Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01597/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01597-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERROLD EVERETT SWANSON,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1597 DFL DAD P 

vs.

SYLVIA GARCIA,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2000 judgment of

conviction entered against him in Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of lewd acts

upon a child under fourteen years of age. He seeks relief on the grounds that he received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his right to due process was violated when the trial

court instructed his jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. Upon careful consideration of the record and

the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas

corpus relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 30, 2000, following a jury trial in Sacramento County Superior Court,

petitioner was found guilty of ten counts of lewd acts upon a child under fourteen years of age, in

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violation of California Penal Code § 288(a). The jury determined that an allegation of substantial

sexual conduct was true within the meaning of California Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(8). On

April 27, 2000, judgment was imposed and petitioner was sentenced to state prison for a term of

twenty-four years. (Pet. at 2; Resp’t’s September 11, 2003 Mot. to Dismiss (MTD) at 1-2 & Ex.

A.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction, claiming he received ineffective assistance of

counsel when his trial attorney failed to make a timely motion for a mistrial and failed to object

to the admission of certain evidence. In an unpublished opinion filed on May 22, 2001, the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, affirmed petitioner’s conviction. In a

petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court on July 3, 2001, petitioner asserted the

same claims he had presented to the Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court denied the

petition in an order filed on August 8, 2001. (Pet. at 3-4; MTD at 2 and Exs. B, D & E.)

Petitioner first sought collateral review in the state courts while his direct appeal

was pending. A petition for writ of habeas corpus dated May 4, 2001, was filed in the

Sacramento County Superior Court with the assistance of appellate counsel after the Court of

Appeal expanded appellate counsel’s appointment for that purpose. Petitioner claimed that trial

counsel’s failure to investigate vital exculpatory evidence deprived petitioner of effective

assistance of counsel. The petition was denied by order filed October 17, 2001. Petitioner’s next

state habeas petition, dated March 14, 2002, was received by the California Supreme Court on

March 18, 2002, and was filed in that court on April 8, 2002. The petition was denied on July

24, 2002. Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on

March 6, 2003, alleging that the jury in his case was erroneously instructed pursuant to CALJIC

No. 17.41.1. It appears that petition was denied on July 7, 2003. (Pet. at 4-7 & Attach.; MTD at

2 & Exs. C, F, G, & H.)

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 The following summary is drawn from the May 22, 2001 opinion by the California 1

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-5, filed on

November 22, 2004, as exhibit C to respondent’s answer.

3

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this court on July 30, 2003. 

Respondent filed her answer on November 22, 2004, and petitioner filed a traverse on January 3,

2005.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Prosecution case-in-chief

Defendant had a relationship with Sonya W. between 1992 and

1997. They lived at various locations in Sacramento, in Georgia,

and in Colorado. Defendant stayed with Sonya’s children while

Sonya worked evening hours.

Defendant’s relationship with Sonya ended in September 1997. In

January 1998, Sonya moved to Yuba City, where her nine-year-old

daughter, Yvonne, started the fourth grade. In April 1998, Yvonne

told a teacher that defendant had been molesting her. The next

day, a Sutter County Sheriff’s deputy interviewed Yvonne and

Sonya. Later, Yvonne spoke with a Sacramento detective and was

examined at the U.C. Davis Medical Center.

Yvonne testified that, after attending a school function on sexual

harassment, she told her teacher that defendant “used to mess with

[her] private part.” According to Yvonne, defendant “put his

private part in [her] private part” when she was home alone with

him in Sacramento. He molested her on more than 50 occasions,

approximately four times per week. Sometimes it hurt. He would

ask her if it felt good. When she would try to push him off of her,

he would say “[j]ust a few more minutes.” He also touched her

private part with his tongue seven times. Defendant told Yvonne

not to tell her mother. She was afraid he might hurt her if she did

so.

Cathy Boyle, a pediatric nurse practitioner, saw Yvonne in May

1998, when she was nine and a half years old. After learning that

defendant repeatedly had penetrated Yvonne’s vagina with his

penis, Boyle examined Yvonne and determined her hymen was

abnormal in that it was “thickened and rolled.” Yvonne had very

little hymenal tissue, which indicated a significant injury. Based

on her training and experience, Boyle opined that a large object had

penetrated Yvonne on more then one occasion.

