Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00397/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00397-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN LOZARO MAINEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM GORE,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17-CV-397-JLS (KSC)

ORDER: (1) ADOPTING REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION; (2)

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

(ECF Nos. 13, 22)

Petitioner John Lazaro Mainez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (“Petition,” ECF No. 1). Respondent William Gore filed a Motion to 

Dismiss the Petition, (“MTD,” ECF No. 13), and Petitioner filed a Traverse, (“Traverse,” 

ECF No. 16). Petitioner also filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, (“Opp’n,” ECF 

No. 21). Magistrate Judge Karen Crawford has filed a Report and Recommendation in 

which she recommends the Court grant Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, (“R&R,” ECF 

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No. 22).1 Petitioner filed Objections to the R&R, (“Obj.,” ECF No. 24).2 Respondent did 

not file a Reply.

BACKGROUND

Judge Crawford’s R&R contains a complete and accurate recitation of the relevant 

portions of the factual and procedural histories underlying Petitioner’s Petition and 

Respondent’s Motion. (R&R 2–6.)3 This Order incorporates by reference the background 

as set forth therein.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R. The district court must “make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980); United 

States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence of timely 

objection, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

 

1 Petitioner filed a supplemental petition, which was received by the Clerk’s Office on February 8, 2018. 

The document was filed electronically by Judge Crawford on March 20, 2018. (See “Supp. Petition,” ECF 

No. 28.) Although the document is titled “supplementary,” it is quite lengthy and comprehensive and it 

appears that it could replace the first petition rather than supplement it. Nonetheless, to give Petitioner 

the benefit of the doubt, the Court will deem the second petition a supplement to the original petition, thus 

preserving the claims contained in the original petition as well as those presented in the later-filed petition. 

The Court will review the supplemental petition in conjunction with the original petition.

The issues in the two petitions are similar for the most part. Because the Court agrees with Judge 

Crawford’s ultimate conclusion that the petition is untimely, the merits of the petitions become moot. 

Judge Crawford did not address the supplemental petition in the R&R. This Court will address any claims 

in the supplemental petition that relate to the timeliness issue to the extent those claims were not addressed 

by Judge Crawford in the R&R.

2 Petitioner also filed supplemental objections, (ECF No. 26), which appear to be a prior draft of his first 

objections document, (ECF No. 25), because the supplemental document contains mostly illegible 

handwritten edits that are corrected in the first objections document. The supplemental document also 

attaches “exhibits” which are sometimes referred to throughout the objections. Any exhibit already in the 

court record has been considered by Judge Crawford and this Court in analyzing the Petition. Any new 

exhibit will be addressed herein if relevant. 

3 Pin citations refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at the top of each page.

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record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

ANALYSIS

I. Relevant Timeline

The only issue presented in Judge Crawford R&R’s is the timeliness of the Petition. 

Judge Crawford engaged in a lengthy analysis regarding the timing of each step of 

Petitioner’s past filings. Petitioner’s case stems from four different cases in San Diego 

Superior Court. (R&R 2.) Petitioner pled guilty to various charges and was sentenced. 

Subsequently, as relevant here:

 On May 20, 2014, Petitioner was resentenced;

 On July 1, 2014, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition in state trial court;

 On September 8, 2014, the state trial court denied the petition because Petitioner had 

an appeal pending in the California Court of Appeal;

 On November 25, 2014, Petitioner filed a Notice of Abandonment of Appeal and 

Request for Dismissal in the California Court of Appeal;

 On December 1, 2014, the California Court of Appeal granted Petitioner’s request 

for dismissal of appeal. The court ordered a remittitur to issue immediately;

 On June 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in state trial court;

 On July 14, 2015, the trial court denied part of the petition, and requested additional 

briefing on two issues;

 On January 5, 2016, the trial court denied the remainder of the June 3, 2015 petition;

 On April 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of 

Appeal;

