Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00844/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-00844-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JAMES EDWARD MOORE, )

1

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:09-CV-844-TMH

) [WO]

)

KATHY HOLT, )

)

Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on an amended complaint filed on

October 16, 2009, by James Edward Moore [“Moore”], a former Alabama inmate now

residing in the state of New York. Doc. No. 12. Moore filed an amendment to his

complaint on November 6, 2009. Doc. No. 15. In these pleadings, Moore challenges

alleged dissemination of false information to officials with the New York Department of

Corrections, which he contends members of the New York Parole Board relied upon to

deny him release on parole in May of 2008. Id. Moore names Kathy Holt, the Director of

At the initiation of this case, Moore was incarcerated in the State of New York and in his in forma pauperis

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application referenced his New York inmate identification number. Moore did not list his Alabama inmate

identification number, AIS #122682, or his alias, Jackie Moore, in either the complaint of financial forms. This

caused confusion in the initial special report filed by the defendant, as she used the records of James Edward Moore,

AIS #232677, in formulating her first response to the complaint. Upon defendant Holt’s receiving the appropriate

information regarding the actual identity of the plaintiff, Holt filed a supplementalspecial report addressing the claim

raised in the complaint (Doc. No. 39) and submitted evidentiary materials relevant thereto (Doc. No. 39-1 and Doc.

No. 44-1). 

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Correctional Records for the Alabama Department of Corrections, as the sole defendant

in this cause of action. He seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages from the

defendant for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Amendment to Complaint -

Doc. No. 15 at 3.

The defendant filed special reports and supporting evidentiarymaterials addressing

Moore’s claim for relief on January 3, 2012 (Doc. No. 39 and Doc. No. 39-1), and February

7, 2012 (Doc. No. 44 and Doc. No. 44-1). Pursuant to the orders entered herein, the court

construes the aforementioned reports as a motion for summary judgment. Thus, this case

is now pending on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of

this motion, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s responses,

the court concludes the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

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of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [– now dispute –] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by

presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing the

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on

which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

The defendant has met her evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case

exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S.

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at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or

fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”). A genuine dispute of material fact

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding

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summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word --

genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.”

Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Thus, although Rule 56

underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior versions of the

rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. Consequently, to

survive the defendant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment, Moore is

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial

supporting his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the

nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary

judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the

opposing party’s position will notsuffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier

of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106

S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577

(11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise

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insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc.,

276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir.

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1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting

evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d

912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces

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nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants);

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own

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conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when

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a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will

bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the

moving party.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v.

Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the

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prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the

case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolving materialfacts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

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for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

establishes the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law,

summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is

appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show

there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material fact.); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (To

establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence

such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford,

906 F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not

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mandate this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil

case. In this case, Moore fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact

in order to preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Absolute Immunity

To the extent that Moore seeks relief from defendant Holt in her official capacity,

the defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages. Official capacity

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lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his

[or her] official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity,

see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900,

908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole

Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).

Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence,

916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated

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Alabama’simmunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought

against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419,

1429 (11 Cir. 1997).

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In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the defendant is a state actor entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claimsseeking monetary damages

from her in her official capacity. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia

Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir. 1994); Parker v. Williams,

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862 F.2d 1471 (11 Cir. 1989).

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B. Claim for Relief

Moore asserts that the “defendant furnished ... false information to New York

authorities” that resulted in his “being punished by the New York Board of Parole with an

additional two years of incarceration ... because [the parole board] believed that plaintiff

was on probation at the time [he committed the murder in New York].” Amended

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Complaint - Doc. No. 12 at 1. The defendant deniesthis allegation. Specifically, Ms. Holt

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maintains that she provided no information to New York authorities regarding James

Edward Moore, AIS #122682, and she has “no knowledge of any false information” in his

Alabama inmate file. Defendant’s Exhibit 3 (Affidavit of Kathy Holt) - Doc. No. 44-1 at

1. Thus, the defendant does not admit that she provided false information to outside

officials and deniesthe existence of any false information in the plaintiff’s Alabama prison

file.

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11 Cir. 1991), the Court held that reliance

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on admittedly false information to deny a prisoner consideration for parole was arbitrary

and capricious treatment which violated the Constitution. The appellate court carefully

distinguished its holding from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons

and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982). “[I]n Slocum,

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the state did not admit that it had relied upon false information in denying parole nor did

the plaintiff present any evidence that his prison file ... contained any false information.

