Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01556/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01556-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 46:1156 Administrative Procedure Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALIA MAGEB QASEM AL-ATRI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MONICA B. LUGO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01556-JLT-EPG

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT:

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

AMEND TO FILE A FOURTH AMENDED 

COMPLAINT BE GRANTED IN PART, and

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 12(B)(1) 

DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT BE DENIED AS 

MOOT.

(ECF Nos. 96 and 101)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Muneera Nasr Ali Abdullah (“Muneera”), Alia Mageb Qasem 

Al-Atri (“Alia”), and Ramzi Mageb Qasem Al-Atri (“Ramzi”)1assert federal statutory and 

constitutional claims arising from the denial of Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K Applications for 

Citizenship and Issuance of Certificate (“N-600K applications”) and the revocation of Muneera’s 

United States passport. 

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 101) to file their 

proposed Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 101-1). Also before the Court is Defendants’ 

1 Alia and Ramzi were minors at the time this lawsuit was filed in 2020, and earlier filings in this matter

refer to these Plaintiffs by their initials, A.M.Q.A. and R.M.Q.A. (See ECF No. 112).

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motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 96). Both motions were referred to 

the undersigned for issuance of findings and recommendations. (ECF Nos. 104, 107). On 

September 27, 2024, the Court held a hearing on the motions. (ECF No. 110). 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion for 

leave to amend in part and denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs’ Initial Complaint

On October 30, 2020, Muneera, her four children – Alia, Ramzi, N.M.Q.A.(1), and 

N.M.Q.A.(2) – and Muneera’s father, Nassar Ali Abdullah Mohamed (“Nassar”), filed this 

lawsuit for declaratory and injunctive relief against: United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (“USCIS”), USCIS Acting Director Kenneth Cuccinelli, USCIS Western District 

Director Monica Toro, USCIS Fresno Field Office, and Monica B. Lugo (collectively, “USCIS 

Defendants”).

2

(ECF No. 1). At the time the initial complaint was filed, Nassar lived in Fresno, 

California, and Muneera lived in Yemen with her children, all of whom were minors at the time. 

(Id. at 6).

In their initial complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Muneera derived her United States 

citizenship through her U.S. citizen father, Nassar, and obtained a U.S. passport in August 2017. 

(Id. at 2). In January 2018, Muneera filed N-600K applications on behalf of her four children 

seeking citizenship under Section 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and 8 

U.S.C. § 1433(a). (Id. at 3). Plaintiffs alleged that all four children were eligible for United States 

citizenship,3 but their N-600K applications were wrongly denied on November 9, 2018. (Id. at 5, 

9). Plaintiffs asserted that the denial of the N-600K applications violated the Administrative 

2 Plaintiffs Nassar, N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2) are no longer parties in this lawsuit. (See ECF No. 112 

(order dismissing Nassar, N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2) based on their notice (ECF No. 111) stating that 

they do not oppose dismissal as they “no longer have active claims that warrant their continued 

involvement in this matter”)). 

3 Plaintiffs specifically asserted that the children were eligible for citizenship under INA § 322 because:

(1) they were born outside the United States in Yemen; (2) they are under 18 years of age; 

(3) their mother is a US citizen; (4) their US citizen grandparent has been physically 

present in the United States of five years, at least five of which were after turning age 14; 

and (5) they are residing outside of the United States in the legal and physical custody of 

the U.S. citizen parent, their mother, Plaintiff Muneera.

(ECF No. 1 at 3 (internal citations omitted)).

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Procedures Act (“APA”) and their procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Id.

at 12–16).

Shortly after Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit, USCIS administratively reopened the N600K applications. (ECF No. 7). As a result, the USCIS Defendants requested an extension of 

time to respond to Plaintiffs’ initial complaint, noting that further proceedings at the 

administrative level were expected. (Id.) The Court granted the request and extended the time for

the USCIS Defendants to respond to the complaint to March 15, 2021. (ECF No. 8). The Court 

subsequently granted additional extensions because administrative proceedings remained 

ongoing. (ECF Nos. 11, 13, 19). 

