Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01414/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01414-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL JUDULANG

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07CV1414 IEG (CAB)

ORDER DIRECTING

PETITIONER’S RELEASE UNDER

APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS OF

SUPERVISION

vs.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

ALBERTO GONZALES, ATTORNEY

GENERAL, ROBIN BAKER, DIRECTOR OF

SAN DIEGO FIELD OFFICE, U.S.

IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

ENFORCEMENT, GABRIELA PACHECO,

OFFICER-IN-CHARGE,

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Petitioner Joel Judulang’s Motion to Enforce This Court’s

Order. The Court GRANTS the Motion and ORDERS that Petitioner, Joel Judulang, be released

under appropriate conditions of supervision.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

i. Prior Proceedings

Petitioner, born in the Phillipines, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States

since July 4, 1974. On October 11, 1989, Petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in

California state court and sentenced to a six-year suspended sentence. (Respondents’ Return in

Opposition to the Petition, Doc. 8, Ex. B.) On June 12, 2003, Petitioner was convicted of grand theft

in California state court and sentenced to two years and eight months in prison. (Id., Ex. C.) 

On July 7, 2005, Petitioner was taken into custody by Respondents due to the initiation of

removal proceedings. He was charged with deportability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and

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(iii) which allow the deportation of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and the deportation of

an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. 

On September 28, 2005, an immigration judge ordered petitioner removed. (Return, Ex. E.)

Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which denied his appeal on February

3, 2006. (Return, Ex. F.) Petitioner filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on February 24, 2006. (Return, Ex. G.) His petition for review, Case No. 06-70986,

contests his removability on several grounds. Petitioner concurrently filed a motion for stay of

removal, which Respondents did not oppose, and the court granted on July 7, 2006. (Id.) Petitioner

filed his opening brief on October 23, 2006, and Respondents filed an opposition on December 7, 2006.

(Id.) The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on June 4, 2007. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit then stayed

petitioner’s case pending the outcome of another case addressing the same issue raised by Petitioner,

Abebe v. Gonzales. In a published opinion in Abebe, 493 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2007), the court

rejected a detainee’s argument under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act which

was identical to one of petitioner’s claims in his appeal. The Ninth Circuit has since withdrawn its

opinion pending rehearing of Abebe en banc (Petitioner’s Notice, Doc. No. 9). The court cited Abebe

in denying petitioner’s appeal as to his Section 212(c) argument (id. at 5), and Petitioner argues the

court is likely to rehear his case after rehearing Abebe (Doc. No. 11). Petitioner’s continued

detention has been reviewed twice during the pendency of his Ninth Circuit appeal. On June 6, 2006,

Petitioner was informed of ICE’s decision to continue to detain him due to his failure “to demonstrate”

he “will not pose a flight risk.” (Return, Ex. I.) On June 5, 2007, Petitioner was informed of the ICE’s

decision to continue detention by a letter explaining he is “an extreme threat to the community” and

thus will remain in ICE custody pending removal from the United States. (Return, Ex. H.) 

ii. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition

On August 2, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

2241, arguing that his detention at the hands of Respondents was unlawful under the Ninth Circuit’s

decisions in Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) and Nadarajah v. Gonzalez, 443 F.3d 1069

(9th Cir. 2006).

On February 12, 2008, this Court granted in part Petitioner’s Petition and, relying on the Ninth

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Circuit’s remedy in Tijani, ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bail hearing before an

immigration judge with the power to grant him bail unless the government were to establish Petitioner

as a flight risk or a danger to the community.

On March 28, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion For Enforcement of This Court’s “Order Granting

in Part Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” asserting Respondents are still unlawfully detaining him

and that they have failed to prove he is a flight risk or danger to society. Plaintiff asserts that the

untranscribed hearing before an immigration judge held on March 11, 2008 failed to comply with the

Court’s February 12, 2008 Order or due process. By the time of the hearing, Petitioner had been in

continuous custody for over five years. 

iii. Tijani Bail Hearing 

Petitioner asserts that after the Court’s Order was issued, nothing happened for thirteen days.

