Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02150/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCANVINSKI HYMES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J. McGRATH, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-2150 SI

FINDINGS OFFACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW

This matter came on for court trial, the parties having waived a jury, in November 2004. Live

testimony was taken and exhibits, including videotape of various incidents at Pelican Bay, were received on

November 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 22, 2004. In addition, deposition testimony was submitted to the Court

for review after trial proceedings were completed. Having considered the evidence received and having

evaluated the credibility and demeanor ofthe witnesses while testifying, the Court hereby makes the following

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

By way of introduction, the Court observes that throughout this action, plaintiff’s core contention has

been that while he was an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison “he was forcibly medicated with psychotropic

drugs as a result of a conspiracy among the defendants on two separate occasions. This conspiracy was

created and implemented out of defendants’ frustration in dealing with plaintiff’s oppositional stance towards

custody.” Plaintiff’s Proposed Statement of Facts and Conclusions of Law (“Pl’s Findings”), at 1. Having

heard all the witnesses in this action, including plaintiff’s extensive testimony and the testimony of numerous

treating physicians, psychiatric workers, medicalpersonneland other correctionalofficials, the Court does not
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find that there was a conspiracy as alleged. It is true that plaintiff took an “oppositional stance towards

custody” – he testified to as much, and the evidence of this attitude was extensive. It is also true, as various

witnesses stated and as the Court observed, that plaintiff is a bright, articulate and engaging man who can be

charming when he wishes to be. But there was substantial testimony that plaintiff could be, and often was,

explosive, violent, physically dangerous to others and extremely disruptive in the close confines of a prison

setting. 

Plaintiff explained that most of his behavior was intended to demonstrate that he had no respect for

people in uniform. He recalls informing “custody” – the custodial staff – that “we were at war,” and that any

time they tried to open his cell door, there would be problems. He did not deny that he violated Pelican Bay

rules over 100 times, but stated that it was always volitional. He chose to act out because he felt that the CDC

had abused him, not just in Pelican Bay but for many years; he has a long memory and sometimes retaliated

years later. He had previously been sent to Atascadero for treatment after having been found incompetent to

stand trial. While there, he sustained at least one felony conviction for assaultive behavior, which he explained

by saying he “did what he had to do” (stabbed anRN with a sharpened toothbrush) when a cell extractionwas

being performed. He testified that after he acts out, he feels better – he has done what he has to do and has

made his point. He testified that he feels that he is always in control of himself, even though it might look like

he is not. He emphasized that he did not want a “psych jacket” – did not want to be in the CDC mental health

system – because “the only thing I have left is my mind.” He did not want to lose his own identity and control.

At the same time, he sometimes stipulated to being “NGI” – not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetent to

stand trial, because it would cause “delay.” 

Captain Daniel Smith, one of the defendants in the case, testified that plaintiff is personable when he

is rational: he is bright and has a good sense ofhumor; but he views acting out as his job. Dr. Ronald Bortman,

another defendant, testified that he thought that without treatment, plaintiff was heading for a destiny of life in

prison, most of it to be spent in the SHU; he thought this was “tragic,” since he felt plaintiff had a treatable

mental illness. 

It was in this contextthatmedicaland psychiatric personnelat PelicanBaymade effortsto treat plaintiff.

Not all ofthe treaters agreed on the correct diagnosis for plaintiff, but all recognized substantial and dangerous
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mental conditions. Ultimately, the treatment team devised a treatment “plan” for Mr. Hymes. What they

characterized as a treatment plan plaintiff characterizes as a conspiracy. Having heard the evidence, the Court

finds that the treatment planwas just that – a plan developed in good faith to treat a puzzling, contradictory and

unpredictable situation. Thatthere were medicaldisagreements among the treaters reflects the difficulty of the

problem presented, not a conspiracy to administer involuntary medication.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Background: plaintiff and defendants

1. Plaintiff is an African American male who was born on February 15, 1970. He spent much

of his childhood in foster care, had his first contact with the criminal justice system at age 9, and was first

incarcerated at age 14. Since then he has been in prison intermittently, in large part because of offenses

committed as a prisoner against custody.

2. The actions at issue in this case occurred while plaintiff was an inmate at Pelican Bay State

Prison, between 1995 and 2001. Defendants in this action are Dr. Ronald Bortman, a psychiatrist at Pelican

Bay State Prison; Teresa Schwartz, who was Associate Warden for the general population at Pelican Bay

during most of the time relevant to this case and, at time oftrial, was Warden ofthe California MedicalFacility

at Vacaville; and Captain DanielSmith, who was Facility Captain incharge ofthe Security Housing Unit (SHU)

during much of the time relevant here and was, at the time of trial, Associate Warden in charge of business

services at Pelican Bay.

