Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05135/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05135-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO PADILLA VENEGAS,

aka Marcos Ranjel,

Petitioner,

 v

D L RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 05-5135 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Before the court is petitioner Guillermo Venegas’ petition

for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254. For the reasons

that follow, the petition is denied.

I 

On April 1, 1999, a grand jury indicted petitioner and

Robert Sanger, whose trial was later severed, charging them with the

murder of Carmel Sanger with the special circumstances that the

murder was committed for financial gain and that petitioner used a

firearm in commission of the murder. The indictment also charged

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petitioner with the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 

On April 11, 2001, a jury in the Superior Court of the

State of California in and for the County of San Francisco found

petitioner guilty as charged and found the special allegations true. 

On April 26, 2001, the trial court (Kevin Ryan, J) sentenced

petitioner to life without the possibility of parole on the murder

charge, with an additional determinate term of four years for his

use of a firearm. The court stayed petitioner’s sentence for the

unlawful possession of a firearm. 

On August 22, 2003, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of the trial court and, on November 25, 2003,

the Supreme Court of California denied review. 

On November 10, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which the

court summarily denied on November 18, 2004.

On October 12, 2005, the Supreme Court of California

denied petitioner’s final petition for state habeas relief.

On December 12, 2005, petitioner filed the instant federal

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254. The court

found that it stated cognizable claims for relief, when liberally

construed, and ordered respondent to show why a writ of habeas

corpus should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer. 

II

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows:

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At trial, the following evidence was

adduced. The victim, Carmel Sanger, owned a

hair salon in San Francisco called the Pink

Tarantula. She and her ex-husband, codefendant

Robert Sanger (aka Skull), lived above the salon

until their separation in April of 1996; their

marriage was dissolved later that year. Robert

Sanger was the beneficiary of two life insurance

policies on the victim, one for $350,000 and the

other for $400,000. In late 1996, Robert Sanger

described the victim as a “fucking bitch,” and

indicated that she had ruined his life. He was

in a rage because she had been seeing someone

else and said, “I will kill her.” Robert Sanger

frequently expressed similar feelings of hatred

toward the victim to Selina Archuletta and

offered Archuletta money to kill the victim.

Robert Sanger began living with a woman

named Tiffany Wallace after the divorce; they

later married. She was a heroin addict, and

when interviewed by the police in January of

1998, she was in custody. She indicated that

the police offered to help her get released if

she provided information to incriminate Robert

Sanger.

On March 5, 1997, at 5:30 p.m., Carmel

Sanger was working at the Pink Tarantula salon,

along with three other hairdressers. A man

whose eyebrows appeared “plucked” or “shaved,”

like those of “a transsexual or transvestite”

entered the salon. Elizabeth Pfau asked if she

could help him. He asked to see Carmel Sanger,

who left her client and approached the man to

talk to him about scheduling an appointment. 

The man produced a gun and shot her in the head. 

He then fled, firing another shot as he left the

salon. Pfau called 911 as people in the salon

screamed and took cover. Nothing was taken from

the salon. Carmel Sanger died from a single

gunshot wound to the head, having been fatally

shot through the eye.

Several witnesses outside the salon

witnessed the shooter either before or after the

shooting. Although their accounts varied in

details, they generally agreed that they saw a

man go into the salon from a car parked nearby,

and that a woman (described as having blonde or

bleached-blonde hair) remained in the

automobile. After the shooting, the man

returned to the vehicle and it drove away. 

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Witnesses’ descriptions of the getaway car and a

partial license plate number led to the

identification of a Chevrolet Malibu purchased

by one Amber Tyler and a man in February of

1997. The individual who sold them the car,

Tony Williams, went to their apartment on Pine

Street in San Francisco to deliver the bill of

sale. The woman was described as a bleached

blonde. The car was cited for parking

violations seven times in February and March

1997, including six times near the corner of

Mason and Pine Streets. The clerk at a nearby

store recognized defendant and Tyler as

customers who drove a car with a description

similar to that of the getaway car (and the

vehicle sold by Tony Williams). The crime scene

witnesses looked at Tyler’s vehicle and said it

resembled the getaway car or was similar to it. 

Bullets and casings were found inside the

Pink Tarantula; the bullets were later matched

with a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun

found in the street about two blocks away from

the salon. The gun was registered to Tannie

Tomlin, a correctional officer at the county

jail in Seattle, Washington. A link was

established between Tomlin and the defendant, as

defendant was an inmate in the part of the jail

where Tomlin worked, in 1992 and 1993. 

