Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01722/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01722-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE NINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. MUNOZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-01722-ADA-CDB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART 

DEFENDANT SULLIVAN’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

(Doc. 38)

14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Joe Nino, appearing through counsel, filed a third amended 

complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 33.) 

On August 22, 2022, following service of the third amended complaint, Defendants 

Carrillo, Escarcega, Harris, Masferrer and Munoz filed an answer to the complaint. (Doc. 39.) 

Also on August 22, 2022, Defendant W. J. Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 38.) 

Plaintiff filed his opposition on September 12, 2022 (Doc. 41), and on September 26, 2022, 

Sullivan filed his reply (Doc. 42). 

On October 6, 2022, the Court issued its Order of Reassignment, reassigning this matter to 

the undersigned as magistrate judge. (Doc. 43.)

//

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) if there is a 

lack of a cognizable legal theory, or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 

legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 

1762 (2012). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court’s review is generally limited to the 

“allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 

subject to judicial notice.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030-31 

(9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks & citations omitted). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court 

“accept[s] as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and construe[s] them in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the 

plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

“If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other 

advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Plaintiff’s 

complaint may be dismissed only when defendant's plausible alternative explanation is so 

convincing that plaintiff's explanation is implausible. The standard at this stage of the litigation is 

not that plaintiff’s explanation must be true or even probable. The factual allegations of the 

complaint need only ‘plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 1216-17 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). “Rule 8(a) ‘does not impose a probability requirement 

at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 

discovery will reveal evidence’ to support the allegations.” Id. at 1217 (quoting Twombly, 550 

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U.S. at 556) (emphasis added in Starr).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 

entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

Section 1983 Actions 

An individual may bring an action for the deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (“Section 1983”), which “is a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In relevant part, Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress...

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a cognizable claim for a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege 

(1) the deprivation of a constitutional right and (2) a person who committed the alleged violation 

acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 529 

F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). 

A plaintiff must allege a specific injury was suffered and show causal relationship 

between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-

72 (1976). A person deprives another of a constitutional right “if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required 

to do so that it causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 

740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally participated in 

the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The facts 

alleged must be sufficient for the Court to conclude that each defendant, through his or her own 

individual actions, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Liability may 

not be imposed on supervisory personnel under Section 1983 based on the theory of respondeat 

superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Id.; Ewing v. City of 

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Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009).

To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, a 

plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either 

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations 

and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the 

policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional 

violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations & internal quotation 

marks omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). For instance, a supervisor 

may be liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of 

his subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is 

made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. 

City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations, quotation marks &

alterations omitted).

A plaintiff must also show that the supervisor had the requisite state of mind to establish 

liability, which turns on the requirement of the particular claim—and, more specifically, on the 

state of mind required by the particular claim—not on a generally applicable concept of 

supervisory liability. Oregon State University Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1071 (9th 

Cir. 2012).

III. PLAINTIFF’S OPERATIVE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on June 15, 2022. (Doc. 33.) Relevant to this 

motion, Plaintiff named W J. Sullivan, Warden at the California Correctional Institution, as a 

Defendant. (Id. at 3.) 

The Factual Allegations

Plaintiff contends that on December 31, 2018, at about 3 p.m., Defendants Harris and 

Masferrer approached Plaintiff’s cell and motioned the tower to open the cell door. (Doc. 33 at 4-

5.) Plaintiff ran to the toilet and flushed some contraband. (Id. at 5.) Defendants Harris and 

Masferrer screamed for Plaintiff to turn around and get on the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff immediately 

“turned around away from them as he put his hands behind his back and handcuffs were placed 

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on [his] wrists.” (Id.) Plaintiff was pulled backwards and out of the cell before Harris and 

Masferrer pushed Plaintiff to the ground in front of the cell. (Id.) Harris and Masferrer were 

yelling, “’what did you flush motherfucker?!’” and Plaintiff responded, “’kites, I flushed kites.’” 

