Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01511/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01511-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cynthia Williams, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Mesa, a municipal corporation;

John Santiago, individually, and in his

capacity as a Mesa Police Officer,

Defendants.

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No. CV-09-1511-PHX-LOA

ORDER

After review of Plaintiff’s Response, doc. 53, to the Court’s January 24, 2011

Order to Show Cause, and Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Response, doc. 54, the Court

finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a Monell claim in her original complaint filed in State

court on July 6, 2009; has not fairly raised such a claim in the parties’ September 16, 2009

Joint Case Management Report, doc. 15; and the parties have not raised a Monell claim by

implicit or express agreement of counsel. Until raised by the Court in its recent OSC,

Plaintiff has not moved to amend the Complaint. The deadline for filing motions to amend

pleadings ended on December 15, 2009, over 14 months ago. (Doc. 17 at 3) Discovery

ended six months ago. (Id.) Simply stated, Monell liability was not an issue in this case until

now.

Plaintiff’s Response requests that the “Court allow modification of the

amendment deadline and allow Plaintiff to amend her Complaint and incorporate additional

Case 2:09-cv-01511-LOA Document 55 Filed 02/14/11 Page 1 of 4
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facts and legal clarification to cure any deficiencies in her Complaint.” (Doc. 53 at 1) The

Court will explain why Plaintiff’s request will be denied.

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 vests the district court with early control

over cases ‘toward a process of judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase,

especially motions and discovery.’” In re Arizona, 528 F.3d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.

denied, S.Ct. , 2009 WL 1738654 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory

committee’s note, 1983 Amendment). “Rule 16 further recognizes the inherent power of the

district court to enforce its pretrial orders through sanctions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f), and the

discretion of the [trial] judge to apply an appropriate level of supervision as dictated by the

issues raised by each individual case.” Id. (citing e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)). Rule

16(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P., mandates that the scheduling order “may be modified only for good

cause and with the judge’s consent.” Rule 16(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added).

Emphasizing the meaningful nature of the Rule 16 deadlines, the Ninth Circuit has made

clear that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 is to be taken seriously. . . .” Janicki Logging

Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard primarily

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992 ). The district court may modify the

pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the

extension.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608. “Good cause” means the scheduling deadlines cannot

be met despite a party’s diligence, citing 6A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed. 1990). (Id.) 

The requisite good cause for extending the deadline to amend the Complaint

or any other pleadings has not been shown in this case. Plaintiff’s counsel has had more than

a reasonable adequate amount of time to amend the Complaint to allege a Monell claim and

engage in discovery related to Monell issues. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any reason, much

less a good one, why she could not have moved to amend the Complaint before now,

especially when Defendants raised this issue early in this litigation that “Plaintiff fails to state

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a Monell claim against the City[.]” (Doc. 15 at 5). The Court agrees with Defendants that if

Plaintiff were granted leave to amend this late in the case “Defendants would suffer

substantial prejudice.” (Doc. 54 at 8) “Defendants have already disclosed expert opinions,

listed trial witnesses, taken depositions, and briefed the motion for summary judgment. The

case that has been prepared for trial and analyzed for summary judgment purposes was (sic)

a use of force case. What Plaintiff is proposing is a different case looking at the propriety of

Mesa’s training and policies.” (Id.) If Plaintiff were allowed to raise new theories of liability

at the eleventh hour, it is likely the Court would also need to extend the discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines, rendering the original Rule 16 scheduling deadlines

meaningless.

The Court repeats what it wrote on July 15, 2010, that counsel were forewarned

during the scheduling conference by the Court and reinforced in the scheduling order itself

that the scheduling “deadlines are real, firm, and, consistent with the undersigned’s

responsibilities mandated by Congress in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C.

§ 471 et seq., will not be altered except only upon a showing of good cause and by leave of

the assigned trial judge.” (Docs. 17 at 2, 27 at 2) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

The scheduling order gives fair notice to the parties that “[t]he Court intends to enforce the

deadlines in this Order. Counsel should plan their litigation activities accordingly[,]” citing

Hostnut.Com, Inc.v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 2006 WL 2573201 *1 (D. Ariz. 2006). Like

the 120-day deadline to serve process pursuant to Rule 4(m), to hold that good cause has

been shown here, “would allow the good cause exception to swallow the rule.” Townsel v.

County of Contra Costa, 820 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1987). Also see, Zivkovic v. Southern

Calif. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that party failed to

demonstrate good cause where a continuance was requested four months after the scheduling

order was issued, and plaintiff was not diligent in complying with the Rule 16 schedule)

(citation omitted).

After consideration of the untimeliness of Plaintiff’s request to amend, the

relevant case law, the absence of good cause, and the present posture of this case,

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request to amend the Complaint to allege a

Monell claim is DENIED. 

Dated this 14th day of February, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-01511-LOA Document 55 Filed 02/14/11 Page 4 of 4