Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06059/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06059-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA GARCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

LOS BANOS UNIFIED SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-CV-6059-SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTIONS IN LIMINE REGARDING

EXPERT TESTIMONY AND OPINION

EVIDENCE (DOCS. 60, 61)

Plaintiff is proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for all

proceedings, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301.

I. Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Opinions and Other

 Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert M. Anne Juri, M.A.,

 M.F.T. (Doc. 60)

Defendant filed a motion to exclude opinion and other

testimony of Plaintiff’s expert M. Anne Juri, M.A., M.F.T., on

December 5, 2006, including a notice, memorandum, declaration,

and exhibits. Plaintiff filed opposition on December 27, 2006,

including a memorandum and the declarations of Rey Hassan and

expert Anne Juri. The motion was argued on February 6, 2007, by

Rey Hassan, counsel for Plaintiff, and Robert Rosati, counsel for

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 1 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Defendant, and the matter was submitted to the Court for

decision.

The motion addresses numerous aspects of anticipated

testimony, which are given twenty numbers in the motion (Mot. pp.

1-3), and it raises multiple grounds for exclusion.

A. Hearsay

Defendant objects on hearsay grounds to testimony and/or

opinions from Juri regarding numerous subjects (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17). 

With respect to examination of expert witnesses, Fed. R.

Evid. 703 states:

The facts or data in the particular case upon

which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be

those perceived by or made known to the expert at or

before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon

by experts in the particular field in forming opinions

or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need

not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion

or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are

otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the

jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference

unless the court determines that their probative value

in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion

substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 

(Emphasis added.)

Fed. R. Evid. 705 states:

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or

inference and give reasons therefor without first

testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the

court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event

be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on

cross-examination.

Rule 703 as amended in 2000 requires a court asked to admit

otherwise inadmissible evidence to determine whether the facts

are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular

field, and then whether or not the probative value of the

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 2 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

underlying data substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The evidence is to be admitted only if the Court answers both

questions in the affirmative. Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa

Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9 Cir. 2003) (upholding the th

trial court’s exclusion of inadmissible hearsay used as the basis

of opinion where the probative value was minimal and the

prejudice from admission substantial). The amendment provides a

presumption against disclosure to the jury of information that is

used as the basis of an expert’s opinion and is not admissible

for any substantive purpose, when that information is offered by

the proponent of the expert. Id. at 1062.

Here, some of these matters that Defendant seeks to exclude

as hearsay concern events or phenomena that Plaintiff apparently

had related to Juri, such as family assessment and cultural

values, Heid’s treatment and/or alleged continued harassment of

Garcia after the October 2002 yelling incident and after the May

30, 2003, masturbation incident, support for her statements by

Garcia’s coworkers, a decline in Plaintiff’s work performance,

instigation by Heid of a poisonous work environment followed by

Defendant’s doing nothing to correct it, and changes in Garcia’s

relationship with her husband. Juri apparently considered these

matters in reaching her opinion. If these matters were offered

for the truth of the matters asserted by Plaintiff in the

statements, the evidence would be hearsay. The only apparent

reason for admitting such statements would be to explain the

basis of the expert’s opinion. 

The treatment that Plaintiff received by Heid and Defendant,

and Plaintiff’s experience of the effects of this on her marriage

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 3 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

and other aspects of her life, will presumably be the subject of

Garcia’s own testimony, so any repetition by an expert in the

form of a detailed narrative of the facts would be duplicative.

These facts, along with a family history or other biographical

information, are of a type reasonably relied on by experts.

However, unnecessary repetition of the details of Plaintiff’s

perception of the events, coworkers’ attitudes, and statements

would bring very subjective phenomena before the jury and would

carry a potential for prejudice in the form of an undue focus on

emotional issues and distraction of the trier from the central

issues in a case already tending towards evidentiary complexity

because of the involvement of several different scenarios of

harassment within the workplace.

On the other hand, Plaintiff, the source of the information,

is subject to cross-examination by Defendant, so the possibility

for true prejudice may be limited by cross-examination and by a

limiting instruction. 

However, on balance, the potential for prejudice, confusion,

and undue consumption of time outweighs the probative value of

the evidence. The Court cautions that Juri shall not summarize

the Plaintiff’s own statements made to Juri regarding what

happened to Plaintiff. Recounting Plaintiff’s statements

regarding her coworkers’ support also will not be allowed because

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential

prejudice. 

The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to exclude

from the expert’s initial testimony Plaintiff’s own statements

regarding what happened to Plaintiff (as distinct from some more

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 4 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

summary explanation by the expert regarding a course of events

related by Plaintiff) and Plaintiff’s statements regarding her

coworkers’ support.

Some of the matters Defendant seeks to exclude are opinions

from the expert regarding the effect of various events, such as

the October 2002 yelling incident, on Plaintiff, such as that

Plaintiff was victimized again by the ineffectiveness of the

school district in stopping Heid’s behavior; that Plaintiff’s

relationship with her husband changed as a result of any conduct

by Heid or Defendant; that Plaintiff had diarrhea and vomiting

during April 2005 during her deposition due to work-related

stress; and more generally that Heid’s behavior caused Plaintiff

psychiatric distress, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and

deeply damaged Plaintiff.

The expert’s opinions concerning Plaintiff’s condition,

including diagnosis, causation of psychological harm, and opinion

regarding the nature and extent of the harm caused Plaintiff, is

generally within the expert’s expertise. It concerns subjects

regarding which expert evidence would assist the trier of fact.

Of course, there will be some overlap with phenomena that the

trier may understand on a common-sense level, such as the fact

that conflict at work may cause stress, or physical threats may

cause fear, etc. However, the nature and extent of the damages

suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the alleged harassment are

material issues. 

