trying to stay low in his seat. He

described the one person that he saw as a heavy man

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wearing a white shirt, black beanie, and a bandana across

his face. Oates also stated that the person had a dark

skin tone and tight braids pressed along the side of his

head that were similar to cornrows. Oates told officers

that he thought the shooter was possibly a Black person.

Eyewitness Testimony

Brittney Patterson was with her friends, including

Oates and Pruitt, on the night of the shooting. When she

heard gunshots, Patterson ran to the front of the

Cadillac and then got underneath it. Pruitt was on the

ground in front of her. After the gunfire stopped,

someone kicked Patterson in the head and then left.

Patterson saw and heard two people. Although she

did not get a good look, Patterson described one of those

people as a heavy Samoan male with two braids or

cornrows. She also stated that the person was wearing a

white shirt.

Around midnight on the morning of the shooting,

Christine Dinwiddie, a resident of Whelan Ranch, heard 10

to 12 popping sounds like firecrackers. Dinwiddie looked

out of her bedroom window and saw a white or silver

four-door Toyota or Ford with its brake lights on and

head lights off. According to Dinwiddie, there were

yellow street lights on in the area that changed the

appearance of vehicles by casting a hue on them. After

noticing a man in the driver's seat, Dinwiddie saw two

men run toward the vehicle. Although Dinwiddie could not

identify the race of the men, she described them as

neither White nor African–American.

Around the same time, Jeff Dresser, another resident

of Whelan Ranch, heard several gunshots. Dresser looked

out of his window and saw a four-door sedan with its head

lights off. The car appeared to be silver, champagne or

cream, but it was hard to make out the color because of

the yellow street lights. Dresser then saw two men

“shuffling” toward the vehicle and heard one of them say

to the other, “Hurry up, nigga.” One of the men had his

hair pulled back, possibly braided in cornrows. Dresser

assumed the men were Black because they used the term

“nigga” and were in a Crips neighborhood.

Dresser accompanied police officers to a storage

facility several months after the incident. He

identified a Ford Taurus that appeared to be the car he

saw on the night of the shooting. Dresser particularly

noticed that the car in the storage facility was the same

color and had similar wrap around tail lights as the car

he previously saw at the scene of the crime. Dresser

told officers that he was 75% sure of his identification.

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Rachel Bourne also lived in Whelan Ranch at the time

of the shooting. Around midnight, Bourne heard gunshots

and went outside onto her balcony. Bourne noticed a

four-door Ford Contour or Taurus with its engine running. 

She heard someone say something similar to “we got them”

and then saw two men get into the car.

Bourne eventually called 911 and described the two

men that she saw as “lighter skin black guys.” Later

that night, Bourne heard Patterson tell the police that

the men were Samoan. Bourne told officers that she was

uncertain of the race of the two individuals, but that

they could have been Samoan, Mexican or light skinned

Black men. A few days after the incident, Bourne told

officers that although other people indicated the men

were Samoan, she still thought they were Black. At

trial, Bourne stated that one of the men had a complexion

similar to a Mexican, Samoan or light skinned Black

person and the other man was slightly darker. She also

stated that one of the men had his hair in a ponytail or

braids.

Forensic Evidence

The police found a black glove and a brochure in

Linnan's Taurus. Toluao's fingerprint was on the

brochure. A DNA test on the glove revealed that Siulua

was a possible contributor of the DNA and Toluao could

not be excluded.

Officers also found numerous items near the location of

the shooting, including a bandana, beanie, jeans, and

sneakers. The beanie had a mixture of DNA on it from at least

two people and Toluao could not be excluded as a contributor. 

DNA obtained from the jeans and sneakers matched Toluao's DNA

profile.

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 2-6

(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012).) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A second amended complaint filed on August 29, 2007, charged

Situe Toluao2 with the murder of Joaquin Pruitt and the attempted

murder of Sean Oates in violation of California Penal Code sections

187(a) and 664. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 13-15, Aug.

2

 Peni Siulua and Patrick Johnson were named as codefendants

in the second amended complaint. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

1, 13-15, Aug. 29, 2007 (second amended complaint).) 

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29, 2007 (second amended complaint).) The complaint alleged that

Petitioner committed both crimes for the benefit of a criminal

street gang in violation of California Penal Code section

186.22(b)(1). (Id. at 15.) The complaint stated that Toluao was a

principal and that at least one principal personally discharged a

firearm causing great bodily injury. (Id. at 14, 16.) The

complaint also alleged Petitioner had two prior prison terms and

one prior strike conviction that qualified as a serious felony. 

(Id. at 17-18.) 

Following a jury trial, Toluao was found guilty of attempted

murder and first degree murder. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

2, 570-71.) The jury also made findings on the special

allegations. (Id.) Petitioner filed a motion for a new trial. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 3, 617-29, Apr. 6, 2010 (motion

for a new trial).) Toluao also moved to strike the prior strike

conviction allegation pursuant to People v. Superior Court

(Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789. 

(Id. at 681-84, Aug. 4, 2010 (motion to strike).) In separate

rulings, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial

and his subsequent request to strike the prior strike conviction. 

(Lodgment No. 6, Rep.’s Tr. Appeal - Augment vol. 6, 488, Aug. 3,

2010 (denying motion for new trial); Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr.

Appeal vol. 20, 2841-42, Sept. 20, 2010 (denying Romero motion).) 

Toluao had admitted his prior strike conviction earlier in the

proceeding, before the court addressed his motion to strike. 

(Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 20, 2824.) Toluao was sentenced

to 114 years to life in state prison. (Id. at 2842-43; Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 3, 891, Sept. 28, 2010 (minutes).) 

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Petitioner timely appealed. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

3, 685, Sept. 23, 2010 (notice of appeal).) On direct appeal, he

raised the same eight claims he alleges in this Petition. (See

Lodgment No. 9, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 19-69, People v. Toluao,

No. D058242 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2012).) The California Court of

Appeal rejected all of Petitioner’s claims and affirmed the

judgment. (Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip

op. at 1-2.) Toluao filed a petition for review with the

California Supreme Court, raising the same claims he raised on

appeal. (Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review at 3-21, People v.

Toluao, [No. S206388] (Cal. Jan. 16, 2013).) The California

Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation. 

(Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao, No. S206388, order at 1 (Cal.

Jan. 16, 2013).) 

Toluao’s Petition in this case was dated January 5, 2014, and

filed with the Court on January 13, 2014. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent argues that Toluao constructively filed his Petition on

January 8, 2014, the date that appears on the trust account form

attached to the Petition. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

13 & n.2, ECF No. 5.) Respondent claims that because the trust

account form was executed on January 8, 2014, and because the

Petition was post-marked January 9, 2014, Toluao could not have

mailed it before January 8, 2014. (Id.) Respondent concedes that

Petitioner “signed his Petition on January 5, 2014, and prepared a

proof of service stating that he placed his Petition in the mail on

that date . . . .” (Id.) 

Along with his Petition, Toluao also submitted an Application

to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 2], which he signed on

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January 5, 2014. To support his request, Petitioner attached a

certified copy of his trust account which was executed and signed

by an authorized officer of the institution on January 8, 2014. 

(Decl. & Appl. Proceed In Forma Pauperis 4, ECF No. 2.) Toluao was

required to fill out a trust account withdrawal authorization form

to request in forma pauperis filing status. He signed the

authorization on January 5, 2014. (Id. at 5.) 

Under the mailbox rule, the Court deems a petition filed on

the date Petitioner hands it to prison authorities for mailing. 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614

F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Rule 3(d), Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, foll. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 2006). 