(Id.) Either Harris or Masferrer angrily responded with “’don’t fuckin’ lie to me you little punk!’” 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff contends he felt the weight of a knee on his mid back “as the other officer placed 

another knee in Plaintiff’s right thigh.” (Doc. 33 at 5.) Plaintiff’s body and clothing were 

searched. (Id.) When the pressure of the officers’ knees subsided, Plaintiff felt his pants and 

boxers being pulled down. (Id.) He then felt pepper spray as Harris and Masferrer “sprayed him 

on his back as he was lying face down on the ground.” (Id.) He heard the officers laughing and 

coughing. (Id.) Plaintiff “felt the direct hit of pepper spray on his buttocks and genitals and then 

felt one of the officer with his hand and finger spread Plaintiff’s buttocks as if conducting a 

search and Plaintiff then felt the officer’s fingers penetrate his rectum.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff “jolted 

and jumped” in response. (Id.) The same officer then said, “fuck you” and both officers then 

placed their knees on Plaintiff’s back until others arrived. (Id.) 

As he was being escorted from the building, Plaintiff contends “multiple Correctional 

Officers, F. Harris, V. Masferrer, and an unknown officers” pushed him against the rotunda wall 

and repeatedly punched him with closed fists on his back and ribs. (Doc. 33 at 6.) Plaintiff asserts 

“[t]he sergeant was laughing along with the correctional officers before finally stating, “’that’s it, 

take him to the front.’” (Id.) As two officers pulled Plaintiff to his feet, Harris kicked Plaintiff in 

the genitals from behind. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he suffered physical pain, shame, humiliation, 

degradation, embarrassment, emotional and mental distress, and other injuries, as a result. (Id.)

On July 29, 2019, at about 9:00 a.m., Plaintiff was on the exercise yard for Facility 4B. 

(Doc. 33 at 7.) About a half an hour later, Defendants Munoz and Carrillo approached and 

ordered Plaintiff to turn around and place his hands behind his back. (Id.) Plaintiff was advised he 

was to be escorted to the 4B holding cage located in the facility’s clinic. (Id.) Plaintiff complied 

by turning around and placing his hands behind his back. (Id.) Munoz applied handcuffs and 

Carrillo applied leg irons. (Id.) Carrillo “grabbed Plaintiff’s right triceps with his left arm” and 

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Munoz did the same with Plaintiff’s left triceps as they escorted Plaintiff through the building’s 

rotunda. (Id.) Upon reaching the “’A’ section door,” but before exiting, Munoz placed his right 

leg in front of Plaintiff’s left leg, intentionally tripping him. (Id.) Carrillo and Munoz 

“simultaneously picked Plaintiff up by his arms and slammed [him] headfirst onto the concrete 

floor.” (Id.) In disbelief and nearly losing consciousness, Plaintiff contends he felt repeated 

punches to the left side of his face and head as Munoz continued to strike him. (Id.) Carrillo was 

doing the same on the right side of Plaintiff’s head and face. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff blurted out, 

“’stop – please leave me alone!’” (Id. at 8.) Munoz placed his hand around Plaintiff’s neck and 

said, “’you know what this is for motherfucker, you want to write me and my partners up, the ball 

is in your court now.’” (Id.) Plaintiff contends the “beating continued and went on for 

approximately four to five minutes, as Plaintiff yelled in pain asking them to please stop.” (Id.) 

When Carrillo and Munoz stopped, Munoz stood “and gave Plaintiff a hard kick to his lower back 

as he stated, ‘SNITCH.’” (Id.) 

Afterwards, Plaintiff contends “there was blood everywhere,” including “a pool of blood 

on the ground.” (Doc. 33 at 8.) Plaintiff’s face was bloody and “split open.” (Id.) Plaintiff heard 

Carrillo say, “’oh shit, the nurses and ISU is coming, we need to cover his face!’” (Id.) Carrillo

and Munoz then placed a blue spit mask over Plaintiff’s face. (Id.) Munoz told Carrillo, “’we will 

say that he kicked you and tried to spit, okay?’” (Id.) Carrillo responded, “’cool.’” (Id.) Plaintiff 

was picked up and escorted to the “4B facility medical clinic, where medical staff and ISU 

Officer Adame logged the incident and took photos of the injuries.” (Id.) 

Following evaluation, Plaintiff contends facility medical staff decided to send him to 

Dignity Health Mercy Hospital Emergency Room as his injuries required a higher level of care. 

(Doc. 33 at 8-9.) In the emergency room, Plaintiff was assessed, and tests were conducted. (Id. at 

9.) He sustained a one-inch laceration above his left eyebrow requiring six sutures. (Id.) A CT 

scan of his head and spine was conducted and showed “Plaintiff also suffered a brain injury and a 

concussion.” (Id.)

