Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05393/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05393-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 7, 2005 Decided July 15, 2005

Reissued July 18, 2005

No. 04-5393

SALIM AHMED HAMDAN,

APPELLEE

v.

DONALD H. RUMSFELD, UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(04cv01519)

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, U.S.

Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Paul D. Clement, Acting Solicitor

General, Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, Douglas N.

Letter, Robert M. Loeb, August Flentje, Sharon Swingle, Eric

Miller and Stephan E. Oestreicher, Jr., Attorneys. 

Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp were on the brief of

amici curiae Washington Legal Foundation and Allied

Educational Foundation in support of appellants.

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 1 of 22
2

Jay Alan Sekulow and James M. Henderson, Jr. were onthe

brief of amicus curiae The American Center for Law & Justice

supporting appellants.

Neal K. Katyal and Charles Swift, pro hac vice, argued the

cause for appellee. With them on the briefs were Benjamin S.

Sharp, Kelly A. Cameron, Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Joseph M.

McMillan, David R. East, and Charles C. Sipos.

Carlos M. Vazquez and David C. Vladeck were on the brief

of amici curiae of fifteen law professors in support of appellee.

David R. Berz was on the brief for amici curiae Louise

Doswald-Beck, et al. in support of appellee.

Jordan J. Paust was on the brief for amicus curiae

International Law and National Security Law Professors in

support of appellee.

Jenny S. Martinez, appearing pro se, was on the brief for

amici curiae Jenny S. Martinez and Allison Marston Danner.

Mary J. Moltenbrey was on the brief for amici curiae 305

United Kingdom and European Parliamentarians in support of

appellee.

Gary S. Thompson was on the brief for amici curiae Eleven

Legal Scholars in support of appellee.

Philip Sundel, Attorney, Office of Chief Defense Counsel,

was on the brief for amicus curiae Military Attorneys Detailed

to Represent Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman Al Bahlul in support

of appellee.

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 2 of 22
3

Kurt J. Hamrock and Phillip E. Carter were on the brief for

amici curiae Military Law Practitioners and Academicians

Kevin J. Barry, et al. in support of appellee.

Blair G. Brown was on the brief for amicus curiae National

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Inc. in support of

appellee.

Elisa C. Massimino was on the brief for amici curiae

Human Rights First, et al. in support of appellee.

David H. Remes was on the brief for amici curiae General

Merrill A. McPeak, et al. in support of appellee.

Jonathan M. Freiman was on the brief for amici curiae

People for the American Way Foundation, et al. in support of

appellee.

Morton Sklar was on the brief for amicus curiae The World

Organization for Human Rights USA in support of appellee.

Jonathan L. Hafetz was onthe brief for amicus curiae Louis

Fisher in support of appellee.

Alan I. Horowitz was on the brief for amicus curiae Noah

Feldman in support of appellee.

Christopher J. Wright and Timothy J. Simeone were on the

brief for amicus curiae Urban Morgan Institute for Human

Rights in support of appellee.

James J. Benjamin, Jr., Nancy Chung, Amit Kurlekar,

Steven M. Pesner, and Laura K. Soong were on the brief for

amicus curiae The Association of the Bar of the City of New

York in support of appellee.

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 3 of 22
4

Before: RANDOLPH and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Afghani militia forces captured

Salim Ahmed Hamdan in Afghanistan in late November 2001.

Hamdan’s captors turned him over to the American military,

which transported him to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in

Cuba. The military initially kept him in the general detention

facility, known as Camp Delta. On July 3, 2003, the President

determined “that there is reason to believe that [Hamdan] was a

member of al Qaeda or was otherwise involved in terrorism

directed against the United States.” This finding brought

Hamdan within the compass of the President’s November 13,

2001, Order concerning the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of

Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.

Reg. 57,833. Accordingly, Hamdan was designated for trial

before a military commission.

