Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00540/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

KENNETH WAYNE PATTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ETOWAH COUNTY, ALABAMA,

TODD ENTREKIN, JONATHAN

SHADWRICK, SCOTT HASSELL,

and MIKE O’BRYANT,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 4:15-CV-540-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Kenneth Wayne Patton filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was beaten while he

was a pretrial detainee at the Etowah County Detention Center (ECDC). Named as

defendants in the lawsuit are Etowah County, Alabama, Todd Entrekin, the Sheriff

of Etowah County, Scott Hassell, Chief Deputy of Detention at ECDC, Mike

O’Bryant, a “Compliance Sargent” [sic] at ECDC, and Jonathan Shadwrick, the

Booking Deputy at ECDC at the time of Patton’s detention. 

After Patton filed his complaint, the defendants moved pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) to dismiss it. The motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and

Patton is ORDERED to submit an amended complaint.

FILED

 2015 Sep-09 AM 09:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 1 of 7
I. Background

Patton was arrested on April 9, 2013, for a domestic violence charge and

was held at ECDC. Doc. 1, ¶ 11. During his booking, Patton informed Jonathan

Shadwrick that Patton was a correctional officer at another facility and requested

that he be held in an isolated cell, separate from the general population of the

ECDC. Doc. 1, ¶ 12–13. Patton did not receive his requested accommodations.

Doc. 1, ¶ 14. Thereafter, he was placed in a holding cell with an inmate named

Moses Reyes. Doc. 1, ¶ 14. Another inmate, Denzil Beck, who was married to

Patton’s first cousin, punched his fist into the open palm of his hand—imagine the

gesture that an archetypal schoolyard bully would make toward a meeker

child—as a means of urging Reyes to attack Patton. Doc. 1, ¶ 15–16.

Patton received a beating in short order, prompting Beck to give a

celebratory fist bump to another inmate, Henry Kicklighter. Doc. 1, ¶ 17. After the

assault, ECDC’s staff nurse, Tiffany Dann, recommended that Patton be

transported to the Riverview Medical Center in Gadsden, Alabama, where he was

treated for cuts and lacerations to his face, and a broken tooth and nose. Doc. 1,

¶18–19.

II. Applicable Legal Standard

2

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 2 of 7
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and comply with Rule 8, a

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

of relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements,

supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient to state a cause of

action. Id. A district court has inherent authority to order repleader where the

initial pleading is so defective as to give defendants—and the Court—inadequate

notice of a plaintiff’s claims. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1232, 1284 n. 3 (11th

Cir. 2001).1

III. Discussion

While the foregoing facts were alleged in the complaint, to quote the

defendants, “it is noteworthy what these allegations do not include.” Doc. 9, ¶ 4.

Here is one omission: “[F]air notice of what the. . .claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Co., 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

1

 The court notes that Patton provides more information in his opposition to the

defendants’ motions, but the Rules of Procedure require that claims be set out in the complaint—

not in briefs. 

3

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 3 of 7
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Instead, Patton has submitted a

textbook example of a Type III2 shotgun pleading. Every complaint must comply

with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is clear that Patton has suffered an

injury, but the issues of who caused the injury—and why they should be

accountable to Patton—are obscured. 

Specifically, the complaint is inadequate in that it names five defendants,

yet only Shadwrick’s actions are described therein. But even this statement is

based upon the assumption that Shadwrick is the Booking Deputy described in

paragraphs 12 and 13. In repleading, Patton must affirmatively allege that

Shadwrick (or some other named person) is the Booking Deputy so described. No

factual basis is stated for Patton’s claims against Haskell, Entrekin, and

O’Bryant—only legal conclusions. In paragraph 21, someone, but it is not clear

who, “with deliberate indifference to the safety of Patton, failed to” place Patton in

a “special management status.” This is the closest the complaint comes to

describing a “sufficient factual matter,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, to support Patton’s

2

 See Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir.

2015) (attempting to taxonomize the different kinds of shotgun pleadings that have been

examined by the Eleventh Circuit, and describing a Type III shotgun pleading as “one that

commits the sin of not separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.”).

4

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 4 of 7
claims, but, in the absence of a definite statement about which defendant(s) is(are)

alleged to have unlawfully harmed Patton, the complaint fails to “[show] that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

As to defendant Etowah County, there are no factual allegations describing

who is a policymaker for the county, what the complained-of policy is, how that

alleged policy caused Patton’s injury, or whether Etowah County actually follows

any custom or has promulgated any policy in this case. See Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51 (2011); Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978). Rather, Patton merely conclusorily asserted that Etowah

County’s failure “to properly fund and supervise” caused ECDC to create a custom

or policy.

3 Doc. 1, ¶ 27. As is, the Court cannot determine whether Patton claims

ECDC, Etowah County, both, or someone else is the party responsible for creating

the alleged custom or policy. 

Finally, in the only count in the complaint, “Count I – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – :

Deliberate Indifference to Inmate Safety,” Doc. 1 at 4, Patton asserts liability

against all five defendants. Further, the paragraphs under that heading contain a

bricolage of references to independent doctrines in civil rights litigation:

“supervisory officials,” Doc. 1, ¶ 26, “inaction of properly training,” Doc. 1, ¶ 26,

3

 Exactly what that custom or policy is is also unclear. 

5

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 5 of 7
“customs and policies,” Doc. 1, ¶ 27, “failing to properly fund,” Doc. 1, ¶ 27, and

“[failing to properly] supervise.” Doc. 1, ¶ 27. Because of Patton’s failure to

comply with Rule 10(b),4

 the court is unable to discern exactly how many causes

of action Patton is asserting, against whom he asserts which one(s), and whether

he asserts primary or vicarious liability. To borrow a phrase, talismanic recitations

of doctrinal buzzwords will not do. Cf. Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 678 (“[A] formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). 

This complaint is a “model ‘shotgun’ pleading of the sort [the Eleventh

Circuit] has been roundly, repeatedly, and consistently condemning for years.”

Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 980 (11th Cir. 2008).

Such a complaint turns the logic of Rules of Civil Procedure on its head, making

topsy-turvy of their purpose; complaints are intended to be drafted “as clearly and

definitely as possible.” Id. at 979. When these sorts of pleadings proliferate,

“issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes

unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court’s

ability to administer justice.” Anderson v. District Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida

4

 FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b): Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims

or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of

circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If

doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence--and

each defense other than a denial--must be stated in a separate count or defense.

6

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 6 of 7
Community College, 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996).

For the foregoing reasons, this Court is exercising its inherent authority to

order that an amended complaint be filed. The amended complaint must rectify all

deficiencies noted in this opinion and be filed within 30 days of the date hereof.5

DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of September, 2015. 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

5

 In light of the foregoing, defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 8, 10, and 12) are

DENIED without prejudice. 

7

Case 4:15-cv-00540-VEH Document 19 Filed 09/09/15 Page 7 of 7