Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01279/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01279-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1335 Interpleader Action

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARTFORD LIFE INS. CO.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

ORDER

vs.

MARY BANKS, et al.,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss Cross-Complaint filed by

Defendant Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard (“Sandberg”) (Doc. # 54); the Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Sandberg, Defendant Mary Banks (“Banks”), and

Defendant Beryl Rayford (“Rayford”) (Doc. # 69); the Motion to Drop Defendant filed by

Defendant Umar Almajid (“Almajid”) (Doc. # 56); the Ex Parte Motion to Set Status

Conference filed by Sandberg (Doc. # 70); and the Ex Parte Motion to Continue Pretrial Dates

filed by Sandberg (Doc. # 77).

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2008, Plaintiff Hartford Life Insurance Company (“Hartford”) initiated this

action by filing the Complaint in Interpleader (“Complaint”) against Sandberg, Banks,

Rayford, Almajid, North American Mercantile (“NAM”), Richard Wier (“Wier”), and

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

Monneye Gross (“Gross”). (Doc. # 1). This case concerns a dispute over the inheritance of

annuities owned by Cleona Bailey Shortridge (“Shortridge”). The Complaint alleges that

Almajid and Rayford, Shortridge’s nephew and niece, were named as the beneficiaries of the

annuities in a revocable trust executed on August 4, 1997, with Banks as the successor trustee.

Compl. at 5. The Complaint alleges that on June 2, 2002, Shortridge changed the beneficiary

of the annuities to NAM. Id. at 4. 

The Complaint alleges that after Shortridge’s death, Banks and Rayford filed a Petition

in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri (“Petition”) which disputed ownership

of the annuities. Id. at 5. The Complaint alleges Sandberg, a law firm, represented Almajid

and NAM in the state court suit. Id. at 5. The Complaint alleges a settlement was

memorialized in writing on July 10, 2007. Id. at 6. The Complaint alleges Hartford sent forms

allowing the disbursement of funds pursuant to the settlement to Sandberg for Almajid and

NAM to complete. Id. at 6. The Complaint alleges the forms were never returned. Id. The

Complaint alleges that Almajid sent a letter to Hartford stating that there was a dispute

between Almajid, NAM, and Sandberg. Id. at 7. The Complaint alleges Hartford requested

confirmation from Almajid and NAM that Sandberg still represented them, but received no

response. Id. The Complaint alleges that the dispute over disbursement of proceeds

necessitated this interpleader action by Hartford. Id. The Complaint alleges claims for

declaratory relief and interpleader. Id.

On September 30, 2008, Sandberg filed an answer. (Doc. # 8). On November 12, 2008,

Wier and Gross were dismissed as interpleader defendants. (Doc. # 19). On November 21,

2008, Almajid, proceeding pro se, filed an “Answer-Complaint in Interpleader Counterclaim

for Damages” (“Answer and Cross-Claim”) on behalf of himself and NAM. (Doc. # 21). The

Cross-Claim against Sandberg, Banks, Rayford, Gross, and Wier alleged claims for (1) civil

RICO violations, (2) conspiracy, (3) interference with contractual relationship, (4) fraudulent

concealment, and (5) accounting. On December 17, 2008, Banks and Rayford’s Motion for

a 30-day extension of time to file an answer was granted. (Doc. # 26). Neither Banks nor

Rayford has filed an answer.

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

On March 25, 2009, this Court dismissed Almajid’s Cross-Claim in its entirety for

failure to state a claim. (Doc. # 39). On July 17, 2009, the Court granted Sandberg’s Motion

for Leave to File Cross-Complaint Against North American Mercantile, Inc. (Doc. # 48). On

July 20, 2009, the Court struck the Answer that Almajid filed on behalf of NAM, holding that

NAM may not appear pro se because it is a corporation. (Doc. # 48). Also on July 20, 2009,

the Court granted Almajid’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer and CrossComplaint. Id. On August 3, 2009, Sandberg filed its Cross-Claim which alleged a single

claim for breach of contract against NAM. (Doc. # 49). NAM did not file an answer to

