Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07024/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 30, 1998 Decided December 22, 1998

No. 98-7024

University of the District of Columbia

Faculty Association/NEA, et al.,

Appellees

v.

District of Columbia Financial Responsibility

and Management Assistance Authority, et al.,

Appellants

Consolidated with

98-7025

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01080)

Daniel A. Rezneck argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs was Robin C. Alexander. John M. Ferren,

Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Lutz A. Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation Counsel, entered appearances.

Andrew D. Roth argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief was Laurence Gold. Jeffrey L. Gibbs entered an

appearance.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Rogers,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: In response to the District of

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 1 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Columbia's "financial problems and management inefficiencies," Congress enacted the District of Columbia Financial

Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub.

L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995) ("FRMAA" or "Act").

Under the Act, a Control Board was granted substantial

authority over the financial management of the District. The

scope of this statutory authority is at issue in this case.

In 1997, in an effort to keep the District's budget under a

congressionally-imposed deficit ceiling, the Control Board

issued an order authorizing the Board of Trustees ("Trustees") of the University of the District of Columbia ("UDC") to

reduce its faculty "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any

collective bargaining agreement." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 88.

Appellees--UDC faculty members--contend that the Control

Board's order was ultra vires and, therefore, without legal

effect. Accordingly, they assert, UDC violated the collective

bargaining agreement between the university and the faculty

when it conducted a reduction-in-force ("RIF") that disregarded the specific provisions covering RIFs in the parties'

agreement.

We agree with the District Court that Congress did not

grant the Control Board the authority to abrogate existing

contracts between the District and its employees. Because

the Control Board's action was ultra vires, we remand appellees' contract claim to the District Court for a determination

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 2 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

as to whether the claim should now be submitted to arbitration.

I. Background

Congress created the Control Board in April 1995, citing

the District's "fail[ure] to provide its citizens with effective

and efficient services," warning that "[t]he current financial

and management problems of the District government have

already adversely affected the long-term economic health of

the District," and calling for "[a] comprehensive approach to

fiscal, management, and structural problems ... which exempts no part of the District government." FRMAA s 2(a).

Sections 103 and 203 of the FRMAA delineate the authority

of the Control Board, the members of which are appointed by

the President. Under these provisions, the Control Board is

empowered to hold hearings and receive evidence, obtain

official data from the federal and District Government, issue

subpoenas, enter into contracts, and approve or disapprove of

Acts passed by the D.C. Council. See FRMAA ss 103, 203;

see also Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility

and Management Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 777 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Control Board has been given wide-ranging

powers to improve the District government's operations.").

In July 1996, Congress enacted the District of Columbia

Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-194, 110 Stat. 2356

(1996) ("Appropriations Act"). Section 141(a)(1) of the Appropriations Act imposed on the District a deficit ceiling of

$74 million for fiscal year 1997. See Appropriations Act

s 141(a)(1). Section 141(a)(2) stated that the "Chief Financial

Officer of the District of Columbia [and the Control Board]

shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that the

District of Columbia meets the requirements of this section."

Id. s 141(a)(2).

Congress subsequently amended the FRMAA. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.

104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The amended s 207(d)(1)

("1996 Amendment") gives the Control Board the power to

issue "such orders, rules, or regulations as it considers appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the FRMAA] ... to the

extent that the issuance of such an order, rule, or regulation

is within the authority of the Mayor or the head of any

department or agency of the District government." Id.

s 5203(f). The parties agree that the 1996 Amendment allows the Control Board to "stand in the shoes" of the Mayor

and other District officials--such as the UDC Trustees--and

perform whatever functions those officials would be authorized to perform themselves.

As fiscal year 1997 unfolded, the District was in grave

danger of exceeding the $74 million deficit ceiling. UDC was

a major contributor to the deficit, so university officials were

obliged to consider spending limitations to cut costs. Among

the options available to UDC was a RIF of faculty members.

