Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07047/USCOURTS-caDC-03-07047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 12, 2004 Decided June 11, 2004

No. 03-7047

THE HONORABLE BOB BARR,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00437)

Paul J. Orfanedes argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Larry E. Klayman.

Suzanne H. Woods argued the cause for appellees. With

her on the brief were David E. Kendall, Roger W. Wilcox Jr.,

and William Alden McDaniel Jr. John G. Perazich and

Paul J. Cambria Jr. entered appearances.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-7047 Document #828363 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 1 of 11
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Before: EDWARDS, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this lawsuit, Congressman Bob

Barr charges that President Clinton and one of his political

advisors unlawfully conspired with Larry Flynt, publisher of

Hustler magazine, to gather and disseminate disparaging

information about Barr in order to retaliate for his role in the

Clinton impeachment proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding it time barred and, alternatively, that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. We affirm, but on different grounds. We affirm

the dismissal as to Clinton and his advisor because the

complaint fails to allege that either took any action within the

statute of limitations to further the conspiracy, and as to

Flynt because the complaint fails to allege that the disparaging information was either false or published with reckless or

knowing disregard for its falsity, as required by the First

Amendment.

I.

Because the district court dismissed the complaint pursuant

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), we

construe the complaint ‘‘liberally,’’ granting plaintiff ‘‘the

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.’’ Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d

1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994) (reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissal); accord Artis v. Greenspan, 158 F.3d 1301, 1305–06 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (reviewing 12(b)(1) dismissal). Viewed through that

lens, the complaint relates the following facts:

Congressman Bob Barr, who represented the seventh district of Georgia from 1995 until 2003, ‘‘was the first Congressman to call for [an] impeachment inquiry of former President

TTT William Jefferson Clinton.’’ Compl. ¶ 9. Barr ‘‘repeatedly and aggressively pressed’’ that position, id., and also

served as a House Manager during the U.S. Senate impeachment trial. Id. ¶ 17.

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On October 4, 1998, Larry Flynt ran an advertisement in

the Washington Post offering one million dollars to anyone

who would admit to having had an affair with a member of

Congress. Id. ¶ 15. Acknowledging that Flynt’s professed

objective was to ‘‘expose the hypocrisy of members of Congress,’’ the complaint alleges that ‘‘[i]n reality,’’ Flynt was

acting ‘‘in concert with [defendants Clinton and James Carville, a senior member of Clinton’s 1992 campaign staff, to]

gather[ ] information from FBI and/or other government files

about TTT Plaintiff Barr, and disseminate[ ] information from

those files to the media in an attempt to intimidate, impede

and/or retaliate against Plaintiff to prevent him from performing his official duties TTT and to harm Plaintiff Barr’s

reputation.’’ Id.

In support of this allegation, the complaint asserts that

Carville maintained files containing information about Barr

which he had obtained from confidential government sources

and ‘‘routinely disseminated this material to the media.’’ Id.

¶ 10. In a January 7, 1999 press conference, Flynt’s estranged daughter ‘‘stated that Flynt had likely been supplied

by Defendant Carville with confidential FBI files to assist

Flynt in his search for ‘dirt’ on Congressmen, including

[Barr], in an on-going effort TTT to prevent them from

performing their official duties.’’ Id. ¶ 19. As to Clinton, the

complaint alleges that he ‘‘approved and ratified’’ Flynt’s

efforts to intimidate Barr. Id. ¶ 18. The complaint cites a

1998 Los Angeles Times article stating: ‘‘[Clinton] laughed

about the fact that Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine, had become the latest influence on the Washington

political debate TTT [and] regaled his listeners with a description of a letter that Flynt wrote to independent counsel

Kenneth W. Starr TTT congratulating Starr for aiding the

cause of pornography.’’ Elizabeth Shogren, ‘‘Clinton Puts

His Faith in History,’’ L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1998, at A1.

On January 11, 1999, Flynt appeared on a television news

program and, according to the complaint, divulged information from the government files, including that Barr ‘‘had not

told the truth, under oath, in divorce proceedings, and that he

had pressured his former wife into having an abortion.’’

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Compl. ¶ 21. During a Salon.com interview on February 23,

1999, Flynt not only repeated those accusations, but also

announced that he intended to publish a one-time issue called

The Flynt Report, which would contain additional improperly

obtained information about Barr and other officials. Id.

