Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02556/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02556-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Cliff Adams S. Vincente

F-90685,

Plaintiff,

v.

F. Rivas, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02556-GPC-MDD

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

& § 1915A

I. Procedural History

On November 12, 2015, Cliff Adams S. Vincente (“Plaintiff”), currently 

incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding 

pro se, filed a civil rights complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 

1). In addition, Plaintiff filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement which 

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the Court liberally construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.) 

On December 7, 2015, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously DISMISSED his Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint 

in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the Court’s Order. (Id.) on 

January 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 4.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

As the Court informed Plaintiff in its previous Order, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s 

IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under 

these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from 

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

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The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 

1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a cognizable 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements 

upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct 

at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or 

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 

1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels 

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (en banc).

Once again, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to due process under 

the Fourteenth Amendment during his disciplinary hearings by falsifying a rules violation 

report and for terminating him from his prison employment. (See FAC at 6-7.) “The 

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

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encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board 

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may 

grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. 

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly 

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement 

that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th 

Cir. 1997). In his original Complaint, Plaintiff attempted to allege facts sufficient to 

show an “atypical and significant hardship” by alleging that he was removed from his job 

assignment and he did not receive payment when he was employed from October 1, 2014 

to February 9, 2015. (See Compl. at 4-5.) 

However, as the Court informed Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit has consistently held 

that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘does not create a property or 

liberty interest in prison employment.’” Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir. 1986), and citing 

Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also 

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 

1080, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1986); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985); see 

also Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1986) (“There is no constitutional right 

to prison wages and any such compensation is by the grace of the state.”) Plaintiff is 

unable to demonstrate either a liberty or property interest in his prison employment or 

right to “back pay” arising directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, 

Plaintiff failed to identify any other “atypical and significant hardship” as a result of the 

allegations that Defendants falsified the rules violation report.

/ / / 

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The Court provided Plaintiff with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” and 

granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, in 

filing his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support a 

finding of “atypical and significant hardship” and in fact admits that the only changes he 

made in his amended pleading was in adding additional defendants. (See FAC at 10.) 

“After Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence of a 

protected, state-created liberty interest is avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is 

not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those 

conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Wilkinson v. 

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). Plaintiff offers no factual allegations to 

support a finding of “atypical and significant hardships” resulting from the disciplinary 

hearing. Therefore, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the existence of a liberty 

interest.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are 

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

In addition, Plaintiff claims that his right to equal protection was violated when 

prison officials removed him from his job assignment. (See FAC at 20.) “The Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to 

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a 

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. 

Cleburne Living Center, 472 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to 

state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated individuals were intentionally 

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treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 

Plaintiff suggests that he should be entitled to proceed on his equal protection 

claim on a “class of one” theory. (See FAC at 17.) This theory holds for the proposition 

that the equal protection guarantee protects not only groups, but individuals who would 

constitute a “class of one.” Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. In order to state a 

claim of violation of equal protection under the “class of one” theory, Plaintiff must 

establish that Defendants intentionally, and without rational basis, treated Plaintiff 

differently from others similarly situated. See id. Plaintiff does not provide any specific 

factual allegations to demonstrate that he was being treated differently from any other 

inmate who had a job assignment and was charged with a disciplinary violation. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are DISMISSED 

for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

§ 1915A(b)(1). However, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave in which to 

re-open his case by filing an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of 

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without 

reference to his original complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil 

action will remain dismissed without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim 

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upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

§ 1915A(b)(1).

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a court approved civil 

rights complaint form.

Dated: February 23, 2016

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