Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04021/USCOURTS-arwd-4_06-cv-04021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

Because the Court finds that substantial evidence supports 1

the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ applied the correct standard

of law, the Court adopts much of Defendant’s brief without

quotation or citation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

TONY BEARDEN Plaintiff

v. Case No. 06-04021

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Tony Bearden, seeks judicial review of the

Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title XVI

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq., as amended

and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Plaintiff has exhausted all

administrative remedies, and therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

405(g), judicial review is appropriate. After reviewing the

record, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.1

I. Background

The complete facts and arguments are presented in the parties’

briefs, and will be duplicated only to the extent necessary.

Additionally, the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision

within the administrative record sets forth her findings and it

will not be repeated except to the extent necessary to address

Plaintiff’s arguments.

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II. Standard of Review

The Court’s review is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner applied the correct standard of law and whether the

Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3); Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.

1999). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable

mind would accept as sufficient to support the Commissioner’s

conclusion. Warburton, 188 F.3d at 1050. In making this

determination, the Court considers evidence that detracts from the

Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it. Id.

The Court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely

because substantial evidence supports a different result. Pierce

v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1999). This is true even if

the Court might have weighed the evidence differently and reached

a different result if a de novo review were applied. Pearsall v.

Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001).

To receive disability benefits a claimant must show: (1) a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has

lasted, or can be expected to last, for not less than twelve

months; (2) an inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity; and (3) the inability results from the impairment. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 423 (d)(1)(A), (d)(2); see also Timmerman v. Weinberger,

510 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The Court reviews the ALJ’s

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decision to determine whether the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s

implementing regulations, which set out a five-step, burdenshifting process for determining whether the claimant has a

“disability” within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

The five steps are (1) whether the claimant is currently

engaging in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) whether the

claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the severe impairment

is, or is comparable to, a listed impairment precluding substantial

gainful activity as a matter of law; (4) whether the claimant, with

his current Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) can meet the

demands of his past work, and if not; (5) whether the claimant

retains the capacity to perform any other work that exists in

significant numbers in the economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920 (2004); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987)

(discussing the five-step analysis). In the first four steps, the

burden is on the claimant to prove that he or she is disabled. If

the claimant is not able to perform his or her past work, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are jobs in

the national economy that the claimant can perform, although the

ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the claimant. See

Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004); see also

Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24, 28 (2003) (noting that the

existence of jobs in the national economy must be proved only at

step five).

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III. Analysis

A. Introduction

The issue below was whether Plaintiff was entitled to a period

of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits, and eligible for

Supplemental Social Security Income payments under §§ 261(I), 223,

and 1614(a)(3)(A), respectively, of the Social Security Act. The

specific issue was whether Plaintiff was under a disability,

defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than twelve (12) months. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial

gainful work; did not have an impairment, or combination of

impairments, medically equivalent to one listed in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulation Number 4; did have severe impairments

preventing Plaintiff from returning to his past relevant work; and

that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity for the full range of

sedentary work is reduced by the inability to read and write, the

need to stand and sit alternately, and some postural and

environmental limitations, but using Medical-Vocational Rule 201.28

as a framework for decision-making, there are a significant number

of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. 

Plaintiff’s Petition alleges the ALJ’s erred in finding

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Plaintiff does not meet a listing level disability, in assessing

Plaintiff’s credibility, and concluding that Plaintiff retains the

residual functional capacity to perform unskilled sedentary work,

and the ALJ applied an erroneous standard of law. (Doc. 1, §§ VI

and VII) Further, Plaintiff’s Petition contends that there is

newly discovered relevant material evidence, which was unavailable

at the time the ALJ rendered the decision denying benefits, that

requires remand for inclusion in the record. (Doc. 1, § VIII) 

Specifically, Plaintiff argues in his Appeal Brief three (3)

issues as points of error by the ALJ. First, Plaintiff contends

the ALJ’s final decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act (“Act”) was not supported by

substantial evidence. (Doc. 9, § III.1) Second, Plaintiff

contends the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s ability to perform

sedentary work was not compromised by Plaintiff’s severely

diminished intellectual capacity. (Doc. 9, § III.2) Third,

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by concluding Plaintiff retained

the residual functional capacity to perform unskilled sedentary

work. (Doc. 9, § III.3)

