Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00552/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-00552-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:3601 Fair Housing Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Several motions are pending before the Court: (1) Defendant Sun City Festival 

Community Association Incorporated’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgement (Doc. 93) 

and accompanying Statement of Facts (Doc. 94); (2) Plaintiff Wayne Hiatt’s Motion to 

Strike Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Statement of Facts and 

Motion to Seal Doc. 94-3 (Doc. 96); and (3) Defendant’s Motion to Seal Plaintiff’s Medical 

Records at Docs. 68-1, 94-3, and 116-1 (Doc. 123). The Court will address the parties’ 

various motions below. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint against Defendant Sun 

City Festival Community Association Incorporated (“Defendant” or the “Association”) 

alleging discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., 

and the Arizona Fair Housing Act (“AZFHA”), A.R.S. § 41-1491.19(B). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff 

alleges that he is a disabled veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder 

(“PTSD”), constant anxiety, and panic attacks. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 8; Doc. 87 at 3). Plaintiff alleges 

Wayne Hiatt,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Sun City Festival Community 

Association Incorporated,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-23-00552-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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that woodworking helps reduce the symptoms associated with his disability. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 

10; Doc. 87 at 3). Plaintiff further alleges that his garage is the only place where he can 

engage in woodwork and achieve therapeutic benefits to his PTSD. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 

87 at 3). The Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions 

(“CC&Rs”) prohibits open garage doors and further provides that “[g]arage doors shall 

remain closed at all times except when entering or exiting the garage.” (Doc. 7 at ¶ 6; Doc. 

97 at 16; Doc. 50-1 at 375, § 3(c)). Plaintiff, however, claims he needs to keep his garage 

door open while woodworking inside of his garage to avoid triggering his PTSD. (Doc. 1 

at ¶ 10; Doc. 87 at 4). 

In October 2022, a neighbor complained to the Association about Plaintiff leaving 

his garage door open, and the Association sent Plaintiff a notice of violation instructing 

him to keep the garage door closed. (Doc. 87 at 3–4). In November 2022, Plaintiff sent the 

Association a request for accommodation under the FHA to keep his garage door open 

while he is woodworking. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 11). In January 2023, the Association, through its 

legal counsel, denied Plaintiff’s accommodation request. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16–17, Doc. 1-2 at 

2–3). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit shortly after. (Doc. 1).

Following the Court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

on August 13, 2024 (Doc. 82), Defendant filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

on the reasonableness and necessity elements of Plaintiff’s FHA claim and the issue of 

damages and its accompanying Statement of Facts on September 11, 2024. (Docs. 93, 94). 

On September 13, 2024, Plaintiff moved to strike Defendant’s Motion and Statement of 

Facts and to seal his mental health records filed at Doc. 94-3. (Doc. 96). Subsequently, 

Defendant filed a Motion to Seal Plaintiff’s Medical Records at Docs. 68-1, 94-3, and 116-

1. (Doc. 123).

II. DISCUSSION

a. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 

93) and accompanying Statement of Facts (Doc. 94). (Doc. 96). Plaintiff argues that

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Defendant did not satisfy the “meet and confer” requirement of this Court’s Rule 16 Case 

Management Order (Doc. 14 at 5) by failing to send Plaintiff a two-page statement 

describing its anticipated motion for partial summary judgment or otherwise conferring.

(Doc. 93 at 1, 3). 

The Court’s Rule 16 Case Management Order provides:

The parties must also confer prior to filing any motion pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In doing so, the parties 

shall exchange a two-page statement describing any 

anticipated motion for summary judgment and response, 

identifying the issues and claims on which summary judgment 

will be sought and the basis for the motions and response. The 

purpose of conferral should be aimed at streamlining the issues 

in dispute, and dispensing of statements of fact. A certificate 

of conferral must be attached to any motion for summary 

judgment. Any motion lacking an attached compliant 

certificate may be summarily stricken by the Court.

(Doc. 14 at 5 (emphasis added)).

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s meet and 

confer requirement unfairly prejudiced Plaintiff by (1) needlessly attaching documents that 

should have been sealed and (2) raising issues resolved by this Court in its Order (Doc. 82) 

ruling on Plaintiff’s prior Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 96 at 3). Plaintiff also 

notes—and Defendant admits—that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiff’s previous 

attempts to meet and confer in March 2024, prior to Plaintiff filing his own summary 

judgment motion. (Id. at 2; Doc. 114 at 1). Defendant argues that its Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 93) should not be stricken because its failure to attach a good 

faith certificate was inadvertent; Defendant’s counsel indicated on a phone conversation 

with Plaintiff’s counsel “[o]n a date that undersigned counsel does not recall” that it 

intended to file a motion for summary judgment on the issues in the Court’s August 13, 

2024 Order (Doc. 82); and its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was narrow and in 

direct response to the Court’s Order. (Doc. 114 at 2–3).

i. Necessity and Reasonableness

To the extent Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks summary 

judgment on the issues of necessity and reasonableness, the Motion essentially acts as a 

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motion for reconsideration of the Court’s August 13, 2024 Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgement (Doc. 82). (See Doc. 93 at 3, 12–14 (“reincorporat[ing] the argument 

and evidence presented in its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” on 

reasonableness element and reiterating arguments on necessity in its previous Response to 

Plaintiff’s Motion)). 

