Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00725/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00725-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 15:1693 Electronic Fund Transfer Act

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

DANIELLE MARIE GAYLOR, )

individually and on behalf )

of all others similarly )

situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:10cv725-MHT

) (WO)

COMALA CREDIT UNION, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Danielle Marie Gaylor, on behalf of herself

and all others similarly situated, filed this lawsuit

against defendant Comala Credit Union asserting

violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (“EFTA”),

15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. The parties settled this case,

and this court preliminarily approved the settlement and

the proposed class on November 17, 2011. The parties now

move for final approval of the class-action settlement.

For the reasons that follow, the joint motions will be

granted.

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 1 of 8
2

The parties have agreed that a plaintiff class,

defined as follows, is due to be certified:

“All consumers who initiated an

electronic funds transfer at the Comala

ATMs located at 418 Madison Avenue,

Montgomery, AL 36104, 105 North Memorial

Drive, Prattville, AL 36067, 300 Jensen

Road, Prattville, AL 36067, and 3380

Eastdale Circle, Montgomery, AL 36117

and who were assessed a fee for such

electronic funds transfer on or after

August 26, 2009 (one year prior to the

filing of the Complaint) and continuing

through September 9, 2010 (the date

Comala posted an external fee notice).”

The parties agree that this class of persons satisfies

the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality,

and adequacy of representation required by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 23(a). There is also no dispute that

certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(3), because

common issues of law and fact predominate among the

proposed class members. 

After an independent review, the court approves of

the certification of this plaintiff-settlement class.

The court finds that plaintiff Gaylor is an adequate

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 2 of 8
3

representative of the plaintiff-settlement class and that

all requirements of subparts (a) & (b)(3) of Rule 23 are

satisfied. The court expressly finds for purposes of

settlement that the class is so numerous that joinder of

all members is impracticable; that there are questions of

law and fact common to the class; that the claims of the

representative plaintiff are typical of the claims of the

class; that the representative plaintiff has fairly and

adequately protected the interests of the

plaintiff-settlement class and will continue to do so;

that, on the assumption that the allegations of the

complaint are true, the questions of law or fact common

to the members of the class predominate over any

questions affecting only individual members; and that a

class action is superior to other available methods for

the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.

The court further finds that maintenance of this action

as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) is superior

to any other means of adjudicating the claims raised.

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 3 of 8
4

Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Comala

established a settlement fund in the amount of

$ 42,869.73. Each class member was eligible to receive

a pro-rata distribution from the settlement fund up to

$ 100.00, with named plaintiff Gaylor to receive an

incentive payment in the amount of $ 2,500.00. Notice

was provided to the class by way of the internet,

newspaper publication, and postings on Comala’s ATMs.

No objections were made to the settlement nor did any

class member opt out of the settlement. Additionally, no

claims were filed. The settlement agreement provides

that any unclaimed funds are to be donated to the Public

Safety Insurance Fund. Attorney’s fees were awarded, but

not from the settlement fund. Gaylor v. Comala Credit

Union, 2012 WL 1987183 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (Thompson, J.).

A fairness hearing was held before this court on

April 4, 2012, to determine whether this court should

approve as fair, adequate, and reasonable a settlement of

the claims asserted in this action against Comala, upon

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 4 of 8
5

the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement

preliminarily approved on November 17, 2011. Due notice

of the settlement hearing has been given in a manner

approved by the court. Additionally, the court has

determined that the notice provided to the class was the

best practicable notice under the circumstances and fully

complies with all requirements of due process and Rule

23. The respective parties have appeared by their

attorneys of record and the court has received and

considered arguments and evidence in connection with the

proposed compromise and settlement of said claims. No

objections to the settlement were made at the hearing.

The court has reviewed and considered the proposed

settlement agreement and all other matters of record in

this action and concludes that the settlement is fair,

reasonable, and adequate. There does not appear to be

any collusion between the parties or any sacrifice of the

plaintiff Gaylor’s interests by her counsel for the sake

of collecting attorney’s fees. 

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 5 of 8
6

***

To be clear: the court was initially troubled that no

class member other than the named plaintiff came forward

to receive a settlement payment. Of course, this fact

raises the specter that this suit was motivated by

attorney’s fees. The court nonetheless recognizes that

Congress has seen fit to award attorney’s fees in EFTA

litigation to encourage private attorneys general to

bring suit. Viewed from this perspective, plaintiffs’

attorneys’ financial self-interest incentivizes banks to

provide proper notice on ATMs. In a passage worthy of

Adam Smith, the Supreme Court has endorsed this rationale

in the analogous context of contingent-fee arrangements

in class actions:

“The use of the class-action procedure

for litigation of individual claims may

offer substantial advantages for named

plaintiffs; it may motivate them to

bring cases that for economic reasons

might not be brought otherwise. Plainly

there has been a growth of litigation

stimulated by contingent-fee agreements

and an enlargement of the role this type

of fee arrangement has played in

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 6 of 8
7

vindicating the rights of individuals

who otherwise might not consider it

worth the candle to embark on litigation

in which the optimum result might be

more than consumed by the cost. The

prospect of such fee arrangements offers

advantages for litigation by named

plaintiffs in class actions as well as

for their attorneys. For better or

worse, the financial incentive that

class actions offer to the legal

profession is a natural outgrowth of the

increasing reliance on the ‘private

attorney general’ for the vindication of

legal rights; obviously this development

has been facilitated by Rule 23.

“The aggregation of individual claims in

the context of a classwide suit is an

evolutionary response to the existence

of injuries unremedied by the regulatory

action of government. Where it is not

economically feasible to obtain relief

within the traditional framework of a

multiplicity of small individual suits

for damages, aggrieved persons may be

without any effective redress unless

they may employ the class-action device.

That there is a potential for misuse of

the class action mechanism is obvious.

Its benefits to class members are often

nominal and symbolic, with persons other

than class members becoming the chief

beneficiaries. But the remedy for abuses

does not lie in denying the relief

sought here, but with re-examination of

Rule 23 as to untoward consequences.”

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 7 of 8
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,

338-39 (1980) (footnotes omitted). Keeping in mind

Congress’s considered Smithian judgment that attorney’s

fees function as a deterrent to EFTA violations, the

court will approve the settlement agreement in full.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 6th day of June, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:10-cv-00725-MHT-SRW Document 53 Filed 06/06/12 Page 8 of 8