3. During this time at Pelican Bay State Prison, plaintiff was regularly housed in the institution’s

Security Housing Unit (SHU). He was a serious disciplinary problem: between January 6, 1998 and May 20,

2001, he had over a hundred charged disciplinary incidents, including batteries on peace officers, willfully

resisting, delaying, obstructing peace officers, threat of force or violence, Destruction/Damage/Misuse of State

Property, and indecent exposures. Plaintiff’s assaults on correctional staff led to injury to, and early retirement

of, several correctional officers.

4. Plaintiff had been actively litigious, having filed between six and eight federal lawsuits so far.

In 1996 he filed three civil rights actions in federal court against various custody officers at Pelican Bay and
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received a $60,000 settlement on one ofthem. He had filed dozens of internal inmate appeals (form 602s) and

was, in his own estimation, a “very high profile inmate.”

5. Priorto 1995, plaintiff had been seen and evaluated by many mentalhealth professionals, none

of whom to that point had determined that he suffered from a mental illness that was properly treated with

psychotropic medication. Between 1995 and April, 1999, plaintiff was seen or evaluated by numerous mental

health professionals at PelicanBay. There was no consensus on a diagnosis. Plaintiff testified that although he

had not been suicidal since 1992, he occasionally pretended to be suicidal, for manipulative purposes and

because it “made him laugh.” At one point he pretended to take an overdose of medications, and several times

he hid razor blades and pretended to have swallowed them. He also testified that he sometimes has

manipulated staff with false claims of chest pain.

B. Mental health facilities/regulations at Pelican Bay State Prison

6. The Psychiatric Services Unit (PSU) at Pelican Bay was created as a result of the case of

Madrid v. Gomez, No. C 90-3094 THE (N.D. Cal.), forthe purpose ofdealing with Pelican Bay inmates who

normally would be housed in the Security Housing Unit (SHU) but who, because they have certain mental

health conditions, are at a particularly high risk ofserious injury to mentalhealth by virtue ofsuch housing. Such

inmates must be removed from the SHU, and the PSU provides the alternative housing. The Madrid remedial

order specifically identifies those at risk individuals as including either inmates with an Axis I diagnosis, or the

following: 

(1) inmates with a mental disorder that includes being actively suicidal; 

(2) inmates diagnosed with a serious mental illness characterized by breaks with reality or

perceptions of reality that lead the inmate to significant functional impairment; 

(3) inmates diagnosed with an organic brain syndrome that results in significant functional

impairment if not treated; 

(4) inmates diagnosed with a severe personality disorder manifested by episodes of psychosis

or depression, and results in significant functional impairment; or 

(5) inmates with mental retardation with significant functional impairment. 

7. The goalofthe PSU is to provide evaluationand treatment ofmental health conditions that are

limiting the ability ofinmates with high security needs to adjust to appropriate institutionalplacements. Program

objectives of the PSU include: (1) providing comprehensive mental health assessment of inmates to determine

the need for treatment and appropriate clinicalplacement; (2) providing alternative housing for inmates whose
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mental health needs limit their ability to adjust to the SHU; (3) providing clinical interventions to reduce the

inmate’s level of dangerousness and allowing re-integration into less restrictive clinical and custodial

environments; and (4) assisting inmates in acquiring skills to function more safely and successfully in an

appropriate institutional placement. 

8. PelicanBay PSU policy provides that inmates housed in the SHU may be referred by any staff

member for an assessment of mentalhealth needs. The normal time for clinical assessment for those referred

to the PSU is 14 days, but that this periodmaybe extended with the approvalofthe applicable Interdisciplinary

Treatment Team (IDTT).

9. Every inmate treated by the MentalHealth Department -- including plaintiff -- has a Treatment

Plan which is periodically discussed and reviewed by an Interdisciplinary Treatment Team (IDTT). The

purpose of a Treatment Plan formentalhealth inmates is to facilitate the goals and objectives ofthe Psychiatric

Services Unit. In particularly difficult cases the Chief Psychiatrist may be involved in Treatment Plan

discussions. Custodial staff familiar with the inmate are also involved in the discussions, since they can provide

information regarding the inmate’s behavior and conduct. 

