Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05137/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed May 28, 1993

No. 93-5137

NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN

THE UNITED STATES; HISTORIC PRESERVATION

LEAGUE, INC., A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION;

PRESERVATION TEXAS, INC., A NON-PROFIT

CORPORATION, APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION;

ANDREW C. HOVE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS ACTING CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL

DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Civil Action No. 93-00904)

Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal

David Armour Doheny, Elizabeth Sherrill Merritt, Andrea C.

Ferster and Richard Bart Nettler were on the motion for stay for

appellants.

Ann Scharnikow DuRoss and Jerome A. Madden, Attorneys, Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation were on the opposition to the motion

for stay.

Before: WALD, RUTH B. GINSBURG and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges

Opinion for the court filed Per Curiam. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

Per curiam: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),

acting as a liquidator with the powers of a receiver, see 12 U.S.C.

§ 1823(d)(3)(A), is in the process of selling the Dr. Pepper

Headquarters Building in Dallas, Texas. The National Trust for

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Historic Preservation, the Historic Preservation League, Inc., and

the Historic Preservation League of Dallas (collectively, the

National Trust), sued to enjoin the transaction on the ground that

the FDIC's contemplated sale would violate the National Historic

Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq. The NHPA

requires, among other things, that federal agencies "take into

account" possible adverse effects of agency "undertakings" on

properties included in or eligible to be included in the National

Register of Historic Places, and afford the Advisory Council on

Historic Preservation "a reasonable opportunity to comment with

regard to such undertaking[s]." See 16 U.S.C. § 470f. The

National Trust alleges that the FDIC is subject to the NHPA's

requirements and has unlawfully ignored them in connection with the

impending sale of the Dr. Pepper Building. The private buyer of

the Dr. Pepper Building, all parties agree, would have no duty to

comply with the federal preservation statute after acquiring the

property. Once the impending sale is consummated, the National

Trust thus will have no judicial or administrative recourse against

this alleged violation of federal law by the FDIC. 

The district court issued a temporary restraining order

barring the sale, see National Trust for Historic Preservation v.

FDIC, No. 93-0904 (D.D.C. May 7, 1993); a week later, the court

(acting through a different district judge) denied the National

Trust's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the

action for lack of jurisdiction, see id. (D.D.C. May 14, 1993). In

dismissing the action, the district court relied exclusively on 12

U.S.C. § 1821(j). We agree that § 1821(j) bars the National

Trust's suit for injunctive relief; accordingly, we deny the

National Trust's motion for a stay pending appeal, and affirm the

dismissal.

Section 1821(j) states:

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1We recognize that in South Carolina v. Regan,

465 U.S. 367 (1984), the Supreme Court read into the

encompassing language of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act,

26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), an exception allowing states to

invoke the Court's original jurisdiction to test the

constitutionality of a provision of the Tax Equity and

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. The Court rested

its decision on the "Act's purpose and the

circumstances of its enactment," which indicated that

"Congress did not intend the Act to apply to actions

brought by aggrieved parties for whom it has not

provided an alternative remedy." 465 U.S. at 378. In

addition to its unique context, the decision can be

fully comprehended only in light of Supreme Court

doctrine that otherwise insulates the tax collector

against suits that would deflect the collector's

energies from the collection of taxes. See, e.g.,

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426

U.S. 26 (1976).

The South Carolina v. Regan decision does not

stand for the proposition that whenever any statute

bars injunctive relief, the courts are to ignore the

statutory restriction if the plaintiff cannot obtain

adequate judicial relief by some other method. 

Injunctions generally issue when the alternative of a

remedy at law is inadequate; preliminary injunctions

and stays issue in order to prevent irreparable harm. 

To hold that the lack of an adequate alternative

remedy renders § 1821(j)'s bar against restraining

orders inoperative would therefore be tantamount to

rendering the provision entirely ineffective.

Except as provided in this section, no court may take any

action, except at the request of the Board of Directors

by regulation or order, to restrain or affect the

exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation as a

conservator or a receiver.

Here, the powers and functions the FDIC is exercising are, by

statute, deemed to be those of a receiver. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 1823(d)(3)(A). An injunction against the planned sale would

surely "restrain or affect" the FDIC's exercise of those powers or

functions. We reject the National Trust's argument that § 1821(j)

applies only to claims that are themselves subject to the

administrative claims procedures set out in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d).

