Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00838/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00838-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1 Petitioner named Dora B. Schriro as a respondent in this matter. Charles L. Ryan, the

current director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, is substituted for Dora B. Schriro

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luther Jernigan, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al. 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-08-838-PHX-MHM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (docket # 6) Respondents1

 have filed an Answer, docket # 13, to which Petitioner

has replied, docket # 17. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

On August 3, 2005, a Maricopa County grand jury indicted Petitioner on one count of

fraudulent schemes and artifices, one count of theft, one count of taking the identify of

another, and three counts of forgery. (Respondents’ Exh. A) The State also alleged that

Petitioner had a 1994 felony conviction for attempted theft, a class 4 felony. (Respondents’

Exh. B) The State subsequently amended the allegation of historical priors, asserting that

Petitioner had three additional prior convictions in federal district court for: (1) dealing in

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 1 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 The Honorable Richard Gama presided. 

- 2 -

counterfeit obligations; (2) conspiracy to possess cocaine; and (3) unlawful possession of a

firearm. (Respondents’ Exh. C) The State also alleged that Petitioner committed the

offenses charged in the indictment while on release from the federal convictions. 

(Respondents’ Exh. D) 

On December 7, 2005, Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to

which he pled guilty to: Amended Count 1, attempt to commit fraudulent schemes and

artifices, a class 3 felony, with one prior felony conviction; and Amended Count 2, theft, a

class 3 felony, non-dangerous and non-repetitive. (Respondents’ Exh. E) In the plea

agreement, Petitioner admitted his 1994 felony conviction for attempted theft. 

(Respondents’ Exh. E) In exchange for Petitioner’s plea, the remaining charges were

dismissed. (Id.)

At the December 7, 2005 change-of-plea hearing, the court2

 inquired whether

Petitioner had read the plea agreement, discussed it with counsel, and understood its terms. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F at 4-6) Petitioner responded affirmatively. (Id.) Petitioner stated that

he understood the plea agreement and that it contained everything to which he had agreed. 

(Id. at 6) Petitioner further stated that he entered the plea voluntarily, of his own free will,

and that he was not forced or threatened to plead guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 6) The

Court explained Petitioner’s sentencing exposure on both counts, including a possible

aggravated sentence of 16.5 years followed by community supervision. (Respondents’ Exh.

F at 6-7) Petitioner stated that he understood the sentencing range. (Id.) The court further

explained the rights Petitioner was waiving by pleading guilty, and Petitioner indicated that

he wished to forego those rights and enter a plea. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 9-10) 

Petitioner’s counsel, Susan Maga, presented the following facts in support of

Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 2) As to Amended Count 1, Petitioner

and co-defendant Tina Ricketts acted in concert to complete a mortgage with CSI Mortgage

and Prescott Title on the Scottsdale home of Lucinda Maxfield, without Maxfield’s

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 2 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

knowledge or permission. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 11) Petitioner had Ricketts pretend to

be Maxfield and provided her with the blonde wig she wore when completing the mortgage

paperwork. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 11) After Petitioner and Ricketts received the money

from the mortgage, Ricketts again pretended to be Maxfield when she obtained a wire

transfer for some of the proceeds ($125,000) from the mortgage to a Bank of America

account in the name of Richard Self (the “Self account”). (Id.) The Self account was

actually controlled by Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 11) Additionally, both Ricketts

and Petitioner were aware that David Robinson was paid money from the mortgage

proceeds, in exchange for his agreement to conceal the mortgage fraud from Maxfield. 

(Respondents’ Exh. F at 12) Petitioner admitted that the facts counsel provided in support

of Amended Count 1 were true. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 12) 

In support of Amended Count 2, counsel stated that Petitioner committed theft by

knowingly controlling, without lawful authority, CSI Mortgage’s cash, with the intent of

permanently depriving CSI of the money. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 13) Petitioner

controlled the money through the Richard Self bank account, to which Petitioner had access. 

(Id.) Petitioner also admitted that the theft involved sufficient monetary value to make the

crime a class 3 felony. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 13) Petitioner again attested to the truth of

the facts counsel provided in support of Amended Count 2. (Id.) 

