Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_20-cv-02524/USCOURTS-cand-4_20-cv-02524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHELLE BRYANT, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

W. Z. JENKINS, Warden,1

 Respondent. 

Case No. 20-cv-02524-YGR (PR) 

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL; FOR 

RESPONDENT TO SHOW CAUSE; AND 

DENYING PENDING MOTION FOR 

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE TO RAISING MOTION 

BEFORE SENTENCING COURT IN 

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

I. INTRODUCTION 

This action was reassigned from a magistrate judge to the undersigned in light of a recent 

Ninth Circuit decision.2 Petitioner, a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Dublin, California, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241. Dkt. 1. Thereafter, she filed an amended petition, which is the operative petition in this 

action.3 Dkt. 7. Petitioner has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 8. 

Petitioner also requests the Court for compassionate release/sentence reduction based on 

the First Step Act of 2018 “along with the Covid-19, and the [Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 

Economic Security Act (‘The Cares Act’)].” Dkt. 5 at 1. Petitioner adds that “[o]n March 27, 

2020, Congress passed The Cares Act in response to the Covid-19 pandemic . . . [which lists the 

criteria required for] [t]ransferring of inmates to Home Confinement to decrease the risks of [the] 

Covid-19 pandemic . . . .” Id. at 2. Petitioner seeks compassionate release because her age (she is 

48 years old) and her “health issues/conditions” increase her “vulnerability to Covid-19.” Id. 

1

 W. Z. Jenkins, the current warden of the prison where Petitioner is incarcerated, has been 

substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2 Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 2017) (magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction 

to dismiss case on initial screening because unserved defendants had not consented to proceed 

before magistrate judge). 

3

 As Petitioner is incarcerated within the Northern District of California and Claim 1 in 

her amended petition challenges the execution of her federal sentence, venue is proper in this 

district. See Dunne v. Henman, 875 F.2d 244, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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II. BACKGROUND 

In April 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of South Carolina indicted Petitioner on 

six counts of intentionally conveying false and misleading information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1038(a)(1)(A), alleging she made false bomb threats to an airport and a hotel. United States v. 

Bryant, Case No:4:18-cr-00437-RBH-1 (District of South Carolina), Dkt. 4. In October 2018, 

Petitioner pled guilty without a written plea agreement to the first three counts in the indictment. 

See id., Dkts. 41, 43, 69. In February 2019, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-four months in 

federal prison. See id., Dkts. 55, 56, 70. Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the Fourth Circuit 

Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions and sentence. See id., Dkts. 63, 72; see also United 

States v. Bryant, 775 F. App’x 117 (4th Cir. 2019). The Fourth Circuit issued its mandate on 

September 13, 2019. See United States v. Bryant, Case No:4:18-cr-00437-RBH-1 (District of 

South Carolina), Dkt. 73. 

On September 23, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate her sentence pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255, in which she raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id., Dkt. 74. 

On February 21, 2020, Petitioner’s section 2255 motion was denied. See id., Dkt. 94. 

On March 11, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion in the Fourth Circuit seeking permission to 

file a second or successive section 2255 motion to challenge her sentence, in which she again 

raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dkt. 7 at 4. To date, Petitioner states that 

motion is still “pending.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION 

In her amended petition, Petitioner raises the following claims challenging: (1) time credits 

during her pre-trial detention and requests “[c]redit for time out on bond under restriction issues 

by [the] Attorney General, DA’s office, Federal Marshal and probation”; and (2) the validity of 

her sentence, in which she seeks to have her sentence reduced or vacated. Dkt. 7 at 6. In Claim 3, 

Petitioner raises the same allegations she brings forth in her request for compassionate 

release/sentence reduction, which will be addressed below. 

The Court first considers Claim 2, which is Petitioner’s challenge to the validity of her 

sentence. A prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court who wishes to attack collaterally 

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the validity of her conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or 

correct the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court that imposed the sentence. See 

Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). Only the sentencing court has 

jurisdiction to hear the section 2255 motion. See id. at 1163. A prisoner generally may not attack 

collaterally a federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(challenge to sentence following probation or parole revocation must be brought in sentencing 

court via section 2255 motion); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162 (challenge to legality of conviction must 

be brought in sentencing court via section 2255 motion); see also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 

840, 842 (5th Cir. 1980) (where challenge is to alleged errors at or prior to sentencing remedy is 

section 2255 motion, not section 2241 writ). 

There is an exception to the general bar against using section 2241 to collaterally attack a 

conviction or sentence: a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under section 2255 may seek 

relief under section 2241 if she can show that the remedy available under section 2255 is 

“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [his/her] detention.” United States v. Pirro, 104 

F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). Although there is little guidance from 

any court on when section 2255 is an inadequate or ineffective remedy, the Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that it is a very narrow exception. See id. For example, the remedy under section 2255 

generally will not be inadequate or ineffective due to a delay in considering a motion under section 

2255, see id. at 299 (district court’s delay in considering section 2255 motion until direct appeals 

are resolved does not make section 2255 motion inadequate or ineffective), or the mere fact that a 

previous section 2255 motion was denied, see Aronson v. May, __ U.S. __, 85 S. Ct. 3, 5 (1964); 

Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63; see also Lane v. Hanberry, 601 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1979) (whether 

seeking to raise new issue or relitigate already decided by prior section 2255, section 2241 not 

proper unless petitioner can show that section 2255 proceeding inadequate or ineffective; must 

show more than lack of success in prior section 2255). Even the dismissal of a subsequent section 

2255 motion as successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) does not render the remedy under section 

2255 to be an ineffective or inadequate remedy. See Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th 

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Cir. 1999). 

