Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00548/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00548-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MCCULLOCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-00548-WQH-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

[ECF No. 58]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Robert McCullock, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 4; 13.) 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that from 2016 through 2018, officials at the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJDCF”) imposed a substantial burden on the 

exercise of his Buddhist faith in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land 

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and denied him equal protection of the 

law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See ECF No. 4 at 22–34.) Presently before 

the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff opposes 

Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 64.)

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.1 of the Local 

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Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

After a thorough review of the parties’ moving and supporting papers, the record in this 

case, and the applicable law, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that the District Court 

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On April 28, 2018,1 Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against the then-acting 

RJDCF Community Resource Manager, Robert Brown, Rabbi Fabrice Hadjadj, J. Davies, 

and the then-acting Chief Deputy, P. Covello. (ECF No. 4 at 2.) Concurrently with his 

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.) 

On July 12, 2018, the Honorable William Q. Hayes granted Plaintiff’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 13.) On September 18, 2018, Defendants Brown, 

Hadjadj, Davies, and Covello answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 24.) 

On June 26, 2019, Defendants moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 58.) The 

Court provided Plaintiff with notice of the requirements for opposing summary judgment 

pursuant to Klingele/Rand and set a Briefing Schedule for Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 

44.) On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff constructively filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion. 

(ECF No. 64.) Defendants did not file a reply. 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges the following in his Amended Complaint:2 Plaintiff has been a 

serious Buddhist practitioner for over ten years. (ECF No. 4 at 24.) His “faith mandate[s]

 

1 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the date Plaintiff delivered his 

Amended Complaint to prison authorities for mailing as the Amended Complaint’s filing 

date. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Houston mailbox 

rule applies to § 1983 complaints filed by pro se prisoners.”) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 

U.S. 266, 275–276 (1988))). The Amended Complaint shows April 28, 2018, as the date 

it was received by a CDCR staff member. (ECF No. 4 at 8.) 

2 The Court summarizes the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for 

background purposes only. Because Plaintiff did not sign the Amended Complaint under 

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meditation, chanting, and prostration” in an indoor setting, such as the chapel at RJDCF. 

(Id.) Group worship in the chapel is “necessary” because it “is needed to improve 

meditation with the assistance of other Buddhist practitioners.” (Id.) 

Buddhist inmates are scheduled for weekly chapel services at RJDCF, but from 2016 

through 2018, Buddhist inmates were denied “weekly access” to the chapel because of the 

absence of chapel supervision for Buddhist services. (Id. at 24–25.) Buddhist inmates 

were denied chapel access when Defendant Hadjadj, a Jewish Rabbi, failed to attend and 

supervise scheduled Buddhist services or when Defendants otherwise failed to provide 

supervision for Buddhist services “in the absen[ce] of volunteers.” (Id. at 25–26.) In 2017, 

there were no Buddhist services held on March 13, March 27, April 3, April 10, July 3, 

July 31, August 7, and August 28. (See id. at 19–20.) In 2018, there were “about six 

Mondays in a row”3from January 1 to February 5 without Buddhist services. (Id. at 21.) 

Also from 2016 through 2018, Defendants failed “to provide foods at state expense for biannual Buddhist holiday.” (Id. at 31.) 

Defendant Covello, as Chief Deputy Warden, is “responsible for policy operation at 

RJDCF” and is the “moving force behind [California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)] policies.” (Id. at 12.) Defendant Brown, as the Community 

Resource Manager at RJDCF, is “the policy maker for all religious groups, chapel 

schedules, religious items, religious approved holiday and religious banquets” and 

 

penalty of perjury, the Court cannot consider the allegations in it as evidence for purposes 

of this Report and Recommendation. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 759 & n.16 (9th Cir. 

2006) (stating that unverified complaints “cannot be considered as evidence at the 

summary judgment stage”); see also Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(noting that pro se inmates are exempted from “strict compliance with summary judgment 

rules,” but not “all compliance”); Harris v. Shelland, No.: 15cv2442-MMA-JLB, 2017 WL 

2505287, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2017) (rejecting a pro se plaintiff’s unverified complaint 

as evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment). 

3 When Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, Buddhist services were scheduled in 

Facility D, where Plaintiff is housed, on Mondays from 9:20–11:30 AM. (ECF No. 4 at 

24.) 

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“oversees all religious programs.” (Id. at 13.) Defendant Hadjadj is a Jewish Rabbi at 

RJDCF and is also responsible for supervising Buddhist services. (Id. at 13–14.) 

Defendant Davies “is personally involved in the supervision” of Defendants Brown and 

Hadjadj “in directing them to communicate and cover Buddhist services weekly.” (Id. at 

14.)

Plaintiff alleges that a lack of weekly chapel access, because of the absence of 

supervision, substantially burdened his practice of Buddhism in violation of the First 

Amendment Free Exercise Clause (id. at 24–30) and RLUIPA (id. at 30–31). Plaintiff also 

alleges that a lack of holiday foods for a bi-annual Buddhist holiday substantially burdened 

his practice of Buddhism in violation of RLUIPA. (Id. at 31.) Additionally, Plaintiff 

alleges that each Defendant “intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff and other 

Buddhist prisoners” by “provid[ing] weekly chaplain supervision to other similarly situated 

religious groups, but not Buddhist[s].” (Id. at 33.) 

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST

Defendants first contend that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to 

all of Plaintiff’s claims because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

before filing his Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 58-1 at 12–17.) Defendants identify two 

CDCR Form 602s (“grievances”) that Plaintiff filed or signed with respect to some of the 

claims at issue and that were submitted to the third level of review: Appeal RJD-18-00579 

and Group Appeal RJD-17-03023 (“the Group Appeal”). Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to Appeal RJD-18-00579 because 

he did not submit it for third-level review, and receive a final decision on the appeal, until 

after he filed the Amended Complaint. (Id. at 12–13.) As to the Group Appeal, Defendants 

argue that this did not exhaust any of Plaintiff’s claims because the Group Appeal was 

granted at the first and second level of review and Plaintiff “failed to put the prison on 

notice that any further action was necessary.” (Id. at 17.) 

///

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A. Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeals 

1. Appeal RJD-18-00579

On February 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed a grievance wherein he complained that there 

was “no weekly service,” and the “Warden, [Assistant Warden], and Community Resource 

Man[ager] refuse[d] to correct violations of Rule, Law, Policy [and] Statute.” (ECF No. 

58-2 at 30.) On March 6, 2018, Plaintiff’s grievance was accepted at the first level of 

review and partially granted. (Id.) In the First Level Appeal Response, L. Eshelman noted 

that Plaintiff had clarified in an interview “that [he] wanted RJDCF to provide weekly 

Buddhist services and to grant an inmate minister approval to the Buddhist group.” (Id. at 

34.) Eshelman stated that “RJDCF is facilitating a nonpaid Buddhist volunteer to provide 

a service twice a month” and “will be reaching out to the local Buddhist community for 

additional volunteers.” (Id. at 35.) Eshelman further stated that “the institution head may 

at their discretion . . . designate a qualified inmate minister,” but that was “not an option 

that is being discussed at this time.” (Id.) 

On March 14, 2018, Plaintiff submitted his grievance to the second level of review. 

(Id. at 31.) On April 24, 2018, Plaintiff’s grievance was accepted at the second level of 

review and denied. (Id. at 36.) In the Second Level Appeal Response, Warden Paramo 

stated that Plaintiff did not clarify why he was dissatisfied with the first level response and 

reiterated the steps RJDCF was taking to ensure Buddhist services would be conducted 

regularly. (Id.) 

On May 5, 2018,4 Plaintiff submitted his grievance to the third level of review. (Id.

at 31.) On August 8, 2018, Plaintiff’s grievance was accepted at the third level of review 

and denied. (Id. at 28.) In the Third Level Appeal Decision, Appeals Examiner L. Warren 

found that Plaintiff had “failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a modification to 

the institution’s decision,” as “RJD[CF] is providing bi-weekly Buddhist services utilizing 

 

4 Approximately one week after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on April 28, 

2018. (See ECF No. 4 at 8.) 

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a Buddhist volunteer to provide the service.” (Id.) Warren further reiterated that “the 

option of utilizing an inmate minister is at the discretion of the institution head when a 

chaplain of a particular faith cannot be obtained to conduct services.” (Id.) Warren 

informed Plaintiff that the Third Level Appeal Decision “exhausts the administrative 

remedy available to [Plaintiff] within CDCR.” (Id. at 29.) 

2. Group Appeal RJD-17-03023

On June 12, 2017, RJDCF inmate Andrew Cejas filed a grievance directed at 

Defendant Brown and complaining of “weekly Buddhist services chapel access denied.” 