At about 1:45 p.m. on July 29, 2019, Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital and 

returned to the facility. (Id.) He arrived at about 4:00 p.m. with a severe headache caused by the 

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injuries to his face and head inflicted by Carrillo and Munoz. (Id.) At about 4:30 p.m., Plaintiff 

was placed in a holding cell in the Receiving and Release area. (Id.) Munoz approached and said, 

“‘you better drop the write up motherfucker!’” (Id.) When Plaintiff responded by saying, “‘what 

write up are you talking about?” Munoz replied, “‘you know what write up, the write up on New 

Year’s.’” (Id.) When Plaintiff told Munoz he did not know what Munoz was talking about, 

Munoz then said, “‘on Friday we sent you back your complaint for the excessive force and 

P.R.E.A. allegations against Harris, if you know what’s better for you, then you better drop it.’” 

(Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff avers that at that point, he told Munoz that he had not received the 

complaint “back from the appeals coordinator” but that he was not going to drop it. (Id. at 10.) 

Munoz angrily responded by stating, “‘No matter where you go on level four prisons, we will get 

to you, I promise you we are going to give you a good ass whooping.’” (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff 

was transferred to Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP). (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that at KVSP his left eye and eyesight worsened, and he started to lose 

his eyesight. (Doc. 33 at 10.) It became blurry and sensitive to light. (Id.) “KVSP ordered an 

urgent visit to the ophthalmologist due to the severe injury to Plaintiff’s eye.” (Id.) On August 12, 

2019, Plaintiff was transported to a Modesto eye surgery center where he was seen by Gregory C. 

Teslok, M.D. (Id.) Plaintiff was diagnosed with “’Subclinical Iritis,’ which is the direct result of 

blunt force trauma to the left eye” sustained in the July 29, 2019 incident. (Id.) Plaintiff contends 

the vision in his left eye changed from 20/20 to 20/40 in five months’ time. (Id.) Plaintiff 

continues to suffer from pain in his left eye, making everyday activities difficult. (Id.) As a result 

of this injury, Plaintiff requires prescription glasses. (Id. at 10-11.) 

The Claims Asserted

Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) excessive force against Defendants Harris, 

Masferrer, Munoz, Carrillo, Escarcega, Sergeant John Doe and Doe Defendants in violation of the 

Fourth and Eighth Amendments; (2) retaliation against Defendant Munoz, Carrillo and Sergeant 

John Doe in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) cruel and unusual punishment for a failure 

to adequately train, failure to supervise, and failure to investigate against Defendant W. J. 

Sullivan in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 33 at 11-19.)

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IV. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON THE MOTION

Defendant Sullivan’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant alleges Plaintiff’s third cause of action, asserting Sullivan is subject to 

supervisory liability for failing to train and failing to supervise his subordinates, fails to state an 

Eighth Amendment claim. (Doc. 38-1 at 4.) Citing to Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 

(9th Cir. 2018), Defendant contends Plaintiff has made only conclusory allegations that Sullivan 

promulgated “unidentified ‘policies, practices and customs,’” and thus the allegations are 

insufficient to state a claim. (Id. at 4-5.) Further, Defendant avers Plaintiff’s assertion that 

Sullivan failed to train and supervise staff “fails to plead any facts at all regarding that training 

and supervision.” (Id. at 5.) This too, Defendant contends, is insufficient to state a claim. (Id.) 

Defendant argues that “Plaintiff apparently hangs his hat on the allegation that Sullivan ‘was 

aware of widespread beatings and use of force in CCI Tehachapi,’ and ‘condoned, encouraged, 

fostered and/or ratified the unlawful conduct’ of the other Defendants.” (Id.) Defendant argues 

“these are simply conclusory assertions without any facts attached to them.” (Id.) As to “the 

‘acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation’ portion of the supervisory liability standard set 

forth in Keates and Starr,” Defendant contends Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory recitations of 

the elements of his claim. (Id.) He contends the “court need not, and should not credit such 

conclusory allegations.” (Id.) 