 On April 13, 2016, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition as untimely 

and on the merits;

 On April 25, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court;

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 On June 22, 2016, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for 

review without comment;

 On June 27, 2016 and July 12, 2016, the state trial court received correspondence 

from Petitioner, and construed the correspondence as a single habeas petition;

 On August 4, 2016, the state trial court denied the habeas petition, noting Petitioner’s 

claim was previously rejected and Petitioner did not allege a change in the law or 

facts. The court also rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim;

 On September 21, 2016, the state trial court received correspondence from Petitioner 

challenging the denial of his June 3, 2015 habeas petition;

 On September 22, 2016, the state court construed this correspondence as another 

habeas petition and denied it again because Petitioner did not allege a change in the 

law or facts. The court also again rejected Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim;

 On February 19, 2017, Petitioner mailed his federal Petition to this Court. 

Judge Crawford found that Petitioner failed to timely file his Petition under the 

statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”). (R&R 20.) Under AEDPA, a one-year statute of limitation applies to an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus, running from “the date on which the judgment 

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review.” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A).

4

 Clearly, the process outlined above has taken 

more than one year. The Parties agree that Petitioner’s judgment of conviction became 

final on December 11, 2014 (ten days after the California Court of Appeal filed the 

dismissal that Petitioner requested), (R&R 9–10), and Petitioner filed his federal petition 

 

4 The limitation period may run from a date later than the date on which judgment becomes final in some 

instances. See infra Section IV.

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on February 19, 2017. The issue is therefore whether there is sufficient tolling of the statute 

of limitations for the Petition to be timely.

II. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period is statutorily tolled during the time 

that “a properly-filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Court 

analyzes each time period at issue to determine whether the limitations period was tolled.

A. December 12, 2014 to June 3, 2015: Untolled

Judge Crawford’s tolling analysis began after the judgment became final on 

December 11, 2014. (R&R 13.) Judge Crawford found the statute of limitations began on 

December 12, 2014 and ran untolled for a period of 173 days until Petitioner filed his 

habeas petition on June 3, 2015. (Id.) 

Judge Crawford addressed Petitioner’s “vacate motions” he alleges to have been 

filed in this period, on March 15, 2015 and April 10, 2015, which he argues toll the statute 

of limitations. (R&R 12 (citing Traverse 4–6; Opp’n 3).) Petitioner argues these motions 

“attacked the pertinent judgment.” (Traverse 4.)

These motions could not be located in the attachments to the Petition or the state 

court record. (R&R 12.) Judge Crawford notes that a trial court minute order dated April 

23, 2015 summarily denied two motions to vacate the judgment, but the minute order does 

not refer to the dates the motions were filed. (R&R 12 (citing ECF No. 1-2, at 135).) Judge 

Crawford found Petitioner had not met his burden to show that he was entitled to tolling 

while these alleged motions were pending. (Id.) Judge Crawford found that even if 

Petitioner had attached the motions to his federal petition and they tolled the statute of 

limitations, they would only toll the limitations period for thirty-eight days, which is 

insufficient to allow his federal Petition to be timely. (Id.) Petitioner objects to this finding. 

Petitioner argues his vacate motions toll the statute of limitations from February 

2015 (the date he now states he filed the first motion) to June 3, 2015. (Obj. 2.) Petitioner

originally alleged he filed vacate motions in March and April of 2015, (ECF No. 16, at 5–

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6; ECF No. 21, at 3), and he now argues he filed them in February and April of 2015. He 

also now alleges one vacate motion was denied on April 3, 2015 and the second was denied 

on April 23, 2015. (Obj. 2.) 

First, the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s argument that the first vacate motion 

was filed in February 2015 (he does not include an exact date). Petitioner previously 

alleged the vacate motions were filed on March 15, 2015 and April 10, 2015. (Traverse 4–

6.) Petitioner now claims the date is February 2015, without explanation for this change. 