Boyle and three pediatricians work as a team to determine whether

a child has suffered sexual abuse. Before Boyle revealed

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 While testifying during the People’s case-in-chief, Sonya acknowledged discovering 2

that defendant was seeing another woman while he lived with Sonya; but she denied confronting

or threatening Tenisha.

4

information about Yvonne’s history other than her age, Dr. Boos

and Dr. McCann analyzed the photographs from Yvonne’s

colposcopic examination while Dr. Rosas took notes. Thus, when

they reviewed the photographs, the doctors did not know how

Yvonne’s vagina had been traumatized. From the photographs, the

doctors concluded there was evidence of healed hymenal trauma. 

Yvonne’s trauma was classified as five on a scale of one to six,

which means healed trauma consistent with sexual abuse injury. 

After the trauma was classified, Boyle revealed Yvonne’s

allegation that defendant repeatedly had penetrated her. Yvonne’s

allegation was consistent with the trauma that Boyle observed

during the examination and in the photographs. Boyle initially

formed her opinion right after the examination; the photographs

did not change her opinion. Boyle’s opinion at trial was based in

part on the fact that the doctors had corroborated her initial

opinion.

Defense

In a July 1998 statement to a defense investigator, Sonya claimed

she kicked defendant out of her home in October 1994 because she

discovered he was having an affair with a woman named Tenisha. 

Sonya went to Tenisha’s home to find out about the affair. While

there, defendant arrived. Sonya said she did not want to see him

again.

Tenisha S. testified that she married defendant in 1998. They had

no children together, but three of Tenisha’s children lived with the

couple. She met Sonya in 1994, when Sonya came to Tenisha’s

home and said she was there to “get [her] man.” While they

argued, Sonya stated she would “make sure” that defendant would

not be with Tenisha by having him arrested for drug use, spousal

abuse, or child sexual abuse.2

Defendant testified that, in September 1994, he arrived at

Tenisha’s home and saw Sonya there. After they argued, he asked

Sonya to leave. Sonya responded by telling him that he would

never see his children again, and that she did not want to see him

either. She threatened to make sure that, if his children ever saw

him again, they “wouldn’t spit on [him] if [he] was on fire.”

Defendant claimed that he renewed his relationship with Sonya in

order to see his children. They moved to various locations with

Yvonne and the other children. In April 1997, he left Sonya again

because they continued to argue. Following the separation, she

sent him a letter threatening that he would never see the children,

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that she would pursue him for child support, and that she would

send him to prison. She later apologized and they briefly

reconciled in Georgia and Colorado. Eventually, he returned to

Sacramento and resumed his relationship with Tenisha.

Defendant denied ever having sexual intercourse with Yvonne,

engaging in oral copulation with her, or otherwise molesting her. 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v.Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance when he: (1)

failed to investigate and present exculpatory evidence; (2) failed to timely request a mistrial after

prejudicial evidence was admitted into evidence; (3) failed to object to prejudicial hearsay; and

(4) failed to raise an objection based on the Confrontation Clause to testimony given by pediatric

nurse Cathy Boyle. After setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate each

of these claims in turn below. 

1. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a petitioner

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identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 

Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a petitioner must establish that

he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice

is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S.

at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’”

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There

is in addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in

all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

2. Failure to Investigate Evidence of Bias

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to investigate and present exculpatory evidence in the form of a letter from Yvonne’s

mother threatening to accuse him of child molestation if he “married the other woman.” (Pet. at

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5.) Petitioner informs the court that witnesses to the existence of this letter were willing to testify

at his trial but counsel declined to interview or call them. In support of this claim, petitioner has

filed the affidavits of his mother, his brother, his wife, and a long-time family friend. (Answer,

Exhs. B,C,D, E to Ex. H.) All of these declarants state that they saw a letter, which has

apparently been lost, in which the victim’s mother threatened to accuse petitioner of child abuse,

among other things, if he left her for another woman. (Id.) Petitioner contends that if these

witnesses had testified at his trial about the existence of this letter, he would not have been found

guilty of the crimes charged against him. 

