Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00765/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00765-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANH VAN NGUYEN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

 15cv765 WQH (NLS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [Dkt. No. 14]; and 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [Dkt. No. 15] 

Plaintiff Anh Van Nguyen brings this action under the Social Security Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the decision of the Social Security 

Administration (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) to deny her claims for disability 

insurance benefits. This case was referred for a report and recommendation on the 

parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After 

considering the papers submitted, the administrative record, and the applicable law, the 

court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and for reversal 

and/or remand be DENIED, and that Defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment be 

GRANTED. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Procedural History. 

Nguyen initially applied for social security disability insurance benefits under the 

Social Security Act on August 19, 2011, and completed that application with an in-person 

interview on September 2, 2011. Administrative Record (AR) 98-104; 180-183. She 

alleged her disability began on September 21, 2010. AR 180. 

The Social Security Administration denied Nguyen’s application initially and on 

reconsideration. AR 105, 119. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gail Reich held a 

hearing on August 5, 2013. AR 56-97. The ALJ issued her decision on October 16, 2013 

and found that Nguyen was not disabled. AR 8-19. The Appeals Council denied 

Nguyen’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision on February 11, 2015, causing the 

decision to become final. AR 1-4. 

Nguyen filed this complaint for judicial review on April 7, 2015. She asks the 

court to reverse the ALJ’s decision and award her benefits. P’s MSJ, p.5. Nguyen also 

asks this court to admit and consider new evidence from a doctor appointment that 

occurred after the ALJ issued her decision. P’s MSJ, pp.24-25. 

B. Nguyen’s Background. 

Nguyen was born on May 7, 1968 in South Vietnam. AR 180. She immigrated to 

the United States in 1991. AR 362. At the time of her initial application in August 2011, 

she said she could not speak or understand English but that she could read and write it. 

AR 194. But this statement conflicts with some notes from doctors. For example, in a 

psychiatric evaluation on May 10, 2012, the examining psychiatrist, Dr. Engelhorn, noted 

that Nguyen “speaks fairly good English.” AR 362. And on May 29, 2012, Nguyen’s 

treating neurologist, Dr. Grisolia, noted that she “speaks fair English with intact attention, 

orientation and comprehension.” AR 369. 

Nguyen worked as a self-employed manicurist from approximately 2002 to 

September 2010, and as a newspaper carrier from 2006 to September 2010. AR 196, 

253. She did not have medical insurance. AR 370. 

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C. Documentary Medical Evidence. 

1. September 2010 Hospital Records. 

On September 21, 2010, Nguyen got up at 3:00 a.m. to go to the bathroom but had 

trouble walking because of weakness in her left leg. AR 319. She then took two blood 

pressure pills and went back to sleep. AR 324. Later that morning she went to her 

doctor, Dr. Nadine Sidrick, who sent her to the emergency room at Scripps Mercy 

Hospital. AR 324, 346, 354. Dr. Sidrick noted that Nguyen was “very concerned re 

[medical] costs.” AR 346. 

At the hospital Nguyen denied having any chest pain, shortness of breath, 

headache or neck pain. AR 319-322, 324. She had a CT scan of her head. The results 

showed she suffered from “cerebrovascular accident” and “lacurnar infarctions,” also 

known as a “stroke.” AR 314, 335. There was “no evidence of acute hemorrhage or 

mass effect.” AR 335. She also had a MRI done on September 21, 2010 that confirmed 

the CT results. AR 333. Her other diagnoses included hypertension for either the last 

two (AR 326) or 10 (AR 313) years, hyperglycemia (AR 326), obesity (AR 315), and 

evidence of a “prior cardiac inferior infarcation,” or heart attack (AR 314, 326). 

Nguyen was discharged from the hospital the next day, September 22, 2010. AR 

314. Her “left sided upper and lower extremity weakness improved.” AR 314. The 

discharge doctor noted that she was in stable condition, “is able to perform her ADLs 

[activities of daily life],” and that she was advised to “exercise, start[ing] with brisk 

walk[s] three to four times a week.” AR 315. 

2. Treating Primary Care Physician Dr. Sidrick. 

Dr. Sidrick is Nguyen’s primary care physician. AR 324. From the time of the 

stroke to the time of the ALJ hearing, Dr. Sidrick saw Nguyen only two times. AR 354. 

She first saw her on September 21, 2010, the day of her stroke, and then over 11 months 

later, on August 29, 2011. AR 345. On August 29 Dr. Sidrick found Nguyen had 

“poorly controlled diabetes.” AR 345. Dr. Sidrick noted under Nguyen’s “subjective” 

complaints that she was “unable to work due to past stroke: memory.” AR 356. 

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Four days after that second appointment with Dr. Sidrick—September 2, 2011—

Nguyen completed her application for social security benefits with an in-person 

interview. AR 180-183. On September 28, 2011, Dr. Sidrick wrote a letter to Social 

Security saying: “Ms. Nguyen needs regular medical care. At this time, she is unable to 

work in any capacity.” AR 345. On April 4, 2012, Dr. Sidrick wrote another letter to 

Social Security, stating that she saw Nguyen only two times—September 21, 2010 and 

August 29, 2010—and that her current condition was unknown. AR 354. 

Nguyen went to see Dr. Sidtrick for a third time only days after her August 5, 2013 

hearing before the ALJ. Dr. Sidrick’s conclusion from that visit differed from her 

conclusion in the September 28, 2011 letter, where she wrote that Nguyen could not 

work. In the August 2013 letter, Dr. Sidrick never said that Nguyen was disabled or that 

she could not work; she gave her only certain limitations for the workday. AR 297-298. 

