Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00052/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00052-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Judith Fitzgerald (“Plaintiff”) asserts she is entitled to disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues the 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating the medical record and relying upon the testimony 

of a vocational expert. For the reasons set forth below, the action is REMANDED for further 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §495(g). 

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed applications for benefits on March 9, 2011, alleging disability beginning 

November 23, 2009. (Doc. 9-3 at 14.) The Social Security Administration denied her claims initially 

and upon reconsideration. (Doc. 9-5 at 5-10.) After requesting a hearing, Plaintiff testified before an 

ALJ on August 29, 2012. (Doc. 9-3 at 14, 28.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review of the ALJ’s decision denying benefits on November 20, 2013. (Id. at 2.) Therefore, the ALJ’s 

JUDITH FITZGERALD, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00052 - JLT

ORDER REMANDING THE ACTION PURSUANT 

TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF JUDITH FITZGERALD

AND AGAINST DEFENDANT CAROLYN W. 

COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY

Case 1:14-cv-00052-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/27/14 Page 1 of 10
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determination became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).

On January 14, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint for judicial review of 

the decision denying her applications for benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1.) She filed 

her opening brief on September 2, 2014, asserting the ALJ’s decision lacks the support of substantial 

evidence and should be remanded. (Doc. 10.) Defendant filed a brief in opposition on October 2, 2014 

(Doc. 11), to which Plaintiff filed a reply on October 15, 2014. (Doc. 12). 

II. Standard of Review

District courts have a limited scope of judicial review for disability claims after a decision by 

the Commissioner to deny benefits under the Social Security Act. When reviewing findings of fact, 

such as whether a claimant was disabled, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court if the proper legal 

standards were applied and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). The record as a whole 

must be considered, because “[t]he court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

III. Disability Benefits

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish she is unable to 

engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if:

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only 

unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 

national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in 

which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would 

be hired if he applied for work. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, 

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the claimant is able to engage in other substantial 

gainful employment. Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984).

IV. Administrative Determination

To achieve uniform decisions, the Commissioner established a sequential five-step process for 

evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920(a)-(f). The process requires 

the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff (1) engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of 

alleged disability, (2) had medically determinable severe impairments (3) that met or equaled one of 

the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether Plaintiff (4) 

had the residual functional capacity to perform to past relevant work or (5) the ability to perform other 

work existing in significant numbers at the state and national level. Id. The ALJ must consider 

testimonial and objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

A. Relevant Medical Opinions1

Dr. Ekram Michiel performed a psychiatric evaluation on May 29, 2011. (Doc. 9-8 at 19.) 

Plaintiff told Dr. Michiel that she had “agoraphobia, panic, anxiety attacks, and depression.” (Id.) She 

reported that she “always felt depressed and anxious,” but the feelings worsened to the point that she 

“had to stop working.” (Id.) She explained she had worked as a waitress, but was “very anxious 

around people,” which caused her heart to race, “shortness of breath and tightness in her chest.” (Id.) 

Further, Plaintiff said she was “unable to sleep at night unless she ‘smokes a little weed.’” (Id.) She 

was not taking any prescription medication for any impairments. (Id. at 20.) Dr. Michiel observed that 

Plaintiff’s “[t]hought process was goal-directed,” and she “was orientated to person, place, and date.” 

(Id. at 21.) Dr. Michiel found Plaintiff’s “attention and concentration was intact,” but her short-term 

memory was poor, and her immediate recall was fair. (Id.) “Based upon the evaluation and 

observation throughout the interview,” Dr. Michiel opined:

 1 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence related to her physical impairments, 

but rather only the conclusions related to her mental impairments. (See generally Doc. 10 at 12-18.) Accordingly, below 

the Court summarizes only the evidence related to Plaintiff’s mental abilities and limitations. 

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[T]he claimant is able to maintain attention and concentration to carry out simple job 

instructions. 

The claimant is able to relate and interact with coworkers, supervisors and the general public.

The claimant is unable to carry out an extensive variety of technical and/or complex 

instructions.

There are no restrictions on activities of daily living.

The claimant is unable to handle her own funds because of her abuse of marijuana.

(Doc. 9-8 at 21.) Dr. Michiel gave Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 55. 

(Id. at 20.)

Dr. Burnard Pearce completed a psychiatric review technique form and mental residual 

functional capacity assessment on June 20, 2011. (Doc. 9-8 at 24-40.) Dr. Pearce opined Plaintiff 

suffered from an affective disorder, disturbance of mood, and depression. (Id. at 24, 27.) He believed 

Plaintiff had mild restriction of activities of daily living; moderate difficulties of maintaining social 

functioning; and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Id. at 34.) 

According to Dr. Pearce, Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” with her ability to understand, 

remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions, but was “moderately limited” with detailed 

instructions. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” with her ability to maintain attention 

and concentration for extended periods; to maintain a schedule, regular attendance, and ordinary 

routine; and to work in coordination or proximity to others without being distracted. (Id.) However, 

Dr. Pearce believed Plaintiff was “moderately limited” with her ability to interact appropriately with the 

general public. (Id. at 39.) He concluded Plaintiff was able to “perform simple and some complex 

tasks,” “relate to others on a superficial work basis,” and “adapt to a work situation.” (Id. at 40.)

