Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55247/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD TAYLOR,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW L. CATE, Secretary of the

California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-55247

D.C. No. 2:09-

cv-05267-ODWOP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

February 3, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed November 19, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit

Judges, and John R. Tunheim, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Clifton

* The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

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2 TAYLOR V. CATE

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying

a habeas corpus petition and remanded with instructions to

grant the writ in a case in which Ronald Taylor, who was

convicted and originally sentenced for felony murder based

on a jury finding that Taylor was the shooter, was resentenced

as an aider and abettor after the State of California concluded

that he was not the shooter.

The panel held that the right to a jury trial in this case

means that Taylor had the right to have a jury decide what

conduct he committed, and that resentencing on the basis of

facts that the jury did not find, and indeed that conflicted with

what the jury did find, violated his Sixth Amendment rights. 

The panel wrote that there was no trial error that could be

subject to harmless error analysis, and concluded that Taylor

is entitled to a new trial.

Judge Clifton concurred in part and dissented in part. He

agreed that constitutional error arose when the State

resentenced Taylor as an aider and abettor. But he disagreed

that the correct remedy is to grant the writ and order a retrial. 

He would hold that the error in this case is amenable to

harmless error review, and would remand for further

proceedings to determine whether Taylor suffered prejudice.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TAYLOR V. CATE 3

COUNSEL

Kurt David Hermansen (argued), Law Office of Kurt David

Hermansen, San Diego, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Dane R.

Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne,

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Eric E. Reynolds

(argued), Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, California,

for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

In 1987, two people entered a fast food restaurant, and

one of them shot and killed the owner, Lewis Lim. A jury

found that petitioner Ronald Taylor was the shooter, and

convicted him of felony murder predicated on attempted

robbery. The state trial court sentenced Taylor to life without

the possibility of parole on the basis of the jury’s finding that

he was the shooter. In 1996, Taylor told the State that

although he had been at the restaurant on the day of the

crime, his cousin, Hugh Hayes Jr., was actually the shooter. 

The State believed Taylor and sought to have him

resentenced as an aider and abettor. The state trial court

resentenced Taylor as an aider and abettor to a term of

imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

Taylor objected to resentencing, contending that the jury

had not found him guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery,

and that he was entitled to a new trial. The state courts did

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not resolve Taylor’s claim for procedural reasons, so he

petitioned the federal court for a writ of habeas corpus,

arguing that the State may not continue to hold him in prison

on the theory that he aided and abetted a robbery, when the

jury did not find the facts necessary to convict him of aiding

and abetting. We agree. The State may not imprison Taylor

for a criminal role the jury considered and expressly found he

did not play.

BACKGROUND

On November 19, 1987, two men drove into the parking

lot of Pioneer Chicken in Sunland, California. The taller of

the two men entered the restaurant and requested the restroom

key from Rajinder Kaur, an employee working behind the

counter. Kaur gave him the key, and he left the restaurant to

use the restroom, which had an outside entry, while the

shorter of the two men was sitting on the hood of the car. 

The taller man then reentered the restaurant, walked behind

the counter, and while he gave Kaur the key with his left

hand, he pulled a gun from his pocket with his right hand. 

The shorter man had by that time entered the restaurant and

was sitting in the dining area.

The owner of the restaurant, Lewis Lim, then came out of

the kitchen. While the gunman was distracted by Lim, Kaur

went through the kitchen door to summon help. Kaur

testified she heard a punch and a gunshot. Lim was later

found dead, having been shot in the back of the head. As

Kaur was trying to leave, the shorter man hit her on the back

and threw her to the ground. The two men fled in the car in

which they had arrived.

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TAYLOR V. CATE 5

Police later found the car abandoned in a parking lot. It

had been wiped down with brake fluid, but police discovered

the palm print of petitioner Ronald Taylor on the driver’s side

rear window. When Taylor was arrested, he did not tell

police the identity of his companion.

In March 1988, the Los Angeles County district attorney

filed a three-count information against Taylor. Count 1

charged that Taylor murdered Lim, in violation of California

Penal Code § 187(a). Count 1 specially alleged that Taylor

committed the murder while in the commission of a robbery,

a “special circumstance” under Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)

that was punishable by death or life without parole. Count 1

also specially alleged that Taylor personally used a firearm

during the offense under Penal Code §§ 1203.06(a)(1) and

12022.5, and that a principal was armed with a firearm during

the offense under Penal Code § 12022(a). Counts 2 and 3

alleged that Taylor committed attempted robbery and grand

theft auto.

At Taylor’s trial, the prosecutor sought a conviction under

a theory of felony murder, because Lim was killed during an

attempted robbery. The prosecutor argued that the man who

shot Lim was guilty of attempted robbery as a principal, and

that the second man was guilty of attempted robbery as an

aider and abettor. The trial court instructed the jury on both

felony murder and aiding and abetting liability.

