Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02344/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02344-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONNE BATTLE,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-01-2344 GEB DAD P

vs.

V. SANCHEZ, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with this civil rights action. 

Defendants Sanchez and Bonaccorso are retired state employees. The case is before the court on

these defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has not filed opposition to defendants’ motion despite multiple court

orders requiring him to do so.

BACKGROUND

The court received plaintiff’s civil rights complaint on November 2, 2001. The

Clerk of the Court filed the complaint in Tyronne Battle v. V. Sanchez, et al., case No. CIV S-00-

1442 FCD JFM P, a case that had been dismissed without prejudice on October 9, 2001, for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. On December 21, 2001, it was

determined that a new civil rights action should be opened for the complaint filed on November

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2, 2001. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint was removed from the closed case and filed in new

case No. CIV S-01-2344 GEB DAD P.

Plaintiff complied with the court’s January 4, 2002 order directing him to pay the

filing fee or submit an in forma pauperis application. Plaintiff also complied with the court’s

February 14, 2002 order requiring him to submit a signed copy of his complaint. On March 6,

2002, the court screened plaintiff’s complaint, determined that the pleading states cognizable

claims, and authorized service of the complaint on the four named defendants: V. Sanchez, S.

Bonaccorso, A. Thompson, and C/O Gomez.

On August 16, 2002, all defendants joined in a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The undersigned

recommended that the motion be granted with regard to plaintiff’s claims against defendants

Thompson and Gomez, as well as all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and that the motion be

denied with regard to plaintiff’s claims of retaliation and property deprivation against defendants

Sanchez and Bonaccorso. The findings and recommendations were adopted in full on February

18, 2003. Defendants Sanchez and Bonaccorso filed their answer to the complaint on March 4,

2003.

By a scheduling order filed August 18, 2003, the court set a discovery deadline of

December 19, 2003, a pretrial motion deadline of February 13, 2004, pretrial conference on June

11, 2004, and jury trial on August 31, 2004. On February 6, 2004, one week prior to the deadline

for filing dispositive motions, defendants filed a motion for the sanction of dismissal grounded

on plaintiff’s refusal to answer questions at his deposition on December 19, 2003, the day on

which all discovery was to be completed. The undersigned recommended that the motion for

dismissal be denied because defendants’ proper remedy was to seek a court order requiring

plaintiff to testify, and the deadline for seeking such an order expired on December 19, 2003. 

The findings and recommendations were adopted in full on March 22, 2004.

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On May 26, 2004, the court received plaintiff’s timely but defective pretrial

statement. On June 4, 2004, the due date for defendants’ pretrial statement, defendants lodged a

request for a thirty-day extension of time to file their pretrial statement. Shortly thereafter

plaintiff filed an untimely supplement to his pretrial statement together with a motion for an

extension of time to file an unspecified pretrial motion. The parties’ filings demonstrated that

the parties would not be ready for trial on August 31, 2004. By order filed June 18, 2004, the

court directed plaintiff to file an amended pretrial statement, set a new date for defendants’

pretrial statement, continued the pretrial conference to September 10, 2004, set a trial

confirmation hearing for December 17, 2004, and continued trial to January 17, 2005.

One week after new dates were set, defendants filed a belated request for leave to

file a motion for summary judgment and lodged a proposed motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff filed a second timely but defective pretrial statement, a motion for attendance of

incarcerated witnesses at trial, and an objection to defendants’ request for leave to file a motion

for summary judgment. In light of the inadequacies of plaintiff’s pretrial statements, the court

granted defendants’ request on August 31, 2004, directed the Clerk to file the proposed motion,

and ordered plaintiff to file opposition to the motion within thirty days. All dates were vacated.

Plaintiff did not file timely opposition to defendants’ motion and did not request

an extension of time to do so. By order filed October 13, 2004, the court granted plaintiff an

additional thirty days to file his opposition. No document has been filed in this action since

October 13, 2004, with the exception of a recent notice of reassignment of counsel for

defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Sanchez and Bonaccorso searched his cell outside

his presence on June 21, 2000, and that numerous items of personal property were taken. 

Plaintiff further alleges that defendants Sanchez and Bonaccorso took his property in retaliation

for a lawsuit plaintiff had filed against defendant Bonaccorso.

