Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01464/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01464-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DOUGLAS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10-cv-1464-GPC (BGS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANT VALENZUELA’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 66.]

vs.

MICHAEL SMELOSKY, WARDEN; et

al.,

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Robert Douglas, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

filed a Complaint on July 12, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Defendants

Smelosky, Walker, and Valenzuela . (“Compl.”, ECF No. 1.) Following the District

Court’s adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s June 17, 2011 Report and Recommendation on

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, only Plaintiff’s claim for violation of his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment against Defendant

Lieutenant Valenzuela in his individual capacity survived.1

 (See ECF No. 18 at 3.)

1

Plaintiff was given leave to amend his claim against Defendant Smelosky, but opted not to

do so. (See ECF No. 18 at 3.) Defendant Walker was never served with the Complaint. (Id.) 

- 1 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendant Valenzuela violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when Valenzuela locked

Plaintiff in an unventilated hot van and allowed him to be forced, bare-chested, against a

hot wall by another guard. (ECF. No. 1.)

On January 30, 2014, Defendant Valenzuela filed a motion for summary judgment.2

(ECF No. 66.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on March 28, 2014. (ECF. No. 69.) 

Defendant Valenzuela did not file a reply. This matter has been referred to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). For the reasons set forth

below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant Valenzuela’s motion for summary

judgment be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 30, 2011, Defendant Valenzuela filed an answer to the Complaint.

(ECF. No. 20.) On July 20, 2012, Defendant Valenzuela filed a motion for summary

judgment, which was later withdrawn to allow Plaintiff to present supplemental evidence

and conduct additional discovery. (ECF. Nos. 41, 52, 53 and 55.) The supplemental

evidence that Plaintiff submitted for the Court’s consideration included a weather report3

and a letter.4 On March 11, 2013, the Court issued an order accepting the filing of these

2

Defendant provided a Rand notice with his motion for summary judgment, which was served

upon Plaintiff. (ECF. No. 66-2.) 

3

The weather report provides the temperature history for Imperial, California on Tuesday, July

8, 2008 – the day Plaintiff was allegedly locked in a hot van and held against a hot wall. (ECF No. 55;

ECF No. 1.) On the report, Plaintiff has circled the time the events allegedly took place, between 2:53

and 3:53. According to the report, the outside temperature at this time was between 109 and 111

degrees Fahrenheit. IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court take judicial notice of this evidence

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201 because the weather report is (1) not subject to reasonable dispute and

(2) can accurately and readily be determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned. 

4

The contents of this letter repeat Plaintiff’s account of the incident. The letter appears to be

written by someone from within the prison administrative system, but it is not signed and its content

is not attributed to any author. Plaintiff refers to the author as a “whistle blower” and claims the author

did not make themselves known due to fear of retaliation. (ECF No. 69 at 5-A.) Without an attending

declaration, signature or even an attributable author, this letter does not satisfy the authentication

requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 901, which requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item

is what the proponent claims it is. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), the Court cannot consider this

type of unauthenticated evidence on a motion for summary judgment.

- 2 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

documents. (ECF No. 56.) 

On June 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to file supplemental

documents. (ECF No. 58.) In the second motion, Plaintiff attached an interview transcript

from a KGTV ABC 10 news segment.5

 (Id.) The transcript recounts an interview between

a reporter and an unidentified prison guard who was working at Centinela State Prison on

the day in question.6

 (Id.) On June 17, 2013, the Court ordered Defendant Valenzuela to

respond to Plaintiff's second request for additional discovery and motion for leave to file

supplemental documents. (ECF No. 59.) On June 24, 2013, Defendant Valenzuela filed a

response in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for leave to submit supplemental documents

objecting to the transcript on the grounds of foundation, relevance, hearsay, and improper

opinion testimony. (ECF No. 60.) 

On September 30, 2013, the Court issued an order re-opening discovery for a limited

period of time and requiring Defendant to withdraw their pending motion for summary

judgment without prejudice to refiling after the close of the new discovery period. (ECF.

