Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01482/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 23:1441 Contract Real Estate

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALPHONSE W. LYLES, No. 2:10-cv-01482-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

AMERICA’s SERVICING COMPANY,

NDEX WEST LLC, and DOES 1-50

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Ex Parte

Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction (“Application”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(b). Plaintiff Alphonse W. Lyles (“Plaintiff”) seeks

to enjoin Defendants America’s Servicing Company and NDEX West,

LLC (“Defendants”) from conducting a trustee sale of his home,

which is currently scheduled for 9:30 a.m. on June 30, 2010. 

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Case 2:10-cv-01482-MCE -DAD Document 8 Filed 06/29/10 Page 1 of 5
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Issuance of a temporary restraining order, as a form of

preliminary injunctive relief, is an extraordinary remedy, and

Plaintiffs have the burden of proving the propriety of such a

remedy by clear and convincing evidence. See Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.

Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442 (1974). Certain prerequisites must

be satisfied prior to issuance of a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”). See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of

Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (stating

that the purpose of a TRO is “preserving the status quo and

preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold

a hearing [on the preliminary injunction application], and no

longer”). In general, the showing required for a temporary

restraining order is the same as that required for a preliminary

injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush &

Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). Following the

Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008), the party requesting preliminary

injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed on the

merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips

in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374; see also American Trucking

Assocs. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (“To the

extent that our cases have suggested a lesser standard [than that

required for injunctive relief by Winter], they are no longer

controlling, or even viable.”). 

Case 2:10-cv-01482-MCE -DAD Document 8 Filed 06/29/10 Page 2 of 5
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The propriety of a temporary restraining order, in

particular, hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury

(Simula, Inc. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999))

that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v.

Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for

TRO and finds that the balance of equities sufficiently tips in

the favor of Plaintiff such that the issuance of a TRO is

warranted. 

Pursuant to California Civil Code § 2924(a), a trustee,

mortgagee, or beneficiary may not exercise the power of sale

until a Notice of Default has been recorded not less than three

months prior to the date of foreclosure. See Cal. Civ. Code

§ 2924(a). The California Court of Appeal has held that while

Civil Code §§ 2924-2924h, inclusive, do not require personal

notice by a trustor of a notice of default or notice of sale,

they do mandate certain procedural requirements reasonably

calculated to inform those who may be affected by a foreclosure

sale that a default has occurred and a foreclosure sale is

imminent. See Knapp v. Doherty, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 10 (Ct. App.

2004); Lupertino v. Carbahal, 111 Cal. Rptr. 112, 115 (Ct. App.

1973).

Such procedural requirements apparently have not been met

here. Plaintiff has alleged that not only was he not informed of

a Notice of Default three months prior to date of foreclosure,

but that Notice of Trustee Sale was not publicly posted or

provided to Plaintiff until sixteen days prior, in violation of

the twenty-day mandate of California Civil Code § 2924(f). 

Case 2:10-cv-01482-MCE -DAD Document 8 Filed 06/29/10 Page 3 of 5
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Plaintiff has indicated that he contacted Defendants via

telephone and facsimile regarding postponement of the sale and

his intention to seek a TRO. Defendants refused to postpone the

sale and, to date, have failed to rebut or oppose the allegation

of deficient notices.

Defendants are statutorily obligated to follow a strict

procedural standard in conducting foreclosure on a home. This

Court will not institute a rule which allows that process to be

shortchanged, thus robbing the mortgagor of an appreciable

opportunity to cure default on his loan and prevent the

irreparable harm of the loss of his home. In light of

Defendants’ failure file any opposition to the allegations

brought against it by Plaintiff, the Court must protect the

status quo until such time as the allegations raised by Plaintiff

can be determined to be true or not true.

Accordingly, to preserve the status quo until hearing on

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction can be had,

Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order is hereby

GRANTED. The sale date of June 30, 2010 is stayed for the

property of 4134 Sea Drift Way, Sacramento, CA 95823. No bond is

required as Plaintiff’s home currently serves as security.

In granting Plaintiff’s Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order, the Court makes no ruling on the merits of the

Plaintiff’s underlying claim and/or the likelihood of the

issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. 

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Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is

hereby scheduled for 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, July 13, 2010, in

Courtroom 7 before Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. Any Opposition

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction must be filed by

4:00 p.m., July 7, 2010. Any Reply to Defendants’ Opposition

must be filed by 4:00 p.m., July 9, 2010. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 29, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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