Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00221/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERN BARBERO,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-0221 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Vern Barbero moves for summary judgment or for

remand. Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart in her capacity as

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration opposes the

motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS

Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment or remand.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On April 1, 1996, Plaintiff Vern Barbero filed an

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1On March 22, 1996, his 62nd birthday, Plaintiff had begun

receiving Social Security retirement benefits of approximately

$845 a month. (Id. at 930) 

2

application for Social Security disability benefits under Title

II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability due to spinal

disease beginning on November 21, 1987. (Administrative Record

(AR) at 960) Plaintiff was sixty-two years old at the time he

filed his application for Social Security disability benefits. 

(Id. at 961)1 His initial application was denied, as was his

appeal. (Id. at 960) On October 31, 1997, the Administrative

Law Judge found that Plaintiff was not disabled on or before his

date last insured (DLI), December 31, 1992, because Plaintiff

had continued to perform substantial gainful activity up to his

DLI. (Id. at 16, 19) This ruling was adopted as the final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (Id. at 924) 

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in this court, Barbero v. Apfel, C-99-

2253 MEJ, alleging that a person cannot receive "substantial

income" from a business operating at a loss, and therefore the

ALJ's finding that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful

activity through December 31, 1992 was legal error. (Id. at

937) On March 30, 2001, Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James

ruled that the ALJ's decision was unsupported by substantial

evidence, reversed the decision of the Commissioner and remanded

the case to the Social Security Administration. (Id. at 944)

On May 7, 2002, a hearing was held before a different ALJ

in San Francisco, California. (Id. at 950) On May 15, 2002,

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that ALJ issued an order denying Plaintiff’s claim, finding

that, although Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since November 21, 1987, he retained the capacity to

perform light work and was able to engage in his past

employment. (Id. at 964-65) Plaintiff requested Appeals

Council review. (Id. at 974) In November, 2002, the council

granted review and remanded with instructions for the ALJ to

consider the testimony of a vocational expert in the

determination of whether Plaintiff's job skills were

transferrable to other sales occupations in the national

economy, as well as whether Plaintiff's job skills were

transferrable to other non-sales occupations. (Id. at 983-84) 

The council instructed the ALJ to "identify and resolve any

conflicts between the occupational evidence provided by the

vocational expert and information in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (DOT) and its companion publication, the

Selected Characteristics of Occupations (Social Security Ruling

00-4p)" before relying on the vocational expert's testimony. 

(Id. at 984)

On April 7, 2003, the ALJ held a supplemental hearing on

Plaintiff's claim. (Id. at 803) On April 11, 2003, the ALJ

issued a second decision denying Plaintiff’s claim, based on the

conclusion that Plaintiff could perform his past work. (Id. at

802-03) On December 15, 2003, the Appeals Council denied review

and the ALJ's April 11, 2003 Order became the final decision of

the Commissioner. (Id. at 793)

II. Employment and Medical History

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Plaintiff received a high school education and attended

approximately one semester of college. (Id. at 877) In 1959,

he began working as a sales representative. (Id. at 790) In

1972, he became a traveling sales representative working on

commission for manufacturers of novelty gift items, visiting

between fifteen and forty stores a day, and working more than

forty hours per week. (Id. at 39, 790, 830, 862). At his 2002

hearing, Plaintiff testified that his case of product samples

had weighed "nothing." (Id. at 830) However, later at the 2002

hearing, when he was questioned by the vocational expert,

Plaintiff testified that his job had required him to lift boxes

of samples that weighed between thirty to fifty pounds. (Id. at

856)

Plaintiff's first car accident was in the early 1980's. 

(Id. at 40) After this accident he attempted to return to work

full-time but could only maintain part-time employment because

he suffered back injuries and was "thinking a lot slower." (Id.

at 832) In November, 1987, Plaintiff was involved in a second

accident, a head-on automobile collision. (Id. at 709) He lost

consciousness for a few seconds and later experienced aches and

pains in his low back, spreading to his legs, and cramps in his

feet and toes. (Id.) He fractured his left wrist. (Id. at

744) After his 1987 accident, Plaintiff worked on a reduced

schedule and stopped earning net income. (Id. at 832) In

March, 1988, Plaintiff was involved in another car accident in

which he was rear-ended. (Id. at 728) In 1994, Plaintiff had a

bicycle accident and broke a finger on his right hand. (Id. at

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66) 

In 1985, Plaintiff had earned $4,332 in net profit. (Id.

at 106) In 1986, Plaintiff earned $4,901 in net profit. (Id.) 

