Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06716/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06716-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Though it appears that Plaintiff’s first amended 1

complaint alleges claims under California law, Plaintiff asserts

in his opposition brief that “there are NO STATE CLAIMS presented

by Plaintiff.” (Doc. 90, filed April 28, 2006, 2:17-18.)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY ALEXANDER TEMPLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARL V. ADAMS, et al., 

Defendants.

CV-F-04-6716 OWW DLB (NEW DJ)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DOCS. 39 & 42) AND

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (DOC.

68)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona

and in forma pauperis, brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

various alleged constitutional violations stemming from his

participation as a suspect in a murder case. (See Doc. 19, 1

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).) Defendants Sutter County, Yuba

City, Carl V. Adams, Frederick Schroeder, and Jeffrey W. Webster

have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for summary judgment under

Rule 56. (Doc. 39, filed Dec. 22, 2005.) Defendants Michael

Alvarez, Michael Carlsen, John Case, John L. Montgomery,

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Genevieve Rangel, Terry Rosario, J. L. Suter, and James P. Walker

have filed a separate motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. 42, filed Dec. 27, 2005.) Plaintiff has filed a motion for

a preliminary injunction seeking designation as a protected

witness under California law, placement in another prison,

housing in a single cell pending transfer, and a name change. 

(Doc. 68, filed January 6, 2006.) 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC are as follows. 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined in California

State Prison in Corcoran, California. FAC 3:25-26. On October

6, 1991, Magdalina Helen Roberts was shot and killed at a

convenience store in Yuba City, California. FAC ¶ 1. In

February of 1991, Plaintiff, then an inmate of Yuba County Jail,

sent a letter to Yuba City Police Chief Roy Harmon indicating

that he knew the name of Roberts’ killer. FAC ¶ 7. Plaintiff

later indicated to Yuba County Sheriff Gary Tindle that John

Wayne Barton was the perpetrator. FAC ¶ 8. Plaintiff did not

request any special treatment in exchange for the information. 

FAC ¶ 9. Law enforcement officials were able to use forensic and

video evidence to confirm that Barton had killed Roberts. FAC

¶ 12.

On August 5, 1991, Barton was arraigned on charges stemming

from Roberts’ death. FAC ¶ 17. On January 28, 1992, Defendant

Webster, then a Corporal with the Yuba City Police Department,

interviewed Larry Ferguson, a Sutter County Sheriff transport

officer, and composed a police report. FAC ¶ 20. The report

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contained statements Barton had made to Ferguson that he knew

Plaintiff was the confidential informant and that “[i]f they want

me to plead, they’re gonna have to put it on paper.” Id.

Defendant Webster forwarded the police report to Defendant Adams. 

Id.

Barton’s attorney, Sutter County Public Defender Roy Van Den

Heuval negotiated a plea agreement with Defendant Schroeder,

Sutter County Assistant District Attorney, that was approved by

Defendant Adams, the Sutter County District Attorney. FAC ¶ 23. 

A “special condition” of the plea agreement required the

prosecution to disclose to Barton in writing the name of the

informant whose testimony led to his arrest. FAC ¶ 24. On

February 21, 1992, Barton pled guilty to Robert’s murder. FAC

¶ 25. At that time, Defendant Schroeder presented the court with

a sealed document indicating that Plaintiff was the informant in

the case. Id. On March 23, 1992, Barton was sentenced to a

prison term of 30 years to life. FAC ¶ 29. After the

sentencing, the court gave Barton the document disclosing

Plaintiff as the informant. Id.

On the day of the sentencing, Defendant Adams appeared on

several televison and print media making public comments

indicating that the informant in the case had agreed to have his

identity disclosed to Barton. FAC ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that

he had, in fact, not been told of the condition that his name be

disclosed as part of the plea agreement and did not agree to

disclosure. FAC ¶ 31.

During May and June of 1992, while housed ant the CSP-New

Folsom Prison, Plaintiff learned that Barton was calling

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Plaintiff an informer in his murder case. FAC ¶ 32. Other

inmates in the prison heard about the “informant issue” on

“Current Affair.” Id.

Around June 2, 1992, Plaintiff wrote letters to Judge

Timothy Evans, the judge who presided over the Barton murder

case; to Defendant Adams; and to Marilyn J. Alverson, a police

officer with the Yuba City police. FAC ¶ 34. The letters

expressed “deep anger and frustration and concern about his

safety.” FAC ¶ 34.

On December 17, 1992, Barton showed documents to his

cellmate David Lynn Scoggins indicating that Plaintiff was the

informant in the Roberts case. FAC ¶ 35. Scoggins spread this

information to other inmates in the California state prison

system, including inmates imprisoned at Pelican Bay, New Folsom,

Tehachapi, and Corcoran. Id. As a result of these rumors,

Plaintiff had a fist fight with another prisoner. FAC ¶ 36.

In January 1996, Scoggins and Plaintiff were housed in the

same facility at New Folsom. Id. Plaintiff started a fist fight

with Scoggins as a means of “refuting the informant allegations.” 

