Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04434/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04434-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE KAPPELMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04434-MEJ 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 18

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Wayne Kappelman (“Plaintiff”) sues the City and County of San Francisco (the 

“City”) and San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department (“RPD”) Supervisor Steve Castile 

(collectively, “Defendants”) for three causes of action: retaliation in violation of the California 

Family Rights Act (“CFRA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2(c)(2); violation of the Family Medical 

Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601; and retaliation in violation of California Labor 

Code section 6310. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment on all three claims. Dkt. No. 18. The Court finds this Motion suitable for 

disposition without oral argument and VACATES the November 5, 2015 hearing. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, 

and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The City hired Plaintiff in 2003 as a Gardener with RPD. Kappelman Dep. at 18:20-25, 

attached to Berkowitz Decl. as Ex. A, Dkt. No. 24. He was promoted to a Park Section Supervisor

in a provisional capacity in 2006. Id. at 22:2-5, 23:14-17 & Ex. C attached thereto. Plaintiff 

became a permanent Supervisor in 2008. Id. at 23:8-12 & Ex. B. Plaintiff worked continuously at

Harding Park Golf Course, one of the City’s five golf courses, from the beginning of his

employment with the City until the winter of 2009. Id. at 27:15-19, 29:15-16. 

Castile has been employed by the City as the golf and turf manager since July 2009. 

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Castile Dep. at 8:6-12, attached to Brock Decl. at Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 34. His duties include 

supervising the City’s five golf courses. Id. at 9:9-16. Castile became Plaintiff’s supervisor in 

July of 2009. Kappelman Dep. at 26:4-8. 

Castile testified that the City is supposed to give a performance evaluation to each 

supervisor and employee every fiscal year. Castile Dep. at 18:13-19. He signed a Performance 

Plan and Appraisal Report for Kappelman for the period July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010. Id.

at 19:16-20:6; Kappelman Decl., Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 31. In the Performance Plan, Castile gave 

Kappelman an overall performance rating of 8, meaning he exceeded Castile’s expectations for 

overall performance. Kappelman Decl., Ex. 3. Castile stated Plaintiff “has done an excellent job 

with minimal staffing on the course,” “changed several of the working schedules to provide better 

coverage and use of his employees,” and “changed several of the working schedules to provide 

better coverage and use of his employees.” Id. Castile acknowledged in his deposition that this 

was accurate. Castile Dep. at 22:24-23:9. However, he testified at his deposition that his 

assessment of Plaintiff’s overall performance in the Performance Plan was false, and if he had 

written the truth, he would have given Plaintiff an overall performance rating of 3, meaning “Does 

not meet reported expectations for overall performance for this position.” Id. at 20:7-17, 28:21-25, 

29:2-8. 

In October of 2009, the President’s Cup Golf Tournament took place at Harding Park. 

Kappelman Dep. at 29:17-19. While preparing the course for the President’s Cup, Plaintiff’s crew 

applied the wrong rate of fertilizer on several greens on the course, resulting in the greens being 

“burned” or dried out. Id. at 30:18-31:4. Plaintiff was not disciplined in connection with this 

incident. Id. at 31:2-10. 

Plaintiff was transferred from Harding Park Golf Course in late 2009. Id. at 31:11-13. 

Plaintiff testified he was informed of his transfer by RPD General Manager Phil Ginsburg, in a 

meeting with Ana Alvarez (Deputy Director III for RPD), Kin Gee (RPD Human Resources 

Manager), and Castile. Id. at 32:10-15. Plaintiff testified he was informed the transfer was due to

communication problems with Professional Golfers’ Association personnel that ran the President’s 

Cup Golf Tournament. Id. at 33:1-4. Castile testified he did not recall any discussion of the 

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reason for relocating Plaintiff. Castile Dep. at 26:17-27:19. Ginsburg gave Plaintiff the option of 

moving to Sharp Park Golf Course or the sod crew; he chose Sharp Park because he wanted to 

stay in golf. Kappelman Dep. at 33:7-12. Plaintiff maintained the same hourly wage when he was 

moved to Sharp Park in early 2010. Id. at 33:20-23, 34:15-19. At the time of the transfer, 

Plaintiff knew Sharp Park Golf Course is a designated protected wildlife area by the United States 

Wildlife Service. Id. at 34:4-12; Alvarez Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 19. 

