Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00741/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00741-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer to the 1

petition. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE ANTHONY PARKS,

Petitioner,

v.

L. CHRONES, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 05-741 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Following a jury trial in the Fresno County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted of

one count of possession of a firearm and misdemeanor obstruction of a peace officer. The trial

court also found true the allegations that Petitioner suffered two prior serious felony convictions

within the meaning of the three strikes law. The trial court also found true the allegations that

Petitioner had served five prior prison terms for prior felony convictions. The trial court struck

one prior serious felony conviction and sentenced Petitioner to an aggregate term of 11 years in

state prison.

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

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Appellate District. (Lodged Docs. A-C.) On March 19, 2004, the Fifth District Court of Appeal

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. (Lodged Doc. D.)

Petitioner filed a timely petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was

denied on June 9, 2004. (Lodged Docs. E, F.) 

Petitioner filed numerous post-conviction collateral challenges, several of which were

filed in the same court on the same date. 

On January 28, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F039809, with the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. G.) The petition was denied on

January 31, 2002. (Lodged Doc. H.)

On February 19, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

S104380, in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on June 12, 2002. (Lodged Docs.

I, J.) 

On January 28, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F039807, with the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. K.) The petition was denied on

January 31, 2002. (Lodged Doc. L.)

On February 6, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F039874, with the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. M.) The petition was denied on

February 14, 2002. (Lodged Doc. N.)

On February 11, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F039894, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. O.) The petition was denied on

February 21, 2002. (Lodged Doc. P.) 

On February 14, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F039918, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. Q.) The petition was denied on

February 21, 2002. (Lodged Doc. P.)

On February 14, 2002, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus, case

number F039917, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. S.) The petition was

denied on February 22, 2002. (Lodged Doc. T.)

On March 1, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

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S104768, with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. U.) The petition was denied on

June 12, 2002. (Lodged Doc. V.)

On October 29, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F041766, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. W.) The petition was denied on

November 7, 2002. (Lodged Doc. X.)

On April 3, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F042712, with the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. Y.) The petition was denied on

April 10, 2003. (Lodged Doc. Z.)

On June 26, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F043326, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. AA.) The petition was denied on

July 10, 2003. (Lodged Doc. BB.)

On February 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F044844, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. CC.) The petition was denied on

February 19, 2004. (Lodged Doc. DD.)

On February 13, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

S122617, in the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. EE.) The petition was denied on

December 15, 2004. (Lodged Doc. FF.)

On March 1, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F045004, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. GG.) The petition was denied on

March 4, 2004. (Lodged Doc. HH.)

On June 10, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F045690, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. II.) The petition was denied on

June 17, 2004. (Lodged Doc. JJ.)

On October 1, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F046415, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. KK.) The petition was denied on

October 21, 2004. (Lodged Doc. LL.)

On or about October 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case

number S128182, in the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. MM.) The petition was

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 The following summary of facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

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Appellate District appearing as Lodged Doc. D, of the Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court

finds the state Court of Appeal’s summary is a correct and fair summary of the facts of the case. 

 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated. 

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denied on August 17, 2005. (Lodged Doc. NN.)

On July 5, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, case number

F048328, in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. OO.) The petition was denied on

July 14, 2005. (Lodged Doc. PP.)

On August 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. QQ.) Respondent submits that this petition is still pending. 

 Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 8, 2005. 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on February 3, 2006. (Court Doc. 11.) Petitioner did

not file a traverse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS2

Procedural History

[Petitioner] Wayne Anthony Parks was charged in an amended criminal

information with possession of a firearm ([Cal.] Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1),

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count one), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a), count two), and

misdemeanor obstruction of a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a), count three). The

amended information alleged [Petitioner] had two prior serious felony convictions

within the meaning of the three strikes law and five prior prison term

enhancements. 

The trial was set to begin on December 6, 2001. On December 7, 2001,

[Petitioner] successfully motioned the court to represent himself pursuant to

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. The trial court cautioned [Petitioner]

that it would not grant a continuance. [Petitioner] encountered difficulty in

gaining access to a law library and subpoenaing witnesses. On December 10,

2001, the trial court granted [Petitioner’s] motion for a continuance as well as

[Petitioner’s] request for an investigator. 

On December 17, 2001, [Petitioner] made a second motion for a

continuance. [Petitioner] renewed his motion for a continuance the next day.