LRCiv 7.2(g) details the proper form, content, and procedure to bring a motion for 

reconsideration before the Court. LRCiv 7.2(g). Defendant failed to comply with this Rule 

in numerous ways, including by repeating “written argument[s] made by the movant in 

support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order,” filing the motion more 

than 14 days after the Court’s Order, and failing to include the requisite information on the 

specific modifications sought. Id. Because Defendant failed to properly and timely seek 

reconsideration in accordance with the Local Rules and this Court’s prior Orders, 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 96) 

will be granted with respect to the portions of Defendant’s Motion pertaining to necessity 

and reasonableness.

ii. Damages

To the extent Defendant’s Motion seeks summary judgment on damages—an issue 

not addressed in this Court’s August 13, 2024 Order (Doc. 82)—the Motion need not 

comply with LRCiv 7.2(g). Although Defendant’s failure to meet and confer violates this 

Court’s Rule 16 Order, that Order provided that the Court may strike noncompliant 

motions. (Doc. 14 at 5). In the interests of justice and efficiency and because the parties 

have fully briefed the issue (Docs. 93, 124, 126), the Court will exercise its discretion and 

address Defendant’s request for summary judgment on the issue of damages (Doc. 93 at 

14–17).

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden 

of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

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477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that 

the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential 

to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. When 

considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the factual record and draw 

all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Leisek v. 

Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant’s accommodation 

denial was the cause of Plaintiff’s alleged harm and thus Plaintiff cannot show actual 

damages. (Doc. 93 at 15). Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to 

punitive damages because he cannot show that Defendant acted with reckless indifference 

in denying the accommodation. (Id. at 17). With respect to actual damages, Plaintiff argues 

that the accommodation denial has clearly caused him to suffer emotional distress, as he 

has been unable to manage his PTSD symptoms and has experienced anxiety, depression, 

and panic attacks with greater frequency. (Doc. 124 at 12). Plaintiff further argues that 

Defendant’s refusal to investigate or discuss the accommodation request constituted a 

“callous disregard” of Plaintiff’s wellbeing warranting punitive damages. (Id. at 15–16). 

Regarding actual damages, “[c]ausation is an intensely factual question that should 

typically be resolved by a jury.” Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 

F.3d 1142, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that summary judgment 

is not appropriate on the ground of absence of causation if a plaintiff can present evidence 

that he suffered an injury that would reasonably be expected to result from a defendant’s 

wrongful conduct. Id. Moreover, causation can be shown through evidence that the

defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, even if other 

factors may have contributed to the harm. Id. Plaintiffs bringing FHA claims may recover 

actual damages for emotional suffering or distress—such as an unusual level of anxiety, 

embarrassment, or humiliation—“even if that distress does not physically manifest itself 

or necessitate psychological counseling.” Id. at 1172 (collecting cases). 

In this case, Plaintiff has provided testimonial evidence that the denial of his 

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requested accommodation has prevented him from managing his disability and triggered

disability-related symptoms, such as anxiety, panic attacks, and depression. (Docs. 124 at 

12; 125-3 at 26–27, 29). To be sure, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether 

Defendant’s denial of the accommodation was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s 

alleged emotional distress, rather than other potential causes outlined by Defendant. (Doc. 

93 at 16–17). However, that is an issue of fact best left for the jury. 

Punitive damages for violations of the Fair Housing Act may be appropriate where 

a defendant’s unlawful activity involved reckless or callous indifference to a plaintiff’s 

federally protected rights. Fair Hous. Ctr. of Wash. v. Breier-Scheetz Props., LLC, 743 F. 

App'x 116, 118 (9th Cir. 2018). “The focus is on the defendant's state of mind, and punitive 

damages may be warranted if the defendant knew it was violating the law or perceived a 

risk that its conduct would violate the law.” Skochko v. Mercy Hous., Inc., No. 20-CV08659-JSC, 2022 WL 3357836, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2022) (citations omitted). 

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have found it premature to rule on punitive damages at summary 

judgment where the underlying FHA claim remains viable. See Patton v. Hanassab, No. 

