Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01531/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01531-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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The following facts are undisputed except where noted.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rebecca E. Kastl, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Community College

District, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-02-1531-PHX-SRB

ORDER

At issue is Defendant Maricopa County Community College District's ("Defendant"

or "MCCCD") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 114), Defendant's Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's Untimely Objection to Defendant's Proffer of Undisputed Facts and Exhibits and

Documents in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 122) and

Plaintiff Rebecca E. Kastl's Motion to Extend Filing Deadline (Doc. 126).

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as an adjunct faculty member in May 2000 to teach

a computer course beginning in August 2000. At the time she was hired, Plaintiff identified

herself as Steven Robert Kastl and indicated on an employee data form that she was a male.

In August 2000, Plaintiff was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, or Gender Identity Disorder

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GID is defined as "the desire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the other sex,"

combined with "persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex or a sense of

inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex." (Def.'s Separate Statement of Undisputed

Facts ("DSOF") ¶ 4 (citing American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision § 302.9 (2000).) 

3

Plaintiff was not required to present any proof of biological sex or sex reassignment

to legally change her name.

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("GID")2

. That summer Plaintiff began the process of "gender transition" from a male

identity to a female identity. The transition process included taking female hormones to

develop a female physical appearance and Androcur, which blocks the production of

testosterone. 

Plaintiff was re-hired in the Fall of 2000 to teach three courses during the Spring 2001

semester. "From approximately August 2000 until the spring [semester] of 2001, Plaintiff

presented as a male at MCCCD" and "dressed as a male, went by the name 'Steven,' and used

the men's restroom." (DSOF ¶ 23, Ex. 1, Deposition of Rebecca Kastl ("Kastl Dep.") at

172:4-14, 200:25-201:1, 253:12-16.)

 On March 1, 2001, Plaintiff legally changed her name from Steven Robert Kastl to

Rebecca Elizabeth Kastl3

 and began presenting herself full time as a female named

"Rebecca." Also in March 2001, Plaintiff changed the sex designation on her Arizona

driver's license from male to female. To change her license, Plaintiff filled out a form

indicating the changes she wanted to make to her name and sex designation and provided the

Arizona Motor Vehicle Division ("MVD") with a letter from her physician stating that

Plaintiff had been "functionally living as a female." (DSOF ¶¶ 11-12, Ex. 6.) In April 2001

Plaintiff filled out a second employee data form changing her name to Rebecca E. Kastl and

indicating that she was a female. 

"Between March 2001 and July 2002, Plaintiff underwent several surgical procedures

to develop a more feminine appearance, including breast augmentation, rhinoplasty, brow

reconstruction, and genioplasty (chin augmentation)." (DSOF ¶ 15, Kastl Dep. at 25:19-24,

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177:6-24.) In July 2003, Plaintiff had sex reassignment surgery, including a vaginoplasty

and labiaplasty to develop the appearance of female genitalia. In March 2005, Plaintiff

legally changed her birth certificate to reflect her new name and female sex.

Plaintiff was hired again by Defendant to teach one course in the Summer and Fall

2001 semesters. In October 2001, Defendant received complaints from some students that

a man was using the women's restroom. The Division Chair of the Instructional Computing

Department, Betty Vickrey, told Plaintiff "that she could not use the women's restroom until

she provided proof that she had completed sex reassignment surgery." (DSOF ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff "offered her driver's license as proof of her gender" but "did not provide proof that

she had completed sex reassignment surgery" because it had not yet occurred. (DSOF ¶ 37.)

Defendant contends that "Plaintiff was not asked to provide any information about or proof

of her genitalia" and that "MCCCD did not specify any kind or form of proof that Plaintiff

had completed sex reassignment surgery." (DSOF ¶ 36; Kastl Dep. at 212:6-11, 213:9-16,

234:3-12, 237:2-4.) Vickrey informed Plaintiff on December 5, 2001 that her contract with

Defendant would not be renewed for the following semester because Defendant's full-time

faculty had filled the schedule. 