Section 1821(j) is not so limited.1

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Nothing in the text of § 1821(j) limits its application to

claims brought by creditors or others who have recourse to the

administrative claims regime of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d). Cf. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1341 (explicitly limiting ban on federal injunctions against

assessment of state taxes to cases in which there is a "plain,

speedy and efficient remedy" in state court). The exclusivity of

the FDIC's administrative claims provisions stems from another

provision located, as one might expect for an exclusivity-ofremedies provision, directly after the claims procedures prescribed

in § 1821(d). That provision, set out in § 1821(d)(13)(D) and

entitled "Limitation on Judicial Review," states:

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection [§ 1821(d)],

no court shall have jurisdiction over--

(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action

seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the

assets of any depository institution for which the [FDIC]

has been appointed receiver, including assets which the

[FDIC] may acquire from itself as such receiver; or

(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such

institution or the [FDIC] as receiver.

It would be plausible, though we need not decide the question here,

to read § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii)'s ouster of jurisdiction as limited to

suits otherwise governed by the administrative claims regime set

out in § 1821(d). See, e.g., Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938

F.2d 383, 395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991). It

would not be plausible, in light of § 1821(d)(13)(D), however, to

read § 1821(j) as a bar only against circumvention of the statutory

administrative claims procedures. Such a reading would make the

latter provision largely redundant and would overlook Congress's

casting of § 1821(j)'s directive in terms, not of precluding

claims, but of shielding the FDIC's exercise of its "powers" and

"functions." 

The National Trust also argues that § 1821(j), which applies

to the FDIC when acting "as a conservator or a receiver," is simply

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2In Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383,

395 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991),

which stated that § 1821(j) does not apply to the

Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in its corporate

capacity, RTC invoked neither § 1823(d)(3)(A) nor any

comparable provision equating corporate action, in the

particular setting, to that of a receiver.

inapplicable because the FDIC is acting in its corporate capacity.

The argument is precluded by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A), which

provides: "With respect to any asset acquired or liability assumed

pursuant to this section, the Corporation shall have all of the

rights, powers, privileges, and authorities of the Corporation as

receiver under section[] 1821 . . . of this title." The FDIC

acquired the Dr. Pepper Building pursuant to its powers under

§ 1823; and the FDIC's immunity from judicial "restraint" is among

its "rights, powers, privileges, and authorities" under § 1821.2

We do not suggest that § 1821(j) precludes courts from

granting injunctive relief against the FDIC whenever and however it

purports to act as a receiver. By its terms, § 1821(j) shields

only "the exercise of powers or functions" Congress gave to the

FDIC; the provision does not bar injunctive relief when the FDIC

has acted or proposes to act beyond, or contrary to, its

statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted, powers or

functions. See Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967

F.2d 703, 707 (1st Cir. 1992); Rosa, 938 F.2d at 399; see also Coit

Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp.,

489 U.S. 561 (1989). In liquidating assets it has obtained

pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823, however, the FDIC is acting squarely

within its statutory "powers and functions," and surely not in

conflict with any constitutional norm. We do not think it

possible, in light of the strong language of § 1821(j), to

interpret the FDIC's "powers" and "authorities" to include the

limitation that those powers be subject to -- and hence reviewable

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3This result is hardly so untoward that one might

doubt whether the statute reaches so far. Cf. South

Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 398-402 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring in the judgment). 

for non-compliance with -- any and all other federal laws. While

Congress has included such provisos in some statutes immunizing

agency action from outside second-guessing, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §

7106(a)(2) (management rights immunized from arbitral review under

Federal Labor Relations Act only when exercised "in accordance with

applicable laws"), we see no such limitation in § 1821(j). 

In disposing of the assets of a bank, the FDIC is performing

a routine "receivership" function that § 1821(j) unequivocally

removes from judicial restraint. Deciding only the clear case

before us, we do not reach further to consider whether § 1821(j)

covers every other case a legal mind could conjure. Cf. Enochs v.

Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)

(recognizing exception to Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. §

7421, where tax collector lacks "good faith" claim to tax sought to

be collected). The Dr. Pepper Building came into the FDIC's hands

only because the building was pledged as collateral on a loan

extended by a federally insured financial institution; were it not

for the fortuity of that institution's failure, the building would

not be even arguably within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.

