Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02266/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02266-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

United Sta.ta ~rt of Appeals FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

BRIAN A. CHURCH, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GEORGE E. SULLIVAN, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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AUG 2 G 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk · 

No. 89-2266 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.c. No. Civ. 87-0118 M) 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico 

(Hal Stratton, Attorney General, with her on the brief), for 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, ALDISERT* and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. 

* . Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, United States Circuit Judge of the 

Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner Church appeals an order of the district court, 

denying with prejudice his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

sought pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Church seeks habeas relief 

following his conviction on a jury verdict in Hidalgo County, 

New Mexico, as an accessory to an armed robbery in violation of 

N.M.Stat.Ann. §§ 30-16-2, 30-1-13 (1978). 1 We reverse the 

district court's determination that a procedural bar precluded 

habeas review of some of Church's claims; we remand for an 

evidentiary hearing on Church's Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of 

counsel claim and his due process claim of jury misconduct; we 

affirm the remaining decisions on Church's claims. 

1 

Respectively, these statutes provide: 

30-16-2. Robbery. 

Robbery consists of the 

value from the person of 

immediate control of another, 

use of force or violence. 

theft of 

another 

by use 

anything of 

or from the 

or threatened 

Whoever commits robbery is guilty of a third 

degree felony. 

Whoever commits robbery while armed with a deadly 

weapon is, for the first offense, guilty of a second 

degree felony and, for second and subsequent 

offenses, is guilty of a first degree felony. 

30-1-13. Accessory. 

A person may be charged with and convicted of the 

crime as an accessory if he procures, counsels, aids 

or abets in its commission and although he did not 

directly commit the crime and although the principal 

who directly committed such crime has not been 

prosecuted or convicted, or has been convicted of a 

different crime or degree of crime, or has been 

acquitted, or is a child under the Children's 

Code[.] 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 2 
( 

I. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

On the evening of June 13, 1985, three individuals were 

involved in the robbery of an elderly couple, Virginia and Carl 

Wilson, at the couple's home near Lordsburg, New Mexico. 

According to the Wilsons, one of the robbers was a man who had 

arrived at their home two or three days earlier requesting water 

for his overheated engine. Carl Wilson had accompanied the man to 

a jeep and then returned home without incident. The man, later 

identified as codefendant Ray Hernandez, was described by the 

Wilsons as a Hispanic man with a fu-manchu mustache. 

On the evening of the robbery, Hernandez returned to the 

Wilson home with a woman, later identified as Kimala Bailey. 

Under the pretext of a·courtesy visit to introduce "his wife," 

Hernandez and Bailey entered the Wilson home, whereupon Hernandez 

pulled a pistol on the Wilsons. After taping the Wilsons' hands 

and feet, Hernandez demanded to know where they kept their 

turquoise and gold. Virginia Wilson turned over a box containing 

unprocessed gold and some old coins. Hernandez then blindfolded 

the Wilsons. The house was searched for valuables, and in 

addition to the gold and coins, cash and jewelry were taken. At 

some time during this search, Virginia Wilson detected through her 

blindfold the presence and shape of a third robber whom she heard 

whispering to the other two. She described the third robber as 

male, short and slender. The robbers left the Wilsons tied up on 

their beds. While leaving the Wilsons' driveway, the robbers' 

vehicle knocked over a post and small tree. The Wilsons later 

freed themselves and summoned the police. 

3 

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At the crime scene Hidalgo County Sheriff Darnell observed 

and photographed three sets of footprints in the Wilson driveway. 

During his investigation over the next few days, Darnell, along 

with state policeman French, encountered Bailey and her boyfriend, 

Kelly Green, living at a campsite in the nearby Burro Mountains. 

Bailey told Darnell that on the day of the robbery a man named 

Brian driving a yellow jeep with a passenger named Hernandez had 

stopped at their campsite. At the mention of the jeep, French 

recalled that on June 1st, two weeks before the robbery, he had 

observed two men and a yellow jeep parked along a dead end road, 

less than a mile from the Wilson home. French had run and filed a 

registration check on the jeep. It was registered to Church and 

his fiance, Laura Wilson. 2 Subsequently Darnell also learned that 

on the evening of June 12th, another police officer had seen a 

yellow jeep with a black top, registration unknown, standing empty 

on the same road, within a quarter mile of the Wilson home. 

Using the registration address, Darnell phoned the Ruidoso 

police and asked them to locate Church and Laura. The two agreed 

to come into the Ruidoso police station, and at Darnell's request, 

they were fingerprinted and photographed. Over the phone, Church 

told Darnell that he had been prospecting in the Lordsburg area, 

but knew nothing about a robbery or a Hispanic man with a fumanchu mustache. Darnell returned to the campsite and 

photographed Green and Bailey. He also compared Bailey's 

footprints to those photographed at the Wilson home and found them 

to be similar. 

2 

To avoid confusion, Laura Wilson, who is not related to the 

victims, shall be referred to simply as "Laura." 

4 

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After seeing Bailey's photo, the Wilsons identified Bailey as 

the woman who robbed them. Darnell brought Bailey and Green into 

the station. Bailey confessed, implicating herself, Hernandez and 

Church. In her statement, Bailey said that on the morning of the 

robbery, she and Green had first met Hernandez and Church, who 

arrived at the campsite looking for an old prospecting claim 

belonging to Church's grandfather. According to Bailey, the two 

drove off in the jeep, but returned later for dinner. She said 

that after dinner, Church and Hernandez recruited her to help rob 

the Wilsons. Green refused to participate and stayed behind. 

Bailey said that during the robbery, Church waited in the jeep 

outside until the Wilsons were blindfolded, but then entered and 

did most of the searching. After Bailey finished her statement, 

Green turned over to the police the two jackets which the Wilsons 

had identified as being worn by the man and woman entering their 

home. Green also gave the police the Wilsons' gold and coin box. 

On this information, Church was arrested and his jeep was 

impounded. 

Darnell came to see Church in the Ruidoso jail on July 7, 

1985. Church was given Miranda warnings and he agreed to talk 

with Darnell. Although he initially denied involvement in the 

robbery, later that evening he requested that Darnell return to 

the jail. Darnell agreed to allow Church to speak with Laura at 

their home, after which Church made a taped statement confessing 

his participation as the third robber. 

A. Trial 

Church was tried before a jury in the Hidalgo County district 

court from March 11-13, 1986. The State's theory was that 

5 

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Church's motive for the robbery was revenge. There was evidence 

that Church had approached Carl Wilson in 1980, seeking 

information about mining property that Wilson and Church's 

grandfather had claimed as business partners, years before. 

Wilson initially refused to disclose the location, but after 

Church's repeated visits the same year, Wilson took Church to an 

old mining site. Nevertheless, Church still believed that Wilson 

had cheated Church's grandfather by staking a claim in the Burro 

Mountains without his grandfather's knowledge. As a result, 

Church spent considerable time searching the mountains for 

Wilson's claim markers. 

There was also evidence of the following facts. In 1981, 

Church was incarcerated in a federal prison. While there, he 

befriended Ray Hernandez. ·upon Church's release from prison in 

1983, he resumed his search in the mountains for proof of Wilson's 

alleged duplicity. 

Two days before the instant robbery Church telephoned 

Hernandez and then picked him up in Albuquerque. 

