Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02602/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02602-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:504 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALEXANDER L. WILD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DEAN PETERSON, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-2602-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

INTRODUCTION 

 Presently pending before the court is plaintiff Alexander L. Wild d/b/a Alex Wild 

Photography’s motion for entry of a default judgment against defendant Dean Peterson d/b/a 

Certified Pest Management, who is the only named defendant in this action. (ECF No. 13.)1

 

Plaintiff’s motion was initially filed on March 22, 2016. (Id.) On April 8, 2016, after defendant 

failed to oppose plaintiff’s motion in accordance with Local Rule 230, the court vacated the 

hearing on the motion and requested supplemental briefing from plaintiff. (ECF No. 15.) 

Subsequently, plaintiff timely filed its supplemental briefing, and although provided with an 

additional opportunity to oppose plaintiff’s motion and supplemental briefing, defendant again 

 

1

 All parties who appeared in the action have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States 

Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including the entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (ECF No. 7.) 

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failed to appear or respond to plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 16.) 

 After carefully considering the written briefing, the court’s record, and the applicable law, 

the court GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s motion on the terms outlined in this order. 

BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff is a well-known insect photographer, who sells or licenses his photographs to 

others wishing to make use of the photographs for advertisements and pecuniary gain. (See 

Complaint, ECF No. 1 [“Compl.”] ¶ 13.) Plaintiff took the original image at issue in this action 

(the “Image”), has ownership of the Image, and registered the Image with the United States 

Copyright Office under Registration Number VAu699-806. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16, Ex. 1.) According to 

plaintiff, defendant willfully used, without plaintiff’s consent, the Image on defendant’s business 

website from March 15, 2015, through at least the filing of the complaint, for commercial benefit 

in promoting defendant’s pest control business. (Id. ¶¶ 17-21.) 

 Based on the above, plaintiff commenced this action alleging a single claim of copyright 

infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq., against defendant on December 15, 2015. (ECF No. 

1.) Plaintiff’s complaint seeks statutory damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 

(Id.) After defendant was properly served with process and failed to appear in the action, the 

Clerk of Court, upon plaintiff’s request, entered defendant’s default. (ECF Nos. 8-10.) The 

instant motion for default judgment followed. (ECF No. 13.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 

against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 

against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 

automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 

238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 

(9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies 

within the district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors: 

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(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the 

complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the 

possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether 

the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 

decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pled factual allegations in the operative 

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 

v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 

Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); accord Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 

285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, although well-pled allegations in the complaint 

are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 

and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 

of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating 

that a defendant does not admit facts that are not well-pled or conclusions of law); Abney v. 

Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be 

entered on a legally insufficient claim”). A party’s default does not establish the amount of 

damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. 

DISCUSSION 

 Appropriateness of the Entry of Default Judgment under the Eitel Factors 

 1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff 

 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 

judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of granting 

a default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would face 

prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment, because plaintiff would be without another 

recourse against defendant. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors the entry of a default 

judgment. 

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 2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claim and 

the Sufficiency of the Complaint

The court considers the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim and the sufficiency of the 

complaint together below because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must 

consider whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim on which plaintiff 

may recover. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 

To establish copyright infringement, “two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a 

valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist 

Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Here, as outlined above, 

plaintiff has adequately alleged that it owns the copyright with respect to the Image, and that 

defendant copied and used plaintiff’s Image on defendant’s business website without permission. 

As such, the complaint sufficiently states a claim for copyright infringement and has merit. 

Therefore, the second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of default judgment. 

 3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

 Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, “the court must consider the amount of money at 

stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1176-77; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. 

Cal. 2003). In this case, plaintiff seeks $20,000.00 in statutory damages. Although not an 

insignificant amount, such an amount is within the range of statutory damages authorized by the 

statute, as discussed below. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Therefore, the sum of money at stake does 

not in itself preclude the entry of a default judgment. 

 4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts 

 The court may assume the truth of well-pled facts in the complaint (except as to damages) 

following the clerk’s entry of default, and defendant has not appeared to dispute any such facts. 

Thus, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra 

Entm’t Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in 

a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is 

no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 

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F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Accordingly, the fifth Eitel factor favors 

the entry of default judgment. 

 5. Factor Six: Whether the Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect

 In this case, there is no indication in the record that defendant’s default was due to 

excusable neglect. Indeed, despite having been provided with multiple opportunities to appear 

and defend its interests, defendant apparently declined to do so. Accordingly, the sixth Eitel 

factor favors the entry of a default judgment. 

 6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

Favoring Decisions on the Merits

 “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 

alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 

PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 

Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of the policy 

in favor of decisions on the merits—and consistent with existing policy would prefer that this 

case be resolved on the merits—that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default 

judgment. 

 In sum, upon consideration of all the Eitel factors, the court concludes that plaintiff is 

entitled to a default judgment against defendant. All that remains is a determination of the 

specific relief to which plaintiff is entitled. 

Terms of the Judgment to Be Entered 

 After determining that a party is entitled to the entry of default judgment, the court must 

determine the terms of the judgment to be entered. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment 

requests an award of statutory damages and injunctive relief, which were also requested in the 

complaint.2 Each form of relief is addressed separately below. 

 

2

 Although plaintiff’s complaint also sought an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, such relief is 

not requested in plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. As such, the court does not evaluate 

whether any attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded. 

