Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01855/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01855-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANA HUDSON D.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KATHERINE L. ARCHUELETA, 

Director, Office of Personnel Management,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:14-CV-01855-LJO-SKO

ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED 

WITH 30 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 6)

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2014, Plaintiff Dana Hudson D. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, filed this her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant Katherine L. 

Archeuleta, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, apparently in her official 

capacity (“Defendant”). (Doc. 6.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

It is difficult to discern the sequence of events and facts alleged in Plaintiff’s meandering 

and disorganized amended complaint. The FAC is nearly identical to the original complaint, and 

adds little in the way of facts to illuminate the substance of Plaintiff’s allegations against 

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Defendant. 

Under the new section “Statement Of Claim,” Plaintiff asserts that

. . . .without my knowledge hospital officials notified the United States 

Department of Justice (USDOJ) sometime between May 2013 and August 2013 

of adverse documents in my medical records in reference to violence and “I may 

never get it,” interferences and the crimes committed violating my civil rights.

(Doc. 6, 2.) Plaintiff further claims that she “was allowed by hospital officials and the USDOJ

from November 2013 to March 2014 to oppose discrimination.” (Doc. 6, 2.) 

In her “Facts” section, Plaintiff states that she was employed by the United States Post 

Office beginning October 7, 1977, as a “LSM Machine Operator,” and eventually switched to a

position as a “Mail Carrier” in 1983. (Doc. 6, 2.) In the course of her duties as a mail carrier, 

Plaintiff alleges that she sustained injuries to her right knee on August 5, 1988, and to her left knee 

on October 20, 1993. (Doc. 6, 2.) 

Plaintiff was put “on the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWCP) rolls” at some point, 

and her benefits were terminated in October of 2003 “in violation of [the] Rehabilitation Act[.]” 

(Doc. 6, 2.) Plaintiff claims that she requested and was granted a hearing to review the 

termination of her Workers’ Compensation benefits, and that her “rights to due process were 

violated” when she reviewed a “copy of the transcript from OWCP hearing office” and requested 

certain omitted information be added to the transcript. (Doc. 6, 2.) Plaintiff appears to allege that 

the omitted information was that she “had not physically worked since December 26, 199 due to 

[her] disability of worn out knee replacement and surgeries.” (Doc. 6, 2.) However, it is unclear 

from the FAC whether Plaintiff is simply stating this as a “fact” or alleging that Defendant or 

another entity is responsible for failing to include this information in the hearing transcript. 

Plaintiff further alleges that “[s]ubsequently to the above, [she was] not given equal 

opportunity as disparate treatment [she is] continuously discriminated against by OPM and denied 

disability retirement” “with 28 years and 7 months of creditable service.” (Doc. 6, 3.) “As further 

disparate treatment without notification [she] was denied the right to due process and terminated 

on May 9, 2008 without ever [being returned] to work with reasonable accommodations in 

violation of the Rehabilitation Act[.]” (Doc. 6, 3.) It is unclear how Defendant or another entity is 

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responsible for not returning her to work with reasonable accommodations. Though Plaintiff 

quotes the Rehabilitation Act to define “a reasonable accommodation,” Plaintiff alleges no facts 

explaining Defendant’s conduct, and what accommodation was not provided to her.

Plaintiff became totally and/or permanently disabled on May 28, 2010, when she was 

granted Social Security Disability benefits, and has had “numerous surgeries to [her] right knee 

including an infection and chronic pain several (sic) of the surgeries required knee replacements 

May 2010, June 2010, July 2010, May 2003, October 2002, May 2002, January 2001, June 1990, 

1979 and 1972.” (Doc. 6, 3.) Plaintiff had additional surgeries in May and August of 2013 “due 

to infection and botched and/or failed knee replacement.” (Doc. 6, 4.) Plaintiff applied for 

“disability retirement” with Defendant on August 12, 2010, and then again in February 2013. 

(Doc. 6, 3.) She alleges that she contacted Defendant directly on April 9, 2013, “to inquire about 

retirement as detriment and disadvantage” and was told that she should “[g]et another government 

job” to become eligible for disability retirement. (Doc. 6, 4.) Plaintiff also “filed a complaint via 

the Congressman office” in April 2013 and again in August 2013 “to obtain disability retirement.” 

(Doc. 6, 4.)

On December 18, 2013, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant denying her disability 

retirement because she “will not become 62 years of age until January 28, 2020, [and therefore 

does] not meet the age requirements for a deferred retirement annuity.” (Doc. 6, 4.) Arguing that 

“disability retirement under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) is any age with five 

years of service[,]” Plaintiff appealed the denial of disability retirement benefits to the Merit 

System Protection Board (“MSPB”) on January 3, 2014, and her appeal was denied on March 6, 

2014. (Doc. 6, 4.) 