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 3 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

This option was less than ideal, however, because UDC was

bound to comply with the enumerated RIF and employee

benefit protections contained in the faculty's collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Although the CBA permits

UDC to conduct a RIF when such action is compelled by a

fiscal emergency, it affords important protections for the

faculty in the event of a RIF. First, the agreement provides

that senior members of the faculty must be retained ahead of

junior members. See J.A. 163. Second, the agreement requires that faculty members receive one year's notice of a

RIF or severance pay in lieu thereof. See id. at 165. The

CBA also mandates that UDC "maintain" the retirement

plans of existing faculty members. Id. at 152.

On January 13, 1997, Julius F. Nimmons, Jr., Acting President of UDC, wrote to Dr. Andrew F. Brimmer, chairman of

the Control Board, requesting that the Control Board exempt

UDC from the seniority, notice, and benefits provisions of the

CBA. See id. at 84-85. Nimmons wrote that "[i]t would be

impossible for the University to meet the goals of my [financial] plan without the legal authority" requested in the letter.

Id. at 84.

Nine days later, the Control Board responded by issuing

the order at issue in this case. Noting that "a state of fiscal

crisis exists" at UDC and that the CBA represents a "signifiUSCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 4 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

cant impediment[ ] to the achievement of any budget savings

through personnel reductions," the Control Board found that

"there are no other less drastic means of achieving the

required budget savings than through the unilateral modification of the [CBA]." Id. at 87. Accordingly, the Control

Board authorized UDC, "[n]otwithstanding ... the provisions

of any collective bargaining agreement, [to] ... conduct its

[RIF] in a manner which will allow it to achieve its planned

budget savings." Id. at 87-88. The order specifically directed that UDC contribute no more than 7% to its employee

retirement plans, and allowed UDC to disregard the seniority

and notice provisions of the CBA. See id. On February 4,

1997, the UDC Trustees implemented the Control Board's

order by approving a RIF that did, in fact, disregard the

applicable terms of the CBA. See id. at 103-05. UDC also

lowered its contributions to the faculty retirement plan to 7%,

effective March 1, 1997.

On February 14, 1997, the UDC Faculty Association ("Faculty") challenged the RIF by filing grievances pursuant to the

grievance procedures outlined in the CBA. UDC responded

on April 7, 1997, in a letter stating that UDC's actions were

not reviewable under the CBA's grievance procedures, because its actions were "mandated by" the Control Board and

"were taken notwithstanding the provisions of the [CBA]."

Id. at 198-99.

The Faculty filed the instant lawsuit on May 15, 1997,

naming the Control Board and UDC as defendants. The suit

alleged that the Control Board had exceeded its congressionally-delegated authority, and that UDC had violated the

terms of the CBA. On February 3, 1998, the District Court

granted the Faculty's motion for summary judgment. See

University of the Dist. of Columbia Faculty Ass'n/NEA v.

Board of Trustees of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 994

F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) ("UDC Faculty"). The court surveyed the congressional acts that delineated the scope of the

Control Board's authority and found no basis for the order

that the Control Board had promulgated. See id. at 10.

Accordingly, the court found UDC in breach of the CBA and

ordered "full compliance by the University with the terms of

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 5 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the [CBA]." University of the Dist. of Columbia Faculty

Ass'n/NEA v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of the Dist. of

Columbia, No. 97-01080 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1998) ("UDC Faculty

Order"), reprinted in J.A. 244.

This appeal followed. In addition to challenging the District Court's interpretation of the relevant congressional statutes, appellants contend for the first time that the District

Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider this case.

II. Analysis

A.The Ultra Vires Claim

1. Jurisdiction

Appellants now claim that, under District of Columbia law

and the terms of the CBA, the Faculty should have sought

redress through arbitration rather than in the District Court.

They contend that the District Court improperly exercised

subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and request a

remand with orders to dismiss. It is, of course, axiomatic

that a challenge to the jurisdiction of a federal district court

may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Insurance

Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,

701-02 (1982). The Control Board's jurisdictional claim fails,

however, not because it is untimely, but because it is without

merit.

