Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00577/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00577-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

VALJEAN JOSHEVAMA, JR., and )

JERRY HONAWA, individually )

and as representatives of a )

Class consisting of themselves )

and other Hopi tribal members ) CIV 07-00577 PCT MEA

observing tradition Hopi )

religious practices, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. )

) 

OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, )

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, ) 

)

 Defendants. )

_______________________________ )

All of the parties who have appeared in this matter

have consented to the exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction

over this case, including the entry of final judgment. Before

the Court are Plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction

and for leave to file an amended complaint, and Defendants’

“Emergency Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction and

to Stay Briefing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction.”

Plaintiffs sought oral argument regarding the motion to dismiss

and to stay briefing on the motion for a preliminary injunction.

See Docket No. 18.

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1

 The National Environmental Policy Act requires federal

agencies to undertake a mandatory procedure, including soliciting and

considering public input, when any proposed federal action implicates

disruption of the natural environment. 

Regulations promulgated in 1973 amending NEPA provide: 

(d) Public review. The procedures established by

these guidelines are designed to encourage public

participation in the impact statement process at

the earliest possible time. Agency procedures

should make provision for facilitating the

comment of public and private organizations and

individuals by announcing the availability of

draft environmental statements and by making

copies available to organizations and individuals

that request an opportunity to comment. 

Final Rule, 38 Fed. Reg. 20555 § 1500.9(d) (Aug. 1, 1973).

2

The Mohave Generating Station itself is not a

part of the proposed Black Mesa Project, but the

Black Mesa mining operation, the coal-slurry

pipeline, and the Coconino aquifer water-supply

system are dependent on resumption of operation

of the power plant. ... the Mohave Generating

Station is the mining operation’s sole customer.

Docket No. 19, Exh. 3.

-2-

Background

The subject of this suit is the public comment period

set by Defendant Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”), pursuant to

the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),1 during which

members of the public may comment on a draft Environmental

Impact Statement (“EIS”) regarding the proposed Black Mesa

Project.2

On December 1, 2004, by means of publication in the

Federal Register, Defendant OSM announced a 90-day public

scoping process from December 1, 2004, through January 21, 2005,

seeking input from the public regarding preparation of an

Environmental Impact Statement for the Black Mesa Project. See

Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 69949-51. The publication announced public

Case 3:07-cv-00577-MEA Document 23 Filed 05/08/07 Page 2 of 24
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3 Plaintiffs contend OSM “indefinitely halted” the EIS

process after July 2006, and that the process was “restarted” in

September of 2006. Docket No. 18 at 2-3.

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meetings regarding the EIS which would occur, inter alia, in

Kayenta and Kykotsmovi, on the Hopi and Navajo reservations,

during January of 2005. Id. The scoping comment period was

later extended to March 4, 2005. See Notices, 70 Fed. Reg. 6036

(Feb. 4, 2005). 

Pursuant to the requirements of NEPA, after seeking

public input regarding the project, a draft EIS was issued in

November of 2006. See Notices, 71 Fed. Reg. 67637 (Nov. 22,

2006). In the notice announcing publication of the draft EIS,

Defendant OSM set a deadline for public comments on the draft

EIS of January 22, 2007. Id. The draft EIS regarding the Black

Mesa Project comprises approximately 758 pages.3 

Defendants aver the draft EIS has been available since

November 2006 via the Internet, and that copies of the draft EIS

are available at Hopi governmental and village locations, and

that “an audio-visual DVD of the Executive Summary” is available

in the Hopi language for free by request. At least 235 copies

of the translated Executive Summary DVD were distributed.

Docket No. 18, Exh. 6.