Further, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s allegations “do not connect Sullivan’s conduct to 

Plaintiff’s alleged harm” because Plaintiff fails to allege any action or failure to act by Sullivan 

causing either incident alleged by Plaintiff. (Doc. 38-1 at 5.) Defendant contends “Plaintiff offers 

only speculation that Sullivan knew of supposedly ‘widespread beatings,’ but fails to state when 

this occurred in relation to the incidents at issue, or what was deficient about Sullivan’s 

response.” (Id. at 5-6.) Because those allegations do not inform Sullivan about what he 

purportedly did wrong, Defendant contends they are insufficient as a matter of law. (Id. at 6.) 

Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment violation against Sullivan and 

therefore the claim should be dismissed. (Id.) 

Finally, Defendant contends he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 38-1 at 6-8.) 

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Specifically, Defendant asserts it was not clearly established in 2018 and 2019 that Sullivan’s 

awareness of “’widespread beatings’ at an unspecified time ... in an unspecified way” ratified the 

purportedly unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates. (Id. at 7.) Rather, Defendant argues “the 

opposite was true.” (Id.) Defendant avers “[s]peculative, conclusory assertions that a supervisor 

somehow ‘authorized the particular conduct’ of subordinates are not sufficient to show a 

constitutional violation by the supervisor.” (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant concludes that because case 

law does not clearly establish “that every reasonable person would have known that Sullivan’s 

alleged conduct was unconstitutional, Sullivan is entitled to qualified immunity.” (Id. at 8.) 

Plaintiff’s Opposition

In opposition to Defendant Sullivan’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff contends his allegations 

are sufficiently pled. (Doc. 41 at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the third amended complaint’s 

assertion “that SULLIVAN ‘was aware of widespread beatings and use of excessive force in CCI 

Tehachapi’” and that the “widespread beatings were common and ‘common knowledge’ at CCI is 

a fact, widely known in and outside of CDCR” and makes the allegation “neither boilerplate nor 

conclusory.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff argues the law does not require “each assault against inmates by 

each of the many correctional officers that were stationed at CCI prior to July 29, 2019 be 

completely documented” and that, at the pleading stage, the law requires “well-pleaded 

allegations – and the inferences to be drawn from them – are plain and cognizable.” (Id.) Thus, 

Plaintiff contends his allegations “are sufficient to pass the pleadings stage.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues 

he has sufficiently alleged that Sullivan demonstrated deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety 

because he has demonstrated the required causal connection that Sullivan set in motion a series of 

acts by knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others that Sullivan knew or 

reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict constitutional injury. (Id. at 7-8.) 

Plaintiff contends Defendant’s assertion that the third amended complaint is speculative as to 

Sullivan’s knowledge of the widespread beatings “is specious.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff avers “[e]very 

single attack by a CCI correctional officer upon a housed inmate is supposed to be reported and 

documented in the facility’s files” and that he has “properly alleged that part of SULLIVAN’S 

duties as CCI’s warden was to oversee and be aware of such reports, including the respective 602 

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administrative complaints brought by CCI inmates against these C.O.’s, of which there were 

many at CCI prior to July 29, 2019.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues he is “only required to demonstrate a 

causal connection that SULLIVAN ‘reasonably should have known (reporting of the December 

18, 2018 attack on [Plaintiff] by F. Harris and V. Masferrer) would cause others (i.e., J. Munoz 

and B. Carrillo) to inflict a constitutional injury of the alleged attack on Plaintiff, or that they 

were involved in it.’” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he has not pled Sullivan had “‘advance 

knowledge’” of the later July 29, 2019 assault by Munoz and Carrillo and condoned by 

Escarcega; he states “[t]hat is what discovery is for” and that Sullivan can be held culpable 

without advance knowledge. (Id.) Plaintiff concludes he has met his pleading burden “by 

identifying with sufficient particularity SULLIVAN’S awareness and knowledge” of the attacks 

on December 31, 2018 and that “it would be reasonably foreseeable that” Plaintiff would be 

brutally beaten again. (Id. at 9.)

Next, Plaintiff argues Sullivan is not entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 41 at 9-10.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Sullivan’s argument is misguided, and largely relies upon 

authorities involving summary judgment proceedings or following jury trial, and thus involved 

discovery rather than dismissal at the pleading stage, making “these non-analogous cases” 

“illogical, improper and prejudicial” to Plaintiff. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff argues he has sufficiently

alleged “deliberate indifference, or callous and reckless indifference” by Sullivan, involving 

detailed allegations that must be taken as true for purposes of this motion, and that Sullivan has 

been properly put on notice regarding those claims. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff concludes that in the 

event the Court find his allegations are insufficient to state a claim, he should be given leave to 

amend to correct any deficiency. (Id.)