14CV1489 AJB (WVG), 2016 WL 4507022, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016); Elliott v. QF 

Circa 37, LLC, No. 16-CV-0288-BAS-AGS, 2018 WL 2933467, at *23 (S.D. Cal. June 

12, 2018). 

Here, Plaintiff has a viable FHA claim and has offered evidence that Defendant 

failed to engage in the interactive process with respect to his requested accommodations. 

(See Doc. 124 at 15–16); see generally Montano v. Bonnie Brae Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 

79 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (awarding punitive damages upon finding 

reckless indifference when defendant failed to grant accommodations or engage in 

interactive process). Plaintiff also argues that Defendant continues to allow other 

community members to keep their garage doors open and was motivated to deny Plaintiff’s 

requested accommodation because of complaints from Plaintiff’s neighbor. (Doc. 124 at 

1–2). Making all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could 

conclude that Defendant’s conduct constitutes reckless or callous indifference, or at the 

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very least, acted “in the face of a perceived risk that its actions would violate federal law.” 

Sw. Fair Hous. Council v. WG Scottsdale LLC, No. CV-19-00180-TUC-RM, 2022 WL 

3155113, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 8, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-16345, 2023 WL 6820681 (9th Cir. 

Oct. 17, 2023). Thus, the Court finds that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding punitive 

damages, and that summary judgment is inappropriate on the issues of both actual and 

punitive damages.

All told, due to Defendant’s noncompliance with LRCiv 7.2 and this Court’s Order, 

Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 93) and its associated documents 

(Docs. 94, 124, 125, 126) will be stricken to the extent they address the issues of necessity 

and reasonableness. Defendant is warned that any further filings that fail to comply with 

the Local Rules or this Court's Orders will be stricken without leave to refile and may result 

in sanctions. Additionally, Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue 

of damages is denied, as genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether actual or 

punitive damages are warranted. 

b. Motions to Seal (Docs. 96, 123)

Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal requeststhat the Court seal his unredacted medical records 

located at Doc. 94-3. (Doc. 96 at 1). Notwithstanding Defendant’s contrary arguments 

against sealing Exhibit 3 in its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 114 at 4–5), 

Defendant’s most recent Motion to Seal also requests the Court to seal Doc. 94-3, along 

with other unredacted filings of Plaintiff’s medical records, found at Docs. 68-1 and 116-

1. (Doc. 123 at 1–2). Defendant seeks to substitute these documents with a redacted version 

of the records, filed at Doc. 123-1, and Defendant’s Motion indicates that both parties 

reviewed Doc. 123-1 to ensure all redactions were made. (Id. at 2). The proposed redactions 

include information that the Court ordered the parties to redact at the September 25, 2024 

Preliminary Injunction Hearing (See Doc. 117 at 43–44), Plaintiff’s birth date information 

as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a), and Plaintiff’s medical record number. (See Doc. 123-

1). The proposed redactions are limited to personally identifiable information that do not 

bear upon the claims of the case and would not impact “the public’s interest in keeping a 

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watchful eye on the workings of” the Court. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs. 

Ltd., No. CV 09-1531-PHX-JAT, 2011 WL 6182346, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2011). 

Because the documents the parties request to be sealed include information that the 

Court instructed the parties to redact, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Exhibit 

3 at Doc. 94-3 (Doc. 96 at 1) and Defendant’s Motion to Seal Plaintiff’s Medical Records 

at Docs. 68-1, 94-3, and 116-1 (Doc. 123 at 1). The Clerk of Court shall seal Docs. 68-1, 

94-3, and 116-1. The Clerk of Court cannot edit filings that have been docketed, and thus, 

Defendant’s request to substitute Doc. 123-1 for Docs. 68-1, 94-3, and 116-1 is denied. 

(Doc. 123 at 2). Defendant has already properly filed a redacted version on the record, 

which can be found at Doc. 123-1. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Wayne Hiatt’s Motion to Strike Doc. 93 Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment and Doc. 94 Statement of Facts (Doc. 96) is granted with 

respect to the issues of necessity and reasonableness.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Sun City Festival Community 

Association’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 93) and its associated 

documents (Docs. 94, 124, 125, 126) are stricken with respect to the issues of necessity 

and reasonableness.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 93) is denied with respect to the issue of damages.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Doc. 94-3 (Doc. 96) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Seal Plaintiff’s Medical 

Records at Docs. 68-1, 94-3, and 116-1 (Doc. 123) is granted in part with respect to 

sealing the documents and denied in part with respect to substituting documents on the 

docket. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall seal Docs. 68-1, 94-3, 

and 116-1.

Dated this 3rd day of December, 2024.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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