No. 61.) Defendant complied (ECF No. 62), and on January 30, 2014 filed a new motion

for summary judgment which is the subject of the instant Report and Recommendation. 

(ECF No. 66.)

///

///

///

///

5

 According to the transcript, an unidentified prison guard alleges that Plaintiff was confined

in the van, with "no windows cracked" and "no ventilation", for roughly an hour. (Doc. No. 58.) The

transcript also says Plaintiff was "banging on the inside" of the van and yelling "let me out, I can't

breath." (Id.) In the transcript, two unidentified prison guards also confirm the availability of two

isolation cells at the time of the incident. This suggests confinement in the van may not have been

necessary. Plaintiff requested a declaration from the reporter in order to verify the information in the

news segment. (Doc. No. 69 at 21.) The reporter and the legal department for the news station,

however, declined Plaintiff’s request. (Id. at 24.) As such, this transcript lacks authentication and

cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

6

This transcript is from a short news clip and article which can be found at the following web

address: http://www.10news.com/news/guard-says-inmate-at-california-prison-was-abused 

- 3 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing and exhibits and finds the following

facts are undisputed: 

A. Undisputed Facts

On June 29, 2008, a large race-riot involving approximately 105 Black and Hispanic

inmates occurred in Facility A at Centinela State Prison. (ECF No. 41-3.) As a result of

the riot, all inmates in Facility A were placed on a modified program (commonly referred to

as a “lock-down”) and prison personnel performed a large-scale investigation. (Id. at 4.) 

The investigation included a thorough cell-by-cell search of every housing unit in Facility

A. (Id.) Facility A is so large that this search required officers from a nearby prison to

assist, and the search took a full day to complete. (Id.) During the search, Plaintiff was

housed in Facility A in building A2 at Centinela State Prison. (Id. at 5.) On July 8, 2008,

housing unit A2 was searched from 08:30 to 17:00 hours. (Id. at 6.) 

The July 8, 2008, search required a specialized Crisis Response Team ("CRT") to

provide safety and security in the prison housing unit. (Id. at 8.) Defendant Valenzuela was

the tactical leader for this CRT. (Id.) In his capacity as tactical leader, Defendant

Valenzuela supervised the CRT officers during the search. (Id.) The officers were

responsible for individually escorting all inmates from their cells to a staging area located

outside the building and then back inside again. (Id. at 9.) The Investigative Services Unit

("ISU") assisted with searching the inmate’s cells, and gang investigators assisted by

searching, photographing, and interviewing inmates in an outside staging area. (Id.) 

Defendant Valenzuela's duties on July 8, 2008, included maintaining the overall safety and

security of inmates, the safety of the staff and officers, as well as escorting inmates in and

out of the building, handling inmate disciplinary issues as they arose, and supervising the

members of the CRT unit. (Id. at 11.) 

///

///

///

- 4 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. The Facts in Dispute

The parties offer different versions of the following events, which occurred on the

day of the search. 

I. Defendant’s Version 

On July 8, 2008, an officer notified Defendant Valenzuela that Plaintiff refused to

follow instructions and was complaining about the search. (ECF No. 66-3 at 12.) 

Defendant asked the officer to bring Plaintiff outside so that Defendant could verbally warn

and counsel Plaintiff regarding his behavior. (Id.) Defendant told Plaintiff to calm down

and follow orders because Plaintiff’s actions were a safety and security risk. (Id. at 13.) 

Plaintiff responded positively, said he understood, and Defendant Valenzuela ordered the

officer to escort Plaintiff back inside. (Id.) 

Sometime later, an officer notified Defendant Valenzuela that Plaintiff again refused

to cooperate. (Id. at 14.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff was questioning the search in

front of other inmates, being loud, and turning to watch the search despite orders not to do

so. (Id.) Defendant again counseled Plaintiff about his behavior and gave him another

warning. (Id.) Plaintiff again seemed receptive, so Defendant told the officer to escort

Plaintiff back inside. (Id.) At this point, Defendant Valenzuela contends that he did not

force Plaintiff against any wall and does not recall seeing Plaintiff being forced against a

wall. (Id.) 

