Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05907/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05907-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERHAN KAYIK,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH M. DIAZ,

Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-05907-TEH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING; 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Erhan Kayik, a California state prisoner sentenced to 15 years to life, 

seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 and an evidentiary hearing 

under Habeas Corpus Local Rule 2254-7 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. For the reasons stated below, the motion for an evidentiary hearing is 

DENIED; and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Volkan’s Death

The following facts, taken from the California Court of Appeal’s unpublished 

decision, have not been rebutted with clear and convincing evidence and must, therefore, 

be presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

[Petitioner] was convicted of murdering his 16-year-old son 

Volkan.

[Petitioner] was born and raised in Turkey. He married in 1990 

and shortly thereafter his wife gave birth to Volkan. 

[Petitioner] and his wife divorced when Volkan was one. 

Sometime thereafter, Volkan’s mother died in an accident. 

[Petitioner] blamed Volkan for her death. [Petitioner] 

remarried and moved to the United States. Volkan remained in 

Turkey with his grandparents. 

Volkan was a charming child but he was also difficult in some 

ways. He did poorly in school and had problems at work. 

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Volkan also ran away from home. The problems grew serious 

enough that [Petitioner] went to Turkey and brought Volkan 

back to the United States. 

Volkan’s problems continued after the move. He got into fights 

at school and ran away from home repeatedly. [Petitioner], 

who was struggling to overcome the effects of a recent heart 

attack, found Volkan’s problems to be challenging. 

On at least one occasion, [Petitioner]’s response to Volkan’s 

behavioral problems exceeded permissible bounds. Volkan told 

a social worker, Randall Freitas, that [Petitioner] hit him. 

Thereafter in May 2007, Freitas met with [Petitioner] and 

Volkan at their home. [Petitioner] admitted he hit Volkan in the 

face. Freitas said that was not an acceptable method of 

discipline in this country and that if [Petitioner] left any marks, 

he would be charged with child abuse. Freitas made 

[Petitioner] and his wife sign a safety plan and told them to 

attend counseling.

On June 20, 2007, [Petitioner] phoned police to report that 

Volkan had run away about a week earlier. [Petitioner] said he 

did not call immediately because Volkan ran away frequently. 

Omer Tutmaz was [Petitioner]’s friend. In July 2007, Tutmaz 

visited [Petitioner] and offered to help him look for Volkan. 

[Petitioner] and Tutmaz went to a lake that Volkan visited 

sometimes. [Petitioner] described an earlier incident during 

which Volkan had pulled down his swim trunks and displayed 

his bottom to an older man. [Petitioner] was concerned because 

such conduct is unacceptable in the Turkish culture.

In August 2007, [Petitioner] and Tutmaz met while on a 

business trip. [Petitioner] was upset because he believed 

friends had betrayed him. He bemoaned the fact that others 

were not as trustworthy as Tutmaz, and in an effort to prove his 

fidelity [Petitioner] said, “do you know how much I trust you?” 

“I killed Volkan. This much I trust you.” Tutmaz was shocked 

by the admission. He did not know what to do. [Petitioner] and 

Tutmaz both went to their rooms. 

[Petitioner] and Tutmaz spoke again the following day. 

[Petitioner] said he killed Volkan the day he displayed his 

bottom to the man at the lake. According to [Petitioner], he 

confronted Volkan about why he was constantly running away. 

When Volkan refused to answer, [Petitioner] put his hands 

around Volkan’s neck and choked him until “[q]uite a bit of 

blood” came out of his mouth. Volkan relented and agreed to 

tell [Petitioner] “everything.” [Petitioner] replied, “You had the 

chance to tell me so long, now there’s blood coming out of 

your mouth. It’s too late. I’m going to kill you.”

Tutmaz asked [Petitioner] why he continued to choke Volkan. 

[Petitioner] replied it was “already too late.” If he had let 

Volkan go, he would have to go to jail anyway. Therefore 

[Petitioner] chose “to finish it.” He squeezed Volkan’s neck 

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while Volkan pleaded for mercy. Volkan was unable to 

struggle because he was so small.

[Petitioner] told Tutmaz that once Volkan was dead, he took 

his body and buried it in the hills. He blamed Volkan’s death 

on business associates who had betrayed him. 

Tutmaz did not go to the police immediately and tell them what 

[Petitioner] had done. He wanted to give [Petitioner] a few 

days to turn himself in. When [Petitioner] did not do so, 

Tutmaz went to the police on August 16, 2007, and told them 

[Petitioner] killed Volkan. 

A detective interviewed [Petitioner] and his wife on September 

7, 2007. [Petitioner] said Volkan was missing and suggested 

that the detective contact a homeless man with whom Volkan 

associated.