If the contemplated sale to a private party goes through, the

building will still be subject to state historic property

preservation laws, see TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 315.006(b) (West

1993) (prohibiting unauthorized destruction of a "historic

structure"), just it would have if it had remained in private hands

all along.3

The prohibition against restraining the FDIC, with its

unambiguous "No court," applies as much to the courts of appeals as

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4We have considered, in reaching this judgment,

the ample written submissions of the parties on the

motion to stay before this court and the full

presentations before the district court on the motions

for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary

injunction.

to the district courts. Having determined that § 1821(j) bars the

National Trust's suit to enjoin the sale of the Dr. Pepper

Building,4 we deny the application for a stay, and affirm the

district court's order dismissing the suit for lack of

jurisdiction.

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5That Act provides, in relevant part, that "no suit for the

purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax

shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such

person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." 26

U.S.C. § 4721(a).

WALD, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Even if the majority should

ultimately be proven right that § 1821(j) of FIRREA deprives this

court of jurisdiction to enjoin the sale and demolition of this

historic building that has come under the FDIC's supervision, I

believe it is singularly inappropriate to decide a first-time-inthe-circuit issue of such momentous consequences--potentially

immunizing an agency from court enforcement of the entire U.S.

Code--without the benefit of full briefing and oral argument.

Accordingly, I dissent from the denial of the stay, which removes

any federal law obstacles to the demolition of the Dr. Pepper

Headquarters Building, considered one of the finest examples of Art

Moderne architecture in Texas and already determined to be eligible

for listing in the National Register of Historic Places.

I do not think the question of a court's jurisdiction to

entertain any action against the FDIC, no matter what statute it is

violating or in what statutorily authorized capacity it is acting,

is as easily resolved as the majority's opinion suggests. While

§ 1821(j)'s language is unqualified in its breath-taking

pronouncement that "no court may take any action," that bar must be

read in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. In South

Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984), for example, the Court

limited the scope of equally expansive language in the AntiInjunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a),5 based in part on its location

within "a statutory scheme that provided an alternative remedy."

Id. at 374. Despite the fact that the Act's language "could

scarcely be more explicit," Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725,

736 (1974), the Court concluded that "the Anti-Injunction Act's

purpose and the circumstances of its enactment indicate that

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Congress did not intend the Act to apply to actions brought by

aggrieved parties for whom it has not provided a remedy." Regan,

465 at 378. Appellants argue here--certainly not frivolously--that

§ 1821(j) must similarly conform to a congressional intent to

preclude judicial intervention only of claims that can be resolved

by the statute's alternative administrative remedy.

The majority, however, disposes of this argument--and of the

teachings of Regan--in a footnote explaining that this recent and

seemingly applicable, if not controlling, Supreme Court precedent

"can be fully comprehended only in light of Supreme Court doctrine"

aimed at insulating the tax collector from suit. Majority opinion

("Maj. op.") at [2] n.1. The panel's reading of Regan, however,

reflects only its own comprehension, not the Court's. The Regan

majority opinion included no language suggesting that the approach

it employed--interpreting the anti-injunction provision in light of

available indicia of congressional intent--was to be confined to

tax cases or was in any way related to a tax collection doctrine.

At best, a concurring opinion stated that the Act served this

"collateral objective" of protecting the tax collector. Regan, 465

U.S. at 387 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Since Regan was, after

all, a tax case, this passing reference to a tax doctrine seems

wholly unremarkable, and certainly a slim reed to support the

panel's contention that the Regan Court's rationale derived from

and was limited to tax cases. To the contrary, the majority

distinguished itself from the concurrence by noting its belief that

Congress was concerned with providing, as well as limiting,

remedies. Id. at 376 n.13. In any event, where the Supreme Court

has indicated that courts may--if not must--inquire into and rely

on indicia of congressional intent in interpreting an antiinjunction provision, I would have thought this court would feel

compelled to at least engage in a full briefing and argument,

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6I agree with the majority, see Maj. op. at __

n.1, that Regan does not stand for the proposition

that an anti-injunction provision can never be applied

in the absence of an alternative remedy, whether

judicial or administrative. I do read Regan to

suggest that an anti-injunction provision should not

be interpreted in the absence of a considered inquiry-

-or indeed, any inquiry--into the reach Congress

intended to give the provision. If the inquiry

reveals no congressional concern for the availability

of alternative remedies, then clearly the court should

not impose such a limitation. My reluctance is to

reach that conclusion without adequate consideration

of "the circumstances of [the provision's] enactment." 

