Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02075/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02075-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\L\07cv2075-dny-IFP-1915(g).wpd -1- 07cv2075

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERIHU HADERA FKADU,

Booking #1551332,

Civil No. 07-2075 L (NLS)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL FILING

FEES MANDATED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

[Doc. No. 3] 

vs.

SAN DIEGO CITY POLICE DEP’T;

WILLIAM LANSDOWNE, San Diego

City Police Chief; CITY OF SAN DIEGO; 

JERRY SANDERS, San Diego City

Mayor,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, currently committed at Patton State Hospital (“PSH”) in Patton, California, and

proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although

difficult to decipher, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that various San Diego Police Department and

City Officials filed false and exaggerated reports in 1994 resulting in his wrongful criminal

conviction and sentence. (Compl. at 2-4.) Plaintiff seeks several million dollars in damages.

(Id. at 7.) 

On November 1, 2007, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s

failure to either prepay the $350 civil filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) or file a

Case 3:07-cv-02075-L-NLS Document 4 Filed 12/04/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access

to the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or

operate as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1179-82; see also Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1123

(noting constitutionality of § 1915(g)).

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\L\07cv2075-dny-IFP-1915(g).wpd -2- 07cv2075

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc No. 2]. In

response, Plaintiff has now filed a Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3].

I. 

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

“In general, filing an action IFP is a privilege, not a right.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d

1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999). This privilege is codified in section 1915 of Title 28 of the United

States Code, which allows certain impoverished litigants to pursue civil litigation without the

full prepayment of fees or costs. Id. at 1177; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 

However, regardless of indigence, subsection (g) bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP:

... if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

The objective of § 1915(g), which has become known as the “three strikes” provision,

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005), is to further “the congressional goal

of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310,

1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot

proceed IFP.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. “‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought

while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed ‘on the ground that [they were]

frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.” Id. Thus, once a prisoner has accumulated

three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other civil action or IFP

appeal in a federal court unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).1

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-02075-L-NLS Document 4 Filed 12/04/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\L\07cv2075-dny-IFP-1915(g).wpd -3- 07cv2075

While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and

other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a

strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews

further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or

importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

II.

APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Court notes as an initial matter that Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that he is

in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Rodriguez, 169 F.3d

at 1178; Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (§ 1915(g)’s imminent

danger “exception applies [only] if the complaint makes a plausible allegation that the prisoner

faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”); see also Ashley v.

Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that “allegations that the prisoner faced

imminent danger in the past” are insufficient to trigger section 1915(g)’s imminent and serious

Case 3:07-cv-02075-L-NLS Document 4 Filed 12/04/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 In fact, Plaintiff was first notified of his inability to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g) in another civil action filed in the Southern District of California. See Fkadu v. Luna, et al.,

S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 06-0058 JAH (NLS) (Feb. 2, 2006 Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP as

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 3]. On December 18, 2006, Judge Moskowitz dismissed

another case, Fkadu v. Mornho, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 06-02391 BTM (NLS) [Doc. No. 2], and

noted Plaintiff’s 3-strikes status. (Dec. 18, 2006 Order at 2 n.1.) Undeterred, Plaintiff filed yet another

Motion to Proceed IFP in Fkadu v. San Diego County, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 07-0282 BTM

(POR), which Judge Moskowitz also denied. (See March 7, 2007 Order denying Motion to Proceed IFP

as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Dismissing Case for failure to pay Civil Filing Fees Mandated

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) [Doc. No. 4]). 

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\L\07cv2075-dny-IFP-1915(g).wpd -4- 07cv2075

physical injury exception). Thus, regardless of Plaintiff’s financial status, he may not proceed

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 if he has, on three prior occasions while incarcerated, had

federal civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failing to state a claim.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119-20; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1178. 

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v.

Moynihan, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 4198211 *10 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2007) (No. 05-16752), slip op.

at 15354 (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations

in original); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 971 F.2d 244,

248 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has had more than three prior prisoner

civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See Dekadu v. State of California, S.D. Cal. Civil Case

No. 04-2065 WQH (POR) (Jan. 4, 2005 Order Denying IFP and Dismissing Complaint sua

sponte as frivolous per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) [Doc. No. 3]) (strike one); Fekadu v. Cal. Dept.

of Corrections, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 04-2173 JM (NLS) (Jan. 3, 2005 Order Denying IFP

and Dismissing Complaint sua sponte as frivolous per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) [Doc. No. 6])

(strike two); and Fkadu v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, C.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 05-06734-UA-SH

(Sept. 28, 2005 Order Denying IFP and Dismissing Complaint [per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)]

based on 11th Amendment immunity) [Doc. No. 2]) (strike three); and Fkadu v. Luna, C.D. Cal.

Civil Case No. 06-0323-UA-SH (Feb. 13, 2006 Order Denying IFP and Dismissing Complaint

as “legally and/or patently frivolous.” [Doc No. 2]) (strike four).2

 

Case 3:07-cv-02075-L-NLS Document 4 Filed 12/04/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\L\07cv2075-dny-IFP-1915(g).wpd -5- 07cv2075

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and does not presently allege facts sufficient to show that he is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury, the Court DENIES his Motion to Proceed IFP

[Doc. No. 3]. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121; Rodriguez, 167 F.3d at 1178.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 3] and DISMISSES the case without prejudice

for failure to pay the full $350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

The Clerk shall close the file.

DATED: December 4, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 3:07-cv-02075-L-NLS Document 4 Filed 12/04/07 Page 5 of 5