Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01960/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01960-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID PRINGLE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07cv1960-LAB (POR)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND

REJECTING IN PART REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION, AND

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, et al.,

Defendants.

On the evening of January 10, 1984, a woman leaving a store was forced into her

vehicle by two men, robbed, driven to a dark residential area where she was raped, and later

released near her home. A witness, Darren Wells, saw the victim abducted from the store

parking lot and called police to report it. Frederick Daye was arrested and identified by the

victim, and Petitioner David Pringle was identified three months later by Wells as one of the

attackers. At separate trials for car theft, kidnaping, and rape, both Daye and Pringle were

convicted. Pringle was convicted on August 17, 1984 and he was sentenced to an

indeterminate term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. His conviction was

affirmed on January 8, 1986. Pringle filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court

on October 9, 2007. With the assistance of counsel, he filed his third amended petition on

January 9, 2009.

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 and 28 U.C.C. § 636, the petition was referred to

Magistrate Judge Louisa Porter for a report and recommendation. Judge Porter issued her

report and recommendation (the “R&R”) on June 22, 2010. After some delay caused by a

change in Pringle’s counsel and Pringle’s attempt to file objections he drafted himself,

Pringle’s counsel filed objections with Pringle’s own objections attached as an exhibit.

I. Legal Standards

A district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision" on a

dispositive matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the

parties for all purposes. Rule 72(b); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district judge may also

receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id.

A party objecting to the recommended disposition of the matter may "serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations," and "a party may

respond to another party's objections. . . ." Rule 72(b).

"The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's

disposition that has been properly objected to.” Rule 72(b). When no objections are filed,

the court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge's findings of fact and decide

the issues on the applicable law. Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 209

(9th Cir. 1974). 

II. Discussion

The facts and procedural history are set forth in the R&R and the Court does not

repeat them here except where necessary for discussion.

A. Objections

Pringle objects that the type of claim he is bringing is not subject to procedural bars

such as AEDPA’s limitations period, or that even if it is, he is entitled to tolling. Pringle

waited over 20 years from his conviction to begin exhausting his claim, but argues that he

could not reasonably have brought it earlier because it is based on newly-discovered

evidence he first learned about in October, 2005.

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The R&R concluded that Pringle’s petition was time-barred under AEDPA because

he first began attempting to exhaust his claims in state court on February 15, 2006,

approximately 20 years after his conviction became final. The R&R rejected his argument

that claims of actual innocence were subject to the one-year limitations period. After the

R&R was issued, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125,

1128–31 (9th Cir. 2010), holding a claim of actual innocence was not a gateway through

which otherwise time-barred claims could be brought, which appeared to confirm the R&R’s

conclusions.

In his objections, Pringle argues Lampert only applies to claims of actual innocence

brought under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), which he now abandons. Instead, he

argues he is bringing a stand-alone “actual innocence” claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506

U.S. 390 (1993). The R&R recognized this possibility and addressed whether Pringle could

succeed with a Herrera-type claim.

Pringle argues the Constitution doesn’t permit any type of procedural barto a Herreratype claim of actual innocence in a habeas petition, but this is erroneous. Recently, in

Souliotes v. Evans, 622 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2010), a non-capital case, the Ninth Circuit

rejected a petitioner’s claims of constitutional error, but remanded his stand-alone claim to

the trial court with instructions to determine whether the petitioner could with due diligence

have uncovered the evidence he says proves his innocence. If he could reasonably have

uncovered the evidence earlier, his claim would be time-barred. Id. at 1175, 1177–80 (“[W]e

hold that § 2244(d)(1)(D) . . . applies to Souliotes’ innocence claim . . . .”) 

As Pringle admits, a stand-alone claim is more difficult to establish than a Schlup-type

claim. Assuming such a claim to be possible, the standard would be “extraordinarily high,”

and a petitioner must demonstrate that he is probably innocent. Carriger v. Stewart, 132

F.3d 463, 476–77 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A petitioner cannot succeed merely by casting

doubt on the evidence that convicted him. Id.

