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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

GARY D. GILLIHAN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) . 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

DUANE SHILLINGER; TOM SHANYFELT; and ) 

JOHN BUNCH, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals TI!TJth r.ir<'t.lit 

APR 121989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

87-2404 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. 87-0176B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Gary D. Gillihan, p~o se. 

Terry L. Armitage, Assistant Attorney General, State of Wyoming, 

Cheyenne , Wyoming, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, District 

Judge.* 

*The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States District Judge for 

the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court 's order of 

Septembe r 10, 1987 , dismissing his complaint for failure to state 

a claim, denying his motion to supplement his complaint, denying 

his motion for summary judgment, and denying his motion for a 

temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction , and an 

order to show cause. Plaintiff commenced the underlying civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 O.S.C. § 1983 against defendants, who 

are the warden, the office manager, and the central services unit 

manager at the Wyoming State Penitentiary in Rawlins, Wyoming. 

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendants violated 

his right to due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual 

punishment. Specifically, plaintiff stated that in 1985, he was 

transferred to Arizona from Wyomi ng at the request of Wyoming 

prison officials. In April of 1987, at the request of Arizona 

prison officials, he was returned to Wyoming. Upon h is return, 

defendant Shanyfelt informed plaintiff that he was going to be 

charged fo r transportation expenses relating to his return to 

Wyoming, in the amount of $174.53. Shanyfelt also informed 

plaintiff that his prison account was going to be frozen until the 

bill was paid in full. 

Plailll:.i .f.£ __ asserted that by failing. to give him notice of the 

charge until after it was levied and depriving him of an 

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Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 2 
opportunity to refuse the transportation based on his inability to 

pay for it, defendants deprived him of his right to due process. 

He stated that he filed an administrative grievance, but 

defendants Bunch and Shillinger responded by approving the 

assessment of the charge and the freezing of his account. 

Plaintiff also alleged that he was subjected to cruel and 

unusual punishment. He said that since he was in protective 

custody and unable to get a job, the bill would remain outstanding 

against his prison account indefinitely and would render nugatory 

all support from outside the prison. Furthermore, the prison only 

provided "bare necessities to maintain human health standards," 

and due to his lack of funds, he was unable to purchase 

cigarettes, coffee, and personal hygiene items, thereby being 

"stripped [of] what little luxury [he] had." 

Plaintiff requested declaratory relief, as well as punitive 

and compensatory damages against each defendant. At the time he 

filed his complaint, plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis and a motion for temporary restraining order, 

preliminary injunction, and order to show cause. He sought to be 

protected from any retaliation by defendants and to have his 

prison account unfrozen. The court entered orders on 

May 11, 1987, granting plaintiff leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and denying his other motion. 

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his 

complaint. He alleged that after he filed his complaint, 

defendants removed. $2.28.£rom his account, without prior notice or 

a hearing, in partial payment of the transportation bill. 

3 

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Plaintiff's allegations suggested that the account only contained 

the $2.28 removed by defendants. 

Defendants responded to plaintiff's complaint by filing a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants asserted that the court 

should defer to the prison officials' 11 broad administrative and 

discretionary authority11 in the management of the prison. They 

also argued that plaintiff had "nothing more than a property right 

claim, .. which was not protected by § 1983, and that he had 

adequate state and administrative remedies for his alleged 

deprivation of property. 

Plaintiff filed both a traverse to the return and a motion 

for summary judgment. In the former, he asserted that although 

he was incarcerated, he was not stripped of all constitutional 

protections, and that his right to own and enjoy property was 

protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. He further 

asserted that defendants' actions were punitive in nature, and 

that he was entitled to due process before being subject to such 

punishment. Furthermore, he argued, he had a liberty interest in 

being able to purchase items from the commissary and elsewhere as 

permitted by prison regulation, which defendants violated. 