The detective interviewed [Petitioner] about a month later on 

October 2, 2007, and again, [Petitioner] said Volkan was 

simply missing. [Petitioner] said any comments Tutmaz may 

have made to the contrary were caused by business problems 

he had with Tutmaz’s family. 

The detective spoke with [Petitioner] again the following day 

and this time, [Petitioner] agreed to take him to Volkan’s body. 

[Petitioner] and two officers drove about 190 miles to the 

mountains near Sierraville. [Petitioner] then led them to 

Volkan's burial site. Animals had dug up the body. 

People v. Kayik, No. A-12-6088, 2011 WL 2237606, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2011). 

II. Petitioner’s Trial

 Based on the above facts, an information was filed on May 16, 2008 in Contra 

Costa County Superior Court charging Petitioner with murder and inflicting corporal 

injury on a child. 1 CT 158. At trial, the prosecution presented the evidence set forth 

above relating to Volkan’s death. Petitioner testified in his own defense, and his testimony 

set forth facts that were slightly different from the facts above. The California Court of 

Appeal’s unpublished decision sets forth Petitioner’s testimony as follows:

[Petitioner] testified in his own defense and he admitted that he 

killed Volkan. [Petitioner] said the death occurred the day he 

saw Volkan display his bottom to the man at the lake. 

[Petitioner] brought Volkan home and they began to argue. At 

one point, [Petitioner]’s wife went to get some pizza. While 

she was gone, [Petitioner] and Volkan continued to argue. 

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Volkan questioned why [Petitioner] had not been there for 

much of his life. [Petitioner] slapped Volkan in the face. 

Volkan went to his room. [Petitioner] followed and when 

Volkan refused to answer his questions, [Petitioner] “squeezed 

his neck.” Volkan agreed to talk. [Petitioner] needed to “calm 

down” and he went to the living room. Volkan came out a few 

minutes later and sat next to him. [Petitioner] again asked 

Volkan what was happening. Volkan replied, “fuck you all. 

Have you done any fatherhood for me the last 16 years?” 

[Petitioner] was out of control. He “squeezed [Volkan’s] neck 

and squeezed his neck and squeezed his neck....” Volkan 

kicked and struggled and tried to run away, but [Petitioner] 

would not stop. He continued squeezing until Volkan said 

“father” and then collapsed.

[Petitioner] tried to “wake [Volkan] up.” That did not work, so 

he carried Volkan to the bathroom and put him in the bathtub. 

When [Petitioner]'s wife came home, he told her “Volkan is 

gone.”

[Petitioner] called his mother in Turkey and told her what he 

had done. She told him to bury the body in a proper place. 

[Petitioner] wrapped Volkan’s body and put it in the trunk of 

his car. He then drove until he found a spot to bury it. He did 

not dig a deep hole. 

[Petitioner] also presented testimony from a doctor who said 

[Petitioner]’s heart attack had injured his brain. The doctor said 

[Petitioner] suffered from memory loss and had a low tolerance 

for frustration. A clinical neuropsychologist testified similarly. 

She said [Petitioner] suffered severe brain injury from this 

heart attack and that such injuries can cause personality 

alterations and behavioral problems.

In addition, [Petitioner] presented a wide array of evidence in 

an effort to show that Volkan had behavioral problems that had 

grown worse as he had gotten older. [Petitioner]’s mother 

testified that Volkan was aggressive and destructive as he was 

growing up. A clinical psychologist testified that Volkan had 

an oppositional defiant disorder. Children with that disorder are 

difficult to parent because they have trouble controlling their 

behavior. A psychiatrist who treated Volkan agreed he had 

oppositional defiant disorder. A relative from Turkey testified 

Volkan was disrespectful and frequently ran away from home. 

He also said Volkan had tried to attack his wife with a knife. 

One of [Petitioner]’s business associates said Volkan stole 

things. Volkan’s cousin testified that Volkan smoked, ran away 

from school, and was disrespectful to his elders. 

Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *2-3. 

///

///

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 Before jury deliberations began, Petitioner’s trial counsel was advised that one of 

the jurors – Juror No. 5 – had been a suspect in a series of child abduction cases in the 

1980s and 1990s.1 Id. at *5; 7 RT 1585. The prosecutor and defense counsel discussed 

this new information with the trial court, and the court found that absent a stipulation from 

counsel, the court did not have good cause to excuse Juror No. 5. 7 RT 1585. Defense 

counsel did not otherwise seek to remove Juror No. 5. On February 20, 2009, the jury 

found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder. 2 CT 408; 4 CT 1027. 

III. Post-Verdict Procedural Background 

On May 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on Petitioner's motion and denied it. Kayik, 2011 WL 

2237606, at *3. On August 21, 2009, the trial court imposed judgment of imprisonment 

for 15 years to life. 5 CT 1361-63. 

