Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-02206/USCOURTS-cand-4_00-cv-02206-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERON GEORGE and SHARICCI FOURTEDANCY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, and

DOES 1 through 20, Inclusive, 

Defendants.

 /

No. C 00-2206 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART PLAINTIFFS'

SUPPLEMENTAL

MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES,

COSTS AND

LITIGATION

EXPENSES FROM

OCTOBER 18, 2003

TO PRESENT 

Plaintiffs Sheron George and Sharicci Fourte-Dancy have filed

a supplemental motion for attorneys' fees in the amount of $924,108

and litigation expenses and costs in the amount of $2,614 for the

time period from October 18, 2003 to the present. Defendant Bay

Area Rapid Transit (BART) opposes this motion. The matter was

submitted on the papers. Having considered all of the papers filed

by the parties on the motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion

in part, awarding attorneys' fees in the amount of $288,841 and

litigation expenses and costs in the amount of $2,614.

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BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2000, Plaintiffs, who are or were visually

impaired, filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging that it

failed to provide equal access to its facilities, as required by

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), to patrons who are

visually impaired. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. BART is a public

entity that provides automated rapid transit services in the San

Francisco Bay Area. Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered physical

and emotional injuries when attempting to access four different

BART stations because the stations are not accessible to the

visually impaired.

On June 1, 2001, Defendant moved for summary adjudication,

arguing among other things that as a matter of law it is required

to provide only one accessible route to all of its disabled

patrons, regardless of the nature of their disability. On July 13,

2001, the Court granted Defendant’s motion, reasoning that persons

with all types of disabilities must be able to access one or more

routes; Defendant need not provide another accessible route if an

existing route is accessible to the visually disabled. 

In April, 2002, following full discovery, the parties crossmoved for summary judgment. The cross-motions raised the issue of

whether Defendant's "universal" accessible route is accessible to

visually impaired persons. Plaintiffs conceded that they could not

identify any way in which the "universal" accessible routes in the

stations at issue violated any specific provision of ADA

Accessability Guidelines. However, the Court agreed with

Plaintiffs that Defendant's "universal" accessible route did not

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comply with the Department of Justice (DOJ) regulation that a

public entity provide its disabled patrons with "information as to

the existence and location of accessible services, activities and

facilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.163. The Court also agreed with

Plaintiffs that the "universal" accessible routes must comply with

the DOJ regulation that a public entity "administer services,

programs, and activities in the most integrated setting

appropriate." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d). The Court rejected

Plaintiffs' claim that the only way for Defendant to do so was to

make the public route accessible to those with visual impairments. 

For these reasons, on September 4, 2002, the Court granted in part

and denied in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment and

granted Plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 

On October 3, 2002, Defendant moved for reconsideration of the

Court's decision, arguing for the first time that Department of

Transportation (DOT) regulations made its stations accessible as a

matter of law regardless of whether they are actually accessible to

visually disabled people. In its January 10, 2003 Order Granting

in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration,

the Court agreed that the DOT regulations applied to Defendant's

stations, but found that the regulations were arbitrary and

capricious in that they did not consider the needs of persons with

visual impairments.

Thereafter, the Court ordered the parties to a settlement

conference to negotiate Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief,

damages, and attorneys' fees. The parties entered into a

stipulated agreement on the issues of injunctive relief and

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damages, but left the issue of attorneys' fees for a further

settlement conference or motion before the Court. By stipulation,

Plaintiffs filed their motion for attorneys' fees on October 17,

2003. On March 18, 2004, the Court issued its order on Plaintiffs'

damages, but stayed the order until all appeals had been exhausted

by Defendant. On August 10, 2004, the Court issued its order

granting in part Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, litigation

expenses, and costs, awarding Plaintiffs $307,748 in attorneys'

fees and $19,879 in litigation expenses and costs. Plaintiffs had

moved for $745,798 in attorneys' fees and $19,914 in litigation

expenses and costs.

Meanwhile, on April 16, 2004, Defendant appealed the Court's

September 4, 2002 order granting in part Plaintiffs' cross-motion

for partial summary judgment and the Court's January 10, 2003 order

granting in part Defendant's motion for reconsideration. The

United States requested and was granted an opportunity to brief and

argue as amicus curiae that the DOT regulations implementing Title

II of the ADA deserved deference and were not arbitrary and

capricious as applied to visually impaired people. On April 21,

2006, the Ninth Circuit issued an order remanding the case to this

Court to allow the United States to intervene to defend the DOT

regulations. See George v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 175 Fed.

Appx. 809 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion). 