Church's yellow jeep to the Lordsburg area. The 

The two drove in 

day after the 

Wilson robbery, Church and Hernandez went to Church's home where 

they researched the value of some coins that Church claimed to 

have found in the mountains. Hernandez stayed overnight and 

Church drove him back to Albuquerque on June 15th. 

In addition to Church's confessions, the State offered in 

evidence a pistol belonging to Church. The State also presented 

evidence that Church sold unprocessed gold to a Ruidoso jeweler 

and some old coins to a Roswell, N.M., coin dealer shortly after 

the robbery. Additionally, the State presented receipts dated 

6 

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shortly after the robbery showing that Church purchased a new tire 

for his jeep (allegedly to replace one damaged while fleeing the 

crime scene) and that Church wired Hernandez $82.67 via Western 

Union. 

Church testified on his own behalf, denying any involvement 

in the robbery itself and asserting that he had been prospecting 

that night. He said he confessed to the crime only to protect 

Laura from Darnell's threats to arrest her on unfounded charges 

and to secure Darnell's promise to return the jeep and Laura's 

photos and fingerprints to her. According to Church, shortly 

before the robbery he had given Hernandez a ride from Albuquerque 

to Tularosa, N.M., where Hernandez' brother lived. After dropping 

Hernandez off on June 13, Church encountered Bailey and Green 

outside Lordsburg. Church alleged that Bailey asked him if he 

knew where she could obtain some 11 speed. 11 Church gave her 

Hernandez' phone number, and then went into the mountains until 

the following day. 

Church's defense theory was that Hernandez, Bailey and Green 

robbed the Wilsons while he was gone, using information obtained 

from Church that the Wilsons kept gold in their home. Church 

further posits that Bailey accused him to protect Green, the third 

robber. Moreover, Church contends that Green smuggled drugs to 

Bailey to ensure she would not change her story. Church also 

explained that the gold and coins he sold were his, and that the 

money sent to Hernandez was to repay an earlier debt. 

Both of the Wilsons testified at trial about the details of 

the robbery. Also, Kelly Green and Kimala Bailey testified as 

prosecution witnesses. In return for her testimony, Bailey 

7 

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received a lighter sentence for her involvement in the robbery. 

B. Conviction and Post-Trial Proceedings 

The jury convicted Church of a single count of accessory to 

an armed robbery. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, 

followed by two years of parole. 3 Church then appealed to the New 

Mexico Court of Appeals, alleging error because: (1) an 

involuntary confession was admitted in evidence against him; (2) 

the denial of his motion for a change in venue violated his right 

to an impartial jury; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to 

support his conviction. The state appeals court rejected each of 

these claims and Church's petition for certiorari to the New 

Mexico Supreme Court was denied without opinion. Church v. State, 

721 P.2d 1309 (N.M. 1986) (Table). 

Church then filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the Hidalgo County district court. In addition to the 

three grounds for reversal argued on his direct appeal, Church 

also alleged as constitutional errors that: (4) members of his 

jury were exposed to improper third party communications during a 

trial recess; (5) his trial counsel, Mr. Ogden, was ineffective 

due to a conflict of interests arising from his prior 

representation of Green, Ogden's failure to prepare, and the trial 

court's erroneous refusal to allow Church to act as co-counsel; 

(6) inconsistent testimony was admitted at trial in violation of 

due process. Accompanying the state habeas petition, Church filed 

motions for an evidentiary hearing and for the appointment of 

3 

Although not relevant to this appeal, Church's sentence was 

subsequently enhanced with four additional years of imprisonment 

following the filing by the State of a habitual offender 

supplemental information pursuant to N.M.Stat.Ann. § 31-18-17(C). 

8 

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counsel. The state habeas court denied the motions for 

appointment of counsel and a hearing and ruled against Church's 

petition on the merits. A pro se petition for a writ of 

certiorari to the state Supreme Court was denied without opinion. 

Having exhausted his state remedies, Church filed the instant 

habeas petition in the federal district court. The petition 

alleges all six of the claims raised in his state habeas petition. 

In addition, Church filed motions for evidentiary hearings on his 

involuntary confession, jury misconduct and conflict of interests 

claims, which were denied. The petition was referred to a federal 

magistrate. He issued proposed findings and recommended that the 

petition be dismissed with prejudice on various grounds. After a 

de nova review of the portions objected to, the district court 

adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendations in toto, and 

dismissed the habeas petition with prejudice. A timely notice of 

appeal was filed and a certificate of probable cause was issued by 

the district judge. 

II. 

Discussion 

Although Church presents a number of issues, we will discuss 

primarily the procedural default questions, the jury misconduct 

claim, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the 

voluntariness of his confessions. 

A. Procedural Default 

The federal district court did not reach Church's jury 

misconduct or due process claim concerning inconsistent testimony 

because it adopted the magistrate's determination that federal 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 9 
habeas review was precluded by procedural default. 4 Under the 

procedural default doctrine as defined in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 

U.S. 72 (1977), federal habeas review of a federal claim which a 

state court has refused to consider because of the petitioner's 

noncompliance with state procedural rules is barred "absent a 

showing of 'cause' and 'prejudice' attendant to a state procedural 

waiver[.]" Id. at 87. 

In Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), the Supreme Court 

created an exception to Sykes' cause and prejudice test by 

extending the "plain statement" rule of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 

1032 (1983), to federal habeas cases. Harris held that: "a 

procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim 

on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court 

rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that 

its judgment rests on a state procedural bar." 489 U.S. at 263 

(quotations omitted). The Court also noted, in footnote, that 

"(t]his rule necessarily applies only when a state court has been 

presented with the federal claim[.]" Id. at n.9; see also Teague 

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (plurality) (noting that the 

Harris rule is "simply inapplicable where the claim was 

never presented to the state courts"). 

4 

In fact, the magistrate found that Church had also defaulted 

on his three-pronged ineffective assistance claim, discussed in 

Part II C, infra. Nonetheless, because the magistrate concluded 

that the ineffective assistance challenge fell within New Mexico's 

fundamental error exception to its waiver rule, the magistrate 

reached the merits of this claim. See IR., Doc. 47 at 3-6, 8-13. 

Although there is some confusion created because the magistrate's 

procedural default analysis overlaps part of the ineffective 

assistance claim, see id. at 13 (listing "ground 4" as barred), we 

read the opinion to have reached the merits on all three prongs of 

the ineffective assistance claim. 

10 

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In applying Harris here, the magistrate looked not to the 

New Mexico habeas court decision, but to the earlier state court 

of appeals decision on direct review. Although the state habeas 

court had reached the merits of Church's claims without addressing 

or raising a procedural default question, the federal magistrate 

discounted that court's opinion because of his view that the state 

habeas court "did not have jurisdiction to decide those issues" 

due to waiver by Church of the claims. See IR., Doc. 47 at 11 

n.6; State v. Gillihan, 524 P.2d 1335 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) 

(holding that under New Mexico procedural rules, issues suitable 

for resolution by direct appeal but not there raised are waived 

for later state habeas petitions). Thus, the magistrate concluded 

that 

the last state court in a position to render judgment 

was the court of appeals when it ruled on the merits of 

petitioner's direct appeal. At that time, petitioner 

had not raised the issues in question at all in the 

state court •.•. Therefore, according to Teaque, the 

Harris exception does not apply and procedural default 

exists. 

Id. at 11-12. Finding that Church failed to establish "cause" and 

"prejudice" as required by Sykes, the magistrate refused to reach 

these claims. As noted, this ruling was adopted by the district 

court. 

