Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05583/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-05583-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCKY L. MEYER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVE GRAZIANI, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-05583 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND GRANTING IN

PART PLAINTIFF'S

REQUEST TO AMEND 

Plaintiff Lucky Meyer brings suit for unlawful discrimination

and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq. and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq. (ADA) and for violation of constitutional rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's first

amended complaint (FAC) and, in the alternative, request a more

definite statement. Plaintiff opposes this motion and, in the

alternative, requests leave to amend. Plaintiff has also appealed

the magistrate judge's order denying her discovery requests in this

matter and has requested a stay in the disposition of this motion. 

These matters have been submitted on the papers. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS

Defendants' motion to dismiss, GRANTS in part Plaintiff's request

for leave to amend, DENIES Plaintiff's request for stay and DENIES

Plaintiff's appeal of the denial of discovery.

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 1 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 As explained in that order, Plaintiff's complaint was

received by the Clerk's office on November 25, 2003, within the

ninety day statute of limitations period, but was not filed until

December 11, 2003. 

2

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History 

Plaintiff was hired by Napa State Hospital (NSH) on July 1,

1999 as a psychiatric technician. On October 10, 2002, Plaintiff

was transferred to a warehouse run by NSH. On April 15, 2003, she

was placed on involuntary disability leave. On May 15, 2003,

Plaintiff was released to return to work by her doctor but was not

reinstated. On June 25, 2003, Plaintiff filed a claim with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging

discrimination based upon race, sex, age, and disability. On

August 29, 2003, the EEOC sent Plaintiff a letter entitled

"Dismissal and Notice of Rights" (right-to-sue letter) indicating

that the EEOC had been unable to substantiate the alleged

discrimination and that Plaintiff had ninety days within which to

file suit to preserve her claims. 

On December 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed suit against NSH only,

alleging employment discrimination based on her race and gender

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On February 24,

2004, NSH moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. On

April 20, 2004, Plaintiff submitted a request for leave to amend as

of right which was granted by the Court on April 23, 2004. On June

15, 2004, the Court denied NSH's first motion to dismiss on statute

of limitations grounds.1

 On October 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed her

FAC, alleging claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 2 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Plaintiff named "Elaine Maulton" as a defendant. 

Defendants' counsel indicates that the correct surname is

"Moulton." The Court will refer to this Defendant as "Moulton."

3

constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 10, 2005,

Defendants filed the motion to dismiss now before the Court. 

II. Factual History

Although, in her original complaint, Plaintiff alleged

violations of Title VII based on race and gender discrimination and

named NSH as the sole defendant, in the body of her complaint

Plaintiff also alleged discrimination by the "management staff" and

the "management program," as well as misconduct by unidentified

"E.D. personnel." Comp. at 1-3. Plaintiff submitted, with her

complaint, her claim filed with the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (DFEH) and a right-to-sue letter from the

DFEH. In the DFEH claim, Plaintiff alleged that "personnel"

informed her that she would be terminated if she "did not go on

involuntary disability or disability retirement."

In her FAC, Plaintiff names eleven individuals as Defendants:

1) David Graziani, executive director of NSH, 2) Jeffrey Zwerin,

medical director of NSH, 3) Michael Stolp, program director of NSH

Program One, 4) Dean Percy, NSH personnel director, 5) Cheryl

Smith, a recreational therapist with NSH Program One, 6) Peggy

Spence, nursing coordinator of NSH Program One, 7) Eric Khoury, an

NSH staff psychiatrist, 8) Jatinder Singh, an NSH staff

psychologist, 9) Sandy Sanut, the unit supervisor for NSH ward T-8,

10) Elaine Moulton2

, an NSH human resources employee, and 

11) Charles Schaffer, a contract psychiatrist employed by NSH

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 3 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 A suit against a State official in his or her "official

capacity" is a suit against the office itself and triggers 

liability of the State. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991).

A suit against a State official in his or her "individual capacity"

is a suit against the person and triggers direct liability on the

part of that individual. Id.

4

 Because Plaintiff does not allege Title VII claims in the

FAC, they are no longer part of this case.

4

(collectively, Individual Defendants). Plaintiff sues each

Individual Defendant "individually in their official capacity." 

FAC at 3:8-12. Plaintiff specifically alleges that she is "unsure

of exactly what capacity to use to sue the defendants, considering

the facts as will be alleged." FAC at 3:5. The Court liberally

construes Plaintiff's FAC to allege all claims against Individual

Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.3

Although Plaintiff does not name NSH in the caption of her FAC, she

alleges elsewhere in the FAC that she brings suit "against NSH." 

Id. Plaintiff neither refers to the right-to-sue letter nor

attaches the letter to the FAC. 

In the FAC, as noted above, Plaintiff sues, not for race or

gender discrimination under Title VII, but for violations of the

Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and her constitutional rights to free

speech, due process and equal protection, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4

The essence of the factual allegations of the FAC is that

Individual Defendants discriminated and retaliated against

Plaintiff because of her arthritis and her use of sick leave due to

her arthritis, and they retaliated against her because she

complained about NSH staff's abuse and neglect of patients and

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 4 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated "because there is

an unwritten . . . policy to harass and terminate anyone from

employment, anyone who goes 'against the grain,' and complains

about rule violations by other staff, or complains about the

patients being abused or neglected." FAC at 14:23-26. 