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6

 Statutory Damages 

 As noted above, plaintiff seeks $20,000.00 in statutory damages. 

In a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff may elect to seek either actual or 

statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504. The statute provides for statutory damages for all 

infringements of a given work of not less than $750.00 and not more than $30,000, as the court 

considers just. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). “In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden 

of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its 

discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.” 17 

U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Courts in this district have previously looked to seven factors in evaluating 

whether a proposed award of statutory damages is just: (1) “the expenses saved and the profits 

reaped;” (2) “the revenues lost by the plaintiff;” (3) “the value of the copyright;” (4) “the 

deterrent effect on others besides the defendant;” (5) “whether the defendant’s conduct was 

innocent or willful;” (6) “whether a defendant has cooperated in providing particular records from 

which to assess the value of the infringing material produced;” and (7) “the potential for 

discouraging the defendant.” See, e.g. Microsoft Corp. v. Nop, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (E.D. 

Cal. 2008). 

In this case, plaintiff has adequately established that defendant’s infringement was willful. 

Apart from alleging willfulness in the complaint, plaintiff’s supplemental briefing and supporting 

materials make clear that plaintiff’s counsel contacted defendant regarding the infringement on 

numerous occasions, starting in February 2015 and long before filing this action in December 

2015. (See ECF No. 16 at 8-11 [outlining exact dates and times for communications by letter, email, and phone].) Nevertheless, at least as of April 2016, after numerous communications from 

plaintiff’s counsel and being served with process in this action, defendant continued to use the 

Image on its website. (ECF No. 16-1 at 6-7.) Therefore, the appropriate range of statutory 

damages is $750.00 to $150,000.00. 

Although $20,000.00 is admittedly towards the lower end of that range, the court finds an 

award of $20,000.00 to be excessive when all the circumstances are considered. According to 

plaintiff, it customarily charges between $95.00 and $375.00 for a “perpetual, non-exclusive, nonCase 2:15-cv-02602-KJM-KJN Document 17 Filed 07/15/16 Page 6 of 9
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transferable, worldwide license” to use the Image for permitted commercial purposes, including 

using it “as part of a commercial website for promotional purposes.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 4.) Even 

assuming that the highest pricing applied, defendant would only have been required to pay 

$375.00 to use the Image on its website indefinitely. This case essentially involves the 

unauthorized copying of a single image by a relatively small, regional pest control company. 

Based on the materials submitted by plaintiff, the Image appeared along with several other images 

of insects, serving as examples of the types of pests encountered in Placer, El Dorado, and 

Sacramento counties. While the Image was undoubtedly used for commercial purposes, it was 

not used as the main logo or trademark for the business, nor is there any other indication that 

defendant derived substantial economic value from its unauthorized use of the Image specifically. 

As such, statutory damages based on a multiplier of more than 53 times the actual cost of a 

license are unjustified. 

On the other hand, the court is cognizant of the significant need for deterrence of both 

defendant and other infringers, particularly when faced with defendant’s continued willful use of 

the Image despite numerous communications from plaintiff’s counsel and this lawsuit. The court 

also recognizes that defendant’s failure to participate in this lawsuit has deprived plaintiff of 

conducting discovery with respect to defendant’s use of the Image and potential profits reaped 

from such use that may not be immediately apparent. 

Therefore, after careful consideration of all the relevant factors and circumstances, the 

court awards $7,500.00 in statutory damages, which represents a multiplier of 20 times the 

$375.00 licensing fee. That amount is sufficient to fairly compensate plaintiff, as well as to deter 

defendant and others from similar conduct, without being unduly punitive.3

 

 Injunctive Relief 

 Plaintiff further requests that defendant be permanently enjoined from further 

unauthorized infringement of the copyrighted Image pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502. 

 

3

 Nothing in this order should be construed as suggesting that a particular multiplier, such as the 

20 multiplier used in this case, is appropriate in all cases. By way of example, in cases involving 

a very large licensing fee, a lesser multiplier may be sufficient to ensure deterrence. Instead, 

multipliers should always be tailored to the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 

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The court may grant “temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem 

reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). To obtain a 

permanent injunction, a plaintiff “must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; 

(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 

that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a 

remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 

permanent injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 

Here, plaintiff has shown that it suffered an irreparable injury for which remedies 

available at law are inadequate. At least as of April 2016, after numerous communications from 

plaintiff’s counsel and being served with process in this action, defendant continued to use the 

Image on its website. (ECF No. 16-1 at 6-7.) As such, it is likely that defendant’s infringement 

of the Image would continue absent an injunction, further impairing the market value of the 

Image. Furthermore, considering the balance of hardships between plaintiff and defendant, a 

permanent injunction is warranted, because defendant would suffer no cognizable hardship from 

merely being prevented from engaging in unlawful activity, whereas plaintiff’s copyright would 

be further infringed if defendant’s conduct is not enjoined. Finally, the public interest would 

undoubtedly be served by the enforcement of federal copyright law. 

Therefore, the court awards plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED IN PART on the 

terms outlined in this order. 

2. Judgment is entered in plaintiff’s favor and against defendant. 

3. Plaintiff is awarded statutory damages in the amount of $7,500.00. 

4. Defendant is permanently enjoined from further unauthorized infringement of the 

copyrighted Image. 

5. Plaintiff shall forthwith serve a copy of this order on defendant by U.S. mail at its lastknown address, and shall file a proof of service on the docket. 

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6. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 15, 2016 

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