Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00400/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00400-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher J. Kirby,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-21-00400-TUC-JGZ

ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher J. Kirby, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Tucson, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On 

screening the First Amended Complaint (FAC) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the 

Court determined that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement 

claim in Count One against Director Shinn, Deputy Warden Martinez, Deputy Warden 

Schwestak, Captain Pulicicchio, and Correction Officer (CO) IV Wood, based on 

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was subjected to excessive heat while confined in the Mental 

Health Unit. (Doc. 12.) The Court concluded that Plaintiff asserted an Eighth Amendment 

medical care claim in Count Two against Nurse Practitioner (NP) Amy Hand based on 

Plaintiff’s allegation that Hand refused Plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair after he injured 

his ankle. (Id.)

Pending before the Court are three fully briefed motions. Defendants Shinn, 

Martinez, Schwestak, Pulicicchio, and Wood move for summary judgment on the merits 

of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims. (Doc. 108, 109, 123, 

127, 134.) Defendant Hand moves for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s 

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Eighth Amendment medical care claim. (Doc. 117, 118, 124, 125, 126, 129.)1 Finally, in 

a Motion for Spoliation of Evidence, Plaintiff requests that the Court penalize Defendants 

for their loss or destruction of certain evidence. (Doc. 74, 90, 114, 115.) 

The Court will deny Defendant Hand’s Motion for Summary Judgment; grant 

Defendants Shinn, Martinez, Schwestak, Wood, and Pulicicchio’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment; and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Spoliation of Evidence.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 

movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 

produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 

1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 

to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 

favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 

it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 

citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). There is no genuine issue of material fact 

when a party fails to establish an element essential to that party’s case and on which that 

1 Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to respond pursuant to Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Docs. 110, 119). 

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party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23.

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 

all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 

materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

II. Defendant Hand’s Motion

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hand disregarded a known risk to Plaintiff using 

crutches due to his hand deformity and, as a result, Plaintiff fell and suffered further injury. 

A. Medical Care Legal Standard

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, a prisoner must 

demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). There are 

two prongs to this analysis: an objective prong and a subjective prong. First, as to the 

objective prong, a prisoner must show a “serious medical need.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 

(citations omitted). A “‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s 

condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 

grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 

(internal citation omitted). 

Second, as to the subjective prong, a prisoner must show that the defendant’s 

response to that need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. An official acts 

with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To satisfy the knowledge 

component, the official must both “be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Id. “Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when 

they deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 

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F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), or when 

they fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

But the deliberate-indifference doctrine is limited; an inadvertent failure to provide 

adequate medical care or negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not 

support an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citations omitted); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (negligence does not rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation). Further, a mere difference in medical opinion does not 

establish deliberate indifference. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Finally, even if deliberate indifference is shown, to support an Eighth Amendment 

claim, the prisoner must demonstrate harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 

1096; see Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (delay in providing

medical treatment does not constitute Eighth Amendment violation unless delay was 

harmful). 

B. Relevant Facts

Plaintiff is in the custody of the ADC. At the relevant time, Plaintiff was housed at 

ASPC-Tucson Rincon Unit and Defendant Hand worked as a medical provider at ASPCTucson. (Decl. of Amy Hand, Doc. 118-1 at 2 ¶ 2.)

On July 11, 2021, an Incident Command System (ICS) was initiated for Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 118-1 at 5.) A nurse responded to Plaintiff’s housing unit and found Plaintiff lying 

on the floor, half in and half out of his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he had “gotten up for 

a drink because he was hot” and had fallen. (Id.) Plaintiff denied hitting his head and 

reported that he felt “tingling all over.” (Id.) Plaintiff was unable to stand and was taken 

to the medical unit on a stretcher, where he was treated with one liter of normal saline. (Id.

at 13.)

The next day, Plaintiff submitted a health needs request (HNR) stating that the day 

before, he had suffered a “heat stroke,” passed out, and fallen to the floor. (Doc. 124 at 

22.) Plaintiff wrote that his neck hurt badly, and he was having extreme headaches. (Id.) 

A note in Plaintiff’s medical records states that Plaintiff was placed on the nurse’s line. 

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(Id.) 

On July 13, 2021, Plaintiff was seen at the medical unit. (Id. at 23.) The notes for 

the visit indicate that Plaintiff stated he did not know why he was there, his neck was still 

stiff, he still had headaches, and he “just got the medicine to help.” (Id.) The notes also 

indicate that Plaintiff stated he still had a bump on his head. (Id.) Defendant Hand gave a 

verbal order for an x-ray of Plaintiff’s cervical spine for diagnosis of his neck pain due to 

his fall. (Id.) It is unclear whether Plaintiff underwent the x-ray or what the results were.

Between August 10 and 19, 2021, Plaintiff submitted at least eight HNRs stating 

that since he had fallen due to “heat exhaustion,” he had been experiencing ringing in his 

right ear, pain behind his right ear, loss of equilibrium or vertigo, and severe headaches 

and migraines. (Doc. 124 at 53-61.) Plaintiff reported that his symptoms affected his 

daily activities, including sleeping and eating. (Id.) Plaintiff was told on August 10 that 

he was scheduled for an appointment; the appointment was rescheduled at least twice. (Id.)

