Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07045/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07045-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Although unclear from the record, it appears that the July 8, 2003 onset date was a

typographical error. At the hearing, plaintiff amended the onset date to June 8, 2003. AR 303-04.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT L. SLAYTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-7045 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

REMANDING FOR AWARD OF

BENEFITS

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment in this Social Security appeal.

Based upon the Court’s review of the parties’ papers and the administrative record, the Court hereby

GRANTS plaintiff’s motion, DENIES defendant’s motion, and REMANDS for an award of benefits.

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2003, plaintiff Robert Slayton filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social

Security Act. Administrative Record (“AR”) 57-59, 271-73. Plaintiff claimed a disability onset date

of July 8, 20031

 due to back pain and degenerative discs in his back, and depression. Id. at 65. Plaintiff

has received continuous treatment for his back condition since January 2002, including physical therapy

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for chronic pain, chiropractic care, a transcutaneous nerve stimulator (TENS unit), and a number of

medications. Id. at 143, 288. In March 2002, an MRI reading showed that plaintiff had three lumbar

discs with abnormalities, including one disc (L4-5) that showed a “[t]ear in annulus near right neural

foramen and posterior paracentral disc. Moderate disc protrusion with complete effacement of ventral

epidural space and severe narrowing of right neural forament. The exiting nerve root is contacted by

disc material.” Id. at 165. 

After the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied the applications initially and on

reconsideration, this matter was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on September 12, 2005.

Id. at 295-321. By decision dated May 16, 2006, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and

denied his applications. Id. at 16-21. 

In reaching this decision, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation procedure set forth

in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At the first step, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not worked since June

8, 2003. Id. at 20. At the second step, the ALJ found that the medical evidence established degenerative

disc disease of the lumbar spine, with disc herniation, and that those disorders were “severe” under

Social Security regulations. Id. at 17. The ALJ also found that “the record indicates an adjustment

disorder and upper extremity impairments that do not significantly interfere with the ability to perform

basic work activities and are not considered to be severe, [but] they have been considered in assessing

claimant’s residual functional capacity . . . .” Id. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s

impairments did not, singly or in combination, meet or equal an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of

Subpart P of Part 404 of the regulations for any twelve-month period. Id. The ALJ also found that

plaintiff’s subjective complaints about his impairments were not fully credible. Id. at 19-20. At step

four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work as a music booking agent,

based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for a limited range of sedentary work with certain

limitations. Id. at 18-21. 

The ALJ found,

[C]laimant retains the ability to perform a limited range of sedentary work, specifically

to occasionally lift up to ten pounds, frequently lift and/or carry lesser weights, stand

and/or walk for two hours in an eight hour day and sit for six hours in an eight-hour day,

with a sit/stand option at will. Claimant is further limited to occasional climbing,

crawling, balancing, bending, stooping and kneeling. 

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 As plaintiff’s counsel notes, since the ALJ found at step 4 that plaintiff could still perform his

past work as a booking agent, there was no need for the ALJ to proceed to step 5 and evaluate whether

plaintiff could perform any other job in the economy. However, the vocational expert’s opinion that

an individual with an hourly stretching limitation would be “virtually unemployable” is helpful to this

Court because, for reasons explained infra, such testimony shows that there is no reason to remand for

further factual findings.

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Id. 17. In making this determination about plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ reviewed the medical reports of

plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Wagner, as well as of two consulting physicians, Dr. Lakshmanan and

Dr. Dhesi. According to plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Wagner, plaintiff is unable to work full time

in any capacity, and “might be able to return to work at 4 hours/[day] up to 20/hrs/wk doing work that

would allow him to change positions at will, that would allow him to take an hourly break of up to 10

minutes; that precluded bending, stooping, climbing, kneeling, and lifting greater than 10 pounds.” Id.

at 270. Dr. Lakshmanan reported that plaintiff should avoid heavy lifting, repetitive lumbar bending,

and that plaintiff should change positions from sitting and standing frequently. Id. at 170. Dr.

