Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00934/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00934-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentenc

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANDREAS JEJUAN SMITH, )

)

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:10cv934-MHT

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Andreas Jejuan Smith (“Smith”) asks this court to vacate, set aside, or correct his

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2008, a jury found Smith guilty of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2113(a), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). Sentence was imposed on May 20, 2009, with Smith receiving a term of 153

months’ imprisonment on the bank-robbery conviction and a concurrent term of 120

months’ imprisonment on the firearm-possession conviction.

Smith appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his bank-robbery conviction and the district court’s consideration of acquitted

Case 2:10-cv-00934-MHT-TFM Document 22 Filed 03/04/13 Page 1 of 16
conduct in imposing his sentence. In addition, Smith argued that his sentence was 1

substantively unreasonable. On March 15, 2010, the appellate court affirmed Smith’s

conviction and sentence. United States v. Smith, 370 Fed. App’x 29 (11 Cir. 2010). Smith th

did not seek certiorari review by the Supreme Court.

On or around November 2, 2010, Smith filed this pro se § 2255 motion, in which he

asserts the following claims:

1. There was insufficient evidence to convict him of bank robbery

and being a felon in possession of a firearm.

2. The eyewitness testimony of Annette Gurley and Daniel

Robinson was unreliable, because (a) Gurley gave conflicting,

uncertain descriptions ofthe robber and first identified someone

else as the robber and (b) Robinson did not positively identify

Smith in the photographic lineup shown to him.

3. His sentence was improperly enhanced for an assault on a

United States Marshal, because the alleged assault was not

proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

4. The Government improperly used acquitted conduct to enhance

his sentence.

5. The prosecutor committed misconduct byknowinglypresenting

false statements by Willie Jackson and Garland Clark to the

grand jury to secure a “false affidavit” to obtain Smith’s

indictment.

6. His sentence was improperly enhanced for second-degree

Two of the counts in the four-count indictment charged Smith with using a deadly or 1

dangerous instrument to assault law enforcement officials while they were engaged in the

performance of their official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(b), and using and carrying a

firearm in furtherance of the assault on law enforcement officials, in violation of 18

U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1). The jury acquitted him on those counts.

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murder when he was never charged with or convicted of

second-degree murder.

7. The district court should have severed the charges against him

so that “certain interlocutory orders [could] become final.”

8. Detective Hill presented false testimony at trial during crossexamination when he stated that Smith was the onlyperson who

fit the description of the robber given by the eyewitnesses.

9. The district court should have dismissed the charges against him

on grounds of double jeopardy.

10. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by (a)

failing to challenge Smith’s indictment and prosecution on

grounds of double jeopardy and (b) failing to request an

evidentiary hearing to challenge “issues of fact and law”

regarding “materials of DNA,” fingerprints, “clear pictures,”

and other physical and psychological evidence.

11. Appellate counsel rendered ineffective of counsel when he

failed to do as Smith requested on appeal.

Doc. No. 1 at 4-9; Doc. No. 1-2 at 5.

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The Government answers that Smith’s claims are either procedurally barred or

meritless, or both. Doc. No. 12. Smith was allowed an opportunity to respond to the

Government’s answer and has done so. Doc. No. 17. Based on consideration of the parties’

submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the court concludes that an evidentiary

hearing is not required and that, pursuant to Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings in the United States District Courts, Smith’s § 2255 motion should be denied.

 Unless otherwise indicated, references to document numbers are to those assigned by the 2

Clerk of Court. Page references are to those assigned by CM/ECF.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. General Standard of Review

Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal; therefore, the grounds for

collateral attack on final judgments of conviction are extremely limited. A federal prisoner

is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 only if the district court imposed a sentence that

(1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3)

exceeded the maximum sentence authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral

attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11 Cir. th

2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11 Cir. 1999). “Relief under 28

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U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow

compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if

condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d

1225, 1232 (11 Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “[A] non-constitutional error that may th

justify reversal on direct appeal does not generally support a collateral attack on a final

judgment, unless the error (1) could not have been raised on direct appeal and (2) would, if

condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232-33 (citations

omitted); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (error oflaw does not provide basis

for collateral attack unless claimed error constituted a “fundamental defect which inherently

results in a complete miscarriage of justice”). The “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must

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be shown that the alleged constitutional violation “has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.”

B. Substantive Claims Raised and Resolved on Direct Appeal

The following claims presented in Smith’s § 2255 motion were also raised on direct

appeal, where they were decided adversely to Smith by the appellate court:

1. There was insufficient evidence to convict Smith of bank

robbery. See Doc. No. 1 at 5; United States v. Smith, 370 Fed.

