Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01222/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01222-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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1 That judgment was actually rendered against “Colin H. Friedman,

individually and as trustee of the Friedman Family Trust UDT, . . . , Hedy Kramer

Friedman, individually and as trustee of the Friedman Family Trust UDT, . . . , 

Farid Meshkatai, and Anita Kramer Meshkatai, individually and as trustee of the

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Fidelity National Financial, )

Inc., a Delaware corporation, )

Fidelity Express Network, )

Inc., a California )

corporation, )

Plaintiffs, ) No. CIV 03-1222-PHX-RCB 

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Colin H. Friedman, et al. )

)

Defendants. ) )

Introduction

This is the latest permutation of a nearly decade long battle

by plaintiffs Fidelity National Financial, Inc. and Fidelity

Express Network, Inc. (“Fidelity”) to enforce a roughly $8.5

million dollar judgment, plus interest. Fidelity obtained that

judgment against defendants Colin H. Friedman and Hedy Kramer

Friedman (“the Friedmans”), among others,1

 following a trial in the 

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Anita Kramer Living Trust . . . , and each of them, jointly and severally[.]” Fid.

Nat'l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, No. 00-cv-06902-GAF-RZ (C.D.Cal. 2002) (Doc. 235).

2 As previously noted, defendants Farid and Anita Meshkatai are also

subject to the 2002 California judgment and they are being represented by the same

counsel as the Friedmans. Although disavowing that they are “moving parties”

herein, the Meshkatais “join in th[e] [Friedmans’] Request as similarly situated

judgment debtors who will be equally affected by the Court’s ruling on the

enforceability of Fidelity’s judgment against Defendants in Arizona[.]” Defs.’

Mot. (Doc. 327) at 2:11-14. In light of the foregoing, the Meshkatais shall be

bound by this order as if they, too, had moved for the relief which the Friedmans

are seeking. 

3 In seeking this relief, the Friedmans filed what they style as “Request

for Ruling Consistent with Ninth Circuit Mandate[.]” (Doc. 327). The court deems

that “Request” to be a motion and, obviously, Fidelity did as well given its timely

filed response thereto.

4 For ease of reference, all citations to page numbers are to the page

numbers assigned by the court’s case management and electronic case filing (CM/ECF)

system.

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the United States District Court for the Central District of

California (“the California federal court”). Fidelity’s judgment

was entered in that court on July 12, 2002 (“the California

judgment”). Fidelity then registered that California judgment in

this Arizona district court by filing, among other things, a

certified copy of that judgment on November 14, 2002 (“the Arizona

judgment”). Essentially, the Friedmans2 are once again seeking to

have this court quash enforcement of that Arizona judgment because

in their view it has expired and Fidelity never properly or timely

renewed it.3 

Fidelity vigorously disputes that the Arizona judgment has

expired. That judgment has not expired, Fidelity counters, because

on April 5, 2007, it filed in this court what it deems to be “both

a second registration” of that judgment under federal law “and

. . . a renewal” of the Arizona judgment under Arizona law. Pls.’

Resp. (Doc. 329) at 6:19-204 (emphasis added). Then, viewing that

April 5th document strictly as a “renewal affidavit,” Fidelity

further asserts that any “defect[s]” therein were “de minimis” and

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5 Given the court's intimate familiarity with this action and because

the issues have been fully briefed, in its discretion the court denies Fidelity’s

request for oral argument as it would not aid the decisional process. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); Lake at Las

Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Dev. Malibu Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir.

1991).

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were “cured” by the filing of “an additional affidavit . . . in

2008.” Id. at 6:24-25. Fidelity thus contends that there is no

basis for quashing its Arizona judgment, which by Fidelity’s most

recent estimation totals $10,685,204.5

 See id. at 8:9 (citation

omitted). Background

I. Procedural

The court assumes familiarity with the prolonged and rather

tortuous history of this litigation. This most recent dispute

begins with this court’s order denying the Friedmans’ motion to

quash enforcement of Fidelity’s Arizona judgment. This court found

two grounds for denial. Both derive from A.R.S. §§ 12-1611, which

provides that “[a] judgment may be renewed by action thereon at any

time within five years after the date of the judgment.” A.R.S. 

§ 12-1611. First, this court found that Fidelity’s “collection

activities in this case” were tantamount to an “action thereon”

within the meaning of section 12-1611. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc.

v. Friedman, 2008 WL 3049988, at *10 (D.Ariz. Aug. 8, 2008)

(“Fidelity I”). Hence, Fidelity “renew[ed] its [Arizona

registered] judgment under” that statute. Id. Second, this court

held that Fidelity’s federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”) action also constituted an “action

thereon” for purposes of renewing its Arizona judgment in

accordance with A.R.S. § 12-1611. The court thus concluded that

because Fidelity had properly renewed the Arizona judgment by those

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activities, there was no basis for quashing it. 

Disagreeing, the Friedmans appealed and the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals certified two questions to the Arizona Supreme

Court:

(1) Do collection activities (such as filing 

for a writ of garnishment or applying for orders 

from the court to inspect a safety deposit box or 

require a debtor's exam) taken within Arizona, renew 

a judgment previously registered in Arizona?

(2) Does the filing of a related lawsuit in a state 

other than Arizona renew a judgment previously 

registered in Arizona?

Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, 602 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.

2010). The Arizona Supreme Court answered both questions in the

negative. To renew a judgment pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12–1551(B) or

12–1611, the Supreme Court explained, a party must bring a

“specific form of suit – the common law action on a judgment[,]” 

. . . not simply an action in some way related to the earlier

judgment[.]” Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v. Friedman, 225 Ariz. 307,

___, 238 P.3d 118, 121 (2010) (“Fidelity III”). Fidelity’s Arizona

collection efforts were not “a common law action on the 2002

judgment[,]” the Supreme Court reasoned, because those “efforts

were attempts to collect upon the 2002 judgment, not to renew it.” 

Id. at 123 (citation omitted). Additionally, that Court held that

Fidelity’s RICO lawsuit “was not a common law action on the

judgment[] [in that] it did not simply recite the amount owed and

seek a judgment on that debt.” Id. Instead, that RICO “suit

sought remedies under federal and California law because of actions

allegedly undertaken by the [Friedmans] to frustrate collection of

the 2002 judgment.” Id.

Adopting the answers of the Arizona Supreme Court, the Ninth

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6 That 2002 Certification does not mention 28 U.S.C. § 1963 on its face.

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Circuit held that because “Fidelity did not file a common law

action for renewal on the 2002 judgment within five years of its

entry, the judgment expired by 2008.” Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Inc. v.

Friedman, 402 Fed.Appx. 194, 196 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Fidelity IV”)

(citation omitted). In Fidelity IV the Court noted that Fidelity

“also question[ed][,]” as it does now, “(1) whether it successfully

renewed the judgment by affidavit in 2008, and (2) whether its 2007

registration of the final California judgment also renewed the

judgment.” Id. at 196. The Ninth Circuit did not address those

issues though because this court did not in Fidelity I. The Ninth

Circuit also declined to address those two issues because “the

parties did not provide comprehensive briefing to inform [the Ninth

Circuit’s] review[.]” Id. (citations omitted). Pursuant to the

Ninth Circuit’s “formal mandate[,]” its judgment took effect

November 22, 2010. See Defs.’ Request For Judicial Notice (“RJN”),

exh. B thereto (Doc. 328-2) at 2. 

II. Factual

The federal judgment registration statute provides in relevant

part:

 A judgment in an action for the recovery of money 

 . . . entered in any . . . , district court, . . . 

 may be registered by filing a certified copy of the 

 judgment in any other district . . . , when the 

 judgment has become final by appeal or expiration 

 of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court 

 that entered the judgment for good cause shown. 

28 U.S.C. § 1963. Presumably in accordance with that statute,6 on

November 14, 2002, Fidelity registered its California judgment by

filing, inter alia, a certified copy of its judgment rendered in

the California federal court. Doc. 1. That copy of the judgment

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7 The attached certification emanating from the federal court in

California actually is dated January 31, 2007 (“the California Certification”), not

January 1, 2007, as Fidelity’s Certification inaccurately states. Defs.’ RJN, exh.

I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 3. 

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is attached to a document entitled “Certification of Judgment for

Registration in Another District[.]” Id. (emphasis omitted). That

2002 Certification states:

 An appeal was taken from this judgment and is 

currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the 9th Circuit. The U.S. District Court for the 

Central District of California, . . . has entered an 

order allowing plaintiff to register its Judgment in 

Arizona. Certified copies of the Judgment (filed 

July 10, 2002), and the Order Allowing Plaintiff to 

Register Its Judgment in Arizona (filed October 22, 

2002) are attached.

Id.

After registering its California judgment here in 2002, in the

following years Fidelity engaged in numerous, mostly unsuccessful,

collection efforts in this district. Eventually, on April 5, 2007,

Fidelity filed in this court a document entitled “Certification of

Judgment for Registration in Another District (dated January 1,7

2007) and Renewal of Judgment in District of Arizona[.]” Defs.’

RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 2 (bold emphasis omitted,

italicized emphasis and footnote added). This dual designation

reflects Fidelity’s uncertainty as to the exact nature of this

document. For brevity’s sake, the court will refer to this

document as the “2007 Certification,” but no legal significance

shall be accorded to that designation. 

Attached to that 2007 Certification is another “Certification

of Judgment for Registration in Another District[,]” again

emanating from the California federal court. That California

Certification indicates that the Ninth Circuit “appeal was

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8 This date does not correspond to the docket sheet which indicates that

on November 14, 2002, the Certification of Judgment was received from the federal

court in California, and that it was “[e]ntered” on November 18, 2002. Pls.’ RJN

(Doc. 330) at 10. 

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dismissed by order entered on May 15, 2003.” Id., exh. I thereto

(Doc. 328-9) at 3. 

Besides filing those two Certifications, on February 7, 2008,

Fidelity filed a document it designated as an “Additional Renewal

Affidavit Renewing the Judgment Registered in Arizona on November

15,8 2002” (“additional renewal affidavit”). Id., exh. H thereto

(Doc. 382-8) at 2 (emphasis omitted) (footnote added). Fidelity

filed that affidavit in response to the Friedmans’ original motion

to quash the Arizona judgment.

Summary of Arguments

The Friedmans argue that the court should quash the 2002

Arizona judgment because it has expired and Fidelity did not

properly or timely renew it. The Friedmans first contend that the

2007 Certification did not renew the Arizona judgment because it

was not a “renewal affidavit” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B). Assuming arguendo that the 2007 Certification “was

sufficient to operate as a renewal affidavit[,]” nonetheless, the

Friedmans contend that it was untimely. Thus, from the Friedmans’

standpoint, Fidelity cannot rely upon the 2007 Certification to

renew the expired Arizona judgment.

Next, the Friedmans argue that the 2008 additional renewal

affidavit did not operate to renew the Arizona judgment because it,

too, was untimely. Regardless of its timeliness, the Friedmans

contend that that affidavit was “filed to correct the deficiencies

in the [2007] Certification[,]” and hence it constitutes “an

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admission that the Certification did not meet the requirements of”

a renewal affidavit under “A.R.S. § 1612(B) and was, therefore,

invalid.” Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 327) at 7:23-24. 

From Fidelity’s perspective, its Arizona judgment is “valid

and enforceable” because its “California judgment was timely

registered in Arizona in 2007 as both a second registration and as

a renewal.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 6:18-20 (emphasis added). 

