Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01483/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01483-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK DERELL VAUGHN,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06 CV 1483 JM

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION

TO VACATE STAY; (2) DENYING

MOTION TO AMEND PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

AND (3) DENYING REQUEST

FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL

(Doc. No. 26, 28)

vs.

J.S. WOODFORD, Director, 

Respondent.

On July 24, 2006, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court challenging his conviction. On January 8, 2007,

Petitioner filed a Motion for a 120-day Stay and Abeyance of the federal proceedings

to allow the state court to review two additional claims. Petitioner also filed a Motion

to Amend his original federal petition to include the two claims. On June 5, 2007, this

court granted the stay but denied the leave to amend as premature. Following the

California Supreme Court’s denial of his state habeas petition, Petitioner now moves

this court to vacate the stay and grant his request for leave to amend, and also requests

appointment of counsel. The government does not oppose vacating the stay but does

oppose Petitioner’s motion to amend. For the reasons set forth below, the court

GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to vacate the stay, DENIES Petitioner’s motion to

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 The date on which the state court judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of time for seeking such review includes ninety days for seeking writ of certiorari

for the United States Supreme Court. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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amend, and DENIES Petitioner’s request for appointment of counsel.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 18, 2003, Petitioner was convicted in California state court of one

count of robbery, one count of second degree burglary, and one count of kidnaping for

purpose of robbery. For these convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate

term of life in prison and a consecutive five-year term. (Lodgment No. 3.) On April

28, 2005, the California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s appeal. (Lodgment No.

7.) Thereafter, on July 27, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied a Petition for

writ of review. (Lodgment No. 9.) On October 25, 2005, the judgment of conviction

was rendered final for purposes of the statute of limitations governing federal habeas

petitions.1

On July 24, 2006, within the one year statute of limitations period governed by

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Petitioner filed a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc.

No. 1.) Petitioner initially alleged: (1) his constitutional right not to be placed twice in

jeopardy was violated; and (2) his due process rights were violated because the

prosecution failed to prove an element of the offense of kidnaping for robbery. (See

Doc. No. 1.) 

On December 22, 2006, May 29, 2008, and January 2, 2009, Petitioner filed

petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the state superior, appellate, and supreme courts

raising two additional ineffective assistance of counsel claims (“IAC” claims). On

January 3, 2007, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay the federal proceedings pending

exhaustion of his claims in state court, and also filed a Motion to Amend his federal

petition to include the two additional claims. On June 5, 2007, this Court granted the

stay but denied the leave to amend as premature. On June 10, 2009, the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s final state habeas petition. (Lodgement No. 19.) 

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Petitioner now asks the court to vacate the Stay and permit him to amend his

federal Petition with the two new IAC claims. (Doc. No. 26, 28.) Respondent does not

oppose vacating the Stay but opposes Petitioner’s Motion to Amend as barred by the

statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 30.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. The 120-Day Stay Should be Vacated 

 Petitioner seeks to vacate the 120-day stay of the federal proceeding because his

state collateral claims are now fully exhausted. Respondent does not oppose vacating

the stay. Accordingly, the stay should be vacated.

B. Petitioner’s Motion to Amend is Barred by AEDPA’s One-Year

Statute of Limitations 

1. Legal Standards

The AEDPA sets a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners to file

complaints in federal court seeking collateral review of their state court convictions.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides the method for calculating the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

(emphasis added). 

Pursuant to section 2244(d)(2) (the tolling provision), the limitations period is

tolled for all the time during which a state prisoner is attempting to exhaust state court

remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application. Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). This generally means that the statute is tolled from the

time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects a

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 The Supreme Court has held that an application for federal habeas corpus relief does not toll

the AEDPA’s limitation period pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). The Court held that the tolling

provision applies to state, not federal, petitions for post-conviction relief, and that the statute is not

tolled during the pendency of a first federal habeas petition. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172

(2001).

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petitioner’s final collateral challenge. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-220 (2002).

