Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01619/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01619-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORY BRANNON, individually, 

and on behalf of others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARLEAN’S ORGANIC OILS, 

LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-01619-BTMMDD

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NO. 4]

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(ECF No. 4 (“Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.”)), which Plaintiff opposes. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Barlean’s Organic Oils, LLC 

(“Barlean’s”) for violations of California business practices law and common law 

causes of action. Plaintiff, a consumer, purchased dietary supplements

(“products”) manufactured by Barlean’s. (ECF No. 1 (“Pl.’s Compl.”), ¶ 1.) 

Barlean’s labeled and advertised its products with the following statements: 

“Nature’s Perfect Superfood,” “Pathway to a better life,” “Vegan Superfood,” and 

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stated the products contain “Antioxidant Power” and are “designed to invigorate 

and nourish both your mind and body. Masterfully formulated with Nature’s most 

vitalizing plant-based ingredients.” (Id.) The labels also claim that the products 

are a “premium superfood created to”: “Support cleansing of organs and tissues,” 

“Super-Boost your health and energy,” “Help improve digestion,” “Aid the body’s 

natural detoxification,” and “Promote a healthy immune system.” (Id.) These 

statements are structure/function claims under the Dietary Supplement Health 

and Education Act (“DSHEA”), because they “describe[] the role of a nutrient or 

dietary ingredient intended to affect the structure or function in humans.” 21 

U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A).

The thrust of Plaintiff’s argument is that Barlean’s advertising and labeling

(the “representations”) are false and misleading on two grounds. First, he claims 

the representations violate the DSHEA because they are not substantiated. 

(Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 2.) Second, he argues the products contain lead beyond the 

limits set by California’s Proposition 65 (“Prop. 65”) and that Barlean’s failed to 

affix the necessary warning label for products that exceed this maximum. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s causes of action follow from the alleged violations of the DSHEA and 

Prop. 65. 

Barlean’s moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 4 (“Def.’s Mot. for 

Summ. J.”).) It submitted factual information in support of what would otherwise 

be a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, thus rendering it a Rule 56 motion for 

summary judgment. (Id. at 2:4-7.) The motion is supported by the declaration of 

John Puckett, Barlean’s CEO, who affirms that all products include the necessary 

Prop. 65 warning label and that the lead in the products is naturally occurring. 

(ECF No. 4 (“Puckett Decl.”), ¶¶ 1, 4-5.) Plaintiff’s opposition includes

information about the harmfulness of ingesting lead. (ECF No. 6 (“Spector 

Decl.”).)

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue 

of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, 

under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Eat Right Foods Ltd. 

V. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 880 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018). A dispute is 

genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting 

evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) 

by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to establish an essential 

element of the nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party bears the 

burden of proving at trial. Id. at 331. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary 

facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. 

Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of 

material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing 

that a genuine issue of disputed fact remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 314. The 

nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion 

by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 256. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all 

inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986).

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III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff has sued under five causes of action. Barlean’s moves for 

summary judgment on each of them.

A. Unfair and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for violation of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”), which prohibits unlawful and unfair business practices. 

Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code §§ 17200, et seq. “An unfair business practice is one 

that either ‘offends an established public policy’ or is ‘immoral, unethical, 

oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” McDonald v. 

Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting People v. Casa 

Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 (1984)). “[V]irtually 

any state, federal, or local law can serve as the predicate” for a UCL claim. 

Friedman v. AARP, Inc., 855 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting People ex 

rel. Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 104 Cal.App.4th 508 (2002)). The predicate 

law need not provide a private cause of action because UCL “‘borrows’ violations 

of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices,” which become 

“independently actionable.” Rose v. Bank of America, N.A., 57 Cal.4th 390, 396

(2013) (quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 

163, 180 (1999)). Plaintiff argues Barlean’s violated the DSHEA and Prop. 65, 

which are the predicates of his UCL claim. 

1. DSHEA

Plaintiff claims that Barlean’s representations do not comply with the 

DSHEA and are thus false and misleading. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 58.) Under the 

DSHEA, a supplement manufacturer may only make a structure/function 

representation if certain requirements are met. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6). The 

requirement at issue is whether Barlean’s “has substantiation” that its 

representations are “truthful and not misleading.” Id. § 343(r)(6)(B); Pl.’s Compl.,

¶ 24. Plaintiff argues that Barlean’s has not substantiated its representations. 

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(Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff asserts, contrary to the representations, that the 

products are harmful. (Id. at ¶ 31.)

