Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04799/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04799-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL GAREDAKIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BRENTWOOD UNION SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-4799-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AS TO PLAINTIFF M.G.

Defendants previously moved for summary judgment as to all claims – federal and 

state – asserted by plaintiffs in the third amended complaint. Defendants argued that the 

state-law claims should be dismissed for failure to comply with the claims presentation 

requirements of the California Tort Claims Act (also referred to as the "Government 

Claims Act"), California Government Code §§ 900, et seq. 

Plaintiffs conceded that dismissal of the state-law claims for failure to comply with 

the claims presentation requirement was warranted, as to all plaintiffs apart from plaintiff 

M.G. They asserted that M.G’s claims should not be dismissed, because of an 

exception, in § 905(m), to the claims presentation requirement for claims alleging 

“childhood sexual abuse.” The court granted summary judgment as to all claims, with the 

exception of the state-law claims asserted by M.G., and ordered further briefing with 

regard to those claims. 

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BACKGROUND

Under the Government Claims Act, "no suit for ‘money or damages' may be 

brought against a public entity until a written claim therefor has been presented to the 

public entity and either has been acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected.” 

Alliance Fin. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 64 Cal. App. 4th 635, 641 (1998) (citing Cal. Gov't 

Code § 945.4). “Compliance with the [Government Claims Act] is mandatory; and failure 

to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action.” Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist. v. 

Honig, 976 F.2d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). 

On June 11, 2014, plaintiff M.G. and his parents, plaintiffs Michael and Tamara 

Garedakis, filed written claims with the Brentwood Union School District ("the District") 

pursuant to the Government Claims Act, alleging "abuse" during the period M.G. was a 

student in Dina Holder's classroom (the 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 school years). M.G. 

was three years old during the 2008/2009 school year, and had received a diagnosis of 

autism. The claims submitted alleged that employees of the District “observed and/or 

had knowledge of information giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dina Holder . . . 

had committed acts of child abuse or neglect as defined by Penal Code § 11165.3 

against special needs children in her classroom.” 

California Penal Code § 11165.3, which is part of the Child Abuse and Neglect 

Reporting Act, Cal. Pen. Code §§ 11164, et seq., defines "willful harming or endangering 

of a child" to mean "a situation in which any person willfully causes or permits any child to 

suffer, or inflicts thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or willfully . . . 

permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation in which his or her 

person or health is endangered." Cal. Pen. Code § 11165.3. A separate section of the

Act – not referenced in the plaintiffs' claims – defines "sexual abuse,” “sexual assault,”

and “sexual exploitation." See Cal. Pen. Code § 11165.1. 

The claim forms submitted by the Garedakis plaintiffs stated that both parents 

described a “game” M.G. played in class, which 

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resulted in their child becoming sexually aroused by toes. When 

confronted by Mr. and Mrs. Garedakis, Holder laughed and said [redacted] 

was 'becoming a little man.' The parents became increasingly concerned 

but Margaret Olsen assured them that everything was okay.

[Redacted] suffers from trauma and is still fixated on feet. This has proven 

to also be a source of great embarrassment for his parents. His 

behavioral changes can be attributed to the mental and/or physical abuse 

he experienced and witnessed in Holder's classroom.

On June 27, 2014, the District’s claims administrator denied the claims, on the 

basis that they were not presented within six months after the event or occurrence, as 

required by Government Code §§ 901 and 911.2. The denial letters added that plaintiffs’ 

only recourse was to apply to the Contra Costa Solano JPA for leave to present a late 

claim, per Government Code §§ 911.4-912.2; § 946.6. Plaintiffs did not apply for leave to 

file a late claim. 

The Garedakis plaintiffs (along with the other plaintiffs whose claims have since 

been dismissed) filed the complaint in the present action on October 28, 2014, asserting

causes of action under both federal and state law.