Later in the afternoon, someone from ISU contacted Defendant Valenzuela and told

him they were going to search Plaintiff's cell again because Plaintiff and his cell-mate were

yelling and throwing papers out of their cell. (Id. at 15.) In response, Defendant instructed

members of the CRT to conduct an unclothed body search of Plaintiff and his cell-mate and

bring them both outside to the staging area. (Id.) Once outside in the staging area,

Defendant Valenzuela spoke to Plaintiff, who this time, was not receptive to counseling and

acted agitated, hostile and disruptive. (Id. at 16.) 

According to Defendant Valenzuela, Plaintiff's behavior began to disrupt the gang

investigations taking place in this same staging area. (Id.) Defendant feared Plaintiff's

- 5 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

behavior would further incite the other inmates to "act up." (Id.) Defendant, "based on [his]

training and experience, knew that [he] needed to get Plaintiff away from the area," but

could not take him inside the building because inmates were also inside the building. (Id.) 

At this time, an officer informed Defendant that there was a holding cell in a van parked

behind them. (Id.) Defendant decided to temporarily place Plaintiff in the van hoping

Plaintiff would calm down and stop inciting inmates. (Id. at 16-17.) Defendant maintains

that the van was the closest and safest containment area available.7

 (Id. at 17.) 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) policy requires

completion of a holding cell log sheet whenever an inmate is placed in a holding cell. 

(ECF No. 66-3 at 20.) When Defendant placed Plaintiff in the van, Officer Reyes prepared

and signed the holding cell log sheet. (Id. at Ex. B.) Defendant Valenzuela also signed the

sheet as the supervisory reviewer. (Id.) The sheet indicates that Plaintiff was placed in the

van at 16:10 and released at 16:25, for a total of fifteen minutes spent inside. (Id.) The

sheet also indicates that Officer Reyes checked on Plaintiff every five minutes and that

Plaintiff was standing at each checkup. (Id.) The sheet does not indicate whether the van

doors were open or closed while Plaintiff was inside. (Id.)

Defendant Valenzuela returned to the van to speak with Plaintiff around 16:25. (Id.

at 21.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff's demeanor appeared improved and Defendant

ordered an officer to return Plaintiff to his cell. (Id.) At this time, Defendant states that he

did not mock, tease, taunt, or threaten Plaintiff, nor did he witness anyone else do the same. 

(Id.) Someone from the CRT eventually escorted Plaintiff back to the building, and sat

Plaintiff down on a bench in the dayroom. (Id. at 23.) Minutes later, Defendant saw

Plaintiff slide off the bench and lie sideways on the ground. (Id. at 24.) Defendant

immediately instructed staff to sound an alarm and remove Plaintiff's restraints for

7

The van was a former bread-company truck similar in size to a UPS box van with enough

room to stand straight up inside the back of the van. (ECF No. 66-3 at 18.) The van has two frontside doors and a back door. (Id. at 3-4.) Defendant Valenzuela states that he placed Plaintiff in one

of the two holding cells in the van, and the doors were left open. (Id. at 18.) Valenzuela did not have

time to watch Plaintiff, so he ordered another officer, Officer Reyes, to watch Plaintiff. (Id. at 20.)

Defendant Valenzuela does not indicate which doors were left open while Plaintiff was confined in

the squad van.

- 6 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treatment and examination purposes. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to a medical facility and

returned to the housing unit a few hours later. (Id.)

ii. Plaintiff’s Version

According to Plaintiff, the incident began when an officer accused Plaintiff of

refusing to comply with direct orders on July 8, 2008. (ECF No. 1.) Because of Plaintiff’s

alleged disobedience, the officer escorted Plaintiff outside where the officer forced Plaintiff

against the housing unit wall, bare-chested, for five to ten minutes. (ECF No. 39 at 1, 4.) 

