Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00327/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00327-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD THOMPSON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-0327-WS-M

BILL RICHARDSON, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This

action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now before the

undersigned on the motion for summary judgment of Defendants,

Sheriff Tracy Hawsey, Jail Administrator Shirley Trent, and Chief

of Operations William Richardson (Docs. 35, 36), and Plaintiff’s

Opposition to that motion (Doc. 42). For the reasons stated

below, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment of

Defendants Hawsey, Trent, and Richardson be granted and that

Plaintiff’s action against these Defendants be dismissed with

prejudice.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

From its review of the record, the Court summarizes the

parties’ allegations that are material to the issues addressed in

this Report and Recommendation. At the time of the incident made

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1 The warrant stated that Plaintiff had been convicted of

lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under the age of 16. 

(Doc. 36, Ex. A at 2).

2

 Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and is living in

Evergreen, Alabama. (Doc. 42).

2

the basis of this litigation, Plaintiff was an inmate

incarcerated at the Conecuh County Detention Facility (“Conecuh

County Jail”), in Evergreen, Alabama. (Doc. 25 at 4). On

February 12, 2004, Plaintiff was arrested on a warrant which

stated that there was probable cause to believe that he had, as

an adult criminal sex offender,1 established a residence within

2000 feet of the property on which a school or child care

facility is located, in violation of Alabama Code § 15-20-26(A). 

(Doc. 36, Ex. A at 2). Plaintiff was booked into the Conecuh

County Jail that day. (Id., Ex. B at 2). 

Plaintiff claims that, on February 13, 2004, while

incarcerated at the Conecuh County Jail, he asked to see a doctor

for his high blood pressure but was not treated by a physician

until February 18, 2004. (Doc. 25 at 4-5). Plaintiff claims

that, in the interim, he suffered a stroke, causing him “pain and

suffering.” (Id.). Plaintiff remained in the Conecuh County

jail until April 28, 2004, when he was released into the custody

of the Escambia County, Florida, Sheriff’s Department, which had

a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest because of his failure to

register as a convicted sex offender.2 (Doc. 36, Ex. E at 1-9).

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3

 On December 22, 2004, the Court consolidated Civil Action

No. 04-355-CG-L with the current action. (Doc. 16).

3

II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE

On May 19, 2004, the present action was transferred to this

Court from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of Alabama. (Doc. 6). On May 18, 2005, Plaintiff filed

his current § 1983 Complaint in this Court,3 seeking compensatory

damages for “pain and suffering” caused by Defendants’ delayed

medical treatment of his high blood pressure. (Doc. 25 at 4-5). 

Plaintiff also requests that Defendants’ employment be

terminated. (Id.). 

On November 18, 2005, Defendants filed their Special Report

and Answer, denying any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights and asserting various defenses, including qualified and

absolute immunity. (Docs. 35, 36). The Court converted

Defendants’ Special Report and Answer to a motion for summary

judgment on November 6, 2006. (Doc. 41). On November 22, 2006,

Plaintiff filed a response to the Special Report, reasserting his

delay of medical care claim against Defendants. (Doc. 42). 

These motions are now before the Court. 

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary judgment,

the Court begins with these basic principles. The Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure grant this Court authority under Rule 56 to

render “judgment as a matter of law” to a party who moves for

summary judgment. “[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . .’” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

The Court must view the evidence produced by “the nonmoving

party, and all factual inferences arising from it, in the light

most favorable to” that party. Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d

923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, Rule 56(e) states that:

an adverse party [to a motion for summary

judgment] may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s

pleading, but the adverse party’s response,

by affidavits or as otherwise provided in

this rule, must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. If the adverse party does not so

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,

shall be entered against the adverse party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

325-27. “[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to

return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence is merely

colorable, . . . or is not significantly probative, . . . summary

judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary

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4

 Plaintiff does not specify whether he is suing Defendants,

Sheriff Hawsey, Jail Administrator Trent, and Chief of Operations

Richardson, in their official or individual capacities or both. 

