Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-17031/USCOURTS-ca9-18-17031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEZMOND C. MITCHELL,

AKA Lezmond Charles

Mitchell,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 18-17031

D.C. Nos.

3:09-cv-08089-DGC

3:01-cr-01062-DGC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 13, 2019

Phoenix, Arizona

Filed April 30, 2020

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Morgan Christen,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Concurrence by Judge Christen;

Concurrence by Judge Hurwitz

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 1 of 35
2 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

SUMMARY*

Criminal / Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) / 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Lezmond

Mitchell’s motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief

from the district court’s denial of his 2009 motion for

authorization to interview jurors at his 2003 criminal trial in

order to investigate potential juror misconduct.

Mitchell argued that the Supreme Court’s intervening

decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855

(2017), which held that jury statements demonstrating racial

animus could be admissible in a proceeding inquiring into the

validity of the verdict, changed the law governing requests to

interview jurors for evidence of racial bias, and that this

change constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying

relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

The panel held that the district court had jurisdiction to

decide the Rule 60(b) motion. The panel explained that the

motion, which at best would give Mitchell the opportunity to

attempt to develop a claim that the jurors were biased, does

not present a substantive claim on the merits and thus is not

a disguised second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

The panel held that Mitchell presents no extraordinary

circumstances or district court errors that would justify

reopening his case, and that the district court therefore did not

abuse its discretion by denying the Rule 60(b) motion. The

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 2 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 3

panel explained that although Peña-Rodriguez established a

new exception to Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), which generally

prohibits jurors from testifying regarding their deliberations,

this change in law left untouched the law governing

investigating and interviewing jurors and thus did not give

rise to “extraordinary circumstances” for purposes of Rule

60(b).

Concurring, Judge Christen wrote that it is worth pausing

to consider why Mitchell, who did not receive the death

penalty for his murder convictions, faces the prospect of

being the first person to be executed by the federal

government for an intra-Indian crime, committed in Indian

country, by virtue of a conviction for carjacking resulting in

death.

Concurring, Judge Hurwitz wrote to suggest that the

current Executive take a fresh look at the wisdom of imposing

the death penalty in this case in which the crimes were

committed by a Navajo against Navajos entirely within the

territory of the sovereign Navajo Nation, and where the

Navajo Nation, and members of the victims’ family, have

opposed imposition of the death penalty on the defendant.

COUNSEL

Jonathan C. Aminoff (argued) and Celeste Bacchi, Deputy

Federal Public Defenders; Amy M. Karlin, Interim Federal

Public Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los

Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 3 of 35
4 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

William G. Voit (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Krissa M. Lanham, Deputy Appellate Chief; Michael Bailey,

United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office,

Phoenix, Arizona; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

In May 2009, Lezmond Mitchell asked the district court

for authorization to interview the jurors at his criminal trial in

order to investigate potential juror misconduct. The district

court denied the motion because Mitchell identified no

evidence of juror misconduct, and therefore failed to show

good cause. In March 2018, Mitchell filed a motion under

Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for

relief from the 2009 ruling. Mitchell argued that the Supreme

Court’s intervening decision in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,

137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), changed the law governing requests to

interview jurors for evidence of racial bias, and that this

change constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying

relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The district court denied this

motion as well. We affirm.

I

A

We have described the facts of this case in detail in two

prior opinions, see United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931

(9th Cir. 2007) (direct appeal) (“Mitchell I”); Mitchell v.

United States, 790 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2015) (appeal of denial

of motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (“Mitchell II”), so we

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 4 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 5

summarize them only briefly. In October 2001, Mitchell and

three accomplices plotted to carjack a vehicle to use in an

armed robbery of a trading post on the Navajo reservation. 

Mitchell and an accomplice, Johnny Orsinger, abducted 63-

year-old Alyce Slim and her 9-year-old granddaughter in

Slim’s GMC pickup truck. Somewhere near Sawmill,

Arizona, Mitchell and Orsinger killed Slim, stabbing her

33 times and moving her mutilated body to the back seat next

to her granddaughter. After driving the truck into the

mountains, Mitchell dragged Slim’s body out of the car and

ordered the granddaughter to get out of the truck and “lay

down and die.” Mitchell slit her throat twice, and then

dropped rocks on her head to finish her off. Mitchell and

Orsinger later returned to the scene to conceal evidence. 

They severed the heads and hands of both victims and pulled

their torsos into the woods. Mitchell and Orsinger also

burned the victims’ clothing, jewelry, and glasses.

Three days after the murders, Mitchell and two

accomplices drove the GMC pickup truck to the trading post. 

Once there, they struck the store manager with a shotgun,

threatened another employee, and stole some $5,530 from the

store. Mitchell and his accomplices drove the GMC pickup

truck back to a location where one of the accomplices had

parked his own vehicle. Mitchell set the truck on fire and left

the scene in the other vehicle.

A Navajo police officer discovered the pickup truck a

mile and a half south of a town within the Navajo Indian

reservation. Criminal investigators discovered evidence in

the truck connecting Mitchell to both the robbery and the

murders. When the FBI arrested Mitchell at an accomplice’s

house, Mitchell (who was in bed) “asked for his pants, which

he told an FBI agent were near a bunk bed on the floor.” 

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 5 of 35
6 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

Mitchell I, 502 F.3d at 944. When the agent picked them up,

“a silver butterfly knife fell from a pocket.” Id. After the

accomplice and his mother consented to a search of the

house, FBI agents retrieved the silver butterfly knife. “Trace

amounts of blood from the silver knife were matched to

Slim.” Id.

