Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02723/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02723-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chance Ronald Collins, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Barry Larson, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-2723-PHX-SRB (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Amended Petition”). Petitioner challenges

his criminal convictions in Pinal County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No. CR2002-

01235. (Doc. 7) Respondents have filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus along with supporting exhibits. (Doc. 14) Petitioner has not filed a reply. As

explained below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends the Amended Petition be

denied.

I. Background

A. Trial and Sentencing

The State of Arizona indicted Petitioner in October 2002 on one count of Assault with

Intent to Incite a Riot or Participate in a Riot While in Custody, a Class Two felony, and one

count of Criminal Damage in Excess of $10,000.00, a Class Four felony. (Doc. 14, Exhibit

(“Exh.”) E) The charges arose from Petitioner’s role in a riot in June 2002 at the Pinal

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 The Honorable Stephen F. McCarville presided over the trial and sentencing.

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County Adult Detention Center. (Doc. 14, Exh. G) Following a jury trial1

 in January 2005,

the jury found Petitioner guilty of both counts. (Id.) On February 14, 2005, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 15.75 years on the first count and 10 years

on the second count. (Doc. 14, Exh. B)

B. Direct Review

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 14, 2005.

(Doc. 14, Exh. D) Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on August 15, 2006. (Doc. 14, Exh. E)

After the State filed an Answering Brief, Petitioner filed a Reply Brief on February 28, 2007.

(Doc. 14, Exh. F) On May 4, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum

Decision in which it “affirmed in part and remanded in part with directions.” (Doc. 14, Exh.

G) The Court of Appeals found the trial court failed to follow the proper procedure with

respect to Petitioner’s admissions of prior felony convictions, which were used to enhance

his sentence. (Doc. 14, Exh. G at 9-12) The case was remanded to the trial court to conduct

a hearing regarding whether Petitioner knew the consequences of admitting to prior

convictions. (Id.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court on

June 18, 2007, which was denied on November 29, 2007. (Doc. 14, Exhs. H, I)

Pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ directive, the trial court held a hearing on August

15, 2008, in which it found Petitioner’s admissions to prior felony convictions were made

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. (Doc. 14, Exh. K) The trial court then imposed a

revised sentence of 12.5 years for the participation in a prison riot conviction and 8 years on

the criminal damage conviction, again to run concurrently. (Id.) Petitioner did not file an

appeal of the newly imposed sentence. (Doc. 14, Exh. A)

C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 Soon after the Arizona Supreme Court denied his petition for review on direct appeal,

Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on December 21, 2007. (Doc. 14, Exh. M)

On May 13, 2009, Petitioner’s appointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion of PostCase 2:12-cv-02723-SRB Document 19 Filed 02/18/14 Page 2 of 10
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 The docket reflects the Petition was actually filed on December 27, 2012. (Doc. 1)

The December 24, 2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the Petition, doc. 1 at 11, and

reflects the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date

it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149

n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Conviction Review by Counsel; Motion for Extension of Time to Allow Defendant to File

Pro Per Petition. (Doc 14, Exh. O) On May 19, 2009, the trial court granted the motion and

set a June 19, 2009 deadline for Petitioner to file a pro se supplemental petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 14, Exh. P) Petitioner did not file a supplemental petition, but on

July 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion to correct his sentence. (Doc. 14, Exhs. A, Q)

Respondents have presented nothing to show whether the trial court ever ruled on

Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief or the motion to correct his sentence. Likewise,

Respondents do not address or provide anything in the record to indicate whether Petitioner

sought review of any adverse post-conviction relief decision by the trial court.

D. Federal Habeas Petition

On December 24, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

District Court.2

 (Doc. 1) After the original petition was dismissed with leave to amend,

Petitioner filed his Amended Petition on April 22, 2013. (Doc. 7) Petitioner raises three

grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges there is insufficient evidence to support

his convictions, contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges his prison sentence was excessive, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. In Ground Three, Petitioner challenges the Governor of Arizona’s

decision to deny a reduction or commutation of his sentence despite a favorable

recommendation by the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency. On August 15, 2013,

Respondents filed their Answer. (Doc. 14) As noted above, Petitioner has not filed a reply.

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Amended Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because

it was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations period. Alternatively, Respondents

contend Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Because Respondents fail to provide

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 Respondents fail to show when the trial court ruled on Petitioner’s Notice of PostConviction Relief. Thus, this Magistrate Judge is unable to determine, based on the record

presented, how long the statute of limitations period was tolled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

(statute of limitations period is tolled during the time a properly filed application for postconviction relief or other collateral review is pending) Without accurate tolling information

from the State record, the timeliness of the habeas petition cannot be determined.

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sufficient information to show the Amended Petition is untimely,3

 the undersigned Magistrate

Judge has considered the alternative argument and recommends Petitioner’s claims be denied

as procedurally defaulted.

A. Procedural Default

1. Legal Standards

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To properly

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s highest court

in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A

petitioner “must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues

by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” Id. at

845. In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals

by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate

post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v.

Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

“In order to ‘fairly present’ an issue to a state court, a petitioner must ‘present the

substance of his claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional

guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.’” Gulbrandson v. Ryan,

738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.

2009)); see also Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the

petitioner failed to fairly present his federal claims to the state court because he did not

describe the operative facts and federal legal theory upon which his claims were based)

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(citations omitted). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that

those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). “If a petitioner fails to alert

the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is

unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient

to establish exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray

v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)).

