Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02543/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02543-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The Court provided the required notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,

962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and permitted Plaintiff time to supplement his response.

(Docs. 56, 58, 59.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John W. Farmer, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dana Youhas, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-2543-PHX-RCB (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff John W. Farmer filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Officer Dana Youhas, of Maricopa County Adult Probation, and Officer #2381, of the

Phoenix Police Department. (Doc. 13.) Defendant Youhas moves for summary judgment

on the claims against her.1

 (Doc. 54.)

The Court will grant the motion and dismiss the claims and Defendant Youhas.

I. Background

In Count I of his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Youhas violated

Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when she stated that his

probation would be revoked if he refused to answer questions during a polygraph. (Doc. 13.)

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Officer #2381 has not been served.

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On Screening, the Court dismissed other Defendants and claims. (Doc. 13.) The

Court subsequently dismissed additional Defendants and claims. (Doc. 25.)

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In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Youhas and Officer #23812 were deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s serious medical condition when Youhas forced Plaintiff to walk without

crutches and a knee brace. Plaintiff also asserted that Officer #2381 took Plaintiff’s crutches

and forced him to walk unassisted approximately 50 feet to his patrol car and when Plaintiff

arrived at the jail informed him that no wheelchair was available and made Plaintiff walk

another 60 feet.3

 

II. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216,

1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(e) compels the non-moving party to “set out specific facts

showing a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against

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a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which the party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. But, if the evidence of the

non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may be granted. Id. at 248-49.

III. Counts I and II

A. Count I 

1. Legal Standard

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held

that the Amendment protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness

against himself in a criminal prosecution and also protects him from answering “official

questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the

answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414

U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 

One does not lose the protection of the Fifth Amendment by reason of a criminal

conviction. Minn. v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). “[A] district court may require,

as a term of supervised release, that a defendant submit to polygraph testing . . . but a

defendant retains his Fifth Amendment rights during any such testing.” United States v.

Weber, 451 F.3d 553, 568 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d

1128, 1134–41 (9th Cir.2005). ) Thus, a probationer can be required to appear and discuss

matters relating to his probationary status; “such a requirement, without more, does not give

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In support of her motion, Defendant submits her Statement of Facts (Doc. 55

(DSOF)) with exhibits, including excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition (id., Ex. A, Pl.’s Dep.

Mar. 24, 2011); Defendant’s declaration (id., Ex. B, Youhas Decl.); discovery documents

(id., Ex. C); and polygraph results (id., Ex. D, E).

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rise to a self-executing privilege.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. But “the result may be different

if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for

answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 435.

There is no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used

in revocation proceedings. Id. at 435, n 7. 

To establish a Fifth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the testimony

desired by the government carried the risk of incrimination and (2) the penalty he suffered

amounted to compulsion. Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1134–41. As to compulsion, “if the state,

either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to

revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to

assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed

compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435. 

In addition, to maintain a civil rights claim based on an alleged violation of the Fifth

Amendment, an incriminating statement must be used against an individual in a criminal

proceeding. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).

2. Parties’ Contentions

a. Defendant4

Plaintiff is a registered sex offender on lifetime probation for child molestations

committed in 1997 and 1998. (Doc. 55, DSOF ¶ 1.) As a condition of his probation, Plaintiff

is required to submit to polygraph examinations on an annual basis and as requested by his

probation officer. (Id. ¶ 2.) During the annual polygraph examinations, Plaintiff is regularly

asked if he has accessed pornography, including child pornography, or if he has had

inappropriate behavior with children. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s probation can be revoked for

failing his annual test or for refusing to take a test required by his probation officer. (Id. ¶ 4.)

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Accessing pornography is also a violation of his probation terms. (Id. ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff was released from the Arizona Department of Corrections in 2007 and was

self-committed to the Arizona Community Protection & Treatment Center (ACPTC) for a

lifetime term. (Id. ¶ 8.)

In September of 2007, Defendant was assigned as Plaintiff’s probation officer. (Id.