After signing a waiver of his Miranda rights, Mitchell

admitted that he had been involved in the robbery and had

been present when “things happened” to Slim and her

granddaughter. Id. He directed Navajo police officers to the

site where he and Orsinger had buried the bodies, and he told

the officers “that he had stabbed the ‘old lady,’ and that the

evidence would show and/or witnesses would say that he had

cut the young girl’s throat twice.” Id. at 944–45. He also

admitted that “he and Orsinger[had] gathered rocks, and with

Orsinger leading on, the two took turns dropping them on [the

granddaughter’s] head.” Id. “Mitchell indicated that he and

Orsinger retrieved an axe and shovel, severed the heads and

hands, buried the parts in a foot-deep hole, burned the

victims’ clothing, and cleaned the knives in a stream.” Id.

Mitchell stated that it was Orsinger’s idea to sever the

victims’ heads and hands “because [Mitchell] would also

have severed the feet.” Id.

Mitchell was indicted for eleven crimes, including

premeditated first degree murder, armed carjacking resulting

in death, felony murder, robbery, kidnapping, and use of a

firearm in a crime of violence. The government filed a notice

of intent to seek the death penalty as to Mitchell based on the

charge of carjacking resulting in death.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 6 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 7

Jury selection in Mitchell’s trial began on April 1, 2003.1

Potential jurors filled out prescreening questionnaires, and

were subjected to a twelve-day voir dire in which they were

asked questions about their qualifications, including their

ability to be impartial towards Native Americans. A petit

jury, including one member of the Navajo Nation, convicted

Mitchell on all counts.

The penalty phase began on May 14, 2003. Consistent

with the Federal Death PenaltyAct, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598,

the district court instructed the jury that “in your

consideration of whether the death sentence is appropriate,

you must not consider the race, color, religious beliefs,

national origin, or sex of either the defendant or the victims,”

and that “[y]ou are not to return a sentence of death unless

you would return a sentence of death for the crime in question

without regard to race, color, religious beliefs, national

origin, or sex of either the defendant or any victim.” See

18 U.S.C. § 3593(f). In addition, the jury was required to

“return to the court a certificate, signed by each juror, that

consideration of the race, color, religious beliefs, national

origin, or sex of the defendant or any victim was not involved

in reaching his or her individual decision and that the

individual juror would have made the same recommendation

regarding a sentence for the crime in question no matter what

the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the

defendant or any victim may be.” Id. Each juror signed the

certificate. Mitchell I, 502 F.3d at 990.

In order to impose the death penalty under the Federal

Death Penalty Act, the jury was required to “unanimously

1 Then District Judge Mary Murguia presided over the trial and

sentencing.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 7 of 35
8 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

find beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was

18 years of age or older at the time of the offense; (2) the

defendant had at least one of four enumerated mentes reae

(often referred to as ‘gateway intent factors’); and (3) the

existence of at least one of sixteen statutorily defined

aggravating factors.” Id. at 973 (internal citations omitted). 

Here, the jury found the four gateway intent factors, the

necessarystatutoryaggravating factors, and one non-statutory

aggravating factor. Id. at 946. “After weighing the

aggravating and mitigating factors, the jury recommended

imposition of a sentence of death.” Id.

The court sentenced Mitchell to death on September 15,

2003. As the jurors were discharged, the district judge stated:

You are free to talk about the case with

anyone or not talk about it as you wish. If

someone asks you about the case, and you

don’t want to talk about it, just advise them of

the fact and they will honor your request.

The lawyers will be standing in the hallway as

you exit. If you choose to talk to them, if you

have any questions for them, you may

approach them and ask them questions. 

They’ve been instructed not to approach you. 

It’s only if you want to talk or discuss the case

with lawyers on either side as you wish, you

may do. So if you decide to just exit the

building, you may.

On direct appeal, Mitchell contended that the procedures

used to empanel jurors caused an under-representation of

Native Americans. Id. at 949–50. Mitchell also argued that

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 8 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 9

his constitutional rights “were violated when the government

elicited testimony bearing on race, religion and cultural

heritage, and made statements in closing argument

impermissibly plying on the same factors.” Id. at 989. We

rejected these arguments. With respect to the government’s

statements in closing, we “accept[ed]the jurors’ assurance [in

their certifications] that no impermissible considerations of

race or religion factored into the verdict.” Id. at 990.

Mitchell alleged additional errors related to race and

religion at the penalty phase. He argued that the government

erred by suggesting, in closing, that “Mitchell turned his back

on his religious and cultural heritage.” Id. at 994–95. We

rejected this argument as well. Because Mitchell had

introduced a letter from the Attorney General of the Navajo

Nation indicating opposition to capital punishment and relied

on this evidence in mitigation, we held that “it was not plainly

erroneous for the government to challenge the credibility of

Mitchell’s reliance.” Id. at 995.

B

Nearly six years later, in May 2009, Mitchell filed a

motion in the district court requesting to interview members

of the jury in order to ascertain “whether any member of the

jury panel engaged in ex parte contacts, considered

extrajudicial evidence, allowed bias or prejudice to cloud

their judgment, or intentionallyconcealed or failed to disclose

material information relating to their qualifications to serve

as jurors in [his] case.”

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 9 of 35
10 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

Mitchell’s request to interview jurors was governed by

District of Arizona Local Rule Civil 39.2,2 which requires a

defendant seeking permission to interview jurors to file

“written interrogatories proposed to be submitted to the

juror(s), together with an affidavit setting forth the reasons

for such proposed interrogatories, within the time granted for

a motion for a new trial.” The rule provides that permission

to interview jurors “will be granted only upon the showing of

good cause.” Mitchell argued that good cause existed

because an investigation into potential juror misconduct was

a necessary part of any federal capital post-conviction

investigation. Despite lacking evidence of juror impropriety,

Mitchell speculated that jurors could have been affected by

the prosecutor’s comment regarding Mitchell’s turning his

back on the Navajo religion. In connection with this

argument, Mitchell cited United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d

1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001), to support his argument that Rule

2

 Local Rule Civil 39.2(b) states:

Interviews with jurors after trial by or on behalf of

parties involved in the trial are prohibited except on

condition that the attorney or party involved desiring

such an interview file with the Court written

interrogatories proposed to be submitted to the juror(s),

together with an affidavit setting forth the reasons for

such proposed interrogatories, within the time granted

for a motion for a new trial. Approval for the interview

of jurors in accordance with the interrogatories and

affidavit so filed will be granted only upon the showing

of good cause. See Federal Rules of Evidence,

Rule 606(b).

