Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00812/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00812-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY McKINNEY,

Petitioner,

 v.

J. MACBER, Warden

Respondent.

CASE NO. 15-cv-0812-H-RBB

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR 

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

On April 10, 2015, Petitioner Gregory McKinney, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner challenges a conviction he received in 2003

for battering a custodial officer while he was incarcerated for an earlier crime. (Id.

at 1–2.) On August 24, 2015, Respondent lodged the state-court record and moved

to dismiss the petition. (Doc. Nos. 18 & 19.) On November 4, 2015, Petitioner filed

a traverse. (Doc. No. 24.) On December 2, 2015, the magistrate judge entered a report

and recommendation that recommended dismissing the petition because it is untimely

by more than eleven years and Petitioner is no longer in custody for the conviction his

petition challenges. (Doc. No. 26.) On February 5, 2016, Petitioner filed objections

to the report and recommendation. (Doc. No. 29.) For the reasons set forth below,

the Court dismisses the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denies a certificate of

appealability.

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BACKGROUND

On September 18, 2002, while incarcerated for a different crime, Petitioner was 1

charged with one count of battery upon a corrections officer by a person in custody. 

(Lodg. No. 4.) On December 13, 2002, he pleaded no-contest to felony battery of a

custodial officer, a violation of California Penal Code § 243.1. (Lodg. No. 5.) At the

plea hearing, Petitioner stated that he was accepting the plea to avoid the possibility of

greater penalties, that he had reviewed his options with counsel and understood his

rights and the consequences of the plea, and that he had not been coerced. (Lodg.

No. 11 at 50–51.) Petitioner stipulated at the hearing that the law-enforcement records

summarized in the probation report were an adequate factual basis for the plea. 

(Id. at 52.) The probation report offers the following account of the incident: 

On October 5, 2000, at approximately 8:35 p.m., personnel of the

Centinela State [Prison] were in the process of reassigning the defendant,

Greg McKinney to a different cell to accommodate new arrivals when he

became defiant, resistive, and combatant [sic]. He was adamant in his

refusal to move and was proclaiming his willingness to be housed in the

Administrative Segregation Unit. A Lieutenant Thouros ordered inmate

McKinney to place his hand behind his back to be handcuffed, and he

refused and tried to move around Lieutenant Thomas to re-enter his cell. 

He was ordered to get down, and McKinney refused grabbing a metal

framed chair and attempted to hide behind a laundry cart. He then hoisted

the hair above his head, and yelled, “You're going to have to take me to

the hole.” He then threw the chair at Lieutenant Thomas, who deflected

it with a back left arm swing. 

A sergeant Butram drew her O.C. Projector and ordered McKinney to get

down. He refused, and [she] sprayed him with an O.C. burst. McKinney

ignored her command and hoisted the chair above his head and swung it

at Lieutenant Thomas who deflected the blow with his left palm. Sergeant

Buttram again sprayed McKinney, but he continued his resistance hiding

behind the laundry cart again.

Another C.O. became involved and he struck McKinney with his baton on

his left lower thigh. McKinney continued to resist refusing to respond to

issued orders by staff to get down. A C.O. finally utilized his upper body

strength and body weight to force McKinney into a prone position on the

floor, and [he] was placed in handcuffs. He continued to violently resist

striking his head on the tier floor. He [was] eventually subdued and

On September 23, 1998, Petitioner was convicted ofsecond-degree attempted 1

burglary. (Lodg. Nos. 1 & 2.) He was sentenced to twenty-five years to life with the

possibility of parole. (Id.) Petitioner is still serving that sentence, which is not the

subject of his petition. 

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transported to Cental Health for decontamination and treatment. He

needed six sutures to close a laceration over his left eyebrow. 

Lieutenant Thomas suffered a swollen left hand and complained of pain

radiating from hand/wrist to elbow.

(Lodg. No. 6 at 3–4.) 

On January 17, 2003, the state court sentenced Petitioner to three yearsin prison

for the battery, to be served concurrently with the sentence he was already serving. 