Additionally, six calls were made from Tomlin’s

phones to defendant and Tyler in June and

December of 1996 and January of 1997, and 41

calls were made to Tomlin’s phones from

defendant and Tyler’s residence from January

1996 to April 1997. Tomlin purchased a one-way

plane ticket for a November 26, 1996 flight from

Seattle to Oakland.

Pfau was shown a photographic lineup

containing defendant’s photograph and indicated

that the shooter was one of two people depicted

in it (one of whom was defendant). She

positively identified defendant as the shooter

later in court. Carmel Sanger’s client, who

witnessed the shooting, was also shown a

photographic lineup and narrowed her choice to

two people, one of whom was defendant.

When initially interviewed by the police in

March of 1997, defendant indicated that he used

cocaine and heroin with Robert Sanger and that

Robert Sanger had unsuccessfully tried to get

him to work for him selling drugs. He claimed

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to have sold the Chevrolet Malibu to a Victor

Peña two months earlier. Even though the police

ultimately informed defendant during this

interview that eyewitnesses had identified him

as the shooter, defendant consistently denied

killing Carmel Sanger.

The day after this interview, defendant and

Amber Tyler left the area, and Tyler told a

friend he could sell their possessions to earn

money. Arrest warrants were issued for

defendant and Tyler on April 3, 1997. An

acquaintance of defendant, Sarah Claxton,

indicated that she encountered defendant and

Tyler in San Francisco several months after

Carmel Sanger had been killed. They had

traveled to Mexico, but had returned to San

Francisco to collect the $20,000 that Robert

Sanger was to pay defendant for killing Carmel

Sanger. When defendant called Robert Sanger,

Robert Sanger promised to pay him $1,300, but

defendant received only $1,100 or $1,200. 

Defendant and Tyler, who were using heroin, left

town shortly thereafter. Claxton thought they

may have gone to Seattle, because someone named

“Tiny” owed defendant money.

Defendant was arrested, along with Amber

Tyler, at a Seattle hotel in December of 1997. 

He at first denied being Marcos Ranjel and

identified himself as Guillermo Padilla. After

Tyler correctly identified herself and

defendant, he admitted his true identity. 

During an interview by the FBI, defendant

indicated that he changed his name from

Guillermo Padilla to Marcos Ranjel when he moved

to the United States from Mexico. He admitted

using cocaine and heroin with Robert Sanger in

San Francisco. Although Robert Sanger offered

him $100,000 to kill Carmel Sanger, defendant

declined the offer. Later, when defendant and

Robert Sanger were using crystal methamphetamine

together, Robert Sanger persisted in trying to

hire defendant to kill his ex-wife. Defendant

explained that he was selling some real property

valued at $800,000 and did not want to share the

proceeds with Carmel Sanger. Robert Sanger

showed defendant a gun that could be used, and

indicated that his girlfriend would help

defendant accomplish the killing. When asked

directly if he killed Carmel Sanger, defendant

replied, “ ‘Maybe I did, maybe I didn’t.’ ” He

indicated that he and Tyler went to Mexico City

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after his first interrogation. When they

returned to San Francisco in August of 1997,

they learned the police were looking for them

and they fled to Seattle.

After the FBI informed defendant that they

had eyewitnesses who had identified him as the

shooter, defendant indicated that he would tell

“what really happened.” He confessed that he

shot and killed Carmel Sanger in the Pink

Tarantula salon, that he ran out into the street

and fired another shot into the salon, and that

Robert Sanger’s girlfriend drove the getaway

car, a black Chevrolet. They had smoked crystal

methamphetamine just prior to the shooting. 

Robert Sanger never paid him any money and he

never saw Robert Sanger or his girlfriend again.

Defendant was later interviewed by San

Francisco homicide investigators. He reiterated

an account of the shooting similar to that which

he had given to the FBI, with some additional

details. He indicated that Robert Sanger had

told him that Carmel Sanger had hired someone to

kill Robert Sanger, so Robert Sanger wanted to

kill her first. On the day of the shooting,

Tiffany Wallace offered to help defendant kill

Carmel Sanger and drove him to Carmel Sanger’s

hair salon in defendant’s car. They ate in a

restaurant and then smoked drugs in defendant’s

car. Defendant told Wallace that he did not

want to shoot Carmel Sanger, but he took the gun

that she provided and did so. He claimed to be

very high on drugs. They disposed of the gun as

they drove away from the scene. Defendant

admitted that the gun he used was a ninemillimeter that he sold to Robert Sanger after

purchasing it from Tannie Tomlin.

