Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05143/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 650
Nature of Suit: Airline Regulations
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 29, 1996 Decided March 26, 1996

No. 95-5143

AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

JANET RENO,

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL AND

DORIS MEISSNER, COMMISSIONER OF THE IMMIGRATION AND

NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv00181)

Eric M. Braun argued the cause for appellant, with whom Michael S. Sundermeyer was on the briefs.

Darrell C. Valdez, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees, with whomEric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney,

were on the brief. Rudolph Contreras, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD. 

WALD, Circuit Judge: Appellant Air Transport Association of America ("ATA") challenges

two policies of the Immigration and Nationalization Service ("INS"). Under the INS's Transit

Without Visa ("TWOV") policy, airlines are permitted to allow foreign passengers to board planes

bound for the United States even if the passengers do not have United States visas, so long as the

passengers are merely connecting to another flight which will take them on to some country other

than the United States. Although most of these passengers eventually board their outbound flights

and leave the United States without incident, a few, upon arrival in the United States, claim asylum,

and under the Refugee Act of 1980 are automatically entitled to remain in the United States until their

claim is heard. During the pendency of their asylum requestswhich often last more than a

yearthe INS currently requires the airlines to pay all expenses of detaining these individuals,

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including hotels, meals, medical services, and round-the-clock guards. In addition, under the INS's

"stowaway" policy, the INS requiresthe carriersto provide similar detention expensesforstowaways

who arrive in the United States and claim asylum.

The district court denied summary judgment for the ATA, finding that the INS's policies were

authorized by the Immigration and Naturalization Act ("INA"). We disagree, and hold that neither

of these policies is authorized by current law. The statutory authority for the INS's TWOV

policysection 233 of the INAwas repealed in 1986, and since that time the INS has had no legal

authority to require the carriersto pay detention expenses. Moreover, the statute which the INS cites

in support of its stowaway detention policysection 237 of the INAonly authorizes the INS to

require carriers to transport back to their country of origin those stowaways who are excluded and

subject to immediate deportation, but does not impose upon airlines any detention responsibilitywith

respect to those stowaways who claimasylum. Although we declare the INS's TWOV and stowaway

policies to be unauthorized by law, we find that the ATA lacks standing to seek an order requiring

the government to compensate ATA's members for detention expenses they have previously paid,

because the determination ofsuch monetary relief would require detailed, individualized proof of the

members' damages.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Transit Without Visa Policy

Transit without visa passengers are individuals who board airlines in foreign countries with

the announced intention of passing through the United States en route to another destination. These

passengers are permitted, under the INS's TWOV regulations, to enter the U.S. without a passport

or visa, provided they are planning "immediate and continuous transit through the United States" to

some other country they are entitled to enter, and will depart the U.S. within 8 hours of their arrival

(or on the first available transport). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.1(f)(1); 214.2(c)(1).

Most such passengers proceed through the United States without incident, remaining in

special airport areas until their continuing flights depart. Some, however, renounce their intention

to merely transit the United States, and assert political asylum as a basis for remaining in the United

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States. Once they have made a claim for asylum, these aliens are entitled, under the Refugee Act of

1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), to remain in the United States during their asylum

hearing process. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (describing asylum procedure). The INS in turn has required

the airlinesto pay the detention expensesfor these asylum applicantsincluding hotelrooms, meals,

24-hour security guards, and medical expensesduring the pendency of the hearing process, which

can stretch out to months or even years. See Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, __ F.3d __,

1996 WL 84186 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing one airline's claim to have spent $162,000 on six

passengers and another airline's claim to have spent $89,000 on a single passenger); 59 Fed. Reg.

14,779, 14,780 (1994) ("most asylum applicants wait a year or more to receive even initial decisions

on their cases").

Prior to 1986, the INS had based its requirement that the airlines bear these detention

expenses principally on section 233 of the INA, which in relevant part provided:

(a) Upon the arrival at a port of the United States of any vessel or aircraft bringing

aliens ... the immigration officers may order a temporary removal of such aliens for

examination and inspection.... A temporary removal of such aliens from such vessels

or aircraft ... shall be made by an immigration officer at the expense of the vessels or

aircraft or transportation lines....