1

 A plaintiff suing a public entity “must 

plead facts showing or excusing compliance with the claims filing requirement.” State of 

Cal. v. Sup. Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1243-44 (2004); see also Perez v. Golden Empire 

Transit Dist., 209 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1236 (2012); Ovando v. Cnty. of L.A., 159 Cal. App. 

4th 42, 65 (2008); see also Del Real v. City of Riverside, 95 Cal. App. 4th 761, 767 

(2002) (to establish liability of a public entity, the plaintiff must prove compliance with 

claim presentation requirement, or excuse for noncompliance). 

The original complaint did not allege that plaintiffs had complied with the claims 

presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act, although it did include 

allegations similar to those in the rejected government claims. See Cplt ¶ 31 (individual 

District defendants “observed or had knowledge of information giving rise to a reasonable 

 

1

 Plaintiffs asserted state-law claims for (1) violation of the Bane Act, California Civil 

Code § 52.1; (2) battery; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligence; 

(5) negligent supervision; (6) violation of mandatory duty under California Penal Code 

§ 11166 to report abuse of a child; (7) violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California 

Civil Code § 51; and (8) violation of California Education Code § 220.

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suspicion that Holder had committed acts of child abuse or neglect as defined by Penal 

Code § 11165.3 against the students in her classroom.”). 

In addition, the original complaint alleged the following with regard to M.G. –

During his time in Holder’s classroom, the adults introduced a "game" which 

resulted in M.G. becoming sexually aroused by the sight of toes. When 

confronted by Mr. and Mrs. Garedakis, Holder laughed and said M.G. was 

"becoming a little man." The parents became increasingly concerned, but 

Margaret Olsen assured them that everything was okay.

Cplt ¶ 72.

M.G. suffers from trauma as a result of his exposure to Holder’s classroom 

and is still fixated on feet. This has proven to also be a source of great 

embarrassment for his parents. His behavioral changes can be attributed to 

the mental and/or physical abuse he experienced and witnessed in Holder's 

classroom

Cplt ¶ 73.

On December 15, 2014, plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint ("FAC"). The 

FAC did not allege compliance with the Government Claims Act, although it did include 

the same allegations as in Cplt ¶¶ 31, 72-73. See FAC ¶¶ 31, 72-73. On January 30, 

2015, plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint ("SAC"), and on October 21, 2015, 

they filed the third amended complaint (“TAC”). Both the SAC and the TAC asserted that 

"[p]laintiffs have complied with all procedural requirements of the California Government 

Tort Claims Act.” SAC ¶ 27; TAC ¶ 27. 

Both the SAC and the TAC also included allegations similar to those in the original 

complaint, regarding the District defendants’ “knowledge of information giving rise to a 

reasonable suspicion that Holder had committed acts of child abuse or neglect as defined 

by Penal Code § 11165.3 against students in her classroom.” See SAC ¶ 32; TAC ¶ 32. 

Finally, both included allegations similar to those in the original complaint regarding the 

“’game’ which resulted in M.G. becoming sexually aroused by the sight of toes.” See

SAC ¶¶ 73, 74; TAC ¶¶ 76-77. However, neither the SAC nor the TAC alleged that M.G. 

was excused from compliance with the claims presentation requirements based on 

allegations of "sexual abuse" and neither asserted a claim of “sexual abuse.”

Defendants now seek summary judgment as to M.G.’s state-law claims. Plaintiffs 

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contend that those claims are not barred, because they are based on "childhood sexual 

abuse" and as such have been excepted from California's claim filing requirements by 

Government Code § 905(m). Section 905(m) provides that claims made pursuant to 

Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 for “recovery of damages suffered as a result of 

childhood sexual abuse . . . arising out of conduct occurring after January 1, 2009" are 

excepted from the claim filing requirements. Section 340.1(e) defines "childhood sexual 

abuse" as including "any act committed against the plaintiff that occurred when the 

plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by" 

California Penal Code §§ 266j; 285; 286; 288(b), (c); 288a(b), (c); 289(h), (i), (j); 647.6. 