The relevant date is thus the date Toluao’s Petition was delivered

to prison officials, not when it was placed in the mail. “A

prisoner's control over the filing of his petition ceases when he

delivers it to prison officials. Whether or not the petition is

actually placed in the mail, delivered to the court or filed once

it arrives there, are all matters beyond the prisoner's control.” 

Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-71). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit

recognized that “prison officials may have an incentive to delay

prisoners' court filings, and prisoners will have a hard time

proving that the officials did so.” Id. 

Respondent does not contest that Toluao signed his Petition

and related documents on January 5, 2014, and does not point to any

document signed by Petitioner on a later date. Likewise,

Respondent does not challenge that Toluao delivered his Petition to

prison authorities on January 5, 2014. “Initially, the burden

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falls on Respondent to show this was not the true mailing date.” 

Quinton v. Clay, No. 07cv0361-LAB (WMc), 2008 WL 744252, at *2

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2008) (citing Washington v. United States, 243

F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). “Absent evidence

to the contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, we

will assume that [petitioner's] motion was delivered to prison

authorities the day he signed it . . . .” Washington, 243 F.3d at

1301. Here, Respondent does not offer any records to demonstrate

when Toluao handed his Petition to the prison officials for

mailing. Therefore, the Court gives Toluao the benefit of the

mailbox rule and considers the Petition filed on January 5, 2014,

the date Toluao signed it. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.

339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

1991). Because Toluao's Petition was filed on January 5, 2014,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

Section 2254(d) reads as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

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State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained "in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors

of state law "unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation"). 

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The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." Id. at 71. In other words, a federal court is not

required to review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather,

a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The "novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to

'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'" Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision

may not be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore v. Calderon,

108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1997). "[A] writ may issue only when

the state court decision is 'contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,' an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court." Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221,

1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

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rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Proper Respondent

To file his Petition in federal court, Toluao used Form CV 68

(Rev. Dec. 1998), “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody,” naming Warden Soto as the Respondent and former

Attorney General Edmond G. Brown Jr. as “Additional Respondent.” 

(Pet. 1, ECF NO. 1.) Soto argues that because Toluao is in his

custody, he is the proper party to be named in this proceeding, and

former Attorney General Brown should be removed as a Respondent in

this matter. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No.

5.) 

The Attorney General of the State of California is not a

proper respondent in this action. Rule 2 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases provides that the state officer having custody

of the petitioner must be named as respondent. See Rule 2(a),

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, foll. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. But

“[i]f the petitioner is not yet in custody -– but may be subject to

future custody –- under the state-court judgment being contested,

the petition must name as respondents both the officer who has

current custody and the attorney general of the state where the

judgement was entered.” Id. R. 2(b). Here, there is no basis for

Petitioner to have named the Attorney General as a respondent in

this action. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Edmond G.

Brown be removed as an additional Respondent. 

//

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B. Admission of Gang Evidence

In his first claim for habeas relief, Toluao alleges that his

constitutional rights were violated when the trial court admitted

“unnecessary and inflammatory evidence pertaining to gang members

and crimes” as well as “Petitioner’s gang letters and lyrics.” 

(Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) Respondent counters that because there is no

clearly established Supreme Court law which holds that admission of

irrelevant or prejudicial evidence violates due process, the state

court's denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

(Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 17-18, ECF No. 5.) 

At trial, Toluao stipulated that he was a documented member of

the Deep Valley Bloods, a criminal street gang within the meaning

of California Penal Code section 186.22. (Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 15, 2483, Nov. 13, 2009.) The trial court accepted the

stipulation over the prosecutor’s objection, but noted that gang

expert testimony “on other topics going to the issue of motive and

intent” would be admissible. (Id. at 2483-84.) The prosecutor

argued that the contents of Toluao’s letters and song lyrics showed

his gang affiliation and motive. (Id. at 2495-96.) The court

ruled, over Toluao’s objection, that the evidence was admissible

and the expert could explain what the lyrics mean because they

included “various words or phrases that may not be common lingo to

the jurors . . . .” (Id. at 2495.) 

Gordon Govier, a gang detective with the City of Oceanside,

testified about Toluao’s gang letters and lyrics. (Lodgment No. 7,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 16, 2505, 2559-64, Nov. 16, 2009.) A relevant

portion of a letter was read to the jury:

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“I damn near tripped and almost opened hell the

moment I found out another homey fell. And it was hell

doin’ 80 on the street smashin’. Look inside my

re[ar]view and seen the po’s flashin’. Fuck ‘em though

my every thought was on something wicked. I kept

thinkin’ about my homey, like, forget a ticket. My blood

pumpin’, it was getting hella hot, drastic, looking up

ahead and see nothin’ but the traffic. So we took the

side road and pressed on the gas, and police, po, po,

stay back, man, they wouldn’t last. I pulled up to the

turf, but it was too late. I seen the homey laid out

across the yellow tape. I seen your girl break down and

watch your mama cry. I seen the whole block shed tears

and many eyes. So I booted up and suited up on the

avenue, but after that only God knows what I had to do.”

(Id. at 2560-61.) Detective Gordon explained that the letter

referenced the afternoon when Rusty Seau was murdered. (Id. at

2561.) Another letter introduced at trial contained gang graffiti

and rap lyrics describing “a killer from the turf” who wears gang

attire. (Id. at 2562-63.) The expert also testified about a rap

song written by Toluao that discussed seeking retribution for the

death of Seau. (Id. at 2563-68.)

Toluao challenged the admission of this evidence in the

petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review at 3-6, People v. Toluao,

[No. S206388].) The California Supreme Court denied the petition

without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao,

No. S206388, order at 1.) Accordingly, this Court must “look

through” to the state appellate court's decision denying the claim

as the basis for its analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

805–06 (1991). 

The court of appeal denied this claim, concluding that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence.

The gang expert testified regarding letters found in

Toluao's belongings. In one of those letters, Toluao

wrote about Rusty's murder, stating that he saw his

“homey laid out across the yellow tape.” Another letter

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contained gang graffiti and rap lyrics. The lyrics

described being a “killer from the turf,” “put[ting] in

work,” and wearing gang attire. Toluao also wrote a rap

song entitled “Rusty” that talked about avenging Rusty's

death.

Toluao claims the court erred in admitting the

letters and rap lyrics because they were inflammatory and

irrelevant. We disagree with Toluao's argument because

the letters and lyrics were directly relevant to his

motive and intent in committing the crimes in this case,

namely seeking revenge for Rusty's death. Further, rap

lyrics describing gang activities are relevant and

admissible in cases charging gang-related crimes. 

(People v. Zepeda (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 25, 35 [songs

showed defendant's gang had motive and intent to kill

rival gang members]; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal. App.

4th 1355, 1372–1373 [rap lyrics were properly admitted

when crime was allegedly gang-related because gang

membership was “obviously important,” and evidence

tending to show it was “highly relevant”].) Accordingly,

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting evidence of the letters and rap lyrics.

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 12-

13.) 

“A federal habeas court . . . cannot review questions of state

evidence law. . . . Even where it appears that evidence was

erroneously admitted, a federal court will interfere only if it

appears that its admission violated fundamental due process and the

right to a fair trial.” Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th

Cir. 1999). “[F]ailure to comply with the state's rules of

evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting

habeas relief.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.

1991). “Evidence erroneously admitted warrants habeas relief only

when it results in the denial of a fundamentally fair trial in

violation of the right to due process.” Briceno v. Scribner, 555

F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)). 

