Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04061/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-04061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JUAN MANCHENO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF ORINDA, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 14-cv-04061-EDL 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 23 

On November 20, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Shortly 

before the hearing on that motion, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion, GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion, and dismisses the complaint with prejudice. 

I. MOTION TO DISMISS 

A. Request for judicial notice 

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of a number of documents indirectly 

referenced by the complaint including warrants and documents from Plaintiff’s state court criminal 

prosecution. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ request and such documents can properly be 

the subject of judicial notice. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 

Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (the Court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other 

courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct 

relation to matters at issue.’” (quoting St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169, 

1172 (10th Cir. 1979)). Consequently, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request.

B. Relevant Factual Allegations and Procedural history 

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On August 26, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that a false report about him was made to police by 

Ali Davoudi and Elizabeth Davoudi. (Cmplt. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he has a daughter with 

Ms. Davoudi, that she is his ex-manager, and that she and Mr. Davoudi have a history of harassing 

Plaintiff. (Id.) The Davoudi’s report was based on an alleged incident that occurred on August 

21, 2012, in front of a school that Plaintiff’s daughters attend. (See id. ¶ 8.) On September 6, 

2012, apparently based on this report, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for violating a 

restraining order prohibiting him from possessing a firearm, brandished a weapon on school 

grounds, and drawing and/or exhibiting a firearm in violation of California Penal Code sections 

626.95(a) and 417(a)(2). (Id. ¶ 6.) Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges that his home was searched 

based on a false “Narrative Statement of Probable Cause” that led to the filing of criminal charges 

against him for these penal code violations. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff ultimately pled no contest to a 

violation of section 30605(a) (possession of an assault weapon) and was sentenced to three years 

of probation. (RJN Exs. I, J.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dennison prepared the “Narrative Statement.” (See id. ¶ 

13.) Plaintiff alleges that a statement by Defendant Mooney that “established probable cause to 

issue an arrest warrant” for Plaintiff was included in the “Narrative Statement.” (Id.) However, 

Plaintiff alleges that the document failed to mention that Defendant Mooney was previously fired 

“for untruthfulness and dishonesty.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also alleges that the document included a 

statement by Joanna Truelson, who apparently obtained a restraining order against Plaintiff, but 

did not mention her “troubled psychological status” and that she has filed several false police 

reports against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Dennison failed to 

include Ali Davoudi’s criminal history in the document. (Id. ¶ 16.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that the “Narrative Statement” contained false accusations by 

Defendant Mooney that, in his prior interactions with Plaintiff, Plaintiff “displayed aggressive, 

hostile and violent behavior” and that “Plaintiff was not cooperative with law enforcement” and 

challenged Defendant Mooney to a fight. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Mooney 

viewed exculpatory video footage that revealed no evidence that Plaintiff was in possession of or 

brandished a firearm, and subsequently ordered that the footage be destroyed. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20.) 

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Plaintiff appears to assert the following claims against Defendants Mooney and Dennison: 

(1) false arrest (2) malicious prosecution; and (3) a Brady violation for failure to disclose 

exculpatory information. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24.) Plaintiff also asserts Monell claims against Defendants 

City of Orinda and Contra Costa County for failure to provide adequate policies, procedures and 

training. (Id. ¶¶ 25-31.) However, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff withdrew 

his malicious prosecution claim and appears to abandon his Monell claim against Defendant 

Contra Costa County.1

C. Standard 

Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (12)(b)(1) and 

(12)(b)(6). A federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction unless the contrary 

affirmatively appears. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 

1989). The party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court (here, Plaintiff) has the 

burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. Westlands Water Dist. Distrib. Dist. v. Natural Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (citing KVOS, Inc. v. Associated 

Press, 299 U.S. 269, 278 (1936) and Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986)); see 

also Shoom, Inc. v. Electronic Imaging Sys. of America, Inc., No. C05-03434 (MJJ), 2006 WL 

1529983, *4 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2006) (“[t]he burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the 

party asserting jurisdiction.”). However, dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in 

federal question cases are exceptional and must satisfy the requirements outlined in Bell v. Hood, 

327 U.S. 678 (1946). Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

that case, the Supreme court held that such dismissals are warranted “where the alleged claim 

under the constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the 

purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous.” Id. (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83). 

A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “sufficient factual 

 

1

 Defendants ask that the Court disregard Plaintiff’s opposition because it was filed late. 

However, because, even considering Plaintiff’s opposition, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s 

motion, it need not decide this question. 