This rule is made applicable to criminal cases by Local Rule Criminal

24.2.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 10 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 11

606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,

3 which generally

prohibits jurors from testifying regarding their deliberations,

cannot preclude evidence regarding jurors’ racial or religious

bias. Mitchell also speculated that the jurors might have been

affected by publicity about the trial, or might have been

influenced by outside sources.

The district court denied Mitchell’s request. The court

ruled that Mitchell had not complied with the procedural

requirements of Local Rule 39.2, because the motion was

untimely and Mitchell had failed to file proposed

interrogatories to the jurors or submit an affidavit setting

3

 Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or

Indictment.

(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an

inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a

juror may not testify about any statement made or

incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations;

the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s

vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the

verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a

juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on

these matters.

(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether:

(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly

brought to the jury’s attention;

(B) an outside influence was improperly broughtto bear

on any juror; or

(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the

verdict form.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 11 of 35
12 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

forth reasons for interrogatories. In any event, the court held

that Mitchell had failed to establish “good cause,” as required

by Local Rule 39.2, because there was no preliminary

showing of juror misconduct; rather Mitchell’s allegations of

juror misconduct were “based on wholesale speculation.” 

According to the court, the prosecutor’s statement that

Mitchell “turned his back on his religious and cultural

heritage” did not raise a potential for juror bias because the

Ninth Circuit had determined on direct appeal that the

statement was not improper. Moreover, the court reasoned

that any testimony regarding the subjective effect of the

prosecutor’s statements on the jury’s deliberation would be

barred by Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

Further, Mitchell had provided no evidence that prejudicial

news articles about his case existed or that any juror saw such

articles. The district court concluded that in the absence of

any showing of juror misconduct or any other basis for good

cause, Mitchell was not entitled to interview jurors.

C

After the denial of his request under Local Rule 39.2,

Mitchell brought a federal habeas motion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to challenge his sentence on multiple grounds,

primarily focusing on ineffective assistance of counsel. His

eleventh claim (Claim K) alleged that the district court had

violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments by denying

his request to interview the jurors. According to Mitchell,

denying his interview request deprived him of the opportunity

to ensure that his jury was impartial and that the verdict was

reliable. The district court rejected Claim K because it

alleged an “error in a postconviction proceeding, not at trial

or sentencing,” and therefore failed to state a cognizable

claim for relief under § 2255. See Franzen v. Brinkman,

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 12 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 13

877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989). The district court did not

grant a certificate of appealability for this claim. On appeal,

we denied a certificate of appealability with respect to all

uncertified claims and affirmed the district court’s denial of

Mitchell’s § 2255 motion. Mitchell II, 790 F.3d at 894 & n.7.

D

Two years after Mitchell II, the Supreme Court decided

Peña-Rodriguez, which held that, notwithstanding Rule

606(b), juror statements demonstrating racial animus could

be admissible as evidence. 137 S. Ct. at 869. Nearly a year

later, in March 2018, Mitchell filed a motion under Rule

60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking

relief from the district court’s judgment in light of PeñaRodriguez.4 Although Mitchell’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion

ostensibly sought to reopen his § 2255 proceeding, it actually

challenged the district court’s denial of his May 2009 request

to interview jurors. The district court5denied the motion, and

Mitchell timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of

discretion, Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir.

4

 Rule 60(b)(6) provides:

(b) Grounds for Relieffroma Final Judgment, Order, or

Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may

relieve a party or its legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following

reasons: . . . (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

5

Judge David Campbell was assigned to the case after Judge Murguia

was appointed to the Ninth Circuit.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 13 of 35
14 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

2008), but we review questions of law underlying the district

court’s decision de novo, Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 984

(9th Cir. 2017). We review de novo whether a § 2255 motion

is an unauthorized second or successive motion. See Jones v.

Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2013).

II

Before addressing the merits of Mitchell’s Rule 60(b)(6)

motion, we must first determine whether the district court had

jurisdiction to hear it. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Washington

v. United States, 653 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2011). We

conclude that it did.

Under Rule 60(b), a court may “relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding”

for specified reasons, including the catchall “any other reason

that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In Gonzalez v.

Crosby, the Court held that, like other Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 60(b) applies in the habeas context “only to

the extent that it is not inconsistent with applicable federal

statutory provisions and rules.” 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005)

(cleaned up). This means that Rule 60(b) does not apply to

the extent it is inconsistent with the habeas rules’ limitations

on second or successive applications. Id. at 529–30; see

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h).6

6 Although Gonzalez addressed only the extent to which Rule 60(b)

is inconsistent with § 2244 (the provision providing the second-orsuccessive bar for habeas petitions filed by state prisoners under § 2254),

545 U.S. at 529 n.3, we held in United States v. Buenrostro that the

reasoning in Gonzalez applies equally to § 2255 motions filed by federal

prisoners. 638 F.3d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 2011). But see Williams v. United

States, 927 F.3d 427, 434–36 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that § 2244(b)(1)’s

prohibition on claims in a second or successive petition that were not

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 14 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 15

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA), a district court has only limited authority

to hear a claim presented in a second or successive habeas

motion. The court must deny a second or successive motion

unless the court of appeals first certifies that the motion relies

on a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively

applicable or presents new evidence that meets the criteria set

forth in § 2255(h). See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 149

(2007); Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–32.