We are persuaded that the rulings of the district court and 

the magistrate were in error in holding two claims (the jury 

misconduct claim and the due process claim concerning inconsistent 

testimony) were precluded from federal habeas review. The Supreme 

Court has recently revisited the procedural bar issues in Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, u.s. __ , 111 s.ct. 2590 ( 1991). There, the 

Court faced the question whether a California Supreme Court order 

11 

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denying a second habeas petition without explanation constituted a 

"decision on the merits" sufficient to lift the procedural bar 

imposed earlier on a direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit had held 

that the state ruling did constitute a decision on the merits due 

to a presumption that when a federal claim is denied without 

explicit reliance on state grounds, the merits of the federal 

claim are the basis for the judgment. 

disagreed. 

The Supreme Court 

The Court focused on the problem of what meaning should be 

attributed to "formulary orders" orders stating no reasons for 

the rulings. The Court held that 

Attributing a reason [to a formulary order is] ... both difficult and artificial. We think that the 

attribution necessary for federal habeas purposes can be 

facilitated, and sound results more often assured, by 

applying the following presumption: where there has 

been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal 

claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment 

or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. 

If an earlier opinion 'fairly appear[s] to rest 

primarily upon federal law,' Coleman, U.S., at 

~~-' 111 S.Ct., at 2559, we will presume that no 

procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent 

unexplained order that leaves the judgment or its 

consequences in place. Similarly where, as here, the 

last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a 

procedural default, we will presume that a later 

decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard 

that bar and consider the merits. 

111 s.ct. at 2594.5 

As instructed by the Supreme Court, we must focus on the last 

state court decision explaining its resolution of Church's federal 

5 

The Sykes requirements of "cause" and "prejudice" apply where 

the state courts were never presented with a federal claim, and 

where a state procedural default rule would therefore bar their 

review. See Teague Y...!... Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989) 

(plurality); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982). Here the 

federal claims were presented to the New Mexico habeas court and 

thus no such procedural problem faces Church. 

12 

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claims. See Ylst, 111 S.Ct. at 2595. we are convinced that as 

used in Ylst, Harris, and Coleman v. Thompson, u.s. --- ___ , 

111 s.ct. 2546, 2550 (1991), the New Mexico habeas court decision 

is dispositive. Moreover, that court's ruling on the merits of 

Church's federal claims meets the Coleman condition because it 

"fairly appeared to rest primarily on resolution of those claims, 

or to be interwoven with those claims," so that a procedural bar 

does not apply here. Coleman, 111 S.Ct. at 2557; Harris, 489 

U.S. at 261; Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147-54 (1979). 

We are satisfied that the New Mexico habeas court did not 

invoke a procedural bar as to any claim before it. As noted, the 

magistrate held that the New Mexico habeas court had no 

jurisdiction to reach the merits of various federal claims of 

Church and hence disregarded its rulings on their merits. We feel 

this analysis is in error under the Supreme Court's decisions and 

reject this approach because it is "intrusive for a federal court 

to second-guess a state court's determination of state law." 

Harris, 489 U.S. at 264. Accordingly, the magistrate and the 

district court here erred in failing to address Church's claims on 

the basis of procedural default under New Mexico law. 

B. The Due Process Claims of Jury Misconduct 

and Inconsistent Testimony 

Church first presented his due process claim of improper 

juror contact to the state court in his pro se habeas petition 

accompanied by motions for an evidentiary hearing and for the 

appointment of counsel. The state habeas court denied the motions 

and rejected Church's claim on the merits, stating: "[t]here is 

no showing that any juror 'broke the Judge's order not to discuss 

the case', and there is no showing that any juror discussed Church 

13 

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and the trial with the jailer's wife, whoever she might be." I 

R., Doc. 7, Ex. I at 2, 114. The state habeas court did not hold a 

hearing. Church's petition for certiorari to the New Mexico 

Supreme Court was denied. 

In the federal district court, Church again raised this 

claim. Accompanying his motion for an evidentiary hearing in 

federal court were the affidavits of Michelle and Robert Miller, 

acquaintances of the defendant. See IR., Attachments to Doc. 40. 

According to Ms. Miller's affidavit, during an afternoon break at 

Church's trial she observed a woman that Church had identified to 

her as his "head jailer's wife" speak with "some of the jurors" 

for about "ten minutes." Id. Ms. Miller stated that "[a]lthough 

I did not hear most of the conversation, at one point I heard the 

woman mention Brian Church's name." Id. In his affidavit, Mr. 

Miller also claims to have observed this same woman during the 

same break "talking to several of the jury members." Mr. Miller's 

affidavit states, "I overheard her saying, 'How could he (or they) 

do this to these old people?' and 'How could anybody do this?'" 

Id. Moreover, his affidavit alleges that "the jury and the 

victims and other spectators to the trial all mingled together 

during the breaks in the hallway." Id. 

The federal district court did not consider Church's request 

for an evidentiary hearing on his improper juror contact claim 

because it found federal review precluded by procedural default. 

We have held that ruling was in error. And having considered the 

arguments of both parties on the merits of this request, we 

conclude that Church is entitled to the requested evidentiary 

hearing under Townsend. 

14 

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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made 

applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "[i]n all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial 

by an impartial jury . • . [and to] be confronted with the 

witnesses against him[.]" Indeed, claims of improper juror 

contact touch "the core of the Sixth Amendment's right to ..• an 

impartial jury[.]" United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099, 1103 

(10th Cir. 1987); see also Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 

743 (4th Cir. 1988) ("No right touches more the heart of fairness 

in a trial."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). 

The Supreme Court has recognized that "the remedy for 

allegations of juror partiality is a hearing" on the merits. See 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). So, too, we have 

concluded that "[w]hen a trial court is apprised of the fact that 

an extrinsic influence may have tainted the trial, the proper 

remedy is a hearing to determine the circumstances of the improper 

contact and the extent of prejudice, if any, to the defendant." 

United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954)), 

cert. denied sub nom., Green v. United States, 489 U.S. 1069 

(1989). 

To date, there has been no hearing at all on Church's claim 

of improper juror contact despite the allegations in the Miller 

affidavits. 

Church to 

authorities 

These 

entitle 

cited 

affidavits present a 

him to an evidentiary 

above. Accordingly, we 

15 

sufficient showing by 

hearing under the 

remand the issue of 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 15 
improper juror contact to the federal district court for an 

evidentiary hearing. 

We hold, however, that Church's other due process claim, 

precluded from review below, is without merit. Church argues that 

the Wilsons' statements at and before trial "were so inconsistent 

with each other that his rights to due process and a fair trial 

have been violated." Appellants Brief at 49-50. Church cites no 

authority for this submission, nor does he identify specific 

inconsistencies for our review. We agree with the State that any 

inconsistencies that existed were either clarified at trial or 

resolved by the jury. See United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 

1531, 1535 (10th Cir.) (noting that resolution of conflicting 

testimony is the "exclusive province of the jury"), cert. denied, 

110 s.ct. 3252 (1990). 

c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Church launches a three-pronged challenge to the 

effectiveness of his trial counsel, alleging that counsel worked 

under an impermissible conflict of interests, that counsel was 

inadequately prepared to try the case, and that the trial court 

should have permitted Church to act as co-counsel because his 

attorney was inadequately prepared. See Appellant's Brief at 

44-48. We will address these challenges separately. 