¶ ¶ 29–30.

On several occasions during the impeachment proceedings,

Barr expressed his concern about defendants’ alleged efforts

to gather and disseminate negative information about him.

He wrote to President Clinton on March 30, 1998, seeking

access to all White House documents relating to him. Id.

¶ 13. On March 3 and April 2, 1999, he also wrote to

Attorney General Janet Reno. Alleging that the attacks and

threatened attacks by Carville, Flynt, and others amounted to

‘‘a deliberate and concerted effort to impede’’ the impeachment process, Barr requested a formal Justice Department

investigation. Id. ¶ ¶ 32, 34. In response, the Justice Department informed Barr that it had reviewed the matter and

determined that an investigation was unwarranted. Id.

¶ ¶ 33, 35.

Finally, on April 5, 1999, Flynt and L.F.P., Inc., his publishing company, released The Flynt Report. Id. ¶ 31. Attached to the complaint, the report states, among other

things, that Barr ‘‘failed to tell the truth about adulterous sex

while under oath in a 1986 deposition,’’ and that, in contrast

to his ‘‘public opposition to abortion,’’ he ‘‘drove [his wife] to

the clinic to have [an] abortion performed [and l]ater he

returned to the facility to pick her up and paid for the

procedure.’’ The Flynt Report 20–24 (L.F.P., Inc. 1999).

On March 7, 2002, Barr filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia against defendants

Clinton, Carville, Flynt, and L.F.P., Inc. In the only count at

issue in this appeal, Barr claimed that the defendants violated

42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) by conspiring to prevent him from performing his official duties. Section 1985(1) makes it unlawful

for ‘‘two or more persons TTT [to] conspire to prevent, by

force, intimidation, or threat, any person TTT from discharging any duties [of public office]; TTT or to injure him in his

person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the

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duties of his office.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (2000). Among

other things, section 1985 plaintiffs must allege the elements

of civil conspiracy, including: ‘‘an agreement to take part in

an unlawful action or a lawful action in an unlawful manner.’’

Hall v. Clinton, 285 F.3d 74, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Seeking

damages in excess of $30 million, see Compl. ¶ 41, Barr

alleged that defendants:

tacitly or explicitly agreed, in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(1), to participate in a common scheme and

unlawful on-going conspiracy TTT in furtherance [of

which they] recommended, agreed to, and participated in obtaining information from Plaintiff’s confidential FBI and/or other government files, in violation

of [federal law], then disclosing that information to

the public TTT [such that] Plaintiff was hindered in

the lawful discharge of his duties TTT and suffered

substantial damages, including, but not limited to

loss of reputation and emotional distress.

Id. ¶ ¶ 38–40.

All defendants filed motions to dismiss under rules 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (lack of subject

matter jurisdiction); 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). They

argued that the complaint was barred by the three-year

statute of limitations applicable to section 1985 claims. Alternatively, they argued that the complaint failed to state a claim

for relief because (1) it pleaded insufficient facts to support

the allegation that the defendants had entered an agreement

and (2) it nowhere alleged that the information about Barr

was either false or published with knowing or reckless disregard for its falsity, as required by the First Amendment.

The district court granted the defendants’ motions, ruling

that the suit was untimely, and, in the alternative, that Barr

failed to state a claim because the complaint insufficiently

alleged the agreement element of conspiracy. See Barr v.

Clinton, No. 02–437 (D.D.C. March 19, 2003).

Barr now appeals. Because the district court dismissed the

complaint pursuant to rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), our review

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is de novo. See Hall, 285 F.3d at 81; Browning v. Clinton,

292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

II.

We begin with the district court’s dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations. As mentioned

above, ‘‘the relevant statute of limitations for a section 1985(1)

violation in this jurisdiction is three years.’’ Hall, 285 F.3d at

82. In Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1981), we

explained that ‘‘the statute of limitations in a civil damages

action for conspiracy runs separately from each overt act that

is alleged to cause damage to the plaintiff.’’ Id. at 1324.

