Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00297/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Linda Barbano,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Washington Mutual/Chase, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-00297-PHX-JZB

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 8.) 

Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint and an Application to proceed in forma pauperis on 

February 18, 2015. (Doc. 2.) On April 30, 2015, the Court granted the Application, 

screened her Complaint, and dismissed it with leave to amend. (Doc. 7.) On May 29, 

2015, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. As detailed below, the Court will 

dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint because her claims are time-barred, and her 

First Amended Complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The Court will allow Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. 

I. Legal Standards 

a. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

 For cases proceeding in forma pauperis, Congress provided that a district court 

“shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the “allegation of poverty 

is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim 

on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 

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immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that section 1915(e) applies to all in forma 

pauperis complaints, not merely those filed by prisoners). Accordingly, “section 1915(e) 

not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. 

b. Rule 8 

 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that to state a claim for 

relief, a complaint must contain (1) “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the 

court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) “a demand for the relief sought.” The complaint also 

must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

 The complaint must also provide each defendant with a fair opportunity to frame a 

responsive pleading. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F. 3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996). Even 

where a complaint has the factual elements of a cause of action present but scattered 

throughout and not organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim,” the Court 

may dismiss the complaint for failure to satisfy Rule 8. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 

864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Dismissal of the complaint is appropriate if it is so 

“verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” 

Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F. 2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969). 

c. Rule 9(b) 

 Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff alleging fraud or mistake “state with particularity 

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) has been 

interpreted by the Ninth Circuit Court to require the plaintiff to “state the time, place, and 

specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of parties to the 

misrepresentation.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furn. Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 

(9th Cir. 1986); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 31 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 

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2003) (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and 

how of the misconduct charged.”). The plaintiff must also “set forth an explanation as to 

why the disputed statement was untrue or misleading when made.” Yourish v. Cal. 

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 993 (9th Cir. 1999). 

II. Analysis of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint appears to assert 

claims against Defendants for certain criminal violations, violation of the Real Estate 

Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), wrongful foreclosure, false misrepresentation, 

extrinsic fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, all related to the foreclosure of her home in 

2004.1

 (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that in a 2004 state court action, CV2004-08567, she 

requested injunctive relief to stop the trustee sale of her home, which the state court 

denied. (Doc. 8 at 8, 11-12.) She asserts that she filed an appeal with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals dismissed “due to Plaintiff not receiving mail or 

reached by phone.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff further asserts that she was “struggling and 

unaware of [the] court schedule” and Defendants made a “[m]isrepresentation to the 

Court.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants “engaged in fraudulent foreclosure 

to take the property belonging to the plaintiff,” “[D]efendants had taken advantage of the 

plaintiff[’]s lack of knowledge in property laws[,] the plaintiff’s ability to hire counsel, 

and the loss of plaintiff’s mother on the 18th day of April 2004,” and the signature on the 

deed was forged. (Id. at 7-8.) As detailed below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint because her claims are time-barred and her First Amended 

Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. 

a. Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. 

As an initial matter, the conduct about which Plaintiff complains in her First 

Amended Complaint occurred at least 10 years ago. Further, Plaintiff fails to assert 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes two captions that contain lists of 

Defendants and claims, some of which overlap. 

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allegations that show she could prove the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled. 

See Jablon v. Daen Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the 

Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred. See Diessner v. Mortgage Elec. 

Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1189 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“RESPA provides a threeyear statute of limitations for violations of section 2605 and a one-year statute of 

limitations for violations of section 2607 or 2608.”); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Harris, 

723 P.2d 670, 672 (Ariz. 1986) (citing A.R.S. § 12-543) (applying a three-year statute of 

limitations to fraud claims); Hullett v. Cousin, 63 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Ariz. 2003) (citing 

A.R.S. § 12-542) (applying a two-year statute of limitations to claims for negligent 

misrepresentation); Crook v. Anderson, 565 P.2d 908, 909 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) 

(applying a two-year statute of limitations to claims for breach of fiduciary duty); A.R.S. 

