Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00983/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00983-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Scott R. James (―Plaintiff‖) alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Kimberly Granger 

(―Defendant‖). This action arises from Defendant‘s involvement in a search of Plaintiff‘s home 

and the resulting criminal action, now dismissed. The Court considers Defendant‘s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Second Amended Complaint (―SAC‖) filed March 13, 2014.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully exceeded the scope of her position as the 

attorney assigned to Plaintiff‘s civil matter by ordering and directing a search of Plaintiff‘s home 

and seizure of his firearms. Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor in 1996 and the conviction 

was expunged in 2008. Doc. 22, 2:24-28. Plaintiff then passed a background check and purchased 

a firearm. Doc. 22, 3:2-3. In the same year he was denied the purchase of a firearm because the 

State believed he had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (―MCDV‖)

and, after appealing to government agencies, Plaintiff brought a suit of mandamus in the 

California State Court seeking judicial determination of his right to purchase firearms in February 

SCOTT R. JAMES,

Plaintiff

v.

KIMBERLY GRANGER,

Defendant

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-0983 AWI SKO 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 23)

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2011. Doc. 22, 3:5-15. Defendant was the attorney representing the State in that action. Doc. 22, 

3:16. 

Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he possessed firearms in his home. Doc. 22, 3:24-

25. Defendant sought a warrant to search Plaintiff‘s home, and, two months after it was issued, 

Defendant led State agents in a search of Plaintiff‘s home in or about October 2011. Doc. 22, 4:9-

17. Firearms were confiscated and Plaintiff was charged with the crime of unlawful possession of 

an assault weapon. Doc. 22, 4:24-26. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant‘s actions were taken to gain 

an advantage in the underlying litigation, in which Plaintiff had a pending motion for summary 

judgment. Doc. 22, 4:8-11, 6:14-16. 

At a hearing in the criminal matter in February 2013, it was revealed that the normal 

practice of the State of California toward those not currently under investigation for another crime 

who may not be permitted to possess firearms based on a potential prior MCDV is to notify the 

person by letter asking to have the weapons stored by a licensed third party during the pendency of 

the proceedings. Doc. 22, 5:10-18. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intentionally singled him out 

for different treatment without basis; and, to his knowledge, no other similarly situated person has 

been subject to a search of their home and subsequent criminal prosecution. Doc. 22, 6:16-18, 

7:23-27. The criminal matter was dropped and dismissed. Doc. 22, 5:12. 

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on June 26, 2013. Doc. 1. The parties stipulated to 

dismissal and amendment. Doc. 8. Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (―FAC‖), which 

the Court dismissed with leave to amend. Docs. 10; 20, 8:7-9. In that order, the Court noted that 

the FAC failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendant acted intentionally and that others 

were treated differently. Doc. 20, 6:10-12. Plaintiff filed the SAC on March 13, 2014. Doc. 22.

The Court considers Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff‘s Opposition, and Defendant‘s 

Reply under submission. Docs. 23, 26, 27, 28. Upon reconsideration of the allegations in the SAC, 

and for the following reasons, Defendant‘s Motion will be denied. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the 

plaintiff's ―failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 

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dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 

646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact are 

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Faulkner v. ADT 

Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013); Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121.

To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662 (2009); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). The allegations must 

be factual in nature. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (―a plaintiff‘s obligation to provide the 

 ̳grounds‘ of his  ̳entitlement to relief‘ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do‖). ―A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‖ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Alleging on information and belief that other unnamed individuals received opposite 

treatment is alone not enough to state a plausible claim for relief under a class-of-one Equal 

Protection theory. Solis v. City of Fresno, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33548, *23-24 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

12, 2012)(10th Cir. and 2d Cir. cases dismissed the plaintiffs‘ claims for failure to identify another 

similarly-situated person). Other circuit courts have found that conclusory and speculative 

allegations fail to state a class-of-one claim. Scocca v. Smith, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87025, *14-