Plaintiff testified he does not recall bringing any safety complaints to Castile’s attention in 

2010. Kappelman Dep. at 36:13-15. In Plaintiff’s 2010-2011 Performance Plan, Castile states 

Plaintiff had improved from the prior year, “exceeded my expectations towards his duties and 

responsibilities at Sharp Park Golf Course,” and was “a very dependable supervisor and has 

significantly improved the conditions at Sharp Park Golf Course. He is a very valuable employee 

and continues to improve each year.” Kappelman Decl., Ex 4. Castile gave Plaintiff an overall 

performance rating on the border between meeting and exceeding expectations. Id. However, 

Castile testified that review was not true at the time he wrote it. Castile Dep. at 34:10-15.

Plaintiff testified he first reported a safety issue to Castile in the beginning of 2011, when 

he reported a plumbing leak at Sharp Park. Kappelman Dep. at 38:15-25. At the time of his 

deposition, Plaintiff testified he believed he reported the leak to Castile by email, but he did not 

recall when he made the report. Id. at 39:19-40:17. That year, in Plaintiff’s 2011-2012 

Performance Plan, Castile gave Plaintiff an overall performance rating between met and exceeded 

expectations. Kappelman Decl., Ex. 5. Castile admits this assessment was accurate at the time he 

gave it. Castile Dep. at 38:4-17. He testified he did not recall any criticisms of Plaintiff’s 

performance at Sharp Park in September 2011 and could not remember if he thought Plaintiff was 

doing a good job as supervisor of Sharp Park at that time. Id. at 62:19-63:5.

Plaintiff also submitted work orders to the City in December 2011 “regarding numerous 

irrigation leaks at Sharp Park.” Kappelman Decl. Ex. 8 (“Work Order Status,” dated Dec. 9, 

2011). He also wrote emails to Castile regarding unspecified leaks. Id., Exs. 7 (“All leaks remain 

unfixed which is causing real problems in the canyon.”) & 9 (“Yesterday plumber and HEO came 

down and fixed 1 leak on 13. Still have 4-5 leaks to go.”). Plaintiff also notified Castile of eight 

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different leaks on the golf course in an email dated August 15, 2012. Kappelman Dep., Ex. D. 

Neither party has presented evidence that Castile responded to these emails. In general, Castile 

would offer to help when Plaintiff made any safety complaints, such as sending a plumber to 

Sharp Park to help fix any leaks. Id. at 43:17-20. However, Plaintiff does not recall whether he 

asked Castile to send a plumber to help fix the leaks in 2011 or not. Id. at 46:13-17. 

Plaintiff notified Castile of various issues at Sharp Park in a February 1, 2013 email, in 

which he listed needed repairs in response to Castile’s request for priorities at Sharp Park. Id. at 

55:6-25 & Ex. E. Plaintiff also emailed Castile on July 1 and 5, 2013. Id., Exs. F-H. Regarding 

safety issues, Plaintiff complained on July 1 that he and the crew had to urinate and defecate 

outside, or use the restrooms at a nearby Safeway during the early morning hour before the golf 

course clubhouse restrooms opened at 6:30 a.m., because there was insufficient lighting in the 

portable toilets. Id., Ex. F. Castile responded by email on July 1: “Every week, I ask you for 

updates and we have gone over almost all of these items of concern. You already know the plan 

of action for the items.” Id., Ex. G. Plaintiff’s next email on July 5, 2013 listed outstanding work 

at Sharp Park, including the removal of dead trees. Id., Ex. H. Plaintiff testified Castile and 

Kevin Teahan, Buildings and Group Maintenance Supervisor at Harding Park Golf Course, came 

to Sharp Park to discuss the irrigation leaks with him in 2012 and 2013, but he did not recall 

whether they provided training on how to detect leaks and turn the main valve off. Id. at 51:22-

52:9. 

On September 25, 2013, Plaintiff sent Castile an email regarding the restroom facilities at 

Sharp Park. Id., Ex. J. Plaintiff claimed the portable toilets were unsafe as the doors would not 

close or lock properly and the facilities were in disrepair. Id. at 68:23-25, 69:1-5. Plaintiff 

testified the gardeners arrived for work at 5:00 a.m. and, although they were permitted to use the 

clubhouse restrooms, the clubhouse opened by 5:30 a.m. less than once a week and sometimes had 

not opened by 6:30 a.m. Id. at 70:1-15, 71:6-17. Castile told Plaintiff to request a key to the 

clubhouse from the owner so staff could use the clubhouse for that hour or so before it opened. Id.

at 74:19-23. Plaintiff obtained the key in November of 2013, after which everyone on his staff 

could use the clubhouse restrooms when they arrived. Id. at 75:10-18, 77:22-25.