On June 30, 2021, the USCIS Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ initial complaint. 

(ECF Nos. 20, 21). On July 21, 2021, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion to stay the case 

until USCIS issued final decisions on the reopened N-600K applications. (ECF No. 24). 

Approximately six months later, the parties filed a joint status report indicating that USCIS had 

issued final decisions denying the reopened N-600K applications on January 10, 2022, and that 

Plaintiffs intended to file an amended complaint in this lawsuit. (ECF No. 33 at 4). The report 

also noted that the USCIS Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend. (Id.) 

Based on the parties’ representations, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a first amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 34). 

B. First and Second Amended Complaints

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on March 9, 2022. (ECF No. 40). In the 

First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs added a sixth defendant, USCIS Fresno Field Office 

Director Lynn Feldman, in addition to the five USCIS Defendants previously named in the initial 

complaint. (ECF No. 40 at 6–7). Plaintiffs asserted violations of the APA as well as their equal 

protection and due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 16–53).

The day after the First Amended Complaint was filed, the United States Department of 

State (“the State Department”) revoked Muneera’s U.S. passport. (ECF No. 43). On June 6, 2022, 

Plaintiffs sought leave to file a second amended complaint, which the USCIS Defendants did not 

oppose. (ECF Nos. 51, 58). The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 

60), and on August 18, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 61). 

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In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs named the USCIS Defendants and the 

following as defendants: the State Department; Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken; National 

Passport Center Director Karen Pizza; Diplomatic Security Service Special Agent “John Doe”; 

and Does 1-15 (collectively, the “State Department Defendants”). (ECF No. 61). Plaintiffs raised 

twelve claims in the Second Amended Complaint stemming from the denial of the N-600K 

applications and the recent revocation of Muneera’s passport. (Id.) 

On October 21, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. 

(ECF No. 65). Due to three stipulated extensions of time (ECF Nos. 69, 71, 74), briefing was not 

yet complete on the motion to dismiss when Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend. (ECF 

Nos. 75). In their motion, Plaintiffs asserted that amendment was necessary because the State 

Department had issued an amended revocation notice “adopt[ing] additional grounds [supporting] 

revocation of [Muneera’s] passport” after the Second Amended Complaint was filed. (Id. at 2).

Defendants did not oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. (ECF No. 76 at 2). On March 

24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend. (ECF No. 77). 

On March 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 78). The 

Court subsequently denied as moot Defendants’ motion to dismiss as it no longer pertained to the 

operative pleading. (ECF No. 79). The Court noted that Defendants, in their response to 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend, “appear[ed] to have acknowledged that [the Third] 

amended complaint would moot their prior motion [to dismiss].” (Id.) 

C. Third Amended Complaint

In the Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 78), Plaintiffs assert claims against the 

USCIS Defendants4and the State Department Defendants5for violations of the APA, their Fifth 

Amendment due process and equal protection rights, and 8 U.S.C. § 1503. (ECF No. 78 at 50–

72).

Plaintiffs allege in the Third Amended Complaint that the State Department issued 

4 The USCIS Defendants are: USCIS; USCIS Director Ur Jaddou; USCIS Western District Director 

Monica Toro; USCIS Fresno Field Office; USCIS Fresno Field Office Director Lynn Q. Feldman; and 

immigration services officer Monica B. Lugo. (ECF No. 78 at 10–11).

5 The State Department Defendants are: the State Department; Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken; 

National Passport Center Director Karen A. Pizza; Diplomatic Security Service Agent “John Doe”; and 

Does 1-15. (ECF No. 78 at 11).

