Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00502/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00502-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Petition to Quiet Title

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Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint was filed in state court on May 11, 2012. (Notice of

Removal, Exh. 1 (Doc. 1-3)). Plaintiff’s action involves property located at HC1 Box 162,

Pearce, Arizona. (Id.). According to Defendant Wells Fargo, the property was sold to

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa S. Jackson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-502-TUC-HCE

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court are: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., (hereinafter “Defendant Wells Fargo”) (Doc. 4); and (2) a Motion to Dismiss

filed by Defendants Michael A. Bosco and Tiffany & Bosco, P.A. (Doc. 5). The Magistrate

Judge does not have full consent of the parties to preside over this case, see 28 U.S.C.

§636(c), therefore, the Magistrate Judge has prepared a Report and Recommendation which

will be directed to District Judge Raner C. Collins. For the following reasons, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and deny the

pending motions to dismiss as moot.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2012, this matter was removed from state court by Defendant Wells Fargo

Bank.1

 (Notice of Removal (Doc. 1)). The civil cover sheet submitted with the Notice of

Case 4:12-cv-00502-HCE Document 22 Filed 10/31/12 Page 1 of 7
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someone other than Plaintiff upon a Trustee’s Sale in March 2012. (Defendant Wells Fargo’s

Motion to Dismiss, pp. 2-3) (Doc. 4)). 

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The Bell Ranch Road address appears on the state court summons. (See Notice of

Removal, Exh. 4 (Doc. 1-6)).

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Removal reflects Plaintiff’s address as 11200 S. Bell Ranch Road, Pearce, AZ 85625

(hereinafter “the Bell Ranch Road address”).2

 (Doc. 1-1). Defendant Wells Fargo indicated

that the Notice of Removal and accompanying exhibits were mailed to Plaintiff at the Bell

Ranch Road Address. (Doc. 1, p.5). The case was assigned to District Judge Cindy K.

Jorgenson. (Doc. 3). Thereafter, on July 13, 2012 Defendant Wells Fargo filed the pending

Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 4). Additionally, Defendants Michael A. Bosco and Tiffany &

Bosco, P.A., also filed their pending Motion to Dismiss on July 13, 2012. (Doc. 5).

Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss were sent to Plaintiff at the Bell Ranch Road

address. (See Docs. 4, 5). On July 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court sent to Plaintiff at the Bell

Ranch Road address, a notice that the case had been reassigned to the undersigned Magistrate

Judge. (Doc. 7). Also, on July 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court sent to Plaintiff at the Bell

Ranch Road address, information and instructions concerning consent to exercise of

jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge and requiring a form be returned to the Court within 14

days. (Doc. 8). On July 25, 2012, the Court issued an Order, sent to Plaintiff at the Bell

Ranch Road address, wherein the Court set a deadline of August 13, 2012 for Plaintiff to

respond to the pending motions to dismiss and advised Plaintiff of her duty to keep the Court

apprised of her current address. (Doc. 9). On August 30, 2012, Defendant Wells Fargo filed

a Request for Summary Disposition of its pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) pursuant to

LRCiv. 7.2(i), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. That

request was sent to Plaintiff at the Bell Ranch Road Address. (Id.). On September 13, 2012,

the envelope containing the notice of reassignment (Doc. 7) was returned to the Court

indicating that the addressee “moved left no address unable to forward.” (Doc. 13).

Review of the record indicates Plaintiff’s address on her Complaint filed in state court

Case 4:12-cv-00502-HCE Document 22 Filed 10/31/12 Page 2 of 7
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and removed to this Court as follows: 

Lisa S. Jackson

In-Care-Of

HC1 Box 162

Pearce, Arizona, 85625

(hereinafter “the HC1 address”) (Notice of Removal, Exh. 1 (Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-

3); see also Notice of Removal, Exh. 4 (Notice of Pendency of Action: Lis Pendens filed by

Plaintiff indicating that recorded documents should be sent to the HC1 address (Doc. 1-6)).

Despite several pieces of Court mail being sent to the Bell Ranch Road address, only

one item has been returned, taking over one month for its return. (Doc. 13). Moreover,

Court mail sent to that address required Plaintiff: (1) to return the enclosed form to the Court

within 14 days of her appearance in the case (Doc. 8); and (2) to submit responses to the

pending motions to dismiss by August 13, 2012 to avoid the Court summarily granting them

under LR Civ. 7.2(i) (Doc. 9). The form was not returned to the Court and no responses to

the motions to dismiss were filed. There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff requested

that mail regarding this action be sent to her at the Bell Ranch Road address. Plaintiff not

having so requested, it is questionable whether she received the mail directed to that address.

Further, in her state filing, Plaintiff indicated the HC1 Address on her Complaint, and that

the Notice of Pendency of Action: Lis Pendens, filed the same day as the Complaint, should

be mailed to her at the HC1 address after it was recorded. (Notice of Removal, Exh. 4 (Doc.

