Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_15-cv-00138/USCOURTS-ared-5_15-cv-00138-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

ROBERT EUGENE JOHNSON PETITIONER 

ADC # 078181 

VS. 5:15-CV-00138-KGB-JTR 

 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 

this Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of 

the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 

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I. Background

On April 30, 2015, Petitioner Robert Eugene Johnson (“Johnson”) initiated 

this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas action.1

 Before addressing the merits of Johnson’s 

claims, the Court will review the procedural history of the state court conviction 

that he is now collaterally attacking. 

On June 17, 2009, a Pulaski County jury found Johnson guilty of: (1) 

possession of cocaine with intent to deliver; and (2) resisting arrest. Doc. 9-2. He 

received an aggregate 40-year sentence as a habitual offender. Id. 

Johnson appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, where he argued that 

the trial court erred in instructing the jury that flight could be considered as 

evidence of guilt. On October 6, 2010, the Court affirmed. Johnson v. State, 2010 

Ark. App. 669, 2010 WL 3902706 (2010). On October 28, 2010, the mandate 

issued. Doc. 6-6. 

Johnson did not file a petition for review with the Arkansas Supreme Court. 

He also did not pursue any post-conviction relief in state court. 

On September 17, 2012, Johnson filed a § 2254 habeas action challenging 

his state court conviction. See Johnson v. Hobbs, Eastern District of Arkansas 

 

1

 See Doc. 1 at 13 (indicating that Johnson mailed the Petition on April 30, 2015). The 

Petition was filed on May 4, 2015. 

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Case No. 5:12-CV-00370-KGB-JTR (“Johnson I”). He argued that: (1) the 

prosecution withheld impeachment evidence in violation of Brady;

2

 and (2) his 

lawyer was ineffective for not investigating his case adequately and not obtaining 

the Brady material.3

 

Respondent, Ray Hobbs, contended that Johnson’s habeas claims should be 

dismissed because they were: (1) barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) 

procedurally defaulted.4

 

On December 17, 2014, the Court entered a Recommended Disposition 

suggesting that Johnson’s habeas case be dismissed, without prejudice, so that he 

could exhaust his Brady claim in state court.5

 

On January 14, 2015, Johnson filed a petition for leave to seek a writ of error 

coram nobis with the Arkansas Supreme Court.6

 He asked the appellate court to 

reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction to consider the alleged Brady violation. 

 

2

 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3

 See Johnson I, at Doc. 2. 4

 Id. at Doc. 9. 5

 Id. at Doc. No. 26. The Court did not address whether Johnson’s habeas claims were 

timely. See Armstrong v. Iowa, 418 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 2005) (“When a state court remedy 

is available for a state prisoner’s unexhausted claims, the federal habeas court must defer action 

until the claim is exhausted, . . . by dismissing the federal petition without prejudice . . .”). 

6 Doc. 6-7. 

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On April 7, 2015, the United States District Court approved and adopted, in 

part, the Recommended Disposition7

 and entered a Judgment dismissing Johnson 

I, without prejudice. 

On April 9, 2015, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied Johnson coram nobis

relief.8

 While acknowledging that an alleged Brady violation could be cause for 

granting the writ, the Court held that Johnson had “not met his burden to show that 

the proposed attack on the judgment is meritorious:”9

 

Petitioner alleges that Hastings was named in at least sixteen 

disciplinary complaints beginning in 2008. However, he does not 

identify how many of those disciplinary complaints occurred prior to 

the date of his trial. Petitioner describes only generally what he 

contends was withheld. He does not describe the complaints 

specifically, and he does not indicate the dates filed, who made the 

alleged withheld complaints, or what concerning the complaints 

should have been available and used to impeach Hastings. As noted 

above, a bare assertion with no factual support does not justify 

reinvesting jurisdiction in the trial court, and petitioner’s assertions 

fall far short of carrying his burden to demonstrate that his claim has 

merit.10

On April 30, 2015, Johnson initiated this federal habeas action (“Johnson 

II”) and reasserted the same habeas claims originally raised in Johnson I: (1) the 

 

7

 Id. at Doc. Nos. 28 & 29. In the District Court’s Order, it clarified that a stand-alone 

actual innocence claim may be cognizable, even in a non-capital case. Id. at Doc. No. 28 at p. 1 

(citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (“We have not resolved whether a 

prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”). 

