Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07243/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 2, 2000 Decided November 21, 2000

No. 99-7223

Atlas Air, Inc.,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

v.

Air Line Pilots Association,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Consolidated with

99-7243

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01100)

Marcus C. Migliore argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee. With him on the briefs were Jerry D. Anker and

Jonathan A. Cohen. Marta Wagner entered an appearance.

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Ronald B. Natalie argued the cause for appellee/crossappellant. With him on the briefs was Douglas W. Hall.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: The cockpit crewmembers employed by Appellee Atlas Air, Inc. elected to unionize, whereupon Atlas Air immediately terminated their participation in

its profit-sharing plan. Atlas sought a declaratory judgment

that its action was a legal modification of status quo employment conditions under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45

U.S.C. s 151 et seq., and that Atlas was free to make further

status quo changes pending the onset of collective bargaining.

The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) filed a

cross-claim charging that Atlas Air's maintenance and execution of a discriminatory anti-union policy violates RLA Section 2, Third and Fourth. The district court granted summary judgment for Atlas Air on the grounds that the RLA

does not require carriers to maintain status quo wages, work

rules, or conditions of employment. See Atlas Air, Inc. v.

ALPA, 69 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.D.C. 1999). The court

further held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Atlas's second

claim because it was insufficiently concrete. See id. at 164.

ALPA and Atlas each appeal. Because the RLA prohibits

carriers from interfering with, coercing, or influencing employee decisions whether to unionize, we reverse and remand

to the district court for further proceedings.

I. Background

A.

Atlas Air, Inc. (Atlas) is a cargo airline. Of Atlas's approximately 1,100 employees, about half are cockpit crewmembers

(pilots and flight engineers). In June 1994, Atlas announced

a new compensation package which included profit-sharing.

Under this plan, "eligible employees" would receive semiannual payments based upon the company's profits. To

ensure that employees would receive additional income under

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the plan, Atlas set a minimum guaranteed payment of seven

percent of annual pay. Under the plan, the definition of

"eligible employee" excludes "those who are subject to a

collective bargaining agreement or who have been certified by

the National Mediation Board or any such other regulatory

agency for representation." This provision was publicized to

Atlas employees along with information about the rest of the

plan's terms.

ALPA began efforts to organize cockpit crewmembers at

Atlas Air perhaps as early as 1994. See Atlas, 69 F. Supp. 2d

at 159. These efforts intensified in 1996. On September 30,

1996, Atlas sent a letter to all of its employees providing a

"straightforward explanation of the profit-sharing plan." A

document enclosed with the letter outlined the eligibility rules

and provided sample calculations of likely benefits from the

plan. The document also provided an explanation for the

eligibility rules, noting that the exclusion of unionized employees is "very common in unionized organizations where the

compensation plans for unrepresented employees are kept

separate from those of unionized employees."

On April 21, 1997, Atlas announced that it was revising the

profit-sharing plan. In particular, for the next three years

Atlas would guarantee eligible employees a minimum profitsharing payment of 10 percent of annual pay, irrespective of

profits (20 percent for captains). Atlas's announcement of

the new plan, mailed to all crewmembers, noted that profit

sharing would end "upon certification of a union" and that all

employment rules and compensation provisions, including "existing and future wages and benefits" would "become subject

to the collective bargaining process," if a union were certified.

ALPA filed its first application for a representation election

for Atlas crewmembers in November 1997. Shortly thereafter, Atlas distributed a draft Flight Crew Policy Manual that

outlined the profit-sharing eligibility rules. According to the

manual, "profit sharing, including the guaranteed portion,

ceases upon certification of a union." Draft Flight Crew

Policy Manual at 21. The draft manual also included a chart

illustrating the guaranteed minimum payments that employUSCA Case #99-7243 Document #557762 Filed: 11/21/2000 Page 3 of 15
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ees could expect so long as they remained eligible for the

profit-sharing plan. At the time, ALPA did not question the

legality of the eligibility provision of Atlas's profit-sharing

plan. ALPA lost the 1997 representation election. It did

not, however, file any objections to the election related to the

profit-sharing plan eligibility requirements or otherwise.

