Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01300/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-01300-36/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIMAR SYSTEMS INC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CISCO SYSTEMS INC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-01300-JSW (MEJ)

DISCOVERY ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 287

INTRODUCTION

This is a patent infringement case in which Plaintiffs ChriMar Systems, Inc. d/b/a CMS 

Technologies and ChriMar Holdings Company, LLC (collectively “ChriMar”) allege infringement 

of U.S. Patent No. 7,457,250 (the ’250 patent). Compl. at 1, Dkt. No. 1. Pending before the Court 

is the parties’ joint discovery dispute regarding certain documents ChriMar withheld from 

production to Defendants Cisco Systems, Inc. and Linksys, LLC f/k/a Cisco Consumer Products 

LLC (collectively “Cisco”) based on claims of attorney-client privilege and/or work product

protection. Jt. Ltr., Dkt. No. 287. Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal 

authority, and the record in this case, the Court issues the following order. 

BACKGROUND

On October 31, 2011, ChriMar filed this suit alleging Defendants Cisco and HewlettPackard Co. infringed the ’250 Patent, entitled “System for Communicating with Electronic 

Equipment,” which allows power to be sent over Ethernet. Compl. at 5. The technology is used 

for Power over Ethernet telephones, switches, wireless access points, routers and other devices 

used in wireless local area networks, and/or cameras and components thereof that are compliant 

with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers1standards. Id. at 5-6. The technology

 

1

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers is a standard-setting organization that sets 

technical specifications to ensure a variety of products from different manufacturers operate 

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“allows buildings . . . to be designed so that electrical plugs do not need to be located near where 

network devices are used.” Cisco Second Am. Countercl. at 22, Dkt. No. 242. Additionally, “the 

use of Power over Ethernet permits devices like VoIP phones to continue to receive power from a 

Power over Ethernet switch in the event of power outages.” Id.

On December 29, 2015, the parties filed the present letter in which they dispute whether 

ChriMar has properly withheld 258 emails based on claims of attorney-client privilege and/or 

work product protection. Jt. Ltr. at 3. The emails at issue were sent by John Austermann, a 

named inventor of the patent-in-suit and non-lawyer, to himself. Id. ChriMar maintains the 

documents are privileged, arguing that each communication reflects and contains legal advice Mr. 

Austermann received from his attorneys. Id. Cisco argues ChriMar has not met its burden of 

establishing these emails are privileged. Id.

On January 4, 2016, the Court ordered ChriMar to submit unredacted copies of the 

documents for in camera review. Order, Dkt. No. 289. In addition to submitting the documents, 

the Court ordered ChriMar to file a declaration from each attorney referenced in its privilege log 

attesting as to each document that (1) Mr. Austermann sought legal advice from him, (2) the 

document contains confidential communications relating to that purpose, and (3) the document 

contains privileged material and should not be produced. Id. 

On January 11, 2016, ChriMar delivered unredacted copies of the emails and filed a Notice 

of Compliance with the Court’s Order. Pl.’s Not., Dkt. No. 306. In its Notice, ChriMar withdrew 

claims of privilege as to certain emails. Id. at 2. ChriMar also submitted declarations from

attorneys Christopher M. Taylor (Dkt. No. 306-1), G. Gregory Schivley (Dkt. No. 306-2), Richard 

W. Hoffman (Dkt. No. 306-3), and J. Michael Huget (Dkt. No. 306-4). ChriMar requested the 

Court proceed without a declaration from attorney Ralph Terrance Rader, as his recollection of 

contact with Mr. Austermann was limited due to a stroke, and he declined to submit a declaration 

for that reason. Pl.’s Not. at 2-3. ChriMar also requested additional time to submit a declaration 

 

compatibly. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015). Because 

these standards often incorporate patented technology, all manufacturers who implement a 

standard must obtain a license to use those standard-essential patents. Id. 

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from attorney Glenn Forbis, as he reported pre-existing obligations that made him unable to 

examine the large volume of material by the January 4 deadline. Id. at 3. The Court granted 

ChriMar until January 22, 2016 to submit Mr. Forbis’s declaration. Dkt. No. 307. On January 21, 

2016, ChriMar filed a second Notice of Compliance, withdrawing its privilege claims as to 

additional emails. Dkt. No. 317. ChriMar also filed Mr. Forbis’s Declaration. Dkt. No. 317-1. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that a party may obtain discovery “regarding 

any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the 

needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Factors to consider include “the importance of the 

issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 

whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. 

Discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. However, “[t]he parties and 

the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery and 

consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes (2015 

amendments). Thus, there is “a shared responsibility on all the parties to consider the factors 

bearing on proportionality before propounding discovery requests, issuing responses and 

objections, or raising discovery disputes before the courts.” Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 2016 

WL 736213, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016); Goes Int’l, AB v. Dodur Ltd., 2016 WL 427369, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (citing advisory committee notes for proposition that parties share a 

“collective responsibility” to consider proportionality and requiring that “[b]oth parties . . . tailor 

their efforts to the needs of th[e] case”).

Rule 26(c) “confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is 

appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 

20, 36 (1984). “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” which may (1) prohibit

disclosure or discovery; (2) condition disclosure or discovery on specified terms; (3) prevent 

inquiry into certain matters; or (4) limit the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

DISCUSSION

Cisco argues ChriMar has failed to meet its burden of establishing the withheld emails are 

privileged for two reasons.

2

 Jt. Ltr. at 3. First, Cisco contends there is no indication that any of 

these documents was sent to, or received from, any attorney. Id. Second, Cisco argues that 

previous discovery produced by ChriMar has revealed other emails Mr. Austermann sent to 

himself reflect his own thoughts, even when they were initially withheld based on claims that the 

emails reflected, contained, or facilitated legal advice, analysis, or litigation strategy. Id. at 4. 

In response, ChriMar claims the emails are privileged because they reflect and 

memorialize legal advice. Id. at 5. Relying on Shire Development, Inc. v. Cadila Healthcare 

Limited, 2012 WL 5247315, at *3 (D. Del. June 15, 2012), ChriMar argues a document does not 

need to be addressed to or from an attorney to be privileged. Jt. Ltr. at 6. Even if an attorney 

never saw the emails in question, ChriMar contends that as long as those emails reflect notes of 

what the client told the attorney, they are as privileged as a confidential conversation between a 

client and the attorney. Id. (citing United States v. Motorola, Inc., 1999 WL 552553, at *5

(D.D.C. May 28, 1999)).

A. The Attorney-Client Privilege

Federal privilege law applies in this federal question case. See Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, 

2016 WL 730211, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016) (“In nondiversity jurisdiction civil cases, 

federal law privilege will generally apply.” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 501, advisory committee 

notes)). The attorney-client privilege protects from discovery “confidential communications 

between attorneys and clients, which are made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” United 

States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, the 

elements of the privilege are: 

 

2

Initially, relying on Hynix Semiconductor v. Rambus, Inc., 2008 WL 350641, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 2, 2008), Cisco maintained that ChriMar’s failure to support its privilege with declarations 

from the attorneys was fatal to its privilege claim. Jt. Ltr. at 3. However, as ChriMar 

subsequently submitted these declarations, this argument is moot.

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(1) When legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal 

adviser in his or her capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to 

that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are, at the client’s 

instance, permanently protected (7) from disclosure by the client or by the 

legal adviser (8) unless the protection be waived.

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g (Mar. 

13, 2002) (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). The privilege 

is “narrowly and strictly construed,” and the party asserting it bears the burden of proving that it 

applies. Vasudevan Software, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 2011 WL 1599646, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 

2011) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 493 (N.D. Cal. 

2003) (holding that the party asserting privilege “must make a prima facie showing” that privilege 

applies (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1992))). 

When a party asserts the privilege to withhold documents, it must “expressly make the 

claim” and “describe the nature of the documents . . . in a manner that . . . will enable other parties 

to assess the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). The privilege log is an accepted method for 

doing so. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d at 1071. When a privilege log is insufficient, 

this can be cured by providing “affidavits of the attorneys who prepared the documents declaring 

that the documents contained confidential information for the purpose of seeking legal advice and 

that the contents of the documents had not been disclosed to anyone outside of the retained law 

firm or the corporation.” Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Fresenius Med. Care Holding, Inc., 2008 

WL 5214330, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2008). However, “[a] vague declaration that states only 

that the document ‘reflects’ an attorney’s advice is insufficient to demonstrate that the document 

should be found privileged.” Hynix, 2008 WL 350641, at *3. 

B. Whether Mr. Austermann’s Emails To Himself Can Be Privileged

As noted above, Cisco argues Mr. Austermann’s emails to himself are not privileged 

because there is no indication they were sent to, or received from, an attorney. Jt. Ltr. at 3. 

