Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01531/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01531-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., a Delaware

corporation, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, 

vs.

Avago Technologies Limited, a Singapore

corporation; Avago Technologies U.S.,

Inc., a Delaware corporation, Avago

Technologies Wireless IP (Singapore) Pte.,

Ltd., a Singapore corporation, 

Defendants/CounterClaimants.

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No. CV 09-1531-PHX-JAT

ORDER

UNDER SEAL

Pending before the Court are TriQuint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docs.

307, 415), Avago’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 313, 420), TriQuint's Motion to

Strike Avago's Reply Statement of Facts, Exhibits, and Declarations (Doc. 377), Triquint's

Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Declaration of Jonathan M. James (Doc. 369),

Avago's Motion for Leave to File Reply Declarations and Reply Statement of Facts (Doc.

387), Avago's Motion to Preclude Margaret Meyer's Deposition Testimony (Doc. 316),

Avago’s Motion for Spoliation Sanctions (Docs. 318, 319), Avago’s Motion to Preclude

Argument that TriQuint and Dr. Aigner did not Have Notice and Knowledge of Potential

Litigation when TriQuint Destroyed Evidence and Motion for Expedited Consideration

(Docs. 375, 434), TriQuint’s Motion to Strike Avago’s Motion to Preclude Argument (Doc.

385), Avago’s Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record with Newly Discovered Evidence

Case 2:09-cv-01531-JAT Document 454 Filed 02/24/12 Page 1 of 92
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(Doc. 444), and Avago’s Motion to Seal Exhibits to Its Motion to Supplement the Record

(Doc. 447). Having considered all the evidence and heard oral argument on January 30,

2012, the Court issues the following Order:

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. (“TriQuint”) alleges that

Defendants/Counterclaimants Avago Technologies Limited, Avago Technologies U.S., Inc.,

and Avago Technologies Wireless IP (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. (collectively, “Avago”) have

infringed three of TriQuint patents and have violated the antitrust laws. Avago filed a

counterclaim against TriQuint for alleged infringement of ten Avago patents,

misappropriation of Avago trade secrets, and infringement of Avago copyrights. The parties

both design, manufacture and sell high-performance radio frequency filters, and power

amplifier integrated circuits (chips) and modules (multiple chips on a circuit board) for use

in wireless communications products, such as mobile telephone handsets.

The technology at issue in this case concerns bulk acoustic wave (“BAW”) products

used in mobile telephones to filter transmitted and received radio frequency signals and the

manufacturing processes used to design and produce those products. BAW filters are

incredibly small, and as a result, manufacturing BAW filters is a highly technical process.

The several patents at issue in this case concern the construction and composition of BAW

filters and the parts that make up BAW filters, such as resonators. The trade secret and

copyright claims involve source code, computer layout files, and design and manufacturing

processes that are used to produce BAW products. Finally, the antitrust claims are directed

at what TriQuint alleges to be Avago’s monopolization, attempted monopolization, and

lessening of competition in various BAW product markets both through its acquisition of the

BAW business of Infineon, a former manufacturer of BAW products, and through its actions

in the marketplace.

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PRELIMINARY MOTIONS AND ISSUES

I. Avago’s Motion for Spoliation Sanctions (Docs. 318, 319), Avago’s Motion to

Preclude Argument and Motion for Expedited Consideration (Docs. 375, 434),

and TriQuint’s Motion to Strike Avago’s Motion to Preclude (Doc. 385)

In connection with its trade secrets claims, Avago has moved for spoliation sanctions

against TriQuint. Avago alleges that three TriQuint employees, Dr. Aigner, Dr. Fattinger,

and Dr. Volatier, destroyed key evidence in this case by permanently deleting computer files

from their computers’ hard drives. Furthermore, Avago alleges that the deletion of the files

occurred in early July 2009, at a time when the doctors were aware of TriQuint’s pending

litigation with Avago and of their obligation to preserve evidence for the pending litigation.

Thus, Avago asks this Court to impose spoliation sanctions on TriQuint including an entry

of default judgment against TriQuint on Avago’s trade secret claims. As a lesser alternative,

Avago asks for at least an imposition of an adverse inference against TriQuint with respect

to the content of the destroyed evidence. Avago also asks the Court to award attorneys’ fees

incurred by Avago to investigate TriQuint’s conduct and to prepare Avago’s motion for

spoliation.

The Court has discretion under its inherent powers to sanction a party who causes the

spoliation of evidence. See Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2006). This

discretion is broad and can range from minor sanctions, such as the awarding of attorneys’

fees, Leon, 464 F.3d at 961, to more serious sanctions, such as dismissal of claims, id. at 958,

or instructing the jury that it may draw an adverse inference. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.,

627 F.3d 376, 386-387 (9th Cir. 2010). Sanctions under these “inherent powers must be

exercised with restraint” and should be appropriate to the conduct that triggered the sanction.

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991). 

Destruction of evidence or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as

evidence in pending litigation constitutes spoliation. See United States v. Kitsap Physicians

Serv., 314 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002). Specifically, failure to “preserve electronic or

other records, once the duty to do so has been triggered, raises the issue of spoliation of

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evidence and its consequences.” Surowiec v. Capital Title Agency, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d.

997, 1005 (D. Ariz. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219

F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003)); see also Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (noting willful destruction of

electronic files constituted spoliation).

“A party seeking sanctions for spoliation of evidence must prove the following

elements: (1) the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it when

it was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss was accompanied by a ‘culpable state

of mind;’ and (3) the evidence that was destroyed or altered was ‘relevant’ to the claims or

defenses of the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated evidence[.]” Surowiec, 790

F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (quoting Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D.

Md. 2009)). The Court will now examine each of these elements to determine if Avago has

sufficiently established that TriQuint and its employees engaged in conduct that led to the

spoliation of evidence and warrants sanctions.

A. Obligation to Preserve Evidence

TriQuint has admitted in its separate briefing for Avago’s Motion to Preclude

Argument (Doc. 385), and at oral argument, that the company and its employees were aware

of the duty to preserve evidence at the time that the files were permanently deleted from the

doctors’ hard drives. Therefore, the Court finds that an obligation to preserve evidence did

exist in early July 2009 when the files were deleted.

B. Culpable State of Mind

“Courts have not been uniform in defining the level of culpability—be it negligence,

gross negligence, willfulness, or bad faith—that is required before sanctions are appropriate.”

Surowiec, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Nor is there

consensus as to how the level of culpability is to be determined, or what prejudice, if any,

may be presumed from culpable conduct.” Id. at 1006-1007. However, it is clear that “[a]n

allegedly spoliating party’s culpability must be determined case-by-case.” Id. at 1007.

Furthermore, “[a] party’s destruction of evidence qualifies as willful spoliation if the party

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has ‘some notice that the documents were potentially relevant to the litigation before they

were destroyed.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).

In this case, the deletion of the files was particularly egregious. The manner in which

the files were deleted clearly points to a finding that the conduct was willful. There is no

dispute that Drs. Fattinger and Volatier did not merely delete the files from their hard drives.

Rather, the doctors admit that they used secure deletion programs that go by the names of

“O&O SafeErase” and “File Shredder.” These programs remove all traces of the deleted files

in an attempt to hide the fact that the files ever existed. Indeed, the parties subsequent

attempts to recover, or even identify the deleted files through sophisticated computer forensic

examination proved futile. Furthermore, as mentioned, TriQuint was under obligation to

preserve evidence at the time the files were deleted. The record indicates that, prior to the

deletion of the files, Dr. Aigner had been in fairly regular contact with TriQuint’s attorneys

regarding any potential litigation with Avago, and that Dr. Aigner subsequently gave the

orders to Drs. Fattinger and Volatier to securely delete the computer files. 

When considered against these facts, TriQuint’s arguments that the doctors were not

acting with a “culpable state of mind,” but rather were deleting the files with other motives

in mind, such as to comply with TriQuint’s policy against using the source code of the

employees’ previous employers, are unavailing. Therefore, the Court finds that TriQuint and

its employees had notice of the potential relevance of the files on their computers at the time

they were deleted and that the deletion of the files using secure deletion programs was

willful.

C. Relevance to the Claims

With regard to willful spoliation of documents, the Ninth Circuit has endorsed the

view that “because ‘the relevance of . . . destroyed documents cannot be clearly ascertained

because the documents no longer exist,’ a party ‘can hardly assert any presumption of

irrelevance as to the destroyed documents.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 959 (internal citation omitted).

Nevertheless, TriQuint attempts to argue that Avago has not demonstrated that the contents

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of any of the deleted files were relevant to this litigation. TriQuint further argues that any

files TriQuint could have misused would have necessarily been kept on its servers rather than

on the doctors’ computers and that Avago’s extensive arguments in its summary judgment

motions indicate that Avago believes it has sufficient evidence to make its case, thereby

rendering the deleted evidence irrelevant. However, in light of the doctors extreme actions

to remove any traces of the files from their computers after the duty to preserve evidence had

arisen, these arguments are hardly credible. Therefore, the Court finds that the deleted files

were relevant to this case.

D. Appropriate Sanction

In light of the foregoing, the Court must determine what, if any, sanction is

appropriate in this case. Specifically, the Court “must determine which sanction best (1)

deters parties from future spoliation, (2) places the risk of an erroneous judgment on the

spoliating party, and (3) restores the innocent party to their rightful litigation position.”

Surowiec, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

Furthermore, there is a five-part test to determine whether a sanction determining

liability in favor of one party is just: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the [party

seeking sanctions]; (4) the public policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits; and

(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788

(9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

The first two factors favor judgment for Avago on liability. Both the Court and the

public have a strong interest in judicial efficiency and the prompt resolution of this case;

thus, TriQuint’s deletion of the computer files, which has resulted in discovery disputes and

the instant motion for sanctions, weigh in favor of a liability-determining sanction against

TriQuint.

Conversely, the final two factors do not favor a judgment for Avago on liability.

Certainly, the desire to resolve a case on its merits always weighs against such a sanction.

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Moreover, here, less drastic sanctions are available, including the imposition of an adverse

inference against TriQuint, which Avago has sought as an alternative sanction to entry of a

default judgment.

The third factor, however, requires closer analysis. That factor, prejudice, “looks to

whether the spoliating party’s actions impaired the non-spoliating party’s ability to go to trial

or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Leon, 464 F.3d at 959

(citation and brackets omitted). In this case, the question of whether Avago has been

prejudiced by the deletion of the computer files largely revolves around whether any of those

files were duplicated on TriQuint’s servers and thus subsequently among the more than

91,000 MATLAB and GDS files produced to Avago during the course of this litigation.

The only real evidence that TriQuint offers to support its theory that most, if not all

of the deleted files were backed up on its servers comes in the form of the testimony from

the doctors themselves. That is, both Drs. Fattinger and Volatier testified that, to the best of

their knowledge, every file that they deleted from their computers with the secure deletion

software had already been uploaded to and stored on TriQuint’s servers. TriQuint further

asserts that the results of the neutral forensic examiner support the doctors’ assertions

because, in accordance with Dr. Fattinger’s testimony, the forensic report showed only that

files were deleted from a “MATLAB” directory on his computer. 

In response, Avago points out that the neutral forensic examination produced no

evidence that any files were deleted from Dr. Volatier’s computer, even though he has

admitted to deleting files, and that therefore the forensic examination is very limited in both

its capability and reliability. That fact further underscores the general thrust of Avago’s

argument, which is that there is no longer any way to determine the exact files that were

deleted from the doctors’ computers, other than by accepting the testimony of Drs. Fattinger

and Volatier. Though Avago urges the Court to simply exclude the testimony and impose

sanctions, the Court finds that Avago has not sufficiently demonstrated a valid reason for

excluding the testimony from evidence. 

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Under these circumstances, the Court cannot accurately determine whether Avago

actually suffered any prejudice without also making a determination of the credibility of the

doctors’ testimony. Thus, the Court must refrain from making a final determination on

prejudice and instead allow the jury to decide whether the doctors testimony is to be

believed. See FMC Techs., Inc. v. Edwards, 2007 WL 1725098, at *10 (W.D. Wash., June

12, 2007) (refusing to impose sanctions for alleged destruction of computer files because

most of the allegations hinged on witness credibility that required evaluation by a jury).

Moreover, while the doctors’ conduct certainly calls their credibility into question, it cannot

be said that no reasonably jury would believe the doctors’ description of which files they

personally deleted. 

Without a determination of prejudice to Avago, the Court must also refrain from

imposing any sanctions at this time. While Avago has likely satisfied the test for imposition

of at least an adverse inference with regard to any permanently deleted evidence, the Court

is unwilling to impose such a drastic measure without further assurance that the evidence in

question was, in fact, permanently deleted. Conversely, prejudice is likely absent or lessened

if any or all of the deleted files resurfaced in this litigation by way of back-up copies on

TriQuint’s servers. Thus, depending on the jury’s finding with regard to whether or not any

of the deleted files were backed up on TriQuint’s servers, then the issue of prejudice to

Avago can be revisited and any appropriate sanctions can be imposed at that time. For now,

however, Avago’s motion for spoliation sanctions must be DENIED.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, TriQuint has admitted that the deletion of the

files from the doctors’ computers occurred after the duty to preserve arose, meaning that

TriQuint admits that both it and its employees had notice of potential litigation when the files

were deleted. Therefore, Avago’s Motion to Preclude Argument and Motion for Expedited

Consideration (Docs. 375, 434) are DENIED as moot. Also, TriQuint’s Motion to Strike

Avago’s Motion to Preclude (Doc. 385) is DENIED as moot.

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Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(e) provides that a reply shall not exceed eleven

pages, exclusive of attachments; perhaps raising an inference that the Rule contemplates the

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II. TriQuint’s Motion to Strike Avago’s Reply Statement of Facts, Exhibits, and

Declarations (Doc. 377), Triquint’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental

Declaration of Jonathan M. James (Doc. 369), and Avago’s Motion for Leave to

File Reply Declarations and Reply Statement of Facts (Doc. 387)

Avago attached materials to its Reply in Support of Summary Judgment. Specifically,

Avago attached the Declarations of Richard Ruby, Robert J. Dolan, Ph.D. and Roger T.

Howe, Ph.D., a Controverting Statement of Facts to TriQuint’s Additional Statement of Facts

and Reply Statement of Facts in Support of Its Statement of Facts, and several exhibits.

TriQuint has moved to strike the Statements of Facts, the Declarations, and all of the

exhibits. (Doc. 377). 

Additionally, TriQuint has filed in conjunction with its Reply in Support of Partial

Summary Judgment a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Declaration of Jonathan M.

James in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 369). The Declaration

includes several exhibits that TriQuint argues it has good cause to submit because they are

necessary to respond to new issues raised in Avago’s Response to TriQuint’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment. In its opposition to TriQuint’s motion to strike, Avago

alternatively moves for leave to file the materials it attached to its Reply, or in the second

alternative, to strike TriQuint’s motion for leave. (Doc. 387). 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(a) requires the party moving for summary

judgment to file a separate statement of facts with its motion. The non-moving party must

then file a statement, separate from its memorandum, that specifically responds to each of

the moving party’s statements of fact and that sets forth any additional facts that make

summary judgment inappropriate. L.R.Civ.P. 56.1(b). Local Rule 56.1 does not provide for

a reply statement of facts or a response to the non-moving party’s separate statement of facts.

The Local Rules do not contemplate attaching additional exhibits to replies in support

of summary judgment1

 or filing a separate response to the non-moving party’s statement of

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filing of attachments. But Local Rule 7.2(e) is a general rule for all motions and memoranda

and does not apply specifically to motions for summary judgment, which have different

burdens of proof.

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facts. “This is consistent with the moving party’s need to show no genuine issue of material

facts exists and that there is no need for a trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence,

assuming the non-moving party’s evidence is true.” See, e.g., EEOC v. TIN Inc., 2008 WL

2323913, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 349 Fed. App’x 190 (9th Cir.

2009). Avago has provided no sufficient reason for deviating from the Local Rules in this

case. Because Avago improperly filed an additional statement of facts and attached

additional exhibits to its Reply, the Court will strike all the exhibits and attachments to the

Reply and ignore all references to them found in the Reply. Similarly, the Court does not

find that good cause exists to grant leave to either party to file the documents noted above.

Therefore, TriQuint’s Motion to Strike Avago’s Reply Statement of Facts, Exhibits,

and Declarations (Doc. 377) is GRANTED; Avago’s Motion for Leave to File (Doc. 387)

is DENIED; and TriQuint’s Motion for Leave to File (Doc. 369) is DENIED.

III. Avago’s Motion to Preclude Margaret Meyer’s Deposition Testimony (Doc. 316)

Avago has moved to preclude TriQuint from relying on the deposition testimony of

Margaret Meyer, an employee of Kyocera and thus a third-party witness in the present

litigation. Avago primarily contends that TriQuint failed to provide “reasonable notice” of

the Meyer deposition, as is required under Rule 30(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The notice provided by TriQuint was not reasonable, in Avago’s view, because

TriQuint did not serve a subpoena on Avago naming Ms. Meyer as a third-party witness,

scheduled the deposition to occur on a federal holiday and only two days prior to the end of

fact discovery, served notice of the deposition on May 19, 2011, which was eleven calendar

days and seven business days prior to the scheduled deposition date of Monday, May 30,

2011, and did not include Avago in any communications with Ms. Meyer to set the date,

time, and location of the deposition.

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TriQuint is quick to point out in its Response that under the parties’ scheduling

agreement, it was only required to give seven calendar days’ notice of the deposition.

Furthermore, with regard to any scheduling communications with Ms. Meyer regarding the

deposition, TriQuint states that the only written communication was the subpoena it served

on her. Moreover, TriQuint correctly points out that the Federal Rules did not require

TriQuint to serve a copy of that subpoena on Avago. Avago does not dispute TriQuint’s

assertions.

Thus, Avago has not demonstrated that TriQuint did not provide reasonable notice of

the Meyer deposition. Rather, if any party acted unreasonably it was Avago. Though Avago

acknowledges that TriQuint provided more than the seven calendar days notice required by

the parties, Avago failed to follow up on the notice simply because it mistakenly presumed

that TriQuint was noticing a deposition of an Avago employee. Because Avago’s attorneys

could not identify an employee named Margaret Meyer, they simply ignored the notice rather

than make any attempt to determine Ms. Meyer’s true identity. A simple phone call or email

to opposing counsel likely would have been sufficient to avoid this misunderstanding.

Furthermore, even when TriQuint’s counsel sent an email to Avago’s counsel the

morning of the deposition to let Avago’s counsel know that the deposition of Ms. Meyer was

about to start, the response from Avago’s counsel later that day was not one that could be

deemed reasonable. The attorney for Avago merely stated that no Avago employee named

Margaret Meyer existed, and thus she could not be produced for the deposition. The attorney

neglected to inquire how the deposition of this allegedly non-existent witness was “about to

begin,” as counsel for TriQuint had stated in the initial email. (Doc. 316, Ex. B.) 

Additionally, though TriQuint’s counsel clarified in a subsequent email response later

that same day that the deposition of Ms. Meyer had indeed already taken place, Avago’s

counsel did not immediately contact TriQuint’s counsel to assert any belief that the notice

of the deposition was improper or to attempt to arrange an opportunity to cross-examine her.

Nor did Avago attempt to promptly bring this issue to the Court’s attention prior to the close

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of discovery. Rather, Avago waited more than two months, well after discovery had closed,

to raise this issue, first directly with TriQuint and, when that failed, through this motion. 

Avago nevertheless claims that its actions were not untimely because it acted as soon

as it learned the extent to which TriQuint was intending to rely on Ms. Meyer’s testimony.

This explanation, however, is unavailing. Had Avago truly been concerned about Ms.

Meyer’s testimony and the extent to which TriQuint might rely on it, Avago should have

promptly raised the issue after first learning that the deposition had taken place. Moreover,

even if Avago was not very concerned about Ms. Meyer’s deposition after learning that it had

taken place, it nevertheless could have immediately raised this issue as a precaution, thereby

ensuring that it was acting more in accordance with the Court’s ordered deadlines rather than

according to its own schedule.