Section 105(a) of the FRMAA, which provides for jurisdiction in the District Court, reads as follows:

Jurisdiction Established in District Court for District

of Columbia.--Except as provided in section 103(e)(2)

(relating to the issuance of an order enforcing a subpoena), any action against the [Control Board] or any action

otherwise arising out of this Act, in whole or in part,

shall be brought in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia.

FRMAA s 105(a). In their brief to this court, appellants

virtually ignore s 105(a), relegating it to passing mention in a

footnote. See Brief of Appellants at 24 n.11. Instead, appellants claim that "[t]he essence of the plaintiffs' claim here was

for breach of contract; the [Control Board's] Order, if valid,

was a defense to that claim." Id. Thus, according to appellants, the Faculty's action did not arise under the FRMAA,

but rather arose under the terms of the CBA, and should

have been adjudicated under the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedures. This argument is simply wrong, because

it patently mischaracterizes the gravamen of the Faculty's

claim.

The Faculty's complaint alleged, inter alia, that "[t]he

action of the Control Board in promulgating the Control

Board Order was neither required nor authorized by the

[FRMAA], as amended, or by any other Act of Congress."

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 6 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Complaint p 33, reprinted in J.A. 13. The complaint went on

to request that the District Court "[d]eclare that the Control

Board Order ... [was] ultra vires, and ... therefore null and

void and of no effect." Id. at 18-19, reprinted in J.A. 18-19.

In short, the Faculty's primary contention before the District

Court was that the Control Board exceeded its authority

when it issued the disputed order. In fact, the principal focus

of the parties in the trial court was on the validity of the

Control Board's order. Given the complaint before the District Court and the issues addressed by the parties at trial, it

cannot seriously be disputed that, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction under s 105(a), the action was "against"

the Control Board and "ar[ose] out of" the FRMAA. Accordingly, the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over

the Faculty's ultra vires claim.

2.The Scope of the Control Board's Authority Under the

FRMAA

This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo.

See Washington Teachers' Union Local #6 v. Board of Educ.,

109 F.3d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Because no factual

matters are in dispute, we must determine whether the

District Court's decision in favor of the Faculty was correct

as a matter of law. We hold that it was.

The Faculty's ultra vires claim is quite straightforward.

As articulated by the District Court, the Faculty's contention

is that "nowhere in the FRMAA's studiously detailed specification of the Control Board's powers is there any mention of

a power to unilaterally repudiate unwanted provisions in

collective bargaining agreements previously entered into by

the District of Columbia or its agencies." UDC Faculty, 994

F. Supp. at 4. It is undisputed that the FRMAA does not

expressly grant the Control Board the power to authorize

nullification of existing collective bargaining agreements.

The issue, then, is whether, as the Control Board asserts, the

language of the FRMAA and subsequent legislation may be

read to suggest that Congress intended the Control Board to

have the power that it exercised when it issued the order.

As an initial matter, we note that the Control Board's

persistent refrain that Congress itself, by virtue of its plenary

authority over the District, could have granted UDC the

authority to unilaterally modify the CBA, see, e.g., Brief of

Appellants at 29-30, is completely irrelevant to the issue at

hand. The Control Board concedes, see Brief of Appellants

at 6, and we agree, that Congress never delegated its plenary

authority to the Control Board or any other agency of government in the District of Columbia. Thus, the Control

Board's power over the District is limited in a way that

Congress's is not; Congress's power is bounded only by the

Constitution, whereas the Control Board's power is bounded

by the parameters set forth in its enabling Act and subsequent legislation.

