Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03514/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03514-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE TABLEWARE ANTITRUST

LITIGATION

 /

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO

ALL ACTIONS

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No C-04-3514 VRW

ORDER

Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases allege that May

Department Stores Co (“May”) and Federated Department Stores, Inc

(“Federated”), which operate department stores across the United

States, and Lenox, Inc (“Lenox”) and Waterford Wedgwood, USA

(“Waterford”), both of which produce fine tableware sold in the

United States, conspired with one another to boycott Bed, Bath and

Beyond, a competitor of May and Federated. Plaintiffs bring suit

under § 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging that defendants’ conduct is

condemned per se. By separate order, the court has denied summary

judgment for Federated and May, granted summary judgment for

Waterford and set the matter for trial on June 11, 2007. 

On November 17, 2006, plaintiffs moved for class

certification. Doc #116; Doc #128. For reasons discussed below,

the court CERTIFIES plaintiffs’ class pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3) and

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GRANTS plaintiffs’ requuest for appointment of counsel pursuant to

FRCP 23(g).

I

Because the court’s summary judgment order addressed many

of the underlying issues presented here, the court assumes

familiarity with that order and the definition of terms therein;

the court will confine its discussion in this order to further

analysis mandated by FRCP 23.

Pursuant to FRCP 23, plaintiffs request certification of

the following class:

All persons who purchased in the United States from

Federated or May Department Stores Lenox Tableware

during the period October 1, 2001 through October

31, 2003 or Waterford Wedgwood Tableware during the

period October 1, 2001 through April 30, 2005 (the

“Class Period”). Excluded from the Class are all

employees, officers, directors or agents (including

attorneys) of any defendant, as well as any judge,

justice or judicial officer presiding over this

matter, and each such person’s immediate family.

“Lenox Tableware” includes Lenox, Gorham and Kate

Spade brand dinnerware (china), crystal stemware,

glassware, flatware (sterling and stainless), and

giftware. 

“Waterford Wedgwood Tableware” includes Waterford,

Marquis by Waterford, Wedgwood, Vera Wang, Johnson

Brothers, and Franciscan brand dinnerware (china),

crystal stemware, glassware, flatware (sterling and

stainless), and giftware. 

“Federated Department Stores” includes Macy’s and

Bloomingdale’s, Rich’s, Lazarus, Goldsmith’s,

Burdine’s and the Bon Marche. 

“May Department Stores” includes May, Famous-Barr

(including L.S. Ayers and The Jones Store),

Filene’s, Foley’s, Hecht’s, Kaufmann’s, Meier &

Frank, Robinsons-May and Strawbridge’s. 

Doc #124 at 3-4. 

//

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A

FRCP 23(a) sets forth the preliminary requirements to

certifying a class action: (1) the class must be so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there must be

questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or

defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the

claims or defenses of the class and (4) the representative parties

must be able fairly and adequately to protect the interests of the

class. FRCP 23(a); see also, e g, Armstrong v Davis, 275 F3d 849,

868 (9th Cir 2001); Walters v Reno, 145 F3d 1032, 1045 (9th Cir

1998).

“In determining the propriety of a class action, the

question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a

cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether

the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Eisen v Carlisle &

Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 178 (1974) (quoting Miller v Mackey Intl,

452 F 2d 424 (5th Cir 1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“A Rule 23 determination is wholly procedural and has nothing to do

with whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the substantive

merits of its claim.” Little Caesar Enter v Smith, 172 FRD 236,

241 (ED Mich 1997). On a motion for class certification, the court

“is bound to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as

true.” Blackie v Barrack, 524 F2d 891, 901 n17 (9th Cir 1975). 

Nonetheless, the court is “at liberty to consider evidence which

goes to the requirements of Rule 23 even though the evidence may

also relate to the underlying merits of the case.” Hanon v

Dataproducts Corp, 976 F 2d 497, 509 (9th Cir 1992). 