On August 19, 2021, Plaintiff was outside for recreation and had “major issues with 

his equilibrium.” (Doc. 8 at 9.) While trying to walk to the medical unit, Plaintiff “severely 

rolled his right ankle and fell, causing it to swell up and turn black and blue, he also 

aggravated a previous back injury called lumbar spinal stenosis.” (Id.) Plaintiff was taken 

by wheelchair to the medical unit, where he saw Registered Nurse (RN) Tatyana Popova. 

(Id.; Doc. 118-1 at 16.)

Plaintiff “tried to have all of his symptoms addressed, however medical stated that 

they were only dealing with the rolled ankle and that Plaintiff would have to wait for his 

appointment for the other issues.” (Doc. 8 at 9.) According to Plaintiff’s medical records, 

during the visit with RN Popova, Plaintiff reported pain at 9 on a scale of 10 and told RN 

Popova he thought he had broken his ankle. (Doc. 118-1 at 16.) Plaintiff also reported that 

he was nauseated. (Id. at 17.) RN Popova noted that Plaintiff’s right ankle was “swollen 

to the size of [a] tennis ball.” (Id.) RN Popova wrapped Plaintiff’s ankle in an ACE 

bandage, elevated his ankle, and applied ice. (Id. at 17-18.) Nurse Practitioner (NP) Mary 

Redwine was the on-call provider at the time. (Id. at 18.) A note in Plaintiff’s medical 

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records states, “Per NP Redwine order [Plaintiff] given Ibuprofen 800mg and x-ray order 

placed.” (Id.)

At some point, RN Popova told Plaintiff that an x-ray needed to be retaken and the 

wheelchair needed to be returned. Plaintiff asked RN Popova how he was going to 

ambulate. (Doc. 8 at 9.) The parties dispute who made the decision to provide Plaintiff 

with crutches.

2

 According to Plaintiff, RN Popova called Defendant Hand who ordered 

the crutches. (Id.) During the phone conversation, Plaintiff told Hand that he had a hand 

deformity and equilibrium issues, and “a leg that felt like spaghetti” due to lumbar spinal 

stenosis and requested a wheelchair. (Id.) Defendant Hand refused to provide a wheelchair 

and told Plaintiff he would be “okay.”3 (Id.) 

In contrast, in her declaration, Hand states that she had limited involvement in 

Plaintiff’s treatment. (Doc. 118 at ¶ 5.) She was not familiar with his pre-existing hand 

conditions or of any limitations he may have had using crutches, and there was no 

indication in the August 19, 2021 medical encounter record that Plaintiff informed Popova 

2 NP Hand argues that the Court should grant her motion for summary judgment and find 

that Plaintiff failed to identify a material issue of disputed fact because Plaintiff’s filings 

do not conform to the requirements of Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. or Rule LRCiv 56.1. Hand 

points out that Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts, (Doc. 125), does not include 

separately numbered paragraphs that correspond to Defendant’s Statement of Facts, nor 

does Plaintiff support the facts by specific reference to specific citations to the record. 

(Doc. 129 at 2-4.) 

The only material factual dispute is whether NP Hand knew that Plaintiff could not use 

crutches due to his physical limitations. Plaintiff’s facts as to Hand’s knowledge are 

alleged in his FAC and are readily apparent in his filings. For that reason, the Court declines 

to grant summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts are not in 

proper form. 

3 Although Plaintiff alleged in his verified FAC that he spoke directly with Nurse Hand on 

August 19, 2021, in his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states 

that he had Nurse Popova tell Hand that Plaintiff had a hand deformity and equilibrium 

issues, and a leg that felt like spaghetti, and that he requested a wheelchair. (Doc. 124 at 

10.) Plaintiff provided a declaration from fellow inmate, Tyson Anderson, who swore that 

he heard Plaintiff inform the nurse that he could not use crutches, heard the nurse say she 

was going to call the provider, heard the nurse relay that information over the phone, and, 

after the phone was hung up, heard the nurse tell Plaintiff that the provider said Plaintiff 

had to use the crutches. (Id. at 66-69.) Although Plaintiffs’ statements are not entirely 

consistent, they are not so contradictory that they can be disregarded on summary 

judgment.

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of a limitation or issue with using crutches. (Id.) NP Hand reviewed the Nurse-ICS 

Response encounter record prepared by Popova and saw no reason to dispute Nurse 

Popova’s clinical judgment as to Plaintiff’s medical needs following her full physical 

assessment of his ankle injury. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.) NP Hand does not address Plaintiff’s claim 

that Hand learned of his physical limitations during an August 19 phone call. 

