Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01004/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1004

___________

Larry Kenneth Alexander, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

DaimlerChrysler Services North * District Court for the

America, L.L.C., a Michigan limited * District of Minnesota.

liability company f/k/a Chrysler *

Financial Corporation f/k/a * [UNPUBLISHED]

Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C.; *

Robert Fletcher, in his official capacity *

as the Ramsey County Sheriff, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 7, 2006 

Filed: April 3, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Appellate Case: 05-1004 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/03/2006 Entry ID: 2028196
1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable Susan R.

Nelson, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

2

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

-2-

Larry K. Alexander appeals the district court’s1

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) dismissal of his federal action challenging a state foreclosure action. We

affirm.

We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2005). We agree with the district court

that Alexander’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman2

 doctrine because they

either had been resolved by the state courts before Alexander brought the instant

action or Alexander could have raised them in the state courts. See Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars cases brought by state-court losers who complain of injuries by statecourt judgments rendered before district court proceedings commenced and invite

district court to review and reject those judgments); Mosby, 418 F.3d at 932 (where

plaintiff failed to raise, but could have raised, constitutional claims before state court,

district court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman doctrine to consider them).

Further, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside an

entry of default, see Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 783-85 (8th Cir.

1998); or in forbidding Alexander from bringing another action about the subject

property without leave of court, see In re Nat’l Warranty Ins. Risk Retention Group,

384 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We deny

Alexander’s motion to file a supplemental memorandum.

Appellate Case: 05-1004 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/03/2006 Entry ID: 2028196