Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00505/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00505-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Trademark

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1 Defendants alternately refer to themselves in the

singular and the plural. However, since both defendants are

represented by the same counsel, the court interprets this motion

as brought on behalf of both M&M Gutters, LLC, and Thermal

Technologies, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BYLIN HEATING SYSTEMS, INC., a

California corporation, doing

business as BYLIN ENGINEERED

SYSTEMS; ROOF ICE MELT SYSTEMS

INCORPORATED, an Oregon

Corporation

NO. CIV. 2:07-CV-0505-FCD-KJM 

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

M&M GUTTERS, LLC, a Utah

Limited Liability Company;

THERMAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a

Utah Corporation; doing

business as ROOF ICE MELT

SYSTEMS, INC, and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants M&M

Gutters, LLC, (“M&M Gutters”) and Thermal Technologies, Inc.’s

(“Thermal Technologies”) (collectively, “defendants”)1

 motion to

dismiss plaintiffs Bylin Heating Systems, Inc., (“Bylin Heating”)

Case 2:07-cv-00505-FCD-KJM Document 23 Filed 10/31/07 Page 1 of 10
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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

3 The facts of this case are taken from plaintiff’s

allegations in the second amended complaint. 

2

and Roof Ice Melt Systems Inc.’s (“RIMS”) (collectively,

“plaintiffs”), sixth claim for relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set

forth below,2

 defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff RIMS is in the business of engineering and

supplying winter freeze protection products for a variety of

roofing structures. (Pl.s’ Second Amended Compl., filed August

10, 2007 (“Compl.”), ¶ 9). RIMS’ products prevent or dissipate

ice dams and icicles by targeting ice accumulation areas of roof

structures. (Id.) RIMS is the assignee of United States Patent

No. 5,391,858 (the “858 patent”), entitled “Ice Dam Melting

System.” (Id. ¶ 10).

In 1997, RIMS exclusively licensed the patent to plaintiff

Bylin Heating pursuant to an Executive Purchase and Marketing

Agreement (the “Agreement”). (Id. ¶ 11). In accordance with the

Agreement, RIMS agreed to exclusively provide its RIM panel

products to Bylin Heating. (Id.) Bylin Heating agreed to market

and sell RIM panel products its capacity as the exclusive

purchaser and marketer of RIM panel systems in North America. 

(Id.)

In 1999, RIMS and Bylin Heating executed an addendum to the

Agreement, by which Bylin Heating exercised its option to begin

manufacturing RIM panel products. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiffs’

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3

products incorporate technology disclosed and claimed in the 858

patent. (Id. ¶ 14). In addition, plaintiffs’ products are sold

in conjunction with the trademarks “Roof Ice Melt Systems,” “RIM”

and “RIM Systems.” (Id.) Bylin Heating is the exclusive owner of

the these trademarks in combination with winter freeze

protection, and icicle and icedam prevention solutions. (Id.)

From 1999 until 2003, defendant M&M Gutters was a purchaser

and installer of Bylin Heating’s Roof Ice Melt Systems products. 

(Id. ¶ 18). In 2003, M&M Gutters discontinued its relationship

with Bylin Heating and began independently manufacturing and

selling competitive heated roof products. (Id.) On May 28,

2004, plaintiffs’ counsel informed Mike Gurr, former president of

defendants M&M Gutters and Thermal Technologies, and current

principal of defendant Roof Ice Melt Systems, that products

offered by defendants infringed on plaintiffs’ technology and

trademarks. (Id. ¶ 19). Defendants disregarded this

correspondence and all subsequent communications. (Id.) 

Thereafter, defendant Thermal Technologies’ former website,

www.meltyourice.com, offered for sale heated roof panel products

with names such as “Original RIM System,” “Original RIM Products”

and “Thermal Link Roof Ice Melt Systems.” (Id. ¶ 22). Thermal

Technologies’ website linked to defendant M&M Gutters’ website

www.mandmgutters.com. M&M Gutters’ website now links to the

website of defendant Roof Ice Melt Systems,

www.rooficemeltsystems.com, which offers for sale a variety of

roof panel products that are identical or nearly identical to

plaintiffs’ products. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25).

