Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01354/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01354-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL D. KANE,

Petitioner, 

v.

JOSIE GASTELO, Warden,

Respondent. 

Case No.: 19cv1354-WQH-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 7]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil 

Local Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED. The Court finds that the 

Petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims and therefore 

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner be advised about the options available to 

him with respect to his mixed petition. If Petitioner fails to pursue either 

option, the Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s 

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unexhausted grounds for relief be DISMISSED and that the Court proceed 

solely as to Petitioner’s exhausted ground for relief.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Federal Proceedings

On July 16, 2019, Michael D. Kane (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, constructively filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Nos. 1, 4). 

Petitioner did not set forth specific claims in the instant federal petition; 

rather he appended his original opening brief filed in the California Court of 

Appeal and the appellate court’s opinion which related to a revised opening 

brief. (See ECF No. 1). Construing his petition liberally, Petitioner raises 

four grounds for relief: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to 

instruct the jury that the prosecution must have proved Petitioner displayed 

a deadly and dangerous weapon in a menacing manner during the robbery of 

the victim; (2) the trial court abused its discretion and violated Petitioner’s 

due process rights by failing to consider the option of striking one of 

Petitioner’s prior strike convictions; (3) the trial court errantly stayed, rather 

than struck, Petitioner’s one-year term on the prison-prior enhancement; and 

(4) the trial court’s abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the 

actual judgment imposed.

1 (See ECF No. 1 at 5-10, 62-66).

 

1 Respondent contends that Petitioner only raises the first, third, and fourth grounds for 

relief in his Petition. (ECF No. 7-1 (“MTD”) at 2). However, Petitioner clearly intended to 

raise four grounds for relief. (ECF No. 1 at 5-10). While Petitioner did not attach the 

revised opening brief raising the second ground to his Petition, he did attach the 

California Court of Appeal’s opinion addressing it. (Id. at 62-66). Further, Respondent is 

aware of the second ground for relief because Respondent references it in the instant 

motion. (See MTD at 2 (citing Lodgment 6)). Because the Court “must construe pro se

habeas filings liberally,” the Court finds that Petitioner has asserted four grounds for 

relief in his Petition. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003).

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On October 18, 2019, Josie Gastelo (“Respondent”) moved to dismiss the 

Petition on the grounds that the Petition contains unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted claims. (ECF No. 7-1 (“MTD”)). To date, Petitioner 

has not filed an opposition to Respondent’s motion. (See Docket; see also ECF 

No. 5 (ordering Petitioner to file any opposition to Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss on or before January 2, 2020)).

B. State Proceedings

On April 6, 2017, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury for murder in 

the first degree (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) and robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 

211). (Lodgment 1 at 1209; Lodgment 2 at 141-42, 256). The jury further 

found true the allegation that Petitioner personally used a deadly and 

dangerous weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b)(1)). (Lodgment 1 at 1209; 

Lodgment 2 at 141-42, 256). On June 6, 2017, Petitioner was sentenced to 

seventy-five years to life, plus an additional eleven years. (Lodgment 1 at 

2515-16; Lodgment 2 at 293-94).

Petitioner filed an appeal with the California Court of Appeal, filing an 

amended opening brief on February 7, 2018, listing the grounds for relief 

raised in the instant Petition. (Lodgment 4; Lodgment 6). On June 1, 2018, 

the California Court of Appeal found that the trial court should have 

stricken, rather than stayed, the prison prior term enhancement and that the 

clerical errors in the abstract of judgment should be corrected. (Lodgment 9 

at 3). Accordingly, the appellate court ordered the judgment be amended to 

strike the prior prison term enhancement and that the abstract of judgment 

be corrected to address certain clerical issues. (Id.). The appellate court

affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (Id.).

On July 11, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the 

California Supreme Court raising a single argument: the trial court abused 

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its discretion and violated Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to 

consider the option of striking one of Petitioner’s prior strike convictions. 

(Lodgment 10). On August 15, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied 

the petition for review without comment. (Lodgment 11).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A federal court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the 

petitioner first has presented his claims to the state courts, thereby 

exhausting them. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 

(1982). The exhaustion requirement is founded on federal-state comity, as 

only when the state court has been presented with the claim may it “pass 

upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Exhaustion of a habeas petitioner’s federal claims requires that 

they have been fairly presented in each appropriate state court, including a 

state supreme court with powers of discretionary review. Baldwin v. Reese, 

541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). In California, this generally entails direct or 

collateral presentation to both the lower courts of appeal and the state 

supreme court, though presentation to the state supreme court alone may 

suffice. Ross v. Craven, 478 F.2d 240, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1973). To exhaust 

one’s claims, the petitioner must also “alert[] [the state] court to the federal 

nature of the claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. A petitioner may do so by 

citing the source of federal law upon which he relies, or by labeling the claim 

as “federal.” Id. at 32. 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims have been presented to the highest 

state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the Court must dismiss 

the petition. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Where 

a petition contains unexhausted and exhausted claims, district courts “have 

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the discretion to hold a mixed petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the 

unexhausted claims.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent contends Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted. (MTD at 3-

4). Petitioner raised four arguments in his direct appeal to the California 

Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 6). However, he raised only one argument in his 

Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 10). In 

his Petition for Review he argued that “[i]t is simply not clear from [the] 

record that the trial court recognized its discretion to strike just one of 

[Petitioner’s] strike-priors and expressly declined to do so.” (Id. at 24). 