8

 Doc. 6-9. 9

 Id. at 3. 

10 Id. 

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prosecution withheld impeachment evidence in violation of Brady; and (2) his 

lawyer was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case and to obtain 

the Brady material. In addition, he raises as a new claim his “actual innocence,” 

both to excuse his filing delay and as a “freestanding claim.”11 

Respondent argues that the Court should dismiss Johnson’s habeas claims 

because they are: (1) barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) procedurally 

defaulted. With regard to his claim of actual innocence, Respondent contends that 

Johnson has failed to make the strong showing required to state such a claim.12

For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that this case be 

dismissed, with prejudice, because all of Johnson’s habeas claims are time-barred. 

II. Discussion

A. “New Evidence” Allegedly Supporting Johnson’s Brady

Claim and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

According to Johnson, at trial the prosecution withheld evidence of prior 

misconduct by Joshua Hastings (“Hastings”), the Little Rock Police Department 

(“LRPD”) officer who arrested him and who provided much of the trial evidence 

 

11 Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 39 and 40. Respondent argues that Johnson has not properly asserted a 

“gateway claim” of actual innocence to excuse his untimeliness and procedural default. 

Liberally construing Johnson’s habeas papers, as it is required to do, the Court concludes that he 

has adequately asserted a gateway claim of actual innocence as grounds to excuse his otherwise 

barred claims. 

12 Doc. 6. 

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that supported his convictions. Johnson argues he could have used that evidence, 

on cross-examination, to impeach Hastings and to support the argument that: (a) 

Hastings “planted” the drugs found at the crime scene; and (2) Hastings was the 

aggressor in a fight that took place before his arrest. 

At trial, Hastings testified that, on June 9, 2008 at around 1:30 a.m., he 

responded to a call at 11th Street in Little Rock.13 When he arrived on the scene, 

he saw three African-American men standing in the street near a pickup truck. One 

of the men, Johnson, turned, saw Hastings, threw a plastic baggie under the pickup 

truck, and fled on foot.14 Hastings chased Johnson and took him into custody after 

a “small altercation.”15 

Chad O’Kelley, another LRPD officer, testified that, when he arrived at the 

scene, the foot chase involving Johnson and Hastings was already underway. 

O’Kelley assisted Hastings in subduing Johnson. Hastings then directed O’Kelley 

to search near a pickup truck. O’Kelley found a baggie containing crack cocaine 

within two feet of where Hastings had directed him to search.16 

 

13 Doc. 6-11 at 16. 

14 Id. at 17. 

15 Id. 16 Doc. 6-11 at 57-59.

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After arresting Johnson, Hastings testified that he conducted a search along 

the path Johnson had used to flee. Hastings found $185 in cash on the ground.17 

In one $20 bill Hastings found a small rock of cocaine.18 According to Hastings, 

when he took Johnson into custody, Johnson spontaneously stated “make sure you 

get my money.”19 

During his trial Johnson elected not to testify or call any witnesses. Now, 

however, he alleges a version of events that is in sharp conflict with the evidence 

presented during his trial. According to Johnson, after Hastings stopped him on 

the street, he held out some “contraband,” and asked Johnson: “What's this?” 

Johnson denied knowing anything about the “contraband” and turned to leave. 

Hastings and O'Kelley then attacked Johnson, placed him in handcuffs, and put 

him in a patrol car. During the ride to jail, Hastings allegedly told Johnson that he 

would be charged with possessing the “planted” crack cocaine unless he agreed to 

become an informant. When he declined the offer, Hastings warned him “to keep 

[his] mouth shut about the incident or suffer consequences,” a threat Johnson 

believed “Hastings would have made good on . . .”20 

 

17 Doc. 6-11 at 17-18. 

18 Id. at 18. 

19 Id. at 21. 

20 Id. at 3-4.

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In his habeas papers, Johnson asserts that his fear for his own safety and the 

safety of his family prevented him from testifying to the “real facts” at trial. While 

he admits that he told his trial attorney the “real facts,” he contends she advised 

him that Hastings “had some powerful friends,” and that if Johnson “wished to 

avoid a life sentence,” he should “keep [his] mouth shut.”21 

Importantly, Johnson admits that, at the time of his arrest, he knew Hastings 

had a reputation for unlawfully targeting African-Americans: 

On June 9, 2008, I was enjoying the day by fellowshipping with 

friends on a street in Little Rock when we noticed Little Rock Police 

Officers approaching. Talk on the street was that there was a young 

officer working this area who is the son of Lt. Terry Hastings, then 

spokesman for the Little Rock Police Department. 

