Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00905/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00905-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Reports

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA FORESTRY ASSOCIATION No. 2:05-cv-00905-MCE-GGH 

and AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DALE N. BOSWORTH, Chief, United MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

States Forest Service;

MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary. 

United States Department of

Agriculture; JACK A.BLACKWELL,

Regional Forester, Pacific

Southwest Region, 

Defendants.

and

SIERRA NEVADA FOREST PROTECTION

CAMPAIGN, ET AL.

Intervenor-Defendants.

----oo0oo----

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2

Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs California Forestry

Association and American Forest & Paper Association

(“Plaintiffs”), both timber and forest industry groups, challenge

the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment (“SNFPA”), commonly

known as the 2004 Framework, under various forest management

statutes, including the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1600, et seq. (“NFMA”), the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of

1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528, et seq., (“MUSYA”), the 1897 Organic

Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 473, et seq. (“Organic Act”) and

the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4231, et seq.

(“NEPA”). An independent claim under the Administrative

Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (“APA”) is also asserted. 

Plaintiffs raise both substantive and procedural claims asserting

that the logging and fuel treatments contemplated by the 2004

Framework fail to comply with these forest management guidelines. 

Defendants are Dale Bosworth, the Chief of the United States

Forest Service, and several federal officials who had roles in

promulgating the 2004 Framework (hereinafter collectively

referred to as “Defendants”). Presently before the Court are

cross motions for summary judgment filed on behalf of both the

Plaintiffs and Defendants. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Sierra Nevada contains some 11.5 million acres of

National Forest Service land with eleven National Forests and

encompasses “dozens of complex ecosystems each with numerous,

inter-connected social, economic and ecological components.” 

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 Documents found within the first eight-volume record are 1

cited as SNFPA, followed by the Bates-stamp number.

3

SNFPA 1920. In the late 1980s, the Forest Service began

developing a comprehensive strategy for managing the myriad

resources found within the region. In 1995, the Regional

Forester for the Pacific Southwest Region of the Forest Service

issued a draft Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) outlining

its management proposal. SNFPA 229. 

1

After extensive public participation and the preparation of

a Final EIS (“FEIS”) responding to public concerns, the Regional

Forester issued, in 2001, a Record of Decision (“ROD”) which

adopted management objectives in five major areas: old forest

ecosystems; aquatic, riparian, and meadow ecosystems; fire and

fuels; noxious weeds; and hardwood ecosystems on the lower

westside of the Sierras. Id. at 231-35. Among the thorniest

issues confronted by the ROD was striking the appropriate balance

between balancing the excessive fuel buildups occasioned by

decades of fire repression and conserving key habitat for

wildlife species dependent on old forest environments. The 2001

ROD included a network of “old forest emphasis areas” across

about 40 percent of all national forest land in the Sierra Nevada

that was designed to provide a contiguous network of old forest

ecosystems conducive to species preferring such habitat like the

California spotted Owl, the American marten and the Pacific

fisher. SNFPA 236. 

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4

Aside from other areas slated for specific treatment (like a

limited “urban wildland intermix” designed to create a buffer

between developed areas and the forest), the 2001 Framework

specified a “general forest” land allocation intended to increase

the density of large old trees and the continuity and

distribution of old forests across the landscape. SNFPA 236-37.

In order to protect old forest conditions within its

specific areas of emphasis, the 2001 Framework generally

prohibited logging that would remove trees over 12 inches in

diameter or logging that would reduce canopy cover by more than

10 percent. SNFPA 328. Even within the “general forest” areas,

the 2001 Framework prohibited logging of trees over 20 inches in

diameter. SNFPA 336. It was only within the intermix zones that

no canopy restrictions were imposed and logging of trees up to 30

inches was permitted. SNFPA 333, 315.

Although the Forest Service ultimately affirmed adoption of

the 2001 ROD despite receipt of approximately 200 administrative

appeals, it nonetheless directed the Regional Forester to conduct

an additional review with respect to specific concerns like

wildfire risk and the Forest Service’s responsibilities under the

Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act (“HFQLG

Act”), a congressional mandate which established a Pilot Program

for fire suppression through a combination of fire breaks, group

selection logging and individual logging. SNFPA 1918. A

management review team was assembled by the Regional Forester for

this purpose.

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 The 2001 Framework’s CASPO analysis was largely predicated 2

on a July 1992 report (the “CASPO Report”) that recommended

establishment of a 300-acre Protected Activity Center (“PAC”)

around all known owl nest sites, a complete prohibition of

logging within the PACs, more limited logging prohibition of

trees over 30 inches in diameter in all habitat suitable for owl

nesting and foraging, and a prohibition on logging that would

reduce canopy cover below 40 percent in owl nesting habitat. 

SNFPA 1037-40. 

5

In March 2003, the team concluded that the 2001 ROD’s

“cautious approach” to active fuels management had limited its

effectiveness in many treatment areas. The management review

team further found that revisions to vegetation management rules

would decrease flammable fuels while protecting critical wildlife

habitat by guarding against the risk of stand-replacing wildfire. 

See SNFPA 1918, 1926. Moreover, with respect to the California

spotted owl (“CASPO” or “owl”), the team felt that the 2001 ROD

had unnecessarily “took a worst case approach to estimating

effects” on the owl. SNFPA 1968. In addition to citing recent 2

research indicating that habitat losses resulting from fuel

treatments were less than previously believed, the team further

found that the 2001 ROD’s extensive reliance on maintaining

extensive canopy cover was impracticable to implement.

Following receipt of the team’s findings, the Regional

Forester ordered that management strategy alternatives in

addition to those considered in the 2001 FEIS be considered. A

draft supplemental environmental impact statement (“DSEIS”),

tiered to the 2001 EIS, was thereafter released to the public in

January 2004. 

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 The DSEIS also considered seven additional alternatives in 3

addition to those considered in detail but eliminated the seven

from extensive consideration because they were found to be

inconsistent with the purpose and need of the DSEIS. SNFPA 3163-

65.

 The SCR consisted of eleven scientists convened by the 4

Pacific Southwest Research Station in Davis, California, and

included experts in fire and fuels management, forest ecology,

and species viability. SNFPA 3503.

6

While the same five areas of concern were targeted in the DSEIS

as in its 2001 predecessor, in 2004 a new action alternative was

identified (Alternative S2), in addition to the alternative

selected by the 2001 Framework (Alternative S1) and the seven

alternatives that had previously been considered before adoption

of the 2001 Framework (Alternatives F2-F8). Following the 3

public comment period after dissemination of the DSEIS, the SEIS

in final form also included response to various issues raised,

including comments by the United States Fish and Wildlife

Service, by the United States Environmental Protection Agency, by

California resources protection agencies, and by the Science

Consistency Review (“SCR”) team.4

By adopting the SEIS on January 21, 2004, the Regional

Forester replaced the 2001 ROD with its 2004 successor and

amended the forest plans for all eleven national forests situated

in the Sierra Nevada. SNFPA 2987-3061. The 2004 ROD reasoned

that the 2001 Framework “prescribed technical solutions that do

not produce needed results, or offered methods we often dare not

attempt in the current Sierra Nevada.” SNFPA 2995. The 2004

Framework reasoned that the methods as adopted in 2001 fail to

reverse the damage, and growing threat, of catastrophic fires

quickly enough. Id. 

