Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_94-cv-00671/USCOURTS-caed-2_94-cv-00671-78/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY VALDIVIA, ALFRED YANCY,

and HOSSIE WELCH, on their own

behalf and on behalf of the class

of all persons similarly situated,

NO. CIV. S-94-671 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor of 

the State of California, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

On March 25, 2008, the court adopted the recommendations of

the Special Master with regards to the enforcement of paragraph

24 of the permanent injunction that has been entered in the

case. This provision of the injunction relates to the use of

hearsay evidence in parole revocation proceedings. By adopting

the Special Master’s recommendations, the court ordered the

defendants to revise their policies and procedures so as to

bring them in line with the consent decree. 

In the instant motion, the defendants move the court to

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The court has described the facts of the case in detail in

its June 13, 2002 and June 9, 2005 orders. 

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stay its order pending appeal. The court resolves the motion on

the papers and after oral argument. For the reasons stated

herein, the court denies defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

 This suit has been brought by a class comprising

California parolees who challenged the parole revocation

procedures utilized by defendants as violative of their due

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. After the court granted

partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the parties

stipulated to a permanent injunction, which was issued as an

order of the court in March 2004. The injunction ordered the

defendants to implement certain policies and procedures in order

to remedy the on-going violations of the plaintiffs’ due process

rights. Among these, the injunction provided that “[t]he use of

hearsay evidence shall be limited by the parolees’ confrontation

rights in the manner set forth under controlling law as

currently stated in United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th

Cir. 1999). The [defendants’] Policies and Procedures shall

include guidelines and standards derived from such law.”

Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunctive Relief (“Permanent

Injunction”), Mar. 9, 2004, ¶ 24.

A Special Master was appointed in August 2005. The Special

Master reported that there has been an ongoing disagreement

between the parties as to whether the policies and procedures

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defendants adopted pursuant to paragraph 24 of the permanent

injunction were adequate. Report and Recommendation Regarding

Motion to Enforce Paragraph 24 of the Valdivia Permanent

Injunction (“Special Master’s Report”), February 24, 2008, at 1.

Additionally, after a recent opinion was handed down by the

Ninth Circuit addressing the use of hearsay evidence in

revocation proceedings, the defendants expressed a desire to

change their policies and procedures. Id. This caused further

disagreement, which culminated in a motion by plaintiffs before

the Special Master in late 2007. The Special Master heard the

motion in December 2007 and issued his resultant report and

recommendations in February 2008.

The Special Master’s report and recommendations expressed

several findings that are relevant to the instant motion. First,

after a lengthy analysis, the Special Master concluded that

defendants must employ the Comito balancing test when hearsay

evidence is sought to be introduced against a parolee in

revocation proceedings, even when that evidence falls under a

recognized hearsay exception. Special Master’s Report at 8-22.

Second, the Special Master concluded that there was inadequate

support for defendants’ position that evidence that would

otherwise be inadmissible could be utilized to corroborate

hearsay evidence, when performing the Comito balancing test. Id.

at 22-24. Finally, although the Special Master recommended the

court not find a violation of the permanent injunction, the

Special Master observed there were deficiencies in the

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defendants’ policies and procedures regarding the use of hearsay

evidence that suggested that defendants’ staff were not

employing the proper legal standard when deciding whether to

admit hearsay evidence against a parolee during revocation

proceedings. Id. at 2-8. He recommended a set of changes to the

policies and procedures to address this failure. Id. at 26-29.

After receiving objections from the parties, the court

adopted the Special Master’s recommendations in its March 25,

2008 order. The defendants now seek a stay of that order pending

their appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

II. STANDARD

A district court has discretion to stay its order, pending

appeal, upon consideration of, “(1) whether the stay applicant

has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the

merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured

absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will

substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v.

Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The Ninth Circuit

conceives this standard as “two interrelated legal tests”

operating along a continuum. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432,

1435 (9th Cir. 1983). At one end of the continuum, the moving

party may succeed if it shows that there is a probability of

success on the merits as well as a possibility of irreparable

injury. Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n. v. City and County of San

Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2008). At the other

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end, the moving party may succeed if it shows that it has raised

“serious legal questions” and that “the balance of hardships

tips sharply in its favor.” Id. at 1116 (quoting Lopez, 713 F.2d

at 1435). Finally, the district court must consider the public

interest implicated by the grant of the stay; this consideration

is distinct from the harm to the parties in the court’s grant or

denial of a stay. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v.

Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2007). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Likelihood of Success on the Merits

In order to succeed in its motion, the defendants must show

at least the potential for success on the merits of its appeal.

See Golden Gate, 512 F.3d at 1115-16; Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435.

In other words, if the defendants have no possibility of

obtaining a favorable ruling in the appellate court, a stay is

improper. Here, the defendants have met their burden to show

that they present “serious legal questions” in their appeal.

1. The Court’s March 25, 2008 Order Is Appealable

The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have no

possibility for success on appeal because the court’s March 25,

2008 order is not appealable. By statute, the Court of Appeals

only has jurisdiction over final decisions of the district court

and over certain interlocutory decisions, including those

“granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving

injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28

U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292. Here, the defendants contend that

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Moreover, the defendants did not follow the requirements of

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for seeking an interlocutory appeal.

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appellate jurisdiction lies on the basis that the court’s order

was a final decision of the district court. Notice of Appeal,

April 7, 2008, at Attachment 3 (Ninth Circuit Civil Appeals

Docketing Statement).2

 The court agrees that the Ninth Circuit

could find this a proper characterization and thus assert

jurisdiction.

In the most basic sense, a final decision is one that “ends

the litigation . . . and leaves nothing for the court to execute

the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945); see

also Warehouse Restaurant, Inc. v. Customs House Restaurant,

Inc., 726 F.2d 480, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1984). In cases where

finality is not so straightforward, however, courts should be

guided by practical considerations when deciding whether an

order is final in the meaning of § 1291. Gillespie v. United

States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Cohen v.

Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). In

weighing practical considerations, the court should consider the

expenditure of judicial resources that results from piecemeal

review, versus the “danger of denying justice by delay.”

Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted). 

A court’s decision is not final where it is only a single

step among many, which will culminate into one final judgment.

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546; see also Kimball v. Commandant Twelfth

Naval Dist., 423 F.2d 88, 90 (9th Cir. 1970). In other words, a

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decision is not final where review would constitute an

intervention or intrusion of the appellate court into a pending

matter. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. Appellate courts may assert

jurisdiction where that concern is absent and where review at

the moment it is sought serves the ends of justice. Id.;

Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 153; Branson v. City of Los Angeles, 912

F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1990); Peabody Coal Co. v. Local Unions

1734, 1508 & 1548, 484 F.2d 78, 84-85 (6th Cir. 1973). 

The circumstances of the instant case suggest that it is

apt to characterize the March 25 order as final, for the purpose

of enabling appellate review. As described above, summary

judgment was entered for the plaintiffs in 2002 and a permanent

injunction issued in 2004. Since then, the court has merely

acted in order to enforce that injunction. Its March 25 order

was another instance of this: the court declined to find that

the defendants had violated the terms of the injunction,

declined to modify the injunction to alter the standard by which

hearsay was to be admitted in revocation proceedings, and gave

guidance to the defendants as to what effective policies and

procedures should guide the use of hearsay evidence. At this

stage in the case, the court is not progressing to a single

final judgment, see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, and appellate review

would not be an undue interference.

Moreover, the interests of justice weigh in favor of

review, in the sense that the defendants would have no other

remedy if the court has erred in its March 25 order. Because the

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court is acting primarily as an enforcer of the permanent

injunction, there is no innate endpoint to the court’s retention

of the case. Consequently, to require the defendants to wait to

bring their appeal until some unknown moment in the future would

exemplify “denying justice by delay,” if the March 25 order does

in fact merit reversal. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152.

The plaintiffs encourage the court to hold that the March

25 order is not final because the court has retained

jurisdiction to set deadlines for the order’s enforcement. A

decision, however, may be “final” under § 1291 even if it is not

necessarily the last order in the case. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at

152. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that a denial of a

temporary restraining order was a “final decision,” as it

implied that the district court would also deny a permanent

injunction, although the case had not yet progressed to that

point. Kimball, 423 F.2d at 90. Similarly, although the court

may later set firm deadlines for the execution of the March 25

order, the conclusions of law and fact contained therein are

firm.

Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that the defendants

have no possibility of success in their appeal on the basis of

jurisdiction.

