Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_02-cv-01712/USCOURTS-alnd-5_02-cv-01712-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

 All other Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims. (Docs. # 68, 69). At the time of the

incident made the basis of this lawsuit Blake was an eleventh grade student at LCHS (B. Grimes

Depo. pp. 38-39), and Cody was an eighth grade student at LCHS. (C. Grimes Depo. pp. 10, 108).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

TYRON AND DELENE WHITE, et.

al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICKY NICHOLS and DEXTER

RUTHERFORD,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

} 

Case No.: 5:02-CV-1712-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The court has before it Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 49) and

Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Doc. # 63). The above-referenced motions have been fully briefed

and were under submission as of January 25, 2005. (Docs. # 47, 55). 

The only remaining Plaintiffs in this case are Doyle Grimes, who brought suit on behalf of

Cody Grimes (“Cody”), a minor and a student at Lawrence County High School (“LCHS”), and

Blake Grimes (“Blake”), who was a minor at the time this case was filed but is now the age of

majority and a graduate of LCHS. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 8).1 Plaintiffs have sued Defendant Ricky

Nichols, the principal of LCHS, and Defendant Dexter Rutherford, superintendent of the Lawrence

County, Alabama School System, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claim those Defendants have violated

their rights in the following ways: they have (1) deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the First

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; (2) discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis

of national origin in violation of their rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment;

FILED

 2005 Aug-12 AM 09:36

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 1 of 28
 

2

 The court has reviewed Defendants’ motion to strike and will assume, without deciding, for the

purposes of summary judgment only, that it is due to be denied and that the evidence sought to be

stricken is properly considered by the court in its summary judgment analysis. As the court is

granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, it finds that, even considering the evidence

sought to be stricken, when the proper summary judgment standard is applied, Plaintiffs have not

met their burden to refute the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

2

(3) discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of race in violation of their rights to Equal Protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) deprived Plaintiffs of their rights to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. # 16). In addition to presenting certain arguments on the merits in

response to Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants have asserted that Plaintiff Blake Grimes lacks standing

to pursue his claims and that both Defendants are due the protection of qualified immunity. 

For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be

granted because there are no disputed issues of material fact and Defendants have demonstrated that

they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants’ Motion to Strike will be denied.2

I. Legal Standards for Evaluating a Summary Judgment Motion

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking

for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for

its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323. Once the moving party has met his

burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his own

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories,and admissions on file, designate specific

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 2 of 28
 

3

 If facts are in dispute, they are stated in the manner most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Fitzpatrick

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).

 

4

 Although Plaintiffs initially thought that the ban included all Confederate symbols (B. Grimes

Depo., p. 105; D. Grimes Depo., p. 69), Rutherford and Nichols have clarified that the ban covered

just Confederate clothing. (Rutherford Depo., p. 118; Nichols Depo., p. 103). In fact, class rings

with Confederate flag symbols were available for purchase at LCHS (through sales by third parties)

and it is undisputed that the ban does not extend to jewelry/class rings or other non-clothing items.

(Rutherford Depo., p 118; D. Grimes Depo., p. 39, 69; Nichols Depo., p 135). 

 

5

 Nichols’ decision was subject to review by Superintendent Rutherford. (Nichols Depo. p.

35-36). 

3

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts

and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

See id. 249.

II. Relevant Undisputed Facts3

On Friday, October 12, 2001, Principal Nichols announced over the school intercom system

at LCHS that, as of the following Monday, students would no longer be permitted to wear clothing

displaying the Confederate flag.(Nichols Depo. p. 101-103).4 Nichols had contacted Superintendent

Rutherford before announcing the ban and informed him of his intention. (Nichols Depo. p. 87).5

The ban applied only to LCHS; students at the Lawrence County School’s Vo-Tech facility were

permitted to wear Confederate symbols. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 55). Eighty-six (86) students signed

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 3 of 28
 

6

 Blake told his parents on Sunday night that he intended to wear a Confederate flag shirt on

Monday to protest the ban, and although his mother advised him against it, she did not forbid it. (B.

Grimes Depo. p. 66). 

 

7

 Blake’s mother was a substitute teacher at LCHS, and when he Principal Nichols called him to

his office, his mother went with him. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 81).

4

a petition protesting the ban on Confederate symbols. (Doc. # 59, Ex. 7 C; 8 c, at p.1). 

On the following Monday, a number of students wore Confederate flag shirts in violation of

the rule. (Nichols Depo. p. 104-106). Principal Nichols asked each student wearing Confederate

flag clothing if he or she was aware of the ban, and those who were not aware were permitted to

change clothes or cover their Confederate flag shirts for the remainder of the day. (Nichols Depo.

p. 104-106). Those who admitted that they were aware of the rule were suspended from school.

(Nichols Depo. p. 104-106). 

Plaintiff Blake Grimes was one of the students who admittedly was aware of the ban but

nonetheless planned with other students to deliberately defy it. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 48-49, 50-51,

140).6

 On Monday, October 15, Principal Nichols called Blake to his office to meet about the Dixie

Outfitters Confederate flag shirt he had worn that day, and Blake was allowed to explain his reasons

for wearing the shirt in violation of the ban. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 81, 92-93).7 Blake admitted that

he was aware of the rule, and he was suspended from school for three days. (B. Grimes Depo., p

83-84; Nichols Depo. 104). 

Blake and his parents also met with Superintendent Rutherford about the ban on Confederate

clothing and Blake’s suspension. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 94-95; D. Grimes Depo. pp. 24-25). As a

result of the meeting with Rutherford, Blake’s suspension from school was removed from, or never

entered on, his permanent record. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 95-96). Also, as a result of the meeting Blake

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 4 of 28
 

8

 Plaintiffs’ attorneys also have met with Rutherford and the Lawrence County Board of

Education in an attempt to persuade the school to rescind the ban on Confederate flag clothing.

