Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-mc-00083/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-mc-00083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bryan Gibson, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Gary Poirier, 

Defendant.

No. MC-14-00083-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Real Party in Interest John Doe’s Motion to Stay Order 

Denying Motion to Quash Subpoena (Doc. 24), the Response (Doc. 28), and the Reply 

(Doc. 30). On March 10, 2015, the Court orally denied Doe’s Motion to Quash 

Subpoena (Doc. 10) because at least some of the statements in question indisputably 

qualified as commercial disparagement and Doe’s identity was therefore relevant to the 

underlying defamation action. Doe intends to appeal that ruling and asks the Court to 

preserve the status quo while his appeal is pending. 

 Courts weigh four factors when considering motions like Doe’s: “(1) whether the 

stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) 

whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of 

the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) 

where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (citations 

omitted). Here, whether the “minimum quantum of likely success” required by the first 

factor is defined as “a reasonable probability” of prevailing or merely as the existence of 

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“serious legal questions,” Doe has not met his burden. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 

962, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Even 

reading Doe’s statements in context, and even employing the summary judgment 

standard Doe urges the Court to borrow from Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 217 Ariz. 103, 170 

P.3d 712 (Ct. App. 2007), Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success in its defamation 

action sufficient to compel the disclosure of Doe’s identity. Contrary to the claim Doe 

makes in his Reply, the Court at oral argument did not “reject[] Doe’s assertion that 

Gibson is a limited purpose public figure.” (Doc. 30 at 2; see generally Doc. 29.) 

Rather, the Court did not decide that question because Doe’s statements were defamatory 

regardless of whether Gibson qualified as a public figure. The cases Doe cites in his 

Reply do not require revisiting the issue. 

 The First Amendment right to engage in anonymous speech “promotes the robust 

exchange of ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely without ‘fear of 

economic or official retaliation . . . [or] concern about social ostracism.’” Anonymous 

Online Speakers v. United States Dist. Court, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(alterations in original) (citation omitted). Doe’s conclusory allegation that, should the 

Court deny his Motion, he may “be dragged into litigation or subjected to other 

retribution” (Doc. 24 at 5) is unavailing. If such vague, unsupported assertions were 

sufficient to establish irreparable injury to First Amendment rights, anonymous speakers 

would be entitled to stays as a matter of course. The Hilton standard is not so indulgent. 

 Doe’s invocation of the “public interest” is no more convincing. Doe’s original 

Motion to Quash Subpoena was predicated on a federal substantive right, i.e., the First 

Amendment right to speak anonymously. As a result, there is no basis to argue that 

resolution of that Motion should have been governed by the Erie doctrine, which holds 

that “federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural 

law.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 

(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

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 Most important, at least on the facts of this case, is the third Hilton factor. The 

underlying defamation action was filed almost a full year ago. Plaintiff has requested 

that all existing deadlines in the scheduling order be extended by ninety days, but 

contrary to Doe’s representation, Plaintiff has not “obtained a stipulation” to that request 

from Poirier. (Doc. 30 at 4 n.2; see Doc. 28-1 at 5.) To date, the North Carolina court 

has not ruled on Plaintiff’s motion. Whether that motion is ultimately granted or denied, 

entering a stay at this late date could significantly disrupt the proceedings in the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, potentially bringing the action to a halt for months. Especially 

where Doe’s odds of success on appeal are so slim, such delay cannot be justified. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Real Party in Interest John Doe’s Motion to 

Stay Order Denying Motion to Quash Subpoena (Doc. 24) is denied. 

 Dated: March 19, 2015. 

Neil V. Wake

United States District Judge

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