2. The Merits of the Defendants’ Arguments on the Legal

Questions Presented for Appeal

The defendants represent to the court that they are

appealing three aspects of the March 25 order: (1) that the

Comito balancing test must be employed even when the evidence

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sought to be introduced falls under a hearsay exception; (2)

that hearsay cannot be corroborated with other hearsay, when

considering the reliability of the evidence under the Comito

test; and (3) that the order exceeds the scope of the injunction

and controlling authority. The court concludes that the

defendants have shown only that they present a “serious legal

question” as to the first and second of these grounds.

a. Comito Balancing Where the Evidence Falls Under a

Recognized Hearsay Exception

While not desiring simply to restate the analysis contained

in the Special Master’s report, incorporated in the March 25

order, it is apparent to the court that the defendants have not

shown a probability of success on the merits of this issue, but

have shown that they will present the Court of Appeals with a

legal question meriting review.

As described above, the Permanent Injunction provides that

the use of hearsay evidence in revocation proceedings is

governed by United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.

1999). Preliminarily, the text of the Injunction appears to

state that Comito controls the issue of the introduction of

hearsay evidence and consequently if the law of the Circuit

changes, an amendment of the Injunction would be required.

Because the Injunction was the result of the joint work and

stipulation of both parties, it seems that defendants agreed to

be bound by Comito. The court is therefore inclined to believe

that defendants’ argument that subsequent cases have undermined

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Comito are misplaced. 

Nevertheless, it is possible that the Circuit court will

disagree, holding that it would be improper to bind the

defendants to Comito’s requirements if Comito no longer remains

good law. The court therefore turns to the merits of defendants’

argument. 

Despite defendants’ assertion to the contrary, it does not

appear that Comito has been abrogated by subsequent decisions.

Comito held that hearsay evidence may only be used against a

releasee at a revocation hearing after the court or

decisionmaker weighs the releasee’s interest in his

confrontation right against the government’s good cause for not

producing the witness. Comito, 177 F.3d at 1170. The releasee’s

interest in confrontation is primarily gauged by the importance

of the evidence to the court’s ultimate decision and the

accuracy and reliability of the evidence. Id. at 1171 (citing

United States v. Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

In Comito, the hearsay testimony at issue was alleged

statements by the victim made to a police officer. Id. The court

held that the unreliability of this type of hearsay evidence

served to strengthen Comito’s interest in confronting the

victim. Id. The court contrasted this hearsay evidence to other

types that were more reliable, such as the regular report of a

business or an official record of a probation officer. Id.

(citing Martin, 984 F.2d at 314 and United States v. Walker, 117

F.3d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1997)). In so doing, the court implied

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that hearsay that falls under a traditional exception to the

hearsay rule may be deemed more reliable when conducting the

balancing test; it did not suggest that such types of hearsay

could bypass the balancing test entirely.

Subsequently, in United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit confronted, albeit obliquely, the

issue of the admission of hearsay evidence in a revocation

hearing. There, the releasee challenged evidence of a domestic

violence charge that was one of the bases for revocation of his

supervised release. Hall, 419 F.3d at 983-84. The court employed

the Comito balancing test, concluding that Hall’s interest in

confronting the adverse witness (the alleged victim of the

domestic violence) was low, since there was sufficient nonhearsay evidence to convict him of the domestic violence charge.

Id. at 986-87. The court then observed that several pieces of

evidence supporting the domestic violence charge were admissible

under hearsay exceptions, including medical records and the

business records of the parole officer, and that these types of

evidence “should satisfy the lesser standard of due process”

afforded to releasees in revocation proceedings. Id. at 987. It

then concluded, “Hall’s interest in excluding hearsay evidence

relevant to the domestic violence allegation was thus weak . . .

.” Id.

As the Special Master explained, Hall’s analysis does not

seem to suggest that the Comito test is unnecessary when

evidence falling under a hearsay exception is at issue. On the

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contrary, by employing the Comito test, the Hall court seemed to

signal that this remained the standard for analyzing the

admissibility of hearsay evidence in revocation proceedings.

Moreover, as detailed in the Special Master’s report, this

approach comports with prior cases in the Circuit as well as the

law governing the due process rights of parolees in revocation

proceedings generally. Consequently, the court cannot agree with

defendants that there is a probability or even a strong

likelihood that they will succeed on the merits of this claim on

appeal.

Nevertheless, because the Ninth Circuit has never addressed

the issue squarely, it is fair to conclude that the defendants

raise a “serious legal question” for review. Consideration of

the remaining prongs of the Hilton test is therefore warranted

and occurs below. 

b. Whether Hearsay Can Be Corroborated With Other

Hearsay, For the Purpose of Determining Its

Reliability Under Comito

The defendants also assert that Comito permits hearsay

evidence to be corroborated with other hearsay in order to show

the former’s reliability, within the context of the balancing

test. Just as the court concluded in adopting the Special

Master’s finding in the March 25 order, there seems little

support for this approach under the Circuit’s precedent. 

