Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01240/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01240-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY FRANKLIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. JIMENEZ, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE ON: (1) CROSS-MOTIONS 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:

DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 

AND GRANT OF DEFENDANT'S 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, 

and (2) DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

[ECF Nos. 43, 57 and 60.]

I. INTRODUCTION

Gregory A. Franklin (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at California 

State Prison, is proceeding in pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a) and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”), Plaintiff alleges California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(“CDCR”) officers Ramos and Hughey and nurses Garcia and Molina-Mata at Calipatria 

State Prison (“Calipatria”), violated his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 31
2

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

retaliation for bringing a lawsuit by forcing him to use an upper bunk even though he had 

a swollen ankle and shoulder sling. (SAC at pp. 4-8.) In his second cause of action, 

Plaintiff alleges retaliation by CDCR Officer Maciel who took a package containing 

denture adhesive, but never delivered it to Plaintiff. Id. at 8-9. Finally, in his third cause 

of action, Plaintiff alleges that CDCR Lieutenant Jimenez wrongly found him guilty of 

possessing a cell phone battery, which actually belonged to his cellmate, in retaliation for 

bringing grievances and suits against CDCR officers. Id. at 10.

On March 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 43.) 

After receiving two extensions, Defendant filed an opposition and cross-motion for 

summary judgment on August 5, 2016. (ECF No. 57.) Plaintiff filed a response nunc pro 

tunc to August 24, 2016 requesting leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint. 

(ECF. No. 60.) This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED and 

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no 

genuine issues as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 

(1970); Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, 

a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 addresses the sufficiency of the 

evidence, or of the law, to support the plaintiff’s claims. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 

F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of 

the declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrates an absence of 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is 

“material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 31
3

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” as to a 

material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return the verdict for a 

non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 

1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the 

movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other 

than for the movant. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will 

have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant may prevail by presenting 

evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or by merely 

pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the 

non-moving party’s claim. Id.; Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 

F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, 

then “the non-moving party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the ultimate burden of persuasion.” Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 

F.3d at 1102. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the 

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually exists. 

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan 

Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103. 

The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “‘may not 

rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, 

Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008); (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence 

of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 

from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Stegall v. Citadel Broad, Inc., 

350 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003); Lindahl v. Air Fr., 930 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 

1991). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air; rather, it is the opposing 

party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 31
4

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

See Juell v. Forest Pharms., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D Cal. 2006); UMG 

Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott Forest Pharms., Inc., 300 F. Supp 2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 

2004) (quoting Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp 1224, 1244-45 (E.D Cal. 

1985), aff’d 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987)).

“A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being simply because a 

litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del 

Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Galen v. County of 

Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, a “motion for summary 

judgment may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘is not 

significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 

F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). Similarly, self-serving declarations, uncorroborated by 

other testimony or other persuasive evidence, cannot create a genuine issue of fact 

sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Villiarimo c. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).

While a court has the discretion in appropriate circumstances to consider materials 

that are not properly brought to its attention, a court is not required to examine the entire 

file for establishing a genuine issue of material fact where the evidence is not set forth in 

the opposing papers with adequate references. See Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of 

Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School 

Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). After discovery, if the nonmoving party fails 

to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party 

is entitled to summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103. 

///

///

///

///

///

///

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 31
5

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. PROFFERED EVIDENCE

A. Defendants’ Proffer

1. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action: Retaliatory Assignment of Upper 

Bunk

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s first cause of action against officers Ramos1and 

Hughey and nurses Garcia2and Molina-Mata for retaliation and deliberate indifference 

must fail because Plaintiff did not have a chrono permitting him to use a lower bunk on 

September 5, 2009 – the day Plaintiff was notified that he needed to relinquish the lower 

bunk in his cell to a newly transferred inmate who actually had a verifiable lower bunk 

chrono. Accordingly, Defendants argue, they could not have been deliberately indifferent 

to an alleged medical need that was not documented and of which they were unaware. 

Similarly, Defendants argue there is no evidence of retaliation on their part because they 

did not take any adverse action against Plaintiff, they simply moved Plaintiff to the upper 

bunk in his cell based on the medical files they had. In support of these arguments,

Defendants Hughey, Molina-Mata, Maciel and Jimenez filed declarations and exhibits

proffering the following evidence:

(1)On September 5, 2009, Officer Hughey was assigned as a Correctional 

Sergeant on Facility A at Calipatria State Prison (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 3.)

(2) On September 5, 2009, Hughey became aware that an inmate named Rideau 

was issued a medical accommodation chrono mandating that he be housed on a lower 

bunk. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 4.)

(3) Each cell in the building can house two inmates in a lower and upper bunk, 

respectively. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 4.) 

 

1 Defendant informs the Court that the U.S. Marshal mailed service to the wrong S. Ramos at Calipatria 

State Prison. The S. Ramos who was served is male, while the person Plaintiff has attempted to sue is a 

female officer. However, there is no female officer named S. Ramos at Calipatria. Therefore, the 

female S. Ramos remains unserved. The currently served S. Ramos was not involved in the September 

5, 2009 incident. [ECF No. 57-2 at 10:23-11:6; Ramos Decl ¶¶ 4-6.]

2 Nurse Garcia has not been served in this action. [ECF No. 57-2 at 6:16.]

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 31
6

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(4) Priority for lower bunks must be given to inmates with medical 

accommodation chromos. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 6.)

(5) Medical accommodation chronos are forms issued by medical doctors to 

prescribe accommodations for inmates with a documented medical need; such as a

cane, extra mattresses or lower bunk assignments. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ¶ 4; Hughey

Decl. at ¶ 7.) 

(6) Medical accommodation chronos can only be issued by doctors or 

physician’s assistants. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ¶ 5.)

(7)Nurse Molina-Mata did not have the authority to issue a medical 

accommodation chrono. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ¶ 11.) 

(8)Officer Hughey did not have authority to issue or override a medical 

accommodation chrono. (Hughey Decl. ¶ 7.)

(9) Officer Hughey checked the building’s computer system to see if any lower 

bunks were available to house inmate Rideau. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 8.) 

