Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01110/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01110-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTHER DIAZ ARGUETA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-01110-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL 

SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Doc. 1)

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 19, 2015, Plaintiff Esther Diaz Argueta (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint under 42 

U.S.C. §§405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her applications for disability 

insurance benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). (Doc. 1.) The matter is 

currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to 

the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on August 26, 1957, and is currently 58 years old. (Administrative 

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 7, 8.)

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Record (“AR”) 98.) She is from El Salvador, has a sixth-grade education, and speaks only 

Spanish. (AR 55.) On September 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB and SSI payments, 

alleging she became disabled on May 22, 2010, due to injuries to her right knee, right shoulder, 

right foot, and lower back. (AR 38, 42, 98, 109.) From 2001 to May 22, 2010, Plaintiff was 

sorter for a produce company. (AR 310.)

A. Relevant Medical Evidence2

In February 2010, while working as an orange sorter, Plaintiff slipped from a stool and 

caught herself on a conveyor belt, injuring her right shoulder, right knee, low back, and neck. 

(AR 408, 389.) Plaintiff thereafter had physical therapy throughout 2010 to relieve pain. (AR 

386, 392-93, 396, 398, 521, 403, 408.) She underwent MRIs of her cervical spine (neck) and 

lumbar spine (low back) in June and July 2010, respectively, revealing posterior disc bulges with 

no evidence of stenosis or narrowing in the cervical spine (AR 438), and mild to moderate 

narrowing in the lumbar spine. (AR 435.)

Plaintiff had an agreed medical evaluation for her worker’s compensation claim in 

January 2011 with Jaime Contreras, M.D. Plaintiff told Dr. Contreras that after her injury in

February 2010, she had modified work that involved lifting only up to 10 pounds and standing

and walking only four hours per day. (AR 408-09). She was laid off from her modified work on

May 22, 2010. (AR 408.) Dr. Contreras found no tenderness in Plaintiff’s cervical roots, but 

tenderness in the interspinous ligaments and transverse processes, decreased range of motion

with pain, and normal sensation and reflexes in the arms. (AR 410.) Plaintiff also had decreased 

range of motion in her low back with pain and tenderness, but had normal sensation and reflexes 

in her legs, and normal muscle strength, indicating no atrophy. (AR 411.) Dr. Contreras 

observed that Plaintiff had pain on motion of her right shoulder and a “positive” impingement 

sign, but found no palpable bone deformities, no soft tissue masses, no articular effusion and no 

evidence of ligament instability. (AR 411.) He further found tenderness in Plaintiff’s right knee, 

with pain on motion and crepitation of the patellofemoral joint. (AR 412.) Dr. Contreras 

 

2 As Plaintiff’s assertion of error is limited to the ALJ’s consideration of her alleged pain symptoms, only evidence 

relevant to these arguments is set forth below.

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diagnosed Plaintiff with “multi level intervertebral cervical disc syndrome,” “multi level 

intervertebral lumbar disc syndrome with mild right sciatic radiculopathy,” “supraspinatus 

infraspinatus tendinopathy, bicipital tendinitis, impingement syndrome” in her right shoulder, 

“oblique radial tear of the posterior horn and mid portion of the medial meniscus” in her right 

knee, and a right ankle sprain. (AR 416.) Dr. Contreras recommended that Plaintiff have 

physical therapy and over-the-counter medication for her pain. (AR 416.). He found no 

indications for surgery to Plaintiff’s neck, lower back, right shoulder, or right ankle, but he did 

recommend that Plaintiff receive arthroscopic surgery of her right knee. (AR 416.) Dr. 

Contreras opined that Plaintiff should avoid heavy lifting, repetitive bending, prolonged sitting, 

working above the shoulder with her right arm, and prolonged standing and walking. (AR 418.)

Plaintiff began treatment with The Spine and Orthopedic Center in March 2011. (AR 

608.) She had reduced range of motion and tenderness, but had normal motor strength, intact 

sensation, symmetrical reflexes, and negative straight-leg raising tests. (AR 609). The treating 

physician opined that Plaintiff should perform a “sitting job only, no lifting.” (AR 610.) 

Plaintiff continued with treatment throughout 2011, reporting improvement from medication and 

acupuncture. (AR 555, 566, 570, 574-75.) Plaintiff said that she could sit, stand, or walk for 

between 15 and 30 minutes at a time. (AR 613-26.)

On October 17, 2011, Plaintiff had surgery on her right knee. (AR 664-65.) She 

thereafter had physical therapy, which she reported was “very beneficial.” (AR 853.) By 

December 2011, Plaintiff was able to sit and walk for one hour each, and stand for 15 minutes at 

a time. (AR 879.) In January 2012, Plaintiff said she could sit for only 30 minutes at a time, and 

stand and walk for 20 minutes each. (AR 877.) Plaintiff’s chiropractor said that her knee 

improved only marginally from surgery; the chiropractor believed this was because she waited 

too long for surgery. (AR 742-43.)

On January 16, 2012, State agency physician N. Shibuya, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s 

records for her disability claim. Dr. Shibuya opined that Plaintiff could stand and walk about six 

hours each per day, sit for about six hours per day, lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally 

and 10 pounds frequently; and could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb 

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ramps and stairs, but could never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. (AR 103-04.) Dr. Shibuya 

concluded also that Plaintiff had limitations in overhead reaching, and should avoid concentrated 

exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights, inclined planes, and uneven terrain because of 

her pain. (AR 104-05.)