Id. In August of 1997, Plaintiff was placed in administrative

segregation. FAC ¶ 37. He learned at this time that it was

“common knowledge” that he was an informant in the Roberts case

and that “he was to be killed as a result.” Id.

Plaintiff contacted Defendant John Case, his “Correctional

Counselor I,” to request protective custody as an exposed

informant. FAC ¶ 38. He provided Defendant Case with Evans’,

Defendant Adams’, and Alverson’s names “for verification

purposes.” Id. Defendant Case denied the request for lack of

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proof of Plaintiff’s informant status. Id. Defendant Case

brought the matter up in an Institutional Classification Hearing

on November 21, 1997. Id. Defendant Chief Deputy Warden Terry

Rosario and Defendant James P. Walker, Facility Captain, were

also present at the meeting. Id. Collectively, Case, Rosario,

and Walker denied Plaintiff protective custody status. Id.

Plaintiff was instead transferred to Corcoran State Prison. Id.

On September 19, 1997, and on other occasions thereafter,

Plaintiff brought up the informant issue to several committee

members and counselors in several classification committee

actions. FAC ¶ 39. When Plaintiff did so, he was asked for

proof he could not provide. Id.

On November 28, 1997, Plaintiff told Richard Dangler and

Charles Stevens, attorneys he had retained, about the exposed

informant issue and provided them with the names, addresses, and

telephone numbers of Evans, Defendant Adams, and Alverson to

verify his claims. FAC ¶ 40. In March 1998, Plaintiff contacted

Defendant J. Suter, his assigned Correctional Counselor I, to

request protective custody based on his exposed informant status. 

FAC ¶ 41. His request was denied for lack of proof. Id. After

this denial, Plaintiff asked Dangler to investigate the informant

issue and to intercede with prison officials on his behalf. 

FAC ¶ 42. Dangler did not make any further inquiry into the

prison officials’ conduct. Id.

During July or August 1998, Plaintiff again asked his

assigned Correctional Counselor I for protective custody, which

was denied for lack of proof. FAC ¶ 43. In 2001, Plaintiff

began hearing rumors that Scoggins, who was confined in a

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neighboring area of the Corcoran Prison, the Facility 3B Yard,

was again telling inmates that Plaintiff was a “rat” in a murder

case against Barton. FAC ¶ 44. This information was

disseminated in the Facility 3A Yard, where Plaintiff was

confined, though it was not supported with paperwork. Id. An

inmate who had transferred from Facility 3A to 3B told Plaintiff

“to watch himself” because other inmates in Facility 3A were

aware of his informant status. FAC ¶ 46. 

On February 12, 2002, fearing that he would be killed as an

informant, Plaintiff cut through his cell window and attempted to

escape from Corcoran Prison. FAC ¶ 47. In the unsuccessful

attempt, Plaintiff broke multiple bones in each foot. Id. 

On February 19, 2002, Defendants Investigative Services Unit

(“ISU”) Sergeant John L. Montgomery, ISU Officer Michael Carlsen,

and ISU Officer Michael Alvarez interviewed Plaintiff’s cellmate,

John Kocak. FAC ¶ 48. Kocak told the ISU that Plaintiff was in

danger as an exposed informant. Id. Kocak also told them that

he was solicited by inmates David Maples and Michael Handline to

kill Plaintiff after the escape. Id. Plaintiff told Defendants

Montgomery and Alvarez of his concerns about being an exposed

informant. FAC ¶ 49. Defendants Montgomery and Alvarez did not

tell Plaintiff that Maples and Handline had solicited Kocak to

kill him. Id.

On September 12, 2002, the Kings County District Attorney’s

Office charged Plaintiff with attempted escape and destruction of

prison property. FAC ¶ 50. In August 2002, while awaiting

trial, Plaintiff was “placed up for transfer” to Salinas Valley

State Prison (“SVSP”). FAC ¶ 52. Plaintiff asked Defendant

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Genevieve Rangel to take him off the transfer list because such a

transfer would endanger his life. Id. On November 30, 2002,

Plaintiff learned through discovery in his criminal case that he

was up for transfer to SVSP, where Handline, who had solicited

Kocak to kill him, was housed. FAC ¶ 53.

In March 2003, Plaintiff obtained, pursuant to subpoena

duces tecum, a copy of the document that had notified Barton that

Plaintiff was the informant. FAC ¶ 54. Before receiving the

document, Plaintiff had believed that Barton had only been

“verbally informed” of his name. FAC ¶ 56. On June 6, 2003, a

search of Barton’s cell at Tehachapi State Prison revealed six

copies of the document identifying Plaintiff, along with copies

of articles and police reports indicating that Plaintiff was the

informant. FAC ¶ 59.

On July 14, 2003, Plaintiff represented himself in the

criminal trial on the charges of escape and destruction of prison

property. FAC ¶ 60. After an eight day trial, the jury found

Plaintiff not guilty based on the necessity defense. FAC ¶ 61.

On December 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. (Doc.

