Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00845/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00845-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH

E-FILED on 5/20/05

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JEANNETTE CARDENAS, individually and as

Guardian ad Litem of RODOLFO CARDENAS,

JESSICA CARDENAS, and RUBEN

CARDENAS, minors; REGINA CARDENAS,

individually; CORINA CARDENAS, individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, a public entity;

MICHAEL WALKER, individually; and DOES 1

to 50,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00845 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND

ACTION TO STATE COURT

[Re Docket Nos. 5, 14]

DORA BARELA, individually and as Successor in

interest for RODOLFO CARDENAS, deceased,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

This is a civil rights action stemming from events leading to the death of Rodolfo Cardenas

("Cardenas"). The state of California, the California Department of Justice, the California Department of

Corrections, the Parole Fugitive Apprehension Team, the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, Officer

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 2

Michael Walker ("Walker"), Officer Jason Lara ("Lara"), Special Agent Steve Davies ("Davies"), Officer

Brian Link ("Link"), and Officer Cesar Sanchez ("Sanchez") (collectively "defendants") move to dismiss

portions of a complaint in intervention (" the complaint") filed by plaintiff Dora Barela ("Barela"), Cardenas'

mother. Cardenas' wife and children ("the Cardenas plaintiffs") also move to remand the case to state

court. The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered the arguments of counsel. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion to dismiss

and denies the Cardenas plaintiffs' motion to remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Barela's complaint alleges that, on February 17, 2004, the individual defendants were staking out a

house in San Jose. Compl. ¶ 19. Defendants were looking to arrest an individual, David Gonzales, for a

parole violation. Id. Barela asserts that defendants mistook Cardenas for Gonzales, even though the two

men did not look alike. Id. at ¶ 20. Defendants pursued Cardenas in unmarked cars, without lights or

sirens, at a high rate of speed and in a reckless manner. Id. at ¶ 21. Cardenas stopped his van and tried to

flee on foot. Id. at ¶ 22. Walker, wearing plain clothes and not identifiable as a police officer, got out of

his unmarked car and, with other defendants, pursued Cardenas. Id. at ¶ 23. Cardenas had nothing in his

hands and was not threatening anyone. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 27. Without warning, Walker shot Cardenas in the

back. Id. ¶ 24. 

Walker, Lara, Davies, Link, and Sanchez searched and handcuffed Cardenas. Id. at 25. Despite

the fact that Cardenas needed immediate medical care, defendants refused to let paramedics help him. Id. 

Cardenas was "awake and alert" immediately after the shooting, and was in "extreme conscious pain." Id.

at 31. Following the shooting, defendants gave false statements, concealed or altered evidence, and

tampered with witnesses to exonerate themselves. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33. Barela alleges the investigation did not

conform to accepted police standards and practices, and was biased in defendants' favor. Id. ¶ 34.

Cardenas died intestate. The Cardenas plaintiffs brought suit on July 19, 2004 against defendants

for wrongful death and excessive use of force. The parties stipulated to allow Barela to join the lawsuit as a

plaintiff. Barela claims that she relied on Cardenas for "financial and other support" at the time of his death. 

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

In a declaration, Barela claims to be Cardenas' "successor in interest" under California

Code of Civil Procedure section 377.11. Barela Decl. ¶ 4. 

2 Barela's assault and battery claim is only against Walker and the state entities, and is not at

issue in this motion.

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 3

Id. at ¶ 2.1 Barela sued defendants for (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"), including

violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, (2) violation of

Article I, sections 1 and 13 of the California Constitution, (3) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, (4)

negligence, and (5) assault and battery.2 

 Defendants removed the action to federal court on February 28, 2005. The Cardenas plaintiffs

brought a motion to remand on March 30, 2005. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard for Dismissal

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when a complaint exhibits either a "lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). The court must accept the facts alleged in

the complaint as true. Id. "A complaint should not be dismissed 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Gilligan v.

Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957)). In addition, "[c]ivil rights complaints are to be liberally construed." Buckey v. County of Los

Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Standing

1. Survival Claim

Defendants first challenge Barela's ability to seek redress for Cardenas' death. Under California,

there are two means by which a plaintiff can bring a claim stemming from someone else's death: survival and

wrongful death actions. In a survival action, the plaintiff "steps into the shoes" of the decedent: "[s]urvival

statutes . . . seek damages for a decedent's injuries and harm sustained prior to the death of the decedent. 

Recovery becomes an asset of the decedent's estate." In re Estate of Lowrie, 118 Cal. App. 4th 220,

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 Damages available in survival actions "are limited to the loss or damage that the decedent

sustained or incurred before death . . . and do not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement." 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34.

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 4

226 n.3 (2004). California's survival statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30, entitles

"successor[s] in interest" to bring such actions:

A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an

action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest, subject to

Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7000) of Part 1 of Division 7 of the Probate

Code, and anactionmaybe commenced by the decedent's personal representative

or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest. 

In turn, California Probate Code section 7000 provides that title to the property of a decedent who dies

intestate passes to the decedent's heirs according to the laws of intestate succession. Also, California's

Code of Civil Procedure defines "successor in interest" as "the beneficiary of the decedent's estate or other

successor in interest who succeeds to a cause of action or to a particular item of the property that is the

subject of a cause of action." § 377.11.3 Thus, a plaintiff may be able to bring a survival action if she is (1)

the beneficiary of the decedent's estate, (2) an heir under the laws of intestate succession, or (3) the

decedent's personal representative. Barela does not meet these requirements. For one, Barela does not

allege that she stands to take from Cardenas' estate by virtue of any testamentary document. In addition,

because Cardenas' wife and children survived him, Barela, is not an heir under the rules of intestate

succession. See Cal. Prob. Code §§ 6401(c)(2)(B) and 6402(b) (decedent's parent is only heir if he has

no surviving spouse or children); cf. Lowrie, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 227-31 (plaintiff had standing to bring

Elder Abuse claim on behalf of grandfather because she took from his estate). 

Barela does, however, have standing to assert a wrongful death claim. In contrast to a survival

action, wrongful death claims "belong to the 'decedent's heirs and other specified relations . . . and are

meant to compensate them for their own losses resulting from the decedent's death." Lowrie, 118 Cal.

App. 4th at 226 n.3 (quoting Cal. Elder Law Litigation: An Advocate's Guide,§ 

6.46, at 411). California's wrongful death statute provides:

A cause of action for the deathof a personcaused bythe wrongful act or neglect of

another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent's

personal representative on their behalf:

(a) The decedent's surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of

deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons,

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Damages for wrongful death can include recovery for loss of love and companionship as

well as loss of financial support. See Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 72 (1977).

5 Accordingly, the court need not address Barela's contention that she may seek damages for

Cardenas' pain and suffering under section 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). Such damages are only

available, if at all, in survival actions. Compare Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F.Supp. 230, 233 (C.D. Cal.

1997) (pain and suffering damages available under section 1983) and Williams v. City of Oakland, 915

F.Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same) and Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981)

(same) with Venerable v. City of Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130, 1132-33 (E.D. Cal. 2002)

("[b]ecause state law does not permit recovery of a decedent's pain and suffering, [plaintiff's] claim for pain

and suffering from injury leading to death does not survive and will be dismissed"). Because Barela cannot

assert a survival action, she cannot recover for Cardenas' pain and suffering.

6 Defendants acknowledge that Barela can assert a claim for loss of familial relationship in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment through section 1983.

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 5

including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the

property of the decedent by intestate succession.

(b) Whether or not qualified under subdivision (a), if they were dependent on the

decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, or

parents. 

 Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60 (emphasis added).4 Because Barela alleges that she was financially

dependent on Cardenas, she has standing to assert a wrongful death claim under section 377.60(b). 

Barela then argues that her ability to bring a wrongful death cause of action also entitles her to bring

a survival cause of action. Barela claims that, as a financially dependent parent, she "succeeds" to wrongful

death cause of action. According to Barela, this "succession" transforms her into a "successor in interest"

under the survival statute. Barela is mistaken. A wrongful death cause of action "arises on the death of the

injured person." Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 864 (1953). To be a "successor in interest" under

the survival statute, Barela must have obtained a cause of action that Cardenas could have brought on his

own behalf had he survived. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.11 ("successor in interest" must receive

cause of action as "beneficiary of the decedent's estate"). Of course, had Cardenas lived, he could not

have brought a wrongful death claim on his own behalf. Thus, the fact that Barela has standing under the

wrongful death statute has no bearing on the issue of whether she has standing under the survival statute. 

The court thus dismisses her survival claim without prejudice.5

2. Fourth Amendment Claim

Next, defendants argue that Barela cannot maintain a section 1983 civil rights claim for violation of

Cardenas' Fourth Amendment rights.6 Compl. ¶¶ 37-42. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1969), the

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 That section provides that federal courts shall exercise their jurisdiction

in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry

the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are

deficient inthe provisions necessarytofurnishsuitable remedies and punishoffenses against

law, the commonlaw, as modified and changed bythe constitutionand statutes ofthe State

wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 6

Supreme Court established that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other

constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States,

394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). The Ninth Circuit recognizes an exception to this rule for survival actions

under section 1983:

[T]he general rule is that only the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were

violated can sue to vindicate those rights. In [section] 1983 actions, however, the

survivors of an individual killed as a result ofanofficer's excessive use offorce may

assert a FourthAmendment claimonthat individual's behalfifthe relevant state'slaw

authorizes a survival action. The party seeking to bring a survival action bears the

burdenofdemonstrating that a particular state's law authorizes a survivalactionand

that the plaintiff meets that state's requirements for bringing a survival action.

Moreland v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations

omitted). Because Barela does not have standing to assert a survival action, her Fourth Amendment claim

must fail.

Barela contends that she has standing to assert Cardenas' Fourth Amendment rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1988(a). That provision requires courts to look to state law to resolve damages issues under

section 1983 but forbids courts from applying state law when it is "inconsistent with the Constitution and

laws of the United States." Id.

7

 Barela cites Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 1966),

Alvarez v. Wiley, 71 Cal. App. 3d 599 (1977), Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177 (1996),

Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wash. 1987), and Venerable v. City of

Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002) for the proposition that denying her claim for

violation of Cardenas' Fourth Amendment rights would be inconsistent with the federal Constitution. 

Barela's authority is not persuasive. For one, Galindo (1) preceded Rakas and (2) while noting that it

involves fatal police shooting, does not specify whether the decedent's Fourth Amendment rights or the

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 As noted, plaintiffs can bring a claim for loss of a familial relationship in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment through section 1983 even if they lack Fourth Amendment standing.

9 At oral argument, Barela's counsel suggested that Moreland held that plaintiffs can seek to

vindicate other people's Fourth Amendment rights under section 377.60. Moreland, which involved

Nevada law, did indeed remark in dicta that section 377.60 gives "a . . . right extending to family members

or heirs to bring a survival action independent or in lieu of the estate's claim." Moreland, 159 F.3d at 370. 

However, the court respectfully submits that Moreland is mistaken about section 377.60. Section

377.60(b) does not authorize a survival action: 

Unlike other provisions of this chapter that relate to causes of actionbelonging

to the decedent, this article relates to a cause of action for the decedent's

wrongful death, whichbelongs not to the decedent, but to the persons specified

in this section. Thus, the cause of action is not property in the estate of the

decedent.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.60(b), Law Revision Commission Comment, 2004 Main Volume, 1992

Addition; see also Dillard v. Curtis, 2004 WL 2496130, *7 fn. 5 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (distinguishing

survival and wrongful death causes of action in the section 1983 context). 

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 7

plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights are at issue. See Galindo, 255 F. Supp. at 931.8 Second,

Alvarez held only that equitable relief was unavailable under section 1983 in a wrongful death action, and

thus is wholly inapposite. See Alvarez, 71 Cal. App. 3d at 604. Third, Garcia held that the decedent's

sister had standing to bring a section 1983 survival action "in her capacity as representative of his estate."

Garcia, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 179. Garcia distinguished this "recovery by the representative of the estate"

from "a wrongful death action by decedent's heirs." Id. at 186-87. Fourth, Davis involved Washington

law and resolved the narrow issue of whether a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the decedent's

parents was barred by their failure to allege dependency. See Davis, 651 F. Supp. at 1257. Finally,

Venerable supports defendants' position. In that case, parents and children of the decedent brought a

section 1983 claim and a state wrongful death action. The court held that the children had standing to bring

a survival action on behalf of the decedent as his "successors in interest." See Venerable, 185 F. Supp. 2d

at 1130. The court also noted that the decedent's mother could bring a survival action on the children's

behalf as their guardian ad litem. See id. However, the decedent's father conceded that he "may only be

a party to the fourteenth amendment claim for deprivation of the right to familial association with his son." 

Id. at 1130 n.3. Thus, the court dismisses Barela's Fourth Amendment claim without prejudice.9

3. Bane Act Claims

Defendants also challenge Barela's attempt to bring claims under the Bane Act, California Civil

Code section 52.1(a), (b). Compl. ¶¶ 46-48. The Bane Act provides that 

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 8

[a]ny individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws ofthe United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this

state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with . . . may institute

and prosecute inhis or her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil actionfor

damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive relief,

and otherappropriateequitable reliefto protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment

of the right or rights secured.

Id.

In Bay Area Rapid Transit v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 4th 141, 144 (1995) ("BART"), the

parents of a teenager who was killed by a police officer sued the officer and the subway system that

employed him for wrongful death and civil rights violations made actionable by the Bane Act. The trial

court overruled defendants' demurrer. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that the Bane Act cannot

apply vicariously: 

We have no wish to denigrate in any way the degree of the loss suffered by the

[parents], or indeed for the loss of a child by any parent. We cannot, however,

accept the particular legal theory advanced in support of the [parent's] attempt to

include aBane Act cause of actionintheir lawsuit for wrongful death. The Bane Act

issimply not a wrongful death provision. It clearly provides for a personalcause of

action for the victim of a hate crime. 

Id. at 144.

Barela argues BART is no longer good law. BART relied on Boccato v. City of Hermosa Beach,

29 Cal. App. 4th 1797, 1809 (1994) for the proposition that the Bane Act 

must be read in conjunctionwithsection51.7, whichprovides that all persons have

the right to be free from 'violence, or intimidation by threat of violence committed

against their persons' because ofrace, color, religion, ancestry, etc. This reinforces

the rational interpretation of the Bane Act, i.e., that it is limited to plaintiffs who

themselves have been the subject of violence or threats. 

 

BART, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 144. However, in 2000, the California Legislature overruled Boccato. See

Stats. 2001, c. 261 (A.B. 587) ("[i]t is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to clarify that an

action brought pursuant to Section 52.1 of the Civil Code does not require the individual . . . to be a

member of a protected class identified by race, color, religion, or sex, among other things"). Barela

contends that, by overruling Boccato, the Legislature concomitantly overruled BART. 

The court disagrees. For one, BART relied on more than just Boccato. The court also declined to

find that the Bane Act applied derivatively "[i]n the absence of a clear legislative intent." BART, 38 Cal.

App. 4th at 145. The fact that the Legislature subsequently amended the Bane Act—but did not mention

BART—suggests that the court was correct. Moreover, the Bane Act only protects plaintiffs "whose

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 Barela also argues that Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004)

indicates that BART is no longer viable. In Venegas, the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff

could state a claim for constitutional violations under the Bane Act if he alleged that the defendant acted

with "threats, intimidation, or coercion" but failed to allege that those acts stemmed from discriminatory

animus. Venegas, 32 Cal. 4th at 842-43. Barela notes that Venegas referred repeatedly to the fact that

the Bane Act entitles "any individual" to assert a cause of action. See id. at 841-42. Yet this hardly reveals

the high court's disapproval of BART. In addition, Justice Baxter, who wrote separately but formed part of

Venegas' four person majority, cited BART for the proposition that the Bane Act "provides for a personal

cause of action for the victim of a hate crime." Id. at 848 (Baxter, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 

Venegas otherwise did not cite or discuss BART. Thus, contrary to Barela's claim, Venegas does not

suggest BART's demise. 

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 9

exercise or enjoyment of rights" have been violated by "threats, intimidation, or coercion." See Cal. Civ.

Code § 51(a) & (b). If the Legislature truly intended the Bane Act to serve as a wrongful death statute,

these words would be odd choices. "Threats, intimidation, or coercion" are felt most intensely in person. 

Plaintiffs like Barela are one step removed: indeed, defendants' alleged wrongdoing was directed at

Cardenas.10 Thus, because the Bane Act is not a wrongful death statute, the court dismisses Barela's Bane

Act claim without prejudice. 

4. Injunctive Relief

Finally, defendants argue that Barela lacks standing to sue for injunctive relief. Compl. at 18. To

have such standing, Barela must allege that "she 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining

some direct injury' as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be

both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,

101-02 (1983). Barela makes no such allegation. Barela's sole contention is that the Bane Act authorizes

her to seek injunctive relief. Because Barela does not have standing under the Bane Act, the court

dismisses her claim for injunctive relief. 

C. Claim for "Cover Up"

Barela alleges that defendants engaged in a post-shooting "cover up" of damaging evidence. 

Compl. ¶¶ 32-34, 37. Defendants correctly assert that Barela's section 1983 cause of action based on

these allegations can only proceed if she proves that defendants impaired her constitutional due process

right of access to the courts. See Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the

Constitution guarantees plaintiffs the right of meaningful access to the courts, the denial of which is

established where a party engages in pre-filing actions which effectively covers-up evidence and actually

renders any state court remedies ineffective"). In response, Barela clarifies that she "does not attempt to

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11 Barela also claims that the non-shooting defendants can be liable because they refused to

provide Cardenas with necessary medical care. However, defendants did not move to dismiss her

allegations in that regard. 

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 10

assert a separate claim for 'cover-up,'" but merely offers evidence "to help prove that underlying Fourth

Amendment violation . . . or to help prove supervisory or municipal liability." Opp. Mot. Dism. at 22:11-

14. Thus, the court will not construe Barela's pleadings to state a claim for an independently tortious "cover

up." 

D. Claims Against State Entities

In addition to the State of California, Barela names the California Department of Justice, the

California Department of Corrections, the Parole Fugitive Apprehension Team, and the Bureau of

Narcotics Enforcement in her complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 4-11. Defendants move to dismiss these entities from

the complaint. In response, Barela asserts that "[l]ocal police departments are public entities and can be

sued for civil rights violations." Opp. Mot. Dism. at 25:17-18. Although Barela is correct, she also alleges

that the entities listed above are "departments" of the State of California. Compl. ¶ 5. Therefore, she will

get a judgment against the State of California if her claims succeed. See Cal. Gov't Code § 900.6 ("'State'

means the State any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or agency of the State

claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Controller"). Because the entities listed above add

nothing to Barela's lawsuit, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss them.

E. Claims Against Davies, Link, Sanchez, and Lara

Defendants argue that Davies, Link, Sanchez, and Lara ("the non-shooting defendants"), who were

not present when Walker shot Cardenas, cannot be liable unless they personally participated in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. According to Barela, however, the non-shooting defendants can be liable in two

ways.11 First, Barela asserts that the non-shooting defendants can be liable "where their pre-shooting use

of excessive and unreasonable force caused an escalation of events that led to the plaintiff's injury." Opp.

Mot. Dism. at 15:13-14. For example, Barela claims, in Alexander v. City of San Francisco, 29 F.3d

1355 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit determined that an allegation that officers "used excessive force in

creating the situation which caused [the decedent] to take the actions he did" stated "a classic Fourth

Amendment violation." Id. at 1366. The flaw in this argument is that, as discussed, Barela cannot assert

Cardenas' Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed, unlike this case, the plaintiff in Alexander had standing to

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 11

assert the decedent's Fourth Amendment rights because he was the executor of the decedent's estate. See

id. at 1357. 

Barela also contends that the non-shooting defendants can be liable under traditional tort principles

of negligence if their pre-shooting conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Barela alleges that

the non-shooting defendants (1) mistook Cardenas for Gonzalez and (2) pursued him in a "dangerous and

reckless manner." Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21. Defendants note that, before they removed this proceeding, the state

court struck "a similar claim" from the Cardenas plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. Mot. Dism. at 6:6-

12. Defendants urge this court to apply the prior court's order under 28 U.S.C. § 1450 ("[a]ll injunctions,

orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until

dissolved or modified by the district court"). The court declines to do so. For one, the state court's order

was directed at the Cardenas plaintiffs, not Barela. In addition, the order granted the motion "without

prejudice to [the Cardenas] plaintiffs bringing a motion for leave to amend to add a separate cause of action

grounded upon the alleged vehicle pursuit." Fong Decl. Supp. Opp. Mot. Dism. Ex. B. Thus, this court

will consider Barela's claim on its merits. 

The existence and scope of a legal duty is a question of law. "This is because 'legal duties are . . .

merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage

done.' Duty is simply a shorthand expression for the sum total of policy considerations favoring a

conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to legal protection." Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App.

4th 1077, 1093-94 (2004) ("Union City") (quoting Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17

Cal. 3d 425, 434 (1976)) (citations omitted). Courts generally balance the so-called Rowland factors to

determine whether a duty exists. These factors include (1) the foreseeability of the harm, (2) the degree of

certainty that the injured party suffered the harm, (3) the closeness of the connection between the

defendant's conduct and the injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy

of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden on the defendant. See Rowland v. Christian, 69

Cal. 2d 108, 112-13 (1968). In cases involving a public agency, courts also must consider (1) the

consequences to the community of imposing a duty of care, (2) the availability, cost, and precedence of

insurance, (3) the extent of the agency's powers, (4) the role imposed upon the agency by law, and (5) the

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 12

limitations imposed on the agency by budget. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,

750 (1980). 

Barela contends that the court does not need to evaluate the Rowland factors because the

California Supreme Court has already determined that "police ow[e] the decedent a duty of care for their

conduct well before [the] shooting." Opp. Mot. Dism. at 17:8-9. For support, Barela cites Grudt v. City

of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 575 (1970) and Munoz v. Olin, 24 Cal. 3d 629 (1979).

 In Grudt, the decedent, who was slightly deaf, was driving in a high crime area. Two plainclothes

officers in an unmarked car attempted to stop the decedent, but he did not respond. Grudt, 2 Cal. 3d at

581. Another plainclothes officer approached the decedent's car at a red light and tapped on the window

with a shotgun. The parties introduced conflicting evidence at trial as to whether the officers then shot the

decedent or whether he suddenly accelerated first. Id. at 582. Even though the plaintiff had not mentioned

negligence in her complaint, the California Supreme Court held that she could pursue such a claim because

she had raised it in the pretrial conference order. Id. at 585-86. The court then held that there was enough

evidence that the officers breached their duty of due care to survive a motion for non-suit. Id. at 587.

In Munoz, the decedent was walking through an alley where there had been several recent cases of

arson. According to the police, officers witnessed him start a fire and then flee. Munoz, 24 Cal. 3d at

633-34. The decedent's widow sued for wrongful death; the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. 

Citing Grudt, the officers "d[id]not dispute that an officer's lack of due care can give rise to negligence

liability for the intentional shooting death of a suspect." Id. at 634. Instead, the officers contended that

there was insufficient evidence of their negligence—a conclusion with which the California Supreme Court

ultimately disagreed. See id. at 635-37. 

However, in Adams v. City of Fremont, 68 Cal. App. 4th 243 (1988), without mentioning Grudt

or Munoz, a California appellate court reexamined the Rowland factors to hold that "police officers

responding to a crisis involving a person threatening suicide with a loaded firearm have no legal duty under

tort law that would expose them to liability if their conduct fails to prevent the threatened suicide from being

carried out." Id. at 248. In Adams, an armed man situated in brush area in his backyard threatened to kill

himself. The officers' attempts to defuse the situation failed, and the man ultimately died from a self-inflicted

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 13

gunshot wound. Id. at 256. The court of appeal reasoned that the Rowland factors suggested that the

officers owed the man no duty to prevent his suicide: 

Onbalance, the relevant public policyconsiderations militate against imposinga legal

duty onpolice officersto take reasonable stepsto prevent a threatened suicide from

being carried out. The foreseeability and certainty of harm suffered are factors which

favor imposing a duty. The absence of moral blame, the remoteness of the

connection between the conduct of appellants and the harm suffered, the policy of

preventingfuture harm, consequencesto the community, the role oflawenforcement

in society, and the potential detriment to the public in imposing judicial allocation of

resources all heavily favor shielding law enforcement personnel from tort liability in

instances such as this.

Id. at 276.

In Union City, another California appellate court extended Adams to a situation not just where the

police failed to prevent harm, but where "police conduct . . . directly inflicted harm." Id. at 1099. The

police responded to a call that a woman with a knife was threatening herself and her family. The woman,

who the police believed was high on methamphetamine, was acting irrationally. When she began to move

in the direction of her father, an officer shot her. The woman's relatives sued the officer and the city,

alleging, inter alia, that the police employed unreasonable tactics. The appellate court determined that the

officers owed the woman no duty of care because "the need to protect the overall safety of the community

by encouraging law enforcement officers to exercise their best judgment in deciding how to deal with public

safety emergencies vastly outweighs the societal value of imposing tort liability for judgments they make in

emergency situations." Id. at 1097. Responding to plaintiffs' argument that Grudt and Munoz held

otherwise, the court noted that "neither Grudt nor Munoz actually analyzed the duty issue or involved a

crisis situation such as in the present case." Id. at 1100. 