However, a document that is not communicated between an attorney and a client may still be 

privileged as long as “the document by its nature and contents memorializes and reflects legal 

advice rendered in a privileged conversation.” Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Fresenius Med. Care 

Holding, Inc., 2009 WL 533124, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2009) (citing In re Rivastigmine Patent 

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Litig., 237 F.R.D. 69, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Courts recognize that “[d]isclosure of [a] client’s 

notes of what he told the attorney would have the same inhibiting effect on the client as asking 

him directly to state what he told the attorney in confidence.” United States v. Motorola, Inc., 

1999 WL 552553, at *5 (D.D.C. May 28, 1999); see also Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 154, 161 

(D.D.C. 1999) (“[t]he attorney-client privilege applies to entries in a client’s diaries that describe 

communications from attorneys or are based on such communications”) (citation omitted; brackets

in original); Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Sofamor Danek Grp., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 505, 515 (W.D.

Tenn. 1999) (finding the attorney-client privilege applied to handwritten notes describing a 

discussion between an attorney and a client “for the purposes of legal advice [that] was intended to 

be confidential”). Finally, “communications between a corporation and its outside counsel are 

presumed to be made for the purpose of seeking legal advice.” United States v. ChevronTexaco 

Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (emphasis in original). Thus, there is no 

reason why Mr. Austermann’s emails are not entitled to protection based solely on the fact that 

they were written by him to himself. While not communicated to his attorneys, Mr. Austermann 

and his attorneys attest that the emails memorialize and reflect confidential communications made 

for the purpose of conveying legal advice. Jt. Ltr. at 4; Taylor Decl. ¶ 5; Schivley Decl. ¶ 5; 

Hoffman Decl. ¶ 5; Huget Decl. ¶ 5; Forbis Decl. ¶ 5. So long as Mr. Austermann’s emails 

describe confidential communications with his attorneys, or are based on such communications, 

they may be protected by the attorney-client privilege.

C. Whether Mr. Austermann’s Emails Are Privileged

Next, Cisco argues the emails do not memorialize legal advice sought from an attorney in a 

privileged conversation. Jt. Ltr. at 4. Specifically, Cisco asserts “ChriMar’s privilege log entry 

for each of the Withheld Documents is virtually identical in nature and substance to ChriMar’s 

entry for the CB-4 document,” an email which ChriMar initially withheld, but the Court ordered

produced after finding ChriMar’s description on the privilege log did not meet its burden of 

establishing the attorney-client privilege applied. Id. Cisco argues that like the CB-4 email, “each 

of the Withheld Documents is an email from Mr. Austermann—a non-lawyer—to himself” and 

that “discovery in this action has revealed that Mr. Austermann regularly took notes of his own 

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thoughts by sending emails to himself.” Id. at 3. For example, ChriMar has now produced an 

email that on one of its previous privilege logs it described as an “[e]mail chain that reflects, 

contains or facilitates legal advice, analysis or strategy regarding pending litigation,” and it also 

produced an email sent from Mr. Austermann to himself that stated “[t]hings to think about” 

followed by a list. Id. at 4; see also id., Ex. B (ChriMar’s Suppl. Am. Privilege Log) at 2, Dkt. 

No. 287-2. Indeed, ChriMar has now produced more than 25 emails that initially were claimed to 

reflect or facilitate legal advice. Jt. Ltr. at 4. Thus, Cisco maintains ChriMar has not met its 

burden of establishing privilege. Id. at 5.

ChriMar argues the emails memorialize legal advice in a privileged conversation and that a 

“careful review” of the descriptions of privilege on the latest amended log corroborates that the 

Withheld Documents do not have the “same substance and format as CB-4.” Id. at 6. In support, 

ChriMar notes that for each email, its log identifies the attorneys that were participants in the

privileged communication with Mr. Austermann. Id. at 5. ChriMar submitted declarations from 

all but one of those attorneys. Dkt. Nos. 306-1, 306-2, 306-3, 306-4, 317-1. ChriMar also points 

out that “Cisco itself logged documents for privilege where no attorney is indicated as appearing 

on the communication.” Jt. Ltr. at 6. 

