Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01811/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01811-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MONIA WILLIAMS, individually and as 

Guardian ad Litem for L.S. and Q.S, minors,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01811-BLF 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT 

[Re: ECF 46]

Plaintiff Monia Williams (“Williams”), individually and as Guardian ad Litem for her two 

minor children, sues the County of Monterey, the City of Salinas, and individual social workers 

and police officers who were involved in the removal of her children based on suspected abuse. 

Defendants Josefina Duran and Marcos Estrada (“Moving Parties”) move to dismiss the only

claims asserted against them in the first amended complaint (“FAC”), Claim 6 for deprivation of 

substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Claim 7 for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. The Court previously dismissed those claims pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after determining that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient 

to state a claim against Moving Parties. Moving Parties contend that the FAC does not cure the 

defects addressed in the Court’s prior dismissal order, and they now seek dismissal of Claims 6 

and 7 without leave to amend. 

The motion is DENIED for the reasons discussed below. 

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 I. BACKGROUND1

Williams adopted twins L.S. (a girl) and Q.S. (a boy) when they were three years old. 

FAC ¶ 8, ECF 43. The children were nine years old at the time of the events giving rise to this 

lawsuit. Id. The children’s biological parents lost custody of the children due to mental health 

issues and use of illegal drugs. FAC ¶ 62. The children likely were exposed to illegal drugs and 

alcohol in utero, and they received neglectful parenting in their early years. FAC ¶ 63. When they 

were enrolled in school, it became apparent that both children suffered from developmental 

delays. FAC ¶ 64. Neither child was performing at or near grade level, and Q.S. had difficulties 

with speech and language comprehension. Id. 

On May 4, 2018, a teacher at the school attended by both children made a report to the 

Monterey County Child Abuse Hotline. FAC ¶ 72. The report stated that Q.S. said he gets “sad” 

when his Uncle Pat (Williams’ brother) tells Q.S. to stay downstairs and watch television while 

taking L.S. upstairs for special time. FAC ¶ 73. Q.S. reportedly said that when he would go 

upstairs to try the door to the room where Uncle Pat and his sister L.S. were, Uncle Pat would yell 

at Q.S. to go watch television. Id. Uncle Pat was sixty-three years old at the time of the report. 

FAC ¶ 76. He did not reside at Williams’ home. FAC ¶¶ 58-61, 81-91. 

Defendant Linda Castillo, a Monterey County social worker, was assigned the case and she 

went to the school on May 4 to begin an investigation. FAC ¶ 79. Castillo did not attempt to 

contact Williams before speaking with the children. FAC ¶¶ 80-81. Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendant Castillo’s investigation was “wholly inadequate and unreasonable,” as she did not ask 

school personnel about the children’s possible cognitive issues, misconstrued the children’s 

responses to her questions, and formed an opinion that sexual abuse had occurred but did not ask 

follow-up questions regarding the frequency or circumstances of the suspected abuse. FAC ¶¶ 84-

86. Castillo was unable to “qualify” either child. FAC ¶¶ 87-88, 121. The complaint defines the 

term “qualify” to mean asking children “a series of questions to ascertain their ability to 

understand the truth from a lie, fantasy from reality, and help assess their understanding of the 

 

1 Plaintiff’s well-pled factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of the motion to 

dismiss. See Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 690 (9th Cir. 2011).

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difference between a truth and a lie, and the importance of telling the truth.” FAC ¶ 57. The 

children’s “responses may be used as a prerequisite to allowing their testimony under oath or in a 

legal proceeding, and as a means of evaluating their credibility.” Id.

Castillo called in a request for law enforcement to report to the school regarding suspected 

child sexual abuse. FAC ¶ 154. In response, several City of Salinas police officers traveled to the 

school, including Defendants Guadalupe Gonzalez, Blake Ziebell, Dana Cornelison, and Mario 

Reyes, Jr. FAC ¶ 155. The defendant officers did not start their body cams at the beginning of 

their investigation, but turned them on randomly. FAC ¶ 158. Castillo told the officers that: Pat 

and L.S. played a game called “secret special time” in an upstairs bedroom, when Q.S. would go 

upstairs the bedroom door was locked, and Pat was no longer allowed to go to the house. FAC ¶ 

160. Plaintiffs allege that the children never told Castillo any of those things. Id. 

The police officers questioned Q.S. and then L.S. without attempting to contact Williams 

first. FAC ¶ 165, 202-03. Plaintiffs characterize the interview of L.S. as “horribly inappropriate, 

leading, unprofessional.” FAC ¶ 268. Plaintiffs claim that the officers asked repeated questions in 

an attempt to elicit confirmation of sexual abuse, and that the officers’ reports of the interviews 

contained lies, misrepresentations, and omissions. FAC ¶¶ 269-276.

