Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02660/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02660-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 25:2701 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUMA BAND OF LUISENO 

MISSION INDIANS OF THE 

PAUMA AND YUIMA 

RESERVATION, 

Plaintiff,

Case No. 16-cv-2660-BAS-AGS

ORDER GRANTING:

(1) DEFENDANTS STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA AND EDMUND G. 

BROWN, JR.’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; AND

(2) DEFENDANT UNITE HERE 

INTERNATIONAL UNION’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF Nos. 34, 36]

v.

UNITE HERE INTERNATIONAL 

UNION; STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR.,

Defendants.

OVERVIEW

This action is an offshoot from a bitter labor dispute between a union and a 

casino operator. Plaintiff Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma & 

Yuima Reservation (“Pauma” or “Tribe”) is a federally-recognized tribe that operates 

Casino Pauma on its reservation in Northern San Diego County. “About 2,900 

customers visit Casino Pauma each day,” and the Casino “employs 462 employees.” 

Pauma v. N.L.R.B., 888 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2018).

In 2013, Defendant UNITE HERE International Union (“Union”), which

represents service and manufacturing employees, began an organizing drive at 

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Casino Pauma. The Tribe claims this organizing effort involved a series of “antics,”

including the Union inviting The San Diego Union Tribune to a “staged rally.” 

(Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 151–54, 45:26, ECF No. 33.) There, the Tribe 

highlights that a casino employee allegedly spoke “exclusively through a translator” 

and “explained that she was ‘a cook in the casino’s pizza restaurant’ who had a ‘$16 

hourly salary,’ but nevertheless struggled to pay ‘$260 a month for health insurance 

for her family’ of undisclosed size.” (Id. ¶ 154.) 

As another tactic, Pauma alleges the Union “went berserk,” filing a flurry of 

unfair labor practice charges against Casino Pauma with the National Labor Relations 

Board (“NLRB”). (SAC ¶ 5.) Pauma claims that “the one thing that all of these 

charges have in common is that they seek to turn Casino Pauma into a soapbox for 

the Union, whereby sympathetic employees can communicate the Union’s message 

directly to customers in any ‘guest area’ of the gaming facility or associated 

property—whether that is within a shuttle bus, across a restaurant table, inside a 

family changing room, or underneath a bathroom stall.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

Ultimately, however, the Union’s charges led to the General Counsel of the 

NLRB filing several administrative complaints against Casino Pauma for unfair labor 

practices. Pauma v. N.L.R.B., 888 F.3d at 1071. The General Counsel’s allegations 

included that Casino Pauma had “interfere[ed] with the distribution of union 

literature by employees near the public entrance to [the] casino,” “threaten[ed]

employees with discipline for distributing union literature at that location,” and 

“interrogat[ed] an employee about her union activity.” Id. at 1071 n.1. After a threeday trial, an administrative law judge determined “Casino Pauma violated the 

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., in most of the ways the 

General Counsel alleged,” and the NLRB affirmed. Id. at 1071; see also Casino 

Pauma (Casino Pauma II), 363 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 3, 2015). 

Then, during the pendency of this action, the Tribe and the Union continued 

their dispute in the Court of Appeals. The NLRB filed a petition for enforcement of 

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its order against Casino Pauma in the Ninth Circuit, the Tribe filed a separate petition 

for review, and the Union intervened in opposition to Pauma. See Pauma v. N.L.R.B., 

888 F.3d at 1072. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Tribe’s challenges and granted the 

NLRB’s petition for enforcement. Id. at 1085. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit upheld 

the NLRB’s “determination that tribe-owned casinos can be NLRA-covered 

employers,” and the court concluded “the NLRA governs the relationship between 

Casino Pauma and its employees.” See id. at 1079.

In the offshoot before this Court, Pauma alleges that by filing the series of 

unfair labor practice charges directly with the NLRB, the Union has skirted a binding 

dispute resolution process. (SAC ¶¶ 5, 150–64.) This dispute resolution process is 

found in a tribal labor ordinance that the State required Pauma to enact to engage in 

casino-style gaming. (Id. ¶ 2 & n.1.) The Tribe requests that this Court rein in the 

Union by ordering it to comply with the dispute resolution process and pay Pauma 

“the costs involved in litigating” the labor charges filed with the NLRB. (Id. Prayer 

¶¶ 2–4.) The Union, on the other hand, argues this ancillary labor dispute is an 

“improper collateral attack on NLRB proceedings,” an effort “to circumvent Ninth 

Circuit review” of the NLRB’s order discussed above, and the product of “procedural 

gamesmanship.” (ECF No. 34-1.)

It appears the reason the Tribe and the Union’s dispute has spilled over into 

this Court, however, is because the Tribe is also suing two other defendants—the 

State of California and Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (collectively, “State”). 

Pauma tries to pull the State into the fray by alleging the State has failed to take 

“reasonable efforts to ensure” the Union would comply with the dispute resolution 

process, including by failing to “direct[] [the Union] to first file any such unfair labor 

practice claims through” that process, as opposed to proceeding directly before the 

NLRB. (SAC ¶ 285.) The State moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, arguing Pauma fails to demonstrate a justiciable controversy between 

these two parties. (State’s Mot., ECF No. 36-1.) The Union similarly moves to 

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dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Union’s Mot., ECF No. 34-1.) Pauma opposes.1 

(Opp’n to State’s Mot., ECF No. 38; Opp’n to Union’s Mot., ECF No. 37.)