This claim was raised for the first time in petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus filed in the Sacramento Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. F.) The Superior Court

rejected petitioner’s arguments, reasoning as follows:

Petitioner first claims that trial counsel should have called three

witnesses, his mother, brother, and a family friend, who could have

testified about the existence of a letter he received from the

victim’s mother, Sonya Williams, threatening, among other things,

that she would charge him with child abuse and spousal abuse if he

ever left her for another woman. He contends this evidence would

have supported his defense that she fabricated these charges.

Whether counsel’s failure to call these witnesses was deficient

turns on whether the testimony of these witnesses as to the content

of the letter would have been admissible. Oral testimony of the

content of a lost writing is not admissible if a genuine dispute

exists concerning material terms of the writing and justice requires

the exclusion or if admission of the secondary evidence would be

unfair. (Evid. Code, §§ 1523(b), 1521(a).) Whether the testimony

of the petitioner’s mother, brother, and family friend as to the

contents of the letter would have been admissible under this

standard is at least questionable.

This issue need not be reached because the court finds that

petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call these

witnesses. That is, there is no reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.

There was highly credible evidence that the victim first disclosed

the molestations by petitioner on her own initiative to her teacher

after attending a school assembly on the subject. A pediatric nurse

practitioner testified that the victim’s physical exam was consistent

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with a sexual abuse injury. And the victim’s testimony about the

molestations by defendant was compelling and credible and was

subject to cross-examination. Petitioner testified about the

contents of the letter. And Tanesha Swanson, his current wife, also

testified that Sonya Williams had threatened to charge petitioner

with child abuse if he ever left her for another woman.

Based on the above evidence, the Court finds it absolutely

implausible that Sonya Williams convinced the victim to lie about

being molested by petitioner. To accept this defense, the jury

would have had to conclude that Sonya Williams knew her

daughter had been or was being molested by someone and

convinced her to lie and testify that it was petitioner. The jury had

an opportunity to consider significant evidence of Sonya Williams

threats and rejected petitioner’s claim that these charges were the

result of these threats. Petitioner’s additional evidence would not

have affected the jury’s verdict. 

(Answer, Ex. G at 2-4.)

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated that "'[a] claim of failure to

interview a witness ... cannot establish ineffective assistance when the person's account is

otherwise fairly known to defense counsel.'" Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.

2001) (citation omitted), as amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001); (quoting Eggleston v.

United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). Petitioner’s trial counsel was informed by

petitioner that his family and friend could testify about the contents of the threatening letter, but

chose, for tactical reasons, not to introduce this testimony. This decision was reasonable. "As a

matter of trial strategy, counsel could well decide not to call family members as witnesses

because family members can be easily impeached for bias." Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 65 F.3d

1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1995). In addition, the fact that the alleged letter from the victim’s mother

threatening petitioner is missing would cast doubt on any self-serving testimony from petitioner’s

family members that it ever existed. 

Even assuming arguendo that counsel’s failure to interview these potential

witnesses and introduce their testimony about the letter fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. As noted by the California

Superior Court, there was significant objective evidence that the victim had been sexually

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molested; the victim, and not her mother, reported the abuse to school authorities; and there was

no direct evidence that the victim’s mother forced her daughter to fabricate charges against

petitioner. Under these circumstances, evidence that petitioner’s former girlfriend had threatened

to charge him with child abuse would not have had a significant impact on the verdict. Further,

the jury was informed by petitioner and his wife of the threats made against petitioner by the

victim’s mother. Indeed, the threats by the victim’s mother to have charges brought against

petitioner for molesting children was a central theme of defense counsel’s closing argument to

the jury. (RT at 374-380, 387.) The absence of cumulative evidence on this point from

petitioner’s family and a family friend would not have resulted in a different outcome at trial.

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument provides support for his

claim that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce evidence about the letter. 

(Traverse at 5.) Specifically, petitioner points to that portion of the prosecutor’s closing

argument wherein she stated that the letter was petitioner’s “ticket to freedom” and questioned

why, if the letter existed, petitioner’s family members had not taken the stand to testify about its

existence. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 404-05.) However, after a review of the

record, it is clear that the prosecutor was simply engaging in hyperbole in order to cast doubt on

petitioner’s assertion that this letter ever existed. (Id. at 403-05.) In any event, argument by

counsel is not evidence and does not establish prejudice in this case. 

