Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01202/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01202-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1346wd Wrongful Death

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ESTATE OF VALERA 

TACHIQUIN ALVARADO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JUSTIN TACKETT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 13-CV-1202 W (JMA)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION [DOC. 164]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of this Court’s 

June 4, 2018 Order, which granted in part Defendant Tackett’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Mot. for Reconsideration [Doc. 164]

1

; June 4, 2018 Order [Doc. 155].) 

Tackett opposes. [Doc. 166.] The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and 

without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court

DENIES the motion.

//

//

 

1 Plaintiffs apply ex parte to replace their original points and authorities with a new version that corrects 

formatting errors. [Doc. 165.] Defendants do not oppose. The ex parte application is GRANTED.

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I. BACKGROUND

On May 20, 2013, Plaintiffs brought this action, which arises from the shooting

death of Ms. Valeria Tachiquin on September 28, 2012 by Mr. Justin Tackett, a Customs 

and Border Protection (“CBP”) Agent. (Compl. [Doc. 1]; Second Amended Complaint

(“SAC”) [Doc. 50].) 

On June 4, 2018, the Court issued an order granting in part Tackett’s motion for 

summary judgment. (June 4, 2018 Order [Doc. 155].) 

Per the June 4 order, the undisputed facts were as follows. (June 4, 2018 Order

[Doc. 155].) Tachiquin knew that CBP Agents Tackett and Roozen were law 

enforcement. These two agents tried to get Tachiquin’s attention as she walked away 

from the apartment they were investigating, but she ignored them and got behind the 

wheel of a car—parked parallel with its windows rolled up. Tackett stood in front of the

car, reading the license plate over the phone to CBP and blocking her exit from the 

parking space. Tachiquin maneuvered the car, impacting Tackett in the legs. Tackett 

gave two verbal warnings. Yet Tachiquin persisted in slowly hitting Tackett’s legs with 

the car—a total of three times. Tackett instructed Roozen to break the car window in an 

attempt to arrest Tachiquin. (See id.)

Roozen broke the window. (June 4, 2018 Order [Doc. 155].) Tachiquin drove

through Tackett at a high rate of speed, sending him onto the car’s hood and buckling its 

windshield. Tachiquin carried Tackett on the hood for 773 feet, swerving around traffic

into the wrong-way lane of a public road and ignoring his commands to stop. Tachiquin 

turned the car onto another street. Tackett slid off the hood, firing ten shots and killing 

Tachiquin. An autopsy revealed that Tachiquin was under the influence of 

methamphetamine at the time. (Id.) 

Per Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015), and Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 

1148 (2018), the Court moved directly to the second prong of the qualified immunity 

analysis and held that Tackett violated no clearly established Fourth or Fifth Amendment 

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rights by using lethal force under these circumstances. (June 4, 2018 Order [Doc. 155].) 

As the Court reasoned:

By the time Agent Tackett fatally shot Tachiquin, he had been impacted by a car 

with so much force as to propel him onto the hood of the accelerating vehicle, 

damaging the windshield. (Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E] 310–11; Haag Expert 

Report [Doc. 122-23, Exh. T] 19.) He stayed on the hood as the car accelerated into 

the road and around Mr. Vargas’ automobile, driving the wrong way into the 

oncoming traffic lane. (Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E] 314–317; Roozen Depo.

[Doc. 122-10, Exh. H] 76–84; Vargas Depo. [Doc. 122-19, Exh. Q] 30–35.) 

Tachiquin ignored his commands to stop as he gripped the sides of hood, struggling 

to maintain his balance. (Hoyos Depo. [Doc. 122-18, Exh. P] 32; Tackett Depo. [Doc. 

122-7, Exh. E] 314; Vargas Depo. [Doc. 122-19, Exh. Q] 33–34.) When it finally 

came to a stop 773 feet away (Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts [Doc. 142] ¶ 8), 

Tackett was faced with a split-second decision as to how to prevent the driver—who 

had already proven she was willing to endanger his life—from running him over. 

His decision to use lethal force was not plain incompetence or knowing violation of 

the law. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308.

(Id.)

Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration without analysis per the appropriate legal 

standard. (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, Exh. 1].) For the reasons that follow, the motion must 

be denied. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) allows a Court to “correct a clerical mistake 

or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, 

order, or other part of the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). “Substantive changes of mind 

by a court cannot be effected through Rule 60(a).” Buchanan v. United States, 755 F. 

Supp. 319, 324 (D. Or. 1990) (citing Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 

527 (9th Cir. 1983). However, “[a] court’s failure to memorialize part of its decision . . . 

is a clerical error.” Id. at 324; see also Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1577 n.2 

(9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, “Rule 60(a) can be used to conform a judgment to a prior 

ruling.” Buchanan, 755 F. Supp. at 324.

There are two ways by which a party may seek substantive reconsideration of an 

order on a motion for summary judgment: (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 

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(motion to alter or amend a judgment), or (2) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 

(motion for relief from judgment). See Hinton v. Pac. Enter., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 

1993). 

“Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous 

order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 

finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 

229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). “Indeed, ‘a motion for 

reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the 

district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if 

there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’ ” Id. (quoting 389 Orange St. 

Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). A motion for reconsideration 

“may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they 

could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id. (emphasis omitted). It 

does not give parties a second bite at the apple. See id. “[A]fter thoughts or shifting of 

ground do not constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration. Ausmus v. Lexington 

Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-2342-L, 2009 WL 2058549, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (Lorenz, 

J.) (internal quotation omitted).

Rule 60(b) provides for extraordinary relief and may be invoked only upon a 

showing of exceptional circumstances. Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 

1044 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Ben Sager Chem. Int’l v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 

809 (7th Cir. 1977)). Under Rule 60(b), the court may grant reconsideration based on: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 

which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision; (3) 

fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; 

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other reason 

justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The last prong is “used sparingly as an equitable 

remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary 

circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an 

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erroneous judgment.” Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. There is No Genuine Dispute the Car Impacted Tackett.

Plaintiffs contend that “[c]ircumstantial [e]vidence [s]upports the [r]easonable 

[i]nference that Tackett [j]umped [o]nto the [d]eparting [c]ar.” (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, 

Exh. 1] 8:4–12:10.) 

Plaintiffs made this argument before. (Tackett MSJ Opp’n [Doc. 132] 6:10–22; 

20:8–25.) The Court analyzed and rejected it. (June 4, 2018 Order [Doc. 155] 5 n.2.) 

As the Court reasoned:

Plaintiffs further argue that Tackett’s testimony that he could not remember 

suffering any abrasions, broken bones, or bruises on his legs is itself sufficient to 

create a genuine dispute as to whether Tackett leaped onto the car. (Pls.’ Disputed 

Facts [Doc. 142] ¶ 12; Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E] 286–312.) It is not. 

Tackett testified that after the incident he “complained of pain in his left side, which 

consisted of [his] leg[,]” but that he couldn’t recall if he specifically complained of 

leg pain. (Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E].) He further testified that he suffered 

internal bleeding after the incident. (Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E] 288–289.) 

Without more, the Court cannot draw the inference that these injuries were 

inconsistent with the impact Tackett and Roozen testified to witnessing—especially 

if the car started out in close proximity to Tackett’s body. Both Roozen and Tackett 

testified, in no uncertain terms: (1) that the car struck Tackett; and (2) that Tackett 

did not jump onto the car. (Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-4, Exh. E] 308; Roozen Depo.

[Doc. 122-10, Exh. H] 76.) Plaintiffs provide nothing that could rise to a genuine 

dispute as to this point.

(Id.) 

Plaintiffs now contend that the Court inappropriately “relie[d] on the testimony of 

Tackett, whose record for lying regarding his encounters with citizens is 

well[-]documented.” (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, Exh. 1] 8:6–9.) 

Credibility determinations are inappropriate in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court is 

tasked with determining whether any reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

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nonmoving party, making all inferences in that party’s favor. See id.; Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–88 (1986). 

As the original analysis made clear, drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, 

there is nothing to show that Tackett leaped onto Tachiquin’s car. The undisputed 

evidence shows that the car hit Tackett. In the instant motion for reconsideration, 

Plaintiffs repeat their argument that Tackett was uninjured, and that he would have 

suffered injuries had he been hit. (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, Exh. 1] 11:5–18.) The 

evidence belies this contention.

Tackett testified that following the incident he complained of “pain in [his] left 

side, which consisted of [his] leg.” (Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E] 288–89.) He 

testified that he suffered “internal bleeding” and “[b]owel movement bleeding” following 

the impact with Tachiquin’s car, but that he did not remember bruises and could not 

remember whether he had marks on his legs. (Id.) Plaintiffs suggest—for the first time 

upon the instant motion for reconsideration—that Tackett’s bleeding stemmed from a 

preexisting condition. (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, Exh. 1] 11 n.3) They represent that he

“believed that this was from an ‘ulcer.’ ” (Id. (quoting Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. 

E] 289).) This is misleading.

The ulcer comment in Tackett’s deposition was in response to a question about a

health issue Tackett had suffered years ago, during his time with the Imperial County 

Sheriff’s Department. Tackett’s tenure with that department ended in 2003—about nine 

years before the incident in question. (Tackett MSJ Opp’n [Doc. 132] 11.) Contrary to 

Plaintiffs’ suggestion, Tackett explicitly testified that the Tachiquin incident caused him 

to suffer internal bleeding:

Q: Now, did you sustain any injuries from the event?

A: I did.

Q: Any injuries that caused bleeding?

A: Yes.

Q: What?

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A: Due to the pills that I’m taking, it’s caused internal bleeding. Bowel movement 

bleeding.

Q: Bloody stools?

A: Correct.

Q: Let me ask you, did your case with Imperial [C]ounty, did that cause you to have 

bloody stools as well?

A: I believe it [sic] did have an ulcer that causes blood.

