Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08206/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08206-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Nicole Rhodes, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Energy Marine LLC, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-08206-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is Defendant Dances with Waves Houseboat, LLC’s (“Dances with 

Waves”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 79, MSJ), to which Plaintiff Nicole 

Rhodes filed a Response (Doc. 82, Resp.) and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 88, Reply). 

The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument, see LRCiv 

7.2(f), and therefore denies Defendant’s request for a hearing (Doc. 94). For the reasons 

that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof as to her 

negligence claims and concludes Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

The Court will therefore grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny as 

moot Defendant’s Motion in the alternative for Exoneration from or Limitation of 

Liability to $125,000 in Accordance with Rule 9(h) and Supplemental Rule F of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On June 21, 2014, an explosion aboard the houseboat M/V Dances with Waves, 

owned by moving Defendant, threw Plaintiff Nicole Rhodes off the vessel, causing her 

serious injuries. At the time, Plaintiff worked for Energy Marine, LLC, which Defendant 

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had hired to service and manage Dances with Waves. The explosion occurred 

immediately after two other Energy Marine employees, Stephen Hancock and Mark 

Haycock, had refueled the vessel, and no Dances with Waves personnel were present. 

 Upon boarding the vessel after the explosion, a National Park Service ranger 

“observed that the blower switch (switch that activates the blower for the purpose of 

ejecting the fuel fumes from the engine compartment and vessel bilge essential during 

fueling operations), was in the OFF position.” (Doc. 80, DSOF Ex. C, Nat’l Park Serv. 

Gen. Report.) The ranger noted, “During all fueling operations and prior to initial startup 

procedures it is strongly advised to have the blower activated to remove combustible fuel 

fumes from the enclosed lower compartments of a vessel.” (Nat’l Park Serv. Gen. 

Report.) The ranger observed that “[t]he blower tube had been completely melted in a 

pattern consistent with a lack of air flow through the blower system indicating that the 

blower itself was not in operation at the time of ignition.” (Nat’l Park Serv. Gen. Report.) 

 Thomas Haycock, a boat pilot for Energy Marine, was responsible for driving 

houseboats to and from the fuel dock and making sure they got fueled properly. (Doc. 83, 

PSOF Ex. C, Haycock Dep. at 4-5.) With regard to fueling safety, his boss, Trent 

Sutherland, and the fuel dock associates trained him to make sure he attends the pump 

during fueling and then runs the blowers for at least four minutes when he is done. 

(Haycock Dep. at 7-9.) Haycock testified that, on the day of the explosion, he turned the 

blowers on after fueling and then left the vessel to go to the dockside store to pay for the 

fuel, buy snacks and talk to the associates, which “usually allows adequate time” for the 

blowers to have run long enough to reduce the risk of an explosion. (Haycock Dep. at 11-

12.) Upon turning the engines on after returning to the vessel, he heard a loud noise, saw 

smoke coming out of the engine compartment, and realized that the “engine room 

flashed.” (Haycock Dep. at 14-15.) Haycock testified that this was the only time he ever 

remembered seeing cleaning personnel such as Plaintiff aboard the vessel while it was at 

the fuel dock, and he believed cleaning personnel were not normally aboard during 

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fueling because they required the use of power, and no power was to be used during 

fueling. (Haycock Dep. at 17-21.) 

 Stephen Hancock was the “check-off person” for Energy Marine, responsible for 

checking houseboats as they arrived and left as well as assisting in pumping the septic 

tanks and pumping fuel. (DSOF Ex. D, Hancock Dep. at 8-10.) He testified that he was 

trained that the blowers had to run for a minimum of three minutes after fueling before 

turning on the engines. (Hancock Dep. at 24.) He stated that, on the day of the explosion, 

he turned the blower on after they finished fueling while Haycock went to pay for the 

fuel, and he does not recall how long it took for Haycock to return before he turned the 

engines on. (Hancock Dep. at 27-31.) 

 In support of her negligence claims, Plaintiff points to an Insurance Survey 

performed on Dances with Waves in 2012. (PSOF at 4 ¶ 3.) The Survey divided its 

findings and recommendations into three categories; (A) Safety Deficiencies, (B) Other 

Deficiencies Needing Attention, and (C) Surveyors’ Notes and Observations. (PSOF Ex. 

5 at 14.) No findings or recommendations were made in the Safety Deficiencies category, 

but the Other Deficiencies Needing Attention category included finding B6, which noted, 

“The invertor on this vessel is connected to a large fuse box. The side of the fuse going to 

the invertor panel was melted. Fuse was blown. (Fire hazard) Wires were pulled out of 

fuse, and spliced together with black tape at time of survey.” (PSOF Ex. 5 at 16.) With 

regard to B6, the inspector offered the recommendation to “[i]nvestigate further. Repair 

or replace as necessary. Full service by an electrical expert.” (PSOF Ex. 5 at 16.) 