[Petitioner] and his investigator had only located two of the four witnesses

[Petitioner] felt he needed for his defense.

After conducting a full hearing on the matter, the trial court found that

[Petitioner] had two witnesses under subpoena who had been at the scene of

[Petitioner’s] arrest. The other two witnesses were not available. [Petitioner]

believed one of the two had been on vacation and sought an additional two-week

continuance. The trial court suggested that from what [Petitioner] represented, the

potential witness who had been on vacation may have returned. [Petitioner] did

not object to this statement.

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 On December 21, 2001, [Petitioner’s] request for the appointment of counsel was granted. 

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 Officer Borrego did not see [Petitioner] drop any object. 5

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[Petitioner] explained that the two unavailable witnesses observed what

[Petitioner] saw, though he was not sure exactly what either one of them would

say. The court denied [Petitioner’s] request for a two-week continuance finding

that based on [Petitioner’s] representations, the testimony of the two missing

witnesses was likely to be cumulative.

On December 20, 2001, [Petitioner] was found guilty after a jury trial of

counts one and three. [Petitioner] was acquitted of count two. In a bifurcated 4

proceeding conducted on January 16, 2002, the court found true allegations

[Petitioner] had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the

three strikes law and that five prior prison term allegations were true. On April

12, 2002, the trial court struck one prior serious felony conviction. The court

sentenced [Petitioner] to prison for three years on count one which it doubled to

six years pursuant to the three strikes law. The court imposed five consecutive

one-year prison terms as prior prison term enhancements for a total prison term of

11 years.

On appeal, [Petitioner] contends the trial court’s denial of [his] request for

a second continuance interfered with [his] ability to represent himself and

constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion.

Facts

On May 27, 2001, Randall Jensen reported the theft of his 1990 Ford

Bronco. There was a .25-caliber Liberty pistol in the vehicle. Jensen identified

People’s Exhibit 14 as the missing weapon. The gun had its magazine but was

not loaded with ammunition when the Bronco was stolen.

On September 7, 2001, at 10:30 p.m., Fresno Police Department Detective

Dennis Lowry was on patrol in a marked police car with Officer Frank Borrero

searching for Leroy Manning who had violated his parole. As they drove down

East Clinton, they saw [Petitioner] and another man walking. [Petitioner]

resembled Manning. [Petitioner] and the other man began walking rapidly away

into an apartment complex. The other man walked out of Lowry’s view.

[Petitioner] stopped.

Though it was dark, the area was well illuminated by the patrol car

spotlights. [Petitioner] threw an object from his hand to the cement sidewalk. 

Lowry heard a clanking sound that sounded like metal hitting the ground.

[Petitioner] was between 15 and 20 feet away. As soon as he dropped the object,

[Petitioner] began to run away with Lowry pursuing him. Lowry encountered

James Greathouse, the man who had been walking with [Petitioner], and detained

him to review his identification. Greathouse was cooperative and followed

Lowry’s direction to sit.

Lowry resumed his pursuit of [Petitioner] who was later arrested by

Officers Borrego and Sanchez. Lowry immediately returned to the place 5

[Petitioner] had discarded the metal object and found a handgun. The gun was

People’s Exhibit 14 which belonged to and was identified by Mr. Jensen. The gun

was loaded with a live round of ammunition in the chamber and other rounds in

the magazine clip. A police technician could not lift usable fingerprints from the

gun or the magazine.

Trenell Lowe was present when police arrived at the apartment complex

on Clinton. Lowe fled immediately because he was wanted by the police. Before

fleeing, Lowe saw [Petitioner] standing in a group of three or four other men. 

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There were also women present. Lowe did not see [Petitioner] drop anything. 

Lowe was convicted of a felony in 1991.

Sharlise Lampkin was also present when the police chased and arrested

Parks. Lampkin said that someone she knew as “T” threw down a gun when

police arrived. Lampkin did not see [Petitioner] throw anything to the ground. 

Lampkin stated that “T” was not [Petitioner]. 

(Lodged Doc. D, Opinion 2-4.)

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997; Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

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Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as to the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9 Cir. 2002) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 th

U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)). Where, as here, the state court reaches a decision on the merits but

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the

record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. 

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9 Cir. 2000). th

///

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C. Procedural Default

Respondent argues that all four of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. As

Respondent submits all four of Petitioner’s claim are essentially variations of the same claim, i.e.

that use of his juvenile conviction to enhance his current sentence under California’s Three

Strikes law was unconstitutional and a violation of an agreement he had with the juvenile court. 

