Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02508/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02508-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in this case.

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dushan Stephan Nickolich, II, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-2508-PHX-SMM (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Dushan Stephan Nickolich, II, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex-Tucson, in Tucson, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion for service. (Doc.# 1, 3.)1

 The Court dismissed all of the

Defendants except Dr. Rowe, ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his claims against Dr.

Rowe should not be dismissed as time-barred and denied the motion for service. (Doc.# 4.)

Plaintiff thereafter filed a document captioned “Status” in which he asked the status of his

motion for service. (Doc.# 7.) He also filed a “Notice of Complaint With Court Order

(Docket Number # 4), and Motion to Amend Complaint,” with a proposed First Amended

Complaint. (Doc.# 8, 9.) Plaintiff’s request for status of his motion to serve will be granted

to the extent set forth above. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint will be granted and

his First Amended Complaint ordered filed. Because the First Amended Complaint fails to

state a claim and Plaintiff has not established cause why his claims are not time-barred, the

First Amended Complaint and this action will be dismissed. 

Case 2:06-cv-02508-SMM Document 11 Filed 01/30/07 Page 1 of 7
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I. Background

Plaintiff’s Complaint concerned the failure to inform him that he was diabetic and to

provide appropriate treatment to him for diabetes for four years. Plaintiff sued the Arizona

Department of Corrections (ADC), ADC Director Dora Schriro, ADC Facility Health

Administrator Jayne Russell and ADC Health Care Provider Dr. Richard Rowe.

The following facts were alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. On August 24, 2004,

Plaintiff was informed for the first time that he was diabetic, although his prison medical

records and tests reflected that he had been diabetic since at least August 29, 2000. Plaintiff

alleged that because he was not informed that he was diabetic until 2004, his diabetes had

consequently not been properly treated resulting in acceleration of its debilitating effects and

damaging his vision and liver. In Count I, Plaintiff alleged Dr. Rowe knew no later than

August 29, 2000 that he was diabetic but failed to inform and treat him for that illness in

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Rowe and

ADC knew of his diabetic condition, but violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to

procedural due process by failing to inform him thereof. In Count III, Plaintiff alleged

malpractice by Dr. Rowe based on his alleged failure to inform Plaintiff that he was diabetic

and to properly treat his diabetes.

The Court dismissed ADC based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. It dismissed

Schriro and Russell because liability in the Complaint was predicated solely on respondeat

superior. The Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his claims against Dr. Rowe, the

only remaining Defendant, were not time-barred. 

II. Motion to Amend

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a

responsive pleading is served. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to amend

will be granted and his First Amended Complaint ordered filed. (Doc.# 8, 9.) The First

Amended Complaint supersedes the Complaint in its entirety.

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III. Statutory Screening First Amended Complaint

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). However, leave to amend need not be given if a complaint as

amended is subject to dismissal. Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538

(9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny or grant leave to amend is particularly broad

where a plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. See

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure

to cure deficiencies by previous amendments is one of the factors to be considered in

deciding whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538.

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend.

IV. First Amended Complaint

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the State of Arizona, Dora Schriro,

Jayne Russell and Dr. Richard Rowe. (Doc.# 9 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and

punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges the same facts in his First Amended Complaint

as those alleged in his Complaint, except that he provides information concerning

administrative exhaustion of his claims. (Id. at 4-6.)

V. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional

claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of

a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

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 As discussed below, even if Plaintiff could sue the State for damages under § 1983,

his claims would be time-barred.

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A. State of Arizona

Plaintiff substitutes the State of Arizona for ADC in his First Amended Complaint.

As the Court stated in its prior Order, under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States, neither a state nor its agencies may be sued in federal court without the

state’s consent. (Doc.# 4, citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).) Contrary to Plaintiff’s

assertion, A.R.S. § 31-201.01(F) does not waive the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity

from suit for damages but instead provides that judgments for torts committed by the ADC

director, officers or employees within the scope of their legal duty will be paid or reimbursed

by the State. (See doc.# 8 at 3-4.) Moreover, the State of Arizona, and its agencies, are not

“persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Hale v. State of Ariz., 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th

Cir. 1993) (en banc); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir.