See Regan, 465 F.2d at 378.

before rejecting that prescribed approach out-of-hand in a

footnote.6

Indeed, in construing the scope of § 1821(j) itself, our

sister circuits, like the Regan Court, have taken pains to consider

the availability of an alternative administrative remedy. The

First Circuit, for example, stated:

Congress did not leave individuals having claims against the

institution without a remedy, however. FIRREA contains an

elaborate administrative system by which the FDIC may

adjudicate claims against the insured institution.

Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 705

(1st Cir. 1992). While the Telematics court went on to conclude

that the district court did, in fact, lack jurisdiction, its

decision was based in part on "the elaborate structure created by

FIRREA, and the evident intent of Congress that the structure

should be permitted to stand with minimal court interference."

Id.; see also United Liberty Life Insur. Co. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d

1320, 1329 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Telematics); In re Landmark

Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc., 973 F.2d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1992) ("In

FIRREA, Congress established a comprehensive statutory scheme

within which the RTC could exercise its broad powers to reorganize

and collect assets for the benefit of depositors (and

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7Both the FDIC and the RTC are subject to § 1821(j), and case

law applying that provision to one agency is applicable to the

other. See, e.g., In re Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d 125, 136 (2d

Cir. 1992) (applying RTC precedent in case involving FDIC).

taxpayers).").7 Similarly, in construing another provision of

FIRREA, the Third Circuit expressly concluded that "[w]hatever its

breadth, we do not believe that clause (ii) [12 U.S.C.

§ 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii)] encompasses claims that are not susceptible

of resolution through the claims procedure." Rosa v. Resolution

Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 394 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.

582 (1991) (emphasis added). FIRREA, however, provides no

administrative remedies for alleged violations of the National

Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), or indeed of any other major

regulatory statute, including worker safety or environmental

protection statutes.

Again rejecting the approach counselled by the Regan Court,

which interpreted the Anti-Injunction Act with regard to "indicia

of congressional intent," Regan, 465 U.S. at 381, the majority

notes that "[n]othing in the text of § 1821(j) limits its

application," Maj. op. at [3], and referring to the "unambiguous"

prohibition of that section, id. at [6], stops there, declining to

look into the legislative history of FIRREA or the circumstances of

its enactment. Appellants note, however, that the legislative

history of FIRREA provides no hint of such an enormous role for the

anti-injunction provision. See Reply to the Opposition to

Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, at 6 & n.9. The House

Committee Report on FIRREA indicated that it was intended to bar

court action only to the same extent as did the existing Home

Owners' Loan Act ("HOLA"). H.R. REP. NO. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.

334 (1989); see also Rosa, 938 F.2d at 395 (§ 1821(j) to have same

effect as HOLA provision). The committee issued its draft of this

legislation shortly after and presumably in light of the Supreme

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Court's decision in Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal

Savings & Loan Insur. Corp., 489 U.S. 561 (1989), in which it

rejected an expansive interpretation of the HOLA anti-injunction

provision. The record before us shows no congressional intent,

reflected in the legislative history, to grant the FDIC virtually

unprecedented authority to carry out its statutory responsibilities

unchecked by any other federal laws and unfettered by any judicial

intervention. Putting aside debates on the proper use of

legislative history, this thundering silence on the part of

Congress surely deserves at least a passing nod before

authoritatively pronouncing circuit law on a stay motion. It is a

true Sherlock Holmesian example of the dog that did not bark.

There are other reasons counselling a more in-depth inquiry

than this stay motion has permitted. First, the majority's

conclusion that, tucked away in the middle of FIRREA's detailed

discussion of the FDIC's responsibilities in the valuation and

distribution of assets and the conduct of liquidation proceedings,

Congress bestowed upon the FDIC sweeping immunity from court

intervention to enforce the entire body of federal regulatory law,

presumably including criminal as well as civil prohibitions,

"`compel[s] an odd result,'" such as to take us out of the plain

meaning rule. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491

U.S. 440, 446 (1989) (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490

U.S. 501, 509 (1989)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has not

generally limited its inquiry to a literal and unqualified reliance

on the plain language of statutes limiting judicial review of

administrative action. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee

Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (giving narrowing construction to

broadly worded statutory bar of judicial review of amnesty

applications under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986);

Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988) (concluding that a

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8Nor does the majority negate the broad

implications of its ruling by its passing reference to

Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S.