When conducting an in camera review, courts consider the “‘totality of circumstances’” 

and offer protection when the “‘document was created because of anticipated litigation, and would 

not have been created in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation.’” In re 

CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 1699536, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006), as 

clarified on reconsideration, 2006 WL 2585038 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2006) (quoting In re Grand 

Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf/Torf Envtl. Mgmt.), 357 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2004)). In assessing 

the nature of the document, courts look at the facts and context surrounding the creation of the 

document, taking into account the “breadth of the recipient list in assessing the centrality of 

potential legal advice generated by the communication” and “whether a communication explicitly 

sought advice and comment.” Id. at *4.

ChriMar’s privilege log includes the date of each email, the sender and recipient, a 

statement that each email “reflects and memorializes legal advice,” and identifies which attorney 

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communicated with Mr. Austermann. Jt. Ltr., Ex. A (ChriMar’s Second Am. Privilege Log), Dkt. 

No. 287-1. This in itself can be sufficient to establish privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 

Investigation, 974 F.2d at 1071 (concluding a log is sufficient when it identifies: “(a) the attorney 

and client involved, (b) the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities shown on the 

document to have received or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities known to have been 

furnished the document or informed of its substance, and (e) the date the document was generated, 

prepared, or dated”). However, given that the emails were sent and received by the same person,

who is not a lawyer, it is not clear based on the privilege log alone that the emails document 

advice from privileged communications. 

Having carefully reviewed each email and the attorney declarations submitted by ChriMar, 

the Court finds ChriMar has properly withheld certain emails under the attorney-client privilege.

3

 

These emails fall into one of the following categories: 

1) Emails memorializing privileged communications concerning 

litigation strategies for actions involving Cisco (mainly the 

infringement of U.S. Patent 5,406,260 (’260)). This includes: (1) 

strategies for preparation, pre-filing, pleading, proposed briefing, 

court rulings, claims of prior art, and licensing agreements; (2) 

analysis of Special Master’s rulings; and (3) assessments of 

infringement elements/facts and the validity of Cisco’s claims.

2) Emails memorializing privileged communications concerning 

litigation strategies regarding pleading, licensing, and settlement for 

an action involving Power Dsine’s infringement of U.S. Patent ’260. 

3) Emails memorializing privileged communications concerning 

legal advice for patent prosecution and enforcement of ChriMar 

intellectual property. 

 

3

These emails are identified in the privilege log as: CB-1, 92, 696, 698, 699, 700, 701, 703, 705, 

710, 721, 722, 723, 724, 731, 733, 736, 738, 1357, 1528, 2195, 2196, 2204, 2208, 2218, 2219, 

2220, 2221, 2233, 2234, 2381, 2382, 2394, 2408, 2452, 2453, 2461, 2463, 2465, 2466, 2467, 

2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2474, 2496, 2568, 2591, 2892, 2953, 3014, 3044, 3239, 3240, 3273, 

3298, 3307, 3324, 3342, 3382, 3402, 3407, 3422, 3449, 3464, 3551, 3573, 3588, 3751, 3752, 

3753, 3754, 3774, 3836, 3837, 3838, 3900, 3916, 3917, 3944, 3945, 3987, 3988, 3989, 3990, 

3991, 3992, 4048, 4049, 4050, 4051, 4052, 4053, 4054, 4057, 4110, 4113, 4114, 4115, 4117, 

4220, 4221, 4222, 4223, 4224, 4225, 4227, 4282, 4333, 4373, 4374, 4375, 4377, 4378, 4400, 

4448, 4449, 4452, 4474, 4526, 4527, 4528, 4529, 4530, 4531, 4532, 4533, 4534, 4558, 4579, 

4580, 4584, 4585, 4586, 4587, 4593, 4598, 4599, 4603, 4604, 4660, 4668, 4669, 4670, 4673, 

4685, 4706, 4707, 4709, 4725, 4792, 4795, 4800, 4801, 4803, 4811, 4812, 4881, 4941, 4996, 

5044, 5066, 5114, 5157, 5190, 5206, 5224, 5228, 5239, 5243, 5245, 5627, 5781, 5805, 6266, 

6325, 6333, 6349, 6422, 6427, 6428, 6429, 6430, 6441, 6452, 6467, 6476, 6479, 6486, 6495, 

6501, 6502, 6503, 6524, 6533, 6556, 6582, 6586, 6598, 6599, 6612, and 6637. Dkt. No. 287-1.

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4) Emails memorializing privileged communications concerning 

legal advice regarding IBM references from prior art database.

