Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03977/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03977-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Jason Augustiniak,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-03977-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On November 8, 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 (“the Petition”). (Doc. 1.) On January 24, 2020, Magistrate Judge Boyle 

issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) concluding the Petition should be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 14.) Afterward, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R

(Doc. 15) and Respondents filed a response (Doc. 16). For the following reasons, the Court 

will overrule Petitioner’s objections, adopt the R&R, and terminate this action.

I. Background

Petitioner was indicted on federal racketeering changes in 2003 but those charges 

were dismissed in 2006. (Doc. 14 at 2.) At the time of the dismissal, Petitioner had spent 

841 days in federal custody. (Id.) 

In 2007, Petitioner was indicted on an array of state charges, including murder, 

kidnapping, and assisting a criminal street gang. (Id.) In 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty, 

pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of second-degree murder. (Id.) The plea 

agreement stipulated to a “flat time” sentence of between 22 and 25 years in prison. (Id.) 

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Petitioner later tried to withdraw his plea, based on claims of involuntariness and 

ineffective assistance, but the motion was denied. (Id. at 3.) In 2012, Petitioner was 

sentenced to 23.5 years in state prison. (Id.)

Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Id.) In February 2015, “the 

parties stipulated that Petitioner would re-enter a guilty plea to Second Degree Murder with 

a stipulation to a new sentence of 20.5 years (flat time) and community supervision upon

his release. The court vacated the prior plea and sentence, accepted Petitioner’s new plea, 

and sentenced him as stipulated. The court found Petitioner was entitled to 841 days of 

presentence incarceration credit for the time he spent in federal custody.” (Id., citations 

omitted).

In April 2015, Respondents filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Id. at 4.) In July 2017, that court concluded Petitioner was not entitled to 

presentence incarceration credit for the time spent in federal custody. (Id.) The Arizona 

Supreme Court subsequently denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (Id.)

In November 2018, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Id.) Although Petitioner initially 

raised three claims, he later moved to dismiss two of them. (Id. at 4-5.) His sole remaining 

claim is that the Arizona Court of Appeals violated his federal due process rights, the 

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, and federal sentencing laws by refusing to 

give him presentence incarceration credit for the 841 days he spent in federal custody. (Id.)

The R&R concludes this claim must be denied because “[t]he decision to deny 

[Petitioner] presentence incarceration credit was decided under Arizona law” and a 

“challenge to [a] state court’s application of presentence-credit law is not cognizable on 

federal habeas review.” (Id. at 5-6.) In support of this conclusion, the R&R cites an array 

of decisions by other judges in this district rejecting § 2254 claims premised on challenges 

to the calculation of presentence incarceration credit. (Id.)

1

 The R&R acknowledges the 

1 The cited decisions are Morgan v. Ryan, 2017 WL 131570, *1 (D. Ariz. 2017) 

(“[T]he issue of presentence incarceration credit is a state-law matter and any alleged error 

in the interpretation or application of state law cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief.”),

Robinson v. Arizona, 2015 WL 4480856, *3-4 (D. Ariz. 2015) (habeas petitioner’s claim 

that “he is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States’ because the trial court did not give him credit for time served on supervised 

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existence of one 14-year-old unpublished district court order that suggested a state prisoner 

could raise a federal due process-based challenge to the denial of presentence incarceration 

credit,2 but it concludes that Petitioner cannot prevail on such a theory because (1) a habeas 

petitioner cannot transform a state-law issue into a federal issue by relabeling it a due 

process violation and (2) the challenged ruling here wasn’t sufficiently egregious to shock 

the conscience or otherwise amount to a due process violation because the charge that 

resulted in the time spent in federal custody (racketeering) has different elements than the 

state-law crime to which Petitioner pleaded guilty (murder). (Id. at 6-7.)

II. Legal Standard

A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served 

with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”). Those 

objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being 

served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis added).