During a subsequent interview in San

Francisco, defendant told the police that he

killed Carmel Sanger because Robert Sanger

offered to pay him $100,000 that Robert Sanger

expected to get from the sale of a building. 

Tiffany Wallace urged him to kill Carmel Sanger

quickly. Defendant reiterated that he killed

Carmel Sanger the next day with a gun that he

purchased from Tomlin and sold to Robert Sanger. 

Tyler drove him to the salon, but he told her

only that he was going there to purchase drugs. 

He said that after he and Tyler ate in a

restaurant, he went into the Pink Tarantula and

shot Carmel Sanger; he fired one more shot as he

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left the salon. He then got into the car and

Tyler drove away. He disposed of the gun as

they drove to Tyler’s mother’s home. When

defendant returned from Mexico months later, he

called Robert Sanger and asked for payment; his

friend Hutton collected $1,500 from Robert

Sanger for him.

People v Ranjel, No A094861, slip op at 2-7 (Cal Ct App Aug 22,

2003) (footnotes omitted) (Resp’t Ex 6).

III

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

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“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes

of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

IV

Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 USC § 2254 based

on three claims: (1) he was denied due process because the trial

court excluded testimony from another judge regarding the veracity

and improper investigative habit of a homicide inspector; (2) he was

denied due process because the trial court refused to provide the

jury with special instructions on negligent investigation and the

relevancy of the circumstances of a confession; and (3) he was

deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his trial

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counsel failed to request an evidentiary hearing into juror

misconduct, failed to redact a tape, and failed to object to

hearsay.

A

1

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due

process rights when it excluded testimony from another judge

regarding the veracity and improper investigative habit of a

homicide inspector.

The California Court of Appeal provided the following

background for petitioner’s claim:

In his opening statement, defendant

referred to an allegation that Inspector Johnson

had, in a prior case, lied about the manner in

which he conducted a photographic lineup, in

front of a superior court judge. The trial

court in the present case later learned that

Judge James Warren had been subpoenaed to

testify for the defense and inquired of

defendant as to what the judge would testify to. 

Ultimately defendant provided the trial court

with a copy of taped interviews of Judge Warren. 

Apparently in a prior murder case, Judge Warren

had found that Inspector Johnson had a habit (at

least in the two instances before him) of

turning off his tape recorder after asking a

witness to view a photographic lineup. He

believed the two civilian witnesses who

testified to that effect. According to

defendant, Inspector Johnson had not only turned

off the tape recorder, but also had informed the

witnesses which individual depicted in the

lineup was the defendant in that case.

The trial court found that Judge Warren’s

testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code

section 352, noting that his testimony was on a

collateral matter and that, despite his

concerns, Judge Warren had not ruled the

evidence of the identifications in his case

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inadmissible. The trial court further noted

that there was “perhaps a significant dispute

about the finding of Judge Warren. He clearly

has not said that Inspector Johnson perjured

himself or even lied, and he was asked, directly

or indirectly, to give those opinions and he

could not bring himself to do that.” The court

specifically found that Judge Warren’s testimony

would be more prejudicial than probative under

Evidence Code section 352; the jury should be

allowed to judge the credibility of Inspector

Johnson without being unduly influenced by the

opinion of a judge. This, the trial court

found, was especially true in light of the taped

interview of the judge, wherein there was

discussion about the judge’s grandfather, the

late Chief Justice Earl Warren. As the trial

court indicated, “[i]t is clear to me from

listening to that tape, Mr. Maas, that you wish

to bring before this jury the opinion of James

Warren, the grandson of Earl Warren. And to add

to his opinion the specter of the former Chief

Jutice of the United States that this Inspector

Johnson is a liar. That, to me, seems to be

completely and unduly prejudicial.” The court

did permit defendant to introduce evidence as to

the alleged police misconduct in the prior case

through Inspector Johnson himself, and then if

necessary, through the testimony of Mr. Sin and

Mr. Jackson, the civilian witnesses in the prior

case.