Because Petitioner raised this ground for relief on direct appeal to the 

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, he has

exhausted his second ground for relief. Petitioner did not raise any of his 

other grounds for relief on direct appeal to the California Supreme Court. 

(See Lodgment 6; Lodgment 10). Additionally, Petitioner has not sought 

collateral review of his claims by way of a state habeas corpus petition. (See 

generally, Lodgments; see also ECF No. 1 at 3). Therefore, Petitioner did not 

exhaust his first, third, or fourth grounds for relief. Accordingly, the instant 

Petition is mixed, meaning it contains both exhausted and unexhausted 

claims.2

 

2 According to Respondent, the first, third, and fourth grounds for relief are unexhausted 

and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner no longer has an available state court 

remedy on direct appeal with which to exhaust his claims. (MTD at 4). While Respondent 

is correct that Petitioner no longer has a state remedy on direct appeal for any of his 

unexhausted grounds for relief, it is possible that Petitioner could present and exhaust an 

appropriate federal claim in the state courts. See In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 460 (2012) 

(“The United States Supreme Court recently, and accurately, described the law applicable 

to habeas corpus petitions in California: “While most States set determinate time limits 

for collateral relief applications, in California, neither statute nor rule of court does so. 

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A mixed petition is subject to dismissal absent a stay. See Rose, 455 

U.S. at 518. Moreover, pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), all federal habeas petitions are subject to a one-year 

statute of limitations, and claims not exhausted and presented to the federal 

court within the one-year period are forfeited. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). As such, 

if a petitioner presents a mixed petition, the petitioner may seek to stay the 

exhausted claims while he pursues the unexhausted claims in state court. 

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276-78 (2005). A petition may be stayed under 

either Rhines, or under Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 

2003), overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th 

Cir. 2007). See King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Pursuant to Rhines, a stay is available only in the limited 

circumstances where a petitioner shows that: (1) “the petitioner had good 

cause for his failure to exhaust,” (2) “his unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious,” and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in 

intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. When a 

petitioner satisfies these three requirements, “it likely would be an abuse of 

discretion for a district court to deny a stay.” Id. However, even if a 

petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, “the district court would 

abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted 

claims are plainly meritless.” Id. at 277.

Under Kelly, a stay requires: (1) that the petitioner file an amended 

petition deleting his unexhausted claims; (2) that the district court “stay[] 

 

Instead, California courts ‘appl[y] a general “reasonableness” standard’ to judge whether a 

habeas petition is timely filed.”) (quoting Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222 (2002)). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are not procedurally defaulted.

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and hold[] in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing the 

petitioner the opportunity to proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted 

claims”; and (3) that the petitioner subsequently amend his federal habeas 

petition “and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition.” 

King, 564 F.3d at 1135 (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71). However, the 

petitioner may only amend his newly-exhausted claims back into his federal 

petition if the claims are timely under the AEDPA or “relate back” to the 

exhausted claims in the pending petition. Id. at 1140-43.

As set forth above, the Court finds that the Petition contains one 

exhausted ground for relief (ground two) and three unexhausted grounds for 

relief (grounds one, three, and four). Because the Petition contains both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims, the Petition is subject to dismissal 

absent a stay. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518; King, 564 F.3d at 1138-39. Petitioner 

has not filed a motion for stay. (See Docket). Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Petitioner be sent an order specifying his options with 

respect to the mixed Petition. If Petitioner seeks to choose the Rhines

approach, he must file a motion for stay and address the three Rhines 

conditions set forth above. If Petitioner seeks to stay this action under Kelly, 

Petitioner must submit an amended petition asserting only his exhausted 

claim for relief and must also file a motion for stay. If Petitioner does not 

elect one of the identified options, then the Court RECOMMENDS that the 

first, third, and fourth grounds for relief be DISMISSED and the Court 

proceed solely as to Petitioner’s exhausted ground for relief (ground two).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and 

Recommendation, (2) DENYING Respondent’s motion to dismiss, (3) finding 

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the Petition contains exhausted and unexhausted claims, (4) issuing a Notice 

Regarding Possible Partial Dismissal of Petition for Failure to Exhaust State 

Court Remedies, and (5) DISMISSING Petitioner’s first, third, and fourth 

grounds for relief if he does not move for a stay under Rhines or Kelly.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 24, 2020, any party to 

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all 

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than March 9, 2020. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2020

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