Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00460/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00460-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO MEDINA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 12cv0460 JM(MDD)

 13cv1891 JM(MDD)

 13cv1892 JM(MDD) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF

LAW; DENYING MOTION FOR

NEW TRIAL; AWARDING

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS;

and DENYING EX PARTE

APPLICATION TO STAY

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

v.

METROPOLITAN INTERPRETERS

AND TRANSLATORS, INC.,

Defendant.

Defendant Metropolitan Interpreters and Translators, Inc. (“Metropolitan”)

moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, for a new trial

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, and to stay execution ofthe judgment. Plaintiffs Fernando

Medina, Eduardo Ruvalcaba, Richard Gonzalez, Francisco Bates, Maria Nielsen,

Melany Duran, Lilia Palomino, Elizabeth Sanchez, and Maribel Taylor (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) oppose both motions and separately move for an award of attorneys’ fees

and costs. Metropolitan opposes Plaintiffs’ motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1),

the court finds the matters presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the Rule 50 motion for judgment as

a matter of law, denies the Rule 59 motion for new trial, awards Plaintiffs attorneys’

fees and costs in the amount of $916,998.37 and $21,824.15, respectively, and denies

the ex parte application to stay execution of the judgment as moot.

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BACKGROUND

Following trial by jury, on June 30, 2015, judgment was entered against

Metropolitan and in favor of the Plaintiffs in the total amount of $2,632,000. (Ct. Dkt.

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315). The court incorporates by reference the court docket, including this court’s

October 24, 2014 Order Grant in Part and Denying in Part Motions for Summary

Judgment (“Order,” Ct. Dkt. 161), and the trial record.

DISCUSSION

The Rule 50 Motion

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), Metropolitan renewsits motion for judgment as

a matter of law. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper if the evidence,

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one

reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict. See 

Gilbrook v. City of Westminister, 177 F.3d 839, 864 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court

must uphold the jury's award if there was any “legally sufficient basis” to support it.

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir.2002). In making that

determination, the district court considers all of the evidence in the record, drawing all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Experience Hendriz L.L.C. v.

Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014). In ruling on the

motion, the court may not make any credibility determinations orreweigh the evidence. 

Id.

Metropolitan contends that no reasonable juror could find that (1) Metropolitan

caused Plaintiffs any damage and (2) Metropolitan’s conduct permitted the

consideration of punitive damages. In light of the extensive evidentiary record

supporting the jury’s findings, these arguments are easily discounted. The jury’s

determination that Metropolitan facilitated and was a substantial factor in jointly

causing Plaintiffs harm is supported by substantial evidence and provides an adequate

This amount reflects the jury verdict after apportionment. The jury returned a

1

total verdict of $4,032,000.

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legal basis for the imposition of liability. As noted in this court’s Order:

Metropolitan, through its employees,facilitated the implementation

of the DEA’s polygraph examination plan. Metropolitan, who employed

about 100 linguists in 2011, notified Plaintiffs of the required polygraph

examinations in writing, scheduled the polygraph examinations, and

advised the employees of the adverse consequences of not taking the

polygraph examinations. Plaintiffs received letters and memos from

Metropolitan purporting to explain that the polygraph examinations were

legal and that monitors/linguists were required to submit for examination. 

Once an employee refused to take the polygraph examination or failed the

test, the employee was not permitted to continue to work on DEA projects

and was terminated. Metropolitan also disclosed the DEA polygraph

examination results of its linguists to ICE officials. ICE then terminated

access to ICE projects for those employees who failed or refused to take

the polygraph examination. 