In Hall, the court considered whether hearsay evidence

should have been admitted to substantiate the releasee’s charge

of false imprisonment. Hall, 419 F.3d at 987-88. The court

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concluded that this evidence bore “some indicia of reliability,”

noting both hearsay and non-hearsay evidence that corroborated

it. Id. It is therefore unclear what corroborative weight, if

any, the court gave the hearsay evidence.

The court, like the Special Master, is aware of no other

binding authority that could support defendants’ position. There

certainly is nothing that suggests to the court that defendants

have any likelihood of success in their appeal of this issue.

Since, however, the Court of Appeals has not held on this issue

and it presents a question that a court is likely to confront

again, see Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 471 (9th Cir.

1991), it is again fair to conclude that this is a serious legal

question for review. 

c. Whether the Court’s Order For the Revision of the

Defendants’ Policies and Procedures 

Finally, the defendants contend that the revisions to their

policies and procedures that the court ordered on March 25 fall

outside of the scope of the permanent injunction and the

requirements of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The

defendants have not shown any likelihood of success on appeal on

this claim, nor does it pose a legal question sufficiently

serious to merit appellate review.

The Permanent Injunction required the defendants to create

policies and procedures to guarantee the due process rights of

the plaintiffs in revocations procedures, which were to include

“guidelines and standards derived from” Comito. Permanent

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Injunction ¶ 24. While the defendants seemed to comply with the

letter of this requirement, by creating and promulgating

policies and procedures in apparent good faith, they did not

comply with its spirit. Consequently, the court agreed with the

Special Master’s recommendations that while it was not

appropriate to hold that the defendants violated the Permanent

Injunction, the policies and procedures remained so deficient as

to warrant additional court direction as to what minimum

elements the policies and procedures must contain so as to

adequately serve their function of guaranteeing due process

rights of the plaintiffs under Morrissey and Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 

This determination was based on several factual findings of

the Special Master. These include that defendants’ written

materials repeatedly misstated what the Comito balancing rule

is, which is a plain indication that Deputy Commissioners would

erroneously apply the balancing test. Special Master’s Report at

2-3. Training on hearsay issues is minimal and “confusing,”

which is of particular concern since a minority of the Deputy

Commissioners are lawyers. Id. at 4-5. These concerns manifest

in observed instances where the Deputy Commissioners have

misapplied the law governing the admission of hearsay. Id. at 5-

8. Finally, it is difficult to ascertain the true scope of the

problem, there has been no systematic review of the Deputy

Commissioner’s application of hearsay law in revocation

proceedings. Id. at 7-8. 

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These findings suffice to show that there is significant

danger that the due process protections to which the plaintiffs

are entitled are not being respected by the defendants, as

evidenced by the systemic deficiencies in training and the

accuracy of written materials. Indeed, this danger is a reality,

as the specific instances of misapplication of hearsay law in

revocation proceedings demonstrate. The changes ordered by the

court on March 25 reflect its attempt to bring the defendants’

policies and procedures in line with the terms of the Permanent

Injunction, which seeks, inter alia, to prevent on-going due

process violations as defined by Morrissey and Gagnon. In other

words, the March 25 order does not create “new” requirements, as

the defendants claim, but rather makes explicit what the

policies and procedures should have contained upon their

inception several years ago.

The court cannot agree that there is any likelihood that

the defendants will succeed on the merits of this claim on

appeal or even that it presents a serious question of law that

the appellate court would find worthy of review.

B. The Balance of Hardships

Because the defendants only show that there are “serious

legal questions” arising from the court’s March 25 order, in

order for the stay to be warranted, the defendants must show

that the balance of hardships tips “sharply” in their favor.

They have not made this showing.

The primary hardships asserted be defendants are the

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financial costs and administrative burden of implementing the

measures required by the March 25 order, if that order is

reversed. These costs include those associated with the

development of a system to track data, training the Deputy

Commissioners to perform Constitutionally adequate revocation

hearings, and participation in the meet-and-confer process.

Additionally, the defendants contend that the process by which

it would contract with outside providers is time-consuming.

Finally, defendants state that the March 25 order would insert

the plaintiffs and Special Master into personnel matters of the

State, harming both state employees and potentially exposing the

State to litigation.