Barlean’s contends that Plaintiff fails to state a UCL claim because there is 

no private cause of action for a substantiation violation of the DSHEA. (Def.’s 

Mot. for Summ. J., at 4:21-23.) While California law does not permit a private 

plaintiff to demand substantiation for advertising claims, he may instead bring a 

UCL action and prove that the claims are false or misleading. Dachauer v. 

NVTY, Inc., 913 F.3d 844, 547 (9th Cir. 2019). A private cause of action does 

exist. See id. at 849 (discussing viability of Plaintiff’s UCL claim under DSHEA

where he presented evidence that could show the challenged statement was 

misleading). 

To the extent that Plaintiff is demanding substantiation, his claims are 

barred. But Plaintiff presents evidence to show Barlean’s claims are false or 

misleading. In his brief, Plaintiff details the purported health risks associated with 

lead, which is present in Barlean’s products. (ECF No. 6 (“Pl.’s Opp.”), 4:1-26; 

Spector Decl.) In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence could show 

that the products are harmful to human health and that the representations are 

false or misleading. Plaintiff thus states a claim under the UCL. Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES Barlean’s motion insofar as it argues that Plaintiff has no private 

cause of action and cannot state a UCL-DSHEA claim.

2. Prop. 65

Plaintiff claims that Barlean’s violated the UCL by selling products with lead

levels above the proscribed limits of Prop. 65 and failing to include the required 

warning label conveying this to consumers. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 59.) See Cal. Health 

& Safety Code § 25249.6. He submits photographs allegedly showing the 

product he purchased and online listings of the products, all without the Prop. 65

“safe harbor” warning. (Spector Decl., ¶¶ 11-13, Exhibit A.) Barlean’s argues it 

is in compliance with Prop. 65. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 6:9-18). It presents a

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photograph of its products, purportedly with the warning sticker, though the 

picture quality is too low for the Court to review. (Puckett Decl., Exhibit A.) 

Puckett also affirms that all products knowingly sold to California consumers 

meet the Prop. 65 labeling requirements. (Id. at ¶ 4.) There thus exists a dispute 

as to whether the products contain the Prop. 65 sticker. Whether the products 

include these stickers is a material fact. Viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a UCL claim with

Prop. 65 as the predicate violation. The Court DENIES Barlean’s motion in so far 

as it argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim under UCL because Barlean’s is in 

compliance with Prop. 65.

3. Standing

Barlean’s argues that the relief Plaintiff seeks is unavailable and 

unnecessary. First, it proposes that injunctive relief is unnecessary because 

Barlean’s is in compliance with Prop. 65. (Id. at 6:22.) The Court determined 

above that a dispute of material fact exists as to Barlean’s compliance, so the 

Court will not address this argument. 

Second, Barlean’s claims that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive 

relief. (Id. at 7:4-18.) For a plaintiff to have Article III standing under the U.S. 

Constitution, he “must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 

1540, 1547 (2016). The injury must be “(a) concrete and particularized and (b) 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 

Barlean’s claims Plaintiff “says that he would not have purchased the 

Product if he knew that it contained naturally occurring lead, but now that he 

knows that, he would purchase the Product in the future.” (Def. Mot. for Summ. 

J., 7:10-13). Barlean’s misrepresents the pleadings. Plaintiff states in his 

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complaint: “Plaintiff would not have purchased the Products, or would have 

purchased them on different terms, if he had known the truth” and “It is possible, 

however, that Plaintiff would purchase the Products in the future if the 

Representations were truthful, and/or if the Products complied with the required 

California disclosure standards.” (Pl.’s Compl., 9:12-17.) 

Barlean’s standing argument appears to be that Plaintiff is unlikely to suffer 

future harm. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 7:14-18.) Under the summary 

judgment standard, the Court must view the facts presented in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff. Thus, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s assertions that he 

would purchase from Barlean’s in the future. This is sufficient at the prediscovery 

stage to confer standing for injunctive relief in the Ninth Circuit. See Davidson v. 

Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 970-72 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the 

Court DENIES without prejudice Defendant’s motion insofar as it argues Plaintiff 

seeks unavailable and unnecessary remedies. 

B. Deceptive Advertising Practices

Plaintiff’s second cause of action is for deceptive advertising under 

California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”). Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code §§ 17500, et 

seq. Plaintiff asserts that Barlean’s made representations that were deceptive 

and that did not comply with DSHEA and Prop. 65. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 72, 75.) 

Barlean’s moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the representations 

constitute mere puffery that could not deceive a reasonable consumer. (Def.’s 

Mot. for Summ. J., 8:13-15, 10:4-7.) It further alleges that the Prop. 65 labels 

were on the products and that no reasonable consumer could be misled as a 

result. (Id. at 11:10-17.) Given the Court’s above determination that a dispute of 

material fact exists as to the presence of Prop. 65 warning labels, the Court will 

not address this latter argument.

