Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02077/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02077-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 07cv2077

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG SMITH,

CDCR #T-09268,

Civil No. 07-2077 BTM (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM

JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 11-1]

vs.

DAN LINK, Deputy District Attorney:

NICHOLAS GONZALEZ, San Diego

Police Officer; CITY OF SAN DIEGO;

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; ALBERT

HARUTUNIAN, Judge of the Superior

Court of California, San Diego,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

Craig Smith (“Plaintiff”) filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on October 25, 2007, while incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility. On

March 3, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), but

simultaneously dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983

relief could be granted and for seeking monetary damages against immune Defendants pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). See March 3, 2008 Order at 6-7.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit on March 28, 2008. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the appellate

Case 3:07-cv-02077-BTM-RBB Document 15 Filed 10/15/08 Page 1 of 6
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 proceedings because he informed the Ninth Circuit that he intended to file a motion pursuant

to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b) with the District Court. Plaintiff was informed that he must file a motion

with the Ninth Circuit for a limited remand which “must include a statement that the district

court has indicated its willingness to consider the proposed Rule 60(b) motion.” See USCA

Order dated July 17, 2008. This Court accepted Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment

Pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b) for filing on August 15, 2008 [Doc. No. 11]. The Ninth Circuit

then issued a “Notice of Limited Remand” on September 22, 2008 [Doc. No. 14].

II. Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)

Under Rule 60(b), a motion for “relief from judgment or order” may be filed within a

“reasonable time,” but usually must be filed “not more than one year after the judgment, order,

or proceeding was entered or taken.” FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b). Reconsideration under Rule 60 may

be granted in the case of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly

discovered evidence; or (3) fraud; or if (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been

satisfied; or (6) for any other reason justifing relief. FED.R.CIV. P. 60(b).

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he claimed that his constitutional rights were violated by a San

Diego Police Officer, Deputy District Attorney, and a Superior Court Judge when he was

arrested, and ultimately convicted of driving under the influence. The Court, in conducting the

required sua sponte screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”), found: (1) Plaintiff’s request for money damages against these Defendants was

not yet cognizable because his claims “necessarily implied” the invalidity of his criminal

conviction; (2) Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Deputy District Attorney Dan

Link were barred by absolute immunity given to prosecutors who are acting within the scope of

their official duties (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); (3) Plaintiff’s claims

for monetary damages against San Diego Superior Court Judge Harutunian were also barred by

absolute immunity (citing Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)); and (4)

Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against San Diego Police Officer Nicholas Gonzalez

who testified at Plaintiff’s trial were also barred as witnesses at a criminal proceeding are entitled

to absolute immunity.

. 

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Plaintiff has filed this Motion for Relief from Judgment because he claims that the

California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District “reversed in full” his criminal conviction.

(See Pl.’s Mot. at 1.) As a result, Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages for the “wrongful

conviction and 799 days of wrongful/false imprisonment.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims that he

has “removed a claim against Superior Court Judge Albert Harutunian III for he has absolute

immunity” but seeks to keep all the remaining claims against the remaining Defendants. (Id.)

First, Plaintiff continues to seek money damages against Dan Link, the Deputy District

Attorney who prosecuted his criminal matter. A criminal prosecutor is entitled to absolute

immunity from monetary damages in a § 1983 action for conduct that is “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. However, a prosecutor

is only entitled to qualified immunity where “he or she is performing investigatory or

administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or defective.” Buckley

v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993). Here, Plaintiff argues that when Defendant Link

spoke to jurors following his first trial and used these discussions to prepare for the second trial,

this was an “investigative act” which entitles Defendant Link to qualified immunity only. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 9.) However, the Court finds that speaking with jurors is “intimately associated with the

judicial phase of the criminal process” and not an investigatory function. Imbler, 424 U.S. at

430. Each allegation by Plaintiff pertaining to Defendant Link appears to arise from his role as

the prosecuting attorney. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Link “fabricated evidence” in

Plaintiff’s second trial. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for decisions

which include initiating a particular prosecution, presenting false testimony at trial, and

suppressing exculpatory evidence. See Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1173

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 & n. 34). Thus, Defendant Link is entitled to

absolute immunity based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff in his Complaint, as well as his Motion.

Second, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Nicholas Gonzalez, a Police Officer for the City

of San Diego, liable for allegedly “submitting a false report to his supervisor that initiated the

prosecution [against Plaintiff] and even committed perjury in preliminary examination.” (Pl.’s

Mot. at 6.) As to the claims arising from his testimony, Defendant Gonzalez is absolutely

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 immune even if he is alleged to have committed perjury. See Paine v. City of Lompoc, 965 F.3d

975, 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[w]itnesses, including police witnesses, are immune from liability for

their testimony in earlier proceedings even if they committed perjury.”). However, Plaintiff is

now claiming that Defendant Gonzalez fabricated evidence which led to his initial criminal

conviction that was later reversed. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 7.) Defendant Gonzalez does not have

absolute immunity for allegations of “non-testimonial acts such as fabricating evidence.”

Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1098, 1291 ( 9th Cir. 2000). Thus, Plaintiff may be able to seek

money damages against Defendant Gonzalez if he is able to articulate a constitutional claim

against him.

Finally, as to Plaintiff’s claims against the County and City of San Diego, the Court finds

that Plaintiff cannot proceed against the County of San Diego. A municipality may be liable

under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where the constitutional deprivation

was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).

To establish municipal liability, plaintiff must show: (1) he was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the city had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference

to plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the “moving force behind the

constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996); see

Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; Trevino v.

Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to state a § 1983 claim against San

Diego County or the City of San Diego, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that his injury was

caused by individual officers whose conduct conformed to an official city policy, custom or

practice. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 624. 

The County of San Diego cannot be held liable under Monell for the actions of Defendant

Link that occurred when he was prosecuting Plaintiff for criminal violations of California state

law. While a district attorney has both state and county functions, they are a state actor when

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“acting in [their] prosecutorial capacity.” Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Pitts v.

County of Kern, 17 Cal.4th 340, 362, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 (1998) (California Supreme Court

analyzing California law and holding that a district attorney is a state official for purposes of

§ 1983 liability while acting in their prosecutorial capacity.) Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot hold

the County of San Diego liable for the actions of Defendant Link while he was acting in his

prosecutorial capacity.

In conclusion, Plaintiff has supplied the Court with additional evidence indicating that

the grounds for his criminal conviction have been reversed by the California Court of Appeal.

The Court’s March 3, 2008 Order relied, in part, on the favorable termination rule of Heck. The

Court’s previous determination that Defendants Harutunian and Link are entitled to absolute

immunity is not changed by the reversal of Plaintiff’s convictions or any new allegations found

in Plaintiff’s Motion. However, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to clarify his claims against

Defendant Gonzalez and the City of San Diego, Plaintiff will be permitted to file a First

Amended Complaint as to these Defendants only.

III. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief

from Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b) is GRANTED in part, and DENIED, in part.

The Clerk of Court is directed to reopen the case and set aside the Judgment as to Defendants

Gonzalez and the City of San Diego. The judgment in favor of Assistant District Attorney Link,

Judge Harutunian and the County of San Diego shall remain in effect. The Court finds no just

reason for delay as to the entry of final judgment in favor of Defendants Link, Harutunian and

the County of San Diego and directs the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment for Defendants

Link, Harutunian and the County of San Diego pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 54(b).

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 Plaintiff will be permitted to file a First Amended Complaint relating to the claims

against Defendant Gonzalez and the City of San Diego within forty five (45) days from the date

this Order is filed. Plaintiff shall notify the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of this Order.

DATED: October 15, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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