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed 

the conviction on June 8, 2011. Ct. App. Order at 20, Ex. 2 to Answer.2 On June 21, 

2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was 

denied on September 14, 2011. Ex. 7 to Answer. Petitioner filed a mixed petition for writ 

of habeas corpus on November 19, 2012, approximately three weeks before the end of the 

one-year statute of limitations period. Docket No. 1. On June 23, 2013, this Court granted 

Petitioner’s motion for a stay and abeyance pending exhaustion of Petitioner’s state court 

remedies. Docket No. 10. On July 23, 2014, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s state 

court habeas petition. Ex. 11 to Answer. On December 17, 2014, the California Supreme 

Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review from the denial of his state habeas petition, 

thus exhausting Petitioner’s state remedies. Ex. 9 to Answer. 

 

1 One of Petitioner’s claims involves Juror No. 5’s answers to questions on the voir 

dire questionnaires provided to prospective jurors. Another claim is the Juror No. 5 and 

Juror No. 10 improperly introduced extrinsic evidence into jury deliberations. These 

claims, and the related factual background, are discussed in more detail below. 

2 Unless otherwise noted, all Exhibits cited are the Exhibits lodged with the Court by 

Respondent. See Docket No. 21-3.

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Now before the Court is Petitioner’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

filed on February 25, 2015. Am. Pet. (Docket No. 16). Also before the Court is 

Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, filed on November 30, 2015. Mot. for 

Evid. Hearing (Docket No. 27). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

I. Habeas Petition

Habeas petitions are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2244, et seq. Under AEDPA, a petitioner is entitled to 

federal habeas relief only if s/he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court 

proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Greene v. Fisher, --- U.S. --- , 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 

(2011). 

AEDPA creates a “highly deferential” standard for evaluating state court rulings 

and “demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). A state court’s decision is contrary to 

clearly established federal law if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 

forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or arrives at a different result in a case that “confronts a 

set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). “The state court’s application of clearly 

established law must be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous.” 

Crittendon v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Further, a federal court must “presume the state court’s factual findings to be correct, a 

presumption the petitioner has the burden of rebutting by clear and convincing evidence.” 

Id. 

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This standard is intentionally “difficult to meet,” because habeas is intended to 

function as a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not 

as a means of error correction.” Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 43 (citations omitted). A petitioner 

must therefore show that the “state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal 

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). 

II. Evidentiary Hearing 

Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that where a petition 

is not dismissed at a previous stage in the proceeding, the judge, after the answer and 

transcripts and record of the state court proceedings are filed, shall, upon review of those 

proceedings, determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. The purpose of an 

evidentiary hearing is to resolve the merits of a factual dispute. An evidentiary hearing on 

a claim is required where it is clear from the petition that: (1) the allegations, if established, 

would entitle the petitioner to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not reliably 

found the relevant facts. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Habeas Petition

 Petitioner presents five claims for habeas relief in his petition to this Court. 

Specifically, Petitioner contends: (1) his due process rights were violated when the trial 

court failed to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (2) his right to an impartial 

jury was violated when the trial court denied his motion for a new trial based on jury 

misconduct; (3) his due process rights were violated when the trial court admitted evidence 

of his prior bad acts and the victim’s hearsay statements; (4) he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to investigate a juror’s background; and 

(5) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to investigate 

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and develop evidence concerning the victim’s possible birth defect. In evaluating these 

claims, the Court reviews the last reasoned state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 

U.S. 797, 805 (1991). 

A. Claim 1: Failure to Instruct the Jury on Involuntary Manslaughter 

The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and 

voluntary manslaughter under a heat-of-passion theory, but did not instruct the jury on 

involuntary manslaughter. 7 RT 1563-73. Defense counsel did not object to the lack of 

instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Petitioner contends that the trial court’s failure to 

instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter constituted a violation of Petitioner’s due 

process rights. This claim was considered and denied on the merits by the California Court 

of Appeal, which is the last reasoned state court decision. See Ex. 8. 

The Court of Appeal correctly stated that “[a] trial court is obligated to instruct, sua 

sponte, on all legal theories that find substantial support in the evidence, but not on 

theories that are unsupported.” Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *3 (citing People v. 

Breverman, 19 Cal. 4th 142, 162 (1998)). The Court of Appeal noted that during the trial, 

Petitioner admitted “that while arguing with Volkan, he lost control. He grabbed Volkan 

and ‘squeezed his neck and squeezed his neck and squeezed his neck...’ Volkan kicked 

and struggled and tried to run away, but [Petitioner] would not stop. He continued to 

squeeze until Volkan collapsed.” Id. at *4. Therefore, the Court of Appeal found that 

there was no support in the evidence for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter 

because no reasonable juror could find involuntary manslaughter from the testimony 

presented at trial. Id. 

A petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based on an erroneous 

jury instruction unless “the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th 

Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit has stated that “an omission, or an incomplete instruction, is 

less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law, and, thus, a habeas petitioner 

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whose claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an especially heavy 

burden.” Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Court of Appeal’s finding that the evidence did not support an involuntary 

manslaughter instruction was not contrary to clearly established law; therefore, the 

omission of the instruction does not amount to a constitutional violation. The Supreme 

Court has declined to hold that a defendant in a non-capital case is constitutionally entitled 

to instructions on a lesser-included offense. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 

(1973), cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 645 (1980). Therefore, there is no “clearly 

established federal law” that would have required the trial court to give the instruction sua 

sponte; the only “clearly established federal law” pertaining to Petitioner’s first claim

establishes that due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the 

evidence supports it. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982). 

 Finally, even if the trial court did err in omitting the involuntary manslaughter 

instruction, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief because no prejudice resulted 

from the omission. Petitioner, in addition to showing error, must show that “the error had 

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the jury 

convicted Petitioner of second degree murder, and thus necessarily found that he acted 

with the requisite intent: conscious disregard for human life. Therefore, an instruction on 

involuntary manslaughter, which encompasses a lower level of intent, would not have 

changed the outcome of the jury’s deliberations.

Because the Court of Appeal’s decision was entirely supported by the factual record 

and involved a reasonable application of Supreme Court authority, Petitioner’s first claim 

is without merit and is therefore DENIED.

B. Claim 2: Failure to Grant New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct 

Petitioner’s next claim is based on purported juror misconduct. Petitioner contends 

that the trial court’s denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct violated Petitioner’s 

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Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. Petitioner identifies two types of 

purported misconduct: (1) that Juror No. 5 was biased and improperly concealed his bias 

during voir dire; and (2) that Jurors Nos. 5 and 10 improperly introduced extrinsic 

evidence into the jury deliberation process. Petitioner’s claim regarding juror misconduct 

was considered on the merits by the California Court of Appeal, which is the last reasoned 

decision. See Ex. 8. 

 1. Procedural default

At the outset, the state trial court previously found that Petitioner’s trial counsel had 

forfeited any claim relating to Juror No. 5’s background because trial counsel was put on 

notice of Juror No. 5’s background but chose not to challenge him.3 The California Court 

of Appeal noted that there was “considerable support for the trial court’s ruling on this 

point.” Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *6. A state court finding that a claim is procedurally 

defaulted is an adequate and independent state ground warranting denial of the claim in 

federal habeas. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. Thus, the claim very well may be barred. However, 

the juror misconduct claims lack substantive merit as well; therefore, mirroring the

California Court of Appeal, this Court will address the merits of the claims. 

 2. Bias

 Petitioner contends that Juror No. 5 was biased, and that his bias violated 

Petitioner’s right to due process of law and right to an impartial jury under the Fifth, Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments. Juror No. 5’s purported bias stems from his failure to 

disclose information about his connection to the past child abduction cases, including past 

involvement with psychologists and experience with law enforcement. Juror No. 5 also 

failed to fully disclose that he had been terminated for job misconduct. 

 

3

The Court may consider both the trial court and appellate court decisions on this 

issue because the appellate court decision “adopts or substantially incorporates the 

reasoning” of the trial court. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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The California Court of Appeal independently considered the potential bias of Juror 

No. 5, considering at length all of the questions Juror No. 5 purportedly answered 

incorrectly on the questionnaire. The Court of Appeal also considered the state trial 

court’s finding of two instances where Juror No. 5 intentionally provided misleading 

answers; therefore, the Court of Appeal found that the misconduct created a presumption 

of prejudice. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *9. 

The two misleading answers identified by the state trial court were in response to 

question numbers 17 and 74. Question number 17 asked, “Have you ever been fired, laid 

off or asked to resign from a job?” Id. at *7. Juror No. 5 answered in the affirmative, but 

his explanation (that he had been “[l]aid off several jobs due to lack of work”) was 

admittedly incomplete because Juror No. 5 did not include the fact that he had been fired 

“on two separate occasions for violating workplace rules.” Id. Question number 74 asked, 

“Have you ever had any experiences with law enforcement, a prosecutor, a criminal 

defense attorney, a judge, or the court system generally which you would characterize as 

unfair or unpleasant?” Id. at *8. Juror No. 5 answered in the negative. Id. However, an 

investigator who spoke to Juror No. 5 after the trial stated that Juror No. 5 admitted to the 

investigator that the answer was “a mistake,” because he had been the subjective of 

extensive investigations that he found “harassing, unfair and unpleasant.” Id. Juror No. 5 

contended that the mistake was not intentional, but instead was a result of fatigue and 

reading the question too hastily in an effort to fill out his questionnaire quickly. Id. 