People v Ranjel, slip op at 36-37.

The California Court of Appeal found no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of Judge Warren’s

testimony. The court explained:

[W]hen questioned about his conduct on the prior

case, Inspector Johnson admitted that he pointed

out the defendant’s photograph to witness

Jackson after he was unable to identify his

assailant. Thus the inspector’s prior conduct

in this regard was before the jury, reducing the

probative value of the judge’s testimony on the

subject and rendering it cumulative. Further,

the likelihood of a jury giving undue emphasis

to a judge’s testimony is undeniable, and here

the defense apparently intended to give further

weight to his testimony by showing the jury that

the judge was the grandson of Earl Warren. 

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Given the collateral nature of the issue, the

fact that the inspector admitted to the prior

conduct, and the specter of undue emphasis being

given to the judge’s testimony, we conclude that

the trial court’s decision that the prejudicial

effect of the proffered evidence substantially

outweighed any probative value was not an abuse

of discretion. 

Id at 37-38.

2

Generally speaking, the exclusion of evidence that is

“highly relevant” to a defense contravenes due process. See Green v

Georgia, 442 US 95, 97 (1979) (finding a due process violation when

testimony excluded at trial “was highly relevant to a critical issue

in the punishment phase of the trial” regardless of the state’s

hearsay rule); Chambers v Mississippi, 482 US 284, 302-03 (1973)

(holding that exclusion of third-party testimony that was “critical

evidence” violated due process). In deciding whether the exclusion

of evidence violates due process, a court balances the following

factors: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the

central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of

evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence

on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a

major part of the attempted defense. Chia v Cambra, 360 F3d 997,

1004 (9th Cir 2004); Drayden v White, 232 F3d 704, 711 (9th Cir

2000). The court must also give due weight to the state interests

underlying the state evidentiary rules on which the exclusion was

based. See Chia, 360 F3d at 1006.

Even if the exclusion of evidence amounts to a violation

of due process, habeas relief may be granted only if the error had a

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substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. See Brecht v

Abrahamson, 507 US. 619, 637 (1993). In other words, the error must

have resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id.

3

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

excluded Judge Warren’s testimony was not contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

First, the excluded testimony had little probative value

in petitioner’s favor. The jury heard Johnson testify on his

previous misconduct in photographic lineup identifications. 

Johnson’s testimony reduced the evidentiary value of Judge Warren’s

testimony on the same subject. Chia’s first factor does not weigh

in petitioner’s favor. See Chia, 360 F3d at 1004.

Second, while the excluded testimony is reliable, there

remains “perhaps a significant dispute about the findings of Judge

Warren.” Rep Tr at 3077. The trial court explained:

[Judge Warren] has not said that Inspector

Johnson perjured himself or even lied, and he

was asked, directly or indirectly, to give those

opinions and he could not bring himself to do

that.

Furthermore, he has not stated * * * the

standard he used to arrive at his opinions as to

Inspector Johnson’s conduct.

And finally, there appears to be some

dispute as to the underlying factual pattern

that gave rise to Judge Warren’s opinion in the

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other case.

Id. Chia’s second factor does not weigh in petitioner’s favor. See

Chia, 360 F3d at 1004.

Third, a jury may well give undue emphasis to a judge’s

testimony, i e, a jury may have difficulty evaluating a judge’s

testimony given that the jury takes an oath to follow the

instructions of a judge. See Cal Civ Proc Code § 232(b). In the

instant case, in his testimony, Judge Warren refers to the fact that

he is the grandson of the late Chief Justice Earl Warren, an

emphasis that only heightens the emphasis that a jury might place on

his testimony. Chia’s third factor does not weigh in petitioner’s

favor. See Chia, 360 F3d at 1004.

Fourth, as discussed above, the excluded testimony is

cumulative in light of Johnson’s testimony on the same subject. 

Chia’s fourth factor does not weigh in petitioner’s favor. See id.

Finally, the excluded testimony is not a major part of

petitioner’s case. At trial, defense counsel indicated that if

Johnson testified truthfully, he would probably not call Judge

Warren as a witness. This indicates that counsel did not consider

Judge Warren’s testimony to be critical to petitioner’s case. 

Chia’s fifth factor does not weigh in petitioner’s favor. Id.

