Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03076/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03076-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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1 All parties have consented to my jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHLEEN EDWARDS,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD.,

Defendant(s).

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No. C 05-3076 BZ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case presents a question of first impression in the

Ninth Circuit - whether the non-moving party on summary

judgment is relieved of the burden of introducing evidence of

the existence of triable issues of fact if it believes that

such evidence has been produced in discovery and could have

been placed into evidence by the moving party. For the

reasons expressed below, I answer this question in the

negative and, because plaintiff elected not to introduce any

evidence in opposition to defendant’s motion, I grant

defendant summary judgment.1

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 50 Filed 11/02/06 Page 1 of 11
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2 Plaintiff’s relevance objections to the Court’s

consideration of all facts supporting defendant’s argument

concerning the impact of the ticket’s contractual terms are

OVERRULED. In addition, plaintiff’s relevance objections to

the documents introduced through Aksana Moshaiv’s declaration

are OVERRULED. In reaching my decision, I have considered only

facts borne out by declarations, deposition transcripts,

documents, and other admissible evidence.

3 As to the factual bases for her claim, evidence

submitted demonstrates that plaintiff received a wheelchairaccessible cabin, but did not receive a cabin with a balcony as

she desired. Although plaintiff was able to disembark at

various Alaskan ports throughout the cruise, the Pacific

Princess was unable to dock at the port of Sitka. Defendant’s

agents refused to allow plaintiff to disembark. Defendant

asserted that this decision was based on safety concerns.

2

Plaintiff Kathleen Edwards filed this Complaint against

defendant, Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., seeking injunctive

relief to remedy “continuing” violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. section 12101 et seq., and damages

under various state laws. Defendant filed its Motion for

Summary Judgment arguing, in part, that plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the six month limitations period included in her

cruise ticket contract. 

Defendant relied on facts which are undisputed. 

Plaintiff requires the assistance of a wheelchair. In July

2003, plaintiff and her husband took a cruise to Alaska aboard

defendant’s ship Pacific Princess. Plaintiff booked her

cruise through a travel agent and received her cruise ticket

and travel documents on June 19, 2003.2 The cruise ended on

July 30, 2003.3 The contract appended to the ticket required

passengers to file all cruise-related personal injury claims

within one year of their trip, and all other claims within six

months. Since plaintiff did not file this suit until July 28,

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4 Plaintiff has not disputed that a cruise ship

passenger ticket is a maritime contract, governed by federal

maritime law. See Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d

827, 834 (9th Cir. 2002); Vavoules v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 822

F. Supp. 979, 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Carnival Cruise

Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)). Federal law

explicitly permits maritime passenger contracts to place a one

year limitation period on the filing of claims involving death

or personal injury. 46 U.S.C § 183b; Dempsey v. Norwegian

Cruise Line, 972 F.2d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts have

gone beyond section 183b to enforce the terms of maritime

contracts against a broad array of claims. See Licensed

Practical Nurses, Technicians and Health Care Workers of New

York, Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 393, 411

(S.D.N.Y. 2000)(breach of contract); Ames v. Celebrity Cruises,

Inc., 1998 WL 427694 (S.D.N.Y., July 29, 1998) (fraudulent

inducement and wrongful billing claims); Cronin v. Cunard Line, 672 N.Y.S.2d 864, 864-65 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (deceptive port

charges); Boyles v. Cunard Line, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21449

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1994) (misrepresentation claim). In

addition, both one year and six month time bars have been found

reasonable. See Dempsey, 972 F.2d at 999-1000 (upholding a one

year time bar); Ames, 1998 WL 427694 at *6 (citing numerous

decisions upholding six month limits against claims other than

personal injury). 

5 In her Complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s

policies and practices regularly preclude the disabled from

disembarking at port stops, and that defendant’s ships fail to

offer an acceptable number and type of disabled-accessible

cabins. Plaintiff also claimed that “she is aware” that

defendant’s ships “routinely fail to provide” reasonable access

to restrooms, restaurants, bars, shops, and other facilities. 

Plaintiff asserted in her unsworn Complaint and in papers filed

by counsel that these barriers have prevented her from

scheduling another cruise. 

3

2005, defendant argued it is entitled to judgment because the

suit was barred by the six month contractual limitations

period.4 

Plaintiff’s Opposition devoted little space to this

issue. Plaintiff cited Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods,

Inc., 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that

the limitations period does not apply to her suit because she

alleged “continuing violations.”5 Plaintiff, however,

presented no admissible evidence that the violations deterred

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6 I noted that the parties had stated at the initial

case management conference that standing might be an issue and

found it improper for defendant to raise the issue in its Reply

so as to preclude plaintiff from making substantive arguments

to the contrary. See Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D.

672, 682 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“It is well accepted that raising of

new issues and submission of new facts in [a] reply brief is

improper.”) (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

4

her from booking another cruise so as to create a factual

basis to apply Pickern to her case. See id. at 1136-37. 

