Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02524/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ARLINGTON ERNEST WINGROVE, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-02524 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On or about December 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 8) on March 24, 2010.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations. 

I Procedural History

In January of 1990 Petitioner was charged with three

counts of child molestation, which crimes were alleged to have

occurred in September of 1981. Answer, Exh. C. Petitioner’s

counsel moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the sevenyear statute of limitations precluded prosecution on the charges

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1

 At the time the crimes were committed Arizona law provided

that the statute of limitations for the crimes was seven years. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-107 (1981).

2

 Petitioner is the uncle of the victim, who was five years

old in 1981, and Petitioner lived with the victim’s family during the

period February 1, 1981, through May 1, 1981. Answer, Exh. C.

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stated in the indictment. Id., Exh. C. The state responded

that the crimes were not discovered by the state, i.e., reported

by the victim, until April of 1984 and, accordingly, that the

charges were timely filed. Id., Exh. C.1 The state trial court

denied the motion to dismiss. Id., Exh. C. 

Petitioner’s counsel then moved the state trial court

to dismiss the charges, asserting Petitioner’s right to due

process of law was violated by the state’s pre-indictment delay

in bringing the charges against Petitioner. Id., Exh. C. The

motion also re-urged the statute of limitations argument

previously presented in the first motion to dismiss. Id., Exh.

C. Petitioner’s second motion to dismiss, filed in April of

1990, was not decided prior to June 5, 1990, when Petitioner

entered into a plea agreement with regard to the charges stated

in the indictment. Id., Exh. C.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, on June 5, 1990,

Petitioner entered a plea of no contest to the amended first

count of the indictment, i.e., a charge of attempted child

molestation. See id., Exh. A. The indictment was amended to

reflect the crime occurred at some time from February of 1981

through May of 1981, rather than during the first two weeks of

September 1981, as originally charged. Id., Exh. C.2 Pursuant

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3

 At the time he entered his plea in the case at issue in

this matter, Petitioner was serving a term of 17 years imprisonment

pursuant to his conviction for child molestation in a 1990 Pinal

County case. Answer, Exh. C. 

4

 In his pro se notice of post-conviction relief Petitioner

also asserted he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

trial and appellate counsel. Answer, Exh. B. However, Petitioner’s

appointed Rule 32 counsel did not brief this issue to the state

court’s attention, noting Petitioner was raising a single issue in his

Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. C. 

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to this conviction Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated

term of ten years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a

sentence of imprisonment Petitioner was already serving in a

different criminal matter. Id., Exh. A.3 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his conviction and

sentence. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence; the mandate issued November 5, 1991.

Id., Exh. A. 

On March 26, 2007, Petitioner initiated an action

seeking state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner

was represented by appointed counsel in his Rule 32 proceeding.

Id., Exh. C. Petitioner asserted he had new evidence that his

crime of conviction was first reported to law enforcement in

1981, not in 1984 as alleged. Id., Exh. C at 1. Petitioner

argued that, because the crime had allegedly been reported

earlier, the statute of limitations had run prior to his arrest

and, accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict

and sentence him.4

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To support this Rule 32 claim Petitioner submitted a

notarized letter dated August 10, 2005, authored by the victim’s

mother. Id., Exh. C at App. B. The letter is addressed to the

Arizona Department of Corrections, in reference to Petitioner’s

parole hearing. The letter stated that “I have been the sole

contact beginning with the initial report of the crime February

1, 1981 ....” Id., Exh. C at App. B. In response to

Petitioner’s assertion of new evidence, the state submitted the

initial police report regarding Petitioner’s crime of

conviction, indicating that the offense was first reported to

the state on April 27, 1984. Id., Exh. A. 

The state trial court denied relief in Petitioner’s

Rule 32 action, concluding Petitioner had failed to set forth a

colorable issue of law or fact that would entitle him to relief.

Id., Exh. A at 2. The state trial court found the alleged

statement attributed to the victim’s mother to the Department of

Corrections was insufficient to substantiate Petitioner’s claim.

Id., Exh. A. The court concluded that there was nothing in the

record to substantiate a claim that Petitioner’s crime was

reported to the police prior to April 1984. Id., Exh. A. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on October 27,

2008. See Petition at 4.

On December 3, 2009, Petitioner filed this action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner asserts three claims

for relief, in each asserting the violation of his rights to due

process of law and a fair trial. Petitioner specifically

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contends he has been denied his rights pursuant to the Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.