(Id. at 12, 14.) Cejas wrote that Defendant Brown had “personally participated in [a] First 

Amendment deprivation by not providing a chaplain for supervision of weekly Buddhist 

services in the chapel that is required indoors.” (Id. at 14.) Cejas further wrote that 

Defendant Brown had “not provided an alternative indoor area for weekly Buddhist 

services if [a] chaplain is not available for supervision” and had “not provid[ed] supervision 

if volunteers are not scheduled.” (Id.) Cejas requested that Brown provide: (1) “weekly[,] 

supervised chapel access . . . by a CDCR chaplain”; (2) a “prisoner minister to guarantee 

indoor weekly chapel access”; (3) “alternative indoor area for weekly Buddhist services”; 

or (4) “supervision if [a] chaplain or Buddhist volunteers are not available.” (Id.) An 

attached CDCR 602-G Inmate/Parolee Group Appeal form (“group grievance”) shows that 

Plaintiff, along with five other inmates, signed and joined Cejas’s grievance on June 8, 

2017. (Id. at 16.) The group grievance echoes the allegations in Cejas’s grievance by

stating that Defendant Brown was responsible for the “weekly denial of chapel access.” 

(See id.) 

On July 21, 2017, the group grievance was accepted at the first level of review and 

granted. (Id. at 17.) In the First Level Appeal Response, Defendant Davies noted that “a 

review of the last seven scheduled services [showed that] the Buddhist inmates met twice.” 

(Id.) In granting the appeal, Davies stated that “Buddhist volunteers have now been 

directed[] to communicate directly to R. Brown, CRM and Chaplain F. Hadjadj when they

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cannot attend, and Chaplain F. Hadjadj will be required to provide coverage for the services 

the volunteers cannot attend.” (Id.) 

On July 25, 2017, Cejas submitted the group grievance to the second level of review, 

stating that he was “dissatisfied with the First Level [Appeal] Response because they have 

not made any mandatory memo that implement[s] chaplain[] supervision of Buddhist 

services, and other actions requested were not addressed.” (Id. at 13.) Cejas further stated 

that Buddhist inmates “have not had weekly services for months. To be exact over 6 

months (2017).” (Id.) 

On August 24, 2017, the group grievance was accepted at the second level of review 

and granted again. (Id. at 19.) In the Second Level Appeal Response, Defendant Covello 

stated:

After a review of Facility D Chapel Reports from 7/24/2017 to 8/21/2017[,] 

which is the last five weeks of services[,] [t]he Buddhist community had 

services and coverage by a chaplain or volunteer every week, except for the 

week of 8/24/2017. The institution is working in good faith to accommodate 

the Buddhist community on facility D and will continue to monitor the weekly 

services. Since the First Level Response[,] services have been covered except 

for the one week due to staff being out. 

(Id. at 20.) Defendant Covello advised that “the issue may be submitted to the Third Level 

of Review, if desired.” (Id.) 

On August 31, 2017, Cejas submitted the group grievance to the Third Level of 

Review, stating only that he was “dissatisfied with the Second Level Response.” (Id. at 

13.) On October 17, 2017, Chief M. Voong of the Office of Appeals rejected the group 

grievance in a notice, stating that the “appeal was granted at the institutional level” and that 

there was “no unresolved issue to be reviewed at the Third Level of review.” (Id. at 11.) 

Language at the foot of the notice advised that one “cannot appeal a rejected appeal, but 

should take the corrective action necessary and resubmit the appeal within the timeframes 

specified in CCR 3084.6(a) and CCR 3084.8(b).” (Id.) 

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B. Legal Standard 

1. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall 

be brought with respect to prison conditions under [§] 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 

1997e(a) has been construed broadly to afford “corrections officials time and opportunity 

to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case” and 

encompass inmate suits about both general circumstances and particular episodes of prison 

life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525, 532 (2002). “The ‘available’ ‘remed[y]’ must 

be ‘exhausted’ before a complaint under § 1983 may be entertained,” “regardless of the 

relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738, 

740 (2001); see also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2002) (per 

curiam) (finding that a prisoner’s civil rights action must be dismissed without prejudice 

unless the prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before he filed suit, even 

if he fully exhausts while the suit is pending). A prisoner is therefore required to “complete 

the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 

including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Marella v. 

Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).

The only limitation to the exhaustion requirement is that administrative remedies 

must be “available” to the prisoner. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1862 (2016) (“An 

inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are ‘available.’”). Failure to 

exhaust remedies that are “effectively unavailable does not bar a claim from being heard 

in federal court.” McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2015). The prisoner bears 

the burden of demonstrating that “he ‘took reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust his 

. . . claim and was precluded from exhausting, not through his own fault.’” Sapp v.

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Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 

1224 (9th Cir. 2010)).

Generally, the Ninth Circuit has held that a motion for summary judgment is the 

proper vehicle to raise whether a plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies. Albino

v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “If undisputed evidence viewed in the light 

most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If material facts are disputed, 

summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should 

determine the facts.” Id. A defendant must first prove “that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 

1172. Once the defendant has carried that burden, the “prisoner must come forward with 

evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and 

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. Even so, 

the ultimate burden of showing entitlement to summary judgment for a prisoner’s failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies remains with the defendant. Id. 

2. CDCR Exhaustion Requirements

In California, the CDCR’s administrative exhaustion requirements are described in 

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. The CDCR has a three-level administrative 

appellate review process whereby an inmate or parolee “may appeal any policy, decision, 

action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can 

demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). An inmate’s administrative remedies for a claim are 

not deemed exhausted until the claim is “addressed through all required levels of 

administrative review up to and including the third level.” Id. § 3084.1(b) (“[A]ll appeals 

are subject to a third level of review, as described in [§] 3084.7, before administrative 

remedies are deemed exhausted.”). To initiate the appeal process, an inmate or parolee 

must submit the appeal directly to the appeals coordinator at their institution within 30 

calendar days of the occurrence of the event or decision being appealed. Id. § 3084.8(b)(1). 

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C. Discussion

1. Exhaustion of Appeal RJD-18-00579

In their motion, Defendants argue that Appeal RJD-18-00579 does not exhaust any 

of Plaintiff’s claims because the Office of Appeals (“OOA”) did not issue their third-level,

final decision denying the appeal on the merits until August 8, 2018, more than three 

months after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on April 28, 2018. (ECF No. 58-1 at 

12.) In support of their argument, Defendants have submitted the declaration of T. Ramos, 

Acting Chief of the Office of Appeals for CDCR. (ECF No. 58-2 at 1.) Ramos’s 

declaration confirms that Plaintiff did not submit Appeal RJD-18-00579 to the third level, 

and the OOA did not issue a third-level decision on the appeal, until after Plaintiff filed his 

Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶ 12.) Ramos’s declaration also confirms that the OOA “did 

not accept any other appeals from [Plaintiff] concerning the weekly Buddhist services a 

RJD[CF],” with the exception of the Group Appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 8–13.) In his opposition, 

Plaintiff makes no argument in response and provides no evidence to dispute Ramos’s 

declaration. (See ECF No. 64.) 

As stated above, the PLRA requires that a state prisoner exhaust all administrative 

remedies before proceeding to federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In California, the 

exhaustion process is complete when a decision is issued at the third level of review. Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] 

prisoner does not comply with [the exhaustion] requirement by exhausting available 

remedies during the course of litigation.” McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199. Here, the Court 

finds that Defendants have met their “burden of raising and proving the absence of 

exhaustion” with respect to Appeal RJD-18-00579. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 

(9th Cir. 2005). The undisputed evidence before the Court shows that Plaintiff did not

submit his grievance to the third level of review until May 5, 2018, and OOA did not issue 

a final decision on Appeal RJD-18-00579 until August 8, 2018. Because Plaintiff had only 

submitted Appeal RJD-18-00579 to the second level of review at the time he filed the 

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Amended Complaint on April 28, 2018, Plaintiff failed to exhaust this appeal prior to filing 

this action. 

Because Defendants have met their burden to show non-exhaustion, Plaintiff must 

“come forward with some evidence showing” that: (1) he properly exhausted his 

administrative remedies before filing suit; or (2) “there is something particular in his case 

that made the existing and generally available remedies effectively unavailable to him by 

‘showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, 

inadequate, or obviously futile.’” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff 

provides no argument or evidence in his opposition to refute Defendants’ evidence of nonexhaustion, nor does the record provide any such evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds 

that Appeal RJD-18-00579 does not exhaust any of Plaintiff’s claims. 

2. Exhaustion of Group Appeal RJD-17-03023

a. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants argue next that Group Appeal RJD-18-00579 also does not exhaust any 

of Plaintiff’s claims. Defendants contend that because the Group Appeal was granted at 

the first and second level of review, and Plaintiff did not identify why he was dissatisfied 

with the second level response on the group grievance, “the third level of review had 

nothing to address.” (ECF No. 58-2 at 16–17.) Defendants assert that because “Plaintiff 

failed to put the prison on notice that further action was necessary,” he “cannot now use 

this appeal to argue that he exhausted his remedies as to all Defendants and claims in this 

case.” (Id.) 

