Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02594/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02594-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS NGUYEN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11CV2594-WQH-NLS

ORDER

vs.

KATHRYN ALBAN; SAN DIEGO

POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER

SERENA MCFALLS; OFFICER LOPEZ;

OFFICER VALDEZ; OFFICER

MICHAEL MORAN,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Kathryn

Alban1

 (ECF No. 6) and the Request to Enter Default against Defendant Alban filed by

Plaintiff Thomas Nguyen (ECF No. 15). 

I. Background

On September 22, 2011, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the

Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego. (ECF No. 1 at 6). On November

7, 2011, Defendants removed the matter to this Court asserting that this Court has original

federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1 at 2). On November 14, 2011, Defendants San

1

 Defendant Kathryn Alban asserts that she was erroneously sued as Officer K. Albans

(clinician #0498). 

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Diego Police Department, Officer Serena McFalls, Officer Eduardo Lopez, Officer David

Valdez, and Officer Michael Moran filed an Answer. (ECF No. 2). 

On November 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Notice of Removal. (ECF

No. 5 at 2). On December 2, 2011, Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 9). 

On November 22, 2011, Defendant Kathryn Alban filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Complaint. (ECF No. 6). On December 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. (ECF No.

13). Plaintiff also filed a Request to Enter Default against Defendant Alban. (ECF No. 15). 

On December 19, 2011, Defendant Alban filed a Reply. (ECF No. 17). 

II. Entry of Default

Plaintiff seeks entry of default judgment against Defendant Alban on the grounds that

she did not respond to the Complaint within 30 days from the date of service. Plaintiff

contends that the Complaint, filed in the California Superior Court, was served on October 11,

2011. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Alban did not file her Motion to Dismiss until

November 22, 2011. Plaintiff has submitted a copy of the “Register of Action” from the

California Superior Court identifying each entry on the docket for this case. (ECF No. 5 at 4). 

The Register of Action reflects that, on November 16, 2011, a “Notice of Removal to Federal

Court” was filed. Id. 

Defendant Alban contends that on October 17, 2011 she was served with the Complaint. 

Defendant Alban contends that on November 15, 2011, the other Defendants filed a notice of

removal and that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c), she was required to file

her motion to dismiss no later than seven days after the notice of removal was filed. Defendant

Alban contends that her motion to dismiss, filed on November 22, 2011, is timely. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 provides that, after removal to federal court, a

defendant who has not answered before removal “must answer or present other defenses or

objections under these rules” within the following periods, whichever is longer:

(A) 21 days after receiving--through service or otherwise--a copy of the

initial pleading stating the claim for relief;

(B) 21 days after being served with the summons for an initial pleading

on file at the time of service; or

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(C) 7 days after the notice of removal is filed. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) provides that the Court may grant a default

judgment after default has been entered by the Clerk of the Court. Rule 55(a) requires that the

Clerk of the Court enter default “when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief

is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or

otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 

The Notice of Removal in this case was filed in on November 16, 2011. Defendant

Alban filed the Motion to Dismiss on November 22, 2011. The Court finds that Plaintiff has

failed to show that Defendant Alban did not plead or otherwise defend in this case. The

Request to Enter Default against Defendant Alban (ECF No. 15) is DENIED. 

III. Motion to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a) provides: “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts

to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990). To sufficiently state a claim to relief and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” but the “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]

to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all “well-pleaded

factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). However,

a court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d

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979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir.

2009) (“Plaintiffs’ general statement that Wal-Mart exercised control over their day-to-day

employment is a conclusion, not a factual allegation stated with any specificity. We need not

accept Plaintiffs’ unwarranted conclusion in reviewing a motion to dismiss.”). “In sum, for

a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to

relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).

A. Claim One - “Civil Rights”

Defendant Alban contends that the first claim identifies the San Diego Police

Department, Officer Lopez, and Officer Valdez, but does not identify Defendant Alban. 

Defendant contends that the claim alleges that there was a First Amendment violation, but it

does not allege any “specific actions, practices, or policies of Defendant Alban that infringed

on Plaintiff’s civil rights.” (ECF No. 6-1 at 4).

Plaintiff contends that “[a]ll defendants were cooperated as a team to do only one task:

Get rid of me from the parade.” (ECF No. 13 at 1). Plaintiff contends that the first claim is

alleged against Defendant Alban because she “put me in mental jail, so I could not do my

rights (Freedom of Speech) at the parade anymore” and that Alban “locked my chance to

protest.” Id. at 2. 

“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to

restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” United

States v. Stevens, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil

Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (noting that First Amendment principles are not

“absolute”)); see also Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir.

2010) (“[P]ure speech is entitled to First Amendment protection unless it falls within one of

the categories of speech ... fully outside the protection of the First Amendment[.]” (quotation

and citation omitted)). “The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper

restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas ....” Dietrich v. John Ascuaga's Nugget,

548 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:

Civil Rights: San Diego Police arrested me at San Diego Big Balloon

Parade on Thursday December 30, 2010 while I was protesting against

CIA under the live reporter TV station booth. Officer Lopez and Valdez

squeezed my arms in my back and dragged me out of the TV booth. I

was handcuffed, stuffed in a patrol car, questioned, evaluated, and then

handed over to a mental-health BHC of Scripps Mercy hospital. This

act violated badly First Amendment (Freedom of Speech).