Everyone knew Lt. Hastings from watching him for years on 

the news. Word was circulating that Josh Hastings, the Lt.’s son, was 

a Racist and a Bully who systematically targeted blacks for arrest and 

unjustified, unreported beatings. It was said that Patrolman [Josh] 

Hastings was getting away with this behavior because his father was 

pulling strings and calling on favors. People were scared of Officer 

[Josh] Hastings.22

In September of 2012, over three years after his conviction, Johnson asserts 

that he read newspaper reports documenting Hastings’ involvement “in at least 16 

 

21 Id. at 5. On its face, this story is highly implausible. At the time Hastings arrested 

Johnson, he had only been a police officer for two years. Given his lack of seniority or rank, it is 

hard to believe the contention that he was too powerful to oppose. Similarly, it is hard to believe 

that his trial counsel told him not to tell the truth about facts which, if believed, would have led 

to his acquittal, because Hastings supposedly had “some powerful friends.” 

22 Id. at 2-3. 

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separate disciplinary complaints.”23 Johnson contends that, only after Hastings’ 

“chronic misconduct made the news,” was he placed on notice of the habeas claims 

he is now asserting in this action.24 

The “news” Johnson refers to involved an incident that occurred on August 

12, 2012, when Hastings shot and killed a fifteen-year-old African-American while 

investigating a car break-in at an apartment complex in Little Rock. Hastings was 

subsequently charged with manslaughter. Both his first and second trials ended in 

hung juries, after which the State decided to nolle prosse the case.25 Both of 

Hastings’ trials were highly publicized in central Arkansas. 

Johnson has attached to his habeas papers four newspaper articles that 

appeared in the ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE in September and October of 

2012.26 According to these articles, Hastings was hired by the LRPD sometime in 

2007. Between 2008 and 2012, Hastings was: (1) “named in at least 18 

[disciplinary] complaints ...;” and (2) “at least six [of the 18 complaints] were 

 

23 Id. 24 Id. at 5. 

25 See generally State v. Hastings, Pul. Co. Cir. Ct. No. CR 13-224, available online at: 

http://www.pulaskiclerk.com. 

26 Doc. 1 at pp. 14-19. The articles attached to Johnson’s current petition are, for the 

most part, illegible. Two of the four articles were attached, in a legible form, to Johnson’s first 

habeas petition. See Johnson 1, Doc. 2 at 11-14. The Court has obtained from Lexis legible 

copies of the other two articles, which are attached to this Recommended Disposition as “Court’s 

Exhibit 1 and 2.” 

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sustained, resulting in 34 days of missed work spread over six suspensions[.]”27 

These news reports also noted that supervisors complained that Hastings was 

“insubordinate, showed a ‘reckless disregard for public safety, damaged 

department property, used profanity, missed court dates, slept on the job, and lied 

to other officers.”28 

In late 2012, as a result of the shooting incident, Hastings was fired by the 

LRPD for “serious misconduct”29 that included “conduct unbecoming an officer or 

neglect of duty” and being “untruthful” “during interviews with internal 

investigators.”30 

Johnson makes the conclusory argument that Hastings’ entire disciplinary 

record constitutes Brady material which his attorney should have discovered and 

used to impeach Hastings’ trial testimony and corroborate Johnson’s version of 

events.31 He faults his trial counsel for not discovering the existence of those 

 

27 Johnson I, Doc. 2 at 11-14. 28 Johnson I, Doc. 2 at 14. 29 Court’s Exhibit 1 at p. 1 (Doc. 1 at p. 18).

30 Id. 31 The record is unclear as to how many of the disciplinary complaints were filed before

Johnson’s trial in June 2009. Respondent correctly points out that, from the press accounts of 

Hastings’ disciplinary record, most of the incidents for which he was disciplined occurred after

Johnson’s trial. All of these post-trial disciplinary complaints are irrelevant and do not constitute 

Brady material because it did not exist and could not have been produced before Johnson’s trial. 

See United States v. Haskell, 468 F.3d 1064, 1075 (8th Cir. 2006). 

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records and not demanding that the prosecutor produce them, as allegedly required 

by Brady. 

