Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-04635/USCOURTS-ca2-14-04635-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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14‐3636 (L)

Legg et al. v. Ulster County et al.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit ________

August Term, 2015

No. 14‐3636 (L), No. 14‐3638 (XAP), and No. 14‐4635 (CON)

ANN MARIE LEGG,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

and

PATRICIA WATSON,

Plaintiff‐Cross‐Appellee,

v.

ULSTER COUNTY and PAUL J. VANBLARCUM, in his official capacity as

Sheriff of the County of Ulster and individually,

Defendants‐Appellees‐Cross‐Appellants.1

________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of New York.

No. 09 Civ. 550 (FJS) ― Frederick J. Scullin, Judge.

________

Argued: October 8, 2015

Decided: April 26, 2016

________

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

Case 14-4635, Document 72-1, 04/26/2016, 1758134, Page1 of 20
Nos. 14‐3636 (L), 14‐3638 (XAP), 14‐4635 (CON)

Before: PARKER, LYNCH, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

________

Appeals from a judgment and post‐judgment orders of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of New York

(Scullin, J.).    At the close of her direct case, the court dismissed

plaintiff‐appellant Ann Marie Legg’s claim for pregnancy

discrimination.    The court also denied for want of jurisdiction

defendants‐appellees‐cross‐appellants Ulster County and Paul

VanBlarcum’s post‐trial motions pursuant to Rule 50(b) and 59(b) on

plaintiff‐appellee Patricia Watson’s claim of a hostile work

environment.  We conclude that under Young v. United Parcel Service,

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015), decided after this appeal was filed, Legg

has presented sufficient evidence to support a claim of pregnancy

discrimination and therefore VACATE the judgment in part and

REMAND with instructions to conduct a new trial.    We also

conclude that the district court erred in denying the defendants’

post‐trial motions for want of jurisdiction and accordingly VACATE

the post‐judgment orders and REMAND for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

________

STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP,

Chester, New York; Brendan Klaproth, Klaproth

Law PLLC, Washington, D.C.; and Joseph Ranni,

Ranni Law Offices, Florida, New York, for

Plaintiff‐Appellant and Plaintiff‐Cross Appellee.

MATTHEW J. KELLY (Amanda Davis Twinam, on

the brief), Roemer Wallens Gold & Mineaux LLP,

Albany, New York, for Defendants‐Appellees‐Cross‐

Appellants.

________

2

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Nos. 14‐3636 (L), 14‐3638 (XAP), 14‐4635 (CON)

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

Ann Marie Legg, a corrections officer at the Ulster County Jail,

appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.) dismissing her claim

against Ulster County and former Sheriff Paul VanBlarcum for

pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (“PDA”).    Legg

claims that the County unlawfully discriminated against her on the

basis of her pregnancy when it denied her request for an

accommodation under its light duty policy, pursuant to which only

employees injured on the job were eligible for light duty

assignments.  The district court granted the defendants’ motion for

judgment as a matter of law at the close of Legg’s direct case,

reasoning that the policy could not be discriminatory because it was

facially neutral with respect to pregnancy.

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).  Young held

that an employer’s facially neutral accommodation policy gives rise

to an inference of pregnancy discrimination if it imposes a

significant burden on pregnant employees that is not justified by the

employer’s non‐discriminatory explanation.  We conclude that Legg

has presented sufficient evidence to support a pregnancy

discrimination claim under Young and therefore vacate the judgment

in part and remand with instructions to conduct a new trial.

The defendants appeal from post‐judgment orders denying

their motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a

new trial on Patricia Watson’s claim of a sex‐based hostile work

environment.  The district court, without objection, initially granted

the defendants an extension of time to file their post‐trial motions.

However, after the motions were filed, the court denied them for

want of jurisdiction, believing that it had lacked authority under

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Nos. 14‐3636 (L), 14‐3638 (XAP), 14‐4635 (CON)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) to grant an extension and

that the time limitations are jurisdictional.    We conclude that the

district court erred in denying the motions for want of jurisdiction

and that, although it lacked authority under Rule 6(b)(2) to grant an

extension, it had discretion to consider whether the plaintiffs waived

compliance with the rule or whether an equitable exception applied.

