Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03914/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03914-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS O’NEIL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HENKEL ADHESIVE, dba HENKEL

ADHESIVES CORPORATION, and DOES 1-

10, inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-03914 SI

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On July 27, 2007, the Court heard argument on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Having considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, and for good cause shown,

the Court GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of plaintiff’s termination after fifteen years of employment at defendant’s

Hayward, California facility. At the Hayward facility, defendant Henkel Corporation makes industrial

adhesives, i.e., glues. Defendant employed approximately 17 employees at the Hayward facility during

the relevant period. Desombre Decl. ¶ 3. Defendant hired plaintiff Douglas O’Neil as a production

worker in 1988. As a production worker, plaintiff was responsible for a variety of tasks, mostly

involving manual labor, and including washing bins in which glue was mixed, preparing the raw

ingredients for batches of glue, and taking out the trash. See Desombre Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Sepulveda Decl.

¶ 3. Over the course of his employment, plaintiff was warned, reprimanded, suspended, or put on

probation for performance problems on several occasions. 

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In February 2000, plaintiff developed an anal fissure, which is a tear in the mucosa of the anus.

See Anderson Depo. at 9 (Champagne Decl., Ex. B). According to plaintiff, the fissure required him

to alter his diet, and refrain from lifting heavy loads. See O’Neal Depo. (Pl.’s Ex. 1) at 16, 62, 65-66,

87. It is apparently undisputed that the fissure affected his ability to perform his job, and plaintiff’s

supervisors and coworkers knew of his condition. 

On September 1, 2002, Yves-Edouard (AKA “Yed”) Desombre became the new plant manager

of the Hayward facility. See Desombre Decl. ¶ 1. Ciro Sepulveda was the production supervisor who

directly supervised plaintiff and other production workers. See Sepulveda Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. In February

or March of 2003, Desombre created two “lead person” positions, and selected John Levy and Shagun

Worley for the positions. See Desombre Decl. ¶ 6. Desombre and Sepulveda instructed the leads each

morning on what tasks needed to be done. The leads then assigned the tasks to the employees, including

plaintiff. See id. (“The two leads were then to assign tasks to the other production employees, based

upon the instructions we had given them.”); Sepulveda Decl. ¶ 11 (Levy “was supposed to ask

production employees to perform certain tasks, based upon Mr. Desombre’s and my instructions.”).

According to defendant, the leads had no authority to hire, fire, discipline, or take any other managerialtype actions; they simply delegated tasks. See Desombre Decl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiff and Levy did not get along well. Their animosity came to a head on July 24, 2003,

when Levy, in full view of plaintiff and several other employees, began rolling around on the floor,

sticking out his buttocks, and repeatedly yelling: “Somebody fuck me in the ass. Oh my fissure hurts.

I can’t eat meat, pork, or beef.” Pl.’s Ex. 8; see also O’Neil Depo. (Pl.’s Ex. 1) at 234:13-16 (“Rolling

around on the floor, pointing at me, calling me a pussy, calling me a little bitch, spreading his cheeks

in front of me, grabbing his dick, telling me to get fucked in the ass.”). Several of the employees who

witnessed the incident signed statements detailing their recollection thereof. See Pl.’s Ex. 9. For

example, Robert Tufi wrote:

On the 24th of July , 2003, I Robert Tufi witnessed John Levy hollerin[g] and screaming

[‘]fuck me in the ass[’] several times. Then to top it off he continued on with the act as

if he was being fucked in the ass. This went on for awhile [sic]. And also he was yelling

out that I smell a pussy in the plant.

Id. Michael Saguil Besabe, Sr. wrote:

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Mr. Besabe’s account states that the incident occurred on July 30, 2003. Counsel for plaintiff

clarified at hearing, however, that Mr. Besabe misdated the account and was, in fact, describing the July

24, 2003 incident.

2

Plaintiff also reported the harassment to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(DFEH) on July 29, 2003.

3

I was welding on tank 6 when I heard John Levy moaning and groaning about his

stomach. Later I learned he was harassing Doug about his medical problem. I sat and

watched him bend over at a 90[degree] angle, he cracked his butt open and said “fuck

me in the ass”. He then rolled on his back and continued saying “fuck me some more”

. . . “fuck me some more”, “that’s a relief”. Then he got up and said “I can’t eat pork,”

“I can’t eat beef”, “I can’t eat chicken because my fisher [sic] hurts”. Then he said

“pussy, pussy, pussy”. He proceeded upstairs to the bench and continued saying “pussy,

pussy, pussy”. 

I was offended by this and embarrassed for Doug. I didn’t know how to take it. I have

never seen anything like this in my life. What he did was horrible and created an

uncomfortable atmosphere at work.

