Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01483/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01483-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Adrian Crihalmean, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles Ryan; et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-01483-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) 

and Supplement. (Doc. 25). This case was referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a 

Report and Recommendation (Doc. 26) recommending that the Court find that the 

Petition in this case is barred by the statute of limitations. 

 In reviewing a Report and Recommendation (R&R), the Court must conduct a de 

novo review of any portion of the R&R to which either party objects. United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The Court grants 

Petitioner’s Motion for a Time Extension (Doc. 27) to the extent Petitioner’s objections 

received on August 5, 2013, are deemed timely. Because Petitioner has objected to the 

recommendation that the Court find that his Petition is barred by the statute of 

limitations, the Court will review the Petition de novo. (Doc. 28). 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Pursuant to a plea agreement, on November 17, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced in 

state court to lifetime probation on count 1, attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a 

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class 3 felony and a dangerous crime against children, and on count 9, attempted sexual 

abuse, a class 4 felony and a dangerous crime against children. (Doc. 20-1 at 16–17). 

Additionally, Petitioner was sentenced to five years imprisonment on count 1. (Id.). 

 On April 23, 2010, in state court, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Sentence 

Modification for Exceeding Subject Matter Jurisdiction.” (Doc. 20-1 at 27). In the 

Motion, Petitioner argued that lifetime probation violates Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments. (Id.). The state trial court construed the Motion as a Petition for PostConviction Relief (“PCR”), and on June 22, 2010, dismissed the PCR as untimely under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a). (Doc. 20-1 at 43). 

 On July 29, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the trial court’s denial 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals (Doc. 20-1 at 46), and on February 10, 2012, the court 

denied review. (Doc. 20-1 at 75). Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the 

Arizona Supreme Court on February 20, 2012 (Doc. 20-1 at 77), which was denied on 

June 6, 2012. (Doc. 20-1 at 95). Finally, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 10, 2012 (Doc. 1). On July, 1 2013, the 

Magistrate Judge issued an R&R, which concluded that the Petition was barred by the 

statute of limitations. (Doc. 26). Petitioner filed objections to the R&R, which dispute 

the conclusion. (Doc. 28). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides a oneyear statute of limitations from when a conviction becomes final for a defendant to file a 

habeas petition. 28 U.S.C § 2244(d). 

 Petitioner’s conviction became final after the opportunity for review in state court 

expired. Under Arizona law, Petitioner’s opportunity for direct review was a Rule 32 

post-conviction relief proceeding. “Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for pleaconvicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716–17 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring 

an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the 

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Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice 

of his or her intent to file a Petition for Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

 Petitioner was sentenced on November 17, 2008. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

deadline to file a PCR expired on February 18, 2009, and thus his conviction became 

final on that date. On July 10, 2012, more than two years later, Petitioner filed a petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, the Petition is beyond the statute of limitations 

unless Petitioner can show that he is entitled to statutory and/or equitable tolling. 

 A. FACTUAL PREDICATE 

 In his objections, Petitioner argues that because he discovered new evidence, the 

statute of limitations did not commence on February 18, 2009. (Doc. 28 at 2). He claims 

(1) that Weems v. United States qualifies as a factual predicate of his claim and (2) that, 

despite his exercise of due diligence, he could not discover this fact because the State 

provided an inadequate law library. In Weems, a United States Coast Guard official was 

convicted of falsifying public documents and was sentenced to fifteen years’ 

imprisonment at “hard and painful labor.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357–64 

(1910). The official was also deprived of parental authority rights, martial rights, and 

property transfer. Id. at 364. Additionally, the court imposed lifetime surveillance. Id. at 

364–65. Based on all of the sentences imposed, the Court found that the sentence was 

disproportionate to the crime of falsifying documents. Id. at 384. As a result, the Court 

held the sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 

 Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year statute of limitations may be tolled until “the 

date on which the factual predicate of the claim . . . presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) (2012). A court 

decision may qualify as a fact if the decision is in the petitioner’s own case. Shannon v. 

Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between discovery of 

case law and discovery of factual predicate). Therefore, court decisions that establish a 

proposition of law do not qualify as facts. Id. 

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Petitioner does not allege any new facts because his discovery of a proposition of 

law in Weems is not a factual predicate of his claim. Since Petitioner’s sentencing on 

November 17, 2008, Petitioner knew that he was sentenced to lifetime probation. While 

a court decision may qualify as a fact, Weems does not change a fact, is not directly 

related to Petitioner’s case, and has no impact on Petitioner’s legal status. Moreover, 

Petitioner filed a Motion on April 23, 2010, that argued lifetime probation is cruel and 

unusual punishment, and cited Weems to support his claim. He then waited until July 10, 

2012, to file this Petition, more than two years after he discovered Weems. Therefore, 

even if the one-year limitation was tolled until Petitioner’s discovery of Weems, 

Petitioner’s Petition is still untimely. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling 

under § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

 B. STATE IMPEDIMENT 

 Alternatively, Petitioner argues that because the State impeded his filing of a 

timely Petition, the statute of limitations did not commence on February 18, 2009. (Doc. 

28 at 2–3). In other words, Petitioner would have filed a timely Petition if he had 

discovered Weems within the statute of limitations, or if defense counsel would have 

altered him to the unconstitutionality of his sentence. Both of these claims do not 

constitute a State impediment to his filing of a timely Petition. 

 The State must assure that inmates have “meaningful access to the courts.” Lewis, 

518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (citation omitted). If the State, through the deficiencies in the 

prison, “hindered [an inmate’s] efforts to pursue a legal claim,” then the State violated the 

inmate’s constitutional right to access to the courts. Id. However, meaningful access to 

the courts does not require the State to ensure that an inmate “litigate effectively once in 

court.” Id. at 343. Therefore, under 2244(d)(1)(B), the Petitioner must show that an 

“impediment . . . created by State action in violation of the Constitution . . . prevented” 

the Petitioner from filing a timely petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) (2012). 

 Petitioner failed to show that the alleged inadequate library actually hindered his 

efforts to file his claim within the statute of limitations because he does not explain how 

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the State prevented him from filing his Petition. At best, Petitioner asserts that an 

inadequate library prevented his discovery of a case that he believes supports his claim, 

which is not a State impediment because the State does not have the duty to ensure that 

inmates litigate effectively. There is no causal connection between a lack of access to 

case law and his untimely Petition. Moreover, Petitioner discovered Weems by at least 

April 23, 2010, and yet waited until July 2012 to file the Petition. Even if the one-year 

limitation began on April 23, 2010, the Petition is still barred by the statute of limitations. 

 Petitioner mistakenly relies on Weems to assert that lifetime probation is 

unconstitutional, and thus defense counsel did not misrepresent Petitioner’s sentence. 

Weems simply held that the sentence imposed, which included fifteen years’ 

imprisonment, removal of parental and marital rights, and lifetime probation, was grossly 

disproportionate to the crime of falsifying documents. Here, lifetime probation is not 

disproportionate to attempted sexual conduct with a minor and attempted sexual abuse.1

 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s argument fails because 2244(d)(1)(B) requires a State 

impediment to filing, but appointed defense counsel is not an actor of the State. See 

Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 549 

U.S. 317 (2007) (Even if Petitioner’s defense counsel acted incompetently, it “is not the 

type of State impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B).”). As a result, Petitioner is not 

entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(B) because neither an alleged inadequate library nor 

misrepresentation prevented Petitioner from filing a timely habeas petition. 

C. EQUITABLE TOLLING 

 Petitioner purports that his pro se status and lack of legal resources entitles him to 

equitable tolling. (Doc. 28 at 3). However, Petitioner fails to establish the necessary 

elements for equitable tolling. 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish 

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances 

 

1

 United States v. Williams, 636 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a 

sentence of lifetime probation is not disproportionate for a sex offender). 

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stood in his way. The petitioner must additionally show that 

the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

untimeliness, and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] 

it impossible to file a petition on time. 

