Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01973/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01973-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07cv1973W

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES C. BOTTOMLEY,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07-CV-1973W(NLS)

ORDER DENYING REQUEST

FOR CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY v.

JAMES E. TILTON,

Respondent.

Petitioner James C. Bottomley (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding through

counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(“Petition”). On December 12, 2007, Respondent James E. Tilton (“Respondent”) filed

a Motion to Dismiss. On April 21, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Nita L.

Stormes issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending that the

Court grant the motion. On May 13, 2008, Petitioner filed objections to the Report.

By order dated July 3, 2008 this court denied habeas relief. Petitioner now requests a

Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

DENIES Petitioner’s COA request. 

//

//

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 07cv1973W

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are not in dispute, and are taken from the Court’s July 3,

2008 order denying habeas relief.

On August 18, 2000, a jury convicted Petitioner, a practicing attorney, of seconddegree murder. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 40-years-to-life. 

On June 27, 2001, Petitioner appealed his conviction. He raised, inter alia, an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to show jurors

Petitioner’s journal entries. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence,

and Petitioner’s subsequent petition for review with the California Supreme Court was

denied. On February 23, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for

writ of certiorari.

Meanwhile, Petitioner’s counsel, Laura Gordon, assured Petitioner that she would

prepare and file his state habeas petition raising a new ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. The new claim was based on trial counsel’s alleged failure to adequately

investigate and introduce evidence that Petitioner was prescribed the wrong medication

(i.e., Wellbutrin) for treatment of his bi-polar disorder. According to Petitioner, these

facts would have assisted his heat-of-passion defense because the Wellbutrin aggravated

Petitioner’s mental state at the time of the murder (the “Wellbutrin Theory”).

During a fifteen month period, Gordon continued to assure Petitioner that she

was investigating and researching the basis for his new claim, and consulting with a

medical expert and other attorneys about the habeas petition. Then on January 3, 2005,

Gordon terminated their attorney-client relationship. 

On February 23, 2005, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a state habeas petition

raising the new ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the Wellbutrin Theory.

On June 10, 2005, the superior court denied the petition.

On September 28, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition with the California Court of

Appeal, which was denied on December 6, 2005. On January 30, 2006, Petitioner filed

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07cv1973W

a petition with the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on October

11, 2006. 

On October 11, 2007, Petitioner filed the federal Petition based on two claims.

First, Petitioner raised the new ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the

Wellbutrin Theory. Second, Petitioner claimed a denial of due process arising from the

California courts’ summary denial, without hearings, of his new claim. On December

12, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Petition was barred by

the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). Petitioner’s opposition argued that

the limitations period should be equitably tolled, and that the claims raised therein were

distinct from those raised on direct appeal. 

On July 3, 2008, this Court issued an order adopting in its entirety Magistrate

Judge Stormes’ Report, granting the motion to dismiss, and denying the Petition. (See

Doc. No. 15 [the “Order”].) In the Order, the Court held that equitable tolling was

appropriate for the period during which Petitioner relied on Gordon (from February 23,

2004 until January 3, 2005). The Court, however, declined to allow equitable tolling

after January 3rd, when Petitioner prepared the state petition himself. Furthermore, the

Court found that Petitioner was aware of the underlying facts supporting the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim based on the Wellbutrin theory by no later than April 21,

2004, not October 11, 2006 as Petitioner contended.

On August 6, 2008, Petitioner filed his request for COA. For the following

reasons, the Court denies the request. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104-132, 110 State. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner may not appeal the denial

of a section 2254 habeas petition unless he obtains a COA from a district or circuit

judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268,

1269-70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain authority to issue certificates

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07cv1973W

of appealability under the AEDPA).

In deciding whether to grant a COA, a court must either indicate the specific

issues supporting a certificate or state reasons why a certificate is not warranted. Id. at

1270. A court may issue a COA only if the applicant has made a “substantial showing”

of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This requirement means

that:

Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits,

the showing required to satisfy section 2253 (c) is straightforward: The

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong ...

When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds

without reaching the petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find

it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added).

III. DISCUSSION

In seeking a COA, Petitioner challenges the Court’s denial of equitable tolling for

the period following the termination of Petitioner’s attorney-client relationship, when

Petitioner prepared and filed his first state habeas petition. Petitioner also challenges

this Court’s ruling regarding the commencement of the statute of limitations. 

