Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01481/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW LINDERMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

HEIDI M. LACKNER,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01481-LJO-GSA

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

(ECF No. 1)

Petitioner is a state prisoner represented by counsel in a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On September 22, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. He 

raises the following nine grounds for relief in his petition:

1. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

present evidence of Petitioner’s good character;

2. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

introduce proof of Petitioner’s lack of propensity to engage 

in professional misconduct;

3. Prosecutor’s misconduct deprived Petitioner of due process 

and a fair trial; trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

by failing to object;

4. Trial court violated Petitioner’s rights to due process, a fair 

trial, a reliable sentence and double jeopardy by improperly 

imposing the high term and by imposing consecutive, 

duplicative terms; trial counsel rendered ineffective 

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assistance by failing to object;

5. Trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence because 

the illegal search and seizure violated Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment rights;

6. Trial court denied Petitioner due process, a fair trial and the 

right to present a defense by excluding Dr. Streed’s expert 

testimony and excluding Edwards’ impeaching

photographs;

7. Prosecution failed, beyond a reasonable doubt, to prove the 

“touching” and “public place” elements of the solicitation 

convictions;

8. Evidence failed to prove Petitioner solicited a bribe because 

the requested acts did not involve money or anything of 

ascertainable value; and

9. Evidence failed to prove that Petitioner committed the 

crime of oral copulation under color of authority.

(Pet., ECF 1). On June 26, 2013, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review, which raised grounds five (5) through eight (8) of the instant petition.1 On September 

18, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court 

which raised grounds one (1) through four (4) of the instant petition. (Pet. 6). 

I.

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary 

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it 

plainly appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petition is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 

of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 

1990).

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial 

 

1

It appears that Petitioner did not raise ground nine (9) of the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in his 

Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court. (Pet. 6).

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opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court 

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 

829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair 

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's 

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal 

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 

(9th Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due 

process rights “he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 

366. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of 

such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 

(1982) (holding that the exhaustion requirement is not satisfied even when the “due process 

ramifications” of an argument might be “self-evident”); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-

63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“[F]or purposes of exhausting state remedies, a claim for relief in 

habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a 

statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising 

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 

669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th 

Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d at 1241. In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court 

reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that 

exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners “fairly 

presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order to give the 

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State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations 

of the prisoners’ federal rights” (some internal quotation marks 

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct 

alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be 

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the 

United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim 

that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must 

say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law. 

See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-988 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Duncan, this court has held 

that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim explicit 

either by citing federal law or in the decisions of federal courts, 

even if the federal basis is “self-evidence,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189 

F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 

U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying claim would be decided 

under state law on the same considerations that would control 

resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d at 1106-1107; Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-831 (9th 

Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d at 865.

. . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state 

court to the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without 

regard to how similar the state and federal standards for reviewing 

the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

If a petition contains unexhausted claims, a petitioner may, at his option, withdraw the 

unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claims. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 

568, 574 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts must provide habeas litigants with the opportunity to 

amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to suffering 

dismissal.”). 

A petition may be stayed either under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005), or 

Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). A petitioner may move to withdraw the 

unexhausted claims and move to hold the petition in abeyance while the unexhausted claims are 

exhausted in state court. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003); Ford v. Hubbard, 

305 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2002). However, such a request will not be considered by the Court until 

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the petition contains only exhausted claims and it is clear that the petition is not barred by the 

statute of limitations. In light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s 

objectives, “stay and abeyance [is] available only in limited circumstances” and “is only 

appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust his claims first in state court.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

A petitioner may also move to withdraw the entire petition, and return to federal court 

only when he has finally exhausted his state court remedies. 2

Here, Petitioner contends that there are four (4) grounds in the instant petition which are 

currently pending in a petition for writ for habeas corpus before the California Supreme Court. 

(Pet. 6). He contends that he previously submitted a Petition for Review to the California 

Supreme Court as part of his direct appeal. (Pet. 6). Upon a review of the petition, it appears 

that ground nine (9) of the instant petition has never been raised to the California Supreme Court 

and grounds one (1) through four (4) of the instant petition are part of the petition for writ of 

habeas corpus that is presently pending before the California Supreme Court. (Pet.). It is 

possible, however, that Petitioner has presented ground nine (9) to the California Supreme Court 

and failed to indicate this to the Court. Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court whether ground 

nine (9) has been presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court 

with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court, along with a copy of any ruling 

made by the California Supreme Court. 

Therefore, it appears that five (5) of Petitioner’s grounds for relief have not yet been 

adjudicated by the California Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner has presented a mixed petition. 

Petitioner has not requested a stay. If Petitioner has not presented all of his claims to the 

California Supreme Court, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1). The Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an 

opportunity to exhaust the claims if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. 

///

 

2 Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in state court, 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 

531 U.S. 991 (2001).

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///

II.

ORDER

Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the

date of service of this Order why the petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust state remedies. 

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will result in dismissal of the 

petition pursuant to Fed. R. Civil Proc. § 41(b) (A petitioner’s failure to prosecute or to comply 

with a court order may result in a dismissal of the action, and the dismissal operates as an 

adjudication on the merits).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2014 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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