1, Compl.) On February 4, 2005, the Magistrate Judge, conducting

an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), dismissed

the complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 14.) On February 9,

2005, the Magistrate Judge issued findings and recommendations

denying Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the

basis that Defendants had not yet been served. (Doc. 15.) On

April 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 19.) 

On April 13, 2005, the Magistrate Judge issued findings and

recommendations dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

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Roy Van Den Heuval, Dr. John Dang, Barton, and the California

Department of Corrections for failure to state a claim. (Doc.

23.) District Judge Robert E. Coyle ordered the Magistrate

Judge’s findings adopted in full. (Doc. 25, filed June 15,

2005.)

On December 22, 2005, Defendants Adams, Schroeder, Webster,

Yuba City, and Sutter County filed a motion to dismiss the FAC

for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for summary

judgment. (Doc. 39.) They contend (1) that all claims are

barred by the statute of limitations, (2) that Defendants Adams

and Schroeder enjoy prosecutorial and Eleventh Amendment

immunity, (3) that Defendants Adams, Schroeder, and Webster enjoy

qualified immunity, and (4) that Plaintiff cannot state a Section

1983 claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, (5) a 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim, (6) a claim for municipal liability

against Yuba City or Sutter County, or (7) a claim pursuant to

state law. Id. On December 27, 2005, Defendants Alvarez,

Carlsen, Case, Montgomery, Rangel, Rosario, Suter, and Walker

filed a separate motion to dismiss. (Doc. 42.) They contend (1)

that the statute of limitations bars all claims against

Defendants Case, Rosario, Walker, and Suter and (2) that

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a cognizable

constitutional injury against Defendant Rangel. Id. Defendants

do not move to dismiss the claims against Defendants Alvarez,

Carlsen, or Montgomery. Id. Plaintiff opposes both motions to

dismiss. (Doc. 89, filed April 28, 2006; Doc. 90, filed April

28, 2006.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion for discovery under

Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 88,

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filed April 28, 2006), which Defendants oppose (Doc. 94, filed

May 19, 2006).

On January 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed an “Amended Motion” for

a preliminary injunction, along with supporting exhibits. (Doc.

69.) Defendant Adams filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc.

75, filed January 20, 2006.)

On June 7, 2007, this case was reassigned to the

undersigned due to the senior status of Judge Coyle. (Doc. 96.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6)

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In

testing the sufficiency of a complaint against a Rule 12(b)(6)

challenge, a court must “accept all material allegations in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d

578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The court need not, however, “accept

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if

those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts

alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55

(9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979). The Ninth Circuit construes pro se

pleadings liberally on a defendant’s motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895

(9th Cir. 2002). The court may consider the complaint itself

along with any material properly considered as part of the

complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). Where the complaint fails

to state a claim on which relief can be granted, leave to amend

“shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a); Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir.

1990). A court may, however, dismiss a complaint without leave

to amend where “the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,

1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

B. Preliminary Injunction

The standard for granting a preliminary injunction balances

the plaintiff’s likelihood of success against the hardships to

the parties. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of L.A., 340

F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the traditional test, a

plaintiff must show:

1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits,

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2) the possibility of irreparable harm to the

plaintiff if injunctive relief is not granted,

3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and 

4) advancement of the public interest (in certain

cases).

Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir.

2005). Alternatively, a court may grant an injunction if a

plaintiff “demonstrates either a combination of probable success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that

serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips

sharply in his favor.” Id. (citation omitted, emphasis in

original). These two formulations of the injunctive relief test

are not separate tests but rather two points on a sliding scale,

in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the

probability of success decreases. Id.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

1. Prosecutorial Defendants

In Section 1983 actions, federal courts apply the forum

state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Jones v. Blanas, 393

F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). Prior to January 1, 2003,

California’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury

actions applied to Section 1983 suits in federal court. 

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.

denied, 544 U.S. 968 (2005). Effective January 1, 2003, the new

California statute of limitations for assault, battery, and other

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California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1 provides, in 2

relevant part, as follows:

(a) If a person entitled to bring an action,

mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with

Section 335), is, at the time the cause of

action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal

charge, or in execution under the sentence of

a criminal court for a term less than for

life, the time of that disability is not a

part of the time limited for the commencement

of the action, not to exceed two years.

12

personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 335.1. Because the extension is not retroactive, it does not

resuscitate claims that would have already been barred by the

prior statute of limitations. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55.

Federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding

tolling except to the extent that any of these laws is

inconsistent with federal law. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1 tolls the statute of 2

limitations for up to two years while the plaintiff is

incarcerated. It is undisputed that Plaintiff has been

continuously incarcerated during the entire period relevant to

this lawsuit. (Doc. 93, filed May 19, 2006, at 8:6-9.) Applying

the one-year statute of limitations period and two years of

tolling under Section 352.1, any Section 1983 claims that accrued

after December 16, 2001, are not barred by the statute of

limitations. See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55. 

Federal law determines when a Section 1983 claim accrues.