In making this argument, Johnson ignores the fact that Hastings had only one 

disciplinary infraction at the time of Johnson’s June 17, 2009 trial. Furthermore, 

according to the newspaper articles that Johnson relies on to support his argument, 

this infraction took place in 2008 and was based on Hastings “failing to forward 

paperwork and investigative documents to others in the department, as well as 

releasing a burglary suspect at the scene to which he responded.”32 As 

punishment, “Hastings received a one-day suspension.”33 Because this was 

Hastings’ only disciplinary record at the time of Johnson’s trial, it was the only 

record that might arguably constitute Brady material. 

Given the minor nature of Hastings’ 2008 disciplinary infraction, 

misconduct, which involved misconduct that was utterly unrelated to the alleged 

misconduct described by Johnson during his arrest, it neither “corroborated” 

Johnson’s version of events nor supported his claim of actual innocence. This 

 

In denying Johnson’s corum nobis petition, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited the many 

problems with Johnson’s Brady claim. In considering Johnson’s Brady claim, this Court must 

give deference to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision unless it “was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 

32 Johnson I, Doc. 2 at 14. 

33 Id. 

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undoubtedly weighed heavily in the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision to deny 

Johnson corum nobis relief on the ground that his alleged Brady claim lacked 

merit. 

Finally, as indicated earlier, Johnson admits in his habeas papers that he 

knew, on the date Hastings arrested him (June 8, 2008), that word was circulating 

that Hastings “was a [r]acist and a [b]ully who systematically targeted blacks for 

arrest and unjustified, unreported beatings.”34 Johnson suggests, without any 

accompanying explanation, that he was “justified” in remaining silent about these 

“facts” until he read the newspaper articles, years later in the Fall of 2012, about 

Hastings’ workplace misconduct. This entirely “new story” not only strains 

credulity, but also smacks of opportunism created by the newspaper articles 

describing Hastings’ many “bad acts,” virtually all of which were committed long 

after Johnson was convicted and sentenced.35

B. Johnson’s Habeas Claims are Time-Barred 

A prisoner seeking to challenge his state court conviction in federal court 

must file a petition for habeas relief within one year after the state judgment of 

 

34 Doc. 1, at p. 3.

35 Johnson’s belated new version of events is also at odds with the purpose of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s 1-year limitations period for seeking federal 

habeas relief, which “quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court 

judgments.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 179 (2001).

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conviction becomes final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the 

time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In certain “limited 

circumstances,” however, the one-year limitations period may begin to run later 

than “the date on which the state judgment becomes final.”36 

Johnson seeks to bring this habeas action within one of the “limited 

circumstances” described in § 2244(d)(1)(D), which permits a filing within one 

year of “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” For the 

reasons explained below, Johnson is not entitled to the benefit of § 

2244(d)(1)(D).37 

 

36 Earl v. Fabian, 556 F.3d 717, 725 (8th Cir. 2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) 

(defining statutory tolling exceptions to the general rule). 

37 For convenience, the Court has listed the following dates, which are relevant to the 

timeliness of Johnson’s habeas claims and “statutory tolling”: 

October 6, 2010: Arkansas Court of Appeals affirms Johnson’s conviction; 

October 25, 2010: Period to file a petition for review with the Arkansas 

Supreme Court expired and AEDPA one year limitation 

under § 2244(d)(1)(A) started to run; 

October 25, 2011: AEDPA statute of limitations expires, under § 

2244(d)(1)(A); 

September 17, 2012: Johnson initiates first habeas petition, Johnson I; 

January 14, 2015: Johnson files coram nobis petition with Ark. Supreme 

Court; 

April 7, 2015: Johnson I is dismissed, without prejudice; 

April 9, 2015: Ark. Supreme Court denies coram nobis petition; 

April 30, 2015: Johnson initiates this habeas action. 

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The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued its opinion affirming Johnson’s 

conviction on October 6, 2010. Doc. 6-5. Because Johnson failed to file a 

petition for rehearing, his conviction was considered “final” eighteen (18) days 

later, on October 25, 2010.38 Thus, Johnson had until and including October 25, 

2011 to file a timely federal habeas petition. Johnson initiated the current habeas 

petition on April 30, 2015, approximately 31⁄2 years after the expiration of the oneyear limitations period established by § 2244(d)(1)(A).39 

 

38 See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-3 (providing that a petition for rehearing must be filed within 

18 calendar days of the appellate decision). King v. Hobbs, 666 F.3d 1132, 1135-36 & n.4 (8th 

Cir. 2012) (for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations, the “conclusion of direct review” 

in cases from the Arkansas Court of Appeals includes the time allowed for petition for review 

from the Arkansas Supreme Court); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 646 (2012) (For 

a state prisoner who does not seek review in a state’s highest court, the judgment becomes 

“final” on the date that the time for seeking such review expires). 

