Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05064/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-05064-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE PEP BOYS-MANNY MOE & JACK 

OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-05064-JSC 

ORDER SETTING SCHEDULE ON 

PLAINTIFF’S UCL CLAIM

Plaintiff Andrew Lee (“Plaintiff”) filed this action arising out of the attempted collection of 

debt incurred as a result of his alleged misuse of his employee discount and for changing the oil on 

his car while at work at Defendant The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California (“Pep Boys”). 

Plaintiff alleges that the settlement demand letters that Defendant Palmer Reifler & Associates and 

Patricia Hastings sent to Plaintiff and others violated various provisions of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

By Order of December 23, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. 

(Dkt. No. 156.) Consistent with that ruling, the Court set a briefing schedule for summary 

judgment motions on Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim, with cross-motions for summary judgment due by 

February 18, 2016, and set a trial on the FDCPA claim for August 8, 2016. (Dkt. No. 151 at 1.) 

The Court did not set a schedule for the UCL claim, given Keshaila Chang’s then-pending motion 

to intervene as an additional plaintiff and class representative. By Order of January 27, 2016, the 

Court denied Chang’s motion to intervene, and directed the parties to jointly submit a proposed 

schedule for resolution of Plaintiff’s UCL claim by February 5, 2016. (Dkt. No. 172 at 16.) 

Chang timely appealed the denial of intervention. (Dkt. No. 173.)

Case 3:12-cv-05064-JSC Document 178 Filed 02/08/16 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Instead of filing a joint status report, Defendants submitted a proposed schedule requesting 

that the current schedule for disposition of the FDCPA claim govern the resolution of Plaintiff’s 

individual UCL claim. (Dkt. No. 174 at 2.) Plaintiff filed his own submission, in which he does 

not propose a schedule and instead requests that the Court stay the UCL claim pending resolution 

of Chang’s appeal. (Dkt. No. 175 at 2-3.) The Court denies this request for at least two reasons. 

First, a separately noticed motion for stay is required before such a request will be considered, and 

neither Plaintiff nor Chang has so moved. And, in any event, Plaintiff offers no reason why the 

appeal of Chang’s motion to intervene has any impact on the schedule of the remaining claims at 

issue here. Plaintiff chose not to appeal the denial of class certification, so it is now settled that he 

cannot bring a UCL class claim. Given the certification denial, Chang is not a party to this 

litigation and has no bearing on Plaintiff’s individual UCL claim. Nor does Plaintiff address the 

factors relevant to determining whether a stay pending appeal is appropriate. Plaintiff instead cites 

West Coast Seafood Processors Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 643 F.3d 

701, 704 (9th Cir. 2011), and Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 

1983), for the proposition that Chang’s appeal will be rendered moot if the Court proceeds to 

adjudicate and enters judgment on the UCL claim. (Dkt. No. 175 at 2.) But these cases, both 

administrative law cases challenging agency action, do not help Plaintiff. 

In West Coast Seafood, on motions for summary judgment the court ordered the agency to 

redraft the environmental restrictions that the intervenor sought to challenge and retained 

jurisdiction to ensure the agency’s compliance. 643 F.3d at 704. Because the agency action that 

intervenor sought to challenge had been completely resolved, there was no case or controversy left 

to dispute, rendering the intervention appeal moot. See id. In contrast, here resolution of 

Plaintiff’s individual UCL claim does nothing to moot Chang’s potential UCL class claim—

which, for the reasons discussed in the Court’s prior Orders, Plaintiff cannot bring—and Plaintiff 

has not cited any authority to the contrary. Moreover, West Coast Seafood did not suggest that the 

district court should have stayed the underlying action pending the intervenor’s appeal. His 

reliance on Sagebrush Rebellion fares no better. There, the district court refused to stay the 

proceedings pending the proposed-intervenors’ appeal of the denial of the motion to intervene. 

Case 3:12-cv-05064-JSC Document 178 Filed 02/08/16 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Thereafter the Ninth Circuit stayed summary judgment briefing pending the appeal and reversed 

the denial of intervention. 713 F.2d at 527. In the opinion cited by Plaintiff there is no discussion 

of why the Ninth Circuit stayed the summary judgment briefing. Further, Sagebrush Rebellion 

involved a denial of a motion to intervene as of right in which the disposition of the action would 

impair the proposed intervenor’s rights. Not so here. The resolution of Plaintiff’s individual UCL 

claim will not impair Chang’s UCL claim, whether brought as an individual or class 

representative. Plaintiff’s unexplained insistence that if the Court adjudicates the UCL claim 

against Plaintiff “the class will be left without a remedy” makes no sense. Neither Chang nor an 

uncertified class is bound by any ruling on Plaintiff’s individual claim. In short, Plaintiff’s status 

report does not provide any good reason for further delaying the resolution of his individual 

claims. 

For each of these reasons, the Court will adopt Defendants’ proposal to schedule resolution 

of Plaintiff’s UCL claim concurrent with adjudication of his FDCPA claim with a slight 

modification given that the initial deadline is barely a week away. The parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment, if any, on Plaintiff’s FDCPA and UCL claims are due on March 3, 2016, 

with a hearing on April 14, 2016. A jury trial on the FDCPA claim will begin on August 8, 2016,

followed immediately by a bench trial on the UCL claim.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 176.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 8, 2016

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:12-cv-05064-JSC Document 178 Filed 02/08/16 Page 3 of 3