Accordingly, we vacate the post‐judgment orders and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Legg began working as a corrections officer for the Ulster

County Jail in 1996.    At the time, the County maintained a policy

under which employees injured on the job were eligible for light

duty assignments, defined as clerical and other duties that would

not aggravate the employee’s condition.    Under Sheriff

VanBlarcum’s implementation, the policy did not apply to pregnant

employees because their condition did not result from a line‐of‐duty

injury.    Consequently, pregnant employees’ only options were to

continue working full duty, use accrued sick, vacation, or personal

time, or take Family and Medical Leave Act or disability leave.

After a number of pregnancy‐related complications, Legg

became pregnant in 2008.  Because the pregnancy was high risk, her

doctor recommended that she work light duty and provided a note,

on July 8, stating that she was “able to work at this time but

shouldn’t have direct contact with inmates.”    Joint App’x at 923.

VanBlarcum directed Undersheriff Frank Faluotico to deny her

request to accommodate her doctor’s recommendation.  On July 10,

Faluotico informed Legg that “[e]mployees are afforded light duty

assignments at the Sheriff’s discretion for work‐related

injuries/illnesses only,” and she therefore had “the option of being

re‐evaluated by [her] attending physician and returning to work full

duty capacity as a Correction Officer or [to] utilize accrued time

(sick, vacation, personal) and file for [New York State] Disability

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benefits.”  Id. at 925.  Faluotico requested that Legg notify him of her

response as soon as possible.

Later that day, Legg received a call from Lieutenant Jon

Becker, who said that he would take care of her by assigning her to

light duty positions if she obtained a revised doctor’s note stating

that she was able to work.    Legg submitted a new note that day

indicating that she was “able to work with no restrictions.”   Id. at

924.

For a time, Legg was assigned to light duty tasks as promised.

By August, however, she was gradually required to work with

inmates again.  While working in a cell block in November, by then

approximately seven months pregnant, Legg came upon two

inmates fighting in the bathroom and was bumped as one ran past

her.   As a result of this incident, she left work and did not return

until after she gave birth.  

After Legg returned to work, she brought this action against

the County and several of its officials, including VanBlarcum,

alleging that the denial of her request for an accommodation

amounted to pregnancy discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Legg, Watson, and two other female corrections officers also

asserted claims for, among other things, a sex‐based hostile work

environment in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The suit proceeded to trial and, at the close of Legg’s direct

case, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law

pursuant to Rule 50 on the ground that all employees who had

“outside line‐of‐duty disabilities” were treated the same under the

light duty policy.  Joint App’x at 674.  The district court granted the

motion, explaining that in requiring that the injury arise when the

employee is on duty,    the policy “applied across the board to

everyone,” “[a]nd when the policy applies across the board to

everybody, there’s no discrimination.”  Id. at 675–76.  The remaining

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claims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in

Watson’s favor on her hostile work environment claim but in the

defendants’ favor otherwise.

After the jury was excused, the defendants indicated that they

intended to file post‐trial motions and the district court, without

objection from the plaintiffs, set a deadline of two weeks from the

date that the defendants received the transcript.    On August 20,

2014, the court entered final judgment, and on November 5, less than

two weeks after receiving the transcript, the defendants filed their

post‐trial motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b)

and, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59(b).   The next day,

the district court denied the motions as untimely, concluding that

although the defendants had been granted an extension, they were

nonetheless required to file their Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(b) motions

no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, and under Rule

6(b)(2) these deadlines were jurisdictional.  The same day, the court

denied the defendants’ Rule 60 motion for reconsideration for

essentially the same reason.    Legg timely appealed from the

judgment.   The defendants cross‐appealed and also appealed from

the district court’s November 6 orders denying their post‐trial

motions.  

DISCUSSION

I.

We begin with the dismissal of Legg’s pregnancy

discrimination claim.    Rule 50 allows a district court to grant a

motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant if,

at the close of the plaintiff’s case, a reasonable jury would not have a

legally sufficient basis to find for the plaintiff on an issue essential to

her claim.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)(B).  We review the district court’s

decision de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in the non‐

movant’s favor and disregarding any evidence favorable to the

movant that the jury is not required to believe because it is

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contradicted or impeached.  Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

A.

Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect to the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment because of a person’s sex.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1).  In 1978, Congress passed the PDA, which

expressly overruled the Supreme Court’s holding in General Electric

Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that pregnancy discrimination is

not sex discrimination.   The PDA accomplished this by adding the

following to Title VII’s definitional section:

The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but

are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,

childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by

pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be

treated the same for all employment‐related purposes . . . as other

persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to

work.