1-6)). The Court notes Defendant Wells Fargo’s statement that the property at the HC1

address was sold upon a Trustee’s Sale in March 2012. (Defendant Wells Fargo’s Motion

to Dismiss, pp. 2-3 (Doc. 4)). Nonetheless, Plaintiff chose to use the HC1 address when she

filed the instant action in state court in May 2012. Therefore, on October 2, 2012, the Court

directed the Clerk of Court to amend the docket to reflect the HC1 address listed on

Plaintiff’s Complaint that had been removed to this Court. (Doc. 14). The Court also

directed that Documents 7 and 8 be re-sent to Plaintiff at that address. Defendants were

granted five days leave to send their Notice of Removal and pending motions to the HC1

address. On October 3, 2012, Defendants filed notices indicating they had served Plaintiff

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with their motions to dismiss at the HC1 address. (Docs. 15, 16). Thereafter, on October

15, 2012, the Court issued an Order advising Plaintiff, inter alia, that if she failed to respond

to Defendants’ motions by November 13, 2012, the Court may deem her failure to file the

required responses as her consent to the granting of the motions. (See Doc. 18 (citing LRCiv

7.2(i)). All Court mail sent to Plaintiff at the HC1 address has been returned to the Court

with indications that delivery was “Attempted-Not Known” (Doc. 19 (return of Docs. 7, 8,

14 on October 16, 2012) or “Attempted-Not Known Unable to Forward” (Docs. 20, 21

(return of Docs. 17, 18 on October 25, 2012)).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has the general duty to prosecute this case. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co.

v. Pioche Mines Consolidated, Inc., 587 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1978). In this regard, it is the

duty of a Plaintiff who has filed a pro se action to keep the Court apprised of his or her

current address and to comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. This Court does

not have an affirmative obligation to locate Plaintiff. “A party, not the district court, bears

the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his [or her] mailing address.”

Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, the Rules of Practice of the

U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona require that an unrepresented party, such as

Plaintiff, “must file a notice of a[n]...address change....” LRCiv 83.3(d). Such notice shall

be captioned “NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS” and shall contain only information

pertaining to the change of address and its effective date. (Id.). "[P]ro se litigants are bound

by the rules of procedure." Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir. 1995); see also King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987)("Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of

procedure that govern other litigants"), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa

County, 693 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s failure to keep the Court apprised of her

address constitutes failure to prosecute and to comply with the rules of Court.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an action may be

dismissed for “fail[ure] to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order....” The

U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a federal district court has the inherent power to

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dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute, even though the language of Rule 41(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appears to require a motion from a party. Link v.

Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962); see also Hells Canyon Preservation

Council v. United States Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) ("courts may

dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte"); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986)

(same). Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, the Court may dismiss an action for failure

to prosecute even without notice or hearing. Link, 370 U.S. at 633.

In determining whether Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of her case,

the Court must weigh the following five factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to

the respondents; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5)

the availability of less drastic sanctions. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440. “The first two of these

factors favor the imposition of sanctions in most cases, while the fourth cuts against a default

or dismissal sanction. Thus the key factors are prejudice and availability of lesser sanctions.”

Wanderer v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990).

Here, the first, second, and third factors favor dismissal of this case. Although

Plaintiff did not initially select this forum, her case is presently pending before the District

Court. Plaintiff indicated the HC1 address in the state court action and the record reflects

that either such address or Plaintiff at that address is “unknown” and the Postal Service is

unable to forward mail sent to Plaintiff at that address. Plaintiff’s failure to provide an

address where she can be reached and her failure to keep the Court apprised of same prevents

her case from proceeding in the foreseeable future. On these facts, further delay to the Court

or to Defendants is not warranted. The fourth factor, as always, weighs against dismissal.

The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether a less drastic alternative is available.

Without Plaintiff’s current address, certain alternatives are bound to be futile. In the instant

case, as in Carey, “[a]n order to show cause why dismissal... [is] not warranted or an order

imposing sanctions would only find itself taking a round trip tour through the United States

mail.” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441.

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Only one less drastic sanction is realistically available. Rule 41(b) provides that a

dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless the court

states otherwise in its order for dismissal. In the instant case, dismissal with prejudice would

be unnecessarily harsh given that this action can be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to

Rule 41(b).

Because this case is subject to dismissal under Rule 41(b), Defendants’ pending

motions to dismiss are moot.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

enter an order dismissing this action without prejudice and denying the pending motions to

dismiss (Docs. 4, 5) as moot.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2).

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Plaintiff is advised that if she does not file written objections to this Report and

Recommendation, this action may be dismissed without further notice to her.

Additionally, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send this Report and

Recommendation to Plaintiff at each of the following addresses:

Lisa S. Jackson

In-Care-Of

HC1 Box 162

Pearce, Arizona, 85625

Lisa S. Jackson

In-Care-Of

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It is possible that instead of “HC1", the address indicated by Plaintiff is “HCI”. (See

Notice of Removal, Exh. 1 (Doc. 1-3); Defendant Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 1

(Doc. 4)). 

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HCI Box 162

Pearce, Arizona, 856253

Lisa S. Jackson

11200 S. Bell Ranch Road

Pearce, Arizona 85625

Plaintiff shall immediately advise the Court and defense counsel of her current

address. Such notice shall be captioned “NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” The

notice shall contain only information pertaining to the change of address and its effective

date. The notice shall not include any motions for any other relief. 

DATED this 31st day of October, 2012.

Case 4:12-cv-00502-HCE Document 22 Filed 10/31/12 Page 7 of 7