Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08095/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08095-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

 Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.

Ronald Lee Tsosie,

 Defendant/Movant.

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No. CV-10-8095-PCT-PGR (JRI)

No. CR-94-0031-PCT-PGR

 

 ORDER

 

Having reviewed de novo the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Irwin in light of the movant’s Opposition to Report and Recommendation

Brief (Doc.24) and the Government’s Response to Defendant’s Objections to the

Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 25), the Court finds that the

movant’s objections should be overruled because the Magistrate Judge properly

concluded that the movant’s federal habeas petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255, must be dismissed as time-barred.

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the

limitations period for the movant’s § 2255 motion commenced running on October

7, 1996, the date on which the movant’s conviction became final as a result of the

Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari, and it expired one

Case 3:10-cv-08095-PGR Document 28 Filed 11/14/11 Page 1 of 5
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1

 While the movant indicates in his § 2255 motion that he is relying on the

limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4), which provides that the one-year

limitations period runs from “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence[,]” the

Courts concurs with the Magistrate Judge that this section is inapplicable to the facts of

this case because the gist of the movant’s argument is not that he did not know, or

could not have known, the factual predicates for his claims prior to the one year

anniversary of the date his conviction became final, but that he did not discover until

thereafter the legal significance of the facts previously known to him. For example, he

states in his § 2255 motion that he did not present the issue raised in his First Ground

on direct appeal because “[t]his issue didn’t come to my attention till I learned about the

laws and took computer courses to research the laws.” He uses a variation of this lack

of legal knowledge excuse to explain his failure to raise on direct appeal any of the other

three grounds for relief set forth in his motion. 

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year later. 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). The movant’s § 2255 motion, which is dated

June 6, 2010, was not filed until June 9, 2010, some 121⁄2 years after the

expiration of the limitations period.1

The movant argues in part that the limitations period should be equitably

tolled. Although the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations may be equitably

tolled in appropriate circumstances, Holland v. Florida, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2549,

2560 (2010), the application of equitable tolling is a rarity due to the very high

threshold needed to trigger it. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011 (9th Cir. 2009). A § 2255 movant is entitled to equitable tolling only if he

meets his heavy burden of showing (1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and

prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. at 2562. The movant is not

entitled to equitable tolling because he has not met either prong.

While the movant need not show “maximum feasible” diligence in order to

meet his burden as to the first prong, he must show that he used “reasonable”

diligence. Id. at 2565. In his objections to the Report and Recommendation, the

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2

 The movant also states in his objections that he was able at some

unspecified time to obtain from sources outside of the prison some of the legal

materials he wanted.

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movant cursorily submits that he pursued his rights diligently for the past thirteen

years in that he was “learning the basics of the legal system and trying to learn

how to work a computer” and that he “had a very high bar, as he had to learn the

law, scientific evidence, Indian laws and policies and the basic Federal Rules of

the Courts.” The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the movant has not

sufficiently demonstrated that he exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his

post-conviction relief rights over the course of the long time period at issue.

In order to meet his burden as to the second prong, the movant must show

not only the existence of some external extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control, but also that there is a casual connection between the extraordinary

circumstance and the untimeliness of his § 2255 motion, i.e., that the

extraordinary circumstance made it impossible for him to file his motion on time.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.2010). The movant asserts in his

objections that the Bureau of Prisons’ failure to provide him with certain legal

materials he considers to be essential to his case, such as federal Statutes at

Large, the Federal Register, and materials on Indian law related to the Navajo

Treaty and the Major Crimes Act, constitutes the requisite extraordinary

circumstance.2

 While the deprivation of essential legal materials may in some

circumstances constitute an external impediment justifying equitable tolling,

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d at 1013, the Court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge that the movant has failed to make the requisite showing that

any lack of access to the noted legal materials made it actually impossible for him

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to file a timely § 2255 motion. The movant’s lack of legal training or ignorance of

the law is insufficient to excuse his more than twelve year delay in filing his 

§ 2255 motion. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2006) (“We

now join our sister circuits and hold that a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable

tolling.”) 

The movant, relying on Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), further argues

that his § 2255 motion should be resolved on its merits because it is not subject

to the AEDPA’s limitations period inasmuch as he is actually innocent of the

crimes for which he was convicted. A credible claim of actual innocence can

constitute an equitable exception to the AEDPA’s limitations period. Lee v.

Lambert, 653 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). However, in order to

present otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court under Schlup, the

movant has the heavy burden of producing “new reliable evidence - whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trust-worthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence - that was not presented at trial” that so strongly shows his

actual innocence “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 938 (quoting Schlup. 513

U.S. at 324 and 327). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the

movant is not entitled to the equitable exception for actual innocence because he

has failed to even proffer, much less produce, any post-conviction evidence that

would permit him to pass through the Schlup gateway. Rather, his claim of actual

innocence rests on allegedly inconsistent trial evidence that was considered and

rejected by the jury. The Supreme Court has made it clear that “actual innocence

means factual innocence, not mere legal inconsistency.” Bousley v. United

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States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998); “it certainly did not hold that a petitioner may

invoke Schlup whenever he wants a trial-do-over.” Lee v. Lambert, 653 F.3d at

946 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).

Since the Court has not reached the merits of the movant’s underlying

constitutional claims given that it is denying his § 2255 motion on the procedural

ground that the motion was untimely filed, the movant is entitled to a certificate of

appealability only if he has shown “that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and

that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct

in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court

concludes that a certificate of appealability should not issue because the movant

has not made that requisite showing. The Court further concludes that the movant

should not be allowed to appeal in forma pauperis. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

(Doc.17) is accepted and adopted by the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the movant Ronald Lee Tsosie’s Motion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in

Federal Custody is denied and that this action is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the movant’s request for the issuance of a

Certificate of Appealability (Doc. 27) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 14th day of November, 2011.

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