§ 12-548 (“An action for debt shall be commenced and prosecuted within six years after 

the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, if the indebtedness is evidenced by or 

founded on . . . A contract in writing that is executed in this state.”); Manterola v. 

Farmers Ins. Exch., 30 P.3d 639, 643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (applying a two-year statute 

of limitations to claims for beach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing). 

b. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. 

The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint because she fails 

to set forth a “short and plain” statement of any claim. Instead, her First Amended 

Complaint offers a disjointed and confusing narrative devoid of specifically enumerated 

causes of action or identifiable legal theories against the Defendants she names. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to comply with the pleading 

requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Additionally, even considering the specific causes of action and statutes Plaintiff 

identifies, her First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief. In the captions of 

her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites to various federal criminal and civil statutes, 

a majority of which do not provide for a private cause of action. (Doc. 8 at 1, 6.) As to 

the statutes that do provide for a private right, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails 

to set forth factual allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief pursuant to Rule 8 of 

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, specific to her fraud claims, Plaintiff fails 

to allege with particularity the circumstances of the alleged fraud as required by Rule 9 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For these reasons, and as explained in more detail 

below, the Court will dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims.2 

i. Criminal Claims 

 In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff cites to various federal criminal 

statutes, none of which allow for a private cause of action. (Doc. 8 at 1.) More 

specifically, Plaintiff alleges claims pursuant to the following criminal statutes: (1) 18 

U.S.C. § 1005 (Bank Entries, reports and transactions); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1519 

(Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and 

bankruptcy); (3) 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles); and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 371 

(Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States). Because none of these 

criminal statutes provide for a private right of action, the Court will dismiss all of these 

claims. 

ii. Violation of RESPA 

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated RESPA.3

 RESPA was enacted to 

protect home buyers from inflated prices, eliminate industry kickbacks, and increase 

information to mortgage consumers about the cost of home loans. Schuetz v. Banc One 

Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2002). Although RESPA does not 

provide for a general private right of action, specific provisions within RESPA do 

provide for a private right. See Sanborn v. American Lending Network, 506 F. Supp. 2d 

917, 922-23 (D. Utah 2007) (“[T]he plain language of section 2601 does not provide for a 

 

2 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief pursuant to any of the federal 

statutes she identifies, this Court does not have federal question jurisdiction over the 

remaining state law claims in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 

1331.    It is unclear based on Plaintiff’s allegations whether the Court has diversity 

jurisdiction over her claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

3

 Plaintiff cites to 12 U.S.C. § 1635 in support of this claim. RESPA is found in 12 

U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. 

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private right of action.”); 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (“Whoever fails to comply with any provision 

of this section shall be liable to the borrower for each such failure”). Under 12 U.S.C. § 

2605, “[e]ach servicer of any federally related mortgage loan shall notify the borrower in 

writing of any assignment, sale, or transfer of the servicing of the loan to any other 

person.” 

 Here, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to provide sufficient factual 

allegations to state a claim under RESPA. Although Plaintiff asserts that “WAMU 

[n]ever notified the plaintiff of the change over in lenders,” she fails to allege any specific 

facts related to a transfer of the servicing of Plaintiff’s loan, including when any alleged 

transfer took place and what entities were involved in the transfer. Further, in order to 

state a claim for relief pursuant to § 2605, Plaintiff must allege an actual pecuniary loss 

attributable to the RESPA violation. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f); Tamburri v. Suntrust 

Mortg., Inc., 875 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“. . . RESPA does not provide 

for injunctive relief[;] actual damages and, in the case of a pattern or practice, statutory 

damages, are the only remedies available when a servicer violates the statute”). Plaintiff 

fails to do so in her First Amended Complaint. As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s 

RESPA claim. 

iii. Wrongful Foreclosure 

 Plaintiff also alleges a claim for wrongful foreclosure. “Arizona . . . has not 

expressly recognized the tort of wrongful foreclosure.” In re Mortgage Elec. 

Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 784 (9th Cir. 2014); Cervantes v. Countrywide 

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Arizona state courts have not 

yet recognized a wrongful foreclosure cause of action.”). Some courts in this District 

have assumed such a tort exists under Arizona law. See Schrock v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. 

Ass’n, No. CV 11-0567-PHX-JAT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85765, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 

2011) (collecting cases). However, based on at least one subsequent decision by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, it is unclear whether, and under what circumstances, Arizona 

courts would recognize a claim for wrongful foreclosure. See Grady v. Tri-City Nat’l 

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Bank, CV 12-2507-PHX-JAT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69102, at *3-5 (D. Ariz. May 15, 

2013) (noting that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Madison v. Groseth, 279 

P.3d 633, 688 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) “calls into question whether any tort claims, such as 

wrongful foreclosure, can survive the waiver provisions of A.R.S. § 33-811(C),” and 

“whether Arizona would recognize such [a] tort (because if the tort cannot survive § 33-

811(c), it would be futile to recognize it)”). 

 Even assuming that a wrongful foreclosure claim exists under Arizona law, 

Plaintiff has failed to state any such claim. A wrongful foreclosure claim is available 

only after a foreclosure had occurred and where the plaintiff was not in default at the time 

of the foreclosure. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1043 (wrongful foreclosure claims “typically 

are available after foreclosure and are premised on allegations that the borrower was not 

in default, or on procedural issues that resulted in damages to the borrower”); Holt v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. CV11-812-PHX-JAT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

13702, *4 (D. Ariz. 2012) (“[t]o establish a claim for wrongful foreclosure, Plaintiffs 

must prove that either they were not in default at the time of the foreclosure or that the 

foreclosing party caused their default.”). Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient factual 

allegations regarding the elements of a wrongful foreclosure claim. Accordingly, the 

Court will dismiss this claim. 

iv. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation 

 In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims for “False 

Misrepresentation § 17200” and “Fraudulent Misrepresentation.” (Doc. 8.) Based on 

these references, it is unclear to the Court to what cause of action Plaintiff is referring. 

However, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging a claim under the Business and 

Professional Code § 17200,4

 that Code does not provide for a cause of action. To the 

extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert tort claims for intentional fraud and negligent 

 

4 Plaintiff identifies “Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200” as a claim in both captions 

of her First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 8 at 1.) 

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misrepresentation, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.5 

 “A showing of fraud requires (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 

(4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker’s intent 

that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the 

hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the right to rely 

on it; (9) his consequent and proximate injury.” See Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 

647 P.2d 629, 631 (Ariz. 1982); Carrel v. Lux, 420 P.2d 564, 568 (Ariz. 1966). To state 

a claim for negligent misrepresentation, (1) there must be incorrect information given for 

the guidance of others in business dealings; (2) the party giving the false information 

intended, or could reasonably foresee, that the other parties would rely on that 

information; (3) the party giving the false information failed to exercise reasonable care 

in obtaining or communicating that information; (4) the other parties actually relied on 

the incorrect information to their determent and were justified in doing so; and (5) such 

reliance caused their damages. See Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Serv., 995 P.2d 

721, 730 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). Plaintiff must plead both claims with particularity. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Vess, 317 F.3d at 1102 (“Averments of fraud must be accompanied 

by the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”); Neilson v. 

Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2003)) (“It is wellestablished in the Ninth Circuit that both claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation 

must meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements”). 

 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint lacks factual allegations sufficient to state 

either claim. Notably, Plaintiff fails to identify the person who made a false statement, 

when or where it was made, or why it was untrue or misleading. See Yourish, 191 F.3d at 

993. Plaintiff further fails to allege that any Defendant knowingly or unreasonably made 

a false statement. Therefore, the Court will dismiss these claims. 

 

5

 “[N]egligent misrepresentation is a separate tort from that of intentional fraud.” 

McAlister v. Citibank (Arizona), 829 P.2d 1253, 1261 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (citations 

omitted). 

