Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02237/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02237-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

Ulllted States COIII't ol Ap~ Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EDDIE MAES, ) 

) 

Petitioner/Appellant, ) 

JAN 2 3 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

vs. ) Case No. 93-2237 

) 

JOHN THOMAS, Warden; and ATTORNEY ) 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,) 

) 

Respondents/Appellees. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 91-851-M/WWD) 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

appearing for Petitioner/Appellant. 

Margaret E. McLean, Ass•t. Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

(Tom Udall, Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, with her on the 

brief), appearing for Respondents/Appellees. 

Before MOORE and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, 

District Judge. 

ROGERS, Senior District Judge 

* . and ROGERS, SenJ.or 

Eddie Maes, a New Mexico state prisoner, appeals the district 

court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus brought pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Maes was convicted of two counts of second 

degree murder and one count of felon-in-possession of a firearm. 

He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court 

* Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 1 
erred when it failed to instruct the jury on a "concerted attack" 

theory of self-defense: 1 (2) whether the district court erred in 

holding that he had procedurally defaulted his claim that the trial 

court had erred in prohibiting evidence that one of the victims had 

been on probation for a violent crime; and (3) whether there was 

sufficient evidence of guilt. 

I. 

The instant convictions arose from an incident that occurred 

on March 8, 1989. On that day, Maes, a brother and a friend began 

drinking alcohol in the morning. Later in the day, they ended up 

at an old dump where they met three of their friends, Leo Leyba, 

Kenneth Garcia, and Clyde Leyba. All six were drinking alcohol and 

some were smoking marijuana. They spent some time arm wrestling 

and roughhousing. Fistfights and arguments were not uncommon when 

these young men got together and were drinking. Esmeralda 

Martinez, a 43-year-old man who lived in a house next to the dump, 

arrived in his pick-up truck and invited everyone over to his house 

in an effort to stop the arguing and fighting. Martinez had known 

these younger men all his life. At some point, Maes obtained a 

rifle from Martinez' truck and fired two shots. One of the shots 

struck and killed Leo Leyba, and the other struck and killed 

1 The "concerted attack" or "joint attack" theory of selfdefense is described in 40 C.J.S. Homicide §118 (1991) as follows: 

Where accused is attacked by one or more persons, or 

is attacked by one person and others are acting with the 

assailant or are present and aiding and encouraging him, 

he has the right to act in self-defense against all and, 

in a proper case, to kill one or all. 

2 

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Kenneth Garcia. The events immediately prior to the shooting and 

the circumstances of the shootings were disputed. Following the 

shootings, Maes gave the gun to Martinez, got in his vehicle with 

his brother and friend, and drove to the local sheriff's office 

where he turned himself in. 

On March 22, 1989, Maes was charged with two counts of first 

degree murder, one count of assault with a deadly weapon, and one 

count of felon-in-possession of a firearm. On July 20, 1989, 

following a five-day trial, the jury found Maes guilty of two 

counts of second degree murder and one count of felon-in-possession 

of a firearm. The jury acquitted Maes of the aggravated assault 

charge. 

Maes appealed his convictions to the New Mexico Court of 

Appeals (NMCOA) . The original docketing statement filed by his 

counsel listed six issues on appeal. For the purpose of this 

appeal, we need only consider two of the issues. Maes contended 

that the trial court erred in (1) excluding any mention of Leo 

Leyba's probation for a felony conviction, and (2) denying certain 

defense jury instructions. The docketing statement contained the 

following argument on the jury instructions issue: 

The court denied defendant's tendered instructions 

8, 9, 10 and 11. The defendant's instructions would have 

allowed for self defense when not only the victim but a 

second assailant approached the defendant. The Court 

allowed only the threatening conduct of the victim in 

question to be considered by the jury. 