(Ct. Dkt. 160 at p.5). The trial record is replete with evidence that Metropolitan was

Plaintiffs’ employer, required Plaintiffs to submit to the polygraphs, rejected claims by

its employees that the polygraphs violated the Employee Polygraph Protection Act

(“EPPA”), 29 U.S.C. §§2002(1)(2), and (3) EPPA, misinformed its employees about

the polygraphs, scheduled the polygraphs, used the polygraph results to discharge its

employees who failed or refused to take the exam, acted jointly and in concert with the

DEA in effectuating the polygraphs, and shared the polygraph results with ICE, leading

to additional employee firings. Moreover, the Plaintiffs provided substantial evidence 2

of the emotional distress caused by Metropolitan’s wrongful discharge of Plaintiffs. 

In light of the substantial evidence submitted in support of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Rule

50 motion fails.

Metropolitan’s arguments concerning punitive damages are moot. While the jury

determined that Metropolitan did in fact act in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights,

the jury ultimately determined not to assess punitive damages. Simply stated, the jury

apparently concluded that the degree ofreprehensibility associated withMetropolitan’s

conduct did not justify damages to punish that conduct. As such, Plaintiffs failed to

carry their burden to establish punitive damages. Metropolitan simply fails to cite any

In several instances, Metropolitan deprived employees of the opportunity to 2

continue working on DEA cases due to revoked security clearances following a failed

or refused exam.

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authority that the denial of a punitive damages award by the jury presents a live

controversy. Furthermore, even if not moot, as set forth by Plaintiffs, the evidentiary

record demonstrated that “Metropolitan’s conduct reflected [a] complete [and reckless]

indifference to Plaintiffs’ [EPPA] rights.” (Oppo. at pp.9 - 10). 

In sum, the court denies the motion for new trial.

The Rule 59 Motion

Pursuant to Rule 59, the court may “grant a new trial on all or some of the issues

. . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted

in an action at law in federal court. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1). “Ultimately, the

district court can grant a new trial under Rule 59 on any ground necessary to prevent

a miscarriage of justice.” Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd.,

762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014). A rule 59 motion will only be granted if the verdict

“[i]s against the great weight of the evidence, or it is quite clear that the jury has

reached a seriously erroneous result.” EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th

Cir. 1997). “Doubts about the correctness of the verdict are not sufficient grounds for

a new trial: the trial court must have a firm conviction that the jury has made a

mistake.” Landes Const. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th

Cir. 1987). “A jury verdict should be set aside only when the evidence permits only

one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury's verdict.” DSPT

Int'l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.2010) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). 

Metropolitan moves for a new trial on six separate grounds: (1) the emotional

distress damages were excessive; (2) Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in prejudicial

misconduct by referring to Metropolitan’s financial condition; (3) the court refused to

instruct on Metropolitan’s affirmative defenses; (4) this court’s summary judgment

Order/instruction was erroneous; (5) the jury’s damages findings were against the

weight of evidence; and (6) Metropolitan was prejudiced by irrelevant evidence. Each

is discussed in turn.

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Excessive Emotional Distress Damages

Metropolitan contends that Plaintiffs, based upon their own representations, were

limited to “garden variety” emotional distress damages. Metropolitan represents that

garden variety emotional distress damages are in the range of about $5,000 - $30,000,

and not the $200,000 - $500,000 awarded by the jury. This argument is not persuasive

for several reasons. First, contrary to Metropolitan’s contentions, the term “garden

variety” is not a term of art with a specialized legal meaning. “Garden variety” simply

means “not unusual: ordinary or common.” Merrian Webster

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/garden-variety (last visited October 1,

2015). Jury Instruction No. 20, Measure of Types of Damages, sets forth the scope of

emotional distress damages: 

“In determining the measure of damages, you should consider past and

future: (2) emotional distress such as any inconvenience, grief, anxiety,

humiliation, worry, or shame, and which with reasonable probability will

be experienced in the future.” 

Metropolitan does not dispute that the jury was properly instructed on the measure of

emotional distress damages nor does it show that the emotional distress damages

actually awarded fall outside the scope of Jury Instruction No. 20.