Plaintiff states that he had difficulty using the crutches and “wanted to ensure that 

medical was aware of the issue,” so after he left the medical unit on August 19, he 

submitted an HNR stating the crutches hurt his right hand, he had “[no] control of the right 

crutch,” he was “all over the place trying to operate [the crutches,]” and his equilibrium 

issue and vertigo were “not helping.” (Doc. 8 at 10.) The HNR provides:

I told u my equilibrium is off. I now fell down, rolling my ankle. Its really 

big and purple. Then I’m told I can’t have a wheelchair to use. I can’t walk 

on this foot. They tell me I get crutches. They know I have a hand deformity. 

It is unsafe for me to use crutches. Yet no one care. I’m still having bad 

migraines, ringing in my right ear on hearing loss in the same ear. How bad 

do I have to get before my issues get address. Pls help me and stop the 

deliberate indifference to my needs.

(Doc. 124 at 62.) That afternoon, a nurse responded to the HNR stating that a nurse’s line 

appointment was already scheduled. (Id.)

On August 21, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an HNR stating that x-rays of his ankles 

had been taken, but he had not been informed of the results, and he still had not been 

evaluated for his extreme migraines, equilibrium issues, and ringing, pain, and hearing loss 

in his right ear. (Doc. 124 at 63.) Plaintiff asked for an “urgent appointment” and to be 

seen “ASAP.” (Id.)

In the evening of August 22, 2021, Plaintiff was trying to shower while using the 

crutches. (Doc. 8 at 10.) When he tried to get out of the shower, he slipped and fell, hitting 

his face on the floor. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered a black eye and concussion and injured his 

back. (Id.) He was taken to the Banner University Medical Center-Tucson emergency 

room by ambulance. (Doc. 118 at ¶ 9.) A laceration above Plaintiff’s right eye was 

sutured. (Doc. 118-1 at 48.) Plaintiff was released from the emergency room the same 

day. (Doc. 118 at ¶ 11.)

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On August 23, Plaintiff wrote in an HRN: 

I got back from the hospital at 11:30 pm, they used a wheelchair to get me to 

my bed, I can’t even get myself to the toilet, I have to pee in a soda bottle, 

they didn’t even feed me breakfast, I can’t walk because of my back, the 

hospital report says I am supposed to go back in 1or 2 weeks to see a spine 

specialist. I need a wheelchair please, I can’t use crutches, I am also in severe 

pain, please help me. 

(Doc. 124 at 62.)

C. Analysis

In her Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Hand argues that she was not 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Her involvement was limited 

to two occasions, August 19 and August 20, and included only approving the request for 

x-ray, reviewing the x-ray, and reviewing Nurse Popova’s treatment record. (Doc. 117 at 

1-2.) Further, NP Hand argues that, based on her review of the encounter record, she had 

no reason to dispute Popova’s determination of Plaintiff’s medical needs and Popova’s 

order for crutches. (Id.) Hand argues there is no evidence that she “approved” an order for 

crutches. (Id. at 2.)

1. Serious Medical Need

Examples of indications that a prisoner has a serious medical need include: “The 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy 

of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” McGuckin, 

974 F.2d at 1059–60. Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff’s ankle injury was a serious 

medical need. The evidence supports a finding of a serious medical need.

2. Deliberate Indifference

Assuming the truth of the facts alleged in the FAC, at the August 19, 2021 visit 

following Plaintiff’s fall, Plaintiff asked RN Popova how he would walk with his ankle 

injury, and Popova called Defendant Hand. Defendant Hand ordered crutches for Plaintiff, 

and, although Plaintiff informed Defendant Hand that he had a hand deformity, equilibrium 

issues, and “a leg that felt like spaghetti,” Hand refused Plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair. 

(Doc. 8.)

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To prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a 

prisoner must show that the chosen course of treatment was medically unacceptable under 

the circumstances and was chosen in conscious disregard for an excessive risk to the 

prisoner’s health. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). A difference 

of opinion with a medical provider about the appropriate medical diagnosis or treatment 

does not establish a deliberate indifference claim. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 

(9th Cir. 1996).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could 

conclude that Defendant Hand was aware that Plaintiff could not safely use crutches given 

his right-hand deformity, equilibrium issues, and other symptoms, and that by refusing 

Plaintiff’s request for a wheelchair, Defendant Hand put Plaintiff at substantial risk of 

serious harm. This is not a mere disagreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Hand about 

a course of treatment. There is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 

Defendant Hand was aware of Plaintiff’s physical limitation and therefore deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in denying his request for a wheelchair. 

Thus, the Court will deny Defendant Hand’s Motion for Summary Judgment.4

III. Defendants’ Shinn, Martinez, Schwestak, Pulicicchio, and Wood’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment

In their motion for summary judgment, the ADC Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

cannot prove that prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment or that the ADC 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent. The ADC Defendants also argue they are entitled 

to qualified immunity. (Doc. 108.)

A. Conditions of Confinement Legal Standard

To prevail on a claim under the Eighth Amendment for unconstitutional conditions 

of confinement, a prisoner must demonstrate deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of 

4 Hand argues in her Reply that there is no record evidence establishing NP Hand 

consciously or even recklessly disregarded known risk of significant injury to Plaintiff. 