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. U.S. 

Const. amends. VI, XIV. The voir dire process serves to safeguard this right by allowing 

the removal of prospective jurors who will not be able to impartially follow the court’s 

instructions. “A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir 

dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct.” In 

re Hitchings, 6 Cal. 4th 97, 111 (1993). 

Juror misconduct “raises a presumption of prejudice that may be rebutted by proof 

that no prejudice actually resulted. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 771, 835 (1991). 

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However, the Court of Appeal found that there was no actual bias or prejudice as a result 

of Juror No. 5’s alleged misconduct. Adopting the trial court’s reasoning, the Court of 

Appeal found that it was not substantially likely that Juror No. 5 was biased against 

Petitioner. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *10. In fact, the Court of Appeal found that if 

Juror No. 5 was biased at all, such bias was likely in favor of Petitioner, because a juror 

with Juror No. 5’s experiences would likely be susceptible to an argument that Petitioner 

was falsely accused or otherwise mistreated by the justice system. Id. Finally, the Court 

of Appeal agreed with the trial court that “the best indication [that there was no bias 

against Petitioner] is the fact that defense counsel, once the information was known in 

substance, declined to request or stipulate that Juror Number 5 be removed.” Id. 

The Court of Appeal’s finding that there was no prejudice was independent factual 

determination, and thus must be presumed correct by this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s determination that Juror No. 5 

was not biased was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law, and is fully 

supported by the record. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

 3. Extrinsic evidence

 Petitioner also contends that Jurors Nos. 5 and 10 improperly introduced extrinsic 

evidence into the jury deliberation process. During deliberations, Juror No. 5 described an 

experience where he was nearly choked to death, and said that the experience informed 

Juror No. 5’s opinion of Petitioner’s mental state, because he was convinced that it would 

take several minutes to kill a person by strangulation. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *10. 

Also during deliberations, Juror No. 10 relayed her experience of having a brain tumor 

surgically removed, and shared with the other jurors that she did not suffer any brain 

impairment or memory loss as a result of the surgery. Id. 

“The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury verdict to be 

based on the evidence produced at trial.” Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th 

Cir. 2008). The Confrontation Clause is implicated by a juror's communication of 

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extraneous facts to other jurors, because “[t]he juror in effect becomes an unsworn witness, 

not subject to confrontation or cross examination.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Furthermore, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be 

established that exposure to extrinsic evidence had “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 

(1993); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court of Appeal considered this claim as well as evidence submitted by 

Petitioner, and found that the conduct of Jurors Nos. 5 and 10 did not amount to 

misconduct because they were simply “rely[ing] on their own personal experience to help 

them evaluate the evidence that had been presented,” which, as a normal part of jury 

deliberations, was not improper. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *11. The Court of Appeal 

also found that even if the conduct had been improper, no prejudice actually resulted 

because (1) the statement of Juror No. 5 about strangulation was consistent with the trial 

testimony and thus did not exercise improper influence over the jurors; and (2) the 

statement of Juror No. 10 about her brain surgery was unrelated to Petitioner’s experience 

with a heart attack, and thus would be unlikely to have much effect on the jurors. Id.

“It is expected that jurors will bring their life experiences to bear on the facts of a 

case.” Hard v. Burlington N. R. R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming 

denial of new trial despite allegations that a juror with special knowledge regarding x-ray 

interpretation attempted to use that knowledge to sway other jurors). The Court of 

Appeal’s decision that the actions of Jurors Nos. 5 and 10 were not misconduct, but rather 

permissible introduction of life experiences, is supported by the factual record and is 

objectively reasonable. However, even if the two jurors committed misconduct, 

Petitioner’s claim would also fail on the merits due to lack of prejudice. 

The inference the jurors may have drawn from Juror No. 5’s account of his own 

near-strangulation is that it likely would have taken Petitioner several minutes to kill 

Volkan by strangulation, and therefore that Volkan’s death could not have happened 

instantaneously. Because Petitioner admitted that he “squeezed and squeezed and 

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squeezed” Volkan’s neck (4 RT 932), and there had already been expert testimony that 

was consistent with Juror No. 5’s narrative, the jurors’ exposure to the alleged extrinsic 

evidence could not have prejudiced their deliberations. Furthermore, because Juror No. 

10’s experience (surgery to remove a brain tumor) was so divergent from Petitioner’s 

situation (a heart attack), it is unlikely that Juror No. 10’s narrative could have prejudiced 

the jury either. 

