Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02154/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02154-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NAPOLEON ANDREWS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PRIDE INDUSTRIES, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-02154-KJM-AC 

ORDER 

On September 30, 2016, this court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment. This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s and defendants’ 

motions for reconsideration. Both parties also request a certificate of appealability. The matters 

were submitted after a hearing on December 2, 2016, at which Andrea Rosa appeared for plaintiff 

and David Daniels appeared for defendants. As explained below, the court GRANTS IN PART 

defendants’ motion for reconsideration, and DENIES plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. 

Additionally, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability to either party. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Federal Enclave Doctrine Issue 

1. Motion to Dismiss 

In a motion to dismiss, defendants contended the federal enclave doctrine barred 

Mr. Andrews’ state law claims because the issues giving rise to his suit occurred on Travis Air 

Force Base (Travis AFB). Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 5–7, ECF No. 6. In this court’s order on 

defendants’ motion, the court accepted that the land officially designated as Travis AFB qualified 

for federal enclave status. Order on Mot. Dismiss at 7, ECF No. 18. The court, however, did not 

conclude the federal enclave doctrine precluded Mr. Andrews’ state law claims because the 

record did not make clear whether the events giving rise to the claims occurred on Travis AFB 

land. Id. In particular, the court found, “[w]hile some tracts of land at or around Travis may be 

subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, some may not be.” Id. (citing Paul v. United States, 371 

U.S. 245, 269 (1963) (because Travis AFB had numerous units acquired at various times, it was 

not clear whether land at issue was subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction) (internal citations 

omitted). The court concluded it lacked sufficient facts to “determine whether the events 

underlying this action occurred on a federal enclave so as to the support the exercise of 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 8. 

The court thus also concluded defendants had not met their burden of establishing 

the events underlying this case occurred on federal enclave land. Id. Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss was denied, and the court granted plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery “limited 

to determining where exactly at or around Travis the events underlying this action occurred and 

whether those locations are areas over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction.” 

Id. at 9. 

2. Motion for Summary Judgment 

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants again argued the federal 

enclave doctrine barred Mr. Andrews’ state law claims because the events giving rise to this suit 

occurred on Travis AFB. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 26, ECF No. 66. In support of their motion, 

defendants presented in a table format the following purportedly undisputed facts, which Mr. 

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Andrews did not dispute: (1) PRIDE is a federal contractor that performs contracted service on 

Travis Air Force Base and (2) Plaintiff worked for PRIDE at Travis Air Force Base. Defs.’ UMF 

Nos. 1, 2, ECF No. 80-5. In the table, in fact, plaintiff’s counsel apparently entered the word 

“Admit” next to these facts. Id. Based on this portion of the record, defendants contended the 

federal enclave doctrine barred Mr. Andrews’ state law claims. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 26. Mr. 

Andrews argued the federal enclave doctrine did not apply because “questions remain about 

whether [Travis AFB] is all on federal lands.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 16, ECF No. 80. 

In its order resolving defendants’ summary judgment motion, the court concluded 

the doctrine did not apply because “the events in question occurred at David Grant Medical 

Center, a later-acquired tract either on or near Travis AFB, [and the court] could not say at that 

point whether defendants’ alleged conduct took place on a federal enclave.” Order Mot. Summ. 

J. (MSJ Order) at 12, ECF No. 95. The court noted even after the parties had an opportunity to 

engage in full discovery, neither party presented evidence showing conclusively that events 

giving rise to Mr. Andrews’ case occurred on federal enclave land. Id. at 12. In the absence of 

such evidence, the court concluded it could not grant summary judgment to the defense. Id. 

B. Disability Discrimination Issue 

Also in its order resolving defendants’ motion, the court concluded Mr. Andrews’ 

FEHA disability discrimination claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the 

interactive process were barred by FEHA’s one-year statute of limitations. MSJ Order at 13. 

Accordingly, the court did not consider whether Mr. Andrews’ claims for disability 

discrimination could support his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See 

id. at 24. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

“A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed 

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 

Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks 

and citations omitted). “A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement 

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with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation . . .” of that which was already considered by the 

Court in rendering its decision. United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp.2d 1111, 

1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing 

nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern–Tulare Water Dist. v. City of 

Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other 

grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(j) (when filing a motion for 

reconsideration, a party must show “what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to 

exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist 

for the motion.”). 

