Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-02373/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-02373-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arizona Yage Assembly, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

William Barr, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-20-02373-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Stay Pending Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ 

of Certiorari (Doc. 246) and Proposed Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene (Doc. 232). For 

the reasons set forth below, both motions, along with Proposed Intervenors’ unauthorized

Amended Motion (Doc. 251), are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Arizona Yage Assembly (“AYA”) and Winfield Scott Stanley III filed this 

action seeking, among other things, a declaration stating that (1) AYA’s use, possession, 

or transportation of Ayahuasca in connection with their practice of “Visionary Religion” is 

lawful and (2) the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s (“DEA”) and the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) 

against AYA violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 

(Doc. 159 at 12-13).

Discovery disputes have plagued this case throughout its 4.5-year pendency. (See

Doc. 219, “Joint Statement”; Doc. 220, “Discovery Order”). On February 12, 2024, the 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 1 of 12
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

parties submitted a joint statement on disputes regarding Plaintiffs’ responses to 

Defendants’ first sets of interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (Joint 

Statement). The information requested by Defendants over the span of 35 requests pertains

to (1) AYA leadership, structure, and facilitators; (2) AYA’s safety protocols; (3) AYA’s 

ayahuasca ceremonies and handling; and (4) information regarding the sincerity of AYA’s 

beliefs and practices. (Joint Statement at 4). Plaintiffs objected to the discovery requests 

on four bases: (1) confidentiality promises made to third parties; (2) medical records; (3) 

the First Amendment Religion Clauses; and (4) the priest-penitent privilege. (Joint 

Statement at 79–85). On February 22, 2024, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ objections and 

ordered them to provide full and complete responses to Defendants’ discovery requests by 

March 8, 2024. (Discovery Order at 20). Plaintiffs appealed the Court’s Discovery Order. 

(Doc. 221).

Relevant to the pending motions and the various appellate proceedings ensuing after 

the Discovery Order was issued is Plaintiffs’ First Amendment privilege objection. In the 

Joint Statement, Plaintiffs asserted “Defendants’ inquiries and demands are also 

constrained by the First Amendment.” (Joint Statement at 6, 40, 62, 77, 80) (citing Surinach 

v. Pesquera De Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 1979)). At issue in Surinach was an 

investigatory subpoena seeking information on a church’s financial practices where there 

was a possibility the church’s financial decision-making would be “supplanted by 

governmental control.” Surinach, 604 F.2d at 78. In the section of the Joint Statement 

specifically addressing the application of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, Plaintiffs 

cited only to Surinach asserting “government agencies” using “compulsory process to 

discover the finances of churches violates the Establishment Clause.” (Doc. 219 at 83–84). 

At no point in the Joint Statement or in their responses to Defendants’ discovery requests 

did Plaintiffs raise the issue of associational privilege as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(5)(A). As such, the Court did not consider the issue of associational privilege in this 

decision.

Nevertheless, on March 11, 2024, Plaintiffs sought appellate review of the 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 2 of 12
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Discovery Order as it relates to 14 of Defendants’ 35 discovery requests in a petition for 

writ of mandamus. (Doc. 230). The petition was based solely on an associational privilege

argument, that is, the Court failed to apply caselaw and standards the parties never raised, 

in the form of the “exacting scrutiny” and “heightened relevance” standards set forth in 

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010). (Doc. 230 at 5). Further, 

in response to the Discovery Order, Taylor Cox (a member of AYA) on behalf of himself 

and a class of 5,239 other AYA members, donors, and email correspondents (“Proposed 

Intervenors”), filed on March 12, 2024 a Motion to Intervene as plaintiffs in this case. 

(Doc. 232). The Court stayed this case until the disposition of Plaintiffs’ appeal without 

ruling on the Motion to Intervene. (Doc. 232).

