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Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

F T L. ,· D- u . - .CJ 

nit.eel Stat')S Court of Apl)Oaln 

Tenth Circuit 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ) 

as Manager of the FSLIC Resolution Fund,) 

as Receiver for First Texas Savings ) 

Association, a savings association ) 

organized pursuant to the laws of the ) 

State of Texas, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

OKC PARTNERS, LTD . , a Texas limited ) 

partnership; JAMES M. AN, an individual,) 

Limited Partner; ERIC DAVID BERNSEN, ) 

an individual, Limited Partner; GARY L. ) 

CHAPPELL, an individual, Limited ) 

Partner; LIPSCOMB NORVELL, JR., an ) 

individual, Limited Partner; RONALD D. ) 

PEPHENS, an individual, Limited Partner;) 

ANDREW B. PHILLIPS, an individual, ) 

Limited Partner; RUSSELLS. SAMPSON, an) 

individual, Limited Partner; 3300 ) 

INVESTMENTS, an unincorporated business ) 

association, Limited Partner; ALLEN B. ) 

CRAIG, III, an individual and principal) 

of 3300 Investments; C.R. GREGG, an ) 

individual and principal of 3300 ) 

Investments, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

EAGLE/TEXAS REALTY COMPANY, INC., a ) 

Texas corporation, General Partner; ) 

MICHAEL B. BIRNIE, an individual, ) 

Limited Partner; DOUGLAS A. DAWSON, an ) 

individual, Limited Partner; DALE B. ) 

ELMORE, an individual, Limited Partner; ) 

C. JACKSON GRAYSON, JR., an individual, ) 

Limited Partner; HANAHO, LTD., a Texas ) 

limited partnershi p, Limited Partner; ) 

JOHN J. REDFERN, III, an individual, ) 

General Partner of Hanaho, Ltd.; JOHN H.) 

LINDSEY, an individual, Limited Partner;) 

JAY W. LORCH, an i ndi vidual, Limited ) 

Partner; PETER L. MARR, an individual, ) 

APRl O 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . " 

No. 91-6300 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-3-A) 

( W. D . Okla • ) 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 1
Limited Partner; W.E. PENLAND, JR. , an ) 

individual, Limited Partner; JOHN J. ) 

PLOTNIK, an individual, Limited Partner;) 

FRED A. SHERIFF, an individual, Limited) 

Partner; L.B. WINDHAM, an individual, ) 

Limited Partner, ) 

Defendants-Appellants, 

FIRST GIBRALTER BANK, FSB, a Federal 

Savings Bank, 

Intervenor. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** Senior 

District Judge . 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior 

States District Court for the District of 

designation. 

District Judge, United 

Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9 . 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Defendants-appellants appeal from an order granting 

Plaintiff-appellee Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 2
Motion For Summary Dismissal of Removal Petition Pursuant to 28 

U.S . C. S 1446(c)(4) and remanding the case to the state court. 

Because we conclude that the order is not reviewable pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. S 1447(d), we dismiss the appeal. 

On March 30, 1988, First Texas Savings Association (First 

Texas) commenced this action in Oklahoma state court against 

Defendants OKC Partners, Ltd. and the general and limited partners 

of OKC Partners, seeking judgment on certain promissory notes and 

foreclosure of real estate mortgages on property owned by OKC 

Partners, as well as judgment on guaranty agreements and 

promissory notes executed by the individual partners. First Tex . 

Sav. Ass'n v. OKC Partners, Ltd., case No. CJ-88-3536. On or 

about May 22, 1988, OKC Partners filed a bankruptcy petition in 

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 

Oklahoma. In re OKC Partners, Ltd., case No. 88-03395-TS. Case 

No. CJ-88-3536 was then removed to federal district court where it 

was referred to the bankruptcy court as Adversary Proceeding 

No . 88-0219. 