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The Supreme Court has acknowledged its “traditional reluctance

to impose constitutional restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings

by state trial courts.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689

(1986). There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent

holding that the “admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant

issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101

(9th Cir. 2009). 

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings

regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due

process. Although the Court has been clear that a writ

should be issued when constitutional errors have rendered

the trial fundamentally unfair, see Williams [v. Taylor],

529 U.S. at 375, 120 S. Ct. 1495, it has not yet made a

clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation

sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. Absent such

“clearly established Federal law,” we cannot conclude

that the state court's ruling was an “unreasonable

application.”

Id. (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). Admission

of evidence can violate due process “only if there are no

permissible inferences” the jury may draw from the evidence

admitted. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

Here, the appellate court determined that Toluao's gang lyrics

and letters were relevant to prove Petitioner’s motive and intent

to commit the gang-related crime. (Lodgment No. 14, People v.

Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 12-13.) The state court pointed

out that “the expert's testimony [concerning gang-related evidence]

was no more prejudicial than Defendants' own stipulation that they

were documented members of a gang engaged in a pattern of criminal

conduct and whose primary activities included ‘the commission of

one of the crimes set forth in Penal Code Section 186.22.’” (Id.

at 15.) The court reasoned that the rap lyrics were relevant

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evidence of Toluao’s affiliation with the gang, loyalty to the

gang, as well as motive and intent to avenge Rusty, a fellow gang

member, on the night of the murder. (Id. at 12-13.) This

conclusion was not fundamentally unfair. See United States v.

Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (holding evidence of defendant's gang

membership to be relevant and admissible where motive in issue).

Toluao's rights to a fair trial and due process were not

violated by the admission of gang letters and lyrics. See

Phommachanh v. Foulk, No. 13CV869-MMA (MDD), 2014 WL 4704589, at

*14-17 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (denying habeas claim based on

admission of rap lyrics and gang moniker). For all these reasons,

Toluao’s claim based on admission of gang evidence should be

DENIED. 

C. Admission of Codefendant’s Out-of-Court Statements

In claim two, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated

his right to confront witnesses by admitting his codefendant

Siulua’s statements that implicated Toluao in the murder. (Pet. 9,

ECF No. 1.) Respondent counters that the statements were properly

admitted as declarations against penal interest. (Resp’t’s Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 19, ECF No. 5.) Respondent Soto also

claims that because the statements were nontestimonial, they do not

implicate the Confrontation Clause. (Id. at 20-21.) 

 The prosecution intended to introduce at trial the statements

made by Toluao’s codefendant, Peni Siulua, to Patrick Johnson, who

was a coconspirator in the murder of Joaquin Pruitt. (See Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 139-49, Sept. 30, 2009 (opposition to

motion for severance).) The defense sought to sever the case and

argued that, in the alternative, Siulua’s utterances implicating

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Toluao should be excluded under People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518,

407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965), and Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 2,

411-23, Sept. 17, 2009 (motion for severance); Lodgment No. 7,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 31-34, Oct. 13, 2009.) The trial court admitted

the statements and did not sever the trial. (Lodgment No. 7,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 37.) 

Patrick Johnson3 testified at trial that he and Defendants

drove to the Whelan Ranch condominium complex “looking for Crips.” 

(Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1568-69, Nov. 3, 2009.) 

Johnson, Siulua, and Toluao saw a group of African-Americans

approaching a Cadillac; Siulua and Toluao got out of Johnson’s car

and went towards the Cadillac. (Id. at 1575-78.) Johnson remained

in his car and heard gunshots. (Id. at 1578-79.) He testified

that Toluao and Siulua ran back and jumped in the car. (Id. at

1580.) Siulua told Johnson that he had shot the driver of the

Cadillac. (Id. at 1583.) One week after the shooting, Siulua told

Johnson that he and Toluao were “both shooting in different

directions.” (Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 10, 1625, Nov. 4,

2009.) 

Detective Damon Smith testified at trial about Johnson’s

statement to the police. (Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 13,

2242, 2269-70, Nov. 10, 2009.) Smith testified that Johnson told

him that a week or two after the shooting Siulua phoned Johnson and

said that Siulua and Toluao shot some people as they were getting

3 Johnson was charged with murder in this case along with

Toluao and Siulua. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol. 1, 13-15.) 

He pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for an

agreement to cooperate. (Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1519-

21, Nov. 3, 2009.) 

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into a car and that Siulua was shooting at the car and shot the

driver. (Id. at 2269.) 

Toluao raised his challenge to the admission of Siulua’s outof-court statements in the petition for review he filed in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review at

6-10, People v. Toluao, [No. S206388].) The California Supreme

Court denied the petition without comment or citation. (Lodgment

No. 17, People v. Toluao, No. S206388, order at 1.) Accordingly,

this Court must “look through” to the state appellate court's

decision denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 805–06. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Toluao’s claim that

admission of the statements violated his rights to confrontation

and due process:

To the extent that Siulua's out-of-court statements

implicated Toluao in the charged crimes, they fell

comfortably within the declaration against penal interest

exception to the hearsay rule. Siulua's inculpatory

statements to Johnson did not suggest any attempt to

shift blame and bore typical indicia of reliability. 

([People v.] Greenberger, supra, 58 Cal. App. 4th at p.

335 [“the most reliable circumstance is one in which the

conversation occurs between friends in a noncoercive

setting that fosters uninhibited disclosures”].) In the

statements at issue, Siulua took responsibility for his

role in the criminal activities and did not place more or

less blame on Toluao. There was no evidence suggesting

that Siulua knew at the time he made the statements that

Oates survived and Pruitt died.

Additionally, Siulua's statements were not made to

curry favor with authorities. The statements were all

made near the time of the shooting and Defendants were

not arrested until two years later. Thus, at the time

that Siulua made the statements, he did not have a motive

to lie.

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 17-

18.)

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"The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that,

‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.' We have

held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal

and state prosecutions." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42

(2004) (alteration in original) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.

400, 406 (1965)). The Confrontation Clause "guarantees the

defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before

the trier of fact." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). The

physical confrontation "enhances the accuracy of factfinding by

reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an

innocent person." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 

Nevertheless, the Confrontation Clause "permits, where necessary,

the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant

despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at

trial." Id. at 847-48. A Confrontation Clause violation is

subject to harmless error review. United States v. Nielsen, 371

F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In Crawford, the Supreme Court explained that the Sixth

Amendment prohibits the admission of “testimonial” hearsay unless

the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 

Crawford and cases that followed made it clear that Confrontation

Clause protections are limited to testimonial statements. See

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) (“[O]nly testimonial

statements are excluded by the Confrontation Clause.”); Whorton v.

Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause has

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no application to [out-of-court nontestimonial] statements . . . .”).

The Bruton rule bars the admission, in a joint prosecution, of

a nontestifying defendant's confession that incriminates a

codefendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 137.

[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury

will not, or cannot, follow instructions [to assess the

impact of a statement of a codefendant as to that

codefendant only] is so great, and the consequences of

failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and

human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. 

Id. at 135. But Bruton must be viewed through the lens of

Crawford; it does not apply to nontestimonial statements by

codefendants. See United States v. Vasquez, 766 F.3d 373, 378 (5th

Cir. 2014); Smith v. Chavez, 565 F. App’x 653, 653 (9th Cir. 2014);

Peoples v. Gipson, No. CV 10–09107 ODW (SS), 2011 WL 5593789, at

*11 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2011) (noting that “numerous other circuits

have held that Bruton does not apply to non-testimonial

statements”). “Bruton is simply irrelevant in the context of

nontestimonial statements. Bruton espoused a prophylactic rule

designed to prevent a specific type of Confrontation Clause

violation. Statements that do not implicate the Confrontation

Clause, a fortiori, do not implicate Bruton.” United States v.

Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 651 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, if the

statement is not testimonial, neither Crawford nor Bruton apply.

“A statement is testimonial when it is ‘made under

circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to

believe that the statement would be available for use at a later

trial.’” United States v. Rojas–Pedroza, 716 F.3d 1253, 1267 (9th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,

310 (2009)). On the other hand, “statements made out-of-court with

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a primary purpose other than possible prosecutorial use are

nontestimonial.” United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 953 (9th

Cir. 2012). Statements “not made to a governmental officer with an

eye toward trial” are not testimonial. Jensen v. Pliler, 439 F.3d

1086, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant

inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals

involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that

reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the

individual's statements and actions and the circumstances in which

the encounter occurred.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360

(2011). 

The state court’s conclusion that Siulua’s statements did not

violate Toluao’s constitutional rights was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Johnson was with Toluao and Siulua on the night of the shooting,

and testified about what he personally observed. (Lodgment No. 7,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1568-69.) He also testified to the

incriminating statements Siulua made to him immediately after the

shooting, (id. at 1583), and one week later. (Id. vol. 10, 1625.) 

Siulua’s statements were not made in a formal setting or to a

government official. He made the statements shortly after the

crime was committed and before the police were involved. The

challenged statements were made to a fellow gang member. There was

no reason for Silulua to anticipate that his private conversation

with Johnson would be available for prosecutorial use at a later

trial. Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310; see also Smith v. Chavez,

565 F. App’x. at 653 (“The disputed statement--an account of the

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crime [petitioner's codefendant] gave to his girlfriend in a motel

room--was clearly not testimonial.”). 

It is clear from the circumstances that Siulua made statements

incriminating himself and Toluao in the shooting without any

reasonable expectation they would be used in a prosecution. See

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 (2006) (citing “statements

from one prisoner to another” and “statements made unwittingly to a

Government informant” as examples that “were clearly

nontestimonial”). Thus, under controlling federal law as

established by the Supreme Court in Crawford, the admission of

Siulua's out-of-court statements to Johnson did not implicate the

Confrontation Clause because the statements were not testimonial.

Even if the state court erred in admitting the statements, the

error was harmless. See Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 755 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmlesserror analysis.”). The error is harmless where other evidence

connects a defendant to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See

United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 2005). The

California Court of Appeal found that evidence against Toluao was

strong based on multiple eyewitness accounts describing the

shooters, and forensic evidence linking Petitioner to the crime. 

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 11-12,

20.) Because testimony regarding Siulua's statements was

cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial, any error in its

admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). For all these reasons,

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Toluao’s claim based on the admission of his codefendant’s out-ofcourt statements should be DENIED. 

D. Request to Sever the Trial

In ground three of his Petition, Toluao claims that his right

to a fair trial was violated when the trial court denied his motion

to sever his trial from his codefendant’s. (Pet. 11, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent argues that Toluao’s claim is meritless because the

failure to sever trials did not amount to a constitutional

violation. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 22, ECF No.

5.) Respondent claims there is no clearly established federal law

requiring severance in state court. (Id. at 23.) 

Before trial, Petitioner’s counsel sought to sever Toluao’s

case from Siulua’s based on the prosecution’s decision to introduce

Silulua’s statements implicating Toluao. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr. vol. 2, 411-23; Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 31-34, Oct.

13, 2009.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion. (Lodgment

No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 37.) Toluao challenged the failure to

sever his trial in the petition for review he filed in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review at

10-11, People v. Toluao, [No. S206388].) The petition was denied

without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao,

No. S206388, order at 1.) Accordingly, the state appellate court's

decision denying the claim is the basis for this Court’s analysis. 

See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. 

The California Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court’s

decision not to sever the trial for abuse of discretion. (Lodgment

No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 19.) It noted

that the severance request was based on the admission of Siulua’s

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out-of-court statements to Johnson. (Id. at 20.) Because the

appellate court rejected Toluao’s challenge to the admissibility of

the statements, it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion to sever. (Id.) The appellate

court stated:

Although Toluao asserts that the statements

implicated him as the person who shot Pruitt, independent

evidence supported the prosecution's theory of the case. 

Jurors heard evidence that just after the shooting,

Toluao stated, “We just shot three people, and I kicked

some girl in the head and domed somebody.” This

statement alone connected Toluao to the crimes and

specifically to Pruitt's murder. Further, as we have

already explained, the evidence against Defendants was

strong. (Ante, part I.B.) There was an abundance of

evidence, including accomplice and eyewitness testimony

and forensic evidence, from which the jury could connect

Toluao to the charged offenses. Given the sufficient

independent evidence, we do not see how the jury would

have reached a different result absent admission of

Siulua's out-of-court statements. Under the

circumstances of this case, the failure to sever the

trials did not result in a gross unfairness that

constituted a constitutional violation.

(Id. at 20-21.)

"There is a preference in the federal system for joint trials

of defendants who are indicted together” because joint trials

“promote efficiency and ‘serve the interest of justice by avoiding

the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’” Zafiro v.

United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (discussing Rule 8(b) of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). At the same time, “[t]he

Supreme Court has never held that a trial court's failure to

provide separate trials on different charges implicates a

defendant's right to due process.” Collins v. Uribe, 564 F. App’x

343 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132

(9th Cir. 2010)); see also Martinez v. Yates, 585 F. App’x 460, 460

(9th Cir. 2014) (“There is no clearly established Supreme Court

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precedent dictating when a trial in state court must be

severed.”)4; Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir.

2012) (“[T]here is no clearly established federal law requiring

severance of criminal trials in state court even when the

defendants assert mutually antagonistic defenses.”). “Because

[there is] no clear answer to the question presented, . . . ‘it

cannot be said that a state court “unreasonably applied clearly

established Federal law.”’” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120,

126 (2008) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77).

Even assuming Toluao could bring a federal habeas claim on

this ground, Petitioner’s argument that his right to a fair trial

was violated by the court’s denial of his severance request is

without merit. The Ninth Circuit has stated that a petitioner can

establish a violation of his federal due process right to a fair

trial if he carries his "burden of demonstrating that the state

court's denial of his severance motion rendered his trial

‘fundamentally unfair.'" Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hollins v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Iowa,

969 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1992)). Grisby, however, fails to cite

4 The Supreme Court noted in a footnote in

United States v. Lane that “misjoinder would

rise to the level of a constitutional violation

only if it results in prejudice so great as to

deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a

fair trial.” 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8, 106 S. Ct.

725, 88 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1986). However, we have

held that this footnote in Lane does not

qualify as clearly established federal law

under federal habeas law. Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The

footnote upon which Collins relies did not set

forth the governing legal principle in Lane. It was merely a comment.”).

Martinez v. Yates, 585 F. App’x at 461.

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any controlling Supreme Court law. See id. In another case, the

Ninth Circuit summarized the test for “constitutionally

impermissible joinder”: “[T]he propriety of a consolidation rests

within the sound discretion of the state trial judge. The

simultaneous trial of more than one offense must actually render

petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative

of due process before relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 would be

appropriate.” Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir.

1998) (quoting pre-AEDPA Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497,

1503 (9th Cir. 1991)). Bean also quoted footnote eight in Lane,

474 U.S. at 446 n.8, which Martinez v. Yates, 585 F. App’x at 461,

and Collins v. Runnells, 603 F.3d at 1132, describe as “not

qualify[ing] as clearly established federal law under federal

habeas law.” Martinez v. Yates, 585 F. App’x at 461. 