On October 22, 2011, Dr. Franco reviewed the medical record and “adopt[ed] the initial 

determination” from Dr. Pearce that Plaintiff “is capable of lp srts.” (Doc. 9-8 at 64.) In other words, 

Dr. Franco believed Plaintiff was capable of performing tasks simple repetitive tasks, with limited 

public exposure. (Id.; see also Doc. 10 at 15; Doc. 11 at 7.)

A treating physician2 from the Fresno County Department of Behavioral Health completed an 

 2 The physician’s signature is illegible. (See Doc. 9-3 at 22; Doc. 9-8 at 81.)

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assessment related to Plaintiff’s eligibility for General Relief on May 3, 2012. (Doc. 9-8 at 80 -81.) 

The physician noted that Plaintiff was “continuing to experience severe depression and anxiety,” 

isolated herself at home, and had diminished concentration. (Id.) Accordingly, the treating physician 

opined Plaintiff was unable to work. (Id.)

B. Administrative Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified that she was 62 years old and that she lived in a “small one-bedroom house.” 

(Doc. 9-3 at 34.) She reported that she graduated from high school and attended a semester of college. 

(Id.) Plaintiff said she was a waitress for over twenty years, starting in the early 1980s and continuing 

through November of 2009. (Id. at 35.) She said she “never did anything else,” and stopped working 

after she was diagnosed with depression and was put on disability. (Id.) Although Plaintiff’s doctor 

told her she was “all better now,” Plaintiff believed she was not able to work because she did not like 

leaving her house or “being around people.” (Id. at 36.) Plaintiff explained she was “very nervous” 

and “very anxious” around people, and she simply did not “like being out in the world.” (Id. at 37.)

Vocational expert Susan Creighton-Clavel testified after Plaintiff at the hearing. (Doc. 9-3 at 

55.) The vocational expert (“VE”) identified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a waitress, which 

required skills including “being able to communicate and interact with the public.” (Id.at 57.) The 

ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical individual the same age as Plaintiff, with a “high school 

education [and] past relevant work the same as the claimant.” (Doc. 9-3 58.) The ALJ stated the 

individual was able to lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. (Id.) The VE opined 

such a person would be able to perform Plaintiff’s past work. (Id.) Based upon Exhibit 7, the 

assessment of Dr. Pearce, the ALJ asked the VE to consider a person with the additional limitation of 

relating only “on a superficial work basis, that’s small talk, not interacting on any deep level.” (Id.) 

The VE opined a worker with that limitation would still be able to perform work as a waitress. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE to consider an individual who was “limited to simple job 

instructions.” (Doc. 9-3 at 61.) The VE explained such a person would not be able to perform 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work because “simple job instructions [were] at the unskilled level, and a 

waitress is the low end of semiskilled.” (Id.) 

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C. The ALJ’s Findings

Pursuant to the five-step process, the ALJ determined first that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial activity after the alleged onset date of November 23, 2009. (Doc. 9-3 at 16.) Second, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff’s severe impairments include Hepatitis B, obesity and depressive disorder. (Id.) 

Next, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or 

medically equaled a Listing. (Id. at 17.)

The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light 

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416(b), because Plaintiff could “occasionally lift 20 

pounds and frequently lift 10 pounds and can stand, sit and walk for 6-hours out of an 8-hour day.” 

(Doc. 9-3 at 18.) Further, Plaintiff was limited to “superficial (‘small talk’) interaction with others.” 

(Id.) With this RFC, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was “capable of performing past relevant work as a 

waitress.” (Id. at 22.) Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not “under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from November 23, 2009 through the date of th[e] decision.” (Id. at 23.)

V. Discussion and Analysis

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence because “[t]he ALJ did not 

address Dr. Franco’s case analysis in [the] decision,” and in failing to adopt Dr. Michiel’s opinion that 

Plaintiff was limited to simple repetitive tasks. (Doc. 10 at 15-16.) Further, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ 

erred in relying upon the testimony of the vocational expert to support the determination at step four 

that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work. (Id. at 18-20.) On the other hand, Defendant 

argues “the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence,” and that the Court should 

affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 11 at 7-11.)

A. Evaluation of the Medical Opinions

In this circuit, cases distinguish the opinions of three categories of physicians: (1) treating 

physicians; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) nonexamining physicians, who neither examine nor treat the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1996). Generally, the opinion of a treating physician is afforded the greatest weight in 

disability cases, but it is not binding on an ALJ in determining the existence of an impairment or on 

the ultimate issue of a disability. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 

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F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). Also, an examining physician’s opinion is given more weight than the 

opinion of a non-examining physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Thus, the courts apply a 

hierarchy to the opinions offered by physicians.