 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is 

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Therefore, “ignorance of the law, even for an 

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.” Fisher v. 

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro see petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). However, lack of case law in 

a prison library or notice of the AEDPA may be extraordinary circumstances if the 

petitioner exercised reasonable diligence. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the equitable tolling may have been appropriate 

because the prison did not provide any legal materials). 

 Petitioner does not explain his delay in filing his Petition. Assuming Petitioner 

was diligent and did not discover his claim until April 2010, he did not file this Petition 

until July 10, 2012. Petitioner delayed filing the Petition for an unexplained twenty-six 

months. Although his Petition for Review over dismissal of his untimely PCR was 

pending in the Arizona Court of Appeals from June 20102

 until February 2012, Petitioner 

delayed filing this Petition for an additional five months after the Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied his Petition for Review. Petitioner has not presented evidence to excuse 

the further five-month delay. (Doc. 26 at 13). Because Petitioner substantially delayed 

filings without sufficient reason, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. As a result, 

Petitioner’s one-year limitation commenced on February 18, 2009, the date his conviction 

 

2

 At the time of the June 2010 state court filing, Petitioner’s federal statute of 

limitations to file his habeas petition had already expired. A new filing in state court 

cannot restart the federal statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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became final, and expired on February 17, 2010. 

D. STATE COURT JURISDICTION 

 Petitioner argues that the one-year limitation should not apply because Petitioner’s 

claims are jurisdictional, in that Petitioner believes his sentence is unconstitutional. 

Petitioner also argues that the State failed to timely respond to his Petition for Review, 

and thus he is entitled to relief by default. 

 Petitioner’s arguments fail because: (1) an unconstitutional sentence would not 

strip the state court of subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying prosecution, and (2) 

federal habeas relief is not a default for state court errors. First, the State criminal case is 

over, and this habeas proceeding is not a part of the State’s prosecution. (Doc. 26 at 13–

14). Petitioner does not point to any law that causes a state court’s lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction (assuming this allegation were true) to alleviate the statute of limitations in a 

collateral federal habeas proceeding. Id. Second, Petitioner does not cite law that 

extends an alleged default by the state court to collateral federal habeas proceedings. As 

a result, Petitioner cannot avoid the federal statute of limitations. 

 E. MERITS 

 Although it is not necessary to reach the merits because the Petition is barred by 

the statute of limitations, the Petition also fails on the merits. Petitioner superficially 

claims that Weems dictates that the imposition of lifetime probation violates the Eight 

Amendment. To test the proportionality of a sentence, the Court compares the gravity of 

the offense to the severity of the sentence. Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2022 

(2010). 

 Here, a comparison of the offense and sentence show that lifetime probation is not 

disproportionate. Petitioner committed the serious and grievous crimes of attempted 

sexual conduct with a minor and attempted sexual abuse of a minor. Although lifetime 

probation limits Petitioner’s privacy, it is especially appropriate in this case because sex 

offenders have a high rate of recidivism. See Williams, 636 F.3d at 1233. Furthermore, 

the crime and the sentence imposed in Weems are not comparable to Petitioner’s crime 

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and sentence imposed. Petitioner’s crime is entirely different from the crime of falsifying 

documents. Additionally, the Court in Weems compared the totality of the sentences, not 

only lifetime probation, to the crime. Based on the severity of fifteen years 

imprisonment, loss of fundamental rights, and lifetime probation, the Court found the 

sentence and crime grossly disproportionate. Because the sentence and crime here are 

not disproportionate, the Petition fails on the merits. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for a Time Extension (Doc. 27) is 

granted to the extent Petitioner’s objections received on August 5, 2013, are deemed 

timely. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 26) is 

accepted and adopted; Petitioner’s objections (Doc. 28) are overruled, the Petition is 

denied and dismissed, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, and 

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court denies 

issuance of a certificate of appealability because dismissal of the Petition is based on a 

plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s decision debatable 

or wrong. Further, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 Dated this 4th day of October, 2013. 

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