Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04417/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04417-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEVERLY SCHULTZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT

DISTRICT, 

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-04417 MHP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendant San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District moves for attorneys fees pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. section 12205 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g). Having considered the

parties’ submission and arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following

memorandum and order. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Beverly Schultz brought this action against defendants Does 1 through 50 and Roes

1 through 50 of the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (collectively “BARTD”), alleging

that the acceleration of a BARTD train caused her to fall and injure herself. After a series of court

orders to pare down her complaint to omit improper causes of action, plaintiff timely filed a revised

second amended complaint that included inter alia claims arising under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12131 et seq. On February 11, 2005 the court entered a

memorandum and order denying defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s second amended complaint. 

On February 28, 2005, plaintiff without leave of court or noticed motion attempted to file a third

amended complaint which did not contain any claims under the ADA. The clerk of the court,

however, rejected the complaint and it was entered but not filed. On March 25, 2005, plaintiff’s
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attorney filed a notice of withdrawal of the third amended complaint On March 28, 2005 defendants

filed a motion for summary judgment and a hearing was set for May 2, 2005. On April 28, 2005

plaintiff’s attorney filed an attorney affidavit of James Fishel in response to the motion for summary

judgment, seventeen days after the due date. On June 29, 2005 the court granted defendant’s motion,

dismissing the case in its entirety.

Now before the court is defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section

12205 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) for work performed in response to the attorney

affidavit of James Fishel. Defendant initially requested attorneys’ fees of between $11,402.83 and

$17,104.25 under section 12205, which represented one sixth and one fourth of the total fees

incurred, respectively. In addition, and in the alternative, defendant requested $3,599.00 pursuant to

Rule 56(g) for work done in response to the attorney affidavit of James Fishel. In their reply brief,

however, defendants have limited their claim to attorneys’ fees of $2,565 and court costs of

$6,202.12. 

DISCUSSION

I Award of Attorneys’ Fees under the ADA

A 42 U.S.C. section 12205

Under section 12205, a court may impose a “reasonable attorneys’ fee, including litigation

expenses” against the non-prevailing party in any action or administrative proceeding under the

ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. 

Defendant contends that the ADA claims pursued by the plaintiff in the second amended

complaint are unreasonable and frivolous and that defendant should be awarded attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 12205 for the time spent litigating those claims. In response, plaintiff

claims that but-for the actions of defendants and this court, she would have been able to properly file

the third amended complaint and in so doing remove the problematic ADA claims. See Fishel Dec.

at 4:10-16. Furthermore, plaintiff claims that the ADA fees requested by defendants are

unreasonable and would be a source of financial hardship for the plaintiff. 
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(i) Reasonableness of Defendant’s Attorneys’ Fees Request

The ADA claims pursued by plaintiff’s counsel were unreasonable and frivolous and as the

prevailing party in a proceeding under the ADA, defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorneys fees pursuant to section 12205. In the second amended complaint, plaintiff’s counsel

asserted ADA claims but failed, as the court noted in its order granting the motion for summary

judgment, to provide any evidentiary basis for these claims. The record contained no indication of

substantial impairments nor did it outline any limitations on the plaintiff’s activities. 

Defendant has submitted documentation detailing the hours spent and fees charged for this

action since August of 2003 and has estimated in their motion for attorney’s fees that a minimum of

one-fourth of the total fees charged involved the ADA claims ($11,402.83). See Meyer Dec. ¶ 11.

This initial request, as plaintiff’s attorney contends, was unreasonable because while the ADA claims

were only introduced in the second amended complaint in October of 2004, the defendant seeks a

portion of its legal costs for a twenty-month period beginning in August of 2003. Defendant’s

amended request for $2,595 in attorneys’ fees for work done on the ADA claims, however, is

reasonable, reflecting one-fourth of the time spent on this action for the three months following the

filing of the second amended complaint.

Defendant has also submitted a bill of costs demonstrating $6,202.12 in court costs, including

the professional fees of John R. Lang who conducted a medical exam of the plaintiff pursuant to her

ADA claims. These costs are reasonable and documented and plaintiff’s attorney has not submitted

any evidence to refute them. Defendant is therefore entitled to attorneys fees of $2,595 for the time

spent on the ADA claims and $6,202.12 for the costs incurred during the course of this action.

(ii) Improper Filing of Third Amended

Additionally, neither the court nor the defendant bears responsibility for plaintiff attorney’s’s

inability to file the third amended complaint, removing the ADA claims. It is incumbent upon the

plaintiff attorney’s to ensure that prior to the filing of any papers with the court, counsel is apprised

of whether there are any orders that have been entered. Plaintiff’s attorney attempted to file the third

amended complaint on February 18, 2005 after the court had issued an order on February 11, 2005. 

His failure to appropriately amend the complaint, which should have be done in his second amended
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complaint, resulted in the opposing counsel spending a significant amount of hours preparing

responses to these claims. See Meyer Dec. ¶10. The pattern of plaintiff’s attorney reflected in the

filings in this action is one of failure to respond, dilatory filings or improper responses. For example,

defendant first filed a motion for partial summary judgment on February 23, 2004. Plaintiff never

responded or opposed the motion and, therefore, it was granted as unopposed. Plaintiff’s attorney

has repeatedly flouted the court’s orders and failed to head instructions. He reasserted claims already

stricken and instead of paring down the complaint as ordered, he filed it with even more inapplicable

claims and irrelevancies.

