Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05334/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05334-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 26, 2000 Decided December 26, 2000

No. 99-5334

AndrE L. Mays a/k/a Abdul R. Wilson,

Appellant

v.

Drug Enforcement Administration,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02496)

Steven J. Kaiser, appointed by the court, argued the cause

as amicus curiae on the side of appellant. With him on the

briefs were Matthew D. Slater and Michael R. Lazerwitz.

AndrE L. Mays, appearing pro se, was on the brief for

appellant.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 1 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. Brian J. Sonfield, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Ginsburg, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: AndrE Mays was convicted of

conspiring to distribute base and powder cocaine. He now

invokes the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.

s 552, to get from the Drug Enforcement Agency documents

relating to its criminal investigation of him. The Government

contends that it may withhold the information pursuant to

FOIA Exemption 7(C), which protects the privacy interests of

third parties, and Exemption (7)(D), which protects confidential information. We hold, under Exemption 7(D), that express and implied grants of confidentiality protect the reports

of informants relating to Mays' conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. With respect to Exemption 7(C), we remand this

matter for the district court to address Mays' argument that

certain non-exempt information must be segregated and released.

I. Background

After his conviction Mays asked the DEA for copies of all

DEA records filed under his name or under the names of

certain third parties. With respect to Mays' own file, the

DEA responded by releasing portions of 14 pages; referring

five pages to the FBI, all of which the FBI later released to

Mays; and withholding 19 other pages under the claimed

authority of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552a(j)(2), and Exemptions 2, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F) of the FOIA. The DEA also

denied Mays access to information in the files of third parties,

citing the same provisions. In all, the DEA processed 44

pages in response to Mays' request, releasing five pages in

their entirety, redacting and releasing 14 pages, and withholding 25 pages.

Mays filed this action in district court in order to compel

release of the withheld information. The Government introduced into evidence the affidavit of Leila Wassom, a DEA

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 2 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

paralegal, justifying the exemptions, along with a so-called

Vaughn index, containing an itemized account of the disputed

documents and of the exemption(s) and rationale(s) under

which the DEA withheld or redacted each item. Mays conceded that the Government may withhold the items for which

it invoked Exemptions 2 and 7(F), and both sides moved for

summary judgment as to the other items. The district court,

believing that Mays challenged only the withholdings pursuant to Exemption 7(D), granted summary judgment for the

Government. The court determined that some of the information in question is the subject of an express grant of

confidentiality the DEA made to an informant, and that the

DEA impliedly undertook to hold the remainder confidential

in light of the danger faced by a cooperating individual who

informs on drug traffickers.

Mays now appeals and, both pro se and through an amicus

appointed by this court, challenges the Government's application of Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D). (We make no further

distinction between the arguments of the appellant and those

of the amicus in this court.) Mays concedes that Exemption

7(C) applies to names of third parties and to other identifying

information, but contests both the Government's decision to

withhold certain "investigative details" and its failure to segregate and to produce non-exempt information on pages that

also contain exempt information. As for Exemption 7(D), he

argues that there is insufficient evidence of an express grant

of confidentiality, and that the nature of his crime by itself

does not support an implied grant of confidentiality.

II. Analysis

Contrary to the understanding of the district court, Mays

properly contested the application of Exemption 7(C) in addition to that of Exemption 7(D). Therefore, we address his

arguments with respect to each exemption.

A. Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) protects information the disclosure of

which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b). As

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 3 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

such, it reflects "the strong interest of individuals, whether

they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, in not being

associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity."

Computer Prof'ls v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 904 (D.C.

Cir. 1996). When information withheld by the Government

implicates this interest, it becomes necessary to determine

whether disclosure is warranted by "balanc[ing] the public

interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended

the Exemption to protect." DOJ v. Reporters Comm., 489

U.S. 749, 776 (1989). Because the FOIA is concerned with

the right of the general public to know what their government

is up to, the identity and interest of the party requesting the

document are irrelevant to this balancing. See id. at 771.

Absent exceptional circumstances, the balance categorically

favors withholding the names and addresses of third parties

as "the type of information sought is simply not very probative of an agency's behavior or performance." Safecard

Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Finally, Exemption 7(C) ordinarily permits the Government

to withhold only the specific information to which it applies,

not the entire page or document in which the information

appears; any non-exempt information must be segregated

and released, see 5 U.S.C. s 552(b), unless the "exempt and

nonexempt information are 'inextricably intertwined,' such

that the excision of exempt information would impose significant costs on the agency and produce an edited document

with little informational value." Neufeld v. IRS, 646 F.2d

661, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

It is against this backdrop that Mays contests the Government's withholdings under Exemption 7(C). In his pro se

opposition to the Government's motion for summary judgment, he conceded the legitimacy of redacting "names or

other identifying symbols" but argued that "merely because

an isolated portion of a document need not be disclosed does

not make the entire document exempt from disclosure." This

adequately presented the argument that under Exemption

7(C) only names and other identifying information can be

withheld.

