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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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• 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS IL fA ls 

United Si11t~ Cmnt o ppea 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT l'enth Circuit 

ELAINE SOLIZ; GUSTAVO MORALES; 

CAROLINE MORALES, individually and as 

next friend for minor child, SERGIO 

MORALES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

SHERIFF PETE ESPINOZA, DEPUTY SHERIFF ) 

ROBERT ESPINOZA, DEPUTY SHERIFF GERALD ) 

MAESTAS, DEPUTY SHERIFF ANTONIO ROYBAL, ) 

DEPUTY SHERIFF FRANK VIGIL, and ) 

COSTILLA COUNTY, COLORADO, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 2 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1142 

(D.C. No. 88-B-1271) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before LOGAN, JONES,** and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

**Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States Court 

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 1 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs appeal from 

defendants' motion for summary 

action. For the reasons set 

reverse in part, and remand. 

The case is therefore ordered 

the district 

judgment in 

court's grant of 

this civil rights 

forth below, we affirm in part, 

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a complaint in the 

district court on August 9, 1988. Plaintiffs are residents of 

Texas. At all pertinent times, the individual defendants were a 

sheriff and deputy sheriffs employed by the defendant county. The 

complaint contains citations to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1343 and 42 

u.s.c. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), as jurisdictional and remedial bases. 

The complaint further contains a statement that the matter in 

controversy exceeds the amount of $10,000. 

The brief factual allegations in the complaint indicate the 

following. On the night of July 3, 1987, plaintiffs were 

attending a family gathering. The sheriff and his deputies came 

to the gathering to arrest one family member named Henry Martinez. 

During the arrest, they discharged their firearms causing serious 

bodily injury to plaintiffs Elaine Soliz and Sergio Morales. The 

sheriff and his men then refused to assist the wounded plaintiffs 

in seeking medical attention. Plaintiffs Gustavo and Caroline 

Morales suffered emotional anguish and pain from witnessing the 

incident. 

It is difficult to discern the precise legal claims advanced 

by plaintiffs. However, the complaint does contain statements 

that defendants' conduct was intentional, negligent, and deprived 

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Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 2 
plaintiffs of their right to equal protection under the laws in 

violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United 

States Constitution. 

On October 21, 1988, defendants filed a motion for summary 

judgment. Affidavits from the four individual defendants 1 were 

appended to the summary judgment motion and supporting brief. 

Essentially, the affiants asserted the following. Sheriff Pete 

Espinoza and his deputies went to the subject gathering to arrest 

Mr. Martinez on a charge of felony menacing. During the course of 

the arrest, a large crowd shouted at the sheriff and his deputies 

and sought to prevent the arrest of Mr. Martinez. The crowd 

became ri o tous and ultimately threw rocks at the sheriff and his 

men. Deputy Robert Espinoza discharged a shotgun twice into the 

air and ordered the mob to disperse. The sheriff then ordered 

Deputy Espinoza to get into the back seat of the sheriff's patrol 

car with the prisoner. The sheriff took the shotgun and started 

to get into the driver's seat of the car. While entering his 

vehicle, the sheriff observed that one of his deputies was 

bleeding from a wound in his left arm, a wound presumably caused 

by a gunshot. The sheriff ordered his men to leave the scene and 

then reentered his vehicle. As he was placing the shotgun on the 

passenger seat with the barrel directed toward the floorboard, a 

rock flew in an open window of the car and hit the sheriff on his 

right hand. The impact of the rock caused the sheriff to feel 

pain in his hand and caused the shotgun to discharge through the 

1 Antonio Roybal was never served with 

complaint and never appeared in this action. 

party to this lawsuit. 

3 

the summons and 

Hence, he is not a 

Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 3 
floorboard of his car. The blast hit the ground and dirt road 

beneath the car. The sheriff and his men then drove away. None 

of the affiants observed anyone in the mob as being injured or 

requesting assistance. 

As legal bases for their summary judgment motion, the 

defendants raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, 

asserted that due process rights are not implicated by merely 

negligent conduct, contended that no allegation of the existence 

of a conspiracy was made to sustain a claim under § 1985(3), and 

argued that nothing beyond a nonactionable respondeat superior 

claim had been made against defendant county. 

By an order entered on October 28, 1988, the court directed 

plaintiffs to respond to the summary judgment motion by 

November 16, 1988. 

