Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03657/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03657-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MLC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03657-SI 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RENEWAL 

AFTER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

Re: Dkt. No. 59

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is scheduled for a hearing on August 12, 2016. 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines that this matter is appropriate for 

resolution without oral argument, and hereby VACATES the hearing. For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court hereby DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2014, plaintiff MLC brought suit against defendant Micron, alleging 

infringement of United States Patent No. 5,764,571 (“the ’571 patent” or “the asserted patent,”

invented by Banks). Dkt. No. 1. The ’571 patent is entitled “Electrically Alterable Non-Volatile 

Memory with N-bits Per Cell.” On October 15, 2014, Micron answered and asserted several 

affirmative defenses, including double patenting, as well as a counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment of non-infringement and invalidity for double-patenting. Dkt. No. 13.1 On January 20, 

2015, Micron served its invalidity contentions. In the invalidity contentions, Micron again alleged 

 

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 The second affirmative defense and the eighth counterclaim both allege that each claim 

of the ‘571 patent is invalid “pursuant to the judicial doctrine barring double-patenting, in view of, 

for example, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,394,362 and/or 5,218,569.” Id. 

Case 3:14-cv-03657-SI Document 70 Filed 08/09/16 Page 1 of 7
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that the claims of the ’571 patent are invalid due to double patenting in view of U.S. Pat. Nos. 

5,394,362 and/or 5,218,569, and pursuant to the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type 

double patenting.

On December 24, 2014, approximately one month before filing its invalidity contentions, 

Micron filed a petition for inter partes review (“IPR”) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 

(“PTO”), challenging the patentability of at least each asserted claim. On February 3, 2015, the 

Court granted Micron’s motion to stay this case pending IPR of the ʼ571 patent. Dkt. No. 31. On 

July 20, 2015, the PTO denied Micron’s petition to institute the IPR, and on August 19, 2015,

Micron filed a request for rehearing of that determination. The stay in this case continued by 

agreement, until MLC moved to lift the stay on February 24, 2016. On March 29, 2016, the Court 

granted MLC’s motion to lift the stay. Dkt. No. 43. On March 31, 2016, the PTO denied 

Micron’s rehearing request. Dkt. No. 48.

On May 27, 2016, Micron moved to amend its invalidity contentions and add U.S. Patent 

No. 7,911,851 (“the ‘851 patent,” also invented by Banks) as a reference for its obviousness-type 

double patenting theory.2The ‘851 patent is entitled “Memory Apparatus Including Programmable 

Non-Volatile Multi-Bit Memory Cell, and Apparatus and Method for Demarcating Memory States 

of the Cell.” In an order filed July 6, 2016, the Court denied Micron’s motion to amend invalidity 

contentions for lack of good cause under Patent Local Rule 3-6. Dkt. No. 61. 

The asserted ʼ571 patent was filed on February 27, 1995, issued on June 9, 1998, and

expired on June 9, 2015. The ‘851 reference patent was filed and issued later than the ‘571 patent, 

but claimed priority to the February, 1995 filing date of the ‘571 patent. Because the application

for the ‘851 patent was filed after June 8, 1995, when changes to U.S. patent law imposed a 20-

year patent term measured from the earliest effective priority date,3the ‘851 patent expired on 

February 27, 2015, just over three months before the earlier-filed ‘571 patent expired.

 

2

 Micron’s motion to amend also sought to add another reference, U.S. Patent No. 

8,570,814 (“the ’814 patent”). The ‘814 patent is not at issue in the present motion.

3

 The 1996 Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) amendments to the patent statute

changed the patent term to 20 years from the earliest effective priority date, instead of the prior 

fixed 17 years from issuance term. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).

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Now before the Court is Micron’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity. Micron 

seeks summary judgment that claims 1, 9, 12, 30, 42, and 45 (“the asserted claims”) of the ‘571 

patent are invalid under the judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting in 

view of the ‘851 patent. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine that “prohibit[s] a party 

from obtaining an extension of the right to exclude through claims in a later patent that are not 

patentably distinct from claims in a commonly owned earlier patent.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr 

Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit has identified two steps in an 

obviousness-type double patenting analysis. “First, ‘a court construes the claim[s] in the earlier 

patent and the claim[s] in the later patent and determines the differences.’” Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva 

Pharm., 518 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 968). “Second, it 

determines whether those differences render the claims patentably distinct.” Id. “A later patent 

claim is not patentably distinct from an earlier patent claim if the later claim is obvious over, or 

anticipated by, the earlier claim.” Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 968. Double patenting is a question of 

law. Pfizer, Inc., 518 F.3d at 1363.

