Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02729/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02729-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 )

)

)

FONDA WHITFIELD, et al., )

) 2:04-cv-2729-GEB-JFM

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

ALAN FEASTER, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

___________________________________)

Defendants Cummings, Curran, Harada, Kegg, Lowe, Matlock,

Merrell, Pagaduan, Sial, Stenoski, Templeton, Thomas, Williams, and

Woodward (collectively “Individual Defendants”) and Defendant

California Youth Authority (“CYA”) (all collectively “Defendants”),

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move to strike Plaintiffs’ damage claims for decedents’ pain and

suffering. Defendant CYA moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third, fifth,

and sixth claims for relief. In addition, Individual Defendants move

to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second and sixth claims for relief. Plaintiffs

oppose the motions, except for Defendant CYA’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ fifth and sixth claims for relief. In their responsive

brief Plaintiffs agree to dismiss Defendant CYA from these claims. 

(Opp’n at 12.) Therefore, Defendant CYA is dismissed from Plaintiffs’

fifth and sixth claims for relief. 

BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2006, Plaintiffs Fonda Whitfield and the

Estate of Deon Whitfield filed a First Amended Complaint against

Defendants, and Plaintiffs Alan Feaster, Gloria Feaster, and the

Estate of Durrell Feaster filed a First Amended Complaint against

Defendants (collectively “Complaint”). On December 20, 2006, the

Court consolidated the two actions. (Order, Dec. 20, 2006, at 2.)

On January 19, 2004, two minors committed to the CYA, Deon

Whitfield and Durrell Feaster, committed suicide. The consolidated

actions are brought by the parents of the two deceased minors. 

Plaintiffs allege the minors had well-documented mental histories

including “depression, [and] physical ailments [which] caused [them]

to be a serious risk for suicide.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege

despite knowledge by CYA staff that the decedents were high risk for

suicide, the minors were improperly treated and housed, causing their

condition to worsen and resulting in the minors committing suicide. 

(Id.) 

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DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “the

court may order stricken from any pleading any . . . redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “A motion to strike

is appropriate to address requested relief, such as . . . damages,

which [are] not recoverable as a matter of law.” Wilkerson v.

Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 172 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 

B. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs

failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the

Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974);

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

In addition, Plaintiffs are given the benefit of every reasonable

inference that can be drawn from the allegations in the Complaint. 

Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied “unless it appears

beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts in support of

[their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

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1 Defendants also request that paragraph 15 be stricken from

Plaintiffs’ Complaint. However, since that paragraph makes no reference

to damages, this request is denied.

4

II. Motion to Strike 

A. Pain and Suffering Damages1

1. Section 1983 Claims

Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs’ claims for decedents’

pain and suffering damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”),

arguing that claims for damages “for the decedents’ pain, anguish,

suffering, . . . [and] loss of [] enjoyment of life’s activities” do

not survive death. (Defs.’ Mot. at 5.) Plaintiffs rejoin that to

grant the motion would “ignore the purposes of damages under

[section 1983].” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 2.) 

Whether these damage claims survive the decedents’ deaths

“raises a complicated question to which there is no clear answer.” 

Venerable v. City of Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2002)

(“Venerable”). Section 1983 is silent on whether pain and suffering

damages survive death, and therefore, state law controls unless it is

“inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588-90 (1978). “Federal

California courts have reached opposite conclusions whether the

limitations set by [California law] appl[y] to the damages available

under [section] 1983.” Moore v. County of Kern, 2006 WL 2190753, at

*6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2006).

Section 1983’s deterrent purpose and goal of compensating

victims is adequately served by California’s wrongful death statute. 

Venerable, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (referencing California Civil

Procedure Code section 377.34, which precludes a decedent’s personal

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representative or successor in interest from recovering damages on the

decedent’s cause of action for pain and suffering); Peacock v.