According to the Supreme Court, these rules require

courts to examine Rule 60(b) motions carefully in order to

determine whether they raise “claims.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S.

at 530–31. If a Rule 60(b) motion raises a claim, it “is in

substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated

accordingly.” Id. at 531. In other words, a Rule 60(b) motion

presenting a claim cannot proceed without certification from

the court of appeals; otherwise, “Rule 60(b) would

impermissibly circumvent” the second or successive bar. Id.

at 531–32.

A Rule 60(b) motion advances a “claim” for purposes of

AEDPA when it contains an “asserted federal basis for relief

from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” Id. at 530. As

explained in Gonzalez, an argument is a “claim” if it

“substantively addresses federal grounds” for setting aside a

prisoner’s conviction. Id. at 533. This includes an argument

seeking to add a new ground for relief, or attacking the

federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits. 

Id. at 532. It also includes a request to present “‘newly

discovered evidence’ in support of a claim previously

raised in a prior habeas petition does not apply to motions made by federal

prisoners under § 2255).

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 15 of 35
16 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

denied,” or an argument “contend[ing] that a subsequent

change in substantive law is a ‘reason justifying relief.’” Id.

at 531 (internal citation omitted); accord Washington,

653 F.3d at 1063. An “attack based on the movant’s own

conduct, or his habeas counsel’s omission . . . in effect asks

for a second chance to have the merits determined favorably”

and amounts to a claim. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.5.

However, not all arguments in a Rule 60(b) motion

constitute claims. Gonzalez gave examples of challenges that

could be included in a Rule 60(b) motion without turning it

into a second or successive habeas motion. For instance, an

argument that a court’s procedural error precluded a prisoner

from obtaining a merits determination does not raise a habeas

“claim.” Id. at 532 n.4. Procedural errors include errors in

determining whether the prisoner had exhausted state

remedies, whether the prisoner had procedurally defaulted a

claim, or whether a claim was time-barred. See id. Nor does

a motion asserting some defect in the integrity of a habeas

proceeding, such as a claim of fraud on the federal habeas

court, advance a “claim.” Id. at 532 n.5.

The government argues that even if a Rule 60(b) motion

does not present a claim on its face, it should be treated as a

disguised second or successive § 2255 motion if its end goal

is to discover and assert a claim. The government relies on

a Fifth Circuit case in which a federal prisoner brought a

Rule 60(b)(6) motion claiming that the district court had

erroneously denied his request to interview jurors regarding

potential racial bias. In re Robinson, 917 F.3d 856, 861–66

(5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom., Robinson v. United

States, No. 19-5535, 2020 WL 872217 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020). 

The prisoner argued that his motion was not a disguised

second or successive § 2255 motion because he was

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 16 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 17

challenging a procedural “defect in the integrity of the habeas

proceedings.” Id. at 864. The Fifth Circuit rejected this

characterization of the § 2255 motion because the district

court had not made any procedural error in denying habeas

discovery. Id. at 865. Because the § 2255 motion was not

challenging a procedural defect, the Fifth Circuit concluded

that the prisoner’s request to interview jurors regarding racial

bias had to be viewed as “attempting to advance a new habeas

claim related to jury impartiality” and constituted a second or

successive § 2255 motion. Id.

We decline to follow In re Robinson. The Fifth Circuit

read Gonzalez as holding that a prisoner could use a Rule

60(b)(6) motion only for a single category of challenges

(challenges to procedural errors); all other challenges were

forbidden merits-based claims. But, rather than narrowing

the use of Rule 60(b)(6) motions to a single type of challenge,

Gonzalez did the opposite: it excised a single category of

challenges from the arguments that could be raised under

Rule 60(b)(6), holding that a prisoner could not bring a

substantive merits-based claim as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 

Gonzalez did not preclude a prisoner from bringing any other

sort of argument under Rule 60(b)(6).7

Because the Fifth Circuit bifurcated Rule 60(b)(6)

motions into permitted challenges to procedural errors and

merits-based claims, it failed to distinguish between a request

7 Perhaps realizing the gap in its analysis, In re Robinson adds that

“[e]ven if we were to find that Robinson’s impartial-jury claim did not

constitute a second or successive habeas petition, we would undoubtedly

conclude that he fails to show that, as a result of the denial of his

discovery request, extraordinary circumstances exist to justify the

reopening of the final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).” 917 F.3d at 866

n.18 (cleaned up) (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535).

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 17 of 35
18 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

for evidence to develop a possible new claim and an effort to

bolster a prior claim, concluding that both fell within the

category of disallowed substantive challenges. Again, we

disagree. Consistent with Gonzalez, we have held that a

request for “newly discovered evidence in support of a claim

previously denied” qualifies as a “claim.” Wood v. Ryan,

759 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gonzalez,

545 U.S. at 531) (holding that a state prisoner’s Rule 60(b)(6)

motion seeking relief from the district court’s denial of his

motion for evidentiarydevelopment in support of a previously

denied ineffective assistance of counsel claim was a second

or successive petition); see also Washington, 653 F.3d

at 1065 (holding that a motion seeking “a fresh opportunity

to air the arguments that failed at . . . trial” was a second or

successive § 2255 motion) (emphasis added).

But Gonzalez did not hold that a prisoner’s request to

develop evidence for a potential new claim also qualifies as

a “claim.” Such a request does not meet Gonzalez’s

definition of a substantive merits-based claim because it does

not assert a federal basis for relief from the prisoner’s

conviction or sentence. Here, for instance, Mitchell’s Rule

60(b)(6) motion argues that the district court erred in denying

Mitchell’s request to interview the jurors who recommended

the death penalty. Mitchell does not claim that the correction

of this alleged error would entitle him to relief or affect the

validity of his conviction or sentence. Nor does Mitchell seek

to present newly discovered evidence to support a prior claim

or argue that a change in law justifies relief from his

conviction or sentence. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531. At

most, a favorable ruling would give Mitchell the opportunity

to attempt to develop a claim that the jurors were biased. 

