Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00184/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00184-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1Shaunna also failed to identify Myers in response to the defendants’ interrogatory calling for

disclosure of “every person ... who otherwise have [sic] relevant knowledge relating to the allegations

contained in the complaint.” (Doc. 87, Exhibit A at 2, ¶ 4). Because the complaint alleges that

Shaunna experienced mental anguish, humiliation and emotional distress, (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 33, 37), she was

obligated to identify Myers. Because the defendant’s motion can be decided based on Rule 26(a)(1),

the Court does not consider the sanctions available to redress Shaunna’s failure to respond to formal

discovery requests.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHAUNNA CROCKER, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 04-0184-WS-B

 )

CITY OF FAIRHOPE, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion in limine to preclude testimony by

plaintiffs’ witness Wilson Myers. (Doc. 90). The plaintiffs have filed a response, (Doc. 93), and the

defendant a reply, (Doc. 99), and the motion is ripe for resolution. 

The defendant correctly notes that Myers was not identified in the plaintiffs’ initial disclosures. 

(Doc. 87, Exhibit D). The plaintiffs explain that they did not list Myers because they did not know

whether he would be available for trial or would still be on duty in Iraq. The difficulty is that the

plaintiffs were obligated to disclose all persons “likely to have discoverable information that the

disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the

subjects of the information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(emphasis added). The plaintiffs’ response

makes clear that at all relevant times they: (1) were aware of Myers; (2) were aware of his possession

of discoverable information concerning Shaunna Crocker’s mental state; and (3) intended to use this

information to support their case, contingent only on Myers’ return from duty.1

The plaintiffs next argue that Rule 26(a)(1) does not apply because they will use Myers’

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2E.g., Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen, Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2003)(citing Fifth

and Seventh Circuit cases); Southern States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318

F.3d 592, 597 (4th Cir. 2003)(citing a First Circuit case); Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor

Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001).

3See Southern States v. Sherwin-Williams, 318 F.3d at 598; Yeti by Molly v. Deckers

Outdoor, 259 F.3d at 1107; Bowe v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 2000 WL 1434584 at **3-4 (6th

Cir. 2000); Trost v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998).

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testimony only to impeach the testimony of defense witnesses regarding Shaunna’s “state of mind at the

time of the sexual acts.” (Doc. 93, ¶ 5). This is false on its face. If Myers has any personal knowledge

concerning Shaunna’s mental state, his testimony constitutes substantive evidence of that mental state;

that his testimony may conflict with the testimony of defense witnesses cannot reduce his testimony to

mere impeachment. E.g., Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 270 (1st Cir. 1998).

“A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a)

... is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial ... any witness ... not so

disclosed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The burden is on the plaintiffs to demonstrate either that their

failure to disclose was substantially justified or that the failure is harmless.2

Except as noted above, the plaintiffs do not attempt to establish substantial justification for their

failure to identify Myers. Their uncertainty as to whether he would be available for trial plainly does not

rise to this level, as appellate courts have routinely found no substantial justification when the

nondisclosing party failed to act prudently to ensure timely disclosure.3 As the plaintiffs have failed to

address harmlessness, they necessarily have failed to carry their burden regarding this element. The

disclosure of Myers comes long after discovery closed and only a few weeks before trial. Granting a

continuance to allow the defendant to explore Myers’ potential testimony would perversely encourage

these plaintiffs and other litigants to disregard the plain mandate of Rule 26(a)(1). Klonoski v. Mahlab,

156 F.3d at 273. 

Exclusion of the undisclosed witness is an “automatic sanction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory

committee notes 1993 amendments. The alternative sanctions listed in Rule 37(c)(1) “are primarily

intended to apply when a party fails to disclose evidence helpful to an opposing party.” Southern

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States v. Sherwin-Williams, 318 F.3d 592, 595 n.2 (4th Cir. 2003)(emphasis in original). Thus,

“absent some unusual extenuating circumstances not present here [i.e., substantial justification or

harmlessness], the appropriate sanction when a party fails to provide certain evidence to the opposing

party as required in the discovery rules is preclusion of that evidence from the trial.” Klonoski v.

Mahlab, 156 F.3d at 271. 

The plaintiffs blatantly violated Rule 26(a)(1). They have not shown either that the violation

was substantially justified or that it was harmless, and exclusion of the undisclosed witness is the

appropriate sanction. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to exclude Myers’ testimony is granted. 

DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 2005.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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