Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02403/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02403-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Account Receivable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ATS PRODUCTS, INC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CHAMPION FIBERGLASS, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 13-cv-02403-SI (DMR) 

ORDER OR MARCH 30, 2015 JOINT 

DISCOVERY LETTER 

Re: Dkt. No. 100 

Plaintiff ATS Products, Inc. and Defendant Champion Fiberglass, Inc. filed a joint 

discovery letter concerning Champion’s intent to depose Plaintiff’s attorney, Marc Shea. The 

court held a hearing on the letter on May 28, 2015. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Description of the Parties and the Prior Litigation 

ATS owns trade secrets regarding the ingredients needed to create particular phenolicresorcinol-formaldehyde resins (the “ATS Resins”). Third Am. Compl. [“TAC,” Docket No. 71] 

at ¶ 5. Plaintiff uses the ATS Resins to create fire-resistant plastics. Id. 

ATS’s predecessor-in-interest was Shea Technology (“Shea Tech”).1

 TAC at ¶ 6. During 

the 2000s, Shea Tech licensed its technology to Champion. TAC at ¶ 6; First Am. Compl [“FAC,” 

Docket No. 1] at ¶ 9(a). Shea Tech worked with Champion in the development of Champion’s 

“Flame Shield” product, which was a plastic pipe containing ATS Resins. TAC at ¶ 31; FAC at ¶ 

9(a). During that development, Champion worked with Frank Ghiorso, who was an employee of 

Shea Tech. FAC at ¶ 9(b). 

 

1

 The court refers to ATS’s attorney as “Marc Shea” in this order to avoid confusion with Shea 

Tech. 

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In 2007, Ghiroso left Shea Tech, formed Thermalguard Technology, LLC and 

Thermalguard LLC (collectively “Thermalguard”), and began marketing and selling resins that 

had the same properties as the ATS Resins. TAC at ¶ 6. 

In 2010, ATS learned that Ghiorso had entered into a contract in 2007 with Champion, 

which was a Shea Tech licensee, to provide resins for the purpose of creating fire-safe plastics. Id. 

On October 28, 2010, ATS filed an action in this district alleging that Ghiorso and Thermalguard 

had misappropriated ATS’s trade secrets. See ATS Products Inc. v. Frank Ghiorso et al., No. 10-

cv-4880-BZ (N.D. Cal. Oct., filed 28, 2010) (the “Ghiorso case”). Marc Shea, who represents 

ATS in this action, also represented ATS in the Ghiorso case. 

According to ATS, Champion played a role in the Ghiorso case even though it was not 

named or joined as a party. Beginning in November 2010, Champion financed the Ghiorso

defense “by making payments to Ghiorso of $10,000 per month and by making loans or 

contributions to payment of fees and costs,” eventually contributing a total of $649,000 for the 

defense. TAC at ¶ 9. ATS contends that Champion provided that financing to the Ghiorso

defendants because (1) Champion was allegedly buying, and wanted to continue to buy, resins 

from Thermalguard in order to continue to create the Flame Shield product; and (2) Champion’s 

president Goran Haag was a principal in Thermalguard LLC, one of the Ghiorso defendants. TAC 

at ¶ 9. 

On September 26, 2011, attorneys for Champion and Haag filed pro hac vice applications 

to appear in Ghiorso as “non-parties,” which the court granted. See Ghiorso, Docket Nos. 169-70, 

171-72. On September 29, 2011, Champion and Haag’s counsel participated in a magistrate judge 

settlement conference held in Ghiorso. See id., Docket No. 174. ATS alleges that sometime in 

September 2011, “Champion announced that it would not consent to the Settlement unless (a) 

ATS licensed Champion to use Thermalguard Resins and (B) ATS gave Champion a general 

release.” TAC at ¶ 13. “Although neither of those provisions had been discussed previously, ATS 

engaged in further settlement discussions with Champion.” Id. On October 10, 2011, 

“Champion’s attorneys notified Plaintiff that Champion had rejected ATS’ offer of settlement.” 