(b) Whenever a temporary removal of aliensis made under thissection, the vessels or

aircraft ...shall pay all expenses ofsuch removalto a designated place for examination

and inspection ... and all expenses arising during subsequent detention, pending a

decision on the aliens' eligibility to enter the United States....

8 U.S.C. § 1223 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783-56 (1986).

While section 233 provided the underlying authority for requiring airlines to pay detention

expenses, implementation of this policy was governed by section 238 of the INA:

The Attorney General shall have power to enter into contracts including bonding

agreements with transportation lines to guarantee the passage through the United

States in immediate and continuous transit of aliens destined to foreign countries.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, such aliens may not have their

classification changed under section 1258 of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (Supp. 1995) (formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1228(d) (1970)). The INS developed a

standard contract with the airlines, known as "Form I-426" under which it has required the airlines

to pay these detention expenses as well asliquidated damagesin the event the airline failsto transport

an alien out of the country. Although the airlines are theoretically free not to sign these contracts,

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1Congress' concern with the INS's detention expense policy can be traced back to 1985, when

the House Appropriations Committee noted its concern

about the policy of the Immigration and Naturalization Service which requires

scheduled passenger airlines to assume custody and financial responsibility for

aliens who arrive by plane in the United States without proper documentation. 

The Committee understands that in the absence of Government detention facilities,

air carriers must detain such aliens in custody and in all cases pay for their food

and shelter. The Committee believes this policy raises significant questions about

the equity and legal propriety of requiring private entities to assume the financial

burdens of maintaining and, at times, exercising physical custody over excluded

aliens for extended periods of time. Specifically, the Committee is concerned

about the possible ramifications of detention of aliens by airline personnel or their

agents who are not, of course, law enforcement officials.

H.R. REP. NO. 197, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 38 (1985). 

if they do not, then they will not be allowed to accept TWOV passengers aboard their planes. Not

surprisingly, most major airlines have signed I-426 agreements. See 8 C.F.R. § 238.3 (listing

signatories).

In 1986, however, Congressrepealed section 233,1and also passed the Immigration User Fee

Statute ("IUFS"), Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 205, 100 Stat. 3341-53 (1986) (codified as amended at INA

§ 286, 8 U.S.C. § 1356). The IUFS established a separate "User Fee Account" to be funded by a $5

surcharge (now $6) on international tickets. See 8 U.S.C. § 1356(d)(h). That money was to be

deposited in a separate account, from which:

The Secretary of the Treasury shall refund out of the Immigration User Fee Account

to any appropriation the amount paid out ofsuch appropriation for expensesincurred

by the Attorney General in providing immigration inspection and preinspection

services for commercial aircraft or vessels and in

(i) providing overtime immigration inspection services ...

(ii) administration of debt recovery ...

(iii) expansion ... of information systems ...

(iv) detection of fraudulent documents used by passengers traveling to the United States; and

(v) providing detention and deportation services for excludable aliens arriving on commercial

vessels.

8 U.S.C. § 1356(h)(2)(A) (emphasis supplied).

In response to the 1986 Amendments, the INS issued new regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 100 et

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seq. (1989), acknowledging that the IUFS required the INS "to address the change from carrier

responsibility to [INS] responsibility for the custody and detention of excludable aliens." While

accepting responsibility for the detention of most excludable aliens, the INS has continued to insist,

however, that "carriers are responsible for the detention expenses of detained TWOV passengers

while in Service custody...." Id. at 101. According to INS, "[a]lthough the issue of carrier

responsibility for TWOV passengers may be a thorny one," section 238 of the INA (governing

bonding agreements) provides the necessary authority for the INS to enter into enforceable Form I426 contracts. Id.

Thus even after the repeal ofsection 233, the INS has continued to require the airlinesto pay

detention expenses for TWOV passengers who renounce their TWOV status and apply for asylum.

B. Stowaway Policy

The INS also requiresthe airlinesto pay the detention expensesforstowaways who apply for

asylum, basing this policy on section 237 of the INA:

Any alien ... arriving in the United States who is excluded under this chapter, shall be

immediately deported, in accommodations of the same class in which he arrived....