Specifically, Dr. Sidrick noted that Nguyen can lift or carry up to 10 pounds frequently 

and up to 24 pounds occasionally. AR 297, 298. In an eight-hour work day, Dr. Sidrick 

said Nguyen could sit for six hours, stand for two hours, and walk for two hours. AR 

298. She noted some limitations, such as no repetitive movements for her left foot and 

hand, including no grasping, pulling or pushing, and that Nguyen be restricted from 

unprotected heights, moving machinery, marked changes in temperature and humidity 

and driving automotive equipment. AR 297. Dr. Sidrick also said that Nguyen suffers 

from poorly-controlled diabetes and left side weakness due to stroke. AR 298. 

3. Treating Neurologist Dr. Grisolia. 

On May 29, 2012, Nguyen saw Dr. Grisolia, a neurologist. AR 369. He noted her 

medical history and a few clinical observations, then said that Nguyen could not perform 

“activities requiring repetitive use of the hands and the patient’s left hemiparesis will 

disable her from activities requiring frequent walking and standing.” AR 369. He added 

that “[t]he disabilities are anticipated to be permanent.” AR 369. Contrary to Nguyen’s 

assertions in her summary judgment motion, Dr. Grisolia never mentioned that he 

reviewed or in any way relied on the MRI or CT scan results from Nguyen’s September 

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2010 one-day hospital stay. AR 369; P’s MSJ, pp.8, 10. 

Nguyen went to see Dr. Grisolia for only the second time on November 20, 2013, 

after the ALJ issued her October 13, 2013 decision denying Nguyen benefits. P’s MSJ, 

Ex. 1. Dr. Grisolia wrote a note about that visit on December 7, 2013. P’s MSJ, Ex. 1. 

Nguyen seeks to make Dr. Grisolia’s note from that day part of the record. 

The December 7 note says that based on his exam, Nguyen still has left-side 

hemiparesis, or weakness, and had “reduced coordinate and grip strength on the left 

side.” P’s MSJ, Ex. 1. He notes she also suffers from “cognitive impairment, memory 

loss, and fatigue,” and that “her disability from the stroke is stable and permanent.” P’s 

MSJ, Ex. 1. 

4. Examining Neurologist Dr. Schweller. 

Nguyen saw Dr. Schweller on May 2, 2012 for a consultative exam. AR 357-359. 

He noted her social and medical history and then conducted a physical examination. 

After studying her station and gait, Dr. Schweller noted Nguyen could walk without 

assistance but had a slight limp on the left. AR 358. She scored a 5/5 for strength in the 

upper and lower extremities. AR 358. Her right-hand grip was for 30 pounds and lefthand grip was for 20 pounds. AR 359. Based on her medical history and the physical 

exam, Dr. Schweller found that Nguyen had the following functional capacity: sit, stand 

and walk for six out of eight hours in a day; lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently; no limits in bending, stooping, squatting, kneeling or crawling, or in upper 

extremity fine or gross manipulation; and she should avoid unprotected heights and 

exposure to moving machinery. AR 359. 

5. Treating Psychiatrist Dr. Henderson. 

Nguyen began to see her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Henderson, in March 2011. AR 

370. She saw him on an irregular basis until at least August 2013. AR 370. Dr. 

Henderson provided no treatment notes. He noted that Nguyen suffered from severe 

depression and post-traumatic stress disorder due to the stroke. AR 370. Dr. Henderson 

concluded that Nguyen “has marked restriction of activities of daily living, marked 

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difficulties in maintaining social functioning and often deficiencies of concentration, 

persistence or pace[.]” AR 372. 

6. Examining Psychiatrist Dr. Engelhorn. 

Dr. Engelhorn examined Nguyen on May 7, 2012, and wrote up his report on her 

on May 10, 2012. AR 362-364. Nguyen reported to Dr. Engelhorn: 

She states that she does not experience depression on a daily 

basis. ... She is fully capable of taking care of her basic needs. 

She does a variety of household chores including cooking, 

cleaning and laundry. She states that she drives a car and 

regularly attends Catholic church services. She has a 

reasonably active social life....She occasionally goes grocery 

shopping. 

AR 363. After listing out several of his clinical observations, Dr. Engelhorn noted that 

Nguyen showed no evidence of psychosis, active depression or anxiety. AR 363. He 

found that she could perform simple, repetitive tasks and complex and detailed work. AR 

364. Dr. Engelhorn noted, “I simply did not see any significant psychiatric disability.” 

AR 364. 

D. Testimony of State Agency Medical Consultant—Dr. Klein. 

Dr. Klein, an internist, testified telephonically at the hearing only in relation to 

Nguyen’s physical condition. AR 69, 74. He first summarized Nguyen’s impairments in 

order of their severity as evidenced in her medical records: stroke in 2010 that caused 

left-sided weakness; type II diabetes; hypertension; frequent headaches; residual leftsided weakness; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; and some cognitive impairments. AR 

69-70. Dr. Klein noted that she does all of her activities of daily life and that her diabetes 

and hypertension are under control. AR 70. 

Dr. Klein concluded that Nguyen does have a severe medically determinable 

impairment but that it does not meet or equal any of the listings in the regulations for a 

central nervous system stroke because she has no loss of motor function and does not 

have any speech impairment. AR 70. He gave Nguyen a light RFC that includes: ability 

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to lift 10 to 20 pounds; no limitations on sitting, standing or walking; occasional low 

stairs and ramps; no ladders, ropes or scaffolds; no limitations on fine motoring or 

reaching or handling; and avoid exposure to extreme cold and heat, dangerous machinery, 

and height. AR 70, 71. 