ALPA and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters

each filed for a second election in February 1999. On February 17, Atlas sent a letter to all crewmembers explaining the

potential consequences of unionization. While noting that

employees have the right to choose union representation, it

also stated that Atlas unilaterally could change the conditions

of employment if a union were to be certified. In bold face

type, the letter declared:

One area that will change if a union is certified is profit

sharing. Our Profit Sharing Plan says clearly that employees who have been certified by the National Mediation Board for representation are not eligible for profitsharing.... Of course, a union could choose to bargain

for profit sharing in subsequent negotiations, but it could

be years before any resolution is reached.

If a union is certified, you instantly lose your profit

sharing. If anyone promises you that you can keep your

profit-sharing should a union be certified--they're either

seriously mistaken, or they're intentionally misleading

you.

(Emphasis in original.) The letter further noted that "[t]he

loss of profit sharing could have a significant financial impact

on you and your family" and included a chart detailing the

likely impact of the plan's termination on the salaries earned

by employees of varying levels of seniority.

In March, Atlas executives sent additional letters to crewmembers reiterating the consequences of union certification.

According to one of the letters, Atlas wanted to ensure that

crewmembers made "an informed decision about representation, based on the financial impact that choosing representaUSCA Case #99-7243 Document #557762 Filed: 11/21/2000 Page 4 of 15
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tion would have on you and your family." "So there is no

misunderstanding," one of the letters explained, "a portion of

your current paycheck will stop being paid if the NMB

[National Mediation Board] certifies a union." The letter

noted that all cockpit crewmembers stood to lose at least 10

percent of their annual pay should they lose eligibility. Given

Atlas Air's substantial profits in recent years, the document

noted the cost of unionization could be much higher.

Despite Atlas's letters, ALPA won the representation election held on April 26. Two days later, the NMB certified

ALPA as the collective bargaining representative. Upon the

announcement of the election results, but before the NMB

certification, Atlas terminated the profit-sharing plan for

cockpit crewmembers. The plan's termination reduced cockpit crewmembers' annual compensation by over 25 percent.

The profit-sharing plan remained in place for Atlas employees

without union representation. At the time this suit was

instituted, Atlas and ALPA had yet to enter into any contract

negotiations.

B.

On May 5, 1999, Atlas Air filed suit seeking a declaratory

judgment that its enforcement of the profit-sharing plan's

eligibility requirements was lawful under the Railway Labor

Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. s 151 et seq., and that under the RLA

Atlas "retains the right to make unilateral changes in the

rates of pay, rules and working conditions of its flight deck

crewmembers while it negotiates the terms of an initial

collective bargaining agreement with ALPA." Complaint at

1. ALPA filed a counterclaim asserting that the exclusionary

provisions of the profit-sharing plan constituted unlawful

interference with the right to organize under Section 2, Third

and Fourth of the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. s 152, Third and

Fourth. ALPA also contended that Atlas's request for a

declaratory judgment that Atlas could make additional unilateral changes in working commitments was not ripe for adjudication or, in the alternative, that ALPA has the right under

the RLA to respond to any such changes with a strike or

other self-help actions. ALPA also moved for a preliminary

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injunction alleging that Atlas's "discriminatory conduct" was

per se unlawful under federal labor law. Atlas responded

with a motion to dismiss and ALPA filed a motion for

summary judgment on the counterclaim.

On October 25, 1999, the district court entered summary

judgment on behalf of Atlas, holding that the company did not

violate the RLA by enforcing the eligibility provisions of the

profit-sharing plan after ALPA was certified and before the

start of negotiations. Although Atlas had not itself moved for

summary judgment, the trial court entered summary judgment sua sponte because both parties' submissions made

clear that there were no genuine issues of material fact in the

case. Atlas, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 158. The court held that the

RLA "imposes no duty to maintain the status quo in a case

such as this where a union has been certified, but collective

bargaining negotiations have not commenced and there is no

prior agreement between the parties." See id. at 164.