Because Mitchell’s motion does not present a substantive

claim on the merits, “allowing the motion to proceed as

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 18 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 19

denominated creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute

or rules.” Id. at 533. Therefore, we conclude that Mitchell’s

motion is not a disguised second or successive § 2255 habeas

motion, and the district court had jurisdiction to decide his

Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

III

We therefore turn to whether Mitchell has established

“‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a

final judgment.” Id. at 535 (quoting Ackermann v. United

States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). In considering whether

there is an “extraordinary” circumstance for purposes of a

Rule 60(b)(6) motion, we consider a number of factors,

including the “degree of connection between the

extraordinary circumstance and the decision for which

reconsideration is sought.” Hall, 861 F.3d at 987 (citing

Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1135–40 (9th Cir. 2009)). 

Said otherwise, we consider whether the alleged

extraordinary circumstance, such as a change in the law, was

material to the prisoner’s claim.

A

“[A] change in intervening law” can constitute an

extraordinary circumstance. Id. at 987–88. Gonzalez made

clear, however, that not every change in intervening law

“provides cause for reopening cases long since final.”

545 U.S. at 536; see also Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1401

(11th Cir. 1987) (“[S]omething more than a ‘mere’ change in

the law is necessary to provide the grounds for Rule 60(b)(6)

relief.”). For instance, Gonzalez held that a Supreme Court

decision that changed an interpretation of controlling law was

not an “extraordinary circumstance” even though it would

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 19 of 35
20 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

have saved a prisoner’s habeas petition from being timebarred. 545 U.S. at 537–38. According to the Court,

development of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in a

particular area does not necessarily justify “reopening cases

long since final”; indeed, it is “hardly extraordinary” that the

Supreme Court arrives at a different interpretation of the law

after a prisoner’s case is no longer pending. Id. at 536. 

Moreover, where an argument is available and raised by other

litigants (and even litigated all the way to the Supreme

Court), but the prisoner did not diligently pursue the

argument, the change in law is “all the less extraordinary.” 

Id. at 537. Thus, a mere development in jurisprudence, as

opposed to an unexpected change, does not constitute an

extraordinary circumstance for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6).

B

Mitchell argues that Peña-Rodriguez was an intervening

change in law that constituted an extraordinary circumstance

requiring the district court to give Mitchell relief from the

prior order denying his request to interview jurors. In

addressing this argument, we consider the legal history

leading up to the decision in Peña-Rodriguez.

We have long imposed restrictions on lawyers seeking

access to jurors. These rules derive their authority from the

common law, where “judges placed the veil of secrecy about

jury deliberations.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199,

201 (9th Cir. 1954). Rules restricting lawyers’ access to

jurors “(1) encourage freedom of discussion in the jury room;

(2) reduce the number of meritless post-trial motions;

(3) increase the finality of verdicts; and (4) further Federal

Rule of Evidence 606(b) by protecting jurors from

harassment and the jury system from post-verdict scrutiny.” 

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 20 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 21

Cuevas v. United States, 317 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Indeed, “[i]t is incumbent upon the courts to protect jurors

from the annoyance and harassment of such conduct,” Bryson

v. United States, 238 F.2d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1956), and “it is

improper and unethical for lawyers to interview jurors to

discover what was the course of deliberation of a trial jury,”

People of Territory of Guam v. Marquez, 963 F.2d 1311,

1315 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Smith v. Cupp, 457 F.2d 1098,

1100 (9th Cir. 1972)). Therefore, in cases where there has

been no showing of juror misconduct, we have held that a

district court “d[oes] not abuse [its] discretion in refusing to

allow postverdict interrogation of jurors.” United States v.

Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 752 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding an

earlier version of the District of Arizona local rule restricting

access to jurors in the absence of “some showing of sufficient

reason”). We have also held that a district court’s “denial of

a motion to interrogate jurors” does not raise a constitutional

problem where “there has been no specific claim of jury

misconduct.” Smith, 457 F.2d at 1100.

The judicial authority to exercise discretion regarding

whether to grant lawyers permission to conduct jury

interviews also undergirds Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules

of Evidence, which also stems fromlong-established common

law rules. Rule 606(b) generally provides that a juror may

not testify about statements and incidents that occurred

during the jury’s deliberations. Specifically, “[d]uring an

inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror

may not testify about any statement made or incident that

occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of

anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s

mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.” Fed.

R. Evid. 606(b)(1). Further, a court “may not receive a

juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 21 of 35
22 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

matters.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1).8 This “no-impeachment

rule” “promotes full and vigorous discussion by providing

jurors with considerable assurance that after being discharged

they will not be summoned to recount their deliberations, and

they will not otherwise be harassed or annoyed by litigants

seeking to challenge the verdict,” and “gives stability and

finality to verdicts.” Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865.

Prior to Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court had declined

to recognize any exceptions (other than those in Rule 606(b))

to the no-impeachment rule. In Tanner v. United States, for

instance, the Court “rejected a Sixth Amendment exception

for evidence that some jurors were under the influence of

drugs and alcohol during the trial,” based on the “existing,

significant safeguards for a defendant’s right to an impartial

and competent jury,” such as voir dire, the opportunity to

observe jurors during trial, and the opportunity for jurors to

report misconduct before a verdict is rendered. PeñaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866 (citing Tanner v. United States,

483 U.S. 107, 125–27 (1987)); see also Warger v. Shauers,

574 U.S. 40, 47–48 (2014).

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s historical hesitance

to interfere with the operation of Rule 606(b), we have long

explained that the protections provided by this evidence rule

are not absolute. See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120. Noting the

longstanding “conflict between protecting a defendant’s right

to a fair trial, free of racial bias, and protecting the secrecy

8 Rule 606(b) contain several exceptions, allowing a juror to testify

about whether “(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly

brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly

brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the

verdict on the verdict form.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2).

