Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00378/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00378-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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1

 The Court notes page 15 of Plaintiff’s complaint is missing. (ECF No. 1, pg. 14, 16). Page

15 could be vital to Plaintiff’s complaint because it likely contains information regarding Plaintiff’s

and Defendants’ response to the blood test results confirming Plaintiff had Hepatitis C.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT SCOFIELD,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv378-BEN (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS (ECF No. 18)

vs.

BALL, et al.,

Defendant.

Introduction

Plaintiff Robert Scofield, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the instant civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concerning the conditions of his confinement at R.J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”), Centinela State Prison (“CEN”), New Folsom State Prison (“NFSP”),

High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), and Calipatria State Prison

(“CSP”).1

 Plaintiff alleges members of the medical staff at the various institutions listed above, as well

as California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) inmate appeals employees,

violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges state law claims

for negligence, malpractice and for claims arising under California Government Code sections

844.6(d) and 845.6. All of Plaintiff’s claims stem from the Defendants’ alleged failure to inform

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 These facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, courts construe pro se pleadings liberally on a Defendant's motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Id. 

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Plaintiff he tested positive for Hepatitis C and treat him for Hepatitis C.

Defendants Gray, Sherman, Penner, and Ball filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (ECF

No. 18). Defendants present the following grounds for dismissal: (1) Plaintiff failed to plead

compliance with the California Government Claims Act with regards to his state law claims, (2)

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are duplicative of his Eighth Amendment claims, (3)

Defendants Gray and Ball cannot be liable via their participation in the inmate appeals process, and

(4) Gray and Ball are immune from liability as to Plaintiff’s state law claim pursuant to California

Goverment Code section 845.6. (ECF No. 18). Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Defendants’ motion.

(ECF No. 19). Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s opposition. (ECF No. 20).

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger T.

Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.3 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. After reviewing the pleadings and parties' briefs, for the reasons

set forth below, the Court recommends that the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants be GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part as discussed in detail below.

Factual Background2

Plaintiff arrived at RJD in October, 1998. (ECF No. 1, pg. 10). Upon arrival, Plaintiff

underwent a medical screening and gave a blood sample. (Id.) Plaintiff did not receive the results of

the blood test. (Id.) 

On January 19, 1999, Plaintiff was transferred to CEN. (Id. at 11). CEN staff did not test

Plaintiff’s blood or inform him of the results of his prior blood test. (Id.) 

On March 8, 2001, Plaintiff was transferred to NFSP. NFSP staff did not test Plaintiff’s blood

or inform him of the results of the blood test performed at RJD. (Id.) On November 10, 2001, Plaintiff

requested to be tested for HIV and Hepatitis A, B, and C. (Id.) A blood sample was taken on

November 16, 2001. (Id.) On November 20, 2001, Defendant Sherman filed a “Confidential Morbidity

Report” confirming Plaintiff tested positive for Hepatitis C. (Id.) Plaintiff was not informed of the

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3

 Nurse Practitioner Lopez is not a Defendant in this action.

4

 It is unclear which results Plaintiff saw on December 31, 2007.

5

 As noted in footnote 1, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain page 15.

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results of the test. (Id. at 12). 

On December 19, 2002, Plaintiff was transferred to HDSP. (Id.) HDSP staff did not perform

a blood test or inform Plaintiff of his previous positive test results. (Id.) On April 16, 2003, Plaintiff

requested to be tested for HIV and Hepatitis A, B, and C. (Id.) A blood sample was taken April 21,

2003. (Id.) On May 8, 2003, Defendant Anderson filed a “Confidential Morbidity Report” confirming

Plaintiff tested positive for Hepatitis C. (Id.) Plaintiff was not informed of the results. (Id.) 

On December 17, 2003, Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP. (Id.) Plaintiff’s blood was not tested

nor were the results of the previous blood tests disclosed to Plaintiff. (Id.) On July 24, 2005, Plaintiff

requested to be tested for Hepatitis C. (Id. at 12-13). On August 10, 2005, a blood sample was taken.

(Id.) On August 17, 2005, Defendant Kumar informed Plaintiff that he would be scheduled for a

follow-up appointment. (Id.) Plaintiff did not have a follow-up appointment.(Id.) Plaintiff was charged

$5.00 for the blood test. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen by the medical staff numerous times regarding the test

but was never informed of the results. (Id.) 

On February 28, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred to CSP. (Id.) Plaintiff’s blood was not tested

nor were the results of the previous blood tests disclosed to Plaintiff. (Id.) On April 4, 2006, Plaintiff

requested to be tested for Hepatitis C. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff did not undergo a blood test because of a

facility lock-down. (Id.) 