At some point after the police arrived, another Monterey County social worker, Defendant 

Justin Ricks, arrived at the school and took over from Castillo. FAC ¶ 277. Once Ricks received 

the police officers’ information regarding their interviews of the children, the school principal, and 

the teacher’s aide, Ricks called Monterey County supervisory personnel. FAC ¶ 280. The 

supervisors included Defendants Christine Lerable, Rebecca Baron, and Charlene Lord. Id. 

Plaintiffs allege that “despite the glaring inconsistencies in the children’s statements,” the decision 

was made to remove the children. Id.

Williams had arrived at the school while police officers were questioning the children, but 

she was not told what was occurring, only that she should “wait.” FAC ¶ 281. The first Williams 

was told about the investigation was when Ricks informed her that she had two options: propose a 

relative who would take the children during the investigation or allow the children to be taken into 

protective custody. FAC ¶ 283. The decision had been made to remove the children before 

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anyone interviewed Williams. FAC ¶ 284. Williams proposed placement with her sister, Regina 

Mason, who previously had worked for Monterey County as a social worker supervisor. FAC ¶¶ 

285, 299. Mason was called on the telephone and stated that she was willing to take the children. 

FAC ¶¶ 289-91. However, Ricks became upset with Mason when she questioned his experience 

and knowledge, and asked him among other things why the children could not return home when 

the alleged perpetrator did not live in the home. FAC ¶¶ 325-27. Plaintiffs allege that Ricks 

vindictively acted on his personal feelings by deciding that the children would not be placed with 

Mason, even though she offered to come pick them up. FAC ¶¶ 327-32. Ricks took the children 

to his car without allowing Williams to speak to them or comfort them. FAC ¶¶ 334-337. 

Williams tried to approach to calm the children down, which conduct Ricks mischaracterized by 

later reporting that Williams was out of control, physically aggressive, and had to be restrained. 

FAC ¶¶ 337-39. 

Ricks placed the children with the school teacher’s aide, Whitney Lopez, over Williams’ 

objection. FAC ¶¶ 341-42. Ricks also asked Defendants Blake Ziebell and Eduardo Bejarano, 

both City of Salinas police officers, to arrange for a videotaped interview of the children by 

another social worker. FAC ¶ 340. The interview took place on May 5, 2018, the day after the

children were taken into custody. FAC ¶¶ 343-44. Neither child could be “qualified.” FAC ¶ 

350. 

Because Williams’ sister, Mason, was a former employee of Monterey County, the 

decision was made to have the case handled by Santa Cruz County social workers. FAC ¶ 356. 

Defendants and Moving Parties Marcos Estrada and Josefina Duran, both Santa Cruz County 

social workers, became involved at that point and were tasked with conducting an independent 

investigation. Id. Duran was Estrada’s supervisor. FAC ¶¶ 30, 356. Estrada was given more than 

twelve body cam videos that were taken at the school on May 4, 2018, as well of transcripts of the 

videos. FAC ¶ 296. However, after Estrada had watched only one video, Duran directed him to 

stop watching, and he complied. FAC ¶¶ 296-97. Estrada was “tasked with making 

recommendations to the juvenile court about what should happen with the family.” FAC ¶ 296. 

Estrada prepared a Jurisdiction Report for the court which failed to advise that the children had not 

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been qualified during the interviews. FAC ¶ 352. As the time he drafted the Jurisdiction Report, 

Estrada knew that the children had not been qualified, based on his conversations with other social 

workers in the case and information in the Salinas police reports. Id. Without including the 

information that the children could not be qualified, Estrada “recommended further court and 

agency involvement in the Williams family and forced the matter to a contested trial, prolonging 

the time the mother and children were separated, and, the time the children continued to live 

outside of their home.” FAC ¶ 358. Plaintiffs allege that Estrada and Duran conspired with other 

officials to make “stick” allegations that L.S. was sexually abused and Williams failed to protect 

her children. FAC ¶ 359. 