Then, on February 25, 2008, Petitioner received notice from an ICE officer that he was scheduled to

appear at a “custody redetermination hearing before the immigration court” in El Centro, Califronia

less than 24 hours later. Petitioner notified counsel immediately who sought and received a

continuance to March 11, a date when witnesses would be able to attend. 

According to the declarations of both counsel in the case, the following transpired at the March

11, 2008 hearing:

Immigration Judge Dennis R. James conducted the hearing. The IJ denied

Petitioner’s request to record proceedings. 

During the course of the hearing, the IJ indicated his reluctance to conduct the

hearing at all, stating that he believed that he lacked jurisdiction to conduct the bail

hearing, but would conduct the hearing only because he was ordered to do so by this

Court. Likewise, the IJ stated that the BIA had no jurisdiction over any appeal, and

acting on this belief, crossed out the line on his order that normally would be used to

indicate whether appeal was waived or reserved. The IJ instructed the Government and

Petitioner to take any actions they believed appropriate at the conclusion of the hearing.

After initiating the hearing by conducting questioning of Petitioner, the IJ asked

Petitioner’s counsel to proceed. Upon being reminded that the Government bore the

burden of proof, the IJ required the Government to present its case first.

Apparently in response to Government questions, Petitioner testified about his

past criminal convictions. The Government presented no witnesses and introduced no

documentary evidence. It made no claim that Petitioner presented a flight risk. 

The Government argued Petitioner presented a danger to the community on the

basis of his prior convictions. This included a 1989 conviction for manslaughter, for

which Petitioner served 228 days in county jail and was sentenced to four years

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probation, two juvenile adjudications from 1982, a 2001 conviction for driving under

the influence, and a 2003 felony conviction for grand theft of the diamond engagement

ring Petitioner had given to his then fiancee, for which he was sentenced to two years

and eight months in state prison. The Government did not introduce the conviction

documents because testimony was elicited and Petitioner admitted to the convictions.

The Government made no claim that Petitioner had engaged in any unlawful or

violent behavior in the time since his 2003 conviction. 

Petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence of his non-violent

character, community ties, rehabilitation, family support, and likelihood of successful

compliance with supervision. 

Petitioner also presented certificates of completion for classes in parenting and

relationships and family services courses which he completed while in state prison as

well as a certification recognizing his participation while in immigration custody in

“Introduction to Vipassana Meditation.” Petitioner also presented evidence that while

in Respondents’ custody, he had been entrusted with a job as Recreation/Sport Room

worker, and had been recognized for his outstanding performance with a certificate of

achievement. 

At the close of the hearing, the Government argued Petitioner had an unbroken

record of criminality and could therefore be expected to pose a danger upon release. 

The IJ found Petitioner was a “danger to the public.” He stated that Petitioner

had not been deterred over the years by his prior convictions and found that the strong

support of his members did not compel a conclusion Petitioner would be any less

dangerous then when he enjoyed the same family support during the time he sustained

the manslaughter conviction. 

The IJ provided no written findings or reasoning at the time of the hearing. The

IJ issued a form order in which the IJ checked the box indicating that “the request for

a change in custody status be denied,” wrote in the words, “Danger to the Public . . .

‘No Bond,’” and crossed out the line concerning appeal.

iv. Immigration Judge Submits Written Findings

On April 23, 2008, Petitioner filed a supplemental exhibit in the form of a letter from the IJ

Dennis James, dated April 18, 2008. The letter contains a bond memorandum related to the March 11,

2008 hearing. In the memorandum, the IJ recounts the conduct of the hearing described above. At the

end of the memorandum, the IJ notes that Petitioner’s “criminal conduct has continued from a young

age right up through the arrest, conviction and sentence on the most recent case. In the next sentence,

the IJ states he finds the Petitioner is not a flight risk but that Petitioner is a danger to the community

and others and should be held without bond. (See Supp. Ex., Doc. 18.)

II. Procedural Background

Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce the Cour’s Order on March 28, 2008. (Doc. No. 14.)

