Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00663/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00663-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOLENE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S 

DEPARTMENT, SAN JOAQUIN 

COUNTY SHERIFF STEVE MOORE 

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, and

DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-00663-MCE-AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In filing the present action against the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department 

and San Joaquin County Sheriff Steve Moore (collectively “Defendants”), Plaintiff Jolene 

Johnson (“Plaintiff”) alleges a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. Currently before the 

Court is Defendant San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department’s Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 17. For the 

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.1

///

 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

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BACKGROUND2

This complaint stems from an incident in 2011 at the San Joaquin County Jail 

(“SJCJ”). On August 31, 2011, Plaintiff was booked into the SJCJ and given a medical 

evaluation. That examination revealed that Plaintiff was approximately five to six weeks 

pregnant with no indication of any pre-natal health problems. Pre-natal vitamins, which 

had been prescribed by Plaintiff’s doctor, were sent and received by staff at SJCJ, but 

were never administered to Plaintiff. 

On or about October 18, 2011, Plaintiff fell in the jail shower and slammed her 

lower back onto a tile step. Plaintiff alleges she was in immediate pain, which she 

relayed to SJCJ staff as they attempted to move her. Plaintiff asserts she was worried 

about her unborn child, but that SJCJ staff undertook no meaningful examination and 

instead merely declared that she was fine since she was able to move her right arm. No 

further tests were conducted. 

Throughout the following day, Plaintiff continued to experience pain in her lower 

back and abdomen area and requested several times that an ultrasound be 

administered. No ultra sound was ever performed. Approximately two days after the 

fall, Plaintiff miscarried. Later, after being transported to Valley State Prison, Plaintiff 

was diagnosed with a fractured lower back. 

Plaintiff initiated an action in the San Joaquin County Superior Court, and on or 

about February 13, 2014, filed a second amended complaint against Defendants,

alleging causes of action for wrongful death, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 

No. 22, 5:1-4. On or about March 17, 2014, Defendants filed a demurrer to the second 

amended complaint, arguing that Plaintiff did not file a government tort claim within the 

time required by the California Tort Claims Act before filing a law suit against a public 

entity. Id. at 5:4-8. Absent such exhaustion, according to Defendants, the state lawsuit 

 2 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 1.

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did not state any viable claims. That action was thereafter dismissed with prejudice on 

April 10, 2014. Id. at 5:8-11. Plaintiff then filed the federal action currently before the 

Court.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 

pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.”)).

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

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the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller § 1202, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only 

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the 

“plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, 

their complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may 

proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, 

and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

ANALYSIS

A. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

The court may take judicial notice of public records “without converting a motion 

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 

668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Materials from a proceeding in another tribunal are appropriate 

to be judicially noticed. Papai v. Harbor Tug & Barge Co., 67 F.3d 203, 207 n.5 (9th Cir. 

1995), rev'd on other grounds by Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 

(1997) (taking judicial notice of a decision and order of an administrative law judge); 

MGIC Indemnity Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504–05 (9th Cir. 1986) (taking judicial 

notice of allegations made in a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum filed in a 

different federal court action). “When a court takes judicial notice of another court's 

opinion, it may do so ‘not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of 

the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity.’” Lee, 

250 F.3d at 690 (quoting Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong 

Shipping Group Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426–27 (3rd Cir.1999)).

Defendants have requested the Court take judicial notice of several documents 

filed in the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 18. 

The relevant documents from the state court to be noticed are: (1) the complaint; (2) the 

first amended complaint; (3) the second amended complaint; (4) Defendant’s demurrer 

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to the second amended complaint; (5) the dismissal with prejudice; (6) the notice of entry 

of dismissal; and (7) the complaint for damages. Id. Accordingly, since the cited 

documents are all public records filed in state superior court, the Court will take judicial 

notice of the requested documents. However, the Court notices only the existence of 

the documents and not the truth of the facts recited therein. 