TAC at ¶ 15. 

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ATS alleges that Champion continued to monitor, finance, and assist the Ghiorso defense. 

TAC at ¶ 17. The case was tried in part to the court, and in part to a jury, which returned a special 

verdict. Ghiorso, Docket No. 247; TAC at ¶ 20. Subsequently, the court entered a judgment (1) 

establishing ATS as the owner of the trade secrets about the ingredients of the ATS Resins; (2) 

determining that Thermalguard’s resins are substantially identical to ATS Resins; and (3) 

determining that ATS is the owner of the trade secret information used to create Thermalguard’s 

resins. TAC at ¶¶ 20-21(A-C); Ghiorso, Docket Nos. 271, 273. The judgment enjoined the 

Ghiorso defendants “and anyone in active concert or in participation with any of them” from using 

or buying Thermalguard resins that were derived from ATS’s trade secrets. TAC at ¶ 21(D); 

Ghiorso, Docket No. 271 at ¶¶ 56-57. 

ATS gave written notice of the judgment in Ghiorso to Champion. TAC at ¶ 22. 

B. The Instant Litigation 

In the case now before the court, ATS alleges that “Champion’s interests were identical to 

the interests of the Ghiorso defendants in the Ghiorso case.”2 TAC at ¶ 17. ATS also alleges the 

Ghiorso defendants acted as agents for Champion, and that as a result of Champion’s actions, 

there was a privity of interest in the Ghiorso case between the Ghiorso defendants and Champion. 

TAC at ¶ 19. 

On this basis, ATS sues Champion for declaratory relief that under the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel, Champion is estopped from re-litigating in this case issues previously tried in 

the Ghiorso case, including ATS’ ownership of the relevant trade secrets and ATS’ rights to 

enjoin others from buying, using or exploiting Thermalguard resins or selling the Flame Shield 

product, which is believed to use Thermalguard resins.3

 TAC at ¶ 44(A). ATS also brings a cause 

 

2

 ATS contends that the Ghiorso defendants and Champion shared the same objectives: “to 

defeat ATS’ claims of ownership of trade secrets, to defeat ATS’ claim that the Ghiorso

defendants had misappropriated ATS’ trade secrets, and to defeat ATS’ requests for damages and 

injunctive relief arising from the Ghiorso defendants’ trade secret misappropriations.” TAC at ¶ 

17. 

3

 The TAC alleges that from 2010 to 2014, Champion marketed and sold its Flame Shield product 

to customers such as the Bay Area Rapid Transit District and the Los Angeles Metro. See TAC at 

¶¶ 33-42. ATS also alleges that Champion is still purchasing the Thermalguard resins and 

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of action for injunctive relief to enjoin Champion from further purchasing or using Thermalguard 

resins and manufacturing and selling the Flame Shield product. Finally, ATS brings a cause of 

action for violation of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA,” California Civil Code 

§ 3426(b)(1) et seq.) for misappropriation by acquisition. TAC at ¶¶ 65-66.4

II. DISCUSSION 

Champion seeks to depose ATS’s attorney Marc Shea to inquire about three topics: (1) the 

settlement negotiations in the Ghiorso case; (2) the “testimony and documents ATS received from 

Champion’s president, Goran Haag, during his deposition in the Ghiorso case, regarding 

Champion’s purchase of resin from Thermalguard Technology, its assistance in funding the 

Ghiorso defense, and payments made to Mr. Ghiorso”; and (3) ATS’s reasons for not joining 

Champion as a party in the Ghiorso case. Letter at 5. 

At the hearing, Champion’s counsel represented that it had deposed Jeff Shea, a nonattorney who is the CEO of ATS, and thereby acquired information regarding the second and third 

topics. Champion’s counsel averred that it no longer seeks to depose Marc Shea on these topics, 

so long as ATS does not intend to offer Marc Shea as a witness on these topics. ATS’s counsel 

represented on the record that ATS would not offer Marc Shea as a witness regarding those two 

subjects. Accordingly, the only subject on which Champion seeks to depose Marc Shea is the 

settlement negotiations in the Ghiorso case. 