16, fn. 1 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2012)(noting three cases in the 6th, 3rd, and 5th Circuits from 2011 

indicating that the plaintiff need to substantiate conclusory allegations that he or she was similarly 

situated and/or of the different treatment). In Scocca, the Northern District found that the 

plaintiff‘s blanket assertion that he and the favored third parties were similarly situated was 

questionable because the criteria for granting a permit to carry a concealed weapon were

subjective and qualitative in nature, as opposed to cases in which the regulatory decision were a 

simple, one-dimensional inquiry, resolved with a tape measure. Id. at *16 (citing Kansas Penn 

Gaming, LLC v. Collins, No. 10-3002, 656 F.3d 1210, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18187 (10th Cir. 

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Sept. 1, 2011)(internal quotations omitted). 

Similarly, allegations of a ―pattern and practice‖ lacking any factual support are not 

sufficient to state an Equal Protection claim –the allegations are nothing more than speculation and 

are insufficient to meet plaintiff's obligation to state the grounds for his claim. Garber v. 

Mohammadi, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110725, *35-36 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013)(citing Twombly, 

127 S. Ct. at 1964-65). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Equal Protection Claim

To state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as a ―class of one,‖ the 

plaintiff must allege facts to show: (1) that the defendant acted intentionally, (2) that the defendant 

treated the plaintiff differently than others similarly situated, and (3) that there was no rational 

basis for the differential treatment. Gerhart v. Lake County, Montana, 637 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th 

Cir. 2011).

1. Defendant Acted Intentionally

―The class of one plaintiff must show that the discriminatory treatment  ̳was intentionally 

directed just at him, as opposed... to being an accident or random act.‘ [Citation.]‖ North Pacifica, 

LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). The requirement that the defendant 

acted intentionally does not require that the defendant acted out of ill-will, but that the defendant 

intended to treat the plaintiff differently from others similarly situated. Gerhart, 637 F.3d at 1022.

The SAC adds allegations that Defendant acted intentionally as opposed to randomly in her 

having an active role in the search and the criminal prosecution. Doc. 22, 7:18-22. The SAC also 

makes several allegations as to Defendant‘s ill-will towards Plaintiff and Defendant‘s improper 

motive in taking the alleged actions. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant‘s actions were wrong and that 

she acted in retaliation and for personal gain. Doc. 22, 6:15, 6:23-25, 7:5-8. Plaintiff also alleges 

that Defendant‘s actions were intentional in that she took affirmative steps in her actions. Doc. 22, 

7:18-22. The alleged ill-will may support an inference of motive driving the conduct, but is not 

sufficient to sustain a claim that Defendant intended to treat Plaintiff differently than others 

similarly situated. 

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However, Plaintiff also alleged that the State‘s normal practice for those persons who may 

not be permitted to possess firearms because of a potential prior conviction of a MCDV, is to 

notify the person by letter and ask to have the weapons stored by a licensed third party pending the 

determination of the person‘s status. Doc. 10, 5:10-16, Doc. 22, 5:13-18. This allegation of a 

normal practice is more than a speculative allegation lacking factual support. Plaintiff alleged that 

during an official proceeding in the criminal matter, the practice of the State of California was 

revealed during questioning. Doc. 22, 5:12-13. This indicates that a representative of the State 

spoke as to the State‘s normal practice. Taking the allegations as true and in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, it is plausible that such a practice existed. 

As to the ―similarly situated‖ allegation, Plaintiff identifies those persons who may not be 

permitted to possess firearms because of a potential prior conviction of a misdemeanor crime of 

domestic violence as those who are similarly situated. Doc. 22, 5:13-16. He states, ―On 

information and belief, no other person who has invited review of their right to possess a firearm 

under the Gun Control Act has been subject to a search of their home and subsequent 

prosecution.‖ Doc. 22, 6:16-18. 

If the State had a normal practice as alleged, it is plausible then that Defendant, as a State 

representative in mandamus cases against the State, was aware of the practice and, considering her 

alleged ill-will toward Plaintiff and underlying personal motives, intentionally treated Plaintiff in a 

manner inconsistent with that practice, whereas no other person had been treated in that way. 

