Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_19-cv-05891/USCOURTS-cand-1_19-cv-05891-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

DEBRA AVENMARG,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05891-RMI 

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 44, 45, 46

Now pending before the court is Defendant Humboldt County’s (“Defendant County”)

Second Motion to Dismiss (dkt. 44), which Defendant Blanck joined (dkt. 45), seeking dismissal 

of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (dkt. 43) without further leave to amend, and 

Defendant Blanck’s Motion (dkt. 46) seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim. Plaintiff has 

responded (dkts. 47, 48), and Defendants have replied (dkt. 50, 52). For the reasons stated below, 

Defendants’ Motion (dkt. 44) is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant Blanck’s Motion

(dkt. 46) is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an original complaint against Jeffrey Blanck, counsel for Humboldt County, 

and Humboldt County itself, for violating her rights to privacy in making familial decisions under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, retaliated against her for exercising that right, and interfered with her 

right to petition the courts under the First Amendment. Compl. (dkt. 1). Defendant County moved 

to dismiss (dkt. 14), and Defendant Blanck moved to join (dkt. 24) the motion which the court 

granted (dkt. 25). On December 19, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motions, and Plaintiff 

orally moved to amend her complaint (dkt. 31). The court granted Plaintiff’s motion and denied 

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Defendants’ motions as moot. Id. 

On January 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC (dkt. 43) which is the subject of the pending 

motions to dismiss. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges eleven claims – five federal claims and six state 

law claims. In Claim-1, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Blanck and County engaged in acts 

which interfered with her right to privacy, specifically privacy in making familial decisions, under 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. FAC (dkt. 43) at 18-20. The first 

infringing act by Defendants was wrongfully accusing Plaintiff of violating her ethical duties as an 

attorney in an attempt to deter her from exercising her right to make familial decisions. Id. at 18. 

Second, Defendants terminated Plaintiff when she declined their ultimatum to either rescind her 

motion to obtain de facto parental status or voluntarily resign from her post as counsel for the 

County. Id. In Claim-2, Plaintiff submits that Defendants retaliated against her for exercising her 

constitutionally protected right to make familial decisions under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 20-22. Defendants retaliated by: 1) wrongfully terminating 

Plaintiff; 2) filing motions to disqualify her from cases in her new job; and 3) Defendant Blanck 

filing false or inaccurate complaints to the California State Bar. Id. at 20. In Claim-3, Plaintiff 

argues that as a public employee she had a qualified right to speak on matter of public concern 

under the First Amendment (i.e. right to petition the courts), and Defendants interfered with that 

right by taking adverse employment actions against her for exercising that right. Id. 22-24. Claim4 alleges that Defendants, through Defendant Blanck’s and his subordinates’ conduct, interfered 

with Plaintiff’s right to familial association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 24-

26. In Claim-5, Plaintiff contends that Defendant County had an official policy that County 

Counsel could not foster children in Humboldt county, thereby depriving Plaintiff of her right to 

familial association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. 26-28. 

In Claim-6, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ retaliatory acts, recounted in her earlier 

claims, violated California Labor Code § 1102.5. Id. at 28-30. In Claim-7, Plaintiff submits that 

Defendants infringed her rights to privacy in familial decision making as guaranteed by Article 1, 

Sec. 1 of the California Constitution. Id. at 30-32. Claim-8 alleges that Defendants defamed 

Plaintiff in violation of California Civil Code § 43. Id. at 32-34. In Claim-9, Plaintiff contends that 

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Defendants intentionally interfered with her contractual relations with Humboldt County Superior 

Court to represent parents and children in juvenile dependency matters in violation of California 

common law. Id. at 34-35. In Claim-10, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in the 

aforementioned conduct with the intent to inflict emotional distress. Id. at 35-36. Lastly, in Claim11, Plaintiff alleges, in the alternative, that Defendants’ conduct constituted negligent infliction of 

emotional distress. Id. at 36-37. 

Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

In the FAC, Plaintiff begins by describing Defendant Blanck’s role and authority as 

County Counsel. FAC (dkt. 43) at 4-5. County Counsel is appointed by Defendant County’s Board 

of Supervisors, and at all relevant times Defendant Blanck was the appointed County Counsel. Id. 

at 4. The County Counsel’s Office provided legal services to Defendant County’s Child Welfare 

Services Department (“CWS”) for trials and appeals. Id. at 4-5. Defendant County’s CWS was 

responsible for the investigation and intervention of child abuse and neglect in Defendant County, 

and the County Counsel’s Office represented CWS in statutory based dependency proceedings. Id. 

at 5. The Office was responsible for addressing potential and actual ethical conflicts of its staff

arising in the course of such representation. Id. It addressed conflicts by creating and managing

policies and procedures such as “screening off attorneys to avoid conflicts; sending the case to 

private counsel and/or transferring the case out of the county.” Id. The County Counsel’s Office 

had the authority to establish, maintain, and make decisions about potential and actual ethical 

conflicts. Id. 