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that neither party discusses the propriety of putting 

the contents of settlement discussions at issue in this case. Champion and ATS do not confront 

the foundational question of whether conduct or communications relating to settlement 

proceedings can be revealed, and if so, under what circumstances. As the parties did not raise the 

issue, the court will not address it.

 

continues to build the Flame Shield product with Thermalguard resins. Id. at ¶ 32. 

4

 The other causes of action in the TAC were dismissed on January 15, 2015. Docket No. 93 at 2 

(holding that the misappropriation of trade secrets, receipt of stolen property, and aiding and 

abetting claims were preempted by CUTSA). 

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A. Legal Standards for Depositions of Opposing Counsel 

1. The Shelton Rule 

The court begins by reviewing the federal rule and the case law regarding depositions of 

attorneys. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[a] party may . . . depose any 

person.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). “Therefore, there is no express prohibition against the taking of 

attorney depositions,” including depositions of the attorneys representing the opposing parties in 

the case. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cerf, 177 F.R.D. 472, 478 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See 

also Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure do not specifically prohibit the taking of opposing counsel’s deposition.”); 

Johnston Development Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348, 352 

(D.N.J. 1990) (“Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Evidence 

prohibit taking the deposition of an opposing party’s attorney.”). 

Even so, courts generally recognize that a deposition of opposing counsel is a unique and 

sometimes undesirable circumstance. The seminal case5 on this issue is Shelton, in which the 

Eighth Circuit noted that “the increasing practice of taking opposing counsel’s deposition [is] a 

negative development in the area of litigation, and one that should be employed only in limited 

circumstances.” Id., 805 F.2d at 1327 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947) 

(“[T]he practice of forcing trial counsel to testify as a witness . . . has long been discouraged”)). 

See also Nocal, Inc. v. Sabercat Ventures, Inc., No. C 04-0240 PJH(JL), 2004 WL 3174427, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2004) (“The Supreme Court of the United States alluded to a presumption that 

 

5

 Courts in this district and across the country recognize Shelton as the leading case on opposing 

counsel depositions. See, e.g., Mass. Mutual, 177 F.R.D. at 479 (Shelton “is generally regarded as 

the leading case on attorney depositions”); Chao v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. C 10-3118 SBA 

(LB), 2012 WL 5988617, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (noting that Shelton is “the leading case 

on attorney depositions” and collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit has not issued a published 

decision addressing the circumstances under which a party may take the deposition of an opposing 

party’s attorney. However, in an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit followed the three-factor 

Shelton test to determine whether a party was allowed to depose its opposing counsel about facts 

allegedly relevant to the pending case. See Willer v. Las Vegas Valley Water Dist., 176 F.3d 486 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 177 F.R.D. 472, 479 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 

(citing Shelton , 805 F.3d at 1327)). 

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trial counsel should not be forced to testify because doing so compromises the standards of the 

legal profession.”) (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513). 

At issue in Shelton was the plaintiffs’ deposition of the defendant’s in-house counsel on 

questions concerning the existence or nonexistence of documents that the plaintiffs believed the 

defendant possessed but had not produced during discovery. Id. at 1325-26. The defendant’s 

attorney appeared for her deposition, which was held under the supervision of a magistrate judge, 

but refused to answer questions about her knowledge of the existence of the documents despite the 

magistrate judge’s order. Id. at 1325. The district court held that the attorney’s refusal to comply 

with the magistrate judge’s orders warranted default judgment against the defendant. Id. The 

Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the case did not meet the “limited circumstances” in which 

deposition of an opposing counsel was appropriate because the plaintiffs could obtain the same 

information about the existence of the documents by deposing the defendant’s officials, and 

because where “opposing counsel has engaged in a selective process of compiling documents from 

among voluminous files in preparation for litigation, the mere acknowledgment of the existence of 

those documents would reveal counsel’s mental impressions, which are protected as work 

product.” Id. at 1326-28. 