Plaintiff continued to report pain, and continued with physical therapy, acupuncture, and 

home exercise. (AR 841-42.) She told her chiropractor that she did not believe that she was 

“being addressed appropriately for her medical conditions” through the worker’s compensation 

system. (AR 738.) Plaintiff saw Dr. Contreras again in April 2012, and Dr. Contreras said 

Plaintiff’s symptoms “have been essentially unchanged” since her prior examination. (AR 666-

68.) He noted that Plaintiff had tenderness and decreased range of motion with pain, but normal 

neurological findings including reflexes and sensation. (AR 669-72.) He opined that Plaintiff

should avoid very heavy lifting repetitive bending, prolonged sitting, repetitive work above the

right shoulder, prolonged standing and walking, repetitive squatting, kneeling, climbing, and

prolonged stooping. (AR 678-79.) During this time, Plaintiff believed that she could sit, stand, 

and walk for up to 30 minutes each at one time. (AR 867.) Throughout 2012, Plaintiff 

continued to report pain, and stated that physical therapy and medication helped her pain. (AR 

800-01, 805-06, 813, 817, 825.)

In October 2012, State agency physician R. Fujikama, M.D., reviewed Plaintiff’s records 

for Plaintiff’s reconsideration request. (AR 132.) Dr. Fujikama’s findings were consistent with 

Dr. Shibuya’s opinion, and the State agency denied Plaintiff applications again on 

reconsideration. (AR 133-37.)

On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff was evaluated by Mark Greenspan, M.D. Plaintiff told Dr. 

Greenspan that she could lift up to 25 pounds before her injury, but now could lift only 5 pounds.

(AR 1016.) Plaintiff reported difficulty with daily activities including laundry, shopping, getting 

dressed, showering, vacuuming, mopping, sweeping, dusting, cleaning bathrooms, and washing 

dishes. (AR 1018.) Dr. Greenspan examined Plaintiff and found decreased range of motion and 

tenderness, normal (5/5) motor strength, symmetric reflexes, some decreased sensation, and 

negative straight leg raising. (AR 1020-23, 1025-27.) He noted that Plaintiff “was started on a

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conservative medical management” including medication, physical therapy, chiropractic care, 

stretching and strengthening exercises, soft tissue manipulation, and a trans-cutaneous electrical 

nerve stimulation (TENS) unit. (AR 1028.)

Later that month, on January 26, 2013, Plaintiff attended a consultative examination with 

psychologist Gil Schmidt, Psy.D. Dr. Schmidt observed that Plaintiff carried a cane “but did not 

appear to use it for any significant issue,” that she “walked without any sense of having physical 

pain,” that her mood and gait were normal, and that she was “bantering socially with the 

interpreter and laughing.” (AR 1041, 1043.) Plaintiff told Dr. Schmidt that she showered daily, 

handled her own hygiene without assistance, and was able to perform light duty domestic chores. 

(AR 1043.) Dr. Schmidt noted that Plaintiff’s mental health was “stable,” and that her “mental 

health condition will probably abate within the next 12 months.” (AR 1045.)

B. Plaintiff’s Statement

On September 15, 2012, Plaintiff completed a function report. (AR 334.) When asked to 

describe what she did from the time he wakes up to the time he goes to bed, Plaintiff reported 

that she has to take several breaks when she is awake and she tries to do light duty chores. (AR 

335.) She responded that she has trouble getting dressed and requires assistance, that she has to 

hold herself to wash while showering, that she has to support her left hand to comb her hair, and 

that she has trouble reaching after using the toilet. (AR 335.) Plaintiff prepares meals such as 

soup, microwaveable meals, and sandwiches, but that she can’t stand for a long period of time. 

(AR 335.) Plaintiff reported that she sometimes forgets to take her medications due to her pain. 

(AR 336.) She has her husband or grandson help her with chores. (AR 336.) She goes outside 

one to three times a day, and gets around by walking, using public transportation, and riding in 

car. (AR 337.) Plaintiff has her daughter or son do her stopping for her. (AR 337.) Plaintiff is 

able to count change. (AR 337.) Plaintiff reports no hobbies or social activities, but reports that 

she attends church on Sunday mornings. (AR 338.) Plaintiff feels vulnerable when she goes out 

so she feels like she needs a relative or friend to assist her in getting out of a vehicle when 

visiting places outside the home. (AR 338.) Plaintiff can walk for about 30-45 minutes before 

needing to rest, and could resume walking after 20-30 minutes. (AR 339.) Plaintiff can pay 

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attention for about 15-20 minutes. (AR 339.) Plaintiff uses a cane because of weakened strength 

in her right/lower knee. (AR 340.)

C. Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI on September 30, 2011, alleging she 

became disabled on May 22, 2010. (AR 38, 98, 109.) The agency denied Plaintiff’s applications 

for benefits initially on January 25, 2012, and again on reconsideration on March 4, 2013. (AR 

120-60.) On November 5, 2013, Plaintiff appeared without counsel and testified before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) with the aid of an interpreter. (AR 54-75.) 

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the November 2013 hearing, Plaintiff agreed to appear unrepresented. (AR 55.) 

Plaintiff testified she was 56 years old at the time of the hearing. (AR 55.) Plaintiff did all of 

her schooling in El Salvador and has a sixth-grade education. (AR 55.) Plaintiff speaks only 

Spanish, and testified at the hearing with the aid of an interpreter. (AR 54-56.) She testified that 

at her previous job, she sorted mandarin oranges for seven months of the year and collected 

unemployment benefits in the off-season. (AR 65-66). Plaintiff initially testified that she 

stopped working because she hurt herself when she slipped on plastic and fell at work (AR 56), 

but later testified that she stopped working because the job was finished and she was laid off (AR 

56-57). Plaintiff testified that following her injury, between February and May 2010, she was 

allowed to sit while sorting, and at some point “they came and took the chair away from her” and 

“gave her a different kind of chair that didn’t have a rest to rest her back.” (AR 73-74.) Plaintiff 

said she was laid off on May 22, 2010, and has not tried to obtain other work since. (AR 57.)