(Doc. 129 at 1.) On summary judgment, Plaintiff’s verified complaint and the declaration 

of Tyson Anderson constitute record evidence. 

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serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Eighth Amendment liability 

requires “more than ordinary lack of due care.” Id. at 835. The prisoner must show a 

“substantial risk of serious harm[,]” meaning that the risk must be objectively sufficiently 

serious. Id. at 834. In addition, the defendant official must have a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind; that is, he must be deliberately indifferent. Id.

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent, a plaintiff must 

show that the “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . 

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the 

inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187-88 

(9th Cir. 2002). To prove that officials knew of the risk, the prisoner may rely on 

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to 

establish knowledge. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 

(9th Cir. 1995).

With respect to temperature, a prisoner may assert a claim for unconstitutional 

conditions based on exposure to temperature extremes. See Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 

F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1985). Whether conditions of confinement rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation may depend on the duration of a prisoner’s exposure to those 

conditions. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended on denial 

of reh’g, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).

B. Facts

The Mental Health Unit at Rincon Unit comprises two buildings, Building 10 and 

Building 11. During the relevant time, Plaintiff was housed in Building 10. Defendant 

Martinez was the Deputy Warden at Rincon Unit. (Decl. of Jorge Martinez, Doc. 109-2 at 

2 ¶ 1.) Defendant Schwestak was an Associate Deputy Warden at Rincon Unit. (Decl. of 

Kaci Schwestak, Doc. 109-3 at 2 ¶ 1.) Defendant Wood was the Unit Grievance 

Coordinator at Rincon Mental Health Unit. (Decl. of Richard Wood, Doc. 109-4 at 2 ¶ 2.) 

Defendant Pulicicchio was Chief of Security at Rincon Unit. (Decl. of Marc Pulicicchio, 

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Doc. 109-5 at 2 ¶ 1.)

In recognition of Arizona’s extreme summertime temperatures, which can present a 

potential hazard to inmate health, beginning each April 1, ADC staff are required to take 

the temperatures in each unit each day at 11:00 a.m., when temperatures begin to rise, and 

at 3:00 p.m., when temperatures typically reach their highest. (Doc. 109 at ¶¶ 1-2.) ADC 

has data for the summer temperatures in all ADC cellblocks, including Rincon Building 

10, during Summer 2021. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Temperatures are taken using an anemometer. (Id.

¶ 3.) The officer taking the temperature readings calls the readings in to the shift sergeant, 

who logs them into an Excel spreadsheet. (Id. ¶ 4.) Temperatures are measured in one cell 

on each tier, in each pod of the linear or H-style cellblocks, alternating daily between cells 

in the front, middle, and end of each tier. (Id. ¶ 5.) In cluster-style cellblocks, temperatures 

are taken in one cell in each tier, in two pods within every cluster, again alternating daily 

between front, middle, and end cells. (Id. ¶ 6.)5 This process was followed in Rincon’s 

Mental-Health Unit (Buildings 10 and 11). (Id. at ¶ 7.)

The objective in monitoring temperatures was to keep temperatures below 85 

degrees in the Mental Health Unit. (Decl. of Kaci Schwestak, Doc. 109-3 at 2 ¶ 4.) 

Temperature logs for Buildings 10 and 11 for June 1 to August 31, 2021, show that 

temperatures rarely exceed 85 degrees and did not exceed 90 degrees.6 (Id. at 2 ¶ 6.) On 

5 Plaintiff agrees that ADC procedures require staff to record temperatures in the 

cellblocks. Plaintiff points to the March 23, 2021 memorandum from the Regional 

Operations Directors to all Wardens setting forth procedures to follow regarding taking 

and recording temperatures in the cellblocks. (Doc. 123 at 89-91.) Each complex was 

required to purchase and use a HoldPeak digital anemometer, model HP-866B, and to 

“follow provided instructions which require operation of the equipment for approximately 

two (2) minutes to obtain an accurate reading.” (Id. at 89.) If the temperature in a cell 

exceeds 95 degrees, the Shift Commander is required to notify the Deputy Warden or the 

On Call Duty Office, and immediate steps are to be taken to bring the temperature down, 

such as adding loaner fans and/or opening traps, placing floor fans in the pod, providing 

ice, and permitting extra showers. (Id. at 90.) The memorandum specifies that if a prisoner 

who is taking psychotropic medication suffers a heat intolerance reaction, all reasonably 

available steps will be taken to prevent heat injury or illness. (Id. at 91.) If all other steps 

have failed to abate heat intolerance reaction, the prisoner will be transferred to a housing 

area where the cell temperature does not exceed 85 degrees. (Id.)

