Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00132/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00132-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERT DEWEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUZUKI, parole office supervisor; 

et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 10-132 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Bert Dewey, an inmate at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran,

California, filed a pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before

the court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. His motion for appointment of counsel also is

before the court for consideration.

DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Case 3:10-cv-00132-SI Document 4 Filed 07/15/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Dewey alleges in his complaint that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated on

September 9, 2008, when a "parole search team" entered his home. He alleges that the parole

search team members did not knock and announce their presence before forcing entry and

crossing the threshold to enter his home, and only announced themselves as they crossed the

threshold. Liberally construed, the complaint states a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be

granted for a Fourth Amendment violation. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)

(knock-and-announce principle is part of 4th Amendment reasonableness inquiry). 

Although the complaint states a claim, there is a problem with the defendants. That is,

the complaint fails to link any defendants to the claim. The complaint lists as a defendant San

Jose parole office supervisor "Suzuki," but did not allege that Suzuki participated in the search

or made any decision with regard to the entry at Dewey's home on September 9, 2008. The

parole office supervisor may have been listed just because he/she was in charge of the parole

office, but that would be improper because there is no respondeat superior liability under section

1983, i.e. no liability under the theory that one is responsible for the actions or omissions of an

employee. Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by

the defendant. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). In his amended complaint,

Dewey must allege what Suzuki did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional

rights. 

Dewey's complaint also lists "the parole search team" and "unknown Jane and Joe Does"

as defendants. Complaint, pp. 2-3. The parole search team apparently is the group of

individuals who conducted the search, and not a legal entity. Although Dewey's complaint does

not have specific allegations against the Jane and Joe Doe defendants, it appears that they were

the members of the parole search team. It is permissible to use Doe defendant designations in

a complaint to refer to defendants whose names are unknown to plaintiff. Although the use of

Case 3:10-cv-00132-SI Document 4 Filed 07/15/10 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Doe defendants is acceptable to withstand dismissal of a complaint at the initial review stage,

using Doe defendants creates its own problem: those persons cannot be served with process in

this action until they are identified by their real names. Dewey must take steps promptly to

discover the full name (i.e., first and last name) of each Doe defendant and provide that

information to the court in an amendment to his pleading that explains what each such person

did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional rights. The burden remains on the

plaintiff; the court will not undertake to investigate the names and identities of unnamed

defendants. 

To summarize, the complaint has only one defendant (i.e., Suzuki) who has been

identified by name, but the complaint does not state a claim against him or her. The complaint

appears to state a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim against the Doe defendants on the parole

search team, but none of them can be served with process because Dewey hasn't provided the

true name for any of them. Thus, he needs to amend to allege facts showing a basis for liability

for Suzuki and to provide true names for the Doe defendants. The court will grant him a lengthy

period of time to amend so that he can find the names of the Doe defendants. If he does not

provide those names, they will be dismissed without prejudice. And if he does not provide

names for the Doe defendants, and does not state a claim against defendant Suzuki in the

amended complaint, the whole action will be dismissed. 

Dewey moved for appointment of counsel to represent him in this action. A district court

has the discretion under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1) to designate counsel to represent an indigent civil

litigant in exceptional circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

1986). This requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability

of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues

involved. See id. Neither of these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before

deciding on a request for counsel under section 1915(e)(1). Here, exceptional circumstances

requiring the appointment of counsel are not evident. The motion for appointment of counsel

is DENIED. (Docket # 3.) 

Case 3:10-cv-00132-SI Document 4 Filed 07/15/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. The amended

complaint must be filed no later than September 30, 2010, and must include the caption and

civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page.

Plaintiff is cautioned that his amended complaint must be a complete statement of his claims and

will supersede existing pleadings. See London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th

Cir. 1981) ("a plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are

not alleged in the amended complaint.") Failure to file the amended complaint by the deadline

will result in the dismissal of the action.

Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. (Docket # 3.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2010 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-00132-SI Document 4 Filed 07/15/10 Page 4 of 4