We held in Slocum that prisoners do not state a due process claim by merely asserting that

erroneous information may have been used during their parole consideration. Id. at 942.

We also determined that prisoners do not have a due process right to examine their prison

files as part of a general fishing expedition in search of false information that could

The record before this court in Moore v. Teague, et al., Case No. 2:02-CV-635-MEF (M.D. Ala. 2004), 3

demonstrates that the documents provided by Alabama officials to New York authorities showed that Moore was on

parole for various Alabama convictions when he committed the New York offense in 1982. Infra at 10-11. Thus, it

is apparent that the alleged reference to “probation” by a New York parole official was merely a mischaracterization

of Moore’s conditional status at the time of his New York offense. 

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possibly exist in their files. Id.” Monroe, 932 F.3d at 1442.

Disposition of the instant case is governed by the holding set forth in Slocum. The

defendant maintains that the information contained in the plaintiff’s Alabama inmate file

is true and correct. Moreover, the only evidence before the court establishes the defendant

provided no information to New York authoritiesregarding the plaintiff. The record in this

case therefore establishes that the defendant did not furnish admittedly false information

to New York authorities. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief as a

matter of law and summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of the

defendant.

C. Issue Preclusion

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The defendant also argues that the false information claim presented by Moore

provides no basis for relief, as she “is entitled to judgment in the instant case due to the

doctrine of collateral estoppel” arising from this court’s previous decision in Moore v.

Teague, et al., Case No. 2:02-CV-635-MEF (M.D. Ala. 2004). Defendant’s Supplemental

Special Report - Doc. No. 39 at 1. In this prior § 1983 action, Moore argued defendant

Teague, the Director of Correctional Records for the Alabama Department of Corrections

“The[] terms [claim preclusion and issue] have replaced a more confusing lexicon. Claim preclusion

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describes the rules formerly known as ‘merger’ and ‘bar’ while issue preclusion encompasses the doctrines once

known as ‘collateral estoppel’ and ‘direct estoppel.’ See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75,

77, n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984).” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2171 n.5 (2008).

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at the time Moore filed his 2002 civil action and a predecessor of defendant Holt, provided

false information to New York authorities regarding his Alabama criminal record,

including terms of probation/parole, which had an adverse impact on the determination of

his release date from the New York sentence. This court decided the false information

claim adversely to Moore. Moore v. Teague, et al., Case No. 2:02-CV-635-MEF (M.D.

Ala. 2004) - Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge -- Doc. No. 43, adopted as opinion

of the court by Order of September 13, 2004 (Doc. No. 46). The relevant portion of the

Recommendation reads as follows:

In 1976, Moore was convicted of second degree burglary by the

Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. He was sentenced to 5 years

imprisonment on this conviction. However, thissentence wassuspended and

Moore was placed on probation. The plaintiff was subsequently convicted

of forgery thereby violating the terms of his probation. On December 12,

1978, Moore was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment on the forgery

conviction to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for his 1976

burglary conviction. The plaintiff was granted parole [by the Alabama

Board of Pardons and Paroles] from these sentences on December 21, 1979.

On February 11, 1980, a declaration of delinquency was issued against

Moore by his parole officer due to Moore’s alleged violations of several

conditions of parole. In light of the foregoing, a warrant was issued for

Moore’s arrest on February 28, 1980. The plaintiff was arrested by deputies

of the Mobile Sheriff’s Department on September 29, 1982. Notice of parole

revocation was issued on November 18, 1982 in which the Alabama Board

of Corrections was advised that the plaintiff “has heretofore been declared

delinquent, and after a hearing on his delinquency his parole having been

revoked, you are directed to keep him in your custody that he may continue

serving his sentence.” A copy of this notice was provided to the plaintiff.

In February of 1983, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers, the plaintiff was transferred to the custody of law enforcement

officials for Nassau County, New York for trial on a second degree murder

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charge. [This detainer related to a murder committed by Moore in June of

1982 while on parole from his Alabama convictions.] He was admitted to

[the] Nassau County [Jail] on February 13, [1983]. At this time, the plaintiff

was still serving his Alabama sentence as such sentence did not expire until

August 30, 1983. On February 8, 1984, Moore was convicted of second

degree murder by the State of New York and sentenced to 25 years to life

imprisonment. Since the plaintiff had not yet completed his Alabama

sentence upon histransfer to the custody of New York authorities, he was not

given jail credit for his New York sentence until expiration of the Alabama

sentence. The plaintiff complains that this interpretation of his records is

based on false information provided by the defendants to New York

officials....