6

In his declaration, Plaintiff states that the temperatures in Building 10 were above 85 

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July 11, 2021, the warmest temperature recorded in Building 10 was 84 degrees. (Id. at 2 

¶ 7.) Records from May to August 2021, show that morning temperatures in Buildings 10 

and 11 ranged between 70 degrees to 88 degrees. (Doc. 109 at ¶ 8.) Morning temperatures 

approached or exceeded 85 degrees only a handful of times and reached 88 degrees only 

on July 12. (Id.) Afternoon temperatures ranged between 74 degrees and 91 degrees and 

exceeded 85 degrees on four occasions: June 15 (88 degrees); June 18 (91 degrees); July 

10 (90 degrees); July 12 (88 degrees).7(Id.)

Defendant Schwestak shared responsibility with the Deputy Warden to ensure that 

the air-handler systems, including evaporative coolers, were functioning before the 

summer months. (Decl. of Kaci Schwestak, Doc. 109-3 at 2 ¶ 2.) The evaporative cooling 

system for Building 10 was not broken,8 but at the hottest times, the system did struggle to 

degrees on multiple occasions. (Doc. 127 at ¶ 8.) Although Plaintiff does not provide a 

basis for this assertion, it is not inconsistent with ADC’s evidence. 

7 Plaintiff alleges that the temperature logs do not reflect the actual temperatures in the 

cells because officers have a history of not following the directions for the handheld 

thermometer, and officers used an anemometer or temperature gauge other than the 

HoldPeak digital anemometer specified in the Memorandum to ADC Wardens. (Doc. 123 

at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff’s evidence does not establish a disputed issue of fact as to the accuracy of 

the temperature records. Plaintiff fails to present competent evidence that officers used the 

wrong anemometer to measure temperatures or failed to follow the device instructions. 

(See Doc. 123 at ¶ 17.) Moreover, such evidence would not, standing alone, demonstrate 

that temperature readings taken with a different type of thermometer were inaccurate.

Plaintiff also asserts that historical weather data for Tucson demonstrates that the logged 

temperature readings for the cells are inaccurate. He argues that it would be impossible for 

cell temperatures to be same on two consecutive days when the outside temperature varied 

by up to three degrees. (Doc. 127 at ¶ 19; Doc. 123 at ¶ 15.) This argument is logically 

flawed; it assumes there is a direct correlation between outside and inside temperatures and 

does not account for the efforts employed by ADC to cool the cell blocks. Plaintiff’s 

evidence regarding the alleged inaccuracy of the logs does not create a material issue of 

fact.

8

In his declaration, Plaintiff states that the evaporative coolers were broken when he was 

moved into Building 10. (Doc. 127 at ¶ 14.) However, the Work Request that Plaintiff 

cites in support relates to the repair only of the grates of the cooler. Moreover, the Work 

Request was entered on May 25, 2021, before Plaintiff arrived at the Rincon Unit. (Doc. 

123 at 27.) There is no evidence that the grates effect the functioning of the cooler or that 

the work was not completed prior to Plaintiff’s arrival. The “Work Performed” section of 

the Work Request states, “completed and picked up,” but it is not signed or dated. (Id.) 

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keep the cellblock cool. (Docs. 109-3 at 2 ¶ 5; 109 at ¶¶ 9-10.) Staff took steps to help out 

the evaporative coolers in an attempt to keep temperatures below 85 degrees. (Doc. 109 at

¶ 11.) For instance, cell door food traps were propped open to facilitate air flow. (Id.) An 

industrial-size fan and a 3 ft. by 5 ft. portable evaporative cooler were placed on each run 

(the aisle between two facing rows of cells). (Id. at ¶ 12.) The evaporative coolers were 

filled with ice to make the air flow as cold as possible.9 (Id. at ¶ 13.) Prisoners were 

permitted to take showers on request during these summer months.10 (Id. at ¶ 14.) Iglootype coolers with unlimited ice were provided, and prisoners could fill their cups with ice 

water whenever they wanted. (Id. at ¶ 16.) 

Plaintiff attached to his filings a June 18, 2021, email from Sergeant Segura to 

Defendants Martinez, Schwestak, Pulicicchio, Wood, and others. (Doc. 123 at 44.) The 

e-mail shows that officers were monitoring temperatures and taking steps to address the 

heat. Sergeant Segura reported that: “Temperatures in the housing units dropped initially 

this morning, but they are back up to high 80[]s, low 90[]s in HU10 and fluctuating between 

mid-to low 80[]s in HU11.” Sergeant Segura stated that, “[Officers] are still allowing 

showers on request, offering ice regularly, and have the traps open in HU10. The traps 

have been closed in HU11 since the temperatures dropped below 85.” (Id.) The e-mail 

states that at 2:00 p.m., the temperature in 10A was 88, the temperature in 10B was 89, the 

9

In his Declaration, Plaintiff avers that the portable swamp coolers were broken, although 

he does not specify when or for how long or how he knows they were broken. Plaintiff 

cites to the declarations and statements of other inmates who said that they told the 

Defendants that the coolers were broken and that the Defendants refused to fix or replace 

them. (Doc. 127 at ¶¶ 5, 16.) These declarations and statements suffer the same defect; 

they do not show how the declarant knew the coolers were broken or when or for how long. 

