Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01590/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01590-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 On September 24, 2004, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY L. NEVELS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1590 MCE EFB P

vs.

CHERYL PLILER, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel seeking relief for alleged civil rights violations. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the July 29, 2003, verified complaint in which

plaintiff claims that Correctional Sergeant John Mayhew violated his Eighth Amendment rights

by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent flooding in the shower area. Plaintiff alleges

that he fell and injured himself when the shower area flooded. Defendant Mayhew moves for

summary judgment, contending that he is entitled to qualified immunity and, in any event, there

is no genuine dispute about whether he was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s safety.1

 On July

18, 2006, the court directed plaintiff to either file an opposition or a statement of non-opposition

to the motion. Instead of filing an opposition or a statement of non-opposition, on July 21, 2006,

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plaintiff filed a paper alleging that he did not understand defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, but if he did he would oppose the motion by “honestly stating the facts of what

happened to me.” The court construes this as an opposition and request for counsel. By separate

order, the court denies the request for counsel. For the reasons explained below, the court finds

that defendant Mayhew is entitled to qualified immunity and, alternatively, there is no genuine

issue about whether he was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, he is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

I. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a prisoner and defendant Mayhew was a

guard at California State Prison, Sacramento. Defendant Mayhew was a sergeant assigned to an

Enhanced Outpatient Program housing unit. Declaration of Mayhew (“Mayhew Decl.”) at 1. 

His duties included maintaining order and security and enforcing the rules of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, including reviewing prisoner grievances at the

informal level of review. Mayhew Decl. at 1. His duties did not include repair and maintenance

of the showers in the unit, and he had no control over when a requested repair occurred. 

Mayhew Decl. at 1-2.

Defendant knew that the shower drains at times would become clogged with hair and

soap, causing water to pool in the showers. Mayhew Decl. at 2. On December 5, 2002, a

different officer reported that the drains “near the upper tier shower” were “clogged, flooding,

won’t drain,” and requested that the condition be remedied. Attach. 1 to Decl. of Philip Albee. 

On December 9, 2002, defendant reviewed this request. Mayhew Decl. at 1. 

On December 10, 2002, plaintiff fell in the shower while it was flooded. Verified

Complaint at 3.

II. Standards for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the utility of Rule 56 to

screen which cases actually require resolution of disputed facts over material issues (through

presentation of testimony and evidence at trial) has been clarified and enhanced.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion; i.e. whether the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Equally important to this motion is that “deliberate

indifference” is an essential element to plaintiff’s cause of action. There can be no genuine issue

as to any material fact where there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477

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U.S. at 323. To overcome summary judgment, plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or

denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Valandingham v.

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989). The evidence he relies on to demonstrate a

genuine factual dispute must be such that a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on

the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248. Here, the substantive law

plaintiff is suing under is 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. To prevail at trial

he must prove that the defendant deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights while acting

under color of state law. To prove an Eighth Amendment violation plaintiff must show by a

preponderance of competent evidence that the defendant knew plaintiff faced a risk of harm that

“is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate,” and that the defendant was “deliberately

indifferent” to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994). As discussed

below, plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine dispute for trial over this material issue. Before

reaching this issue, however, the court addresses the defense of qualified immunity.

III. Qualified Immunity

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. This defense protects

“government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The defense permits defendants

to act on “a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law requires in any

given situation,” thereby protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Even if there has been a

constitutional violation, an official “should prevail if the right asserted by the plaintiff was not

‘clearly established’ or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his particular conduct

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was lawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In deciding whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the first inquiry must

be: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show

the [defendants’] conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Seigert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). If the court determines that no “constitutional right would

have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity.” Id. However, if the court finds that such a right would have

been violated, the court must determine whether the right defendants are alleged to have violated

was clearly established. Id. A right is clearly established if “[t]he contours of the right [are]

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The court must consider the specific

facts of the case before it. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Therefore, the dispositive inquiry at the

second step is whether it would be clear to a reasonable prison official that “his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted,” by reference to decisional law agreeing that “certain

conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts

presented in the case at hand.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Decisional law need not proscribe the

exact conduct in question; it must only make the conduct’s unlawfulness apparent. Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).

The applicable decisional law in this matter is Eighth Amendment jurisprudence from the

United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Prison officials violate 

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if they are deliberately

indifferent to some basic human need of a prisoner, such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care

or safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347 (1981). To exhibit deliberate indifference, a prison official must be more than merely

negligent. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Rather, he must know of, or infer

from the circumstances, a risk of harm or injury that “is not one that today’s society chooses to

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tolerate,” yet fail to take reasonable actions to mitigate or eliminate that risk. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).

IV. Analysis

In order to decide the first part of the qualified immunity standard, the court considers

verbatim the allegations in plaintiff’s verified complaint: 

On 12-10-02, I slipped and fell in a flooded shower and badly injured my back. 

