Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00613/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00613-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 In Petitioner’s Traverse and memorandum in support of Traverse he conceded that

his claims were either noncognizable or procedurally defaulted, with the exception of

Amended Grounds Three, Four, Six, and Seven, to which he now objects. (Traverse, p.3,

Doc. #19; Memorandum, p.4, Doc. #20.) The Magistrate Judge provided analysis on the

merits of each of the Petitioner’s claims, despite noting Petitioner’s concession. R & R at

8. This Court is not conducting a de novo review on any claims other than Amended

Grounds Three, Four, Six, and Seven because Petitioner has conceded that those claims fail.

 WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jason L. Laliberte,

Petitioner, 

vs.

E.W. Morris, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV 08-613-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1218 (“AEDPA”). On

December 31, 2008, the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report

and Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that the Petition be denied. Doc. #21.

Petitioner filed objections to the R & R and requested a de novo review of all his claims for

relief set forth in his Petition.1

 Doc. #24.

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2

 This court does note a further clarification of the law governing exhaustion, which

is not mentioned in the R & R, as will be discussed in more detail later in this Order.

3

 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in accordance

with Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Pages 1 through 7 of the R & R recite the factual and procedural history of this case.

R & R at 1-7. Neither party has objected to this account and the Court hereby accepts it.

Next, pages 7-10 of the R & R lay out the law governing exhaustion, procedural default

(including adequate and independent state grounds), and cause and prejudice. Id. at 7-10.

This discussion correctly summarizes the law governing what must occur for a federal court

to consider the merits of a habeas claim arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the Court hereby

accepts and adopts this legal framework.2

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original).

As stated above, Petitioner seeks relief from his state court conviction based on 28

U.S.C. § 2254. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted before the state courts,

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2), this Court must deny the Petition on those claims

unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law”3

 or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “When applying these standards, the

federal court should review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson v.

Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the summary denial of

Petitioner’s petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals renders the trial court’s

decision on Petitioner’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) the “last reasoned

decision” of the state court, subject to this Court’s review. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

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797, 803 (1991) (“later unexplained orders upholding [a] judgment [rejecting a federal

claim]” raises a presumption that the reviewing court “looks through” that order to the last

reasoned decision).

The Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeals has noted that applying the foregoing

standards is difficult when no rationale was provided for the state court’s decision on the

merits. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Atwood v. Schriro, 489 F.Supp.2d 982, 1000

(D.Ariz. 2007). When there is no rationale provided by the state court upon which the

federal court can rely:

[A] federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state court

decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853; Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). Although the record

is reviewed independently, a federal court nevertheless defers to the state court’s

ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167 (citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82; see

also, Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state court did not decide the merits of a

properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo, because in that

circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to accord

deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167... .

Atwood, 489 F.Supp.2d at 1000.

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied

on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available

in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

Discussion

Petitioner objects to the R & R on several grounds: (1) that Petitioner did exhaust his

state court remedies for ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Amended Grounds

Three and Four of his Petition; and (2) that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that

the Petitioner was required to cite federal law to support his claims set forth in Amended

Grounds Six and Seven of his Petition. In this case, because objections were filed, this Court

will review all issues to which an objection was filed de novo. 

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I. Exhaustion in State Court of Ineffective Assistance

The Magistrate Judge found in the R & R that Petitioner’s Amended Ground Three

and Four were raised in his PCR, but were abandoned in his petition for review to the

Arizona Court of Appeals, and thus were not sufficiently exhausted. R & R at 13-14, 16.

Petitioner argues that he did raise Amended Ground Three and Four in his direct appeal by

raising generally the issue of an “unambiguous claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel,

and incorporating his entire PCR by referencing the PCR and attaching it as an appendix.

(Objection to R & R, p.3-4, Doc. #24.)

Under Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, the Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeals found

claims were fully and fairly presented to the state court when a full copy of the second PCR

was attached to the motion for review as an appendix. 403 F.3d 657, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2005).

The court reasoned that in the appendix the claims were presented with extensive argument

in support of the claims and citations to the requisite authority. Id. at 669. Therefore, the

court held the issues were exhausted. Id. at 668-69.