Avago has thus not established that there was anything unreasonable about the notice

it received regarding Ms. Meyer’s deposition. Further, the cases on which Avago relies

cannot support its allegations that TriQuint’s actions, which were proper under this Court’s

orders and the parties’ scheduling agreement, somehow failed to meet the “reasonable

notice” standard of Rule 30(b)(1). See Tradewinds Envtl. Restoration, Inc. v. St. Tammany

Park, LLC, 2008 WL 449972, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2008) (party that “effectively provided

one business day of notice” did not provide sufficient notice); Tucker v. Tangipahoa Parish

Sch. Bd., 2007 WL 1989913, at *2 (E.D. La. July 3, 2007) (six days of notice of deposition

was not reasonable); Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. Supreme Golf Sales, Inc., 1989 WL 153335,

at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1989) (four working days’ notice not sufficient). Furthermore, even

to the extent that Avago could have demonstrated that TriQuint’s eleven-day notice was not

reasonable, which it has not done in its motion, Avago’s failure to raise the issue promptly

weighs heavily against finding that it has been prejudiced in any way by TriQuint’s actions.

Cf. In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 320, 327-28 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (ten business

days of notice not reasonable when noticed party promptly expressed concern about the

timeliness of the notice and party noticing deposition failed to promptly respond to noticed

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Avago made additional arguments regarding the declaration of Dr. Elbrecht in its

improper Controverting Statement of Facts (Doc. 412-1). However, because the Court has

stricken that document, and because Local Rule 7.2(m) requires Avago’s reply to appear in

its reply memorandum, the Court will not consider those additional arguments. 

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party’s concern). 

TriQuint also urges the Court to deny Avago’s motion because it is improper under

Local Rule 7.2(m)(2). However, because the Court finds that Avago’s motion lacks merit,

it need not consider any procedural impropriety of the motion. Hence, Avago’s motion to

strike Margaret Meyer’s Deposition Testimony (Doc. 316) is DENIED. 

IV. TriQuint’s Motion to Strike Avago’s Expert Declarations and Objection to the

Expert Report of Dr. Lueder Elbrecht

In its Response to TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment, Avago has included new

declarations from each of its expert witnesses. TriQuint argues that these new expert

declarations introduce new matter and theories of infringement that were not contained in the

original expert reports. The new declarations, in TriQuint’s view, violate this Court’s

scheduling orders, and therefore much, if not all, of the content of the new declarations

should be stricken. Avago, on the other hand, does not offer much explanation for these new

expert declarations. Rather, Avago merely states that “with the filing of this response,

[Avago’s experts] have supplemented their opinions to rebut TriQuint’s new arguments, as

they are obligated to under Fed R. Civ. P. 26(e).” (Doc. 424, at 45).2

Indeed, Rule 26(e) does require an expert to supplement his or her report or deposition

testimony if the original report or testimony under Rule 26(a) was “incomplete or incorrect.”

However, the Ninth Circuit stated the following in a recent unpublished opinion:

Rule 26(e) creates a “duty to supplement,” not a right. Nor does Rule 26(e)

create a loophole through which a party who submits partial expert witness

disclosures, or who wishes to revise her disclosures in light of her opponent’s

challenges to the analysis and conclusions therein, can add to them to her

advantage after the court’s deadline for doing so has passed. Rather,

supplementation under the Rules means correcting inaccuracies, or filing the

interstices of an incomplete report based on information that was not available

at the time of the initial disclosure. 

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Luke v. Family Care and Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 Fed. App’x 496, 499 (9th Cir. 2009)

(internal citation and quotations omitted). Additionally, Rule 37(c)(1) authorizes the

exclusion of evidence that was not disclosed as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), unless the

failure to comply with the Rule was substantially justified or harmless.

Here, Avago has failed to demonstrate that the new expert declarations are valid

supplemental reports under Rule 26(e). Its passing reference to “TriQuint’s new arguments”

is not at all sufficient to show that these declarations were necessary to correct “incomplete

or incorrect” information in the original expert reports. Moreover, because Avago cites to

these declarations primarily to support its theories of infringement, theories on which it bears

the burden of proof, any “new arguments” made by TriQuint could not possibly affect the

completeness or correctness of those theories as they were required to have been presented

in Avago’s original reports. 

Indeed, the declarations read more like full-length expert reports than mere

supplements. To that end, it is notable that Avago almost exclusively cites to these new

declarations to support its arguments and theories of infringement. Avago rarely states where

any of its arguments or theories might be supported in the original expert reports or in the

experts’ deposition testimonies. Moreover, the new declarations themselves rarely, if ever,

reference those original expert reports and depositions.

Thus, in light of the substantial length and content of the declarations and Avago’s

failure to provide a sufficient explanation for them, the Court can only conclude that Avago

is essentially seeking a “do-over” on its original expert reports under the guise of Rule 26(e)

supplemental reports. However, as stated in the Court’s Rule 16 scheduling order, the

original Rule 26(a) expert reports were due on April 15, 2011. (Doc. 40, at 4). Avago’s new

declarations were not filed until September 10, 2011, nearly 5 months after that deadline.

Thus, the Court can find no basis or substantial justification for considering these

declarations in support of Avago’s response to TriQuint’s motion under either Rule 26(a) or

(e).

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Additionally, the Court acknowledges that, due to the great length of the declarations,

they likely do contain information that was properly disclosed in the experts’ original reports

and depositions. However, because Avago has completely failed to identify which portions

of the declarations are purportedly supplementary and which portions merely restate

previously disclosed information, the Court has no way to determine whether it can validly

consider any portions of the declarations. Thus, the Court also cannot determine whether any

portions of the declarations are harmless. Rather, in light of their substantial length and the

timing of their filing, the Court must assume that the declarations are not harmless.

Therefore, the Court will exclude the entire declarations of Dr. Elbrecht (Doc. 425), Dr.

Muralt (Doc. 426), Dr. Milsom (Doc. 427), and Dr. Howe (Doc. 428). TriQuint’s motion to

strike these declarations is GRANTED.

TriQuint similarly objects to the expert report of Dr. Elbrecht, which Avago did not

produce until July 29, 2011, after the deadline for expert reports had passed. The only

explanations Avago offers for this untimely report appear in its stricken Controverting

Statement of Facts (Doc. 412-1) and thus will not be considered. Therefore, the Court will

not consider Dr. Elbrecht’s untimely report in resolving the pending motions. 

V. Avago’s Objection to TriQuint’s Statement of Facts under Rule 56.1(a)

In its Reponse to TriQuint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 424), Avago

asserts that TriQuint includes “more than one hundred citations to facts” in its motion that

are not included in its separate statement of facts, in violation of Local Rule 56.1(a). (Doc.

424, at 2). Avago argues that those facts should therefore be treated as non-material,

stricken, and disregarded. However, Avago makes no attempt to identify any of these

allegedly non-material facts. Thus, the Court will not strike any facts from TriQuint’s

motion for summary judgment.

VI. TriQuint’s Objection to Avago’s Statement of Facts under Rule 56.1(a)

In its Responsive and Additional Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to

Avago’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 423), TriQuint asserts that Avago has

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included several facts in it Statement of Facts that Avago does not cite in its brief. TriQuint

objects to any subsequent use of these facts by Avago in its Reply brief. However, TriQuint

does not cite to any support for its objection in the Federal or Local Rules. Nor do the cases

cited by TriQuint support its argument. See Nolte v. Astrue, 2008 WL 2561936, at *5 n.3 (D.

Ariz. June 26, 2008) (stating that issues raised only in the separate statement of facts, and not

raised and briefed in the motion, will not be considered); Melcher v. City of San Luis, 2008

WL 691853, at *1 n.1 (“Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(e) requires that a memorandum

of law filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment ‘include citations to the specific

paragraph in the statement of facts that supports factual assertions made in the

[memorandum].’”). Thus, the Court will not strike any of Avago’s citations to its Separate

Statement of Facts in its Reply brief.

VII. Avago’s Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record with Newly Discovered

Evidence (Doc. 444) and Motion to Seal Exhibits to Avago’s Motion to

Supplement the Record (Doc. 447)

On January 30, 2012, the same day the parties presented oral argument on the several

pending motions addressed in this order, Avago filed a motion to supplement the record with

additional evidence. Avago claims that it has good cause to introduce the evidence because

the evidence came into existence after the close of briefing and will allow the Court to rely

on a more complete record in rendering its decision on the parties’ motions for summary

judgment with respect to TriQuint’s antitrust claims. 

A court has wide discretion to grant a party leave to supplement the record. See

LimoStars, Inc. v. New Jersey Car and Limo, Inc., 2011 WL 3471092, at *3 n.5 (D. Ariz.

Aug. 8, 2011). However, the Court finds that Avago has not shown sufficient good cause to

introduce this evidence so long after the close of briefing nor has Avago shown that the

evidence is necessary for the Court to render a decision on the parties’ motions. Avago’s

motion is therefore DENIED. The Court will, however, grant Avago’s motion to seal the

exhibits to its motion to supplement the record. 

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LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must show that genuine factual

issues exist “that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 250 (1986).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Finish Eng’g Co. v. Zerpa Indus., 806

F.2d 1041, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Court must resolve all doubt regarding the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the non-movant. Chore-Time Equip. v.

Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

ANTITRUST ISSUES

TriQuint claims that Avago, through its acquisition of Infineon and other activities,

has violated both section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act. TriQuint

has moved for summary judgment only on the Clayton Act claim, while Avago has moved

for summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “summary

judgment procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation . . . .” Poller

v. Columbia Broad. Syst., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); see also Christofferson Dairy, Inc.

v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[S]ummary judgment generally

is disfavored in antitrust litigation . . . .”). Indeed, in light of the extensive briefing by both

parties in this case, and the several issues of material fact therein raised with regard to the

antitrust issues, the Court must deny the parties’ motions on these claims. 

I. TriQuint’s Antitrust Claims

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions “where in any line of commerce

or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such

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acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15

U.S.C. § 18. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits both monopolization and attempted

monopolization. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that a private party

may seek treble damages for violations of the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15., which include

both section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act. Similarly, section 16

of the Clayton Act provides that private parties may seek injunctive relief for such violations.

15 U.S.C. § 26. 

Here, TriQuint is seeking both monetary damages and injunctive relief for Avago’s

alleged antitrust violations. However, as described below, triable questions of material fact

exist with regard to the definition of the relevant product market, which is a necessary

element of all of TriQuint’s claims. These fact issues preclude summary judgment for either

party on any of the antitrust claims. 

A. Relevant Product Market

The Supreme Court has stated that “[d]etermination of the relevant market is a

necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton Act because the threatened

monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition within the area of

effective competition. Substantiality can be determined only in terms of the market

affected.” U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Similarly, “[m]arket definition is crucial” to proving a

violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51

F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).

“The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable

interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and

substitutes for it.” Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). Moreover, though

summary judgment is available on this issue, “the definition of the relevant market is a

factual inquiry for the jury, and the court may not weigh evidence or judge witness

credibility.” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at. 1435.

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TriQuint proposes that its evidence establishes three relevant markets, including a

BAW filter die market, a BAW band 2 duplexer market, and a PCS CDMA duplexer market.

Avago counters that TriQuint’s evidence of its proposed markets is insufficient because it

does not take into account cross-elasticity of demand and interchangeable substitute products,

namely with regard to surface acoustic wave (“SAW”) products. In TriQuint’s view,

however, SAW products are not viable substitutes.

There are thus several factual disputes underlying the parties’ various definitions of

the relevant market. Specifically, these questions of material fact relate to the demand for

SAW products in PCD CDMA and WCDMA applications, the interchangeability of SAW

and BAW products and any cost advantage of SAW products over BAW products, and the

presence of SAW duplexers in handsets using the WDCMA standard (Doc. 420, at 42-43).

Moreover, though TriQuint points to testimony from customers downplaying the significance

of SAW as a substitute for BAW products, Avago points to evidence that TriQuint’s own

BAW experts have recognized the potential of SAW products to compete against BAW

duplexers. (Doc. 420, at 47). 

With regard to expert testimony, the parties vigorously dispute the credibility of the

report of TriQuint’s expert, Dr. Hayes. While TriQuint asserts that Dr. Hayes adequately

demonstrated, through analysis of price and margin data, that SAW products should be

excluded from the relevant product market, Avago contends that Dr. Hayes’ analysis was not

sufficient because he failed to perform a proper regression analysis and further misinterpreted

his data regarding prices and margins. (Doc. 420, at 48-49). Therefore, summary judgment

is not appropriate on this issue because that determination would require the Court to resolve

questions of credibility and conflicting inferences with regard to the expert testimony. See

Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1435. Thus, because defining a relevant product market is essential to

all of TriQuint’s antitrust claims, there are triable issues of fact with respect to all of

TriQuint’s claims that preclude the possibility of summary judgment for either party.

Nevertheless, with regard to its section 7 claim, TriQuint argues that no determination

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of a relevant market is necessary because, under any proposed market, Avago’s market share

is sufficiently high that it is subject to a presumption that its acquisition of Infineon violated

section 7 under the standard elucidated in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374

U.S. 321 (1963). Under the Philadelphia National Bank presumption, once a plaintiff shows

that a proposed merger or acquisition will result in undue concentration of the relevant

market, a presumption of a Section 7 violation arises, and the burden of production shifts to

the defendant to rebut the presumption. Id. at 363. 

Regardless of whether that presumption applies to Avago in any of the proposed

markets and whether Avago can successfully rebut any such presumption, TriQuint has not

demonstrated that its Clayton Act claim can proceed without proof of a relevant product

market. The cases TriQuint cites in support of its theory do not stand for the proposition that

a finding of a section 7 violation can proceed without first defining a relevant product

market. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-550 (1966) (choosing

a precise geographic market was not necessary); Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1298

(9th Cir. 1993) (either of the defined product markets identified by the Commission were

likely acceptable); FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1505-06 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (any

of the Commissions six alternatively defined product markets were likely acceptable); Woods

Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1306 (5th Cir. 1971)

(unnecessary to choose precise geographic market); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,

264 F. Supp. 439, 455-56 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (unnecessary to choose precise geographic

market). Thus, in each of those cases, though a precise geographic market may have been

left undefined, it was clear that there was at least one properly defined product market.

TriQuint has therefore not provided any support for its assertion that it may be relieved of

its burden to prove a specific “line of commerce,” as is explicitly required by the language

of section 7. 15 U.S.C. § 18.

Alternatively, TriQuint argues that the relevant market proposed by Avago’s expert,

Dr. Dolan, consisting of Band 2 duplexers that includes both BAW and SAW duplexers is

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also subject to the Philadelphia National Bank presumption. TriQuint states that Avago has

a market share of approximately 65% in that market, which in TriQuint’s view is more than

sufficient to invoke the Philadelphia National Bank presumption. See Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374

U.S. at 364 (finding a 30% market share sufficient to apply the presumption). However, even

assuming that this is the relevant market, which TriQuint must still prove at trial, and

assuming also that the presumption applies to this market, it is nevertheless possible that

Avago has presented sufficient evidence to rebut a presumption of a section 7 violation.

To rebut the presumption, Avago points, in part, to evidence of post-merger

competition. Though the use of such evidence to ascertain competitive effects of a merger

has been questioned, it nevertheless may be considered in a section 7 case. See F.T.C. v.

Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965) (“The Court of Appeals was not in

error in considering the post-acquisition evidence in this case, [b]ut we think it gave it too

much weight.”); see also United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus,

Avago’s evidence of its decreased market shares, TriQuint’s increased market shares,

declining prices, and increased output in the potential relevant markets must be weighed with

other evidence, including evidence directed toward the existence of barriers to entry and

efficiencies, to determine whether Avago has rebutted the presumption, and ultimately

whether it has violated section 7. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“It is a foundation of section 7 doctrine . . . that evidence on a variety of

factors can rebut a prima facie case.”).

In light of these several triable fact issues, the Court cannot grant either party’s motion

for summary judgment on TriQuint’s antitrust claims. Hence, TriQuint’s motion for

summary judgment on its Clayton Act claim is DENIED, and Avago’s motion for summary

judgment on TriQuint’s Clayton Act and Sherman Act claims is also DENIED.

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TRADE SECRET AND COPYRIGHT ISSUES

I. Avago’s Trade Secret Claims

Avago alleges that TriQuint has misappropriated various trade secrets that Avago

acquired when it purchased Infineon’s BAW business. Specifically, Avago alleges that

former Infineon employees, Drs. Aigner and Fattinger, obtained these trade secrets while

working at Infineon’s German facilities and used them in their subsequent employment at

TriQuint’s facilities in Florida. Avago alleges that the trade secrets include confidential and

proprietary source code, GDS layout files, and design and manufacturing processes. 

A. Choice of Law

The parties dispute whether California law or Florida law governs Avago’s Trade

Secret Claims. The parties both agree, however, that as the forum state, Arizona’s choice-oflaw rules must be applied to make this determination. Furthermore, both parties agree that

Arizona follows section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws

(“Restatement”). See Bates v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 46, 48-49 (1988) (“Arizona courts

apply the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) to determine the

controlling law for multistate torts.”). 

Under section 145 of the Restatement, the local laws of the state that “has the most

significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties” will determine the rights and

liabilities of the parties with respect to an tort issue. See Bates, 156 Ariz. at 48-49.

Furthermore, the relevant contacts to be considered in determining which state has the most

significant contacts include: 

1) the place where the injury occurred;

2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of

business of the parties; and

4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

Id. at 49. Furthermore, comment (f) to section 145 of the Restatement suggests that when

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misappropriation of a plaintiff’s trade secrets is involved, the place of injury does not play

as important of a role for choice-of-law purposes. Instead, the principal location of the

defendant’s conduct is typically the factor that is given the greatest weight.

Under the test adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court in Bates, and following the

Restatement’s guidance for cases involving trade secrets, the Court finds that Florida law

governs Avago’s trade secret claims because Florida was the principal location of the

conduct that gave rise to the claims. Though the alleged theft of any trade secrets likely

occurred in Germany, any alleged misuse of those trade secrets by TriQuint could not likely

have occurred until the former Infineon employees, who allegedly stole the trade secrets,

arrived at and began working at TriQuint’s facilities in Apopka, Florida.

Avago nevertheless argues that California law should apply because Avago’s United

States headquarters are located in California, and thus California is the place where the injury

occurred. Avago further argues that this determination under the “place of injury” factor is

a more straightforward determination because the accused doctors’ alleged conduct took

place in more than one location, namely Florida, Germany, and to some extent, Texas. 

The Court, however, finds Avago’s argument unpersuasive. First, at the time that the

alleged theft of any trade secrets actually took place, in 2006, Avago had not yet acquired

Infineon. Thus, any connection between California and Avago’s claims did not arise until

2008, when Avago acquired Infineon and any trade secrets that Infineon owned. Second,

even after the acquisition, it is undisputed that Avago is a global organization with offices

and employees located throughout several continents and countries. Thus, to the extent that

TriQuint’s and its employees’ alleged conduct is spread out among multiple locations, the

location of Avago’s injury is even more so spread out. Additionally factoring in the modified

weighting of the factors that the Restatement suggests for trade secret cases, it is clear that

Florida has a more significant relationship to Avago’s claims than does California.

Finally, the parties do not argue that the final two factors listed in Bates are as

significant as or should be given as much weight as the first two factors. The Court

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accordingly finds that any further analysis of the final two factors will not alter the

conclusion that Florida law governs Avago’s trade secret claims.

B. The Parties’ Motions under Florida Trade Secret Law

Florida has adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“FUTSA”) Fla. Stat.

§ 688.001. “Under Florida law, a trade secret consists of information that (1) derives

economic value from not being readily ascertainable by others and (2) is the subject of

reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.” Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc.,

143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Fla. Stat. § 688.002(4)). “Information that is

generally known or readily accessible to third parties cannot qualify for trade secret

protection.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Moreover, an employer may not preclude its

former employee from ‘utilizing contacts and expertise gained during his former

employment.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). Finally, for there to be actionable

misappropriation of trade secrets under Florida law, “the party asserting trade secret

protection bears the dual burden of describing the alleged trade secret information and also

showing that it has taken reasonable steps to protect this secrecy.” Levenger Co. v. Feldman,

516 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (internal citation omitted). Thus, “the party

asserting trade secret protection must describe the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets

with reasonable particularity.” Id.

Avago has asserted trade secret claims with respect to three different categories of

alleged trade secrets: source code, layout files, and design and manufacturing processes. The

parties’ motions with respect to each of these categories are discussed below. 