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in August 2002. Her amended Complaint alleges

that Defendant's requirement "that she use men's restroom facilities, and its subsequent

termination of her employment for failing to work under such conditions, amounts to a

constructive discharge on the basis of sex . . . ." (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff alleged that she is "biologically female, determined in accordance with the portion

of her brain that determines gender identity, her overall physiology, and as confirmed by two

(2) PhD psychologists and at least one medical doctor." (SAC ¶ 54(A).) The Court

dismissed one count of the Amended Complaint brought under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and portions of Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The three remaining

claims allege violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et

seq. ("Title VII"), Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. ("Title

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The Title IX claim apparently derives from Plaintiff's allegation that she was also

taking classes at MCCCD in addition to teaching.

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IX")4

, and § 1983 for alleged violations of Plaintiff's right to privacy, equal protection and

freedom of speech.

Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of

Undisputed Facts on February 21, 2006. The Court granted the parties' stipulation to extend

the deadline for Plaintiff to file her Response to the motion. Plaintiff filed her Response on

the April 24, 2006 deadline, but two days later she filed two additional pleadings including

objections to six of Defendant's forty-four statements of fact and a notice of filing six

exhibits in support of her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

On May 12, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the two additional pleadings and

attached exhibits as untimely. Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Extend the Filing Deadline and

a Response to the Motion to Strike on May 26, 2006, claiming that her untimeliness was due

to excusable neglect. The Court has previously issued a warning to Plaintiff that "untimely

filings will not be considered in the future." (Order dated Jan. 7, 2004 (Doc. 37).)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike and Motion for Extension of Time

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) provides that the court may enlarge the

specified time period for an act "upon motion made after the expiration of the specified

period . . . where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Since it is a rule of

general application, courts are given broad discretion in granting or denying extensions. See,

e.g., Rutledge v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1975).

The determination of excusable neglect "is an equitable one, taking account of all

relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v.

Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). Generally, the court will consider

several factors, including "the danger of prejudice to the [other party], the length of the delay

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and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether

it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good

faith." Comm. for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 (9th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395).

Plaintiff contends that her untimely filings were due to excusable neglect, specifically,

that her lawyer's spouse required an emergency appendectomy on April 3, 2006 and because

the lawyer was also "recuperating from her own extended illness." (Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to

Def.'s Mot. to Strike ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 2-3.) Plaintiff says the "gravity" and "unforeseeable"

nature of the situation created a reasonable basis for missing the deadline. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3.)

The Court notes that, although the surgery may have been unexpected, it took place twentyone days before the April 24, 2006 deadline for filing a Response, leaving time for Plaintiff

to seek leave of the Court or a stipulation from Defendant to extend the deadline. In fact,

Plaintiff admits that she considered requesting a stipulated extension but chose not to. (Pl.'s

Opp'n at 2, n.2.) Instead, Plaintiff decided to file the pleadings late, and only filed a motion

for an extension after Defendant moved to strike the pleadings, nearly a month later. 

There is also a question about whether Plaintiff's omission was in good faith given that

Plaintiff has missed other deadlines in the course of this litigation and the fact that the Court

told Plaintiff in 2004 that it will not consider any more untimely submissions from her. In

the first motion for extension, granted by the Court, Plaintiff's lawyer claimed that the missed

deadline was due to excusable neglect because of her spouse's developing health conditions

and because she misread the rules for when her pleading was due. (Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. of

Time to Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for a More Definite Statement (March 11, 2003)(Doc. 10).) In

the second motion for extension, Counsel claimed that her increased workload prevented her

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5

 The Court denied the Motion as moot because Plaintiff's amended Complaint was

stricken for not complying with the Court's Order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

(Doc. 24).

6

 Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Reply Memorandum and Supplemental Statement

of Undisputed Facts were filed three days late and should likewise be stricken. (Pl.'s Opp'n.

at 3.) Plaintiff is mistaken because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) provides three days

mailing time when service is delivered through electronic means, as it was in this case.

Therefore, Defendant filed its Reply Memorandum in a timely fashion. 

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from filing her Amended Complaint on time.5

 (Pl.'s Mot. for Ext. of Time to File her

Amended Compl. (July 26, 2003) (Doc. 19).) 

Although Counsel may be going through a rough time in both her personal and

professional life, that is no excuse for not taking care of her professional responsibilities in

a timely manner. Most attorneys face great pressure from "extenuating" circumstances but

are forced to meet the deadlines set by the courts or the rules of procedure. See Pioneer, 507

U.S. at 398 ("In assessing the culpability of respondents' counsel, we give little weight to the

fact that counsel was experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar date.").

