Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00358/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00358-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAREN JEAN MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES MORA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-CV-00358-AWI-SMS-P

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND

DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 10)

I. Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Daren Jean Miller (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner who was proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

March 30, 2006. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that his parole was wrongfully revoked,

in violation of the Due Process Clause, and that neither his preliminary hearing nor his final

revocation hearing comported with due process. (Id.) Plaintiff sought money damages and

injunctive relief, including an order requiring defendants to dismiss the charge and recalculate his

time assessment. (Id.) On May 30, 2006, the Court dismissed this action, without prejudice, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. (Doc. 9.) On June 15,

2006, plaintiff filed a motion for the appointment of counsel and to set aside judgment. (Doc. 10.)

B. Motion Seeking Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the Court cannot require an attorney to represent

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plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern

District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional

circumstances the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section

1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. 

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether

“exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even if

it is assumed that plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations

which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This court is faced with

similar cases almost daily. Further, in light of the fact that this action has been dismissed for failure

to state a claim and plaintiff’s motion for set aside judgment is not meritorious, as discussed in the

subsection that follows, plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits at this time. Finally, based on a

review of the record in this case, the Court does not find that plaintiff cannot adequately articulate

his claims. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel shall be denied.

C. Motion to Set Aside Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse

party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.

Motions to reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983)

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

the court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

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F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). The Ninth Circuit

has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding

clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, “the clause is

reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local

Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion.”

In its order dismissing this action, the Court stated, 

[w]hen a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, or raises a

constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct.

1242, 1245-48 (2005); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Young v. Kenny,

907 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 11 S.Ct. 1090 (1991). Moreover, when

seeking relief for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, “a §

1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of

a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487-

88 (1994). “A claim . . . bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has

not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 488.

Plaintiff may not at this time bring a civil rights action arising out of his allegedly

wrongful parole revocation. Plaintiff’s sole remedy is to file a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Accordingly, this action is HEREBY DISMISSED, without

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section

1983.

(Doc. 8, 2:3-17.)

Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in dismissing this action and that he is entitled to proceed

with his complaint. Plaintiff is seeking, in part, damages stemming from his allegedly

unconstitutional parole revocation and an order dismissing the charge of threatening/harassing

another against plaintiff, recalculating the time assessment, and expunging the charge of

threatening/harassing another. (Doc. 1, Comp., pp. 17-18.) Plaintiff’s section 1983 action is clearly

barred at this juncture. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82 (“[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred

///

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. . . if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its

duration.); Nonette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 875- (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff, who has a habeas petition pending, argues that the Court’s decision to dismiss this

action is contrary to Young, 907 F.2d at 878, and that under Young, this action should have been

stayed pending plaintiff’s completion of the state remedies rather than dismissed. The Ninth Circuit

issued its decision in Young in 1991. In 1994, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision

in Heck, holding that a prisoner “has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction

or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.”

Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). In holding in Young that the action should be stayed rather

than dismissed, the Ninth Circuit was concerned with the possibility that the limitations period on

a section 1983 action might run before the prisoner exhausted the state remedies, a process that can

take years. Young, 907 F.2d at 878. The Supreme Court addressed this concern in Heck, stating that

“the statute of limitations poses no difficulty while state challenges are being pursued, since the §

1983 claim has not yet arisen.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. Accordingly, plaintiff’s contention that this

Court is bound to stay these proceedings pending exhaustion and erred by dismissing the action is

without merit. 

Plaintiff has no cause of action under section 1983 at this time. Plaintiff’s sole remedy is his

pending writ of habeas corpus. 

D. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, filed June 15, 2006, is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to set aside judgment, filed June 15, 2006, is DENIED; and

3. No further motions for reconsideration will be considered.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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