These categories represent emails created based on the threat of litigation or litigation that was 

ongoing at the time they were written. While Cisco contends these emails are analogous to those 

ChriMar has already been ordered to produce, such as the CB-4 email, these emails memorialize 

direct legal questions posed to a named attorney, describe updates about business and litigation 

developments regarding infringement litigation, outline summaries of legal advice received, and 

concern communications involving patent prosecution strategy. Jt. Ltr. at 3-4. These emails are 

privileged as they would not have been created in substantially the same form if not for litigation

or patent prosecution. See In re CV Therapeutics, 2006 WL 1699536, at *4 (“The attorney-client 

privilege protects documents which ‘involve either client communications intended to keep the 

attorney apprised of continuing business developments, with an implied request for legal advice 

based thereon, or self-initiated attorney communications intended to keep the client posted on 

legal developments and implications, including implications of client activity noticed by the 

attorney but with regard to which no written request for advice from the client has been found.’”

(quotation omitted)); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 372, 378 

(N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Communications from inventor to patent lawyer, even those that are entirely 

technical, remain presumptively protected by the attorney-client privilege.”). 

Further, while some emails contain both business and legal analysis, such as the discussion 

of licensing agreements, they “d[o] not have a readily separable purpose unrelated to the provision 

of legal advice,” given that business analysis informs the legal strategy for infringement litigation. 

Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 2004 WL 1878209, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004) (holding 

documents prepared at the request of counsel for the purpose of rendering legal advice are 

privileged even if they may have informed business analysis as well). Accordingly, ChriMar 

properly withheld these documents.4 

 

4 On reconsideration of its previous order, the Court in In re CV Therapeutics noted the “because 

of” standard laid out by the Ninth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d at 900, dealt 

with the work product privilege and not the attorney-client privilege, and that some cases in this 

District have used a “predominate purpose” standard for attorney-client privilege. 2006 WL 

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Emails identified in ChriMar’s privilege log as 4196 and 5075 contain both privileged and 

nonprivileged information. Dkt. No. 287-1. Both emails concern similar content, where the 

bottom portion of each appears to represent legal advice in a privileged conversation like those 

emails described above. However, the top portion of each email contains what appears to be a 

schedule or reminder list that is unrelated to legal advice. Therefore, ChriMar shall produce these 

emails, but may redact the portion beginning with “***Concise . . .” to the end of the emails. 

As to the remaining emails, the Court finds ChriMar has not meet its burden to establish 

privilege. These emails fall into one of two categories: (1) documents created for purely business 

purposes;5and (2) documents that include unknown senders/recipients that are attributed to the 

legal advice of an attorney in the privilege log.6 

Regarding the first category of documents, “the critical question is the extent to which the 

communication solicits or provides legal advice or functions to facilitate the solicitation or 

provision of legal advice.” In re CV Therapeutics, 2006 WL 1699536, at *4 (concluding a 

document created for business or technical purposes must be “so permeated by the need for legal 

advice such that the documents were created ‘because of’ the need to obtain legal advice”). A 

document that has a “readily separable business purpose” or that “would have been prepared as 

part of ordinary course of business” cannot receive protection. Visa U.S.A., 2004 WL 1878209, at 

*8. 

Three of the four emails in the first category (3041, 5238, 6526) are related to board 

meetings, including agenda items and lists of items for board review, such as cash flow, salaries, 

 

2585038, at *2 (citing In re Napster, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11497, at 

*19 n. 1 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 12, 2005)). However, like the court in In re CV Therapeutics, the Court 

discerns no reason why “for purposes of determining the discoverability of documents that have

both a legal purpose and a nonlegal purpose (e.g., business purpose), the methodology in In re 

Grand Jury Subpoena should not be applied to the attorney-client privilege,” and regardless, “the 

result in the instant case is the same under either standard.” In re CV Therapeutics, 2006 WL 

2585038, at *2.

5

These emails are identified in the privilege log as: 3041, 4999, 5238, and 6526. Dkt. No. 287-1.

6

These emails are identified in the privilege log as: 697, 788, 793, 2454, 2486, 3400, 3481, 3757, 

3921, 3968, 4060, 4094, 4095, 4109, 4151, 4235, 4236, 4258, 4549, 4550, 4551, 4552, 4573, 

4574, 4576, 4577, 4578, 4590, 4591, 4592, 4600, 4602, 4674, 4680, 4787, 4943, 5047, 5111, 

6205, 6323, 6326, 6386, and 6470. Dkt. No. 287-1.