In 1987, Plaintiff earned $2,620 in net profit. (Id. at 106,

259) For 1988, Plaintiff reported a business loss of $409 on

his federal income tax return. (Id. at 246) For 1990,

Plaintiff reported a business loss of $36. (Id. at 213) For

1991, Plaintiff earned gross receipts of $15,551 but had $566 in

business losses. (Id. at 963, 205) In 1992, Plaintiff earned

$16,957 in gross receipts and had $862 in business losses. (Id.

at 174, 177) 

Plaintiff traveled 29,328 miles in 1990, 28,567 miles in

1991 and 59,904 in 1992 to make sales calls. (Id. at 219, 199,

182) In 1990, Plaintiff incurred business expenses of $2,593 on

hotels, $3,006 on meals and $7,828 on phone calls. (Id. at 216) 

In 1991, Plaintiff incurred business expenses of $2,693 on

travel, $938 on meals and entertainment and $7,510 on phone

calls. (Id. at 194) In 1992, Plaintiff incurred business

expenses of $2,900 on travel, $5,561 on meals and entertainment

and $8,348 on phone calls. (Id. at 177)

Between 1987 and 1988, Plaintiff visited Drs. Friedman,

Sapienza, Shen, Klein, Steinhardt, Dorsay, Wang, Peterson,

Friedman, Degalos, Rosenberg and additional unidentified

physicians. Plaintiff informed the Social Security

Administration that, in 1986 or 1987, Dr. Friedman prescribed

physical therapy for him. (Id. at 108) The remaining visits

are chronicled in Plaintiff's medical records. On December 9,

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1987, Dr. Sapienza recorded Plaintiff's complaints of neck and

back pain. (Id. at 747) Dr. Shen and an unidentified doctor

also reported Plaintiff's complaints of a stiff neck and pain in

his low back, cervical spine and left leg. (Id. at 707, 740) 

On December 21, 1987, Dr. Klein diagnosed Plaintiff's left wrist

fractures, suffered in the 1987 car accident, as healing. (Id.

at 744)

On January 16, 1988, Dr. Steinhardt concluded that x-rays

of Plaintiff's cervical spine showed “rather severe degenerative

disc disease of the lower cervical spine,” and “rather severe

degenerative changes” in the lower lumbar spine. (Id. at 736) 

On June 21, 1988, Dr. Dorsay concluded that a CT scan of

Plaintiff's lumbar spine showed a broad-based disc bulge at the

level of L4-5 placing pressure on the thecal sac (encasing the

spinal cord), consistent with a synovial cyst, and small joint

disease at L4-5. (Id. at 734) He also noted Plaintiff's "LBP"

(presumably lower back pain) despite his regimen of prednisone

and other medications and physical therapy. (Id.)

On an unidentified date, Dr. Rosenberg noted Plaintiff's

constant low back pain, numbness in his right thigh and chronic

neck pain. (Id. at 728) He noted that Plaintiff's physical

therapy was helping, but that there was "no clear response to

meds." (Id.) On an unidentified date, Dr. Rosenberg requested

consultation on Plaintiff's back pain and a recommendation on

whether surgery for his synovial cyst would help the pain. (Id.

at 730) An unidentifiable doctor's report noted that he or she

was "not sure if the cyst observed on CAT is the source of his

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pain." (Id. at 727) At that time, the physician prescribed

Plaintiff various pain relief modalities, including a lumbar

corset, a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (TENS)

unit and medication. (Id.) 

In approximately August, 1988, Dr. Rosenberg reported that

Plaintiff complained of pain and prescribed regular use of the

TENS unit and bicycling. (Id. at 711) On August 11, 1988, Dr.