The court found that Petitioner made the guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily and accepted his pleas. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 14) 

Petitioner subsequently moved to withdraw from the plea agreement on the ground

that the factual basis in support of Amended Count 1 was inaccurate. Due to differences that

arose between Petitioner and his counsel over this issue, the court allowed Susan Maga to

withdraw and replaced her with Terri Capozzi. (Respondents’ Exhs. G, H) 

At the beginning of the May 12, 2006 sentencing hearing, the court addressed the

motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 3) Petitioner’s counsel,

Capozzi, requested a continuance so she could secure the presence of four individuals whose

testimony Petitioner wanted to present in support of his motion to withdraw. (Respondents’

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 3 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Exh. I at 4) The court denied the motion to continue, noting that the matter had previously

been continued. (Id.) The court clarified that the motion to withdraw was before the court

for “oral argument” and declined counsel’s request that Petitioner testify. (Respondents’

Exh. I at 4) During oral argument, Petitioner’s then-counsel, Capozzi, argued that former

counsel, Maga, had permitted Petitioner to plead guilty based on “an incorrect and

inaccurate factual basis,” which that constituted the “manifest injustice that’s required to set

aside a guilty plea.” (Respondents’ Exh. I, Tr. 5/12/06 at 7) Counsel explained that

Petitioner’s “position is and has been . . .that he never provided a wig or disguise for Tina

Ricketts.” (Respondents’ Exh. I at 6) Counsel Capozzi further argued that Petitioner had

conveyed this information to his former counsel, Maga, but she ignored him. (Respondents’

Exh. I at 7) The State argued that, during the change-of-plea proceeding, Petitioner was

given several opportunities to express any disagreement with the asserted factual basis, but

said nothing. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 8-10) The court found that Petitioner did not satisfy

his burden of showing manifest injustice, and denied the motion to withdraw from the plea

agreement. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 12) 

The court then proceeded to sentencing. The court found that Petitioner had been

convicted in 1994 of the alleged prior felony. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 13) The State

requested an “extremely aggravated term” based on Petitioner’s background and the facts of

the case. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 15-17) Defense counsel argued that the court should

impose “no more than [the] presumptive” sentence. (Id. at 22) The court concluded that an

aggravated sentence was appropriate on Count 1, finding three aggravating factors: the prior

felony conviction admitted in the plea agreement, the presence of an accomplice, and the

offense was for pecuniary gain. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 22) Accordingly, the court

sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 16.25 years’ imprisonment on Count 1. (Id. at

23), see A.R.S. § 13-702.01(C)(1). 

On Count 2, the court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Petitioner on

supervised probation for 5 years to begin after Petitioner’s discharge from prison on Count

1. (Id. at 25) 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 4 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

B. First Post-Conviction Proceeding

On June 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief and requested

appointment of counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. J) The court appointed counsel who filed a

petition for post-conviction relief on December 20, 2006. (Respondents’ Exh. K) The trial

court denied relief on April 12, 2007. (Respondents’ Exh. L)

On May 31, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, 1 CA-CR 07-0472 PRPC. (Respondents’ Exh. M) On February 5, 2008, the Court

of Appeals denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. N) Petitioner did not seek review in the

Arizona Supreme Court. (docket # 6 at 6-9)

C. Second Post-Conviction Proceeding

On August 27, 2007, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. O) On September 21, 2007, the trial court found Petitioner’s claims

precluded, pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). (Respondents’ Exh. P) The court also

rejected Petitioner’s argument that “newly-discovered” facts entitled him to relief. The

court noted that Petitioner could have discovered the information before pleading guilty, and

that by pleading guilty, he waived his right to contest the evidence against him. (Id.) 

On or about October 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals, 1 CA-CR 07-0872 PRPC. (Respondents’ Exh. Q) On March 12,

2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. R) Petitioner did

not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (docket # 6 at 6-9)

D. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On August 15, 2008, Petitioner filed a timely amended petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this Court. (docket # 6; docket # 13 at 6) Petitioner raises the following claims:

(1) “Violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Petitioner can show manifest injustice has occurred and trial court refused to

hold an evidentiary hearing to allow Petitioner to withdraw from the plea;” (2) Petitioner

received ineffective assistance of counsel and suffered a “manifest injustice” because

counsel provided an incorrect factual basis for his guilty plea; and (3) Petitioner received

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 5 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (a) failed to subpoena witnesses to testify

in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and (b) failed to object to the

aggravated sentence. (docket # 6) 

II. Exhaustion

Respondents assert that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted Ground Two and a

portion of Ground Three, and that those claims are barred from federal habeas corpus

review. As discussed below, the Court agrees. 

A. Relevant Law

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner

has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When seeking

habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly exhausted each

claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam). The exhaustion

inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for writ of habeas

corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). The prisoner

“shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to

raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). In other

words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete round”

includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary

appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. State prisoners may skip a procedure

occasionally employed by a state’s courts to provide relief only if a state law or rule

precludes use of the procedure, or the “State has identified the procedure as outside the

standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for purposes of

exhaustion. Id. at 848, 850. 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest”

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 6 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each appropriate

state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). In Arizona,

unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if

the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d

925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, Petitioner was not required to present his claims to the

Arizona Supreme Court. 