Defendant Chelsea Chacon, a Monterey County social worker, signed the Petition pursuant 

to Welfare & Institutions Code Section 300, alleging among other things that L.S. had been a 

victim of sexual abuse or was at risk for sexual abuse, and that Williams had failed to protect L.S. 

adequately. FAC ¶¶ 21, 46-49. Plaintiffs allege that it is unclear why Chacon signed the Petition, 

if Santa Cruz County was supposed to handling the case. FAC ¶ 360. Plaintiffs claim that all of 

the allegations in the Petition were false. FAC ¶ 50. The children remained out of Williams’ 

custody for approximately three months, at which time juvenile proceedings were dismissed after 

a contested trial. FAC ¶ 294. Plaintiffs allege that the Petition was “replete with lies, 

misrepresentations, and omissions of wholly exculpatory and/or mitigating, clarifying, explanatory 

facts and circumstances known to the Defendant Social Workers.” FAC ¶ 23.

Williams filed this action on April 4, 2019, on behalf of herself and as guardian ad litem 

for L.S. and Q.S., asserting claims against Monterey County and its employees Ricks, Castillo, 

Lerable, Baron, Lord, and Chacon; the City of Salinas and City police officers Ziebell, Gonzalez, 

Cornelison, Reyes, and Bejarano; and Santa Cruz County social workers Estrada and Duran. The 

operative FAC contains six federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress: (1) Violation of 4th Amendment – Seizure 

by Interrogation; (2) Violation of 14th Amendment – Interrogation of Minors; (3) Violation of 4th 

Amendment – Removal; (4) 14th Amendment Violation (Procedural); (5) 14th Amendment 

Violation (Substantive) – Interference Familial Association; (6) 14th Amendment Violation 

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(Substantive) – Continuing Detention – Fraud; and (7) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 

Plaintiffs seek general, special, and compensatory damages; punitive damages; statutory damages; 

attorneys’ fees and costs; and any further relief the Court may deem just and proper.

Monterey County and its employees answered the complaint on June 6, 2019, and the City 

of Salinas and its officers answered on July 22, 2019. See Answers, ECF 11, 28. Moving Parties 

Estrada and Duran moved to dismiss, and their motion was granted with leave to amend in an 

order issued October 17, 2019 (“Prior Dismissal Order”). See Prior Dismissal Order, ECF 41. 

Plaintiffs filed the operative FAC on November 15, 2019. See FAC, ECF 43. 

 II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force 

v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 

claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must consider the allegations of 

the complaint, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters which are 

subject to judicial notice. Louisiana Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, 829 F.3d 1048, 

1063 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007)).

 III. DISCUSSION

The FAC asserts two claims against Moving Parties Estrada and Duran. Claim 6, asserted 

under § 1983, alleges that Moving Parties and other defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process rights to familial association by submitting fraudulent 

information to the juvenile dependency court, which resulted in continued separation of the family 

after the initial removal of the children. See FAC ¶¶ 392-98. Claim 7, asserted under state law, 

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alleges that Moving Parties and other defendants are liable for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (“IIED”). See FAC ¶ 402.

At the start of the hearing, the Court expressed its tentative view that both claims were 

subject to dismissal. However, after reviewing the new allegations highlighted by Plaintiffs’

counsel during the lengthy oral argument, as well as the relevant case law, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiffs have alleged enough facts to satisfy the applicable pleading standard and to show 

that the claims may fall outside the scope of the immunities asserted by Moving Parties.

A. 14th Amendment Violation – Substantive Due Process (Claim 6)

In Claim 6, Plaintiffs assert that Moving Parties and other defendants violated Plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to familial association by submitting 

fraudulent information to the juvenile dependency court, which resulted in continued separation of 

the family after the initial removal of the children. See FAC ¶¶ 392-99. Moving Parties argue that 

Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of their substantive due process rights and that 

Moving Parties are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.

1. Adequacy of Pleading

“The substantive due process right to family integrity or to familial association is well 

established.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). “A parent has a 

fundamental liberty interest in companionship with his or her child.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The violation of the right to family integrity is subject to remedy under § 

1983. Id. “Parents and children may assert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 

claims if they are deprived of their liberty interest in the companionship and society of their child 

or parent through official conduct.” Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 

1075 (9th Cir. 2013). “[O]nly official conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ is cognizable as a due 

process violation.” Id.

Plaintiffs allege that Moving Parties conspired with other officials to make allegations 

against Williams “stick,” specifically, allegations that L.S. was sexually abused and that Williams 

failed to protect her children. FAC ¶ 359. Plaintiffs claim that in furtherance of that conspiracy, 

Moving Parties deliberately refrained from viewing the body-cam videos that contained 

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potentially exculpatory information, and that Estrada omitted known exculpatory information –

that the children could not be qualified – in his Jurisdiction Report. FAC ¶¶ 296-97, 352-53, 359. 

