Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01097/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01097-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN J. STROTHER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1097 GEB GGH P

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action is proceeding on the amended petition

filed February 9, 2006. Petitioner challenges his 2003 conviction for illegal wiretapping, Cal.

Penal Code § 632(a). For this conviction, petitioner was placed on felony probation. Petitioner

alleges that the trial court’s failure to give a necessity defense jury instruction deprived him of his

right to present a defense. After carefully considering the record, the court recommends that the

petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

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138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The AEDPA “worked

substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential standards of

review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication of a criminal

defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

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The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review

without comment or citation. Respondent’s July 19, 2005, lodged document no. 8. The

California Court of Appeal issued a reasoned decision, but did not address the constitutional

issue. Respondent’s July 19, 2005, lodged document no. 6. Rather, the California Court of

Appeal applied state law only in addressing petitioner’s claim. Id. Accordingly, this court must

independently review the record to determine whether the denial of petitioner’s claim by the

silent California Supreme Court decision was objectively unreasonable. 

III. Background

The factual and procedural background is summarized in the opinion of 

California Court of Appeal lodged on July 18, 2005. After independently reviewing the record,

the court finds this summary to be accurate and adopts it below.

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Before the events that gave rise to his prosecution, defendant lived with his wife

(Christine), their three-year-old daughter S., and Christine’s three older daughters

from prior relationships: J. (age 10), Ma. (age 7) and Me. (age 16).

Defendant’s marriage to Christine was troubled, and Christine’s extramarital

affair with a man named Ron contributed to the tension.

After defendant confronted Christine about the affair and they began to discuss

divorce, Christine and defendant continued to share the house, but defendant

moved into the basement. A day or two later, Christine found a photograph of

defendant taken with her daughter J. (defendant’s stepdaughter), in which J. had

torn the image in half and scratched out the face and crotch portions of defendant

in the photograph. Christine asked J. if defendant had ever touched her

inappropriately, and J. said, “no.” About the same time, Christine filed for

divorce.

Shortly thereafter, Christine discovered a recording device connected to a tape

recorder: On the tape were recorded telephone conversations between Christine

and Ron, as well as conversations to which defendant was a party.

Notwithstanding J.’s denials that she had been molested, Christine continued to

harbor “a suspicion...that maybe [defendant] had done something to her.” 

Eventually, J. reported to Christine that defendant had molested her, and

defendant was arrested.

Defendant was charged with two counts of committing a lewd act upon a child

under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), and

one count of felony eavesdropping, in violation of Penal Code section 632,

subdivision (a).

At trial, defendant denied molesting J., but admitted recording telephone

conversations at the house. He testified that, although he initially bought the

recording device to preserve advice during conversations with his out-of-state

attorney, he continued recording because he “just wanted to know what was going

on between Christine and her love, as concern for my daughter and her safety.” 

His motivation, he testified, was to “gather information because I was in fear for

the safety of my daughter and her upbringing” and he wanted to ensure that he got

custody.

Defendant also testified he learned from Christine that Ron had a gun. Later,

while eavesdropping on Christine’s conversations with Ron, he heard “ a threat

...involving a gun.” Defendant then contacted the county’s victim assistance

program in an unsuccessful effort to obtain a restraining order preventing Ron

from coming to the house where defendant Christine continued to live; he testified

he was concerned that Ron might bring weapons to the house. When defendant

spoke to sheriff’s deputies around the time of his arrest, he told them his

“concerns involving Ron” coming to the house, but did not tell them he was

concerned about his physical safety because he knew he had obtained information

about the threat illegally.

\\\\\

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The jury acquitted defendant of the molestation charges, and convicted him of

eavesdropping.

Respondent’s Lodged July 18, 2005, lodged document no. 6, pp. 2-4.

IV. Discussion

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s failure to give a necessity defense

instruction violated his right to present a defense. The California Court of Appeal denied this

claim for the following reasons:

At trial, defendant asked the court to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity

with CALJIC No. 4.43 (1998 Rev.)(6th ed. 1996). That instruction provides:

“A person is not guilty of a crime when [he] [she] engages in an act, otherwise

criminal, through necessity. The defendant has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to establish the elements

of this defense, namely:

“1. The act charged as criminal was done to prevent a significant and imminent

evil, namely, [a threat of bodily harm to oneself or another person] [or]...;

“2. There was no reasonable legal alternative to the commission of the act;

“3. The reasonably foreseeable harm likely to be caused by the act was not

disproportionate to the harm avoided;

“4. The defendant entertained a good-faith belief that [his] [her] act was

necessary to prevent the greater harm; 

“5. That belief was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances; and

“6. The defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation of the

emergency.”