//

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The court further notes that class actions play a

particularly vital role in the private enforcement of antitrust

actions. See Brown v Pro Football Inc, 146 FRD 1, 4 (DDC 1992)

(“the framers of Rule 23 seemed to target such cases as this

[antitrust action] as appropriate for class determination”); In re

Plastic Cutlery Antitrust Litig, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 3628 at *2 (ED

Pa 1998)(“Class actions are widely-recognized as being particularly

appropriate for the litigation of antitrust cases alleging a

price-fixing conspiracy * * * “); In re Playmobil Antitrust Litig.,

35 F Supp 2d 231, 238 (EDNY 1998) (“antitrust claims are well

suited for class actions”). Accordingly, in antitrust cases,

courts tend to favor class certification when in doubt. See

Playmobil, 35 F Supp 2d at 239 (“Because of the important role that

class actions play in the private enforcement of antitrust actions,

courts resolve doubts in favor of certifying the class.”);

Eisenberg v Gagnon, 766 F2d 770, 785 (3d Cir 1985) (“The interests

of justice require that in a doubtful case * * * any error, if

there is to be one, should be committed in favor of allowing a

class action.”).

The court first assesses whether the FRCP 23(a)

requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy

are met. Under FRCP 23(a)(1), the class be “so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable.” “A finding of numerosity

may be supported by common sense assumptions, and it is especially

appropriate in antitrust actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3).” In

re Playmobil Antitrust Litig, 35 F Supp 2d 231, 239 (EDNY 1998)

(citing 4 Newberg on Class Actions, § 18-03, n 17 (2d ed 1985)). 

Plaintiffs estimate that their proposed class “contains thousands

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of members,” Doc #124 at 13, and assert that joinder would be

impracticable because class members are geographically dispersed

throughout the United States. The court agrees and finds that the

numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied.

The court also concludes that the commonality requirement

is met. To satisfy FRCP 23(a)(2), “[t]he existence of shared legal

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a

common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies

within the class.” Hanlon v Chrysler Corp, 150 F3d 1011, 1019 (9th

Cir 1998). Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that all class members

paid supracompetitive prices for tableware due to defendants’

horizontal agreement to boycott Bed, Bath & Beyond in violation of

§ 1 of the Sherman Act. Doc #18, ¶¶23-25. Common issues of law

and fact include whether such an agreement existed and, if so,

whether it affected the price plaintiffs paid for tableware at

defendants’ stores. Accordingly, all class members’ claims share

these and other common questions of law and fact.

Along these lines, the court concludes that the named

plaintiffs’ claims appear to be typical of the putative class. 

“The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or

similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not

unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members

have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Hanon, 976 F2d

at 508 (internal quotation omitted). See also Estate of Jim

Garrison v Warner Brothers et al, 1996 WL 407849 at *2 (CD Cal

1996) (“Typicality in the antitrust context will be established by

plaintiffs and all class members alleging the same antitrust

violation by the defendants”). 

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Here, the claims of representatives Young and Galindo and

the claims of the class members arise from the same event: they

claim injury from an alleged agreement between Federated and May to

boycott Bed, Bath & Beyond via their purchase of tableware at an

artificially inflated price. The fact that named plaintiffs

purchased different types of tableware products at different prices

from those of the absent class members does not render their claim

atypical. See In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig, 232 FRD 346,

353 (ND Cal 2005) (“That some members of the proposed class may

have received discounts * * * such that they did not pay the prices

set does not counsel against class certification.”). Nor is it

consequential that named plaintiffs did not purchase Lenox

tableware; the horizontal nature of the alleged boycott means that

named plaintiffs were harmed by the same overarching conspiracy as

those in the class who purchased Lenox goods. See In re Bulk

[Extruded] Graphite Prod Antitrust Litig, 2006 WL 891362 at *6 (DNJ

2006) (certifying class in which named plaintiffs represented only

one particular customer category of three because prices of all

categories were allegedly inflated by the same horizontal

price-fixing conspiracy). Accordingly, the court finds that the

claims of named plaintiffs are typical of those of the class.

Finally, FRCP 23(a)(4) provides that class

representatives — both named plaintiffs and their counsel — must

“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 

Legal adequacy turns on two questions: “(1) do named plaintiffs and

their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class

members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel

prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon,

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150 F3d at 1020. 

Regarding the first inquiry, the court cannot detect —

and defendants do not offer — a potential conflict of interest that

exists between the representatives and class members. Members of

the class were allegedly overcharged for tableware and have a

mutual and coterminous interest in establishing defendants’

liability and recovering damages. Similarly, a review of the

litigation heretofore gives the court no reason to doubt that

plaintiffs’ counsel will act vigorously on behalf of the class. 