Defendant’s Reply

In reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendant Sullivan contends Plaintiff has asserted only 

conclusory allegations regarding policies or training, making those allegations insufficient. (Doc. 

42 at 2.) Defendant specifically references paragraphs 70 and 71 of Plaintiff’s third amended 

complaint, arguing those allegations are legal conclusions and thus are insufficient to state a 

claim. (Id. at 2-3.) As concerns Plaintiff’s allegation that Sullivan was aware of widespread 

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beatings at CCI, Defendant argues “the allegation is conclusory in that it does not include any 

facts as to the supposed widespread beatings, when they started, when they happened, how 

Sullivan knew about them, or how Sullivan responded to this information.” (Id. at 3.) Defendant 

contends the allegation is “without any factual support.” (Id.) Defendant contends “the allegation 

is a legal conclusion (namely that Sullivan had knowledge) couched as a factual allegation, 

because it says nothing about what Sullivan’s conduct was, but only makes assertions about the 

legal elements of a claim.” (Id.) 

Defendant asserts this Court “recently addressed an analogous issue” in Peyton v. Cates, 

No. 1:22-cv-00151-JLT-EPG (PC), 2022 WL 1430752, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2022), adopted at 

2022 WL 2307789 (June 27, 2022), where the complaint at issue generally alleged a supervisor 

knew of the threat posed by COVID-19 but implemented deficient policies regarding the response 

to COVID-19. (Doc. 42 at 3.) In Peyton, Defendant avers those allegations were found to be 

“insufficient because they ‘fail[ed] to specify any COVID policy that was deficient, what policy 

should have been implemented, and how the failure to follow a policy led to a constitutional 

violation.’” (Id.) Defendant argues Plaintiff’s similar assertion that Sullivan purportedly knew of 

“‘widespread beatings’” “does not state when Sullivan knew, how he responded, what the 

response should have been, and crucially does not state how that response led to” a violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights. (Id.) In the absence of that information, Defendant maintains Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Defendant states Plaintiff’s attempt to rescue his claims by asserting that Sullivan “would 

have learned about uses of force against inmates from reports filed by officers and grievances by 

inmates,” does not assist him because “those supposed ‘facts’ were not pled” in Plaintiff’s third 

amended complaint. (Doc. 42 at 4.) Because those facts were not pled in the complaint, 

Defendant contends this Court cannot consider them. (Id.) Next, Defendant argues that even if 

Plaintiff did plead that Sullivan learned of excessive force use through reports and grievances, 

Plaintiff would “still not state a claim, because there still would be no allegation as to Sullivan’s 

conduct, and no allegation as to how that conduct led” to Plaintiff’ harm. (Id.) Plaintiff’s assertion 

that Defendant Sullivan acquiesced in the conduct of his subordinates is only a legal conclusion 

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without factual support. (Id.) Defendant contends he is entitled to dismissal. Further, Defendant 

argues that “because even with the additional facts [he] proposes to plead,” Plaintiff would still be 

unable to state a claim leave to amend would be futile. (Id.) 

Finally, Defendant argues qualified immunity can be appropriately determined in a motion 

to dismiss, despite Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary. (Doc. 42 at 4-5.) Defendant avers that 

“accepting any non-conclusory factual allegations as true, the TAC shows on its face that 

qualified immunity applies” and therefore there is no reason to delay a ruling. (Id. at 5.) Also, 

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s opposition does not argue that it was clearly established that 

Defendant’s alleged conduct was unconstitutional, “effectively conceding that it was not.” (Id.) 

Further, Defendant contends “it is difficult to imagine a case establishing that an unspecified 

failure to act in response to unspecified reports of excessive force is unconstitutional” because the 

“right at issue must be framed specifically with reference to the particular allegations of the 

claim.” (Id.) Sullivan argues that because Plaintiff has not asserted “any particular conduct” by 

him, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of demonstrating the alleged conduct was clearly 

established as unconstitutional. (Id.) Thus, qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim against 

Defendant. (Id.) 