The outside temperature at the time was between 100 and 110 degrees Fahrenheit and the

wall would have been extremely hot. (ECF No. 55.) Plaintiff alleges that at this time, the

officer, Defendant Valenzuela, and SWAT personnel all mocked him about how hot the

wall was and how it must burn his chest. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant Valenzuela asked

Plaintiff whether he would continue to be a problem. (ECF No. 39 at 3.) Plaintiff replied

“no” and was escorted back to the building. (Id.)

When returning to his cell, Plaintiff noticed that SWAT personnel were discarding

his personal property during the search and Plaintiff brought this to the attention of

Defendant Valenzuela. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff was again escorted outside and placed

against the hot wall. (Id.) SWAT personnel threatened to keep Plaintiff in that position

until the entire search was over. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Valenzuela was

personally present while Plaintiff was forced against the hot wall. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff

alleges that his chest was flushed red from the heat of the wall and that the pain was severe;

on a scale of one to ten with ten being the worst, Plaintiff claims the pain was an eight. 

(Id.)

After Plaintiff was returned to his cell for the second time, Plaintiff’s cell-mate

began sliding paper and trash out from under the cell door. (ECF No. 39 at 6 and ECF No.

69 at 11.) SWAT personnel came to the cell and blamed Plaintiff for the paper outside the

door. (Id. at 7.) According to Plaintiff, SWAT personnel escorted Plaintiff outside to the

staging area for a third time. (Id. No. 7.) Defendant Valenzuela first asked Plaintiff if he

was taking any medication, and Plaintiff replied, “no.” (Id.) Defendant and another officer

- 7 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

then placed Plaintiff in a hot, parked van, with the doors closed. (Id.; ECF No. 1.) SWAT

personnel then mocked Plaintiff about how hot it must be inside the van. (ECF No. 39 at

14.) Plaintiff claims he was sweating so much that he could not see. (Id.; ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff then heard someone outside the van asking him if he was “ok” or “still alive.”

(ECF No. 39 at 14.) When Plaintiff failed to respond, he was removed from the van. (Id.;

ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff estimates that he was in the van for approximately thirty to forty-five

minutes. (ECF No. 39 at 10.)

Upon exiting the van, Plaintiff stumbled and required assistance getting back to the

housing unit. (ECF No. 39 at 14.) Plaintiff was brought inside where he subsequently

passed out and fell to the ground. (ECF No. 69 at 12.) Medical staff were called to the

scene and a registered nurse took Plaintiff's vitals. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant Valenzuela

asked the nurse to give him a minute with Plaintiff. (Id.) SWAT personnel then

surrounded Plaintiff and Defendant Valenzuela asked Plaintiff what happened. (Id.) 

Plaintiff could not answer. (Id.) Defendant Valenzuela then began calling Plaintiff a "punk

b*tch" until Plaintiff passed out. (Id.; ECF No. 39 at 15.) Plaintiff states he is uncertain

how long he was unconscious. (ECF No. 39 at 14.) Plaintiff was taken to the facility

medical clinic where he remained for a few hours. (ECF No. 66-3 at 24.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute

and the moving party has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56©). Under summary

judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56c); Zoslaw v. MCA

Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). The “purpose of summary judgment is to

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for

- 8 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(citations omitted).

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Bias, 508 F.3d at 1218. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party is “required to present significant, probative evidence tending to support h[is]

allegations,” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1218 (citations omitted), and must point to some evidence in

the record that demonstrates “a genuine issue of material fact [which], with all reasonable

inferences made in the plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the

plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 249 (1986). To “defeat a summary judgment motion ..., the non-moving party ‘may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials’ in the pleadings.” FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Berg v.

Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory

allegations of fact or law). Instead, the non-moving party “must establish the existence of a

genuine factual dispute on the basis of admissible evidence; bare allegations without

evidentiary support are insufficient to survive summary judgment.” Estate of Tucker ex rel.

Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1033 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008).

However, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255; Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (The nonmoving

party’s declaration or sworn testimony “is to be accepted as true .... [The non-movant’s]

evidence should not be weighed against the evidence of the [movant].”) (citation omitted). 