Fidelity does not explain why, as it maintains, “[t]he 2007 renewal

was timely[.]” Id. at 6:24. Instead, Fidelity offers the following

non sequitur: That renewal “was timely because any defect in the

renewal affidavit was de minimis and was cured by an additional

affidavit filed in 2008.” Id. at 6:24-25. 

Discussion

I. Requests for Judicial Notice

Before addressing the parties’ respective arguments, the court

must consider their separate RJNs made pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.

201. Defendants’ RJN lists ten court filings, all pertaining

directly to this action. See Defs.’ RJN (Doc. 328) at 1-3. The

first such filing is the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Fidelity

III, 225 Ariz. 307, 238 P.3d 118 (2010). Defendants’ RJN also

includes the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Fidelity IV, 402 Fed.Appx.

194 (9th Cir. 2010), and mandate issued in accordance therewith. 

Third, defendants’ RJN lists six filings in this action and a

filing in the related action in the federal court in California,

Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, No. CV 06-4271 CAS (JWJx). 

Rather than relying upon any specific pleading, Fidelity simply

seeks to have this court take judicial notice of the docket sheet

herein. See Pls.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 1.

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Pleadings and orders in this action, or others, are matters of

public record and hence properly the subject of judicial notice.

See, e.g., Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741,

746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice, as a matter of

public record, of “pleadings, memoranda, expert reports, etc., from

[earlier] litigation[,]” which were thus “readily verifiable”);

Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 994 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted) (“court records from related proceedings can be taken into

account without converting a motion to dismiss into a summary

judgment motion[ ]”), overruled on other grounds, Taylor v.

Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008). 

Therefore, to the extent necessary to resolve this motion, the

court grants the defendants’ and Fidelity’s respective RJNs. 

The court is only taking judicial notice of those prior

filings and orders to show, for example, that a prior proceeding

occurred or that a certain argument or position was asserted

therein. See, e.g., Faurie v. Berkeley Unified School District,

2008 WL 820682, at *2 n. 3 (N.D.Cal. March 26, 2008) (taking

judicial notice of pleadings to “see what arguments Defendants

advanced in” another court and “what that court ruled[]”); Mitchell

v. Branham, 2008 WL 3200666, at *8 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 5, 2008)

(“[d]ocuments that are part of the public record may be judicially

noticed to show ... that a judicial proceeding occurred or that a

document was filed in another court case[ ]”). The parties are not

requesting that the court take judicial notice of factual findings

made by other courts; and, indeed, the court could not do that. See

Mitchell, 2008 WL 3200666, at *8 (citations omitted) (“[A] court

may not take judicial notice of findings of facts from another

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case.”) 

II. “Request for Ruling Consistent with Ninth Circuit Mandate”

A. Rule of Mandate

It is well settled in this Circuit that “‘[w]hen a case has

been decided by an appellate court and remanded, the court to which

it is remanded must proceed in accordance with the mandate and such

law of the case as was established by the appellate court.’” 

United States v. Luong, 627 F.3d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Firth v. United States, 554 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1977)). An

equally well settled corollary is that a district court “‘may

consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate[.]’”

United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2007)

(quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 256 16 S.Ct.

291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895)) (emphasis added). Thus, on remand where

“courts are often confronted with issues that were never considered

by the remanding court[,] . . . [b]roadly speaking, mandates

require respect for what the higher court decided, not for what it

did not decide.” United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1093

(9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis added). So, “although lower courts are obliged to

execute the terms of a mandate, they are free as to anything not

foreclosed by the mandate, and, under certain circumstances, an

order issued after remand may deviate from the mandate if it is not

counter to the spirit of the circuit court’s decision.” United

States v. Perez, 475 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). “[T]he

ultimate task is to distinguish matters that have been decided on

appeal, and are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the lower

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court, from matters that have not[.]” Id. (internal quotation

marks, citation, footnote and emphasis omitted). 

In undertaking that task, “the Supreme Court [has] emphasized

that, in addition to the mandate itself, ‘[t]he opinion by this

court at the time of rendering its decree may be consulted to

ascertain what was intended by its mandate[.]’” Kellington, 217

F.3d at 1093 (quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247,

256, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895)). “[I]n construing a

mandate, the lower court may consider the opinion the mandate

purports to enforce as well as the procedural posture and

substantive law from which it arises.” Id. at 1093. 

The mandate here is exceedingly brief, indicating that the

Ninth Circuit’s judgment takes effect November 22, 2010. Defs.’

RJN, exh. B thereto (Doc. 328-2) at 2. It concludes by specifying

that it is “the formal mandate of this [Ninth Circuit] Court issued

pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.” Id. Because the mandate is silent as to its scope,

the court will look to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. When the court

does that, it is readily apparent, as earlier mentioned, that the

Ninth Circuit expressly left open the issues of renewal by

affidavit in 2008 and renewal by registration in 2007. Thus, the

mandate does not foreclose consideration of those two issues now. 

Consequently, this court may properly resolve those two issues

without impermissibly exceeding the scope of the mandate.

B. “2007 Certification”

1. Contents

Section 12-1612(A) permits renewal of a judgment “by filing an

affidavit for renewal with the clerk of the proper court.” A.R.S.

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§ 12-1612(A). The Friedmans argue that Fidelity did not renew the

Arizona judgment by affidavit because it did not file a document

pursuant to that statute specifically designated as a “renewal

affidavit.” Further, regardless of its title, and contrary to what

Fidelity believes, the Friedmans argue that the 2007 Certification

is not tantamount to a renewal affidavit because it does not

include many of the details section 12-1612(B) specifies. Given

that lack of detail, that 2007 Certification was “woefully

inadequate” from the Friedmans’ perspective in that it did not

serve the notice purpose of that statute. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. D

thereto (Doc. 328-4) at 7:14. 

Strenuously disagreeing, Fidelity claims that the 2007

Certification did provide the requisite notice because it

“identifie[d] the parties, the court in which the judgment was

docketed, the date and amount of judgment, and the owner of the

judgment.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 14:4-5. Fidelity also points

out that “[t]he Friedmans do not dispute that they had notice of

the 2007 renewal, nor do they contend that any other person lacked

notice of the existence of the judgment.” Id. at 14:7-8. 

Characterizing the omissions from the 2007 Certification as

“alleged technical ‘deficiencies[,]’” Fidelity further asserts they

are not “misleading[.]” Id. at 14:22. Hence, Fidelity reasons that

“if” such deficiencies “exist, [they] are all correctable” pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and its state counterpart, Ariz. R. Civ.

P. 60(a). Id. at 14:21-22. Therefore, Fidelity argues that such

“deficiencies” do not “‘doom’ the validity of the renewal.” Id. at

14:8-9. 

“[T]he statutory requirements must be strictly followed in

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order that a judgment be renewed.” Triple E. Produce Corp. v.

Valencia, 170 Ariz. 375, 824 P.2d 771 (App. 1991) (citing, inter

alia, Fay v. Harris, 64 Ariz. 10, 164 P.2d 860 (1945)). At the

same time, however, “some defects contained in an affidavit may not

defeat a renewal of judgment[.]” State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n of

Ariz. v. Galloway, 224 Ariz. 325, 330 n. 5, 230 P.3d 708, 713 n.5

(App. 2010). For example, in Weltsch v. O’Brien, 25 Ariz.App. 50,

540 P.2d 1269 (App. 1975), the court held that “the failure to

include in the renewal affidavit information as to the book and

page of the clerk’s docket in which the judgment sought to be

renewed appears was not fatal and d[id] not affect the validity of

the renewal.” Id. at 53, 540 P.2d at 1272. Those omissions were

of “no practical significance[,]” the court reasoned, because the

information in the renewal affidavit “sufficiently identifie[d] the

judgment sought to be renewed[.]” Id.

Likewise, in Fay, an arguably more significant error in a

renewal affidavit, failure to “show the exact balance due[]”

because of “errors in computation[,]” did not defeat renewal. Fay,

64 Ariz. at 11, 164 P.2d at 861. That error was not fatal to

renewal, explained the Fay Court, because “all of the items of the

judgment appeared, all of the credits were set out, the data

appeared on the face of the affidavit, from which the exact balance

could be determined.” Id. (emphasis added). “Any party

interested, under these circumstances, would have the right on

notice, or the court would have the right to correct the judgment

on its own motion[,]” the Court pointed out. Id. (citations

omitted). Thus, the Court in Fay held that the judgment was

properly renewed based upon the “data and correct computations”

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which did “show the exact amount due.” Id. at 14, 164 P.2d at 862.

Heavily relying upon Fay, the court in Triple E. reached a

similar result. Due to an inadvertent failure to credit a payment

made, in Triple E. the renewal affidavit incorrectly overstated the

balance due on the judgment. The Triple E. court held that that

error did not “prevent the judgment from being renewed[,]” but only

“in the amount actually due and owing.” Triple E., 170 Ariz. at

378, 824 P.2d at 774 (footnote omitted). 

Admittedly, the renewal affidavits in Fay, Triple E. and

Weltsch were each flawed in their own way. Significantly, despite

those flaws, the judgment debtor and interested third parties could

determine the balance due from the face of those renewal affidavits. 

Hence, those judgment creditors sufficiently complied with section

12-1612 because each provided the notice which that statute

contemplates. See Weltsch, 25 Ariz. App. at 53, 540 P.2d at 1272

(“[O]ne of the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-1611 et seq. is to give

notice to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the

identity of the judgment to be renewed.”); J.C. Penney v. Love, 197

Ariz. 113, 119, 3 P.3d 1033, 1039 (App. 1999)(emphasis added)

(“[O]ne of the purposes for the requirements concerning the

affidavit of renewal is to give notice to the judgment debtor and

other interested parties of the status of the judgment.”); In re

Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 345, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (filing of a

renewal affidavit “serves to notify interested parties of the

existence and continued viability of the judgment.”); but see J.C.

Penney, 197 Ariz. at 119, 3 P.3d at 1039 (filing of a renewal

affidavit “in a superior court in a county different from that in

which its judgment was docketed, . . . did not provide reasonable

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notice to interested persons of the status of the judgment and

cannot be considered a correctable error[]”).

Here, it is undisputed that on April 5, 2007, Fidelity did not

file a document explicitly designated as a “renewal affidavit.” 

Ordinarily, the court would be hesitant to exalt form over

substance. Thus, merely inaccurately titling a document would not

necessarily render it defective or somehow invalid. If the only

omission from the 2007 Certification was the failure to properly

designate it as a “renewal affidavit,” in all likelihood, the court

would overlook that omission. Failing to properly title the 2007

Certification as a “renewal affidavit” is not simply a matter of

form given the legal import of an affidavit, however. 

By definition, “[a]n ‘affidavit’ is a signed, written

statement, made under oath before an officer authorized to

administer an oath or affirmation in which the affiant vouches that

what is stated is true.” In re Wetzel, 143 Ariz. 35, 43, 691 P.2d

1063, 1071 (1984); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)

(an affidavit is “[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down

and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to

administer oaths[]”) The 2007 Certification itself is not signed

and does not include a notary’s jurat. A “‘[j]urat’ means a

notarial act in which the notary certifies that a signer, . . . ,

has made in the notary’s presence a voluntary signature and has

taken an oath or affirmation vouching for the truthfulness of the

signed document.” A.R.S. § 41-311(6); see also A.R.S. § 12-2221(A)

(“oath or affirmation shall be administered” to “best awaken the

conscience and impress the mind of the person taking the oath or

affirmation[]” and “shall be taken upon the penalty of perjury[]”). 