There was a dispute at trial about whether Taylor, if he

was present, was the shooter or the second man, and about

whether the second man intended the robbery. The

prosecutor contended that both the shooter and the second

man, who was arguably acting as a lookout, knowingly

participated in the robbery. The prosecutor therefore argued

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6 TAYLOR V. CATE

that the evidence showed that Taylor was the shooter, but that

if the jury disagreed, the jury should find that Taylor actively

participated as the lookout. Defense counsel argued that any

involvement Taylor had was as the second man and that he

did not know that his companion intended to rob the

restaurant.

The prosecutor also sought a finding of the “special

circumstance”—murder in the commission of a robbery. 

Under California law, the “special circumstance” can apply

to an aider and abettor only if the aider and abettor has the

intent to kill. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(c). The prosecutor

acknowledged in closing that this was a felony murder case

and that he did not prove that the lookout intended to kill

Lim. The prosecutor therefore correctly told the jury that in

order to find the “special circumstance,” the jury had to find

that Taylor was the actual shooter.

The jury found Taylor guilty of murder, attempted

robbery, and grand theft auto. The jury found true the

“special circumstance” that Taylor committed the murder

during the commission of a robbery, and also the allegations

that Taylor personally used a firearm and that a principal was

armed with a firearm. The jury therefore found that Taylor

was the shooter, not the second man.

On the basis of the “special circumstance” finding, the

trial court sentenced Taylor to life without the possibility of

parole. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17). The California Court

of Appeal affirmed Taylor’s conviction, and the California

Supreme Court denied his petition for review in 1991.

In 1996, Taylor contacted the Los Angeles Police

Department and reported that although he had been at the

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TAYLOR V. CATE 7

restaurant on the day of the crime, his cousin, Hugh Hayes

Jr., was the one who shot Lim. The State investigated

Taylor’s claim. Taylor’s brother told investigators that Hayes

admitted to him shortly after the murder that he shot Lim. 

Hayes’s former girlfriend told investigators that she

overheard Hayes talking on the phone and admitting to the

shooting. Kaur, the restaurant employee working behind the

counter, positively identified Hayes in a photographic lineup. 

Trial testimony established that it was the taller of the two

men who shot Lim, and investigators discovered that Hayes

is much taller than Taylor.

In January 1999, the State tried Hayes for the murder of

Lim, but the jury found him not guilty. Nonetheless, both the

original case detective and the officers who investigated

Hayes continued to believe that Hayes, not Taylor, was the

shooter. In March 1999, the district attorney wrote to the

California Board of Prison Terms and requested that Taylor’s

case be returned to the trial court for resentencing, given the

new evidence that Taylor was not the shooter. The Board

denied the request.

In 2004, Taylor, acting pro se, filed his fifth state habeas

corpus petition, arguing that he was not the shooter and

asking for a new trial. In May 2005, while the California

Supreme Court was considering Taylor’s petition, the district

attorney again wrote to the California Department of

Corrections and the California Board of Prison Terms to

request that they recall Taylor’s sentence. The district

attorney repeated that new evidence—including the

statements of Taylor’s brother and Hayes’s former girlfriend,

as well as Kaur’s identification of Hayes—showed that

Hayes, not Taylor, was the shooter. The California Supreme

Court then instructed the California Attorney General to

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submit an informal response to Taylor’s petition that

addressed the district attorney’s requests.

In its informal response, the State suggested that the

California Supreme Court issue an order to show cause to the

State regarding Taylor’s claim that he was not the shooter. 

This would allow the State to file a statement of nonopposition to Taylor’s claim. The State added, however, that

even if Taylor was not the shooter, he was an aider and

abettor, and urged that he was therefore properly convicted of

the underlying crime of felony murder. The State suggested

that the trial court strike the “special-circumstance” and

firearm-use findings and resentence Taylor as an aider and

abettor. The record does not indicate that Taylor, still acting

pro se, had an opportunity to respond.

In March 2006, the California Supreme Court issued an

order requiring the State to show cause why Taylor was “not

factually innocent of the special circumstance and the

firearm-use allegation, and why he should not be

resentenced.” In its response filed in the trial court, the State

conceded that Taylor was actually innocent of the “specialcircumstance” and firearm-use findings. The State again

argued, however, that Taylor was properly convicted of

felony murder because the jury could have found that, as the

second man, he aided and abetted the attempted robbery. The

State urged that the trial court strike the special findings and

resentence Taylor as an aider and abettor.