V. DISCUSSION

To begin, the undersigned quotes that portion of the third amended complaint pertaining 

to the specific claim against Defendant Sullivan:

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(42 U.S.C. § 1983, 8th Amendment to U.S. Constitution)

(Against Warden W.J. Sullivan)

67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and 

every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 66, above, and 

incorporates each allegation stated as though fully set forth in full 

herein.

68. Defendant Warden W.J. Sullivan violated Plaintiff’s right to 

be free from cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed to him by the 

Eight[h] Amendment to the United States Constitution by his failure 

to adequately train custody staff in the appropriate use of force and

criminal activity; and by his failure to supervise the other Defendants 

and by his failure to investigate the incident or discipline the other 

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defendants.

69. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Sullivan are based on his 

maintaining and permitting the practices, policies and customs under 

CDCR guidelines and procedures for correctional facilities. In 

addition, Defendant Sullivan was responsible for the supervision, 

training and hiring of persons and employees working within CCI 

Tehachapi including correctional officers, medical staff, mental 

health staff and other employees within the CCI facility. In 

particular, Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon 

alleges that Defendant Sullivan, as the official policy maker for CCI 

Tehachapi, was aware of widespread beatings and use of excessive 

force in CCI Tehachapi. On information and belief, instead of taking 

proper steps to discipline Individual Defendants and named Doe 

Defendants, Defendant Sullivan condoned, encouraged, fostered 

and/or ratified the unlawful conduct of said Defendants. Plaintiff is 

further informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant 

Sullivan ratified the Individual Defendants and Doe Defendants’ 

unconstitutional conduct towards Plaintiff. Defendant Sullivan is 

sued in both his individual/personal and official capacities for his 

own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision or control 

of his subordinates, or for his acquiescence in the constitutional 

deprivations which this amended Complaint alleges, or for the 

conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights 

of others.

70. Defendant Sullivan acted under color of state law, and he 

knew or should have known that his conduct, attitude and actions 

created an unreasonable risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Despite this 

knowledge, Defendant Sullivan failed to take reasonable steps to 

protect Plaintiff and to ensure his constitutional right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment while he was in Defendants’ care and 

custody at Tehachapi.

71. The actions and conduct of Defendant Sullivan demonstrate 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s well-being and constitutes 

violations of Plaintiff’s Eight[h] Amendment rights under the United 

States Constitution.

72. As a proximate result of the Defendants’ failure to ensure 

Plaintiff’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment while 

incarcerated at Tehachapi, Plaintiff has suffered, is suffering, and 

will continue to suffer irreparable harm.

73. As a direct and foreseeable result of the Defendants’ 

violations of Plaintiff’s Eight[h] Amendment rights, Plaintiff has 

suffered, is suffering and will continue to suffer physical injuries in 

the form of damage to his left eye, loss of eyesight, headaches, 

problems with balance, and other injuries.

74. As a direct and foreseeable result of the Defendants’ 

violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, Plaintiff has 

suffered, is suffering and will continue to suffer injuries in the form 

of pain and suffering, shame, humiliation, degradation, emotional 

distress, embarrassment, mental distress and other injuries.

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(Doc. 33 at 17-19.) 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against Sullivan

“A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his 

or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr, 652 F.3d at 

1207 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). “The requisite causal 

connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by others, ... or by 

knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or 

reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Id. at 1207-

08 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). “Even if a supervisory official is not directly

involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, ‘[a] supervisor can be liable in his individual 

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Starr, 

652 F.3d at 1208).

Because the third amended complaint does not assert that Defendant Sullivan was 

personally involved in the constitutional violation at issue, Plaintiff must allege a sufficient causal 

connection between Sullivan’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.

Policies, Practices and Customs

Plaintiff alleges his claims against Sullivan “are based on his maintaining and permitting 

the practices, policies and customs under CDCR guidelines and procedures for policy makers.” 