Because class representatives serve as a guardian of the

interests of the class, the representatives must have some minimal

familiarity with the litigation, see, e g, Burkhalter Travel Agency

v MacFarms Int’l, Inc, 141 FRD 144, 153-53 (ND Cal 1991), although

a detailed understanding of the theories and facts of the case is

not required. See In re Playmobil Antitrust Litig, 35 F Supp 2d

231, 243 (EDNY 1998) (representatives had “an adequate layman’s

understanding” of the case). Notwithstanding defendants’

nitpicking, both Young and Galindo understand the underlying theory

of this case: that plaintiffs overpaid for tableware due to the

exclusion of Bed, Bath & Beyond from the market. See Doc #206, Ex

2 (Galindo depo) at 9:17-10:23, 12:24-14:12; Ex 12 (Young depo) at

13:3-7; 14:6-16:10; 38:5-19; 40:21-42:4; 58:2-12. Accordingly, the

court finds that class representatives Young and Galindo — along

with their counsel — adequately represent the class. 

Courts have also read an additional threshold requirement

into FRCP 23(a) that does not neatly fall under any of the four

listed prerequisites: to certify a class, there must be some

evidence that a class exists and that it may be defined with

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reasonable specificity. Simer v Rios, 661 F2d 655, 669 (7th Cir

1981); O’Connor v Boeing North American, Inc, 184 FRD 311, 319 (CD

Cal 1998); In re Copper Antitrust Litig, 196 FRD 348 (WD Wis 2000)

(denying certification in part because plaintiffs could not define

the class in a way that would inform copper purchases whether they

were in or out of the class). See also Wagner v Central La

Electric Co Inc, 99 FRD 279, 281 (ED La 1983) (the existence of a

class is an “implied prerequisite”). A proper class definition is

essential because it “identifies the persons (1) entitled to

relief, (2) bound by the judgment, and (3) entitled to notice in a

Rule 23(b)(3) action.” Gustafson v Polk County, Wis, 226 FRD 601,

607 (WD Wis. 2005). 

The proposed class is not ascertainable, defendants

charge, because the definition of “tableware” is too generic and

imprecise. Defendants fault this term for encompassing thousands

of items, including “casual” tableware and “giftware,” Doc #151 at

5-6, 10-11, 13. The inclusion of so-called casual tableware

allegedly raises a host of issues because Bed, Bath & Beyond may

have sold this kind of tableware before the boycott in June 2001. 

Adding giftware to the class definition allegedly renders the case

unmanageable because Federated sells two hundred thousand items

that it considers to be giftware, approximately 45% of which is

manufactured by Waterford and Lenox. These items include

candlesticks, picture frames, vases, bowls, cake stands and

utensils. Doc #154, ¶¶ 7-8. 

Neither of these inclusions renders the proposed class

unascertainable. A class definition is “definite enough” to

satisfy FRCP 23(a)(1) if it “is administratively feasible for the

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court to ascertain whether an individual is a member.” O’Connor v

Boeing North American, Inc, 184 FRD 311, 319 (CD Cal 1998). Yet

defendants’ complaint regarding casual tableware does not even

concern administrative feasibility; it deals with the provability

of damages. As such, this theory is appropriately presented in a

motion for summary judgment or directed verdict, not one for class

certification. 

The inclusion of giftware purchasers in the proposed

class gives the court pause due to the sheer number of purchasers

it implicates. But defendants fail to explain why the term

giftware is so amorphous that it would preclude the court from

ascertaining whether an individual is a member of the proposed

class. The actual dispute — as the court understands it — concerns

whether and to what extent giftware falls within the ambit of the

alleged boycott; this is a disputed issue better resolved at trial.