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 In so affirming, Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth denied 5

6,241 separate administrative appeals of the 2004 Framework. 

SNFPA 3998.

7

Consequently fuels treatment contemplated under the 2004

Framework increased from the figures envisioned by its 2001

predecessor. Average annual sawtimber harvest under the selected

alternative (S2) increased from 118 million board feet (“mmbf”)

under the 2001 Framework to 458 mmbf during the first five years

following implementation of the 2004 Framework. Figures during

the second five years also increased (from 82 to to 371 mmbf).

The Chief of the Forestry Service ultimately affirmed the

2004 ROD, with the direction that details of the ROD’s adaptive 5

management be submitted to him within six months. SNFPA 3997-

4305. The Regional Forester submitted that supplemental

information to the Chief on March 31, 2005.

Through the present lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege that the 2004

Framework is flawed because it impermissibly favors the

management of forests for individual species and old-growth

habitat over treatments designed to reduce unnaturally-high fuels

levels and to produce commercial timber.

PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK

Congress enacted NEPA in 1969 to protect the environment by

requiring certain procedural safeguards before an agency takes

action affecting the environment. 

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8

The NEPA process is designed to “ensure that the agency ... will

have detailed information concerning significant environmental

impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant information will be

made available to the larger [public] audience.” Blue Mountains

Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 171 F.3d 1208, 121 (9th Cir.

1998). The purpose of NEPA is to “ensure a process, not to

ensure any result.” Id. “NEPA emphasizes the importance of

coherent and comprehensive up-front environmental analysis to

ensure informed decision-making to the end that the agency will

not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision

after is it too late to correct.” Center for Biological

Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir.

2003). Complete analysis under NEPA also assures that the public

has sufficient information to challenge the agency’s decision. 

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989);

Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir.

1998).

NEPA requires that all federal agencies, including the

Forest Service, prepare a “detailed statement” that discusses the

environmental ramifications, and alternatives, to all “major

Federal Actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c). An agency must take a

“hard look” at the consequences, environmental impacts, and

adverse environmental effects of a proposed action within an

environmental impact statement (“EIS”), when required. Kleppe v.

Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, n.21 (1976). 

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 The National Forestry Management Act (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. 6

§ 1600 et seq, provides for substantive, as opposed to procedural

protection with regard to actions that affect the environment. 

Plaintiffs have not alleged any violation of the NFMA through

this lawsuit.

9

Given its status as a statutory scheme safeguarding

procedure rather than substance, NEPA does not mandate that an 6

EIS be based on a particular scientific methodology, nor does it

require a reviewing court to weigh conflicting scientific data. 

Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986

(9th Cir. 1985). An agency must be permitted discretion in

relying on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts,

even if the court might find contrary views more persuasive. See,

e.g., Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 420, n. 21. NEPA does not allow an

agency to rely on the conclusions and opinions of its staff,

however, without providing both supporting analysis and data. 

Idaho Sporting Cong., 137 F.3d at 1150. Credible scientific

evidence that contraindicates a proposed action must be evaluated

and disclosed. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b). 

In addition to arguing that the Forest Service violated NEPA

in this case, Plaintiffs also contend that the 2004 Framework

violates several substantive forest management statutes. First,

they point to the NFMA, which requires that “resource plans and

permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and

occupancy of National Forest Systems lands shall be consistent

with the land management plans.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). 

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10

Consequently, all activities in Forest Service forests, including

timber projects, must be determined to be consistent with the

governing forest plan, which is a broad, programmatic planning

document. See, e.g., Wilderness Society v. Thomas, 188 F.3d

1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999). If an EA or EIS adequately discloses

such effects, that goal is satisfied. Inland Empire Pub. Lands

Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis in original).

Secondly, Plaintiffs cite the provisions of the 1897 Organic

Act, which entrusted the Forest Service with sweeping authority

to “make such rules and regulations and establish such service as

will insure the objectives of the [national forests], namely to

regulate their occupancy and preserve the forests thereon from

destruction.” 16 U.S.C. § 551. This broad delegation of

authority sweepingly instructs the Secretary of Agriculture to

“make provisions for the protection against destruction by fire

and depredations upon the public forests and national forests”

(Id.), and contains a statement that forests should “furnish a

continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of

citizens of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. § 475.

Plaintiffs also invoke the guidelines of the Multiple-Use

Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (“MUSYA”), a general statute that

requires the Forest Service to consider competing potential uses

for forest resources like those required by outdoor recreation,

range, timber, watershed, and fish and wildlife needs. 16 U.S.C.

§ 528; see Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy, 835 F.

Supp. 1362, 1372-73 (D. Wyo. 1993); aff’d 85 F.3d 641 (10th Cir.

1996). 

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11

The MUSYA concept of multiple use gives the Forest Service broad

discretion in determining the proper mix of forest resources to

be utilized. Intermountain Forest Ass’n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp.

1330, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1988) (Forest Service need only consider

various uses; MUSYA does not direct how such uses should be

allocated). Therefore, while MUSYA voices general principles for

use management, it imposes few, if any, judicially reviewable

constraints on the Forest Service’s exercise of its discretion. 

Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (MUSYA

contains “the most general clauses and phrases” that “can hardly

be considered concrete limits upon agency discretion. Rather, it

is language that ‘breathe(s) discretion at every pore.’”)

(internal citation omitted). The NFMA expressly incorporates the

principles of the MUSYA for development of forest plans. 

16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (forest plans are to “provide for multiple

use and sustained yield of the products and services obtained

therefrom” in accordance with MUSYA); see also Sierra Club v.

Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1994) (principles of MUSYA

“incorporated into the statutory and regulatory scheme of NFMA”). 

Compliance with NFMA will therefore satisfy the requirements of

the MUSYA, as both statutes grant the agency similar discretion. 

See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727,

733 (D. Or. 1993).

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Because neither NEPA nor NFMA contains provisions allowing a

private right of action (see Lujan v. National Wildlife

Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990) and Ecology Center Inc. v.

United States, 192 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1999) for this

proposition under NEPA and NFMA, respectively), a party can

obtain judicial review of alleged violations of NEPA only under

the waiver of sovereign immunity contained within the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Earth

Island Institute v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th

Cir. 2005).

Under the APA, the court must determine whether, based on a

review of the agency’s administrative record, agency action was

“arbitrary and capricious,” outside the scope of the agency’s

statutory authority, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 

Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1356

(9th Cir. 1994). However, the court may not substitute its own

judgment for that of the agency. Id. (citing Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971),

overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99

(1977)).

In reviewing an agency’s actions, then, the standard to be

employed is decidedly deferential to the agency’s expertise. 

