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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

HERBERT J. 

v. 

VERNE ORR, 

Department 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GULLEY, JR.' ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) No. 

) 

Secretary, United States ) 

of the Air Force, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeala 

Tenth circuit 

JUN 111990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

87-2388 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 83-867-R) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Michael T. Braswell, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

William s. Price, United States Attorney, Steven K. Mullins, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and 

Jay L. Cohen, Major, USAF, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 

Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, JONES,* and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

* The Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 87-2388 Document: 01019857924 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Herbert J. Gulley, Jr. commenced this action 

pursuant to Title VII of_the CiYil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. 

§§ 2000e-2000e-17, alleging that defendant United States Air Force 

failed to promote him and subjected him to a series of 

increasingly severe disciplinary actions, resulting in the 

termination of Gulley's employment as an aircraft painter at 

Tinker Air Force Base, because of his race, black, and in 

retaliation for his assertion of discrimination complaints to the 

Air Force and a congressman. After trial to the court, the 

district court entered a verdict in favor of defendant. 

Gulley appeals, asserting eight grounds for error. 1 He first 

asserts the trial court erred in dismissing his class action 

claims due to his failure to exhaust class administrative 

remedies. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite 

to filing a Title VII action in federal court. 42 u.s.c. 

§ 2000e-16(c); see Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 

832 (1976). Gulley argues that the exhaustion of his individual 

administrative remedies was sufficient to enable him to assert the 

class claims in federal court. Gulley also contends that the 

district court committed numerous errors in its adjudication of 

his individual Title VII claims. We disagree and affirm the 

district court on all grounds. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate 

has determined unanimously that oral argument 

assist the determination of this appeal. See 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The caselS 

submitted without oral argument. 

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record, this panel 

would not materially 

Fed. R. App. P. 

therefore ordered 

Appellate Case: 87-2388 Document: 01019857924 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 2 
I 

Prior to 1977, there. was .. no. administrative procedure 

specifically designed to address class discrimination claims 

commenced by aggrieved individuals. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 

F.2d 1516, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985); James v. Rumsfeld, 580 F.2d 224, 

227~28 (6th Cir. 1978). Under these pre-1977 procedures, the 

exhaustion of individual administrative remedies by one of the 

named plaintiffs was sufficient to enable the class to pursue a 

class action in federal court. See,~, Lewis v. Smith, 731 

F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1984); Rumsfeld, 580 F.2d at 228. 

In 1977, in response to judicial criticism that no 

administrative mechanism existed through which an individual could 

assert class claims in the context of his own individual 

discrimination claims, see generally Barrett v. United States 

Civil Serv. Comm'n, 69 F.R.D. 544, 549-52 (D,D.C. 1975), the Civil 

Service Commission promulgated specific class administrative 

remedies, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.601-.643. 2 See,~, Griffin, 755 

F.2d at 1530-31; Patton v. Brown, 95 F.R.D. 205, 207 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 

1982). These class administrative procedures created a detailed 

scheme markedly different than the administrative mechanism for 

2 These class administrative remedies were originally 

promulgated as 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.601-.643, but are now codified as 

29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.601-.643, as a result of the transfer of 

authority to enforce equal employment opportunity in the federal 

government from the Civil Service Commission to the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission. See Patton. v. Brown, 95 F.R.D. 

205, 207 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1982). --Similarly, individual 

administrative remedies, previously codified as 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 713.201-.283, are now codified as 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.201-.283. 

Id. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2388 Document: 01019857924 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 3 
addressing individual discrimination claims. See McIntosh v. 

Weinberger, 810 F.2d .. l.411, 14.23-25 .. (,8th Cir. 1987), vacated on 

other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 2861 (1988); Patton, 95 F.R.D. at 206-

07. In light of the distinct administrative mechanism created 

specifically to address class claims of discrimination, the weight 

of authority addressing this issue has held that exhaustion of 

individual administrative remedies is insufficient to commence a 

class action in federal court; rather, one of the named plaintiffs 

must have exhausted class administrative remedies. McIntosh, 810 

F.2d at 1423-25; Wade v. Secretary of Army, 796 F.2d 1369, 1373 

(11th Cir. 1986); Lew1s, 731 F.2d at 1540; Patton, 95 F.R.D. at 

207-08; Johnson v. Bond, 94 F.R.D. 125, 127 (N.D. Ill. 1982); 

Downes v. Adams, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 929, 930-31 (E.D. 