On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff began working for Defendant County as Deputy County 

Counsel at the Office of County Counsel. Id. She was one of three attorneys assigned to provide 

legal services to CWS at the trial level. Id. In January of 2015, Plaintiff recognized the name of a 

minor in a confidential dependency case. Id. She “immediately brought the matter to the attention 

of the [] County Counsel legal secretary, Eliza Onate, and informed her of the apparent conflict.” 

Id. at 6. 

Plaintiff recognized the name because it was her extended family member, 

. Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s family ties to GN began many years 

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They also played together and went for walks. Id. She also worked with GN to build his language 

and other developmental skills. Id. GN called Plaintiff “Auntie Debra.” Id. GN’s placement with 

Plaintiff’s and became problematic, and CWS suggested that GN be placed with 

Plaintiff. Id. Other possible placements were out of the county, far from his birth home and family. 

Id. Thus, Plaintiff took action to seek appropriate approvals from both CWS and the County 

Counsel’s Office to become GN’s foster parent. Id. In November of 2015, Plaintiff arranged 

weekly meetings for GN and his Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) whose job was to 

advocate on GN’s behalf in proceedings. Id. at 8.

On or about December 11, 2015, Plaintiff was informed that she satisfied the requirements 

to become a foster parent, but CWS and the County Counsel’s Office were still discussing whether 

Plaintiff’s status as Deputy County Counsel presented issues since she represented CWS in other

legal proceedings. Id. In the meantime, Plaintiff obtained approval to have extended visits with 

GN. Id. On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff and her spouse submitted fingerprint scans to be eligible 

for fostering. Id. Plaintiff also attempted to make an appointment with CWS to finalize the 

paperwork to become GN’s foster parent. Id. However, she was informed by the assistant county 

counsel that further discussions were required before she could become GN’s foster parent. Id. 

On December 21, 2015, with approval from the County Counsel’s Office and CWS, 

Plaintiff became GN’s foster parent. Id. Plaintiff met with GN’s biological parents to learn his 

preferences and arrange visits between them. Id. GN was twenty-five months old when he 

transitioned to Plaintiff’s home. Id. GN and Plaintiff further developed their bond, and GN began 

calling Plaintiff “auntie mamma” and eventually “mamma.” Id. Plaintiff and her husband took 

walks and GN would ride his tricycle; she took him swimming and to gymnastics; and they read 

books together every night. Id. GN became attached to Plaintiff and followed her around the house 

and wanted to be involved in everything she did, including household chores. Id. He would help 

her feed the cats, sort the laundry, and cook. Id. GN liked to be rolled up in a blanket and turned 

into a “burrito,” then carried around, and delivered to Plaintiff’s husband who would then pretend 

to eat him. Id. GN thrived in Plaintiffs home. Id. He went from being very delayed in speech to 

advanced for his age, and he began to exhibit strong bonding behaviors which he had not 

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previously exhibited. Id. at 8-9. 

Throughout this period, Plaintiff was advised by the assistant county counsel that she was 

completely screened from accessing information in GN’s case. Id. at 9. On May 13, 2016, Plaintiff 

found a mentor to support her as a foster parent. Id. On May 24, 2016, GN’s case was transferred 

from Humboldt County Counsel’s Office to the Del Norte County Counsel’s Office. Id. Due to 

ethical considerations, Plaintiff was not informed of the reason for the transfer other than being 

informed that it was an additional screening measure. Id. On June 15, 2016, Plaintiff was informed 

by a social worker supervisor from the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human 

Services that Plaintiff could not be assigned a mentor or attend foster parent support groups in 

Humboldt county because GN’s case had been transferred to Del Norte county. Id. On September 

6, 2016, Plaintiff filed her first “Caregiver Information Form” in which she objected to a proposed 

visitation process for GN’s mother. Id. 

Nearly a year later, around June of 2017, Del Norte County Counsel and CWS declined to 

continue overseeing GN’s case and transferred the matter back to Defendant County. Id. at 10. 

Humboldt County CWS then retained private, outside counsel (i.e. conflict counsel) to represent 

them in GN’s case. Id. The following month, Plaintiff was advised by her employer that she must 

either surrender her role as a foster parent or be removed from her usual assignments which would 

be transferred to a newer attorney in the office (who did not handle dependency cases) as an 

ethical screening measure. Id. Plaintiff chose to switch assignments so she could continue 

fostering GN. Id. At around the same time, the assistant county counsel recommended that 

Plaintiff apply for “de facto parent” status and to seek an attorney to represent her in the 

proceedings. Id. Plaintiff stated she was not prepared to do so at that time. Id. 