E. Nguyen’s Testimony at the Hearing. 

Nguyen testified that she takes care of the household, cooks, and does the grocery 

shopping. AR 63. She said she does not drive often or long distances but testified that 

she drove to the hearing in downtown San Diego from Poway that day, driving for 

approximately 30 minutes. AR 64, 66. She can write checks and walk short distances. 

AR 65. Regarding pain and function, Nguyen testified that she gets tired and dizzy after 

walking short distances. AR 65-66. She said she is tired all the time. AR 66. 

F. The ALJ’s Decision. 

1. Evaluating Social Security Disability Claims. 

To qualify for disability benefits under the SSA, an applicant must show that he or 

she cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last at least 12 

months. 42 U.S.C. §423(d). The Social Security regulations establish a five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining whether an applicant is disabled under this 

standard. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Batson v. Comm’r of the Social Security Admin., 359 

F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 At step one, the ALJ determines whether the applicant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). At step two, the ALJ determines whether 

the applicant suffers from a “severe” impairment within the meaning of the regulations. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the impairment is severe, the ALJ goes on to step three 

to decide whether the impairment meets or equals one of the “Listing of Impairments” in 

the Social Security regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If it does, the applicant 

is found disabled, and benefits are awarded. Id. If the impairment does not meet or equal 

a Listing, the ALJ goes on to step four to determine whether the applicant retains the 

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residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the applicant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ–at step 

five–must consider whether the applicant can perform any other work that exists in the 

national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 

1175 (9th Cir. 2013); see Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010-1011 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(discussing the sequential process in greater length). 

 While the applicant carries the burden of proving eligibility at steps one through 

four, the burden at step five rests on the agency. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 

(9th Cir. 2003). Applicants not disqualified at step five are eligible for disability benefits. 

Id.

2. Substance of ALJ Decision. 

 The ALJ determined that Nguyen satisfied Step 1 of the evaluation. First, Nguyen 

met the insured status requirement because her date of last insured was June 30, 2015. 

AR 13. Second, she found that Nguyen did not engage in any substantial gainful activity 

since September 21, 2010, the alleged onset date of her disability. AR 13. 

At Step 2, the ALJ found that Nguyen suffered from the following “severe” 

impairments as defined in the regulations: left hemiparesis secondary to stroke in 2010; 

diabetes; obesity; and hypertension. AR 13. These impairments caused “significant 

work-related limitations” for Nguyen. AR 13. The ALJ found that Nguyen’s carpel 

tunnel syndrome was non-severe. AR 13. Even though the medical evidence did not 

establish a cause for Nguyen’s reported headaches, the medical expert considered them in 

his opinion. AR 13. The ALJ also found that Nguyen’s medically determinable mental 

impairment was non-severe and did not cause more than a minimal limitation on her 

ability to perform basic mental work activities. AR 11. 

Moving on to Step 3, the ALJ found Nguyen did not suffer from an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments in the 

Social Security Regulations listed in 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 13-14; 

see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526. 

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In determining—at step 4—whether Nguyen retained the residual functional 

capacity (RFC) to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found that she could perform 

light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following limitations: no 

more than occasionally climbing ramps and stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes and 

scaffolds; and must avoid all exposure to temperature extremes, heights and dangerous 

machinery. AR 15. The ALJ relied on the vocational expert’s testimony that an 

individual with Nguyen’s RFC could return to her past occupation as a manicurist 

(sedentary semiskilled work), and that she could perform it as actually and generally 

performed. AR 17. 

Even though the ALJ found that Nguyen was capable of her past relevant work as a 

manicurist, she proceeded with the evaluation at step five for considering whether 

Nguyen could perform any other work existing in the national economy. AR 17. The 

ALJ considered Nguyen’s RFC, age, education, work experience in conjunction with the 

medical-vocational guidelines and testimony of the vocational expert. AR 17. Based on 

these factors, she found that in addition to her past relevant work as a manicurist, Nguyen 

could also work as a garment folder and a small products assembler. AR 18. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard of Review. 

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision 

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must 

affirm the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and applies the correct legal standards. Batson v. Comm’r of the Social Security Admin., 

359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence means “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Put another 

way, it is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 

F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

/ / / 

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If the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the 

agency’s decision must be upheld. Id.; Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Further, when medical 

reports are inconclusive, questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the 

testimony are the exclusive functions of the agency. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

751 (9th Cir. 1989). The reviewing court cannot reinterpret or re-evaluate the evidence 

however much a re-evaluation may reasonably result in a favorable outcome for the 

plaintiff. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

B. Assertion of Error. 

In challenging the ALJ’s denial of benefits, Nguyen argues the ALJ committed 

reversible error and did not base the decision on substantial evidence. She argues that the 

ALJ erred by disregarding the opinions of Nguyen’s treating physicians, namely Dr. 

Sidrick, Dr. Grisiola and Dr. Henderson. She also argues the ALJ erred when she 

interrupted Nguyen’s attorney to allegedly prevent the cross-examination of the Agency’s 

medical expert. 

C. Is There Substantial Evidence to Support the Decision? 

1. Rejection of Treating Physicians’ Opinions. 

A treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded “substantial weight.” Bray v. 