The FRMAA itself does not lend support to the Control

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 7 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Board's claim of authority. It is true that Congress, in its

statement of findings, detailed at length the unfortunate state

of the District's financial health. See FRMAA s 2(a). Congress also stated that the purpose of the Act was to "eliminate budget deficits and cash shortages of the District" and

"ensure the long-term financial, fiscal, and economic vitality

and operational efficiency of the District." Id. s 2(b). Appellants contend that this background section of the FRMAA

serves as "an indispensable road map to a reading of the

statute as a whole." Brief of Appellants at 28. However,

appellants' argument continually loses sight of the fact that

Congress specifically enumerated the Control Board's powers

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 8 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

in ss 103 and 203 of the FRMAA. And, as the District Court

aptly noted, "given the well known concerns about how an

unelected entity with considerable power over the District

government's operations would affect 'Home Rule' " in the

District, UDC Faculty, 994 F. Supp. at 6, it is hardly surprising that Congress did not grant the Control Board carte

blanche to run the city.

The only mention of collective bargaining agreements in

the FRMAA is found in the provision granting the Control

Board the authority to review and approve collective bargaining agreements into which the D.C. Council proposes to

enter. See FRMAA s 203(b)(1). Appellants claim that it is

an "enormous stretch" to infer that when Congress gave the

Control Board the authority to review and approve new

collective bargaining agreements, it simultaneously meant to

prohibit the Control Board from unilaterally modifying existing agreements. Brief of Appellants at 34. In other words,

according to appellants, it was improper for the District

Court to assume that, because Congress did not speak to the

issue of existing collective bargaining agreements, it meant to

protect such agreements from the authority of the Control

Board. Appellants' premise--that the Control Board has the

authority to do anything that is not expressly prohibited by

the FRMAA--is quite extraordinary and we reject it.

In Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation

Board, 29 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), this court

rejected an argument virtually identical to the one advanced

by appellants in this case. In Railway Labor, the court

invalidated the National Mediation Board's ("NMB") attempt

to exercise a power that was not explicitly conferred by the

Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), but which nevertheless furthered the NMB's "purported mandate." Id. at 660. It is

true, as appellants point out, that the facts of Railway Labor

are distinguishable from those of this case, because Congress's grant of authority to the NMB was narrower than

that granted to the Control Board. Nevertheless, the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation articulated by the

en banc court in Railway Labor is equally compelling in this

case:

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 9 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The [NMB] does not even claim that the terms of [the

RLA] support the authority it asserts.... Instead, the

Board would have us presume a delegation of power

from Congress absent an express withholding of such

power. This comes close to saying that the [NMB] has

the power to do whatever it pleases merely by virtue of

its existence, a suggestion that we view to be incredible.

Id. at 659; see also American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52

F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Despite the broad language

of the FRMAA's findings and purposes section, which only

establishes Congress's concern for the District's financial

well-being, appellants cannot avoid the conclusion that their

argument essentially boils down to a claim that because

Congress never said that the Control Board could not unilaterally modify existing agreements, the power to do so is

implicit in the Act.

We agree with the District Court that appellants' reading

of the FRMAA requires precisely the kind of tortured statutory interpretation that we spurned in Railway Labor. See

UDC Faculty, 994 F. Supp. at 7 ("[T]he position that the

Control Board has taken in this litigation is analytically

indistinguishable from one that already has been roundly

rejected in [Railway Labor]."). We also agree with the

District Court that it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to give the Control Board the power to repudiate existing

labor contracts--a power that the Constitution denies to the

States, see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.

234, 242-44 (1978) (explaining how the contract clause, U.S.

Const. art. I, s 10, cl. 1, limits "the power of a State to

abridge existing contractual relationships")--without seeing

fit to mention this power even once in the Act or its legislative history. See UDC Faculty, 994 F. Supp at 8. In sum,

we hold that the FRMAA, standing alone, does not provide

the Control Board with the authority it exercised in this case.

3.The 1996 Amendment to the FRMAA

The subsequent congressional legislation appellants cite in

support of their argument is no more availing. Before the

District Court, and in their brief to this court, appellants

contended that the 1996 Amendment--granting the Control

Board the power to "stand in the shoes" of the UDC Trustees--established the Control Board's "independent" authority

to issue its order. The theory was that if the UDC Trustees

themselves had the authority in the event of a fiscal emergency to nullify certain provisions of the CBA, the Control Board

could have done so as well, under the 1996 Amendment. See

Brief for Appellants at 30-32.