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and costs. Documents prepared for a board meeting that would have been created regardless of 

litigation are not privileged. Id. (holding materials prepared to inform board of substantive 

business decisions were not privileged, even if sent to counsel for review, as they “cannot fairly be 

said that they were created in the first place because of the need to obtain legal advice” when they

would have been prepared in any event). A fourth email (4999) merely discusses public or nonconfidential information and contains no legal advice. Without further explanation, the Court 

cannot find these emails are privileged. 

As to the second category, it is not clear these emails are privileged as they include 

unknown senders and recipients. While the privilege log states these emails memorialize legal 

advice from a named attorney, it does not identify the other recipients or senders named in the 

emails or in the “To” or “From” fields in emails included in the body of the emails Mr. 

Austermann sent to himself. Dkt. No. 287-1. Furthermore, the inclusion of unidentified email 

recipients can “destroy[] the confidential nature of the communication absent an explanation of 

who the[] recipients were.” In re CV Therapeutics, 2006 WL 1699536, at *9; In re Rivastigmine 

Patent Litig., 237 F.R.D. at 83 (“Without information identifying the individuals involved in the 

particular communications, it is impossible for the plaintiffs to meet their burden of establishing 

the ‘attorney’ element of the attorney-client privilege.”). Thus, ChriMar should produce these 

emails as it has not explained how they memorialize legal advice.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

1) The following emails are privileged and need not be produced: 

CB-1, 92, 696, 698, 699, 700, 701, 703, 705, 710, 721, 722, 723, 724, 731, 733, 

736, 738, 1357, 1528, 2195, 2196, 2204, 2208, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2233, 

2234, 2381, 2382, 2394, 2408, 2452, 2453, 2461, 2463, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 

2469, 2470, 2471, 2474, 2496, 2568, 2591, 2892, 2953, 3014, 3044, 3239, 3240, 

3273, 3298, 3307, 3324, 3342, 3382, 3402, 3407, 3422, 3449, 3464, 3551, 3573, 

3588, 3751, 3752, 3753, 3754, 3774, 3836, 3837, 3838, 3900, 3916, 3917, 3944, 

3945, 3987, 3988, 3989, 3990, 3991, 3992, 4048, 4049, 4050, 4051, 4052, 4053, 

4054, 4057, 4110, 4113, 4114, 4115, 4117, 4220, 4221, 4222, 4223, 4224, 4225, 

4227, 4282, 4333, 4373, 4374, 4375, 4377, 4378, 4400, 4448, 4449, 4452, 4474, 

4526, 4527, 4528, 4529, 4530, 4531, 4532, 4533, 4534, 4558, 4579, 4580, 4584, 

4585, 4586, 4587, 4593, 4598, 4599, 4603, 4604, 4660, 4668, 4669, 4670, 4673, 

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4685, 4706, 4707, 4709, 4725, 4792, 4795, 4800, 4801, 4803, 4811, 4812, 4881, 

4941, 4996, 5044, 5066, 5114, 5157, 5190, 5206, 5224, 5228, 5239, 5243, 5245, 

5627, 5781, 5805, 6266, 6325, 6333, 6349, 6422, 6427, 6428, 6429, 6430, 6441, 

6452, 6467, 6476, 6479, 6486, 6495, 6501, 6502, 6503, 6524, 6533, 6556, 6582, 

6586, 6598, 6599, 6612, and 6637. 

2) ChriMar shall produce the following emails in redacted format: 4196 and 5075.

3) ChriMar has not met its burden to establish privilege as to the following emails: 

697, 788, 793, 2454, 2486, 3041, 3400, 3481, 3757, 3921, 3968, 4060, 4094, 4095, 

4109, 4151, 4235, 4236, 4258, 4549, 4550, 4551, 4552, 4573, 4574, 4576, 4577, 

4578, 4590, 4591, 4592, 4600, 4602, 4674, 4680, 4787, 4943, 4999, 5047, 5111, 

5238, 6205, 6323, 6326, 6386, 6470, and 6526. 

Accordingly, by April 28, 2016, ChriMar shall either (a) produce these emails, or 

(b) lodge (not file) a brief for in camera review addressing the deficiencies noted 

above. If ChriMar chooses to lodge a brief, it must provide a separate explanation 

for each withheld email; a blanket statement for all emails will not suffice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2016

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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