¶ 11.) In 2009, pornographic material was found on an ACPTC resident’s computer. (Id. ¶

16.) Plaintiff took two polygraphs thereafter; one was required by ACPTC and was

therapeutic in nature, and the second, which is at issue here, was required by Defendant after

Plaintiff failed the first exam. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18.) Defendant asserts that, after the computers

were first searched, Plaintiff requested to be given a polygraph test because he was being

accused of downloading the pornography. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff failed the first polygraph

because of the questions concerning whether he downloaded the pornography. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

Defendant maintains that the second polygraph was administered only for the purpose

of complying with probation conditions; specifically, Defendant required the second

polygraph exam to follow up on the first failed test. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) There were no charges

pending against Plaintiff at the time and no threat of a separate charge or crime. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was not and has not been charged with a crime in

connection with the discovery of pornographic material on another resident’s computer. (Id.

¶ 26.) And at the time he received the directive to take the second exam, Plaintiff knew that

no charges were going to be brought against him. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendant asserts that despite

this belief, Plaintiff was advised not to take the second polygraph, even though he knew his

probation could be revoked for refusing. (Id. ¶ 28.) 

Defendant also asserts that when Plaintiff was notified of the second polygraph exam,

his “general attitude . . . was pretty hostile” because he felt there was nothing to file charges

on and there were no charges pending, so the exam was merely a pretext to revoke his

probation. (Id. ¶ 29.) Though he understood no charges would come from the pornography

incident, Plaintiff still considered invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, which he

communicated to Defendant, but “[he] did not say that [he] was” going to invoke the Fifth.

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In opposition Plaintiff submits his response (Doc. 56), with exhibits, his supplemental

response (Doc. 59), and Statement of Facts (Doc. 60 (PSOF)).

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(Id. ¶ 31.) 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff took the second polygraph under threat of a

probation violation if he refused. (Id. ¶ 32.) He understood that he was required to submit

to polygraphs as a term of his probation, and Defendant informed Plaintiff if he refused to

take the polygraph he would be in violation of his probation. (Id. ¶ 33.) Defendant asserts

that Plaintiff never invoked his Fifth Amendment rights; he told Defendant merely that he

was considering pleading the Fifth. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35.) Plaintiff’s probation was revoked only

for failing a polygraph exam and for viewing sexual material. (Id. ¶ 36.) No criminal

charges have been filed; there have been no consequences from the polygraph other than

probation revocation. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.) Plaintiff was arrested for a probation violation on

September 9, 2009 for failing the second polygraph examination. (Id. ¶ 41.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff never invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and that

because he was not asked questions that could incriminate him on new criminal charges, he

had no right to invoke the privilege. (Doc. 54 at 7-9.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff

has no §1983 claim because no statements that he made at the polygraph were ever used

against him in a criminal proceeding. (Id. at 10, citing Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767.)

b. Plaintiff5

Plaintiff asserts that although he committed himself to ACPTC, he is not there for a

lifetime and each year has the option of going to court to request a full discharge or a

modification of his Least Restrictive Alternative status. (Doc. 56 at 1.) He is not required

to take an annual polygraph; rather, he must submit to psychological or physiological

assessment at the direction of probation. (Id. at 2; ref. Doc. , Ex. B.) He takes a polygraph

every year as well as a plethysmograph; he argues that there is no requirement that he pass

a polygraph. (Id. at 2.) 

When pornography was discovered on an ACPTC resident’s computer in March 2009,

Plaintiff requested a polygraph when he met with his primary therapist. This polygraph was

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therapeutic and used only for treatment purposes. Plaintiff notes that no pornography was

found on his file in that computer. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant waited over five months to request the second

polygraph and that although he was told that no charges were pending, if an investigation

was still in progress, Plaintiff would likely not have been told. (Id. at 3.)

Plaintiff alleges that e-mails between Defendant and Plaintiff’s attorney on another

matter show that in late July through mid-August there was an issue that Plaintiff could be

“exposed to serious criminal liability.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the second polygraph was

an attempt to discover incriminating evidence as shown by Defendant’s statement that “they

are required to remain crime free while on probation, and if they do not, it is a violation.”

(Id. at 3-4, Ex. B.) 

