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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1352 

FALYN BRUCE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

DEREK GUERNSEY, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 12-3198 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 26, 2015 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges. 

WOOD, Chief Judge. After Falyn Bruce’s high-school boyfriend told a school official that Bruce had attempted to kill 

herself, the official contacted local authorities. A police officer, Justin Harris, went to the home where Bruce was staying and detained her until a county sheriff’s deputy, Derek 

Guernsey, arrived on the scene. Guernsey then took Bruce 

against her will to a local hospital where she was subjected 

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to a mental health examination. At the time they took these 

steps, Harris and Guernsey had only a report of Bruce’s alleged suicidal ideation; they took no account of contradictory information, including her father’s statements and her 

calm demeanor. Bruce filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging that Harris and Guernsey’s actions constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, as applied to the states. The district court held 

that probable cause for the seizure was apparent on the face 

of Bruce’s complaint. It also found that Guernsey had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. Bruce has appealed; we now affirm the district 

court’s judgment in favor of Harris but reverse and remand 

for further proceedings as to Guernsey. 

I 

Our account of the facts follows Bruce’s First Amended 

Complaint. Because the district court dismissed for failure to 

state a claim, we proceed on the assumption that these facts 

are true (without making any finding to that effect). See Santana v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 679 F.3d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 

2012). On September 5, 2011, Bruce was with her boyfriend, 

B.S., at B.S.’s home. At the time, Bruce was 17 years old. 

Bruce and B.S. had an argument, and Bruce wanted to leave. 

Initially B.S. attempted to stop her, but Bruce eventually 

managed to get away. She contacted her friend, D.F., and 

wound up spending the night at D.F.’s home. Around 8:00 

the next morning, Bruce spoke on the phone with James 

Bruce, her father and custodial guardian. She explained to 

him that she was fine but did not want to go to school. Mr. 

Bruce told her that he would inform her school, Riverton 

High School, that she would be absent. 

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No. 14-1352 3

Sometime on the morning of September 6, B.S. told some 

of Bruce’s friends that Bruce had attempted suicide the night 

before by tightening a belt around her neck. (Bruce swears 

that this is a lie and that she never has been suicidal.) But she 

was not around to refute the assertion, and so some of her 

friends told the Riverton High School guidance counselor 

about B.S.’s claim. The counselor contacted the Riverton Police Department. The Department dispatched police officer 

Andrew Landgrebe to the school. Mr. Bruce—who later arrived at the school—told Landgrebe that he had spoken to 

Bruce and that she was fine. Landgrebe, however, disregarded the father’s statement, contacted the Sangamon 

County dispatch service, told the dispatcher that Bruce was 

possibly suicidal, and suggested that they send someone to 

check on her. 

At 10:17 a.m., a dispatcher for Sangamon County contacted Rochester Police Department officer Justin Harris and 

told him that Bruce was possibly suicidal. Harris went to 

D.F.’s house and spoke to Bruce. During this encounter, 

Bruce was “perfectly fine and showed absolutely no signs of 

physical, mental or emotional distress.” Harris evidently 

thought so: he advised the Sangamon County dispatch that 

Bruce was “o.k.” and that emergency medical services were 

not needed. Nevertheless, Harris entered D.F.’s home and 

told Bruce to come outside of the house because “Sangamon 

County was coming to get her.” In response to Bruce’s question why she had to leave the house, Harris said, “if you 

want to ask questions I can just handcuff you and take you 

out myself.” Feeling that she had no choice, Bruce went outside to the driveway. There were other people at D.F.’s home 

with Bruce, but Harris did not ask any of them whether they 

had any concerns about Bruce’s mental state. He never asked 

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Bruce about her mental wellbeing, nor did he observe any 

physical injuries. 