Thus, the Court will consider both. Each of these Defendants is

a state official; thus, each Defendant is absolutely immune from

suit for damages in his or her official capacity. See Harbert

Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state

officials sued in their official capacities are protected from

suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover,

“[q]ualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities

unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In

determining whether qualified immunity is appropriate in a given

case, “[t]he court must first ask the threshold question whether

the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, show that the government official’s conduct violated

5

judgment may be granted against a party who fails to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahawneh, 2001 WL 530424, *1 (S.D.

Ala. May 11, 2001) (unreported) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249-50).

IV. DISCUSSION

In this action, Plaintiff seeks redress for an alleged

constitutional deprivation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants as

asserting a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment

inasmuch as Defendants allegedly delayed medical treatment of

Plaintiff’s high blood pressure while he was incarcerated at the

Conecuh County jail.4 For the reasons set forth below, the Court

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a constitutional right.” Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995 (citing

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Having found herein

that Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a constitutional

violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

6

finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish any

constitutional violation by Defendants. 

Denial of Adequate Medical Care

In this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated

his rights under the Eighth Amendment by delaying proper medical

treatment for him during his incarceration at the Conecuh County

Jail. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he asked to see a

doctor on February 13, 2004, but was not allowed to do so until

February 18, 2004. According to Plaintiff, he suffered a stroke

in the interim. (Doc. 25 at 4-5). 

The Eighth Amendment provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The

Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments

prohibits prison officials from exhibiting deliberate

indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.” Campbell v.

Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). In Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d

980 (11th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit delineated the

objective and subjective portions of an Eighth Amendment claim as

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follows:

An Eighth Amendment claim is said to have two

components, an objective component, which

inquires whether the alleged wrongdoing was

objectively harmful enough to establish a

constitutional violation, and a subjective

component, which inquires whether the

officials acted with a sufficiently culpable

state of mind.

Sims, 25 F.3d at 983 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992)). 

To meet the objective element required to demonstrate a

denial of medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff first must demonstrate the existence of an “objectively

serious medical need.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th

Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is “‘one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the

necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id. (quoting Hill v.

Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir.

1994)). “In either of these situations, the medical need must be

one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

“Delay in access to medical attention can violate the Eighth

Amendment . . . when it is tantamount to unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187 (internal citations

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8

and quotation marks omitted). “Cases stating a constitutional

claim for immediate or emergency medical attention have concerned

medical needs that are obvious even to a layperson because they

involve life-threatening conditions or situations where it is

apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical

problem.” Id.

The “seriousness” of an inmate’s medical

needs also may be decided by reference to the

effect of delay in treatment. Gaudreault,

923 F.2d at 208; Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at

347. Where the delay results in an inmate’s

suffering “a life-long handicap or permanent

loss, the medical need is considered

serious.” Id. An inmate who complains that

delay in medical treatment rose to a

constitutional violation must place verifying

medical evidence in the record to establish

the detrimental effect of delay in medical

treatment to succeed. Further, we have held

that “[t]he tolerable length of delay in

providing medical attention depends on the

nature of the medical need and the reason for

the delay.” Harris v. Coweta County, 21 F.3d

388, 393-94 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis

added). Consequently, delay in medical

treatment must be interpreted in the context

of the seriousness of the medical need,

deciding whether the delay worsened the

medical condition, and considering the reason

for delay.

Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188-89 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).

In this action, Plaintiff claims that he suffered a stroke

during the five-day delay in treatment of his high blood

pressure; however, there is no medical evidence to support that

claim. When examined on February 18, 2004, Dr. Gerald Roberts,

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5

 Dr. Roberts stated: “Even though I can’t find anything

definitely wrong with him, he seems to think he had a stroke.” 

(Doc. 36, Ex. L at 9).

9

the prison physician who treated Plaintiff throughout his

incarceration at the Conecuh County jail, could find no evidence

that Plaintiff had suffered a stroke. (Doc. 36, Ex. L at 18). 

