Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00604/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00604-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HUFTILE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-0604 DFL JFM P

vs.

JACK VOGNSEN, Ph.D., ORDER

Defendant.

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Plaintiff is in custody at Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to California’s

Sexually Violent Predators Act, Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600, et seq. Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This proceeding was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

On October 3, 2005, pursuant to court order, plaintiff filed a second amended

complaint. As noted in this court’s September 13, 2005 order, because plaintiff is proceeding in

forma pauperis, the court reviews plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the action

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

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 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 1

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court must, therefore, dismiss a case as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an

arguable legal and factual basis. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989);

Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims

that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the allegations of the complaint. Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The court also construes the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Plaintiff again named Jack Vognsen, Ph.D., as his sole defendant. As noted in

this court’s previous order, Dr. Vognsen and Dr. Miccio-Fonseca testified at petitioner’s civil

commitment proceedings trial in 2002. See Huftile v. Hunter, CIV S-05-0174 GEB DAD P 1

(application for writ of habeas corpus challenging plaintiff’s November 1, 2002 civil

commitment). Plaintiff’s claims here are analogous to his claims raised against Dr. MiccioFonseca in a separate civil rights action. Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.

2005)(Heck barred Huftile’s civil rights claims for monetary damages because they necessarily

implicate the validity of his underlying civil commitment.) Plaintiff’s claims here similarly

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 “[T]the structure of the SVPA statutory scheme indicates that the success of Huftile's 2

§ 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his civil commitment. Before the

California Director of Mental Health can forward a request for an SVPA commitment petition to

the appropriate county, two evaluators must agree that "the person has a diagnosed mental

disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate

treatment and custody." Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 6601(d). An attorney for that county may then

file a petition for commitment. Id. § 6601(i). A judge must then review this petition to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person "is likely to engage in

sexually violent predatory criminal behavior" upon release. Id. § 6602(a). Because Dr.

Miccio-Fonseca was one of Huftile's evaluators, a judgment in favor of Huftile in his § 1983

action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his civil commitment. That is, if only one

evaluator, rather than two, had concluded that Huftile had a "mental disorder" within the meaning

of § 6601(d), there would have been no basis for the state Director of Mental Health to send the

request to the county, no basis for the county attorney to file a petition for commitment, and no

basis for the judge to go forward with a probable cause determination.” Huftile, 410 F.3d at

1140-41.

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challenge the validity of mental health information used to support his civil commitment.2

However, that commitment has not been "reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477, 486-87 (1994). Thus, plaintiff’s civil rights claims for monetary damages are barred

pending invalidation of his underlying civil commitment.

Although expressly instructed to include only claims for injunctive relief in his

second amended complaint, plaintiff included his claims barred by Heck, 512 U.S. at 477, his

medical malpractice claims and his claim that defendant violated his right to privacy. 

Plaintiff asks the court to allow him to amend his complaint or to refile it and ask

for damages and declaratory relief should he obtain a favorable termination order under Heck. 

Plaintiff is advised that any claims dismissed under Heck would be dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff alleges defendant violated his right to privacy. 

Individuals have a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding

disclosure of personal matters, including medical information.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 . . . (1977); Tucson

Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir.2004).

However, "the right to informational privacy is not absolute; rather,

it is a conditional right which may be infringed upon a showing of

proper governmental interest." Tucson Woman's Clinic, 379 F.3d

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at 551 (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood of Southern Arizona

v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, the Court must

" 'engage in the delicate task of weighing competing interests' to

determine whether the government may properly disclose private

information." In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir.1999),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189 . . . (2000) (citation omitted); Planned

Parenthood of Southern Arizona, 307 F.3d at 790. Relevant factors

include: (1) the type of information requested; (2) the potential for

harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure; (3) the

adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (4) the

degree of need for access; and (5) whether there is an express

statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable

public interest militating toward access. Tucson Woman's Clinic,

379 F.3d at 551; In re Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959. "The list is not

exhaustive, and the relevant considerations will necessarily vary

from case to case." In re Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959. "In most cases,

it will be the overall context, rather than the particular item of

information, that will dictate the tipping of the scales." Id.

Hubbs v. Alamao, 360 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2005). In Hubbs, the district court

evaluated whether the privacy right of Hubbs, determined to be a sexually violent predator,

outweighed the state’s compelling government interest in “identifying, confining and treating

sexually violent predators, who have been diagnosed as sexually violent and represent a distinct

threat to the health and safety of the public.” Id. at 1081-82 (citations omitted). The Hubbs court

found that the “balance falls squarely in the State’s favor” (id. at 1082) and held Hubbs’

constitutional rights were not violated when certain doctors reviewed Hubbs’ medical records. 

(Id.) This court adopts the reasoning of the Hubbs court and finds plaintiff’s constitutional right

to privacy was not violated by defendant herein.

