Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03311/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-03311-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN D. FRUTH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AGCS MARINE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03311-JD 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATION 

OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL AND 

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Re: Dkt. No. 49

On March 31, 2016, the Court referred this case to the American Arbitration Association 

(“AAA”) for determination of arbitrability and possible arbitration pursuant to the terms of an 

insurance contract between the parties. Dkt. No. 48. The order involved a straightforward 

application of Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015), to the facts of this case. 

Plaintiffs John Fruth and Dream On Limited now ask for certification of an interlocutory appeal 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or alternatively leave to seek reconsideration of the arbitration order. 

Dkt. No. 49. The Court finds these matters suitable for decision without oral argument under Civil 

Local Rules 7-1(b) and 7-9(d) and denies both requests.

Plaintiffs have not identified any reason to abandon the final judgment rule here in favor of 

a piecemeal appeal. An interlocutory appeal should be considered only in exceptional 

circumstances and when the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) are satisfied. In re Cement 

Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). Section 1292(b) limits the possibility of an 

interlocutory appeal to the rare case when an order involves “a controlling question of law as to 

which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and [] an immediate appeal from the 

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). To 

avoid the chaos that would inevitably follow from the willy-nilly allowance of pop-up appeals, the 

decision to certify an order for interlocutory review is committed to the district’s court discretion. 

Case 3:15-cv-03311-JD Document 51 Filed 04/22/16 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 (1995); Heaton v. Soc. Fin., Inc., No. 14-CV05191-TEH, 2016 WL 232433, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2016) (the district court’s discretion over 

certification is “unfettered”). 

Nothing in plaintiffs’ motion comes close to meeting these high standards. For the most 

part, plaintiffs’ argument is simply that they disagree with the Court’s arbitration order. That is, of 

course, nowhere near enough to go forward with immediate appellate review. Plaintiffs try to 

portray their disagreement as raising a disputed question of controlling law by pointing to a district 

court decision in Montana, Galilea, LLC v. AGCS Marine Ins. Co., No. CV 15-84-BLG-SPW, 

2016 WL 1328920 (D. Mont. Apr. 5, 2016), where the court decided arbitrability itself. But that 

case does not bear the weight plaintiffs place on it. The main material difference between that 

case and this one is an issue of fact and not of controlling law. The court in Galilea reached 

arbitrability because it found the plaintiffs to be unsophisticated. Id. at *3. In this case, the record 

persuaded the Court that the plaintiffs showed more than enough sophistication to fall comfortably 

within Brennan for referral of arbitrability to the AAA. The difference between the cases does not 

turn on a “question of law” suitable for potential interlocutory appeal, Matsunoki Grp., Inc. v. 

Timberwork Or., Inc., No. 08-CV-04078-CW, 2011 WL 940218, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011), 

and certainly does not evince a substantial disagreement among the district courts meriting 

immediate circuit court attention. 

Consequently, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing “exceptional circumstances” 

warranting interlocutory review. They also have not shown that reconsideration of the Court’s 

order is warranted. Plaintiffs’ papers merely rehash their prior arguments and fail to satisfy the 

requirements of Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) for reconsideration. The Court denies certification under 

Section 1292(b), and denies leave to file a motion for reconsideration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cv-03311-JD Document 51 Filed 04/22/16 Page 2 of 2