* * *

The plaintiff contends that the defendants submitted false and

erroneous information to New York authorities which has had an adverse

effect on ... his New York sentence.

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11 Cir. 1991), the plaintiff

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alleged that he was deprived of due process because erroneous information

contained in his prison records about charges for which he was never

arrested, charged, or convicted was used to deny him fair consideration for

parole and minimum custody status. Monroe alleged that the PSI report

information indicating he had raped the victim of his crime was false. The

defendants admitted the PSI information was false. Acknowledging that he

had no liberty interest in parole, Monroe claimed a due process right to be

fairly considered for parole. He contended that the defendants’ reliance on

admittedlyfalse information in orderto deny himparole or minimumsecurity

classification violated due process.

The court in Monroe held that the defendants’ reliance on admittedly

false information to deny Monroe consideration for parole was arbitrary and

capricious treatment violative of the Constitution. However, the court was

careful to distinguish its holding from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia

State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11 Cir. 1982).

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Our holding today does not conflict with our

earlier holding in Slocum, supra. In Slocum, the

plaintiff, who had been denied parole, made the

conclusory allegation that the Board must have

relied upon erroneous information because

otherwise the Board would surely have granted

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him parole. Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941. The

plaintiff then sought to assert a due process right

to examine his prison file for the alleged errors.

Unlike the instant case, in Slocum the state did

not admit that it had relied upon false

information in denying parole nor did the

plaintiff present any evidence that his prison file

even contained any false information. We held in

Slocum that prisoners do not state a due process

claim by merely asserting that erroneous

information may have been used during their

parole consideration. Id. at 942. We also

determined that prisoners do not have a due

process right to examine their prison files as part

of a general fishing expedition in search of false

information that could possibly exist in their

files. Id. In the case at bar, we are confronted

with prison authorities who admit that

information contained in Monroe's files is false

and that they relied upon such information, at

least in part, to deny Monroe parole and to

classify him as a sex offender. As we stated, the

parole statute does not authorize state officialsto

rely on knowingly false information in their

determinations. Thomas [v. Sellers], 691 F.2d

[487] at 489 [(11 Cir. 1982)].

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Slocum controls the disposition of the instant case. The defendants

maintain that the information contained in the plaintiff’s records [and

provided to New York authorities] is accurate. There is no admission by

either defendant that any of the information about which the plaintiff

complains is false. The plaintiff’s contention that the information in his

records is false does nothing more than raise the possibility that the

information may be false and this mere possibility fails to provide a basis for

relief. Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1142; Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944 (11 Cir.

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2001) (“[P]risoners cannot make a conclusory allegation regarding the use

of such information as the basis of a due process claim.”). Since it is

undisputed that the defendants did not furnish admittedly false information

to New York authorities, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief as a matter of

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law and summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants

on this claim.

In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief as a matter

of law and summary judgment is therefore due to be granted in favor of the

defendants.

Moore v. Teague, et al., Case No. 2:02-CV-635-MEF (M.D. Ala. 2004) - Recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge -- Doc. No. 43, adopted as opinion of the court by Order of

September 13, 2004 (Doc. No. 46), at 2-3, 5-7 (citations to record omitted). This court

therefore determined that the information provided to authoritiesin New York byAlabama

officials failed to implicate the protections of the Constitution. This information is the

same information challenged by Moore as false in the instant cause of action.

The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and

issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as “res judicata.” Under

the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive

litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim

raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532

U.S. 742, 748, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Issue preclusion,

in contrast, bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually

litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior

judgment,” even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Id., at

748–749, 121 S.Ct. 1808. By “preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters

that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” these two doctrines

protect against “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,

conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action by

minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–154, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).

Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S.Ct. at 2171.

Based on the decision of this court in Moore v. Teague, supra, finding no

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dissemination of knowingly false information to New York authorities, the court likewise

concludes Moore’s that false information claim entitles him to no relief, as it is precluded

from review by the doctrine of res judicata.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendant.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before August 13, 2012, the parties may file objectionsto this

Recommendation. Any objectionsfiled must clearly identify the findingsin the Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

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District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11 Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en

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banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down

prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 30 day of July, 2012.

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/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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