App’x 29, 35-36 (11 Cir. 2010). th

2. The eyewitness testimony of Annette Gurley and Daniel

Robinson was unreliable, because (a) Gurley gave conflicting,

uncertain descriptions of the robber and first identified someone

else as the robber and (b) Robinson did not positively identify

Smith in the photographic lineup shown to him. See Doc. No.

1 at 5; 370 Fed. App’x at 36.

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3. Smith’s sentence was improperly enhanced for an assault on a

United States Marshal, because the alleged assault was not

proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See Doc. No. 1 at

7; 370 Fed. App’x at 36-38.

4. The Government improperly used acquitted conduct to enhance

Smith’s sentence. See Doc. No. 1 at 7; 370 Fed. App’x at 36-

38.

“The district court is not required to reconsider claims of error that were raised and

disposed of on direct appeal.” United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11 Cir. th

2000); see also United States v. Rowan, 663 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11 Cir. 1981). If a claim has th

In his appeal, Smith presented these same arguments in support of his claim that there was 3

insufficient evidence to convict him of bank robbery.

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previously been raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to a defendant, it cannot be

relitigated in a collateral attack under § 2255. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343. Furthermore,

“[a] rejected claim does not merit rehearing on a different, but previously available, legal

theory.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit found Smith claims to be meritless and decided the

attendant issues adversely to him. See 370 Fed. App’x at 35-38. Because these claims were

raised and resolved in Smith’s direct appeal, this court will not reconsider the claims here.

Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343. 

C. Substantive Claims Not Raised on Direct Appeal

Smith’s § 2255 motion contains these substantive claims, which were not raised on

direct appeal: 

1. There was insufficient evidence to convict Smith of being a

felon in possession of a firearm. See Doc. No. 1 at 5.

2. The prosecutor committed misconduct byknowinglypresenting

false statements by Willie Jackson and Garland Clark to the

grand jury to secure a “false affidavit” to obtain Smith’s

indictment. Id.

3. Smith’s sentence was improperly enhanced for second-degree

murder when he was never charged with or convicted of

second-degree murder. Id. at 7.

4. The district court should have severed the charges against Smith

so that “certain interlocutory orders [could] become final.” Id.

5. Detective Hill presented false testimony at trial during crossexamination when he stated that Smith was the onlyperson who

fit the description of the robber given by the eyewitnesses. See

Doc. No. 1-2 at 5.

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6. The district court should have dismissed the charges against

Smith on grounds of double jeopardy. See Doc. No. 1 at 8-9.

Ordinarily, if an available claim is not advanced on direct appeal, it is deemed

procedurally barred from review in a § 2255 proceeding. See Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d

1052, 1055-56 (11 Cir. 1994); Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11 Cir. th th

1989). “A defendant can avoid a procedural bar only by establishing one of the two

exceptions to the procedural default rule. Under the first exception, a defendant must show

cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the alleged

error.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11 Cir. 2004) (citing Bousley v. United th

States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)). “Under the second exception, a court may allow a

defendant to proceed with a § 2255 motion despite his failure to show cause for procedural

default if ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent.’” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234–35 (quoting Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055).

With the arguable exception of his double jeopardy claim, Smith does not attempt

4

to establish cause for his procedural default of the above-listed substantive claims. Further,

although he maintains that he has “raised several claims centered around ‘actual innocence’

that will also excuse him from any procedural default” (Doc. No. 17 at 2), Smith’s

arguments in this regard are the same sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments he presented

on direct appeal and which were rejected by the appellate court. “‘[A]ctual innocence’

 This issue is discussed below. 4

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means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. “To be

credible, [an actual innocence] claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not

presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Smith’s arguments regarding

his “actual innocence” do not rely on any new evidence and are merely attempts to relitigate

the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at

623. Smith’s failure to present a viable claim of actual innocence, combined with his failure

to show cause for not raising his other claims of error on direct appeal, prevents him from

overcoming procedural default; consequently, his substantive claims raised for the first time

in his § 2255 motion are procedurally barred from review.

Smith’s § 2255 motion contains an independent claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to challenge his indictment and prosecution as

being in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Doc. No. 1 at 4. Ineffective

assistance of counsel may satisfy the “cause” exception to a procedural bar, see Greene, 880

F.2d at 1305, but only if the ineffective-assistance claim is meritorious. Id. To determine

if an ineffective-assistance claim is meritorious, the court must determine if the underlying

substantive claim is meritorious, as counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

claim. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1344. Because this court concludes, as discussed more fully

below (see Part II.D.1), that Smith’s double jeopardy claim is meritless, and thus his trial

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counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the claim, Smith fails to demonstrate cause

for the procedural default of his double jeopardy claim.

