Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01626/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01626-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. On June 12, 2007, the 1

Honorable Anthony W. Ishii reassigned the case to the undersigned for all purposes. 

 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 2

number.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY KINMAN, JR., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:06cv1626 DLB

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Roy Kinman, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability

insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before

the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable

Dennis L. Beck, United States Magistrate Judge.1

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff filed his application on March 21, 2005, alleging disability since February 10,

2005, due to lymphoma, neck problems and panic attacks. AR 66-68, 78-84. After an initial

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denial, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 57-62, 63. 

On March 14, 2006, ALJ Acevedo-Torres held a hearing. AR 230-242. ALJ Acevedo-Torres

denied benefits on April 11, 2006. AR 40-50. The Appeals Council denied review on October 6,

2006. AR 6-9.

Hearing Testimony

ALJ Acevedo-Torres held a hearing on March 14, 2006. Plaintiff appeared with his

attorney, Roman Ortega. AR 230. 

Plaintiff testified that he was 60 years old at the time of the hearing. He completed the

eleventh grade. He last worked in February 2005, as an aircraft installer, where he installed parts

on “tire drones.” He stopped working mostly because of the pain from the disc in his neck. AR

233. Plaintiff had surgery in 1992 to fuse two discs and his doctor has not recommended more

surgery. AR 234. He currently takes five medications for high blood pressure, cholesterol,

anxiety and pain. He gets little relief from pain medication and is only taking Tylenol now

because Darvocet, Vicodin and other medications that he’s tried in the past upset his stomach and

didn’t help with the pain much. AR 234-235. 

Plaintiff estimated that he could walk for 10 to 15 minutes before needing to sit down and

could stand for about 15 minutes. He thought he could lift about 10 pounds, at most. AR 235. 

During a typical day, he gets up and showers and sometimes cooks breakfast. He sits down for a

while and then gets up and takes a little walk. He usually takes the dogs for a 15 minute walk in

the morning, but when he returns, he has to rest his head in a position where the weight is not on

his shoulders. AR 235-236. He does not do any laundry or housework, but can cook something

that does not take more than 15 minutes. AR 236. Plaintiff doesn’t read much but watches

television. He lives with his wife. AR 236.

When questioned by his attorney, Plaintiff explained that he worked at his last job for 21

years and would have continued working if he could. AR 237. Plaintiff also explained that he

filed a complaint against the consultive examiner because “it was so quick” and because the

doctor questioned whether Plaintiff still had lymphoma. AR 238. Since the surgery to remove

the lower lobe of his left lung, Plaintiff gets claustrophobic, nervous and out of breath quickly. 

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He estimated that he would walk for about 10 minutes before having shortness of breath. AR

239-240. Although sitting is his most comfortable position, his shoulders, neck, lower back and

right leg ache. AR 240. 

Medical Record

On March 25, 2004, Plaintiff underwent a CT scan of his chest. The scan showed postlymphomatous changes in the chest and no interval change over September 12, 2003. AR 120. 

Plaintiff underwent a CT scan of his abdomen on February 21, 2005. The scan was

stable. AR 115. 

Plaintiff began treating with Ashim Arora, M.D., on March 24, 2005. He complained of

difficulty breathing, a chronic cough, fatigue and snoring. AR 159. His examination was

essentially normal. Dr. Arora ordered numerous tests, including a sleep study. AR 159-162. 

Plaintiff underwent a pulmonary function test on April 7, 2005. The overall results were

essentially normal, except for an indication of mild airways obstruction primarily involving the

small airways. This was consistent with Plaintiff’s prior history of smoking. AR 165. 

On April 25, 2005, Harry S. Menco, M.D., Plaintiff’s oncologist, completed a Neoplastic

Disease questionnaire. He indicated that Plaintiff had inoperable pulmonary lymphoma but that

it was currently “stable by observation.” His main symptom is increasing shortness of breath,

which began in January 2005. He opined that Plaintiff’s prognosis was less than 10 years. AR

174-175. 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Arora on May 6, 2005. Plaintiff complained of shortness of

breath upon “answering the door or getting to another room” and a chronic cough. Upon

examination, he was in no acute distress and his lungs were clear. He had pain and stiffness in

his neck. AR 158. 