Salmon River, 32 F.3d at 1356. Although the scope of review for

agency action is accordingly limited, such action is not

unimpeachable. The reviewing court must determine whether there

is a rational connection between the facts and resulting judgment

so as to support the agency’s determination. 

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Baltimore Gas and Elec. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983),

citing Bowman Trans. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 419

U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). An agency’s review is arbitrary and

capricious if it fails to consider important aspects of the

issues before it, if it supports its decisions with explanations

contrary to the evidence, or if its decision is either inherently

implausible or contrary to governing law. The Lands Council v.

Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is an appropriate procedure in reviewing

agency decisions under the dictates of the APA. See, e.g.,

Northwest Motorcycle Assn. v. U.S. Dept. Of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468,

1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56, summary judgment may accordingly be had where, viewing the

evidence and the inferences arising therefrom in favor of the

nonmovant, there are no genuine issues of material fact in

dispute.” Id. at 1472. In cases involving agency action,

however, the court’s task “is not to resolve contested facts

questions which may exist in the underlying administrative

record”, but rather to determine whether the agency decision was

arbitrary and capricious as defined by the APA and discussed

above. Gilbert Equipment Co., Inc. v. Higgins, 709 F. Supp.

1071, 1077 (S.D. Ala. 1989); aff’d, Gilbert Equipment Co. Inc. v.

Higgins, 894 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Occidental Eng’g

Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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14

Consequently, in reviewing an agency decision, the court must be

“searching and careful” in ensuring that the agency has taken a

“hard look” at the environmental consequences of its proposed

action. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 402

F.3d 846, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2005); Or. Natural Res. Council v.

Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1997).

ANALYSIS

I. CLAIMS UNDER THE ORGANIC ACT, MUSYA AND NFMA

As an initial matter, Defendant-Intervenor Pacific Rivers

Council, citing Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,

732-37 (1998), claim that challenges under these forest

management statutes are not yet ripe for adjudication because

they are challenges to a general forest management plan unrelated

to any site-specific or concrete harm. Pacific Rivers alleges

that Plaintiffs fail to articulate any imminent injuries

occasioned by adoption of the 2004 Framework. Plaintiffs

disagree, contending that their allegations that adequate timber

harvesting will not occur under the 2004 Framework is not subject

to review in a later, site-specific decision. They correctly

point out that even Ohio Forestry envisioned a different result

if a plaintiff could show current hardship apart from any

subsequent site-specific implementation. In that instance, the

Supreme Court implied that a challenge could be “immediately

justiciable”. Id. at 738-39.

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15

Given Plaintiffs’ allegations that the failure to

sufficiently address forest overgrowth conditions through logging

and other treatment means will immediately effect its members

both economically and environmentally, the Court believes that

their claims under these forest management statutes are indeed

ripe. We now move to address the substance of those claims.

A. Because the 2004 Framework Complies with the Forest

Management Statutes by Appropriately Balancing

Resources Use, Defendants are Entitled to Summary

Judgment on Plaintiffs’ First Claim.

In its First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs allege that the

2004 Framework substantively violates The NFMA, MUSYA and the

Organic Act by unlawfully favoring wildlife protection over

timber harvest needs. See Pls.’ Am. Compl., ¶ 22. According to

Plaintiffs, implementing that emphasis, and preventing adequate

fuels reduction treatments, has caused forest health to

deteriorate, thereby creating the potential for large ecosystem

collapses by allowing overly-dense forests to deteriorate to the

extent that they are subject to destruction by fire, drought,

insect infestations, and/or tree diseases. 

Plaintiffs initially point to the language of the 1897

Organic Act to support their contention that timber interests

have paramount performance. They particularly emphasize

provisions of that Act which require national forests to “furnish

a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of

citizens of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. § 475. 

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 Although Plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court’s decision 7

in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) for the

proposition that timber production’s interest in forest

management is paramount, that case is distinguishable because it

involved a highly specific inquiry into Congress’ intent to

reserve water rights, as opposed to the general management of

forest service lands involved here. Significantly, in County of

Okanogan v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1086

(9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit limited the holding of New

Mexico to water rights. 

16

Plaintiffs ignore the fact, however, that both MUSYA and NFMA

expanded the purposes for which national forest lands must be

managed and expressly directed that other purposes be considered. 

16 U.S.C. 528; Intermountain Forest Indus. Ass’n v. Lyng, 683 F.

Supp. at 1337 (“Arguing that the Organic Act requires the Forest

Service to manage national forests primarily for the production

of timber and for the protection of watershed ignores the

Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960"; MUSYA gives range,

recreation and wildlife an equal footing with timber

production”); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 757 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1982 (Organic Act supplemented by MUSYA). Indeed, emphasis

on the Organic Act’s reference to furnishing timber, to the

exclusion of other forest uses, has been specifically rejected. 

Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1315 (W.D.

Wash. 1994, aff’d sub nom Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80

F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996) (claim that a region-wide amendment

violated 16 U.S.C. § 475 has no merit, because the Organic Act

“does not provide an exhaustive list of forest uses”).7

MUSYA provides only that “due consideration shall be given

to the relatives values of the various resources in particular

areas.” 16 U.S.C. 529. The concept of “due consideration” has

been interpreted very broadly. 

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Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2s 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979). Indeed

the general directives of MUSYA “breathe discretion at every

pore.” Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975).

In The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.

2008), the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated that “Congress’

current vision of national forest uses, a broader view than

Congress articulated in [the 1897 Organic Act] is expressed in

the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield act of 1960", which directed

that forests “be administered for outdoor recreation, range,

timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” Id. at 990. 

Hence Plaintiffs are incorrect in relying upon the Organic Act as

supporting any preeminence for timber interests within these

competing multiple-use considerations.

Consistent with the provisions of MUSYA which, as indicated

above, are also incorporated within the statutory and regulatory

scheme of the NFMA (Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d at 795), the

Forest Service has broad discretion to determine the combination

of uses that best promotes forest health. See Perkins v.

Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806-07; Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F.

Supp. 1526, 1540 (E.D. Wis. 1994). The legislative history of

the NFMA shows that, by granting such discretion, Congress wanted

to avoid prescribing any particular forest management practices

or resource priorities by statute, instead leaving such decisions

to the Forest Service. 

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See Compilation of the Forest and Range Renewable Resource Act of

1974, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S.

Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 790 (“RPA Compilation”) at 671

(“if we are locked into an inflexible guideline by prescription

from the Congress, then we are not allowing the forest

professionals to practice forestry in the forests”) (remarks of

Rep. Symms).

The 2004 Framework is a reasonable exercise of the

discretion afforded the Forest Service by the combined multipleuse provisions of the Organic Act, MUSYA and the NFMA. The

record demonstrates that the Regional Forester considered and

balanced numerous considerations, including wildlife (SNFPA 3264-

49); fuels reduction to facilitate fire-fighting and to protect

communities (SNFPA 3202-3204); and commercial forest products,

especially in the HFQLG Pilot Project area and the Big Valley

Sustained Yield Unit of the Modoc National Forest, where timber

production is considered both as a by-product of fuel treatments

and as a regulated commodity. See, e.g., SNFPA 3243-47, 3386-

3392. The Regional Forester concluded that the 2004 Framework

improved upon its 2001 predecessor by representing “a better

balance... between the production of timber, grazing, and other

resources and the long-term protection and restoration of the

environment.” SNFPA 4057. 

