Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00566/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Court issued a Notice pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc), advising Plaintiff of his responsibility to respond. (Doc. #47.) 

WO SVK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ricardo Herrera,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Phoenix Police Chief, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 07-0566-PHX-GMS (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Ricardo Herrera, who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Tucson, filed this pro se civil rights action against the Phoenix Police Chief

and several officers of the Phoenix Police Department. (Doc. #1.) The Court ordered

Officers Dorman, Cutchall, and Reiff to answer Counts I, II, and III, in which Plaintiff

alleged that Defendants used excessive force during Defendants’ apprehension of Plaintiff

and then refused to get him medical attention for his injuries. The Court dismissed the

remaining counts and Defendants. (Doc. #3.) Defendants now move for summary

judgment.1

 (Doc. #45.) The motion is ready for ruling. (Doc. ##50, 54.)

The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

///

///

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

I. Background

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s apprehension on September 15, 2005, at

approximately 1:00 am as a suspect in a home-invasion robbery. Plaintiff alleged that his

Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Dorman used excessive force during the

arrest and that Cutchall and Reiff failed to take any action to stop Dorman. (Doc. #1.) 

He further alleged that Dorman denied him medical treatment by refusing to take him to

the hospital and by using threats and intimidation to prevent him from leaving to receive

treatment. Although Plaintiff was not arrested that night, he was later arrested and

charged in connection with the robbery and found guilty. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff cannot

prove that Cutchall or Reiff participated in any force used by Dorman; (2) Dorman’s

conduct was reasonable and, therefore, did not violate the Fourth Amendment; and (3)

Dorman is entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

 A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial

responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the

record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party who must demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact

in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

for the non-moving party. Id. at 250; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d

1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 56(e) compels the non-moving party to “set out specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial” and not to “rely merely on allegations or denials

in its own pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a

material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). However, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party

who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which the party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At summary judgment, the judge’s function is

not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a

genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is

“to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. 

But, if the evidence of the non-moving party is merely colorable or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50.

B. Excessive Force

“‘[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the

course of an arrest . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment ‘reasonableness’

standard.’” Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Supreme Court has stated:

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight.

. . .

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for

the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,

and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.

Id. at 396-97 (citations omitted). In determining whether an officer acted objectively

reasonably under the Fourth Amendment, the Court considers the “severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at

396. The court must balance the nature and the quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the Government interests at stake. Id.

at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). Whether the amount of force

used was reasonable is usually a question of fact for the jury. Barlow v. Ground, 943

F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th 1991). Summary judgment should be granted sparingly. Bell v.

City of Seattle, 395 F. Supp.2d 992, 998 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 

C. Qualified Immunity

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for

civil liability if his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the

Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence for resolving a qualified immunity claim:

the “constitutional inquiry” and the “qualified immunity inquiry.” The “constitutional

inquiry” asks whether, when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If so,

a court would turn to the “qualified immunity inquiry” and ask if the right was clearly

established at the relevant time. Id. at 201-02. This second inquiry “must be undertaken

in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. at 201. 

In Pearson v. Callahan, — S.Ct.—, 2009 WL 128768, *9 (Jan. 21, 2009), the

Supreme Court held that the Saucier procedure is not an inflexible requirement; judges

“should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 

A right is clearly established if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Kennedy v. City of

Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

739 (2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior case with the identical facts showing

that a right is clearly established; it is enough that there is preexisting law that provides a

defendant “fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065. 

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants submit their Statement of Facts (Doc. #46 (DSOF)); the affidavits of

Officers Dorman and Cutchall, (id., Ex. 1, Dorman Aff.; Ex. 2 Cutchall Aff.); excerpts

from Plaintiff’s deposition (id., Ex. 3, Pl.’s Dep. (May 28, 2008)); and Plaintiff’s plea to

four counts in connection with the home invasion robbery (id., Ex. 4.). 

On September 15, 2005, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Dorman received a radio dispatch

regarding a home-invasion robbery that was in progress and involved firearms. (DSOF ¶1.)

At the time he received the call, Dorman was about a minute from the location; he was the

first Phoenix police officer to respond to the scene. (Id. ¶ 2; Dorman Aff. ¶ 5.) 

