Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00688/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARRIE COLLINS, an individual, on 

behalf of himself and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

AUROBINDO PHARMA USA, INC.; 

and AUROBINDO LTD.;

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00688-MMA-KSC

ORDER DENYING PLANTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND AND 

GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY

[Doc. Nos. 5, 6]

Plaintiff Carrie Collins (“Plaintiff”) filed this putative class action against 

Defendants Aurobindo Pharma USA (“Aurobindo USA”) and Aurobindo LTD,

(collectively, “Defendants”) in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. 

See Doc. No. 1-2, Ex. A (hereinafter “Compl.”). On April 15, 2019, Aurobindo USA

removed the action to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(d).1 See Doc. No. 1. 

On May 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand this action back to state court. 

See Doc. No. 5. Aurobindo USA then filed an opposition, to which Plaintiff replied. See

 

1 Aurobindo LTD has not filed a responsive pleading. See Docket.

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Doc. Nos. 14, 15. On May 22, 2019, Aurobindo USA filed a motion to stay proceedings 

pending a decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”). See Doc. 

No. 6. Plaintiff subsequently filed an opposition. See Doc. No. 13. Aurobindo USA did 

not file a reply. See Docket.

The Court found the matters suitable for determination on the papers and without 

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 16. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand and GRANTS IN PART 

Aurobindo USA’s motion to stay.

BACKGROUND

On or about November 24, 2018, Plaintiff, a California resident, was prescribed the 

prescription drug Valsartan-HCTZ 320-12.5 manufactured by Defendants. See Compl. 

¶¶ 2, 17. On December 31, 2018, Defendants recalled 80 lots of valsartan-containing 

medications including Valsartan, Valsartan HCTZ, and Amlodipine Valsartan

(“Valsartan”). See Doc. No. 1-3, ¶ 9; Compl. ¶ 3. 

On March 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed this putative class action in San Diego Superior 

Court, alleging three claims for relief: (1) violation of California’s Consumers Legal 

Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5), 1770(a)(7); (2) breach of implied warranty 

under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1792, 

1791.1; and (3) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 17200. See Compl. Plaintiff defines the proposed class as “[a]ll persons or entities 

who purchased or used Defendants’ contaminated Valsartan in California.” Id. ¶ 17. 

Defendant removed the action to this Court on April 15, 2019. See Doc. No. 1. 

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand. See Doc. No. 5. Aurobindo 

USA filed an answer on June 25, 2019. See Doc. No. 17.

On April 17, 2019, Aurobindo USA filed a Notice of Potential Tag-Along Action 

with the JPML. See Doc. No. 6-1, Ex. B. Pursuant to that notice, the JPML entered a 

Conditional Transfer Order (“CTO”) on April 19, 2019, indicating that this action would 

be transferred to an existing multi-district litigation (“MDL”) in the District of New 

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Jersey, In re: Valsartan Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2875 (“Valsartan 

MDL”), unless parties object to the transfer. See Doc. No. 6-1, Ex. C. On April 26, 

2019, Plaintiff filed a notice of opposition to the CTO, and later filed a motion to vacate 

or stay the CTO pending this Court’s decision on the instant motion to remand to state 

court. See Doc. No. 6-1, ¶¶ 12, 14. As such, the motion to vacate the CTO, the motion to 

remand, and the motion to stay the action in this Court are all fully briefed. 

ORDER OF MOTIONS

In the interest of judicial efficiency, courts generally “address subject matter 

jurisdiction at the outset in the ‘mine run of cases,’ and reach other issues first only where 

the jurisdictional issue is ‘difficult to determine,’ and the other ground is relatively less 

burdensome.” Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, the 

pendency of a CTO or motion before the JPML “does not affect or suspend orders and 

pretrial proceedings in any pending federal district court action and does not limit the 

pretrial jurisdiction of that court.” See J.P.M.L. Rule 2.1(d); Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 

980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that a court should not automatically 

stay a case or suspend rulings upon a party’s motion before the JPML).