Lakshmanan did not provide an opinion regarding how many hours per day plaintiff could work, nor

did he provide a specific lifting restriction (e.g., pounds). Dr. Dhesi stated that plaintiff suffered from

degenerative disc disease, and opined that plaintiff could, inter alia, stand 4 to 6 hours in an 8 hour day

with no more than 30-45 minutes at a time and that plaintiff should alternate standing with sitting;

plaintiff could sit for 4 to 6 hours per day for no more than 45 minutes at a time; plaintiff could be

expected to lift 25 pounds frequently and 40 pounds occasionally; and plaintiff should be precluded

from frequent bending and stooping activities. Id. at 208. 

The ALJ discounted the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician because Dr. Wagner had relied

on plaintiff’s statements of his symptoms in formulating his opinion. “I have also considered the

opinion of [Dr. Wagner] who has long term knowledge of claimant’s medical condition and symptoms.

In assessing claimant’s function[al] capacity, however, Dr. Wagner has relied primarily on claimant’s

subjective complaint, since his medical findings are not indicative of total disability.” 

The ALJ also relied on the testimony of a vocational expert, Robert Rashke, to find that plaintiff

could still work as a booking agent or in other sedentary jobs.2

 In response to a hypothetical question

from the ALJ, Mr. Rashke testified that a person with certain restrictions could perform plaintiff’s

previous job as a booking agent as well as other jobs in the national economy. Id. at 313-14. However,

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in response to a hypothetical by plaintiff’s attorney which included an additional limitation of needing

to take hourly 5 to 10 minute breaks for stretching, Mr Rashke answered that such an individual would

be “virtually unemployable” in any capacity. Id. at 316-17.

On September 8, 2006, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s

decision. Id. at 5-8. Plaintiff then filed this action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s final

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Both parties have moved for summary

judgment. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s review of a disability determination is limited, and a final administrative

decision may be altered “only if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are not supported by

substantial evidence.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence

is that relevant evidence in the entire record “which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence

consists of “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 181,

183 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court must consider the entire record, including evidence that both supports

and detracts from the ALJ’s decision. See Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001).

However, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld if the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation. Allen v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 726 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited plaintiff’s statements regarding his

symptoms and pain, and that this error led the ALJ to erroneously discount the opinion of plaintiff’s

treating physician. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s determination of his RFC was flawed, and that

the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert at the administrative hearing.

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s subjective complaints and that the ALJ’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

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I. Analysis of plaintiff’s subjective complaints

The ALJ found that “[t]here are medically documented disorders to account for the type of

subjective complaints alleged. The alleged intensity, persistence and functionally limiting effects of the

symptoms, however, are not found entirely credible, for the reasons discussed in the body of this

decision.” AR 21. In the body of the decision, the ALJ stated,

I also considered all of claimant’s subjective complaints. He estimated that, as a result

of his medical disorders, he could sit for ten to fifteen minutes at a time and lift about

five to ten pounds. Claimant also noted that his ability to walk was reduced. With

respect to his daily activities, claimant reported that he customarily drinks coffee and

takes his pain medications. He lies down for a while, operates his computer and uses his

hot tub. In disability reports, claimant indicated he was unable to perform the tasks of

his former job. He indicated, however, that he performed household chores, cooking,

caring for his personal needs and doing laundry at a slower pace. He described frequent

breaks between household chores. He described activities including regular feeding and

walking his pets and preparing simple meals. He is able to drive, read and watch

television. He remains in contact with others through the telephone and on e-mail. He

attends clubs for music about once every one to two weeks. Claimant also noted that he

is able to retain attention and concentration for ten to thirty minutes at a time (Exhibits

7E and 8E). Claimant also testified that he continues to perform self employment as a

booking agent on a limited basis. In an August 2004 disability report, Richard Pollmann,

claimant’s friend, confirmed claimant’s daily activities and essentially reiterated his

subjective complaints (Exhibit 9E). I have considered this statement as essentially

consistent with claimant’s subjective allegations that do not preclude the functional

capacity found herein, and have weighted it accordingly. The evidence as a whole fails

to support the alleged intensity, persistence and functionally limiting effects of the

subjective complaints, and the alleged severity of claimant’s symptoms are not found

entirely credible.

AR 19-20.

“Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the

Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be ‘clear and convincing.’” Lester

v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ “must make a credibility determination with

findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit

claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ must consider

the record as a whole and may not isolate a “specific quantum” of evidence to support his conclusion.

Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984). The ALJ may properly consider the daily

activities of a claimant when evaluating credibility if they provide contradictory evidence to his asserted

limitations. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ

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 The ALJ did not make a finding that plaintiff was malingering, and defendant does not contend

that there was any such evidence.

4

 In addition, Social Security Ruling 96-7p states:

It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory statement that “the

individual’s allegations have been considered” or that “the allegations are (or are not)

credible.” It is also not enough for the adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are

described in the regulations for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision

must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence

in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and

to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s

statements and the reasons for that weight.

Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing

the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements, SSR 96-7p (July 2, 1996), 1996 WL 374186, at *2.

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is “responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony [and] is likewise

responsible for resolving ambiguities.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). If the

ALJ’s interpretation of plaintiff’s testimony is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, it is

not the Court’s role to second-guess it, even where a contrary finding might be reasonable. See Rollins

v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, because there was no evidence of malingering,3

 the ALJ was required to provide clear and

convincing reasons for discrediting plaintiff’s testimony. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. The ALJ did not

do so, and indeed, although the ALJ recounted plaintiff’s testimony in detail, he did not provide any

specific reasons for finding plaintiff’s testimony not entirely credible. Defendant asserts that the ALJ

considered the affirmative findings of the record medical sources, the lack of supporting objective

medical evidence, and plaintiff’s activities in making his determination about plaintiff’s credibility.

However, defendant’s assertions are purely speculative, as the ALJ does not make any explicit, specific

findings discussing how either the medical evidence or plaintiff’s activities are inconsistent with his

subjective symptoms. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] reviewing court

should not be forced to speculate as to the grounds for an adjudicator’s rejection of a claimant’s

allegations of disabling pain.”).4 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.

To the extent that the ALJ implied that he found plaintiff incredible on various grounds, it was improper

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to do so and does not withstand review. However, because defendant attempts to justify the ALJ’s

decision on these implied grounds, and because the Court finds that none of these grounds is tenable –

and therefore remand for further factual findings is unnecessary – the Court discusses each below.

A. Daily activities

“[I]f a claimant engages in numerous daily activities involving skills that could be transferred

to the workplace, the ALJ may discredit the claimant’s allegations upon making specific findings

relating to those activities.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Morgan v.

Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (claimant’s ability to fix meals, do laundry, work in the yard,

and occasionally care for his friend’s child was evidence of claimant’s ability to work). However, “[t]he

Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be eligible for benefits,

and many home activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of

the workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication.” Fair v. Bowen,

885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 

As an initial matter, the ALJ did not make any specific findings relating to plaintiff’s daily

activities. However, to the extent that the ALJ implied that plaintiff’s subjective symptoms were

inconsistent with his daily activities, the record does not support such a finding. The ALJ noted,

With respect to his daily activities, claimant reported that he customarily drinks coffee

and takes his pain medications. He lies down for a while, operates his computer and uses

his hot tub. . . . he performed household chores, cooking, caring for his personal needs

and doing the laundry at a slower pace. He described frequent breaks between

household chores. He described activities including regular feeding and walking his pets

and preparing simple meals. He is able to drive, read and watch television. He remains

in contact with others through the telephone and on e-mail. He attends clubs for music

about once every one to two weeks.

AR 19. Plaintiff also reported that it is painful to perform these activities, that he needs to “lay down

and stretch out many times daily,” and that he takes “quite a few pain meds each day so I do what I can

and then I nap too.” Id. at 99. Plaintiff reported difficulty in dressing (putting on his shoes and socks,

bending over to put on pants), bathing (getting in and out of the shower), feeding himself (“can’t lift

much for groceries, or do much prep work, hard to stand to cook”), toileting (“hard to get up off stool”),

and caring for his hair and shaving (“some days it’s hard to get arms above head”). Id. at 100. Plaintiff

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also reported that he can only drive, go to music shows, and stand for longer periods of time with the

assistance of a cane, brace and electric stimulator, and that he has difficulty concentrating. Id. at 100-