Wang noted that Plaintiff told him that his back pain was making

it difficult to walk or work more than a week at a time. (Id.

at 715) Plaintiff informed Dr. Wang that his back pain

continued, that the TENS unit was not helping and that physical

therapy afforded him only some relief. (Id.) On August 24,

1988, Dr. Peterson, a neurosurgeon, noted that Plaintiff

complained of low back pain, a stiff neck and constant numbness

in his right leg from knee to hip. (Id. at 709) Dr. Peterson

was not sure the disk bulge at L4-5 explained Plaintiff's

bilateral symptoms and wanted to try alternative measures before

performing an open procedure to decompress the disk bulge. 

(Id.) After 1988, there is no record of further treatment for

Plaintiff's back condition.

On May 2, 1996, State Agency examiners for the Social

Security Administration, based on reviews of Plaintiff's medical

records, diagnosed Plaintiff with "Disorders of the Back

(Discogenic & Degenerative)" and determined that he was not

disabled through his DLI. (Id. at 71) The June 20, 1996

reconsideration assessment by the Social Security Administration

amended Plaintiff's diagnosis to include a secondary diagnosis

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of "Osteoarthritis & Allied Disorders" and affirmed the previous

conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled through his DLI. 

(Id. at 72)

III. The ALJ Hearings

A. May 12, 1997 Hearing

At the administrative hearing on May 12, 1997, Plaintiff

testified to his present employment conditions, and his

vocational history and medical condition between the onset of

his disability in 1987 and his DLI in 1992. (Id. at 33) 

Plaintiff testified that, on a typical day at the time of

the hearing, it took him three and a half to four hours to

prepare himself to leave the house. (Id. at 45-46) A few times

a week he was not able to get up at all. (Id. at 46) He could

only stand or walk for twenty or thirty minutes before he needed

to lie down or recline for about fifteen minutes. (Id. at 43) 

Plaintiff continued to do his own light grocery shopping and

could carry his groceries home. (Id. at 53) His cooking

regimen was restricted to microwaveable foods and he vacuumed

about once a month. (Id. at 53-54)

Plaintiff testified that his current part-time job required

that he lift small, lightweight boxes of product samples onto a

luggage cart and roll them in to visit his accounts. (Id. at

44) In order to visit accounts, he arrived at his destination

the day before to rest in a motel. (Id. at 46-47) He returned

to the motel between calls to rest for thirty or forty minutes. 

(Id. at 47) He generally made two sales calls a day, but may

have made up to four on a good day. (Id.) Plaintiff was

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selling a new "hot item" which he hoped would increase his gross

earnings. (Id. at 48) Although Plaintiff had no reportable

income, he lived on investments made with the funds he received

from settlements resulting from car accidents. (Id. at 59)

Plaintiff also testified to his medical history. He went

to physical therapy for his back for a few years, but "it

seem[ed] like all that therapy just aggravated the situation." 

(Id. at 49) He also testified that he felt like he "wasn't

getting any real benefit from that therapy and all I did, it

just was wearing me out just to get down there. I'd just as

soon put that effort into something else." (Id. at 65-66) He

did not feel improvement and a doctor had told him to do

"whatever feels best," so he stopped physical therapy and began

lying down during the day. (Id. at 49-50) He also used to take

pain medication, but felt it "cloud[ed] the mind" and interfered

with his "body functions." (Id. at 50) At least one doctor

suggested back surgery to Plaintiff, but he feared it would

cause further damage to his back and decided not to pursue it. 

(Id. at 54)

B. May 7, 2002 Hearing

At the May 7, 2002 hearing, Plaintiff, the medical expert,

Dr. Louis Lesko, and the vocational expert, James Grier,

testified.

Plaintiff testified that from 1988 to 1992 he was on the

road in hotels only every other week and repeated the

limitations that he had described in the 1997 hearing. (Id. at

831-35) He testified that he stopped visiting Fisherman's

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Wharf, his most lucrative territory, because he was unable to

walk to all of the stores; he could walk only a block before

becoming exhausted. (Id. at 837) He also testified that some

of his top items were no longer popular and this hurt his sales. 