5

D. Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the standards of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325,

1344 (11 Cir. 2006). Under Strickland’s two-part test, a petitioner must demonstrate (1)

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that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2)

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184

Even if some of the vague statements in Smith’s § 2255 motion were to be construed as 5

assertions that the ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel constituted cause for his failure to

raise his remaining substantive claims on direct appeal, Smith would be unable to satisfythe “cause”

standard, because he wholly fails to demonstrate the merit of any of these substantive claims. Smith

presents absolutely no supporting argument for his claim that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See Doc. No. 1 at 5. Likewise, Smith

presents no argument or evidence to support his claim that he prosecutor knowingly presented false

statements by Willie Jackson and Garland Clark to the grand jury. Id. Smith’s claim that his

sentence was improperly enhanced for second-degree murder, see id. at 7, is factually inaccurate; he

was never charged with or convicted of second-degreemurder. While the district court, in imposing

his sentence, considered the conduct underlying his indictment on state charges of attempted murder

(which conduct was also the basis of the counts in his federal indictment of which he was acquitted),

Smith’s counsel, both at sentencing and on appeal, did in fact challenge the court’s consideration of

this conduct in imposing his sentence. Both the district court and the appellate court rejected this

argument, however. Next, Smith presents no supporting argument for his claim that the district court

should have severed the charges against him so that “certain interlocutory orders [could] become

final.” Id. Finally, Smith does not show that Detective Hill presented false testimony during crossexamination at trial. See Doc. No. 1-2 at 5. During cross-examination of Hill, Smith’s trial counsel

demonstrated only that Hill’s recollection of part of his prior testimony at a suppression hearing was

inaccurate. This falls far short of showing Hill provided “false testimony” or that the Government

knowingly presented false testimony. Further, because the conflict in Hill’s testimony was made

known to the jury, Smith could not possibly have been prejudiced under the circumstances.

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(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313

(11 Cir. 2000). A “reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the

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outcome.” Strickland., 466 U.S. at 694.

Scrutiny of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and the court indulges a

“strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was reasonable. Chandler, 218 F.3d at

1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will “avoid second-guessing counsel’s

performance: It does not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would

not have chosen is guilty of rendering ineffective assistance.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted). Thus, “[g]iven the strong presumption in favor of competence, the

petitioner’s burden of persuasion – though the presumption is not insurmountable – is a

heavy one.” Id.

Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of the Strickland

inquiry, relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, once a court

decides that one of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the

other one has been. Id. at 697; Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11 Cir. 1998) (“if a

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defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong, the court need not address the performance

prong”).

A criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel continues through

direct appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel may be shown if the movant can “establish ... that counsel omitted

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significant and obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly

weaker.... Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented,

will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Mayo v. Henderson,

13 F.3d 528, 533 (2 Cir. 1994). nd

1. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Challenge Indictment and

Prosecution on Grounds of Double Jeopardy

Smith contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to challenge Smith’s indictment and prosecution on grounds of double jeopardy. See

Doc. No. 1 at 4 & 8-9. Smith maintains that if his counsel had raised this double jeopardy

defense, the district court would have ruled in his favor and dismissed the charges against

him, just as the state trial court did with attempted-murder charges that were brought against

Smith in state court based on the same conduct forming the basis of the counts in his federal

indictment charging him with using a gun in an assault on a United States Marshal. Id. The

6

jury in this case acquitted Smith on those two counts of the four-count indictment, although

the district court considered the conduct underlying those charges in imposing Smith’s

sentence. 

Smith’s double jeopardy claimis meritless. Even if his federal and state prosecutions

were based on the same underlying conduct, offenses charged by different sovereigns are

The record indicates that the State of Alabama issued warrants against Smith on the 6

attempted-murder charges shortly before his federal prosecution was initiated and that an indictment

on the charges was returned by the State of Alabama after the jury returned its verdicts in Smith’s

federal trial but before Smith’s federal sentencing.

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different for double jeopardy purposes. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 (1985); see

also United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1360-61 (11 Cir. 1004); United th

States v. Woods, 216 Fed. App’x 931, 938 (11 Cir. 2007). Smith’s double jeopardy claim th 7

lacks merit, thus it is axiomatic that his counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise

the claim. See Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11 Cir. 2001) (counsel cannot be

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ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue). United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970,

974 (11 Cir. 1992) (same). th

2. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Request Evidentiary Hearing

Smith contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an

evidentiary hearing to challenge “issues of fact and law” regarding “materials of DNA,”

fingerprints, “clear pictures,” and other physical and psychological evidence. Doc. No. 1

at 4. Smith, however, neglects to elaborate in any way on this claim. He points to no

specific benefit to his defense that his counsel might have obtained by requesting an

evidentiary hearing addressed to the matters in question. In an affidavit addressing Smith’s

claim, his former trial counsel states that “all government evidence was vigorously

challenged through cross-examination, defense testimony/evidence, and expert testimony.” 