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Additionally, the 2007 Certification is not a statement of any

kind. It is a one page document, reciting the caption in this case

and the names of Fidelity’s attorneys and their contact

information. See Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 2. 

That Certification also notes the civil docket case number for the

California federal court. See id. Plainly the 2007 Certification

itself lacks even the most basic attributes of an affidavit of any

sort. 

Compounding Fidelity’s failure to file a document specifically

designated as a “renewal affidavit,” and containing the essential

components of such an affidavit, is that even taking into account

the attachments to the 2007 Certification, the bulk of the

information set forth in A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) is missing. 

Certified copies of the California judgment, the Ninth Circuit’s

dismissal order, and minutes of the California district court’s

dismissal order following issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate,

are attached to the 2007 Certification. It is possible to glean

from those attachments, as Fidelity emphasizes, the names of the

parties, the court in which the California judgment was docketed,

as well as the date, amount and owners of that judgment. That

basic information is only a small portion of the contents of a

renewal affidavit, however, as section 12-1612(B)(1) delineates. 

Fidelity’s additional renewal affidavit declares that it

recorded the California judgment in Maricopa and Coconino Counties. 

See Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8) at 4:11-13, ¶ 7. 

Assuming those recordings were made prior to April 5, 2007, they

should have been included in the 2007 Certification, along with

“the name of the county in which recorded, . . . the number and

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page of the docket book in which recorded by the county

recorder[,]” as section 12-1612(B)(1) specifies. See A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B)(1). The 2007 Certification and its attachments do not

mention those County recordings at all. 

The court could overlook the omission of those County

recordings, especially, although unlikely, if they occurred after

the filing of the 2007 Certification. However, the court cannot

overlook, and what is far more troubling is, the absence of any of

the information enumerated in the four other subparts of section

12-1612(B). In accordance with that statute, “[t]he judgment

creditor, . . . may . . . , make and file . . . a renewal

affidavit, . . . setting forth[,]” inter alia:

2. That no execution is anywhere outstanding 

and unreturned upon the judgment, or if any 

execution is outstanding, that fact shall be stated.

3. The date and amount of all payments upon the 

judgment and that all payments have been duly credited

upon the judgment.

4. That there are no set-offs or counterclaims in 

favor of the judgment debtor, and if a counterclaim 

or set-off does exist in favor of the judgment debtor, 

the amount thereof, if certain, or, if the counterclaim 

or set-off is unsettled or undetermined, a statement 

that when it is settled or determined by action or 

otherwise, it may be allowed as a payment or credit upon 

the judgment.

5. The exact amount due upon the judgment after 

allowing all set-offs and counterclaims known to 

affiant, and other facts or circumstances necessary 

to a complete disclosure as to the exact condition

of the judgment.

A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)(2)-(5) (emphases added). None of that

enumerated information can be found in the 2007 Certification or

its attachments. 

Tellingly, the additional renewal affidavit which Fidelity

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filed on February 8, 2008, as part of its response to the

Friedmans’ original motion to quash, mirrors section 12-1612(B) in

its entirety. That later filed affidavit indicates that by

February 20, 2007, prior to the filing of the 2007 Certification,

Fidelity had collected nearly $15,000.00 in cash and two sets of

coins having an unstated value. See Defs.’ RJN , exh. H thereto

(Doc. 328-8) at 4-5, ¶ 10. Those successful collection efforts are

conspicuously absent from the 2007 Certification. Obviously,

without that information the “exact amount due upon the judgment”

on April 5, 2007, when the Certification was filed, cannot be

ascertained. Moreover, section 12-1612(B)(2) is mandatory in terms

of whether or not any execution of the judgment is outstanding. 

Despite that statutorily mandated obligation, Fidelity did not

disclose that information anywhere in the 2007 Certification or its

attachments. 

Further, arguably the later filed additional renewal affidavit 

contains “other facts or circumstances necessary to a complete

disclosure as to the exact condition of the judgment[]” –

information of which Fidelity was fully aware of on April 5, 2007

when it filed its second Certification. See A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B)(5). That renewal affidavit explains the filing of the RICO

action by Fidelity on July 6, 2007. Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto

(328-8) at 5, ¶ 13. It also indicates that in that RICO action,

“[o]n July 12, 2007, the court issued a preliminary injunction

freezing defendants’ assets and enjoining their transfer.” Id.

The additional renewal affidavit also states that “[o]n March 22,

2007, Fidelity recorded th[at] preliminary injunction in Maricopa

County, Arizona, number 2007-0339883.” Id. Neither the 2007

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Certification nor any of its attachments mentions that litigation,

which at least from Fidelity’s perspective, bears directly on the

judgment it is attempting to enforce herein. 

Despite Fidelity’s urging, the court cannot agree that the

missing information described above amounts to nothing more than

“technical omission[s] or errors” that should not “defeat the

renewal of the judgment.” See Weltsch, 25 Ariz.App. at 54, 540

P.2d at 1272. The omissions from the 2007 Certification are

glaring and critical. In sharp contrast to Weltsch, where the

clerk’s docket number and page were omitted, the omissions here,

such as “[t]he date and amount of all payments upon the judgment

and that all payments have been duly credited upon the judgment[,]”

A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)(3), are of “practical significance.” See id.

at 53, 540 P.2d at 1272. Without that information, neither

judgment debtors nor interested third parties have any way to

determine the amount outstanding on the judgment, thus thwarting

the notice purpose of section 12-1612. 

This is not a situation such as Fay where all of the

information necessary to ascertain “the exact balance [of the

judgment] could be determined from the face of the” 2007

Certification and its attachments. See Triple E, 170 Ariz. at 378,

824 P.2d at 774. Nor are the outright omissions from the 2007

Certification mere computational errors, as in Fay, where the

amount due and owing was incorrect. Simply put, here, interested

parties could not ascertain from the documents Fidelity filed on

April 5, 2007, the exact outstanding balance of the California

judgment. Likewise, they could not confirm whether execution on

that judgment is outstanding – a fact which must be disclosed

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pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)(2). 

Deficiencies in the 2007 Certification do exist, as is

abundantly clear. And, although Fidelity asserts otherwise, those

omissions are misleading. That is because section 12-1612(B)

places equal import on disclosing the existence of set-offs,

counterclaims, or outstanding executions, as it does on disclosing

the lack of such items. Yet, Fidelity did not disclose the lack of

any of the foregoing in its 2007 Certification or attachments. It

was not until roughly ten months later that Fidelity disclosed that

information in its additional renewal affidavit. See Defs.’ RJN,

exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8)at 4, ¶ 9; at 5, ¶ 11.

 Finally, the court finds unavailing Fidelity’s bald assertion

that the numerous omissions from the 2007 Certification and its

attachments are mere “clerical mistakes . . . arising from

oversight or omission” which are “correctable” under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(a) and its state counterpart, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a). See

Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 14:9-11; and 14:22. Quite simply,

Fidelity’s omissions are not “clerical mistakes” within the meaning

of those Rules. 

In pertinent part, that Rule states:

 The court may correct a clerical mistake or a

mistake arising from oversight or omission

whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or 

other part of the record. The court may do so on 

motion or on its own, with or without notice. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (emphasis added). Mirroring its Federal

counterpart, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a) states in relevant part:

 Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or 

 other parts of the record and errors therein arising 

 from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 

 court at any time of its own initiative or on motion 

 of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 

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 court orders.

That similarity is not a coincidence. “The Arizona Rules of Civil

Procedure were adopted from the federal rules.” La Paz County v.

Yuma County, 153 Ariz. 163, 164, 735 P.2d 772, 774 (Ariz. 1987). 

Arizona state courts thus “give great weight to interpretations

given to similar federal rules.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Consequently, here, there is no reason to separately analyze the

clerical mistake issue under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) and Ariz. R.

Civ. P. 60(a). Further, a singular analysis is in keeping with the

notion that “uniformity in interpretation of [Arizona] rules and

federal rules is highly desirable.” See Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166

Ariz. 301, 304, 802 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1990). 

“The basic distinction between ‘clerical mistakes' and

mistakes that cannot be corrected pursuant to Rule 60(a) is that

the former consist of ‘blunders in execution’ whereas the latter

consist of instances where the court changes its mind[.]” Blanton

v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1987). “It is a

mistake in mechanics, rather than apprehension.” Dearing v. United

States, 1996 WL 523782, at *2 (E.D.Wash. 1996). “The focus of Rule

60(a) is ‘on what the court originally intended to do.’” In re

Fort Defiance Housing Corp., 2011 WL 1578504, at *4 (D.Ariz. April

27, 2011) (quoting Blanton, 813 F.2d at 1576). “[M]istakes under

Rule 60(a) are not factual or legal and deal with the intent of the

trial court.” Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis

added). Put differently, “Rule 60(a) errors are minor and

ministerial ones, not substantively factual or legal.” Id. at *4

n. 4 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, Rule 60(a)

“may not be used to correct substantial errors, such as errors of

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law.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir.

1990) (citation omitted); accord Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132

F.3d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted) (“The relevant test for the application of Rule

60(a) is whether the change affects substantive rights of the

parties and is therefore beyond the scope of Rule 60(a) or is

instead a clerical error, a copying or computational mistake, which

is correctable under the Rule.”) What is more, Rule 60(a) does not

permit a court to “correct something that was deliberately done but

later discovered to be wrong.” McNickle v. Bankers Life and Cas.

Co., 888 F.2d 678, 682 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Fidelity’s errors, in the form of omissions from the 2007

Certification and its attachments, were substantial, as discussed

herein. Fidelity did not commit a mathematical error or an error

in computation. See In re Hale, 359 B.R. 310, 318 (Bankr.

E.D.Wash. 2007) (describing “[m]athematical errors” as “classic

examples of clerical mistakes under Rule 60(a)). Likewise,

Fidelity did not misidentify a party. See Mitchell Repair

Information Co. v. Rutchey, 2009 WL 3242093 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 2,

2009) (granting Rule 60(a) relief correcting the judgment to

include defendant’s “true name” in addition to his alias). Rather,

Fidelity omitted from the 2007 Certification the majority of the

information A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) specifies for a renewal affidavit. 

Those substantive factual and legal omissions left judgment debtors

and interested third parties alike uncertain, in many respects, as

to the status of the California judgment. Accordingly, that 2007

Certification did not serve the essential purpose of A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B) – notice. Those omissions had nothing to do with this

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court’s intent. Hence, if for no other reason, because Fidelity

has not shown that the omissions from the 2007 Certification were

clerical mistakes, it has no basis for seeking or obtaining relief

under federal or state Rule 60(a). 

To summarize, Fidelity’s 2007 Certification did not serve, in

accordance with A.R.S. § 1612(B), to renew its 2002 Arizona

judgment because that Certification is not specifically designated

as a renewal affidavit. More problematic is that even considering

the 2007 Certification’s attachments, that Certification has almost

none of the characteristics of a renewal affidavit. Lastly, there

is no basis whatsoever for “correcting” Fidelity’s 2007

Certification under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a) or Ariz. R. Civ. P.

60(a). Consequently, Fidelity’s 2007 Certification did not serve

to renew its 2002 Arizona judgment, as section 1612(B) permits.

