Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05786/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05786-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MISAEL GUZMAN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JEANNE WOODFORD, DIRECTOR, )

)

Respondent. )

)

___________________________________ )

CV F 04-5786 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After entering a plea of no contest on November 21, 1997, Petitioner was convicted

of two counts of first degree residential robbery (Penal Code § 211) with enhancements for

sue of a firearm (Penal Code § 12022(a)(1)); one count of assault with a deadly weapon

likely to result in great bodily injury (Penal Code § 245(a)(1)); one count of vehicle theft

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(Veh. Code § 1085(a)); one count of arson of a vehicle (Penal Code § 451(d)); and one count

of impersonation of a public officer (Penal Code § 1465(b)). On December 16, 1997,

Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for a term of ten years and four months. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District (“Court of Appeal”). On January 20, 1999, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion

finding the Petitioner was precluded from raising his claim on appeal and affirming the

judgment. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court, which

denied the petition on March 24, 1999.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court

on August 18, 2003. The court denied the petition on April 28, 2004. Petitioner filed the

present petition on June 2, 2004. Respondent opposes the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams

v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of

his rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction

challenged arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the court has

jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after

its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9

th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107,

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117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117

S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). 

The instant petition was filed on June 2, 2004, after the enactment of the AEDPA, thus it is

governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply

with respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court.

Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for

habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). 

“A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that

application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. 

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Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the

state court’s factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must

accept all factual findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,

116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that he was given a sentence which is illegal under state law, and

that the Court of Appeal denied his federal right to due process by failing to review the

sentence. Petitioner argues that the California Supreme Court ruled in People v. Buttram, 30

Cal.4th 773 (2003), that cases like his were reviewable on appeal.

On his direct appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled that Petitioner was precluded from

raising his claim on appeal because he had pleaded no contest and had not obtained the

certificate of probable cause required under Penal Code section 1237.5. Further, the Court of

Appeal held that even if he could appeal without receiving a certificate of probable cause,

Petitioner was precluded from raising his claim of double jeopardy by California Rules of

Court 412(b), because he had not raised the claim at the time the agreement was recited on

the record. The California Supreme Court then denied Petitioner’s petition for review.

Subsequently, the California Supreme Court issued the decision in People v. Buttram,

30 Cal.4th 773 (2003). In Buttram, the court found that, absent contrary provisions in the

plea agreement itself, a certificate of probable cause is not required to challenge the exercise

of individualized sentencing discretion within an agreed maximum sentence, because such

appellate claims do not constitute an attack on the validity of the plea, for which a certificate

is necessary. Id. at 790-91. 

In response to the Buttram decision, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus with the California Supreme Court, requesting review of his sentence. The court

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denied the petition on April 28, 2004, without explanation.

In his present petition, Petitioner challenges the state court’s application of a state

sentencing law. The role of this court on federal collateral review of a state criminal

conviction is limited to determining whether the Petitioner’s federal constitutional or other

federal rights have been violated and does not extend to review a state’s application of its

own laws. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal courts must defer to

the state courts’ interpretation of state sentencing laws. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-

68 (1991); Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993). Absent a showing of

fundamental unfairness, a state court’s application or misapplication of its own sentencing

laws does not generally justify federal habeas relief. Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469

(9th Cir. 1994). 

Further, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s post-Buttram petition

was a silent denial, which operates as a decision on the merits. Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d

344, 348 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, he has not been denied review

of his sentence. Rather, Petitioner presented the challenge to his sentence to the California

Supreme Court, which denied it on the merits. When the California Supreme Court’s opinion

is summary in nature, this court "looks through" that decision and presumes it adopted the

reasoning of the Court of Appeal, the last state court to have issued a reasoned opinion. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)

(establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with

lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v.

Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned

state court opinion in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). The ruling by

the California Supreme Court is entitled to deference under the AEDPA, and Petitioner has

not carried his burden of showing that the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

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that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Most glaringly, Petitioner

has failed to address the second conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal, i.e., that

Petitioner was estopped from raising his claim under California Rules of Court, Rule 412(b).

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and that judgment be entered for Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule

72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by

mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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