Here, Petitioner attached his Reply to the State’s Response to the PCR (“Reply”) as

an appendix when he appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Similar to Insyxiengmay,

wherein the claims were fully presented in the attached appendix, here Petitioner presented

argument and citations to the requisite authority in the attached Reply. Further, Petitioner

alerted the Arizona Court of Appeals to these claims by referring to them as an

“unambiguous” claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and then referencing his Reply,

which he identified as Appendix A. (Petition, p.2-3, Doc. #8, Exh. 10.) Thus, the Arizona

Court of Appeals did not have to read beyond the petition for review to discover the federal

claim. C.f. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (court held a claim was not fairly

presented when the court had to read lower court opinions of the case to discover the claim).

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4

 The Magistrate Judge accurately states the law, and her finding that the ineffective

assistance of counsel issues were not properly exhausted is supported by Castillo v.

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005). (“Castillo must have presented his federal,

constitutional issue before the Arizona Court of Appeals within the four corners of his

appellate briefing.”). However, another 2005 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case allowed

incorporation by reference in the state court for a habeas petition. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan,

403 F.3d 657, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2005). Because Insyxiengmay is factually similar to the

present case, the Court here finds the issues exhausted in state court.

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Therefore, Amended Claims Three and Four were fully presented and exhausted in state

court, and the Court will not adopt the R & R on these points.4

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In this case, both the trial court and appellate court issued minute entries denying

Petitioner’s PCR. (Petition, Exh. #9, Exh. #11.) Neither court supplied the rationale for its

decisions. Therefore, the Court undertakes independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable under federal law while still

deferring to the state court’s ultimate decision. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Atwood v. Schriro, 489

F.Supp.2d 982, 1000 (D.Ariz. 2007).

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny, “[a]n

ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components: A petitioner must show that

counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To

establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

(2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A deficient performance is one that is

“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations.” Id. at 691. However, counsel may

make a reasonable decision that some investigation is unnecessary. Id. The court should be

highly deferential in assessing the reasonableness of counsel’s representation. Id. at 689. 

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In cases in which a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on an

alleged conflict of interest, the petitioner must show: (1) that the attorney actively

represented conflicting interests, and (2) that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected

the lawyer’s performance. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987); See Mickens v.

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (an actual conflict is “a conflict that affected counsel’s

performance ! as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties”) (emphasis in original).

In order to show prejudice, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Without specifics that cause the court to have such

doubts, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be denied. See James v. Borg, 24

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the petitioner needs to “identify what evidence

counsel should have presented” to show his innocence).

A. Amended Ground Three

As recounted in the R & R, in Amended Ground Three, Petitioner argues he received

ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to review the pre-sentence report

prior to sentencing. R & R at 13. Further, Petitioner generally contends that his counsel

failed to investigate for possible mitigation, to call witnesses at his sentencing hearing, and

to present mitigation evidence. Id.

As was noted in the R & R, Petitioner failed to describe what mitigating evidence was

available. Id. at 13, footnote 6. Further, Petitioner neglected to specify how review of the

pre-sentence report would have affected his sentence. Petitioner also did not explain what

facts further investigation could have uncovered that would have aided him at sentencing.

See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998) (court did not find ineffective

assistance of counsel for not properly preparing for sentencing and failing to investigate

information in pre-sentence report when the petitioner failed to explain what counsel should

have done and what further investigation would have uncovered). 

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5

 Petitioner has alleged there was a conflict of interest based on a Deputy Public

Defender being a “victim” in a different case he was prosecuted for, but that case is not

before the Court and has no relevance here.

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Additionally, as noted in the R & R, Petitioner never demonstrated how the facts that

might have been uncovered would have changed the result of his sentence. R & R at 13,

footnote 6. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (court noted even if

investigation efforts were flawed, the petitioner needed to “show a reasonable probability

that, but for [] alleged investigative omissions, the result would have been different”);

Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2008) (court found no ineffective

assistance of counsel even if performance was constitutionally deficient in failing to

investigate and call witnesses when the petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice). Petitioner

is unable to provide specific facts to show counsel’s performance was deficient, and even if

such facts existed, that the failure to uncover such hypothetical facts caused prejudice.