Comm’r of SSA, 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). But it is not always given 

controlling weight: “Although a treating physician's opinion is generally afforded the 

greatest weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the 

existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of disability.” Batson, 359 F.3d 

at 1194-95 (internal quotations omitted). “The ALJ may disregard the treating 

physician’s opinion whether or not that opinion is contradicted.” Id. (internal quotations 

omitted). 

To reject a treating physician’s opinion, an ALJ must provide specific, legitimate 

reasons based on substantial evidence in the record. See Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring an ALJ to give specific, legitimate reasons based 

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on substantial evidence for rejecting the opinion of a treating physician based in part on 

the testimony of a non-examining medical advisor); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752-753. 

The ALJ can meet this burden “by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the 

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 

findings.” Id. at 751-755. Additionally, when confronted with conflicting medical 

opinions, an “ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating 

physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical 

findings.” Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Finally, the “ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical 

evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

a. Dr. Sidrick—Physical Impairments. 

The ALJ did not assign controlling weight to Dr. Sidrick’s opinion namely because 

(1) Dr. Sidrick treated Nguyen on only two occasions (AR 354); (2) her conclusions were 

brief and based on only one handwritten page of sparse notes in one of the examinations 

(AR 16; 354); and (3) Dr. Sidrick gave conflicting opinions. The ALJ also relied on Dr. 

Klein, the medical expert, who opined that the examination records were insufficient to 

support any of Dr. Sidrick’s conclusions. AR 16. 

First, Dr. Sidrick never obtained a detailed picture of Nguyen’s impairment over 

the relevant time period because she saw Nguyen only two times over an 11-month 

period. This is a specific and legitimate reason, based on substantial evidence—or lack 

thereof—to reject her opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (“the longer a treating 

source has treated you and the more times you have been seen by a treating source, the 

more weight we will give to the source's medical opinion”). The two examinations did 

not provide much more opportunity, if any, than the consulting doctors had in their 

examinations with Nguyen. 

Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Sidrick provided little objective support for her 

conclusion that Nguyen’s impairments were disabling. The ALJ pointed out there was 

only a single-page, sparsely-written progress note. It was reasonable, therefore, for the 

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ALJ to conclude that Dr. Sidrick’s finding of total inability to work was not supported by 

objective medical evidence. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2001) (rejecting opinion of a doctor that is “conclusory and brief and unsupported by 

clinical findings”); Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 (rejecting a treating physician’s conclusory 

opinion because it was not supported by clinical evidence); see also 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an 

opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give 

that opinion”). 

Third, the ALJ noted that Dr. Sidrick provided conflicting findings. AR 16. For 

example, in September 2011 Dr. Sidrick wrote a letter stating that Nguyen could not 

work at all. But then in August 2013 she filled out a medical assessment—without 

showing any evidence of another visit or examination—that said Nguyen could do 

sedentary work.1

 AR 16. Dr. Sidrick does not at all explain her change of position. 

In addition, the ALJ cited to the opinion of examining neurologist Dr. Schweller, 

who found that Nguyen was capable of light work. AR 17. In his opinion, Dr. Schweller 

wrote out the seven different physical examinations he conducted, his observations, and 

his findings. AR 358. While he did not review Nguyen’s medical record, his opinion 

constitutes substantial evidence because he based it on his own clinical findings. See 

Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (finding a consultative examiner’s opinion “constitutes 

substantial evidence, because it rests on his own independent examination”). 

i. Reliance on Opinion of Dr. Klein. 

Finally, in rejecting Dr. Sidrick’s opinion, the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. 

Klein, the testifying medical expert. AR 16-17. Dr. Klein based his opinion on his 

                                                                

1

 Nguyen tries to argue that the ALJ’s decision is flawed due to her “total failure to 

address Dr. Sidrick’s August 20, 2013 evaluation submitted after the hearing.” P’s MSJ, 

pp.9, 17; Reply, p.1. That is simply wrong. The ALJ addressed that August 20, 2013 

note in her opinion: “An August 2013 medical source assessment from Dr. Sidrick then 

opined the claimant was only capable of sedentary work.” AR 16. 

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complete review of the medical evidence. AR 70. He opined that Nguyen could perform 

light work with certain postural and environmental restrictions. AR 70. His opinion, 

coupled with other evidence in the record, serves as additional substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s opinion. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 

600 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). A 

Commissioner’s decision to reject the opinion of a treating or examining physician, 

however, may be upheld where it is based in part on the testimony of a nonexamining 

medical advisor. Id. (citing e.g. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751-55; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 

1043; Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179 (9th Cir. 1995)). Where the ALJ does not rely on a 

nonexamining physician’s testimony alone to reject the treating physician’s opinions, 

also relies on other evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s decision, the rejection of 

the treating physician’s opinion is adequately supported. See id. 

Here, the ALJ’s decision to not assign controlling weight to Dr. Sidrick’s opinions 

was based only in part on the opinion of Dr. Klein, the non-examining and non-treating 

medical advisor. The ALJ did not rely on Dr. Klein’s opinion alone as to Nguyen’s RFC. 

Rather, the ALJ also cited to other evidence in the record, such as the report from the 

consultative neurologist, Dr. Schweller, which listed out Nguyen’s capabilities; and to the 

medical evidence of the record in general, including Nguyen’s testimony, which Dr. 

Klein considered. AR 17. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Klein had the “greatest longitudinal 

view of [Nguyen]’s condition.” AR 17. Reliance on Dr. Klein’s opinion does not justify 

reversal. 

ii. Dr. Klein Is Not a Specialist. 

Second, Nguyen argues that Dr. Klein was not qualified to opine on her 

neurological impairment because he was an internist as opposed to a neurologist. P’s 

MSJ, p.7. Nguyen cites to no legal or medical authority to support her claim. 

