Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00441/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00441-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARJORIE FRANKS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12cv441-LAB (NLS)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

vs. RECONSIDERATION

DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

On February 21, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their complaint bringing state-law claims and

invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. Because it appeared one of the Defendants was

a citizen of the same state (California) as were Plaintiffs, the Court on February 24, 2012,

ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. Plaintiffs were ordered to respond no later than Monday, February 27. After

Plaintiffs filed nothing, the Court dismissed the action on February 28. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel then responded by telephoning chambers, saying he had been too

busy to respond to the Court’s order and notifying the Court that he would seek

reconsideration. Then on March 7, Plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for leave to seek

reconsideration. The motion points out that the Plaintiffs wish their case to be part of the

Pinnacle multidistrict litigation proceedings. The motion argues that the Court should allow

the MDL panel to address issues of jurisdiction and proper Defendants.

/ / /

Case 3:12-cv-00441-LAB-NLS Document 7 Filed 03/09/12 Page 1 of 4
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In support of this contention, the motion represents that other judges in this district

have taken the approach the motion recommends:

In fact, counsel for Plaintiffs have recently filed other matters arising out of

the defective Pinnacle Device in the Southern District of California, naming

the same three defendants, and those matters were promptly transferred to

the Pinnacle MDL. (See for instance, Stang v. Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. et

al. 3:12-cv-00443-W-BLM)[.]

(Motion, 2:15–18.)

A review of the Stang docket, however, reveals that that case has not been

transferred, nor has any action been taken there. In addition, it may be that Plaintiffs’

counsel is mistaken about the district in which he or his firm filed cases involving these

Defendants, but a docket search revealed this case and Stang are the only ones he or his

firm have ever filed in this District against Depuy Orthopaedics or Dr. Thomas Schmalzried.

As the Court’s standing order, ¶ 4(j), points out, reconsideration is disfavored unless

the party shows there is new evidence, or a change in controlling law, or establishes that the

Court committed clear error in its earlier ruling. See School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5

F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993) (citing these three circumstances as warranting

reconsideration, and noting also that “other, highly unusual, circumstances” may warrant

reconsideration). See also Civil Local Rule 7.1(I) (requiring party seeking reconsideration to

show “what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist,

or were not shown, upon such prior application”).

None of these factors is present here. In particular, the Court was acting as it is

required to act. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278

(1977) (holding that court is “obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the

existence of federal jurisdiction”). Because the Court made the required inquiry, and because

Plaintiffs never responded, the Court was obliged to assume jurisdiction was lacking and to

dismiss the action. Furthermore, Plaintiffs admit jurisdiction was lacking and even now is

lacking, although they allege the jurisdictional defect can be cured by dismissing the nondiverse Defendant.

/ / /

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The court recognizes that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 the Court may add or drop a party,

on terms that are just, in order to avert the need for dismissal. At the same time, the

complaint in no way suggests the non-diverse Defendant, Dr. Schmalzried, was anything

other than a necessary party. The complaint brings thirteen separate claims, all of which are

brought against all three named Defendants. The complaint alleges these Defendants

conspired and cooperated together to commit all the wrongs giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims.

(Complaint, ¶ 6.) The Court certainly would not have dismissed claims against Dr.

Schmalzried sua sponte, nor is it clear that doing so now would be possible or just. The only

basis for thinking Dr. Schmalzried is not a necessary party is Plaintiffs’ counsel’s declaration

saying he would be prepared to refile the complaint without naming Dr. Schmalzried, if

required to do so. Plaintiffs do not now claim they are prepared to dismiss Dr. Schmalzried

if not compelled to do so; rather, they ask the Court merely to keep the case pending in its

current form so it can be quickly transferred to the MDL panel.

The only basis on which the Court finds Plaintiffs might reasonably seek

reconsideration is the fairly short time they were given to respond to the order to show

cause. The order was issued on Thursday and they were given until Monday to respond.

At the same time, the motion doesn’t explain their counsel’s failure to respond in a timely

fashion. 

First, the Court notes that the motion erroneously shaves off one day of response time

by representing that the Court’s order was issued on Friday, February 25. (Motion, ¶ 4.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel actually had one more day than he now believes. Second, because

Plaintiffs’ counsel receives notices of docket filings by email, and can file documents

electronically at any time, he could have filed some kind of response on Thursday or Friday,

or over the weekend if he wished, or on Monday February 27 until midnight. His

representation that “other previously scheduled discovery and trial preparation matters on

February 27th” prevented him from responding does not explain his failure to respond either

before or after the scheduled matters. Third, any adequate response to the order to show

cause would have been rather simple and would not have required much time. If Plaintiffs

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 Even apart from the clear mandate to inquire into jurisdiction, overlooking the 1

jurisdictional defect would serve no useful purpose. Even if this case were transferred, the

court to which the MDL panel transferred it would be required to make the same inquiry. And

if the case survived and were transferred back to this Court, the Court would be required to

make the inquiry at that time. Furthermore, any court on appeal would be required to make

the same inquiry. Allowing the case to proceed without a clear showing of jurisdiction would

needlessly waste judicial resources and the parties’ time and money. 

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were prepared to cure the jurisdictional defect by dismissing Dr. Schmalzried as a

Defendant, they could simply have filed a notice voluntarily dismissing him. If they needed

more time, they could have filed a request to extend the response time. 

The only type of response that would have required a long time to prepare would be

an inadequate one. For example if, as Plaintiffs are apparently now arguing, the Court

should have overlooked the jurisdictional defect and allow the MDL panel to deal with it, their

request would have been denied no matter when it was filed.

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Although there was no reason to address it earlier, the complaint also doesn’t show

why venue is proper in this District rather than in the Central District of California. The

Plaintiffs and Dr. Schmalzried reside in the Central District, not in this District, and under

normal circumstances all medical treatment would have taken place there, not here.

Defendant Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. are alleged to be an

Indiana corporation and a New Jersey Corporation, respectively, both doing business in

California. But the complaint does not allege they do business in this District, or that any of

their activities in this District gave rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. Assuming Plaintiffs refile their

claims, they should consider whether this District, or the Central District of California is the

proper venue.

The motion for leave to seek reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 8, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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