1. Source Code

Avago has moved for summary judgment on its claims that TriQuint has

misappropriated trade secrets contained in Avago’s source code. TriQuint has not moved for

summary judgment with regard to these claims, but does assert that questions of material fact

exist that preclude the Court from granting Avago’s motion.

TriQuint first asserts that Avago has not described any trade secrets in its source code

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with reasonable particularity. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a “plaintiff should

describe the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient particularity to separate it from

matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons . . .

skilled in the trade.” Imax Corp. v. Cinema Techs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, as the Seventh

Circuit has commented, “a plaintiff must do more than just identify a kind of technology and

then invite the court to hunt through the details in search of items meeting the statutory

definition.” IDX Systs. Corp. v. Epic Systs. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Avago has not described its source code trade secrets with sufficient

particularity to meet its burden on summary judgment. Instead, Avago generally describes,

in very broad terms, two aspects of the source code: processing of BAW production data and

trimming of BAW products. With respect to processing of BAW production data, Avago

merely states that it is an indispensable part of large-scale BAW production. Avago does not,

however, state with any particularity what aspect of its source code, in respect to processing

BAW data, can be separated from the general knowledge of the trade.

Similarly, with respect to trimming, Avago merely states that trimming generally

involves removing thin layers of material from BAW resonators and the trimming steps must

be precisely controlled and properly performed. Again, Avago fails to suggest particular

aspects of its trimming steps that differ from those generally known in the trade, such that

they may qualify as trade secrets. Furthermore, in its Reply, Avago responds to the

arguments that it has not particularly described which aspects are known and not known in

the trade by stating that if any of its source code was publicly known, it would not have been

necessary for TriQuint’s employees to misappropriate them. Of course, this argument does

nothing to get Avago past the requirement to describe its trade secrets with reasonable

particularity.

Moreover, Avago’s failure to describe the trade secrets in its source code with

reasonable particularity makes it impossible to determine whether Avago derives any

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economic value from them. That is, while Avago’s source code, in general, undoubtedly has

economic value, it is unclear whether any economic value is derived from portions of the

source code not being generally known in the trade because, as stated above, Avago has not

identified which portions of its source code are not so generally known. Furthermore,

TriQuint has raised questions of fact with regard to whether Avago actually uses the code,

the level of skill required to write the code, the routine nature of the code, and whether the

code utilizes “built-in” MATLAB techniques.

Therefore, because Avago has failed to identify portions of its code with sufficient

particularity, it is not possible to determine whether Avago owns any trade secrets in its

source code under Florida law. Therefore, with respect to its source code, Avago’s motion

for summary judgment of trade secret misappropriation is DENIED.

2. Layout Files

Avago has also moved for summary judgment on its claims that TriQuint has

misappropriated trade secrets contained in Avago’s GDS layout files. TriQuint too has

moved for summary judgment with regard to these claims; however, because GDS layout

files may be among those deleted from Drs. Fattinger’s and Volatier’s computers and thus

potentially not produced during discovery, TriQuint may be subject to a spoliation sanction

with regard to any GDS files that were permanently deleted. For the purposes of these

summary judgment motions, however, the parties have limited their arguments to only the

GDS layout files for Infineon’s N0010 and N0011 devices, which apparently were produced

in the course of this litigation. Therefore, the Court will consider both TriQuint’s and

Avago’s motions for summary judgment only in relation to these two GDS files. 

As an initial matter, TriQuint argues that Avago’s trade secret claims regarding the

GDS layout files are preempted by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (“SCPA”), 17

U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq., because the GDS layout files constitute mask works. However, even

assuming that the GDS files constitute mask works under the SCPA, TriQuint has not

established that the SCPA preempts Avago’s trade secret claims. Though the SCPA certainly

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does preempt state laws to the extent those state laws provide rights or remedies “which are

equivalent to those rights or remedies provided by” the SCPA, 17 U.S.C. § 912(c), TriQuint

does not point out which section of the SCPA allegedly provides the same rights or remedies

as Florida’s trade secret laws. 

Furthermore, the SCPA itself anticipates the possibility that the mask works it covers

might also be subject to trade secret laws. Specifically, the rules and regulations which

govern the deposit of materials for registration clearly anticipate the assertion of trade secret

protection in layers of a mask work fixed in a semiconductor chip. 37 C.F.R. § 211.5. These

deposit guidelines apply to works that are both commercially exploited and not commercially

exploited. Id. Therefore, because the SCPA recognizes the possibility that mask works may

be subject to trade secret protection, but does not grant such protection itself, and without

determining whether the GDS files actually constitute mask works for the purposes of the

SCPA, the Court finds that the SCPA does not preempt Avago’s claims.

 TriQuint also argues, as it did with the source code, that Avago has failed to describe

any trade secrets in the layout files with sufficient particularity. Here, Avago has mostly

used general terms to describe the content of its layout files and any trade secrets contained

therein. Thus, Avago merely describes in broad terms that the layout files contain a “known

good design” for arranging resonators within a filter and that the resonators generally should

possess particular desirable characteristics, such as a high Q factor, a high effective coupling

coefficient, minimal spurious modes, and small effect of temperature on frequency response.

(Doc. 420, at 6-8). These descriptions are simply not particular enough to separate any

information in the layout files from the information generally known in the trade. Thus, they

do no sufficiently identify any valid trade secrets. 

Avago also identifies the dimensions of the resonator structures, which are contained

within the layout files, as potential trade secrets. Furthermore, Avago acknowledges that

approximate dimensions of the resonator structures can be derived through physical

examination or reverse engineering. Nevertheless, Avago states that it is the exact

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dimensions contained within the layout files that constitute trade secrets. Avago does not,

however, state at all, let alone with any particularity, the exact dimensions alleged to be trade

secrets.

TriQuint argues that Avago’s descriptions, including the reference to any

“dimensions,” are too vague to satisfy the requirement of reasonably particularity. TriQuint

further cites to a case in which the Ninth Circuit found that a plaintiff’s mere reference to

“dimensions and tolerances” was not sufficiently particular to identify any alleged trade

secrets. Imax, 152 F.3d at 1164-67. In that case, the district court held that the plaintiff,

Imax, had failed to identify “the precise numerical dimensions and tolerances” that it claimed

to be trade secrets. Id. at 1166. 

On appeal, Imax argued that its identification of “dimensions and tolerances” was

sufficient under the level of specificity approved by the Ninth Circuit in Forro Precision, Inc.

v. IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 1982). In the Forro opinion, the Ninth Circuit

held that a plaintiff’s reference to “dimensions and tolerances” specifically contained in

blueprints acquired by the Defendant was sufficient to identify those dimensions and

tolerances as trade secrets. Id.

In Imax, the Ninth Circuit rejected Imax’s argument and affirmed the district court’s

holding. Imax, 152 F.3d at 1167. The appellate court distinguished Forro by stating that the

reference to “dimensions and tolerances” in Forro was “sufficient because it clearly referred

to trade secret material, i.e., engineering drawings and blueprints.” Id. In contrast, a mere

reference to “dimensions and tolerances,” disconnected from such trade secret material, is

not sufficient to identify trade secrets in precise numerical dimensions and tolerances. Id.

Thus, because Imax merely used a catchall phrase generally referring to “every dimension

and tolerance that defines or reflects” the design of a patented projector system, Imax did

“not clearly refer to tangible trade secret material” and thus did not meet Forro’s degree of

specificity. Id. (emphasis in original).

Here, the Court finds that Avago’s general references to “dimensions” meet Forro’s

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level of specificity because Avago has clearly referred to tangible trade secret material, i.e.,

the GDS layout files, that contain the dimensions. (Doc. 420, at 6-8). Specifically, Avago

has stated that “[i]t is only possible to know the exact dimensions and design rules for the

BAW filter by access to the Layout Files themselves.” (Id. at 7). Even though Avago claims

trade secrets in the “exact” dimensions, by referring to the layout files that contain those

exact dimensions, Avago has sufficiently identified those exact dimensions as potential trade

secrets.

Avago also attempts to claim “design rules” in the layout files as trade secrets.

Though Avago does refer to the design rules in conjunction with tangible trade secrets,

Avago never clearly identifies with any particularity what those design rules might include.

Thus, unlike the resonator dimensions, which undoubtedly are represented as exact numerical

measurements in the layout files, it is not clear to the Court what a design rule might

encompass or how it could be represented with any greater particularity in the layout files.

Therefore, the Court finds that, to the extent that any trade secrets exist in its layout files,

Avago has only identified such potential trade secrets with respect to the exact dimensions

of the resonators contained within the files. 

Even so, Avago cannot establish that the exact dimensions of the resonators in the

N0010 and N0011 files are not readily ascertainable, or to the extent that they are only

readily ascertainable to within a certain variance level, that Avago derives any economic

value from difference between the actual dimensions and the readily ascertainable

approximate dimensions. Avago does not dispute that, through reverse engineering, the

dimensions of its filters can be determined to between 1-3% variance from Avago’s GDS

layout file. Such reverse engineering can be sufficient to defeat an argument that the

dimensions are not “readily ascertainable.” See Levenger Co. v. Feldman, 516 F.Supp. 2d

1272, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (recognizing that reverse engineering could render alleged trade

secrets to be readily ascertainable by others under Florida law). 

TriQuint contends that the variance is no more than 1% and that such a small variance

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between the actual design and the reverse engineered design means that the dimensions in

the GDS layout files are readily ascertainable. TriQuint also states that such a small variance

would not have affected the results of the benchmarking tests it performed in fall 2007 using

the N0010 and N0011 layouts. Thus, TriQuint argues that, because of the low variance, the

reverse-engineered dimensions are equivalent to the actual dimensions with regard to the

filters’ performance. 

Because Avago has established that only the exact dimensions contained in the GDS

layout files can possibly constitute trade secrets, only its arguments regarding the reverse

engineering of those dimensions will be considered. To that end, though Avago counters that

the variance may be as high as 3%, it nevertheless concedes that reverse-engineering can

provide dimensions that are extremely close to the actual dimensions. Thus, as TriQuint

points out, any trade secrets that exist in the resonator dimensions in the GDS files can only

exist if Avago derives economic value from the small 1-3% variance from the actual

dimensions that cannot be determined through reverse engineering, and thus is maintained

as secret. See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d

1064, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (“[T]o qualify as a trade secret, information that the Plaintiff

seeks to protect must derive economic value from not being readily ascertainable by others

. . . .”).

Avago, however, has failed to establish that it actually does derive such economic

value from the small level of variance between the actual dimensions and the reverseengineered dimensions, which is the only aspect of the layout files that both was identified

with reasonable particularity and is potentially not readily ascertainable by others. As is the

case with its insufficiently particular descriptions of many of its alleged trade secrets, Avago

has directed the bulk of its economic value arguments toward the layout files in general and

the alleged “known good design” they contain. Avago further argues that the economic value

of any of its trade secrets is established simply by the fact the TriQuint allegedly acquired

and used them. Avago, however, offers no facts, and not even any argument, that it derives

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any economic value from allegedly maintaining the secrecy of the dimensions in the GDS

layout files, let alone from the small variance between the actual dimensions and the reverseengineered dimensions. 

Avago has therefore failed to establish that any trade secrets exist in the N0010 and

N0011 layout files. Thus, Avago’s trade secrets claims with regard to those files must fail,

and TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment with regard to those files is GRANTED.

Consequently, Avago’s motion for summary judgment with regard to those files is DENIED.

3. Design and Manufacturing Processes

Avago has also moved for summary judgment on its claims that TriQuint has

misappropriated trade secrets contained in Avago’s design and manufacturing processes.

TriQuint has also moved for summary judgment with regard to these claims. 

TriQuint again alleges that Avago has not identified any alleged trade secrets in it

design and manufacturing processes with sufficient particularity. As is stated above, a

“plaintiff should describe the subject matter of the trade secret with sufficient particularity

to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those

persons . . . skilled in the trade.” Imax, 152 F.3d at 1164 (quotation marks and citations

omitted) (emphasis in original).

Here, Avago has again failed to describe its alleged trade secrets with sufficient

particularity. Rather, Avago relies on very broad descriptions, stating that its design and

manufacturing processes consist of specifications and details for its “layer stack.” Avago

further describes, again in general terms, various considerations that go into the design of a

layer stack, and states that developing a good design is a difficult, time-consuming process.

Avago further includes a figure illustrating an example of a “typical Infineon stack,” though

Avago provides no precise description of the figure or of what trade secrets it might depict.

Finally, Avago also alleges that its design and manufacturing processes include “know-how”

that generally relates to the use of trimming machines in high-volume BAW manufacturing.

Unlike in Forro, Avago cannot tie any of these vague references to design and

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manufacturing processes to any tangible trade secret material. See Imax, 152 F.3d at 1167.

Thus, as was the case in Imax, Avago’s descriptions are not sufficiently particular to identify

an potential trade secrets. Id. Moreover, even assuming that Avago’s descriptions of its

design and manufacturing processes are sufficiently particular, which they are not, TriQuint

has presented evidence that, at least at the low level of particularity used by Avago to

describe its processes, Avago’s processes are likely readily ascertainable through reverse

engineering and various publications.

Avago has failed to identify any potential trade secrets in its design and manufacturing

processes with the reasonable particularity required to prove its claims of trade secret

misappropriation. Therefore, its motion for summary judgment with regard to those claims

is DENIED, and TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment with regard to those claims is

GRANTED. 

II. Avago’s Copyright Claims

Avago has also moved for summary judgment that TriQuint is liable for direct,

contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement. Avago’s claims are based on the copying

of source code, for which Avago claims it owns the copyrights. Specifically, Avago alleges

that Drs. Aigner and Fattinger created source code while working at Infineon, and that this

source code became the intellectual property of Infineon through the work-for-hire doctrine.

See JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing “works made for

hire” as works in which an author’s employer, rather than the author, may properly be

deemed the copyright owner of a work when the work was prepared by the author-employee

within the scope of his or her employment). Avago further alleges that it acquired the rights

to the source code through its acquisition of Infineon’s BAW business line in August 2008.

Also, prior to presenting its case for infringement, Avago further asserts that “[g]iven that

the copyrighted works at issue here originated in Germany, Avago need only prove

ownership, which it has done, and not registration, to establish the first prong for a valid

copyright infringement claim.” (Doc. 420, at 23).

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Indeed, as Avago points out earlier in its brief, a proper claim for copyright

infringement requires a party to establish “(1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2)

violation by the alleged infringer of at least one of the exclusive rights granted to copyright

owners by the Copyright Act.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th

Cir. 2011). Though Avago believes the facts described above plainly establish its ownership

of the copyrighted source code at issue, TriQuint asserts that Avago has not properly

established that it owns the copyrights on which its motion is based.

Particularly, TriQuint argues that the Infineon-Avago Asset Purchase Agreement,

which describes the transfer of any assets between those parties, did not in fact transfer any

copyright ownership from Infineon to Avago. The Purchase Agreement defines “Intellectual

Property Rights” as “all intellectual property rights arising from (i) Patents, (ii) Copyrights

and (iii) Trademarks.” (Doc. 420, Ex. 8, at 10). Furthermore, while section 2.3 of the

Purchase Agreement, entitled “Sale of Patents; License to Intellectual Property Rights,”

transfers Patent rights from Infineon to Avago, that section does not describe a sale of any

Copyrights. (Id. at 21-22). Because there is no explicit mention of such a sale, TriQuint

argues that Copyrights must fall under the “Licensed Intellectual Property” described in

section 2.3.2 of the Purchase Agreement. Thus, in TriQuint’s view, Avago has at most a

non-exclusive license to any intellectual property rights in the source code created by Drs.

Aigner and Fattinger during their employment at Infineon, and has therefore failed to

establish copyright ownership.

Avago nevertheless asserts that the Purchase Agreement did in fact transfer copyright

ownership to Avago. Under Avago’s reading of the document, the disputed copyrights were

transferred as part of the “Purchased Know How” in section 2.1.3. That section defines

“Purchased Know How” as “all Know How owned by Seller or a Selling Subsidiary which

is Exclusively Used for the Business . . . .” (Doc. 420, Ex. 8, at 21). Though, as Avago

points out, this “Purchased Know How” is licensed back to Infineon under section 2.3.3, and

is thus lumped together with the transfer and licensing of intellectual property rights

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described in section 2.3, Avago ignores the Purchase Agreement’s definition of “Know

How,” which explicitly “exclud[es] any Intellectual Property Rights . . . .” (Id. at 10-11). 

Thus, the Court cannot find, under Avago’s interpretation of the Purchase Agreement,

that ownership of any copyrights was transferred from Infineon to Avago. Nor does Avago

put forth any other theory by which it might have standing to sue TriQuint on these claims

of copyright infringement. Moreover, though not argued in the parties’ briefs, the Court

notes that it is unclear whether, even under Avago’s interpretation of the Purchase

Agreement, Infineon had ever acquired ownership of the copyrights at issue because there

is no indication that the “work-for-hire” doctrine under United States law, or any similar

doctrine under German law, would have applied to vest those rights in Infineon. Therefore,

the Court need not reach the question of infringement, and Avago’s motion for summary

judgment that TriQuint is liable for copyright infringement is DENIED. 

Furthermore, the Court notes that it has “the power sua sponte to grant summary

judgment to a non-movant when there has been a motion but no cross-motion.” Kassbaum

v. Steppenwolf Prod., Inc., 236 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2000). But before doing so, the Court

must determine that “the party against whom summary judgment is rendered has had a full

and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to

be tried, and that the party for whom summary judgment is rendered is entitled thereto as a

matter of law.” Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 73 -74 (2d Cir. 1996). 

Here, TriQuint did not move for summary judgment on Avago’s copyright

infringement claims with respect to source code in its filed motion, though TriQuint’s

counsel stated at oral argument that TriQuint believes it is entitled to summary judgment on

this issue. Moreover, Avago clearly had a full and fair opportunity to brief, and did brief, the

issue of copyright infringement. Thus, because the Court finds that, for the reasons discussed

above, TriQuint is entitled to summary judgment on Avago’s source code copyright claims

as a matter of law, TriQuint’s non-filed cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Finally, TriQuint has moved for summary judgement that Avago did not properly state

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a claim of copyright infringement with respect to GDS files. However, Avago stated in its

response that its copyright claims are limited only to information contained in the source

code. Therefore, to the extent that Avago has ever or plans to ever argue that any of its

copyrights claims cover any of the GDS files described in TriQuint’s brief, TriQuint’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

III. Avago’s Common-Law Tort and Unfair Competition Claims

A. Avago’s Common-Law Tort Claims

Avago has asserted common-law claims of unjust enrichment, conversion, and

intentional interference with prospective economic disadvantage against TriQuint. These

claims are based on facts that are very similar, if not identical to Avago’s trade secrets

claims. Both parties have filed summary judgment motions on these claims, though Avago

has limited its motion to only the conversion claim.

Avago asserts that it is seeking these claims as an alternative to its trade secret claims.

That is, if any of the materials that it alleges TriQuint stole are not deemed to be trade

secrets, Avago then wishes to seek relief under these common-law tort claims. Avago

realizes, however, that to the extent these materials are deemed to be trade secrets, these

common-law tort claims are preempted by Florida’s UTSA, “which displace[s] conflicting

tort, restitutory, and other law of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of

a trade secret.” Fla. Stat. § 688.008. 

TriQuint argues, on the other hand, that even if the materials are not found to be trade

secrets, Avago’s common-law tort claims are still preempted because the claims are based

on the same underlying facts as the trade secrets claims. Thus, in TriQuint’s view, the

common-law tort claims should be dismissed.

The Court finds that TriQuint’s view is better supported by the relevant case law. The

majority of courts have determined that the FUTSA preemption provision preempts a parties’

common law claims when those claims are based on the same operative facts as its trade

secret claims. See, e.g., New Lenox Inds., Inc. v. Fenton, 510 F. Supp. 2d 893, 908 (M.D.

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Fla. 2007) (“[A]s a general proposition other torts involving the same underlying factual

allegations as a claim for trade secret misappropriation will be preempted by the FUTSA.”);

Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Motorcycle Info. Nework, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180-81

(M.D. Fla. 2005) (“[I]f the allegations of trade secret misappropriation alone comprise the

underlying wrong, only the FUTSA claim will survive the motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis

in original); Allegiance Healthcare Corp. v. Coleman, 232 F.Supp. 2d 1329, 1335-36 (S.D.