5

violations of NSH policies and procedures.5

Plaintiff alleges that adverse employment actions, such as her

transfer to the NSH warehouse and her ultimate termination, were

taken against her by her supervisors at NSH. Plaintiff also

alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment by NSH

staff through a pattern of unfair discipline, repeated reassignment

within the hospital, verbal harassment, humiliation and

intimidation. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it is “clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002), citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514

(2002). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken as

true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). A

complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and

direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). These rules “do not require a claimant to

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 5 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the

contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of

the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it rests.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, a court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97. A pro se plaintiff's complaint will be

liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (l972);

King v. Atiyeh, 8l4 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. l987). 

II. Section 1983 Claims 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's section 1983 claims

based on the statute of limitations and Eleventh Amendment

immunity. 

A. Statute of Limitations

Plaintiff's original complaint, filed on December 11, 2003,

contained no allegations of constitutional violations under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and in the caption of the complaint, Plaintiff named

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 6 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

NSH as the sole defendant in her suit. In the FAC filed on October

20, 2004, Plaintiff alleges section 1983 claims against Individual

Defendants based on violations of her constitutional rights to due

process, equal protection and free speech. As noted above,

Plaintiff's claims were based on allegations of discrete adverse

actions against her as well as of a hostile work environment. 

The EEOC documents attached to Plaintiff's original complaint

alleged adverse actions taken by NSH on or about August, 2002

through December, 2002. The section 1983 claims against Individual

Defendants were filed on October 20, 2004. Assuming that the

adverse actions described in the EEOC complaint are the basis for

Plaintiff's section 1983 claims, Individual Defendants contend that

the section 1983 claims were not filed within the applicable oneyear statute of limitations. 

1. The Applicable Statute of Limitations

 Section 1983 claims are governed by California's statute of

limitations for personal injury claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.

261, 276 (1985) (forum State's statute of limitations for personal

injury claims applies to section 1983 claims). Until January 1,

2003, the applicable statute of limitations for section 1983 claims

was one year under California Civil Procedure Code section 340(3). 

McMillan v. Goleta Water Dist., 792 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986)

(citing Wilson, 471 U.S. at 279 and Cal. Civ. P. Code § 340(3)). 

Effective January 1, 2003, the California statute of

limitations for assault, battery, and other personal injury claims

was changed to two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. 

Individual Defendants contend that the statute of limitations in

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 7 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

this case is governed by California Civil Procedure Code section

340(3), the statute of limitations which applied to personal

injuries before the enactment of section 335.1. They are

incorrect. 

Although a section 1983 action filed in California today

clearly would be governed by California's new two-year statute of

limitations for personal injury actions, this circuit and

California courts have held that the new statute of limitations

does not apply retroactively to expired claims. Maldonado v.

Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (two-year statute of

limitations did not apply to claim which had expired several months 

before enactment of section 335.1); Krupnick v. Duke Energy Morro

Bay, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1028 (2004) (two-year statute of

limitations did not apply retroactively to claims already barred). 

However, a recent California appellate decision clarified that

claims which were not already barred by the original limitations

period at the time section 335.1 went into effect are governed by

the new statute. Andonagui v. May Dept. Stores Co., 128 Cal. App.

4th 435, 441 (2005). Because Plaintiff's claims were not timebarred when section 335.1 went into effect on January 1, 2003, the

two-year statute of limitations governs this case. 

2. Acts Triggering of the Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations on section 1983 claims begins to

run "when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of the action." Bagley v. CMC Real Estate

Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1991). When an injury occurs

for purposes of the statute of limitations depends on the nature of

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 8 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

the alleged injury. 

a. Discrete Retaliatory Acts

Discrete retaliatory acts begin the statutory clock the day

they happen. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

110 (2002) (Title VII); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307

F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Morgan analysis to

section 1983 actions). Although Plaintiff does not provide dates

in her FAC, according to her EEOC complaint, she was reassigned to

the NSH warehouse on December 10, 2002 and placed on involuntary

disability on April 15, 2003. Thus, her October 20, 2004

complaint, which alleges that several Individual Defendants

"combined and arranged" these discrete retaliatory actions, is

timely. 

b. Hostile Work Environment 

Plaintiff appears to allege that, in response to her exercise

of protected speech, Individual Defendants not only took discrete

actions against her but also created a hostile work environment. 

See Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 434 n.17 (9th Cir. 1987)

("entire campaign of harassment which though trivial in detail may

have been substantial in gross" sufficient to state a claim under

the First Amendment). Plaintiff alleged retaliatory injury in the

form of the denial of assignments, perpetual reassignment within

the hospital, intimidation and unfair discipline. 

With respect to "hostile work environment" claims:

It does not matter . . . that some of the component acts

of the hostile work environment fall outside the

statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing

to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire

time period of the hostile environment may be considered

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 9 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

by a court for the purposes of determining liability.

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. Hostile work environment claims do not

begin at any discrete point in time because "[t]heir very nature

involves repeated conduct." Id. at 115. Because Plaintiff filed

the FAC on October 20, 2004 and because the applicable statute of

limitations is two years, if any act contributing to the hostile

work environment claim occurred on or after October 20, 2002, the

claim is timely. 

Even if Plaintiff's claim were barred by the statute of

limitations, equitable tolling might apply. As with the statute of

limitations, this Court must apply the rules for equitable tolling

from the forum State, California. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536,

539, 544 (1989); Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275

(9th Cir. 1993). Under California law, equitable tolling

"reliev[es] a plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when,

possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith,

pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or

damage." Addison v. California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 317 (1978).