Just as the concept of transferred intent applies to 

a defendant who shoots at one and kills another, so 

should the same concept apply to self defense. Such 

procedure violated defendant's Fifth, sixth, Fourteenth 

3 

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Amendments to the U.S. Canst. and Art II § 14 and 18 of 

the N.M. Canst. 

In response to the docketing statement, the NMCOA issued a 

calendar notice which assigned the case to the summary calendar and 

proposed summary affirmance. 2 As to the probation issue, the NMCOA 

found that Maes had not specified the "type of felony conviction 

Leyba was on probation for and what connection, if any, that fact 

had to defendant's fear and belief he had to defend himself." As 

to the jury instruction issue, the NMCOA determined that review of 

this issue was not necessary because the defendant had not cited 

any authority for its argument that the concept of transferred 

intent should apply to self-defense. 

Maes then filed a motion to amend the docketing statement and 

a memorandum in opposition to summary affirmance. Maes, through 

appellate counsel, sought to amend the docketing statement to 

indicate that "the victim was on probation for a violent crime, 

probably aggravated battery." He also sought to clarify the jury 

instructions argument as follows: 

The docketing statement describes the issue as one 

of transferred intent and self-defense. However, 

conversations with trial counsel made clear that the 

phrase "transferred intent" misdescribes the argument of 

the defense at trial. This memorandum accurately 

describes the argument. 

2 In New Mexico, the NMCOA assigns a criminal case to its 

general, legal or summary calendar based upon the docketing 

statement and the record. Cases are assigned to the summary 

calendar where the court determines that the application of legal 

principles to the facts is clear and no genuine issue of 

substantive evidence is involved. State v. Anaya, 98 N.M. 211, 647 

P.2d 413, 414 (1982). 

4 

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The memorandum went on to delineate the trial court's error as a 

failure to allow instructions on a "concerted attack" theory of 

self-defense. Maes argued that the court should have allowed the 

jury to consider whether the "concerted action" of Leyba and Garcia 

caused him to be placed in apparent danger of immediate death or 

great bodily harm. 

A second calendar notice denied the motion to amend and 

proposed summary affirmance of Maes' convictions. Maes filed a 

second memorandum in opposition to summary affirmance. A third 

calendar notice assigned the case to the general calendar. As a 

result of the third calendar notice, Maes filed his brief-in-chief. 

This brief raised only two issues: the jury instructions argument 

and a jury composition argument. In response to Maes' brief, the 

State recognized that the defendant was raising the issue of the 

trial court's failure to instruct on a concerted action theory of 

self-defense. The State made the following admission: 

The State acknowledges any issue concerning the 

self-defense jury instructions was preserved. The 

Defendant tendered jury instructions and argued the 

position to the trial court. 

The NMCOA did not address the merits of the probation claim 

because it found that the petitioner had waived the claim by not 

raising it in his brief-in-chief. The NMCOA further determined 

that it need not reach the jury instructions argument because it 

was "not raised or preserved below" and the issue did not raise a 

fundamental error. The NMCOA stated: "Both the language of the 

tendered instructions and the arguments made to the trial court 

support a conclusion that the court was requested to instruct the 

5 

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# 

jury to consider whether there was an appearance of danger based on 

the attack of one or the other of the victims rather than a joint 

attack by both victims." The NMCOA went on to conclude that the 

defendant also was not entitled to any relief based upon a plain 

error analysis. The NMCOA affirmed Maes' convictions. 

Maes filed a writ of certiorari with the New Mexico Supreme 

Court in which he again argued only the two issues raised in his 

brief-in-chief. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied Maes' writ on 

June 22, 1990. Maes then filed a state petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in which he raised the same issues as those raised in this 

case. The trial court summarily dismissed the habeas petition. 

Maes sought review by the New Mexico Supreme Court by filing a writ 

of certiorari. The petition for writ of certiorari was denied. 