01, 105. In addition, when he goes to a club to watch live music, he is unable to “dance, sit or stand for

any length of time. ” Id. at 103. There is nothing inconsistent about the activities listed by the ALJ and

plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain and disability. See Gallant, 753 F.3d at 1453 (ordering award of

benefits for constant back and leg pain where claimant testified he cooked; could not sit over 10 minutes

or stand over half an hour without back pain; could lift between 5 to 10 pounds; took several walks a

day for about 20 to 25 minutes each, walking about a block or block and a half, resting and then

returning home; and swam about 8 to 10 times a day averaging 5 minutes at a time). Further, none of

plaintiff’s reported daily activities involve skills that could be transferred to the workplace.

The ALJ’s treatment of a disability report provided by plaintiff’s friend, Richard Pollmann, is

also questionable. The ALJ stated, “[i]n an August 2004 disability report, Richard Pollmann, claimant’s

friend, confirmed claimant’s daily activities and essentially reiterated his subjective complaints.” AR

20. The ALJ stated that he “considered this statement as essentially consistent with claimant’s

subjective allegations that do not preclude the functional capacity found herein, and have weighed it

accordingly.” Id. However, if the ALJ had fully credited Pollmann’s report, as well as plaintiff’s

subjective statements, the ALJ could not have arrived at the RFC that he did. Mr. Pollmann stated that

he had known plaintiff for 8 years and spent time with him several afternoons per month helping him

with chores and eating dinner with him. Id. at 107. Mr. Pollmann stated, inter alia, that plaintiff

“spends a lot of his time dealing with his pain and resting,” “can barely do the minimal physical

activities,” has “very limited body movements, slow movements, has to double and triple read

instructions and makes a lot of notes to remember things,” and can walk 1 or 2 blocks before needing

to rest for 10 to 15 minutes. Id. at 107-13. These statements are not consistent with the ALJ’s

determination that plaintiff has the RFC to “stand and/or walk for two hours in an eight-hour day and

sit for six hours in an eight hour-day, with a sit/stand option at will,” or that plaintiff can engage in

“occasional climbing, crawling, balancing, bending, stooping and kneeling.” Id. at 21.

B. Continued self-employment

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Defendant contends that the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s testimony because plaintiff

reported that he “continues to perform self employment as a booking agent on a limited basis.” Id. at

20. Plaintiff testified that he works for about 1 hour at a time, approximately 1 or 2 times per month and

that he is permitted to change positions at will. Id. at 300-01. Such limited employment is entirely

consistent with plaintiff’s statements of his symptoms and pain, and is not a clear and convincing reason

for discrediting plaintiff’s testimony. 

C. “Conservative” medical treatment

Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s conservative medical treatment weighed against his

subjective complaints. The ALJ stated that “the conservative and symptomatic medical attention

provided by Dr. Wagner does not support a finding of a more diminished functional capacity than found

herein.” Id. at 18. However, as Dr. Wagner stated in his report,

[Plaintiff’s] back pain has been disabling, and much of the day is consumed with

activities aimed at decreasing his pain. He does hourly stretches for 5-10 minutes; is

forced to lie down for about 90 minutes to 2 hours/d; and uses his hot tub 4 x/d. He has

been an active participant in his back care, and non-responsive to conservative care. He

might be a surgical candidate, but there is no guarantee of success, and he does not wish

to pursue surgery unless it is an emergent situation. Good studies do not demonstrate

long term benefits of surgery over conservative care. . . .

Id. at 269. In addition, plaintiff testified that he had an uncle whose condition worsened after

undergoing surgery. Id. at 310. The fact that plaintiff opted for conservative treatment under these

circumstances is not a “clear and convincing” reason to discredit plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The

record shows that plaintiff has continuously sought treatment for his back condition, has undergone

physical therapy, chiropractic care, and has taken a variety of pain medications. Id. at 18, 269; see

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1455 (holding ALJ erred in discrediting plaintiff’s subjective testimony about back

pain based on plaintiff’s intermittent use of pain medication when plaintiff’s doctor had recommended

intermittent medication and record otherwise shows continuous treatment).