On September 13, 2024, the Ninth Circuit issued a dispositive order denying 

Plaintiffs’ mandamus action closing their petition on September 13, 2024. (Doc. 243). The 

Court subsequently lifted the stay. (Doc. 247). On September 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a

Motion for Stay pending their intended petition for writ of certiorari (Doc. 246), which was 

filed in the Supreme Court on November 8, 2024 (Doc. 256). The Court ordered 

Defendants to respond to the Motion to Stay and the Motion to Intervene, (Doc. 249), which 

they did (Docs. 248, 249).1 

The Court will first analyze Plaintiffs’ Motion for Stay and then turn to Proposed 

Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene. Finally, the Court will provide next steps to progress 

this case forward.

II. MOTION FOR STAY

Plaintiffs move for a stay of all proceedings before this Court “pending the 

resolution of Plaintiffs intended petition to the United States Supreme Court for writ of 

1

Instead of a substantive reply to the Motion to Intervene, however, Plaintiffs argue 

Defendants’ response, along with the original Motion, have been rendered moot by 

Proposed Intervenors’ filing of an Amended Motion to Intervene consisting of an amended 

complaint. (Doc. 252). Both the reply (Doc. 252) and the Amended Motion (Doc. 251) 

were filed on the same day. The Court did not authorize the filing of an amended motion. 

Nor would it, because Proposed Intervenors are not entitled to “amendment as of right” 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, as they claim, because they have not been granted intervenor 

status. Plaintiffs are incapable or unwilling to follow the procedural rules of this Court. 

Consequently, in its decision, the Court will not consider Proposed Intervenors 

unauthorized Amended Motion to Intervene.

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 3 of 12
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

certiorari in In Re: Arizona Yage Assembly, Case No. 24-01405 to review this Court’s order 

entered February 22, 2024.” (Doc. 246 at 5). Alternatively, Plaintiffs request the Court to 

conduct Defendants’ requested status conference “following the Supreme Court’s 

disposition of the pending motion for certiorari.” (Id.). For the reasons set forth below, 

Plaintiffs motion for stay is denied, and the litigation will proceed. Plaintiffs continued 

unwarranted attempts to delay discovery and the progression of this case will not be 

tolerated.

A. Legal Standard

A request for a stay pending appeal is committed to the exercise of judicial 

discretion. Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926). The party 

requesting a stay pending appeal “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances 

justify an exercise of that discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009). “A 

stay is not a matter of right” but is instead “an intrusion into the ordinary processes of 

administration and judicial review” and is “not to be issued ‘reflexively,’ but rather based 

on the circumstances of the particular case.” Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 687-88 

(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 427, 433) (alterations omitted).

As the party seeking to stay this litigation, Plaintiffs must show: (1) a strong 

showing of likelihood of success on the merits of a petition for certiorari appealing the 

Ninth Circuit’s denial of a writ of mandamus, (2) that Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured 

absent a stay, (3) that the balance of hardships favors staying this case, and (4) that staying 

this case is in the public interest. Nken, 556 U.S. at 426. Of these, “[t]he first two factors 

are the most critical.” Id. at 434. And where the government is a party to the case, the 

third and fourth factors merge. Id.

B. Analysis

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiffs seek certiorari review of the Ninth Circuit’s denial of the petition for a 

writ of mandamus. Plaintiffs in this Motion present exactly the same arguments the Ninth 

Circuit considered when denying Plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandamus. But the Ninth 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 4 of 12
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Circuit held “Petitioners have not demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the 

extraordinary remedy of mandamus,” based on the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. Dist. 

Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). (In Re: Arizona Yage Assembly, No. 24-1405, 

Doc. 15). Despite this decision, Plaintiffs sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, 

and the Ninth Circuit denied that request without calling for a response. (In Re: Arizona 

Yage Assembly, No. 24-1405, Doc. 21). The Ninth Circuit has thus freely considered—

and twice firmly rejected—the same arguments Plaintiffs now rely on to request a stay 

pending the disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Petitions for certiorari are “granted only for compelling reasons” and only as a 

matter of judicial discretion. Sup. Ct. R. 10. An interlocutory posture “alone furnishe[s] 

sufficient ground for the denial” of the petition. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. 

& Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916). Typically, to merit a stay of a mandate of a court of 

appeals, Plaintiffs would need to demonstrate “(1) a reasonable probability that four 

Justices would vote to grant certiorari; (2) a significant possibility that the Court would 

reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood of irreparable harm, assuming the 

correctness of the applicant’s position, if the judgment is not stayed.” Packwood v. Senate 

Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1319 (1994) (Rehnquist, J.); see also id. at 1320-

22 (refusing to stay case to consider claim that an “overly broad” subpoena violated the 

Fourth and Fifth Amendment).

Plaintiffs are far from demonstrating a “strong likelihood” that the Supreme Court 

would grant review and reverse the Ninth Circuit’s denial of mandamus relief. Mandamus 

is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes,” and a writ 

cannot issue unless this Court’s order is “clearly erroneous as a matter of law.” United 

States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court 

for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)). Plaintiffs cannot claim clear error in the Court’s 

failure to sustain objections that Plaintiffs never made. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber 

Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a 

failure to object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 5 of 12
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

objection.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying 

mandamus petition where district court had held that untimely privilege objections were 

waived); Kona Enters. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration where plaintiffs had “failed” to make 

argument previously despite having “numerous opportunities” to do so). Thus, Plaintiffs 

have not demonstrated a strong likelihood that the Court erred—much less clearly erred—

in not ruling on an objection Plaintiffs never made. 

2. Irreparable Injury Absent Stay

Plaintiffs contend “[f]orcing a litigant to disclose privileged materials necessarily 

inflicts irreparable harm because once the materials have been disclosed, it is impossible 

to ‘undisclose’ them.” (Mot. at 14). Plaintiffs also assert that “a stay applicant ‘need only 

demonstrate the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim,’” to show irreparable 

harm. Doc. 246 at 16 (quoting Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 321 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th 

Cir. 2003)). However, the Ninth Circuit’s summary denial of Plaintiffs’ writ of mandamus 

suggests that procedural issues preclude consideration of Plaintiffs’ substantive First 

Amendment claim on appeal or here at this stage. The merits of Plaintiffs’ First 

Amendment privilege claim can only be addressed after proper objection to Defendants’ 

discovery requests and after a discovery dispute based on those specific objections arises. 

Further, Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking relief from discovery requests served in September 

2023, “implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. 

Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985).

3. Balance of Equities

Where, as here, the government is a party, the balance of the equities and the public 

interest merge. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Because the issues raised by Plaintiffs are 

resolvable at the trial level, the balance of equities favor denying the Motion for Stay which 

would again delay this case.

/ / /

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 6 of 12
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. MOTION TO INTERVENE

After filing the writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiffs’ Counsel filed a 

motion to intervene (Doc. 232) on behalf of Proposed Intervenors—Taylor Cox and a class 

of 5,239 AYA members, donors, and email correspondents whose First Amendment 

association rights Plaintiffs seek to assert. Proposed Intervenors seek intervention as a 

matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P 24(a)(2), or alternatively, by permission under Fed. R. 

Civ. P 24(b)(1). (Doc. 232 at 6). Because (1) Proposed Intervenors have not shown they 

are inadequately represented by Plaintiffs and (2) the Court deems permissive intervention 

to be inappropriate, Proposed Intervenors’ motion is denied.

A. Intervention of Right

1. Legal Standard

An applicant for intervention of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 24(a)(2) must satisfy 

a four-part test: (1) the motion for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a 

“significantly protectable” interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 

subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action 

may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the 

applicants interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. United 

States v. Aerojet General Corp., 606 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010). “[I]t is incumbent 

on the party seeking to intervene to show that all the requirements for intervention have 

been met.” Cooper v. Newsom, 13 F.4th 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). 

“Failure to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the application, and [courts] need 

not reach the remaining elements if one of the elements is not satisfied.” Perry v. 

Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009).