Second, Metropolitan’s argument that the amount of emotional distress damages

is excessive ignores the evidence of significant, extensive emotional suffering by

Plaintiffs, as reflected in evidentiary record, and fails to recognize that Metropolitan

engaged in egregious conduct which violated federal law. Moreover, Metropolitan

fails to cite any evidence suggesting that any Plaintiff suffered such severe emotional

distress to require intensive psychiatric treatment or hospitalization such that an expert

on mental health issues would be required for the jury to understand the nature of the

emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs. See FRE 702. The emotional distress

damages, as discussed below, are ordinary, commonplace, and thoughtfully and

reasonably determined by the jury.

The emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs fully supports the jury’s verdict. 

Plaintiffs’ were wrongfully required to subject themselves to an illegal polygraph,

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certain Plaintiffs (correctly) informed Metropolitan that the polygraphs violated EPPA,

Metropolitan provided erroneous information concerning the polygraphs, and

Metropolitan required its employees to take the polygraphs. Metropolitan then

discharged the employees who refused to take the exam or failed the exam or imposed

other significant adverse employment consequences. Fromthis conduct, Plaintiffs lost

their unique and purposeful employment, in which they performed important services

for the United States government, and suffered serious diminished quality of life. 

Plaintiffs provided testimony about the severe emotional distress including, the stress

arising from the loss of income, the ability to provide for their families, and loss of

meaningful and satisfying work. Furthermore, the evidentiary record demonstratesthat

Plaintiffs were humiliated because, as discharged employees who failed a polygraph

exam, they could be seen by members of the community as having engaged in criminal

conduct and shunned by society and prospective employers because of those

perceptions. The emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs is significant and the jury’s

verdict is amply supported by the evidentiary record.

The court rejects Metropolitan’s argument that the emotional distress damages

are excessive. 

Reference to Metropolitan’s Financial Condition

Metropolitan contends that Plaintiffs’ reference to Metropolitan’s financial

condition during the liability phase of the trial so prejudiced Metropolitan that a new

trial is warranted. This argument is not persuasive. During the cross examination of

Mr. Citrano, Plaintiffs’ counsel asked about Metropolitan’s business dealings with the

DEA and asked about a multi-year contract for hundreds of millions dollars. At this

point, the court sua sponte stopped the questioning and instructed the jury to disregard

any references to specific dollar amounts. Plaintiffs’ counsel also made reference to

the contract between Metropolitan and DEA as “very large” and “huge.” Metropolitan

concludes its argument by noting that the non-economic damages were so large that

only improper prejudice can explain the amount of the non-economic damages award. 

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The court rejects Metropolitan’s arguments. The court struck the monetary

references in the question and answer and promptly provided two firmly worded

limiting instructions, instructing the jury not to consider the financial evidence in

determining liability. “The law presumesthat the jury carefully followsthe instructions

given to it.” Jadwin v. County of Kern, 767 F.Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 

Accordingly, any potential prejudice suffered by Metropolitan was cured by the court’s

timely action, including its limiting instructions.

In sum, the court rejects Metropolitan’s argument that the brief reference to its

financial condition caused severe prejudice.

The Affirmative Defense Instructions

Metropolitan contends that the court erred in not providing jury instructions

concerning the affirmative defenses of contractual assumption of the risk, consent,

superseding cause, unclean hands, and waiver. As a threshold mater, the court denies

this ground for a new trial because Metropolitan, who has the burden to show that the

evidentiary record supports the elements of the affirmative defenses, does not cite any

evidence supporting the applicability of any of these affirmative defenses. See United

States v. Sparks, 791 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2014 (“To qualify for an affirmative defense

jury instruction, a defendant must point to evidence supporting each element of the

affirmative defense.”); United States v. Figueroa-Lugo, 793 F.3d 179 (1st Cir. 2015)

Here, without reference to the evidentiary record, the court is unable to assess whether

the evidence would support any element of an affirmative defense. Moreover, the court

incorporates its reasoning and rulings during jury instruction conferences when those

matters were addressed.