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 22 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 23

and sanctity of jury deliberations,” we suggested that there

may be an exception to Rule 606(b) in cases where there was

evidence of juror racial bias. Id. at 1119. Although we did

not decide “whether or to what extent the rule prohibits juror

testimony concerning racist statements made during

deliberations,” id. at 1121, we agreed that “a powerful case

can be made that Rule 606(b) is wholly inapplicable to racial

bias,” id. at 1120.

Vindicating our views in Henley, Peña-Rodriguez

subsequently recognized an exception to Rule 606(b) to allow

jurors to testify about statements showing racial bias. In

Peña-Rodriguez, a criminal defendant was convicted of

unlawful sexual contact and harassment for sexually

assaulting two teenage sisters. 137 S. Ct. at 861. After the

jury was discharged, two jurors told the defendant’s counsel

that another juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias against the

defendant and the defendant’s alibi witness during

deliberations. Id. According to the jurors’ affidavits, the

biased juror stated he thought the defendant was guilty

because “Mexican men ha[ve] a bravado that caused them to

believe they could do whatever they wanted with women,”

and made similar statements evincing racial prejudice. Id.

at 862. The trial court denied the prisoner’s motion for a new

trial, finding the affidavits would be inadmissible under Rule

606(b).9 Id.

9 Although the trial court decided the admissibility of the affidavits

under Rule 606(b) of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, the Colorado rule

is substantively identical to its federal counterpart, and the Supreme Court

on appeal analyzed Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. PeñaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864–65.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 23 of 35
24 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sixth

Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury required the

admission of evidence of juror racial bias. Id. at 870. The

Court held that racial bias is a “familiar and recurring evil

that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the

administration of justice.” Id. at 868. According to the

Court, “racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional,

and institutional concerns.” Id. Further, “[a] constitutional

rule that racial bias in the justice system must be

addressed—including, in some instances, after the verdict has

been entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of

confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central

premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.” Id. at 869.

While acknowledging the safeguards that protect the right

to an impartial jury (and urging trial courts to use such

“standard and existing processes designed to prevent racial

bias in jury deliberations,” id. at 871), the Court noted that

“their operation may be compromised, or they may prove

insufficient” in addressing juror prejudice, id. at 868. For

instance, “[t]he stigma that attends racial bias may make it

difficult for a juror to report inappropriate statements during

the course of juror deliberations.” Id. at 869.

In light of these concerns, the Court held that “where a

juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied

on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal

defendant,” then “the Sixth Amendment requires that the noimpeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court

to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any

resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.” Id. The Court

did not set down a rule for determining“[w]hether that

threshold showing has been satisfied” but rather held that

such a decision “is a matter committed to the substantial

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 24 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 25

discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances,

including the content and timing of the alleged statements and

the reliability of the proffered evidence.” Id. The Court

noted that “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial

bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment

bar to allow further judicial inquiry.” Instead, “there must be

a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting

overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and

impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict”

and “the statement must tend to show that racial animus was

a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.” 

Id.

Despite establishing this exception to Rule 606(b), PeñaRodriguez acknowledged and confirmed the longstanding

rules giving trial courts discretion over lawyer efforts to

investigate and interview jurors. The Court stated that “[t]he

practical mechanics of acquiring and presenting such

evidence will no doubt be shaped and guided by state rules of

professional ethics and local court rules, both of which often

limit counsel’s post-trial contact with jurors.” Id. Limits on

contact with jurors “seek to provide jurors some protection

when they return to their daily affairs after the verdict has

been entered” and can be found even in jurisdictions “that

recognize a racial-bias exception” to the no-impeachment

rule. Id. at 869–70. The Court explained that jurors “may

come forward of their own accord” to report racial bias

notwithstanding rules prohibiting lawyers frominitiatingsuch

contact, a practice that “is common in cases involving juror

allegations of racial bias.” Id. (collecting cases).

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 25 of 35
26 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

C

Mitchell’s theory is that Peña-Rodriguez’s recognition of

the threat posed by racial bias to the judicial system worked

a sea change in the law applicable to his case. Although

Peña-Rodriguez’s immediate effect was to make an exception

to the rule precluding admissibility of evidence of racial bias

in jury deliberations under Rule 606(b), Mitchell argues that

this exception would have no practical effect if defendants

could not acquire evidence of juror bias. As a result, Mitchell

reasons, Peña-Rodriguez made an equally significant change

to the precedents allowing district courts to deny lawyers

leave to interrogate jurors and to rules such as Local Rule

39.2, which require lawyers to show good cause before they

can interview jurors. These rules must now be set aside,

according to Mitchell, because they impose an unreasonable

burden on a criminal defendant’s ability to ensure that no

racial bias impacted the jury’s verdict. Therefore, Mitchell

claims, Peña-Rodriguez made a fundamental change in the

law relevant to his request to interview jurors, and as such the

district court was obliged to grant his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

We disagree. Although Peña-Rodriguez established a

new exception to Rule 606(b), this change in law left

untouched the law governing investigating and interviewing

jurors. See Hall, 861 F.3d at 987 (listing the “degree of

connection between the extraordinary circumstance and the

decision for which reconsideration is sought” as a factor for

a court to consider when ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion). 

Indeed, Peña-Rodriguez acknowledged that juror-access rules

would impose limitations on the use of the new racial-bias

exception to Rule 606(b) because “[t]he practical mechanics

of acquiring and presenting such evidence will no doubt be

shaped and guided by state rules of professional ethics and

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 26 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 27

local court rules, both of which often limit counsel’s post-trial

contact with jurors.” 137 S. Ct. at 869; see also id. at 870

(referencing various rules setting limits on juror contacts). 

Rather than override the limitations on lawyers’ access to

jurors, Peña-Rodriguez emphasizes the important purpose of

such limitations in providing “jurors some protection when

they return to their daily affairs after the verdict has been

entered.” Id. at 869.