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Plaintiff also sent Castile an email on September 25, 2013 entitled “Shitty equipment,” 

informing him that the Sharp Park greens mowers had mechanical problems. Id. at 78:15-22 & 

Ex. K. He stated: “Training apprentices on such old equipment is quite unsafe.” Id., Ex. K. 

Plaintiff admits he had the authority to instruct one of the teamsters under his supervision to bring 

any unsafe or broken equipment Sharp Park to Harding Park for repair. Id. at 79:22-25. 

At some point, Plaintiff informed Castile he had urinated and defecated in Sharp Park. 

Castile Dep. at 133:22-134:16. Plaintiff admits he urinated and defecated outside, and that such 

action was inappropriate given the golf course was a protected area. Kappelman Dep. at 96:17-23. 

On October 18, 2013, Castile gave Plaintiff a written reprimand for his use of profanity in sending 

the September 25, 2013 “Shitty equipment” email, as well as for his failure to “down” unsafe 

equipment. Id. at 87:7-19 & Ex. N. Castile testified he also heard Harding Park Golf Course 

supervisor Keven Teahan use profanity, but Castile did not issue a reprimand in that instance. 

Castile Dep. at 125:8-126:3.

On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff requested a thirty-day vacation—from February 17 to 

March 28, 2014. Kappelman Dep. at 115:8-19 & Ex. DD. That vacation request was not 

approved. Id., Ex DD. Plaintiff is not aware of any other park section supervisors who take 

thirty-day vacations. Id. at 115:23-25. 

Plaintiff submitted his first request for leave under the FMLA on February 4, 2014, 

requesting leave from January 30 to February 14, 2014. Id., Ex. HH. His request was granted. 

Id., Ex. JJ. He then submitted an additional request for FMLA leave from February 15 through 

February 26, 2014. Id. at 126:18-25 & Ex. GG. This additional request was also granted. Id. at 

128:17-19, 129:15-16.

On February 25, 2014, Alvarez sent Plaintiff a memo welcoming him back from his leave 

and informing him of his new work assignment as a Park Section Supervisor for Glen Park/Balboa 

Gardening Complex. Id., Ex. OO. Plaintiff has been in the supervisory position at Glen Park 

since his transfer there in 2014. Id. at 137:13-15. His hourly wage at Glen Park is less than he 

earned at Sharp Park, as his wage dropped from $39.75 to $37.50. Id. at 136:14-25. 

Castile wrote portions of a Performance Plan for 2013-2014, dated December 23, 2014, in 

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which he wrote: “Mr. Kappelman did not meet the job responsibilities for the first nine months 

while working at Sharp Park Golf Course.” Kappelman Decl., Ex. 6. Castile did not write a 

Performance Plan for Plaintiff for 2012-2013; he testified he was too busy to do so. Castile Dep. 

at 43:13-25. 

B. Procedural Background

On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff commenced this action in San Francisco Superior Court. 

He brings three claims: (1) retaliation in violation of the CFRA, against the City only; (2) violation 

of the FMLA, against the City only; and (3) workplace retaliation in violation of California Labor 

Code section 6310, against both Defendants. See Compl. Defendants removed the case to this 

Court on October 2, 2014. Dkt. No. 1. 

Defendants filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment on September 24, 2015. They 

argue Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action fail because he cannot establish the required 

causal link between any adverse employment action and his taking a medical leave. Mot. at 1. 

They argue Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails because he has not filed a Government Claims 

Act claim under California Government Code section 910.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 

that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment 

bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 

party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where 

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by 

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pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25.