On August 9, 2017, the dependency court was considering the possibility of transitioning 

GN to his biological parents. Id. Plaintiff filed a second “Caregiver Information Form” regarding 

visitation and placement of GN. Id. A month later, CWS retained different, private counsel which 

represented CWS in GN’s case until Plaintiff’s eventual termination. Id. On September 27, 2017, 

Plaintiff filed a third “Caregiver Information Form” requesting visitation with GN in anticipation 

of GN returning to his biological parents’ care. Id. The following day, GN was returned to the care

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to leave a mark. Id. Due to a previously scheduled visit, GN was in Plaintiff’s care when CWS 

later made contact. Id. GN was once again transferred to the custody of his other biological parent. 

Id. As a result, Plaintiff no longer had visitation through informal agreement. Id. From December 

of 2017 to May of 2018, Plaintiff repeatedly tried to arrange visits with GN without success. Id. 

Also, around December of 2017, the assistant county counsel directed Plaintiff to reassign six of 

her cases because the social worker assigned to GN’s case was also assigned to those six cases. Id. 

On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for de facto parent status in GN’s case to request 

visitation and to provide the court with information about GN and his relatives. Id. This was 

Plaintiff’s fourth filing in GN’s case during the term of her employment with the County. Id. That 

day, Plaintiff was called into the office to speak with the assistant county counsel and Defendant 

Blanck. Id. at 12-13. They informed Plaintiff that they had discussed Plaintiff’s motions filed in 

GN’s case with the director of CWS. Id. at 13. They told her that, if she was given standing in 

GN’s case, her position would be potentially adverse to that of the County Counsel’s Office. Id. 

Plaintiff was surprised as she had filed motions in GN’s case before without any issues, and it was 

the assistant county counsel who encouraged Plaintiff to file for de facto parent status. Id. 

Moreover, Defendant Blanck and assistant county counsel previously told Plaintiff that there were 

no conflicts due to her role as GN’s foster parent. Id. They inquired whether Plaintiff would appeal 

if her motion in GN’s case was denied, and Plaintiff responded that she would. Id. Defendant 

Blanck informed Plaintiff that such an appeal would be directly adverse to the County’s position 

which would be required to defend against the motion and any subsequent appeal. Id. Defendant 

Blanck and assistant county counsel encouraged Plaintiff to withdraw her motions in GN’s case. 

Id. They also advised her to contact the State Bar ethics hotline. Id. Given Plaintiff’s relationship 

and bond with GN the idea that she would abandon her efforts to be in his life was untenable and 

inconsistent with the instructions of GN’s therapist regarding his best interests and healthy 

development. Id. 

As directed, Plaintiff spoke with the State Bar ethic’s hotline the following day. Id. The 

hotline operator could not provide any specific authority for her situation and did not provide clear 

guidance other than confirmation that previous ethical screening measures were significant. Id. 13-

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14. The hotline operator stated that the matter would benefit from a proceeding before a judge who 

could make a ruling after being presented with all the facts. Id. at 14. Plaintiff relayed this 

information to the assistant county counsel, who responded that she would not discuss the matter 

without Defendant Blanck present. Id. 

On May 31, 2018, Plaintiff once again met with Defendant Blanck and the assistant county 

counsel. Id. Defendant Blanck told Plaintiff that she would either need to withdraw the motion for 

de facto parent status and her motions for visitation, or end her employment with the County. Id. 

She was given until the following Monday to decide. Id. The assistant county counsel added that 

the County Counsel’s Office had a new policy that deputy county counsels could no longer take 

placement of foster children in Humboldt County. Id. The stated purpose of the policy was to 

eliminate potential or actual conflicts of interest. Id. The policy effectively prevented Plaintiff 

from being able to care for GN, who had lived with her for almost two years and was possibly the 

only familiar person willing to take him. Id. Plaintiff believed the policy was created specifically 

to justify firing her and limiting her access to the court system. Id. On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff told 

Defendant Blanck and assistant county counsel that she would neither withdraw her motions nor 

resign. Id. She was fired on the spot. Id. 

The next day, the lead attorney for the panel of court-appointed counsel in dependency 

cases contacted Plaintiff and informed her that there was a newly created full-time position on the 

panel. Id. at 14-15. Lead counsel added that Plaintiff was eligible to obtain a contract with the 

court to the join the panel and recommended that she try to obtain a waiver of any potential 

conflicts from the County Counsel’s Office. Id. at 15. A few days later, Plaintiff requested a 

waiver from the County Counsel’s Office, and the assistant county counsel provided an 

encouraging response. Id. 

On June 8, 2018, Plaintiff emailed the County’s Human Resources Director to preserve her 

appeals rights, if any, and to state that she believed she had been wrongfully terminated. Id. 