(10) The building’s computer system indicated Plaintiff did not have a 

cellmate, therefore, there was an available lower bunk in his cell to house inmate 

Rideau. (Hughey Decl. at ¶8.)

(11) When inmate Rideau moved to Plaintiff’s cell, Plaintiff protested that 

he could not be housed on an upper bunk because of a medical condition. (Hughey

Decl. at ¶ 9.) 

(12) Plaintiff could not produce a medical accommodation chrono to 

Officer Hughey to support his assertion that he could not be housed on an upper bunk. 

(Hughey Decl. at ¶ 9.) 

(13) On September 4, 2009, the day before the September 5th bunk reassignment, Plaintiff had been examined and treated by a nurse named Ortiz for 

falling whiling running a week earlier. Nurse Ortiz noted that Plaintiff’s extremities

and ankle appeared normal and that he had discomfort in his right shoulder when 

lifting over 90 degrees. She gave him Naproxyn. She did not refer Plaintiff to a 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 31
7

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

doctor, nor did she recommend a lower bunk accommodation. (Molina-Mata Decl. ¶ 

4; see also Encounter Form dated September 4, 2009 at ECF No. 57-5 at p. 6.) 

(14) Officer Hughey called the prison’s medical facility to investigate 

Plaintiff’s assertion that he had a medical accommodation chrono requiring him to use 

a lower bunk. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 9.) 

(15) Nurse Molina-Mata informed Officer Hughey that Plaintiff did not 

have a lower bunk chrono on September 5, 2009. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 9; Molina-Mata

Decl. at ¶ 10.) 

(16) A Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono attached to the declaration 

of Nurse Molina indicates Plaintiff had a temporary knee brace accommodation, two 

years earlier on December 12, 2007, but no lower bunk chrono as of September 5, 

2009. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ECF No. 57-5, p. 8.) 

(17) A chrono dated March 30, 2009, also attached to the declaration of 

Nurse Molina, indicates Plaintiff had a temporary chrono to wear prescription 

eyeglasses. {Molina-Mata Decl. at ECF No. 57-5, p. 9.)

(18) Plaintiff did not have a lower bunk chrono on September 5, 2009, 

therefore Officer Hughey assigned inmate Rideau to be housed on the lower bunk in 

Plaintiff’s cell and Plaintiff to be housed on the upper bunk. (Hughey Decl. at ¶¶ 8-9.)

(19) Plaintiff later reported falling off the upper bunk on September 5,

2009 and Nurse Molina-Mata examined and treated Plaintiff in the A-yard medical 

clinic. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ¶ 6 and Exh. D to ECF No. 57-5; Hughey Decl. at ¶ 11.)

(20) After his fall from the upper bunk, Nurse Molina-Mata noted Plaintiff 

was alert and oriented and reported shoulder pain, left ankle pain, and pain to the back 

of his head, so Molina-Mata referred Plaintiff to the prison’s medical clinic 

(Treatment Triage Area) for further evaluation and treatment by staff. (Molina-Mata 

Decl. at ¶ 6; see also Interdisciplinary Progress Notes dated September 5, 2009 at ECF 

No. 57-5 at pp. 12-15.) 

(21) Nurse Molina-Mata only examined and treated Plaintiff on September 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 31
8

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5, 2009. She was not present or involved in medical treatment Plaintiff received from 

Nurse Ortiz on September 4, 2009. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ¶ 3, 8.)

(22) Officer Hughey did not witness Plaintiff’s fall from the upper bunk on 

September 5, 2009 and was not involved in his medical treatment. (Hughey Decl. at ¶ 

11.)

(23) A Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono attached to the declaration 

of Nurse Molina indicates that approximately one year later, on or about September 

16, 2010, Plaintiff was given a temporary knee brace accommodation which also 

included a temporary lower bunk chrono. (Molina-Mata Decl. at ECF No. 57-5, p. 

10.) 

2. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action: Retaliatory Delay In Shipment of 

Quarterly Package

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s second cause of action against Officer Maciel in 

violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for failure to deliver a 

quarterly package containing dental adhesive in 2007 must fail because under the prison’s 

privilege group rules, Plaintiff was not eligible to receive packages during the time period

in question. When Plaintiff regained eligibility, he received a replacement package. In 

support of these arguments, Defendants proffered the following evidence:

(24) Maciel was a Receiving and Release package officer on the A-yard 

where Plaintiff was housed in late 2007. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 4.)

(25) Inmates who are in the C-status privilege group are not eligible to 

receive quarterly packages. (Maciel Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6.)

(26) Inmates are placed on C-status by an Institutional Classification 

Committee and Receiving and Release Officers have no control over an inmate’s 

privilege group. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 6.)

(27) Plaintiff was on C-status from September 18, 2007 to October 16, 

2007. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 7.)

(28) A quarterly package for Plaintiff arrived at Calipatria State Prison on 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 31
9

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

September 19, 2007. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 8.)

(29) When quarterly packages arrive for inmates who are ineligible to 

receive them, they are shipped back to the vendor. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 9, Exh. B to ECF 

No. 57-4.)

(30) Officer Maciel is not responsible for the mailing of return packages. 

He only distributed and returned packages to and from the A-yard to the prison mail 

room. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 10.)

(31) Officer Maciel completed an unauthorized package form due to 

Plaintiff’s inability to receive the September 19, 2007 quarterly package and provided 

a copy of the form to Plaintiff on October 14, 2007. (Maciel Decl. at ¶ 11; see also

Unauthorized Package Form at ECF No. 57-4, p. 14.)

(32) A replacement package was sent to Plaintiff on November 17, 2007 

after Plaintiff was taken off C-status. (Maciel Decl. at ¶¶12-16.)

(33) Officer Maciel has no authority to deliver packages to inmates on Cstatus regardless of what is inside the package. (Maciel Decl. at ¶¶17-18.)

3. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action: Retaliatory Rules Violation

Finding of Guilty

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s third cause of action, which alleges Lieutenant 

Jimenez violated Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by finding him guilty

of a prison rules violation without evidence, must fail because some evidence supported 

the finding, which was made after a full hearing. In support of these arguments, 

Defendants proffered the following evidence:

(34) Jimenez is a Correctional Lieutenant at Calipatria. As part of his 

duties, he acts as a Senior Hearing Officer for rules violation report hearings. A rules 

violation report is a disciplinary report that is issued to an inmate who is accused of 

violating prison rules or the law. A Senior Hearing Officer is an impartial decision 

maker who conducts the hearing, reviews the evidence and renders a decision and 

assesses corrective action where appropriate. (Jimenez Decl. at ¶¶3-5.)

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 31
10

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(35) On November 24, 2009 Jimenez served as the Senior Hearing Officer 

for a rules violation report involving Plaintiff, which charged him with possession of a 

cell phone battery on November 16, 2009. (Jimenez Decl. at ¶6.)

(36) Plaintiff was present in person for the November 24, 2009 hearing. 

He read the rules violation report aloud at the hearing and stated that he understood it. 

Plaintiff entered a plea of not guilty and gave a statement in his defense. He received 

all documents more than twenty-four hours before the hearing. Plaintiff also presented 

and questioned inmate Rideau as his witness. (Jimenez Decl. at ¶¶10-11; see also

Rules Violation Report dated November 18, 2009 at ECF No 57-3 at pp. 6-10.)

(37) At the hearing, Jimenez also considered the written statements of 

Officer Landeros, who wrote the rules violation report against Plaintiff. (Jimenez 

Decl. at ¶12.)

(38) Jimenez was not involved in the cell search or discovery of the cell 

phone battery. After conducting the hearing, he added his findings to the rules 

violation report. (Jimenez Decl. at ¶6-8, Exh. A to 57-3 at pp. 7-8.)

(39) Jimenez found Officer Landeros’s testimony concerning the layout of 

inmate prison cells and her search for contraband to be more credible than Plaintiff’s 

denial of contraband possession or Inmate Rideau’s testimony. (Jimenez Decl. at 

¶¶13-15.)

B. Plaintiff’s Proffer

In the SAC and the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends: 1) officers 

Ramos and Hughey and nurses Garcia and Molina-Mata violated his First, Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights in retaliation for bringing lawsuits by forcing him to use an 

upper bunk even though he had a swollen ankle and shoulder sling; 2) Officer Maciel 

took a quarterly package containing denture adhesive, but never delivered it to Plaintiff in 

retaliation for bringing suits against CDCR officers; and 3) Lieutenant Jimenez wrongly 

found him guilty of possessing a cell phone battery, which actually belonged to his 

cellmate, in retaliation for bringing suits against CDCR officers. In conjunction with his 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 31
11

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff also filed an affidavit (ECF No. 43 at pp. 31-40), 

signed under penalty of perjury, and supporting exhibits proffering the following 

evidence:

1. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action: Retaliatory Assignment of Upper Bunk

(1) Plaintiff submitted a Health Care Services Request Form dated August 21, 2009 

and completed by Nurse Stepp indicating that he reported pain to the right 

shoulder and requested a low bunk chrono. The August 21, 2009 form also 

includes a note indicating Plaintiff “needs MD visit for eval prior to chrono.” 

[ECF No. 43 at p. 137.] 

(2) Plaintiff submitted a Health Care Services Request Form dated September 4, 

2009 and completed by Nurse Ortiz indicating Plaintiff reported twisting his left 

ankle and re-injuring his shoulder in a fall.

(3)Plaintiff states in his declaration that on September 5, 2009, Officer Ramos 

demanded he take the top bunk in his cell. Plaintiff told Officer Ramos that he 

had been to medical on the previous day – September 4, 2009, and could not take

the top bunk; however, Ramos insisted Plaintiff use the top bunk. Plaintiff tried 

to climb up, but hit his head and feel to the floor. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 31-32.]

(4) After falling to the floor, Plaintiff was taken to medical where Nurse Garcia 

made a t-shirt sling for Plaintiff’s arm and told him that while she did not have the 

authority to issue a lower bunk, she would put him on the doctor’s list so he could 

make a request for a lower bunk chrono. [ECF No. 43 at p. 32.]

(5)Plaintiff submitted an Interdisciplinary Progress Note signed by Nurse Molina 

documenting Plaintiff’s fall from an upper bunk on September 5, 2009 and stating 

“no visible injuries seen....verbalized pain to right shoulder and back of head also 

left ankle.... Medical transport for further eval.” [ECF No. 43 at pp. 134-135.]

(6)After leaving medical on September 5, 2009, the guards made Plaintiff walk back 

to his cell despite his swollen foot. Officer Hughey told Plaintiff that he could 

use the top bunk or “go to the hole (administrative segregated housing) and still 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 31
12

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be on a top bunk.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 33.]

(7) Similarly, Officer Ramos told Plaintiff, “I don’t want to see you on the bottom 

bunk if you get on the bottom bunk you are going to the hole.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 

33-34.]

(8) Inmate Rideau submitted a declaration in support of Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment stating that “there were other cells I could have been forced to 

move into; approximately about 10 other cells in the building with guys not 

having bottom bunk chronos.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 131.]

(9) Plaintiff stayed on an upper bunk for twelve days until he was seen by a 

physician and given a lower bunk chrono. [ECF No. 43 at p. 34.]

(10) Plaintiff submitted a Comprehensive Accommodation Chrono dated 

November 19, 2010 that indicates he now has a permanent bottom bunk 

accommodation. [ECF No. 43 at p. 138.]

(11) Plaintiff submitted an operative report dated May 24, 2011, indicating that 

two years later, he had surgery on his shoulder on or about May 17, 2011. {ECF 

No. 43 at pp. 123-125.]

2. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action – Retaliatory Delay In Shipment of 

Quarterly Package 

(12) Plaintiff submitted a September 17, 2007 invoice from Access Securepak 

addressed to him indicating a shipment of Stay Dent Denture Adhesive was 

ordered for him, along with other sundries and foodstuffs. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 98-

99.]

(13) Sometime in October of 2007, Officer Maciel told Plaintiff that he got his 

quarterly package and sent it back and “will keep sending it back where you 

would not receive [it] until months later.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 31.]