Plaintiff alleges that she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC) on July 16, 2014, and received a letter on October 30, 2014, informing her 

that “the MSPB did not address the issues and/or allegations of discrimination in violation of Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act...therefore EEOC does not have jurisdiction [and she] can file a civil 

action in district court.” (Doc. 6, 4.) It remains unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff 

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received an actual “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC, as one is not attached as an exhibit to the 

complaint. 

Plaintiff concludes that

It is hospitals officials who notified the USDOJ of the crimes committed against 

me as I am deprived the right to disability retirement the conduct of OPM it is 

alleged from medical records I will become an old lady and/or only my 

beneficiary will benefit. 

It is alleged by hospital officials civil rights violations were committed against me 

including botched and/or failed knee replacements and attempt to have my right 

leg amputated.

. . . . It is hospital officials and the USDOJ who “addressed the issues of 

discriminations” and “I may never get it” in violation of [the Civil Rights Act].” 

(Doc. 6, 5.) Plaintiff provides no facts explaining or identifying the specific conduct or actions 

taken by Defendant, “hospital officials,” or the “USDOJ” that constituted “crimes committed 

against [her.]” 

Plaintiff alleges that the “discrimination were (sic) based on diagnosed and accepted as 

right and left knee Patellofemoral Chondromalacia and Arthritis Syndrome, Asthma and Plantar 

Fasciitis both feet.” (Doc. 6, 5.) Plaintiff also contends that “it is alleged with false accusations 

[she] went dancing and camping that is how [she] sustained [her] job related injuries” “as 

interference in [her] medical records.” (Doc. 6, 5.) It is unclear from the complaint whether 

Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant or another entity is responsible for this “discrimination.” There 

are again no facts alleging actions attributable to Defendant, or how Defendant allegedly harmed 

Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff “want[s] the discrimination, civil rights violations and disparate treatment to stop 

immediately.” (Doc. 6, 5.) She requests the Court to reinstate her Workers’ Compensation 

benefits, as “if the discrimination had not occurred with creditable service 36 years and 11 months 

and disability retirement.” (Doc. 6, 5.) She also requests both “front pay for unlawful 

termination” and “back pay in order to make whole for all terms and conditions of employment 

with monetary value[,]” as well as compensatory damages and punitive damages “for the harm 

suffered botched and failed knee replacements, sustain plantar fasciitis and wrong doing of 

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unlawful termination (sic).” (Doc. 6, 5.) She asks the Court to appoint an attorney, with fees and 

costs included in the relief requested. (Doc. 6, 6.) Finally, Plaintiff requests “[a]n order 

restraining defendant(s) from further acts of discrimination and/or civil rights violations.” 

(Doc. 6, 6.) 

III. SCREENING STANDARD

In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen 

each case, and must dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of 

poverty is untrue, or the Court determines that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the 

complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies 

of the complaint are capable of being cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, 

but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint may not simply allege a wrong has been 

committed and demand relief. The pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[;]” the complaint must contain “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). Further, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Fails to Plead a Cognizable Federal Claim

Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (Doc. 1.) Although 

both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibit 

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discrimination on the basis of disability, Title VII is only applicable in an employer-employee

context, while the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination in all federally funded programs. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Though Plaintiff concludes that the termination 

of her Workers’ Compensation benefits and denial of disability retirement were based on 

“discrimination, civil rights violations and disparate treatment” in violation of both laws, she fails 

to allege facts setting forth actions attributable to Defendant, or how Defendant allegedly harmed 

her. 

1. Plaintiff Does Not Allege Facts Supporting a Claim of a Violation of Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act

Plaintiff alleges that she appealed Defendant’s denial of disability retirement benefits to the 

MSPB on January 3, 2014. (Doc. 6, 4.) In denying review of Defendant’s decision, the MSPB 

allegedly “did not address the issues and/or allegations of discrimination in violation of Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act[.]” (Doc. 6, 4.) When she then complained to the EEOC, she “receive[d] a 

letter from EEOC the MSPB did not address the issues and/ or allegations of discrimination in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act . . . therefore EEOC does not have jurisdiction” and 

she could “file a civil action in district court.” (Doc. 6, 4.) It remains unclear from the amended

complaint just which entity Plaintiff is alleging discriminated against her, on what basis she was 

discriminated against, and the effect of the alleged discrimination. As currently pled, the first 

amended complaint fails to support a claim that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act. 

a. Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability 

Plaintiff's claims are based solely on allegations that Defendant discriminated against her

based on her disability. (Doc. 6, 4 (“It is alleged I am discriminated against based on my 

disabilities.”).) However, as Plaintiff was clearly informed in the Court’s screening of her initial 

complaint (Doc. 5, 5-6), “Title VII does not encompass discrimination on the basis of disability.”

Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1093 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see also 

Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Title VII does not proscribe 

discrimination on the basis of disability.”); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 824 n.12 (6th Cir.