The sole jurisdictional issue before the Court is whether it has jurisdiction pursuant 

to CAFA. See Doc. No. 5-1. Thus, it is not so difficult to determine that a decision 

should be deferred to the JPML. See Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., 325 F. 

Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding a court should wait until transfer to an 

MDL if jurisdictional issues are legally difficult). This Court accordingly addresses

Plaintiff’s remand motion prior to addressing Aurobindo USA’s motion to stay.

MOTION TO REMAND

A. Legal Standard

“As a general matter, defendants may remove to the appropriate federal district 

court ‘any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 

States have original jurisdiction.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The propriety of removal thus 

depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in federal court.” City of 

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Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997). The “propriety of removal” 

in this case arises under “CAFA[, which] gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain 

class actions, defined in § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, the parties 

are minimally diverse, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.” Dart 

Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 552 (2014). 

A notice of removal must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for 

removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). There is no presumption against removal jurisdiction in 

CAFA cases. Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 554 (noting “CAFA’s provisions should be read 

broadly, with a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal 

court if properly removed by any defendant.”) (internal quotations omitted). The burden 

of establishing removal jurisdiction under CAFA lies with the proponent of federal 

jurisdiction. See Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015). 

“[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-incontroversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or 

questioned by the court.” Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 553. “Evidence establishing the amount is 

required” where, as here, the plaintiff challenges the defendant’s amount in controversy 

assertion. Id at 554 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)). “Under the preponderance of the 

evidence standard, a defendant must establish ‘that the potential damage could exceed the 

jurisdictional amount.’” Bryant v. NCR Corp., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 

2018) (quoting Rea v. Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

B. Discussion

The Court must determine whether Aurobindo USA has shown by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the action involved more than 100 plaintiffs and that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $5 million. Plaintiff argues the Court lacks jurisdiction for three 

reasons: (1) Aurobindo USA’s notice of removal was insufficient; (2) Aurobindo USA 

has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the class exceeds 100 members; 

and (3) the amount in controversy does not exceed $5 million. See generally Doc. No. 5-

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1. Plaintiff does not challenge minimal diversity. See id. The Court addresses each 

argument in turn. 

1. Initial Burden

First, Plaintiff asserts that Aurobindo USA’s notice of removal did not meet its 

initial burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. See

Doc. No. 5-1 at 2. In support, Plaintiff explains that, “Defendants’ evidence is 

speculative, conclusory, and lacks foundation.” Id. The Supreme Court has made clear 

that in a notice of removal, “[a] statement ‘short and plain’ need not contain evidentiary 

submissions.” Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 551. “Evidence establishing the amount [in 

controversy] is required by § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court 

questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 

In its notice of removal, Aurobindo USA avers that the amount in controversy 

exceeds $5 million based upon the potential class size and Plaintiff’s prayer for relief. 

See Doc. No. 1 at 5. Thus, Aurobindo USA provided a “short and plain statement of the 

grounds for removal.” Moreover, Aurobindo USA was not obligated to submit evidence 

in support of its notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); see also Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 554. 

Accordingly, Aurobindo USA met its initial burden in removing the instant action.

2. Class Size

Second, Plaintiff asserts that Aurobindo USA’s “speculation as to class 

membership is unsustainable for purposes of removal under CAFA.” Doc. No. 5-1 at 4. 

In its notice of removal, Aurobindo USA stated that “the Class in this case is potentially 

tens of thousands of members strong, and almost certainly greater than 100 individuals.” 

Doc. No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff argues that Aurobindo USA’s class size calculations are “not 

very plausible.” Doc. No. 15 at 3. According to Plaintiff, based on the number of pills 

distributed in California, “the class size would have to be at least 114,235 individuals.” 

Doc. No. 15 at 4. To reach this number, Plaintiff divides the quantity of pills distributed 

in California by 270—the number of pills Plaintiff was prescribed during the class period. 