At 10:26 a.m., a Sangamon County dispatcher contacted 

Mr. Bruce and gave him the address of D.F’s home. The dispatcher told him that Bruce was fine and that he should go 

to the home to pick her up. At 10:54 a.m., Sangamon County 

Sheriff’s Deputy Derek Guernsey arrived at D.F.’s house; 

Mr. Bruce arrived at the same time. Two minutes later, Harris left the scene. That was the last Harris saw of Bruce; this 

means that Harris was present for less than 37 minutes (he 

was contacted at 10:17, presumably took a few minutes to 

travel to the house, and then left at 10:54). 

When Guernsey arrived, he directed Bruce to get into his 

police car. Both Bruce and her father objected, telling Guernsey that Bruce was fine and that they wanted Bruce to go 

with Mr. Bruce. Guernsey insisted, however, that Bruce 

come with him to St. John’s Hospital. At this time, Guernsey 

had been told only that Bruce was possibly suicidal; he had 

not been informed that she allegedly had threatened or attempted suicide. He did not ask Bruce or anyone else present about her mental state. In fact, throughout all these 

events neither Guernsey nor Harris personally observed any 

behavior or actions indicating that Bruce was mentally disturbed or a danger to herself or others. 

At 11:05 a.m., Guernsey left D.F.’s home with Bruce in his 

police car; the two arrived at St. John’s Hospital shortly 

thereafter. (It appears that Mr. Bruce drove there separately, 

became upset, and was eventually forced to leave.) At the 

hospital, Guernsey and another sheriff’s deputy, Troy 

Sweeney, retained custody of Bruce until the hospital briefly 

admitted her at 1:55 p.m. Guernsey signed a “petition for inCase: 14-1352 Document: 43 Filed: 01/26/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-1352 5

voluntary judicial admission” at 11:30 a.m. In the petition, he 

stated that Bruce was likely to harm herself or others if not 

treated as an inpatient and that Bruce needed immediate 

hospitalization. Guernsey’s petition incorrectly noted that he 

was attaching a copy of a doctor’s medical examination; in 

fact, none was attached. (There was an option to state that no 

certificate was attached because a doctor could not be located after a diligent effort, but Guernsey did not select this option.) He also falsely wrote in the petition that Bruce had 

told him that she was thinking of suicide. Bruce did not see a 

doctor until 11:53 a.m., after Guernsey completed the form. 

A few hours after she was admitted to St. John’s, she was 

sent to a nearby behavioral health center for evaluation; she 

was released from that institution three days later. 

Bruce later initiated this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

She sued Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney, alleging that they 

violated the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably seizing 

her. In addition, Bruce alleged a due process violation by 

Guernsey related to his filing of a false document, i.e., the 

petition for involuntary judicial admission. Bruce also 

named Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department as defendants, alleging a failure to train their employees. 

The defendants promptly filed motions to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The district court granted them, dismissing the 

complaint without prejudice. Bruce then filed an amended 

complaint containing essentially the same allegations except 

for the due process claim against Guernsey. Again the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. It 

found that Harris and Guernsey had probable cause to seize 

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Bruce and that Guernsey was entitled to qualified immunity 

in any case because he had at least arguable probable cause 

when he took Bruce into custody. 

Because she had no additional facts to plead, Bruce 

moved to modify the district court’s order to a dismissal 

with prejudice, so that she could appeal. The district court 

obliged with an order stating that it would dismiss the complaint with prejudice if Bruce filed a notice of appeal. After 

Bruce did so, the district court entered final judgment. Bruce 

then filed an amended notice of appeal to make clear that 

she was appealing the district court’s final judgment. (This 

was a belt-and-suspenders move. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2). 

That is why we eventually dismissed the second appeal.) 

Bruce now challenges only the district court’s dismissals of 

Harris and Guernsey. 

II

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim de novo. See Santana, 679 F.3d at 620. Because both defendants concede that they seized Bruce, the central question 

for this appeal is whether each defendant had either probable cause to do so, or arguable probable cause such that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity. (Neither defendant argues 

that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), justified his actions.) 