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matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The reviewing 

court’s “inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 

580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). A court need not, however, accept as true the complaint’s “legal 

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Thus, a reviewing court 

may begin “by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Furthermore, a court also need not “accept as true 

allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

D. Discussion 

1. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply 

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction 

over appeals of state court judgments. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(discussing emergence of the doctrine). Historically, “the lower federal courts have variously 

interpreted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and 

Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal court jurisdiction concurrent with 

jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 

(2005). However, in 2005, the Supreme Court retrenched the doctrine to its original lines: 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases 

of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought 

by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or 

supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines 

that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference 

to state-court actions. 

Id. at 284. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has since been construed narrowly and it is limited to 

situations where a plaintiff alleges a de facto appeal by both asserting errors by the state court and 

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seeking relief from the state court judgment as a remedy. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283; 

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Significantly, a district court is not barred from exercising subject matter jurisdiction 

“simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state 

court.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293. The Ninth Circuit’s formulation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

in Noel v. Hall speaks to this situation: 

If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous 

decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court 

judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject 

matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a 

federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or 

omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar 

jurisdiction. 

341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (2003). In Kougasian, the Ninth Circuit cited Noel and emphasized this 

point: “Rooker-Feldman thus applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury 

legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court 

judgment.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140 (emphasis in original). Kougasian involved allegations 

of fraud on the state court. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had submitted a false 

declaration in an earlier state court proceeding and refused to supply contact information for the 

declarant, thereby preventing the plaintiff from questioning him. Id. The Ninth Circuit observed 

that: 

At first glance, a federal suit alleging a cause of action for extrinsic 

fraud on a state court might appear to come within the RookerFeldman doctrine. It is clear that in such a case the plaintiff is 

seeking to set aside a state court judgment. But for Rooker-Feldman 

to apply, a plaintiff must seek not only to set aside a state court 

judgment; he or she must also allege a legal error by the state court 

as the basis for that relief. 

Id. The Court went on to state that “[e]xtrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by 

that court. It is, rather, a wrongful act committed by the party or parties who engaged in the 

fraud.” Id. at 1141. 

Here, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent the Court from asserting subject 

matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff neither alleges an injury stemming from a state court judgment nor 

seeks relief from such a judgment. Rather, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants, two police 

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officers, the City of Orinda, and Contra Costa County, for alleged constitutional violations. These 

allegations focus on wrongs of the Defendants, not the state court itself, and do not invite “review 

and rejection” of a state court judgment. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283. Although these 

claims certainly appear to overlap with the subject matter of Plaintiff’s criminal conviction, this 

overlap is insufficient to deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction where Plaintiff does not 

allege injury from legal errors by the state court. See id.; Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1143; Noel, 341 

F.3d at 1164.2

2. Heck v. Humphrey bars Plaintiff’s Brady and false arrest claims 

Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a plaintiff criminally convicted in state 

court “cannot recover damages in a § 1983 suit if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff ‘would 

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the plaintiff can 

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.’” Guerrero v. Gates, 

442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). The purpose of this rule is to 

avoid “parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt,” to “‘preclude[] the 

possibility of the [convicted criminal defendant] succeeding in [a] tort action after having been 

convicted in [an] underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy 

against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical 

transaction,’” and to prevent a “‘collateral attack on [a convicted criminal defendant’s] conviction 

through the vehicle of a civil suit.’” Heck, 512 U.S. at 484 (quoting 8 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. 

Gans, American Law of Torts § 28:5, p. 24 (1991)). 

Here, Plaintiff’s conviction, based on a plea of no contest, has not been invalidated. See 

Nuno v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“[F]or purposes of 

the Heck analysis, a plea of nolo contendere in a California criminal action has the same effect as 

 

2

 The post-Exxon-Mobil cases cited by Defendants are not to the contrary and are distinguishable. 

Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 2012) involved a direct constitutional challenge to a 

state court judgment. Defendant’s other cases, Thompson v. Santa Cruz County, 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 58307 (N.D. Cal. April 23, 2013), Ismail v. County of Orange, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

119989 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012), and Miramontes v. Zellerbach, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25183 

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2014), similarly involved federal challenges to state court judgments. 

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a guilty plea or jury verdict of guilty.”). 

a. Plaintiff’s Brady claim is barred by Heck 

In order to state a claim pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Plaintiff must 

show that “the nondisclosure prejudiced” him. Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 

2011). This is because “‘there is never a real “Brady violation” unless the nondisclosure was so 

serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a 

different verdict.’” Id. (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). 

Plaintiff’s Brady claim appears to be based on the surveillance video that allegedly showed 

that Plaintiff was not carrying a firearm at the school. (Cmplt. ¶¶ 19, 24.) As an initial matter, 

Plaintiff was only convicted of possession of an assault weapon, the evidence for which appears to 

have stemmed from a search of his home – not the school incident directly. (See RJN Exs. A-C.) 