Plaintiff repeats these assertions in his supplemental response. (Doc. 59 at 1-3.) He

argues that he was at risk with the second polygraph due to the nature of the images and that

the questions that could have been and were asked carried the possibility of future criminal

prosecution. (Id. at 5.) 

c. Reply

In her reply, Defendant argues that the Fifth Amendment only protects individuals

from being compelled to answer specific questions that carry the risk of incrimination and

that no question asked of Plaintiff during the polygraph exam carried the risk of

incrimination in a criminal proceeding. (Doc. 57 at 2-3, citing Garner v. United States, 424

U.S. 648, 654-55 (1976).) She notes that Plaintiff’s own response concedes that “plaintiff

did not know if there would be any questions regarding the incident he would be questioned

about, or if the questions would be related to the suspected child pornography.” She argues

that the Fifth Amendment offers no protection until an incriminating question is actually

asked and the Fifth Amendment is actually invoked. (Id. at 3, citing Garner, 424 U.S. 654-

55. 

Defendant also argues that her e-mail exchange with plaintiff’s attorney for another

issue does not establish Fifth Amendment rights when no incriminating questions were

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asked. (Id.) Plaintiff would still only be able to invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to

individual questions, which he did not do, and not as a blanket protection from having to take

a polygraph exam. Defendant contends that although Plaintiff asserts that he was placed in

a “classic penalty situation,” the questions asked of him were relevant only to his status on

probation, which the Supreme Court specifically stated would not be deemed a penalty

situation nor would answers be deemed compelled. (Id. at 4, citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426

n.7.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s probation was not revoked for refusing to answer the

polygraph or for his substantive answers but for failing the polygraph exam. Id. at 4 n.4.

Defendant also argues that to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to set forth separate

Fourteenth Amendment claims (Doc. 56 at 7-8), these claims are redundant and subsumed

by the specific Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims. (Doc. 57 at 7.) 

3. Analysis

The Court will grant Defendant summary judgment on Count I. Because it is

undisputed that the testimony given at the second polygraph was never used in a criminal

proceeding, the Court need not consider whether Plaintiff can show that: (1) the testimony

desired by the government carried the risk of incrimination and (2) the penalty he suffered

amounted to compulsion. Plaintiff has no § 1983 claim. 

In Chavez, the Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that for purposes of a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an alleged violation of the Fifth Amendment, there is no

harm until an incriminating statement is used against an individual in a criminal proceeding.

538 U.S. 760. In Chavez, six Justices found that the civil rights action based on an alleged

violation of the Fifth Amendment could not survive because the plaintiff had never been

charged with any crime. Id. at 766-67 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, J.,

and Scalia, J.), id., at 777-79 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.). 

Since Chavez, the Ninth Circuit has considered the meaning of “use” of a statement

in a “criminal proceeding.” See Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 922-25 (9th Cir.

2009). In Stoot, the court held that held that a coerced statement has been used in a criminal

case when it has been relied on to file formal charges, to determine judicially that the

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prosecution may proceed, and to determine pretrial custody. Id. at 925. See also Crowe v.

County of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 429 (9th Cir. 2010) (statements obtained in violation of

the Fifth Amendment and used at various pretrial criminal proceedings, including the grand

jury, gave rise to a Fifth Amendment claim). 

Plaintiff’s responses make no argument regarding Chavez and the lack of a criminal

proceeding in Plaintiff’s case; he addresses only the two elements of a Fifth Amendment

claim. It is well-settled that a probation revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.

Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). It is

undisputed that the only use of Plaintiff’s statements from the polygraph was in the probation

revocation. Moreover, Plaintiff’s probation was not revoked for invoking his Fifth

Amendment privilege. Therefore, even if the questions asked carried the risk of

incrimination and Plaintiff was compelled to answer them, Plaintiff has no civil rights claim

regarding any alleged Fifth Amendment violation. 

Plaintiff did not assert a separate due process claim in his Second Amended

Complaint, and the Court will not consider it now. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779-80.

Count I will be dismissed. 

B. Count II

1. Legal Standard

To prevail on a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must

demonstrate “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff

must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and

(2) the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096

(citations omitted). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of

and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate

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indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096. 

2. Parties’ Contentions

a. Defendant

On August 29, 2009, Plaintiff had surgery on his left knee. (Doc. 55, DSOF ¶ 40, Ex.