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Amended Ground Three

does not meet the Strickland test, and this claim is denied.

B. Amended Ground Four

In Amended Ground Four, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of

counsel when counsel failed to withdraw. R & R at 16. Petitioner claims counsel was

required to withdraw because counsel allegedly had a conflict of interest based on the

“victim” in the case being a Deputy Public Defender, and colleague of counsel. (Petition,

p.4, Doc. #8, Exh. 8.)

The Magistrate Judge found in the R & R the “victim” to which Petitioner appears to

refer is not in the case presently before this Court. R & R at 16. After reviewing the record,

this Court agrees with the R & R on this point.5

Notwithstanding that fact, Petitioner also failed to offer any evidence that his counsel,

Lloyd C. Tate of the Office of the Legal Defender, and the Deputy Public Defender

Petitioner identified, knew each other or had any type of relationship. Thus, even if the

Deputy Public Defender was the victim, Petitioner still failed to show that counsel actively

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represented conflicting interests, and that this alleged conflict affected counsel’s

performance. See Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001) (court found to

establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of interest the

petitioner must prove an actual conflict with a factual showing on record); U.S. v. Rodrigues,

347 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2003) (court found no ineffective assistance of counsel when

petitioner simply alleges a conflict and there is no proof of a conflict offered by the

petitioner). Therefore, Petitioner fails to establish his ineffective assistance of claim based

on conflict of interest in Amended Ground Four, and this claim is denied.

III. Amended Ground Six

In Amended Ground Six, Petitioner argues Maricopa County Superior Court Judge

Dennis W. Dairman failed to consider Petitioner’s Reply prior to rendering his ruling. R &

R at 17. The Magistrate Judge found in the R & R that Petitioner failed to provide any

federal law or evidence to support this claim. Id. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge did not

consider this claim and recommended that it be denied. Id. After reviewing the record this

Court agrees with the R & R. See Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999)

(court found a claim for habeas must include a reference to a specific federal guarantee and

a statement of facts that entitle the petitioner to relief). Therefore, the Court adopts the R &

R on this point, and Amended Ground Six is denied.

IV. Amended Ground Seven

In Amended Ground Seven, Petitioner argues Judge Dairman dismissed his PCR in

error because Petitioner raised a “clear and unambiguous claim.” R & R at 17. The

Magistrate Judge notes that Petitioner’s claim in Amended Ground Seven is vague and fails

to provide federal law in support of the claim. Id. Upon review of this claim, it appears

Petitioner is contending the state courts erred in failing to provide him with an evidentiary

hearing despite the fact that he alleges he presented a colorable claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

For this Court to find ineffective assistance of counsel Petitioner must meet the

Strickland test. Petitioner’s argument that he presented a colorable claim does not meet the

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standards for ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, a request for an evidentiary

hearing in state court is not cognizable as a habeas claim. Because Petitioner cannot meet

the Strickland test, habeas relief on Amended Ground Seven is denied.

V. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing in this Court. (Objections to R & R, p.6,

Doc. #24.)

The AEDPA Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless

the applicant shows that–

(A) the claim relies on–

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). In order to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must have

(1) alleged facts, which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) showed that he did not

receive a full and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of trial or in a collateral

proceeding. See Greyson v. Kellam, 937 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, Petitioner has failed to allege any facts, which if proven, would entitle him to

relief. Petitioner stated that mitigating evidence for sentencing was available, but did not

specify what mitigating evidence existed. (Petition, p.8, Doc. #8.) See Gonzalez v. Knowles,

515 F.3d 1006, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[H]e has not presented, nor has he even alleged,

the existence of any quantum of mitigating evidence upon which we can conclude entitle him

to an evidentiary hearing.”). Accordingly, this Court denies Petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the R & R (Doc. # 21) is accepted to the extent indicated

above, the objections (Doc. # 24) are overruled to the extent indicated above, the Petition is

denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 7th day of April, 2009.

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