10. State prisoners cannot be involuntarily medicated unless Keyhea provisions are followed so

named based on an injunction issued in Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526 (1986). Pursuant to the

Keyhea injunction, prison officials may not administer involuntary medication to state prison inmates in excess

ofthree days unless certain conditions for certification of additionaltreatment are met. Pursuant to the Keyhea

injunction, a certification hearing must be held within ten days of the initial involuntary medication.

11. The Keyhea injunctiondoes not prohibit emergencyadministrationofantipsychotic medication.

An emergency exists when there is a sudden marked change in the prisoner’s condition so that action is

immediately necessary for the preservation of life or the prevention of serious bodily harm to the patient or to

others, and it is impracticable to first obtain consent. If the medication is administered during an emergency,

such medication shall be only that which is required to treat the emergency condition and shall be provided in

ways that are least restrictive of the personal liberty of the patient.

C. Plaintiff’s treatment plan
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12. Dr. Bortman began working at Pelican Bay in March 1999. In July, 1999, Dr. Bortman

recommended to the plaintiff’sIDTT that plaintiff be referred to the PSU for a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff

contends that this referral was the first step in the conspiracy to medicate him involuntarily. However, Dr.

Bortman testified, credibly in the Court’s view, that this referralwas based on his diagnosis that plaintiff has a

mental illness, perhaps bi-polar disorder, and his medical opinion that plaintiff might benefit from a more

thorough evaluationand possible treatment at the PSU. By the time of this referral, Dr. Bortman had reviewed

much of plaintiff’s voluminous medical file, had spoken with Associate Warden Teresa Schwartz and other

custodialofficials about plaintiff and had conducted a brief interview with plaintiff. It was his “sense” that there

was disagreement among the various medical and other personnel as to what the correct diagnosis should be,

but he felt there clearly was a mental health disorder. Plaintiff was transferred to the PSU in July, 1999 and

stayed through September. He was evaluated there, including an extensive psychological evaluation by Tod

A. Roy, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist. Dr. Roy’s 9/1/99 report (Ex. #22) concluded that plaintiff is

behaviorally disordered, was demonstrating progressive development of a psychopathic personality, with a

“personality organizationwhich uses aggression to express []identityand satisfy needs [] with a callousnessthat

is completely self-serving.” Dr. Roy opined that “Hymes cannot respond to traditional treatment . . . because

he will not respond and cannot in effect change his behavior.” He concluded that “it would be a disservice to

the PSU to have this inmate remain in the unit due to his severe character pathology,” as he “is not treatment

amenable.” Plaintiff was thereafter released back to the SHU.

 13. Dr. Everett Allen was first hired by PBSP as a contract physician/surgeon in March of 1999

(he characterized this as a “doc-in-the-box” position). In February, 2000 he was hired by PBSP as a staff

physician/surgeon; on July 7, 2000, he was promoted to the position ofChief Physician and Surgeon. He had

substantial contacts with other medical professionals as well as custody staff. Dr. Allen was the primary

medicaldoctor at the SHU infirmary during much ofthe time relevant to this action, and dealt withplaintiffoften.

Plaintiff made many complaints to medical staff regarding chest pains, and Dr. Allen became involved in

plaintiff’s treatment to try to provide an objective medicaldiagnosis ofplaintiff’s coronary health, as well as to

attempt to minimize some of the disruptive contact plaintiff had with custody and staff.
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D. The Keyhea procedures: 4/27/00 and 4/10/01

14. The central events ofplaintiff’s conspiracy allegations are two instances ofinvoluntary medication

using Keyhea procedures. Both were initiated by Dr. Bortman.

 15. On July 27, 2000, plaintiff lay down and refused to cooperate with custody officers who were

moving him from one cell to another. He told them “It’s on,” meaning he would fight the custody officers.

When officers attempted to lift him off the ground he violently kicked, attempting to getfree, and yelled threats.

 He testified that he was in control of himself the whole time, although it might have looked like he was out of

controlto observers. Much of this incident was captured on videotape, which was admitted in evidence (Ex.

63) Three officers were assaulted, two of whom were taken to the hospital for treatment. 