(Rutherford Depo. p. 126-129). 

5

was allowed to make up any missed school work during the suspension, including a math test that

he missed. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 97). Blake and his parents also attended the next regularly scheduled

board meeting. (B. Grimes Depo. pp. 101-102).8

Cody Grimes also learned about the ban when Principal Nichols announced it over the

intercom system at LCHS on October 12. (C. Grimes Depo. p. 29). Although Cody wore a

Confederate flag shirt to school the following Monday, he removed it when he learned that other

students were being suspended for violating the ban. (C. Grimes Depo. p. 46). Therefore, Cody was

not suspended from school. (C. Grimes Depo. p. 36). Cody testified that he had not planned with

other students to protest the ban but wore the shirt to defend his Southern heritage. (C. Grimes Depo.

p. 48-49).

At the time of the ban, the demographic composition of the student population at LCHS was

(approximately) less that 1% Hispanic, 12% African American, 23% Native American and the

remainder Caucasian. (Nichols Depo. p. 53-54). Principal Nichols testified that based upon his

observations at LCHS, there was a link between racial tension, interracial incidents, and students

wearing the Confederate flag. (Nichols Depo. p. 138-139). Prior to the ban, an African-American

female student and a White male student wearing a tee-shirt depicting a skull wearing a Confederate

flag “do-rag” were involved in an incident in which racial slurs were spoken to the minority student.

(Nichols Depo. p. 69-71; Doc. # 58, Ex. 5; Grimes Aff., p. 2 ¶¶ 1, 4). 

Nichols also reported that in the Fall of 2001, the mother of an African-American female

student at LCHS complained to him that African-American students were concerned about the

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 5 of 28
 

9

 Although Plaintiffs’ summary judgment opposition asserts that “[the White student] using a

racial slur to an African-American female student is the only agreed upon verifiable basis for Nichols

banning the flag” (Doc. # 58, at No. 282), Blake Grimes admitted that he and other students

understood that the ban was implemented because an African-American student and parent had

complained that Confederate flag clothing was offensive to them. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 73).

Moreover, although Plaintiffs dispute Nichols’ testimony that he received complaints about the

Confederate flag and reports of racial incidents from students at LCHS, Plaintiffs do so primarily

with affidavits of students who cannot possibly have personal knowledge of each and every

complaint Nichols claims to have received. Rather, their testimonies fall into one or more of the

following categories: (1) they admit that complaints could have occurred, but did not witness any

incidents and/or they believe that any complaints were made by “trouble-makers,” (see e.g., Doc. #

58, Ex. 8d, p. 2; C. Grimes Depo. 35-36); (2) they admit that complaints could have occurred, but

they believe that the African-American students they know “have no problem with the Confederate

flag,” (see, e.g., Doc. # 58, Ex. 8d, at p.2); or (3) they doubt that any complaints were made because

they believe that if anyone had a problem with the Confederate flag, they “would have heard about

it” (see, e.g., Doc. # 58, Ex. 8, at p. 2). This evidence is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of

fact regarding Nichols’ testimony. Further, and in any event, Plaintiffs admit that, at the very least,

one racial incident occurred as a result of Confederate flag clothing. 

6

display of Confederate symbols at LCHS. (Nichols Depo. pp. 60-61). Between August and October

2001, one or two students reported to Nichols that a group of students, all wearing clothing

displaying Confederate flags, had spoken racial slurs in the hallway. (Nichols Depo. p. 65). Nichols

alsotestified that an African-American female student, whose name he cannot recall,reported feeling

ill because she was surrounded by Confederate flags and racial slurs spoken by unidentified students.

(Nichols Depo. p. 68-69; Doc. # 58, Ex. 4). No students had reported to Principal Nichols that the

Confederate flag itself had been used to intimidate them. (Nichols Depo., p. 76). However, all the

incidents that involved the Confederate flag and that were reported to Nichols involved students

wearing clothing that included the Confederate flag. (Nichols Depo. p. 76).9

III. Standing and Mootness

As a threshold matter, this court must examine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over

Blake Grimes’ claims in his case. FW/PBS v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (“The federal courts

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 6 of 28
 

10 The Supreme Court has also identified specific prudential considerations of standing, but none

of those come into play here. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.

7

are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction.”); Focus on the Family v.

Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 344 F. 3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that standing

and mootness should be addressed at the outset “because [they] directly implicate federal subject

matter jurisdiction”). It is undisputed that Blake graduated from Lawrence County High School in

2003 and is no longer a student in the Lawrence County School System. (B. Grimes Depo., pp. 8-9).

Standing and mootness are two companion components of jurisdiction. “The requisite

personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue

throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.

22 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant

is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984)(internal quotations omitted). A case becomes moot when it no longer

presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief. Al Najjar v.

Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335-36 (11th Cir.2001).

In this case, the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Blake Grimes’ claims

both because he lacks standing to assert them and because they have become moot. With respect to

standing, the Supreme Court has defined several requirements, all of which must be satisfied: (1)

an injury-in-fact, meaning an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2)

a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury

will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).10 The

Eleventh Circuit has noted, “because injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 7 of 28
 

11 Alternatively, Plaintiff claims that Blake’s father, Doyle Grimes, still has standing, because

“parents have independent standing to bring constitutional challenges to the conditions in their

children’s schools.” (Doc. # 56, at 8 (citing Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211,

217 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2003)). The court agrees that Doyle Grimes still has standing to challenge

Defendants’ actions with respect to his other minor son, Cody Grimes, but this has no effect on the

now moot claims asserted by Blake Grimes. See Donovan, 336 F.3d at 217 n. 2 (citing Honig v.

Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320-322 (1988)). 

8

injunctive relief only if the party alleges . . . a real and immediate – as opposed to a merely

conjectural or hypothetical – threat of future injury.” Wooden v. Board of Regents of University

System of Georgia, 247 F. 3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). 

It is this requirement, which is specific to injunctive relief, that proves fatal to Blake’s claims.

Plaintiffs in this case seek only prospective injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction

and declaratory judgment. (Doc. # 16, at 18-19). Because Blake Grimes is no longer a student

subject to the Confederate ban that serves as the impetus for the claims in this case, he cannot allege

a real and immediate threat of future injury. Accordingly, Blake Grimes lacks standing to pursue

his claims for injunctive relief in this case. See Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193

F. 3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that “[i]njury in the past [] does not support a finding of

an Article III case or controversy when the only relief sought is a declaratory judgment”).11

Moreover, under the doctrine of mootness, Blake Grimes’ claims are no longer actionable.

“[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). When events

subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer

give the plaintiff meaningful relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed because any decision on

the merits of a moot case would be an impermissible advisory opinion. See Jews For Jesus, Inc. v.

Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 162 F. 3d 627, 629 (11th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S.

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 8 of 28
9

45, 48 (1969). In this case, Blake is no longer subject to the rules and regulations of Lawrence

County Schools; therefore, there is no longer any live controversy in the present case to which the

court could give meaningful relief. 

Relying on a non-binding Third Circuit case involving a challenge to religious speech in a

graduation ceremony, Plaintiff claims that “graduation from school does not automatically render

a case moot if the student’s claims are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Donovan v.

Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2003). A quick review of Donovan,

however, demonstrates that it is not only distinguishable from this case, but also fails to support

Plaintiff’s contention that his claims for injunctive relief remain valid. In Donovan, Plaintiff sought

both money damages and injunctive relief. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 216-17. The Third Circuit held

that upon her graduation, the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief became moot and

only her claim for damages continued to present a live controversy upon which the case could

proceed. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 217-18. As noted earlier, Blake has only sought injunctive relief in

this case and therefore under Donovan, his claims are no longer “capable of repetition.”

Accordingly, because the court finds that Blake Grimes has no standing to pursue his

injunctive relief claims in this case, and that his claims are moot, summary judgment will be granted

in favor of Defendants as to Blake Grimes’ claims. 

IV. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that Rutherford and Nichols are protected by the doctrine of qualified

immunity because they did not have final policymaking authority and because the school did not

have a policy or custom of banning Confederate symbols. (Doc. # 51, at 4). Plaintiffs respond by

arguing that Defendants did have final rule-making authority for the school and that regardless, the

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 9 of 28
10

school’s flag ban was a custom or practice within the meaning of Monell v. New York City Dep’t of

Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Both parties’ arguments miss the mark. As outlined below,

neither qualified immunity nor the Monell analysis is applicable to this case because Defendants

have been sued only in their official capacities, and Plaintiffs have not sought money damages. 

Under § 1983, suits against municipalities and other local government entities are permitted

under Monell, although liability is limited to situations in which the “execution of a government’s

policy or custom ... inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. It is this Monell limitation upon

which Defendants base what they call their “qualified immunity” defense. (Doc. # 51, at 4-6).

Defendants’ argument confuses two separate bodies of law, neither of which are applicable to this

case. 

First,Defendants inappropriately rely on Monell. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have brought

claims against only Rutherford and Nichols in their official capacities – not against a municipality

or local governmental entity. Although generally a suit for monetary damages against an officer in

his official capacity is “in actuality, [a] suit[] directly against the [entity] that the officer represents,”

Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.1991)(quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165 (1985), official capacity suits seeking only prospective injunctive relief are not deemed to

be suits against the entity, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 142-48 (1908). Because Plaintiffs seek

only prospective injunctive relief in this case, Ex Parte Young dictates that their claims are strictly

claims against Rutherford and Hayes. Monell, therefore, is inapplicable. 

Second, Defendants erroneously call upon the doctrine of qualified immunity, which is not

available to Rutherford and Nichols because they have been sued in their official capacities. It is

well-settled that qualified immunity does not extend to claims against state actors in their official

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 10 of 28
 

12Defendants’ reliance on Denno v. School Board of Volusia County, Florida, 218 F.3d 1267

(11th Cir. 2000) for their “qualified immunity” argument is also misplaced. In Denno, a public high

school student who had been disciplined for displaying the Confederate flag at school sued the

school board and two school administratorsin their individual capacities under § 1983. Denno, 218

F.3d at 1268. The court applied qualified immunity to shield the individual defendants from

liability, and also found that the school board was not liable for the actions of the individual

defendants under Monell because the individual defendants were not final policymakers and because

Plaintiff failed to show that the board had a well-settled custom of banning the Confederate flag.

Denno, 218 F.3d at 1270-75. As noted above, Plaintiffs in this case have not sued the board – such

that Monell would apply – nor have Plaintiffs claimed monetary damages – such that qualified

immunity would apply. Thus, Denno’s qualified immunity analysis is also inapplicable.

 

13 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First

Amendment “right to inoffensively express their religious convictions, through the display of a

venerated religious icon, Confederate battle flag,” and that Defendants have discriminated against

Plaintiffs on the basis of religion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Doc. # 16, at “Second, Ninth, and Tenth Causes of Action”). Plaintiffs have

voluntarily abandoned their religion claims and therefore the court will not address them here. (Doc.