This Court has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence or claims presented for 

the first time in objections to a report and recommendation. See Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 

742, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court declines to consider Petitioner’s claim here, 

finding it suspect and without evidence to support it. The Court, like Judge Crawford, 

relies on Petitioner’s assertion from his Traverse that he filed the vacate motions in March 

and April 2015.5 The Court agrees with Judge Crawford that even if these motions could 

be verified,6and would toll the statute of limitations for thirty-eight days (from March 15, 

2015 to April 23, 2015), this does not affect the ultimate conclusion that the Petition is 

untimely. (R&R 13.) 

Petitioner further argues that the motions’ “pending status” did not end on April 23, 

2016 because they were still appealable, thus, the entire period until June 3, 2016 should 

be tolled. (Obj. 4.) This is unsupported by law. Petitioner did not appeal the order denying 

his vacate motions, so the motions were not “pending” for sixty days afterwards simply 

because he alleges he could have appealed them. The term “pending” in section 2244(d)(2) 

 

5 Petitioner also now claims that the vacate motions were denied on different days, April 3, 2015, and 

April 23, 2015. This, although not relevant to the tolling issue, is not supported by the record. The trial 

court summarily denied two motions to vacate on April 23, 2015. (ECF No. 1-2, at 135.)

6 Without the motions in the record, it is unclear whether they are “properly filed application[s] for State 

post-conviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” 

pursuant to § 2244(d)(2). For example, “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance 

are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for 

example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must 

be lodged, and the requisite filing fee.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (citations omitted). The 

Court is unable to verify any details regarding the motions.

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includes the time between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a petition in a 

higher state court as long as long as the petitioner seeks “timely” review in accordance with 

state law. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219–21, 225–26 (2002). The “vacate 

motions” were denied by the state trial court in April 2015 and on June 3, 2015, Petitioner 

filed a habeas petition in state trial court. This is not a “higher court” and therefore the 

statute of limitations would not be tolled for this period.

The Court therefore OVERRULES Petitioner’s objection and ADOPTS the R&R 

as to this time frame. The statute of limitations ran untolled for 173 days from December 

12, 2014 to June 3, 2015. 

B. June 3, 2015 to January 5, 2016: Tolled

The limitations period was then tolled from June 3, 2015 to January 5, 2016 (the day 

the state trial court denied the June 3 petition).

C. January 6, 2016 to April 11, 2016: Untolled

Judge Crawford found the statute of limitations began again on January 6, 2016 and 

ran for 96 days until Petitioner filed a petition in the California Court of Appeal on April 

11, 2016. (R&R 14.) Judge Crawford found this 96-day gap is unreasonable in length and 

therefore the statute of limitations was not tolled for this period. (Id. at 16.) 

As mentioned above, the statute of limitations is tolled while an application is 

“pending” which means the time between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a 

petition in a higher state court as long as long as the petitioner seeks “timely” review in 

accordance with state law. Carey, 536 U.S. at 219–21; 225–26; see Evans v. Chavis, 546 

U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“As long as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate review within 

a ‘reasonable time,’ he could count as ‘pending’ (and add to the 1-year time limit) the days 

between (1) the time the lower state court reached an adverse decision, and (2) the day he 

filed a petition in the higher state court.”). Under California law, a “timely” review is one 

that is sought in a “reasonable” time. Evans, 546 U.S. at 193. As Judge Crawford noted,

“the Ninth Circuit has indicated that ‘a thirty-to-sixty-day benchmark’ should be applied 

to determine whether the filing of a new petition in a higher court after a lower court’s 

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adverse decision meets California’s reasonableness requirement.” (R&R 16 (quoting

Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014).) A delay longer than this may be 

deemed reasonable if the petitioner establishes good cause. Stewart, 757 F.3d at 936. 

Judge Crawford noted Petitioner did not address the 96-day gap and therefore has not 

established it was a reasonable delay; thus, the statute of limitations was not tolled during 

this time. (R&R 16.)