16. The Admission Summary and Notice of Certification relating to plaintiff’sfirst certification for

involuntary medication (the first Keyhea) was prepared by Dr. Bortman on July 27, 2000 (Ex. 65, 215). This

was based on plaintiff’s assaultive behavior and the injury to three officers. On that date, Dr. Bortman

medicated plaintiff with Haldoland other medications, on an emergency basis. Dr. Bortman testified credibly

at trialthat he wanted plaintiffto get appropriate psychiatric and medical treatment for his condition, which he

then believed might be bipolar disorder with rapid cycling, and he felt Depakote would be appropriate

treatment. He was aware that nurse CyndiScott disagreed with his decision to place plaintiffin restraints, but

felt her behavior was inappropriate. On July 28, 2000, John Douglas, M.D., took over for Dr. Bortman, who

was on vacation. At that point, plaintiff agreed to voluntarily take Depakote and the Keyhea process was

terminated. Dr. Douglas believed plaintiff’s Axis I diagnosis should be “intermittent explosive disorder,” rather

than bipolar disorder, but he did not have any reason to question Dr. Borton’s good faith belief in his bipolar

diagnosis. Dr. Allen also saw plaintiff at this time, and worked with Dr. Douglas to persuade plaintiff to take

the Depakote. Dr. Allen thought it possible that plaintiff had a seizure disorder.

17. On July 28, 2000, SHU clinician Delbert Costiloe, LCSW, signed a document which

contained his Axis I diagnosis ofplaintiff(R/O Mood Disorder NOS, versus Cognitive Disorder NOS). (Ex.

223) Mr. Costiloe believed that plaintiff needed treatment based on his assaultive, disruptive behavior

 18. Plaintiff took the Depakote for approximately six weeks (July 28, 2000 - September 12,

2000), during which time his behavior improved significantly. He testified at trial that he agreed to take the
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Depakote to show themthat it would not controlhim, but he acknowledged that while he was taking it he was

letting things slide that ordinarily he wouldn’t give the officersthe benefit of. On September 12, 2000, plaintiff

refused to continue taking the Depakote, because he did not want to “get a psych jacket.” Dr. Allenadvised

him to keep taking the medication.

19. In February, 2001, plaintiff began having incidents in the SHU again. He testified that he

wanted to “irk” the staff, so he began kicking his cell, doing considerable damage. He placed razor blades in

his mouth, and when officerstried to get themback he kicked themand thrashed violently while being subdued.

 Also in February 2001, plaintiff decided to plead NGI to a case pending against him in Del Norte County.

Sometime before April, 2001 Dr. Bortman was subpoenaed to testify about plaintiff at the NGI hearing. 

20. On April 10, 2001, plaintiff destroyed a telephone after an attorney visit. Later that day, he

assaulted Correctional Sergeant Anthony VanNocker while being transported to a holding cell. Thereafter,

plaintiff was taken to the infirmary and evaluated. The second Notice of Certification for involuntary medication

(second Keyhea) was signed by staff psychologist Robert Levine, Ph.D., on April 10, 2001, as the evaluating

physician, and was signed by Dr. Bortman, as the chiefpsychiatrist or his designee (Ex. 220; see also 99, 100,

and 221). On the Notice, Dr. Levine and/or Dr. Bortman checked the box that plaintiff Hymes was a danger

to others. The Notice states: “Plaintiff repeatedly assaulted staff resulting in injury to staff . . . unable to control

assaultive behavior. He is mentally ill and refusing voluntary medication.” Plaintiff was involuntarily medicated

with Depakote, Haldol and other medications. 

21. Dr. Wendy Saville, Chief Psychiatrist at PBSP, performed an independent psychiatric evaluation

ofplaintiff on April 12, 2001, at the request of her supervisor (CMO Dr. Winslow). She determined that Dr.

Bortman’s Keyhea in April of 2001 was warranted and proper, although she reached a different Axis I

diagnosis ofplaintiff. (Ex. 104, 222) On April 17, 2001, plaintiff was discharged to the PSU by Dr. Bortman,

for evaluation by the Treatment Team. (Ex. 106) Dr. Roy evaluated him, and on May 8, 2001 issued a report

finding that although plaintiff had an Axis II “antisocial personality disorder, severe, psychopathic variant,” he

had no AxisI disordermeetingSHU exclusioncriteria. (Ex. 111) Thereafter, plaintiff was returned to the SHU,

where he continued his “oppositional conduct” toward custody.
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E. Staff evaluations of plaintiff

22. All of the trained professionals who performed formal evaluations of plaintiff over the years

agreed that he suffers from some psychiatric diagnosis, or mental illness. However, they differed in their

identification of the diagnosis, ranging from bipolar disorder (Dr. Bortman), to Provisional-Mood Disorder

NOS (Dr. Saville and D. Costiloe, LCSW), to personality disorder (all psychiatrists and psychologists), and

to explosive disorder (Dr. Douglas). There was substantial disagreement among mental health specialists

concerning the psychological/psychiatric Axis I diagnosis, but far less disagreement concerning the Axis II

diagnosis of plaintiff Hymes. Except Dr. Roy, all agreed that Depakote was an appropriate medication for

plaintiff.