In his opposition, Plaintiff states only that the Group Appeal “was not cancelled or 

rejected” at the third level, and that the appeal “complies with California Code of 

Regulations Title 15 § 3084.2(h),” which sets forth the requirements for group appeals. 

(ECF No. 64 at 1.) 

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b. Legal Standard

As mentioned, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative 

defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof. Brown, 422 F.3d at 936. The 

defendant cannot demonstrate an absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains 

available. Id. at 936–37. Therefore, the defendant must produce evidence that the prisoner

did not properly exhaust a remedy that is available as a practical matter, in that it must be 

capable of use or at hand. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171. Again, once the defendant meets that 

burden, the prisoner must “come forward with evidence showing that there is something in 

his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 

effectively unavailable to him.” Id. at 1172. 

In California, prisoner appeals that are not accepted may be rejected or cancelled. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6. “When an appeal is not accepted, the inmate . . . shall 

be notified of the specific reason(s) for the rejection or cancellation of the appeal and the 

correction(s) needed for the rejected appeal to be accepted.” Id. § 3084.5(b)(3). “[A] 

cancellation or rejection decision does not exhaust administrative remedies.” Id.

§ 3084.1(b); accord Wilson v. Soto, No. CV 15-9546-PSG (JPR), 2017 WL 3275966, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. June 13, 2017), adopted sub nom. Wilson v. J.D. Soto, No. CV 15-9546-PSG 

(JPR), 2017 WL 3269072 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2017). 

c. Discussion

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “never submitted an appeal stating that he disagreed 

with the decision at the first and second levels of review” which “would have notified the 

institution that he was still not satisfied with the decision and that RJD[CF] needed to take 

further action.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 16.) Defendants further assert, “Because Plaintiff failed 

to identify what he disagreed with from the first and second level of review and what other 

relief he sought, the third level of review had nothing to address,” and the prison was not 

put “on notice that any further action was necessary.” (Id. at 17.) Although it is not entirely 

clear, the Court interprets this to be an argument that Plaintiff’s Group Appeal does not 

///

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satisfy his exhaustion requirement because the third level appeal was never resubmitted 

with further clarification as to what additional relief was being sought after it was rejected.

 Defendants’ present undisputed evidence that the OOA rejected the Group Appeal 

at the third level and, therefore, did not reach a final decision on the merits. Defendants 

have submitted the declaration of T. Ramos, Acting Chief of the Office of Appeals, who

states that the Group Appeal “was rejected on October 17, 2017, because RJD[CF] had 

already granted the appeal.” (Id. ¶ 11.) To his declaration, Ramos attached Plaintiff’s 

“Inmate/Parolee Appeals Tracking System – Level III” log (“IATS log”), which contains 

all of Plaintiff’s appeals received by the OOA at the third level. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s IATS 

log shows that on October 17, 2017, log number RJD-17-03023—the Group Appeal—was 

screened out and rejected. (Id. at 9.) Further, Defendants have supplied the group 

grievance which shows a date stamp reading “Oct 17 2017” on the line designating rejected 

grievances5in the “Third Level – Staff Use Only” section. (Id. at 13.) Finally, Defendants 

provide the notice rejecting the Group Appeal at the third level, which states: 

Your appeal was granted at the institutional level. There is no unresolved 

issue to be reviewed at the Third Level of review.

. . . .

Be advised that you cannot appeal a rejected appeal, but should take the 

corrective action necessary and resubmit the appeal within the timeframes 

specified in CCR 3084.6(a) and CCR 3084.8(b). Pursuant to CCR 3084.6(e), 

once an appeal has been cancelled, that appeal may not be resubmitted. 

However, a separate appeal can be filed on the cancellation decision. The 

original appeal may only be resubmitted if the appeal on the cancellation is 

granted.

(ECF No. 58-2 at 11.) 

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues, without any evidentiary support, that the Group 

Appeal “was not cancelled or rejected.” (ECF No. 64 at 1.) Plaintiff’s self-serving 

 

5 Concededly, the box next to the word “Rejected” is unchecked.

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statement, however, is not enough to create a genuine dispute as to whether the Group

Appeal was rejected at the third level. FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 

1171 (9th Cir. 1997). The undisputed evidence before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff 

did not receive a third level decision on the Group Appeal’s merits; rather, the appeal was 

rejected. Defendants have therefore met their burden to show that the appeal does not 

exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(a)(1); 

Bradley v. Villa, No. 1:10–cv–01618 LJO GSA PC, 2015 WL 3540673, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

June 3, 2015) (“A cancellation or rejection at the third level does not exhaust an inmate[’s] 

administrative remedies because it is not a decision on the merits of the claim.”). 

Because Defendants have met their burden to show non-exhaustion, Plaintiff must 

“come forward with some evidence showing” that: (1) he properly exhausted his 

administrative remedies before filing suit; or (2) “there is something particular in his case 

that made the existing and generally available remedies effectively unavailable to him.” 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. Plaintiff has not done so, as he makes no argument in response, 

except his unsupported allegation that the appeal was not “rejected or cancelled.” It is true 

that the notice rejecting the Group Appeal did not explicitly state that the appeal was 

rejected, nor did it specify the correction(s) needed for the appeal to be accepted, as 

required by § 3084.5(b)(3). However, the inclusion of directions for resubmitting rejected 

appeals in the notice plus the date stamp next to the “Rejected” box on group grievance,

together, gave fair notice to Plaintiff that the Group Appeal was rejected, and Plaintiff 

never attempted to resubmit the appeal for consideration at the third level. Moreover, 

Plaintiff makes no argument that the language in the notice confused him about the Group 

Appeal’s status. 

The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has held that a prisoner is not required to 

proceed to the third level of review to fully exhaust his claims where the prisoner’s appeal 

was granted at the second level and no further relief remained available. Brown, 422 F.3d 

at 940 (“Once an agency has granted some relief and explained that no other relief is 

available, ‘the administrative process has not been obstructed. It has been exhausted.’” 

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(quoting Jasch v. Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002))). Nor is a prisoner required 

to “appeal from a grant of relief, or a partial grant that satisfies him, in order to exhaust his 

administrative remedies.” Harvey, 605 F.3d at 685. However, here, the Group Appeal was 

granted at the first and second level of review, but nothing in the decision at either level of 

review implied that no further remedies were available. Both the First Level Appeal 

Response and the Second Level Appeal Response advised that the group grievance could 

be submitted to the next level of review. (ECF No. 58-2 at 18, 20.) Additionally, although 

the notice rejecting the Group Appeal is not a paragon of clarity, as it contains instructions 

on how to proceed for both rejected and cancelled appeals, it did explain that additional

administrative remedies remained available.6 

Moreover, Plaintiff makes no argument that he was satisfied with the relief granted 

at the first and second levels of review. On the contrary, the record shows that the movant 

on the Group Appeal, Cejas, was not satisfied with the relief at the first and second levels 

of review. At the second level of review, he stated that he was “dissatisfied with first level 

response because they have not made any mandatory memo that implement[s] chaplain[]

supervision of Buddhist services, and other actions requested were not addressed . . . .” 

(Id. at 13.) And although he failed to specify the nature of his dissatisfaction at the third 

level of review (which is why the appeal was rejected), he did explicitly say he was 

“dissatisfied with the second level response” (id.). See Wilson v. Campbell, No. 1:16–

cv–00534–AWI–SKO (PC), 2018 WL 903585, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018)

(distinguishing Harvey and rejecting the inmate plaintiff’s argument that he was not 

required to resubmit his rejected appeal to the third level of review because his appeal was 

 

6 The Court further notes that although the notice rejecting the Group Appeal was 

addressed to inmate Cejas, and not to Plaintiff, this does not excuse Plaintiff from his 

exhaustion requirement. See Crane v. Evans, No. C 07–00763 JF (PR), 2009 WL 3072460, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009) (finding “the fact that [the] [p]laintiff was not personally 

informed of the outcome of [a] [withdrawn] group appeal [did] not constitute an exception 

to the exhaustion requirement”). 

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partially granted at the second level review, for it was clear the plaintiff was dissatisfied by 

the partial grant at the second level). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material 

fact that the Group Appeal was rejected at the third level of review, and therefore, 

administrative remedies remained available to Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Group Appeal 

cannot exhaust any of Plaintiff’s claims. 

D. Claims Raised by Group Appeal RJD-17-03023

Even if the District Court should disagree with this Court’s determination and find 

that Plaintiff fully exhausted all available remedies with respect to the Group Appeal, the 

Court nonetheless recommends that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be 

granted, either because Plaintiff’s claims were not raised in the Group Appeal or because 

they lack merit. The Court first considers which of Plaintiff’s claims, if any, the Group 

Appeal could have exhausted. Neither party makes an argument as to which claims were 

raised in the Group Appeal. 