In light of the totality of the circumstances, the trial

court’s exclusion of Judge Warren’s testimony cannot be said to have

amounted to a violation of petitioner’s due process rights. Cf Pool

v Dowdle, 834 F2d 777, 780 (9th Cir 1987) (no due process violation

to exclude expert testimony where testimony was cumulative and not

major part of defense); Miller v Stagner, 757 F2d 988, 994 (9th Cir

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1985) (evidence obtained by police excluded on grounds of misconduct

by police does not violate right to present defense of entrapment

where not probative of central issue of guilt and activities of

police all took place after arrest of petitioner; connection with

defense of entrapment too tenuous), amended, 768 F2d 1090 (9th Cir

1985); Perry v Rushen, 713 F2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir 1983) (no

constitutional violation in excluding evidence that another man was

seen near scene and that he had history of sexual attacks where

identification of petitioner was strong).

Even if the exclusion of Judge Warren’s testimony had

amounted to constitutional error, petitioner would not be entitled

to federal habeas relief because it cannot be said that the “error”

had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See

Brecht, 507 US at 637. The excluded testimony would have had little

impact on the jury in light of Johnson’s testimony on the same

subject, as well as the other substantial evidence presented at

trial implicating petitioner in the murder of Carmel Sanger for

financial gain. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

exclusion of evidence claim. The state court’s rejection of the

claim cannot be said to be contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or be

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 USC §

2254(d).

//

// 

//

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B

1

Petitioner next claims that he was denied due process

because the trial court refused to provide the jury with special

instructions on negligent investigation and the relevancy of the

circumstances of a confession.

Petitioner proposed the following special or pinpoint

instructions regarding the police investigation in this case, all of

which the trial court rejected:

Defendant’s Special Jury Instruction No. 1 [¶]

If you find that the police inadequately

investigated one matter, you may infer that the

prosecution also inadequately investigated other

matters. Based on this inference alone you may

disbelieve the prosecution witness and evidence. 

This may be sufficient by itself for you to have

a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt;

[¶] Defendant’s Special Jury Instruction No. 2

[¶] Inadequate or incomplete investigation by

the prosecution may support an inference adverse

to the prosecution which may be sufficient to

leave you with a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant’s guilt; [¶] Defendant’s Special Jury

Instruction No. 3 [¶] It is a defense theory

that the prosecution’s investigation of this

case was negligent, and not done in good faith.

[¶] Investigation which is thorough and

conducted in good faith may be more credible

while an[] investigation which is incomplete,

negligent, or in bad faith may be found to have

lesser value or no[] value at all. [¶] It is for

you to decide if the investigation was

negligent, and conducted in bad faith, and if

so, to give it whatever weight to which you feel

it is entitled.

People v Ranjel, slip op 38-39. The trial court also rejected

defendant’s request for the following special jury instruction

regarding the circumstances under which his confession occurred: 

“Evidence of the circumstances under which a confession or admission

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was made is admissible as relevant to its weight and credibility.” 

Id at 40. Instead, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No.

2.70, which states, in part: “You are the exclusive judges as to

whether the defendant made a confession or an admission, and if so,

whether the or that [sic] statement is true in whole or in part. 

Evidence of an oral confession or an oral admission of the defendant

not made in court should be viewed with caution.” Id.

The California Court of Appeal found no error in the trial

court’s refusal to grant petitioner’s special jury instructions. 

Regarding petitioner’s requested special instructions on the police

investigation, the court found that

[w]hile defendant cites general authority for

the proposition that the thoroughness and good

faith of a police investigation is relevant, he

has cited no authority specifically supporting

the giving of each of these instructions. 

Further, we do not believe any of them

accurately state the law. The first requested

instruction, for example, would tell the jurors

that if they find the police inadequately

investigated one matter, they may infer the

prosecution inadequately investigated other

matters and that they may, based on that

inference alone, disbelieve the prosecution

witnesses and evidence. The fact that one

particular investigator may have inadequately

investigated one particular facet of the case

(such as the identification of defendant by a

particular witness), if found to be true by the

jury, would not necessarily support an inference

that other particulars were inadequately

investigated (such as the forensic work in the

case). Even if the first inference permitted in

the instruction were proper, permitting the jury

to disbelieve all the prosecution witnesses and

evidence because of such limited inadequate

police investigation defies logic. Finally, it

is improper to instruct the jury that certain

evidence, such as inadequate police

investigation, might give rise to reasonable

doubt. (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126,

1136 [defendant has a right, under Sears, supra,

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2 Cal.3d 180, to a proper instruction that

pinpoints defendant’s theory of the case, but

not that pinpoints specific evidence that might

give rise to a reasonable doubt]; see also

People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 192-193

[court may refuse instruction that directs jury

to consider specific evidentiary issues in

determining reasonable doubt where instruction

argumentative and confusing].) As proposed,

defendant’s instruction was also argumentative. 