See Doc. No. 15 at 3. However, Plaintiff neither explains why that class size is

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considered “implausible,” nor why each class member must have taken no more than 270 

pills during the class period. See id. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is speculative and 

unsupported by any evidence or citation to legal authority.

Further, Plaintiff’s argument assumes that only persons are included in the putative 

class. This is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s class definition, which includes “persons and 

entities.” Compl. ¶ 17; see In re Vioxx Class Cases, 180 Cal. App. 4th 116, 120 n.1 (Ct. 

App. 2009) (indicating that a putative class of “persons and entities” is permissible for 

violations of the UCL, CLRA, and breach of implied warranty if the class action 

requirements are met). Even assuming the class only included persons, Aurobindo USA 

proffered credible evidence that there are more than 100 individuals in the class.

Aurobindo USA submitted the declaration of Hunter Murdock, Vice President, General 

Counsel of Aurobindo Pharma, USA. See Doc. No. 14-3 (hereinafter “Murdock Decl.”). 

Mr. Murdock declares over 36 million tablets were distributed in California, and that, 

based on his knowledge and experience as the Vice President and general counsel of a 

pharmaceutical company, each of the three types of Valsartan tablets were distributed to 

more than 100 individuals. Murdock Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 17. Plaintiff objects to Mr. 

Murdock’s declaration on the grounds that it “lacks foundation” and is not based on 

“personal knowledge.” See Doc. No. 15 at 3. In ruling on a motion to remand, courts 

consider “real evidence and the reality of what is at stake in the litigation, using 

reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant’s theory of damages exposure.” Ibarra, 

775 F.3d at 1198. The evidence must be “summary-judgment-type evidence,” such as 

affidavits or declarations provided by the removing defendant. Singer v. State Farm Mut. 

Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997); see Moreno v. Ignite Rest. Grp., No. C 13-

05091 SI, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37035, at *11, *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014) (finding a 

declaration sufficient to establish the number of class members). At the summary 

judgment stage, district courts consider evidence with content that would be admissible at 

trial, even if the form of the evidence would not be admissible at trial. See Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 

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410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the content of the declaration in another form could 

be admissible at trial. Additionally, Plaintiff does not submit any proof or even argue

that the class size is fewer than 100 members. Thus, Aurobindo USA has shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the class size exceeds 100 members. See Dart, 135 S. 

Ct. at 554 (explaining that when a defendant’s assertion is challenged, “both sides submit 

proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-incontroversy requirement has been satisfied”).

3. Amount in Controversy

Finally, Plaintiff argues Aurobindo USA has not established “by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.” Doc. No. 5-1 at 3. 

Plaintiff contends that actual damages, replacements costs, and disgorgement of profits

would only yield “a total of $1,174,500.” Doc. No. 5-1 at 6. According to Mr. Murdock, 

the replacement cost for recalled medication would total “in excess of $11,000,000 . . . 

before consideration of any other category of damages sought by plaintiff including 

statutory penalties, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.” Doc. No. 14-3 at 3. The 

parties agree that an estimate of replacement cost damages can be calculated by 

multiplying the number of tablets distributed in California by the estimated replacement 

cost for each variation of Valsartan. 

First, the Court determines the number of tablets distributed in California for each 

variation of Valsartan. Plaintiff asserts that the Court cannot determine the number of 

tablets at issue because Aurobindo USA has not shown how many of those tablets were 

distributed to persons. See Doc. No. 5-1; Doc. No. 15. However, as discussed 

previously, Plaintiff defines the putative class as “[a]ll persons or entities who purchased 

or used Defendants’ contaminated Valsartan in California.” See Compl. ¶ 17. Because 

Plaintiff includes “entities” in the proposed class, all tablets distributed to California are 

relevant to the amount in controversy. 

Aurobindo USA provides evidence that more than 36.5 million tablets were 

distributed in California during the relevant time frame. See Murdock Decl. ¶¶ 11-16. 

