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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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,. 

FI LED 

United Stares C.OUrt of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JAN ~ 0 1911 

RICHARD RALPH MARTINEZ, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

GEORGE E. SULLIVAN, Warden, New Mexico ) 

State Penitentiary, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

· ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2115 

(D.C. No. 84-1657JB) 

(D. N.M.) 

Before MOORE, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and SPARR,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Daniel 

District Court for 

designation. 

B. Sparr, District Judge, United States 

the District of Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-2115 Document: 010110083588 Date Filed: 01/30/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner Richard R. Martinez appeals from the district 

court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, filed 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2254. After considering all the issues 

presented, we affirm. 

I. 

In the early hours of January 3, 1980, Richard Martinez drove 

past the home of Esther Vera in Clovis, New Mexico, and fired five 

random gunshots. He was intoxicated at the time. One of the 

stray bullets hit and killed a fifteen year old boy who was 

visiting friends in the house. 

Upon learning Mr. Martinez was a potential suspect, police 

went to the trailer home he shared with his brother. They asked 

if he would voluntarily go to the police station for questioning 

regarding "a shooting." At that time, petitioner did not know 

someone had been killed. He agreed to go. While the officers 

were in the trailer, one of them observed .38 caliber revolver 

ammunition lying on a table. The officer asked petitioner if he 

had a gun. He replied that he did, and the gun was seized. The 

revolver was introduced at trial and identified as the weapon 

involved in the shooting. 

At the police station, petitioner was interrogated over a 

period of four to five hours. He made three written statements, 

all of which were preceded by a signed waiver outlining his 

Miranda rights. The first two statements did not contain any 

admissions or references to the shooting incident. After the 

second statement, a police officer told Mr. Martinez a fifteen 

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' year old boy had been killed. Petitioner broke down and told 

police he would tell them what he did the night before. In his 

final statement, he admitted firing the gunshots. 

statements were introduced at trial. 

All three 

Following a jury trial, Mr. Martinez was convicted of one 

count of depraved mind first degree murder in violation of N.M. 

Stat. Ann. S 30-2-1 A (3) (1978). He was given a life sentence. 

The New Mexico appellate courts affirmed the conviction on direct 

appeal. In this habeas petition, Mr. Martinez makes three 

principal arguments including 1) that the state court's failure to 

present a requested lesser included offense jury instruction to 

the murder charge violated his due process rights, 2) that the 

signed statements and the gun were the tainted fruits of an 

illegal arrest and, therefore, were inadmissible, and 3) that he 

was incompetent at the time of trial. We address these arguments 

in turn. 1 

II. 

A. Lesser Included Offense Jury Instruction 

At trial, counsel for petitioner sought to have the jury 

instructed on negligent use of a deadly weapon as a lesser 

included offense of depraved mind murder. Although the court 

denied this request as to the murder charge, the jury was 

1 During the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Martinez filed a 

motion seeking to amend his complaint to add an objection to the 

state court jury instructions based on State v. Ibn Omar-Muhanunad, 

694 P.2d 922 (N.M. 1985). Because petitioner has failed to 

exhaust this issue in the state courts, we will not consider it 

here. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6-8 (1982). 

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instructed on negligent use of a deadly weapon in conjunction with 

the involuntary manslaughter instruction submitted in this case. 

Petitioner now argues that the failure to give an instruction on 

the lesser charge rises to the level of constitutional error. We 

disagree. 

In cases where the death penalty is imposed, a lesser 

included offense instruction must be provided if the evidence 

supports it. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635-38 (1980). 

This protects the defendant from the risk of a jury disregarding 

the reasonable doubt standard when faced with the all or nothing 

choice of complete acquittal or the death penalty. Id. at 642-43. 

The lesser included offense instruction gives the jury a third 

option where the evidence supports conviction of some serious 

crime, but may not support the death penalty. See id. at 634 

(quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973)). 

However, the Supreme Court has declined to extend this right to 

noncapital cases such as the one presented here. Id. at 638 n.14. 

Historically, this circuit adhered to the rule that habeas 

relief would not be granted based on the failure to present a 

lesser included offense jury instruction. See Poulson v. Turner, 

359 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966). 

The Beck decision altered that rule with respect to capital cases. 

However, where the death penalty is not imposed, the Poulson 

nonreviewability rule still applies. See Chavez v. Kerby, 848 

F.2d 1101, 1103 (10th Cir. 1988)("Poulson would appear to still be 

the law in this Circuit in all cases where the death sentence is 

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, 

( 

' not imposed"). 2 Because this is a noncapital case, we will invoke 

the Poulson rule. As a consequence, Mr. Martinez cannot receive 

habeas relief on this claim. 

