Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01295/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01295-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1295

___________

Dolandon Mack, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Tim Dillon, Patrolman, Little Rock *

Police Department; Jana Rayburn, * [PUBLISHED]

Patrolman, Little Rock Police *

Department; Kathy Trudell, Crime *

Scene Investigator, Little Rock Police *

Department; Roger Swope, Crime *

Scene Investigator, Little Rock Police *

Department; Scott Timmons, Lt., Little *

Rock Police Department; J. C. White, *

Detective, Little Rock Police *

Department; John Does, 1 - 50; City *

of Little Rock, Arkansas, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 5, 2010

Filed: February 10, 2010

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

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1

Mack also named John Does, but on appeal he raises no issues concerning

these defendants, who were never identified; he also does not challenge the dismissal

of defendants Roger Swope or Kathy Trudell. 

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Federal inmate Dolandon Mack appeals following the district court’s adverse

grant of summary judgment, and its denial of reconsideration, in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

In a verified amended complaint, Mack sought damages and declaratory and

injunctive relief against the City of Little Rock (City), and employees of its police

department, including officers Tim Dillon and Jana Rayburn, detective J.C. White,

and Lieutenant Scott Timmons.1

 He claimed a Fourth Amendment violation, and a

conspiracy to conceal the violation. His claims arose from allegations concerning

injuries he sustained when Dillon and Rayburn shot at him as he was fleeing after an

armed robbery; and from the ensuing investigation of the incident. 

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissal of Rayburn for

insufficient service of process. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (if defendant is not served

within 120 days after filing of complaint court--on motion, or on its own after notice

to plaintiff--must dismiss action without prejudice); Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA,

Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286-88 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (litigant proceeding in forma

pauperis (IFP) is entitled to rely on service by federal marshals, where failure of

marshals to effectuate service is through no fault of litigant, but IFP plaintiff may not

remain silent and do nothing once he receives notice of failure to effectuate service);

see also Edwards v. Edwards, 754 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (no

abuse of discretion where 170 days had passed between filing of complaint and

dismissal, and plaintiff was warned of dismissal should he not serve defendants). We

are troubled, however, by the court’s failure to address Mack’s subsequent challenge

to the dismissal--especially given that Rayburn later provided an affidavit which

reflected that she and Dillon were married, so that Rayburn’s whereabouts clearly

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2

The amendment to Rule 56(c) effective December 1, 2009, requires a response

to summary judgment motion within twenty-one days of service. 

-3-

were known to defendants. Nevertheless, Rule 4(m) dismissals are without prejudice,

and on remand Mack can reassert his claim against Rayburn and attempt to serve her.

As to the grant of summary judgment, this court reviews de novo, viewing the

record and drawing all fair inferences from it in a light most favorable to Mack. See

Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006). We disagree with Mack’s

contention that the district court was required to hold a hearing before granting

defendants’ motion, see McCormack v. Citibank, N.A., 100 F.3d 532, 541 (8th Cir.

1996) (summary judgment hearing is not required absent prior request), but we are

troubled by the court’s failure to address the merits, and its apparent grant of summary

judgment based solely on the lack of a response from Mack, see United States v. One

Parcel of Real Property, Located at 9638 Chicago Heights, St. Louis, Mo., 27 F.3d

327, 329 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure to respond to summary judgment motion does not

automatically compel resolution in favor of moving party; reviewing court must still

determine whether entry of summary judgment was appropriate); John v. Louisiana,

757 F.2d 698, 707-08 (5th Cir. 1985) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 clearly commands that

nonmoving party need not respond to summary judgment motion unless moving party

discharges initial burden; holding that summary judgment cannot be supported solely

on ground that nonmoving party failed to respond to motion). And while the court

was not required to notify Mack when he was required to respond, see Jacobsen v.

Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-66 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting pro se litigant’s assertion that

it was district court’s duty to advise him of measures he should take in opposing

defendants’ summary judgment motion), the terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(c) applicable at the time required only that a response be filed “before the hearing

day” (no hearing was noticed),2

 and the local rule requirement for a response to be

filed within eleven days puts a pro se plaintiff incarcerated out of state at great

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disadvantage, see Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 1987) (local

rules may not conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

Nonetheless, even considering Mack’s verified complaint allegations, see

Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (for summary

judgment purposes, verified complaint is equivalent of affidavit), there were no

trialworthy issues concerning whether City’s police department had an official policy,

custom, or practice of using excessive force during arrests, and neither his objections

below nor his brief on appeal identify any evidence of such. See Moyle v. Anderson,

571 F.3d 814, 817-18 (8th Cir. 2009) (municipal liability under § 1983); cf. Allen v.

Entergy Corp., 181 F.3d 902, 905-06 (8th Cir. 1999) (conclusory affidavits devoid of

specific factual allegations rebutting moving party’s evidence cannot defeat summary

judgment motion). Further, there was no basis for section 1983 claims against

defendants Timmons and White, who were solely involved in various aspects of the

investigation of the shooting, cf. Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir.

1999) (even if it was assumed as true that there were shortcomings in investigation

into shooting, shortcomings would not prove flawed investigation was moving force

behind deputies’ alleged misconduct or caused them to use excessive force); and

Mack’s complaint allegations were insufficient to state a section 1983 conspiracy

claim, see Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (allegation of

conspiracy to provide false testimony was conclusory and failed to state conspiracy

claim, which requires allegations of specific facts showing meeting of minds among

alleged conspirators).

In contrast, we find genuine issues of material fact concerning whether

defendant Dillon’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting him, without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.

See Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2009) (reasonableness of

officer’s use of force is evaluated by looking at totality of circumstances, including

severity of crime, whether suspect poses immediate threat to safety of officers or

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3

The videotape from Dillon’s patrol car shows nothing verifying either the

officers’ or Mack’s version of the incident. 

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others, and whether suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade by flight;

where suspect poses no immediate threat to officer and no threat to others, harm

resulting from not apprehending him does not justify use of deadly force). Mack

declared that Dillon began shooting immediately after directing him to freeze,

although Mack was not holding his gun in his hand; and that when he fled due to the

shooting, Dillon’s shots struck him. Dillon’s version of the incident differed from

Mack’s. Dillon did not attest as to whether he saw Mack holding a gun inside the

store, but he attested that Mack was holding a gun when he exited the store, that Mack

ignored directions to stop and turned toward Dillon, making Dillon believe Mack was

going to shoot, and that Dillon did not believe he actually hit Mack until they were

both behind the store and Rayburn was involved. See Wilson v. City of Des Moines,

Iowa, 293 F.3d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 2002) (when suspect threatens officer with weapon

and there is probable cause to believe he has committed crime involving inflicting or

threatened infliction of serious physical harm, use of deadly force is warranted if

necessary to prevent escape and if, where feasible, some warning is given). The

videotape from Rayburn’s patrol car3

 appears to support Mack’s version that Dillon

kept shooting as Mack fled down the side of the store, and that (at least when he was

in the back of the store) he was not holding anything in his hand. Cf. Moore v.

Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir. 2008) (use of excessive force against unarmed

man who was simply fleeing from officers was unreasonable and Fourth Amendment

violation). Defendants’ own evidence also presents trialworthy issues as to whether

Dillon’s use of deadly force once he chased Mack to the area behind the store were

warranted. It does not appear from the videotape that Mack had anything in his hand

at the time, and Dillon’s and Rayburn’s attestations differ as to what happened after

Mack was hit by Rayburn’s car: both attested that Mack turned toward them at an

angle (which would seem impossible, given that the officers were coming from

different directions) and that they were forced to shoot him because he appeared to be

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holding a gun and it was necessary to protect both officers. Further, Dillon’s

attestation that Mack was ten feet behind Rayburn’s car when he attempted to get back

up and turned toward Dillon is not supported by the videotape. Also, this is not a case

involving a de minimis injury, see Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir.

2006) (minor bruises and scrapes and temporary aggravation of previous shoulder

condition were de minimis injuries that supported conclusion that officer did not use

excessive force against arrestee), as the parties do not dispute that Mack’s leg had to

be amputated after the shooting.

Finally, while the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying without

prejudice Mack’s motion for counsel, see Phillips v. Jasper County Jail, 437 F.3d 791,

794 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review; relevant criteria), appointment of counsel

may be warranted on remand to effectuate service of process on Rayburn and to

prepare for trial or to prepare a response to any additional summary judgment motion

defendants might file. Accordingly, we affirm all but the grant of summary judgment

to defendant Dillon, we clarify that the dismissal of defendant Rayburn was without

prejudice, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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