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution governs 

mental-health seizures. See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 

732 (7th Cir. 2013). Like ordinary seizures, mental-health seizures comply with the Fourth Amendment if officers have 

probable cause, which exists “only if there are reasonable 

grounds for believing that the person seized is subject to seizure under the governing legal standard.” Id. (quoting VillaCase: 14-1352 Document: 43 Filed: 01/26/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-1352 7

nova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1992)). Generally 

speaking, a mental-health seizure is lawful if there is probable cause to believe that the person seized is a danger to herself or others. See, e.g., Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 

(6th Cir. 1997). 

Bruce argues that a mental-health seizure of a minor in 

Illinois is constitutional only if the officer personally has 

observed something that gives him reasonable grounds to 

believe that the minor is eligible for admission to a mental 

health facility and needs immediate hospitalization to 

protect herself or others. She points to the Illinois Mental 

Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, which 

included that rule at the time of the events here. See 405 ILL.

COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-504(b), amended by 2014 Ill. Legis. 

Serv. 98-975 (West) (modifying this provision to exclude the 

personal observation requirement). Because Harris and 

Guernsey did not personally observe any behavior 

indicating mental disturbances, Bruce claims that the seizure 

was unconstitutional. 

As we have noted repeatedly, however, the constitutionality of a seizure does not depend on the particularities of 

state law. We noted in Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 

1989), that for federal constitutional purposes “[a] police officer need not personally witness the behavior giving rise to 

the probable cause—even if there must be personal observation according to a state statute.” Id. at 987. And in McKinney 

v. George, 726 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1984), we upheld a similar 

seizure that did not meet the Illinois requirement of personal 

observation, remarking that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard is federal. Id. at 1188–89 (noting that if an 

officer has probable cause for an arrest, “it is immaterial to 

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the constitutionality of their conduct that the arrest may 

have violated state law”). The present case fits that pattern, 

and we come to the same conclusion: the constitutionality of 

a mental-health seizure does not depend on whether the officer met each requirement spelled out by Illinois state law. 

Whether or not an officer complied with these state law conditions may have some evidentiary value when determining 

whether that officer’s conduct was reasonable, but a violation of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code does not constitute a per se violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. Our task instead is to see whether Harris and Guernsey had probable cause to believe that Bruce 

needed immediate hospitalization because she was a danger 

to herself or others. In making that determination, we bear in 

mind the collective knowledge doctrine, under which a law 

enforcement officer may rely on information conveyed to 

him by another law enforcement officer or the agency for 

which he works. See United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 

252–53 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally United States v. Hensley,

469 U.S. 221 (1985) (one police department could rely on another’s “wanted” flyer to support a stop). 

Justin Harris

Harris was summoned to D.F.’s home by the Sangamon 

County dispatch service at 10:17 a.m.; he arrived a few 

minutes later. After knocking on the door and speaking with 

Bruce, he ordered Bruce to come out of the house and remain with him in the driveway. Bruce was in Harris’s custody until 10:54 a.m., when Guernsey arrived and took control 

of the scene. Harris left the scene two minutes later. The dispatcher had told Harris that Bruce was possibly suicidal, but 

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No. 14-1352 9

Harris had no other information regarding Bruce’s mental 

state. 

Even giving Bruce the benefit of the doubt, we agree with 

the district court that she has not described a situation in 

which Harris violated her constitutional rights. Knowing 

that Bruce was possibly suicidal, Harris merely ordered her 

out of the home in which she was staying and kept her within his custody for a relatively short time (less than 37 

minutes). He did not remove Bruce from the general vicinity 

in which he found her; he kept an eye on her until Guernsey 

arrived. Harris was the first officer to arrive on the scene, but 

the little information he had been given about the possible 

fragility of Bruce’s mental state supported his decision to 

maintain custody over Bruce for this brief time. Even if he 

acted in an overly brusque manner, as Bruce alleges, his seizure of her did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Derek Guernsey

Guernsey’s participation in these events was more prolonged and involved. After arriving at D.F.’s home and taking over from Harris, he ordered Bruce into his police car 

over the protests of both Bruce and her father. At that point 

he whisked Bruce off to the hospital against both her will 

and that of her father (and recall, she was still a minor at this 

time). Once at the hospital, Guernsey signed a petition for 

involuntary judicial admission that included several material 

falsehoods. In particular, Guernsey said that he was attaching a copy of a physician’s medical examination, but no doctor had examined Bruce, and Guernsey wrote that Bruce told 

him that she was thinking of suicide, but Bruce denies saying 

such a thing (and for present purposes we must credit her 

account). 