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision, adopted by the

Defendant, is not supported by substantial evidence in the record

because the ALJ (1) failed to properly develop the record by

obtaining a psychiatric consultative exam; (2) failed to consider

the combined effect of Plaintiff’s impairments; (3) improperly

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discredited Plaintiff’s testimony; (4) improperly discredited

Plaintiff’s witness’s testimony; and (5) failed to include all of

Plaintiff’s disabilities in the hypothetical question posed to the

vocational expert. 

Plaintiff’s Appeal Brief contains nothing pertaining to the

assertion in Plaintiff’s Petition that there is newly discovered

relevant material evidence, which was unavailable at the time the

ALJ rendered the decision denying benefits. Thus, the Court will

consider that argument withdrawn and not address the issue.

 B. Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant’s Decision that

Plaintiff Was Not Disabled Within the Meaning of the Social

Security Act

Under the sequential evaluation, the second step concerns

whether Plaintiff has a severe impairment as defined within the

Social Security Act. A severe impairment must meet the

requirements of a listed impairment which meets or equals the level

of severity listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P, Regulation Number 4.

Plaintiff contends that his disability stems from a history of

chronic back and neck pain, muscle spasms, chronic fatigue,

headaches, depression, insomnia, side effects of medication,

degenerative disc disease, weakness of both wrists, and diminished

intellectual functioning. 

In determining whether Plaintiff is disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ must determine

Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), that is, what

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Plaintiff can still do physically, with his impairments, and also

Plaintiff’s age, education, and relevant work experience. If the

ALJ’s finding is that the RFC, age, education, and work experience,

meet any of the combinations of those criteria contained in the

tables of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appx. 2 (1992), then the ALJ must

reach the conclusion that Plaintiff is either “disabled” or “not

disabled” as directed by the relevant rule or line of the

applicable table. The Court finds that substantial evidence

supports Defendant’s decision that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

1. The ALJ Properly Determined Plaintiff’s RFC

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s RFC is what he can do despite

his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. It is Plaintiff’s burden,

and not Defendant’s burden, to prove Plaintiff’s RFC. Masterson v.

Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2004). 

The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination was properly

based on all relevant evidence, including medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and Plaintiff’s own

descriptions of his limitations. Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d

549, 556 (8th Cir. 2003). Based on all relevant evidence, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work activity,

including lifting up to ten (10) pounds occasionally, walking

and/or standing for ninety (90) minutes in an eight (8) hour day,

and sitting for eight (8) hours. (Tr. 295, Finding No. 6) The ALJ

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further found that Plaintiff needed to alternate between sitting

and standing as necessary; that Plaintiff could occasionally climb,

crouch, balance, stoop, kneel, and crawl; and that Plaintiff could

not work around dust, humidity, vibrations, or extremes of

temperature. (Tr. 295, Finding No. 6) The Court finds that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. 

a. Medical Evidence Supports the 

 ALJ’s RFC Determination

Although the ALJ must assess Plaintiff’s RFC based on all

relevant evidence, the Eighth Circuit has also stated that

Defendant’s RFC “is a medical question.” Masterson, 363 F.3d at

738. Medical evidence must support the ALJ’s determination of

Plaintiff’s RFC, and the ALJ should obtain medical evidence that

pertains to Plaintiff’s “ability to function in the workplace.”

Id. (quoting Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2000)).

In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ is not limited to considering

medical evidence, but is required to consider at least some

supporting evidence from a professional. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(c); Masterson, 363 F.3d at 738. 

On April 2, 1999, an x-ray examination of Plaintiff’s

thoracolumbar spine showed minimal developmental anomalies and mild

degenerative disc disease at L4-5 and L5-S1, but was otherwise

unremarkable. On May 5, 1999, x-ray examinations of Plaintiff’s

cervical spine and right knee were normal. On April 25, 2000, Dr.

