Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01158/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SIDNEY WYCKOFF,

Plaintiff,

v.

RYAN COUZENS, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-1158-TLN-KJN PS

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff Sidney Wyckoff, who proceeds in this action without counsel, has requested 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.)1 Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915, the court is directed to dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the 

allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant.

For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted, and that further leave to amend would be futile. As 

such, the court recommends that the action be dismissed with prejudice and that plaintiff’s 

application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied as moot. 

 

1

This case proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327.

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

the court must accept the factual allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), 

and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 

U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 

(1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Unless it is clear 

that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma 

pauperis is ordinarily entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissal. See Noll 

v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 (9th 

Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, leave to amend need not be granted when further amendment would be 

futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, on or about October 17, 2009, plaintiff was “convicted 

by a jury of one count of ADW (Assault with a Deadly Weapon) in violation of California Penal 

Code 245(a)(1) and blamed for causing a vehicle collision although his vehicle was not involved 

in the collision.” (See Complaint, ECF No. 1 [“Compl.”] ¶¶ 12, 14.) According to plaintiff, an 

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individual named Bernadette Earnest “was injured in the collision for which the plaintiff was 

blamed and her Mercedes coup was destroyed.” (Id. ¶ 13.) On the day of his conviction, 

plaintiff’s attorney, Patricia Tilley, was “allowed by the court to retire” and after several further 

court appearances, defendant Daniel Hutchinson, who was employed by defendant Yolo County 

Public Defender’s Office, was appointed as plaintiff’s public defender. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 18, 45.) 

Plaintiff claims that Hutchinson negotiated with prosecutor and defendant Ryan Couzens, who 

was employed by defendant Yolo County District Attorney’s Office, “to produce a sentencing 

agreement that provided, inter alia, five years of probation in lieu of a prison sentence for the 

ADW on the condition that Plaintiff waived his rights to appeal.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The sentencing 

agreement also allegedly “contained a ‘deal sweetener’ in the form of an admission that plaintiff 

committed the crime of ‘leaving the scene of an accident,’ a second felony,” which plaintiff 

claims did not happen. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 48.) Plaintiff asserts that he thought that the sentencing 

agreement was comprehensive, but that it in fact “did not include the charge of reckless driving” 

for which the assigned judge, defendant Arvid Johnson, a judge with defendant Yolo County 

Superior Court, “rendered a conviction and added a surprise sentence of one year in County Jail.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 21, 28iv, 51, 53c.)

In addition to the above, plaintiff alleges various violations and irregularities related to his 

criminal case. Plaintiff alleges incompetent and ineffective representation by Hutchinson, who, 

despite plaintiff’s instructions, allegedly did not request a trial transcript to familiarize himself 

with the case. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23, 26, 28iii, 30, 46-48.) Plaintiff posits that the transcript was not 

obtained due to “cost to the Court, District Attorney, and Public Defender, as the case may be”

(particularly in light of the alleged “financial crisis” and “mismanagement of funds” within the 

California courts system) and “to avoid the review and potential discovery of reversible errors 

that a review would expose, including that the time for a timely trial for the charge for which the 

plaintiff was convicted had expired before the trial had begun.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 28vi, 30, 43-44, 

53b.)2

 

2

Plaintiff himself states that the state appellate court denied a writ application based on the 

timeliness of the trial, but plaintiff posits that the denial was “probably because [the writ 

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Plaintiff further alleges that he discovered that Bernadette Earnest’s husband had been 

charged with the commission of felonies. (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.) According to plaintiff, Couzens, as 

the prosecutor, and Judge Johnson violated their duty to disclose exculpatory information 

regarding the husband of a chief witness against plaintiff, which precluded plaintiff’s crossexamination of Ms. Earnest regarding that subject matter and precluded plaintiff from potentially 

calling her husband as a witness in the trial. (Id. ¶¶ 28ii, 28viii, 30-39, 53a.) Additionally, 

plaintiff suggests that the alleged charges against Ms. Earnest’s husband gave Couzens leverage 

over Ms. Earnest’s testimony, which should have been disclosed. (Id. ¶¶ 28i, 33.)

Finally, plaintiff alleges that all the defendants (including Hutchinson, Couzens, and 

Judge Johnson) colluded in a conspiracy or “shell-game” to coerce plaintiff into a settlement and 

avoid an appeal. (Compl. ¶¶ 28v, 28vii, 43, 46, 49, 51, 53.)