In December 2003, Hamdan was removed from the general

population at Guantanamo and placed in solitary confinement in

Camp Echo. That same month, he was appointed counsel,

initially for the limited purpose of plea negotiation. In April

2004, Hamdan filed this petition for habeas corpus. While his

petition was pending before the district court, the government

formally charged Hamdan with conspiracy to commit attacks on

civilians and civilian objects, murder and destruction of property

by an unprivileged belligerent, and terrorism. The charges

alleged that Hamdan was Osama bin Laden’s personal driver in

Afghanistan between 1996 and November 2001, an allegation

Hamdan admitted in an affidavit. The charges further alleged

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 4 of 22
5

that Hamdan served as bin Laden’s personal bodyguard,

delivered weapons to al Qaeda members, drove bin Laden to al

Qaeda training camps and safe havens in Afghanistan, and

trained at the al Qaeda-sponsored al Farouq camp. Hamdan’s

trial was to be before a military commission, which the

government tells us now consists of three officers of the rank of

colonel. Brief for Appellants at 7.

In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), Hamdan received a formal

hearing before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal. The

Tribunal affirmed his status as an enemy combatant, “either a

member of or affiliated with Al Qaeda,” for whom continued

detention was required.

On November 8, 2004, the district court granted in part

Hamdan’s petition. Among other things, the court held that

Hamdan could not be tried by a military commission unless a

competent tribunal determined that he was not a prisoner of war

under the 1949 Geneva Convention governing the treatment of

prisoners. The court therefore enjoined the Secretary of Defense

from conducting any further military commission proceedings

against Hamdan. This appeal followed.

I.

The government’s initial argument is that the district court

should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction over

Hamdan’s habeas corpus petition. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1

(1942), in which captured German saboteurs challenged the

lawfulness of the military commission before which they were

to be tried, provides a compelling historical precedent for the

power of civilian courts to entertain challenges that seek to

interrupt the processes of military commissions. The Supreme

Court ruled against the petitioners in Quirin, but only after

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 5 of 22
6

considering their arguments on the merits. In an effort to

minimize the precedential effect of Quirin, the government

points out that the decision predates the comity-based abstention

doctrine recognized in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738

(1975), and applied by this court in New v. Cohen, 129 F.3d 639

(D.C. Cir. 1997). Councilman and New hold only that civilian

courts should not interfere with ongoing court-martial

proceedings against citizen servicemen. The cases have little to

tell us about the proceedings of military commissions against

alien prisoners. The serviceman in Councilman wanted to block

his court-martial for using and selling marijuana; the serviceman

in New wanted to stop his court-martial for refusing to obey

orders. The rationale of both cases was that a battle-ready

military must be able to enforce “a respect for duty and

discipline without counterpart in civilian life,” Councilman, 420

U.S. at 757, and that “comity aids the military judiciary in its

task of maintaining order and discipline in the armed services,”

New, 129 F.3d at 643. These concerns do not exist in Hamdan’s

case and we are thus left with nothing to detract from Quirin’s

precedential value.

Even within the framework of Councilman and New, there

is an exception to abstention: “a person need not exhaust

remedies in a military tribunal if the military court has no

jurisdiction over him.” New, 129 F.3d at 644. The theory is that

setting aside the judgment after trial and conviction

insufficiently redresses the defendant’s right not to be tried by

a tribunal that has no jurisdiction. See Abney v. United States,

431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977). The courts in Councilman and New

did not apply this exception because the servicemen had not

“raised substantial arguments denying the right of the military

to try them at all.” New, 129 F.3d at 644 (citing Councilman,

420 U.S. at 759). Hamdan’s jurisdictional challenge, by

contrast, is not insubstantial, as our later discussion should

demonstrate. While he does not deny the military’s authority to

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 6 of 22
7

try him, he does contend that a military commission has no

jurisdiction over him and that any trial must be by court-martial.

His claim, therefore, falls within the exception to Councilman

and, in any event, is firmly supported by the Supreme Court’s

disposition of Quirin.

II.

In an argument distinct from his claims about the Geneva

Convention, which we will discuss next, Hamdan maintains that

the President violated the separation of powers inherent in the

Constitution when he established military commissions. The

argument is that Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives

Congress the power “to constitute Tribunals inferior to the

supreme Court,” that Congress has not established military

commissions, and that the President has no inherent authority to

do so under Article II. See Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,

Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals,

111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1284-85 (2002).