In addition to presenting his claims to the proper court, a state prisoner must fairly

present his claims to that court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A claim is “fairly

presented” in state court only if a petitioner has described both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28. It is not enough that

all of the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state court or that a

“somewhat similar” state law claim was raised. Reese, 541 U.S. at 28 (stating that a

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel does not alert the court to federal nature of the

claim). Rather, the habeas petitioner must cite in state court to the specific constitutional

guarantee upon which he bases his claim in federal court. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d

895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such

as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish fair

presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th

Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne,

223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for prisoner to have made “a general appeal

to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked reference to “due process,” or to a

“constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a mere reference to the “Constitution of

the United States” does not preserve a federal claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,

162-63 (1996). Even if the basis of a federal claim is “self-evident” or if the claim would be

decided “on the same considerations” under state or federal law, the petitioner must make

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 7 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

the federal nature of the claim “explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the

federal courts . . . .” Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim

to the state court if the court must read beyond the pleadings filed in that court to discover

the federal claim. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27. 

In sum, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2)

through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)(citations omitted). 

A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds such as

waiver or preclusion. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. Thus, a state prisoner may be barred from raising federal claims that he did not

preserve in state court by making a contemporaneous objection at trial, on direct appeal, or

when seeking post-conviction relief. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842 (9th Cir. 1995)

(stating that failure to raise contemporaneous objection to alleged violation of federal rights

during state trial constitutes a procedural default of that issue); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding claim procedurally defaulted where the Arizona Court of

Appeals held that habeas petitioner had waived claims by failing to raise them on direct

appeal or in first petition for post-conviction relief.) If the state court also addressed the

merits of the underlying federal claim, the “alternative” ruling does not vitiate the

independent state procedural bar. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989); Carringer

v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court found ineffective assistance

of counsel claims “barred under state law,” but also discussed and rejected the claims on the

merits, en banc court held that the “on-the-merits” discussion was an “alternative ruling”

and the claims were procedurally defaulted and barred from federal review). A higher

court’s subsequent summary denial of review affirms the lower court’s application of a

procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 803. 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 8 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

The second procedural default scenario arises when a state prisoner failed to present

his federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the

state courts’ procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the

previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart,

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035,

1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (postconviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must

be filed within thirty days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction action is futile

where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th

Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal

of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule

32.2(a)). This type of procedural default is known as “technical” exhaustion because

although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the petitioner no longer has an

available state remedy. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted

his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no

remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a

showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v.

Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94, (2004); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To

establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Id. The following

objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by state officials, (2) a showing that

the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available, or (3) constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, the ineffective assistance of counsel in

collateral proceedings does not constitute cause because “the right to counsel does not

extend to state collateral proceedings or federal habeas proceedings.” Martinez-Villareal v.

Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 9 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Prejudice is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v.

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a habeas petitioner

bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional

dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where petitioner fails to establish cause, the court need not

reach the prejudice prong. 

A federal court may also review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when a constitutional violation has probably

resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. To satisfy the “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” standard, petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that

no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new

evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B). Even if petitioner asserts a

claim of actual innocence to excuse his procedural default of a federal claim, federal habeas

relief may not be granted absent a finding of an independent constitutional violation

occurring in the state criminal proceedings. Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393-94. 

B. Application of Law to Petitioner’s Claims

1. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts a due process violation under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Petitioner argues that the factual basis provided by his counsel at the changeof-plea hearing was incorrect and that the trial court refused to conduct an evidentiary

hearing on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on that basis. (docket # 6 at 6) 

In his first petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleged a federal due process

violation based on counsel’s failure to provide an accurate factual basis and the trial court’s

failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

(Respondents’ Exh. K at 6) The trial court rejected these claims. Petitioner raised the same

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 10 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 3, 6) Thus, Petitioner

properly exhausted Ground One. 

2. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for providing an

incorrect factual basis for his guilty pleas. (docket # 6 at 7, 12) Petitioner’s first petition

for post-conviction relief also asserted a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

“providing an incorrect factual basis.” (Respondents’ Exh. K at 6, 7) However, Petitioner

did not assert this claim in his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

(Respondents’ Exh. M at 3, 6-7) Accordingly, Petitioner did not properly present Ground

Two to the state courts and that claim is procedurally defaulted. 

3. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based

on: (a) counsel’s failure to subpoena witnesses for the motion-to-withdraw/sentencing

hearing; and (b) not objecting to the trial court’s failure give advance notice that it intended

to impose an exceptionally-aggravated sentence. (docket # 6 at 8) Petitioner raised both of

these claims in his first petition for post-conviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 8) In

his petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner challenged counsel’s

failure to subpoena witnesses but did not challenge counsel’s failure to object to Petitioner’s

aggravated sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. M at 3, 7) Accordingly, Petitioner did not

properly present to the state courts his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the aggravated sentence. Thus, he has procedurally defaulted Ground 3(b). 

C. Procedural Bar 

 Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 2 and Ground 3(b) are technically exhausted and

procedurally barred, because a return to state court to present those claims would be futile

because they would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. First, Petitioner is

time-barred under Arizona law from raising these claims in a successive petition for postconviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long

expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 11 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.”) Although Rule

32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in

Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions

apply to him. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410

(9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for

dismissal of an Arizona petition for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under

Rule 32.2(a)). 

Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant is precluded from raising claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in

any previous collateral proceeding. See Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d

1149, 1151 (1995) (capital defendant’s early petition for post-conviction relief raised limited

number of issues and waived other issues that he could have then raised, but did not); State

v. Curtis, 185 Ariz. 112,113, 912 P.2d 1341, 1342 (App. 1995) (“Defendants are precluded

from seeking post-conviction relief on grounds that were adjudicated, or could have been

raised and adjudicated, in a prior appeal or prior petition for post-conviction relief.”); State

v. Berryman, 178 Ariz. 617, 624, 875 P.2d 850, 857 (App. 1994) (defendant’s claim that his

sentence had been improperly enhanced by prior conviction was precluded by defendant’s

failure to raise issue on appeal). The claims asserted in Grounds 2 and 3(b) could have, and

should have, been properly raised on post-conviction review. Accordingly, the State court

would find those claims procedurally barred. 

1. Cause and Prejudice

As set forth above, Petitioner’s claims in Grounds 2 and 3(b) are procedurally

defaulted and barred from federal habeas review absent a showing of “cause and prejudice”

or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to

the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Murray, 477

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 12 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

U.S. at 488-492. The following objective factors may constitute cause: (1) interference by

state officials, (2) a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available, or (3) constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Prejudice is actual

harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d

240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). Where petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default,

the court need not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the

alleged constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

Petitioner does not assert any specific basis to overcome the procedural bar. (docket

# 17) Rather, he generally argues that he is pro se and lacks legal assistance. Petitioner’s

pro se status and ignorance of the law do not satisfy the cause standard. Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d

1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). Because Petitioner offers no legitimate “cause” which

precluded him from properly exhausting his state remedies, the Court declines to reach the

issue of prejudice. Engle, 456 U.S. at 134 n. 43. 

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

Additionally, Petitioner has not shown that failure to consider his claims raised in

Grounds 2 and 3(b) will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. A federal court may

review the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim if the petitioner demonstrates that

failure to consider the merits of his claim will result in a “fundamental miscarriage of

justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

occurs when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent. Id. 

This gateway “actual innocence” claim differs from a substantive actual innocence

claim. Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

described the gateway showing in Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, as a less stringent standard

than a substantive claim of actual innocence. See also Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,

476 (9th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that a “habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence

claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt and must affirmatively prove that

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 13 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

he is innocent.”). If Petitioner passes through the Schlup gateway, the court is only

permitted to review his underlying constitutional claims. Smith, 466 F.3d at 807. The

fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies only to a “narrow class of cases” in

which a petitioner makes the extraordinary showing that an innocent person was probably

convicted due to a constitutional violation. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 231 (1995). To

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, Petitioner must show that “a constitutional

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at

327. To establish the requisite probability, Petitioner must prove with new reliable evidence

that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327. New evidence presented in

support of a fundamental miscarriage of justice may include “exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence that was not

presented at trial.” Id. at 324, see also, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (stating that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice contention must involve evidence that the trial jury did

not have before it). 

Petitioner has not established that, in light of newly discovered evidence, “it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 327.

III. Analysis 

 The Court will consider the merits of Petitioner’s claims after setting forth the

standard of review. As discussed below, whether or not procedurally defaulted, all of

Petitioner’s claims lack merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (stating that the court may deny a

petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits “notwithstanding the failure of the applicant

to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”) Id.

A. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 14 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court” unless the state court’s decision

was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006); Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an “unreasonable

application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the Supreme Court

which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-

15 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has

acknowledged that it cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision

conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cited United States Supreme

Court authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme Court

precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that

citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not

even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 15 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

(2000).