At oral argument, however, counsel for the Control Board

essentially abandoned this argument, and rightfully so. The

argument fails because it is simply not true that the UDC

Trustees had the authority to repudiate the provisions at

issue in the CBA. Article X of the CBA does give UDC the

authority to "take whatever actions may be necessary to

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 10 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

carry out the mission of the University in emergency situations." J.A. 122. However, Article X allows UDC to take

such emergency actions only to the extent that they are not

"specifically limited by the provisions of this Agreement." Id.

By its very terms, then, the CBA does not allow UDC to

repudiate the seniority, notice, and benefit provisions that it

repudiated pursuant to the Control Board's order. Thus, as

the District Court determined, "[b]ecause the University does

not have an independent entitlement to renounce unwanted

provisions in the Agreement, the Control Board, likewise, has

no authority under the 1996 Amendment to compel renouncement by the University." UDC Faculty, 994 F. Supp. at 9.

Far from supporting appellants' cause, the 1996 Amendment actually serves to weaken their contention that the

broad language of the original FRMAA should be read to

authorize the Control Board's action. Although the 1996

Amendment gave the Control Board "enormous power vis--

vis the Mayor, as well as all department and agency heads

subordinate to the Mayor," Shook, 132 F.3d at 779, it also

further delineated the parameters of the Control Board's

authority pursuant to the Act. Nothing in the original Act

prohibited the Control Board from "standing in the shoes" of

the Mayor and other officials, yet Congress felt it necessary

to expressly grant the Control Board this authority in the

1996 Amendment. While not dispositive, Congress's 1996

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 11 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

amendment of the FRMAA certainly suggests that it did not

intend, when it originally enacted the Act, to provide the

Control Board with the unbridled authority that appellants

seek.

4.The Appropriations Act

Finally, appellants point to s 141 of the Appropriations

Act, which directs the Control Board to "take such steps as

are necessary" to avoid exceeding the $74 million deficit

ceiling. Appropriations Act s 141(a)(2). The accompanying

conference report states that the "conferees urge the Mayor,

the City Council, and the control board to use every means

possible to reduce the costs of operating the Nation's Capital

and make every effort to avoid deficit spending." H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 104-740, at 17 (1996). Appellants contend that the

language of s 141 and its legislative history establish authority for the Control Board's order. We disagree.

It is clear to us, just as it was to the District Court, that

s 141 of the Appropriations Act cannot be read to provide the

Control Board with the grant of authority required to promulgate the order at issue in this case. The Act's cryptic

direction to "take such steps as are necessary" surely does

not give the Control Board unlimited authority, and the

Control Board makes no such claim here. Rather, in citing

the Appropriations Act, appellants once again appear to rely

on the implicit contention that any action taken by the

Control Board was lawful unless expressly prohibited by

Congress. We rejected this kind of reasoning as specious in

Railway Labor and we reject it here as well. In disposing of

the parties' arguments on the Appropriations Act, the District

Court got it right when it held that, in drafting s 141,

Congress simply "communicated its desire for the Control

Board to make full use of the powers that Congress had

delegated to it in the FRMAA." UDC Faculty, 994 F. Supp.

at 10.

We note that our conclusion in this regard is supported by

three additional points. First, while Congress may amend

substantive law in an appropriations act, it must do so "clearly." Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440