The court dismissed Atlas's second claim for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with ALPA that a

declaratory judgment on the lawfulness of future, unspecified

status quo changes under the RLA did not present a justiciable case or controversy. Finally, the court dismissed ALPA's

counterclaim, motion for summary judgment, and motion for

a preliminary injunction as moot in light of its other decisions.

ALPA appealed the court's ruling in favor of Atlas and

Atlas filed a cross-appeal challenging the court's holding that

it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Atlas's broader

claims.

II. Discussion

This case comes to us on an appeal and cross-appeal from a

motion for summary judgment. Therefore, our review of all

issues raised by either party is de novo. See, e.g., Cone v.

Caldera, 223 F.3d 789, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (court reviews

cross-motions for summary judgment de novo); Frizelle v.

Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (grant of summary

judgment reviewed de novo); Shields v. Eli Lilly and Co.,

895 F.2d 1463, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same).

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A. The Profit-Sharing Plan Exclusion

1. Status Quo Obligations under the RLA

Atlas Air's claim and the district court's judgment are

based on the proposition that the Railway Labor Act imposes

no obligation upon carriers to maintain status quo wages,

rules or working conditions after the certification of a union

but before the onset of collective bargaining. RLA Section 2,

Seventh, for instance, provides:

No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of

pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a

class as embodied in agreements except in the manner

prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this

title.

45 U.S.C. s 152, Seventh. RLA Section 6 requires that

employers and employee representatives "shall give at least

thirty days' written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions...." Id. s 156.

By their express terms, these so-called "status quo" provisions of the Act only prohibit unilateral changes in wages or

working conditions where there is a preexisting collective

bargaining agreement. See Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 402-03 (1942) ("The prohibitions of s 6

against change of wages or conditions pending bargaining and

those of s 2, Seventh, are aimed at preventing changes in

conditions previously fixed by collective bargaining agreements."); Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United

Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 158 (1969) (status quo changes

in working conditions prior to collective bargaining are permissible where there is "absolutely no prior history of any

collective bargaining or agreement between the parties on

any matter"). As this Court recognized in International

Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.

Trans World Airlines, "no power to enjoin unilateral changes

in working conditions by management flows from Section 6 of

the Act in the absence of pre-existing, in place, collective

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bargaining agreements." 839 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988).1

Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines,

Inc., 55 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (The RLA "simply do[es]

not impose an obligation on the carrier to maintain the status

quo in the absence of an agreement."); Regional Airline

Pilots Ass'n v. Wings West Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1399, 1402

(9th Cir. 1990). Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers v. Transportes Aereos Mercantiles Pan

Americandos, S.A., 924 F.2d 1005, 1007 (11th Cir. 1991) (RLA

precludes status quo changes once collective bargaining has

begun). But cf. Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 90, 92 (2nd Cir. 1995) ("The

question presented in this lawsuit is whether [certain unilateral changes in conditions of employment] are allowed after

bargaining has commenced ... but before an agreement is

reached. We answer the question in the affirmative.").

On the basis of these decisions the district court below

ruled that the Railway Labor Act "imposes no duty to maintain the status quo in a case such as this where a union has

been certified, but collective bargaining negotiations have not

commenced and there is no prior agreement between the

parties." Atlas, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 164. This is no doubt true.

Section 2, Seventh and Section 6 do not require carriers to

maintain status quo working conditions. But, the lack of a

status quo obligation under the RLA does not mean that any

change in the status quo is per se legal. A carrier's action

may violate other rights or obligations fixed by the RLA.

2. RLA Section 2, Third and Fourth

The lack of an enumerated obligation to maintain the status

quo pending the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement does not absolve an employer from its obligation to

refrain from activities which undermine employees' rights.