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4

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges defendants’ actions have

resulted in economic losses and a loss of goodwill associated

with plaintiffs’ marks and products. Specifically, plaintiffs

bring claims for (1) patent infringement; (2) common law

trademark and trade name infringement; (3) false designation of

origin; (4) false advertising; (5) unfair competition; and (6)

domain name infringement. Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’

sixth cause of action for domain name infringement. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

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relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). Only where a plaintiff

has not “nudged [his or her] claims across the line from

conceivable to plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. 

Id. “[A] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that

no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be

proved consistent with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs allege defendants’ domain name,

www.rooficemeltsystems.com, is confusingly similar to plaintiffs’

trademarks and trade name (“marks”). (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 57). 

Plaintiffs allege its marks are inherently distinctive and had

acquired distinctiveness long before defendants’ began using the

domain name www.rooficemeltsystems.com. (Id. ¶ 57). As such,

plaintiffs contend that defendants’ domain name (1) diverts

consumers from Bylin Heating’s website; (2) usurps search engine

results that would otherwise direct consumers to Bylin Heating’s

products; and (3) gains a commercial advantage by misleading

consumers to perceive an affiliation or sponsorship between

plaintiffs and defendants and their products. (Id.) Defendants

assert that “Roof Ice Melt Systems” is generic within the meaning

of 15 U.S.C. § 1125. (Mot. at 3.) Defendants contend that

plaintiffs have not alleged facts that satisfy their burden to

show “Roof Ice Melt Systems” is not generic. Therefore,

defendant contends this issue may be resolved on a motion to

dismiss.

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As part of the Lanham Act, the Anticybersquatting Consumer

Protection Act (“ACPA”) provides that 

a person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner

of a mark . . . if without regard to the goods or

services of the parties, that person: (1) has a bad

faith intent to profit from that mark . . .; (2)

registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that . . . in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time

of registration of the domain name, is identical or

confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark.

 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(I) (emphasis added). A “mark” is defined

as “any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or

certification mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 

In determining which marks are entitled to protection, marks

are classified in categories of increasing distinctiveness (1)

generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; and (5)

fanciful. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,

768 (1992); see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,

537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). “In general, fanciful, arbitrary,

and suggestive marks receive automatic protection because of

their inherent distinctiveness.” Interstellar Starship Servs.,

Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). While

generic terms are not protected, a descriptive mark is entitled

to protection “upon [a showing of] proof of distinctiveness

acquired in commerce.” Id.; see generally, TCPIP Holding Co.,

Inc. v. Harr Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2001)

(discussing the “requirements of distinctiveness”). 

A mark need not be registered to be protected. Two Pesos,

Inc., 505 U.S. at 768 (stating Lanham Act “protects qualifying

unregistered marks”); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,

529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). However, registration of a mark

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“provides some indication the mark is descriptive rather than

generic.” Novak v. Overture Servs., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458

(E.D.N.Y. 2004). 

Whether a term is generic is a question of fact. Comm. for

Idaho’s High Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“genericness is a question of fact”); see also In re Northland

Aluminum Products, Inc., 777 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Whether

a term is a common descriptive name is a question of fact.”). 