Pub. L. 95‐555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k));

see  Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S.

669, 670–71 & n.1 (1983).    This provision ”makes clear that it is

discriminatory to treat pregnancy‐related conditions less favorably

than other medical conditions.”  Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684.

Like other Title VII discrimination claims, pregnancy

discrimination may be proven under a disparate treatment or

disparate impact theory of liability.   Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345.   To

establish disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant’s actions were motivated by a discriminatory intent,

either through direct evidence of intent or by utilizing the three‐part

burden‐shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See, e.g., Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d

58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995).    Alternatively, a plaintiff may proceed on a

disparate impact theory by showing that even if a policy or practice

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Nos. 14‐3636 (L), 14‐3638 (XAP), 14‐4635 (CON)

is facially neutral or is not motivated by a discriminatory intent, it

has a discriminatory effect.  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78

(2009).

During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court

decided Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. to resolve how the PDA’s

“same treatment” clause applies to pregnancy discrimination claims

brought under a disparate treatment theory of liability.    The

circumstances of Young are similar to those presented here.  Young,

a UPS mail carrier responsible for delivering packages weighing up

to seventy pounds, became pregnant and was told by her doctor that

she should not lift more than twenty pounds.    UPS refused to

accommodate her, however, even though it provided

accommodations to employees who were injured on the job, had lost

their Department of Transportation certification, or suffered from a

disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq.  135 S. Ct. at 1344.

Young sued for pregnancy discrimination, claiming that UPS

had a “light‐duty‐for‐injury” policy that excluded pregnant

employees while covering numerous “other persons” who were

similar in their ability or inability to work.  Id. at 1347.  The District

Court granted UPS summary judgment and the Fourth Circuit

affirmed, reasoning that Young was “different from those ‘injured

on the job because, quite simply, her inability to work did not arise

from an on‐the‐job injury.’”    Id. at 1347–48 (quoting 707 F.3d 437,

450–51 (4th Cir. 2013)).

The Supreme Court reversed.  Writing for the majority, Justice

Breyer held that an employer violates the PDA when it treats

pregnant employees “less favorably” than non‐pregnant employees

similar in their ability or inability to work to such an extent that it is

more likely than not that the disparity is motivated by intentional

discrimination. Id. at 1344.    To facilitate this inquiry, the Court

established a modified McDonnell Douglas analysis which focuses on

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“whether the nature of the employer’s policy and the way in which

it burdens pregnant women shows that the employer has engaged in

intentional discrimination.”  Id.

First, as with any other discrimination claim, the plaintiff must

establish a prima facie case by “showing actions taken by the

employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain

unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were

based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under Title VII.”    Id. at

1354 (internal quotation marks omitted).    This burden is “not

onerous” and requires the plaintiff to show only (i) “that she belongs

to the protected class,” (ii) “that she sought accommodation,” (iii)

“that the employer did not accommodate her,” and (iv) “that the

employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or

inability to work.’”  Id.  

If the plaintiff satisfies her initial burden, a presumption of

discriminatory intent arises and the burden shifts to the employer to

articulate a legitimate, non‐discriminatory reason for its policy or

action.    See id.; Quaratino, 71 F.3d at 64.    But “consistent with the

Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a

claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant

women to the category of those (‘similar in their ability or inability

to work’) whom the employer accommodates.”  Young, 135 S. Ct. at

1354; see also Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity &

Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983)

(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing that

Congress’s passage of the PDA indicates that the greater cost of

providing benefits for a protected class cannot justify differential

treatment based upon the protected trait).

If the employer puts forth a legitimate, non‐discriminatory

justification, the presumption drops out of the analysis and the

plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

employer’s justification is a pretext for discrimination.    See Young,

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135 S. Ct. at 1354. The plaintiff may rebut the justification through

circumstantial proof of discriminatory intent.    In the pregnancy

discrimination context in particular, Young recognized that a

plaintiff can make this showing by presenting “sufficient evidence

that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant

workers, and that the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather –

when considered alongside the burden imposed – give rise to an

inference of intentional discrimination.”    Id. (emphases added)

(internal quotation marks omitted).  Young went on to explain that a

plaintiff may create a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a

significant burden by showing “that the employer accommodates a

large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to

accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.”  Id.  Young,

for instance, could do so by demonstrating that UPS accommodated

most non‐pregnant employees with lifting limitations “while

categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with

lifting limitations.”    Id.    To establish that UPS’s reasons were not

sufficiently strong, she could point to the fact that UPS had multiple

policies to accommodate non‐pregnant employees.    Id. at 1354–55.