A, Pl.’s Dep. 65.) He was arrested for a probation violation on September 9, 2009 for failing

the second polygraph examination. (DSOF ¶ 41.) He was taken to the ACPTC visitation

area where Defendant, Angel Williams, approximately 13 ACPTC staffers and security

personnel, and 2 Phoenix police officers were waiting. (Id. ¶ 42, Pl.’s Dep. 67.) Plaintiff

was on crutches, using a knee immobilizer with steel bands to prevent his knee from moving

and causing pain. (DSOF ¶ 43.). 

One of the Phoenix police officers informed Plaintiff that he could not keep his

crutches. (Id. ¶ 44, Pl.’s Dep. 68.) Plaintiff then told Defendant that he at least needed the

knee brace; Defendant did not respond. (DSOF ¶ 45, Pl.’s Dep. 68.) Plaintiff then told the

Phoenix police officers that he needed either the crutches or the brace to walk, but the

Phoenix police officers told him that metal could not be taken into the jail. (DSOF ¶ 46, Pl.’s

Dep. 68-69.) Phoenix police officers then escorted Plaintiff to the police car. (DSOF ¶ 47,

Pl.’s Dep. 69.) Defendant was not involved in transporting plaintiff; rather, she was an

observer. (DSOF ¶ 48, Pl.’s Dep. 69-70, 73, 75.) 

Plaintiff was allowed to take his time going to the police car. (DSOF ¶ 49, Pl.’s Dep.

70.) He refused to ask the police officers for help because he was upset with them. (DSOF

¶ 50, Pl.’s Dep. 76.) 

Plaintiff was taken to the Fourth Avenue Jail where Defendant was positioned outside

of the police car while a Phoenix police officer went inside to check for a wheelchair.

(DSOF ¶¶ 51-52, Pl.’s Dep. 71.) There were no wheelchairs available, so Phoenix police

officers helped Plaintiff into the jail. (DSOF ¶ 53, Pl.’s Dep. 71.) Plaintiff had no

conversation with Defendant at the Fourth Avenue Jail. (DSOF ¶ 54, Pl.’s Dep. 72.)

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Plaintiff testified that no medical doctor has treated him since this incident or

informed him that the conditions in his complaint caused or contributed to his current pain.

(DSOF ¶ 55, Pl.’s Dep 82.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show that he suffered an objectively

sufficiently serious harm. (Doc. 54 at 12 (citing Duarte v. Gill, 359 Fed. App’x 883, 884 (9th

Cir. 2009).) She asserts that there are no facts to show that Plaintiff ever notified her that he

would suffer serious injury by walking 50 feet without crutches or a brace and he offers no

evidence that he was injured as a result of the claimed violation. (Id. at 14.) There were

legitimate safety concerns in requiring Plaintiff to relinquish his brace and crutches. (Id. at

15.) Defendant contends that her mere presence at the scene is insufficient for liability and

as a probation officer, she had no duty to ensure Plaintiff’s well-being when he was in

custody of law enforcement officials. (Id.) Plaintiff’s deposition testimony shows that it was

the Phoenix Police Department officers who required Plaintiff to give up the knee brace and

crutches. (Id. at 16.)

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has no separate Fourteenth Amendment claims.

(Id. at 16). She also asserts qualified immunity. (Id. at 17.)

b. Plaintiff

Plaintiff asserts that the case notes maintained by Defendant show how long Plaintiff

needed to wear the knee brace on his left knee and that he was due to have surgery on his

right knee. (Doc. 56 at 6, Ex. C.) Plaintiff claims that in her responses to discovery,

Defendant asserted that she told the officer that Plaintiff needed the leg brace. (Id.) Plaintiff

argues that Defendant knew that Plaintiff would be harmed if made to walk without crutches

or a knee brace. (Id.) Defendant knew Plaintiff was still suffering pain from the surgery and

the pain he suffered was due to Defendant’s inaction. (Id. at 7.) Defendant is listed on jail

records as the arresting officer. (Id.)