Thus, it is unlikely that Plaintiff can demonstrate prejudice. However, assuming that he can, 

Plaintiff’s claim is barred because Heck applies to “[a] claim alleging a constitutional violation 

under Brady v. Maryland.” Rodriguez v. Kwok, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69248, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 

May 20, 2014) (Illston, J.); Williams v. L.A. County Superior Court, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

112208, at *18-19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008) (“Plaintiff may not pursue Section 1983 claims against 

persons who allegedly suppressed material impeachment evidence during his criminal proceedings 

unless and until he succeeds in invalidating his conviction through other means”).3

 

b. Plaintiff’s False Arrest claim is also barred by Heck 

 

3

 The non-binding cases on which Plaintiff relies are inapposite. United States v. Rigas, 377 F.3d 

195 (2d Cir. 2004) and Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 2002) do not address the 

relationship between Brady and Heck. Furthermore, the Second Circuit has subsequently stated 

that it: “has emphatically and properly confirmed that Brady-based § 1983 claims necessarily 

imply the invalidity of the challenged conviction in the trial (or plea) in which the Brady violation 

occurred. . . . That should come as no surprise; the remedy for a Brady violation is vacatur of the 

judgment of conviction and a new trial.” Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 132 (2d 

Cir. 2014). Similarly, White v. McKinley, 605 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2010) and Segwick v. Superior 

Court of D.C., 584 F.2d 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1978) do not address Heck. Furthermore, a prior Eighth 

Circuit case, Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1998), applied the Heck bar to 

allegations that, similar to this case, a potentially exculpatory videotape was destroyed. See also 

Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Heck bar to Brady claims alleging 

the destruction of exculpatory evidence.) Furthermore, courts in this circuit have squarely held 

that the Heck bar applies to a Brady claim alleging constitutional violations. Ciria v. Rubino, 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70229, *8-18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2008) (Chesney, J.); Rodriguez, 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69248, at *6 (Illston, J.); Williams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112208 at *18-19. 

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The Heck bar also applies to false arrest claims. Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 

F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To prevail on his § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, 

[plaintiff] would have to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him. . . . . 

[F]inding there was no probable cause would ‘necessarily imply’ that [plaintiff’s] conviction for 

disturbing the peace was invalid. Therefore, under Heck, [Plaintiff’s] false arrest and 

imprisonment claims [are] not cognizable.”); see also Frost v. City & County of San Francisco, 

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37453, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2006). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he 

was falsely arrested for violating a restraining order (to not possess a firearm), brandishing a 

weapon on school grounds and exhibiting a firearm. Plaintiff was convicted of unlawfully 

possessing an assault weapon. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is barred because a verdict in Plaintiff’s 

favor would “negat[e] the basis for the arrest that led to [Plaintiff’s] conviction.” Frost, 2006 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 37453, at *10. 

In response, Plaintiff argues that Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), somehow prevents 

the application of Heck in this case. However, that case pertains to the statute of limitations for § 

1983 false arrest claims and is not relevant here. Furthermore, the case confirms that Heck 

requires dismissal of a false arrest claim where the civil suit would impugn a criminal conviction. 

Id. at 394. Additionally, the allegations in the complaint do not limit this claim to “the arrest of 

plaintiff up to the period of his arraignment” as Plaintiff argues. (Opp. at 7.) Even if they did, 

there is no significance to this argument. The issue here is whether or not the officers had 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and a finding of no probable cause would necessarily imply that 

Plaintiff’s conviction was invalid. See Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 380; Frost, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

37453, at *10-11. 

3. The Younger abstention doctrine does not apply 

Defendants’ Younger argument is based on their contention that Plaintiff is appealing his 

state court criminal conviction. (See RJN Ex. K.) However, Plaintiff states that the he is not 

appealing his criminal conviction. Rather, the appeal to which Defendants refer is of “a 

restraining order by the state court against [Plaintiff] after his criminal conviction was complete.” 

(Opp. at 14.) Defendants appear to concede the inapplicability of this doctrine as they do not 

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argue Younger in their reply. 

4. Failure to State a Claim 

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Officers Mooney and Dennison are 

barred by Heck, it does not address Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

for false arrest and violations of Brady. This leaves Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Defendant 

City of Orinda.4 Under Monell, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality pursuant 

to § 1983 must: 

identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s 

injury. . . . Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held 

liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its 

duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts 

may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. . . . Similarly, an 

act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally 

approved by an appropriate decision maker may fairly subject a 

municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so 

widespread as to have the force of law. 