Nevertheless, even if the trial court's denial of the severance

motion violated Petitioner's due process rights, habeas relief is

not available in this Court unless the error had a "substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328

U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5

(1996). 

Petitioner has not shown that the denial of his motion to

sever amounted to a due process violation. Toluao’s request was

based on the admission of Siulua’s statements implicating

Petitioner. Toluao’s concern was that the jury would be prevented

from making a reliable judgment about his guilt or innocence after

hearing the statements from another gang member. As discussed

earlier, however, Siulua’s statements were nontestimonial in

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nature. They were sufficiently reliable because they were made by

a coconspirator soon after the crime, and they did not shift the

blame to Petitioner. Additionally, the state court noted there was

“an abundance of evidence” connecting Toluao to the offense. 

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 20.) 

Toluao’s statements after the shooting, as well as strong

eyewitness and forensic evidence connected him to the crime. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his trial was

fundamentally unfair as a result of the denial of his severance

motion. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that the state

appellate court's denial of this claim involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court

proceedings. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011);

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Assuming

Petitioner could demonstrate that his federal constitutional rights

were violated, he has not established that the denial of the

severance motion had any effect on the jury's verdict, must less a

substantial and injurious one. Thus, any error was clearly

harmless. Roy, 519 U.S. at 5; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. For all

these reasons, Toluao’s severance claim should be DENIED.

E. Admission of Toluao’s Statements

In claim four, Toluao alleges that he did not receive a fair

trial because the trial court allowed into evidence inadmissible

hearsay statements implicating Petitioner in the murder. (Pet. 12,

ECF No. 1.) At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce

testimony by Toluao’s friend, Monica Villarreal, about Petitioner’s

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statements to his cousin Masi several days prior to the shooting. 

(See Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1504.) 

Defense counsel objected to the evidence as irrelevant and

inadmissible hearsay. (Id.) The prosecution argued that the

statements were not hearsay and were relevant to Toluao’s state of

mind and motive. (Id. at 1507.) The trial court initially decided

the utterances were not admissible. (Id. at 1507-13.) A week

later, Monica Villarreal was again called to the stand to testify. 

(Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 13, 2235-36.) After hearing

further argument, the court allowed her to testify about statements

Masi and Toluao made because they were relevant to Toluao’s motive. 

(Id. at 2226-33.) Villarreal testified that several days before

the shooting, she picked up Petitioner and he was crying. (Id. at

2237.) Toluao was upset because he and his cousin Masi had a

fight. (Id. at 2238.) Villarreal testified she told the police

that Masi said Toluao “wasn’t shit, and he wasn’t about shit and

that he really wasn’t from the hood[.]” (Id. at 2240.) On

cross-examination, Villarreal acknowledged that Toluao “didn’t go

into specifics about what the shit was about.” (Id. at 2241.) She

stated that “it was a family problem.” (Id.) 

Toluao challenged the decision to allow Villarreal’s testimony

about Masi’s and Petitioner’s statements in his petition for review

he filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 15,

Petition for Review at 12-14, People v. Toluao, [No. S206388].) 

The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or

citation. (Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao, No. S206388, order

at 1.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state

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appellate court's decision denying the claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at

805–06. 

The state appellate court dismissed Toluao’s challenge to the

admitted statements, concluding they were admissible because they

were offered not for the truth but to show Petitioner’s state of

mind and motive:

Here, there were two layers of out-of-court

statements: (1) Masi's statement to Toluao that

“[Toluao] wasn't shit, and he wasn't about shit and that

he really wasn't from the hood,” and (2) Toluao's

statement to Villarreal that Masi made those remarks. 

When evidence consists of multiple layers of hearsay, the

evidence is admissible if each layer separately meets the

requirements of a hearsay exception. (People v. Arias

(1996) 13 Cal. 4th 92, 149; People v. Perez (1978) 83

Cal. App. 3d 718, 730.) Likewise, multiple layers of

out-of-court statements are admissible if they are

nonhearsay because they are not offered for the truth of

the matter. (See People v. Dehnel (1979) 99 Cal. App. 3d

404, 408–409.)

Both layers of statements in this case were relevant

to Toluao's motive and state of mind regardless of the

truth of the stated facts that Toluao “wasn't shit” and

“wasn't from the hood.” As to the first layer, Masi's

statement to Toluao was relevant to prove that the effect

of that statement on Toluao was to motivate Toluao to

prove himself to Masi, a “shot caller” within the gang. 

A statement that is offered to prove the effect on the

hearer is nonhearsay because “‘it is the hearer's

reaction to the statement that is the relevant fact

sought to be proved, not the truth of the matter asserted

in the statement.’” (People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.

App. 3d 901, 907; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 282,

295.) Similarly, as to the second layer, Toluao's

statement to Villarreal about Masi's remarks was relevant

to Toluao's state of mind. Statements that

circumstantially prove state of mind regardless of the

truth of the contents of the statements are nonhearsay. 

(People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal. App. 4th 377, 389; People

v. Spencer (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 933, 944.) Further,

Toluao's state of mind and motive were relevant to an

issue in dispute, namely whether his motivation in

committing the crimes was to benefit the gang.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

ruling that the evidence was admissible because it was

relevant to Toluao's motive. Moreover, given the

abundance of evidence supporting Toluao's conviction, it

is not reasonably probable that Toluao would have

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obtained a more favorable result absent Villarreal's

testimony, especially where she stated that Toluao did

not tell her the specifics of the argument and that it

was a “family problem.” Accordingly, we reject Toluao's

argument. 

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 22-

24.) 

Toluao argues that the state appellate court erred in ruling

that the statements were nonhearsay. (Pet. 12, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent argues that Toluao’s claim fails because the admission

of evidence raises a state law claim, and there is no “clearly

established Federal law” addressing the alleged violation of due

process. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 24-25, ECF No. 5

(citing Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d at 1101.) 

A “state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not

subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal

law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or

statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process.” Walters v.

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Pulley v. Harris,

465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)). “[E]vidence erroneously admitted warrants

habeas relief only when it results in the denial of a fundamentally

fair trial in violation of the right to due process.” Briceno, 555

F.3d at 1077 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67–68). 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate the admission of out-of-court

statements was so arbitrary or prejudicial that it “rendered the

trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” See

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926,

930 (9th Cir. 1995).) Under Ninth Circuit authority, the admission

of evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair “[o]nly if there

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are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.” 

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Here, as explained by the California

Court of Appeal, the statements were offered not for their truth,

but for a nonhearsay purpose, namely, to show Toluao’s motivation

was to benefit the gang. (See Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao,

No. D058242, slip op. at 23.) The jury could reasonably conclude

that Petitioner was influenced by his fight with Masi and intended

to participate in the shooting to seek revenge for the gang. 

Moreover, it is unlikely that exclusion of Villarreal’s testimony

would result in a more favorable verdict for the Petitioner because

other evidence connected Toluao to the crime.

The Court concludes that the state court's decision on this

claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, and was not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state courts. Based thereon, the Court

recommends that habeas relief as to claim four be DENIED. 

F. Denial of Request for Evidentiary Hearing and Motion for a New

Trial

In ground five, Petitioner claims his due process rights were

violated when the trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on

Toluao’s motion for a new trial and summarily denied the motion. 