Pauma’s detailed pleading interweaves a retelling of the history of tribal-state 

compacting in California, exposition on the NLRB’s jurisdictional jurisprudence, and 

colorful criticisms of the Union’s efforts to organize workers at Casino Pauma. But 

the Court is unconvinced by Pauma’s attempt to construct a justiciable controversy 

against the State to invoke federal jurisdiction. At most, Pauma’s factual allegations 

demonstrate the State has declined to participate in the Tribe’s labor dispute, has 

taken “no official position on the matter,” and has rejected Pauma’s request to

voluntarily agree “to be bound by a judgment issued by the Court in this case.” (SAC 

¶¶ 168, 171.) These allegations do not reveal an actual controversy between Pauma 

and the State. And the Court discerns no independent basis to exercise jurisdiction 

over the Tribe’s remaining declaratory relief and breach of contract claims against 

the Union. Consequently, for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the State’s

and the Union’s motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND2

As will be seen, Pauma claims this case turns on a model tribal ordinance that 

is an addendum to a tribal-state gaming compact. Pauma and the State of California 

entered into this gaming compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 

(“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21. Hence, the Court first provides a brief overview 

of IGRA before expanding upon the Tribe’s allegations.

I. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

“In 1988, Congress attempted to strike a delicate balance between the 

sovereignty of states and federally recognized Native American tribes by passing

 1 The Court finds the State’s and the Union’s motions suitable for determination on the 

papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1).

2 Pauma’s Second Amended Complaint presents a fifty-one page account of the events 

underlying this action. (SAC ¶¶ 1–186.) The Court provides only a synopsis of the Tribe’s 

allegations here.

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IGRA.” Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Reservation v. 

California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2015). IGRA’s general purpose is “to 

provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of 

promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal 

governments.” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).

To accomplish this purpose, IGRA “creates a framework for regulating 

gaming activity on Indian lands.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 

2024, 2028 (2014) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3)). “The Act divides gaming on Indian 

lands into three classes—I, II, and III.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 

44, 48 (1996). IGRA then “assigns authority to regulate gaming to tribal and state 

governments depending on the class of gaming involved.” Big Lagoon Rancheria v. 

California, 789 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

The final category—Class III gaming—“includes the types of high-stakes 

games usually associated with Nevada-style gambling.” In re Indian Gaming 

Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Coyote Valley”). “As a result, 

Class III gaming is subjected to the greatest degree of control under IGRA’s 

regulations.” Pauma v. California, 813 F.3d at 1060. A tribe may conduct Class III 

gaming “only if such activities are conducted pursuant to a Tribal-State Compact 

entered into by the tribe and a state that permits such gaming, and the Compact is 

approved by the Secretary of the Interior.” Id. (citing Coyote Valley, 331 F.3d at 

1097); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1), (3)(B). Thus, IGRA contemplates that a tribe 

and the relevant state shall negotiate to enter into a compact that (i) permits Class III 

gaming and (ii) may address various regulatory issues related to this type of gaming. 

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A), (C) (identifying the permissible gaming compact 

topics to include standards for “maintenance of the gaming facility” and “licensing”).

II. Pauma’s Compact with the State

Historically, Pauma’s members “relied upon subsistence farming and federal 

funding to stave off destitution.” (SAC ¶ 111.) In 2000, Pauma sought to improve 

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its members’ circumstances by opening a tribal gaming facility. (See id. ¶¶ 111–16.) 

To do so, the Tribe entered into a tribal-state gaming compact with the State of 

California under IGRA. (Tribal-State Compact Between the State of California and 

the Pauma Band of Mission Indians (“Pauma Compact”), SAC Ex. 1, ECF No. 33-

1.)

The terms of the Pauma Compact are not unique. In 1999, the State of 

California and numerous tribes negotiated a form compact—the “1999 Compact.” 

See Coyote Valley, 331 F.3d at 1101–07 (detailing the course of negotiations). 

Pauma’s agreement is an executed version of the 1999 Compact. (See SAC ¶¶ 68–

85, 114.) When the State and various tribes were negotiating the 1999 Compact, a 

point of contention was the collective bargaining rights of employees at tribal gaming 

facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 69–76.) The Union opposed the approval of any gaming compacts 

that did not include desired protections for workers. (Id. ¶ 69.) The State’s negotiator 

believed the issue of collective bargaining rights could be “work[ed] out directly with 

the Union.” (Id. ¶ 72.) However, the initial discussions between the negotiating 

tribes and the Union “were unfruitful” because of the Union’s efforts to invalidate a 

voter initiative concerning tribal gaming. (Id.) 

As the negotiation deadline for the 1999 Compact neared, the State presented 

the tribes with its “final compact offer.” (SAC ¶ 74.) “Since the tribes had been 

unable to agree upon labor relations provisions with the Union,” the State’s offer 

included a provision requiring the tribes to provide an “agreement or other procedure 

acceptable to the State for addressing organizational and representational rights of 

Class III Gaming Employees and other employees associated with the Tribe’s Class 

III gaming enterprise.” (SAC ¶ 75; see also Pauma Compact § 10.4.) If the tribes 

failed to do so by a set deadline, the 1999 Compact provided the agreement would be 

rendered null and void. (See Pauma Compact § 10.4.) 

“Fifty-seven tribes participating in the negotiations signed letters of intent to 

execute the compacts . . . in accordance with the State’s request.” (SAC ¶ 76.) “With 

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that, the signatory tribes continued to negotiate collective bargaining rights for casino 

employees with the Union,” with the aim of reaching an agreement by the 1999 

Compact’s deadline. (Id.) 

III. Model Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance

The result of the tribes and union representatives’ efforts is the Model Tribal 

Labor Relations Ordinance dated September 14, 1999 (“Tribal Labor Ordinance” or 

“Ordinance”). (SAC ¶ 78; see also Tribal Labor Ordinance, Attachment to Pauma 

Compact Add. B, SAC Ex. 1 at 1-50.) The Tribal Labor Ordinance provides that:

Eligible Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, to 

join, or assist employee organizations, to bargain collectively through

representatives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted 

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 

protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such 

activities.