Here, Petitioner fails to show that the remedy under section 2255 is inadequate or 

ineffective to test the legality of her detention, and thus she does not show that this Court has 

authority to entertain Claim 2 in her amended petition. When asked to explain why the remedy 

under section 2255 was inadequate, Petitioner states that the sentencing court in the District of 

South Carolina “indicated [she] did not prove ineffective assistance of counsel.” Dkt. 7 at 4. 

However, as mentioned above, the mere fact that the section 2255 motion was denied by the 

sentencing court does not show that section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See Tripati, 843 

F.2d at 1162-63. Therefore, Claim 2 is DISMISSED because it does not fit within the very narrow 

exception for situations where the remedy available under section 2255 is inadequate to test the 

legality of her detention. It seems that Petitioner has filed a motion in the Fourth Circuit seeking 

permission to file a second or successive section 2255 motion to challenge her sentence, but that 

motion is still “pending.” Dkt. 7 at 4. Thus, this Court’s dismissal of Claim 2 is without prejudice 

to bringing it in a second or successive section 2255 motion before the sentencing court in the 

District of South Carolina if she is granted permission to do so by the Fourth Circuit. 

Next, Petitioner seeks compassionate release from custody based on her “vulnerability to 

Covid-19,”4 which was a request inappropriately raised as Claim 3 and thus it shall be construed 

as a supplement to her pending motion for compassionate release/sentence reduction. See Dkt. 5 

at 2; Dkt. 7 at 6. However, such a request is not proper before this Court because any relief that 

may be available under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, must be 

sought in Petitioner’s criminal case as it is the sentencing court that would make any modification 

to a term of imprisonment under that section. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) provides that a sentencing court 

“may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except . . . upon motion of the 

Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant.” Furthermore, Petitioner is 

cautioned that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) requires the criminal defendant to first attempt exhaustion of 

administrative remedies: a defendant may bring a section 3582(c) motion after he/she has “fully 

4

 The Court notes that this issue is a separate matter from the aforementioned claim (Claim 

2) asserted in her amended petition, which attacks the validity of her sentence. 

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exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons” to bring the motion 

on his/her behalf, or after “the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of 

the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s request for compassionate release from custody is DENIED without prejudice to 

raising such a request before the sentencing court in the District of South Carolina. Dkt. 5. 

Finally, as to the remaining claim in her amended petition challenging time credits, it does 

not appear from the face of the amended petition that Claim 1 is without merit. Good cause 

appearing, Claim 1 is sufficient to require a response. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 

1. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Dkt. 8. 

2. Claim 2 is DISMISSED because it does not fit within the very narrow exception for 

situations where the remedy available under section 2255 is inadequate to test the legality of her 

detention. This dismissal is without prejudice to bringing Claim 2 in a second or successive 

section 2255 motion before the sentencing court in the District of South Carolina if she is granted 

permission to do so by the Fourth Circuit. 

3. Petitioner’s request for compassionate release from custody, which was 

inappropriately raised as Claim 3 and instead construed as a supplement to her pending motion for 

compassionate release/sentence reduction, is DENIED without prejudice to raising such a request 

before the sentencing court in the District of South Carolina. Dkt. 5. 

4. Liberally construed, Claim 1 is sufficient to require a response. 

5. The Clerk of the Court shall serve electronically a copy of this order upon the 

Respondent and Respondent’s attorney, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of 

California, at the following email addresses: (1) usacan.ecf@usdoj.gov; 

(2) sara.winslow@usdoj.gov; and (3) kathy.terry@usdoj.gov. The amended petition and the 

exhibits thereto are available via the Electronic Case Filing System for the Northern District of 

California. See Dkt. 7. The Clerk shall serve by mail a copy of this order on Petitioner. 

6. Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on Petitioner, within sixty (60) days 

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of the date this Order is filed, an answer to this amended petition, showing cause why a writ of 

habeas corpus should not be granted based on Petitioner’s Claim 1. Respondent shall file with the 

answer and serve on Petitioner a copy of all exhibits that are relevant to a determination of the 

issues presented by Claim 1. 

7. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, Petitioner shall do so by filing a 

Traverse with the Court and serving it on Respondent within twenty-eight (28) days of 

Petitioner’s receipt of the Answer. Should Petitioner fail to do so, the amended petition will be 

deemed submitted and ready for decision twenty-eight (28) days after the date Petitioner is served 

with Respondent’s Answer. 

8. Respondent may file with this Court and serve upon Petitioner, within sixty (60) 

days of the issuance of this Order, a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds in lieu of an 

Answer, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. If Respondent files a motion to dismiss, Petitioner shall file with the Court and serve 

on Respondent an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion within twenty-eight 

(28) days of receipt of the motion, and Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on 

Petitioner a reply within fourteen (14) days of receipt of any opposition. 

9. It is Petitioner’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner must keep the 

Court and Respondent informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s 

orders in a timely fashion. Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro 

se whose address changes while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of 

address specifying the new address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss a pro se action 

without prejudice when: (1) mail directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the 

Court as not deliverable, and (2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written 

communication from the pro se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b); see also

Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

Petitioner must also serve on Respondent’s counsel all communications with the Court by mailing 

a true copy of the document to Respondent’s counsel. 

10. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be 

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granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend. 

11. This order terminates Docket Nos. 5 and 8. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 1, 2020 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

 United States District Judge 

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