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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ERNEST EUGENE HARPER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

Ualtecl States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

AUG 3 0 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. No. 95-5026 

LEROY L. YOUNG; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 93-C-948-B) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Ernest Eugene Harper, Pro Se, Boley, Oklahoma. 

W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Jennifer 

B. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 95-5026 Document: 01019280011 Date Filed: 08/30/1995 Page: 1 
Mr. Ernest Harper, presently an inmate in the Oklahoma prison 

system, challenges the constitutionality of the process by which 

he was terminated from the Oklahoma Pre-parole Conditional Supervision Program ("the Program")--a penal status similar to, 

although more restrictive than, parole that allows convicts to 

live and work in society. The parties do not dispute that Mr. 

Harper received verbal notice of his renewed incarceration somewhat less than five hours before he was to turn himself in to 

authorities and that he was never granted any sort of hearing at 

which he could present evidence of any kind. Believing himself to 

have been deprived of liberty without due process of law, Mr. 

Harper first exhausted his state remedies, see Harper v. Young, 

852 P.2d 164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), and then petitioned the 

district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court 

denied this petition, and Mr. Harper now appeals. 

It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause shields from 

arbitrary or capricious deprivation those facets of a convicted 

criminal's existence that qualify as "liberty interests." See 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 

U.S. 460 (1983). Certain liberty interests--of which parole and 

probation are of greatest salience here--inhere in the Due Process 

Clause and are not subject to deprivation without adherence to the 

strict procedural safeguards of Morrissey. See. e.g., Morrissey, 

408 U.S. 471; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). More 

commonly, the liberty interests possessed by those living in 

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prison are created, if at all, by state law. See Sandin v. 

Conner, No. 93-1911, u.s. , 1995 WL 360217, at * 3-5 (June 

19, 1995) (recounting development of caselaw). In Sandin, the 

Supreme Court markedly narrowed the ranges of circumstances that 

will give rise to state-created liberty interest. See id. at * 6 

(holding that state-created liberty interests "will generally be 

limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and 

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life") .1 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals has, apparently, held under pre-Sandin standards that the 

state had created a liberty interest in program participation. 

See Barnett v. Moon, 852 P.2d 161, 162-63 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1993) .2 The extent to which that conclusion survives Sandin is a 

question of no small difficulty.3 We need not address it today, 

however, because we hold that program participation is sufficiently similar to parole or probation to merit protection by the 

Due Process Clause itself. 

1 Sandin does not purport to alter the law as it pertains to 

those liberty interests that inhere in the Due Process Clause itself. See Sandin, 1995 WL 360217, at * 6; see also id. at * 6-7 

(opining that prior standards had led courts to interfere in dayto-day management of incarcerated prisoners) . 

2 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not explicitly 

hold in Barnett that a state-created liberty interest existed. 

That court, however, did indicate that removal from the Program 

for disciplinary reasons should be subject to the procedural protections outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)--a 

result which rather strongly suggests that the Oklahoma court 

found a state-created liberty interest in continued participation 

in the Program. 

3 A state could, presumably, choose to impose procedural standards upon itself that are more stringent than those mandated by 

the Constitution. It was, of course, unnecessary for the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals to draw such a distinction in Barnett. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5026 Document: 01019280011 Date Filed: 08/30/1995 Page: 3 
Established by statute, see Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 365 

(West 1995), the Program releases qualified inmates into society 

on a conditional basis. Program participants are chosen by the 

Pardon and Parole Board. Statutory criteria limit selection to 

those inmates who are eligible for parole, have served fifteen 

percent of the relevant sentence, and are within one year of a 

parole docket date. Id. § 365(A) .4 Although remaining in the 

"constructive custody" of the Department of Corrections, those in 

the Program work and reside beyond the confines of a state penal 

institution and are thus free to enjoy most of the benefits of a 

normal existence. In return, a program participant must agree to 

abide by restrictions similar to those placed upon a parolee.S 

Violation of a condition may result in termination from the 

Program and a return to incarceration. An otherwise eligible 

participant who has been denied parole may also be removed from 

4 Additional requirements have been set by Department of 

Corrections regulation. To qualify for consideration, an inmate 

must have a verified home offer; must pursue an educational program or otherwise be employed; must have no serious prison misconduct; must be medically cleared; and must have no detainers for 

prosecution. The state does not contend that Mr. Harper failed to 

meet any of these conditions. 