Id. at 955. “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the

basis of the action.” Id. For accrual of a claim to be found,

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“it is critical that the plaintiff know that he has been hurt and

who inflicted the injury.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of

Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1979)). Once he has

this knowledge, the plaintiff is on inquiry notice to determine

the details of his claims that are readily discoverable. Id.

(citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123). In determining when a claim

accrues the focus is on the time of the illegal act, “not the

point at which the consequences of the act becomes painful.”

Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (wrongful termination

claim accrued when defendants notified plaintiff that she would

be terminated, not when her position actually terminated); see

also Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., 91 F.3d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir.

1996) (holding that a cause of action accrued upon the freezing

of appellants’ ERISA reimbursement amounts and that there was not

a continuing violation each and every time the appellants were

entitled to a reimbursement payment).

Plaintiff alleges that he can state a cause of action

against Defendant Adams, Defendant Schroeder, and Defendant

Webster, captain of the Yuba City Police Department, based on

their conduct in connection with disclosing his identity to

Barton and for failing to protect him following the disclosure. 

Plaintiff contends that his claims against Defendants Adams,

Schroeder, and Webster (collectively “Prosecutorial Defendants”)

accrued in March 2003 when he alleges he first became aware that

his name had been given to Barton in writing. FAC 15 n.4. 

Plaintiff alleges he was previously unaware Barton had been given

written documentation indicating that he was the informant. Id.

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Before this time, Plaintiff had speculated that Barton had been

“verbally informed” of Plaintiff’s identity off the record. FAC

¶ 56. Plaintiff argues that the written document amounts to a

“death warrant inside of prison” that “can get a prisoner

anywhere in America killed.” FAC ¶ 30.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim accrued much earlier

when Plaintiff first learned that his role as an informant was

disclosed to Barton. The FAC indicates that Plaintiff was aware

that Barton had been told that Plaintiff informed on him as early

as 1992:

During May and June of 1992, while housed at

CSP-New [F]olsom Prison (C-Facility)

plaintiff began hearing that John Wayne

Barton was housed at New Folsom (B-Facility)

and was calling plaintiff an informant in his

murder case. Inmates coming from B-Facility

to C-Facility on institution transfers stated

that the case had just aired on “Current

Affair” referencing the informant issue

. . . .

FAC ¶ 32. Further, Plaintiff alleges that around June 2, 1992,

“plaintiff wrote letters to Judge Timothy Evans, Carl Adams, the

court clerk and a [Y]uba [C]ity police officer by the name of

Marilyn J. Alverson expressing deep anger and frustration and

concern about his safety as well as that of other correctional

officers . . . .” FAC ¶ 34. The FAC also alleges that “[i]n the

month of August 1997, plaintiff was placed in Administrative

Segregation and subsequently learned through several inmates that

it was ‘Common Knowledge’ on C-Facility that he was an informant

in the Helen Roberts case and that he was to be killed as a

result.” FAC ¶ 37. 

Before November 1997, Plaintiff had complained to prison

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officials that he was an “Exposed Informant.” FAC ¶ 38. On

November 28, 1997, Plaintiff retained an attorney regarding the

“exposed informant issue.” FAC ¶ 40. Plaintiff indicated that

Defendant Adams and Yuba City police officer Alverson “could

verify the exposed informant issue.” Id. In March of 1998,

Plaintiff requested protective custody based on his status as an

exposed informant. Facts pled in the FAC and undisputed by

Plaintiff in his opposition establish that, by 1997, he was aware

that Barton had been told that he was an informant, that Barton’s

prosecutors and Yuba City police officers were responsible, that

disclosure threatened his safety, and that his life was in danger

as a result. 

That Plaintiff later became aware Defendant’s actions had

put him in more danger than he had previously realized and that

he eventually suffered greater injuries does not alter the

accrual of his claims. Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955. In Nasim, the

plaintiff brought a claim under Section 1983 claiming that he had

suffered physical and psychological injuries as a result of

asbestos removal at the prison where he was confined. 64 F.3d at

956. The plaintiff’s complaint revealed that, before the crucial

statute of limitations date, he knew that asbestos was dumped

into his cell and that asbestos was a health hazard, he

complained to medical staff and prison officials about his

exposure, he witnessed others who had been injured by asbestos,

and he suffered physical and psychological injuries himself. Id. 

Plaintiff contended that he was not aware of the nature of his

injuries until after the crucial limitations date. Id. Nor did

he become aware, before that time, that asbestos was linked to

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Plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to pursue his claims 3

does not mitigate his failure to file timely his claim. See Link

v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (“Petitioner

16

some of the ailments that he suffered, including strokes, eye

disease, or skin disease. Id. The court dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint based on a statute of limitations defense. Id. It

held that Plaintiff’s claim accrued once he knew that he had been

exposed to asbestos, that it was dangerous, and that he had been

injured, even though he was unaware of the extent of his injuries

until later, after the crucial limitations date. Id.

Here, before the crucial date, Plaintiff knew that

Prosecutorial Defendants had disclosed his identity to Barton and

that, as a result, his life was in danger. The danger Plaintiff

faced was already manifest prior to 1996 in his fights with two

different inmates over the informant allegations. FAC ¶ 36. 

