Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01984/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1984 

MARY C. FONTAINE, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:12-cv-08738 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 1, 2014 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 4, 2015 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. In 1989, the Supreme Court held 

that courts should apply de novo review in suits challenging 

denials of employee benefits governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, better known as 

ERISA. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 

(1989); see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). But there was a catch. If the 

benefit plan provided expressly for a different, more deferential standard of review, Firestone said, that specific proviCase: 14-1984 Document: 61 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 17
2 No. 14-1984 

sion would control over the default rule of de novo review. 

489 U.S. at 115. Insurance companies and plan sponsors began including such provisions in most employee benefit 

plans, typically saying the insurer or plan administrator 

would exercise discretionary judgment in interpreting a plan 

or deciding whether to pay benefits. Courts would then apply a deferential standard of review under which a denial 

would stand unless it was “arbitrary and capricious.” See, 

e.g., Black v. Long Term Disability Ins., 582 F.3d 738, 743–44 

(7th Cir. 2009). 

A further round in the tug-of-war over employee benefits 

has been adoption of state laws intended to protect employees and plan beneficiaries from abuse of such discretion. In 

this case, we address a federal preemption challenge to such 

an Illinois insurance law, one that prohibits provisions “purporting to reserve discretion” to insurers to interpret health 

and disability insurance policies. Like our colleagues in the 

Ninth and Sixth Circuits, as well as the district court in this 

case, we reject the preemption challenge and apply the state 

law. See Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 

2009); American Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600 

(6th Cir. 2009); Fontaine v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2014 WL 

1258353, *11–12 (N.D. Ill. March 27, 2014). We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff Mary 

C. Fontaine. 

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Plaintiff Fontaine was an equity partner in the structured 

finance group of the law firm of Mayer Brown LLP. Mayer 

Brown offered Fontaine long-term disability insurance 

through the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), and Fontaine paid the premium for that policy. In 2011, 

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No. 14-1984 3

Fontaine retired after 30 years of practice at Mayer Brown. 

She said vision problems prevented her from continuing to 

perform at the high level and pace expected in her work as a 

structured finance attorney. Two days after retiring, Fontaine 

filed a claim for disability benefits with MetLife.

MetLife denied her claim, finding that Fontaine did not 

fit the definition of disabled in her insurance policy. MetLife 

affirmed that initial denial in an internal administrative appeal. Fontaine then filed this suit against MetLife under 

ERISA for wrongful denial of benefits.

Fontaine and MetLife each moved for entry of judgment 

by the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). This procedure is essentially a trial on the papers, 

see Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 

(7th Cir. 2001), and is well-suited to ERISA cases in which 

the court reviews a closed record. Both sides presented extensive medical evidence, which the district court examined 

in detail. See Fontaine, 2014 WL 1258353, at *2–10. 

The standard of review is the pivotal issue. Fontaine’s 

disability plan provides that MetLife’s benefit determinations “shall be given full force and effect” unless they are 

shown to be “arbitrary and capricious,” thus calling for deferential review. An Illinois insurance regulation known as 

§ 2001.3, however, prohibits such terms in health and disability insurance policies. Here is its full text: 

No policy, contract, certificate, endorsement, 

rider application or agreement offered or issued in this State, by a health carrier, to provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for or reimburse 

any of the costs of health care services or of a 

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4 No. 14-1984 

disability may contain a provision purporting 

to reserve discretion to the health carrier to interpret the terms of the contract, or to provide 

standards of interpretation or review that are 

inconsistent with the laws of this State. 

50 Ill. Admin. Code § 2001.3. The district court held that 

§ 2001.3 applied so that the court decided Fontaine’s eligibility for benefits de novo. The court found that Fontaine had 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she was disabled and entitled to benefits.

MetLife appeals. MetLife does not challenge the district 

court’s findings under the de novo review standard, but MetLife argues that § 2001.3 is preempted by ERISA and that the 

denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious. Fontaine 

contends that § 2001.3 is not preempted and that even if it 

were, the denial of benefits was still arbitrary and capricious. 

We affirm, concluding that § 2001.3 applies and is not 

preempted. In Part II we address the preemption issue, 

which is the heart of this appeal. In Part III, we briefly address MetLife’s arguments that § 2001.3 should not apply by 

its terms. We do not reach Fontaine’s alternate ground for 

affirmance, whether the denial of benefits was arbitrary and 

capricious. 