The cost of the maintenance including detention expenses and expenses incident to

detention of any such alien while he is being detained shall be borne by the owner or

owners of the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The INA does not define the term "stowaway," but

provides only that "[a]ny alien who is a stowaway is excludable." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(D).

However, through a series of directives, the INS has applied section 237 not only to those individuals

who have boarded airlines without tickets, but also to individuals who arrive without proper

documentation and whom the airlines cannot prove had proper documents when they boarded.

Consequently, the airlines are potentially liable for the detention expenses of individuals who board

properly, but then destroy their travel documents en route, thus converting themselves into

"stowaways."

Prior to 1980, allstowaways were excluded from the United States and subject to immediate

deportation. During that time, it was not disputed that under section 237, the airlines had

responsibility for returning these stowaways to the country from which they had arrived, and were

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required to bear any detention expenses incurred before the stowaways' return travel could be

arranged. Even today the airlines do not dispute their liability under section 237 for promptly

returning stowaways who are not seeking asylum. However, they do dispute their liability for

detaining those stowaways who claim asylum. These aliens, since the enactment of the Refugee Act

of 1980, are permitted to remain in the United States pending consideration of their asylum claims,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1), but the INS has continued to classify them as "excluded" rather than

"excludable," and to require the airlines to bear their detention expenses.

C. District Court Proceedings

The ATA brought suit challenging both the INS's TWOV detention policy and its stowaway

detention policy. The district court denied ATA's motion for summary judgment, finding that the

language of the IUFS did not clearly establish that Congress intended for the INS to bear the

detention costs of aliens who applied for asylum. The court found persuasive the government's

argument that section 238 provides the INS with the legal authority to enter into enforceable

contracts with the airlines under which the airlines can be held responsible for the detention expenses

of all TWOVs, regardless of whether they abandon their announced travel plans and instead seek

asylum in the United States. In addition, the court concluded that stowaways are "excluded" rather

than "excludable" aliens, and thus the INS has authority to require the airlinesto bear their detention

expenses under section 237. There are no disputed facts, and we review the district court's legal

conclusions de novo.

II. DISCUSSION

A. TWOV Policy

The first question is whether the relevant portion of the INA which survived the 1986

Amendmentssection 238provides an adequate basisfor the INS's TWOV detention policy. We

conclude, along with two of our sister circuits, that it does not. See Aerolineas Argentinas v. United

States, --- F.3d ----, 1996 WL 84186 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Linea Area Nacional De Chile v. Meissner,

65 F.3d 1034 (2d Cir. 1995) ("LAN Chile"). In light of the well-reasoned discussions of identical

issues in these recent opinions, we will be brief.

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2The INS argues on appeal that its detention policy has all along been based not only on

section 233 but also on section 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c). Addressing this precise question, the

Second Circuit concluded:

We also reject INS's contention that it historically has relied not only on repealed §

1233 [section 233] for the power to require carriers to assume the burden of

detaining TWOVs who petition for asylum, but also on unscathed § 1228(c).... 

We think it plain that the invocation of former section 238 sets forth INS's

unchallenged general power to contract, and not its controverted power to compel

the carriers to detain the subset of TWOVs who petition for asylum. Further the

record is rife with instances in which INS has cited solely § 1223 in support of its

actions.

LAN Chile, 65 F.3d at 1041. Our own examination of the legislative history leads us to agree that

not only had INS represented at times that it relied solely on section 233 to support its detention

policy, but that it made such representations to Congress, thus presumably inducing Congress to

repeal section 233 in order to take this authority away from the INS. See id. (quoting INS

statements to Congress). 

3The INS argues that "the plain meaning of "bonding agreement' includes a requirement that

one party acts as a bail or surety to ensure that the United States will not have to incur the

Put simply, it is clear to this court that the repeal of section 233which had previously

supported the INS's TWOV detention policyleft the INS without a statutory leg to stand on in its

attempts to charge the airlinesfor detention expenses for aliens pending their asylum determinations

by the INS. Section 233 had indeed required the carriers to pay "all expenses arising during

subsequent detention," if aliens failed to immediately depart the United States, and had been

specifically identified by the INS asthe source ofits authority for imposing these costs on the airlines.