Long before December 16, 2001, Plaintiff was aware that

Prosecutorial Defendants’ disclosure of his identity put him in

mortal danger, which had led him to complain to the authorities. 

The danger he faced had also been realized in the form of

physical altercations. As early as November 28, 1997, Plaintiff

had undertaken to retain lawyers to take action on his behalf

because of the danger he faced as an exposed informant. FAC

¶ 39, 40. He had directed his lawyer to contact members of the

Sutter County District Attorney’s office and the Yuba City Police

Department to investigate on his behalf. FAC ¶ 40. A reasonable

investigation would have revealed that Prosecutorial Defendants

were responsible for negotiating and implementing the plea

agreement. 

3

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voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the

action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or

omissions of this freely selected agent.”).

17

The court accepts as true Plaintiff’s allegations that the

existence of written documentation of his informer status placed

him in even greater danger and that he suffered the most serious

injury when he attempted to escape from prison on February 12,

2002. His failure, however, to understand the full extent of the

danger he faced or the extent of the injuries he would later

suffer did not prevent his claim from accruing at the moment he

knew that Prosecutorial Defendants’ conduct had injured him. The

court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Prosecutorial

Defendants for their disclosure of his identity accrued prior to

December 16, 2001.

Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should have

been tolled based on fraudulent concealment by Prosecutorial

Defendants, citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397

(1946). The equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment “is

read into every federal statute of limitation.” Thorman v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d 1090, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397). A plaintiff seeking to establish

fraudulent concealment carries the burden of showing that the

defendant “affirmatively misled” him as to the “operative facts

that give rise to the claim” and that plaintiff had neither

“actual nor constructive knowledge” of the operative facts

despite his diligence in trying to uncover them. Id. at 1094. 

“Equitable estoppel focuses on the defendant’s wrongful actions

preventing the plaintiff from asserting his claim.” Leong v.

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Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff contends that Prosecutorial Defendants

“consciously and deliberately concealed evidence” that it had

informed Barton of Plaintiff’s identity in written form. (Doc.

90, filed April 28, 2006, at 9:13-26.) Regardless of the

sufficiency of Plaintiff’s contentions that Prosecutorial

Defendants misled him, his claim for tolling based on fraudulent

concealment fails because of the nature of the facts allegedly

concealed. As discussed above, any claim arising from

Prosecutorial Defendants’ disclosure of Plaintiff’s identity to

Barton accrued when Plaintiff became aware of the exposure and

the danger it exposed him to. At that point, he was on inquiry

notice of all of the “operative facts” on which a Section 1983

claim based on the exposure of his identity might rest. 

Plaintiff has not shown how his ignorance that written

documentation existed impaired his ability to bring such a claim.

In any event, Plaintiff’s claims against Prosecutorial

Defendants fail as a matter of law even if they did not accrue

until he became aware of the written documentation of his

informant status. This is because the FAC reveals that Plaintiff

became aware that Barton had received written documentation of

Plaintiff’s informer status in 1996. Plaintiff attached to the

FAC a copy of a form headed “INMATE/PAROLEE APPEAL FORM.” FAC

56. This document is treated as part of the complaint for

purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Hal Roach Studios, 896

F.2d at 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Banco Santander de

P.R. v. Lopez-Stubbe (In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp.), 324

F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that dismissal for failure

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to state a claim based on an affirmative defense may be

predicated on documents attached to the complaint).

Plaintiff’s inmate appeal provides as follows:

On March 23, 1992, Barton was sentenced per

the plea agreement and given appellant[’]s

name in writing as the informant who le[d]

police to Barton. (Exhibit “E”.) Barton was

now in physical possession of “Prisoner Proof

Paperwork” by convict standards that would

get appellant killed in the California State

Prison System, in effect appellant[’]s “Death

Warrant” once considered with the news

articles in the case from Barton[’]s plea,

sentencing, and the news media coverage on

KOVR, KTXL, ect. [sic] appellant was a well

known (Yuba & Sutter County state prison

inmates) informant.

Appellant was not fully aware of the actual

document given to Barton until the matter

caught up with him in the form of a

confrontation with another inmate at CSPSacramento in 1996 when appellant was told

the inmate had personally reviewed the

paperwork while Barton’s cell mate at

[P]elican Bay State prison.

FAC 57 (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s reference to “the actual

document given to Barton” denotes the written document the

Prosecutorial Defendants gave Barton as a result of the plea

agreement. Id. This passage unequivocally maintains that

Plaintiff was first aware in 1996, not 2003, that Barton had

received written documentation of Plaintiff’s identity. 

Plaintiff does not contend that the phrases “the actual document

given to Barton” and “the paperwork” do not refer to the document

that Prosecutorial Defendants gave to Barton. Rather, Plaintiff

admits that he “made an error” when he indicated in the Inmate

Appeal that he had heard about the informant document in 1996. 