The United States filed a brief as an intervenor in this

action, arguing in support of Defendant's view that the DOT

regulations were owed deference and that Title II did not require

actual access for visually impaired people. Both parties filed a

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1 $308,036 is the sum of $292,116 requested in Plaintiffs'

supplemental motion for work performed from October 17, 2003 to

April 3, 2007 and $48,430 requested in Plaintiffs' reply for work

performed since April 3, 2007.

5

response to the United States' brief. Defendant filed a reply to

Plaintiffs' response, to which Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply. The

United States also filed a reply to Plaintiffs' response. On March

20, 2007, the Court again found that the DOT regulations are

arbitrary and capricious and are therefore not entitled to

controlling weight. The Court again denied Defendant's motion for

summary judgment and again granted Plaintiffs' cross-motion for

summary judgment. On March 22, 2007, the Court amended its

judgment to provide that Plaintiffs recover from Defendant $35,000

in damages, attorneys' fees of $307,748, expenses and costs of

$19,879, and that Defendant remedy the accessability deficiencies

within one year of the date of entry of the order. 

On April 3, 2007, Plaintiffs filed this supplemental motion

for attorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses incurred from

October 18, 2003 to the present, during the appeal and remand. 

Plaintiffs seek to recover attorneys' fees since October 17, 2003

in the lodestar amount of $308,0361 with a 3.0 multiplier. Thus,

Plaintiffs request a total of $924,108 in attorneys' fees. 

In support of their request for fees, Plaintiffs submit

declarations stating each attorney's hourly billing rate and years

of experience and time records indicating the hours billed by their

attorneys and staff, which are summarized as follows:

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2

 This is net of a $50 reduction for the cost of a book from

the amount Plaintiffs originally requested in their supplemental

fee motion.

6

Attorney/Staff Hours Worked Hourly Rate Total

Paul Rein 157.100 $435 $ 68,339

Patricia Barbosa 408.000 $400 $163,200

Julie (McLean) Ostil 208.000 $275 $ 57,200

Sidney J. Cohen 13.178 $420 $ 5,535

 10.720 $450 $ 4,824

Bryce Anderson 7.0 $300 $ 2,100

Scott Holmes 49.1 $125 $ 6,138

Aaron Clefton 7.0 $100 $ 700

Total fees $308,036

Plaintiffs also request $2,614 in litigation expenses and

costs.2

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard 

Under the ADA's fee-shifting provision, plaintiffs may be

awarded, in the Court's discretion, "a reasonable attorney's fee,

including litigation expenses, and costs." 42 U.S.C. § 12205. 

Plaintiffs also seek fees, expenses and costs pursuant to

California Civil Code § 54.1 and California Code of Civil Procedure

§ 1021.5 because they obtained a result in the public interest. 

The Court analyzes Plaintiffs' motion under the ADA standard, and

discusses California law only where it provides for recovery

different than the ADA. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277

F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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A court may decide not to award attorneys' fees where special

circumstances would render such an award unjust. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). "The defendant has the burden

of showing special circumstances warrant a denial of fees, and the

defendant's showing must be a strong one." Herrington v. County of

Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1989). 

If the district court determines that an applicant is a

prevailing party who should be awarded attorneys' fees, it must

determine what fees are reasonable. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. In

the Ninth Circuit, reasonable attorneys' fees are determined by

first calculating the "lodestar." Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). The lodestar is calculated by

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably

expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Morales v.

City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). There is a

strong presumption that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable

fee. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262. 

In calculating a reasonable number of hours, the applicant

must justify his or her claim by submitting detailed time records. 

Chalmers v. Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). The

court may adjust these hours downward if the documentation is

inadequate or if the hours are duplicative, excessive, or

unnecessary. Id. 

In establishing the reasonable hourly rate, the district court

should take into account (1) the novelty and complexity of the

issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the

quality of representation, (4) the results obtained, Cabrales v.

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County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988), and 

(5) the contingent nature of the fee agreement. City of Burlington

v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1992). These factors are subsumed

in the initial lodestar calculation, and should not serve as

independent bases for adjusting fee awards. Morales, 96 F.3d at

363-64. Reasonable fees are generally calculated according to the

prevailing market rates in the forum district. Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Upward adjustments of the lodestar figure are permissible

under federal law, but such modifications are proper only in

certain "rare and exceptional" cases, supported by both specific

evidence in the record and detailed findings by the lower court. 

Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 478

U.S. 546, 565 (1986). For example, an upward adjustment of the

lodestar may be appropriate in an extraordinary case where the

attorneys faced exceptional risks of not prevailing or not

recovering any fees. Chalmers, 796 F.2d 1205 at 1212. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that, while it is appropriate

for the district court to exercise its discretion in determining an

award of attorneys' fees, it remains important for the district

court to provide "a concise but clear explanation of its reasons

for the fee award." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437

(1983); Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1985) (in

computing an award, the district court should provide a "detailed

account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for 'the number of

hours reasonably expended' and 'a reasonable hourly rate'")

(quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898).

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II. Analysis

The parties agree that Plaintiffs are presumptively entitled

to reasonable attorneys' fees under the ADA as the prevailing

party. However, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs are entitled

to, if anything, no more than $155,986 in attorneys' fees and $365

in costs. First, Defendant argues that, due to Plaintiffs'

mismanagement of the case, it would be unjust to award Plaintiffs

any fees beyond the $307,748 already awarded. Second, Defendant

asserts that it is not responsible for reimbursing Plaintiffs for

fees and costs incurred in opposing the United States, an

intervenor, on remand to this Court. Third, Defendant contends

that Plaintiffs have requested an unreasonable amount in fees and

costs. Fourth, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs should not receive

a multiplier on their fees. Fifth, Defendant states that

Plaintiffs' litigation expenses and costs are inflated.

A. Plaintiffs' Management of the Case 

Plaintiffs prevailed, not on the theories they advanced, but

on the Court's ruling that the DOT regulations are arbitrary and

capricious. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs should not be

rewarded for inefficient litigation and are not entitled to any

further attorneys' fees because Plaintiffs could have resolved the

case years earlier by arguing that the DOT regulations are

arbitrary and capricious.

In its August 10, 2004 Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs'

Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs, this

Court rejected Defendant's argument that it should reduce

Plaintiffs' fees because they lost their core claim. The Court

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3

 It is not clear how Defendant arrived at this figure. 

Schedule A of Defendant's Exhibit A in its response states that a

total of 144.4 hours were expended by Plaintiffs after remand. 

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reasoned, "The claims upon which Plaintiffs prevailed involve a

common core of facts and legal theories related to their

unsuccessful claim . . . [W]here Plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on

a theory related to one on which they earlier failed, the Court

must recompense counsel's time 'devoted generally to the litigation

as a whole.'" (Aug. 10, 2004 Order, Docket # 160 at 18.) That

Plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on a theory related to their

unsuccessful ones remains true. Moreover, although the Court ruled

that the DOT regulations are arbitrary and capricious on January

10, 2003, Plaintiffs seek in this supplemental motion reimbursement

for work performed since October 17, 2003. Therefore, work

performed during the three years of this case that Defendant

asserts were "all for nothing" due to Plaintiffs' mismanagement are

not the subject of this supplemental motion.

This argument does not contribute to any showing of special

circumstances rendering an award of attorneys' fees unjust. The

Court rejects Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs should not

receive additional fees because they won the case on an issue they

did not argue.

B. Fees Incurred in Opposing an Intervenor

Defendant further asserts that it is not responsible for

reimbursing Plaintiffs for 147.53 hours incurred in opposing the

United States, an intervenor, after remand to this Court.

Defendant cites Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v.

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Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761 (1989), in which the Supreme Court held

that in Title VII employment discrimination cases, a prevailing

plaintiff is entitled to attorneys' fees from a losing intervenor

only where the intervenor's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or

without foundation. Zipes addressed the situation in which a

prevailing plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees from a losing

intervenor, not the present situation in which a prevailing

plaintiff seeks intervention-related attorneys' fees from a losing

defendant. 

Citing Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169,

178 (4th Cir. 1994), Defendant argues that Zipes extends to prevent

prevailing parties from recovering intervention-related expenses

from losing defendants. In Rum Creek, 31 F.3d at 172-74, the

plaintiff company challenged a state statute regarding labor

disputes and the AFL-CIO intervened on behalf of the defendant

police officers. In awarding the plaintiff its attorneys' fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the district court excised interventionrelated fees. Id. at 174. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating

that although "Zipes may have left room to argue that

intervention-related fees may be shifted . . . , because the only

issue there related to an intervenor's fee liability, we

nevertheless conclude that Zipes instructs us not to shift

intervention-related expenses to the losing defendant." Id. at

177.

Rum Creek's application to this case is limited; it does not

bind this Court, and its reasoning that Defendant asks this Court

to adopt is its interpretation of dicta. Moreover, Rum Creek was a

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Title VII case in which the defendants were state police officers

who had enforced the law the plaintiff employer challenged as

unconstitutional. In contrast, this is an ADA case in which

Defendant was found to have wrongfully discriminated against

disabled Plaintiffs. Furthermore, the plaintiff in Rum Creek had

appealed the district court's three decisions, including its

decision to award the plaintiff part of its fees. It was after one

of the plaintiff's appeals that the ALF-CIO entered the case as an

intervenor. In the instant case, Defendant, not Plaintiffs,

initiated the appeal during which the United States intervened. 