Petitioner objects and argues the statute of limitations should be tolled during this 

period. (Obj. 6.) Petitioner cites Osumi v. Giurbino, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 

2006), where the court determined a 96 or 98-day gap between the Court of Appeal’s 

decision and the petitioner’s filing in the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable. 

Id. at 1159. The court reasoned the delay was not unreasonable “given the lengthy briefs 

petitioner filed in the California appellate courts and petitioner’s substantial rewriting of 

his habeas corpus petition following the denial of that petition by the [trial court].” Id. 

Petitioner here argues the delay in his case was reasonable because he “had to research 

complex issues under severe restrictions imposed by prison officials.” (Obj. 7.) He 

includes a list of subjects he was required to research and notes the limits on research 

imposed by the prison library. (Id. at 7–8.)

The Court finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause to show the 96-day 

gap was “reasonable” under California law. Petitioner’s June 3, 2015 Petition, (ECF No. 

14-19), and the “supplement” he filed to that Petition on July 10, 2015, (ECF No. 14-20), 

are lengthy and extensive. Petitioner does not demonstrate that he needed 96 days to file 

his next Petition, (ECF No. 14-24), when he already had conducted the research for these 

two writings and the issues overlapped with those in the later petition.

7

 This case is 

therefore distinguishable from Osumi where the subsequent petition involved “substantial 

 

7 Further, Petitioner argues the gap is explainable because he had to research “a number of legal issues” 

and obtain case law, wherein he lists approximately 15 cases that he had to research. However, these 

cases are not ever referred to in Petitioner’s April 11, 2016 petition, (ECF No. 14-24), so Petitioner’s 

reasoning here is unclear.

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rewriting.” The Court’s holding is consistent with the majority of courts that have analyzed 

this issue in similar cases. See e.g., Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir.

2011) (holding that the petitioner was not entitled to “gap tolling” for unjustified delays of 

ninety-one and eighty days), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 554 (2011); Culver v. Dir. of Corrs.,

450 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1140–41 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that unjustified intervals of 

ninety-seven days and seventy-one days between the denial of one state petition and the 

filing of the next state petition constituted unreasonable delays which precluded tolling).

Further, the need for research and the limited library time and resources while 

incarcerated does not demonstrate good cause for the unreasonable delay. See Griffin v. 

Perry, No. 2:15-cv-1776-MCE-CMK-P, 2016 WL 4899205, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 

2016) (noting that “access to the prison law library is a burden every prisoner faces. It is 

not an unusual event, and it the type of hurdle that would have been known and 

contemplated when establishing the statute of limitations in [A]EDPA” and this did not 

demonstrate good cause for an 84-day delay). Thus, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

objection and ADOPTS the R&R as to this time period.

D. April 12, 2016 to June 22, 2016: Tolled

The Court of Appeal denied the petition on April 13, 2016.8 Petitioner promptly 

filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Given that Petitioner filed his 

Petition without unreasonable delay, the limitations period is tolled during this time. The 

California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment on June 22, 2016. The 

statute of limitations was tolled during this time period.

E. June 22, 2016 to August 4, 2016 (Second Round): Tolled

The California Supreme Court’s decision became final thirty days later, on July 23, 

2016. But, before the decision became final, Petitioner began a second round of collateral 

 

8 The Court of Appeal included an analysis as to the untimeliness of the petition, noting it was “filed nearly 

two years after [petitioner] was sentenced without any adequate explanation for the delay.” (R&R 14 

(citing ECF No. 14-25, at 2).) This time is not relevant to the 96-day gap at issue, so the Court does not 

address Petitioner’s objection to this finding.

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review, starting with his correspondence dated June 27, 2016 which he sent to the trial 

court. This was denied on August 4, 2016. Because his petition was pending at this time, 

the period between June 27, 2016 and August 4, 2016 is tolled. (R&R 17.)