James M. Arthur, a treating physician, noted that a Magnetic

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Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) of Plaintiff’s back was negative. On

January 14, 2002, Dr. Julius K. Sheppard, an orthopedic surgeon and

consultative physician, concluded that Plaintiff moved reasonably

well from the table to a walking position; that Plaintiff’s

Patrick’s Test, straight-leg raising test, and Patrick’s Supine

Test were all within normal limits; and that Plaintiff’s deep

tendon, sensory, and motor reflexes were all 1+ and equal. Dr.

Sheppard also noted that Plaintiff was not a candidate for surgery

because Plaintiff’s MRI and neurology tests were within normal

limits, and that an x-ray examination of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine

showed minimal changes. 

The Court finds that the ALJ properly incorporated this

medical evidence into his determination. See Masterson, 363 F.3d

at 738; see also Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th

Cir. 2002) (stating that there must be medical evidence to support

an ALJ’s RFC determination). 

b. Plaintiff’s Testimony Supports the 

 ALJ’s RFC Determination

The ALJ properly relied in part on Plaintiff’s testimony that

suggests Plaintiff is capable of considerable physical activity

despite Plaintiff’s impairments. At the administrative hearing,

Plaintiff testified that he worked at a sheltered workshop from

2002 through May 2004. Plaintiff also testified that he was

capable of walking a couple of blocks, lifting between fifteen (15)

and twenty (20) pounds, and fishing. The Court finds that the ALJ

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properly incorporated Plaintiff’s testimony into the ALJ’s

determination. 

c. The ALJ Properly Weighed the Opinions 

 of Plaintiff’s Treating and 

 Examining Physicians 

“The [social security] regulations provide that a treating

physician’s opinion . . . will be granted ‘controlling weight,’

provided the opinion is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record.”

Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 715, 720 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Prosch, 201 F.3d at 1012-13 (alteration in original) (quoting 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). The ALJ may properly discount a

physician’s opinion if other medical assessments are supported by

superior medical evidence, or if the treating physician has offered

inconsistent opinions. Id. Whether the weight given a physician’s

opinion is great or small, the ALJ must give good reasons for the

weight accorded the physician’s opinion. Id.

i. The ALJ Properly Declined to Give Controlling 

 Weight to the Opinion of Dr. Hasmukh Patel, 

 a Treating Physician, Because the Opinion 

 Was Based On Plaintiff’s Subjective 

 Complaints

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating

medical evidence by improperly discounting the opinion of Dr.

Hasmukh Patel, Plaintiff’s treating physician. Dr. Patel testified

that his findings were based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints,

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and that he had no objective medical evidence supporting his

findings. Accordingly, the ALJ declined to give Dr. Patel’s

opinion controlling weight because the ALJ found that the primary

basis for Dr. Patel’s opinion was Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

and reported limitations rather than on objective clinical findings

or diagnostic testing. The Court agrees with the ALJ’s

determination. 

On July 5, 2000, Dr. Patel completed a (Physical) Residual

Functional Capacity Assessment indicating that Plaintiff could lift

up to ten (10) pounds; that Plaintiff could stand, walk, and sit

for less than two (2) hours in a regular workday; that Plaintiff

had to alternate sitting and standing every twenty (20) minutes;

and that Plaintiff could not perform repetitive operations with his

legs and feet while seated. Dr. Patel also concluded that

Plaintiff could frequently balance, occasionally climb, and never

stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, push/pull, or drive; and that

Plaintiff could not work around temperature extremes, moving

machinery, heights, fumes, dust, or humidity. However, Dr. Patel

stated his findings were based on Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, and he had no objective medical evidence supporting his

findings. 

While subjective complaints by a claimant may be an essential

diagnostic tool, the Court finds that a treating physician’s

opinion must also be supported by medically acceptable clinical and

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laboratory diagnostic techniques. Such techniques were not

employed here, and the ALJ may properly discount the opinions of a

treating physician to the extent they are based on a claimant’s

subjective complaints. Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir.