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific 

facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 

2004). However, it is not the task of the Court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of 

triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court “rel[ies] on the 

nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary 

judgment.” Id.; see also Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Thus, “[t]he district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine 

issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references 

so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 

(9th Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

A. Violation of FMLA and CFRA

Defendants first argue Plaintiff fails to establish a claim under the FMLA and CFRA 

because it is undisputed the City granted his request for medical leave. Mot. at 8, 10. Defendants 

contend the City did not subject Plaintiff to an adverse employment action because he took such 

leave, and he is unable to establish a causal connection between his transfer to Glen Park and his 

request for medical leave. Id. at 8-9. Defendants maintain he was transferred for performance 

problems at both Harding Park and Sharp Park Golf Courses, alleging he: (1) negligently 

supervised a crew that burned the back greens while preparing for the President’s Cup; (2) was 

dismissive and disrespectful to Professional Golfers’ Association personnel who ran the 

tournament; and (3) ignored federal wildlife regulations protecting endangered species by 

urinating and defecating outside. Id. at 9-10.

In response, Plaintiff argues the evidence establishes a triable issue of fact because the City

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transferred him away from Sharp Park while he was on medical leave, and the transfer resulted in 

a reduction of his pay. Opp’n at 1, Dkt. No. 26. 

“The FMLA creates two interrelated, substantive employee rights: first, the employee has a 

right to use a certain amount of leave for protected reasons, and second, the employee has a right 

to return to his or her job or an equivalent job after using protected leave.” Bachelder v. Am. W. 

Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a)). It is 

“unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to 

exercise” these rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Sanders v. City of Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th 

Cir. 2011).

Prohibited acts under § 2615(a) of the FMLA fall into two general categories: (1) 

“interference” claims under § 2615(a)(1), and (2) “retaliation/discrimination” claims under § 

2615(a)(2). Latif v. M & C Hotel Interests, Inc., 2012 WL 893729, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 

2012). However, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[b]y their plain meaning, the anti-retaliation 

or anti-discrimination provisions [of the FMLA] do not cover visiting negative consequences on 

an employee simply because he has used FMLA leave. Such action is, instead, covered under § 

2615(a)(1), the provision governing ‘Interference [with the] Exercise of rights.’” Bachelder, 259 

F.3d at 1124. Accordingly, “when a plaintiff alleges retaliation for exercise of FMLA rights, that 

claim is properly analyzed as an interference claim under section 2615(a)(1).” Rivera v. FedEx 

Corp., 2013 WL 6672401, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec.18, 2013); Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122-23 

(explaining that using protected leave as a negative factor in employment decisions violates the 

FMLA because “attaching negative consequences to the exercise of protected rights surely ‘tends 

to chill’ an employee’s willingness to exercise those rights”).

The CFRA is California’s counterpart to the FMLA. The Ninth Circuit has held that 

FMLA and CFRA claims may be analyzed together, “[s]ince CFRA adopts the language of the 

FMLA and California state courts have held that the same standards apply.” Xin Liu v. Amway 

Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Dudley v. Dep’t of Transp., 90 Cal. App.

4th 255, 261 (2001)); see also Lew v. Superior Ct., 348 F. App’x 227, 229 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 

CFRA adopts the same language as the FMLA, and California state courts have held that the same 

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standards apply; therefore, this memorandum will treat both causes of action together.”).

To establish an interference claim, a plaintiff must show by the preponderance of the 

evidence that (1) he took “FMLA-protected leave” and (2) it constituted “a negative factor” in an 

adverse employment decision. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122, 1125. Evidence in support of the 

claim may be direct, circumstantial, or both. Id. at 1125. 

Here, the Court’s focus is on: (1) whether the City failed to properly reinstate Plaintiff to 

the same or a comparable position after his return from leave, and (2) whether the City 

impermissibly used Plaintiff’s leave as a “negative factor” in the decision to transfer him. 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds he has 

set forth specific facts showing there are genuine issues for trial on these issues, thus making 

summary judgment improper. 

First, it is undisputed Plaintiff’s hourly wage at Glen Park is less than he earned at Sharp 

Park, as his wage dropped from $39.75 to $37.50. Kappelman Dep. at 136:14-25. Defendants 

attempt to minimize this wage decrease. See Mot. at 8 (“Plaintiff’s hourly wage decreased slightly

when he was transferred to Glen Park—from $39.75 an hour to $37.50 per hour, although his title 

and position did not change.”) (emphasis added). However, Defendants cite no authority 

establishing that a job transfer resulting in a salary decrease of over $4,000 per year (assuming a 

forty-hour workweek) constitutes the same or a comparable position. Compare Yen v. Yang Ming 

