Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01460/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01460-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS MINNARD, )

) 2:06-cv-1460-GEB-GGH

Plaintiff, )

) ORDER*

v. )

)

ROTECH HEALTHCARE, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

)

Plaintiff moves to amend his Complaint and for remand to

state court. Defendant Rotech Healthcare, Inc. (“Defendant”) opposes

the motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Patient Technician from

mid-1998 until April 2006. (Mot. at 1:21-22, Opp’n at 1:16-17.) Dawn

Neal (“Neal”) became Plaintiff’s manager in 2002 or 2003. (Mot. at

1:24, Opp’n at 1:19.) In 2005, Plaintiff complained to Neal about

what he perceived as an unlawful overtime compensation policy. (Mot.

at 2:6-7, Opp’n at 1:23-24.) In April 2006, Neal terminated

Plaintiff. (Mot. at 2:18-19, Opp’n at 2:4-5.) Plaintiff contends

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that he was fired for allegedly “forging a date on a document” and

that “his termination was wrongful, based upon false and pretextual

reasons in retaliation for his complaints about, and objections to,

unlawful working conditions, wages and compensation.” (Mot. at 2:18-

19, 3:1-3.) Defendant counters that Neal terminated Plaintiff because

Plaintiff “wr[ote] [a] date on a delivery form for [a] patient” which 

Neal believed constituted forgery, after Neal had advised Plaintiff

“that the Company was renewing its emphasis on the requirement that

patients or their designees, and not Rotech’s service technicians,

were to sign and date delivery forms.” (Opp’n at 2:4-5, 1-3.) 

Plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint against Defendant

for retaliation under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) (Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12900 et seq.); wrongful termination in

violation of public policy; defamation; failure to pay overtime

compensation; waiting time penalties pursuant to California Labor Code

section 203; violation of California Business and Professions Code

section 17200; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 13-59.) Plaintiff moves to amend the Complaint to join

Neal as a Defendant for claims of retaliation, defamation, and

invasion of privacy and to add new claims against the existing

Defendant for invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, and

breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Am.

Notice of Mot. to Amend and for Remand at 1:26-28, 2:1-3.) 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that joinder of Neal is appropriate under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15, 19, and 20 and under 28

U.S.C. § 1447(e), and that he should be allowed to amend his Complaint

to add new claims against the existing Defendant because the factual

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bases for these claims were not previously known “and could not have

been known or fully developed prior to undertaking discovery in this

case.” (Mot. at 3:11-13, 9:4-7.) Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s

“motion fails to recognize that before the Court reaches the amendment

standards of Rule 15 and [28 U.S.C. §] 1447, he must first demonstrate

good cause for modifying the Pretrial Scheduling Order under Rule

16(b).” (Opp’n at 4:5-8). Defendant further contends that

Plaintiff’s “motion should be denied because he has made no attempt to

show, and he cannot show, that good cause exists to modify the

Pretrial Scheduling Order under Rule 16.” (Id. at 4:11-13.) 

The parties filed a Joint Status Report on December 4, 2006,

in which they stated they did not anticipate joinder of additional

parties or amendment of the pleadings. (Joint Status Report at 2:7-

9.) The Scheduling Order issued after this filing and provides in

pertinent part that “[n]o further service, joinder of parties or

amendments to pleadings is permitted, except with leave of Court, good

cause having been shown.” (December 11, 2006 Scheduling Order at 2:4-

6.) 

To amend the Scheduling Order’s “[n]o further . . .

amendments to pleadings” provision, Plaintiff must show good cause

exists for the amendment under Rule 16(b). Howard Rice Nemerovski

Canady Falk & Rabkin v. Total Tech., Inc., 2006 WL 2850047, at *1

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2006) (citing Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,

975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992)). Rule 16(b)’s “good cause”

standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. 

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608-09. A diligence inquiry under this standard

is whether the movant discharged his obligation “to collaborate with

the district court ab initio in fashioning” a workable Rule 16

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Plaintiff raised the “good cause” standard for the first time 1

in his Reply brief. “Courts generally decline to consider arguments

that are raised for the first time in reply.” Stewart v. Wachowiski,

2004 WL 2980783, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2004). However,

Plaintiff’s arguments under § 1447(e) in his Motion are considered under

the good cause standard. 

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scheduling order for the case. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire

Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 229 (1st Cir. 1997); Jackson v. Laureate, Inc.,

186 F.R.D. 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). The issue is whether Plaintiff

could have assisted the judge with input in his Rule 16 status report

so that the amendment Plaintiff now seeks could have been sought under

Rule 15’s more lenient amendment standard. Counsel are expected to

inform the judge in their Rule 16 status reports about reasonably

foreseeable contingencies that could affect scheduling. Such

information enables the judge to consider whether discovery pertinent

to a party’s decision to amend should be completed within a specified

period, and whether to allow amendment triggered by such discovery to

be sought under Rule 15(a), and in this case, guided by the factors

provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608; IBC

Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V,

125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 

Plaintiff does not argue in his motion that he has “good

cause” to modify the no amendment provision prescribed in the

Scheduling Order. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s argument under 28 U.S.C. 1

§ 1447 sheds light on the “good cause” diligence inquiry. Plaintiff

argues that “[t]he first knowledge Plaintiff’s counsel had that claims

existed against [Neal] in her individual capacity was during her

deposition” which occurred on December 15, 2006 and February 23, 2007,

after the Scheduling Order was issued. (Mot. at 5:19-26.) Plaintiff

contends that “Neal is the individual who carried out most of the acts

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of wrongful termination, defamation, and retaliation claimed by

[P]laintiff”; “[h]er deposition testimony made it clear that she had

conversations that a jury could conclude were defamatory and invaded

[P]laintiff’s privacy”; and “[u]ntil her deposition, it was not clear

who actually made the decision to terminate [P]laintiff, and what was

said to whom about that decision.” (Id. at 6:5-11.) 

