Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00150/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00150-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SHAVER, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S- 05-0150 FCD GGH P

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, filed on

April 8, 2005. By order, filed on July 29, 2005, defendants, inter alia, were directed to file a

response to the motion within 30 days. Having failed to do so, defendants were then ordered to

show cause for their failure to comply with the court’s order, within 10 days, by order filed on

November 22, 2005. Defendants discharged the show cause order in a timely response and were

granted an extension of time, until December 30, 2005, to file their response, which was filed on

December 29, 2005. 

First Amended Complaint

This action was transferred, on December 8, 2004, from the Central District to the

Fresno Division of the Eastern District. The Fresno Division of the Eastern District directed the

Case 2:05-cv-00150-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 08/16/06 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Defendant Grannis was dismissed from this action, as was defendant Runnels, in his 1

individual capacity only; plaintiff’s due process claims were also dismissed. See, Order, filed on

September 28, 2005, p. 2. 

2

transfer of this case to the Sacramento Division, by order filed on January 24, 2005. The

allegations of the First Amended Complaint, were modified by the September 28, 2005, Order, 

adopting the Findings and Recommendations of the undersigned, filed on July 29, 2005, in

adjudicating defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

1

This action now proceeds against two defendants: Dr. Nancy Nauman on

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims only, and against (former Folsom State Prison Warden) D.

L. Runnels, or his successor, in his official capacity, for prospective injunctive relief only and

solely as to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. Defendant Nauman, a psychiatrist, diagnosed

plaintiff, on January 17, 2003, as suffering from a mental disorder with symptoms of

schizophrenia and manic-depression. First Amended Complaint (FAC), p. 5. As a result of her

diagnosis and in light of a prior psychiatric diagnosis indicating that plaintiff has an antisocial

personality disorder, among other mental conditions, defendant Nauman recommended plaintiff’s

placement on single cell status. Id. Notwithstanding, two committees, the Folsom State Prison

Unit One Classification Committee (UCC), on May 6, 2003, and an Inter-disciplinary Treatment

Team Committee (ITTC), on December 19, 2003, both denied defendant Nauman’s

recommendation that plaintiff be placed on single cell status. Id. Plaintiff asserts that his Eighth

Amendment right to adequate medical care and treatment was thereby violated and that he has

been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. FAC, p.5 and attachment. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Nauman was present at the two committee meetings and failed to object to the

committees’ decisions denying plaintiff adequate medical care. Id. Although plaintiff sets forth

no specific involvement by defendant Runnels, plaintiff alleges that he violated plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment right to adequate medical care. FAC, p. 3. Plaintiff seeks both “immediate”

injunctive relief, in the form of “temporary” placement on single cell status, and money damages. 

Case 2:05-cv-00150-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 08/16/06 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief 

Although plaintiff couches his motion as one whereby he seeks both preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief, he appears to be seeking, in the form of preliminary injunctive

relief, the permanent injunctive relief sought by his first amended complaint; that is, although he

does not clearly state it within the motion, he is asking that the court require prison officials to

house him in a single cell, pending adjudication of this action; he also adds he needs to be

provided unspecified “adequate” medical/mental health care and treatment. Plaintiff’s

declaration in support of motion (plaintiff’s Dec.), p. 11. His declaration largely reiterates the

allegations of his first amended complaint, as set forth above. 

Plaintiff contends that he is threatened with irreparable harm, although he does

not provide the specific factual basis for such a conclusion. Motion, p. 4. He contends that the

mental suffering he will endure if the motion is denied outweighs any inconvenience to

defendants, such that the balance of hardships tip in his favor. Id., p. 5. Plaintiff argues that he is

likely to succeed on the merits because defendants have intentionally interfered with his

prescribed medical/mental treatments. Id., p. 6.

Preliminary Injunction Standard

 The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well established. 

To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the

possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships

tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,

700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal point

being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. “Under any

formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the

court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

Case 2:05-cv-00150-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 08/16/06 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Defendant Nauman’s declaration sets forth that she is a clinical psychologist at Napa 2

State Hospital, who was employed by the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation for about five years, and was a staff psychologist at FSP during the time relevant

for plaintiff’s allegations. Opp., Exhibit A, Nauman Dec. 

4

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any

preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the

harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

Opposition

Defendants observe that at the times relevant for this motion for preliminary

injunction, defendant Nauman was employed at Folsom State Prison (FSP) and, from January

2

21, 2004, until May 10, 2004, defendant Runnels was the Acting Warden at FSP. Opposition

(Opp.), p. 2, citing the Answer at 2, ¶ III; see docket entry # 12. 

Defendants also point out that, on March 21, 2005, plaintiff notified the court that

his address changed to the Correctional Training Facility (CTF) in Soledad. Opp., p. 2; see also,

docket entry # 7. Thereafter, on November 7, 2005, plaintiff filed a request, indicating that he

had been transferred to RJ Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego. Opp., p. 2; see also,

docket entry # 14. Plaintiff indicated, on November 21, 2005, that he is currently participating in

RJD’s Enhanced Outpatient Program for mental health. Opp., p. 2; see also docket entry # 18. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s motion should be denied because (1) the court

does not have jurisdiction to require non-parties to act; (2) plaintiff has been transferred to

another correctional institutional wherein he is no longer subject to the same conditions and his

request for equitable relief has thereby been rendered moot; (3) plaintiff has not demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury. Opp., p. 2.

Discussion

Defendants’ contentions are well-taken, in part. When an inmate seeks injunctive

relief concerning an institution at which he is no longer incarcerated, his claims for such relief

Case 2:05-cv-00150-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 08/16/06 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

become moot. See Sample v. Borg, 870 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1989); Darring v. Kincheloe, 783

F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff has demonstrated no reasonable possibility that he will be incarcerated at Folsom State

Prison at any predictable time in the future. In addition, plaintiff has not, since either of his two

subsequent transfers, informed the court that he remains subject to any of the conditions of which

he complained in either his request for preliminary injunctive relief or in the instant action. 

Plaintiff under these circumstances has not made the requisite showing that he is under any threat

of significant or irreparable injury. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. If even had his motion

not been rendered moot, absent a showing that he is subject to the possibility of irreparable harm,

the court need not reach the question of likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Accordingly,

plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.

Moreover, plaintiff’s requests for permanent injunctive relief within his first

amended complaint against two defendants who are, or were, located at Folsom State Prison have

also been rendered moot by his transfer. As plaintiff’s permanent injunctive relief claims have

been rendered moot by his subsequent transfers, this court will recommend dismissal of

defendant Runnels, or the successor warden of Folsom State Prison, who is being sued in this

case at this point in his official capacity only, on a claim for prospective injunctive relief solely. 

As to defendant Nauman, this action should proceed only on a claim of money damages against

her. 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s April 8, 2005, motion for preliminary relief be denied as moot;

2. Plaintiff’s claims for permanent prospective injunctive relief within his first

amended complaint be dismissed as moot;

3. Defendant Runnels, or his successor, sued only in his official capacity for

prospective relief solely, be dismissed from this action; and

\\\\\

Case 2:05-cv-00150-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 08/16/06 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

4. This matter proceed only as to defendant Nauman on a claim for money

damages solely.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 8/16/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

shav0150.pi

Case 2:05-cv-00150-FCD-GGH Document 34 Filed 08/16/06 Page 6 of 6