1. Conflict of Interests 

At some time prior to Church's trial, Kelly Green was 

arrested, tried and convicted for smuggling methamphetamine to his 

girlfriend, Kimala Bailey, while she was in jail awaiting trial 

for the instant armed robbery. See T.13 at 14:30-16:55, 3/12/86. 

Green's attorney in the methamphetamine proceeding was Carlos 

16 

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Ogden. Ogden was later appointed to represent Church in the 

New Mexico robbery case following the withdrawal of Church's first 

attorney, who handled the preliminary hearing. 

At Church's trial, both Green and Bailey testified for the 

State. Church's defense theory was that Green was actually the 

"third robber" and that Bailey had implicated Church to protect 

Green. Consistent with this theory, Church sought to show that 

Green's conviction for smuggling methamphetamine to Bailey 

resulted from Green's efforts to ensure that Bailey continued to 

"cover" for him. See id. at 38:45-39:30, T.17 at 4:45-5:10, 

3/13/86; Appellant's Brief at 45. 

In his pro se state habeas petition, Church first raised this 

conflict issue as part of a general attack on the effectiveness of 

his trial counsel. The state habeas court, implicitly denying 

Church's claim, stated only: "Church claims his second attorney 

(Carlos Ogden?) had a conflict of interest when he represented the 

witness against Church. Church does not name names or tell us 

what he is talking about. This court is not able to devine [sic] 

what this is all about." IR., Doc. 7, Ex. J. No evidentiary 

hearing was ever held in state court on this claim. 

In the federal district court, Church specifically argued 

that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 

assistance of counsel because of the successive representations by 

Ogden of Church and Green. Church claims that Ogden was unable to 

adequately cross-examine Green on Green's role as the third robber 

for fear of violating the attorney-client privilege. See 

Appellant's Brief at 46. 

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The federal magistrate rejected this claim without an 

evidentiary hearing. First, the magistrate ruled that Church had 

"abandoned the issue when he sought a writ of certiorari" 

following denial of his state habeas petition. IR., Doc. 47 at 

4. Moreover, the magistrate found the claim to be without merit 

because Ogden had "informed the court that he had previously 

represented Kelly Green in connection with Green's smuggling dope 

to his girlfriend" and that Ogden "fully cross-examined Kelly 

Green; particularly, concerning Green's involvement in the drug 

smuggling incident." Id. at 5. In his subsequent objections to 

the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations, Church 

requested an evidentiary hearing on this matter. IR., Doc. 48 at 

4, 11 4. The district court, in adopting the magistrate's view, 

implicitly denied this request. On appeal, Church argues that the 

district court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on 

his conflict of interests claim as required by Townsend v. Sain, 

372 U.S. 293 (1963). 

Under Townsend, there are two steps to determining whether an 

evidentiary hearing is required. First, before a federal court 

may exercise its power in habeas corpus to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing, the applicant must "allege[] facts which, if proved, 

would entitle him to relief[.]" Id. at 312. Once a claimant 

satisfies this initial inquiry, Townsend explains, "the federal 

court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the 

habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary 

hearing in the state court, either at the time of the trial or in 

a collateral proceeding." Id., 372 U.S. at 312. 

18 

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Without question, Church has had no evidentiary hearing on 

this issue, either by the state or federal courts. Thus, the only 

question in this portion of Church's appeal is the ·threshold one, 

whether he has alleged the requisite facts that would entitle him 

to relief. 

The Supreme Court has declared that: "[w]here a 

constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases 

hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is 

free from conflicts of interest." Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 

271 (1981). In this circuit, we apply the conflict principles 

from multiple representation cases to successive representation 

cases involving factually related litigation. See United States 

v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605, 610 (10th Cir. 1983). 

To establish a Sixth Amendment conflict violation, "a 

defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that 

an actual conflict of interests adversely affected his lawyer's 

performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) 

(footnote omitted). Moreover, "if the defendant can show that his 

attorney's previous representation of the witness adversely 

affected the adequacy of the defendant's representation, then the 

defendant need not demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief." 

Winkle, 722 F.2d at 610 (citing Cuyler). 

We believe that Church has shown the existence of an "actual 

conflict" within the meaning of Cuyler. This showing is 

sufficient to entitle him to the relief sought -- an evidentiary 

hearing -- in which he might develop facts sufficient to prove 

that the conflict adversely affected his representation. Should 

19 

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he succeed, he would then be entitled to Cuyler's presumption of 

prejudice. 

Initially, we note that the magistrate inaccurately concluded 

that Church "abandoned" his conflict claim in applying to the 

New Mexico Supreme Court for collateral relief. In his petition 

for state habeas relief, Church designated the conflict of 

interests claim as part of his sixth ground for relief. See I R., 

Doc. 7, Ex. Hat 2. Subsequently, Church filed a prose petition 

in the New Mexico Supreme Court which omits this ground in the 

"Questions Presented for Review" section. Nevertheless, Church 

clearly raised this Sixth Amendment claim before that court by 

alleging in the same petition that: "Petitioner's right to 

effective assistance of counsel was violated [because of] 

the second attorney's conflict of interest when attorney [sic] 

represented a witness against the petitioner[.] The second 

attorney (Carlos Ogden) represented Kelly Green (on a drug charge) 

who was the co-defendant's boyfriend who testified against 

petitioner [sic]. 11 I R., Doc. 7, Ex. J at 3. Thus, this claim 

was not "abandoned." 

The uncontested facts of this case show an inherent, but 

actual, conflict of interests. 6 At trial, Church's defense theory 

sought to show that Green was the third robber, and that Green 

smuggled drugs to Bailey to ensure she would continue to inculpate 

Church. Whether one believes this theory or not, there is no 

6 

As background, we also note that Church's 

Ogden involved some level of dissension. 

1:00-1:21, 3/11/86 (Church threatens to strike 

to the court); id. at 3:40-3:48 (Church, 

files handwritten motions to the court). 

20 

relationship with 

See, e.g., T.l at 

Ogden in a letter 

though represented, 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 20 
dispute that Green was present during the planning of the crime 

and later division of the loot in his camp. Green also knew where 

the stolen box and robbers' jackets had been stashed. T. 13 at 

11:25-12:40, 18:50-23:20, 3/12/86. More significantly, Green 

himself testified on direct that Bailey "promised me that if I did 

that [smuggled drugs to her], she'd go ahead and give her 

testimony and everything, and help, which she had pretty much been 

doing at the time." Id. at 15:35-15:55, 3/12/86. Thus, the 

record shows, without contradiction, that Green was somewhat 

involved with the robbers, and that his efforts to smuggle drugs 

to Bailey were factually related to promoting her subsequent 

testimony against Church at trial. Since Ogden represented Green 

for smuggling drugs to Bailey, the representation necessarily 

involved the circumstances ·and motivation for Green's actions 

topics clearly covered by the attorney-client privilege. Absent a 

waiver by Green, Ogden could not fully cross-examine him in these 

areas about any privileged information he received. 

In United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1990), we 

there explained that "[w]hen defense counsel has previously 

represented a government witness in a related case, the primary 

conflict-of-interest concern is that defense counsel may not be 

able to effectively cross-examine the witness for fear of 

divulging privileged information." Id. at 1501. Accord Winkle, 

722 F.2d at 611. Here although Ogden questioned Green about his 

possible involvement in the armed robbery and his reasons for 

smuggling drugs to Bailey, there were no questions ever posed 

about Green's sentence or the circumstances which led him to 

testify (e.g., whether a plea agreement was reached). See T.13 at 

21 

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15:25-17:05, 35:30-38:10, 3/12/86; T.17 at 4:31-5:22, 3/13/86. 