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By regulation, the Commissioner “generally give[s] more weight to the opinion of 

a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion 

of a source who is not a specialist.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5). But this is only one 

factor to consider and does not, on its own, justify reversal. See, e.g., Garcia v. Colvin, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 607, *16 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2014) (considering whether a doctor 

is a specialist “is certainly a factor that the ALJ could properly consider in affording less 

weight to that portion of his opinion.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5)). 

iii. ALJ’s Interruption of Nguyen’s Cross-Examination of Dr. Klein. 

Finally, Nguyen argues that the ALJ interfered with her attorney’s crossexamination of Dr. Klein, which prevented her from obtaining favorable testimony from 

him. P’s MSJ, pp.7, 11-13. But Nguyen mischaracterizes what actually happened at the 

hearing. The ALJ was clarifying Dr. Klein’s statements because Nguyen’s attorney (1) 

seemed to misconstrue what Dr. Klein was saying; and (2) did not have a solid grasp of 

the facts of her own case. 

For example, after Dr. Klein explained that he reviewed all the medical records, 

including the psychiatric records, Nguyen’s attorney said: 

ATTY: I thought that he testified that he did not read all of the medical 

history. 

ALJ: No, he did not say that. 

ATTY: Okay. 

AR 73-75. 

Dr. Klein also emphasized several times that while he read the psychiatric records, 

he was not qualified to give an opinion on them, so did not account for them in his 

opinion or RFC. Nguyen’s attorney, though, had difficulty accepting his testimony, 

causing the ALJ to have to clarify that point several times: 

ATTY: Just, just to make sure that we have an agreement here. That, in your 

assessment, you did not take into account 10F, which is the 

psychiatric evaluation. Is that correct? 

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ALJ: All right. This is the 6th time we’ve been through that. Can -- do you 

want to talk about something you haven’t covered already? 

ATTY: I just want to make sure, your honor. Because, with, dealing with 5F 

and 6F and 9F and I just want to make sure that he did not include – 

ALJ: He’s not testifying as to – how many ways can I say that to you? 

AR 86. 

Nguyen’s attorney also misunderstood Dr. Klein’s testimony about Dr. Sidrick’s 

examination of Nguyen: 

ATTY: So, there’s no basis for your statement that Dr. Sidrick was not 

examining the patient when she made the April, 2012 report. Is that 

correct? 

ALJ: He didn’t say she didn’t examine the patient. 

ATTY: He say something about Dr. Sidrick not examining – 

ALJ: He said something about that. He didn’t say she didn’t examine her. 

AR 79. 

Finally, Nguyen’s attorney did not have a solid grasp of the facts of her case, as 

she asked Dr. Klein if he knew whether Nguyen saw Dr. Sidrick more than one time. AR 

79. The ALJ explained that was not a question to pose to the medical expert. AR 79. As 

it turns out, even though Nguyen’s attorney argued that Dr. Sidrick was the treating 

physician, she herself did not know—or have the records to figure out—whether Nguyen 

saw Dr. Sidrick more than once: 

ALJ: [Dr. Sidrick is] not a treating physician? Is that correct? That was just 

someone – 

ATTY: That’s the treating physician. 

/ / / 

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ALJ: Because it says “seen for a disability evaluation.” That doesn’t sound 

like a treating physician. ...Where are the other records from that 

doctor? 

ATTY: I don’t have them. 

ALJ: You don’t have them? Okay. So, that was the only time the claimant 

saw that doctor? 

ATTY: I don’t know, your honor. 

ALJ: Well, the record is – the letter begins “I’m seeing this patient for a 

disability evaluation.” That’s not how a treating physician’s records 

begin. 

ATTY: It’s my understanding that he [sic] is a treating physician. 

ALJ: And it’s your understand[ing] that the claimant saw that person how 

many times? 

ATTY: And, she might have seen him [sic] more than once, your honor. 

*** 

ALJ: Do you have any evidence that the claimant saw [Dr. Sidrick] more 

than once? 

ATTY: I’ll speak to the claimant, your honor. 

ALJ: I’m asking you. 

ATTY: I don’t have any evidence with me. I will have to contact the doctor’s 

office. 

AR 81-82. 

 After reviewing the entire transcript, the court finds that in her interjections the 

ALJ was merely clarifying questions to Dr. Klein and preventing the repetition of 

questions to him. Further, Dr. Klein appeared by phone, and while it is not specified in 

the transcript, it is possible that some of the clarifications were due to his appearance by 

phone. And finally, according to Defendant, it is in the province of the ALJ to take such 

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actions. See Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX), HALLEX I-2-

6-70.C (on cross-examination of a medical expert, “the ALJ will determine when 

[counsel] may exercise this right and whether questions asked or answers given are 

appropriate.”) 

In sum, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial 

evidence in the record—including that provided by Dr. Klein—to reject Dr. Sidrick’s 

opinion. 

b. Dr. Grisiola—Physical Impairments. 

In his May 2012 letter, Dr. Grisiola opined that Nguyen could not perform 

activities requiring repetitive use of her hands or frequent walking or standing. AR 369. 