Plaintiff testified that her job ended in May 2010 because the seven-month sorting season ended, 

and “if the season had still been going on and there will still mandarins to sort, [she] would have 

been able to continue doing that with the chair.” (AR 73.) Plaintiff again stated that if she had 

her “same job back where [she] was doing sorting work and [she] was able to do that position in 

the same chair [she] used for three months, [she’d] be able to do [her] work like [she] did 

before.” (AR 75. See also AR 73.)

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Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she could not work because of hand, shoulder, back, 

and leg problems. (AR 57-58.) She said that she did not believe she could work because she 

couldn’t “even do the chores in my house right now.” (AR 58.) Plaintiff testified that the 

doctors referred to her by her insurance company told her that she has a “bone dislocated from 

her foot.” (AR 58-59.) She testified that she had headaches and high blood pressure. (AR 69.) 

Plaintiff testified that she felt sad and depressed, but that she was not receiving any mental health 

treatment. (AR 71.) Plaintiff said she feeds herself using her left hand only, that her son or 

husband had to help her get dressed, and her daughter brushed her hair. (AR 68-69.) Plaintiff 

stated that she could sit and stand throughout the day in 15-minute increments if she could shift 

positions, and that she could use her left hand to lift and carry up to 20 pounds, but not her right 

hand. (AR 61-63.)

2. Medical Expert’s Testimony

Alexander White, M.D., an internist, testified at the hearing as a medical expert. (AR 

72.) Dr. White said that Plaintiff had the medically determinable impairments of right shoulder 

tendinopathy and right ankle spurs, and that the record showed slight limitations in Plaintiff’s 

back, but none that would limit her ability to work. (AR 77-80.) He noted that Plaintiff could 

benefit from using a cane to walk because of her antalgic gait and her obesity. (AR 81.)

Regarding functional limitations, Dr. White testified that Plaintiff could lift and carry up to 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently with her left arm and 10 pounds occasionally and 

5 pounds frequently with her right arm; could walk four to six hours per day, sit for an hour at 

one time for six hours total, and stand for an hour at one time for six hours total; occasionally 

bend and crouch; should avoid climbing ramps and stairs; hazardous, moving machinery, 

unprotected heights, concentrated exposure above street levels for dust, gas and fumes, and 

climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds; and could occasionally reach overhead with her right arm, 

extend her right arm to half of a normal distance both to the front and to the side, and use both 

hands for fine fingering, handling, and feeling. (AR 82-86, 88.)

//

//

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3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

A Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing that Plaintiff had past relevant work 

as a sorter, DOT 529.687-186, which was a light job with a specific vocational preparation 

(“SVP”)

3

level of 2. (AR 92). The VE also identified sedentary sorting, DOT 521.687-086, 

which represents another category of jobs, usually involving nuts, but the VE acknowledged 

Plaintiff “wasn’t sorting nuts.” (AR 92). The ALJ asked the VE to consider a person of 

Plaintiff’s age, education, and with her work experience. The VE was to assume this person had 

the functional limitations as follows:

Has the capacity to work at the light exertion level, which would include –

modified light, rather – which would include lifting and carrying up to 10 pounds 

frequently and 20 pounds occasionally with the left arm, and the use of the right 

arm is limited to 10 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally.

Has the capacity to sit in one hour increments for up to six out of an eight 

hour workday, to stand in the same increments for the same durations, and to walk 

tin one half hour increments for a range of appropriately four to six hours out of 

the normal workday. This is without a sit/stand option. The increments are 

sufficient.

Posturals are all occasional. There would be a preclusion, however, from 

climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or stairs and ramps. There would also be a 

preclusion for working around hazardous, moving machinery or at unprotected 

heights. The manipulative limitations are that the right upper extremity for 

reaching is limited to occasional overhead reaching. Otherwise is limited to one 

half of normal full extension for reaching below shoulder level to the front or to 

the right side. The left upper extremity, there are no limitations. 

Environmental. There should be a preclusion from exposure to 

concentrated dust, gases, and fumes above street level. As far as manipulative 

limitations otherwise with both hands, there are unrestricted – foot controls, 

unrestricted. Then finally there would be a provision to allow the hypothetical 

[person to use a cane if they needed to walk on uneven surfaces or over long 

distances.

(AR 93-94). The VE testified that such an individual could not perform the produce sorter job as 

it was normally performed, but could perform the produce sorter job as Plaintiff actually 

performed it from February to May 2010, that is, while sitting. (AR 94.) The VE further 

 

3

Specific vocational preparation, as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a typical 

worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a 

specific job-worker situation. DOT, Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). 

Jobs in the DOT are assigned SVP levels ranging from 1 (the lowest level – “short demonstration only”) to 9 (the 

highest level – over 10 years of preparation). Id. 

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testified that Plaintiff could perform the nut sorter job as it is normally performed and that it

“would be very similar, if not exactly, to what she was doing in the modified [produce sorting] 

position,” with the only difference that nuts being a smaller product than produce. (AR 95.)