(Pet. 14, ECF No. 1.) Toluao moved for a new trial based on

alleged juror misconduct and juror coercion. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 3, 617-26.) He also filed a petition seeking the

release of juror information. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 3, 609-13, Apr. 6, 2010 (petition to release juror

information).) In support of his requests, Petitioner’s defense

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counsel submitted a declaration from an investigator who spoke with

one of the jurors. (Id. at 614-15.) Juror number five told the

investigator that she believed Toluao was not guilty. She stated

that the jurors discussed the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday and the

fact that the trial took longer than expected. (Id. at 615.) She

also explained that she believed Petitioner had the right to appeal

even if she voted guilty and could be home for Thanksgiving. (Id.)

The prosecution opposed the petition and motion on the grounds

that the investigator’s declaration was inadmissible hearsay, and

any evidence regarding a juror’s thought process during

deliberations was barred by California Evidence Code section 1150. 

(Id. at 630-41, May 10, 2010 (opposition to petition and motion).) 

The trial court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing, the

motion for new trial, and the petition to release juror

information. (Lodgment No. 6, Rep.’s Tr. - Augment vol. 6, 485-88,

Aug. 3, 2010 (post-trial motions).) 

Petitioner raised these claims in the petition for review he

filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 15, Petition

for Review at 15-16, People v. Toluao, [No. S206388].) The

California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or

citation. (Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao, No. S206388, order

at 1.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the state

appellate court's decision denying the claim as the basis for its

analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. 

The California Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s denial of the request for evidentiary hearing and

denial of the motion for new trial: 

Here, the only evidence Toluao presented of jury

misconduct was the defense investigator's declaration

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containing hearsay statements from one juror regarding

her feelings on Toluao's guilt and about what other

jurors purportedly discussed during deliberations. 

“[O]rdinarily a trial court does not abuse its discretion

in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the

issue of juror misconduct when the evidence proffered in

support constitutes hearsay.” (People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal. 4th at p. 810.)

Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the

prosecutor actually disputed the information obtained by

the defense investigator. Instead, the prosecutor took

the position that the information, even if true, did not

trigger either a requirement that juror information be

disclosed or a new trial granted. Absent a factual

dispute necessitating a hearing to resolve it, the trial

court acted within its discretion in deciding the motion

for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. 

(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 539, 625.) 

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 26.)

Toluao disagrees with the state court’s reasoning and

maintains that a review is “necessary,” but fails to provide any

support for his claim. (Pet. 15-16, ECF No. 1.) Respondent argues

that Toluao’s claim must be denied because he failed to present any

admissible evidence of juror misconduct. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 25-27, ECF No. 5.) 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right

to a “fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors.”

Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see Dyer v. Calderon, 151

F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998). “If only one juror is unduly biased

or prejudiced or improperly influenced, the criminal defendant is

denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial panel.” United

States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror

has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.” Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). The Supreme Court has held

that the remedy for allegations of jury misconduct is a hearing, in

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which the trial court determines the circumstances of what

transpired, the impact on the jurors, and whether it was

prejudicial. See id. at 215-16; Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S.

227, 229–30 (1954). 

Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court, does not mandate a hearing whenever an allegation of jury

misconduct or bias is raised. See Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148,

1153 (9th Cir. 2005); Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“Remmer and Smith do not stand for the proposition that

any time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process

requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have

bias.”); accord Harrison v. Arnold, Case No. 14-cv-011211 JST (PR),

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85085, at *40 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015). 

Rather, the decision to conduct a hearing into alleged jury

misconduct and to determine its extent and nature is within the

trial court's discretion. See, e.g., Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1044

(“[I]n determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must

consider the content of the allegations, the seriousness of the

alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source.”)

(quoting United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993));

United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The

decision to conduct a hearing into alleged jury misconduct and to

determine its extent and nature is discretionary.”). 

Not all allegations or evidence of jury misconduct may

properly be considered. The “near-universal and firmly established

common-law rule in the United States flatly prohibit[s]” the

admission of juror testimony to impeach a verdict except where “an

extraneous influence” affected the verdict. Tanner v. United

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States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987) (citations omitted). Both Federal

Rule of Evidence 606(b) and California Evidence Code section

1150(a) prohibit the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict

when that testimony relates to intrinsic matters such as the

internal mental process by which the verdict was rendered. See

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); Cal. Evid. Code § 1150(a) (West 2009).

Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence limits the

evidence a federal court may receive in considering the validity of

a jury verdict:

 During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or

indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement

made or incident that occurred during the jury's

deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or

another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes

concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not

receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's

statement on these matters. 

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). There are exceptions for testimony on

“extraneous prejudicial information . . . improperly brought to the

jury’s attention”; an improper “outside influence” on a juror, or a

mistake in completing the verdict form. Id. Federal Rule of

Evidence 606(b) applies to petitions for habeas corpus from state

court prisoners. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d) advisory committee’s

notes (discussing subdivision (d) to 1972 proposed rules) (“[R]ule

[1101(d)] does not exempt habeas corpus proceedings. . . . Hence

subdivision [(d)(3)] applies the rules to habeas corpus proceedings

to the extent not inconsistent with the statute.”); accord Capps v.

Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260, 262-63 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Federal courts have rejected habeas claims alleging juror

misconduct where those claims rely on evidence inadmissible under

Rule 606(b). See, e.g., Harrison v. Gillespie, 640 F.3d 888, 895

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n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting, in context of a § 2241 habeas

petition, that a Court “may not consider jurors' testimony

addressing the jury's deliberative process unless the testimony

‘bear[s] on extraneous influences on the deliberation[]’”) (quoting

United States v. Pimentel, 654 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 1981));

Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2008)

(approving district court's conclusion that juror affidavits were

inadmissible to support a § 2254 habeas petitioner's juror

misconduct claim); Anderson v. Terhune, 409 F. App'x 175, 179 (9th

Cir. 2011) (limiting, pursuant to Rule 606(b), the evidence

considered in deciding habeas petitioner's juror misconduct claim). 

Petitioner's claim fails because, as explained above, there is

no constitutional requirement or United States Supreme Court case

that requires a trial court to conduct an investigation into juror

misconduct unless sufficient credible evidence demonstrated jury

tampering, juror misconduct, or juror bias. See Tracey, 341 F.3d

at 1044–45. The only evidence Toluao presented was a defense

investigator's affidavit recounting the juror's statement. 

Petitioner did not offer a sworn statement from the juror, and his

counsel represented to the trial court that the juror would not

sign a declaration under penalty of perjury. (Lodgment No. 6,

Rep.’s Tr. Aug. vol. 6, 485-86.) Given these facts, the court did

not have any basis for conducting a further inquiry. The state

court properly concluded that no admissible evidence supported

Petitioner’s claim. 

Additionally, the investigator’s declaration would not be

admissible because it contained statements about a juror’s

deliberative process. The comments Toluao sought to introduce

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reflected the juror’s mental process, including her thoughts on the

weight of evidence, length of trial, and the influence of the

upcoming holiday on her decision. Juror statements about the

internal deliberative process are not admissible under federal law. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d at 1237

(holding that juror's declaration that he felt pressured to vote

guilty was inadmissible evidence of subjective mental process). 

Because Petitioner would not be able to present admissible evidence

of the alleged juror misconduct, this claim must fail. The court

of appeal’s denial of Toluao’s claim of juror misconduct was not an

unreasonable application of federal law. 

Moreover, the evidence Toluao sought to introduce did not

demonstrate juror misconduct. Juror number five’s comments reflect

that she had second thoughts after she voted to convict Petitioner. 