Equitable tolling is not appropriately resolved on a motion to

dismiss unless it is absolutely plain from the face of the

complaint that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that could

entitle him or her to the benefit of that doctrine. Cervantes, 5

F.3d at 1276. 

As evidenced by her EEOC documentation, Plaintiff has spent

time pursuing administrative remedies with the EEOC. Although she

was pursuing remedies for discrimination based on disability, as

long as two claims are predicated upon the same wrong, plaintiffs

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 10 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

will be entitled to equitable tolling for time spent pursuing each

claim, if they satisfy California's three-pronged equitable tolling

test. Lucchesi v. Bar-O Boys Ranch 353 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir.

2003). Plaintiff's pursuit of administrative relief for her

disability discrimination claim may equitably toll her section 1983

claim. Therefore, it is not clear from the face of the pleadings

that Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling. 

If, in the future, Defendants wish to move for summary judgment on

statute of limitations grounds, they must address the issue of

equitable tolling. 

B. Properly Named Defendants

1. NSH Is Not a Person under Section 1983 

NSH is an agency of the State of California and thus cannot be

named as a defendant in a section 1983 suit. Section 1983 provides

that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law." The Supreme Court has

found that a State is not a "person" within the meaning of section

1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989). Agencies such as NSH, which are run by the State, are

likewise not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. Taylor

v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Any section 1983

claim against NSH is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 11 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

2. Individual Defendants Cannot Be Sued in Their

Official Capacities for Damages under Section 1983.

Because suits for damages against individuals in their

official capacity are impermissible under section 1983, Plaintiff's

section 1983 damages claims against Individual Defendants in their

official capacities must be dismissed. Official capacity suits

generally represent only another way of pleading an action against

an entity of which an officer is an agent. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

21, 25 (1991). Suits against State officials in their official

capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State. 

Id. Section 1983 does not allow suits against individual State

employees in their official capacity. Will, 491 U.S. at 71. 

Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 damages claims against Individual

Defendants in their official capacity are hereby dismissed with

prejudice. However, Plaintiff's section 1983 official capacity

claim for injunctive relief may proceed against Graziani under the

Ex parte Young doctrine. Hale v. Arizona 993 F.2d 1387, 1399 (9th

Cir. 1993) (Section 1983 claim for injunctive relief may proceed

against State official in his official capacity). Because Graziani

is the only party necessary to provide injunctive relief, the 

§ 1983 claims for injunctive relief against the remaining

Individual Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 1983 allows suits against State officials in their

"individual capacities" as "persons" within the meaning of the

statute. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. Section 1983 claims can be made

against Individual Defendants in their individual capacities.

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 12 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

C. Plaintiff Must Amend to State a Claim Under Section 1983

1. Legal Standard

Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the 'deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia

Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but

merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To

state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda

County, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 

section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant

proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City

of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person

deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of 

section 1983 if he or she does an affirmative act, participates in

another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he or

she is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which

the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633; Robins v. Meecham,

60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (prison official's failure to

intervene to prevent Eighth Amendment violation may be basis for

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 13 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

liability). To be held liable for failure to intervene,

individuals must have had a "realistic opportunity" to intercede to

prevent the constitutional injury. Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d

1271, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000) (police officer without realistic

opportunity to prevent excessive force by fellow officer not

liable). 

The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on

the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose

acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. To demonstrate causation in a

retaliation claim based upon the exercise of free speech, a

plaintiff must show "that his constitutionally protected expression

was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's adverse

decision or conduct." Allen, 812 F.2d at 433. A plaintiff

alleging denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

race or other suspect classification must plead intentional

unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least

susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent. Monteiro v.

Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To state a claim for relief, the plaintiff must allege that the

defendant State actor acted at least in part because of the

plaintiff's membership in a protected class. Serrano v. Francis,

345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). The Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against governmental

deprivations of "life, liberty or property" without due process of

law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972);

Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1995). Procedural

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 14 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

due process analysis involves two steps. First, a plaintiff must

show that the government has deprived him or her of life, liberty

or property. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).

Second, the plaintiff must show that the government deprived him or

her of these constitutionally-protected interests without due

process of law. Id.

2. Alleged Acts and Omissions of Individual Defendants 

Plaintiff alleges that Khoury, Stolp, Smith, Spence, Singh,

Sanut and Moulton subjected her to retaliation. Alone, these

conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). Although Plaintiff provides specific allegations with

respect to each named defendant regarding his or her participation

in depriving Plaintiff of her constitutional rights, she fails to

state a claim against any Individual Defendant. 

Plaintiff alleges that Khoury was a staff psychiatrist at NSH

who, on more than one occasion, yelled at Plaintiff in front of

patients and fellow NSH employees. Khoury allegedly "combined and

arranged" Plaintiff's continual transfer within NSH wards and her

ultimate transfer to the NSH warehouse, both of which were

considered a demotion. FAC at 6:8. Plaintiff alleges that

Khoury's conduct occurred after Plaintiff complained about Khoury's

violations of NSH health and safety rules. Plaintiff does not

allege that Khoury knew of Plaintiff's complaints nor does she

allege that Khoury took any adverse action against her because of

her membership in a protected class or without due process of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Stolp, who is responsible for

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 15 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

overseeing the activities of all Program One employees, improperly

"combined and arranged" Plaintiff's continual transfer within NSH

wards and her ultimate transfer to the NSH warehouse. FAC at 6:27. 