Citing procedural and substantive errors by the IJ, Petitioner seeks an order from this Court directing

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that he be released under appropriate conditions of supervised release. Respondents filed their

opposition on April 14, 2008. (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner filed his reply on April 21, 2008. The Court

heard argument on this case, as well as in a case raising similar issues, Mau v. Chertoff, et. al.,

07cv2037-IEG (LSP), on April 28, 2008.

DISCUSSION

i Did he Bail Hearing in this Case Satisfy this Court’s Order?

i. Parties’ Arguments

1. Petitioner’s Argument

a. The IJs reliance on past convictions alone cannot support a finding of

present dangerousness.

Petitioner argues that the meager evidence of dangerousness presented at his hearing—the fact

of two juvenile adjudications in 1982, a 1989 conviction for voluntary manslaughter, 2001

misdemeanor DUI and 2003 grand theft—fails, as a matter of law, to prove Petitioner poses a present

danger to the community.

Petitioner emphasizes that it is not enough for the government to claim dangerousness on the

basis of only past crimes, especially ones that are remote in time because “presenting danger to the

community at one point by committing crime does not place [a petitioner] forever beyond redemption.”

Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Measures must be taken to assess the risk of flight and

danger to the community on a current basis.”); Korkees v. Reno, 137 F.Supp.2d 590, 598 (M.D. Pa.

2001) (“The mere conviction of a crime is not an adequate basis for finding that an individual is a threat

to the community.”).

Petitioner notes that the presumption of dangerousness applied to him rendered the relief

ordered by this Court effectively meaningless. Further, Petitioner notes that the presumption of

dangerousness would apply to nearly every petitioner afforded relief under Tijani since many such

individuals fall within the classification of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which means they have sustained

criminal convictions or engaged in past terrorist activities. 

Petitioner cites the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th

Cir. 2008) in support of his argument that past convictions are insufficient to establish present

dangerousness. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the state’s denial of parole to a prisoner serving

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an indeterminate term for murder because the state’s decision was premised on “continued reliance on

[the] unchanging circumstances” of the crime committed twenty years ago. The court explained that

such reliance “violates due process because petitioner’s commitment offense has become such an

unreliable predictor of his present and future dangerousness.” Id. at 546. The court observed that the

fact of the prior offense amounted to “no evidence” at all to support a determination that release “would

unreasonably endanger public safety.” Id. at 544, 546.

Petitioner says that like Hayward, here, the IJ erred by relying solely on past conduct which was

no evidence of present dangerousness. 

Petitioner argues that distant in time convictions have little predictive value of likely recidivism.

See e.g., Julian V. Roberts, The Role of criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 Crime & Justice

303, 335 (1997). See also USSG § 4A1.2(e)(3) (imposing 15 year staleness cap on using prior

convictions to enhance a federal criminal sentence). 

b. Respondents failed to provide a hearing which comported with due

process

Petitioner also asserts he should be released because Respondents failed to provide a the hearing

required by this Court’s order and the Due Process clause. Petitioner complains the hearing lacked

judicial safeguards essential to procedural fairness, including some form of recording or transcription

as well as an uninterested decisionmaker.

With respect to the lack of recording or transcription, Petitioner argus that Respondents

reconstruction of the hearing is no remedy to the lack of a recording of transcription because “once the

court has entered judgment, it may become subject t to the very natural weight of its conviction, tending

to focus on that which supports its holding.” Bergerco, U.S.A. v. Shipping Corp. of India Ltd., 896

F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1990). 

c. Petitioner should be released immediately

Petitioner argues he is entitled to immediate release under appropriate conditions of supervision.

Such relief is justified, says Petitioner, because Respondents have failed to make any claim that he

poses a flight risk and have failed to prove Petitioner presently poses any kind of articulable danger.

In the alternative, Petitioner asks the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing or refer such a

hearing to the assigned magistrate judge. Petitioner argues such a hearing would be more appropriate

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than proceedings before the IJ since it would involve a neutral, impartial arbiter unaffiliated with

Respondents and would produce a written record. 