(Tribal Labor Ordinance § 4.) Further, the Ordinance defines unfair labor practices 

for the tribe and labor organizations. (Id. §§ 5–6.) It also provides for alternative 

dispute resolution. (Id. § 13.) Specifically, the Ordinance states:

All issues shall be resolved exclusively through the binding dispute 

resolution mechanisms herein, with the exception of a collective

bargaining negotiation impasse, which shall only go through the first 

level of binding dispute resolution.

(Id. § 13(a).) If the informal portion of the dispute resolution process is unsuccessful, 

the tribe and the labor organization are to submit their dispute to arbitration before a 

mutually agreed upon arbitrator or several arbitrators from a ten-member “Tribal 

Labor Panel” created under the Tribal Labor Ordinance. (Id. § 13(c)(1).) Other 

topics addressed by the Ordinance include procedures for union elections, access to 

eligible employees, and decertification of certified unions. (Id. §§ 8, 10, 12.)

IV. Pauma’s Adoption of the Tribal Labor Ordinance

Pauma was not one of the tribes that participated in the negotiation of the 1999 

Compact and the Tribal Labor Ordinance. (SAC ¶ 115.) Consequently, when Pauma 

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entered into the Pauma Compact in 2000, the Tribe did so via executing a form 

version of the 1999 Compact “through a simple exchange of letters with the Office

of the Governor.” (Id. ¶ 114.) Addendum B to the Pauma Compact states:

In compliance with Section 10.7 of the Compact, the Tribe agrees to

adopt an ordinance identical to the Model Tribal Labor Relations 

Ordinance attached hereto, and to notify the State of that adoption no 

later than May 5, 2000. If such notice has not been received by the State 

by May 5, 2000, this Compact shall be null and void. Failure of the 

Tribe to maintain the Ordinance in effect during the term of this 

Compact shall constitute a material breach entitling the State to 

terminate this Compact. No amendment of the Ordinance shall be 

effective unless approved by the State.

(SAC Ex. 1 at 1-49.) Both the State and Pauma executed Addendum B to the Pauma 

Compact. (Id.) Further, Pauma provided notice to the State that on April 27, 2000, 

the Tribe “adopted the Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance pursuant to Section 10.7 of 

the” Pauma Compact—satisfying the condition mentioned in Addendum B above. 

(Id. at 1-51.) Although the Union allegedly negotiated the content of the Tribal Labor 

Ordinance with other tribes, the Union is not a signatory to the Pauma Compact or 

its Addendum B containing the Model Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance to be 

enacted as tribal law. (Id. at 1-41, 1-49.) Rather, the tribal-state gaming compact 

was “entered into on a government-to-government basis by and between” Pauma and 

the State. (Id. at 1-5.) 

Accordingly, having entered into the Pauma Compact to satisfy IGRA’s 

requirements to conduct Class III gaming activities, Pauma opened a gaming facility 

on its reservation in Pauma Valley the following year. (SAC ¶¶ 14, 116.)

V. Labor Dispute at Casino Pauma

Over a decade later, the Union engaged in the aforementioned effort to 

unionize workers at Casino Pauma. (See SAC ¶¶ 144–56.) As part of its efforts, the 

Union allegedly sought to allow Casino Pauma workers to use “card check election 

procedures” to decide whether to make the Union their representative. (See id. ¶¶ 5, 

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134, 145, 150–51.) Pauma, however, informed the Union “that any representational 

effort would have to take place” according to “secret ballot election” procedures 

contained in the Tribal Labor Ordinance. (Id. ¶ 5.) Then, on May 25, 2012, a Union 

director invoked the dispute resolution process under the Tribal Labor Ordinance,

and the Union later proceeded to seek appointment of an arbitrator, but the Union 

subsequently withdrew its request for arbitration under Pauma’s Ordinance. (Id. ¶¶ 

145–48.)

The Tribe claims the Union then “went berserk, filing nine unfair labor practice 

charges against Pauma directly with the NLRB.” (SAC ¶ 5.) In doing so, Pauma 

alleges the Union “abandoned the ‘binding dispute resolution mechanism’” contained 

in the Tribal Labor Ordinance. (Id. ¶ 156.) And, because the Union has opted to 

pursue its unfair labor charges against Pauma with the NLRB instead of the dispute 

resolution process, Pauma claims it has incurred “at least $400,000” in legal fees and 

expenses.” (Id. ¶ 162.)

VI. Pauma’s Attempt to Involve the State

In September 2016, Pauma’s counsel sent a letter to the State of California 

regarding “the Union’s non-compliance with” the Tribal Labor Ordinance. (SAC ¶ 

167.) In a subsequent meeting at the State Capitol, Pauma’s counsel “requested the 

State’s assistance in holding the Union to the terms of the [Tribal Labor Ordinance] 

or otherwise devising a fix for the solution.” (Id. ¶ 168.) “In response, the Office of 

the Governor’s Senior Advisor for Tribal Negotiations Joginder Dhillon explained 

that the State did not have an official position on the matter and thus would not get 

involved at the time, though he would communicate possible solutions should he 

think of any.” (Id.) 

VII. Pauma’s Lawsuit

Pauma filed this action on October 27, 2016, against the State and the Union.

In its initial Complaint, the only claim Pauma pled against the State was for 

declaratory relief. (Compl. ¶¶ 148–54, ECF No. 1.) The Tribe alleged an actual 

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controversy exists regarding the Tribal Labor Ordinance because Pauma is “arguing 

for the dispute resolution procedure in the” Ordinance, the Union is arguing for “the 

NLRA,” and the State is purportedly “feigning indifference despite demanding that 

the signatory tribes agree to the [Tribal Labor Ordinance] in the first place.” (Id. ¶ 

154.) 

