Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01051/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01051-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TARA GARLICK; MERRI SILVA; CHRIS 

SILVA; MINORS MAKEYLA L. SILVA, 

CHELSEA J. SILVA, CATELYN R. SILVA, 

AND ELI Z. SILVA, INDIVIDUALLY AS 

SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST TO DAVID 

S. SILVA, BY AND THROUGH THEIR 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM, JUDY SILVA; 

AND, MINOR JADE SILVA, 

INDIVIDUALLY AS SUCCESSOR IN 

INTEREST TO DAVID S. SILVA, 

DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH HER 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM ADRIANE 

DOMINGUEZ, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, IN ITS OFFICIAL 

CAPACITY; SERGEANT DOUGLAS 

SWORD, DEPUTIES JEFFREY KELLY, 

LUIS ALMANZA, RYAN BROCK, DAVID 

STEPHENS, TANNER MILLER, RYAN 

GREER, AND CHP OFFICERS MICHAEL 

PHILLIPS AND MICHAEL BRIGHT, EACH 

IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-CV-01051-LJO-JLT

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN 

LIMINE NO. 16.

(Doc. 177)

Plaintiffs Tara Garlick, Merri Silva, Chris Silva, and minors Makeyla L. Silva, Chelsea J. 

Silva, Catelyn R. Silva, and Jade Silva (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring the instant civil rights action 

against Defendants County of Kern, Sergeant Douglas Sword, Deputies Jeffrey Kelly, Luis Almanza, 

Ryan Brock, David Stephens, Tanner Miller, Ryan Greer, and California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) 

Officers Michael Phillips and Michael Bright (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging excessive force 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). The case arises from the in-custody death of David S. Silva 

(“Silva” or “the Decedent”) in the course of an encounter with County of Kern Sherriff’s Deputies 

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and California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officers on May 7, 2013. Plaintiffs claim that the officers’

use of force violated Decedent’s Fourth and Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants 

counter that their use of force was reasonable. The facts are otherwise known to the parties and 

need not be repeated here. See Doc. 157, Order on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment; 

see also Doc. 161, Pretrial Order.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion in limine No. 16 (Doc. 177), which the 

Court deems appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 230(g). 

Upon the Court’s request (Doc. 218), the parties filed additional briefing on the issue. Docs. 220 & 

223. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Defendants’ motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may use a motion in limine as a procedural mechanism to exclude inadmissible or 

prejudicial testimony or evidence in a particular area before it is introduced at trial. See Luce v. 

United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984); see also United States v. Heller, 551 F.3d 1108, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2009). Such motions allow parties to resolve evidentiary disputes before trial and avoid 

potentially prejudicial evidence being presented in front of the jury, thereby relieving the trial judge 

from the formidable task of neutralizing the taint of prejudicial evidence. Brodit v. Cambra, 350 

F.3d 985, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2003). Pretrial motions such as motions in limine “are useful tools to 

resolve issues which would otherwise clutter up the trial.” Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 

1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Jonasson v. Lutheran Child and Family Services, 115 F.3d 

436,440 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] motion in limine is an important tool available to the trial judge to 

ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings.”).

Motions in limine that exclude broad categories of evidence are disfavored, and such issues 

are better dealt with during trial as the admissibility of evidence arises. See, e.g., Brown v. 

Kavanaugh, No. 1:08-CV-01764-LJO, 2013 WL 1124301, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (citing 

Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975); see also In re 

Homestore.com, Inc., No. CV 01-11115 RSWL CWX, 2011 WL 291176, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 

2011) (holding that motions in limine should “rarely seek to exclude broad categories of evidence, 

as the court is almost always better situated to rule on evidentiary issues in their factual context 

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during trial”); Cf. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2012 WL 1189898, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012) (concluding that “a broad categorical exclusion” was unwarranted). 

Additionally, some evidentiary issues are not accurately and efficiently evaluated by the 

trial judge in a motion in limine, and it is within the district court’s discretion to defer ruling until 

trial when the trial judge can better estimate the impact of the evidence on the jury. See, e.g., United 

States v. Amaro, 613 F. App’x 600, 602 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Stewart-Hanson v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 276 (2015); see also Jonasson, 115 F.3d at 440.

I. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION IN LIMINE (“MIL”) NO. 16.

to Preclude Testimony or Arguments Regarding the Alleged Deletion of Videos from 

Witness Maria Melendez’s Cell Phone (Doc. 177).

Defendants seek to exclude any and all testimony that Kern County Sheriff personnel 

deleted video recordings on the incident from percipient witness Maria Melendez’s phone (Doc. 

177 at 2:15-17), on the basis that: the County personnel are not themselves parties to this case; and, 

that any evidence or testimony on this topic is “irrelevant and immaterial” (Doc. 220 at 2:24-25) 

given the Court’s dismissing the Monell claims in its summary judgment Order. See Fed. R. Evid. 

401. In their additional briefing (see Doc. 220), Defendants primarily argue that such evidence will 

cause a “trial within a trial,” that it amounts to “wasting time” (Doc. 220 at 3:23), and should 

therefore be precluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

Plaintiffs argue that the County’s conduct “constitutes willful suppression of evidence,” 

from which a jury could draw an adverse inference. Id. at 2:15-17; see, e.g. Akiona v. United States, 

938 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1991) (“a trial court . . . has the broad discretionary power to permit a jury to 

draw an adverse inference from the destruction or spoliation against the party or witness 

responsible for that behavior”). Plaintiffs contend that evidence emerged during discovery that 

County employees had “tampered with or deleted cellphone video footage of the [subject] 

encounter” (Doc. 223 at 2:8-10), from two separate cellular phones (id. at 9:3). Plaintiffs offer that 

they will call two witnesses, Melendez and Francisco Arrieta (“Arrieta”), who will each testify that 

they personally recorded the subject incident on their individual cellular telephones, and can 

describe what they recorded. Id. at 9:19-22. The offer of proof is that these witnesses will testify 

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that after the incident, County employees seized their cellular telephones over their objections. 

Melendez will testify that the County never returned her cellular telephone; Arrieta will testify that 

County returned his cellular telephone with the recorded footage missing. Id. at 9:25-28. Other 

witnesses will testify that they were present when the County employees seized the cellular phones. 

Defendants counter that they would offer rebuttal testimony to put in question whether the 

alleged video recordings actually existed, that the video recordings were not actually deleted, and 

that Melendez’s cellular phone was not in the possession of the Kern County Sheriff’s personnel 

the entire time it was out of Melendez’s possession. Doc. 220 at 4:2-6. 

The alleged destruction of evidence adverse to Defendants is relevant. Defendants’ primary 

objection, however, is under Rule 403. Also, Defendants do not move to exclude or address 

evidence related to the alleged destruction of Arrieta’s video recordings. In any event, the Court 

acknowledges that there are issues in this case about whether video footage exists or existed, as 

well as the alleged seizure and/or destruction of it. In sum, the testimony and evidence sought to be 

excluded is in the realm of factual dispute and is well within the province of a decision by the trier 

of fact. Moreover, Defendants overestimate how long it will take to resolve the issue during the 

trial. In weighing and balancing the required factors, the call is not close. The Court DENIES the 

motion on 403 grounds.

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion in limine

Number 16 (Doc. 177) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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