Shortly thereafter, the assistant county counsel wrote to Plaintiff that she was made aware that 

Plaintiff filed a complaint regarding her termination and thus, assistant county counsel could no 

longer communicate with Plaintiff about her application for waiver of conflict of interest. Id. 

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On June 19, 2018, Plaintiff received notice that a hearing for her motion for de facto parent 

status was set for June 22, 2018. Id. Plaintiff then contacted GN’s paternal and maternal relatives 

to come to court with her that day to establish a showing that GN’s family supported Plaintiff’s 

application, and that they were relying on Plaintiff so they may continue to have a relationship 

with GN. Id. At the hearing, Plaintiff, her husband, and eleven family members showed up to 

support her application. Id. Plaintiff, GN’s counsel, and GN’s father presented information to 

support Plaintiff’s motion. Id. GN’s counsel stated that GN continued to ask for Plaintiff and 

wanted to see her. Id. GN’s mother opposed the motion, and CWS took a neutral position. Id. at 

15-16. The court granted Plaintiff’s motion, naming Plaintiff and her husband GN’s de facto 

parents giving them a number of rights as a party to GN’s dependency proceedings. Id. at 16. 

Plaintiff then participated in the remaining days of trial in GN’s case. Id. At the conclusion of the 

contested hearing, the judge tentatively ruled that GN’s mother would have primary custody. Id. 

Plaintiff was granted visitation rights. Id. 

On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff began contracting with the Humboldt County Superior Court to 

accept appointments to represent parents, children, and other parties to juvenile dependency 

matters. Id. On July 9, 2018, Defendant County Counsel’s Office began objecting to Plaintiff’s 

appointment on all juvenile cases. Id. One deputy county counsel moved to disqualify Plaintiff

from all of her cases – including newly filed cases that did not exist while she was employed by 

Defendant County. Id. Another deputy county counsel moved to disqualify Plaintiff from all of the 

cases that existed at the time Plaintiff worked for Defendant County. Id. Both argued that Plaintiff 

had not obtained waivers from the County or her clients, and that they could not consent to a 

waiver of Plaintiff’s alleged conflict. Id. at 16-17. In addition to oral motions to disqualify, 

Plaintiff received written motions to disqualify her from her cases on July 10, 2018. Id. at 17. 

Defendant County filed more of the same motions the following week. Id. If these motions were 

granted, Plaintiff would have lost her assigned cases and the pay she would be due if she retained 

those cases. Id. 

On July 19, 2018, a dependency court judge consolidated the motions to disqualify 

Plaintiff and held a hearing. Id. Defendant Blanck represented the County Counsel’s Office and 

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argued to disqualify Plaintiff from all cases that existed in the office during her employment there.

Id. The parties resolved the matter before a ruling was issued, and the County withdrew its 

motions. Id. 

On May 17, 2019, Plaintiff received a notice from the State Bar of California that it had 

received a complaint from Defendant Blanck alleging that she had violated ethical rules. Id. On 

December 9, 2019, the State Bar informed Plaintiff that the complaint had been investigated and 

the matter did not warrant further action and would be closed. Id. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws,” that were perpetrated by 

a person or entity, including a municipality, acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

see also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978). In the present context, in 

order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a 

plaintiff must allege facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); thus, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). While “all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and 

construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner 

Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998), the court is not required to accept as true 

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, mere recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only where it appears, beyond doubt, 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of pleaded facts that would entitle her or him to relief. Morley v. 

Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In short, for a complaint to survive a motion to 

dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must 

plausibly suggest a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 

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F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s federal claims are rooted in Defendants’ alleged interference with her 

constitutional rights and retaliation for exercising those rights. Although Defendant Blanck joined 

in Defendant County’s Second Motion to Dismiss, some of the arguments belong solely to 

Defendant County. The court will address Defendant County’s arguments, then Defendants’ 

shared arguments, and finally, Defendant Blanck’s argument in his separate motion.

Defendant County argues that Plaintiff fails to allege a basis for municipal liability in 

Claims 1 through 4 because Defendant Blanck did not have final policymaking authority, and 

Plaintiff’s allegations were unclear about what role Defendant Blanck played regarding the policy

– at times alleging he created it, and other times that he “implemented or approved” it, or “acted 

because of” it. Defs.’ Mot. (dkt. 44) at 11-13. Additionally, Defendant County argues, in Claim-2, 

that Plaintiff’s allegation that the County “ratified and approved” Defendant Blanck’s conduct is 

conclusory. Id. at 13. Plaintiff counters that her allegations that Defendant Blanck, as County 

Counsel, had final policymaking authority “for establishing policies and procedures to address 

potential and actual ethical conflicts within the Office of the County Counsel” are sufficient. Pl.’s 

Opp. (dkt. 47) at 11. 