Fla. 2002) (preemption under FUTSA depends on “whether allegations of trade secret

misappropriation alone comprise the underlying wrong”); see also 1-1 Milgrim on Trade

Secrets § 1.01[3][a] (2011) (“If the ‘other’ claims are no more than a restatement of the same

operative facts which would plainly and exclusively spell out only trade secret

misappropriation, then dressing those claims up in different clothing, such as common law

trade secret misappropriation, conversion, unjust enrichment or unfair competition, is not

likely to be found consistent with the preempting dictates of UTSA.”) 

Here, Avago’s common-law claims rely entirely on its assertion that TriQuint

misappropriated valuable confidential and proprietary information, i.e., trade secrets. Avago

points to no other facts or allegations it has made that materially separate its common-law

claims from its trade secret claims. Instead, Avago incorrectly argues only that preemption

cannot take effect until Avago “wins” on its trade secret claims. That argument is

inconsistent with the plain language of the preemption provision of the FUTSA. Thus, the

undisputed facts show that Avago’s common-law tort claims are based on the same set of

operative facts as its trade secret claims. The FUTSA therefore preempts Avago’s common

law claims. Moreover, in this case, the Court did not hold that Avago’s “secrets” could never

be trade secrets within the meaning of FUTSA. Instead, the Court held that Avago failed to

meet the elements of proving a trade secret claim. Thus, not only are these claims preempted

because they rely on the same facts as the trade secret claims, they are also preempted

because nothing herein held that such “secrets” could never be trade secrets as a matter of

law. 

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Accordingly, TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Avago’s tort

claims is GRANTED. Avago’s motion for summary judgment with respect to its conversion

claims is DENIED. 

B. Avago’s Unfair Competition Claim 

Avago has also asserted a claim against TriQuint under California’s Unfair

Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.. Both parties have moved for

summary judgment on this claim. As discussed previously, the Court has found that under

Arizona’s choice-of-law rules, Avago’s trade secret claims are governed by Florida law.

Thus, because Avago’s unfair competition claim is based on the same conduct that gave rise

to its trade secret claims, the Court’s previous choice-of-law analysis applies and Florida law

must also govern any unfair competition claim. Therefore, Avago’s claims under

California’s unfair competition laws must be dismissed. See Johnson v. KB Home, 720 F.

Supp. 2d 1109, 1121-22 (D. Ariz. 2010); see also Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Superior Court,

85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 23-25, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214, 222-25 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that

California’s unfair competition laws were not intended to regulate conduct unconnected to

California).

Accordingly, with respect to Avago’s unfair competition claim, TriQuint’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED and Avago’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

PATENT ISSUES

I. Claim Constructions

The Court held a Markman hearing on December 14, 2010 and, after reviewing the

parties’ briefing and the arguments presented at the hearing, constructed the disputed claim

terms in an order issued on January 12, 2011 (Doc. 229, “Markman order”). The parties have

stipulated to additional constructions of other claim terms. These claim constructions are

referred to throughout this Order where appropriate.

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II. Legal Standard for Patent Infringement

Pursuant to section 271 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271, liability for patent

infringement may be imposed on any person who without permission of the patentee,

“makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention [] within the United States . . .

during the term of the patent therefor.” The rights granted to the patentee are defined by the

patent’s claims. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996). In

determining whether an allegedly-infringing device falls within the scope of the claims, a

two-step process is used: “the court first determines, as a matter of law, the correct claim

scope, and then compares the properly constructed claim to the accused device to determine,

as a matter of fact, whether all of the claim limitations are present in the accused device,

either literally or by a substantial equivalent.” K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356,

1362 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa per Anzioni, 158 F.3d 1243,

1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Although the second step of the infringement inquiry involves

a factual determination, summary judgment is still appropriate when no genuine dispute of

material fact exists. Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1299

(Fed. Cir. 2004). 

The patentee bears the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the

evidence. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991). To prove

literal infringement, the patentee must establish that, “every limitation recited in the claim

appears in the accused product, i.e., the properly construed claim reads on the accused

product exactly.” Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

(citing Amhil Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 

Alternatively, if one of more elements of the claim are not literally present in the

allegedly infringing product or process, the patentee may establish infringement under the

doctrine of equivalents. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131,

1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This doctrine allows infringement to be found in some cases where

the elements of the accused device are substantially equivalent to the corresponding elements

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of the asserted claim. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. at 29.

To determine whether infringement exists under the doctrine of equivalents, the Court

engages in an element-by-element comparison of the patented invention and the accused

device. Id. at 40. Toward this end, the Court considers whether the accused device

“contain[s] elements that are either identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the

patented invention.” Id. A feature of an accused device is “equivalent” to an element of

claimed invention if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way

to achieve substantially the same result. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,

339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). However, this “linguistic framework” may not be appropriate in

every case. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997). Instead, “[a]n analysis of the

role played by each element in the context of the specific patent claim [must] inform the

inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the

claimed element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different from

the claimed element.” Id. at 40. Additionally, “[i]n applying the doctrine of equivalents, the

fact finder must determine the range of equivalents to which the claimed invention is entitled,

in light of the prosecution history, the pioneer-nonpioneer status of the invention, and the

prior art.” Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l. Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

The Court must also be mindful of the limitations of the doctrine of equivalents.

Particularly, the doctrine of equivalents cannot allow a patent to encompass subject matter

existing in prior art. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d

677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 508 U.S. 83 (1993). The doctrine

also may not be used to allow coverage of obvious or “trivial” variations of the prior art. See

Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Further,

“where the patent document expressly identifies a role for a claim limitation, the doctrine of

equivalents cannot be used to capture subject matter that does not substantially fulfill that

role.” K-2 Corp., 191 F.3d at 1367 (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40). 

Additionally, the doctrine of equivalents is limited by the principle that the patentee

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may not use the doctrine to recover subject matter that has been surrendered. Id. “For

example, prosecution history estoppel will exclude from the doctrine of equivalents any

subject matter that was, by amendment or argument during prosecution, relinquished.” Id.

(citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30-31). These limitations on the doctrine of

equivalents are questions of law. Id. “Taken together, these concepts - that the doctrine of

equivalents is both limited and subject to estoppel - reflects [the Federal Circuit’s] (and the

Supreme Court’s) approach of maintaining the principled application of the doctrine of

equivalents while hewing closely to the doctrine’s original purpose: to prevent fraud on a

patent.” Id.

III. Avago’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Assignor Estoppel

Avago asserts that TriQuint is barred from asserting that the ‘922 patent, the ‘4619

patent, the ‘340 patent, the ‘807 patent, the ‘436 patent, and the ‘5619 patent are invalid

under the theory of assignor estoppel because Dr. Aigner, a TriQuint employee, is listed as

an inventor on all of these patents and Dr. Fattinger, another TriQuint employee, is listed as

an inventor on one of the patents. In response, TriQuint argues that assignor estoppel does

not apply to its invalidity claims.

“Assignor estoppel is an equitable doctrine that prevents one who has assigned the

rights to a patent (or patent application) from later contending that what was assigned is a

nullity.” Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “[I]t

is the implicit representation by the assignor that the patent rights that he is assigning

(presumably for value) are not worthless that sets the assignor apart from the rest of the

world and can deprive him of the ability to challenge later the validity of the patent.” Id.

“To allow the assignor to make that representation at the time of the assignment (to his

advantage) and later to repudiate it (again to his advantage) could work an injustice against

the assignee.” Id. Thus, the doctrine is “mainly concerned with the balance of equities

between the parties.” Id. at 1225.

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Assignor estoppel also applies to bar parties in privity with the assignor from asserting

invalidity challenges. Id. at 1224. The determination of privity between parties is also

determined upon a balance of the equities. Shamrock Techs., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc.,

903 F.2d 789, 793 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Federal Circuit has stated:

If an inventor assigns his invention to his employer company A and leaves to

join company B, whether company B is in privity and thus bound by the

doctrine will depend on the equities dictated by the relationship between the

inventor and company B in light of the act of infringement. The closer that

relationship, the more the equities will favor applying the doctrine to

company B. 

Id. Thus, because of the focus on the closeness of the relationship between the parties, a

finding of privity is unlikely between a company and an assignor who is a “mere employee”

of that company. Id. at 794. 

Rather, privity is far more likely in cases where, for example, the company alleged to

be in privity with the assignor was founded by the assignor. See Diamond Scientific, 848

F.2d at 1224. Further, in determining the closeness of the relationship, the significant

determination becomes “whether the ultimate infringer availed itself of the inventor’s

‘knowledge and assistance’ to conduct infringement.” Intel Corp. v. ITC, 946 F.2d 821, 839

(Fed. Cir. 1991). All direct and indirect contacts between the assignor and defendant

company must be evaluated in making this determination. Id. at 838. 

Here, TriQuint does not argue that assignor estoppel does not apply to either Dr.

Aigner or Dr. Fattinger as individuals. Rather, TriQuint argues that assignor estoppel should

not bar TriQuint from asserting its invalidity defenses because neither Dr. Aigner nor Dr.

Fattinger exercises substantial control over TriQuint or owns a significant number of shares

of TriQuint stock. Therefore, in TriQuint’s view, there is no privity between TriQuint and

either Dr. Aigner or Dr. Fattinger. 

Though control of a company and stock ownership are not necessarily determinative

factors, a significant number of cases cite to the presence of these factors as tipping the scales

of equity in favor of finding privity. See Acushnet Co. v. Dunlop Maxfli Sports Corp., 2000

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WL 987979, at *2-*3 (D. Del., June 29, 2000) (discussing “the handful of cases” where

privity was found and how in each case “the assignor [] exercised substantial control over,

and/or held considerable financial interest in, the defendant corporation”). Indeed, the

Federal Circuit’s emphasis on these factors when finding privity in cases of assignor estoppel

led one district court to conclude that the policy goal of assignor estoppel is specifically to

“prevent[] an assignor from perpetrating in a corporate guise the very injustice the doctrine

precludes him or her from accomplishing in a personal capacity.” Id. at *3. Thus, because

the defendant company in that case was not the assignor’s “corporate disguise,” that court

found that extending the doctrine in that instance would not accomplish its goal, but rather

“would punish [the defendant company] for hiring [the assignor] and using his talents to

compete with [the] plaintiff.” Id. TriQuint further argues that these policy considerations

apply directly to this case and preclude the application of the doctrine to TriQuint.

Avago, on the other hand, argues that TriQuint’s focus on control and financial

interest in a defendant corporation is misguided and not the proper test under Federal Circuit

precedent. Rather, Avago argues that the “knowledge and assistance” determination must

be made only in the context of the assignor’s role in the defendant company’s allegedly

infringing activities. Therefore, to the extent that Avago argues that Dr. Aigner and Dr.

Fattinger exert any control over TriQuint, that control is solely in terms of their influence

over any allegedly infringing products.

To support its argument, Avago relies heavily on the decision in Synopsis, Inc. v.

Magma Design Automation, Inc., 2005 WL 1562779 (N.D. Cal., July 1, 2005). That court

criticized the Acushnet decision, upon which TriQuint relies, for apparently “reject[ing]

application of assignor estoppel in any case where the inventor/assignor lacks control over

the company alleged to infringe the assigned patent.” Id. at *7, n. 6. That view, stated the

Synopsis court, “conflicts with the Federal Circuit’s holding in Intel that the key factor is

whether the infringing company uses the assignor’s knowledge and assistance to conduct

infringement.” Id. Thus, Avago argues, it is not relevant whether Dr. Aigner and Dr.

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Fattinger exercise substantial control over TriQuint or own significant financial interests in

the company; rather, what is relevant in Avago’s view is that both Dr. Aigner and Dr.

Fattinger “used their knowledge from their patented inventions to develop the accused

products.” (Doc. 412 at 32). 

The Court finds that both parties’ arguments have some merit under Federal Circuit

precedent. Certainly, “control of the allegedly infringing entity [is not] a prerequisite” to

finding privity, Synopsis, 2005 WL 1562779, at *7, as TriQuint would seem to have it.

Nevertheless, as the Acushnet case points out, in several Federal Circuit cases in which

privity was found, the assignor was found to have substantial control over or a significant

financial relationship with the defendant company. See Acushnet, 2000 WL 987979, at *2-

*3. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has specifically cited the case of a company founded by an

assignor as an example where assignor estoppel would apply. Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d

at 1224. Thus, the assignor’s control over and financial relationship with a defendant

company, or lack thereof, is an important factor that must be considered in determining

whether privity exists. See Intel Corp, 946 F.2d at 838 (stating that all direct and indirect

contacts between the assignor and defendant company must be considered). 

Furthermore, in delineating whether a sufficiently close relationship exists to find

privity, Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d at 793, clearly the Court must also ascertain whether

TriQuint availed itself of Dr. Aigner’s and Dr. Fattinger’s knowledge and assistance to

conduct any alleged infringement. Id. at 794. Of course, in resolving this question, the Court

must acknowledge that “[e]very employee provides some knowledge or assistance to his

employer.” HWB, Inc., 869 F. Supp. at 582. Instead, “the relevant question is whether the

assignor/inventor plays such a significant part in his new employer’s infringing operations

that his new employer could not have initiated the infringing operations without the

assistance of the assignor/inventor.” Id. Therefore, to determine whether TriQuint has

availed itself of sufficient knowledge and assistance to support a finding of privity, the Court

must ascertain the closeness of the relationship between TriQuint and Drs. Aigner and

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Fattinger in light of the alleged act of infringement. Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d at 793. 

With regard to any control that Dr. Aigner or Dr. Fattinger may have exerted over

TriQuint, the record indicates that no such control existed. TriQuint points out that Drs.

Aigner and Fattinger are not founders, officers, or strategic decision-makers at TriQuint.

(Doc. 423, at 322, ¶¶ 136-38). Rather, Dr. Aigner, whose title is “director of research and

development in acoustic technologies” is one of about 385 managerial-level employees and

is two levels down from the vice president to whom he reports. (Id.). Dr. Fattinger, whose

title is “BAW R&D manager,” is one level below Dr. Aigner. (Id.). Avago does not dispute

these facts.

With regard to financial interests in TriQuint, both employees participate in TriQuint’s

standard employee stock option program, and both have been granted options to purchase

only small amounts of stock. (Id.). Thus, neither Dr. Aigner nor Dr. Fattinger own a

substantial percentage of TriQuint stock or exert any significant control over the company

as a result of any financial interests in the company. Avago also does not dispute these facts.

Therefore, this undisputed evidence clearly demonstrates that Drs. Aigner and Fattinger have

no closer of a relationship to TriQuint than any other of the hundreds employees at their

respective levels and are therefore “mere employee[s]” with respect to corporate control and

financial interests. This weighs strongly in favor of a finding of no privity between either

of the doctors and TriQuint. See Shamrock Technologies, 903 F.2d at 794.

The parties dispute, however, whether TriQuint availed itself of the knowledge and

assistance of Drs. Aigner and Fattinger to a sufficient degree such that there can be privity

between TriQuint and the doctors even in the absence of substantial control over the

company or significant financial interests. Avago asserts that the relationship was

sufficiently close between TriQuint and Drs. Aigner and Fattinger that TriQuint could not

have initiated the allegedly infringing activities without the assistance of the doctors.

Specifically, Avago alleges that Dr. Aigner exercised “substantial control” over TriQuint’s

BAW research and development efforts, that he “owned” TriQuint’s acoustic development,

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that he hired several new employees, including Dr. Fattinger to assist him with BAW

research and development, and that he is the ultimate decisionmaker concerning TriQuint’s

BAW products. (Doc. 420-1 at ¶¶ 380-396). Avago further alleges that Dr. Fattinger, as Dr.

Aigner’s second in command, was hired by Dr. Aigner because Dr. Fattinger knows all of

the dirty tricks of Infineon’s BAW processes, and that together the two doctors exercised

direct control over TriQuint’s BAW research and development operations. (Id.). In support

of these allegations, Avago points to deposition testimony of TriQuint employees,

correspondence between TriQuint employees, and charts illustrating TriQuint’s managerial

organization. (Id.).

TriQuint, on the other hand, correctly asserts that Avago’s evidence does not prove

that Drs. Aigner and Fattinger have not contributed any greater knowledge and assistance to

TriQuint’s BAW processes than that which would be contributed by a mere employee in their

respective positions at a large corporation. Indeed, the organizational charts cited by Avago

merely show that the doctors are each one of a very large number of employees working in

what could only be described as a typical multi-level corporate structure. The charts show

that there are several other TriQuint employees, at levels above those of Drs. Aigner and

Fattinger, to whom both doctors must report. Avago’s evidence therefore fails to

demonstrate that Dr. Aigner actually had any hiring power or that he ultimately made all of

the decisions concerning TriQuint’s BAW products. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that

TriQuint accepted the input of Dr. Aigner, as a mere employee, with regard to hiring and

decision-making.

The statements made by TriQuint employees do not alter this conclusion. In the

deposition testimony of Brian Balut, Mr. Balut states that Dr. Aigner “owned total acoustic

development.” (Doc. 420-16, Ex. 179 at 227:16-17). However, from the context of Mr.

Balut’s complete statement, it appears more likely that he was merely expressing his opinion

that TriQuint hired Dr. Aigner to have responsibility over both its BAW and its SAW

research divisions. As the declaration of TriQuint’s Vice President of Human Resources,

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Debbie Burke, demonstrates, this responsibility likely extended only to typical mid-level

managerial control. (Doc. 422, at ¶¶ 4-7). Additionally, when immediately following his

statement, Mr. Balut was asked whether Dr. Aigner made the decision to hire Dr. Fattinger,

Mr. Balut’s reply was, “In the end we hired Dr. Fattinger.” (Doc. 420-16, Ex. 179 at 227:22-

228:2). Mr. Balut’s use of the word “we” undermines Avago’s assertion that Dr. Aigner

“owned” acoustic development in such a way that he personally controlled TriQuint’s BAW

business without any direction or input from his superiors or other TriQuint employees.

Moreover, Dr. Aigner’s statement that Dr. Fattinger knew the “dirty tricks” of Infineon’s

BAW processes, regardless of what his intentions were when he made the statement, does

nothing to prove that Dr. Aigner actually had any control over Dr. Fattinger’s subsequent

hiring by TriQuint.

Similarly, Dr. Fattinger’s acknowledgment in his deposition that he believed Dr.

Aigner had “ultimate responsibility for technical decisions that were made with respect to

the bulk acoustic wave process . . . .” (Doc. 420-16, Ex. 186 at 47:16-21) does not support

Avago’s conclusions. Apart from the fact that what the phrase “technical decisions”

encompasses is never specified, this statement from one of Dr. Aigner’s subordinates does

not conclusively demonstrate that Dr. Aigner exercised any control beyond the mid-level

managerial responsibilities that TriQuint admits he had. 

Of course, all of this evidence does clearly demonstrate that both Dr. Aigner and Dr.

Fattinger were involved in TriQuint’s BAW research and development. Indeed, TriQuint

does not dispute that fact. However, as talented experts in the area of BAW technology, such

a conclusion could easily be drawn from the doctors’ mere employment at TriQuint. In other

words, the Court finds that the evidence in the record, including the doctors’ lack of any

corporate control over or significant financial interest in TriQuint, does not establish that Drs.

Aigner and Fattinger had any closer of a relationship to TriQuint than any other employee

at their respective levels within the TriQuint corporate structure would have had. Nor does

the evidence demonstrate that their relationships with TriQuint are any closer than engineers

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with their respective levels of expertise would generally be expected to have with their

employers. Rather, the evidence only shows that TriQuint availed itself of the doctors

knowledge and assistance in their capacities as mere employees of TriQuint, and that

therefore TriQuint was not in privity with either of the doctors for the purposes of assignor

estoppel. 

 Furthermore, it is notable that two other competitors of TriQuint, one of which was

Avago, also pursued Dr. Aigner and offered him employment. (Doc. 423, at 323, ¶¶ 141-

142). These firms were essentially competing for Dr. Aigner’s talents before his employment

at TriQuint began. Together with the other evidence in the record, this fact helps support the

conclusion that Dr. Aigner was hired merely for his expertise in his field, and that his role

and the closeness of his employment relationship likely would have been no different had he

accepted one of the other two employment offers. Thus, the Court finds that to extend

assignor estoppel to apply to TriQuint in this case would not comport with the policy goals

of the doctrine. That is, “[a]ssignor estoppel was not designed to prevent companies from

competing for talented employees; rather, it was intended to prevent the assignor (whether

acting individually or through another entity) from ‘making [a] representation [of the patent's

validity] at the time of assignment (to his advantage) and later . . . repudiat[ing] it (again to

his advantage).’” Acushnet, 2000 WL 987979, at *3 (citing Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d

at 1224). 