Hence, Plaintiff has met his burden to allege that Defendant intended to treat Plaintiff differently

than other individuals not currently under investigation for a crime who may not be permitted to 

own or possess firearms based on a prior MCDV. 

2. Different Treatment

While bare unsupported allegations of different treatment are insufficient to allege this 

element of the cause of action, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support the allegation that 

different treatment in fact was plausible. Other cases have insisted that the plaintiff provide 

specific instances of others similarly situated who were treated differently. However, the SAC 

sufficiently alleges that the State of California‘s practice for a person in Plaintiff‘s situation is to 

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notify the individual by letter and ask to have the weapons stored by a licensed third party pending 

the individual‘s status. Doc. 22, 5:13-18. Plaintiff also alleges that no such letter was delivered to 

him, nor any oral request made. Doc. 22, 5:19-20. These allegations taken as true and in a light 

most favorable to Plaintiff support a plausible claim that Plaintiff was treated differently than 

those similarly situated. 

Further, unlike in Scocca, in which the plaintiff alleged that he was treated differently in a 

matter that is inherently subjective and individualized, Plaintiff has alleged that the State‘s practice 

was uniformly applied. 

Plaintiff alleges that peace officers under investigation for domestic violence offenses

(Plaintiff was investigated for the same) were reassigned to positions that did not require a firearm 

or dismissed, but not charged with a criminal investigation. Doc. 22:19-22. Assuming this 

additional allegation is true for the purpose of this motion, it is not probative or relevant to the 

present action because Plaintiff is not similarly situated to the peace officers. Peace officers who 

are required to carry a firearm for their position, and whose employer has a procedure in place for 

MCDV investigations, are not similarly situated to Plaintiff, an individual whose status regarding

his possession of firearms is under determination by the California Superior Court. To illustrate 

using Plaintiff‘s example, Plaintiff cannot be similarly situated to peace officers because the 

remedies mentioned cannot be applied to Plaintiff –the Superior Court could not have Plaintiff

―reassigned to [a] non-firearm-carrying position‖ or ―dismissed‖ from his employment. 

Plaintiff alleged that there existed a normal practice to those in Plaintiff‘s situation 

deviation from which never occurred, except as to Plaintiff. Hence, Plaintiff has met his burden to 

allege that Defendant treated him differently than others similarly situated. 

3. No Rational Basis

A class of one claim requires plaintiff to show that there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment, not that there is no rational basis for the treatment itself. Gerhard, supra, 

637 F.3d at 1023 (italics added).

Plaintiff alleges that there was no rational basis for singling him out for a search. Plaintiff 

asserts that he was cooperative and forthcoming in his admission of gun possession, which was the 

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subject of the mandamus action. Doc. 22, 5:20-22. Plaintiff alleges that the different treatment that 

he suffered (from similarly situated possessors of firearms who may not be permitted to own or 

possess firearms because of an MCDV) was due to his filing of a petition for writ of mandamus. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not have a legitimate reason to conduct the search as opposed 

to sending a letter according to the State‘s practice. The only reason that the search was conducted 

was to against Plaintiff for his filing a mandamus action and to gain an advantage in the summary 

judgment proceeding. Doc. 22, 6:4-16. 

Taking the alleged facts as true in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has met his 

burden to allege that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 

B. Absolute Immunity 

Prosecutors have absolute immunity under Section 1983 for a decision to initiate a criminal 

prosecution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). This provision was extended to 

administrative enforcement proceedings and civil claims with ―functions analogous to those of a 

prosecutor.‖ Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-14, 15 (1978), Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 

832, 838 (9th Cir. 1991). When considering immunity for government officials, qualified

immunity is the norm, except in ―exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute 

immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business.‖ Butz, 438 U.S. at 507. Fry stated that 

government attorneys are entitled to absolute immunity in all litigation contexts, but it is not 

required in all civil suits; specifically in cases where the prosecutor has side-stepped the judicial 

process. Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 2013). Prosecutors are not necessarily 

immune for actions taken outside of the judicial process, including actions ―logically—though not 

necessarily temporally—prior to advocacy, such as those  ̳normally performed by a detective or 

police officer,‘ like gathering evidence, and those separate from the process, like providing legal 

advice to the police.‖ Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2012).