(Lodg. No. 8.) Additionally, the court ordered him to pay a mandatory restitution fine

of $200 and a parole revocation restitution fine of $200, which was stayed and would

be imposed only if parole was revoked. (Id.; Lodg. No. 11 at 40–41.) Petitioner did

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not appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) 

More than a decade later, in April of 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in Imperial County Superior Court. (Lodg. No. 11.) On May 7,

2014, the superior court denied the petition because it was untimely. The order read: 

Petitioner offers no explanation for his delay in filing the petition, which

is reason alone for denial. Moreover, a review of the record provided by

Petitioner indicates that when he agreed to enter the plea on the eve of

trial on December 13, 2002, Petitioner was advised that it would result in

a three year sentence, to be served concurrentlywith his existing sentence. 

In fact, the transcript from the January 7, 2003 sentencing reveals that on

that date Petitioner was sentenced to three years to run concurrently with

his existing sentence, such that there was no changed from the agreement

articulated on the record on December 7, 2002. In addition, Petitioner has

articulated no prejudice, because the sentence was concurrent with his

existing sentence.

(Lodg. No. 12.) 

On July 2, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal. (Lodg. No. 13.) On July 10, 2014, the court of appeal

denied the petition because it was untimely. The order read: 

McKinney fails to establish a basis for the grant of relief because his

petition is untimely and does not set forth an exception to the procedural

bar or allege good cause for the delay. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750,

783, 797–798.) Moreover, McKinney fails to provide any documentary

evidence concerning his plea and sentencing or other evidence to support

The court noted at Petitioner’s change-of-plea hearing that there was no issue

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of restitution to the victim because the victim was deceased. (Id. at 50.) 

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his claims. A petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus bears a heavy burden

to plead and prove sufficient grounds for relief. (People v. Duvall (1995)

9 Cal. 4th 464, 474.) The petitioner should include copies of reasonably

available documentary evidence supporting the claim. (Ibid.)

(Lodg. No. 14.) 

On September 4, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 15.) On January 14, 2015, the California

Supreme Court denied the petition because it was untimely. The order read: “The

petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770,

780.).” (Lodg. No. 16.) 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this Court on April 6, 2015. (Doc.

No. 1 at 11–13.) His federal petition contains the same claims he asserted in his state

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petitions: (1) that his defense counsel wasineffective for failing to file pretrial motions

and for using misrepresentations to coerce him to accept the plea agreement; and

(2) that ordering him to pay restitution violated the plea agreement and was improper

because the victim was deceased. (Id. at 5–6.) 

DISCUSSION

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party

objectsto any portion of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district

court reviews those portions of the report and recommendation de novo. See id. 

A. Timeliness 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., a one-year limitation period applies to habeas petitions

by state inmates, with certain exceptions:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

A pro se federal habeas petition is deemed filed when it is delivered to prison 3

officials to be forwarded to the federal court. See Robinson v. Lewis, 795 F.3d 926,

933 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Under these rules, Petitioner’s federal petition was more than a decade late. 

Petitioner pleaded no-contest on December 13, 2002. (Lodg. No. 5.) He wassentenced

on January 17, 2003. (Lodg. No. 8.) He did not appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Under 

Rule 8.308 of the California Rules of Court, his conviction became final sixty days

later, on March 18, 2003. Accordingly, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period ended

on March 18, 2004, eleven years and nineteen days before he filed his federal habeas

petition in this Court on April 6, 2015. 

Petitioner also did not set forth any colorable basis for statutory or equitable

tolling of the deadline. His untimely state petitions did not toll the AEDPA limitations

period under § 2244(d)(2). See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005). 

Petitioner asserted in his traverse thatstate-created impediments extended the deadline,

that he did not discover the factual basis for his claims until a date that would have

made his petition untimely, and that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control

warrant equitable tolling. (Doc. No. 24 at 6.) But he did not provide any factual basis

for those assertions or identify any external forces that prevented him from filing on

time. See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When external

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forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). 