Federal regulations require a minimum public comment

period of at least 45 days subsequent to publication of an

Environmental Impact Statement. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10. The

purpose of the draft EIS procedure is to procure “informed

agency and public comment. [] Regulations require the draft EIS

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4 The notice published in the Federal Register states: 

To ensure consideration in the preparation of the

final EIS, written comments must be received by

OSM by 4 p.m. , m.s.t., on February 6, 2007. A

public meeting to receive comments on the draft

EIS will be held in Leupp, Arizona, on January

11, 2007, from noon to 4 p.m. at the Leupp

Chapter House on Navajo Route 15.

The notice of the extension of the comment period also

appears on the official Office of Surface Mining website, which stated

on May 4, 2007, and was last modified March 5, 2007:

OSMRE has extended the closing date for public

comments to February 6, 2007. OSM will not be

extending the comment period beyond February 6,

2007. To the extent practicable during

preparation of the Final EIS, OSM will consider

comments on the Draft EIS that are received after

February 6, 2007. 

Available at www.wrcc.osmre.gov/WR/BlackMesaEIS.htm

-4-

to be circulated to enable informed comments....” Adler v.

Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 1982). 

As stated supra, pursuant to the requirements of NEPA,

Defendant OSM established a public comment period for the draft

EIS from November 22, 2006, through January 22, 2007, a period

of approximately 60 days, by means of publication of a notice in

the Federal Register. In a Notice of Action issued January 10,

2007, the public comment period was formally extended through

February 6, 2007, by means of publication of a notice stating

such in the Federal Register. See Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 1764-65

(Jan. 16, 2007).4 

Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed a concern about the

ability of traditional Hopi to comment on the draft EIS, as the

comment period coincided with the Hopi winter ceremonial

calendar. Docket No. 16, Exh. 5. In response, in February

2006, OSM advised Plaintiffs’ counsel, that “[t]o the extent

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5 The current schedule for the issuance of the final

Environmental Impact Statement regarding the Black Mesa Project is

July 18, 2007. Docket No. 16 at 7.

6

 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) was enacted

in 1993 as Congress’ response to the free exercise analysis espoused

by the United States Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act provides:

Government shall not substantially burden a

person’s exercise of religion even if the burden

results from a rule of general applicability,

except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section.

(b) Exception

Government may substantially burden a person’s

exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that

application of the burden to the person--

1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering

that compelling governmental interest.

(c) Judicial relief

A person whose religious exercise has been

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practicable, during preparation of the Final Environmental

Impact Statement, OSM will consider comments arriving after

February 6, 2007.” Docket No. 16, Exh. 5 (dated February 15,

2007).5 

Plaintiffs filed a complaint on March 16, 2007.

Plaintiffs alleged Defendants substantially burdened their

religious practice by setting a public comment period for the

draft EIS coinciding with a period of time, i.e., November

through February, during which their religion forbids them from

engaging “in government or significant non-religious pursuits.”

Docket No. 1 at 2. The initial complaint alleged Defendants

violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to the free exercise

of their religion and their rights pursuant to the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).6

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burdened in violation of this section may assert

that violation as a claim or defense in a

judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief

against a government. Standing to assert a claim

or defense under this section shall be governed

by the general rules of standing under article

III of the Constitution.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2003 & Supp. 2006).

7

 An amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

leaving the original complaint without legal consequence. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,114 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1997) (“a

plaintiff waives all claims alleged in a dismissed complaint which are

not realleged in an amended complaint. [] This rule is premised on the

notion that the amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter

being treated thereafter as non-existent.” (internal citations and

quotations omitted)); Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir.

2000).

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Plaintiffs further asserted their rights pursuant to the Treaty

of Guadalupe Hidalgo were violated. Plaintiffs also filed a

motion seeking preliminary injunctive relief, i.e., that the

Court order Defendants to “move” the comment period regarding

the draft EIS, the same relief sought in the complaint. 

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (Docket No. 11)

on April 16, 2007, and subsequently sought leave to file the

amended complaint. See Docket No. 13.7 The amended complaint

asserts Plaintiffs are “representatives of a Class consisting of

themselves and other Hopi tribal members observing traditional

Hopi religious practices”. Docket No. 11. The amended

complaint “seeks suitable remedies for the desecration of the

traditionally religious portion of the Hopi calendar year by the

Office of Surface Mining and the Department of the Interior.”