The third amended complaint’s allegations regarding Defendant Sullivan are conclusory and are 

not supported by sufficient factual detail. Plaintiff does not allege any facts concerning the 

“policies, practices and customs” he asserts Defendant promulgated. He does not identify any 

specific policy, nor does he point to a document stating such a policy existed. Plaintiff does not 

allege Defendant Sullivan said or did anything that leads to Plaintiff’s conclusion that Sullivan 

had adopted such a policy, practice or custom. Nor does Plaintiff allege how Sullivan was 

responsible for or otherwise involved in the policies or practices or customs Plaintiff claims are at 

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issue. It is not enough to merely allege Sullivan had a general supervisory role, as the facility’s 

warden, and that because of that role, he is responsible for the constitutional deprivation suffered 

by Plaintiff. These types of general allegations that rely upon claims of the general responsibility 

of the warden for prison operations are insufficient to establish Section 1983 liability. E.g., 

Samaniego v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., No. 1:21-cv-0839 JLT BAK (EPG), 2022 WL 

2194588, at *10 (E.D. Cal. June 17, 2022) (dismissing § 1983 claims against warden based on 

similar allegations of his maintenance of unspecified institutional guidelines and permitting 

practices and policies).

Plaintiff asserts Sullivan knew or should have known Plaintiff would suffer a 

constitutional deprivation because Sullivan would have access to and/or reviews grievances or 

602s submitted by inmates at CCI. However, Plaintiff has alleged no facts demonstrating Sullivan 

read Plaintiff’s grievance or how Plaintiff is aware that Sullivan read his grievance. Plaintiff 

merely argues in his opposition that as warden Sullivan was aware because he reviews inmate 

grievances. The undersigned finds it is unreasonable to infer that Sullivan read Plaintiff’s 

grievance without more. There is insufficient factual detail to draw a reasonable conclusion that 

Sullivan knew or should have known from the fact that inmates file grievances that Plaintiff was 

at risk of harm. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also, e.g., Simmons v. Galipeau, No. 3:22-CV-783-

JD-MGG, 2022 WL 4355760, *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2022) (finding that the warden’s 

“undefined role in processing grievances is not a basis for personal liability”).

Supervision, Training and Hiring

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint alleges Sullivan “was responsible for supervision, 

training and hiring of persons and employees working with the CCI facility.” Plaintiff’s allegation 

is vague and conclusory. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff 

makes no effort to specifically identify how Sullivan’s “supervision, training and hiring” were 

constitutionally deficient, other than his broad assertion that, as warden, Sullivan was responsible.

That simply is not enough. Plaintiff does not allege specific facts concerning the purportedly 

deficient supervision, training or hiring. These conclusory statements are insufficient to link 

Sullivan to a constitutional violation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Cf., e.g., Rood v. Cal. Dep’t of 

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Corr., No. 1:19-cv-01517-JLT-HBK (PC), 2021 WL 6052169, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2021) 

(declining to dismiss failure-to-train claim against warden where plaintiff’s specific allegations 

concerning specific training were “closely related” to plaintiff’s injury), adopted at 2022 WL 

17418440 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2022); see also Bryant v. Salem County, No. 18-837 (RMBKMW), 2019 WL 2588804, at *9 (D.N.J. June 24, 2019) (“Plaintiff has not identified a specific 

policy that caused the constitutional deprivation alleged, nor has he alleged a specific training 

program that was deficient in such a manner as to cause the constitutional violation at issue. 

Merely citing ‘excessive force’ as the policy or training deficiency is insufficient to state a § 1983 

municipal liability claim”).

Widespread Beatings and Use of Excessive Force

In an effort to allege Sullivan’s knowledge of conditions sufficient to maintain a § 1983 

claim, Plaintiff relies on assertions of “widespread beating and use of force in CCI Tehachapi.” 

In Starr v. Baca, the Ninth Circuit determined a plaintiff stated a cognizable claim against 

a supervisor where he alleged that the sheriff knew of — and was specifically given official 

notice of — culpable uses of force by subordinates prior to the alleged use of excessive force 

against the plaintiff and took no preventative action. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208-1209. The Court 

observed there were “many allegations in the complaint detailing what Sheriff Baca knew or 

should have known, and what Sheriff Baca did or failed to do.” Id. at 1209. Starr alleged Baca 

signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1999, which required him “to address and correct the 

continuous constitutional violations to which inmates were being subjected.” Id. Starr also 

detailed numerous instances of injuries to other named inmates that occurred after Baca signed 

the Memorandum of Understanding. Id. at 1209-1212. The Court noted Baca also received notice 

of all incidents, and Starr alleged “Baca did not take action to protect inmates under his care 

despite the dangers, created by the actions of his subordinates, of which he had been made 

aware.” Id. at 1216. The Court concluded the allegations “plausibly suggest that Sheriff Baca 

acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and was thereby deliberately 

indifferent to the danger posed to Starr.” Id. at 1216. Thus, the Court concluded Starr “sufficiently 

alleged under Rule 8(a) a supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference against Sheriff 

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Baca.” Id. at 1217.