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff asserted that 

defendants, by filing a motion to dismiss, admitted all the facts 

alleged by plaintiff, and that based upon the traverse to the 

motion and the exhibits attached to the motion for summary 

judgment, . he was . entitled to . judgment. The exhibits attached 

consisted of plaintiff's grievance, as well as correspondence from 

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Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 4 
Shanyfelt and Shillinger concerning the transportation bill. Also 

attached were notes from an institution classification committee 

hearing in Arizona finding plaintiff guilty of attempting to 

escape and threatening the staff through letters, and recommending 

that he be placed in administrative segregation pending his 

transfer back to Wyoming. 

A few weeks later, plaintiff filed another motion for 

temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and order to 

show cause, in which he sought an order directing defendants to 

reopen his account and to refrain from "confiscating" any funds in 

the account, including those received from persons outside the 

prison, pending the court's final ruling in the action. 

On September 10, 1987, the court entered the order at issue 

on appeal. The court apparently rejected the arguments of 

defendants for dismissal, since it denied defendants' motion to 

dismiss. The court determined, nonetheless, that plaintiff's 

complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. The court found that plaintiff had requested the 

transfer and his own actions were responsible for his being 

returned to Wyoming, and concluded that it was not unreasonable to 

require plaintiff to pay some of the costs of the transportation. 

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing his complaint because he was entitled to due process 

before being charged for the transportation costs and having his 

account frozen, there was no statutory authority for the charge, 

and . the prison manual does not . _ _state that an inmate will be 

charged for the costs of transportation or that his account will 

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Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 5 
be frozen as a result thereof. Plaintiff also asserts that he was 

denied equal protection under the fourteenth amendment because his 

account was frozen and those of other prisoners were not. We will 

not consider on appeal those issues that were not raised in the 

district court. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 

S. Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826, 837 (1976); United States v. 

Beery, 678 F.2d 856, 861 (lOth Cir. 1982). 

Plaintiff also asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying his motion to supplement the complaint, and 

that it erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff does not mention the district court's dismissal of 

either of his motions for temporary restraining orders, 

preliminary injunctions, and orders to show cause. We, therefore, 

must deem the latter abandoned on appeal. See United TransE· 

Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 827 (lOth Cir. 1986). Defendants' 

arguments on appeal are the same as those asserted below in their 

motion to dismiss. 

We review the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 

complaint de ~, since the sufficiency of a complaint is a 

question of law. See Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 

(lOth Cir. 1986). A complaint should not be dismissed under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the court concludes, as a matter 

of law, that the plaintiff can prove no facts that would entitle 

him to relief. Id. 

In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we 

presume that .. all of. plaintiffts allegations are true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to him. Id. See also Meade v. 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 6 
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 

construe pro se pleadings 

stringent standards than 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

L.Ed.2d 652, 654 (1972). 

1526 (lOth Cir. 1988). Furthermore, we 

liberally and hold them to "less 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." 

519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 

The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that he was 

deprived of his property without due process. To determine 

whether plaintiff's allegations stated a claim, we must first 

determine whether plaintiff has a property interest in the funds 

in his prison account. The record here does not reveal the source 

of any funds in plaintiff's account. To the extent that they 

constitute monies received from friends and family outside the 

prison, plaintiff clearly has a property interest in them. 

Likewise, it appears that he has a property interest in any wages 

he has earned or may earn while incarcerated in the Wyoming State 

Penitentiary. 

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 7-16-203 {1977), "[p]ersons in 

confinement in state institutions may receive compensation for 

services performed as specified by the board of charities and 

reform." Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 7-16-205 {1977), any such 

compensation shall be deposited in the prisoner's trust and agency 

account and shall be disbursed for the reasons, and in the order, 

specified in subsection (a). The funds may also be subject to 

fines levied as punishment for misconduct pursuant to rules and 

regulations promulgated by the charities and reform board in 

accordance with Wyo. Stat. § 7-16-204 (1977). Any remaining funds 

are to be paid to the prisoner upon his parole or final discharge. 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 7 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-16-205(a)(v) (1977)~ These statutes create a 

legitimate expectation that money not used for the specified 

reasons will be returned to the inmate at the end of his 

incarceration and, therefore, create a protected property interest 

in the funds. 