1. Legal Standard

A plaintiff must administratively exhaust each of his claims before he can bring suit 

regarding those claims. See Jones v. Block, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2001). In California, the 

regulations require a prisoner “to lodge his administrative complaint on a CDC[R] form 

602 and ‘to describe the problem and action requested.’” Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 

946 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)). “A plaintiff need not 

have included verbatim in his 602–appeal every claim he now seeks to assert in litigation, 

but he must have exhausted administrative review of each type of complaint he . . . brings 

before the [c]ourt.” Panah v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 14–cv–00166–BLF, 2015 

WL 1263494, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). “A grievance need not include legal 

terminology or legal theories unless they are in some way needed to provide notice of the 

harm being grieved.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). “The primary 

purpose of a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to 

lay groundwork for litigation.” Id. 

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With respect to exhaustion of specific defendants, California regulations require that 

the inmate “list all staff member(s) involved” and “describe their involvement in the issue.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Failure to identify a defendant in the CDCR 602

“bars federal review as to those [d]efendants not named.” Carter v. Paramo, No.: 3:17-

cv-1833-JAH-AGS, 2018 WL 4579854, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018). 

2. Discussion 

As addressed above, Plaintiff asserts the following claims in his Amended 

Complaint against all Defendants: a violation of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause 

for lack of weekly chapel access and Buddhist services; a violation of RLUIPA for lack of 

weekly chapel access and Buddhist services; a violation of RLUIPA for a lack of holiday 

foods for a bi-annual Buddhist holiday; and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 

Equal Protection Clause for intentional discrimination against Buddhist inmates. (ECF No. 

4 at 24–31, 33.) 

The group grievance sets forth that Buddhist inmates were denied weekly chapel 

access in violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. (ECF No. 58-2 at 14.) The 

group grievance further states that Defendant “Brown[] personally participate[d] in the 

First Amendment deprivation by not providing a chaplain for supervision of weekly 

Buddhist services,” and that Brown had “not provided an alternative indoor area for weekly 

Buddhist services if [a] chaplain is not available for supervision” and had “not provid[ed] 

supervision if volunteers are not scheduled.” (Id.) 

The Court finds these allegations in the group grievance were sufficient to alert 

RJDCF to Plaintiff’s free exercise and RLUIPA claims based on a denial of weekly chapel 

access due to a lack of chapel supervision. However, the group grievance does not contain 

any allegations with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim for lack of bi-annual Buddhist 

holiday foods. Therefore, the grievance could not have exhausted this claim. 

As to Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, the group grievance does not specifically 

mention an equal protection violation, as it does with Plaintiff’s First Amendment and 

RLUIPA claims, but California inmates are not required to articulate all legal theories in 

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an appeal to exhaust them. Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. The absence of specific beliefs or 

allegations in the appeal that Defendant Brown treated Buddhist inmates differently from 

inmates of other religions does not render Plaintiff’s equal protection claim unexhausted.

The religious nature of the appeal and the facts it alleged—that Buddhist inmates were not

being afforded weekly chapel access and Buddhist services due to a lack of chapel 

supervision—could have reasonably alerted prison officials to the disparate treatment of 

Buddhist prisoners. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824 (“A grievance suffices to exhaust a claim if 

it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks to 

redress.”); Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120 (“The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert the 

prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork for litigation.”); see 

also Denegal v. Farrell, No. 1:15-cv-01251-DAD-JLT (PC), 2018 WL 4616262, at *10 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2018) (finding an equal protection claim for gender discrimination 

exhausted where the inmate’s grievance alleged that she was denied sex reassignment 

surgery, even though the grievance did not include “phrases like ‘equal protection’ or 

‘discrimination on the basis of gender or transgender status’”), adopted by No. 1:15-cv01251-DAD-JLT (PC), 2019 WL 1220767 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2019). Therefore, the Court 

finds that the group grievance sufficiently raised Plaintiff’s equal protection claim. 

However, the only responsible party named and identified in the group grievance is 

Defendant Brown. (See ECF No. 58-2 at 12–16.) Section 3084.2(a)(3) makes clear that 

a grievance “must name or at least provide ‘available information’ about the staff members 

involved.” Morales v. Torres, No.: 1:17-cv-01673-AWI-JLT (PC), 2019 WL 7282048, at 

*5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2019). Because the group grievance specifically names Defendant 

Brown as the only responsible party, the Court finds that the grievance does not exhaust 

Plaintiff’s claims against any other defendant. See, e.g., Martinez v. Swift, No. C 13–3973 

RS (PR), 2015 WL 1349525, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2015) (granting summary judgment 

for non-exhaustion because the prisoner’s grievance did “not mention [the defendant], or 

describe with any specificity his actions or words,” and therefore did not comply with 

§ 3084.2(a)(3)). The group grievance is insufficient to satisfy the administrative

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exhaustion requirement as to Defendants Hadjadj,7 Davies, and Covello, as it failed to 

provide an opportunity for RJDCF to address Plaintiff’s claims against them. 

E. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that neither Appeal RJD-18-00579 nor

Group Appeal RJD-17-03023 exhaust any of Plaintiff’s claims. It is undisputed that 

Plaintiff did not submit Appeal RJD-18-00579 to the third level of review, or receive a 

decision at the third level, until after he filed the Amended Complaint. It is also undisputed 

that Group Appeal RJD-17-03023 was rejected at the third level of review, and is therefore, 

unexhausted. Further, Defendants have presented undisputed evidence that these are the 

only two appeals Plaintiff pursued with respect to the claims at issue in the Amended 

Complaint. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

administrative remedies as to all of his claims. 

Alternatively, should the District Court find that Group Appeal RJD-17-03023 was 

fully exhausted, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies for all claims against Defendants Hadjadj, Davies, and Covello 

and his RLUIPA claim for bi-annual Buddhist holiday foods. 

///

///

 

7 The Court notes that the First Level Appeal Response and the Second Level Appeal 

Response mention Defendant Hadjadj, but only in the context of the form of relief CDCR 

was granting to the complainants. (See ECF No. 58-2 at 17, 19 (“The Buddhist volunteers 

have now been directed[] to communicate directly to R. Brown, CRM and Chaplain F. 

Hadjadj when they cannot attend, and Chaplain Hadjadj will be required to provide 

coverage for the services the volunteers cannot attend.”).) This does not change the fact 

that the group grievance specifically named, and was only directed to the alleged failings 

of, Defendant Brown. The group grievance failed to put RJDCF on notice that Plaintiff 

had a complaint about how Defendant Hadjadj himself was meeting or failing to meet his 

alleged obligations to Plaintiff. 

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IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS

The Court turns next to Defendants’ argument that, even if the Court finds that 

Plaintiff exhausted all of his claims, they are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on 

the merits of the case. (See ECF No. 58-1 at 17–25.) As discussed, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has not exhausted any of his claims, and therefore, Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on this ground alone. However, should the District Court find that 

Group Appeal RJD-17-03023 exhausted Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim, 

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, and RLUIPA claim for a lack of weekly 

chapel access against Defendant Brown, the Court RECOMMENDS, for the reasons 

discussed below, that the District Court GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment based on the merits of these claims. 

A. Undisputed Material Facts

The record on summary judgment is sparse. The only evidence Defendants 

submitted regarding the merits of this case are excerpts8from Plaintiff’s deposition 

transcript. (See id. at 31–56.) Plaintiff likewise attached the same excerpts to his 

opposition and provided no other meaningful evidence.9 (See ECF No. 64 at 28–53.) The 

 

8 For reasons unknown to the Court, Defendants also “lodged” with the Court, by mail, 

Plaintiff’s full deposition transcript. (See ECF No. 59.) Because the full deposition 

transcript is not on the docket, and therefore not part of the record, the Court does not 

consider it as evidence for purposes of this Report and Recommendation. 

9 Plaintiff signed his opposition under penalty of perjury (ECF No. 64 at 6), so the 

Court may consider any facts contained therein that are based on Plaintiff’s personal 

knowledge as evidence for purposes of the instant motion. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 

918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering as evidence a pro se plaintiff’s “contentions offered 

in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and 

set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where [the plaintiff] attested under 

penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct” (citing 

McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987))). In contrast, and as noted above, 

Plaintiff did not sign his Amended Complaint under penalty of perjury. (See ECF No. 4.) 

Therefore, the Court cannot consider any facts contained therein, even if based on 

Plaintiff’s personal knowledge, as evidence. See supra note 2. Plaintiff, however, filed 

four declarations signed under penalty of perjury as exhibits to his Amended Complaint. 

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Court therefore derives the following material facts from excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition 

transcript. Because both parties submitted identical excerpts, these facts are undisputed.

Buddhist inmates do not have access to the RJDCF chapel unless a Buddhist service 

is “scheduled and authorized.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 49:3–6.) All services in the chapel must 

be supervised by a prison employee (such as a chaplain), a volunteer, or an inmate 

minister.10 (See id. at 45:3–4; 47:17–20; 48:16–49:22; 51:10–16; 52:2–24.) Chaplains of 

 

(ECF No 12. at 3–11.) The Court considers the content of these declarations as evidence 

as well. 