Given his proximity to the crime in progress, Dorman knew that it was likely that he

would encounter armed suspects as he approached the location. (DSOF ¶3; Dorman Aff. ¶¶

4-5.) To facilitate the element of surprise, Dorman turned off his headlights and interior

lights and drove toward the residence where the home invasion was reportedly underway,

approaching the residence slowly so that he could see any unusual movements on the

perimeter of the street. (DSOF ¶ 4; Dorman Aff. ¶ 6.) As he neared the home, Dorman saw

a male adult, later identified as Plaintiff, walking across the street away from the residence

where the incident had reportedly occurred. (DSOF ¶ 5.) Dorman could not determine the

person’s ethnicity. (Dorman Aff. ¶ 8.) 

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Dorman slowed his vehicle; Plaintiff crouched down in the street, looked at Dorman,

and suddenly changed directions by walking north across the street toward a black

automobile. (DSOF ¶ 6; Dorman Aff. ¶ 10.) Given the time of day, Plaintiff’s nearness to

the victim’s house, and his erratic behavior of quickly changing directions, Dorman believed

that Plaintiff was involved in the home invasion. (DSOF ¶ 7.) 

Accordingly, Dorman immediately stopped his vehicle, jumped out, drew his service

weapon and ordered Plaintiff to stop. (DSOF ¶ 8; Dorman Aff. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff disobeyed

the command and immediately started running across the street and into El Prado Park.

(DSOF ¶ 9; Dorman Aff. ¶ 12.) Dorman holstered his weapon, informed radio dispatch that

he was in a foot pursuit, and chased Plaintiff into the park. (DSOF ¶ 10; Dorman Aff. ¶ 13.)

At about this time, Cutchall approached in a marked police car and pulled in behind

Dorman’s vehicle. Seeing Dorman run into the park after Plaintiff, Cutchall drove his

vehicle into the park in pursuit. (DSOF ¶ 11; Dorman Aff. ¶ 14.) Cutchall drove over a

water retention area toward Plaintiff, eventually cutting Plaintiff off. (DSOF ¶ 12.)

When Plaintiff realized that he was not going to be able to outrun the police vehicle,

he stopped. (DSOF ¶13.) At that point, Cutchall ordered Plaintiff to put his hands on his

head and get down on his knees, but Plaintiff refused to comply with this order. (DSOF ¶

14; Cutchall Aff. ¶¶ 10-11.) Not knowing if Plaintiff was armed or would try to run again,

Dorman then came up from behind Plaintiff and pushed him to the ground. (Dorman Aff.

¶ 16.) To control Plaintiff and facilitate cuffing him, Dorman put his knee into Plaintiff’s

back and to the back of Plaintiff’s head. (DSOF ¶15; Dorman Aff. ¶ 16.) Then Dorman

placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and searched him for weapons. (DSOF ¶ 16; Dorman Aff. ¶

17.) Cutchall did not physically touch Plaintiff during the initial detention and search for

weapons. (DSOF ¶ 17; Cutchall Aff. ¶ 21.) Reiff was not even present during the detention

or search of Plaintiff. (DSOF ¶ 18; Cutchall Aff. ¶ 20.) 

After cuffing Plaintiff and searching him for weapons, Dorman placed Plaintiff into

the back of Cutchall’s patrol vehicle. Cutchall then drove Plaintiff to the victims’ house to

give the victims of the home invasion robbery an opportunity to identify Plaintiff as a

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

potential suspect. (DSOF ¶ 19.) The victims of the home invasion robbery were unable to

do so. (DSOF ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was released and, at his request, driven to his mother’s house.

(DSOF ¶ 21.) Plaintiff had no visible injuries, he was not bleeding, he made no requests for

medical attention, he was able to walk, and he never made a citizens complaint against

Dorman in connection with his arrest. (DSOF ¶ 22; Dorman Aff ¶¶ 21-22; Cutchall Aff.

¶¶15-16.) 

Plaintiff was later arrested and charged, in connection with the home-invasion

robbery. (DSOF ¶ 23.) On June 24, 2008, he was found guilty of Conspiracy to Commit

Burglary in the First Degree, Armed Robbery, Burglary in the First Degree, and Aggravated

Assault. (DSOF ¶ 24.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Cutchall or Reiff participated in the

force that Dorman used to subdue Plaintiff. Plaintiff stated in his deposition that Cutchall

was “guilty by association” and did not participate in Dorman’s use of force. In addition,

Plaintiff cannot verify if Reiff was present. (Doc. #45 at 7.) Dorman argues that he had cause

to believe that Plaintiff was involved in a home-invasion robbery and he used only the force

necessary and reasonable to get control over Plaintiff who was fleeing the scene of a home

invasion robbery involving firearms. He asserts that considering the Graham factors, 490

U.S. at 396, and the need to make split second judgments, the force used was reasonable.

