Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01115/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01115-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEONEL GOMEZ, Civil No. 10cv1115 BTM (PCL)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS

v.

TIMOTHY F. BUSBY, Warden,

Respondent.

I. 

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Leonel F. Gomez (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C §2254 on May 19, 2010.

Respondent Timothy F. Busby (“Respondent”) filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 10, 2010

contending that the Petition is an unexhausted mixed petition. (Doc. Nos. 13; 13-1) Petitioner did

not file an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. After reviewing the Petition, the Motion and the

supporting documents, the Court recommends the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

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 California Penal Code § 654 provides that an act or omission punishable by different provisions of the

Penal Code is punished under the provision resulting in the longest prison sentence. No act or omission

can be punished under more than one provision. 

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II. 

BACKGROUND

A. State Court Proceedings

In May 2008, a jury convicted Petitioner of driving under the influence of alcohol and

driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, in violation of California Vehicle Code § 23152

(a) & (b) respectively. (Lodgment No. 1 at 1.) Petitioner admitted two prior prison term allegations

and two prior conviction allegations of felony driving under the influence within ten years. (Id. at 1-

2.) The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of five-years on the first count, and three-years on

the second count to run concurrently with the first. (Id.) The court stayed the sentence on the second

count pursuant to California Penal Code § 654.1

 (Id. at 2.)

The California Court of Appeal affirmed on August 24, 2009. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner had

asserted three claims: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for a witness’s

testimony by making reference to evidence outside the record; (2) the court erred by not instructing

the jury on a lesser included offense of attempted driving under the influence; (3) the court erred by

running the sentence for the second count concurrently instead of merely staying the sentence under

California Penal Code § 654. (Id. at 2.)

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on November 10, 2009.

(Lodgment No. 3.) The petition for review raised only claims (1) and (2) made to the Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 2 at 3.) The judgment became final on February 9, 2010. See Clay v. United

States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003); Fed R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1); Sup Ct. R. 13(1). Petitioner has not sought

collateral review of his conviction in state court. (Doc. No. 1 at 3-5.)

B. Federal Court Proceedings

Petitioner filed this Petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254 on May 19,

2010. (Doc. No. 1.) The Petition asserts two grounds for relief: (1) the trial court erred by not

instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted drunk driving; and (2) ineffective

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 Due to an unnumbered inserted page in the Petition and for the purpose of clarity, the court’s citations

refer to the page number assigned by the docketing clerk.

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assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise an insanity defense. (Id. at 6-8.)2

 Petitioner admits that

his second ground for relief was not raised when seeking review by the California courts. (Id. at 8.)

Following two unsuccessful motions to proceed in forma pauperis, a third was granted on October 1,

2010. (Doc. No. 7.) On December 10, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition

without prejudice, contending that the petition constitutes a mixed petition that must be dismissed.

(Doc. No. 13.) Petitioner did not oppose the Motion to Dismiss.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Prisoners in state custody wishing to challenge their confinement by initiating federal habeas

corpus proceedings must first exhaust state judicial remedies with respect to each claim raised in

their petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982); Ex parte Royall, 117

U.S. 24, 251 (1886). To exhaust a habeas claim properly, a habeas petitioner must “invok[e] one

complete round of the State’s established appellate review process,” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 845 (1999), giving the state courts a full and fair opportunity to correct the alleged

constitutional error at each level of appellate review. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 

(2004). Improperly exhausted claims are deemed “procedurally defaulted.” Procedurally defaulted

claims include those within the following circumstances: (1) when a petitioner has completely failed

to raise a particular claim before the state courts; (2) when a petitioner has raised a claim, but has

failed to fully and fairly present it as a federal claim to the state courts, as discussed directly above;

or (3) when the state courts have rejected a claim on an independent and adequate state procedural

ground. See Martinez v. Klauser, 266 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Wells v. Maass,

28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

When a petition presents some claims that have been exhausted in state court and other

claims that have not been exhausted in state court, federal district courts will find these petitions to

be “mixed” petitions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2005). Considering a

mixed petition containing unexhausted claims would violate the exhaustion requirement, and courts

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will generally dismiss mixed petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)-(c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at

522. However, petitioners facing dismissal of a mixed petition are given the option of either: (a)

returning to state court to exhaust their unexhausted claims; or (b) amending their petition by

deleting unexhausted claims and proceeding on their exhausted claims alone. Rose at 510; Jefferson

v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Analysis

On direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, Petitioner presented two issues: (1)

prosecutorial misconduct by “vouching for the primary witness against petitioner by referring to

facts outside the record;” and (2) trial error for failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included

offense. (Lodgment 2 at ii.) The California Supreme Court issued a denial of the Petition for