1991). Accordingly, the State of Arizona will be dismissed.2

B. Statute of Limitations 

Counts I and III mirror Counts I and III of the original Complaint, while Count II has

been somewhat altered. (See doc.# 9 at 4-6.) Nevertheless, all three claims, as amended,

facially appear to be barred by the statute of limitation. 

In response to the Court’s show cause order, Plaintiff argues the statute of limitation

runs from when he exhausted his grievance administratively rather than from when he first

learned that Defendants had failed to inform him that he was diabetic. (Doc.# 8 at 3-6.)

Alternatively, he argues the statute of limitation is subject to tolling while he exhausted

administrative grievance procedures. (Id.) 

In § 1983 actions, the Court applies the statute of limitations of the forum state for 

personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 (1985); TwoRivers v.

Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.

1991). The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions, including medical

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 Arizona’s former tolling provision for prisoner causes of action, A.R.S. § 12-

 502(B), was repealed effective July 20, 1996. See TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 995. Because

Plaintiff’s claims accrued after repeal of the tolling provision, he is not entitled to tolling on

that basis. Arizona otherwise provides for tolling of the statute of limitation after a cause of

action accrues for the period during which a plaintiff was less than 18 years old or of

unsound mind. A.R.S. § 12-502.

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malpractice, is two years. See A.R.S. § 12-542(1); Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943

P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Vaughan, 927 F.2d at 478. The Court must also apply

any state rule for tolling to actions brought under § 1983.3

 Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536,

544 (1989); TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992 (§ 1983). Additionally, however, the applicable

statute of limitation will be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion

process pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2004, Facility

Health Administrator Russell denied his grievance regarding Dr. Rowe’s failure to inform

him that he was diabetic and/or to properly treat him for it prior to that time. (Doc.# 9 at 4.)

On May 2, 2005, Director Schriro denied Plaintiff’s appeal from Russell’s response. (Id.)

“[A] claim generally accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of his action.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374,

379 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff alleges that he first learned that he was diabetic, and that he

had been diabetic for more than four years, on August 26, 2004; therefore, Plaintiff’s claims

regarding the failure to inform and/or to properly treat that condition prior to learning that

he was diabetic, accrued no later than August 26, 2004. 

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 20, 2006, or more than two years after his

claims accrued. (Doc.# 1.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that he fully exhausted his claims by

May, 2005. The availability of tolling while he administratively exhausted his claims is

irrelevant here because Plaintiff could have commenced this action within the limitation

period even after he had fully exhausted his grievance. Plaintiff nevertheless waited until

more than a year after exhaustion was complete, and after the statute of limitation had run,

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to bring this action. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish cause why his claims,

as amended, should not be dismissed as time-barred. 

C. Failure to State a Constitutional Violation in Count II

Count II of the First Amended Complaint is subject to dismissal on the alternative

basis that it fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges

that he was denied procedural due process because Dr. Rowe had input into Russell’s denial

of the grievance. There is no free-standing constitutional right to a grievance process

because inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in prison grievance procedures.

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,

1430 (7th Cir.1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d

728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991). Moreover, while a prisoner may challenge a state action that does

not restrain a protected liberty interest, he may do so only if it “nonetheless imposes [an]

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). “As long as the conditions or degree of

confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and

is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself

subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Montanye v.

Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Dr. Rowe’s input into the denial of Plaintiff’s grievance

in no way affected the condition or degree to which Plaintiff was otherwise confined. In

short, Plaintiff cannot state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim based on

Dr. Rowe’s alleged involvement in resolution of his grievance. 

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion for status will be granted to the extent stated herein. Plaintiff’s

motion to amend will be granted and the First Amended Complaint filed. For the reasons

discussed, however, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and this action will be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for status of his motion to serve is granted to the extent set

forth herein. (Doc.# 7.)

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(2) Plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted and his First Amended Complaint must

be filed. (Doc.# 8.)

(3) Defendant State of Arizona is dismissed. 

(4) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (doc.# 9) and this action are dismissed. 

(5) The Clerk of Court must enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with

prejudice that states that the dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 26th day of January, 2007.

 

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