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Even if the initial act of taking control over Bruce at 

D.F.’s home was permissible, and that is not clear given the 

simultaneous appearance of Mr. Bruce, we cannot say on 

this limited record that Guernsey’s transportation of Bruce 

to the hospital and his actions while there were objectively 

reasonable. By that time, much more information was available than the initial imprecise and potentially unreliable tip 

from the ex-boyfriend. See Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 

739–41 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that officers did not have 

probable cause to seize the plaintiff and take him to the hospital where their visit to the plaintiff’s home was prompted 

by a 911 call from a neighbor and when upon arrival the 

plaintiff was alone eating lunch and was not visibly distraught). Guernsey’s actions went well beyond a temporary 

seizure by an officer facing an unknown situation. On 

Bruce’s version of the facts, Guernsey forced a perfectly calm 

and rational minor, surrounded by several friends and her 

father, to get in his police car so that she could be taken to 

the hospital, over the objections of the father, based solely on 

a report that she was possibly suicidal. 

Once at the hospital, Guernsey’s lies helped ensure that 

Bruce remained in custody against her will for an even longer period. Bruce suggests that Guernsey’s checking of the 

box indicating that he had attached a copy of a medical examination is a lie because it implies that Bruce already had 

been examined by a physician when she had not. Maybe it 

was a mistake, but we cannot make an assumption favorable 

to Guernsey at this stage of the case. It is fair to infer that the 

misrepresentation made the hospital more likely to admit 

her, as it gave credence to the idea that Bruce needed medical attention. Of even more concern is the alleged statement 

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No. 14-1352 11

that Bruce told Guernsey that she was thinking of suicide, 

which certainly increased the probability that Bruce would 

be kept against her will in an institution for observation. Cf. 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978) (false statement made in a sworn statement used to procure a search 

warrant could be violation of Fourth Amendment if statement was necessary to finding of probable cause). 

Guernsey argues that the seizure was constitutional because, in addition to the information that Bruce was possibly 

suicidal, he knew that Bruce had not attended school that 

day and was staying with a male friend 15 miles away from 

her home. The latter two facts, however, shed little if any 

light on Bruce’s mental state. Teenagers have been known to 

skip school on more than a few occasions and without a hint 

of mental instability. It is common for a parent to call the 

school and alert it to a sick day or a late arrival, and that is 

just what Mr. Bruce did. The fact that Bruce was staying 

with a male friend on a school night—and that her father 

had not known exactly where she was—might have indicated to Guernsey that something was amiss, but he had no 

way of knowing whether this behavior was caused by a 

mental disturbance or ordinary teenage rebellion and freespiritedness. Factual development may reveal that the latter 

is the case, considering the fact that Bruce was found accompanied by several other people at D.F.’s home, and that 

she had no hesitation in calling her father that morning before any of these events erupted. Finally, as Bruce emphasizes, she was calm at all times and exhibited no signs of being 

suicidal. 

Guernsey also argues that the fact that Bruce was ultimately admitted to the hospital and later involuntarily 

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committed to a behavioral health center for three days 

demonstrates that he had probable cause to seize her. But 

the Fourth Amendment requires an ex ante, not an ex post, 

analysis. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001) (explaining that most issues under the Fourth Amendment “are 

evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon the information the officers had when the conduct occurred”); 

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“[A]lmost 

without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the 

Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts and 

circumstances then known to him.”); Brinegar v. United 

States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (probable cause must be 

based on facts and circumstances within officers’ knowledge 

and “of which they had reasonably trustworthy information”). In fact, this ex ante approach is beneficial to police 

officers because it allows them to act quickly based on the 

information at their fingertips, without worrying that evidence discovered at a later time will ultimately demonstrate 

that they acted unreasonably. Here, when Guernsey seized 

Bruce, he did not know that she would ultimately be admitted for care; he knew only that she was possibly suicidal. 