Neither Mueller v CBS, 200 FRD 227, 233-34 (WD Pa 2001),

nor In re Copper Antitrust Litig, 196 FRD 348, 350 (WD Wis 2000)

undermines the court’s conclusion on this issue. In Mueller, the

plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all of the

defendant’s former employees over forty years of age who had been

terminated in order “to interfere with their benefits.” 200 FRD

227, 233-34. The court denied certification, explaining that it

would be necessary to hold a series of individualized causation

hearings to determine which of the employees had been fired in

order to prevent them from receiving retirement benefits. In In re

Copper Antitrust Litig, 196 FRD 348, 350 (WD Wis 2000), the

district court denied certification to a proposed class consisting

of “all copper or metals dealers * * * that purchased physical

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copper” during a specified time period “at prices expressly related

to LME or Comex copper future prices.” The court observed that

this definition did not “communicat[e] to copper purchasers what

they [would] need to know to decide whether they [were] in or

outside the proposed class” because plaintiffs failed to explain

the meaning of the terms “copper or metals dealers,” “physical

copper” and “expressly related to.” Id at 358-60.

Having reviewed plaintiffs’ class definition, the court

is satisfied that individuals would be able to determine, simply by

reading the definition, whether they are members of the proposed

class. Unlike in Copper Antitrust, none of the terms in the

definition requires further clarification. And unlike the proposed

definition in Mueller, plaintiffs’ definition would not require the

court to hold individualized hearings to decide whether a

particular individual fell within the scope of the definition.

Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs have proposed an

ascertainable class.

B

In addition to satisfying the Rule 23(a) prerequisites,

the class must also satisfy one of the three alternatives listed

under Rule 23(b). Walters, 145 F3d at 1045. Plaintiffs bear the

burden of demonstrating that they have satisfied all four FRCP

23(a) elements and one FRCP 23(b) alternative. Zinser v Accufix

Research Institute, Inc, 253 F3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir 2001). 

Failure to carry the burden on any FRCP 23 requirement precludes

certifying a class action. Burkhalter Travel Agency v MacFarms

Int’l, Inc, 141 FRD 144, 152 (ND Cal 1991) (Jensen, J) (citing

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Rutledge v Electric Hose & Rubber Co, 511 F2d 668 (9th Cir 1975)).

Plaintiffs have opted to proceed under FRCP 23(b)(3),

which authorizes the court to certify a class action if “the

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,

and * * * a class action is superior to other available methods for

the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” FRCP

23(b)(3). See also Zinser v Accufix Research Inst, Inc, 253 F3d

1180, 1189 (9th Cir 2001). The matters pertinent to such a finding

include: (a) the interest of members of the class in individually

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the

extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy

already commenced by or against members of the class; (c) the

desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of

the claims in the particular forum; (d) the difficulties likely to

be encountered in the management of a class action. Id.

The objective behind the two requirements of Rule

23(b)(3) is the promotion of economy and efficiency. See FRCP

23(b)(3) advisory committee notes. When common issues predominate,

class actions achieve these objectives by minimizing costs and

avoiding the confusion that would result from inconsistent

outcomes. Id.

To predominate, common questions “need not be dispositive

of the litigation.” Rather, the court must identify issues

involved in the cases and determine which of them “are subject to

generalized proof * * * applicable to the class as a whole” and

which must be the subject of proof on behalf of individualized

class members. “Because no precise test can determine whether

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common issues predominate, the court must pragmatically assess the

entire action and the issues involved.” Romero v Producers Dairy

Foods, Inc, 235 FRD 474, 489 (ED Cal 2006). Courts in antitrust

cases, as in other cases, typically evince a greater willingness to

certify classes involving individualized damages, as opposed to

individualized liability issues. See Alexander v QTS Corp, 1999 US

Dist LEXIS 11842 (ND Ill 1999).

 Here, the common questions concern whether defendants

agreed to boycott Bed, Bath & Beyond and, if so, whether the

boycott affected the price plaintiffs paid for tableware. See In

re Master Key Antitrust Litig, 70 FRD 23 (D Conn 1975) (classes

certified in case involving horizontal and vertical communications

where “the damage claims arise from the horizontal, not the

vertical, conduct and evidence of vertical communications would be

offered “only to demonstrate by implication the existence of a

horizontal conspiracy”).