Petitioner claims he was denied due process of law

because he has a notarized letter allegedly establishing that

his crime was first reported to authorities more than seven

years before he was arrested. Accordingly, Petitioner argues,

his arrest occurred outside the state’s statute of limitations

period. Petitioner also alleges that he was denied his right to

the effective assistance of counsel. In his third claim for

relief Petitioner argues the Arizona Court of Appeals committed

“compound fundamental error” by not conducting a hearing on the

colorable claim presented in his Rule 32 action.

II Analysis

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state

prisoners whose convictions became final before April 24, 1996,

to file their petitions for habeas corpus relief from those

convictions by April 25, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The running of this one-year

statute of limitations on habeas petitions for state convictions

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which became final before April 24, 1996, was suspended during

any period when “a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim [was] pending” in any state court.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8,

121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051,

1053 (9th Cir. 2008); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327-28

(4th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final in

1991 at the conclusion of his direct appeal proceedings, prior

to the effective date of the AEDPA. Accordingly, Petitioner had

until April 25, 1997, to file a federal petition for habeas

relief regarding his 1990 conviction for attempted child

molestation. Petitioner did not file a federal habeas action

prior to expiration of the statute of limitations on April 25,

1997. Petitioner’s filing of an action pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 2007, could not and did

not restart the already-expired statute of limitations for

filing Petitioner’s federal habeas action. See Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v.

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson,

234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner presents federal habeas claims that are

predicated on what he asserts is newly discovered evidence,

i.e., the letter from the victim’s mother dated August 10, 2005.

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The AEDPA provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or

the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

***

(D) the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim or claims presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

The limitations period on a habeas claim challenging

the petitioner’s conviction, which claim is based on newly

discovered evidence, begins to run when the prisoner could have

discovered the new evidence through the exercise of due

diligence. See, e.g., Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th

Cir. 2003).

However, under AEDPA’s exhaustion

requirement, the petitioner must fully

present his claim based on newly discovered

evidence to the state courts before he can

file a federal habeas petition. []. The

limitations period is tolled, however, under

§ 2244(d)(2) while the prisoner’s claim based

on newly discovered evidence is pending in

state court. Thus, for claims based on newly

discovered evidence, the limitations period

begins to run when the new evidence should

have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence until the prisoner files a

petition for state collateral review. The

prisoner’s federal petition based on that

claim becomes ripe for filing once the state

courts have completed a full round of

collateral review.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

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The federal habeas petition raises two claims related

to Petitioner’s criminal proceedings in 1990; a claim that he

was denied his right to due process of law because the statute

of limitations had expired prior to his indictment, and a claim

that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel. The factual predicate for these claims was known to

Petitioner at the time of his conviction and sentencing in 1990.

The statute of limitations issue was raised in his initial

criminal proceedings. Any deficiency on the part of

Petitioner’s trial or appellate counsel was known to Petitioner

no later than the conclusion of his direct appeal in 1991, and

Petitioner did not seek post-conviction relief on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel prior to 2007. 

Assuming that the factual predicate for Petitioner’s

claims is the purported evidence in the letter written by the

victim’s mother that the crimes were reported in 1981, the oneyear statute of limitations with regard to Petitioner’s first

two federal habeas claims began to run on or about the date the

letter was notarized, September 16, 2005, when this information

became available to Petitioner, and allowing for the tolling of

the statute of limitations from March 26, 2007, through November

27, 2008, during the pendency of Petitioner’s state Rule 32

proceedings, the petition filed on December 3, 2009, was still

not filed within one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly,

the Court should not consider the merits of the first two claims

raised in the habeas petition, absent Petitioner’s demonstration

that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of

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5

 Additionally, the assertion that the state courts deprived

a petitioner of their right to due process of law based on a state

court’s decision in post-conviction proceedings is not a cognizable

claim for federal habeas relief. Federal habeas relief is not

available to redress errors in state post-conviction proceedings. See

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); Gerlaugh v.

Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir. 1997); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that a claim that the

petitioner “was denied due process in his state habeas corpus

proceedings” was not cognizable on federal habeas review); Franzen v.

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989).

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limitations.

With regard to Petitioner’s third claim for habeas

relief, asserting the deprivation of due process in his state

post-conviction proceedings, assuming the basis of this claim

became known to Petitioner on October 27, 2008, the habeas

petition asserting this claim, filed on December 3, 2009, was

not filed within the one-year limitations period.5

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15 (2005). See also WaldronRamsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

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Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris,

515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is “typically applied

sparingly”). The petitioner must establish a causal connection

between the alleged roadblock to their timely filing of their

federal habeas petition and the actual failure to file the

petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v.

Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026;

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

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Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Wingrove’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

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District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 29th day of April, 2010.

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