“That is, why, when the employer accommodated so many, could it

not accommodate pregnant women as well?”  Id. at 1355.

B.

Legg argues to us that she presented sufficient evidence to

support a discrimination claim under either Young’s disparate

treatment framework or a disparate impact analysis.  We agree that

Legg has adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to have considered

whether the County’s policy was motivated by a discriminatory

intent. Consequently, we do not reach her disparate impact

arguments.

As an initial matter, we do not believe that Legg has presented

direct evidence of discriminatory intent.  Although she contends that

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the County’s policy is itself direct evidence because it excluded

pregnant women, the policy did so on a facially neutral basis – the

source of one’s inability to work – making it impossible to conclude,

without inferring, that the distinction was based upon an intent to

discriminate against pregnant employees.  See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183–85 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Young, 135 S. Ct.

at 1354 (direct evidence is “a workplace policy, practice, or decision

[that] relies expressly on a protected characteristic”).    This

conclusion is apparent to us from Young.    Were Legg correct, the

burden‐shifting framework would have been unnecessary because

UPS’s policy would have amounted to direct evidence of UPS’s

alleged discriminatory intent.

Legg has, however, established a prima facie case of

discrimination under Young.    She sought a light duty

accommodation while pregnant.  The County did not accommodate

her.    And, as a matter of policy, the County provided light duty

accommodations to other employees who were similar in their

ability or inability to work, namely, those who were unable to

perform non‐light‐duty tasks as a result of injuries incurred on‐duty.

These facts are enough, if left unexplained, for a reasonable jury to

conclude that it is more likely than not that the policy was motivated

by a discriminatory intent.  

The defendants claim that they had a legitimate, non‐

discriminatory reason for the distinction because New York General

Municipal Law § 207–c(1) requires municipalities to continue to pay

corrections officers injured on the job but does not require the same

for employees who become unable to work for other reasons.   We

agree that compliance with a state workers’ compensation scheme is

a neutral reason for providing benefits to employees injured on the

job but not pregnant employees.  UPS offered the same justification

for its policy in Young, see 135 S. Ct. at 1360 (Alito, J., concurring)

(citing Md. Lab. & Empl. Code Ann. § 9–614 (2008)), and the

majority implicitly determined that this was a legitimate, non‐

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discriminatory reason for the distinction, remanding for

consideration of whether Young had raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to pretext, see id. at 1355–56.  So too, here, once the

County represented that its policy was based upon a workers’

compensation scheme, the burden of production shifted back to

Legg to show by a preponderance of the evidence that this

justification was a pretext for intentional discrimination.  For several

reasons, we believe that a reasonable jury could find that Legg

carried her burden.

First, even before Young, a plaintiff could establish pretext and

intentional discrimination by pointing out significant inconsistencies

in the employer’s justification.  See, e.g., Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp.

LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013). At trial, the defendants

presented several different justifications for declining to extend light

duty accommodations to pregnant employees and for denying

Legg’s request.    While VanBlarcum testified that he limited light

duty accommodations to employees injured on the job because he

wanted to “encourage everybody to build up sick time” and did not

“believe” in providing light duty accommodations to employees

who were injured off the job, Joint App’x at 520, Faluotico testified

that VanBlarcum made the determination as to Legg “for her safety,

not only her but her unborn child, in the facility,” id. at 349.

VanBlarcum also conceded on cross‐examination that it would be

more costly to provide light duty accommodations to pregnant

employees.  And although the defendants now claim that the policy

was based upon compliance with state law, the only testimony in the

record on this point was VanBlarcum’s explanation of the meaning

of abbreviations listed in the minutes from a sergeant’s meeting, and

he simply noted that “207‐c is a section of law that allows people

that get hurt on duty to be out and still receive pay.”   Id. at    459.

Neither VanBlarcum, nor anyone else, ever testified that this was his

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reason for denying accommodations to pregnant employees.2

  Under

these circumstances, a reasonable jury drawing all reasonable

inferences in Legg’s favor could find that the defendants’ current

explanation – compliance with state law – is pretextual, and the real

reason for the distinction was unlawful discrimination.