In October of 2007, Nurse Practitioner Lopez3

 called Plaintiff into his office and asked him

about the status of his Hepatitis. (Id.) Nurse Practitioner Lopez then informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff

had tested positive for Hepatitis as early as 2001. (Id.) On October 29, 2007, Nurse Practitioner Lopez

ordered another blood test. (Id.) 

On December 31, 2007, Plaintiff was shown the blood sample lab results for the first time.4

(Id.) The results confirmed Plaintiff had Hepatitis. (Id.) Plaintiff immediately requested treatment.5

(Id.)

On June 2, 2008, Plaintiff received a liver biopsy. (Id. at 16). The biopsy indicated chronic

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6

 Plaintiff does not specify to which appeal he refers.

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Hepatitis C, grade 2 interface Hepatitis with stage 2-3 Fibrosis. (Id.) 

On July 9, 2008, Defendant Gray partially granted Plaintiff’s appeal.6

 (Id.) Defendant Gray

informed Plaintiff he would have to wait to see if Plaintiff met the requirements for treatment because

Plaintiff had received a biopsy and vaccines for Hepatitis A and B. (Id.) Defendant Ball was in a

supervisory position at CSP during this time and could have, but did not, change the policy regarding

inmate notification of positive Hepatitis test results. (Id. at 17). Both Gray and Ball made false

statements regarding the sources they considered when reviewing Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id.) Gray and

Ball should have seen the results of Plaintiff’s June 2, 2008 liver biopsy which indicated state 2-3

fibrosis and grade 2 inflammation. (Id.) 

Dissatisfied with Gray and Ball’s response to his appeal, Plaintiff filed a “Director’s Level”

review. (Id.) Defendant Grannis appointed Defendant Hall to examine Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id.) Hall

denied Plaintiff’s appeal. (Id. at 18). However, Hall did not investigate Plaintiff’s appeal and was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s health and well-being. (Id.) If Hall had investigated Plaintiff’s

appeal, Hall would have discovered doctors at CSP had diagnosed Plaintiff and had started Interferon

and Ribavirin treatments. (Id. at 19). 

Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd.

of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). The old formula—that the complaint must not be dismissed

unless it is beyond doubt without merit—was discarded by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 563 n. 8 (2007).

Now, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The court must accept as true all material allegations in the

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complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d

969, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.2003));

Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986).

The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8. A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is

generally proper only where there “is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001)

(citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988)).

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true; rather, it must

“examine whether [they] follow from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11

F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 973 (citing Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 (9th Cir.1994)) (stating that on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

court “is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged[ ]”). “Nor is the court required to

accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001).

Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights case, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim–Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). The rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th

Cir.1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may not “supply

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

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participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1984) (finding conclusory

allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that

support the plaintiff's claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v. Carlson,

809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir.1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights complaint may be

dismissed, the court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies.

Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24. But where amendment of a pro se litigant's complaint would

be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th

Cir.2000).

Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show (1) a person

acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir.1986).

Discussion

Compliance with California Government Claims Act

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims against all Defendants for failure to

state a claim because Plaintiff did not plead compliance with the California Government Claims

Act. (ECF No. 18-1, pg. 4). In the opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff admits,

“[b]y inadvertence and mistake, I may have failed to plead that the claims under state law were

presented . . .”(ECF No. 19, pg. 2). Plaintiff further alleges he did comply with the presentation

requirements of the California Government Claims Act. (Id.) Defendants allege Plaintiff’s claims

are nevertheless untimely and should be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 20, pg. 4). 

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 The Court expresses no opinion regarding whether Plaintiff will be able to allege, or prove,

compliance with the claims presentation requirements of the California Government Claims Act.

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Under California law, in order to allege a state tort claim against a public entity or public

employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the presentment of claims requirements of the

California Government Claims Act. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 945.4, 950.2; Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir.1988). “Before a civil action may be brought

against a public entity, a claim must first be presented to the public entity and rejected.” Ocean

Servs. Corp. v. Ventura Port Dist., 15 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1775 (1993); Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4;

see also Brown v. Yates, 2008 WL 928119, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Apr.4, 2008), adopted, 2008 WL

2915085 (E.D.Cal. July 25, 2008) (“Presentation of a written claim and action on, or rejection of,

the claim are conditions to suit.”) (citations omitted). Claims for personal injury and property

damage must be presented within six months after accrual. See Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2(a); City of

Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (2007). “[F]ailure to timely present a claim for

money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” City

of Stockton v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th at 738 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Timely claims presentation is an “element of the plaintiff's cause of action.” Shirk v. Vista

Unif. Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 (2007) (citation omitted). A plaintiff “must allege facts

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement.” State v. Superior

Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243 (2004). California courts “employ a test of substantial

compliance rather than strict compliance in evaluating whether a plaintiff has met the demands of

the claims statutes.” Life v. County of Los Angeles, 227 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 (1991).