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Muneera a U.S. passport in August 2017 pursuant to INA § 309 “as a child born out of wedlock 

as a result of her father’s polygamous marriages, legal in Yemen but not recognized by United 

States law.” (ECF No. 78 at 14). Plaintiffs allege that this passport was issued after “a Consular 

Officer, a Section Chief, a supervising evaluator from Washington and a Washington secondary 

review” all determined—based on evidence Muneera submitted, DNA testing, and interviews 

with Muneera and Nassar—that Muneera was a United States citizen. (Id.)

The Third Amended Complaint then alleges the following timeline regarding the USCIS 

Defendants’ adjudication of the N-600K applications Muneera filed on behalf of her children: (1) 

the applications were sent to the USCIS Fresno Field Office for processing; (2) USCIS requested 

additional evidence regarding Nassar’s physical presence in the United States and Muneera’s date 

of birth; (3) Plaintiffs responded to the requests for evidence; (4) USCIS denied all four N-600K 

applications on November 9, 2018; (5) Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit; (6) USCIS 

administratively reopened the N-600K applications and once again requested additional evidence; 

(7) Plaintiffs responded to the requests for evidence; (8) USCIS issued Notices of Intent to Deny 

(“NOIDs”) the reopened N-600K applications; (9) Plaintiffs responded to the NOIDs; and (10) on 

January 10, 2022, USCIS denied the administratively reopened N-600K applications. (Id. at 13–

21).

The Third Amended Complaint alleges that after the reopened N-600K applications were 

denied, the State Department revoked Muneera’s U.S. passport on March 10, 2022, by sending a 

written notice to her attorney. (Id. at 21). Plaintiffs allege that this notice was improperly served 

and that Muneera’s passport “was revoked without providing a hearing for review as required 

under” 8 U.S.C. § 1504. (Id. at 22). The Third Amended Complaint further alleges that on 

September 6, 2022, the State Department issued Muneera an amended notice of revocation which 

stated: 

Your passport application and supporting documents do not provide consistent 

information regarding your date of birth, the identity of your biological mother, or 

the dates of marriage and divorce/death of your father’s wives. In addition, the 

physical presence statement provided by your father was not a detailed statement 

which documented his periods and places of his physical presence and residences 

in the United States with public records to support his claim.

(Id. at 22–23). Plaintiffs assert that the State Department improperly revoked Muneera’s passport 

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as both revocation notices “suffer[] from many of the same infirmities and logical defects,” that 

any supposed inconsistencies in Muneera’s date of birth are “immaterial,” and that Nassar “had 

more than adequate physical presence to transfer citizenship to both his daughter and his 

grandchildren.” (Id. at 23–24).

Plaintiffs also assert in the Third Amended Complaint that Defendants have a “pattern and 

practice of stymying family unification of Yemeni-American[s] and preventing transmission of 

citizenship to children of Yemeni-American citizens.” (Id. at 24–30). Plaintiffs contend

Defendants have implemented policies and practices “targeting Yemeni-Americans and their 

family members,” that they have used “biometric, DNA collection, and AI databases to

discriminate” against Yemeni-American citizens and their families, and that they have adopted 

“discriminatory procedures and policies . . . that in effect [have] create[d] a substantially higher 

and different standard of proof for N-600K Petitioners of Yemeni race and/or national origin.” 

(Id. at 30–46).

D. Procedural History after filing of the Third Amended Complaint

On May 5, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint under 

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 84). While the 

motion to dismiss was still pending, Defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay the case

because the parties were engaged in settlement discussions. (ECF No. 91). On February 29, 2024, 

the Court stayed the case. (ECF No. 92). 