10 The Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and 

Plaintiff’s opposition all allude generally to this supervision requirement. The Court also 

takes judicial notice of the following sections in Chapter 10, Article 6 of the CDCR 

Department of Operations Manual: 

101060.3 Responsibility 

Wardens are responsible for the religious programs in the institution and 

conservation camps. . . . The Chief Deputy Warden or an AW, shall provide 

supervision of the staff chaplains, intermittent chaplains, and part-time 

chaplains. Staff chaplains shall develop, supervise, and operate their assigned 

religious programs. 

101060.5 Religious Program Activities

To implement the religious activities program, the Wardens may obtain the 

following qualified persons: 

• Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant chaplains and a Native American 

Spiritual Leader on a full-time, part-time, or intermittent basis. 

• Volunteer non-paid community clergy and/or religious or spiritual 

leader representatives.

• Inmates. 

101060.8 Location and Use of Chapel

Where only one chapel is available, a schedule for the use of the chapel shall 

be prepared by the staff chaplains and approved by the Warden or designee. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of two kinds of facts: 

(1) those that are “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”; or (2) 

those that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

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other faiths may provide Buddhist inmates with access to the chapel in the absence of a 

volunteer Buddhist chaplain when a Buddhist service is scheduled and authorized. (Id. at 

49:15–19.) Plaintiff was deprived of Buddhist services in the chapel “once every month at 

the very minimum” because of “a chaplain who was absent or because there was no 

volunteer.” (Id. at 51:7–16.) Sometime within the “last two to three years” of May 15, 

2019, the date of Plaintiff’s deposition, there was a thirteen-month period at RJDCF where 

no Buddhist services were held with a volunteer Buddhist, although within that time period, 

“[t]he Catholic chaplain let a group assemble.” (Id. at 31:20–24.) 

Plaintiff believes that one of the components of Buddhism requires a Buddhist 

chaplain to conduct Buddhist services. (Id. at 32:2–17; 43:24–25.) Plaintiff also believes 

that a Buddhist service cannot properly be conducted, and he cannot practice Buddhism, 

without a Buddhist chaplain present to conduct the service. (Id. at 42:6–43:3; 44:12–14.) 

To Plaintiff, a Buddhist service requires “somebody . . . at the level that [can] teach the 

other people of the [Buddhist] faith.” (Id. at 49:9–12.) 

Defendant Brown’s responsibilities as the Community Resource Manager (“CRM”)

included “mak[ing] sure that there were [Buddhist] services conducted.” (Id. at 33:18–21.) 

Defendant Brown’s responsibilities as the CRM also included finding, training, and 

“put[ting] in the position [volunteers] to conduct those services, but he didn’t do that.” (Id. 

at 33:22–34:1.) Plaintiff believes that Defendant Brown violated his equal protection rights 

because “he did not do his responsibility in any way, shape, or form.” (Id. at 56:21–24.)

B. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers a court to enter summary judgment 

on factually unsupported claims or defenses to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 

determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the materials in the record, together with the affidavits, 

 

reasonably be questioned.” See also Brown, 422 F.3d at 931 n.7 (taking judicial notice of 

the CDCR Department of Operation Manuel). 

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if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

Each party’s position as to whether a fact is disputed or undisputed must be 

supported by: (1) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not 

limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) a showing that the 

materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the 

opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1). The court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, 

but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). If a party supports its motion by 

declaration, the declaration must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence and 

show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(4). An affidavit will not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact if it is 

“conclusory, self-serving . . . [and] lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence.” 

Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d at 1171. 

When a defendant seeking summary judgment has carried its burden under Rule 

56(c), the burden shifts to the plaintiff who “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 

(2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 

(1986)). The plaintiff “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). If 

the plaintiff fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case, the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

C. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim

1. Legal Standard

The free exercise clause of the First Amendment “requires government respect for, 

and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people.”

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded 

by the First Amendment including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise 

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of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted) 

(citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 

“To merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a 

religious claim must satisfy two criteria.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 

1994). First, an inmate must show that his religious belief is “sincerely held.” Id. (quoting 

Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981)). Second, the inmate must 

demonstrate that his claim is “rooted in religious belief, not in ‘purely secular’ 

philosophical concerns.” Id. (quoting Callahan, 658 F.2d at 683). To be deeply rooted in 

religious belief, an inmate’s claim need not be compelled by or central to his religion. See

Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 708 (1981) (“The guarantee 

of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a 

religious sect.”); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 

“sincerity test” and not the “centrality test” applies to a free exercise analysis). Instead, 

“[d]etermining whether a claim is ‘rooted in religious belief’ requires analyzing whether 

the [inmate]’s claim is related to his sincerely held religious belief.” Malik, 16 F.3d at 333. 

Once the inmate makes this initial showing, he must then establish that a prison 

official’s actions “substantially burdens [the] practice of [his] religion.” Jones v. Williams, 

791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). “A substantial burden . . . place[s] more than an 

inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into 

acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to 

modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 

988 (9th Cir. 2006)). In other words, the burden must prevent the inmate “from engaging 

in [religious] conduct or having a religious experience.” Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 

Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by 535 F.3d 1058 

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration 

and may be curtailed to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security. 

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O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348–49. Even when a prison policy or practice substantially burdens 

an inmate’s religious exercise, it will not violate the First Amendment if the government 

can demonstrate that the policy or practice “is reasonably related to legitimate penological 

interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 79, 89 (1987). In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme 

Court identified four factors for courts to consider when determining whether a regulation 

is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: (1) whether there is a “valid, 

rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest 

put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right 

that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted 

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation of prison 

resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives,” or, in other words, 

whether the rule at issue is an “exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Id. at 89–90. 

The task in considering the Turner factors is not to balance the four factors, but to 

determine whether the state has shown a “reasonable” relation between the policy and 

legitimate penological objectives, rather than simply a “logical” one. Beard v. Banks, 548 

U.S. 521, 522 (2006). However, “the burden . . . is not on the State to prove the validity 

of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 

132 (2003).

2. Discussion

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that a lack of weekly chapel access and 

Buddhist services from 2016 through 2018 substantially burdened his practice of 

Buddhism in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Plaintiff states that pursuant to § 

101060.8 of the CDCR Department of Operations Manual, inmates are granted chapel 

access when “a state chaplain, other staff[,] or [a] religious volunteer is present,” and “in 

the absence of a chaplain or religious volunteer,” “custody staff are still required to 

supervise chapel access.” (ECF No. 4 at 17.) Plaintiff alleges that from 2016 through 

2018, he and other Buddhist inmates were deprived of weekly chapel access and Buddhist 

services because each Defendant did “not provid[e] chaplain supervision, or Buddhist 

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chaplain supervision.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that “each defendant . . . did not 

provide security coverage, or chaplain supervision in the absence of religious volunteers.” 

(Id. at 29.) Plaintiff also contends that “[e]ach Defendant did not make any alternative 

accommodations” to “resolve not providing weekly Buddhist services when the 

supervising chaplain or volunteers [did] not show up for Buddhist service,” such as 

appointing an “inmate minister” or “hir[ing] a Buddhist chaplain.” (Id. at 18; see also id.

at 26.) Plaintiff asserts that this lack of chapel supervision resulted in the deprivation of 

weekly chapel access, which substantially burdened his practice of Buddhism. (See id. at 

27.) 

The crux of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is that he, and other Buddhist inmates,

did not have access to the weekly scheduled Buddhist service in the chapel when there was 

no one to supervise the inmates. As for the religious accommodation he seeks, Plaintiff 

identifies three different accommodations for supervision in the Amended Complaint: (1) 

supervision from a staff chaplain, or in the absence of a chaplain, a correction officer; (2) 

the hiring of a full-time Buddhist chaplain; and (3) the appointment of himself or another 

inmate as an inmate minster pursuant to California Code of Regulations Title 15, § 3311. 

(See id. at 18, 26, 35.) The Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations 

in turn. 

a. Services Led and Supervised by a Non-Buddhist Chaplain

The first religious accommodation Plaintiff seeks is the supervision of Buddhist 

services in the chapel by a staff chaplain, of in the absence of a chaplain, a correctional 

officer. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s free 

exercise claim for lack of weekly chapel supervision from staff chaplains or correctional 

officers because Plaintiff does not have a sincerely held religious belief that is 

accommodated by attending weekly Buddhist services led and supervised by a nonBuddhist. (See ECF No. 58-1 at 20.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff admitted in his 

deposition “that, unless the [c]haplain was Buddhist, and could teach Plaintiff something 

about his faith, he did not believe it was sufficient for him.” (Id.) Defendants maintain

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that Plaintiff’s testimony “undercuts [his] entire First Amendment claim,” because “if 

Plaintiff does not consider RJD[CF]’s weekly services, supervised by any available 

chaplain or volunteer to be compliant with his faith, then [] he cannot with any credibility 

also claim to ‘sincerely believe’ that attending these services every week is necessary or 

consistent with his faith.” (Id.) In his opposition, Plaintiff contends that he “never admitted 

that the services do not satisfy his religious need[s].” (ECF No. 64 at 2, 5.) 