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v. Extrinsic Fraud 

In her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also alleges a claim for “Extrinsic Fraud 

UCC 2.201.” (Doc. 8 at 6.) The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a uniform 

proposed code that generally does not provide for a separate cause of action unless 

codified into a state statute. See UCC § 2-201 (“Statute of Frauds”). Even assuming that 

Plaintiff meant to raise a claim under A.R.S. § 44-101, which codifies the Statute of 

Frauds into Arizona law, Plaintiff fails to offer any allegations that challenge the 

sufficiency of the mortgage contract under the Statute of Frauds. A.R.S. § 44-101. 

 However, courts recognize a separate claim for extrinsic fraud, which subjects a 

state court judgment to collateral attack. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-

41 (9th Cir. 2004); Dockery v. Cent. Ariz. Light & Power Co., 45 P.2d 656, 662 (Ariz. 

1935).6

 To state a claim for extrinsic fraud, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was 

kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in some other way was fraudulently 

prevented from presenting his claim or defense. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 

F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The focus of [an extrinsic fraud] claim is not on whether 

a state court committed legal error, but rather on “a wrongful act by the adverse party.”); 

Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140-41 (“A plaintiff alleging extrinsic fraud on a state court is 

 

6

 The Court notes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts from 

exercising subject matter jurisdiction over suits “[b]rought by state-court losers 

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 

judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). However, the doctrine does not 

apply to claims of extrinsic fraud in relation to state court proceedings. Kougasian, 359 

F.3d at 1140-41 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).) Here, 

Plaintiff has provided only limited information regarding the state court complaint and 

any resulting judgment, and it is unclear whether Plaintiff is seeking to set aside a 

previous state court judgment. Further, although, as detailed below, Plaintiff fails to state 

a claim for extrinsic fraud, the Court will allow Plaintiff leave to amend to make clear her 

allegations. Therefore, the Court cannot determine at this time to what extent, if at all, 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to Plaintiff’s claims. 

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not alleging a legal error by the state court; rather, he or she is alleging a wrongful act by 

the adverse party.”).

 While not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to allege two acts of extrinsic fraud. 

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants delayed providing her with documents she 

requested. (Doc. 8 at 8.) However, Plaintiff also asserts she received at least one copy of 

the documents she sought. (Id.) (“Plaintiff claims, [t]hen two months later the [P]laintiff 

had asked the[] [D]efendant for another copy for the [C]ourt, the [P]laintiff had wrote 

notes on the first and wanted a clean copy for the [J]udge.”). Further, the allegation of 

delay in this case is insufficient to state a claim for extrinsic fraud because Plaintiff fails 

to allege that the documents she requested were intentionally withheld by any specific 

Defendant or to explain how the delay in receiving the documents prevented her from 

presenting her case. 

 Second, Plaintiff alleges generally that a signature on the deed was forged. (Id. at 

7, 8) (“Plaintiff claims, and believes,” the signature on the deed was “signed by someone 

other th[a]n whom it states.”) However, she fails to allege with any particularity who 

forged the deed, how the deed was forged, and when and where the deed was forged. 

Plaintiff only provides a conclusory allegation that she was unable to locate the notary 

and, therefore, the deed must have been forged. (Id.) This allegation does not address 

how the initial judgment was procured as a result of fraud, and thus fails to meet the 

standard enumerated in Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 9(b). Finally, as to both alleged acts of extrinsic fraud, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to 

make clear which court decision she seeks to collaterally attack. Rather, Plaintiff simply 

offers a brief history of her state court case, and her appeal of the trial court’s ruling on 

her request for injunctive relief. (Doc. 8 at 3.) Accordingly, the Court will dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claim for extrinsic fraud. 

vi. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 

 Plaintiff also alleges a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. However, she fails to 

allege with whom she has a fiduciary relationship, or the basis of any such relationship. 