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas court,

in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that the

state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner must

establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v. McNeil,

541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

In conducting an analysis under the AEDPA, the habeas court considers the last

reasoned state court decision addressing the claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803

(1991). Additionally, the habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations

are correct and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues

made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v.

Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where a state court decision is deemed “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application

of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine whether it

resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). 

On habeas review, the court assesses the prejudicial impact of most constitutional errors by

determining whether they “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for

harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies to habeas review of a

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 16 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on

the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas

relief to be granted based on constitutional error in capital penalty phase, error must have

had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v.

LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence

of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by

the court’s consideration of those convictions because the trial court found four other prior

convictions which would have supported petitioner’s sentence.) The Court will review

Petitioner’s claims under the applicable standard of review. 

B. Ground One - Due Process Violation

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to due process

by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw from the plea agreement 

(docket # 6 at 6) In his motion to withdraw, Petitioner asserted that the factual bases for his

pleas were incorrect. (Respondents’ Exh. V) Specifically, Petitioner explained that the

factual bases were incorrect because, contrary to the facts recited by defense counsel during

the change-of-plea hearing, Petitioner denied providing Tina Ricketts with a wig or disguise

to impersonate Lucinda Maxfield. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 5-8; Exh. V) The trial court

denied the motion following oral argument, but not an evidentiary hearing, on the motion.

On post-conviction review, Petitioner challenged the trial court’s failure to conduct

an evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw. (Respondents’ Exh. K) The postconviction court rejected Petitioner’s claim. (Respondents’ Exh. L) The court noted that

Petitioner’s motion to withdraw was supported by “the general facts to which he expected

the witnesses to testify.” The court also noted that the motion included “a deposition

transcript, and documentation from a forensic laboratory.” (Respondents’ Exh. L at 2) In

rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the court found that: “Defense counsel read the factual

foundation for both counts into the record, and defendant agreed to the accuracy thereof.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. L at 2) The court further noted that the “detective who led the

investigation . . . did not believe that the victim was involved or that the victim benefitted

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 17 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

from the scheme.” (Id.) The post-conviction court concluded that Petitioner had “not shown

error based on the Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw from the plea agreement . . . .” 

(Id.) It further concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

Petitioner’s pleas were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (Id. at 2-3) 

Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner pleaded

guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement which the trial court accepted. Where a

defendant pleads guilty, review is limited to whether the underlying plea was counseled and

voluntary. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.

238, 242-43 (1969) (stating that to comport with due process, a guilty plea must be knowing

and voluntary); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant

has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense of which he is

charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack

the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he

received from counsel was [deficient.]”).

The record demonstrates that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty

without force, threats, or promises. (Respondents’ Exh. F) At the change-of-plea hearing,

Petitioner advised the court that he had reviewed the charges and the plea agreement with

counsel. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 6) Significantly, Petitioner attested to the accuracy of the

factual bases for his guilty pleas. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 12-13) Petitioner’s “solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” United States v. Rubalcaba,

811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim of involuntariness of guilty plea). In

accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea, the court noted that Petitioner had acknowledged that he

was guilty as charged, there was a factual basis for Petitioner’s pleas, and that he was aware

of his rights and waived those rights knowingly and voluntarily. (Respondents’ Exh. F at

14) 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 18 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

During the sentencing hearing, Scottsdale police detective, Paul Arnold, testified that

he did not believe Lucinda Maxfield, the victim, was involved in the mortgage scheme. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I at 15-17) Arnold testified that Petitioner provided crack cocaine to

Maxfield to keep her in a drug-induced state so she would not be aware that Petitioner and

Ricketts were obtaining a mortgage on Maxfield’s property. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 16) 

This testimony was consistent with the factual bases for Petitioner’s guilty pleas provided at

the change-of-plea hearing. 

Petitioner has not established that the post-conviction court’s rejection of his claim

that he was entitled to withdraw from his guilty pleas due to the inaccurate factual bases is

contrary to, or rests on an unreasonable application of, federal law. Although the state court

neither explained its ruling nor cited United States Supreme Court precedent, this Court

must look to Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the decision was a reasonable

application of federal law. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The Supreme Court has

held that citation to federal law is not required and that “a state court need not even be aware

of [Supreme Court] precedent, ‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts them.’” Mitchell v. Esparaza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (citing

Early, 537 U.S. at 8). 

