Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-02324/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-02324-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

MICHAEL STEVENS, 

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

JEFF MACOMBER, Warden,1

 Respondent. 

Case No: C 13-2324 SBA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner Michael Stevens (“Petitioner”) brings the instant pro se habeas action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to challenge his 2010 conviction and sentence rendered in the 

Contra Costa County Superior Court. Having read and considered the papers filed in 

connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby DENIES the 

Petition for the reasons set forth below. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was charged in state court by way of an amended information, filed May 

10, 2010, with 22 counts of rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping for sexual purposes and 

other offenses against four victims, some of whom had a history of prostitution. Petitioner 

testified, admitting all of the sex acts alleged by all four victims, but claiming all were 

consensual. In July 2010, a Contra Costa County jury convicted Petitioner on 14 of the 22 

counts. In reaching its verdict, the jury rejected Petitioner’s defense that the acts were 

consensual. See People v. Stevens, No. A130778, 2012 WL 3756261, *1-7 (Cal. Ct. App. 

Aug. 30, 2012).2 The jury found true the multiple victim enhancement and prior prison 

 1 Jeff Macomber, the current warden of the prison where Petitioner is incarcerated, 

has been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

2 The facts of the case are familiar to the parties and are set forth in the California 

Court of Appeal opinion. Stevens, 2012 WL 3756261, *1-7.

Case 4:13-cv-02324-SBA Document 16 Filed 07/24/15 Page 1 of 8
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term enhancement allegations. Id. at *6. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to multiple 

consecutive 15-year-to-life terms, and the total unstayed prison term was 166 years to life 

in state prison. Id. at *7. 

Petitioner appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed 

the conviction in an unpublished opinion on August 30, 2012. Id. at *1-15; Resp’t Ex. 3. 

The California Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner’s petition for review on 

November 28, 2012. Resp’t Exs. 4, 5. On May 22, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant 

Petition, alleging two claims of instructional error. Dkt. 1. The petition is now fully 

briefed and ripe for adjudication. Dkts. 7, 15. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

The instant Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA, a federal court cannot grant 

habeas relief with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in a state-court proceeding 

unless the proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or 

if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 

precedent.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause is appropriate “if the state 

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. Habeas 

petitioners bear the burden of showing that a state court’s decision applied some Supreme 

Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 

19, 25 (2002) (per curiam). 

Case 4:13-cv-02324-SBA Document 16 Filed 07/24/15 Page 2 of 8
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court must evaluate jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a 

component of the entire trial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 

(1982). If instructional error is shown, the court must then determine whether there was 

prejudice; that is, whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict within the meaning of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 

637 (1993). See Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Fry v. 

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007)). 

Here, the trial court instructed the jury with the following defense pinpoint 

instruction that allowed them to consider the victims’ history of prostitution 

arrests/convictions in evaluating their credibility. Over the prosecutor’s objection, the trial 

court gave Petitioner’s proposed instruction: “In determining whether or not . . . Jane Does 

I, II, III or IV is a truthful witness, you may consider each witness’s history of prostitution 

arrests and/or prostitution convictions.” Stevens, 2012 WL 3756261, *13. However, the 

trial court also gave the prosecution’s version of the pinpoint instruction: “Evidence of a 

complaining witness’s arrest or convictions for prostitution has been admitted. You may, 

but are not required to, consider this evidence as it relates to the witness’s credibility.” Id. 

(italics omitted). The court read the prosecution instruction immediately after giving the 

defense instruction. 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that while his pinpoint instruction was proper, the 

prosecution pinpoint instruction was incorrect and presented an inconsistent statement of 

the law. Id. The state appellate court disagreed, finding that although the pinpoint 

instructions may have been “redundant,” they were “not contradictory.” Id. The court 

explained: 

We have two instructions saying essentially the same thing with 

a slightly different choice of words. Defendant’s instruction 

tells jurors they “may” consider the complaining witnesses’ past 

prostitution in evaluating their credibility. The use of the word 

“may” would convey to a reasonable juror that he or she can 

consider that history on the question of credibility, not that the 

juror is required to do so. Such a juror would construe the 

prosecution’s instruction to mean exactly the same thing: we 

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may but are not required to consider the witness’s prostitution 

history in evaluating her credibility. Substantively, the 

instructions in issue are redundant, not contradictory. 