D. The ALJ’s Decision

In a decision dated December 13, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

(AR 38-46.) The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920. (AR 38-46.) The ALJ decided that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since May 22, 2010, the alleged onset date. (AR 40.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had 

the severe impairments of (1) right shoulder tendinopathy, (2) right ankle spurs, and (3) obesity 

(step two). (AR 40-41.) However, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”) (step three). (AR 41.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

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to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except 

she is limited to lifting/carrying 10 pounds with the right arm; sitting and standing 

up to six hours of an eight hour day in one-hour increments; walking four to six 

hours in an eight-hour day in half-hour increments; never climbing; occasionally 

performing other postural activities; occasionally reaching overhead and half of the 

full extension (below shoulder) to the front or sides with the right upper extremity; 

avoiding pulmonary irritants above street-level concentrations and hazardous 

moving machinery; and using a cane to walk on uneven surfaces or for long 

distances. She should be given the option to use a stool to work in a seated 

position for comfort.

(AR 42.)

Given her RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff can continue to perform her past 

relevant work as a “sorter, (DOT 529.687-186, light per the [Directory of Occupational Titles 

(“DOT”)] and sedentary as performed, SVP 2)” as she had “actually performed” it (step four). 

(AR 45-46.) In reaching his conclusions, the ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s subjective 

 

4 RFC is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work 

setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. Social 

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result 

from an individual’s medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. “In determining a 

claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records, lay 

evidence, and ‘the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable 

impairment.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).

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complaints were not fully credible. (AR 44.)

The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 19, 2015. (AR 1-9.)

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ’s decision denying benefits “will be disturbed only if that decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.” Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 

599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 

1996). Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal 

standards and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner’s 

findings. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more 

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 

1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply 

by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he or she is 

unable to engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be 

expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The 

impairment or impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

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abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous 

work, but cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind 

of substantial, gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 

1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential 

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her 

from performing basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step, 

the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 

C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step, the 

ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various 

limitations to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, in Step Five, the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists 

in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is 

found to be disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider 

subsequent steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520, 416.920.

V. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Vocational Analysis

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ incorrectly classified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a 

sedentary sorter and that, even if the position did qualify as past relevant work, it did not amount 

to substantial gainful activity. The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had past relevant work as a sedentary sorter and that she retained 

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the residual functional capacity to perform that work.

1. Legal Standard

In Step Four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has 

a sufficient RFC, despite impairments or various limitations, to perform her past work. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). “Past relevant work” is work that a claimant has “done 

within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the 

claimant] to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a). 

Substantial gainful activity is “work activity that is both substantial and gainful[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.972. “Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing significant physical or 

mental activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(a). A claimant’s work may be substantial even if it is 

done on a part-time basis or if the claimant does less, gets paid less, or has less responsibility 

than when the claimant worked before. Id. Gainful work activity is work activity that a claimant 

does for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972(b). 

A social security disability claimant bears the burden of proving that she cannot perform 

either the “actual functional demands and job duties of a particular past relevant job” or the 

“functional demands and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employers 

throughout the national economy.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Social Security Ruling (“SSR”)

5

82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2); see also Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1986). 

A claimant is typically the primary source for determining what past jobs the claimant has 

performed, as well as how those jobs were actually performed. See SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, 

at *3 (“The claimant is the primary source for vocational documentation, and statements by the 

claimant regarding past work are generally sufficient for determining the skill level [,] exertional 

demands and nonexertional demands of such work.”). Further, “[t]he claimant is in the best 

position to describe just what he or she did in [past relevant work], how it was done, what 

 

5

Social Security Rulings (“SSR”) are final opinions and statements of policy by the Commissioner of Social Security, 

binding on all components of the Social Security Administration. 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(b)(1). They are “to be relied 

upon as precedent in determining cases where the facts are basically the same.” Paulson v. Bowen, 836 F.2d 1249, 

1252 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).

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exertion was involved, what skilled or semiskilled work activities were involved, etc.” See SSR 

82-41, 1982 WL 31389, at *4.

Although the burden of proof lies with the claimant at Step Four, the ALJ still has a duty 

to make the requisite factual findings to support his conclusion. SSR 82-62; Pinto, 249 F.3d at 

844. The ALJ may draw on two sources of information to define the claimant’s past relevant 

work as actually performed: (1) the claimant’s own testimony, and (2) a properly completed 

vocational report. Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002). The duty to inquire 

and make findings regarding a claimant’s impairment as it relates to an ability to perform past 

work does not mean that the initial burden of proving a disability by showing an inability to 

perform past relevant work has been removed from the claimant. Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 

328, 331-332 (9th Cir. 1990).

2. The ALJ Did Not Err By Finding that Plaintiff Had Past Relevant 

Work as a Sedentary Sorter of Agricultural Produce is Not Erroneous

a. The ALJ Correctly Classified Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work

Plaintiff argues the VE incorrectly classified Plaintiff’s past relevant work under the DOT

as a nut sorter, DOT 521.687-86, because Plaintiff had never sorted nuts. (Doc. 12, p. 7-8.) 

While Plaintiff is correct that the VE testified Plaintiff would be able to perform the nut sorter 

job as “normally performed” (AR 94-95), the ALJ did not base his decision on this testimony 

and did not find that the nut sorter job constituted Plaintiff’s past relevant work. Instead, the 

ALJ determined, based on the VE’s description of the past work Plaintiff actually performed, 

that Plaintiff’s past relevant work was that of sorter, agricultural produce, DOT 529.687-186, 

characterized as light, sedentary as performed, with a SVP of 2. (AR 45.) The ALJ found the 

VE’s testimony consistent with Plaintiff’s own description of how she actually performed her 

prior work. (AR 46; 409.) See Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845; see also SSR 82-62. Because Plaintiff’s 

statements were “highly probative” of the demands of her prior work, Matthews v. Shalala, 10 

F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1993), the ALJ properly concluded Plaintiff had past relevant work as a 

sedentary sorter of agricultural produce. See Lee v. Astrue, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1041 (C.D. 