On May 17, 2005, Plaintiff saw consultive examiner Jagvinder Singh, M.D. Plaintiff

complained of lymphoma, degenerative disease in his neck, high blood pressure, high cholesterol

and anxiety. Upon physical examination, Plaintiff had no problems walking or getting on and off

the examining table. His gait was normal. His lungs were clear. There was no paravertebral

spasm, tension or tenderness in his beck or neck. Range of motion was limited in his cervical

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spine. Motor strength was 5/5 in all muscle groups with no evidence of any atrophy. Reflexes

were 2/4 bilaterally. Dr. Singh diagnosed neck pain, hypertension well controlled with

medication, hyperlipidemia, a history of lymphoma, status post left lung surgery in 1998, and a

history of anxiety and claustrophobia. AR 176-180.

In assessing his functional limitations, Dr. Singh noted that Plaintiff had slight limitation

in movement of his cervical spine. He also stated that Plaintiff “insists that he has lymphoma”

but Dr. Singh did not “see any physical signs of it or anything relevant in examination at

present.” He opined that Plaintiff could stand and walk for about six hours, and could sit without

restriction. He could lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently. He had no

further restrictions. AR 180.

On June 1, 2005, a State Agency physician completed a Physical Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment form. AR 196. Plaintiff could occasionally lift 50 pounds, 25 pounds

frequently. He could stand and/or walk for about six hours in and eight hour day, and could sit

for about six hours in an eight hour day. He was limited in pushing/pulling with his upper

extremities. Plaintiff had to avoid even moderate exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor

ventilation and hazards. AR 196-202. The physician noted that there was no evidence of

recurrent lymphoma and that Dr. Hohl’s comment regarding the recurrence was not supported by

evidence. AR 202. 

Plaintiff saw Mason Hohl, M.D., on June 14, 2005. Plaintiff reported that any activity

causes neck, right leg and low back pain, and that he takes an occasional Darvocet and/or Tylenol

PM at night. It provides minimal relief, however. Examination revealed very limited cervical

range of motion and fairly good lumbar range of motion. Dr. Hohl prescribed Darvocet and

recommended “home measures.” AR 211. 

A June 28, 2005, CT scan of Plaintiff’s chest showed an “extensive area of

consolidation” in the superior segment of the right lower lobe, which had increased slightly since

March 25, 2004, but had not changed significantly since February 21, 2005. AR 112. 

On June 29, 2005, Plaintiff underwent an overnight polysomnography split report. The

testing revealed severe obstructive sleep apnea and hypopneas. AR 206-207.

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On July 19, 2005, Dr. Hohl completed a Spinal Impairment Questionnaire. He indicated

that he first treated Plaintiff in 1992 and has seen him once or twice a year. He diagnosed

Plaintiff with cervical spondylosis and radiculopathy and indicated that he was status post

cervical fusion. His prognosis was poor because he has painful stiffness that would only get

worse with time. Dr. Hohl noted that Plaintiff had very limited cervical range of motion and

stiffness. He had fairly good lumbar range of motion. He further noted that “x-rays clearly

demonstrate cervical spondylosis” and that his last MRI was in 1999. Dr. Hohl explained that

Plaintiff had constant pain in his right shoulder and neck area and that his symptoms were

reasonably consistent with the physical impairments. AR 104. Dr. Hohl has been unable to

completely relieve the pain with medication, without unacceptable side effects. In an eight hour

day, Plaintiff could sit for one hour before needing to move around and could stand/walk for one

hour before needing to sit or lie down. He could not sit continuously and had to get up every

hour, for 10 to 15 minutes. Plaintiff could frequently lift less than 10 pounds, 10 to 20 pounds

occasionally, and could frequently carry less than 5 pounds. He could not perform overhead

reaching. His pain is frequently severe enough in the morning to interfere with concentration,

and constantly severe enough in the evening to interfere with concentration. Dr. Hohl concluded

that Plaintiff “really can’t work any longer” and that his symptoms were “generally” present for

the past 12 years. AR 102-108. 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Menco on August 25, 2005. Plaintiff was diagnosed with a