In contrast, a general allegation that a supervisor knew of “systemic excessive force” by 

officers fails to support a claim. In an action filed in the Central District of California, the district 

court determined a plaintiff failed to state a claim against three associate wardens when the 

plaintiff asserted they “knew of the ‘systemic acts of excessive force on inmates’ by the Green 

Wall prison officials and condoned them.” Windham v. Franklin, No. CV 13-3004-SVW (JEM), 

2014 WL 7740262, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014). That court explained that the plaintiff’s 

“allegations that [the associate wardens] knew that prison officials used excessive force against 

inmates are too conclusory to constitute a basis for holding them personally liable for the force 

used against” the plaintiff. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sullivan knew of “widespread beatings and use of 

excessive force” at CCI and that Sullivan was aware of it “as the official policy maker for CCI.” 

However, the allegations in the third amended complaint are conclusory. Plaintiff does not 

specifically identify what incidents or retaliatory behavior by correctional officers support the 

legal conclusion that Defendant Sullivan knew of “widespread beatings and use of excessive 

force” at CCI and “condoned, encouraged, fostered and/or ratified” the conduct. Without such 

allegations, Plaintiff fails to support his claim against Sullivan. E.g., Samaniego, 2022 WL 

2194588, at *11.

Acquiescence

The Ninth Circuit has “held that ‘acquiescence or culpable indifference’ may suffice to 

show that a supervisor ‘personally played a role in the alleged constitutional violations.’” Starr, 

652 F.3d at 1208. There, the Ninth Circuit held that “Starr’s complaint makes detailed factual 

allegations that go well beyond reciting elements of a claim of deliberate indifference. These 

allegations are neither ‘bald’ nor ‘conclusory,’ and hence are entitled to the presumption of truth” 

and the “factual allegations in Starr’s complaint plausibly suggest that Sheriff Baca acquiesced in 

the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, and was thereby deliberately indifferent to the 

danger posed to Starr. There is no ‘obvious alternative explanation,’ within the meaning of Iqbal, 

for why Sheriff Baca took no action to stop his subordinates’ repeated violations of prisoners’ 

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constitutional rights despite being repeatedly confronted with those violations, such that the 

alternative explanation requires us to conclude that Starr’s explanation ‘is not a plausible 

conclusion.’” Id. at 1216. 

Here, unlike Starr, Plaintiff’s lack of specificity makes his allegation that Sullivan 

acquiesced in Plaintiff’s constitutional deprivations insufficient. The undersigned agrees with 

Defendant that the allegation is conclusory and is merely a recitation of elements of the claim. Id.

(a complaint may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action). 

Causal Connection

Plaintiff's contentions against Sullivan are insufficient to plausibly show a “sufficient 

causal connection” between his conduct and the constitutional violations. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 

1207. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual allegations to support a 

claim that Sullivan directly or indirectly caused the alleged constitutional violations.

Summary of Findings

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for supervisory 

liability against Defendant Sullivan. The undersigned will recommend Sullivan’s motion to 

dismiss be granted on this basis. Although the Court extended to Plaintiff two earlier 

opportunities during the screening process to cure deficiencies in his pleadings against Defendant 

Sullivan (see Docs. 9, 25), Plaintiff still may be able to cure the deficiencies in his third amended 

complaint, and accordingly, the undersigned will recommend Plaintiff be afforded one final 

opportunity to amend his complaint concerning his cause of action asserted against Defendant 

Sullivan, assuming he can do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 

2000).

1

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons given above, this Court RECOMMENDS Defendant Sullivan’s motion to 

dismiss be GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. Further, the undersigned 

1 Because the undersigned finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Sullivan and 

recommends Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint, the undersigned declines to address the 

matter of qualified immunity. Separately, the remaining Defendants—Carrillo, Escarcega, Harris, 

Masferrer and Munoz—have filed an answer to Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. See Doc. 39.

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RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff be granted leave to file a fourth amended complaint to cure the 

deficiencies identified herein regarding his claim against Defendant Sullivan. 

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 

this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of service of these 

Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. The 

document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2023 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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