Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_15-cv-00322/USCOURTS-ared-3_15-cv-00322-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 

COLUMBUS DIVISION 

IN RE MENTOR CORP. OBTAPE 

TRANSOBTURATOR SLING PRODUCTS 

LIABILITY LITIGATION 

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MDL Docket No. 2004 

4:08-MD-2004 (CDL) 

Case No. 

4:12-cv-237 (B. FOSTER) 

O R D E R 

Defendant Mentor Worldwide LLC developed a suburethral 

sling product called ObTape Transobturator Tape, which was used 

to treat women with stress urinary incontinence. Plaintiff 

Betty Foster was implanted with ObTape and asserts that she 

suffered injuries caused by ObTape. Foster brought this product 

liability action against Mentor, contending that ObTape had 

design and/or manufacturing defects that proximately caused her 

injuries. Foster also asserts that Mentor did not adequately 

warn her physicians about the risks associated with ObTape. 

Mentor seeks summary judgment on several of Foster’s claims. 

For the reasons set forth below, Mentor’s Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37 in 4:12-cv-237) is granted. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of 

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material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, 

the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in 

the opposing party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant 

or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. A factual 

dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury 

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Viewed in the light most favorable to Foster, the record 

reveals the following. Foster lives in Texas, but she lived in 

Arkansas when she filed her Complaint. All of her medical 

treatment relevant to this action occurred in Arkansas. 

In 2003, Foster saw her urologist, Dr. Charles Campbell, 

for treatment of stress urinary incontinence. Dr. Campbell 

implanted ObTape in Foster on January 14, 2004. During that 

timeframe, Dr. Campbell did not have a preferred surgical mesh, 

and he used mesh tapes from several different manufacturers in 

his practice. Campbell Dep. 22:22-23:20, ECF No. 42-4. He did 

not choose ObTape for Foster—he used “whatever” tape was brought 

to him. Id. at 25:1-13. Dr. Campbell does not recall reading 

the ObTape product information data sheet, and he does not 

recall speaking with a Mentor representative about ObTape. 

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In the years following her ObTape implant, Foster sought 

medical treatment for urinary and bladder symptoms from Dr. Ben 

Cranfill. Foster now attributes those symptoms to ObTape. She 

also attributes her dyspareunia symptoms to ObTape. Foster’s 

ObTape has not been removed, although she asked Dr. Cranfill if 

the ObTape should be removed. After he examined her, Dr. 

Cranfill told Foster that it would not be a good idea for her 

situation. 

Foster filed her Complaint on September 11, 2012. See 

generally Compl., ECF No. 1 in 4:12-cv-237. Foster brought 

claims for personal injury under a variety of theories, 

including negligence, strict liability design defect, strict 

liability manufacturing defect, strict liability failure to 

warn, breach of implied and express warranties, fraudulent 

misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and negligent 

misrepresentation. In her response to Mentor’s summary judgment 

motion, Foster stated that she does not contest summary judgment 

on her manufacturing defect claim. Summary judgment is 

therefore granted as to that claim. Foster did not respond to 

Mentor’s summary judgment as to her claims for breach of implied 

and express warranties, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent 

concealment, and negligent misrepresentation, so the Court 

grants summary judgment as to those claims. Resolution Trust 

Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en 

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banc) (“[G]rounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon 

in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”). The only remaining 

question raised by Mentor’s partial summary judgment motion is 

whether Foster’s strict liability failure to warn claim survives 

summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION 

Foster filed her action in this Court under the Court’s 

direct filing order. The parties agreed that for direct-filed 

cases, the “Court will apply the choice of law rules of the 

state where the plaintiff resides at the time of the filing of 

the complaint.” Order Regarding Direct Filing § II(E), ECF No. 

446 in 4:08-md-2004. The parties agree that Arkansas law 

applies to Foster’s claims because Foster was an Arkansas 

resident when she filed her Complaint and all of her medical 

treatment relevant to this action occurred in Arkansas. 

Under Arkansas law, Mentor had a duty to provide an 

adequate warning regarding the risks of ObTape to Foster’s 

implanting physician, Dr. Campbell. See Boehm v. Eli Lilly & 

Co., 747 F.3d 501, 503 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining 

Arkansas’s learned intermediary rule). Foster contends that 

Mentor did not provide an adequate warning because the ObTape 

product insert data sheet did not say anything about the risk of 

dyspareunia. It is true that the ObTape product insert data 

sheet did not warn about the risk of dyspareunia. But that 

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fact, standing alone, is not enough to create a genuine fact 

dispute on Foster’s failure to warn claim. Foster must also 

establish causation; in other words, she must point to some 

evidence that a different warning would have altered Dr. 

Campbell’s treatment of her. See Bushong v. Garman Co., 311 

Ark. 228, 233-34 (1992) (affirming trial court’s finding that 

the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim was precluded because the 

plaintiff admitted he did not read the product label). Foster 

did not point to any evidence that Dr. Campbell would have taken 

a different approach had Mentor provided additional warnings. 

Foster argues that the Court should presume that Dr. Campbell 

would have read and heeded adequate warnings in the product 

insert data sheet. But it is undisputed that Dr. Campbell did 

not recall reading the ObTape product insert data sheet. It is 

also undisputed that he did not even specifically select ObTape 

for Foster. Given this evidence—and the lack of any evidence 

that Dr. Campbell would have altered his treatment of Foster had 

the ObTape warnings been different—Foster’s failure to warn 

claim fails. See id. (noting that additional warnings would 

have been futile because the plaintiff did not read the existing 

warnings). 

CONCLUSION 

As discussed above, Mentor’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 37 in 4:12-cv-237) is granted. Only Foster’s 

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negligence and strict liability design defect claims remain 

pending for trial. Within seven days of the date of this Order, 

the parties shall notify the Court whether the parties agree to 

a Lexecon waiver. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED, this sixteenth day of September, 2015. 

s/Clay D. Land 

CLAY D. LAND 

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 

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