2000) (in assessing claimant’s RFC, ALJ was entitled to disregard

treating physician’s opinion that claimant’s ability to reach,

push, or pull, was limited by pain, in part because such opinion

was based on subjective descriptions to physician of claimant’s

pain levels); Rankin v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1999)

(although a treating physician’s opinion is normally entitled to

great weight, it was appropriate to discredit treating physician’s

testimony when it was based heavily on claimant’s subjective

complaints and at odds with the weight of the objective evidence);

Gaddis v. Chater, 76 F.3d 893, 895-96 (8th Cir. 1996) (ALJ may

discount physician’s opinion if it is based on discredited

subjective complaints); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th

Cir. 1993) (ALJ was justified in discrediting opinion of disability

by treating physician on ground that it was based solely on

claimant’s complaints of pain and was unsupported by physician’s

other findings). 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the ALJ

properly declined to give Dr. Patel’s opinion controlling weight as

the primary basis for Dr. Patel’s opinion was Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints and reported limitations without any support

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from objective clinical findings or diagnostic testing. 

ii. The ALJ Properly Declined to Give Controlling 

 Weight to the Medical Report of Dr. Julius K. 

 Sheppard, a Consultative Examiner, Because 

 the Report Was Inconsistent With the 

 Results of an Evaluation that Dr. 

 Sheppard had Given Plaintiff 

 on that Very Same Day 

 

The ALJ also properly declined to give controlling weight to

the Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related

Activities (Physical) form of Dr. Sheppard, a consultative

physician, because the ALJ concluded that the form was inconsistent

with the results of an evaluation that Dr. Sheppard had given

Plaintiff on that very same day. 

On January 14, 2002, Dr. Sheppard indicated in his Medical

Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities

(Physical) form that Plaintiff could lift and carry ten (10) pounds

occasionally and less than ten (10) pounds frequently, stand and/or

walk for less than two (2) hours in an eight (8) hour workday, and

had to periodically alternate between sitting and standing. Dr.

Sheppard further found that Plaintiff could occasionally climb,

balance, kneel, crouch, crawl, stoop, and reach; and that his

ability to reach in all directions was limited.

On that very same day, as discussed in Part III.B.1.a supra,

Dr. Sheppard also observed and concluded that Plaintiff moved

reasonably well from the table to a walking position; that

Plaintiff’s straight-leg raising test was within normal limits;

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that Plaintiff’s deep tendon, sensory, and motor reflexes were all

1+ and equal; and that Plaintiff was not a candidate for surgery

because Plaintiff’s MRI and neurology tests were within normal

limits. Dr. Sheppard also reported that an x-ray examination of

Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed minimal changes. The ALJ may

properly discount a physician’s opinion if other medical

assessments are supported by superior medical evidence, or if the

treating physician has offered inconsistent opinions. Holmstrom,

270 F.3d at 720. The Court finds that the ALJ properly considered

Dr. Sheppard’s Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do WorkRelated Activities (Physical) form and declined to give it

controlling weight because, on the same day, Dr. Sheppard

physically observed and also concluded that Plaintiff moved

reasonably well from the table to a walking position and that

various clinical diagnostic tests were all within normal limits. 

2. The ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Subjective 

 Complaints and Discounted Them for Legally 

 Sufficient Reasons

The relevant evidence that also must be addressed by the ALJ

in determining Plaintiff’s RFC is Plaintiff’s own description of

his pain and limitations. Masterson, 363 F.3d at 738; Anderson v.

Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ

considered and found Plaintiff’s own description of his pain and

limitations not to be fully credible. Plaintiff takes issue with

the ALJ’s discounting of Plaintiff’s subjective pain and limitation

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complaints, but Plaintiff fails to show how the ALJ erred in that

assessment. 