Both Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish that her relationship with GN was 

constitutionally protected for Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5. Defs.’ Mot. (dkt. 44) at 7. Plaintiff counters 

that Defendants’ attempt to undermine her relationship with GN disregards the jurisprudence 

regarding extended family relationships. Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 47) at 17-21. Defendants also argue that 

Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 are duplicative because the relationship analysis does not vary by virtue of 

which Amendment (First or Fourteenth) or nature of the right (privacy or liberty) is invoked and 

that deciding whether to associate is the same as actually associating with another person. Defs.’ 

Mot. (dkt. 44) at 15. Plaintiff responds that that Defendants’ attempt to collapse her claims into 

one right – associational interest – is factually and legally inaccurate. Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 47) at 13.

She also argues that her first claim asserts two cognizable legal theories – intrusion by compelled 

disclosure of personal matters and attempts to interfere with her familial decisions. Id. at 14-15. 

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Regarding Claim-3, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s speech was not constitutionally protected 

because it was on a private matter, and even if it was speech on a public matter, Defendants had 

adequate justification, as an employer, to terminate her employment. Defs.’ Mot. (dkt. 44) at 24-

30. In her Opposition Plaintiff does not address whether her speech was on a public matter; 

instead, she argues that she spoke as a private citizen in a court proceeding, and Defendants’

threats to terminate her and the policy itself constituted efforts to chill her petitioning in the 

dependency case. Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 47) at 16-17. Finally, Defendants argue that the motions to 

disqualify were shielded from liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine – a form of First 

Amendment protection; and, as to her state-law claims regarding those motions, Defendants assert 

the motions were privileged as publications in the course of a judicial proceeding. Defs.’ Mot. 

(dkt. 44) at 30-31. Plaintiff counters that the motions were not filed to obtain relief but rather the 

filing process was used to injure her, and thus, fall outside the protection of both the NoerrPennington doctrine and the state-law litigation privilege. Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 47) at 21-22. 

Separately, in his motion to dismiss Claim-6, Defendant Blanck argues that California 

Labor Code § 1102.5 does not provide for individual liability, and thus, Claim-6 should be 

dismissed. See Def. Blanck’s Mot. (dkt. 46). Plaintiff argues that, in 2013, the code was amended 

to impose individual liability. Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 48) at 9-14. 

Claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 – Municipal Liability

Local government entities are considered “persons” for the purposes of being subject to 

liability under § 1983 where an official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. 

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); however, a municipality may not be held 

vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat 

superior. See Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 

691. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff 

must establish: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) 

that the municipality had a policy, custom or practice; (3) that the policy, custom or practice 

amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy, 

custom or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. 

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School Dist. No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997); see also AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of 

Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts regarding the 

specific nature of the policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, 

and these facts must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. AE ex rel. Hernandez, 

666 F.3d at 637.

A plaintiff may establish municipal liability in one of three ways: 1) establish that a formal 

government policy or longstanding practice or custom cause her injury; 2) show that an official 

with final policymaking authority acted in a way that injured her rights and the act was itself the 

result of a deliberate choice made among alternatives; or 3) show an official policymaker either 

delegated such authority to, or ratified the deprivation by, a subordinate. See City of St. Louis v. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1996); 

Goldstein v. Cty. of San Mateo, No. C 05-03209 SBA (PR), 2008 WL 2954173, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 

July 30, 2008) (citing Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995). “Whether a 

particular official has final policy-making authority is a question of state law.” Gillette v. Delmore, 

979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. at 737, 109 

(1989); and Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123–24 (1988)). Additionally, “[p]roof of random acts or 

isolated incidents of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee are insufficient to 

establish the existence of a municipal policy or custom.” Goldstein, 2008 WL 2954173, at *11. 

Plaintiff starts her factual allegations by laying out Defendant Blanck’s position and 

authority as County Counsel. Id. at 4-6. She alleged that Defendant County’s Board of Supervisors

appointed Defendant Blanck as County Counsel, and the County Counsel’s Office was established 

in 1956. Id. at 4. Plaintiff explained that employees of the County Counsel’s Office, including 

Defendant Blanck, are employees of Defendant County, and the Office represented CWS in 

dependency proceedings. Id. at 5. Any potential and actual ethical conflicts arising during that 

representation were addressed by the County Counsel’s Office via policies and procedures it 

created and managed. Id. Defendant Blanck, as County Counsel, had final policymaking authority 

to determine whether an ethical conflict existed, and the appropriate course of action to address 

ethical conflicts “within the office of County Counsel.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant 

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Blanck approved of the actions taken in response to her alleged ethical conflict because he made 

the initial determination that a conflict existed. Id. Throughout her federal claims, Plaintiff alleges 

that “Defendants . . . directed [] subordinates in the acts that deprived Plaintiff of her rights,” and 

“Defendant Blanck knew that his subordinates were engaging in these acts . . . .” Id. at 18, 21, 23, 

25, 27. 