In his complaint, Plaintiff does not allege he complied with the claims presentation

requirements of the California Government Claims Act, including timeliness, with respect to his

claims against the Defendants. Therefore, the state law claims against the Defendants would

ordinarily be dismissed. However, because it appears from Plaintiff's Opposition that Plaintiff may

be able to allege facts showing compliance with the claims presentation requirements of the

California Government Claims Act, the Court should grant leave to amend.7 See Broam v. Bogan,

320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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Accordingly, This Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s state law claims against the

Defendants be DISMISSED with leave to amend.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims as duplicative of his

Eighth Amendment claims regarding Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

(ECF No. 18-1, pg. 5). Plaintiff asserts the Fourteenth Amendment claims should survive

Defendants’ motion to dismiss because of the liberal pleading standard applicable to state inmates

and because Defendants failed to assert sufficient grounds for dismissal. (ECF No. 19, pg. 3-7.)

“If a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision ... the claim must

be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of

substantive due process” of the Fourteenth Amendment. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 843 (1998) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7 (1997)); accord Saucier

v. Katz, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

Here, Plaintiff’s first through sixth claims state Plaintiff’s “8th and 14th Amendment rights

were violated.” (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff does not extrapolate on, or differentiate between, his Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment claims or the underlying facts attributable to either claim. Thus,

Plaintiff appears to bring an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim for deliberate

indifference to his medical needs under the generalized notion of due process. Accordingly, the

Court will analyze this claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

272–73 (1994) (noting that when a broad “due process” violation is alleged, but a particular

amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against a particular

sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive

due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395 (1989)); Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2001).

To the extent plaintiff raises a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against the

Defendants separate and apart from his Eighth Amendment claim, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to

state a legally cognizable claim because he does not allege any facts in support thereof with

sufficient specificity. If plaintiff intends to amend his pleadings to raise a separate Fourteenth

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Amendment due process claim, plaintiff must show: (1) a life, liberty or property interest exists

and has been subject to interference by the state; and (2) the procedures attendant upon the

deprivation of an existing interest were constitutionally insufficient. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections

v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1990).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims be

DISMISSED without prejudice.

Defendants Gray and Ball (Appeals Process)

Defendants also seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment,

First Amendment, and state law claims against Gray and Ball. Plaintiff’s claims relate solely to

these Defendants’ participation in Plaintiff’s appeals process. Each claim is addressed separately

below.

Fourteenth Amendment

Defendants cite Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003) and Mann v. Adams,

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988), for the proposition that Plaintiff lacks a constitutional

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure. (ECF No. 18-1, pg. 6). Taken together, these

cases hold a Plaintiff has no substantive right to a prison grievance system and due process claims

based on the denial of or interference with a prisoner's access to a prison grievance system are not

cognizable. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (citing Mann, 855 F.2d at 640). However, a prisoner can

state a cognizable claim where the prisoner claims the appeal reviewer’s actions constitute cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Coleman v. Adams, 2010 WL

2572534, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2010). 

Here, Plaintiff claims Gray and Ball failed to “truthfully and responsibly resolve” his

inmate appeals and knowingly made false statements. (ECF No. 1, pg. 39-41). To the extent

Plaintiff claims a due process violation, such a claim is not cognizable because it is presumably

premised on the Defendants’ failure to process his appeals, consider evidence, or otherwise deny

his appeals without adequate process. Coleman, 2010 WL 2572534 at *7.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims

against Gray and Ball be DISMISSED.

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Eighth Amendment

Defendants assert Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Gray and Ball must be

dismissed because Gray and Ball were “only reviewing and responding to his appeal” and

“Plaintiff did not have a constitutional interest or right to that appeal.” (ECF No. 18-1, pg. 7).

Plaintiff does not squarely address this argument in his opposition. (ECF No. 19). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Gray and Ball acted with deliberate indifference to his medical

needs because both Defendants failed in their “duty of care to truthfully and responsibly resolve”

his inmate appeal and knowingly and maliciously made false statements regarding their review of

his appeal. (ECF No. 1, pg. 39-41). Plaintiff also alleges Ball was in a supervisory position at CSP

and failed to change the allegedly unconstitutional policy by which inmates are informed of their

blood-test results. (Id. at 17). Plaintiff further alleges Gray is a nurse and Ball is Chief Physician

and Surgeon at CSP. (Id. at 16-17). 

 To state a section 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show the defendants acted with

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show: (1) a “‘serious

medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) the defendant's

response “was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1991)).