The evidence also suggests that the United States intervened in

this case at Defendant's request. Plaintiffs' counsel, Patricia

Barbosa, submits a declaration in which she states that following

the filing of Defendant's appeal, she spoke with Karl Geller who

works at the DOJ and it "was clear from the discussion that BART

had contacted the DOJ to ask for support for BART's argument that

the DOT regulations were not 'arbitrary and capricious.'" (July

13, 2007 Barbosa Decl. at ¶ 2.) Defendant benefitted from the

United States' intervention because they shared the position that

the DOT regulations were not arbitrary or capricious. Defendant's

role in and benefit from bringing the United States into this case

as an intervenor supports a finding that Defendant is responsible

for Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in opposing the United States. The

Court will not excise Plaintiffs' intervention-related fees from

their total fees. 

C. Reasonableness of Plaintiff's Request for Fees and Costs

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have requested an

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unreasonable amount of fees and costs. Defendant does not argue

that Plaintiffs' counsel's rates are unreasonable. The Court finds

that Plaintiffs' counsel's rates are reasonable in the San

Francisco Bay Area market in light of each attorney's education,

experience, knowledge and qualifications set forth in their

supporting declarations. Defendant disputes and the Court

considers only the reasonableness of the amount of hours

Plaintiffs' counsel have billed. 

1. Block Billing

Defendant argues that because 202.6 hours of Plaintiffs'

counsel's time entries are insufficiently detailed and thus

unreliable, compensation for these time entries should be reduced

by twenty percent. Defendant contends that these 202.6 hours were

"block-billed," that is, billed as a lump sum across two or more

discrete tasks so that someone reviewing the record cannot

ascertain how much time was charged to complete a specific task. A

review of Schedules C through G (Ex. A of Def.'s Response) reveals

that Plaintiffs' counsel's time entries for these 202.6 hours are

sufficiently specific to determine how much time was charged to

complete a specific task; therefore, the Court will not reduce

compensation for the hours based on Defendant's claim that the time

entries are block-billed.

Similarly, Defendant contends that the time entries by

Plaintiffs' counsel's paralegal Scott Holmes are too vague to be

compensable. The Court found in its August 10, 2003 Order that

Holmes' billing records were sufficiently specific to justify all

his claimed hours, and again finds Holmes' billing records to be

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sufficiently specific.

2. Reasonableness of Amount of Hours

Defendant argues next that in comparison to its own counsel's

hours, Plaintiffs' counsel have requested an unreasonable amount of

hours. Defendant therefore requests that Plaintiffs' counsel's

compensable hours litigating the appeal be reduced from 452.45 to

320.9, the amount of hours Defendant's counsel spent on the appeal. 

Defendant also requests that Plaintiffs' counsel's compensable

hours litigating after remand be reduced from 144.4 to 100, which

is twice as many hours as Defendant's counsel spent litigating

after remand. (Schedule A, Ex. A of Def.'s Response.) The amount

of hours Defendant's counsel spent on the appeal and after remand

is not a model for the amount of hours Plaintiff reasonably should

have spent because of the difference between the outcomes of

Plaintiffs' and Defendant's work: Defendant expended fewer hours,

but Defendant did not prevail. Furthermore, following the United

States' intervention, Plaintiffs' counsel had more work than

Defendant's counsel because Defendant's counsel simply agreed with

the DOJ's position. The Court will therefore not reduce

Plaintiffs' compensable hours on this basis.

3. Necessary Party

Defendant also asserts that, if not excluded completely,

compensation for the hours Plaintiffs' counsel spent after remand

should be reduced by at least half because Plaintiffs' failure to

bring in the United States, a necessary party under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 19, caused the remand. Defendant cites Mercier v.

Fraternal Order of the Eagles, 2004 WL 1354362 (W.D. Wis.) in which

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the district court awarded the plaintiffs slightly less than half

of their claimed fees for the second round of briefing and argument

because their failure to add a necessary party had caused the

second round.

Plaintiffs did not cause the second round of litigation in

this case. The United States became a proper intervenor only after

Defendant raised for the first time in its October 3, 2002 motion

for reconsideration the argument that the DOT regulations made its

stations accessible as a matter of law. This argument prompted the

Court to find the DOT regulations to be arbitrary and capricious. 

Apparently at Defendant's request, the United States intervened to

protect its interest in the continuing validity of its regulations. 