(14) Plaintiff submitted a 602 form dated October 10, 2007, which requests 

“Mr. Franklin package [be] given to him immediately and an explanation for the 

delay.” The informal level response to the request, dated October 15, 2007 reads: 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 31
13

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“Granted – Franklin - I show I received it and delivered it to a yard – from there I 

can’t explain it – it will be replaced within the following week & noted as 3rd

quarter. Sorry for the delay.” [ECF No. 43 at pp. 100-101.]

(15) Plaintiff submitted a Calipatria State Prison Receiving and Release 

Unauthorized Package Form dated October 14, 2007 stating: “Your item/package 

is being returned to send for the following reasons(s): C-status privilege group 

cannot receive.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 110.]

(16) Plaintiff submitted a 602 form dated October 18, 2007, in which Plaintiff 

writes that he was told he could not receive his package “because he was on Cstatus”; however he was not informed that his package had arrived and was not 

given his package despite the fact that it had denture adhesive needed to alleviate 

dentures from cutting his gums. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 105-108.]

(17) Plaintiff’s October 18, 2007, 602 form also raised Plaintiff’s objection that 

the package should not have been sent back, but temporarily withheld until 

Plaintiff was no longer on C-status due to his need for the denture adhesive. 

Plaintiff also objected that he did not have an opportunity to appeal the decision 

to return his package to the sender. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 106-108.]

(18) Plaintiff submitted an informal response to Plaintiff’s 602 appeal form 

dated November 5, 2007 from officer Maciel denying the appeal and stating: 

“Your package was returned on October 14, 2007. Access Catalog Co. verified 

that your 3rd quarter package arrived at Calipatria on September 19, 2007, by 

which time you had already been placed on ‘C’ status, making you ineligible to 

receive the package. Operational Procedures 3004 states, ‘the arrival date of a 

package shall be the basis for the eligibility determination.’ Since you remained 

on ‘C’ status until the end of the 3rd quarter, you missed the deadline to receive a 

package for that quarter; however, you are now eligible to receive a 4th Quarter 

package. For future reference, exceptions to issue a package are not made based 

on the contents of a package, i.e. dental adhesive, regardless of the privilege 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 31
14

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

group.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 109.]

3. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action: Retaliatory Rules Violation Finding of 

Guilty

(19) On November 16, 2009, Officer Landeros stopped plaintiff and his 

cellmate, inmate Rideau to tell them she had found a cell phone battery in their 

cell. Inmate Rideau immediately told Officer Landeros that the cell phone battery 

she found in the cell search belonged to him, not Plaintiff. [ECF No. 43 at p. 34.]

(20) Plaintiff submitted a Rules Violation Report dated November 16, 200, 

documenting Officer Landeros’s random cell search and discovery of a Black 

Samsung Cell Phone Battery in a brown paper bag in the lower locker. [ECF No. 

43 at 140-141.]

(21) A disciplinary hearing concerning the discovery of the cell phone battery

was held on November 24, 2009. At that hearing, Inmate Rideau told hearing 

officer Lieutenant Jimenez that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the battery. 

Nevertheless, Lieutenant Jimenez told Plaintiff he would find him guilty because 

“he know [Plaintiff] like to sued [sic] and he don’t want [Plaintiff] to sued [sic] 

him, with a smirk on his face.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 35.]

(22) Plaintiff submitted a Rules Violation Report summary of the November 24, 

2009 hearing disciplinary hearing indicating Plaintiff received a copy of the Rules 

Violation Report in advance of the hearing, Inmate Rideau testified at the hearing 

that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the battery and that Plaintiff was found guilty 

of having a contraband cell phone battery. [ECF No. 43 at p. 143-146.]

(23) Plaintiff submitted a Director’s Level Appeal Decision dated September 30, 

2010, indicating Plaintiff’s second and third level appeals of the guilty decision 

were denied with the remark that the battery was found in an area of the cell 

readily accessible to both inmates. [ECF No. 43 at p. 147.]

///

///

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 31
15

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action Against Defendants Hughey and 

Molina Under The First and Eighth Amendments re: Lower Bunk 

Assignment

1. First Amendment - Retaliation

a. Party Arguments

As to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the First Amendment, Defendants Hughey 

and Molina-Mata argue they did not take any adverse action against Plaintiff because 

neither of them had authority to: (1) issue a lower bunk chrono for Plaintiff, or (2) to 

override the lower bunk chrono given to Plaintiff’s new cell mate. [ECF No. 57-2 at 

14:15-21.] Defendants also argue there was no causation or retaliatory link between the 

alleged retaliatory switch from a lower bunk to an upper bunk and the alleged protected 

conduct (the filing of lawsuits against CDCR officers in general) because Defendants 

were simply following prison housing policy. Id.

Plaintiff argues Defendants targeted him for a move from a lower bunk to an upper 

bunk assignment on September 5, 2009, because of a complaint he brought against 13 

officers at Calipatria State Prison in July of 2007. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 35-36.] Plaintiff 

states in his affidavit that nurse Molina was “cordial [but] once 13 defendants were 

served with summons from me that they were being sued by me, nurse Molina was very 

rude.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 36.] Plaintiff also states in his affidavit that Officer Hughey told 

him either “I get up on the top bunk or I go to the hole (administrative segregated 

housing) and still be on a top bunk.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 33.]

b. Standard of Review

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate, (2) because of, (3) 

that inmate’s protected conduct, and that action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his 

First Amendment Rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005.)

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 31
16

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The plaintiff must submit evidence that links the alleged retaliation with the 

exercise of a First Amendment right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995.) 

More specifically, the plaintiff must show the exercise of the First Amendment right was 

the substantial or motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct. Soranno’s Gasco, 

Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Raising a genuine issue of material 

fact as to retaliatory motive requires the plaintiff to produce “in addition to evidence that 

the defendant knew of the protected speech, at least: (1) evidence of proximity in time 

between the protected speech and the allegedly retaliatory decision, (2) evidence that the 

defendant expressed opposition to the speech or (3) evidence that the defendant’s 

proffered reason for the adverse action was false or pretextual.” Pinard v. Clatskanie

School Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 771 n.21 (9th Cir. 2006).

c. Discussion

Here, Plaintiff has not proffered evidence demonstrating an adverse action. 

