Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00281/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00281-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Joseph Artiaga, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00281-TUC-RM

ORDER 

 On August 2, 2016, Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald issued a Report and 

Recommendation (Doc. 35) recommending that this Court deny Petitioner’s Petition 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. No objections to the Report and 

Recommendation were filed. 

 A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a 

magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The advisory committee’s notes to Rule 

72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that, “[w]hen no timely objection is 

filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record 

in order to accept the recommendation” of a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) 

advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition. See also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 

F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If no objection or only partial objection is made, the 

district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”); Prior v. Ryan, 

CV 10-225-TUC-RCC, 2012 WL 1344286, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2012) (reviewing for 

Case 4:13-cv-00281-RM Document 36 Filed 09/08/16 Page 1 of 4
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

clear error unobjected-to portions of Report and Recommendation). 

 The Court has reviewed Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation, the 

parties’ briefs, and the record. The Court has not found any clear error in Judge 

Macdonald’s recommended disposition. 

 With respect to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims found by Judge 

Macdonald to be procedurally defaulted, the Court notes that Petitioner has not argued 

that ineffective assistance of post-conviction review counsel establishes cause under 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), for the procedural default of any claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Even if Petitioner had raised a Martinez issue, he 

has not shown that the underlying procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims are substantial. See id. at 1318. 

 Judge Macdonald found that Petitioner relied only on state law in presenting to the 

state court his claim regarding the denial of a continuance. (See Doc. 35 at 40.) In his 

opening brief on direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner cited only to 

state cases regarding when denial of a continuance violates constitutional rights. (Doc. 

23-2, Exh. O at ¶ 16.) However, Arizona v. Hein, 674 P.2d 1358, 1367 (Ariz. 1983), 

cited by Petitioner in the opening brief, discusses when a defendant’s federal 

constitutional rights are violated by the denial of a request for a continuance. 

Additionally, Petitioner argued in his opening brief that he had a right under the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution to challenge grand jury proceedings, and 

connected this argument to his argument regarding the denial of a continuance. (Id. at ¶ 

17.) Respondents conceded in their Answer that Petitioner’s opening brief on direct 

appeal in state court raised the argument regarding the denial of a continuance as a 

federal claim. (Doc. 23 at 11.) However, even if Petitioner’s opening brief on direct 

appeal could be interpreted as fairly presenting a claim that the denial of a continuance 

violated Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights, the opening brief argued only that the 

denial of a continuance prevented Petitioner’s trial counsel from reviewing the grand jury 

transcript for error. As explained in Judge Macdonald’s Report and Recommendation, 

Case 4:13-cv-00281-RM Document 36 Filed 09/08/16 Page 2 of 4
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

any constitutional errors in Petitioner’s grand jury proceedings are harmless because 

Petitioner was ultimately convicted of the offenses charged. See United States v. 

Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986); Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2006). Petitioner did not argue in state court that the denial of a continuance prevented 

defense counsel from adequately preparing for trial. To the extent that Petitioner is now 

arguing that the denial of a continuance prevented adequate trial preparation, that claim is 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991). Petitioner has not shown cause or prejudice to 

excuse the procedural default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986). 

 Judge Macdonald found Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct to be 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. The Court notes that, in Petitioner’s opening 

brief on direct appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued that the state 

violated his constitutional rights by misrepresenting to the grand jury the reasons for his 

failure to appear. (Doc. 23-2, Exh. O at ¶ 19.) The Court agrees that this argument did 

not fairly present a federal claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004) (state prisoner must alert state court to alleged federal nature of 

claim); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (general appeal to broad 

constitutional guarantee does not satisfy fair presentation requirement). However, even if 

the argument could be interpreted as fairly presenting a federal claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct, the claim relates only to alleged constitutional errors in the grand jury 

proceedings, and any constitutional errors in those proceedings are harmless due to 

Petitioner’s convictions of the offenses charged. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70; Williams, 

441 F.3d at 1042. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 35) is accepted 

and adopted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied, and this case is dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 4:13-cv-00281-RM Document 36 Filed 09/08/16 Page 3 of 4
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability, because 

reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Dated this 8th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Rosemary Márquez

United States District Judge

Case 4:13-cv-00281-RM Document 36 Filed 09/08/16 Page 4 of 4