On June 28, 2024, the parties filed a joint status report stating that they were unable to 

reach a settlement. (ECF No. 95). The parties apprised the Court of the current status of the 

administrative proceedings, specifically that: (1) USCIS had sua sponte reopened and approved 

N.M.Q.A(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2)’s N-600K applications; (2) USCIS also approved Muneera’s own

N-600K application; (3) certificates of citizenship were issued to Muneera, N.M.Q.A(1), and 

N.M.Q.A.(2) on January 17, 2024; and (4) the State Department issued Muneera a new U.S. 

passport on January 18, 2024. (Id.) The parties reported that USCIS did not reopen Alia and 

Ramzi’s N-600K applications. (Id. at 2). Considering these factual developments, the parties 

agreed that Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint was moot. (Id.

at 4). The parties noted that Plaintiffs intended to move for leave to file a fourth amended 

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complaint and that Defendants intended to file another motion to dismiss solely under Rule 

12(b)(1). (Id. at 4–5). Upon review of the joint status report, the Court lifted the stay and denied 

Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 84) as moot. (ECF Nos. 97, 100).

E. Pending Motions

On June 28, 2024, Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint under 

Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to dismissal because they are either moot 

or lack redressability. (ECF No. 96).

Rather than file a response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to

amend (ECF No. 101) along with a proposed Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 101-1). In 

their motion, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to address the recent developments at the 

administrative level. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek leave to: 

remove several causes of action which have been rendered moot by the actions of 

Defendants, to add additional facts surrounding the decision on [Alia and Ramzi’s]

N-600Ks and subsequently filed Forms I-131 and their denial, and [] their effects 

on the remaining causes of action; to adjust the APA causes of action to address 

the Court’s equitable estoppel authority; to drop two Plaintiffs [N.M.Q.A.(1) and 

N.M.Q.A.(2)] whose relief has been accorded in full; and to adjust the relief 

sought in accordance with the current status of proceedings.

(ECF No. 101 at 2). Defendants filed a response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to 

amend, arguing that granting Plaintiffs leave to amend would be futile and cause undue delay and 

prejudice to Defendants. (ECF No. 103 at 3–5). Plaintiffs filed a reply. (ECF No. 106). 

On September 27, 2024, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend

and Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Upon consideration of the briefing and the parties’ arguments 

during the hearing, the Court issues the following findings and recommendations.

II. MOTION TO AMEND

The Court begins by addressing Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend to file their 

proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. 

A. Applicable Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a plaintiff to amend the complaint once as a 

matter of course; further amendment requires the defendant’s consent or leave of court, but “[t]he 

court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see Foman v. 

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “Although leave to amend should be given freely, denying leave 

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is not an abuse of discretion if it is clear that granting leave to amend would have been futile.”

Lathus v. City of Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 

2018) (“Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject 

to dismissal.”). In addition, “a district court has discretion to deny leave to amend when there are 

countervailing considerations such as undue delay, prejudice, [or] bad faith.” Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity v. United States Forest Serv., 80 F.4th 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

B. Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint

In their motion, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend to address the recent developments at the 

administrative level. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek leave to omit several causes of action that they 

assert no longer apply in this case, to “adjust[] the requested relief as to several causes of action 

pertaining to [Alia and Ramzi],” and to remove N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2) as parties because 

“their cases have been resolved.” (ECF No. 106 at 4). Plaintiffs argue that their proposed

amendments are not futile or made in bad faith and will not cause undue delay or prejudice to 

Defendants. (ECF No. 101 at 6–8).

With their motion to amend, Plaintiffs lodged a proposed Fourth Amended Complaint 

(ECF No. 101-1). In the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs6 name the same two sets 

of Defendants – the USCIS Defendants and the State Department Defendants – that were named 

in the Third Amended Complaint. (Id. at 8–10).

In addition to reasserting the facts previously alleged in the Third Amended Complaint, 

the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint includes the recent events at the administrative level—

i.e., the recent approval of N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2)’s N-600K applications, the approval of 

Muneera’s own N-600K application, the issuance of certificates of citizenship to Muneera, 

N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A(2), and the issuance of a new U.S. passport to Muneera. (Id. at 12–

25). As to Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K applications, Plaintiffs allege in the proposed Fourth 

6 Although the caption of the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint includes N.M.Q.A.(1) and 

N.M.Q.A.(2) as plaintiffs, the body of the proposed complaint identifies only Muneera, Alia, Ramzi, and 

Nassar as plaintiffs. See ECF No. 101-1 at 1–2, 8. As previously noted, Nassar, N.M.Q.A.(1), and 

N.M.Q.A.(2) are no longer parties in this lawsuit. See supra n.2. 