Sandberg’s Cross-Claim. On August 12, 2009, Almajid filed his amended Answer and CrossComplaint against Sandberg, Banks, Rayford, Gross, and Wier. (Doc. # 52). The Cross-Claim

alleges claims for (1) civil RICO violations, (2) conspiracy, (3) interference with contractual

relationship, (4) fraudulent concealment and (5) accounting. Id. at 23-26. On September 1,

2009, Sandberg filed its Motion to Dismiss Cross Complaint. (Doc. # 52). On September 2,

2009, Almajid filed his Motion to Drop Defendant. (Doc. # 56). On September 4, 2009, the

Clerk of the Court entered default on Sandberg’s Cross-Claim in favor of Sandberg and against

NAM. (Doc. # 58). On October 2, 2009, the Clerk of the Court entered Default Judgment on

the Cross-Claim in favor of Sandberg and against NAM. (Doc. # 65). On October 8, 2009,

Sandberg, Banks, and Rayford filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. # 69).

On October 9, 2009, Sandberg filed its Ex Parte Motion to Set Status Conference. (Doc. # 70).

ANALYSIS

I. Sandberg’s Motion to Dismiss Cross-Complaint

A. Allegations of the Cross-Claim

Almajid’s Cross-Claim arises out of an alleged “complex insurance company fraud

scheme that caused substantial losses . . . founded upon a frivolous lawsuit [in Missouri state

court] consisting [of] known misrepresentations . . . .” (Doc. # 52 at 3). The Cross-Claim

alleges that Sandberg was deficient in its representation of Almajid and NAM and conspired

with Rayford and Banks to defraud Almajid and NAM. Id. The Cross-Claim alleges “Rayford

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

and Banks sought to wrongfully procure insurance proceeds managed by Hartford” while

“Sandberg sought to procure exorbitant profits from Almajid by failure to file procedural

motions to cure Banks and Rayford[’s] pleadings deficiencies . . . .” Id. The Cross-Claim

alleges “Sandberg recognized the deficiencies in the St. Louis lawsuit from the outset[, but]

[i]nstead of filing pertinent motions in initial stages, Sandberg chose to compound and conceal

Rayford and Banks in an apparent effort to justify exorbitant fees.” Id. at 4.

The Cross-Claim alleges that “the fraudulent scheme lasted seven years, from 2000 to

2007.” Id. at 6. The Cross-Claim alleges that Banks informed Almajid that she no longer

wished to be named as the successor trustee to Shortridge’s will, and that Almajid and Banks

approached Banks’s attorneys, Monneye Gross and Richard Wier, to change Shortridge’s

estate planning documents. Id. The Cross-Claim alleges Gross, Weir, Banks, and Rayford

conspired to submit “a series of false reports” to the San Diego County Health and Human

Services Department. Id. The Cross-Claim alleges the subsequent investigation revealed “no

evidence to substantiate allegations of criminal or tortuous [sic] conduct.” Id. The CrossClaim alleges that Sandberg was aware that the investigation by San Diego County authorities

revealed that Almajid had not abused Shortridge, but Sandberg concealed this information

from the Missouri state court in order to defraud Almajid and NAM. Id. at 17. The CrossClaim alleges Sandberg failed to prevent Banks from embezzling $15,000 from the annuity and

concealed the embezzlement from the Missouri state court. Id. at 18. The Cross-Claim alleges

“Sandberg prepared a settlement agreement that unjustly enriched itself, Banks, and Rayford.

Almajid executed the purported settlement under circumstances constituting fraud,

misrepresentation, duress, negligence, and lack of informed consent.” Id. at 19. The CrossClaim alleges that Almajid and NAM suffered “extensive damages” from Sandberg’s

misrepresentations, including damage from Hartford freezing the accounts during the state

court proceedings. Id. at 20-21. 

B. Contentions of the Parties

Sandberg contends Almajid’s Cross-Claim should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). (Doc. # 54 at 2).

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

Sandberg contends that the Cross-Claim seeks damages on behalf of NAM as well as Almajid,

violating this Court’s order that Almajid may not file pleadings on behalf of NAM. Id.

Almajid contends that his amended complaint satisfies the pleading requirements of Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b) and seeks judicial notice of his response to

interrogatories to supply additional facts about his allegations of fraud. (Doc. # 59 at 2-3).