2. Timeliness

Even assuming arguendo that the 2007 Certification “was

sufficient to operate as a renewal affidavit . . . ,” nonetheless,

the Friedmans contend that it was “premature[,]” because that

Certification was not filed within the time frame set forth in

A.R.S. § 1612(B). See Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 327) at 5:23. The

Friedmans thus argue that that Certification was “ineffective[]” to

renew the 2002 Arizona judgment. See id. at 5:24. 

Also assuming arguendo that the 2007 Certification is a

renewal affidavit, Fidelity does not directly dispute the

untimeliness of that filing. Instead, Fidelity is taking the

position that because it “took the debtor examination of

[defendant] Anita Meshkatai” within the time frame for the filing

of a renewal affidavit, i.e., within 90 days of the expiration of

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the 2002 Arizona judgment, that “examination gave notice of the

Arizona judgment and its renewal.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 14:26

(emphasis added). Strenuously disagreeing, the Friedmans counter

that “[k]nowledge [by] a judgment debtor does not excuse a judgment

creditor from following Arizona law[,]” requiring the timely filing

of a renewal affidavit. Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 332) at 10:1-2. 

Defendants have the stronger argument by far. Essentially

that is because Arizona requires strict compliance with its

judgment renewal statutes, and Fidelity did not so comply. 

Furthermore, Mrs. Meshkatai’s judgment debtor examination did not

provide the notice which those renewal statutes contemplate. 

Fidelity registered its California judgment pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1963. As relevant at this juncture, that statute provides

in part that a judgment registered thereunder “shall have the same

effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where

registered and may be enforced in like manner.” 28 U.S.C. § 1963. 

Rule 69(a)(1), governing the procedure for execution on money

judgments “is to the same effect[.]” Hilao v. Estate Marcos, 536

F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). That Rule states in pertinent part:

The procedure on execution — and in proceedings 

supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution — 

must accord with the procedure of the state where the 

court is located, but a federal statute governs to the 

extent it applies.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). “To paraphrase, Rule 69 provides that

state law applies generally, but a federal statute governs to the

extent it applies.” Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696,

701 (9th Cir. 2010). 

There is no federal statute specifically governing renewal of

judgments. Hence, treating the 2007 Certification as a

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“proceeding[] supplementary to and in aid of judgment or

execution[,]” as do the parties, Arizona law governs the renewal of

the Arizona judgment herein. See In re Davis, 323 B.R. 745, 748

(Bankr. D.Ariz. 2005) (citing Fed. Bankr. R. 7069, incorporating

Rule 69(a)(1), Arizona law governs renewal of bankruptcy court

judgment registered in Arizona); accord In re Fifarek, 370 B.R.

754, 759 (Bankr.W.D.Mich. 2007) (“Rule 69(a) mandates the practice

and procedure of the State of Michigan be utilized to enforce or

renew the prior bankruptcy court judgment.”); Lillie v. Hunt, 323

B.R. 665 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn. 2005) (applying Tennessee state rule

pertaining to renewal of judgments to judgment registered in

Tennessee District Bankruptcy Court). Likewise, because 28 U.S.C.

§ 1963, the statute under which Fidelity registered the California

judgment, “has no limitations period[,]” this court will “look[] to

the law of the registration forum[,]” i.e., Arizona, “for its

statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments.” See Hilao,

536 F.3d at 988 (citing cases). 

“In Arizona, a judgment becomes unenforceable after five

years from the date of entry unless action is taken to renew it.” 

In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d. 637; see also Crye v.

Edwards, 178 Ariz. 327, 238, 878 P.3d 665, 666 (App. 1993)

(“monetary judgments expire in Arizona if not renewed every five

years”). Section 12-1551(B) specifically provides:

 An execution or other process shall not be 

issued upon a judgment after the expiration of 

five years from the date of its entry unless the 

judgment is renewed by affidavit or process 

pursuant to § 12-1612 or an action is brought on 

it within five years from the date of the entry of 

the judgment or of its renewal.

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A.R.S. § 12-1551(B) (emphasis added). Thus, under that statute,

“it is the judgment creditor who must act to prevent expiration,

not the debtor who must act to achieve it.” Crye, 178 Ariz. at

329, 873 P.2d at 666. So, quite simply, “[i]f the creditor fails

to renew the judgment, it expires. The judgment debtor need do

nothing.” Id. at 328-329, 873 P.2d at 666-667. 

 At issue now is the timeliness of Fidelity’s purported

renewal affidavit, i.e., the 2007 Certification, under A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B). Pursuant to that statute, a “judgment creditor need only

file an affidavit, in a form specified by statute, within a ninety

day period before the judgment expires to obtain renewal and

maintain the priority of the original judgment.” Fidelity III, 225

Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122 (footnote omitted). 

Arizona courts have consistently held that “strict compliance

with the renewal provisions is required to effect a renewal.” 

Galloway, 224 Ariz. at 329-330, 230 P.3d at 712-713 (citing cases)

(footnote omitted). That is especially so with respect to the

timeliness of a renewal affidavit, as the Galloway court explained. 

While “recogniz[ing] that some defects contained in an affidavit

may not defeat a renewal of judgment,” that court stressed that

“timeliness of the affidavit is a rigid statutory requirement and

is not subject to modification by the court.” Id. at 330 n.5, 230

P.3d at 713 n. 5 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Mobile Discount Corp. v. Hargus, 156 Ariz. 559, 753 P.3d 1215

(App. 1988), illustrates just how critical the timely filing of an

affidavit of renewal is in Arizona. A.R.S. § 12-1612(E),

governing the filing of additional and successive renewal

affidavits, allows for the filing of same “within ninety days of

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expiration of five years from the date of the filing of a prior

renewal affidavit.” A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) (emphasis added). Finding

“[t]he language of th[at] statute” to be “plain and unambiguous[,]”

the Mobile Discount court held that the italicized phrase “means

within 90 days before expiration and not 90 days after expiration.” 

Mobile Discount, 156 Ariz. at 560, 753 P.2d at 1216. The court

thus held that a second renewal affidavit, recorded just “16 days

past the expiration of five years from the filing and recordation

of the first affidavit of renewal[,]” was not timely. Id.

To be sure, the Mobile Discount court was considering the

filing of a second renewal affidavit under subsection (E), and not,

as here, the filing of an initial renewal affidavit under

subsection (B) of A.R.S. § 12-1612. Mobile Discount is no less

instructive on the issue of whether the 2007 Certification was

timely filed, however. That is because sections 1612(E) and

1612(B) contain substantially similar language as to the time frame

for filing under each. Much like A.R.S. § 12-1612(E), section 12-

1612(B) specifies that the time for filing a renewal affidavit is

“within ninety days preceding the expiration of five years from the

date of entry of . . . judgment[.]” A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). Thus

that statute, too, is “plain and unambiguous[]” as to the time

frame for filing a renewal affidavit. See Mobile Discount, 156

Ariz. at 560, 753 P.2d at 1216. A renewal affidavit must be filed

within 90 days before “the expiration of five years from the date

of entry of . . . judgment[]” – not some indefinite time prior

thereto. See A.R.S. § 1216(B).

“[O]ne of the purposes for the requirements concerning the

affidavit of renewal is to give notice to the judgment debtor and

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other interested parties of the status of the judgment.” J.C.

Penney, 197 Ariz. at 119, 3 P.3d at 1039 (citations omitted). 

“Among the parties most interested in the status of the judgment

are those considering extending credit to the judgment debtor.” 

Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122. In addition to

providing notice, “the filing requirements of” Arizona’s statutes

allowing for renewal by affidavit “limit the amount of record

searching interested parties must do to ascertain whether the

judgment remains valid.” Smith, 209 Ariz. at 346, 101 P.3d at 640

(citation omitted). Strict statutory adherence to the renewal

statutes thus is essential to serve “their central purpose” –

notice. See Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122. 

Here, even deeming the 2007 Certification to be a renewal

affidavit (which the court has already found that it was not), it

is evident that Fidelity did not file that Certification within the

time frame section 12-1612(B) imposes. Fidelity registered its

California judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 by filing a

certified copy of that judgment in this district court on November

14, 2002. See Pls.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 10. Relying upon A.R.S. 

§ 12-1551(A), the Friedmans declare that the Arizona judgment “was

effective for a period of five years from the date of docketing.”

Defs.’ RJN, exh. D thereto (Doc. 328-4) at 4:11-12 (emphasis

added). So, when calculating the time for filing a renewal

affidavit under that statute, the Friedmans use November 14, 2002 –

Fidelity’s original registration date. See id. at 4:21-5:3. 

Before proceeding, some clarification is necessary. First, in

computing the time frame for filing a renewal affidavit pursuant to

section 12-1612(B), the date of the “entry of such judgment”

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9 Perhaps the Friedmans are using the date of docketing because A.R.S.

§§ 12-1612(A) refers to “[a] judgment . . . which has been entered and docketed in

the civil docket . . . of the United States District Court[.]” A.R.S. §§ 12-1612(A)

(emphasis added). Even so, the Friedmans did not take into account that that

phrase is in the conjunctive, requiring both entry and docketing.

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governs, not the “date of docketing” as the Friedmans presume.9

See A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). That distinction is especially relevant

here because whether looking to the California judgment, or, as the

Friedmans do, to the Arizona judgment, the filing dates are

different than the entry dates. The California judgment was filed

on July 10, 2002, but not entered until July 12, 2002. Defs.’ RJN,

exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 8. Likewise, the Arizona judgment

was filed on November 14, 2002, but not entered until November 18,

2002. Pls.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 10. As A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)

mandates, this court will use the date of entry – not the docketing

date, as the Friedmans urge. 

Next, the court must consider which “judgment” forms the basis

for computing the date by which Fidelity had to timely file a

renewal affidavit based upon Arizona statute. Section 12-1612(B)

requires that renewal affidavits be made and filed “within ninety

days preceding the expiration of five years from the date of entry

of such judgment[.]” A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) (emphasis added). 

Assuming with no explanation that registering a judgment pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is the equivalent of entry of a judgment in the

first instance, the Friedmans base their timeliness argument only

on the Arizona judgment, entered on November 18, 2002. That

assumption finds support in the Ninth Circuit’s settled view that

registration of a judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 is “the

functional equivalent of obtaining a new judgment of the

registration court.” See Hilao, 536 F.3d at 989 (citing Matanuska

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Valley Lines, Inc. v. Molitor, 365 F.2d 358, 360 (9th Cir. 1966);

Marx v. Go Publ’g Co., 721 F.2d 1272, 1273 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

Consistent with that view, in determining whether Fidelity’s

purported renewal affidavit was timely, the relevant judgment is

the Arizona, not the California, judgment. For these reasons, the

court finds that when calculating the time frame for filing a

renewal affidavit in this particular case: (1) the date of entry of

the judgment governs; and (2) the pertinent judgment is the Arizona

judgment. 

With that clarification, even if Fidelity’s 2007 Certification

fit the statutory definition of a renewal affidavit under Arizona

law, that Certification was not timely. Based upon the Arizona

judgment’s entry date of November 18, 2002, “within ninety days of

[November 18, 2007], or the expiration of five years from the entry

of the Judgment, [Fidelity] w[as] required to file [its] first

renewal affidavit.” See Davis, 323 B.R. at 750 (citing A.R.S. 