Therefore, TriQuint may proceed with its invalidity defenses, and Avago’s motion to

apply assignor estoppel to TriQuint in this case is DENIED.

B. Laches

The doctrine of laches refers to “the neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an

alleged wrong, which taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes

prejudice to the adverse party and operates as an equitable bar.” A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.

Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). In the context of

a patent infringement suit, laches acts to bar the recovery of only those damages accrued

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prior to suit. Id. at 1041. Furthermore, “where the plaintiff alleges infringement of more

than one patent, laches must be determined separately for each.” Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc.,

912 F.2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Aukerman, 960 F.2d

at 1038. 

To determine whether to apply the defense of laches, the trial court must “look at all

of the particular facts and circumstances of each case and weigh the equities of the parties.”

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, to invoke the defense, an

alleged infringer must prove two factors:

1. the plaintiff delayed filing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length

of time from the time the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of

its claim against the defendant, and

2. the delay operated to the prejudice or injury of the defendant. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Generally, there are no “fixed boundaries” on the length of time that may be deemed

an unreasonable delay, but rather the determination will depend on the circumstances of each

case. Id. However, the Federal Circuit has held that after a delay of six years, a presumption

of laches will apply that shifts only the burden of production to the patentee. Id. at 1035-39.

The patentee may overcome the presumption by “raising a genuine issue respecting either

factual element of a laches defense.” Id. at 1038. 

Furthermore, with respect to the second prong, the defendant may show either

economic prejudice, which “may arise where a defendant and possibly others will suffer the

loss of monetary investments or incur damages which likely would have been prevented by

earlier suit,” or evidentiary prejudice, which “may arise by reason of a defendant’s inability

to present a full and fair defense on the merits due to the loss of records, the death of a

witness, or the unreliability of memories of long past events, thereby undermining the court’s

ability to judge the facts.” Id. at 1033.

1. TriQuint’s Delay and the Presumption of Laches

As previously stated, to determine the length of any delay in bringing suit, and also

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whether the presumption of laches applies, the court must ascertain at what point in time “the

plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against the defendant.”

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032. Thus, either actual or constructive knowledge of the

defendant’s potentially infringing activities is sufficient to begin the period of delay.

Wanlass v. Gen. Electric Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Further, because

constructive knowledge may be sufficient to begin the delay period, a duty is imposed on

patentees to police their rights. Id. at 1338. “For example, sales, marketing, publication, or

public use of a product similar to or embodying technology similar to the patented invention,

or published descriptions of the defendant's potentially infringing activities, give rise to a

duty to investigate whether there is infringement.” Id. Furthermore, in calculating the delay

period, the transfer of a patent between parties does not restart the delay clock for the

transferee. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1559

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“A patentee cannot avoid the consequences of his laches by transferring the

patent.”), overruled on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,

1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Similarly, an alleged infringer that is the transferee of a business or

its assets may include any allegedly infringing conduct of the transferor to determine the

patentee’s period of delay. R2 Med. Systs., Inc., v. Katecho, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1397, 1412-

13 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“[A] defendant that is the transferee of an entire business or its assets

may rely upon the patentee’s delay in suing the transferor.”).

Here, genuine issues of material fact exist as to the point in time that TriQuint, or its

predecessor TFR, first knew of or had reason to know of potential infringement by Avago,

or its predecessor Agilent. Avago argues that TFR had both actual and constructive

knowledge as early as 2002, when the accused products first became publicly available.

Avago further points to evidence of licensing negotiations between TFR and Agilent in 2002

and to evidence that the founder and CEO of TFR, Dr. Kenneth Lakin, examined Agilent’s

products in 2002. 

TriQuint does not dispute that products named similarly to the accused products were

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available in 2002; however, TriQuint asserts that because of the many changes made to

Avago’s products since that time, the products did not actually infringe TriQuint’s patents

until several years later. Furthermore, Avago’s evidence that Dr. Lakin may have examined

any of Agilent’s products in 2002 is based solely on testimony from Dr. Richard Ruby, an

Avago employee, and thus is subject to a determination of his credibility. Such

determinations are not appropriate on summary judgment. See Wanlass v. Fedders Corp.,

145 F.3d at 1463 (“In determining the propriety of summary judgment, credibility

determinations may not be made . . . .”). Similarly, though it is undisputed that Drs. Lakin

and Ruby discussed the possibility of a licensing deal between TFR and Agilent, the content

of the negotiations, particularly whether the negotiations may have been motivated by TFR’s

belief that Agilent infringed any of TFR’s patents, is disputed by the parties. Much of

Avago’s evidence that the negotiations were so motivated also comes only from Dr. Ruby’s

declaration, which again is subject to a determination of his credibility. Therefore, a genuine

issue of material facts exists as to whether TFR knew or should have known of Agilent’s

potential infringement in 2002.

Furthermore, because Avago has not established that the delay period began prior to

2003, or six years prior to the beginning of this litigation, the presumption of laches does not

apply. Thus, for the purposes of this summary judgment motion, Avago retains the burdens

of production and persuasion on the issues of unreasonable delay and prejudice. See

Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032. However, apart from its theory that the delay began in 2002,

Avago points to no other potential date on which any delay may have began. Nor does the

evidence in the record indicate that any such date may be properly determined on summary

judgment. Hence, because genuine issues of material fact exists as to whether TriQuint

delayed in bringing suit, Avago has failed to carry its burden, and the Court cannot reach the

issues of whether any such delay was reasonable and whether Avago was prejudiced by any

possible delay. Therefore, Avago’s motion for summary judgment on its laches defense is

DENIED. 

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C. Non-Infringement of the ‘647 Patent

TriQuint asserts that Avago infringes United States Patent No. 5,894,647 (“the ‘647

patent”). Avago has moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of all asserted

claims. The ‘647 patent generally describes a method for fabricating piezoelectric resonators

with both a top and a bottom electrode. The patent further discloses the steps of adding a

differential layer of conducting material to one of the electrodes and then trimming off

misaligned portions of both the initial and differential layers of that electrode to improve the

resonator’s performance. Of particular relevance to Avago’s motion, the claims of the ‘647

patent all refer to adding the differential layer to and subsequently trimming only the “top”

electrode of the resonator.

Though TriQuint alleges that some of Avago’s products literally infringe the ‘647

patent, Avago focuses its motion only on its products that apply a mass-loading layer to the

bottom electrode. Avago contends that these products are alleged only to infringe under the

doctrine of equivalents. TriQuint, in response, asserts that some of the Avago products

applying a mass-loading layer to the bottom electrode also literally infringe the ‘647 patent

because the fabrication of those products include additional steps that apply a so called

“innie” layer to the top electrode. 

The Court finds that Avago has not moved for summary judgment on the issue of

whether any of the accused Avago products that include an “innie” layer step in addition to

applying a mass-loading layer to the bottom electrode do not literally infringe the ‘647

patent. Hence, the Court will only address Avago’s argument that, as a matter of law, the

step of applying a mass-loading layer to the bottom electrode of its products does not infringe

the ‘647 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 

Avago argues that the disclosure-dedication rule precludes TriQuint from making such

an argument under the doctrine of equivalents. Under that rule, “when a patent drafter

discloses but declines to claim subject matter, . . . this action dedicates that unclaimed subject

matter to the public.” Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d

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1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the Federal Circuit’s view, “[a]pplication of the doctrine of

equivalents to recapture subject matter deliberately left unclaimed would ‘conflict with the

primacy of the claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.’” Id. The rule

also prevents a patentee from “narrowly claim[ing] an invention to avoid prosecution

scrutiny by the PTO, and then after patent issuance, us[ing] the doctrine of equivalents to

establish infringement because the specification discloses equivalents.” Id. 

Furthermore, “disclosures implicating the disclosure-dedication rule need not directly

relate to the description of the claimed invention or be contained in the ‘Detailed Description

of the Invention’ section of the patent, but may appear merely in the portion of the patent

describing the ‘Background of the Invention.’” Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Inds., Inc.,

383 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, though the disclosure need not meet the

requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the disclosure must be sufficiently specific to invoke the

disclosure-dedication rule. Id. With regard to the required level of specificity, the Federal

Circuit has stated the following:

We thus hold that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the

unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the

alternative matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public. . . . The

disclosure must be of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could

identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.

Id. (quoting PCS Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed.

Cir. 2004)). Finally, application of the dedication-disclosure rule is a question of law. Id.

at 1331. 

Here, the parties agree that Avago’s method of applying a mass-loading layer to the

bottom electrode is not literally claimed in the ‘647 patent. However, the parties dispute

whether the specification of the ‘647 patent discloses that method, thereby precluding

TriQuint from arguing that such a step infringes the claims of the ‘647 patent under the

doctrine of equivalents.

The relevant portions of the ‘647 specification that could reasonably be deemed to

disclose Avago’s method include the following paragraph from the “Background of the

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Invention” section of the ‘647 patent:

Many techniques exist for fabricating piezoelectric resonators. For some

applications a suitable resonator can be fabricated simply by adding

conducting electrodes to a thin piezoelectric crystal "blank" obtained from

commercial sources which "blank" may have been further thinned by

processing. Another technique is to first fabricate a bottom electrode on a

supporting substrate such as silicon. Next, a thin film of piezoelectric material

is deposited over the electrode and substrate. The supporting substrate is then

removed in some regions so as to expose the bottom electrode, which leaves

the electrode and piezoelectric film in the form of a membrane or plate

supported at the edges. The top electrode is then fabricated on the top surface

of the membrane. The equivalent of a thin membrane may also be created by

fabricating a sequence of quarter-wavelength thick layers of material upon a

suitable substrate. A bottom electrode is then fabricated upon the uppermost

quarter-wavelength reflector followed by a layer of piezoelectric material and

finally by the top electrode. The quarter-wavelength thick layers of material

act as reflectors and mechanically isolate the acoustic motion of the bottom

electrode and of the piezoelectric material from the underlying substrate.

(‘647 patent, at 1:55-2:10). Additionally, the “Detailed Description” section of the patent

begins with the following: “Referring to FIGS. 3 and 4, to fabricate a device having two

resonators in accord with this invention, a thin substrate 10 is fabricated by any of the various

methods known in the prior art.” (‘647 patent, at 4:46-49). Finally, the patent states the

following in reference to its description of figures 3 and 4:

It should be understood that the differential fabrication technique could[] be

applied to electrode 12 instead of to electrode 16. In the latter instance, a

differential layer of metal would, instead, be added to that portion of electrode

12 that overlaps with electrode 16, either before or after the primary layer of

metal for electrode 12 is fabricated on the substrate. In this latter instance, the

areas of electrode 12 that coincided with electrode 16 and in which the metal

thickness was not equal to the sum of the primary layer of metal and the

differential layer of metal, would then be removed in a manner similar to that

described above for the removal of such non-uniform areas of electrode 16.

(‘647 patent, at 6:26-37). 

In Avago’s view, these portions of the ‘647 patent, when combined, disclose the

method used by Avago. Specifically, Avago’s method involves the second fabrication

technique described in the cited background portion of the ‘647 patent, whereby a bottom

electrode is first fabricated on a supporting substrate, a piezoelectric layer is deposited over

the bottom electrode, a portion of the supporting substrate is removed, and the top electrode

is then fabricated on the top surface of the piezoelectric layer.

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While those general steps are clearly in the prior art, Avago further modifies its

method by adding a mass-loading layer, which the parties agree is equivalent to the

differential layer described in the ‘647 patent, to the bottom electrode either before the

bottom electrode is fabricated on the substrate or before the piezoelectric layer is deposited

over the bottom electrode. Avago further trims the misaligned portions of its bottom

electrode and its mass-loading, or differential, layer.

In contrast, the ‘647 patent describes and depicts its claimed method in terms of the

first fabrication technique described in the cited portion of the background section, whereby

conducting electrodes are simply added to the top and bottom sides of a thin piezoelectric

crystal “blank.” However, Avago asserts that its method is nevertheless disclosed by the

‘647 patent because the portions of the detailed description cited above state that figures 3

and 4 also refer to “any of the various methods known in the prior art,” which Avago argues

includes the second fabrication technique described in the background section. Hence,

because the detailed description also describes, in reference to figures 3 and 4 and thus

potentially to any of the described fabrication techniques, applying a differential layer to the

bottom electrode (electrode 12) rather than the top electrode (electrode 16), Avago argues

that the ‘647 patent discloses Avago’s method of applying a mass-loading layer to the bottom

electrode utilizing the second fabrication technique.

In response, Triquint asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art could not reasonably

read the specification of the ‘647 patent to disclose Avago’s method because Avago’s

method requires that the bottom electrode and the mass-loading layer are to be fabricated and

trimmed before the top electrode even exists. In contrast, TriQuint asserts that the alternative

method disclosed in the detailed description of the ‘647 specification requires that the top

electrode already exist at the time that the differential layer is added to the bottom electrode.

Specifically, TriQuint points out that the ‘647 specification states in the detailed description

that when applying a differential layer to bottom electrode 12, “a differential layer of metal

would, instead, be added to that portion of electrode 12 that overlaps with electrode 16.”

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(‘647 patent, at 6:28-30). That portion of the specification further states that “the areas of

electrode 12 that coincided with electrode 16 and in which the metal thickness was not equal

to the sum of the primary layer of metal and the differential layer of metal, would then be

removed . . . .” (‘647 patent, at 6:32-35). 

In TriQuint’s view, one of ordinary skill in the art could not possibly interpret this

language to apply to either the second fabrication technique described in the background

section or Avago’s method because those methods do not allow for the top electrode to exist

at the same time that the differential layer would be added to the bottom electrode. Rather,

those methods both required that the bottom electrode is buried prior to fabrication of the top

electrode. Hence, TriQuint asserts that this language is only directed to resonators that use

the first fabrication technique, whereby the resonator is built on a “blank,” which allows both

the top and bottom electrodes to exist prior to adding a differential layer to either electrode.

The Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art could only reasonably accept

TriQuint’s interpretation of the ‘647 specification. Avago’s strained interpretation is not

well-supported and does not meet the level of specificity required to apply the dedicationdisclosure rule. See Toro, 383 F.3d at 1334 (“The disclosure must be of such specificity that

one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and

not claimed.”). For, example, though the statement about “various methods known in the

prior art,” (‘647 patent, at 4:46-49), clearly refers to methods for fabricating substrates,

Avago interprets that passage to refer back to the paragraph in the background section about

fabricating resonators. In fact, to the extent that the quoted excerpt is referring to the

background section, it is far more likely that the excerpt is referring to the preceding

paragraph in the background section, which states that “[t]he substrate may consist entirely

of a piezoelectric material, or may consist or layers of piezoelectric and non-piezoelectric

materials.” (‘647 patent, at 1:49-54). Indeed, both excerpts conclude with an identical

citation to a scientific article. The paragraph about fabricating resonators to which Avago

refers does not, however, refer to the article.

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Moreover, because the graphical depictions of the design in figures 3 and 4 of the ‘647

patent and the graphical depiction of Avago’s design are so different, as is demonstrated in

TriQuint’s response brief (Doc. 421, at 74-75), it is unlikely that one of ordinary skill in the

art would interpret the figures and described design as disclosing any designs other than

those using a piezoelectric blank. This is especially true considering that the only way to

connect the figures to any other designs is via Avago’s reading of the reference to the

background section, which as described above is not correct.

Finally, as TriQuint notes, its interpretation of the disclosure in the ‘647 patent is even

further bolstered by the language used in the patent, which strongly suggests that the top and

bottom electrodes both exist at the time the differential layer is added and trimmed. While

Avago is correct that the cited excerpts do not conclusively indicate that electrodes 12 and

16 must exist at the same time, TriQuint’s plain-language reading of the excerpts, in light of

the other pertinent parts of the specification described above, is far more likely to be the one

accepted and understood by those of ordinary skill in the art.

Because the ‘647 patent does not disclose the bottom mass-loading design used by

Avago, TriQuint may proceed with its claims of infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents. Avago’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘647 patent

is therefore DENIED.

IV. TriQuint’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Avago’s Allegations of Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents

TriQuint argues that Avago’s experts have not provided sufficiently particularized

testimony to support Avago’s claims of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and

therefore all of Avago’s infringement claims should be limited to only claims of literal

infringement.

As described above, “[t]he ‘essential inquiry’ in any determination under the

equivalents doctrine is whether ‘the accused product or process contains elements identical

or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention.’” Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am.

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Honda Motor Co., Inc., 651 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson

Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). “An element in the accused

product is equivalent to a claim limitation if the differences between the two are

‘insubstantial’ to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-LA Roche Ltd,

580 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40).

“Insubstantiality may be determined by whether the accused device performs substantially

the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result as the claim

limitation.” Id. (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608

(1950)). 

Under Federal Circuit precedent, “a patentee must still provide particularized

testimony and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of differences’ between the

claimed invention and the accused device or process, or with respect to the function, way,

result test when such evidence is presented to support a finding of infringement under the

doctrine of equivalents.” Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d

1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The patentee must present the evidence “on a limitation-bylimitation basis.” Id. “Generalized testimony as to the overall similarity between the claims

and the accused infringer’s product or process will not suffice.” Id.

However, this “particularized testimony” standard is not without limitations. For

example, it does not require an expert to “re-start his testimony at square one when

transitioning to a doctrine of equivalents analysis.” Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504

F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Rather, it is “desirable for a witness to incorporate earlier

testimony in order to avoid duplication.” Id. Nevertheless, “[t]he evidence and argument on

the doctrine of equivalents cannot merely be subsumed in plaintiff’s case of literal

infringement.” Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co. of Michigan, Inc., 873 F.2d 1422,

1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

TriQuint asks the Court to preclude all of Avago’s arguments under the doctrine of

equivalents. However, the Court will not simply exclude all of Avago’s doctrine of

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equivalents arguments, and instead will evaluate each of Avago’s theories of infringement

under the doctrine of equivalents, using the standards elucidated above, on a claim-by-claim

basis. 

B. Non-Infringement of the ‘907 Patent

Avago claims that TriQuint has infringed U.S. Patent No. 6,051,907 (“the ‘907

patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of non-infringement on claims 10 and

11 of the ‘907 patent. The abstract of the ‘907 patent states that the patent is directed to “[a]

method for tuning a Thin Film Bulk Acoustic Wave Resonator (FBAR) located on a wafer.”

Independent claim 10 of the ‘907 patent requires the following:

A method for simultaneously tuning a plurality of Thin Film Bulk Acoustic

Wave Resonators (FBARs) before the FBARs are separated from a wafer,

comprising steps of: 

measuring a frequency at which selected ones of the FBARs exhibit a

resonance, the frequency being a function of thicknesses of the selected

FBARS; 

calculating an average of the measured frequencies; 

calculating an amount (A) by which the thicknesses of the selected FBARs

need to be altered in order to substantially minimize a difference between the

calculated average of the measured frequencies and a reference frequency; and

simultaneously altering the thicknesses of each of the plurality of the FBARs

by the amount (A) before the plurality of FBARs are separated from the wafer

for reducing the difference between the reference frequency and the calculated

average of the measured frequencies.

Claim 11 depends from claim 10, requiring “[a] method as set forth in claim 10, wherein the

number of selected ones is less than a total number of the plurality of FBARs fabricated on

the wafer.”

TriQuint puts forth three arguments supporting its motion for non-infringement of

these claims, including that TriQuint does not alter the thicknesses of its resonators

simultaneously, TriQuint does not alter its resonator thicknesses by a single amount, and

TriQuint does not average measured frequencies. 