Because Barr filed his complaint on March 7, 2002, every

alleged act that occurred prior to March 7, 1999 is timebarred. Although acknowledging that the April 5, 1999 publication of The Flynt Report occurred within the limitations

period, the district court nonetheless dismissed the entire

complaint as untimely, relying largely on our statement in

Hall v. Clinton that the three-year period begins ‘‘when the

plaintiff has sufficient notice of the conduct TTT which is now

asserted as the basis for [his] lawsuit.’’ 285 F.3d at 82

(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that rule, the district court concluded that Barr had

sufficient prior notice of the report’s publication, pointing to

Flynt’s February statements to Salon.com announcing that

the report would be published and to Barr’s March 3 letter to

the Attorney General requesting an investigation of Flynt.

We cannot agree with the district court’s analysis. In Hall,

all allegedly unlawful conduct occurred outside the statute of

limitations, and the question was whether the case could

nevertheless go forward because the plaintiff filed suit within

three years of discovering the allegedly unlawful conduct. Id.

Here, by contrast, the allegedly unlawful conduct—The Flynt

Report’s publication—occurred inside the three-year period.

To be sure, Barr had prior notice of Flynt’s intent to publish

the report, but Flynt’s threat to do so gave Barr no knowledge of exactly what the report would contain, to whom it

would be distributed, or even whether it would ever be

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published. The complaint, moreover, alleges that publication

of The Flynt Report represented a separate and distinct overt

act in furtherance of the conspiracy—an act that, under

Lawrence, triggered a new three-year limitations period. As

Barr points out, dismissing his suit just because he had prior

notice would be ‘‘the same as finding that a threat to assault

someone, occurring outside the limitations period, would bar

an action for a subsequent actual assault that occurred within

the limitations period.’’ Appellant’s Br. at 15.

That said, our decision in Lawrence nevertheless requires

affirmance of the district court’s dismissal of the claims

against two defendants—Clinton and Carville. In Lawrence,

as here, all but one of the acts alleged in furtherance of a

section 1985(1) conspiracy occurred outside the limitations

period. 665 F.2d at 1323. Because the period runs separately from each overt act, we held that the statute of limitations

‘‘confine[d] our focus, for purposes of considering damages’’ to

the single overt act within the limitations period, in that case,

a negative performance evaluation. Id. at 1324. We therefore dismissed the claim with respect to two defendants who

had not participated in the evaluation because ‘‘[t]here [wa]s

no allegation that [they] furthered the conspiracy against’’ the

plaintiff at any time during the statute of limitations. Id.

Lawrence is indistinguishable from this case. The complaint here alleges that only ‘‘Flynt and L.F.P. published The

Flynt Report.’’ Compl. ¶ 31. It does not allege that either

Clinton or Carville participated in the report’s publication or

in any other act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the

limitations period; Clinton’s alleged approval rests on comments he made in 1998, and Carville’s alleged disclosure of

secret files to Flynt occurred sometime before January or

February 1999.

Because the statute of limitations bars the claim against

both Clinton and Carville, we confine our review of the

district court’s alternative basis for dismissing the complaint

to the single overt act not barred by the statute of limitations—Flynt’s and L.F.P.’s publication of The Flynt Report.

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III.

We affirm a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)

only if the ‘‘plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.’’ Browning, 292 F.3d

at 242. In this case, the district court granted the Rule

12(b)(6) motion because ‘‘Congressman Barr’s allegations associated with The Flynt Report are bereft of any details

substantiating the principal and essential element of a conspiracy, a ‘meeting of the minds’ between Defendants.’’

Barr, slip op. at 17. Challenging that ruling, Barr insists that

his allegations meet the minimal notice pleading standards of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

(requiring only a ‘‘short and plain statement of the claim’’);

see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)

(‘‘Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice

of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We need not resolve this question, however, for Flynt

persuasively argues that the relief Barr seeks is precluded by

the First Amendment. See EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208

F.3d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (‘‘[B]ecause we review the

district court’s judgment, not its reasoning, we may affirm on

any ground properly raised.’’). In New York Times Co. v.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held that

under the First Amendment, public officials claiming defamation must allege that the published information was both false

and published with actual malice, i.e., with knowing or reckless disregard for its falsity. See id. at 279–80. Flynt argues

that the New York Times standards apply to Barr’s section

1985(1) claim insofar as it seeks damages for loss of reputation and emotional distress resulting from the actual publication of The Flynt Report. Barr responds only that he need

not allege that the report was defamatory in order to state a

section 1985(1) claim.