Taylor, still acting pro se, filed a “Motion to Stop All

Sentencing,” arguing that the trial court could not resentence

him as an aider and abettor because the jury never found that

he was an aider and abettor. The trial court, however, refused

to consider Taylor’s argument on the ground that it could not

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TAYLOR V. CATE 9

consider matters outside the scope of the California Supreme

Court’s order. The court resentenced Taylor as an aider and

abettor to twenty-five years to life.

Taylor obtained counsel and appealed. The California

Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision. It held

that the court correctly declined to address Taylor’s claim that

he was improperly resentenced for a crime no jury had found

he committed, because the Supreme Court’s order referred to

resentencing. Under California law, the trial court must limit

its inquiry upon remand from the Supreme Court to the

matters identified in the remand order. See, e.g., People v.

Lewis, 91 P.3d 928, 936 (Cal. 2004); People v. Bloyd, 729

P.2d 802, 820 (Cal. 1987). The appellate court did not

“express any view on the merits” of Taylor’s claim. The

California SupremeCourt denied Taylor’s petition for review. 

Taylor then petitioned the California Supreme Court for a

writ of habeas corpus, again arguing that he could not be

resentenced as an aider and abettor because the jury never

found that he was an aider and abettor. The Court denied the

petition.

Taylor then turned to federal district court and urged the

same ground in a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The magistrate judge applied the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and

concluded that the state court’s resentencing was a decision

entitled to deference, and that it was not unreasonable. The

district court adopted the magistrate judge’s decision and

denied a certificate of appealability. This court issued a

certificate of appealability on the following issue: “whether

resentencing appellant as an aider and abettor violated

appellant’s due process and jury trial rights.”

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DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s denial of Taylor’s habeas

petition de novo. Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 1006, 1011

(9th Cir. 2008). The district court said that the state court’s

rejection of Taylor’s claim was reasonable under AEDPA. It

treated the resentencing as if it were the product of a reasoned

decision on Taylor’s due process claim. As the State

acknowledges on appeal, however, the district court erred in

applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review. The

California courts never addressed Taylor’s claim that he was

denied due process when he was resentenced for an offense

no jury found he committed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

(AEDPA’s standard of review applies to claims “adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings”). Because there is

no state court decision on the merits, we review Taylor’s

claim de novo.

It is undisputed that the jury found Taylor shot Lim, but

Taylor was resentenced for assisting someone else commit

the robbery. Taylor argued he was entitled to a new trial and

a jury finding that he was an aider and abettor before he could

be sentenced as one. The state trial court agreed with Taylor

that, in hindsight, the jury was incorrect and that he was not

the shooter, but nonetheless resentenced Taylor as an aider

and abettor on the basis of facts the jury did not find. The

state courts never even considered the claim that the

resentencing violated his right to a jury trial as guaranteed by

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

We conclude that the right to a jury trial in this case

means that Taylor had the right to have a jury decide what

conduct he committed. The Sixth Amendment and the Due

Process Clause “entitle a criminal defendant to a jury

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TAYLOR V. CATE 11

determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime

with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (alteration

in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995);

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993). This

right is “one of our most vital barriers to governmental

arbitrariness,” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957), and

“fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Resentencing on the

basis of facts that the jury did not find, and indeed that

conflicted with what the jury did find, violated Taylor’s Sixth

Amendment rights.

The dissent tries to compare this case to one involving

prosecutorial misconduct during trial. Since such misconduct

would be reviewed for its effect on the jury under the

harmless error standard, see Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972,

984 (9th Cir. 2005), and the prosecutor in this case did not

even commit misconduct, the dissent asks us to conclude

there must be review for harmless error here too. That

argument does not come to grips with the problem in this

case, which is the absence of any jury verdict to support the

sentencing.

The state essentially asks us to ignore what the jury

found. The state contends it is sufficient that the jury was

instructed on aiding and abetting, along with felony murder. 

Yet the jury had to choose between two mutually inconsistent

roles. To convict Taylor as an aider and abettor under

California law, the jury would had to have found that he

specifically intended to encourage or assist someone else in

robbing the restaurant. People v. Perez, 113 P.3d 100,

103–05 (Cal. 2005) (noting a person cannot aid and abet

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himself). We know the jury did not make this finding

because it concluded Taylor was the person who robbed

Pioneer Chicken and shot Lim.

Because we know the jury actually found that Taylor was

the shooter, the State’s reliance on Griffin v. United States,

502 U.S. 46 (1991), is misplaced. In Griffin, the Court held

that when the prosecutor puts multiple theories to a jury, one

of which is factually unsupported, the jury may be trusted to

have relied on the theory that is supported by the evidence. 

