Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-06134/USCOURTS-caed-1_97-cv-06134-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TEDDY BRIAN SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden of San Quentin State 

Prison,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:97-CV-06134 AWI-SAB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

(ECF No. 172)

(CASE TO REMAIN CLOSED)

Before the court is petitioner’s motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s July 

23, 2015 memorandum and order to the extent it denied claims 6-10, 14, 15, 18, 37, 40, 

44, 46-48, 52 and 60; denied an evidentiary hearing and certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) for those claims; and denied leave to depose aged witnesses lead trial counsel 

Eugene Toton and defense expert Dr. Theodore Donaldson. Petitioner argues as grounds 

for this relief that the court committed clear legal and factual error. 

Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Petitioner replied to the opposition. 

Based on the facts of this case and controlling law, the instant motion for 

reconsideration is amenable to decision without a hearing. 

I. BACKGROUND

The court set forth the factual and procedural history of this case in its July 23,

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2015 memorandum and order and will not repeat it here in full, but will provide a 

summary where relevant to the motion before the court. 

The underlying petition raised 61 claims asserting insufficient evidence, actual 

innocence, prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel based on 

allegations petitioner did not assist Joey Bocanegra in killing Joey’s father, and that his 

assistance in the murder of Joey’s mother did not make him eligible for the death penalty. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a district court to alter, 

amend, or vacate a prior judgment. Under Rule 59(e), a motion for reconsideration

should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is 

presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 

intervening change in the controlling law. See 389 Orange Street Partners v. Arnold, 179 

F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir.

2011). 

The purpose of Rule 59(e) is “to allow the district court to correct its own errors, 

sparing the parties and appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.” 

Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting York v. Tate, 858 

F.2d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 1988)). To this end:

Rule 59(e) does not list “specific grounds for a motion to amend or 

alter[;]” hence, “the district court enjoys considerable discretion in 

granting or denying the motion.” [Citation]

At the same time, however, “[a] motion for reconsideration may not be 

used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they 

could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” [Citation] 

Therefore, a party “rais[ing] arguments or present[ing] evidence for the 

first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the 

litigation[] ... raise[s] the concern that [it] has abused Rule 59(e)[.]” 

[Citation] “Ultimately, a party seeking reconsideration must show more 

than a disagreement with the court's decision, and recapitulation of the 

cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original 

decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.” [Citation]

As is abundantly clear, “amending a judgment after its entry remains an 

extraordinary remedy[.]” [Citation] The Ninth Circuit thus has repeatedly 

cautioned that such an amendment “should be used sparingly.” Id.

Amendment of judgment is sparingly used to serve the dual “interests of 

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finality and conservation of judicial resources.” [Citation] It stands to 

reason then that plaintiff, as the moving party here, has a “high hurdle.” 

[Citation] Moreover, denial of a motion for reconsideration under Rule 

59(e) will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. 

[Citation]

. . . 

Manifest error is, effectively, clear error, [Citation] such that “a court 

should have a clear conviction of error.” [Citation] Thus, “[m]ere doubts 

or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision of this or a lower 

court will not suffice[.]” [Citation] “To be clearly erroneous, a decision 

must strike [a court] as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must 

be dead wrong.” [Citation]

Within the Ninth Circuit, courts also have looked to Black's Law 

Dictionary, stating that “[a] manifest error of fact or law must be one ‘that 

is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the 

controlling law or the credible evidence in the record.

Teamsters Local 617 Pension & Welfare Funds v. Apollo Grp., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 216, 

220-21, 231 (D. Ariz. 2012); see also Local Rule 230(j). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas corpus proceedings only “to 

the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or [the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases].” Rule 12, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P 81(a)(4). 

The Supreme Court has not addressed whether or how Rule 59(e) is to be applied 

in federal habeas corpus cases subject to Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”). See Row v. Beauclair, No. 1:98-CV-00240-BLW, 2015 WL 1481416, at *5 

(D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2015). 

The circuits are split regarding whether § 2244 and Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 

524, 532 (2005) (finding Rule 60 [relief from judgment or order] motions to be second or 

successive habeas application under § 2255) apply to Rule 59(e) motions, viz.:

The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits have determined or implied 

that a Rule 59(e) motion should be treated as a second or successive 

petition if it in substance challenges the same conviction or sentence. 