5 He or she may be searched or visited at any time by a law 

enforcement officer; must report to an assigned probation officer 

at frequent intervals; cannot travel freely and may be subject to 

a curfew; cannot use drugs or alcohol or visit locations where 

those substances are likely to be present; may be urine tested at 

any time; must remain employed or pursue a full-time educational 

program; must pay monthly fees to the Department of Corrections; 

and may not assume debt or apply for public assistance without 

permission. The state admits that Mr. Harper violated none of 

these prohibitions. 

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Appellate Case: 95-5026 Document: 01019280011 Date Filed: 08/30/1995 Page: 4 
the Program after a ninety-day review period. Okla. Pardon & 

Parole Bd. Proc. 4-11 (effective Aug. 8, 1991) .6 

The State does not here contend either that Mr. Harper was 

terminated from the Program because of ineligibility or that it 

possessed peremptory authority to remove him from the Program. 

The record, in any event, would support neither contention. 

Although Mr. Harper was in fact removed from the Program because 

he was denied parole, nothing in the regulations governing the 

Program mandated that result. The statute, in relevant part, 

requires only that an applicant be within one year of parole 

consideration--a condition that Mr. Harper has met at all times 

since his termination. Procedure 4-11, moreover, states that 

convicts can remain in the Program after the denial of parole. 

The regulations likewise contain no language suggesting that participants may be terminated "at will" upon the denial of parole. 

Procedure 4-11 indicates the truth of the converse: convicts have 

both the right to remain with the Program for ninety days after 

parole denial and the opportunity to be considered for continued 

placement with the Program. Having determined that Mr. Harper was 

in fact qualified to remain with the Program, we turn to the 

question of what procedures should have accompanied his termination from the Program. 

6 We note that Procedure 4-11 became effective some five months 

after Mr. Harper was returned to prison. 

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The State contends that, similarities to parole notwithstanding, placement in the Program does not effect release from 

the custody of the Department of Corrections and is, therefore, 

merely a change in the degree or situs of an inmate's confinement. 

As such, the State concludes, program participation cannot be 

equated to parole or probation, and revocation of such participation does not warrant the extensive procedural protections mandated by Morrissey. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 

adopting the reasoning advocated by the State, has held that participation in the Program is not a liberty interest inherent in 

the Due Process Clause itself. See Barnett v. Moon, 852 P.2d 161, 

162-63 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). 

The identification of the liberty interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause is a question of federal constitutional law that we review de novo. See Memphis Light. Gas. & 

Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). Thus, while we respect 

the Court of Criminal Appeals's analysis of the constitutional 

implications of the Program, we are not bound by it. We are 

instead persuaded by the contrary holding of Edwards v. Lockhart, 

908 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1990). In Edwards, the Eighth Circuit 

analyzed a program that "released [a prisoner] from confinement 

and allowed [her or him] to live and pursue studies or work outside corrections facilities under the close supervision of a 

parole officer." Id. at 300. The program considered in Edwards, 

like that at issue here, required participants to have a home 

sponsor, maintain employment or pursue an education, refrain from 

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drugs and alcohol, obtain approval before leaving their county of 

residence, and obey all applicable Department of Corrections regulations. Id. at 301. Although recognizing that a participant's 

existence was somewhat less free than that of a parolee, the 

Edwards court nonetheless held that the similarities were sufficiently strong to warrant the process required by Morrissey: 

Viewing parole and work release on a continuum, with 

more freedom and self-determination associated with 

parole and less with work release, we believe that 

Edwards' participation in this program is more closely 

related to parole. Certainly Edwards is subject to more 

constraints in the [] program than she would be if on 

parole, but we find determinative the fact that she has 

been released from institutional life into society. The 

constraints applied to Edwards serve to guide her in the 

outside world, not . . . to confine her to the equivalent of,an institutional life. 

Id. at 302-03 (citations omitted). 

"A liberty interest inherent in the Constitution arises when 

a prisoner has acquired a substantial, although conditional, 

freedom such that 'the loss of liberty entailed [by its revocation] is a serious deprivation requiring that the [prisoner] be 

accorded due process.'" Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 

1420 (11th Cir. 1985) (gyoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781)). 