Id. at 56. But in this case, since the prosecutor told the jury

it could not find the “special circumstance” true if it found

that Taylor was an aider and abettor, we know that the jury

found that Taylor was the shooter. We thus cannot assume

that the jury relied on aiding and abetting, because the jury’s

findings reveal it did not.

The actual identity of the shooter was not known to the

prosecutor during trial. The State’s evidence was properly

presented to the jury. There was no trial error that could be

subject to harmless error analysis. Neither the Petitioner nor

the State has suggested that there was. Harmless error

analysis is often utilized where an omission or misinstruction

on the law may not have affected the jury verdict. See, e.g.,

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999); California v.

Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5–6 (1996); see also Arizona v. Fulminante,

499 U.S. 279, 307–08 (1991) (“The common thread

connecting these cases is that each involved ‘trial

error’—error which occurred during the presentation of the

case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively

assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order

to determine whether its admission was harmless . . . .”);

Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60–62 (2008) (holding

harmless error analysis appropriate where the jury was

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TAYLOR V. CATE 13

instructed on multiple theories of guilt that would have

supported conviction, and one theory which was legally

invalid under California law).

The prosecutor in this case presented alternative theories

of guilt, each of which was legally valid: that Taylor was the

shooter, or that Taylor was an aider and abettor. In this case,

unlike Hedgpeth, we know which theory the jury relied on. 

Because the prosecutor sought a penalty that could be

imposed only if Taylor were the shooter, the jury was asked

to find he was the shooter, and the trial record fully supports

that finding. We now have extrinsic evidence that Taylor was

not the shooter, but no jury has ever heard it. Taylor’s

resentencing on the basis of such evidence violated the Sixth

Amendment and due process.

The dissent agrees that Taylor should not have been

resentenced on the basis of conduct the jury found he did not

commit. The dissent says we should remand to the district

court to review the trial record for harmless error. Yet no

error can be found in the trial record. The error was in the

resentencing. Resentencing Taylor for a criminal role on

which the jury was instructed, but did not find, violates his

Sixth Amendment right to be tried and convicted by a jury. 

And it does so in a way that is not amenable to harmless error

analysis. Taylor is entitled to a new trial. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the

case REMANDED with instructions to grant the writ.

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CLIFTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

The State of California concluded that it had sentenced

the petitioner in this case, Ronald Taylor, too harshly. 

Although the State thought he was guilty of murder, the crime

for which he had been convicted, it concluded that he was an

aider and abettor and not a principal. The State made this

determination because Taylor, after denying his guilt at trial,

subsequently came clean about his involvement in the crime

and fingered the likely principal in an effort to get a lighter

sentence. The State eventually came to the same conclusion. 

Although it was under no obligation to do so, the State then

laudably moved to give him that lighter sentence as an aider

and abettor.

On Taylor’s petition for habeas corpus, the majority rules

that the State may not resentence Taylor but must instead

retry him or let him go. I expect that it may be difficult for

the State to retry him successfully more than a quarter

century after the crime was committed, for reasons having

nothing to do with Taylor’s actual guilt or innocence. Thus,

the result of our decision may well be to free Taylor and wipe

this crime off his record. By punishing California for doing

the right thing in reducing Taylor’s sentence, our decision

will create a disincentive for states to correct prisoners’

sentences in similar situations in the future.

That result is both illogical and unwarranted under the

law. I agree with the majority, albeit with some hesitation,

that constitutional error arose when the State resentenced

Taylor as an aider and abettor, given that the jury originally

found that Taylor was the principal. But I disagree that the

correct remedy is to grant the writ and order a retrial. 

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Instead, I would hold that the error in this case is amenable to

harmless error review, as is ordinarily the case when an error

is discerned on habeas corpus review, and would remand to

the district court for further proceedings to determine whether

Taylor suffered prejudice.

I. Background

The following facts emerged at trial and, with one small

exception noted below, are undisputed in the record before

us. On November 19, 1987, petitioner Ronald Taylor and

another man stole a car with the intent to use it to commit a

robbery. The two men drove to a Pioneer Chicken restaurant

in Sunland, California. The first man entered the restaurant

and requested the key to the lavatory from Rajinder Kaur, the

attendant behind the counter. Kaur gave him the key, and the

man went out of the restaurant to the lavatory, which was

entered from the outside. The man kept the lavatory door ajar

and watched until two customers drove off. The second man

was sitting on the hood of the car in which the men had

arrived.1

The first man then reentered the restaurant, walked behind

the counter, and gave Kaur the key back with his left hand

while pulling a gun from his pocket with his right. The

second man had by then also entered the restaurant and was

sitting in the dining area near the restaurant cook. The owner

1 This is the small exception. During a subsequent preliminary hearing

in connection with charges brought against Hugh Hayes, Jr., the person

Taylor eventually identified as the actual shooter, Taylor stated that the

second man (who Taylor had by then confessed was himself) sat in the

car. Wherever the second man was sitting, he was able to see the lavatory,

so the difference appears immaterial.