See Hearings on Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies Appropriation for 1986 Before

House Subcomm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1230-32 (1985). In the absence of

section 233, we find no basis in law for the INS's TWOV detention policy.2

The INS arguesthat notwithstanding the repealofsection 233, Congress evinced itsintention

to allow the TWOV policy to continue by leaving intact section 238, which authorizes the INS to

enter into "bonding agreements" with the airlines. But section 238 cannot support the weight the INS

would lay upon it. The contracts or bonding agreements authorized under that section are only for

the purpose of "guarantee[ing] the passage through the United States in immediate and continuous

transit of aliens destined to foreign countries," 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (emphasis supplied), not for the

purpose of guaranteeing the payment of detention expenses while an asylum application is pending.3

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expenses caused by a breach of the airlines promise." Brief for INS at 9. While that may be so, it

is not clear to us just what promise the airlines have breached when the very party they contracted

withthe United Statesis the one preventing the immediate departure of the alien. 

4We do note that the INS in its own regulations acknowledged that the IUFS contemplated

shifting detention responsibility for excludable aliens to the INS, yet it nonetheless carved out an

exception for TWOVs from that general shift. 

In response, the INS argues that if section 238 does not permit it to shift detention costs to the

airlines, the section would be rendered a "nullity." Brief for Appellee at 11. We, however, agree with

the Second Circuit's rejection of that argument in LAN Chile:

We believe that Congressleft § 1228(c) [section 238] untouched in 1986 because that

section provides the necessary statutory authority to allow the Commissioner to

require common carriers to maintain responsibility for TWOV's during the relatively

brief period of a routine layover. Had § 1228(c) been repealed, no provision would

allow the INS to place that burden upon the airlines. As a matter of statutory

construction, however, § 1228(c) cannot authorize the Commissioner [of the INS] to

enter into contracts that exceed the bounds of the authority granted her.

65 F.3d at 1040. Thus the INS is still free, under section 238, to enter into bonding agreements with

airlines, and to penalize the airlines if they fail to ensure that TWOV passengers (other than those

seeking asylum) remain in the proper areas of the airport, and board their outbound flights.

Finally, although our conclusion that the INS's TWOV detention policy is ultra vires is

bolstered by the enactment of the User Fee Statute, we are not as confident as our sister circuits that

the IUFS by itself stripped the INS of its authority to require the airlines to bear TWOV detention

expenses. Cf. Aerolineas Argentinas, __ F.3d at __, 1996 WL 84186 at *3; LAN Chile, 65 F.3d at

1041 (both finding that IUFS required INS to assume detention responsibility). While the IUFS

provides a fund for the payment of expenses the INS has incurred in detaining excludable aliens, it

does not expressly require the INS to assume responsibility for such detention.4 Most certainly, the

IUFS was a part of an overall congressional plan to shift the burden of detention of excludable aliens

to the INS, but in our view, it wasthe repeal ofsection 233 which decisively established that the INS

has no authority to require carriers to bear the detention expenses for TWOV passengers who claim

asylum.

B. Stowaway Policy

The statute cited by the INS to justify itsstowaway policysection 237 of the INAapplies

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5

In light of our disposition of this matter, we do not reach the contention raised by the ATA

that the INS's directives implementing its stowaway policy were legislative rules improperly

promulgated without the notice and comment required by the Administrative Procedure Act

("APA"). Cf. Dia Navigation Co. v. Pomeroy, 34 F.3d 1255, 1263-66 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding the

INS's regulations were legislative in nature, and thus subject to APA's notice and comment

procedure). 

only if the alien in question is "excluded under this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). The nub of the

dispute here is whetherstowaways who apply for asylum are aliens "excluded under this chapter" (as

the INS insists), or whether they are "excludable" (as ATA insists). We conclude that stowaways

who applyfor asylumare excludable, not excluded, and thusthe carriers cannot be held liable for their

detention expenses.