Petitioner argued in state court that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance when he failed to introduce other evidence of animosity and bias by the victim’s

mother against petitioner, including a false allegation of car theft and spousal abuse and false

accusations made by the victim’s mother against other former boyfriends. (Answer, Ex. H at 6-

8.) These claims also fail due to the lack of a showing of prejudice. As discussed above, the

victim herself told authorities about the sexual abuse committed by petitioner, and independent

medical evidence verified that she had been abused. Given this evidence, the prior behavior of

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 Petitioner argues in the traverse that his state habeas counsel rendered ineffective 3

assistance when she failed to attach to her petitions copies of documents reflecting the threats and

false accusations made against petitioner by the victim’s mother. (Traverse at 5-6.) To the

extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly raise a new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

in this manner, the claim is conclusory and improperly raised and should be denied on that basis. 

See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26

(9th Cir. 1994) (“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a

statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”)); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d

504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for

relief); Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“we review only

issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief”). Even if this claim

had been properly raised, petitioner has failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation. No

constitutional provision or federal law entitles petitioner to state collateral review. Pennsylvania

v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). Therefore, unless state collateral review violates some

independent constitutional right, errors cannot form the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. 

See Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (errors in a state post-conviction review

proceeding are not addressable through federal habeas corpus). There is no evidence of an

independent constitutional violation here. Accordingly, any such claim should be rejected. 

11

petitioner’s former girlfriend was largely irrelevant to the issues put before the jury at petitioner’s

trial. 

3

The decision of the California Superior Court rejecting petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

3. Failure to Request a Mistrial

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to make a timely request for a mistrial after the jury was improperly informed that

petitioner had previously served time in jail. The California Court of Appeal fairly explained the

background to this claim as follows:

Videotape of Yvonne’s interview at the Sacramento Sheriff’s

Department was played for the jury. The next morning, outside the

jury’s presence, the prosecutor informed the court and defense

counsel that, contrary to an in limine order, she inadvertently had

neglected to redact a passage in the videotape and transcript that

referred to defendant’s arrest in Denver, Colorado.

Immediately prior to this passage, Yvonne was explaining that

defendant had molested her while they lived in Denver. The

following colloquy then occurred: “[INTERVIEWER]: . . . How

many different times did it happen in your mom’s room? [¶] 

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YVONNE W: Um, it happened like every time my mom was gone

. . . . [¶] [INTERVIEWER]: Okay. Did it happen on the same day

that he went to jail? [¶] YVONNE W: (Unintelligible).” Yvonne

went on to say that defendant would call her into her mother’s

bedroom while her mother was “like out grocery shopping or

something, or she went somewhere,” would tell her to pull down

her pants, and then would “put his private in [her private].”

The court stated it had noticed the passage in the transcript when

the videotape was played and wondered if there would be an

objection, but none was made. When asked whether he had not

noticed the passage or whether he had decided to not object to it,

defense counsel replied: “From our standpoint I did recognize and

notice the mistake was made on the tape and the video transcript. 

[¶] Our intent was not to interrupt the court at that time and not –

and the trial at that time. We did not want to put in an objection at

that point in time in the middle of the tape on the record. We

figured we could do – or I figured I could do that outside the

presence of the jury. A recess did go by, and then we did recess for

the evening. [¶] And the only thing I did was forget to put it on

the record outside the presence of the jury. However, it was

something I wanted to put on the record this morning. I don’t

know what the court could possibly do about it now. [¶] I do

think, however, that because that statement was in there the bell

has rung in that the jury did see it and not only in writing, but . . .

did hear it[.] I know we can excise . . . that from the videotape. 

But I don’t know what that would do to repair the jury. [¶] . . . I

understand a limiting instruction could be approved that could

possibly go to the jury. But I don’t know the effectiveness of that. 

And, thus, I feel that it is my duty as counsel to object to that and

ask for a mistrial as a result of this coming in.”

The court replied that a mistrial would not “be in the interests of

justice in this case” and that granting a mistrial should be “a

remedy of last resort.” The court added: “We do have a child of

young age who’s been submitted to direct and cross[-]examination. 