The Court will not deduct compensation for the hours Plaintiffs'

counsel incurred opposing the United States.

4. Hours Spent on This Motion 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claim of 65.7 hours spent on

this supplemental fee motion, not including the time spent on their

reply, is unreasonable; Plaintiffs do not respond to this

contention in their reply. (Schedule A, Ex. A of Def.'s Response.) 

Citing Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1214, the Court in its August 10, 2004

Order reduced payment for the hours Plaintiffs' counsel claimed for

preparing its attorneys' fees motion from 77.6 to fifteen hours due

to its considerable overlap with the issues in the July 15, 2003

settlement conference. In Chalmers, the Ninth Circuit found

counsel's claim of over ninety hours for a fee motion was excessive

in light of the motion's overlap with an appeal for which counsel

claimed to have spent over eighty hours preparing. Issues in this

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4

 The Court attributes these fifteen hours to the work of

Plaintiffs' counsel in proportion to the amount of hours they spent

on this motion: 16.59% of the hours, or 2.4885 hours are

attributable to Paul Rein, 61.64%, or 9.246 hours are attributable

to Patricia Barbosa, and 21.77%, or 3.2655 hours are attributable

to Julie Ostil. (Schedule A, Def.'s Ex. A of Def.'s Response.)

16

supplemental fee motion substantially overlap with those in the

previous motion for fees and costs. The Court therefore finds

fifteen hours a reasonable amount of time to prepare this

supplemental motion, and reduces Plaintiffs' award accordingly.4

The total hours to be reimbursed are as follows:

Attorney/Staff Hours Worked Hourly Rate Total

Paul Rein 148.689 $435 $ 64,680

Patricia Barbosa 376.746 $400 $150,698

Julie (McLean) Ostil 196.966 $275 $ 54,166

Sidney J. Cohen 13.178 $420 $ 5,535

 10.720 $450 $ 4,824

Bryce Anderson 7.0 $300 $ 2,100

Scott Holmes 49.1 $125 $ 6,138

Aaron Clefton 7.0 $100 $ 700

Total fees $288,841

 D. Multiplier 

Plaintiffs assert that under federal law, the Court should

apply a 3.0 multiplier to their lodestar amount because the appeal

and remand of this case have presented novel legal issues that make

it rare and exceptional. In denying Plaintiffs a 2.0 multiplier in

its August 10, 2004 order, the Court stated that Plaintiffs'

counsel's success in the case was neither extraordinary nor

exceptional. Since the appeal and remand, the disposition of the

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case has not changed; the Court on remand again ruled that the DOT

regulations are arbitrary and capricious. Because the case

continues to be neither rare nor exceptional, the Court will not

apply a multiplier to the lodestar.

E. Litigation Expenses and Costs

Defendant finally argues that the amount Plaintiffs seek in

litigation expenses and costs is inflated. Defendant states that

7,000 pages of xeroxed copies is unnecessary considering that no

discovery was conducted during this phase of the case and that a

rate of $.25 per page is excessive compared to Defendant's

counsel's rate of $.20 per page. Defendant contends that

Plaintiffs are entitled to total litigation expenses and costs of

$365. Both parties agree that Plaintiffs' attorneys' inclusion of

a $50 expense for a book was improper. 

 Considering that there were ninety case filings during the

period for which Plaintiffs seek reimbursement and that Plaintiffs'

counsel needed to make multiple copies of each filing for their

staff and files, 7,000 copies over three and a half years does not

appear to be an inflated figure. Defendant provides no evidence

that $.20 per page is its counsel's rate or the market rate. 

Plaintiff's rate of $.25 per page is reasonable. Plaintiffs shall

recover $2,614 in litigation expenses and costs which takes into

account the $50 reduction for the cost of the book.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion

in part, awarding attorneys' fees in the amount of $288,841 and

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litigation expenses and costs in the amount of $2,614.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/21/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE, ET AL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BART,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV00-02206 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on September 21, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Jeffery Lowell Podawiltz

Glynn & Finley

100 Pringle Avenue Ste 500

Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Karl N. Gellert

U.S. Dept. of Justice

Civil Rights Division

RFK Main Blvdg., Rm. 3718

Ben Franklin Station

P.O. Box 14403

Washington, DC 20044-4403

Patricia Barbosa

Law Offices of Paul L. Rein

200 Lakeside Dr Ste A

Oakland, CA 94612

Robert Griggs Schock

Law Office of Robert G. Schock

1970 Broadway

Suite 1200

Oakland, CA 94612

Sidney J. Cohen

Sidney J. Cohen Professional Corporation

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427 Grand Avenue

Oakland, CA 94610

Dated: September 21, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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