§ 12-1612(B)) (footnote omitted). In other words, Fidelity had a

90 day window commencing roughly August 20, 2007, in which to file

its renewal affidavit. Fidelity did not do that; it filed its

purported renewal affidavit (the 2007 Certification), on April 5,

2007, approximately 225 days prior to the expiration of its Arizona

judgment. Given the unequivocal language of A.R.S. § 12-1612(B),

undoubtedly, Fidelity did not file that Certification within the

statutorily prescribed time frame. That premature filing renders

the 2007 Certification ineffective to renew the Arizona judgment by

the filing of an affidavit. Cf. Galloway, 224 Ariz. at 330, 230

P.3d at 713 (creditor’s 16 month “premature filing of its renewal

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10 Using the entry date of the California judgment yields the same result.

Based upon an entry date of July 12, 2002, “within ninety days of [July 12, 2007],

or the expiration of five years from the entry of the Judgment, [Fidelity] w[as]

required to file [its] first renewal affidavit.” See Davis, 323 B.R. at 750

(citing A.R.S. § 12-1612(B)) (footnote omitted). Under that calculation, Fidelity

had a ninety day window commencing roughly April 17, 2007, in which to file its

renewal affidavit. Fidelity’s purported renewal affidavit (the 2007 Certification)

was filed prematurely, on April 5, 2007. Admittedly, that April 5th filing was not

nearly as premature as the filing based upon the Arizona judgment’s entry date.

That time difference is immaterial though. Arizona statutes governing renewal by

affidavit do not make allowances for varying from the ninety day window, regardless

of how near to that window a given filing may be. Therefore, even calculating the

time frame for filing a renewal affidavit based upon the entry date of the

California judgment, still, Fidelity did not comply with that time frame under

Arizona renewal statutes. Such a premature filing also renders the 2007

Certification ineffective to renew the California judgment by the filing of an

affidavit. 

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affidavit” was “ineffective”).10

The court is fully aware, as Fidelity mentions, that

ultimately the Galloway court found that the “prematurity of the

renewal affidavit” did not preclude the judgment creditor from

proceeding with that garnishment action. See id. Even if, as

Fidelity maintains, the “ruling on the validity of the renewal

affidavit was . . . unnecessary to the holding” in Galloway, that

does not somehow excuse Fidelity’s premature filing of the

purported renewal affidavit, i.e., the 2007 Certification. 

Unquestionably, the timing of the filing of a renewal affidavit is

critical. 

Indeed, earlier in this litigation the Arizona Supreme Court

unequivocally stated:

[T]he judgment debtor will be released from further 

 obligation unless a judgment creditor timely files 

a renewal affidavit or brings an action on the 

judgment within five years after its entry. 

Fidelity III, 225 Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122 (emphasis added). 

Fidelity did not comply with the time frame for filing a renewal

affidavit under Arizona’s statutes. Those statutes reflect the

Arizona state legislature’s determination that renewal affidavits

must be filed within the time frame specified therein. It is not

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within this court’s prerogative to alter that time frame by, for

example, arbitrarily allowing, as here, a purported renewal

affidavit to be filed well in advance of that 90 day window.

Fidelity makes an attempt to show its compliance with section

12-1612(B)’s 90 day window. Fidelity points out that on August 24,

2007, within that statutory window, it conducted a judgment debtor

examination of Mrs. Meshkatai. The taking of that deposition,

reflected not in a filing by Fidelity, but only in a minute entry

on the court’s docket (stating that it was “held” and took four and

a half hours), can hardly be said to provide the requisite notice

that the Arizona judgment was renewed. See Pls.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at

24. That meager docket entry certainly does not “serve[] to notify

interested parties of the existence and continued viability” of the

Arizona judgment. See Smith, 209 Ariz. at 345, 101 P.3d at 639.

Furthermore, this theory of renewal by deposition is just a

narrower variant of Fidelity’s theory, argued unsuccessfully in

Fidelity III, that “a judgment could be renewed by ‘any matter or

proceeding in a court, civil or criminal[.]’” See Fidelity III, 225

Ariz. at 311, 238 P.3d at 122. Under that theory:

[a] potential lender would be required to search 

the records of at least every court in the state

—and perhaps the nation—to determine whether a writ 

of garnishment or other proceeding relating to the 

judgment[,such as a judgment debtor’s examination,] 

had been instituted.

See id. (citations omitted). In contrast, section 12-1612,

allowing for renewal by affidavit, provides a far less tedious and

more efficient means of notification. Under that statute, “a

potential creditor need only search the docket of the court in

which the original judgment was entered for the ninety days

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11 This finding that Fidelity’s 2007 Certification did not constitute a

“renewal affidavit” as A.R.S. § 12-1612(B) defines it, renders moot the Friedmans’

alternative argument that Fidelity’s 2008 additional renewal affidavit, discussed

next, “operates as an admission that th[at] Certification did not meet the

requirements of A.R.S. § 1612(B) and was, therefore, invalid.” See Defs.’ Mot.

(Doc. 327) at 7:23-24. 

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preceding the five-year expiration date to determine whether a

judgment has been renewed by affidavit.” Id. Adopting the sound

reasoning of the Fidelity III Court, this court likewise concludes

that:

It would make little sense for the legislature 

to have provided strict temporal and filing 

limitations on the affidavit process, while 

at the same time allowing any action relating to the 

 judgment, filed anywhere, to renew it. 

Id. Consequently, Fidelity’s judgment debtor examination of Mrs.

Meshkatai is not a substitute for the timely filing of a renewal

affidavit under A.R.S. § 12-1612. 

“Inherent in any statute of limitations is the risk that a

party who owes money may escape liability if the creditor does not

act in a timely fashion.” Id. (emphasis added). That is precisely

what happened to Fidelity. Fidelity had available to it “a simple

mechanism for renewing the [Arizona registered] judgment.” See id.

As “[t]he judgment creditor[,]” Fidelity “need[ed] only [to] file

an affidavit, in a form specified by statute, within a ninety day

period before the [Arizona registered] judgment expire[d][,]” but

Fidelity did not do that. See id. Fidelity’s 2007 Certification

did not contain most of the information set forth in A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B). Therefore, it did not constitute a “renewal affidavit”

within the meaning of that statute.11 Even construing that 2007

Certification as a “renewal affidavit,” Fidelity cannot rely upon

it to renew the Arizona judgment because Fidelity did not file that

Certification within section 12-1612(B)’s 90 day window before the

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expiration of that judgment. 

C. 2008 “Additional Renewal Affidavit”

Having found that the 2007 Certification is not tantamount to

a renewal affidavit under section 12-1612(B) and, alternatively,

that that Certification was not timely filed, the court turns to

Fidelity’s 2008 additional renewal affidavit. Fidelity is taking

the position that that affidavit, too, renewed the Arizona

judgment. 

As part of its response to the Friedmans’ original 2008 motion

to quash, Fidelity attached a document entitled, “Additional

Renewal Affidavit Renewing the Judgment Registered in Arizona on

November 15, 2002,” which was being “submitted under A.R.S. § 12-

1612(B) and (E).” Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc. 328-8) at 2

(emphasis omitted); and at 3:16-17, ¶ 3. That additional renewal

affidavit is “ineffective” to renew the Arizona judgment, the

Friedmans argue, because it “was filed on February 7, 2008, more

than five years after the Judgment was registered.” Defs.’ Mot.

(Doc. 327) at 7:15-16 (citations omitted). 

Timeliness aside, there is a more fundamental shortcoming with

Fidelity’s additional affidavit. It cannot serve to “cure[] any

deficiencies in the original [April 5, 2007] Renewal request[,]” as

Fidelity claims, Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 15:9, because the 2007

Certification did not constitute a renewal affidavit, as earlier

discussed in section (B)(1) above. A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) allows for,

inter alia, “[a]dditional . . . renewal affidavits as provided for

in subsection B [to] be made and filed within ninety days of

expiration of five years from the date of the filing of a prior

renewal affidavit.” A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) (emphasis added). The

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12 The timing of the filing of Fidelity’s 2008 additional renewal

affidavit is questionable. It appears that Fidelity did not file that affidavit

wholly of its own volition. Seemingly, Fidelity may have been unaware of the

statutory requirements for filing a renewal affidavit until they were brought to

its attention by the Friedmans as a possible basis for quashing Fidelity’s 2007

Certification. It was not until then that, attached to its response to the

Friedman’s motion, Fidelity submitted its “additional renewal affidavit,” which at

least in content mirrors A.R.S. § 12-1612(B). See Defs.’ RJN, exh. H thereto (Doc.

328-8).

13 Fidelity inaccurately quotes the 2007 Certification as stating that it

was filed “‘under 28 U.S.C. § 1963’[,]” but that Certification is void of any such

reference. See Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 7:22-25 (citing Defs.’ RJN, exh. I

thereto). As with the 2002 Certification, however, the court presumes that section

1963 is the statutory basis for the filing of the 2007 Certification as well.

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filing of a valid “prior renewal affidavit” thus is a predicate to

the filing of an additional renewal affidavit under that statute. 

It follows, a fortiori, that because Fidelity did not file a

“renewal affidavit” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-1612(B),

necessarily there could be no “additional . . . affidavit” as

section 12-1613(E) allows. See A.R.S. § 12-1612(E) (emphasis

added). Thus, there is no merit to Fidelity’s claim that the

filing of an additional renewal affidavit on February 7, 2008,

renewed its California judgment entered here on November 18, 2002.12

D. 2007 “Re-Registration”

Arizona’s renewal statutes notwithstanding, Fidelity asserts 

that in accordance with federal law, more particularly, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1963, on April 5, 2007, it “validly registered the California

judgment.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 9:2 (emphasis omitted). 

Relying exclusively upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Del Prado

v. B.N. Development Co., 602 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2009), Fidelity

contends that “registration of its California judgment in Arizona

in 2002 did not preclude [that] second registration in 2007.”13 See

Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 13:14-15. Additionally, Fidelity argues

that its April 5, 2007, re-registration was timely because it was

filed within Arizona’s four year statute of limitations governing

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the enforcement of foreign judgments, i.e., A.R.S. § 12-544(3). 

Thus, even if this court finds, as it has, that Fidelity did not

properly renew its judgment under Arizona law, Fidelity maintains

that that judgment is still enforceable because in 2007 it timely

re-registered that judgment here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963.

Disagreeing, the Friedmans contend that: (1) “federal law does

not permit a second registration of a judgment in the same foreign

court[;]” and (2) Fidelity’s reliance upon Del Prado is

“misplaced.” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 332) at 6:16-17 (emphasis

omitted); and at 6:27. Then, stressing that because the

“California Judgment was final and enforceable in 2002[,]” id. at

5:7-8, the Friedmans retort that the 2007 “[c]ertification is not a

[v]alid [i]ndependent [r]egistration of th[at] California

[j]udgment in Arizona.” Id. at 3:23-24 (emphases omitted). 

Consequently, despite the purported 2007 “re-registration,” the

Friedmans counter that because Fidelity did not properly renew its

Arizona judgment in accordance with Arizona’s renewal statutes,

that judgment is no longer enforceable.

1. “Re-registration” under 28 U.S.C. § 1963

 Section 1963 allows, inter alia, money judgments entered in a

district court to be registered in another district court in

several situations. Under one scenario, such registration is

allowed “when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for

good cause shown.” 28 U.S.C. § 1963. On July 12, 2002, Fidelity

entered its judgment against defendants in the California federal

court. Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 8. Without

explicitly finding good cause, that California Court issued an

order “allow[ing] [Fidelity] to register its judgment in the State

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of Arizona.” See id. at 14. The California federal court also

issued a “Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another

District[.]” Id. at 3. Consistent with section 1963, on November

14, 2002, Fidelity registered its California judgment in this

Arizona federal district court. See Pls.’ RJN (Doc. 330) at 10. 