In Pauma’s Second Amended Complaint,3 Pauma supplements its pleading

with allegations arising from a meet-and-confer meeting required by this Court’s 

Standing Order for Civil Cases. (SAC ¶¶ 170–73.) Under this Court’s Standing 

Order, “[a]ny party contemplating the filing of any noticed motion before this Court

must first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly—preferably in person—

the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution.” During such 

a conference, Pauma alleges “counsel for the State questioned the Court’s 

jurisdiction,” including by explaining the State’s “perception that Pauma’s suit was 

really one against the Union, which meant that the State should not be a party to the

suit especially since Pauma had not alleged a breach of compact claim against the 

State.” (Id. ¶ 171.) “Nevertheless, in an attempt to eliminate the need for the State’s 

motion to dismiss, counsel for Pauma agreed to dismiss the State [] from the suit if

[it] stipulated to be bound by the order issued by the Court on the declaratory relief 

claim.” (Id.) The State declined to “enter into such an agreement in order to secure 

[its] dismissal from the case.” (Id.) Based on this conduct, Pauma alleges the State 

breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Pauma Compact. 

(Id. ¶¶ 280–86.)

In addition, Pauma joins the Union in its declaratory relief claim. (SAC ¶¶ 

187–94.) Pauma also pleads a series of claims alleging the Union has purportedly 

 3 Pauma previously filed a First Amended Complaint, which the State and the Union moved 

to dismiss while Pauma moved for leave to amend to file a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF 

Nos. 13–15.) “In light of the liberal policy favoring amendment,” the Court granted Pauma’s 

request to amend and deferred consideration of Defendants’ challenges to Pauma’s action. (ECF 

No. 32.) 

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breached the Pauma Compact by not adhering to the dispute resolution process in the 

Tribal Labor Ordinance that was enacted by Pauma and appended to the Pauma 

Compact. (Id. ¶¶ 195–279.) 

The State now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to 

dismiss Pauma’s claims against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (State’s 

Mot. 1:2–25, 5:21–11:6, ECF No. 36.) The Union similarly moves to dismiss

Pauma’s claims involving the Union. (Union’s Mot. 4:13–12:16, ECF No. 34.)4

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction of a 

federal court over the subject matter of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

“It is axiomatic that ‘[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess 

only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded 

by judicial decree.’” Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “It 

is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.; see also 

Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).

ANALYSIS

I. State’s Motion to Dismiss

The State argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Pauma 

does not identify a suitable basis for jurisdiction and fails to plead a live, justiciable 

controversy between the Tribe and the State. (State’s Mot. 1:2–25, 5:21–11:6.) 

Although there is a colorable ground for federal jurisdiction for Pauma’s claims 

against the State, the Court agrees that Pauma does not plead a requisite controversy 

between these two parties.

 4 Both the State and the Union alternatively move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Pauma’s 

claims for lack of plausibility and under Rule 12(f) to strike certain allegations in the Second 

Amended Complaint. Because the Court ultimately grants their motions based on a lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, the Court does not reach these alternative requests.

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A. Basis for Jurisdiction

Pauma’s Second Amended Complaint identifies the following bases for this 

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction: 

• The Indian Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. art I., 

§ 8, cl. 3;

• The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.;

• IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2701, and “interpretive case law such as Cabazon Band 

of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 1997)”;

• Federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 

• Indian tribes jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1362;

• The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and

• Section 9.1 of the Pauma Compact.

(SAC ¶ 10.) Many of these items do not provide an independent basis for 

jurisdiction.5

 The Court focuses on the two interchangeable possibilities that may 

provide jurisdiction: the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Indian 

tribes statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1362. 

 5 These are: (1) the Indian Commerce Clause, (2) the Federal Arbitration Act, (3) the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, and (4) Section 9.1(d) of the Pauma Compact. First, the Indian 

Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the 

Indian Tribes,” does not vest this Court with jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The 

“Indian Commerce Clause makes ‘Indian relations . . . the exclusive province of federal law.’” 

Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 60 (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of 

N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985)). But it alone does not provide jurisdiction here. 

Second, although “the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the 

parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any independent federal-question 

jurisdiction.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).

Third, the Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent basis for jurisdiction because it 

is “procedural only.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937). 

This Act “enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their 

jurisdiction.” Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).

Fourth, Section 9.1 of the Pauma Compact does not create jurisdiction. Section 9.1 provides 

that the parties may resolve a dispute “in the United States District Court where the Tribe’s Gaming 

Facility is located.” (Pauma Compact § 9.1.) The parties, however, have “no power to confer 

jurisdiction on the district court by agreement.” See Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State 

Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Under the federal question statute, a district court has “original jurisdiction of 

all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. Similarly, under the Indian tribes statute, the court has “original 

jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe . . . , wherein the matter 

in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 

Id. § 1362. Thus, where a tribe is bringing suit, these provisions are duplicative—

the existence of jurisdiction under both provisions depends on whether the action 

arises under federal law. See id. §§ 1331, 1362; see also Gila River Indian Cmty. v. 

Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to 

interpret the “arises under” language in the Indian tribes provision more broadly than 

the corresponding language in the federal question statute).6

“For a case to ‘arise under’ federal law, a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint 

must establish either (1) that federal law creates the cause of action or (2) that the 

plaintiff’s asserted right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial question 

of federal law.” K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, LLC, 653 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (quoting Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 

2004)). That a federally-recognized tribe is involved in the action “is not, by itself, 

sufficient to raise a federal question.” Peabody Coal, 373 F.3d at 949 (citing Gila 

River, 626 F.2d at 714). Consequently, “federal courts do not have jurisdiction over 

run-of-the-mill contract claims brought by Indian tribes.” Cabazon Band of Mission 

Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 6 Although these two statutes now “appear[] largely duplicative,” when the Indian tribes 

provision was enacted, the federal question statute “still contained an amount in controversy 

requirement.” 13D Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3579 Indian 

Tribes (3d ed. supp. 2018). “The purpose of § 1362 was to permit Indian tribes or bands of the sort 

described in the statute to bring a suit arising under federal law regardless of the amount in 

controversy.” Id. Now that the federal question statute does not require an amount in controversy, 

the Indian tribes statute “is generally superfluous.” Id.; see also Winstead v. J.C. Penney Co., 933 

F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (“The elimination of the minimum amount in controversy 

from section 1331 made of the numerous special federal jurisdictional statutes that required no 

minimum amount in controversy . . . so many beached whales, yet no one thought to repeal those 

now-redundant statutes.”).

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Pauma’s allegations seek to plead claims arising under IGRA, which the Court 

introduced above. IGRA explicitly confers federal question jurisdiction for several 

causes of action specified in the statute. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)–(iii). 

These are: (1) an action based on a state’s failure to enter into negotiations to form a 

tribal-state compact or to conduct those negotiations in good faith; (2) an action to 

enjoin casino-like gaming conducted on Indian lands that is conducted in violation 

of a compact; and (3) an action by the Secretary of the Interior to enforce mediation 

procedures in the event a compact cannot be reached. See id.7

 The Tribe’s claims 

do not fit into any of these categories.

In addition to these express causes of action, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted 

IGRA to allow a tribe to sue a state to enforce obligations in a tribal-state gaming 

compact. Cabazon, 124 F.3d at 1055–56. In Cabazon, four tribes entered into 

gaming compacts with California and “agreed to submit the question of whether the 

license fees collected pursuant to California Horse–Racing Law are permissible 

under IGRA” to the district court. Id. at 1053, 1062. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 

held these fees were not permissible, but once the case was remanded to the district 

court, the State “refused to pay the fees [back] to the [tribes], declared the Compacts 

invalid,” and argued “the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce 

the Compacts.” Id. at 1054. 

Back up on appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded the tribes’ “action seeking to 

enforce the Tribal-State Compacts clearly and necessarily arises under IGRA,” which 

resulted in federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362. Cabazon, 124

 7 The Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), that 

Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states’ sovereign 

immunity. Consequently, 28 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) does not allow a suit against a state unless the 

state waives its sovereign immunity. “The practical effect of this holding is to take away from 

tribes the ability to force states to comply with IGRA’s compacting scheme.” Hein v. Capitan 

Grande Band of Diegueno Mission Indians, 201 F.3d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 2000). Pauma alleges 

the State waived its immunity in the Pauma Compact and California Government Code § 98005. 

(SAC ¶ 11.) Because the Court ultimately concludes it lacks jurisdiction over Pauma’s claims 

against the State, the Court need not reach the issue of state sovereign immunity.

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F.3d at 1050. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the federal interest at stake was

substantial enough to confer federal question jurisdiction because “Congress, in 

passing IGRA, did not create a mechanism whereby states can make empty promises 

to Indian tribes during good-faith negotiations of Tribal–State compacts, knowing 

that they may repudiate them with immunity whenever it serves their purpose.” Id.

at 1056. The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the characterization of the federal interest 

by the district court, which had noted:

It would be extraordinary were [IGRA] to provide jurisdiction to 

entertain a suit to force the State to negotiate a compact yet provide no 

avenue of relief were the State to defy or repudiate that very compact. 

Such a gap in jurisdiction would reduce the elaborate structure of IGRA 

to a virtual nullity since a state could agree to anything knowing that it 

was free to ignore the compact once entered into. IGRA is not so 

vacuous.

Id. at 1056 (quoting the district court’s order); but see id. at 1062–65 (Wiggins, J,

dissenting on the ground that there is “no reason for the federal courts to become the 

arbiter of any and all disputes that may arise out of” tribal-state compacts). Thus, the 

Ninth Circuit rejected the State’s jurisdictional argument and proceeded to address 

the State’s sovereign immunity and the merits of the dispute. Id. 1056–62. 

Here, Pauma brings claims against the State for declaratory relief and breach 

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on the Pauma Compact. 

(SAC ¶¶ 280–86.) Provided that Pauma’s declaratory relief claim raises a federal 

interest that is as substantial as the interest implicated by a breach of compact claim 

against the State, the Court concludes IGRA, as interpreted in Cabazon, provides a 

colorable basis for jurisdiction over these claims. They must still be justiciable, 

however.

B. Justiciable Controversy

Beyond arguing there is no jurisdictional basis for Pauma’s claims, the State 

contends Pauma fails to allege a justiciable controversy between the Tribe and the 

State. (State’s Mot. 5:23–7:24, 9:12–10:5.) The Court first considers Pauma’s 

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request for declaratory relief, which was the sole claim against the State in the Tribe’s

initial Complaint. The Declaratory Judgment Act states that “[i]n a case of actual 

controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing 

of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any 

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 

sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). “[T]he phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the Act 

refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article 

III.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007) (quoting Aetna 

Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)); accord Am. States Ins. Co. v. 

Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 143 (9th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, when a party pursues declaratory relief, the court must determine 

whether Article III’s case or controversy requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., Principal 

Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005); Wickland Oil Terminals 

v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 1986). The inquiry “is whether the facts 

alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, 

between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 

warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127; 

accord United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting this 

standard determines the “constitutional ripeness of a declaratory judgment action”).