As the INS's own regulations suggest, there is a difference between excludable and excluded

aliens, in that the latter are subject to immediate deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(e):

[The INS may notify an airline] that the alien passenger may be excludable from the

United States and in the event the alien is ordered formally excluded and deported,

the carrier will be responsible for detention and transportation expenses to the last

foreign port of embarkations provided in § 237.5 of this chapter.

Moreover, the language of the INA supports this conclusion, saying that "Any alien who is a

stowaway is excludable." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(D) (emphasis supplied). It is true, as the district

court pointed out, that stowaways have historically been "disfavored" and that a snippet oflegislative

history from 1952 suggests that "[s]towaways are excluded absolutely." H.R. REP. NO. 1365, 82d

Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1703. But the fact that stowaways

have been disfavored does not transformtheminto "excluded" aliens. Moreover, the single statement

from the 1952 report on which the INS relies was made before the 1980 Refugee Act allowing

stowaways to remain in the United States to assert an asylum claim. Consequently, we conclude, as

did the Federal Circuit, that "after the Refugee Act of 1980 provided that stowaways may apply for

political asylum, they were properly considered "excludable' rather than "excluded.' " Aerolineas

Argentinas, __ F.3d __, 1986 WL 84186 at *11. Consequently, the INS lacks the statutory authority

to require carriers to pay their detention expenses while their asylum claims are pending.5

C. Remedy

The ATA seeks an exceedingly broad remedy here: not only does it wish this court to declare

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6The ATA does not claim that it has suffered any harm to itself as an association, and thus

would qualify for organizational standing, but instead seeks relief only on behalf of its

membersa claim of representational standing. 

the INS's TWOV and stowaway detention policies illegal, but it also requests an order allowing its

members to make individualized showings of damages and receive compensation for amounts they

have expended for the detention ofTWOVs and stowawayssince 1986, when the IUFS was enacted.

Although we grant the ATA the declaratory relief it seeks, we find that it lacks standing to seek an

order requiring the INS to reimburse its members for detention expenses they have unnecessarily

incurred since 1986.

The starting point for our analysis is Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432

U.S. 333 (1977), in which the Supreme Court summarized the three requirements an organization

must meet in order to have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members:

(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the

interestsit seeksto protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither

the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit.

Id. at 343. While the ATA meets all three of these requirements with respect to its request for

declaratory relief, we find that any award of monetary compensation would "require[ ] the

participation of individual members in the lawsuit," and thus that ATA lacks standing to seek such

relief.6

The situation here is similar to that in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), in which the

Supreme Court held that an association of construction firms lacked standing to seek damages for

profits and businesslost by its members because of a town's zoning ordinances. Reviewing previous

cases in which associations had been granted standing, the Court noted that in all such cases the

association had sought a "declaration, injunction or some other form of prospective relief," where "it

can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members

of the association actually injured." Id. at 515. In the case before it, however, the Court found that

the

association seeksreliefin damagesfor alleged injuriesto itsmembers. Home Builders

[the association] alleges no monetary injury to itself, nor any assignment of the

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7

In the other case cited by ATA, Beverly Hospital v. Bowen, 872 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

not only did the associations bring suit, but several individual hospitals joined them in challenging

damages claims of its members. No award therefore can be made to the association

as such. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, the damages claims are not

common to the entire membership, norshared by all in equal degree. To the contrary,

whatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member

concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof.

Thus, to obtain relief in damages, each member of Home Builders who claims injury

as a result of respondents' practices must be a party to the suit, and Home Builders

has no standing to claim damages on his behalf.

Id. at 515-16. That reasoning is equally applicable here. While it can fairly be said that declaratory

relief will inure to the benefit of ATA's members, the "damages claims are not common to the entire

membership, nor shared by all in equal degree," and consequently there is simply no way the extent

of the harm to the ATA's members can be determined without "individualized proof." See

Telecommunications Research v. Allnet Communication Servs., 806 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

(association did not have standing to seek money damages on behalf of its members).

