Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02234/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02234-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

HANS G. HIGGINS, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 07-2234 PHX PGR (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

MCSO, SHERIFF ARPAIO, ARIZONA )

ATTORNEY GENERAL, DORA SCHRIRO, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

As noted by counsel for Respondents, Petitioner is now

in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections.

Therefore, the proper party respondents in this matter are Dora

Schriro and the Arizona Attorney General. 

On November 19, 2007, while in the custody of the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 challenging his April 2007 conviction by the Maricopa

County Superior Court. See Docket No. 1. Respondents filed an

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) on June

5, 2008. See Docket No. 21. Petitioner filed a reply to the

answer on June 25, 2008. See Docket No. 22.

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I Procedural background

On June 12, 2006, Petitioner was indicted by a grand

jury on one count of theft of a means of transportation and one

count of unlawful flight from a law-enforcement vehicle. See

Answer, Exh. A. The indictment was later amended to allege

Petitioner had six prior felony convictions. Id., Exhs. B & C.

Petitioner’s first trial on the 2006 charges, conducted

in January of 2007, ended in a mistrial due to the 12-member

jury being unable to reach a verdict. Id., Exh. D at 2; Exh. E

at 3; Exh. N at 4 n.1. Petitioner unsuccessfully petitioned the

Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court for a

special action. Id., Exhs. E & F; Petition at 16. In his

special action, Petitioner asserted the trial judge erred by

denying his motion for a directed verdict and that there was

insufficient evidence to find he had driven the allegedly stolen

vehicle. See Answer, Exh. E. The Arizona Court of Appeals and

the Arizona Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over the special

action. See id., Exh. F.

Petitioner’s second trial in March of 2007 resulted in

the 12-member jury finding Petitioner guilty on both counts

charged in the indictment. See id., Exh. G; Exh. H at 28; Exh.

I; Exh. N at 4. 

At a sentencing hearing conducted December 7, 2007, the

state trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for a new trial.

Id., Exh. H. The trial court also found Petitioner had three

prior felony convictions for aggravated driving under the

influence of alcohol. Id., Exh. H. At the hearing Petitioner’s

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1

 The premise of Petitioner’s special action was that the

state had produced no evidence in his first trial that Petitioner had

driven the allegedly stolen vehicle and, accordingly, that he was

entitled to a direct verdict and his re-trial should be prohibited.

In Petitioner’s counsel’s statement of facts in his Anders brief he

notes a witness “pointed out defendant in court as the man he saw

driving the victim’s vehicle on the date in question.” Answer, Exh.

N at 5.

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counsel argued for the mitigation of Petitioner’s sentence based

on his history of substance abuse and mental illness, and his

poor physical health. Id., Exh. H. Counsel noted Petitioner’s

prior felony convictions occurred more than ten years prior to

his 2006 offenses. Id., Exh. H. 

After consideration of the evidence and the statements

made at the hearing the state trial court sentenced Petitioner

to a mitigated term of 7.5 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for theft of means of transportation. Id., Exh. H.

Petitioner was also sentenced to a concurrent super-mitigated

term of 3 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

unlawful flight from a law-enforcement vehicle. See id., Exhs.

H & J. 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with regard

to his convictions and sentences. See id., Exh. K. Petitioner

was assigned counsel to represent him in his direct appeal.

Id., Exh. K & N. On May 23, 2008, Petitioner’s appointed

counsel filed a brief asserting counsel could find no

meritorious issues to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh.

N.1 Petitioner’s counsel also filed a motion for an extension

of the time allowed for Petitioner to file a pro se brief in his

direct appeal. See id., Exh. O. On May 28, 2008, the Arizona

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An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted

unless it appears that--

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process

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Court of Appeals granted the motion and set a deadline of July

7, 2008, for Petitioner to file a brief in his direct appeal.

Id., Exh. P.

The petition for federal habeas relief was filed on

November 19, 2007, approximately one month prior to the date

that Petitioner was sentenced by the state court. Accordingly,

the federal habeas petition was unarguably filed prior to the

date that Petitioner’s convictions and sentences will become

final upon the completion of direct review. In his habeas

petition, Petitioner asserts he is entitled to relief because

his detention is illegal and a miscarriage of justice in

violation of his rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Docket No. 1

at 6. Petitioner contends he exhausted his federal habeas

claims by raising them by means of a special action proceeding

before the Arizona Supreme Court.