(Id. at 831-33)

Plaintiff again described the 1987 car accident and his

subsequent medical history. (Id. at 839) He was in physical

therapy, but quit after a few years, and had difficulty with the

pain medication because "[t]hey gave me so much stuff that I

couldn't even see where I was going." (Id. at 840) The pain

did not get better, so Plaintiff "just started dealing with it

or just learned to live with it more." (Id. at 841) He bought

a TENS unit, but it did not help the pain. (Id. at 844)

The medical expert, Dr. Lesko, questioned Plaintiff. (Id.

at 845) Plaintiff testified that his primary pain medication

was Motrin and aspirin. (Id. at 847) He also testified that he

had back pain prior to the 1987 car accident, but that that

accident aggravated his condition. (Id. at 848) Dr. Lesko then

provided his opinion, based on Plaintiff's testimony and medical

records. (Id. at 849) He concluded that Plaintiff's back pain

was due to a pre-existing degenerative condition, specifically a

synovial cyst in the lumbar spine. (Id.) The 1987 accident

caused minor injuries, including a wrist fracture and loss of

consciousness. (Id. at 850) It aggravated his back and neck

pain, but the changes noted in later x-ray and CT scan findings

were present before the 1987 accident. (Id. at 851) The

aggravation of his back pain caused by the car accident normally

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would not last five years. (Id.) Plaintiff likely returned to

his pre-1987 level of pain six months after the accident. (Id.) 

Based on the changes to Plaintiff's back and neck, Dr. Lesko

evaluated his residual functional capacity (RFC), defined as the

maximum level of work-related activities that a claimant can

perform in spite of his limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545, and

stated that Plaintiff was capable of light work. (Id. at 852)

The vocational expert, James Grier, ascertained Plaintiff's

level of education. (Id. at 855) Mr. Grier then testified that

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) defined Plaintiff's

past relevant work as "sales representative for wholesale

jewelry," which is skilled, light work. (Id. at 855) Because

Plaintiff had testified that, before his accident, he regularly

lifted thirty to fifty pounds in his work, Mr. Grier stated that

this placed the job, as actually performed, at the medium level

work. Therefore, Mr. Grier concluded that Plaintiff could

perform his past job "not as actually but as typically

performed." (Id. at 856)

C. April 7, 2003 Hearing

At the April 7, 2003 hearing, held pursuant to the December

9, 2002 Appeals Council's remand order, Plaintiff and vocational

expert Gerald Belchick testified. (Id. at 860) The council

ordered a review of the former vocational expert's comparison of

Plaintiff's job to that of a jewelry salesman. (Id.)

Plaintiff again testified to the current requirements of

his job as a sales representative. (Id. at 862-63) He told Mr.

Belchick that his cases of product samples were very heavy and

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that he pushed multiple cases, each weighing thirty or forty

pounds and cumulatively weighing 200 or 300 pounds, on a hand

truck to his sales calls. (Id. at 864) 

Mr. Belchick provided his opinion of Plaintiff's actual

performance, classifying it as "a light exertional level." (Id.

at 865) He stated that "several hundred pounds held on a

simple, wheeled in, as opposed to being carried in, that

wouldn't change 

-- appreciably wouldn't change the light lifting load. I mean,

if he was having to lift them all at one time, it would be a

whole different story. . . . But as he described it just now, I

think we're very much within the small part of calling it a

light exertional level." (Id.) He found no sales jobs in the

DOT which exceeded light work and concluded that all sales jobs

are light. (Id.) He characterized Plaintiff's job as "sales

representative, novelties." (Id.) Because Plaintiff could lift

twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently and walk at

least six hours in an eight hour day and had few activity

restrictions, Mr. Belchick concluded that Plaintiff could

perform the full range of light work, including his past

relevant work. (Id. at 868)

IV. The ALJ Decisions

A. The May 15, 2002 Order

Pursuant to SSA regulations, the ALJ performed the fivestep sequential evaluation process to determine whether

Plaintiff was entitled to benefits under the Social Security

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2 The five steps of the inquiry are: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so,

then the plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. If not, proceed to step two. (2) Is the

plaintiff’s impairment severe? Is so, proceed to step three. 