Cal. 2010) (citing Santiago v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 944 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1991) (per 

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curiam) (“The ALJ is entitled to rely upon a claimant’s own description of the duties involved in 

her former job.”)).6

b. The ALJ Properly Found Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work as a 

Sedentary Agricultural Produce Sorter Was Substantial 

Gainful Activity

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff’s prior work as a sorter of 

agricultural produce, performed with the use of a chair from February 2010 to May 2010, 

constituted past relevant work because such work is not substantial gainful activity. Plaintiff 

argues that the accommodated position instead constituted an “unsuccessful work attempt.” 

(Doc. 12, pp. 9-10.)

In conducting the substantial gainful activity analysis, certain work attempts, classified as 

“unsuccessful work attempts,” will not be considered as substantial gainful activity for purposes 

of the Step Four analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(c)(1), 416.974(c)(1); see also Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 2009). The SSA “generally 

consider[s] work that [the claimant is] forced to stop or to reduce below the substantial gainful 

activity level after a short time because of [her] impairment to be an unsuccessful work attempt.” 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(a)(1), 416.974(a)(1). See SSR 05-02, 2005 WL 6491604, at *2 (Feb. 28, 

2005).7 Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that her previous work qualifies as an 

unsuccessful work attempt. Seitz v. Astrue, No. CIV.A.3:08CV355HEH, 2009 WL 2392159, at 

*8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2009) (citing Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1993)); Scott v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 899 F. Supp. 275, 277 (S.D.W. Va. 1995).

The unsuccessful work attempt analysis takes into account the length of time a claimant 

was employed in a particular position. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(c)(3)-(5), 416.974(c)(3)-(5);

SSR 05-02, 2005 WL 6491604, at *2-3. If the claimant’s work effort lasted three months or less, 

 

6

Plaintiff argues that “Slack v. Colvin,” No. CIV S-09-1107 FCD, 2011 WL 534049 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011), is a 

case where this Court “recently found a basis for remand under similar facts.” Assuming Plaintiff intended to rely on 

Slack v. Astrue, that case is hardly “similar”: in Slack, the ALJ’s decision improperly included within the claimant’s 

past relevant work jobs that did not fit that definition, a point which the Commissioner conceded. See Slack, 2011 

WL 534049, at *4. Here, as set forth above, the ALJ did not mischaracterize Plaintiff’s past relevant work in his 

decision, nor has the Commissioner conceded any error by the ALJ.

7

SSR 05-02 is a policy interpretation ruling that applies to “Determination of Substantial Gainful Activity if 

Substantial Work Activity is Discontinued or Reduced—Unsuccessful Work Attempt.” SSR 05-02, 2005 WL 

6491604. See Rogers v. Colvin, No. 3:15-5938-DWC, 2016 WL 3344573, at *5 (W.D. Wash. June 15, 2016).

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the claimant must show that she stopped working, or reduced her work and earnings to the nonsubstantial gainful activity level, “because of [her] impairment or because of the removal of 

special conditions which took into account [her] impairment and permitted her to work.” 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(c)(3), 416.974(c)(3). See also Alderson v. Astrue, No. C09-5081BHS, 2009 

WL 3245416, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 6, 2009); Seitz, 2009 WL 2392159, at *2; SSR 05-02, 

2205 WL 6491604, at *2.

Here, the ALJ explicitly found that Plaintiff’s work attempt lasted less than three months 

because “she was laid off,” not “due to functional limitations arising from her impairments.”

(AR 44; see also AR 42.) Though the ALJ did not characterize it as such, his implied finding 

that Plaintiff’s sedentary agricultural produce sorter was not an unsuccessful work attempt is 

supported by substantial evidence. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s sedentary 

agricultural produce sorter position was cut short by her impairment or by “the removal of 

special conditions,” e.g., “special equipment . . . suited to [her] impairment.” SSR 05-02, 2005 

WL 6491604, at *3.

Plaintiff argues that her position as a sedentary agricultural produce sorter was an 

unsuccessful work attempt due to her employer’s removal of the chair in which she sat while 

performing the work. (Doc. 12, p. 10.) There is no evidence in the record, however, indicating

that Plaintiff’s position as a sedentary agricultural produce sorter ended or was reduced to a nonsubstantial gainful activity level because her employer removed the chair, as required by 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(c)(3), 416.974(c)(3). To the contrary, it is well-established in the record that 

Plaintiff was laid off from her job because the sorting season ended. (AR 56, 73, 388.) Plaintiff 

testified that she was laid off from her job because the seven-month sorting season had ended, 

and that if sorting season had not ended, she would have been able to continue sorting produce 

with the use of a chair. (AR 56, 73-75; see also AR 388.)8 See, e.g., Abreu v. Astrue, 303 Fed. 

 

8

Furthermore, although Plaintiff does not make this argument, the fact that Plaintiff’s employer permitted the use of a 

chair while sorting from February 2010 to May 2010 does not automatically render that position non-substantial 

gainful activity. See Fatheree v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01577-SKO, 2015 WL 1201669, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 

2015) (“[W]ork performed under special conditions is not dispositive, but is a factor the ALJ may consider in 

determining whether work was substantial gainful activity.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573). See also Sharkey v. 

Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV 07-176-S-LMB, 2008 WL 3289267, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 8, 2008) (“[C]ontrary to 

what Petitioner’s argument suggests, not all work performed under special conditions will be placed outside of the 

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Appx. 556, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[Claimant’s] testimony itself provides substantial evidence 

to support the ALJ’s conclusion that [claimant] could perform his past relevant work as a 

customer service representative.”); Giordano v. Astrue, 304 Fed. Appx. 507, 509 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“It was . . . reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that [the claimant] could return to her past 

relevant work, given that [the claimant’s] own description of her past jobs accommodated all of 

the limitations.”); Kimble v. Colvin, No. CV–11–3076–CI, 2013 WL 1290651, at * 10 (E.D. 

Wash. Mar. 27, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff could meet the demands of her past relevant 

work as a housekeeper where she admitted that she performed various housekeeping jobs for 

over one year, but reversing because the ALJ failed to establish whether that work amounted to 

substantial gainful activity); Rodriguez v. Astrue, No. CV 08–153–E–CWD, 2009 WL 2750071, 

at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2009) (holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

determination that the claimant could perform her past relevant work as a fast food worker where 

she worked at McDonald’s for 17 years, and said that she can work at her own pace and could 

return to McDonald’s if they asked her to come back); Leach v. Apfel, No. C 96-4099-CAL, 

1998 WL 246704, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1998) (“In light of what was essentially an admission 

by plaintiff that he could perform some of his past relevant work, this court will not reverse the 

ALJ’s findings regarding that work.”)

Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that her sedentary agricultural 

produce sorter position was an unsuccessful work attempt, and her argument that the ALJ erred 

by considering that position as substantial gainful activity is without merit. See Meadows v. 

Astrue, No. 4:08-CV-527-A, 2009 WL 1563523, at *13 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2009) (finding that 

 

substantial gainful activity category. As the regulations describes, special conditions are simply a factor for the ALJ 

to consider and ‘work done under special conditions may show that you have the necessary skills and ability to work 

at the substantial gainful activity level.’”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1573(c)). Moreover, Plaintiff’s impairment did not 

begin until May 22, 2010, after she was laid off as an agricultural produce sorter. The unsuccessful work attempt 

concept “is an equitable means of ensuring that impaired workers who attempt to engage in substantial gainful 

activity, but are forced to stop because of their impairments, are not penalized for making such attempts.” Nadeau v. 

Astrue, No. 07–CV–203–PB, 2008 WL 924525, at *5 (D.N.H. Apr. 2, 2008) (citing SSR 05-02, 2005 WL 6491604). 

Plaintiff has offered no reason to justify expanding the unsuccessful work attempt concept to brief periods of work 

that precede the onset of the impairment, and the facts of this case provide no equitable reason to do so. See Nadeau, 

2008 WL 924525, at *5 (unsuccessful work attempt argument rejected where claimant did not allege that the 

employment was cut short by alleged impairment and alleged date of onset of impairment was long after he stopped 

working at job at issue)

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claimant failed to demonstrate that the ALJ’s determination that she engaged in substantial 

gainful activity was unsupported by substantial evidence, where “it was not shown that she was 

forced to stop work or forced to reduce the amount of her work due to her impairment” necessary 

to support a finding of an unsuccessful work attempt). See also Dickison v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-

1022-F, 2014 WL 4418117, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 2014). The ALJ properly assessed 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a produce sorter as substantial gainful activity.

B. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Evidence

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by improperly evaluating the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

examining physician, Dr. Contreras. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated 

the medical evidence, giving Dr. Contreras’ opinion significant weight.

1. Legal Standard

The medical opinions of three types of medical sources are recognized in Social Security 

cases: “(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not 

treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the 

claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Generally, an examining physician’s opinion is entitled to greater weight than a non-examining 

physician’s opinion. Id. Where a treating or examining doctor’s medical opinion is contradicted 

by another doctor, the Commissioner must provide “specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting 

that medical opinion, and those reasons must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Id. at 830-31; accord Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The ALJ can meet this burden by setting forth a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating her interpretation thereof, and making findings. Tommasetti 

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Factors relevant to evaluating medical opinions 

include the amount of relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the quality of the 

explanation provided and the consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole. See 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6)).

//

//

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2. The ALJ Did Not Err in His Assessment of the Opinion of Workers’ 

Compensation Examining Physician Dr. Contreras

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work, further limited to 

lifting and carrying no more than 10 pounds with the right arm, and sitting, standing, and 

walking in half-hour increments; could never climb, could occasionally perform all other 

postural activities, and could reach overhead with the right arm occasionally, and extend the right 

arm to half of normal distance otherwise; had to avoid pulmonary irritants above street-level 

concentration and hazardous moving machinery; needed a cane for uneven surfaces or long 

distances, and should have the option to use a stool for working. (AR 42.) Plaintiff contends the 

ALJ erred by failing to include workers’ compensation physician Dr. Contreras’s opined 

limitation that Plaintiff is precluded from “prolonged sitting.” (Doc. 12, p. 14-15.) Contrary to 

Plaintiff’s claim, the ALJ did not find Plaintiff “capable of sitting for six hours in an eight-hour 

workday.” (Doc. 12, p. 15.) Instead, after giving “significant weight” to Dr. Contreras’ opinion, 

the ALJ interpreted “prolonged sitting” as imposing a durational limitation of sitting for one 

hour at a time, up to six hours out of an eight-hour workday. (AR 42, 44.) This finding was 

consistent with the opinion of internist medical expert Dr. White, who reviewed the entire record 

as of November 2013. Dr. White testified that Plaintiff “should be able to sit for an hour at least 

at one time and then move about and sit again,” for a total of six hours in an eight-hour day. (AR 

83-84.) Dr. White’s opinion constituted substantial evidence upon which the ALJ could properly 

rely. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The opinions of non-treating 

or non-examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are 

consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”).