Plaintiff alleges that this conduct occurred after Plaintiff

complained about Khoury's violations of NSH health and safety

rules, but does not allege that Stolp knew about her complaints or

took any act against Plaintiff with the intent to discriminate

against her on the basis of her membership in a protected class or

without due process of law. 

Plaintiff alleges that Percy was the NSH personnel officer and

personally handled her case. She alleges that Percy "combined and

arranged" Plaintiff's continual transfer within NSH wards and her

ultimate transfer to the NSH warehouse and was one of two

individuals who informed her that she must take involuntary

disability or be terminated. FAC at 7:27. Plaintiff further

alleges a verbal confrontation between Percy and herself in which

he snapped at her, stating, "I'm tired of you and I'm tired of it

all," and forcefully directed Plaintiff to "get out." She alleges

that he was present during a discussion between Moulton, Spence and

NSH police regarding Plaintiff's unfitness for duty. FAC at 7:16-

23. However, she does not allege that Percy knew about her

complaints or that he took any adverse action against Plaintiff on

the basis of her membership in a protected class or without due

process of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Smith untruthfully reported to Spence

that Plaintiff assaulted her. Plaintiff also alleges an incident

of intimidation in which Smith stood very close to her, followed

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 16 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

her, and ignored Plaintiff's request that Smith move further away. 

Again, however, Plaintiff does not allege that Smith knew about her

complaints or that Smith took any adverse action against her on the

basis of her membership in a protected class or without due process

of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Spence "combined and arranged"

Plaintiff's continual transfer within NSH wards and her ultimate

transfer to the NSH warehouse. FAC at 8:23. Plaintiff

particularly alleges an intimidating verbal altercation between

Spence and Plaintiff in which Spence accused Plaintiff of

manipulating her shifts at the hospital and which concluded with

Spence stating that, "if I find out you are causing problems, you

will find out that I will do something about it!" FAC at 9:3-4. 

Plaintiff fails to allege that Spence knew about her complaints or

that Spence took any adverse action against her on the basis of her

membership in a protected class or due process of law. 

Plaintiff alleges that Singh "combined and arranged"

Plaintiff's continual transfer within NSH wards and her ultimate

transfer to the NSH warehouse. FAC at 10:4. Plaintiff further

alleges that Singh untruthfully accused Plaintiff of misconduct and

of having an affair with a client. Plaintiff also alleges that

Singh "supported" Khoury's actions against Plaintiff. FAC at

10:13. However, Plaintiff does not allege that Singh knew about

her complaints or that Singh took any adverse action against her on

the basis of her membership in a protected class or without due

process of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Sanut "combined . . and arranged" her

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 17 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

continual transfer within NSH wards and her ultimate transfer to

the NSH warehouse. FAC at 10:17. She also alleges that Sanut

yelled and cursed at her in front of a patient and then spoke with

one of her supervisors and untruthfully accused her of cursing that

patient. However, she does not allege that Sanut knew about her

complaints or that Sanut took any adverse action against her on the

basis of her membership in a protected class or without due process

of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Moulton, who worked in the Office of

Human Resources at NSH, "combined and arranged" Plaintiff's

continual transfer within NSH wards and her ultimate transfer to

the NSH warehouse. FAC at 10:17. Plaintiff alleges that Moulton

was one of two individuals who instructed Plaintiff that she must

take involuntary disability or be terminated. Plaintiff also

alleges that Moulton discussed with Spence and NSH police

Plaintiff's unfitness for duty and dangerousness and threatened to

have Plaintiff arrested if she returned to NSH facilities. 

However, Plaintiff does not allege that Moulton knew about her

complaints or that Moulton took any adverse action against her on

the basis of her membership in a protected class or without due

process of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Schaffer, a contract psychiatrist,

falsely diagnosed Plaintiff as too dangerous to continue working at

NSH "in order to circumvent . . . the unlawful and unethical

actions of NSH." FAC at 11:21-22. Plaintiff alleges that by

providing this false diagnosis and later withholding the report

from Plaintiff, Schaffer was "doing the bidding" of NSH. FAC at

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 18 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

12:11-12. However, Plaintiff does not allege that Schaffer knew

about her complaints or that Schaffer took any adverse action

against her on the basis of her membership in a protected class or

without due process of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Graziani, as executive director of NSH, 

is legally and ultimately responsible for the creation,

implementation, monitoring, review, and enforcement of all rules

and regulations governing NSH employees. Plaintiff further alleges

that Graziani had "personal knowledge of [Plaintiff's] case" and

failed to perform an adequate investigation of the misconduct of

his employees. FAC at 5:6-10. However, Plaintiff fails to allege

that Graziani knew about her complaints or that he took any adverse

action against her on the basis of her membership in a protected

class or without due process of law.

Plaintiff alleges that Zwerin, as medical director of NSH, is

legally responsible for the supervision of the psychiatrists and

medical doctors at NSH. Plaintiff further alleges that Zwerin had

"personal knowledge of [Plaintiff's] case" and failed to perform an

adequate investigation of the misconduct of staff psychiatrists

alleged elsewhere in the complaint. FAC at 5:16-18. However,

Plaintiff fails to allege that Zwerin knew about her complaints or

that Zwerin took any adverse action against her on the basis of her

membership in a protected class or without due process of law.

