Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02667/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-02667-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

JASON W. CLARK,

Petitioner,

v.

GROUNDS, WARDEN

Respondent. /

Case No. 14-2667 JSW

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Jason Clark, a prisoner of the State of California, filed a pro se petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that the California Board of

Parole Hearings (“BPH”) violated his First Amendment rights by insisting that he participate

in a faith-based self-help program. Respondent filed an answer to the petition, and 

Petitioner filed a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Petitioner was convicted in San Bernardino County Superior Court of

second-degree murder and was sentenced to a term of 15-years-to-life in state prison. In

2013, the BPH found Petitioner ineligible for parole. He challenged the denial of parole in a

habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court on March 4, 2014. Ten days later, the

Case 4:14-cv-02667-JSW Document 19 Filed 08/25/15 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition with a citation to People v. Duvall,

9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995). On June 10, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). The first prong applies to both questions of law and to mixed

questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while

the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations. Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under

the first clause of § 2254 (d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently that [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254 (d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because the court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

Case 4:14-cv-02667-JSW Document 19 Filed 08/25/15 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous 

2

Correctional Clinical Case Management System

3

the light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 332 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that the BPH violated his First Amendment by insisting that he

participate in a faith-based self-help program as a condition of parole. “The Constitution

guarantees that the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion

or its exercise.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). Specifically, the state may not

require, compel, or coerce prisoners to attend AA/NA as a condition of parole. Inouye v.

Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712-13 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a three-part

test to determine if there has been governmental coercion of religious activity. Id. at 713.

The test consists of three sequential questions: 1) has the state acted, 2) does the action

amount to coercion, and 3) is the object of the coercion religious rather than secular? Id. In

Inouye, the prisoner’s rights were violated because the state official told him he had to either

attend AA/NA or be imprisoned. Id. 

Petitioner claims that his rights were violated when a BPH Commissioner at his

hearing stated, “I do want to tell you that AA/NA1

, a lot of people think that is a one-on-one

[relationship] with a higher power.” (Ex. A at 2). This statement does not satisfy the

second prong of the Inouye test because it is not coercive Stating that many people find the

program to involve a religious component simply describes a feature of the program. At

most, it could infer an endorsement of the program, but it does not require or condition

parole upon Petitioner’s participation. This is especially apparent when the statement is

viewed in context. Petitioner had previously stated that he preferred CCCMS,2

 a non faithbased self-help program, to AA because of “the one-on-one [relationship] with the

psychologist.” (Ex. 8 at 48.) In that context, it is clear that the Commissioner was simply

pointing out the similarities between AA/NA and CCCMS. The Commissioners

Case 4:14-cv-02667-JSW Document 19 Filed 08/25/15 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

subsequently clarified that it also approved of CCCMS, stating “so taking charge and

maybe going through this CCCMS one-on-one will open up many individual opportunities

for you where you can start using your abilities to build strengths.” (Id. at 50.) Unlike in

Inouye, at no point in the hearing did the BPH ever require, insist, or force Petitioner to

participate in a faith-based self-help program in order to be eligible for parole.

Under these circumstances, the BPH did not violate his First Amendment rights, and

the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A

certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in

which “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. Mcdaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 25, 2015 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

Case 4:14-cv-02667-JSW Document 19 Filed 08/25/15 Page 4 of 4