Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00539/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00539-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG L. FLENORY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES D. HARTLEY, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:10-CV-00539 SMS HC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #9]

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE CASE

ORDER DECLINING ISSUANCE OF

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, following his conviction by plea of

guilty on January 29, 2004, to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated and felony drunk

driving. On March 25, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a determinate term of 14 years in

state prison. He did not appeal.

This information is derived from the documents lodged by Respondent with his motion to dismiss.

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U.S. District Court

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Petitioner filed five post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent

judgment in the state courts as follows:

1. Tulare County Superior Court

Filed: August 6, 2007 ; 2

Denied: August 13, 2007;

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: November 9, 2007;

Denied: November 20, 2007;

3. Tulare County Superior Court

Filed: April 10, 2009; 

Denied: May 6, 2009;

4. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: June 1, 2009;

Denied: June 4, 2009;

5. California Supreme Court

Filed: June 17, 2009;

Denied: November 19, 2009.

On March 23, 2010 , Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 3

On June 25, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition for violation of the one-year

limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

Petitioner filed an opposition on July 13, 2010. Respondent filed a reply on July 26, 2010.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the various petitions filed on the dates they were signed and

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presumably handed to prison authorities for mailing. Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; Houston v. Lack, 487

U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222, (9 Cir. 2001).

th

Although the petition was filed in this Court on March 26, 2010, it contains a proof of service dated March 23,

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2010. Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court will deem the petition filed on March 23, 2010, the date Petitioner presumably

handed his petition to prison authorities for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

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state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

one-year limitations period and for failure to exhaust state remedies. Accordingly, the Court will

review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on March 23, 2010, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations period on petitioners seeking

to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, Petitioner did not appeal. Therefore, direct review concluded on

May 24, 2004, when the sixty (60) day period for filing an appeal expired. Cal. Rules of Court, rule

30.1 (renumbered to rule 8.308). The statute of limitations commenced on the following day,

May 25, 2004, and expired one year later on May 24, 2005. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9 Cir.2001). Here, Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until March 23, 2010, th

exceeding the due date by nearly five years. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is

barred by the statute of limitations. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely, or it was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). If the state court states the petition was

untimely, “that [is] the end of the matter, regardless of whether it also addressed the merits of the

claim, or whether its timeliness ruling was “entangled” with the merits.” Carey, 536 U.S. at 226;

Pace, 544 U.S. at 414.

As previously stated, the statute of limitations began to run on May 25, 2004, and expired on

May 24, 2005. Petitioner did not file any post-conviction applications for collateral relief in the state

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courts in that time frame. His first state habeas petition was filed on August 6, 2007, which was over

two years after the limitations period had already expired. Since the limitations period had already

expired, he is not entitled to statutory tolling. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9 Cir.2001). th

Accordingly, the federal petition remains untimely.

D. Tolling Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)-(D)

It appears from Petitioner’s opposition that he seeks to circumvent the untimeliness of his

petition by arguing that he is entitled to a later start date based on the Supreme Court’s decision in

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date, either

under § 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D). Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(C), the statute of limitations runs from “the

date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review.” As noted by Respondent, Cunningham is to be applied retroactively; however, it

is not a new rule. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 639 (9 Cir.2008), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 77 th

U.S.L.W. 3359 (Dec. 15, 2008). It is only a further application of the rule announced in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Therefore, § 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply.

Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations commences on “the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence.” In this case, Petitioner fails to establish that he acted with due diligence. As

discussed above, Cunningham did not announce a new rule. It was based on the rule announced in

Apprendi in 2000. Petitioner knew or should have discovered the factual predicate for his claims at

sentencing. Even so, Petitioner delayed filing his first state habeas petition until seven months after

Cunningham was decided in 2007. Therefore, Petitioner failed to act diligently. Moreover, none of

the claims presented in the federal petition are based on Cunningham. Thus, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply.

E. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

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Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). In this case, Petitioner makes no claim for equitable tolling. In addition, the Court

finds no extraordinary circumstance sufficient to justify equitable tolling.

F. Exhaustion

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

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of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the petition before the Court, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief. Respondent

contends that all four claims have not been presented to the California Supreme Court and are

therefore unexhausted. The Court has reviewed the petition for review filed with the California

Supreme Court. None of the grounds presented in this petition were raised in the petition for review.

Therefore, the instant petition is unexhausted and must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

G. Motion for Stay

Petitioner requests a stay of the proceedings pending exhaustion of state remedies. A district

court has discretion to stay a petition which it may validly consider on the merits. Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269 (2005); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 987-88 (9 Cir. th

1998); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997). 

However, the Supreme Court held that this discretion is circumscribed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. In light of AEDPA’s

objectives, “stay and abeyance [is] available only in limited circumstances” and “is only appropriate

when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his

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claims first in state court.” Id. at 277. 

The Court does not find good cause to stay the proceedings. The petition is untimely;

therefore, any claims Petitioner could exhaust by returning to state court would likewise be untimely. 

H. Certificate of Appealability

A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court 

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

“if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at

1040.

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In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a

certificate of appealability.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;

2) The petition for writ of habeas corpus petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for

Petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period, and his failure

to exhaust state remedies;

3) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the case; and

4) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

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