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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11275

____________________

GEORGE D. METZ, II, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

D. BRIDGES, 

officer,

J. DODSON, 

officer,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11275

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00056-ECM-SMD

____________________

Before WILSON, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Officers Bridges and Dodson (collectively, the Officers) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss based on 

qualified immunity from George Metz’s claims of Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. On appeal, the Officers argue that: (1) the district court 

erred in concluding that there was no arguable probable cause to 

arrest Metz and that it was impermissible to perform a search incident to arrest under the circumstances; and (2) the district court 

erred in concluding that the Officers’ actions violated clearly established law. After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse the district court’s decision denying the officers 

qualified immunity.

I.

The relevant background—gleaned from the allegations in 

the complaint and the video recordings relied on and undisputed 

by Metz1—is this. On June 4, 2020, Metz and a colleague he calls 

1 At the motion to dismiss phase, the court may look beyond the pleadings and

consider documentary evidence, such as body camera footage, if: (1) the complaint refers to the footage; (2) the footage is central to the plaintiff’s claim;

and (3) the authenticity of the footage is not challenged. See, e.g., Baker v. City 

of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2023); Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 

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23-11275 Opinion of the Court 3

“Bad Cop No Donut” went to the Houston County Department of 

Human Resources (DHR) in Dothan, Alabama.2 When Metz and 

his colleague entered the lobby, a DHR security guard noticed that 

they were recording a video. She told Metz and his colleague they

were not allowed to film in the building and asked them to leave. 

They refused, claiming they were from “Bolt Action News Group” 

and they had a First Amendment right to film in public spaces. 

Metz’s video showed flyers posted in the DHR lobby about matters 

including adult protective services, child abuse, and child support. 

The security guard asked them to leave several times, and each

time they ignored her or refused. At one point, the security guard 

asked a DHR employee to call 911 to inform the police dispatcher 

that there were men “filming inside of a building they’re not supposed to be in.” 

Officer Bridges arrived first. Upon his arrival, a DHR employee pointed out the men and said, “These men are videoing 

down here.” Officer Bridges asked Metz and his colleague to produce identification, but they refused. After asking six times, and 

1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002). As Metz referred to the video by timestamp 

throughout his complaint, the footage captures the events central to the complaint, and Metz does not dispute its authenticity, the district court properly 

considered the footage. In fact, Metz never challenged the district court’s decision to consider the videos, nor has he claimed on appeal that we should not 

consider them. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (holding that issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned).

2 Alabama DHR offices administer “all forms of public assistance” Ala. Code 

§ 38-2-6(1). 

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being refused each time, Officer Bridges handcuffed them. When 

Officer Dodson arrived, a DHR employee told him that the men 

were refusing to leave after being asked to do so by the security 

guard. Officer Dodson informed them that they were trespassing 

and asked them to identify themselves. They did not comply, and 

Officer Dodson searched them. Eventually, the Officers’ supervisor arrived and, after some discussion, told Metz and his colleague 

they were free to go. They left around an hour after first being 

handcuffed. 

Metz brought a § 1983 claim pro se against Officers Bridges 

and Dodson for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from unlawful searches and seizures. The Officers moved to dismiss for qualified immunity, and the district court denied the motion. The Officers timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 

1121 (11th Cir. 2001). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Id.; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277 (explaining that we do the 

same for ambiguities in video footage). But where video footage is

“clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we accept the video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account and 

view the facts in the light depicted by the video.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 

1277–78 (citation omitted). 

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Further, we are mindful of our obligation to construe filings 

by pro se litigants liberally, no matter how “inartfully pleaded.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations omitted). But

we may not rewrite deficient pleadings, and pro se complaints that 

fail to state a claim must be dismissed. See Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 

760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

III.

Section 1983 provides private citizens a cause of action 

against persons who violate their constitutional rights while acting 

under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Government officials 

performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory 

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation marks 

omitted). “Qualified immunity is a defense not only from liability, 

but also from suit.” Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 272 (11th Cir. 

2013). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” are 

shielded from litigation. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th 

Cir. 2007). 

To prove he is entitled to qualified immunity, a public official must show that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged misconduct took place. Holloman ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 

2004). If proven, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show: (1) the 

defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was 

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clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Gilmore, 

738 F.3d at 272. 

There are three recognized ways a plaintiff can show that a 

law is clearly established. Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1310 

(11th Cir. 2019). First, by pointing to a case with materially similar 

facts decided by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the 

highest court of the relevant state. Id. Second, by showing “a 

broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts 

in this situation.” Id. (quotations omitted). This principle must be 

“specific enough to give the officers notice of the clearly established right.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th 

Cir. 2005). Finally, “the plaintiff can show that the conduct at issue 

so obviously violated the Constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” J.W. ex. rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 

1248, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018).

The Fourth Amendment, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects people from unreasonable searches 

and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 

Courts have recognized three categories of police-citizen encounters, subject to different levels of Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1) 

police-citizen interactions involving no coercion or detention; (2) 

brief seizures or investigatory detentions (known as Terry stops3); 

and (3) arrests. See Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 

2006). 

3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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A brief, investigatory Terry stop does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the 

person has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States 

v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011). “[I]f there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to 

identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly while 

attempting to obtain additional information.” Hayes v. Florida, 470 

U.S. 811, 816 (1985). Reasonable suspicion is “a less demanding 

standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably 

less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 

U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Still, “[t]he officer must be able to articulate 

more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of 

criminal activity.” Id. at 123–24 (quotations omitted). When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the courts must review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 

officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity

“may be afoot.” Miller, 458 F.3d at 1259 (quotation marks omitted). 