First, any deficiency in the factual bases for Petitioner’s guilty pleas does not give

rise to a constitutional violation. In federal court, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11

requires that there be a factual basis for a guilty plea. Similarly, Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure Rule 17.3 requires that, before the trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must

satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea. State v. Herndon, 109 Ariz. 147, 148,

506 P.2d 1041, 1042 (1973). However, neither the Rule 11 nor the Ariz.R.Crim. P. 17.3

procedure are “constitutionally mandated.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465

(1969). In other words, state courts are not constitutionally required to establish a factual

basis for an otherwise voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. See North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 777 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1985)

(concluding that “the due process clause does not impose on a state court the duty to

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 19 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

establish a factual basis for a guilty plea absent special circumstances.”) Accordingly, to the

extent that Petitioner challenges the state court’s failure to comply with Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.3,

that claim is based solely on state law and is not cognizable on habeas corpus review. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (explaining that “it is not the province of a

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”).

Moreover, the trial court’s rejection of Petitioner’s motion to withdraw from the

guilty plea was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, or based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. During the change-of-plea hearing, Petitioner

himself advised the court that the factual bases for his pleas were accurate. Specifically,

after counsel articulated the factual bases for the pleas, the court asked Petitioner if those

facts were true. Petitioner responded affirmatively as to the factual basis for his guilty plea

on each count. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 12, 13) In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-

74 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that although the defendant’s representations at the time

of the plea are not “invariably insurmountable,” when a defendant later challenges the

voluntariness of his plea, the defendant’s representations, and any findings made by the trial

court accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier . . . . Solemn declarations in open

court carry a strong presumption of verity.” See also Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986). 

As previously stated, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct

an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement based on

his assertion that the factual bases for those pleas were inaccurate. Had that trial court held

an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner essentially would have had testified that he had lied to the

trial court during the change-of-plea hearing when he told the court that the factual bases for

his guilty pleas were accurate. The court would have likely found this testimony unreliable. 

See Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1540 (8th Cir. 1984). Moreover, Petitioner’s

credibility would have been impeached by the fact that during the change-of-plea hearing, he

had the opportunity to explain any inaccuracies in the factual bases for his pleas, but rather

stated that:

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 20 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

I really don’t have anything to say. It’s a shame people [are] not interested

in the truth, you know. We make up all these little stories but nobody knows

the truth. It’s really sad. But I see no other thing. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I at 19) 

Finally, the record before the state court supported Petitioner’s guilty pleas. Under

Arizona law, the factual basis for a guilty plea may be determined from the extended record,

including the pre-sentence report, preliminary hearing transcripts, the defendants’

statements, proceedings before the grand jury, and other sources. State v. Varela, 120 Ariz.

596, 598, 587 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Ariz. 1978). During the change-of-plea hearing, Petitioner

advised the court that the factual bases for his guilty pleas were accurate. Petitioner’s

subsequent statement that Maxfield was involved in the scam and that he did not provide

Ricketts with a disguise to impersonate Maxfield, were contrary to the record. At the

sentencing hearing, Scottsdale police detective Arnold advised the court that, in view of the

evidence he had reviewed, Maxfield was not involved in the mortgage fraud and Petitioner

was the “mastermind” of the scheme. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 15-17) Petitioner’s

involvement with co-defendant Ricketts in committing the crimes against Maxfield was

detailed in the police reports, which were cited in the pre-sentence report. (Respondents’

Exh. S at 1) 

Petitioner has not established that, if the court had held an evidentiary hearing on his

motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, evidence would have been presented that

would have called into question the accuracy of the factual bases articulated by defense

counsel during the change-of-plea hearing. The pre-sentence report indicates that Ricketts

pled guilty to Count One and to Count Five, taking the identity of another. (Respondents’

Exh. S at 2) The addendum to Ricketts’ plea agreement, which set forth the factual bases for

her guilty pleas, was attached to the State’s response to the Motion to Withdraw. 

(Respondents’ Exh. T) That written factual basis establishes that: (1) the mortgage was

obtained without Maxfield’s knowledge or permission; (2) Ricketts pretended to be

Maxfield; and (3) Ricketts wore a blonde wig provided by Petitioner as part of her disguise. 

(Respondents’ Exh. T) 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 21 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

Furthermore, even if evidence was presented indicating that Maxfield was somehow

involved in the mortgage scheme or that Ricketts created her disguise by herself, there

would still be a sufficient factual basis for Petitioner’s guilty plea. Petitioner knew about the

scheme and benefitted when proceeds from the mortgage were wired to his “Richard Self”

account. At sentencing, Petitioner’s counsel conceded that any participation by Maxfield in

the scheme, “does not exclude or excuse Mr. Jernigan’s participation in this . . . .” 

(Respondents’ Exh. I at 19-20) Additionally, the pre-sentence report noted that Petitioner

admitted participating in the fraud, but attempted to minimize his culpability by claiming

that he “did not initiate or organize this fraud.” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 3) 

In view of foregoing, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s rejection of his

challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. 