Determination of whether a mark is generic requires consideration

of both quantitative and qualitative data, including the extent

of advertising, the length of exclusive use, and public

recognition, in order to determine whether the public domain

defeats a mark outright or merely weakens it. See Entrepreneur

Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiffs’ complaint sets forth numerous facts sufficient

to support its allegation they have acquired trademark rights in

the mark “Roof Ice Melt Systems,” which defendants allegedly use

as their domain name. Plaintiffs allege that “Roof Ice Melt

Systems Inc.” has, since 1966, been continuously utilized as a

trade name by plaintiffs within the meaning of California Bus. &

Prof. Code § 14401, et seq. (Compl. ¶ 3(b)). Plaintiffs further

allege Bylin Heating is the exclusive owner of the trademarks

“Roof Ice Melt Systems,” “RIM,” and “RIM Systems” and that

defendant Roof Ice Melt Systems has adopted Bylin Heating’s

trademark as both its company name and domain name, selling

nearly identical products and thereby trading on the goodwill

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4 Defendants argue that the 858 patent is evidence that

the mark “Roof Ice Melt Systems” is generic because these terms

are merely descriptive of the function of the products. However,

a descriptive mark is entitled to protection “upon [a showing of]

proof of distinctiveness acquired in commerce.” Interstellar

Starship Servs., 304 F.3d at 943 n.6. As set forth above,

plaintiffs allege that the mark has acquired such

distinctiveness. Such allegations are sufficient to withstand a

motion to dismiss. 

5 The majority of cases cited by defendants were

adjudicated after consideration of evidence indicating the nature

of a mark’s use by the parties. Rudolph Intern., Inc. v. Realys,

Inc., 482 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2007) (motion for summary

judgment); Yellow Cab Co. v. Yellow Cab/Elk Grove, 419 F.3d 925

(9th Cir. 2005) (motion for summary judgment); Japan Telecom,

Inc. v. Japan Telecom A.M. Inc., 287 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2002)

(motion for summary judgment); Committee v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814

(9th Cir. 1996) (bench trial); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St. Regis

Publ’g, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d. Cir. 1975) (preliminary

injunction).

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associated with Bylin Heating’s marks. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24).4 As

such, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that defendants’

violated the ACPA by appropriating plaintiffs’ mark as their

domain name. 

Morever, based upon the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint

and because the issue of genericness is a question of fact, it is

inappropriate for the court to rule on this issue at this stage

in the litigation. The cases cited by defendants are

distinguishable from the present case.5 Defendants rely on Toho

Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981)

to support their position that a motion to dismiss is permissible

where the facts alleged do not “permit a conclusion that

consumers are likely to be confused.” (Def.s’ Reply to Opp’n to

Mot. to Dismiss, filed Oct. 20, 2007 (“Reply”), at 5 (quoting

Toho, 645 F.2d at 791)). In Toho, defendant used the term

“bagzilla” as a marketing tool for its “monstrously strong”

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garbage bags. Toho, 645 F.2d at 791. The Ninth Circuit found it

was implausible defendant’s use would lead customers to believe

plaintiff, owner of the trademark for the character “Godzilla,”

was the source or sponsor of the bags. Id. at 791. Conversely,

in this case, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges defendants are

engineering and marketing a product nearly identical to

plaintiffs’ product and using an identical name, “Roof Ice Melt

Systems,” for their domain name and online sales. As such, the

court’s finding with respect to genericness in Toho is

inapplicable. 

Defendants’ reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co. is similarly misplaced. 

86 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1996). In Murray, the court found that

there was no likelihood of consumer confusion between the

plaintiff’s registered trademark “America Speaks” and the

defendant’s use of the term “America’s Talking.” Id. at 861. 

The court found that the plaintiff conducted “man-on-the-street”

consumer surveys under his mark while the defendant offered talkshow television programming under the allegedly infringing name. 

Id. The court found because the parties did not share customers

and because the services offered by the parties’ were unrelated,

there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks as a

matter of law. Id. However, in this case, plaintiffs allege

that plaintiffs and defendants target identical consumer classes

through identical channels of trade. Further, the complaint

alleges that the services and products marketed and sold by the

parties are nearly identical. Thus, the court’s findings in

Murray are inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

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Giving plaintiffs every reasonable inference from the

allegations in the complaint, plaintiffs have sufficiently

alleged that the mark “Roof Ice Melt Systems,” which is used as

defendants’ domain name, is not generic. Therefore, defendants’

motion to dismiss is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 31, 2007.

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