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1. “Simultaneously Altering” Limitation 

Claim 10 requires, in part, “simultaneously altering the thicknesses of each of the

plurality of the FBARs by the amount (A).” In the Markman order, the Court construed this

term to mean “altering the thickness of each film bulk acoustic resonator to be detuned on

a wafer by the same amount (A) at the same time.” (Doc. 229, at 72). In construing this

element of the claim, the Court rejected TriQuint’s proposed construction wherein “all the

FBARs” on a wafer must be altered at the same time. Id. Rather, under the Court’s

construction, “each film bulk acoustic resonator to be detuned on a wafer” must be altered

at the same time. Though this construction could in certain instances refer to all resonators

on a wafer if all resonators on a wafer are to be detuned, this construction could also refer

to only a small subset of resonators on the wafer that are to be detuned, where the remaining

resonators on the wafer will not be detuned. Thus, determining infringement of this element

turns on a factual question of whether all resonators to be detuned on a wafer in TriQuint’s

allegedly infringing process are altered at the same time.

TriQuint argues that it does not literally infringe the claims of the ‘907 patent because

it does not alter the thicknesses of each resonator to be detuned on its wafers at the same

time. Instead, TriQuint contends that its Ion Beam Etching (IBE) tool “moves the beam over

the surface of the wafer and trims different locations on a wafer at different times.” (Doc.

415, at 46). Thus, because the different locations are trimmed at different times, and each

of the locations that is trimmed corresponds to a location “to be detuned,” in TriQuint’s view

it cannot be liable for literal infringement of this element. TriQuint further argues that Avago

has failed to properly allege infringement of this element by equivalents.

In response, Avago points primarily to statements included in Dr. Howe’s excluded

declaration to support its arguments of literal infringement and infringement by equivalents.

Because the Court has excluded Dr. Howe’s declaration, arguments based on that document

will not be considered. Furthermore, in Dr. Howe’s expert report, he states only that “each

of the TriQuint Products/Processes meets all of the limitations of claim 10 of the ‘907 Patent

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by the doctrine of equivalents and, therefore, infringes claim 10 of the ‘907 Patent.” (Doc.

417-16, Ex. 95 at ¶ 143). Dr. Howe makes an almost identical statement in his report with

respect to claim 11. (Id. at ¶ 149). Furthermore, in his deposition testimony, Dr. Howe

stated that, under the Court’s construction of this element, TriQuint could only infringe under

the doctrine of equivalents. (Doc. 417-15, Ex. 93 at 63:3-64:5). Thus, the Court finds that

the undisputed facts show that TriQuint does not literally infringe this element. Any theory

to the contrary that may be included in Dr. Howe’s excluded declaration was submitted too

late for the Court to consider. 

Similarly, any analysis under the doctrine of equivalents in Dr. Howe’s excluded

declaration will not be considered. Further, though Dr. Howe did to some degree discuss

infringement by equivalents in his deposition testimony, he provided no discussion of such

infringement in his expert report, which under Rule 26(a) must contain “a complete statement

of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Thus, Dr. Howe

could not overcome the inadequacies of his report through deposition testimony. See

MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 2d 526, 543 (D.N.J. 2005)

(“MOSAID’s argument that the inadequacies of these expert reports can be shored up by

posing questions to its own experts during expert depositions concerning their position on

equivalency is incorrect.”); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 289 F.

Supp. 2d 493, 500 (D. Del. 2003) (“Since Honeywell's position on the doctrine of equivalents

is only supported by Dr. Hansman's deposition testimony on direct examination and is not

contained in his expert report, Honeywell is precluded from relying on his deposition

testimony to argue infringement by equivalents.”).

The Court therefore finds that Avago has not sufficiently alleged infringement of this

element either literally or by equivalents. Since this element is required by both claims 10

and 11 of the ‘907 patent, TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of

those claims is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court need not consider the parties’ arguments

regarding any other limitations of those claims.

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C. Non-Infringement and Invalidity of the ‘807 Patent

Avago claims that TriQuint infringes U.S. Patent 6,933,807 (“the ‘807 patent”). In

response, TriQuint argues that the ‘807 patent is invalid and that TriQuint therefore cannot

infringe the patent. TriQuint bases its invalidity argument in part on its assertion that the

claims of the ‘807 patent are indefinite.

Patent claims are subject to a statutory requirement of definiteness. The second

paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more

claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant

regards as his invention.” “The ‘distinctly claiming’ requirement means that the claims must

have a clear and definite meaning when construed in light of the complete patent document.

. . . Section 112 thus ensures definiteness of claim language.” Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon,

Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 874-75 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

Only those claims that are “not amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous”

are indefinite. Haliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir.

2008). Furthermore, determination that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness is a question of

law. Exxon Research and Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

A single indefinite limitation will invalidate any claim that includes that limitation. See Net

MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Halliburton

Energy Servs., 514 F.3d at 1249-55. Additionally, any claim depending from such an invalid

claim also necessarily incorporates the indefinite limitation, and is therefore also invalid. See

Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(“‘Aesthetically pleasing,’ as it is used in the only independent claim of the ‘137 patent, fails

to ‘particularly point[] out and distinctly claim [] the subject matter which the patentee

regards as his invention.’ . . . We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment of invalidity of all claims of the ‘137 patent.”). 

Avago’s ‘807 patent is generally directed to “a BAW resonator with an acoustic

reflector whose performance at the resonance frequency is improved.” (‘807 patent, at 6:8-

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10). The patent includes two independent claims, claims 1 and 10. Claim 1 requires, in part,

a BAW resonator with an acoustic reflector, while claim 10 requires, in part, a filter circuit

with a plurality of BAW resonators, each of which comprises an acoustic reflector. Notably,

both claim 1 and claim 10 include the following limitation:

. . . wherein the performance of the acoustic reflector is determined by its

reflectivity for a longitudinal wave existing in the BAW resonator at the

resonance frequency of the BAW resonator and by its reflectivity for a shear

wave existing in the BAW resonator at the resonance frequency of the BAW

resonator . . .

After the Markman hearing, this Court determined in its subsequent order that this claim term

was “indefinite and incapable of construction.” (Doc. 229, at 38). Therefore, because both

claims 1 and 10 include this indefinite limitation, both claims 1 and 10 are invalid.

Moreover, because claims 2-9 depend, either directly or indirectly, from claim 1 and claim

11 depends from claim 10, those additional claims also incorporate this indefinite limitation

and are therefore also invalid. 

Avago nevertheless argues that rather than finding this limitation indefinite, the Court

found this limitation “unnecessary.” (Doc. 424, at 51). Avago then puts forth new testimony

from its expert, Dr. Milsom, to argue that the limitation is not indefinite to one of ordinary

skill in the art. Thus, Avago essentially asks the Court to reconsider its previous construction

of this limitation. 

However, as the Court noted in the Markman order, Avago argued at that time that

no construction of this term was necessary and merely directed the Court to the patent

specification without any elaboration to support that argument. (Doc. 229, at 38). The Court

clearly rejected Avago’s argument. (Id.). Avago cannot now take a “mulligan” and seek a

new construction of this limitation. Claim construction is a question of law, see Markman

v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S.

370 (1996), and this Court decided, after a hearing and full briefing by both parties, that the

“performance” limitation was indefinite as a matter of law.

Furthermore, though the Court is not willing to revisit construction of this claim, the

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Court will clarify some remarks made in the Markman order. The Court compared its

analysis of this claim limitation’s indefiniteness to the analysis of whether a preamble is

limiting, stating that “deletion of the disputed claim term from claims 1 and 10 does not

affect the remaining terms, claims or invention.” (Doc. 229, at 38). The Court further stated

that “[t]he disputed claim term is invalid and must not be considered in determining whether

the ‘807 patent has been infringed.” (Id.). 

The Court acknowledges that this statement, by seeming to leave open the potential

for an infringement finding, was not entirely accurate. The Federal Circuit has held that

infringement and validity are “entirely separate” questions. Medtronic, Inc., v. Cardiac

Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, “an invalid claim

cannot give rise to liability for infringement.” Id.; see also Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion

Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding the district court erred in

concluding that invalidity for indefiniteness should be found only in the alternative to its

finding of non-infringement and thus vacating the district court’s finding of non-infringement

and affirming the district court’s finding of invalidity). As discussed above, by finding a

term of claims 1 and 10 of the ‘807 patent to be indefinite, the Court necessarily found that

those entire independent claims, and the remaining dependent claims that depend from claims

1 and 10, were invalid under Section 112, second paragraph. Thus, there can also be no

liability for infringement of the ‘807 patent. 

All of the eleven claims of the ‘807 patent are therefore invalidated for indefiniteness

under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of

invalidity and non-infringement of the ‘807 patent is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

need not reach TriQuint’s alternative argument for invalidity based on inadequate enablement

under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. 

D. Non-Infringement of the ‘340 Patent

1. Aspect ratios that are “the same”

Avago claims that TriQuint infringes claims 1-4 and 9-12 of United States Patent

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6,909,340 (“the ‘340 patent”). In response, TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of

non-infringement of those claims. TriQuint also argues that Avago has presented no

allegations of infringement of claim 11. In its controverting statement of facts, Avago

confirms that it does not assert infringement of claim 11. Thus, with respect to claim 11 of

the ‘340 patent, TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement is

GRANTED. The remaining asserted claims are discussed below. 

The ‘340 patent is directed to bulk acoustic wave filters in which the spurious modes

are attenuated. Claims 1 and 12, the only two independent claims of the ‘340 patent, each

require, in part, “[a] bulk acoustic wave filter, comprising . . . a plurality of bulk acoustic

wave resonators . . . said plurality of bulk acoustic wave resonators having effective

resonator surfaces . . . [and] the effective resonator surfaces of all of said plurality of bulk

acoustic wave resonators having different aspect ratios.” 

In the Markman order, this Court noted that the parties stipulated that the phrase “[a]

bulk acoustic wave filter, comprising: a plurality of bulk acoustic wave resonators” means

“[a] bulk acoustic wave filter having at least two bulk acoustic wave resonators.” (Doc. 229,

at 47). Additionally, the Court construed “aspect ratios” to mean “the smallest dimension

of the resonator within the surface plane divided by the largest dimension of the resonator

within the surface plane. The directions of these two dimensions need not be perpendicular

to each other.” (Id. at 51). Further, the parties stipulated that “the effective resonator

surfaces of all of said plurality of bulk acoustic wave resonators having different aspect

ratios” means “no two resonators in the filter have effective resonator surfaces with the same

aspect ratio.” (Doc. 209, at 3). TriQuint argues that it does not infringe any of the claims

of the ‘340 patent because all of its accused products contain at least two resonators with the

same aspect ratio.

Though the Court’s claim constructions and the parties’ stipulations regarding the

terms of these claims give guidance as to what an aspect ratio is and how it should be

measured, there is little guidance as to when two aspect ratios are “the same.” Hence,

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TriQuint’s argument is directed toward establishing that its products all include at least two

resonators with aspect ratios that can be shown to be “the same,” when the degree of

sameness is measured with fewer significant digits and thus less precise measurements.

Avago, conversely, argues that a greater number of significant digits must be used when

calculating aspect ratios and that when a higher level of precision is used, TriQuint’s

resonators can be shown to all have different aspect ratios and therefore infringe the ‘340

patent. The parties additionally use two different formats to recite aspect ratio

measurements, with each party’s format being the inverse of the other’s format.

More specifically, TriQuint argues that the aspect ratio measurements taken by

Avago’s expert, Dr. Muralt, should be compared in the format of “1:x” with “x” limited to

the tenths digit beyond the decimal point because that is how aspect ratios are recited in the

‘340 specification and claims (e.g., 1:1.5). Nevertheless, TriQuint further argues that its

products can be shown to contain resonators with the same aspect ratio even when an extra

significant digit, the hundredths digit, is included (e.g., 1:1.50). Finally, when including the

thousandths digit in the inverse format (e.g., 0.667 instead of 1:1.50) with respect to accused

product EG9504, TriQuint argues that it can show that this product has two resonators with

the same aspect ratio. TriQuint additionally contends that “measurement deviation” in Dr.

Muralt’s measurements further supports a finding that at least two resonators in each accused

TriQuint product have the same aspect ratio.

In response, Avago argues that limiting aspect ratio measurements to only the tenths

or hundredths place leads to “illogical results,” even allowing resonators that are intended

to have different aspect ratios to be measured with sufficient imprecision to have the same

aspect ratio. Thus, in Avago’s view, aspect ratios of the resonators in TriQuint’s products

must be compared using at least the thousandths place. Avago alternatively states this

required level of precision as including five significant digits, though it is unclear how Avago

calculates this number of significant digits. Finally, Avago contends that TriQuint overstates

the impact of “measurement deviation” on the calculated aspect ratios, and that any

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uncertainties in the measurements would not preclude a finding that all resonators in

TriQuint’s products have different aspect ratios.

Essentially, the parties’ arguments with regard to comparing aspect ratio

measurements boil down to determining how one of ordinary skill in the art would compare

aspect ratio measurements. Specifically, at least the format preferred by one of ordinary skill

in the art, the number of significant digits one of ordinary skill in the art would include in the

measurements, how one of ordinary skill in the art would calculate the number of significant

digits, and how one of ordinary skill in the art would weigh uncertainties in measurements

all must be determined before it can be said with any certainty whether one of ordinary skill

in the art would consider two aspect ratio measurements to be “the same.” 

These issues all present questions of material fact. And based on the evidence

submitted by the parties, including conflicting expert testimony, a reasonable finder of fact

could decide in favor of either party on any one of these questions. For example, though

TriQuint is correct in asserting that the ‘340 patent itself only includes the tenths digit

beyond the decimal point when reciting aspect ratios, it never does so in the context of

comparing two aspect ratios to determine if they are “the same.” Thus, to the extent that the

‘340 patent itself provides any guidance on the comparison of two aspect ratios, it remains

unclear whether one of ordinary skill in the art would employ this same level of precision for

purposes of determining infringement of this patent. TriQuint therefore has failed to

establish that no question of material fact exists with regard to whether any of its resonators

have aspect ratios that one of ordinary skill in the art would deem to be “the same.” Its

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement is DENIED with respect to this claim

limitation.

2. Claimed Aspect Ratio Range in Claim 12

Claim 12 further requires, in part, that “the aspect ratios of the effective resonator

surfaces be[] between 1:1.5 and 1:3.” TriQuint claims that its products do not infringe this

element because each of its products contains at least one resonator with an aspect ratio

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below 1:1.5 and therefore outside of the ranged claimed in claim 12. Specifically, TriQuint

points to measurements taken by Avago’s expert Dr. Muralt that show that its accused

products EG9503, EG9504, EG9505, EG9506, and EG9422 each contain a resonator with

an aspect ratio that is below 1:1.5. Avago does not dispute this fact, and instead asserts that

each of these products nevertheless infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Thus, with

respect to products EG9503, EG9504, EG9505, EG9506, and EG9422, TriQuint’s motion

for summary judgment of non-infringement is GRANTED with regard to literal infringement

of claim 12. 

With respect to products EG9515, EG9421, and EG9423, TriQuint asserts that Dr.

Muralt did not analyze these designs in his report. Furthermore, TriQuint claims that its

expert, Dr. Kim, showed that these designs have aspect ratios that are outside of the range

claimed in claim 12. In its response, Avago does not dispute TriQuint’s assertions and rather

maintains only that all of TriQuint’s accused products infringe this element under the

doctrine of equivalents. Therefore, with respect to products EG9515, EG9421, and EG942,

TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement is GRANTED with regard to

literal infringement of claim 12. 

3. Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents

Though TriQuint does not literally infringe the aspect ratio range elements of claim

12, Avago also asserts that TriQuint does infringe that element under the doctrine of

equivalents. In its motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, TriQuint argues first

that Avago has not properly asserted infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Rather,

in TriQuint’s view, Avago has only “made a passing effort” at arguing such infringement and

has thus failed to provide the particularized testimony and linking argument required to make

out a proper claim. 

TriQuint also argues that Avago is barred by prosecution history estoppel from

claiming infringement of claim 12 under the doctrine of equivalents. Under the principle of

prosecution history estoppel, a patentee risks surrendering subject matter when making a

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narrowing amendment to a claim such that the patentee will be estopped from using the

doctrine of equivalents to recapture the surrendered subject matter in subsequent litigation.

Festo Corp v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir.

2003) (en banc). 

The Federal Circuit has held that application of prosecution history estoppel relies on

a multi-step test. The first inquiry is “whether an amendment filed in the Patent and

Trademark Office . . . has narrowed the literal scope of a claim.” Id. at 1366. If it has, then

the next inquiry is “whether the reason for that amendment was a substantial one relating to

patentability.” Id. If it was, then the third and final inquiry “addresses the scope of the

subject matter surrendered by the narrowing amendment.” Id. at 1367. At that point a

presumption is imposed that “the patentee has surrendered all territory between the original

claim limitation and the amended claim limitation.” Id. On the other hand, if the amendment

did not narrow the claim, it was not made for a substantial reason related to patentability, or

the patentee successfully rebuts the presumption of surrendered territory, then prosecution

history estoppel will not apply. Id. at 1366-67. Finally, “[q]uestions relating to the

application and scope of prosecution history estoppel . . . fall within the exclusive province

of the court. Accordingly, the determinations concerning whether the presumption of

surrender has arisen and whether it has been rebutted are questions of law for the court, not

a jury, to decide.” Id. at 1368.

TriQuint argues that narrowing amendments were made to the ‘340 patent at the

prosecution stage when specific numerical aspect ratio ranges were added to claims 1 and 12

and that these amendments were made specifically to overcome the examiner’s rejection of

the original claims. Thus, TriQuint contends that Avago is limited to arguing only literal

infringement of those specific ranges and that the ranges cannot be expanded through the

doctrine of equivalents.

The prosecution history of the ‘340 patent supports a finding that adding these ranges

to the claims constituted narrowing amendments and that these amendments were made for

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a substantial reason relating to patentability. First, in the office action dated July 13, 2004,

the examiner states that original claims 7 and 8, which included the range limitations of

current claims 1 and 12, “would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all

of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claim.” (Doc. 196-3, Ex. 20 at 8).

In that same office action, the examiner rejected the remaining claims as either being

anticipated by or obvious in view of the prior art. (Id. at 3-7). 

In response, the applicants amended claim 1 to include the limitations of claims 6 and

7. (Doc. 196-4, Ex. 21 at 5, 12-13). The applicants also amended claim 8 to include the

limitations of claims 1 and 6. (Id. at 6-7, 13). Additionally, with respect to claim 1, the

applicants stated “[s]ince claim 7 contains allowable subject matter as indicated by the

Examiner in item 11 on page 8 of the office action, claim 1 is now believed to be allowable.”

(Id. at 12-13). The applicants further stated that “[a]pplicants acknowledge the Examiner’s

statement . . . that claims 7-8 would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including

all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.” (Id. at 13). Claims 1 and

8 from that amendment are identical to current claims 1 and 12, respectively.

There is no dispute that the addition of the aspect ratio ranges to the independent

claims of the ‘340 patent narrowed the scopes of those claims. Furthermore, the prosecution

history clearly demonstrates that those amendments were made specifically to overcome the

examiner’s rejections based on prior art and to thereby get the independent claims in

allowable form. The amendments therefore were made for a substantial reason relating to

patentability, and thus give rise to a presumption of prosecution history estoppel. See Festo

Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“Estoppel

arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment narrows the

patent’s scope.”).

Thus, under Festo, a presumption arises that Avago has “surrendered all territory

between the original claim limitation and the amended claim limitation.” 344 F.3d at 1367.

Specifically, that would include all aspect ratios outside of the specified ranges added to the

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claims during prosecution. Avago is entitled to rebut the presumption, but it is limited to

three methods: “the patentee must demonstrate that the alleged equivalent would have been

unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing amendment, that the rationale underlying the

narrowing amendment bore no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question,

or that there was ‘some other reason’ suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably have

been expected to have described the alleged equivalent.” Festo, 344 F.3d at 1368.

However, Avago makes no attempt to overcome the presumption using these methods.

Instead, Avago merely states that though “it is conceivable” that TriQuint’s prosecution

history estoppel arguments could apply to claim 1, they cannot apply to claim 12 because

claim 12 requires a range that is narrower than claim 1. (Doc. 424, at 59). In Avago’s view,

that fact indicates that the limitation of claim 12 could not have been made to overcome the

prior art. 