On October 7, 1988, First Texas moved the bankruptcy court to 

abstain or remand case No. 88-0219 to state court. While that 

motion was pending, First Texas was declared insolvent and the 

Federal Savings and Loan Association was appointed its receiver. 

Substantially all of First Texas' assets were transferred to First 

Gibraltar Bank, which was permitted to intervene. On 

September 25, 1989, the federal district court remanded Adversary 

Proceeding No. 88-0219 to the state court. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 3
Certain Defendants moved the state court to dismiss case 

No. CJ-88-3536 for failure to join the Federal Savings and Loan 

Association as an indispensable party. On November 30, 1989, the 

FDIC as manager of the FSLIC Resolution Fund (The Federal Savings 

and Loan Association's successor) and as receiver for First Texas, 

was substituted as plaintiff in lieu of First Texas in case 

No. CJ-88-3536. 

Within thirty days of the receipt of the substitution order, 

certain Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to remove the action 

to federal district 1 court. The notice provided that "All 

Defendants who have been named in this action have indicated that 

at this time they have no objection to the removal of this case to 

this Court." Appellants' App. at 3. 

On January 9, 1990, an Amended Notice of Removal was filed at 

the request of the clerk of court to "clarify the style of the 

case." Appellants' App. at 22. The amended notice incorporated 

and realleged the original Notice of Removal, and added to the 

caption as defendants James M. Andrew, David Eric Bernsen, Hanaho 

Ltd., Lipscomb Norvell, Jr., Ronald Pephens, Allen B. Craig, III, 

and C.R. Gregg . 

1 28 u.s.c. § 1446(b) provides in relevant part that "[i]f the 

case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 

removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the 

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of ... [any] 

other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case 

is one which is or has become removable .... " The petitioning 

Defendants' theory was that once the FDIC became the plaintiff, 

the case could be removed under 12 u.s.c. § 1819. 12 u.s.c. 

S 1819(b)(2)(B) provides generally that "the [FDIC] may. 

remove any action, suit, or proceeding from a State court to the 

appropriate United States district court." 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 4
Also on January 9, the FDIC filed a Motion for Summary 

Dismissal of Removal Petition Pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1446(c)(4) 

on the ground that, inter alia, Defendants David Eric Bernsen, 

Lipscomb Norvell, Jr., and Ronald D. Pephens had not agreed to or 

otherwise joined in the removal petition. The motion requested 

that the removal petition be dismissed and "that the action be 

transferred or remanded back to the state court." Appellants' 

App. at 26-27. Defendants objected to the motion, representing 

that although Bernsen, Norvell, and Pephens did not actually join 

in the removal petition, they had authorized counsel for the 

petitioning Defendants to represent that they did not object to 

removal. 

In ruling on the motion the district court first observed 

that the case had "several unique aspects," Appellants' App. at 

86, specifically, that the petitioning Defendants were 

appropriating the FDIC's right to remove under 12 U.S.C. S 18192 

and the FDIC opposed removal. Additionally, while under 12 u.s.c. 

§ 1819(b)(2)(A), suits to which the FDIC is a party are generally 

considered to have arisen under the laws of the United States, the 

complaint was for foreclosure, which is governed by Oklahoma state 

law. Finally, the district court found that not all Defendants 

joined in the petition for removal. The court deemed the final 

issue dispositive and did not rely on the first two issues. 

The federal district court then noted that the procedural 

requirements for removal must be strictly adhered to, and that 

2 The district court incorrectly referred to this 

U. S.C. § 1219. However, within the context of its 

clear that it intended to refer to 12 u.s.c. § 1819. 

5 

statute as 12 

opinion it is 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 5
removal is permissible only if all defendants join in the 

petition. The court concluded that the removal petition was 

deficient in two respects: first, it stated that the 

nonpetitioning Defendants do not object "at this time;" second, 

the nonpetitioning Defendants had not personally informed the 

court of their consent to removal. The court granted the FDIC's 

motion and remanded the case to the state court. Appellants' App. 

at 89. 