To support the proposed class-wide approach, plaintiffs

submit a report from Roger Noll, an economist, who avers that he

has identified at least three formulae to measure the class-wide

impact of the alleged boycott in this case: one that compares the

list prices for tableware before, during and after the alleged

conspiracy; one that analyzes the retail markup over the wholesale

cost of tableware; and one that compares similar products that were

not part of the collusive agreement. Doc #207, Ex 17 (Noll report)

at 7. Noll concludes that the first approach (so-called “beforeand-after”) is the most useful here. Id at 8. 

A second economist, Paul Liu, performed a regression

analysis consistent with Noll’s before-and-after approach. Doc

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#207, Ex 18 (Liu report) at 8. To determine impact, Liu

constructed a mark-up specification model based on transactional

data produced by defendants that purports to demonstrate a

statistically significant decline in Lenox, Wedgwoood and Waterford

tableware markups at Federated and May following the respective

introductions of such tableware at Bed, Bath & Beyond. Id, Ex 18

at 6-8, 13, 14 & Fig 2. Liu’s regression specification shows price

declines quantified for Lenox (3.84), Wedgwood (2.14) and Waterford

(6.21) as a percentage of cost relative to the baseline. Id at

6-7, 11-16 & Fig 3. Applying these results to a damage formula

(difference between “actual” and “but-for” multiplied by total

cost), Liu estimates that the class suffered damages in the amount

of $12,301,941 as a result of the boycott. Id at 15-16. 

Defendants criticize these two expert reports for failing

to account for individual criteria, such as defendants’ store

locations and their proximity to Bed, Bath & Beyond. Plaintiffs

contend that this argument ignores the national structure of the

tableware market: Federated and May both adhere strictly to a

national pricing formula. Doc #207, Ex 17 at 32. In view of this

formula, Noll concludes that “all customers who purchased their

products were affected identically by any corporate decision that

affected the distribution and prices of their products,” id at 32,

and that individual damages are not likely to vary substantially

among products within a line. Id at 7. 

These submissions suffice to show that means exist for

proving impact on a class-wide basis, which is all that is required

under the authority cited by defendants. The central and common

element of this suit is whether defendants agreed to boycott Bed,

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Bath & Beyond. See Citric Acid, 1996 WL 655791 at *6 (common

questions include whether there was a conspiracy, whether prices

were fixed pursuant to the conspiracy, and whether the prices

plaintiffs paid were higher than they should have been). If this

element is shown, various exogenous factors may affect the amount

of recovery individual plaintiffs may obtain. But this

qualification does not militate against class certification; in few

class actions is there a simple per capita measure of recovery. 

Citric Acid, 1996 WL 655791, at *6 (“Contentions of infinite

diversity of product, marketing practices, and pricing have been

made in numerous cases and rejected.”). See also In re Brand Name

Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig, 1994 WL 663590 at *4-*5 (ND Ill

1994) (class of 50,000 independent retail pharmacists certified to

bring claims against thirty-one drug manufacturers involving

hundreds of different drugs). “It is not necessary that plaintiffs

show that their expert’s methods will work with certainty at this

time. Rather, plaintiffs’ burden is to present the court with a

likely method for determining class damages.” In re Domestic Air

Transp Antitrust Litig, 137 FRD 677, 693 (ND Ga 1991).

To be sure, the sheer size of the proposed class will

engender management problems, but the advantages of class treatment

more than compensate for these administrative costs. The modest

amount at stake for individual plaintiffs in this case renders

individual prosecution impractical; class treatment not only

promotes judicial economy, it represents plaintiffs only chance for

adjudication. See Amchem Prods v Windsor, 521 US 591, 616 (quoting

with approval Advisory Committee’s reference to the desirability of

a class action when “the amounts at stake for individuals may be so

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small that separate suits would be impractical”). Accordingly, the

court finds that common questions of law and fact predominate over

individual questions and that class treatment of this matter is

superior to any other available means of adjudication. 

III

In sum, the court finds that the FRCP 23(a) requirements

of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy are met. The

court further finds, pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), that common

questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions and

that class treatment of this matter is superior to any other

available means of adjudication. Finally, the court appoints

Saveri & Saveri, Inc; Zelle Hofmann Voelbel Mason & Gette; Furth

Lehmann & Grant LLP; The Law Firm of Joseph M Alioto; and The Law

Offices of Randy Renick as class counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03514-VRW Document 287 Filed 03/13/07 Page 15 of 15