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At screening, the court found that the pro se pleading describes an intentional

deprivation of property carried out pursuant to established state procedures and asserts that the

motivation for the deprivation was retaliation against plaintiff for exercising a constitutional

right. After defendants filed their motion to dismiss, the court reviewed the complaint pursuant

to the standards applicable to Rule 12(b) motions and found again that plaintiff’s pro se

complaint states claims concerning property deprivation, due process violations, and retaliation.

STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated by a party that “there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party may seek summary judgment upon all or any part

of another party’s claim. Id.

The moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. 

Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. Summary judgment

should be granted “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or

admissible discovery material in support of the contention that a dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The party opposing summary judgment must show that

any fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In trying to

establish the existence of a factual dispute, the party opposing summary judgment need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in his or her favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on

1963 amendments).

The evidence of the party opposing summary judgment is to be believed, and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in

favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587. Inferences will not be drawn out of the air, however; it is the opposing party’s

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. Richards v.

Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902

(9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is some

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metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

By order filed March 25, 2002, plaintiff was advised of the requirements for

opposing a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,

957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

DEFENDANTS’ EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS

Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the facts do not

support plaintiff’s retaliation claim and (2) both defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendants offer a detailed statement of undisputed facts supported by the declarations of

defendant Sanchez, defendant Bonaccorso, and Correctional Officer M. Gomez. Attached to the

declarations are photographs and documents, including a cell search form for the relevant date

and plaintiff’s property inventory records. 

Defendants’ evidence establishes the following facts: plaintiff is a wheelchairbound state prisoner who is housed at the California Medical Facility; on June 21, 2000, plaintiff

lived in a hospital dorm room in the G-1 hospital of Unit 1; at that time, defendant Bonaccorso

was facility captain and defendant Sanchez was facility lieutenant for Unit 1; Bonaccorso was

responsible for the overall safety and security of the unit and routinely made rounds to examine

the inmates’ living quarters; state regulations require that the combined volume of an inmate’s

state-issued and allowable personal property items in a cell or dorm room shall not exceed six

cubic feet; state regulations authorize routine searches of prison cells, rooms, and dormitory areas

to assess whether excess property or contraband, i.e., unauthorized or altered items, pose a threat

to institutional safety, security, order, sanitation, or health; inmates do not have a right to be

present during routine, general searches of a cell or dorm room when staff are not searching for a

particular item; plaintiff lived in a closed medical wing akin to a convalescent hospital; ensuring

that hospital living areas are clean and free of excess property and contraband is important to

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maintaining a clean, sanitary, and secure atmosphere; on June 21, 2000, while making her

rounds, Bonaccorso determined that plaintiff’s dorm area had excessive property, including

excess food, was very messy, and was not sanitary; since plaintiff’s dorm area did not appear to

comply with regulations that require cleanliness and limit personal property to six cubic feet,

Bonaccorso initiated a search of plaintiff’s dorm area by notifying facility lieutenant Sanchez that

she believed plaintiff’s dorm area needed to be searched for excessive property and contraband;

Sanchez concurred; Bonaccorso and Sanchez entered plaintiff’s dorm area, and Bonaccorso

notified plaintiff that staff would be searching his area; Bonaccorso assigned two correctional

officers whom she believed were very knowledgeable regarding property issues to assist her; one

of the officers was Correctional Officer M. Gomez, who was a search and escort officer for the

central office at CMF but had worked with Bonaccorso in the past; Bonaccorso asked Gomez to

do the search because she knew he did cell searches thoroughly, fairly, and “by the book”;

Bonaccorso explained to Gomez that plaintiff had contraband and property in excess of six cubic

feet, that his living area posed a health, safety, and sanitation hazard, and that the area needed to

be searched; in accordance with Bonaccorso’s instructions, Gomez and another officer obtained

plaintiff’s property inventory list and methodically went through plaintiff’s belongings to

confiscate items he did not have permission to have and to throw away trash; the two officers

were authorized to determine what property was excess property or contraband; items that

plaintiff was allowed to possess were left behind by the officers; the officers spent approximately

two hours searching plaintiff’s dorm area; photographs of plaintiff’s living area and the

confiscated property show that plaintiff had a large amount of property and that his living area

was messy; the officers removed three to four bags of trash from plaintiff’s living area; before

any item was removed, the officers verified whether the item was on plaintiff’s property

inventory; the officers filled out a standard cell search form for their search; plaintiff was present

at the beginning of the search; after plaintiff became unruly, correctional staff wheeled him in his

wheelchair into the shower so that the search could be concluded; during the search, Bonaccorso