On February 12, 1990, all Defendants except Norvell, Bernsen, 

and Pephen filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's 

remand order. Also on February 12, 1990, Norvell, Bernsen, and 

Pephens filed a Combined Notice of Consent to Removal, Motion for 

Reconsideration, and Joinder in Motion for Reference to Bankruptcy 

Court, 3 in which they formally informed the federal district court 

of their consent to removal. They stated that on or about 

December 29, 1989, they informed counsel for the petitioning 

Defendants that they did not object to removal, and that counsel 

for those Defendants accurately represented Norvell, Bernsen, and 

Pephens' position in the removal petition. 

reconsideration 

representations. 

of the remand order based 

They requested 

on these 

3 Before the federal district court remanded the case to state 

court, certain Defendants filed a Motion for Reference to 

Bankruptcy Court representing that all parties had consented to 

the bankruptcy court's retention of jurisdiction over an issue 

regarding the validity of an assignment of rents clause contained 

in First Texas' (now First Gibraltar's) loan agreements. The 

motion requested that, for purposes of clarification, the federal 

district court specifically confirm the bankruptcy court's 

retention of jurisdiction. Appellants' App. at 41. 

6 

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While the reconsideration motions were pending, certain 

Defendants, including Bernsen, Norvell, and Pephens, appealed from 

the remand order, case No. 90-6099, and petitioned this court for 

a writ of mandamus to compel the federal district court to assume 

jurisdiction of the action, case No . 90-6086. 

On March 12, 1990, the federal district court issued an order 

declining to rule on the motions for reconsideration because 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides that a remand order is not reviewable on 

appeal or otherwise, and because of the pendency of the appeal and 

mandamus proceeding in this court. On April 11, 1990, Defendants 

filed a notice of appeal from the March 12 order. Case No. 

90-6143. 

We denied the mandamus petition on April 26, 1990. We noted 

in the order that the motions for reconsideration rendered the 

notice of appeal in case No. 90-6099 a nullity, relying on Griggs 

v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982). On 

December 5, 1990, we dismissed case No. 90-6099. 

The federal district court entered an order January 14, 1991, 

again declining to take further action because it "remanded the 

case on grounds of procedural irregularities in the removal 

process as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)," and such an order 

is immune from review under 28 u.s.c. § 1447(d). Appellee's 

Supplemental App. at 3-4. On May 28, 1991, we dismissed case No. 

90-6143 because the pending motion for reconsideration had 

rendered that notice of appeal a nullity as well. The district 

court then denied the motions for reconsideration and the Motion 

for Reference to Bankruptcy Court as moot. Some of the Defendants 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 7
then filed a notice of appeal from the February 2, 1990, remand 

order. They did not appeal from the July 30, 1991, order denying 

reconsideration. 

28 U.S.C. S1447(d) provides that "[a]n order remanding a case 

to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on 

appeal or otherwise" unless the action was removed under 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1443. The present action was not removed under S 1443, so 

§ 1447(d) appears to deprive this court of jurisdiction. 

Defendants suggest that because the federal district court 

granted the FDIC's motion for summary dismissal, the order was not 

"an order remanding a case to the State court." We disagree. 

Regardless of the title used by the FDIC on its motion, the 

court's order expressly remanded the case to state court. The 

order is a remand order under§ 1447(d). 

Defendants' main contention in support of our jurisdiction is 

that under Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 

(1976), appellate review of a remand order is permitted if a 

district court remands a case on grounds other than those provided 

in 28 u.s.c. § 1447(c). They argue that the federal district 

court remanded this action under 28 u.s.c. § 1446(c)(4), 4 not 

§ 1447(c), and review is therefore available under Thermtron. 