This court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, when federal claims have been dismissed before trial, the

interests promoted by supplemental jurisdiction are no longer present, and a court should decline

to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 n.7 (1988). Thus, this court again declines to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

medical malpractice claims.

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 “We have been informed in a post-argument submission that probable cause for a 3

recommitment trial was found on March 14, 2005, and that a trial has been set for August 23,

2005. Huftile is being detained at Atascadero State Hospital pending the civil recommitment

trial. Dr. Miccio-Fonseca did not conduct any of the evaluations underlying the state's

recommitment petition.” Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141.

 "It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal 4

courts must satisfy the threshhold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by

alleging an actual case or controversy." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983). 

This requirement, known as constitutional standing, requires the plaintiff to allege "that he 'has

sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as the result of the

challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both 'real and immediate,'

not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103 (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394

U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969)). See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-354 (1996).

To pursue injunctive relief, therefore, a plaintiff must not only be able to show that he has

suffered an injury in the past, but also that he is likely to be similarly injured in the future. City of

Los Angeles v. Lyon, 461 U.S. 95, 105-09 (1983) (plaintiff, who had been placed in a choke hold

when arrested, lacked standing to seek an injunction against what he deemed to be a policy of

routinely placing choke holds on arrestees, because any allegations of future injury were too

speculative); see also meet the usual requirements for injunctive relief, see, O'Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974).

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Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief precluding defendant from employing the

challenged policies, practices and customs alleged in plaintiff’s second amended complaint. The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that plaintiff’s injunctive relief claims against Dr.

Miccio-Fonseca were not barred by Heck. Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1142. As noted in this court’s

prior order, however, it appears from that 2005 opinion that plaintiff’s circumstances have

changed and it is still unclear on the present record whether defendant was involved in the 2005 3

recommitment proceedings. All of the allegations in plaintiff’s second amended complaint refer

to actions taken by defendant in 2001. Plaintiff must allege a real and immediate threat of harm

at the hands of the defendant named herein. Thus, whether or not defendant Vognsen played a

role in the 2005 recommitment proceedings is particularly relevant. Accordingly, plaintiff’s

second amended complaint will again be dismissed and plaintiff will be granted leave to file a

third amended complaint to more fully develop his claim for prospective injunctive relief, if 4

appropriate. Plaintiff is cautioned that he cannot seek release from prison nor seek reversal of

orders issued relative to his sexually violent predator status as those claims are barred under

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 Plaintiff has a petition for writ of habeas corpus pending in this district. (Case No. CIV 5

S-05-0174 GEB DAD P.)

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Heck. Most of plaintiff’s claims concerning defendant’s actions in the past would necessarily

imply the validity of his underlying civil commitment and therefore would be barred under Heck.

If plaintiff chooses to file a third amended complaint, plaintiff must include only

his claims for prospective injunctive relief. He should refrain from raising the civil rights claims

barred by Heck (see September 13, 2005 order), and privacy or medical malpractice claims

addressed above. In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading

in order to make plaintiff's third amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that

an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a third amended complaint, the

original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. 

Finally, plaintiff has brought his complaint as a 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights

action stating he is seeking only injunctive relief. However, in his prayer for relief, plaintiff

seeks his immediate and unconditional release. Such relief cannot be awarded in a civil rights

action under § 1983. Such relief may only be awarded through a petition for writ of habeas

corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Plaintiff is correct that he may elect to proceed

under § 1983 with a claim for prospective injunctive relief rather than bringing a properly

exhausted habeas petition. Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005). But, the 5

types of relief allowed under § 1983 are quite different from that offered by a successful habeas

petition. Success in a § 1983 action will allow a court to order a new hearing at which Dr.

Vognsen is forbidden from participating. If a fair hearing is once again denied, the court may

only order yet another hearing, but the court could not order petitioner released or the order

declaring plaintiff to be a sexually violent predator to be reversed. Moreover, any such order

would not prevent the state from having a different psychiatrist or psychologist review plaintiff’s

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records and testify at the next hearing. However, in a habeas action, the court has latitude to

grant far greater relief. If the court found that there was not sufficient evidence to support the

finding that plaintiff is a sexually violent predator under the law, the court could grant the habeas

petition and order the petitioner released. Plaintiff should consider whether his efforts are better

focused in seeking habeas relief through his presently pending habeas petition seeking release

from prison rather than attempting to artfully plead related arguments in the instant case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is dismissed. 

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

third amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the third amended complaint must

bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled “Third Amended Complaint”;

plaintiff must file an original and two copies of the third amended complaint; plaintiff shall raise

only injunctive relief claims; failure to file a third amended complaint in accordance with this

order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

DATED: October 21, 2005. 

001; huft0604.lta2

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