However, Plaintiff does not allege that any local or state laws grant Defendant Blanck final 

policymaking authority. Additionally, in Claim-4, Plaintiff stated, without more, that Defendant 

County “ratified and approved Defendant Blanck’s actions and actions of the Assistant County 

Counsel.” FAC (dkt. 43) at 21. That is a conclusory statement and thus cannot survive a motion to 

dismiss. However, it is not clear that these claims cannot be saved by an amendment, the dismissal 

shall be without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5. See In re 

Daou Systems, 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (complaint may be dismissed with prejudice if 

it is clear that it cannot be saved by amendment); Bloom v. Martin, 77 F.3d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 

1996) (“Dismissing a complaint without leave to amend is appropriate when granting leave would 

serve no purpose because the acts complained of cannot constitute a claim for relief.”); Bell v. City 

of Kellogg, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 (9th Cir. 1991) (dismissal with prejudice is proper if amendment 

“would be futile in saving the plaintiff's case”). In amending, rather than relying on conclusory 

statements, Plaintiff must include allegations that establish the fact that Defendant Blanck had 

final policymaking authority or that establish how a final policymaker ratified or adopted 

Defendant Blanck’s conduct. Additionally, Plaintiff should be clear about what role she believes 

Defendant Blanck played in regard to the policy – whether he created it, implemented or approved 

it, or that he acted because of it. Thus, Plaintiff should amend her complaint to show how she is 

entitled to relief under a theory of municipal liability. 

Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 – Constitutionally Protected Relationship

The right to familial association is entirely judge-made as it does not appear in the text of 

the Constitution. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has 

provided guidelines to identify whether a foster relationship may be entitled to some degree of

constitutional protection. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families For Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816

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Opp. (dkt. 47) at 17-18. Plaintiff added that the factors the Supreme Court laid out in US Jaycees

weighed in favor of finding her relationship sufficiently intimate to garner constitutional 

protection. Id. at 19. The size of the association was small; the purpose was to create a safe and 

healthy environment for GN to promote his growth and wellbeing; selectivity was shown by 

Plaintiff’s continued efforts to become closer with GN to provide aid, provide him with a home, 

and ultimately maintain their familial relationship; and, exclusivity existed because not all 

individuals could qualify as GN’s foster parent, and later, his de facto parent. Id. Additionally, 

Plaintiff argues that the cases cited by Defendants to show foster relationship are not 

constitutionally protected are inapposite. Id. at 20 n.9. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff was required to show either biological relation or adoption 

as well as unregulated cohabitation at the time of the challenged state action to state a 

constitutionally protected relationship. Defs.’ Mot. (dkt. 44) at 17-24. Defendants cite a string of 

appellate cases to support the position that foster relationships are not constitutionally protected

(id.), but the Ninth Circuit cases do not squarely reject protection of any kind for such 

relationships. Rather, these cited authorities found that foster parents do not have the same level of 

constitutional protection as natural parents or that protections for foster relationships are limited. 

See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that “foster parents do not 

enjoy the same constitutional protections that natural parents do.”); Gibson v. Merced Cty. Dep't of 

Human Res., 799 F.2d 582, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that any liberty interest asserted by 

foster parents is limited because California law treats foster care as part of a reunification process). 

Because the case law does not deny foster relationships all constitutional protection, the court will 

not find, on a motion to dismiss, that Plaintiff cannot allege a sufficiently intimate relationship that 

was entitled to at least some protection. Therefore, Defendants motion to dismiss is denied on this 

ground. 

Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 – Duplicative Claims

“The freedom of association substantially overlaps with the right of privacy.” Fleisher v. 

City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1499 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 

479, 483-84 (1965); and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462(1958)). In Fleisher, the plaintiff 

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alleged in one claim that the defendants violated his right of privacy, and in another claim, he 

alleged that the defendants violated his freedom of association. Fleisher, 829 F.2d at 1493. Both 

claims were presented to a jury. Id. Upon review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated 

that “[b]ecause the right of privacy and the freedom of intimate association have the same scope, 

our analysis of the freedom of association in this case is the same as our analysis of the right of 

privacy.” Id. at 1500. That court, however, did not state that the claims were duplicative; only that 

the analysis under both amendments was the same. See generally id. Thus, Claims 1 and 2 will not 

be dismissed as duplicative of Claims 4 and 5. To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to add her claim, 

raised for the first time in her Opposition ((dkt. 47) at 14-16), that Defendants violated her right to 

be free from disclosure of personal information she must do so in an amended complaint. 