A physician’s opinion is not binding upon the ALJ, and may be discounted whether or not 

another physician contradicts the opinion. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. An ALJ may reject a 

contradicted opinion of a physician with “specific and legitimate” reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If there is conflicting medical evidence, “it is the ALJ’s role to determine credibility and to 

resolve the conflict.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). The ALJ’s resolution of the 

conflict must be upheld when there is “more than one rational interpretation of the evidence.” Id.; see 

also Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Here, ALJ gave “[g]reat weight” to the opinions of Drs. Michiel and Pearce. (Doc. 9-3 at 22.) 

The ALJ noted Dr. Michiel “opined that the claimant is able to maintain attention and concentration, 

relate and interact with co-workers, supervisors and the public and has no restrictions in activities of 

daily living.” (Id. at 22.) However, the ALJ failed to acknowledge that Dr. Michiel, an examining 

physician, opined Plaintiff was “able to maintain attention and concentration to carry out simple job 

instructions” and was “unable to carry out an extensive variety of technical and/or complex 

instructions.” (Doc. 9-8 at 21, emphasis added.) Similarly, Dr. Pearce believed that Plaintiff was 

“moderately limited” with her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions, and 

opined Plaintiff was able to “perform simple and some complex tasks.” (Id. at 38, 40.) Dr. Franco, 

who reviewed Plaintiff’s treatment notes and medical record, and opined that Plaintiff was capable of 

simple, repetitive tasks with limited public interaction. (See generally Doc. 9-3 at 22l Doc. 9-8 at 64.) 

Thus, each physician that examined Plaintiff or reviewed her medical records believed that Plaintiff 

lacked the ability to concentrate on or perform all tasks.3

In the RFC, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to “superficial (‘small talk’) interaction with others, but 

did not limit Plaintiff to simple tasks or address Plaintiff’s limitations with attention and concentration. 

 3 Notably, Plaintiff’s treating physician, whose opinion was rejected by the ALJ, also believed Plaintiff had 

“difficulty with concentration.” (Doc. 9-3 at 22.)

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(See Doc. 9-3 at 18.) Thus, the ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Michiel and Pearce regarding her 

limitations, yet failed to articulate any reasons for doing so. Moreover, the ALJ failed to acknowledge 

or discuss the opinion of Dr. Franco that Plaintiff should be restricted to simple, repetitive tasks. As a 

result, the AJ erred in her evaluation of the medical evidence, and the RFC lacks the support of 

substantial evidence in the record. See Allen, 749 F.2d at 579; see also Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 

1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). 

B. Testimony of the Vocational Expert

The Commissioner may establish a claimant can work in the national economy through the 

testimony of a vocational expert, who may “testify as to (1) what jobs the claimant, given his or her 

functional capacity, would be able to do; and (2) the availability of such jobs in the national economy.” 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th 

Cir. 1999). The ALJ may pose “hypothetical questions to the vocational expert that ‘set out all of the 

claimant’s impairments’ for the vocational expert’s consideration” when eliciting testimony. Tackett, 

180 F.3d at 1101 (quoting Gamer v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 

1987)). The description of impairments “must be accurate, detailed, and supported by the medical 

record.” Id. “If the assumptions in the hypothetical are not supported by the record, the opinion of the 

vocational expert that the claimant has a residual working capacity has no evidentiary value.” Gallant 

v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984). When the “weight of the medical evidence supports 

the hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ,” the ALJ’s findings will be upheld by the court. Martinez 

v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456. 

Here, the ALJ relied upon the testimony of the vocational expert at step four of the sequential 

evaluation to determine that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work. (See Doc. 9-3 at 22.) 

However, because the ALJ failed to articulate specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of 

Drs. Michiel, Pearce, and Franco regarding Plaintiff’s concentration and limitation to simple, repetitive 

tasks, the limitations should have been incorporated in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational 

expert. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 886 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the testimony of the vocational expert 

has no evidentiary value for the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as 

a waitress. 

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C. Remand is appropriate in this matter

The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or to 

order immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the District Court. Harman v. Apfel, 

211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Except in rare instances, when a court reverses an administrative 

agency determination, the proper course is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 

explanation. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 

16 (2002)). Generally, an award of benefits is directed when:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, 

(2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 

disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, an award of benefits is directed 

when no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has 

been fully developed. Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Applying the Smolen factors to this case, the ALJ failed to set forth legally sufficient reasons to 

reject the opinions of Drs. Michiel and Pearce regarding her limitations, and failed to discuss the 

opinion of Dr. Franco. Notably, the vocational expert testified that a person “limited to simple job 

instructions” would not be able to perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work because “simple job 

instructions [were] at the unskilled level, and a waitress is the low end of semiskilled.” (Doc. 9-3 at 

61.) However, the vocational expert did not offer any testimony regarding whether an individual with 

the same background and limitations as Plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national economy. 

Thus, it is not clear from the record that Plaintiff is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act, and

a remand for further proceedings is appropriate in this matter. 

VI. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical 

evidence and in relying upon the testimony of the vocational expert to find that Plaintiff is able to 

perform her past relevant work. Because the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards, the 

administrative decision should not be upheld by the Court. See Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 510. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this matter is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this decision; and

2. The Clerk of Court IS DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Judith 

Fitzgerald and against Defendant Carolyn Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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