Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02948/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02948-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAT DELOS SANTOS,

Plaintiff,

v

JOHN E POTTER, Postmaster 

General

Defendant. /

No C-06-2948- VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated him based on

his race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e et seq, and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA), 29 USC § 621 et seq. Doc #1 (Compl). On

January 12, 2007, defendant moved to dismiss several of plaintiff’s

claims. Doc #8. In response, plaintiff filed a “statement of nonopposition” to defendant’s motion and requested leave to file an

amended complaint, Doc ##13, 19, which defendant opposed in part,

Doc #18. 

Case 3:06-cv-02948-VRW Document 22 Filed 03/26/07 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Because the court finds this matter suitable for decision

without oral argument, the hearing scheduled for March 22, 2007, is

VACATED. See Civ L R 7-1(b). For the reasons that follow, the

court GRANTS defendant’s unopposed motion and GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.

I

“[A] party may amend the party’s pleading * * * by leave

of court * * * and leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” FRCP 15(a). The Ninth Circuit directs district courts

to apply the policy of Rule 15(a) with “extreme liberality.” 

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v Rose, 893 F2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir

1990) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v Leighton, 833 F2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir 1987)). This liberality, however, is “subject to the

qualification that amendment of the complaint [1] does not cause

the opposing party undue prejudice, [2] is not sought in bad faith

and [3] does not constitute an exercise in futility.” DCD

Programs, 833 F2d at 186 (internal citations omitted). See Lockman

Foundation v Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F2d 764, 772 (9th

Cir 1991) (“The district court may decline to grant * * * leave [to

amend], though, where there is any apparent or declared reason for

doing so, including undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing

party or futility of the amendment.”) (internal quotations

omitted). 

 The only qualification relevant to the present case is

the potential futility of plaintiff’s desired amendments. “A

proposed amendment to a complaint is ‘futile only if no set of

facts can be proved under the amendment * * * that would constitute

Case 3:06-cv-02948-VRW Document 22 Filed 03/26/07 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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a valid and sufficient claim.’” Fischer v City of Portland, 2003

US Dist LEXIS 25613, *6 (D Ore 2003) (quoting Sweaney v Ada County,

Idaho, 119 F3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir 1997)). “A plaintiff should be

afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits rather than

on a motion to amend unless it appears beyond doubt that the

proposed amended complaint would be dismissed for failure to state

a claim under [FRCP] 12(b)(6).” Id (citing Miller v Rykoff-Sexton,

Inc, 845 F2d 209, 214 (9th Cir 1988)). See Moore v Kayport Package

Express, Inc, 885 F2d 531, 538 (9th Cir 1989) (affirming district

court’s denial of leave to amend when proposed amendment was

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim). Finally, the

Ninth Circuit has held that leave to amend should be denied if the

proposed amendment is “redundant.” Sisseton- Wahpeton Sioux Tribe

v United States, 90 F3d 351, 356 (9th Cir 1996). 

Defendant does not oppose plaintiff’s proposed amended

complaint “save for two aspects: [plaintiff’s] proposed first cause

of action for ‘constitutional violations’ under the Fifth And Ninth

Amendments and [plaintiff’s] naming of ‘Does 1 through 50' as

defendants.” Doc #18. The court addresses these two issues in

turn.

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot maintain his

proposed Bivens action because Title VII is the exclusive remedy

for employment discrimination allegations against defendant. See 

Brown v General Services Admin, 425 US 820, 829 (1976) (ruling that

Title VII “provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of

discrimination in federal employment.”). Under Brown, Title VII

precludes all employment discrimination claims except those for

non-job-related “highly personal violations” and unconstitutional

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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acts other than discrimination, such as assault, rape and physical

abuse. See Otto v Heckler, 781 F2d 754, 755, 756-7 (9th Cir 1986)

(exclusivity exception applied to the lawsuit alleging

non-job-related assault); White v General Services Admin, 652 F2d

913, 916-7(9th Cir 1981) (exclusivity exception would apply to

“unconstitutional action other than the discrimination”). Here, 

plaintiff’s constitutional claim arises out of the alleged

employment discrimination and thus falls within Title VII’s

exclusivity. See Doc #13, ¶ 26, 34-35, 39, 50 (alleging plaintiff

was forced to resign in violation of plaintiff’s “due process

rights”). 

Moreover, in view of the comprehensive remedial scheme

for employment discrimination provided by Title VII and the ADEA,

the court doubts whether separate remedies are even available under

Bivens, see Bush v Lucas, 462 US 367, 390 (1983) (Bivens remedies

unavailable where Congress has established a comprehensive remedial

scheme), especially for plaintiff’s unprecedented reliance on the

Ninth Amendment. See Correctional Services Corp v Malesko, 534 US

61, 66-8 (2001) (explaining that Bivens has been applied to Fourth,

Fifth and Eight Amendments, but since 1980, “we have consistently

refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new

category of defendants”). Accordingly, because plaintiff’s Bivens

claim is based on defendant’s allegedly discriminatory termination

of plaintiff, Title VII and the ADEA constitute plaintiff’s

exclusive remedies.

Next, the court addresses plaintiff’s proposed addition

of fifty “Doe” defendants. Unnamed, or “Doe” defendants are not

favored in the Ninth Circuit. Gillespie v Civiletti, 629 F2d 637,

Case 3:06-cv-02948-VRW Document 22 Filed 03/26/07 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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642 (9th Cir 1980) (citing Wiltsie v California Dep’t of

Corrections, 406 F2d 515, 518 (9th Cir 1968)). This court has also

expressed its disfavor of Doe defendants. See Estrada v Gomez,

1995 US Dist LEXIS 14239, *15-16 (ND Cal 1995). See also Casillas

v Auto-Ordnance Corp, 1996 US Dist LEXIS 7396, * 17 (ND Cal 1996). 

The court disfavors such nebulous pleading because (1) a Doe

defendant cannot be effectively served, (2) the court cannot

determine that a Doe defendant is a real person or entity who could

be sued in federal court, (3) the court cannot determine if a Doe

defendant is subject to any type of immunity and (4) the court

cannot determine if plaintiff’s suit could survive a Doe

defendant’s motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment. See

Cornejo v Unknown Agents of the United States Marshal Service, 1994

US Dist LEXIS 11297, *6 (ND Cal 1994); Stewart v Federal Bureau of

Investigation, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 18784, *5-6 (D Ore 1999). 

Numerous Doe defendants, especially ones sued in their

individual capacities, have no place in a complaint unless

plaintiff provides the court with more identifying information

regarding such defendants. Given that a named defendant remains in

this suit, the court encourages plaintiff to use discovery to

attempt to identify the Doe defendants. If plaintiff uncovers

information concerning the identities of the Doe defendants, the

court will entertain a motion to amend the complaint. Accordingly,

the court denies plaintiff’s current motion to add 50 Doe

defendants. 

//

//

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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II

In sum, the court GRANTS defendant’s unopposed motion to

dismiss and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART plaintiff’s motion

for leave to amend his complaint. Plaintiff may file his proposed

first amended complaint, see Doc #13, but the court DENIES

plaintiff’s motion to add a cause of action for constitutional

violations and DENIES plaintiff’s motion to add Doe defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-02948-VRW Document 22 Filed 03/26/07 Page 6 of 6