If this standard is not met, there “is no case or controversy” because the “case is not 

ripe for review,” and the “court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Principal Life Ins. 

Co., 394 F.3d at 669 (citing Kearns, 15 F.3d at 143).

The facts alleged in Pauma’s Second Amended Complaint do not demonstrate 

an actual controversy with the State. The crux of the Tribe’s action is that the Union 

is not abiding by the Tribal Labor Ordinance’s alternative dispute mechanism. (SAC 

¶¶ 4–8.) The Union has instead allegedly circumvented the Ordinance by repeatedly

filing unfair labor practice charges “directly with the NLRB.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 185, 192, 

199, 206, 213, 220, 227, 234, 241, 248, 255, 263.) Accepting the Tribe’s allegations 

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as true, it is clear that there is a dispute between the Tribe and the Union over the 

enforceability of the Ordinance’s alternative dispute mechanism.

The same cannot be said with respect to the State. At the threshold, the State 

is absent from Pauma’s description of the actual controversy in its pleading:

This action presents an actual and live controversy as to whether the 

[Ordinance] obligates the Union to resolve any work related disputes –

including unfair labor practice charges – through the binding dispute 

resolution process set forth within the ordinance rather than the 

administrative courts of the NLRB, and whether Pauma has and will 

continue to sustain damages as a result of the Union’s refusal to abide 

by the terms of an agreement that it negotiated and accepted. The 

district court has the power to remedy this dispute in accordance with 

the Prayer for Relief, infra.

(SAC ¶ 13.) Further, in considering the remainder of the Tribe’s pleading, Pauma 

does not allege facts demonstrating the State has taken an adverse position against 

the Tribe with respect to the Tribal Labor Ordinance. Rather, Pauma alleges that

after the Tribe sent a letter to the State and met with it in the State Capitol, the State 

informed the Tribe that “the State did not have an official position on the matter and 

thus would not get involved at the time.” (SAC ¶ 168; see also id. ¶ 269.) That is 

the only concrete factual allegation regarding the State’s conduct prior to the filing 

of this action. There is no allegation that the State controls the Union or has aided 

the Union in filing unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. There is similarly 

no allegation that the State has taken any action whatsoever against Pauma regarding 

the Ordinance during the Tribe’s ongoing dispute with the Union. 

The Court recognizes that a model of the Tribal Labor Ordinance is 

incorporated into Pauma’s Compact with the State. Under Section 10.4 and 

Addendum B of the Pauma Compact, the Tribe was required to adopt the Tribal 

Labor Ordinance. It did. If Pauma fails to “maintain the Ordinance in effect during 

the term of [the] Compact,” the State has the power to terminate the Compact on 

account of the Tribe’s “material breach.” But, again, there is no claim or evidence

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that the State has threatened to terminate the Compact or otherwise taken an adverse 

action against the Tribe. The gravamen of Pauma’s pleading is that the Union—not 

Pauma—has failed to adhere to the Ordinance.

Pauma attempts to demonstrate an actual controversy in its opposition, but the 

Court is unconvinced. The Tribe leans on the Supreme Court’s decision in 

MedImmune, arguing that Pauma “is in the same position as the petitioner in 

MedImmune, as both are ‘coerced’ contracting parties who file suit to determine their 

rights after being faced with the pre-suit predicament of abandoning said rights or 

risking prosecution.” (Opp’n to State’s Mot. 6:11–14.) Yet, an examination of the 

Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune bolsters this Court’s conclusion—not 

Pauma’s. 

In MedImmune, the petitioner and respondent entered into a patent license 

agreement. 549 U.S. at 121. The agreement provided the petitioner with the right to 

make and sell licensed products, so long as the company paid royalties to the 

respondent. Id. Several years later, the respondent sent the petitioner a letter 

expressing its belief that one of the petitioner’s products was covered by a patent 

addressed in the license agreement. Id. Thus, the respondent conveyed its 

expectation that the petitioner would pay the respondent royalties. Id.

The petitioner, however, “did not think royalties were owing, believing that 

the [relevant] patent was invalid and unenforceable.” MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 121–

22. Nonetheless, the petitioner viewed the respondent’s letter “to be a clear threat to 

enforce the [relevant] patent,” terminate the parties’ agreement, “and sue for patent 

infringement if petitioner did not make royalty payments as demanded.” Id. at 122. 

Consequently, “[u]nwilling to risk such serious consequences, petitioner paid the 

demanded royalties ‘under protest and with reservation of all of [its] rights.’” Id. 

(alteration in original). The company then filed a declaratory judgment action against 

the respondent seeking a determination that the underlying patent was invalid, 

unenforceable, or not infringed. Id. at 121–22. In light of the foregoing

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circumstances, the Supreme Court held there was a justiciable controversy. 

Id. at 137.

Like the companies in MedImmune, the State and Pauma are parties to an 

agreement—the Pauma Compact. But the similarities end there. Pauma does not 

allege the State has taken action to enforce the Compact against the Tribe or 

committed conduct that the Tribe views “to be a clear threat to” do so. See 

Medimmune, 549 U.S. at 122. Pauma’s theory is that MedImmune is analogous 

because the Tribe claims it risked prosecution if it did not “comply with the NLRB’s 

procedures and orders” after the Union chose to allegedly abandon the Tribal 

Ordinance’s dispute resolution mechanism. (Opp’n to State’s Mot. 6:25–28.) 

“Given the contempt powers of the NLRB,” Pauma contends it—like the petitioner 

in Medimmune—“had to bring suit to ameliorate a big and quickly devolving 

quandary created by the Union’s coercive actions.” (Id. 7:5–7.)