Whether an advertising misrepresentation is an actionable “statement of 

fact” or nonactionable puffery is a question of law that may be resolved in a Rule 

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12(b)(6) order. Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 

(9th Cir. 2008). Puffery consists of “generalized, vague, and unspecific 

assertions . . . upon which a reasonable consumer could not rely.” Glen Holly 

Entm’t, Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 343 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003). Such 

statements make no specific claims and “are so exaggerated as to preclude 

reliance by consumers.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 

911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990). This inquiry “rests in the specificity or 

generality of the claim,” since “consumer reliance will be induced by specific 

rather than general assertions.” Newcal Indus., 513 F.3d at 1053. 

“[M]isdescriptions of specific or absolute characteristics of a product” — those 

that are measurable and imply underlying product testing — are actionable. 

Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(quoting Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, 911 F.2d at 246). 

The Court finds that some of the representations, standing alone, constitute 

mere puffery. Nevertheless, advertising claims must be viewed in context with 

one another. See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 & n.3 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Viewing the products’ packaging as a whole and in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the representations are not mere puffery 

and that Plaintiff could plausibly prove that a reasonable consumer would be 

deceived by the representations. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Barlean’s

motion as to this cause of action.

C. Consumer Legal Remedies Act

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for violation of the Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act (“CLRA”), which prohibits unfair and deceptive acts in the sale of 

goods. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. Plaintiff asserts that Barlean’s “falsely 

and misleadingly labeled and represented” its products through “material 

misrepresentations and omissions” via the representations and the alleged lack 

of the Prop. 65 warning label. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶¶ 87-90.) Barlean’s moves to 

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dismiss the CLRA claims using the same arguments made for the UCL and FAL 

causes of action. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 11:25-12:12.) The Court rejected 

those arguments above and does so again here. The Court DENIES Barlean’s

motion as to this cause of action.

D. Breach of Express Warranty

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is for breach of express warranty. He 

argues that Barlean’s labels and advertising constituted express warranties that 

formed the basis of the bargain that Barlean’s breached. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 98, 

100-01.) To state a claim for breach of express warranty, a plaintiff must allege 

(1) “the exact terms of the warranty,” (2) “plaintiff’s reasonable reliance thereon,” 

and (3) “a breach of that warranty which causes plaintiff injury.” Williams v. 

Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 142 (1986). 

Barlean’s contends that product descriptions do not create an express 

warranty. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 14:6-9.) This is not so. Under California 

law, “[a]ny description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain 

creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.” 

Cal. Comm. Code § 2313(1)(b); see also Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc., 180 

Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 (2010) (explaining that the seller’s “affirmations, 

promises, and descriptions of the goods” determine what the seller has agreed to 

sell and thus the basis of the bargain). Plaintiff says that Barlean’s labeling 

constituted the basis of their bargain. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 98.) The Court must view 

such factual assertions in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff has thus stated a claim for 

breach of warranty with respect to the product descriptions on the label.

Barlean’s also argues that puffery does not create an express warranty. 

(Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 13:1-2.) The Court decided above that Barlean’s

representations, taken as a whole, were not mere puffery and could deceive 

reasonable consumers. A puffery argument will thus not dispose of this cause of

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action at this stage. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Barlean’s motion as to 

breach of express warranty.

E. Quasi-Contract

Plaintiff’s final cause of action is for quasi-contract. Barlean’s argues that 

unjust enrichment is not an independent theory of recovery but rather a form of 

restitution. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 14:13-15:1.) Some California courts agree 

with this proposition. See, e.g., Levine v. Blue Shield of Cal., 189 Cal.App.4th 

1117, 1138 (2010) (stating “[t]here is no cause of action in California for unjust 

enrichment” and determining that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim “does not 

properly state a cause of action”); Williamson v. Reinalt-Thomas Corp., 2012 WL 

1438812, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (collecting cases stating the same). In Astiana v. 

Hain Celestial Group, Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated: “When a plaintiff alleges 

unjust enrichment, a court may ‘construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract 

claim seeking restitution.’” 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rutherford 

Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231 (2014)). Astiana is 

indistinguishable from the case at hand. The Court must rely on the Ninth 

Circuit’s ruling. Plaintiff states a claim for quasi-contract. See Sebastian v. 

Kimberly-Clark Corp., 2017 WL 6497675, at *10 (S.D. Cal. 2017). Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES the motion with respect to this cause of action.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 4) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 12, 2019

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