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As indicated above, the 2004 Framework actually represents a

considerable increase in timber production over the 2001

Framework. In fact, as the Forest Service points out, timber

harvest contemplated by the 2004 Framework is actually some 85

percent of the levels permitted by the individual forest plans in

place prior to adoption of the 2001 Framework. SNFPA 3391. 

Substantial timber harvest is permitted on over a million acres

as part of the HFQLG and Modoc National Forest projects. SNFPA

3386, SNFPA 986 (HFQLG FEIS at 2-3). By no means has commercial

timber harvest been eliminated.

Although Plaintiffs claim that the 2004 Framework does not

go far enough in reducing dangerously overloaded fuel loads in

the Sierra Nevada, and consequently fails to reduce the risk of

catastrophic fire fast enough, the SEIS makes it clear that

treating the entire 8 million acres in vegetation classes with a

moderate to high risk of wildland fire is “practically

impossible”. SNFPA 3289. Given that inherent limitation, the

2004 Framework takes a reasonable approach in initially

attempting to aggressively treat areas around communities and

structures in a land use classification known as the Wildland

Urban Intermix (“WUI”). See SNFPA 2995 (“My first emphasis is on

reducing fuels in the [WUI]”); SNFPA 3289. In addition to this

attempt to reduce fire risk around populated areas, the Framework

also envisions a system of strategically placed area treatments

across the landscape to reduce fire risk in other areas as well.

See SNFPA 2998 (describing thinnings that would occur outside the

aforementioned defense zones). 

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This strategy for reducing fire risk is well within the Forest

Service’s discretion in attempting to deal not only with fire

danger but also the myriad of other competing forest interests

that must necessarily be weighed.

While Plaintiffs argue that timber harvesting is not spread

across the entire eleven national forests comprising the Sierra

Nevada and instead is largely confined to particular areas, there

is no requirement that use considerations be evenly distributed. 

See Wind River Multiple-Use Advocates v. Espy, 835 F. Supp. at

1372 (“the MUSYA does not contemplate that every acre of National

Forest be managed for every multiple use”); Big Hole Ranchers

Ass’n Inc v. U.S. Forest Serv., 686 F. Supp. 256, 264 (D. Mont.

1988) (“The Forest Service has wide discretion to weigh and

decide the proper uses within any area.”).

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, there also is no mandate

that regional forest plans, like the 2004 Framework, determine 

particular forest harvesting levels under 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(2) 

First, there is no fundamental entitlement to timber production

on forest lands. California Forestry Ass’n v. Thomas, 936 F.

Supp. 13, 18 (D.D.C. 1996) (“[T]he Department of Agriculture

retains full authority to determine the quantity of timber it

will allow to be sold, if any, from the National Forests”)

(emphasis added; Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman,

92 F.3d 1228, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that federal timber

contracts are not a required right); Intermountain Forest

Industry Ass’n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. at 1340 (no right to harvest

timber “is conferred by statute or regulation”).

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Secondly, while Plaintiffs rely extensively on the failure

of the Framework to establish allowable sale quantities (“ASQ”)

for each of the eleven forests falling within auspices of the

2004 Framework, and claim that such failure runs afoul of NFMA

requirements, the ASQ is a ceiling, and not a quota on harvesting

as Plaintiffs appear to allege. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at

729 (forest plan “sets a ceiling on the total amount of wood that

can be cut”); Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923,

935 (D. Mont. 1992) (stating that ASQ objectives “simply

represent a ceiling on timber production and do not mandate that

such quantities actually be harvested”); Alcock, 779 F. Supp. At

1361-62 n.7 (ASQ is “merely a ceiling”).

Moreover, and in any event, the 2004 Framework does not

amend the ASQ or alter the scheduling of regulated timber

harvest. See SNFPA 2999 (decision does not schedule any

regulated timber harvest” from forest lands); SNFPA 3005. 

Instead, the 2004 Framework lawfully decided that the scheduling

of regulated timber harvest and its associated ASQ should be

addressed within individual forest plans. SNFPA 2999

(“Scheduling regulated timber harvest and the associated [ASQ] is

part of the land and resource management planning process and

will be addressed in individual forest plan revisions”); SNFPA

4076. Caselaw permits such deferral. See Wilderness Soc’y v.

Bosworth, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1111 n.36 (D. Mont. 2000) (an

agency’s decision to postpone revisions to the forest plan is a

proper exercise of discretion).

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Plaintiffs make a related argument by claiming that in

addition to failing to establish ASQs, the Forest Service also

neglected its duties under the NFMA by failing to designate lands

deemed unsuitable for timber harvesting as required by 16 U.S.C.

§ 1604(k). Although this argument presupposes that recategorization of lands in fact has occurred, nothing in the 2004

Framework in fact changes any land allocation or timber base. 

The record states that the Framework “does not change the

capable, available, and suitable timber land determinations made

in individual forest plans.” SNFPA 2999.

Because there are no changes in land classifications, there

is no requirement for redesignation in the Framework. See Am.

Forest Res. Council v. Conroy, 2005 WL 771577 at *6 (D. Or.

2005). The fact that the 2004 Framework may have set aside

certain forest acreage for wildlife habitat does not amount to a

de facto redesignation; there has been no finding that such

acreage will indefinitely remain unsuitable for timber. See id. 

Additionally, in developing forest plan alternatives, the Forest

Service is allowed to depart in any event from principles

governing regulated timber harvest when it is “reasonable to

expect that overall multiple-use objectives would otherwise be

better attained.” 36 C.F.R. 219.16(a)(3)(iv) (2000).

In sum, the forest management statutes create no entitlement

to timber harvest, and instead give the Forest Service broad

discretion in determining the appropriate balance of multiple

resource uses. The 2004 Framework is a reasonable exercise of

that discretion and must be upheld. 

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Defendants are accordingly entitled to summary adjudication as to

Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action.

B. Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment on

Plaintiffs’ Challenges to the 1982 Regulations

Implementing NFMA.

In addition to claiming the 2004 Framework improperly

reverses the resource priority envisioned by the forest

management statutes, Plaintiffs also contend that the 1982 NFMA

regulations (under which the Framework was prepared) fail on the

same grounds. Plaintiffs’ argument in that regard is no more

successful.

First, although the 1982 Regulations are no longer in

effect, having been supplanted by new rules in 2005, the

transitional regulations in effect when the Forest Service

proposed and adopted the 2004 Framework permitted the Forest

Service to use the 1982 Regulations in preparing the plan

amendment, and it did so. SNFPA 4055-4056; see 36 C.F.R. 219.35

(2004); 67 Fed. Reg. 35,431, 35,434 (May 20, 2002). The Ninth

Circuit has also confirmed that the 1982 regulations apply to the

2004 Framework. In Natural Res. Def. Council v. Forest Serv.,

421 F.3d 797, 800 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005, the court applied the 1982

regulations in reviewing the forest plan, for the Tongass

National Forest, a programmatic document similar to the 2004

Framework at issue here. 