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Document 89 as filed on CM/ECF comprises two separately 4

numbered documents. This citation refers to page 4 of the second

document, labeled “Declaration of Troy Alexander Temple,” which

appears on page 11 of the document as electronically filed.

Plaintiff also alleges that Prosecutorial Defendants 5

have, as part of the conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights “fraudulently concealed evidence and

information on a continual basis from shortly after plaintiff

informed on Barton right up to the present date of this filing

from plaintiff including documentary physical evidence subpoenaed

during the course of plaintiff’s trial on escape charges.” FAC

¶ 68. It is unclear how such a claim is actionable under Section

1983. Plaintiff does not provide authority for, and the court is

20

(Doc. 89, filed April 28, 2006, at 11.) 

4

The allegation in the Inmate Appeal contradicts Plaintiff’s

claim in the FAC that he did not know Barton had been given such

a document until March 2003. See FAC 15 n.4. “[W]hen a written

instrument contradicts allegations in a complaint to which it is

attached, the exhibit trumps the allegations.” Thompson v. Ill.

Dep’t of Prof’l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2002);

United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355

F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that exhibit attached to

the pleading controls over inconsistent allegations). The

statement that Plaintiff knew of the document in 1996 is part of

the FAC, and “trumps” his allegation to the contrary. See

Thompson, 300 F.3d at 754. 

The FAC also contains allegations that Prosecutorial

Defendants “deliberately failed to protect plaintiff from a known

harm after exposing him as a government witness and informant.” 

FAC ¶ 68 (emphasis added). It appears that Plaintiff is alleging

that Prosecutorial Defendants committed a continuing violation by

failing to protect him over time. Even if Plaintiff is 5

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unaware of, any cause of action under Section 1983 for failure to

provide discovery in a criminal case in which he was acquitted. 

See, e.g., Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Merola, 678 F. Supp. 64, 66

(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d 848 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 855 (1988) (holding that “no denial of a fair trial can

be shown where the plaintiff was acquitted of the crime

charged”). It appears that Plaintiff is contending that the

concealment is evidence of the conspiracy to violate his Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Any such actions by Defendants

after the crucial limitations date would not make actionable on a

civil conspiracy theory conduct occurring before that date. See

Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986)

(holding that plaintiffs may recover only for overt acts that

they allege occurred within the limitations period).

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contending that Prosecutorial Defendants had a duty to protect

him after December 16, 2001, this does not alter the accrual of

his claims before that date. In a Section 1983 case, discrete

unlawful acts “‘are not actionable if time barred, even when they

are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.’” 

Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344

F.3d 822, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)). A claim against a

government official for failure to protect the plaintiff accrues

at the moment when a defendant fails to act, not when the

plaintiff later suffers an injury. Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d

865, 871-72 (2d Cir. 1994). 

In Eagleston, four police officers separately reported to

plaintiff’s home in response to violence between plaintiff and

her husband before the crucial statue of limitations date. Id.

at 871. Later, after the crucial date, the husband attacked

plaintiff and seriously injured her. Id. Plaintiff argued that

her claims against the four officers accrued on the date of the

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attack, not when they visited plaintiff’s home and failed to

arrest plaintiff. Id. The court disagreed, holding that

plaintiff’s claim accrued when each officer arrived and failed to

arrest the husband.

Here, the only misconduct Plaintiff alleges is Prosecutorial

Defendants’ disclosure of his identity without his permission and

their endeavors to conceal providing Barton with documentation

thereof. Plaintiff sent letters to Defendant Adams and a Yuba

City police officer around June 2, 1992, notifying them that he

was in danger and seeking protection. He had actual on notice

long before December 16, 2001, that Prosecutorial Defendants had

refused to protect him in prison.

Plaintiff’s FAC establishes that he was aware of

Prosecutorial Defendants’ injurious conduct before the crucial

limitations date of December 16, 2001. Any attempt by Plaintiff

to amend his claims against Prosecutorial Defendants will be

futile because “the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 

Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims

against Prosecutorial Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. Municipal Defendants

Defendants argue that the claims against Yuba City and

Sutter County (collectively “Municipal Defendants”) are also

subject to dismissal based on a statute of limitations defense. 

Section 1983 claims against a county or a municipality require an

allegation that a harm stems from the municipality’s “policy or

custom.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). A claim based on a “policy or custom” does not

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necessarily accrue at the time of the harmful act, but rather

only later when it is clear, or should be clear, that the “policy

or custom” caused the wrongful act. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk,

52 F.3d 1139, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995). “Where no single act is

sufficiently decisive to enable a person to realize that he has

suffered a compensable injury, the cause of action may not accrue

until the wrong becomes apparent.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Municipal Defendants have each failed

to adopt a policy to protect in-custody witnesses and informants

who provide information in criminal prosecutions. FAC ¶ 100. He

also alleges that Sutter County has a de facto policy of exposing

witnesses and informants in custody. FAC ¶ 101.

Plaintiff was aware that his identity had been disclosed to

Barton long before December 16, 2001. He alleges this disclosure

resulted from the policy and customs of the Municipal Defendants. 