It is unfair to require Defendant to comply with the rules but not hold Plaintiff to the same

standard.6

 

Finally, the Court's January 7, 2004 Order warned Plaintiff that no more untimely

filings would be accepted. Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's late-filed

pleadings is granted and Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time is denied.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriately granted when there are no genuine issues of

material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). The initial burden is on the moving party to show an absence of genuine issues of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets

its initial burden, then the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine

issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In deciding

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a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence of the non-movant in the light

most favorable to that party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

1. Title VII and Title IX

Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on any of its enumerated

grounds: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title

IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex under any educational program receiving

federal financial assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. The same standards apply to discrimination

claims brought under Title IX as to those brought under Title VII. Weinstock v. Columbia

Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000).

A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII may proceed either under a theory

of disparate treatment or disparate impact. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 692 F.2d

602, 604-05 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982). The disparate treatment theory is appropriately employed,

in cases such as this one, where an aggrieved employee claims that he or she was

intentionally treated less favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);

Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 612-13.

Two methods of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII

are recognized in the Ninth Circuit. First, a plaintiff may establish her case by submitting

direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th

Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Second, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by

showing she is entitled to a presumption of discrimination arising from factors such as those

set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (discussing

factors leading to establishment of prima facie case and presumption of discrimination). The

Ninth Circuit has held that a Plaintiff alleging disparate treatment based on sex establishes

a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas by showing: "(1) she belongs to a protected

class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment

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action; and (4) similarly situated men were treated more favorably, or her position was filled

by a man." Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002);

Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998); McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802. 

A plaintiff proceeding under McDonnell Douglas is subject to a burden shifting

analysis. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden of production shifts to the defendant, who must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action. Id. If the defendant bears its burden, the

production burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show the reasons offered by the

defendant were not the true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 803; Texas

Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Natl.

Trust & Sav. Assoc., 879 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff retains the burden of

persuasion at all times. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143

(2000); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 

When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, "the moving party need only

point out 'that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'"

Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

Under Rule 56(e), once the moving party carries its initial burden and has supported its

motion by affidavit or otherwise, the adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations

or denials of the adverse party's pleading," but must provide affidavits or other sources of

evidence that "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 ("One of the principal purposes of the

summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses

. . . ."); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) ("If

. . . a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must produce

evidence to support its claim or defense."). "If the adverse party does not so respond,

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summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims under Title VII and Title IX fail because she

cannot "prove her allegation that she is a biological female" i.e., a member of a protected

class, the first element of a prima facie case. (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s MSJ") at 9.)

Defendant contends that "[b]ased on the standards of commonly accepted medical science,

an individual's biological sex is determined by three criteria: (1) phenotypic characteristics;

(2) endogenous hormonal characteristics; and (3) chromosomal characteristics." (DSOF ¶

44; Ex. 4, Declaration of Christopher Cunniff, M.D. ("Cunniff Decl."), ¶ 5; Ex. 2, Deposition

of Christine Petrous Grubb, PhD ("Grubb Dep.") at 67:22-68:13.) Defendant argues that

"[a]t all times relevant to her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did not possess the

phenotypic characteristics, or internal and external genitalia, of a biological female," that she

was "designated as a male at birth based upon a genital exam" and that prior to her sex

reassignment surgery in March 2003, Plaintiff had "normal adult male genitalia, including

a penis and testicles." (Def.'s MSJ at 9; DSOF ¶¶ 1, 17.) 

As evidence, Defendant cites to the deposition of Plaintiff's physician, Dr. Kenneth

Fisher, who examined Plaintiff in August 2000, and who testified that his examination notes

indicate that "Steven had male genitalia, that his testicles were bilaterally descended and

there was no abnormality. . . . Rebecca had every indication of being a biological genetic

male." (DSOF ¶ 17, Ex. 3, Deposition of Kenneth Mark Fisher, M.D. ("Fisher Dep.") at

21:16-22:4.) Dr. Fisher testified further that Plaintiff "will never make her own female

hormones" because "she doesn't have any ovaries." (Fisher Dep. at 32:19-33:10.)

Defendant's expert, Dr. Cunniff, stated in his declaration that Plaintiff's chromosomal

analysis establishes that her "chromosomal complement is 46,XY, and her chromosomal sex

is male." (DSOF ¶ 8, Cunniff Decl., ¶ 6.) 