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More recently, in Earth Island Institute v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

442 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit stated

unequivocally that “we conclude the NFMA regulations in 1982

apply to the 2001 Framework and 2004 Supplement.”

Plaintiffs take aim here at 36 C.F.R. § 219.19, a provision

in the 1982 regulations which required that fish and wildlife

habitat be managed to maintain viable populations of the existing

native and desired non-native species in the planning area. 

Plaintiffs claim that application of § 219.19 to the 2004

Framework produced “extraordinary” land allocations and

management constraints for individual species like the California

spotted owl, the willow flycatcher and the American fisher. 

Pls.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., 23:13-16. Plaintiffs

claim that this “species viability” rule resulted in a preference

over timber production and forest health concerns that is contrary

to the multiple-use mandates of the forest management statutes.

Plaintiffs’ arguments fail because the 1982 regulations, and

particularly § 219.19, are a reasonable interpretation of the

NFMA’s ambiguous directive to “provide for diversity” in light of

other multiple use objectives. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(b); see

Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837

(upholding agency’s interpretation as reasonable). Although

Congress did not define “diversity” within the NFMA or explain

how to comply with its expressed desire to facilitate the

concept, the 1982 regulations reasonably attempted to facilitate

diversity both through habitat identification and the selection

of certain species upon which habitat effects could best be

evaluated (the so-called management indicator species, or “MIS”).

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Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, § 219.19 of the 1982

regulations is not an attempt to always let wildlife concerns

prevail over timber uses and considerations of forest health.

Rather, it is a flexible directive designed to ensure that

habitat issues, as well as other multiple-use factors, are

properly taken into account. That interpretation is borne out by

a caveat in the statute itself that habitat shall be selected “to

the degree consistent with overall multiple use objectives”. 36

C.F.R. § 219.19(a).

Significantly, the courts have already considered and

rejected Plaintiffs’ argument; namely, “that the [viability]

regulation is invalid under the multi-use provisions of MUSYA and

NFMA.” Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1315

(W.D. Wash 1994); aff’d sub nom Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley,

80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). “[T]he regulation makes clear that

planning for species diversity occurs with multiple use

principles in mind.” Id. at 1316. See also Seattle Audubon Soc.

v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Wash. 1992); aff’d 998

F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the underlying NFMA

statute (16 U.S.C. 1604(g)(3)(B)) simply “requires Forest Service

planners to treat the wildlife resource as a controlling, coequal factor in forest management....”).

Given this authority, and the flexible approach to § 219.19

also advocated by the Forest Service, Plaintiffs have conceded

their “facial” challenge to the statute fails and should be

dismissed. See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., 5:11-13;

8:16-18. 

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Plaintiffs nonetheless persist in arguing that § 219.19, “as

applied” to the 2004 Framework, creates a dominance for viable

wildlife populations that runs counter to NFMA, MUSYA, and the

Organic Act. Plaintiffs claim that this purported hierarchy,

which provided at minimum a “beginning constraint” for

development of the Framework, is improper. As an example of a

result colored by such hierarchy, Plaintiffs point to the acreage

allocated to species habitat within the Framework.

This argument fails for the same reason that Plaintiff’s

overall challenge to the 2004 Framework, on grounds that it

contravened the forest management statutes, was rejected by the

Court as discussed above. First, the statutes themselves create

no priority for timber over any other competing use, including

those entailed by wildlife. It would be unprecedented for this

Court to subordinate wildlife protection and declare logging the

dominant forest use, as Plaintiffs appear to request. Secondly,

examination of the Framework shows that multiple use

considerations were properly weighed in accordance with the

Forest Service’s considerable discretion in deciding how to best

accommodate those considerations.

II. NEPA CLAIMS.

As a preliminary matter, Intervenor Defendant Pacific Rivers

Council argues that neither Plaintiffs or their members have

standing to challenge the 2004 Framework’s proposal for handling

forest timber supply because they have not demonstrated any

injury in fact related to that handling. 

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In order to satisfy Article III’s standing requirements a

plaintiff must show that “(1) it has suffered an injury in fact

that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and

(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000).

Pacific Rivers argues no standing is present under this

standard because the interests Plaintiffs invoke are purely

economic, as opposed to environmental, and consequently to not

fall within the zone of interests protected by NEPA. Ashley

Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 944-45 (9th Cir.

2005).

After examining Plaintiffs’ various contention, the Court

believes, however, that standing is in fact present. Courts have

held that governmental action constricting timber supply inflicts

the constitutionally necessary injury for purposes of NEPA. 

Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1233

(D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, Plaintiffs unquestionably cite

interests of forest health in the Framework’s alleged failure to

adequate thin overdense national forests– a factor they claim

poses imminent risk to privately owned forestland adjacent to the

federally owned property. 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff is cloaked with

standing under NEPA, even if its interest is primarily economic,

if it has “also alleged an environmental interest or economic

injuries that are causally related to an act within NEPA’s

embrace.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation

omitted). Here, as Plaintiffs point out, their interests in

increased fuels treatment are “causally related’ to environmental

concerns like stand-replacing wildfires which clearly fall within

NEPA’s rubric. Therefore the Court concludes that Plaintiffs

have adequately demonstrated standing.

Turning now to NEPA’s analytic structure, as indicated above

the statutory scheme requires only that federal agencies like the

Forest Service establish a consistent process for considering

environmental impacts, and take a “hard look” at the consequences

of such impacts. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. NRDC, 435 U.S.

at 558. So long as “the adverse environmental effects of the

proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the

agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values

outweigh the environmental costs.” Id. 

While NEPA requires an evaluation of environmental effects,

it imposes no substantive constraints on the Agency’s decision

making. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. at 350 (So long

as “the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are

adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained

by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental

costs”); Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d at 1356

(NEPA “does not dictate a substantive environmental result”).

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NEPA even presumes that agencies will have a preferred action,

requiring only that impacts be evaluated objectively and in good

faith. See 40 C.F.R. §1502.14(3) (requiring identification of

agency’s preferred alternative); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135,

1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (“NEPA assumes as inevitable an

institutional bias within an agency proposing a project....”).

Judicial review under NEPA cannot extend to the substantive

need for, or desirability of, a particular policy like increased

protection against wildfires or heightened protection for

wildlife. See Mobil Oil Expl. & Prod. Southeast, Inc. v. United

Dist. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 230-31 (1991); Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. at 541-48; Personal Watercraft

Ass’n v. Dept. of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540, 544-56 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

The Constitution reserves such policy decisions for assessment

and determination by the Executive and Legislative branches of

government.