Around June 2, 1992, Plaintiff sent letters to Defendant Adams,

the Sutter County District Attorney, and Alverson, a Yuba City

police officer, expressing concern for his safety. FAC ¶ 34. 

These communications indicate that Plaintiff was on notice that

Sutter County and Yuba City were responsible for the alleged

misconduct. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he obtained any more

information about the policy and custom of Municipal Defendants

after the crucial statute of limitations date. The only

information about the actions of Municipal Defendants that he

claims he acquired after December 16, 2001, is the purported

discovery that Barton had received written documentation of

Plaintiff’s identity. Even ignoring Plaintiff’s admission in the

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Inmate Appeal that he knew of the documentation in 1996, his

discovery that Barton had received this paperwork did nothing to

make clear to Plaintiff that Municipal Defendants’ policy or

customs caused his injury. Plaintiff already knew that the

actions of Prosecutorial Defendants had put his life in danger. 

At best, learning that his life was even more imperiled by the

existence of documentary evidence could lead him to believe that

a policy or custom, if one existed, was more harmful than he had

previously believed. In other words, if Plaintiff’s knowledge

that Prosecutorial Defendants had endangered his life by

disclosing his identity verbally did not put him on notice of the

Municipal Defendants’ injurious policy or custom, learning of the

written documentation would not give him a unique reason to

suspect that such a policy or custom was to blame. Plaintiff’s

claims against Municipal Defendants accrued prior to his

knowledge of the written documentation and so are barred by the

statute of limitations. In any event, the FAC reveals that

Plaintiff learned of the written documentation in 1996. 

Plaintiff does not contend, and there is no basis to believe,

that he can state a claim against Municipal Defendants that

accrued after December 16, 2001. Accordingly, all claims against

the Municipal Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Defendants Case, Rosario, Walker, and Suter

Defendants also move to dismiss the claims against Case,

Rosario, Walker, and Suter on the basis that they accrued prior

to December 16, 2001. Plaintiff alleges that these individuals

violated his constitutional rights when they refused to grant his

requests for protective custody. Defendants Case, Rosario, and

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Walker denied Plaintiff’s request for protective custody at an

Institutional Classification Hearing on November 21, 1997. FAC

¶ 38. Defendant Suter denied Plaintiff’s request for protective

custody in March 1998. FAC ¶ 41. Following these denials of

protective custody, Plaintiff asked his lawyer to take action on

his behalf based on his status as an exposed informant. FAC

¶ 42.

Plaintiff contends that his claims against Case, Rosario,

Walker, and Suter did not accrue until he discovered the written

documentation of his informant status that had been given to

Barton. Plaintiff does not explain how learning of the existence

of that document was necessary to inform him “that he ha[d] been

hurt and who inflicted the injury.” Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955. Long

before the crucial date of December 16, 2001, the allegations in

Plaintiff’s FAC establish he was aware that his life was in

danger and that these Defendants had failed to act to mitigate

that danger. Even if these Defendants’ actions before that date

contributed to injuries suffered later, Plaintiff’s claims

accrued when he knew of the injurious actions. See Chardon, 454

U.S. at 8; Nasim, 64 F.3d at 956. Plaintiff does not contend

that he can amend his complaint to allege injurious conduct after

December 16, 2001.

Plaintiff again urges that his claims against Case, Rosario,

Walker, and Suter are equitably tolled because of their

fraudulent concealment of the informant document given to Barton. 

Plaintiff has not met, nor does he contend he can amend his

complaint to meet, his burden to show that the document informed

Plaintiff of any “operative facts that give rise to the claim.” 

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Thorman, 421 F.3d at 1094. Even if Defendants concealed the

document from Plaintiff, he was already on notice of any claims

against Defendants Case, Rosario, Walker, and Suter. 

Accordingly, all claims against Defendants Case, Rosario, Walker,

and Suter are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

4. Defendant Rangel

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not stated a cause of

action against Defendant Rangel under the Eighth Amendment based

on her refusal to remove him from the list of prisoners to be

transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). A

prisoner’s treatment while confined is subject to scrutiny under

the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan (Farmer), 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials

provide humane conditions of confinement and “take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (citing

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984)). This duty

requires officials to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833. The rationale is that,

“having stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of

self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the

government and its officials are not free to let the state of

nature take its course.” Id. A prison official’s conduct

violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: 

first, the deprivation must be, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious,’” and second, a prison official must act with

“deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. at 834

(citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)).

The objective requirement of an Eighth Amendment claim is

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“contextual and responsive to ‘contemporary standards of

decency.’” Hudson v. McMillian (McMillian), 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). Thus, because “routine discomfort” fulfills the penal

objectives of the criminal justice system, “extreme deprivations

are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.

at 9. 

Courts of appeals leave open the possibility that a prisoner

who faces a risk of attack, but who has not yet been attacked,

may nonetheless be able to recover for Eighth Amendment

violations. Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th

Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment may be implicated not only to

physical injury, but also by the infliction of psychological

harm.” (citing McMillian, 503 U.S. at 16-17 (Blackmun, J.

concurring))); Babcock v. White (Babcock), 102 F.3d 267, 273 (7th

Cir. 1996) (declining to preclude suits under the Eighth

Amendment based solely on psychological injury, also citing

Justice Blackmun’s McMillian concurrence). 