39 On September 17, 2012, Johnson initiated his first habeas action in federal court. 

Johnson I, Doc. 2. Even that action, however, was filed almost eleven months after the 

expiration of the one-year limitations period. 

On April 7, 2015, the Court dismissed Johnson I, without prejudice, to allow Johnson to 

exhaust his Brady claim by seeking coram nobis relief in state court. Johnson I, Doc. 28. Before 

recommending dismissal, the Court considered whether it should stay Johnson’s habeas action, 

but concluded it had no discretion to stay “because Johnson never presented his habeas claims in 

state court, [and] it [did] not present a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims.” 

Johnson I, Doc. 26, at p. 12 (citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 278 (2005)). Since the 

Rhines decision, several other circuits have held that a district court may consider a stay of a 

habeas petition that raises only unexhausted claims to allow a petitioner to exhaust those claims 

without losing his place in federal court. See, e.g., Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2016); 

Doe v. Jones, 762 F.3d 1174, 1178-84 (10th Cir. 2014). The Eighth Circuit has not addressed this 

issue. 

Even if the Court had conducted a Rhines analysis of Johnson’s first habeas action, he 

could not have satisfied his burden of showing that: (1) good cause existed for his failure to 

exhaust his claim in state court; (2) his unexhausted claim was not meritless; and (3) he had not 

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Johnson argues that he is entitled to the later filing deadline found in § 

2244(d)(1)(D) because he did not become aware of the “factual predicate” for his 

habeas claims until September of 2012, when he read the newspaper articles about 

“Hastings’ chronic misconduct” and he “began to believe that there was hope for 

the truth to also come out in his case.”40 Of course, to obtain the benefit of this 

later filing deadline, Johnson must also show that, even with the exercise of “due 

diligence,” he could not have discovered the “factual predicate” of his claims 

sooner. Johnson simply has not demonstrated that he exercised the “due diligence” 

required by §2244(d)(1)(D). 

Due diligence obligated Johnson to “make reasonable efforts to discover the 

facts supporting his claims.” Anjulo-Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 814, 818 (8th

Cir. 2008); see also Frazier v. Rogerson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 825, 833 (N.D. Iowa 

2003) (“[C]ourts appear to require that the defendant show some kind of measure 

of prudence, activities or assiduity as may be properly expected from and 

 

engaged in abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277-78 (explaining 

that “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances”). 

Finally, Johnson’s first habeas action was filed eleven months after the expiration of the 

one-year statute of limitations contained in § 2244(d)(1)(A), which meant his state coram nobis

petition, filed in January of 2015, had no tolling effect. See Jackson v. Ault, 452 F.3d 734, 736–

36 (8th Cir. 2006) (the statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions is not tolled during the 

pendency of a state proceeding brought after the limitations period has expired). 

40 Doc. 1 at 5 and Doc. 7 at 1.

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ordinarily exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the particular 

circumstances present”). 

The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), in effect at the time of 

Johnson’s arrest and trial, authorized either Johnson or his counsel to request a 

copy of any final disciplinary actions against Hastings. See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-

19-105 (versions in effect before July 27, 2011); Ark. Att. Gen. Opinion No. 2009-

067. Neither of them sought to obtain that information through a FOIA request.41 

Furthermore, even if they had done so, all they would have discovered was that 

Hastings had one final disciplinary action for “failing to forward paperwork and 

investigative documents to others in the department, as well as releasing a burglary 

suspect . . .”42 Assuming that disciplinary conviction constituted Brady material, 

Johnson has presented no arguments or offered any evidence to satisfy Brady’s 

prejudice requirement. As previously explained, the impeachment value of such a 

minor and largely irrelevant disciplinary conviction is nil, and it has no probative 

value with regard to Johnson’s guilt or innocence. Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 

 

41 Arkansas’ FOIA statute was amended, effective July 27, 2011, to deny persons 

convicted of a felony and incarcerated in a correctional facility from having access to public 

records, except through counsel. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(B) (2014). After 

July 27, 2011, Johnson’s incarceration status prevented him from obtaining Hastings’ 

disciplinary record through the FOIA. See Holt v. Howard, 806 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 2015) 

(rejecting constitutional challenge to Arkansas’ FOIA for only allowing incarcerated felons to 

request public records information through an attorney). 