And quite frankly I don’t know what my ruling would have been

had an objection been made promptly. [¶] When the sentence in

question did appear on the transcript I did notice, [defense

counsel], that you appeared to be conferring with your client. So it

did appear that you didn’t miss it. I mean that’s my impression. 

And then no objection is ever made and nothing is ever done. 

Nothing is said and we . . . continue on. [¶] Quite frankly I don’t

know how else to put this. I really do feel that you waived your

right to a mistrial. I don’t think you waive your right to object . . . 

But any right to mistrial would be in this court’s opinion absolutely

unfair when you consider the fact that . . . you commenced the

cross[-]examination of the little girl and we continued on with the

trial.”

/////

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Prior to deliberations, the offending reference was redacted from

the videotape and the transcript. Defense counsel stated for the

record that he did not want a limiting instruction. During

deliberations, the jury requested and was provided a videocassette

recorder to view the videotape.

(Opinion at 5-7.) 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

failed to make a timely motion for mistrial after the jury heard the interviewer refer to petitioner

being “in jail.” He contends that counsel’s inaction “waived any right to a mistrial.” (Pet. at 5.)

The California Court of Appeal found that petitioner had failed to establish

prejudice with respect to this claim. (Opinion at 8.) Specifically, the appellate court concluded

that there was no reasonable probability the trial court would have granted a timely motion for

mistrial. (Id.) The state appellate court explained its reasoning as follows:

. . . the offending statement was a brief, passing reference to

defendant having gone to jail in Denver. It was not an admission

by defendant of any wrongdoing, and it did not indicate that

defendant had in fact been found guilty of some serious moral

offense different than the crimes he was accused of committing

against Yvonne. Nor was the statement “calculated to result in

prejudice to [defendant].” (citation omitted.)

Because it was so brief and innocuous, the statement was not likely

to cause irreparable damage, and any harm could have been cured

by an appropriate admonition or instruction. Hence, it is not

reasonably probable that the trial court would have granted a

mistrial if defense counsel had made a timely motion. 

Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that he was

prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to do so.

(Id. at 9-10.)

Petitioner argues that prejudice is demonstrated by the fact that the trial judge

stated he didn’t know what his ruling would have been had defense counsel made a timely

objection to the interrogator’s reference to “jail.” (Traverse at 8.) However, the trial judge’s

indecisive statement does not provide evidence either way as to what his ruling would have been. 

As noted by the state appellate court, the reference to petitioner being in jail was brief and rather

vague. Further, the videotape was later edited to delete the offending passage, so the jury was

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not reminded of it when it viewed the tape during deliberations. This court concludes that there

is no reasonable probability petitioner would have obtained a mistrial had his trial counsel made

a timely objection to the inadvertent admission of evidence concerning petitioner’s previous stay

in jail. The state court’s decision to the same effect is not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable

application” of federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

4. Failure to Object to Testimony of Nurse Practitioner Cathy Boyle

In claims three and four, petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance when he failed to object on hearsay and Confrontation Clause grounds to

the testimony of Cathy Boyle. (Pet. at 6.) The California Court of Appeal described the

background to these claims as follows:

Defense counsel tendered a hearsay objection when the prosecutor

asked pediatric nurse practitioner Cathy Boyle what findings the

doctors had made after reviewing photographs of the victim’s

colposcopic examination. Outside the jury’s presence, the trial

court stated: “As I understand it the offer of proof is that Ms.

Boyle at least in part bases her opinion as to the existence of

evidence of sexual molestation based upon the if you will triple

blind corroboration observations of doctors Rosas[,], McCann, and

Boos . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . which I would anticipate would be that . . .

the photographs in their opinion manifested signs of . . . sexual

molestation. [¶] Is that correct?” The prosecutor agreed. The

court determined that, pursuant to Evidence Code section 801,

subdivision (b), Boyle could base her expert opinion on hearsay. 

Defense counsel requested a limiting instruction. The jury was

admonished that the doctors’ opinions were not admitted for the

truth of what they said but to show a basis upon which Boyle

formed her opinion.