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 4 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Although the district court did not address this argument,

we would affirm its grant of summary judgment if Mays could

not prevail against the Government's factual showing. That,

however, is not the case. In her affidavit Ms. Wassom

establishes that "[s]ome of the documents ... contain names

and addresses and other identifying information [exempt

from disclosure]," and asserts that "information about the

plaintiff is inextricably intertwined with third party information." She does not say, however, that all the "third party

information" with which information about Mays is "inextricably intertwined" is itself exempt. Segregation may prove

feasible when only that "third party information" actually

protected under Exemption 7(C), such as the aforementioned

"names and addresses and other identifying information," is

excised.

The Vaughn index also leaves open the possibility that

some of the "third party information" in question is unprotected. It repeatedly characterizes withheld information as

"investigative details," but Exemption 7(C) does not necessarily cover all "investigative details" -- a category presumably

distinct from, and potentially far broader than the "names of

individuals/personal information" to which the Vaughn index

elsewhere refers. Only the latter, narrower category of

information is necessarily exempt. See Nation Magazine v.

Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Safecard

Servs., 926 F.2d at 1206. The present record simply does not

tell us whether and to what extent release of the "investigative details" referred to in the Vaughn index would reveal the

identity or otherwise implicate the privacy interests of any

third party.

Therefore, we must remand this aspect of the case for the

district court to determine what information is actually protected under Exemption 7(C) and whether any intelligible

portion of the contested pages can be segregated for release.

Consistent with our precedent, the district court may review

the disputed documents in camera in order to make this

determination. See QuiNon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (1996).

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 5 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

B. Exemption 7(D)

Exemption 7(D) protects against the disclosure of "information furnished by a confidential source" and contained in a

record "compiled by [a] criminal law enforcement authority in

the course of a criminal investigation." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b).

The applicability of the exemption in each case depends upon

whether the particular source who furnished the information

at issue was granted confidentiality, either expressly or by

implication. See DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993).

1. Express grant of confidentiality

Mays argues, first, that the district court lacked adequate

evidence to conclude that one source in this case received an

express grant of confidentiality. This claim is without merit.

Wassom's affidavit attributes four of the contested pages to a

single "coded informant" and describes the DEA's standard

practice of identifying confidential informants in this way.

The Vaughn index confirms that each of the four pages is

marked by the same "DEA confidential informant code."

This evidence is cognizable and unrebutted.

Mays nonetheless maintains that the record is insufficient

to support summary judgment for the Government in light of

our recent explication of the evidence required:

To withhold information under Exemption 7(D) by express assurances of confidentiality, the [Government]

must present "probative evidence that the source did in

fact receive an express grant of confidentiality." Davin

[v. DOJ, 60 F.3d 1043, 1061 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Such

evidence can take a wide variety of forms, including

notations on the face of a withheld document, the personal knowledge of an official familiar with the source, a

statement by the source, or contemporaneous documents

discussing practices or policies for dealing with the

source or similarly situated sources.

Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (1998) (emphasis supplied).

This obviously is not an exhaustive list. In any event, the

Vaughn index in this case plainly refers to "notations on the

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 6 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

face of [the] withheld document[s]" -- specifically, the DEA

confidential informant code -- indicating that this source

received an express assurance of confidentiality. The Government is therefore entitled to summary judgment with

respect to the four pages so coded.

2. Implied grant of confidentiality

Mays argues, second, that the district court erred in concluding that an implied grant of confidentiality covers three

pages attributable to a second source who, according to

Wassom's affidavit, provided a local sheriff's office with information "about the drug trafficking activities of [Mays] and

third parties." According to Wassom, because Mays "has

been convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine

base .... [i]t is reasonable to infer that the individuals who

provided information about [Mays] would fear for their safety

if their identities or the information they provided was revealed." Indeed, the Government maintains that the crime of

trafficking in cocaine is inherently so dangerous, and the

relationship of any individual with information about it sufficiently close to the danger, that confidentiality should automatically attach in these circumstances.

In DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165 (1993), the Supreme

Court mapped the contours of the inquiry into implied confidentiality. It rejected the broad presumption urged by the

Government there "that a source is confidential within the

meaning of Exemption 7(D) whenever the source provides

information to the FBI in the course of a criminal investigation." Id. at 181. At the same time, the Court anticipated

that "often" the Government would be able to point to "more

narrowly defined circumstances that will support the inference." Id. at 179. After instancing the case of paid informants, the Court acknowledged that "[t]here may well be

other generic circumstances in which an implied assurance of

confidentiality fairly can be inferred." Id. "For example,

when circumstances such as the nature of the crime investigated and [the informant's] relation to it support an inference

of confidentiality, the Government is entitled to a presumption." Id. at 181.