The ALJ gave this opinion little weight because Nguyen had seen Dr. Grisiola only one 

time, and the medical record did not substantiate his findings that Nguyen suffered from 

carpal tunnel syndrome. AR 16. Nguyen argues that Dr. Grisiola’s opinion is entitled to 

controlling weight because he was a treating physician and because he reviewed and 

relied on the MRI and CT scan results from the hospital in making his assessment. P’s 

MSJ, pp.8-10; Reply, p.2. She also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting “Dr. Grisolia’s 

opinions or findings because the ALJ did not have the December 7, 2013 report available 

and erroneously found that Dr. Grisolia was not a treating physician.” P’s MSJ, p.8. In 

other words, Nguyen argues that the ALJ’s opinion is “wrong” because it did not 

consider her second visit to Dr. Grisiola, which occurred almost four months after the 

hearing and over a month after the ALJ’s decision came out. Nguyen asks that this court 

consider that new evidence. 

First, the fact that, at the times of the hearing and of the written opinion, Nguyen 

had seen Dr. Grisiola only one time did not entitle his opinion to any more deference than 

the opinion of any other consultative medical source, so the ALJ did not err in citing that 

as a reason to reject his opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (entitling treating 

physician opinions to more deference because they “provide a detailed longitudinal 

picture of ... medical impairment(s)” as opposed to “reports of individual examinations, 

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such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations”). Second, Dr. Grisiola’s 

conclusion that Nguyen could not engage in repetitive use of both of her hands was based 

on his finding of carpal tunnel syndrome; he said that the left-sided weakness only kept 

her from frequent walking or standing. AR 369. But there was no other mention in the 

record of carpal tunnel or weakness in both hands. Because there were no clinical 

findings to support that conclusion, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Grisiola’s opinion 

on that basis. See Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 (rejecting a treating physician’s conclusory 

opinion because it was not supported by clinical evidence). 

The court finds the single visit to Dr. Grisiola and the lack of supporting clinical 

evidence to be specific and legitimate reasons to not give Dr. Grisiola’s opinion 

controlling weight. And, contrary to Nguyen’s argument, there is no mention that Dr. 

Grisioloa reviewed or in any way relied on the MRI or CT scan results. AR 369. Finally, 

as previously explained, the ALJ cited to the opinion of examining neurologist Dr. 

Schweller, who saw Nguyen just as much as Dr. Grisiola did. Dr. Schweller provided a 

much more detailed review and assessment than Dr. Grisiola, as he listed out the seven 

different physical examinations he conducted, his observations, and his findings. AR 

358. His opinion constitutes substantial evidence because he based it on his own clinical 

findings. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149 (finding a consultative examiner’s opinion 

“constitutes substantial evidence, because it rests on his own independent examination”). 

i. Proposed Introduction of New Evidence from Dr. Grisiola. 

Nguyen asks the court to admit and consider evidence of her second appointment 

with Dr. Grisiola dated in December 2013, nearly two months after the ALJ issued her 

opinion. A court can order new evidence to be considered by the Commissioner if it “is 

material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence in a prior 

proceeding.” Evidence is material if “there is a reasonable possibility that the new 

evidence would have changed the outcome of the Secretary’s determination[.]” Booz v. 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(emphasis in original). 

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Nguyen argues the evidence is material and had it been considered by the ALJ, 

there is a reasonable probability it would have changed the outcome. She also argues 

there is good cause for why it was not available any earlier because Nguyen did not have 

the funds to seek additional medical treatment. P’s MSJ, p.25. 

ii. Evidence of December 7, 2013 Medical Exam. 

The new evidence from Dr. Grisiola consists of a short letter summarizing a 

medical visit on November 20, 2013. The letter first summarizes Nguyen’s subjective 

complaints. P’s MSJ, Ex. 1. The entire results of Dr. Grisiola’s neurologic exam are 

contained in one sentence: “Neurologic examination discloses a continued presence of a 

left hemiparesis with reduced coordination and grip strength on the left side.” P’s MSJ, 

Ex. 1. Based solely on that single finding, Dr. Grisiola concludes that Nguyen is 

“substantially disabled by her stroke with left hemiparesis, cognitive impairment, 

memory loss and fatigue.” P’s MSJ, Ex. 1. There are no other treatment notes or 

observations to lend any support for his broad conclusions. 

First, this court finds there is no reasonable possibility that this letter would have 

changed the outcome of the determination, as there is no evidence cited to support Dr. 

Grisiola’s conclusions or cognitive impairment, memory loss or fatigue. See Bray, 554 

F.3d at 1228 (rejecting a treating physician’s conclusory opinion because it was not 

supported by clinical evidence). Second, the court has no factual basis on which to find 

any good cause, based on financial difficulties, to belatedly admit the evidence, as there 

is no objective evidence of financial distress. There is also no explanation of how that 

alleged financial situation quickly changed after the ALJ opinion came out, which 

allowed Nguyen to go to the doctor. The court, therefore, denies the request to admit this 

exhibit into evidence in this case or to remand this case for the Commissioner to consider 

it. 

c. Dr. Harry Henderson—Mental Impairments. 

The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Henderson because (1) he based his opinion 

on Nguyen’s physical impairments as opposed to her depression; (2) there were no 

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treating records submitted to support his findings; and (3) his findings were inconsistent 

with those of Dr. Engelhorn. AR 13. In his August 5, 2013 report, Dr. Henderson said 

he saw Nguyen on an irregular basis since 2011 due to her lack of medical insurance. AR 

370. He said her “depression and posttraumatic stress syndrome result[ed] from the side 

effects of stroke.” AR 371. He concluded she had major, recurrent depression and that 

she “has marked restriction of activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining 

social functioning and often deficiencies of concentration[.] AR 371, 372. 