__________

1 Other courts have evidenced much less willingness to review

claims under ss 152, Third and Fourth in the post-certification

context. See, e.g., Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Railway Co.,

100 F.3d 228, 235 (1st Cir. 1996).

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The RLA bars employers from engaging in discriminatory

actions designed to impede or inhibit employees' exercise of

their right to organize for collective bargaining purposes.

For this reason, "the real question" in this case "is whether

... the carrier has discriminated against its employees because they have engaged in activities protected by the

RLA...." Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Boston &

Maine Corp., 808 F.2d 150, 157 (1st Cir. 1986).

Section 1a(2) of the Act "forbid[s] any limitation upon

freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a

condition of employment or otherwise, of the rights of employees to join a labor organization." 45 U.S.C. s 151a(2).

Section 2 of the RLA fleshes out this protection. Section 2,

Third provides that employees may select their representatives "without interference, influence, or coercion" of "any"

kind. Id. s 152, Third. Section 2, Fourth further provides

that:

No carrier, its officers or agents, shall deny or in any

way question the right of its employees to join, organize,

or assist in organizing the labor organization of their

choice, and it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees

... or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to

induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain

members of any labor organization....

Id. s 152, Fourth. "These provisions prohibit employers

from interfering with, coercing or influencing the representational choices of workers and from interfering with the right

of employees to organize in labor unions." ALPA v. Eastern

Air Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

In Eastern, the carrier sought to modify its flight schedule

and furlough over 3,000 employees, the majority of whom

were represented by ALPA or other unions. Eastern Air

Lines was in substantial financial difficulty at the time, and

the changes would reduce its monthly payroll expenses by

nearly $7 million. See id. at 893. The unions challenged this

plan alleging, among other things, that it violated Section 2,

Third and Fourth of the RLA. We rejected ALPA's claims

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because the carrier had legitimate business motivations independent of any effort to discourage employees from exercising their rights under the RLA, stating that "[w]orkers'

Railway Labor Act rights to unionize are adequately protected so long as management is limited to taking only measures

that it would have taken in the absence of any anti-union

animus." Id. at 902.

ALPA argues that Eastern is distinguishable from the

present case because the challenged policy did not "impose a

differential impact on union members." Id. at 903. Atlas can

make no such claim about the profit-sharing plan eligibility

requirements or its decision to terminate plan participation

for flight crewmembers. In addition, ALPA contends, Eastern reaffirms precedent from other circuits that employers

cannot make changes in status quo working conditions that

are anti-union in motivation or effect.

ALPA argues there is a "class of anti-union acts that are

'inherently destructive' of important employee interests, so

that 'no proof of anti-union motivation is needed.' " Eastern,

863 F.3d at 902 (quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,

388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)). Following the Supreme Court's

teaching in Great Dane, the Sixth Circuit found an exclusionary eligibility requirement for a voluntary retirement savings

and profit-sharing plan to be "inherently destructive" of

employee rights and per se unlawful under the National

Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d

682, 686-89 (6th Cir. 1968). The Sixth Circuit held that the

policy "would naturally have some deterring effect on union

membership." Id. at 686. As a result, the policy was deemed

facially invalid; the court required no showing of anti-union

animus. Other courts have reached similar conclusions under

the NLRA. See, e.g., AMF Bowling Co. v. NLRB, 977 F.2d

141, 145 (4th Cir. 1992) (termination of a severance-pay plan

upon an employee becoming a "member of a bargaining unit"

violates the NLRA); Melville Confections, Inc. v. NLRB, 327

F.2d 689, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1964) (exclusion of unionrepresented employees from profit-sharing plan is per se

violation of the NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board

also follows this interpretation. See, e.g., E & L Plastics

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Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 1119, 1119-20 (1992); AMF Bowling Co.,

303 N.L.R.B. 167, 170 (1991), enforced in relevant part, 977

F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1992); Niagara Wires, Inc., 240

N.L.R.B. 1326, 1327-28 (1979).