marginal zone lymphoma of the left lower lobe in 1997. He decided against chemotherapy and

has generally done well. Over the past few months, Plaintiff began complaining of wheezing and

increasing neck pain due to severe osteoarthritis. On examination, there were no neurologic

findings, although Plaintiff complained of pain and parathesia in his arms. He had severe and

permanent immobility of his neck. Dr. Menco reviewed the recent CT scans and found evidence

of bilateral pulmonary abnormalities with a slight increase in the right lower lobe area. He

diagnosed “marginal cell lymphoma of the lung with increasing shortness of breath recently, not

responding well to therapeutic intervention per Dr. Arora, therefore suspect progressive marginal

zone lymphoma, and severe degenerative joint disease of the neck, status post multiple surgeries

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28 One form is handwritten and one form is typed, but the opinions remain the same. 

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leading to disability.” Dr. Menco explained that the decision to treat Plaintiff has been “difficult”

because he had been stable for the past 7 to 8 years. He opined, though, “that he is progressing

currently, even though this is only slight per CT scan.” Unless Plaintiff improved with Dr.

Arora’s treatments, Dr. Menco would consider starting Plaintiff on therapy with drugs such as

Rituxan. AR 111. 

Plaintiff returned to Dr. Hohl on August 30, 2005, and continued to complain of neck

pain, which increased with any walking or sitting. AR 211. Dr. Hohl diagnosed status-post

cervical fusion. AR 211. 

On September 7, 2005, Dr. Arora completed a Pulmonary Impairment Questionnaire. He

first saw Plaintiff on March 24, 2005, and last saw him on August 19, 2005. Dr. Arora indicated

that Plaintiff had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and a slow growing maltoma with

gradually worsening symptoms. Clinical findings included shortness of breath, fatigue and

coughing. Dr. Arora opined that Plaintiff could sit for four hours in an eight hour day, but had to

lay down due to neck pain. He could stand/walk “0-1" hours. Plaintiff could occasionally lift

and carry up to 20 pounds. Plaintiff gets anxious when he is short of breath. Plaintiff’s

symptoms were frequently severe enough to interfere with attention and concentration. He

would need to take unscheduled breaks about four times a day, for 20 to 30 minutes a time. He

needed to avoid odors, fumes, dust, perfumes, cigarette smoke, gases, soldering fluxes,

solvents/cleaners, and chemicals. Dr. Arora believed that these limitations have existed for

approximately two years. AR 151-157. 

On March 6 and March 10, 2006, Allen Hassan, M.D., completed Multiple Impairment

Questionnaires. AR 212-219, 220-224. Dr. Hassan first treated Plaintiff in 1989 for cervical

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spine problems and most recently saw him on February 15, 2005. He treated Plaintiff

approximately once per month. Dr. Hassan listed numerous diagnoses, including marginal cell

lymphoma, intraabdominal lymphoma, stable, atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease with renal

artery calcification, secondary hypertension, multi-level degenerative disc disease of the cervical

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spine, and post traumatic stress disorder secondary to health catastrophes. His prognosis was

poor. For clinical findings, Dr. Hassan listed immobilized cervical spine, positive Lhermitte’s

test with tingling in the arms, left chest scars, dyspnea, shortness of breath with mild exertion, 50

percent decrease in shoulder abduction, positive straight-leg raising test, and a mini-mental status

examination that revealed anxiety, propulsion of speech and depressed affect. Dr. Hassan cites

multiple x-rays of Plaintiff’s cervical spine, as well. He believed that Plaintiff was in constant

pain and noted that he has been unable to completely relieve the pain. Plaintiff could sit for three

to four hours a day, and stand/walk for two hours a day. He could not sit continuously and had to

get up and move around every 15 minutes, for 10 minutes. He could lift/carry 10 pounds

occasionally. Due to Plaintiff’s severe spinal cord and foraminal stenosis, numbness and tingling

in his arms and hands, Plaintiff was markedly limited in manipulative activities. Plaintiff would

have to take 10 to 15 unscheduled breaks during an eight hour workday, for about 10 to 15

minutes to one hour. He also has to avoid wetness, noise, fumes, gas, temperature extremes,

humidity, dust, and heights. He could not push, pull, kneel, bend or stoop. Dr. Hassan believed

that these symptoms and limitations began in 1989. He concluded that Plaintiff as “100%

unemployable form a physical standpoint.” AR 220-224. 