We now address the specific NEPA shortcomings identified by

Plaintiffs. As alleged in their Second Cause of Action,

Plaintiffs contend that the 2004 Framework fails to sufficiently

address other alternatives to its chosen approach, and points

specifically to the Forest Service’s alleged failure to

adequately consider the utility of reverting to the no-action

alternative reflecting policies in place prior to adoption of the

2001 Framework. Pls.’ Am. Compl., ¶ 30. In addition, on a more

general basis, Plaintiffs claim that the 2004 Framework fails to

properly analyze the constraints on timber harvesting that it

envisions. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.

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A. Failure to Consider Pre-Framework Management as an

Alternative in Deciding the Nnew Direction Represented

by the 2004 Framework.

According to Plaintiffs, while the 2004 SEIS, as a

supplemental document to the original 2001 EIS, purportedly

carries forward the alternatives considered in conjunction with

the original 2001 Framework, it nonetheless does not revisit

consideration of the original “no-action” alternative to

implementation of any new plan; namely, retaining the status quo

for individual forest plans in place prior to 2001. Plaintiffs

complain that the 2004 SEIS is “largely a comparison of

alternatives S1 and S2,” which represent a comparison between the

2001 Framework and the preferred alternative identified by the

Forest Service for adoption in 2004. See Pls.’ Mem. in Support

of Mot. for Summ. J., 46:8-12. According to Plaintiffs, the 2004

Framework contains only “scant” discussion of the alternatives

originally considered in 2001, including the “no action”

alternative identified above.

NEPA does require that federal agencies like the Forest

Service herein “produce an EIS that rigorously explores and

objectively evaluates all reasonable alternatives so that the

agency can sharply define the issues and provide a clear basis

for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public to

consider alternatives to the proposed action.” Kootenai Tribe of

Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 40

C.F.R. § 1502.14). As the Ninth Circuit explained, “NEPA

regulations describe this alternatives requirement as the ‘heart’

of the EIS.” Id. 

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An EIS is inadequate for purposes of NEPA if it fails to address

“[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative.” 

Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at 813.

Defendants counter Plaintiffs’ argument that the 2001

alternatives were not adequately reconsidered by asserting that

because the 2004 Framework was by definition a “supplemental”

environmental impact statement to the original 2001 version, the

consideration of alternatives considered in conjunction with the

2001 Framework, including the “no-action” alternative, must

necessarily be incorporated by reference in the 2004 version

presently under scrutiny. 

The viability of these arguments has recently been squarely

addressed by the Ninth Circuit within the context of a decision

overruling this Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction sought

by Plaintiffs to permit logging within three site-specific

proposals (Basin, Empire and Slapjack) approved by the Forest

Service for logging. In Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 526 F.3d

1228, (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit looked specifically at

whether or not the 2004 Framework rigorously explored and

objectively evaluated all reasonable alternatives in analyzing

whether Plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of success on

the merits for purposes of their entitlement to preliminary

injunctive relief. It unequivocally concluded that the Forest

Service “cannot rely on its discussion of alternatives in the

2001 FEIS to satisfy its requirement [that reasonable

alternatives be evaluated] for the 2004 FEIS.” Id. at 1231.

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In reaching this conclusion, the Sierra Forest Legacy court

reasoned that because the Forest Service altered its modeling

techniques between the issuance of the 2001 FEIS and the 2004

SEIS but failed to update its analysis of the 2001 FEIS

alternatives to reflect these new techniques, changed

circumstances were present that rendered improper any reliance by

the 2004 Framework on its 2001 predecessor. Id. As the court

stated, “where changed circumstances affect the factors relevant

to the development and evaluation of alternatives,” the Forest

Service “must account for such change in the alternatives it

considers. Id., citing Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at

813-14.

Given the Ninth Circuit’s clear precedent on the very issue

presently before this Court, summary adjudication in Plaintiffs’

favor must be granted on their argument, as set forth in the

Second Cause of Action, that alternatives to the 2004 Framework

were not adequately considered.

B. Effects on timber harvest activities.

As indicated above, the second prong of Plaintiffs’ NEPAbased attack on the 2004 Framework consists of their claim that

the Framework violated NEPA by failing to address the changes in

timber harvest level and the environmental consequences of those

changes. Pls.’ Am. Compl., ¶ 32.

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This argument is misplaced. The record demonstrates that

levels of timber harvest, and its effects on production of

commercial forest products, have been discussed in adequate

detail in the 2004 Framework SEIS. See SNFPA 3386-3392. The

SEIS outlines the anticipated production of commercial products

under the 2004 Framework along with its expectation that large

volumes of sawtimber and other forest products would be

generated. SNFPA 3386, 3390-91. The SEIS states that the 2004

Framework, as opposed to its 2001 predecessor, will permit an

increased level of timber harvesting, largely attributable to a

“combination of increased acres in group selection in the HFQLG

pilot project area and a change from emphasizing prescribed fire

under [the 2001 Framework] to providing greater flexibility to

select appropriate fuels treatments based on local conditions

under [the 2004 Framework].” SNFPA 3665, 3263. Anticipated

average annual sawtimber harvests are estimated on an annual

basis for a period spanning 20 years under levels proposed under

both the 2001 and 2004 Frameworks. SNFPA 3386. Commercial

biomass generated under the directives of the 2004 Framework, as

compared to the 2001 version, is also discussed, and the expected

volumes produced by each forest is listed. SNFPA 3390-3391.

While Plaintiffs further argue that the 2004 SEIS does not

adequately address issues pertaining to ASQ and lands suitability

designations, those arguments have already been disposed of

above. In addition, Plaintiffs’ contention that the Framework

does not describe the socio-economic effects that elimination of

specific timber sales programs may have on local communities and

businesses also appears to lack merit. 

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The SEIS considers socioeconomic effects in many contexts,

including an economic analysis for assessing employment and

earning effects. See SNFPA 3391-92; see also SNFPA 3352

(discussing employment trends). In response to public comments,

the Forest Service further addressed issues pertaining to the

wood products industry, SNFPA 3695; regional employment, SNFPA

3700; and other socio-economic impacts from logging. SNFPA 3698-

3702. The Court concludes that the SEIS has sufficiently

considered both socio-economic and environmental impacts from

timber harvest.

Although Plaintiffs may disagree with the Forest Service’s

decision to proceed with 2004 Framework in light of the painful

tradeoffs between industry interests and economic concerns, that

kind of policy disagreement does not give rise to a NEPA

violation. See, e.g, Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to

Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1988). 

III. CLAIMS UNDER THE APA THAT DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE THE

REQUISITE “REASONED ANALYSIS” FOR ADOPTION OF THE 2004

FRAMEWORK

Plaintiffs have reduced the scope of their independent APA

challenge to the 2004 Framework, as set forth in the Third Cause

of Action, by eliminating the following claims: 1) that the

Framework is arbitrary because it does not do enough to

accomplish its goal of reducing unnaturally high fuel levels;

2) that the Framework arbitrarily seeks to establish too much

acreage in so-called Old-Growth Emphasis Areas; and 

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3) that percent allocation to such Old-Growth Emphasis Areas is

contrived and arbitrary. See Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ.