This argument is clearly not sufficient to rebut the presumption of patent history

estoppel under the methods outlined in Festo. Moreover, though this argument appears to

be directed more to the second inquiry of the Festo test, Avago offers no alternative

interpretation of the prosecution history, which as described above, appears to clearly

demonstrate that the patent applicants made the amendments at issue specifically to

overcome the prior art and to put the claims in allowable form. Thus, Avago has failed to

rebut the Festo presumption and is barred from relying on the doctrine of equivalents with

respect to the aspect ratio ranges of claims 1 and 12. Festo, 344 F.3d at 1367. TriQuint’s

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement is therefore GRANTED with respect to

infringement of claim 12 of the ‘340 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.

In sum, Avago may proceed to trial on its infringement claims with respect to claims

1-4 and 9-10 of the ‘340 patent, but not claims 11 and 12. 

E. Non-Infringement of the ‘637 Patent

Avago claims that TriQuint infringes claims 1-3, 6, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 20, and 21 of

United States Patent No. 6,262,637 (“the ‘637 patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary

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judgment of non-infringement of these claims and further argues that Avago’s assertion of

claims 6, 16, and 20 were untimely. The ‘637 patent is directed to a duplexer made using

FBAR filters. Several of the asserted claims require a “90E phase shifter,”which the Court

has construed to mean “a phase shifter that shifts the phase of a signal by 90 degrees.” (Doc.

229, at 67-68). Also, claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 21 of the ‘637 patent each require “an

auxiliary inductor,” a term that has not been construed by the Court or the parties. TriQuint

claims that none of its accused products contains a 90 degree phase shifter and that Avago’s

assertions of claims that include an auxiliary inductor were untimely and thus should be

barred.

1. The “Auxiliary Inductor” Claims

With respect to the auxiliary inductor claims, Avago first asserted these claims in its

Final Infringement Contentions dated April 15, 2011, the same day that final infringement

and invalidity contentions were due under the Court’s modified scheduling order. (Doc.

246). TriQuint argues that this belated assertion of these new claims violates the Court’s

scheduling order and is substantially prejudicial to TriQuint, depriving it of the opportunity

to take proper discovery and necessitating the reopening of expert discovery. TriQuint

further argues that the parties disagree over the scope of the newly asserted claims, thus

requiring the Court to revisit construction of any disputed claim terms. 

In its Rule 16 Scheduling Order dated October 29, 2009, the Court ordered that

Preliminary Infringement Contentions were due by April 10, 2010 and that Final

Infringement Contentions were due on March 18, 2011. (Doc. 40, at 2-4). The Court later

extended the deadline for Final Infringement Contentions to April 15, 2011. (Doc. 246, at

1). Under Rule 16(b)(4), “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the

judge’s consent.” Furthermore, Rule 16(f) provides that a court may impose on a party

sanctions that are consistent with Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) for failure to comply with a scheduling

order, including “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated

claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence.” 

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With regard to infringement contentions in a patent case, the general purpose of

preliminary infringement contentions is “to provide defendants with notice of infringement

beyond the claim language itself.” Shurtape Techs., LLC v. 3M Co., 2011 WL 4750586, at

*2 (W.D.N.C. October 7, 2011) (citing Shared Memory Graphics LLC v. Apple, Inc., 2010

WL 5477477, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2010)); see also Whipstock Servs., Inc. v.

Schlumberger Oilfield Servs., 2010 WL 143720, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2010)). Final

infringement contentions, on the other hand, generally provide parties the opportunity to

amend their preliminary infringement contentions in response to a court’s claim

constructions, if necessary. Cf. 02 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc., 467

F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing the role of preliminary and final

infringement contentions under the local rules for patent cases in the Northern District of

California).

Here, Avago admits that it did not assert claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 21 of the ‘637

patent until April 15, 2011. Thus, Avago did not provide TriQuint with notice of

infringement of these claims until that date. Avago nevertheless argues that TriQuint

anticipated that these infringement assertions were coming, alleging that TriQuint asked for

constructions of terms in claims 20 and 21 during Markman briefing, questioned the

inventors of the ‘637 patent about “auxiliary inductors,” and submitted expert reports on both

invalidity and infringement of claims having “auxiliary inductors.” (Doc. 424, at 64).

However, Avago does not cite specifically to any part of TriQuint’s Markman briefing, and

all of the deposition transcripts and expert reports to which it refers are dated after April 15,

2011, when Avago first asserted claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 21. Thus, there is no support

for Avago’s assertion that TriQuint, prior to April 15, 2011, somehow anticipated that these

infringement claims would eventually be asserted. Therefore, Avago’s new infringement

contentions with regard to these claims, as they appeared in Avago’s Final Infringement

Contentions, served merely to provide TriQuint with notice of infringement. Hence, the

Court will view them as preliminary infringement contentions, rather than final infringement

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contentions. 

As previously stated, the Court set April 10, 2010 as the deadline for preliminary

infringement contentions. Thus, Avago did not assert its preliminary infringement

contentions regarding claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 20, and 21 until more than one year beyond the

deadline. Rule 16 therefore requires Avago to show good cause for this delay. See also 02

Micro Intern., 467 F.3d at 1366 (“The burden is on the movant to establish diligence rather

than on the opposing party to establish a lack of diligence.”). However, Avago’s only

attempt to explain its untimeliness is to state that at the time of its belated infringement

contentions, TriQuint had “only recently provided” certain product samples and had still not

provided other product samples. (Doc. 424, at 63). Avago offers no further discussion of

these assertions, let alone any evidence to support them. Therefore, the Court finds that

Avago has failed to show good cause for its untimely infringement contentions regarding

claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 20, and 21. 

Furthermore, Avago’s attempt to assert these claims at such a late stage in this

litigation clearly prejudices TriQuint, which was not provided adequate time to assess these

claims or to complete discovery on them. Moreover, as TriQuint argues, allowance of these

claims likely would require the Court to revisit claim construction and potentially reopen

expert discovery. The Court is not willing to do so because of Avago’s lack of diligence in

asserting its infringement contentions. Thus, the Court, under the authority to impose

sanctions granted by Rules 16(f) and 37(b), bars Avago from asserting that TriQuint has

infringed claims 6, 7, 13, 14, 16, 20 and 21 of the ‘637 patent. 

2. 90 Degree Phase Shifter

Claim 1 and all of its dependent claims of the ‘637 patent require a “90E phase

shifter.” As previously stated, the Court has construed this term to mean “a phase shifter that

shifts the phase of a signal by 90 degrees.” (Doc. 229, at 67-68). In its analysis of this term,

the Court rejected constructions in which the 90 degree phase shift must occur “at the center

frequency of the other band pass filter,” in which the phase shift could occur “by

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approximately 90E,” and in which additional intent limitations were read into the term. (Id.

at 67-68).

In its motion for summary judgment, TriQuint does not argue that its accused products

do not contain phase shifters, but rather it argues that the phase shifters that its products do

contain shift the signal phase by an amount other than 90 degrees. Therefore, TriQuint

argues that its products do not literally infringe the ‘637 patent. Further, TriQuint asserts that

Avago has completely failed to present any evidence that the TriQuint phase shifters shift the

signal phase by 90 degrees. Rather, as TriQuint points out in its brief, Avago’s expert, Dr.

Howe, limited his remarks on this claim term to stating in his expert report that TriQuint

circuits contain “an inductor and capacitors serving as a 90 degree phase shifter,” (Doc. 418-

5, Ex. 237 at ¶ 99), and estimating in his deposition testimony that TriQuint’s phase shifters

would shift the phase of the signal “somewhere between 85 and 95 degrees.” (Doc. 417-15,

Ex. 93 at 282-83). Thus, TriQuint argues that Dr. Howe’s statements are merely unsupported

conclusions that are insufficient to support a finding of infringement, either literally or by

equivalents.

To rebut these arguments, Avago relies heavily on statements made by Dr. Howe in

his declaration which Avago attached to its response to TriQuint’s motion. However, as

previously described, the Court has excluded this declaration in its entirety because it is

untimely. Thus, in responding to TriQuint’s allegations that Dr. Howe’s statements are

merely conclusory assertions, Avago fails to point to any evidence in Dr. Howe’s expert

report or his deposition testimony that supports his assertion that the TriQuint circuits contain

phase shifters that shift the phase of a signal by 90 degrees. 

The Court therefore finds that Dr. Howe’s statements regarding the ‘637 patent are

not sufficiently supported to establish a material question of fact as to whether any of the

TriQuint circuits contains “a phase shifter that shifts the phase of a signal by 90 degrees,” as

is required by the Court’s claim construction. Rather, Dr. Howe’s statements in both his

report and his deposition testimony merely constitute bare assertions on the issue of

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infringement. Such unsupported conclusory assertions are insufficient to support a finding

of infringement. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1046 (Fed. Cir.

2000) (“[I]t is well settled that an expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of

infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). Therefore, Avago has

failed to establish that a genuine issue of fact exists with regard to literal infringement of

claims 1-3 and 10 of the ‘637 patent, and thus TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of

non-infringement with respect to literal infringement of those claims is GRANTED.

Similarly, with regard to potential infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,

TriQuint again argues that Avago has failed to provide sufficient particularized testimony

and linking argument to support such a claim. In response, Avago points only to statements

in Dr. Howe’s excluded declaration to support its doctrine-of-equivalents claim. Thus, the

Court finds that Avago has failed to sufficiently support its doctrine-of equivalents claims

by providing the required particularized testimony and linking argument. See Texas

Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567. Therefore, TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement with respect to infringement of claims 1-3 and 10 of the ‘637 patent under the

doctrine of equivalents is GRANTED. 

F. Non-Infringement of the ‘5619 Patent

Avago claims that TriQuint infringes claims 1-20 of United States Patent No.

7,365,619 (“the ‘5619 patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of noninfringement of claims 1-10.

1. “Electrically Operated in Inverse Phase” Element

Each of claims 1-10 of the ‘5619 patent requires, in part, a BAW filter comprising “a

first BAW resonator and a second BAW resonator connected antiparallel,” wherein “the first

BAW resonator and the second BAW resonator are electrically operated in inverted phase.”

The parties have stipulated that the term “electrically operated in inverted phase” means

“operated such that the electrical signals applied to the first BAW resonator and the second

BAW resonator have the same magnitude, but when the voltage of one signal is positive, the

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other is negative, and vice versa.” Additionally, the Court has construed “antiparallel” to

mean “[t]he first electrode of the first resonator is electrically connected to the second

electrode of the second resonator, and vice versa; where the first and second electrodes of a

resonator are determined by the direction of polarization of the resonator.” (Doc. 229, at 27).

TriQuint argues that Avago has failed to prove that any of TriQuint’s resonators are

electrically operated in inverted phase. Rather, TriQuint asserts that the report by Avago’s

expert, Dr. Muralt, only relates to the physical, and not the electrical, characteristics of the

resonators. TriQuint further argues that Dr. Muralt has admitted that the voltages applied to

the TriQuint resonators are “the same,” which is inconsistent with the Court’s construction

of the claim, and thereby precludes infringement. TriQuint additionally argues that its

interpretation of Dr. Muralt’s remarks are supported by the report of its own expert, Dr.

Kiaei, who stated that the small size of and distance between the accused resonators would

cause the signal applied to each resonator to have “a practically identical magnitude and sign

at all times,” (Doc. 417-16, Ex. 114 at ¶ 131), thereby precluding infringement.

Avago responds by arguing that it is TriQuint’s interpretation of the stipulated

construction that leads to impossible results. Specifically, Avago states that TriQuint’s

interpretation would require that the voltage of the first electrode of the first resonator be the

opposite of the voltage on the second electrode of the second resonator. However, because

under the Court’s construction of “antiparallel” those two electrodes must be connected,

those two electrodes must also have the same voltage, in terms of both magnitude and sign.

Thus, Avago argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would correctly interpret the

stipulated construction to mean that “the electrical signal applied to each BAW resonator

refers to the electrical signal applied across the top electrode and the bottom electrode of the

resonator–not the voltage at just one of the electrodes–such that the overall voltage of the

electrical signal applied to each resonator is simply the top electrode voltage minus the

bottom electrode voltage.” (Doc. 424 at 66). Avago further states that this interpretation is

supported by Dr. Muralt’s expert report, wherein he stated that TriQuint’s first and second

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BAW resonators are electrically operated in inverted phase, and offered images from an

acoustic image microscope as proof. (Doc. 417-16, Ex. 104 at ¶ 53).

In its reply, TriQuint states that Dr. Muralt’s report only demonstrates that the

resonators are acoustically out of phase, rather than electrically out of phase. Also, TriQuint

implies that the Court’s construction of “antiparallel,” which was urged by Avago, is not

consistent with the parties’ stipulated construction of “electrically operated in inverted

phase.” Thus, TriQuint argues that to accept Avago’s theory would require the Court to

revisit claim construction.

The Court finds, however, that no such revisiting of claim construction is necessary.

TriQuint’s arguments fail to show that Avago has not made out a proper case of

infringement. Rather, the evidence presented by Avago is not only consistent with both the

Court’s construction of “antiparallel” and the parties’ stipulated construction of “electrically

operated in inverted phase,” but also sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Moreover, TriQuint has failed to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill in the art would not

interpret the acoustic microscope images as evidence that TriQuint infringes these elements

of the ‘5619 patent. Thus, TriQuint has failed to show that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on Avago’s theory of infringement, and its motion for summary judgment of

non-infringement of the “electrically operated in inverted phase”element of the ‘5619 patent

is DENIED. 

2. “Related to a Common Ground” Element

TriQuint also moves for summary judgment of non-infringement of the “related to a

common ground” element of claims 1-10 of the ‘5619 patent. Specifically, those claims

require that the BAW filter further comprises “a signal input and a signal output related to

a common ground.” The Court has construed this term to simply mean “related to a common

electrical ground.” (Doc. 229, at 24-25). In its reply brief, TriQuint summarizes the parties’

arguments on this element. Specifically, TriQuint contends that “the grounds connected to

its filters’ signal input and signal output are separate.” TriQuint summarizes Avago’s

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response as arguing “that the split grounds are eventually connected (grounded) outside the

filter on the circuit boards on which the filter chips are mounted.” (Doc. 411, at 32).

TriQuint does not make an attempt to dispute that Avago has provided sufficient evidence

to support its argument. Thus, TriQuint concludes that “[t]he parties’ dispute . . . is not an

issue of fact, but an issue of law: whether the claimed ‘common ground’ must be located

within the claimed ‘BAW filter’ or not.” (Id.).

The Court finds that TriQuint’s characterization of the parties’ arguments to be

accurate, and further finds that the parties have provided sufficient evidentiary support for

their respective arguments. However, the Court does not agree with TriQuint’s view that the

dispute over this claim term is a question of law. As is noted in the Court’s Markman order,

TriQuint originally argued for a construction of this claim term that included the limitation

that the common ground is located within the filter: “using a shared terminal within the filter

that electrically connects the reference voltages of the input and output signals to the device’s

ground voltage.” (Doc. 229, at 24). However, as is stated in the Markman order, the Court

rejected the additional concepts in TriQuint’s proposed construction, including the “within

the filter” language, because they would require further unnecessary construction. Rather,

the Court concluded that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand ‘related to

a common ground’ to mean ‘related to a common electrical ground.” (Id. at 24-25).

Thus, in accordance with the Markman order, the Court finds that a question of

material fact remains in determining whether TriQuint’s accused filters infringe the ‘5619

patent. Based on the evidence submitted, a reasonable jury could conclude that any of

TriQuint’s accused filters, regardless of whether its common ground is within the filter or

not, meets the claim limitation of “related to a common electrical ground.” TriQuint’s

motion for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to the “related to a common

ground” element of claims 1-10 of the ‘5619 patent is therefore DENIED, and Avago may

proceed to trial on all claims of infringement of the ‘5619 patent.

 

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G. Non-Infringement of the ‘137 Patent

Avago claims that TriQuint infringes claims 1, 4-10, 16-18 and 20 of United States

Patent No. 6,377,137 (“the ‘137 patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of

non-infringement of all of the asserted claims.

1. Removal of Material from Bottom Surface of Substrate

Claim 1 of the ‘137 patent requires, in part, “[a] method for batch processing acoustic

resonators, comprising . . . removing material from a bottom surface of said substrate to

reduce the thickness of the substrate and to reduce an electromagnetic influence in a resulting

filter.” The Court has construed this claim term to mean “removing material from a bottom

surface of said substrate to reduce the thickness of the substrate and to reduce the effects

caused by currents flowing through the filter.” (Doc. 229, at 62). Claims 4-10 depend from

claim 1 and thus incorporate the same requirement.

TriQuint argues that Avago has only alleged that TriQuint thins its wafers, but has

presented no evidence regarding the purpose of why TriQuint thins its wafers. Specifically,

Avago’s expert, Dr. Howe, stated in his expert report that “[t]he wafer is thinned from the

backside from its initial thickness of 525 μm to a final thickness of 150 μm (transmit filters)

or 110 μm (receive filters).” (Doc. 417-16, Ex. 95 at ¶ 30). Furthermore, though TriQuint

does not dispute that it thins its wafers, TriQuint asserts that it does so solely for the purpose

of making them smaller. (Doc. 417-16, Ex. 114 at ¶ 42).

In response, Avago first states that determining TriQuint’s intent in thinning its wafers

is not an appropriate inquiry for summary judgment. In support of this assertion, Avago cites

to cases that do not involve patent claims. Rather, the cases to which Avago cites involve

circumstances where intent may be an element necessary to prove a fraud claim, Garter-Bare

Co. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 650 F.2d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 1981), to prove an employee’s claim

that her employer terminated her in violation of her First Amendment rights, Ashman v.

Barrows, 438 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006), or to prove the intended beneficiary of a

deceased person’s life insurance policy, Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 16 (2d.

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Cir. 1993). However, “[i]ntent is not an element of infringement,” see Hilton Davis Chem.

Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on

other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and the cases cited by Avago are clearly not on point. 

Furthermore, the parties’ focus on TriQuint’s subjective motivation in thinning its

wafers is misguided. Under established Federal Circuit law, “the motive of the accused

infringer when performing a claimed method is simply not relevant.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee

Industs., Inc., 341 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Notably, though the

claimed method at issue in the Dow case required “the mass flow rate of the liquid droplets

being increased over time to avoid destructive thermal stresses,” id. at 1375 (emphasis

added), the Federal Circuit emphasized that the pertinent issue was “whether by increasing

the amount of water over time in the systems sold by Mee, destructive thermal stress was

avoided.” Id. at 1380. Therefore, “[e]ven if an operator increased water over time in a Mee

system for an entirely different reason, that would not avoid infringement . . . .” Id.

The claim language at issue here presents a similar question. Thus, it is not relevant

whether TriQuint’s motivation in thinning its wafers is to reduce the thickness of the

substrate and to reduce the effects caused by currents flowing through the filter. Rather, the

relevant inquiries, in addition to whether TriQuint actually thins its wafers, are whether, in

doing so, the thickness of the substrate and the effects caused by currents flowing through

the filter are, in fact, reduced.

To that end, Avago’s only properly cited evidence to support infringement is Dr.

Howe’s statement from his expert report. Avago does refer to several other statements made

by Dr. Howe in his declaration; however, as described previously, that declaration has been

excluded in its entirety as untimely. With regard to the statement in Dr. Howe’s infringement

report, it is clear that Dr. Howe has alleged that TriQuint thins its wafer. Indeed, TriQuint

does not dispute that it does so, and further admits that it does so to reduce the thickness of

the substrate. However, Dr. Howe’s statement in his report makes no mention of the effects

caused by currents flowing through the TriQuint filter, if any, and whether TriQuint reduces

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them by thinning its wafers. Thus, Avago has not provided sufficient evidence to support

its assertion of infringement of this element of the ‘137 patent. Therefore, TriQuint’s motion

for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1 and 4-10 of the ‘137 patent is

GRANTED.

2. “Die Cavity” Element

Claims 5-7, 16-18, and 20 of the ‘137 patent each require a “die cavity.” Specifically,

the methods of claims 5-7 require the step of “mounting said die in a die cavity of a

package.” Claims 16-18 and 20 require “a package having a die cavity formed therein, said

die substrate being mounted in said die cavity.” The Court has construed the term “die

cavity” to mean “a hollow area in a package where the die is mounted.” (Doc. 229, at 63).