Where there is an error in the underlying order, only a failure to correct “clear 

error” constitutes an abuse of discretion. See McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration where question 

whether it could enter protective order in habeas action limiting Attorney General’s use of 

documents from trial counsel’s file was debatable). “Clear error” occurs when “the reviewing 

court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.” Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit 

has held it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration merely because the 

underlying order is “erroneous,” rather than “clearly erroneous.” McDowell, 197 F.3d at 

1255 n.4. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Defendants’ Request for Reconsideration 

Here, defendants request the court grant its motion, contending: (1) there are errors 

of fact upon which the summary judgment order is based, and (2) because the undisputed material 

facts establish the events underlying the suit occurred on a federal enclave, the federal enclave 

doctrine applies, and any state law claims are barred. Defs.’ Mot. Recons. at 5–6, ECF No. 97. In 

particular, defendants contend no evidence in the record supported the conclusion the events 

giving rise to Mr. Andrews’ claims occurred at David Grant Medical Center. Id. at 4. 

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Defendants’ motion is GRANTED to the extent the court will issue an amended 

order correcting its factual error. The court’s order on summary judgment did mistakenly state 

the events giving rise to Mr. Andrews’ claims took place at David Grant Medical Center. Instead, 

the court should have noted that nothing in the record clarified whether the events giving rise to 

Mr. Andrews’ claims occurred on a federal enclave. 

The court concludes it did not otherwise commit “clear error” in resolving 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See McDowell, 197 F.3d at 1256. Defendants have 

submitted no real evidence establishing one way or another where the events underlying this suit 

occurred, and accordingly, whether such events occurred on federal enclave land. At hearing, 

defense counsel conceded that his position was based solely on plaintiff’s counsel recordation of 

the word “Admit” in response to defendants’ first two undisputed facts. Given the totality of the 

record, the court is not prepared to resolve a critical legal question based on this bare appearance 

of an admission. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s prior conclusion that the federal 

enclave question is unresolved. Defendants’ motion in this respect is DENIED. 

B. Defendants’ Request for Certificate of Appealability 

At hearing, defendants agreed to a one-day bench proceeding to determine whether 

the claims giving rise to this suit occurred on a federal enclave, and the court confirmed a bench 

trial would be held. ECF No. 108. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, there is no 

“substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Defendants’ request for a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 

(9th Cir. 1981) (to certify an appeal, the court must find “(1) that there be a controlling question 

of law, (2) that there be substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and (3) that an immediate 

appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”). 

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration 

As recounted above, the court previously granted PRIDE’s motion for summary 

judgment on Mr. Andrews’ disability discrimination claims based on failure to accommodate and 

failure to engage in the interactive process as time-barred. MSJ Order at 14–15. Accordingly, the 

court declined to consider whether Mr. Andrews’ disability discrimination claims could give rise 

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to his wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim. Id. at 24. Mr. Andrews asks this 

court to reconsider this decision, contending his time-barred FEHA disability discrimination 

claims could give rise to his wrongful termination claim. Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 4, ECF No. 101. 

Mr. Andrews has not presented newly discovered evidence, shown clear legal 

error, or shown an intervening change in state law. His counsel cites no case law establishing that 

a wrongful termination claim can be based on time-barred FEHA claims, and the court finds 

none. In light of the Ninth Circuit case of Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Lucent 

Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 748 (9th Cir. 2011), the court concludes Mr. Andrews cannot raise a 

wrongful termination claim based on already dismissed disability discrimination claims. In 

Lucent Techs, the Ninth Circuit concluded although “disability discrimination can form the basis 

of a common law wrongful discharge claim,” the plaintiff could not prevail on a wrongful 

termination claim based on a dismissed FEHA disability discrimination claim. Id. 

Reconsideration is not warranted here and is therefore DENIED. 

D. Plaintiff’s Request for Certificate of Appealability 

The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability here as well because 

Mr. Andrews merely disagrees with the court’s order, and has not shown there is substantial 

ground for difference of opinion on the issue of whether a wrongful termination of public policy 

claim can be based on time-barred FEHA disability claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

In sum, defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED to the extent the 

court will correct a factual finding in its order on summary judgment. Defendants’ motion is 

otherwise DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

The bench trial on federal enclave status will take place on March 17, 2017, with 

a joint statement due by March 3, 2017. 

This order resolves ECF Nos. 97 & 100. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 10, 2017. 

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