All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255). At the summary judgment stage, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not

those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t,

424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d

- 9 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

964, 968 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding district court erred in granting summary judgment when

the affidavits and other evidence raised credibility issues); United States v. Two Tracts of

Land in Cascade County, Montana, 5 F.3d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing district

judge’s decision to grant summary judgment based upon an assessment of nonmoving

party’s credibility).

IV. DISCUSSION

At the summary judgment stage, the Defendant, as the moving party, bears the

burden of proving no material facts are in dispute. FED.R.CIV.P. 56. Accordingly,

Defendant must demonstrate Plaintiff does not posses adequate evidence to establish he

was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends Defendant Valenzuela violated his Eighth Amendment right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in two ways. First, Plaintiff alleges

Defendant Valenzuela subjected him to inhumane conditions of confinement by acting with

deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff's health and safety when he confined Plaintiff in a

hot, unventilated van. (ECF. No. 1.) Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Valenzuela used

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when one of his subordinates held

Plaintiff against a hot wall. (Id.) The Court addresses each claim separately below.

A. The Hot Van Incident: Alleged Inhumane Conditions of Confinement Violation

1. Parties’ Arguments

The parties agree that Plaintiff was held in a van on the day in question. The parties

also agree Plaintiff needed medical attention following his confinement in the van. 

Defendant Valenzuela, however, maintains in his declaration that he was justified in

placing Plaintiff in the van because: (1) Plaintiff was only inside the vehicle for fifteen

minutes, (2) the doors were open, (3) an officer was assigned to check on Plaintiff every

five minutes, and (4) Plaintiff was placed in the van for safety and security reasons. (ECF

No. 66-3 at 5-6.)

Plaintiff contends Defendant Valenzuela deprived him of humane conditions of

confinement and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by placing Plaintiff: (1) in

- 10 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a van for thirty to forty-five minutes, which is supported by the declaration of Plaintiff’s

cellmate, Lamont Stewart;8

 (2) with the doors closed; (3) in one hundred degree heat, which

is supported by weather records.9

 (ECF No. 69.)

2. Standard of Review: Inhumane Conditions of Confinement

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits both the imposition of cruel and unusual

punishment and inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d

1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Conditions of confinement claims require extreme deprivations

that are sufficiently grave to deny the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison

official has deprived [prisoners] of humane conditions of confinement must meet two

requirements, one objective and one subjective.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th

Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The prisoner must

“objectively show that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’” and “make a

subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to [his] health

or safety.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Each requirement will be analyzed separately below.

I. The Objective Requirement: Sufficiently Serious Deprivation

Under the objective requirement, conditions of confinement must pose a substantial

risk of sufficiently serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The conditions of a prison may

be restrictive and harsh, but officials have the duty to provide prisoners with adequate food,

clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d

726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may consider the circumstances, nature, and duration

of the deprivation to determine whether the risk of harm is sufficiently serious. Lewis, 217

F.3d at 731.

Defendant Valenzuela states he placed Plaintiff in the van, with the doors opened,

for only fifteen minutes. (Doc. No. 66-3 at 22.) Defendant submitted his declaration and

8

 See March 13, 2014 Stewart Declaration, ECF No. 69 at pp. 11-12.

9

 See Weather History for Imperial CA on July 8, 2008, ECF No. 69, Exh. H.

- 11 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the holding cell log sheet10 as evidence to support his position. (Doc. No. 66-3; Exh. B at

20.) Plaintiff, however, contends Defendant Valenzuela locked him in a van for thirty to

forty-five minutes and that the van doors were closed. (ECF No. 69. at 11-12.) Plaintiff

was only removed from the van after he failed to respond to an unidentified guard who

asked from outside the van whether Plaintiff was “still alive.” (Id.) Plaintiff submitted and

signed under the penalty of perjury a response in opposition (ECF No. 69) to Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment and a response to Defendant’s interrogatories (ECF No. 39

at 4), both of which support Plaintiff’s account of the confinement. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56C.