Terhune, 2002 WL 459810, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2002). Therefore,

“in light of the damages that are provided by the California survival

and wrongful death statutes, the [C]ourt finds that state law is not

inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 

Because state law does not permit recovery of a decedent’s pain and

suffering, [Plaintiffs’] claim for pain and suffering from injury

leading to death does not survive.” Venerable, 185 F. Supp. 2d

at 1133. Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ references to

damages for decedents’ pain and suffering in Plaintiffs’ section 1983

claims is granted.

2. ADA Claims

Defendants also move to strike Plaintiffs’ claims for

decedents’ pain and suffering damages under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), arguing the claims for those damages do not

survive the minors’ deaths. (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) Plaintiffs do not

respond to this argument. “The party seeking to bring a survival

action bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state’s law

authorizes a survival action and that the plaintiff meets the state’s

requirements for bringing a survival action.” Dillard v. Curtis, 2004

WL 2496130, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2004). California’s survival

statute precludes damage claims for a decedent’s pain and suffering. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.34. Since Plaintiffs have failed to make

an argument showing California law allows damage claims under the ADA

to survive death, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiffs’ references

to damages for decedents’ pain and suffering in Plaintiffs’ ADA claims

is granted.

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III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Second and Sixth Claims for Relief

Individual Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second

claim for relief for violation of statutory duty and failure to

supervise, train and take corrective measures and Plaintiffs’ sixth

claim for relief for negligent supervision, training, and retention. 

Plaintiffs argue that only employers can be liable for these failure

to supervise claims and none of these Defendants is an employer. 

(Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff rejoins supervisors may be liable even

if they are not employers. (Pls.’ Opp’n at 12.) 

“A supervisor may be liable if there exists either (1) his

or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2)

a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation.” Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). In addition,

“[s]upervisory liability exists even without overt personal

participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement

a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional

violation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Since Individual Defendants have not established that

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief, Individual

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second and sixth claims for

relief is denied.

B. Third Claim for Relief

Defendant CYA moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third claim for

relief under section 1983 in which Plaintiffs seek injunctive and/or

declaratory relief, arguing Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for this

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relief because they are not in the custody of the CYA or subject to

CYA policies. (Defs.’ Mot. at 11.) Plaintiffs respond they “have set

forth the proper allegations for the remedy of injunctive or

declarative relief.” (Pls.’ Opp’n at 15.) 

To establish standing under Article III Plaintiffs must

show, “(1) actual or threatened injury (2) suffered as a result of the

allegedly illegal conduct of the defendant, which (3) fairly can be

traced to the challenged action and (4) is likely to be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32

F.3d 1346, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Salmon River”) (citing Valley Forge

Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,

Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). 

Where only injunctive or declaratory relief is

sought, a plaintiff must show a very significant

possibility of future harm in order to have

standing to bring suit. The complainant must

allege an injury to himself that is distinct and

palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the

alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical. Moreover, [a]

federal court is powerless to create its own

jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient

allegations of standing.

Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 929 (9th Cir. 1991)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In addition, to establish standing for injunctive relief,

Plaintiffs must show:

First, . . . a credible threat of future injury

which is sufficiently concrete and particularized

to meet the “case or controversy” requirement of

Article III. And second . . . the plaintiff must

allege not only a likelihood of future injury, but

also show an imminent threat of irreparable harm.

The imminent threat showing is a separate

jurisdictional requirement, arising independently

from Article III, that is grounded in the

traditional limitations on the court’s power to

grant injunctive relief. 

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Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 366 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (internal

citations omitted). 

“In general, injunctive relief is to be used sparingly, and

only in a clear and plain case, especially when the court is enjoining

the conduct of a state agency.” Id. at 367. The burden is on

Plaintiffs to show they have standing. Salmon River, 32 F.3d at 1353. 

Plaintiffs have made no argument to show they meet any of the elements

required for standing and therefore, Defendant CYA’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief is granted. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant CYA is dismissed from Plaintiffs’ fifth and sixth

claims. Defendants’ motion to strike decedents’ pain and suffering

damages alleged under section 1983 and the ADA is granted. Further,

Defendant CYA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ third claim for relief

for violation of section 1983 is granted. Individual Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for statutory failure to

supervise and negligent supervision and training is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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