2. Analysis

Proposed Intervenors fail to satisfy the requirements of intervention of right. Most 

notably, Proposed Intervenors do not demonstrate their interests are inadequately

represented by the Plaintiffs in this case. 

In determining whether the existing parties adequately represent an applicant’s 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 7 of 12
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

interest, courts consider: “(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will 

undoubtedly make all the intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable 

and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the would-be intervenor would offer 

any necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would neglect.” United States

v. City of Los Angeles, Cal., 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2002). “The prospective intervenor 

bears the burden of demonstrating that existing parties do not adequately represent its 

interests.” Id. Courts need not conclusively determine that representation is inadequate—

rather, this requirement is satisfied “if the applicant shows that representation of his interest 

‘may be’ inadequate.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 

(1972). However, “[w]here the party and the proposed intervenor share the same ‘ultimate 

objective,’ a presumption of adequacy of representation applies,” which can be rebutted 

only by “a compelling showing to the contrary.” Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. 

Geithner, 644 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Perry, 587 F.3d at 951). 

Proposed Intervenors have failed to make even a minimal showing that their 

interests are not adequately represented by Plaintiffs. See Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10. 

Proposed Intervenors’ sole argument that they are not adequately represented is that, in a 

previous Order, the Court determined “Plaintiff AYA may not assert the Fifth Amendment 

on behalf of its members in responding to Defendants’ discovery requests.” (Doc. 210 at 

2). However, this does not mean that individual members of AYA could assert a Fifth 

Amendment privilege to shield Plaintiffs from Defendants’ discovery requests. Indeed, the 

Order stated, “Defendants’ discovery requests do not seek incriminating admissions or 

documents from any individual members of Plaintiffs’ organization, but instead seek 

organizational records and communications held by the organization itself .... It is well 

established that ‘the official records and documents’ of an organization ‘cannot be the 

subject of the personal privilege against self-incrimination.’” (Doc. 210 at 1-2) (quoting 

United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944)). The Fifth Amendment “does not 

independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating 

evidence.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). Instead, the privilege 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 8 of 12
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial 

communications.” United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611 (1984).

Further, both Plaintiffs and Proposed Intervenors share the same objective: to 

prevent Defendants from receiving relevant information in discovery.2 Proposed 

Intervenors have failed to show any other objective in their motion and lodged complaint. 

Intervention is not appropriate when Plaintiffs have “demonstrated they are capable and 

willing to make all of [the members’] arguments.” Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 

1087 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs have numerously demonstrated their capability and 

willingness to make arguments on behalf of their members by claiming “associational 

standing to represent the members of its congregation.” (Doc. 177 at 17). This is bolstered 

by the fact that the same counsel represents both Plaintiffs and Proposed Intervenors. See 

In re Weingarten, 492 F. App’x 754, 756 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he [intervenors] are 

represented by the same counsel as [an existing party], indicating that [existing party] is 

‘capable and willing to make’ the same arguments that the [intervenors] would make if 

they were permitted to intervene.” (quoting City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 398)).

Proposed Intervenors have failed to satisfy an important element in the intervention 

of right test. Because “[f]ailure to satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the 

application,” Perry, 587 F.3d at 950, the Court will not consider the remaining elements.

B. Permissive Intervention

1. Legal Standard

An applicant for permissive intervention pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) must 

show: (1) it shares a common question of law or fact with the main action; (2) the motion 

for intervention is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for jurisdiction over 

the applicant’s claims. Cooper, 13 F.4th at 868. “Even if an applicant satisfies those 

2

In their Motion to Intervene, Proposed Intervenors state, “[t]he Complaint in Intervention 

is submitted because [Defendants] have propounded eight (8) interrogatories and seven (7) 

requests for production of documents, and obtained an order (the “Discovery Order,” Dkt. 