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(Id.) Arizona law does not generally recognize a fiduciary relationship between lenders 

and mortgagors. See Valley Nat’l Bank of Phoenix v. Elect. Dist. No. 4, 367 P.2d 655, 

662 (Ariz. 1961); Urias v. PCS Health Sys., 118 P.3d 29, 29–30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) 

(holding that a debtor/creditor relationship does not create a fiduciary duty). Moreover, 

contractual relationships alone do not give rise to fiduciary duties. Cook v. Orkin 

Exterminating Co., 258 P.3d 149, 152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (“[C]ommercial transactions 

do not create a fiduciary relationship unless one party agrees to serve in a fiduciary 

capacity.”). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any specific Defendant agreed to serve in 

a fiduciary capacity. Accordingly, she has failed to state a claim for relief, and the Court 

will dismiss this claim. 

vii. Breach of Contract 

 Plaintiff also asserts a claim for “Reckless Breach”7

 in her First Amended 

Complaint. Under Arizona law, a breach of contract claim has three requisite elements: 

(1) the existence of a contract, (2) its breach, and (3) resulting damages. Graham v. 

Asbury, 540 P.2d 656, 657 (Ariz. 1975). Here, Plaintiff fails to identify a specific 

contract, and she does not allege any particular breach of a contract by any particular 

Defendant. (Doc. 8.) As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for “Reckless 

Breach.” 

viii. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

 Plaintiff also asserts a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing. Arizona law implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. 

Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 569 (Ariz. 1986). The covenant prohibits the 

parties to a contract from “any action which would impair the benefits which the other 

had the right to expect from the contract or the contractual relationship.” Id. at 570. 

Parties may “breach [the] duty of good faith without actually breaching an express 

 

7

 Plaintiff asserts her reckless breach claim under “Sec. 1337.11.” (Doc. 8 at 1.) It is 

unclear to the Court to what state or federal provision Plaintiff is referring. Accordingly, 

the Court will treat Plaintiff’s “Reckless Breach” claim as a breach of contract claim 

under Arizona common law. 

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covenant in the contract.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborer, Teamster & Cement 

Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 29 (Ariz. 2002). Arizona courts 

recognize that tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith are available 

in certain circumstances in which there is a “special relationship between the parties 

arising from elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.” Burkons 

v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 813 P.2d 710, 720 (Ariz. 1991). 

 Here, the Court cannot discern which allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint correspond to her claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing. Further, 

Plaintiff has not pled any facts in her First Amended Complaint sufficient to establish the 

elements of such a claim. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks tort damages for her 

claim, she fails to allege the requisite special relationship. Therefore, the Court will also 

dismiss this claim. 

III. Leave to Amend 

 The Court will give Plaintiff an opportunity, if she so chooses, to amend her First 

Amended Complaint to show that she can prove the applicable statutes of limitations 

were tolled, to make her allegations clear, and to otherwise state a claim for relief. See 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (when dismissing for failure to state a claim, “a district court 

should grant leave to amend if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”) 

(quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). As the Court advised 

Plaintiff in its April 30, 2015 Order, in any amended complaint she files, she must assert 

sufficient allegations to show that she is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations 

where her claims are otherwise time-barred. (Doc. 7.) Further, Plaintiff must write out, 

in short, plain statements, (1) the rights she believes were violated, (2) the name of the 

person or entity who violated each right, (3) exactly what that individual or entity did or 

failed to do, (4) how the action or inaction of that person or entity is connected to the 

violation of each right, and (5) what specific injury was suffered because of the other 

person’s or entity’s conduct. 

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 Plaintiff is warned that if she elects to file an amended complaint and if she fails to 

comply with the Court’s instructions explained in this Order or the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the action will be dismissed pursuant to section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and/or 

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180 

(affirming dismissal with prejudice of amended complaint that did not comply with Rule 

8(a)); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(affirming dismissal of amended complaint that was equally as verbose, confusing, and 

conclusory as the initial complaint”). 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) is dismissed 

for failure to comply with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended 

complaint by December 16, 2015. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff elects to file an amended 

complaint, the complaint may not be served until and unless the Court screens the 

amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff elects not to file an amended 

complaint by December 16, 2015, the Clerk shall dismiss this action without further 

order from this Court. 

 Dated this 16th day of November, 2015. 

 

 

 

 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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