Defendant’s other proposed instructions

regarding the police investigation suffer from

the same maladies.

People v Ranjel, slip op at 39-40 (footnote omitted). 

The court of appeal also found that petitioner’s requested

special instruction on the circumstances under which his confession

occurred was not a pinpoint instruction, nor was it supported by

case law. Id at 40. Moreover, the court found that because the

jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.70, petitioner’s proposed

instruction was repetitious and thus properly rejected. Id.

2

A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does

not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus

proceeding. See Dunckhurst v Deeds, 859 F2d 110, 114 (9th Cir

1988). The omission of an instruction is less likely to be

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. See Walker v Endell,

850 F2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir 1987) (citing Henderson v Kibbe, 431 US

145, 155 (1977)). The error must so infect the trial that the

defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment. See id. A habeas petitioner whose claim

involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an

“‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v Stewart, 111 F3d 616,

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624 (9th Cir 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 US at 155). 

An examination of the record is required to see precisely

what was given and what was refused and whether the given

instructions adequately embodied the defendant’s theory. See United

States v Tsinnijinnie, 601 F2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir 1979). The

defendant is not entitled to have jury instructions raised in his

precise terms where the given instructions adequately embody the

defense theory. See United Staes v Del Muro, 87 F3d 1078, 1081 (9th

Cir 1996); Tsinnijinnie, 601 F2d at 1040.

If constitutional error is found, the court also must find

that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict before granting relief in habeas

proceedings. See Calderon v Coleman, 525 US 141, 146-47 (1998)

(citing Brecht, 507 US at 637).

3

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

rejected his special jury instructions was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

The state court reasonably determined that there was no

legal basis for the requested special instructions on the police

investigation or the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s

confession. Cf Clark v Brown, 450 F3d 898, 904-05 (9th Cir 2006)

(failure to instruct on specific defense theory violation of due

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process only if the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case

makes it applicable). Moreover, petitioner’s special jury

instruction on the circumstances surrounding his confession was

repetitive in light of CALJIC No. 3.70. Because CALJIC No. 3.70

adequately embodied petitioner’s defense theory on the circumstances

of his confession, petitioner was not entitled to have his

instruction given on his precise terms. See Del Muro, 87 F3d at

1081; Tsinnijinnie, 601 F2d at 1040. 

Even if the court’s rejection of petitioner’s special jury

instructions had amounted to constitutional error, it cannot be said

that the “error” had a substantial and injurious effect on the

jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 US at 637. Nothing in the

instructions that were given prohibited the jury from considering

evidence regarding the police investigation or petitioner’s

confession. To the contrary, by instructing the jury with CALJIC

No. 3.70, for instance, the court explicitly advised the jury to

take the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s confession into

consideration.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

instructional error claim because the California Court of Appeal’s

rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable determination of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, or involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

//

//

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C

1

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel. Petitioner argues that counsel was

ineffective for: (1) failing to request an evidentiary hearing to

determine whether the twelve participating jurors overheard

Alternate Juror No. 5 tell Alternate Juror No. 2 that petitioner was

guilty, (2) failing to redact, and (3) failing to oppose hearsay

statements.

2

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under

Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-88 (1984), petitioner must

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s

performance was deficient, i e, that it fell below an “objective

standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

Id. The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have

done, but rather whether the choices made by defense counsel were

reasonable. See Babbitt v Calderon, 151 F3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir

1998). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 US at 689. 

Second, petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s deficient performance, i e, that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id at 694. A

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reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the

confidence in the outcome. Id.

3

a

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the

twelve participating jurors overheard Alternate Juror No. 5 tell

Alternate Juror No. 2 that petitioner was guilty.