While Plaintiff is correct that “[t]he ALJ is responsible for . . . resolving conflicts in the 

medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities,” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1042, Plaintiff has 

not established that the limitation of sitting for one hour at a time, up to six hours in an eight 

hour day, is inconsistent with a restriction from “prolonged sitting.”

9

 Both cases on which 

 

9 The term “prolonged sitting” is not defined in the California workers’ compensation guidelines, see Booth, 181 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1108, and Dr. Contreras’ opinion does not define the term. Even if “prolonged sitting” were a defined 

term in the workers’ compensation guidelines, however, such definition would not have been conclusive of the ALJ’s 

decision. See Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Plaintiff exclusively relies in arguing that the ALJ’s finding is inconsistent with Dr. Contreras’ 

opinion, Norman v. Barnhart, No. SA CV-04-902-PLA, 2006 WL 211949, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 

25, 2006), and Booth v. Barnhart, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2002), are inapposite. In 

both Norman and Booth, the Court interpreted the term “prolonged sitting” in the Social Security 

disability context to mean sitting “for at least half of the work day.” See Norman, 2006 WL 

211949, at *6; Booth, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1108. In Norman, the Court found that the ALJ’s 

determination that the claimant had “no sitting restriction and could stand and walk for six hours 

during the workday” was erroneous in light of the ALJ’s failure to interpret or discuss the 

“contradict[ory]” and “conflicting” opinion of the workers’ compensation physician who 

imposed the “prolonged sitting” limitation. Norman, 2006 WL 211949, at *6. In Booth, the 

Court found that the ALJ’s erred by not “adequately translat[ing] . . . into Social Security terms”

the workers’ compensation physician’s “prolonged sitting” limitation, and by not adequately 

analyzing her opinion, even though it was “controverted by other medical opinion evidence.” 

Booth, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1108-09.

Here, while the ALJ did not expressly translate Dr. Contreras’ “prolonged sitting”

limitation into Social Security terms, he also did not reject that limitation, either. To the 

contrary, unlike in Norman and Booth, the ALJ accorded significant weight to Dr. Contreras’

opinion and interpreted “prolonged sitting” consistently with the evidence in the record, 

including Plaintiff’s own testimony that she could perform the work of sorter of agricultural 

produce, if allowed to perform that work in a seated position as she had from February to May 

2010. (AR 75.) Because there was no “contradiction” or “conflict” in the record between Dr. 

Contreras’ opinion and the other evidence, the ALJ permissibly incorporated a limitation to sit 

for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday in no more than one-hour blocks to address Dr. 

Contreras’s opinion Plaintiff was precluded from “prolonged sitting.” See Macri v. Chater, 93 

F.3d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (in analyzing medical opinions using workers’ compensation 

terminology, the ALJ “is entitled to draw inferences ‘logically flowing from the evidence.’”) 

(quoting Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)); Norman, 2006 WL 211949, 

at *5 (“[T]he ALJ was required to evaluate [workers’ compensation] terminology like any other 

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medical opinion.”) (citing Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3rd Cir. 1984) (“[T]he ALJ 

should evaluate the objective medical findings set forth in the medical reports for submission 

with the worker’s compensation claim by the same standards that s/he uses to evaluate medical 

findings in reports made in the first instance for the Social Security claim”)). The ALJ’s 

determination that Plaintiff is able to sit in one-hour increments for up to six hours in an eight 

hour work day is supported by substantial evidence, including Dr. Contreras’ “prolonged sitting”

limitation, the opinion of medical expert Dr. White, and Plaintiff’s own testimony. The ALJ’s 

RFC assessment properly incorporated all of those limitations supported by substantial evidence 

within the record.

C. The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for 

discounting her statements regarding the severity and extent of her ongoing symptoms. The 

Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly relied on evidence in the record that undermined 

the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

1. Legal Standard

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, 

the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged. Id. The claimant is not required to show that her impairment “could reasonably be 

expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could 

reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 

1036). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can 

only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if he gives “specific, 

clear and convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant’s credibility, 

including (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s 

reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 

other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course 

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of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities. If the ALJ’s finding is 

supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.

Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

Bray, 554 F.3d at 1226-27; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Other factors the ALJ may consider include a 

claimant’s work record and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, 

severity, and effect of the symptoms of which he complains. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 

789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).

The clear and convincing standard is “not an easy requirement to meet,” as it is “‘the 

most demanding required in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 

2002)). General findings are not sufficient to satisfy this standard; the ALJ “‘must identify what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.’” Burrell v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

1995).

2. The ALJ Properly Found Plaintiff Less Than Fully Credible

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s credibility was undermined by several factors:

The documented objective medical evidence, including generally normal clinical 

findings, and the claimant’s daily activities are inconsistent with functional 

limitations to the degree alleged. A consultative examiner noted that though the 

claimant carried a cane, she “did not appear to use it for any significant issue,”

“walked without any sense of having physical pain,” and was able to “banter[] 

socially with the interpreter and laugh,” behavior which is inconsistent with the 

severe level of pain alleged. (Ex. 12F: 1, 3, 5) Moreover, she stopped working 

when she was laid off, rather than due to functional limitations arising from her 

impairments, and testified that she did not look for work since then, suggesting 

that she may be unemployed for reasons other than her impairments and could 

have continued to work.