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came and went, monitoring the officers’ progress; Bonaccorso approved all items taken from

plaintiff’s living area and verified that they were not authorized items or exceeded the space

limit; the search was routine and was done because plaintiff had excess property and contraband

in his area; Sanchez scanned the confiscated items but did not itemize them herself and was not

involved in deciding which items would stay and which would be taken; Sanchez did not observe

the entire search but entered and exited the area a few times and observed the officers searching

and inventorying plaintiff’s belongings; Sanchez did not actively participate in the search; at the

time of the search, Sanchez was aware of several lawsuits that inmates had filed against her over

the years, but she was not specifically aware of or concerned about case No. 98-2086 FCD DAD

P; at the time of the search, defendant Bonaccorso and Correctional Officer Gomez were not

aware of the lawsuit against defendant Sanchez; Bonaccorso initiated the search of plaintiff’s

hospital area to promote a clean, safe, and orderly hospital environment, as she was required to

do under prison regulations.

Defendants contend that their evidence proves that the search of plaintiff’s living

area furthered the legitimate penological objectives of maintaining an orderly, sanitary, and safe

hospital environment and that the search was not done in retaliation for a 1998 lawsuit plaintiff

had filed against defendant Sanchez. Defendants argue that there is no evidence that retaliation

for constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor, much less a substantial factor or

the sole motivating factor, for their actions.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because both of

them could reasonably have believed it was lawful to search plaintiff’s cell and confiscate excess

property and contraband. Defendants point to the evidence that defendant Bonaccorso followed

prison regulations closely and assigned the search task to officers who were experienced,

thorough, and meticulous, while defendant Sanchez was merely an observer rather than an active

participant in the search.

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PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS

Because plaintiff has refused to file opposition to defendants’ motion, the court

deems his pretrial statements to be his opposition to the motion.

Plaintiff’s first pretrial statement identifies these undisputed facts: (1) plaintiff is

a 59 year old paraplegic and diabetic inmate in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections; (2) on June 21, 2000, the defendants came to plaintiff’s dorm, had plaintiff locked

in the shower, “proceeded to tear [plaintiff’s] area apart and left it that way, and took all of the

property listed in plaintiff’s complaint.” (Pl.’s May 26, 2004 Pretrial Statement at 1-2.) Plaintiff

identifies one disputed factual issue: “Why Capt. Bonaccorso was not around to answer my

Appeal when it was sent to her in a Timely Fashion.” (Id. at 2.) The sole relief sought is “Return

of property taken or replacement.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he “brings this action before the

court because defendant’s [sic] maliciously and flagrantly locked plaintiff in the shower and

illegally took plaintiffs [sic] property under Color of State Law, ” in violation of two state

regulations. Plaintiff states that § 3287(3) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

provides that an inmate should be permitted to observe a search when it is reasonably possible

and safe to do so and the search has been initiated because the inmate is suspected of having a

specific item or items of contraband in his or her property or quarters. Plaintiff states that § 3193

provides that the CDC accepts liability for the loss or destruction of inmate personal property

when it is established that such loss or destruction results from employee negligence. Plaintiff

asserts that his property was taken due to defendants’ “intentional negligence.” Plaintiff cites no

authority regarding retaliation and no authority regarding federal constitutional rights related to

property or due process. (Id. at 2-3.)

The court instructed plaintiff to file a new pretrial statement setting forth the

undisputed facts and disputed factual issues concerning his federal constitutional claims of

retaliation and property deprivation. Plaintiff was cautioned that failure to set forth undisputed

facts and disputed factual issues with regard to either claim will result in a determination that the

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claim has been abandoned. Plaintiff was also advised that his amended pretrial statement must

include points and authorities demonstrating that he intends to prove a violation of federal

constitutional rights. Plaintiff was cautioned that failure to cite such authorities for either claim

will result in a determination that the constitutional claim has been abandoned. Plaintiff was

advised that, if no federal constitutional issue remains to be decided, the undersigned will

recommend that this action be dismissed. (Order filed June 18, 2004, at 3.)