A CT scan of Plaintiff’s chest taken on May 5, 2006, revealed that Plaintiff had a right

lower lobe consolidation in his lung for which neoplastic involvement could not be excluded. 

The concentration had not significantly changed since June 28, 2005. AR 228-229. 

X-rays dated August 15, 2006, showed mild degenerative changes in the lumbar spine at

multiple levels, with no acute abnormality. AR 227. 

ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative joint

disease of the cervical spine, sleep apnea and status post left lung surgery for lymphoma. Despite

these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

(“RFC”) to perform a full range of medium work. He could lift, carry, push and pull 50 pounds

occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, and could sit, stand and walk without restriction for six to

eight hours per day. AR 44-45. Due to his history of lymphoma and sleep apnea, the ALJ

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determined that Plaintiff had to avoid even moderate exposure to fumes, odors, gases, hazards

and machinery. AR 45. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could return to his

previous work as a structural mechanic and was therefore not disabled. AR 48-49.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at

401. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and

the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993,

995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must

apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

 REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that he is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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 All references are to the 2002 version of the Code of Federal Regulations unless otherwise noted. 4

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The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f), 416.920 (a)-(f) (1994). Applying this process in this case, the ALJ 4

found that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of

his disability; (2) has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered “severe”

(degenerative joint disease of the cervical spine, sleep apnea and status post left lung surgery for

lymphoma) based on the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§ 416.920(b)); (3) does not

have an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals one of the

impairments set forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; and (4) retains the RFC to

perform his past relevant work as a structural mechanic. AR 49. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) improperly rejected the treating physicians’ opinions in

favor of the consultive examiner; (2) improperly assessed his credibility; and (3) erred in finding

him capable of performing his past relevant work. 

DISCUSSION

A. Physicians’ Opinions

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of his treating physicians,

Drs. Hohl and Arora, in favor of examining physician Dr. Singh.

The opinions of treating doctors should be given more weight than the opinions of

doctors who do not treat the claimant. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.1998);

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995). Where the treating doctor's opinion is not

contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Even if the treating

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without

providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.

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(quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir.1983)). This can be done by setting out

a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th

Cir.1989). The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849

F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir.1988).

In Orn v. Astrue,495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit reiterated and expounded

upon its position regarding the ALJ’s acceptance of the opinion an examining physician over that

of a treating physician. “When an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a

treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining

physician are not ‘“substantial evidence.”’ Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Murray, 722 F.2d at 501-502. 

“By contrast, when an examining physician provides ‘independent clinical findings that differ

from the findings of the treating physician’ such findings are ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn, 496

F.3d at 632; Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir.1985). Independent clinical findings

can be either (1) diagnoses that differ from those offered by another physician and that are

supported by substantial evidence, see Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir.1985), or (2)

findings based on objective medical tests that the treating physician has not herself considered,

see Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041.

If a treating physician’s opinion is not giving controlling weight because it is not well

supported or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ is

instructed by Section 404.1527(d)(2) to consider the factors listed in Section 404.1527(d)(2)-(6)

in determining what weight to accord the opinion of the treating physician. Those factors include

the “[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination” by the treating

physician; and the “nature and extent of the treatment relationship” between the patient and the

treating physician. 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii). Other factors include the supportablility of

the opinion, consistency with the record as a whole, the specialization of the physician, and the

extent to which the physician is familiar with disability programs and evidentiary requirements. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)-(6). Even when contradicted by an opinion of an examining

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physician that constitutes substantial evidence, the treating physician’s opinion is “still entitled to

deference.” SSR 96-2p; Orn, 495 F.3d at 632-633. “In many cases, a treating source’s medical

opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted, even if it does not meet the

test for controlling weight.” SSR 96-2p; Orn, 495 F.3d at 633. 