DISCUSSION

I. Notice

MLC contends that Micron’s motion should be denied because Micron did not previously 

disclose the specific invalidity theory on which its motion is based in its answer to MLC’s 

complaint or its counterclaim for a declaration of invalidity. MLC also notes that Micron 

attempted to obtain leave to supplement its Patent L.R. 3-3 invalidity contentions to assert the ‘851 

reference, but that the Court denied Micron’s request for leave to supplement. MLC argues that 

Micron should not be permitted to raise on summary judgment an invalidity theory based on the 

‘851 patent that was not disclosed in its answer, counterclaim, or invalidity contentions.

Micron argues that it provided adequate notice by alleging the judicially-created, 

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obviousness-type double patenting defense in its answer, counterclaim and invalidity contentions. 

Micron argues that MLC does not cite any authority for the proposition that Micron was required 

to specifically identify the ‘851 patent, and that neither the Federal Rules nor the Local Patent 

Rules require such a disclosure. Micron also argues that it would have been unreasonable to 

require such a disclosure in this case where there are more than 30 members of the ‘571 patent 

family and MLC’s complaint did not identify which claims of the ‘571 patent were at issue. 

Micron argues, “[u]ntil MLC identified the claims that it would assert, Micron was handicapped in 

its ability to identify which of the patent-in-suit’s 30+ related patents and their nearly 1,200 claims 

(each an individual alleged invention) would be applicable for invalidity analysis based on 

obviousness-type double patenting.” Dkt. No. 66 at 3:1-4.

The Court finds that Micron provided adequate notice of the double patenting defense, and 

thus that Micron may seek summary judgment based on the ‘851 patent. Micron asserted 

judicially-created, obviousness-type double patenting in its answer, counterclaim and its original 

invalidity contentions. Although Micron did not specifically disclose the ‘851 patent, that patent

in the same family as the asserted patent and the reference patents Micron did disclose and claimchart in its invalidity contentions. There is no dispute that MLC has long been on notice that 

Micron challenged the ‘571 patent as invalid based upon judicially-created, obviousness-type 

double patenting in view of patent references in the same family as the asserted patent. See 

Medtronic, Inc. v. AGA Medical Corp., No. C-07-0567 MMC (EMC), 2009 WL 513370, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (denying a motion to strike defense expert report referring to 

obviousness-type double patenting where answer only referred to statutory double patenting 

because although “as a formal matter, [defendant] failed to give notice of OTDP in its answer,” 

that fact “did not cause any prejudice to [plaintiff].”). 

MLC does not cite any authority holding that Micron was required to specifically disclose 

the ‘851 patent. MLC asserts that the Court’s ruling on Micron’s motion for leave to amend its 

invalidity contentions precludes the Court from reaching the merits of Micron’s motion for 

summary judgment. However, the Court’s July 6, 2016 order addressed whether Micron had good 

cause to amend its invalidity contentions under Patent Local Rule 3-6, and the Court did not 

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answer the separate question of whether obviousness-type double patenting allegations must be 

included in Patent Local Rule 3-3 disclosures. While it may be prudent for a party to disclose 

obviousness-type double patenting in its invalidity contentions, the Court agrees with Micron that 

such disclosures are not specifically required by the plain language of Local Rule 3-3 as either 

prior art disclosures covered by 3-3(a)-(c) or statutory defenses covered by 3-3(d). Cf. Fresenius 

Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc., No. C 03–1431 SBA, 2006 WL 

1329997, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006) (denying motion to strike defendant’s “best mode” 

invalidity defense which had not been disclosed in Patent Local Rule 3-3 invalidity contentions 

because Local Rules did “not impose an obligation on parties to disclose their best mode 

defenses,” the patentee was the most knowledgeable party with respect to the best mode defense, 

and the issue had been extensively briefed to the court).