In response, the ATA arguesthat this court and the Supreme Court have "previously granted

associations the precise type of monetary relief that ATA seeks." Reply Brief for ATA at 17. The

leading case cited by the ATA, however, did not involve the precise question we have here. In

International Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477

U.S. 274 (1986), a union sought a declaration that the Secretary of Labor had improperly caused

state agencies to deny union members certain trade readjustment benefits. Although the injunctive

relief sought by the union would ultimately have resulted in the payment of these benefits to union

members, the Supreme Court found that the third prong of the Hunt test had been met: "The suit

raises a pure question of law: whether the Secretary properly interpreted the Trade Act's TRA

eligibility provisions." Id. at 287. Once the Court granted the injunction, the Supreme Court said,

it would then be up to the individual state agenciesto calculate the amount the union members were

entitled to. Id. at 288. Because there were separate entities vested with authority to assess

individualized claims and ready and able to do so once the obstruction posed by the defendant

agency's error oflaw wasremedied, the matter could be judicially disposed of without the individual

participation of union members.7

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HHS's interpretation of certain Medicare regulations. We granted the plaintiffs in Beverly

Hospital the reimbursement for photocopying expenses that they were already entitled to by

statute. We did not, however, address the question of organizational standing. 

8

In this regard our case is distinguishable from LAN Chile, in which the Second Circuit held

that an individual airline could seek monetary compensation arising out of the INS's illegal

policies. Id., 65 F.3d at 1042-44. In LAN Chile, the court found that the United States had

waived sovereign immunity for the monetary relief the plaintiff was seekingan issue we do not

reach here. Even if sovereign immunity bars an action for monetary damages in the district court,

the Federal Circuit has held that individual airlines may seek monetary relief under the Tucker

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), in the Court of Federal Claims. See Aerolineas Argentinas, __ F.3d

__, 1996 WL 84186 at *9 ("We conclude that the Tucker Act provides jurisdiction to recover the

sums exacted illegally by the Service due to its misinterpretation or misapplication of statutes,

regulations, or forms ... [a]fter 1986...."). 

In this case, however, a judicial declaration that the INS's policies are invalid would not end

the matter. The determination of how much money the airlines paid, for what kinds of detention

services, and for which types of aliens, would be no simple administrative matter, but would instead

require detailed and individualized proof from each airline. The money that the airlines have paid is

not in the hands of the INS, but rather was paid out to myriad hotels, restaurants, doctors and

security firms, asfar back asten years ago. While we acknowledge that a request for monetary relief

by an association does not absolutely preclude standing in all cases, the question in each case is

whetherthe monetaryrelief can be awarded without "individualized proof." Under the circumstances

of this case, we find that individualized proof would definitely be required, and thus we find that the

ATA lacks standing to obtain monetary relief.8See Self-Insurance Inst. of Am. v. Korioth, 53 F.3d

694, 696 (5th Cir. 1995) (association challenging tax had standing to seek injunctive relief but could

not obtain refunds, because of need to determine individual refund eligibility and amount); United

Union of Roofers, Waterproofers &Allied Trades No. 40 v. Insurance Corp. of Am., 919 F.2d 1398,

1400 (9th Cir. 1990) (union challenging underpayment of wages did not meet third prong of Hunt

test because the "claimsfor monetary relief necessarily involve individualized proof"); Terre Du Lac

Ass'n, Inc. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 470-71 (8th Cir. 1985) (association lacked standing

to obtain monetary relieffor violations ofLand Sales Act because ofthe need for individualized proof

concerning the circumstances under which each of its members purchased the land in question), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 682 & n.57 (7th Cir. 1981)

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(organization lacked standing to challenge failure to provide heating assistance because

"individualized proof" would be required asto whether individuals had in fact been discouraged from

seeking such assistance), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982).

III. CONCLUSION

The INS's policies ofrequiring carriersto bear the detention costs ofTWOVs and stowaways

who seek asylum not only lack a basis in law, but reflect a position "hardly worthy of our great

government." Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (9th Cir. 1970). When TWOV passengers or

stowaways seek asylum in the United States, carriers cannot be required, by regulation, contract, or

otherwise, to bear the detention expenses during the pendency of their asylum applications in the

absence of a statute imposing such a duty on them. We conclude, however, that the ATA lacks

standing to seek monetary relief on behalf of its members. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is reversed, and the case is remanded for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor

of the ATA.

So ordered.

USCA Case #95-5143 Document #190005 Filed: 03/26/1996 Page 13 of 13