And, as we discussed above, this knowledge was insufficient 

to provide probable cause for Guernsey’s prolonged seizure. 

(We note, however, that the hospital’s decision to commit 

her may shed some light on what Guernsey was observing 

during his encounter with her. This too needs further factual 

development.) 

Finally, Guernsey asserts that even if his actions violated 

the Fourth Amendment, he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

Qualified immunity is available when a defendant’s conduct 

“does not violate clearly established statutory or constituCase: 14-1352 Document: 43 Filed: 01/26/2015 Pages: 15
No. 14-1352 13

tional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). When 

the constitutionality of an action depends on the existence of 

probable cause, the officer must have had “arguable probable cause” for qualified immunity to attach. Humphrey v. 

Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, even when an 

officer lacks probable cause, he is still entitled to qualified 

immunity when a reasonable officer “could have reasonably 

believed that probable cause existed in light of wellestablished law.” Id. (citing Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 

1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997)). 

While arguable probable cause is a relatively flexible 

standard, it does not bend so far as to encompass Guernsey’s 

actions at this early stage in the case. Recall that for mentalhealth seizures, the question is whether there is probable 

cause to believe that the subject of the seizure is a danger to 

herself or others. This record does not establish as a matter 

of law that Guernsey, whose only indication that Bruce 

might commit suicide was the knowledge that someone had 

said Bruce was potentially suicidal, reasonably believed that 

he had probable cause to continue to seize her. When determining whether arguable probable cause exists, we must 

take into consideration the particular circumstances facing 

the officer. Guernsey faced a calm and undisturbed high 

school student who was at a friend’s house with several other companions and whose father was present and objecting 

to Guernsey’s actions. Not only did Guernsey take Bruce 

from D.F.’s home to the hospital against both her will and 

that of her father, but he also made misrepresentations on 

the petition for involuntary judicial admission and thus 

made it more likely that Bruce’s confinement would continCase: 14-1352 Document: 43 Filed: 01/26/2015 Pages: 15
14 No. 14-1352

ue. On this view of the facts, Guernsey is not entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

We stress, however, that this is an early stage of the case. 

It is possible that after further discovery, Guernsey may decide to move again for qualified immunity or for summary 

judgment. See Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 765 n.3 (7th 

Cir. 2000). We note as well that Bruce is pursuing an action 

in state court in Sangamon County against St. John’s Hospital and its personnel. See Bruce v. St. John’s Hosp., et al., No. 

2013-L-000055 (Ill. Cir. Ct.) That case may shed further light 

on Bruce’s mental state on the day of the events, her father’s 

behavior and statements while at the hospital, and, ultimately, the reasonableness of Guernsey’s actions. While medical 

evidence related to Bruce’s admission to the hospital cannot 

by itself exonerate Guernsey, given the ex ante perspective 

that applies, such evidence may still be relevant. For example, if Guernsey argues that Bruce was not perfectly calm 

and rational but rather was exhibiting signs of mental instability, medical records could corroborate (or refute) his account of the facts. In the interest of both efficiency and comity, the district court should consider staying this case until 

the pending state litigation is complete. 

III 

While Harris had indisputable probable cause to detain 

Bruce briefly, Bruce’s case against Guernsey cannot be resolved so readily. Taking the facts favorably to Bruce, 

Guernsey overstepped the boundaries of the Fourth 

Amendment in taking her to the hospital and making false 

statements that resulted in a more prolonged seizure. We 

therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to 

Count I of the complaint but REVERSE as to Count II. We 

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No. 14-1352 15

REMAND the case for further proceedings as to Count II but 

invite the court to consider staying the case until Bruce’s 

state court proceedings have terminated. 

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