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 7 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

In Landano the Court plainly contemplated making probability judgments in assessing whether an implied grant of

confidentiality attaches to a particular type of source. To

illustrate, the Court observed that"[m]ost people would think

that witnesses to a gang-related murder likely would be

unwilling to speak to the [FBI] except on the condition of

confidentiality." 508 U.S. at 179. We have since identified

the crimes of "rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy,

and advocating overthrow of the government" as serious

offenses that, when undertaken by a criminal enterprise with

a record of violence, warrant the inference that an informant

expects confidentiality. Williams v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1155, 1159-

60 (1995).

In this case the cooperating individual supplied information

about a conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine.

The pertinent question is whether the violence and risk of

retaliation that attend this type of crime warrant an implied

grant of confidentiality for such a source. They most assuredly do.

This court knows all too well the violence and danger that

accompany the cocaine trade. See United States v. Payne,

805 F.2d 1062, 1065 (1986) (firearms "are as much tools of the

[drug] trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia"); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1058

(1999) (Congressional Record establishes "disproportionate

link between [assault] weapons and drug-trafficking and violent crime"); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1219

(1987) (drug transactions "contribute directly to the violent

and dangerous milieu that Congress sought to eliminate").

Indeed, for the same reasons that an informant would justifiably fear reprisal from a murderous street gang and expect

the authorities to keep his information confidential, so too

would an informant reasonably fear reprisal by conspirators

to distribute cocaine; the two types of criminal enterprises

are closely comparable in terms of their organization and

their penchant for violence. See U.S. Sentencing Commission,

Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 4 (1997) (trafficking in crack cocaine closely

associated with "systemic crime ... particularly the type of

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 8 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

violent street crime so often connected with gangs, guns,

serious injury, and death"); U.S. Sentencing Commission,

Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 95-98 (1995) (chronicles empirics of violent

crime, including "elimination of informers," that attends trafficking in crack and powder cocaine).

Indeed, our notion of what is reasonable police conduct has

long reflected the heightened danger and risk of violence

posed by cocaine trafficking. See United States v. Bonner,

874 F.2d 822, 827 (1989) (police justified in breaking down

door in part because "entrance into a situs of [cocaine]

trafficking carries all too real dangers to law enforcement");

United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 35 n.29 (1981) (study of

drugs and violence justifies police drawing weapons because

"odds [are] too high to require policemen to play 'russian

roulette' each time they effect a drug arrest"). Surely we

must extend the same consideration to informants when they

help a law enforcement agency combat this type of crime. To

expose them to the real potential of retaliation at the hands of

cocaine traffickers would be not only incongruous but also

perverse.

Mays protests that the presumption urged by the Government is too broad, that it would cloak in confidentiality

anything anyone ever tells a law enforcement officer about

any drug crime. Not so: We speak here only of those

informants who supply intelligence relating to the crime of

conspiracy to distribute cocaine; the accumulated evidence

and experience of this court bear most forcefully upon that

specific offense.

Mays further objects that a presumption based solely upon

the "character of the crime" effectively obviates consideration

of "the source's relation to the crime." 508 U.S. at 179. In

Landano the Supreme Court said only that both character

and relation -- presumably whether the informant's "relation

to the crime" puts him at risk of retaliation -- "may be

relevant," id., not that the source need have any particular

relationship to the crime in order for the information he

supplies to be deemed confidential. Mays questions why,

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 9 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

then, our decision in Williams, which involved crimes of a

very violent nature, turned nonetheless in part upon evidence

that (in Mays' words) "the particular sources were close to

the group" responsible for the crimes. The answer is that

with respect to certain sources we did not have any independent evidence that they were close to the group; we inferred

that they were precisely because they had provided "information [that] was of an intelligence nature and generally was not

provided to the public." 69 F.3d at 1158. We reasoned that

if the sources could furnish such information then they surely

would have been "vulnerable to retaliation if [their] cooperation had been disclosed." Id. at 1160. That hardly suggests

that evidence of a close relationship between the source and

the crime is required in order to infer confidentiality.

In sum, whatever his "relation to the crime," an informant

is at risk to the extent the criminal enterprise he exposes is of

a type inclined toward violent retaliation. That a conspiracy

to distribute cocaine is typically a violent enterprise, in which

a reputation for retaliating against informants is a valuable

asset, is enough to establish the inference of implied confidentiality for those who give information about such a conspiracy.

This is not to deny that there may be cases in which a

person who provides information to the police, such as a

neighborhood anti-crime crusader, might not expect or even

want to be treated confidentially. Nonetheless, Landano

plainly contemplates that courts will identify "generic circumstances in which an implied assurance of confidentiality fairly

can be inferred." 508 U.S. at 179. And we have no doubt

that a source of information about a conspiracy to distribute

cocaine typically faces a sufficient threat of retaliation that

the information he provides should be treated as implicitly

confidential.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the

district court with respect to Exemption 7(D), and remand

this case for the district court to address, in a manner

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 10 of 11
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

consistent with this opinion, Mays' claim with respect to

Exemption 7(C).

So ordered.

USCA Case #99-5334 Document #564812 Filed: 12/26/2000 Page 11 of 11