(1992). Section 141 is far from clear, inasmuch as it makes no

reference to any grant of new authority to cut spending, and

does not purport to amend the FRMAA. Second, under the

language of s 141, the scope of the powers that the Control

Board claims for itself would accrue as well to the District's

Chief Financial Officer. There is nothing to suggest that

Congress intended this result, and appellants do not even

claim as much. Thus, it is doubtful that Congress viewed

s 141 as vesting broad new powers in either the Chief

Financial Officer or the Control Board. Third, in s 140(b) of

the Appropriations Act, the section immediately preceding

the one upon which appellants rely, Congress authorized

agency heads in the District (but not the UDC Trustees) to

terminate employees "[n]otwithstanding any other provision

of law, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement." ApUSCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 12 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

propriations Act s 140(b). This authorization undermines

appellants' argument by making clear that if Congress meant

to suggest that it could authorize certain District officials to

abrogate existing collective bargaining agreements, it knew

how to do so expressly. Section 140(b) also contains procedural protections for terminated employees that were not

provided to the faculty members in this case, suggesting that

the Control Board's claim of unfettered discretion to terminate existing collective bargaining agreements far exceeds the

scope of authority that Congress might have delegated.

5.Summary

We affirm the District Court's determination that the Control Board's order was issued ultra vires. Nothing in the

FRMAA or in the subsequent congressional legislation cited

by appellants gave the Control Board the authority to repudiate the CBA. Accordingly, we hold that the order was

without legal effect.

B.The Contract Claim

In conjunction with its primary contention that the Control

Board's order was issued without legal authority, the Faculty

argues that, if that is the case, UDC undeniably violated the

terms of the CBA. The Faculty's complaint therefore requested that the District Court declare that "all actions taken

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 13 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

pursuant to the Order are rescinded." Complaint at 19,

reprinted in J.A. 19. The District Court did so, declaring

UDC to be in breach of the CBA and ordering "full compliance" with its terms. UDC Faculty Order at 2, reprinted in

J.A. 244. Nothing in the record indicates that the parties or

the trial court dwelt long, if at all, on the contract claim.

Rather, as noted above, the principal focus in the District

Court was on the validity of the order. It appears that the

District Court, after finding that the Control Board's order

was ultra vires, concluded, a fortiori, that UDC had breached

the CBA.

The Faculty asserts that, because the contract claim was

undoubtedly "related to" the ultra vires claim, the District

Court properly exercised its supplemental jurisdiction in considering and resolving the contract claim. See 28 U.S.C.

s 1367(a) (1994). Appellants, however, contend that, under

the terms of the CBA, and in accordance with District of

Columbia law, the Faculty was required to submit its grievance to arbitration before bringing a breach of contract action

in court. See District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d

621, 635 (D.C. 1991) (holding that the D.C. Council intended

the District's Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act ("CMPA"),

D.C. Code Ann. ss 1-601.1 to -637.2, to provide District

employees with an exclusive administrative remedy for the

resolution of their grievances); J.A. 117-21 (detailing the

CBA's grievance procedure). Thus, appellants argue that the

District Court never had jurisdiction over the contract claim,

because the Faculty failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

In the trial court, however, appellants never raised exhaustion, in part because they appeared to concede that the CBA

had been abrogated pursuant to the Control Board's order.

Accordingly, the Faculty claims that appellants waived their

exhaustion defense by failing to raise it before the District

Court. The Faculty also asserts that, under District of

Columbia law, it would have been futile to pursue arbitration

in the face of UDC's flat refusal to follow the CBA's grievance procedures. See Board of Trustees, Univ. of the Dist. of

Columbia v. Myers, 652 A.2d 642, 645 (D.C. 1995) (establishUSCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 14 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ing that a showing of futility may overcome an employer's

exhaustion defense). For their part, appellants cite Thompson and its progeny for the proposition that the so-called

"exhaustion" requirement is, in fact, jurisdictional and, therefore, cannot be waived. See Brief of Appellants at 20-24.

In our view, the parties are on a wild goose chase in

contesting whether the CBA's grievance procedures amount

to a "jurisdictional" bar that precludes resolution of the

contract claim in District Court. District of Columbia law

clearly subscribes to the rule--long considered fundamental

to federal labor policy--that parties to a collective bargaining

agreement who have agreed to submit their disputes to

arbitration normally may not bypass their contract grievance

procedures in favor of a lawsuit. In Jordan v. Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 548 A.2d 792, 796

(D.C. 1988), the D.C. Court of Appeals stressed that:

if the collective bargaining agreement establishes procedures which are intended to be exclusive for resolving

employer-employee grievances ... and if the employee

brings suit against the employer before those grievance

procedures have been exhausted, the employer may defend on the ground that the employee has not exhausted

the exclusive remedies available under the contract.

