Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02563/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiff’s request and supporting documents establish that the proper venue for this

action lies in the Central District. The court notes that Plaintiff has filed over seventy actions

in the Central District of California and has been ordered to show cause why he should not be

declared a vexatious litigant. See Greene v. Mens Central Jail, Case No. 2:11-cv-997, Doc.

No. 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011). 

- 1 - 11cv2563

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CEDRIC GREENE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-CV-2563-JM (WMC)

ORDER 

(1) DISMISSING THE

COMPLAINT;

(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; &

(3) DENYING AS MOOT

REQUEST TO PROCEED IN THIS

DISTRICT 

vs.

MCDONALDS RESTAURANT; CHRIS

RESENDIZ,

Defendants.

On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff Cedric Greene, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint for

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants McDonald’s Restaurant and Chris

Resendiz. Plaintiff did not pay the $350 filing fee; instead, he filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. Plaintiff has also filed a request to proceed in this district, attaching his declaration.1

 The

court notes that Plaintiff has brought the same action in this District before. See Greene v. McDonalds

Restaurant et al., 11-CV-610-IEG (NLS) (filed on March 28, 2011). On April 5, 2011, the court

Case 3:11-cv-02563-JM-WMC Document 5 Filed 11/14/11 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 11cv2563

transferred the case for lack of proper venue to the Central District, Western Division. The United

States District Court for the Central District of California thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request to

proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, noting that the court lacks jurisdiction over the

complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint for

failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denies as moot Plaintiff’s motion

to proceed in forma pauperis and Plaintiff’s request to proceed in this district.

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a United States District Court must

pay a filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Proceeding

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a district court must dismiss a case sua sponte if it determines that the

action is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff’s two-page complaint against McDonald’s Restaurant and Chris Resendiz alleges that

Plaintiff requested to take time off from his employment, but Defendants continued to place Plaintiff

in the work schedule with the knowledge that Plaintiff would not be able to work. Plaintiff alleges

that he was terminated from his employment. On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff attempts to

bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is to “give

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Under California law, “the elements of the tort of

intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant

with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress;

(2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Christensen v. Superior

Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). Extreme and outrageous conduct must be “so extreme as to exceed

all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32

Case 3:11-cv-02563-JM-WMC Document 5 Filed 11/14/11 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 11cv2563

Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982). The court concludes that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint fail to state

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Plaintiff’s case also lacks proper venue. Plaintiff must bring this action “in: (1) a judicial

district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State; (2) a judicial district

in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . or a judicial

district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise

be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). A determination of improper venue does not go to the merits of

the case, and, therefore, any dismissal on this ground must be without prejudice. In re Hall, 939 F.2d

802, 804 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s claims appear to have arisen in Los Angeles, California, which

is within the jurisdictional confines of the Central District of California, Western Division. See 28

U.S.C. § 84(c)(2). No claim is alleged to have arisen and no Defendant is alleged to reside in the

Southern District. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(d). Therefore, venue is proper in the Central District of

California, Western Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 84(c)(2), but not in the Southern District of

California. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, it appears that this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint. “Federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004).

It is presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Here, Plaintiff fails to establish any valid basis for federal subject matter

jurisdiction. Plaintiff does not show that this is a civil action “arising under the Constitution, laws,

or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff fails to indicate any federal law that may

bring his claim under the jurisdiction of this court. Nor does Plaintiff allege that complete diversity

of citizenship of the parties exists to satisfy the jurisdictional basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

The court concludes that the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim against

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-02563-JM-WMC Document 5 Filed 11/14/11 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 11cv2563

 Defendants, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. Accordingly, the court

sua sponte dismisses the complaint, and denies as moot Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 14, 2011

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-02563-JM-WMC Document 5 Filed 11/14/11 Page 4 of 4