Plaintiff suggests that evidence includes the fact that an inmate slipped and fell on the water 

that had leaked out of the portable cooler. (Doc. 127 at ¶ 6.) However, discharge of water 

from a cooler does not necessarily demonstrate disrepair, and Plaintiff provides no 

evidence that it did in this instance. Thus, this evidence does not present a disputed issue 

of fact as to the operability of the coolers.

10 Plaintiff’s statement that the showers were broken for 36 days is unsupported and 

inconsistent with his later statements and those of other inmates that the showerheads were 

not functioning properly. Even if the shower heads were not working well, this defect 

would not affect one’s ability to use shower water to cool down. 

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temperature in 11A was 86, and the temperature in 11C was 86. (Id.) At 3:00 p.m., the 

temperature in 10C was 91. (Id.)

Staff also monitored prisoners for signs of heat-related distress and “would take 

appropriate steps if it were ever observed, including initiating ICS and calling for medical 

assistance.” (Doc. 109 at ¶ 17.) The only heat-related incident that summer known to any 

of the ADC Defendants is the July 11 incident alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.11 (Id. at ¶

18.) 

All of the ADC Defendants acknowledge that temperatures in Building 10 were 

occasionally uncomfortable, but none of them ever thought conditions were unbearable and 

none ever drew the conclusion that they were dangerous to inmates, including Plaintiff. 

(Id. at ¶ 19.) Other than Director Shinn, the ADC Defendants lacked the authority to order 

replacement of the air-cooling system or to close down the unit. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-24.)

Plaintiff was relocated to building 10 on June 1, 2021. (Doc. 127 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff 

participated in a June 4th inmate hunger strike to protest unconstitutional conditions of 

Building 10. (Id. at ¶ 4.) However, heat and cooling were not issues identified by the 

prisoners in their list of demands. (Doc. 123 at 36.) 

11 Plaintiff asserts that several inmates suffered heat-related injuries during the Summer of 

2021. (Doc. 127 at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff submits Declarations of Roque Eliseo, Jose Rodriguez, 

and Musaibli Abdullah, but these declarations do not show that any named Defendant was 

aware of an inmate suffering an injury due to high temperatures in the cells and lack 

sufficient detail to establish that the inmate suffered a heat-related injury due to high 

temperatures in the cells. Eliseo declares that at the end of June 2021, he “ha[d] a bad 

reaction to the elevated heat,” became “extremely dizzy[,] and fell out.” (Decl. of Roque 

Eliseo, Doc. 123 at 57 ¶ 8.) Rodriguez declares that in mid-June 2021, he had “serious 

heat related symptoms and fell out.” (Decl. of Jose Rodriguez, Doc. 123 at 59 ¶ 8.) 

Abdullah declares that in early July 2021, he “suffered heat related injuries.” (Decl. of 

Musaibli Abdullah, Doc. 123 at 61 ¶ 6.) Abdullah avers that he was “found on the floor, 

non-coherent and extremely dizzy.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff also submits statements signed by inmates David Szymanski and Marvin Potts, in 

which they state that they suffered heat-related injuries in the summer of 2021. (Id. at 69-

71.) However, neither statement is signed under penalty of perjury, Szymanski’s statement 

does not show that the Defendants were made aware that he was claiming a heat-related 

injury, and Potts claims he fell in a designated recreational area. (Id.) Thus, the declarations 

and statements do not create a material issue of fact.

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On July 11, 2021, CO II Encinas called a medical ICS for Plaintiff after observing 

Plaintiff laying down on the floor. (Doc. 109-2 at 5-7.) The ICS Report shows that CO II 

Encinas requested medical assistance, a “man down bag,” and a supervisor. (Id. at 7.) 

Sergeant Flannagan, CO II Aros, and medical staff arrived several minutes later. (Id.) 

Medical staff evaluated Plaintiff, and he was placed on a gurney and taken to the Behavioral 

Health Unit for further evaluation. (Id.) Medical staff then sent Plaintiff to Rincon 

Building 9 for IPC/IV for rehydration. (Id.) An IV was completed, and Plaintiff was 

released back to the BHU. (Id.) A July 12, 2021 supplement to the report, under the 

“Comments/Action Taken” section, states CO IV Wood and DW Martinez spoke with 

Plaintiff, and “[t]he cooling issue is being addressed and is currently with Central Office 

[and] maintenance.” (Id. at 10.) According to Defendant Martinez, the sentence referring 

to “the cooling issue,” indicates that complaints about the “sometimes uncomfortable 

conditions” in Buildings 10 and 11 were elevated to ADC[]’s Central Office. (Decl. of 

Jorge Martinez, Doc. 109-2 at 3 ¶ 13.)

In his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff explains that on 

July 11, he was outside for recreation around 1:30 p.m. when he began having symptoms 

of heat exhaustion. (Doc. 123 at 3.) He informed an officer who sent Plaintiff to the 

medical unit where he was seen by a nurse. (Id.) The nurse informed Plaintiff that he 

needed to get out of the heat and drink a lot of water. (Id.) Twenty minutes later, Plaintiff 

returned to his cell. He was not able to cool down, and two hours later, when he stood up, 

he blacked out, and hit the back of his head. (Id.) 