As stated above, to prevail on a free exercise claim, Plaintiff must establish that the 

religious accommodation he seeks is based on a sincerely held religious belief. Shakur, 

514 F.3d at 884–85. Generally, “[t]he sincerity of [religious] beliefs is a question of fact 

. . . not appropriate for decision at summary judgment.” Isbell v. Ryan, No. CV 11-0391-

PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 6050337, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2011).11 However, the Court here

agrees with Defendants and finds that the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff does 

not have a sincerely held religious belief in attending weekly Buddhist services, unless the 

services are led and supervised by a Buddhist chaplain. 

The Amended Complaint, which frames the claims in issue, does not allege that only 

a Buddhist chaplain may supervise Buddhist services to satisfy Plaintiff’s religious beliefs. 

Instead, the allegations in the Amended Complaint revolve around the denial of chapel 

access for Buddhist services because of the absence of anyone to supervise the services. 

To illustrate, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Hadjadj—a Jewish rabbi—

would “not show up for scheduled services to guarantee Buddhist services every week,”

 

11 The Court notes that some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have concluded that 

“the weight of recent case law suggests that it is inappropriate for a court to grant summary 

judgment based on a Plaintiff’s alleged lack of sincerity.” Thomas v. Cox, No. 

313CV00508RCJCBC, 2019 WL 2509023, at *5 (D. Nev. May 3, 2019) (collecting cases), 

adopted by No. 313CV00508RCJCBC, 2019 WL 2517788 (D. Nev. June 17, 2019). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed a district court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants on an inmate’s free exercise and RLUIPA claims 

because the inmate “failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his 

proffered religious beliefs were sincerely held.” Merrick v. Ryan, 719 F. App’x 702, 703 

(9th Cir. 2018). 

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and that Defendant Hadjadj was “required to provide coverage for Buddhist services” when 

volunteers could not attend. (ECF No. 4 at 13, 19.) Further, Plaintiff requests injunctive 

relief in the form of “correctional officers to cover every week chapel services for Buddhist 

services throughout facility A-E in the absence of a chaplain,” “chaplain supervision every 

week for Buddhist services, and/or hire Buddhist chaplain for supervision every week.” 

(Id. at 35.) Buddhist “services,” as Plaintiff describes them in the Amended Complaint, 

would not require the supervision of a Buddhist chaplain. 

Yet, as Defendants highlight, Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he believes 

only services held with a Buddhist spiritual leader are services that satisfy his religious 

needs: 

Q: So you’re saying that even if a chaplain of another faith was present to 

help you conduct your services, that still does not satisfy your faith because 

they’re non-Buddhists themselves?

A: True, and that’s also what your expert testimony stated.

Q: I’m not asking what my expert said because you’re going to interpret 

that however you want. I’m just asking you, based on your beliefs, having a 

chaplain who is not Buddhist is not sufficient for you to have your Buddhist 

services?

A: As I stated before, one of the components is not there. 

Q: Because they need to be Buddhists themselves, the chaplain?

A: Right. And as in any religion the person that’s running the service 

should be someone that’s more learned that those under him. Otherwise, 

what’s the purpose if you’re not learning, if you’re not progressing in your 

religion? 

. . . .

Q: So whether a chaplain of another religion is present or not doesn’t 

satisfy your requirements. You’ve made that clear, right?

A: You don’t bring in a rabbi to run a mass. 

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Q: Is there any way you can practice your faith without the presence of a 

Buddhist chaplain? 

A: You cannot have a Buddhist service without having Buddhists. 

. . . .

Q: So your belief is that a [Buddhist] leader is required to be present in 

order for it to count as a service?

A: That is my belief. 

(ECF No. 58-1 at 32:2–21; 42:6–13; 44:12–14.) 

In his opposition, Plaintiff does not set forth any argument or facts supporting the 

contrary assertion: that he sincerely believes his need to attend weekly Buddhist services 

can be accommodated by the supervision of a staff chaplain of another faith or by a 

correctional officer. Plaintiff only argues that he “never admitted that the services do not 

satisfy his religious need[s].” (ECF No. 64 at 5.) However, Plaintiff’s self-serving 

statement does not suffice to create a genuine dispute as to whether his belief is sincerely 

held. See Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff 

himself submitted the same deposition testimony wherein he admits that services in the 

chapel without a Buddhist chaplain present do not count as services and therefore, do not 

satisfy his religious beliefs. Thus, there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff does not have

a sincere religious belief in attending weekly Buddhist services in the chapel unless the 

service is led and supervised by a Buddhist chaplain. See Hall v. Skolnik, No. 2:10–cv–

00054–JCM, 2012 WL 993726, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2012) (finding that there was no 

genuine dispute of material fact that the plaintiff’s request for a kosher diet was not a 

sincerely held religious belief when the plaintiff testified that he had chosen to eat nonkosher foods even after the prison had provided him with kosher meals, because he had 

grown “tired of the lack of variety in the kosher menu”). Therefore, the Court finds that 

Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s free exercise claim for a 

lack of chapel supervision from non-Buddhist staff chaplains or correctional officers. 

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b. Services Led and Supervised by a Buddhist Chaplain

The second religious accommodation Plaintiff seeks is the hiring of a full-time 

Buddhist chaplain to supervise and conduct Buddhist services in the chapel. Defendants 

do not dispute that Plaintiff has a sincerely held religious belief in attending Buddhist 

services with the supervision of a Buddhist chaplain, nor is there anything in the record to 

contradict Plaintiff’s testimony that he sincerely believes attending services with a 

Buddhist chaplain is consistent with the mandates of his faith. The question then becomes 

whether Defendants have met their burden to show that Defendant Brown did not 

substantially burden Plaintiff’s practice of Buddhism by failing to hire a full-time Buddhist 

chaplain. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant Brown burdened the 

practice of his Buddhist faith in this respect because the “case law is clear that the Free

Exercise Clause does not require the availability of full-time chaplains or volunteers of any 

faith.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 18.) Defendants rely primarily on Hartmann v. California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2013), and argue 

that Hartmann “dispensed of similar claims” to those here. (Id. at 19.) Defendants further 

argue, without citation, that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause simply does not require prison 

administration to provide for weekly chapel access, let alone ensure that there is a chaplain 

for every faith, or an unpaid volunteer on a weekly basis.” (Id. at 19–20.) Plaintiff offers 

no meaningful argument in reply. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff presents no evidence that Defendant Brown was 

responsible for the hiring of staff chaplains at RJDCF. The only evidence before the Court 

concerning the responsibilities of Defendant Brown as the CRM is Plaintiff’s undisputed 

deposition testimony. In his deposition, Plaintiff stated only that he believes Defendant 

Brown’s responsibilities as the CRM included “mak[ing] sure that there were [Buddhist] 

services conducted,” and finding, training, and “put[ting] in the position each of the people 

to conduct those services.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 33:18–34:1.) And by “people,” Plaintiff 

clarified that he meant “Buddhist volunteers.” (Id. at 33:25–34:1.) As the CRM—

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Community Resource Manager—Defendant Brown’s duties involved finding and training

volunteers from the community to conduct religious services, not the hiring of full-time 

staff.12 For this reason alone, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s free exercise claim for the denial of a full-time Buddhist chaplain. 

However, even if Defendant Brown were responsible for the hiring of staff chaplains 

at RJDCF, the Court agrees with Defendants and finds that Plaintiff cannot show that 

Defendant Brown substantially burdened the practice of his Buddhist faith by failing to 

provide him with a full-time Buddhist chaplain to supervise Buddhist services because 

Plaintiff is not entitled to one under the Free Exercise Clause. In Hartmann, the inmate 

plaintiffs alleged that prison officials violated their First Amendment right to free exercise 

of religion by denying their request for “a paid full-time Wiccan chaplain.” 707 F.3d at 

1120. The plaintiffs argued that there were “no chaplains at [the prison] who [were] 

knowledgeable about [the] Wiccan religion or [were] otherwise sufficiently informed to 

provide religious counseling or other religious accommodation services to Wiccans.” Id. 

The Hartmann court, however, agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs had failed 

to state a claim under the First Amendment, concluding that “[t]he Free Exercise Clause 

[did] not require prison administration to provide [the] [p]laintiffs with more than that 

which they were currently receiving—i.e., the services of staff chaplains and a volunteer 

Wiccan chaplain.” Id. at 1123. In making its determination, the court stated that although 

the plaintiffs “may be better able to exercise their religious beliefs with the assistance of a 

paid full-time Wiccan chaplain, it is well-settled that the First Amendment does not require 

prison administration to provide inmates with the chaplain of their choice.” Id. (citing Cruz 

v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

 

12 The Court also takes judicial notice of Chapter 10, Article 6, § 101090.5 of the 

CDCR Department of Operations Manual, which sets forth the responsibilities of CRMs, 

including, inter alia, “supervis[ing] the recruitment of volunteers.” 