Counsel should take care to question the expert carefully to

elicit opinions concerning these matters and not opinions

concerning the conduct itself which the expert would opine was

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 5 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

the cause of Plaintiff’s damage; it is the condition of the

Plaintiff and the effects of any conduct that should be the focus

of the inquiry. 

The expert has no personal knowledge of the events

experienced by Plaintiff, and thus any opinion of the expert as

to whether or not Plaintiff was harassed, Heid’s alleged

treatment of Plaintiff after the yelling incident, whether the

school district victimized Plaintiff again, or the motivation of

other actors in the workplace, separate and apart from the

opinion of the effect of such conduct on Plaintiff, would be

inadmissible.

To the extent that it is generally accepted that one

person’s yelling at another is unpleasant and usually upsetting,

the jury most likely would not be assisted by Juri’s opinion on

this. However, Juri will be allowed to testify that she was told

it occurred, Plaintiff was upset by it, and Juri considered the

totality of the circumstances in diagnosing Plaintiff.

Other matters involve opinions regarding Plaintiff’s

subjective state of mind that resulted from the various events,

such as Plaintiff’s claimed fear of retaliation if she reported

Heid, Plaintiff’s feeling that she was repeatedly or continually

victimized by the district, and Plaintiff’s feeling that Heid

sensed he was safe from the district to continue to abuse

Plaintiff. This type of information is probative of Plaintiff’s

state of mind as a result of the alleged harassment and of any

emotional distress that Plaintiff might have suffered; it relates

to her damages. Again, it is expected that Plaintiff herself will

testify to her own subjective experience of the treatment she

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 6 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

received from the district; undue repetition of this material

could be prejudicial, particularly if repeated with the imprint

of an expert. However, the expert should be allowed to testify to

her opinion of the perceived psychological damage to Plaintiff

that resulted from the alleged misconduct, and to any fear and

anxiety if they are part and parcel of that damage.

Further, the Court emphasizes that if otherwise inadmissible

evidence is admitted to explain the expert’s opinion, then a

limiting instruction should be given to the jury to inform it

that the hearsay evidence is to be considered solely as a basis

for the expert opinion and not as substantive evidence. United

States v. 0.56 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9 Cir. 1997) th

(citing Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1261-62

(9 Cir. 1984)). To the extent that any hearsay is admitted, a th

limiting instruction should be given.

The Court will evaluate the proffer of this evidence as it

is presented in trial and entertain any objections and

suggestions for limiting instructions at that time. 

B. Opinion Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s Credibility

Defendant seeks to exclude evidence relating to credibility,

including various opinions concerning the effect of discrete

instances of Heid’s misconduct on Plaintiff, opinions regarding

Plaintiff’s credibility, whether or not she was telling the truth

(subject matter not further specified) and/or the veracity of

Garcia’s claimed reactions, such as fear of retaliation or a

sense that Heid felt free to harass her, the veracity of or the

claimed effects on Garcia of Garcia’s allegations that Heid

mimicked masturbation on May 30, 2003, or adjusted himself or

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 7 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

played with his private parts at other times, and opinions

regarding Heid’s later treatment of Plaintiff.

The Court has previously addressed the inadmissibility of

opinions of the expert regarding the conduct of Defendants and

the admissibility of opinions relating to the injury caused by

the alleged harassment. Further, the Court has addressed the

inadmissibility (absent further development of evidence, request

by a party, or cross-examination) in general of Plaintiff’s own

statements as related to the expert.

With respect to opinions of the expert as to the Plaintiff’s

credibility, it is established that because it is the province of

the jury to determine credibility, opinions that are nothing more

than vouchers for or attacks on credibility (such as that sexual

harassment occurred as alleged by the victim) do not assist the

trier of fact. United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912-13 (9th

Cir. 1973) (upholding, in the absence of unusual circumstances,

the trial court’s exclusion of the opinion of a psychiatrist and

psychologist that a government witness was a sociopath who would

lie when it was to his advantage to do so); United States v.

Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9 Cir. 1979) (error to permit an th

expert to testify to the ability of a witness to recall a

stabbing, and noting that under the Federal Rules of Evidence,

opinion testimony on credibility is generally limited to

character, and all other opinions on credibility are for the jury

to form); United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10 Cir. th

1999) (in criminal proceeding concerning sexual abuse, it was

held appropriate to admit an expert’s statement that the alleged

victim’s symptoms were consistent with symptoms of sexually

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 8 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

abused children, but error to have admitted statements to the

effect that abuse had happened because doing so invaded the

province of the jury); United States v. Witted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-

(8 Cir. 1993) (in criminal proceeding for sexual abuse of a th

child, it was held permissible for expert to describe the

characteristics exhibited by the alleged victim, summarize the

medical evidence, and express an opinion that the evidence was

consistent with the victim’s allegations of abuse; however, a

diagnosis of repeated child sexual abuse was in effect an opinion

that sexual abuse was in fact occurring and, whether in the guise

of a medical opinion or not, was not useful to the jury and was

not admissible); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-41 (8th

Cir. 1986) (error to permit pediatrician to opine as to the truth

of the story told by a victim of child sexual abuse

[specifically, to testify that the child was believable and that

he could see no reason why she would not be telling the truth]

because it invaded the province of the jury and exceeded the

scope of permissible expert testimony under Rule 792); Nichols v.

American National Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 882-83 (8 Cir. 1998) th

(it was held to be an intrusion into the jury’s territory and

error to permit a psychiatric expert to testify that the

Plaintiff had poor psychiatric credibility or ability to assess

the cause of her own state or report her symptoms accurately;

further, she had “recall bias” (mistaken ideas regarding her past

symptoms), malingered, and was motivated by secondary gain, and

the Plaintiff’s own psychiatric expert’s examination of her had

been subject to such weaknesses); but see, United States v.

Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 15 (1 Cir. 1997) (finding error st

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 9 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

in the exclusion of an expert’s testimony regarding a potential

witness’s mental illness and its impact on his behavior,

including a propensity to exaggerate, where the witness was

incompetent and thus did not testify in front of the jury, but

the witness’s taped statements were introduced, and thus there

was a special need for probative evidence regarding the condition

in order for the lay jury to be able to determine intelligently

the weight to place on the recorded statements); Skidmore v.

Precision Printing and Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 618 (5 Cir. th

1999) (in a sexual harassment case, upholding a trial court’s

admission of the testimony of a psychiatrist that the Plaintiff

seemed genuinely distressed to him, and he did not think that the

Plaintiff had lied to him or fabricated her psychiatric symptoms,

because it did not constitute testimony that Plaintiff was

undoubtedly telling the truth, but rather was in essence

testimony that her symptoms and recollections appeared genuine

and that he felt that he had not been duped by her).

Here, as previously noted, the opinions regarding the effect

of the claimed harassment on Plaintiff would be admissible, but

opinions regarding whether or not the claimed harassment occurred

would be beyond the scope of permissible expert opinion. Opinions

regarding Plaintiff’s credibility in general would likewise be

inadmissible, although there might be, pursuant to Skidmore, some

room for the expert to testify to her reliance on Plaintiff’s

statements to her and her impression that she had not been duped

as a basis for her opinion (as distinct from testifying to

Plaintiff’s overall credibility, or her credibility on the

stand). It does not appear that there is any component of

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 10 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Plaintiff’s diagnosed condition, PTSD, that relates to

truthfulness; there does not appear to be any set of special

circumstances here that would warrant departing from the general

rule that opinions regarding Plaintiff’s credibility, and her

credibility with respect to the material allegations, are

inadmissible.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude

testimony and opinions regarding Plaintiff’s credibility IS

GRANTED.

C. Opinions on Cultural Practices

Defendant would exclude Juri’s testimony and opinions

regarding Mexican burial and funeral practices because Juri is

unqualified. 

Juri testified that she had received a lot of training in

cultural diversity, had lived in Puerto Rico for four years, and

currently treated Hispanic clients in Spanish, including a lot of

people from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Chile; she was a Catholic.

(Rosati Decl., Ex. 3, Dep. p. 146.) She stated in her declaration

that she speaks Spanish, is bilingual, understands the spiritual

and cultural values of Roman Catholic Hispanic people, such as

Plaintiff, and she visited Mexico numerous times, although the

nature and extent of the contact with Mexico or burial or funeral

customs is not specified. She states that she is familiar with

Mexican burial customs, where the burial and memorial services

may be separated by an interval of time, but the basis for the

familiarity is uncertain.

The relevance of this testimony is uncertain, but it appears

that it is part of an effort to set forth a cultural context in

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 11 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

which to establish the nature or extent of Plaintiff’s damages

resulting from an apparent assertion that Plaintiff fabricated in

some respect in connection with funeral or family leave that

Plaintiff took in order to visit Mexico, or that Plaintiff abused

the leave system. It may also be for the purpose of buttressing

Plaintiff’s credibility regarding the leave, her conduct

regarding it, and an apparent controversy that arose thereafter

concerning her use of the leave.

In some sense, a cultural background or context for

Plaintiff’s experiences with respect to the funeral leave would

be based on specialized knowledge of cultural facts within the

meaning of Rule 702. However, it does not appear that Plaintiff

is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education, or that the testimony is based on

sufficient facts or data and is the product of reliable

principles and methods. Although experience may be a sufficient

basis for qualifying an expert, it does not appear that Juri had

any special familiarity or experience with Mexican funeral

practices. There is no basis for a conclusion that Plaintiff has

sufficient qualifications to opine what the precise cultural

context is with respect to the Mexican funeral or burial

practices in question. Training in cultural diversity does not

appear to constitute training regarding Mexican funeral

practices. Likewise, knowledge of Spanish and even some anecdotal

experience with Mexican citizens would not appear to qualify the

psychologist as a cultural expert. There is evidence that

Plaintiff brought Juri papers, including the death certificate,

the date of the burial, photographs of various churches Plaintiff

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 12 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

visited, a description of the importance to Mexican people of the

importance of an island also visited, and information, apparently

from the internet, brought by Plaintiff to Juri to explain how

Mexican people celebrate the Day of the Dead or a funeral ritual.

(Id. pp. 25-30.) However, there is no evidence of Juri’s

qualifications to render an opinion on Mexican funeral practices

or the special cultural significance of bereavement activities in

Mexico. Cf. United States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592, 595-96 (9th

Cir. 1996) (recognizing the court’s discretion and upholding

exclusion of a cultural expert, a person familiar with problems

faced by migrant farmworkers, to testify to an explanation of the

Defendant’s flight from police, where the person was allowed to

testify that the Defendant was afraid of governmental

deportation, and where the subject was not necessarily one that

needed illumination from an expert); Jinro America Inc. v. Seure

Investments, Inc., 266 F.3d 993 (9 Cir. 2001, amended 272 F.3d th

1289 (9 Cir. 2001) (finding an abuse of discretion to admit the th

defense’s expert witness to testify about Korean law and business

practices, including a propensity to engage in fraud, based on

experience as a detective in Korea for many years, because the

limited experience was inadequate qualification and permitted no

more than impressionistic generalizations about Korean businesses

based on personal experiences, a hobby, newspaper articles, and

marriage to a Korean woman).