The Shelton court noted that deposing opposing counsel disrupts the adversarial system, 

adds to the burdens and costs of litigation, and could chill candid communications between that 

counsel and his or her client. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327. On the other hand, the Shelton court also 

“recognize[d] that circumstances may arise in which the court should order the taking of opposing 

counsel’s deposition.” Id. See also Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania v. Krieger, 160 F.R.D. 

582, 588 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (deposition of opposing counsel may be appropriate where “the attorney 

is a fact witness, such as an ‘actor or viewer’”); Johnston Development Group, Inc., 130 F.R.D. at 

352 (“The deposition of the attorney may be ‘both necessary and appropriate’ where the attorney 

may be a fact witness, such as an ‘actor or viewer,’ rather than one who was not a party to any of 

the underlying transactions giving rise to the action, or whose role in a transaction was speculative 

and not central to the dispute.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Balancing the various concerns, Shelton concluded that “opposing trial counsel is [not] 

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absolutely immune from being deposed.” Id., 805 F.2d at 1327. Instead, the court should permit 

the taking of opposing counsel’s deposition only when the party seeking to take the deposition has 

demonstrated three factors: (1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose 

opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and non-privileged; (3) the information is 

crucial to the preparation of the case. Id. (citations omitted). This three-factor test has been 

employed by many courts, including courts within this district, to determine the appropriateness of 

one party’s deposition of the opposing party’s counsel. 

2. The Pamida Rule 

Champion argues that Shelton does not apply to the instant case, and instead urges the 

court to adopt the ruling in Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 281 F.3d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 2002), 

in which the Eighth Circuit revisited Shelton and held that the Shelton rule should not apply where 

a party seeks to depose opposing counsel about a prior closed case, rather than the pending case. 

In Pamida, the Pamida department store had been sued by a patentholder who alleged that 

Pamida sold shoes that infringed her patent for a shoe tying system. Pamida’s attorneys rejected 

the patentholder’s early settlement overtures and instead chose to engage in costly, protracted 

litigation that ultimately resulted in a settlement. Prior to the settlement, Pamida sued Dynasty, 

the manufacturer of the offending shoes, seeking indemnification. Pamida was represented in the 

indemnification suit by the same attorneys that represented it in the patent infringement suit. 

Dynasty then sought to depose those attorneys on issues which the court described as being 

“central to the instant litigation,” including “what actions Pamida took to give Dynasty notice of 

the patent infringement action and . . . [Pamida’s] claim for indemnity from Dynasty[,] as well as 

whether the $750,000 in attorneys’ fees sought by Pamida were reasonably incurred.” Id. at 728-

29. 

The Eighth Circuit reviewed its holding in Shelton, and noted that “the Shelton test was 

intend[ed] to protect against the ills of deposing opposing counsel in a pending case which could 

potentially lead to the disclosure of the attorney’s litigation strategy.” Id. at 729-30 (citing 

Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1329). The Pamida court then distinguished Shelton, stating that it “was not 

intended to provide heightened protection to attorneys who represented a client in a completed 

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case and then also happened to represent that same client in a pending case where the information 

known only by the attorneys regarding the prior concluded case was crucial.” Id. at 731. Thus, 

the Pamida court determined that “[t]he concerns raised in Shelton regarding abuse of the 

discovery process . . . are not implicated in this case where [the defendants] seek relevant 

information uniquely known by [the plaintiff’s] attorneys about prior terminated litigation, the 

substance of which is central to the pending case.” Id. The court stated that the issues of whether 

the amount of the attorneys’ fees incurred was reasonable and if the plaintiff was given adequate 

notice of the indemnity claim were both “peculiarly within counsel’s knowledge and centrally 

relevant to the issues in the indemnification action.” Id. The Eighth Circuit therefore held that the 

defendants did not have to satisfy the Shelton rule in order to depose opposing counsel about the 

concluded patent infringement suit. Id. at 730-31. Instead, the proposed depositions of Pamida’s 

attorneys should be evaluated under the ordinary discovery standards of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and any asserted privileges. Id. at 731. 