C. Applicable Law

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the

legal sufficiency of the pleadings. See De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978).

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where the

factual allegations do not raise the right to relief above the speculative level. See Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Conversely, a complaint may not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim where the allegations plausibly show that the pleader is entitled to relief.

See id. (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court

must construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must accept as true

all material allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn

therefrom. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Chang v. Chen,

80 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1996). “Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally,

including pro se motions as well as complaints.” Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d

920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ.

Pro. 8(a)(2). While the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, every complaint must,

at a minimum, “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[i]n alleging fraud or

mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 9(b). The Ninth Circuit has “interpreted Rule 9(b) to mean that the pleader

must state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright,

862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988). Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump

multiple defendants together but “require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when

suing more than one defendant . . . and inform each defendant separately of the allegations

surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud.” Swartz v. KPMG LLO, 476 F.3d 756, 764-

65 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he plaintiffs must, at a minimum, ‘identify the role of each defendant

in the alleged fraudulent scheme.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885

F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1989)). “[W]here fraud is not an essential element of a claim only

allegations (‘averments’) of fraudulent conduct must satisfy the heightened pleading

requirements of Rule 9(b). Allegations of non-fraudulent conduct need satisfy only the

ordinary notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a).” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003). “When an entire complaint, or an entire claim within a complaint

is grounded in fraud and its allegations fail to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of

Rule 9(b), a district court may dismiss the complaint or claim.” Id. at 1107. “If insufficiently

pled averments of fraud are disregarded, as they must be, in a complaint grounded in fraud,

there is effectively nothing left of the complaint.” Id.

D. Analysis

1. Cross-Claim for Civil RICO Violations

To state a claim for a civil RICO violation, the claimant must allege: “(1) conduct (2) of

an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,

Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). When a claimant alleges fraudulent acts, such as mail and wire

fraud, as the predicate acts in a RICO claim, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“requires that circumstances constituting fraud be stated with particularity.” Alan Neuman

Productions, 862 F.2d at 1392. The predicate acts underlying the claim for civil RICO

violation alleged in the complaint are “‘[m]ultiple instances of mail fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. section 1341,” and “[m]ultiple instances of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. section

1343.” (Doc. # 52 at 23). The Cross-Claim alleges that Rayford, Banks, Wier, and Gross

made misrepresentations before the St. Louis County Circuit Court, the Superior Court of

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Almajid attempts to cure this deficiency by asking the Court to take judicial notice of

his answers to interrogatories. (Doc. # 61). However, even if the Court considers the

information in the answers to interrogatories, it does not add sufficient detail to state a claim

for fraud with particularity. 

- 7 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

California, and in settlement discussions. Although the Cross-Claim references “multiple

instances” of fraud, and “gross misrepresentations,” the Cross-Claim does not allege with

sufficient specificity the time, place or specific content of each misrepresentation or fraudulent

act giving rise to the claim for violation of RICO. See id. The Cross-Claim also fails to allege

with sufficient specificity the identities of the parties to each misrepresentation; instead, the

Cross-Claim lumps multiple defendants together, which is insufficient under Rule 9(b).1

 The

Cross-Claim fails to allege the time, place and specific content of the misrepresentations

underlying the RICO claims, and fails to identify the role of each Defendant in the fraudulent

scheme. The Cross-Claim fails to state a claim for civil RICO violation because the CrossClaim fails to allege the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity.

2. Cross-Claim for Conspiracy

In support of the claim for conspiracy, the Cross-Claim alleges that Rayford, Banks,

Gross, Wier and Sandberg “engaged in the formation and operation of several conspiracies”

in which “Defendants would abuse the fiduciary relationship and trust between Hartford and

NAM,” would “abuse the discretion granted [to] Hartford by NAM,” would “induce Hartford

to breach the obligation of undivided loyalty and fidelity to NAM,” and would “fail to disclose

material facts with the intent of defrauding NAM.” (Doc. # 52 at 24). The conspiracy claim

alleges Sandberg’s legal services were deficient and that the law firm failed to present all of

the available evidence to the Missouri court in the prior proceeding. Id. at 19. The conspiracy

claim does not allege any facts to support the assertion that these alleged failings by Sandberg

were part of a conspiracy with the other defendants to defraud Almajid and NAM. The

conclusory allegations underlying the conspiracy claim are not pled with sufficient

particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and are otherwise

insufficient to put Defendants on notice of the grounds upon which the conspiracy claim rests,

pursuant to Rule 8(a). The Cross-Claim fails to state a claim for conspiracy.

