Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03011/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03011-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SKIP MANSKER, No. CIV S-09-3011-FCD-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

McKINZY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

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allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: McKinzy, Ndugbu, McCue, Jackson,

Bruce, McDonald, and Grannis. Plaintiff claims that he was not allowed out of his cell on July 7,

2008, to attend scheduled Wiccan religious services. According to plaintiff, this occurred again

at the next scheduled Wiccan services on July 14, 2008, and July 21, 2008. Plaintiff eventually

was able to go to the chapel and was informed that Wiccan services had been cancelled and that

the Catholic chaplain – defendant Ndugbu – could “conduct Catholic confession.” Plaintiff was

then threatened by defendant McKinzy with disciplinary action if he did not leave the chapel

immediately. According to plaintiff, the next scheduled Wiccan service – July 28, 2008 – was

also cancelled. Plaintiff states that Wiccan services were scheduled for August 25, 2008, but that

such services were cancelled “because Christian services were held in place of the scheduled

Wiccan services, per Chaplain Ndugbu.” 

Plaintiff states that, during the course of the grievance process, he was

interviewed by defendant McCue, who “showed complete indifference to plaintiff’s Appeal

issues, and subsequently denied the appeal.” Plaintiff claims that he was denied access to

Wiccan services again on October 13, 2008, and October 20, 2008. According to plaintiff, he

had a meeting with another chaplain – defendant Jackson – who also “showed indifference.” 

Plaintiff states that he was thereafter denied access to Wiccan services and that his appeal was

denied at the second level by defendant McDonald. Plaintiff adds that he was able to attend

Wiccan services on December 15, 22, and 19, 2008, but denied access in March 2009 following

denial of his grievance at the final level by defendant Grannis. 

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Plaintiff asserts that these facts give rise to a § 1983 claim based on violation of

his right to freedom of religion under the First Amendment. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages

and injunctive relief. 

II. DISCUSSION

The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First

Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Thus,

for example, prisoners have a right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good

health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d

196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are required to provide prisoners facilities

where they can worship and access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse,

428 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required to supply clergy at state

expense. See id. Inmates also must be given a “reasonable opportunity” to pursue their faith

comparable to that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts. See

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free

exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See

McElyea, 833 F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the penological interest in

a simplified food service has been held sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish

inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d

873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in

getting inmates to their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258

F.3d 930, 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim inmates’ First Amendment challenge to prison

work rule). 

While free exercise of religion claims originally arose under the First

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Amendment, Congress has enacted various statutes in an effort to provide prisoners with

heightened religious protection. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Prior to these congressional efforts, prison free exercise claims were analyzed under the

“reasonableness test” set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987); see e.g. O’Lone,

382 U.S. at 349. The first effort to provide heightened protection was the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act (“RFRA”) of 1993. However, the Supreme Court invalidated that act and

restored the “reasonableness test.” See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see

also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne invalidated RFRA and restored the “reasonableness

test” as the applicable standard in free exercise challenges brought by prison inmates). 

Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”) in 2000 “. . . in response to the constitutional flaws with RFRA identified in City of

Boerne.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir.

2006). Under RLUIPA, prison officials are prohibited from imposing “substantial burdens” on

religious exercise unless there exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the

least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. See id. at 986. RLUIPA has been upheld by the

Supreme Court, which held that RLUIPA’s “institutionalized-persons provision was compatible

with the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and concluded that RLUIPA ‘alleviates

exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise.’” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at

994 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005)). Congress achieved this goal by

replacing the “reasonableness test” articulated in Turner with the “compelling government

interest” test codified in RLUIPA at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). See id. 

It is not clear whether a prisoner must specifically raise RLUIPA in order to have

his claim analyzed under the statute’s heightened standard. In Alvarez v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit

held that, if a complaint contains “factual allegations establishing a ‘plausible” entitlement to

relief under RLUIPA, [plaintiff has] satisfied the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8

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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); but see

Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to express any opinion

about whether plaintiff could prevail under RLUIPA because plaintiff brought his claim under

the First Amendment only). Therefore, it is possible for a prisoner’s complaint to raise both a

First Amendment claim and RLUIPA claim based on the same factual allegations. In other

words, even if the plaintiff does not specifically invoke the heightened protections of RLUIPA,

he may nonetheless be entitled to them. Under Henderson, however, the plaintiff’s claim may be

limited to the less stringent Turner “reasonableness test” if the plaintiff specifically brings the

claim under the First Amendment only. 

Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the prisoner bears the initial

burden of establishing that the defendants substantially burdened the practice of his religion by

preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125

F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier,

418 F.3d at 994-95 (analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define what

constitutes a “substantial burden,” pre-RLUIPA cases are instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing

cases defining “substantial burden” in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial

burden on the practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials’ conduct 

“. . . burdens the adherent’s practice of his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an

act forbidden by the religion or by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a

religious experience which the faith mandates.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51

(9th Cir. 1987). The burden must be more than a mere inconvenience. See id. at 851. In the

context of claims based on religious diets, a plaintiff must prove that prison officials refused to

provide a diet which satisfies his religious dietary laws or that the available prison menu

prevented him from adhering to the religious dietary laws mandated by his faith. See Bryant v.

Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). 

In this case, plaintiff alleges that he was prevented from attending Wiccan

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services on several occasions in July 2008, August 2008, October 2008 and March 2009. He

states that he was able to attend services in December 2008. The court finds that these

allegations do not suggest a substantial burden because plaintiff does not allege that his faith

mandated regular attendance at Wiccan services. Given the relatively few occasions when

plaintiff was not able to attend services, and given that plaintiff was able to attend services in

December 2008, plaintiff’s allegations establish, at best, an inconvenience to the practice of

plaintiff’s religion that does not rise to the level of either a constitutional or statutory violation. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings

and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right

to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 6, 2010

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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