MLC also claims that “[b]y not disclosing or otherwise providing notice of an 

obviousness-type double patenting theory based on the ‘851 patent, Micron deprived MLC of the 

opportunity to consider filing a terminal disclaimer in response.” Dkt. No. 65 at 5:3-5. It is true 

that Micron only raised the ‘851 reference after that patent expired. However, the Court finds that 

if the ‘851 patent indeed claims obvious variations of the same invention as the asserted patent, the 

asserted patent should have been terminally disclaimed irrespective of Micron’s actions. “[I]t is a 

bedrock principle of our patent system that when a patent expires, the public is free to use not only 

the same invention claimed in the expired patent but also obvious or patentably indistinct 

modifications of that invention. . . . that principle is violated when a patent expires and the public 

is nevertheless barred from practicing obvious modifications of the invention claimed in that 

patent because the inventor holds another later-expiring patent with claims for obvious 

modifications of the invention.” Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1214

(Fed. Cir. 2014).

II. Double patenting

Micron contends that claims 7 and 3 of the ‘851 patent each separately invalidate the 

claims of the ’571 patent under the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting. Micron 

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contends that the ‘571 patent contains “mere linguistic differences” from the ‘851 patent, and that 

an element-by-element comparison of the claims of the two patents demonstrates that they cover 

the same invention. Specifically, Micron argues that both patents claim (1) a multi-level memory 

cell structure, (2) a programming structure to program the memory cell, (3) a structure for 

selecting a reference voltage, where the selected reference voltage is determined by the memory 

state to which the memory cell is to be programmed, and (4) a structure for comparing the voltage 

of the memory cell with the selected reference voltage to verify when the memory cell has been 

programmed to the proper memory state.

MLC argues that the Court should defer the motion until after claim construction and the 

close of discovery.4 The Court agrees and finds that upon the current record, defendant has not 

met its burden to demonstrate the patent-in-suit is invalid. The analysis of obviousness-type 

double patenting involves a claim by claim comparison of the asserted patent to the invention 

claimed in the reference patent. As one example, Micron argues that claim 1 of the ‘571 patent, 

which claims a “multi-level memory cell for storing input information in a corresponding one” of 

“predetermined memory states” covers the same structure as claim 1 of the ’851 patent, which 

claims “an electrically-alterable non-volatile memory cell having more than two predetermined 

memory states.” Compare ‘571 patent at 12:7-12 with ‘851 patent at 19:40-41 (Dkt. No. 59-2, 59-

3). Although Micron argues that this analysis can be done on the present record, the Court finds 

that claim construction is necessary to the double patenting analysis in this case. The Court notes 

that the parties have filed joint claim construction and pre-hearing statements, in which the parties 

 

4

 MLC also argues that the ’851 patent cannot be used as an invalidating reference against 

the ’571 patent under Gilead. Specifically, MLC argues that Gilead is limited to a situation where 

both the subject patent and double patenting reference are post-URAA patents. Dkt. No. 65 at 10. 

MLC contends that because “this case presents a situation involving a pre-URAA subject patent 

and post-URAA reference patent,” Gilead does not apply. Id. However, Gilead held that “an 

earlier-expiring patent can qualify as an obviousness-type double patenting reference for a laterexpiring patent.” Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1217. The fact that the patents in Gilead were governed by 

the URAA was not relevant to the Court’s reasoning. Gilead’s holding was based on the principle 

that “when a patent expires, the public is free to use not only the same invention claimed in the 

expired patent but also obvious or patentably indistinct modifications of that invention.” Id. at 

1214; see also Abbvie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. Of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 

1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In Gilead, we held that a later-issued, but earlier-expiring patent 

could qualify as a double patenting reference, and thus invalidate an earlier-issued, but later 

expiring patent.”). 

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state that “there are no agreed constructions at this time,” and there are sixteen disputed claim 

terms. Dkt. No. 58. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Micron’s motion for summary judgment without

prejudice to renewal after claim construction. 

CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Micron provided adequate notice of its obviousness-type double 

patenting theory, and that the ’851 patent can be used as an invalidating reference against the ’571 

patent. However, the Court also finds this motion premature at this stage of the litigation, and 

DENIES Micron’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice to renewal after claim 

construction

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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