Edwards, we think, correctly identifies the dispositive characteristic that marks the point at which the Due Process Clause 

itself implies a liberty interest: it is the fact of release from 

incarceration. The liberty associated with a life outside the 

walls of a penal facility dwarfs that available to an inmate. It 

is the freedom to "be gainfully employed," "to be with family and 

friends," and "to form the other enduring attachments of normal 

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life." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. It is the ability to reside 

in a horne of one's own, without bars or fences or bonds, beyond 

the immediate authority of guards or wardens. The passage outside 

the walls of a prison does not simply alter the degree of confinement; rather, it works a fundamental change in the kind of 

confinement, a transformation that signals the existence of an 

inherent liberty interest and necessitates the full panoply of 

procedural protections outlined in Morrissey. See, e.g., id. at 

481-84; see also Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 

1987) ("[T]he Court has found independent constitutional liberty 

interests where total release from institutional life has been 

revoked."); Whitehorn, 758 F.2d at 1420-21 (same); cf. Hewitt v. 

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1983) (analyzing transfer of inmates 

into administrative segregations and emphasizing difficulties of 

prison management and limited rights of incarcerated convicts); 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-63 (recognizing difficulties of implementing Morrissey procedures in prison environment) . 

We are therefore in accord with the Eighth Circuit in concluding that a prisoner release program which permits a convict to 

exist, albeit conditionally, in society on a full-time basis more 

closely resembles parole or probation than even the more permissive forms of institutional confinement. See Edwards, 908 F.2d at 

302-03; see also United States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 

(6th Cir. 1991) (finding inherent liberty interest in continued 

placement in supervised release program that allowed convicts to 

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.. 

live in society); cf. Brennan, 813 F.2d at 5-6 (finding no inherent liberty interest in continued placement with institutional 

halfway house); Whitehorn, 758 F.2d at 1420-21 (finding no inherent liberty interest in continued participation in work release 

program that confined convicts to institutional community center) . 

There is no question but that those in the Program enjoy the benefits and joys of gainful employment, the company of family and 

friends, and the pursuits of humdrum existence. Finding no 

material distinction between the program addressed in Edwards and 

that presented here, we adopt the sound reasoning of our fellow 

circuit. Due process therefore mandates that program participants 

receive at least the procedural protections described in 

Morrissey: 

(a) written notice of the claimed violations ... , (b) 

disclosure . . . of [the] evidence against him; (c) 

opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the 

hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not 

allowing confrontation) ; (e) a "neutral and detached" 

hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members 

of which need not be judicial officers of lawyers; (f) a 

written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence 

relied on and the reasons for [revocation] . 

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 

The record conclusively demonstrates that the process 

afforded Mr. Harper fell far short of the Morrissey standard. On 

March 14, 1991, at 5:30a.m., Mr. Harper received a telephone call 

from his parole officer informing him that he had been removed 

from the Program because he had failed to win parole. Mr. Harper 

was given until 10:00 a.m. to report to the Program office and was 

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returned to prison later that same day. He subsequently was 

mailed a four-word explanation of the reasons for his removal from 

the Program. He received no subsequent hearing or other opportunity to respond to the Parole Board's decision to remove him 

from the Program. Mr. Harper therefore received no prior written 

notice of revocation; no opportunity to offer evidence, rebut 

arguments made against him, or argue on his own behalf; and no 

meaningful explanation of the reasons for his termination from the 

program. In sum, the record supports the conclusion that Mr. 

Harper received almost no process at all before he was deprived of 

his liberty.? 

We therefore reverse the decision of the district court and 

remand with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless 

Mr. Harper is reinstated to the Program by the State of Oklahoma. 

After reinstatement, any attempt to remove Mr. Harper from the 

Program must, of course, comply with the procedures mandated by 

this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

7 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also concluded that 

Program Procedure 4-11 gives inmates adequate prior notice that 

they can be returned to prison if parole is not granted. See 

Harper, 852 P.2d at 165. However, we note that Procedure 4-11 was 

promulgated on August 8, 1991, some five months after Mr. Harper's 

termination from the program. In addition, Mr. Harper received 

none of the other procedural safeguards required by Morrissey and 

was not even afforded the less comprehensive process deemed 

necessary by the Court of Criminal Appeals in the companion case 

of Barnett v. Moon, see Barnett, 852 P.2d at 163. 

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