23. All of the psychologists and psychiatrists who testified in this action (Dr. Bortman, Dr. Saville,

Dr. Roy and Dr. Douglas) confirmed that such disagreements in diagnosis are common at Pelican Bay State

Prison. Further, each of the mental health specialists who testified (Dr. Douglas, Dr. Saville and Dr. Roy)

stated that he or she had no reason to doubt that Dr. Bortman’s diagnosis of plaintiff was made in good faith.

Dr. Bortman testified credibly that he believed, and believes, his diagnosis was correct. 

24. None ofthe mentalhealthspecialistswho testifiedhad any reason to believe that Dr. Bortman’s

diagnosis of plaintiff, or his initiations of the Keyhea procedure in July of 2000 or April of 2001, were a part

of any plan or scheme or conspiracy with custody to have plaintiff removed from the SHU. 

25. Defendant Smith, a facilitycaptain ofthe SHU, requested that a psych evaluation be performed

on plaintiff based on Smith’s good-faith concerns arising from plaintiff’s behavior and prior claims of mental

illness. Defendant Smith understood that there was a plan to have plaintiff referred to PSU for an evaluation

based on plaintiff’s unpredictable, disruptive, explosive behavior. Defendant Smith understood this was a

legitimate treatment planput forward by the IDTT. Defendants Smith and Schwartz never conspired to have

plaintiff undergo a Keyhea. Defendants Smith and Schwartz never conspired to recommend referral to PSU

without reason. Dr. Allen’s contrary opinion was based on incomplete information.

26. Dr. Bortman’s decisions to initiate treatment of plaintiff with psychotropic medications on July

27, 2000 and April 10, 2001 were based his genuine medical judgment that such treatment was appropriate

under the circumstances. 
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27. The Court found the defendants’ testimony in this case to be credible. The differing diagnoses

of plaintiff’s condition reflected the complicated nature of the condition, not a conspiracy against him. The

Court found no evidence of deliberately incorrect medical opinions concerning plaintiff’s condition.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Plaintiff has not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant Bortman,

defendant Smith or defendant Schwartz deliberately violated any ofthe proceduralrequirements orsubstantive

standards of the Keyhea provisions or the Madrid protocol, in connection with any recommendations for

plaintiff’s referral to the PSU or on those two occasions where plaintiff was involuntarily medicated. 

2. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, plaintiff was required to prove, by a preponderance ofthe evidence,

that (1) there was a conspiracy whose purpose was to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection or equal

privileges and immunities, or to obstruct the course of justice in the state; (2) that the defendants intended to

discriminate against the plaintiff; (3) that the defendants acted under color of state law and authority; and (4)

that the acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy resulted in an injury to the plaintiff's person or property or

prevented him fromexercising a right or privilege of a United States citizen. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88 (1971); Skolnick v. Campbell, 398 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.

1959). Plaintiff has not done so, because plaintiff did not prove any agreement, or meeting of minds, between

among the parties, to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

3. Plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any treatment provided by Dr.

Bortman to plaintiff violated plaintiff’s constitutionalorstatutory rights. Dr. Bortman did not act with deliberate

indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), nor did that

treatment amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or California Civil Code

§ 52.1. The difference of opinion between Dr. Bortman and plaintiff concerning the appropriate course of

treatment for plaintiff does not amount to deliberate indifference,Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th

Cir.1996); nordoesthe difference ofopinion between Dr. Bortman and other medicalprofessionals concerning

the appropriate course of treatment for plaintiff. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.1989).

4. Plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any action on the part of
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defendants Smith or Schwartz violated plaintiff’s federal constitutional or California statutory rights.

5. Plaintiff has not proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant Bortman,

defendant Smith or defendant Schwartz acted maliciously and sadistically forthe very purpose of causing harm

to plaintiff, or conspired to do so.

6. Plaintiff did notsustain any injuryordamage orharmas a result of any improper act or omission

on the part of any defendant. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2005

_________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge