Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00546/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00546-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Hubert Dymitr Haraszewski,

Plaintiff,

v.

Lisa Brannan et al.,

 Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS (Doc. 80);

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.

80); AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

AMEND (Doc. 88.)

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry Alan Burns,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Hubert Dymitr Haraszewski (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner incarcerated at Mule Creek

State Prison and proceeding pro se, filed a Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 52.) Plaintiff claims Defendants Lisa Brannan, police investigator, John Morgans, District

Attorney Investigator, and Patricia Lavermicocca, Deputy District Attorney, violated his right to Due

Process by placing him in Administrative Segregation (Ad-Seg) for two weeks at the Vista Detention

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 1 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Facility (“VDF”) while he was a pretrial detainee there. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff claims he was denied a due

process hearing throughout his three weeks in Ad-Seg. (Doc. 52, at 5.) Defendants filed a motion for

summary judgment, asserting that (1) no evidence suggests that the Ad-Seg placement was done with

the express intent to punish Plaintiff; (2) such intent cannot be inferred because they reasonably thought

that the placement would serve the legitimate, non-punitive objective of limiting Plaintiff’s ability to

contact his victims by mail or telephone; (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 80-1, at 6.) Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief in

opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion on exhaustion grounds but otherwise did not file

on the docket an opposition to Defendants’ entire summary judgment motion.1 (Doc. 107.) Having

considered the motion and Plaintiff’s response, including supplemental briefing on the exhaustion issue,

the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED on

qualified immunity grounds. The Court also recommends that Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint

be DENIED. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In September 2009, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at VDF awaiting trial on various sex crimes

charges involving four minor victims. (Declaration of Patricia Lavermicocca, Doc. 80-3, at 1.) He was

held in protective custody during this time. (Declaration of Greg Rose, Doc. 80-4, at 3.) Through

various protective orders, Plaintiff was prohibited from “personal, electronic, telephonic, or written

contact” with the minor victims, as well as “contact ... through a third party.” (Doc. 80-2, Exhibits A, B,

and C.) A few days prior to his September 8, 2009 trial, Plaintiff sent letters to two of his alleged

victims. (Doc. 80-3, Exhibits E, L.) On September 11, 2009, Defendant Lavermicocca, Deputy District

Attorney (DDA), learned that Plaintiff had contacted the two victims. (Lavermicocca Decl., Doc. 80-3,

at 2.) On September 14, 2009, Defendant Lavermicocca appeared ex parte before Judge Goldstein

regarding Plaintiff’s violation of the protective orders. (Id.) Judge Goldstein ordered the seizure of all

documents and photographs from Plaintiff’s cell at VDF. (Id.) Also on September 14, Defendant

1

 In his brief entitled “Supplemental briefing,” Plaintiff claims that he had filed an opposition to

Defendants’ summary judgment motion. However, the Court has not received this document. 

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 2 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Lavermicocca asked DA Investigator Morgans to contact officials at VDF to find out what they could do

to prevent Plaintiff from contacting victims. (Lavermicocca Decl., Doc. 80-3, at 3.) Defendant Morgans

advised Defendant Lavermicocca that Plaintiff could be placed in Administrative Segregation, and

Defendant Lavermicocca agreed to place him in Ad-Seg based on the understanding that this would

limit Plaintiff’s contact with other inmates and his phone access. (Id. at 3-4.) Detective Kopchak

informed Deputy Frierson, a classification deputy at VDF, that Plaintiff had violated a court order

prohibiting him from contacting his victims, and that Defendant Morgans wanted him to be more closely

monitored. (Rose Decl., Doc. 80-4, at 3.) Deputy Frierson exercised his discretionary authority and

placed Plaintiff in Ad-Seg. (Id.) Defendant Lisa Brannan, Detective, denied any involvement in

Plaintiff’s Ad-Seg placement. (Doc. 80-2, at 24-25 (Exhibit G).) Plaintiff remained in Ad-Seg until

September 27, 2009, a total of 14 days. (Rose Decl., Doc. 80-4, at 4.)

Plaintiff claimed he submitted multiple requests for an explanation for his isolation while in AdSeg but received no immediate response from the jail officers. (Doc. 52, at 2-3.) On September 29,

2009, Plaintiff filed two grievances regarding his placement in Ad-Seg (Doc. 80-2, at 34-41, Exhibits J

and K), which were acted upon on October 3, 2009 (Doc. 103-1, at 4). In his response to the grievance,

Sgt. Weidenthaler told Plaintiff that the move to Ad-Seg was at the request of the District Attorney’s

Office, specifically John Morgans, and approved on a temporary basis by Lt. Hillen. (Id.) The Grievance

Report stated that two different deputies, Frierson and Williams, told Plaintiff in person why he was

moved but did not document the conversation. (Id. at 5.) The report concludes that Plaintiff was “testing

multiple sources in an effort to check the consistency of responses.” (Id. at 5.) 

Plaintiff submitted briefing (not a sworn affidavit or declaration) that he attempted “numerous”

times from September 14 to September 27 while in isolation in Ad-Seg to make verbal inquiries, to file

written requests, and to file grievances, but that “at least four written or countless verbal complaints ever

yielded any response.” (Doc. 107, at 1.) After he was released from Ad-Seg, Plaintiff alleges that he

attempted to file a grievance “on every shift, but no deputy accepted the form until September 29, when

Deputy Williams finally took it, then proceeded to threaten and intimidate me, throwing the grievance

form away rather than returning it to me.” (Id. at 1-2.) Defendants submitted to the Court the two

grievances that Plaintiff filed, which are documented as being received by Sgt. Weidenthaler on October

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 3 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1, 2009. (Doc. 80-2, at 35-41, Exhibits J and K.) In his first grievance, Plaintiff requested an explanation

for his Ad-Seg placement starting on September 14, 2009. (Doc. 80-2, Exhibit J.) In his grievance,

Plaintiff did not specifically state that he was placed in Ad-Seg improperly without an administrative

hearing. (Id.) In his second grievance, Plaintiff complained of improper treatment of his previous

attempt to file a grievance regarding his Ad-Seg placement by jail staff. (Doc. 80-2, at 38-39, Exhibit

K.) Defendants submitted the Grievance Report for the two grievances written by Sgt. Weidenthaler and

submitted on October 3, 2009. (Doc. 103-1, at 4-5.) In it, Sgt. Weidenthaler stated that both Deputies

Frierson and Williams told Plaintiff why he was moved but did not document any details of the

conversation. (Id. at 5.) Sgt. Weidenthaler wrote that he told Plaintiff that “Mr. Morgans of the District

Attorney’s Office requested the temporary move.” (Id.) The report concluded that the move was

approved on a temporary basis by Lt. Hillen. (Id. at 4.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff confirmed that Sgt. Weidenthaler “accepted the form and responded that it

was not ‘his people’ who ordered the segregation.” (Doc. 52, at 2.) Sgt. Weidenthaler, in a signed

declaration, stated that he accepted two grievances from Plaintiff, signed the grievances, and then

documented them in the Jail Information Management System (JIMS) by way of a Grievance Report,

which also described his response to the grievances. (Doc. 103-1, at 2.) After Plaintiff received the

response to his initial grievance, Plaintiff allegedly was told that his grievances “couldn’t be appealed

beyond [Sgt. Weidenthaler and another, unidentified Sergeant’s] review.” (Doc. 52, at 4.) However, Sgt.

Weidenthaler stated that although he did not recall his conversation with Plaintiff after he handed him

his response to the grievance, he did not believe that he would inform Plaintiff that his response to the

grievance could not be appealed to a higher level of review, as this would directly contradict the

Grievance Procedure and instructions provided to Plaintiff on the J-22 Inmate Grievance Form. (Decl. of

Weidenthaler, Doc. 103-1, at 2.) Also in a signed declaration, Sgt. Wicklander stated that after

reviewing Plaintiff’s booking jacket as well as the JIMS records, he found that Plaintiff submitted two

grievances on September 29, 2009 and that both grievances were received by Sgt. Weidenthaler on

October 1, 2009. (Decl. of Wicklander, Doc. 103-2, at 2.) Sgt. Wicklander also stated that the booking

file and the JIMS records contained no records indicating that Plaintiff ever appealed his grievances to

VDF’s Grievance Review Officer or Facility Commander. (Id.) Plaintiff did not complete second level

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 4 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

review of his grievance by VDF’s Grievance Review Officer, or third level review by the Facility

Commander. (Stephanie Kish Decl., Doc. 80-2, at 2.) 

Plaintiff acknowledged in his supplemental brief in opposition to the Defendants’ summary

judgment motion that after allegedly being thwarted by various deputies from filing a first-level

grievance, he eventually succeeded in obtaining a first-level response from the jail. (Doc. 107, at 2.)

Then, on November 18, 2009, “after no deputies would accept [his] grievances for an entire month,” he

allegedly submitted a grievance through institutional mail, but it was returned to him “without the white

cover sheet, as if [it had] been processed, but [his] copy showed no record of JIMS entry.” (Doc. 107, at

3.) Plaintiff supplied a copy of the grievance form to the Court as evidence. (Doc. 107, at 7-12.) In the

grievance form dated November 18, 2009, Plaintiff complained that he was placed in Ad-Seg without an

explanation and without a disciplinary hearing in violation of his due process rights. (Doc. 107, at 7-8.)

This grievance form was not signed by a jail staff member. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff submitted a four-page

letter on the Sheriff’s Department’s grievance form on December 23, 2009, which was received on

January 11, 2010. (Doc. 107, at 9-10.) This form was not entered in the JIMS because it was deemed an

inmate request, not a grievance. (Id. at 9.) In the letter, Plaintiff complained that he was placed in AdSeg at the direction of DA Investigator Morgans and that he had been consistently stonewalled by

deputies who refused to accept his grievances for a variety of reasons, including because the action was

not deemed a jail grievance because DA Investigators and detectives are not considered jail staff. (Doc.

107, at 9-10.) The grievance form shows that Sgt. Kanoss signed the form on January 11, 2010, but that

he deemed it not a grievance but an inmate request. (Id. at 9.) In his response to the inmate request, Sgt.

Kanoss stated the following: “This is not grievable at the level seek guidance through attorney.” (Id.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as

to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P.

56(c); Adickes v. SH. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema,

Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, a motion for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P.

56 addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, or of the law, to support the plaintiff’s claims. Warren v.

City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). The party seeking summary judgment bears the

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 5 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the

declarations (if any), pleadings, and discovery that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.,

509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A dispute is

“genuine” as to a material fact if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185

(9th Cir. 2006).

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the movant. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Where the non-moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the

movant may prevail by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s

claim or by merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of

the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,

1105 (9th Cir. 2000). If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving

party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate

burden of persuasion.” Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1102. If the moving party meets its initial

burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material

fact actually exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986);

Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at 1103. The opposing party cannot “‘rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [its] pleading’ but must instead produce evidence that ‘sets forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Estate of Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1030

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be

drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Stegall v. Citadel Broad, Inc., 350 F.3d 1061,

1065 (9th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air; rather, it is the opposing

party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Juell v.

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 6 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Forest Pharms., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2006); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott,

300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997 (E.D. Cal. 2004). “A genuine issue of material fact does not spring into being

simply because a litigant claims that one exists or promises to produce admissible evidence at trial.” Del

Carmen Guadalupe v.. Agosto, 299 F.3d 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Galen v. County of Los Angeles,

477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). Further, a “motion for summary judgment may not be defeated . . .

by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘is not significantly probative.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;

Hardage v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006). Self-serving declarations, uncorroborated by other testimony or other persuasive evidence, cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to

defeat summary judgment. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Additionally, while the court has the discretion in appropriate circumstances to consider materials that

are not properly brought to its attention, the court is not required to examine the entire file for evidence

establishing a genuine issue of material fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers

with adequate references. See Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.