The constitutionality of using the conviction (claims 1 and 3) was rejected by the Fifth District

Court of Appeal on July 10, 2003, in a silent denial. (Lodged Docs. CC, DD.) On December 15,

2004, the California Supreme Court denied the same claims on the merits and with citations to In

re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993); In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 (1949); and People v. Duvall, 9

Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). (Lodged Docs. EE, FF.) 

The violation of the alleged juvenile court promise or plea bargain agreement (claims 2

and 4) was rejected by the Fifth District Court of Appeal on October 1, 2004, in a silent denial. 

(Lodged Docs. KK, LL.) On August 17, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied the claims

on the merits and with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993) and In re Miller, 17 Cal.2d

734. (Lodged Docs. MM, NN.)

A federal court will not review claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the state

court has denied relief on those claims by a state law that is independent of federal law and

adequate to support the judgment. A federal court will not review a petitioner’s claims if the

state court has denied relief of those claims pursuant to a state law that is independent of federal

law and adequate to support the judgment. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801, 111 S.Ct.

2590, 2592 (1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2553-54

(1989); See also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S.Ct. 183, 184 (1935). A state

court’s refusal to hear the merits of a claim because of petitioner’s failure to follow a state

procedural rule is considered a denial of relief on independent and adequate state grounds. Harris

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260-61, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989). This doctrine of procedural default

is based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730-32, 111 S.Ct. at

2554-55.

There are limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and

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refuse to evaluate the merits of a claim because the petitioner violated a state’s procedural rules. 

Procedural default can only block a claim in federal court if the state court “clearly and expressly

states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109

S.Ct. 1038,1043 (1989). 

In addition, a federal court may only impose a procedural bar on claims if the procedural

rule that the state used to deny relief is “firmly established and regularly followed.” O’Dell v.

Thompson, 502 U.S. 995, 998, 112 S.Ct. 618, 620 (1991) (statement of Blackmun joined by

Stevens and O’Connor respecting the denial of certiorari); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-

24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857 (1991); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51, 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835-

37 (1984). The state procedural rule used must be clear, consistently applied, and wellestablished at the time of the petitioner's purported default. Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757,

760 (9 Cir. 1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 112, 129 (9 Cir. th th

1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1569. However, even if there is an independent and adequate state

ground for the decision, the federal court may still consider the claim if the petitioner can

demonstrate: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of

federal law, or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 262 (citing

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 495 (1986)). 

The Court finds that the California Supreme’s Court citation to In re Clark was

independent. In Bennett v. Mueller, the Ninth Circuit found that California’s untimeliness rule

was independent after In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998). See Bennett v. Mueller, 322

F.3d 573, 581-83 (9 Cir. 2003). In the instant case, the new claims were raised in 2004, six th

years after Robbins was decided in 1998. The Court further finds that the California Supreme

Court’s citation to In re Clark was adequate. For a state procedural default to be adequate, it

must be well-established and consistently applied. Id. at 583. While the ultimate burden of

proving adequacy rests with the respondent, the petitioner must place the state’s affirmative

defense of independent and adequate state procedural grounds at issue “by asserting specific

factual allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure.” Id. In this case,

Respondent has adequately asserted a procedural bar; however, Petitioner has not placed the

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 To date, the Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict. 6

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affirmative defense at issue. Therefore, under Bennett, the procedural bar is both independent

and adequate. Further, Petitioner makes no showing of actual prejudice and as explained below,

because there is no merit to his claims Petitioner cannot demonstrate that a fundamental

miscarriage of justice will result if the Court does not review the claims. Accordingly, this Court

is barred from reviewing Petitioner’s claims. In any event, even if the Court were to review the

claims they are without merit. 

D. Claims 1 and 3: Use of Juvenile Conviction to Enhance Sentence Violated Federal

Constitutional Rights

Petitioner contends that the use of his juvenile conviction to enhance his sentence under

California’s Three Strikes law was illegal and a violation of his Sixth Amendment Rights. This

claim was presented to the to (1) the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which issued a summary

denial (Lodged Docs. CC & DD); and (2) the California Supreme Court summarily denied the

claim with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993); In re Swain, 34 Cal.2d 300, 304; People

v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). (Lodged Doc. FF.) 