N.Y. 1982); Williams v. United States Postal Serv., 33 Fair Empl. 

Prac. Cas. (BNA) 533, 534-35 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Moore v. Orr, 33 

Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 523 (D. Colo. 1982); Thomas v. United 

States Postal Serv., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 521, 522-23 

(N.D. Cal. 1981); contra Fitzwater v. Veterans Admin., 90 F.R.D. 

435, 437-38 (S.D. Ohio 198l)(relying on cases prior to 1977 

promulgation of class administrative remedies). We agree with the 

majority and therefore uphold the district court's determination 

that Gulley's class action claims were barred due to his failure 

to exhaust class administrative remedies. In light of our holding 

on this issue, it is unnecessary for us to address plaintiff's 

other two class action arguments. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2388 Document: 01019857924 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 4 
II 

.. Gulley asserts the trial court erred in finding that the 

disciplinary actions instituted against him were not retaliatory 

and that the Air Force was not engaging in discrimination when it 

refused to promote him. This court reviews a trial court's 

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. See Pitre v. 

Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). "If the 

district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of 

the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not 

reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the 

trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." 

Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 

573-74 (1985)). 

Gulley. asserts two kinds of discrimination cognizable under 

Title VII: (1) that he was discriminated against because of his 

race in that the Air Force failed to promote him despite three 

vacant supervisory positions; and (2) that he was reprimanded and 

discharged in retaliation for his having complained of 

discriminatory treatment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-3. In each 

cause of action, Gulley bears the burden of presenting a prima 

facie case that the Air Force's actions were motivated by unlawful 

considerations. In each instance the Air Force may prevail by 

asserting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dep't 

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See 

generally Love v. RE/MAX of Arn., Inc., 738 F.2d 383 (10th Cir._ 

1984) (applying McDonnell Douglas prima facie case analysis to 

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Appellate Case: 87-2388 Document: 01019857924 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 5 
. ( 

Title VII retaliation claim) and Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 

646 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying. McDong,ell, Douglas analysis 

to Title VII action for discrimination in promotion decisions). 

Gulley established a prima facie case for both causes of action; 

however, in each instance, the Air Force rebutted Gulley's showing 

with a plausible nondiscriminatory justification for its actions. 

The district court did not clearly err in its decision to credit 

the Air Force's version over Gulley's. See Pitre, 843 F.2d at 

1266. 

Gulley argues that the Air Force's system of detailing 

employees to supervisory positions prior to announcing the 

vacancies and then filling the vacancies with those employees 

already detailed to those assignments was unlawfully 

discriminatory under a disparate impact theory. See Hawkins v. 

Bounds, 752 F. 2d 500, 502-04 (10th Cir. 1985). Because such 

detailing practices have been found to be unlawfully 

discriminatory, see id. at 502-04; Chisholm v. United States 

Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 494-97 (4th Cir. 1981); Machakos v. 

Meese, 647 F. Supp. 1253, 1261 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 859 F.2d 1487 

(D.C. Cir. 1988), this court has viewed, and continues to view, 

detailing practices with suspicion. See Hawkins, 752 F.2d at 

502-04. Nonetheless, because Gulley failed to present any 

evidence of the discriminatory effect of defendant's detailing 

policy, he was not entitled to relief under this theory. See 

Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 

1987)(plaintiff not entitled to relief under disparate impact 

challenge to a suspect pexsonnel policy where plaintiff failed to 

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Appellate Case: 87-2388 Document: 01019857924 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 6 
produce sufficient evidence of the discriminatory impact of the 

challenged policy). 

Gulley next argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion for a default judgment, made at the close of trial, 

alleging that the Air Force failed to answer his second amended 

complaint. The Air Force concedes its failure to do so. 

Appellee's Brief at 46. In light of the strong preference for the 

disposition of litigation on the merits, see Gomes v. Williams, 

420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970), and the lack of any 

allegation of prejudice to Gulley, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Gulley's motion for default 

judgment. See Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 840 (1989). 

Gulley's final argument on appeal is that the district court 

erred in quashing two of Gulley's subpoenas. A motion to quash a 

subpoena is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See, 

~, United States v. Peters, 687 F.2d 1295, 1297 (10th Cir. 

1982). Upon careful review of the record on appeal, we determine 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the 

subpoenas. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

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