In his amended pretrial statement, plaintiff asserts the same undisputed facts: (1)

he is a 59 year-old paraplegic and diabetic inmate in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections; (2) on June 21, 2000, the defendants came to plaintiff’s dorm, had plaintiff locked

in the shower, and “proceeded to tear [plaintiff’s] bed and locker area apart and left it that way,

and took all of the property listed in plaintiff’s complaint.” (Pl.’s July 22, 2004 Am. Pretrial

Statement at 1-2.) Plaintiff identifies the disputed factual issue previously identified and adds a

disputed evidentiary issue: “Why Capt. Bonaccorso was not around to answer my appeal when it

was sent to her in a timely fashion” and “Whether or not Plaintiff was locked in the shower, and

what was taken from plaintiff.” (Id. at 2.)

In his amended points of law, plaintiff cites the state regulations previously cited,

again to show that defendants “maliciously and flagrantly locked plaintiff in the shower and

illegally took plaintiff’s property. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff adds that it was the defendants’ intent to

take his property and dispose of it so that he could not get it back. Plaintiff asserts that

defendants “have violated plaintiff’s Due Process and Equal Protection rights” and “illegally

deprived plaintiff of his Personal Property.” Plaintiff cites four federal cases regarding the

pleading requirements for stating a cause of action for property deprivation under § 1983 as well

as one Supreme Court case and two treatises regarding deprivation of property interests, the

defense of good faith, and the vicarious liability of a superior for a subordinate’s acts. (Id. at 2-

3.) The only relief sought is return of property taken or replacement. (Id. at 2.)

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ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

Prisoners may not be retaliated against for exercising their right of access to the

courts. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). In order to prevail on a claim

of retaliation, a prisoner must prove facts demonstrating that he was retaliated against for

exercising a constitutional right and that the retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor for

each defendant’s acts or conduct. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87

(1977); Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314-16 (9th Cir. 1989). A prisoner

must also prove that each defendant’s retaliatory acts did not advance legitimate penological

goals. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-

16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

Defendants’ evidence shows that it was defendant Bonaccorso who initiated the

search of plaintiff’s dorm area, and she was unaware of plaintiff’s 1998 lawsuit against defendant

Sanchez. Defendant Sanchez was generally aware of several lawsuits brought against her over

the years but had no specific recollection of plaintiff’s 1998 lawsuit against her when she

concurred with defendant Bonaccorso’s decision to search plaintiff’s living area. It does not

appear that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact concerning defendants’ motivation for

the June 21, 2000 search. The burden then shifts to plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s pretrial statements do not mention retaliation and do not set forth any

undisputed fact, any disputed factual issue, any relief sought, or any point of law pertaining to

retaliation. In light of defendants’ evidence and plaintiff’s abandonment of his retaliation claim,

the undersigned finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

II. Plaintiff’s Property Deprivation and Due Process Claim

A prisoner may not be deprived of a protected property interest without due

process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Protected property interests are

“created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an

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independent source, such as state law – rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and

that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

577 (1972). The scope of a property interest is defined by state law. Id.; Soranno’s Gasco, Inc.

v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1989). The process due generally includes notice of

intended deprivation and an opportunity to oppose it. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-

49 (1976); Jordan v. City of Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1984).

“[T]he Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an

official causing unintended loss of or injury to . . . property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

328 (1986). In addition, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee

does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). In California, such a remedy is available in the

form of a tort claim against public officials pursuant to California Government Code § 900, et

seq. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999). Because the State of

California provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for a property deprivation that was

negligent or unauthorized, the allegation of a negligent deprivation of property or an

unauthorized deprivation of property fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A

postdeprivation remedy may not satisfy due process “where the property deprivation is effected

pursuant to an established state procedure.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534. An authorized, intentional

deprivation of property by a public official may constitute an actionable violation of the Due

Process Clause. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982).

Defendants have shown that plaintiff’s personal property exceeded the six-cubicfeet limit and that his living area in the hospital dorm was messy. The evidence demonstrates

that a routine search was conducted on June 21, 2000, for the purpose of removing contraband

and excess property in accordance with state regulations and for legitimate penological reasons. 

