Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01225/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIRK PATRICK VAUGHT, JR.,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07-CV-01225 W (CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION

AND DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JAMES A. YATES, Warden,

Respondent.

On July 5, 2007, Kirk Patrick Vaught, Jr. (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No.

1.) On November 7, 2007, Respondent filed an answer. (Doc. No. 13.) On January 1,

2008, Petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 22.) On May 5, 2008, the magistrate judge

filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the petition be denied. (Doc. No.

23.) As of the date of this Order, Petitioner has not filed objections to the Report and

Recommendation, although the deadline for doing so is long past. (See Doc. No. 23.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the Report and

Recommendation and DENIES the Petition. 

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Background

A. Procedural History

On April 19, 2004, a San Diego County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty

of two counts of robbery, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and one count of

burglary. (Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 185-91.) The jury also found true the allegation

that Petitioner personally used a firearm during the commission of the robberies. (CT at

186, 188.) On November 30, 2004, Petitioner’s sentence included applicable

enhancements for the use of a firearm under Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b) found by the

jury. (CT at 201.) On May 1, 2006, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions. (Lodgment 5 at 1.) On June 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review by

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 6 at 1.) On July 17, 2006, the California

Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Lodgment 7 at 1.) 

B. Factual History

The state appellate court summarized the relevant facts as follows:

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 28, 2003, two employees were

working at the Aaron Brothers store located on Midway Drive in San Diego.

The assistant manager, Jill Bautista, was helping Geoffrey Moon complete the

final orders for the night. When Bautista opened the store's back door to ensure

it was locked, she was approached by a woman who asked to make a return of

merchandise. Bautista explained the store was closed and she could not

complete the merchandise's return until the next day. Vaught appeared from

behind the door and told Bautista he was robbing the store. When Vaught held

a gun to Bautista's chest, she admitted Vaught and the woman into the store.

Bautista immediately walked to the room in which Moon was working.

Vaught followed Bautista. Bautista told Moon that Vaught was there to “take

our money.” Moon noticed Vaught had a gun pointed at Bautista. Bautista then

lead [sic] Vaught to the office, where money was kept in a safe. Vaught waved

the gun at Moon, directing him to follow.

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After unlocking the office door, Bautista entered the office, followed by

Moon and Vaught. Bautista opened the safe and handed Vaught the cash from

the cash drawers. Vaught stuffed the money in his pockets. At this time, the

gun was either in his hand or his waistband, and was still visible to Bautista and

Moon. When Vaught insisted there was more money in the safe, Moon handed

over two pouches containing the daily deposits. Vaught asked Bautista and

Moon to give him time to get away, and he and the woman left the store. No

gun used in the robberies was ever recovered; the existence of a gun was based

solely on the testimonies of Bautista and Moon.

(Lodgment 5 at 2-3.)

At trial, the two robbery victims, Bautista and Moon, both testified that Petitioner

possessed and personally used a gun during the robbery. (RT at 128, 213.) Bautista

testified that Petitioner pulled a gun out of his waistband and put it to her chest. 

(RT at 213-16.) When he pointed the gun at her chest, Petitioner told her “it wasn’t a joke

and that he was here to take [Aaron Brothers’] money.” (RT at 216.) Although Bautista’s

initial reaction was that the gun looked like the kind of gun “you play with when you’re a

kid,” she testified she complied with Petitioner’s demands because she thought the gun was

real and loaded. (RT at 215, 225.) She could not remember the exact details of the gun,

only that it was “long and pointy.” (RT at 215.)

Moon testified that Petitioner had the gun in his left hand and was pointing it at

Bautista. (RT at 128.) Moon stated he had previously handled a gun and described the

difference between a revolver and a semi-automatic pistol. (RT at 129.) He testified the

gun was a dark metal revolver with a long barrel, approximately nine to ten inches long. 

(RT at 129.) Moon also testified that the barrel appeared to be consistent in color and there

were no red or orange markings at the end of the barrel. (RT at 129-30.)

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C. The Habeas Petition

On July 5, 2007, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner contends that his convictions violate the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1.)

Discussion

Petitioner alleges that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to

support his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under Cal. Penal 

Code § 12021(a)(1) and the imposition of sentence enhancements for the personal use of a

firearm during the commission of a robbery under Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b). (Doc.

No. 1.) Petitioner contends that his conviction is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process Clause.

A. Standard of Review

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), to provide the following standard of review applicable to state court

decisions:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

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To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) 

or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court

interprets the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) and the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13 (2000); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76

(2003).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court, the Court "looks

through" to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not "furnish a basis for its

reasoning," federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S.

3, 8 (2002). "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state court decision is not “contrary to” clearly

established federal law. Id.