Id., *13 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 

The state appellate court also rejected Petitioner’s ancillary claim that the 

prosecution pinpoint instruction conflicted with CALCRIM No. 220, which states in 

relevant part: “In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable 

doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received 

throughout the entire trial.” Id. at *14 (italics in original). The court flatly rejected the 

notion of any instructional inconsistency: 

In our view, however, there was no conflict. Other instructions 

told jurors they could, but were not required, to consider 

evidence for certain purposes. Thus, the instruction on the use 

of evidence under Evidence Code section 1101 told jurors that 

if they found the defendant committed the uncharged offenses, 

“you may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the 

limited purpose of deciding” intent, common plan, or consent. 

The robbery instruction told the jury it “may consider how, 

where and when the defendant possessed the property, along 

with any other relevant circumstances tending to prove his guilt 

of second degree robbery.” Such instructions do not conflict 

with CALCRIM No. 220. Although the jury is instructed to 

“consider” all of the evidence, that does not mean the jury may 

or must use (“consider”) any particular piece of evidence in 

making a specific determination of credibility or fact. That is a 

matter to be filled in by other instructions addressing how the 

jury is to approach deciding the particular issues of credibility 

and fact necessary for it to reach a verdict. We do not find it 

reasonably likely the jury would have been confused by these 

distinct senses in which the CALCRIM No. 220 and other 

instructions used the word “consider.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

In his Petition, Petitioner challenges the prosecution pinpoint instruction and argues 

that the trial court “erred by reading instructions to the jury informing them that it need not 

consider evidence presented by the defense.” Dkt. 1 at 3. He asserts that by instructing the 

jurors that “they ‘may but were not required to’ consider evidence in assessing witness 

credibility,” the trial court allowed the jury to disregard critical evidence presented by the 

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defense in assessing the credibility of the complaining witnesses. Id. In essence, Petitioner 

makes the same argument that he did on direct appeal; to wit, that the prosecution pinpoint 

instruction was an incorrect and inconsistent statement of the law which should not have 

been given to the jury. 

Petitioner’s arguments are unavailing. As discussed above, the court of appeal 

presented a reasoned analysis to support its conclusions that prosecution pinpoint 

instructions conflicted with neither the defense pinpoint instruction nor CALCRIM No. 

220. Stevens, 2012 WL 3756261, *13-14. On federal habeas review, federal courts are 

bound to presume that state courts know and follow the law, and to give state-court 

decisions “the benefit of the doubt.” See Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 838 n.6 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The deference afforded to 

state court decisions “applies with even greater force when a state court is analyzing a jury 

instruction developed under state law,” as in the case here. Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 

861-62 (9th Cir. 2009). Deference notwithstanding, the trial court record makes it clear 

there was not a reasonable likelihood that the prosecution pinpoint instruction was 

misunderstood. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (the challenged instruction must be evaluated in 

light of the instructions as a whole and the evidence introduced at trial); Cupp v. Naughton, 

414 U.S. 141, 146-147 (1973) (“a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial 

isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge”). As such, the state 

appellate court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not objectively unreasonable. 

Even if the jurors had misunderstood and misapplied the prosecution pinpoint 

instruction, Petitioner has not shown that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The jurors were 

aware that the victims were prostitutes. Petitioner testified in his defense, admitting all of 

the sex acts alleged by the four victims, but claimed they were consensual. Stevens, 2012 

WL 3756261, *5. Petitioner does not argue that the prosecution pinpoint instruction in any 

way restricted the jurors’ consideration of evidence of the victims’ prostitution activity at 

the time of the offenses, and its effect on Petitioner’s reasonable belief regarding consent. 

Case 4:13-cv-02324-SBA Document 16 Filed 07/24/15 Page 6 of 8
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Court of Appeals. 

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment, terminate any pending matters, and close the 

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 7/23/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.13\Stevens2324.denyHC-final_rev.docx 

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