Defendant Hughey has put forth evidence that the addition of a cellmate to Plaintiff’s cell 

and his subsequent direction for Plaintiff to take an upper bunk were not conducted in 

retaliation, but as a part of Defendant Hughey’s duty to find inmate Rideau a cell with a 

lower bunk because Rideau had a valid lower bunk chrono. As previously stated in the 

Court’s review of the facts, on September 5, 2009, Officer Hughey became aware that 

Rideau was issued a medical accommodation chrono mandating he be housed on a lower 

bunk. Each cell in Facility A can hold two inmates in a lower and upper bunk. The

building’s computer system indicated Plaintiff did not have a cellmate, therefore, there 

was an available lower bunk in Plaintiff’s cell in which to house inmate Rideau. Priority 

for lower bunks must be given to inmates with medical accommodation chromos like 

inmate Rideau. Plaintiff, however, could not at the time, and still has not produced a 

medical accommodation chrono showing his entitlement to a lower bunk on September 5, 

2009. Because medical accommodation chronos are only issued by medical doctors to 

prescribe accommodations for inmates with a documented medical need, Officer Hughey 

had no authority to override Rideau’s chrono in favor of Plaintiff’s desire to remain on a 

lower bunk. Nurse Molina also had no authority to require that Plaintiff remain on a 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 31
17

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

lower bunk despite Rideau’s chrono because she is not a physician.

Plaintiff has also failed to provide evidence demonstrating causation or a link 

between the bunk reassignment in September 2009 and the complaint he filed two years 

earlier - in July 2007- against various unidentified Calipatria officers. Specifically, the 

plaintiff’s speech (or 2007 complaint) must be the motivating factor behind the retaliatory 

conduct. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807. The Ninth Circuit has held that raising a genuine issue of 

material fact as to retaliatory motive requires the plaintiff to prove evidence of proximity

between the speech and retaliation, opposition to the speech and a pretextual reason for 

the retaliatory conduct. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 771 n.21. Proximity in time between the 

exercise of the First Amendment right and the alleged retaliation can serve as evidence 

that the adverse action constituted retaliatory conduct. However, in this case, two years 

passed between the service of Plaintiff’s complaint in July of 2007 and the bunk 

reassignment on September 5, 2009. This fact weighs against the demonstration of a 

causal link.

Evidence that Defendant expressed opposition to the speech may demonstrate a 

link between the exercise of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right and the alleged retaliation.

Plaintiff has stated that after his complaint was served, Nurse Molina was rude to him. 

However, Plaintiff provides no evidence that Nurse Molina’s change in demeanor was 

connected to the service of his complaint. Plaintiff has also stated that Officer Hughey 

told him he could either take the top bunk in his cell or the top bunk in the administrative 

segregation unit. Again, while Officer Hughey’s interaction with Plaintiff may have been

rude, it does not show a connection, opposition, or even a mention of the service of 

Plaintiff’s complaint two years earlier in 2007. These facts also weigh against the 

demonstration of a causal link.

Finally, evidence that a defendant’s proffered reason for adverse action was false 

or pretextual may demonstrate a link between the alleged relation and exercise of 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment right. But, as previously stated above, Defendants have

presented evidence that: (1) inmates with medical accommodation chronos have lower 

bunk preference; (2) Plaintiff did not have a medical accommodation chrono for a lower 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 31
18

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

bunk on September 5, 2009; and (3) medical accommodation chronos are only issued by 

medical doctors. This evidence demonstrates Defendants Hughey and Molina had a 

legitimate correctional purpose in switching Plaintiff’s bunk assignment upon the arrival 

of inmate Rideau. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the 

First Amendment.

2. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference re: Lower Bunk 

Assignment

a. Party Arguments

As to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment, 

Defendants Hughey and Molina-Mata argue they were not deliberately indifferent 

because Plaintiff did not have a medical accommodation chrono from a medical doctor 

guaranteeing him a lower bunk as a result of his injured shoulder and ankle. [ECF No. 

57-2 at 12:11-16.] Therefore, they did not consciously disregard a risk to Plaintiff’s 

health. Id. at 12:24-27; 13:8-16. Hughey argues additionally, that the facts show he took 

steps to investigate Plaintiff’s assertion that a chrono existed, the antithesis of disregard. 

Nurse Molina notes that she did not give care to Plaintiff. She simply reported the 

contents of his file and had no authority as a nurse to mandate Plaintiff be given a lower 

bunk despite his cellmate’s valid lower bunk chrono. Id.

Plaintiff argues his arm sling and visibly swollen foot demonstrated his need for a 

lower bunk and deliberate indifference is demonstrated by the officers’ conduct in 

making him walk back more than 200 yards to his cell with a sling and swollen ankle 

after he had fallen from the upper bunk. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 32-33.]

b. Standard of Review

The Eighth Amendment prohibits both the imposition of cruel and unusual 

punishment and inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 

1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Conditions of confinement claims require extreme 

deprivations that are sufficiently grave to deny the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “An Eighth Amendment claim 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 31
19

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that a prison official has deprived [prisoners] of humane conditions of confinement must 

meet two requirements, one objective and one subjective.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 

1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The prisoner 

must “objectively show that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’” and 

“make a subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to 

[his] health or safety.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). 

Under the objective requirement, conditions of confinement must pose a 

substantial risk of sufficiently serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The conditions of a 

prison may be restrictive and harsh, but officials have the duty to provide prisoners with 

adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may consider the circumstances, 

nature, and duration of the deprivation to determine whether the risk of harm is 

sufficiently serious. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 731.

The subjective requirement, relating to defendant’s state of mind, requires 

“deliberate indifference.” Id. In the context of a prisoner’s medical needs, the 

determination of “deliberate indifference” requires an examination of two elements: (1) 

the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical needs and (2) the nature of the defendant’s

response. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (overruled on 

other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v Miller, 104 F3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997)).

c. Discussion

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment

claim, plaintiff must demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to whether he has 

objectively been deprived of a necessity of life. As for the subjective prong of an Eighth 

Amendment inquiry, plaintiff must show there is a triable issue of material fact as to the 

Defendants’ states of mind, i.e. whether Officer Hughey and Nurse Molina were

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for an upper bunk. 