The court then concluded that Pamida had waived any claims of attorney-client privilege 

or work product protection by “institut[ing] an indemnification action . . . [and] putting the work 

of its attorneys squarely at issue,” and upheld the district court’s ruling permitting the depositions 

of Pamida’s attorneys. Id. at 732. 

The Ninth Circuit has not issued a published decision governing depositions of opposing 

counsel either in the context of soliciting testimony about a pending case or about a concluded 

case. Courts in this district have followed the demanding three-factor test laid out in Shelton, but 

most of those courts have encountered the issue when a party seeks to depose opposing counsel 

about the pending case, and thus did not have to consider a scenario like the one presented in 

Pamida. See, e.g., Chao, 2012 WL 5988617 at *1 (defendant sought to depose plaintiff’s 

counsel); Villaflor v. Equifax Info., No. C-09-00329 MMC, 2010 WL 2891627, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

July 22, 2010) (same); M.A. Mobile Ltd. v. Indian Inst. of Tech. Kharagpur, No. C-08-02658-

RMW, 2014 WL 819161, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (plaintiffs’ sought to depose defendants’ 

counsel); AWGI, LLC v. Duncan & Elbaz, Inc., No. C10-01529 HRL, 2010 WL 4595158, at *1 

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(N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010) (same).6 

Champion points to two out-of-district cases in which courts applied Pamida instead of 

Shelton to determine whether to permit the deposition of opposing counsel about topics not related 

to the pending case. One of these cases, Devlyne v. Lassen Mun. Util. Dist., No. CIV. S-10-0286 

MCE, 2011 WL 4905672, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2011), is factually distinguishable from the 

circumstances here. In Devlyne, the plaintiff employees sought to depose Jamie Jones, the former 

in-house counsel of the defendant employer. Ms. Jones had percipient knowledge of the factual 

circumstances leading to the employees’ lawsuit, because she had participated in an employee 

meeting and had communicated with an investigator about events that gave rise to the lawsuit. 

The court permitted the deposition, reasoning that “the Shelton criteria apply only when trial 

and/or litigation counsel are being deposed and the questioning would expose litigation strategy in 

the pending case.” Id. at *2 (citing Pamida, 281 F.3d at 730). But in Devlyne, unlike the instant 

litigation, the former in-house counsel was not the employer’s present trial counsel. In fact, the 

Devlyne court specifically declined to apply the Shelton factors because the employer had 

“established no factual foundation to demonstrate that Jones is or was trial/litigation counsel for 

[the employer]. Likewise, no foundation exists that Jones was so intimately involved with the 

litigation that taking her deposition would be akin to deposing one’s litigation counsel.” Id. 

The other case cited by Champion is aaiPharma, Inc. v. Kremers Urban Development Co., 

361 F.Supp.2d 770 (E.D. Ill. 2005). There, the plaintiff sued defendants for patent infringement. 

The defendants sought to depose the plaintiff’s present counsel, who had also been involved in the 

prosecution of the underlying patents, in order to develop its theory that the patents were 

unenforceable due to the plaintiff’s inequitable conduct during patent prosecution. Id. at 772. The 

aaiPharma court, citing Pamida, characterized Shelton as being limited to “depositions of trial 

 6

 In its own research, the court could locate only one case within this district considering 

the issue of a deposition of counsel who represented the opposing party in the present case and had 

also represented that party in a different, concluded matter. That court followed the Shelton

standard, without discussing Pamida. See State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Khatri, No. C 13-00433 LB, 

2014 WL 1877618 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2014). 

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counsel regarding their knowledge of the particular case in which they served as trial counsel.” Id.

at 775. Since the deposition of the plaintiff’s attorneys would probe the attorneys’ conduct during 

patent prosecution, rather than during the present case, the court concluded that the heightened 

Shelton standard did not apply, and instead the propriety of the discovery request would be 

determined under the general standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The court 

then considered the plaintiff’s relevance, burden, and privilege objections, and granted the 

defendants permission to take opposing counsel’s depositions on a limited number of topics. Id. at 

777-78. 