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2003) (“Title VII does not address disability discrimination.”); Brennan v. Nat’l Telephone 

Directory Corp., 881 F.Supp. 986, 996–97 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“[W]hile Title VII prohibits 

discrimination based upon a person’s ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e–2, it does not prohibit disability discrimination.” (italics added)). Plaintiff’s complaint does 

not allege discriminatory conduct by Defendant on the basis of a class protected by Title VII. 

Plaintiff’s complaint of discrimination based on disability does not support a claim under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 

b. Plaintiff Has Not Fully Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies

Further, while Plaintiff states that she filed a complaint with the EEOC, she again fails to 

describe the underlying EEOC discrimination charge and again fails to attach a right to sue letter 

indicating the permissible scope of claims that the Court may hear. (Doc. 6, 4.) As discussed in 

the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s initial complaint, without the EEOC right to sue letter, the 

Court cannot determine whether there has been substantial compliance with the law’s 

administrative exhaustion requirement, and therefore cannot hear any claim against Defendant 

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 

Title VII requires a plaintiff to file an administrative claim with the EEOC against their 

employer1 within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice 

occurred. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5. The EEOC issues a “right-to-sue” notice permitting a civil action 

to be brought against the employer within ninety days. Id., § 2000e–5(f)(1). Substantial 

compliance with the administrative exhaustion process is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing 

of a civil action against that employer under federal law. See Sommatino v. United States, 255 

F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (Title VII); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(Rehabilitation Act). The scope of the EEOC complaint determines the permissible scope of the

claims that may be presented in district court. Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122.

If plaintiff has filed a charge with the EEOC against Defendant, she “must allege the facts 

relevant to that charge, including: (1) the alleged violation(s); (2) when the charge was filed; and 

 

1

 It is unclear from the first amended complaint whether Defendant is an “employer” under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act. 

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(3) who it was against. The charge itself should be attached as an exhibit if possible.” Whitsitt v. 

Hedy Holmes Staffing Servs., No. 2:13-CV-0117-MCE-AC, 2014 WL 5019667, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Oct. 7, 2014). A description of the charge to the EEOC and a copy of the right-to-sue notice are 

necessary to provide the Court with jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims and to determine the 

scope of its review. Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122. Plaintiff provides neither. Without these, the Court 

cannot determine whether Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies, and whether it has

jurisdiction to proceed with the case. 

2. Plaintiff Does Not Allege Facts Supporting a Claim of Violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiff alleges that her Workers’ Compensation benefits were terminated in October of 

2003, she was “denied the right to due process and terminated on May 9, 2008, without ever 

[being returned] to work with reasonable accommodations[,]” and she was denied disability 

retirement in April and December of 2013, all in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 6, 3-4.) 

Though Plaintiff concludes that she was denied various benefits “based on [her] 

disabilities[,]” it is unclear from the first amended complaint how these benefits were denied based 

on disability. Instead, Plaintiff provides two rationales for the denial of disability retirement –

neither of which are based on her disability. She alleges that she was told to “[g]et another 

government job” in order to qualify, and that she was formally denied disability retirement for not 

meeting the mandatory age requirement until the year 2020. (Doc. 6, 4.) 

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits any “otherwise qualified individual . . . be 

excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” solely on the basis of his or 

her disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “To establish a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation 

Act, (2) she is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought, (3) she was denied the benefit 

or services solely by reason of her handicap, and (4) the program providing the benefit or services 

receives federal financial assistance.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)); 

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see also Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must show that she was denied benefits by reason of 

her disability. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135. Here, Plaintiff does not state facts that plausibly support 

the conclusion that she was denied disability retirement or Workers’ Compensation benefits

because of her disability. In fact, the only reasons she has identified for Defendant’s denial of 

disability retirement are not based on her disability. (Doc. 6, 4.) Plaintiff’s conclusory statements 

that she was denied benefits and “discriminated against based on [her] disabilities” (Doc. 6, 4) are 

not sufficient to support a cause of action for a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. See Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (the pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.”). 

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts indicating she was denied any benefit or services 

solely by reason of her disability, the first amended complaint fails to state a claim under the 

Rehabilitation Act. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

B. Leave to Amend Should Be Granted

Plaintiff’s amended complaint has not set forth a cognizable federal claim under either

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Rehabilitation Act. Because Plaintiff has not remedied the 

deficiencies of her original complaint, and still fails to plead facts invoking the Court’s 

jurisdiction, the FAC must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 

352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the burden of 

proving the actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction.”). 

Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND. Plaintiff will be given another opportunity to remedy the deficiencies of the complaint 

as discussed above. Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in her amended complaint to both invoke 

the Court’s jurisdiction and show that she has exhausted her administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The amended 

complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” 

Rule 220 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

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Once Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in 

the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the 

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended 

complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified above, the Court will recommend that the 

complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED;

2. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days from the date of service of 

this order; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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