# 56, at 13-22). 

11

capacities. Heggs v. Grant, 73 F.3d 317, 319 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996); Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-67 (1993); Lassiter v. Alabama A

& M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (11th Cir.1994). Because the qualified

immunity analysis has no place in this case,12 the court will not examine further the substance of

Defendants’ argument, and will now turn to the analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims.

V. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Claims

 Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action alleges that Defendants violated their First Amendment

right to freedom of symbolic expression by banning clothing displaying the Confederate flag.13 The

Eleventh Circuit has already considered the issue of school-imposed Confederate flag bans and

determined that such bans are not an unconstitutional restriction of the students’ First Amendment

rights. Scott v. School Board of Alachua County, 324 F. 3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003). Because

this court finds no distinction between this case and Scott, summary judgment is appropriate on this

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 11 of 28
 

14 As the Supreme Court stated in Fraser:

Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the

12

claim. 

In Scott, the Eleventh Circuit addressed facts similar to the case at hand and affirmed the

constitutionality of the defendant school officials’ suspension of two students for violating an

unwritten ban on the display of Confederate flags on school grounds. Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1247. The

court held:

Although public school students’ First Amendment rights are not forfeited at the

school door, those rights should not interfere with a school administrator’s

professional observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could lead

to, an unhealthy and potentially unsafe learning environment for the children they

serve.

Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1247. The court reiterated that school officials can appropriately censure

students’ speech under either Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503

(1969) or Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1248. Tinker

proclaims that school officials can restrict students’ speech when they reasonably fear that certain

speech is likely to “appreciably disrupt the appropriate discipline in the school.” Denno v. School

Board of Volusia County Florida, 218 F. 3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2000), citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at

514. Alternatively, under Fraser, “even if disruption is not immediately likely, school officials are

charged with the duty to ‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values conducive both to

happiness and to the practice of self-government.’” Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1248, citing Denno, 218 F.3d

at 1271. Fraser mandates that officials have “the flexibility to control the tenor and contours of

student speech within school walls or on school property.” Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1248, citing Denno,

218 F.3d at 1271.14 The court in Scott found that the school officials’ Confederate flag ban satisfied

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 12 of 28
use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse. Indeed, the “fundamental

values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” disfavor the

use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the

Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are

inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the

“work of the schools.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S. Ct. at 737... The determination

of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate

properly rests with the school board.

The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined

to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the

shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers – and

indeed the older students – demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and

political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.

13

both tests and therefore was not an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 

Likewise, this court finds that Defendants’ Confederate flag clothing ban was proper under

both Tinker and Fraser. Just as in Scott, Defendants in this case have presented evidence of racial

tensions at the school and other disruptions that appeared to be race-based and related to the display

of the Confederate flag. See Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1249. Nichols testified that prior to implementation

of the ban, more than one confrontation had occurred at LCHS involving students wearing

Confederate flag shirts. Nichols also had received reports from students (primarily minority

students) who either felt uncomfortable in the academic setting when surrounded by students

displaying the Confederate flag on their clothing, or reported having been harassed or intimidated

by those students. As noted earlier, although Plaintiffs dispute Nichols testimony, the court finds

that their dispute is not supported by the evidence to which they cite. See discussion footnote 9

supra. Regardless, even assuming that Plaintiffs had sufficient evidence to dispute Nichols’

testimony, they acknowledge (as they must) that at least one altercation ensued between a student

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 13 of 28
 

15 Plaintiffs pluck from Denno the Eleventh Circuit’s recognition that “the Confederate flag is

honored by many as a non-racist memorial to their Southern heritage,” Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274, n.6,

to bolster their argument that the display of the Confederate flag “clearly was an emotional matter

of great public concern []and therefore [] should be permitted.” (Doc. # 56, at 19). Plaintiffs have

grossly distorted the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Denno. What the court actually said is that it does

not matter whether a plaintiff lacks racist intentions in displaying the Confederate flag or that other

individuals revere the Confederate flag as a non-racist memorial to their Southern heritage; rather,

the relevant issue is whether “the school official might reasonably think that other students would

perceive the display as racist or otherwise uncivil.” Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274 n.6. This is but one

of many occasions when Plaintiffs have taken statements out of context in a thinly veiled attempt

to conceal the fact that the Eleventh Circuit has clearly pronounced their First Amendment claim

unviable.

 

16 The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusions above render meaningless Plaintiffs’ suggestion that it takes

a finding of the school board that the Confederate Flag was a symbol linked to racial prejudice in

order to justify Defendants’ actions in this case. (Doc. # 56, at 21-22). 

14

wearing a Confederate flag shirt and a minority student, and Blake Grimes admitted that he and other

students understood that the ban was implemented because an African-American student and parent

had complained that Confederate flag clothing was offensive to them. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 73). Thus,

this court finds that Defendants’ ban was constitutional under the Tinker standard. 

Moreover, even in the absence of such evidence of racial tensions, it was not unreasonable

for Defendants to conclude that the Confederate battle flag has “uncivil aspects akin to those referred

to in Fraser, in that many people are offended when the Confederate flag is worn on a tee-shirt or

otherwise displayed.” Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274.15 As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, “[w]ords like

‘symbol,’ ‘heritage,’ ‘racism,’ ‘power,’ ‘slavery,’ and ‘white supremacy’ are highly emotionally

charged and reveal that for many, perhaps most, this is not merely an intellectual discourse. Real

feelings--strong feelings--are involved. It is not only constitutionally allowable for school officials

to closely contour the range of expression children are permitted regarding such volatile issues, it

is their duty to do so.” Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1249.16

 

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17 Plaintiffs counter with the following assertion: “With due respect to the Honorable Judge

Propst, if the evidence in this case shows anything, it shows that one cannot simply assume that the

display of the Flag will be perceived as being offensive and racist, even in the Deep South.” (Doc.