The Commissioner does not address the ALJ’s reasoning that Dr. Henderson based 

his opinion on Nguyen’s physical impairments as opposed to her mental ones. Nguyen 

argues that Dr. Henderson did base his opinions on her mental health, as he conducted a 

mental status examination and found that psychiatric care was not helping her. AR 362. 

Without any other reasoning provided by the ALJ, or any argument provided by the 

Commissioner, the court does not find the alleged reliance on only physical impairments 

to be a specific and legitimate basis to reject Dr. Henderson’s opinion. 

Second, the ALJ explains that no treatment notes supported Dr. Henderson’s 

findings. It was not clear to the ALJ, therefore, whether Dr. Henderson’s findings were 

based on Nguyen’s subjective complaints or on his clinical findings. Such a 

determination directly impacts how much weight is afforded to a treating physician’s 

opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“the more a medical source presents ... 

medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion”); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (discounting 

an opinion based on a plaintiff’s subjective complaints where those complaints are 

properly discounted). 

Nguyen blames the ALJ for not obtaining Dr. Henderson’s treatment records 

herself. P’s MSJ, pp.15-16. She argues that under 20 C.F.R. 404.1519a(b)(4), this duty 

fell on the ALJ. The court disagrees. The code section that Nguyen relies on says that an 

ALJ can order a consultative examination where the evidence is inconsistent or 

insufficient to determine a claim. Further, the burden was on Nguyen to provide medical 

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evidence from her own treating doctors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c) (“You must 

provide medical evidence showing that you have an impairment(s) and how severe it is 

during the time you say that you are disabled”); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-

460 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding duty is on the claimant to prove disability and that “[a]n 

ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous 

evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the 

evidence”). While the Commissioner can help a claimant get the medical reports, there is 

no evidence here that Nguyen asked for help or gave the ALJ permission, as required, to 

request the reports. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d) (“We will make every reasonable effort 

to help you get medical reports from your own medical sources when you give us 

permission to request the reports”). 

The court finds that Nguyen did not fulfill her burden in obtaining any treatment 

notes from Dr. Henderson or in asking the Commissioner to obtain those notes. The lack 

of treatment notes to support Dr. Henderson’s opinion is a specific and legitimate reason 

to justify rejecting his opinion. 

Finally, Dr. Henderson’s opinion was inconsistent with that of Dr. Engelhorn, a 

consultative psychiatrist. In his opinion, Dr. Engelhorn reviewed and cited Nguyen’s 

personal history, employment history, medical history and psychiatric history. AR 362-

363. He then listed out the extensive results of a mental status examination. AR 363-

364. Some of those clinical findings include: 

She is adequately dressed and groomed ...Her speech is normal 

... She is noted to smile and laugh appropriately at several 

occasions ...She appears to make an honest presentation. She 

is an adequate historian. ... Concentration and attention were 

adequate as judged by accurate and rapid responses to serial 

sevens. 

AR 363. 

Dr. Engelhorn also noted that Nguyen “is fully capable of taking care of her basic 

needs. She does a variety of household chores including cooking, cleaning and laundry. 

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She stated she drives a car and regularly attends Catholic church services. She has a 

reasonably active social life.” AR 363. These observations echo Nguyen’s own 

testimony at the hearing, where she said she took care of herself, cooked for the family, 

did household chores and drove. AR 63-66. The court finds that because there were no 

clinical findings to support Dr. Henderson’s conclusion, and because Nguyen’s own 

testimony echoed the findings noted in Dr. Engelhorn’s report that contradicted the one 

from Dr. Henderson, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Henderson’s opinion. See 

Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856 (rejecting a treating physician’s assessment of limitations where 

the notes regarding the plaintiff’s capabilities contradict the findings). 

2. Nguyen’s Allegations of Disabling Pain and Dysfunction. 

The ALJ did not find Nguyen’s allegations of disabling pain and dysfunction 

credible. AR 15. To discount allegations of pain and dysfunction, an ALJ must provide 

specific and clear findings to explain the weight given to the claimant’s testimony. See 

Social Security Ruling 96-7p (credibility findings “must be sufficiently specific to make 

clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to 

the individual’s statements”); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-346 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(en banc) (ALJ cannot “arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain” 

(internal quotations omitted)). Nguyen argues that the ALJ did not provide clear and 

convincing reasons to discredit her testimony. P’s MSJ, pp.16-20. 

In discrediting Nguyen’s allegations of pain and dysfunction, the ALJ first noted 

inconsistencies between Nguyen’s testimony and the objective medical evidence. The 

medical evidence showed that Nguyen suffered a stroke that caused left-side weakness 

and that she has a history of obesity, diabetes and hypertension. AR 15. But she found 

the objective findings in the record were inconsistent with Nguyen’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. AR 15. For 

example, the hospital record from the day after her stroke noted that Nguyen’s left-side 

weakness was “rapidly improving” over her one-day stay in the hospital. AR 15-16. A 

consultative neurologist examination in May 2012 showed that Nguyen’s stroke was 

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likely due to hypertension and that Nguyen had no other injuries to her head, neck, back 

or extremities. AR 16. At most, this medical evidence showed that Nguyen suffered 

from a stroke in September 2010.2

 The ALJ did not err in finding that Nguyen’s 

testimony did not corroborate her allegations of disabling pain and dysfunction. See 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although lack of medical 

evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the 

ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis”). 

Second, Nguyen reported to Dr. Engelhorn that she took care of all her basic needs, 

did various household chores like cooking, cleaning and laundry, and drove. AR 16. She 

also attends church services regularly and “leads a reasonably active social life.” AR 16. 