(iii) Financial Hardship of the Plaintiff

Plaintiff is correct in asserting that the district court has authority to consider the financial

status of the non-moving party with respect to the awarding of attorneys’ fees. See Lee v. ABB

Daimler-Benz Transportation, 17 Fed. Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s reduction

of fee award based on non-moving party’s demonstrated financial hardship). However, plaintiff has

not submitted any documentation demonstrating financial hardship or an inability to pay a sanction. 

See, e.g., Ory v. McDonald, 2005 WL 1793205 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s imposition

of attorneys fees since the non-moving party did not provide any evidence to demonstrate financial

hardship). See also Businessmen’s Assurance Corp. v. Townsend, 63 Fed. Appx. 992 (9th Cir. 2003)

(finding that the non-moving party bore the burden to produce prima facie evidence of financial

hardship). Moreover, as discussed infra plaintiff’s counsel and not plaintiff, will be required to pay

the attorneys’ fees and costs.

II Award of Attorneys’ Fees Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 56(g)

Defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 11 and 56(g). Under Rule 56(g), if an affidavit is determined to have been made in

bad faith, the court shall order the offending party to pay for the “reasonable expenses which the filing

of the affidavits caused the other party to incur.” See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(g). Pursuant to Rule 11, a

court may sanction an attorney or party who makes improper representations to the court, such as
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through the filing of papers for an “improper purpose” or which contain “allegations and other factual

contentions . . . [that have no] evidentiary support.” See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(b)(2)-(3). A court may

sua sponte impose sanctions under Rule 11. See Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 43 n.8 (1991) 

On April 28, 2005, on the eve of the hearing and in opposition to the motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff attorney’s filed “objections to evidence” which was in the form of an attorney

affidavit. The affidavit was filed seventeen days after the due date for plaintiff’s opposition, and was

deemed by this court to be incoherent as a brief and inadmissible as an affidavit and thereby stricken

from the record. The affidavit was devoid of any legal arguments but rather contained unsupported

factual assertions and requests for discovery. Plaintiff counsel’s contention that defendant was

given significantly more time to work on their motions is immaterial as counsel was on notice that

her reply was to be submitted on a certain due date. Further, counsel’s claim that the affidavit

lacking evidentiary support was filed with a belief that the court would direct her to conduct further

supplemental discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) is unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s

counsel did not submit an opposition with a supporting affidavit, but merely filed an affidavit which

as the court found in its order granting the motion for summary judgment, “frame[d] legal arguments

and factual attestations as personal knowledge subject to attorney testimony.” Memorandum &

Order, No. C 03-04417 MHP, slip op. at 4 (Jun. 29, 2005) Plaintiff’s attorney, in his untimely filing

of this document which was wholly lacking any evidentiary support, demonstrated bad faith and may

be properly sanctioned by this court for the amount that defendant’s incurred as a result. Defendant’s

have submitted documentation evidencing that as a result of plaintiff attorney’s bad faith affidavit,

they incurred an additional $3,559 in legal fees. 

III Attorney Sanctions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1927

Additionally, section 1927 provides authority for the imposition of sanctions against

attorneys. It states in relevant part that “any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings . . .

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required . . . [to pay the] excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’

fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In order to impose

sanctions under section 1927, there must be a showing of subjective bad faith on the part of the
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attorney. See Salstrom, et al., v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 183 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991)). Knowing or reckless behavior

is sufficient to establish a finding of bad faith. New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d

1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court has had to instruct plaintiff’s attorney on numerous occasions to amend the

complaint and explained to him how to amend it, advising what claims were meritless or

inapplicable and what claims would not withstand scrutiny. The court has repeatedly admonished

plaintiff’s attorney with respect to the inadequacy of the papers filed and the inarticulate

characterization of the claims asserted, noting that the action was unlikely to survive dispositive

motions. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, has continued to pursue these claims, at times violating the

court’s orders with respect to claims that have already been dismissed, including in this instance a reargument of the dismissed ADA claims in her response to defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees. 

Counsel in this case, through his late filings and the legal inadequacy of the court papers submitted,

and through the filing of the purported “objections of evidence” has demonstrated the requisite bad

faith and has unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings before this court. Counsel

may be properly sanctioned pursuant to section 1927.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion for

attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. section 12205, 42 U.S.C. section 1927 and Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 11 and 56. Plaintiff’s counsel is hereby ORDERED to pay defendant’s attorneys’ fees in

the amount of $6,154 and court costs in the amount of $6,202.12 for a total of $12,356.12, payment

to be made to counsel for defendant within sixty (60) days of the date of this order. The amount

ordered shall be borne solely by plaintiff’s counsel who is responsible for the circumstances giving

rise to these fees and costs and shall not be passed on to his client.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: August 26, 2005 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Judge
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