Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02838/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02838-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUGENE E. WELCH, No. 2:12-cv-2838-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

CDCR, et al.,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

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84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges defendant Knipp and the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in general, is attempting to get him hurt or killed by

transferring him to a different prison. He claims that he has many enemies within the prison

system because he killed a known gang member. He also claims that if he is housed in a dorm,

he will likely get hurt or killed due to his sleepwalking. 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from a number of defects, only some of which are

subject to cure. First, to the extent plaintiff indicates he is at risk of being hurt or killed, the

undersigned finds this claim to be speculative and lacks sufficient basis of facts as alleged. 

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of

dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.

1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1)

objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of

serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge

element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not

liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison

officials know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more

than a mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison

officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to

respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

There are no facts alleged as to any specific threat against plaintiff, nor that he is

being transferred to and placed in the same yard as a known enemy. Transfer of prisoners among

the different facilities within CDCR is common, and enemy separation occurs even within the

same facility. There is simply not enough facts presented in the complaint for the court to

determine whether there is in fact a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff, or that he is being subject

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to transfer, notwithstanding the risk, with the defendant’s knowledge and disregard of that risk. 

These defects are curable, and plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to file an amended

complaint to allege sufficient facts, if possible, to state a claim for violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights to be free from a substantial risk of harm. 

Second, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to state a claim regarding a right to

remain at a specific facility, such a right does not exist. Prisoners have no liberty interest in

avoiding being transferred to another prison. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245

(1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976); United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102,

105 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Inmates have “no justifiable expectation” that they will be

incarcerated in any particular prison, and transferring an inmate to another prison does not

infringe a protected liberty interest. Olim, 461 U.S. at 245; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489

(1980). This claim is not subject to cure.

Finally, plaintiff names CDCR as a defendant to this action. However, the

Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against a state both by

its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley

Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition extends to suits against states

themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248

(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A state’s

agency responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state agency for purposes of

the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hale v.

Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th cir. 1993) (en banc). Therefore, this court is prohibited

from hearing a suit brought against CDCR. Again, this claim is not subject to cure.

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the

entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

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Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original

complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following

dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged

in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order

to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint

must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Because some of the defects identified in this order cannot be cured by

amendment, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend as to such claims. Plaintiff, therefore, now

has the following choices: (1) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which does not allege the

claims identified herein as incurable, in which case such claims will be deemed abandoned and

the court will address the remaining claims; or (2) plaintiff may file an amended complaint which

continues to allege claims identified as incurable, in which case the court will issue findings and

recommendations that such claims be dismissed from this action, as well as such other orders

and/or findings and recommendations as may be necessary to address the remaining claims.

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; 

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a new form Complaint 

By a Prisoner.

DATED: December 23, 2015

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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