Defendants argue that Adams and Union City suggest that defendants' "pre-shooting tactical

decisions," including "how they responded to the urgent information they received concerning the

whereabouts of fugitive parolee David Gonzalez," and "their actions taken during the vehicle pursuit" did not

give rise to a duty of care. Mot. Dism. at 8:28-9:5. Defendants note that Cardenas "generally does match

the description of the fugitive parolee" and "fled from Agent Walker when he followed him to determine his

identity." Mot. Dism. at 10 n.3. Defendants contends that (1) it is not foreseeable that mis-identifying

Cardenas and "driving very aggressively" in a "dangerous and reckless manner" would lead to Cardenas

being shot, (2) defendants' conduct was not morally blameworthy because they were attempting to

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 Defendants cite Cal. Veh. Code § 17001 (public entity liable for negligent or wrongful

operation of motor vehicle) and Cal. Gov't Code § 820(a) (public employees generally liable to same

extent as private person).

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 14

apprehend a fugitive parolee, (3) the law already imposes tort liability on police officers for negligent

operation of police vehicles,12 and (4) recognizing a duty here would chill effective law enforcement. 

The difficulty with defendants' arguments is that this is a motion to dismiss, and the court is bound

by the allegations in Barela's complaint. Barela's allegations are substantially different than defendants'

characterization of the facts:

Rodolfo Cardenas did not match the physical description of David Gonzalez 

. . . . Without having any reasonable basis to believe that Rodolfo Cardenas had

committed or was about to committ[sic]anycrime,Defendant Walker and the other

Individual Defendants pursued Rodolfo Cardenas, who was driving a van.

Defendants pursued Rodolfo Cardenas in unmarked cars . . . without proper

emergencylights or sirens, at a high rate of speed . . . . Rodolfo Cardenas stopped

the van he was driving . . . got out . . . and ran. 

Compl. ¶¶ 19-22. Thus, two of defendants' central factual claims— that (1) Gonzalez and Cardenas look

alike and that (2) Cardenas fled from Walker when Walker tried to determine Cardenas' identity—are not

mentioned in the complaint. 

Based on Barela's allegations, the court cannot absolve the non-shooting defendants from owing a

duty of reasonable care toward Cardenas. Adams and Union City are manifestly different. Both cases

rejected claims that police tactics during stand-offs could give rise to a duty of due care. Here, according

to Barela, the non-shooting defendants mistook Cardenas for Gonzalez and then pursued him without

identifying themselves as police officers. While Adams and Union City were reluctant to impose the

specter of tort liability upon officers who must decide how to approach a delicate, pre-existing, and

hazardous situation, Barela alleges that the non-shooting defendants' own conduct created danger out of

whole cloth. In addition, both Adams and Union City had the benefit of a full-fledged factual record. 

Here, at this early stage, this court cannot adequately evaluate Rowland factors such as the moral

blameworthiness of the non-shooting defendants' conduct and the burden that recognition of a duty of care

in these circumstances would impose upon police. Moreover, defendants' claim that tort law already

imposes liability for the negligent operation of police vehicles is belied by their later attempt to seek

immunity under California Vehicle Code section 17004, which exempts public employees from damages

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 15

while responding to emergencies. For these reasons, the court denies the non-shooting defendants' motion

to dismiss Barela's negligence claim.

F. Immunity

Defendants argue that (1) they are immune from any injury that results from a vehicle pursuit, (2)

they are immune for their "discretionary acts" during the pursuit, and (3) the State of California is immune

from liability. The court disagrees.

First, defendants argue that California Vehicle Code section 17004 shields them from liability for

Cardenas' death. That provision states that "[a] public employee is not liable for civil damages on account

of personal injury to or death of any person . . . resulting from the operation, in the line of duty, an

authorized emergency vehicle while responding to an emergency call or when in the immediate pursuit of an

actual or suspected violator of the law . . . ." Cal. Veh. Code § 17004. However, Cardenas' death did not

"resul[t] from the operation" of an emergency vehicle. No case of which the court is aware has applied

Vehicle Code section 17004 to a post-pursuit shooting. 

Defendants also argue that they cannot be liable for their "discretionary" decision to pursue

Cardenas in unmarked cars without lights or sirens. California Government Code section 820.2 provides

that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from

his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion be abused." However, "[t]here is no immunity 'if the injury . . . results, not

from the employee's exercise of discretion vested in him to undertake the act, but from his negligence in

performing it after having made the discretionary decision to do so.'" Martinez v. City of Los Angeles,

141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 252, 261

(1969)). Because the court has rejected defendants' argument that they had no duty of care during their

pursuit of Cardenas, whether they were negligent is an open question. Thus, discretionary immunity is

inappropriate.

Finally, defendants argue that the State of California is immune from liability here. California

Government Code section 815.2 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is

not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the

employee is immune from liability." Defendants argue that because they are immune under Vehicle Code

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 16

section 17004 and Government Code section 820.2, the state cannot be liable for their actions. As noted

above, the court holds that defendants are not immune under these statutes. Thus, the court denies

defendants' immunity arguments.

 G. State Constitutional Claims

Barela seeks damages under Article I, sections 1 and 13 of the California Constitution. Compl. ¶¶

43-45. Defendants move to dismiss these claims on the grounds that neither provision authorizes a private

right of action for money damages. Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution ("section 1") provides

that "[a]ll people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying

and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining

safety, happiness, and privacy." Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution ("section 13") is similar

to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant

may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be

seized. 

In Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002), the California

Supreme Court elucidated how courts should determine whether a provision of the state constitution gives

rise to a private right of action for damages. The court first looked to "whether there is evidence from

which we may find or infer, within the constitutional provision at issue, an affirmative intent either to

authorize or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation." Id. at 317. Where there is no such

intent, the court instructed other courts to evaluate (1) whether there are other, adequate remedies, (2) the

extent to which a constitutional tort would change established tort law, and (3) the importance of the

particular constitutional provision. Id. Even if these factors suggest recognizing a constitutional tort, courts

must also weigh "the existence of any special factors counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages action,

including deference to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy consequences, considerations of

government fiscal policy, practical issues of proof, and the competence of courts to assess particular types

of damages." Id.

Defendants rely exclusively on Clausing v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 221 Cal. App. 3d

1224 (1990). In Clausing, a student sought money damages under section 1 based on allegations that a

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 Katzberg reserved the question of whether the existence of a section 1983 claim is an

"adequate remedy." See Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th at 328 n.29. Defendants simply assume that it is. 

14 If Barela wishes to pursue these claims, she should address whether her lack of standing to

bring a Fourth Amendment claim dooms her section 13 claim. California courts originally followed the

"vicarious exclusionary rule," where, unlike federal law, "a defendant had standing to object to the

introduction of evidence seized in violation of the rights of a third person." In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d

873, 879 (1985). This changed when California voters passed Proposition 8 on the June 1982 primary

election ballot, adding section 28(d) to article I of the state constitution. Although Proposition 8 abrogated

the "vicarious exclusionary rule," see In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 892-95, it states only that "relevant

evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." Cal. Const. Art. I. § 28. Although the court

takes no position on the issue, it notes that if section 13 authorizes a private right of action, it is entirely

possible that Proposition 8 did not foreclose the possibility of its vicarious assertion.

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 17

teacher had beaten and humiliated him. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers. The court of

appeal affirmed, reasoning that section 1only authorizes injunctive relief:

Although citizens have a private cause of action against public entities for violation

of the right to privacy, no case has ever held that California Constitution, article I,

section 1, imposes a mandatoryduty on public entities to protect a citizen's right to

privacy. The constitutional mandate is simply that the government is prohibited from

violating the right; if it does, an aggrieved citizen may seek an injunctive remedy in

court.

Id. at 1238. However, Katzberg seemed to disapprove of Clausing. Indeed, Katzberg noted that

Clausing "summarily concluded" that money damages were unavailable and "overlooked" Porten v.

University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829 (1976), which overruled a demurrer on a cause

of action that sought money damages under section 1. See Katzberg, 29 Cal. 4th at 315 n.16. In addition,

defendants' argument that section 13 does not create a private right of action consists of three sentences:

A plaintiff claiming an unreasonable search and seizure already has . . . a possible

action for wrongful death, negligence, battery, and violation of civil rights under

[section] 1983. These alternative remedies, thus, weigh against creating a damages

action under Article I, Section 13. Further, no California case has recognized a

damages action under Article I, Section 13.

Mot. Dism. at 17:11-16. Defendants make no argument about Katzberg's most important factor: the

existence of intent either to authorize or withhold a damages remedy.13 Yet Barela's briefing on these issues

is even more sparse. Citing space constraints, Barela does not mention the Katzberg factors at all. The

court is thus inclined to dismiss Barela's state constitutional theories without prejudice. If Barela wishes to

submit additional briefing on the Katzberg factors, she may do so.14 

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 18

H. Remand Issues

The Cardenas plaintiffs move to remand on grounds that (1) the removal was untimely; and (2) the

federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

1. Timeliness of Removal

Defendants who want to remove a case to federal court must file a notice of removal within 30 days

after receipt of the first pleading in the state action that sets forth a removable claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b):

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may

be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become

removable.

 

The Cardenas plaintiffs argue that the "other paper" can be unfiled papers, see Addo v. Globe Life

& Acc. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 2000), or deposition testimony. S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v.

Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1996); Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Partnership, 194 F.3d

1072,1078 (10th Cir. 1999). They further contend that removal was untimely because defendants had

notice of Barela's federal civil rights claims at the latest on December 22, 2004, the date of a letter sent by

the State to counsel for Barela.

The court has reviewed both the text of the December 22, 2004 letter from Supervising Deputy

Attorney General Tyler Pon and the Stipulation to Permit Complaint in Intervention by Decedent's Mother,

Dora Barela. Nothing in the text of either document states that Barela intends to make a federal claim. The

only specific grounds for intervention named was Barela's standing under state code provision Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code section 377.60 to assert a wrongful death claim. Thus, even if this court were to adopt the rule

of the Fifth and Tenth circuits, Cardenas plaintiffs name no "other paper" sufficient to put defendants on

notice of Barela's federal claims prior to January 31, 2005. 

Defendants allege they received a copy of the Complaint in Intervention by mail on February 2,

2005. Since defendants filed their notice of removal within 30 days of January 31, 2005, on February 28,

2005, removal was timely.

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 19

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

a. Federal Question

Federal courts have removal jurisdiction if a civil action commenced in state court might have been

brought originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The statute defines a federal question in pertinent

part as follows:

Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a

claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States

shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

The Cardenas plaintiffs argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. First, they argue that

Barela lacks standing to assert Fourth Amendment and "cover-up" claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections

1983 and 1988. Second, the Cardenas plaintiffs argue that Barela's Fourteenth Amendment claim for

deliberate interference in her right to familial relationship does not rest on any federal statute, but instead

depends on Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 377.60(b). The Cardenas plaintiffs rely on Chavez v.