B. Claim Preclusion

Given the resolution of Plaintiff’s earlier state court case, Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s federal claims should be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata, 

specifically claim preclusion. ECF No. 17, 5. The Federal Full Faith and Credit statute, 

28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to “give to a state-court judgment the same 

preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the 

judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 

(1984). This means that the decision of whether claim preclusion applies in this case will 

rest on the application of California law. In California, res judicata precludes a second 

action if: (1) there has been a final determination on the merits; (2) on the same cause of 

action; and (3) between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Tensor Group v. 

City of Glendale, 14 Cal. App. 4th 154, 160 (1993). Each of these factors is met here.

First, California's general rule is that “[a] valid final judgment on the merits in favor 

of a defendant serves as a complete bar to further litigation on the same cause of 

action.” Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 794 (1975). Under California law, 

voluntary dismissal of an action with prejudice constitutes a final determination on the 

merits and satisfies the requirement for res judicata. Sierra Mgmt. Inc. v. City of 

Sonoma, No. C-95-1664 SC, 1996 WL 147632, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1996) (citing

Roybal v. University Ford, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1080, 1085-87 (1989)). Consequently, since 

it appears that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her state action with prejudice (Req. for 

Judicial Notice, ECF No. 18, Ex. E), the first criteria for claim preclusion is satisfied.

Second, Plaintiff could have brought her § 1983 claim in her state court lawsuit, 

but failed to do so. See Clark v. Yosemite Community College Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 786 

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(9th Cir. 1986) (“A section 1983 claim may be brought in California state courts.”). Under 

California's doctrine of claim preclusion, “all claims based on the same cause of action 

must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later 

date.” Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 897 (2002). 

Distinct from the federal transactional theory of claim preclusion, California 

defines a “cause of action” as comprising “of a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a 

corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant 

constituting a breach of that duty.” Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 681 (1994). “[I]f 

two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant 

then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads 

different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts 

supporting recovery.” Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174. “If the 

same primary right is involved in two actions, judgment in the first bars consideration not 

only of all matters actually raised in the first suit, but also all matters which could have 

been raised.” Id. at 1175. “Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative 

factor is the harm suffered.” Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal. 4th 788, 798 

(2010).

The Plaintiff in this case attempts to allege that claim preclusion is not a bar to her 

claim because the state action and current action involved different “primary rights.” 

Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 22, 8:20-27. That argument is not supported by case 

law. To the contrary, courts have come to the opposite conclusion. See Hawkins v. 

Starosciak, No. C 10-0248 JW PR, 2011 WL 3739038 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). In 

Hawkins, the plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, initially filed a state tort action that was later 

dismissed in an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at *1. The 

plaintiff subsequently filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal 

court. Id. The court found that the subsequent federal claim was barred by the doctrine 

of res judicata because, under the California “primary rights theory,” the plaintiff’s state 

tort action and the federal claim involved the same controversy under California law, 

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namely, defendant’s potential culpability for the complained of injury. Id. at *3. 

Plaintiff has asserted the same facts and alleged the same injury in the current 

action as she did in state court. Both cases revolve around the Defendants’ action, or 

rather inaction, after Plaintiff slipped and fell while in state custody. As a result, the 

Court determines that Plaintiff’s negligence claims in state court and the current claim 

brought under § 1983 are the same cause of action for purposes of claim preclusion.

Finally, the third element of claim preclusion is also present. Like the current 

action, Plaintiff’s complaint filed in state court named Jolene Johnson as plaintiff, and the 

San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department and San Joaquin County Sheriff Steve Moore 

as defendants, thus the cases involved the same parties. 

CONCLUSION

Since the three requirements for claim preclusion are met, the San Joaquin 

County Sheriff’s Department’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED, and this 

case is DISMISSED with prejudice.3 The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2015

 3 Because Plaintiff is precluded from bringing her § 1983 action under the doctrine of res judicata, 

the Court need not address Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff's claim is also barred by her failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a sufficient deliberate indifference claim.

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