(Am.) Corp., 2005 WL 6133905, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005) (no genuine issue of material fact 

where, “[b]efore and after his leave, Plaintiff was entitled to and received the same pay, benefits, 

and terms and conditions of employment.”); Jadwin v. Cty. of Kern, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1163 

(E.D. Cal. 2009) (genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether physicians use of FMLA 

was a negative factor in the decision to remove him from his chairmanship and then cut his pay, 

precluding summary judgment for employer on physician’s FMLA interference claim). Further, 

Defendants admit Plaintiff’s transfer was not the same position, as the wage reduction “was 

because he no longer earned the premium wage of supervising teamsters, who work on the golf 

courses.” Mot. at 8. Thus, the Court cannot find as a matter of law Plaintiff was reinstated to the 

same or a comparable position after his return from leave.

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Second, although Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot show the City transferred him because 

he took a medical leave, Mot. at 9, a reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Defendants

contend Plaintiff’s transfer occurred for performance problems, including his negligent 

supervision of a crew that burned the back greens while preparing for the President’s Cup in 2009, 

his alleged dismissive and disrespectful behavior to Professional Golfers’ Association personnel 

who ran the tournament, and that he ignored federal wildlife regulations by urinating and 

defecating outside. Id. at 9-10. Defendants also contend Ginsburg, who made the decision to 

transfer Plaintiff, had no knowledge Plaintiff requested and been granted medical leave when he 

made the decision. Id. at 10 (citing Ginsburg Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 21). 

However, Plaintiff has also set forth evidence regarding his transfer which, drawing all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him, show there are genuine issues for trial. 

Plaintiff notes Defendants present no evidence the City contemplated transferring him prior to his 

medical leave. Opp’n at 3; see Brock Decl., Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 36 (Defs.’ Resp. to Special Interrog. 

No. 2 (“The decision to transfer Plaintiff was made sometime between February 22-25, 2014.”)). 

Even assuming Ginsburg did not know Plaintiff was on medical leave, Alvarez made the 

recommendation that Ginsburg transfer Plaintiff, and she admits she knew he was on a medical 

leave at the time she made the recommendation. Alvarez Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7. “When the ‘temporal 

proximity’ between the protected activity and adverse action is ‘unduly suggestive,’ this ‘is 

sufficient standing alone to create an inference of causality and defeat summary judgment.’” 

Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We believe, 

therefore, that Lichtenstein has met her burden of demonstrating pretext because . . . the timing of 

[UPMC’s] decision could lead a fact finder to infer that [Lichtenstein] would not have been fired 

absent her taking of leave.” (internal quotation and citation omitted; alterations in original)); Kohls 

v. Beverly Enters. Wis., Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 806 (7th Cir. 2001) (although ultimately affirming

summary judgment for the employer because the record was “clear” that “the employer did not 

discover many of the deficiencies in [the employee’s] work . . . until after [the employee] took 

leave,” the Seventh Circuit noted: “We can imagine circumstances in which the timing of this 

decision could lead a fact finder to infer that the employee would not have been fired absent her 

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taking of leave (if, for example, a supervisor who had been aware of problems with an employee 

did not decide to fire the employee until she took leave, and the supervisor based the firing on the 

incidents of which the employer had already been aware).” (alterations in original)). Here, the 

City was aware of Plaintiff’s alleged performance issues well before his medical leave, yet it did 

not transfer him until the time of his leave, there is a genuine issue as to whether his leave 

impacted the transfer decision. See Moorer v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 488-

90 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The record . . . shows that [the employer] was aware of many of Moorer’s 

alleged performance deficiencies prior to his FMLA leave, thereby casting doubt on the timing of 

the purported reasons for his termination.” (alteration in original)).

Even if the temporal proximity in this case is not unduly suggestive, there is other evidence 

from which an inference of causation can be drawn. Defendants argue Plaintiff was transferred, in 

part, because of the President’s Cup greens incident in 2009. Mot. at 9-10. However, it is 

undisputed he was not disciplined for the incident. Kappelman Dep. at 31:2-10. Plaintiff also 

directs the Court’s attention to evidence of his performance evaluations, including the 2009-2010

evaluation, in which Castile stated Plaintiff exceeded his expectations for overall performance,

“has done an excellent job with minimal staffing on the course.” Kappelman Decl., Ex. 3. In the 

2010-2011 evaluation, Castile states Plaintiff had improved from the prior year, “exceeded my 

expectations towards his duties and responsibilities at Sharp Park Golf Course,” and was “a very 

dependable supervisor and has significantly improved the conditions at Sharp Park Golf Course. 

