Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00122/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00122-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ELIA A. AGUNDIS )

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Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-122-CG-B

JOHN LEON RICE, COUNTY OF 

OKTIBBEHA MS SHERIFF 

DEPARTMENT, OKTIBBEHA 

COUNTY CHANCERY COURT 

JUDGE DOROTHY COLOM, and 

CITY OF COLUMBUS MS 

POLICE DEPARTMENT

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Emergency motion to stay 

Chancery Court proceedings. (Doc. 3). Upon review of the motion, the Court 

construes it to be a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and finds that 

the motion is due to be denied.

This Court previously noted the applicable standard for a preliminary 

injunctive relief in Hammock ex rel. Hammock v. Keys et al., 93 F.Supp.2d 1222 

(S.D. Ala. 2000):

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish the following 

four factors: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a 

threat of irreparable injury; (3) that its own injury would outweigh the 

injury to the nonmovant; and (4) that the injunction would not disserve 

the public interest. Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir.1999); 

McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.1998). 

The Court should be mindful that a preliminary injunction is an 

extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant 

has clearly satisfied the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites. 

Case 1:16-cv-00122-CG-B Document 5 Filed 03/31/16 Page 1 of 3
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McDonald's, 147 F.3d at 1306; Northeastern Fl. Chapter of the Ass'n of 

Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 

(11th Cir.1990).

Id., at 1226-27. The same standard applies to a request for a temporary restraining 

order as to a request for a preliminary injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., v. 

Frisby, 163 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1374 (N.D.Ga. 2001), citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 

898, 900 (11th Cir.1995). After reviewing Plaintiff’s motion, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing a substantial likelihood of success 

on the merits.

“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings 

in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where 

necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 

U.S.C.A. § 2283 (Anti–Injunction Act). Under the facts reported by Plaintiff, the 

exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act do not appear to apply to this case. 

“[S]ince the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the 

fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts,” the 

exceptions in the Act should be narrowly construed. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of 

Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970) “Any doubts as to the propriety of a 

federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of 

permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the 

controversy.” Id. at 297. 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act 

should apply that would allow this Court to enjoin an ongoing Chancery Court 

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proceeding in Oktibbeha County. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to stay Chancery 

Court proceedings (Doc. 3), is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of March, 2016.

/s/ Callie V. S. Granade

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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