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8 Plaintiff Honawa asserts in his affidavit, dated March 4,

2007:

I have had to engage in secular activities in

direct contradiction to ancient teachings that

govern these activities. In fact, because of the

time of year, merely needing to make this

affidavit is an example of my religious freedoms

being violated. 

Docket No. 2, Attach.

9

 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint has two pages numbered “10"

and two pages numbered “11". Defendants did not oppose the motion to

file an amended complaint, stating leave was not required because no

responsive pleading had yet been filed. Docket No. 14 at 1.

Defendants disagree that class action certification is necessary or

would save the amended complaint from the effects of the mootness

doctrine. Id.

10 Defendants further assert Plaintiffs do not have standing

to assert the First Amendment rights of other “traditional” Hopi.

Pursuant to Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff

may be allowed, in the Court’s discretion, to bring suit as a

representative of or on behalf of other parties only if: (1) the class

is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there

are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or

defenses of the purported representative plaintiff(s) are typical of

the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

See, e.g., Brooks v. Educators Mut. Life Ins. Co., 206 F.R.D. 96, 108

(E.D. Pa. 2002). Plaintiffs Joshevama and Honawa have sought

certification by means of a claim for relief in their amended

complaint and the allegation in their supplemental pleading that they

will seek certification “when” the motion to dismiss is denied.

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Id.8 The claim for relief seeks:

a preliminary injunction, to be made into a

permanent injunction, as deemed advisable,

vacating the original November 2006-January

2007 comment period on the subject Draft

Environmental Impact Statement on the Black

Mesa Project, and restarting the comment

period in the Spring of 2007 (or later) -

outside the religious period of the

traditional Hopi calendar.

Id.9 The amended complaint also asks the Court to certify this

matter as a class action, and asks the Court to award attorney’s

fees.10

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On April 19, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction asserting the

matter is moot. See Docket No. 16. Defendants aver the comment

period for the draft EIS has been extended through May 11, 2007,

allowing Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to comment on

the draft EIS without burdening their free exercise of

traditional Hopi religion. The Court notes notice of such an

extension has not, as of May 4, 2007, been published in the

Federal Register. Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ free exercise

of their religion has not been burdened since February 18, 2007,

because traditional Hopi participation in governmental events

was not prohibited after this date. Id. at 10. Accordingly,

Defendants argue, Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is moot

because Plaintiffs received the relief sought, i.e., an

extension of the comment period. Id.

Defendants allege the Hopi tribal government does not

favor extending the EIS process regarding the Black Mesa Project

because the Hopi tribal government favors re-opening the Black

Mesa Mine. Id. at 5-6. 

Even accepting Plaintiffs’ religious

arguments, they have had since the February

18, 2007 new moon to submit their comments --

over 50 days so far. ....

Furthermore, OSM has evaluated the status of

progress on the EIS and concluded that

additional comments received by May 11 from

Hopi who did not comment for religious

reasons will be considered, as such

consideration will not further delay the NEPA

process. .. [I]t is undisputed that: OSM has never

refused or failed to consider comments by

Plaintiffs on the draft EIS; ...

Even if Plaintiffs’ religious arguments are

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11 In Lomayaktewa, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held

the Hopi Tribe was an indispensable party to litigation brought by

“traditional Hopi” plaintiffs to void a lease of Indian land to a

coal-mining company. Defendants argue:

These and other benefits to the Tribe are

dependant on prompt approval of the Project. The

owners of MGS have made clear that investing the

capital necessary to restart MGS will be

economically viable only if NEPA approval of the

Black Mesa Project occurs on the timetable

already established by OSM and approved by the

Tribe. [] By filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek

to unreasonably extend and delay that timetable,

making the Project a financial impossibility and

depriving the Tribe of its expected economic and

other benefits. In essence, Plaintiffs’ request

for an injunction is an attempt to halt the

Project entirely. The Tribe therefore strongly

supports dismissal of this lawsuit.[] As

discussed in the Motion to Dismiss, the severe

potential prejudice to the Tribe, outlined above,

together with the Tribe’s sovereign immunity

makes it an indispensable party to this

litigation. .... The case must therefore be

dismissed. 