Nor was Green closely scrutinized about the circumstances by which 

he was permitted to meet with Bailey while they were both in jail 

following Green's arrest. T.13 at 35:38-37:45, 3/12/86. 7 Such 

omissions, though possibly innocent or explainable, nonetheless 

demonstrate likely areas in which Ogden would be hindered in 

cross-examining his former client. 

In Bowie, we recognized that "'[a]ctual conflict' and 

'adverse effect' are not self defining phrases." Id. at 1500. We 

are aware that "there is no per se rule prohibiting representation 

of a defendant by counsel who has previously represented a 

government witness in a related case[.]" However, in the 

context of successive representations, we find it difficult to 

envision circumstances more fraught with inherent conflict than 

where an appointed attorney representing a reluctant defendant 

must present a defense theory inculpating the attorney's former 

client, particularly where the former representation was factually 

intertwined with the criminal defendant's case. See, e.g., Bowie, 

892 F.2d 1502 (noting "the potential for conflict is great where 

there is a substantial relationship between the cases"). Here we 

feel that Church has demonstrated an actual conflict of 

interests. 8 

7 

Nor is it disputed that Bailey also received certain special 

privileges while incarcerated. On at least one occasion, her 

jailer purchased carry-out fast food for her, and Sheriff Darnell 

loaned her money for unspecified purposes. See T.12 at 

44:35-45:05, 3/12/86; T.17 at 13:00-14:08, 3/13/86. 

8 

We are aware that in Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863 (1987), a case with many factual 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

22 

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We cannot dismiss Church's claim, as did the court below, 

merely because the state trial court may have been aware of the 

former representation. First, we are unable to find support in 

the record for the magistrate's determination that the trial court 

was informed of the details of Ogden's former representation of 

Green. I R., Doc. 47 at 5. Indeed, of record, the former 

representation is mentioned only once. There, Ogden states, in 

passing, that "Kelly Green has, [sic] I represented him on that 

9 thing, and he's gained weight." T.16 at 6:20-6:37, 3/12/86. The 

(Footnote continued): 

similarities to this one, the Eleventh Circuit refused to find an 

inherent conflict when defense counsel had previously represented 

"the most likely other suspect[.]" Id. at 1404-07. There, 

however, the former representation, involving a marijuana 

conviction, was not "substantially related to [the attorney's] 

later representation of petitioner[.]" Id. at 1406. Here, 

Green's testimony shows ·a close connection between the two 

representations. Moreover, the Smith opinion does not reveal 

whether Smith's trial theory sought to show that the former client 

was really the guilty party. These facts make Smith 

distinguishable. 

Finally, to the extent that the Smith holding relies on the 

Eleventh Circuit's view that "it is more difficult to prove that 

successive representation caused an actual conflict of interest 

than that simultaneous representation did so[,]" id. at 1405, we 

feel this view is inconsistent with our holdings in Winkle and 

Bowie. 

9 

During a recess in the trial, a juror had asked the trial 

judge if both Green and Church could stand together before the 

jury so that their physiques could be compared with the 

description of the third robber. Ogden's remark about a 

"representation" came during an objection to this in-court 

show-up, and reads in full: 

Your honor, I think it takes on the aura of a 

lineup. Kelly Green has [sic], I represented him 

on that thing, and he's gained weight. I think 

there'd be, [sic] the probative value, [sic] would 

be prejudicial, irrelevant. I think the jury would 

draw the wrong inferences. 

Id. at 6:20-6:46. We are unable to find any other references to 

the former representation anywhere else in the New Mexico 

proceedings. 

23 

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State argues and the magistrate found that the trial court was 

aware of the potential conflict. If this were the case, we note 

that Cuyler "mandates a reversal when the trial court has failed 

to make an inquiry even though it 'knows or reasonably should know 

that a particular conflict exists.'" Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 

261, 272 n.18 (1981) (quoting Cuyler) (emphasis in original); see 

Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 548, 555 (2d Cir. 1991). However, 

we do not believe that the circumstances were sufficient "to alert 

the trial court to a potential conflict[.]" Id. at 555. As a 

federal habeas court we presume the propriety of state court 

proceedings until shown otherwise. Thus, we cannot say that the 

state trial court should have known of the conflict as a result of 

Ogden's sole, unspecified reference to "that· thing." 

In any event Ogden '·s cross-examination of Green was not 

sufficient to cure the conflicting representation of taint. As 

shown by our disposition in Bowie, the mere fact that crossexamination might appear "vigorous" does not necessarily expunge 

this aspect of the constitutional error. See id. at 1502. 

Rather, the dangers inherent in successive and multiple 

representations do not become apparent merely by scrutinizing what 

the attorney did: "representation of conflicting interests is 

suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from 

doing." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978). The 

apparent "vigor" of cross-examination is but a factor to be 

considered in determining whether a conflict adversely affected 

counsel's performance. Thus, Bowie created a test which holds 

that defense counsel's 

adversely affected his 

former, conflicting representation 

performance "if a specific and seemingly 

24 

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valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic was available to 

defense counsel, but it was inherently in conflict with his duties 

to others or to his own personal interests." Id. at 1500. As 

noted, the record in this case is insufficient to resolve the 

factual issue of "adverse affect." In Bowie, where there had been 

no inquiry into possible conflicts, we remanded for an evidentiary 

hearing. See id. at 1500, 1502. We do so here on the adverse 

effect question. 

On remand, the district court should determine whether either 

of two waivers occurred because if Green "waive(d] his 

attorney-client privilege, then any potential conflict is 

removed[,]" and further, Church may have "waived his right to 

counsel free of such conflicts." Bowie, 892 F.2d at 1502; see 

also Holloway, 450 U.S. at ·493 n.5 (1978) ("a defendant may waive 

his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a 

conflict of interests"). There is no mention that Church was ever 

apprised of the conflicting representation before trial, and an 

evidentiary hearing should resolve this key concern. 

If the district court finds that Church's representation was 

adversely affected by the conflict and that there was no valid 

waiver, the court should fashion a remedy "as law and justice 

require." 28 u.s.c. § 2243; see, e.g., Bromley v. Crisp, 561 

F.2d 1351, 1364 (10th Cir. 1977) (en bane) (constitutional defects 

found on habeas review may be remedied by further proceedings), 

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 

261, 265 (10th Cir. 1972). 

25 

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2. Failure to Prepare 

Although we remand the conflict issue for an evidentiary 

hearing, we affirm the district court's ruling and the 

magistrate's conclusion that Church did not show ineffectiveness 

of counsel by his failure to prepare for trial. As the magistrate 

noted, to establish this claim Church must satisfy the Strickland 

v. Washington standard by showing "(1) the assistance of his 

counsel was outside the bounds of professional conduct; and (2) 

that petitioner was actually prejudiced by his counsel's deficient 

performance." I R., Doc. 47 at 6 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984)). 

Church argues that Ogden was inadequately prepared because he 

failed to listen to the preliminary hearing tapes before 

presenting Church's motion·to suppress. As a result, Ogden twice 

failed to impeach Sheriff Darnell's claim that he never told 

Church that Laura was a suspect in this case.