There is doubt that this separation-of-powers claim properly

may serve as a basis for a court order halting a trial before a

military commission, see United States v. Cisneros, 169 F.3d

763, 768-69 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and there is doubt that someone

in Hamdan’s position is entitled to assert such a constitutional

claim, see People’s Mojahedin Org. v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d

17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 32 County SovereigntyComm. v. Dep’t

of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In any event, on

the merits there is little to Hamdan’s argument.

The President’s Military Order of November 13, 2001,

stated that any person subject to the order, including members

of al Qaeda, “shall, when tried, be tried by a military

commission for any and all offenses triable by [a] military

commission that such individual is alleged to have

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 7 of 22
8

committed . . ..” 66 Fed. Reg. at 57,834. The President relied

on four sources of authority: his authority as Commander in

Chief of the Armed Forces, U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2; Congress’s

joint resolution authorizing the use of force; 10 U.S.C. § 821;

and 10 U.S.C. § 836. The last three are, of course, actions of

Congress. 

In the joint resolution, passed in response to the attacks of

September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the President “to use

all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,

organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,

committed, or aided” the attacks and recognized the President’s

“authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and

prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States.”

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,

115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946),

which dealt with the validity of a military commission, held that

an “important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of

measures by the military commander, not only to repel and

defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary

measures those enemies who, in their attempt to thwart or

impede our military effort, have violated the law of war.” Id. at

11. “The trial and punishment of enemy combatants,” the Court

further held, is thus part of the “conduct of war.” Id. We think

it no answer to say, as Hamdan does, that this case is different

because Congress did not formally declare war. It has been

suggested that only wars between sovereign nations would

qualify for such a declaration. See John M. Bickers, Military

Commissions are Constitutionally Sound: A Response to

Professors Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 899, 918

(2003). Even so, the joint resolution “went as far toward a

declaration of war as it might, and as far or further than

Congress went in the Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection, the

Boxer Rebellion, the Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa,

the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the invasion of Panama, the

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 8 of 22
9

Gulf War, and numerous other conflicts.” Id. at 917. The

plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in suggesting that a military

commission could determine whether an American citizen was

an enemy combatant in the current conflict, drew no distinction

of the sort Hamdan urges upon us. 124 S. Ct. at 2640-42.

Ex parte Quirin also stands solidly against Hamdan’s

argument. The Court held that Congress had authorized military

commissions through Article 15 of the Articles of War. 317

U.S. at 28-29; accord In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 19-20. The

modern version of Article 15 is 10 U.S.C. § 821, which the

President invoked when he issued his military order. Section

821 states that court-martial jurisdiction does not “deprive

military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction with respect

to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may

be tried by military commissions.” Congress also authorized the

President, in another provision the military order cited, to

establish procedures for military commissions. 10 U.S.C.

§ 836(a). Given these provisions and Quirin and Yamashita, it

is impossible to see any basis for Hamdan’s claim that Congress

has not authorized military commissions. See Curtis A. Bradley

& Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War

on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2129-31 (2005). He

attempts to distinguish Quirin and Yamashita on the ground that

the military commissions there were in “war zones” while

Guantanamo is far removed from the battlefield. We are left to

wonder why this should matter and, in any event, the distinction

does not hold: the military commission in Quirin sat in

Washington, D.C., in the Department of Justice building; the

military commission in Yamashita sat in the Phillipines after

Japan had surrendered.

We therefore hold that through the joint resolution and the

two statutes just mentioned, Congress authorized the military

commission that will try Hamdan.

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 9 of 22
10

III.

This brings us to Hamdan’s argument, accepted by the

district court, that the Geneva Convention Relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316

(“1949 Geneva Convention”), ratified in 1955, may be enforced

in federal court.

“Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the

Land.” U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. Even so, this country has

traditionally negotiated treaties with the understanding that they

do not create judicially enforceable individual rights. See

Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1972);

Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092

(D.C. Cir. 1980). As a general matter, a “treaty is primarily a

compact between independent nations,” and “depends for the

enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the

governments which are parties to it.” Head Money Cases, 112

U.S. 580, 598 (1884). If a treaty is violated, this “becomes the

subject of international negotiations and reclamation,” not the

subject of a lawsuit. Id.; see Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,

474 (1913); Whitney v. Robertson,124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888);

Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 306, 314 (1829),

overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32

U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1883).

Thus, “[i]nternational agreements, even those directly

benefitting private persons, generally do not create private rights

or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.”

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a, at 395 (1987). The district court

nevertheless concluded that the 1949 Geneva Convention

conferred individual rights enforceable in federal court. We

believe the court’s conclusion disregards the principles just

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 10 of 22
11

mentioned and is contrary to the Convention itself. To explain

why, we must consider the Supreme Court’s treatment of the

Geneva Convention of 1929 in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.

763 (1950), and this court’s decision in Holmes v. Laird, neither

of which the district court mentioned.

In Eisentrager, German nationals, convicted by a military

commission in China of violating the laws of war and

imprisoned in Germany, sought writs of habeas corpus in federal

district court on the ground that the military commission

violated their rights under the Constitution and their rights under

the 1929 Geneva Convention. 339 U.S. at 767. The Supreme

Court, speaking through Justice Jackson, wrote in an alternative

holding that the Convention was not judicially enforceable: the

Convention specifies rights of prisoners of war, but

“responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights

is upon political and military authorities.” Id. at 789 n.14. We

relied on this holding in Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d at 1222, to

deny enforcement of the individual rights provisions contained

in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, an international

treaty. 

This aspect of Eisentrager is still good law and demands

our adherence. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), decided

a different and “narrow” question: whether federal courts had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “to consider challenges to

the legality of the detention of foreign nationals” at Guantanamo

Bay. Id. at 2690. The Court’s decision in Rasul had nothing to

say about enforcing any Geneva Convention. Its holding that

federal courts had habeas corpus jurisdiction had no effect on

Eisentrager’s interpretation of the 1929 Geneva Convention.

That interpretation, we believe, leads to the conclusion that the

1949 Geneva Convention cannot be judicially enforced. 

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 11 of 22
12

Although the government relied heavily on Eisentrager in

making its argument to this effect, Hamdan chose to ignore the

decision in his brief. Nevertheless, we have compared the 1949

Convention to the 1929 Convention. There are differences, but

none of them renders Eisentrager’s conclusion about the 1929

Convention inapplicable to the 1949 Convention. Common

Article 1 of the 1949 Convention states that parties to the

Convention “undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the

present Convention in all circumstances.” The comparable

provision in the 1929 version stated that the “Convention shall

be respected . . . in all circumstances.” Geneva Convention of

1929, art. 82. The revision imposed upon signatory nations the

duty not only of complying themselves but also of making sure

other signatories complied. Nothing in the revision altered the

method by which a nation would enforce compliance. Article 8

of the 1949 Convention states that its provisions are to be

“applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the

Protecting Powers . . ..” This too was a feature of the 1929

Convention. See Geneva Convention of 1929, art. 86. But

Article 11 of the 1949 Convention increased the role of the

protecting power, typically the International Red Cross, when

disputes arose: “[I]n cases of disagreement between the Parties

to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the

provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting Powers

shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the

disagreement.” Here again there is no suggestion of judicial

enforcement. The same is true with respect to the other method

set forth in the 1949 Convention for settling disagreements.

Article 132 provides that “at the request of a Party to the

conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided

between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation

of the Convention.” If no agreement is reached about the

procedure for the “enquiry,” Article 132 further provides that

“the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who will

decide upon the procedure to be followed.” 

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 12 of 22
13

Hamdan points out that the 1949 Geneva Convention

protects individual rights. But so did the 1929 Geneva

Convention, as the Court recognized in Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at

789-90. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement, at issue in

Holmes v. Laird, also protected individual rights, but we held

that the treaty was not judicially enforceable. 459 F.2d at 1222.