Docket No. 22 at 9. As noted, infra, the basis of the complaint is

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accepted, they will still have some 82 days,

from February 18, 2007 through May 11, 2007,

to comment on the draft EIS.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 

Additionally, Defendants maintain the amended complaint

must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 19, Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, for failure to join indispensable parties, i.e., the

Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation. Id. at 13. Defendants

maintain they would be prejudiced by injunctive relief, alleging

that reopening the comment period “could result in cancellation

of the Project and cause the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation to

lose the vital economic and other benefits that the Project

offers.” Id. at 16, citing Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d

1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975).11

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the assertion that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to

RFRA, and it is not at all clear that the Hopi tribal government or

the Navajo Nation would be parties indispensable to the resolution of

that issue.

12 Plaintiffs also argue:

[T]he comment period is not simply a time to make

comments, it is also a time: (1) to consider

presentations by the government; (2) to consider

arguments by experts, advocates and detractors;

(3) to discuss and debate the matter with friends

and opponents; (4) to reach a considered opinion

on what comments should be made; (5) to draft,

revise, and submit the comments. Plaintiffs are

asking for a new, complete comment period to make

full and fair comments. Any other relief would

be deficient.

Docket No. 18 at 6.

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Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss

and the motion to stay briefing on their motion for injunctive

relief. See Docket No. 18. Plaintiffs assert their claims are

not mooted by the extension of the comment period because

Defendants have averred only that comments submitted by May 11,

2007, will be considered “to the extent [it is] practicable to

do so.” Docket No. 18 at 2, 5 & n.5. Plaintiffs maintain it is

necessary to vacate the prior comment period and establish a new

comment period to ensure “OSM will be forced to consider all

comments.” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).12 Plaintiffs further

contend the allowance of “late” comments to the draft EIS “does

not also provide the substantial collateral benefits,

safeguards, and features of a regular comment period.” Id. at

7.

On April 27, 2007, the Court issued an order allowing

the parties until May 4, 2007, to file any further pleadings

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regarding the motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

Plaintiffs filed a supplement to their response to the motion to

dismiss. See Docket No. 21. In this pleading, Plaintiffs note

Defendants did not file any notice of extension of the relevant

comment period in the Federal Register, asserting without

citation this would be the “only valid way to make such an

extension.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs allege Defendants are “not

being candid” with the Court with regard to whether Defendants

would be required to consider comments to the draft EIS

submitted after February 6, 2007, beyond the “extent

practicable.” Id. Plaintiffs assert 

the offer to consider comments from

Plaintiffs is invalid, because it was never

published in the Federal Register. Thus,

even if the named Plaintiffs made comments,

without publication of an extension of the

comment period in the Federal Register,

Defendants could just ignore the Plaintiffs’

comments with no adverse consequences at all.

... Defendants’ extension offer was just a

pretense with no legal substance.

Id. at 3 (emphasis removed). Attached to this supplemental

pleading are the identical sworn but not notarized declarations

of 71 “members of the Hopi tribe complaining about their

exclusion from the original comment process because the federal

government scheduled the original comment process during the

traditional Hopi religious calendar.” Id. at 2 (emphasis

removed). Each of these declarations states:

A vitally important part of the traditional

Hopi religious practice is observance of the

winter ceremonial calendar, which roughly

goes from November thru January, or even a

little longer. I was unable to participate

in the comment process concerning Black Mesa

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Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement

because the Federal Government scheduled the

comment process during the Hopi winter

ceremonial calendar. The Black Mesa Project

Draft EIS is extremely important to me, to my

religion, to the water that are a part of my

religion and beliefs, and to the Hopi people.