Because Petitioner was denied habeas relief on procedural grounds, the two-part test

established in Slack applies. A COA is warranted if the petitioner shows that “jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (emphasis

added). The test has two components which must be satisfied: “one directed at the

underlying constitutional claims and one directed at the district court’s procedural

holding.” Id. at 484-85. Thus, a court may dispose of a COA application if the

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 07cv1973W

petitioner fails to make either showing. Id. at 485. Indeed, “[w]here a plain procedural

bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a

reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the

petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id. at 484. 

Here, the Court properly held, and no reasonable jurist would find it debatable,

that Petitioner’s habeas claim was procedurally defective because it was not timely filed.

Therefore, the COA must be denied. 

 

A. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner first claims that the amount of equitable tolling awarded by the Court

was incorrect. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the Court erred in finding that the

statute of limitations should not be tolled for the time following the termination of the

attorney-client relationship, when Petitioner was preparing his state habeas petition.

The Court finds Petitioner’s contention unpersuasive. 

The AEDPA provides: 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is permitted

when “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the petitioner’s control make it

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 07cv1973W

impossible for him to file his petition on time. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 128 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1997)). “When external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Lott v. Mueller, 304 F. 3d

918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under AEDPA, the statute of limitations in this case began to run on February

23, 2004, when the U.S. Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for certiorari. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner established that from February 23, 2004 until

January 3, 2005, when Gordon terminated their attorney-client relationship, he

justifiably relied on Gordon to prepare the state habeas petition. Accordingly, the Court

held that the statute of limitations should be tolled for this period. 

The Court, however, refused to allow tolling for the period after January 3, 2005,

when Petitioner was preparing the petition. Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for this

period because he failed to demonstrate how the termination of the attorney-client

relationship hindered his ability to prepare and file the state petition. Many habeas

petitioners proceed on a pro se basis. Thus, the fact that Petitioner was forced to

proceed pro se, especially considering that he is an attorney, does not amount to the

extraordinary hardship necessary to justify equitable tolling. Because Petitioner failed

to support his request for tolling during this period, the Court finds that the ruling is not

debatable by jurists of reason. Petitioner’s COA request on this issue is, therefore,

denied.

 

B. Statute of Limitations

In objecting to the Report, Petitioner claimed that the statute of limitations did

not begin to run until October 12, 2006, because until then, Petitioner did not know

about the facts supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the

Wellbutrin Theory. (Objection, 6:16–19.) The Court found, however, and reasonable

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Indeed, by adopting “the findings contained in the Report” (see Order, 9:6–7),

the Court necessarily agreed with Magistrate Judge Stormes’ conclusion that the

limitations period began as early as August 2003. (Report, 10:17–20.)

- 7 - 07cv1973W

jurists could not debate, that Petitioner and his counsel were “clearly” aware of all of the

underlying facts regarding his new claim by no later than April 21, 2004. (Order,

8:11–12.)

Relying on that finding, Petitioner now raises a new argument: that the Court’s

ruling on the statute of limitations start date should be combined with the equitable

tolling ruling. In other words, Petitioner seeks to add 315 days of tolling to April 21,

2004. Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.

First, contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the Court did not establish April 21,

2004 as the definitive statute of limitations start date for the claim based on the

Wellbutrin Theory. Rather, in the context of evaluating Petitioner’s contention that

until October 12, 2006, he was unaware of sufficient facts to start the limitations period,

the Court found that Petitioner, in fact, had the requisite knowledge by no later than

April 21, 2004, when attorney Gordon sent Petitioner a letter discussing the status of the

investigation into the Wellbutrin Theory. Based on that letter, Gordon and Petitioner

must have known about the facts giving rise to the Wellbutrin Theory long before April

21, 2004, otherwise Gordon could not have written the letter. Thus, the Court did not

establish April 21, 2004 as the statute of limitations start date.1

 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Petitioner’s argument misconstrues the

Court’s decision on equitable tolling. As discussed above, the Court allowed equitable

tolling for the period during which Petitioner justifiably relied on Gordon to prepare the

state habeas petition. Thus, regardless of when the statute of limitations started, tolling

ended on January 3, 2005, when Gordon terminated the attorney-client relationship,

because at that point Petitioner could not longer justifiably rely on Gordon to prepare

the petition. Accordingly, if the statute started on April 21, 2004, rather than February

23, 2004, Petitioner would have simply been entitled to fewer days of tolling.

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 07cv1973W

For these reasons, the Court properly determined that Petitioner’s habeas claim

was untimely. No reasonable jurist could conclude otherwise. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s COA request. The case

shall remain closed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 5, 2008

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01973-W-NLS Document 19 Filed 09/05/08 Page 8 of 8