 David Whitehead, co-manager of Defendant, testified that all of the category B 

deficiencies noted in the 2012 Survey were resolved and the manager at the time 

submitted a report to the insurance company that items B1 through B7 were completed. 

(PSOF Ex. 2, Whitehead Dep. at 25-27.) However, he could not identify the electrician 

who completed the repairs and certified that items B1 though B7 were completed. 

(Whitehead Dep. at 25-26.) 

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 Plaintiff raises claims of negligence and gross negligence, alleging Defendant 

failed to adequately maintain its vessel. (Doc. 34, Am. Compl.) Defendant now moves for 

summary judgment on both counts against it. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 

appropriate when: (1) the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, 

the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 

1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). Under this standard, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect 

the outcome of the suit under governing [substantive] law will properly preclude the 

entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A “genuine issue” of material fact arises only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the 

non-moving party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. However, the non-moving party 

may not merely rest on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence 

tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question 

of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (holding that the plaintiff must present affirmative 

evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment); First 

Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968). 

 “A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory 

allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989). “Summary judgment must be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d 

1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 

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III. ANALYSIS

 To establish a prima facie negligence claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate the 

following elements: “(1) the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 

plaintiff; (2) the breach of that duty of care; (3) a causal connection between the 

offending conduct and the resulting injury, i.e., proximate cause; and (4) actual loss, 

injury, or damage suffered by the plaintiff.” In re Fun Time Boat Rental & Storage, LLC, 

431 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Pearce v. United States, 261 F.3d 643, 

647 (6th Cir. 2001)). To survive a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must prove all 

four elements of her claim. See, e.g., Tau v. F/V Saint Jude, 227 Fed. App’x 663, 664 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in a negligence action 

under general maritime law because Plaintiff failed to establish that his injuries were 

foreseeable or that Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care under the 

circumstances). 

 Defendant concedes the first and fourth elements of Plaintiff’s claim, but disputes 

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant breached its duty of care or that this breach caused the 

resulting injury. Because the Court struck Plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding causation 

(Doc. 95), Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff has 

not, and cannot, establish either that Defendant breached its duty of care or that such 

breach caused the explosion and Plaintiff’s injuries. 

 A negligence claim such as Plaintiff’s requires a showing that Defendant’s 

conduct fell below the duty of care and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. See 

Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists, 269 P.3d 704, 706 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 

“The proximate cause of an injury is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, 

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the 

injury would not have occurred.” Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 

(Ariz. 1990) (citations omitted). Expert testimony is required whenever proof of an 

element of a claim, such as the duty of care or causation, calls for information that is 

outside an ordinary person’s common knowledge. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 

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F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff must proffer admissible expert 

testimony when special expertise is necessary for a fact-finder to draw a causal 

inference); see also Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2004)

(stating expert testimony as to causation is necessary “where a lay juror could not be 

expected to intuit the causal relationship between the acts in question and the injury”). 

Indeed, the case that gave birth to the current standard for a court’s evaluation of the 

reliability of expert testimony, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., involved a question 

of causation requiring special expertise, namely, whether a drug could cause limb defects. 

43 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 The explosion aboard the vessel does not speak for itself. For its part, Defendant 

points to a National Park Service incident report that states that the condition of the boat 

upon inspection after the explosion was consistent with an explosion caused by a buildup of fumes resulting from a failure to run the blower after fueling—a task for which 

Energy Marine, not moving Defendant, was responsible. (Nat’l Park Serv. Gen. Report.) 

Plaintiff must be able to produce some reliable evidence of both of breach of duty by 

Defendant and the cause of the explosion for the Court to find a genuine dispute of fact 

and send this case to a jury. The Insurance Survey Plaintiff relies on is not sufficient, 

because even if the Survey were shown to be relevant, any conclusion that could be 

drawn from it regarding the explosion two years later would be mere speculation. 

Plaintiff has failed to proffer sufficient admissible evidence of either breach of duty by 

Defendant or causation to meet her burden of proof, and Defendant is thus entitled to 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against it.1 See Carter, 906 F.2d at 1376. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Defendant Dances with Waves 

Houseboat, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 79) on all of Plaintiff’s claims 

against it, and denying as moot Defendant’s Motion in the alternative for Exoneration 

from or Limitation of Liability to $125,000 in Accordance with Rule 9(h) and 

 

1

 Plaintiff has not proffered sufficient evidence to support a finding that spoliation of evidence has occurred, as Plaintiff mentions in her Response. 

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Supplemental Rule F of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et 

seq. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Dances with Waves Houseboat, 

LLC’s Request for Oral Argument (Doc. 94). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly 

and, because all of the claims in this matter are now dismissed, close this case.

 Dated this 15th day of November, 2016. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:14-cv-08206-JJT Document 96 Filed 11/15/16 Page 7 of 7