B. Evidentiary Issues 

Petitioner's second ground on appeal is really twofold. 

First, he asserts that the seizure of the .38 caliber revolver in 

his home violated the fourth amendment. Second, he argues that 

the written confession and other statements were involuntary and, 

therefore, inadmissible under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 

We address these issues separately. 

1. Gun Seizure 

Petitioner asserts the revolver was the product of an illegal 

seizure and therefore was inadmissible. However, as a threshold 

matter, a habeas petitioner may not be granted relief on fourth 

amendment grounds if he was given an opportunity for full and fair 

consideration of the issue in state proceedings. Stone v. Powell, 

428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1163 

(10th Cir. 1978). "'Opportunity for full and fair consideration' 

includes, but is not limited to, the procedural opportunity to 

2 In Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987), a panel of this circuit questioned 

the continued viability of the Poulson rule in those cases where 

the death penalty was sought but not obtained. Id. at 602-04. 

Without deciding the issue, that panel concluded petitioner's 

argument had no merit regardless of the method of review. Id. at 

604. We believe this case mandates the same result. Although 

Poulson is still binding precedent in this circuit, Mr. Martinez 

could not prevail using any standard because he did, in fact, 

receive a lesser included offense instruction. Therefore, the 

concern raised in Beck is not present here. 

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l 

raise or otherwise present a Fourth Amendment claim. It also 

includes the full and fair evidentiary hearing contemplated by 

(Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)]." Gamble, 583 F.2d at 

1165 (footnote omitted). 

Here, petitioner had ample opportunity to raise this claim. 

There is nothing in the record to suggest the state court failed 

to afford Mr. Martinez procedural avenues for objecting to the 

gun's introduction. He had every opportunity to litigate this 

issue. In fact, although Mr. Martinez filed a motion to suppress 

the alleged involuntary statements and confession, he did not 

include an objection to the gun's seizure in the motion. 

Moreover, despite petitioner's argument to the contrary, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate the state court applied 

incorrect legal standards to introduction of the revolver. See 

Gamble, 583 F.2d at 1165-66 (state court's failure to follow clear 

precedent denied petitioner the full and fair opportunity to 

litigate the issue). Accordingly, the rule of Stone v. Powell 

bars further review in this court. 

2. Involuntary Confessions 

The ultimate question whether a confession was voluntary is 

legal and therefore subject to plenary review in the federal 

habeas court. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985). 

However, findings regarding underlying factual issues, such as the 

length and circumstances of the interrogation, are due deference 

if they are supported by the record. Id. at 117. Therefore, a 

voluntariness determination requires an independent examination of 

the record. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). 

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J 

' 

\ 

Here, petitioner asserts his confession was involuntary for 

two reasons. First, he argues his intoxicated state rendered him 

unable to give answers which were the "product of a rational 

intellect and a free will." Id. Second, he asserts the police 

officers interrogating him used coercive tactics. After reviewing 

the entire record, we do not find these arguments persuasive. 

Following the hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress the 

statements, the state trial court found they were voluntarily 

given. Mr. Martinez was advised of his Miranda rights no less 

than four times and stated he understood them. Each statement was 

accompanied by a signed waiver of the Miranda warnings. The 

police officers involved testified that although Mr. Martinez 

looked tired, he did not appear intoxicated and spoke well. Our 

independent review leads us to agree with the other courts which 

have considered this issue that petitioner's statements were 

voluntary. 

C. Competency 

Petitioner bears the burden to show he was incompetent to 

stand trial. Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 631 (5th Cir. 1986). 

However, the trial judge has a duty to order a hearingTM sponte 

if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's 

ability to stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 

(1966). Mr. Martinez was given a complete evaluation six weeks 

before trial and was found competent. However, he now argues 

excessive medication and emotional disturbances rendered him 

incompetent after that time. He asserts the state trial judge 

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JI' 

erred in failing to recognize his incompetence because there was a 

bona fide doubt as to his ability to understand the proceedings. 

We cannot agree. 

In the hearing on this issue before the federal district 

court, testimony was given which made clear that Mr. Martinez 

retained the ability to understand the proceedings and could 

provide meaningful input to his counsel. See Drope v. Missouri, 

420 u .s. 162, 171 (1975)(person unable to understand the 

proceedings and assist counsel should not be subject to trial). 

We agree with the district court that no bona fide issue regarding 

petitioner's competence was apparent during trial. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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