42 Johnson I, doc. 2 at 14.

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422 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that habeas petitioner did not prove prejudice 

because he failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different) (omitting citation and internal quotations). 

Johnson’s lack of diligence is even more glaring given his admission that he 

knew, at the time of his arrest and trial, that: (1) Hastings had a reputation for 

violence against African-Americans; (2) Hastings targeted him because of his 

race; (3) Hastings planted drugs on him after Johnson refused to act as an 

informant; and (4) Hastings, without any provocation, physically assaulted him.43 

Finally, Johnson contends that he conveyed all of these facts to his trial counsel, 

but was advised to keep quiet because Hastings had “powerful friends.”44 

As previously explained, at the time of Johnson’s trial, Hastings had only 

one minor disciplinary conviction, for misconduct that paled in comparison to what 

Johnson alleges he already knew about Hastings being a “rogue cop” at the time of 

his arrest. This admission by Johnson seriously undermines the merits of his 

 

43 Doc. 1, at 2-4.

44 Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based solely on his counsel’s 

failure to conduct an adequate investigation to discover the alleged “Brady material.” He has not 

asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his attorney’s alleged advice not to 

testify based on Hastings having “powerful friends.” 

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Brady claim45 and weighs heavily against a finding that he acted with due diligence 

in pursuing his claims. 

Because Johnson has failed to show that he is entitled to the benefit of 

statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year limitations period began to 

run on October 25, 2010 (the deadline for filing a petition for review with the 

Arkansas Supreme Court) and expired one year later, on October 25, 2011. Thus, 

this habeas action, initiated on April 30, 2015, is time-barred. 

For similar reasons, the 2012 newspaper articles do not provide a basis for 

equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period. A petitioner may be entitled to 

equitable tolling if he shows: (1) he has been “pursuing his rights diligently,” but 

(2) some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented timely 

filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645, 649 (2010). 

 

45 Because Johnson’s habeas Petition is untimely, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of 

his Brady claim, which can only be described as extremely weak. First, because Hastings’ single 

minor disciplinary conviction is largely irrelevant and of almost no value as impeachment 

evidence, it does not constitute Brady materiality. Miller v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 

2005). Second, the prosecution’s Brady obligation did not require it to supply Johnson and his 

attorney with evidence they could have obtained for themselves under Arkansas’s FOIA. See

U.S. v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 8, 2005) (“the government 

is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he already has, or with 

any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself”) (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. 

Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (no Brady violation resulting from government’s 

failure to produce the transcript of prosecution witness’s state court testimony in an unrelated 

case where the defendant cross-examined the witness about the results of that trial, and because 

he “could have obtained a copy of the transcript himself.”). 

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First, the Court has already discussed the fact that Johnson knew or could 

have discovered the factual basis for his habeas claims during the running of the 

one-year limitations period. Second, Johnson has not alleged, much less 

demonstrated, any “extraordinary circumstances” as required by Holland. The 

Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that equitable tolling cannot be justified based 

on a petitioner’s pro se status, lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, or any 

confusion about the federal limitations period or state post-conviction law. See, 

e.g., Johnson v. Hobbs, 678 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2012); Shoemate v. Norris, 

390 F.3d 595, 597-98 (8th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to any 

equitable tolling. 

B. Johnson’s “Actual Innocence” Claims Fail 

Johnson argues that Hastings’ disciplinary record establishes his “actual 

innocence,” both as a gateway claim to excuse his late filing of this habeas action 

and as a freestanding claim. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes 

that Johnson’s actual innocence arguments are without merit. 