[Citation]

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The Third and Sixth Circuits have concluded that § 2244 and Gonzalez do 

not apply to timely filed Rule 59(e) motions. [Citation]

Row, 2015 WL 1481416, at *7.

It appears the Ninth Circuit has not decided whether a Rule 59(e) motion should 

be treated as a second or successive habeas application, as a Rule 60(b) motion would be

under Gonzalez, or whether a Rule 59(e) motion is more properly viewed as a 

continuation of proceedings rather than a second or successive habeas application. 

Within the Ninth Circuit, the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Washington has followed the Third and Sixth Circuit's reasoning and conclusions. See 

Rishor v. Ferguson, 65 F.Supp.3d 1078, 1084-85 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (petitioner’s timely 

motion to alter or amend judgment not a second or successive habeas application).

Here, the court need not decide whether petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion for 

reconsideration constitutes a second or successive habeas corpus application under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244 because the motion fails on the merits. See Liggins v. Brazelton, No. 2:09-

CV-01777 GEB EFR 2013 WL 950352, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013) (whether and/or 

when a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration may constitute a second or successive

habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 need not be decided since petitioner 

has not made an adequate showing on the merits of his request for reconsideration).

B. Analysis

1. Reconsideration of Claims

Petitioner, in his Rule 59(e) motion, has not set forth any basis that warrants 

reconsideration. Specifically, he has not demonstrated that the court committed clear 

error of law or fact such that reconsideration is warranted. Rather, petitioner appears to 

be reiterating the same arguments and re-litigating the same issues the court already 

considered in denying the petition and related evidentiary motions. (cf., ECF Nos. 163, 

172.) This is improper. “Reconsideration should not be used merely to ask the court to 

rethink what it has already thought.” Clarke v. Upton, No. 1:07-CV-0888 AWI-SMS, 

2012 WL 6691914, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012); see also Arteaga v. Asset 

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Acceptance, LLC, 733 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1236 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[R]ecapitulation of the 

cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to 

carry the moving party's burden.”). 

Guilt Phase Claims

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claims 6-10, 14 and 18. He argues the court 

erred in denying these claims which allege counsel’s failure to investigate and present 

evidence relating to mental state defenses, witness impeachment and alternative defense 

theories. However, petitioner in essence repeats his arguments that counsel did not 

reasonably investigate: petitioner’s psychiatric impairments and brain damage, 

impeachment of jailhouse informant Hernandez, accomplice Reyes’s presence in the 

Bocanegra home at the time of the capital murders, petitioner limited involvement in the 

capital murders, and submission of the guilt phase upon waiver of jury trial. His reargument of these matters previously considered by the court and rejected is not a basis 

for reconsideration.1 (See ECF No. 163 at 31:24-46:4, 53:7-58:3, 64:8-66:4.)

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claim 15. He argues the court erred in denying 

this claim which alleges counsel’s failure to cross-examine reporter Trihey about his 

published interviews with petitioner. Specifically, petitioner argues the court erred by 

relying upon the state supreme court’s mistaken belief that the contents of these

interviews had been admitted into evidence at trial, as a basis to conclude counsel 

reasonably decided not to cross-examine Trihey. 

However, in denying claim 15, the court concluded that the state supreme court 

could reasonably have found the claim speculative (see ECF No. 163 at 59:7-9), and that 

counsel could have been tactically motivated given petitioner’s potentially contradictory 

statements to Trihey and others (see e.g., ECF No. 163 at 58:20-23, 59:12-16).

Moreover, the state supreme court addressed petitioner’s state law evidentiary issue in its 

 

1 The court corrects, sua sponte and nunc pro tunc, the typographical error that appears in its analysis of 

claim 14, by substituting the word “infirm” in place of the word ‘inform”, ECF No. 163 at 56:21. (See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).) 

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noted modified decision. This court was free to consider that court’s prior analysis 

incorporated in the modified state supreme court decision. See e.g., Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2005) (the federal court will consider the last reasoned 

decision including incorporated reasoning from a prior decision). It follows that 

petitioner’s disagreement with counsel’s decision not to cross-examine Trihey as to 

interviews, the contents of which counsel excluded from the record, is not a basis for 

reconsideration. 