Petitioner does not dispute that his petition is untimely. Instead, he asserts that

he is excused from compliance with the limitations period under Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298 (1995), and Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), because he is

actually innocent. (Doc. No. 29 at 2–4.) Petitioner claims that he was acting in selfdefense and that there was insufficient evidence because the victim had passed away

by the time he accepted the plea. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) “To establish actual innocence,

petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623

(internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner has not satisfied that requirement. 

Additionally, the Court notes that Petitioner accepted the plea and stipulated that

the facts in the law-enforcement files provided an adequate factual basis for the plea,

(Lodg. No. 11 at 52), and that at least four officers were involved in the scuffle, (Lodg.

No. 6 at 3–4). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the petition because it is untimely and

Petitioner has not established any colorable basis for statutory or equitable tolling or

for his claim that he is actually innocent. 

B. The Custody Requirement

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), federal courts “shall entertain an application for

a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States.” Courts have construed this provision to mean

that federal courts have jurisdiction over a petition only if the petitioner is “under the

conviction orsentence under attack at the time his petition isfiled.” Bailey v. Hill, 599

F.3d 976, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2010). Physical custody is not always necessary, and courts

have found that certain other restraints on liberty not shared by the public generally can

support jurisdiction over a habeas petition. See id. at 979. “The boundary that limits

the in custody requirement is the line between a restraint on liberty and a collateral

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consequence of a conviction.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

While Petitioner isstill in custody for his earlier crime, he was not in custody for

the battery when he filed his petition in 2015. He was sentenced to serve three years

for the battery on January 17, 2003, and the sentence ran concurrentlywith the sentence

he was already serving. (Lodg. No. 8.) Accordingly, his sentence for the battery ended

in 2006. 

In his objection, Petitioner claims that the battery conviction has prevented him

fromobtaining relief under the Three StrikesReformAct of 2012 (“TSRA”), California

Penal Code § 1170.126. (Doc. No. 29 at 4.) The TSRA made certain nonviolent

offenders with three strikes eligible for resentencing as second-strike offenders. See

People v. White, 223 Cal. App. 4th 512, 517 (2014). Similarly, in his traverse,

Petitioner argued that he faces collateral consequences as a result of the 2003 battery

conviction, including the prospect of harsher punishment at a later date. (Doc. No. 24

at 4–5). 

Neither contention establishes that Petitioner is still in custody for the battery

conviction. A prisoner is not in custody on an earlier conviction “merely because of

the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed

for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,

492 (1989). And, even if an expired prior conviction was used to enhance a different

sentence, subject to certain exceptions that do not apply here, the expired conviction 4

cannot be challenged in habeas if it “is no longer open to direct or collateral attack

in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were

available.” Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted). That is the case here. Petitioner never appealed

his battery conviction and his collateral attack is more than a decade too late. 

The Court in Lackawanna identified three possible exceptions: (1) where there 4

was a failure to appoint counsel for the prior conviction, (2) where the state court,

without justification, refused to rule on a properly presented constitutional claim, and

(3) where the Petitioner obtained compelling evidence of his actual innocence after the

time for direct or collateral review has expired. See 532 U.S. at 404–05. 

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Even if the Court were to construe the petition as a challenge to the sentence

Petitioner is presently serving based on the theory that it was retroactively enhanced

by the battery conviction and the TSRA, see Allen v. Oregon, 153 F.3d 1046, 1049–50

(9th Cir. 1998), Petitioner raised that issue for the first time in his objections to the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and he did not provide any information

regarding his current sentence or the status of his request for relief under the TSRA. 

Additionally, while Petitioner challenges the court’s imposition of restitution

fines, fines and orders of restitution are not sufficient to meet § 2254’s jurisdictional

requirements because they lack a sufficient nexus to custody. See Bailey, 599 F.3d

at 979–81. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the petition because Petitioner is no

longer in custody for the relevant conviction and the time for challenging either of his

convictions has long passed. Because the Court dismisses the petition, the Court also

denies Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, (Doc. No. 1), and adopts the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

(Doc. No. 26). The Court also denies a certificate of appealability, as Petitioner

has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 1, 2016

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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