Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00049/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00049-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS RIOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID STRAYHORN, Correctional 

Officer; JONES, Correctional Officer; S. 

RUTLEDGE, Correctional Sergeant; A. 

ALLAMBY, Correctional Lieutenant; 

ESTRADA, Registered Nurse; CAMPOS, 

Licensed Vocational Nurse; G. 

STRATTON, Chief Deputy Warden.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00049-BEN-BGS

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING EX PARTE MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 

ADDENDUM; and

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

[ECF No. 9, 11]

On January 9, 2017, Plaintiff Carlos Rios, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, 

brought this action for alleged violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His 

claims arise from an incident in which a correctional officer allegedly used unreasonable 

force against him. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining 

order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction. On June 1, 2017, he filed a motion for leave 

to file an addendum to his TRO and preliminary injunction motion. The Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an addendum.

/ / /

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Plaintiff alleges that Institution Classification Committee (“ICC”) members, 

specifically “Counselor Stuart, CCI, and John Does I-IV, and Daniel Paramo, Warden,” 

have conspired to deny Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and retaliated against his exercise 

of his rights by proposing to transfer Plaintiff from Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”) to a 50/50 General Population Yard in Los Angeles State Prison. 

Plaintiff contends that transfer to a 50/50 General Population Yard would seriously 

threaten his health, life, and safety because he is a Sensitive Needs Yard (“SNY”) inmate. 

Upon receiving notice that the ICC recommended a transfer, Plaintiff filed an 

administrative grievance on a CDCR Form 602. Plaintiff now seeks a court order 

directing the ICC members as well as Scott Kernan, Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to “stop immediately the proposed 

recommendation to transfer” Plaintiff and to “halt immediately their retaliatory bias 

towards” Plaintiff. 

LEGAL STANDARD

The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction 

hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent 

irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of 

Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (noting that a TRO is 

restricted to its “underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing 

irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer”). The 

standard for issuing a TRO is similar to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. 

Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 

(N.D. Cal. 1995). A party must establish that he is “likely to succeed on the merits, that 

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance 

of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 65. This is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) further requires prisoners to satisfy 

additional requirements when seeking preliminary injunctive relief against prison 

officials:

Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than 

necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and 

be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall 

give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation 

of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect 

the principles of comity set out in paragraph (1)(B) in tailoring any 

preliminary relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Section 3626(a)(2) places significant limits upon a court’s power 

to grant preliminary injunctive relief to inmates and “operates simultaneously to restrict 

the equity jurisdiction of federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison 

administrators—no longer may courts grant or approve relief that binds prison 

administrators to do more than the constitutional minimum.” Gilmore v. California, 220 

F.3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to a TRO. As a preliminary matter, 

Plaintiff seeks a TRO against persons that are not named defendants in this action. “A 

federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and 

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of 

persons not before the court.” Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). “Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), an injunction binds only ‘the parties to the action, 

their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and [those] persons in active 

concert or participation with’” the parties or their officers, agents, servants, employees, or 

attorneys. Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)). The ICC members 

and Kernan are not parties or their officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys. 

Plaintiff does not allege that the ICC members and Kernan are in active concert or 

participation with Defendants. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that ICC members and Kernan 

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are “top officials” and “supervisors” within the CDCR. Accordingly, this Court has no 

power to bind the ICC members and Kernan.

Furthermore, at a minimum, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he will be subject 

to immediate and irreparable harm if a TRO does not issue. To meet Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 65’s “irreparable injury” requirement, Plaintiff must do more than simply 

allege imminent harm; he must demonstrate it. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. 

Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). This requires he allege “specific facts in 

an affidavit or a verified complaint [which] clearly show” a credible threat of “immediate 

and irreparable injury, loss or damage.” Fed R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff has not 

made this showing. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient 

to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674. 

Plaintiff’s motion for a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 

injunction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2017

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