Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02755/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-02755-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gerry O. Dufort,

Plaintiff,

v.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commisioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

NO. CIV-05-2755-PCT-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 10),

and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 16). After consideration of the

arguments advanced by the parties, the Court makes the following rulings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the Social Security

Administration ("SSA") on November 7, 2002, alleging an onset date of disability of August

31, 2000. (Administrative Record ("AR") 18-19.) Plaintiff asserted disability on the basis

of dizziness, nausea, vomiting, loss of balance, ringing in his ears and hearing loss. (AR at

19.) Plaintiff's application was denied, at which time Plaintiff moved the agency for

reconsideration. (Id.) On reconsideration, the agency affirmed its decision. (Id.) Plaintiff

then requested a hearing, which was held on February 16, 2005. On March 17, 2005,

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael J. Cianci, Jr. ruled that Plaintiff was not under

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a disability, and therefore not entitled to receive disability insurance benefits. (AR at 22-23.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff, though severely impaired, had the residual functional capacity

("RFC") for a wide range of medium work activity, such as past relevant work as a car wash

manager. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's RFC rendered him able to perform other work

existing in significant numbers in the national economy, namely that of semi-skilled

assembly/production jobs at the medium level. (AR at 22.) Plaintiff requested agency

review of the ALJ's decision on July 12, 2005. The Appeals Council declined to review the

ALJ's determination, thereby rendering the decision of the ALJ the agency's final

determination. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's determination from this

Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See

Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton v.

Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing factual determinations

by the Commissioner, acting through the administrative law judge, this Court affirms if

substantial evidence supports the determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177,

1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Howard ex

rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276

F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is

relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. Howard, 341 F.3d at 1011; Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169

F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Commissioner's conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

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Commissioner. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072,

1075 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving

conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at

1040; Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ's

determinations of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable

construction of the applicable statutes. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel,

201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

The ALJ found that Plaintiff, though severely impaired, had the residual functional

capacity ("RFC") for a wide range of medium work activity. Plaintiff argues that, in

reaching this decision, the ALJ failed to make the findings necessary to support his rejection

of Plaintiff's credibility. Plaintiff also argues that the RFC determination made by the ALJ

employed improper legal procedures. The Court will address each of Plaintiff’s arguments

in turn.

I. Credibility Determination

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly assessed the credibility of his testimony

regarding dizzy spells and the degree to which they incapacitate him. The Court disagrees.

"[O]nce a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, an [ALJ] may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a

lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of the

[complaint]." Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)(en banc). If the ALJ

finds the claimant's [subjective] testimony not to be credible, the ALJ must "specifically

make findings that support this conclusion," and the findings "must be sufficiently specific

to allow a reviewing court to conclude the [ALJ] rejected the claimant's testimony on

permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant's testimony." Id. at 345

(internal quotation marks omitted). If there is no affirmative evidence that the claimant is

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malingering, the ALJ must provide convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony

regarding the severity of symptoms. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting his credibility. However, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific reasons,

beyond the absence of objective medical evidence, for rejecting Plaintiff's allegations

regarding the extent and severity of his periodic dizzy spells. In addition to noting that the

objective medical signs and laboratory findings did not support Plaintiff's subjective

complaints to the "extent alleged," the ALJ cited Plaintiff's failure to seek current medical

treatment as well as Plaintiff's ability drive, travel and perform household chores. (AR at 20-

21.) The ability to perform daily activities as well as an inadequately explained failure to

seek medical treatment are findings sufficient to discredit an allegation of dizziness. See Fair

v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)(stating that the ability to perform daily

activities and an inadequately explained failure to seek medical treatment are findings on

which an ALJ can rely to find an allegation of pain incredible). The ALJ gave clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting the extent of Plaintiff's dizzy spells and those reasons were

supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ did not commit legal error in

rejecting Plaintiff's credibility. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

II. Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity

 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to follow proper legal procedures in assessing his

RFC. (Dkt. 10 at 9.) The Court disagrees. As detailed below, the ALJ determined

Plaintiff’s RFC in compliance with the applicable Regulations and his RFC determination

is supported by substantial evidence.

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a) and 416.945(a), the ALJ is required to

determine a claimant’s RFC based on all of the relevant evidence in the record, including,

among other things, the claimant’s medical history, medical signs, reports of daily activities,

effects of symptoms, and medical source statements. See SSR 96-8p. 