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Amended Complaint that Defendants refused to reopen Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K applications on 

the basis that Alia and Ramzi have “aged out” and are no longer statutorily eligible for relief, 

which Plaintiffs assert is the result of Defendants’ “delays, revocations, and other bad faith 

actions.” (Id. at 24). Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “intentionally timed out the denial of [Alia 

and Ramzi’s] N-600K applications in order to deprive” them of their citizenship. (Id. at 25–26). 

Plaintiffs further allege that “Defendants’ actions amount to affirmative misconduct to delay the 

applications . . . until [Alia and Ramzi] aged out.” (Id. at 40).

Plaintiffs further allege that Muneera filed Form I-130 Petitions for Alien Relative (“I-130 

petitions”) on behalf of Alia and Ramzi on June 9, 2023. (Id. at 24). After the I-130 petitions were 

approved, Alia and Ramzi filed I-131 Applications for Humanitarian Parole “to come to the 

United States while their [I-130 petitions] are processing, so they would not be separated from 

their family.” (Id. at 25). Plaintiffs allege that counsel for Defendants notified them on May 3, 

2024 that the humanitarian parole applications “were denied but did not explain the basis for the 

denial[,] [o]nly that the parole requirements had not been met.” (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiffs allege in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint that Defendants have 

a “pattern and practice of stymying family unification of Yemeni-Americans and preventing 

transmission of citizenship to children of Yemeni-American citizens.” (Id. at 26–33). Plaintiffs

assert Defendants have implemented policies and practices “targeting Yemeni-Americans and 

their family members,” which “in effect [have] create[d] a substantially higher and different 

standard of proof for N-600K Petitioners of Yemeni race and/or national origin.” (Id. at 33, 37).

Plaintiffs raise seven claims in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs assert 

in Count 1 that Defendants’ revocation of Muneera’s previous U.S. passport violated the APA 

and their Fifth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 41–42). In Counts 2 and 3, Plaintiffs assert 

that the USCIS Defendants’ adjudication of Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K applications violated the 

APA. (Id. at 43–44). Notably, in Count 2, Plaintiffs ask the Court to apply equitable estoppel to 

“reopen and retroactively grant” Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K applications. (Id. at 44). In Counts 4 

and 5, Plaintiffs raise Fifth Amendment procedural due process and equal protection claims 

against all Defendants. (Id. at 47–55). In Count 6, Plaintiffs assert an APA claim arising from the 

denial of Alia and Ramzi’s humanitarian parole applications. (Id. at 56–58). And in Count 7, 

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Plaintiff assert a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act. (Id. at 59).

C. Analysis

1. Timeliness of Amendment

As an initial matter, the Court addresses Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs should be 

denied leave to amend because “this case has been pending since October 2020 without having 

ever advanced past the pleading stage.” (ECF No. 103 at 5). In response, Plaintiffs argue that they 

have not unduly delayed seeking leave to amend as their proposed amendments address recent 

developments at the administrative level that took place after the Third Amended Complaint was 

filed. (ECF No. 101 at 6–7). 

The Court does not find Defendants’ argument persuasive regarding the timeliness of the 

amendment. During the pendency of this lawsuit, the parties have repeatedly requested extensions 

of time or stays to permit the parties to resolve this matter through the administrative process. 

While the extensions and stays have resulted in the case remaining pending for a lengthy period, 

Defendants do not allege, nor does the Court find, that there has been any unreasonable delay or 

lack of diligence on the part of Plaintiffs in prosecuting this action.