In sum, the FAC details individual events including verbal

threats, physical intimidation, false accusations, unjust

discipline, perpetual reassignments, false diagnosis and

Plaintiff's ultimate termination performed by Khoury, Stolp, Percy,

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 19 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Smith, Spence, Singh, Sanut, Moulton, and Schaffer individually or

in combination. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. These cognizable injuries

could support a First Amendment retaliation claim if they were

caused by Plaintiff's exercise of free speech rights. Allen, 812

F.2d at 433. The alleged actions could support an Equal Protection

claim if they were motivated by each Defendant's intent to

discriminate against Plaintiff on the basis of her membership in a

protected class. The alleged actions could support a due process

claim if they deprived Plaintiff of a protected property interest

without due process of law.

However, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts from which could

be drawn the inference of individualized causation necessary to

state a section 1983 claim. In order for Plaintiff's injuries to

implicate the First Amendment, each Individual Defendant must have

acted out of a desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for speaking

on an issue of public concern, i.e. the abuse of patients at NSH. 

However, the FAC fails to indicate to whom Plaintiff addressed any

of her complaints about the abuse of patients at NSH, or when. Nor

does the FAC allege that any Individual Defendant knew or could be

reasonably expected to have known about Plaintiff's complaints

concerning the abuse of patients or that any Individual Defendant

committed any of the individual actions listed in the FAC because

of such knowledge. 

Therefore, Plaintiff's section 1983 claims against the

Individual Defendants based on First Amendment violations are

dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff can amend her

complaint to assert truthfully facts from which it could be

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 20 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

inferred that Khoury, Stolp, Percy, Smith, Spence, Singh, Sanut,

Moulton, and Schaffer 1) knew of her complaints about the abuse of

patients at NSH and 2) thereafter took individual retaliatory

actions because of this knowledge, she may state a First Amendment

claim for damages under section 1983 against these Individual

Defendants. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that would

raise an inference of discriminatory intent on the part of any

Individual Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff's section 1983 claims

against the Individual Defendants based on Equal Protection

violations are dismissed with leave to amend for Plaintiff to add

such allegations, if she truthfully can do so.

 Plaintiff also alleges inadequate investigation by Graziani

and Zwerin of the workplace abuses committed by the aforementioned

Individual Defendants. Graziani and Zwerin are allegedly

responsible for monitoring the behavior of NSH employees. As noted

above, failure to intervene to prevent a constitutional injury can

support a section 1983 claim. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. However, in

order to be held liable for a failure to intervene, an individual

must have had a "realistic opportunity" to prevent the

constitutional injury. Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289. Graziani and

Zwerin could not have had such an opportunity unless they knew of

Plaintiff's constitutional injuries while they were ongoing, a fact

which Plaintiff has not alleged. If Plaintiff can amend her

complaint to assert truthfully that Graziani and Zwerin knew 

1) that Plaintiff engaged in protected speech, 2) that adverse

employment actions were taken against her because of her protected

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 21 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

speech, or 3) that adverse employment actions were taken against

her because of her membership in a protected class, she may state a

First Amendment or Equal Protection claim against Graziani and

Zwerin under section 1983. 

In regard to Plaintiff's due process claim, she may have a 

property interest in continued employment. See Skelly v. State

Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 206-07 (1975) (California's

statutory scheme regulating civil service employment creates

property interest if employee has achieved permanent employee

status). If Plaintiff has such a property interest, she may not be

dismissed or subjected to other disciplinary measures without a

hearing. Id. at 207. Plaintiff must allege that she has such a

property interest and specify which Defendant or Defendants

terminated her employment or subjected her to disciplinary measures

without providing for a hearing prior to taking such actions.

Therefore, Plaintiff's due process claim is dismissed with leave to

amend for Plaintiff to add allegations that would remedy these

deficiencies, if she truthfully can do so.

D. Summary of Section 1983 Claims

Any section 1983 claim against NSH, the damages claims against

Individual Defendants in their official capacities, and all section

1983 injunctive relief claims against Individual Defendants in

their official capacities, except those against Graziani, are

dismissed without leave to amend. The section 1983 damages claims

against Individual Defendants in their individual capacities and

the official capacity claim for injunctive relief against Graziani

are dismissed with leave to amend.

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 22 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 The Court does not decide whether Plaintiff's arthritis is a

qualifying disability within the meaning of the ADA; the

determination of this issue is inappropriate at this stage in the

proceedings. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.

23

III. ADA Claim 

A. Nature of the ADA Claim

The essence of Plaintiff's ADA claim is that Individual

Defendants discriminated and retaliated against her because she had

arthritis and took sick leave due to arthritis.

 Title I of the ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from

discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability"

on the basis of that individual's disability. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12112(a). As defined by section 12112(b)(5)(B), discrimination

includes "denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or

employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered

entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental

impairments of the employee or applicant." 

Although Plaintiff need not support each element of her Title

I discrimination claim at this stage in the case, Swierkiewicz, 534

U.S. at 508, the elements of such a claim are as follows. To

establish that her termination constituted discrimination under

Title I, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is disabled; (2) she

is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, either

with or without accommodation; and (3) she was terminated because

of her disability. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d

1080, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2001).6

 

Title V prohibits retaliation against individuals seeking to

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 23 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

enforce the statutory provisions of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).

To succeed in a retaliation claim a plaintiff must show 

"(1) involvement in an activity protected under the ADA, (2) an

adverse employment action and (3) a causal link between the two." 