In Eastern we did not hold the carrier's actions to be

"inherently destructive" because there was no claim that the

policy "impose[d] a differential impact on union members."

Eastern, 863 F.2d at 903. "The vast majority of acts found

'inherently destructive' " have been those, like the actions of

Atlas Air, that "discriminate solely on the basis of union

membership." Id. at 902; see, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood

Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (unjustified failure to reinstate ex-strikers held unlawful without reference to employer's intent); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221

(1963) (grant of superseniority to strike replacements and

workers coming off the strike held inherently destructive); C.

H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981)

(disparate treatment of union officials held to be inherently

destructive); Kroger, 401 F.2d at 602 (action denying union

members access to profit-sharing plan held unlawful without

showing of anti-union animus).

As we noted above, the "inherently destructive" precedents

all arose under the NLRA, not the RLA. While the two laws

are not equivalent, we have interpreted the respective provisions barring undue employer influence of employees as

meaning "pretty much the same thing." US Airways, Inc. v.

NMB, 177 F.3d 985, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Despite the

statutory differences, "carefully drawn analogies from the

federal common labor law developed under the NLRA may be

helpful in deciding cases under the RLA." Trans World

Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489

U.S. 426, 432 (1989); see id. at 432-34 (applying NLRA

precedents to interpret RLA Section 2, Fourth). "While of

course NLRA precedents may not be casually transferred to

the RLA context" given the severe impact of Atlas Air's

actions on its newly unionized employees we see "no reason

why the latter requires us to cast a more jaundiced eye on

efforts to exert economic pressure than the former." Eastern, 863 F.2d at 909.

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Atlas Air adopted a facially discriminatory policy that

penalized employees by terminating their participation in

profit sharing for no other reason than their decision to

unionize. Prior to the election of ALPA as the crewmembers'

bargaining representative, Atlas repeatedly threatened its

employees with a substantial decrease in compensation that

would have a real and material impact on the conditions of

employment. In case there was any confusion about the

magnitude of the loss that would result upon certification of a

union, Atlas distributed documents detailing the amount of

income at stake. Then, upon learning of ALPA's election,

Atlas immediately fulfilled its threat and terminated the

profit-sharing plan before the results had even been certified.

It is difficult to view these actions as anything other than the

sort of "interference, influence, or coercion" explicitly barred

by the RLA.

In reaching this conclusion we need not decide whether

there is a broad class of inherently destructive acts that are

per se illegal under the RLA. That is, even without importing NLRA precedent with full force into the RLA context, we

find instructive the concept that the very nature of actions

against unionized labor by an employer can in and of itself

provide evidence of the animus generating those acts. While

we continue to recognize that the employer may alter status

quo working conditions, so long as no collective bargaining

agreement exists between the parties, where the challenged

modification to the status quo is far from merely formal, and

is in fact the equivalent of a substantial decrease in compensation having a real and material impact on the conditions of

employment, and is justified on no other grounds than union

certification, we may presume that the carrier's actions were

motivated by anti-union animus and are in violation of RLA

Section 2, Third and Fourth. To hold otherwise would allow

a carrier, without legal consequence, to slash to subsistence

levels the wages of those employees who elect to unionize.

Were we to allow such a result, the RLA provisions "prohibit[ing] employers from interfering with, coercing or influencing the representational choices of workers and from interfering with the right of employees to organize in labor unions"

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would no longer be effective. Eastern, 863 F.2d at 893.

While carriers retain the right to make unilateral changes in

status quo working conditions, so long as there is no collective

bargaining agreement, they may not make such changes

which selectively penalize unionized employees so as to interfere with, coerce, or influence their decision to exercise their

rights under the RLA.

3. Statute of Limitations

Atlas posits that ALPA's claim under the RLA is timebarred and that this provides an alternative ground upon

which to uphold the district court's grant of summary judgment. The statute of limitations for the RLA, borrowed from

section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

s 160(b), is six months. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35

(1987). According to Atlas, ALPA's claim accrued either

upon the initial imposition of the profit-sharing plan, or no

later than January 1998 when ALPA lost its initial representative election. In either case, ALPA's claim would be timebarred.