In sum, the court rejects Metropolitan’s argument that the jury should have been

instructed on the affirmative defenses of contractual assumption of the risk, consent,

superseding cause, unclean hands, and waiver.

The Summary Judgment Order

Metropolitan contends that the Order was erroneous because “the evidence

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showed that Metropolitan’s conduct did not constitute any of the statutory violations

set forth in EPPA. . . . [and Metropolitan did] not take adverse employment actions

against Plaintiff.” (Motion at p.17:9-13). Metropolitan also repeatedly argues that the

“DEA revoked Plaintiffs’ security access, which meant that they could not work in the

DEA facility.” (Motion at p.17 13-14). This argument misconstrues the evidentiary

record and minimizes Metropolitan’s wrongful conduct. As noted in the Order, 

The court grants summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against

Metropolitan on whether Metropolitan violated 29 U.S.C. §§2002(1)(2)

and (3). Plaintiffs come forward with overwhelming evidence to show (1)

Metropolitan is the Plaintiffs’ employer and (2) Metropolitan required

Plaintiffs to submit to ortake a polygraph examination, it inquired into the

results of the polygraph examinations, and Metropolitan discharged

employees who failed or refused to take the polygraph examination. See

i.e. Exh. 24, Metro 2101-02. Such conduct violates 29 U.S.C.

§§2002(1)(2) and (3). Moreover, Metropolitan does not submit any

evidence to rebut or challenge the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs that it,

in fact, was Plaintiffs’ employer or that it required, inquired into, or

discharged Plaintiffs who failed or refused to submit to polygraph

examination.

(Order at p.9:9-19). Metropolitan’s wrongful conduct in subjecting its employees to

polygraph examination in violation of EPPA provides a private right of action by

creating a cause of action for an employee against “an employer who violates [the

EPPA] . . . for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. §

2005(c)(1). Contrary to Metropolitan’s contentions, the evidentiary trial record

overwhelming supports, rather than undermines, the grant ofsummary adjudication on

the issue of whether Metropolitan violated EPPA.

In sum, the court rejects Metropolitan’s argument that the Order was

improvidently granted. 

Excessive Damages Award

Metropolitan contends that the damages awarded to Plaintiffs are excessive

because “the evidence demonstrated that the damages were caused by the conduct of

the DEA, not Metropolitan.” (Motion at p.18:5-6). As set forth above, this skewed

view of the evidentiary record minimizes Metropolitan’s significant wrongful conduct

in subjecting its employees to polygraph examination and ignores its role in the

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examinations. While Metropolitan views its conduct as mere “technical EPPA

violation[s],” the evidentiary record refutes these contentions. These arguments do not

directly challenge the amount of damages awarded. Rather, Metropolitan argues that

it is an innocent party and continues to lay blame at the foot of the DEA for the

discharge of Plaintiffs. The court rejects these contentions.

Here, Metropolitan was under a duty imposed by EPPA to not polygraph its

employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§2002(1)(2) and (3). Causation and the amount of

emotional distress injuries and damages is a question of fact determined by the jury

based upon the admissible evidence presented at trial. Here, based upon applicable

legal authorities and the evidentiary record, the damages awarded are not excessive and

merely compensate Plaintiffs for the harm caused by Metropolitan.

In sum, the court rejects Metropolitan’s argument that the damages awarded are

excessive. 

Irrelevant Evidence

Metropolitan contends that it was prejudiced by irrelevant evidence related to

Plaintiffs’ fraud cause of action which was later dismissed by Plaintiffs. 

Metropolitan’s failure to cite any prejudicial and irrelevant evidence is fatal to this

argument. Metropolitan fails to show that the unidentified evidenced (1) did not have

some relevance to the EPPA or state law claims or (2) caused Metropolitan any unfair

prejudice. Under these circumstances, the court rejects Metropolitan’s argument that

it suffered undue prejudice by irrelevant evidence. 