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Supreme Court held that,

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” In United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit held

that the Apprendi “prior conviction” exception only applied to those convictions which allowed a

jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in Tighe, it was held that nonjury juvenile

adjudications were not “convictions” falling within the Apprendi exception. Id. at 1194-95. 

However, the Court finds that the Ninth Circuit’s more recent opinion in Boyd v. Newland, 467

F.3d 1139 (9 Cir. 2006), as amended on other grounds, persuasive authority on Petitioner’s th

claim. In Boyd, the petitioner’s sentence was increased from three to six years based on a 6

nonjury juvenile adjudication. There, the Ninth Circuit recognized its prior holding in Tighe that

nonjury juvenile adjudications did not fall in the prior convictions exception outlined in the

Apprendi. Id. at 1151-1152. The Court went on to acknowledge that California courts have

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disagreed with its holding in Tighe stating, “[t]hey conclude that Apprendi does not preclude the

use of nonjury juvenile adjudications to enhance the sentence of an adult offender.” Id. at 1152

(citing among others, People v. Bowden, 102 Cal.App.4th 387 (2002).) Further, the Court

acknowledged, that “the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held the Apprendi ‘prior

conviction’ exception includes nonjury juvenile adjudications, which can be used to enhance a

defendant’s sentence.” Id. (citing United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (11 Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 551 (2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 668, 696 (3d Cir.

2003) and United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8 Cir. 2002).) The Ninth Circuit th

concluded, 

Although we are not suggesting that Tighe was incorrectly decided, as some of

these varying interpretations of Apprendi suggest, the opinion does not represent

clearly established federal law “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In general, Ninth Circuit precedent remains

persuasive authority in determining what is clearly established federal law. See

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9 Cir. 1999) (stating that Ninth

th

Circuit case law may be used to help determine clearly established federal law). 

But, in the face of authority that is directly contrary to Tighe, and in the absence of

explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the California

courts’ use of Petitioner’s juvenile adjudication as a sentencing enhancement was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 

Id. at 1152. 

For the reasons explained in Boyd, this Court finds that in light of the lack of authority

from the Supreme Court resolving the issue, it cannot find that the state courts’ rejection of

Petitioner’s claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court authority. Petitioner’s claim fails on the merits.

E. Claims 2 and 4: Breach of Plea Agreement

Petitioner contends that in 1979 when he suffered his juvenile conviction, the juvenile

court told him that once he was discharged from the California Youth Authority, the conviction

would never be used against him in the future. Therefore, use of the juvenile conviction as a

“strike” prior to enhance his current sentence, is a violation of his plea bargain agreement. This

claim was presented to (1) the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the claim

(Lodged Docs. KK & LL); and (2) the California Supreme Court which summarily denied the

claim with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 and In re Miller, 17 Cal.2d 734. (Lodged Docs.

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MM & NN.) 

As Respondent submits, Petitioner’s claim is conclusory in nature as Petitioner fails to

demonstrate with evidence or otherwise that his 1979 plea to his juvenile conviction for assault

with a firearm involved a promise that it would not be used in the future as a strike. Further, the

Court has not found any proof substantiating the purported promise or plea bargain in the state

court record. (See RT 455-482.) 

To the extent that Petitioner argues that the alleged breach renders his current sentence

unconstitutional, his claim must fail. When a plea agreement rests in any significant degree on a

promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or

consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 22 (1971). 

Here, there is no indication that any promise not to use the 1979 conviction was made during the

plea negotiations. Accordingly, as there is no basis for finding that such a promise was included

in the 1979 proceedings, the agreement was not violated by virtue of the current enhancement. 

Moreover, the sentence imposed under Three Strikes is not additional punishment for the prior

convictions, but rather a stiffened penalty for the latest crimes. See Monge v. California, 524

U.S. 721, 728 (1998). 

To the extent that Petitioner alleges that he had no knowledge at the time of his 1979 plea

of the possibility that it could later be used to enhance a sentence, his claim must also fail. Due

process requires that a defendant be informed of all the direct consequences of a guilty plea. 

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). There is no due process violation where a trial

court fails to inform the defendant of collateral consequences, such as the potential for

enhancement in the future. United States v. Garrett, 680 F.2d 64, 65-66 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus,

Petitioner’s lack of knowledge that the 1979 conviction could later be used to enhance a future

sentence does not violate due process. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is wholly conclusory, and

the state courts’ determination of this issue was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

This Findings and Recommendations is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 6, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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