 Therefore, the Court finds that the purported extrinsic evidence was not prejudicial 

because it did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict. For these reasons, and because the Court of Appeal decision was supported 

by the record and involved a reasonable application of federal law, the Court DENIES 

Petitioner’s request for habeas relief as to his juror misconduct claim. 

C. Claim 3: Trial Court’s Admission of Evidence

 Petitioner seeks habeas relief from the trial court’s admission of the following 

evidence: (1) a social worker’s testimony that Petitioner had admitted that he had hit 

Volkan in the face; (2) a teacher’s testimony that Petitioner blamed Volkan for Volkan’s 

mother’s death; (3) testimony from Volkan’s friends that Volkan was afraid of Petitioner 

and that Petitioner had hit and threatened Volkan; and (4) a stipulation that a friend of 

Volkan’s would testify that he saw Petitioner chasing Volkan and yelling at him in 

Turkish. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *11-12. 

A federal habeas court “cannot review questions of state evidence law” and may 

only consider “whether the petitioner's conviction violated constitutional norms.” Henry v. 

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). Even if “it appears that evidence was 

erroneously admitted, a federal court will interfere only if it appears that its admission 

violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair trial.” Id. (citing Hill v. United 

States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). The Ninth Circuit advises that “[o]nly if there are no

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due 

process” and “[e]ven then, the evidence must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a 

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fair trial.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasis in 

original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Here, there were permissible inferences that the jury could draw from the testimony 

of the social worker and the teacher. Under California Evidence Code Section 1101, other 

than evidence used to prove a person’s disposition to commit a crime, evidence “relevant 

to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge...)” 

is freely admissible. Hurd v. Carey, 280 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The 

social worker’s testimony that Petitioner had hit Volkan before and was told of the 

consequences of hitting him again could support an inference relating to Petitioner’s 

motive for killing Volkan, as the Court of Appeal explained. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at 

*12 (“Indeed, when Tutmaz asked [Petitioner] why he did not stop strangling Volkan 

[Petitioner] replied that it was ‘already too late’ and that if he had let Volkan go, he would 

have to go to jail anyway.”). The teacher’s testimony relating to Petitioner blaming 

Volkan for Volkan’s mother’s death could also support an inference that Petitioner had a 

motive to kill Volkan, out of anger. Finally, the evidence that Volkan was afraid of 

Petitioner and that Petitioner had been seen chasing and yelling at Volkan supports an 

inference that Petitioner may not have been entirely provoked by Volkan’s bad behavior.4

 

Finally, the statements made by Volkan to his teacher and friends were not hearsay 

statements because they were not used for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to 

show Volkan’s state of mind in that he was afraid of Petitioner. 

Under the broad federal habeas standard, the possibility that the jury could make 

these permissible inferences is sufficient, on its own, to defeat Petitioner’s claim. 

However, in addition to proving constitutional error, Petitioner must also show that the 

error had a “substantial and injurious” effect on the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

The Court of Appeal correctly concluded that even if the admission of the evidence was 

 

4 As the Court of Appeal noted, the evidence of Volkan’s fear of his father was 

correctly only admitted by the trial court as rebuttal evidence to the defense’s theory of 

provocation. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *11. 

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erroneous, it was nevertheless harmless. Kayik, 2011 WL 2237606, at *14. The evidence 

that was admitted was quantitatively and qualitatively trivial when considered in the 

context of the entire trial. Id. at *14 (“The rebuttal evidence in question was brief and 

covered less than 20 pages of a more than 1,700-page transcript. The conduct identified 

was far less serious than the conduct [Petitioner] admitted to in open court and was not 

particularly harmful.”). It certainly was not objectively unreasonable for the Court of 

Appeal to determine that the admission of the evidence was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). For these reasons, Petitioner’s claim relating to the trial court’s admission of 

evidence is hereby DENIED on the merits. 

 D. Claims 4 and 5: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner brings two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, both with regard to

Petitioner’s trial counsel. First, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective 

when she failed to investigate Juror No. 5’s background. Second, Petitioner contends that 

his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to investigate the possibility of Volkan 

having a birth defect that could have made it more probable that Volkan suffered an instant 

death by neck compression. 

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must 

show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and 

“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 688, 694 (1984). In the context of federal habeas relief, the district court does not 

review the trial counsel’s performance directly; rather, “[t]he pivotal question is whether 

the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 101. This Court must therefore use “a ‘doubly deferential’ standard of review 

that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt v. 

