Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02253/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PERRY ROBERT AVILA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

RICHARD J. KIRKLAND, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 04-2253 WHA (PR)

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The

court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent has

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and has lodged

exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the reasons set forth

below the petition is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

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United States District Court

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U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

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When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

The petition in this case is directed to petitioner's classification as a gang member and

consequent confinement in the Security Housing Unit ("SHU"). The Court initially doubted

that the claim went to the validity of petitioner's confinement or the length of it, but after

hearing from petitioner on the question, concluded that the case could proceed as a habeas case

because petitioner was unable to earn certain time credits while confined in the SHU. 

As grounds for habeas relief petitioner asserts that his due process rights were violated

in that there was insufficient evidence to “validate” him as a gang member, that validating him

as a gang member based in part on his possession of a list of Nahuatl words violated his First

Amendment rights, and that the institution’s ban on use of Nahuatl words is unconstitutional.

1. “SOME EVIDENCE”

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the Supreme Court held that prison

disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy due process requirements unless there is "some

evidence" in the record to support the findings of the prison disciplinary board. This standard

applies to placement in a SHU for gang affiliation. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th

Cir. 2003) (noting that any one of three pieces of evidence -- a sheriff’s department report that

prisoner was a gang member, a probation report that prisoner’s codefendant was a gang

member, and a statement from a prison informant -- would constitute “some evidence”). 

The initial decision in 1999 to validate petitioner as a member of the Mexican Mafia

prison gang was based on four items, and the decision in 2003, which is at issue here, was based

on three items of evidence. These were a memorandum dated August 8, 1999, and two

memoranda dated September 17, 1999 (resp. exh. 4, 5, 7). These memoranda were based on

information developed when petitioner was in jail in Riverside, California, awaiting trial. Two

chronicle reports from a Riverside County Sheriff’s Department detective that petitioner had

written to two known members of the EME-Mexican Mafia gang, with the basis for concluding

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that they are EME members set out and photocopies of the correspondence, with the detective’s

notes, attached (exh. 5, 6). Both memoranda point out that the correspondence “speaks of other

gang members.” (Ibid.) The third item was a memorandum reporting that the same Riverside

detective had seized a list of Nahuatl words and their English meanings from petitioner’s cell

and stating that based on the officer’s experience with gangs, EME members commonly use

Nahuatl to avoid interception of their communications (exh. 7). A copy of the list of words

with the Riverside detective’s explanation of how it was discovered and how the words are used

by the gang was attached (ibid.). 

Ascertaining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or

weighing of the evidence. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached. Id. at 1005-06. Even if it is assumed for purposes of decision on this

issue that the list of Nahuatl words should not have been considered, the remaining evidence

described above is evidence that could support the conclusion reached, and this is even clearer

if the list is considered. There was no constitutional violation.

2. USE OF THE WORD LIST AS EVIDENCE

Petitioner contends that basing his gang validation on possession of the list of Nahuatl

words violated his First Amendment rights. An argument that a ban on possession of writings

in Nahuatl is unconstitutional was recently rejected by the Court in a civil rights case brought

by petitioner. See Avila v. Woodford, No. C 05-2063 WHA (PR) (Order Sept. 28, 2007). 

This is a habeas case, however, and only claims that go to the fact or length of

petitioner’s incarceration are grounds for relief. See Moran v. Sondalle, 218 F.3d 647, 650-52

(7th Cir. 2000); Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (civil rights action is proper

method of challenging conditions of confinement); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891-92 &

n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of habeas petition on basis that challenges to terms and

conditions of confinement must be brought in civil rights complaint). Because there is no due

process right limiting the evidence that can be considered in determining whether

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administrative segregation is appropriate, and because there was “some evidence” to support the

decision even without the allegedly-protected materials, this claim cannot succeed. 

3. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BAN ON NAHUATL

Petitioner also contends that the institution’s ban on possession of materials containing

Nahuatl words violates the First Amendment. This is the claim rejected in petitioner’s civil

rights case mentioned above. As it has no bearing on the fact or length of petitioner’s

confinement, it is not a proper basis for habeas relief. 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has not established that his constitutional rights were violated in connection

which his validation as a gang member. The rejection of these claims by the state courts,

therefore, could not have been contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished United States Supreme Court authority. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26 , 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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