If not, then the plaintiff is not disabled. (3) Does the

impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments

described in 20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1? If so, then the

plaintiff is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. (4) Is

the plaintiff able to do any work that he or she has done in the

past? If so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. If not,

proceed to step five. (5) Is the plaintiff able to do any other

work? If so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. If not, then

the plaintiff is disabled. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d

949, 953 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920).

The plaintiff maintains the burden of proof for steps one

through four. However, should an inquiry proceed to step five,

the burden then shifts to the Commissioner. 

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Act.2 (AR at 960-65)

First, the ALJ examined the tax records presented by

Plaintiff and concluded that Plaintiff did not have net earnings

after 1988 and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity after his date of onset, November 21, 1987. (Id. at

961-62)

Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff's impairments were "severe"

because they had more than a minimal effect on his ability to

work. (Id. at 962) At the third step, the ALJ found that the

record did not demonstrate that Plaintiff suffered from an

impairment sufficiently severe to constitute a listed impairment

from 20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1. (Id.) 

Fourth, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's medical records, the

State Agency examiners' evaluations, medical expert testimony

and Plaintiff's testimony to determine his RFC. (Id. at 962-63) 

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's alleged inability to earn net

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profits after his 1987 accident and found that Plaintiff's

testimony that he could only work every other week and that he

had to lie down frequently was "not credible based upon the

paucity of medical treatment and medication usage, the extent of

his work activities, and the opinions of the State Agency

examiner and the medical expert regarding claimant's

limitations." (Id. at 963) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff

was not precluded from performing "light work." (Id.)

The ALJ agreed with the vocational expert's testimony that

Plaintiff's current employment was comparable to the "light

work" occupation of "sales representative/jewelry," as defined

by the DOT Code 279.357-018. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that the

"sales representative/jewelry" position sufficiently

incorporated the skills and activities used by Plaintiff in his

past work as a sales representative for novelty gift items and

that Plaintiff was capable of performing his past work. (Id. at

964) 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as

defined in the Social Security Act at any time through the date

of the decision and that his RFC allowed him to perform light

work. (Id. at 963, 965)

B. The April 11, 2003 Order

In the April 11, 2003 Order, after remand for a review of

the classification of Plaintiff's previous employment and

Plaintiff's ability to transfer his work skills to other

occupations, the ALJ again performed the five-step sequential

evaluation process required by SSA regulations. (Id. at 803) 

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Steps one through three were unchanged from the previous order

and, for the reasons given in the previous order, the ALJ again

concluded that Plaintiff's testimony was not credible.

At step four, pursuant to the instructions of the Appeals

Council, the ALJ engaged in a "function by function assessment"

of Plaintiff's RFC and corresponding categories of employment. 

(Id. at 805) He explained that light work involves lifting

objects of no more than twenty pounds or frequently lifting or

carrying objects weighing up to ten pounds. (Id.) A job may be

classified as light when it does not require significant

lifting, but does require a fair amount of walking or standing

or sitting with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. 

(Id.) Incorporating the discussion presented in his May 15,

2002 Order, the ALJ found that Plaintiff: 

was able to lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally

and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk (with

normal breaks) for a total of about 6 hours in an

eight-hour workday, . . . and has unlimited ability to

push and/or pull (including operation of hand and/or

foot controls).

(Id.)

On the basis of this information and the testimony of

vocational expert Gerald Belchick, who testified that

Plaintiff's past work as a sales representative for novelty

items was classified in the DOT as light, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff could still perform his past relevant work as a sales

representative of novelties and gifts. (Id. at 806) 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's RFC would allow him to

engage in light work, including his past relevant work. (Id. at

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805) Therefore, at step four, the ALJ again concluded Plaintiff

was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act at any

time through the date of the decision. (Id. at 806)

LEGAL STANDARD

If the ALJ issues an unfavorable decision denying benefits,

a court cannot set it aside unless the ALJ's findings are based

upon legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in

the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Sandgathe v. Chater,

108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not

just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Thompson

v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Walker

v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976)). If there is

substantial evidence to support the decision of the ALJ, it is

well-settled that the decision must be upheld even when there is

evidence on the other side, Hall v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. and

Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (1979), or when the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, Gallant v.

Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If supported by

substantial evidence, the findings of the court as to any fact

shall be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637

F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981). It must therefore be more than a

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"mere scintilla" of evidence. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1939); Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and

Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1988); Swanson v.

Secretary of Health and Human Services, 763 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th

Cir. 1985). 

If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Secretary's conclusion, the court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary. Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457. 

The reviewing court may not decide the facts anew or reweigh the

evidence, but it must be more than an uncritical rubber stamp. 

Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986). A decision

that is supported by substantial evidence will nevertheless be

set aside if proper legal standards were not applied in weighing

the evidence and making the decision. Wilson v. Shalala, 841 F.

Supp. 1491, 1494 (E.D. Wash. 1994).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to cite clear and

convincing reasons for concluding that Plaintiff's testimony

regarding his subjective symptoms was not credible. He argues

that, by disregarding this testimony, the ALJ reached an

incorrect finding that Plaintiff retained an RFC for light work

and could return to his past work as a sales representative.

I. Standard of Review for Assessing Plaintiff's Credibility

In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth

Circuit developed a threshold test to determine the credibility

of a claimant's subjective symptom testimony. Under Cotton, a

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claimant "must produce objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'" Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-08); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). Cotton requires "only that the

causal relationship be a reasonable inference, not a medically

proven phenomenon." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Therefore, a

claimant is not required to produce objective medical evidence

of the pain itself or its severity. Id. (citing Bunnell, 947

F.2d at 347-48). "It is improper as a matter of law for an ALJ

to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it

is not fully corroborated by objective medical findings." 

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Once a claimant meets the Cotton test, "the

Commissioner may not discredit the claimant's testimony as to

subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupportable by

objective evidence. Unless there is affirmative evidence

showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner's

reason for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be 'clear and

convincing.'" Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

1996) (quoting Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir.

1989)); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. When outlining the findings

supporting a conclusion that a plaintiff's testimony is

incredible, the ALJ must consider "all of the available

evidence" in analyzing the severity of the claimed pain. SSR

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88-13. Factors to be analyzed include: (1) the nature,

location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity

of any pain; (2) precipitating and aggravating factors; (3)

type, dosage, effectiveness and adverse side effects of any pain

medications; (4) treatment, other than medication, for relief of

pain; (5) functional restrictions; and (6) the plaintiff's daily

activities. Id.; see Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (types of activities

ALJ may rely on to find pain allegations credible include the

type of daily activities performed by plaintiff and whether

plaintiff sought or followed treatment); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240

F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding rejection of

plaintiff's alleged pain justified where plaintiff had little

evidence of spinal abnormalities, had not used strong pain

medication, had not participated in pain management or physical

therapy, and limited daily activities by choice not necessity). 

However, medical evidence is still relevant in determining the

severity of a plaintiff's alleged pain and its disabling

effects. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v. Massanari, 261

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

The ALJ's finding on the plaintiff's credibility should be

given "great weight." Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th

Cir. 1986). "This type of credibility determination is within

the province of the ALJ, and cannot be disturbed where . . . it

is supported by specific findings." Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d

1453, 1458 n.8 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Walker, 546 F.2d at 820

("It is not within our province to judge the credibility of the

witnesses before the Administrative Law Judge"). 

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II. Analysis 

A. Evidence of underlying impairments and causal

relationship 

 between the impairments and Plaintiff's symptoms

Pursuant to the Cotton threshold test, Plaintiff presented

objective evidence of a medical condition. In the May 15, 2002

Order, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff presented evidence to

demonstrate the presence of "orthopedic impairments which could

reasonably be expected to cause some degree of functional

restriction." (Id. at 963) In the April 11, 2003 Order, the

ALJ accepted the presence of osteoarthritis, cervical and lumbar

degenerative changes, lumbar synovial cyst and cervical

spondylosis as demonstrated by laboratory tests and radiographic

evidence. (Id. at 804) 

B. The ALJ's Credibility Analysis

In the May 15, 2002 Order, which was incorporated into the

April 11, 2003 Order, the ALJ found that "the extent of symptoms

are not substantiated by objective medical evidence" and

proceeded to a credibility analysis. (Id. at 963)

Plaintiff contests the use of three pieces of evidence to

challenge the credibility of his testimony regarding his RFC:

(1) his lack of medical treatment after 1989, (2) his continued

employment after 1988, and (3) the opinions of non-examining,

non-treating State Agency examiners and an expert physician. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly relied on this evidence,

which collectively supports the ALJ's disbelief of Plaintiff's

testimony and serves as substantial evidence of Plaintiff's

ability to perform light work.