Dr. Roberts indicated in his notes that, while Plaintiff “thinks”

he has had a stroke, he “walks fine,” “talks fine,” “doesn’t seem

to be in any distress,” “hasn’t had any trouble swallowing or

seeing,” “has had no trouble with his respiratory system,” “has

no trouble with his digestive system,” “could stand with his feet

together and arms to the side with his eyes closed without any

problem,” “could walk on his toes and heels,” and his finger to

hand exam was normal. (Doc. 36, Ex. L at 18). At a follow up

examination on April 8, 2004, Dr. Roberts indicated that he was

puzzled by Plaintiff’s claim that he had suffered a stroke,5

noting only that Plaintiff’s left hand was weaker than his right,

which he concluded might be simply the result of Plaintiff being

right-handed. (Id. at 9). Because Plaintiff has failed to offer

any verifying medical evidence to show that the five-day delay in

treatment of his high blood pressure from February 13, 2004, to

February 18, 2004, “pos[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm”

to him, Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243, or in any way had a detrimental

effect on his medical condition, Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188, Plaintiff

has failed to establish the objective element of his Eighth

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Amendment claim. 

Further, in order to meet the subjective requirement of an

Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, Plaintiff must

demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need. 

Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243.

In Estelle, the Supreme Court established

that “deliberate indifference” entails more

than mere negligence. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

106, 97 S. Ct. 285; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835,

114 S. Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court clarified

the “deliberate indifference” standard in

Farmer by holding that a prison official

cannot be found deliberately indifferent

under the Eighth Amendment “unless the

official knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also

draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (emphasis added). In

interpreting Farmer and Estelle, this Court

explained in McElligott that “deliberate

indifference has three components: (1)

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious

harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by

conduct that is more than mere negligence.” 

McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255; Taylor, 221

F.3d at 1258 (stating that defendant must

have subjective awareness of an “objectively

serious need” and that his response must

constitute “an objectively insufficient

response to that need”).

Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46. In this action, Plaintiff must show

that Defendants engaged in “deliberately indifferent” delay in

treating his serious medical problems. Cf. McElligott v. Foley,

182 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 1999) (reversing summary

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6 In his affidavit, Defendant Sheriff Hawsey testified that

it is the policy of the Conecuh County Jail that all inmates

receive all necessary medical care. (Doc. 36, Ex. G at 3). To

that end, the Conecuh County Jail has an inmate sick call policy

whereby any inmate who desires to go on sick call need only

request a form, complete the form, and return it to any member of

the jail staff. (Id.). The forms are then given to the jail

physician, Dr. Roberts, who reviews them and notifies the jail

staff if he needs to see an inmate. (Id.). Jail staff are

required to follow all medical instructions and to fill and

11

judgment for a prison physician and nurse who knowingly and

deliberately delayed medical treatment to an inmate who was

suffering from severe abdominal pain, extreme vomiting, and

significant weight loss). 

A review of the record in this case shows that, upon being

booked into the Conecuh County Jail on February 12, 2004,

Plaintiff was given a health screening and assessment. (Doc. 36,

Ex. K). At that time, Plaintiff indicated that he had high blood

pressure; however, he stated that he was taking no medications

for that condition. (Id.).

According to Plaintiff, the following day, on February 13,

2004, he asked to see the doctor. Voncille Davis, a corrections

officer at the jail, testified that, when Plaintiff asked her to

put him “on sick call,” she gave him a form and put his name on

the list to see Dr. Roberts. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at 3). The precise

date that Davis placed Plaintiff on the sick call list is unclear

from the record; however, it is undisputed that it was some time

between February 13, 2004, and February 18, 2004.6 (Doc. 25 at

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dispense all prescriptions issued by the prison physician in

accordance with the instructions on the prescription. (Id.). In

the event of an emergency, jailers have the independent authority

to call the doctor and/or to summon an ambulance to the jail to

transport an inmate to the hospital. (Id.).