If given the chance, I would participate in

the comment process, which I understand

involves meetings, presentations, discussions

with representatives of the Office of Surface

Mining and Peabody. The overall comment

process is very important to me. I am

saddened the Federal Government stole the

chance that I had to participate in the

original comment process and hope that the

Federal Court can give me and the other

members of my tribe a chance to participate

to comment process.

Id., Attach. 

Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ response to the

motion to dismiss on May 4, 2007. See Docket No. 22.

Defendants allege: “Plaintiffs’ claim that OSM only agreed to

consider their comments ‘to the extent practicable’ ignores the

April 9, 2007 letter and is mistaken.” Id. at 4. Defendants

argue:

Plaintiffs’ response inaccurately asserts

that OSM has only agreed to consider

Plaintiffs’ comments if “practicable” and

mistakenly concludes that the case is

therefore not moot. Plaintiffs’ case is moot

because OSM has agreed to fully consider and

respond to comments submitted by Plaintiffs

and other traditional practitioners, not just

“to the extent practicable.” It is wellsettled that “[c]orrective action by an

agency ... can moot a previously justiciable

issue.”

Id. at 3 (emphasis in original and citations omitted). 

Defendants further aver:

by letter dated April 9, 2007, OSM notified

Plaintiffs that if they submit comments by

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May 11, 2007—nearly three months after the

end of the period of religious observance

that they assert—those comments will be fully

considered. See Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 7.

Public comments are still being considered,

and found among them are comments made by

both Plaintiffs at public meetings January 4,

2007. See attached Exhibit 12 (Comments of

Valgean Joshevama, Jr., 01-04-07 at Hopi

Wellness Center) and Exhibit 13 (Transcript

of public comments, Veteran’s Center, Second

Mesa, Jerry Honawa, pages 21- 27) ...

Id. at 4 (bold emphasis added). Defendants further allege:

the Hopi Tribe took several steps to assure

that Tribal members were notified of their

ability to submit comments through May 11,

including: issuing a press release to the

local newspaper, posting notice in the

community center of each Hopi village, and

holding public meetings to accept oral and

written comments. []. Notably, two individual

Hopi, Doran Dalton and Benjamen Nuvamsa,

whose declarations complaining about the

original comment period are attached to

Plaintiffs’ Supplement, appeared and

submitted or are submitting comments. [] Like

those individuals, Plaintiffs and the other

declarants remain free to submit comments to

the Hopi Tribe and OSM through May 11th to

have them considered (or thereafter to the

extent practicable). 

Id. 

Defendants contend Plaintiffs have not maintain the

litigation in good faith:

A reasonable inference can be drawn from

Plaintiffs’ continued refusal to submit

additional comments, that the purpose of this

litigation is to monkey wrench the Black Mesa

project rather than to obtain the procedural

opportunity provided by NEPA to comment on

the project DEIS.

Id. at 6.

With regard to Plaintiffs’ argument Defendants will not

be required to review comments submitted by May 11, 2007,

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because a notice of extension of the deadline was not published

in the Federal Register, Defendants state:

[Plaintiffs’] counsel has constructed a

straw-man argument that comments can be

disregarded because the commitment to

consider them was not published in the

Federal Register. On the contrary, OSM would

be compelled to consider the late comments,

by judicial estoppel alone. Klamath Siskiyou

Wildlands Center v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 555

(9th Cir. 2006). Federal Register publication

is not required where an agency merely

requests public comments or considers late

comments. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1; 1506.6. The

“unclean hands” doctrine applies to this

attempt to misuse NEPA procedures - indeed,

rather than exercise their existing right to

comment on the DEIS, Plaintiffs are just

trying to kill the project by obtaining a

preliminary injunction.

Id. at 7. 

Analysis

Standard for granting or denying a motion to dismiss

It is presumed that a federal court is without

jurisdiction to hear a claim. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 144 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). Rule

12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court to

dismiss an action “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the

parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction [.]”

Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 629 (6th Cir. 2002). The

Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit

wherein the plaintiffs do not have a legally cognizable interest

in the outcome. See Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest

Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting the federal

courts would otherwise be issuing an advisory opinion), cert.

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denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3523 (Mar. 19, 2007); Ruiz v. City of Santa

Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 1998). 

To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to the Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove that the

relevant jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. See

Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, 54 F.3d

156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995). A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may be a

factual challenge to the complaint. See Mortensen v. First Fed.

Savings & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). The

Court may hear evidence and resolve disputed facts when

considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. See Roberts v. Corrothers,

812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court may consider material outside of the 

pleadings of the action when dealing with a

factual attack on subject matter

jurisdiction, such as affidavits and

testimony, without converting the motion to

dismiss into one for summary judgment.

Furthermore, it is the plaintiff who bears

the ultimate burden of proving that subject

matter jurisdiction exists, and argumentative

inferences favorable to the pleader should

not be drawn.

Abbott Chemical, Inc. v. Molinos de Puerto Rico, Inc., 62 F.

Supp. 2d 441, 445-46 (D.P.R. 1999) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). 

When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), it is proper for the

district court to look beyond the

jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint

and to view all evidence submitted. This

standard differs from the one district courts

use when deciding a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); in the latter case, when

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the district court looks beyond the

pleadings, the court is to treat the motion

as one for summary judgment under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding the instant

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, we will consider all relevant

documents.

Osario v. Harza Eng’g Co., 890 F. Supp. 750, 751 (N.D. Ill.

1995) (internal citations omitted).

Mootness

To pursue a claim in federal court, a party must

maintain a live controversy through all stages of the litigation

process, rather than just at the time the complaint is filed.

See DiGiorgio v. Lee, 134 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 1998). If a

claim loses its character as a live controversy the plaintiffs

then lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. See

Ruiz, 160 F.3d at 549. Where plaintiffs without a legally

cognizable interest in the relief sought do not have standing to

sue, their claims are moot. Id. See also Earth Island Inst.,

442 F.3d at 1157. “[T]he question is not whether the precise

relief sought at the time of the application for an injunction

was filed is still available. The question is whether there can

be any effective relief.” Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241

F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001).

Mootness is not a basis for dismissal if the challenged

activity is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review, or

if there is a “reasonable expectation” the plaintiffs will face

the same conduct in the future. Mahoney v. United States

Marshals Serv., 454 F. Supp. 2d 21, 31 (D.D.C. 2006). Voluntary

cessation of allegedly wrongful conduct moots a claim only if it

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is “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could

not reasonably be expected to recur.” Adarand Constructors,

Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222, 120 S. Ct. 722, 725 (2000).

Defendants bear the “heavy burden” of persuading the Court that

the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to resume.

See id.

Defendants assert the claims raised in the complaint

are moot and, accordingly, that the complaint must be dismissed.

Defendants argue the matter is moot because the comment period

for the draft EIS has been extended beyond the date traditional

Hopi may not participate in governmental matters. 

Plaintiffs contend the extension of the comment period

does not moot their claims because Defendants will not be

required to consider comments submitted after February 6, 2007

and by May 11, 2007, but instead will only consider those

comments if practicable. Plaintiffs state: 

the Plaintiff Class seeks an entirely new

comment period where OSM must pay attention

to their comments, and the Plaintiff Class

can participate in all of the normal studies,

debates, and processes concerning the Final

EIS. ... In any event, “practicable” means

“maybe,” and is not the same as “must.”

Therefore, the case is not moot.

Docket No. 18 at 5.