J., 28:14-16. That leaves only two remaining APA contentions for

disposition by the Court. First, Plaintiffs claim that the 2004

Framework is improperly based on a defective model in the form of

the 2001 Framework. Second, Plaintiffs allege that the

Framework’s constraint against harvesting trees greater than 30

inches diameter at breast height (“dbh”) is arbitrary.

To the extent that the 2004 Framework represents a

significant departure from the policies embodied by its 2001

predecessor, the rationale for that change must be adequately

articulated. As long as the agency provides a procedural

explanation for the change of course, the APA is satisfied. 

Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,

981 (2005); Springfield Inc. v. Buckles, 292 F.3d 813, 819 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). An agency changing its course must “supply a

reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be

required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” See

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. at 42. “[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and

articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a

rational connection between the facts found and the decision

made.” Id. at 43. The standard of review to be employed is not

whether an agency’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence; instead, the Court must uphold a decision for which an

administrative hearing is not required unless it is arbitrary or

capricious because the requisite reasoned analysis is lacking. 

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See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d

1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In analyzing the propriety of the 2004 Framework, it should

also be noted that claims under the APA must be viewed in light

of the substantive statutory authority under which the agency

acts. As set forth above, the NFMA requires that the Forest

Service “provide for multiple use and sustained yield” of

products and services, including “coordination of outdoor

recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and

wilderness.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1). The case law confirms

that forest planning statutes incorporate considerations of

multiple use. Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir.

1994 ).

The burden is on Plaintiffs to demonstrate that the Forest

Service’s action is flawed; otherwise, the agency’s action is

given a presumption of regularity. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup

School Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). As we

have already seen, this confers broad discretion to the Forest

Service in its balancing of different resource uses, including

timber and wildlife. Such discretion permits the Forest Service

to determine the mix of uses that best suits the public interest. 

See 16 U.S.C. § 529 (directing Secretary of Agriculture to

administer the National Forest Service for multiple uses and

sustained yield); Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th

Cir. 1979) (the mandate to manage for multiple uses “‘breathe[s]

discretion at every pore.’” (citation omitted); Intermountain

Forest Ass’n v. Lyng, 683 F. Supp. 1330, 1337-38 (D. Wyo. 1988).

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Discretion in managing for multiple use is reflected in

pertinent forest management statutes and is also incorporated

into the forest planning. Where the factual issue concerns an

opinion or judgment on some environmental or silvicultural

matter, on such a “scientific determination.... a reviewing court

must generally be at its most deferential.” Baltimore Gas &

Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103

(1983). An “agency must have discretion to rely on the

reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an

original matter, a court might find contrary views more

persuasive.” Marsh v. Oregon, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).

In light of that analytical approach, and particularly the

discretion that must be accorded to the Forest Service’s judgment

on how to best accommodate competing multiple-use objectives

within forest planning, we turn to the specific APA shortcomings

identified by Plaintiffs. 

A. Flawed Adoption of the 2004 Framework.

Plaintiffs argue that the 2001 Framework is flawed, and that

the 2004 Framework is similarly improper since it is based on the

flawed model of its 2001 predecessor. Plaintiffs generally claim

that both Frameworks are arbitrary and capricious because they

make wildlife habitat dominant over other multiple-use

objectives, particularly timber production. That contention has

already been rejected earlier in this Order. 

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Plaintiffs also argue, however, that the 2004 Framework fails to

go far enough in producing fire-resistant and resilient

ecosystems because it is not sufficiently aggressive in reducing

the risk of fire damage. See Pls.’ Am. Compl., ¶ 36.

The Forest Service’s adoption of the 2004 Framework in the

face of the numerous challenges it faced cannot be considered

arbitrary and capricious. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention,

the record does contain support for the Forest Service’s

conclusion that the 2004 Framework would better address fire and

fuels concerns than its predecessor. The Management Review Team

(assembled by the Regional Forester to address specific concerns

raised by the Forest Service following adoption of the 2001

Framework) evaluated the fuels strategy encompassed in the 2001

Framework and identified three critical areas meriting

improvement. SNFPA 3100-3101. First, the Team identified the

need for fuel treatments to be strategically placed across the

landscape. Secondly, the group recommended that enough material

be removed to ensure that wildfires burn at lower intensities and

slower speeds in treatment areas. Finally, the Management Review

Team recognized the need for cost efficient reduction measures

that would allow program goals to be accomplished within the

confines of appropriated funds. Id.

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The 2004 Framework, in response to those suggestions,

provides more flexibility to strategically locate treatments

across the landscape. SNFPA 3290, 3291. Because the 2004

Framework does not restrict the location of mechanical treatments

as much as the 2001 ROD, fire behavior can more effectively be

modified than under the 2001 Framework, which dramatically

limited such treatments in many areas. See SNFPA 2995; 3290,

3291 (comparing rate of spread, flame length, scorch height, and

projected mortality). The 2004 Framework also results in the

removal of more hazardous fuels, making mechanical treatment more

effective. See SNFPA 3290 (noting that the effectiveness of

mechanical treatments under the 2001 ROD was “greatly

compromise[d]” by the fact that 30 percent of the acreage

treatment was limited to removing trees less than six inches in

diameter). Finally, the increased cost efficiency of the 2004

Framework is illustrated by the fact that while its more

comprehensive treatment objectives would be higher and cost more

to implement, it would also generate 3.5 times more revenue

annually to offset the higher costs necessary to more effectively

reduce fire risk to the landscape. See SNFPA 3293-94. The fact

that the 2004 Framework addressed the concerns voiced by the

Management Review Team with regard to its 2001 predecessor

provides a reasoned basis for changing the Forest Service’s

approach to fire and fuels management, thereby satisfying the

APA.

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 A stand-replacing fire is one where most or all vegetation 8

is killed, thereby destroying associated habitat for existing

species. See SNFPA 3287.

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In addition, it was reasonable for the Forest Service to

choose a treatment option that, after a decade of implementation,

would result in fewer acres experiencing stand-replacing8

wildfires. See SNFPA 3287, 3288. Significantly, too, the

management review team also identified numerous practical

difficulties in implementing the 2001 Framework in any event. It

identified difficulties in classifying vegetation at the small

(one-acre increment) scale required by the 2001 ROD that made it

subject to inconsistent classification. See SNFPA 1947, 3290-01,

3612. It further found that the 2001 Framework relied upon

relatively small discrepancies in canopy cover that were

difficult to consistently measure with any precision. SNFPA

1946-48. Importantly, also, more than 80 percent of district

rangers responding to a survey reported that 2001 Framework

standards and guidelines prevented effective treatment. SNFPA

1928, see also SNFPA 2995.

It must further be emphasized that there is adequate support

in the record for the proposition that the 2004 Framework would

better meet the Forest Service’s goal of moving forest landscapes

towards a natural fire regime which, in the long run, would

result in more effective fuels treatment. See SNFPA 3287, 3288

(Table 4.2.4a, Figure 4.2.4b). 

