Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02621/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02621-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID THOMAS COLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02621-H-JMA

ORDER:

(1)DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; and 

[Doc. No. 11]

(2)GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 [Doc. No. 18]

On October 21, 2016, David Thomas Cole (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against 

Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”),

seeking judicial review of an administrative denial of disability benefits under the Social 

Security Act. (Doc. No. 1.) On February 7, 2017, Defendant filed an answer to 

Plaintiff’s complaint and the administrative record. (Doc. Nos. 6, 7.) On March 16, 

2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting that the Court reverse 

the Commissioner’s final decision and order the payment of benefits, or alternatively, 

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remand the case for further administrative proceedings. (Doc. No. 11.) On June 15, 

2017, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and a response in opposition 

to Plaintiff’s motion, requesting that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s final decision. 

(Doc. Nos. 18, 19.) For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and affirms 

the Commissioner’s final decision.

BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, claiming a 

disability onset date of May 15, 2011. (AR68-69.) The Social Security Administration 

denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially on January 9, 2013, and again upon 

reconsideration on June 7, 2013. (AR77, 89.) On July 5, 2013, Plaintiff requested a 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR107-08.) 

On September 30, 2014, an ALJ held a hearing where Plaintiff appeared with 

counsel and testified. (AR40-58.) At the hearing, the ALJ also heard testimony from a 

vocational expert. (AR58-65.) In a decision dated April 3, 2015, the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: lumbar spinal stenosis with 

radiculopathy, disc herniation, degenerative disc disease, disc protrusion of the cervical 

spine, cervical central canal narrowing with radiculopathy, left hand carpal tunnel 

syndrome, obesity, and diabetes mellitus with neuropathy; but concluded that Plaintiff 

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed 

impairment. (AR23-25.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with the further limitations that the claimant 

may engage in postural movement occasionally, and may use his hands frequently for 

fingering, handling, feeling and grasping. (AR25.) Based on this RFC assessment and 

the testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform 

past relevant work as a front desk clerk and a property manager. (AR30.) As a result of 

these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled from May 15, 2011 the 

alleged onset date, through December 31, 2014, the date last insured. (AR31.)

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On May 27, 2015, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals 

Council. (AR14, 15.) On August 31, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision final. (AR1-3.) 

DISCUSSION

I. The Legal Standard for Determining Disability

“A claimant is disabled under Title II of the Social Security Act if he is unable to 

‘engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or ... can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Parra v. Astrue, 

481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(12)(A)). “To determine 

whether a claimant meets this definition, the ALJ conducts a five-step sequential 

evaluation.” Id.; see C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Ninth Circuit has summarized 

this process as follows: 

The burden of proof is on the claimant as to steps one to four. As to step five, the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner. If a claimant is found to be “disabled” or “not 

disabled” at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. 

The five steps are:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, 

then the claimant is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act 

and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant is not working in 

a substantially gainful activity, then the claimant's case cannot be resolved at step 

one and the evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).

Step 2. Is the claimant's impairment severe? If not, then the claimant is “not 

disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant's 

impairment is severe, then the claimant's case cannot be resolved at step two and 

the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments 

described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled 

to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant's impairment neither meets nor 

equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant's case 

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cannot be resolved at step three and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he or she has done in the past? If 

so, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to disability insurance 

benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the 

claimant's case cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to the 

fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, then the claimant is 

“disabled” and therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner 

must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy 

that claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden 

of showing that there is other work in “significant numbers” in the national 

economy that claimant can do: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) 

by reference to the Medical–Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, 

app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is “not disabled” and 

therefore not entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(f), 404.1562. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the 

claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. As part of step four, the ALJ must determine the 

claimant’s RFC, i.e., the most a claimant can do despite her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545; Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). “In determining 

a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including, 

inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain, 

that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins v. 

Social Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Standards of Review for Social Security Determinations

Unsuccessful applicants for social security disability benefits may seek judicial 

review of a Commissioner’s final decision in a federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). “As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security 

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determinations is limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 

1098 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“An ALJ’s disability determination should be upheld unless it contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th

Cir. 2014). “‘Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 

1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995)). The district court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 

conclusions. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009. “‘Where the evidence as a whole can support 

either a grant or a denial, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ’s.’” 

Bray, 554 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.

2007)). “‘The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 

medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (quoting 

Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039).