1. Johnson’s “gateway claim” of actual innocence 

Johnson argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he is “actually 

innocent.” In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013), the Court 

explained that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a 

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petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or, as in this 

case, expiration of the statute of limitations.” The Court went on to “caution, 

however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: A petitioner does 

not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in 

light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

329 (1995) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The actual-innocence 

exception requires a habeas petitioner to come forward with “new reliable 

evidence” which was “not available at trial through the exercise of due diligence.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

In support of his gateway claim, Johnson again relies on the newspaper 

articles describing Hasting’s criminal charges arising from his involvement in the 

August 2012 shooting, and his prior record of disciplinary convictions. This 

alleged “new evidence” falls far short of what is required to support a gateway 

claim of actual innocence. Even if Johnson had been able to use Hastings’ single 

minor 2008 disciplinary conviction to attack his credibility at trial, that evidence 

would not have been sufficient to “show that it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have convicted” Johnson after hearing such innocuous 

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impeachment evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).46 See Dansby v. 

Norris, 682 F.3d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Latter-day impeachment evidence, 

however, will seldom, if ever, make a clear and convincing case that no reasonable 

jury could believe the core of the witness’s account.”) (internal quotations 

omitted), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2767 (2012); Jennings v. United 

States, 696 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Actual innocence means factual 

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”) (internal quotations and alterations 

omitted); Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1099 (8th Cir. 2007) (“in non-capital 

cases the concept of actual innocence is easy to grasp, because it simply means the 

person didn't commit the crime.”). 

Additionally, the evidence at trial undercuts Johnson’s belated contention 

that the drugs were not his but were planted on him by Hastings. Hastings testified 

that, upon his arrival at the crime scene, he saw Johnson throw something under a 

pick-up truck before fleeing the scene on foot. Officer O’Kelley testified that he 

found the drugs by the truck, near where Hastings asked him to search. 47 Under 

Johnson’s version of events, either: (1) Officer O’Kelley was a participant in the 

 

46 In Schlup, the Court provides several examples of “reliable evidence” that might meet 

that high evidentiary standard, including “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence.” Id. at 324. 

47 Doc. 6-11 at 17, 58-59, 68.

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scheme to plant the drugs, something that is unsupported by any evidence in the 

record; or (2) Hastings threw the drugs under the truck before starting to chase 

down Johnson, which meant he was “anticipatorily” planting drugs on someone he 

might or might not be able to run down. Apart from Johnson’s own self-serving 

statements in his habeas papers, there are no facts in the record which support his 

belated contention that because Hastings allegedly planted the drugs on him, he is 

actually innocent. 

Finally, in assessing Johnson’s claim of actual innocence, the Court must 

consider his lack of diligence. See McQuiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1982 (“Our opinion 

clarifies that a federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway claim, 

should count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner's part, not as an absolute 

barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining whether actual innocence has been 

reliably shown.”). To counter Respondent’s contention that he failed to act 

diligently, Johnson points out that: (1) he filed his habeas petition in Johnson I

within 30 days of learning of the newspaper article documenting Hastings’ 

disciplinary history; (2) he filed his petition seeking coram nobis relief with the 

Arkansas Supreme Court within 30 days of receipt of the Recommended 

Disposition in Johnson I; and (3) he initiated this habeas action within 30 days 

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after the Arkansas Supreme Court denied corum nobis relief.48 Johnson, however, 

fails to address his 31⁄2 year delay in demonstrating any diligence in pursuing his 

habeas claims, despite his admission that, at the time of his arrest in June of 2008, 

he knew all about Hastings’ reputation as a “rogue cop.” 

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Johnson’s gateway 

actual innocence claim is without merit. Accordingly, it cannot serve as a basis for 

excusing his failure to timely seek federal habeas relief within the applicable one 

year statute of limitations. 

 2. Johnson’s “freestanding claim” of actual innocence 

The Court’s decision in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1931, did not 

resolve “whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence.” Even if this Court assumes that such a 

claim is cognizable, the law is clear that the burden required to establish a 

freestanding actual innocence claim is greater than the burden required to establish 

a gateway actual innocence claim. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) 

(finding that although petitioner had established a gateway innocence claim such 

that his procedurally defaulted constitutional claims would be considered, such 

evidence fell short of the “extraordinarily high” showing required for a 

 

48 Doc. 7 at 2.

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“hypothetical freestanding innocence claim”); Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809 (8th

Cir. 2014) (relying on House to reject petitioner’s freestanding actual innocence 

claim). 

As previously explained, Johnson has failed to establish a gateway actual 

innocence claim. A fortiori, his freestanding actual innocence claim also fails. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED, and this case be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of Appealability be 

DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Dated this 15th day of December, 2016. 

 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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