Cal. Civ. P. Code § 340.1(e). The TAC does not mention § 340.1, and does not include 

any claim that references conduct proscribed by the listed Penal Code sections. 

At the April 13, 2016, hearing on the prior motion, the court asked plaintiffs’ 

counsel which of the state-law causes of action could be construed as asserting a claim 

of “sexual abuse.” See Transcript (“Tr.”), Apr. 13, 2016 (Doc. 208) at 12. Plaintiffs’ 

counsel pointed to the allegations in TAC ¶ 76 (“During his time in Holder’s classroom,

the adults introduced a ‘game’ which resulted in M.G. becoming sexually aroused by the 

sight of toes.”). Tr. at 12-13. The court asked, “Which cause of action does that conduct 

give rise to?” Tr. at 13. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded, “We have alleged factually that 

conduct. We have alleged claims arising out of . . . that conduct, including IIED, the Bane 

Act, the Unruh Act, and those claims flow from those facts.” Tr. at 13. 

The court asked, “Well, which claims, specifically? . . . [E]ach of the claims has a 

standard. And if this is the conduct upon which each is based, I need to be able to figure 

out how. So tell me specifically which claims.” Tr. at 14. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded 

that it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to plead a claim under Code of Civil Procedure 

§ 340.1, “since we’ve put them on notice as to the factual basis of those claims.” Tr. at 

15. Following further discussion, the court ordered additional briefing, directing that 

defendants could move for summary judgment on the state-law claims as to M.G. Tr. at 

14-17, 38-39. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of . . . a 

claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court 

of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery 

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue 

where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can 

prevail merely by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to 

support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. If the moving party 

meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out specific facts showing a 

genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). 

When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011).

B. Defendants' Motion

Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted as to the state-law 

claims asserted by plaintiff M.G. First, defendants contend that no iteration of the 

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complaint, including the TAC, provided defendants with fair notice that plaintiffs intended 

to assert a claim for childhood sexual abuse, whether under § 340.1 or otherwise. They 

note that the term "sexual abuse" does not appear in the TAC, that none of the causes of 

action reference sexual abuse, and that each of the state-law claims is asserted by all the 

minor plaintiffs, including M.G., and none of the claims differentiates in any way among 

any of the plaintiffs. 

In particular, defendants assert, the allegations in TAC ¶ 76 were insufficient to put 

them on notice that M.G. was attempting to bring a separate claim for childhood sexual 

abuse, or that any of the state claims pled in the TAC could be fairly understood to 

include a claim for childhood sexual abuse on behalf of M.G. They argue that the 

paragraph does not specify who introduced the "game" or what it entailed – just that as a 

result of the game, M.G. became sexually aroused at the sight of toes. They contend 

that there are no facts pled showing that the “game” involved a “lewd and lascivious act” 

committed by defendants with the intention of arousing their own sexual desires or those 

of M.G., required under Penal Code § 288. 

Defendants argue further that nothing in plaintiffs' responses to defendants' 

discovery requests put them on notice that a childhood sexual abuse claim was being 

made as to M.G. They assert that the discovery responses lumped all the minor plaintiffs 

together, indicating that they had suffered from the same abuse and sustained the same 

type of damages. For instance, defendants note, plaintiffs' amended initial disclosures 

state, with regard to the damages being sought in the case, that damages were sought 

for "physical, emotional and psychological harm” to “[p]laintiffs M.G., B.G., A.G., B.R., 

M.R., and E.R., resulting from the hostile educational environment they experienced in 

Dina Holder's classroom." 

Defendants assert that having failed to plead a claim for childhood sexual abuse or 

otherwise put defendants on notice that such a claim was being made, plaintiffs cannot 

now manufacture a triable issue and avoid summary judgment by relying on a claim or 

theory that was not pled in the complaint and as to which neither the court nor the 

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defendants had notice. 

In their second main argument, defendants note that plaintiffs never requested 

leave to amend to add a childhood sexual abuse claim on behalf of M.G., and assert that 

plaintiffs would not be entitled to do so under the Ninth Circuit's five-factor analysis, which 

looks at bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, 

and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. See Johnson v. 

Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 

First, defendants contend that plaintiffs have demonstrated bad faith in failing to 

raise these issues prior to their opposition to defendants' previous motion for summary 

judgment. Second, defendants assert that plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue is undue 

and unjustifiable, and that in any event, the deadline to amend has long passed. Third, 

defendants argue that they would be prejudiced by any amendment, as discovery has 

closed, and they have not had a fair and full opportunity to develop evidence or witnesses 

regarding the precise details and timing of plaintiffs' allegations regarding M.G. and his 

issues with women's toes. Finally, defendants contend that leave to amend should also 

be denied because plaintiffs have already amended the complaint on several occasions, 

and that they could have properly pled a claim for childhood sexual abuse of M.G. if they 

in fact had believed they had adequate grounds to do so.

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that the TAC adequately states a claim for childhood 

sexual abuse. They assert that no amendment to the complaint is necessary, but that to 

the extent that the court finds that the childhood sexual abuse allegations in the TAC 

require "clarification," they should be permitted to "amend the pleading to conform to 

proof.” Plaintiffs contend that defendants have had knowledge of the nature of the 

childhood sexual abuse claims and the relief sought since the beginning of the case, 

because the TAC pleads facts that give rise to the claims, and because defendants have 

thoroughly litigated the facts giving rise to and damages flowing from these claims. 

Plaintiffs point to the allegations in TAC ¶¶ 30, 71-77, where they assert that M.G. 

was born in March 2005, attended Holder's class during the 2008-2009 school year, has 

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been diagnosed with autism and is non-verbal, and was unable to communicate what 

was happening to him; that during his time in Holder's classroom "the adults introduced a 

'game' which resulted in M.G. becoming sexually aroused by the site of toes," and that 

when confronted by Mr. and Mrs. Garedakis, Holder laughed and said M.G. was 

"becoming a little man;" that when the parents expressed concern, Margaret Olson 

assured them that everything was OK; that each defendant "had knowledge of" the abuse 

since 2008; and that M.G. "suffers from trauma as a result of his exposure to Holder's 

classroom and is still fixated on feet" and that the behavior is so serious the family cannot 

go out in public places with M.G. 

Plaintiffs also contend that despite defendants' representation that they had no 

notice of the childhood sexual abuse claims, their conduct during discovery proves 

otherwise. Plaintiffs cite to deposition testimony by M.G.'s parents, and assert that 95 

pages of Mr. Garedakis' deposition transcript and 51 pages of Mrs. Garedakis’ deposition 

transcript relate to facts surrounding, and damages arising out of, M.G.'s childhood 

sexual abuse claim. 

In the cited deposition excerpts, Mr. Garedakis testified that he came to the school 

on one occasion when M.G. was three years old, and briefly witnessed female aides 

putting their feet in M.G.'s face, which caused M.G. to become “sexually aroused.” 

Plaintiffs note that defendants directly asked Mr. Garedakis whether he thought M.G. was 

"sexually abused," whether what he saw was "sexual abuse," whether he thought the 

aides were "pedophiles," whether he thought M.D. was "sexually arouse[d]," whether he 

told anyone from the District that M.G. was "sexually molested or abused in Mrs. Holder's 

classroom," and whether he told anyone at Lyon Center (the school M.G. attended after 

the District school) that M.G. had been "sexually molested by Brentwood Union School 

District employees." Plaintiffs argue that these questions about “sexual abuse” show that 

defendants were on notice of the “sexual abuse” claim as to M.G. 

