Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00333/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00333-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Thelma S. Cohen, counsel for Plaintiff John David Hoover Jr., seeks an award of attorney fees 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 28) Neither Plaintiff nor the Commissioner of Social Security 

oppose the motion.2 For the following reasons, the motion for attorney fees is GRANTED.

I. Relevant Background

Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement with the law office of Potter, Cohen & 

Samulon on November 20, 2012. (Doc. 28-1) The agreement entitled counsel to an award of “25% of

all past due benefits, including dependents’ benefits” if judicial review of an administrative decision 

was required, and the adverse decision of an ALJ was reversed. (Id. at 2) The agreement also indicated 

Court approval would be sought for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Id.)

 

1 This action was originally brought against Michael J. Astrue in his capacity as Commissioner. Andrew M. Saul

has been automatically substituted as the defendant in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 The Commissioner filed a response to the motion, in which he offered an “analysis of the requested fees to assist 

this Court” but asserted he was “not in a position to either assent to or object to the §406(b) fees that Counsel seeks from 

Plaintiff’s past-due benefits.” (Doc. 30 at 2-3)

JOHN DAVID HOOVER JR.,

 Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL1,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-0333- JLT

ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(Doc. 28)

Case 1:13-cv-00333-JLT Document 31 Filed 02/03/20 Page 1 of 4
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On December 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint for review of the administrative decision 

denying his application for Social Security benefits. (Doc. 1) The Court observed the record 

established that “[t]he Commissioner found Plaintiff was disabled as of May 25, 2012, while the ALJ 

determined Plaintiff was not disabled through May 24, 2012, without any indication of an intervening 

act causing disability.” (Doc. 25 at 5) Because the administrative record was insufficient to determine 

whether Plaintiff’s applications for benefits involved the same evidence, the Court remanded the action 

for further proceedings pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on August 21, 2014. (Id. at 5-6) 

The parties stipulated to the award of fees and costs, and the Court awarded $4,700.00 in fees under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act to Plaintiff. (Doc. 27)

Following the remand, a “Notice of Award” was issued on June 8, 2019. (Doc. 28-3 at 2) The 

Social Security Administration determined Plaintiff “became disabled ... on September 30, 2009” and 

was “entitled to monthly benefits from Social Security beginning March 2010.” (Id. at 2-3) In 

addition, Plaintiff was entitled “to monthly child’s benefits from Social Security beginning March 

2010. (Doc. 28-4 at 2) In total, Plaintiff was entitled to $75,491.60 in past-due benefits. (See Doc. 30 

at 2; see also Docs 28-3; Doc. 28-4) From this, the Commissioner withheld 25% for payment of fees, 

or $18,872.90. (See id.; Doc. 28-3 at 4; Doc. 28-4 at 3)

Ms. Cohen filed the motion now before the Court on January 9, 2020, seeking the withheld

fees in the amount of $18,872.90. (Doc. 28) Ms. Cohen served Plaintiff with the motion and informed 

him of the right to file a response to indicate whether she agreed or disagreed with the requested fees.

(Id. at 3; Doc. 29) Plaintiff has not opposed the motion.

II. Attorney Fees under § 406(b)

An attorney may seek an award of fees for representation of a Social Security claimant who is 

awarded benefits:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [42 USC § 401, et 

seq] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine 

and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in 

excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is 

entitled by reason of such judgment. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794 (2002) (Section 406(b) 

controls fees awarded for representation of Social Security claimants). 

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A contingency fee agreement is unenforceable if it provides for fees exceeding the statutory 

amount. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807 (“Congress has provided one boundary line: Agreements are 

unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.”).

III. Discussion and Analysis

District courts “have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts § 406(b) cases.” 

Hern v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003). However, the Court must review 

contingent-fee arrangements “as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in 

particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. In doing so, the Court should consider “the character of 

the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 808. In addition, the Court should 

consider whether the attorney performed in a substandard manner or engaged in dilatory conduct or 

excessive delays, and whether the fees are “excessively large in relation to the benefits received.” 

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Plaintiff entered into the contingent fee agreement in which he agreed to pay twenty-five 

percent of any awarded past-due benefits, including dependents’ benefits. (Doc. 28-1 at 2) The law 

office of Potter, Cohen & Samulon accepted the risk of loss in the representation and expended a total 

of 34.75 hours while representing Plaintiff before the District Court. (Doc. 28-5 at 2) Due to counsel’s 

work, the action was remanded further proceedings, and Plaintiff received a favorable decision, finding 

he was disabled prior to the date previously identified. For this, Ms. Cohen requests a fee of 

$18,872.90. (Doc. 28 at 1) Because $4,700.00 was previously paid under the EAJA, the net cost to 

Plaintiff is $14,172.90. (See Doc. 28 at 5) Finally, though served with the motion and informed of the 

right to oppose the fee request (Doc. 28 at 3; Doc. 29), Plaintiff did not file oppose the request and 

thereby indicates his implicit belief that the fee request is reasonable. 

Significantly, there is no indication Ms. Cohen performed in a substandard manner or engaged 

in severe dilatory conduct to the extent that a reduction in fees is warranted. Plaintiff was able to 

secure a remand for payment of benefits following the appeal, including an award of past-due benefits

for himself and a dependent. Finally, the fees requested do not exceed twenty-five percent maximum 

permitted under 42 U.S.C. §406(b), or the amount withheld by the administration for payment of fees. 

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IV. Conclusion and Order

Based upon the tasks completed and results achieved following the remand for further 

proceedings, the Court finds the fees sought by Ms. Cohen are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court 

ORDERS:

1. Counsel’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 24 U.S.C. §406(b) in the amount of

$18,872.90 (Doc. 28) is GRANTED;

2. The Commissioner shall pay the amount directly to Counsel, Theresa Cohen; and

3. Counsel SHALL refund $4,700.00 to Plaintiff John David Hoover, Jr.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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