District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific 

objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does 

not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual 

or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to 

those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations 

de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). Thus, district judges need not review 

an objection to an R&R that is general and non-specific. See, e.g., Warling v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 5276367, *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Because de novo review of an entire R & R would 

defeat the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection ‘has the same effect as 

probation or in county jail when it sentenced him to prison . . . does not sufficiently allege 

a federal claim and, therefore, is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review”), and 

Elliot v. Ryan, 2011 WL 4829407, *1 (D. Ariz. 2011) (adopting recommendation to deny 

habeas petition “claiming Petitioner’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated by the denial of presentence incarceration credit against his Arizona sentences for 

the 14 months he spent in federal prison in Florida”).

2 Conway v. Schriro, 2006 WL 3063643, *8 (D. Ariz. 2006).

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would a failure to object.’”) (citations omitted); Haley v. Stewart, 2006 WL 1980649, *2 

(D. Ariz. 2006) (“[G]eneral objections to an R & R are tantamount to no objection at all.”).3

III. The Objections 

In his written objections, Petitioner begins by generically “object[ing] to all adverse 

rulings in the . . . R&R” and attempting to incorporate by reference various arguments he 

made in earlier case filings. (Doc. 15 at 1-2.) This approach is improper—as noted, a 

district court need only review specific objections to the R&R.

Next, Petitioner challenges the R&R’s conclusion that a miscalculation of 

presentence incarceration credit is a state-law issue that is not cognizable in a habeas 

proceeding. (Doc. 15 at 3.) Citing Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 1994), he 

contends that “misapplication of a state’s sentencing laws could justify federal habeas 

relief.” (Id., emphasis in original.) 

Last, Petitioner challenges the R&R’s conclusion that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

decision wasn’t so obviously wrong as to shock the conscience or result in fundamental 

unfairness. (Id. at 4-5.) He contends that because his federal racketeering charge “was not 

based on drug dealing or gun running” and was instead “based on ARS 13-1104,” which 

is the same crime to which he pleaded guilty, it follows that “‘but for’ the state murder 

offense, the Petitioner would not have been in federal custody for 841 days.” (Id.)

Respondents do not address, with any specificity, Petitioner’s first argument 

concerning Christian. Instead, they repeat the citations contained in the R&R concerning 

the non-cognizable nature of habeas claims pertaining to presentence incarceration credit. 

(Doc. 16 at 1-2.) As for Petitioner’s second argument, Respondents argue that Petitioner 

“conflates the factual basis for his charges with the distinct elements of each offense. 

Without the racketeering aspect of his charge, he would not have been subject to federal 

custody. A ‘mere’ murder is precisely the type of crime that involves a state’s general 

3 See generally S. Gensler, 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, Rule 72, at 422 (2018) (“A party who wishes to object to a magistrate judge’s 

ruling must make specific and direct objections. General objections that do not direct the 

district court to the issues in controversy are not sufficient. . . . [T]he objecting party must 

specifically identify each issue for which he seeks district court review . . . .”).

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police powers, which generally does not subject a defendant to federal custody unless there 

is some kind of federal ‘hook.’ In this case, the federal ‘hook’ was the racketeering aspect 

of the murder, meaning the fact that it was done to further a criminal enterprise (the Hells 

Angels Motorcycle Club of Arizona). This element (racketeering) is entirely missing from 

Arizona’s murder statute, which means that they are two distinct crimes (as the Magistrate 

and the state courts pointed out), which means that he is not entitled to presentence 

incarceration credit for time spent in federal custody.”). (Id. at 2-3.)

Petitioner did not file a reply.

IV. Analysis

Petitioner’s objections to the R&R will be overruled. First, the Court agrees with 

the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of presentence incarceration 

credit is a state-law claim not cognizable on habeas review. Petitioner cannot evade this 

conclusion by repackaging his challenge as a due process claim. Langford v. Day, 110 

F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A petitioner] may not, however, transform a state-law 

issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process. We accept a state 

court's interpretation of state law, and alleged errors in the application of state law are not 

cognizable in federal habeas corpus.”). Rhode does not compel a different conclusion. It 

is a pre-AEDPA decision that didn’t involve presentence incarceration credit. As the R&R 

notes, “[n]either party has directed this Court to clearly established federal law holding that 

incorrect state-law decisions regarding presentence credit can amount to a due process 

violation. Instead, several courts have determined there is no constitutional right to 

presentence credit.” (Doc. 14 at 6 n.2)