Likewise, plaintiffs contend, defendants’ “repeated[ ]” and “relentless[ ]”

questioning of Mrs. Garedakis shows that they were on notice of the “sexual abuse”

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claim. In particular, plaintiffs assert, defendants directly asked Mrs. Garedakis whether 

she heard Mr. Garedakis say that Holder and her aides acted as "sexual predators or 

pedophiles," whether she agreed with the term "sexual predators or pedophiles," whether 

she heard Mr. Garedakis say he saw "sexual abuse" of M.G., and whether Mr. Garedakis 

told her he saw Holder "sexually abusing" M.G.; and whether she asked Kelly Knapp 

(one of the classroom aides) whether Knapp was one of the "perpetrators of this sexual 

abuse," whether she asked Knapp whether Knapp saw M.G. being "sexually abused," 

and whether she told Knapp she believed M.G. was "sexually assaulted." 

Plaintiffs also assert that defendants asked Mrs. Garedakis how long after Mr. 

Garedakis told her about M.G. being "sexually assaulted" she asked him who was 

involved, whether she told anyone that the aides involved in the "sexual assault" were 

named Connie or Leslie, whether Mr. Garedakis specified how long the "sexual abuse" 

was going on when he saw it through the window, or whether Mr. Garedakis told her what 

he did when he saw the "sexual assault" of M.G., and whether she took M.G. out of the 

classroom immediately upon learning that he had been "sexually assaulted," and 

whether she knew by 2011 that M.G. had been "sexually assaulted" or whether she had 

heard anything, other than from Mr. Garedakis, that M.G. was "sexually abused;" whether 

she reported the "sexual assault" to the police, whether Mr. Garedakis told anyone about 

M.G. being "sexually assaulted," whether she told any of M.G.'s medical providers that 

M.G. had been "sexually assaulted," and whether she had done any research about 

"sexualized behavior by autistic children," and whether she agreed there is a difference 

between M.G. having a fixation with feet and being "sexually assaulted." 

In their second main argument, plaintiffs contend that they are not required to 

assert Government Code § 905(m) – whether to plead compliance with the Government 

Claims Act or to plead an excuse for non-compliance. They assert that § 905(m) is 

neither a requirement to comply with the Claims Act nor an excuse from the compliance, 

but rather simply provides that a plaintiff alleging a claim of childhood sexual abuse is not 

required to file a written claim under the Government Claims Act. 

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Plaintiffs also assert that they are not required to plead a claim under Civil Code 

§ 340.1, as that section relates to the statute of limitations for claims seeking “recovery of 

damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse.” They contend that § 340.1 

does not provide the substantive basis for a cause of action such as negligence, battery, 

or IIED. Indeed, they contend, the plain language of § 340.1 does not expressly discuss 

or refer to these claims or causes of action, but rather, simply extends the statute of 

limitations for all claims seeking "recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood 

sexual abuse."

In this case, plaintiffs assert, they allege that M.G. was three years old at the time 

of the alleged incident, and that under § 340.1, his state claims arising out of the 

childhood sexual abuse are still timely, and "[n]othing more needs to be alleged in the 

TAC." Plaintiffs contend that because there is no civil state cause of action or claim for 

sexual abuse in California, § 340.1(a) anticipates many different types of claims or 

causes of action that might be brought based on childhood sexual abuse. They argue 

that they have adequately alleged facts supporting the state-law claims.

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. M.G.'s claims are not saved by the operation of 

Government Code § 905(m) because M.G. has not brought a claim of childhood sexual 

abuse pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1. No such claim was pled in the TAC 

or in any prior iteration of the complaint, and there is no evidence that defendants were 

on notice that plaintiffs were asserting a claim of childhood sexual abuse. 

Neither the facts nor the evidence suggest a claim that qualifies under § 340.1, 

which defines "childhood sexual abuse" as including "any act committed against the 

plaintiff that occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would 

have been proscribed by" Penal Code § 266j (procurement of child for lewd or lascivious 

acts); § 285 (incest); § 286(b), (c) (act of sodomy with minor); § 288(a), (b) (lewd or 

lascivious acts upon a child); § 288a(b), (c) (oral copulation with minor); § 289(h), (i), (j) 

(sexual penetration of minor); § 647.6 (child molestation). Cal. Civ. P. Code § 340.1(e).