Nguyen also testified to these facts at the hearing. AR 63-66. The ALJ noted that these 

daily activities are not consistent with Nguyen’s complaints of disabling symptoms and 

limitations and that they are “generally consistent with the limitations” noted here: no 

more than occasionally climbing ramps and stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes and 

scaffolds; and must avoid all exposure to temperature extremes, heights and dangerous 

machinery. AR 15, 16. The court finds that the ALJ did not err in her finding. See 

Valentine., 574 F.3d at 693 (finding that the ALJ properly considered a claimant’s 

activities in rejecting his credibility because it showed the claimant had greater functional 

capacity that he acknowledged in written statements and testimony). 

Finally, the ALJ found that Nguyen’s accounts of disabling pain and dysfunction 

did not correspond with the course of medical treatment in this case, which consisted of 

three doctor visits for physical impairments in a three-year period, accompanied by only a 

single-page sparsely-written progress note. AR 16. In comparison to the number of 

consultative exams done, “there is a notable paucity of actual, consistent treatment for the 

                                                                

2 While Nguyen had consistent reports of diabetes and hypertension, the ALJ noted that 

they “greatly preceded her cessation of work.” AR 16 (hypertension in 2000 and 

gestational diabetes for her pregnancy approximately nine years before the stroke).

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claimant’s hemiparesis or other impairments.” AR 16. The court finds that the ALJ’s 

finding is reasonable here. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding 

unexplained failure to seek treatment can cast doubt on sincerity of claimant’s 

testimony); Stanistreet v. Chater, 21 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding the 

absence of medical treatment over a nine-month period suggested the claimant’s 

“subjective complaints of worsening symptoms and chronic, disabling pain are 

exaggerated”). Further, contrary to Nguyen’s argument, there is no evidence that her 

alleged lack of medical insurance prevented her from seeing doctors. First, she did not 

testify that she lacked insurance and her counsel never raised the issue at the hearing. AR 

56-97. Second, she did see Dr. Henderson on a more frequent basis than she saw any 

other doctor. See AR 370 (Dr. Henderson noted that Nguyen did not have medical 

insurance but he was also the doctor that she saw the most frequently). 

In sum, the ALJ showed specific and clear reasons for discounting Nguyen’s 

statements regarding her disabling pain and dysfunction. 

3. Whether Nguyen Had Past Relevant Work as a Manicurist.3

 A claimant’s prior work qualifies at past relevant work if it “was done within the 

last 15 years, lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it, and was substantial 

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a). Here, the ALJ found that Nguyen could 

perform her past relevant work as a manicurist. AR 17. But Nguyen argues that she did 

not have past relevant work as a manicurist. Specifically, she argues it was not a 

substantial gainful activity for her because (1) she did not earn more than the required 

amount of money to presume it was a substantial gainful activity; and (2) as a matter of 

                                                                

3

 In her argument regarding “substantial gainful activity” Nguyen repeats that the record 

“clearly establishes” that she is not fluent in English. P’s MSJ, pp.23-24; Reply, pp.8-9. 

First, the court disagrees that the fact is “clearly established” in the record because Dr. 

Engelhorn noted that she “speaks fairly good English” (AR 362) and Nguyen’s treating 

neurologist, Dr. Grisolia, noted that she “speaks fair English” (AR 369). Second, Nguyen 

does not show how her English abilities, or lack thereof, affected her substantial gainful 

activity as a manicurist. 

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law, part-time employment is not substantial gainful activity. P’s MSJ, pp.20-23. The 

Commissioner argues that Nguyen’s argument is “at odds with her work history report 

and earnings record.” Opp’n, pp.13-15. 

First, the Social Security Administration established threshold amounts of 

minimum monthly income to show substantial gainful activity (SGA). See Program 

Operations Manual System, Disability Insurance § 10501.015B (available at 

https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0410501015) (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). 

Compared to the earnings record provided in the administrative record, Nguyen surpassed 

the threshold amounts for substantial gainful activity for at least three years: 

 2003: SGA=$800; Nguyen=$10,954 yearly, or $913/monthly (AR 187) 

 2005: SGA=$830; Nguyen=$13,696 yearly, or $1141/monthly (AR 187) 

 2008: SGA=$940; Nguyen=$12,341 yearly, or $1028/monthly (AR 188) 

Second, contrary to Nguyen’s argument, part-time work can constitute substantial 

gainful activity. In relying on Gatliff v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 172 F.3d 690, 694 

(9th Cir. 1999), Nguyen argues that “part-time employment is not ‘substantial gainful 

activity’” as a matter of law. P’s MSJ, p.22. But Gatliff does not stand for that 

proposition. In Gatliff, the claimant worked full time but had an issue with long-term 

employment as he could not hold a job for longer than two months. 172 F.3d at 692-693. 

Here, Nguyen did not have a problem with short-term work, because she worked for 

many years in two different jobs. She worked as a manicurist from 2002 to 2010 and as a 

newspaper carrier from 2006 to 2010. AR 196, 253. Thus, Gatliff does not apply to this 

case. 

The court finds that Nguyen engaged in substantial gainful activity as a manicurist, 

and thus has past relevant work experience as a manicurist. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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III. CONCLUSION 

The court finds that the ALJ’s decision to deny Nguyen benefits is supported by 

substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment be DENIED and that Defendant’s cross motion for summary 

judgment be GRANTED. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties on or before February 17, 2016. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

Any response to the objections shall be filed and served on or before February 24, 

2016. The parties are advised that any failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 2, 2016 

y 

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