Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01587/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01587-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Citicapital Technology Finance, Inc.

formerly known as EAB Leasing Corp., a

Pennsylvania corporation; Citicapital

Commercial Leasing Corporation,

formerly known as Associates Leasing,

Inc., an Indiana Corp., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Grant H. Goodman; Teri B. Goodman,

husband and wife, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-1587-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ “First Verified Consolidated Independent

Action” in which they seek, as Plaintiffs, to set aside the judgment against them in this case.

The judgement entered by this Court on July 21, 2006 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals

(see Mandate at Doc. #136, received August 4, 2008).

Despite calling their filing an “independent action,” Defendants invoke the

jurisdiction of this Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “60(b)” and “60(b)(3)(4)(5)”

(which are actually three different subsections). Defendants also reference the injunction

provisions of Rule 65. The Court has reviewed Rule 60(b) and does not find authority for

the “independent action” in Rule 60(b). The Court notes that Rule 60(d)(1) provides that

nothing in the enactment of Rule 60 as a whole limited the district court’s ability to entertain

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an independent action. However, the Court does not find that any provision of 60(b)

provides the court with an affirmative grant of the power to entertain an independent action.

Therefore, this Court rejects Defendants’ contention that they can invoke the jurisdiction of

this Court to entertain an independent action under Rule 60(b). 

The Court suspects that Defendants’ repeated references to the “savings clause” of

Rule 60(b) stems from Defendants failure to read a current version of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Thus, the Court presumes Defendants intended to be citing Rule 60(d)(1)

as their basis for bringing an “independent action.” However, the Court’s analysis is

unchanged. Specifically, whether the reference to the independent action is found in the

savings clause of former Rule 60(b) or in Rule 60(d)(1), the reference to the independent

action, “is not an affirmative grant of power but merely allows continuation of whatever

power the court would have had to entertain an independent action if the rule had not been

adopted.” Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2868, at 396

(1995); see also Herring v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 82 F.3d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, nothing in Rule 60 grants the power to entertain an independent action to the

district courts; instead the power that pre-dates the rules remains reserved to the district

courts.

Having now identified the source of this Court’s power to entertain independent

actions, the Court must consider the breadth of that power. The Supreme Court has held that,

given the power conferred to the district court to set aside judgments for fraud,

misrepresentation, or misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3), the power reserved to the court to hear

an independent action must be something more than the bases listed in the Rule. See United

States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998). Thus, the Supreme Court stated that the

independent action is “reserved for those cases of injustices which, in certain instances, are

deemed sufficiently gross to demand departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res

judicata.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the Court concluded that “an

independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” Id.

at 47.

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1

 All parties have discussed whether the fact that the case was on appeal when the

motion was filed divested this Court of jurisdiction to hear the motion. That issue is now

moot because the Court of Appeals has issued the mandate which returns jurisdiction to this

Court.

2

 The Court notes that the basis for setting aside judgments based on “fraud upon the

court,” reserved to the court in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), is not subject to this

same time limitation. However, Defendants have not invoked this power of the court in

bringing their “independent action.”

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Having now defined the standard governing an independent action, the Court must

consider the timing of the independent action. Generally, “There is no time limit on when

an independent action may be brought, but the doctrine of laches is applicable and undue

delay may bar relief.” Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d §

2868, at 401-02 (1995) (footnotes omitted). When a case has been appealed to a court of

appeals, and the appellate court has affirmed the district court’s judgment, some courts have

held that leave of the appellate court is required before the district court can entertain an

independent action which attacks the affirmed judgment. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2868, at 402 and n. 20 (1995). Notably, the Supreme

Court has held that leave of the court of appeals is not required to bring a Rule 60(b) motion.

See Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 17-19 (1976); Wright, Miller

& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2873, at 438 (1995). However, in

Standard, the Supreme Court was discussing the affirmative grants of power vested in the

district courts through Rule 60(b) and not the powers that remained with the district courts

from prior to the enactment of Rule 60(b). No party has discussed whether leave of the

appellate court is required to bring an independent action.1

The Court also notes that Defendants appear to be seeking relief under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4), and 60(b)(5). Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the

Response (Doc. #134) that any relief sought under Rule 60(b)(3) is barred by the one year

statute of limitations. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(c)(1).2

 The limitations period for claims under

60(b)(4) and 60(b)(5) is, “a motion under Rule 60(b) [(4) and (5)] must be made within a

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3

 The Court makes no ruling at this time regarding Defendants’ addition of new

“defendants” in the independent action. Whether those “defendants” are properly added and

whether they have been properly served may be raised at the hearing. Further, any issues of

whether new “plaintiffs” can be added in the independent action may also be raised at the

hearing.

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reasonable time.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(c)(1). The Response does not address whether this

motion was made within a “reasonable time.”

For the reasons stated above, the Court does not find the independent action to be

subject to summary denial as the Response suggests. Accordingly the Court will set an

evidentiary hearing on the “independent action” — docketed at 132 as a motion to vacate

judgment. Each party shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the

independent action consistent with an order to follow outlining the time requirements for

such submissions. These submissions shall address all potential bars to the independent

action raised herein, the merits of the independent action, and any other issues the parties

deem appropriate.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED setting a hearing on Doc. #132 for October 15, 2008 at 9:00 a.m.3

DATED this 7th day of August, 2008.

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