Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01713/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01713-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐1713

ERIC V. HARDEN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 12‐cv‐581‐TWP‐TAB — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 20, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 25, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY,

District Judge.



KENNELLY, District Judge. In 2012, Eric Harden sued the

Marion County Sheriff’s Department for retaliation under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐

                                                   Of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi‐

nois, sitting by designation.

Case: 14-1713 Document: 41 Filed: 08/25/2015 Pages: 17
2 No. 14‐1713

3(a). He alleged that the Sheriff’s Department terminated

him in retaliation for testifying on behalf of African‐

American police officers in a race discrimination investiga‐

tion. The district granted summary judgment for the Sheriff’s

Department. Harden now appeals that decision. We affirm.

I.

Because we are reviewing the district court’s grant of

summary judgment against Harden, we recount the facts in

the light most favorable to him, “resolving all evidentiary

conflicts in [his] favor and according [him] the benefit of all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record.”

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 842 (7th Cir. 2012).

Harden was employed by the Marion County Sheriff’s

Department from November 1, 2008 until his termination on

December 23, 2010. He was hired to work as a building dep‐

uty and, in that capacity, provided security to the City‐

County building in Indianapolis. At least two of Harden’s

supervisors felt that he was an excellent employee. One of

his supervisors, Sgt. Ernest Worthington Todd, III, described

Harden’s “skills, training, and judgment” as “superior to

nearly all the other building deputies,” and his “demeanor

and professional bearing” as “top notch.” App. at 54. Anoth‐

er supervisor, Lt. Nathaniel Neal, said that he was “com‐

pletely satisfied with Harden’s job performance” and that

Harden “was one of my top employees.” App. at 49.

In 2010, the Sheriff’s Department’s Equal Employment

Opportunity officer, Sgt. Nancy Blair, initiated an investiga‐

tion into the alleged discriminatory treatment of African‐

American deputies. Her investigation focused on two offic‐

ers in particular: Lt. Tammy Nelson and Cpl. James Russo.

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No. 14‐1713 3

Harden, who is Caucasian and thus was not subjected to the

alleged discrimination, agreed to be interviewed for the in‐

vestigation. During his interview, Harden testified that Lt.

Nelson and Cpl. Russo treated African‐American deputies

differently from Caucasian deputies. He alleged that he had

“heard comments” that “just [don’t] seem right,” and that

“certain officers are not respected at all.” Supp. App. at 1; see

also App. at 21. He also alleged that Lt. Nelson and Cpl. Rus‐

so gave African‐American deputies less‐desirable assign‐

ments than Caucasian deputies. As a result of this investiga‐

tion, both Lt. Nelson and Cpl. Russo were demoted.

Shortly after giving this interview, Harden began to no‐

tice changes in his work schedule. Harden’s patrol time was

reduced—a change that, he alleges, was recognized as unde‐

sirable in the Sheriff’s Department. Harden was also taken

off a prestigious assignment with the mayor. When Harden

approached Cpl. Russo about the changes, Cpl. Russo re‐

plied, “It’s not me and Tammy [Nelson] fucking with you,

it’s [Deputy Chief Shirley] Challis and [Lt. Bryce] Wolfe [sic]

fucking with you.” App. at 18. He also warned Harden, “[I]n

the future you ought to be more careful with who you talk

to.” App. at 18.  

In addition to the work‐schedule changes, Harden con‐

tends, Lt. Nelson, Cpl. Russo, Lt. Wolf, and Deputy Chief

Challis pressured Harden’s supervisors to cite Harden for

disciplinary infractions. According to Lt. Neal, Lt. Nelson

instructed him to “write [Harden] up for anything I could

find on him.” App. at 50. Similarly, Lt. Neal also says that

Cpl. Russo asked him “why [he] didn’t write Harden up

more often.” App. at 50. (Lt. Neal told him, “it was because

[Harden] never did anything wrong.” App. at 50.) Accord‐

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4 No. 14‐1713

ing to Lt. Neal, Lt. Wolf insisted that a complaint about

Harden’s conduct on the shooting range “go up the chain of

command” even though the shooting range instructor “did

not wish to complain on Harden.” App. at 50–51. Lt. Neal

also “did not agree with the decision to proceed with [the]

complaint and, as his supervisor, did not believe that Hard‐

en should have been disciplined” for his conduct on the

shooting range. App. at 51. In addition, Deputy Chief Challis

allegedly instructed another of Harden’s supervisors, Sgt.

