Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00485/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00485-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

David Frank Jennings,

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV 20-00485-PHX-MTL (JFM)

 CR 06-00684-PHX-MTL

ORDER

On March 6, 2020, Movant David Frank Jennings, who is confined in the United 

States Penitentiary-McCreary in Pine Knot, Kentucky, filed a pro se Motion Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. 

The Court will summarily dismiss the § 2255 Motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111. On March 14, 2008, the Court sentenced Movant to a 420-

month term of imprisonment followed by 60 months on supervised release.

Movant raises two grounds for relief. In Ground One, he claims the Federal 

Correctional Institution in Phoenix, Arizona, is not subject to federal jurisdiction because 

the federal government “failed to accept jurisdiction over said land by not filing an 

‘Explicit Acceptance of Jurisdiction[’] with the Governor of Arizona or [the] ap[p]ropriate 

agency.” In Ground Two, Movant contends the “President issued Exec[u]tive Order 

Case 2:20-cv-00485-MTL--JFM Document 3 Filed 03/17/20 Page 1 of 4
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

#10355 dated May 26, 1952[,] taking said land for use by the F.B.I.” but the State of 

Arizona “never agreed to [a] transfer of jurisdiction.”

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears 

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving 

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for 

the United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a 

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 

526 (9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982).

In this case, the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted 

because Movant has waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.

III. Waiver

Movant has waived his right to file a § 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” 

United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible 

to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable 

presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. 

Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, 

express, and unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be 

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo, 

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring 

a § 2255 action challenging the length of the sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or 

that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v. 

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the 

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an 

Case 2:20-cv-00485-MTL--JFM Document 3 Filed 03/17/20 Page 2 of 4
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); 

Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that 

counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); 

Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of 

ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 

1156 n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims 

implicating the voluntariness of the waiver). 

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are 

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v. 

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396 

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth 

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and 

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to 

attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel during sentencing.”).

As part of Movant’s plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

The defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause 

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the 

indictment or information or to the Court’s entry of judgment against 

the defendant and imposition of sentence upon the defendant 

providing the sentence is consistent with this agreement. The 

defendant further waives: . . . (3) any right to collaterally attack 

defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States 

Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. The defendant 

acknowledges that this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any 

appeal or collateral attack the defendant might file challenging 

his conviction or sentence in this case.

(Doc. 70) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in the plea agreement that he had discussed 

the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered into the plea 

voluntarily. (Doc. 70).

Case 2:20-cv-00485-MTL--JFM Document 3 Filed 03/17/20 Page 3 of 4
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Movant’s assertions in the § 2255 Motion do not pertain to the voluntariness of the 

waiver. Movant expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted 

the plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the issues 

raised in the § 2255 Motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the § 2255 Motion. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence (Doc. 74 in CR 06-00684-PHX-MTL) is denied and the civil action opened in 

connection with this Motion (CV 20-00485-PHX-MTL (JFM)) is dismissed with 

prejudice. The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(2) Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, in the 

event Movant files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability 

because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Dated this 17th day of March, 2020.

Case 2:20-cv-00485-MTL--JFM Document 3 Filed 03/17/20 Page 4 of 4