During a court recess Alternate Juror No. 2 notified the

court that Alternate Juror No. 5 had told him “in so many words,

that she didn’t see why [the trial] was going to go on so long

because she already thought [petitioner] was guilty.” Rep Tr at

1934. The court asked Alternate Juror No. 2 whether this

interaction with Alternate Juror No. 5 would “impact” his state of

mind. Id at 1935. When Alternate Juror No. 2 replied that it would

not, the court excused him for the day. Id. 

The court then brought in Alternate Juror No. 5 for

questioning. Id at 1936. Alternate Juror No. 5 admitted to telling

somebody on the panel that she felt the defendant was guilty before

hearing all the evidence. Id. When asked if she could keep an open

mind in the case going forward, Alternate Juror No. 2. replied “I

don’t know.” Id at 1940. After some further questioning, the court

excused Alternate Juror No. 5 from the panel “for failing to follow

the court’s instructions and for violating the basic instructions

that the court has given.” Id at 1945.

The court did not believe that Alternate Juror No. 2's

“ability to proceed as a future juror” was compromised by his

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interaction with Alternate Juror No. 5. Id at 1946. Defense

counsel and the district attorney agreed with the court on this

point. Id. The court decided to keep Alternate Juror No. 2 in the

panel. Id at 1946.

Petitioner argues that defense counsel should have

requested an evidentiary hearing into whether other jurors heard

Alternate Juror No. 5 tell Alternate Juror No. 2 that petitioner was

guilty. He claims that counsel’s failure to do so amounted to

ineffective assistance. The claim is without merit.

 In order to show prejudice under Strickland from failure

to make a motion, petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel made

the motion, it is reasonable that the trial court would have granted

it as meritorious; and (2) had the motion been granted, it is

reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to

him. Wilson v Henry, 185 F3d 986, 990 (9th Cir 1999).

Here, had defense counsel requested an evidentiary

hearing, it is not reasonable to believe that the trial court would

have granted the request and much less that it would have excused

any jurors. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the twelve

participating jurors heard Alternate Juror No. 5 tell Alternate

Juror No. 2 that petitioner was guilty. Petitioner’s claim that the

other jurors might have heard this exchange between Alternate Juror

Nos. 2 and 5 is entirely speculative. Defense counsel had no

reason to request an evidentiary hearing into this matter. It

simply cannot be said that his failure to request an evidentiary

hearing under these circumstances amounted to ineffective

assistance. See id. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

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relief on this claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

 b 

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing

to redact an audiotape and a transcript that referenced a felony

that petitioner previously committed.

Inspectors Toomey and Johnson interviewed petitioner on

December 10, 1997. Rep Tr at 2905. During the interview there was

a discussion about petitioner’s shoplifting arrest at Nordstrom’s on

January 10, 1997. Id at 2908. 

At trial, the district attorney played an audiotape of the

interview and also provided the jury with a transcript. Id at 2905-

06. It appears that the jury heard some portion of the tape where

the shoplifting incident was being discussed, at which point defense

counsel objected on hearsay grounds and moved to strike. Id at

2907. The court asked the jury to leave their transcripts on their

chairs and to proceed to the jury room. Id at 2908. Defense

counsel requested that the jury be discharged for the rest of the

day so he could discuss with petitioner “whether it’s in his best

interest * * * to move for a mistrial.” Id at 2909-10. The court

found that the reference to petitioner’s shoplifting conviction in

the audiotape and transcript “probably should have been kept out,”

but that “it does not rise to the level of a mistrial, by any

standard.” Id at 2911. When the court asked defense counsel how he

would like to proceed, he requested that “all future versions” of

the tape and transcript be excised and that the jury be instructed

“not to draw any inferences whatsoever” from the shoplifting

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references in the transcript and the tape. Id at 2912. The court

called the jury back and told them to disregard the reference to

petitioner’s shoplifting arrest in the transcript and the tape. Id

at 2917-18. The jurors then took a recess, during which the

district attorney “cleaned up” the transcript and tape to eliminate

any references to the shoplifting incident. Id at 2926-27. 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to redact the audiotape and transcript. He theorizes that

the jury found he murdered Carmel Sanger for money because they

heard about his shoplifting arrest on the audiotape. Petitioner’s

claim is without merit.

