Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00389/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MAURISE WILKES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-CV-389-MEF

) [WO]

)

JUDGE PINSTON, et al., )

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)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Maurise

Wilkes, a pre-trial detainee confined at the Elmore County Jail, against Patrick Pinston, a

district judge for Elmore County, Alabama, and Investigator Brouillard, an officer with the

Elmore County Sheriff’s Department. In this complaint, Wilkes challenges the

constitutionality of criminal charges pending against him for first degree robbery and first

degree burglary. Complaint - Doc. No. 1 at 3. Specifically, Wilkes argues that there is no

evidence to support these charges. Id. Wilkes seeks a public apology and monetary

damages from the defendants. Id. at 4. It is likewise clear that issuance of a decision in

Wilkes identifies the lead defendant as Judge Pinston. The court notes, however, that the defendant’s true

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name is Patrick Pinkston. For purposes of this Recommendation, the court will refer to this defendant as he is

identified by the plaintiff. 

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favor of Wilkes on claims arising from actions of the state court would result in the

granting of declaratory relief from those actions.

Upon thorough review of the complaint, the court concludes that this case is due to

be summarily dismissed prior to service of processin accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Attendant Declaratory Relief

1. Non-Final Orders. To the extent that Wilkes seeks relief from adverse decisions

issued by a state court which are not yet final, he is due no relief from this court on such

claims as there is an adequate remedy at law. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11 Cir.

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2000) (“In order to receive declaratory or injunctive relief, plaintiff[] must establish that

there was a [constitutional] violation, that there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable

injury if the relief is not granted, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.”).

Specifically, Wilkes may request reconsideration by the District Court of Elmore County,

seek relief from the Circuit Court of Elmore County or file an appeal with the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals of the lower court’s adverse ruling(s). Since state law provides

an adequate remedy for Wilkes to challenge non-final orders, the plaintiff is “not entitled

The court granted Wilkes leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. Order of May 28, 2014 - Court 2

Doc. No. 3. A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis will have his/her complaint screened under the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) which requires this court to dismiss a prisoner’s complaint if it determines

that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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to declaratory or injunctive relief in this case.” Id. at 1243.

2. Final Orders. With respect to claims presented by Wilkes which attack the

constitutionality of ordersissued by a state court that have become final in accordance with

state law, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such judgment in an action filed pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents... lower federal courtsfrom

exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court

judgmentsrendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’ Exxon MobilCorp.

v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454

(2005).” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199 (2006). Although

“Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine,” it remains applicable to bar Wilkes from

proceeding before this court asthis case, with respect to any claims challenging final orders

issued by a state court in pending criminal actions, is “‘brought by [a] state-court loser[]

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.’ 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. [at] 1517.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464, 125 S.Ct. at

1201; District of ColumbiaCourt of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (federal

district courts in § 1983 actions “do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to state court

decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges

allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”). Moreover, a § 1983 action is

inappropriate either to compel or to appeal a particular course of action taken by a state

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court. Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 254 (11 Cir. 1995) (§ 1983 suit arising from alleged

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erroneous decisions of a state court is merely a prohibited appeal of the state court

judgment); see also Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11 Cir. 1988).

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In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that dismissal of requests for relief

from final actions undertaken by a state court during proceedings related to the plaintiff’s

pending criminal cases is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Clark v.

State of Georgia Pardons and Paroles Board, 915 F.2d 636 (11 Cir. 1990); see also

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

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B. Monetary Damages Against Judge Pinston

Wilkes alleges that Judge Pinston violated his constitutional rights during a

preliminary hearing addressing the charges of first degree robbery and first degree burglary

which are presently pending against Wilkes. It is clear that any allegations made by

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Wilkes against Judge Pinston emanate from actions taken by this defendant in his judicial

capacity during state court proceedings over which he had jurisdiction. The law is well

established that a state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for acts taken

pursuant to his judicial authority. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 227-229 (1988);

Paisey v. Vitale in and for Broward County, 807 F.2d 889 (11 Cir. 1986); Stump v.

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Although Neitzke interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the predecessor to § 1915(e)(2), the

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analysis contained therein remains applicable to the directives contained in the present statute.

 These charges arise from two separate home invasions which occurred in March of 2014. 

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Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Accordingly, Wilkes’ claims for monetary damages

against Judge Pinston are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” and are

therefore due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

327.

C. Pending Criminal Charges

Wilkes challenges the constitutionality of criminal charges pending against him

before the state courts of Elmore County, Alabama for first degree robbery and first degree

burglary. Under the decision issued by the United States Supreme Court in Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), a federal court must refrain from interfering with

pending state criminal proceedings “when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law

and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” The Younger abstention

doctrine is premised upon a fundamental “public policy against federal interference with

state criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 43. In this case, Wilkes has an adequate remedy at law

regarding any claims attacking the propriety of the pending criminal charges because he

may pursue these claims through the state court system in the on-going state criminal

proceedings. See generally Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405 (11 Cir. 1985). Moreover,

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the plaintiff has not alleged the existence of any special circumstance which creates a threat

of irreparable harm. The mere fact that Wilkes must endure state criminal proceedings

fails to demonstrate irreparable harm. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. This court is therefore

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compelled to abstain from considering the merits of Wilkes’ claims which place into

question the constitutionality of the criminal charges pending against him as such claims

are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action at this time. Id. at 43-44. Consequently,

dismissal of these claims is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief with respect to orders issued/actions

undertaken by the state court in his pending criminal cases be DISMISSED in accordance

with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

2. The plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against defendant Pinston be

DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

3. The plaintiff’s claims relative to pending criminal charges be DISMISSED

without prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

4. This case be dismissed prior to service of process.

To the extent that Wilkes seeks release from confinement, it is well settled that a state prisoner may

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challenge the fact of his imprisonment only by way of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). An inmate cannot proceed on such a claim in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action so as

to avert the exhaustion requirements attendant to habeas actions. Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5 Cir. th

1981); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5 Cir. 1980). In addition, before a claim challenging the fact of an inmate’s

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confinement may be heard in federal court, the inmate must first exhaust available state court remedies. Georgalis

v. Dixon, 776 F.2d 261 (11 Cir. 1985); Walker v. Zant, 693 F.2d 1087 (11 Cir. 1982). These remedies include

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appropriate motions filed with the state district or circuit courts and, if convicted, a direct appeal and/or a Rule 32

petition raising claims which go to the validity of any conviction which may be imposed. In addition, a general state

petition for habeas relief is the proper vehicle in which to challenge the amount set for bail/bond. Ex parte Stokes,

990 So.2d 852, 856 (Ala. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper

vehicle by which to challenge the setting of allegedly excessive bail.... However, such a petition must be filed within

a reasonable time.”). Upon full and proper exhaustion in the state courts, the plaintiff may then seek relief from this

court with respect to the exhausted claims through an appropriate action for habeas corpus relief. 

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It is further

ORDERED that on or before June 20, 2014, the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11 Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

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banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 6 day of June, 2014.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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