Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03777/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03777-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Docket No. 16, filed December 12, 2005.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSCAR BRAUN and ANDREA BRAUN,

 Plaintiffs,

 v.

GALE NORTON, et al.,

Defendants. /

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant and CounterClaimant,

 v.

OSCAR BRAUN and ANDREA BRAUN,

Plaintiffs and CounterDefendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-03777-MJJ

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND TO

ADD ADDITIONAL PLAINTIFFS

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Oscar Braun and Andrea Braun's (“Plaintiffs,” the “Brauns”)

Motion for Leave to Amend.1

 The motion is opposed by Defendants Gale Norton, John W. Keys,

Kirk C. Rogers, Michael R. Finnegan, Pedro "Pete" Lucero ("Defendants"). 

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for leave to amend.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendants manage the recreation area around Lake Berryessa, California (“Lake Berryessa

Recreation Area,” “Lake Berryessa”). In carrying out their management duties, Defendants are

required to comply with the government’s Reservoir Area Management Plan (“RAMP”). 

Defendants prepared and adopted the RAMP pursuant to applicable legal guidelines and

requirements. Among other things, the RAMP provides that individuals with mobile homes, travel

trailers, boats, and other similar vehicles, may park their vehicles within the Lake Berryessa

Recreation Area if they acquire a permit with one of seven designated concessionaires. 

Lake Berryessa Recreation Area is divided into seven parcels, each sub-managed by a

designated concessionaire. The concessionaires, pursuant to concession agreements with

Defendants, develop the land and issue permits allowing use of the designated parcels of Lake

Berryessa Recreation Area. The parcel at issue here is known as Pleasure Cove Marina (“Pleasure

Cove”). 

On September 1, 2000, the former designated concessionaire for Pleasure Cove issued

permits to the Brauns. Upon receipt of these permits, the Brauns moved their private mobile homes,

boats, docks, and other personal property to Pleasure Cove. According to the Plaintiffs’ Complaint,

the permits, which were issued pursuant to a site rental agreement, did not have an expiration date. 

In 2005 Defendants terminated their contract with the former concessionaire of Pleasure

Cove and entered a new concession agreement with Forever Resorts, Inc. (“Forever Resorts”) for

that parcel. Under the new concession agreement, Forever Resorts had the ability to require permitholders to enter into new site rental agreements. The concession agreement provided that if permitholders refused to enter into new rental agreements, their previously issued permits would expire,

and Defendants would have the authority to remove their vehicles and deny them access to Pleasure

Cove. Defendants assert that they provided the Brauns and the other permit-holders with the

requisite notice regarding the changes to site rental agreements, including permit termination, under

the new concession agreement.

According to the Brauns, the permit-holders under the former site rental agreement requested

that Defendants reconsider and rescind the provisions of the new concession agreement that

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provided for the removal of vehicles from Pleasure Cove if the permit-holders decline to enter into

the new site rental agreement. Despite their requests, Defendants refused to do so. 

Defendants assert that those Pleasure Cove occupants who did not enter into new site rental

agreements no longer have valid permits. Accordingly, Defendants have determined that these

individuals are now unlawfully on Pleasure Cove property and have ordered the removal of their

vehicles, and have denied them access to the land.

 The Brauns filed their complaint on September 19, 2005, asserting that Defendants’ eviction

order violates the RAMP. In the Complaint, the Brauns seek declaratory and injunctive relief to

prevent Defendants from enforcing their order. 

On December 12, 2005, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend their complaint and add 53

additional plaintiffs. These additional plaintiffs also held Pleasure Cove permits pursuant to the

former site rental agreement and also parked their vehicles at Pleasure Cove. These additional

plaintiffs also refused to enter into new site rental agreements and are now subject to Defendants’

eviction order.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to amend a complaint to

join parties provided that a right to relief arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, and that

there exists a single common question of law or fact affecting each of the persons of the party. Rule

15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend a pleading once as a

matter of course before a responsive pleading is served; after that, the party may amend the pleading

only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Additionally, Rule 15(a) instructs

that, “leave shall be freely granted when justice so requires.” The Supreme Court has made it clear

that courts are to carefully heed this mandate. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Moreover, “[t]his liberality in granting leave to amend is not dependent on whether the amendment

will add causes of action or parties.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.

1987). 

In determining whether to grant leave to amend, the Court considers the following factors:

(1) whether the movant unduly delayed in bringing the motion; (2) evidence of bad faith or dilatory

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motive on the part of the movant; (3) the movant’s repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous

amendments; (4) prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) futility of amendment. Id. Generally, the

court engages in this analysis with all inferences in favor of granting the motion. Griggs v. Pace

Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). While each of these factors is relevant to

determine the propriety of leave to amend, the predominating factor is the resulting prejudice to the

opposing party. Howey v. Radio Corp. of Am., 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). “Absent

prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [] factors, there exists a presumption under

Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d

1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, if the party opposing the motion fails to establish any of these

factors, “the leave sought should, as the rules require, be ‘freely given.’” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 

ANALYSIS

As the party seeking leave to amend, Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of demonstrating why

amendment is necessary. In their motion, Plaintiffs state that the other 53 plaintiffs for which they

seek joinder are also long-term permit holders, also purchased and moved their vehicles to Pleasure

Cove pursuant to the former site rental agreement, also refused to enter into the new site rental

agreement, also requested that Defendants reconsider the new concession agreement, and will also

suffer harm if Defendants enforce their eviction order. 

Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the new

plaintiffs’ claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence or involve a common question of

law or fact. The Court will address each of these challenges in turn.

1. The Claims Arise Out Of The Same Transaction Or Occurrence.

Courts broadly construe the requirement that the right to relief arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence, and engage in a case by case analysis to determine whether claims satisfy

this requirement. Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 623 F. 2d 1371, 1375 (9th

Cir. 1980); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974). 

Defendants argue that the claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 

First, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to plead their motion for leave to amend with sufficient

detail for the Court to find that the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. 

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Defendants rely on Aaberg v. ACandS, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 498 (D. Md. 1994), and Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348

(9th Cir. 1997), to support their contention that Plaintiffs failed to provide adequate detail to establish a common transaction

or occurrence. This Court, however, distinguishes this case from both Aaberg and Coughlin. 

Aaberg, a memorandum opinion, involved a maritime asbestos case where a “skeleton” complaint joined 1,000

plaintiffs under Rule 20. Aaberg, 152 F.R.D. at 500. Plaintiffs did not describe the incidents or circumstances of asbestos

exposure or the products/defendants responsible for the asbestos exposure. Id. at 500. Accordingly, the district court dropped

the misjoined parties, pursuant to Rule 21, for failure to demonstrate the claims arose out of the same transaction or

occurrence. Id. at 500-01. Here, however, Plaintiffs describe the details of the alleged harm as well as the Defendants against

whom they allege the claim. 

Additionally, Coughlin involved seven plaintiffs, all of whom had claims against the Director of Immigration and

Naturalization Services. Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1349. The complaint alleged the defendant had unduly delayed in

adjudicating plaintiffs’ petitions in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The seven plaintiffs’ claims, however,

fell into six distinguishable categories. Id. The district court severed the parties with the distinct claims, stating that delay,

in and of itself, does not create a common transaction or occurrence. Id. at 1350-51. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1352.

Here, the common transaction or occurrence is not delay, but rather the series of events giving rise to Defendants’ order

authorizing removal of property from and denial of access to Pleasure Cove. 

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Defendants assert that Plaintiffs merely added the names of the parties to be joined without adding

additional, particularized facts relating to the new plaintiffs. The Court disagrees. 

Plaintiffs need not identify every fact involved in order for their motion for leave to amend to

stand. See Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333. Plaintiffs adequately describe the details of the alleged harm

as well as the Defendants against whom the claims are alleged.2

 That the facts alleged are the same

as those alleged in the original complaint is immaterial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a); N.D. Cal. R. 10-1. 

Second, Defendants argue the claims did not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence

because Plaintiffs and the 53 additional plaintiffs occupied Pleasure Cove during different dates, had

different permit documents, and had different rent-payment histories. Whether the Brauns and the

additional plaintiffs actually occupied Pleasure Cove at different times, held their permits pursuant

to different permit documents, or had different rent-payment histories is unclear from the pleadings. 

The Court, however, does not believe that such details are dispositive as to whether the claims arise

out of the same transaction or occurrence or series thereof. Instead, the Court finds that there is a

logical relationship between what the government allegedly did and the claims sought to be joined,

and that there is a common legal framework for the Court to decide these issues.

Plaintiffs base their claim on Defendants’ order to remove property and deny access to

Pleasure Cove to permit-holders who refused to sign the new site rental agreement. Similarly, the

new plaintiffs base their claim on the same set of facts. Like the Brauns, the plaintiffs to be added to

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the Complaint owned permits with a former concessionaire. They, too, parked their mobile homes,

boats, docks, and other personal property at Pleasure Cove pursuant to these permits. Like the

Brauns, the additional plaintiffs refused to sign a new site rental agreement and urged Defendants to

reconsider the provisions of the new concession agreement. As a result of their refusal to sign a new

site rental agreement, Defendants issued an order to remove the additional plaintiffs’ property and

deny them access to Pleasure Cove, on the grounds that their permits were expired. The claims of

Plaintiffs and the additional plaintiffs are grounded in Defendants’ eviction order, and therefore arise

out of the same transaction or occurrence. 

2. The Claims Present A Common Legal Issue.

Courts also liberally construe the single common question of law or fact requirement. Any

factual or legal question satisfies this requirement. League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d

1330, 1333-34 (8th Cir. 1974). 

The Court finds a common legal question here. All of these plaintiffs litigate the same issue

and seek the same remedy: they all request injunctive relief to invalidate and prevent enforcement

of Defendants’ order removing property from and denying access to Pleasure Cove. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs Braun meet the commonality requirement for joinder. 

3. Defendants Fail To Establish A Reason Why Leave Should Not Be Freely Granted.

Although the Court considers the five factors mentioned above when considering whether to

grant a motion for leave to amend, unless granting the motion will result in undue prejudice, a court

should grant a motion to amend. Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190. “The undue prejudice which a court

must guard against is that prejudice which would cause a party undue difficulty in prosecuting a

lawsuit as a result of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other party.” Securities &

Exchange Com. v. Glick, No. CIV.LV.78-11, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12141, at *7 (D. Nev. June 12,

1980); Deakyne v. Commissioners of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 1969).

Plaintiffs have not unduly delayed, displayed bad faith, or failed to cure in filing their motion

for leave to amend. Moreover, Defendants have given the Court no reason to find that granting the

motion will result in undue prejudice. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants have failed to

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Docket No. 16, filed December 12, 2005.

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establish any reason this Court should not grant Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the

complaint to add additional plaintiffs.3 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2006 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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