Second, Legg has offered sufficient evidence to proceed to trial

under the framework articulated in Young.  A reasonable jury could

conclude that the defendants imposed a significant burden on

pregnant employees because, like UPS, the County categorically

denied light duty accommodations to pregnant women.  Indeed, the

defendants represent that of 176 corrections officers during

VanBlarcum’s tenure, just one – Legg – was pregnant, and she was

denied an accommodation.  Defs.’ Opp’n Br. at 27.  VanBlarcum also

testified that another employee came to him “stating she wanted to

get pregnant and wanted to know if [he] would allow light‐duty

employment.”   Joint App’x at 528.    He advised the employee that

she would not be accommodated.   Id.   Although it is unclear from

the record whether the County accommodated a large percentage of

non‐pregnant employees in practice, they at least were eligible.  By

contrast, as one would expect, the County failed to accommodate

100% of its pregnant employees.  This disparity counsels in favor of

a finding that the policy imposed a significant burden on pregnant

employees.  See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.

The defendants perplexingly suggest that these figures show

that pregnant employees were not significantly burdened because

“only one of 176 COs were affected by this policy.” Defs.’ Opp’n Br.

at 27.    But under Young, the focus is on how many pregnant

employees were denied accommodations in relation to the total

number of pregnant employees, not how many were denied

2 We doubt that this testimony would permit a reasonable jury to conclude, without

speculating, that the defendants even offered G.M.L. § 207‐c as a neutral justification

for denying accommodations to pregnant employees.  However, because the

defendants clearly offered other justifications, we assume arguendo that this testimony

was adequate.

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accommodations in relation to all employees, pregnant or not.  The

reason is simple enough; this comparison better reveals whether or

not there is a burden on pregnant employees.   If an employer has

fifty pregnant employees and only five are adversely affected by its

policy, it will be more difficult to draw an inference of a significant

burden because many pregnant employees are able to or have taken

advantage of the accommodation, providing less reason to believe

that the policy is motivated by animus against pregnant employees.

On the other hand, if an employer has just one pregnant employee

and she has been adversely affected, then it has undoubtedly

imposed a significant burden on its pregnant employees – it has

burdened the only one it has.    Contrary to the defendants’

implication, an employer cannot justify pregnancy discrimination by

relying upon the fact that pregnant employees constitute an

insignificant part of its workforce.  

The defendants also argue that Legg did not suffer a

significant burden because she was able to perform her ordinary job

duties and simply “decided to stop working until after she gave

birth.”  Id. at 26.  While that is one view of the evidence, a reasonable

jury drawing all reasonable inferences in Legg’s favor could reach a

very different result:  Faced with the prospect of going without pay

during her pregnancy, and having been informally promised an

accommodation by Becker, Legg sought a revised doctor’s note

allowing her to work full duty, which reflected her need to work

rather than her ability to do so.  She was then gradually required to

return to full duty work, and she acquiesced until she suffered a

serious health scare and decided to take leave from her job.  These

circumstances would permit a jury to reasonably conclude that

pregnant employees suffered a significant burden.    Moreover,

regardless of Legg’s particular circumstances, we think that when an

accommodation policy excludes pregnant employees from coverage

and thereby places them at risk of violent confrontations, a

reasonable jury could find that the denial itself is evidence of a

significant burden.

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The defendants finally contend that Legg did not suffer a

significant burden because employees who received a light duty

accommodation were also burdened in that they were subject to

“strict rules,” including an inability to leave their homes during their

shifts and random home visits to ensure their compliance.  Id. at 25.

We do not doubt that a comparison of the burdens imposed upon

employees who receive an accommodation and those who do not

may, in appropriate circumstances, undermine an inference that

pregnant employees are subjected to a significant burden.  We think

it obvious, however, that a reasonable jury could conclude that the

“burdens” imposed upon accommodated employees in this case do

not show that the burden imposed upon Legg and other pregnant

corrections officers was insignificant.