B. Ground Two

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel, Susan Maga, was ineffective at

the change-of-plea hearing because she “provided an incorrect factual basis for the guilty

plea.” (docket # 6 at 7) Petitioner argues that the incorrect factual basis led the “court to

conclude that petitioner was the mastermind behind the crime and his sentence was

aggravated accordingly to a superaggravated sentence of 16.25 years.” (docket # 6 at 7) 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 22 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective

assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the

result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Acts or omissions

that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the

defendant is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). To prove prejudice in the context of a guilty

plea, petitioner must establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient

performance, he would not have accepted the offer but would have proceeded to trial. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. The court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong. Jackson

v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly deficient

performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155. 

Petitioner fails to establish that counsel was ineffective. First, he has not shown that

counsel’s performance was deficient. The factual bases which attorney Maga set forth

during the change-of-plea hearing were consistent with the record. The factual bases were

consistent with the police reports and with the factual bases for the guilty pleas entered by

co-defendant Ricketts. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 1-2, Exh. T) During a settlement

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 23 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

conference, the prosecutor described the facts the State would prove at Petitioner’s trial. 

(Respondents’ Exh. U at 4-6) Petitioner did not contest the State’s case, but rather entered a

plea agreement. Additionally, at the change-of–plea hearing Petitioner advised the court

that the factual bases articulated by counsel were accurate. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 12, 13) 

Petitioner has not presented any evidence supporting his allegation the factual bases

for his guilty pleas were false, that Maxfield was involved in the scheme, or that he did not

provide Ricketts with a blonde wig or otherwise assisted her impersonate Maxfield. Thus,

Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient with respect to the factual

bases for Petitioner’s guilty pleas. 

Additionally, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner has not

shown that he was prejudiced thereby. In other words, he has not established that but for

counsel’s deficient performance, he would have rejected the plea and proceeded to trial. See

Wanatee v. Ault, 101 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (to show prejudice resulting

from counsel’s deficient advice, petitioner must offer more than self-serving statements;

rather he must present credible, nonconclusory evidence that he would not have pleaded

guilty had he been properly advised). Furthermore, even if counsel articulated inaccurate

factual bases, those inaccuracies did not affect Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty. Rather,

Petitioner pled guilty despite his alleged knowledge that the factual bases were not true. See

Lipscomb v. Secretary, 2008 WL 434881, * 10 (M.D.Fla., Feb. 14, 2008) (stating that

“Lipscomb’s acceptance of the favorable plea bargain was an informed election to forego

further pursuit of his known claim that the victim’s accusations were not true.”) Also,

Petitioner did not deny involvement in the scheme. Rather, he admitted participating in the

scheme, but claimed that he “did not initiate or organize [it].” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 3) 

He also conceded that any participation in the scheme by Maxfield, did not “exclude or

excuse” his participation. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 19-20) 

Petitioner also argues that the alleged inaccuracies in the factual bases articulated by

counsel led the court to believe Petitioner was the “mastermind,” and to impose a superaggravated sentence. (docket # 6 at 7) Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the aggravated

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 24 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

sentence was not based on the court’s conclusion that Petitioner was the mastermind behind

the crime. Rather, the court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Petitioner’s

1994 conviction, which Petitioner admitted; (2) the presence of an accomplice; and (3) the 

offense was committed for pecuniary gain. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 22) Thus, even if

defense counsel’s factual bases wrongly led the court to consider Petitioner the mastermind,

Petitioner was not prejudiced because this conclusion was unrelated to the aggravating

circumstances supporting Petitioner’s sentence. Moreover, even if the court concluded that

Petitioner was the mastermind, there was sufficient evidence, aside from the factual bases set

forth by defense counsel, from which the court could have reached that conclusion. The

presentence report indicated that Petitioner orchestrated the scheme and that the State had

made a more favorable plea offer to co-defendant Ricketts. (Respondents’ Exh. S at 1-3) 

Additionally, Scottsdale police detective Arnold testified at sentencing that “the fact that

[Petitioner] opened up a bank account using fictitious information, had a considerable

amount of money wire transferred after directing Miss Ricketts to initiate that wire transfer

to his account at Bank of America, then withdrew funds from the account, clearly led me to

believe that he was the mastermind, that he did orchestrate and benefit from this.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. I at 16-17)

Additionally, Petitioner’s subsequent counsel, Ms. Capozzi, made the court aware of

Petitioner’s position regarding his role in the scam. At sentencing, she told the court, “it’s

my client’s strong position that Lucinda Maxfield was very much involved in this . . . .That,