2. Respondents’ Argument

Respondents contend the Government complied with the Court’s order because it conducted

a bond hearing for Petitioner before an IJ with the authority to grant bail. At the hearing, the

Respondents say the Government established Petitioner is a danger to the community and that his

continued detention is justified.

Respondents also contend Petitioner has failed to articulate a due process violation because he

only challenges a discretionary and factual bond determination. Respondents assert such issues are

beyond the scope of habeas review because discretionary decisions and factual determinations are not

reviewable in habeas proceedings. Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 2002)

(attempts to change the discretionary result reached by INS are not within the scope of 2241 and should

be denied); Sing v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The scope of habeas jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 224 is limited to claims that allege constitutional or statutory error in the removal

process.”).

Respondents argue that the only claim Petitioner has set forth that potentially raises a due

process concern is the allegation that the IJ failed to supply Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate

hearing. However, Respondents contend the hearing in this case was constitutionally adequate. With

respect to the lack of a written record, Respondents argue this cannot serve as the basis fora due process

claim because if Petitioner had appealed the bond determination, a written bond decision would have

issued. Moreover, Respondents assert that no hearing transcript is usually made in a bond hearing

before the immigration court.

Respondents also contend the IJ applied the proper standard to determine the Petitioner posed

a danger to the community and referred to the Government’s burden during the bail hearing indicating

the IJ placed the burden on the Government. Further, while Respondents concede the IJ did not

explicitly state at the hearing that the Government met is burden of proof by “clear and convincing

evidence” the IJ stated that based on the evidence in the record, the Government met its burden of

proof.” 

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Respondents reject Petitioner’s argument that a magistrate judge should be assigned the bail

hearing in this case. Petitioner argues that he role of district courts in a civil immigration habeas

proceeding is akin tot he role of a court of appeals in that the district court reviews the actions of the

agency only for constitutional or statutory error. Guiterrez-Chavez, 298 F.3d at 829-30 (the scope of

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to allegations of constitutional or statutory error in the

removal process). 

In addition to these arguments, Respondents assert Petitioner has failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. 

ii. Analysis

1. Jurisdiction

No published decision has discussed what jurisdiction, if any, a habeas court retains over a

Tijani bail hearing which it has ordered. As discussed above, Respondents assert any challenge to

custody determinations, aside from challenges related to the procedural adequacy of the hearing, are

beyond the scope of habeas review since bond decisions, Respondents argue, are discretionary.

Petitioner disagrees, insisting this position is significantly flawed since it would prevent this Court from

ensuring that its judgment was enforced. 

To the extent the Respondents argue this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the IJ’s bond

determination, the Court disagrees. The Court finds Respondents view inconsistent with the Ninth

Circuit’s observation that habeas courts are empowered to make an assessment concerning compliance

with their mandates. See Castro, 520 F.3d at 1064. The cases cited by Respondent are unpersuasive,

since those cases did not involve a court ordered bail hearing following a finding of indefinite

detention. Where, as here, the habeas petitioner has successfully secured a conditional release, that

petitioner is entitled to the habeas court’s continuing supervision to ensure the government’s

compliance with the court’s order. That is, he is entitled to a judicial determination as to whether the

government has established flight risk or dangerousness at the required Tijani bail hearing. Otherwise,

the habeas court’s grant of relief is meaningless. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001)

(recognizing the serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute that permits an indefinite

deprivation of human liberty without the protection of significant later judicial review); see also United

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States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention under Bail Reform Act of 1984,

stressing stringent time limitations, the fact that detention is reserved for the most serious of crimes,

the requirement of proof of dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, and the presence of

judicial safeguards).

By Respondents’ reasoning, Petitioner’s only recourse in the case of government noncompliance would be to file a new Tijani petition challenging his detention anew. Imposing such a

requirement would be burdensome and inefficient. Accordingly, the Court concludes it possesses

authority to review the IJ’s hearing for compliance with this Court’s order. 