Other courts have held that prisoners have a protected 

property interest in their prison trust accounts. See Quick v. 

Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985): Artway v. 

Scheidemantel, 671 F. Supp. 330, 337 (D.N.J. 1987): Ruley v. 

Nevada Bd. of Prison Commr •s, 628 F. Supp. 108, 112 (D. Nev. 

1986); Jones v. Clark, 607 F. Supp. 251, 254 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 

Given a valid property interest in the funds in the account, 

plaintiff cannot be deprived of the same without due process. 

Contrary to the argument of defendants, it has long been 

recognized that rights in property are basic civil rights. Lynch 

v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1122, 

31 L.Ed.2d 424, 435 (1972). Section 1983 does not distinguish 

between personal liberties and property rights, and a deprivation 

of the latter without due process gives rise to a claim under 

§ 1983. 405 u.s. at 549. 

Defendants contend that p l aintiff has not been deprived of 

his property without due process because he has adequate 

administrative and state post-deprivation remedies. While 

defendants are correct that the United States Supreme Court has 

held that neither negligent nor intentional deprivations of 

.pr:operty under .color of .state _law tha.t are random and unauthorized 

give rise to a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff has an adequate 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 8 
Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S. Ct. 3333, 92 L. Ed.2d 739 (1986); 

Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 473 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 474 u.s. 1101, 106 S. Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed.2d 917 (1986). In 

such cases, the availability of an adequate state post-deprivation 

remedy is irrelevant and does not bar a § 1983 claim. See Sanders 

v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1986); Rit~enhouse v. 

DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1455 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L.Ed.2d 308 (1986); Spruytte v. 

Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,· 474 U.S. 

1054, 106 S. Ct. 788, 88 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986); Stana v. School Dist. 

of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122, 129 (3d Cir. 1985). 

Although plaintiff did not allege that the depri vation of his 

prison account funds was the result of an established state 

procedure in those exact words, his allegati ons suggested that the 

deprivation was not the result of a random and unauthorized act, 

but an established policy. The correspondence from defendants 

Shanyfelt and Shillinger supported this suggestion. 

In determining the timing and nature of the hearing due a 

plaintiff, courts have balanced the following competing interests 

of the plaintiff and the state: 

F i rst, the private interest that will be affected by the 

official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 

deprivation of such interest through the procedures 

used, and the probable value, if any, of additi onal or 

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 

Government's interest, including the function involved 

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 

additional or substitute procedural requirement would 

entail. 

10 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 9 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 

L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976}. 

The state of the record on appeal does not permit us to 

perform the balancing test necessary to determine the exact 

nature and timing of the hearing due plaint i ff . Nonetheless, 

since the record does not reveal "'the necessity of quick action 

by the State or the impracticability of providing any 

predeprivation process,'"~ Logan, 455 U.S. at 436 (quoting 

Parratt, 451 u.s. at 539), and the facts alleged by plaintiff 

indicate that defendants could have provided plaintiff with a 

hearing prior to depriving him of his property, we conclude that 

plaintiff stated a claim for relief based on a deprivation of his 

property without due process. The refore, the district court erred 

in dismissing plaintiff's due process claim. 

The district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's 

claim for cruel and unusual punishment, however. The United 

States Supreme Court, in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 

S. Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), discussed when the conditions 

of a prisoner's confinement may rise to the level of cruel and 

unusual punishment. The Court stated that "[n]o static 'test' can 

exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement 

are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its 

meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 

progress of a maturing society.'" 452 u.s. at 346 (quoting Trap 

v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 

642 .. (1958.} (plurality.-opinion)) . 

