Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04194/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04194-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

v FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

lifted States Court ot Appeals Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DAVID JAMES FRATUS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

GARY W. DELAND, individually; ) 

0. LANE MCCOTTER, individually; ) 

L.E. HINES, individually; ) 

R. SPENCER ROBINSON, individually; ) 

M. ELDON BARNES, individually; ) 

and SCOTT CARVER, individually ) 

and pursuant to their respective ) 

capacity as an employee of the ) 

Utah Department of Corrections ) 

during the time of the allega- ) 

tions made herein, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

M4R 0 7 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-4194 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 94-CV-430) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

David Fratus, Pro Se. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MCKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-4194 Document: 01019282413 Date Filed: 03/07/1995 Page: 1 
David Fratus filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

alleging that the Utah State Prison (USP) violated his Eighth 

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights by overcharging him for 

damage he caused to windows and a television. Mr. Fratus also 

alleges that the issuance of a restitution order at a hearing 

where he was not present and at a time when he was mentally 

incompetent violated his due process rights. Upon the 

magistrate's recommendation, the district court dismissed Mr. 

Fratus' action as time-barred. Mr. Fratus appeals, and we 

reverse. 

I. 

Mr. Fratus broke several windows and damaged a television at 

the USP on November 20, 1988, and his complaint stems from this 

incident. Mr. Fratus claims that he was "seriously mentally ill" 

at the time of this incident. Rec., vol. I, doc. 9 at 2. The 

USP, in conjunction with the Utah Department of Corrections, held 

a disciplinary hearing on November 30 to review the damage and 

assess restitution. Mr. Fratus was not present, and he claims 

that he was "too delusional and mentally ill to attend the 

hearing." Id. On January 4, 1989, the USP entered a restitution 

order of $8,412.00 against Mr. Fratus. 

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From November 20, 1988 to September 21, 1989, Mr. Fratus was 

confined in a 24-hour lockdown cell where he had minimal verbal 

contact with other prisoners. On September 21, the USP 

transferred Mr. Fratus to the Utah State Hospital for 

psychological treatment. He remained at the hospital until 

February 20, 1990. 

According to his Objections to the Magistrate's Report and 

Recommendations, Mr. Fratus discovered in December 1990, upon 

speaking with a prisoner who had recently been transferred to his 

housing section, that he may have been arbitrarily overcharged for 

the damage which is the subject of this action. Id. at 3; see 

also Rec., vol. I, doc. 2, exs. H, I, J. Mr. Fratus then 

collected restitution orders from other inmates that revealed a 

wide divergence in charges for broken windows, ranging from 

$326,521 to $44.64. Id., exs. A-P.1 Mr. Fratus alleges the 

windows he broke were identical in size, age, and location to 

windows three other prisoners broke; the USP nonetheless assessed 

restitution charges which varied dramatically. Rec., vol. I, doc. 

9 at 4-5. 

Mr. Fratus filed his section 1983 complaint on April 28, 

1994, alleging (1) the USP's practice of arbitrarily overcharging 

prisoners for damage to prison facilities, specifically windows, 

1 The state courts have reduced some of these excessive 

restitution orders. See, ~' Rec., vol. I, doc. 2, ex. 0. 

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violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal 

protection, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) the USP denied him his 

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by holding the 

disciplinary hearing outside his presence and during a time when 

he was deemed mentally incompetent. The magistrate recommended 

that both claims be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) as barred 

by the applicable four year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78-12-25. Mr. Fratus responded to this recommendation, 

asserting among other things that the statute of limitations 

should be tolled from November 1988 to November 1991 because he 

was mentally incompetent. Id. at 5. 

In adopting the magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the 

complaint as frivolous under section 1915(d), the district court 

found that "[t]he submitted letters and the fact that the 

plaintiff was institutionalized give prima facie proof that he 

would be mentally incompetent for purposes of § 78-12-36 for 

periods of time between January 1, 1989 and February 20, 1990." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 10, at 2-3. However, the district court found 

that "the plaintiff's statement alone is insufficient evidence to 

prove that, after February 20, 1990, his mental illness was of· 

such a nature to make him mentally incompetent." Id. at 2. The 

district court concluded that Mr. Fratus' claim, filed April 28, 

1994, remained time-barred because the statute of limitations, if 

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tolled, began running on February 20, 1990 at the latest, and Mr. 

Fratus filed his complaint more than four years thereafter. 

II. 

We review frivolousness determinations under section 1915(d) 

for an abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernantlez, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 

1734 (1992). A district court may deem an in forma pauperis 

complaint frivolous only if 11 it lacks an arguable basis either in 

law or in fact. 11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 

Section 1915(d) dismissal is appropriate for a 11 Claim based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory. 11 Id. at 327. In 

contemplating dismissal under section 1915(d), the district court 

may consider affirmative defenses sua sponte only when the defense 

is 11 obvious from the face of the complaint 11 and 11 [n]o further 

factual record [is] required to be developed. 11 Yellen v. Cooper, 

828 F.2d 1471, 1476 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

In other words, the § 1915(d) frivolous determination, 

frequently made sua sponte before the defendant has even 

been asked to file an answer, cannot serve as a 

factfinding process for the resolution of disputed 

facts. . . . Some improbable allegations might properly 

be disposed of on summary judgment, but to dismiss them 

as frivolous without any factual development is to 

disregard the age-old insight that many allegations 

might be 11 Strange, but true; for truth is always 

strange, stranger than fiction. 11 

Denton, 112 S.Ct. at 1733-34 (quoting Lord Byron, Don Juan, canto 

XIV, stanza 101 (T. Steffan, E. Steffan & W. Pratt eds. 1977)). 