"A claim normally accrues when the factual and legal

prerequisites for filing a suit are in place." 3M Co. v.

Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Were ALPA's

claim solely based upon the actions taken by Atlas prior to

the 1999 certification election, it would be time-barred. However, under the NLRA, from which the RLA borrows its

statute of limitations, the maintenance of exclusionary clauses in employee benefit plans has been held to constitute a

violation. See, e.g., Kroger Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 362, 363, 376

(1967), enforced in relevant part, 401 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1968);

Melville Confections, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1334, 1339 (1963),

enforced, 327 F.2d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1964) ("The Board found

that the company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by

maintaining and continuing to maintain a profit-sharing

plan ... which required as a condition precedent to participation ... that the employee not be represented by a labor

organization for the purposes of collective bargaining." (emphasis added and footnote omitted)); id. at 692 ("Nor does

the fact that the company's violation antedated the Section

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10(b) period applicable to the instant charge preclude a

finding of a violation which occurred through a continuation of

the proscribed conduct during and within the six-month period prior to the filing of the charge."). Thus, Atlas Air's

continued reliance upon its exclusionary eligibility policy, and

repeated threats to enforce this policy should the crewmembers exercise their right to unionize, constitutes a continuing

violation under the applicable case law.

Therefore, ALPA's claims are still clearly alive. As the

Supreme Court noted interpreting section 10(b) of the

NLRA:

[W]here occurrences within the six-month limitations period in and of themselves may constitute, as a substantive

matter, unfair labor practices.... earlier events may be

utilized to shed light on the true character of matters

occurring within the limitations period....

Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416 (1960); see

also id. at 416-17 (distinguishing the above from cases in

which "conduct occurring within the limitations period can be

charged to be an unfair labor practice only through reliance

on an earlier unfair labor practice"); International Union,

United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of

Am. v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 702, 706-07 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (claim

not time-barred where unfair labor practice "started more

than six months prior to the charge" was "carried forward by

more recent actions"). In the case at bar, Atlas committed

violations within the limitations period by, among other

things, repeatedly threatening to terminate profit sharing for

employees that elect to unionize and its immediate severance

of represented unit members from the profit-sharing plan

upon learning that ALPA won the election. Under Local

Lodge No. 1424, this is sufficient to prevent ALPA's claims

from being time-barred.

B. Atlas Air's Cross-Appeal

Atlas cross-appeals the district court's dismissal of its

additional claim for a declaratory judgment that it retained

the right to make additional unilateral changes to salary and

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working conditions prior to the ratification of a collective

bargaining agreement. There is no subject matter jurisdiction for this claim.

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a dispute "must not

be nebulous or contingent but must have taken on fixed and

final shape." Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Freeman, 351 F.2d

832, 833-34 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (quoting Public Service Comm'n

v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 244 (1952)); see also Federal

Express Corp. v. ALPA, 67 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding

no concrete legal dispute in airline's suit for declaratory

judgment that unopposed changes in status quo working

conditions were protected under the RLA). That a union

may posture in labor negotiations or otherwise threaten to

respond to future changes is insufficient to create the reasonable apprehension of litigation necessary for the claim to be

justiciable. See id. at 964-65. Thus the district court correctly dismissed Atlas's additional claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction on the grounds that it "must not speculate

as to future unilateral changes Atlas may wish to make and

whether those changes would be lawful under the RLA."

Atlas, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 164.

III. Conclusion

Atlas Air violated the RLA by dramatically cutting the

take-home pay of its cockpit crewmembers for the sole reason

that they exercised their statutory right to unionize. Such an

action is not protected by the status quo provisions of the

RLA. Consequently, the district court's grant of summary

judgment for Atlas Air is reversed and this case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

USCA Case #99-7243 Document #557762 Filed: 11/21/2000 Page 15 of 15