Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00771/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00771-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUIS A. MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv771-IEG(WMc)

ORDER REJECTING OBJECTIONS;

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

[DOC. NO. 6]

vs.

MIKE EVANS, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction and sentence in San Diego County

Superior Court Case No. SCD 163989. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the petition

was time-barred. Petitioner did not file an opposition to the motion. On October 16, 2007,

Magistrate Judge McCurine filed a Report and Recommendation (“Report”), recommending the

Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss. On November 16, 2007, Petitioner filed an objection

to the Report. Respondent did not file a reply.

For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner’s objections to Magistrate Judge McCurine’s

Report are rejected. The Court adopts the Report in full, and GRANTS Respondent’s motion to

dismiss.

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Discussion

1. Magistrate Judge McCurine Properly Found the Petition is Time-Barred

Because Petitioner objects to the Report, the Court reviews it de novo. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner does not dispute

Magistrate Judge McCurine’s determination that his conviction became final on July 12, 2005, or

that the statute of limitations required his petition be filed on or before July 12, 2006. Petitioner

also does not dispute Magistrate Judge McCurine’s determination that he is not entitled to any

period of statutory tolling. Petitioner’s sole objection is that the Report wrongly concludes he is

not entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner argues his petition should be considered timely because

his appellate attorney failed to notify him when the California Supreme Court, on April 13, 2005,

denied his Petition for Review. Petitioner argues his appellate attorney only notified him of the

denial in January of 2007, after he called Appellate Defenders regarding the status of his appeal.

Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling for the time after his petition for review was

denied, until his appellate attorney informed him of the denial.

Magistrate Judge McCurine identified the proper legal standard for determining when the

statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) is equitably tolled. The statute of limitations

under § 2244(d) is equitably tolled only when petitioner shows “(1) that he has been pursing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v.

DiGulielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1153. 

Magistrate Judge McCurine properly found Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of

showing diligence. Petitioner implicitly concedes he knew his attorney filed a Petition for Review

in or around March of 2005. California Rule of Court 28(b)(2) (now Rule 8.512(b)), provides that

a petition for review will be decided within ninety days. Nonetheless, Petitioner made no inquiry

of his appellate counsel regarding the status of the court proceedings for nearly two years, until

January of 2007. In his objections, Petitioner states “he will provide explanation for his failure to

check on the status of his petition between March 8, 2005 and the time before the January 10, 2007

letter from appellate counsel.” [Objection, p. 7.] However, it is Petitioner’s burden to demonstrate

diligence. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1153. In light of Magistrate Judge McCurine’s finding that

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1

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his equitable tolling claim because he

has failed to make “a good-faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.” 

Roy v. Lambert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919

(9th Cir. 2003)). Unlike the petitioners in Roy, Petitioner has not alleged he took any action

between the time his counsel notified him in March of 2005 that she would file a Petition for

Review, and January of 2007. Petitioner has not alleged any specific effort he undertook to pursue

his rights during that period of time, or any obstacles which prohibited him from inquiring as to

the status of his proceedings.

2

In the motion to dismiss, Respondent also argued the sole claim presented in the petition

was unexhausted. The Report did not address this argument.

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Petitioner was not diligent, Petitioner cannot avoid dismissal of his petition by asserting he will

later provide an explanation.1

Likewise, Magistrate Judge McCurine properly found Petitioner has not demonstrated

extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented him from pursuing his rights. The

Ninth Circuit in Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) surveyed the cases regarding when

attorney negligence will constitute extraordinary circumstances. The court concluded that

“[t]hough ordinary attorney negligence will not justify equitable tolling,” an attorney’s

“sufficiently egregious” misconduct may constitute “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 800. 

Petitioner’s allegation that his attorney failed to timely notify him of the denial of his petition for

review does not constitute the type of “egregious” misconduct which the Ninth Circuit has found

justifies equitable tolling. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, and his petition is barred

by the statute of limitations. Therefore, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

2. Petitioner is not Entitled to Relief on His Claim

Assuming arguendo the Court found Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, Petitioner’s

sole claim for relief is unexhausted and does not entitle him to relief on the merits.2 In order to

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner “must make reference to provisions of the federal Constitution

or must cite either federal or state case law that engages in a federal constitutional analysis.” Fields

v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2005). In his Petition for Review, Petitioner

stated that “[s]ubject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the

power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the Legislature . . . .” This brief

statement was insufficient to put the state court on notice of petitioner’s claim that the sentence

imposed in his case violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore,

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even if the petition is not time-barred, it is properly dismissed. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (district court must immediately dismiss a petition containing only

unexhausted claims).

Finally, even if Petitioner’s claim was procedurally proper, the Court concludes Petitioner

is not entitled to relief on the merits. Petitioner argues the trial court violated the Eighth

Amendment when it allowed him to be convicted of eight counts of kidnaping when there were

only three victims. Petitioner argues that because the prosecution charged and the jury found the

offenses were committed pursuant to a single conspiracy, five of his eight kidnaping convictions

should be stricken. A fair reading of Petitioner’s claim demonstrates it does not arise under the

Eighth Amendment, but instead is based upon errors of interpretation of state law. The Eighth

Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Petitioner does not explain or cite any case law which

would demonstrate how his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated by the allegedly

improperly conviction. Federal habeas corpus relief is not available to cure errors of state law.

Dubria v. Smith, 224 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67

(1991)). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court rejects Petitioner’s objections to Magistrate

Judge McCurine’s Report and Recommendation, adopts in full the Report, and GRANTS

Respondent’s motion to dismiss, terminating this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 27, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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