Review as to these issues on November 10, 2009. (Lodgment 3.) In his federal Petition, Petitioner

asserts two grounds for relief: (1) trial error for failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included

offense of attempted drunk driving; and (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise

an insanity defense. (Doc. No. 1, at 6-8.) Respondent contends his first claim or trial error has been

fully exhausted and this court agrees. (Doc. No. 13-1 at 3.) That claim was raised in essentially the

same form and supported by the same facts on direct appeal before the California Court of Appeal

and in the petition for review to the California Supreme Court. (See Lodgments 1; 2.) Therefore,

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on a lesser included offense of

attempted drunk driving is fully exhausted. 

However, Petitioner’s second claim has not been adjudicated in the state courts. Regarding

his failure to exhaust this claim, Petitioner states:

Issue number 2 was not presented to the California Supreme Court nor the Appellate

Court because petitioner is bringing this issue under the ‘cause and prejudice’ doctrine.

The issue is captioned as: Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to present an NGI

settled insanity defense, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution; petitioner was prejudiced thereby. Due process was also violated because

petitioner’s Apellate[sic] Attorney failed to raise an ineffective Assistance of counsel

[claim] for trial counsel’s failure to present the NGI defense.

(Doc. No. 1 at 5.) In light of this explanation, the Court notes Petitioner is actually making two

additional claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise the “NGI” insanity

defense; and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise the claim of

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ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (See Doc. No. 1-1 at 21.) Unfortunately for Petitioner,

neither of these claims have been adjudicated in the state courts and remain unexhausted for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Although Petitioner argues that his failure to exhaust is excused by

the “cause and prejudice doctrine,” Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. 

If a petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted, a federal district court cannot hear the merits

of the claim unless a petitioner makes a showing of adequate legal “cause” for the default, and

“prejudice” arising from the default, which means that a miscarriage of justice will occur if the claim

is not heard in federal court. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)(quotations added). To

show “cause” for a procedural default, a petitioner must ordinarily demonstrate that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded his or his counsel’s efforts to comply with the state

procedural rule at issue. Id. To show “prejudice,” a petitioner bears “the burden of showing not

merely that the errors [in his proceeding] constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of

constitutional dimension.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

To the extent that Petitioner’s arguments can be construed as demonstrating “cause” based

on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, this argument fails. An independent ineffective assistance

of counsel claim cannot serve as cause if that claim is itself procedurally defaulted. Edwards v.

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000). Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised

to explain the cause for the procedural default of a different claim. In the instant case, Petitioner

argues that his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is cause to excuse the procedural default of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, Petitioner has not shown that he has previously

raised this claim in the state courts. Because the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is itself

procedurally defaulted, this claim cannot be used to establish cause to excuse the procedural default

in state court. Petitioner otherwise fails to make a clear argument regarding cause to excuse the

procedural default. Because petitioner has failed to show cause to overcome the procedural default,

the Court need not address the prejudice prong. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982);

Roberts v. Arave, 847 F.2d 528, 530 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (where petitioner fails to show cause, the

court need not consider whether the petitioner suffered actual prejudice). Similarly, Petitioner’s

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 Petitioner also makes a Request for Evidentiary Hearing in his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. (Doc. No. 1 at 8; Doc. No. 1-1 at 39-40.) However, the Court concludes that no additional

factual supplementation is necessary in this case and that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary or

appropriate with respect to any of Petitioner’s claims. The facts alleged in support of Petitioner’s

claims, even if established at an evidentiary hearing, would not entitle him to federal habeas relief for

the reasons set forth above. Therefore, Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied.

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claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel fails for the same reason: Petitioner has not

shown he previously raised this claim in the state courts. 

Therefore, as Petitioner admits, his second and third claims are unexhausted under 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b) and this petition contains exhausted and unexhausted claims for relief. Having determined

that this is a “mixed petition,” the District Court should grant Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 

However, because the period of time for bringing a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d) has run, dismissing the Petition outright would prevent Petitioner from obtaining federal

relief in the future. The Court therefore recommends the District Court give Petitioner the option of

foregoing his unexhausted claim and proceeding with only his exhausted claim in federal court. 

Thereafter, if Petitioner fails to elect this option, the Court recommends the Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED.3

IV. 

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered GRANTING Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss UNLESS within 30 days of the

Court’s Order Petitioner elects to amend his Petition by deleting his unexhausted claim and

proceeding with his exhausted claim alone.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 13, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than May 27, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998; Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: April 22, 2011 

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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