10 Church also 

claims that Ogden's performance was constitutionally infirm 

because he failed to highlight to the jury the inconsistencies 

between the Wilsons' preliminary hearing and trial testimony 

concerning the date that Hernandez first visited the Wilson home. 

We need not address whether Ogden's performance fell below 

the standard of reasonable professional norms because we agree 

with the conclusion below that Church has "failed to show 

[that his] defense was prejudiced in any way by some deficient 

performance on the part of his counsel." IR., Doc. 47 at 6. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (noting that "a court need not 

10 

The significance of this testimony is discussed more fully in 

Part II D, infra. 

26 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 26 
determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of 

the alleged deficiencies"); United States v. Taylor, 832 F.2d 

1187, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 1987) (same). 

As we have noted before, "the mere failure to cross-examine a 

witness does not necessarily require a finding of ineffective 

assistance of counsel." United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 

1002 (10th Cir. 1990). Although we do not condone Ogden's failure 

to review the preliminary hearing tapes before the motion to 

suppress hearing, we cannot say that Church was prejudiced 

thereby. Moreover, Church concedes that Ogden did listen to the 

tapes before the trial, see Appellant's Brief at 47. We also see 

no prejudice in Ogden's failure to "impeach" Darnell or the 

Wilsons on these points. At the preliminary hearing, Darnell was 

asked whether he had ever indicated to Church that Laura was a 

suspect. 

know." 

He replied: "I'm not sure ... 

T.5 at 28:35-28:58, 8/30/85. 

• I may have, I don't 

Later, at the suppression 

hearing, Church rebutted Darnell's claim with his own recollection 

of the earlier preliminary hearing testimony. See T.3 at 

16:25-17:45, 2/18/86. 

Recognizing that New Mexico law permits using prior 

inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, see Tapia v. 

Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1561 n.12 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing State v. 

Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 143 (Ct. App. 1978)), nevertheless, we view 

this equivocal testimony at the preliminary hearing as weak 

impeachment material, at best. By itself, it fails to undermine 

our confidence in the fairness of Church's trial. Further, the 

fact that the Wilsons misstated the date of Hernandez' pre-robbery 

27 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 27 
visit to their home does not undermine their credibility as to the 

events of the night of the robbery. Church bears the burden of 

demonstrating how more extensive cross-examination of Darnell or 

the Wilsons might have changed the outcome of this trial. See 

Miller, 907 F.2d at 1002; United States v. Voigt, 877 F.2d 1465, 

1468 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 517 (1989). He has not 

carried that burden. 

3. Right to Act as Co-counsel 

The third prong in Church's ineffective assistance claim is 

unpersuasive. Church argues that because Ogden was not present at 

the preliminary hearing, the trial court erred in denying Church 

the right to act as co-counsel. While Church "had a right to 

conduct his own defense under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 

(1975), he had no right ·to some sort of 'hybrid' representation 

where he acted as co-counsel." I R., Doc. 47 at 4 (citing 

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984)). Accord United 

States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1991) (no error in 

trial court's refusal to allow represented defendant to 

cross-examine witnesses), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2272 (1991). As 

noted above, Church was permitted to testify about his memory of 

the preliminary hearing testimony. 

D. Voluntariness of Confessions 

Both Church and Darnell testified in state court at a motion 

to suppress hearing about the circumstances surrounding Church's 

f . 11 con essions. Church said that during an interview at the jail, 

11 

Deputy Sheriff 

a review of her 

police dispatcher's 

Diaz also testified at this hearing. However, 

testimony shows that she was in the adjacent 

room at the Ruidoso jail during all the time 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

28 

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Darnell accused him of lying and sent him back to his cell after 

he denied any involvement. See T.1 at 1:55-250, 2/18/86. Later, 

when questioning resumed, Church claims Darnell threatened to 

arrest his fiance, Laura. Continuing to protest his innocence, 

Church then conceded that he had been aware of the scheme, but had 

only agreed to sell the stolen property. He also admitted 

replacing the jeep tire that was damaged when the robbers fled. 

Darnell, however, insisted that Church "make a convincing 

statement" or else Laura would be arrested on aiding and abetting 

charges. Id. at 5:02-5:25, 7:50-9:10, 11:30-12:05. 

When Church agreed to confess, Darnell briefed him on the 

full facts of the robbery, giving him a copy of Green's and 

Bailey's statements and the affidavit accompanying Church's arrest 

warrant. Church also contends that Darnell further induced the 

confessions by promising to return to Laura the jeep, her only 

mode of transportation, and by promising to return Laura's 

photographs and fingerprints to her. Id. at 5:02-5:15, 9:20-9:50. 

Later that evening, Church asked Darnell for an opportunity to 

speak to Laura before making a full statement. Darnell agreed, 

and took Church home. After an emotional discussion with Laura in 

which Church told her that he had to confess to protect her, 

Church gave a full tape-recorded statement to Darnell at the 

kitchen table. The jeep was returned to Laura the following day 

and the photographs and fingerprints were returned to her some 

time later. Id. at 9:57-11:25. 

(Footnote continued): 

that Darnell questioned Church and was unable to hear any of the 

disputed conversation. See T.3 at 5:26-16:25, 2/18/86. 

29 

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( 

Darnell denied making any threats or promises to induce the 

confessions. Moreover, he asserted that there was no probable 

cause for him to believe that Laura was involved. Id. at 

30:00-31:50, 37:30-37:55; T.2 at 00:30-00:50, 37:15-37:40, 

2/18/86. Darnell acknowledged that he gave Church copies of the 

statements and affidavits which led him to suspect Church's 

involvement. So confronted, Darnell said that Church initially 

gave a limited statement admitting his role in the plan to sell 

the stolen goods, but later that evening Church asked that Darnell 

return for a more complete statement. When Darnell arrived, 

Church asked to speak to Laura before giving a full statement. 

Darnell agreed and transported Church home where, at Darnell's 

request, Laura turned over a handgun which was later identified as 

the robbery weapon. Darnell permitted Church and Laura to speak 

semi-privately -- under visual observation only after which, 

Church made a full confession. T.2 at 2:30-17:25. Darnell 

concedes having returned the jeep to Laura the next day despite 

his belief that the jeep constituted evidence in the case, 

indicating that she agreed to make it available when needed, and 

that he thus avoided the problem of transporting it to Lordsburg 

for the trial. He also acknowledged that the photos and 

fingerprints were returned to Laura sometime later. 

18:30-20:25, 41:25-42:30. 

Id. at 

At the end of the suppression hearing, at which Church's 

counsel was permitted to cross-examine Darnell thoroughly, the 

state trial court denied the motion to suppress. The judge's 

ruling, in full, states: 

30 

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Well, if you get a case, which almost never 

happens, it seems like, where there's no conflict in the 

testimony surrounding an admission or confession, then 

the court can make a ruling as a matter of law: yes, 

this is and should be suppressed or this can be admitted 

without even an instruction to the jury. But what I've 

heard all day is a big conflict in the testimony. If I, 

[sic] if it were exactly like Mr. Church said, I 

wouldn't have much problem suppressing the statement. 

But there is a conflict in testimony, and writers of 

U.J.I. [Uniform Jury Instructions] criminal recognize 

that we do get conflicts. U.J.I. 40.40 states as 

follows: "Evidence has been admitted concerning the 

statement allegedly made by the defendant. Before you 

consider such statement for any purpose you must 

determine that the statement was given voluntarily. In 

determining whether a statement was voluntarily given 

you should consider if it was freely made and not 

induced by promise or threat." 