An August 2, 2021 Information Report from Sergeant Rivera to Defendant 

Pulicicchio documents that on July 12, 2021, while conducting temperature checks in 

Building 10, staff advised the temperatures in the runs have exceeded 85 degrees. Sergeant 

Rivera stated that “Hourly temperatures [checks] will continue throughout the day. All

fans and swamp coolers are on down each run. Ice offered to the population.” (Doc. 123 

at 46.) In the Comments/Action Taken section of the Report, a note states, “Each run has 

2 portable coolers and 1 fan in HU10, Per ADW Schwestak.” (Id.)

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On September 27, 2021, an e-mail was sent to all Rincon Unit prisoners stating, 

“Daily temperatures are at a reasonable level, and the housing units are not nearly what 

they had been. As such, we will be modifying operations in the house. These changes will

take effect today 09/28/21. If temperatures rise to previous levels, we will evaluate 

appropriate additional cooling measures.” (Id. at 39 ¶ 3.)

C. Discussion

1. Defendant Shinn

Plaintiff sues Defendant Shinn in his official capacity. A claim against an individual 

in his or her official capacity is “only another way of pleading an action against an entity 

of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 

(1978). “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against 

the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from 

a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) 

(internal citation omitted). 

Plaintiff cannot maintain a lawsuit for damages against Defendant Shinn in his 

official capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (“State officials sued for 

damages in their official capacity are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the suit because they 

assume the identity of the government that employs them.”); see also Gilbreath v. Cutter 

Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] state is not a ‘person’ for 

purposes of section 1983. Likewise[,] ‘arms of the State’ such as the Arizona Department 

of Corrections are not ‘persons’ under section 1983.”) (citation omitted). Although 

Plaintiff can maintain a lawsuit for prospective injunctive relief against ADC’s officials in 

their official capacities, Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief in his complaint. (See Doc. 

8.) The Court will therefore grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Shinn.

2. Defendants Martinez, Schwestak, Wood, and Pulicicchio

To demonstrate that Defendants Martinez, Schwestak, Wood, and Pulicicchio were 

deliberately indifferent to the conditions in Buildings 10 and 11, Plaintiff must show that 

they “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety.” Farmer, 511 

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U.S. at 837. Plaintiff must show that each Defendant was “both [] aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” and each 

Defendant “must also draw the inference.” Id. Prisons officials may avoid liability by 

demonstrating “that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently 

substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the 

underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise 

was insubstantial or nonexistent.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Liability may also be avoided 

by demonstrating that defendant’s response was reasonable in light of all the 

circumstances. Id. at 844–45.

The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 

U.S. 3337, 349 (1981). The Eighth Amendment guarantees an “adequate” temperature, 

“but not necessarily a ‘comfortable’ temperature.” Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1049 

(9th Cir. 2010); see Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended

on denial of reh'g, 135 F.3d 1318 (affirming summary judgment for defendants where 

plaintiff alleged only that average temperatures in his cell “tend[ed] to be either well above 

or well below room temperature ... which suggest[ed] only that the temperature was not 

comfortable”). 

Plaintiff contends a reasonable jury could find that temperatures in Buildings 10 and 

11 reached 85 degrees and higher “multiple times,” and as a result, at least five prisoners, 

including Plaintiff, suffered heat-related injuries. (Doc. 123 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants did not take sufficient steps to ameliorate the heat: they did not bring sufficient 

swamp coolers; some of the coolers were broke; and some of the coolers leaked. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that at times his cell reached more than 95 degrees. (Id.)

Plaintiff was not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment as a result of the 

temperatures in Building 10 in the summer of 2021. Prison logs show that in the seven 

months between April 1 and October 31, 2021, the temperatures in Buildings 10 and 11 

exceeded 85 degrees on a handful of occasions. The morning temperatures in Building 10 

and 11 ranged from 70 degrees to 88 degrees, rarely exceeded 85 degrees, and did not 

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exceed 90 degrees. Afternoon temperatures ranged between 74 degrees and 91 degrees and 

exceeded 85 degrees on four occasions: June 15 (88 degrees); June 18 (91 degrees); July 

10 (90 degrees); July 12 (88 degrees). Plaintiff’s contention that the temperatures were 

higher is unsupported. Undoubtedly, the cells were uncomfortable in the summer. But the 

high temperatures were neither consistent nor frequent. For example, on June 18, the 

temperature reached 91 degrees, but the next day, June 19, the highest temperature logged 

was 86 degrees. According to the logs, the inside temperature never exceeded 95 degrees, 

the threshold at which the ADC memorandum directed staff to take extra steps to reduce 

temperatures.12

Plaintiff reads Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) as setting an 85 

degree threshold for temperatures in a mental health unit. In Graves, the Ninth Circuit 

affirmed an injunction requiring Sheriff Arpaio to house pretrial detainees taking 

psychotropic medications in cells where temperatures do not exceed 85 degrees. Id. at 

