Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-03046/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-03046-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGGIE R. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 14CV3046 BEN (KSC)

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING REPORT & 

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) DISMISSING PETITION;

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY; AND 

(4) DENYING REQUEST FOR BAIL

[Docket Nos. 16, 21, 22, 24]

Petitioner Reggie R. Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this 

action with the filing of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254. (Docket No. 1). Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition as untimely. 

(Docket No. 16.) On September 4, 2015, Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford issued a 

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thoughtful and thorough Report and Recommendation recommending that the Petition be 

dismissed as untimely. (Docket No. 21.) Objections to the Report and Recommendation 

were filed. (Docket No. 22.) For the reasons that follow, the Objections are overruled, 

the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED, and the Petition is DISMISSED as 

untimely.

DISCUSSION

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition” of a 

magistrate judge on a dispositive matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the [report and 

recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

However, “[t]he statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate 

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis 

in original); see also Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). 

“Neither the Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, 

findings and recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. The Court will not restate the Report & Recommendation and 

its conclusions. Although the Court has conducted a de novo review, the Court will only 

specifically address those issues to which Petitioner has objected.1

I. Statutory Tolling Objections

Petitioner asserts that the Report and Recommendation incorrectly concluded that 

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed 261 days after his conviction became final 

because his direct appeal had just been completed. Petitioner includes a copy of the 

appellate court’s January 22, 2009 decision affirming his conviction. However, as the 

 

1 Petitioner’s Objections include arguments addressing the merits of the Petition. Because the Motion to 

Dismiss and Report and Recommendation are based on untimeliness the Court does not address the 

merits arguments.

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Report and Recommendation explains, the California Supreme Court subsequently 

denied his petition for review on April 1, 2009. Because no writ of certiorari was filed 

with the United States Supreme Court, Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 30, 

2009. He did not file his first state court habeas petition until March 18, 2010 — 261 

days later. As explained in the Report and Recommendation, the statute of limitations is 

not tolled during this time. Accordingly, this objection is overruled. 

Petitioner also objects that statute of limitations should be tolled for the entire 

period from the date the first habeas petition is filed in state superior court until the 

petition is rejected by the State Supreme Court. (Objections at 4.) He cites Brown v. 

Poole, 337 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) is support of this objection. (Id.) Brown does not 

stand for this proposition and the case has no application. Brown concluded that the 

statute of limitations was tolled while a petition was pending in the Superior Court, but 

taken off calendar at the petitioner’s request pending an upcoming parole hearing. 

Brown, 337 F.3d at 1158-59. That is not the case here. Additionally, Petitioner’s 

statement of the law is not entirely accurate. “The time that an application for state 

postconviction review is ‘pending’ includes the period between (1) a lower court’s 

adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that

the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 

189, 191 (2006) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002)). “[I]n California, 

‘unreasonable delays’ are not timely” and the statute of limitations is not tolled during 

these periods. Id. at 197. And, the time between the denial of a petition and the filing of 

a successive petition in the same court is only tolled if the “subsequent petition [is] 

limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition.” Stancle v. 

Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing first step in the test outlined in King 

v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, abrogated on other grounds by Chavis, 546 U.S. 189).

The Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation’s conclusions concerning 

the intervals between state court filings, including those dealing with successive petitions.

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However, even if the statute of limitations was tolled during every interval,

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as he asserts 

is should be in his Objections, his federal Petition was still filed outside the statute of 

limitations. As explained above, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition in state court 

261 days after his conviction became final. “[T]he statute of limitations is not tolled 

‘from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal to the time the first state 

collateral challenge is filed.’” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other 

grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225 (2002)). And, 284 days passed between 

the California Supreme Court’s denial of his habeas petition and the filing of his federal 

Petition. The combined 545 days exceeds the 365 days allowed by 180 days even if, as 

Petitioner objects, the statute of limitations was tolled during the entire period from when 

his first state habeas petition was filed and the California Supreme Court rejected it.

Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to any more statutory tolling than 

provided in the Report and Recommendation. His statutory tolling Objections are 

overruled. 

II. Equitable Tolling Objections

Petitioner appears to assert that is entitled to equitable tolling in his Objections.3 

“The Supreme Court and the policies behind AEDEPA require that equitable tolling be 

used only to protect diligent petitioners facing extraordinary circumstances that prevent 

them from timely filing federal habeas petitions.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 

F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

“The exception for equitable tolling cannot be interpreted so broadly as to displace the 

 

2 The Court agrees with and adopts the Report and Recommendation’s analysis concerning tolling of the 

intervals between Petitioner’s filings. 