We hold that the district court improperly dismissed Mr. Fratus' 

complaint by raising sua sponte a statute of limitations defense 

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that was neither patently clear from the face of the complaint nor 

rooted in adequately developed facts. 

By dismissing Mr. Fratus' claim for failure to file within 

the statute of limitations, the district court raised sua sponte 

an affirmative defense. See United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 

1271, 1280 (lOth Cir. 1987). For section 1983 actions, state law 

determines the appropriate statute of limitations and accompanying 

tolling provisions. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 

(1980). We recently held that Utah's four-year residual statute 

of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3), governs suits 

brought under section 1983. Arnold v. Duchesne County, 26 F.3d 

982 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 721 (1995). This 

four-year statute of limitations may be tolled if the plaintiff is 

mentally incompetent at the time the cause of action accrues.2 

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-36, 78-12-42. 

From the face of Mr. Fratus' complaint, it is unclear how 

long the statute of limitations should be tolled. Relying on 

three letters that Mr. Fratus attached to his complaint, the 

district court held that the statute of limitations should be 

tolled from January 1, 1989 to February 20, 1990 due to Mr. 

2 A plaintiff is mentally incompetent for purposes of § 78-12-

36 when incapable of comprehending his or her legal rights, caring 

for his or her personal safety and providing for basic human needs 

such as food, shelter, and clothing. Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 

1345, 1347 (Utah 1993). 

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Fratus' mental incompetence. However, Mr. Fratus alleged that he 

was mentally ill through November 1991 and stated that numerous 

medical reports would establish his mental condition during that 

time. If true, this would squarely place his cause of action 

within the four year statute of limitations. The district court 

disregarded this allegation because "plaintiff's statement alone 

is insufficient to prove that, after February 20, 1990, his mental 

illness was of such a nature to make him mentally incompetent." 

Rec., val. I, doc. 10 at 2. The district court erred in so doing 

because Mr. Fratus need not prove the validity of the factual 

allegations in his initial pleadings. While it is certainly 

possible that the statute of limitations should be tolled only 

through February 20, 1990, this fact is not patently clear from 

the face of Mr. Fratus' pro se pleadings, pleadings which we must 

construe liberally. Jones v. Cowley, 28 F.3d 1067, 2069 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). Whether the statute of limitations should be tolled 

until February 20, 1990 or beyond is clearly a fact question which 

the district court improperly resolved during its frivolousness 

determination. See Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1733 (section 1915(d) 

determination cannot serve as factfinding process) . 

Furthermore, it is unclear when one of Mr. Fratus' causes·of 

action accrued. While state law governs limitations and tolling 

issues, federal law determines the accrual of section 1983 claims. 

Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (lOth Cir. 1993). A 

civil rights action accrues when "facts that would support a cause 

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of action are or should be apparent." Blumberg v. HCA Management 

Co., 848 F.2d 642, 645 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Johnson v. 

Johnson County Comm'n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

Mr. Fratus argues that the USP violated the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by arbitrarily charging him 

more than it charged similarly situated prisoners for similar 

damage. He documents this allegation with numerous affidavits and 

restitution orders. Comparison of restitution charges thus lies 

at the heart of Mr. Fratus' cause of action. Consequently, his 

equal protection claim did not necessarily accrue on Jan. 4, 1989, 

when the prison delivered the restitution order to Mr. Fratus; it 

may have accrued at some later date when Mr. Fratus learned, or 

should have learned, that the prison arbitrarily charged him more 

than other prisoners for similar damage. This is clearly a fact 

question that the district court prematurely decided in the course 

of section 1915(d) dismissal. In Mr. Fratus' response to the 

magistrate's findings and recommendations, he claims that he did 

not learn of the USP's disparate charging practices until December 

1990. Rec., vol. I, doc. 9, at 3. If true, Mr. Fratus' equal 

protection claim may not have accrued until that time and 

therefore would fall within the four-year statute of limitations. 

But the veracity of this scenario is not for us to decide; nor was 

it appropriate for the district court to decide through its 

section 1915(d) dismissal. Accrual, like tolling, is a fact-laden 

issue in the instant case. Given the uncertainty regarding the 

timing of accrual, it is. impossible at this stage of the 

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proceedings to place the claim definitively inside or outside of 

the statute of limitations. 

Section 1915 dismissal on the basis of an affirmative defense 

which the district court raises sua sponte is reserved for those 

extraordinary instances when the claim's factual backdrop clearly 

beckons the defense. This is not such an instance. Due to 

outstanding fact issues regarding Mr. Fratus' mental incompetence, 

the district court could not know with certainty how long the 

statute of limitations should be tolled. The factual difficulty 

in pinpointing when the equal protection claim accrued and, 

concomitantly, the appropriate four-year window of viability, 

magnifies the impropriety of the district court's section 1915(d) 

dismissal. 

We hold that the district court abused its discretion in 

dismissing Mr. Fratus' claim as frivolous. We therefore REVERSE 

and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings in light 

of this opinion. 

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