In addition, even when the ALJ commits legal error, a reviewing court will uphold 

the decision where that error is harmless. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099; see also Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have long recognized that harmless 

error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.”). “[A]n ALJ’s error is 

harmless where it is ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.’” 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. “‘[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally 

falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.’” Id. at 1111 (quoting Shinseki 

v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 

III. Analysis 

In denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits, the ALJ’s analysis 

proceeded through four of the five steps. At step one, the ALJ determined that as a 

threshold matter Plaintiff was not working, and thus Plaintiff was not engaged in 

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substantial gainful activity. (AR22.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had eight 

severe impairments: lumbar spinal stenosis with radiculopathy, disc herniation, 

degenerative disc disease, disc protrusion of the cervical spine, cervical central canal 

narrowing with radiculopathy, left hand carpal tunnel syndrome, obesity, and diabetes 

mellitus with neuropathy. (AR23.) At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s 

impairments, independently or in combination, met one of the listed impairments. 

(AR25.) Next, in order to complete step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC 

allowed him to perform light work, with occasional postural movement, and frequent use 

of hands for fingering, handling, feeling and grasping. (Id.) The ALJ based his RFC 

determination on Plaintiff’s symptoms to the extent the symptoms were consistent with 

the objective medical record. (Id.) Using this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing past relevant work as a front desk clerk and property manager. 

(AR30.) In so finding, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s alleged disability. 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on three separate grounds. Specifically, 

Plaintiff argues: (1) that the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient basis for discrediting Dr. 

Thomas Golden’s medical opinions, (2) that the ALJ improperly found Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments to be not severe, and (3) that the ALJ improperly made an adverse 

credibility determination against Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 2.) The Court addresses 

each of these arguments in turn below.

A. Dr. Golden’s Opinion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discredited the medical opinion of Dr. 

Golden concerning Plaintiff’s disability, and various limitations on lifting weight, 

standing, sitting, walking, stooping, crouching, reaching, pushing, handling, fingering,

and feeling. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 6-12.) Defendant disagrees, arguing that the ALJ properly 

discredited Dr. Golden’s opinion because it was not supported by the record and was 

contradicted by the findings of Dr. Do and Dr. Lee. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 6-15.) The Court 

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agrees with Defendant; the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Golden’s opinion by providing 

specific and legitimate reasons for so doing.1

Whether an ALJ properly discredited a treating physician’s opinion is a question of 

law. Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The ALJ made a legal 

error when it rejected the opinions of [claimant’s] treating physician without giving 

sufficient reasons”). The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among three types of physicians: 

“(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not 

treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat 

the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 

1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining treating, 

examining, and nonexamining sources). Generally, the opinions of treating physicians 

are given more weight than the opinions of examining physicians, which are in turn given 

more weight than the opinions of nonexamining physicians. See Benton ex rel. Benton v. 

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003). Treating physicians’ opinions, in 

particular, are given the “greatest weight”, and the ALJ must justify a decision to 

disregard them. Gardner v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 2017). 

If a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may 

only disregard the opinion if he justifies that decision with “clear and convincing reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830). Even if a treating physician’s opinion is 

contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may still only disregard it by providing “‘specific 

and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Id. (quoting 

 

1 In his brief, Plaintiff states that the ALJ was required to set out clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting the opinion of Dr. Golden. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 2.) This standard is incorrect. Because Dr. 

Golden’s opinion was contradicted by other physicians, Dr. Do and Dr. Lee, the ALJ need only provide 

“specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence to discredit Dr. Golden. See

Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (opinions of nonexamining physicians can be used to discredit treating physicians when used in conjunction with 

evidence from the medical record).

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Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). “The ALJ may meet his burden 

by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. (quoting 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, an “ALJ may 

discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the 

record as a whole, or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Dr. Golden, Plaintiff’s treating physician, opined that because of Plaintiff’s leg and 

back problems, a finding of disability was appropriate once Plaintiff’s unemployment 

benefits ran out. (AR270.) Dr. Golden also indicated that Plaintiff should be limited in

various types of physical work, like stooping, crouching, or climbing. (AR440.)

In his opinion, the ALJ discredited Dr. Golden’s opinions because they were 

inconsistent with the medical evidence in the record and with the other medical opinions. 

(AR29.) Specifically, the ALJ looked to Plaintiff’s daily activities, his course of 

treatment, his evaluations, and the opinions of state agency medical consultants Dr. Do 

and Dr. Lee in determining whether Dr. Golden’s opinion was reliable. (AR26-29.) Dr. 

Do opined Plaintiff could crawl, crouch, kneel, stoop, and climb ramps and stairs 

frequently, could engage in frequent handling and fingering, and should climb ladders, 

ropes, and scaffolds only occasionally. (Id.; see also AR73-75.) Dr. Lee reiterated these 

findings, and only diverged in that he believed Plaintiff should never climb ladders, ropes 

and scaffolds. (AR85-87.) The ALJ found these opinions consistent with his RFC 

determination, but not consistent with Dr. Golden’s opinion. (AR29.) 