Defendant also points to Plaintiff's own deposition testimony in which she stated that

prior to her sex reassignment surgery in 2003 she had a penis and testicles and that her body

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 Even if Plaintiff had filed the exhibits on time and the Court did consider them, they

are inadmissible as hearsay. If Plaintiff were attempting to admit these exhibits as exceptions

to the hearsay prohibition, say, for example, as learned treatises under Federal Rule of

Evidence 803(18), then those publications could only be admitted if they are "established as

a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the [expert] witness or by other expert

testimony or by judicial notice." Plaintiff submitted nothing establishing these exhibits as

reliable authority.

Even if the Court did not strike Plaintiff's exhibits, and even if she did establish they

are reliable authority, she never states how any of the information in the exhibits applies to

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does not naturally produce female hormones. (DSOF ¶¶ 17, 7; Kastl Dep. at 104:6-10,

135:17-19.) Plaintiff also testified that chromosomes are indicative of biological sex,

although she does not have the specialized medical training to determine her own biological

sex. (DSOF ¶¶ 8, 9; Kastl Dep. at 273:18-274:1, 44:17-45:11.) Defendant also points to the

fact that, although Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that in February 2001 she was

"determined to be biologically female by her personal physician" (SAC ¶ 14), Dr. Fisher's

letter to the MVD in March 2001 "did not identify Plaintiff as a biological female, but

indicated only that she had been 'functionally living as a female.' Moreover, Dr. Fisher's

letter referred to Plaintiff in the masculine pronoun and indicated that her 'gender change'

would occur in the future." (DSOF ¶ 12, Ex. 6 ("Fisher Letter"); Kastl Dep. at 185:24-

187:15.)

Plaintiff disputes the opinion of Dr. Cuniff that there are three commonly-accepted

factors for determining one's biological sex and argues that Dr. Cuniff's opinion "is not the

opinion of the medical community at large." (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ.

J. ("Pl.'s Resp.") at 3.) However, Plaintiff has failed to properly present evidence supporting

her theory that there are other determinants of biological sex or which, if any, of those

determinants applies to Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues over several pages what she says is "the

accepted theory of the scientific community regarding factors to be considered in

determining one's sex." (Pl.'s Resp. at 6-10.) The only supporting documentation of that

theory, though, are the exhibits that Plaintiff filed late and the Court will not consider.7

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her, thereby creating a genuine issue of material fact about whether Plaintiff was a biological

female and a member of protected class when she was employed by Defendant. Moreover,

Plaintiff failed to disclose any experts by the close of discovery and she has not offered any

expert testimony that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether Plaintiff was a

biological female during the relevant time, an issue that could not be resolved in this case

without expert testimony.

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Finally, while Plaintiff argues that "Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff is not

biologically female," (Pl.'s Resp. at 8) it is Plaintiff who has the burden of establishing a

prima facie of discrimination, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, and producing evidence to rebut

Defendant's evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Plaintiff is not

challenging Defendant's policy of segregating its restrooms on the basis of sex. (DSOF ¶ 43;

Kastl Dep. at 154:18-23.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she initially presented as a male

when she began working for Defendant. (DSOF ¶ 20; Kastl Dep. at 168:7-170:6; Ex. 7.)

Plaintiff is the one alleging that she was diagnosed a biological female in February 2001; yet

Plaintiff has presented no evidence of this diagnosis. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden

of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination because she has provided no evidence

that she was a biological female and member of a protected class while she was employed

by Defendant. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Title

VII and Title IX claims is granted.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action against a person who: (1) acts

"under color of state law"; and (2) "deprives another of rights guaranteed by the Constitution"

or a federal statute. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no

dispute in this case that Defendant acted under color of state law. The disputes concerns

whether Plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights were violated.

a. Right to Privacy

A person's right to privacy guaranteed by the Constitution is "limited to those [rights]

which are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . ." Paul v. Davis,

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424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (citation omitted). "Individuals have a constitutionally protected

interest in avoiding 'disclosure of personal matters,' including medical information." Tucson

Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.

589, 599 (1977)). However, the right to informational privacy "'is a conditional right which

may be infringed upon a showing of proper governmental interest.'" Eden, 379 F.3d at 551

(quoting Planned Parenthood of So. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff claims that her right to privacy was violated when Defendant required she

"provide information and certification that Defendant arguably had no right to demand." 