A reasonable jury could also conclude that the defendants’

reasons were not “sufficiently strong,” when considered alongside

the burden imposed, to justify the denial of accommodation to

pregnant employees.  The defendants maintained a light duty policy

for employees injured on duty but did not extend that benefit to

pregnant employees, who, during VanBlarcum’s tenure, amounted

to a single corrections officer – Legg.  As a result, she was required

to continue working with inmates.   The defendants rationalize this

arrangement on the basis that G.M.L. § 207‐c applies only to

employees injured on duty.    But of course nothing in the statute

prevented them from offering the same accommodations to

pregnant employees.  Under these circumstances, we believe that a

reasonable jury could find that compliance with a state law requiring

accommodation of certain employees was an insufficient reason for

denying accommodation to pregnant employees.

Moreover, although the defendants claim that they were

motivated solely by compliance with state law, a reasonable jury

could find that cost was a factor, as the defendants lacked the same

financial incentive to continue to employ pregnant employees in

some capacity and had a countervailing incentive to replace them.

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VanBlarcum admitted as much at trial, stating that it would be more

costly to provide benefits to pregnant employees because the County

would have to “find somebody else to fill [the full duty] position”

and “pay them as well.”  Joint App’x at 521.  The defendants all but

concede the same on appeal, admitting that “[i]f there is an element

of cost associated with the distinction, it is a result of New York State

law and policy.”  Defs.’ Opp’n Br. at 30.  Young expressly cautioned,

however, that cost alone is generally not a legitimate basis for

refusing to accommodate pregnant employees on the same basis as

other employees similar in their ability or inability to work.  135 S.

Ct. at 1354.  To the extent that the defendants’ policy was motivated

by cost, a reasonable jury could conclude that their purported

justification for denying light duty accommodations to pregnant

employees – compliance with state law – is pretextual.  

Finally, we emphasize that a jury would not have necessarily

been compelled to reach these conclusions and could have returned

a verdict in the defendants’ favor.  As the Supreme Court made clear

in Young, the PDA does not “grant[] pregnant workers a ‘most‐

favored‐nation’ status” requiring employers who grant any

accommodation to any employee to “provide similar

accommodations to all pregnant workers (with comparable physical

limitations),” regardless of other considerations.    Id. at 1349–50

(emphasis removed).    Indeed, the Court declined to endorse an

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline that

construed the PDA to entirely prohibit policies that “provid[e] light

duty only to workers injured on the job.”  Id. at 1351.  The legality of

such policies depends, rather, upon a careful analysis of the facts of a

given case.  

As we previously noted, a jury may infer a discriminatory

intent where the employer “accommodates a large percentage of

nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage

[here, 100%] of pregnant workers.”    Id. at 1354 (emphasis added).

But if, for example, the evidence showed that the County

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accommodated very few injured workers under the light duty policy

and that many non‐pregnant workers were among those denied

accommodation, the jury might reasonably refuse to infer a

discriminatory intent.    And while the cost of adding pregnant

workers to an otherwise expansive program of accommodation

cannot justify their exclusion, a policy is not necessarily doomed by

the fact that it was partially motivated by cost.  After all, if cost were

not a factor, employers would have little reason not to accommodate

everyone, and the cost of adopting such a policy is presumably

always a factor in limiting accommodations to those injured on the

job.  A policy that requires nearly all workers to use sick leave when

injured or ill rather than be accommodated on the job with light duty

is not an unreasonable one.    Whether it is appropriate to infer a

discriminatory intent from the pattern of exceptions in a particular

workplace will depend on the inferences that can be drawn from

that pattern and the credibility of the employer’s purported reasons

for adopting them.  We simply hold that in this case, based on the

evidence presented, Legg was entitled to have these issues decided

by a jury.

II.

We now consider the district court’s denial of the defendants’

Rule 50(b) and 59(b) motions, as well as its denial of their motion for

reconsideration pursuant to Rule 60.  Our review of the denial of a

Rule 50(b) motion is, as noted, de novo.   We review the denial of a

Rule 59(b) or Rule 60 motion for abuse of discretion. Stevens v. Miller,

676 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2012); Arnold v. Cty. of Nassau, 252 F.3d 599,

602 (2d Cir. 2001).3

3 The defendants appeal the district court’s decision on their post‐trial motions.

Because the notice of appeal of the denial of those motions was filed within the time

prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 26(a)(1), the

December 8, 2014 notice of appeal was timely to appeal the district court’s denial of

those motions for lack of jurisdiction, which is the only issue that we decide based on

that notice of appeal.  See Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc., 802 F.3d 307, 313 n.6 (2d Cir. 2015);

see also Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1359 n.15 (11th

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This case presents somewhat peculiar circumstances.    The

district court initially granted the defendants an extension of time to

file their motions but later denied the motions as untimely on the

ground that it lacked authority to grant an extension and Rule

6(b)(2) renders the 28‐day time limitations under Rules 50(b) and

59(b) jurisdictional.    The court denied the defendants’ motion for

reconsideration on the same basis.