Because Peña-Rodriguez does not override local court

rules or compel access to jurors, it is not “clearly

irreconcilable” with our precedent, Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 893 (2003) (en banc), and therefore did not

make any change in the law regarding lawyer access to jurors,

let alone one so significant that it would constitute

“extraordinary circumstances” for purposes of Rule 60(b). 

Peña-Rodriguez permits district courts to continue to exercise

their discretion in granting motions to interview jurors, see

Smith, 457 F.2d at 1100, and to implement and adhere to rules

such as Local Rule 39.2 requiring a showing of good cause,

see Eldred, 588 F.2d at 752.

All other circuits that have considered this issue have

reached the same conclusion. The Second Circuit rejected the

argument that Peña-Rodriguez required a district court to

grant a request for juror interviews, and instead upheld a

district court’s denial of a request to interview jurors where

there was no “clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible

evidence” that an impropriety occurred. United States v.

Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 134 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 

As theSecond Circuit explained, Peña-Rodriguez established

“a narrow exception to the no-impeachment rule,” but “d[id]

not address the separate question of what showing must be

made before counsel is permitted to interview jurors postCase: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 27 of 35
28 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

verdict to inquire into potential misconduct.” Id. at 133–34. 

Rather “as to this question, the decision simply reaffirms the

importance of limits on counsel’s post-trial contact with

jurors.” Id. at 134; see also United States v. Birchette,

908 F.3d 50, 55–60 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming the denial of a

request to interview jurors, even when presented with some

evidence of potential racial bias, because the evidence did not

satisfy the local rule’s “good cause” requirement); cf. United

States v. Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 770 (6th Cir. 2017)

(affirming the denial of a motion for a new trial based on

evidence of a juror’s racial bias obtained in violation of local

rules because of Peña-Rodriguez’s “reaffirmation of the

validity of . . . local rules” regulating access to jurors).

Given this conclusion, Mitchell has failed to show an

intervening change in law that constituted extraordinary

circumstances.

D

We reject Mitchell’s other arguments. First, Mitchell

points to the district court’s statement that procedural

safeguards implemented during trial, such as voir dire and the

in-court observation of jurors, helped protect Mitchell’s

conviction from the influence of racial bias, and weighed

against finding “extraordinary circumstances.” Mitchell

argues that the district court erred in making this statement,

because Peña-Rodriguez held that procedural safeguards,

such as those presented in Tanner and its progeny, were

insufficient to protect the right to a fair trial free from racial

bias. This argument fails. Although Peña-Rodriguez

indicated that procedural safeguards might be insufficient by

themselves to protect against racial bias, 137 S. Ct. at 868–69,

it also stated that they could effectively limit the impact of

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 28 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 29

racial bias, id. at 871. Here, the district court took significant

steps to prevent racial bias. Jurors were asked in voir dire

about their attitudes towards Native Americans, were

instructed not to consider race, and were required to sign a

certification attesting that they did not consider race. In

addition, they were given the opportunity to speak with the

lawyers as they left the courtroom. Peña-Rodriguez noted

that these and similar procedural safeguards “deserve

mention” for their role in helping to avoid racial bias in

deliberations. Id.

Second, Mitchell argues that the district court should have

revisited the question whether Mitchell lacked “good cause”

for purposes of Local Rule 39.2 in light of Peña-Rodriguez. 

This argument also fails. Peña-Rodriguez did not change our

controlling precedent on the issue of jury access. Moreover,

the district court did not err in denying Mitchell’s request for

lack of good cause, given that Mitchell did not offer any

“specific claim of jurymisconduct.” Smith, 457 F.2d at 1100;

see Eldred, 588 F.2d at 752. We previously concluded in

Mitchell’s case that the racial composition of the jury pool

and petit jury, the government’s use of peremptory

challenges, and comments made by the prosecutor in closing

argument did not constitute errors at trial, see Mitchell I,

502 F.3d at 946–51, 957–58, 970–71, and thus they do not

support Mitchell’s claim that he had good cause to interview

jurors. We also decline to adopt a per se rule that good cause

is always satisfied in capital cases.

Because Mitchell presents no extraordinarycircumstances

or district court errors that would justify reopening his case,

we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Mitchell’s Rule 60(b) motion.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 29 of 35
30 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

E

Our decision today does not mean that defendants will

lack opportunities to learn of racial bias occurring in their

cases. Although Mitchell asserts that local rules that require

a preliminary showing of juror bias before allowing parties to

interview jurors operate as an “all-out ban” on the ability of

criminal defendants to learn of any racial bias that impacted

the jury’s deliberations, Peña-Rodriguez explained that the

“pattern” of jurors approaching the lawyers in the case to

report racial bias expressed during deliberation “is common

in cases involving juror allegations of racial bias.” 137 S. Ct.

at 870 (collecting cases). It was pursuant to this pattern that

the criminal defendants in Peña-Rodriguez, id. at 861, and

Henley, 238 F.3d at 1113, obtained information of jurors’

racial bias, see also Baker, 899 F.3d at 128–29; Birchette,

908 F.3d at 55. There were ample opportunities for jurors in

Mitchell’s case to report any racial bias, including the

opportunity that the district judge gave the jurors to “discuss

the case” with the lawyers as the jurors exited the courtroom.

Nor does our decision mean that local rules will never

give way to the “unique historical, constitutional, and

institutional concerns” of racism that motivated PeñaRodriguez. 137 S. Ct. at 868. If a criminal defendant makes

a preliminary showing of juror bias, a district court may set

aside a procedural hurdle limiting access to jurors, just as the

Supreme Court made an exception to Rule 606(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence in the face of evidence of racial

bias. Indeed, the district court did not rely on Mitchell’s

failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Local

Rule 39.2 in denying Mitchell’s request to interview jurors. 

We save questions regarding the extent to which procedural

rules must give way to the right to an impartial trial for

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 30 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 31

another day, however, because Mitchell has presented no

evidence of racial bias here.

AFFIRMED.