As pointed out in Souliotes’ dissent, it is doubtful whether Herrera actually permits

habeas petitioners to bring stand-alone claims of actual innocence in non-capital cases. 622

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F.3d at 1182–83 (noting that two other circuits had found such claims were precluded by

Herrera and criticizing the majority for remanding the case without deciding the issue). 

The R&R also discusses this at length based on earlier cases. Based on the earlier

cases, the R&R concluded that a freestanding claim of actual innocence constitutes a

cognizable constitutional claim and can serve as the basis for a federal grant of habeas.

(R&R, 13:26–28.) The Court, however, is not so sanguine. In light of the dissent’s

comments in Souliotes and two other circuits’ disagreement, the Court declines to make this

holding. Furthermore, such a holding is unnecessary because it is clear Pringle’s claim is

time-barred and fails to meet the high Herrera standard in any event.

B. Timeliness

1. Events Before October, 2005

The newly-discovered evidence consists of four semen stains found at the scene of

the crime. Daye was able to have these tested in 1994. They were tested by a private

laboratory, and later by the government. On the basis of the government’s testing, Daye was

excluded as a source of the semen, though Pringle was not. As a result, the government

decided not to oppose his habeas petition and Daye was exonerated and released. The

results of the second round of DNA testing were given to Pringle’s trial attorney. In June,

2005, Pringle wrote to his attorney and asked for his case file. According to Pringle, he

received it some time in October, 2005. Then in February, 2006, Pringle filed his first

habeas petition in California superior court. The superior court denied the petition on April

5, 2006.

Pringle argues that he couldn’t have brought his petition until October, 2005 when he

actually received the government’s DNA analysis. While the R&R accepted this argument,

and Respondent didn’t object to it, the Court cannot accept this finding.

The state courts found Pringle had failed to explain the fourteen-year delay in bringing

claims based on the government’s DNA analysis. (Cal. Superior Court’s order of April 5,

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 The parties haven’t provided a copy of the California Supreme Court’s order denying 1

Pringle’s habeas petition, which was decided after he filed his petition in this Court. But

Pringle’s briefing implies the Supreme Court either didn’t rule on this, or ruled against him.

While he points out the superior court’s finding of unreasonable delay, he omits the Supreme

Court’s findings (if any). (Obj. to R&R, 8:22–9:2; Trav., 9:11–17.) In conducting its habeas

review, the Court must accept all factual findings made by a state court, unless the petitioner

can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1). Because the Supreme Court made its finding, if any, after Pringle had already

filed his petition here, it is unclear what preclusive effect that court’s finding should have.

But in any event, if the state supreme court rejected the superior court’s finding that there

was no explanation for the 14-year delay, Pringle should and would have documented this.

If the Supreme Court accepted that finding, Pringle was required to provide “clear and

convincing” evidence it was wrong. 

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2006 (Lodgment 11) at 3:13–15.) There is no showing this is an unreasonable finding, even 1

assuming Pringle submitted the same evidence he submitted here. The operative date is

not the date when Pringle actually received the new evidence or when he realizes its

significance, but the earliest date he could, with due diligence, have discovered it. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). Due or

reasonable diligence doesn’t mean maximum diligence, nor is a petitioner required to look

for evidence he has no reason to know about. Souliotes, 622 F.3d at 1178. But the word

“diligence” implies activity, not passivity, so that if a petitioner has reason to believe evidence

exists that would support a habeas claim, he should take appropriate steps to seek it out

rather than ignoring the possibility or waiting for it to come to him.

For purposes of showing the eyewitness testimony was unreliable, the first notice

Pringle had was Daye’s exoneration. Accepting Pringle’s version of the evidence as true,

the eyewitness evidence was the lynchpin of the government’s case. (See Mem. in Supp.

of Mot. to file Third Am. Pet., 10:3–5 (“Indeed, by releasing Daye, the Government has no

choice but to release Pringle as well. As the Government made clear at both of their trials,

Pringle[‘s] and Daye’s fate[s] are tied together.”)) As soon as Pringle found out Daye had

been exonerated, he should have known that the eyewitness testimony that identified both

Daye and himself as the assailants had been cast into doubt. He needn’t have known

precisely what form the exonerating evidence took in order to be on notice that it existed. 