In conclusion, the court denies the motion for new trial.

Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs request an award of attorneys’ feesin the amount of $1,222,664.50 and

litigation expenses of $21,824.15. The parties do not dispute that the court may award

the prevailing party “reasonable costs, including attorneys’ fees.” 28 U.S.C.

§2005(c)(3). The amount of the prevailing party’s reasonable attorney fees is

determined by using the lodestar method. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523

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F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number

of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. See Camacho v. Bridgeport

Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). 

“Although in most cases, the lodestar figure is presumptively a reasonable

fee award, the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to

account for other factors which are not subsumed within it.” Ferland v. Conrad Credit

Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). These factors include (1) the time

and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee

is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and

ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length

of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). 

In this case, Plaintiffs seek to be compensated for attorneys’ fees consisting of

fees for Eugene Iredale (846.3 hours at $850 per hour), Julia Yoo (523.7 hours at $625

per hour), and Grace Jun (596.6 hours at $295 per hour) for a total of $1,222,664.50,

in addition to expenses of $21,824.15. 

The Hourly Rates

The fee applicant bearsthe burden of producing evidence that the requested rates

are “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.

886, 895 n.11 (1984). The relevant community is the forum in which the district court

sits. See Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). Comparable cases are

those of “similar complexity.” Davis v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536,

1545 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds on denial of reh’g, 984 F.2d 345

(9th Cir. 1993). 

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Here, Iredale, Yoo, and Jun seek to be compensated at the hourly rates of $850,

$625, and $295 per hour, respectively. The court finds these hourly rates reasonable

under the circumstances. Plaintiffs’ attorneys include their own declarations

substantiating their education and experience, as well as four declarations from

attorneys in the community with similar skills, experiences, and reputations. These

declarations, as well as the declaration of Carol Sobel, and the authorities cited by

Plaintiffs, establish that the requested rates are in line with the fees ofsimilarly situated

attorneys. Moreover, Metropolitan does not oppose the hourly rates of counsel.

In sum, the court finds the proposed hourly rates reasonable under the

circumstances.

Hours Reasonably Expended

“The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours

expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support ofthose hours worked.”

Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992). The opposing party then

has the burden of submitting evidence that challenges the accuracy or reasonableness

of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its affidavits. Id. at

1397–98. 

“By and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional

judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won,

and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento,

534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). However, courts may reduce the allowable hours

if they are inadequately documented, duplicative, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary. 

See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), amended

on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In large part, Metropolitan does not challenge the total amount of time spent by

Plaintiffs’ counsel in prosecuting this action. Metropolitan does assert that Plaintiffs

engaged in “block-billed time entries.” Block billing is described as a time-keeping

method in which an attorney enters the time working on a case rather than specifically

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itemizing the time spend on specific tasks. See Welch v. Met. Life Ins. Co.,m480 F.3d

942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). The court notes that Plaintiffs’ counsel have submitted

approximately 51 pages of detailed billing records identifying the activity performed

by counsel and the time spent on that activity. The only challenged so-called “block

entry” identified by Metropolitan is an entry on February 28 , 2015 for 5.5 hours. The

description states: “Trial preparation meeting with Richard, Maria and Francisco.” (Ct.

Dkt. P.28). The court concludes that this is not a “block entry” because it identifies

that counsel met with three of the Plaintiffs to discuss trial related matters. This entry,

in combination with counsel’s other detailed entries, is sufficient to substantiate

counsel’s time and the work performed on this activity.

In sum, the court finds that the requested hours were reasonably expended.

Adjustments

Metropolitan seeks a downward adjustment of 90% to the lodestar amount based

upon its perception ofthe limited success obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Metropolitan

contends that Plaintiffs prevailed on only one of ten claims (the EPPA claim) against

only one of eight defendants thereby warranting a 90% reduction in the requested fees. 