It is doubtful that defense counsel was constitutionally

deficient because he personally failed to redact the tape and

transcript. Defense counsel submitted that it was the district

attorney’s “duty” to clean up the tape and transcript, and that the

district attorney violated a court order by introducing these two

items into evidence without removing any references to petitioner’s

“alleged shoplifting incident.” Id at 2911-12. There is no

evidence to the contrary. Regardless, petitioner’s claim fails

because there is no indication that defense counsel’s alleged error

prejudiced petitioner in any way. The trial court judge

specifically instructed the jury not to take any reference to

petitioner’s shoplifting arrest into account when arriving at a

decision. Id at 2917-18. In light of the judge’s admonition and

the substantial evidence implicating petitioner in the commission of

the murder of Carmel Sanger for financial gain, there is no

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged failure to

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redact, the result of this proceeding would have been different. 

See Strickland, 466 US at 694. Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

c

Petitioner claims that defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to oppose “the statements of Tannie Tomlin, Amber Tyler, and

Robert Sanger as relayed at trial by Sarah Claxton, Walter Hulit,

Inspector Joseph J. Toomey and the prosecutor” because they “were

testimonial hearsay and were improperly admitted in the declarants’

absence and without prior opportunity for cross examination.” Pet

at 12. Although Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004), had not

been decided at the time of his trial, petitioner argues “that is no

excuse for trial counsel failing” to oppose such “testimonial

hearsay” under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit.

In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that out-of-court

statements by witnesses that are testimonial hearsay, ie,

testimonial statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted,

are barred under the Confrontation Clause unless (1) the witnesses

are unavailable, and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to

cross-examine the witnesses. Crawford, 541 US at 59. The

Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of testimonial

hearsay, or any other hearsay statements, when the declarant appears

for cross-examination at trial. Id at 59 n9 (citing California v.

Green, 399 US 149, 162 (1970)). 

Crawford announced a “new rule” which does not apply

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retroactively on collateral attack. Whorton v Bockting, 127 S Ct

1173, 1184 (2007) (applying Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989)). 

Because counsel’s performance must be evaluated at the time of

petitioner’s trial, counsel was not required to anticipate Crawford. 

See Lowry v Lewis, 21 F3d 344, 346 (9th Cir 1994); see, eg, Fuller v

United States, 298 F3d 644, 650 n4 (7th Cir 2005) (arguments that

counsel should have anticipated Blakely v Washington, 124 S Ct 2531

(2004), and United States v Booker, 125 S Ct 738 (2005), untenable).

In any event, petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim fails because there is no reasonable probability that

a motion opposing any of the statements at issue would have been

granted and, much less that, if granted, there would have been an

outcome more favorable to petitioner. See Wilson, 185 F3d at 990. 

Only one of the statements that petitioner cites in his petition -

Inspector’s Toomey testimony that “Mr. Tomlin admitted owning the

gun” that petitioner used to kill Carmel Sanger - might be

considered testimonial hearsay. Rep Tr at 3104-05. But when Toomey

testified as such, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. See

id at 3105. The prosecutor responded that the inspector was being

asked to explain his investigation. The court agreed and admitted

the statement not for the truth of the matter asserted, but “solely

for the purpose to explain why the officer did or did not do certain

things.” Id. A motion to strike the statement on Confrontation

Clause grounds would have been denied because even if the statement

was testimonial, the Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial

statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the

matter asserted.” Crawford, 541 US at 60 n9.

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None of the other statements that petitioner cites in his

petition implicated the Confrontation Clause. For example,

petitioner alleges that it was testimonial hearsay when “Sarah

Claxton told inspector Jose J. Toomey, that on petitioner’s birthday

party, she saw Tannie Tomlin.” Pet at 13 (citing Rep Tr at 2596). 

He also alleges that it was testimonial hearsay when “John Joseph

Stuart indicated that he saw Robert Sanger (skull) in the house of

petitioner.” Id at 13 (citing Rep Tr at 3111). The Clause was not

violated. In both instances, the witnesses (Claxton and Stuart,

respectively) testified in court and were subjected to crossexamination by defense counsel. See Crawford, 541 US at 59 n9 (the

Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of testimonial

hearsay, or any other hearsay statements, when the declarant appears

for cross-examination at trial). Neither of these two statements,

nor any of the others, were testimonial, ie, none of the statements

constituted “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a

grand jury, or at a former trial” or were the product of “police

interrogations.” Id at 68. Nor were any of the statements 

hearsay, ie, they were not offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. See id at 51. Again, there is no reasonable probability

that a motion opposing any of these statements would have been

granted. See Wilson, 185 F3d at 990. Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

//

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V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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