Eisentrager also answers Hamdan’s argument that the

habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C § 2241, permits courts to

enforce the “treaty-based individual rights” set forth in the

Geneva Convention. The 1929 Convention specified individual

rights but as we have discussed, the Supreme Court ruled that

these rights were to be enforced by means other than the writ of

habeas corpus. The Supreme Court’s Rasul decision did give

district courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed on

behalf of Guantanamo detainees such as Hamdan. But Rasul did

not render the Geneva Convention judicially enforceable. That

a court has jurisdiction over a claim does not mean the claim is

valid. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). The

availability of habeas may obviate a petitioner’s need to rely on

a private right of action, see Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130,

140-41 & n.16 (2d Cir. 2003), but it does not render a treaty

judicially enforceable.

We therefore hold that the 1949 Geneva Convention does

not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provisions in

court. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir.

1978).

IV.

Even if the 1949 Geneva Convention could be enforced in

court, this would not assist Hamdan. He contends that a military

commission trial would violate his rights under Article 102,

which provides that a “prisoner of war can be validly sentenced

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 13 of 22
14

only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts

according to the same procedure as in the case of members of

the armed forces of the Detaining Power.” One problem for

Hamdan is that he does not fit the Article 4 definition of a

“prisoner of war” entitled to the protection of the Convention.

He does not purport to be a member of a group who displayed

“a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance” and who

conducted “their operations in accordance with the laws and

customs of war.” See 1949 Convention, arts. 4A(2)(b), (c) &

(d). If Hamdan were to claim prisoner of war status under

Article 4A(4) as a person who accompanied “the armed forces

without actually being [a] member[] thereof,” he might raise that

claim before the military commission under Army Regulation

190-8. See Section VII of this opinion, infra. (We note that

Hamdan has not specifically made such a claim before this

court.)

Another problem for Hamdan is that the 1949 Convention

does not apply to al Qaeda and its members. The Convention

appears to contemplate only two types of armed conflicts. The

first is an international conflict. Under Common Article 2, the

provisions of the Convention apply to “all cases of declared war

or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or

more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is

not recognized by one of them.” Needless to say, al Qaeda is

not a state and it was not a “High Contracting Party.” There is

an exception, set forth in the last paragraph of Common Article

2, when one of the “Powers” in a conflict is not a signatory but

the other is. Then the signatory nation is bound to adhere to the

Convention so long as the opposing Power “accepts and applies

the provisions thereof.” Even if al Qaeda could be considered

a Power, which we doubt, no one claims that al Qaeda has

accepted and applied the provisions of the Convention.

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 14 of 22
15

The second type of conflict, covered by Common Article 3,

is a civil war -- that is, an “armed conflict not of an international

character occurring in the territory of one of the High

Contracting Parties . . ..” In that situation, Common Article 3

prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of

executions without previous judgment pronounced by a

regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees

which are recognized as indispensable by a civilized people.”

Hamdan assumes that if Common Article 3 applies, a military

commission could not try him. We will make the same

assumption arguendo, which leaves the question whether

Common Article 3 applies. Afghanistan is a “High Contracting

Party.” Hamdan was captured during hostilities there. But is

the war against terrorism in general and the war against al Qaeda

in particular, an “armed conflict not of an international

character”? See INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III

GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF

PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (1960) (Common Article 3 applies only

to armed conflicts confined to “a single country”). President

Bush determined, in a memorandum to the Vice President and

others on February 7, 2002, that it did not fit that description

because the conflict was “international in scope.” The district

court disagreed with the President’s view of Common Article 3,

apparently because the court thought we were not engaged in a

separate conflict with al Qaeda, distinct from the conflict with

the Taliban. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161

(D.D.C. 2004). We have difficulty understanding the court’s

rationale. Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan in November

2001, but the conflict with al Qaeda arose before then, in other

regions, including this country on September 11, 2001. Under

the Constitution, the President “has a degree of independent

authority to act” in foreign affairs, Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi,

539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003), and, for this reason and others, his

construction and application of treaty provisions is entitled to

“great weight.” United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 15 of 22
16

(1989); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S.