3. Cross-Claim for Interference with Contractual Relationship

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

In support of the claim for interference with contractual relationship, the Cross-Claim

alleges “[f]rom 2005 until 2007, Sandberg had a valid and existing agreement . . . in which

Sandberg served as attorney for Almajid and NAM” and owed “the duty to make the fullest

disclosure of all material facts that might affect . . . investment decisions, to use reasonable

care, skill, and diligence.” (Doc. # 52 at 25). The Cross-Claim alleges that Rayford, Banks,

Gross, Wier, and Sandberg “committed intentional and unjustifed acts designed to interfere

with and/or disrupt the agreement and fiduciary relationship between Almajid, NAM, and

Hartford.” Id. The Cross-Claim fails to allege sufficient facts to explain the intentional and

unjustified acts allegedly committed by Defendants or how those acts interfered with Almajid’s

relationship with Hartford. The allegations supporting the claim for interference with

contractual relationship are conclusory, vague, and insufficient to put Defendants on notice of

the alleged misconduct that gives rise to the claim. The Cross-Claim fails to state a claim for

interference with contractual relationship.

4. Cross-Claim for Fraudulent Concealment

In support of the claim for fraudulent concealment, the Cross-Claim alleges “[i]n

engaging in secret agreements with Rayford, Banks, Gross, and Wier, Sandberg had a duty to

disclose and correct the fact of a lawsuit based on a series of factual misrepresentations in that

the defendants nondisclosures were likely to mislead Hartford, St. Louis County Circuit Court,

and San Diego Superior Court. . . . Defendants intentionally and knowingly concealed facts

with the intent to induce Hartford to transfer funds into Shortridge Revocable Trust Account.”

(Doc. # 52 at 26). The claim for fraudulent concealment fails to explain what the allegedly

concealed information was, how it induced Hartford to transfer money into the account, or how

transferring money into the account damaged Almajid. The Cross-Claim fails to state a claim

for fraudulent concealment because it fails to allege the circumstances constituting fraud with

particularity.

5. Cross-Claim for Accounting

The Cross-Claim does not make a separate claim for an accounting, but in the prayer for

relief, seeks equitable relief including “[a]n accounting of all benefits, consideration and profits

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

received and/or paid, directly including but not limited to the imposition of constructive trusts

with tracing.” (Doc. # 52 at 26). “A suit for an accounting will not lie where it appears from

the complaint that none is necessary or that there is an adequate remedy at law.” St. James

Church of Christ Holiness v. Superior Ct., 135 Cal. App. 2d, 352, 359 (1955). The CrossClaim does not allege facts that show that the financial transactions or amounts due are so

complex as to require an accounting or that there is not an adequate remedy at law. The CrossClaim fails to state a claim for accounting.

II. Almajid’s Motion to Drop Defendant

Almajid’s Motion to Drop Defendant seeks to drop NAM as a defendant to Sandberg’s

Cross-Claim and substitute himself in NAM’s place. (Doc. # 56 at 2, Doc. # 56-2 at 1). 

Almajid contends NAM’s Board of Directors has “transferred and assigned all rights, title, and

interest relative” to this case to Almajid, and that as the assignee, he is the proper defendant

to the Cross-Claim, not NAM. (Doc. # 56-2 at 8-9). Almajid submitted a copy of a resolution

by the NAM board of directors stating that “while the action is pending, North American

Mercantile, Inc., assigns and transfers to Umar Almajid all of North American Mercantile[’s]

rights, title and interest in and to the claim(s) against defendant(s). As a result of the

assignment, Umar Almajid became the lawful owner and holder of North American

Mercantile, Inc.’s claim(s) against defendant(s).” (Doc. # 56-4 at 4). 

In its response, Sandberg contends “[d]ropping NAM as a party or substituting Almajid

in its place would unduly prejudice Sandberg, and therefore, would contravene the purpose of

[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 21.” (Doc. # 57 at 3). Sandberg further contends that

“NAM’s assignment, if valid, only assigned NAM’s ‘rights, title and interest relative [to this

case,]’ not NAM’s liabilities, especially liabilities incurred prior to this case.” Id.

