Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01283/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01283-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JASON EUGENE DEOCAMPO; JESUS

SEBASTIAN GRANT; and JAQUEZS

TYREE BERRY,

NO. CIV. S-06-01283 WBS GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER RE: MOTION TO BIFURCATE

TRIAL AND STAY DISCOVERY

CITY OF VALLEJO, a municipal

corporation; ROBERT NICHELINI, 

in his capacity as Chief of 

Police for the CITY OF VALLEJO; 

JASON POTTS, individually, and

in his capacity as a Vallejo 

police officer; JEREMY PATZER,

individually, and in his 

capacity as a Vallejo police 

officer; ERIC JENSEN, individually, and in his capacity 

as a Vallejo police officer;

and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This is an action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as

well as supplemental state law claims, to recover damages arising

out of several alleged incidents of improper conduct by city

police officers. Defendants are the City of Vallejo, Vallejo

Case 2:06-cv-01283-WBS-CMK Document 50 Filed 06/04/07 Page 1 of 4
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Monell refers to Monell v. Department of Social 1

Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in which the

Supreme Court held that a municipality can be sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 when execution of a government policy or custom

results in a violation of constitutional rights. 

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Police Chief Robert Nichelini, Vallejo Police Officers Jason

Potts, Jeremy Patzer, and Eric Jensen (“defendants”). Before the

court is defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial and stay

discovery of all Monell-related claims until after the trial of

plaintiffs’ non-Monell claims. 

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 Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) grants district courts the

discretion to bifurcate claims in a single action. It provides

that:

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid

prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to

expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of

any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party

claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of

claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims

or issues, always preserving the right of trial by jury

as declared by the Seventh Amendment of the

Constitution or as given by a statute of the United

States.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); See also Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist.

Court, 549 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir. 1977). However, absent some

experience demonstrating the worth of bifurcation, “separation of

issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered.” Advisory

Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). 

Plaintiffs have a right to sue whichever parties they

wish, regardless of whether the defendants, or even the court,

may think that the inclusion of some defendants may be of little

or no practical economic benefit to plaintiffs. There may also

be non-economic benefits that plaintiffs could obtain from suing

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the municipality in addition to the individual officers. As one

district court observed, “[d]epending on the size of the verdict

and the size of the municipality, as well as other factors, a

judgment against a police officer (even one paid for by the

municipality) may be less likely to prompt the municipality to

act to prevent future violations than a judgment naming the

municipality itself as responsible based on its policies and

customs.” Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896

(N.D. Ill. 2000). 

That given, the court cannot assume, as defendants

suggest, that the Monell claims will simply go away after the

claims against the individual officers are tried. Regardless of

whether plaintiffs win or lose on their claims against the

officers, there is no assurance that plaintiffs would voluntary

abandon their claims against the city, and there has been no

showing at this stage of the proceedings that the city would

necessarily be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under

these circumstances, defendants’ suggestion is wholly unworkable. 

Should plaintiffs wish and be able to proceed on their Monellrelated claims after the trial of the claims against the

individual defendants, the court would either have to impanel a

second jury or return the first jury after the several months

that it would take to complete discovery on the Monell-related

claims. The court declines to exercise its discretion to do

that.

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4

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

bifurcate the trial and to stay discovery on all Monell-related

claims until the conclusion of trial on the claims against the

individual defendants be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: June 1, 2007

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