The cases cited by defendant are distinguishable in that the plaintiffs in those cases had

unexplained gaps in their treatment or did not sufficiently seek non-surgical options to mitigate their

symptoms. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (plaintiff’s pain testimony dismissed because she had not sought

any treatment for three months); see also Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff

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 Defendant also asserts that the ALJ’s decision is supported by the opinion of two reviewing

(but non-examining) physicians, Dr. Pong and Dr. Miller. However, the ALJ does not cite Dr. Pong’s

report, which was approved by Dr. Miller, AR 223-30, anywhere in his decision. Accordingly, the

Court does not consider this contention.

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complained of pain but did not take any pain medication).

D. Medical evidence

Dr. Wagner has been plaintiff’s treating physician continuously since 2002, and he provided

comprehensive medical notes to support his diagnosis and his opinion that plaintiff cannot work full

time. AR 133-67, 270. The ALJ Dr. Wagner’s opinion because it was based in part on plaintiff’s

statements. Instead, the ALJ relied upon the opinions of two consulting physicians, Dr. Lakshmanan

and Dr. Dhesi, to conclude that plaintiff is able to perform sedentary work that provides a sit/stand

option. In addition to arguing that the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s subjective testimony,

defendant asserts that the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of the consulting physicians because they

were inconsistent with Dr. Wagner’s opinion.5

By rule, the SSA gives controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician in disability

determinations as it “may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained

from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as

consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). If a treating

physician’s opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques” and not inconsistent with substantial evidence in a claimant’s file, then the opinion will be

given controlling weight over the opinions of non-treating physicians. Id.; see also Orn v. Astrue, 495

F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing regulations regarding analysis of treating physician opinions).

A treating physician’s opinion can only be dismissed for “clear and convincing” reasons that are

supported by substantial evidence in the plaintiff’s medical record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Even if the

treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ cannot disregard the treating

doctor’s testimony unless he has a “specific and legitimate reason” that is supported by substantial

evidence. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983). Furthermore, if the non-treating

physician’s opinion differs only in the conclusion and not in the clinical findings, this discrepancy does

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not constitute substantial evidence to discredit the opinion of a treating physician. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.

However if the examining physician provides “independent clinical findings that differ from the findings

of the treating physician,” such findings are “substantial evidence.” Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845,

849 (9th Cir. 1985). “Independent clinical findings can be either (1) diagnoses that differ from those

offered by another physician and that are supported by substantial evidence, or (2) findings based on

objective medical tests that the treating physician has not herself considered.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 632

(internal citations omitted).

For the reasons discussed supra, because the ALJ erroneously discredited plaintiff’s subjective

testimony, he also erred by discounting Dr. Wagner’s opinions to the extent that those opinions were

based on plaintiff’s statements. In addition, the ALJ erred by not giving controlling weight to Dr.

Wagner’s opinion because he did not provide clear and convincing reasons for doing so that were

supported by substantial evidence. In dismissing Dr. Wagner’s opinion that the plaintiff is unable to

perform sustained work activities for an 8 hour work period and was limited to performing work that

allowed for a change of position at will and hourly breaks for 10 minutes, the ALJ stated: 

Hari Lakshmanan, M.D., a specialist in physical medicine, evaluated claimant and

reported on August 27, 2003 that, as a result of the back disorder, claimant should avoid

heavy lifting and repetitive lumbar bending. Dr. Lakshmanan further believed that

frequent change of position was indicated. Rajpreet Dhesi, M.D., a specialist in physical

medicine and rehabilitation, conducted a consultative examination and reported in May

of 2004 that claimant was limited to standing and walking for thirty to forty five minutes

at a time each for a total of six hours in an eight hour day, sitting for forty five minutes

at a time for four to six hours in an eight-hour day and lifting up to forty pounds

occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently. Dr. Dhesi also indicated a sit/stand

option and preclusion against frequent bending and stooping. 

AR 18. Dr. Lakshmanan’s determination that the plaintiff should required a frequent change of position,

and Dr. Dhesi’s opinion that plaintiff was unable to sit for more than 45 minutes at a time, was not

inconsistent with the Dr. Wagner’s opinion that plaintiff might be able to work at a job that “would

allow him to change positions at will, that would allow him to take an hourly break of up to 10

minutes.” Id. at 270. Each physician stated that plaintiff’s condition precludes him from frequent

bending, lifting, extended sitting or standing, and lifting heavy objects. Id. at 170, 208, 270. In

addition, Dr. Lakshmanan reviewed plaintiff’s condition and noted that his “[s]ymptoms at least partly

appear consistent with a diskogenic process from the findings of the MRI report.” Id. at 170. 

