Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01803/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01803-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENT CLARK,

Petitioner,

v.

J. GASTELO, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-cv-1803-AJB-JMA

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS;

(3) DENYING PETITIONER’S 

OBJECTIONS; AND

(4) CLOSING THIS CASE

(Doc. Nos. 1, 10, 44, 47)

On February 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler filed a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”). (Doc. No. 44.) The R&R recommends that Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss be granted. (Id.) On March 19, 2018, Petitioner Brent Clark filed a 

motion for extension of time to file objections to the R&R, (Doc. No. 45), which was 

granted on March 21, 2018, (Doc. No. 46). On April 16, 2018, Petitioner filed his

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objections. (Doc. No. 47.) As will be explained in greater detail below, the Court ADOPTS

the R&R in its entirety, DENIES Petitioner’s objections, and GRANTS Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Petitioner challenges his 

2004 conviction for kidnapping for robbery or rape, forcible oral copulation, robbery, and 

burglary. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) On October 18, 2004, he was sentenced to twenty-nine years 

to life. (Id. at 1.) 

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal arguing that the 

trial court erred by: (1) failing to conduct a fourth competency hearing on his competency 

to stand trial; and (2) granting his request for self-representation despite his incompetence. 

(Doc. No. 11-1 at 10.) The Court of Appeal ultimately rejected these claims and affirmed 

his judgment on January 25, 2008. (Id. at 36, 57.) Thereafter, on May 14, 2008, the 

Supreme Court of California denied Petitioner’s request for review. (Doc. No. 11-2.) 

More than six years later, on June 16, 2015, Petitioner challenged his conviction by 

filing a motion in the San Diego Superior Court to modify his sentence by striking his 

restitution fine and reducing it to $200. (Doc. No. 11-3.) This motion was denied on July 

20, 2015. (Id.) On August 4, 2015, Petitioner appealed. (Doc. No. 11-4.) However, the 

California Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal stating that because Petitioner did not 

appeal the imposition of the restitution fine on appeal, he was barred from subsequently 

raising such a challenge. (Doc. No. 11-5 at 1.)

At the beginning of the next year, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Superior 

Court of California claiming that (1) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in 

failing to raise and investigate issues relating to sentencing; (2) the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to dismiss one or more strike allegations; (3) the trial court should not 

have permitted him to waive counsel because he was mentally incompetent; and (4) the 

trial court should not have permitted him to represent himself because of his mental 

incompetence. (Doc. No. 11-6 at 3–6.) On March 3, 2016, the Superior Court denied the 

habeas petition stating that Petitioner had not met his burden in stating a prima facie case 

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for relief and finding that his claims were untimely. (Doc. No. 11-7.) Additionally, the 

court stated that Petitioner’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel were

unsubstantiated and did not provide a sufficient basis upon which to prove his claims. (Id. 

at 4.)

On March 28 and 30, 2016, Petitioner appealed the superior court’s denial of his 

motion to modify sentence and the denial of the superior court’s March 8, 2016 order. 

(Doc. Nos. 11-9, 11-10.) Thereafter, on April 7, 2016, the Court of Appeal treated 

Petitioner’s filing as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and ultimately denied the petition. 

(Doc. No. 11-11.) Not long after that, the Court of Appeal analyzed Petitioner’s motion 

requesting modification of his sentence. (Doc. No. 11-12.) However, finding nothing to 

alter the court’s previous holding, the court again dismissed the appeal. (Id.)

In a final effort, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Supreme Court of California 

raising the same claims that he raised in the lower court. (Doc. No. 11-13.) Subsequently, 

Petitioner also filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of California raising 

identical claims. (Doc. No. 11-14.) Without any analysis or citation to authority, the 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review on June 15, 2016, and seven days later denied 

his writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. Nos. 11-15, 11-16.)

The instant petition was filed with this Court on July 11, 2016. (Doc. No. 1.) On 

September 27, 2016, Respondent filed its motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 10.) Petitioner then 

filed several motions for extensions of time. (Doc. Nos. 13, 18, 22, 24, 29, 39.) All of which 

were granted. (Doc. Nos. 14, 19, 23, 25, 30, 40.)

DISCUSSION

The R&R recommends that Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because 

it is time-barred. (Doc. No. 44 at 5.) In opposition, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling as he has been suffering from a major mental illness since his trial and 

continues to suffer from it. (Doc. No. 47 at 2–4.)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a 

one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners in federal 

court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

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The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence.

Id.

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review on direct appeal on May 14, 2008. His judgment then became final ninety days later 

on August 12, 2008. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 1999); see also 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A). Consequently, the limitations period began to run on August 

13, 2008, and expired one year later on August 13, 2009. Thus, absent any statutory or 

equitable tolling, Petitioner’s petition was filed nearly seven years too late. 

A. Equitable Tolling1

The Ninth Circuit has held that the one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas 

petition may be equitably tolled if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 

1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), opinion withdrawn on other grounds by 404 F.3d 

1118 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is justified in few cases as “the threshold necessary 

to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the 

rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Petitioner 

 

1 Petitioner does not object to the R&R’s conclusion that he is not entitled to statutory 

tolling. (See generally Doc. No. 47.) Thus, this Order will focus only on Petitioner’s 

arguments in support of equitable tolling.