Although Barr is correct, see Lawrence, 665 F.2d at 1324

(section 1985(1) plaintiff is not required to allege that ‘‘each

overt act TTT [is] independently actionable’’), the fact that his

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complaint alleges something other than a traditional defamation action does not mean that First Amendment protections

are inapplicable. Both the Supreme Court and this court

have made clear that the constitutional protections available

to defendants charged with defaming public officials may

extend to other civil actions alleging reputational or emotional

harm from the publication of protected speech. In Hustler

Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), where a public figure

plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional

distress against the publisher (also Larry Flynt) of a lewd

cartoon parody of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court extended

the New York Times standards to the intentional infliction

claim, finding such safeguards ‘‘necessary to give adequate

‘breathing space’ to the freedoms protected by the First

Amendment.’’ Id. at 56; cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501

U.S. 663, 671 (1991) (holding that New York Times does not

apply to a promissory estoppel claim seeking damages for

economic rather than emotional or reputational harm). We

followed a similar path in Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22

F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994), where an author sued a newspaper

for the publication of a negative book review, alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy. We held that because

the plaintiff had failed to meet the burdens of proof associated with his defamation claim, the ‘‘related claim for false light

invasion of privacy must also fail.’’ Id. at 319. As we

explained, ‘‘a plaintiff may not use related causes of action to

avoid the constitutional requisites of a defamation claim.’’ Id.

at 319–20.

Although we have not previously addressed the First

Amendment issue in the section 1985(1) context, the Sixth

Circuit, in Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.

1983), recognized that ‘‘the New York Times case dealt with

state tort law,’’ but saw ‘‘no reason not to apply that [constitutional] test to [a] section 1985(1) action[ ]’’ alleging conspiracy

to injure a public official through the publication of disparaging newspaper articles. Id. at 162. In this circuit, District

Judge Kollar–Kotelly reached the same conclusion in Sculimbrene v. Reno, 158 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2001), explaining

that ‘‘[l]ike the libel statute at issue in New York Times v.

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Sullivan and the Sedition Act of 1789, Section 1985 of Title 42

carries the potential to infringe upon a speaker’s First

Amendment right if certain safeguards are not imposed.’’ Id.

at 18. Judge Kollar–Kotelly concluded that ‘‘the constitutional considerations and protections afforded to defendants in a

defamation action seem equally applicable’’ to a section 1985

claim alleging that defendants conspired to publish information injuring a plaintiff’s reputation. Id.

Persuaded by the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and Judge

Kollar–Kotelly, we hold that First Amendment protections

apply to section 1985 claims like the one presented here.

Barr’s cause of action rests entirely on his claim that Flynt’s

conspiratorial publication of The Flynt Report injured his

reputation and mental state. Indeed, ruling otherwise would

allow public officials to recast defamation claims barred by

New York Times as section 1985(1) conspiracies, thus choking

off the ‘‘breathing space’’ necessary to safeguard ‘‘the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.’’ Hustler, 485 U.S.

at 56. Because Barr’s complaint alleges neither that the

information in The Flynt Report is false nor that the report

was published with actual malice, Barr cannot obtain damages

for the report’s publication.

In affirming the district court’s 12(b)(6) ruling on this

ground, we emphasize that we have not reached an issue that

arose at oral argument in response to questions from the

court, i.e., whether or how Flynt’s First Amendment defense

might be affected by the complaint’s allegation that he participated in illegally obtaining the published materials. Cf.

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528–29 (2001) (leaving open

the question of whether the First Amendment would permit

the punishment of the publication of truthful information

obtained unlawfully); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535

n.8 (1989) (same). Barr neither raised this issue in response

to Flynt’s First Amendment arguments nor cited any of the

relevant authority either before the district court or here.

Indeed, nothing in Barr’s appellate briefs can arguably be

read as encompassing the issue. Because Barr failed to raise

the issue and because Flynt has had no opportunity to

respond, we will not address it. See Carducci v. Regan, 714

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F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (‘‘[A]ppellate courts do not sit

as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but

essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before themTTTT [W]here counsel has

made no attempt to address the issue, we will not remedy the

defect, especially where, as here, important questions of farreaching significance are involved.’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

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