Claim 5 – Constitutionality of Policy

Defendants argue that the policy prohibiting deputy county counsel from pursuing foster 

parenting was not unconstitutional on its face or as-applied to Plaintiff because her relationship 

with GN was not constitutionally protected. Defs.’Mot. (dkt. 44) at 21-22. As stated above, a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests whether Plaintiff can state a claim for relief which is plausible on 

its face; and, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that she had an intimate

relationship with GN that may be entitled to at least some protection under the constitution. The 

court, however, does not venture to say what level of protection she is entitled to at the pleading 

stage. On this ground, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied. 

Claim 3 – Retaliation for Petitioning 

“[T]he First Amendment protection of a public employee’s speech depends on a careful 

balance ‘between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 

public services it performs through its employees.’” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231 (2014)

(quoting Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 

568 (1968)). “‘In conducting this balancing, courts must give government employers wide 

discretion and control over the management of [their] personnel and internal affairs. This includes 

the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with 

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dispatch.’” Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 867 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended on 

denial of reh'g (July 15, 1999) (quoting Brewster v. Board of Education, 149 F.3d 971, 979 (9th 

Cir.1998)). “[A] stronger showing may be necessary if the employee’s speech more substantially 

involved matters of public concern.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983). “Whether an 

employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, 

and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 147–48. The forum 

where the petition is lodged is also relevant to the public-matter inquiry. Borough of Duryea, Pa. 

v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 398 (2011). 

Here, Plaintiff makes a conclusory statement that her speech was on a public matter. FAC 

(dkt. 43) at 22. The facts about her petitioning activities are that Plaintiff filed several motions in 

GN’s dependency case to obtain certain rights in his proceedings as a de facto parent and 

visitation. Id. at 9. In her Opposition, Plaintiff did not attempt to add facts to support her bare 

assertion that her speech was on a public matter. Instead, she argued that she spoke as a private 

citizen, that her filings were submitted truthfully to assist the court in the dependency proceedings, 

and that Defendants attempted to interfere with her petitioning by threatening to terminate her job. 

See Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 47) at 16-17. As far as forum and content, the court notes that dependency 

proceedings are confidential, and Plaintiff’s petitions presented private grievances – visitation of a 

minor and her right to participate in GN’s proceeding.

1, 2 Thus, Plaintiff failed to meet the required 

public-speech showing, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Claim-3 is granted without 

prejudice.3

1

“Unless requested by a parent or guardian and consented to or requested by the minor concerning whom 

the petition has been filed, the public shall not be admitted to a juvenile court hearing. The judge or referee 

may nevertheless admit such persons as he deems to have a direct and legitimate interest in the particular 

case or the work of the court.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 346. 

2

Juvenile case files are confidential and only available to parties directly involved in the case, certain state 

officials, and the child’s school superintendant or other designee of the school district. See Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 827. All others who wish to view a juvenile case file must file a petition with the juvenile 

court. Id. 

3 Defendant County also asserted that even if Plaintiff’s speech concerned a public matter, the County’s 

interest in “avoiding conflicts of interest between it and its attorneys outweighed [her] desire to visit [GN].” 

Defs.’ Mot. (dkt. 44) at 27. However, the weighing of such interests is not appropriate at this early stage of 

litigation. 

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Claim 2 – Motions to Disqualify 

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a form of First Amendment protection that arose in the 

context of Antitrust liability under the Sherman Act. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference 

v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). “Although the Noerr–Pennington doctrine 

originally immunized individuals and entities from antitrust liability, Noerr–Pennington immunity 

now applies to claims under § 1983 that are based on the petitioning of public authorities.” 

Empress LLC v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). The doctrine 

shields individuals and entities from liability for petitioning any part of the government for 

redress, even if the outcome of the petitioning results in harm to a competitor. See id. at 1056. It 

also “applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that are based on the petitioning of public 

authorities.” Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Noerr-Pennington immunity is not absolute. When the petitioning process is used to injure 

the plaintiff rather than to obtain relief, the sham exception applies, and a defendant may be liable 

for the injury caused. Empress, 419 F.3d at 1057. If, however, it is the desired outcome of the 

petitioning that harms the plaintiff, the defendants are immune from liability. Manistee, 227 F.3d 

at 1095. The sham exception is interpreted narrowly in the more political branch of the legislature, 

and it is more broadly applied in the judicial branch. Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056, 

1061 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he political arena has a higher tolerance for outright lies than the judicial 

arena does.”) (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972)). In 

litigation, the standard to make out the sham exception requires a plaintiff to first show that the 

petitioning was “‘objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically 

expect success on the merits.’” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231–32 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993)). Once 

a plaintiff satisfies that prerequisite showing, a court may consider the defendant’s allegedly 

illegal motive to petition the government. Id. “The fact that a litigant loses his case does not show 

that his lawsuit was objectively baseless for purposes of Noerr–Pennington immunity.” White, 227 

F.3d at 1232. 