(Doc. #45 at 9-11.) Dorman argues that because of the nature of the crime, when he reported

to the scene there was a high probability that the suspect would be armed and dangerous.

Plaintiff posed a threat of safety to the officers, which was increased by Plaintiff’s

unwillingness to obey the command to stop and get on the ground. In addition, Plaintiff was

resisting and evading arrest. Dorman contends that he was justified in taking Plaintiff to the

ground and restraining him till he was cuffed and searched for weapons. 

Finally, Dorman argues that because there was no clearly established right to put him

on notice that using force to seize a fleeing suspect was unconstitutional, he is entitled to

qualified immunity. 

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

2. Plaintiff’s Contentions

In support of his opposition, Plaintiff submits his Statement of Facts (Doc. #51,

(PSOF)); excerpts from his deposition (id., Ex. 1, Pl. Dep. (May 28, 2008)); Plaintiff’s

unsworn statement (id., Ex. 2); Phoenix Police Department Report (id., Ex. 3); authentication

of records and recordings and incident details (id. Ex. 4); Interview with Cutchall for State

v. Herrera (id., Ex. 5, Cutchall Interview (April 10, 2008)); Interview with Dorman for State

v. Herrera (id., Ex. 6, Dorman Interview (April 10, 2008)); what appear to be excerpts from

trial (id., Ex. 7); and a Phoenix Police Department Report (id., Ex. 8). 

Plaintiff asserts that at the time of the incident, he was walking to his mother’s house.

(PSOF ¶ 1.) The officers received a radio call regarding three black males, high school

students, with hand guns and on foot. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff crossed the street and saw vehicles

with no lights coming down the street, and he feared for his safety. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) The

vehicles slammed on the breaks, and Plaintiff saw only a light when he turned around and

someone yelled “hey.” (Id. ¶ 5.) He was afraid and ran across the street into the park. (Id.

¶ 6.) Plaintiff asserts that Dorman knew “he was going to contact a [H]ispanic male.” (Id.

¶ 7.) Plaintiff heard sirens as he ran, so he stopped because he realized it was the police.

(Id. ¶ 8.) Cutchall told Plaintiff not to move and to put his hands in the air, which Plaintiff

did. (Id. ¶ 9.) Dorman then kicked Plaintiff in the back, and Plaintiff hit the ground and

blacked out for an undetermined period. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) 

Plaintiff regained consciousness and was in handcuffs when Dorman began beating

him by stomping his foot into Plaintiff’s face and forcing his head onto the ground. Dorman

stomped on Plaintiff’s head and back and Plaintiff screamed for help. (Id. ¶ 12.) Cutchall

and Reiff watched without intervening. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was dragged to the police

car and leaned over the hood while Dorman patted him down; when Plaintiff asked what was

going on, Dorman hit him on the right side under his ribs. (Id. ¶ 13.) Dorman kicked

Plaintiff into the back of the patrol car and because there was no cushion to break the fall,

Plaintiff came down on a hard surface. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff asked for medical treatment

but was told to shut up. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

The officers took Plaintiff for identification by the victims, but the victims said that

Plaintiff did not rob them and that it was black men. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) The victim asked if

Plaintiff was hurt, and Plaintiff said the police beat him. (Id. ¶ 19.) The Sergeant told the

officers to take Plaintiff home; Plaintiff again asked for medical treatment, and Dorman

refused. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff threatened to get a lawyer, and the officers told him not to

leave the house. (Id. ¶ 23.)

 Plaintiff argues that Dorman knew that Plaintiff did not fit the description of the

perpetrators, that he was unarmed and complied with Cutchall’s commands, and that Plaintiff

was beaten while in handcuffs and cooperative. (Doc. #51 at 2.) He argues that the severity

of the crime weighs in his favor because he did not fit the description of the perpetrators, that,

likewise, he posed no threat because he did not fit the description, and that he was not

resisting arrest. (Id. at 9.) He asserts that the beating caused a serious injury to his right eye

and vision problems and that he is in the “early stages of schizophrenia,” which is caused by

head injury. (Id.) He contends that Dorman is not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff

argues that Reiff was with Cutchall on the night in question and that Cutchall has given

inconsistent statements regarding this matter. (Id. at 6.) 

3. Defendants’ Reply

 In their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has provided no sworn testimony or 

admissible evidence to establish that Reiff was present during his detention by Dorman.