As a preliminary matter, several of these claimed hardships

carry no weight in the court’s balancing process. The meet-andconfer process, while required by the March 25 order, was

already required by the Permanent Injunction. See Stipulated

Order for Permanent Injunctive Relief ¶ 10 (requiring the

defendants to “meet periodically with Plaintiffs’ counsel to

discuss their development” of all policies and procedures

developed in accordance with the injunction). Therefore, even if

the court had not issued its guidelines for the policies and

procedures relevant to Paragraph 24 of the Permanent Injunction,

the parties would nevertheless be required to meet and confer

until they reached an agreement or an impasse requiring court

resolution. See id. The March 25 order has added no extra burden

on the defendants in this regard.

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The court also places no weight on the defendants’ parade

of horribles regarding the improper insertion of the plaintiffs

and Special Master into State personnel matters. The March 25

order does no such thing. The order, through its adoption of the

Special Master’s recommendations, requires defendants to create

a plan that adequately ensures that the Deputy Commissioners are

in fact carrying out revocation hearings that meet “minimum

standards” as defined by the defendants. Special Master’s Report

at 28. It does not confer on plaintiffs or the Special Master

the right to inspect personnel files or to monitor staff

evaluations or discipline proceedings. Nor, as the defendants

suggest, would it compell the termination of a Deputy

Commissioner who fails to meet these minimum standards. Instead,

the order plainly gives the defendants discretion to create a

plan that ensures that revocation hearings pass Constitutional

muster, so long as the plaintiffs and Special Master have input

in the plan itself and so long as the plan “proceeds under the

guidance of the Special Master.” See id. at 28-29. Defendants’

allegations beyond this appear to be no more than hyperbolic

hand-wringing.

What remains, then, are the financial costs and

administrative burden of implementing policy reforms that may

later be deemed unnecessary by the Circuit court. On the other

side of the equation, if a stay is granted, the injury to the

plaintiffs includes the possibility of unlawful revocation of

parole based on the improper admission of hearsay evidence.

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Balancing these competing hardships, those of the plaintiffs are

plainly more weighty. Where human welfare and the potential for

suffering are concerned, the state’s expenditures of money,

time, and administrative resources are rarely so overwhelming so

as to permit a court to conclude that balance of hardships

sharply favors the latter. See, e.g., Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1437;

Golden Gate, 512 F.3d at 1126; see also Long v. Robinson, 432

F.2d 977, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1970). Not only are plaintiffs’

potential physical and emotional suffering resulting from

wrongful incarceration some of the most burdensome “hardships”

cognizable, but this suffering could not truly be remedied

retroactively. See Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1437 (wrongful loss of

disability benefits could not be remedied by retroactive

restoration). A wrongful incarceration undoubtedly strains an

individual’s personal relationships and career stability, as

well as causes personal distress. It is difficult to imagine how

this damage could be repaired retroactively, even if a plaintiff

succeeds in writ of habeas corpus later. Put plainly, “faced

with such a conflict between financial concerns and preventable

human suffering, we have little difficulty concluding that the

balance of hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.” Id.

C. The Public Interest

Finally, the court considers whether the public interest

lies in granting the stay or denying it. Hilton, 481 U.S. at

776. While defendants are correct in asserting that the strain

to public finances and administrative resources figures into

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this calculus, it is not dispositive. The court must also

consider the harm to the plaintiffs’ friends and family members,

as well as the myriad interests of society as a whole. Lopez,

713 F.2d at 1437; Golden Gate, 512 F.3d 1126.

The public certainly has an interest in seeing that public

resources are not expended needlessly. However, “the government

must be concerned not just with the public fisc, but also with

the public weal.” Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1437. The public has an

interest in ensuring that revocation proceedings are fair,

because the public has a general interest in the guarantee of

the due process rights enshrined in the Constitution. See id. In

addition, those who rely on the individual plaintiffs in the

context of various relationships -- whether it be family,

friend, or even employer or employee -- have an interest in

ensuring that that plaintiff is not wrongfully incarcerated

through the misuse of hearsay evidence. Although the court is

mindful of the countervailing interest in prudent spending of

state financial and administrative resources, the public

interest firmly favors the plaintiffs in this instance.

In sum, although the defendants present a serious legal

question that may merit appellate review, the balance of

hardships and public interest weigh in favor of denial of the

stay.

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for a stay of the

court’s March 25, 2008 order is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: May 5, 2008.

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