The Tribe’s comparison does not survive scrutiny. Pauma claims it is 

threatened by the contempt powers of the NLRB, but Pauma is not suing the NLRB. 

It is suing the State of California. These arguments do not support that “there is a 

substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality” between Pauma and 

the State. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127. Consequently, the Court is unpersuaded 

by Pauma’s attempt to analogize this case to MedImmune’s circumstances. 

The Tribe also attempts to use the State’s opinion that there is no actual 

controversy to create one. Pauma argues the State’s “impassioned defense of this 

suit shows” the State “is heavily invested in the outcome of this case and acting in 

concert with the Union.” (Opp’n to State’s Mot. 4:15–18.) The Court disagrees. The 

State has filed a motion to dismiss arguing first and foremost that there is no case or 

controversy between it and the Tribe. The State’s belief that there is no controversy 

does not create one. In sum, Pauma’s factual allegations fail to show a justiciable 

controversy to support the Tribe’s declaratory relief claim against the State.

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* * *

Given that there are insufficient factual allegations to demonstrate a justiciable 

declaratory relief claim, the Court inevitably reaches the same conclusion for 

Pauma’s nebulous claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. In support of this claim, Pauma seeks to use a court-mandated meet-andconfer session to inject an actual controversy into this lawsuit. As mentioned, Pauma 

alleges that after it filed its initial Complaint, the parties participated in a meet-andconfer session required by this Court’s Standing Order for Civil Cases to discuss an 

anticipated motion to dismiss by the State. (SAC ¶¶ 170–73.) There, “counsel for 

the State questioned the Court’s jurisdiction” and “explained its perception that 

Pauma’s suit was really one against the Union, which meant the State should not be 

a party to the suit especially since Pauma had not alleged a breach of compact claim 

against the State.” (Id. ¶ 171.) Pauma’s counsel then “agreed to dismiss the State []

from the suit if [it] stipulated to be bound by the order issued by the Court on the 

declaratory relief claim,” but the State declined “to enter into such an agreement.” 

(Id.) 

Pauma uses this meet-and-confer meeting in its Second Amended Complaint 

to try to stitch together a justiciable controversy by adding a claim for breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Pauma Compact. (SAC ¶¶ 

280–86.) Pauma claims the State’s (i) lack of an official position on the Tribe’s

dispute with the Union, (ii) unwillingness to voluntarily participate in this lawsuit, 

and (iii) decision to decline Pauma’s dismissal offer demonstrates the State has 

breached Pauma’s “reasonable expectations” under the Pauma Compact. (Id. ¶ 284.) 

Pauma also claims the State has failed “to take reasonable efforts to ensure that its 

privy in interest the Union would comply with the [Tribal Labor Ordinance], even if 

that simply meant directing it to first file any such unfair labor practice claims 

through the procedure in the [Tribal Labor Ordinance] while the declaratory relief 

claim in this matter was being adjudicated.” (Id. ¶ 285.) Yet, again, there is no 

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allegation that the State has aided the Union or that the State has the power to 

“direct[]” the Union to do anything. This effort to use a court-mandated meet-andconfer session to transmute an inchoate declaratory relief claim into a justiciable

breach of contract claim is not convincing.

Regardless of the legal theory employed, when the Court examines the factual 

allegations in Pauma’s pleading regarding Pauma and the State, the Court does not 

discern an actual case or controversy between these parties. Pauma has the burden 

of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction, which includes a justiciable 

controversy, but it does not meet this burden. Consequently, the Court GRANTS

the State’s motion to dismiss Pauma’s action against it for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction.

II. Union’s Motion to Dismiss

Having dismissed Pauma’s claims against the State for lack of jurisdiction, the 

Court considers whether it has jurisdiction over Pauma’s remaining claims against 

the Union. Aside from seeking comparable declaratory relief, Pauma is suing the 

Union for breach of the Tribal Labor Ordinance, with the Tribe characterizing its 

claims as being for breach of the Pauma Compact. (SAC ¶¶ 195–279.) In its own 

motion to dismiss, the Union argues that there is no independent basis to exercise 

jurisdiction over Pauma’s claims against the Union. (Union’s Mot. 6:14–9:5.) 

Relatedly, the Union argues that if the Court dismisses the Tribe’s claims against the 

State for lack of jurisdiction, there is no basis to invoke supplemental jurisdiction 

over the Tribe’s remaining claims. (Id. 12:3–11.)

The Court agrees that there is no independent basis for jurisdiction over 

Pauma’s claims against the Union. In making this determination, the Court

recognizes the potential obstacles to Pauma bringing “breach of compact” claims 

against the Union. For example, the Union is not a signatory to the Pauma Compact 

or the agreement’s Addendum B that attaches the Tribal Labor Ordinance to be 

adopted by Pauma. (Pauma Compact, ECF No. 33-1 at Ex. 1-41, 49.) In the same 

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vein, the Union is not identified as a party to the Pauma Compact. (Id. at 1-1 

(providing “[t]his Tribal-State Gaming Compact is entered into on a government-togovernment basis by and between [Pauma] and the [State] pursuant to [] [IGRA]”).) 

In addition, Pauma does not allege it negotiated the Pauma Compact or the content 

of the Tribal Labor Ordinance with the Union—the Tribe alleges it executed the 

Compact “through a simple exchange of letters with the Office of the Governor.” 

(See SAC ¶¶ 114–15.) Finally, the plain language of the Pauma Compact requires 

the Tribe to adopt and maintain the Tribal Labor Ordinance as tribal law to address 

“organizational and representational rights of Class III gaming Employees.” (Pauma 

Compact § 10.7, Add. B.) This compact requirement plainly places an enforceable 

obligation on Pauma, not the State—or any other party. (See id.) Cf. Unite Here 

Int’l Union v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1198 (S.D. Cal. 