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1

 California Penal Code § 12021(a)(1) provides:

Any person who has been convicted of a felony under the laws of the United

States, the State of California, or any other state, government, or country or of

an offense enumerated in subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 12001.6, or who

is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, and who owns, purchases, receives,

or has in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control any firearm is

guilty of a felony.

2 California Penal Code § 12022.53(b) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who, in the commission

of a felony specified in subdivision (a), personally uses a firearm, shall be

punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state

prison for 10 years. The firearm need not be operable or loaded for this

enhancement to apply.

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B. Substantial Evidence of a Firearm

Petitioner was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 12021(a)(1).1 The jury also found that Petitioner personally

used a firearm during the commission of two robberies, in violation of Cal. Penal Code

§ 12022.53(b).2

 Petitioner’s due process claim is that the testimony of the two witnesses

was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon he possessed and used

during the robberies was an actual firearm within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code §

12001(b), as opposed to a pellet gun or a toy gun. The Court concludes that this claim

lacks merit.

The Due Process Clause protects a criminal defendant from conviction “except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In reviewing an evidentiary

sufficiency claim in habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court must

determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This

standard “must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the

criminal offense as defined by state law.” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324, n.16).

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A federal court faced with a factual record “that supports conflicting inferences must

presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record-that the trier of fact resolved

any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson,

443 U.S. at 326. “Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient

to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.

2004).

In reviewing Petitioner’s appeal, the California Court of Appeals applied an

evidentiary sufficiency test virtually identical to the federal Jackson standard: “[t]he

reviewing court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment

below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier

of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Lodgment 5 at 4-7;

quoting People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 578 (Cal. 1980).)

Under California law, Penal Code § 12001(b) defines a firearm as: “any device,

designed to be used as a weapon, from which is expelled through a barrel a projectile by the

force of any explosion or any other form of combustion.” (Lodgment 5 at 5.) The

character of the weapon may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as descriptions of

the weapon and its role in the commission of the crime. See People v. Hayden, 30 Cal.

App. 3d 446, 451-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), overruled on other grounds by People v. Rist, 16

Cal.3d 211, 222 n.10 (Cal. 1976). Furthermore, California courts have often held a

defendant’s statements and behavior while making an armed threat against a victim may

warrant a jury’s finding that the firearm used to make the threat was loaded. People v.

Rodriguez, 20 Cal. 4th 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1999).

Additionally, a defendant’s statements and behavior are sufficient to justify the

jury’s determination that he personally used a firearm within the definition of Cal. Penal

Code § 12022.53(b). People v. Monjaras, 164 Cal. App. 4th 1432, 1436-37 (2008). The

Monjaras court reasoned that “when as here a defendant commits a robbery by displaying

an object that looks like a gun, the object’s appearance and the defendant’s conduct and

words in using it may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that

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it was a firearm within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b). Id. at 1437.

The circumstantial evidence surrounding Petitioner’s robbery is stronger than the

circumstantial evidence held in Monjaras to be sufficient for the jury’s finding of the

personal use of a firearm under Cal. Penal Code § 12001(b). Bautista, one of Petitioner’s

victims, testified that Petitioner pulled out his gun and pointed it at Bautista, which is more

indicative of a loaded weapon than the defendant in Monjaras simply showing his victim a

gun tucked into his waistband. (RT at 213-16.) Both Petitioner and the defendant in

Monjaras made demands of their victims, and both Petitioner’s victims and the victim in

Monjaras complied because they thought the guns were real. (RT at 215, 225.) Lastly,

Petitioner’s other victim, Moon, who had previously handled a gun, was able to describe

the characteristics of the gun much more thoroughly than the victim in Monjaras: Moon

testified that the gun was a dark metal revolver with a long barrel, approximately nine to

ten inches long, and did not have red or orange markings on the end. (RT at 129-30.) This

is sufficient evidence to support his conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 792 F.2d

866, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding conviction for use of a firearm during the

commission of a bank robbery where the gun was not produced at trial, but a bank customer

testified he was familiar with guns, the weapon “was gunmetal,” and “appeared to be either

a .38 or .45 automatic”).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court concludes that the

evidence could have persuaded a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Petitioner was in possession of a firearm within the meaning of Cal. Penal 

Code § 12001(b). As a result, the Court concludes that the California Court of Appeal’s

decision affirming Petitioner’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, as well as

the enhancements for using a firearm in the commission of a robbery, was neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

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C. Request for a Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on his Fourteenth Amendment sufficiency

of the evidence claim. For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that the claim

upon which the request for an evidentiary hearing is based lacks merit. Therefore, the

Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. See Schriro v. Landrigan,

127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007) (holding that “if the record refutes the applicant's factual

allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an

evidentiary hearing”).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendations

and DENIES Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court also denies a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 10, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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