No evidence in the record indicates that juror number five was

prevented from expressing her views during deliberations or

pressured to vote a certain way. Furthermore, the court asked each

juror whether the verdicts they reached as to both defendants were

their individual verdicts, and juror number five responded in the

affirmative. (Lodgment No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. Aug. vol. 18, 2809-13

(polling jurors).) She answered without hesitation and did not

mention being uncertain or pressured when polled after the verdict. 

(See Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at

28.)

Even assuming Petitioner could offer evidence of pressure

applied to the individual juror, he cannot establish a

constitutional violation on this basis. Mere “heated discussions

that naturally occur at times during jury deliberations” without

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physical coercion did not support a habeas claim based on juror

misconduct. See Panella v. Marshall, 434 F. App’x 603, 605 (9th

Cir. 2011); Flores v. Chavez, No. CV 10–5375 DSF(JC), 2013 WL

3762203, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2013) (agreeing with the state

court’s conclusion that “the ‘harsh’ treatment of the ‘holdout’

juror by other jurors does not constitute grounds to impeach the

verdict”). “[A]llegations that relate to ‘intrinsic jury processes’

do not implicate the protections of the Sixth Amendment.” Gomez v.

Biter, No. CV 12–09681–FMO (DFM), 2014 WL 4828939, at *7 (C.D. Cal.

Sept. 29, 2014) (citations omitted). 

Toluao asserts that he should have been granted an evidentiary

hearing and new trial based on juror misconduct. (Pet. 14, ECF No.

1.) For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the

state court's decision rejecting Toluao’s claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the

state courts. Based thereon, the Court recommends that habeas

relief as to this claim be DENIED. 

G. Denial of Request to Release Juror Information

In claim six, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in

denying his request for juror information which Petitioner needed

for his motion for a new trial. (Pet. 15, ECF No. 1.) Toluao

filed a petition to release juror information alleging juror

misconduct and juror coercion. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol.

3, 609-13.) The trial court denied the request. (Lodgment No. 6,

Rep.’s Tr. Aug. vol. 6, 485-89.) Petitioner raised these claims in

his petition for review to the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment

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No. 15, Petition for Review at 17-18, People v. Toluao, [No.

S206388].) The petition was denied without comment or citation. 

(Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao, No. S206388, order at 1.) 

Accordingly, this Court looks to the state appellate court's

decision denying the claim as the basis for its analysis. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 805–06. 

Under California law, juror identifying information in a

criminal case must be sealed upon the recording of a jury's

verdict, absent further order of the court. See Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 237(a), (b) (West 2006). A defendant may, however, petition

the court for access to juror identifying information “necessary

for the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purposes of

developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose.” 

Id. § 206(g). The defendant must make a prima facie showing of

good cause for the release of juror information. See id. § 237(b). 

The state appellate court concluded that Toluao had not shown

good cause to access juror information under California law:

Here, Defendants argue they made a prima facie

showing of good cause based on the declaration from

Toluao's defense investigator. Even assuming the truth

of the defense investigator's assertions, Juror No. 5's

statements reflected the jurors' thought processes and

were not of such a character as to have influenced the

verdict improperly. While jurors may have discussed the

upcoming Thanksgiving holiday and their desire to be

home, there was no evidence that they rendered guilty

verdicts because of those considerations. Further, Juror

No. 5's statements that some jurors believed that the

perpetrators were Black, that she believed Toluao was not

guilty, and that she believed Toluao had a right to

appeal if she voted guilty went to the mental processes

of the jurors. (See People v. Peavey (1981) 126 Cal.

App. 3d 44, 51 [juror's statement that she “believed

[defendant] to be not guilty but only voted guilty

because the rest of the jurors did so” was “demonstrative

only of her mental processes and the subjective

considerations”]; People v. Stevenson (1970) 4 Cal. App.

3d 443, 445 [juror's statement that he would have voted

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not guilty had he known his vote would result in a hung

jury went to the mental process of the juror].)

Notably, after the jury returned its guilty

verdicts, each juror, including Juror No. 5, answered

“yes” when polled as to whether the verdict was their

individual verdict. There was no evidence of any

hesitation or equivocation from the jurors.

Under the circumstances, the defense investigator's

declaration did not constitute a good cause showing of

juror misconduct justifying a subsequent hearing under

Code of Civil Procedure section 237, and the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying that hearing.

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 28-

29.)

In his Petition, Toluao claims that the state court erred in

denying his petition to release juror information “that was

necessary for a motion for new trial.” (Pet. 15, ECF No. 1.) 

Respondent alleges that Petitioner’s claim fails to state a federal

question and must be denied. (Resp’t’s Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 27-28, ECF No. 5.) Respondent Soto points out that the

appellate court applied California state law, and its application

of state law is binding and cannot be challenged on federal habeas

review. (Id.) 

To state a claim under § 2254, a petitioner must allege the

state court violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez,

930 F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d at 885. “The state

courts' allegedly improper application of [California Code of Civil

Procedure section] 237 is not a basis for federal habeas relief.” 

Yang v. McDonald, No. 2:11–cv–0212 KJM AC P, 2012 WL 6738311, at

*18 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

at 67–68). Thus, to the extent Petitioner brings his claim on this

basis, it must be denied. 

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 Toluao cites no United States Supreme Court authority

recognizing a federal constitutional right to have jury information

unsealed, particularly where it appears the information from the

juror is not likely to be of constitutional significance. See id.

(“No federal law, clearly established by the Supreme Court or

otherwise, requires a state court to permit post-trial access to

jurors in a fishing expedition for misconduct.”); White v. Knowles,

No. C 00–3482 PJH (PR), 2011 WL 1196053, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29,

2011) (“Petitioner cites no United States Supreme Court authority

recognizing a constitutional right to have jury information

unsealed, and the court has found none.”). Toluao’s request for

release of juror information was based on his allegations of juror

misconduct. Because Petitioner’s juror misconduct claim did not

give rise to a due process violation, the failure to release juror

information to investigate the claim likewise does not warrant

federal habeas relief. For these reasons, the Court recommends

that claim six in Toluao’s Petition should be DENIED. 

H. Denial of Romero Motion

Toluao claims in ground seven that the trial court incorrectly

denied his motion to strike his prior conviction when imposing a

sentence. (Pet. 16, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner had a conviction from

2003 that qualified as a strike prior. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's

Tr. vol. 1, 17-18.) Toluao participated in a robbery where the

victim was punched and kicked. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

2, 597 (criminal history).) At sentencing, defense counsel asked

the court to strike the strike and argued that Toluao was a young

individual “facing a considerable amount of time.” (Lodgment No.

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No. 7, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 20, 2834.) The trial court discussed the

factors involved in its decision to deny the motion:

The first issue with respect to Mr. Toluao is

whether or not the strike should be stricken. The Court

in –- the Supreme Court in the Romero case only gave the

courts limited jurisdiction in deciding whether or not to

strike a strike. Among the factors the Court considers

is whether or not the current offense is de minim[i]s. 

Under the three strikes law, the offense could be any

felony, could be a petty theft, it could be that’s a

felony because of the prior or something along those

lines. That’s not what we have in this case.

This current case is not de minim[i]s. It’s

obviously the most serious type of offense we have in the

system. So considering that factor, that factor points

against striking the strike.

The other factor the Supreme Court looked at was the

age of the prior. There are some cases where the prior

is 20 years old and the person’s led an exemplary life

for 20 years. Well, there in that situation the Court

would say you -- that would point towards striking the

strike. We don’t have that in this case. This was a

relatively recent prior, as the District Attorney pointed

out, only about two years from the prior until the

current case.