Here, Plaintiff can testify to her family’s cultural

traditions, her own conduct, and its significance with respect to

her experience in connection with the leave controversy at her

place of work and the alleged misconduct of Heid and the

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 13 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Defendant. The jury can evaluate that testimony; it does not

appear that the subject is one that necessarily needs

illumination from an expert. Juri may testify regarding

Plaintiff’s damages or injury, which necessarily involved to some

extent a cultural context as related by Plaintiff. However, it

does not appear that Juri has adequate qualifications on her own

to establish expertise with respect to Mexican burial practices

themselves.

Defendant’s motion to exclude Juri’s expert opinion

regarding Mexican burial practices IS GRANTED.

D. Scope of Opinion

1. Opinions regarding Defendant’s Conduct

Defendant seeks to exclude Juri’s opinion regarding the

effectiveness of Defendant’s anti-discrimination procedures,

including that Plaintiff was victimized again by the

ineffectiveness of the school district in stopping Heid’s

behavior, and regarding Heid’s having instigated a poisonous work

environment with Defendant’s doing nothing to correct it.

As previously noted, Juri lacks personal knowledge of the

conduct of Defendant and its agent. As to expertise, Juri is a

licensed family therapist, and has been since 1982, all in good

standing; she has testified in court and jury trials and has been

declared an expert in the areas of stress, chemical dependency,

family law, and post-traumatic disorder.

The only qualifications mentioned with respect to poisonous

work environment are that Juri has been retained by four

different school district and seven different schools by

insurance carriers to mediate school interpersonal conflicts

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 14 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

between personnel and provide training to school staff and

management. Further, she states that she knows about group

dynamics and is well aware that one person may cause discord

among the whole group; further, she states that if one attempt at

resolution is unsuccessful, there are a multitude of other

approaches which could be used, but Defendant did not try any of

them.

Plaintiff’s qualifications are clearly geared towards family

therapy; her expertise is psychological. Her experience was in

mediating personnel disputes, not in dealing with sexual

harassment, fashioning or evaluating policies or procedures with

respect to the work environment, or judging the adequacy of

employers’ responses to complaints of sexual harassment. It does

not appear that the trier would be assisted by the testimony

because it is up to the trier to determine the adequacy and

reasonableness of Defendant’s actions and responses to the

complaints.

Although qualification may to some extent be a matter of

degree, this case is analogous to United States v. Chang, 207

F.3d 1169 (9 Cir. 2000) (within the trial court’s discretion to th

exclude expert testimony on authenticity of a foreign certificate

where the expert’s expertise covered the history of issuance of

the certificates, not authenticity), and Jones v. Lincoln

Electric Co., 188 F.3d 709 (7 Cir. 1999) (qualifications in th

material science and metallurgy insufficient to warrant opinion

testimony as to medical or biological issues concerning the

ability of lungs to absorb manganese from manganese fumes).

Defendant’s motion to exclude Juri’s opinion testimony

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 15 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

regarding the effectiveness of Defendant’s anti-discrimination

procedures and the instigation and perpetuation of a poisonous

work environment IS GRANTED.

2. Mexican Funeral and Burial Practices

As previously noted, Plaintiff lacks qualifications with

respect to these issues; further, it would not appear that any

opinion in this area would be of assistance to the trier of fact.

Defendant’s motion to exclude such evidence IS GRANTED.

3. Opinion that Plaintiff’s Diarrhea

 and Vomiting during April 2005 and Her

 Deposition Was Due to Work-Related Stress 

Defendant seeks to exclude this evidence because of lack of

qualification to utter an opinion. Defendant relies on the

testimony of Dr. Laurie Hedden, Garcia’s primary care physician,

that her vomiting in April 2005 was caused by an illness and

medication prescribed by Hedden, but that stress could have

contributed to it.

It appears that Juri’s qualifications and methodology would

permit her to opine regarding the cause of a symptom such as

nausea, which common knowledge holds is sometimes associated with

stress. Although vomiting may be a biological or physiological

phenomenon, even the medical expert acknowledged that stress

could have contributed to the symptom. The soundness of the

opinion and the facts upon which it was based may be explored by

cross-examination. It has been recognized that a psychologist may

testify that physical symptoms, such as sexual problems, fatigue,

and difficulty breathing, are caused by a psychological

phenomenon where they are related to the psychological diagnosis.

Ferris v. Pennsylvania Federation Brotherhood of Maintenance of

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 16 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Way Employees, 153 F.Supp.2d 736, 742 (E.D.Pa 2001). Here, the

physical symptom of vomiting or nausea may constitute physiologic

reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an

aspect of the traumatic event, phenomena included in the

diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to exclude

the testimony of Juri regarding Plaintiff’s PTSD and the

causation of distress, other symptoms, and injury as a result of

Plaintiff’s experience with Heid and Defendant.

E. Reliability of Expert’s Method

Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness

qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education, may testify thereto in the form

of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is

based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony

is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods

reliably to the facts of the case.

By way of overview, in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)

(providing that generally, preliminary questions concerning the

qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a

privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined

by the court) and 702 (expert opinion evidence), it is suggested

that the possible preliminary fact determinations that a district

court must make upon objection may include 1) whether the

testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge; 2) whether the expert’s testimony will assist the

trier of fact; 3) whether the witness is a qualified expert; 4)

whether the information underlying the opinion was of a type

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 17 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in

forming an opinion; and 5) whether the testimony is both reliable

and relevant. Jones and Rosen, Federal Civil Trials and Evidence

§ 8: 1627 (Rutter 2006); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-95 (1993). 