Titlow, --- U.S. --- , 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 

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190 (2011)). The last reasoned state decision on both claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is the Superior Court’s ruling on Petitioner’s state habeas petition. See Ex. 11.5

 1. Failure to investigate Juror No. 5’s background

Petitioner’s first challenge is to trial counsel’s failure to investigate Juror No. 5’s 

background during voir dire. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel could have easily learned 

of Juror No. 5’s connection with past notorious child abduction cases if she had conducted 

a Google search of Juror No. 5’s name, or “his name plus the word ‘crime’ or ‘criminal,’” 

and that “[s]uch a search would have resulted in a picture that could be compared to the 

actual juror.” Am. Pet. at m-19 (Docket No. 16). 

The Superior Court rejected Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to investigate Juror No. 5’s background. Ex. 11 at 5-7. 

The Superior Court noted that “[t]he use of technology in the courtroom has not yet 

reached the stage where case law has held that compliance with professional norms would 

require routine internet background checks of potential jurors,” and that defense counsel 

acted in accordance with professional norms when, upon learning that someone in the 

district attorney’s office recognized Juror No. 5, she requested and obtained Juror No. 5’s 

criminal history, which showed nothing more than a “minor incident of public 

intoxication.” Id. at 6. Furthermore, the Superior Court found that it was not “reasonably 

probable that the failure to perform an internet background check affected the outcome,” 

because later in the course of the trial, defense counsel had the opportunity to stipulate to 

Juror No. 5’s removal, but chose not to do so for seemingly tactical reasons. Id. at 6-7. 

The Court must determine whether this application of Strickland was unreasonable. 

///

 

5

The Superior Court found a procedural bar to Petitioner’s claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, finding that the state habeas petition was untimely. Ex. 11 at 4-5. 

Such a determination is an adequate and independent ground which could warrant denial 

of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. However, the Superior Court 

nonetheless decided to reach the merits of the claims; thus, this Court will do the same. 

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At the outset, the Superior Court was correct that if Petitioner could not establish 

prejudice, then he could not succeed on his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 

regardless of whether his trial counsel’s performance was defective. Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995). No particular 

finding on the question of performance was required. This Court finds that the Superior 

Court’s conclusion that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice was not unreasonable. First 

of all, as discussed above, the Court finds a high probability that Juror No. 5 – replete with 

his history with the criminal justice system – would be a juror that a criminal defendant 

would want to keep on a jury. However, even if not investigating Juror No. 5 during voir 

dire was a failure on trial counsel’s part, it is highly improbable that the failure to conduct 

internet research to discover Juror No. 5’s background would affect the outcome of the 

trial, because trial counsel was informed of Juror No. 5’s background, and given the 

opportunity to strike Juror No. 5, prior to jury deliberations. Therefore, any purported 

failure during voir dire was rendered harmless by that opportunity. 

 For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has not established that it was unreasonable 

for the Court of Appeal to conclude that he was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure 

to investigate the background of Juror No. 5. Therefore, Petitioner’s fourth claim for 

habeas relief fails on the merits. 

 2. Failure to investigate Volkan’s birth defect

Petitioner’s next challenge is to trial counsel’s failure to investigate Volkan’s 

Turkish birth records in order to develop evidence that Volkan had a birth defect that 

caused him to hold his neck at an angle, thus making him more susceptible to death by 

neck compression. Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective because she should have 

first asked the defense expert, Dr. Hermann, whether evidence of a neck deformity would 

have made a difference as to his testimony, and then if he answered in the affirmative, she 

should have ordered Volkan’s medical records from Turkey. Am. Pet. at m-25. 

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The Superior Court identified the two items provided by Petitioner to support his 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) a letter from the defense expert, Dr. 

Hermann; and (2) a declaration from Petitioner’s current counsel, referencing a note he had 

seen in a file that was written by Petitioner. The letter indicated that Dr. Hermann had 

reviewed statements from people who knew Volkan as a child and a photograph of 

Volkan, and stated how his testimony at trial would have differed had he reviewed the 

statements and photograph.6 Ex. 11 at 7. The declaration from Petitioner’s counsel states 

that “in some unidentified file there is a written statement by [P]etitioner that [P]etitioner 

informed his trial counsel of Volkan’s neck deformity, but that she ‘refused to even 

investigate it.’” Id. at 8. 

The Superior Court first found that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of pleading 

a prima facie case because he did not support his petition “with whatever documentary 

exhibits are necessary for a complete understanding of his claim.” Id. at 7 (citing 

Sherwood v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 183, 187 (1979)). The Superior Court noted the 

convoluted nature of the evidence provided by Petitioner. First, the Superior Court 

questioned why Petitioner did not file his own declaration setting forth precisely what 

steps he asked his counsel to take that she refused, but instead filed a declaration from his 

current counsel lacking any personal knowledge. Id. at 7-8. Second, the Superior Court 

noted that Petitioner only provided the expert’s letter, and not the statements or picture 

upon which his letter relied. Id. This circular and incomplete evidentiary showing was 

insufficient to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively 

reasonable standard. Id. Finally, the Superior Court stated that even if Petitioner had met 

his documentary burden, “he would not have shown prejudice because the medical 

evidence would not support a defense to the murder charge.” Id. at 8. 

