Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01088/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01088-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Plaintiff’s other claims have previously been adjudicated 1

through law and motion. The Monell claim is Plaintiff’s only

remaining claim.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAFAR AFSHAR,

NO. CIV. S-04-1088 LKK/JFM

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

CITY OF SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO

POLICE DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF

SACRAMENTO; SACRAMENTO COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; and SHERIFF

LOU BLANAS, individually and in his

official capacity as Sheriff of the

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, Jafar Afshar, brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) against

the County of Sacramento (“defendant”). Plaintiff alleges that he

was assaulted by officers while in custody at the Sacramento County

Jail. Pending before the court is defendant’s motion to bifurcate 1

the trial. For the foregoing reasons the court finds that

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bifurcation is not appropriate in this case. The court decides the

matter based on the papers and after oral argument.

I.

Standards

Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confers

broad discretion upon the district court to bifurcate a trial.

Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021

(9th Cir. 2004). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides

in pertinent part:

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to

avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will

be conducive to expedition and economy, may

order a separate trial of any claim,

cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party

claim, or of any separate issue. . . .

The issue of whether to bifurcate is guided by

consideration of several factors: (1) whether separation of the

issues for trial will expedite disposition of the action; (2)

whether such separation will conserve trial time and other

judicial resources; (3) whether such separation will avoid

prejudice; and (4) whether the issues are essentially

independent of each other so that there will be no need to

duplicate the presentation of significant areas of the evidence

in the separated proceedings. McKellar v. Clark Equip. Co., 101

F.R.D. 93, 94 (D. Me. 1984). “Absent some experience

demonstrating the worth of bifurcation, ‘separation of issues

for trial is not to be routinely ordered.’” Hamm v. American

Home Products Corp., 888 F.Supp. 1037, 1039 (E.D. Cal.

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1995)(citing Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)).

II.

Analysis

Defendant moves to bifurcate the trial. Specifically,

defendant requests that the issue of whether plaintiff

suffered a constitutional injury be adjudicated first. If a

jury finds that there was a constitutional injury, the second

phase of the trial would address the issue of whether the

injury resulted from an official government policy or custom. 

Defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating

that bifurcation is warranted. It is clear that evidence

regarding the constitutional injury is relevant to the

question of whether there is a policy or custom of abuse. For

instance, proof of a constitutional violation might (although

not necessarily) be probative of official government policy. 

Moreover, bifurcating the trial as suggested by defendant

would require the repetition of both lay and expert witness

testimony. Defendant’s seven page brief fails to explain how

having a single trial would prejudice the County or might

confuse the jury. 

A close examination of the cases cited to by defendant do

not support bifurcation. For example, defendant cites to

General Patent Corporation v. Hayes Microcomputer, (C.D. Cal.

1997) 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21342. That case had multiple

defendants with a common interest in the issues regarding the

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validity and enforceability of a patent. The issue of

damages, however, was specific and unique to each individual

infringer. The trial was bifurcated so that the common issues

could be tried together and the issue of individual damages

could be tried in the second phase of the trial. In the case

at bar, there are no individual defendants and therefore,

convenience to individual defendants is not a concern. 

The other cases cited to by defendant are similarly

distinguishable. For example, in Quintilla v. City of Downey,

the district court bifurcated the trial of the individual

police officers from the government entities. “The

bifurcation enabled the [district] court to separate the

questions regarding the constitutionality of the three

officers' actions from the questions regarding the Chief and

city's liability under Monell.” 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir.

1996). The district court was concerned not only about

economy, but also potential prejudice to the individual

officers. Id. 

Generally, when district courts bifurcate § 1983 trials

it is to hear claims against individual officers first, before

turning to Monell claims against government entities. See,

e.g., Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002);

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 518 (9th Cir.

1999). In the case at bar, however, the Monell claim is the

only claim at issue and the County is the only named

defendant. There are no individual officers and thus,

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concerns of prejudice and confusion are minimal.

Defendant is correct that a public entity is not liable

for § 1983 damages unless a fact finder concludes that an

individual officer, acting pursuant to policy, inflicted

constitutional harm. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475

U.S. 796 (1986)(per curiam). As the Supreme Court explained

in Heller: 

[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at

the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that

the departmental regulations might have authorized the

use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside

the point.

475 U.S. at 799. This general principal does not, without

more, justify bifurcation. Indeed, there are less burdensome

ways to deal with potentially prejudicial and confusing

evidence than bifurcating the trial. Concerns about potential

prejudice to the defendant may be directly addressed with

appropriate limiting instructions. The court may also use a

special verdict form which would instruct the jury to

determine the question of injury before determining the

question of policies or customs. 

In short, this case involves one claim against one

defendant. This is not a case in which there are claims

against several individual government officials as well as

separate Monell claims against governmental entities. 

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, separate trials in this

case would not be efficient and would inconvenience the court,

the jury, and the plaintiff. Accordingly, defendant’s motion

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must be DENIED. 

III.

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to bifurcate is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 14, 2007.

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