The evidence demonstrates that the day before the September 5th bunk reassignment, Plaintiff had been examined and treated by a nurse named Ortiz for falling 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 31
20

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

while running a week earlier. Nurse Ortiz noted Plaintiff’s extremities and ankle 

appeared normal and that he had discomfort in his right shoulder when lifting over 90 

degrees. She gave him Naproxyn. She did not refer Plaintiff to a doctor, nor did she 

recommend a lower bunk accommodation. When Plaintiff could not produce a chrono 

entitling him to a lower bunk, Officer Hughey called the prison’s medical facility to 

investigate. Nurse Molina-Mata informed Hughey when he called that Plaintiff did not 

have a lower bunk chrono as of September 5, 2009. Thus, Defendant’s actions do not 

demonstrate knowledge of a serious or excessive health risk because despite Plaintiff’s 

fall on the previous day there was no chrono authorizing lower bunk preference. These 

facts also do not establish disregard; not only because one cannot disregard a risk of 

which he is unaware, but also because Hughey investigated Plaintiff’s entitlement to a 

lower bunk and Nurse Molina looked through the records in response to Hughey’s 

request for confirmation, but found no chrono. No triable issue of material fact exists as

to the objective or subjective components of Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, IT IS 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendants Hughey and Molina’s motion 

for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action : Claims Against Officer Maciel 

Under The First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 

1. Party Arguments

First, Defendants argue Officer Maciel’s failure to deliver the package in violation 

of the First Amendment could not constitute retaliation because when the package 

arrived, Plaintiff was ineligible to receive it due to his placement on C-Status. Next, 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment 

must fail because the ability to receive a quarterly package is determined by the inmate’s 

privilege group, not the contents of the package. Therefore, Officer Maciel argues, the 

fact that the package contained denture cream had no effect on Plaintiff’s eligibility to 

receive it or his authority to deliver it. Lastly, Defendants argue the availability of a state 

tort action to Plaintiff precludes relief under the Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 31
21

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

has an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss of an inmate’s property. [ECF No. 

57-2 at pp. 16-20.]

Plaintiff argues the package should not have been sent back, but temporarily 

withheld until Plaintiff was no longer on C-status due to his need for the denture 

adhesive. Plaintiff also objects that he did not have an opportunity to appeal the return of 

his package to the sender. [ECF No. 43 at pp. 106-108.]

2. First Amendment Retaliation

As the Court discussed in Section A(1) above, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation contains five elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took adverse action 

against an inmate, (2) because of, (3) that inmate’s protected conduct, and that action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment Rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005.) The plaintiff must submit evidence that links the alleged 

retaliation with the exercise of a First Amendment right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 

807 (9th Cir. 1995.) More specifically, the plaintiff must show the exercise of the First 

Amendment right was the substantial or motivating factor behind the defendant’s 

conduct. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Defendant Maciel has provided evidence demonstrating inmates who are in the Cstatus privilege group are not eligible to receive quarterly packages. Officers have no 

control over an inmate’s privilege group because inmates are placed on C-status by an 

Institutional Classification Committee. Plaintiff was on C-status from September 18, 

2007 to October 16, 2007. A quarterly package for Plaintiff arrived at Calipatria State 

Prison on September 19, 2007, a day after Plaintiff was placed on C-status. When 

quarterly packages arrive for inmates who are ineligible to receive them, they are shipped 

back to the vendor. Officer Maciel was not responsible for the mailing of return packages 

and only distributed and returned packages to and from the A-yard to the prison mail 

room. Officer Maciel completed an unauthorized package form due to Plaintiff’s inability 

to receive the September 19, 2007 quarterly package and provided a copy of the form to 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 31
22

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff on October 14, 2007. Although Officer Maciel told Plaintiff he would “keep 

sending [the package] back where you would not receive [it] until months later,” a

replacement package was sent to Plaintiff on November 17, 2007, at a time when Plaintiff 

was taken off C-status. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence showing

elements two and five, namely that retaliation for the filing of Plaintiff’s July 2007 

complaint – not Plaintiff’s C-status - was a substantial motivating factor causing Officer 

Maciel to fail to deliver the quarterly package to Plaintiff in October of 2007. 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant Maciel’s 

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.

3. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

As the Court explained in Section A(2) above, “An Eighth Amendment claim that 

a prison official has deprived [prisoners] of humane conditions of confinement must meet 

two requirements, one objective and one subjective.” Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The prisoner must 

“objectively show that he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’” and “make a 

subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to [his] 

health or safety.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Under the objective requirement, the Court may 

consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation to determine whether 

the risk of harm is sufficiently serious. Lewis, 217 F.3d at 731. The subjective 

requirement, relating to defendant’s state of mind, requires “deliberate indifference.” Id. 

In the context of a prisoner’s medical needs, the determination of “deliberate 

indifference” requires an examination of two elements: (1) the seriousness of the 

prisoner’s medical needs and (2) the nature of the defendant’s response. See McGuckin 

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by WMX 

Techs., Inc. v Miller, 104 F3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Plaintiff has failed to show serious deprivation under the objective requirement 

because the evidence indicates a replacement package was sent to Plaintiff only one 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 31
23

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

month later, on November 17, 2007, when Plaintiff was taken off of C-status. This same

evidence also fails to show the presence of subjective deliberate indifference on the part 

of Maciel because despite Maciel’s alleged October 2007 comment that he would

continue withholding the package, Plaintiff, nevertheless, received his package in 

November 2007 after he was taken off of C-status. Accordingly, IT IS 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant Maciel’s motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

a. Standard of Review

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from 

arbitrary government action by prohibiting states from depriving people of “life, liberty, 

or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A valid due process 

claim has three prerequisites: (1) the deprivation, (2) of a liberty or property interest, (3) 

by officials acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536–37 

(1981). 