# 56, at 19). To the contrary, that is exactly what the Eleventh Circuit necessarily concluded when

it held that, “one only needs to consult the evening news to understand the concern school

administrators had regarding the disruption, hurt feelings, emotional trauma and outright violence

which the display of the [Confederate] symbols involved in this case could provoke.” Scott, 324 F.

3d at 1249.

 

18 Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Fraser by arguing that the expression in that case was during

a school assembly while the displays at issue in this case are purely personal holds no water in light

of Scott’s application of Fraser to substantially similar facts. 

15

The August 1995 decision by another judge of this court to take judicial notice that “the

wearing by a student in school of a shirt depicting a Confederate flag can cause dissension and

disruption” carries new weight in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s clear proclamation of this same

observation in Scott. (Hayward vs. Taylor, CV-95-PT-1393-M, August 30, 1995 Memorandum

Opinion of The Honorable Robert B. Propst (Doc. # 21)). As Judge Propst noted, “[o]nly an ostrich

could conclude otherwise.”17

 Therefore,underFraser, “even if disruption is not immediately likely,”

Defendants’ ban is nonetheless constitutional because it comports with the Defendants’ duty under

Fraser to “‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values conducive both to happiness and

to the practice of self-government.’” Scott, 324 F. 3d at 1248, citing Denno, 218 F.3d at 1271.18

 

Contrary to the clear authority of Scott, Plaintiffs call upon a body of general content-based

First Amendment law, arguing that any restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs’ free speech must be both

reasonable and viewpoint neutral. (Doc. # 56, at 16-17) (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.

720, 730 (1990) and Griffin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 129 F. Supp. 2d 832, 843 (D. Md.

2001)). These cases are not applicable here in light of the niche carved by Scott and Denno.

Plaintiffs also urge the court to ignore Eleventh Circuit law and instead apply cases from the Sixth

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16

and Third Circuits which held Confederate flag bans to be unconstitutional. (Doc. # 56, at 19-20)

(citing Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000); Sypniewski v. Warren

Hills Reg. Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2002)). This argument too, has no merit. This court

cannot – and will not – rule for Plaintiffs when there is clear binding precedent to the contrary. 

Plaintiffs also question Defendants’ motives in this case. They claim that the Confederate

Flag was singled out in this case, while other divisive symbols were ignored, suggesting that

Defendants had “no particular concern about the civility of the student’s discourse.” (Doc. # 56, at

18). Plaintiffs’ argument is temporally deficient. Blake Grimes testified that after the ban was

implemented, African-American students “would wear their Malcolm X or FUBU [shirts] and just

kind of make it known like they could wear theirs, but knowing we couldn’t wear ours.” (B. Grimes

Depo. p. 131). There is no evidence to suggest that, at the time the ban was implemented, Nichols

knew about and ignored incidents involving other symbols with racial undertones. Moreover, Blake

Grimes admitted that he was not aware of any incident of disruption ever occurring at LCHS that

involved a student wearing a “FUBU” or Malcolm X shirt. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 134; Nichols Depo.

p. 95-96). 

In fact, the undisputed evidence shows that Defendants took care in ensuring that the ban on

Confederate flag clothing was not overly broad. Defendants did not prohibit Cody Grimes’

distribution of pamphlets discussing the Confederate flag, (C. Grimes Depo. 17, 19, 44; Nichols

Depo. p. 114)) and did not ban certain displays of the flag that had not been linked to incidents of

disruption, such as class rings or other jewelry. (Rutherford Depo., p. 118; D. Grimes Depo., pp. 39,

69; Nichols Depo., p. 135). Rutherford testified that he would permit students to wear shirts

displaying the State flag of Mississippi, even though it contains within it a Confederate Battle flag.

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19 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint also asserts discrimination claims based on “Cherokee”

as their national origin. (Compare and Doc. # 16, at “Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action” with Doc.

# 56). Plaintiffs have voluntarily abandoned these claims, however, (Doc. # 56, at 22-30), and for

good reason. Plaintiffs have not produced substantial evidence to demonstrate they are Native

American (see D. Grimes Depo., pp. 71-73), and regardless, the undisputed facts do not establish any

discrimination against Plaintiffs on the basis of Cherokee heritage. Blake Grimes admitted that his

“Dixie Outfitter” tee-shirts that display the Confederate flag did not say anything about Cherokee

heritage. (B. Grimes Depo., pp. 122-23). Plaintiffs also testified that the only message they intended

to convey by wearing Confederate flag shirts was pride in Southern heritage and that no one who saw

their shirts displaying the Confederate flag would have interpreted them to convey any message

about Native American heritage. (B. Grimes Depo., pp., 129, 122-23; C. Grimes Depo., pp. 68-69,

81).

17

(Rutherford Depo. pp. 178-79). 

In light of the clear weight of authority from the Eleventh Circuit on this issue, Plaintiffs have

not shown that Defendants’ ban was an unconstitutional deprivation of their First Amendmentrights.

VI. Plaintiffs’ National Origin Claims

Plaintiffs next allege that Defendants’ ban of the Confederate flag violated their civil rights

and their constitutionally guaranteed right of equal protection to be free from discrimination on the

basis of national origin, which the plaintiffs describe as “Confederate Southern American.” (Doc.

# 16, at “Third and Fourth Causes of Action”).19

 They invite this court to be the first to recognize

“Confederate Southern American” as a protected national origin. The court declines to do so for the

reasons outlined below. 