Minton, to find “any reason” he could to discipline Harden.

App. at 20.  

Harden eventually concluded that he was suffering retal‐

iation and contacted the EEOC. After some initial investiga‐

tion into his complaint, the EEOC retained an outside inves‐

tigator, Michelle Cooper, to whom Harden gave a statement

in September 2010. Harden testified that after he gave this

statement, the harassment ceased.

About three months later, Harden arrested a man by the

name of Victor Rybolt for neglect of a child. Upon his release

from custody, Rybolt realized that $100 was missing from

his wallet and reported the missing property to the Sheriff’s

Department. One witness to this exchange says that Rybolt

initially accused Lt. Maurice Frazier of the theft, though Ry‐

bolt himself later denied making this accusation. The follow‐

ing day, the Sheriff’s Department launched a criminal inves‐

tigation regarding the theft. When interviewed by an inves‐

tigator, Rybolt stated that he had seen Harden take an un‐

sealed property bag into a back room, where Harden would

have been alone. Harden was ultimately cleared by the crim‐

inal investigation. The Sheriff’s Department then initiated an

Internal Affairs investigation. Internal affairs investigators

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No. 14‐1713 5

concluded that Harden had, in fact, perpetrated the theft of

Rybolt’s money. Shortly thereafter, the Sheriff’s Department

terminated Harden.  

Harden filed this suit in May 2012. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s De‐

partment about two years later. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, Harden argues that he has presented suffi‐

cient evidence of unlawful retaliation to survive summary

judgment. He also contends that one of the district court’s

evidentiary rulings was in error. We review the district

court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all

facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

Harden. See, e.g., Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 876

(7th Cir. 2014). We review the district court’s evidentiary rul‐

ing for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Harney v. City of Chicago,

702 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 2012).

A.  Evidentiary issues

We begin with the evidentiary issues raised by the Sher‐

iff’s Department. The Sheriff’s Department argues that

Harden’s response to the summary judgment motion relied

on inadmissible hearsay. See Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979,

985 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A party may not rely upon inadmissible

hearsay to oppose a motion for summary judgment.”). In

particular, the Department cited Rybolt’s alleged accusation

of Lt. Frazier and statements made by various Sheriff’s De‐

partment personnel to Lt. Neal. The district court ruled that

one of these statements—Rybolt’s accusation of Lt. Frazier—

was indeed inadmissible hearsay (it did not address the oth‐

ers).  

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6 No. 14‐1713

This ruling was erroneous. As Harden notes, the state‐

ment is offered to prove that the Sheriff’s Department was

aware of (and ignored) another suspect, not to prove that Lt.

Frazier was the thief. Evidence that is “used only to show

notice” is not hearsay. Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Mar‐

seilles Land & Water Co., 518 F.3d 459, 468 (7th Cir. 2008); see

also FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee’s note (“If the

significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that

it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything as‐

serted, and the statement is not hearsay.”). The ruling was

not reversible error, however, because the district court con‐

cluded—as we do—that the Sheriff’s Department is entitled

to summary judgment even if the statement is considered.  

We need not address the other statements cited by the

Sheriff’s Department, namely statements that Lt. Neal says

various supervisory personnel made to him. Even if these

statements, which we summarized earlier in this decision,

are considered, they do not warrant reversal of the district

court’s decision.  

B.  Retaliation claim

Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against

employees for testifying, assisting, or otherwise participating

in a race discrimination investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).

“[R]etaliation may be established by either the direct or indi‐

rect methods of proof.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 859. Harden

proceeds under both methods.