II. ERISA Preemption 

ERISA authorizes participants in and beneficiaries of employee benefit plans like Fontaine to sue to recover benefits 

due under the terms of those plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 

It is well established that “a denial of benefits challenged 

under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo

standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or 

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No. 14-1984 5

fiduciary discretionary authority.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 

v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Like so many other plans in 

the wake of Firestone, Fontaine’s benefit plan gives MetLife 

discretionary authority when making benefit determinations. 

Section 2001.3 of the Illinois insurance regulations prohibits discretionary clauses like the one in Fontaine’s disability policy. See 50 Ill. Admin. Code § 2001.3. (Fontaine’s disability policy was issued in Illinois.) The proper standard of 

judicial review for MetLife’s benefit denial depends on 

whether ERISA preempts § 2001.3. 

ERISA deals expressly with the issue of preemption of 

state law. It first preempts state laws that “relate to any employee benefit plan,” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), but then saves from 

preemption any state law “which regulates insurance,” 29 

U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Fontaine and MetLife agree that 

§ 2001.3 is a state law that relates to an employee benefit 

plan. They disagree on whether § 2001.3 is a state law that 

“regulates insurance.” They also disagree on whether it conflicts with ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. We agree with 

the district court and Fontaine, and with our colleagues in 

the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, which have both held that such 

state laws prohibiting discretionary clauses in insurance contracts are not preempted by ERISA. Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009); American Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2009). 

A. ERISA & State Insurance Regulation

To be deemed a law that “regulates insurance” and thus 

to avoid preemption, a state law must satisfy two requirements. “First, the state law must be specifically directed toCase: 14-1984 Document: 61 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 17
6 No. 14-1984 

ward entities engaged in insurance. ... Second, ... the state 

law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement 

between the insurer and the insured.” Kentucky Ass’n of 

Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003). Section 

2001.3 meets both requirements. 

1. “Directed Toward Entities Engaged In Insurance”

Section 2001.3 is “specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance,” id., because it is “grounded in policy 

concerns specific to the insurance industry,” UNUM Life Ins. 

Co. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 372 (1999). It regulates, indeed prohibits, discretionary clauses in health and disability insurance policies, so it regulates insurers “with respect to their 

insurance practices.” Miller, 538 U.S. at 334, quoting Rush 

Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366 (2002). 

MetLife argues that § 2001.3 is not specifically directed 

toward entities engaged in insurance because it prohibits a 

plan sponsor, like Mayer Brown, from delegating discretionary authority to the insurer of an employee benefit plan. The 

argument is too clever, and without merit. While Mayer 

Brown is not an insurer and is nevertheless affected by 

§ 2001.3, that does not mean that § 2001.3 is not specifically 

directed toward entities engaged in insurance. The Supreme 

Court rejected essentially the same too-clever argument in 

Miller: “Regulations ‘directed toward’ certain entities will 

almost always disable other entities from doing, with the 

regulated entities, what the regulations forbid; this does not 

suffice to place such regulation outside the scope of ERISA’s 

saving clause.” 538 U.S. at 335–36 (footnote omitted). 

In Miller the Supreme Court considered “any-willingprovider” laws, which require health maintenance organizaCase: 14-1984 Document: 61 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1984 7

tions to include in their networks any health care providers 

within their coverage areas who are willing to meet their 

terms and conditions. Such laws “equally prevent providers

from entering into limited network contracts with insurers, 

just as they prevent insurers from creating exclusive networks in the first place.” Id. at 334 (emphasis in original). 

The fact that the laws also affected health care providers did 

not stop the Supreme Court from holding that such laws are 

specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance 

and are thus saved from preemption under ERISA as state 

insurance regulations. Prohibitions on discretionary clauses, 

like any-willing-provider laws, have similarly inevitable effects on “entities outside the insurance industry.” Just as in 

Miller, that does not change their character as insurance regulations. See id. at 335. 

In another too-clever argument, MetLife asserts that the 

discretionary clause in this case is not actually in an insurance policy but in an ERISA plan document. From this premise, MetLife reasons that if § 2001.3 prohibits discretionary 

clauses in ERISA plan documents as distinct from insurance 

policies, then the law’s effect on plan sponsors is not incidental and thus the law is not specifically directed toward 

entities engaged in insurance. In Ward, the Supreme Court 

rejected a similarly hyper-technical argument aimed at defeating the ERISA compromise on preemption. Whether a 

provision for discretionary interpretation is placed in an insurance policy or in a different document is arbitrary and 

should make no legal difference. If MetLife’s interpretation 

of ERISA’s saving clause were correct, then states “would be 

powerless to alter the terms of the insurance relationship in 

ERISA plans; insurers could displace any state regulation 

simply by inserting a contrary term in plan documents. This 

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8 No. 14-1984 

interpretation would virtually ‘read the saving clause out of 

ERISA.’” Ward, 526 U.S. at 376, quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. 

Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985). 

On MetLife’s reasoning, a plan sponsor could delegate 

authority to an insurer to refuse to comply with a state insurance regulation mandating, say, coverage of ovarian cancer screenings, so long as it did so by delegating that discretionary authority in an ERISA plan document rather than in 

the insurance policy itself. See Brief of Amicus Curiae AARP 

at 5. MetLife replies to this hypothetical in two ways: first, by 

noting that mandating coverage for a medical procedure 

falls within a state’s power to regulate insurance coverage 

terms, and second, by invoking its other preemption arguments. The first reply just begs the question; the second is 

irrelevant to the point of the hypothetical. The hypothetical 

illustrates the same point the Supreme Court made forcefully in Ward: the artificial distinction that MetLife draws between ERISA plan documents and insurance policies, which 

are linked together so closely, has no basis in either law or 

common sense. 

2. “Affects Risk Pooling Between the Insurer and the Insured”

The second requirement a state law must meet to be 

deemed a law that “regulates insurance” is that it must 

“substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement between 

the insurer and the insured.” Miller, 538 U.S. at 341–42. Section 2001.3 does so by altering “the scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds.” Id. at 338–39. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld state laws that operate 

in this manner against ERISA preemption arguments. 

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No. 14-1984 9

In Miller the Supreme Court held that any-willingprovider laws substantially affect risk pooling by barring insureds from seeking “insurance from a closed network of 

health-care providers in exchange for a lower premium.” Id.

at 339. In Ward the Court held that a “notice-prejudice rule” 

was saved from preemption under ERISA as a state insurance regulation. See id. “The notice-prejudice rule governs 

whether or not an insurance company must cover claims 

submitted late, which dictates to the insurance company the 

conditions under which it must pay for the risk that it has 

assumed.” Id. at 339 n.3. In this sense, § 2001.3 operates similarly to the laws upheld in Miller and Ward. By prohibiting 

discretionary clauses in insurance policies, it alters the scope 

of permissible bargains and dictates the conditions under 

which risk is assumed in the insurance market. 

MetLife argues that § 2001.3 does not substantially affect 

risk pooling because it does not “determine whether a class 

of risks is covered, does not extend coverage to a class of 

previously excluded risks, and does not mandate new claim 

review procedures.” The Supreme Court has applied a much 

broader, more practical standard to such questions. For example, the any-willing-provider laws considered in Miller

also do not determine whether a class of risks is covered, extend coverage to a class of previously excluded risks, or 

mandate new claim review procedures. Yet those laws were 

also upheld by the Court because, like § 2001.3, they alter the 

scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds. 538 U.S. at 338–39. We are not persuaded by MetLife’s attempt to narrow artificially the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the requirement that state laws substantially 

affect risk pooling. 

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10 No. 14-1984 

We join the Ninth and Sixth Circuits in concluding that a 

state law prohibiting discretionary clauses squarely satisfies 

this requirement. Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 

844–45 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Montana insureds may no longer 

agree to a discretionary clause in exchange for a more affordable premium. The scope of permissible bargains between insurers and insureds has thus narrowed. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld similar scope-narrowing 

regulations.”); American Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 

F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Prohibiting plan administrators from exercising discretionary authority in this manner 

dictates to the insurance company the conditions under 

which it must pay for the risk it has assumed.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

B. ERISA’s Civil Enforcement Scheme

MetLife has another preemption theory. Any “state-law 

cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants 

the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear 

congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive 

and is therefore pre-empted.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 

U.S. 200, 209 (2004). MetLife argues that § 2001.3 fits that description, but we disagree. Quite obviously, § 2001.3 does not 

duplicate, supplement, or supplant the ERISA civil enforcement remedy. All it does is restore in Illinois ERISA’s own 

default rule of de novo review in court cases challenging denials of health and disability benefits. Section 2001.3 is not 

preempted by ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. 