Coons v. Sec'y of United States Dept. of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879,

887 (9th Cir. 2004).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

Defendants argue that any ADA claims are barred because

Plaintiff has failed to plead exhaustion of remedies or to attach

to the FAC any evidence of exhaustion. To bring a claim under

Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative

remedies by filing a formal complaint with the EEOC and filing suit

within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. Santa

Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Defendants rely upon the Ninth Circuit's statement that

"substantial compliance with the presentment of discrimination

complaints to an appropriate administrative agency is a

jurisdictional prerequisite." Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d

704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). The jurisdictional

prerequisite to which the Sommatino court refers, however, is not

the pleading of exhaustion of administrative remedies in the

complaint but the filing of a formal EEOC complaint. See id. ("In

cases where a plaintiff has never presented a discrimination

complaint to the appropriate administrative authority, we have held

that the district court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction.")

Here, Plaintiff's formal EEOC complaint and right-to-sue

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 24 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

letter, referring to discrimination based on disability, were

attached to her original complaint. Therefore, it appears that

Plaintiff has complied with the exhaustion requirements necessary

to secure the jurisdiction of this Court with regard to her

disability discrimination claims. Plaintiff is directed to attach

her EEOC documentation to her second amended complaint.

However, Plaintiff has not exhausted her ADA retaliation

claims. Exhaustion extends only to claims that fall "within the

scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or an EEOC investigation

that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge." 

B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002). 

When the legal theory of unlawful retaliation and the operative

facts regarding a retaliation claim are not related to the facts in

the EEOC charge, a plaintiff has not exhausted a retaliation claim. 

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir.

2003). The box on Plaintiff's EEOC complaint referring to

retaliation was not checked and the EEOC complaint does not refer

to Plaintiff engaging in a protected activity as required for a

retaliation claim. Retaliation is beyond the scope of reasonable

EEOC investigation of Plaintiff's claims, so Plaintiff has not

exhausted her ADA retaliation claim. Because exhaustion of

remedies is a jurisdictional requirement, Sommatino, 255 F.3d at

708, this claim is therefore dismissed. 

 The Court also notes that Plaintiff failed to name Individual

Defendants in her EEOC complaint. Charges of discrimination can be

brought against persons not named in an EEOC complaint "as long as

they were involved in the acts giving rise to the E.E.O.C. claims." 

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 25 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 Defendants contend for the first time in their reply brief,

without providing supporting argument, that the statute of

limitations has expired for Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act

claims. However, like section 1983 claims, claims under the ADA

and the Rehabilitation Act are typically governed by State statutes

of limitations for personal injury. See Baker v. Board of Regents

of State of Kan., 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1993) (analogizing

Rehabilitation Act claims to personal injury claims). To the

extent that the statute of limitations is relevant to the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims, the statute of limitations analysis

applicable to Plaintiff's section 1983 claims applies here.

26

EEOC v. National Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir.

2005). Plaintiff's EEOC complaint does not specify the acts of

harassment by Individual Defendants upon which she now bases her

claims against them. However, because, as discussed below,

Plaintiff cannot bring ADA claims against individuals, the Court

need not address whether Plaintiff's EEOC complaint exhausted the

claims against Individual Defendants.7

C. Claims Against the Individual Defendants

 Individual Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA claim on

the ground that individuals cannot be sued under the ADA. 

1. Discrimination Claims under Title I Against Individual

Defendants as Individuals

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against

a "qualified individual with a disability" by a "covered entity"

such as an "employer." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a). The ADA

defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting

commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of

such person . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). This definition

mirrors the definitions of employer in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e(b), and in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),

29 U.S.C. § 630. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly noted that

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 26 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

analogy to Title VII helps to define the scope of parallel

provisions of the ADA. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362

F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004) (drawing on Title VII precedent to

set out plaintiff's burden in ADA case); Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093

(holding that Title VII analysis applies in ADA case); Head v.

Glacier Northwest Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding Title VII causation standard is applicable under the ADA). 

Individual employees cannot be held personally liable for damages

under Title VII or the ADEA. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991

F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The Ninth Circuit has not decided the issue of individual

liability under the ADA. Eason v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 303

F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002). However, other circuits, and

district courts in the Ninth Circuit, have held, by analogy to

Title VII and the ADEA, that individuals do not qualify as

"employers" under Title I of the ADA and are not subject to

personal liability for acts of disability discrimination. See,

e.g., Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996); EEOC

v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir.

1995); Stern v. California State Archives, 982 F. Supp. 690, 692

(E.D. Cal. 1997); Gallo v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

California, 916 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D. Cal. 1995). The Court

finds the reasoning of these courts persuasive and holds that

individuals may not be held personally liable under Title I of the

ADA for acts of disability discrimination. Therefore, Plaintiff's

Title I claims against Individual Defendants in their individual

capacities are dismissed. 

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 27 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

2. Discrimination Claims under Title I Against

Individual Defendants in Their Official Capacities

Plaintiff also brings suit under the ADA against Individual

Defendants in their official capacities, both for money damages and

for injunctive relief. 

a. Monetary Damages

Claims for damages against Individual Defendants in their

official capacities, which would require payment by the State

treasury, implicate the State's sovereign immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars from the federal

courts suits for damages against a State by its own citizens,

citizens of another State or citizens or subjects of any foreign

State. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 n.2

(1985); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Edelman v.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676-77 (1974). Unless a State has waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it, a State

cannot be sued for monetary damages. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Pugh, 438 U.S. at 781);

Confederated Tribes & Bands v. Locke, 176 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir.

1999).

In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,

the Supreme Court held that in Title I of the ADA Congress did not

validly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 531 U.S.