(explaining that in resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any.) Plaintiff also submitted a weather report from the day in question which

demonstrates the outside temperature at the time of the incident was one hundred eleven

degrees. (ECF. No. 69.) A reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence suggests

that the van’s internal temperature may have been even hotter regardless of whether the

van’s doors were closed or open. See Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 587. Plaintiff further

submitted the declaration of his cell mate, which states Plaintiff was in the van for forty

minutes, not fifteen – and that Plaintiff was yelling out for help. (ECF. No. 69 at 11.)

Extreme heat conditions can be sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective

requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Maldonado v. Youngblood, 2013 WL

322089, *4 (E.D. Cal.) (court found locking prisoner in a transportation vehicle for three to

four hours with no ventilation and no water, with temperatures allegedly reaching ninety

degrees inside the vehicle constituted a substantial risk of serious harm); See also Pitcher v.

Wackenhut Corp., 2007 WL 2695407 *6 (D. Nev.) (where prisoner was placed in a van

holding cell with temperatures exceeding one hundred degrees, court found the risk of

harm, especially the allegation of dangerously high temperatures in the van, sufficiently

serious to satisfy the objective requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim.)

10The holding cell log sheet details Plaintiff’s time spent in the van and five-minute interval

checkups by an officer. 

- 12 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

At the summary judgment stage, the moving party must establish that there is an

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). Defendant attempts to do so by providing a sworn declaration and the holding cell

log sheet to contradict Plaintiff’s account of his confinement in the van. Plaintiff, as the

non-moving party, must establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that there is a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Plaintiff submitted his response in

opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and his response to Defendant’s

interrogatories. Plaintiff also submitted the sworn declaration of his cell mate. These

submissions contradict Defendant’s account of the confinement and establish a genuine

issue of material fact. Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff needed medical attention

following his confinement in the van. A jury could reasonably infer that Plaintiff’s need

for medical assistant is consistent with heat exhaustion and is supported by the weather

report submitted by Plaintiff. At this stage, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be

believed. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Further, the nonmoving party’s declarations or sworn

testimony are to be accepted as true. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir.

1999). Accepting Plaintiff’s evidence as true, which the Court must do, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the Court find there is a genuine issue of material fact for the jury

to decide on the issue of whether Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm as

required by the objective requirement of his Eighth Amendment claim.

ii. The Subjective Requirement: Deliberate Indifference 

 “The subjective requirement, relating to the defendant's state of mind, requires

deliberate indifference.” Allen, 48 F.3d at 1087. “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced

only when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health or

safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Whether an official had the requisite knowledge is a question of

fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, and a fact finder may conclude that the

official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that it was obvious. Farmer, 511 U.S.

- 13 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at 826.

Defendant argues he did not act with deliberate indifference because his actions had

a penological justification and were necessary to maintain order. (Doc. No. 66-1.)

Defendant argues that he made the decision to place Plaintiff in the van, not as a

punishment, but to avert a safety threat. (Id. at 14.) Further, Defendant contends Plaintiff

had been disruptive all day and the van was the closest and safest place to hold Plaintiff

until Plaintiff calmed down. (Id.) Defendant, however, does not argue he lacked

knowledge of the risk of heat exposure, nor does he argue that he did not disregard the risk. 

Defendant only argues his actions were necessary and justified. (Doc. No. 66-1.) 

Plaintiff attacks Defendant’s justification argument and claims he was placed in the

hot van as a form of torture and cruel punishment. (ECF No. 69 at 5.) Plaintiff refers to the

incident as the “bake-em, time-out” treatment. (ECF No. 52.) As noted above, Plaintiff

submitted a weather report from the day in question which indicates that the outside

temperature at the time of the incident was one hundred and eleven degrees. Plaintiff

argues Defendant Valenzuela knew, or at least should have known, based on Defendant’s

training and experience, that locking Plaintiff in such a hot van would lead to serious harm.

(Doc. No. 69 at 5.) Plaintiff argues even the K-9 unit will not leave their dogs in a hot car

for five minutes in such extreme heat. (Doc. No. 69 at 5.)