Soon it was known throughout the plant that Doug had reported the incident. The

following week, John Levy approached me and told me that I should not get involved

with this situation. I told him that if anyone asked me anything, that I would tell them

the truth.

Id.1

The following day, plaintiff called defendant’s corporate “compliance hotline,” a complaint line

operated by a third party, to which any employee could make a complaint. See Sorenson Decl. ¶ 3.

Plaintiff complained about the incident.2 The compliance hotline interviewer took down his complaint,

and prepared a report, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8, which was sent to defendant’s corporate legal counsel. See

Sorenson Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. Defendant’s legal counsel then forwarded the report to the human resources

department. See id. ¶ 4. John Levy also called the compliance hotline on July 25, 2003, to report that

on July 24, 2003, plaintiff had called him a “fat motherfucker,” and ridiculed his weight and abilities.

See id., Ex. A. 

After receiving the reports, defendant’s director of human resources, Judy Sorenson, visited the

Hayward facility to investigate. See Sorenson Decl. ¶ 8. Sorenson spent two days at the facility

interviewing various employees, including plaintiff and Levy, about the incident. See id. ¶¶ 9-13.

Sorenson ultimately concluded that “John Levy should be issued a warning for engaging in

inappropriate conduct.” Id. ¶ 14. Desombre issued the recommended warning to Levy, Desombre

Declaration, Exhibit J, and also “had Mr. Sepulveda and the other lead, Mr. Worley, work with Mr.

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Defendant objects to these lines of deposition testimony on relevance grounds. The Court

OVERRULES defendant’s objection. Plaintiff’s statement bears directly on his first claim, as discussed

below. Defendant also objects to all of the deposition excerpts submitted by plaintiff on the ground that

plaintiff did not include a reporter’s certification of the deposition transcript. The Court OVERRULES

this objection. Defendant submitted excerpts from the same deposition transcript, along with the

reporter’s certification, and provides no reason to doubt the authenticity of plaintiff’s excerpts. See

Champagne Decl., Ex. B at 372.

4

Defendant objects to these lines of deposition testimony on relevance grounds. The Court

OVERRULES defendant’s objection. Plaintiff’s statement bears directly on his first claim, as discussed

below. 

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O’Neil as much as possible,” id. ¶ 23. 

According to plaintiff, Levy continued to harass him after the July 24th incident. See, e.g.,

O’Neil Depo. (Pl.’s Ex. 1) at 273:10-11 (“[T]he harassment started before then and it continued after.”);

264:12-183

 (“Q. So that’s what you mean by the . . . continued harassment, he was threatening you with

your job? A. With my job, calling me a pussy, talking about my fissure, . . . all of these things.”);

263:19-214 (“‘I shouldn’t have to work like this with this man constantly calling me pussies and names

and stuff like that at the job.’”). 

Over the following months, plaintiff was absent from work on several occasions, and did not

follow company policy in reporting his absences. See Desombre Decl. ¶ 24. According to plaintiff, he

began missing work because of the stress caused him by Levy’s continued harassment. See O’Neil

Depo. (Pl.’s Ex. 1) at 274, 284-285. On September 29 and October 6, 2003, plaintiff received official

warnings for his absenteeism. See Desombre Decl., Ex. K. On Friday, December 12, 2003, plaintiff

again missed work, without notifying his supervisors. See id. ¶ 27. On Monday, December 15, 2003,

Desombre terminated plaintiff’s employment. See id. ¶¶ 28-29. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint in Alameda County Superior Court on September 6, 2005 alleging five

causes of action under state law: harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public

policy, disability discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On June 23, 2006,

defendant removed the case to this Court, based on diversity of citizenship. Defendant now moves for

summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

On a motion for summary judgment, “[i]f the party moving for summary judgment meets its

initial burden of identifying for the court those portions of the materials on file that it believes

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact,” the burden of production then shifts

so that “the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986)); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103-04 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not make credibility

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). The

evidence the parties present must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat

summary judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 (2d. Cir. 1985);

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay statements found

in affidavits are inadmissible. See, e.g., Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir.

1980). The party who will have the burden of proof must persuade the Court that it will have sufficient

admissible evidence to justify going to trial.

DISCUSSION

I. Disability harassment

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that he suffered disability harassment under the California

Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment

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Many of the cases cited in the Order addressed claims brought under Title VII. “Title VII and

FEHA operate under the same guiding principles.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

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on this claim due to plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate the objective hostility of his work environment.

 An employer is liable for conduct giving rise to a hostile work environment if plaintiff proves

(1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing nature, (2) that this conduct was

unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment. Kortan v. California Youth

Authority, 217 F.3d 1104, 1090-10 (9th Cir. 2000).5

 To survive summary judgment, plaintiff must show

the existence of a genuine factual dispute as to whether a reasonable disabled person would find the

workplace so objectively and subjectively hostile as to create an abusive working environment. See

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether

challenged conduct constitutes an actionable hostile work environment, courts must consider “all the

circumstances, including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably

interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786,

118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S. Ct. 367,

370 (1993)).

