Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01655/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01655-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JARED BENJAMIN MIMMS,

Booking #17141130,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01655-CAB-JLB

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PAY 

FILING FEES REQUIRED 

BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) AND AS 

FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

JARED BENJAMIN MIMMS (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego 

Central Jail, and proceeding pro se, filed a two-paged Complaint against the State of 

California on July 16, 2018, claiming that the State is “going in for murder” and is 

“coming at” him. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff further appears to charge the 

State with “Calexit” and “eugenics,” and attaches an email from his friend Silas, who 

claims he is “genious” [sic] in the “online crypto currency market.” Id. at 2.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence civil action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), nor has he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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I. Failure to Pay Filing Fee or Request IFP Status

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in any district court of 

the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay 

this filing fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 

Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 in filing and administrative fees required to 

commence a civil action, and he has not filed a Motion to Proceed IFP in compliance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Therefore, his civil action cannot proceed. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a); Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1051. And while the Court would ordinarily grant 

Plaintiff leave to file an IFP Motion pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), it finds, for the 

reasons set out below, that doing so would be futile since he is no longer entitled to that 

privilege, he fails to plausibly allege he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury

at the time he filed his Complaint, and his claims are legally frivolous.

II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s “Three-Strikes” Bar

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). “Prisoners,” however, “face an 

additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee” in installments as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in 

cases where the prisoner:

. . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 

detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of 

 

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter 

“Andrews”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed 

IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The 

objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, 

which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state 

a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the 

district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 

action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 

1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless he can show he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing.”).

III. Application to Plaintiff’s Allegations

As an initial matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s pleading and has ascertained 

that it contains no “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger of 

serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

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Instead, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is comprised of three nonsensical sentences in 

which he seeks either help or to “fire” the State of California for trying to “murder” him 

“for hire,” and “doing Calexit and Eugenics at the same time to kill rich ugly.” Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 1. See In re Gonzalez, 2008 WL 666465 at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2008) 

(finding prisoner with a “delusional tale” of having a “special genetic structure,” and 

being “irradiated ... by radioactive smoke” by “government scientists,” did not plausibly 

allege “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”); Holz v. McFadden, 2010 WL 

3069745 at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (finding “imminent danger” exception to § 

1915(g) inapplicable where prisoner implausibly claimed the FBI and BOP were “going 

to kill him.”); Sierra v. Woodford, 2010 WL 1657493 at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) 

(finding “long, narrative, rambling statements regarding a cycle of violence, and vague 

references to motives to harm” insufficient to show Plaintiff faced an “ongoing danger” 

as required by Cervantes).

If this were not enough, Plaintiff’s claims are patently frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1) (requiring sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints, or any portions of 

them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted.”); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015); Byrd v. Phoenix Police 

Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose 

of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the 

expense of responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(internal citation omitted); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (a 

complaint “is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in fact or law.”).

And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. 

That is the case here.

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A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 

F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council 

v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Therefore, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Jared Benjamin Mimms, 

currently identified as San Diego County Sheriff Department Inmate Booking 

#17141130, has while incarcerated had three previous civil actions or appeals dismissed 

on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.

They are: 

1) Mimms v. Becerra, Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-02001-LAB-KSC (S. D. Cal., 

Nov. 16, 2017) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil 

Action as Frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)) (ECF No. 3) (strike 

one);

2) Mimms v. United States of America, Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-02539-LABBGS (S.D. Cal., Feb. 21, 2018) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and 

Dismissing Civil Action as Frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)) (ECF 

No. 3) (strike two); and

3) Mimms v. Kevin Faulconer, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-01339-CAB-AGS 

(S.D. Cal., Sept. 11, 2018) (Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing 

Civil Action as Frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)) (ECF No. 4) 

(strike three).

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Accordingly, because Plaintiff has accumulated three “strikes” pursuant to 

§ 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced imminent danger of 

serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not entitled to the 

privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

IV. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

(1) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte for failure to pay filing fees 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); 

(2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would also be frivolous and 

therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and 

(3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2018

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