A court should not disturb the decision of an ALJ who

seriously considers, but for good reasons explicitly discredits, a

claimant’s subjective testimony of pain and limitations. See Reed

v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1993). The credibility of

Plaintiff’s subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to

decide, not the Court. Masterson, 363 F.3d at 738. Because the

ALJ is in a better position to evaluate credibility, this Court

defers to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, as long as, the

determinations are supported by good reasons and substantial

evidence. See Cox v. Barnhart, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 3751503 (8th

Cir. Dec. 22, 2006). The ALJ must make express credibility

determinations and set forth the inconsistencies in the record

which cause him to reject Plaintiff’s complaints. See id. 

When evaluating evidence of Plaintiff’s pain and limitations,

the ALJ must consider: (1) Plaintiff’s daily activities; (2)

subjective evidence of the duration, frequency, and intensity of

Plaintiff’s pain; (3) any precipitating or aggravating factors; (4)

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects, of any medication; and (5)

Plaintiff’s functional restrictions. Masterson, 363 F.3d at 738.

Because pain or lack of range of motion, for example are difficult

to measure, the ALJ may not disregard Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of pain solely because the objective medical evidence

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does not fully support such complaints. Id. 

The absence of this evidence is just one of several factors

used to evaluate the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony and

complaints. Subjective complaints may be discounted if the

evidence as a whole is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s testimony.

See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)

(setting forth a list of factors the ALJ should consider in

reviewing subjective complaints). 

Plaintiff argues that he is disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. However, Plaintiff relies solely on his own

subjective complaints and medical evidence that is inconsistent and

based solely on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

The ALJ found the subjective allegations by the Plaintiff to

not be fully credible and not borne out by the overall record.

First, the ALJ noted that the medical evidence did not support

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. Second, Plaintiff’s

daily activities did not support his subjective complaints of pain.

Third, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had a history of failing to

follow up with medical treatment, appointments, or use prescribed

medication. See Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir.

2001) (failure to receive follow up treatment fails to support

subjective complaints); Novotny v. Chater, 72 F.2d 669, 670 (8th

Cir. 1995) (failure to seek regular or sustained medical treatment

contradicts subjective complaints of pain). 

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The ALJ articulated the inconsistencies in discrediting the

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and these credibility findings

were supported by substantial evidence. The Court finds that the

ALJ properly determined the Plaintiff’s credibility and rejected

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.

C. The ALJ Met the Burden of Showing that There Were Jobs 

Plaintiff Could Do Once It Was Shown that 

 Plaintiff Could Not Do His Past Work

Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving that a medically

determinable impairment prevents him from performing his past

relevant work. Where Plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts

to the Defendant to establish that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform

other substantial gainful activity in the national economy.

Plaintiff contends he could not perform the jobs listed by the

vocational expert due to his diminished intellectual capacity.

Plaintiff underwent an IQ test in 2002 and was found to have

a full scale IG of 59. While an IQ test may be helpful in

determining whether Plaintiff has a mental impairment, it is not

the only evidence that may be examined. Other information which

indicates Plaintiff’s ability to function can be used to discredit

the results of the I.Q. test. Johnson v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 1067,

1071 (8th Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit has held on numerous

occasions that an ALJ may reject I.Q. scores if they are

inconsistent with the rest of the record. See id., see also Clark

v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1252, 1255 (8th Cir. 1998). I.Q. test results

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should be examined to assess consistency with daily activities.

See id. 

In our case, the ALJ expressly discounted Plaintiff’s I.Q.

scores because they were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s activities

and abilities as reflected in the record. The ALJ noted that

Plaintiff did not allege a mental deficiency when Plaintiff filed

for disability, and that the Social Security Administration

interviewer who took his application did not observe any difficulty

with Plaintiff’s ability to understand, speak coherently,

concentrate, or answer questions. 

Thus, even though the hypothetical did not include Plaintiff’s

specific IQ, the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert

included some of Plaintiff’s mental limitations and those

limitations which the ALJ accepted as true, and which were

supported by the record. Thus, the ALJ was correct to rely upon the

testimony of the vocational expert and no error resulted in finding

there were jobs that exist in significant umbers in the national

economy which Plaintiff can perform.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is

supported by the substantial evidence of the record as a whole and

is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this 8th day of February, 2007.

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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