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 This acreage has been denoted as falling within Classes 2 9

and 3, which represent areas where fire regimes have been so

altered from their historic range of fire return interval that

they are at “moderate risk of losing key ecosystem components”

due to wildland fire (Class 2) and areas which are at “greatest

risk of ecological collapse” because it has been so long since

fire operated as a process in the ecosystem. Id.

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The Sierra Nevada faces a situation where nearly 8 million of the

11.5 million acres that comprise national forests in the region

are in vegetation condition classes that pose moderate to high

risks from wildland fires. SNFPA 2998. The proliferation of 9

smaller, less fire-resistant tree species (which under natural

conditions had kept in check by widespread, low severity fires)

has created a highly-combustible fuel bed, as well as a fire

ladder serving to carry ground fire into the crowns of larger

trees. Given that potential tinderbox, it was reasonable for the

Forest Service to explore and adopt measures to more effectively

address fire danger by reducing the understory of smaller and

less desirable vegetation. The 2004 Framework points out that

the magnitude of this increasing danger has been borne out by

devastating fires throughout the Western United States in recent

years that has occasioned an “unacceptable loss of life, property

and critical habitat” calling out for a more effective alteration

of current forest conditions. Id.

Given such conditions, it was understandable that the

current Administration felt less comfortable with the 2001

approach of fighting “fire with fire”, which relied more heavily

on prescribed burning to reduce overly-dense forests with the

hope those fires did not get out of control. 

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This constituted a rational basis for moving, as the 2004

Framework did, to greater reliance on mechanical methods for

thinning overly dense forests. SNFPA 2995.

At the same time, much of the increased fuel treatments

entailed within the 2004 Framework were attributable to full

implementation of the HFQLG Act Pilot Project, which, as stated

above, represented a congressional mandate to test the efficacy

of improved fires suppression through a combination of fire

breaks, group selection logging and individual logging. SNFPA

1918. The Management Review Team found that the 2001 ROD

“severely limit[ed]” implementation of the HFQLG Pilot Project,

as it did not allow the full extent of group selection envisioned

by the HFQLG Act. SNFPA 1967, 1970. Experimentation with such

techniques is a valuable tool in refining adaptive management

techniques, whereas the 2001 Framework’s more passive approach

reduced the ability to experiment and obtain information. See

SNFPA 3001-02, 3139-43. Such experimentation is anticipated by

the provisions of the NFMA (16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C), and the

management review team concluded that a new direction could more

thoroughly test group selection and better fulfill the goals of

the HFQLG Act. SNFPA 1967, 1970; see also SNFPA 3002.

In addition to finding that the impacts to the California

spotted owl occasioned by full implementation of the Pilot

Project were less than originally believed (as discussed in more

detail, infra), the Team also found that the community stability

goals of the HFQLG Act were not being met. 

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See SNFPA 1967, 1968 (a “key component” of the Pilot Project is

to “provide socio-economic benefit through timber and biomass

production, and therefore enhance community stability in the

project area.”); SNFPA 1969, 1970 (the community stability, and

socio-economic aspects of the Pilot Project are not being

implemented”); SNFPA 3001. See SNFPA 3386, 3697 (“Alternative S2

is designed to better meet[] the goals envisioned by the Pilot

Project and will contribute toward producing socio-economic

benefits of enhancing community stability in the pilot project

area.”). Timber production is a legitimate objective in national

forest management and is one of the competing resources the

Forest Service is responsible for managing.

Because the record contains adequate support for the

conclusion that the 2004 Framework would more effectively reduce

landscape fuels, would better protect communities from the risk

of catastrophic wildfire, and would further permit fulfillment of

the legitimate objectives of the congressionally mandated HFQLG

Act, the change in resource use and emphasis represented by the

2004 Framework’s provisions concerning fuels and fire managements

was well within the agency’s statutory discretion and

consequently do not run afoul of the provisions of the APA. By

revisiting the unnecessary assumptions of the 2001 Framework and

by better providing for community stability, the Forest Service

decided upon a different resource balance that would address both

the needs of wildlife and the duty under the HFQLG Act to fully

implement the Pilot Project. See SNFPA 3338-39, 3608-09. 

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In adopting the 2004 Framework, the Forest Service had the

policy discretion to provide more or less emphasis to any given

resource or interest, so long as essential protections were

afforded. In managing forests, every decision involves tradeoffs

among competing use values and the competing interests of

different species. Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d at 800-02. As

stated above, while much of the Sierra Nevada is in a dangerously

overstocked condition, not all eight million acres that are at

moderate to high risk can be treated at the same time. See SNFPA

3289. It was reasonable for the Forest Service to emphasize

treatment in areas with closest proximity to human dwellings and

communities.

The policy values the Forest Service emphasized to a greater

extent in the 2004 Framework were not arbitrary or capricious so

as to violate the APA. Those policy choices are within the

Forest Service’s “wide discretion to weigh and decide proper”

multiple uses under the NFMA and MUSYA. Big Hole Ranchers Ass’n

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 686 F. Supp. at 264. Such multiple use

determinations involve the weighing of both technical policy

concerns and scientific methodologies, functions in which this

Court should ordinarily not interfere. See, e.g., The Lands

Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d at 988 (explaining that choosing

between competing scientific approaches is not a “proper role for

the court”). Instead, deference should be afforded to the Forest

Service, and its methodological choices, in making the hard

choices necessary for forest management. Id. at 991.

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B. Constraints on Logging Large Trees.

Plaintiffs’ remaining APA contention lies in the argument

that the 2004 Framework’s general prohibition against harvesting

trees more than 30 inches dbh is “unexplained, and hence,

arbitrary.” Pls.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., 37:14-

15; See Pls.’ Am. Compl., ¶ 38.

The record does not bear out Plaintiffs’ claim in this

regard. The SEIS explains that the retention of larger trees is

needed to provide habitat for old-forest species like the

California spotted owl, the American marten and the Pacific

fisher. See, e.g., SNFPA 3348, 3602, 3615. The Forest Service

expressly considered diameter limits in light of the 2001

Framework’s more restrictive diameter limits and concluded that

mandating smaller limits reduced managers’ ability to design and

implement cost-efficient fuel treatments in the face of marginal

contributions to objectives like canopy cover needs. SNFPA 3163,

1928. All this suggests that tree harvesting diameter limits was

a reasonable decision meriting deference. Courts “defer to

agency expertise on questions of methodology unless the agency

has completely failed to address some factor...” Inland Empire

Pub. Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citation omitted). No such indication is present here.

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 10

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

46

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and following careful review and

consideration of the parties’ Cross Motions for Summary Judgment

in this matter, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment with the exception of the NEPA claim for failure to

consider reasonable alternatives to the 2004 Framework as

required by NEPA. Summary adjudication as to that claim, which 10

is contained within the Second Cause of Action, is GRANTED in

favor of Plaintiffs.

As requested by the parties, remedies issues with regard to

Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action shall be adjudicated following

further briefing. The parties are directed to propose a briefing

schedule to the Court for its consideration not later than ten

(10) days following the date of this Memorandum and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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