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of the restaurant, Lewis Lim, came out of the kitchen. While

the gunman was distracted by Lim, Kaur went through the

kitchen door to summon help. The gunman then punched

Lim and shot him through the head. As Kaur was trying to

leave, the second man struck her on the back and threw her to

the ground. The two men fled in the stolen car in which they

had come. The car was later found wiped down with brake

fluid to remove fingerprints, but Taylor’s palm print was

found on it.

Taylor was arrested and charged with murdering Lim in

violation of California Penal Code § 187(a). The State also

alleged three special circumstances. First, it alleged that

Taylor committed the murder while engaged in the

commission of a robbery in violation of Penal Code

§ 190.2(a)(17). Next, the State alleged that Taylor personally

used a firearm during the crime. Third, the State alleged that

a principal was armed with a firearm during the offense.

There was a dispute at trial whether Taylor, if he was

present at all, was the shooter or the second man. The second

man could be held guilty of murder under an aiding and

abetting theory, and the jury was instructed on this theory. 

But, as the prosecutor acknowledged at the time, the jury

could not properly find Taylor guilty of the § 190.2(a)(17)

special circumstance on an aiding and abetting theory. Under

California law, someone found guilty as “an actual killer”

does not need to “have had any intent to kill at the time of the

commission of the offense” for the special circumstance to be

found true, but someone who aided and abetted the murder is

subject to the special circumstance only if it is found that he

acted with “the intent to kill.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(b),

(c). The prosecutor conceded that he had not proven that the

second man had the intent to kill Lim, so the jury could not

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TAYLOR V. CATE 17

convict Taylor of the special circumstance if it found Taylor

was the second man. This made a difference for Taylor’s

sentence: Taylor would only be eligible for life without

parole or death if the jury found the special circumstance true. 

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a). Otherwise, Taylor would be

eligible for a term of 25 years to life. Cal. Penal Code

§ 190(a).

At trial, Taylor could not deny, in light of his palm print,

that he had helped wipe down the stolen getaway car, but he

otherwise tried to minimize his involvement. His attorney

argued that he wasn’t “necessarily . . . even there at the time

of the robbery.” If he was there, the attorney argued, he was

the second man, and he had no idea that the shooter planned

to commit a robbery. Or, the attorney argued to the jury, the

shooter might simply have wanted to execute Lim, not

commit a robbery. If the jury believed this last theory, then

even if it found that Taylor was the shooter, it could not

convict Taylor of the first special circumstance, robbery

murder.

In the face of the evidence against him, Taylor’s defense

amounted to a high-risk gamble. Taylor lost. The jury found

him guilty of first degree murder, attempted robbery, and the

unlawful taking of a vehicle. The jury also found that the

murder was committed while Taylor was engaged in an

attempted robbery and that Taylor personally used a firearm.

After the verdict was rendered but before the sentence

was imposed, Taylor told his lawyer that he was present

during the robbery but that someone else was the shooter. 

Taylor filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative,

sought to strike the finding that he was the shooter and had

personally used a firearm. The trial court denied that motion,

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and he was sentenced to life without parole. The verdict was

upheld on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied

Taylor’s petition for review.

Seven years later, hoping that “somehow [he wouldn’t]

die in prison,” Taylor tried again to convince the State that he

had not been the actual killer, identifying his cousin, Hugh

Hayes, Jr., as the shooter. The Los Angeles Police

Department and Los Angeles County District Attorney’s

Office concluded that was true, and the district attorney’s

office filed an information charging Hayes with murder. 

Taylor testified at Hayes’s preliminary hearing that he and

Hayes stole the car and drove around with a loaded gun

looking for a place to rob, and that he had been with Hayes at

the Pioneer Chicken during the attempted robbery. In 1999,

Hayes was tried for the murder but was acquitted. There was,

therefore, no adjudication inconsistent with the jury verdict

finding that Taylor was the actual shooter. Nonetheless, that

same year, the district attorney attempted to have Taylor’s

sentence recalled but failed.

Even though the State had not managed to convict the

man it thought was the actual killer, the district attorney still

supported the effort to reduce Taylor’s sentence. In 2006, the

California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause why

Taylor should not be resentenced. The State agreed that

Taylor should be resentenced, and Taylor was resentenced to

25 years to life as an aider and abettor, plus an additional six

years for his prior prison time and felony record.

