Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01330/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01330-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANKLIN ANDRADE, JR.,

Booking #13768758, Civil No. 14cv1330 GPC (BGS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(ECF Doc. No. 2) AND 

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;

SAN DIEGO SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

MEDICAL SERVICE; WILLIAM GORE

Defendants.

Franklin Andrade, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at George Bailey Detention

Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2)

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee 1

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee. Accordingly, the Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and assesses no initial partial filing

fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further orders the Watch Commander at

George Bailey Detention Facility to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in

this case, collect and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013,

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must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), (b); Judicial Conference

Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1, 2013). However, the additional $50

administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v.

Washington Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ketchum v.

Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)).

First, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the “San Diego County Sheriff’s Department,”

and the “San Diego Sheriff’s Department Medical Service” have violated his constitutional

rights, his Complaint fails to state a claim because these entities are not “persons” subject to suit

under § 1983. Neither a local law enforcement department (like the San Diego County Sheriff’s

Office), a jail (like the San Diego County Jail), or a state agency (like the California Department

of Corrections), are proper defendants under § 1983. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928

F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an

appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.”) (citation omitted);

Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Section 1983 imposes

liability on any‘person’ who violates someone’s constitutional rights ‘under color of law.’ Cook

County Jail is not a ‘person.’); 

While the County of San Diego itself may be considered a “person” and therefore, a

proper defendant under § 1983, see Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978); Hammond v. County of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1988), Plaintiff has not

named the County as a Defendant. Moreover, as a municipality, the County may be held liable

under § 1983–but only where the Plaintiff alleges facts to show that a constitutional deprivation

was caused by the implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation,

or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the County, or a “final decision maker” for

the County. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; Board of the County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). In other words,

“respondeat superior and vicarious liability are not cognizable theories of recovery against a

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municipality.” Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 279 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 2002). 

“Instead, a Monell claim exists only where the alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted

in ‘execution of a government’s policy or custom.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b) because he has failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly suggest” that either

the County itself, or any individual County employee (a “person”), like Sheriff Gore, violated

his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012)

(applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)’s pleading standards to Monell claims);

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for relief only

against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts,

participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to performlegally required duties, cause the

deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights).

Plaintiff does make general allegations of refusal by unnamed medical staff to provide

him with medication he was receiving before he was incarcerated. Where an inmate’s claim is

one of inadequate medical care, the inmate must allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful

to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976). Such a claim has two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and

the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

(9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997). A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could

result in further significant injuryor the ‘unnecessaryandwanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need

include “the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities.” Id. at 1059-60. By establishing the existence of a serious medical need, an inmate

satisfies the objective requirement for proving an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

In general, deliberate indifference may be shown when prison officials deny, delay, or

intentionally interfere with a prescribed course of medical treatment, or it may be shown by the

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way in which prison medical officials provide necessary care. Hutchinson v. United States, 838

F.2d 390, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1988). Before it can be said that a inmate’s civil rights have been

abridged with regard to medical care, however, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). See also Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

While Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to support an Eighth Amendment

claim against individually named medical staff, he currently only pleads facts that demonstrate

a difference of opinion. A mere difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical

personnel regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment are not enough to establish a

deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff also alleges that he has been denied access to the courts. Prisoners do “have a

constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which includes a

reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir.

1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817,

the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires

prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by

providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons who are

trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish a violation of the

right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to show that: (1)

a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement has been

frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice with respect to

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present

a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994); Sands v.

Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to alleged any actions with any particularity that have precluded

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or

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sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to

access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly

or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”). In addition, Plaintiff

must also describe the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of action, whether

anticipated or lost.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a

complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ... 

the predicate claim[must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show

that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which section 1983 relief can be granted.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a viable section 1983

claim against any of the currently named Defendants, it is therefore subject to sua sponte

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Because Plaintiff is proceeding

pro se, however, the Court having now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his

complaint,” will also provide him an opportunity to “effectively” amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa,

698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.

1992)).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2) is

GRANTED. 

2. The Watch Commander of George BaileyDetention Facility, or his designee, shall

collect from Plaintiff’s inmate trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case

by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%)

of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the

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amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on the WATCH

COMMANDER, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, Suite 5300, San Diego,

California 92158.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSEDwithout prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 

However, Plaintiff is further GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is 

filed in which to submit a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading 

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to

his original pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and any claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

DATED: June 9, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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