Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02204/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2204

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In re: Operation of the Missouri

River System Litigation

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State of North Dakota, through the

North Dakota Department of

Health, an Agency of the State of

North Dakota; John Hoeven,

Governor; Wayne Stenehjem,

North Dakota Attorney General,

Ex. Rel. State of North Dakota;

North Dakota Department of

Health,

Appellants,

v.

United States Department of the

Army, the Corps of Engineers, a

Federal Agency; David Fastabend,

General Commander, Nw

Division, Portland, Oregon,

United States Army Corps of

Engineers; Kurt F. Ubbelohde, Lt.

Colonel, District Engineer,

Omaha District,

Appellees,

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the District of

Minnesota.

Appellate Case: 04-2204 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/16/2005 Entry ID: 1940792
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State of Nebraska,

Appellee,

State of Missouri,

Intervenor on Appeal.

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State of South Dakota,

Amicus on Behalf of

Appellant,

The Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara

Nation,

Amicus on Behalf of

Appellant.

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Submitted: April 11, 2005

 Filed: August 16, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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Appellate Case: 04-2204 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/16/2005 Entry ID: 1940792
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The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

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For more background on the operation of the Missouri River main stem

reservoir system, see our related opinion in In re: Operation of the Missouri River

System Litigation, Nos. 04-2737/04-2774/04-2785/04-2794/04-2878/04-2994, also

released today.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

 North Dakota appeals the district court’s1

 dismissal of its suit to enjoin the

United States Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) from releasing water from Lake

Sakakawea to support downstream navigation on the Missouri River. North Dakota’s

complaint alleges that the releases violate water quality standards for Lake

Sakakawea established pursuant to the Clean Water Act. For the reasons discussed

below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Lake Sakakawea is a reservoir in North Dakota formed by the enclosure of the

Garrison Dam, part of the Missouri River main stem reservoir system established by

the Flood Control Act of 1944 (“FCA”). The FCA assigns to the Corps the task of

managing the main stem reservoir system. The Corps releases water from Lake

Sakakawea into the Missouri River to support downstream navigation in accord with

the goals of the FCA.2

 North Dakota filed suit to enjoin the releases from Lake

Sakakawea on the grounds that lowering the level of the lake would violate state-law

water-quality standards established pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§

1251 et seq. (“CWA”). The states of Nebraska and South Dakota also filed

complaints as intervenors.

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The CWA is a federal law that directs the states to adopt state-law waterquality standards. Id. at § 1313. The state water-quality standards must incorporate

a designated use for each navigable body of water, as well as water-quality criteria

based on the designated use. Id. at § 1313(c)(2)(A). “Such standards shall be

established taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies,

propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial,

and other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for

navigation.” Id. Pursuant to the CWA, North Dakota designated Lake Sakakawea

as a “cold water fishery,” requiring the water to support the growth of salmonid fishes

and associated water life. In accord with that designation, North Dakota instituted

certain water-quality standards. North Dakota contends that the Corps’ releases of

water from Lake Sakakawea violate these water-quality standards because they

reduce the volume of cold-water habitat in the lake below that needed to support a

viable cold-water fishery ecosystem.

The district court dismissed the North Dakota complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6), holding that the CWA preserves sovereign immunity from suit for the Corps

when the Corps’ authority to maintain navigation is at issue. The district court also

dismissed the appeals of the intervenors as moot. North Dakota appeals, arguing that

the CWA waives the Corps’ sovereign immunity in this case. 

II. DISCUSSION

“We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss,

viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Casazza v. Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 2002). “Like the District Court, we

must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and dismiss the case only when

‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its]

claim which would entitle [it] to relief.’” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

Appellate Case: 04-2204 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/16/2005 Entry ID: 1940792
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45-46 (1957)). The district court’s interpretation of the CWA is reviewed de novo.

United States v. Templeton, 378 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2004).

North Dakota cannot enforce its state water quality standards against the Corps,

a federal agency, unless Congress has unequivocally waived the federal government’s

sovereign immunity from suit. United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607,

615 (1992). “Waivers of immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the

sovereign . . . .” Id. (quotations omitted). The CWA contains a limited waiver of

sovereign immunity:

Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative,

and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction

over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or

which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants . . . shall be

subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local

requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions

respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same

manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity . . . .

33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). This waiver of sovereign immunity is further limited by 33

U.S.C. § 1371(a), which states: “[The CWA] shall not be construed as . . . affecting

or impairing the authority of the Secretary of the Army . . . to maintain navigation.”

“Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, when we find the terms

of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.” Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v.

Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1032 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Okla. Tax

Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987)). On its face, § 1371(a) exempts the Corps, which

operates under the authority of the Secretary of the Army, from complying with the

CWA when its authority to maintain navigation would be affected. It is also clear

from the face of North Dakota’s complaint that North Dakota is attempting to use its

state water-quality standards to affect the Corps’ authority to release water from Lake

Sakakawea to support navigation. There are no exceptional circumstances here to

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The Corps argues that § 1323(a) can be read as not waiving sovereign

immunity in this case because the Corps merely is releasing water from the reservoir,

not discharging pollutants. Because we find § 1371(a) independently preserves the

Corps’ sovereign immunity in this case, we do not address the Corps’ argument

concerning the interpretation of § 1323(a). 

We note that in National Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 384 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit held that § 1323(a)

waived sovereign immunity with respect to the Corps’ discretionary operation of

dams on the Snake River. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that the CWA could

not be enforced against the Corps where state-law water-quality violations were due

to “the existence of the dams and not any discretionary method of operating the

dams.” Id. at 1178. The Corps’ authority to maintain navigation was not at issue in

that case.