If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in the state court, the

federal court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 (1989)

(O’Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may

dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state remedies. Id. If the

federal court finds, however, that the petitioner would have no state remedy were he to return

to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (holding that a claim is procedurally defaulted “if

the petitioner failed to exhaust state court remedies and the court to which the petitioner

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would

now find the claims procedurally barred”); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir.

2002) (a defendant’s claim is procedurally defaulted when it is clear the state court would

hold the claim procedurally barred). Federal habeas review of these claims is barred unless

the petitioner can establish cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting therefrom, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claim would result in a miscarriage of justice. See,

e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).

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“‘Cause’ must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot be fairly

attributed to him: We think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must

ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the

defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Coleman, 501

U.S. at 753 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation mark omitted). To show prejudice, the

“habeas petitioner must show ‘not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire

trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United

States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (omission and emphasis in original). “Miscarriage

of justice” is a narrow exception to the cause requirement “in an extraordinary case, where

a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent” of the substantive offense. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. Under such circumstances,

“a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the

procedural default.” Id.

2. Analysis

a. Ground One

Petitioner claims in Ground One that his conviction for participating in the prison riot

at the Pinal County Jail was based on nothing more than “circumstantial and inconsistent

evidence.” (Doc. 7 at 6) He argues “log notes and eyewitness accounts are sketchy at best”

and “witness statements contradict each other,” among other alleged deficiencies in the

evidence. (Id.) He claims, therefore, his convictions violated the Due Process Clause of the

U.S. Constitution. Petitioner, however, fails to provide any specific examples from his trial

to support his allegations. 

Petitioner did not raise this general due process claim in either his direct appeal or his

notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 14, Exhs. E, M) Petitioner did raise a due process

claim in his direct appeal, but it alleged a denial of due process “by virtue of the admission

of perjured testimony.” (Doc 14, Exh. E at 26) Petitioner makes no mention of perjured

testimony in Ground One of his habeas petition.

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 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(1) provides that a defendant is

precluded from post-conviction relief on any ground that could have been raised on direct

appeal. In addition, the time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in the State court under

Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner has not shown any

of the exceptions to the time limits identified in Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him.

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Petitioner has failed to fairly present the claim asserted in Ground One to the Arizona

courts on direct review or post-conviction relief. By not presenting his claim to the Arizona

Court of Appeals, Petitioner has failed to “give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve

any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. Petitioner has, therefore, failed to exhaust

his State-court remedies. Moreover, Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned

to the Arizona courts.4

 As a result, his claims in Ground One is procedurally defaulted. 

Having failed to file a reply, Petitioner presents nothing to establish cause for the

procedural default and resulting prejudice. Petitioner has also not demonstrated that the

failure to consider his claim on the merits would result in a miscarriage of justice. This

Magistrate Judge will, therefore, recommend Ground One be denied.

b. Ground Two

Petitioner alleges in Ground Two that the sentence imposed “does not properly reflect

the punishment suited for this crime.” (Doc. 7 at 7) He claims that due to his “minor”

involvement, the sentence was clearly excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment. (Id.)

Like Ground One, Petitioner did not raise a claim in either his direct appeal or his

notice of post-conviction relief that his sentence was excessive in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (Doc. 14, Exhs. E, M) Petitioner has, therefore, failed to exhaust his State-court

remedies. Because Petitioner would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the Arizona

courts, his claim in Ground Two is procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner has presented nothing to establish cause for the procedural default and

resulting prejudice. Petitioner has also not demonstrated that the failure to consider his claim

on the merits would result in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, this Magistrate Judge will

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recommend Ground Two be denied.

c. Ground Three

Lastly, Petitioner asserts in Ground Three he received a unanimous recommendation

by the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency to commute his sentence. (Doc. 7 at 8)

Petitioner states the Governor of Arizona rejected the Board’s recommendation and denied

Petitioner’s request. (Id.) Petitioner appears to be requesting a review of the Governor’s

decision.

As with Grounds One and Two, Petitioner did not raise this claim in the Arizona

courts. (Doc. 14, Exhs. E, M) Petitioner has, therefore, failed to exhaust his State-court

remedies. Regardless, Petitioner’s claim in Ground Three is not cognizable on federal habeas

review and must be denied on that basis.

A habeas petitioner must allege “that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or law or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does

not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v.

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 349 (1993)

(stating that “mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas.”). Moreover, “[f]ederal habeas relief is not

available to redress errors in state post-conviction proceedings.” Franzen v. Brinkman, 877

F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989). “[A] petition alleging errors is the state post-conviction review

process is not addressable through habeas corpus proceedings.” Id.; see also Ortiz v. Stewart,

149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his court has specifically stated that federal habeas

relief is not available to redress alleged procedural errors in state post-conviction

proceedings.”).

Petitioner alleges in Ground Three he is in custody because the Governor failed to

adopt the Board’s recommendation to commute his sentence, not because of a violation of

the United States Constitution. Moreover, to the extent clemency proceedings are part of the

State’s post-conviction review process, habeas relief is not available to redress errors in that

process. The Governor’s decision whether to grant clemency is purely an issue of Arizona

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law and, as a result, cannot be challenged on federal habeas review.

B. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner failed to exhaust his

State-court remedies and, because such remedies are no longer available, his claims in

Grounds One and Two are procedurally defaulted. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show

cause to excuse the default, and he has not demonstrated a miscarriage of justice. Finally,

Petitioner’s claim in Ground Three is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Accordingly,

this Magistrate Judge will recommend the Amended Petition be denied.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 7, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Amended

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the

procedural ruling debatable.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.

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