TriQuint argues that Avago’s evidence only shows that TriQuint mounts its die on the

surface of a flat laminate structure, and then uses a process known as “overmolding” to cover

the die and substrate with a plastic material. (Doc. 417-15, Ex. 93 at 255-56). Thus, to the

extent that any cavity is formed, it is immediately occupied by the die itself upon formation.

TriQuint therefore argues that its process does not include a “hollow area in a package where

the die is mounted” because a “cavity” which is formed from, and always occupied by the

die cannot properly constitute a “hollow area.”

In response, Avago argues that TriQuint has improperly read a new construction into

the claim, one that requires a preexisting cavity and a particular order of manufacture. Thus,

Avago asserts that contrary to TriQuint’s alleged new construction, there is no requirement

that “a cavity (i.e., a hollow area) exist before the die is encapsulated.” (Doc. 424 at 70).

Rather, Avago asserts that the construction of the claim would allow for a die cavity to be

formed by encapsulating or “overmolding” the die itself. Furthermore, with regard to the

apparatus claims, Avago argues that any process of making the apparatus, and more

importantly any sequence of steps within that process, is irrelevant to the question of

infringement.

There is some basis for Avago’s assertion that the steps of a claimed process need not

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be performed in the order written unless that order is explicitly or implicitly required. See

Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Nevertheless, Avago’s focus on the order in which steps of a process are performed is

misguided. Implicit in Avago’s argument that a cavity, or hollow area, need not exist before

the die is encapsulated is the requirement that, at some point, the hollow area must simply

exist. Avago does not cite to any evidence of the existence of a hollow area in TriQuint’s

“overmolding” process. Furthermore, based on the statements of Dr. Howe, no reasonable

jury could conclude that the “overmolding” process he describes ever includes a hollow area.

Instead, as TriQuint asserts, the “cavity” described by Dr. Howe always contains the

mounted and encapsulated die. Nor does Dr. Howe’s description indicate that the

encapsulated die might ever be removed, thereby potentially leaving in its place a hollow

area. 

Avago points to no other evidence, other than Dr. Howe’s excluded declaration, to

support its infringement claim. Moreover, Avago also only cites to that untimely and

excluded declaration to support its last-minute assertion of infringement under the doctrine

of equivalents. Therefore, TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of

the “die cavity” element of claims 5-7, 16-18, and 20 is GRANTED.

In sum, the Court has granted summary judgment in favor of TriQuint with respect

to all asserted claims of the ‘137 patent. 

H. Non-Infringement of the ‘922 Patent

Avago claims that TriQuint infringes United States Patent No. 6,841,922 (“the ‘922

patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1-5 and

7-9. Claim 1, the only independent claim of the ‘922 patent, requires, in part, a “resonator

apparatus” comprising “an acoustic reflector comprising a sequence of stacked layers having

alternating low and high acoustic impedance . . . wherein the thickness of one layer is set

different from a quarter of the acoustic wavelength in this layer at the operating frequency

due to technological limitations in the manufacturing of this layer.” In the Markman order,

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the Court gave “due to technological limitations in the manufacturing of this layer” its plain

and ordinary meaning.

TriQuint does not dispute that it varies the thickness of its layers. However, it argues

that Avago’s evidence is not sufficient to show that TriQuint varies the thickness of its layers

due to technological limitations in the manufacturing of the layers. Instead, TriQuint asserts

that, though Avago’s expert Dr. Milsom has identified general limitations involved in

manufacturing tungsten layers, he has failed to specifically demonstrate that TriQuint

actually faces any of these manufacturing difficulties. Furthermore, TriQuint argues that

Avago’s evidence demonstrates that layer thickness is not a problem for TriQuint because

it uses layers that only need to be “half as thick as the problematic layers identified in the

‘922 patent” for their given operating frequency and that TriQuint chooses to manufacture

one of its layers to be thicker than is considered optimal at its 1.875 GHz operating

frequency. (Doc. 415, at 73). Also, TriQuint argues that because is uses a different

deposition process than was used by the patentee of the ‘922 patent, TriQuint does not face

the same problems that the patentee faced.

In response, Avago notes that during his deposition, TriQuint’s expert, Dr. Kim,

admitted that one faces technological challenges when depositing tungsten layers because

of serious problems like delamination and wafer bow. Specifically, Dr. Kim described how

residual stress increases with layer thickness, and that such stress may make the layer more

prone to delamination or wafer bow. (Doc. 418-5, Ex. 240 at 207:14-25). Dr. Kim further

states that wafer bow is problematic when manufacturing a bulk acoustic wave device. (Id.

at 209:13-23). 

Furthermore, with regard to TriQuint’s argument that its choice to manufacture a

thicker layer precludes the conclusion that technological limitations are a factor in how it

chooses to alter layer thickness, Avago points again to the deposition of Dr. Kim. He

testified that placing a thicker layer higher in the stack of layers would subject it to “higher

force or stress, force, tensile residual stress,” which would make the wafer more prone to

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bow or warp. (Id. at 208:1-209:12). Avago argues that TriQuint therefore places its layer

at the bottom of the stack to avoid these problems, which is supported by Dr. Milsom’s

expert report. (Doc. 417-17, Ex. 117 at ¶ 269). Finally, TriQuint records describe “[d]elays

due to working the unplanned film stress ([i.e.] bowed wafers) issue.” (Doc. 417-17, Ex. 132

at 6).

In reply, TriQuint argues that Avago has failed to provide evidence that any layer

manufacturing problems, including those identified by Dr. Kim in his deposition, figured into

TriQuint’s decision to depart from one-quarter wavelength thicknesses in its tungsten layers.

However, as discussed with respect to the ‘137 patent, “the motive of the accused infringer

when performing a claimed method is simply not relevant.” Dow Chem., 341 F.3d at 1380

(citation omitted). Hence, Avago need not present evidence that TriQuint chose to use

different layer thicknesses as a result of any technological limitations in manufacturing its

layers. Rather, with respect to the element of the claim at issue, Avago only needs to show

that such limitations were present and that TriQuint subsequently varied its layer thicknesses

according to the claim language of the ‘922 patent, the latter of which TriQuint has not

disputed.

Therefore, the Court finds that the evidence discussed above demonstrates that a

genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to infringement of the ‘922 patent. A

reasonably jury could certainly conclude from Dr. Kim’s deposition testimony, the TriQuint

documents, and Dr. Milsom’s expert report that TriQuint encountered technological

limitations in manufacturing its layers and subsequently varied the thickness of those layers

in response. Therefore, TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement of the

‘922 patent is DENIED. 

I. Non-Infringement of the ‘4619 Patent

Avago asserts that TriQuint infringes United States Patent No. 6,864,619 (“the ‘4619

patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1-12.

Claims 1-12 each require a “detuning layer sequence compris[ing] at least a first layer having

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a first acoustic impedance and a second layer having a second acoustic impedance in order

to shift a resonance frequency of the first piezoelectric resonator relative to the resonance

frequency of the second piezoelectric resonator.” In the Markman order, the Court construed

this limitation to mean that “the detuning layer sequence comprises at least a first layer

having a first acoustic impedance and a second layer having a second acoustic impedance for

the purpose of shifting the resonance frequency of the first piezoelectric resonator relative

to the resonance frequency of the second piezoelectric resonator.” (Doc. 229, at 58). 

TriQuint argues primarily that Avago cannot prove infringement because it has

presented no evidence that TriQuint selected or chose to have detuning layers with different

impedances because TriQuint was seeking to shift the resonant frequencies of any of its

resonators. However, as discussed previously with respect to the ‘137 and ‘4619 patents,

“the motive of the accused infringer when performing a claimed method is simply not

relevant.” Dow Chem., 341 F.3d at 1380 (citation omitted). Thus, TriQuint’s focus on

whether Avago has produced evidence on why TriQuint selected detuning layers with

different impedances is irrelevant. Rather, the relevant determinations are whether TriQuint

does indeed use a detuning sequence comprising at least two layers with different acoustic

impedances, which TriQuint does not dispute, and whether TriQuint’s use of the detuning

sequence comprising those layers is for the purpose of shifting resonance frequency of the

first piezoelectric resonator relative to the resonance frequency of the second piezoelectric

resonator. In other words, does TriQuint’s use of the claimed sequence of layers result in the

claimed shift in relative frequencies, regardless of whether TriQuint subjectively wanted or

intended that result? See Dow Chem., 341 F.3d at 1380.

By focusing its argument on its own subjective intent in choosing its layers, TriQuint

has failed to establish that Avago has not provided sufficient evidence to show that, by using

a layer sequence comprising multiple layers with different acoustic impedances, TriQuint

achieves a relative shift in the resonant frequencies of its resonators. Moreover, as Avago

points out in its brief, Dr. Fattinger stated in his deposition that TriQuint uses a sequence of

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aluminum and tungsten layers for the purpose of “offsetting frequency between series and

shunt resonators.” (Doc. 420-16, Ex. 187 at 90:17-91:23). Furthermore, when specifically

asked whether “the layers are put down in order to shift the frequency of the shunt resonators

as compared to the series resonators,” his response was “yes.” (Id.). Finally, when

TriQuint’s own expert, Dr. Kim, was asked at his deposition whether it is “true that TriQuint

adds the detuning layer sequence of aluminum copper and tungsten in order to shift the

frequency of the shunt resonator as compared to the series resonator,” he responded,

“Correct. Yes.” (Doc. 418-5, Ex. 240 at 98:13-25). 

For these reasons, a genuine issue of material fact exists and TriQuint’s motion for

summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1-12 of the ‘4619 patent is therefore

DENIED. 

J. Non-Infringement of the ‘436 Patent

Avago asserts that TriQuint infringes United States Patent No. 7,268,436 (“the ‘436

patent”). TriQuint has moved for summary judgment of non-infringement of claims 1-3 and

5. Independent claim 1 of the ‘436 patent, and its dependent claims 2, 3, and 5, require, in

part, an electronic device comprising “contact areas disposed on the top side of the

semiconductor chip external to the cavity frame, the contact areas being connected via

bonding connections to inner areas of external contacts, wherein the bonding connections of

the contact areas and the inner areas of external contacts each include a bonding arc.”

In the Markman order, the Court construed “wherein the bonding connections of the

contact areas and the inner areas of external contacts each include a bonding arc” to mean

“wherein each bonding connection formed between the contact areas and the inner area of

external contacts includes a bonding arc.” (Doc. 229, at 33). The Court also construed

“bonding connections” to mean “a connection that bonds two elements,” (id.), and “bonding

arc” to mean “a bond formed by bonding the side of a bond wire to a contact area/inner area

of external contact, forming an arc-like shape.” (Id. at 34).

TriQuint argues that Avago’s evidence is insufficient to show that TriQuint infringes

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these claims for two reasons: first, the evidence does not show that TriQuint’s products are

formed by bonding the side of a wire to a contact area/inner area of external contact, and

second, the evidence does not show that the bonds in TriQuint’s accused products form an

arc-like shape.

With regard to the first argument, TriQuint argues that its products use

thermocompression heads, which are formed from the end of a wire, rather than bonding

arcs, which, under the Court’s claim construction, are formed from the side of a wire. The

parties agreed during the claim construction hearing that bonding arcs and

thermocompression heads differ. Furthermore, TrQuint argues that Dr. Howe’s analysis of

TriQuint’s “reverse stand-off stitch bond” (“RSSB”) is not sufficient to establish

infringement. Specifically, TriQuint states that the RSSB is formed using two

thermocompression heads. However, as TriQuint describes in its motion, a wire on one of

the thermocompression heads is broken off and replaced by a newly bonded second wire.

TriQuint argues that it is the end of this second wire, rather than the side, that is bonded to

the modified thermocompression head, or “free-ball.”

In his expert report, Dr. Howe referred to diagrams from TriQuint’s assembly

documents to demonstrate that the RSSB’s in TriQuint’s products use a bonding arc rather

than a thermocompression head. (Doc. 418-5, Ex. 237 at ¶ 84). Nevertheless, TriQuint

asserts that these diagrams only confirm its argument that TriQuint uses only

thermocompression heads in its products, and does not use bonding arcs.

With regard to TriQuint’s second argument, TriQuint states that Dr. Howe provided

no evidence regarding the shape of TriQuint’s bonding connections and that the diagrams

used by Dr. Howe do not show an arc-like shape, as is required by the claim construction.

Further, though Dr. Howe claimed at his deposition to have seen photographs of TriQuint

parts with “arc-like” shapes, TriQuint states that Dr. Howe has never identified or produced

those photographs or the accused TriQuint parts.

In response to TriQuint’s first argument, Avago argues that the bonding connection

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identified by TriQuint as a “free-ball” is not transformed back into a thermocompression

head after the second wire is bonded to it. Rather, Avago argues that the free-ball is simply

a “contact area,” as described by the ‘436 patent. Moreover, Avago asserts that there is “no

question” that TriQuint forms a bond between the side of a wire and this “free-ball,” or

contact area. To support this statement, Avago points to the deposition of Dr. Ulrich,

TriQuint’s expert, during which he was asked whether “according to [his] understanding of

the reverse standoff stitch bond, the wire is bonded on its side against the standoff, not

against the bond pad.” (Doc. 418-1, Ex. 224 at 209:13-16). Dr. Ulrich responded, “Yes,

that’s correct. What we’ve been calling a stud bump lately.” (Id.).

Further, in response to TriQuint’s second argument, Avago again cites Dr. Ulrich’s

deposition, during which he stated that a stitch bond “may or may not have an arc-like

shape.” (Id. at 178:2-3). Further, Dr. Ulrich also identified what he believed to be a bond

with an “arc-like” shape in a photograph shown to him during his deposition. (Id. at 113:10-

114:2). When shown a picture of a bond from one of TriQuint’s products, Dr. Ulrich stated

that he was “not really sure” whether the bond had an “arc-like” shape. (Id. at 184-185). 

Dr. Ulrich’s statements indicate that TriQuint may use a bonding connection with an

“arc-like” shape. He also appears to agree that TriQuint’s RSSB includes a wire bonded on

its side. Furthermore, because the bond he identified as having an “arc-like” shape shows

only a minimal amount of curvature, or arcing, it is reasonable to conclude that one of

ordinary skill in the art may also find such an “arc-like” shape in the diagrams or other

photographs of TriQuint products discussed above. Therefore, the Court finds that based on

the evidence, a reasonably jury could conclude that TriQuint’s “free-ball” bonding

connection infringes the ‘436 patent. TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of claims 1-3 and 5 of the ‘436 patent is DENIED. 

K. Non-Infringement of the ‘2619 Patent

Avago asserts that TriQuint infringes claims 1, 4, 5, 8-10, 15, 27-30, 32, 33 and 35

of United States Patent No. 6,812,619 (“the ‘2619 patent”). TriQuint has moved for

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summary judgment of non-infringement of all of the asserted claims. All of the asserted

claims require, in part, a thin film resonator, wherein “the resonator is adapted in such a way

that a width of the frame-like zone and acoustical property means of the layer structure in the

frame-like zone are arranged so that displacement relating to the piezoelectrically excited

strongest resonance mode is substantially uniform in the center area of the resonator.” The

Court found that no construction was necessary for this limitation. (Doc. 229, at 59-60).

TriQuint argues that Avago’s evidence, namely the report of its expert, Dr. Milsom,

shows only that TriQuint uses frame-like zones and that it picks the dimensions of that

structure to improve filter performance generally. (Doc. 415 at 81). According to TriQuint,

Dr. Milsom stated that this optimization process decreases spurious modes, which in turn

provides for substantially uniform displacement. (Id.) TriQuint argues that because picking

border ring dimensions to improve border performance does not necessarily cause

substantially uniform displacement in the center area of a resonator, Avago’s evidence is not

sufficient to prove infringement. 

TriQuint further provides images of TriQuint resonators that have all undergone the

optimization process described by Dr. Milsom. These images show varying amounts of

displacement among the resonators. TriQuint argues that because, in its view, not all of the

resonators demonstrate uniform displacement, Dr. Milsom’s theory of infringement, as

framed by TriQuint, is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment.

TriQuint’s attempt to reframe Dr. Milsom’s theory of infringement is not persuasive.

In his report, Dr. Milsom stated that 

TriQuint’s documents show that they took numerous steps to optimize the

width of the border ring . . . The performance of the resonator with an

optimized border ring as compared to a resonator without such a border ring

will reduce spurious modes. The displacement of the centre [sic] area will be

more uniform with a border ring as compared to a resonator without a border

ring. As such, with this optimum frame-like zone width the design concept

achieves its aim of providing substantially uniform amplitude and therefore

maximum electrical coupling to the wanted TE mode (in the centre [sic]

region), and minimum electrical coupling to (i.e. suppression of) the

unwanted modes.

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(Ex. 417-17, Ex. 117 at ¶ 125). Thus, contrary to TriQuint’s argument, Dr. Milsom clearly

connected the concepts of optimizing the frame-like zone with suppressing spurious modes

and achieving substantially uniform displacement in the center region. Furthermore, portions

of the images TriQuint included in its brief could certainly be reasonably interpreted to show

“displacement relating to the piezoelectrically excited strongest resonance mode is

substantially uniform in the center area of the resonator.” 

Thus, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to

infringement of the ‘2916 patent, and TriQuint’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of this patent is therefore DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Avago’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (Docs. 313, 420).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying in part and granting in part Plaintiff and

Counterclaim Defendant TriQuint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgement (Docs. 307,

415). Summary judgment is DENIED as to all Antitrust Claims, non-infringement of claims

1-4 and 9-10 of the ‘340 patent, non-infringement of the ‘5619 patent, non-infringement of

the ‘922 patent, non-infringement of the ‘4619 patent, non-infringement of the ‘436 patent

and non-infringement of the ‘2619 patent. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to Avago’s

trade secret claims regarding the N0010 and N0011 layout files, Avago’s trade secret claims

regarding its design and manufacturing processes, Avago’s copyright claims with respect to

any GDS files, Avago’s tort and unfair competition claims, non-infringement of claims 10

and 11 of the ‘907 patent, invalidity and non-infringement of the ‘807 patent, noninfringement of claims 11-12 of the ‘340 patent, non-infringement of the ‘637 patent, and

non-infringement of the ‘137 patent. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting TriQuint’s non-filed motion for summary

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judgement on Avago’s copyright claims with respect to source code. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying TriQuint’s Motion for Leave to File

Supplemental Declaration of Jonathan M. James (Doc. 369) and striking all attachments. 

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED granting TriQuint's Motion to Strike Avago's

Reply Statement of Facts, Exhibits, and Declarations (Doc. 377) and denying Avago's

Motion for Leave to File Reply Declarations and Reply Statement of Facts (Doc. 387). The

Clerk shall strike all attachments to Docket 366. The Clerk shall also strike and leave under

seal all attachments to Docket 412. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Avago's Motion to Preclude Margaret

Meyer's Deposition Testimony (Doc. 316).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying without prejudice Avago’s Motion for

Spoliation Sanctions against TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. (Docs. 318, 319).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Avago’s (1) Motion to Preclude Argument

that TriQuint and Dr. Aigner Did Not Have Notice and Knowledge of Potential Litagation

when Triquint Destroyed Evidence and (2) Motion for Expedited Consideration (Docs. 375,

434).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying TriQuint’s Motion to Strike Avago’s Motion

to Preclude (Doc. 385). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Avago’s Motion for Leave to Supplement

the Record with Newly Discovered Evidence (Doc. 444). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Avago’s Motion to Seal Exhibits to Avago’s

Motion to Supplement the Record (Doc. 447). The Clerk shall strike and leave under seal

the Proposed Declaration of David Hahn (Doc. 445) and the Proposed Declaration of Saul

Espino with Exhibits (Doc. 446).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, consistent with this Order, the Clerk shall strike

the Declaration of Lueder Elbrecht in Support of Avago’s Response to TriQuint’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 425), the Declaration of Paul Muralt in Support of

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Avago’s Response to TriQuint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 426), the

Declaration of R.F. Milsom, Ph.D. in Support of Avago’s Response to TriQuint’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 427), and the Declaration of Roger T. Howe, Ph.D. in

Support of Avago’s Response to TriQuint’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc.

428).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall confer and redact this Order for

public filing. The parties shall then file the joint, redacted version of the Order in the public

record within 14 days of the date of this Order. 

DATED this 24th day of February, 2012.

Copies to Only:

All Counsel

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