The Supreme Court has emphasized a functional approach for determining when public 

officials may claim absolute immunity under Section 1983, stating, ―An official must be 

performing a duty functionally comparable to one for which officials were rendered immune at 

common law, and it is only the specific function performed, and not the role or title of the official, 

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that is the touchstone of absolute immunity.‖ Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 2013)(internal citations and quotations omitted). For example, prison officials were found to 

enjoy absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability for enforcing court orders because they are 

performing functions necessary to the judicial process. Id. at 1039-40. However, the prison 

officials are still limited to act within their authority. Id. at 1041. Parole officials enjoyed absolute 

immunity for the imposition of parole conditions, ―a quasi-judicial function,‖ but not to the 

enforcement of the conditions in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 

Thornton v. Brown, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3037, *8-10 (9th Cir. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014). Conduct 

arising from their duty to supervise would be subject to qualified immunity. Id. at *10. This 

Circuit also found that prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity in their actions of 

initiating a civil RICO suit because their doing so was not acting in a uniquely governmental role, 

and the court found that the civil suit was ―essentially a harassing public-relations ploy.‖ Stapley, 

733 F.3d at 811-12. The prosecutors in Stapley filed the civil suit for the purpose of holding a 

press conference, and subsequently withdrew the suit prior to it being heard. Id. at 812. These 

cases demonstrate that certain officials are entitled to absolute immunity for certain actions, those 

necessary or integrally related to the judicial process, and not others, those not necessary to or 

taken outside of the judicial process.

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity on a motion to dismiss, 

the court considers the facts as alleged in the complaint, and then applies the law to those alleged 

facts. Stapley, at 809. The standards of a motion to dismiss –to take all allegations of material fact 

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but not to accept as true 

legal conclusions couched as factual allegations- apply to this absolute immunity analysis. See Id. 

at 809. Defendants have the burden of showing that they are entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 

811. 

Based on the pleadings, taking them as true and construing them in a light most favorable 

to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden to demonstrate entitlement to 

absolute immunity. Defendant‘s brief discussion on absolute immunity does not indicate what 

makes this case so exceptional as to deviate from the standard afforded to government officials of 

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qualified immunity. She only states that because Plaintiff admits that Defendant‘s conduct was 

one done to ensure victory in the mandamus case, her actions are ―based entirely on her official 

conduct as an attorney for the government.‖ Doc. 23, 7:25-28. Her position as a government 

attorney does not alone qualify her for absolute immunity; the specific actions performed must be 

those necessary to the judicial process. 

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant‘s actions were unconstitutional in intentionally 

singling him out for different treatment without a rational basis. He has also alleged that 

Defendant ―side-stepped‖ the judicial process by acting beyond the scope of her duties as the 

attorney assigned to the mandamus action and leading a search and criminal prosecution. As in 

Stapley, in which it the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity for filing a civil action 

for the purpose of holding a public hearing and subsequently withdrawing the action, Plaintiff has 

alleged that Defendant only pursued the search and encouraged the criminal action by abusing her 

position to gain an unfair advantage over Plaintiff. Plaintiff refers to Defendant‘s actions as a 

―misuse of power‖ and with the purpose to ―intimidate and publicly vilify‖ Plaintiff. Doc 22, 6:2, 

5-7. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant obtained the search warrant under false pretenses. Doc. 22, 

4:6-7. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant accompanied officers in the search of his home, 

directed the police where to search, and ―advised the officers to undertake a criminal 

investigation‖ of Plaintiff. Doc. 22, 6:1-3. These are actions considered in Lacey that may be 

outside of the judicial process as actions normally performed by a detective or police officer and 

giving legal advice to the police. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not serve as the prosecutor in 

the criminal action, and her actions related to the search were outside of the realm of her role as 

the attorney in the mandamus case, for which there was a normal practice regarding the storage of 

firearms that she failed to follow. These are not the type of exceptional circumstances that must be 

protected by absolute immunity, as opposed to qualified immunity. 