F. August 4, 2016 to September 21, 2016 (Third Round): Untolled

Petitioner then began a third round of collateral review by sending additional 

correspondence to the trial court on September 21, 2016. This is deemed a third round of 

review because the correspondence was sent to the trial court, not an appellate/higher court. 

(R&R 17.) Petitioner is not entitled to tolling between rounds of state habeas petitions. 

(Id. at 17–18 (citing Briggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003)).) The 

limitations period therefore ran for 47 days between August 4, 2016 and September 21, 

2016. Petitioner does not object to this portion of the R&R and the Court agrees with Judge 

Crawford. The Court ADOPTS the R&R as to this time period.

G. September 22, 2016 to February 19, 2017: Untolled

The state trial court denied the final state habeas petition on September 22, 2016, 

and Petitioner did not file his federal petition until February 19, 2017. The limitations

period ran for this time period: 149 days. Petitioner does not object to this portion of the 

R&R and the Court agrees with Judge Crawford. The Court ADOPTS the R&R as to this 

time period.

In sum, the limitations period ran for 465 days. (R&R 19.) The Court now considers 

equitable tolling.

III. Equitable Tolling

Judge Crawford concluded Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling. Equitable 

tolling of the one-year limitations period applies “only if extraordinary circumstances 

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” (R&R 18 

(quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations 

omitted)).) Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Judge Crawford determined Petitioner 

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had not explained the delays in his filing in his Petition, thus, he did not demonstrate

extraordinary circumstances. (R&R 19.) 

In his supplemental petition, Petitioner appears to argue Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. 

Ct. 1309 (2012), applies to his case as it relates to his ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim. (Supp. Petition 19.) The Court construes this as an argument for equitable tolling 

due to Petitioner’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. In Martinez, the Supreme 

Court held:

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must 

be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will 

not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no 

counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.

Id. at 1320. But, Martinez applies only to excusing procedural default and/or lack of 

exhaustion in state court and does not apply to the AEDPA statute of limitations which 

govern the filing in federal court. See Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 

2014) (holding “the Martinez rule explicitly relates to excusing a procedural default of 

ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does not apply to AEDPA’s statute of limitations or 

the tolling of that period”); McKinnie v. Long, No. EDCV 12-2101-CBF (RNB), 2013 WL 

1890618, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) (“Martinez dealt solely with the state procedural 

default doctrine, which is entirely different from the issue presented here of whether 

petitioner’s claims are time barred under the AEDPA statute of limitations.”) Accordingly, 

Martinez does not present a basis for equitable tolling.

In his Objections, Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling from January 6 

to April 10, 2016. (Obj. 2.) As mentioned above, this was the 96-day period between the 

state trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s June 3, 2015 petition and his filing in the California 

Court of Appeal. Also as mentioned above, Petitioner argues the delay was reasonable due 

to his limited law library time and legal resources. (Id. at 8–9.) Limited access to the law 

library does not entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 

998 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Given even the most common day-to-day security restrictions in 

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prison, concluding otherwise would permit the exception to swallow the rule.”). Petitioner 

has not demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient for equitable tolling. The 

Court ADOPTS the R&R as to this claim.

IV. Petitioner’s Actual Innocence Claim

Petitioner argues a procedural default is overcome if he can show evidence of actual 

innocence through “newly discovered evidence.” (Supp. Petition 54; Obj. 10.) The Court 

considers the allegations in analyzing the statute of limitations. As noted above, the 

limitations period begins on the date on which judgment becomes final. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). “It is only in rare instances that, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1) (B)–(D), the 

limitation period may run from a date later than the date on which judgment becomes final.” 

Hernandez v. Small, No. CV 08-8639-AG (VBK), 2011 WL 4550342, at *3 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 11, 2011). For example, “[i]f the petition alleges newly discovered evidence, . . . the 

filing deadline is one year from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 388–89 (2013) (quoting § 2244(d)(1)(D)).