1, 7 (1962). Enochs held that a taxpayer could seek

to enjoin the collection of a tax only where the

government had no chance, under any circumstances, of

prevailing on its claim, such that its action would be

an "exaction" in "the guise of a tax." Id. (internal

citation omitted). So limited a remedy provides no

relief in situations like this one, where two

provision barring judicial review of "the decision of the

[Veterans' Administration] Administrator on any question of law or

fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration

providing benefits for veterans," 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), did not

preclude judicial review of a claim that the VA's denial of certain

benefits to recovering alcoholics violated the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794). A careful examination of the

circumstances surrounding the adoption of FIRREA might indeed yield

"`clear and convincing evidence,'" Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (internal citations omitted), sufficient to

overcome "the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial

review of administrative action," Bowen v. Michigan Academy of

Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986), but our hurried

consideration of this stay motion precluded any such examination.

Despite the majority's reassurance that it is "deciding only

the clear case before us," Maj. op. at [6], that cannot be so. The

implications of its basic approach and its holding cannot be so

easily cabined. It has declined to inquire into any indicia of

congressional intent that might limit the sweep of § 1821(j)'s

broad prohibition, and it has declined to interpret the statute to

make the FDIC's exercise of its functions generally subject to

other federal laws. See Maj. op. at [5]. How then can we read its

"plain meaning" rationale other than to preclude virtually any

other case "a legal mind could conjure"? Maj. op. at [6].8 The

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different district court judges have determined that

the party seeking an injunction has made a strong

showing on the merits. National Trust for Historic

Preservation v. FDIC, No. 93-0904-HHG (D.D.C. May 7,

1993), slip op. at 7 (Trust had "established absolute

irreparable harm" and had shown that it "m[ight] well

prevail" on the merits); id. (D.D.C. May 14, 1993)

(agreeing that the Trust had made a "strong showing on

the merits").

majority cannot have it both ways. By this decision, the majority

does effectively insulate the FDIC from judicial intervention even

in the face of allegations of egregious violations of federal law

threatening grave and irreparable harm. Suppose, for example, that

the FDIC, acting in its receiver capacity, were operating a factory

or even a hazardous waste facility in a manner that was causing

serious health or environmental damage and that allegedly violated

the Clean Water Act or the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The

majority's approach would effectively hold the court powerless to

take "any action . . . to restrain or affect" that operation,

unless the FDIC "has acted or proposes to act beyond, or contrary

to, its statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted powers

or functions." Maj. op. at [4-5]. This case, however, raises the

question--again hardly a frivolous one--whether the freedom to

wholly disregard the NHPA, a duly enacted law applicable to all

other federal agencies, is indeed a statutorily granted receiver

power, so that the FDIC may violate that law, without acting

outside the scope of its powers.

I do not mean to suggest that appellants do not face

significant hurdles in their argument for jurisdiction. In Rosa,

for example, the Third Circuit held that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over a request for an injunction prohibiting the RTC,

in its role as conservator, from terminating a pension plan in

violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

("ERISA"), or requiring it to make payments to the plan's trustees.

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Read broadly, Rosa could be taken to preclude jurisdiction over

injunctions alleging violations of federal laws not directly

related to the resolution of creditors' claims under FIRREA. A

tighter reading of Rosa, however, reveals certain distinctions.

First, the Rosa court expressly reserved ruling on possible

exceptions to § 1821(j), such as those based on the absence of an

alternative remedy, an argument not put forward there but squarely

presented here. Second, the Rosa court expressly concluded that

the anti-injunction provision did not bar claims against the RTC in

its corporate capacity. Briefing and argument could shed light on

the proper reading of Rosa and the right resolution of these

questions.

This action was brought not by a disappointed claimant, but

by, among others, the National Trust for Historic Preservation in

the United States, the primary congressionally-authorized protector

of the nation's significant historical properties. Before the

preliminary injunction was denied in a conclusory one-paragraph

order, a different district court had already concluded that the

National Trust had "established absolute irreparable harm" and had

shown that it "m[ight] well prevail" on the merits, and that a

temporary restraint would not cause serious harm to the appellee

and would be in the public interest. National Trust for Historic

Preservation v. FDIC, No. 93-0904-HHG (D.D.C. May 7, 1993), slip

op. at 7. Given the high stakes here, both in this and in future

cases, I would, at a minimum, follow the lead of our sister

circuits and allow this question to be decided in a more

comprehensive, albeit expedited, fashion with regular briefing and

argument, instead of making binding circuit precedent in barely

over a week on an unargued stay motion.

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