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997). Here, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has inadequate policies in place regarding handling exculpatory 

evidence, conducting criminal investigations, and not bearing false witness and that the “lack of 

adequate supervisorial training and or policies and procedures is so gross that it demonstrates the 

existence of an informal custom of [sic] policy of promoting, tolerating, and ratifying of the 

above-mentioned misconduct.” (Cmplt. ¶¶ 27-28, 30.) 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim. First, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that an employee 

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As explained above, Heck prevents this Court from 

reaching such a conclusion. Thus, Plaintiff’s Monell claim must fail. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 

(Monell plaintiffs must prove a constitutional injury). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claim fails for a 

number of other reasons: (1) Plaintiff does not allege ratification of the allegedly deficient policies 

by an authorized policy maker. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To show 

ratification, a plaintiff must prove that the ‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's 

 

4

 Although the complaint alleges Monell claims against Defendant Contra Costa County as well, 

Plaintiff’s opposition does not mention this Defendant. Consequently, it appears as if Plaintiff 

intends to abandon his claims against Contra Costa County. Regardless, the Court’s analysis 

applies equally to Defendant Contra Costa County as it does to Defendant City of Orinda. 

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decision and the basis for it.’” (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 

(1988))); (2) Plaintiff merely alleges an isolated incident and does not allege a basis for inferring a 

longstanding custom or practice. Id. at 1235 (“‘Liability for improper custom may not be 

predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient 

duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying 

out policy.’” (quoting Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996))); and (3) Plaintiff’s 

allegations with regard to causation are too conclusory to establish a link between Defendant City 

of Orinda’s allegedly deficient training and Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional injury. See 

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissing a complaint that 

“lacked any factual allegations regarding key elements of the Monell claims, or, more specifically, 

any facts demonstrating that [plaintiff’s] constitutional deprivation was the result of a custom or 

practice of the [defendant] or that the custom or practice was the ‘moving force’ behind his 

constitutional deprivation.”). 

II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 

Plaintiff moves for leave to file an amended complaint that adds an additional claim that 

Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment because he filed a 

complaint against one of the Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated by causing the 

criminal charges to be brought against him. (Dkt. 23-1 (Proposed Amended Complaint) ¶ 25.) 

Defendants, citing Heck, argue that leave to amend should be denied because it would be futile. 

See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, 

justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend. . . . [A] district court does not abuse its discretion 

in denying a motion to amend where the movant presents no new facts but only new theories and 

provides no satisfactory explanation for his failure to fully develop his contentions originally.”).

Plaintiff’s proposed new claim alleges that Defendants induced the prosecution of Plaintiff 

and is thus a claim for retaliatory prosecution. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262-63 

(2006). An essential element of this claim is a showing that there was no probable cause for 

pressing the underlying criminal charges. Id. at 265-66 (holding that “an absence of probable 

cause . . . must be pleaded and proven”); Paul v. City of Sunnyside, 405 F. App'x 203, 206 (9th 

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Cir. 2010) (affirming a grant of summary judgment against the plaintiff on a retaliation claim 

where the defendants “had probable cause to charge” plaintiff). 

As previously explained, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested for violating a 

restraining order (to not possess a firearm), brandishing a weapon on school grounds, and 

exhibiting a firearm. Plaintiff was convicted of unlawfully possessing an assault weapon. 

Although Plaintiff argues that this conviction was based on “distinct” facts, a finding of no 

probable cause to arrest on these charges would necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s conviction for 

possessing an assault weapon was invalid. See Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 380; Frost, 2006 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 37453, at *10-11. Therefore, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is barred by Heck.5 See Smith v. 

Ball, 278 F. App’x 739, 741 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a First Amendment retaliation claim barred 

by Heck “because prevailing on [plaintiff’s] claim would imply the invalidity of her criminal 

convictions arising from the same events”); Golt v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F. App’x 704, 706 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“Any determination by this court that [plaintiff’s] arrests and convictions were 

effected only for retaliatory purposes would necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction[s], 

and that would be contrary to Heck.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s 

Monell claim based on the alleged retaliation fails because Heck precludes Plaintiff from proving 

an underlying injury. See Brown 520 U.S. at 404 (an essential element of a Monell claim is that 

plaintiffs must allege an injury). 

Plaintiff’s citations to Hooper v. San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) and Yount v. 

City of Sacramento, 43 Cal. 4th 885 (2008) for the general proposition that sometimes different 

factual contexts can exist within one continuous chain of events is not to the contrary. Both cases 

involve the application of Heck to excessive force claims and Plaintiff asserts no such claim here. 

III.CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by 

 

5 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that without discovery there is insufficient 

information to determine whether the retaliation claim is Heck barred. As previously mentioned, 

Plaintiff’s claim requires a finding of no probable cause for the underlying criminal charges, 

which all involve possession of a firearm; such a finding would necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s 

conviction, for possession of a firearm, was invalid. 

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Heck, leave to amend would be futile. Therefore, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 12, 2015 

______________________________________ 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:14-cv-04061-EDL Document 31 Filed 02/13/15 Page 12 of 12