To prove retaliation under the direct method, Harden

must show that: (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he

suffered a materially adverse employment action, and (3)

there was a causal link between his protected activity and

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No. 14‐1713 7

the adverse action. Id. To prove retaliation under the indirect

method, Harden must show that: (1) he engaged in protect‐

ed activity, (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment

action, (3) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expecta‐

tions, and (4) he was treated less favorably than similarly‐

situated employees who did not engage in protected activi‐

ty. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir.

2008). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under

the indirect method, “a presumption of [retaliation] is trig‐

gered” and the burden shifts “to the employer to articulate

some legitimate, [nonretaliatory] reason for its action.” Cole‐

man, 667 F.3d at 845 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“When the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the

plaintiff, who must present evidence that the stated reason is

a ‘pretext,’ which in turn permits an inference of unlawful

discrimination.” Id.

We begin with the direct method. The first two elements

are not in dispute.1 Thus, we limit our inquiry to whether

Harden has presented sufficient evidence that his protected

activity was a “substantial or motivating factor” in his ter‐

mination. Id. at 860. To do so, Harden may rely on direct ev‐

idence, “which would entail something akin to an admission

by the employer (‘I’m firing you because you had the nerve

                                                  1 Although the Sheriff’s Department concedes that Harden’s termi‐

nation was a materially adverse action, it argues that the discipline im‐

posed on Harden in the months leading up to his termination was not.

That may be true, but it is beside the point. Harden does not say that the

discipline was a materially adverse action; rather, he points to the disci‐

pline as circumstantial evidence of the Sheriff’s Department’s true moti‐

vations. The rush to discipline him for specious infractions, Harden con‐

tends, suggests that the Sheriff’s Department was motivated by retalia‐

tion.  

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8 No. 14‐1713

to accuse me of sex discrimination!’).” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). He may also “present[] a ‘convincing mosa‐

ic’ of circumstantial evidence that would permit the same

inference without the employer’s admission.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). That is, even if “[n]o single piece

of evidence [ ] amount[s] to a smoking gun,” Harden may

“establish retaliation by assembling a number of pieces of

evidence none meaningful in itself, consistent with the

proposition of statistical theory that a number of observa‐

tions each of which supports a proposition only weakly can,

when taken as a whole, provide strong support if all point in

the same direction.” Hobgood v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635,

647 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Harden does not have direct evidence of a causal connec‐

tion and therefore relies on circumstantial evidence to satisfy

the third element. We have recognized three categories of

circumstantial evidence: suspicious timing, ambiguous

statements, and “other bits and pieces from which an infer‐

ence of [retaliatory] intent might be drawn”; evidence that

similarly‐situated employees were treated differently; and

evidence that the employer’s stated reason for the decision

was pretext. Id. at 643–44. “[T]hese categories of evidence are

not exclusive, nor are they a set of prongs of a circumstantial

evidence ‘test.’” Id. at 644.

Harden first argues that there is evidence of suspicious

timing. Temporal proximity between an employee’s protect‐

ed activity and an adverse employment action is rarely

enough to show causation. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860. An in‐

terval of the length at issue in this case may be probative of

causation if “there is corroborating evidence of retaliatory

motive,” id. at 861, but Harden has offered no such evidence.

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No. 14‐1713 9

Harden next points to evidence that, he says, reveals “a

continuing pattern of harassment of which his termination

for theft is the final act.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. This evidence