II Analysis

Absent particular circumstances, the Court should not

entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the

petitioner’s state remedies have been exhausted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b) & (c) (2006 & Supp. 2008).2 Although it may deny

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ineffective to protect the rights of the

applicant.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 

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relief on the merits of an unexhausted claim, the District Court

may not grant federal habeas relief on the merits of a claim

which has not been exhausted in the state courts. See

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731

(1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S. Ct.

2546, 2554-55 (1991). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (2006 & Supp. 2008); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997,

1003 (9th Cir. 2008). Unless there is “an absence of available

State corrective process” or the existence of circumstances that

“render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the

applicant” the District Court should not consider the merits of

an unexhausted claim for federal habeas relief. See Duckworth

v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3, 102 S. Ct. 18, 19-20 (1981) (“An

exception [to the exhaustion requirement] is made only if there

is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the

corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile

any effort to obtain relief.”); Trimble v. Kansas, 927 F. Supp.

401, 403 (D. Kan. 1996) (“this case presents the unusual

situation of an inmate whose claims almost surely will not be

considered by the state court until any possibility of

meaningful relief has passed...”).

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Petitioner has not exhausted any federal habeas claim

regarding his convictions and sentences because he may still

raise any claim stated in his habeas petition in the state

courts in his direct appeal. Petitioner has not demonstrated

there is an absence of an available state corrective process to

address his claims that his convictions and sentences violate

his federal constitutional rights. Accordingly, pursuant to a

doctrine akin to ripeness, the District Court should not

entertain the claims raised in the federal habeas petition

because it is possible the state court will redress any error

asserted by Petitioner. See Stanley v. California Supreme

Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994); Sherwood v. Tomkins,

716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that when a

petitioner’s appeal of his state criminal conviction is pending

the petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his

state remedies are exhausted); Fordjour v. Stewart, 44 Fed. App.

789, 790 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding a habeas petition was

“premature” when the petitioner’s direct appeal was pending in

the state courts). 

When presented with a federal habeas petition

containing only unexhausted claims which are not obviously

without merit, the Court should dismiss the petition without

prejudice and allow Petitioner to exhaust his claims in the

state courts. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 102

S. Ct. 1198, 1199 (1982); Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th

Cir. 2001).

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As noted by Respondents, if the instant habeas petition

is dismissed without prejudice, Petitioner may file a federal

habeas petition asserting his claims after he has properly

exhausted them in the state courts in his now-pending direct

appeal or in an action for state post-conviction relief. Such

a federal habeas petition would not be deemed a forbidden

“second or successive” petition and be dismissed, but instead it

would be considered as an initial petition. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486-87, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1605 (2000) (“A

habeas petition filed in the district court after an initial

habeas petition was unadjudicated on its merits and dismissed

for failure to exhaust state remedies is not a second or

successive petition.”). Additionally, the dismissal of the

pending petition without prejudice would not implicate a statute

of limitations issue with regard to the claims stated by

Petitioner because the statute of limitations will not begin to

run until Petitioner’s convictions and sentences are final upon

the completion of state review in his direct appeal. See, e.g.,

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2005).

Furthermore, with regard to Petitioner’s allegations about the

record on appeal, if Petitioner’s direct appeal is denied by the

Arizona Supreme Court based on an erroneous determination of the

facts, Petitioner’s concerns regarding his access to the record

in his case may be pursued in proceedings pursuant to Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.18(c) &

32.1 (2007).

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 In his reply to the response to his habeas petition,

Petitioner contends he is challenging the prosecutor’s

malfeasance in “forcing” a mistrial in his first trial.

Petitioner contends the violation of his constitutional rights

in the first trial resulted in his second trial rather than an

outright acquittal and, therefore, that any claims regarding his

first trial are ripe for review. Petitioner asserts his

conviction and sentence violate the Eighth Amendment because he

is actually innocent of the crimes of conviction, and he asserts

he was a passenger in the vehicle and not the driver of the

vehicle. To the extent Petitioner argues he has exhausted his

federal habeas claims by presenting them in a special action

petition, such presentation did not satisfy the exhaustion

requirement because the question presented in the special action

was not decided on the merits. See Hayes v. Kincheloe, 784 F.2d

1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986).

III Conclusion

The petition for federal habeas relief is premature

because Petitioner’s direct appeal is still pending in the

Arizona state courts. Accordingly, any claim presented in the

habeas petition has not been exhausted by fair presentment to

the state courts in a procedurally correct manner. Because the

state court has not had an opportunity to rule on the merits of

the claims stated in the federal habeas petition and there is no

statute of limitations or second or successive petition issue

implicated by the dismissal of the petition, Mr. Higgins’

petition should be dismissed without prejudice. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Higgins’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed without

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 30th day of June, 2008.

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