More than four years after issuing the first Certification of

Judgment, on January 31, 2007, the California federal court issued

a second “Certification of Judgment for Registration in Another

District[.]” Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc. 328-9) at 3. That

2007 Certification indicates that the appeal of Fidelity’s 2002

California judgment was “dismissed by order entered May 15, 2003.” 

Id. As did the 2002 Certification, this 2007 Certification 

pertains to Fidelity’s underlying California judgment. See id.

Because 28 U.S.C. § 1963 allows, inter alia, registration of a

foreign judgment “when the judgment has become final by appeal[,]”

Fidelity asserts that when it filed that second certification in

this district court on April 5, 2007, it “met all the criteria

under” that statute “for registering a federal judgment in another

district.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 9:15-16. Fidelity thus

reasons that even if it did not properly and timely renew its

judgment under Arizona law, that judgment remains valid and

enforceable here because in 2007 it properly “re-registered” that

judgment under section 1963.

Based solely upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Del Prado,

602 F.3d 660, Fidelity contends “registration of its California

judgment in Arizona in 2002" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1963 “did not preclude a second registration [under that statute]

in 2007.” See id. at 13:14-15. For two reasons, Del Prado has no

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bearing on the re-registration issue currently before this court. 

First, unlike Ninth Circuit case law, cases outside this

Circuit, such as Del Prado, are not binding on this court. Second, 

there is a fundamental difference between the issue of successive

registrations in Del Prado and the re-registration issue currently

before this court. As the Del Prado Court framed it, the issue was

“whether a judgment entered in one federal court and then

registered in a second federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963,

may be re-registered and enforced in a third federal court, a

process termed ‘successive registration.’” Del Prado, 602 F.3d at

662 (emphasis added). 

Del Prado had its genesis in a lawsuit brought in the District

Court for the District of Hawaii against Ferdinand Marcos, the

former president of the Philippines. In 1995, that Hawaii District

Court entered a nearly $2 billion judgment in favor of the

plaintiffs. In 1997, plaintiffs registered that judgment in the

Northern District of Illinois. In 2005, plaintiffs also registered

the Hawaiian judgment in the Northern District of Texas. Prior to

being registered in Texas, however, the original judgment had

expired under Hawaii law. In 2008, returning to the Northern

District of Illinois, the plaintiffs revived the Illinois

registered judgment in accordance with Illinois state law. Shortly

thereafter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, plaintiffs registered

that revived Illinois judgment in the Northern District of Texas. 

The Fifth Circuit in Del Prado held that because the Hawaiian

judgment expired prior to its registration in Texas, it could “not

be registered and enforced by the Texas federal district court.” 

Id. at 664. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit held that the

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14 Fidelity’s subsequent registration in another federal court, the

Western District of Washington, is the subject of a related action Fidelity

National Financial, Inc. v. Friedman, 11-mc-00072-PHX-RCB, and pending motions. 

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revived Illinois registered judgment could be “re-registered in the

Northern District of Texas and enforced” there. Id. at 667. 

“Examining parallel situations in our federal-state system[,]”

persuaded the Del Prado Court that “[g]iven the ability of a

plaintiff to enforce his judgment from one state to another state,

and between state and federal courts, it would be strange indeed

for Congress to intend for § 1963 to yield the incongruous result

that federal judgments, when registered in another federal district

court, are not entitled to their full effect.” Id. at 669. The

Court thus concluded that “[b]ecause the Illinois registered

judgment was equivalent to a new federal judgment with the same

status as a judgment on a judgment, it was also capable of being

successively registered and enforced under § 1963 in the Northern

District of Texas.” Id.

Clearly this is not a case, as in Del Prado, of successive

registration in different federal courts. In this action, Fidelity

did not attempt to register the California judgment in two

different federal courts.14 Rather, Fidelity registered that

judgment in this Arizona district court and then sought to register

that same judgment for a second time also in this same district

court. This important distinction undermines Fidelity’s reliance

upon Del Prado. The court therefore agrees with the Friedmans that

Fidelity’s reliance upon Del Prado is “misplaced.” See Defs.’

Reply (Doc. 332) at 6:27. 

Significantly, the court does not agree with the Friedmans

however that no case law exists “allow[ing] the re-registration of

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one judgment in the same foreign state more than once[.]” See id.

at 7:21-22. Such case law does exist, albeit Fidelity did not

mention it. Given the similarity between Irby v. Haden, 2008 WL

2561958 (N.D.Cal. June 25, 2008), and the present case, Irby is

instructive on the re-registration issue herein and warrants

careful examination. 

After obtaining a judgment against a defendant in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (“Texas

judgment”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, plaintiff registered that

judgment in a California federal court in 1996. California state

law provides that a judgment is enforceable for ten years. Much

like Arizona, California statutes provide two ways “to preserve a

judgment[]” from expiration. Id. at *3. The first way is to file

an application for renewal of the judgment under the California

Code of Civil Procedure (“the California Code”), which

“automatically renews the judgment for another period of ten

years.” Id. (citation omitted). Alternatively, the California

Code permits a judgment creditor to preserve a judgment by bringing

a separate action on the judgment. The judgment creditor in Irby

did neither. Consequently, in 2006, ten years after the

registration of the California judgment, it “expired by operation

of [California state] law[.]” Id. at *1. 

Returning to the Southern District of Texas, in 2008 plaintiff

“obtained a new Certification of Judgment[,]” also based upon the

original underlying Texas judgment. Id. More than 12 years after

she first registered her Texas judgment in California, plaintiff

re-registered that judgment in the same California federal district

court where she previously registered it. Moving to vacate the reCase 2:03-cv-01222-RCB Document 336 Filed 03/02/12 Page 40 of 59
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registered judgment because it was “based on the original . . .

registration of the judgment, which had expired in August 2006[,]”

the defendant debtor argued that the plaintiff could not “save that

judgment from expiration by registering the original underlying

Texas judgment a second time.” Id. at * 1; *4. Plaintiff

“respond[ed] that, so long as the original underlying Texas

judgment was, and is, still enforceable, it may be re-filed in

California, and is entitled to recognition as a judgment worthy of

enforcement under California law.” Id. at *4. Agreeing, the Irby

court found “permissible . . . plaintiff’s timely renewal of the

underlying judgment in Texas and subsequent re-registration of the

same judgment in California[.]” Id. at *5. 

At the outset, the Irby court framed the issue generally as

“whether a plaintiff who registers a foreign judgment in California

and then allows that judgment to go dormant under California law,

can subsequently re-register that same judgment as a new judgment

(thereby commencing the enforcement period all over again) so long

as the underlying judgment remains valid in the foreign state.” 

Id. at *2. Recognizing that in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1963,

the California registered judgment at issue in Irby was governed by

the enforcement measures of California, as the forum state for

registration, that court discussed the California statutes

pertaining to preservation of judgments. 

Noting the lack of “controlling Ninth Circuit authority[,]”

the Irby court began its analysis with the “principle[] of law 

. . . that so long as an originating state has an enforceable

judgment, that judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in the

foreign state in which a plaintiff seeks enforcement.” Id. at *4

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(citing, inter alia, Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 87 S.Ct. 357,

17 L.Ed.2d 286 (1966)). The Irby court then summarized just two

cases – the Supreme Court’s decision in Watkins, and Yorkshire

West Capital, Inc. v. Rodman, 149 P.3d 1088 (Okla.Civ.App.Div.

2006) – which were the bases for its holding. 

Watkins involved the attempted enforcement of a Florida state

judgment in Georgia state courts. Five years and one day after the

rendering of the Florida judgment, plaintiff brought an action on

that judgment in a Georgia state court. Georgia has a five year

statute of limitations for foreign judgments, but a longer

limitation period for domestic judgments. Critically, at the time

however, the Georgia statute “bar[red] suits on foreign judgment

only if the plaintiff [could] not revive his judgment in the State

where it was originally obtained.” Watkins, 385 U.S. at 189, 191,

87 S.Ct. 357 (emphasis added). 

Under that Georgia statute the relevant date was “not the date

of the original judgment, but rather . . . the date of the latest

revival of the judgment.” Id. at 189, 87 S.Ct. 357 (citations

omitted). Therefore, given Florida’s 20 year statute of

limitations on domestic judgments, the Supreme Court found

plaintiff had “ample time” to “return to Florida and revive his

judgment.” Id. at 190 and n. 2 (citation omitted), 87 S.Ct. 357. 

The Supreme Court thus suggested that the plaintiff could return to

“Georgia within five years and file suit free of” Georgia’s five

year statute of limitations for foreign judgments. Id.

Because Watkins could revive his judgment in Florida, and

return to Georgia to enforce it, the Supreme Court declared “that

the Georgia statute [did] not discriminate[] against the judgment

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from Florida.” Id. Explaining, the Court hypothesized that “[i]f

Florida had a statute of five years or less on its own judgment,

the [plaintiff] would not be able to recover here.” Id. at 190-

191, 87 S.Ct. 357 (footnote omitted). However, because that

“disability would flow from the conclusion of the Florida

Legislature that suits on Florida judgments should be barred after

that period[,]” the Court further explained that “Georgia’s

construction of” its five year statute of limitations for foreign

judgments “insured, rather than denied . . . full faith and

credit[]” to Florida’s judgment. Id. Likewise, the Watkins Court

found that Georgia’s statutory scheme did not amount to a denial of

equal protection in that it “relie[d] upon the judgment State’s

view of the validity of [its] own judgments.” Id.

In addition to Watkins, the Irby court found the “court’s

reasoning in Yorkshire West Capital helpful, . . . although not

controlling authority[.]” Irby, 2008 WL 2561958, at *4. In

Yorkshire West Capital, 149 P.3d 1088, the issue was “whether a 

foreign [Texas] judgment filed in Oklahoma in 1996, may be refiled

in Oklahoma while it is still valid and enforceable in the state in

which it was granted [Texas], notwithstanding [an Oklahoma statute]

which provides that judgments become unenforceable after five years

when specified collection activities have not occurred.” Id. at

1089. Moving to vacate that refiled Texas judgment, the defendant

argued that “once the judgment became unenforceable in Oklahoma, 

. . . it could not be revived in Oklahoma by refiling.” Id.

Disagreeing, the Yorkshire West court found “that the law in

Oklahoma requires that a foreign judgment which is valid and

enforceable in the issuing state may be filed as a new judgment in

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Oklahoma, even where the same foreign judgment has previously been

filed and become dormant in Oklahoma.” Id. at 1092. In holding

that plaintiff could file the Texas judgment “a second time in

Oklahoma[,]” the court explained that “[t]he judgment’s validity in

the issuing state [wa]s paramount, and that nothing in the [Uniform

Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”)] expressly

prohibit[ed] a second filing of judgment.” Id. At 1093. Thus,

because plaintiff’s Texas judgment “remained valid and enforceable”

in 2005 when it refiled that judgment in Oklahoma, the court held

that that “[re-]filing resulted in a second Oklahoma judgment which

remain[ed] enforceable” under an Oklahoma statute limiting the

enforceability of judgments to five years. Id. at 1090; 1093.