Plaintiff repeats these arguments in his supplemental response. He argues that

Defendant’s prior knowledge of Plaintiff’s knee injury and how long he would need the knee

brace demonstrates deliberate indifference. (Doc. 59 at 8.) Plaintiff asserts that the record

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shows interference with prescribed treatment. (Id.)

c. Reply

Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to offer any medical evidence in support of his

Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 57 at 5.) Plaintiff has no direct evidence such as a

prescription, affidavit from his doctor, or even a case note from Defendant that the brace and

crutches were required after surgery. Defendant contends that Plaintiff submitted a doctor’s

note which states that Plaintiff will need surgery and “he cannot stand or walk on it for

extended periods.” (Id., ref. Doc. 56, Ex. C, case note entry dated 10/30/08.) Defendant

argues that if that is correct, she would have been acting in compliance with doctor’s orders

by permitting plaintiff to walk the short distances he describes. (Id. at 5.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is attempting to create liability simply for creating

an alleged risk of harm, even if no harm occurs and that this is an incorrect standard. (Id.

at 6.) 

Defendant further argues that she has not offered contradictory responses; her

declaration notes that she did not speak to Plaintiff at the time he was being taken into

custody and her interrogatory responses indicate that she believes she did speak to the

arresting officers from the Phoenix Police Department. She contends that her interrogatory

answer strongly supports her defense that no Eighth Amendment claim exists as the plaintiff

must prove “that the official . . . failed to act,” and her statement to Phoenix Police shows

that she acted to prevent harm from befalling the plaintiff. (Id., citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842.) Because Plaintiff was in the custody of the Phoenix Police Department, Defendant

could not have done more. Defendant also asserts that the fact that she was listed as an

arresting officer is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim because at no point

was she more than an observer when plaintiff was taken into custody. (Id. at 7.)

3. Analysis

The Court will grant Defendant summary judgment on Count II. Plaintiff fails to

create a triable issue of fact as to the objective seriousness of the risk or Defendant’s

awareness of such a risk. Moreover, the record shows that it was not Defendant who

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required Plaintiff to relinquish the knee brace or crutches; rather it was officers of the

Phoenix Police Department.

Plaintiff’s only evidence of a serious risk is his own claim that he could not walk

without knee brace or crutches. Plaintiff presents no medical evidence, such as an affidavit

or directive from a doctor. While Plaintiff wore the knee brace and used the crutches after

surgery, the issue is whether there was a substantial risk of serious harm from walking a short

distance without them. The only evidence in Defendant’s case notes indicates that following

a 2008 knee surgery, Plaintiff could not stand or walk for extended periods. ( Doc. 56, Ex.

C, case note entry dated 10/30/08.) This is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed from walking 40 or 50 feet to the patrol car and 60

feet from the car to the jail and insufficient evidence from which Defendant could draw an

inference of a substantial risk of serious harm. See Duarte, 359 Fed. App’x at 884 (finding

insufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious harm or that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent when they required the plaintiff to walk relatively short distances on

his broken foot). In addition, Plaintiff testified that he did not ask the Police Department

officers for assistance in getting to the patrol car because he was upset with them; the Court

finds such behavior is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claim of a substantial risk of serious harm.

In sum, there is insufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious harm or evidence from

which Defendant could have drawn the inference of such a risk. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate

a triable issue of fact that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.

See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Moreover, it is undisputed that it was the Phoenix Police officers, not Defendant, a

County probation officer, who ordered Plaintiff to relinquish his crutches. To prevail on a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered a specific injury as a result

of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). Plaintiff

offers no evidence to show that Defendant asked or suggested to the police officers that the

knee brace and crutches be taken away or evidence to show that she could have required the

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Phoenix Police Department to restore them. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s claim that because

Defendant may have been listed on a report as the arresting officer she had any authority

regarding the Police Department procedures. 

The Court need not consider Defendant’s remaining arguments. 

The Court also agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff did not raise a separate due

process claim there are no separate Fourteenth Amendment claims.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn for Defendant Youhas’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54).

(2) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is granted; the claim in

Count I is dismissed and the claim in Count II is dismissed as to Defendant Youhas.

(3) Defendant Youhas is dismissed.

(4) The remaining claim is Count II against Officer #2381. As he had not yet been

served, the Magistrate Judge shall issue an Order to Show Cause to Plaintiff to show why the

claim against Officer #2381should not be dismissed. 

DATED this 7th day of February, 2012.

Case 2:09-cv-02543-RCB-SPL Document 63 Filed 02/08/12 Page 14 of 14