Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02058/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02058-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Leonard Harris, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-09-2058-PHX-JAT (JRI)

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc.

1). On February 8, 2011, the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a

Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the Petition be dismissed because

it is barred by the statute of limitations. (Doc. 14). On February 23, 2011, the Petitioner

filed objections to the R&R. (Doc. 15).

I. Legal Standard

The Court “may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). It is “clear that

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo

if objection is made, but not otherwise. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original). When an objection or objections are made,

a de novo review is required of only “those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 16 Filed 04/19/11 Page 1 of 5
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1

 The Court’s adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s finding on this issue includes the

finding that Petitioner’s second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was untimely and therefore

not properly filed, rendering it non-applicable to tolling considerations.

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Because Petitioner filed objections, the Court will review de novo the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion that the Petition in this case is barred by the statute of limitation.

II. Statute of Limitations

As the R&R correctly recounts, under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Petitioner had one year from the date his conviction became final

to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court. (Doc. 14, 4:10-15). The

Petitioner’s conviction became final on May 14, 2004, thirty days after dismissal of his PCR

proceeding at which time the Petitioner’s right to appeal expired. (Id., 5:7-12). Therefore,

the Petitioner’s Petition in this Court was due by May 14, 2005. The Petition was filed on

September 30, 2009. (Doc. 1). The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s finding calculating

this date,1

 as neither party objects. Therefore, the Petition is untimely unless Petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations until September 30, 2009. 

A. Statutory Tolling

By statute, the Petitioner is entitled to tolling during any period in which he had a

“properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim . . . pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). As discussed

above, statutory tolling ended on May 14, 2004, which is calculated as follows. The statute

was tolled upon Petitioner’s filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on June 26, 2003.

(Doc. 14, 2:12-13). Subsequently, Petitioner failed to file a petition for post-conviction relief

within the required time and Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was dismissed on April 14, 2004.

(Id., 2: 13-20). Therefore, the tolling period ended at that time and the AEDPA limitation

period began thirty days later, on May 14, 2004, when Petitioner’s time to appeal expired.

(Id.). More than five years passed before Petitioner filed his Petition. (Id., 3:14-16). The

Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings on this issue, as neither party objects.

Therefore, after considering statutory tolling, the Petition is still untimely.

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B. Equitable Tolling

Next, the Court considers equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560

(2010) (finding AEDPA’s statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling “in appropriate

cases.”). The Magistrate Judge concluded that equitable tolling was not available. (Doc. 14,

8:21-22). Petitioner objects to this conclusion.

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only by demonstrating: “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’

and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (quoting Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). To justify equitable tolling, the Petitioner bears

the burden of proving that he has been pursuing his rights diligently. See id. The facts or

arguments that Petitioner offers to show a diligent pursuit of his rights between May 14, 2004

and September 30, 2009 consist only of a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, filed

more than three years after his limitations period expired. (Doc. 14, 7:28-8:1-2).

To show extraordinary circumstances, Petitioner implies that he lacked knowledge of

his claim — ineffective assistance of counsel — until he filed his second Notice of PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 15, 6:12-18). Petitioner alleges that his defense was prejudiced by

ineffective assistance of counsel because Petitioner’s attorney told him to expect a sentence

of ten to thirteen years and that “lifetime probation was never mentioned to him as a possible

sentence.” (Id., 8:25-9:2). Petitioner was, in fact, sentenced to nineteen years in prison and

lifetime probation. (Doc. 14, 2:3-6). While Petitioner correctly points out that the statute of

limitations on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel begins to run upon discovery of

the claim’s factual predicate (id., 6:13-18) (citing Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2001)), Petitioner’s reliance on this point of law misconstrues its applicability to the

instant case. 

In Hasan, the court acknowledged that, while some facts supporting the claim were

apparent at trial, much stronger support for the claim was discovered after the statute of

limitations expired. Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154-55. Here, in contrast, Petitioner knew that his

actual sentence surpassed his expected sentence at the time the sentence was handed down.

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Petitioner fails to offer any new information that remained undiscovered until the time of his

filing the second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, which was dismissed as untimely. 

Petitioner also suggests that his claim is not barred by any limitations period because

the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and habeas corpus petitions

fall within federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 15, 7:17-19). Petitioner is correct that

this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions. And, this Court’s lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Here, however, this Court has

jurisdiction over the underlying subject matter of the case and therefore any applicable statute

of limitations remains intact. Thus, the Court will apply the appropriate statute of limitations

to this case.

Because the Petitioner fails to meet his burden of proving that he has been pursuing

his rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing

his Petition, the Petitioner has failed to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling for the

approximately five years necessary for his Petition to be timely. 

III. Conclusion

Because the Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, the last date that he could

have timely filed his Petition was May 14, 2005. This Petition is therefore untimely.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 14)

is ACCEPTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1) is DENIED; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Objections (Doc. 15) are overruled, and the

Petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because it is barred by the statute

of limitations and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

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/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED

because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of

reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

DATED this 19th day of April, 2011.

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