12

4-5). Davis testified that, at no time did she observe Plaintiff

in medical distress or exhibiting any signs or symptoms of a

stroke. (Doc. 36, Ex. J at 3).

Plaintiff’s medical records show that he was in fact

examined by Dr. Roberts on February 18, 2004. (Doc. 36, Ex. L at

18). At that time, Plaintiff requested medication for high blood

pressure, and Dr. Roberts consented, noting that Plaintiff’s

blood pressure was 150/90. (Id. at 18-19). Plaintiff informed

Dr. Roberts that he had never been on medication for this

condition, nor had he ever seen a doctor for it. (Id. at 18). 

Dr. Roberts’ notes indicate that Plaintiff also thought that he

had suffered a stroke, but Dr. Roberts could find no sign of a

stroke. (Id.). Dr. Roberts continued to closely monitor

Plaintiff throughout his incarceration at the Conecuh County

Jail, treating Plaintiff for high blood pressure, headaches, ear

aches, and gingivitis. (Id. at 11-19). 

 In order to satisfy the subjective element of an Eighth

Amendment claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants knew of and

disregarded “an excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” 

Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245. Stated differently, Plaintiff must

show that Defendants had “subjective knowledge of a risk of

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7

 Plaintiff alleges that the five-day delay in treatment for

his high blood pressure was racially motivated, stating that a

white inmate and a female inmate received prompt attention for

their medical complaints. (Doc. 25 at 4-5). However, there is

no evidence in the record related to the medical conditions of

these two inmates that may or may not have prompted a more

expeditious course of medical treatment for them; thus,

Plaintiff’s allegations of racial bias are unavailing.

13

serious harm,” that Defendants disregarded that risk, and that

Defendants did so “by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” 

Id. The record is devoid of such evidence. There is no evidence

that, during the five-day period of time between February 13,

2004, and February 18, 2004, Plaintiff exhibited symptoms that

would have indicated to Defendants that he was having, or in

danger of having, a stroke or any other serious medical problem. 

After conducting his examination on February 18, 2004, Dr.

Roberts could find no evidence that Plaintiff had suffered a

stroke or any other serious medical problem. On the other hand,

Plaintiff’s medical records show that Dr. Roberts followed him

closely throughout his incarceration in the Conecuh County Jail

and conscientiously treated his high blood pressure, as well as

other various ailments presented.7 

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “when a prison

inmate has received medical care, courts hesitate to find an

Eighth Amendment violation.” Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030,

1035 (11th Cir. 1989). In this action, there is no evidence that

the alleged five-day delay in treatment for Plaintiff’s high

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8

 In addition to the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure to establish

a causal connection between any of the Defendants and the alleged

constitutional deprivation. In order to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must

establish a causal connection between each defendant’s actions,

orders, customs, policies, or breaches of statutory duty and the

alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Boglin v.

Weaver, 2001 WL 228172, *14 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (unpublished). 

There is no evidence that any of these Defendants was personally

involved in the alleged delay in providing Plaintiff medical

treatment, nor is there any evidence that, as supervisors, any of

the Defendants failed to establish procedures for the protection

of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or failed to take action

against violations of which they had notice. See Goodson v. City

of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381, 1389 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus,

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for this reason, as

well.

14

blood pressure posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him or

that Defendants Hawsey, Trent, and/or Richardson were

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet the objective and subjective

requirements of his Eighth Amendment claim, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment.8

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the motion

for summary judgment of Defendants, Sheriff Tracy Hawsey, Jail

Administrator Shirley Trent, and Chief of Operations William

Richardson (Docs. 35, 36), be granted and that Plaintiff’s action

against these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. 

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this

action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a

transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that

Case 1:04-cv-00327-WS-M Document 43 Filed 03/01/07 Page 15 of 16
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transcription is necessary is required before the United States

will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 1st day of March, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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