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indicate that Congress would not have intended the § 1371(a) “navigation exception”

to the waiver of sovereign immunity to apply in this case.3

The CWA was amended in 1977 to emphasize that it applies to discharges from

the Corps’ channel-dredging operations. North Dakota argues that the legislative

history from the 1977 amendment evidences Congress’ intent for the Corps to comply

with the CWA in all its operations, in spite of the navigation-based limitation in §

1371(a). This argument fails because the 1977 amendment, while emphasizing that

the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1323(a) applied to the Corps, left the

clearly worded navigation exception in § 1371(a) intact. “Absent some ambiguity in

the statute, we have no occasion to look to legislative history.” Clark, 315 F.3d at

1032. There is nothing ambiguous about the admonition of § 1371(a) that the CWA

“shall not be construed as . . . affecting or impairing the authority of the Secretary of

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In any event, the legislative history from the 1977 amendment would not

support North Dakota’s argument. The legislative history indicates that Congress’

intent in enacting the 1977 amendments was to subject the Corps’ channel-dredging

activities to state water-quality standards promulgated pursuant to the CWA, while

preserving its authority to maintain navigation. The relevant passages from the

legislative history of the 1977 amendments are as follows:

The amendment is prompted by varying legal interpretations of

the applicability of [CWA] sections 313 [33 U.S.C. § 1323] and 404 [33

U.S.C. § 1344] to dredging activities. In 1975, the U.S. District Court

in Minnesota [held] that section 313 and legislative history of the

[CWA] required the Corps of Engineers to comply with State water

quality standards in dredging activities carried out in the State of

Minnesota . . . . This judgment was reversed in 1976 by the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals, which found that the legislative history of the

[CWA] conveyed an intent on the part of Congress to exempt the Corps

of Engineers, operating under section 404 [governing permits for

dredging], from State environmental law despite the language of section

313. [Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).]

By this amendment, the committee clarifies that corps dredging

activities are not exempt from State pollution abatement requirements.

In spite of language on section 313 in the Senate report on the 1972 act,

. . . the Supreme Court ruling in the Minnesota case would otherwise

free corps-conducted dredging from compliance with State water quality

standards. The intention of the 1972 act was not to exempt the corps or

any other public or private agency from State water quality standards

and the interpretation of section 404 by the courts is at variance with the

intent of Congress. In fact, Congress intended that section 404 in the

1972 act would in its initial implementation end the open water disposal

of dredge spoil. Quite the contrary has been the case.

. . . .

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the Army . . . to maintain navigation.” As a result, we do not reach the legislative

history in this case.4

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This amendment to section 404 is neither intended nor expected

to result in compromising the ability of the corps to maintain navigation.

S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 68-69 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4393 - 94.

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North Dakota also argues that whether compliance with its CWA water-quality

standards would affect the Corps’ authority to maintain navigation is a factual

question. For example, Lake Sakakawea was constructed so that water releases

siphon water from near the bottom of the lake. North Dakota suggests that the

construction of new outflow structures at Garrison Dam to siphon warmer water from

the top of Lake Sakakawea, rather than colder water from the bottom, might allow the

Corps to comply with North Dakota’s water-quality standards for a cold-water fishery

while still providing the requisite water releases to maintain navigation. If we

allowed North Dakota to enforce its water-quality standards on this basis, there is no

discernible limit to the new structures and new operational plans that other states with

main-stem reservoirs could demand to force the Corps to comply with their own

water-quality standards. If each state is allowed to use its reservoir water-quality

standards as a tool to control how the Corps must release water from the main stem

reservoirs, the “authority of the Secretary of the Army . . . to maintain navigation”

will obviously be affected, in violation of § 1371(a). 

As the district court noted, the above result is also supported by the principles

of preemption. Implied conflict preemption arises “where state law stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

Congress.” Nordgren v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 101 F.3d 1246, 1248 (8th Cir. 1996)

(quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (internal citations

omitted)). “In determining whether state law ‘stands as an obstacle’ to the full

implementation of a federal law, ‘it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both

federal and state law’ is the same.” Forest Park II v. Hadley, 336 F.3d 724, 733 (8th

Cir. 2003) (quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)). “A state

law also is pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute

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was designed to reach that goal.” Id. (quoting Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 494).

“Thus, ‘where a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must

give way.’” Id. (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993)).

Congress established the goals for the Missouri River main stem reservoir

system in the FCA. The dominant functions of the project are flood control and

downstream navigation, and secondary interests include irrigation, recreation, fish

and wildlife. South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 2003).

Congress also set forth the method by which the federal statute was designed to reach

those goals—the FCA vests the Corps with the duty to balance navigation with other

water-use interests, including the interests of the reservoir states. Ubbelohde, 330

F.3d at 1027. Allowing individual states to use their water-quality standards to

control how the Corps balances water-use interests would frustrate the design of the

FCA. Accordingly, the enforcement of state water-quality standards against the

Corps’ release of water from Lake Sakakawea is preempted.

The CWA’s preservation of sovereign immunity where the Corps’ authority to

maintain navigation would be affected and the principles of preemption preclude the

enforcement of North Dakota’s state water-quality standards against the Corps’

releases of water from Lake Sakakawea. Therefore, the district court did not err in

dismissing North Dakota’s complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the dismissal of North Dakota’s

complaint.

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