Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01882/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01882-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS HERRERA,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. HALL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01882-LJO-SKO PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

R E C O M M E N D I N G D E N I A L O F

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(Docs. 17, 25, 28)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 30 DAYS

Plaintiff Carlos Herrera (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court are three motions

to dismiss from Defendants. On October 23, 2009, Defendant Grannis filed a motion to dismiss. 

(Doc. #17.) On November 9, 2009, Defendants Hall and Zamora filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc.

#25.) On November 16, 2009, Defendant Moonga filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. #28.) Plaintiff

has filed oppositions to all three motions to dismiss. (Docs. #30, 36, 39.) Defendants Grannis, Hall,

Zamora, and Moonga (collectively referred to as “Defendants” in this order) have filed replies to

Plaintiff’s oppositions. (Docs. #34, 38, 40.) All three motions to dismiss argue that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim against Defendants for their role in responding to Plaintiff’s administrative appeals. 

The issues raised in all three motions to dismiss are identical. Therefore, the Court will address all

three motions simultaneously.

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I. Background

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on June 19, 2009. (Doc.

#10.) Plaintiff is suing Defendants under Section 1983 for the violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment rights. Plaintiff names N. Dill, Sherry Lopez, C. Hall, N. Grannis, Turella, Penner, S.

Zamora, G. Moonga, and L. Bluford as Defendants.1

Plaintiff claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent toward his serious medical

needs and that Defendants denied him treatment for his Hepatitis C. The denial of treatment was

initially based on reports in Plaintiff’s medical file that rendered him ineligible for treatment due to

a history of drug abuse and mental illness. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Defendants that these

reports were false and requested that Defendants provide treatment. However, Defendants continued

to deny Plaintiff’s requests for treatment. Plaintiff claims that he suffered severe injury as a result

of Defendants’ decisions to deny him treatment.

Plaintiff claims that he requested Hepatitis treatment from Defendants Turella, Penner, and

Lopez, each alleged to be physicians. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal requesting Hepatitis

treatment that explained that his treatment requests were being denied because of false reports in

Plaintiff’s medical file. Plaintiff’s administrative appeal was denied by Defendants Bluford, Dill,

Hall, Grannis, Moonga, and Zamora. Plaintiff alleges that Bluford, Dill, Hall, Grannis, Moonga, and

Zamora were all aware that the reports in Plaintiff’s medical file were false, yet denied Plaintiff’s

requests for treatment based on information in the false reports.

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

In their motions to dismiss, Defendants argue that theyare entitled to dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim

for an Eighth Amendment violation. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief

Defendants Lopez, Turella, and Penner have filed answers to Plaintiff’s complaint but have not joined the

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motions to dismiss currently before the Court. Defendants Dill and Bluford have not made an appearance in this

action. The Court received unexecuted summonses as to Dill and Bluford on October 23, 2009 that indicated that

the U.S. Marshal was unable to effect service of process on Dill and Bluford using the information provided by

Plaintiff.

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based on Defendants’ actions in processing Plaintiff’s administrative appeals. Defendants contend

that “[a] claim for relief based on the failure to grant administrative grievances or process them

properly is not a cognizable claim because there is no constitutional guarantee to a prison

administrative grievance or appeal system.” (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Grannis’ Mot. to Dismiss

3:15-19; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Zamora and Hall’s Mot. to Dismiss 3:15-18; Mem. of P. &

A. in Supp. of Moonga’s Mot. to Dismiss 3:8-11.) Defendants argue that ruling against a prisoner

on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to a constitutional violation and that

prison officials whose participation in an alleged constitutional violation is limited to the

consideration of a prisoner’s administrative complaint cannot be held liable for that violation under

Section 1983.

Plaintiff argues that he is not challenging the constitutionality of the inmate administrative

grievance process, and is instead challenging Defendants’ role in denying Plaintiff’s medical care

when Plaintiff had a serious need for medical care. Plaintiff claims that Defendants had the authority

to grant Plaintiff’s request for treatment and therewas no legitimate reason to denyPlaintiff’s request

for treatment. Plaintiff claims that Defendants knew that the reports in Plaintiff’s medical file were

false, yet denied Plaintiff’s requests for treatment based on the information in the false reports. 

Plaintiff further argues that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s need for treatment and were aware

of the excessive risk posed by denying treatment. Plaintiff argues that the denial thus constituted

deliberate indifference.

II. Discussion

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Defendants contend that they are entitled to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) because Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a claim. To survive a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet the pleading standard set by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 8. Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading

standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

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1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are

‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a

court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a

plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

B. Eighth Amendment Claims Against Appeals Reviewers

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. The Eighth

Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and “embodies ‘broad and

idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). A prison

official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the objective

requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the subjective requirement that the

prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

(1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

The objective requirement that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious” is met where the

prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). The subjective

requirement that the prison official has a “sufficientlyculpable state of mind” is met where the prison

official acts with “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S.

at 302-303). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action

under § 1983.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on

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deficient medical treatment, a plaintiff must show: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) a deliberately

indifferent response by the defendant. Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). A serious medical need is shown by

alleging that the failure to treat the plaintiff’s condition could result in further significant injury, or

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. A deliberately indifferent response by the

defendant is shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical

need and harm caused by the indifference. Id. In order to constitute deliberate indifference, there

must be an objective risk of harm and the defendant must have subjective awareness of that harm. 