Carpenter, 91 Cal. App.4th 1433 (2001) to support this contention. Chavez addresses dependent

parents' standing under section 377.60. It does not decide who may bring a federal claim under 42 U.S.C.

section 1983. 

Defendants counter that section 1983 created a cause of action for federal constitutional violations. 

Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995). "'Section 1983 provides a cause of action

for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the

United States.'" Id. (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990)). Defendants are

correct. Section 1983 provides the cause of action, not the state code. Barela's First and Fourteenth

Amendment claims on her own behalf survived defendants' motion for dismissal. Thus, the court retains

federal question jurisdiction over these claims.

b. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims is discretionary, including claims that involve

intervention: 

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise

by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original

jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other

claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 20

that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that

involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If the claims are transactionally related, the federal court has jurisdiction over the

state law claims of persons who are to parties to the federal claim. Mendoza v. Zirble Fruit Co., 301

F.3d 1163, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2002). When an action is properly removed based on a claim arising under

the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States per 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), the court may not remand

the entire action. Ukiah Automotive Investments v. Mitsubishi Motors of North America, Slip Copy,

2004 WL 2623229, 1 (N.D. Cal., 2004). However, the court may remand matters in which state law

predominates:

Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the

jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more

otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be

removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its

discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 

The Cardenas plaintiffs’ and Barela's claims all arise out of the same transaction: the shooting death

of Cardenas. The wrongful death claims in particular must be consolidated in a single cause of action, and

dependent parents do not have a separate and independent cause of action from the heirs or personal

representative. Mayerhoff v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 71 Cal. App. 3d 803, 805 (1977);

see also Villaman v. Schee, 15 F.3d 1095, 2 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Cardenas plaintiffs argue that this court should remand because state claims predominate. 

They argue that “predominate” should be interpreted as follows: “If the federal court finds that the federal

claim, while plausible, is not really the plaintiff’s main mission, that it is only an incident or adjunct of the

state claim, and that the state claim is the crux of the action, the federal court can remand all claims in which

it finds that state law ‘predominates.’” David A. Seigel, Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions of

Section 1441. They argue that the state claims predominate because (1) the federal law raised by Barela is

not essential to her cause of action; (2) no construction of federal law is implicated (3) there is no showing

her federal rights cannot be enforced in state court through section 377.60.

Defendants counter that the standard for supplemental jurisdiction is properly met when all claims

arise out of the same case or controversy and plaintiffs do not allege that the state issues are “more

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 21

important, more complex, more time consuming to resolve, or in any other way more significant than their

federal counterparts,” Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 790 (3rd Cir. 1995) (denying

remand); see also Miller v. Lovette, 879 F.2d 1066 (2nd Cir. 1989) (finding it an abuse of discretion to

deny supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims brought in conjunction with federal civil rights claims

alleging excessive use of force). Defendants argue that the Cardenas plaintiffs do not allege facts supporting

a finding that state issues predominate.

Defendants also contend that supplemental jurisdiction also depends on economy, convenience,

fairness and comity, Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1991), and that to sever the

claims would prejudice the parties, add expense and could lead to inconsistent results. The court agrees. 

The claims all arise out of the same transaction. The Cardenas plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the

state law issues predominate over the federal constitutional claims. Thus, the court retains supplemental

jurisdiction over all claims in this case.

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 22

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Dora Barela's claims under the California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.30 are

DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. Dora Barela's claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of the decedent's Fourth

Amendment rights is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

3. Dora Barela's claim under California Civil Code section 52.1 is DISMISSED with leave to

amend;

4. Dora Barela's claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

5. Barela's claim for damages under Article I, sections 1 and 13 of the California constitution

is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

6. Defendants' motion to dismiss Dora Barela's Complaint in Intervention against the

California Department of Justice, the California Department of Corrections, the Parole

Fugitive Apprehension Team, and the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement as separately

named defendants is GRANTED;

7. Defendants' motion to dismiss Barela's alleged "cover up" claim is MOOT;

8. Defendants' motion to dismiss Barela's claims for individual liability of defendants Davies,

Link, Sanchez, and Lara is DENIED;

9. Cardenas plaintiffs' motion to remand this entire action to state court is DENIED.

DATED: 5/20/05 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ORDERGRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONTODISMISSANDDENYINGPLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO STATE COURT— C05-00845 RMW

JED/DOH 23

A copy of this order was emailed on 5/20/05 to:

Counsel for Jeanette Cardenas, et. al.:

John C Stein boccardo@boccardo.com 

Counsel for Dora Barela:

Julia Sherwin haddad.sherwin@sbcglobal.net 

Michael J. Haddad haddad.sherwin@sbcglobal.net 

Counsel for Defendants:

Craig Eugene Modlin Craig.Modlin@doj.ca.gov 

Tyler Bruce Pon, Esq. tyler.pon@doj.ca.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this order to co-counsel, as necessary.

Case 5:05-cv-00845-RMW Document 22 Filed 05/20/05 Page 23 of 23