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Specifically, Mr. Murdock declares that 30,843,360 tablets of Valsartan; 5,505,660 

tablets of Valsartan HCTZ; and 180,000 tablets of Amlodipine Valsartan were delivered 

to California during the class period. Id. As such, Aurobindo USA has shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that 36.5 million tablets were distributed in California 

during the relevant time frame. 

Second, the Court must determine the replacement cost for each variation of the 

Valsartan tablets. Plaintiff argues that the Medicaid Federal Upper Limit (“FUL”) is “a 

good proxy for the class” in determining the value of each tablet. Doc. No. 5-1 at 6. 

Plaintiff further contends the FUL for Valsartan HCTZ 320 mg/12.5 mg is $0.29 per 

tablet, and that this valuation should be used to calculate the replacement cost damages. 

Id. Notably, Plaintiff neither cites legal authority nor provides evidence that the FUL for 

Valsartan HCTZ 320 mg/12.5 mg is $0.29 per tablet. See id. Conversely, Aurobindo 

USA explains that the FUL varies depending on the type and dosage of each tablet. Doc. 

No. 14 at 5. In addition, Aurobindo USA proffers evidence demonstrating the FUL value 

for each variation and dosage of Valsartan at issue, as of December 2018. See Murdock 

Decl. ¶ 27. According to Mr. Murdock, the cost of one tablet of Valsartan varies from 

$0.45 to $1.19. See id. Plaintiff does not argue these FUL prices are inaccurate.2 See

Doc. No. 15 at 4-5. As such, the preponderance of the evidence supports the FUL 

valuations provided by Aurobindo USA. 

As indicated previously, the Court multiplies the quantity of tablets by the FUL 

value for each variation and dosage of Valsartan to estimate replacement cost damages. 

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, the estimated replacement cost damages 

amount to $24,372,901.48 as follows:

 

2

Instead, Plaintiff argues Aurobindo USA’s calculation of damages using a separate valuation – the National 

Average Drug Acquisitions Costs (“NADAC”) – does not exceed $5 million. Doc. No. 15 at 4-5. However, 

Aurobindo USA does not argue the Court should use the NADAC price, and Plaintiff argues the FUL is a “good 

proxy” to calculate damages. See Doc. Nos. 5-1 at 6; 14 at 4-6. In any event, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s 

proposed FUL would also result in replacement cost damages in excess of $5 million ($0.29 x 36.5 million=$10.5 

million).

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Medication & Dose Quantity FUL Est. Replacement Cost

Valsartan 40 mg 2,815,200 $ 0.543144 $ 1,529,058.99 

Valsartan 80 mg 7,948,800 $ 0.637534 $ 5,067,630.26 

Valsartan 160 mg 13,085,280 $ 0.684268 $ 8,953,838.38 

Valsartan 320 mg 6,994,080 $ 0.824999 $ 5,770,109.01 

Valsartan HCTZ 320 mg/12.5 mg 926,460 $ 0.523385 $ 484,895.27 

Valsartan HCTZ 160 mg/12.5 mg 1,594,080 $ 0.519986 $ 828,899.28 

Valsartan HCTZ 320 mg/25 mg 1,352,160 $ 0.581555 $ 786,355.41 

Valsartan HCTZ 80 mg/12.5 mg 721,440 $ 0.544590 $ 392,889.01 

Valsartan HCTZ 160 mg/25 mg 911,520 $ 0.453912 $ 413,749.87 

Amlodipine Valsartan 5 mg/160 mg 76,320 $ 0.598834 $ 45,703.01 

Amlodipine Valsartan 10 mg/160 mg 21,600 $ 0.711352 $ 15,365.20 

Amlodipine Valsartan 10 mg/320 mg 36,000 $ 1.193140 $ 42,953.04 

Amlodipine Valsartan 5 mg/320 mg 46,080 $ 0.899626 $ 41,454.77 

TOTAL $ 24,372,901.48 

In light of the fact that the amount in controversy already exceeds $5 million, the 

Court declines to address the remaining arguments with respect to amount in controversy.