Maes filed the instant writ of habeas corpus with the United 

States District Court for the District of New Mexico on June 20, 

1991. The writ was assigned to a magistrate for further 

proceedings. After examination of exhaustive briefs, the 

magistrate, in a thorough opinion, dismissed Maes' writ. As to the 

jury instructions issue, the magistrate found that the record 

supported the NMCOA' s conclusion that the "concerted attack" theory 

of self-defense had not been raised at trial. The magistrate, 

however, determined that this issue had not been procedurally 

defaulted because the NMCOA had considered the claim under a plain 

error analysis. In moving to the merits of the issue, the 

magistrate decided that Maes' due process rights had not been 

violated by the trial court's refusal to instruct on the "concerted 

6 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 6 
attack" theory of self-defense. 3 As to the probation argument, the 

magistrate concluded that Maes had procedurally defaulted on the 

issue because he had failed to raise the issue in his appellate 

brief before the NMCOA. Finally, as to the sufficiency of evidence 

issue, the magistrate determined that sufficient evidence existed 

in the record to establish that Maes did not act in self-defense 

when he killed Leyba and Garcia. Maes filed objections to the 

findings of the magistrate. The State failed to file any 

objections. 

The district court adopted the findings and recommended 

disposition of the magistrate's order. This appeal followed. 

II. 

The court shall turn initially to the jury instructions 

argument. The respondent raises two arguments in defending this 

claim. First, the respondent contends that Maes failed to tender 

this defense during the trial. Second, the respondent argues that 

the petitioner's due process rights were not violated by the 

refusal to give a concerted attack instruction. 

The court is troubled by the procedural background of this 

issue. At the conclusion of the trial, the petitioner's attorney 

tendered a self-defense instruction which provided in pertinent 

3 In reaching the merits, the magistrate assumed that New 

Mexico would recognize the "concerted attack" theory of selfdefense. The magistrate noted that both parties had admitted that 

the right of self-defense from joint attackers had not been 

addressed by New Mexico law. The magistrate believed that New 

Mexico would recognize the defense because the New Mexico uniform 

jury instructions on self-defense did not exclude the possibility 

of such a defense. 

7 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 7 
" 

part: "The killing is self-defense if: 1. There was an appearance 

of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm to the defendant 

as a result of Leo Leyba approaching with a knife or Kenneth Garcia 

approaching with a chain." In arguing the instructions at trial, 

petitioner's counsel stated: 

[T)he defendant knew of their conduct while intoxicated 

in previous occasions, which could justify an ordinary 

person, being fearful and terrorized, by more than one 

person coming at them. Also, the deadly weapons. Let's 

say they believe the chain was there but not the knife, 

he didn't shoot to defend himself, but he did shoot while 

he was in fear. He wasn't defending himself, perhaps, 

because Kenneth wasn't coming at him, maybe, but just the 

fact of the chain there, and all the fighting, and people 

are drunk, people are approaching him, more than one, and 

making statements, all of that combined in an ordinary 

person may make them fearful enough to have difficulty 

reasoning out each step. 

The state trial judge believed that the petitioner's attorney 

was asserting a "transferred intent" theory4 which he believed was 

improper. He said it would "be loathe to give an instruction which 

basically allows the appearance of danger or death from other party 

resulting in the death of the victim." On appeal, the NMCOA found 

that the "concerted attack" jury instruction was not tendered and 

therefore not preserved for appeal. 

The suggestion by the NMCOA that the issue of whether a 

concerted attack instruction should have been given was not 

4 The doctrine of transferred intent is defined as follows: 

Under the common-law doctrine of transferred intent, 

a defendant, who intends to kill one person but instead 

kills a bystander, is deemed the author for whatever kind 

of homicide would have been committed had he killed the 

intended victim. 

2 c. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 144 (14th ed. 1979). 

8 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 8 
preserved at the trial court is persuasive. Petitioner has 

suggested that the requested instructions were "awkwardly drafted." 