(Doc. #54 at 3-4.) They assert that Plaintiff offers only a police report that contains Reiff’s

name and badge number, which is inadmissible hearsay. In addition, Cutchall attests that

Reiff was not present during Plaintiff’s detention. (Id., see DSOF ¶18, Cutchall Aff. ¶ 20).

During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he was not sure if Reiff was present and that he

was only speculating that Reiff was present because his name appeared in a police report. 

 Q: Let me ask you this: How did you come to identify Officer Cutchall in your

lawsuit? 

A: From the police report. 

Q: What in the police report told you that Officer Cutchall was involved? 

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

A. I’m not quite sure, bit I did – I started reading it and I was figuring out what

officers were what, and that’s how I came to the conclusion that, you know he

was one of the officers involved in this. 

Q. What about Officer Reiff? 

A: Same thing. I read in there somewhere that his name came up, and he was

part of this. Because, if you look on page 6 of my police report, which I have

here, which if you want to look at it –

Q: What does page 6 say? 

A: It just says – where I underlined it, it says “Officers Cutchall and Dorman.”

So that’s how I know it was both of them. And I believe the other one was

involved because I read in there somewhat he was involved in that. Because

they give like a brief interview of what happened toward my pursuit right

there, what they call a pursuit. 

* * * 

Q: . . . I’m trying to figure out if you’re absolutely positive that Officer Reiff

was there, because Officer Reiff is stating that he wasn’t even there. 

A. Like I said, hey, I’m not absolutely 100 percent sure of Reiff, whatever his

name is, Reiff, but I do know Dorman and Cutchall were there. 

(Doc. # 46, Ex. 3 47:14-49:20.)

Reiff argues that he should not be forced to undergo a trial based on Plaintiff’s

unsupported speculation. 

Cutchall argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that Cutchall had a realistic

opportunity to intercede in the alleged excessive force. (Doc. #54 at 5.) Finally, they argue

that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff continued to resist commands to get to his knees

even after he stopped and therefore he continued to pose a significant risk to officer safety.

They assert that Dorman was justified in using deadly force to prevent Plaintiff from

escaping and thus Dorman is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. 5-6.)

B. Analysis

 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable force; the right to 

make an arrest carries with it the inherent right to use some force. Hicks v. City of Portland,

2006 WL 3311552, at *9 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2006) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

Reasonable force is the force that is necessary to secure the safety of police officers during

a search or arrest. Hicks, 2006 WL 3311552, at *8 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). Not

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary, violates the Fourth Amendment.

Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810. The reasonableness determination must also take into account that

police officers must often make split-second judgments about the amount of force that its

necessary in a particular situation. See Graham, 490 U.S. 396-97. 

1. Dorman

 Dorman admits using physical force on Plaintiff but provides evidence that Plaintiff

was evading capture as a suspect in an armed home invasion. For the purposes of this

motion, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and determine

whether there are genuine issues of material fact. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). “[S]ummary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive

force cases should be granted sparingly.” Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415-16

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Defendants argue that it is undisputed that when Cutchall drove along side Plaintiff,

Plaintiff stopped running, but remained standing, despite orders to get to his knees, and that

he was then tackled by Dorman. (Doc. #54 at 2.) Plaintiff does not acknowledge (or clearly

dispute) that he was ordered to his knees—only that he was ordered to stop and complied.

Nevertheless, the Court finds that Dorman acted reasonably in tackling Plaintiff. Not every

push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary, violates the Fourth Amendment.

Forrester, 25 F.3d at 810. It is undisputed that Dorman was responding to a report of an

armed home invasion and that upon encountering Plaintiff in the vicinity of the crime at 1:00

am, Plaintiff fled the scene, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff was standing when Dorman

first made physical contact. 

The Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments that because Plaintiff did not match the

description of the home invaders, Dorman’s actions were unreasonable. Plaintiff offers no

evidence—only speculation—that Dorman knew Plaintiff was Hispanic nor evidence of how

Dorman could have determined Plaintiff’s ethnicity as Plaintiff ran away in the dark.

Conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). The seriousness

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

of the offense made the pursuit reasonable. See Graham, 490 U.S. 396-97. It was also

reasonable for Dorman to be concerned that Plaintiff might have a weapon in view of the

report that the invaders were armed. Securing the safety of officers during an arrest is an

important governmental interest. Id. at 396; Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,

477 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court also notes that tackling Plaintiff was reasonable because

reasonableness determinations must take into account that police officers must often make

split-second judgments about the amount of force that its necessary in a particular situation.

See Graham, 490 U.S. 396-97. 