Defendant counters that “[t]he initial disclosures, written

discovery and depositions, and even [Plaintiff’s] [California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”)] charge filed prior

to the commencement of this case, demonstrate [Plaintiff’s] knowledge

of Neal as a potential defendant long before [Plaintiff] began work

toward the present motion.” (Opp’n at 5:3-5.) Specifically,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff named Neal “as the person who

terminated his employment allegedly in retaliation for his complaint

about the overtime policy” in the DFEH charge (filed May 11, 2006),

and that in his initial disclosures, served September 27, 2006, prior

to the parties’ Joint Status Report, Plaintiff produced a letter

written by his attorney to Defendant’s Vice President of Human

Resources asserting that “Neal ‘fired [Plaintiff] on Friday morning

without notice, warning, or cause [and that Neal’s] reasons for

[Plaintiff’s] termination are specious and unworthy of belief.’” (Id.

at 5:6-15.) Defendant contends that “[i]n addition to [Plaintiff’s]

prior knowledge of his potential retaliation claim against Neal,”

Plaintiff revealed, through his deposition taken on November 20, 2006,

that he “had knowledge of his potential defamation and invasion of

privacy claims long before Neal’s deposition.” (Id. at 5:17-20.) 

Defendant presents deposition testimony where Plaintiff “testified

that he was aware that Neal had told Bethany Gilmore [Neal’s coCase 2:06-cv-01460-GEB-GGH Document 26 Filed 07/09/07 Page 5 of 8
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worker] that [Plaintiff] was terminated because he committed fraud or

forgery.” (Id. at 5:21-22, Decl. of Kristina Launey, Ex. C (Minnard

Dep.) at 145:11-147:10.)

Plaintiff rejoins that “[w]hile it is true that [P]laintiff

was aware that [] Neal was the one who carried out his termination,

[P]laintiff initially believed that [] Neal was acting at the

direction of one of her superiors, Joni Moss, who was also identified

in the DFEH complaint.” (Reply at 1:25-28.) Plaintiff argues that

until Neal’s “deposition was completed, [he] had no reason to believe

that [] Neal was acting on her own to retaliate against [P]laintiff.” 

(Id. at 2:1-2.) Plaintiff also argues that “[w]hile it is true that

[he] became aware near the end of November[] 2006 . . . that Neal told

Bethany Gilmore that she was going to fire [P]laintiff for committing

‘fraud in paperwork,’ and for ‘forging a signature,’ [P]laintiff’s

counsel determined that such information, alone, was insufficient to

allege a cause of action against [] Neal for invasion of privacy and

defamation” and that it was only in the second session of Neal’s

deposition on February 23, 2007, that Neal revealed that she told

three other people that she was terminating Plaintiff “for acts

involving dishonesty.” (Id. at 4:5-9, 2:3-8.) 

Even if Plaintiff had been uncertain at the time of filing

the Joint Status Report as to whether Neal had made the termination

decision on her own, Plaintiff has not shown why he did not at least

anticipate adding Neal as a possible defendant given his knowledge

that she was his manager and that she terminated Plaintiff. “The

[diligence] inquiry focuses on whether Plaintiff discharged [his] duty

to assist the Court in fashioning a Rule 16 [scheduling] order that

would accommodate circumstances [he] now presents.” Jackson, 186

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F.R.D. at 608. It is evident that Plaintiff either was aware, or

should have reasonably been aware, of those circumstances when the

Joint Status Report was filed. Therefore, Plaintiff should have

requested in the Joint Status Report a specified period within which

he could conduct discovery pertinent to the decision whether he should

add Neal as a defendant, and that any amendment of the Complaint

triggered by that discovery be allowed to be sought solely under Rule

15. Plaintiff’s failure to do this constitutes “carelessness [which

is not] compatible with a finding of diligence.” Id. (quoting

Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609). Further, Plaintiff concedes that he knew

that Neal had told Bethany Gilmore that Plaintiff had committed fraud

and forged a signature prior to the parties’ filing of the Joint

Status Report. Although Plaintiff contends “such information, alone,

was insufficient to allege a cause of action against [] Neal for

invasion of privacy and defamation,” Plaintiff does not provide legal

support for this assertion. (Reply at 4:8-9.) Accordingly, Plaintiff

has failed to show that he “was diligent in assisting the Court in

creating a workable Rule 16 order.” Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608. 

Lastly, Plaintiff seeks to add new claims against the

existing Defendant, arguing that “[t]he factual bases for these claims

were not known, and could not have been known or fully developed prior

to undertaking discovery in this case.” (Mot. at 9:4-6.) Defendant

counters that Plaintiff “has not even attempted to argue that the

additional claims he seeks to add against [Defendant] are based on any

newly-discovered facts.” (Opp’n at 7:9-12.) Plaintiff does not argue

in his motion that there is good cause to amend the Scheduling Order

to add new claims against Defendant, nor has he shown that these new

claims are based on newly discovered facts that could not have been

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discovered earlier. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established that

Rule 16’s good cause standard justifies the amendment he effectively

seeks.

CONCLUSION

Since Plaintiff has not shown good cause justifies

modification of the no amendment provision of the Rule 16 Scheduling

Order, his motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

 

 

 

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