In order to state a claim for battery or negligence or any other legal theory, based 

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on "sexual abuse," a plaintiff must allege facts showing underlying childhood sexual 

abuse, as did the plaintiffs in Quarry v. Doe 1, 53 Cal. 4th 945 (2012), a case cited by 

plaintiffs herein. As indicated above, “childhood sexual abuse” is defined by reference to 

the Penal Code. Here, however, there are no facts pled in the TAC, and no evidence 

presented, showing any inappropriate physical or sexual contact between M.G. and any 

adult that would qualify as “childhood sexual abuse” within the meaning of § 340.1. 

Plaintiffs’ "sexual abuse" theory is based solely on the allegation that "[d]uring his 

time in Holder's classroom, the adult's introduced a 'game' which resulted in M.G. 

becoming sexually aroused by the sight of toes." The only evidence presented is the 

testimony of M.G.’s father that he briefly observed several unidentified adults sitting in a 

circle sticking their feet in M.G.’s face, as M.G. was lying on the floor and clutching his 

genitals.2 

Defendants were plainly on notice of the claim based on the “toes,” which was not 

pled as a claim of sexual abuse. Had plaintiffs submitted a written claim to the District 

within six months of the event, they might have fit the claim within one of the state-law 

causes of action. Instead, plaintiffs belatedly chose to try to fit the claim within a statute 

that limits conduct to specified Penal Code sections, but have provided no evidence of 

any such conduct. The deadline to seek leave to amend has long passed. Having failed 

to file the written claim with the District within the statutory limitation period, and having 

failed to plead or prove a claim of sexual abuse, plaintiffs are barred from proceeding with 

the state-law claims as to M.G. 

As for plaintiffs' contention that the questions defendants’ counsel asked Mr. and 

Mrs. Garedakis in their depositions demonstrate that defendants were on notice of the 

purported claim of “sexual abuse,” the evidence shows that it was not until the first day of 

Mrs. Garedakis’ deposition (September 9, 2015) that Mr. Garedakis stated in an off-the-

 

2

 Plaintiffs claim that this conduct was a regular occurrence, based on Mrs. Garedakis' 

testimony that the aide Kelly Knapp told her that it occurred several times a week, and 

Mr. Garedakis' testimony that Ms. Knapp told him "something was wrong” and it had 

been “going on for a long time” – all of which is inadmissible hearsay. 

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record comment that the aides in Holder’s classroom were “sexual predators” and 

pedophiles.” The evidence also shows that it was in an attempt to discover whether 

plaintiffs were in fact attempting to assert a claim of sexual abuse that defendants’ 

counsel questioned Mr. and Mrs. Garedakis on this issue in their depositions. 

Mr. Garedakis testified that his outburst was made in a moment of frustration. In 

addition, however, he refused on the record to characterize the "toe" incident as "sexual 

abuse" or to label the aides and teachers in Holder's classroom “pedophiles.” He testified 

further that he did not report the incident to the police or to Child Protective Services, and 

that M.G. had not seen a therapist or any professional in connection with his behavior 

toward feet. 

Plaintiffs filed the TAC on October 21, 2015, less than a week after Mr. Garedakis' 

deposition. If plaintiffs believed – as they are now arguing – that the testimony of Mr. and 

Mrs. Garedakis supported a claim for "sexual abuse," they could easily have asserted 

that claim in the TAC. Nevertheless, as was true with the prior iterations of the complaint, 

the TAC does not contain the phrase "sexual abuse." The sole use of the word "sexual" 

in the TAC is in the allegation that during M.G.'s time in Holder's classroom, "the adults 

introduced a 'game' which resulted in M.G. being sexually aroused by the sight of toes." 

TAC ¶ 76. The following paragraph alleges that M.G.'s "behavioral changes can be 

attributed to the mental and/or physical abuse he experienced and witnessed in Holder's 

classroom." TAC ¶ 77. However, there is no claim that M.G. suffered sexual abuse.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to 

M.G.’s state law claims is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:14-cv-04799-PJH Document 236 Filed 06/30/16 Page 13 of 13