Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02389/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02389-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:2672pi Federal Tort Claim Act - Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EXPLORER INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

vs. 

UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND 

MANAGEMENT; and Does 1 through 10, 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18cv2389-LAB-WVG

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[Dkt. No. 4] 

 

Explorer Insurance Company sued the United States Bureau of Land 

Management. The United States now moves to dismiss. For the reasons below, the 

Motion is GRANTED, and the matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

Explorer insured a driver who collided with a vehicle driven by a BLM employee on 

December 7, 2016. Dkt. No. 1. On January 26, 2018, Explorer filed an administrative 

property damage claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) with the United States 

Department of the Interior regarding the accident. Dkt. No. 4-2 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 6 at 2. 

The agency denied the claim and mailed Explorer notice of denial on May 25, 2018. 

Dkt. No. 4-2. 

Unsure whom to sue in the district court, in July 2018, Explorer’s attorney asked 

agency counsel whether Explorer should name the United States or the BLM as a 

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defendant. Dkt. No. 6 at 4, 7-9. Agency counsel declined to provide legal advice. 

Id. at 8. On October 18, 2018, Explorer filed this lawsuit against the BLM. Dkt. No. 1. 

The Complaint alleges a claim for subrogation and seeks to recover $5,168.47 for 

damaged property. Id. The Complaint doesn’t mention the FTCA or name the United 

States as a defendant, and Explorer hasn’t served the United States. Id.; Dkt. No. 4-4; 

Dkt. No. 6 at 4.

The United States now moves to dismiss the matter for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) and for insufficient service of process under FRCP 4. 

Dkt. No. 4. Explorer opposes the Motion and seeks leave to amend to add the United 

States as an FTCA defendant. Dkt. No. 6.

DISCUSSION

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and there is a presumption that jurisdiction 

is lacking unless a party proves otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Sopcak v. N. Mountain 

Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir.1995). If lacking jurisdiction, a court must 

dismiss the action. FRCP 12(h)(3).

A damages suit against a federal agency is essentially a suit against the United 

States, and is barred by sovereign immunity unless expressly authorized by Congress. 

Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1460, n.6 (9th Cir. 1985); Midwest Growers Co-op. 

Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 465 (9th Cir. 1976). The limitation is jurisdictional (United

States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)), and the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for 

tortious conduct of federal government employees (28 U.S.C. § 2679; F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 

157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, Explorer’s claim—which seeks money from the 

BLM for property damage allegedly caused by a BLM employee—is barred by sovereign 

immunity unless brought under the FTCA. Gilbert, 756 F.2d at 1460, n.6 (“A claim for 

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damages against a federal agency is barred by sovereign immunity unless Congress has 

consented to suit.”).

Even if Explorer had properly pled an FTCA action, its claim would still be barred. 

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). In an FTCA claim for damaged property against the federal 

government, the only proper defendant is the United States. Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 

656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)); Kennedy v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 145 F.3d at 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). Further, the FTCA requires a plaintiff to 

file suit no more than six months after the mailing of the denial of an administrative claim. 

Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 

If the plaintiff doesn’t meet this deadline, a tort claim against the United States is “forever

barred.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Although Explorer satisfied the administrative claim 

requirement, it failed to file its FTCA claim against the United States before the statute of 

limitations ran. Dkt. No. 4-2; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Explorer was required to sue the 

United States by November 25, 2018, but mistakenly sued the BLM and then failed to 

amend its Complaint to add the United States as a party before the limitations period 

expired. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 6 at 8-9; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Explorer’s FTCA claim is

therefore time-barred (28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)) and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 2679; FRCP 12(h)(3); see also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475-76 

(1994) (FTCA acts as a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity, which is 

jurisdictional in nature).

2. Relation Back

Explorer argues that despite its failure to name the right defendant before the 

limitations period expired, the Court should nonetheless grant it leave to add the United 

States as a party because the amended pleading would relate back to the date the action

commenced. Dkt. No. 6 at 3-5; FRCP 15(c). But leave to amend is inappropriate here. 

Explorer acknowledges that it failed to deliver or mail the Complaint to the United States 

Attorney or the Attorney General before the limitations period ran. Dkt. No. 6 at 9, ¶ 9; 

FRCP 15(c)(2); Miles v. Dept. of Army, 881 F.2d 777, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1989). And, the 

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United States didn’t otherwise receive timely notice. FRCP 15(c)(1). Although Explorer 

maintains that the United States was put on notice about the lawsuit when Explorer’s 

attorney reached out to agency counsel (Dkt. No. 6 at 2, 5), this is immaterial because

“[a]ctual knowledge possessed by an agency will not be imputed to the United States.” 

Allen, 749 F.2d at 1389-90 (“Only if the United States Attorney and the Attorney General 

receive notice of the suit prior to the running of the statute of limitations will a plaintiff be 

allowed to substitute the United States as a defendant under Rule 15(c).”). Likewise, the 

fact that Explorer served the BLM after the statute of limitations ran on its FTCA claim

makes no difference. Id.; Dkt. No. 5. Under these circumstances, Explorer has failed to 

provide a basis for the amended complaint to relate back to the date of the original 

pleading and may not now add the United States as a defendant. 

In sum, Explorer hasn’t established any basis1 for blowing the FTCA statute of 

limitations. The Complaint can’t be remedied by amendment, so the Court lacks 

jurisdiction and the action must be dismissed with prejudice. Given this disposition, the 

Court need not address the United States’ alternate argument that the Complaint should 

be dismissed for insufficient service. 

CONCLUSION

Explorer’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and the clerk is directed

to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 17, 2019

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

Chief United States District Judge

 

1 Explorer claims its counsel’s failure to name the United States as a defendant was the 

result of a “genuine mistake” about which party to name as the defendant. Dkt. No. 6 at 

3-4. This explanation falls short of the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to support 

equitable tolling. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007); see also, Frye v. 

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that general attorney negligence, 

including miscalculation of the limitations period, isn’t an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling).

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