This Court finds that the Superior Court’s determination was not unreasonable. As 

noted above, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas, a 

 

6

The Superior Court noted that Dr. Hermann “does not indicate that he reviewed any 

medical records from Turkey.” Ex. 11 at 7. 

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defendant must show not just that his trial counsel’s performance was objectively 

unreasonable and that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different absent the unreasonable performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 694, but that the state court’s application of Strickland was itself objectively 

unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. 

First, the Superior Court’s determination that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of 

showing ineffective assistance of counsel was not unreasonable. The purported Turkish 

medical records have not been produced, and the Superior Court was justifiably skeptical 

as to whether the records exist at all. It appears probable that trial counsel found it to be a 

waste of time and resources to chase an unsupported lead across continents. The Ninth 

Circuit has made clear that a difference of opinion as to trial tactics is insufficient to 

establish ineffective assistance. United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Based upon an independent review of the record, it cannot be said that trial counsel’s 

decision to not investigate Volkan’s alleged birth defect “so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced 

a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 

Second, it was not unreasonable for the Superior Court to find that even if counsel 

was ineffective, there was no prejudice. Petitioner admitted during trial that he strangled 

Volkan by squeezing his neck for a period of time. 4 RT 932 (Petitioner stated “Then I 

squeezed his neck and squeezed his neck and squeezed his neck and – and I heard him 

saying something like, ‘father,’ then he collapsed on the floor.”). Furthermore, Petitioner 

admitted that he strangled Volkan because he lost control, due in part to side effects from 

his heart attack, which made him unable to control his anger. See 4 RT 932 (Petitioner 

stated “I was out of control and I was another person at that time.”). Therefore, the 

Superior Court was correct to state that “without question the illegal act of strangulation 

was a substantial cause of Volkan’s death,” and that Volkan’s pre-existing condition would 

not have relieved Petitioner of liability. Ex. 11 at 8 (citing People v. Caitlin, 26 Cal. 4th 

81, 155 (2001)). Therefore, this Court finds that there is not a reasonable probability that 

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the result of Petitioner’s trial would have been different, even if trial counsel had somehow 

been able to produce the medical records and the defense expert’s testimony had changed 

accordingly. Given the doubly deferential standard of review here, the Court cannot find 

that the Superior Court’s determination was objectively unreasonable. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims was not an unreasonable application of clearly 

established law, and is fully supported by the record. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled 

to federal habeas relief on these claims, and the claims are DENIED on the merits. 

II. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Mot. for Evid. Hearing at 6. An evidentiary hearing on a habeas petition is 

mandatory only if a petitioner was denied a “full and fair hearing in a state court, either at 

the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 

(1963). The Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner fails to allege 

facts sufficient to justify habeas relief. 

In considering whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the Court must first 

determine whether a factual basis exists in the state court record. “It is axiomatic that 

when issues can be resolved with reference to the state court record, an evidentiary hearing 

becomes nothing more than a futile exercise.” Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th 

Cir. 1998). Section 2254 provides that district courts shall afford state court factual 

findings the presumption of correctness, and that the petitioner must rebut the presumption 

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Upon careful consideration, the Court has determined that Petitioner’s habeas 

petition does not allege facts sufficient to entitle him to relief on either claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the Court concludes that these claims do not require 

further evidentiary development beyond the findings of the Superior Court. The Superior 

Court’s finding that there was no prejudice was correct; therefore, even if Petitioner were 

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able to elicit new evidence relating to the reasonableness of trial counsel’s tactical 

decisions, such evidence would still fall short of justifying habeas relief. Because the facts 

necessary to evaluate Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims exist in the 

present record, and because it is extremely unlikely that an evidentiary hearing would yield 

any further information about trial counsel’s decisions, Petitioner’s motion for an 

evidentiary hearing is hereby DENIED. 

III. Appealability of This Decision 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases requires a district court to 

rule on whether a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability in the same order in 

which the petition is denied. Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. District courts 

grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has 

rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Here, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing that his claims amounted to a 

denial of his constitutional rights, nor has he demonstrated that a reasonable jurist would 

find this Court’s denial of his claims to be debatable. Accordingly, no certificate of 

appealability is warranted in this case. Petitioner is advised that he may not appeal the 

denial of a certificate of appealability, but he may ask the Court of Appeals to issue a 

certificate of appealability under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

///

///

///

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CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 is hereby DENIED. Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is also DENIED.

Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 05/04/16 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge

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