In determining to admit scientific evidence, the trial court

must determine if the evidence is relevant and reliable. Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)

(upholding the trial court’s admission of a well-credentialed

expert’s opinion, based on a review of extensive published

scientific literature, that maternal use of a specific

pharmaceutical was not a risk factor for human birth defects, and

exclusion of other well-credentialed experts who based their

opinions regarding causation of birth defects on test-tube and

live animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and unpublished

and therefore not peer-reviewed re-analysis of previously

published human statistical studies). In order for a scientific

expert’s opinion, inference, or assertion to be reliable, it must

be derived by the scientific method, with science being

recognized as a process for proposing and refining explanations

about the world that are subject to further testing and

refinement; further, it should be supported by good grounds

(appropriate validation) based on what is known. Id. p. 590.

Evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness of scientific evidence

is based on scientific validity in the context of the purpose for

which the evidence is offered; there must be a valid scientific

connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to

admissibility. Id. In place of a personal knowledge requirement

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 18 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

for the basis of an opinion is the assumption that the expert’s

opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and

experience of his discipline. Id. p. 592.

The relevance portion of Rule 702 consists of the

requirement that the evidence or testimony must assist the trier

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and

must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will

aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute. Id. p. 591.

The trial court’s determination of preliminary facts

concerning the admissibility of expert evidence that is based on

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge should be

stated on the record; the proponent of challenged evidence bears

the burden of establishing its admissibility by a preponderance

of the evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 592 n. 10 (1993); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd.

v.Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-51 (1999); Elsayed Mukhtar v.

California State University Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9 Cir. th

2002).

Here, Defendant seeks to exclude Juri’s opinions and

testimony regarding Garcia’s suffering from post-traumatic stress

disorder, psychiatric distress, decline in work performance, deep

damage, and a change in her relationship with her husband as a

result of Heid’s conduct.

Defendant argues that Juri’s method was unreliable because

Juri did not know about or use established standards in her field

for differential diagnosis. There is evidence that Juri did not

sit down and use a specific or current diagnostic tree; she did

not use the American Psychological Association’s Diagnostic and

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 19 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text

Revision, in diagnosing Plaintiff; she had the DSM-IV,

copyrighted in 1994, but only the diagnostic criteria, and not

the commentary. She testified that no one in her professional

organizations had promulgated the newer version, and consistent

use of the older codes had produced no problems with codes for

insurance billing; further, the industry standard was moving to

ICD codes, but that had not yet been mandated. (Dep. pp. 52-53.)

She went through the diagnostic criteria for PTSD with Plaintiff

in order to present normalizing experience, and she noted which

diagnostic criteria Plaintiff had. (Dep. p. 55-56.) Although Juri

did not formally go through the decision tree for differential

diagnosis, she had studied how to diagnose during her training

for her license; and because she had done it so often, it was

automatic as activating the clutch in a car, and she determined

that Plaintiff had PTSD, depression, and marital and occupational

problems. (Dep. pp. 55-57.) 

In her declaration, Juri stated that she made a differential

diagnosis of Plaintiff, narrowing the diagnosis from chronic

depression, generalized, anxiety disorder, social anxiety

disorder, agoraphobia, obsessive compulsive disorder,

panic/anxiety disorders and/or malingering to post trauma stress

disorder as the only diagnosis that embraced all of Plaintiff’s

symptoms, using the diagnostic criteria in the DSM IV Statistical

Manual. (Decl. pp. 2-3.) She noted that Plaintiff was not

obsessive compulsive or a malingerer. (Id. p. 3.) Further, the

criteria sets used for the diagnosis did not differ in the DSMIV-TR and DSM-IV. (Id.) 

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 20 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

There is no expert evidence contradicting Juri’s assertions,

and Defendant admits that no changes were made in the later

manual in the criteria sets for diagnosis; however, Defendant

notes that additional or updated information regarding associated

features is provided.

Juri held approximately a dozen clinical consultations with

Plaintiff, performed mental status examinations, and reviewed

journals and self-scoring scales filled out by Plaintiff. Juri

also considered Plaintiff’s performance evaluations and her

deposition, and she met with two of Plaintiff’s coworkers. (Dep.

p. 33; Report of June 2, 2005.)

The Court concludes that Juri adhered essentially to a

process of differential diagnosis. She distinguished her

diagnosis from acute stress disorder; her path of differential

diagnosis included the major differentiations set forth in the

DSM-IV-TR (Rosati Decl., Ex. 6 p. 467), including consideration

of mood disorders, chronic depression, other anxiety disorders,

obsessive-compulsive disorder, and malingering. 

She did not evaluate whether any of her anxiety disorder was

attributable to the physiological effects of medication because

Juri was not a physician and thus was not competent to do so;

however, she determined that Plaintiff’s anxiety began before she

was medicated. (Dep. p. 61-62.) She determined that Plaintiff did

not have anxiety disorder due to general medical conditions

because her anxiety arose when the problems with Heid arose; her

attempt to review medical records was thwarted by the physician’s

failure to send all the requested records. (Dep. pp. 63-64.) Juri

determined that Plaintiff was borderline with agoraphobia that

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 21 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

was not full-blown, and she did not have a social phobia or

social anxiety disorder; she only had anxiety disorder around

Heid. (Dep. 76.) She determined (made an educated guess) that

Plaintiff used alcohol to cope with stress and anxiety and that

the alcohol did not cause the problem. (Dep. p. 66.) Juri went

through generalized anxiety disorder, but it was not as complete

as PTSD, so she settled on PTSD. (Dep. p. 78.)