Defendant‘s actions, as alleged, are not analogous to the prosecutorial function, and are not 

necessary to or integrally related to the judicial process. Hence, the Court does not find that 

Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity at this stage. 

///

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C. Qualified Immunity

To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the threshold question is whether, in the 

light most favorable to the party asserting injury, the facts show an officer‘s conduct violated a 

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 

F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). If the violation could be established, the next question 

is whether the right was clearly established, given the specific context of the case. Saucier, at 201. 

―In order to determine whether it the constitutional violation was clearly established, the violation 

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 

that right. In other words, the unlawfulness must be apparent.‖ Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 

(2002)(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))(internal citations omitted). If an 

official could have reasonably but mistakenly believed that her conduct did not violate a clearly 

established constitutional right, she is entitled to qualified immunity. Hunt v. County of Orange, 

672 F.3d 606, 615 (9th Cir. 2012).

Government employees are not entitled to qualified immunity on judicial deception claims. 

Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 393 (9th Cir. 2011). If an officer submitted an affidavit that 

contained statements known to be false he cannot be said to have acted in a reasonable manner, 

and the shield of qualified immunity is lost. Id. (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1387

(9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation. Defendant‘s Motion 

frames the issue as whether or not Defendant ―was reasonable in her belief that Plaintiff‘s battery 

conviction is a MCDV thus precluding Plaintiff from owning, possessing or purchasing firearms.‖ 

Doc. 23, 9:4-6. She asserts that she was. Doc. 23, 9:24-25. Plaintiff has framed the issue as 

whether ―a reasonable attorney, similarly situated, would have believed that the United States 

Constitution allows for state actors to retaliate against civil litigants for having filed a suit in 

mandamus.‖ Doc. 26, 8:15-17. The Court understands the constitutional violation at hand to be 

Defendant‘s different treatment of Plaintiff, giving rise to a cause of action under the Equal 

Protection Clause. Defendant‘s papers do not assert that the class-of-one principle of the Equal 

Protection Clause was unclear, but bases her claim to entitlement of qualified immunity on the 

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factual claim of reasonableness of her actions based on the circumstances. Therefore, the 

reasonableness inquiry for purposes of finding qualified immunity would be whether or not a 

reasonable attorney in a mandamus action regarding Plaintiff‘s right to possess firearms, would 

have believed, under the circumstances, that departing from the normal practice and obtaining a 

warrant to search and conducting a search of Plaintiff‘s home was a constitutional violation. 

As discussed, Plaintiff has alleged that there was a normal practice for individuals not 

under a criminal investigation at the time, but may not be able to possess firearms based on a prior 

MCDV. Plaintiff alleges that he was fully cooperative and forthcoming during the process, even 

admitting in his first filing that he possessed firearms. He alleged that he lawfully purchased the 

guns that in his possession and set forth the same in the mandamus pleadings. He alleged that 

Defendant conducted the search two months after obtaining a warrant under false pretenses. 

Taking theses allegation as true, qualified immunity is inapplicable to Defendant‘s actions because 

she allegedly provided false and/or incomplete information when obtaining the warrant. It is also 

likely that a reasonable official would have understood the State‘s normal practice. The Court 

construes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and finds that a reasonable attorney 

would not have submitted false information to obtain a warrant and would have known that 

obtaining a warrant and conducting a search was different treatment in violation of Plaintiff‘s 

constitutional rights.

Hence, Defendant has not demonstrated that she is entitled to qualified immunity at this

stage. 

IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended 

Complaint is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 28, 2014 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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