The ALJ’s reasons for discrediting Dr. Golden are sufficient. Because Dr. 

Golden’s opinion was contradicted by two other doctors, Dr. Do and Dr. Lee, the ALJ 

need only provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting it. Reddick v. Charter, 

157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). And the ALJ can do this by “setting out a detailed and 

thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 

thereof, and making findings.” Orn, 495 F.2d at 632. That is what the ALJ did here. 

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The ALJ engaged in a thorough examination of the medical evidence, the record, 

Plaintiff’s course of treatment, and Plaintiff’s daily activities. (AR26-29.) He then

identified the conflicting medical opinions of Dr. Golden and Dr. Do and Dr. Lee, and 

afforded greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Do and Dr. Lee because they were 

consistent with the overall record, which showed relatively conservative treatment for 

Plaintiff’s back impairments and no significant limitations in his range of motions. 

(AR29.) Moreover, the ALJ added that the opinions of Dr. Do and Dr. Lee also mirror 

the limitations demonstrated in the claimant’s daily activities, in which he lives alone, 

prepares simple meals, shops in stores, and performs household chores. (Id.) As such, 

the ALJ’s ultimate determination as to the conflicting medical opinions was proper. See

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility [and] 

resolving conflicts in medical testimony”). Consequently, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s 

argument that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Golden’s medical opinions. 

B. Mental Impairment 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff does not have a severe 

mental impairment despite Plaintiff’s depression and alcohol abuse. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 

16-17.) Defendant disagrees, arguing that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

finding that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 6-15.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant; the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s depression 

and history of alcohol abuse were not severe impairments.

If a claimant makes a colorable claim of mental impairment, the ALJ is required to

apply a special technique to rate the degree of functional limitations resulting from the 

mental impairments in four different areas: “activities of daily living; social functioning; 

concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation.” Hoopai v. Astrue, 

499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). Legal error 

occurs when the ALJ neglects to document his application of the technique or fails to 

include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in any of the four functional areas. 

Keyser v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 2011). After 

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rating the degree of limitation in each functional area, the ALJ will determine whether the 

claimant has a severe mental impairment. Averbach v. Astrue, 731 F. Supp. 2d 977, 987

n.4 (C.D. Cal 2010). After the ALJ determines whether the mental impairment is severe, 

he moves onto the normal RFC determination. Cooper, 880 F.2d at 1155 n.5. 

In evaluating Plaintiff’s claim that his depression and abuse of alcohol constituted 

severe mental impairments, the ALJ considered the four broad functional areas set out in 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). (AR23.) First, he found that Plaintiff had mild limitations 

when it came to activities of daily living, noting that Plaintiff engaged in regular 

household chores and enjoyed going to movies and softball games. (Id.) Next, he found 

that Plaintiff had no social functioning limitations, as Plaintiff regularly played card and 

board games, is able to go to stores and movie theaters, and frequently interacts with his 

family members. (AR24.) Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no limitations in 

concentration, persistence, or pace. (Id.) The ALJ pointed to the lack of psychometric 

tests and mental status evaluation indicating limitations in concentration, persistence, or 

pace, and also noted that Plaintiff regularly engages in activities like preparing meals, 

shopping in stores, managing personal finances, and driving, which indicate that he 

finishes what he starts, can follow written and spoken instructions, and has no problems 

paying attention. (Id.) Lastly, the ALJ found no episodes of decompensation that have 

been of extended duration. (Id.) Because Plaintiff’s mental impairments caused no more 

than mild limitations and no episodes of decompensation, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe. (Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. 

404.1520a(d)(1)). 

The ALJ’s reasons for determining that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere are sufficient and supported by the record. Because Plaintiff made a colorable 

claim of mental impairment, the ALJ must document his findings “as to the four 

functional areas, as required by the plain language of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e).” Keyser,

648 F.3d at 726. This is precisely what the ALJ did here. Relying on evidence from the 

medical record, Plaintiff’s testimony, and the medical opinions of state agency

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psychological consultants Dr. Hurwitz and Dr. Lee, the ALJ stated his findings in each 

functional area: daily living, social functioning, concentration, persistence or pace, and 

episodes of decompensation. (AR23-24.) The ALJ gave his rating for each functional 

limitation, and stated his reasons and included support in the record. (Id.; see also 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4) (“When we rate your degree of limitation in these areas, we 

will use the following five-point scale: None, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.”) 

The ALJ thus met the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a “by rating and assessing 

Plaintiff’s limitations in each of these four functional areas.” Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1078. 

