Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00555/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00555-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH EDWARD MARTY, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:10-cv-0555-GEB-DAD

)

v. ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

) VERIFIED EX PARTE MOTION FOR A

WELLS FARGO BANK, LOAN STAR ) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER*

TRUSTEE SERVICES, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On March 9, 2010 Plaintiff, proceeding in propria persona, 

filed a verified and unnoticed ex parte motion for a temporary

restraining order (“motion”), requesting that the Court: (1) enjoin

the “illegal foreclosure sale of the property owned by Plaintiff

[(“the property”)] at 3216 Woedee Dr. El Dorado Hills, CA 95762 set

for March 9, 2010[,]” (2) issue a “[d]eclaratory [j]udgment to

invalidate and eliminate any nonexistent rights of the Defendants” to

the property, and (3) “grant free and clear ti[t]le to the property to

the Plaintiff.” (Mot. 1:19-23, 6:2-6). Plaintiff does not state what

time today his property is scheduled to be sold. For the purpose of

deciding Plaintiff’s TRO motion, the motion is construed as a

complaint and a motion, since Plaintiff is pro se and did not file

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separate pleading designated as a complaint. See Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed

the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of

pro se litigants.”)(internal reference omitted).

Plaintiff’s motion indicates he obtained a loan from

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank (“Wells Fargo”) to finance his property.

Plaintiff fails to explain how long he has known his property was

scheduled to be sold at a foreclosure sale today.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same 

standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.” Pimentel v. Deutsche

Bank Nat. Trust Co., No. 09-CV-2264 JLS (NLS), 2009 WL 3398789, at *1

(S.D.Cal. October 20, 2009)(referencing New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal.

v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n. 2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.)). 

Plaintiffs “seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [they

are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is

in the public interest.” Id. (citing Winter v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., –-U.S.–-, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008)).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

Plaintiff’s averments in the TRO motion are confusing and

unorganized, yet it appears Plaintiff argues he is entitled to a TRO

based on the following law: the California Commercial Code Section

3302, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), and the

Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”).

//

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1. California Commercial Code Section 3302

Plaintiff avers “Defendants are attempting to sell his 

property without ow[n]ing the property and have admitted that they do

not hold the original note and cannot legally establish possession or

ownership of the note or the Mortgage.” (Mot. 1:24-2:1.) Plaintiff

also avers that because the original note has been “securitized,” the

“original note, without the legally required transfer stamps and

documentation, is null and void.” (Id. 2:2-5). Plaintiff declares

“Defendants cannot establish legal standing to even institute a

foreclosure action let alone a foreclosure sale.” (Mot. 2:6-9.) 

Plaintiff cites “California [C]ommercial [C]ode [Section] 3302" for

the proposition that “absent being holder in due course of the Debt

instruments, Defendants lack[] standing to enforce the rights of [the]

contract, in this case the foreclosure against Plaintiff[’s] property

by Defendants.” (Mot. 5:22-25.) The gist of Plaintiff’s argument

appears to be that Defendants are unlawfully foreclosing on his home

in violation of California Commercial Code Section 3302 because they

do not hold the original note to the loan.

However, Plaintiff has not shown that Section 3302 of the

California Commercial Code governs the non-judicial foreclosure about

which he complains. See Casteneda v. Saxon Mortg. Services, Inc., 

No. CIV. 2:09-01124 WBS DAD, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL 4640673 at *7

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2009) (finding the California Commercial Code

inapplicable to non-judicial foreclosure because the “comprehensive

statutory framework [of California Civil Code section 2924] . . . is

intended to be exhaustive” (citing Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal.App.4th

822, 834 (1994)). Further, regardless of whether the California

Commercial Code is applicable, “[u]nder California law, there is no

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requirement for the production of the original note to initiate a

non-judicial foreclosure.” Id. (citing Oliver v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., No. CIV S0-1381 FCD GGH, 2009 WL 3122573, at *3 (E.D.Cal.