2003); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). After

discovery, if the non-moving party fails to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1103.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies is a matter in abatement,

not going to the merits of the claim, and as such is not properly raised in a motion for summary

judgment.” Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir.

1988). However, “when a defendant files a summary judgment motion that raises the issue of exhaustion

of non-judicial remedies, the motion should be treated as a ‘nonenumerated’ motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).” Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 1125, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2001)

(citing Ritza, 837 F.2d 368-69). When “a factual issue arises in connection with a jurisdictional or

related type of motion, the general view is that there is no right of jury trial as to that issue ... and that

the Court has a broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute.” Ritza v.

Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988). As such, the

standard of review in evaluating exhaustion is broadened beyond the normal scope of a standard 12(b)

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 7 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003). In deciding a motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the Court may look beyond the pleadings and decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. Although Defendants bear the burden of proving exhaustion, Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to Plaintiff’s

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial Court from evaluating

for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369. The plaintiff must put forth specific

facts in declarations, affidavits, authenticated documents, or other evidence to contradict the defendants’

evidence to show he had exhausted administrative remedies or that some exception to exhaustion

applies. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 & n. 14 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff must be notified of

his opportunity to develop a record. Id. at 1119. The court then decides disputed issues of fact, and

dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate remedy if the court determines that the plaintiff has failed

to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 1120. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Because Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, this Court

will treat the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as a nonenumberated motion under Federal

Rule 12(b), rather than a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56, when considering this issue.

The Court will consider the exhaustion issue as a 12(b) motion with regard to Plaintiff’s claim that he

was placed in Ad-Seg at the direction of the DA’s office and police investigators without the benefit of a

due process hearing by jail officials at Vista Detention Facility. The Court will also address Defendants

Lisa Brannan, police investigator, John Morgans, District Attorney Investigator, and DDA Patricia

Lavermicocca’s qualified immunity defense on summary judgment. Finally, the Court will address

Plaintiff’s pending motion to amend his Second Amended Complaint. 

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WITH REGARD

TO HIS PLACEMENT IN AD-SEG WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A DISCIPLINARY

HEARING. 

A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act Requires Proper Exhaustion. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that an inmate exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a federal action concerning prison or jail conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 8 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2008); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies

to all inmate suits about prison or jail life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular

episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 532

(emphasis added). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532

U.S. 731, 741 (2001); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that

exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”). 

Exhaustion must be “proper.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). This means that a

grievant must use all steps the jail holds out, enabling the jail to reach the merits of the issue. Id. at 90.

An inmate must “complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable

procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Id. at 88. 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Accordingly,

“[t]he burden of establishing nonexhaustion . . . falls on defendants.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1112 (9th Cir. 2003). To meet this burden, a defendant “must show that (1) a grievance procedure

existed and (2) [the plaintiff] did not exhaust the grievance procedure.” Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023,

1032 (9th Cir. 2012). Relevant evidence sufficient to demonstrate an inmate’s failure to exhaust

“include[s] statutes, regulations, and other official directives that explain the scope of the administrative

review process; documentary or testimonial evidence from inmate officials who administer the review

process; and information provided to the inmate concerning the operation of the grievance procedure . . .

.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If the defendants meet their burden of showing the absence of exhaustion, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that the grievance procedure was unavailable. Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1032

(9th Cir. 2012). An inmate’s subjective lack of knowledge of the grievance procedure does not render

administrative remedies “unavailable.” Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2012). When

a jail official prevents an inmate from utilizing an administrative remedy, that remedy is not “available,”

and the inmate need not further pursue the grievance. See Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir.

2005). “Where prison officials have effectively prevented a prisoner from using the available procedures, for example by literally denying the prisoner access to the process, falsely claiming that the

prisoner could not use the process, or threatening reprisals if the prisoner used the process, courts have

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 9 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

held that administrative remedies were not ‘available’ for purposes of the PLRA.” Nunez v. Duncan,

591 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir. 2010) (dissenting opinion). Similarly, there is an exception to the PLRA’s

exhaustion requirement “where a prison official renders administrative remedies effectively unavailable

by improperly screening a prisoner’s grievances.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010).

To use this exception, “the inmate must establish (1) that he actually filed a grievance or grievances that,

if pursued through all levels of administrative appeals, would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that he

seeks to pursue in federal court, and (2) that prison officials screened his grievance or grievances for

reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations.” Id. at 823-824.

B. San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Grievance Procedures.

Section N.1 of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Detention Services Bureau Manual

of Policies and Procedures (“Grievance Procedure”) provides that inmates may submit written

grievances regarding “any condition of confinement, including but not limited to: . . . 2. Classification

actions . . . .” (See Grievance Procedure, Doc. 80-2, at 30-33.) Grievances are to be submitted on Inmate

Grievance Forms (J-22) or any other writing material. When a deputy receives a grievance, it is entered

into the Jail Information Management System (JIMS), along with “all related actions and responses.”

The Grievance Procedure provides that “every effort should be made by a deputy who receives a

grievance to handle it at his or her level.” This is the first level of grievance review, and must be

completed in ten days. If the deputy cannot resolve the complaint to the inmate’s satisfaction, the inmate

must then direct the grievance “through successive levels of command until a resolution is obtained, or

until the Facility Commander reviews the grievance.” 

Second level review is carried out by the facility’s Grievance Review Officer, who is the sworn

officer designated by the Facility Commander to hear inmate grievances. Second level review also must

be completed within ten calendar days. 

If the Grievance Review Officer does not resolve the complaint to the inmate’s satisfaction, the

inmate must seek third level review. Third level review is conducted by the Facility Commander, who

also has ten calendar days to respond. The Facility Commander’s decision is final. (See Grievance

Procedure, Doc. 80-2, at 30-33.)

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 10 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The reverse side of the J-22 Inmate Grievance Form explains the grievance procedure. It states

that grievances can be appealed to successfully higher levels of command, and that “[i]f you appeal a

grievance to the level of the facility commander, his or her decision will be final.” (See Doc. 80-2, at 34-

41.) 

C. Defendants Have Met Their Burden in Raising Exhaustion as an Affirmative Defense.

Defendants have put forth evidence documenting VDF’s Grievance Procedure, which requires

that, before an inmate can bring a lawsuit regarding any aspect of his incarceration at San Diego

County’s jails, he must have raised the issue with both the Grievance Review Officer and the Facility

Commander. (See Grievance Procedure, Doc. 80-2, at 30-33.) Defendants have shown, and Plaintiff

does not deny, that Plaintiff failed to appeal his grievance regarding his claim that he was denied a due

process hearing throughout his three weeks in Ad-Seg while he as a pre-trial detainee at VDF to either

the Grievance Review Officer or its Facility Commander (the second and third levels of review). (Decl.

Of Steven Wicklander, Doc. 103-2, at 1-2; see Plaintiff’s Supplemental Briefing, Doc. 107, at 1-3.)

Moreover, Defendants have put forth evidence that Plaintiff had not sufficiently informed the jail of the

nature of his grievance that he was denied a due process hearing when he was sent to Ad-Seg as a pretrial detainee at the first level of review. (Doc. 80-2, at 38-41.) Plaintiff’s two first-level grievances that

were entered into the JIMS system state only that Plaintiff was not told the reason for his placement in

Ad-Seg and that he requested an explanation and identification of the persons who ordered the move.

The response that Plaintiff received for his grievance was that he was moved to Ad-Seg at the request of

the District Attorney’s Office, specifically DA Investigator Morgans, and the move was approved on a

temporary basis by Lt. Hillen. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s first-level grievance form does he complain that he

was denied a due process hearing specifically by jail staff. (Doc. 80-2, at 38-41.) Plaintiff has submitted

a grievance form that he allegedly submitted to the jail on November 18, 2009. (Doc. 107, at 7-12.) In it,

Plaintiff complains that he was placed in Ad-Seg without an explanation and without a disciplinary

hearing in violation of his due process rights. (Doc. 107, at 7-8.) However, this grievance form has not

been authenticated; it was not signed by a jail staff member; there is no record of it in the jail grievance

system; and Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence or affidavit that this document was in fact

submitted to the jail. Moreover, even if the document were authenticated, this grievance form would not

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 11 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have been submitted within the 10-day deadline for initial grievance or appeal required under the

Grievance Procedure rules. Thus, Defendants have met their burden in showing that Plaintiff has failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies according to VDF’s Grievance Procedures.

D. Plaintiff Hasn’t Met Burden of Showing that the Jail Grievance Procedure was “Unavailable.” 

In his Second Amended Complaint and in his supplemental briefing opposing Defendants’

motion, Plaintiff alleges that he “was told the matter couldn’t be appealed beyond [the] review” of Sgt.

Weidenthaler and another (unidentified) sergeant. (Doc. 52; Doc. 107.) However, Plaintiff’s allegation,

which is unsupported by any declaration or affidavit, is disputed by Sgt. Weidgenthaler in a signed

declaration. (Decl. of Weidenthaler, Doc. 103-1, at 2.) Also, the grievance form itself, which Plaintiff

does not deny receiving, instructs that grievances are appealable to successively higher levels of

command and that only the Facility Commander’s decision is the final one. (Doc. 80-2, at 35-41,

Exhibits J and K.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot rely on this unsupported allegation to show that the Jail

Grievance Procedure was unavailable. 

Plaintiff also argues that he submitted multiple requests for an explanation for his isolation while

in Ad-Seg but received no immediate response from the jail officers. Whether or not this unsupported

allegation is true, the fact of the matter is that his grievance form was accepted by the jail on September

29, 2009, and Plaintiff received a response from Sgt. Weidenthaler on October 3, 2009, answering

Plaintiff’s request for an explanation for his placement in Ad-Seg. (Doc. 103-1, at 4-5). Plaintiff was

told that “Mr. Morgans of the District Attorney’s Office requested the temporary move” and that the

move was approved on a temporary basis by Lt. Hillen. (Doc. 103-1, at 4.) At this point, Plaintiff had

enough information to make a claim for improper placement without a disciplinary hearing in Ad-Seg

by Lt. Hillen in violation of his due process rights but he failed to do so, or properly document that he

tried to do so, in a timely fashion. Plaintiff claims that he tried to submit a grievance on his placement in

Ad-Seg for an entire month after receiving his first-level response; however, he failed to submit any

evidence documenting the details of the exact claim he tried to make during this month period. The only

piece of evidence that Plaintiff has submitted documenting his attempt to file a claim for improper

placement in Ad-Seg without a disciplinary hearing in violation of due process is dated November 18,

2009; however, this document has not been signed as being received by jail staff; it has not been

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 12 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

authenticated in any way; and it is not supported by any sworn declaration or affidavit. What’s more,

this document would have been filed after the deadline for filing a grievance as outlined in the

Grievance Procedures. Plaintiff claims that his attempts to file a timely grievance on the due process

issue that is the subject of this lawsuit were stymied by jail officials, but he has failed to produce any

evidence to that effect up to this point in time. 

Finally, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that he filed a four-page letter on the Sheriff’s Department’s grievance form on December 23, 2009 and that the form was received by Sgt. Kanoss in January

2010. (Doc. 107, at 9-10.) This form was not entered in the JIMS because it was deemed an inmate

request, not a grievance. (Id. at 9.) In the letter, Plaintiff complained that he was placed in Ad-Seg at the

direction of DA Investigator Morgans and that he had been consistently stonewalled by deputies who

refused to accept his grievances for a variety of reasons, including because the action was not deemed a

grievance because DA Investigators and detectives are not considered jail staff. (Doc. 107, at 9-10.) The

grievance form shows that Sgt. Kanoss signed the form on January 11, 2010, but that he deemed it not a

grievance but an inmate request. (Id. at 9.) In his response to the inmate request, Sgt. Kanoss stated the

following: “This is not grievable at the level seek guidance through attorney.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that

the grievance process was effectively exhausted at this point because the jail did not consider his

placement in Ad-Seg at the direction of DA Investigator Morgans and detectives to be a grievable

offense. (Doc. 107.) However, Plaintiff’s argument fails for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff was

aware at this point that Lt. Hillen approved his placement in Ad-Seg after he received his first-level

response; yet, Plaintiff makes no mention that his grievance is directed at jail staff for placing him in

Ad-Seg or that he was improperly placed there without a disciplinary hearing, which is the claim in his

lawsuit. Throughout the grievance process, Plaintiff has never explicitly denied that he improperly sent

letters to his alleged victims while awaiting trial in violation of a court order, which was the reason he

was placed in Ad-Seg to begin with. Even if this grievance were deemed a timely attempted pursuit of

his administrative remedies, it does not suffice to exhaust the essence of the claim — that he was placed

in Ad-Seg at the direction of the DA’s office without the benefit of a due process hearing by jail

officials — that he is seeking to pursue in this Court. In short, Plaintiff’s grievance did not provide

sufficient notice to VDF officials that Plaintiff believed he was being punished without a due process

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 13 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disciplinary hearing and for no valid reason. Thus, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that the

Jail Grievance Procedure was unavailable to him. 

E. Conclusion

Defendants have met their burden in showing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to the issue that he was denied a due process hearing conducted by jail officials regarding

his placement in Ad-Seg at the direction of the DA’s office, and Plaintiff has not met his burden of

showing that administrative remedies were or are unavailable. Thus, with the portion of Defendants’

summary judgment motion addressing the exhaustion issue hereby deemed a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), see Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369

(9th Cir. 1988), the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be GRANTED. 

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Public officials sued pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983 may assert the affirmative

defense of qualified immunity, which protects “government officials performing discretionary functions 

 . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223

(2009), courts were instructed to first determine whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff

established the violation of a constitutional right, and then to examine whether that right was “clearly

established” at the time of the defendants’ alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202

(2001). In Pearson, the Supreme Court dispensed with Saucier’s rigid sequence, and courts now have

discretion to determine which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed

first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-237. Qualified

immunity will apply unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established right of which a

reasonable person would have known. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The right to be

free from restrictive pretrial confinement sought by a district attorney’s office and police investigators

absent a pre-deprivation showing to a state court is not “clearly established” for qualified immunity

purposes. Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 598-599 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Moreover, when a prosecutor or

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 14 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

investigators seek to have a pre-trial detainee placed “in ‘lockdown until further notice’ and his social,

telephone, and mail privilege be withdrawn” for a prosecutorial and not an institutional or punitive

purpose “would be entitled to [] qualified immunity” because a clearly established right of which a

reasonable person would have known would not have been violated. Id. at 600. 

Here, the facts before the court proferred by Defendants show that Plaintiff was placed in AdSeg for a prosecutorial purpose. Through various protective orders, Plaintiff was prohibited from

“personal, electronic, telephonic, or written contact” with the minor victims, as well as “contact ...

through a third party.” (Doc. 80-2, Exhibits A, B, and C.) A few days prior to his September 8, 2009

trial, Plaintiff sent letters to two of his alleged victims. (Doc. 80-3, Exhibits E, L.) On September 11,

2009, Defendant DDA Lavermicocca learned that Plaintiff had contacted the two victims.