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of and disregard an

excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may

be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need

and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be

shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or

by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner's medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

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Here, the Court finds unpersuasive Defendants’ blanket assertion that inmate appeal

reviewers cannot violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights for the following reasons. First,

the Court notes Defendants did not provide, nor can this Court find, any legal authority to support

Defendants’ assertion. Indeed, prison administrators can be liable for deliberate indifference when

they knowingly fail to respond to an inmate’s requests for help. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Jett, 439

F.3d at 1098. Second, based on Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendants Gray and Ball are not merely

non-medically trained, faceless and distant CDCR administrators tasked with reviewing the fullspectrum of inmate appeals and grievances. Rather, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Gray and Dr. Ball, both

employed at CSP while Plaintiff was incarcerated there, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records in

response to his appeal regarding the “treatment of [his] serious medical condition.” (ECF No. 1,

pg. 47). Plaintiff alleges these Defendants acted knowingly and maliciously in denying his appeal.

Defendants’ assertion lacks merit because deliberate indifference may be shown when a prison

official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison

doctors respond to the prisoner's medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at

1096.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims against Gray and Ball be DENIED.

First Amendment

Plaintiff claims Gray and Ball used “false statements to deny an inmate appeal” and thus

“violate[d] the First Amendment by making the grievance procedure useless.” (ECF No. 1, pg. 46).

However, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Gray and Ball fail because Plaintiff does not

allege facts sufficient to show: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or

conditions of confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury

as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996) (identifying an “actual injury” as “actual

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing

deadline or to present a claim.”). Essentially, Plaintiff alleges Gray and Ball must have lied about

what documents they reviewed when they decided his appeal because he did not get the relief he

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sought.8 (ECF No. 1, pg. 17, 46-47). Plaintiff does not allege Gray or Ball’s actions prevented him

from making a threshold showing of a denial of care or other wrongdoing. For example, Plaintiff

does not allege Gray and Ball lied about his diagnosis which frustrated or impeded his ability to

present the merits of his appeal. Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint confirms Plaintiff presented his

appeal to the third level of review (director’s level) following Gray and Ball’s second level review.

(ECF No. 1, pg. 17). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege the Defendants’ false statements caused an

“actual injury.” See Ornelas v. Giurbino, 358 F.Supp.2d 955, 972 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Gray

and Ball be DISMISSED.

State Law Claims

Defendants Gray and Ball contend they are immune from liability on Plaintiff’s state law

claims under Government Code section 845.6 because they merely reviewed Plaintiff’s grievance

and therefore were not in a position to summon immediate medical care. (ECF No. 18-1, pg. 8). 

 The Court disagrees. In order to state a claim under section 845.6, a prisoner must establish

three elements: (1) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate

medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care. Furthermore, the need for

“immediate medical care” can arise more than once in regards to a serious on-going medical

condition. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1099. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges Nurse Gray and Dr. Ball, both employed at CSP while Plaintiff was

incarcerated there, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records in response to his appeal regarding

“treatment of Plaintiff’s serious medical condition.” Plaintiff further alleges his medical records

included blood-test results from 2001 which confirmed he had Hepatitis C. Plaintiff also alleges

the medical records contained a 2008 blood-test which confirmed Hepatitis C. Plaintiff alleges he

went untreated between 2001 and 2008, then discovered his condition and requested immediate

treatment from Gray and Ball but was denied. Thus, the Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged

sufficient facts to satisfy the elements required to state a claim under section 845.6 because he has

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alleged facts demonstrating (a) Gray’s and Ball’s knowledge of his condition in 2008, (b) Gray’s

and Ball’s knowledge that Plaintiff was never treated for Hepatitis C, (c) the need for immediate

care, and (d) Gray’s and Ball’s failure to arrange care. Morever, Plaintiff alleges Dr. Ball was the

Chief Physician and Surgeon at CSP. (ECF No. 1, pg. 16-17). Certainly, the Chief Physician and

Surgeon of CSP, even when acting in a appeal-review capacity, can order immediate medical care

should the need arise. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state

law claims under section 845.6 against Defendants Gray and Ball based on their immunity from

suit be DENIED.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue the

following Orders:

1. The Court GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims

against the Defendants with leave to amend. 

2. The Court GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claims against the Defendants without prejudice. 

3. The Court DENY Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claims against Defendants Gray and Ball.

4. The Court GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment

claims against Defendants Gray and Ball.

5. The Court DENY Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims

pursuant to section 845.6 against Defendants Gray and Ball based on their alleged immunity.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 2, 2012 any party to this action may file a

written objection with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than February 9, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir.1998); see also

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2012

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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