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As provided in Hartmann, the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle Plaintiff to a 

full-time Buddhist chaplain to supervise and conduct Buddhist services, as RJDCF permits 

staff chaplains and Buddhist volunteers to supervise Buddhist services in the chapel. 

Although the Amended Complaint alleges several specific dates where Buddhist services 

were not held,13 presumably because of a lack of chapel supervision, the Court cannot use 

this as evidence. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was deprived of Buddhist 

services “only once every month at the very minimum” when “there was a chaplain who 

was absent or because there was no volunteer.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 51:7–16.) Plaintiff also 

testified that there was a thirteen-month period “within the last two to three years” of 2019 

where Plaintiff did not receive “a single Buddhist service” with a Buddhist chaplain 

present, but the Catholic chaplain “let a group assemble” an unspecified number of times. 

(Id. at 31:20–24.) The evidence on summary judgment before the Court, although sparse, 

shows that Plaintiff did “receive the assistance of staff chaplains . . .—albeit not of the 

quality or as often as [he] would like.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123. Thus, given that 

Plaintiff is not entitled to the full-time Buddhist chaplain, as he admittedly received the 

assistance of staff chaplains or Buddhist volunteers, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant 

Brown’s failure to hire a full-time Buddhist chaplain substantially burdened his practice of 

Buddhism. Accordingly, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

free exercise claim for the absence of a full-time Buddhist chaplain to supervise and 

conduct Buddhist services in the chapel.

c. Services Led and Supervised by an Inmate Minister

The third religious accommodation Plaintiff seeks is the designation of himself or

another Buddhist inmate as an “inmate minister” to lead and supervise Buddhist services. 

Defendants do not dispute whether Plaintiff has a sincerely held religious belief in 

 

13

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on March 13, March 27, April 3, April 10, July 3, July 31, August 7, and August 28. (See 

ECF No. 4 at 19–20.) Plaintiff alleges that in 2018, there were “about six Mondays in a 

row” from January 1 to February 5 without Buddhist services. (Id. at 21.) 

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attending Buddhist services led by himself, or even another inmate minister, and the Court 

cannot determine otherwise from the evidence before it. As discussed above, Plaintiff 

testified that only services led by a Buddhist chaplain satisfy his religious beliefs. (See 

ECF No. 58-1 at 32:2–21; 42:6–13; 44:12–14.) Although Plaintiff does not ever allege that 

he is a Buddhist chaplain, or that there are other inmates who are Buddhist chaplains, it is 

unclear from the evidence before the Court whether inmate-led services would satisfy 

Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiff testified that a Buddhist service 

satisfies his religion if the leader of the service is a Buddhist and can “educate [him] in 

some way about the Buddhist faith.” (Id. at 39:12–15.) The Court therefore cannot 

conclusively determine that Plaintiff does not have a sincerely held religious belief in 

attending inmate-led Buddhist services without a Buddhist chaplain. 

Defendants instead argue that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to 

Plaintiff’s request for inmate-led services because, under Turner, “Defendants’ actions” in 

denying Plaintiff’s “request for unsupervised inmate religious gatherings” are “reasonably 

related to a legitimate penological interest.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 21.) In applying Turner, 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff “recognized there is a legitimate security concern when 

unmonitored inmates gather in an indoor group setting, including the potential for gang 

activity, and specifically claimed that this very security risk is [] ‘an issue at RJD[CF].’” 

(Id.)

Again, as an initial matter, the only evidence before the Court concerning the 

responsibilities of Defendant Brown as the CRM is Plaintiff’s undisputed deposition 

testimony that he believes Defendant Brown’s responsibilities as the CRM included 

“mak[ing] sure that there were [Buddhist] services conducted,” and finding, training, and 

“put[ting] in the position [volunteers] to conduct those services.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 33:18–

34:1.) There is no evidence before the Court suggesting in any way that Defendant Brown, 

as the CRM, was responsible for designating inmate ministers or approving inmates’ 

requests to become inmate minsters, or that he denied any request by Plaintiff to be

///

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designated as an inmate minister.14 When asked in his deposition if Plaintiff knew “who 

denied [his] request to have an inmate designated or cleared to hold services,” Plaintiff 

testified that he did not remember, but “believed at that time it was a person by the name 

of Rushmore.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 45:3–18.) The Court finds that there is no evidence upon 

which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Brown was responsible for 

designating inmate ministers or permitting inmate-led Buddhist services, and therefore,

could not have placed a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s exercise of Buddhism by failing 

to do so. For this additional reason, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s free exercise claim for a denial of inmate-led Buddhist services. 

Although it need not continue with its analysis, the Court sees fit to addresses 

Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to summary judgment under Turner. As 

discussed above, Turner sets forth four factors for courts to consider when determining 

whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: (1) whether 

there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate 

governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are alternative means 

of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the impact accommodation 

 

14 Neither party provides evidence concerning who is responsible at RJDCF for 

designating inmate ministers. However, the Court notes that, pursuant to Title 15, § 3211 

of the California Code of Regulations, that the designation of an inmate minister is at the 

discretion of “the institution head.” Section 3211(a) provides that:

[w]hen a chaplain of a particular faith cannot be obtained to conduct services 

within a facility housing inmate of that faith, the institution head may at their 

discretion and subject to the controls reasonably required for facility security, 

designate a qualified inmate minister to the religious needs of inmates for that 

specific faith. In determining the qualifications of an inmate to conduct such 

services, the institution head will, whenever possible, seek the advice and 

counsel of outside religious leaders of that faith.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3211(a). Plaintiff also cites to this section in his Amended 

Complaint, stating that “the warden may at his/her discretion . . . designate a qualified 

inmate to minister the religious needs of that particular faith.” (ECF No. 4 at 16.) 

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of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the 

allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready alternatives,” or, 

in other words, whether the rule at issue is an “exaggerated response to prison concerns.” 

482 U.S. at 89–90. Defendants’ argument, however, is based solely on the first factor, and 

Defendants contend, without citation, that “the Court need not go further in this four-prong 

analysis.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 21.) 

Although the Turner factors are not balancing factors, see Beard, 548 U.S. at 522, 

the Court cannot determine the “reasonableness” of the denial of inmate-led services 

without additional evidence supporting the first and remaining three factors. See Swift v. 

Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Prison officials must at least produce some 

evidence that their policies are based on legitimate penological justifications. . . . In every 

case cited by [the defendants] in which legitimate penological interests justified a prison 

policy, the prison had produced some evidence concerning those justifications.” (citations 

omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a), as recognized

in Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Ryan, No. 

04CV2468JLS(NLS), 2008 WL 1944112, at *24 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2008) (“[W]hile 

Plaintiff ultimately must show the impact on prison operations would be insignificant, 

Defendants at the very least must provide the Court with enough factual specificity to 

support their claim that the asserted legitimate governmental interests they have put 

forward to justify their policy are grounded in real fiscal, efficiency, or security 

concerns.”). Thus, without additional evidence and analysis with respect to Turner, the

Court cannot recommend granting Defendants summary judgment on the basis that the 

denial of inmate-led services is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.15 

 

15 The Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has recognized that inmate-led religious 

services can pose security threats to a prison, and in applying the Turner factors, has 

rejected a First Amendment challenge to a policy prohibiting inmate-led religious services. 

See Anderson v. Angelone, 123 F.3d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Nevada’s prohibition on 

inmate-led religious services does not violate the First Amendment. . . . [T]he rule does 

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3. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Defendant Brown is entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s free exercise claim concerning the deprivation of weekly 

chapel access for Buddhist inmates because of the absence of someone to supervise the 

inmates in the chapel. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court 

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment claim. 

D. RLUIPA Claim

The Court turns next to Defendants’ argument they are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. 

1. Legal Standard

Section 3 of RLUIPA provides that:

[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise 

of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden 

results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). “Under RLUIPA, [the prisoner] bear[s] the initial burden of 

persuasion on whether [a] [p]olicy ‘substantially burdens’ [his] ‘exercise of religion.’” 

Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1124 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(b)). Thus, the court must begin 

by “identifying the ‘religious exercise’ allegedly impinged upon.” Greene v. Solano Cty. 

Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). “Religious exercise” is “any exercise of religion, 

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 

 

not foreclose [the plaintiff] from practicing his religion; in fact, he is welcome to assist the 

prison chaplain in leading his religious activities.”). 

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2000cc–5(7)(A); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888. RLUIPA therefore “bars inquiry into whether 

a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion.” Greene, 513 F.3d at 987 

(quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made clear 

that a prisoner’s request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief 

and not some other motivation. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015). 