(Pl.'s Resp. at 14.) Defendant argues that it had a legitimate interest in obtaining the

information sought because Plaintiff "put her sex at issue by changing her sex designation

and restroom use." (Def.'s Reply at 11; DSOF ¶¶ 20, 23, 27, 29; Kastl Dep. at 168:7-170:6,

172:4-14, 200:24-201:1, 253:12-16, 170:15-171:14; Ex. 9; Ex. 10.) Plaintiff does not dispute

the fact that in October 2001 "MCCCD received complaints from minor students regarding

a man using the women's restroom in the student halls" and that the "students expressed

concerns regarding their privacy and/or safety." (DSOF ¶ 34; Ex. 13, ¶ 4; Kastl Dep. at

157:24-158:9, 226:7-17.) Nor is Plaintiff "challenging MCCCD's right to segregate its

restrooms on the basis of sex." (DSOF ¶ 43; Kastl Dep. at 154:18-23.) Defendant argues

that it has "a compelling interest in protecting the privacy rights of other individuals who use

Defendant's restrooms by maintaining the sex-segregation of the restrooms" and that it "chose

a minimally intrusive means of obtaining accurate information regarding Plaintiff's biological

sex." (Def.'s MSJ at 13-14.) 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has a diminished expectation of privacy because

she "agreed to allow MCCCD to investigate the information she provided on her Employee

Data Form (including her sex)." (Def.'s Reply at 11; DSOF ¶ 20; Ex. 7.) Plaintiff says she

"does not contest Defendant's right to investigate" but argues that there are limits on that

right. (Pl.'s Resp. at 14.) That is all Plaintiff argues, aside from asserting that she has a

"significant interest in maintaining her privacy with regard to her genitals and general

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medical condition." (Pl.'s Resp. at 15.) Plaintiff has presented no evidence creating an issue

of fact related to her privacy rights.

Plaintiff's citation to the Court's earlier Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

is inapposite because, on a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes all of the plaintiff's facts as

true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754.

At that time, the Court accepted as true Plaintiff's assertion that she was a biological female

whom Defendant required to use the men's restroom facilities. (SAC ¶ 32.) Here, at the

summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must present evidence creating a genuine issue of material

fact. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence (or even much argument) establishing a

genuine issue of material fact regarding her privacy rights. Accordingly, Defendant's motion

is granted as to Plaintiff's privacy claim.

b. Equal Protection

A plaintiff alleging an Equal Protection violation arising under §1983 “must prove

that the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was

intentional.” Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citations omitted). "A plaintiff who fails to establish intentional discrimination for purposes

of Title VII . . . also fails to establish intentional discrimination for purposes of § 1983."

Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Cmty. Coll. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citations omitted). Because Plaintiff's Title VII claim of sex discrimination failed, Plaintiff's

equal protection claim fails as a matter of law.

c. Freedom of Speech

To establish a prima facie case that Plaintiff's free speech rights were violated,

Plaintiff must show: "(1) that he or she engaged in protected speech; (2) that the employer

took adverse employment action; and (3) that his or her speech was a substantial or

motivating factor for the adverse employment action.” Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted), judgment rev'd on

other grounds, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). 

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Plaintiff has again failed to present any evidence or even argument addressing the

showing she must make. At most, Plaintiff argues that because "the evidence proffered by

both parties indicates that there is, as a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact as to what

factor or factors determine human sexuality, Defendant cannot prevail on the core issue of

Plaintiff's biological sex." (Pl.'s Resp. at 15-16.) Even if it were true that the evidence

created an issue of fact about what determines human sexuality, that is not an element of the

showing Plaintiff needs to make. The Court declines to create an issue of fact when Plaintiff

has utterly failed to even argue the elements of a prima facie case. And, once again, Plaintiff

mistakenly relies on the Court's Order denying Defendant's motion to dismiss in order to

create an issue of fact at the summary judgment stage. 

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 114).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's

Untimely Objection to Defendant's Proffer of Undisputed Facts and Exhibits and Documents

in Support of Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 122).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Filing Deadline

(Doc. 126).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter Judgment in favor of

Defendant dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.

DATED this 22nd day of August, 2006.

Case 2:02-cv-01531-SRB Document 131 Filed 08/23/06 Page 14 of 14