The Court concludes that Juri’s opinion was reached pursuant

to a reliable scientific method, namely, differential diagnosis,

whereby it is determined which of two conditions or diseases with

similar symptoms is the one suffered by the patient by systematic

comparison and contrasting of clinical findings; it is a standard

scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical

problem by eliminating likely causes until the most probable one

is isolated. Such a method, if properly conducted, is recognized

to be admissible under Daubert. Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339

F.3d 1049, 1057 (9 Cir. 2003). Competing causes generally th

capable of causing the symptom or condition should be considered,

and hypotheses should each be eliminated by a process of

providing reasons, using scientific methods and procedures as

distinct from subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation,

until a conclusion is reached as to the most likely cause of the

findings. Id. p. 1058. 

Here, Juri used a differential diagnosis. The fact that she

might have not ruled out a general medical condition or

medication should not preclude a finding that the otherwise

reliable methodology was indeed reliable; Juri was not a

physician. However, she did consider medication and use of

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 22 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

alcohol and made conclusions thereon based on data and logic in

light of her experience and training. She stated in her

declaration that she did consider malingering. (Decl. p. 2.)

It has been recognized that not every possible cause must be

ruled out in order for the differential process to be considered

reliable enough to be admitted. See, Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc.,

167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999); see, Weinstein’s Federal

Evidence § 702.06[2][c] n. 48 (2d ed. 2006) (citing numerous

authorities). Strict or perfect adherence to method is not

required. S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 921 (9 Cir. 2001) (opinion th

of psychiatrist that Plaintiff suffered from PTSD held admissible

even though the expert testified that he did not rely solely on

the DSM criteria but also on his own understanding of the

disorder, which permitted triggering by an event less severe than

one outside the range of usual human experience, because later

revisions of the DSM supported the expert’s criterion and thus

reflected general acceptance). 

To the extent that Defendant seeks to show that the decision

was unsound, Defendant may cross-examine Juri regarding her

methodology and assumptions, and it is ultimately for the trier

of fact to evaluate the opinion.

There do not appear to be additional bases for challenging

the reliability of the evidence. The Court notes that the

opinions of Juri appear to be based on scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge. The testimony will directly assist

the trier of fact to understand the nature and extent of any

damages suffered by Plaintiff. The information underlying the

opinion appears to be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 23 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

in the particular field in forming an opinion. 

Defendant’s motion to exclude this evidence IS DENIED. 

F. Undisclosed Opinions 

Defendant also seeks to exclude any opinions not set forth

in the Rule 26 disclosure. The Court has not been made aware of

any such opinions; however, it notes that the general rule is

that matters not disclosed are not admissible without

establishing substantial justification or harmlessness. Fed. R.

Evid. 37(c). At this point there is no specific undisclosed

evidence before the Court or any showing of substantial

justification or harmlessness; thus, no undisclosed opinion

evidence should be admitted.

Defendant’s motion to exclude such evidence IS GRANTED.

II. Exclusion of Testimony and Opinions of Stephen

 Morewitz, Ph.D. (Doc. 61) 

Defendant filed a motion to exclude opinion and other

testimony of Plaintiff’s expert Stephen Morewitz, Ph.D., on

December 5, 2006, including a notice, memorandum, declaration,

and exhibits. Plaintiff filed opposition on December 27, 2006,

including a memorandum and the declarations of Rey Hassan and

expert Stephen Morewitz, Ph.D., and a resume of Dr. Morewitz. The

motion was argued on February 6, 2007, by Rey Hassan, counsel for

Plaintiff, and Robert Rosati, counsel for Defendant, and the

matter was submitted to the Court for decision.

This motion again seeks to exclude fifteen separate

opinions; however, they break down into various categories which

will be addressed in the following analysis.

The facts may be briefly summarized. Morewitz had worked in

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 24 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

assessing the impact of injuries, and specifically sexual

harassment, on the victim and the victim’s social, family, and

occupational functioning; he had done research on sexual

harassment and psycho-social problems. (Rosati Decl., Ex. 3 pp.

132-33.) He had taught sociological research methods including

survey, field research, experimentation, and collection and

analysis of data from different sources, using a widely

recognized text in his teaching; although sociology and

psychology overlap, there are basic methodological criteria,

including two different approaches to field research. (Rosati

Decl., Ex. 3 p. 11-13.) In studying organizations, sociologists

use a variety of methods and theories, including field research,

survey research, and experimental research. There are a variety

of methods of performing field research, including unobtrusive

methods, such as analysis of existing records, organizational

records, and records of human behavior; further, there is

collection of data in the field and design or use of a

questionnaire. (Id. p. 14.) Field research involves going into an

organization or organizations, looking at the policies and

observing how they are being implemented, interviewing human

resource managers and personnel as well as employees to find out

what issues are coming up, what the organizational problems are,

assessing the experience of people being trained, checking for

problems with training of employees and staff regarding sexual

harassment and the procedures, comparing the attitudes and

knowledge of managers with those of employees, and assessing it

through the process of triangulation; selecting interview data,

reviewing documents, comparing and contrasting, determining

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 25 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

whether the documents are being used; assessing the effectiveness

by looking at outcomes, such as claims or lawsuits filed compared

to others in the field. He had participated in one of the first

studies of sexual harassment in the late 1970's, which led to his

writing of a book on sexual harassment. (Id. 14-19.)

Triangulation was taking different sources of data and relating

the sources to each other to discern the presence of

epistemological gaps, inconsistencies, or errors in knowledge or

perceptions; if needed, additional data would then be collected.

(Id. p. 22.)