As a threshold matter, the court must define what it means to be “Confederate Southern

American.” That task is not an easy one – Plaintiffs’ explanation of the alleged national origin is a

moving target. On the one hand, Plaintiffs’ attorneys offer the following definition in their summary

judgment opposition brief:

A Confederate Southern American is an individual who descends from those who

lived in and often (but not necessarily) fought for the Confederate States of America.

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18

By definition, this requires a person claiming Confederate Southern American

heritage to be a descendent from individuals residing in one of the thirteen states that

seceded from the federal Union in 1861 and fought against the federal army between

1861 and 1865. In other words, to be a Confederate Southern American, it is

necessary but not sufficient that one be a Southerner; put yet another way, all

Confederate Southern Americans are Southerners, but not all Southerners are

Confederate-Southern Americans.

(Doc. # 56, at 29). On the other hand, each Plaintiff offers a different interpretation in his

deposition. Although Blake Grimes suggests that a “Confederate Southern American” has ancestors

who fought for the Confederate States of America (B. Grimes Depo., p. 126), he also believes that

a blood relationship to a Confederate soldier is not required. Those who merely identify with

Confederate soldiers can also say they are “Confederate Southern American.” (B. Grimes Depo.,

pp. 126-27). Doyle Grimes testified that he does not consider “Confederate Southern American”

heritage to be dependent upon any ancestral relationship to persons who served in the Confederate

military; rather it requires being “involved in the Confederate ancestry,” i.e. attending Confederate

war re-enactments and “anything that is held,” and growing up and living in the South. (D. Grimes

Depo., pp. 73-74). Cody Grimes defined his claim to “Southern heritage” by stating merely “that

I was born and raised in the South, and my ancestors were born and raised in the South, and we’re

just southern.” (C. Grimes Depo., p. 49). 

Despite the plethora of definitions offered by Plaintiffs, the court will give Plaintiffs the

benefit of the doubt and assume, as Plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest, that a Confederate Southern

American is an individual who descends from those who lived in and often (but not necessarily)

fought for the Confederate States of America. Even under this definition, however, the court finds

that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiffs have not produced substantial evidence to

indicate that they are, indeed, Confederate Southern American.

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 18 of 28
 

20As the Plaintiffs’ brief recognizes, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “national origin” under

the Civil Right Act of 1964 suggests that, at a minimum, Plaintiffs must show ancestry to the group

claimed. In Espinoza v. Farah Manuf. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the Court noted:

The only direct definition given to the phrase ‘national origin’ is the following

remark made on the floor of the House of Representatives by Congressman

Roosevelt, Chairman of the House Subcommittee which reported the bill: ‘It means

the country from which you or your forebears came ... You may come from Poland,

Czechoslovakia, England, France or any other country.’ We also note that an earlier

version of § 703 had referred to discrimination because of ‘race, color, religion,

national origin, or ancestry,’ suggesting that the terms ‘national origin’ and ‘ancestry’

were considered synonymous.

Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88-89 (emphasis in the original; internal citations omitted). 

19

When questioned about how their claimed ancestry differs from anyone else who was born

and raised in the South, Blake Grimes testified that he believes on his “grandmother’s aunt’s side”

there were six brothers whose last name was Cash who fought in the Civil War on the side of the

Confederate States of America. (B. Grimes Depo., pp. 118-120). Blake candidly admits that he did

not come to believe this was his ancestry until after the ban on Confederate flags had been

implemented at Lawrence County High School. (B. Grimes Depo., p. 120). Although Doyle Grimes

believes that his family has Confederate ancestors, he cannot “trace it back very well” and is not

aware of any records that detail the ancestry of his side of the family. (D. Grimes Depo. pp. 74-75).

Given the paltry evidence of ancestry provided by the Plaintiffs in this case, the court finds that they

have not even met their own attorneys’ definition of their claimed national origin.20 Summary

judgment is due to be granted for this reason alone.

Moreover, summary judgment is appropriate because, even assuming Plaintiffs have

presented substantial evidence demonstrating that they are Confederate Southern American, this

court finds that it is not a protected national origin group. Plaintiffs urge this court to recognize a

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20

new national origin because they contend that Confederate Southern Americans, while admittedly

not a “separate nation,” are nonetheless a distinct, sub-national group with a separate identity despite

their existence within the boundaries of another, larger, sovereign nation-state. (Doc. # 56, at 25-30).

Plaintiffs point out that “proof of national origin does not require a claimant to produce a map and

point to a particular country from whence his ancestors came,” and they maintain that there are

identifiable cultural and linguistic signs and characteristics associated with Confederate Southern

Americans. (Doc. # 56, at 25). Plaintiffs also point to several district court cases in which national

origin protection has been extended to other “sub-national” groups. See Roach v. Dresser Ind. Valve

& Instrument Div., 494 F.Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980) (extending protection to the Acadians of

Louisiana); Metoyer v. State of Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding that Creole is a

valid national origin); Janko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989)

(holding that Gypsies are due national origin protection). 

A review of relevant case law, however, reveals that other courts have declined to find that

“Confederate Southern American” is a valid national origin. Within this Circuit, the Middle District

of Florida recently considered, and rejected, some of the same “Confederate Southern American”

arguments presented by Plaintiffs in this case. Fanucci v. Minetta, No. 03-00223-CV-J-20-HTS.

(M.D.Fla. 2003). In Fanucci, the plaintiffs, represented by the same attorneys in this case, claimed

that an Federal Aviation Administration manager’s decision to ban display of the Confederate flag

at work constituted discrimination on the basis of national origin, race, and religion under Title VII.

Fanucci, Doc. # 40, March 18, 2004 Order, at 1-2. The court granted summary judgment for the

defendants, in part because plaintiffs had not established that they are members of a protected

national origin group. Fanucci, Doc. # 40, March 18, 2004 Order, at 5-10. The court held that: (1)

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 20 of 28
 

21 Although not binding on this court, the Eleventh Circuit’s rejection of Confederate Southern

American as a separate national origin is nonetheless persuasive. See Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2

(“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent. They may be cited as persuasive

authority . . . .”). 