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s complaint purports to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution against defendants Couzens, the Yolo County District Attorney’s 

Office, Judge Johnson, the Yolo County Superior Court, Hutchinson, the Yolo County Public 

Defender’s Office, Kamala Harris (as Attorney General for the State of California), and the State 

of California. Plaintiff seeks actual damages in the amount of $253,000.00; special damages in 

the amount of $280,800.00; exemplary/punitive damages in an amount not less than 

$2,000,000.00; an order setting aside plaintiff’s state court criminal convictions and voiding the 

sentencing agreement; and an award of fees, costs, and expenses. (Compl. at 19-20.)

As an initial matter, the court notes that it has serious concerns regarding the potential 

frivolousness of at least some of plaintiff’s allegations. Nevertheless, the court need not resolve 

such concerns to adjudicate plaintiff’s claims here. 

Plaintiff cannot state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hutchinson, because 

Hutchinson was acting as plaintiff’s defense attorney in his state court criminal proceedings, and 

thus was not a state actor for purposes of section 1983 liability. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 

 

application] did not include a transcript of the trial.” (Compl. ¶ 46.)

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U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a 

lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding”).

Furthermore, with respect to plaintiff’s monetary damages claims, Couzens and Judge 

Johnson are absolutely immune. The United States Supreme Court has held that “in initiating a 

prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from civil suit for 

damages under § 1983.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Such absolute immunity 

applies “even if it leaves the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a 

prosecutor whose malicious and dishonest action deprives him of liberty.” Ashelman v. Pope, 

793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Similarly, “[j]udges are immune from damage actions for 

judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts...Judicial immunity applies however 

erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved 

to the plaintiff.” Id. Here, all the actions allegedly attributable to Couzens and Judge Johnson 

were plainly taken in their capacities as a prosecutor and judge in a criminal case to which they 

were assigned. Additionally, plaintiff’s allegations of collusion or a conspiracy do not overcome 

their immunities. First, plaintiff’s allegations of collusion are entirely conclusory, speculative, 

unsubstantiated, and frivolous. Second, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “a conspiracy 

between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly 

improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and prosecutors.” Id. at 

1078. 

 Plaintiff’s claims for non-monetary relief (orders setting aside plaintiff’s state court 

criminal convictions and voiding the sentencing agreement) are likewise not viable, because they 

amount to a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court decision. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 

531 (2011) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids a losing party in state court 

from filing suit in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, 

and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment). Here, plaintiff alleges 

numerous errors made by the state court, and plaintiff specifically seeks to have this court set 

aside his convictions. As such, plaintiff’s claims for non-monetary relief in this civil action are 

barred as a forbidden de facto appeal. Any relief from plaintiff’s criminal convictions must 

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instead be sought in a direct appeal to the state appellate court3or potentially through habeas 

corpus proceedings, assuming that the appropriate requirements are satisfied. 

Plaintiff’s claims against the Yolo County Public Defender’s Office, Yolo County District 

Attorney’s Office, and the Yolo County Superior Court (the respective employers of Hutchinson, 

Couzens, and Judge Johnson) should also be dismissed. The doctrine of respondeat superior does 

not apply in section 1983 civil rights cases, and plaintiff’s complaint fails to plausibly allege that 

Hutchinson, Couzens, or Judge Johnson acted pursuant to any specific municipal policy or 

custom. See Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 n.1.

Finally, plaintiff’s claims against Kamala Harris (as Attorney General for the State of 

California) and the State of California are subject to dismissal, because plaintiff does not 

plausibly allege that either of these defendants had any actionable involvement with plaintiff’s 

criminal case.

Ordinarily, the court liberally grants a pro se plaintiff leave to amend. However, because 

the record here shows that plaintiff would be unable to cure the above-mentioned deficiencies 

through further amendment of the complaint, the court concludes that granting leave to amend 

would be futile.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The action be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be denied as moot.

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

In light of these recommendations, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that all pleading,

discovery, and motion practice in this action are stayed pending resolution of these findings and 

recommendations. Other than objections to the findings and recommendations or non-frivolous 

motions for emergency relief, the court will not entertain or respond to any pleadings or motions 

until the findings and recommendations are resolved.

 

3 Although plaintiff states that he waived his appellate rights as part of the sentencing agreement, 

he was free to attempt to argue in an appeal to the state appellate court, as he does in this case,

that any such waiver was not effective or binding, a matter on which this court expresses no 

opinion. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED. 

Dated: August 10, 2015

 

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