In formulating his RFC, the ALJ gave significant weight to the opinion of Dr. Singh, the

consultive examiner, as well as the opinion of the State Agency physician. AR 45-46. 

Consequently, he rejected the opinions set forth by Drs. Hohl, Arora and Hassan, Plaintiff’s

treating physicians. 

The ALJ first explained why he gave Dr. Singh’s findings significant weight. AR 45. As

explained above, the ALJ may credit the consultive examiner’s findings over those of a treating

source “when an examining physician provides ‘independent clinical findings that differ from the

findings of the treating physician. . .’” Orn, 496 F.3d at 632. Dr. Singh performed his own

examination of Plaintiff and reviewed “all medical records.” AR 176. During his examination,

Plaintiff had no problems walking or getting on and off the examining table, and a normal gait. 

He had clear lungs, and no paravertebral spasm, tension or tenderness in his beck or neck,

although range of motion was limited in his cervical spine. Motor strength was 5/5 in all muscle

groups with no evidence of any atrophy and reflexes were 2/4 bilaterally. AR 177-179. Based

on these findings, Dr. Singh concluded that Plaintiff could perform medium work. His opinion

was therefore based on independent findings that differed from those of the treating physicians

and can serve as substantial evidence. See Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 

Plaintiff attempts to discredit the ALJ’s decision by explaining that Dr. Singh made

“inappropriate and misinformed comments” and “steadfastly refused to accept [his] insistence

that his doctors had found a recurrence of his lymphoma in his right lung. . .” Brief, at 17. 

Indeed, Dr. Singh noted in his findings that Plaintiff has a history of lymphoma and “still insists”

that he has lymphoma, but there were no “physical signs of it or anything relevant in examination

at present.” AR 180. Dr. Singh’s diagnoses, however, are not the critical part of his opinion. 

The mere diagnosis of an impairment is not sufficient to sustain a finding of disability. Key v.

Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985). Rather, an impairment must result in significant

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limitations prior to a finding of disability. Dr. Singh’s opinion as to the current status of

Plaintiff’s lymphoma, therefore, was irrelevant, given his finding that Plaintiff had no resulting

limitations. 

While Dr. Singh’s opinion was sufficient to constitute substantial evidence in support of

the ALJ’s RFC finding, the ALJ must nonetheless properly reject the opinions of the treating

sources. As to Dr. Hohl’s July 2005 opinion setting forth extreme limitations and concluding

that Plaintiff “really can’t work any longer,” the ALJ first explained the record “contains scant

medical evidence to support his conclusion.” AR 46. A lack of supporting clinical findings is a

valid reason for rejecting a treating physician's opinion. Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,

751 (9th Cir. 1989). For example, although Dr. Hohl diagnosed Plaintiff with radiculopathy, his

neurological examination of Plaintiff was normal. AR 46. Both Dr. Arora and Dr. Singh noted

normal neurological examinations, as well. AR 158, 179. Moreover, although there are

indications in the record that range of motion in his neck was somewhat limited, Dr. Hohl’s

restrictions appear out of proportion to the objective findings. 

Plaintiff directs the Court to Dr. Hohl’s statement that “x-rays clearly demonstrate

cervical spondylosis,” and suggests that the ALJ should have attempted to “provide the missing

data, rather than to assume it does not exist at all.” AR 104. However, it is Plaintiff’s burden to

produce full and complete medical records, not the Commissioner’s. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d

1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). Only when the evidence is ambiguous or “the record is inadequate”

to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence does the ALJ has a duty to develop the record. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.2001). Here, despite Plaintiff’s contention

that all treating sources referred to x-rays, the record was not inadequate or ambiguous and the

ALJ therefore had no further duty to request information.