Moreover, the recent developments in the administrative process have necessitated the 

need for an amendment. The re-issuance of a U.S. passport to Muneera, the approval of 

N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A(2)’s N-600K applications, and the refusal to reopen Alia and Ramzi’s 

N-600K applications are all significant factual developments that have occurred since the Third 

Amended Complaint was filed. The proposed Fourth Amended Complaint alleges these 

additional facts and more importantly, omits those causes of action that are now moot as a result 

of the recent developments at the agency level. 

The Court also finds that an amendment at this juncture will not unduly prejudice 

Defendants as this case is still in its procedural infancy, seeing that the Court has not yet issued a 

scheduling order and discovery has not commenced. Thus, Defendants have failed to show any 

undue delay that would warrant denying Plaintiffs leave to amend.

2. Futility

The Court likewise is not persuaded by Defendants’ contention that amendment would be 

futile because Plaintiffs’ claims in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint are now either moot 

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or not redressable, for the reasons set forth more fully below.

a. Plaintiff’s Claims Stemming from the Denial of Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K 

Applications

Turning first to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Alia and Ramzi, the proposed Fourth 

Amended Complaint contains several causes of action stemming from the denial of Alia and 

Ramzi’s N-600K applications. Defendants argue that these claims are not redressable because 

applicants seeking derivative citizenship under INA § 322 must be under the age of eighteen, and 

since Alia and Ramzi have aged out, the Court cannot equitably grant them relief in contravention 

of the statutory age requirement. (ECF No. 96 at 8–9; ECF No. 103 at 3). 

In support of this argument, Defendants cite to an unpublished case from the Second 

Circuit, Keane v. Dibbins, 2023 WL 6785370 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2023). In Keane, the plaintiffs –

who like Alia and Ramzi had aged out – argued they were entitled to mandamus relief and 

equitable estoppel because they were under the age of eighteen at the time they applied for 

derivative citizenship through the N-600 process. The Second Circuit determined that the 

plaintiffs failed to meet “the highly demanding mandamus standard” because the statutory 

scheme “is ambiguous as to whether the age requirement must be met only at the time the 

application is submitted or also up through to the time that application is adjudicated.” Id. at *3. 

The Second Circuit also held that plaintiffs were not entitled to equitable relief because “courts 

cannot grant citizenship through their equitable powers” in violation of statutory limitations. Id. at 

*4 (quoting INS v. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2014)).

In response, relying on Harriot v. Ashcroft, 277 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Pa. 2003), and 

Petition of Tubig on Behalf of Tubig, 559 F. Supp. 2 (N.D. Cal. 1981), Plaintiffs argue that courts 

have the “equitable authority to grant citizenship where an application was timely filed before 

aging out, [but] where the government engaged in ‘affirmative misconduct’ in order to age out the 

applicant.” (ECF No. 106 at 3). In Tubig, the district court found that immigration officials were 

estopped from denying the petitioner’s application for naturalization of his son because the 

petitioner’s “failure to complete the application process before his son reached the cut-off age of 

eighteen was due to the INS’ failure to follow its own regular procedures.” 559 F. Supp. at 3. The 

district court explained: “The INS is entitled—indeed, is required—to enforce the statutory 

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requirements under which it operates. It may not, however, by reason of its own unjustified delay 

or error, cause an alien to run afoul of regulations upon which the INS then relies in denying the 

alien the status to which he is entitled.” Id. at 4. In reaching this conclusion, Tubig relied on 

Villena v. INS, 622 F.3d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980), in which the Ninth Circuit held that “the rule of 

estoppel may be invoked against the government in immigration cases where there is affirmative 

misconduct.” Id. at 1360; see also Rahman v. Holder, 434 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 

government in immigration cases may be subject to equitable estoppel if it has engaged in 

affirmative misconduct.”).

During the hearing, Defendants appeared to concede that courts may grant the requested 

equitable relief in certain circumstances. However, Defendants argued that the facts will show 

that there was not any unreasonable delay or affirmative misconduct on the part of Defendants.