The trial court stated it denied defendant’s request because “I don’t think that

there was significant and imminent threat of bodily harm that has been established

in the evidence.”

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in rejecting the instruction,

thereby prejudicially infringing upon his right to a jury determination based on his

theory of the case.

We disagree: The instruction was properly refused.

“California appellate courts have recognized the necessity defense ‘despite the

absence of any statutory articulation of this defense and rulings from the

California Supreme Court that the common law is not a part of the criminal law in

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California.’ [Citation.]” (In re Eichorn (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 32, 388.)

The defense of necessity is “‘founded upon public policy and provides a

justification distinct from the elements required to prove the crime. [Citation.]

The situation presented to the defendant must be of an emergency nature,

threatening physical harm, and lacking an alternative, legal course of action.

[Citation.] The defense involves a determination that the harm or evil sought to be

avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law

defining the offense charged. [Citation.] Necessity does not negate any element of

the crime, but represents a public policy decision not to punish such an individual

despite proof of the crime. [Citations.] [¶] An important factor of the necessity

defense involves the balancing of the harm to be avoided as opposed to the costs

of the criminal conduct. [Citation.]” (In re Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p.

389 [defense of necessity available to rebut charge of illegal camping], quoting

People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 900-901 [noting the defense of

necessity has been recognized in prosecutions for a nonviolent prison escape,

kidnapping, and false imprisonment]; but see People v. Youngblood (2001) 91

Cal.App.4th 66, 72-73 [defense unavailable against charge of animal cruelty] and

People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 241, 242 [necessity no defense to

crimes committed while demonstrating outside abortion clinic].)

A trial judge must instruct on the law applicable to the facts of the case, and a

defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense, but

the judge must only give those instructions which are supported by substantial

evidence, and must refuse instructions on a defense theory for which there is no

supporting evidence. (People v. Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1386; see

also People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 558 .) “The standard for evaluating

the sufficiency of the evidentiary foundation [to support a necessity instruction] is

whether a reasonable jury, accepting all the evidence as true, could find the

defendant’s actions justified by necessity. [Citation.]” (People v. Trippet (1997)

56 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539, citing People v. Slack (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 937,

941.)

In rejecting defendant’s request that the jury be instructed on the necessity defense

with CALJIC No. 4.43, the trial court focused on the first element of the defense

as defined by that instruction, i.e., that defendant must have acted to “prevent a

significant and imminent evil” (italics added). “[A] well-established central

element [of the necessity defense] involves the emergency nature of the situation,

i.e., the imminence of the greater harm which the illegal act seeks to prevent. [Fn.

omitted.]” (People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 960 & fn. 6 [in “[s]ome

formulations of the necessity defense specifically include an ‘imminence’

requirement,” while “[i]n others, the immediacy of the danger becomes a factor in

assessing the reasonableness of the actor’s belief regarding the magnitude of the

‘greater harm’ he seeks to prevent”]; see also In re Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th

at p. 389 [defense available only if the defendant was presented with a situation

“‘of an emergency nature, threatening physical harm, and lacking an alternative,

legal course of action’”]; People v. Beach (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 955, 971 [the

necessity defense “excuses criminal conduct if it is justified by a need to avoid an

imminent peril”].

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Mindful that doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the necessity

instruction should be resolved in favor of the accused (People v. Patrick, supra,

126 Cal.App.3d at p. 961), we nonetheless conclude the factual predicate for

defendant’s claim is insufficient as a matter of law to establish all of the elements

of that defense because no exigent circumstance required him to record

Christine’s conversations.

First, defendant testified his “initial” motivation for installing the recording device

was to preserve his own conversations with counsel, not to avoid harm to himself

or his daughter.

Second, defendant’s concern “for the safety of [his] daughter,” which prompted

him to continue automatically recording every telephone conversation after he

began the practice, arose from his fear that, if he ultimately lost custody of his

daughter in the pending divorce action, her subsequent “upbringing” would

ultimately suffer, not from a fear for her immediate physical safety. Even had the

jury accepted that defendant’s daughter would be imperiled by remaining in her

mother’s care, that evidence did not establish that defendant considered it to pose

an “emergency” situation (cf. In re Eichorn, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 389).

Finally, the evidence failed to establish that defendant recorded Christine’s

conversations to “protect[] [him]self from being murdered” by Christine’s friend,

Ron, as he now argues. 