Properly filed state petitions, however, must be pending in order to toll the limitations

period. A state petition is “pending” if filed within the one year limitations period,

otherwise there is no period remaining to be tolled. Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

a state petition filed before the AEDPA’s statute of limitations will toll the federal

limitations period.) 

2. Analysis

The statute of limitations began to run when Petitioner’s judgment of conviction

became final on October 25, 2005. On July 24, 2006, Petitioner filed his first federal

habeas petition well within the one year statute of limitations.2

 Petitioner, however, did

not seek leave to amend his federal petition until January 3, 2007; 70 days after the one

year statute of limitations had expired. While the statute and case law provide statutory

tolling of the one year limitations period for the entire time a petitioner is seeking state

post-conviction relief, a state petition must be pending prior to the running of the statute

of limitations in order for the tolling provision to apply. Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner did not file his first petition for state collateral relief until December

22, 2006; 58 days after AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired. Tolling is therefore

inapplicable to Petitioner’s amended petition because the state petition was filed nearly

two months after the federal limitations period had expired. While California does not

provide a rigid limitations period governing state habeas petitions (the standard is one

of reasonableness), even a timely filed state petition cannot toll the federal limitations

period when there is no period remaining to be tolled. Thus, because Petitioner’s first

state petition was filed beyond the federal deadline, tolling is inapplicable and Petitioner

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has exceeded the time for filing an amended federal petition. 

Respondent recognizes, however, that if Petitioner’s two additional claims “relate

back” to the two issues raised in his original federal petition, the amended petition

would not be time barred. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). Whether the two issues sought to

be raised in the amended petition relate back to the original pleading rests on whether

or not this court determines that the two new IAC claims are separate in time and type

from the double jeopardy and due process challenges raised in the original petition.

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 646 (2005) (emphasis added.) Under Rule 15 and Felix,

there must be a common core of operative facts uniting the newly asserted claims with

the original. Id. This means that the claims asserted in the amended pleading must

arise “out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth

in the original pleading.” Id. at 656. 

Here, Petitioner’s two proposed amendments do not relate back to his original

claims. In his original petition, Petitioner targeted the court’s declaration of a mistrial

placing him twice in jeopardy, and the prosecution’s failure to provide evidence of

asportation to support the kidnaping for robbery charge. Petitioner seeks to amend his

petition with two ineffective assistance of counsel claims stemming from the failure of

trial counsel to introduce fingerprint evidence to show third party culpability. The IAC

claims do not arise out of the same core of facts as the original claims. The original

claim relating to the mistrial, relies on conduct of a witness that occurred prior to the

original trial and its subsequent effects. The second original claim relies on conduct of

the prosecution. In contrast, the factual predicate for the two new IAC claims are based

on conduct and transactions of trial and appellate counsel occurring during the original

trial and during appellate review. Petitioner is targeting discreet episodes in the original

and amended petitions. Therefore, the amended claims do not relate back for purposes

of Rule 15 and the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

C. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Appointed Counsel 

There is generally no federal constitutional right to the representation of counsel

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in habeas proceedings, but courts are empowered to appoint counsel to assist a

petitioner if justice so requires. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 553 (1987). “In

deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the district court must

evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of petitioner to

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.”

Weygant v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th 1983). Further, “[t]he rules governing habeas

proceedings mandate the appointment of counsel if necessary for the effective

utilization of discovery procedures, or if an evidentiary hearing is required.” Id. 

Petitioner is not entitled to the appointed counsel in this circumstance primarily

because he raises no issues of merit. This is most clearly evidenced by the fact that

Petitioner has already proceeded through one full round of state post conviction

collateral attacks wherein all his arguments were rejected. Further, none of his

arguments present issues of first impression for this court or demand procedures

normally within the province of an attorney. While Petitioner admits to his lack of legal

knowledge in his reply brief and there is evidence he suffers from mental illness,

appointment of counsel is not mandated nor would it be fruitful. Therefore, counsel

should not be appointed.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court hereby GRANTS Petitioner’s motion to vacate

the stay, DENIES Petitioner’s motion to amend, and DENIES Petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: October 19, 2009

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge cc: All parties

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