As a non-lawyer, Almajid may not file motions or pleadings on behalf of NAM. See 28

U.S.C. § 1654; Local Civil Rule 83.3(k); see also Doc. # 48 at 3. Almajid’s motion to drop

NAM as a defendant is therefore denied.

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

III. Banks, Rayford and Sandberg’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Banks, Rayford, and Sandberg filed a Joint Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which contends that there is “no material

issue of fact with respect to whether the settlement is valid and binding on the parties.” (Doc.

# 69-1 at 3). Almajid contends he was duped into signing the “purported settlement” by

Sandberg as part of a “scheme to obtain insurance profits by fraud and/or false pretenses.”

(Doc. # 74 at 3). Almajid also contends he signed the settlement under “duress.” (Doc. # 74

at 4).

Judgment on the Pleadings is proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)

“after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay trial,” if “the moving party

clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be

resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). “For purposes of the motion, the

allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted as true, while the allegations of the

moving party which have been denied are assumed to be false.” Id. 

Rayford and Banks have not filed responsive pleadings to the original complaint or to

Almajid’s Cross-Claim. Therefore, the pleadings are not closed, barring judgment in their

favor on the pleadings. See Doe v. United States, et al., 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[T]he pleadings are closed for the purposes of Rule 12 (c) once a complaint and answer have

been filed, assuming . . . that no counterclaim or cross-claim is made.”)

Furthermore, although Almajid failed to state a claim for relief in his Cross-Claim, his

answer attacked the validity of the settlement agreement and asserted defenses to enforcing it.

See Doc. # 52 at 3-4, 6-12, 16-19. Specifically, Almajid asserts that he signed the settlement

under “circumstances constituting fraud, misrepresentation, negligence, and lack of informed

consent.” Id. at 19. While Almajid made these assertions in the section of his filing labeled

as a counterclaim, courts do not hold pro se litigants to the same standards of pleading as

represented parties. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008). “Courts

have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally.” Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920,

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

925 (9th Cir. 2003). Despite the technical deficiency in Almajid’s pleadings, he has raised a

defense that requires going beyond the pleadings to resolve, barring judgment pursuant to Rule

12(c).

IV. Sandberg’s Ex Parte Motion to Set Status Conference and Ex Parte Motion to

Continue Pretrial Dates

Sandberg’s Motion to Set Status Conference contends “[a] status conference regarding

the various default applications would assist counsel in resolving the remaining issues in the

case.” (Doc. # 70 -1 at 2). Sandberg contends a status conference would allow it to “seek

guidance from the Court regarding (1) the consequences to the case of the defaults already

entered, (2) the Court’s view of the other defaults requested, and (3) the procedure the Court

prefers to follow with regard to resolving the remaining issues raised by the Complaint in

interpleader.”

Sandberg’s Motion to Continue Pretrial Dates notes that there are several rapidly

approaching pretrial deadlines and seeks to delay those pretrial deadlines. The Court granted

Sandberg’s motion (Doc. # 79) and has issued a new scheduling order concurrently with this

order which addresses the remaining issues in this action. The pretrial deadlines have been

extended to allow the parties to file motions on the outstanding issues in the case. Sandberg’s

Ex Parte Motion to Set Status Conference is therefore denied. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Sandberg’s Motion to Dismiss Cross-Complaint (Doc. # 54) is GRANTED.

(2) Almajid’s Motion to Drop Defendant (Doc. # 56) is DENIED.

(3) Banks, Rayford, and Sandberg’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. # 69)

is DENIED.

(4) Sandberg’s Ex Parte Motion to Set Status Conference (Doc. # 70) is DENIED.

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 08cv1279 WQH (WVG)

(5) Sandberg’s Ex Parte Motion to Continue Pretrial Dates (Doc. # 77) was previously

granted (Doc. # 79). A scheduling order issued concurrently with this order sets

new pretrial deadlines.

DATED: January 26, 2010

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01279-WQH-WVG Document 86 Filed 01/26/10 Page 12 of 12