On October 28, 1988, defendants filed a motion for stay of 

discovery. In the stay motion, defendants requested that 

discovery be stayed until the court had made a decision on the 

summary judgment motion. Defendants included a statement that 

plaintiffs had agreed to the stay. Plaintiffs filed no response 

to the stay motion. The court entered an order granting the 

motion for stay on November 16, 1988. 

On November 16, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a motion for 

extension of time within which to respond to the summary judgment 

motion. Plaintiffs' attorney cited a busy trial schedule, a staff 

shortage, and the difficulty of communicating with his 

out-of-state clients as grounds for the motion. Plaintiffs' 

attorney wrote that he was awaiting the return of an affidavit 

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Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 4 
from one of the plaintiffs that he would attach to the response to 

the summary judgment motion. Although the extension of time 

motion was not officially filed until November 16, 1988, it was 

received earlier because the magistrate signed a minute order on 

November 15, 1988, in which he denied the motion. The minute 

order was entered the following day. The magistrate denied the 

motion because plaintiffs failed to comply with Colo. R. 402(C) 

which provides that no motion for continuance will be considered 

without proof that a copy of the motion was served on the moving 

attorney's client as well as all other attorneys of record. The 

certificate of mailing appended to plaintiffs' motion failed to 

show that it had been mailed to the plaintiffs. Notified of the 

defect, plaintiffs' attorney filed, on November 16, 1988, a second 

motion for extension of time which contained a proper certificate 

of mailing. In this second motion, plaintiffs additionally stated 

that they needed time to tender a settlement offer to the 

defendants. The court denied the second motion for continuance 

without comment by a minute order entered on November 28, 1988. 

By special order entered on January 9, 1989, the court 

referred this case to a magistrate for a recommendation on 

defendants' 

magistrate 

motion for 

a ninety-day 

recommendation. 

summary judgment. The court allowed the 

period within which to file the 

Plaintiffs filed their opposing response to the defendants' 

summary judgment motion on March 9, 1989. An affidavit executed 

by plaintiff Caroline Morales on November 17, 1988, accompanied 

the response. Ms. Morales's affidavit disputed the factual 

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Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 5 
scenario presented by the individual defendants in the following 

particulars. No one at the family gathering threw anything at the 

sheriff or tried to interfere with the arrest of Mr. Martinez. 

Prior to getting into his patrol car with Mr. Martinez and Deputy 

Robert Espinoza, the sheriff instructed Deputies Espinoza, 

Maestas, and Roybal to shoot anyone who interfered. While 

attempting to drive away, the sheriff backed his car into a truck 

and then exited his vehicle to inspect the damage. While doing 

this, Deputy Espinoza emerged from the car and, after pointing his 

rifle at the crowd, fired his weapon into the dirt road in front 

of plaintiffs. Elaine Soliz then cried out that she had been 

shot. At this same time, Gustavo Morales informed his wife that 

their son had been shot. The affiant saw her child's blood on her 

husband's hand. Ms. Morales then shouted to Deputy Espinoza that 

a baby had been shot. Ms. Soliz also informed the sheriff that 

she had been shot and asked for help. The sheriff said "Don't 

blame us, blame your brother" and drove off with his deputies. 

In light of the above information, the plaintiffs asserted in 

their response to the summary judgment motion that material issues 

of fact existed and that defendants were not qualifiedly immune 

from suit in light of their behavior. Plaintiffs also, for the 

first time, characterized their constitutional claims as including 

one of a violation of their due process rights, stemming from the 

use of excessive force by the sheriff and his deputies. 

The magistrate filed his recommendation on March 30, 1989. 

He wrote that he had not given any consideration to plaintiffs' 

response because of its late filing. Viewing the case as devoid 

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Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 6 
of any evidence supportive of plaintiffs' complaint, the 

magistrate recommended that defendants' summary judgment motion be 

granted. Following plaintiffs' submission of both their 

objections to the recommendation and a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) 

motion for stay pending discovery, the court accepted the 

magistrate's recommendation and granted defendants' summary 

judgment motion and dismissed the action with prejudice. 

On appeal, plaintiffs essentially assert that the district 

court erred both in granting the defendants' summary judgment 

motion and denying their Rule 56(f) motion. 

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary 

judgment. Manders v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health, 875 

F.2d 263, 264 (10th Cir. 1989). In considering a summary judgment 

motion, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is proper only if 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and any relief pursuant 

to Rule 56 should be awarded with care. Conaway v. Smith, 853 

F.2d 789, 792 n.4 (10th Cir. 1988). The initial burden is on the 

moving party to show the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Id. 