The essential inquiry here concerns Defendant’s knowledge of the risk of harm to

the Plaintiff and a subsequent disregard of that risk. In his declaration, Defendant

acknowledges the extreme heat on the day of the incident. (ECF No. 66-3.) Defendant also

argues he left the van door open, ordered a guard to check on Plaintiff every five minutes

and only held Plaintiff in the van for a total of fifteen minutes. These precautionary actions

performed by Defendant suggest he knew the internal temperature of the van posed a

substantial risk of serious harm because of the extreme heat of the day. A reasonable jury

could conclude from Defendant’s actions that he knew the van was dangerous and

disregarded the risk by ordering Plaintiff into the van anyway. A reasonable jury could

therefore infer Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Because the issue of

- 14 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendant’s knowledge of the risk posed by extreme heat and deliberate indifference to that

risk is one for the jury to decide, summary judgment is not proper at this time. Therefore,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim be DENIED.

B. The Hot Wall Incident - Alleged Excessive Force Violation 

i. Supervisory Liability

To state a claim for the use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

Plaintiff must show that prison officials applied force “maliciously and sadistically to cause

harm" and not in “good faith to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Typically, Defendants only incur liability for excessive force under

section 1983 if they personally participate in the alleged event. Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d

858, 862 (9th Cir.1979). A supervisor, however, can be “liable for constitutional violations

of his subordinates” without personal participation if the supervisor “directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Defendant Valenzuela was the supervisor of the CRT; that fact is undisputed. (ECF.

No. 66 at 8.) The parties do dispute, however, whether Defendant was present and thus

knew and failed to prevent Plaintiff from being forced against a hot wall. Defendant claims

he has no recollection of seeing Plaintiff pushed up against a wall and supports this position

with a statement in his declaration. (ECF No. 66 at 14.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant

Valenzuela was present when he was forced into the wall and failed to stop this alleged

excessive force. (ECF No. 39 at 3.) Plaintiff’s position is supported by his statement in

response to Defendant’s interrogatories. (Id.) Although Defendant Valenzuela and Plaintiff

offer different versions of the wall incidents, this dispute is immaterial and unworthy of

consideration by a jury unless Plaintiff has provided evidence to demonstrate Defendant’s

subordinate applied malicious and sadistic force as required for an Eighth Amendment

violation.

- 15 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ii. Standard of Review - Malicious and Sadistic Force

To determine whether the use of force was malicious and sadistic, a court may

consider: (1) the extent of injury suffered by a prisoner; (2) the need for application of

force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the

severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 321 (1986)). 

First, the court looks at the extent of the injury suffered by the Plaintiff. It is

undisputed that the extent of Plaintiff’s injury was a “flush-red” chest. (ECF No. 39 at

Interrogatory Response No. 5.) This is a minor injury and Plaintiff has not provided any

medical evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment to indicate that he

suffered serious harm, such as burns, from being forced against the wall. See Hudson, 503

U.S. at 9-10 (explaining the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of

physical force.) Accordingly, the undisputed evidence of minimal injury weighs in favor of

finding there was no use of malicious and sadistic force.

Second, the court looks at the need for the use of force. Defendant states Plaintiff’s

disruptive behavior necessitated placement against the wall. (ECF. No. 66-1 at pp. 12-13.) 

Plaintiff does not dispute he was escorted outside due to perceived unruly behavior. (ECF.

No. 39 at Interrogatory No. 3.) Because the undisputed evidence indicates there was an

admitted dispute between Plaintiff and the prison guards, this factor weighs in favor of

finding there was a need for the application of force. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444,

1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that as long as an inmate “engages in violent and

disruptive behavior, prison officials are authorized and indeed required to take appropriate

measures to maintain prison order and discipline and protect staff and other prisoners from

such violent inmates”).

Third, the court looks at the relationship between the force needed and the force

used. Case law indicates the applied force must be balanced against the need for that force. 

- 16 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir.1994). 

Defendant argues Plaintiff was placed against the wall to restore order. (ECF. No. 66-1 at

p. 13.) Plaintiff states the pain of being placed against the hot wall was an eight on a scale

of one to ten. (ECF. No. 39 at Interrogatory No. 5.) Plaintiff also admits he was forced

against the wall for five to ten minutes. (Id. at Interrogatory No. 4.) The force applied was

painful to Plaintiff. However, it was not prolonged. The brevity of the force applied

weighs in favor of finding the five-to-ten-minute use of force was balanced with the need

for force.