The two correctional officers who performed the search were knowledgeable and experienced,

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and defendant Bonaccorso authorized the officers to determine what property was contraband or

excessive. The officers obtained plaintiff’s property inventory list and methodically went

through plaintiff’s belongings to determine which items were on his list. All items that plaintiff

was allowed to have were left behind. The officers confiscated items plaintiff did not have

permission to have and threw away three or four bags of trash. Before any item was removed,

the officers verified that the item was not on plaintiff’s property inventory. The officers

completed a standard cell search form. During the two hours that the officers were conducting

the search, defendant Bonaccorso monitored their progress and approved the items that were

removed after she verified that the items were not authorized or exceeded the space limit. 

Defendant Sanchez also scanned the confiscated items.

The scope of plaintiff’s protected property interest is defined by § 3190 of Title 15

of the California Code of Regulations. This regulation requires wardens to maintain a list of

personal property items and the maximum amount of such items an inmate may have in his

possession within the institution. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3190(a). The regulation also requires

institutions to permit inmates to possess state property items issued to them and personal

property items that present no threat to institution security or the safety of persons. Id. “The

combined volume of state-issued and allowable personal property items shall not exceed six

cubic feet,” and an inmate is limited to any two of the following items: one television receiver,

one musical instrument, one radio, one recorded tape/disk playback unit, and one typewriter. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3190(b). As defined by this regulation, an inmate does not have a

protected property interest in items not on his personal property list, in more than two of the

items listed in § 3190(b), in contraband, or in property that exceeds the limit of six cubic feet.

Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that plaintiff was not deprived

of a protected property interest without due process. The burden then shifts to plaintiff. Plaintiff

has not disputed that his combined volume of state-issued and allowable personal property

exceeded six cubic feet on June 21, 2000. Nor has he disputed that the two correctional officers

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removed three or four bags of trash and confiscated such property as two hot pots that had been

altered, a cane for which plaintiff had no chrono, numerous items that were not on plaintiff’s

personal property list, and excessive amounts of state-issued clothing, medical supplies, and

electrical cables and jacks. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that he was entitled to possess any

specific item that was taken from him of June 21, 2000.

In his pretrial statements, plaintiff appears to claim he had a right under state law

to be present during the search. Plaintiff’s reliance on § 3287 of Title 15 of the California Code

of Regulations is misplaced. The regulation merely provides that the inmate should be permitted

to observe the search when it is a special inspection or when the search was initiated because the

inmate is suspected of having a specific item or items of contraband in his property or quarters. 

Defendants’ evidence shows that the search conducted on June 21, 2000, was not a special

inspection and was not initiated because plaintiff was suspected of having a specific item or

items of contraband in his property or quarters. Moreover, the regulation provides that the

inmate should be permitted to observe the search only when it is reasonably possible and safe to

do so. Defendants’ evidence shows that plaintiff was permitted to be present until he interfered

with the search by becoming unruly, thereby rendering it unsafe and not reasonably possible for

him to be present. In any event, inmates have no federal constitutional right to the particular

procedures established by state law. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1096-97 (9th

Cir. 1986). For these reasons, plaintiff has no federal claim arising from the fact that he was not

allowed to be present throughout the search of his cell. 

Plaintiff’s pretrial statements also appear to assert a general due process violation

arising from defendants’ “intentional negligence” and lack of good faith. To the extent that

plaintiff was deprived of any item of property due to the negligence of either defendant or due to

an unauthorized intentional act of either defendant, such a deprivation did not violate the

requirements of the Due Process Clause because a meaningful postdeprivation remedy was

available to plaintiff in the form of a state tort claim. To the extent that plaintiff argues lack of

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good faith, defendants’ evidence supports a conclusion that each defendant had a good faith

belief that it was lawful to search plaintiff’s cell for the purpose of removing excess property and

contraband.

In light of defendants’ evidence and plaintiff’s failure to offer any admissible

evidence that establishes the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, the undersigned

finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s property deprivation

and due process claim.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ August 31, 2004 motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule

56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be granted on all remaining claims; and

2. This action be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. A document containing objections

should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply

to objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain

circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 11, 2005.

DAD:13

batt2344.msj

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