(Tackett Depo. [Doc. 122-7, Exh. E] 289.) It is unclear what, if any, relationship this 

previous ulcer has with the injury Tackett testified to in this case. If Plaintiffs wanted to 

make an argument about this, the time for doing so was in opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment. They chose not to. (Tackett MSJ Opp’n [Doc. 132].)

There is evidence Tackett suffered injuries. Nothing shows he leaped onto the car 

from off the bumper—the position at which Plaintiffs contend he was blocking 

Tachiquin’s exit from the parking space.2 

There is no newly discovered evidence. There has been no intervening change in 

controlling law. Plaintiffs do not show the Court’s decision on this point to be clear 

error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Kona Enters, 229 F.3d at 890. And there are no 

extraordinary circumstances that could justify invoking Rule 60(b).

B. Plaintiffs Conceded that Tackett Was Not Seized Prior to the Seizure.

This Court’s June 4, 2018 order held the following as to Plaintiffs’ claims alleging 

a pre-shooting seizure by Agent Tackett:

//

 

2 Plaintiffs now argue that Tackett was “at the side front quarter panel of the car when [Tachiquin] fled 

the area[,]” and that an impact “would have pushed him away from the car as it came out from the 

parking spot, not into the hood.” (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, Exh. 1] 11:19–12:4.) This is a new theory,

appearing for the first time in this motion. (See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n [Doc. 132] 4:9 (“Tackett positioned 

himself in front of [Tachiquin’s] car.”).) A motion for reconsideration should not serve as a fresh

opportunity for attorneys to use new ideas to litigate previously decided issues.

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The Court held in its April 27, 2015 order that Defendant Roozen did not seize 

Tachiquin during their encounter prior to the shooting. (Apr. 27, 2015 Order [Doc. 

103] 11–12.) In reversing this Court’s decision on a separate issue as to Defendant 

Shavatt, the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs frame their claim 

as a challenge to the pre-shooting seizure of Tachiquin, that argument fails because 

they have not adequately alleged that a pre-shooting seizure occurred.” (Ninth Cir. 

Memo. Opinion [Doc. 115] 3.) Plaintiffs have not subsequently amended the 

operative SAC.

Tackett argues that the same reasoning as to the failure to properly allege a preshooting seizure should apply to him, and that as a result, he is entitled to summary 

judgment on the first through fifth causes of action. (Tackett MSJ [Doc. 122-1] 

1:22–2:11.) The argument is very brief. It appears in the motion’s introduction. 

But Plaintiffs do not address it anywhere in their opposition. (Tackett MSJ Opp’n 

[Doc. 132].) As such, Plaintiffs appear to concede the merits of the argument and 

acquiesce in summary judgment as to the first five claims against Agent Tackett—

all of which explicitly allege pre-shooting seizures in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. (SAC [Doc. 50] ¶¶ 185–212.) Indeed, the first four of these causes of 

action are the very same the Court previously dismissed as against Agent Roozen. 

(Id. [Doc. 50] ¶¶ 185–205; Apr. 27, 2015 Order [Doc. 103] 10–13, 20.) The fifth 

alleges a violation of the Fourth Amendment through Tackett “jump[ing] onto the 

hood of [Tachiquin’s] car[.]”[] (SAC [Doc. 50] ¶¶ 206–212.) 

Consistent with the Court’s reasoning in April of 2015 and the Ninth Circuit’s 

reasoning in March of 2017, there is no genuine dispute that Tachiquin was never 

seized prior to the shooting. (Apr. 27, 2015 Order [Doc. 103] 10–13, 20; Ninth Cir. 

Memo. Opinion [Doc. 115] 3.) 

Defendant Tackett’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ first through fifth 

causes of action will be granted.

(June 4, 2018 Order [Doc. 155] 10:10–11:10.) Now, construing their previous failure to 

oppose this portion of Tackett’s motion as inadvertence, Plaintiffs devote about two 

pages to a new argument that did not appear in their opposition. (Pls.’ Mot. [Doc. 165-1, 

Exh. 1] 2:20–3:5 (“Plaintiffs did not intend, and do not concede, that [Tachiquin] was not 

the subject of a pre-shooting seizure.”); 15:14–17:28.) It does not matter that Plaintiffs 

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did not intend to omit the relevant passage from their brief. They did. They had the 

burden at that point,

3

and they did not meet it.

There is no newly discovered evidence. There has been no intervening change in 

controlling law. The Court’s decision is not clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59; Kona 

Enters, 229 F.3d at 890. And there are no extraordinary circumstances that could justify 

invoking Rule 60(b).

C. Plaintiffs Fail to Show Newly Discovered Evidence, Intervening Change 

in Controlling Law, Clear Error, or Extraordinary Circumstances.

The remainder of the motion is an attempt to relitigate the motion for summary 

judgment. There is no newly discovered evidence. There has been no intervening 

change in controlling law. The Court’s decision is not clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59; Kona Enters, 229 F.3d at 890. And there are no extraordinary circumstances that 

could justify invoking Rule 60(b).

//

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3

If the moving party meets its initial burden of production on the motion for summary judgment, the 

nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED. [Doc. 164.]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 4, 2018

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