In 2008, after the resentencing and an unsuccessful

appeal, Taylor filed another habeas corpus petition with the

California Supreme Court. Taylor’s argument was that the

jury had already found factually that he was not the aider and

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TAYLOR V. CATE 19

abettor in Lim’s murder; because it had determined that he

was the principal, so he could not be sentenced and held as an

aider and abettor. The petition was summarily denied.

Taylor filed a habeas petition in federal district court. 

The district court, following the magistrate judge’s

recommendation, denied relief. But the majority has now

accepted Taylor’s argument and has ordered the writ to be

granted, requiring the State either to retry Taylor or free him.

II. Discussion

As discussed in detail below, our opinion here leads to a

result that seems to me strange and even a bit perverse. The

evidence that Taylor aided and abetted murder was very

strong. It seems unlikely that he has actually been prejudiced.

Yet, the majority’s remedy may well lead to Taylor being

freed and the conviction wiped from his record. At a

minimum, it imposes on the State the burden of trying to

convict Taylor of a crime committed long ago, following a

fair trial in which he could have been honest about his role

but instead gambled for a full acquittal and lost. Moreover,

this case has only arisen because California moved to

resentence Taylor. Otherwise, Taylor would have had no

basis for obtaining the writ. We should not punish California

for doing the right thing, nor should we create an incentive

for states in the future to avoid doing the right thing.

In my view, this case does not represent the kind of

“extreme malfunction[] in [a]state criminal justice system[]”

that may justify granting federal habeas relief. Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J.,

concurring in judgment)). There is no malfunction of any

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kind, let alone an extreme one, when a state voluntarily

moves to resentence a prisoner in response to that prisoner’s

belated confession.

It does not have to be like this. The Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments do not compel this illogical result.

A. The Sixth Amendment violation

Although the issue is not free from doubt, I agree with the

majority that there has been a Sixth Amendment violation in

this case. This violation stems from California’s resentencing

of Taylor under an aiding and abetting theory when the jury

did not find all the “elements” of aiding and abetting. See

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)

(reaffirming that a criminal defendant is entitled to “a jury

determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime

with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt”

(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995))

(emphasis added)). I therefore concur in part with the

majority.

I say that the issue is not free from doubt, however,

because the federal courts have declined to treat the

“elements” of aiding and abetting liability like the elements

of a crime for all purposes. It is not Apprendi error to fail to

allege the elements of aiding and abetting in an indictment. 

See, e.g., United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 976 (7th Cir.

2002). This is because aiding and abetting is not itself a

substantive offense. See United States v. Armstrong, 909

F.2d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1990). Rather, aiding and abetting

is only a theory of criminal liability and does not have

elements.

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Normally, the failure of a jury to “find” a particular

theory is not an issue that arises on appellate review. Jurors

need not agree on a single theory of liability. Schad v.

Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 645 (1991). And jurors are presumed

to be capable of determining which theory of liability, if any,

fits the facts of a particular case. Griffin v. United States, 502

U.S. 46, 59 (1991). The issue of whether a jury has “found”

a theory is usually not a question for an appellate court.

Nevertheless, I am persuaded that, in this unusual case,

the failure of the jury to convict Taylor on an aiding and

abetting theory should be treated like the failure of a jury to

find an element of a crime. As the majority points out, we

know that the jury settled on a theory that Taylor was the

shooter, not an aider and abettor. We have previously

considered the failure of a jury to find the elements of aiding

and abetting liability as similar to the failure to find the

elements of a crime. See, e.g., Martinez v. Borg, 937 F.2d

422, 423 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “Beeman error is

constitutional error because the jury did not have the

opportunity to find each element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt,” and going on to apply harmless error

review) (citing People v. Beeman, 674 P.2d 1318 (Cal.

1984)). Therefore, I agree that there is a constitutional

violation in this case.

B. The proper remedy

I respectfully disagree with the majority, however, that

the correct remedy for this constitutional violation is the

granting of the writ. This resentencing error flowed directly

from an inadvertent error by the State at Taylor’s trial, as well

as from Taylor’s high-risk defense gamble. We should

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therefore consider whether this error, like other trial errors, is

amenable to review for harmless error.

When a prisoner challenges his sentence or conviction on

collateral attack in federal court, and the court concludes that

his constitutional rights have been infringed, the error falls

into one of two categories. Only a “very limited” number of

constitutional errors are deemed “structural” and require

automatic reversal. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,

468 (1997). These include grave defects tainting the entire

process, such as a biased judge or the total deprivation of the

right to counsel. See id. at 468–69 (citing Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273

U.S. 510 (1927)). If the error does not fall into this very

limited category, it is a “trial error” and is subject to

harmlessness analysis, whereby the court is required to

determine whether the error had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) (quotingKotteakos

v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). See generally

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–12 (1991)

(dividing errors into “structural defects” and “trial errors”).