(footnote omitted); see also Myers, 652 A.2d at 645; cf.

Communications Workers v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 434 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) ("It is a well-settled rule of labor law that parties to

a collective bargaining agreement normally must seek to

resolve their contract disputes under agreed-upon grievance

and arbitration procedures; and where the parties have

agreed to final and binding arbitration, disputes within the

scope of the arbitration clause may not be pursued in a

breach of contract action under section 301 of the [Labor

Management Relations Act] in lieu of arbitration.").

Under prevailing D.C. and federal law, an employee may

bypass the agreed-upon arbitration procedures only by showing that the "grievance procedures are unreasonable or that

the hostility of union officials makes a fair hearing impossible," Jordan, 548 A.2d at 797 (citations omitted), or that

"pursuit of [administrative] remedies would be futile."

Myers, 652 A.2d at 645; see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,

185-88 (1967). In this case, nothing about the CBA's grievance procedures is alleged to be unreasonable. And, since it

is the faculty's union that brought this action, there is certainly no claim that the union has breached its duty of fair

representation. Finally, although the Faculty now contends

that an attempt to arbitrate would be futile, the District

Court has made no such finding. Thus, it appears that the

Faculty's contract claim is subject to arbitration.

It is true that the D.C. Court of Appeals, in Wilson v.

District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 161, 161 n.1 (D.C. 1992),

intimated in a footnote that failure to raise exhaustion in the

trial court could preclude the defense on appeal. It is also

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 15 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

true that the D.C. Court of Appeals has never explicitly

referred to the exhaustion requirement as a "jurisdictional"

bar, thus at least ostensibly leaving open the possibility that a

federal district court could hear an employee grievance under

its supplemental jurisdiction if an objection to exhaustion has

been waived. The Faculty would have us conclude from

these two facts that, as a matter of District of Columbia law,

appellants have waived their exhaustion defense in this case,

because the issue was never raised by appellants before the

District Court.

We decline the invitation to decide this question. We are

convinced that, in normal circumstances, D.C. law holds that

parties to a collective bargaining agreement must resolve

their contract disputes under agreed-upon grievance and

arbitration procedures. In this case, however, because of the

way the matter was initially presented, neither party focused

on the contractual issue in the District Court. Appellants'

failure to raise the so-called exhaustion issue is at least

partially explained by the fact that the validity of the Control

Board's order, and not the actual RIF, was the primary

concern of the parties in the trial court. In these circumstances, we are loath to find that appellants "waived" anything; indeed, all that may be at issue here is a possible

"forfeiture" of the exhaustion defense. Cf. United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (explaining the legal distincUSCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 16 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tion between "waiver" and "forfeiture"). In any event, we

happily eschew the temptation to wander through the maze of

District of Columbia law--to cut fine lines between futility,

forfeiture, waiver, exhaustion, and jurisdiction--when a less

indulgent course is apparent.

Prudence beckons, so we will remand the contract claim to

the District Court. Upon remand, the District Court should

determine whether there are any viable issues remaining to

be resolved in arbitration; if the trial court so finds, then the

case should be submitted to arbitration. In other words, the

District Court should not resolve the contractual issue unless

UDC, upon remand, (1) refuses to participate in an arbitration of the merits of the Faculty's contract claim, so that a

remand to arbitration would be futile; or (2) abandons its

exhaustion defense in light of our decision that the Control

Board's action was ultra vires.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the opinion of the

District Court, insofar as it holds that the Control Board

acted ultra vires when it issued its order. We remand to the

District Court to determine whether the Faculty's contract

claim should now be submitted to arbitration.

So ordered.

USCA Case #98-7024 Document #404424 Filed: 12/22/1998 Page 17 of 17