Under these circumstances, I issued a tentative ruling

granting the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the

limitations period applied to plaintiff’s claims and that

plaintiff failed to produce evidence demonstrating that her

Complaint was not time-barred. Plaintiff responded by

requesting oral argument.

Defendant filed its Reply arguing for the first time that

plaintiff lacked standing to bring her suit. Two days before

the hearing, plaintiff filed an objection to defendant’s

Reply, arguing that the standing issue had been improperly and

untimely raised. In support of her objection, plaintiff

attached as exhibits to counsel’s declaration, portions of her

interrogatory answers and her deposition testimony, and her

declaration. To varying degrees, this showing goes to

plaintiff’s thwarted desire to book another cruise aboard

defendant’s ships.

At the hearing, I sustained plaintiff’s objection to

defendant’s standing argument and stated that I would not

consider it as having been presented by defendant’s summary

judgment motion.6

 Because I sustained the objection, I struck

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7 But for the arguments premised on Pickern and Goka, plaintiff did not contest the applicability or reasonableness

of the ticket’s time bar provision. 

5

the declaration and attached exhibits since the standing issue

was not before me and the declaration had not been timely or

properly filed. I reminded counsel for plaintiff that the

exhibits were not before me; that he had failed to submit any

evidence of his client’s desire to book another cruise; and

that he had not sought relief from his failure to allow him to

present such evidence late. Plaintiff took no steps to place

properly the exhibits before me. Instead, plaintiff argued

that she had no need to do so, because 1) the “futile gesture”

doctrine codified in § 308 of the ADA precluded the assertion

of a limitations period as a bar to any ADA claim based on a

continuing condition, and 2) relying on Goka v. Bobbitt, 862

F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1988), a case not cited in her Opposition,

she was relieved of her burden because she had produced such

evidence in discovery.7

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine

issue as to any material facts and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

There is no genuine issue of material fact where “the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the [adverse party].” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); see also

Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). When

determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial,

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6

“inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must

be viewed in the light most favorable to the [adverse party].” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732,

735 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“When the party moving for summary judgment would bear

the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with

evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the

evidence went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the

moving party has the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to

its case.” C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Co., Inc. v.

Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted). “When the moving party meets its burden,

the ‘adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse

party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in

this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial.’” Miller v. Glenn Miller

Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “Summary judgment will be

entered against the non-moving party if that party does not

present such specific facts. [Citation omitted.] Only

admissible evidence may be considered in deciding a motion for

summary judgment.” Id. (citing Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Serv.,

Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Here, defendant, as the moving party, met its initial

burden when it introduced evidence that plaintiff failed to

abide by the ticket contract by filing this claim nearly two

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8 Nowhere has plaintiff explained how her contention

would advance the policies underlying either the ADA or periods

of limitation. On the one hand, it would seem that while a

plaintiff delays asserting her claims, potential violations

would continue unabated to the detriment of other disabled

people and the public at large. On the other hand, the

concerns which underlie periods of limitations, such as the

need to bring closure and the evidentiary problems created by

the passage of time, would increase as plaintiff delays. 

9 Indeed, it is the claimant’s burden to demonstrate

that the continuing violation doctrine applies. This includes,

for example, a showing that some actionable conduct took place

within the limitations period. See Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982) (“[W]here a plaintiff,

pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, challenges not just one

incident of conduct violative of the Act, but an unlawful

practice that continues into the [180 day] limitations period,

the complaint is timely when it is filed within 180 days of the

last asserted occurrence of that practice.”) (footnote

omitted); see also Deck v. City of Toledo, 56 F. Supp. 2d 886,

892-94 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (ADA claim) (demonstrating the

7

years after her cruise. The burden then shifted to plaintiff

to set forth specific facts establishing that there remain

issues to be tried. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather

than meeting her burden, plaintiff impermissibly rested on the

allegations of continuing violations in her Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s arguments that she was relieved of her 

burden to produce evidence are not persuasive. Plaintiff has

cited no authority, and the court has found none, for the

contention that no limitations period applies to an ADA

violation alleged to be continuing or ongoing in nature.8

Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136-37, does not, as plaintiff contends,

support this position. Were that the law, the Ninth Circuit

would not have undertaken a lengthy analysis to determine

whether the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the one year

statute of limitations which the parties in Pickern agreed

applied. See id.9 

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maintenance of a discriminatory system before and during the

limitations period). Edwards has not produced evidence of

conduct violating the ADA which occurred within the six months

preceding the filing her complaint.