includes Lt. Nelson and Cpl. Russo’s statements encourag‐

ing Lt. Neal to discipline Harden; Deputy Chief Challis’s

statement encouraging Sgt. Minton to discipline Harden; the

discipline actually imposed on Harden, which Lt. Neal

thought was unwarranted; undesirable changes to Harden’s

schedule; Cpl. Russo’s statement that Deputy Chief Challis

and Lt. Wolf were “fucking” with Harden by changing his

schedule; Cpl. Russo’s warning that Harden “ought to be

more careful with who [he] talk[s] to”; and the fact that

Harden was removed from his post at the mayor’s office,

which Lt. Neal interpreted as “retribution for Harden’s

EEOC complaint.” This evidence certainly suggests that of‐

ficers within the Sheriff’s Department—including officers

who oversaw Harden’s schedule and assignments—had it in

for Harden. What’s missing, however, is a link between this

evidence and Harden’s termination. Harden has offered no

evidence that the animus of these individual officers had any

impact on either the Internal Affairs investigators or the

higher‐ups who made the decision to terminate him. (In‐

deed, the harassment ceased after Harden filed a complaint,

which suggests that some high‐ranking officers opposed this

harassment.) Thus, although the evidence of harassment

says something about the context in which the theft investi‐

gation was initiated, without more, it cannot support an in‐

ference that Harden’s termination was retaliatory.

Harden’s appeal therefore turns on his claim that the In‐

ternal Affairs investigation was mere pretext for unlawful

retaliation. Before addressing the merits of Harden’s pretext

argument, however, we must attend to an issue that was

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10 No. 14‐1713

raised at oral argument. Harden’s attorney now claims that

transcripts of the interviews conducted by Internal Affairs

were never produced to him. These transcripts are potential‐

ly important because an investigative report that misrepre‐

sents witness statements is “enough for a reasonable jury to

conclude that the proffered reason for termination is pre‐

textual.” Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 358 (7th Cir.

2002), overruled on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724

F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013). But Harden neither filed a motion to

compel in the district court nor made this argument in any

of his briefs.2 Arguments that are raised for the first time in

oral argument are forfeited. See Veluchamy v. FDIC, 706 F.3d

810, 817 (7th Cir. 2013). Thus, for the purposes of this appeal,

we assume that the Sheriff’s Department produced tran‐

scripts of the Internal Affairs interviews to Harden. Because

the transcripts are not in the record, furthermore, we also

assume that they are consistent with the Internal Affairs re‐

port.

We now turn to whether Harden has offered evidence

from which a reasonable jury could find that the Sheriff’s

Department’s stated reason for the discharge—the conclu‐

sion by the Internal Affairs investigators that Harden was

responsible for the theft—was a pretext for unlawful retalia‐

tion. In making this determination, we do not evaluate

                                                  2 Harden did argue at summary judgment that because the Sheriff’s

Department failed to produce the audio recordings of the interviews, he

was entitled to an inference that these recordings would have supported

his case. The district court found, however, that “[s]uch an inference is

not warranted in this case because Harden was provided the transcripts

of the interviews” and “Harden does not assert that the transcripts them‐

selves are not accurate.” Harden v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:12‐

CV‐00581‐TWP, 2014 WL 852946, at *6 n.1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 4, 2014).

Case: 14-1713 Document: 41 Filed: 08/25/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14‐1713 11

whether the stated reason “was inaccurate or unfair, but

whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has

offered to explain the discharge.” Harper v. C.R. England, Inc.,

687 F.3d 297, 311 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting another source). A

pretextual decision, then, “involves more than just faulty

reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the employer;

it is [a] lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Ar‐

gyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 736 (internal quotation marks omit‐

ted).

Based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury

could find that the Internal Affairs investigation was unwor‐

thy of credence—that is, a “sham” investigation. In a typical

sham investigation, persons conducting the investigation

fabricate, ignore, or misrepresent evidence, or the investiga‐

tion is circumscribed so that it leads to the desired outcome

(for instance, by deliberately failing to interview certain wit‐

nesses). The investigation at issue in this case, by contrast,

was thorough and transparent. The investigators inter‐

viewed each and every person involved in the incident

(fourteen in all), they reviewed surveillance footage and ra‐

dio traffic, and they explained their grounds for eliminating

suspects other than Harden. Moreover, there is no evidence

of any kind that the investigators themselves harbored retal‐

iatory animus.