As the second reason for rejecting Dr. Hohl’s opinion, the ALJ explained that although

Dr. Hohl believed Plaintiff to be disabled due to severe pain, he did not refer Plaintiff to a pain

management clinic or suggest other “modalities of treatment.” AR 46. This, the ALJ believed,

was inconsistent with an individual complaining of severe pain. AR 46. Johnson v. Shalala, 60

F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (the need for conservative treatment suggests a lower level of

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pain and functional limitation). Indeed, as the ALJ notes, the only medical treatment Dr. Hohl

cited was a cervical fusion performed in the 1990s. AR 46-47. Plaintiff continued to work after

the fusion, and the ALJ correctly noted that there was no objective evidence that his conditioned

had worsened since the time he was able to work. AR 47. For example, despite Dr. Hohl’s grim

outlook, he notes that the last MRI was performed in 1999. AR 106. See eg., Gregory v. Bowen,

844 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1988) (where “condition of [claimant’s] back had remained constant

for a number of years and her back problem had not prevented her from working over that time,”

ALJ properly concluded impairment was not disabling). 

Plaintiff submits that the ALJ improperly inserted his own medical opinion in his

interpretation of Dr. Hohl’s lack of treatment. He believes that surgery, followed by a

prescription for Darvocet and unspecified “home measures,” supports Dr. Hohl’s finding. 

However, despite Plaintiff’s belief, the fact remains that Dr. Hohl offered an extremely limiting

opinion without supporting evidence. Rather than substituting his own medical opinion, the ALJ

was merely comparing the opinion with the underlying evidence, a comparison he is entitled to

make. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (treating physician’s opinion

properly rejected as treatment notes failed to present “the sort of description and

recommendations one would expect to accompany a finding that [the claimant] was totally

disabled.”); Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982) (an ALJ is entitled to draw

inferences logically flowing from the evidence). The ALJ therefore set forth specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Hohl’s opinion.

The ALJ then moved on to analyzing Dr. Arora’s September 2005 assessment, in which

he opined that Plaintiff’s lung condition would essentially preclude work. AR 151-157. The

ALJ first explained that although Dr. Arora cited the pulmonary function studies in support of his

restrictive limitations, the testing showed only mild airways obstruction. AR 47. Indeed, the

overall results were essentially normal, and the mild airways obstruction was consistent with

Plaintiff’s prior history of smoking. AR 165. Furthermore, although a CT scan in July 2005

revealed an area of consolidation in the right lower lobe, no specific treatment was rendered or

recommended. From this, the ALJ concluded that if Plaintiff were suffering from severe

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shortness of breath, he would have been receiving more aggressive treatment. AR 47. Rollins,

261 F.3d at 856. The objective evidence supports this finding, as CT scans repeatedly showed

that Plaintiff’s right lung lymphoma was slow growing and stable. AR 112, 120, 228-229. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s criticism of the course of treatment was improper and

suggests that his treatment was a joint effort between Dr. Arora and Dr. Menco. While this may

be so, Plaintiff’s own interpretation of the evidence does not negate an otherwise proper ALJ

analysis. Specifically, Plaintiff cites Dr. Menco’s April 25, 2005, diagnosis of “non-operable

lymphoma.” Dr. Menco continued, though, that Plaintiff’s status was stable by observation. AR

175. In August 2005, Dr. Menco explained that he would consider drug therapy if Plaintiff did

not improve with Dr. Arora’s treatments. AR 111. There is no record of subsequent treatment

and the ALJ was entitled to draw an appropriate inference. Plaintiff again suggests that it was

incumbent upon the ALJ to request “clarification” regarding the treatment plan, but there is no

indication in the record that Plaintiff’s treatment, or lack thereof, was not clearly set forth. The

ALJ therefore provided specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Arora’s opinion.

Based on the above, the ALJ’s decision to adopt the consultive examiner’s opinion over

those of his treating sources was supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. The

Court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s direction in Orn v. Astrue, supra. However, where the

treating physicians’ opinion are not supported in the first instance, as here, Orn v. Astrue is not

instructive.

B. Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was flawed.

The ALJ is required to make specific findings assessing the credibility of plaintiff's

subjective complaints. Cequerra v. Secretary of HHS, 933 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1991). “An ALJ is

not ‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain’ or other non-exertional impairment,”

Orn v. Astrue,495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In rejecting the

complainant’s testimony, “the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what

evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir.