C. Conclusion

In review, Aurobindo USA has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 

there are more than 100 class members and the amount in controversy exceeds $5 

million. As such, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand.

MOTION TO STAY

Aurobindo USA moves the Court to stay all proceedings in this action until either 

“30 days after the JPML has ruled [on Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the CTO], if the JPML 

denies transfer” or “the date set by the transferee court, if the JPML grants transfer.” Doc. 

No. 6-1 at 5. 

The Court’s power to stay proceedings is “incidental to the power inherent in every 

court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort 

for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 

(1936). When determining whether to stay proceedings pending a JPML transfer, courts 

evaluate factors such as “(1) potential prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) hardship and 

inequity to the moving party if the action is not stayed; and (3) the judicial resources that 

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would be saved by avoiding duplicative litigation if the cases are in fact consolidated.” 

Rivers, 980 F. Supp. at 1360. Whether to stay an action is a matter entrusted to the 

discretion of the district court. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55 (“How this can best be 

done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and 

maintain an even balance.”).

Aurobindo USA avers that staying the action “would serve the principle aims of 

multidistrict litigation—preserving resources of the courts and litigants and avoiding 

inconsistent decisions on the same pretrial issues—by allowing a single transferee court to 

coordinate discovery and to consider the common legal and factual pretrial issues together 

and issue consistent rulings on such issues.” Doc. No. 6-1 at 6. Additionally, Aurobindo 

USA contends “consistence and economy will be served” by preventing duplicative 

actions, such as answering or otherwise responding to Plaintiff’s complaint and engaging 

in other pretrial matters, such as discovery. Id. Plaintiff counters that imposing an 

indefinite stay would not promote judicial efficiency and would prejudice Plaintiff. Doc. 

No. 13 at 4-5. Plaintiff also asserts that Aurobindo USA will not be prejudiced if a stay is 

denied. Id. at 5-6. However, the bulk of Plaintiff’s argument is directed at Plaintiff’s 

motion to remand and Aurobindo USA’s deadline to file an answer.3 See id. at 4-6. 

Here, the motion to vacate the CTO is fully briefed, this Court has resolved 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand, and Aurobindo USA has already filed an answer to 

Plaintiff’s complaint. See Doc. No. 6-1 at 5; see also Doc. No. 17. Thus, a stay will not 

prejudice Plaintiff with respect to the motion to remand or responsive pleading deadline. 

Additionally, as the motion to vacate the CTO is fully briefed, the stay will be of limited 

duration, and it is unlikely that any damage will result from the granting of a stay. 

 

3 Plaintiff asserts that an action removed from state court “solely under CAFA . . . cannot be transferred to an 

MDL.” Doc. No. 15 at 2 (citing In re: Darvocet, 939 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2013)). Plaintiff is 

incorrect. The JPML in In re: Darvocet held that CAFA limited the JPML’s authority to transfer actions removed 

as “mass actions.” In re: Darvocet, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 1378-81. In fact, the JPML noted that “CAFA was 

intended . . . to expand access to federal multidistrict litigation for such newly-removable [class] actions.” Id. at 

1378. This case is not a mass action and this case can be transferred to an MDL. 

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Further, a stay will save both party and judicial resources with respect to discovery and 

other pretrial proceedings. Finally, deference to the JPML allows for the uniformity, 

consistency, and predictability in litigation that underlies the MDL system. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1407. 

Accordingly, the Court finds a stay is warranted pending the JPML’s ruling on 

Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the CTO. Therefore, the Court GRANTS IN PART

Aurobindo USA’s motion to stay the case.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. No. 

5) and GRANTS IN PART Aurobindo USA’s motion to stay (Doc. No. 6). The case is 

STAYED pending the JPML’s final determination on whether this case should be 

transferred to MDL No. 2875. The stay will automatically lift upon the JPML’s final 

order regarding transferring the matter to the District of New Jersey. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 16, 2019

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