Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04689/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04689-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT THELANDER,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY KANE, Warden, and

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor, 

Respondents.

 /

No. C 05-4689 CW

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND ORDERING

BRIEFING ON

HABEAS PETITION 

In this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner Scott Thelander, a prisoner incarcerated

at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California,

alleges that his right to due process was violated in being denied

parole for the eighth time.

Respondent Anthony Kane moves to dismiss this action for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that there is no

federally protected liberty interest in parole and therefore no

federal due process rights involved in parole decisions. 

Petitioner opposes the motion. Having considered all the papers

filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Respondent's motion to

Case 4:05-cv-04689-CW Document 13 Filed 09/19/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

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dismiss and orders briefing on the habeas petition.

BACKGROUND

On May 27, 1981, Petitioner was convicted of second degree

murder. The Board of Parole Hearings1

 denied Petitioner parole

seven times on the following dates: June 22, 1990, April 15, 1992,

April 19, 1994, July 5, 1995, July 1, 1997, June 5, 2001 and June

7, 2002. On September 18, 2003, the Board denied Petitioner parole

for the eighth time. In this habeas petition, Petitioner

challenges the Board's September 18, 2003 parole denial. 

Petitioner claims that the Board's decision violates his liberty

interest in being released on parole, an interest protected by the

federal constitutional right to due process.

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, arguing that California law does not create a

federally protected liberty interest in parole release. 

Although a convicted person has no inherent or constitutional

right to early release on parole, a State's statutory parole scheme

may create "a presumption that parole release will be granted" if

it uses mandatory language. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska

Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (finding that the

Nebraska parole statute, which provides that the Board "shall"

release the prisoner subject to certain restrictions, creates a due

process liberty interest in release on parole). This presumption

Case 4:05-cv-04689-CW Document 13 Filed 09/19/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

 All further statutory references in this Order are to the

California Penal Code, unless otherwise specified.

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of parole release gives rise to a constitutionally protected

liberty interest that cannot be denied without adequate due process

protection. Id. at 11-16; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (finding that the Montana parole statute,

which provides that board "shall" release the prisoner subject to

certain restrictions, creates a due process liberty interest in

release on parole).

California's parole scheme is set forth in California Penal

Code § 3041.2

 Section 3041 instructs that the Board "shall set a

release date" unless it decides this is inadvisable based on the

nature and timing of the offense and in consideration of public

safety: 

[a] One year prior to the inmate's minimum

eligible parole release date a panel of two or

more commissioners or deputy commissioners

shall . . . meet with the inmate and shall

normally set a parole release date . . . The

release date shall be set in a manner that will

provide uniform terms for offenses of similar

gravity and magnitude in respect to their

threat to the public, and that will comply with

the sentencing rules that the Judicial Council

may issue and any sentencing information

relevant to the setting of parole release

dates. The board shall establish criteria for

the setting of parole release dates and in

doing so shall consider the number of victims

of the crime for which the inmate was sentenced

and other factors in mitigation or aggravation

of the crime . . . [b] The panel or the board,

sitting en banc, shall set a release date

unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted

offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration for this individual,

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be

fixed at this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a), (b).

Respondent contends that a recent decision of the California

Supreme Court, In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005),

establishes that California prisoners have no liberty interest in

parole and therefore no federal due process rights in connection

with parole decisions. The Ninth Circuit has recently rejected

this contention. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 2006 WL

2506393 at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2006). Therefore, the Court has

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to decide

whether Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated by the Board's determination that he was not suitable for

parole. Accordingly, Respondent's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Respondent's

motion to dismiss and orders briefing on the merits of the

petition. Respondent shall have thirty days from the date of this

order to file an answer. Petitioner shall have thirty days

thereafter to file a traverse.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/19/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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