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1988)). Pursuant to Ninth Circuit law, if the ALJ finds that the claimant’s testimony as to the

severity of her pain and impairments is unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination

with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily

discredit claimant’s testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“The ALJ may consider at least the following factors when weighing the claimant’s

credibility: ‘[claimant’s] reputation for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in [claimant’s]

testimony or between [her] testimony and [her] conduct, [claimant’s] daily activities, [her] work

record, and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect

of the symptoms of which [claimant] complains.” Id. (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d

789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). “If the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in

the record, we may not engage in second-guessing.” Id.

In his decision, the ALJ explained that he considered Plaintiff’s testimony but rejected his

reports of extreme functional limitations first based on a lack of evidence in the record. For

example, although Plaintiff contends that his neck pain prevents him from working, he has

“sought scant medical care for his complaints.” AR 48. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681

(9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ is permitted to consider lack of medical treatment in assessing credibility). 

His last MRI was in 1999, and while the records of Plaintiff’s neck complaints may not be

“scant,” they simply do not support the extreme limitations he alleges. Plaintiff argues that he

“complained to no fewer than five treating physicians about his neck pain and stiffness,” but as

Defendant states, complaints are not treatment. Opening Brief, at 20. Indeed, the reports relating

to Plaintiff’s neck consist mainly of subjective complaints.

The ALJ next noted that Plaintiff has not “required emergent treatment for neck pain” and

“has been maintained on a conservative medication regime.” AR 48. As the ALJ explained,

Plaintiff has not been referred “for other modalities of treatment such as a chronic pain program,

chiropractic manipulation or physical therapy sessions.” The need for conservative treatment

suggests a lower level of pain and functional limitation. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434

(9th Cir. 1995). Although there are notations in the record suggesting that Plaintiff’s medication

was not controlling the pain, they are again based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports. 

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The ALJ also explained that objectively, there were no reports of atrophy, a finding

common in patients with chronic pain. Plaintiff again asserts that the ALJ improperly offered a

medical assessment and suggests that the treating sources did not require such a finding to

determine that Plaintiff was disabled. However, rather than offering his own medical opinion,

the ALJ made permissible inferences from the record. 

Next, the ALJ contrasted Plaintiff’s severe allegations with his ability to continue

working. AR 48. Plaintiff admits that he was able to work for many years after his surgery, but

contends that his “pain and motion limitation simply became too great to continue.” Opening

Brief, at 19. The ALJ correctly notes that there was no evidence of worsening, and therefore the

fact that Plaintiff could work previously suggests that he can continue to do so. AR 48. 

Moreover, as Defendant points out, the treating sources all indicate that Plaintiff’s condition has

been the same since 2003, when he was still working. 

The ALJ’s credibility analysis was sufficiently specific to allow the Court to conclude

that he did not arbitrarily reject Plaintiff’s claims. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts

in the medical evidence, and the Court must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750

(9th Cir. 1989). The record simply did not support the Plaintiff’s testimony of extreme

limitations.

C. Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding that his past relevant work was

free from pulmonary irritants and hazards. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s RFC,

which included a preclusion from having moderate exposure to fumes, odors, gases, hazards and

machinery, did not preclude his return to his past work as a structural mechanic. AR 48.

The step four determination involves a comparison between the demands of the claimant's

former work and his present capacity. Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1986). It is

Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that he is unable to return to his previous job, and if he is

unable to do so, the burden remains with him rather than shifting to Secretary to proceed with

step five. Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678 681 (9th Cir. 1993). 

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Although Plaintiff disagrees with the name of the position, he cites the same Dictionary

of Occupational Title (“DOT”) section relied upon by the ALJ and the disability analyst- DOT

806.381-026. Pursuant to this section, the position requires “occasional” exposure to moving

machinery and high exposed places. AR 97. Exposure to other hazards are “not present.” AR

97. 

In making his argument, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the RFC finding. The ALJ found that

Plaintiff had to avoid “moderate” exposure, not all exposure, as he suggests. Plaintiff does not

argue that needing to avoid moderate exposure precludes occasional exposure, but rather bases

his argument on an all or nothing approach. Plaintiff therefore fails to demonstrate why he

cannot return to his past work. In any event, exposure to hazards on an “occasional” basis is not

necessarily inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff needed to avoid “moderate”

exposure. Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. The clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in

favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff,

Roy Kinman, Jr.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 11, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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