356, 360 (1999). After Garrett, it is clear that States are immune

from suits for money damages under Title I of the ADA. Douglas v.

California Dept. of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 821 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Individual Defendants in

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 28 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

their official capacities for compensatory and punitive damages are

dismissed with prejudice. Any ADA claim for monetary damages

against NSH is also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore,

all of Plaintiff's damages claims under the ADA are dismissed. 

b. Injunctive Relief

i. Reinstatement 

Plaintiff requests that this Court "require the defendants to

take such actions as will ensure [that] lawful and fair conditions

of employment are afforded to me . . . ." FAC at 16:30-17:1. The

Court construes this prayer as a request for the prospective

injunctive relief of reinstatement. 

Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a suit for prospective

injunctive relief provides a narrow exception to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); Doe v.

Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In Garrett, the Court explicitly stated that suits for injunctive

relief under Title I can be brought against individuals in their

official capacities under the Ex parte Young doctrine. 531 U.S. at

374 n.9. Therefore, Plaintiff can properly bring a claim under the

ADA to recover her position at NSH. However, this claim need not

be addressed to each Individual Defendant, but only to the official

responsible for hiring employees at NSH. Because Plaintiff alleges

that Graziani, in his capacity as executive director of NSH, is

ultimately responsible for all employment decisions at NSH,

Graziani is the only defendant necessary to secure injunctive

relief. The injunctive relief claims against other Individual

Defendants are dismissed without leave to amend. 

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 29 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

ii. Fair Conditions for Fellow Employees

Plaintiff also requests that the Court "require the defendants

to take such actions as will ensure [that] lawful and fair

conditions of employment are afforded to . . . employees of Napa

State Hospital." FAC at 16:30-17:2. Except to the extent that

this request embodies Plaintiff's request for her own

reinstatement, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a claim. 

 "[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal

courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article

III of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy."

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). In order to

establish the existence of such a case or controversy, a plaintiff

must demonstrate standing: that he or she has suffered an injury in

fact, that the injury was caused by the defendant's conduct, and

that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable court

ruling. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61

(1992) (reciting the requirements for standing). When a plaintiff

requests injunctive relief, this constitutional mandate requires

that the plaintiff face a threat of present or future harm. Lyons,

461 U.S. at 101-03. Because Defendants' treatment of other NSH

employees does not injure Plaintiff, Plaintiff lacks standing to

bring this claim and it must be dismissed.

D. Plaintiff Must Amend Her Complaint to State a Claim for 

Injunctive Relief under the ADA against Graziani

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA. Plaintiff

alleges that 

I was subjected to some discrimination . . . and

harassment, as a result of my having the debilitating and

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 30 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

disabling condition of arthritis. I was given a hard

time because I chose to utilize my employee 90 "free"

days leave to rest and somewhat recuperate from the

problems I have from arthritis . . . 

FAC at 4:15-18. 

Plaintiff's ADA claims fail to allege either that 1) NSH

employees knew of Plaintiff's arthritic condition, or 2) any of the

specific adverse actions allegedly taken by NSH employees against

Plaintiff was performed to discriminate against her because of her

disability. Plaintiff's allegation that she was "given a hard

time" because of her use of sick leave does not support a

disability discrimination claim unless adverse action directed

towards Plaintiff was motivated by her disability. If Plaintiff

can amend her complaint to assert truthfully facts from which it

could be inferred that NSH employees 1) knew of Plaintiff's

arthritis and 2) took adverse actions against Plaintiff because of

this knowledge, she may state a claim for injunctive relief against

Graziani. 

E. Summary of ADA Claims

In summary, all ADA claims except the claim for injunctive

relief against Graziani in his official capacity based on

discrimination against Plaintiff are dismissed without leave to

amend. The official capacity claim against Graziani for injunctive

relief based on discrimination is dismissed with leave to amend. 

IV. Rehabilitation Act Claims 

The Rehabilitation Act is substantially identical to the ADA,

except that it is limited to programs that receive federal

financial assistance, Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 862 n.17

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 31 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

(9th Cir. 2001), and requires a plaintiff to prove discrimination

"solely by reason of his or her disability." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 

The standards used to determine whether an act of discrimination

violated the Rehabilitation Act are the same standards applied

under the ADA. Coons, 383 F.3d at 884 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)).

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims under the

Rehabilitation Act must be dismissed because she failed to exhaust

administrative remedies. However, exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not required for Rehabilitation Act claims. Smith v.

Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore,

Defendants' argument for dismissal on this ground fails.

B. Claims Against Individual Defendants

Individual Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's

discrimination and retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act

on the ground that they are not proper defendants.

1. Discrimination Claims

 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972 prohibits

discrimination against employees on the basis of disability by any

"program or activity" which receives federal funding. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794(a). Because Individual Defendants are not a "program or

activity" as defined in section 794(a) they cannot be sued in their

individual capacities for discrimination under this section. 

2. Retaliation Claims

The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on whether individuals may

be held liable for retaliation claims under the ADA or the

Rehabilitation Act. Several courts, addressing retaliation claims

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 32 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

The Court did not address the merits of Plaintiff's

retaliation claim under the ADA because it was dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

33

in employment under the ADA, have decided that individuals may not

be held liable. See e.g., Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 471-72 (4th

Cir. 1999); Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999);

Van Hulle v. Pacific Telesis Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (N.D.