But Plaintiff also asserts that after he was tackled and handcuffed, Dorman stomped

his foot into Plaintiff’s face and stomped Plaintiff’s head and back and then kicked him into

the patrol car. “[T]he degree of force used is permissible only when a strong government

interest compels the employment of such force.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1280

(9th Cir. 2001). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no

evidence that Plaintiff continued to resist apprehension or continued to struggle or reached

for a weapon after he was on the ground and handcuffed. See Drummond v. City of

Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003). Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff had

not yet been searched for a weapon, the force alleged by Plaintiff is unrelated to a search for

weapons. Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiff provides no medical evidence of his

alleged injuries, see Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2000), but the issue for an

excessive force claim is whether the force used was reasonable, not the degree of harm. The

lack of medical evidence of harm goes to the weight of Plaintiff’s evidence of excessive

force, but at summary judgment, the judge’s role is not to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth, but to determine if there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249. It is enough that the factual dispute requires a judge or jury to resolve the differing

versions of the truth. 

In addition, Dorman has not established entitlement to qualified immunity. The

qualified immunity analysis requires Dorman to demonstrate that he acted reasonably

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

because the force alleged did not violate clearly established constitutional law. See Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201-02.

 A right is clearly established if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Kennedy v. City of

Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior case with the identical facts showing that a

right is clearly established; it is enough that there is preexisting law that provides a defendant

“fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065. A police officer

can be liable for use of excessive force. Graham, 490 U.S. 386. The law was clearly

established in 2005 that there must be a government interest that compels the force used. See

Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1280. Thus, at the time in question, it was clearly established that

Plaintiff had a constitutional right to be free from unnecessary use of force.

Defendants argue that the constitutional violation alleged by Plaintiff would not have

been clear to a reasonable officer because there was no precedent at the time of the incident

that would have put Dorman on notice that using force to seize a suspect fleeing the scene

of an armed robbery was unconstitutional. (Doc. #45 at 12.) But as discussed, the Court has

determined that disputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, create a triable

issue regarding whether Dorman used excessive force after Plaintiff was handcuffed.

Dorman could not have reasonably believed that he was acting lawfully if he stomped on

Plaintiff’s face, head, and back after Plaintiff was cuffed and on the ground and not

struggling. The same disputed facts that preclude summary judgment on the constitutional

prong preclude a finding of qualified immunity. 

2. Cutchall and Reiff

Police officers have a “duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the

constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271,

1289-90 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir.

1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). But officers can be held liable only if

they had an opportunity to intercede. Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289-90; (citing with

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

approval Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting

no opportunity to intercede where an alleged attack came quickly and was over in a matter

of seconds)). 

Here, the only account of the alleged attack that was not prevented by Cutchall and

Reiff is that of Plaintiff. In his Complaint he states he was on the ground and “before I could

even get my face turned all the way around and speak, [Dorman] crashed his foot down onto

the side of may face with a stomping type motion . . .;” Plaintiff alleged that he screamed for

help. (Doc. #1; see Doc. #51, PSOF ¶ 12.) He claims that the other officers watched

without intervening. (PSOF ¶ 12.) In the Complaint, he states Dorman kicked him twice

more. It appears from Plaintiff’s account that the alleged attack came quickly and without

warning and was over in a matter of seconds. Plaintiff, who has the burden to show that

Defendants’ conduct caused the alleged harm and thus that they could have intervened, offers

no explanation how long the attack took, where the officers were standing, or how they could

have stopped the alleged blows. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 (summary judgment is

appropriate against a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which

the party will bear the burden of proof at trial). The Court will grant summary judgment as

to Cutchall.

In addition, there is insufficient probative evidence that Reiff was even present at the

scene. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Cutchall attests that Reiff was not there. Although

Plaintiff claims that Cutchall offered differing accounts of this fact, Plaintiff submits no

evidence to substantiate that claim. Plaintiff admits in his deposition that he did not know

if Reiff was there—he only got Reiff’s name from a police report. Although the police report

has Reiff’s name on it, it does not state that Reiff was there, and appears, according to the

serial number 7102, to be written by Dorman. (Doc. #51, Ex. 3.) The Court will grant

summary judgment as to Reiff.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 45).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 45) is granted in part 

and denied in part as follows:

(a) denied as to Dorman, except as provided herein; and

(b) granted as to Cutchall and Reiff.

(3) The remaining claims are those against Dorman as described herein and 

Count III for denial of medical care.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2009.

Case 2:07-cv-00566-GMS Document 59 Filed 01/28/09 Page 15 of 15