(Lavermicocca Decl., Doc. 80-3, at 2.) On September 14, 2009, Defendant Lavermicocca appeared ex

parte before Judge Goldstein regarding Plaintiff’s violation of the protective orders. (Id.) Judge

Goldstein ordered the seizure of all documents and photographs from Plaintiff’s cell at VDF. (Id.) Also

on September 14, Defendant Lavermicocca asked DA Investigator Morgans to contact officials at VDF

to find out what they could do to prevent Plaintiff from contacting victims. (Lavermicocca Decl., Doc.

80-3, at 3.) Defendant Morgans advised Defendant Lavermicocca that Plaintiff could be placed in

Administrative Segregation, and Defendant Lavermicocca agreed to place him in Ad-Seg based on the

understanding that this would limit Plaintiff’s contact with other inmates and his phone access. (Id. at 3-

4.) Detective Kopchak informed Deputy Frierson, a classification deputy at VDF, that Plaintiff had

violated a court order prohibiting him from contacting his victims, and that Defendant Morgans wanted

him to be more closely monitored. (Rose Decl., Doc. 80-4, at 3.) Deputy Frierson exercised his

discretionary authority and placed Plaintiff in Ad-Seg. (Id.) Defendants also proferred evidence that

Detective Lisa Brannan took no part in Plaintiff’s placement in Ad-Seg. (Doc. 80-2, 24-25 (Exhibit G).)

Plaintiff remained in Ad-Seg until September 27, 2009, a total of 14 days. (Rose Decl., Doc. 80-4, at 4.) 

On the other hand, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence refuting the prosecutorial purpose

behind his Ad-Seg placement. Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had some pretext to

placing Plaintiff in Ad-Seg as a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff has not proferred any evidence to this effect.

Thus, Defendant Lisa Brannan, Sheriff’s Department investigator, Defendant John Morgans, District

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 15 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Attorney Investigator, and Defendant DDA Patricia Lavarmicocca, all of whom were involved in

Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution in state court, are all entitled to qualified immunity because their official

conduct in seeking his Ad-Seg placement for a prosecutorial purpose did not violate a clearly established constitutional right when Plaintiff was sent to Ad-Seg without receiving a pre-deprivation

hearing. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted on the basis of qualified

immunity. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE IT

IS UNTIMELY AND HE HAS NOT EXHAUSTED HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

Plaintiff also submitted a proposed Third Amended Complaint in which he seeks to substitute

three John Does with named defendants Lt. K. Hillen, Sgt McNeeley, and Deputy Frierson, all VDF

employees and all of whom Plaintiff claims were previously unknown to him and were involved in his

claim that he was improperly placed in Ad-Seg without a disciplinary hearing in violation of due

process. (Doc. 88.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s amendment would prejudice Defendants because it

is untimely and would be futile in any event. (Doc. 97, at 4.) The Court agrees that granting leave to

amend would be unfair to Defendants because it is untimely and it will ultimately be futile. Plaintiff has

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the jail’s failure to conduct a disciplinary hearing

before sending Plaintiff to Ad-Seg as a pretrial detainee. The Court should deny Plaintiff’s motion to

amend his complaint a third time, because Plaintiff has not put forth any facts or evidence that would

cure the deficiency and reverse Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Myles v.

Sullivan, 2010 WL 4628688, at *4 (E.D. Cal. November 8, 2010). Thus, Plaintiff’s motion to amend

should be DENIED. (Doc. 88.)

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies be GRANTED, that Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment should be GRANTED in favor of all Defendants on qualified immunity grounds, and that

Plaintiff’s motion to amend should be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Burns, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1©) of the United States District Court for the Southern

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 16 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

District of California. Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the

Court and a copy served on all parties on or before March 29, 2013. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or

before April 8, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file either of these documents within the

specified time periods may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of this Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 15, 2013

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc: The Honorable Burns

 All Counsel of Record 17 10cv546 LAB (PCL)

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 110 Filed 03/15/13 Page 17 of 17