 

22The same considerations which lead the court to find Plaintiffs have no statutory national origin

claim – their failure to show they are in fact Confederate Southern Americans and (even more

21

based on prior rulings of the Supreme Court, the Confederacy was not a sovereign nation; (2) cases

in which other courts have recognized distinct sub-national groups as protected national origins are

distinguishable because those plaintiffs were members of a recognized ethnic group and could trace

their ancestry to a foreign colony, former independent nation, or foreign geographic region; and (3)

regionalism is insufficient to establish a separate national origin group. Fanucci, Doc. # 40, March

18, 2004 Order, at 5-10. In an unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the findings of

the court. Fanucci v. Minetta, No. 04-12478 (11th Cir. 2005).21 Moreover, at least one other Court

of Appeals – the Fourth Circuit – has rejected the contention that “Confederate-American” is a valid

basis for a national origin discrimination claim. Terrill v. Chao, 31 Fed. Appx. 99 (4th Cir. 2002).

 Against this backdrop of case law, the court declines to find that “Confederate Southern

American” is a viable national origin. For the same reasons articulated by the court in Fanucci, this

court cannot conclude that Confederate Southern Americans are a distinct sub-national group entitled

to protection as a separate national origin. Unlike the sub-national groups recognized as national

origins in the district court cases cited by Plaintiffs, Confederate Southern Americans are not able

to trace their ancestry to a foreign area; rather, their ancestry is traced only to a region of the United

States which was in rebellion for a period of time. Fanucci, Doc. # 40, March 18, 2004 Order, at

9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to establish that they are due national origin protection and their

national origin discrimination claims, both constitutional22 and statutory, are due to be dismissed.

Case 5:02-cv-01712-RDP Document 70 Filed 08/12/05 Page 21 of 28
importantly) the court’s finding that Confederate Southern Americans are not a protected national

group in any event – also foreclose their constitutional claims.

22

VII. Plaintiffs’ Race Claims

Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges that they have been discriminated against on the basis of

their race in violation of “constitutionally guaranteed rights of equal protection” and “civil rights,”

which they define only as “the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (Doc. # 16, at “Seventh and Eighth Causes

of Action”). Although Plaintiffs “specifically reject the notion that there is a racial component to

one’s identity as Confederate-Southern American,” they allege that Defendants’ actions in

“suspending only those students who displayed Confederate symbols, and their failure to deal

similarly with the display of other symbols associated with other races . . . ha[ve] created a hostile

learning environment for White, Cherokee, and mixed race students proud of their Confederate

ancestry and heritage.” (Doc. # 16, at “Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action”). Plaintiffs’

opposition brief clarifies that their statutory and constitutional race claims are based on a disparate

impact theory: 

Defendants’ prohibition against displaying the Flag had a disparate impact on

white/Cherokee students because most students wishing to display the Flag (whether

or not they considerthemselves Confederate Southern Americans) are white, or white

with Cherokee ancestry so that the Flag Ban stereotypes white/Cherokee students as

racists, and ultimately discriminates against them on the basis of race.

(Doc. # 56, at 30-32) (emphasis added). 

As an initial matter, the court notes that Defendants argue – and Plaintiffs have not contested

– that Plaintiffs’ Seventh and Eighth Causes of Actions are stated only on behalf of the students who

were suspended. (Doc. # 16, at “Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action”). It is undisputed that Cody

Grimes was not suspended (C. Grimes Depo. p. 36), and therefore the only remaining race claims

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23

are the ones asserted by Blake Grimes. As noted earlier, Blake Grimes lacks standing to pursue his

claims and therefore, summary judgment is due to be granted as to these claims for that reason alone.

A. Statutory Claim under “The Civil Rights Act of 1964”

However, even if Blake Grimes had standing to pursue his race claims, summary judgment

is nonetheless appropriate. First, Blake’s statutory race claim necessarily fails. Although he

generally claims that Defendants’ actions violated “the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” the only section

of that Act which potentially applies to his educational-setting race claim is Title VI, which prohibits

discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance. The Supreme Court has made

clear, however, that disparate impact claims are not actionable under Title VI. Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285-293 (2001). Accordingly, because Blake Grimes has not stated an

actionable race-based disparate impact claim under any statutory authority, summary judgment is due

to be granted in favor of Defendants on this claim.

B. Constitutional Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

Summary judgment is also appropriate on Blake Grimes’ constitutional disparate impact

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. It is undisputed in this case that

Defendants’ ban on Confederate clothing applied equally to all students. Instead, Plaintiff claims

that the ban unequally impacted white, Cherokee, and mixed-race students. Plaintiff’s constitutional

claim fails for two reasons – one factual, the other legal. First, factually, Plaintiff has presented no

evidence that the ban did, in fact, result in a disparate impact. Although Plaintiff’s attorneys allege

that “most students wishing to display the Flag (whether or not they consider themselves Confederate

Southern Americans) are white, or white with Cherokee ancestry so that the Flag Ban stereotypes

white/Cherokee students as racists,” (Doc. # 56, at 31), Plaintiff’s testimony clearly indicates

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24

otherwise. 

Q: Well, did only white students wear Confederate flag symbols to school?

A: No. There was [sic] black students that I’ve seen on several occasions that wore

Confederate flag necklaces and jewelry and shirts. 

(B. Grimes Depo. p. 148). Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a ban which applied to all students

disparately impacted some students or “stereotyped” them as racists when Plaintiff admits that other

students outside of those races also wore, and on October 12, 2001 were prevented from wearing,

the Confederate flag to school. 