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that even if the ALJ did properly find his mental 

impairments not severe, the ALJ still did not adequately assess Plaintiff’s mental 

limitations when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 23-25.) The Court does 

not find this argument persuasive. When determining RFC, the ALJ is required to

“consider all of [Plaintiff’s] medically determinable impairments of which [he is] aware, 

including medically determinable impairments that are not ‘“severe”’. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545. Here, the ALJ reviewed the medical record, relied on physician opinions, and 

properly found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments only posed “mild” or “no” limitations. 

(AR23-24.) Thus, the ALJ has met his requirement under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.

C. Credibility Determination

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony 

concerning the severity of his symptoms. (Doc. No. 11-1 at 26.) Specifically, Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ disregarded Plaintiff’s testimony concerning his restricted abilities in 

lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, stair-climbing, 

memory, using hands, and getting along with others. (Id.; see also AR215.) Defendant 

maintains that ALJ properly considered the evidence available in the medical record, and 

made a credibility determination that was supported by substantial evidence. (AR19-23.) 

The Court agrees with Defendant; the ALJ properly made an adverse credibility 

determination against Plaintiff by permissibly relying on evidence from the record, 

medical opinions, and Plaintiff’s daily activities. 

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“To determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or 

symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-1036 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment ‘“which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged.” Id. (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). This test requires that the causal relationship 

between impairment and symptoms be “a reasonable inference, not a medically proven 

phenomenon.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 

If Plaintiff meets this first test, “the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about 

the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the 

ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant's complaints.” Ghamin v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 834). When assessing credibility, the ALJ may consider a range of 

factors including “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's 

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other 

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately 

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) 

the claimant's daily activities.” Ghamin, 763 F.3d at 1163 (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1284). 

In his opinion, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 

could reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms. (AR26.) He then relied 

upon Plaintiff’s course of treatment, daily activities, and medical record in finding that 

Plaintiff’s statements about his symptoms were not entirely credible. (AR26-27.) For 

example, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff’s treatment measures for his back predated his 

disability by one year, and that during that time, he was able to perform work as 

substantial gainful activity despite his back impairments. (AR27.) In addition, the ALJ 

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pointed to Plaintiff’s lack of treatment for his conditions between January 2013 and April 

2014, and then his sparse and intermittent treatment thereafter, as being inconsistent with 

the alleged severity of Plaintiff’s impairments.2

 (AR27.) The ALJ also observed that 

Plaintiff’s reported daily activities – such as preparing simple meals, shopping in stores, 

performing household chores, going out to movies and softball games, and overseeing 

house repairs and maintenance – do not support the level of his alleged physical 

limitations. (AR27.) Further, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and made 

findings that suggested Plaintiff’s physical limitations were not as severe as alleged, such 

as significant improvement in Plaintiff’s back pain, full strength in his hands, and no 

evidence of hand numbness, despite this being alleged by Plaintiff. (AR27-28.) 

The ALJ’s reasons for his adverse credibility determination are sufficient. In order 

to meet his burden, the ALJ must give “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for 

finding Plaintiff’s testimony not credible. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. This must be 

done by noting which parts of the testimony were not credible, and which parts of the 

record undermine them. Ghamin, 763 F.3d at 1163. This is what the ALJ did here. He 

recorded the relevant parts of Plaintiff’s testimony, thoroughly reviewed the record, and 

documented which parts of the record undermined Plaintiff’s statements. (AR26-28.) 

The ALJ did not make “general findings,” 763 F.3d at 1163, but rather specifically 

showed why he came to his determination by making findings based on Plaintiff’s course 

of treatment, Plaintiff’s daily activities, and the medical record. (AR26-28.) Thus, the 

ALJ has met his requirement for providing specific, clear and convincing reasons. 

///

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2 Plaintiff argues that the reason he did not receive treatment between January 2013 and April 

2014 was because he could not afford insurance, and that the ALJ erred in ignoring Plaintiff’s lack of

insurance when determining Plaintiff’s credibility. (Doc. 11-1 at 29.) The Court does not find this 

persuasive. The ALJ did not solely rely on Plaintiff’s lack of treatment during this period in making his

adverse credibility finding; rather, he relied on several other reasons, including Plaintiff’s intermittent 

and sparse treatment even after obtaining insurance, Plaintiff’s daily activities, and his examination 

notes. (AR27.) Thus, the Court does not find error with this part of the ALJ’s analysis. 

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CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence 

and was based on proper legal standards. Therefore, the ALJ’s disability determination 

must be upheld. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendant’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment and denies the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: July 17, 2017

 Hon. Marilyn L. Huff

 United States District Judge

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