The Irby court expressly “adopt[ed]” the “same rationale” as

the Yorkshire Capital court, finding it to be “consistent with the

court’s reasoning in Watkins, which is controlling.” Id. at *5

(emphasis in original). The Irby court reinforced its reasoning by

pointing out that the parties did not “dispute that, while . . .

the California Code . . . contemplate[s] a ten year enforcement

period and statute of limitations regarding registered judgments,

respectively, there is no statutory provision that expressly

prohibits the second registration of an otherwise valid foreign

judgment.” Id. (emphasis in original). “All” of the foregoing

“supports the conclusion[,]” the Irby court held, “that, even

though the [California Code] bar[red] plaintiff's enforcement of

the 1996 registration of the underlying Texas judgment, plaintiff's

timely renewal of the underlying judgment in Texas and subsequent

re-registration of the same judgment in California, is

permissible.” Id.

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The Irby court recognized “that allowing plaintiff to file her

judgment a second time permits plaintiff to circumvent California’s

statutory enforcement scheme, since California law expressly

contemplates that, once a judgment is registered, that judgment

will necessarily expire after 10 years unless it is either renewed,

or an action upon it is taken, with no other possibilities

enumerated.” Id. at *5 (citations omitted). Of far more import to

the Irby court, however, was the fact “that California's statutory

enforcement provisions take no position with respect to the

re-registration of a valid judgment.” Id. 

Finally, because plaintiff had been attempting to execute upon

her judgment for two decades, and had “been diligent in her

efforts” in pursuing defendant, whereas the defendant “presented no

explanation for his efforts to avoid enforcement of the

judgment[,]” the Irby court found that the “equities . . . tilted

in favor of allowing plaintiff to re-register the underlying Texas

judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). Based upon the foregoing, the

Irby court denied defendant’s motion to vacate plaintiff’s reregistration of the Texas judgment in the California federal

district court.

Two factors are determinative in assessing whether reregistration of a foreign judgment is proper under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1963, as Irby shows. The first is whether the judgment remains

enforceable in the rendering state. The second is whether the law

of the registering state expressly prohibits re-registration of a

judgment. In the present case, both factors compel a finding that

on April 5, 2007, Fidelity permissibly re-registered its Arizona

judgment under section 1963. 

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The California Code “defines the period for enforceability of

judgments, and provides that a money judgment may not be enforced

after the expiration of 10 years following the date of entry of the

judgment.” Id. at *3 (citing Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 683.020). 

Fidelity’s California judgment was entered in the California

federal court on July 12, 2002. Defs.’ RJN, exh. I thereto (Doc.

328-9) at 8. Therefore, in accordance with section 683.020, that

judgment remains enforceable in California for ten years, that is,

until July 12, 2012. Accordingly, when Fidelity filed its second

Certification here on April 5, 2007, the underlying California

judgment was still enforceable in California.

What is more, in sharp contrast to Irby, when Fidelity reregistered its judgment here in 2007, the previously registered

judgment had not expired by operation of Arizona law, as had the

California registered judgment in Irby. In Arizona, a judgment is

enforceable in the first instance “at any time within five years

after entry of that judgment[.]” A.R.S. § 12-1551(A) (emphasis

added). In accordance with that statute, Fidelity’s Arizona

judgment, first registered on November 18, 2002, was thus

enforceable for five years, or until November 18, 2007. Plainly

when Fidelity re-registered it Arizona judgment on April 5, 2007,

that judgment remained enforceable under Arizona law. Thus, when

Fidelity re-registered its Arizona judgment, not only was the

underlying California judgment still enforceable in California, but

its Arizona judgment also remained enforceable here. The fact that

Fidelity’s judgment was enforceable in both the originating 

(California) and the registering (Arizona) states, provides an even

more compelling reason for allowing re-registration under section

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15 This court is acutely aware, as the Friedmans emphasize, that the

Fidelity III court indicated that “‘[w]hen a judgment creditor fails to utilize

either of these statutory alternatives [renewal by affidavit or a common law action

on the judgment], its resultant inability to enforce the original judgment in

Arizona is compelled by law.’” See Defs.’ Mot. (Doc. 327) at 6:13-14 (quoting

Fidelity III, 238 P.3d at 122 (defendants’ emphasis omitted). The court does not

read that language to suggest, as the Friedmans strongly imply, that failure to

comply with Arizona state renewal statutes precludes re-registration of an

otherwise valid, enforceable judgment under federal law. 

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1963 than did Irby, where the California registered judgment had

become dormant in the ten years after its original registration. 

This action presents no such dormancy issue. 

Also, because the Arizona judgment still was enforceable in

Arizona when Fidelity re-registered it, the court cannot agree, as

the Friedmans urge, that allowing re-registration renders Arizona’s

renewal statutes meaningless. See Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 332) at 6:22-

23. The Friedmans’ contention would carry more weight if Fidelity

had re-registered its Arizona judgment after the expiration of the

renewal time under Arizona statutes, but Fidelity did not. 

Furthermore, as in Irby, there is nothing in Arizona law,

including its UEFJA, “expressly prohibit[ing] the second

registration . . . of an otherwise valid foreign judgment.” See

id. at *5 (emphasis in original). The absence of such a statutory

prohibition bolsters the conclusion that Fidelity permissibly reregistered its Arizona judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 by filing a

second Certification of Judgment in this court on April 5, 2007.15

2. Timeliness

 Having found that 28 U.S.C. § 1963 allows for “reregistration” of a judgment under the particular facts of this

case, the issue now is whether that “re-registration” was timely,

as Fidelity claims. Section 12-544(3) requires that an action

“[u]pon a judgment . . . rendered without the state” be “commenced

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. . . within four years after the cause of action accrues[.]” 

A.R.S. § 12-544(3). Equating “re-registration” with such an

action, the parties agree that section 12-544(3) provides the

applicable statute of limitations; and so, too, will this court. 

Cf. Juneau Spruce Corporation v. I.L.W.U., 128 F.Supp. 697 (D.Haw.

1955) (citation omitted) (Section 1963 “supplies an equivalent

remedy to a suit upon a judgment. It has the same effect as a

judgment of the local forum, . . . Therefore, although different

from a suit upon a judgment, registration is designed to achieve

the same result and the legal principles of a suit upon a judgment

are generally applicable to problems that may arise from

registration.”)

The parties disagree as to when a cause of action accrues

under A.R.S. § 12-544(3), however. Fidelity focuses on finality of

a judgment, whereas the Friedmans focus on enforceability. As it

turns out, both factor into determining the accrual date under

section 12-544(3), but, for the most part, not for the reasons

which the parties proffer. 

Heavily relying upon Day v. Wiswall, 11 Ariz.App. 306, 464

P.2d 626 (App. 1970), Fidelity maintains that finality of a

judgment is determinative of the accrual date for a section 12-

544(3) cause of action. In Day, the plaintiff sought to enforce a

California state court judgment in an Arizona state court. 

Defendants countered that section 12-544(3)’s four year statute of

limitations barred that action. Because “[i]n an action on a

foreign judgment[,] its validity and finality are to be tested by

the law of the jurisdiction where such judgment was rendered[,]”

the Day court looked to section 1049 of the California Code. Id.

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at 313, 464 P.2d at 633 (citation omitted). Defining a “pending

action,” section 1049 states in pertinent part:

 An action is deemed pending from the time 

of its commencement until its final determination 

upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed[.]

Id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1049). Mainly based upon that

definition, and with no analysis, the Day court “h[e]ld that the

limitation period set forth in A.R.S. § 12-544[(3)], does not begin

to run against an action on a foreign judgment until its final

determination on appeal or until the time for appeal has passed[,]

. . . since no ‘cause of action’ accrues until the judgment is

final.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Applying the Day reasoning here, Fidelity maintains that the

California judgment did not become final until May 15, 2003, the

dismissal date of the Friedmans’ appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 

Therefore, according to Fidelity, its April 5, 2007, reregistration was timely “because it was on a date within four years

of the date th[at] . . . appeal was dismissed and the California

judgment became final.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 329) at 11:6-7. 

Fidelity’s reliance upon Day is unavailing for a host of

reasons. Succinctly put, Day has no bearing upon the present case

because: (1) a state, not a federal, court judgment was at issue;

(2) Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 and 58 preempt the California state statute

which formed the basis for Day’s holding that a section 12-544(3)

cause of action accrues when a judgment becomes final on appeal;

(3) Day did not involve, as does this action, how the failure to

post a bond on appeal impacts a judgment’s enforceability; and 

(4) in Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256, 260, 165 P.3d 234, 238

(App. 2007), the court expressly “rejected . . . Day.”

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 Of these reasons perhaps the most significant, and the one

which the parties almost completely overlooked, is that Day

involved a California state court judgment and, not, as here, a

federal court judgment. That distinction is important because,

inter alia, instead of looking to California state law, as did the

Day court and as Fidelity suggests, this court must look to federal

law in determining finality and enforceability for purposes of

section 12-544(3)’s statute of limitations. Consequently, section

1049 of the California Code, which formed the basis for the holding

in Day, is not germane here. The distinction between a federal, as

opposed to a California state, judgment has broader implications

than simply rendering Day inapplicable, as will soon become

evident.

There are three other compelling reasons why Day is not

controlling here. The first is that as the court in Leuzinger v.

County of Lake, 253 F.R.D. 469, 471 (N.D.Cal. 2008), soundly

reasoned, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54 and 58 preempt

section 1049 of the California Code. After entry of a judgment in

a California federal district court, plaintiff Leuzinger sought to

execute upon her judgment in that same court. As does Fidelity,

the defendant in Leuzinger argued, among other things, that section

1049 of the California code barred plaintiff from executing upon

her judgment until a final determination of defendant’s appeal. 

Id. at 470. Examining when a federal court judgment becomes final,

however, the Leuzinger court began by parsing Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 54 and 58. 

“Under Rule 54, a ‘judgment’. . . includes . . . any order

from which an appeal lies.” Id. at 471. Rule 58 governs “[t]he

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actual date of a ‘final judgment,’ however[.]” Id. That Rule also

“define[s] what it means for a final order or judgment to be

entered[:]

Under Rule 58(a)[e]very judgment . . .

must be set out in a separate document. . . .

When Rule 58(a) requires a separate document, 

then judgment is ‘entered’ when it is entered 

in the civil docket under Rule 79(a) and the 

earlier of these events occurs: (A) it is set out 

in a separate document; or (B) 150 days have run 

from the entry in the civil docket.

Id. (internal quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). 

The Leuzinger court “entered judgment as a separate document, on

its civil docket, on October 31, 2007[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 

The Leuzinger court thus reasoned that “a ‘final judgment’ as

defined by rule 54, was ‘entered’ by the Court, as defined by Rule

58, . . . , on October 31, 2007.” Id. 

Despite the clear import of Rules 54 and 58, much like

Fidelity, the defendant in Leuzinger argued that the court should

apply section 1049 of the California Code and find that the

judgment against it would not become final until a final

determination of its appeal. Id. at 472. Rejecting that argument,

the Leuzinger court found that Rules 54 and 58 preempt conflicting

section 1049. In so holding, the court recited the settled

principle that “federal courts apply state substantive law but

federal procedural law.” Id. (citing, inter alia, Hanna v. Plumer,

380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)). “Thus,

when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governs a situation, the

Court applies the rule, even if in direct conflict with relevant

state law[,]” unless, of course, that rule violates the Rules

Enabling Act. Id. (citation omitted). 

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16 Although Leuzinger was decided many years after Day, that does not

render the former any less applicable. That is because the court’s analysis in

Leuzinger was based strictly on the text of Rules 54(a) and 58, which for present

purposes has remained essentially unchanged through the years. 