I understand, does not exclude or excuse Mr. Jernigan’s participation in this, but I do believe

those are some of the facts he’s alluding to in this case.” (Respondents’ Exh. I at 19-20) The

presentence report notes that, although Petitioner admitted participating in the fraud, he

claimed that he “did not initiate or organize [it].” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 3) Thus, even if

counsel’s factual bases inaccurately described Petitioner’s role in the scheme, any

inaccuracy was minimized by Petitioner’s statements in the presentence report and attorney

Capozzi’s rebuttal at sentencing to the State’s “mastermind” theory. See Farrow v. United

States, 580 F.3d 1339, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 25 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 -

In conclusion, Petitioner fails to establish that counsel was ineffective with respect to

the factual bases for his guilty pleas or for leading the court to believe that Petitioner was the

mastermind behind the mortgage scheme. 

C. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for (a) not

subpoenaing witness to support Petitioner’s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement;

and (b) not objecting to the trial court’s failure to give advance notice that it intended to

impose an exceptionally aggravated sentence on Count 1. (docket # 6 at 8) 

The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner

must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d

1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When

reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that counsel

rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be

made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial

strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the

defendant is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 26 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The court may proceed directly to the prejudice

prong. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697). The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155. 

Petitioner challenges attorney Capozzi’s failure to subpoena the following four

people as witnesses to testify in support of his motion to withdraw from the plea agreement:

Lucinda Maxfield, David Robinson, William Flynn, and Stacey Scaife. (docket # 6 at 9)

Whether to subpoena a witness is a strategic decision based on counsel’s professional

judgment. Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Counsel in this case

attempted to subpoena the foregoing persons, but advised the court that she was “unable to

get return of service on those individuals.” (Respondents’ Exh. I at 4) Counsel asked for a

continuance, but the court denied the motion because the matter had previously been

continued. (Respondents’ Exh. I at 4) Although counsel was unable to secure the

attendance of the foregoing individuals in person, she supported the motion to withdraw

Petitioner’s guilty pleas with excerpts from Scaife’s deposition in a civil case and forensic

documentation. (Respondents’ Exh. V, attachments) In view of the foregoing, counsel’s

performance was not deficient. 

Additionally, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient

performance. The state court found that it did not need the testimony of Maxfield,

Robinson, Flynn, or Scaife to decide the motion to withdraw. (Respondents’ Exh. L) The

court noted the motion to withdraw from the guilty plea “stated the general facts to which

[Petitioner] expected the witnesses to testify and his position.” (Respondents’ Exh. l at 3) 

The motion also included Scaife’s deposition transcript and documentation from a forensic

laboratory regarding signatures by Lucinda Maxfield. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 3; Exh. V,

attachment) The court concluded that “Defendant has failed to show a reasonable

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 27 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had counsel secured

the attendance of the witnesses at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea

agreement.” (Respondents’ Exh. L at 3) Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application, of federal law. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

Petitioner has not presented any evidence regarding the testimony the four witnesses

would have given that would have shown that the factual bases for Petitioner’s guilty pleas

were inaccurate. Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49, 53 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that the court

was not convinced that testimony of uncalled witnesses would have been helpful.) 

Petitioner has not presented any evidence indicating that there is a reasonable likelihood that

Maxfield would have testified that she was involved in the scheme. Nor is there any

indication that co-defendant Robinson would have contradicted the factual bases agreed to

by both Ricketts and Petitioner. Indeed, Robinson previously admitted to the police that he

received checks from Petitioner in exchange for “keeping the scheme hidden from

Maxfield.” (Respondents’ Exh. S at 1) In support of the motion to withdraw, attorney

Capozzi submitted excerpts from Scaife’s deposition from a civil case. (Respondents’ Exh.

V, attachment) Petitioner has not explained William Flynn’s relationship to this case, or

described how his testimony would have persuaded the trial court that the factual bases were

inaccurate and that Petitioner should be permitted to withdraw from his guilty pleas. In

view of the foregoing, Petitioner fails to show that counsel was ineffective for failing to

subpoena witnesses. 

Petitioner further argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial

court’s failure to give advance notice that it intended to impose super-aggravated sentence. 

Even assuming counsel was deficient for failing to raise this issue, Petitioner has not shown

prejudice. There is nothing to suggest that, had counsel objected and the court continued

sentencing, the court would not have found the three aggravating circumstances or would

not have imposed the aggravated sentence. 

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 28 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 -

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied

and dismissed. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (docket # 6) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2009.

Case 2:08-cv-00838-MHM Document 18 Filed 04/23/09 Page 29 of 29