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Dr. Dhesi’s assessment does differ from Dr. Wagner’s in two aspects. Dr. Dhesi opined that

plaintiff could be expected to lift 25 pounds frequently and 40 pounds occasionally; however, on that

point the ALJ chose to give weight to Dr. Wagner’s opinion that plaintiff cannot lift objects exceeding

10 pounds. Id. at 19. Dr. Dhesi also opined that plaintiff can sit and stand for 4 to 6 hours in an 8 hour

day, for 30 to 45 minutes at a time. Id. at 208. In contrast, Dr. Wagner stated that plaintiff cannot work

for 8 hours a day in any capacity. 

Under Orn, if the differing conclusions between a treating and non-treating physician are not

derived through independent clinical findings – such as differing diagnoses or use of an objective

medical test that the treating physician did not consider – the treating physician’s conclusion is given

controlling weight. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Here, the objective medical evidence showed that plaintiff

suffered from degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with disc herniation. Dr. Dhesi’s conclusion

that plaintiff can work an 8 hour day in a limited capacity was not based on a different diagnosis of

plaintiff’s back disorder. Nor did Dr. Dhesi’s opinion derive from an objective clinical test that

plaintiff’s treating physician did not consider. Dr. Dhesi only conducted a general examination of the

plaintiff’s back, neck and shoulders, and did not rely upon a separate MRI or other medical tests. AR

206-09. Thus, Dr. Dhesi’s different conclusion is not an independent finding that can be used to

discredit the treating physician’s opinion. 

The ALJ also appeared to discredit Dr. Wagner’s opinion when he noted that “[e]xcept for a

diminished sensation in the left foot, there is no evidence of severe root irritation or focal neurological

deficits to support Dr. Wagner’s opinion that claimant is unable to perform sustained work activity for

eight hours in a workday.” Id. at 18. However, once plaintiff provided medical evidence supporting

an impairment that is likely to cause his symptoms, the ALJ may not discredit plaintiff’s subjective

symptoms merely because of a lack of objective evidence fully supporting these symptoms. Bunnell

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc); see also Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407

(9th Cir. 1986) (“it is improper as a matter of law to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground

that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical findings”). In this case, the ALJ found that plaintiff

has a medically determinable physical impairment that is severe, and therefore a lack of objective

medical evidence fully supporting the plaintiff’s alleged symptoms is not substantial evidence to deny

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the plaintiff’s statements of his symptoms. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in failing

to give adequate weight to Dr. Wagner’s conclusions regarding plaintiff’s functional capacity. Orn, 495

F.3d at 633; Murray, 722 F.2d at 501-02 (where findings of treating and consulting physicians were

same but conclusions were different, ALJ improperly disregarded treating physician’s opinion).

E. Evaluation of depression 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ also erred by not evaluating whether plaintiff’s depression

affected his pain. Plaintiff repeatedly reported that he suffered from depression, see, e.g., AR 65, 269,

306, and the consulting examining psychiatrist confirmed plaintiff’s depression and found that plaintiff

“certainly has symptoms of depression complicating his chronic back pain, but he is not disabled by the

depression.” Id. at 205. Social Security Ruling 96-7p instructs that when evaluating an individual’s

statements about pain or other symptoms, adjudicator should consider “[i]ndications of other

impairments, such as potential mental impairments, that could account for the allegations.” 1996 WL

374186, at *8. Although the ALJ considered plaintiff’s depression in assessing his RFC, he did not

appear to consider his depression in evaluating plaintiff’s statements regarding his symptoms. This was

error.

II. Vocational expert

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly relied upon the testimony of a vocational expert

in response to a hypothetical question that did not incorporate all of plaintiff’s limitations. At the

hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert the following question:

[L]et me ask you to assume a hypothetical person with the following restrictions. For

starters, an inability to perform any more than light work, with the need for a sit-stand

option at will. And no more than occasional postural work including climbing,

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. And this individual would be .