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“bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to him.” Id. at 

1065. Determining whether equitable tolling is justified is a “fact-specific inquiry.” Frye 

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).

The standard for equitable tolling based on mental impairment is a two-step test:

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an 

“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control by 

demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either 

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally 

understand the need to timely file, or 

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally to 

prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. 

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the 

claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental 

impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under 

the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available 

access to assistance. 

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2010). These factors illuminate the 

stringency of the overall equitable tolling test: “the mental impairment must be so 

debilitating that it is the but-for cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating 

impairment the petitioner must still demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 

F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).

Presently, Petitioner’s objections fail to illustrate both diligence and severe mental 

impairment to justify equitable tolling. Petitioner claims that the medical record before the 

Court demonstrates that he has been suffering from a “major mental illness before, and 

during trial, which has extended to date.” (Doc. No. 47 at 2.) Further, to demonstrate that 

diligence in filing a petition would have been impossible, Petitioner makes several 

argumentative claims. For instance, Petitioner states “at what point during a continuing 

treatment of major mental illness does a Petitioner become competent to prepare and file 

legal material when the medical record does not indicate that the Petitioner has a legal 

understanding?” (Id.) Additionally, he argues that it is nonsensical to believe that he could 

prepare or file legal work on his own behalf when he was undergoing “continuous on-going 

treatment for major mental illness[.]” (Id. at 3.) Furthermore, Petitioner claims that the

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R&R ignores the side effects he suffered due to the various medications he was prescribed. 

(Id.)

Regrettably, Petitioner’s minimal arguments regarding a mental impairment do not 

demonstrate that this “extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him. McAlpin v. 

McDonald, No. C 12-6015 WHA (PR), 2013 WL 6325905, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013) 

(highlighting that the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling is 

warranted). Specifically, Petitioner does not meet the two-part test delineated supra p. 5. 

In fact, as the Court will illustrate below, Petitioner has not even established through the 

record that he has satisfied the first step—that the mental impairment was so severe that he 

could not understand the need to timely file or that he was unable to personally prepare his 

habeas petition. 

The Court notes that even the day before the limitations period began to run, 

Petitioner was fully alert, fully oriented, and had fair insight. (Doc. No. 41-38 at 19–20.) 

Further, on October 10, 2008, Petitioner denied any current overt psychological distress or 

stressors. (Doc. No. 41-37 at 39.) This is not to say that the Court does not believe that

Petitioner suffered from major mental health issues during this time. The record proves that 

on November 14, 2008, three months after the limitations period began, Petitioner 

experienced a major mental health crisis. (Id. at 29.) On this day, Petitioner was referred to 

a crisis bed and assigned a GAF score of 29.2(Id. at 29–30.) However, on November 20, 

2008, Petitioner was assigned a GAF score of 45 and was discharged. (Id. at 28.)

 

2 GAF scores reflect a clinician’s “rough estimate of an individual’s psychological, social, 

and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual’s need for treatment.” Vargas 

v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). A GAF score in the 21–30 range 

indicates behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations or serious 

impairment in communication or judgment or inability to function in almost all areas. Am. 

Psychiatric Ass’n Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Michael B. First 

ed., 4th ed. 2000) (“DSM”) at 32. A GAF score in the 41–50 range indicates serious 

symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any 

serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable 

to keep a job, cannot work). Id. at 34. 

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As to the remainder of the statute of limitations period, the record illustrates that 

Petitioner’s mental health remained strong in December of 2008 and he was observed as 

“quite stable.” (Id. at 21.) Most notably, on December 24, 2008, Petitioner expressed 

concern that his V.A. benefits may be cancelled and that he was in the process of figuring 

out the situation. (Id. at 19.) Petitioner’s mental health continued to remain stable through 

January 2009, with the clinician progress notes stating that his memory and thought 

processes were within normal limits. (Id. at 4–12.) Fast forward to August of 2009, 

Petitioner was noted as stable, had clear and linear thinking, and presented himself as both 

bright and cheerful. (Doc. No. 41-35 at 9.) 

In sum, despite being provided an extension of time to file his objections, the record 

reveals that during the limitations period, Petitioner was not so mentally impaired that he 

could not timely file or personally prepare his habeas petition. Moreover, even construing 

Petitioner’s petition liberally, he has not made “a good-faith allegation that would, if true, 

entitle him to equitable tolling[.]” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In light of these circumstances, Petitioner has failed to show the extraordinary 

circumstances beyond his control necessary to establish equitable tolling. Because 

equitable tolling does not apply, Petitioner’s federal petition is untimely. 

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons explained more fully above, the Court hereby: (1) ADOPTS 

Magistrate Judge Jan M. Adler’s R&R in its entirety; (2) OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

objections; (3) GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss WITH PREJUDICE; and (4) 

DISMISSES the Petition. 

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability is required to appeal a final order in a habeas 

proceeding. See id. A certificate of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner 

makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2); 

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Under this standard, the petitioner must 

demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been 

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resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000) (quoting 

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)). Thus, finding that reasonable jurists 

could not debate the Court’s conclusion to dismiss with prejudice Petitioner’s claims, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2018

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