Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00397/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00397-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIRGIE AYALA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 15cv397-LAB (NLS)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.

COUNTY OF IMPERIAL, et al.,

Defendants.

The claims in this case arose from the fatal shooting in 2014 of Mark Anthony Ayala

by agents of the Imperial County Narcotics Task Force. Plaintiffs, Ayala’s heirs and family

members, are represented by counsel. A related case, Lerma-Mayoral v. City of El Centro,

15cv818-LAB (PCL), deals with claims by the driver of the taxi in which Ayala was riding

when he was shot. That case is in discovery.

In this case, the only remaining Defendant is the County of Imperial. Judgment has

already been entered in favor of the other Defendants. (See Docket no. 44.) The only

surviving claim is based on allegations that the County was responsible for the Task Force’s

violations under a Monell theory. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

All other claims have been either abandoned or dismissed.

The Task Force consists of officers from various government entities, including the

County, and is itself a federal entity. So far, Plaintiffs have been unable to allege any facts

that would suggest the County is responsible for the Task Force’s customs or policies. To

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the contrary, everythingPlaintiffs have submitted suggests that either the federal government

or the entity itself is responsible for its customs and policies. There is no reason to believe

Plaintiffs can successfully amend to salvage their remaining claim. By noon on May 2,

Plaintiffs’ counsel were to have filed an ex parte motion for leave to file a second amended

complaint. (See Docket no. 49.) But they have allowed that deadline to pass and have filed

nothing. This action is therefore subject to dismissal both for failure to prosecute and on the

merits.

Plaintiffs are represented by two attorneys, who have missed deadlines and

repeatedly disobeyed local rules and the Court’s orders. Among the most frustrating of

counsel’s many lapses has been their repeated failure to register for electronic filing and to

file documents electronically, as is required of all attorneys practicing before this Court. They

have ignored numerous warnings about their violations. (See Docket nos. 2, 11, 19, 21, 23,

32, 34, 36, 45, 46 (warning Plaintiffs’ counsel of Civil Local Rule 5.4 violations, and

cautioning them regarding the consequences).) Their failure to file documents electronically

has caused chaos in the docket, resulting in the vacatur of two previous dismissals. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel were warned that if this action were dismissed a third time, the third

dismissal would not be vacated. (Docket no. 42 at 9:9–11.) 

In an effort to impose order, the Court on March 8 required both Plaintiffs’ attorneys

to register for electronic filing, and each was ordered to confirm that the other had registered

as required. (See Docket no. 37 at 3:8–15.) Nevertheless, attorney Goodman continued to

try to submit paper copies of documents. These included a motion for leave to amend that

was essentially a rehash of the one he filed on March 16, which had been denied on the

merits.

On April 28, the Court specifically ordered Plaintiffs’ counsel to electronically file their

motion for leave to amend by noon on Tuesday, May 2, 2017, and said that no more

extensions would be granted. (Docket no. 49.) This was the latest in a string of stern

warnings to Plaintiffs’ counsel. (See also Docket nos. 37, 38, 42, 49 (orders pointing out

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s violation of rules and orders, and giving increasingly serious cautions).) 

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May 2 has come and gone, and Plaintiffs have filed nothing.

The Court therefore deems Plaintiffs’ remaining claim abandoned. The Court

recognizes that dismissal is a sanction of last resort. Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiffs’

counsel’s refusal or inability to move forward with the case in spite of numerous warnings,

dismissal is the only reasonable option. See Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829,

831–32 (9 Cir. 1986) (per curiam). th

As explained in detail in the Court’s March 21 order, Defendants have already been

unfairly surprised and burdened several times by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s disobedience of the

Court’s orders and the local rules. (Docket no. 42 at 7:19–9:11.) If the case is permitted to

linger on the docket, the County is very likely to continue to suffer such unfair prejudice. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel have also wasted judicial resources, created needless emergencies,

usurped control of the docket, and improperly sought special indulgences from the Court. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs' counsel were specifically warned that lesser attempts to impose order had

been unsuccessful, and that if they continued their disobedience, dismissal appeared to be

the only remaining option. (Id. at 9:6–10.) 

Although the Court is mindful of the public policy favoring disposition of the cases on

the merits, see Thompson at 831 (citing Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423–24),

Plaintiffs have escaped dismissal twice already on the basis of that policy, and the case is

no closer to resolution. Lesser methods of persuasion have proved to be in vain. At some

point, trying to resolve a case on the merits becomes impractical, and the Court finds that

in this case that time has come. Without finality, Defendants will be unfairly prejudiced and

the public interest will not be served. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 n.6 (1975)

(noting the “powerful public interest in finality of litigation”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (the rules

“should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the

just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). Considering

the factors set forth in Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831, the Court finds that dismissal is

appropriate.

/ / /

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Finally, it does not appear that dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim based on their attorneys’

neglect of the case is unfair. The chance of their showing that the County is responsible for

the Task Force’s policies is remote. Without that, they cannot prevail. In all likelihood,

Plaintiffs’ counsel have recognized that their clients have no claim, and they have chosen

not to amend because they realize they cannot do so successfully. 

This action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, BUT WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND, for failure to prosecute, and for disobedience to the rules and to the Court’s orders. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d

683, 689 (9 Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a court may sua sponte dismiss for failure to th

prosecute or to comply with applicable rules or the court’s orders). Finally, even if the case

were not being dismissed for those reasons, the Court finds it would be subject to dismissal

on the merits, because Plaintiffs have never successfully stated a claim even after being

given multiple opportunities to do so.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 4, 2017

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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