Other case law, State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 

where the judge on record passed on the voluntariness 

and admissibility at a suppression hearing and submitted 

the statements to the jury with a charge which complied 

with this instruction, the defense argument that his 

statements were the product of promises and inducement 

was to be considered with all the conflicting evidence 

and it was not for the appellate court to substitute its 

own judgment for that of the trier of fact and the trial 

judge. So, in the end it's up to the jury that's going 

to decide whether or not this was a voluntary statement 

and whether or not there were any promises or 

inducement. 

The court preliminarily will find that the 

statement was voluntarily CsicJ, voluntarv and 

admissible for consideration of the jury but subject to 

the, CsicJ. all the evidence that might be produced in 

that connection and the jury instruction which I've just 

read to you. Therefore the court would, at this time, 

deny the motion for suppression. 

(T.3 at 25:05-27:45, 2/18/86) (emphasis added). 

After reviewing the record, the federal magistrate 

considering Church's habeas petition rejected Church's claim that 

his confessions were involuntary. No evidentiary hearing was 

held. The magistrate first focused on the trial court's mention 

of the conflict in testimony at the suppression hearing. The 

magistrate then noted that the jury was properly instructed on 

31 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 31 
voluntariness before it found the statements voluntary. Thus, the 

magistrate concluded that "the admission of petitioner's 

statement[s) into evidence at his state court trial was proper." 

12 See IR., Doc. 47 at 3, 1111 5-8. 

On appeal, Church argues that the federal district court 

erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

voluntariness of his post-arrest statements. Church contends that 

the State failed to provide him a full and fair hearing in which 

the trial court made an independent determination of voluntariness 

before permitting the question to go to the jury, as required by 

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The trial court's ruling, 

Church argues, shows that "the trial judge in this case evidenced 

a misunder-standing [sic) of his role in the voluntariness 

determination." Appellant's Brief at 25. Because the state trial 

court "refused to make a credibility choice and instead decided to 

leave the voluntariness decision to the jury[,]" id. at 26, the 

district court was obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing under 

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 

we agree that the facts Church testified to in his 

suppression hearing, if true, might entitle him to suppression of 

the statements. See United States v. Chalen, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307-

08 (10th Cir. 1987) (describing factors relevant to assess 

voluntariness); Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 

12 

We do not read the magistrate's conclusion as relying upon 

the jury's determination of voluntariness to justify admission of 

the confessions. Jackson v. Denno, cited by the magistrate, 

clearly forbids such a conclusion. See id., 378 U.S. 368, 382-91 

(1964). 

32 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 32 
1985) (unfounded threats to prosecute wife constitute coercive 

conduct); Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873, 877-79 (4th Cir. 1977) 

(threats to "live-in" girlfriend coercive). Thus, under Townsend, 

we must determine whether Church "receive[d] a full and fair 

evidentiary hearing in the state court, either at the time of the 

trial or in a collateral proceeding." Id., 372 U.S. at 312. 

In Jackson, the Court held that "[a) defendant objecting to 

the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in 

which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of 

his confession are actually and reliably determined." Jackson, 

378 U.S. at 380. This determination "requires facing the 

[voluntariness) issue squarely, in illuminating isolation and 

unbeclouded by other issues and the effect of extraneous but 

prejudicial evidence." Id. at 390. The Due Process Clause 

requires that the states ensure that "the trial judge, another 

judge, or another jury, but not the convicting jury, fully 

resolves the issue of voluntariness" before a confession is 

admitted in evidence. See id. at 391 & n.19. 

In Townsend, the Court explained that "if no express findings 

of fact have been made by the state court, the District Court must 

initially determine whether the state court has impliedly found 

material facts." Id. at 314. Moreover, the Court said: 

If the state court has decided the merits of the claim 

but has made no express findings, it may still be 

possible for the District Court to reconstruct the 

findings of the state trier of fact, either because his 

view of the facts is plain from his opinion or because 

of other indicia. 

Id. Although Townsend may require a federal court to search for 

implicit factual findings, the facts so found must not be the 

33 

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result of speculation or surmise: "Although the judge need not 

make formal findings of fact or write an opinion, his conclusion 

that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with 

unmistakable clarity." Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 (1966). 

We are convinced that the state trial court clearly found the 

statements "voluntary and admissible," T. 3 at 27:25-27:45, 

2/18/86, although the judge did not expressly state the facts 

supporting his conclusion. Thus, Townsend requires that we 

attempt to "reconstruct" the facts, if possible, from the state 

court ruling. If the necessary facts are implicit in the state 

court's ruling, the federal district court was not required to 

hold an evidentiary hearing, though it remained within its 

discretion to do so. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318; Cranford v. 

Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860, . 862-63 (10th Cir . 1975); see also 

PhilliQS v. MurQhy, 796 F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir. 1986) (no 

evidentiary hearing required where factual dispute resolved). 

We review the ultimate conclusion on the voluntariness of 

Church's post-arrest statement under a de nova standard. See 

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). However, "[e)xplicit 

and implicit [factual] findings by state trial and appellate 

courts" are presumed correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) unless one 

of the statute's exceptions applies, or the findings are not 

fairly supported by the record. Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 

1392 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 s.ct. 1490 (1990). 

Moreover, the "subsidiary factual question" of whether "the police 

have engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged" is also entitled 

to the presumption. Miller, 474 U.S. at 112. Lastly, we treat a 

34 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 34 
state court finding regarding witness credibility as a finding of 

fact. See Mondragon at 1393. 

Although the state trial record raises some concern, we 

believe the state trial judge impliedly made the requisite 

credibility determination before concluding that Church's 

statement was voluntary and admissible. See Marshall v. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983); Lavallee v. Delle Rose, 410 

U.S. 690 (1973) (per curiam); Cranford v. Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860 

(10th Cir. 1975). The judge was plainly aware of the correct 

constitutional standard as shown by his reference to New Mexico 

U.J.I. 40.40 and his quotation from State v. Ramirez, 556 P.2d 43, 

47-48 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976), overruled on other grounds, Sells v. 

State, 653 P.2d 162 (N.M. 1982), which together, adequately state 

the law concerning the voluntariness of a confession. See 

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 314 (noting that reconstruction is only 

possible where correct constitutional standard was used). 

Moreover there were only two versions of the events before the 

judge -- Darnell's and Church's. The judge said that if the facts 

surrounding the confession "were exactly like Mr. Church said, I 

wouldn't have much problem suppressing the statement." (T.3 at 

25.20-25.25, 2/18/86) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this is 

precisely the sort of case where we "can be reasonably certain 

that the state trier would have granted relief if he had believed 

petitioner's allegations[.]" Townsend, 372 U.S. at 315. 

We reject Church's argument that the state trial judge 

misunderstood his role as the initial trier of the voluntariness 

issue. The judge referred directly to the Ramirez decision, which 

quotes the exact passage of Jackson v. Denno invoked by Church as 

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Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 35 
the proper procedure. Admittedly, the judge's statement that "in 

the end its up to the jury ."is confusing, and should not 

have been mentioned before the court ruled on voluntariness. Yet, 

in context, this statement does not undermine our conviction that 

the court understood its role and was in accord with the 

constitutional requirements of Jackson. 

We are persuaded that the state trial court made an implicit 

factual finding that Darnell was more credible than Church. 