Pringle says he later received the DNA evidence that cleared Daye. But

§ 2244(d)(1)(D)’s limitations period doesn’t begin to run from the date a petitioner is on

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28 It is not particularly surprising that Pringle’s attorney didn’t turn over the results to 2

him, since they tend to identify him and Smallwood as the two assailants, fully consistent

with his sworn confession.

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notice of the last piece of evidence he is relying on. This is particularly true here, where that

last piece of evidence, the government’s DNA analysis, incriminates the petitioner.

Pringle’s declaration shows he knew about Daye’s habeas petition. Though Pringle

argues otherwise (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Leave to File Third Am. Pet., 13:27–14:1), he

also apparently knew new DNA analysis was being undertaken in that case because an

earlier round of DNA testing had suggested Daye was not involved. (Decl. of James Atkins

(Lodgment 4) (discussing first round of DNA testing, followed by visit to Pringle in prison to

obtain a DNA specimen)). And after the new DNA analysis became available, Pringle’s trial

attorney had it for over a decade. Pringle doesn’t say when he learned Daye had been 2

released. But assuming Pringle is innocent as he claims, it is strange that he would not at

least wonder whether his declaration or the new DNA analysis had cleared Daye, and

whether the DNA evidence might clear him too. And knowing that such analysis was

possible, he should have sought it in his own case. Compare Souliotes, 622 F.3d at

1178–79 (holding that earliest date petitioner could reasonably have discovered that

chemicals on his shoes didn’t match those found at the crime scene was the date when he

could reasonably have learned of new analysis available). 

Pringle doesn’t say when he learned of Daye’s exoneration, but his attorney knew

about it in 1996 at the latest. (Original Pet., Ex. A (letter from Pringle’s attorney dated

January 5, 1996, mentioning Daye’s successful habeas petition and release from prison, and

soliciting letters of appreciation to be used at Pringle’s parole hearing)). He could also have

learned about it had he written to Daye or the deputy district attorney. Pringle also doesn’t

say whether he knew about the new DNA testing results, only saying he “did not personally

receive any of this information.” (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to File 3d Am. Pet., 9:4; Obj. to

R&R, 9:14.) As with Daye’s exoneration, he could have learned about it earlier, had he

inquired. And in fact he never alleges he didn’t learn about either of these things earlier. He

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says he “fortuitously wrote his attorney asking for his case file” in 2005, but offers no

explanation why he wanted it then. 

In short, Pringle’s evidence falls far short of the “clear and convincing” standard.

Although Respondents didn’t object to the R&R’s finding that Pringle with due diligence

couldn’t have discovered the exculpatory evidence earlier than October, 2005, untimeliness

was raised as a defense, and the Court is not free to reject the state court’s reasonable

factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735–36

(9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 2254(d) is a limitation on federal courts’ power to grant

habeas relief). For this reason, though it is not the only reason, the petition must be denied

as untimely.

2. Events After October, 2005

AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period is tolled for the time during which a properly filed

state habeas petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In California, habeas petitions can

be filed in the superior court, the court of appeals, and the state supreme court. Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005). A petitioner is entitled to “gap tolling” or

“interval tolling” for the time between filing at each level, but only if the delay between denial

of petition at one level and filing of a petition at the next level is reasonable. Id. at 1042.

Assuming, arguendo, that the limitations period didn’t begin to run until Pringle

received the DNA test results, over three and a half months elapsed from the time he

received the results until he filed his first petition in state court on February 15, 2006. Then

from April 5, 2006, when that petition was denied, until August 1, 2007, when he filed his

petition in the California Supreme Court, Pringle had no petitions pending. The R&R points

out he makes no showing of any other basis for tolling during this 16-month period, and

Pringle hasn’t objected to this finding. A 16-month delay is clearly unreasonable and

prevents Pringle from benefitting from gap tolling. See, e.g., Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964,

969 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a petitioner’s delay of 146 days between filing of petitions

was “plainly” unreasonable). 