A “trial error” is an “error which occurred during the

presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore

be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence

presented in order to determine whether its admission was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fulminante, 499 U.S.

at 307–08. It is clear that, even though Taylor’s trial was fair,

there was an “error” in the presentation of the case to the jury. 

The State presented a theory that turned out to be wrong. 

This theory led the jury wrongly to find that Taylor was the

actual shooter.

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That was a result that everyone today agrees was

incorrect. If the State had not argued to the jury that Taylor

was the shooter, the jury would not have found that he was. 

I therefore disagree with the majority that “[t]here was no

trial error that could be subject to harmless error analysis.” 

Maj. op. at 12. The trial error was that the State presented a

theory that turned out to be wrong.

The only reason the majority reaches the conclusion that

this was not a “trial error” is that the State was not aware of

its error at the time. See Maj. op. at 12 (“The actual identity

of the shooter was not known to the prosecutor during trial.”). 

But this does not make a difference in distinguishing between

trial errors and structural defects. For that purpose, an error

is an error, regardless of whether someone is aware of it or

not. The error was no more “structural” because it was

unknowingly committed.

The majority assumes, in effect, that the error was

structural because it does not fit neatly into an established

category of trial error. That is backwards. It is the category

of structural errors that is the exception, not the rule.

Suppose, in contrast to the actual facts here, the

prosecutor had actually known that Taylor was not the actual

shooter but argued and presented evidence to that effect to the

jury anyway. That would be trial error subject to harmless

error review. We have held that it is not structural error for

a prosecutor knowingly to put a false theory to a jury. Hayes

v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). That

kind of behavior by the prosecutor—described by us in Hayes

as “pernicious” and surely worse than what happened

here—would be considered a trial error and would not lead to

an automatic reversal. Id. at 981 (quoting Willhoite v.

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Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 251 (9th Cir. 1990) (Trott, J.,

concurring)).

But because the State did not knowingly present a

factually false theory in this case—did not act perniciously

here—the majority concludes that the error here was

structural and does require an automatic reversal, without

requiring Taylor to demonstrate actual prejudice. That result

is counterintuitive, as well as at odds with precedent. It

makes no sense to disregard the customary requirement for

actual prejudice because the State unknowingly presented a

false theory at trial. Logic compels that we conclude that the

error in this case was a trial error.

Supreme Court precedent also leads to this conclusion. 

The Court has established that, even on direct review, a

failure by the jury to find an element of a crime is susceptible

to harmless error analysis. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S.

1, 11 (1999). The failure of the jury to find the “elements” of

aiding and abetting should not render the resentencing error

structural, as the majority concludes.

The majority’s approach is all the weaker because, unlike

Neder, this case is on collateral and not direct review. As

noted above, we have the power to grant the writ only as a

“guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal

justice systems.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Jackson,

443 U.S. at 332 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). 

And there is no malfunction when the State willingly chooses

to reduce a prisoner’s sentence on account of his tardy

confession.

There is analogous precedent from the Supreme Court on

which we should rely. The case most similar to this situation

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is Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam). 

California prosecuted Pulido for the same crime as here,

aiding and abetting felony murder. The State presented two

inconsistent theories: first, that Pulido formed the intent to aid

and abet the underlying felony before the murder; and second,

that he formed the necessary intent after the murder. Pulido,

555 U.S. at 59. Under California law, the second theory was

invalid.

On habeas review, our court held that the error was

structural. Pulido v. Chrones, 487 F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam). The Supreme Court reversed us. Even though

one of the theories of aiding and abetting was invalid as a

matter of law, harmless error review still applied.

Here, as in Pulido, the State put forward two mutually

inconsistent theories of the defendant’s guilt: that Taylor was

the shooter or that he was the second man. We know that the

jury adopted one of these theories, that he was the actual

shooter, and implicitly rejected the other. The Supreme Court

reversed us in Pulido because it would be “patently illogical”

to “draw[] a distinction between alternative-theory error and

the instructional error[] in Neder.” 555 U.S. at 61 (internal

quotation marks omitted). All that separates this case from

Pulido is that one of the theories here was wrong as a matter

of fact, not of law.

When a jury errs by accepting an incorrect legal theory,

we apply harmless error review. In this rare situation when

we know that the prosecutor caused the jury to credit the

wrong evidence, there is no reason to apply a more stringent

standard.

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Comparing this case to trial error cases is enough to show

that the error in this case should be subject to harmlessness

review. Comparing this situation to structural errors leads to

the same result. In fact, because structural defects are “the

exception and not the rule,” the majority should bear the

burden of explaining why the resentencing error in this case

warrants automatic reversal. Pulido, 555 U.S. 61. It cannot

do so.