Petitioner presents an exhibit which he deems “newly discovered”—a declaration 

by his co-defendant Estrada which he refers to as “Exhibit 23.” (Supp. Petition 54.) 

Petitioner states Estrada said “in a recorded phone call” with her mother that she lied to the 

police about Petitioner and the allegations against him, and this shows his innocence. 

(Supp. Petition 54.) He states this declaration has been in his possession since 2013, but, 

at the time he filed his petitions, he was unable to have the recorded phone call transcribed. 

No evidence of the declaration is attached as an exhibit to either petition, but, in his 

objections, Petitioner attaches a document which is a “transcription” by Edward Robson 

from speakwrite.com dated July 17, 2017. (ECF No. 26, at 27–28.) This document 

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purports to be a transcription of Ms. Estrada’s statement regarding the falsity of her 

previous allegations made against Petitioner.9

First, although Petitioner argues the declaration was only recently transcribed, he 

states Estrada provided him the declaration on December 27, 2013. (Supp. Petition 54.) 

Therefore, he was clearly aware of the facts underlying his claim of alleged innocence at 

this time. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides that “the one-year limitations period begins 

when petitioner knows (or through the exercise of due diligence should know) the facts

underlying the claim, not when []he garners sufficient evidence to support the claim.” 

Walker v. Cavazos, No. CV 11-3109 ODW (FMO), 2011 WL 6951841, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 

Nov. 30, 2011) (citing cases). Because Petitioner knew of the facts behind this declaration 

in 2013 (before judgment became final), this evidence does not delay the start of the oneyear limitations period.

Further, the Court finds the declaration is not reliable. “To be credible, [an actual 

innocence] claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with 

new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup 

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). The petitioner must “show that with the new evidence 

‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’” Griffin v. 

Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).

Petitioner claims Ms. Estrada made the statements in the declaration in a recorded 

phone call to her mother on December 27, 2013. (Supp. Petition 54.) The declaration is 

not attested to be made under penalty of perjury by Ms. Estrada nor is it signed by Ms. 

Estrada. It is only alleged to be “transcribed” by Mr. Robson from speakwrite.com in July 

2017, and Mr. Robson declares the transcription is accurate. Thus, the Court finds that the 

 

9 This Court has discretion, but is not required, to consider evidence or claims presented for the first time

in objections to a report and recommendation. See Brown, 279 F.3d at 744–45. The declaration is not 

part of either petition and is presented for the first time in Petitioner’s supplemental objections. The Court 

exercises its discretion to review the declaration.

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evidence presented does not qualify as “newly discovered” nor is sufficient to demonstrate 

actual innocence. The Court DENIES the Petition as to this claim.

V. Petitioner’s Request to Amend

Petitioner admits his Petition contains some unexhausted claims. Petitioner requests 

leave to amend his Petition to delete his unexhausted claims so that the Court can consider 

only his exhausted claims. Judge Crawford recommends denying Petitioner leave to amend 

because even if his Petition contained only exhausted claims, those claims are subject to 

dismissal as untimely, as detailed above. (R&R 19.) Petitioner does not address this in his 

objections. The Court agrees with Judge Crawford and ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES

Petitioner leave to amend.

VI. Certificate of Appealability

In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, if a 

court denies a petition, a certificate of appealability may only be issued “if jurists of reason 

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists 

could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court finds that Petitioner did not make a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right, the issues are not debatable among jurists of reason, 

and a court could not resolve the issues in a different manner. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

327. The Court therefore DENIES a certificate of appealability.

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

In sum, Petitioner has not filed his federal petition within the time limits required by 

AEDPA and is not entitled to sufficient statutory tolling or equitable tolling to avoid this. 

Further, Petitioner has not demonstrated newly discovered evidence of actual innocence to 

avoid this procedural bar. The Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Petition. The 

Clerk SHALL close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2018

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