Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02264/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID AVILA AND JOHN HAYNE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NEWREZ, LLC D/B/A SHELLPOINT 

MORTGAGE SERVICING, JP 

MORTGAGE ACQUISITION 

CORPORATION, AND PEAK 

FORECLOSURE SERVICES INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:24-cv-2264 TLN-CSK

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DENY PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND EX 

PARTE MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

(ECF No. 19)

Plaintiffs David Avila and John Hayne, who are proceeding pro se, have filed their 

second ex parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).

1 Pls. TRO No. 2 (ECF 

No. 19.) Defendants Newrez, LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“Shellpoint”) and

JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation (“Chase”) have filed an opposition. (ECF 

No. 23.) Defendant Peak Foreclosure Services Inc. has not appeared in this action, and 

there is no indication that it has received notice of Plaintiffs’ TRO motion. See Docket.

Pursuant to Local Rules 230(g) and 231(c), the motion was submitted upon the record 

and the briefs. 

1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 

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For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends DENYING Plaintiffs’ second 

ex parte TRO motion. The Court also cautions Plaintiffs against filing successive or 

duplicative motions that have already been denied.2

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se, initiated this action to challenge a mortgage

foreclosure of real property located at 8651 Crane Road, Oakdale, California. Compl. 

(ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs allege that despite making timely regular mortgage payments and 

having valid homeowners’ insurance, Defendants rejected Plaintiffs’ mortgage payment 

“alluding” he did not have homeowners’ insurance. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs allege they always 

had private homeowners’ insurance coverage and sent proof and documentation of that 

coverage to Defendants. Id. Plaintiffs further allege Defendants “unlawfully and 

erroneously insisted Plaintiffs pay a second insurance.” Id. In addition, Plaintiffs allege 

“Defendants are not qualified to receive any payments” because “new evidence

suggests based on a defective Assignment of Deed of Trust that this assignment failed 

to include both the note and deed of trust.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiffs seek to “void all 

subsequent documents and actions taken by Defendants, including Substitution of 

Trustee and foreclosure sale due to the invalid and fatally defective assignment.” Id. at 3. 

Plaintiffs also seek “injunctive and declaratory relief to stop the unlawful actions to 

foreclose.” Id.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on August 21, 2024, alleging the following claims: 

(1) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; (2) trespass; (3) breach of contract; 

(4) common law fraud; (5) statutory fraud and misrepresentation; (6) breach of fiduciary 

duty; (7) promissory estoppel; (8) action to quiet title; (9) action to quiet title; and 

(10) unfair business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code 

§ 17200. Id. at 19–39.

On September 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Pls. Mot. 

2 It appears Plaintiffs filed this second TRO motion after their first TRO motion was 

denied because a new date for the trustee sale was set. 

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Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 4). This motion was rejected as procedurally deficient pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) and Local Rules 131(b), 230(b), and 231(d). 

9/10/2024 Minute Order (ECF No. 5). The Court provided Plaintiffs with instructions on 

how to access the district court’s Local Rules, and also expressly identified Local Rule 

231, which governs requests for TROs and preliminary injunctions. See id. The Court 

further instructed that if Plaintiffs re-filed their preliminary injunction motion, that they 

must ensure that it was served on all parties. Id. The Court also noted that the motion 

may be potentially moot as the records submitted by Plaintiffs indicated that they sought 

to enjoin a sale that had been scheduled approximately two weeks earlier, on August 21, 

2024. See id. 

On September 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction, which the district court construed as a TRO. Pls. TRO No. 1 (ECF No. 6). 

Plaintiffs sought an injunction of the foreclosure sale, which was rescheduled from 

August 21, 2024, to October 4, 2024. Id. On October 3, 2024, the district court denied 

Plaintiffs’ TRO motion based on Plaintiffs’ unexplained delay in seeking relief and that 

this delay contradicted their claims of irreparable injury, a required element to grant a 

TRO. 10/3/2024 Order at 4-5 (ECF No. 15). Almost three weeks later, on October 23, 

2024, Plaintiffs filed a second TRO motion, again seeking to stop the foreclosure sale, 

which was rescheduled again, this time from October 4, 2024 to November 8, 2024.3

Pls. TRO No. 2, Memo and Brief at 2 (ECF No. 19-1 at 2) & Exh. A (ECF No. 19-1 at 13). 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Plaintiffs move ex parte for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 

injunction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65 against all Defendants. The 

standard for issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary 

injunction, which requires the plaintiff to “establish that he is likely to succeed on the 

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that 

3 Confusingly, Plaintiffs’ motion also states that the foreclosure sale was rescheduled 

from August 21, 2024, to October 4, 2024. Pls. TRO No. 2 at 2.