Petitioner argues as to the guilt phase claims in general that the court erred by

attributing to counsel defense tactics which counsel did not espouse. However, a 

reviewing court is not limited to trial counsel’s subjective state of mind. See Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) (the state court must “affirmatively entertain the 

range of possible reasons . . . [that trial] counsel may have had for proceeding as they 

did”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011) (allowing for strategic 

considerations that may have justified counsel’s failure to act). An ineffective assistance 

claim requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). That counsel 

did not specifically confirm all the reasons for actions taken and how they furthered 

defense strategies is not alone a basis for error. See Id.; Richter, 562 U.S. at 109. 

Furthermore, “once counsel reasonably selects a defense, it is not deficient performance 

to fail to pursue alternative defenses.” Rios v, Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner argues as to the guilt phase claims in general that the court erred by 

applying a sufficiency of evidence standard rather than the AEDPA standard. He points 

to pre-AEDPA state law suggesting that non-conclusory facts must be taken as true, and

that summary claim denial by the state supreme court without issuance of an order to 

show cause (as here – see ECF No. 180 at 15:1) reflects a presumed determination by the 

state court that no prima facie claim is stated. See In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302 

(1949); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 770 (1993); People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 

(1995). Petitioner appears to argue this court’s claim denial reflected the state 

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presumptions and not AEDPA. However, it remains that these claims were denied 

pursuant to § 2254(d). (See ECF No. 163 at 31:24-66:17; see also Frye v. Warden, San 

Quentin State Prison, No. 2:99-CV-0628 KJM CKD, 2015 WL 300755, at *41 (E.D. Cal. 

Jan. 22, 2015) (“[T]he question under § 2254(d) is not whether this court finds the 

petitioner has established a prima facie case, but whether no reasonable jurist could have 

found otherwise.”). 

Finally, petitioner may argue as to the guilt phase claims generally that the court 

erred by discounting the negative impact of trial counsel Toton’s disbarment. However, 

the court previously considered and rejected this allegation. (See e.g., ECF No. 163 at 

70:9-80:8.) 

Penalty Phase Claims

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claim 37. He argues the court erred in denying 

this claim which alleges the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by using, failing to correct 

and arguing testimony of detective Boggs falsely attributing to petitioner a statement by 

accomplice Mr. Reyes that after the Tatman murder:

[T]hey returned to their own room and just, again in his own words, 

kicked back, drank some whiskey, smoked some dope, ate some food, and 

just relaxed for the rest of the evening. 

(SHCP Ex. 100 ¶ 3.) Petitioner argues the prosecutor should have known the noted 

testimony was false because she was present at the preliminary hearing when detective 

Boggs correctly attributed the statement to Mr. Reyes. Petitioner argues the court also 

erred by discounting the reasonable likelihood of a different verdict. However, the court 

concluded the state court reasonably rejected the claim on grounds neither Boggs nor 

Ryals was aware the trial testimony was false and there was no reasonable likelihood the 

error affected the sentence selection. (See ECF No. 163 at 110:11-112:16.) Petitioner’s 

disagreement alone does not entitle him to reconsideration. Teamsters, 282 F.R.D. at 

220. He has not demonstrated legal or factual error in the court’s denial of the claim. 

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claim 40. He argues the court erred in denying 

this claim which alleges prosecutorial misconduct relating to an allegedly undisclosed 

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offer of probation on two then pending felony charges in exchange for Mr. Hernandez’s 

testimony at trial. However, the court considered and rejected petitioner’s circumstantial 

proffer for the reasons stated in the order denying the claim. (See ECF No. 163 at 91:26-

93:20, 116:23-118:18.) Petitioner’s re-argument, including his citation to Mr. 

Hernandez’s arrest and probation reports and criminal minutes noted in the court’s order 

(see e.g., ECF No. 163 at 91:27-93:20) does not demonstrate a basis for reconsideration. 

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claims 44, 47 and 48. He argues the court 

erred in denying these claims which allege counsel’s failure to investigate and present 

mitigating evidence relating to: the Bocanegra homicides, jailhouse informant Seeley, 

mental state defenses allegedly flagged by Dr. Donaldson, the aggravating 1982 

Ammarie and Pena crimes, and petitioner’s background, character and behavior including 

as to alleged mental disorders and defects. Petitioner argues that the court also erred in 

its prejudice analysis by discounting the mitigating strength of alleged mental disorders,

given that his role was limited to that of accomplice. 