In addition to conducting a thorough investigation, the

investigators offered a legitimate explanation for their con‐

clusion that Harden was the thief. First, they noted that

Harden was the only person who went into the back room,

where he would have been alone. Thus, they reasoned,

Harden was the only person who had the opportunity to

steal the money (because he was the only person who was

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12 No. 14‐1713

ever alone with the money) and the means to steal it (be‐

cause as the arresting officer, he had “legitimate access” to

the property bag and “no one would question him handling

the property bag or its contents”). App. at 69–70. Second, the

investigators observed that Harden’s arrest report for Rybolt

did not list the amount of money recovered, even though fif‐

ty‐seven of Harden’s fifty‐nine other arrest reports listed this

amount for those arrestees. This omission, the investigators

reasoned, was intended to obscure the fact that a theft had

occurred. Third, the investigators noted that when they

asked Harden why he did not list the amount, he replied,

“You only fill out that part of the incident report if the sub‐

ject being arrested has over $500.00 on him.” App. at 64.

That statement, however, was inconsistent with Harden’s

assertion, made earlier in the interview, that he did not

know how much money was in the wallet. It was also incon‐

sistent with his other arrest reports, some of which list de‐

nominations as small as $0.25 or $0.00. And fourth, the in‐

vestigators provided a plausible explanation for why Hard‐

en had the motive to commit the theft (disrespectful com‐

ments made by Rybolt, which angered Harden, and Hard‐

en’s personal financial troubles).

Harden offers several reasons to support his contention

that the investigation was pretextual. First, throughout his

brief, Harden disputes the investigators’ reasoning. But

“faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment on the part of the

employer” is not sufficient to show pretext. Argyropoulos, 539

F.3d at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,

Harden must offer evidence tending to show that the Sher‐

iff’s Department did not actually believe the findings of the

investigation. To do this by challenging the strength of the

Internal Affairs report, Harden “must identify such weak‐

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No. 14‐1713 13

nesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions” in

the report “that a reasonable person could find [it] unworthy

of credence.” Harper, 687 F.3d at 311 (internal quotation

marks omitted). He has not done so. At most, Harden has

raised some doubts about his guilt. That is not enough to

suggest that the Internal Affairs investigation was a sham or

that the relevant decisionmakers at the Sheriff’s Department

did not legitimately rely on the investigatorsʹ conclusions in

terminating him.

Harden also contends that weaknesses of the criminal in‐

vestigation cast doubt on the Internal Affairs investigation.

First, he points to discrepancies between the criminal inves‐

tigation interviews and the probable cause affidavit. The

criminal investigation, however, was conducted by a differ‐

ent investigator. Moreover, in terminating Harden, the Sher‐

iff’s Department relied on the Internal Affairs investigation,

not the criminal investigation. The alleged weaknesses of the

criminal investigation thus have little bearing on whether

the Internal Affairs investigation was a sham or unworthy of

credence.  

Second, Harden observes that he was cleared by the

prosecutor’s office and that Detective Sharp—the detective

who conducted the criminal investigation—later testified

that he did not know who committed the theft. This indi‐

cates, Harden contends, that the Sheriff’s Department did

not really believe that he was guilty. But Detective Sharp

was neither involved in the Internal Affairs investigation nor

responsible for deciding whether to terminate Harden. Ac‐

cordingly, his personal beliefs about Harden’s guilt tell us

nothing about the beliefs of the actual decision‐makers. In

any event, the fact that no criminal charge was instituted

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14 No. 14‐1713

against Harden is of little relevance. Criminal investigations

and internal investigations are governed by different stand‐

ards of proof; the Sheriff’s Department could honestly be‐

lieve, based on the Internal Affairs investigation, that Hard‐

en committed the theft even if those responsible for institut‐

ing criminal charges did not think they could prove a crimi‐

nal theft charge.

Next, Harden argues that he “immediately became the

principal suspect” and that the Sheriff’s Department ignored

Rybolt’s accusation of another officer, Lt. Frazier. The facts

in the record, however, do not support this claim. In describ‐

ing the process by which they conducted the investigation,

the investigators state that they “did not focus [their] inves‐

tigation on Dep. Harden but rather everyone in the room

were suspects because they were in the room when the

money went missing.” App. at 69. Indeed, the investigators

interviewed each and every person who was involved in the

incident. Harden notes that the Internal Affairs report does

not mention Rybolt’s accusation of Lt. Frazier. He argues

that this omission was deliberate and belies the investiga‐

tors’ true intentions. But there is no evidence in the record

that Holland, the person who allegedly heard the accusation,

told the investigators about it during her interview.  