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1. Plaintiff's Lack of Medical Treatment after 1989

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly considered his lack

of medical treatment between 1989 and his DLI, December 31,

1992. He argues that Social Security Ruling 96-7p requires the

ALJ not to draw any inferences about symptoms from a failure to

seek regular medical attention without first considering

Plaintiff's explanation for this lack of medical care. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's

"conservative medical care" and his reasons for not seeking

additional care as required by Social Security Ruling 96-7p;

therefore, he did not err in discrediting Plaintiff's subjective

complaints.

Under Social Security Ruling 96-7p, the credibility analysis

must not contain:

any inferences about an individual's symptoms and their

functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue

regular medical treatment without first considering any

explanations that the individual may provide, or other

information in the case record, that may explain

infrequent or irregular medical visits or failure to

seek medical treatment.

1996 S.S.R. 7p, *21.

Social Security Ruling 96-7p lists potentially legitimate

explanations for lack of treatment, including the restructuring

of daily activities to minimize symptoms and the negative sideeffects of medication. 1996 S.S.R. 7p, *22. However, under

Smolen, the ALJ may give weight to an "inadequately explained

failure to seek treatment." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

Plaintiff testified that during the period following his

1987 car accident the pain never improved and only continued

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getting worse. (Id. at 42-43) During the only period that

Plaintiff did seek treatment, from the 1987 accident through

1989, he received physical therapy and medications for a period

of less than twelve continuous months. (Id.) Plaintiff did not

elect surgery, (id. at 840), and eventually stopped prescribed

treatments, such as physical therapy, the TENS unit and

prescription pain medications, because they did not help. (Id.

at 839-40, 889)

The ALJ noted Plaintiff's lack of treatment after 1989 and

the absence of evidence that Plaintiff was seen regularly for

his medical condition during the three years before his DLI and

the seven years before he filed his application for Social

Security disability benefits. (Id. at 963) The ALJ concluded

that the severity of Plaintiff's symptoms was not supported by

his medical records or decisions regarding his medical care and,

although not explicitly stated, that Plaintiff failed adequately

to explain his failure to seek treatment from 1989 until his

DLI. (Id.) 

Although the ALJ did not specify why he did not find

sufficient Plaintiff's explanations for not seeking further

treatment, the record supports the ALJ's conclusion that

Plaintiff's reasons were not sufficient. Plaintiff's reason for

not pursuing physical therapy was that he wasn't getting any

benefit from it and that "it was wearing me out just to get down

there. I'd just as soon put that effort into something else." 

Plaintiff also stated that a doctor had told him to do what

feels best, so he stopped physical therapy and started to lie

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down during the day. These reasons for not seeking further

treatment are insufficient in light of Plaintiff's testimony

that after the 1987 car accident his pain never improved and

only got worse. 

The ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's testimony that he had

to limit his work activities and lie down frequently and that he

had sitting and standing restrictions is not credible is

supported by Plaintiff's medical records and evidence of lack of

treatment.

2. Plaintiff's Continued Employment

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on his work

activity from 1988 to 1992 to challenge his credibility. He

argues that, although he continued to work, his ability to work

was reduced because he could not maintain full-time employment

and therefore he did not accrue net earnings. 

Individuals seeking Social Security benefits should not be

penalized for attempting to perform the daily activities which

are consistent with their physical impairments and limitations. 

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). However,

activities inconsistent with a plaintiff's claimed limitations

may negatively affect the credibility of his claims regarding

subjective symptoms. Id. 