In Thermtron, the defendants removed a case to federal 

district court pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §§ 1441 and 1446. After 

reviewing its civil docket and finding no available time to try 

the action in the foreseeable future, the federal district court 

remanded the case to state court. The district court balanced the 

4 This section applies to removal of criminal prosecutions. 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-6300 Document: 010110240419 Date Filed: 04/10/1992 Page: 8
defendants' right to removal against the plaintiffs' right to a 

forum of their choice and to a speedy decision on the merits. It 

noted that the plaintiffs' right of redress was being severely 

impaired due to removal, and that defendants had made no showing 

of possible prejudice that might result from remand. Id. at 

340-41. 

Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. That court 

concluded that it had no jurisdiction to review the remand order 

because of the § 1447(d) prohibition against review, and denied 

the petition. 

After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held that review 

was not prohibited by § 1447(d). The Court first recited the 

established rule that S 1447(d) "prohibits review of all remand 

orders issued pursuant to§ 1447(c) whether erroneous or not and 

whether review is sought by appeal or by extraordinary writ." Id. 

at 343. It then noted that the issue before the Court was whether 

§ 1447(d) also bars review where a case was properly removed and 

is then remanded on grounds not authorized by§ 1447(c). 5 Id. 

The Court observed that the plaintiffs never questioned the 

propriety of the removal or the federal district court's 

jurisdiction. Further, the remand order did not mention§ 1447(c) 

and was based on grounds wholly different from those included in 

this section. Id. at 344. The Court concluded that the federal 

5 At the time,§ 1447(c) permitted remand "[i]f at any time 

before final judgment it appears that the case was removed 

improvidently and without jurisdiction." This section now 

provides for remand on the basis of any defect in removal 

procedure or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

9 

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district court exceeded its authority by remanding the action on 

grounds not permitted by§ 1447(c). Id. at 345. 

Turning to the question whether§ 1447(d) bars review, the 

Court reasoned that S 1447(c) and (d) must be construed together 

because they are in pari materia. Id. at 345. It concluded that, 

while remand orders issued under § 1447(c) "and invoking the 

grounds specified therein" are immune from review under§ 1447(d), 

id. at 346, because the district court remanded a properly removed 

case on grounds the court had no authority to consider, review was 

not barred by§ 1447(d). Id. at 351. 6 

Revised§ 1447(c) allows remand for "any defect in removal 

procedure." Dawson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 736 F. Supp. 1049, 

1054 (D . Colo. 1990)(quoting 28 u.s.c. § 1447(c)). The failure of 

all defendants to join in a removal petition renders the petition 

procedurally defective, Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 

(10th Cir. 1981), and§ 1447(c) requires that the district court 

remand the case. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 673 F. Supp . 1445, 

1447 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 

Here, the FDIC's Motion for Dismissal of Removal Petition 

referred to§ 1446(c)(4), which the FDIC now concedes was error. 

Answer Brief of Appellee at 5. The federal district court's order 

stated that the "Motion for Summary Dismissal of Removal Petition 

Pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1446(c)(4) is granted." However, we will 

ignore the district court's incorrect statutory reference where it 

6 The Court also noted that because an order remanding an 

action is not a final judgment reviewable by appeal, the remedy to 

review such an order is by mandamus, not writ of error. Id. at 

352-53. 

10 

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is apparent the court remanded the action because not all 

Defendants joined in the petition or properly consented to 

removal, which is a basis for remand under§ 1447(c). 7 See Kunzi 

v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.6 (9th Cir. 

1987)(appellate court ignores district court's reference to 

nonexistent statute as basis for remand where it was apparent 

district court was relying on§ 1447(c)). 

A remand order is unreviewable if the federal district court 

purports to remand on grounds specified in§ 1447(c), even if the 

court's decision concerning those grounds is wrong. FDIC v. 

Alley, 820 F.2d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 1987). The order is 

therefore unreviewable, and we lack jurisdiction of this appeal. 

Having reached this conclusion, we express no opinion as to the 

correctness of the federal district court's decision. 

The appeal is DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

7 The January 14, 1991, order made clear that the court 

remanded the action "on grounds of procedural irregularities in 

the removal process as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)." 

Appellee's Supplemental App. at 3. 

11 

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