See Jaa v. U.S. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1986) (for equitable estoppel to apply, the 

“affirmative misconduct must be more than negligence[;] [m]ere unexplained delay does not 

show misconduct.”) (internal citations omitted)). Defendants asserted in their papers and during 

the hearing that the adjudicative timeline establishes that there were no unreasonable or 

unexplained delays in their processing of Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K applications.

Plaintiffs disagree, pointing to allegations in their proposed Fourth Amended Complaint

that USCIS improperly denied the N-600K applications initially, that the State Department

revoked Muneera’s passport without any legitimate basis to do so and then intentionally delayed 

the reissuance of her passport until after Alia and Ramzi aged out, and that USCIS intentionally 

waited until Alia and Ramzi aged out before it approved N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2)’s N600K applications. (See ECF No. 101-1 at 15–16, 21–26, 40–44). 

Construing Plaintiffs’ factual allegations in the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint as 

true, as the Court must do at this stage, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they are entitled to 

equitable estoppel because Defendants have engaged in affirmative misconduct. Thus, while 

Defendants may argue that the evidence will not support Plaintiffs’ allegations, such argument is 

not a basis to deny leave for Plaintiffs to file their Fourth Amended Complaint. 

Additionally, Defendants have not challenged Plaintiffs’ cause of action for denial of 

equal protection related to the initial denial of Alia and Ramzi’s N-600K applications. While the 

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Court appreciates the legal hurdles to Plaintiffs’ claims stemming from the denial of Alia and 

Ramzi’s N-600K applications, it cannot find based on this record that these claims are futile.

The Court therefore recommends granting the motion to amend with respect to these 

claims.

b. Plaintiff’s Claim in Count 1 regarding the Revocation of Muneera’s U.S. 

Passport

Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs’ due process claim in Count 1 concerning the 

previous revocation of Muneera’s U.S. passport is moot because Muneera has been reissued a 

passport. 

In response, Plaintiffs argue “there is an exception to the mootness doctrine for situations 

that are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064, 

1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n. 11 (1975)). For the 

controversies “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine to 

apply, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully 

litigated prior to cessation or expiration,” and (2) “there is a reasonable expectation that the same 

complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United 

States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs contend that the above exception to the mootness doctrine applies here because 

the State Department unreasonably revoked Muneera’s passport and later reversed its decision 

based on the same information that Muneera had initially submitted when she applied for the 

passport. Absent Court order, Plaintiffs argue that Muneera could be subject to the same action 

again by Defendants. And the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint asserts the existence of 

policies and practices implemented by Defendants to denaturalize and revoke the passports of 

Yemeni-American citizens.

While Defendants argued in the hearing that the claim is moot because the government 

has determined Muneera is entitled to a U.S. passport, Defendants fell short of formally agreeing 

that Muneera is entitled to a court order declaring the same. 

Thus, Plaintiffs’ due process claim in Count 1 is not clearly moot. Because the issuance of 

a Court order would redress the issue raised in this claim, the Court recommends granting 

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Plaintiffs leave to amend this claim.

c. Plaintiffs’ Claim Regarding Alia and Ramzi’s Humanitarian Parole 

Applications (Count 6)

Finally, the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint asserts a cause of action under the APA 

stemming from the denial of Alia and Ramzi’s humanitarian parole applications.7 Specifically, 

Plaintiffs allege in Count 6 that “Defendants’ denial of [Alia and Ramzi’s] request for parole 

under 212(d)(5) violates the APA as arbitrary, capricious, and [constitutes] an abuse of 

discretion.” (ECF No. 101-1 at 58). Defendants argue that it would be futile to grant Plaintiffs 

leave to add this cause of action because “the denial of a parole application is a discretionary 

agency decision over which this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 103 at 4).

Plaintiffs did not respond to this argument in their reply brief. (ECF No. 106 at 4).