The Court concludes that plaintiff’s evidence of a hostile work environment is sufficient to

survive summary judgment. Defendant argues that plaintiff only presents evidence of one incident of

disability-based harassment – the July 24, 2003 tirade by John Levy described above. Contrary to

defendant’s argument, however, the record contains reference to other incidents of disability-based

harassment by Levy. Though plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not contain any specific descriptions

of harassment other than the July 24th incident, it does repeatedly mention ongoing, continual

harassment by Levy, both before and after July 24th. See, e.g., O’Neil Depo. (Pl.’s Ex. 1) at 273:10-11

(“[T]he harassment started before then and it continued after.”); 264:12-18 (“Q. So that’s what you

mean by the . . . continued harassment, he was threatening you with your job? A. With my job, calling

me a pussy, talking about my fissure, . . . all of these things.”); 263:19-21 (“‘I shouldn’t have to work

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like this with this man constantly calling me pussies and names and stuff like that at the job.’”). The

July 24th incident, combined with evidence that similar harassment continued in the following months,

is sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environment.

Defendant also argues that it is not liable for the conduct of Levy because it took appropriate

action to investigate and deter the harassment. Under FEHA, an employer is stricly liable for

harassment by a supervisory employee, but “is not liable for acts of harassment committed by a

nonsupervisory employee . . . unless the employer failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective

action.” Hope v. California Youth Auth., 134 Cal. App. 4th 577, 593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Cal.

Gov. Code § 12940(j)(1)).

As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Levy was a supervisory or nonsupervisory

employee. FEHA defines “supervisor” as:

any individual having the authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,

suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other

employees, or the responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or

effectively to recommend that action, if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise

of that authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of

independent judgment.

Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(r)) (emphasis added). As discussed above, Levy was a “lead.” He and the

other lead were instructed by the managers each morning on what tasks needed to be done. The leads

then delegated the tasks among the employees, including plaintiff. See Desombre Decl. ¶ 6 (“The two

leads were then to assign tasks to the other production employees, based upon the instructions we had

given them.”); Sepulveda Decl. ¶ 11 (Levy “was supposed to ask production employees to perform

certain tasks, based upon Mr. Desombre’s and my instructions.”). It is unclear from these declarations

whether Levy had discretion to assign tasks as he saw fit, or whether Desombre and Sepulveda told him

which employee was to perform each task. As such, there is a factual question as to whether Levy’s

“responsibility to direct” other employees was “not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but require[d]

the use of independent judgment.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(r). Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude

that defendants are not strictly liable for Levy’s conduct.

Even if Levy was a nonsupervisory employee, however, plaintiff has raised a triable issue as to

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California state law permits a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy where

termination of employment occurs in violation of a fundamental state policy delineated in constitutional

or statutory provisions. See Freund v. Nycomend Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim is based on defendant’s alleged violation of FEHA.

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whether defendants took immediate and appropriate corrective action in response to the harassment by

Levy. As mentioned above, after plaintiff called the corporate compliance line to complain about the

July 24th incident, defendant’s director of human resources, Judy Sorenson, visited the Hayward facility

to investigate. See Sorenson Decl. ¶ 8. Sorenson spent two days at the facility interviewing various

employees, including plaintiff and John Levy, about the incident. See id. ¶¶ 9-13. Sorenson ultimately

concluded that “John Levy should be issued a warning for engaging in inappropriate conduct.” Id. ¶ 14.

Desombre issued the recommended warning to Levy, and also “had Mr. Sepulveda and the other lead,

Mr. Worley, work with Mr. O’Neil as much as possible.” Desombre Decl. ¶¶ 21, 23. This evidence,

defendant argues, conclusively demonstrates that it fulfilled its obligation under FEHA to take

immediate and appropriate corrective action. 

The Court disagrees, and finds that plaintiff has raised a triable issue as to whether defendant

took appropriate corrective action. Considering the severity of the July 24th incident, there is a triable

issue as to whether a mere warning to Levy was sufficient corrective action. Furthermore, as discussed

above, plaintiff has provided evidence that Levy continued to harass him after the July 24th incident,

and after Sorenson’s investigation. Plaintiff also testified at deposition that he told Desombre of the

continuing harassment, and Desombre took no corrective action. See, e.g., O’Neil Depo. (Pl’s Ex. 1)

at 276:8-11 (“‘I mean, you are the manager, and you’re not doing anything about it. Tell him to leave

me alone.’ And I would repeatedly tell him that, but he would do nothing.”). Accordingly, the Court

DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s first cause of action.

II. Retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful termination

Plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth claims, for retaliation, disability discrimination, and wrongful

termination in violation of public policy6

, all depend on a theory that defendant fired plaintiff for illegal

reasons. This theory ultimately fails, and the Court therefore must GRANT defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action.

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Under FEHA, courts employ the same burden shifting framework as is used to evaluate claims

of retaliation and disparate treatment under Title VII. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (disparate treatment under Title VII); Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 24 Cal.

4th 317, 354 (2000) (disparate treatment under FEHA); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d

1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (retaliation under Title VII); Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th

1028, 1042 (2005) (retaliation under FEHA). This burden shifting works as follows:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a

prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima

facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection. Third, should the defendant

carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were

not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in

protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a

causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Manatt v. Bank of

America, 339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). To show a causal link, a plaintiff may use circumstantial

evidence, but he or she must demonstrate the employer’s knowledge of the protected activity and

proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Morgan v. Regents of the

Univ. of California, 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000); see also Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1987) (holding retaliatory actions three months after a protected activity supports the plaintiff’s

prima facie case). A plaintiff may make a prima facie case of discrimination through direct or

circumstantial evidence. See Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1997).

A plaintiff may also create an inference of unlawful discrimination by meeting the four requirements

outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). 

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to

demonstrate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Reynolds v.

Brock, 815 F.2d at 574; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817,

1824 (1973). To satisfy this burden, the employer “need only produce admissible evidence which would

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According to plaintiff, “Desombre is the individual that terminated Plaintiff.” Oppo. at 19:2.

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allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by

discriminatory animus.” Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257, 101

S. Ct. 1089, 1096 (1981).

Here, plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue as to his termination-based claims. The evidence in

the record conclusively establishes that defendant had a non-pretextual, legitimate reason for terminating

plaintiff. Specifically, the following excerpt of plaintiff’s own deposition testimony completely

undercuts his termination-based claims:

Q. Now, you were told the reason you were terminated was due to attendance,

right?

A. Yed [Desombre]7

 told me I was fired because I didn’t call in. I remember that.

Q. Okay. That’s attendance, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. What do you think the reason for your termination was?

A. I believe Yed feel [sic] like it was because of my attendance. And I believe he

really feel [sic] it was because of my attendance. And I feel that, too. But you

have to understand why I was missing all of those days when I was being

harassed.

Q. Is there any other reason you think you were terminated other than what you

have already told me?

A. No. I can’t think of any.

O’Neil Depo. at 320:24-321:15 (Champagne Decl., Ex. A). Plaintiff thus admits that defendant fired

him for a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason, and that the reason was not pretextual. Accordingly,

plaintiff’s termination-based claims fail, as a matter of law, and the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion

for summary judgment on plaintiff’s second, third, and fourth causes of action.

III. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Finally, defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s fifth cause of action, for

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Under California law, “the elements of the tort of

[IIED] are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or

reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe

or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the

defendant’s outrageous conduct . . . . The defendant must have engaged in ‘conduct intended to inflict

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injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.

3d 868, 903 (1991) (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209-10 (1982)).

In order for conduct to be considered “extreme and outrageous,” the “[c]onduct [] must be so

extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Cervantez v. J. C.

Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, 593 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1979). This standard sets a very high bar; it is “the

California rule that ‘it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even

criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been

characterized by ‘malice’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive

damages for another tort.’” Pardi v. Kaiser Permanente Hosp., Inc., 389 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting case). This “rule is of course easy to state but only can be applied with certainty in light of the

holdings in decided cases which have determined that the questioned conduct before them was or was

not outrageous.” Soto v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 184 Cal. App. 3d 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

Here, plaintiff has raised a material issue as to whether John Levy’s harassment of him was

outrageous. Plaintiff fails to articulate, however, how defendant’s actions were outrageous. Plaintiff

argues that “the evidence creates a triable issue as to whether the employer actually took any meaningful

corrective steps. Instead, management denied the incidents even occurred and lied about the basis for

his termination.” Oppo. at 20:6-9. Plaintiff cites no authority in support of his theory that a failure to

properly control or discipline a harassing employee can serve as the basis for an IIED claim, and the

Court finds none. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s IIED claim.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART

Case 3:06-cv-03914-SI Document 63 Filed 08/06/07 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendant also filed 54 single-spaced pages of evidentiary objections. With the exception of

the lines of plaintiff’s deposition testimony discussed above, in footnotes three and four, the Court did

not rely on any of the objected-to evidence in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s first claim. The Court therefore DENIES AS MOOT the remainder of defendant’s objections.

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defendant’s motion for summary judgment.8 [Docket No. 42]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-03914-SI Document 63 Filed 08/06/07 Page 12 of 12