. . 47 to 50. . . . Would you be able to testify as to what impact those limitations would

have on the prior work in this case?

AR 313. The vocational expert responded that a person with these limitations would not be precluded

from performing plaintiff’s previous job as a booking agent, and that even if the person was restricted

to a sedentary exertional level, he would still be able to perform this work as generally performed in the

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national economy. Id. In addition, the vocational expert stated that a person with the skill set of a

booking agent, a sedentary RFC and an additional postural restriction with a sit-stand option would be

able to perform other jobs, mostly office work, in the national economy. Id. at 314.

Plaintiff contends that the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert was incomplete and did

not account for plaintiff’s pain symptoms and need to take hourly breaks for stretching. Plaintiff notes

that when his attorney posed a hypothetical that did incorporate plaintiff’s need to take a 5 minute break

every hour for stretching, the vocational expert replied: “I think the fact that it would become a working

part of his day and it would be just seen as a problem, that I’d place it virtually unemployable as far as

past work is concerned.” Id. at 316. The vocational expert further testified that a person with the “break

period requirement” would not be able to perform any work. Id. at 317.

When proposing a hypothetical, the ALJ “must propose a hypothetical that is based on medical

assumptions supported by substantial evidence in the record that reflects each of the claimant’s

limitations.” Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2001). If a hypothetical is

incomplete, the opinion of the vocational expert “has no evidentiary value and cannot support the ALJ’s

decision.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1988). Hypothetical questions posed to a

vocational expert must include a claimant’s subjective impairments unless the ALJ has clear and

convincing reasons for discrediting the claimant’s testimony. See Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456; see also

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

Here, the Court finds that the ALJ’s hypothetical was not complete because it did not “reflect

each of the claimant’s limitations.” Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1164. Plaintiff’s treating physician opined

that plaintiff’s condition requires him to take hourly stretches for 5 to 10 minutes and change positions

at will. AR 18, 269-70. The opinions of Dr. Lakshmanan and Dr. Dhesi – upon which the ALJ relied

in his determination of plaintiff’s RFC – did not contradict Dr. Wagner on these points. Dr.

Lakshmanan recommended that plaintiff change his position from sitting and standing frequently, id.

at 170, and Dr. Dhesi found that plaintiff is “limited to standing and walking for thirty to forty minutes

at a time” and to “sitting for forty five minutes at a time” for four to six hours in an eight hour day. Id.

at 208. “Because claimant’s allegations of persistent disabling pain are supported by the medical

evidence in this case and the ALJ had no clear or convincing reasons for rejecting such claims,

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claimant’s pain should have formed a part of the ALJ’s question to the expert.” Gallant, 753 F.2d at

1456. 

III. Remedy

The remaining question is whether to remand for further administrative proceedings or simply

for the payment of benefits. Where the ALJ fails to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion

of a treating physician, the Court must credit the opinion “as a matter of law.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

at 834. Similarly, where the ALJ improperly rejects a claimant’s testimony regarding his own subjective

pain and symptoms, and the claimant would be disabled if that testimony were credited, that testimony

is credited as a matter of law. Id.; Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396 (9th

Cir. 1988).

Here, the medical evidence and plaintiff’s testimony depict an individual who cannot sit, stand

or walk for any length of time without severe pain, who must take hourly breaks to stretch, and who is

required to alternate sitting and standing, and lie down frequently. The vocational expert testified that

a person with an hourly stretching limitation was unemployable. In cases very similar to the instant one

involving plaintiffs with chronic, severe back problems, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[a] man who

cannot walk, stand or sit for over one hour without pain does not have the capacity to do most jobs

available in the national economy.” Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir.1983); see also

Gallant, 753 F.2d 1450 (remanding for award of benefits where medical evidence and the plaintiff’s

testimony showed, inter alia, that the plaintiff suffered from chronic low back pain and needed to

alternate standing and sitting). On this record, the Court finds that there is no need to remand for further

fact-finding. Accordingly, the Court REMANDS for an award of benefits. 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 15 & 16). The Court REMANDS

for the payment of benefits consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2008 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge 

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