Defensiveness toward police is a relevant factor. Jordan, 635 F.3d 

at 1187.

Arrests, on the other hand, must be based on probable cause. 

Miller, 458 F.3d at 1259. “Probable cause exists when the facts and 

circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, of which he or she 

has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent 

person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect 

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause requires 

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“only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Paez 

v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks

omitted). It “does not require anything close to conclusive proof . 

. . or even a finding made by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 

An officer need not “rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for 

suspicious facts” nor rule out every affirmative defense, so long as 

it was reasonable to conclude from the totality of the circumstances 

that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.” District 

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018); see also Paez, 915 F.3d 

at 1286. Officers may search a subject incident to a lawful arrest. 

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973).

When an officer asserts qualified immunity in the context of 

an investigatory stop, “the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but whether the officer had ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 

F.3d 1156, 1166 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, a “law enforcement 

official who reasonably but mistakenly concludes that reasonable 

suspicion is present is still entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 

1165–66. In the context of an allegedly unconstitutional arrest, 

qualified immunity applies if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had “arguable probable cause” to make the arrest. Fish v. Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir. 2016). Arguable 

probable cause is a lower standard than actual probable cause and 

only requires that, “under all of the facts and circumstances, an officer reasonably could—not necessarily would—have believed that 

probable cause was present.” Id. (quotation marks and emphasis 

omitted). This inquiry includes “the collective knowledge of law 

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enforcement officials derived from reasonably trustworthy information.” Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). 

The Officers argued that when they arrived on scene, they 

believed Metz was committing the crime of trespass. Under Alabama law, “[a] person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon 

premises.” Ala. Code § 13A-7-4(a). Alabama also has a “stop and 

identify” statute, which provides:

A . . . policeman of any incorporated city . . . within 

the limits of the county . . . may stop any person 

abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects 

is committing, has committed or is about to commit 

a . . . public offense and may demand of him his 

name, address, and an explanation of his actions. 

Ala. Code § 15-5-30. Dothan City Code § 1-5 makes it a crime for a 

person to “fail, neglect or refuse to comply with any lawful order 

of any lawful officer of the city made in pursuance of and under his 

authority as such officer.”

IV.

In this case, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

We begin by noting that Metz did not dispute that the Officers 

were acting within their discretionary authority, which meant that 

the burden shifted to him to show both that the Officers violated 

one of his constitutional rights and that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 

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1264; Williams, 904 F.3d at 1258. However, Metz has not shown 

that the Officers violated his constitutional rights, nor that any violation was clearly established. 

First, Metz cannot show that Officer Bridges violated his

rights because Officer Bridges had at least arguable reasonable suspicion to stop Metz under the circumstances, as well as arguable 

probable cause to arrest. For starters, even drawing all reasonable 

inferences from the complaint and video evidence in Metz’s favor,

Chesser, 248 F.3d at 1121; Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277, Officer Bridges 

had arguable reasonable suspicion that Metz was trespassing, justifying a Terry stop. As the complaint and undisputed video evidence 

demonstrate, Officer Bridges was responding to a 911 call made by 

a DHR employee about men “filming inside of a building they’re 

not supposed to be in.” When Officer Bridges arrived, two men 

were walking around the lobby filming, and a few DHR employees 

were standing by looking concerned. As soon as Officer Bridges 

stepped into the lobby, one DHR employee pointed out Metz and 

his colleague and said, “These men are videoing down here.” 

On this record, Officer Bridges could have reasonably suspected that the DHR employees had asked the men to leave and 

that the men had refused, and, thus, that they were trespassing under Alabama law. See Ala. Code § 13A-7-4(a). This justified a Terry

stop. See Ala. Code § 15-5-30; Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.

Once Officer Bridges validly had stopped Metz, he was allowed to ask Metz for identification, and to arrest him when he 

refused. “The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect 

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to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.” Hiibel v. Sixth 

Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004). Alabama’s stop-andidentify statute imposes this requirement. See Ala. Code § 15-5-30. 

This meant that Metz’s refusal to identify himself during a valid 

Terry stop violated Alabama’s stop-and-identify statute and gave 

Officer Bridges probable cause to arrest him. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 

180, 189 (suspect’s refusal to provide identity, in violation of state 

stop-and-identify statute, gave officers probable cause to arrest 

him); see also Ala. Code § 15-5-30; Dothan City Code § 1-5. 

As for Officer Dodson, Metz cannot show that he violated a 

clearly established right. Because Metz was in handcuffs, it was reasonable for an officer in Officer Dodson’s position to believe that 

Metz was arrested, and that Officer Dodson could therefore conduct a search incident to arrest. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35.

V.

In short, Metz has not established a violation of his constitutional rights—let alone a clearly established right. See Sebastian, 918 

F.3d at 1310. He does not cite binding caselaw which clearly establishes that either officer’s conduct was unlawful, nor do the broader 

Fourth Amendment principles on which he relies proscribe the Officers’ conduct. Finally, he has not shown that the Officers’ conduct was so obviously violative of the Constitution that prior case 

law is unnecessary. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred 

in denying the Officers qualified immunity.

REVERSED.

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