Even had defendant’s testimony shown that the conversation contained an

imminent threat of bodily harm, which it did not, defendant testified he first heard

about “a threat...involving a gun” while listening to a conversation he had

recorded. This testimony effectively undermined any argument that he engaged in

the illegal eavesdropping because he feared bodily harm at Ron’s hands; at the

most, defendant feared Ron because of what he heard while engaged in illegal

eavesdropping.

Because the evidence offered by defendant was insufficient to permit a reasonable

jury to find that his unlawful eavesdropping “was done to prevent a significant

and imminent evil” (CALJIC No. 4.43), the trial court properly refused to instruct

the jury on the necessity defense.

Respondent’s Lodged July 18, 2005, lodged document no. 6, pp. 2-4.

“Due process requires that criminal prosecutions “comport with prevailing notions

of fundamental fairness” and that “criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to

present a complete defense.” Clark v. Brown, 442 F.3d 708, 714 (9 Cir. 2006), as amended on th

denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, 2006 WL 1462274 (9 Cir. May 30, 2006), quoting th

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984). “When habeas is sought

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ‘[f]ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the case is reversible error

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 The alleged victim’s mother was a member of the District Attorney’s Office. However,

1

even if petitioner’s argued position regarding the lack of evidence for the molestation charges is

true, such alleged overzealousness has nothing to do with the viability of the tape recording

eavesdropping charges.

 Indeed, in reading petitioner’s papers, one gets the impression that because petitioner 2

subjectively thought the eavesdropping to be necessary, he was entitled to argue the necessity

defense. However, a good faith belief is only one of the prerequisites of a necessity defense. 

Clearly, the bulk of evidence which permits one to argue the necessity defense is objective in

nature.

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if the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable.” Id., quoting

Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9 Cir. 2004)(as amended). “A habeas petitioner th

must show that the alleged instructional error ‘had substantial or injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id., quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113

S.Ct. 1710 (1993). 

While understanding petitioner’s plight from a practical perspective, as well as the

argued possibility, small or large, of overzealous prosecution on the molestation charges given

the jury’s expeditious rejection of the prosecution’s case, petitioner misapprehends the law 1

which governs here on the eavesdropping charges. While petitioner has a right to argue a

defense, the defense remains circumscribed by state law. Petitioner still has the requirement of

presenting sufficient evidence to warrant the necessity instruction for all elements of the state law

defense. In light of that evidence, it cannot be reasonably asserted that at the time petitioner

initiated the eavesdropping, or even at any other time, he was in imminent peril of serious bodily

harm. As noted by the state appellate court, petitioner’s initial motivation was not based on a

desire to avoid harm to himself or his daughter. In addition, petitioner feared Ron because of

what he heard while engaged in the illegal eavesdropping, i.e. he did not engage in the

eavesdropping because of his imminent fear of Ron.2

This court notes that petitioner testified that when he was first questioned by

Deputy Sheriff Peay regarding the alleged molestation, he did not mention his safety concerns

regarding Ron. RT at 267. Petitioner did not mention his safety concerns because he knew he

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 Also, the letter is not very probative. What the juror thought might be a legitimate 3

reason to eavesdrop, e.g. cheating wife, may have nothing to do with the requirements of the law

with respect to the necessity defense.

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had obtained this information through an illegal wiretap. RT at 269. Petitioner also testified that

earlier that day, he had been to the Victim-Witness office because he was contemplating filing a

restraining order to keep Ron out of the house. RT at 255. Petitioner testified that he did not go

to the Sheriff’s department regarding these concerns because he was not sure about the legality of

the wiretapping and he wanted to gather more information. RT at 269-270

Petitioner’s testimony that he contemplated filing a restraining order and that he

continued the wiretapping because he was attempting to gather more information does not

suggest that he perceived an imminent threat of bodily harm. That petitioner began the

wiretapping before he knew of the alleged threats from Ron also demonstrates that the

wiretapping was not done to prevent an imminent killing or bodily harm.

Finally, petitioner has also submitted a letter written by a juror to the sentencing

judge. See Petitioner’s Appendix filed June 3, 2005, p. 76. In this letter, the juror states he and

the other jurors felt that petitioner had a legitimate reason for wiretapping. This letter is

inadmissible in these proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).3

After independently reviewing the record, the court finds that the denial of

petitioner’s claim by the California Supreme Court was not an unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court authority.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 6/28/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ggh:kj

str1097.157

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