Fontaine sued MetLife to recover benefits due under the 

terms of an employee benefit plan, as ERISA authorizes. 29 

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). She sought only the benefits due to her 

under the plan. She did not seek, for example, tort damages 

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No. 14-1984 11

for negligent denial of her disability claim, or punitive damages under any theory, any of which would be preempted. 

See Davila, 542 U.S. at 205–06; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 

481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987); see also Morrison, 584 F.3d at 846 (state 

laws prohibiting discretionary clauses are distinct from 

“state attempts to meld a new remedy to the ERISA framework”); Ross, 558 F.3d at 607 (prohibiting discretionary 

clauses does not “create, duplicate, supplant, or supplement 

any of the causes of action that may be alleged under 

ERISA”). 

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002), is 

the controlling case on this issue. In Moran the Supreme 

Court considered another state law regulating health 

maintenance organizations (HMOs). The law provided that 

when a patient sought care that her primary care physician 

said was medically necessary but that her HMO refused to 

cover, she was entitled to an independent medical review of 

her claim for coverage. If the independent medical reviewer 

found that the treatment fit the definition of medically necessary treatment in the patient’s insurance plan, then the 

HMO was bound to cover the treatment. Id. at 359–61. 

The independent review law conflicted with a discretionary clause in Moran’s insurance policy. Id. at 359–60. The insurer argued that this state law conflicted with ERISA’s civil 

enforcement scheme and was thus preempted. The Supreme 

Court disagreed, in reasoning that applies directly to 

§ 2001.3: 

But this case addresses a state regulatory 

scheme that provides no new cause of action 

under state law and authorizes no new form of 

ultimate relief. While independent review ... 

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12 No. 14-1984 

may well settle the fate of a benefit claim under 

a particular contract, the state statute does not 

enlarge the claim beyond the benefits available 

in any action brought under § 1132(a). And although the reviewer’s determination would 

presumably replace that of the HMO as to 

what is “medically necessary” under this contract, the relief ultimately available would still 

be what ERISA authorizes in a suit for benefits 

under § 1132(a). 

Id. at 379–80 (footnotes omitted). While “a deferential standard for reviewing benefit denials” is “highly prized by benefit plans,” it is not required by the “text of the statute.” Id. at 

384–85. ERISA requires only “a uniform judicial regime of 

categories of relief and standards of primary conduct, not a 

uniformly lenient regime of reviewing benefit determinations.” Id. at 385. And as noted, “the de novo standard of review is already the default standard in ERISA cases, so it is 

difficult to imagine how a state law requiring that level of 

review would conflict with the statute.” Ross, 558 F.3d at 608. 

Faced with the rejection of its preemption argument in 

Moran, Morrison, and Ross, MetLife points out that they were 

decided before Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010), 

which MetLife calls a “monumental ERISA decision.” Monumental or not, the problem for MetLife is that Conkright is 

not an ERISA preemption decision and offers little guidance 

here. 

Conkright explained “that an ERISA plan administrator 

with discretionary authority to interpret a plan is entitled to 

deference in exercising that discretion.” 559 U.S. at 509, citing Firestone, 489 U.S. 101. Conkright then held that “a single 

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No. 14-1984 13

honest mistake in plan interpretation” does not justify 

“stripping the administrator of that deference for subsequent 

related interpretations of the plan.” Id. MetLife points to the 

considerations that Conkright cited in favor of its holding—

that deferential review of benefit determinations promotes 

“efficiency, predictability, and uniformity”—as establishing 

that ERISA entitles employers to the option of delegating 

discretionary authority in their benefit plans. See id. at 518. 

“Because ERISA’s text does not directly resolve” the 

standard of review courts should apply to benefit determinations, the Court had to decide this question in both Firestone and Conkright. See id. at 512. In Firestone the Court 

looked to trust-law principles for guidance, id., and in 

Conkright the Court looked to some of the underlying purposes of ERISA after finding trust law unsettled on the precise question before it. Id. at 516–17. 

Unlike Firestone and Conkright, this case does not call on 

the courts to decide in the first instance which standard of 

review should apply to a benefit denial. The State of Illinois 

has already answered that question as a matter of its state 

insurance law. Conkright dealt with a judicially created remedy for an insurer’s error, not state legislation exercising the 

“historic police powers” of the states. See Moran, 536 U.S. at 

365, quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995), quoting in turn Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 

(1947). Those powers are not “to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 

Congress.” Id. ERISA is a quite detailed statute, yet Congress 

was completely silent on the standard of review for benefit 

determinations. 