The Supreme Court has held that an error is structural

when it “necessarily render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair”

and “vitiates all the jury’s findings.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 11

(quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986), and

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993)). Taylor’s

trial and resentencing were fair. The jury’s most important

findings remained intact, even considering Taylor’s revised,

post-conviction version of events. It is hard to see the

“fundamental unfairness” of a trial process where the

defendant gambles on being acquitted, the jury convicts him

of a crime in which he is indisputably involved, and the State

then invests considerable effort to reduce his sentence in

response to the defendant’s post-trial admissions.

California’s decision to give Taylor the benefit of his

belated confession did not “vitiate all the jury’s findings.” 

The most important findings stand: Taylor was present at the

scene of the crime and was involved in an attempted robbery

in which Lim was murdered. The only finding that is vitiated

is that Taylor pulled the trigger. This is far short of what is

required for us to find structural error.

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C. The consequences of the majority’s remedy

As noted above, to obtain habeas relief in federal court a

petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate that the error had a

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. By concluding

that the error here was structural, the majority opinion

relieves Taylor of that burden. That probablymakes a critical

difference. I would remand to the district court for the parties

to address that question and for the district court to make a

factual determination. Based on the record as it appears to

me at this point, however, the evidence against Taylor

appeared strong, and I think it would be an uphill climb for

him to make that showing.

Under California law, an aider and abettor must “share the

specific intent of the perpetrator” of a crime in order to be

found guilty. Beeman, 674 P.2d at 1326. In this case, Taylor

would be guilty of aiding and abetting felony murder if he

knew that the gunman entered Pioneer Chicken in order to

rob it. It is doubtful that the jury would have concluded

otherwise. Indeed, Taylor has since admitted that he and the

gunman intended to rob a fast food restaurant that day and

stole a car for that purpose. He admitted that they had robbed

five or six restaurants in the previous month. Taylor’s sole

defense would presumably be that he didn’t know that Hayes

was planning to rob that particular restaurant. This seems

extraordinarily weak, and the proposition that he could have

persuaded the jury that his companion did not intend to rob

the Pioneer Chicken seems fanciful. At oral argument before

us, Taylor’s counsel conceded that the argument that he was

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28 TAYLOR V. CATE

not planning to rob the Pioneer Chicken was flimsy. We

should not pretend otherwise.2

But retrying Taylor at this point would not be easy. The

killing took place in 1987, more than a quarter century ago. 

Witnesses lose their memories, disappear, or die. Even with

Taylor’s testimony, Hayes was acquitted by a jury when he

was tried years after the events. In addition, Taylor could

have an argument that a retrial on an aiding and abetting

theory would be barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Santamaria

v. Horsley, 133 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Taylor’s

counsel has understandably been quiet about this argument,

responding to inquiry at oral argument by saying only that the

question is not currently before this court. At a minimum, the

majority opinion imposes on the State the burden of trying to

convict Taylor of a crime committed long ago, following a

fair trial in which he had could have been honest about his

role but instead gambled for a full acquittal and lost.

This result is all the more bizarre considering how this

case comes before us. Taylor objects that the State

committed error in his resentencing. If California had not

2 Moreover, the crime underlying the felony murder, attempted robbery,

may have been complete as soon as the gunman went into the lavatory to

case the joint. In California, attempt may consist of “a direct but

ineffectual act” done toward the commission of a crime. Cal. Jury Instr.

6.00; see, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 704 (Cal. 1983)

(substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the defendant

committed attempted robbery, where the defendant and his companions

“watched for their opportunity” to rob a marijuana field without entering

it). There was testimony in the first trial that Taylor watched the gunman

go into the lavatory and keep the door ajar, so he would have known that

the gunman planned a robbery. 

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moved to resentence him, this case would not be here. 

Taylor’s only option would be to plead that, contrary to the

jury verdict, he was actually innocent of the personal use of

a firearm special circumstance. But this claim, without any

supporting constitutional challenge, would likely fail. See

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404–05 (1993).

To avoid all of this, the State could simply have declined

to resentence Taylor. But we should be glad that it did. It

would have been wrong for the State to hold Taylor on a

theory of personal liability when it sought to convict Hayes

under the same theory. “[T]here is surely something

troubling about having the same sovereign, particularlyacting

through the same prosecutor, urge upon two juries a

conviction of both A and B, when it is clear that the crime

was committed by either A or B.” Thompson v. Calderon,

120 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting), rev’d, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).

We should not punish the State of California for doing the

right thing in this case by forcing it to retry Taylor or free

him. Neither should we discourage other prosecutors from

doing the right thing in the future. Justice is not served by the

result reached here.

I respectfully dissent.

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