This is charitable interpretation since a reading of the tendered 

instructions appears to substantiate the NMCOA's conclusion that 

they did not raise the issue of joint attack. Nevertheless, as a 

result of events that have followed, the court finds it unnecessary 

to consider whether this issue was procedurally defaulted. The 

magistrate concluded that this issue had not been procedurally 

defaulted because the NMCOA had considered the claim under a plain 

error analysis. The respondent failed to object to the 

magistrate's findings and recommendations. This failure 

constitutes waiver of the procedural default argument. Moore v. 

United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (lOth Cir. 1991). But see Meadows 

v. Legursky, 904 F.2d 903, 907 (4th Cir.) (en bane) (procedural 

default defense not raised before magistrate and district court is 

not waived where state court's dismissal order was before 

magistrate), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986 (1990). Accordingly, the 

court shall turn to the merits of the jury instructions argument. 

In a habeas proceeding attacking a state court judgment based 

on an erroneous jury instruction, a petitioner has a great burden. 

Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F. 3d 1031, 1035 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 

114 s.ct. 1074 (1994). A state conviction may only be set aside in 

a habeas proceeding on the basis of erroneous jury instructions 

when the errors had the effect of rendering the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial. Shafer 

v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 508 {lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 u.s. 

9 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 9 
961 (1990). "The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous 

instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral 

attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment 

is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error 

on direct appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 u.s. 145, 154 (1977) 

(footnote omitted). The question in this proceeding is not whether 

the instruction is "undesirable, erroneous, or even '''universally 

condemned,'" but whether the instruction so infected the trial that 

the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. (quoting ~ 

v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). "An omission, or an 

incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a 

misstatement of the law." Id. at 155. The degree of prejudice 

from the instruction error must be evaluated in the context of the 

events at the trial. United States v. Frady, 456 u.s. 152, 169 

(1982). 

Having carefully reviewed the record, the court is not 

convinced that the failure of the trial court to instruct on the 

joint attack theory of self-defense constituted a violation of due 

process. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense as to 

each murder charge. The self-defense instructions did not preclude 

the petitioner from arguing his joint attack theory of selfdefense. While the instructions directed the jury to consider the 

appearance of danger of death or great bodily harm to the 

petitioner as the result of each victim approaching separately, the 

instructions also directed the jury to "consider all the evidence 

in the case." Given the context of the case, the petitioner had 

10 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 10 
every opportunity to argue the joint attack theory, and the jury 

had the opportunity to consider it. The failure to specifically 

instruct on this theory, in light of the circumstances of this 

case, does not rise to the level of an error that rendered the 

trial so fundamentally unfair as to cause a denial of a fair trial. 

See, ~' Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1138 (4th Cir. 1992) 

(failure to give self-defense instruction even where sufficient 

evidence to warrant it did not rise to due process violation), 

cert. denied, 113 s.ct. 1289 (1993); Frey v. Leapley, 931 F.2d 

1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1991) (failure to give appropriate theory-ofdefense instruction, without more, is not a due process violation). 

III. 

The second issue has two parts: (a) whether the district 

court erred in holding petitioner procedurally defaulted his 

"probation claim" and (b) whether the state trial court denied 

petitioner his right to due process when it prohibited him from 

presenting evidence that he knew Leo Leyba had been on probation 

for a violent crime. We need only reach the second part if we find 

no procedural default. 

The aforementioned discussion of the background of this case 

contains some of the information necessary to understand the 

procedural default aspect of this argument, but some additional 

background is required. At the time of the incident, petitioner 

was aware that Leyba had been convicted of a felony but did not 

know the nature of it. He had given Leyba rides to the probation 

office, and Leyba had told him he was on probation or parole. In 

11 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 11 
opening statement, one of petitioner's attorneys stated that 

petitioner "knew about Leyba being on probation." The prosecutor 

sought a bench conference and the court reminded counsel that the 

court had already granted the prosecution's motion to exclude 

evidence regarding Leyba's probation and petitioner's knowledge of 

it. This ruling apparently occurred during an unrecorded inchambers hearing attended by petitioner's other counsel. At the 

bench conference, counsel for petitioner acknowledged the court's 

ruling, and the defense adhered to the ruling throughout the trial. 