Assuming Plaintiffs’ assertions as true, the period

during which their religion prohibited them from commenting on

the draft EIS ended no later than when they became engaged in

this suit, i.e., March 16, 2007. The Court notes the

prohibition arguably ended much sooner, i.e., at the beginning

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13 The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs do not

have a substantive, judicially-enforceable right to submit public

comments to any particular EIS “dependent on demands of their

individual schedules.” Docket No. 16 at 4 n.1. However, this is not

a suit brought under NEPA or the Administrative Procedures Act, but

a claim that government action violated the free exercise of

Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise of their religion, a right

enhanced by the RFRA.

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of February. Because the comment period has been extended to

May 11, 2007, Plaintiffs have at least 55-60 days to review the

draft EIS and submit comments, a reasonable period of time to

offer public comment on the draft EIS, notwithstanding its

length. See Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1118-19

(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding a 69-day comment period regarding a

700 page draft Environmental Impact Statement satisfied the

requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, stating:

“[w]hether still more time might have been beneficial to some

parties is not the issue.”).13 

Plaintiffs assert they need time to not only comment on

the draft EIS but also to actually consider what their position

on the draft EIS might be, after conferring with others and

reviewing the available information, rendering the May 11, 2007,

deadline unreasonable and an undue burden on their free exercise

of their religion. However, the issue stated in the amended

complaint is not the length of the comment period, i.e., whether

Plaintiffs will have enough time to review and evaluate the

draft EIS, but the fact that the comment period overlapped with

a time during which Plaintiffs were prohibited by their religion

from participating in governmental affairs.

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 Additionally, the Court finds this factual allegation

disingenuous and not believable. Plaintiffs’ position on the

Black Mesa Project is apparently well-informed and completely

formulated, and presumably has been for some time. Plaintiffs

aver the Black Mesa Project proposal was the subject of a NEPA

process which was “halted” from July of 2006 through September

of 2006. Docket No. 18 at 2-3. Plaintiffs were aware,

presumably, of the nature of the project and the potential

conclusions reached in the draft EIS no later than its

publication in November 2006; both Plaintiffs stated their

opposition to the Black Mesa Project and their frustration at

the Hopi Tribal Council’s apparent support for the project at a

public meeting conducted January 4, 2007. See Docket No. 22,

Exh. 12 & Exh. 13. On January 4, 2007, Plaintiff Josehvama

stated: “As I have been reading the EIS report, I understand

that it has already traveled among the People and I have been at

some of those hearings...” Id., Exh. 12. Plaintiff Honawa

stated on that date that he had not read “a page” of the draft

EIS, although he had “studied this thing and worked on this

thing more so than my Council has.” Id., Exh. 13. 

Furthermore, the operation of the Black Mesa mine, the

re-opening of the Mohave Generating Station, and the recommissioning of the coal-slurry pipeline, have all been the

subject of intensive debate among Hopi, and a subject of

disagreement between “traditional” Hopi and the Hopi tribal

government for some time. The Court is not unaware of these

conflicts, however, this forum is not the appropriate venue for

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14 See United States v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D.

Ariz. 2006).

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resolution of the dispute between “traditional” Hopi and the

Hopi tribal government,14 specifically with regard to the

desirability of further mining at Black Mesa, the use of

groundwater to slurry coal, or the re-commissioning of the

Mohave Generating Station. The issue before this Court,

presented in the amended complaint, is the ability of

traditional Hopi to comment on the draft EIS without a

substantial burden being placed on the free exercise of their

religious beliefs. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs misstate the effects of Defendants’ extension of the comment period

for the draft EIS. In a letter addressed to Plaintiffs’ counsel

dated April 9, 2007, and sent “in response” to the filing of

this suit, Defendant OSM stated:

OSM has determined that it will be

practicable to consider in the final EIS the

comments of the plaintiffs if they are

received by May 11, 2007, consistent with

OSM’s earlier letter to you in which we

stated that OSM would consider to the extent

practicable comments received after the close

of the comment period, February 6, 2007.

Docket No. 18, Exh. 7. A similar letter was sent to the ViceChairman of the Hopi Tribe, and the tribe took a “number of

actions to disseminate” the information that public comments

regarding the draft EIS submitted by May 11, 2007, would be

considered. See Docket No. 22, Exh. 14, Exh. 15, Exh. 16.