However, the court considered and rejected these arguments under § 2254(d) and 

Strickland standards. (See ECF No. 163 at 131:27-137:17, 142:24-149:13.) In rejecting 

claims 44, 47 and 48, the court considered the mitigating evidence that petitioner asserts a 

reasonable investigation would have disclosed. (Id.) The court determined the state 

court could reasonably have concluded there was no reasonable probability such 

mitigation evidence could have affected the jury’s imposition of the death penalty given 

the noted substantial evidence against petitioner.2 (Id.) 

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claim 46. He argues the court erred in denying 

this claim which alleges counsel failed to contest detective Boggs’s noted false 

testimony. Specifically, he argues the court could not have applied the Strickland

standard because the court found the claim failed substantively for reasons discussed in 

claim 37 (which alleges prosecutorial misconduct relating to Boggs’s false testimony). 

 

2

Petitioner’s incorporation of claims 6-10 provides no basis for relief for the reasons stated, ante.

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He argues the court also erred by concluding that evidence of remorse might have 

undercut a “lingering doubt” defense, and by discounting the prejudicial effect of 

Boggs’s false testimony. However, the court considered these matters and denied claim 

46 pursuant to the standard in Strickland. (See ECF No. 163 at 140:20-142:23.) 

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of claims 52 and 60. He argues the court erred in 

denying these claims which respectively argue cumulative ineffectiveness and 

constitutional error during the penalty phase. However, these claims fail for the reasons 

stated above and those stated in the court’s order denying these claims. (See ECF No. 

163 at 159:6-160:8, 199:15-200:15.) Furthermore, claims previously denied for which 

reconsideration is not sought cannot alone serve as a basis for Rule 59 relief. Teamsters, 

282 F.R.D. at 231. The penalty phase claims do not individually and cumulatively 

support Rule 59 error.

Finally, petitioner argues as to the penalty phase claims in general that the court 

erred in attributing to counsel un-espoused trial tactics and by errantly applying a 

substantial evidence standard. These arguments fail for the reasons stated above and in 

the memorandum and order denying these claims. (See ECF No. 163 at 110:11-200:15.) 

2. Reconsideration of Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the court’s denial of evidentiary hearing on the 

above reconsideration claims. He argues entitlement to an evidentiary hearing because 

these claims satisfy § 2254(d). 

However, the claims denied herein were adjudicated on the merits by the 

California Supreme Court and do not survive 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis for reasons 

discussed above. See Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (a 

summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits absent a showing of 

implausibility). “[R]eview under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182; accord

Stokely v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 809 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181) 

(“[E]vidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review.”).

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Reconsideration of petitioner’s request for evidentiary hearing also fails for the reasons 

stated by the court in its July 23, 2015 memorandum and order. (See ECF No. 163 at 

203:14-206:4.) Therefore, any attempted “relitigation” is “bar[red],” Richter, 562 

U.S. at 98, no matter what semantics petitioner employs to avoid being “limited to the 

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits,”

Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82. To this extent, new evidence in federal court simply 

cannot assist petitioner. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has also followed this principle. In Stokely, the Ninth Circuit 

acknowledged Pinholster’s mandate that habeas review is “confined to the record before 

the state courts.” 659 F.3d at 809. It explained that the limitation on consideration of 

new evidence in federal habeas proceedings “also forecloses the possibility of a federal 

evidentiary hearing.” Id. 

Even if AEDPA did not prohibit an evidentiary hearing on these claims, such a 

hearing is nonetheless unnecessary. Specifically, even if the additional evidence 

petitioner offers were both true and admissible, he would not be entitled to relief on any 

of his claims for the reasons stated and in light of the deference to which the California 

Supreme Court’s rulings are otherwise entitled under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

see also Studebaker v. Uribe, 658 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Kesser 

v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 358 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006)) (clear and convincing proof required 

to rebut state court findings of fact with extrinsic evidence presented for the first time in 

the federal habeas court). 

Accordingly, the request for evidentiary hearing on the reconsideration claims 

shall be denied. See Teamsters, 282 F.R.D. at 220-21, 231.

3. Reconsideration of Certificate of Appealability

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the court’s denial of COA as to all the above 

claims except claim 8 (for which reconsideration was previously granted – see ECF No. 

163 at 211:6-7). He argues the court erred in denying COA for these claims because any

determination whether the state court’s denial of these claims was reasonable under § 

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2254(d) is debatable amongst jurists of reason. 