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the majority’s considered opinion in full, but write

separately because the lengthy history of this case may make

it easy to lose track of the fact that Mitchell did not receive

the death penalty for his murder convictions. Mitchell was

sentenced to death because, in the course of committing their

atrocious crimes, he and his accomplice also committed a

carjacking. In my view, it is worth pausing to consider why

Mitchell faces the prospect of being the first person to be

executed by the federal government for an intra-Indian crime,

committed in Indian country, by virtue of a conviction for

carjacking resulting in death.

For intra-Indian offenses committed in Indian country, the

Major Crimes Act allows federal prosecution of serious

crimes such as murder and manslaughter. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1153(a). The Major Crimes Act was enacted in 1885, in

direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte

Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that the federal

government lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder

of another Indian in Indian country. Keeble v. United States,

412 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1973). More than one hundred years

later, Congress eliminated the death penalty for federal

prosecutions of Indian defendants under the Major Crimes

Act, subject to being reinstated at the election of a tribe’s

governing body—the so-called “tribal option.” 18 U.S.C.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 31 of 35
32 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

§ 3598; United States v. Gallaher, 624 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir.

2010).1 The tribal option was an important recognition of

tribal sovereignty. See Gallaher, 624 F.3d at 938–39. In

short, the tribal option “place[d] Native American tribes on an

equal footing with states: they may decide whether or not . . .

first degree murder committed within their jurisdiction is

punishable by death, even [when] first degree murders . . . are

prosecuted in federal court.” Id. at 939. The Navajo Nation,

like many other tribes, declined to opt in to the federal death

penalty.

Because of this history, when the United States

prosecuted Mitchell for the murders of Alyce Slim and her

nine-year-old granddaughter, it could not seek the death

penalty for those charges. The United States circumvented

the tribal option by also charging Mitchell with carjacking

resulting in death and seeking the death penalty for that

charge. The death penalty was not authorized for carjacking

until 1994.2 Because carjacking is a “crime of nationwide

applicability,”3rather than a Major Crimes Act offense, the

1 The tribal option also extends to crimes prosecuted under the Indian

Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. But because the Indian Country

Crimes Act does not extend to intra-Indian offenses committed in Indian

country, United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498 (9th Cir. 1994), I limit

my discussion to the Major Crimes Act.

2 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.

No. 103-322, § 60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1796, 1968 (1994).

3 Crimes of nationwide applicability are laws that “make actions

criminal wherever committed.” Begay, 42 F.3d at 498. By contrast,

enclave laws—such as those prosecuted under the Major Crimes

Act—“are laws in which the situs of the offense is an element of the

crime—places such as military bases, national parks, federal buildings,

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 32 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 33

tribal option is inapplicable to it. United States v. Mitchell,

502 F.3d 931, 948 (9th Cir. 2007).

The decision to seek the death penalty in Mitchell’s case

was made against the express wishes of the Navajo Nation,

several members of the victims’ family, and the United States

Attorney for the District of Arizona. As the Attorney General

of the Navajo Nation Department of Justice explained,

although “the details of [Mitchell’s] case[] were shocking,”

the Navajo Nation did not support the death penalty for

Mitchell because Navajo “culture and religion teaches us to

value life and instruct against the taking of human life for

vengeance.” To be sure, the evidence of Mitchell’s guilt was

overwhelming, as the majority explains, but those who

opposed the death penalty in his case did not doubt the

horrific nature of Mitchell’s crimes. The imposition of the

death penalty in this case is a betrayal of a promise made to

the Navajo Nation, and it demonstrates a deep disrespect for

tribal sovereignty. People can disagree about whether the

death penalty should ever be imposed, but our history shows

that the United States gave tribes the option to decide for

themselves.

Our court has already decided that the United States was

legally permitted to seek death pursuant to the carjacking

statute, Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 946–49, and I do not revisit that

conclusion. I write to underscore only that the United States

made an express commitment to tribal sovereignty when it

enacted the tribal option, and by seeking the death penalty in

this case, the United States walked away from that

and the like.” United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.

2004).

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 33 of 35
34 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

commitment. For all of these reasons, this case warrants

careful consideration.

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Judge Ikuta’s opinion ably and comprehensively

addresses the issue raised in this appeal, and I join it in full.

I write separately to stress a point aptly made earlier in

the long history of this case by Judge Reinhardt. See Mitchell

v. United States, 790 F.3d 881, 894–97 (9th Cir. 2015)

(Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part). The heinous crimes that

gave rise to this case occurred entirely within the territory of

the sovereign Navajo Nation. The defendant is a Navajo, as

were the victims. The Navajo Nation has, from the outset of

this case, opposed imposition of the death penalty on the

defendant, as have members of the victims’ family.

The AttorneyGeneral nonetheless decided to override the

decision of the United States Attorney for the District of

Arizona not to seek the death penalty. Because this case

involved a carjacking, I do not question the government’s

legal right to seek the death penalty; indeed, we have already

held that it had the statutory right to do so. See United States

v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 946–49 (9th Cir. 2007). But that

the government had the right to make this decision does not

necessarily make it right, and I respectfully suggest that the

current Executive should take a fresh look at the wisdom of

imposing the death penalty. When the sovereign nation upon

whose territory the crime took place opposes capital

punishment of a tribal member whose victims were also tribal

members because it conflicts with that nation’s “culture and

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 34 of 35
MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 35

religion,” a proper respect for tribal sovereignty requires that

the federal government not only pause before seeking that

sanction, but pause again before imposing it. That is

particularly true when imposition of the death penalty would

contravene the express wishes of several members of the

victims’ family.

The decision to pursue—and to continue to pursue—the

death penalty in this case spans several administrations. The

current Executive, however, has the unfettered abilityto make

the final decision. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Although

the judiciary today has done its job, I hope that the Executive

will carefully consider whether the death penalty is

appropriate in this unusual case.

Case: 18-17031, 04/30/2020, ID: 11676333, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 35 of 35