He is a very valuable employee and continues to improve each year.” Id., Ex 4. Despite these 

positive evaluations, Castile now testifies the assessments he wrote were false. Castile Dep. at 

20:7-17, 28:21-29:8, 34:10-15, 35:17-36:6. As to the reprimand Plaintiff received for using the 

term “shitty” in an email to Castile, it is undisputed Castile did not reprimand Teahan for using

profanity at work. Id. at 125:8-126:3. 

Based on this conflicting evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiff’s medical

leave was used as a negative factor in the decision to transfer him to Glen Park. This is a question 

of fact, and the jury may weigh and consider relevant evidence on the issue. Therefore, construing 

the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, a genuine issue of material fact exists 

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as to whether the City failed to properly reinstate Plaintiff to the same or a comparable position 

after his return from leave, and whether Plaintiff’s use of medical leave was a negative factor in 

the City’s transfer decision. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 

FMLA and CFRA claims is DENIED.

B. Violation of California Labor Code Section 6310

As to Plaintiff’s section 6310 claim, Defendants argue he is unable to establish such a 

claim as a matter of law because he failed to file a government tort claim. Mot. at 11. In 

response, Plaintiff argues he substantially complied with the tort claim requirement when his 

attorney sent a notice to the City informing it of Plaintiff’s claims on July 3, 2014. Opp’n at 1, 4. 

California Labor Code section 6310(b) provides: “Any employee who is discharged, 

threatened with discharge, demoted, suspended, or in any other manner discriminated against in 

the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because the employee has made a 

bona fide oral or written complaint . . . of unsafe working conditions, or work practices, in his or 

her employment or place of employment . . . shall be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement 

for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer.” The policy behind section

6310 is “to prevent retaliation against those who in good faith report working conditions they 

believe to be unsafe.” Freund v. Nycomed, 347 F.3d 752, 759 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Taylor v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 472, 485 (2000) (“Labor Code section 6310 is part of 

California’s statutory scheme for occupational safety.”). Although section 6310 is silent regarding 

administrative remedies, section 98.7, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “Any person who 

believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of any 

law under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner may file a complaint with the division 

within six months after the occurrence of the violation.” Cal. Lab. Code § 98.7(a).

Prior to 2014, the general rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies in California was 

“‘that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the 

administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act.’” Campbell v. Regents 

of Univ. of Cal., 35 Cal. 4th 311, 319 (2005) (quoting Abelleira v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 

280, 292 (1941)). This was so even where the administrative remedy is couched in permissive, as 

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opposed to mandatory, language. Williams v. Housing Auth. of Los Angeles, 121 Cal. App. 4th 

708, 734 (2004). However, effective January 1, 2014, the California Legislature passed two new 

laws amending the Labor Code’s statutory scheme and effectively overruling Campbell. First, the 

Legislature amended California Labor Code section 98.7 to add subsection (g), which provides:

“In the enforcement of this section, there is no requirement that an individual exhaust 

administrative remedies or procedures.” Cal. Lab. Code § 98.7(g). The Legislature also enacted 

Labor Code section 244, which provides: “An individual is not required to exhaust administrative 

remedies or procedures in order to bring a civil action under any provision of this code, unless that 

section under which the action is brought expressly requires exhaustion of an administrative 

remedy.” Cal. Lab. Code § 244(a).

As section 6310 contains no mandatory exhaustion requirement, the Court finds Plaintiff 

was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. See Ramirez v. Cty. of 

Marin, 578 F. App’x 673, 674 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing “that one generally does not have to 

exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a civil action for a violation of the California Labor 

Code.”); Reynolds v. City & Cty. of S.F., 576 F. App’x 698, 700 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). As 

Defendants raise no arguments regarding the substance of Plaintiff’s section 6310 claim, there 

Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment.1 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

 

1

Plaintiff made objections to a variety of documents and other evidence Defendants submitted in 

support of their Motion. Dkt. No. 28. However, the Court has not considered this evidence as part 

of its analysis, and Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are therefore moot.

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