The Court agrees with Defendants that it would be futile for Plaintiffs to add a cause of 

action concerning the agency’s decision to deny Alia and Ramzi’s parole applications. As 

Defendants pointed out in their briefing and the hearing, courts may not review discretionary 

agency decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (judicial review is precluded over decisions 

“under this subchapter” that are vested “in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary 

of Homeland Security[.]”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (judicial review is precluded under the 

APA where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”). The decision to grant or 

deny a parole application is a discretionary decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (“The 

Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such 

conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis . . . .”) (emphasis added). Because 

parole decisions are not subject to judicial review, it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to assert a 

claim challenging the discretionary decision to deny humanitarian parole to Alia and Ramzi. See

Vazquez Romero v. Garland, 999 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he jurisdiction-stripping 

provision of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to discretionary parole decisions under § 1182(d)(5).”). 

Indeed, the Supreme Court very recently confirmed the legal principle that discretionary 

agency decisions are not subject to judicial review. See Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, No. 23-583, 2024 

7 The parties disagree as to whether USCIS has in fact denied Alia and Ramzi’s parole applications or if 

they remain pending.

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WL 5048700, at *7 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2024) (“§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions 

‘made discretionary by legislation.’”).

Thus, the Court recommends denying Plaintiffs leave to add a cause of action in their 

Fourth Amended Complaint concerning the denial of Alia and Ramzi’s parole applications.

D. Recommendation

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court recommends granting Plaintiffs’ motion 

for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint and permitting Muneera, Alia, and Ramzi to 

proceed on the following claims:

- Fifth Amendment Due Process claim against all Defendants (Count 1);

- violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), against USCIS Defendants (Count 2);

- violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), against USCIS Defendants (Count 3);

- Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process claim against all Defendants (Count 4);

- Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claim against all Defendants (Count 5); and

- Declaratory Judgment Act against all Defendants (Count 7).

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint 

on grounds of mootness and redressability. (ECF No. 96). Defendants specifically argue that 

Muneera’s claims are now moot because she has been issued a certificate of citizenship and U.S. 

passport. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims stemming from the denial of Alia and 

Ramzi’s N-600K applications are not redressable because they have “aged out” and are no longer 

statutorily eligible for relief through the N-600K process.8

As discussed above, rather than file an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 

Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. 

Defendants ask the Court to treat their motion to dismiss as unopposed because Plaintiffs 

elected to file a motion for leave to amend rather than a response in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss. The Court declines to do so. As can be seen by the analysis above, the parties’ arguments 

in connection with the motion for leave to amend address the same substantive arguments 

8 Defendants also raise mootness arguments with respect to N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2), which the 

Court does not consider because N.M.Q.A.(1) and N.M.Q.A.(2) are no longer parties in this lawsuit.

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regarding mootness and redressability that are raised in the motion to dismiss. Additionally, 

Defendants do not dispute that their motion to dismiss will be rendered moot if the proposed 

Fourth Amended Complaint is allowed to proceed. See Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 

F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because the Defendants’ motion to dismiss targeted the 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which was no longer in effect, we conclude that the motion 

to dismiss should have been deemed moot[.]”). 

Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint as moot. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 101) be 

GRANTED in part as follows:

a. The Clerk of Court be directed to file the Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF 

No. 101-1);

b. Plaintiffs be permitted to proceed on the following claims in the Fourth 

Amended Complaint: Fifth Amendment Due Process claim against all 

Defendants (Count 1); violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), against USCIS 

Defendants (Count 2); violation of APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), against USCIS 

Defendants (Count 3); Fifth Amendment Procedural Due Process claim against 

all Defendants (Count 4); Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claim against all 

Defendants (Count 5); and Declaratory Judgment Act against all Defendants

(Count 7);

c. All other claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint be dismissed.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 96) be 

DENIED as moot.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

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Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The objections shall not exceed more than fifteen (15) 

pages, including exhibits. Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen 

(14) days after service of the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result 

in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2024 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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