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the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Because the first factor “is 

a threshold inquiry and is the most important factor,” a “court need not consider the other 

factors” if a movant fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Baird v. Bonta, 81 

F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,”

and may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 24 (citation omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that 

irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

In their second TRO motion, Plaintiffs seek to stop Defendants from foreclosing 

on properly located at 8651 Crane Road, Oakdale, California. Pls. TRO No. 2 at 1.

Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion is almost identical to Plaintiffs’ first TRO motion. Compare 

Pls. TRO No. 1 at 1-5 (ECF No. 6), with Pls. TRO No. 2 at 1-5 (ECF No. 19).

In their opposition, Defendants Shellpoint and Chase argue that Plaintiffs’ motion 

should be denied on the following grounds: (1) as moot because it seeks to stay a 

October 4, 2024 sale after this date passed; (2) as procedurally defective for failure to 

provide the required notice to Defendants; (3) based on Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing the 

motion in violation of Local Rule 231(b); and (4) based on Plaintiffs’ failure to establish 

likelihood of success on the merits. Defs. Opp’n at 13-24. Defendants Shellpoint and 

Chase also note that the subject loan with Plaintiff Hayne has been in default since 

2017, with the first Notice of Default recorded in June 2017. Defs. Opp’n at 10-11. 

The Court recommends denial of Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion as procedurally 

deficient and because Plaintiffs unduly delayed in seeking relief, contradicting their 

allegations of irreparable injury.

/ / /

/ / /

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A. Plaintiffs’ Motion is Procedurally Deficient

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) permits the court to issue a TRO without 

notice to the adverse party only if (1) specific facts in the affidavit or underlying pleading 

show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result before the 

opposing party may be heard; and (2) the movant certifies in writing efforts made to give 

notice and the reasons why notice should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). This 

Court's Local Rules also set forth certain procedural mandates for a temporary 

restraining order to issue, including that the movant provide the following documents: 

(1) a complaint; (2) a motion for temporary restraining order; (3) a brief on the relevant 

legal issues; (4) an affidavit to support the existence of irreparable harm; (5) an affidavit 

detailing the notice or efforts undertaken or showing good cause why notice should not 

be given; (6) a proposed temporary restraining order and provision for bond; (7) a 

proposed order with blank for fixing time and date for a hearing; and (8) where a 

temporary restraining order is requested ex parte, the proposed order should also notify 

the affected parties of the right to apply to the Court for modification or dissolution on two 

(2) days’ notice or such shorter notice as the Court may allow. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 

231(c). 

Plaintiffs’ motion is procedurally deficient because Plaintiffs do not provide 

reasons why notice of their motion to Defendant Peak Foreclosure Services Inc. should 

not be required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B); E.D. Cal. Local Rule 231(c)(5); Pls. 

TRO No. 2. Plaintiffs did not submit a declaration or other document regarding Plaintiffs’

efforts to notify Defendant Peak Foreclosure Services Inc. of their TRO motion or provide 

any reason why notice should not be required. See Pls. TRO No. 2. Though Plaintiffs 

state that they are giving notice to all Defendants of their TRO motion (Pls. TRO No. 2 at 

2), the record does not reflect that Plaintiffs notified any Defendant.4 See Pls. TRO No. 

4 Because Defendants Shellpoint and JP Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corporation

have appeared in this action (ECF No. 17), these defendants have received actual 

notice of Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion through the CM/ECF system.

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2; Docket. Instead, Plaintiff Avila notified “all defendants” of their errors regarding the 

mortgage payments. Avila Affidavit ¶ 2 (ECF No. 19-2). Plaintiffs’ Certificate of Service 

also indicates that Plaintiffs did not notify Defendants of their second TRO motion as the 

certificate indicates that the motion was only sent to the district court. Pls. Cert. Service 

(ECF No. 19-4) (box indicating Defendants were notified is blank). 

There is no reference in Plaintiffs’ motion or the docket regarding any such efforts

to notify Defendant Peak Foreclosure Services Inc. of Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion. 

See Pls. TRO No. 2; Docket. The docket also does not indicate that Defendant Peak 

Foreclosure Services Inc. has made an appearance in this action.5 See Docket.

Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 65(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 231(c)(5) 

because they did not make efforts to provide notice of their motion to Defendant Peak 

Foreclosure Services Inc., and Plaintiffs did not provide reasons why notice on this 

defendant should not be required. See Pls. TRO No. 2. 

Courts regularly deny TROs for failing to comply with the stringent requirements 

of Rule 65(b)(1), including those sought by pro se plaintiffs. See Reno Air Racing Ass'n, 

Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (“courts have recognized very few 

circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO”); Abdel-Malak v. Doe, 2020 

WL 5775818, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (denying TRO sought by pro se plaintiff for 

failure to satisfy Rule 65(b)’s “strict requirements”); Seymour v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 2010 

WL 3385994, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) (same); Roman v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc., 

2010 WL 3489962, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2010) (same). In addition, Plaintiffs’ 

failure to comply with the Local Rules’ requirements for TROs is sufficient justification to 

deny the motion. See Nible v. Macomber, 2024 WL 2133319, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 

2024) (denying TRO sought by pro se plaintiff as procedurally deficient); see, e.g., TriValley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Denial of a 

5 The Court notes that the docket includes a return of service of the Summons and 

Complaint for each Defendant. (ECF Nos. 7-9.) Service of the Summons and Complaint 

does not, however, constitute notice of Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion to Defendants.

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motion as the result of a failure to comply with local rules is well within a district court’s 

discretion.”).

The Court will therefore recommend denial of the second TRO motion based on 

this procedural deficiency. The Court next addresses Plaintiffs’ delay and allegations of

irreparable harm.

B. Delay

Like Plaintiffs’ first TRO motion, Plaintiffs unduly delayed in seeking injunctive 

relief in their second TRO motion. See Local Rule 231(b). The notice rescheduling and 

postponing the trustee sale is dated October 3, 2024, and Plaintiffs again fail to explain 

why they waited almost three weeks to file this second TRO motion. Pls. TRO No. 2, 

Exh. A (ECF No. 19-1 at 13); see also 10/3/2024 Order at 4-5. This notice also indicates 

that Plaintiffs may monitor the schedule for the trustee’s sale by calling, and provides 

instructions on how to do so. Pls. TRO No. 2, Exh. A.

The district court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ first TRO motion also applies here: 

More importantly, however, it appears Plaintiffs have been 

aware for months that Defendants considered them to be 

delinquent on their loan and were moving forward with

foreclosure proceedings. In a declaration filed as part of the 

instant motion, Plaintiff Avila acknowledges he was notified of 

the foreclosure actions and validated that information with the

Stanislaus County Recorder’s Office. ([ECF No. 66] at 55.) 

Plaintiffs also attached various documents to Complaint and 

the instant motion, including letters Plaintiffs sent to 

Defendants about this dispute as early as January 2024. (Id. 

at 7.) Based on the foregoing evidence, and absent any 

explanation as to why Plaintiffs waited until 10 days before 

the foreclosure sale to file the instant motion, the Court 

concludes Plaintiffs’ delay contradicts their allegations of 

irreparable injury.

Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing their second TRO motion is even more striking given that 

Plaintiffs’ first TRO motion was denied based on Plaintiffs’ delay. The Court recommends 

that Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion is similarly denied because Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing 

this motion contradicts their allegations of irreparable injury. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 

231(b); Deck v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 499224, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) 

(finding plaintiff unduly delayed filing a TRO when a Notice of Default was recorded nine 

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months earlier); Mammoth Specialty Lodging, LLC v. We-Ka-Jassa Inv. Fund, LLC, 2010 

WL 1539811, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010) (denying TRO based on Local Rule 231(b) 

because “plaintiff did not file the motion until four business days before the scheduled 

foreclosure sale”); Avila v. Citi Mortg. Inc., 2017 WL 5871473, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 

2017) (denying plaintiff’s TRO under Local Rule 231(b) because plaintiff failed to 

“explain why he waited until the last possible moment to attempt to block the sale.”). 

Because Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm, the Court need not and declines to

address the other Winter factors. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040.

The Court therefore also recommends denial of Plaintiffs’ second TRO motion 

based on finding Plaintiffs unduly delayed in bringing their motion, which contradicts their 

allegations of irreparable harm.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the findings above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ second 

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 19) be DENIED. The Court also 

cautions Plaintiffs against filing successive or duplicative motions that have already been 

denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 

be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 

reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14

days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 4, 2024

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