The nonmoving party may not rely on the mere allegations or 

denials of his pleadings in resisting the summary judgment motion, 

but must respond with specific facts showing genuine issues 

requiring resolution at trial. See id. 

While cognizant of the great need for timely and efficient 

processing of cases in an overburdened court, we conclude that the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 7 
district court erred in not considering plaintiffs' response and 

affidavit filed on March 9, 1989. We note that plaintiffs' 

attorneys did ultimately request an extension of time within the 

time provided for by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The grounds asserted 

in the motion appear to be legitimate reasons for a continuance. 

The court's summary denial of this motion was error. A reasonable 

extension of time would have been appropriate. Moreover, given 

the drastic nature of the grant of summary judgment, it was error 

to disregard the plaintiffs' response to the summary judgment 

motion when there was apparently no prejudice to the court or the 

defendants in considering these documents. 

In their second motion for extension of time, plaintiffs' 

attorneys requested that they be given until November 30, 1988, to 

respond to defendants' summary judgment motion. As Ms. Morales's 

affidavit was completed on November 17, 1988, plaintiffs' 

attorneys were apparently able to respond within the extension 

period that they sought. Plaintiffs' attorneys have never offered 

any explanation as to why they waited until March 9, 1989, to file 

their clients' response. By our present disposition, we do not 

mean to condone this tardiness. 

We determine that plaintiffs' lawsuit survives only as an 

action for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the use of 

excessive police force in violation of plaintiffs' due process 

rights. Caroline Morales's affidavit did clearly contradict 

defendants' rendition of the facts and created a genuine issue of 

fact regarding the conduct of defendants relative to this claim. 

While excessive force claims are commonly brought by those with 

the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1142 Document: 01019969762 Date Filed: 05/02/1990 Page: 8 
pertinent status of arrestee or pretrial detainee, see~, Meade 

v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988), we have indicated 

that where, during the course of an arrest, the police direct 

action against a person who previously had bystander status, that 

person may have a constitutional claim against the police. See 

Archuleta v. Mcshan, No. 86-1461, slip op. at 7 n.6 (10th Cir. 

Mar. 1, 1990). If the police act with the requisite 

deliberateness to do injury to that person, that person's status 

changes from a bystander to a direct object of state action. Id. 

Here, plaintiffs' response, along with Ms. Morales's affidavit, 

constituted a rebuttal sufficient to permit the excessive force 

claim to survive the defendants' summary judgment motion. Thus, 

we reverse the district court's judgment as to this claim and 

remand for further proceedings. 

We affirm the district court's judgment in all other 

respects. Plaintiffs have made no allegations that in any way 

implicate their right to equal protection. Plaintiffs have also 

made no allegations concerning conspiratorial conduct that might 

be remedied by resort to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiffs have 

likewise failed to make allegations against the county that might 

possibly support liability for any wrongdoing. The record is 

devoid of any reference to the existence of an unconstitutional 

policy or custom on which municipal liability could be based. On 

appeal, the plaintiffs contend that they had asserted a state law 

negligence claim after invoking the court's diversity 

jurisdiction. It is doubtful that the plaintiffs ever adequately 

apprised the court or defendants of their purported claim. 

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However, even if we construe plaintiffs' pleadings to advance such 

a claim, it is time-barred. In their answer, defendants raised 

the defense of the applicable statute of limitations, Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 13-80-103(c) (1987), which requires actions against 

sheriffs, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, to 

be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues. A 

negligence claim against defendants would have accrued on the date 

of the shooting, July 3, 1987. Plaintiffs filed their complaint 

on August 9, 1988. 

Plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in 

failing to grant their Rule 56(f) motion to permit discovery is 

without merit. Apparently, plaintiffs acquiesced in the district 

court's November 16, 1988, order staying discovery pending 

determination of the summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs' Rule 

56(f) motion followed the filing of their response to the summary 

judgment motion and the filing of the magistrate's recommendation, 

which was unfavorable to them. Under these circumstances, 

plaintiffs cannot complain that their afterthought Rule 56(f) 

moti o n was not granted. See generally Paterson-Leitch Co. v. 

Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 988-990 (1st 

Cir. 1988){plaintiff who acquiesces in an order staying discovery 

and later files Rule 56(f) motion following a magistrate's 

unfavorable recommendation fails to meet criteria which Rule 56(f) 

embodies). 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado entered on April 20, 1989, is AFFIRMED in 

part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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