# 220) compelling [Plaintiffs] to answer the interrogatories in full and produce unredacted 

documents that will reveal Intervenor Plaintiffs’ names, tens of thousands of personal 

emails with AYA about religious matters, records of donations and ceremonial 

contributions, records of medical conditions, travel activity, and many other personal 

matters.” (Doc. 232-1 at 5).

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 9 of 12
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

threshold requirements, the district court has discretion to deny permissive intervention.” 

Id. “In exercising its discretion, the district court must consider whether intervention will 

unduly delay the main action or will unfairly prejudice the existing parties.” Id.

2. Analysis

The Court finds the intervention of a purported class of 5,239 AYA members is 

unnecessary for the reasons discussed above and would serve only to further delay the 

litigation, thereby prejudicing Defendants. The Court will not repeat or belabor the 

significant, preexisting delays associated with discovery disputes in this case, much less 

the inevitable delays that would arise out of intervention. See Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 

572 F.2d 250, 255 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it “decided that 13 additional plaintiffs would unnecessarily delay and complicate 

the case”). Not only would intervention be wasteful and burdensome, but it would also run 

counter to the objectives of AYA at-large by subjecting individual members to the 

disclosure of information that Plaintiffs and Proposed Intervenors so vehemently oppose. 

IV. NEXT STEPS

Defendants requested a status conference regarding pending discovery disputes after

the Ninth Circuit’s denial of the writ of mandamus. (Doc. 245). The Court views a status 

conference to be wasteful and unproductive at this time. The parties are required by the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules, and numerous orders of this Court to

collaborate in good faith to resolve valid disputes. As Defendants gleaned from the Court’s 

answer to the petition for writ of mandamus (Doc. 248 at 9), the Court would have long 

ago adjudicated the issue of associational privilege if it had been properly presented to the 

Court (Doc. 242 at 2). But Plaintiffs chose not to timely raise associational privilege. It is 

obvious that Plaintiffs decided to obfuscate the litigation by embarking on a lengthy 

appellate journey rather than raising the issues with the Court. Thus far, those efforts have

not proven fruitful. 

The Court is wary to allow Plaintiffs to assert associational privilege objections nine 

months after the discovery responses deadline. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling 

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 10 of 12
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is well established that a failure to 

object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any 

objection.”). However, due to the important constitutional rights at stake, the Court will 

undertake the privilege issue. To that end, Plaintiffs shall provide Defendants with a 

categorical privilege log (asserting associational privilege only) no later than January 3, 

2025. The log, though categorical for efficiency purposes, “must still describe the 

documents with sufficient detail so that the other party and court can assess the claim of 

privilege.” Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-2211-DMG DTBX, 2013 WL 

8116823, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) (“Privilege logs should contain the following 

information: (1) The general nature of the document, (2) the identity and position of its 

author, (3) the date it was written, (4) identity and position of recipients, (5) location of the 

document, and (6) reason document was withheld.”). Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 

10-2211-DMG DTBX, 2013 WL 8116823, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2013); see 8 FED. PRAC.

& PROC. CIV. § 2016.1 (3d ed.) (citing cases where broad categorical descriptions were 

uninformative or misleading). Failure to oblige shall constitute a waiver of the privilege 

or any objection to discovery, and Plaintiffs will be ordered to fully comply with the 

Discovery Order at risk of serious sanctions. Further, the parties shall meet and confer and 

prepare a Proposed Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order to be filed with the Court no later 

than January 3, 2025.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 11 of 12
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED Plaintiffs’ Motion for Stay (Doc. 246) is DENIED.

IS IT FURTHER ORDERED Proposed Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene 

(Doc. 232) is DENIED. The Amended Motion to Intervene (Doc. 251) is also DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the parties shall meet and confer and prepare a 

Proposed Amended Rule 16 Scheduling Order to be filed with the Court no later than 

January 3, 2025.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Plaintiffs shall provide Defendants with a 

categorical privilege log (asserting associational privilege only) no later than January 3, 

2025.

Dated this 4th day of December, 2024.

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:20-cv-02373-ROS Document 258 Filed 12/04/24 Page 12 of 12