Plaintiff testified that he has made no net profit since

1987, (id. at 106, 827, 832, 897-98), and the evidence in the

record shows a decline in Plaintiff's financial productivity

between 1987 and his DLI. (Id. at 106, 259) However, Plaintiff

continued to amass considerable gross receipts, (id. at 963),

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and traveled a significant amount to make sales calls. (Id. at

219, 199) 

In the May 15, 2002 decision, the ALJ made a specific

finding that "[Plaintiff's] allegations are also inconsistent

with the extent of his work activities as indicated by both his

hearing testimony and his tax returns. . . ." (Id. at 964) In

the decision, he quoted Plaintiff's gross receipts from his 1991

and 1992 tax returns and highlighted Plaintiff's testimony

regarding the extent of his work activity. (Id. at 963)

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden

of demonstrating that "his medical condition precluded him from

performing substantial gainful activity" because of this

evidence of continued employment and high business-related

expenses. (Id.) The ALJ had concluded that Plaintiff was not

performing substantial gainful activity, pursuant to step one of

the disability analysis. (Id. at 962) However, in determining

Plaintiff's RFC at step four he concluded, "[T]he undersigned is

not persuaded from the medical evidence that claimant's

decreased work activity was related solely to his medical

problems" because of his continued gross earnings and expenses. 

(Id. at 963) This conclusion is supported by evidence in the

record, which indicates that there are other reasons why

Plaintiff's work activity and earnings may have decreased. 

Plaintiff testified that his previously successful products were

no longer selling. (Id. at 831-33) 

Because Plaintiff's testimony is inconsistent with his

continued gross earnings and business expenses and travel, the

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ALJ's credibility determination is supported by these findings

based on the record.

3. The Testimony of State Agency Examiners and Medical 

 Expert 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ cannot rely on the opinions of

State Agency physicians or the testimony of the medical expert,

Dr. Louis Lesko, to discredit his testimony. Defendant agrees

that these medical opinions alone do not constitute substantial

evidence, but argues that when combined with Plaintiff's minimal

medical treatment and continuing work-related activities, the

totality constitutes substantial evidence.

The ALJ may properly rely on the testimony of non-examining

physicians as substantial evidence in the credibility analysis

if their testimony is supported by other evidence in the record. 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The

opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may also

serve as substantial evidence [to reject the opinion of a

treating physician] when the opinions are consistent with

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.")

 In the May 15, 2002 Order, the ALJ summarized the State

Agency examiners' conclusion as follows:

State Agency examiners concluded that at the time his

insured status expired (December, 1992) that [sic]

claimant had the residual functional capacity to

perform light work.

(AR at 962) The ALJ then summarized the medical expert, Dr.

Lesko's conclusion as follows:

At the hearing the medical expert, Dr. Lesko,

summarized and discussed the medical evidence and

concluded that after his 1987 motor vehicle accident

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(and thereafter) claimant had the residual functional

capacity to perform light work. [Dr. Lesko] also felt

this was true after claimant's 1994 treatment for the

bicycle accident and this was as a prophylactic

measure since heavier work might aggravate claimant's

condition.

(Id.)

The ALJ concluded that the opinions of the State Agency

examiner and the medical expert were supported by Plaintiff's

testimony regarding his work activities, evidence regarding his

work activities, his medical records and the lack of medical

treatment and medication usage. (Id. at 963) The ALJ gave

these opinions significant weight because he found that

Plaintiff's testimony was not supported by the medical records. 

(Id.)

The State Agency medical examiners relied on two of

Plaintiff's medical reports and found insufficient evidence that

Plaintiff's condition affected his ability to work as of his

DLI. (Id. at 73) Medical expert Dr. Lesko also concluded that

a light work category would be sufficiently prophylactic to

prevent aggravation of his condition. (Id. at 854) He

determined that Plaintiff's daily activities as detailed by his

testimony and additional evidence would not aggravate his

condition. (Id.)

The ALJ's reliance on the opinions of non-examining

physicians to support his conclusion that Plaintiff's claims

were not credible is proper because these opinions were based on

evidence in the record. 

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CONCLUSION

Thus, the ALJ properly based his finding that Plaintiff's

claims were not credible on his failure to seek medical

treatment, his continued employment and the opinions of nontreating physicians. The Court affirms the ALJ's determination

that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social

Security Act. 20 CFR § 404.1520(e).

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/5/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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