Cal. 2000) Stern v. California State Archives, 982 F. Supp. 690,

692-93 (E.D. Cal. 1997). To this Court's knowledge, only one court

has held the opposite. See Ostrach v. Regents of the Univ. of

Cal., 957 F. Supp. 196, 200 (E.D. Cal. 1997). The Court could find

no rulings addressing retaliation in employment under the

Rehabilitation Act. However, without deciding whether individuals

can be liable for retaliation, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim of retaliation under the Rehabilitation

Act. 8

As noted above, a claim of retaliation requires a plaintiff to

show a causal link between involvement in a "protected activity"

and an adverse employment action. Coons, 383 F.3d at 887. A

causal link requires a showing that the defendant knew of the

protected activity, or that the temporal proximity between the 

protected activity and the adverse action was "very close." Clark

County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (per

curiam). Protesting the actions of supervisors for their alleged

violation of a discrimination law is a protected activity, as is

making such informal complaints to a supervisor. Trent v. Valley

Electric Ass'n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994); Ray v.

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 33 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff fails to allege, nor can the Court infer, any

activity in which she engaged that was protected under the

Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff alleges that she complained about

the abuse of patients at NSH. However, the abuse of patients is

not forbidden under the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits only

disability discrimination. Plaintiff also alleges that she was

"given a hard time" because of her use of sick leave. It does not

appear that use of sick leave is "protected activity" under the

Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act

retaliation claim is dismissed. If Plaintiff can truthfully allege

a causal connection between her participation in an activity

protected by the Rehabilitation Act and an adverse employment

action, she may include this claim against specific Individual

Defendants in her second amended complaint. 

C. Discrimination and Retaliation Claims against NSH

Under the Rehabilitation Act, sovereign immunity is not

implicated because the State of California has unambiguously waived

its Eleventh Amendment immunity by receiving Rehabilitation Act

funds. Douglas, 271 F.3d at 820; see also Phiffer v. Columbia

River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming

continued validity of Douglas holding). Therefore, Plaintiff may

assert Rehabilitation Act claims for injunctive relief and for

damages against NSH based on discrimination and retaliation. 

Plaintiff's ability to sue NSH directly renders unnecessary claims

against Individual Defendants in their official capacity. Soffer

v. City of Costa Mesa, 798 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1986). The

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 34 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

Rehabilitation Act claims against the Individual Defendants in

their official capacities are dismissed without leave to amend, but

Plaintiff may bring a Rehabilitation Act claim for injunctive

relief and damages against NSH in her second amended complaint. 

Although, under the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff may sue NSH,

the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to state a claim

against it. The standards for liability under the ADA and

Rehabilitation Act are the same. Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 862 n.17. 

Therefore, for the reasons discussed above in regard to the ADA

claims, Plaintiff must amend her complaint to state a claim under

the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim based

on discrimination and retaliation is dismissed with leave to amend.

D. Summary of Rehabilitation Act Claims

All Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims against

Individual Defendants are dismissed without leave to amend. The

Rehabilitation Act damages claims for retaliation against

Individual Defendants are dismissed with leave to amend to state a

claim. The Rehabilitation Act discrimination and retaliation

claims against NSH for damages and for injunctive relief are

dismissed with leave to amend to state a claim. 

V. Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal Denial of Discovery

On August 1, 2005, Plaintiff submitted an appeal of Magistrate

Judge Laporte's order, entered July 7, 2005, denying Plaintiff's

motion for reconsideration and denying without prejudice

Plaintiff's motion to compel. Under Rule 72(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must file objections to a

magistrate judge's order on a non-dispositive motion within ten

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 35 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

days of the order. Because Plaintiff has failed to meet this

deadline, Plaintiff's request to appeal the denial of discovery is

denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion to dismiss

(Docket No. 63) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request for leave to amend

is GRANTED in part. The following claims are dismissed without

leave to amend: 1) all section 1983 claims against Individual

Defendants in their official capacities except the claim for

injunctive relief against Graziani, 2) any section 1983 claim

against NSH, 3) all ADA claims against Individual Defendants in

their individual capacities, 4) all ADA claims against Individual

Defendants in their official capacities except the claim for

injunctive relief against Graziani for discrimination, 5) any ADA

claim against NSH, 6) all Rehabilitation Act claims for

discrimination against Individual Defendants in their individual

capacities, and 7) all Rehabilitation Act claims against Individual

Defendants in their official capacities. The following claims are

dismissed with leave to amend in accordance with this order: 1) the

section 1983 damages claims against Individual Defendants in their

individual capacities, 2) the section 1983 claims against Graziani

for injunctive relief, 3) the ADA discrimination claim against

Graziani in his official capacity for injunctive relief, 4) the

Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim against NSH for damages and

injunctive relief, and 5) the Rehabilitation Act retaliation

claims against Individual Defendants and NSH for damages. Because

leave to amend has been granted, Plaintiff's request for stay

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 36 of 37
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

(Docket No. 82) is DENIED as moot. If Plaintiff chooses to file a

Second Amended Complaint (SAC) remedying the deficiencies noted in

this Order, she must do so within two weeks from the date of this

Order. Defendants' response will be due twenty days thereafter. 

The case management conference that has been set for March 10, 2006

at 10:00 a.m. is VACATED. If Defendants file a motion to dismiss

the SAC, they shall notice it for April 28, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. A

case management conference will be held on the same date. If

Plaintiff fails to file a timely SAC, the case will be dismissed

with prejudice for failure to prosecute. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/15/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Copies mailed to counsel

as noted on the following page

Case 4:03-cv-05583-CW Document 89 Filed 02/15/06 Page 37 of 37