(ECF No. 1 at 6). 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show Defendant Alban’s involvement in the

alleged infringement of his right to freedom of speech. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege facts plausibly suggestive of a claim that Defendant Alban violated his right to

freedom of speech pursuant to the First Amendment. 

B. Claim Two - Defamation

Defendant Alban contends that the second claim references both Defendant Alban and

Officer Moran but fails to identify the individual who made the allegedly defamatory

statements. Defendant Alban contends that, even if Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Alban

made the allegedly defamatory statements, the statements were expressions of opinion rather

than factual assertions. Defendant Alban contends that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the

statements were false or adequately allege that Plaintiff has suffered damage. 

Plaintiff contends that “Albans [sp] was a clinician, so she was responsible to deal with

medical staffs at Emergency room,” and that “Albans [sp] is a liar and a bad clinician.” (ECF

No. 13 at 2). 

The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3)

defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special

damage.” Wong v. Tai Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1369 (2010); see also Gilbert v. Sykes,

147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 27 (2007). “Statements ... cannot form the basis of a defamation action

if they cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.” Gilbert,

147 Cal. App. 4th at 27. “[D]efamation alone is not actionable under section 1983.” Czapleski

v. Woodward, 1991 WL 639360 at *3 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,

710-12 (1976)). In order to have an actionable section 1983 claim, the defamatory statements

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must accompany a concurrent deprivation of a constitutionally recognized “protectable

interest.” Id. (citing Paul, 424 U.S. 693 at 712).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: 

Defamation: Officer Michael Moran and [Defendant Alban] lied to

medical staffs of Scripps Mercy that I was a mental ill, “had

malnourished appearance”, and I yelled at women and children at the

parade. So they put me in mental-health jail under Section 5150. This

damaged my reputation so much. I had two master degrees in

Computer Science and Physics. I might not get any jobs in the future

because I had been slandered as a mental ill person in Police record. 

This can cost me a fortune.

(ECF No. 1 at 6). 

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the allegedly defamatory

statements accompanied a concurrent deprivation of his constitutionally recognized protectable

interest. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show a claim of

defamation against Defendant Alban. 

C. Claim Three - False Arrest

Defendant Alban contends that the third claim mentions the San Diego Police

Department but does not allege a claim against Defendant Alban. Defendant Alban contends

that the fraud claim is not pleaded with the requisite level of particularity. Plaintiff contends

that Defendant Alban has read the Complaint too narrowly and that “there is no doubt that the

arrest was fraudulent and a false arrest.” (ECF No. 13 at 2). 

Plaintiff listed his third claim as “Fraud.” To state a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must

allege “a representation, usually of fact, which is false, knowledge of its falsity, intent to

defraud, justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and damage resulting from that

justifiable reliance.” Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal. App. 3d 59, 72-73 (1990). Plaintiff has

failed to identify the specific content of any false representations, his knowledge of any false

representations, an intent to defraud him, or that he justifiably relied on any misrepresentation. 

The Court does not construe the Complaint to allege a claim of fraud.

Under California law, “false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts. False

arrest is but one way of committing a false imprisonment....” Asgari v. City of Los Angeles,

15 Cal.4th 744, 752 n.3 (1997) (quotations omitted). “[A] police officer is granted statutory

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immunity from liability for malicious prosecution, but not for false arrest and imprisonment.”

Asgari, 15 Cal.4th at 752. To state a claim of false arrest against an individual, a plaintiff must

show that “there has been an unlawful arrest followed by imprisonment.” City of Newport

Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal. App. 3d 803, 810 (1970); see also George v. City of Long Beach, 973

F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992) (Penal Code § 847(a) protects police officers from civil liability

for false arrest or imprisonment arising out of an arrest if the arrest is lawful or the officer had

reasonable cause to believe it was lawful.”). 

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges: “Fraud: San Diego Police arrested me under Section

5150 is a fraud: false arrest. To thousands of people at the parade and at the hospital, I was a

bad guy who had been arrested by police.” (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). As noted above, Plaintiff also

alleges that “Officer Lopez and Valdez squeezed my arms in my back and dragged me out of

the TV booth. I was handcuffed, stuffed in a patrol car, questioned, evaluated, and then

handed over to a mental-health BHC of Scripps Mercy hospital.” Id. at 6. The Court construes

the third claim as a claim of false arrest. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to show Defendant Alban’s involvement in the

false arrest. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly suggestive of a

claim that Defendant Alban is liable for false arrest. 

IV. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Alban (ECF

No. 6) is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED as to Defendant Alban. The Request

to Enter Default against Defendant Alban filed by Plaintiff Nguyen (ECF No. 15) is DENIED. 

DATED: March 14, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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