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14 No. 14-1984 

Preemption can of course be implied rather than express. 

But implied preemption analysis must be especially cautious 

when Congress has provided expressly for preemption. 

“Implied preemption analysis does not justify a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension 

with federal objectives’; such an endeavor ‘would undercut 

the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that 

preempts state law.’” Chamber of Commerce of United States v. 

Whiting, 563 U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (plurality 

opinion), quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,

505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in judgment). 

The objectives that Conkright cited in developing a standard of review for benefit determinations in the face of congressional and state silence—efficiency, predictability, and 

uniformity—were threatened at least as much, if not more 

so, by the state independent review law upheld in Moran. 

See Morrison, 584 F.3d at 848–49 (prohibiting deferential judicial review of benefit determinations is, in a way, “considerably more consistent with ERISA policy” than mandating 

independent medical reviews; “the ultimate decisionmaking 

entity—the federal district court—is the one foreseen by 

Congress and not a creature of state law”). Seeing no indication from the Supreme Court that Conkright overruled or 

limited Moran, and knowing that a “high threshold must be 

met if a state law is to be preempted for conflicting with the 

purposes of a federal Act,” we hold that § 2001.3 is not impliedly preempted by ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. See 

Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (plurality opinion), quoting Gade, 

505 U.S. at 110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 

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No. 14-1984 15

III. The Scope of § 2001.3

Up to this point, we have been assuming that § 2001.3 

applies without showing why it does. MetLife offers four 

arguments that § 2001.3 should not apply to this case according to its terms. None has merit. Here again is the full text of 

§ 2001.3: 

No policy, contract, certificate, endorsement, 

rider application or agreement offered or issued in this State, by a health carrier, to provide, deliver, arrange for, pay for or reimburse 

any of the costs of health care services or of a 

disability may contain a provision purporting 

to reserve discretion to the health carrier to interpret the terms of the contract, or to provide 

standards of interpretation or review that are 

inconsistent with the laws of this State. 

50 Ill. Admin. Code § 2001.3. 

MetLife’s first argument is that the discretionary clause is 

contained in an ERISA plan document, not in an insurance 

document, and thus should be beyond the reach of § 2001.3 

and of the Illinois Insurance Director more generally. The 

discussion of UNUM Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 526 U.S. 

358, 376 (1999), and the ovarian cancer screening hypothetical above show that an artificial distinction between “plan” 

documents and “insurance” documents is not tenable. It 

“would virtually ‘read the saving clause out of ERISA.’” 

Ward, 526 U.S. at 376, quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 

Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985). It would also nullify 

the evident purpose of § 2001.3. 

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16 No. 14-1984 

MetLife’s second argument is that § 2001.3 should not 

apply because Fontaine’s disability insurance policy was offered not by MetLife—the only “health carrier” in the picture—but by the employer. Yet the first page of Fontaine’s 

disability insurance policy states, “This policy is issued in 

return for the payment by the Policyholder of required Premiums,” and it specifies the employer as the Policyholder. 

The page is printed on MetLife stationery and signed by 

MetLife’s corporate officers. MetLife obviously issued Fontaine’s disability insurance policy. 

MetLife’s third argument is that MetLife did not reserve 

discretionary authority to itself; rather, the employer delegated discretionary authority to MetLife. This similarly artificial distinction makes no difference under the terms of 

§ 2001.3. The regulation prohibits any “provision purporting 

to reserve discretion to the health carrier.” What matters is 

that the policy provision purports to reserve discretion, not 

who put the provision in the policy. 

MetLife’s final argument is that § 2001.3 does not prohibit 

all discretionary clauses but only clauses reserving discretion “to interpret the terms of the contract, or to provide 

standards of interpretation or review that are inconsistent 

with the laws of this State.” MetLife claims that clauses reserving discretion to make benefit determinations are unaffected by § 2001.3. In Firestone, the Supreme Court rejected this 

artificial dichotomy between “benefit determinations” and 

“contract interpretation,” pointing out that “the validity of a 

claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to turn on the 

interpretation of terms in the plan at issue.” 489 U.S. at 115. 

MetLife does not grapple with this point, much less argue 

that this is an exceptional case where its benefit determinaCase: 14-1984 Document: 61 Filed: 09/04/2015 Pages: 17
No. 14-1984 17

tion did not “turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan 

at issue.” Id.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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