(AR 44.) Thus, in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ relied on: the Plaintiff’s work history 

and inconsistencies between both the Plaintiff’s symptoms and clinical observations and the 

record, including the objective medical evidence her reports of activities of daily living.

a. Work History

The ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s credibility was weakened by her own testimony 

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that she stopped working in May 2010 for reasons unrelated to any alleged impairment. (AR 

44.) Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ did not err in considering the 

claimant’s work history and his admission that he left his job for reasons other than his alleged 

impairment); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1992) (ALJ did not err in 

considering that, “according to [the claimant’s] own testimony, she did not lose her past two jobs 

because of pain”). Plaintiff testified that she was laid off from her job because the seven-month 

sorting season had ended, and that if sorting season had not ended, she would have been able to 

continue sorting produce with the use of a chair. (AR 56, 73-75; see also AR 388.) Plaintiff’s

admission that she could have continued to work but for the end of the sorting season was a 

sufficiently clear and convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s credibility, and highly probative 

as to the veracity of her statements that she is unable to work due to her physical and mental 

limitations. See Alonzo v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-00460-SKO, 2015 WL 5358151, at *18 (E.D. 

Cal. Sept. 14, 2015).

b. Clinical Observations

The ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility due to inconsistencies between 

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the consultative examiner’s clinical observations. (AR 44.) 

Regennitter v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a 

determination that a claimant’s complaints are “inconsistent with clinical observations” can 

satisfy the clear and convincing requirement). In her disability report, adult function report, and 

testimony at the hearing, Plaintiff claimed that she has problems in her right shoulder (AR 303), 

excessive pain on her right knee and foot (AR 334), pain in her back and waist (id.), problems 

walking due to weakness (AR 63), and pain in her right hand up to her shoulder (AR 68). 

However, Dr. Schmidt, psychological consultative examiner, made contradictory findings. Dr. 

Schmidt observed that although Plaintiff “carried a cane with her,” she “did not appear to use it 

for any significant issue,” “walked without any sense of having physical pain,” and was able to 

“banter[] socially with the interpreter and laugh.” (AR 1041, 1043, 1045.) As the ALJ noted in 

his decision, these clinical observations are “inconsistent with the severe level of pain alleged.” 

(AR 44.)

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While subjective symptom testimony cannot be rejected solely on the ground that it is not 

fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor 

in determining Plaintiff’s credibility. Rolling v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing 20 CFR § 404.1529(c)(2)). The inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s complaints of severe 

pain and her consultative examiner’s clinical observations, taken together with Plaintiff’s 

inconsistent statements relating to her inability to work, constitute substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. See, e.g., Vellanoweth v. Astrue, No. CV 10-

3105-MLG, 2010 WL 5094254, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010).

c. Objective Medical Evidence and Daily Activities

Finally, the ALJ noted that “the documented objective medical evidence, including 

generally normal clinical findings, and the claimant’s daily activities are inconsistent with 

functional limitations to the degree alleged.” (AR 44.) Though the Commissioner asserts the 

ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff on these bases, the Court is unconvinced that the ALJ was 

sufficiently specific in his articulation of these reasons to permissibly discredit Plaintiff’s 

testimony. For example, the ALJ failed to specifically refer to what parts of the objective 

medical evidence or Plaintiff’s testimony as to her daily activities undermined her subjective 

pain testimony; it is merely a conclusory statement that the objective medical evidence and 

Plaintiff’s daily activities, summarized earlier within the decision, are not consistent with 

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015); 

Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014). Under Brown-Hunter, the observations 

an ALJ makes as part of the summary of the medical record are not sufficient to establish clear 

and convincing reasons for rejecting a Plaintiff’s credibility. 806 F.3d at 494. Instead, the ALJ 

must link the medical evidence at issue to the Plaintiff’s testimony. Id. Under Burrell, the ALJ 

must specify “which daily activities conflicted with which part of [the plaintiff]’s testimony.” 

775 F.3d at 1138. Here, the ALJ did neither.

However, because the ALJ articulated permissible reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

credibility, this error is harmless due to the other reasons articulated by the ALJ for discounting 

Plaintiff’s credibility -- including Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements and contradictory clinical 

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observations. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (citing Batson v. Comm. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 

F. 3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (“So long as there remains ‘substantial evidence supporting the 

ALJ’s conclusions on . . . credibility’ and the error ‘does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s 

ultimate [credibility] conclusion’ such is deemed harmless and does not warrant reversal.”); 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F. 3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (that some reasons for discrediting 

claimant’s testimony should be properly discounted does not render an ALJ’s determination 

invalid so long as that determination is supported by other, substantial evidence). Given the 

above, the ALJ provided sufficiently clear and convincing reasons to conclude Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom testimony was not credible.

Further, even if Plaintiff’s subjective complaints had been fully credited, the Court notes 

that the ALJ’s credibility determination would not be disturbed, as Plaintiff testified that she is 

still capable of performing her past relevant work as a sedentary sorter of produce. See Salajan 

v. Astrue, No. EDCV 07-1065 JC, 2008 WL 2705166, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2008) (finding 

clear and convincing reason to reject plaintiff’s testimony based upon the inconsistency between 

her admission that she could perform her past relevant work and her allegations of disability). 

Again, any error in the ALJ’s credibility analysis is harmless to the ultimate disability 

determination. The ALJ’s credibility determination was proper.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

After consideration of the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s briefs and a thorough review of the 

record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is 

therefore AFFIRMED. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of 

Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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