Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00638/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00638-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MONTUE, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-02-0638 FCD KJM P

vs.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, et al., 

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

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Plaintiff is a state prison inmate proceeding pro per with a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by

Folsom Prison’s requirement that African-Americans share tables at mealtimes with white and

Hispanic racists and gang members, which subjects plaintiff to the risk of being injured by other

inmates during an altercation or by guards attempting to quell altercations. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages and “any other damages according to proof” as well as

injunctive relief.

 Defendants Campbell and Butler, present and former wardens of Folsom, have

brought a motion to dismiss.

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I. Standards For A Motion To Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976). The court must also construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See Hishon

v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651

F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981).

Generally the court evaluates the complaint and its attachments, if any, in ruling

on a motion to dismiss. However, a court may rely on matters properly subject to judicial

notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (“a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable

dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th

Cir. 2001). A court may take judicial notice of its own records. United States v. Wilson, 631

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) .

II. Injunctive Relief

Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff’s address

on his pleadings is no longer Folsom State Prison, but rather California Medical Facility; they

argue plaintiff thus has no standing to obtain injunctive relief. Mem. P. & A. in Supp. Mot to

Dismiss (MTD) at 4-5. Plaintiff relies on a number of attachments and argues it is likely he will

be transferred back to Folsom and subjected to the same dangerous arrangement. Am. Opp’n to

MTD (Opp’n) at 2, Exs. A-F.

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A federal court will not entertain an action that does not present an actual case or

controversy and “‘[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not itself show a present case or

controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse

effects.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). Generally, when a prisoner is transferred from the prison whose

policy he is challenging, any claim for injunctive relief becomes moot. Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d

1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1986). The court

takes judicial notice of its own records and finds that plaintiff’s transfer moots his claim for

injunctive relief.

Plaintiff argues that the situation is capable of repetition yet evading review, and

there is a reasonable expectation he will be sent back to Folsom Prison and subjected to the same

policies in the future. He does not prevail on either point.

As the Supreme Court has explained, a claim does not “evade review” if it may be

litigated in a lawsuit, as plaintiff is attempting to do here. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. Those claims

generally found to “evade review” are based on “activity that is of short duration.” Wiggins v.

Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985). Moreover, the principle applies only in

“exceptional situations,” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109, and cannot be based on plaintiff’s “subjective

fear . . . of again being transferred” to Folsom. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 403 (1975);

Wiggins, 760 F.2d at 1011-12. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is moot and

must be dismissed.

II. The Requirement Of Actual Injury

Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot recover for mental and emotional injury

because he has not alleged he suffered actual physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). However,

the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) limiting recovery do not apply to

allegations of constitutional violation that are not based on mental or emotional injury. Calhoun

v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003) (action may proceed on Eighth Amendment claim

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even though no physical injury); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 2002). To the

extent plaintiff seeks nominal damages for the violation of his rights, apart from any emotional

injury, he may proceed with the action if his complaint states a claim.

III. Failure To State A Claim

Plaintiff argues that the district court determined that his complaint stated a claim

when it remanded to permit him to show imminent danger and proceed without the prepayment

of fees. See Order filed Feb. 5, 2003 (docket no. 12). However, a court’s determination under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “is not a vehicle for determining the merits of a claim.” Ciarpaglini v. Saini,

352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). This court thus proceeds to consider the merits of

defendants’ motion. 

A. Eighth Amendment

In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), the Supreme Court confirmed

that “‘prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners’” under the Eighth Amendment. A prison official is not liable, however, “unless the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. In other words, in order to be

deliberately indifferent, a prison official must be subjectively aware of the risk. Id. at 839-40. 

The ultimate test is whether the prison official acted reasonably in light of his knowledge; if he

did, he is not liable under the Eighth Amendment even if the prisoner is harmed. Id. at 844. 

In Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996) the Seventh Circuit framed the

question before it as

when officials knowingly and unreasonably house a prisoner with

inmates who pose a substantial risk to his safety, what harm must

actually befall the prisoner before a court may say he is entitled to

monetary compensation for a violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights.

Id. at 271. The court concluded “it is the reasonably preventable assault itself, rather than any

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fear of assault, that gives rise to a compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 272.

And in Doe v. Welborn, 110 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1997), the court rejected Doe’s claim of an

Eighth Amendment violation because he had neither been harmed nor subjected to extreme,

officially sanctioned psychological harm. Plaintiff’s claim of mere fear of assault in this

situation does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff also posits a Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from the same set of

facts. To the extent he is basing this claim on the perceived danger from his association with

racist Hispanics and skinheads, his claim is subsumed in his Eighth Amendment claim. Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). To the extent he is claiming a substantive due process

right not to associate with other, objectionable inmates, his claim similarly fails. While the due

process clause confers both procedural and substantive rights, the “reach of substantive due

process” has been restricted to interference with bodily integrity or personal decisions relating to

marriage, child bearing and rearing, and family relationships. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d

1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the bounds of substantive

due process as thus delineated. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss be

granted. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: March 1, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

2/mont0638.57

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