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28 Although Pringle argues many witnesses testified he was at a party, they agreed he 3

left at 5:00 p.m. Only one witness, Ethel Gonzalez, testified she was with Pringle at 7:00,

when the attack took place.

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Even indulging all factual and legal assumptions in Pringle’s favor, he filed his petition

in this Court over seven months after AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period had run. This delay

also requires that his petition be denied.

C. Herrera Standard

Even assuming that a stand-alone “actual innocence” claim is available to Pringle, he

would be required to show that he is probably innocent. Here, the DNA testing doesn’t

exclude Pringle, and may even inculpate him. 

Pringle presented alibi evidence consisting of his own testimony and the testimony

of a woman he was with that he was elsewhere at the time of the attack. Both the victim 3

and Wells identified both Day and Pringle as the assailants. Daye’s exoneration casts doubt

on the reliability of these identifications, though. As the R&R points out, Pringle might be

able to succeed if he were proceeding under the more lenient Schlup standard. But here he

is proceeding under the “extraordinarily high” Herrera standard. He must therefore “go

beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably

innocent.” Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476 (citations omitted).

Furthermore, Pringle formally confessed at least four times since 1990. The first of

these was a confession in a declaration under penalty of perjury in support of Daye’s

petition, in which Pringle said he (Pringle) and another man, Eddie Smallwood, committed

the theft, kidnaping, and rape. Pringle’s own trial attorney asked him to provide this

confession in 1993. In a handwritten note appended to the formal confession, he apologized

for waiting so long to confess, explaining that because Daye was tried separately he hadn’t

realized Daye had been convicted. He later confirmed this confession in an interview with

a deputy district attorney who was investigating Daye’s petition. In his pleadings, Pringle

admits he made this confession, but downplays its reliability, arguing that he gave it simply

to help Daye, figuring he himself had nothing to lose. (Obj. to R&R, 8:8:12–13 (“Pringle,

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 The state court of appeals noted inconsistencies in the alibi testimony of Pringle and 4

his principal alibi witness Ethel Gonzalez. For example, Pringle first told police he was in

Fresno on January 10, the day of the attack. (Cal. Court of Appeal’s Order of Jan. 8, 1986

(Lodgment 2) at 3, 13.) Then when his mother said he had returned from Fresno on January

4, he changed his story, saying he and Gonzalez had been at a party and then had drive

around the San Diego area on a number of errands when the attack was taking place. Id.

at 3–4. The credibility of this evidence is discussed in some detail. Id. at 3–5.

 The government’s DNA analysis shows the specimen would be consistent with 1 in 5

2,000 African-Americans, and excluded Daye and Smallwood as possible sources. The

analysis Smallwood could be the source of a different stain, and excludes both Daye and

Pringle. The DNA in the second specimen would be consistent with 1 in 2,300 AfricanAmericans. This DNA analysis tends to corroborate Pringle’s confession, identifying himself

and Smallwood as the assailants. The earlier testing was inconclusive, and the two

remaining stains weren’t tested. Inconclusiveness or absence of testing, though, isn’t

exculpatory and therefore doesn’t weigh in favor of innocence.

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figuring he had nothing to lose, signed the statement.”)) Pringle also confessed on two other

occasions, in connection with his own parole consideration hearings.

Pringle’s alibi evidence is the sole evidence in his favor. The evidence is not

necessarily reliable, but for purposes of this order the Court will assume its credibility. As 4

the R&R noted, both the victim’s and Wells’ eyewitness testimony may be less reliable

because of their misidentification of Daye. But casting doubt on this evidence would merely

neutralize it, not cause it to weigh affirmatively in Pringle’s favor. Because the DNA testing

of one stain is consistent with Pringle’s DNA, it tends to incriminate him. This forms the 5

main body of evidence, and taken together it might support a claim of innocence under

Schlup, but falls short of showing Pringle is probably innocent and does not meet Herrera’s

“extraordinarily high” standard.

While the confessions arose later and didn’t form part of the record, it is appropriate

to consider all newly-discovered evidence the parties have submitted, not just the newlydiscovered evidence that favors Pringle’s arguments. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776

(9th Cir. 2002) (requiring petitioner to show “that, in light of all the evidence, including

evidence not introduced at trial, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).

