Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03991/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03991-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY SNODGRASS,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.P. KANE,

Respondent. /

No. C-05-3991 MMC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 15)

Before the Court is respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s first amended petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground petitioner has not exhausted the claims set forth

therein. Petitioner has filed opposition to the motion, to which respondent has replied. 

Having considered the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, the

Court rules as follows.

“[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the

applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” Gatlin v.

Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). To

exhaust a claim in state court, the petitioner must “fairly present” the substance of the claim

to the highest court of the state by including in his state petition a “reference to a specific

federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the

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petitioner to relief.” See id. at 887-88 (finding claim unexhausted where petitioner

“adequately described the factual basis for his claim” but failed to identify specific “federal

legal basis for his claim”); see also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding “state prisoner must describe in the state proceedings both the operative facts and

the federal legal theory on which his claim is based”; finding ineffective assistance of

counsel claim unexhausted to extent petitioner raised in federal court factual bases for such

claim beyond those presented to state court). A petitioner must plead his claims “with

considerable specificity before the state courts in order to satisfy the exhaustion

requirement.” See Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005).

In the instant petition, petitioner alleges the Board of Prison Terms (“Board”), on

November 22, 2002, denied him parole in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See First Amended Petition at 6-8.) In

particular, petitioner alleges, the Board’s denial of parole violated the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments because (1) the Board lacked evidence to support its decision that petitioner

is a danger to society, (2) the Board’s “determination process is arbitrary and

standardless,” and (3) the Board ignored substantial evidence demonstrating petitioner is

not a current risk to public safety. (See id.)

Although petitioner contends the above-referenced claims were exhausted in a

habeas petition he filed in the Contra Costa County Superior Court, petitioner has focused

on the wrong petition. In order to exhaust the claims raised in the instant petition, petitioner

must have raised such claims with the California Supreme Court; if he did not do so, it is

irrelevant that he raised them with a lower state court. See Galvan v. Alaska Department

of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because [petitioner] did not claim in

her petition to the Alaska Supreme Court that her federal constitutional right had been

violated, it does not matter what she did in the Alaska Court of Appeals.”).

The petition filed by petitioner in the California Supreme Court, (see Motion to

Dismiss Ex. 4), does not include the claims set forth in the instant petition. Rather,

petitioner raised entirely different theories in the Supreme Court, specifically, that the

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Department of Corrections violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel

and unusual punishment, because the length of his sentence has exceeded the maximum

“suggested base term” set forth in the “California Matrix” for persons convicted of second

degree murder, and that, as a consequence, he “is now serving the sentence of a First

Degree murder which he was not found guilty of.” (See id. Ex. 4 at 7-10.) Petitioner did not

challenge, in his Supreme Court petition, the factual basis for the Board’s denial of parole

nor did he contend that the Board’s procedure for making parole determinations is arbitrary

and standardless. Additionally, as respondent points out, none of the decisions of the

California courts denying petitioner’s state court petitions, (see Motion to Dismiss Exs. 1-3),

reached the merits of any of the claims raised in the instant petition. See, e.g., Sandgathe

v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 377 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no exhaustion defense available where

state court opinion actually addressed federal issue even though not raised in petition). 

Consequently, the Court finds petitioner has not exhausted the claims raised in his federal

habeas petition. 

“The exhaustion rule set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) requires district courts to

dismiss habeas petitions containing unexhausted claims.” Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982)).

Accordingly, respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and petitioner’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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