Boyle then testified that she initially formed her opinion right after

she examined Yvonne. When she viewed the photographs, her

opinion did not change. However, she explained that her opinion

at trial was “based in part at least” upon what the doctors told her

during the photo review; in other words, the doctors corroborated

her initial opinion. On cross-examination, Boyle reiterated that,

when she first formed her opinion that Yvonne was the victim of

sexual molestation, Boyle did not base her opinion upon what the

doctors told her at the ensuing photo review.

(Opinion at 10-11.)

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Petitioner argues that after Boyle explained that she did not rely on the doctors’

opinions in reaching her own conclusion, but reached her conclusion prior to speaking to the

doctors, counsel should have renewed his hearsay objection. (Pet. at 6.) In state court, petitioner

claimed that: 

Ms. Boyle testified – twice – that she reached her opinion

independently of Drs. Rosas, Boos and McCann. Their opinions

corroborated hers, but were did (sic) not form the basis of hers. 

Competent counsel would have required that Ms. Boyle testify

regarding her reliance on the doctors’ opinions at the hearing held

outside the presence of the jury after his initial objection, rather

than accepting the prosecutions’ assurance as to what her testimony

would be. Similarly, once Ms. Boyle testified that she had not

relied on the doctors’ opinions in reaching her own opinion,

counsel should have moved to strike those opinions as out-of-court

statements being offered for the truth of the matter stated, barred

by the hearsay doctrine.

(Answer, Ex. A at 24-25.) 

In the instant petition, petitioner also argues that trial counsel should have raised

an objection to the testimony of Cathy Boyle based on the confrontation clause because

“admission of the opinions of absent doctors, without any opportunity to cross-examine them,

violated my right to confrontation of witnesses against me.” (Pet. at 6.) Petitioner recognizes

that “expert testimony formed in reliance on the opinions of others does not necessarily violate

the confrontation clause, because cross-examination of the testifying witness furnishes the means

through which the opinions may be tested through confrontation and cross-examination.” 

(Answer, Ex. A at 30.) He argues, however, that the opinions of the three doctors did not form

the basis of Ms. Boyle’s opinion; therefore, “the rationale justifying the admission of out-of-court

statements on which an expert relies was not applicable here.” (Id. at 31.) 

The California Court of Appeal rejected both of petitioner’s challenges to Ms.

Boyle’s testimony, reasoning as follows:

Boyle made it plain that, at the conclusion of her physical

examination of Yvonne, she first formed an opinion as to the cause

of Yvonne’s injuries. That opinion was not based on the doctors’

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hearsay statements because the doctors had not yet seen the

photographs of the examination. A hearsay objection to that

opinion would have been futile.

Boyle also made it plain that her opinion at trial, which was the

target of the hearsay objection, was “based in part at least upon

what [the doctors] told [her] later on,” i.e., after Boyle showed

them the photographs. Her acknowledgment on cross-examination

that she did not rely on the doctors’ opinions when she “made,”

i.e., first formed, her own opinion did not detract from her

testimony that her opinion at trial was based in part on the doctors’

opinions. Hence, the doctors’ opinions were properly admitted to

show a basis on which Boyle reached her opinion at trial. (Evid.

Code, § 801, subd. (b); People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312,

403.) For this reason, hearsay and confrontation objections to

Boyle’s opinion at trial would have been futile. Defense counsel

was not ineffective for having failed to make futile objections. 

(People v. Stratton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 87, 97.)

(Opinion at 11-12.)

Both of petitioner’s challenges to Ms. Boyle’s testimony are based on the premise

that Boyle did not rely on the opinions of the doctors in forming her own opinion that the victim

had been sexually abused. Petitioner argued in state court that the opinions of the doctors

“corroborated hers, but . . . did not form the basis of hers.” (Answer, Ex. A at 24.) The state

appellate court, however, concluded that the doctors’ opinions sufficiently informed Boyle’s trial

testimony that they were admissible “to show a basis on which Boyle reached her opinion at

trial.” The appellate court’s conclusion in this regard is not “an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). 

This court also notes that upon questioning by the trial judge, nurse practitioner

Boyle agreed that her testimony at trial was based, at least in part, upon what the doctors told her

after they had evaluated the victim’s photographs, and that their opinions “corroborated [her]

opinion.” (RT at 242.) It appears, then, that Ms. Boyle’s testimony was based, at least in part,

upon the corroborating opinions of the three doctors. That being the case, petitioner’s claim

must fail for lack of a factual basis.