Lastly, Harden contends that it was highly unusual to in‐

vestigate an arrestee’s theft allegation. Thus, he argues, the

fact that the Sheriff’s Department initiated the theft investi‐

gation in the first place is evidence of pretext. In Baker v. Ma‐

con Resources, Inc., 750 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2014), we said that

“selective enforcement or investigation of a disciplinary pol‐

icy can [ ] show pretext.” Id. at 677. Baker is distinguishable,

however, for two reasons. First, the employer in Baker had

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No. 14‐1713 15

reason to believe that the plaintiff’s supervisors had violated

the same company policy as the plaintiff with regard to the

same incident, but failed to “offer[] a reason why, at the

same time it fired [the plaintiff] ... , it chose not to investi‐

gate whether her own supervisors violated the same report‐

ing rule.” Id. Our use of the phrase “selective investigation”

did not refer to the initiation of the investigation in the first

instance, but the manner in which the investigation was

conducted once initiated. Here, by contrast, the Internal Af‐

fairs investigators did not selectively investigate the theft ac‐

cusation; they interviewed each and every person involved

in the arrest of Rybolt. And although the Sheriff’s Depart‐

ment did not typically initiate arrestee theft investigations,

there is no evidence in the record that the Department had

actually concluded that these other arrestee theft accusations

had merit (unlike the Rybolt accusation). Thus, there is no

evidence that the Department “selectively enforced” the dis‐

ciplinary policy either. Second, in addition to selective inves‐

tigation, the court in Baker also found flagrant inaccuracies

and inconsistencies in the employer’s supposed reason for

the terminating the plaintiff. Id. In this case, by contrast,

there is no evidence that the investigation was conducted in

bad faith or that the investigation was not the true basis for

Harden’s termination.  

The same goes for the other cases in which we have said

that selective enforcement or investigation can be evidence

of pretext. In Coleman, we observed that “evidence of selec‐

tive enforcement of a rule calls into question the veracity of

the employer’s explanation.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 857 (inter‐

nal quotation marks omitted). But in Coleman, unlike the case

at bar, it was undisputed that the comparators had actually

violated the same rule as the plaintiff (indeed, in a manner

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16 No. 14‐1713

that a reasonable jury could conclude was “much more

egregious”).3 Id. at 857. In Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr.,

612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010), we concluded that there was ev‐

idence that the employer’s “grounds for firing [the plaintiff]

were insincere” because the decision to terminate was

“reached in an unusual way.” Id. at 916. Specifically, the em‐

ployer had decided to terminate “within 24 hours of receiv‐

ing [a] complaint” about the plaintiff, conducted a “cursory

investigation,” failed to consider “evidence that the com‐

plaint was unfounded,” and provided “[a] shifting justifica‐

tion for [the] employment action.” Id. at 915–16. Here, by

contrast, the Internal Affairs investigation was thorough and

transparent.  

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no reasona‐

ble jury could find that the Internal Affairs investigation was

pretextual. The Sheriff’s Department was therefore entitled

to summary judgment on Harden’s claim under the direct

method of proof.

Our conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that

the Departmentʹs reliance on the Internal Affairs investiga‐

tion was pretextual is also dispositive of Harden’s claim un‐

der the indirect method of proof. Where pretext is absent,

the court need not “march through” the entire process for

showing retaliation under the indirect method. Lesch v.

Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2002) (pro‐

ceeding to the dispositive issue of pretext without deciding

if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case). The Sher‐

                                                  3 We also questioned whether the plaintiff could  ʺfairly be said to

have violated any workplace rule at all.ʺ Id. at 853.  

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No. 14‐1713 17

iff’s Department is therefore entitled to summary judgment

under the indirect method as well.

III.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s

Department.

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