To prevail on a claim of deprivation of liberty or property without due process of 

law, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a protected liberty or property interest. 

After meeting this threshold requirement, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the 

defendants failed to provide the process due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, at 

556–57 (1974); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, at 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, a temporary deprivation of personal property does not constitute a 

violation of a prisoner’s due process rights unless Plaintiff can show the deprivation 

imposed “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life,” causing actual harm to the inmate. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472, 483–84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).

Where a prisoner alleges the deprivation of a liberty or property interest in the 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, caused by the unauthorized negligent or 

intentional action of a prison official, the prisoner cannot state a constitutional claim 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 31
24

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy under the Parratt-Hudson 

Doctrine. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 359 (1981) (holding that a negligent 

deprivation of a prison inmate’s property by state officials does not violate the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause if an adequate post remedy exists); see also Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533 (1983) (extending Parratt rule to intentional deprivation); see 

also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (per curiam) (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that 

prisoner had failed to state a due process claim for deprivation of property because 

“California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property 

deprivations. See Cal. Gov’t Code § § 810-895.”).

The Ninth Circuit has held that California law provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for property deprivations caused by public officials. Barnett v. 

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (per curiam) (9th Cir. 1994); see Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895

(West 2013). Under California Government Code §§ 810 et seq., California permits

prisoners to seek a post deprivation state judicial remedy for any property deprivations. 

Cal. Gov’t Code §§810-895 (West 2013). It is the existence of the alternative remedies 

that bars Plaintiff from pursuing a §1983 procedural due process claim, not whether 

Plaintiff attempted or even succeeded in redressing his loss through the available state 

remedy process. Willoughby v. Lewis, 717 F.Supp. 1439, 1443 (D. Nev. 1989). 

b. Discussion

There is no evidence that Plaintiff pursued the state law remedy available to him 

under California Government Code § § 810 et seq. before asserting his constitutional 

claim. Therefore, as a matter of law, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim. In addition, Plaintiff has not provided 

evidence that the deprivation he experienced was of such constitutional magnitude that a 

material issue of fact exists. Although prisoners have a protected property interest in 

their personal property, authorized property deprivations are permissible if conducted 

pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. See

Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 31
25

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(1987). 

The undisputed facts show Plaintiff was on C-status from September 18, 2007 to 

October 16, 2007. A quarterly package for Plaintiff arrived at Calipatria State Prison on 

September 19, 2007 – while he was classified under C-status and ineligible to receive it. 

When quarterly packages arrive for inmates who are ineligible to receive them, they are 

shipped back to the vendor. Officer Maciel completed an unauthorized package form due 

to Plaintiff’s inability to receive the September 19, 2007 quarterly package and provided 

a copy of the form to Plaintiff on October 14, 2007. A replacement package was sent to 

Plaintiff on November 17, 2007 after Plaintiff was taken off C-status. Thus, the evidence 

demonstrates the deprivation resulting from the return to sender and subsequent reshipment of Plaintiff’s quarterly package constituted a temporary deprivation of personal 

property, which is not a cognizable due process violation. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 

813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (no due process violation where an inmate’s property was taken 

in connection with his reclassification to a status in which he was not authorized to 

possess the additional property); Choun v. Woodford, No. C 03 3219 SI, 2005 WL 

1910930, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (concluding that the temporary deprivation 

of personal property did not violate the prisoner’s due process rights); Owens v. Ayers, 

No. C 01 3720 SI (PR), 2002 WL 73226, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2002). Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that this Court GRANT Defendant Maciel’s motion for

summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

C. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action: Claims Against Lieutenant Jimenez 

Under The First and Fourteenth Amendments 

1. Party Arguments

Defendant argues Lieutenant Jimenez, who presided over Plaintiff’s rule violation 

hearing, did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendment because Plaintiff was given a 

full hearing and there was some evidence to support Jimenez’s guilty finding. [ECF No. 

57-2 20:11-14.]

Plaintiff argues Lieutenant Jimenez found him guilty of possessing a cell phone 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 31
26

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

battery in retaliation for bringing suits against CDCR officers because his cellmate 

testified that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the battery at the rules violation hearing and 

Lieutenant Jimenez told Plaintiff that: “he know [Plaintiff] like to sued [sic] and he don’t 

want [Plaintiff] to sued [sic] him, with a smirk on his face.” [ECF No. 43 at p. 35.]

a. First Amendment Retaliation

As explained previously, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains 

five elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took adverse action against an inmate, (2) 

because of, (3) that inmate’s protected conduct, and that action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment Rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a 

legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005.) 

The plaintiff must submit evidence that links the alleged retaliation with the exercise of a 

First Amendment right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995.) Specifically, 

the plaintiff must show the exercise of the First Amendment right was the substantial or 

motivating factor behind the defendant’s conduct. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 

F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that raising a genuine issue of material fact as to 

retaliatory motive requires the plaintiff to prove evidence of proximity between the 

speech and retaliation, opposition to the speech and a pretextual reason for the retaliatory 

conduct. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 771 n.21. However, Plaintiff has failed to show Defendant 

Lieutenant Jimenez’s November 24, 2009 guilty finding was substantially motivated by 

Plaintiff’s July 2007 complaint two years earlier against CDCR officers, none of whom 

were Lieutenant Jimenez. No proximity in time has been demonstrated. Plaintiff has also 

failed to show causation in light of the undisputed evidence that non-party Officer 

Landeros found the battery in a cell shared by both Plaintiff and Rideau after a random 

search. Lieutenant Jimenez was neither involved in the random cell search, nor involved 

in the discovery of the battery that led to an issuance of the rules violation report.