We cannot agree.    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2)

provides that a district court may, for good cause, extend the time to

file a motion but “must not extend the time to act under” Rules 50 or

59.   While for many years we described the time limitations in the

Federal Rules as “jurisdictional,” see, e.g., Weissman v. Dawn Joy

Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 230 (2d Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court has

since clarified the difference between jurisdictional rules and non‐

jurisdictional, claim‐processing rules, see In re Indu Craft, Inc., 749

F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing Fed. R. App. P. 6(b)(1)).  A

time limitation is jurisdictional only if it is prescribed by statute.  By

contrast, procedural rules which have no statutory analogue,

although “mandatory” in the sense that a party may insist upon

their enforcement, do not affect the power of the courts and are

subject to waiver or equitable exception.  Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc.,

802 F.3d 307, 311 (2d Cir. 2015).   This distinction follows from the

fundamental principle that Congress alone has authority to

determine a lower federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452–56 (2004).  

Although we have yet to address whether Rule 6(b)(2) is

jurisdictional, we have little difficulty in concluding – like every

other circuit to consider the question – that it is not.  See, e.g., Mobley

v. C.I.A., 806 F.3d 568, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Blue v. Int’l Brotherhood of

Cir. 2010) (holding that even though the appellant’s post‐trial motions were untimely,

when it “appealed the district court’s order denying the motions within 30 days of the

court’s entry of the order . . . that appeal was timely” and provided “jurisdiction to

review the district court’s . . . order as to [the appellant’s] post‐trial motions”).

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Elec. Workers Local Union 159, 676 F.3d 579, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2012);

Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352, 1359

n.15 (11th Cir. 2010); Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 581

F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2009); Dill v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 525

F.3d 612, 618–19 (8th Cir. 2008); Nat’l Ecological Found. v. Alexander,

496 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2007).  Because the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure are promulgated and amended by the Supreme Court

pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077, an

individual rule is jurisdictional only if it is codified by statute in

language that clearly reflects Congress’s intent to treat it as

jurisdictional.    See Indu Craft, 749 F.3d at 114.   Rule 6(b)(2) has no

such statutory codification.  Its language is also virtually identical to

that of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) and Bankruptcy

Rule 9006(b), which the Supreme Court has held are non‐

jurisdictional.    See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005);

Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455–56 & n.10 (observing that Rules 45(b) and

9006 are “modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)”).

Accordingly, even though the district court was without

authority to grant an extension under Rule 6(b)(2), it retained the

power to consider whether the plaintiffs had waived compliance

with the rule or whether an equitable exception applied.    See

Weitzner, 802 F.3d at 311.    The defendants claim that the plaintiffs

never objected to the extension and were not prejudiced by the

delay.    Any objection on timeliness grounds may therefore have

been waived.    Compare Advanced Bodycare, 615 F.3d at 1359 n.15

(“[S]ince Rule 6(b) is a claims‐processing rule, [defendant‐appellee],

in failing to object to the district court’s violation of the rule (by

extending the time for filing post‐trial motions) forfeited its objection

to the time extension.”), with Dill, 525 F.3d at 619 (no waiver where

party failed to oppose request for extension but subsequently raised

objection in response to Rule 50(b) motion).

We see no reason, however, to resolve that issue now.

Although the plaintiffs never objected in the district court, it is not

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clear whether they had an effective opportunity to do so given the

district court’s quick denial of the motion and of reconsideration.

Under the circumstances, we prefer to leave it to the district court to

consider in the first instance whether the plaintiffs waived objection

to the court’s improper grant of an extension of time or whether an

equitable exception to the prohibition of such extensions applied on

the facts of this case.    Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s

post‐judgment orders denying the defendants’ motions for lack of

jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we VACATE the judgment as to Legg’s

pregnancy discrimination claim and REMAND with instructions to

conduct a new trial, and VACATE the orders denying the

defendants’ post‐trial motions and REMAND for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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