176, 185 (1982); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).

While the district court determined that the actions in

Afghanistan constituted a single conflict, the President’s

decision to treat our conflict with the Taliban separately from

our conflict with al Qaeda is the sort of political-military

decision constitutionally committed to him. See Japan Whaling

Ass’n v.Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). To the

extent there is ambiguity about the meaning of Common Article

3 as applied to al Qaeda and its members, the President’s

reasonable view of the provision must therefore prevail.

V.

Suppose we are mistaken about Common Article 3.

Suppose it does cover Hamdan. Even then we would abstain

from testing the military commission against the requirement in

Common Article 3(1)(d) that sentences must be pronounced “by

a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees

which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”

See Councilman, 420 U.S. at 759; New, 129 F.3d at 644; supra

Part I. Unlike his arguments that the military commission

lacked jurisdiction, his argument here is that the commission’s

procedures -- particularly its alleged failure to require his

presence at all stages of the proceedings -- fall short of what

Common Article 3 requires. The issue thus raised is not whether

the commission may try him, but rather how the commission

may try him. That is by no stretch a jurisdictional argument.

No one would say that a criminal defendant’s contention that a

district court will not allow him to confront the witnesses against

him raises a jurisdictional objection. Hamdan’s claim therefore

falls outside the recognized exception to the Councilman

doctrine. Accordingly, comity would dictate that we defer to the

ongoing military proceedings. If Hamdan were convicted, and

if Common Article 3 covered him, he could contest his

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 16 of 22
17

conviction in federal court after he exhausted his military

remedies.

VI.

After determining that the 1949 Geneva Convention

provided Hamdan a basis for judicial relief, the district court

went on to consider the legitimacy of a military commission in

the event Hamdan should eventually appear before one. In the

district court’s view, the principal constraint on the President’s

power to utilize such commissions is found in Article 36 of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 836, which

provides:

Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of

proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courtsmartial, military commissions and other military tribunals

. . . may be prescribed by the President by regulations

which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the

principles of law and the rules of evidence generally

recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States

district courts, but which may not be contrary to or

inconsistent with this chapter.

(Emphasis added.) The district court interpreted the final

qualifying clause to mean that military commissions must

comply in all respects with the requirements of the Uniform

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This was an error. 

Throughout its Articles, the UCMJ takes care to distinguish

between “courts-martial” and “military commissions.” See, e.g.,

10 U.S.C. § 821 (noting that “provisions of this chapter

conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive

military commissions . . . of concurrent jurisdiction”). The

terms are not used interchangeably, and the majority of the

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 17 of 22
18

UCMJ’s procedural requirements refer only to courts-martial.

The district court’s approach would obliterate this distinction.

A far more sensible reading is that in establishing military

commissions, the President may not adopt procedures that are

“contrary to or inconsistent with” the UCMJ’s provisions

governing military commissions. In particular, Article 39

requires that sessions of a “trial by court-martial . . . shall be

conducted in the presence of the accused.” Hamdan’s trial

before a military commission does not violate Article 36 if it

omits this procedural guarantee.

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343

U.S. 341 (1952), provides further support for this reading of the

UCMJ. There, the Court spoke of the place of military

commissions in our history, referring to them as “our

commonlaw war courts. . . . Neither their procedure nor their

jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute.” Id. at 346-48. The

Court issued its opinion two years after enactment of the UCMJ,

and it is difficult, if not impossible, to square the Court’s

language in Madsen with the sweeping effect with which the

district court would invest Article 36. The UCMJ thus imposes

only minimal restrictions upon the form and function of military

commissions, see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 828, 847(a)(1), 849(d), and

Hamdan does not allege that the regulations establishing the

present commission violate any of the pertinent provisions.

VII.

Although we have considered all of Hamdan’s remaining

contentions, the only one requiring further discussion is his

claim that even if the Geneva Convention is not judicially

enforceable, Army Regulation 190-8 provides a basis for relief.