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That Act “requires [that] a rule of procedure ‘shall not

abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.’” Id. (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2072(b)) (other citation omitted). The test adopted by

the Supreme Court for determining whether a given rule “relates to

the ‘practice and procedure of the district courts[]” is “whether a

rule really regulates procedure, --the judicial process for

enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for

justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction

of them.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 1140, 85 S.Ct. 1136 (internal

quotations and citation omitted). Finding that “Rules 54 and 58

which merely define when a judgment is ‘final and ‘entered,’

respectively, clearly pass th[at] test[,]” the Leuzinger court

applied those Rules “even in the face of conflicting California

law[,]” i.e. section 1049. Leuzinger, 253 F.R.D. at 472. 

That preemption argument applies with equal force here where

Fidelity is attempting to enforce a federal, not a state, court

judgment. Leuzinger thus seriously erodes the continuing vitality

of Day,16 as well as showing even more clearly Day’s irrelevancy to

this case where enforcement of a federal judgment is at issue. 

Third, Day does not govern the present case because the

plaintiffs there did not commence their action to enforce under

section 12-544(3) until after the California judgment was finally

decided on appeal. The Day court thus had no need to consider, as

does this court, the effect of the failure to post a bond pending

appeal upon the enforceability of a judgment.

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17 Cf. Menken v. Emm, 386 Fed.Appx. 599, 600 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations

omitted) (describing Grynberg as “provid[ing] . . . clarity” after Day, and noting

that “because of Day’s imprecise language[,]” it “was at least debatable before

Grynberg . . . [w]hether Day . . . created a standard that looked to the foreign

state’s finality rule, or instead created a rule that the statutory period always

runs from the end of the appellate process[]”).

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Lastly, this court gives no credence to Day because its 

precedential value also is highly doubtful in light of Grynberg v.

Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256, 165 P.3d 234 (App. 2007), a case which

Fidelity and the Friedmans both mention. The Grynberg court

unequivocally “rejected the reasoning and conclusions reached . . .

in Day.” Id. at 260, 165 P.3d at 238.17 In Grynberg, a Colorado

state court issued a pre-judgment interest order in May 2001, and

that judgment was affirmed in 2003. In January, 2006, the

judgment-creditor registered his Colorado judgment in an Arizona

state court under Arizona’s UEFJA. 

Although agreeing that section 12-544(3)’s statute of

limitations “begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which

is the date on which the foreign judgment is entitled to full faith

and credit in Arizona[,]” in Grynberg, the parties “disagree[d] as

to when the Colorado judgment was final and entitled to full faith

and credit.” Id. at 257, 165 P.3d at 235 (citation omitted). 

“Because the judgment of a sister state must be final before full

faith and credit attaches,” the Grynberg court “look[ed] to

Colorado law to determine when the judgment in th[at] case became

final.” Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 258, 165 P.3d at 236 (citation

omitted). Under Colorado law, “an appeal to the Colorado appellate

court may be taken from a ‘final judgment’ of the district court.” 

Id. (citing Colo.App. R.1(a)(1)). Further, in accordance with

Colo. R. Civ. P. 62(d), “execution upon that judgment will not be

stayed unless the judgment-debtor files a supersedeas bond.” Id.

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(citations omitted). That Rule further “permits execution upon

such final judgments to begin fifteen days after the judgment has

been entered, even if an appeal has been taken, unless a

supersedeas bond has been filed.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Based upon the foregoing, because the judgment-debtor “did not

file a supersedeas bond in Colorado while the appeal was

pending[,]” the Grynberg court found that “execution of the

judgment in Colorado was not stayed during the appeal and was

enforceable fifteen days after the judgment was entered in May

2001.” Id. Given that “the Colorado judgment was final in May

2001,” the Grynberg court affirmed the granting of defendants’

motion to vacate the judgment because the judgment-creditor’s

“January 2006 registration was not within [A.R.S. § 12-544(3)’s]

four-year statute of limitations[]” for enforcement of foreign

judgments. Id. at 260, 165 P.3d at 238.

Adhering to its view that Day provides the applicable rule of

law, Fidelity attempts to distinguish Grynberg on a variety of

grounds. None are persuasive, however, primarily because a

federal, not a state, court judgment is at issue here. So for

example, it matters not, as Fidelity stresses, that the Grynberg

court was examining Colorado law, whereas Day looked to California

law in determining the accrual date for an action to enforce a

foreign judgment pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-544(3). Moreover, because

Fidelity’s judgment was rendered in a California federal, as

opposed to a state, court, the law of that jurisdiction is

determinative of finality and enforceability – a principle which

both the Day and Grynberg courts invoke. See Grynberg, 216 Ariz.

at 259, 165 P.3d at 237 (“[A] foreign judgment becomes enforceable

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in Arizona when it has become enforceable in the rendering

state[.]”); Day, 11 Ariz.App. at 313, 464 P.2d at 633 (citation

omitted) (“In an action on a foreign judgment its validity and

finality are to be tested by the law of the jurisdiction where such

judgment was rendered.”) In short, Fidelity’s reliance upon Day is

unavailing. Accordingly, this court declines to follow Day and

find, as Fidelity so strongly urges, that its judgment became final

for section 12-544(3) purposes on May 13, 2003 – the dismissal

date of the Friedmans’ appeal. 

Fidelity is not alone in improperly relying upon California

state law; the Friedmans did as well. Presuming that California

state law governs the enforceability of this federal court

judgment, the Friedmans contend that because they did not “file a

supersedeas bond[]” under section 917.1(a) of the California Code,

Fidelity’s “Judgment was enforceable long before the appeal was

dismissed.” Defs.’ Reply (Doc. 332) at 5:7-8. In fact, according

to the Friedmans, “Fidelity recognized and acted upon this rule in

registering the California judgment in Arizona in 2002 and

commencing collection proceedings almost immediately.” Defs.’

Reply (Doc. 332) at 5:9-10 (emphasis added). The Friedmans are

correct in terms of the impact of not filing a supersedeas bond,

but they are incorrectly relying upon section 917.1(a). That is

because, as with section 1049 of the California Code, the Leuzinger

court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preempt

section 917.1(a). 

More specifically, the Leuzinger court found that Fed.R.Civ.P. 

62(d) preempts that section of the California Code. Leuzinger

“argued that Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(a) and (d) allow[ed] her to enforce

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18 The 2009 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective

December 1, 2009, revised Rule 62(a)’s time from 10 to 14 days. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

62 2009 Amendments. 

 

19 Until December 1, 2009, under Rule 6(a) all deadlines for periods of

less than 11 days were computed in the same way; the day of the event that triggers

the deadline was excluded, but all intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal

holidays were included. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1) 2009 Amendments.

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her judgment while the [defendant’s] appeal [wa]s pending, as [it]

had not filed a supersedeas bond.” Leuzinger, 253 F.R.D. at 470

(citation omitted). Agreeing with plaintiff, the court first

focused upon Rule 62(a), which at that time read in relevant part,

“[e]xcept as stated in this rule, no execution may issue on a

judgment, nor may proceedings be taken to enforce it, until 10 days

have passed after its entry.”18 Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(a). Prior to

December 1, 2009, Rule 62(a) thus dictated that “‘a judgment of a

United States District Court becomes final and enforceable ten days

after judgment is entered.’” Id. at 472 (quoting Columbia Pictures

TV v. Krypton Broadcasting, 259 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Counting pursuant to the then operative provisions of Rule

6(a)(2),19 the Leuzinger court held that plaintiff’s judgment was

“final and enforceable on November 14, 2007[]” – ten days after

its October 31, 2007 entry. Id.

Shifting to Rule 62(b), the Leuzinger court looked to Rule

62(b) because it “addresses how an appeal affects the date on which

a judgment become[s] final and enforceable.” Id. at 473. The

court explained:

Except for certain equitable types of actions

inapplicable here, [i]f an appeal is taken, the 

appellant may obtain a stay by supersedeas bond. . . . The bond may be given upon or after filing the notice 

of appeal or after obtaining the order allowing the 

appeal. . . . The stay takes effect when the court 

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approves the bond. . . . In lieu of seeking a stay

in a district court, a party may seek a stay in the 

Court of Appeals.

Id. at 473 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis added). On March 3, 2008, defendant filed its appeal in

Leuzinger, but it “never requested a stay nor posted a bond of

supersedeas, under Rule 62(d), in th[at] Court, nor under Rule

62(g), in the Ninth Circuit.” Id. (footnote omitted). 

Consequently, “under Rule 62, Leuzinger’s judgment remain[ed] final

and enforceable as of November 14, 2007[,]” even though defendant’s

appeal had not been finally determined at that time. Id.; see also

A. Coolot Co. v. L. Kahner & Co., 140 F. 836 (9th Cir. 1905) (“A

judgment is none the less a final judgment, within the meaning of

the rule requiring judgments to be final in order to sustain an

action thereon, because an appeal is pending, if no supersedeas

bond on appeal is given.”)

The preemption of section 917.1(a) notwithstanding, Leuzinger

does lend support to the Friedmans’ broader contention that because

they did not file a supersedeas bond, Fidelity’s judgment was

enforceable before the dismissal of their appeal. As earlier

noted, Fidelity’s registration of its California judgment in this

court under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, was “the functional equivalent of

obtaining a new judgment of the registration court.” See Hilao,

536 F.3d at 989 (citations omitted). By extension then, in

accordance with Rules 54 and 58, Fidelity’s Certification of

Judgment (with attached copy of its California judgment) became

final on its entry date –- November 18, 2002. See Leuzinger, 253

F.R.D. at 471. 

Finality alone is not dispositive of when a cause of action

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accrues under A.R.S. § 12-544(3), as earlier discussed.

Enforceability also factors into the accrual determination. It is

undisputed that the Friedmans did not post a supersedeas bond or

seek a stay as Rules 62(d) and 62(g) permit, respectively. 

Therefore, adopting the reasoning in Leuzinger and relying upon the

2002 version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 62, Fidelity’s newly registered

judgment became enforceable ten days after its entry. Counting

pursuant to Rule 6(a) as then in effect, i.e., excluding

intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, and based upon

the November 18, 2002, entry date, Fidelity’s Arizona judgment

became enforceable on December 3, 2002. Again, assuming as do the

parties, that the four year statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-

544(3) supplies the time frame for re-registering a judgment under

28 U.S.C. § 1963, Fidelity thus had until December 3, 2006, by

which to re-register its judgment. See Hilao, 536 F.3d at 989

(“The effect” of registering a judgment under section 1963 “is to

allow that judgment, i.e., the newly registered judgment, to be

enforced for the period allowed by the law of that forum, i.e., the

state of registration) [Arizona][.]”) But, Fidelity did not do so. 

Fidelity did not even attempt to “re-register” its judgment until

April 5, 2007, when it filed the 2007 Certification. That reregistration was not timely, however.

In sum, because Fidelity did not timely file a renewal

affidavit as Arizona law requires, and because it did not timely

“re-register” its Arizona judgment, the court hereby ORDERS that:

(1) defendants’ “Request for Ruling Consistent with Ninth

Circuit Mandate” (Doc. 327) is GRANTED; and

(2) that plaintiffs’ “Certification of Judgment for

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Registration in Another District (dated January 1, [sic] 2007) and

Renewal of Judgment in District of Arizona” (Doc. 148) is VACATED.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2012.

Copies to counsel of record

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