This argument is not persuasive.

There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. 

D’Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990). In

determining the reasonableness of any fee award, the court considers all relevant

circumstances, including the 12 factors identified in Kerr. Applying the Kerr factors,

the court concludes that a 25% reduction in the fee request is appropriate in light of the

degree of success of the overall litigation.

As noted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), the court may adjust

the lodestar amount based upon several factors, including the degree of success

achieved by the prevailing party. Applying the factors identified in Hensley and Kerr,

the court reduces the lodestar amount by 25%. The court notes that the distribution of

labor, as reflected in the time records, does not demonstrate the most efficient use of

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the time of Iredale, Yoo, and Jun. For example, many of the tasks performed by Mr.

Iredale at $850 per hour could be reasonably performed at a lower partner or associate

hourly rate, particularly with respect to the amount of client communication time,

drafting the complaints, responses to motions to dismiss, responses to the summary

judgment, and discovery related matters. (Plaintiffs Exh. 12). The court notes that the

arguments and issues raised in these documents are not particularly complex from

either a factual or legal perspective such that the extensive use of a senior partner is

warranted under the circumstances. 

Another factor warranting an adjustment is the degree of success achieved by

counsel. The original complaint alleged ten causes of action against six defendants.

(Ct. Dkt. 1). The second amended complaint alleged nine cause of action against the

same six defendants, and five DEA related defendants. Plaintiffs alleged three EPPA

claims and six state law claims for civil conspiracy, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and declaratory relief. In

addition, Plaintiffs sought an award of punitive damages. The court notes that

Plaintiffs spent substantial time litigating claims against parties who were ultimately

dismissed from the action. 

In the October 24, 2014 Order, (Ct. Dkt. 161), entered about six months prior to

trial, Plaintiffs established that Metropolitan violated EPPA. Following the entry of

summary judgment against Metropolitan on this portion of Plaintiffs’ EPPA claims,

Plaintiffs continued to conduct discovery and prepare for trial. At trial, Plaintiffs

submitted evidence in support of their state law claims. While some evidentiary

overlap exists, the court notes that much of the time spent in the pursuit of the state law

claims never bore fruit because, after the parties expended substantial time and

resources pursuing state laws claims both at trial and pre-trial, Plaintiffs dismissed all

state law claims and all individual defendants prior to jury deliberation. 

Finally, an adjustment to the lodestar is appropriate because Plaintiffs did not

prevail on their claim for an award for punitive damages even though substantial

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discovery and trial time was dedicated to the pursuit of punitive damages. Further, the

court notes that the reduced lodestar amount is consistent with a one third contingency

attorneys’ fee award. 

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In sum, the court awards Plaintiffs’ counsel $916,998.37 ($1,222,664.50 times

.75) in attorneys’ fees and costs of $21,824.15.4

Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment

Metropolitan moves ex parte to stay execution of the judgment pending

resolution of the post-trial motions and through appeal. The court denies the motion

to stay as moot in light of the present order. With respect to a stay of execution

pending appeal, the motion is denied until Metropolitan posts an appropriate

supersedeas bond. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d). 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the court deniesthe Rule 50 motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict, denies the Rule 59 motion for new trial, awards attorneys’ fees and costs

in the amount of $916,998.37 and $21,824.15, respectively, and denies the ex parte

application to stay execution of the judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 13, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

In relation to the DEA settlement, Plaintiffs represented that one third of the

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settlement would be distributed to counsel pursuant to the client fee agreement. A one

third attorneys’ fee award on the present record would amount to $877,333 ($2,632,000

times one third).

The court finds that the costs requested are reasonable and of the type that are 4

typically billed to fee paying clients. While Metropolitan argues that Plaintiffs fail to

show that certain Office Depot and Office Max expenses were incurred in this

litigation, the court accepts counsels’ declarations as officers of the court that the

expenses were incurred in this litigation.

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