This regulation, which contains many subsections, “implements

international law, both customary and codified, relating to

[enemy prisoners of war], [retained personnel], [civilian

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 18 of 22
19

internees], and [other detainees] which includes those persons

held during military operations other than war.” AR 190-8 § 1-

1(b). The regulation lists the Geneva Convention among the

“principal treaties relevant to this regulation.” § 1-1(b)(3); see

Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2658 (Souter, J., concurring) (describing

AR 190-8 as “implementing the Geneva Convention”). One

subsection, § 1-5(a)(2), requires that prisoners receive the

protections of the Convention “until some other legal status is

determined by competent authority.” (Emphasis added.) The

President found that Hamdan was not a prisoner of war under

the Convention. Nothing in the regulations, and nothing

Hamdan argues, suggests that the President is not a “competent

authority” for these purposes.

Hamdan claims that AR 190-8 entitles him to have a

“competent tribunal” determine his status. But we believe the

military commission is such a tribunal. The regulations specify

that such a “competent tribunal” shall be composed of three

commissioned officers, one of whom must be field-grade. AR

190-8 § 1.6(c). A field-grade officer is an officer above the rank

of captain and below the rank of brigadier general -- a major, a

lieutenant colonel, or a colonel. The President’s order requires

military commissions to be composed of between three and

seven commissioned officers. 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(a)(2), (3). The

commission before which Hamdan is to be tried consists of three

colonels. Brief for Appellants at 7. We therefore see no reason

why Hamdan could not assert his claim to prisoner of war status

before the military commission at the time of his trial and

thereby receive the judgment of a “competent tribunal” within

the meaning of Army Regulation 190-8. 

* * *

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 19 of 22
20

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district

court is reversed.

So ordered.

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 20 of 22
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in

all aspects of the court’s opinion except for the conclusion

that Common Article 3 does not apply to the United States’s

conduct toward al Qaeda personnel captured in the conflict in

Afghanistan. Maj. Op. 15-16. Because I agree that the

Geneva Convention is not enforceable in courts of the United

States, and that any claims under Common Article 3 should be

deferred until proceedings against Hamdan are finished, I

fully agree with the court’s judgment. 

* * *

There is, I believe, a fundamental logic to the

Convention’s provisions on its application. Article 2 (¶ 1)

covers armed conflicts between two or more contracting

parties. Article 2 (¶ 3) makes clear that in a multi-party

conflict, where any two or more signatories are on opposite

sides, those parties “are bound by [the Convention] in their

mutual relations”--but not (by implication) vis-à-vis any nonsignatory. And as the court points out, Maj. Op. at 14, under

Article 2 (¶ 3) even a non-signatory “Power” is entitled to the

benefits of the Convention, as against a signatory adversary, if

it “accepts and applies” its provisions. 

Non-state actors cannot sign an international treaty. Nor

is such an actor even a “Power” that would be eligible under

Article 2 (¶ 3) to secure protection by complying with the

Convention’s requirements. Common Article 3 fills the gap,

providing some minimal protection for such non-eligibles in

an “armed conflict not of an international character occurring

in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” The

gap being filled is the non-eligible party’s failure to be a

nation. Thus the words “not of an international character” are

sensibly understood to refer to a conflict between a signatory

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 21 of 22
2

nation and a non-state actor. The most obvious form of such a

conflict is a civil war. But given the Convention’s structure,

the logical reading of “international character” is one that

matches the basic derivation of the word “international,” i.e.,

between nations. Thus, I think the context compels the view

that a conflict between a signatory and a non-state actor is a

conflict “not of an international character.” In such a conflict,

the signatory is bound to Common Article 3’s modest

requirements of “humane[]” treatment and “the judicial

guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized

peoples.” 

I assume that our conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda

are distinct, and I agree with the court that in reading the

Convention we owe the President’s construction “great

weight.” Maj. Op. at 15. But I believe the Convention’s

language and structure compel the view that Common Article

3 covers the conflict with al Qaeda. 

USCA Case #04-5393 Document #906132 Filed: 07/15/2005 Page 22 of 22