Doc. No. 9 at 4. Weighing Smith’s conclusory allegations against the averments of his

former counsel, and considering the record evidence supporting counsel’s contention that

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals recognized this “doctrine of dual sovereignty” in 7

reversing the state trial court’s ruling dismissing the state attempted-murder charges brought against

Smith. See State v. Smith, 46 So. 3d 14, 16-17 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). 

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he vigorously challenged the Government’s case, the court finds that Smith has failed to

show that counsel’s performance in this regard was deficient or that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89. Therefore, Smith is not entitled

to any relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

3. Appellate Counsel’s Failure to Do as Smith Requested

Finally, Smith alleges that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective because he did

not do as Smith requested on appeal. See Doc. No. 1 at 7. Smith’s claim in this regard is

devoid of specifics, and Smith fails to point to (much less demonstrate) a single meritorious

issue that his counsel should have raised on appeal, but did not.

The attorney who represented Smith at sentencing and on direct appeal filed a

detailed affidavit with this court addressing Smith’s suggestion that there were meritorious

issues counsel neglected to argue on appeal. See Doc. No. 11. Counsel’s affidavit provides,

in pertinent part, as follows:

3. Mr. Smith asserts that the undersigned counsel’s representation was

ineffective. The undersigned represented the Defendant at Sentencing

and on Appeal. After reviewing Mr. Smith’s petition, it appears that

his claims are unclear and frivolous in nature.

4. Smith’s Ground One: There was no double jeopardy issue to invoke

at Sentencing or on Appeal as there were no other charges against Mr.

Smith by any other Federal Court. However, since the Federal

prosecution, the State of Alabama indicted Mr. Smith on Attempted

Murder (the basis of the acquitted conduct). Mr. Smith’s double

jeopardy claim is without merit.

5. Smith’s Ground Two: The undersigned on Appeal raised the issue of

Sufficiencyofthe Evidence on the bank-robberyconviction and for the

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possessing-a-firearm-during-a-crime-of-violence conviction. These

convictions were affirmed. The undersigned did not represent the

Defendant at trial.

6. Smith’s Ground Three: This attorney strenuously argued against Mr.

Smith being sentenced on acquitted conduct, and again on appeal, and

at oral argument. This Circuit’s long-standing precedent directs that

“[r]elevant conduct of which a defendant was acquitted nonetheless

may be taken into account in sentencing for the offense of conviction,

as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct relied upon by

a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d

1448, 1452 (11 Cir. 1997); United States v. Hristov, 466 F3.d 949,

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954 n.6 (11 Cir. 2006) (district court’s determination of relevant

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conduct is governed by the preponderance of the evidence standard

rather than the more demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt). The Supreme Court explained, in United States v. Watts, 519

U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 636 (1997), that “sentencing enhancements

do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not convicted,

but rather increase his sentence because of the manner in which he

committed the crime of conviction.” This claim of improper

sentencing is without merit.

7. Smith’s Ground Four: Mr. Smith’s claim that the Federal Court

committed “Double Jeopardy” is completely without merit and is

frivolous as there were no other pending Federal charges against Mr.

Smith. However, Mr. Smith was indicted by the State of Alabama on

the acquitted conduct (Attempted Murder). The State of Alabama at

present is appealing the dismissal of the Attempted Murder charges. 

The State of Alabama can prosecute and this is not a “Double

Jeopardy” issue.

Doc. No. 11 at 1-3.

The averments in counsel’s affidavit are well taken and are fully supported by the

record. While Smith, in presenting this claim, fails to forthrightly point to, or present

supporting arguments for, any claim counsel supposedly should have raised on appeal,

counsel’s affidavitsusses out possible claims fromSmith’s vague allegations and establishes

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that such claims are not meritorious. Smith’s vague and conclusory allegations are 

insufficient to show that his appellate counsel’s performance was in any way deficient or

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-89.

Therefore, Smith is not entitled to relief based on this claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed by Smith be denied, as the claims therein entitle him to no relief.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

before March 18, 2013. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party froma de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See th

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Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc). th

Done this 4 day of March, 2013.

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/s/ Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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