Plaintiff has not submitted evidence sufficient to meet elements two and five, namely that 

retaliation for the filing of Plaintiff’s July 2007 complaint – not the discovery of 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

 31
27

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

contraband in Plaintiff’s shared cell - was a substantial motivating factor that caused 

Lieutenant Jimenez to find Plaintiff guilty of a prison rules violation. Accordingly, IT IS 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant Jimenez’ motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.

b. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

As the Court explained in Section B(4) above, under the Constitution’s Fourteenth 

Amendment, no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 

process of law. Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions 

imposed by the nature of the penal system. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 

S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Although a prisoner in a prison disciplinary hearing is 

not entitled to the full array of due process rights that a defendant possesses in a criminal 

prosecution, he is entitled to some protections including: the right to call witnesses, to 

present documentary evidence, and to have a written statement by the fact finder as to the 

evidence relied upon along with the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. Id.

When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of credits, which 

happened in this case, due process requires the prisoner to receive: (1) advance written 

notice of at least 24 hours of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent 

with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary 

evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence 

relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 

454 (1985); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–567. In addition, due process requires that the 

decision be supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, citing U.S. ex rel. 

Vatauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106, 47 S.Ct. 302, 71 L.Ed. 560 

(1927).

As the records attached to both parties’ motions show, Plaintiff was given all the 

rights and procedural safeguards of a rule violation hearing when Lieutenant Jimenez 

found him guilty of possession of contraband. Specifically, Plaintiff received the rules 

violation report documents more than twenty-four hours before the hearing. Plaintiff was 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

 31
28

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

present in person for the November 24, 2009 hearing, read the rules violation report aloud 

at the hearing and stated that he understood it. Plaintiff gave a statement in his defense 

and also presented and questioned inmate Rideau as his witness. After the hearing had 

concluded, Lieutenant Jimenez added his findings to the report. 

Finally, there was some evidence introduced at the hearing to support Jimenez’

finding despite testimony that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the contraband cell phone 

battery. Specifically, Jimenez also considered the written statements of Officer Landeros, 

who wrote the rules violation report against Plaintiff, conducted the search, found the 

contraband and determined the battery belonged to Plaintiff. IT IS THEREFORE 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Jimenez’ motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court, however, has 

found that no violation of Plaintiff’s First, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights

occurred. As a result, the Court need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. 

See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5 (1998) (“The better approach 

to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine 

first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”); see 

also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have 

been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries 

concerning qualified immunity.”)

E. Unserved Defendants

Summary judgment may be entered in favor of unserved defendants where: (1) the 

controlling issues would be the same as to the unserved defendants; (2) those issues have 

been briefed; and (3) the plaintiff has been provided an opportunity to address the 

controlling issues. Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 

802–03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 864, 116 S.Ct. 178, 133 L.Ed.2d 117 (1995) 

(citing, inter alia, Silverton v. Department of the Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

 31
29

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 393, 70 L.Ed.2d 210 (1981)).

In this case, the controlling issues for unserved Defendant Nurse S. Garcia, who is

alleged to have made a sling for Plaintiff’s arm after his fall on September 5, 2009, yet 

did not recommend a lower bunk [ECF No. 43 at pp. 32-33] and Defendant S. Ramos, 

who is alleged to have forced Plaintiff to use an upper bunk despite his injured shoulder 

and ankle are the same as those for Nurse Molina and Office Hughey respectively. These

issues have been fully briefed in the cross-motions for summary judgment and discussed 

in the instant Report and Recommendation. In sum, the Court recommended a finding 

that there are no material issues of fact remaining as to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment 

retaliation or Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims because Defendants have 

presented evidence that inmates with medical accommodation chronos have lower bunk 

preference; Plaintiff did not have a medical accommodation chrono for a lower bunk on 

September 5, 2009; medical accommodation chronos are only issued by medical doctors

and neither the nurses, nor officers identified by Plaintiff were able to issue, modify or 

disregard medical accommodation chronos. For the same reasons explained in detail 

herein, it is also RECOMMENDED that the Court find unserved Defendants S. Garcia 

and S. Ramos are also entitled to summary judgment as to the claims against them.

On August 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response to the cross-motions for summary 

judgment seeking leave of Court to amend his Second Amended Complaint because he 

believes he has discovered the new name of the unserved defendant S. Ramos to now be

V. Sojo. [ECF No. 60. ] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may 

amend its complaint once “as a matter of course” before a responsive pleading is served, 

or at any time within twenty days of service if it requires no response. “Otherwise a party 

may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 

adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15 (a). This Court notes that on several occasions, “the Supreme Court has instructed the 

lower federal courts to heed carefully the command of Rule 15(a), F[ed]. R. Civ. P., by 

freely granting leave to amend when justice so requires.” DCD Programs, LTD. v. 

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of

 31
30

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward & 

Co., 785 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1986)) (quoting Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 

1190 (9th Cir. 1973)) (citations omitted). “Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to 

pleadings should be applied with ‘extreme liberality.’” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 

977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406 (9th

Cir. 1960) (per curiam)). Liberality in granting leave to amend pleadings is not 

dependent on whether amendment will add causes of action or parties; however, “it is 

subject to qualification that amendment not cause opposing party undue prejudice, is not 

sought in bad faith, and does not constitute an exercise in futility.” DCD Programs, Ltd. 

v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1981). In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), 

the United States Supreme Court held that leave to amend pleadings should be freely 

given in the absence of any apparent or declared reasons. The Court enunciated multiple 

factors a district court should consider when deciding whether to grant leave to amend, 

including: [U]ndue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment. Id. 

at 182. Here, the Foman factors of futility of amendment and undue prejudice to 

Defendants weigh against granting Plaintiff leave to amend. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint 

to change the name of S. Ramos to V. Sojo and thereafter serve officer Sojo be DENIED

for futility because it has been recommended herein that the Court find neither the nurses, 

nor officers violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the First or Eighth

Amendment. The existence of undue prejudice also supports this recommendation for 

denial of leave to amend because discovery is now closed in this case and Defendants 

would be prejudiced by the year-long length of the delay (the Second Amended 

Complaint was filed on March 20, 2015) and the advanced stage of this case.

///

///

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 30 of

 31
31

11cv1240 JAH (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge John A. Houston under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons 

outlined above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment and DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. IT IS 

FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court DEBY Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

amend.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than September 20, 

2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 27, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: September 6, 2016

Case 3:11-cv-01240-JAH-BGS Document 61 Filed 09/06/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of

 31