2008) (Whelan, J.) (finding the Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance is “incorporated by 

reference” into the 1999 Compact “only in the most technical sense”).

Those potential obstacles aside, in assessing jurisdiction, the Court will adopt 

as true Pauma’s allegation that the Union “accepted” the Tribal Labor Ordinance. 

(SAC ¶ 13.) The Court will also assume, for the sake of argument, that because the 

Union accepted the benefits of an ordinance enacted by Pauma as tribal law, and 

because a copy of the tribal ordinance is incorporated into the Pauma Compact as 

part of Pauma’s agreement with the State, that means the Tribe can sue the Union for 

“breach of compact.” (See Pauma Compact § 10.7, Add. B.)

Having adopted Pauma’s framing of the compact and the tribal ordinance, the 

Court repeats that as a starting point it does “not have jurisdiction over run-of-themill contract claims brought by Indian tribes.” See Cabazon, 124 F.3d at 1055. In 

its opposition to the Union’s motion, the Tribe argues that its claims do not fall under 

this category because they are instead analogous to the four tribes’ breach of compact 

claims against California in Cabazon. Id. at 1050. As summarized above, in 

Cabazon, the Ninth Circuit concluded the tribes’ action against the state for breach 

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of their tribal-state compacts presented a substantial enough federal interest to be 

“arising under” IGRA. See id. at 1055–56 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. 

Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986)). The Tribe argues that the “similarities 

between Cabazon and the instant matter could not be any more apparent.” (Opp’n to 

Union’s Mot. 12:4–6.) The “only wrinkle between the present case and Cabazon,” 

in Pauma’s view, is the addition of the Union “in the compact dispute.” (Id. 14:12–

13.)

This distinction is more than a wrinkle. Again, the default rule is that a federal 

court does not have jurisdiction over a tribe’s general contract claims. Cabazon, 124 

F.3d at 1055. In deviating from that rule in Cabazon, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 

there is an important federal interest in enforcing “Tribal-State compacts in the 

federal courts” because “Congress, in passing IGRA, did not create a mechanism 

whereby states can make empty promises to Indian tribes during good-faith 

negotiations of Tribal–State compacts, knowing that they may repudiate them with 

immunity whenever it serves their purpose.” Id. at 1056. As the district court had 

also recognized: “It would be extraordinary were [IGRA] to provide jurisdiction to 

entertain a suit to force the State to negotiate a compact yet provide no avenue 

of relief were the State to defy or repudiate that very compact.” Id.

The same concerns do not arise here for Pauma’s claims against the Union. 

The Union, as a private party, cannot evade its alleged contractual promises with 

assertions of state sovereign immunity. See Cabazon, 124 F.3d at 1056; cf. Unite 

Here, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 (noting in the context of an action between the Union 

and a different tribe, the necessity to provide a federal forum in Cabazon was missing 

because “neither litigant is significantly disadvantaged by proceeding in a state or 

tribal forum”). And there is no comparable danger that a federal court’s failure to 

entertain the Tribe’s breach of compact claims against the Union “would reduce the 

elaborate structure of IGRA to a virtual nullity.” See Cabazon, 124 F.3d at 1056. 

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Consequently, at a minimum, the importance of any federal interest raised by 

Pauma’s alleged breach of compact claims against the Union is diminished in these 

circumstances. See Cabazon, 124 F.3d at 1055–56. Given the foregoing, this Court 

is wary of “[becoming] the arbiter of any and all disputes that may arise out of 

[gaming compacts].” See Unite Here, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 (alterations in original) 

(quoting Cabazon, 124 F.3d at 1064 (Wiggins, J., dissenting), and expressing this 

caution where “neither [] IGRA nor Cabazon expressly confer federal jurisdiction for 

this type of action”). Indeed, Pauma does not identify any decisions in this circuit

that have extended Cabazon’s reasoning to a situation involving a party that is neither 

the “state” nor the “tribe” in a tribal-state gaming compact under IGRA. (See Opp’n 

to Union’s Mot. 10:6–16:12; see also Union’s Reply 4:16–17 (arguing that “[n]o 

court has adopted Pauma’s expansive theory of Cabazon jurisdiction”).) Ultimately, 

none of the Tribe’s arguments convince this Court that Pauma’s claims against the 

Union present a substantial enough federal interest to allow these claims to arise 

under IGRA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1362.

In sum, this is a Court “of limited jurisdiction,” and “[i]t is to be presumed 

that” Pauma’s claims against the Union “lie[] outside this limited jurisdiction.” See 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Pauma does not meets its “burden of establishing the 

contrary.” See id. The Court consequently GRANTS the Union’s motion to dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the State’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and TERMINATES AS MOOT the State’s 

accompanying motion to strike allegations in Pauma’s pleading (ECF No. 36). The 

Court similarly GRANTS the Union’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and TERMINATES AS MOOT the Union’s accompanying motion to 

strike (ECF No. 34).

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In opposing the motions to dismiss, Pauma requests leave to file a Third 

Amended Complaint in the event that this Court grants the State’s and Union’s 

motions. (Opp’n to Union’s Mot. 15:19–16:12; Opp’n to State’s Mot. 26:3.) In light 

of concerns over jurisdiction and the futility of a proposed amendment, the Court 

defers determining whether granting leave is appropriate until the Court may review 

a proposed amended pleading. If Pauma seeks to file a Third Amended Complaint, 

it must first file a noticed motion for leave to amend with the proposed pleading 

attached and in compliance with Civil Local Rule 15.1. Any such motion must be 

filed no later than October 19, 2018. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Pauma’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No 33). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2018

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