1049. The court explained: 

We have held that the Eighth Amendment guarantees adequate heating, but 

not necessarily a “comfortable” temperature. One measure of an inadequate, 

as opposed to merely uncomfortable, temperature is that it poses “a 

substantial risk of serious harm.” Accepting the district court's factual finding 

that temperatures in excess of 85° F greatly increase the risk of heat-related 

illness for pretrial detainees taking psychotropic medications, it follows that 

the Eighth Amendment prohibits housing such pretrial detainees in areas 

where the temperature exceeds 85°.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Graves does not require a finding that the conditions in the 

Rincon Unit were per se unconstitutional. For one thing, the temperatures in the Rincon 

Unit rarely exceeded 85 degrees in the Summer of 2021. But more importantly, as noted 

in the Graves decision, a measure of an inadequate, as opposed to merely uncomfortable, 

temperature is that it poses a substantial risk of serious harm.

Plaintiff presents little evidence that the temperaturesin the cellblock in the Summer 

of 2021 posed a substantial risk of serious harm to himself and other inmates. Accepting 

as true that Plaintiff’s fall on July 11, 2021 was heat-related, the July 11 incident is the only 

incident of harm, known to Defendants, caused by the heat during the hot summer 

12 See nt. 5, supra. 

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months.

13

 Moreover, the highest temperature recorded on that date was 84 degrees, which 

is lower than the threshold temperature that Plaintiff identifies as putting prisoners who 

take psychotropic medications14 at higher risk of heat-related injuries. Notably, Plaintiff’s 

injury occurred after he participated in outdoor recreation at 1:30 in the afternoon. The July 

11 incident is insufficient to support a conclusion that the temperatures in the cells in 

Buildings 10 and 11 were so high that Defendants knew or should have known that heatrelated injuries were likely to result. 

Finally, ADC had in place procedures to monitor the temperatures in response to 

the extreme heat. ADC monitored the temperatures in the cells from May to August, taking 

and recording temperatures in different cells at least twice a day, and sometimes hourly. 

This process was followed in Rincon’s Mental-Health Unit (Buildings 10 and 11). ADC 

implemented measure to address excessive heat. There was an evaporative cooling system 

for Building 10, and to the extent it could not keep the cellblock cool, ADC staff propped

open cell door food traps to facilitate air flow; placed industrial-size fans and 3 ft. by 5 ft. 

portable evaporative coolers in the aisles between two facing rows of cells; and filled the 

evaporative coolers with ice to make the air flow as cold as possible. In addition, to

ameliorate the effects of the heat, prisoners were permitted to take showers on request 

during the summer months and Igloo-type coolers with unlimited ice were provided where 

prisoners could fill their cups with ice water whenever they wanted.

Plaintiff fails to present evidence of a material issue of fact that would prevent entry 

of summary judgment in favor of ADC Defendants. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the ADC Defendants were not deliberately 

indifferent, and thus, are entitled to summary judgment. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, 

13 The insufficiency of Plaintiff’s proffered evidence as to other inmate heat-related injuries 

is addressed at nt. 11, supra.

14 The ADC Defendants dispute that Plaintiff takes psychotropic medications. This factual 

dispute is not material to the Court’s conclusion. 

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IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Spoliation of Evidence (Doc. 74) is denied.

15

2. Defendant Hand’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 117) is denied.

3. Defendants Shinn, Martinez, Schwestak, Wood, and Pulicicchio’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 108) is granted.

4. Defendants Shinn, Martinez, Schwestak, Wood, and Pulicicchio are 

dismissed with prejudice.

5. The remaining claim is the Eighth Amendment medical care claim against 

Defendant Hand.

Dated this 29th day of September, 2023.

15 In his Motion for Spoilation of Evidence, Plaintiff seeks sanctions because the ADC 

Defendants cannot produce video from the security and medical staff response to the July 

11, 2021 incident (the “ICS call”) or from the closed-circuit security cameras outside the 

entrances to the medical unit and Buildings 9 and 10. Plaintiff also appears to assert that 

there is spoliation of maintenance records related to the alleged planned replacement of the 

evaporative-cooling system in Building 10. 

Video of Plaintiff’s request for medical assistance after he became overheated at outdoor 

recreation would not assist the resolution of the motions for summary judgment. The Court 

has accepted Plaintiff’s assertion that he suffered a heat-related injury after outdoor 

recreation on July 11. The ADC Defendants have already explained that there are no 

records related to replacement of the evaporative-cooling system. Nonetheless, such 

evidence is not necessary to resolve the pending motion, because the Court accepts, and 

the Defendants admit, that the existing evaporative cooling system struggled to keep up 

with the heat. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Spoilation. In 

addition, because the Court is granting the ADC Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, the Court will deny as the motion as moot to the extent Plaintiff requests 

sanctions at trial based on spoilation of this same evidence. 

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