Accepting Darnell's testimony and applying the necessary 

presumption of correctness, we feel the state court was warranted 

in admitting the statements. Church failed to tender to the 

district court convincing evidence that one of the § 2254(d) 

exceptions applies. The only evidence Church intends to present 

at an evidentiary hearing is his own testimony contradicting 

Darnell's version of events, and jail logs and preliminary hearing 

transcripts apparently offered to impeach Darnell. 

Defendant's Tender of Evidence To Be Presented At Evidentiary 

Hearing, filed 12/15/88. None of this is new or sufficient to 

overcome the presumption of correctness. The record fairly 

supports the state court's finding. 

Accordingly, the federal district court acted within its 

discretion in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing because the 

"state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found 

the relevant facts." Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. 13 The rejection 

13 

During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided 

Arizona v. Fulminante, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), in 

which a majority of the Court determined that the admission of a 

coerced confession is susceptible to a harmless error analysis. 

See id. at 1263-66. Accordingly, by order of this court, the par-

(Footnote continued on next page) 

36 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 36 
of the constitutional challenge to the confessions was not error. 

E. Improper Venue 

Before jury selection, Church moved, pro se, for a change of 

venue from Hidalgo County, New Mexico. The state trial court 

granted Church an evidentiary hearing where he testified that 

venue was improper because the community had been exposed to 

inflammatory publicity about the crime. Specifically, Church said 

that friends had informed him of a locally circulated El Paso 

Times newspaper article in which Sheriff Darnell expressed his 

belief in Church's guilt. According to Church, Darnell's 

authority is so respected by Hidalgo County residents that Church 

would not be able to receive a fair trial following this 

statement. See T.1 at 6:20-13:15, 2/6/86. The trial court 

reserved judgment on the motion until after a jury was selected. 

A state trial court's findings of jury impartiality may be 

overturned by a federal habeas court only for manifest error. 

Mu'Min v. Virginia, U.S. --- , 111 s.ct. 1899, 1901 (1991) ---

(quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984))· In a 

federal habeas case, Patton considered a state trial court's 

finding that a jury panel as a whole was impartial; the Court 

held that the state court did not commit "manifest error" in so 

finding. Id. at 1032. Patton distinguished that conclusion from 

a federal habeas court's function in reviewing state court 

(Footnote continued): 

ties filed supplemental, post-argument briefs on the impact of 

that decision. We agree with both parties' analyses that the 

Fulminante harmless error rule does not apply retroactively to 

collateral review cases because it creates a "new rule" within the 

meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and does not fit 

within any of the Teague exceptions. Our disposition of Church's 

coerced confession claim, however, obviates the need to further 

elaborate on the supplemental arguments presented. 

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findings on the partiality of individual jurors, which findings 

Patton held to be entitled to a presumption of correctness under 

28 u.s.c. § 2254(d). Id. at 1036, 1040. Here we are called on to 

consider the former type of a state court ruling made in denying a 

motion for a change of venue namely a general finding that the 

final panel which heard Church's trial was impartial. Hence we 

will apply the "manifest error" standard of review recently 

followed in Mu'Min. 

During the voir dire, conducted by the judge and also counsel 

there was both general questioning of the jury panel, of juror 

groups, and of individual jurors. Church's brief specifically 

notes that one of the jurors, Mrs. Sanchez, had read about the 

case and was very uncertain whether she could be impartial. As we 

understand the tape, which is frequently unintelligible, at one 

point the district attorney asked whether she could be impartial. 

He then states that she had shaken her head "no." T.3 at 19:11-

19:30, 3/11/86. In chambers, Church's attorney challenged Mrs. 

Sanchez for cause, arguing that her responses to questions about 

being impartial were conflicting; that the responses indicating 

that she had made up her mind from what she had read were stronger 

than her other responses; and that she finally said she guessed 

she could be impartial, or some similar statement. T.1 at 18:45-

18:57, 3/11/86. The trial court denied the challenge for cause as 

to Mrs. Sanchez. Church's attorney did not exercise a peremptory 

challenge to Mrs. Sanchez when he had that opportunity, although 

eventually he used all his peremptories. 

The trial judge denied the renewed 

venue. In so doing he stated that they had 

38 

motion for change of 

been able to find 

Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 38 
twelve impartial jurors and one alternate in approximately two 

hours. Id. at 31:00-31:20. This ruling and its accompanying 

statements constitute, in our opinion, a general finding that the 

panel selected for the trial was impartial. This finding is 

subject to the "manifest error" standard referred to in Patton, 

467 U.S. at 1031, and Mu'Min, 111 s.ct. at 1907. 14 

Considering the whole of the record, although it is of 

inferior quality, we do not believe that the judge's finding can 

be disregarded. The evidence of an out-of-state newspaper article 

and the unsubstantiated testimony of Church that Hidalgo County 

residents would accept, without question, the word of their 

sheriff is insufficient to overturn the trial court's conclusion 

that the jury was impartial. 15 Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 

719-20 (1961) (intensely· publicized press releases issued by 

police officials and prosecutor noting defendant's pretrial 

confession to six area murders) with Hickock v. Crouse, 334 F.2d 

95, 98, 101-102 (10th Cir. 1964) (large crowd attending arrival of 

14 

We are constrained to note that consideration of this 

important record has been impeded by the inferior quality of 

record presented. The cassette tapes are poor in many instances, 

and critical responses by jurors are often totally inaudible. We 

have been obliged to piece together what appears to be their 

content from statements of counsel or inferences from the court's 

remarks. 

This record has materially delayed this opinion and has 

caused us serious concern as to the fairness of the record to both 

parties. Had a court reporter been used, creating a written 

record to study, the procedure would have been infinitely fairer 

to all parties and our disposition would have been considerably 

expedited. Additionally, a written record would have greatly 

simplified the identification of jurors in the record. 

15 

Although some of the jurors read local newspaper accounts of 

the crime, notably no jurors claimed to have read the offending 

El Paso Times news story. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 39 
suspects following newspaper, radio, television coverage of 

arrests and confessions), cert. denied sub nom, Smith v. Crouse, 

379 U.S. 982 (1965). The state trial judge had the benefit of 

observing the demeanor of the jurors as the basis for his general 

finding. We are not persuaded that Church has borne the burden of 

showing "manifest error" in the judge's finding. 

In sum, we uphold the rejection of Church's due process 

argument on the venue issue. 

F. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Finally, Church challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as 

inadequate to convict him. We are not persuaded. The 

constitutional standard for determining the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether "any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in 

original). In addition to the direct and circumstantial proof 

presented at trial and noted in the magistrate's report, see IR., 

Doc. 47 at 8 and record citations therein, we need only add that 

Church's confession, found to be voluntary, was corroborated by 

other evidence at trial. This was more than adequate to convince 

a rational trier of fact of Church's guilt. 

III. 

Conclusion 

In sum, we REVERSE the district court's determination that 

Church's 

testimony 

due process claims of jury misconduct and inconsistent 

were procedurally defaulted. We REMAND the jury 

misconduct claim for further proceedings by the federal district 

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Appellate Case: 89-2266 Document: 01019630323 Date Filed: 08/26/1991 Page: 40 
court. Further, we REVERSE the district court's determination 

that there was no actual conflict of interests in the successive 

representations in this case and REMAND for an evidentiary hearing 

on that claim. Finally, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of 

Church's petition for a writ of habeas corpus in all other 

respects. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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