2. The Tijani Bail Hearing

It is clear from the declaration of both counsel that the IJ relied exclusively on Petitioner’s past

criminal record in concluding Petitioner was presently dangerous. The Government apparently made

no argument regarding risk of flight and the IJ offered no analysis or comment on this point. It was this

dangerousness determination which the IJ indicated justified the denial of bond.

A review of the record reveals that Petitioner’s criminal record is indeed extensive. Petitioner’s

troublesome behavior spans three decades, beginning with juvenile adjudications related to theft and

a fight in 1982, continuing with his 1989 voluntary manslaughter conviction, a 2001 DUI conviction,

and a 2003 conviction for grand theft involving the theft of a diamond engagement ring from his thenfiancee. 

Despite these prior convictions, however, though some quite serious, the Court finds, based on

the undisputed description of the evidence, argument, and witnesses, put before the IJ, the government

did not meet its burden imposed by this Court of proving Petitioner’s present and future dangerousness.

Respondents highlight Petitioner’s 1989 conviction for voluntary manslaughter as evidence of

Petitioner’s violent character. Respondents assert that Petitioner’s testimony regarding this past crime

revealed that he had played an active role in the altercation by jumping on to the car in which the victim

was sitting and proceeding to kick out a window on the car. Petitioner vigorously disputes any such

testimony was elicited and has furnished three declarations to that effect. In the absence of a record,

the Court is unable to resolve the dispute. However, in any event, given the remoteness of this offense,

the Court finds it sheds little light on the issue of Petitioner’s potential danger to the community if

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released. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 544, 546 (old convictions are “no evidence” that release “would

unreasonably endanger public safety.”); Ngo, 192 F.3d at 398 (“The assessment of flight risk and

danger to the community must be made on a current basis”). The crime was committed decades ago

and there was no evidence that similar conduct, based on Petitioner’s demeanor, temperament, or

associations, was likely to recur. Cf. Hayward, 512 F.3d at 544 (crime committed decades ago and with

unusual provocation was unlikely to recur). Similarly, the specialized circumstances of Petitioner’s

only recent felony conviction, a five year old theft conviction for stealing an engagement ring from his

then fianceé—a woman who submitted a declaration on his behalf describing their currently friendly

relationship and Petitioner’s non-violent nature (See Decl. Keri Anderson, Mem. ISO, Ex. D.)—is weak

support for the proposition that Petitioner would present a danger to the community at large if released.

See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that preventative detention based on dangerousness should be

limited to specially dangerous individuals). Further, the government presented no evidence that

Petitioner had committed a disciplinary infraction in immigration custody nor did the government

present evidence of any negative behavioral episodes in the past five years in custody. This failure is

additional support against a finding of dangerousness. See id. at 691 (“When preventive detention is

potentially indefinite, th[e] dangerousness rationale must also be accompanied by some other special

circumstance, such as mental illness, that helps to create the danger.”). 

Where Petitioner’s only relevant conviction for violence is nearly 20 years old and no other

evidence indicating dangerousness was put forward, the IJ’s finding of present dangerousness was an

error of law and the denial of bond was inappropriate. 

Finally, the Court rejects Respondents’ claim that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 mandates bond in this case

be at least $1,500. Such cash bond has not been required for other Tijani petitioners who’s cases arose

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision. See e.g., Tijani, NO. 03cv1624 WQH

(RJB) (S.D. Cal. March 13, 2006) (Doc. No. 29.). 

Because the Court finds Respondents’ failure to meet their burden of establishing Petitioner is

a flight risk or a danger to the community mandates his release under appropriate conditions of

supervision, the Court need not consider whether other alleged deficiencies in the IJ proceeding,

including those related to notice and/or the lack of a written record, violated due process.

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CONCLUSION

The evidence before the IJ failed, as a matter of law, to prove flight risk or danger pursuant to

the Court’s order. Accordingly, under the facts of this case, Petitioner’s continued detention is not

authorized by statute. The Court therefore orders Respondents to release Petitioner under appropriate

conditions of supervision set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.5. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 10, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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