Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01032/USCOURTS-arwd-1_06-cv-01032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Because the Court finds that substantial evidence 1

supports the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ applied the correct

standard of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant’s brief

without quotation or citation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

ANTOINE D. ROBINSON, Plaintiff

v. Case No. 06-1032

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration, Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Antoine Robinson (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial

review of the Commissioner’s denial of his request for

supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Plaintiff has exhausted

all of his administrative remedies, and therefore, pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review is now appropriate. After

reviewing the record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision of

the Commissioner.1

I. Background

The facts and arguments are presented in the parties’

briefs, and consequently will be duplicated here only to the

extent necessary. Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ”) decision within the administrative record sets forth his

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

2

findings and it will not be repeated herein except to the extent

necessary to address Plaintiff’s arguments.

II. Standard of Review

The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct standard of law and whether the

Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.

1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a

reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support the

Commissioner’s conclusion. See Warburton, 188 F.3d at 1050. In

making this determination, the Court considers evidence that

detracts from the Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence

that supports it. See id. The Court may not reverse the

Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence

supports a different result. See Pierce v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704,

706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is true even if the Court might have

weighed the evidence differently and reached a different result

if a de novo review were applied. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).

To receive disability benefits a claimant must show: (1) a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has

lasted, or can be expected to last, for not less than twelve

months; (2) an inability to engage in any substantial gainful

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

3

activity; and (3) the inability results from the impairment. See

42 U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2); see also Timmerman v.

Weinberger, 510 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The Court

reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ followed

the Commissioner’s implementing regulations, which set out a

five-step, burden-shifting process for determining whether the

claimant has a “disability” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.

The five steps are (1) whether the claimant is currently

engaging in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) whether the

claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the severe impairment

is, or is comparable to, a listed impairment precluding

substantial gainful activity as a matter of law; (4) whether the

claimant, with his current Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

can meet the demands of his past work, and if not; (5) whether

the claimant retains the capacity to perform any other work that

exists in significant numbers in the economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520, 416.920 (2004); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42

(1987) (discussing the five-step analysis). In the first four

steps, the burden is on the claimant to prove that he or she is

disabled. If the claimant is not able to perform his or her

past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that

there are jobs in the national economy that the claimant can

perform, although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

4

the claimant. See Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2

(8th Cir. 2004); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24,

28 (2003) (noting that the existence of jobs in the national

economy must be proved only at step five).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff is a twenty-six year old male. He contends he

has been disabled since October of 2003, due to asthma and a

gunshot wound. The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled and had

the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work. 

Plaintiff’s alleges six points of error by the ALJ. Two of

these points concern the ALJ’s treatment of the evaluation of

Plaintiff performed by Dr. Kahn. Specifically, the Plaintiff

contends the ALJ was in error to characterize Dr. Kahn’s

examination of Plaintiff as “basically normal” and that the ALJ

failed to consider Dr. Kahn’s finding that Plaintiff was “mildly

disabled.” The remaining four points of claimed error concern

the ALJ’s discounting of the Plaintiff’s credibility and

subjective complaints.

EVALUATION OF DR. KAHN

The examination by Dr. Kahn, a physician who treated

Plaintiff at the request of the social security administration,

revealed bullet fragments in Plaintiff’s chest. It is

Plaintiff’s position that these fragments explain the pain

articulated by Plaintiff when he moves and uses his left arm.

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

5

Dr. Kahn noted that Plaintiff was “mildly disabled” due to the

gunshot wounds. 

 The ALJ found Dr. Kahn’s examination to be “basically .

. . normal” and was well supported in this conclusion. Dr. Kahn

noted that Plaintiff’s limits on limb function and passive range

of motion for his extremities were within normal limits. (Rec.

231-232). In fact, Dr. Kahn found Plaintiff had normal

reflexes, range of motion, lungs and heart, as well as a clear

chest with no acute problems. (R. 230-232, 235). Dr. Kahn

concluded Plaintiff had a mild disability of a two percent

limitation to his functional abilities (R. 234), but did not

conclude that Plaintiff was “disabled.” 

Given the conclusions of Dr. Kahn that Plaintiff was within

normal limits of the tested areas, there was no error for the

ALJ to conclude that Dr. Kahn’s examination found Plaintiff to

be “basically normal.” Additionally, the ALJ took Dr. Kahn’s

report into account in determining Plaintiff’s claim. While

there is no specific reference to the two percent functional

limitation Plaintiff may now experience, the ALJ did reflect

that some of the limitations were the result of his gunshot

wounds. Thus, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Kahn’s opinion is

without error and is supported by the substantial evidence of

record.

PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILTIY

Plaintiff contends the ALJ further erred in evaluating

Plaintiff’s credibility. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

6

ALJ failed to take into account that while the Plaintiff stated

he could lift five (5) pounds, he also stated such lifting would

be with pain. Also, the Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in

discounting his credibility due to Plaintiff’s failure to seek

medical care without considering Plaintiff’s financial hardship

in affording such treatment or care. The Plaintiff further

testified to difficulty walking and to frequent headaches, which

the Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly failed to consider. 

The substantial evidence of record shows that the ALJ

properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and

relied upon those limitations he found to be credible. The ALJ

followed the directives of Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 948

(8th Cir. 1984)in evaluating the Plaintiff’s credibility. He

gave careful consideration to Plaintiff’s daily activities,

frequency and intensity of pain, aggravating factors,

effectiveness of medication, and any functional restrictions.

Id. The ALJ then articulated clear inconsistences between

Plaintiff’s testimony and the evidence of record.

The medical records do not demonstrate a level of disabling

pain consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony. Plaintiff’s only

treating physician, Dr. Newsome, was treating the Plaintiff for

bronchitis, not for a disabling impairment. Furthermore,

Plaintiff did not seek any medical treatment for his alleged

disabling conditions. Plaintiff argues this is because he could

not afford medical treatment, but the Eighth Circuit is clear

that failure to seek treatment is a valid reason to discount a

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

7

claimant’s credibility, despite financial status. Plaintiff

could have sought care for the indigent, or other low-cost

medical services. Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926 (8th Cir.

2004) (finding that failure of claimant to seek care is relevant

consideration to discount credibility even if financial hardship

exists). Additionally, Plaintiff is only taking Tylenol for his

headaches, giving the ALJ a proper ground to discount

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding the effect of those

headaches. Haynes v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir.

1994)(finding that only taking medications, such as aspirin for

pain on occasional basis as proper reason to discount

Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain.) 

Finally, the daily activities performed by Plaintiff are

inconsistent with the level of disabling pain reflected in his

testimony. Plaintiff takes care of his personal needs, ironing,

cleaning, preparing small meals, attending church, and watching

television. Although Plaintiff claims he is unable to work

because he can not lift more than five pounds, the record shows

he stopped working in 2001, much before his accident in 2003.

Thus, the ALJ’s is supported by the substantial evidence of

record in discounting the Plaintiff’s credibility as to his

subjective complaints of pain. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is

supported by the substantial evidence of the record as a whole

and is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED WITH

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>
AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

8

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: October 31, 2006

 /s/ Robert T. Dawson 

ROBERT T. DAWSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01032-RTD Document 11 Filed 10/31/06 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: <pageID>