Fourth, the court looks at the threat perceived by the responsible officials. 

Defendant argues the setting was tense, as inmates were all escorted outside in order for

prison officials to search their cells. (Doc. No. 66-3.) Plaintiff does not dispute that inmates

were moved outside so that their cells could be searched. [ECF No. 69 at 11.] It was not

unreasonable for prison officials to view uncooperative inmates outside of their cells as a

threat to prison security. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding the existence

of a reasonably perceived threat.

Finally, the court looks at whether officials took any effort to temper the severity of

the force. Defendant Valenzuela argues that he does not recall seeing Plaintiff being placed

against a wall, and that he did not put Plaintiff against a wall. [ECF No. 66-3 at p. 4.] As

mentioned in the supervisory liability section above, Plaintiff states Defendant Valenzuela

was present at the time Plaintiff was pushed into a wall and did nothing to prevent it. [ECF

No. 39 at Interrogatory No. 2.] Because Defendant Valenzuela was either: (1) not present to

temper the severity of force, or (2) present and failed to temper the severity of the force

used, this factor weighs against finding there was an effort to temper the severity of the

force used.

Undisputed evidence for four of the five factors used to assess the use of force weigh

in favor of finding that the force used against Plaintiff was not malicious and sadistic. As

explained above: the impact of the wall on Plaintiff’s chest was minimal; there was a need

for force as Plaintiff has admitted he was disagreeable; Plaintiff states he was only held

- 17 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

against the wall for five to ten minutes; and the force at issue was applied to Plaintiff during

a prison-wide lock down and cell search. In order for an Eighth Amendment excessive

force case to go to the jury, the evidence must go “beyond a mere dispute over the

reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior

alternatives” to support “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.” 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986). There is no genuine issue of material fact

presented that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude Plaintiff was placed against the

wall maliciously and sadistically. The Court RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion

for summary judgment be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's claim for excessive force

against Defendant Valenzuela.

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Valenzuela also argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. The defense

of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability insofar as the official’s

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A

court considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine: (1) whether, in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, the facts alleged show the official’s conduct violated a

constitutional right; and (2) whether, in light of the specific context of the case, such right

was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have understood that his conduct

violated the right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). 

1. The Hot Van Incident

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it has been has

recommended, as detailed in Section A above, that the Court find triable issues of material

fact exist as to: (1) whether the conditions inside the box van’s holding cell were

sufficiently serious to meet the objective component of an Eighth Amendment violation;

and (2) whether Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety

when he confined Plaintiff in the box van’s holding cell. 

Furthermore, established law makes clear that a reasonable officer, who was

- 18 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

admittedly aware of the day’s extreme temperatures, would have understood that his

conduct violated Plaintiff’s eighth amendment right. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738

(2002) (holding that handcuffing an inmate to a hitching post and inducing “unnecessary

exposure to the heat of the sun” violated clearly established rights under the Eighth

Amendment); see e.g. Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing

that the “Eighth Amendment requires that the temperature of the areas in which pre-trial

detainees are held or housed does not threaten their health or safety.”) 

It is therefore recommended that Defendant’s request for qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim be DENIED.

2. The Hot Wall Incident

The Court has recommended, as detailed in Section B above, that Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on the issue of excessive force be granted. Therefore, the

Court need not reach the question of whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity

on the use of excessive force. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,

2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (explaining that if the facts alleged do not show the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right, the inquiry is over.)

V. CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to

the United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C.

section 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN

PART.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 7, 2014 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

///

///

///

- 19 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than July 21, 2014. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998).

DATED: June 19, 2014

Hon. Bernard G. Skomal

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

- 20 - 10cv1464-GPC (BGS)

Case 3:10-cv-01464-GPC-BGS Document 70 Filed 06/19/14 Page 20 of 20