Warden Pliler is responsible for that institution. Sgt. Mayhew, as E.O.P. Sgt. Is

supposed to make sure that everything in that housing unit functions properly. 

CA Dept. Of Corrections failed to ensure that the shower floor was properly

installed.

Complaint at 3. In the attachments to the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the floor was not

properly installed and that water frequently does not drain, causing flooding. These allegations

clearly allege a claim for negligence. In the light most favorable to plaintiff, he alleges a duty of

care, a breach of the duty and a hazardous condition that resulted in his injury. If taken as true,

his claim shows that water regularly pooled in the shower area because the floor was not

installed correctly, defendant Mayhew, as the sergeant in that area, knew or should have know

that there was a risk that a prisoner would fall but failed to eliminate that risk before the plaintiff

fell. However, facts establishing a claim for negligence are not enough.

Generally, slippery floors, without more, “do not state even an arguable claim for cruel

and unusual punishment.” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by

statute as stated in, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). Yet, it is important

to bear in mind that confinement “strips [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Therefore, a condition of confinement, even if harsh, must have some

legitimate penological purpose. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 584 (1984); Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Thus, what might appear to be a mere slip-and-fall claim

for negligence might, under some circumstances, constitute of case of deliberate indifference

under the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Frost v.

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) (Noting that slippery floors without protective

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 As discussed below, defendant Mayhew only learned of the shower condition one day

before plaintiff fell. 

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measures could create a sufficient danger to warrant relief where prison guards were aware that

inmate was on crutches and fell and injured himself several times.) However, this case does not

present such facts, nor other circumstances that could rise to the level of an Eight Amendment

violation. There is nothing even bordering on the cruel alleged here. There is no allegation that

Mayhew knew of and ignored an inmate’s special needs because of impairment with ambulation. 

 Neither is there an allegation that Mayhew knew of and ignored several prior falls and injuries

with plaintiff. Neither is there an allegation that with such knowledge Mayhew deliberately

allowed the floor to remain slippery as an impaired inmate was required to ambulate over it. See

Gilman v. Woodford, 2006 WL 1049739, n.1 (E.D. Cal., 2006). Rather, the complaint alleges a

defective shower drain in need of repair. Moreover, there is no allegation that Mayhew was

aware of and ignored the dangerous condition for an extended period.2 There simply is nothing

presented here to establish deliberately indifferent conduct that rises to the level of cruel and

unusual punishment. Therefore, the allegations fail to satisfy the first part of the qualified

immunity inquiry.

Defendant is entitled to immunity under the second part of the test as well. Under the

second step the court must find that it would have been reasonably clear to a correctional

sergeant in defendant Mayhew’s position that failure to mitigate or eliminate the risk of harm

would violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In 2002 it was clear that slippery floors, without

more, could “ not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment.” Jackson, 885

F.2d at 641 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it was also established that prison officials must ensure

safe shower conditions, including non-skid floor coverings, to a prisoner wearing a leg brace and

using crutches, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (1998), no case has yet held that a slip-andfall occurring one day after a guard had notice of the floor condition constitutes a violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Rather, none of the cases this court has found supports a finding that a

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prison guard in the circumstances that defendant Mayhew confronted would have known his

actions violated the Constitution. For these reasons, defendant Mayhew is entitled to qualified

immunity at the second step as well.

Alternatively, defendant Mayhew is entitled to summary judgment on the merits. Since

plaintiff has the burden of proving the essential elements of his claim, i.e., that defendant

Mayhew knew of yet failed to mitigate or eliminate a serious risk of injury, he must come

forward with evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See Valandingham, 866 F.2d at

1142. The evidence he relies on must be such that a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for

[him] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor, the court finds that plaintiff has not submitted evidence that creates a

genuine dispute for trial. The evidence demonstrates that defendant Mayhew was a sergeant in

plaintiff’s housing unit, where the showers flooded regularly because the floor was not installed

correctly. One day before plaintiff fell and injured himself, defendant learned that the shower

was in a period of flooding when he reviewed a different officer’s request that it be repaired. 

Defendant Mayhew submits evidence that he had no control over when a repair, once requested,

would be made. Mayhew Decl. at 1-2. Plaintiff submits no evidence that defendant Mayhew

knew about the condition earlier than these facts show. Neither does plaintiff submit evidence

that Mayhew could, either himself or by contacting other prison staff, accelerate the time frame

in which the condition would be remedied. Finally, there is no evidence that plaintiff asked

Mayhew for permission to use a different shower and that Mayhew refused. In short, there is no

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that defendant Mayhew was deliberately

indifferent to the risk of harm posed by the flooding shower. Therefore, defendant Mayhew is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

////

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Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant’s May 31, 2006, motion for

summary judgment be granted and that judgment be granted in his favor.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 1, 2007.

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