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The relief sought, the allowance of public comments

during a period when traditional Hopi are not prohibited from

governmental participation, has already been allowed by

Defendants. The Court would be redundant in ordering Defendants

to do something which Defendants have already done, i.e.,

extending the formal comment period beyond the date Plaintiffs,

individually and as the purported class, may not, pursuant to

their free exercise, comment on the draft EIS. See Berg v.

LaCrosse Cooler Co., 548 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1977).

Furthermore, as Defendants note, Defendants would be judicially

estopped from asserting in any future suit that they were not

required to consider comments submitted by May 11, 2007. See,

e.g., Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005).

 A finding that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot does not

have any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on any

future decision regarding Defendants’ establishment of a NEPA

public comment period which again conflicts with observance of

their religion by traditional Hopi. It is arguable whether

Plaintiffs would be barred from bringing a suit challenging the

final EIS if they did not submit comments to the draft EIS. See

High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 436 F.

Supp. 2d 1117, 1147 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (noting this issue is

“unsettled” in the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals). 

Plaintiffs contend the allegation their claims are moot

is contravened by their assertion of the suit as a class action.

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15

In addition to the requirements expressly

enumerated in Rule 23, class actions are also

subject to more generally applicable rules such

as those governing standing and mootness. For

instance, a plaintiff who lacks the personalized,

redressable injury required for standing to

assert claims on his own behalf would also lack

standing to assert similar claims on behalf of a

class. [] Additionally, even a plaintiff with

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However, the federal courts have generally concluded a suit

styled as a class action becomes moot when the claim of the

individual plaintiff becomes moot. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa,

419 U.S. 393, 399-400, 95 S. Ct. 553, 557-58 (1975) (holding

that, in order to meet the case or controversy requirement of

Article III there must not only be a named plaintiff who has

such standing at the time the complaint is filed, but there must

continue to be a live controversy at the time the class action

is certified by the District Court); Cruz v. Farquharson, 252

F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 2001). A named plaintiff in a class

action must, to establish standing, show that the threat of

injury is still “real and immediate,” rather than “conjectural”

or “hypothetical.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94

S. Ct. 669, 675 (1974); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-

10, 89 S. Ct. 956, 960-61 (1969). 

To continue their involvement in a suit the named

plaintiff must be a member of the class which he seeks to

represent at the time the class action is certified by the

District Court. See, e.g., Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 519 F.2d 403,

404-05 (6th Cir. 1975). Compare Holmes v. Pension Plan of

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135 (3d Cir. 2000)15 (“So

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standing is generally disqualified from

representing a class if his individual claim

becomes moot before the proposed class is

certified. []. Not surprisingly, however, there

are exceptions to this general rule. One such

exception is at issue in this case.

 So long as a class representative has a live

claim at the time he moves for class

certification, neither a pending motion nor a

certified class action need be dismissed if his

individual claim subsequently becomes moot. []

If, on the other hand, the putative class

representative’s individual claim becomes moot

before he moves for class certification, then any

subsequent motion must be denied and the entire

action dismissed.

Holmes v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 213 F.3d 124, 135-36

(3d Cir. 2000).

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long as a class representative has a live claim at the time he

moves for class certification, neither a pending motion nor a

certified class action need be dismissed if his individual claim

subsequently becomes moot.”).

Conclusion

This matter is moot because relief sought on the claim

stated in the amended complaint, i.e., establishment of a

comment period regarding the draft EIS which did not violate the

free exercise of Plaintiffs’ religion, has been allowed by

Defendants. Accordingly, there is no meaningful relief to be

awarded by the Court and Plaintiffs have no standing because

they lack a cognizable legal interest in the subject of the

amended complaint.

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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the amended complaint is granted. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint

is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

DATED this 7th day of May, 2007.

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