According to Plaintiffs, Moving Parties’ conduct “was the but-for cause of L.S. and Q.S.’s 

continued detention away from their mother,” and Moving Parties intended their acts to injure

Plaintiffs. FAC ¶ 297. These allegations describe official conduct that shocks the conscience, and 

that allegedly resulted in the continued separation of the family. The Court concludes that

Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due 

process rights.

2. Qualified Immunity

The Court previously granted Moving Parties’ motion to dismiss Claim 6 on the basis of 

qualified immunity, concluding that the original complaint did not allege facts against Moving 

Parties rising to the level of a constitutional violation. See Prior Dismissal Order at 12-13, ECF 

41. 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary 

functions from liability for damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Dunn v. 

Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982)). In analyzing whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court 

looks at two distinct questions: (1) whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable 

to the injured party, establish the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was 

clearly established such that a reasonable government official would have known that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 1199. Courts may exercise their discretion in 

deciding “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in 

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 

(2009).

In their briefs opposing both the earlier motion to dismiss and the present motion, Plaintiffs

cited Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 661 

F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2011), which held that “the right to be free from deception in the presentation 

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of evidence during a protective custody proceeding was clearly established.” At the hearing on the 

present motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel also cited Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1118 

(9th Cir. 2017), which in turn quoted the above language from Greene. 

The original complaint included allegations that Estrada was provided with twelve bodycam videos taken at the school on May 4, 2018, but that he viewed only one video before 

preparing his report for the juvenile court. Compl. ¶ 296-97, ECF 1. The complaint alleged that 

Estrada stopped viewing the body-cam videos at the direction of his supervisor, Duran. See id. 

The complaint also alleged that Estrada and Duran conspired with other officials to reach the 

conclusion that L.S. was sexually abused and Williams failed to protect her children. Compl. ¶

358. The Court determined that those allegations were insufficient to show a constitutional 

violation under Greene. See Prior Dismissal Order at 13, ECF 41. As framed in the original 

complaint, Plaintiffs’ allegations at most suggested that Moving Parties failed to undertake an 

adequate investigation before preparing the Jurisdiction Report. See id. 

In their FAC, Plaintiffs repeat the allegations that Estrada was given more than twelve 

body-cam videos but stopped viewing after the first video at the direction of his supervisor, Duran. 

FAC ¶¶ 296-97. However, Plaintiffs have added new allegations that Estrada knew the children 

could not be qualified but deliberately omitted that information from the Jurisdiction Report. See

FAC ¶¶ 352-53. Plaintiffs claim that Estrada learned the children could not be qualified from 

talking to other social workers and from the Salinas police reports. FAC ¶ 352. Plaintiffs also 

allege that both Duran and Estrada deliberately and intentionally failed to examine potentially 

exculpatory evidence provided to them, so that they could support the determinations desired by 

Monterey County and other defendants, that is, that Williams had failed to protect her children and 

that L.S. had been sexually abused. FAC ¶¶ 297, 352-53, 359. 

The Court must accept these alleged facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 

Plaintiffs’ favor. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013). Applying 

this standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged that Moving Parties engaged in 

“deception in the presentation of evidence during a protective custody proceeding.” Greene, 588 

F.3d 1035. The new facts give rise to reasonable inferences that Moving Parties conspired with 

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Monterey County and other defendants to reach a predetermined conclusion adverse to Williams, 

and that pursuant to that conspiracy Moving Parties deliberately refrained from viewing body-cam 

footage which might contain exculpatory information, and deliberately omitted from the

Jurisdiction Report the known potentially exculpatory information that the children could not be 

qualified.

Moving Parties argue that the facts alleged in the FAC do not give rise to a reasonable 

inference of deception in the presentation of evidence to the juvenile court, but at most 

demonstrate that the investigation was inadequate. Moving Parties assert that “[p]erhaps it wasn’t 

a complete investigation, but it was an investigation done in the time frame allowed.” Reply at 3, 

ECF 55. That argument ignores Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the deliberate omission of the 

information that the children could not be qualified, and the deliberate choice not to view the 

body-cam footage so as to avoid seeing any potentially exculpatory evidence. While the Court 

agreed with Moving Parties in the first round of motion practice that Plaintiffs must allege more 

than inadequacy of the investigation, the Court disagrees with Moving Parties’ position that 

Plaintiffs have failed to surmount that hurdle in the FAC. At the hearing, Moving Parties’ counsel 

argued that Plaintiffs have not provided a sufficient factual basis for their allegations regarding 

Estrada’s knowledge that the children could not be qualified and the reasons Estrada and Duran

refrained from viewing the body-cam videos. The Court finds the facts alleged to be sufficient at 

the pleading stage. 