B. Analysis 

The court must first determine which standard to apply in deciding whether Champion 

should be permitted to depose Marc Shea: (1) the heightened three-factor standard articulated in 

Shelton and apparently unanimously followed by the courts in this district; or (2) the regular 

discovery standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, as determined by the Pamida court. 

The court applies Pamida to the situation presented in this dispute. The Shelton court 

applied a heightened test for depositions of opposing counsel on matters relating to the pending 

case because those depositions disrupt the adversarial system, lower professional standards, 

burden the legal system with collateral disputes about attorney client and work product objections, 

and could chill communications between the client and the attorney. 805 F.2d at 1327. These 

concerns, although still present, are less pronounced when, as here, the subject matter of the 

deposition of opposing counsel is not his conduct in the pending case but his percipient knowledge 

of the events surrounding a prior concluded litigation. To permit a fact witness to evade a 

deposition simply because he acted as an attorney in a prior case would invite parties to retain the 

same counsel in subsequent cases to avoid revealing information that would otherwise be 

discoverable. Champion seeks to depose Marc Shea about the settlement negotiations in the 

Ghiorso case, during which ATS was represented by Marc Shea. Because Champion seeks the 

deponent’s percipient knowledge of events that occurred during a prior concluded case, Pamida 

applies, which requires the court simply to analyze the question under the ordinary discovery 

standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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At the hearing, ATS’s counsel admitted that Marc Shea has percipient knowledge of the 

settlement negotiations in Ghiorso and that this information is relevant to the claims asserted by 

ATS in this case. The thrust of ATS’s allegations is that even though Champion was not a party in 

Ghiorso, it was nevertheless fully involved in that litigation, as illustrated by the fact that 

Champion was able to participate in, and eventually scuttle the settlement. TAC at ¶¶ 13, 15. 

Champion also notes that Marc Shea handled the negotiations on ATS’s behalf and communicated 

with defense counsel and counsel for Champion, neither of which Plaintiff disputes.

However, simply because the discovery sought is relevant does not mean that the court 

must permit it. A court “must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by [the 

Federal] rules” if “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). To the extent that Champion seeks information about the extent of 

Champion’s involvement in Ghiorso, it can first attempt to obtain that information from other 

sources more convenient and less burdensome than through the disfavored practice of deposing 

opposing counsel. For example, Champion itself would presumably know what happened in the 

settlement proceedings, since it appears undisputed that Champion participated in them. A 

number of witnesses experienced the settlement negotiations in Ghiorso firsthand, including Frank 

Ghiorso and the original and substitute counsel for the Ghiorso defendants.

7

 Indeed, at the 

hearing, ATS’s counsel noted that ATS was not planning to offer Marc Shea as a fact witness on 

this topic, and instead planned to depose Frank Ghiorso and his original counsel John Piccone. 

Champion could do the same. 

However, ATS did not unequivocally represent that it will not call Marc Shea as a witness. 

Instead, ATS asserted that it would call upon Marc Shea if it is unable to establish key facts 

through other discovery. Under such circumstances, the burdens created by allowing Champion to 

 

7

 As noted above, the Ghiorso defendants were, at the end of the case, represented by the same 

attorneys from the law firm of Trump, Alioto, Trump & Prescott LLP who represent Champion in 

this case. It is unclear whether those attorneys were involved in the settlement negotiations in 

Ghiorso, or whether they joined the case after all settlement talks concluded. If the former is true, 

then Champion’s current attorneys also have percipient knowledge of the Ghiorso settlement 

negotiations. 

Case 3:13-cv-02403-SI Document 109 Filed 06/08/15 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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Case 3:13-cv-02403-SI Document 109 Filed 06/08/15 Page 12 of 12