8

Instead, Pickern reversed a summary judgment that the

statute of limitations barred plaintiff Jerry Doran’s ADA suit

because Doran’s declaration had established that he had

visited defendant’s store a few months before filing suit and

was deterred from further visits by his knowledge of the

store’s barriers. Id. at 1137. Doran’s declaration and other

evidence established that the store was near his grandmother’s

house, that he visited his grandmother nearly every weekend,

and that he desired and intended to visit the store again but

he could not enter it. Id. at 1135. Thus, although Doran had

first become aware of the barriers outside the limitations

period, he had presented evidence of a continuing violation

such that he did not need to engage in the futile gesture of

attempting to gain access again. Plaintiff made no such

showing here.

Nor does plaintiff’s invocation of the futile gesture

doctrine, standing alone, relieve her of the evidentiary

burden. Originating in employment discrimination cases, see

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), Congress

incorporated the futile gesture doctrine into the ADA. See 42

U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall require a

person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such

person has actual notice that a person or organization covered

by this subchapter does not intend to comply with its

provisions.”). As stated in Teamsters, however, a futile

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9

gesture claimant is charged with “the not always easy burden

of proving” that the discriminatory practice deterred her from

attempting to secure the desired outcome. Id. at 368; see

also Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1137 (applying the futile gesture

doctrine where plaintiff produced admissible evidence that,

shortly before filing suit, he would have entered the store

but for the presence of known barriers). Plaintiff’s failure

to produce admissible evidence supporting application of the

futile gesture doctrine is fatal to her claims.

Citing Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1988),

plaintiff posits a second argument: she was excused from

introducing into the record evidence of deterrence by

defendant’s knowledge of such evidence produced in discovery. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Goka is misplaced. 

Goka reversed a summary judgment against a pro se

plaintiff granted to defendants who had filed their motion

knowing that their depositions, which they did not produce,

were “materially inconsistent” with the deposition of

plaintiff, which they did produce. Id. at 648, 650-51. Goka,

a former prisoner, had sued prison guards and officials after

being assaulted by another inmate, and was pro se at the time

defendants moved for summary judgment. “Serious questions”

existed as to whether defendants’ deposition transcripts were

even available to plaintiff, as the depositions had been taken

by Goka’s then-counsel pursuant to a protective order which

prohibited their disclosure to Goka. Id. at 651 n.3. To

allow defendants to obtain summary judgment under such

circumstances not only defeated the purposes of summary

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10 In its 20 year history, Goka has been cited sparingly

by the Seventh Circuit, applied mostly in cases concerning

prison guard liability for punishment violative of the 8th

Amendment. The few cases on point indicate that Goka did not

alter the Celotex burden shifting mechanism. See Herman v.

City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that

a party has a duty to respond once a summary judgment movant

meets their burden); Petru v. City of Berwyn, 872 F.2d 1359,

1363-64 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).

10

judgment – disposing of cases which lacked material disputes

of fact - it also violated Rule 11. Id. at 650.

Goka does not help plaintiff for a variety of reasons. 

First, I do not read Goka as changing the summary judgment

burdens announced in Celotex, 377 U.S. at 324. See Goka, 862

F.2d at 649 n.1 (listing those burdens). Rather, Goka appears

to rest more on the Rule 11 obligations of defense counsel in

seeking summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff. 

Second, Goka is factually distinguishable. Here,

plaintiff is represented by counsel well-schooled in ADA

litigation who had the ability to introduce evidence. Unlike

Goka, in which the missing deposition testimony was directly

inconsistent with that relied on by the movants, the discovery

excerpts that plaintiff cited in her objections do not

establish such a strong factual predicate for the futile

gesture doctrine that defendant had a Rule 11 obligation to

produce them.

Finally, whatever the scope of Goka,10 it is not the law

of this circuit. I am unaware of any court within the Ninth

Circuit that has relied on Goka or cited it. 

On the admissible evidence before me, there is no issue

of material fact as to the applicability of the ticket’s time

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11 I am mindful that I have a duty under Rule 56 to

consider the entirety of the record before me and that had

plaintiff chosen to, she may have been able to establish

disputed issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See,

e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (summary

judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party”); but see Kennan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278

(9th Cir. 1996) (not the Court’s task “to scour the record in

search of a genuine issue of triable fact.”). Even after

issuing a tentative ruling and cautioning plaintiff about the

consequences of failing to produce admissible evidence

supporting her contentions, however, I am left with a record

devoid of evidence sufficient to deny defendant’s motion. 

12 Plaintiff and defendant lodged numerous additional

objections to evidence. In particular, plaintiff objected to

reliance on the declaration of Jan Tuck, and defendant objected

to reliance on the declaration of Karl Danz. Because I have

not relied on either declaration or on any of the evidence

objected to and not ruled on in footnote two, supra, the

remaining objections are OVERRULED as moot.

G:\bzall\-bzcases\edwards\OrderGrantSumJ.BZ.RM.VERION.2.wpd 11

limitation language. Plaintiff’s claims are therefore timebarred.11

For all these reasons, defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby GRANTED.12

DATED: November 2, 2006

 

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:05-cv-03076-BZ Document 50 Filed 11/02/06 Page 11 of 11