Id.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he had a serious medical need. Plaintiff claims that the

failure to provide Hepatits treatment caused him severe injury, and that the response from

Defendants was deliberately indifferent. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew that Plaintiff had a

serious need, knew that Plaintiff needed treatment for his serious medical need, knew that the reports

in his medical file were false, yet denied Plaintiff’s requests for treatment by relying on the

information in his medical file that was known to be false. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

support the plausible conclusion that Defendants were aware that their actions in denying Plaintiff’s

administrative appeal exposed Plaintiff to an excessive risk. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants

were deliberately indifferent.

Defendants argue that there can be no claim for relief based on the failure to grant an

administrative grievance because prisoners have no constitutional right to a prison administrative

grievance system. Defendants’ argument is not supported by law. Defendants rely on two Ninth

Circuit cases in support of their proposition that the processing of administrative grievances cannot

form the basis of a claim for relief under Section 1983.

In Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that a state’s

unpublished policy statements establishing a grievance procedure did not create a constitutionally

protected liberty interest. The Ninth Circuit did not discuss Mann’s claim in the context of any

specific constitutional right, but state-created liberty interests are an element of Fourteenth

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Amendment due process claims. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (“States may

under certain circumstances create libertyinterests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.”)

In Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that “inmates lack

a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Id. at 860 (citing

Mann, 855 F.2d at 640). The Ninth Circuit applied that proposition to reject “Ramirez’s claimed

loss of a liberty interest in the processing of his appeals.” Id.

Taken together, Mann and Ramirez cannot be read broadlyenough to support the proposition

that the processing of an administrative appeal cannot, under any circumstances, form the basis of

a claim to relief under Section 1983. Mann and Ramirez simply held that a Plaintiff has no

substantive right to a prison grievance system and that due process claims based on the denial of or

interference with a prisoner’s access to a prison grievance system are not cognizable. Thus, if a

prisoner were to raise a claim premised on an asserted denial of due process caused by denied or

obstructed access to a prison’s administrative grievance system, the claim would not be cognizable

under Mann and Ramirez. However, here, Plaintiff is not claiming a loss of a substantive right in

the processing of his appeals caused by denied or obstructed access to a prison grievance system. 

Plaintiff’s claim is based on rights secured by the Eighth Amendment--the right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishments. The decisions in Mann and Ramirez do not touch upon whether an

appeals reviewer’s actions can be considered “cruel and unusual” within the meaning of the Eighth

Amendment.

Defendants cite Ham v. Clark, No. 1:08-cv-01982-LJO-SMS PC, 2009 WL 2355265 (E.D.

Cal. July 29, 2009), to support their position that a prison official cannot be liable under Section

1983 for the processing of an administrative appeal. In Ham, a prisoner attempted to sue prison

officials for the failure to provide pain medication which allegedly left Plaintiff in severe pain. Ham

v. Clark, No. 1:08-cv-01982-LJO-SMS PC, 2009 WL 2355265, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009). 

The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the prison officials who denied his

administrative appeals on two separate grounds: (1) the plaintiff has no substantive right to a

particular grievance procedure, and (2) the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the appeals reviewers

were personally involved with Plaintiff’s medical care or treatment. Id. It appears that plaintiff’s

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Eighth Amendment claims were dismissed because he did not allege that the appeals reviewers had

the authorityto grant the plaintiff’s request for treatment. Thus, it was unclear whetherthe plaintiff’s

administrative appeal was a request for medical treatment or whether the plaintiff was merely

complaining about another prison official’s failure to provide him with treatment. The distinction

is important because an appeals coordinator does not cause or contribute to a completed

constitutional violation that occurs in the past. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-610 (7th Cir.

2007) (“[a] guard who stands and watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the

Constitution; a guard who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct

does not”). However, if there is an ongoing constitutional violation and the appeals coordinator had

the authority and opportunity to prevent the ongoing violation, a plaintiff may be able to establish

liability by alleging that the appeals coordinator knew about an impending violation and failed to

prevent it. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisory official liable under

Section 1983 if he or she knew of a violation and failed to act to prevent it). Plaintiff has done so

here.

Defendants also cite Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), for the proposition that “[a]

defendant who is involved only to the extent that he or she considered a plaintiff’s inmate appeal

may not be held liable.” (Def. Grannis’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Her Mot. to Dismiss 2:20-22;

Zamora and Hall’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Their Mot. to Dismiss 2:21-23; Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to

Moonga’s Mot. to Dismiss 2:19-21.) Iqbal discussed the viability of a detainee’s Bivens action

against supervisorygovernmental officials. TheSupremeCourt held that “Government officials may

not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct at 1948. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983

suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id.

Iqbal does not support Defendants’ proposition that “a defendant who is involved only to the

extent that he or she considered a plaintiff’s inmate appeal may not be held liable.” Iqbal does not

even discuss the processing of inmate appeals. Further, even if Defendants could be considered

supervisors, Plaintiff is not attempting to hold them liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

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subordinates. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ own individual actions in denying

Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment violated the Constitution. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to state a claim against Defendants Grannis, Hall, Zamora, and Moonga.

III. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states cognizable claims against

Defendants Grannis, Hall, Zamora, and Moonga for deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss, filed

on October 23, 2009, November 9, 2009, and November 16, 2009, be DENIED.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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