Second, even if Petitioner’s claim were theoretically cognizable, he is not entitled 

to relief on the merits. The rule in Arizona is that presentence credit should be afforded 

for “‘[a]ll time’ spent in custody pursuant to an Arizona offense . . . [but] is unavailable for 

time served based on a charge other than that for which the defendant is being sentenced, 

because such incarceration is not ‘pursuant to’ the relevant offense.” State v. Cecena, 334 

P.3d 1282, 1284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted). “As long as the foreign 

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incarceration is pursuant to the Arizona charge for which he or she is being sentenced, a 

defendant should be entitled to credit for presentence incarceration.” Id. 

In Cecena, the defendant fled to Mexico after being charged in state court with 

sexual abuse of a child. Id. at 1283. He was convicted in absentia in September 2010, 

arrested in Mexico in July 2012, and then extradited to Arizona in May 2013 for sentencing. 

Id. at 1283. The issue on appeal was whether the defendant should receive presentence 

incarceration credit for the time he spent in Mexican jail. Id. at 1283-84. The Cecena court 

concluded the record was insufficiently developed to resolve this issue because neither 

party had introduced evidence showing why Mexican authorities had arrested the defendant 

in July 2012—although the trial court had issued a bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest 

following the September 2010 trial, “Cecena never actually asserted before the trial judge 

that his detention in Mexico was pursuant to the September 2010 arrest warrant.” Id. at 

1285. Thus, the appellate court “remand[ed] this case for further findings on . . . whether 

[Cecena’s incarceration in Mexico] was pursuant to the Arizona charge of continuous 

sexual abuse of a minor.” Id. at 1285-86. The court also suggested, in a parenthetical, that 

the defendant would not be entitled to credit unless his “foreign incarceration was solely 

on account of in-state charge.” Id. at 1286 (citation omitted).

Here, unlike in Cecena, there is no possibility that Petitioner was arrested by federal 

authorities “pursuant to” the Arizona charge to which Petitioner ultimately pleaded guilty. 

The federal arrest occurred in 2003, yet the state charges weren’t even initiated until 2007. 

Although it’s true that the federal racketeering statute incorporates some state laws by 

reference, Cecena suggests that presentence credit is available only when out-ofjurisdiction incarceration occurs at the behest of Arizona authorities due to a pending statelaw charge. Id. at 1285 (suggesting that credit could also apply if foreign arrest was the 

“result of a formal hold or detainer” or pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant). Under 

that logic, there is no reason to provide presentence incarceration credit based on time spent 

in custody on a federal racketeering charge—such a charge may be pursued by federal 

authorities without the assent or request of the state whose criminal laws are incorporated 

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by reference.4 

Finally, and in any event, Petitioner has not identified any cases from Arizona (or 

any other jurisdiction) holding or even suggesting that presentence incarceration credit is 

required under these somewhat unusual circumstances. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish 

(as he concedes he must) that the alleged error was so palpably and obviously wrong as to 

violate notions of fundamental fairness and warrant habeas relief. (Doc. 15 at 3 [“All 

parties agree that the Arizona Court of Appeals[’] ruling must ‘shock the conscience’ and 

be so ‘arbitrary and fundamentally unfair’ that it violated federal due process.”].).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) The R&R’s recommended disposition (Doc. 14) is accepted.

(2) The Petition (Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice.

(3) A Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural 

bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has 

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right

(4) The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 7th day of April, 2020.

4 See generally State v. Augustiniak, 2017 WL 2871588, *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) 

(“[T]here is no evidence the State asked federal authorities to initiate, maintain, or 

otherwise prolong Augustiniak’s federal custody as a result of any Arizona offense for 

which Augustiniak was convicted. Therefore, Augustiniak did not spend any time in 

federal custody ‘pursuant to’ an Arizona offense that resulted in the underlying conviction 

and sentence. That some of the federal racketeering charges were based, in part, upon the 

same murder for which Augustiniak later pleaded guilty is of no consequence.”).

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