Moreover, as a matter of law, summary judgment is due to be granted on Blake Grimes’

constitutional claim because he has not presented substantial evidence that Defendants had a racially

discriminatory purpose in implementing and enforcing the ban. It is well settled that disparate

impact without proof of discriminatory intent is not actionable under the Equal Protection Clause.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, “The

unlawful administration by state officers of a [rule] fair on its face, resulting in unequal application

to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown

to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” ENT Realty v. Strickland,

830 F. 2d 1107, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 1987). As noted earlier, the ban on Confederate flag shirts at

Lawrence County High School was implemented in response to increasing disruption, complaints,

and incidents involving students wearing Confederate flag shirts. See discussion Section V supra.

Blake Grimes admits that he was suspended because he intentionally wore a Confederate flag shirt

to defy the school’s policy against it. The undisputed facts do not establish any discriminatory

purpose for Defendants’ actions, and they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

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25

constitutional race claim for this reason as well. 

VIII. Procedural Due Process Claims

Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged that they were not provided adequate due processbefore being

suspended from Lawrence County High School. (Doc. # 16, at “Eleventh Cause of Action”). It is

undisputed that Cody Grimes was not suspended (C. Grimes Depo. p. 36), and Plaintiffs have not

disputed that this count is not asserted on his behalf (through his father, Doyle Grimes). (Doc. # 56,

at 32-34). Thus, the only remaining procedural due process claim is the one asserted by Blake

Grimes. As noted earlier, Blake lacks standing to pursue his claims and therefore, summary

judgment is due to be granted as to this claim for that reason alone.

Even if Blake had standing to pursue this claim, it fails on the merits because the due process

afforded to Blake before his suspension far exceeds that which is required in the public school

setting. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Supreme Court articulated the procedural

protections that must be afforded to students in connection with short-term suspensions from public

school:

Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of the

Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10

days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him

and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an

opportunity to present his side of the story.

There need be no delay between the time “notice” is given and the time of the

hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the

alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that,

in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the

student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation

is.

Goss, 419 U.S. at 581-82. 

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23 Moreover, Rutherford ultimately expunged Grimes’ record of any notation concerning the

suspension and allowed him to make up all the schoolwork that he missed during the period of the

suspension. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 95-97).

26

The undisputed facts indicate that Blake met with Nichols and was informed of the offense

of which he had been accused – deliberately planning with other students to violate the ban as a

means of protest – before he was suspended. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 48-49, 50-51, 81, 92-93, 140).

Nichols confirmed that Blake was aware of the ban and that he had intentionally violated it, and

Nichols provided Grimes with an opportunity to explain his reasons for having done so. (B. Grimes

Depo. p. 81, 92-93). The court finds that at that point, the minimum due process requirements

established in Goss v. Lopez were completely met. Nevertheless, Defendants also allowed Blake to

meet with the school superintendent the same day the suspension was imposed and to appear before

a hearing panel during the duration of the suspension. (B. Grimes Depo. p. 94-95, 100-01; D. Grimes

pp. 24-25). Neither of those opportunities were required under Goss. Without question, Blake

Grimes received more than the minimal due process required by law.23

Blake maintains that due process was not afforded to him because “the so-called

opportunities [he was] given to explain [himself] were only to Defendants — the same people who

imposed and implemented the unconstitutional ban in the first place.” (Doc. # 56, at 33). Plaintiffs

rely on Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 569 (1973) and Little v. Streatter, 452 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1981)

for the premise that due process requires both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard by

an impartial tribunal before the deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurs. 

Plaintiffs’ argument defies clear Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit law to the contrary.

Gibson and Little, the cases cited by Plaintiffs as requiring a hearing before a separate tribunal are

not controlling in a public education setting. See Gibson, 411 U.S. at 569 (addressing proceedings

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24 In fact, when students are removed from school for creating a disturbance, “a tentative decision

to continue to suspend the students for some days may be made before a hearing as long as the

disciplinarian goes on to hold a prompt – given the practicalities – hearing at which the

preliminary decision to suspend can be reversed.” Driscoll, 82 F.3d at 386-87(citing Sweet v. Childs,

518 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1975)). The undisputed facts in this case suggest that Blake Grimes’

clear defiance of school rules was disruptive enough to warrant suspension without a pre-disciplinary

hearing. 

27

to revoke the licenses of optometrists) and Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. at 5-6 (considering the denial

of a paternity test requested by a putative father who was incarcerated). A “meaningful” hearing

before a separate impartial tribunal is simply not required here. As the Eleventh Circuit has noted,

The dictates of Goss are clear and extremely limited: Briefly stated, once school

administrators tell a student what they heard or saw, ask why they heard or saw it,

and allow a brief response, a student has received all the process that the Fourteenth

Amendment demands. The only other requirement arises from the Court’s

admonishment that the hearing come before removal from school “as a general rule,”

unless a student’s continued presence is dangerous or disruptive. In these instances,

removal can be immediate. 

C.B. by & Through Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 386 (11th Cir., 1996).24 In Driscoll, the court

held that due process was given when the school principal who made the decision to suspend the

student participated in a telephone conference with the plaintiff student’s mother, even though the

decision to suspend the student had been made before the telephone call took place. Driscoll, 82

F.3d at 386-87.

The undisputed evidence shows that Defendants’ actions in this case satisfy the very low

threshold for procedural due process in a public school setting. Thus, even if Blake Grimes had

standing to pursue this claim, summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate. 

IX. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

The court finds that no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial and that Defendants are

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28

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants’ motion to strike will be denied. A separate

order will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of August, 2005.

___________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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