The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Claim 6. This ruling is without prejudice to 

Moving Parties filing a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. 

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Claim 7)

In Claim 7, Plaintiffs allege that the conduct of Moving Parties and other defendants was 

intended to and did cause Plaintiffs severe emotional distress. See FAC ¶¶ 401-02, ECF 43. 

Moving Parties argue that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for IIED and that state law immunities 

apply to this claim.

1. Adequacy of Pleading

The elements of an IIED claim are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 

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with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 

distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and 

proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” 

Christensen v. Sup. Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The alleged conduct “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Moving Parties’ participation in a conspiracy to make 

allegations “stick” against Williams satisfies the first element. The second and third elements are 

satisfied by Plaintiffs’ allegation that Moving Parties’ conduct was the “but-for cause of L.S. and 

Q.S.’s continued detention away from their mother,” and that the separation of the family caused 

Plaintiffs severe emotional distress FAC ¶ 297, 402. Plaintiffs’ allegations therefore are sufficient 

to state a claim for IIED.

2. State Law Immunities

The Court previously dismissed Claim 7 on the basis of state law immunities under 

California Government Code §§ 820.2 and 821.6. See Prior Dismissal Order at 8-10, ECF 41.

California courts have held broadly that “a social worker’s decisions relating to, as here, 

the investigation of child abuse, removal of a minor, and instigation of dependency proceedings, 

are discretionary decisions subject to immunity under section 820.2, and/or prosecutorial or quasiprosecutorial decisions subject to immunity under section 821.6.” Jacqueline T. v. Alameda Cty. 

Child Protective Servs., 155 Cal. App. 4th 456, 466 (2007), as modified (Oct. 4, 2007). “Such 

courts have reasoned that civil liability for a mistaken decision would place the courts in the 

unseemly position of making the county accountable in damages for a decisionmaking process 

delegated to it by statute.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

The immunities conferred by §§ 820.2 and 821.6 are limited by California Government 

Code § 820.21, which provides: “[T]he civil immunity of juvenile court social workers, child 

protection workers, and other public employees authorized to initiate or conduct investigations or 

proceedings . . . shall not extend to any of the following, if committed with malice: (1) Perjury[;] 

(2) Fabrication of evidence[;] (3) Failure to disclose known exculpatory evidence[;] (4) Obtaining 

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testimony by duress, . . . fraud, . . . or undue influence. . . .” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.21. The 

Court determined that the original complaint did not allege specific facts implicating § 820.21.

See Prior Dismissal Order at 10. The Court noted that the complaint did not allege that Estrada 

knew the children had not been qualified or that lack of qualification was exculpatory information. 

See id. at 9. The Court concluded that, as framed in the original complaint, Plaintiffs’ allegations 

at most suggested a failure to conduct an adequate investigation. See id.

As discussed above, the FAC contains new allegations that Estrada knew the children 

could not be qualified and deliberately omitted that potentially exculpatory information from the 

Jurisdiction Report. See FAC ¶¶ 352-53. The FAC also clarifies Plaintiffs’ theory that Duran and 

Estrada deliberately refrained from viewing the body-cam video footage, which may have 

contained exculpatory information, so that they could omit any exculpatory information from the 

Jurisdiction Report and thereby support the adverse determination against Williams desired by 

Monterey County and others. See FAC ¶¶ 296-97, 352-53, 359. The Court finds that these facts, 

viewed liberally and with all reasonable inferences drawn in Plaintiffs’ favor, are sufficient to 

show that Moving Parties’ conduct may fall within Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.21 and thus that the 

state law immunities may not apply. 

The motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Claim 7. This ruling is without prejudice to 

Moving Parties filing a motion for summary judgment on the basis of state law immunities.

 IV. ORDER

The motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Defendants Estrada and Duran shall file answers no later than February 12, 2020.

Dated: January 21, 2020

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:19-cv-01811-BLF Document 57 Filed 01/21/20 Page 12 of 12