The court must then address “whether the prison regulation at issue ‘substantially 

burdens’ that religious exercise.” Greene, 513 F.3d at 987. A substantial burden on 

religious exercise “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such 

exercise.” Id. (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 

1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). If the prisoner makes a showing of a substantial burden on the 

exercise of his religion, the court’s analysis then turns to whether the defendant has 

established that the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so “by 

the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–l(a), (b); Greene, 513 F.3d at 988. 

2. Discussion

In their motion, Defendants cite to Hartmann and argue generally that Plaintiff 

“cannot establish a substantial burden on the exercise of his faith” under RLUIPA for the 

same reasons Plaintiff cannot state a First Amendment claim. (ECF No. 58-1 at 23.) 

Plaintiff makes no substantive argument with respect to his RLUIPA claim in his

opposition. (See ECF No. 64.) 

The Court finds that Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

RLUIPA claim that his exercise of Buddhism was substantially burdened by a lack of 

weekly chapel supervision from non-Buddhist staff chaplains or correctional officers. Like 

the free exercise clause, Plaintiff’s belief in attending weekly Buddhist services in the 

chapel with the supervision of a staff chaplain or correctional officer of another faith must 

be sincerely held to be protected under RLUIPA. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862. For the same 

reasons articulated above in the Court’s free exercise analysis, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony—wherein he admits that only services held with a 

Buddhist leader satisfy his Buddhist faith—shows that Plaintiff does not have a sincerely 

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held belief in attending weekly chapel services when those services are supervised by a 

staff chaplain or correctional officer of another faith. Because there is no genuine dispute 

of material fact that Plaintiff does not have a sincerely held belief in attending Buddhist 

services unless the services are led and supervised by a Buddhist, Defendant Brown is 

entitled to summary judgment on this aspect of Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. 

Additionally, Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

requests for the hiring of a full-time Buddhist chaplain and for inmate-led Buddhist 

services. Again, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that Defendant Brown is 

responsible for the hiring of full-time chaplains at RJDCF or the designation of inmate 

ministers. Without any evidence tying Defendant Brown’s responsibilities to Plaintiff’s 

requests for these religious accommodations, Plaintiff cannot show that Brown 

substantially burdened his practice of Buddhism under RLUIPA by failing to provide such

accommodations. 

Accordingly, for these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court 

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA 

claim for lack of weekly chapel access and Buddhist services. 

E. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

Finally, the Court turns to Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s equal protection claim. (ECF No. 58-1 at 23–25.) In the Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that from 2016 through 2018, each defendant “intentionally 

discriminated against Plaintiff and other Buddhist prisoners because of their Buddhist faith 

by not providing [weekly] chaplain supervision for weekly scheduled services.” (ECF No. 

4 at 33.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[e]ach Defendant provided weekly chaplain 

supervision to other similarly situated religious groups, but not Buddhist[s].” (Id.) 

In their motion, Defendants argue generally that “Plaintiff’s claim fails because he 

cannot even establish that there was discrimination, let alone intentional discrimination, or 

that Defendants each engaged in such actions towards [Buddhist inmates].” (ECF No. 58-

///

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1 at 23.) In response, Plaintiff makes no meaningful argument and simply states that he 

“has stated equal protection.” (ECF No. 64 at 4.) 

1. Legal Standard

The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from 

denying any person the equal protection of the laws, with the general objective “that all 

persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 

Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A viable equal protection claim under § 1983 requires a 

prisoner “to show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against 

the [prisoner] based on membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 

Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999)). The “intent” component of a 

discrimination claim requires the prisoner to demonstrate that “the defendant acted at least 

in part because of the [prisoner]’s protected status.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 

1082 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In the religious exercise context, “[p]risoners enjoy religious freedom and equal 

protection of the law subject to restrictions and limitations necessitated by legitimate 

penological interests.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Bell 

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545–46 (1979)), overruled on other grounds by Shakur, 514 F.3d 

at 884–85. “[P]rision officials cannot discriminate against particular religions” and “must 

afford an inmate of a minority religion ‘a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith 

comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional 

religious precepts.’” Id. (quoting Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322). However, “prisons need not 

provide identical facilities or personnel to different faiths.” Id. Rather, prisons “must make 

‘good faith accommodation of the [prisoners’] rights in light of practical considerations.’” 

Id. (quoting Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 1987)) (alteration in original). 

To defeat summary judgment on a religious discrimination claim, the prisoner must set 

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute “as to whether he was afforded 

///

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a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith as compared to prisoners of other faiths and 

that such conduct was intentional.” Id. 

2. Discussion

As stated above, the Amended Complaint alleges unequal treatment to Buddhist 

inmates in terms of weekly access to the prison chapel for religious services because of an 

absence of supervision. (See ECF No. 4 at 33.) However, Plaintiff offers no evidence, 

such as a chapel schedule, substantiating the barebones allegations in his complaint that

“[e]ach defendant provided weekly chaplain supervision to other similarly situated 

religious groups.” (ECF No. 4 at 33.) Thus, there is no evidence showing that Buddhist 

inmates were not afforded “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to 

the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners.” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322. Moreover, Plaintiff 

offers no evidence that this alleged lack of supervision for weekly services in the chapel

was the product of Defendant Brown’s discriminatory intent. Plaintiff’s allegations in the 

Amended Complaint—which is not verified and therefore, is not evidence on summary 

judgment—that Defendant Brown acted with intentional discrimination in not providing 

supervision for weekly Buddhist services is conclusory and insufficient to defeat a motion 

for summary judgment. (See ECF No. 4 at 33.) There is simply no evidence in the record 

that supports an inference that intentional discrimination animated Defendant Brown’s

alleged deprival of weekly chapel access and supervision for Plaintiff and other Buddhist 

inmates. 

Plaintiff has not shown that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether 

he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith compared to inmates of other 

religions. Defendant Brown is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s equal 

protection claim. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment equal protection claim. 

///

///

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F. Qualified Immunity 

Finally, the Court turns to Defendants’ argument that, even if Court finds that 

Defendants violated the constitution, they are entitled to qualified immunity because “none 

of the requests for relief Plaintiff makes here are ‘clearly established’ constitutional 

violations.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 26.) 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982)). The purpose of qualified immunity is to strike a balance between the competing 

“need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the 

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 

duties reasonably.” Id. 

A court conducts a two-prong analysis to determine whether a government official 

is entitled to qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001). First, 

examining the alleged facts in favor of the plaintiff, the court must consider whether the 

alleged facts show the government official’s actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. Id. at 201. Second, the court must determine whether the constitutional right 

purportedly violated was clearly established in the specific context of the case at hand. Id. 

A constitutional right is clearly established if it would be clear to a reasonable officer that 

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202. This standard “‘gives 

ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam)). 

The plaintiff “bears the burden” of showing that the rights at issue were clearly 

established at the time of the government official’s alleged violation. Robinson v. York, 

566 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th 

Cir. 1998)). The plaintiff need not identify “a case directly on point, but existing precedent 

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must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Further, the contours of the right established must be 

“undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” 

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). 

As discussed above, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant 

Brown did not violate Plaintiff’s free exercise or equal protection rights.

16

 As such, 

Defendant Brown is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to these claims.

17

 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) 

GRANTING Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

///

///

 

16 Qualified immunity does not apply to RLUIPA claims. See Rogers v. Giurbino, No.: 

11cv560 WQH (RBB), 2016 WL 8578589, at *14 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2016), adopted by

2016 WL 4651244 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016).

17 Although it need not proceed to the second prong, the Court agrees generally with 

Defendants that none of the “requests for relief” Plaintiff seeks are clearly established 

violations of the First Amendment. (ECF No. 58-1 at 25–26.) Although an inmate’s right 

to attend religious services is clearly established, see, e.g., Hagen v. Jabar, 56 F. App’x 

302, 304 (9th Cir. 2002), the question here is whether an inmate is entitled to attend weekly 

religious services consistently every month. In his opposition, Plaintiff provides the 

standard for a qualified immunity analysis (see ECF No. 64 at 5), but he does not cite to 

any case that places beyond debate the question of whether inmates have a right to attend

weekly religious services. See also Chaparro v. Ducart, No. C 14-4955 LHK (PR), 2016 

WL 491635, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016) (finding no precedent on point regarding 

“whether a prisoner’s right to free exercise is denied when he is temporarily prohibited 

from attending weekly chapel services”), affirmed by 695 F. App’x 254, 255 (9th Cir. 

2017). Additionally, and as discussed above, the First Amendment does not require prisons 

“to provide each inmate with the spiritual counselor of his choice.” Allen, 827 F.2d at 569; 

see also Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that policies 

prohibiting inmate-led religious services do not violate the First Amendment when they 

are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Anderson, 123 F.3d at 1199. 

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IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 14, 2020, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than February 21, 2020. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 28, 2020

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