In 1984, Leyba had been indicted for two counts of felony 

aggravated battery against two women arising from a barroom 

incident. Leyba pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of misdemeanor 

battery and was placed on probation for six months. In 1987, Leyba 

was convicted of felony commercial burglary. His sentence was 

suspended and he was placed on probation for eighteen months. 

We must initially consider whether, as argued by the State, 

Maes' "probation argument" is barred by the procedural default 

doctrine. Maes argues that he did not default this claim because 

(1) the NMCOA effectively precluded him from raising it by denying 

his motion to amend the docketing statement; (2) under New Mexico 

Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant does not default an 

issue already adversely decided by the NMCOA in its summary 

calendar by failing to respond to the adverse ruling; and (3) none 

of the procedural bars purportedly applied by the New Mexico courts 

was "adequate" for procedural default purposes. 

12 

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In a habeas proceeding, we do not address issues that have 

been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state 

procedural ground, unless cause and prejudice or a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice is shown. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 750 (1991); Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521 (lOth Cir. 

1993) . 

Maes does not contest the independence of the state court's 

decision. A state court finding of procedural default is 

independent if it is separate and distinct from federal law. See 

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 u.s. 68, 75 (1985). The procedural bar 

applied to Maes • "probation argument" was obviously an 

"independent" state ground as it was the exclusive basis for the 

state court's holding. 

Maes does, however, argue that the state court's finding of 

procedural default is not an "adequate" state ground. In Andrews 

v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1188 n. 40 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. 

denied, 112 s.ct. 1213 (1992), this court explained this aspect of 

the procedural default doctrine as follows: 

A state court finding of procedural default is 

adequate if it is "strictly or regularly followed." 

Hathorn v. Lovern, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 

2426-27, 72 L.Ed. 2d 824 (1982). Thus, the procedural 

rules must be applied "evenhandedly to all similar 

claims." Id. see Ford v. Georgia, __ U.S. __ , 111 

S.Ct. 850, 857, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 

489 U.S. at 411 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217 n. 6; Gutierrez 

v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464, 1471 (lOth Cir. 1991); Osborn 

v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 616-21 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Maes contends that the NMCOA has failed to consistently apply 

the procedural bar rule it applied in his case. He asserts that 

the New Mexico appellate courts exercise unfettered discretion to 

13 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 13 
waive the procedural rule barring issues presented, briefed and 

then decided in the summary calendar procedure, but not again 

raised in an appellant's brief-in-chief. 5 In support of this 

position, he relies upon Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 801 P.2d 

1223 (1991) and State ex rel. N.M. State Police Dept. v. One 1984 

Pontiac 6000, 111 N.M. 85, 801 P.2d 667 (Ct.App. 1990). 

The petitioner made this same argument below and it was 

rejected by the magistrate. The magistrate found that the 

procedural bar applied in petitioner's case had been regularly 

followed in New Mexico. The magistrate distinguished the cases 

cited by the petitioner. 

The uneven application of state procedural default rules in 

general does not establish that the application of a procedural 

default rule in a particular case is not "adequate." Andrews, 943 

at 1190. The consideration of adequacy for the purpose of the 

procedural default doctrine requires application of the rule 

"evenhandedly to all similar claims." Adams v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 

401, 410-12 (1989); Hathorn v. Lovern, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982). 

"The test then is whether the [state] courts' actual application of 

5 As noted previously, petitioner has also argued that this 

issue should not have been found to be abandoned under New Mexico 

law. Petitioner contends that State v. Simpson, 111 N.M. 2123, 867 

P.2d 1150 (1993) supports this contention. We disagree. In 

Simpson, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an appellant did 

not waive or abandon an issue by not responding to an appellate 

summary calendar notice. Simpson does not address the situation 

involved in this case which is the failure of a party to raise an 

issue in its brief-in-chief. As the subsequent discussion 

suggests, New Mexico has consistently applied the abandonment rule 

to this occurrence. Petitioner's reliance upon simpson in this 

case is misplaced. 