Morewitz testified that he made a psychosocial evaluation of

Plaintiff to evaluate the social, occupational, and family impact

considering the issues of trauma; it was not purely an approach

of clinical psychology. Such evaluations could be performed in

different ways, but he used the Social Readjustment Rating

Questionnaire developed by Holmes and Rahe, a social adjustment

scale that was developed to assess the impact of life events on

social functioning, family functioning, occupational functioning,

and educational functioning, and that has been used extensively

and found to have high reliability and validity. He used it in

conjunction with interviewing and observation and review of

depositions; he then analyzed it and prepared a report. Plaintiff

filled out the scale, and then Morewitz conducted an observation

interview of Plaintiff about it for several hours. He then

reviewed the depositions, reviewed his book, and prepared the

report. (Id. pp. 43-44, 89.) The Holmes and Rahe instrument

permitted bringing up issues such as a hostile work environment

and/or anxiety and fear about retaliation on the job causing

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 26 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

errors in job performance. (Id. p. 147.) In forming his opinions,

he used methods that are approved, including triangulation from

different data sources, looking for inconsistencies and patterns,

doing further research, and then looking for further

corroboration for consistencies, to determine whether there is a

consistent pattern over time. He used the protocol, or screening

devices to assess psycho-social impact of problems, and he had

special knowledge and training in the use of protocols and had in

fact developed them. (Id. p. 144-45.) The techniques he utilized

in evaluating the claim had been subject to peer review; the

Holmes and Rahe scale and the use of triangulation were classic

techniques that were in the textbooks, and the instrument had

quantitative scores. (Id. p. 147.) 

Plaintiff had experienced fifteen out of forty-three events

in the rating scale, indicating that her problems with Heid had

significantly impaired her occupational, family, and social

functioning. (Tr. 149.)

Further, in his declaration submitted in opposition to this

motion, Morewitz stated that the Homes and Rahe Social

Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRQ) is commonly used and well known

as a standard instrument to assess the type of functioning to

which he seeks to testify; its findings have been replicated and

validated, with validation in more than thirty-four recent peerreviewed scientific publications. Triangulation is a method he

has used to collect and analyze data as a valuable research

strategy; he notes its use in evaluation of social, family and

occupational functioning. 

A. Compliance with Defendant’s Policies 

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 27 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

Defendant seeks to exclude expert opinion as to whether or

not Defendant effectively followed its own sexual harassment

policies and procedures in responding to Plaintiff’s complaints

of sexual harassment and workplace abuse against Heid. 

Pursuant to Rule 702, specialized knowledge must assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact

in issue. The test is to undertake a common sense inquiry whether

the untrained layperson would be qualified to determine

intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular

issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized

understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. Fed. R.

Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note (1972). It is within the trial

court’s discretion to exclude expert testimony where the jury is

capable of evaluating the testimony presented at trial and could

determine for itself the matter in question. Curtis v. Oklahoma

City Public Schools Bod. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1219 (10 Cir. th

1998) (upholding the trial court’s exercise of discretion where

expert testimony was allowed regarding what effective recruiting

was and the potential negative effects of recruiting during the

summer, but disallowed with respect to whether the recruitment

plan in the case was effective and constituted harassment or

retaliation because the issues were not beyond the ken of people

of ordinary intelligence); Pelster v. Ray, 987 F.2d 514, 526 (8th

Cir. 1993) (suggesting that even if a witness had qualified as an

expert, testimony regarding whether a vehicle’s odometer had been

rolled back based on odometer readings on two titles, odometer

statements, and check-in sheets was within the ability of any lay

person to compare and determine). 

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 28 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Here, determining whether Defendant’s own policy was

followed or not is within the ability of a lay person

intelligently to determine without the aid of specialized

knowledge.

B. Failure to Investigate, Monitor, and Train,

 and Sub-standard Response

Defendant seeks to exclude evidence regarding whether

Defendant and Elliott failed to investigate Garcia’s complaint of

sexual harassment and abuse, monitor the progress towards a

resolution, and ensure Heid did not retaliate; whether

Defendant’s employees were properly trained in what constitutes

abusive behaviors, including sexual harassment; and whether

Defendant’s conduct fell below the standards of an organization

in responding effectively to Garcia’s complaints.

Initially, the Court notes that it would be helpful to the

trier of fact to have information from someone with specialized

knowledge of the elements of effective sexual harassment policies

and implementation thereof in the workplace. Although generally a

lay person is qualified to determine what is reasonable in

various circumstances, Morewitz’s experience includes twentythree years as a social scientist at academic and other

institutions, where he taught, trained regarding, and researched

sexual harassment policies and procedures. He taught and

conducted research on sexual harassment policies and procedures

to students who included human resource managers and

administrators. He is certified by the National Association of

Forensic Counselors. He appears to have specialized knowledge of

the sociological aspects of these subjects as well as an

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 29 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

understanding of sociological methods. If he has sufficient

specialized knowledge regarding the elements of effective sexual

harassment policies and effective implementation of such policies

within the relevant context (i.e., with respect to institutions

such as Defendant during the relevant time period, etc.), he

could testify to norms or standards concerning such policies and

implementation thereof, and the manner in which and extent to

which Defendant’s conduct deviated from normative standards. His

expertise would be helpful to the trier in evaluating the

appropriateness and effectiveness of the Defendant’s response to

Plaintiff’s complaints. Compare, Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d

1473, (noting the appropriateness of admitting expert testimony

that compares the conduct of parties to an industry standard),

overruled on another point in Davis v. City and County of San

Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, vacated in part and hearing denied in

Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 984 F.2d 345 (1993). 