3 As noted in the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner declined to seek equitable tolling in his 

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss despite it being raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner 

specifically notes “It is unsure [sic] to petitioner why respondent cite equitable tolling claims.” (Opp. at 

3.) Petitioner asserts for the first time that he is entitled to equitable tolling in his Objections.

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statutory limitations that Congress crafted.” Id. Equitable tolling is only available when 

the petitioner “shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing” Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). “[E]quitable tolling 

is ‘unavailable in most cases.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). “[T]he threshold necessary 

to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the 

rule.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

In support of his equitable tolling Objection, Petitioner identifies six prisons where 

he has been incarcerated and notes that he had either limited or no access to the law 

library at those facilities. In addition, he attaches an exhibit documenting which facilities 

he was located in within the prison system over his entire incarceration. Comparing the 

two, the Court can conclude that only three of those prisons listed in his Objections could 

have any relevance:

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(1) California Rehabilitation Center (NORCO) (“CRC”) — two 

hours a week; (2) California Institution for Men, Central, (“CIM-Central”) [identified as 

“Chino Central”] — no access; and (3) Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (“CVSP”) —

limited access. 

The Court first addresses Petitioner’s challenge as to CRC and CVSP. Petitioner is 

not entitled to equitable tolling based on his law library access while housed at these 

facilities for numerous reasons. First, the “two hours a week” or “limited access”

available at CRC and CVSP are “ordinary prison limitations” on law library access that 

 

4 The other facilities identified are not relevant for purposes of tolling because Petitioner was housed in 

them either before his conviction became final or after his federal petition was filed. The month he was 

housed at Richard J. Donovan from March 6, 2008 to April 7, 2008, when he claims he had no access to 

the law library, was more than a year before his conviction became final. And, he was housed in 

LaPalma Correctional Facility, where he claims he had no law library access, and California City 

Correctional Facility, where he claims he has limited law library access, after he filed his federal 

petition.

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do not constitute extraordinary circumstances. See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 

(9th Cir. 2009) (denying equitable tolling when petitioner was in administrative 

segregation and had limited access to the law library and copy machine). Second, 

Petitioner does not explain how the level of library access prevented him from timely 

filing. Even if the Court found his library access was an extraordinary circumstance, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated how it made “it impossible to file a petition on time.” 

Roy, 465 F.3d at 969. He has offered no explanation. Third, particularly as to CRC, 

Petitioner’s record of filings in the state courts while housed in CRC reflect that the 

prison’s time limitations were not extraordinary circumstances that prevented Petitioner’s 

timely filing. For example, during the 261-day period noted above, Petitioner was 

housed in CRC. This is the same facility where he was housed when he filed at least six 

petitions before the state courts. 

As to Petitioner’s time at CIM Central, where he claims he had no access to a law 

library, he was only housed in CIM-Central for two days — October 9, 2013 to October 

10, 2013. It appears on those two days that he was being assigned a facility within the 

prison. Again, this is an ordinary prison limitation, but even if the Court assumed it was 

an extraordinary circumstance, Petitioner has not explained how this circumstance 

prevented him from timely filing. 

Petitioner’s equitable tolling Objections are overruled. 

III. Evidentiary Hearing Objection

Petitioner appears to assert that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue 

of tolling and relies on Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964. However, Roy reiterated that an 

evidentiary hearing is warranted “when [a petitioner] makes ‘a good faith allegation that 

would, if true, entitled him to equitable tolling.’” 465 F.3d at 969 (quoting Laws v. 

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). Petitioner has made no allegations that 

would entitle him to equitable tolling. As discussed above, he does not allege how two 

hours a week or “limited access” prevented him from timely filing. It is not clear that 

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these limits could ever justify equitable tolling because ordinary limitations on a 

prisoner’s access to the law library are not extraordinary circumstances. See Ramirez, 

571 F.3d at 998. As the Ninth Circuit explained in addressing the access limits imposed 

on prisoners in administrative segregation, “[g]iven even the most common day-to-day 

security restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit the exception to 

swallow the rule.” Id. However, the Court need not conclude that two hours a week or 

limited access to the law library could never constitute an extraordinary circumstance 

because Petitioner’s allegations do not even suggest how the limits prevented him from 

timely filing.

Petitioner’s Objections based on access to an evidentiary hearing are overruled.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability because the issues are not 

debatable among jurists of reason and there are no questions adequate to deserve 

encouragement. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s Objections are overruled and the Report and Recommendation is 

ADOPTED. The Petition is DISMISSED as untimely and a certificate of appealability 

is DENIED. Petitioner’s Motion for Bail Pending Determination of Petition is DENIED

as moot. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment DISMISSING the Petition as untimely.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2015

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