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Finally, the court observes that at trial petitioner’s counsel did object to Ms.

Boyle’s testimony on the grounds that it was based on hearsay. Further, the basis of Ms. Boyle’s

testimony, and specifically the extent to which it was informed by the opinions of the three

doctors, was fully explored at trial. Under those circumstances, counsel’s failure to renew his

objections or to make further attempts to clarify the basis of Ms. Boyle’s testimony was not

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. For all of these reasons, petitioner

is not entitled to relief on these claims. 

B. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner’s final claim is that his federal constitutional rights were violated when

the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. This claim was raised for the first time in

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. 

(Answer, Ex. J.) The Supreme Court denied the petition with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th

750 (1993) and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756.) (Answer, Ex. K.) Respondent argues that the

Supreme Court’s citation to Clark and Dixon constitutes a state procedural bar precluding this

court from addressing the merits of petitioner’s jury instruction claim. 

1. Procedural Default

When a state prisoner fails to exhaust his federal claims in state court and the state

court would now find the claims barred under applicable state rules, the exhaustion requirement

is satisfied, but the federal claims are procedurally barred. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

735 n.1 (1991); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2004). Similarly, if a federal

constitutional claim is expressly rejected by a state court on the basis of a state procedural rule

that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment, the claim is

procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30; Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580

(9th Cir. 2003). Habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless the petitioner

demonstrates cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or that the failure to consider

the claims will result in a miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Although the

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question of procedural default "should ordinarily be considered first," a reviewing court need not

do so "invariably," especially when it turns on difficult questions of state law. Lambrix v.

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997). See also Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 720 (5th Cir.

2004). In this case, this court finds that petitioner’s jury instruction claim can be resolved more

easily by addressing it on the merits. Accordingly, this court will assume that petitioner’s claim

is not procedurally defaulted and will address it on the merits.

2. Merits of Petitioner’s Jury Instruction Claim

Petitioner’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which provides as

follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their

deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is

the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court

of the situation.

(Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal at 101). Petitioner claims that this jury instruction violated his

right to “trial by jury, to jury unanimity, and to due process of law.” (Answer, Ex. J at Points and

Authorities (P&A) p. 6; Pet. at 6.) Petitioner contends that the instruction may have “infring[ed]

on the secrecy of jury deliberations” and “prohibit[ed] the jurors from discussing notions of

justice, oppression and fairness as applied to this case.” (P&A at 2, 6.) 

Petitioner’s claim for relief is foreclosed by the decision in Brewer v. Hall, 378

F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1037 (2004). In Brewer, the Ninth Circuit

held that, regardless of the "constitutional merits" of CALJIC No. 17.41.1, habeas corpus relief

was unavailable on the identical claim presented by petitioner here because there is "no Supreme

Court precedent clearly establishing" that use of this jury instruction violates a defendant's

constitutional rights. Id. at 955-56. Here, as in Brewer, petitioner "has pointed to no Supreme

Court precedent clearly establishing that CALJIC 17.41.1--either on its face or as applied to the

facts of his case--violated his constitutional rights." Id. at 957. Thus, the state court's rejection

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 In People v. Engelman, 28 Cal. 4th 436, 439-40 (2002), the California Supreme Court 4

held that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 “does not infringe upon defendant's federal or state constitutional

right to trial by jury or his state constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.” However, using its

supervisory authority over the lower state courts, the California Supreme Court discontinued the

use of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 because of its "potential" to intrude on jury deliberations. Id. at 440.

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of petitioner's jury instruction claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).4

Even if the state trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1,

any such error was harmless under the circumstances of this case. See Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that a federal court may not grant habeas relief for trial errors

without a showing of actual prejudice, defined as a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury's verdict”). There is no evidence that any of the jurors at petitioner’s trial

wished to engage in jury nullification or that any juror was a “holdout” for acquittal. There is

simply no indication that the giving of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in this case chilled the jurors’

exercise of free speech or prevented free and full deliberations on the part of the jury. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

/////

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 that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 23, 2007.

DAD:8:swanson1597.hc

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