The R&R, citing Schriro v. Landrigan, concluded that the Court couldn’t consider the

confessions for any purpose without giving Pringle an evidentiary hearing at which he could

explain his motives for making them. See 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (“In deciding whether

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28

 Pringle’s traverse, citing Osborne v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th 6

Cir.2008), rev’d 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2321 (2009), also argued that confessions Pringle made to

obtain parole shouldn’t be fatal to his claim of actual innocence, because a prisoner has an

incentive to make a false confession to obtain his release through parole. (Trav., 3:10–14.)

But that doesn’t apply to Pringle’s initial confession, because he made it to help Daye. Even

now he can’t allege any reasonable motive for this confession, nor does he offer any

explanation for the spontaneous handwritten apology he added.

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to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could

enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the

applicant to federal habeas relief.”) The R&R explained that it was considering Pringle’s

claim under the more lenient Schlup standard, and Pringle has now clarified he is bringing

only a Herrera-type claim. But Schriro goes on to hold that “if the record refutes the

applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not

required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. 

Here, the record refutes Pringle’s allegations (in addition to showing his petition is

untimely), so no hearing is necessary. Pringle’s allegations attempt to explain his initial

confession. But even accepting his explanation, the confession is still admissible even

without an evidentiary hearing to examine why he made it.

First, he can’t point to any motive for making a false confession. And second, he

6

made his confession under penalty of perjury. Pringle cannot create an issue requiring an

evidentiary hearing simply by alleging that if put on the stand he intends to contradict his

earlier declaration. See Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 590–91 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding

that documentary evidence may obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing). 

Pringle’s confession also bears strong indicia of reliability because the government’s

DNA analysis tends to inculpate Smallwood as well. Pringle offers an explanation of why he

chose to implicate Smallwood (whose DNA he now knows to be consistent with that of the

second assailant):

After Pringle had been convicted, Ethel Gonzalez had recalled that

Smallwood had approached her shortly after the day [of the rape] and

mentioned he had come across some jewelry. Gonzalez believed it might

have been jewelry obtained from the . . . rape.

(Obj. to R&R, 8:13–16.) Apparently Pringle is arguing he had some idea Smallwood would

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be a plausible person to accuse, based on the jewelry. But this if anything would show

Pringle had even less incentive to make a false confession, because having committed the

crime with one of the actual assailants would incriminate him further, while helping to

exculpate Daye, a man he says was a total stranger to him. And, assuming Pringle to be

innocent, he would have had no reason to know Daye was innocent too; even if he knew

Smallwood was the second assailant, he didn’t know the first one wasn’t Daye. 

Finally, as noted, Pringle spontaneously added an apology at the end of his

confession, saying:

I’m sorry it took me so long to do this. But I had no knowledge of Mr. Daye

being convicted of the crime, he had nothing to do with. I hope this will help

you out. Eddie Smallwood is the one who did this case.

This apology not only affirms the confession, but is inconsistent with Pringle’s allegation

about his motives for confessing. If Pringle had no involvement in the crimes beyond what

he now alleges, nothing in his allegations shows any motive for the false spontaneous

apology to Daye. On the other hand, if he was guilty and knew Daye wasn’t, the apology

makes perfect sense.

In short, even assuming a stand-alone claim of actual innocence is available to

Pringle, he cannot meet the extraordinarily high standard. And on the basis of the pleadings

and record, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

III. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, the Court concludes Pringle’s petition in this Court is time-barred.

The Court accepts the state court’s determination that Pringle waited too long to file his

petition after he could with reasonable diligence have discovered the new DNA evidence.

And even if he couldn’t with reasonable diligence have discovered the DNA evidence earlier

than October, 2005, his petition is still late by seven months. Finally, even if he were given

an evidentiary hearing, he cannot show he is probably innocent. The remaining objections

do not affect the outcome. 

/ / /

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Pringle’s objections to the R&R are therefore OVERRULED. The R&R is, however,

MODIFIED as noted above, and ADOPTED. The petition is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 12, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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