Plaintiff argues that the numerous motions to disqualify her from the dependency cases 

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were made “without any factual basis, and contrary to prior representations.” Pl.’s Opp. (dkt. 47) 

at 22. The FAC supplies the following facts to support this argument: 1) when she was employed 

by the County, Defendant Blanck and the assistant county counsel told Plaintiff that there was no 

actual conflict when she fostered GN and simultaneously acted as a deputy county counsel; 2) then 

when she became a member of the panel of court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings,

deputy county counsels filed motions to disqualify Plaintiff from cases that did not exist during 

her term of employment with Defendant County; and 3) the motions were abandoned before a 

ruling was rendered. See FAC (dkt 43.) at 11, 16-17. The court finds Plaintiff’s allegations that the 

motions to disqualify were objectively baseless are sufficient to survive motion to dismiss. Thus, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim-2 regarding the motions to disqualify is denied. 

Claim 8 - California Litigation Privilege

In Claim-8, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants defamed her in violation of California Civil 

Code § 43. Id. at 32-34. California Civil Code § 47(b)(2) renders privileged any publication made 

in the course of a judicial proceeding. The privilege is absolute and covers any communication 

related to the litigation whether or not it amounts to a publication. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 

205, 215 (1990). “Any doubt as to whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying 

it.” Comstock v. Aber, 212 Cal. App. 4th 931, 952 (2012). “Moreover, the litigation privilege 

applies even where the communications at issue are alleged to be false or pretextual.” Gamble v. 

Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1029–30 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 

Plaintiff’s Claim-8 fails to allege any facts about what specific behavior she claims 

defamed, and merely states the elements of the claim which includes statements made verbally and 

in writing. FAC (dkt. 43) at 32-34. In their motion, Defendants assume Claim-8 is related to the 

motions to disqualify her in the dependency proceedings. Defs.’ Mot. (dkt. 44) at 31. From the 

facts section of the FAC, the court believes that Defendant Blanck’s complaint to the California 

bar could also be conduct associated with Claim-8. As Defendants’ and the court’s guesswork 

makes clear, Plaintiff failed to allege with specificity and in a non-conclusory way Defendants 

defamed her. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on this ground is granted, and Plaintiff is 

granted leave to amend. 

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Claim 6 – California Labor Code § 1102.5

In Claim-6, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants retaliated against her for engaging in a 

protected activity pursuant to Labor Code Section 1102.5. FAC (dkt. 43) at 28-30. Section 1102.5 

provides, in relevant part, that employers “shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing 

information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose 

information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the 

employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the 

violation or noncompliance . . . .” Cal. Lab. Code §1102.5(b). “Section 1102.5 is a whistleblower 

statute, the purpose of which is to encourage[e] workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts 

without fearing retaliation.” Lewis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. LACV167377PARAOX, 2016 

WL 7107760, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (quoting Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 

Cal. 4th 260, 287 (2006)). Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants retaliated against her for

disclosing information about a violation of or noncompliance with the law. Rather, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants retaliated against her for petitioning the government for relief in GN’s 

dependency case. The petitioning is not a protected activity under this provision. It is unclear what 

conduct Plaintiff engaged in that was protected from retaliation under this particular statute.

Therefore, it does not appear, from the face of the complaint, that Section 1102.5 applies, and thus, 

the court does not resolve the question of whether the statute imposes individual liability.

Therefore, the court dismisses this claim with leave to amend in the event that Plaintiff can allege 

any facts that she engaged in protected whistleblower activities and that conduct was the basis for 

any alleged retaliation by Defendants. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (dkt. 44) is granted in part and 

denied in part. The court finds the following arguments by Defendants unpersuasive: that no 

constitutional right could be alleged; that the federal claims were duplicative; and that the facts 

alleged were insufficient to show the policy infringed a constitutional right. The court finds the 

remaining arguments persuasive, and grants Plaintiff leave to amend as follows: Claims 1-4 are 

dismissed with leave to amend to allege municipal liability; Claim-3 is dismissed with leave to 

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amend to show Plaintiff’s speech was on a public matter; Claim-2 is dismissed with leave to 

amend to allege facts that the disqualification motions were objectively baseless; and Claim-8 is 

dismissed with leave to amend to specify what speech was defamatory. Finally, Claim-6 is 

dismissed with leave to amend to add allegations that Plaintiff engaged in protected whistleblower 

activities and to allege acts by Defendants in retaliation of her engaging in those protected 

activities. Defendants do not seek dismissal of the remaining state law claims, and thus, the court 

will not reach the sufficiency of those allegations at this time. 

Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to file an amended pleading no later than 30 days from the 

date of this order. The failure to file an amended complaint will result in a dismissal of those 

claims with prejudice. If Plaintiff fails to amend her complaint, the FAC will remain operative for 

Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 as against Defendant Blanck. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

April 29, 2020

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