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Plaintiff argues that the RFC determination was improper because the ALJ ignored

the frequency, duration and severity of his dizzy spells and focused solely upon evidence

concerning Plaintiff's strength and stamina. (Dkt. 10 at 9.) Yet, in his RFC assessment, the

ALJ clearly explained why he found Plaintiff's complaints of dizziness inconsistent with the

medical and other evidence and considered all relevant evidence, not simply evidence

concerning Plaintiff's strength and stamina. 

Relying on the psychological evaluation of Stephen R. Patrick, Ph.D., the ALJ

assessed Plaintiff's nonexertional capacity in light of his complaints of dizziness. As

opposed to exertional capacity, which addresses an individual's physical limitations and

restrictions, nonexertional capacity considers all work-related limitations and restrictions

that do not depend on an individual's physical strength. See SSR 96-8p. Based on the

opinion of Dr. Patrick, who estimated Plaintiff's Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF")

at 65, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff "does not have any limitations from a medically

determinable severe mental impairment." (AR at 19.) In making this determination, the

ALJ noted that Plaintiff "complained of dizziness interfering with his ability to work and

function in a normal routine." 

 In addition to considering Plaintiff's nonexertional capacity, the ALJ considered

"objective medical signs and laboratory findings," including: (1) "essentially normal"

magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") results from 2001; (2) Plaintiff's failure to seek current

medical treatment for his dizziness; (3) the opinion of Michael P. Strasser, M.D., an

otolaryngologist who examined Plaintiff in 2003 and opined that Plaintiff's "imbalance

seemed to be of periodic vertinious episodes that do not seems to follow any particular

pattern and do not seem to be positional particularly;" and, (4) the medical source statement

of Kevin Wilson, D.O., a treating physician of record since December 2001. (AR at 19-21.)

The record indicates that the ALJ considered all of the relevant evidence in assessing

Plaintiff's RFC, paying particular attention to symptoms, such as dizziness, arising from

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Plaintiff's hearing impairment and vertigo.

Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the ALJ did not improperly reject the medical expert

testimony of Dr. Charles F. Bahn. Plaintiff claims "the ALJ never explains how he reached

his conclusion that Dr. Bahn's opinion was not supported by the greater objective record."

(Dkt. 10 at 8.) The bulk of the ALJ's evaluation of the evidence addresses exactly why he

rejected Dr. Bahn's conclusion. While the ALJ was required to consider Dr. Bahn's medical

opinion, he was under no such obligation to give it controlling weight. Instead, the ALJ

assigned Dr. Wilson's opinion "greater weight." (AR at 21.) Unlike Dr. Bahn, Dr. Wilson

is a treating source and, as such, his opinion about the nature of Plaintiff's impairment was

entitled to "special significance" and "may be entitled to controlling weight." SSR 96-8p.

Based on Plaintiff's medical history and examination, Dr. Wilson found he could "walk for

six hours a day each, frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl with no

further limitations." (AR at 21.) The Court finds the ALJ's decision to reject Dr. Bahn's

opinion and give Dr. Wilson's opinion "greater weight" was reasonable since Dr. Wilson

was a treating source and his opinion was supported by substantial evidence.

The Court also finds that the incidental discrepancy between the actual testimony of

Dr. Bahn and the testimony quoted by the ALJ is harmless. Plaintiff correctly states that Dr.

Bahn never stated that he "might not" be able to sustain a 40-hour workweek. (Dkt. 10 at 8.)

Rather, Dr. Bahn testified that Plaintiff 's dizzy spells would interfere with his ability to

sustain a full-time work schedule "unless he had an understanding boss" and that it would

be "very difficult for him to maintain a five-day-a-week work record." (AR at 240.) The

Court finds this error is harmless because the substantial weight of evidence runs contrary

to Dr. Bahn's testimony. The ALJ provided clear reasons for rejecting Dr. Bahn's opinion

and the incidental discrepancy between the language quoted and the actual testimony does

not undermine the ALJ's decision. Moreover, the fact that the ALJ was present while Dr.

Bahn testified provides additional assurance that his opinion was afforded due consideration.

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Thus, the mistake does not impact the substance of the ALJ's decision or analysis. See

Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1990) (harmless error rule is applicable to

an ALJ’s decision); Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1381

(9th Cir. 1984) (error harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that error would have

changed outcome of case). 

Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that the record contains sufficient

evidence to support awarding Plaintiff benefits without remand for additional proceedings.

The record belies this assertion. Based on all the relevant evidence in the record, the ALJ

properly determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and therefore not entitled to receive benefits. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial

evidence. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94

F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate as a matter of law.

Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

[Dkt. 10], is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment [Dkt. 16], is hereby GRANTED.

DATED this 27th day of September, 2006.

 

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