Here, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is proposing to offer

Morewitz to give such testimony, or is instead attempting to

establish that Morewitz conducted a scientific study of the

specific sexual harassment policies and implementation thereof by

Defendant using specific sociological methods, and that his

opinion should be admitted based on such a process. In view of

the centrality of the issue that the trier must decide, namely,

the reasonableness of Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s

complaint, the Court has determined not to rule on this aspect of

this motion at this juncture. Instead, further clarification of

Plaintiff’s offer, including the basis for the opinion and method

used, is required. The Court has only very general information

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 30 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

regarding Morewitz’s experience; it is difficult at this point to

determine his actual familiarity and experience with the elements

and implementation of sexual harassment policies in institutions

such as Defendant and other pertinent aspects of qualification to

render an opinion on a standard within educational employment

such as Plaintiff’s. Further, if Morewitz’s testimony on this

matter is not sought to be introduced to show an industry

standard and deviation therefrom, then it is not clear what

method or expertise is being relied upon. 

The Court expects to be further informed regarding this and

further proposes to arrange with counsel to hold a hearing

outside the presence of the jury before Morewitz begins his

testimony at which these preliminary matters relating to his

testimony concerning the adequacy of the investigation and

response may be presented, considered, and ruled upon by the

Court.

Ruling on this portion of Defendant’s motion IS RESERVED for

further proceedings.

C. Evidence of the Effect of Defendant’s Policies, 

 Procedures, and Conduct

Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of the effect of

Defendant’s policies, procedures, and conduct, including the

possible impact of Heid’s behaviors on Plaintiff’s family,

social, and occupational functioning, including but not limited

to Dr. Morewitz’s psycho-social evaluation regarding the social

impact, occupational impact, and family impact of the alleged

events on Garcia, and any opinions derived from his use of the

Holmes and Rahe’s “Social Readjustment Rating Questionnaire”; and

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 31 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

whether Plaintiff suffered stress, anxiety, depression, and

stress-related health problems, including aggravation of her skin

condition, Vitiligo, severe stress which resulted in multiple

health problems and major disruption of her occupation, social,

and family functioning, and was prescribed anti-depressant

medication as a result of her problems in dealing with Heid

because of her problems in dealing with Heid.

With respect to the determination of reliability, there is

no exhaustive list of factors to be considered, but factors noted

by the authorities include whether the scientific theory or

technique can be and has been tested, whether it has been

subjected to peer review and publication, whether there is a

known or potential error rate, and whether it is generally

accepted in the relevant scientific community; the inquiry is

whether the analysis undergirding the experts’ testimony falls

within the range of accepted standards governing how scientists

conduct their research and reach their conclusions, and thus the

party presenting the expert must show that the expert’s findings

are based on sound science by presenting some objective,

independent validation of the expert’s methodology. Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316-17 (9 Cir. th

1995).

Here, Morwitz testified that he used a reliable,

established, accepted method and protocol; the techniques he

utilized in evaluating the claim had been subject to peer review.

He had special knowledge and skill in using the protocol. There

is no expert evidence contradicting this evidence or otherwise

creating doubt as to the reliability of the Holmes and Rahe

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 32 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

scale. Questions regarding the precise use of triangulation in

his assessment may be covered on cross-examination, but even if

the Court were to accept the fact that some experts may misuse

triangulation, it has not been established that there was any

misuse in the present case. It appears that the method used to

assess the social, family, and occupational effects on Plaintiff

was reliable. 

Morewitz reviewed deposition testimony, pleadings, and other

discovery in addition to administering the instrument and

interviewing Plaintiff. Although he did not review all of the

material before rendering his initial report, the later

additional review did not change his opinion. Questions regarding

the precise factual basis or responses of Plaintiff on the

instrument may likewise be covered on cross-examination.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion in limine IS DENIED with

respect to opinions based on the use of the Holmes and Rahe

instrument and as to the nature and extent of the effects on the

sociological, occupational, and family functioning of Plaintiff.

To the extent that Defendant objects that a sociologist is

not qualified to opine as to the truth of falsity of Plaintiff’s

harassment allegations, and as to causation of medical or

physical conditions (i.e., that anxiety, depression, aggravation

of Vitiligo, and stress-related health problems were suffered by

Plaintiff as a result of sexual harassment or Heid’s conduct, and

that anti-depressant medication was prescribed as a result of

Heid’s conduct), the Court agrees that opinions as to the truth

of falsity of Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment, and

further opinions as to purely physical phenomena and the

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 33 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

causation thereof, are not helpful to the trier and are beyond

the expertise of this expert, respectively. 

Further, to the extent that Defendant objects that Morewitz

should not be able to repeat Plaintiff’s assertions of fact as

his opinions, again, the Court notes that it is anticipated that

Plaintiff will be testifying before Morewitz testifies, and it

would be duplicative to have the expert recite in detail all the

factual assertions of Plaintiff. As previously noted, it is not

the province of the expert to testify to the truthfulness of the

allegations. 

However, the Court understands from Morewitz’s testimony

(Dep. pp. 131-32) that Morewitz has assumed the truth of

Plaintiff’s representations because he stated that it was

“implicit,” and that it was the role of the trier of fact, and

not his role, to determine the facts; he has merely assumed that

Plaintiff is credible in forming his opinions. Again, as

previously analyzed, it is not the province of the expert to

testify generally as to the Plaintiff’s credibility or as to the

ultimate issue of whether or not the events claimed by Plaintiff

to have occurred did or did not actually occur. 

Accordingly, consistently with the foregoing analysis,

Defendant’s motion to exclude opinions as to these matters IS

GRANTED.

C. Undisclosed Opinions 

As previously noted, the Court understands that only

opinions previously disclosed in conformity with Fed. Rule Civ.

Proc. 26 are admissible. Thus, to the extent that this motion

seeks to exclude any opinions not disclosed, the motion IS

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 34 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-06059-SMS Document 117 Filed 03/08/07 Page 35 of 35