14 

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the particular procedural default rule to all "similar" claims has 

been evenhanded 'in the vast majority' of cases." Andrews, 943 

F.2d at 1190. Gutierrez v. Moriarty, 922 F.2d 1464, 1469-71 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 112 s.ct. 140 (1991), a case which addressed 

the adequacy of New Mexico's procedural default rules and upon 

which petitioner relies heavily in this case, is not to the 

contrary. In Gutierrez, we considered the application of the New 

Mexico procedural default rules only to the same issues that were 

raised in that case. See Andrews, 943 F.2d at 1190. 

A review of New Mexico law reveals that the New Mexico courts 

have consistently applied the rule that deems all issues abandoned 

that are not raised in an appellant's brief-in-chief. See State v. 

Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 867 P.2d 1175 (Ct.App. 1994); State v. 

Pettigrew, 116 N.M. 135, 860 P.2d 777, 779-80 (Ct.App. 1993); State 

v. Manes, 112 N.M. 161, 812 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Ct.App. 1991), cert. 

denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575 (N.M.), cert. denied, 112 s.ct. 

381 (1991); State v. Gattis, 105 N.M. 194, 730 P.2d 497, 499 

(Ct.App. 1986); State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 701 P.2d 374, 376 

(Ct.App.), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 734, 700 P.2d 197 (1985); State 

v. Martinez, 100 N.M. 532, 673 P.2d 509, 511 (Ct.App. 1983); State 

v. Thoreen, 91 N.M. 624, 578 P.2d 325, 328 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. 

Vogenthaler, 89 N.M. 150, 548 P.2d 112, 114 (Ct.App. 1976). The 

two cases, relied upon by petitioner, do not suggest otherwise or 

indicate that the New Mexico courts have unfettered discretion to 

consider claims not raised in an appellant's brief-in-chief. In 

Swafford, the petitioner contended in a post-conviction proceeding 

15 

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that he had received an unconstitutional sentence. He had not 

raised the issue in his direct appeal. The New Mexico Supreme 

Court allowed him to raise the issue where both of the following 

factors were present: (1) important constitutional issues were 

involved; and (2) sentences that may be beyond legislative 

authority. 810 P.2d at 1226 n. 1. In allowing consideration of 

the issues raised by the petitioner, the Court specifically noted 

that it had always been reluctant to consider issues that could 

have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal, "even where the 

issues raise important constitutional rights." Id. (citing State 

v. Gillihan, 86 N.M. 439, 524 P.2d 1335 (1974)). In State Police, 

the NMCOA determined that a party was not precluded from arguing an 

issue in its brief-in-chief after the case is assigned to the 

nonsummary calendar where the party had not specifically responded 

to the issues in opposing summary disposition on the summary 

calendar. 801 P.2d at 671. 

This court agrees with the lower court that these cases do not 

support the contention of the petitioner. The specific 

circumstances of those cases differ substantially from those of 

this case. The holdings in those cases do not indicate that the 

New Mexico courts would apply a different result when faced with 

the facts of this case. 

Maes has also argued that he has demonstrated "cause" for his 

state default. He contends that the failure of the NMCOA to grant 

his motion to amend prevented him from effectively arguing the 

exclusion of the probation evidence. 

16 

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In McCleskey v. Zant, 499 u.s. 467, 493-94 (1991), the Supreme 

Court explained the "cause" requirement as follows: 

In procedural default cases, the cause standard 

requires the petitioner to show that "some objective 

factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" 

to raise the claim in state court. Murray v. carrier, 

477 u.s. [478], at 488 [(1986) ]. Objective factors that 

constitute cause include "'interference by officials'" 

that makes compliance with the State's procedural rule 

impracticable, and "a showing that the factual or legal 

basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 

counsel." Ibid. In addition, constitutionally 

"ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause." Ibid. 

Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, however, does not constitute cause and will not 

excuse a procedural default. Id., at 486-488. 

The cause noted by the petitioner is not an appropriate 

external factor. Petitioner has failed to show why his counsel 

could not have properly raised this issue in the first instance. 

The information was available to counsel and could have been 

presented. Petitioner has made no suggestion that his counsel's 

actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Accordingly, we find an inadequate showing of cause for the 

purposes of procedural default. With this finding, we need not 

consider the issue of prejudice. 

Even if we were to reach the merits of this argument, we would 

find that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. In a 

habeas proceeding claiming a denial of due process, "we will not 

question the evidentiary or procedural rulings of the state court 

unless [the petitioner] can show that, because of the court's 

actions, his trial, as a whole, was rendered fundamentally unfair." 

Tapia v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1557 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 

s.ct. 115 (1991). It is the materiality of the excluded evidence 

17 

Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 17 
to the presentation of the defense that determines whether a 

petitioner has been deprived of a fundamentally fair trial. 

Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1988). 

The court is somewhat handicapped in considering this issue 

because the trial court's ruling on the exclusion of this evidence 

occurred during an unrecorded in-chambers meeting. The record 

fails to contain the basis for the trial court's ruling. The 

evidence may have been excluded as cumulative or as evidence whose 

probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In any 

event, given the circumstances of this case, we do not find that 

the exclusion of evidence on Leyba's probation status rendered the 

trial so fundamentally unfair as to merit habeas relief. The 

petitioner was allowed, and did present, evidence of Leyba's 

violent past. The State made no effort to dispute this evidence. 

The State offered no evidence to rebut petitioner's testimony that 

Leyba was violent when drinking or petitioner's version of Leyba's 

past incidents of violence. The petitioner has argued that this 

evidence could have bolstered his credibility, but we find no 

fundamental unfairness occurred where his credibility on the issues 

of Leyba's past violent behavior was never challenged. See Lujan, 

2 F. 3d at 1034 (excluded evidence that would have more "clearly 

established" a fact does not rise to level of fundamental 

unfairness). 

IV. 

Finally, we consider the petitioner's argument that the 

evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a 

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Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 18 
reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. Petitioner 

argues that the record lacks evidence demonstrating that he did not 

act in self-defense. 

A sufficiency of the evidence claim presents a mixed question 

of fact and law. Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 1392 (lOth Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 494 u.s. 1035 (1990). A determination of a 

mixed question of fact and law carries no presumption of 

correctness and is to be reviewed de novo on federal habeas review. 

Id. at 1393. Habeas corpus relief is available if the court 

determines, after considering all the trial evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, that a rational trier-of-fact 

could not have found each separate element of the crime charged was 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979); Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321, 1332 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 498 u.s. 904 (1990). 

The relevant inquiry here is whether any rational trier of 

fact could have found the absence of self-defense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the evidence, we find 

that the jury could have rejected petitioner's self-defense claim 

and convicted him of two counts of second-degree murder. The only 

evidence of self-defense came from the testimony of the petitioner. 

He was the only witness to unequivocally place weapons in the hands 

of Leyba and Garcia. The testimony of the other witnesses 

suggested that Leyba and Garcia were not armed. The testimony of 

some witnesses also suggested that Leyba and Garcia were not 

dangerous. A rational jury, confronted with the evidence presented 

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Appellate Case: 93-2237 Document: 01019290360 Date Filed: 01/23/1995 Page: 19 
in this case, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

killings were not made in self-defense and thus constituted murder. 

In sum, the court finds that the petitioner is not entitled to 

relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254. The decision of the district court 

is hereby AFFIRMED. 

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