The next factor the Court considers is how serious

was the prior. Some strike offenses are more serious

than others. This one was clearly a serious offense. In

looking at all the Romero factors, the Court then says,

looking at all of those factors, the Court makes an

inquiry as to whether or not it appears from all of that,

looking at the totality of the circumstances, does this

person appear in weighing those factors that they fall

outside the spirit of the three strikes law. In that

case the Court could strike the strike. In this case

when you combine all those factors, clearly this

defendant falls within the spirit of the three strikes

law; therefore, it appears to me it would be an abuse of

discretion to strike the strike. So the strike will not

be stricken.

(Id. at 2841-42.) Petitioner raised his prior strike claim in the

petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review at 19-20, People v. Toluao,

[No. S206388].) The California Supreme Court denied the petition

without comment or citation. (Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao,

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No. S206388, order at 1.) Accordingly, this Court must “look

through” to the state appellate court's decision denying the claim

as the basis for its analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. The

state appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Toluao’s motion: 

 Our review of the record convinces us that the trial

court fully understood its discretion on the Romero

motion and properly applied it. Toluao has a continuous

history of criminal conduct that started when he was a

juvenile and has escalated ever since. In 1998, Toluao

committed petty theft and vandalism and was sentenced to

community service. In 2000, Toluao committed a robbery

in which he hid behind dumpsters, jumped out and then

punched the victim in the face while his cohort stole the

victim's wallet. Toluao then committed another robbery

in 2003. This time, Toluao and other Bloods members

punched and kicked the victim until the victim gave them

his wallet. Toluao was sentenced to two years in prison

for this crime, which constituted a prior strike

conviction. Additionally, since he was a juvenile,

Toluao continuously associated with known gang members.

Toluao has not met his burden of showing that the

trial court's decision was irrational or arbitrary. 

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion in declining to strike Toluao's

prior strike conviction. 

(Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242, slip op. at 31-

32.) 

To the extent Toluao’s habeas petition is based on the trial

court’s denial of his motion to strike the prior conviction

pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917

P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, his claim does not entitle him to

relief. The application of a California state court decision,

Romero, raises an issue of state law and thus is not cognizable on

federal habeas review. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. The Ninth

Circuit has refused to consider state law errors in the application

of state sentencing law. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th

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Cir. 1994) (holding that a claim that state court improperly used

prior federal offense to enhance punishment is not cognizable on

federal habeas review); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19

(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a claim that prior conviction was not

a “serious felony” under state sentencing law was not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus proceeding); Edwards v. Ollison,

621 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Brown v. Mayle,

283 F.3d 1019, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds,

Mayle v. Brown, 538 U.S. 901 (2003) (“The Ninth Circuit has held

that a challenge to the denial of a Romero request constitutes a

state law claim that cannot be considered in a federal habeas

petition.”). Habeas relief for this claim is therefore foreclosed.

Under narrow circumstances, however, the misapplication of

state sentencing law may violate due process. See Richmond v.

Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992). “[T]he federal, constitutional

question is whether [the error] is so arbitrary or capricious as to

constitute an independent due process” violation. Id. (internal

quotation and citation omitted); see also Christian v. Rhode, 41

F.3d at 469 “Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state

court's misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify

federal habeas relief.”). Petitioner has shown no such fundamental

unfairness. 

To state a cognizable federal habeas claim based on an alleged

due process violation, Toluao must establish that his state

sentence was “arbitrary or capricious.” Richmond, 506 U.S. at 50. 

Petitioner may not, however, “transform a state-law issue into a

federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). Courts in

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the Ninth Circuit have rejected the argument that a denial of a

Romero motion can serve as the basis for a federal habeas claim. 

See Taylor v. Mitchell, No. EDCV 11–1207–JSL (MAN), 2012 WL

3670632, at *10 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2012); Edwards v. Ollison, 621

F. Supp. 2d at 881. Toluao has not otherwise established that his

sentence violated due process, and merely attaching this label on

an alleged state law sentencing violation is insufficient to state

a cognizable federal constitutional claim. The state court of

appeal properly found that the trial court committed no error in

the exercise of its discretion by declining to strike Petitioner's

prior conviction. (Lodgment No. 14, People v. Toluao, No. D058242,

slip op. at 31-32.) This decision was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was the decision based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). 

For all these reasons, claim seven in Toluao’s Petition does

not entitle him to relief and should be DENIED.

I. Joinder

In claim eight, Petitioner seeks to join “into arguments made

by co-petitioner that would accrue to his benefit.” (Pet. 17, ECF

No. 1.) Respondent argues that this claim fails to allege a

violation because Toluao has no co-petitioner. (Resp’t’s Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 30, ECF No. 5.) 

Toluao raised this claim on direct appeal and also in the

petition for review he filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment No. 9, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 68, People v. Toluao,

No. D058242; Lodgment No. 15, Petition for Review at 21, People v.

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Toluao, [No. S206388].) In his state court appeal, Petitioner

cited California Rule of Court 8.200(a)(5) to join or adopt by

reference “any brief in the same or companion cases.” (Lodgment

No. 9, Appellant’s Opening Br. at 68, People v. Toluao, No.

D058242.) Toluao cited California Rule of Court 8.504(e) to

support his request to “join in a petition or adopt by reference

any petition in the same or companion cases” in his petition for

review to the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 15, Petition

for Review at 21, People v. Toluao, [No. S206388].) The California

Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation. 

(Lodgment No. 17, People v. Toluao, No. S206388, order at 1.) 

Petitioner did not cite any legal authority for his request to

join in the arguments raised by another petitioner. (Pet. 17, ECF

No. 1.) Toluao relies on state court rules for his joinder

request, but the California Rules of Court do not bind the federal

court. See In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod.

Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1493 n.11 (8th Cir. 1997). Unlike in

state court, a federal habeas petitioner may not incorporate claims

by reference. Rials v. Grounds, No. ED CV 13–2152–JVS (PLA), 2015

WL 1893199, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015). The rules governing

federal habeas cases require a petition to “specify all the grounds

for relief available to the petitioner,” “state the facts

supporting each ground,” and “state the relief requested.” Rule

2(c), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254.

Even if Toluao could incorporate another petitioner’s claims

in his federal habeas petition, his request fails. Toluao has not

attached any other briefs or petitions to this habeas petition. He

does not have a co-petitioner. Toluao fails to articulate any

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arguments or claims he attempts to join, and does not provide any

supporting facts for this claim. 

Under § 2254, a petitioner is required to allege facts “with

sufficient specificity to support his claim for relief.” Wacht v.

Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1979).

[I]n order to substantially comply with the Section 2254

Rule 2(c), a petitioner must state specific,

particularized facts which entitle him or her to habeas

corpus relief for each ground specified. These facts

must consist of sufficient detail to enable the court to

determine, from the face of the petition alone, whether

the petition merits further habeas corpus review.

Adams v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Toluao’s conclusory joinder claim is insufficient because it

does not include any factual allegations in support of this ground

for relief. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994)

(“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading

requirements . . . .”). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on

his unsupported and conclusory claims. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d

20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not

supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief.”); see also United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 896 (9th

Cir. 1991) (“[U]nsupported and conclusory claims are not sufficient

to show error.”) (discussing writ of habeas corpus ad

testificandum). For these reasons, claim eight in Toluao’s

Petition does not entitle him to relief and should be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge John A. Houston under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

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above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation and

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 28, 2015, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

October 12, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 25, 2015 __________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Houston

All parties

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