11 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 10 
Nonetheless, the Court has established some basic principles 

relating to cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, "[c]onditions 

must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, 

nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 

crime warranting imprisonment... Rhodes, 452 at 347. See also 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 

L.Ed.2d 251, 260 (1986). Other conditions that "deprive inmates 

of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" may also 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 347. 

Following the reasoning of Rhodes, the United States Court of 

Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held, in Inmates of Occoquan v. 

Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1988), that not all 

deprivations 

deprivations 

"rise 

of 

to constitutional significance," and that 

"essential human needs" trigger the 

only 

eighth 

amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 

Plaintiff, here, did not allege a deprivation of essential human 

needs. Rather, he alleged that he was deprived of "what little 

luxury" he had. While such a deprivation may be ''restrictive and 

even harsh, .. see Rhodes, 452 u.s. at 347, it did not amount to the 

infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim for 

cruel and unusual punishment. 

Turning to plaintiff's motion to supplement his complaint, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. l5(d) provides that a court may permit a party to 

serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, 

occurrences,. or events tha~ have -happened -since the date of the 

pleading sought to be supplemented. Motions to supplement are 

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Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 11 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Reid v. 

International Union, UAW, Dist. Lodge 1093, 479 F.2d 517, 520 

(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 u.s. 1076, 94 s. Ct. 592, 38 

L.Ed.2d 483 (1973). 

Leave to supplement a complaint should be liberally granted 

unless good reason exists for denying leave, such as prejudice to 

the defendants. See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 

F.2d 449, 462 (9th Cir. 1966), revvd in part on other grounds, 389 

u.s. 384, 88 5. Ct. 528, 19 L.Ed.2d 621 (1967); New Amsterdam 

Casualty Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28-29 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. 

denied, 376 O.S. 963, 84 S. Ct. 1124, 11 L. Ed.2d 981 (1964}; 

United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 694 F. Supp. 1158, 1187 

(D.N.J. 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1988); Argus, Inc. v. 

Eastman Kodak Co., 552 F. Supp. 589, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 

Plaintiff sought ·to supplement his complaint just seven days 

after he filed his original complaint. The supplement concerned 

events which took place after he filed the complaint, to wit: 

defendants went beyond freezing plaintiff's account and removed 

funds therefrom, in partial payment of the transporta t ion b i l l , 

without providing plaintiff prior notice or an opportunity to be 

heard. Since plaintiff's mo t ion was made promptly and concerned 

subsequently occurring facts relating to his original claim for 

deprivation of property without due process, the court should have 

granted it. On remand, the district court is directed to permit 

plaintiff to supplement his complaint. 

As to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, we review the 

district court's denial thereof de novo, applying the same 

. 13 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 12 
standard as the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See 

Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth 

Cir. 1988}. Summary judgment should only be granted if there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Plaintiff asserted in his motion that, by filing a motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(b)(6), defendants admitted 

all the allegations of plaintiff's complaint. Although the party 

moving to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) does admit the 

allegations of the complaint, it is only for purposes of ruling on 

the motion to dismiss. The admission does not extend beyond the 

immediate consideration of the dismissal motion. Therefore, 

defendants were not deemed to have admitted the allegations of the 

complaint for the purposes of plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgment. 

The district court ruled on plaintiff's motion for summary 

judgment before defendants responded to it. Given the present 

state of the record, we cannot say that plaintiff is entitled to 

summary judgment. On remand, plaintiff may renew his motion if he 

so desires. 

In conclusion, the district court erred in dismissing 

plaintiff's claim for deprivation of property without due process 

and in denying plaintiff's motion to supplement the complaint. 

Therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court for 

the District of Wyoming is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and 

REMANDED . for further -...proceedings.. __ Plaintiff's. motion -for 

14 

Appellate Case: 87-2404 Document: 01019596402 Date Filed: 04/12/1989 Page: 13 
enfor cement of the judgment, filed with this court on 

October 24, 1988, is DENIED as moot. 

The mandate shall issue for thwith . 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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