However, for the same reasons discussed above and in the July 15, 2015 

memorandum and order (see ECF No. 163 at 210:3-211:19), petitioner has not 

demonstrated error in the court’s denial of COA for the reconsideration claims. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c). “[W]here a district court has rejected constitutional claims on the 

merits . . . the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Turner v. Calderon, 

281 F.3d 851, 865 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000)). Petitioner’s reconsideration motion does not suggest reasonable jurists would 

disagree with the court’s resolution of these claims or conclude the issues presented 

deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Id.; cf., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 327 (2003) (COA issued upon substantial evidence of Batson v. Kentucky [476 U.S. 

79 (1986)] violation).

Accordingly, the request to reconsider denial of COA for claims 6-7, 9-10, 14, 15, 

18, 37, 40, 44, 46-48, 52 and 60 shall be denied. See Teamsters, 282 F.R.D. at 220-21, 

231.

4. Reconsideration of Preservation of Evidence

Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the court’s denial of his motion and renewed 

motion to preserve testimony by deposing witnesses 79-year-old trial counsel Eugene 

Toton and 88-year-old defense psychiatrist Theodore Donaldson.3 He argues that the 

court erred by ignoring both the actuarial risk that testimony from these witnesses may be 

lost during the pendency of an appeal and the probity of the proposed testimony as 

“detailed in the pleadings before this court.” (See ECF No. 172 at 51:20-22.) He argues 

that he has demonstrated the probity of this testimony because:

What the above listed witnesses will testify to is not a secret. Everything 

that [petitioner] believes will come out in the depositions has been detailed 

in the pleadings before this court. [Petitioner] is not on a fishing 

 

3

Petitioner does not seek reconsideration of the court’s denial of his motion to preserve deposition 

testimony of Patricia McGregor, Maria Valenzuela, Susan Peninger, Jeri Doane, and David Foster. 

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expedition. [Petitioner] is only seeking to “determine whether the facts 

alleged [by him are] indeed true.” [Citation]

(Id., citing ECF No. 150 at 12:16-21.)

However, the court previously considered this argument and nonetheless rejected 

the claim because petitioner did not show that the proposed discovery would lead to 

relevant evidence likely to be lost due to age alone. (See ECF No. 163 at 206:6-208:22.) 

Good cause in this context requires that: 

Specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the 

petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that 

he is . . . entitled to relief . . . . [Citation]

(ECF No. 163 at 207:27-208:3; see also Rules Governing § 2254 cases, Rule 6, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254; Fed. R. Civ. P. 27.) Petitioner’s re-argument fails to demonstrate good 

cause. 

Petitioner also argues that the court erred by citing to an inapplicable case, Gilday 

v. Callahan, and based thereon errantly concluding that:

[N]othing reasonably suggests a basis to believe the proposed testimony 

would lead to factual development showing entitlement to relief, and that 

the proposed testimony might otherwise be lost. [Citation]; see also 

Gilday v. Callahan, 99 F.R.D. 308, 309 (D.C. Mass. 1983) (no “good 

cause” under Rule 6 where the facts petitioner seeks to dispute had been 

resolved by state court).

(ECF No. 163 at 208:16-20) (emphasis added.) Irrespective of whether Gilday has 

application, the court’s noted good cause analysis was informed by cited authorities in 

addition to Gilday. (See ECF No. 163 at 206:6-208:22.) Petitioner does not address the 

additional cited authority. Furthermore, both the state supreme court and this court 

denied habeas relief on the facts as alleged without evidentiary hearing – suggesting that, 

as in Gilday, factual dispute resolution was unnecessary. 

Finally, the denial of petitioner’s reconsideration claims, ante, does not suggest 

preservation of evidence would lead to entitlement to relief. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 

U.S. 899, 908-09 (1997) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) (“[W]here 

specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the 

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facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief, it is the 

duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate 

inquiry.”).

For the reasons stated, the request to reconsider denial of the motion and renewed 

motion to preserve testimony by deposing trial counsel Eugene Toton and defense 

psychiatrist Theodore Donaldson shall be denied. See Teamsters, 282 F.R.D. at 220-21, 

231.

IV. ORDER

Accordingly it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner’s motion (ECF No. 172) 

seeking Rule 59(e) reconsideration of this court’s July 23, 2015 memorandum and order 

denying petitioner’s claims 6-10, 14, 15, 18, 37, 40, 44, 46-48, 52 and 60, and denying 

his motions for evidentiary hearing and to preserve testimony, and granting certificate of 

appealability for claims 8, 59 and 61, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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