In the absence of an attack, however, courts have been

hesitant to find a “sufficiently serious” deprivation to satisfy

Farmer’s objective requirement. See 511 U.S. at 834. A line of

Seventh Circuit cases has completely foreclosed recovery based

solely on an unrealized risk of violence at the hands of other

inmates. Doe v. Welborn (Doe), 110 F.3d 520, 524 (1997) (“An

allegation that prison officials exposed a prisoner to a ‘risk of

violence at the hands of other inmates,’ . . . does not implicate

the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”

(quoting Babcock, 102 F.3d at 273)). Meanwhile, the Tenth

Circuit has declined to adopt such a rule. Benefield, 241 F.3d

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at 1271-72 (rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Doe and

Babcock and holding that plaintiff’s allegations that defendant

labeled him a “snitch” and communicated the label to other

inmates, knowingly exposing him to danger, stated a claim for an

Eighth Amendment violation).

In any event, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirement that

he faced an objectively sufficiently serious risk because

Defendant Rangel’s actions never exposed him to any danger. In

Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2001), plaintiff alleged

that defendant prison officials had threatened to discipline

another inmate if he refused to attack plaintiff and had informed

that inmate and other inmates that plaintiff was an informant. 

Id. at 490-91. Plaintiff failed to allege that any inmate

assaulted him, that he actually faced a serious threat from any

inmate, or that there were any credible rumors that an inmate

intended to attack him. Id. at 494. The court affirmed the

district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis that the

complaint failed to allege that defendants’ conduct created a

substantial risk of serious harm. Id.

Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Rangel’s

conduct caused him to remain on the transfer list to SVSP. He

contends that inmate Michael Handline, who was housed at SVSP,

wanted to have Plaintiff killed. FAC ¶ 53. The FAC establishes

that Plaintiff has never been transferred to SVSP. FAC 3:26-4:3. 

Nor does he contend he has ever had any contact with Handline. 

Plaintiff does not assert that he is still on the transfer list. 

Nor does Plaintiff in the FAC seek forward-looking injunctive

relief to remove himself from or to prevent his placement on any

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transfer list. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)

(holding that, because “[i]t would be odd to deny an injunction

to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening

condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had

happened to them,” the Eighth Amendment “protects against

sufficiently imminent dangers”). Rather, Plaintiff seeks to

recover damages based on the “thoughts of suicide and despair” he

experienced out of fear that he would be transferred. (Doc. 89,

filed April 28, 2006, at 6:2-5.) Plaintiff has not alleged that

Defendant Rangel’s failure to remove him from the transfer list

exposed him to any risk of being injured by other inmates. 

Plaintiff has thus failed to allege an objectively serious risk

as required by Farmer. Plaintiff does not contend that he can

amend his complaint to allege any other conduct by Defendant

Rangel. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rangel

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) Motion

Plaintiff has filed a “Motion To Allow For Discovery Under

Federal Rule 56(f).” (Doc. 88, filed April 28, 2006.) Rule

56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the

district court to grant a continuance to a party opposing a

motion for summary judgment so it may undertake discovery to

obtain facts essential to justify its opposition. Because the

court has dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) all claims on which

Defendants seek summary judgment, Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) motion

is DENIED AS MOOT.

 

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C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction “ordering Carl V.

Adams, Sutter County District Attorney, Bill Lockyer, California

Attorney General, and the California Department of Corrections”

to undertake certain actions to protect Plaintiff. (Doc. 69,

filed January 6, 2006, at 5:28-6:17.) 

“A preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant

intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be

granted finally.” De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States,

325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). An injunction may not issue concerning

“a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” Id.,

see, e.g, Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997)

(preliminary injunction to protect plaintiff’s First Amendment

rights was inappropriate in an action for fraud); Omega World

Travel v. TWA, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of

interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the

pendency of the action, from being harmed or further harmed in

the manner in which the movant contends it was or will be harmed

through the illegality alleged in the complaint.”). Bill Lockyer

is not listed as a defendant in the FAC. Plaintiff’s request for

an injunction against Bill Lockyer is inappropriate as it lies

wholly outside the issues in this suit.

The party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that it

is likely to prevail on the merits. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S.

656, 665 (2004). All claims against Defendant Adams and

Defendant California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) have been

dismissed with prejudice. (See Doc. 23, filed April 13, 2005, at

10:4-6.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to

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prevail on the merits against them. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The motion to dismiss the claims against Defendants

Adams, Schroeder, Webster, Yuba City, and Sutter County

is GRANTED; 

2. The motion to dismiss the claims against Defendants

Case, Rangel, Rosario, Suter, and Walker is GRANTED;

3. Plaintiff’s motion for discovery under Rule 56(f) is

DENIED AS MOOT; and

4. Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.8/22/06

/s/Oliver W. Wanger

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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