Sept. 29, 2009) (citing Alvara v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. C-0-1512 SC,

2009 WL 1689640, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Jun.16, 2009)); Putkkuri v.

Recontrust Co., No. 08cv1919 WQH (AJB), 2009 WL 32567, at *2 (S.D.Cal.

Jan. 5, 2009); Kamp v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. SACV

09-00844-CJC(RNBx), 2009 WL 3177636, at *4, (C.D.Cal. Oct. 1, 2009);

Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No S-09-1316 LKK/DAD, 2009

WL 3429622, at *13-14 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 22, 2009) (stating possession of

the note is not required for non-judicial foreclose on a property). 

Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown he is likely to succeed on the

merits of this claim.

2. RESPA

Plaintiff also avers that “[o]n March 3, 2009, Plaintiff 

sent a Qualified Written Request [(“QWR”)] (RESPA), Complaint, Dispute

of Debt and Validation of Debt Letter, TILA Request be certified Mail

# 70080500000220702339 to Wells Fargo Bank,” which Plaintiff attaches

to his TRO motion. (TRO Mot. 2:10-13). Plaintiff avers that since

Wells Fargo has not responded to his QWR, “Wells Fargo . . . is in

default” and therefore loses all rights to Plaintiffs’ loan and

Plaintiff is thereby entitled to damages and “is grant[ed] . . .

unlimited Power of Attorney and any and all full authorization in

signing and endorsing Wells Fargo Home Mortgage’s name upon any

instruments or any agreement arising from this agreement.” (TRO Mot.

2:11-4:15).

A QWR is a request for specific “information relating to the 

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servicing of [federally regulated mortgage loans]” when the borrower

believes “the account is in error;” the borrower must “provide[]

sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought 

. . .” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B)(ii). Upon receipt of a QWR, “the

[loan] servicer shall provide a written response acknowledging receipt

of the correspondence within 20 days (excluding legal public holidays,

Saturdays, and Sundays) unless the action requested is taken within

such period.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A). Failure to comply with this

section entitles the borrower to “any actual damages to the borrower

as a result of the failure[,]” “any additional damages, as the court

may allow, in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with

the requirements of this section, in an amount not to exceed

$1,000[,]” attorney fees, and the costs of suit. 12 U.S.C. §

2605(f)(1), (3). The remedy for failure to respond to a QWR is

damages, not rescission of a loan, which is available under specific

provisions of TILA. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that

Defendants’ failure to respond to his QWR entitles him to a TRO

enjoining the foreclosure sale of his property. 

3. TILA

Plaintiff also declares that “[o]n June 1, 2009" Plaintiff

sent “a notice of rescission of contract . . . to Wells Fargo who is

now in default and does not even have a legal contract on the

property.” (TRO Mot. 4:17-18.) Even assuming arguendo that these

averments concern TILA, they are too conclusory to state a claim for

which relief can be granted. Further, Plaintiff’s conclusory

averments fail to show that TILA applies to the contract referenced in

his motion. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown he is likely to

succeed on the merits of this claim. 

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B. Irreparable Harm, balance of equities, public interest

Even though the loss of a home may constitute irreparable

harm, Plaintiff has not explained why he “unduly delayed in seeking

injunctive relief,” which “contradicts [Plaintiff’s] allegations of

irreparable injury.” E.D. Cal. R. 231 (b). Moreover, Plaintiff has

not shown the factual context concerning why his home is scheduled to

be sold, and the facts that justify finding he will suffer irreparable

harm if his home is sold. Nor has he explained the time of the day

his home is scheduled to be sold. If Plaintiff’s home has already

been sold, the harm Plaintiff seeks to avoid has already occurred. 

Further, Plaintiff’s conclusory averments are insufficient to tip the

equities in his favor or to show that the public interest favors the

TRO he seeks. 

III. CONCLUSION

Since Plaintiff has failed to show he has a likelihood of 

success on the merits of his claims, that he will suffer irreparable

harm if his unnoticed motion is not granted, that the equities tip in

his favor, or that the public interest favors granting his motion,

Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

Dated: March 9, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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