Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02656/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02656-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRYAN BLUE, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF THE 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD 

ORDER 

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is before the court. Mot. Remand (“Mot”), ECF 

No. 10-1. Plaintiffs Bryan Blue, Jason Hastey, Steven Oschner, Arthur Tovar, James 

McCloughan and the California Correctional Peace Officers Association ("CCPOA") argue the 

court should remand the case because they have amended their complaint to delete all federal 

causes. See id. at 2. Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion. Defs.’ Opp’n (“Opp’n”), ECF No.13. 

The court submitted the matter without hearing. After careful consideration of the 

motion, including supporting and opposing arguments, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED for 

reasons set forth below. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 25, 2015, plaintiffs initiated this action in Sacramento County 

Superior Court. Not. Remov. 5, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs brought claims against the California 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 1 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Officer of the Inspector General (“OIG”), General Robert A. Barton, the California Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Secretary of CDCR Jeffrey Beard, Chief Deputy 

Inspector General Roy Wesley, and Deputy Inspector General Michael Maddox (collectively 

“defendants”). Id. at 6–8. Plaintiffs alleged defendants compelled plaintiffs to undergo OIG 

interviews while depriving them of their right to representation. Id. at 8–16. Plaintiffs also allege 

defendants improperly used administrative subpoenas throughout the OIG interview process. Id.

at 11. Through such acts, defendants allegedly violated the Public Safety Officers’ Procedural 

Bill of Rights (“POBRA”) set forth in California Government Code section 3300, et seq., 

California Penal Code section 6126.5, as well as the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Id. at 12–14. Through § 1983, plaintiffs allege violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 14. 

On December 23, 2015, defendants removed the case to this court based on 

28 U.S.C. § 1441. Not. Remov. On December 30, defendants OIG, Robert Barton, Roy Wesley, 

and Michael Maddox answered the complaint. ECF No. 7. Defendants CDCR and Jeffrey Beard 

filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 6. The motion to dismiss is still pending. On January 8, 

2016, defendants filed a Notice of Related Cases, ECF No. 8, but on March 2, 2016, this court 

declined relation, ECF No. 18. 

On January 12, 2016, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. First Am. 

Compl. (FAC), ECF No. 9. In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs maintain their claims 

under POBRA and California Penal Code section 6126.5. See id. Plaintiffs added claims under 

California Penal Code sections 6127.3 and 6127.4 and removed all federal law claims. See id. 

Plaintiffs filed the amended complaint without leave of court. Two days later, plaintiffs filed the 

instant motion to remand the case to state court. ECF No. 10. 

///// 

///// 

///// 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 2 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A. Amendment of Complaint 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides in pertinent part: 

A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: 

(A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a 

responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a 

responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 

12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (1) (A)–(B). According to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, allowing 

the right to amend as a matter of course after service of a motion would “force the pleader to 

consider carefully and promptly the wisdom of amending to meet the arguments in the motion.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, 2009 Rules Committee Note. The Committee noted a “responsive amendment 

may avoid the need to decide the motion or reduce the number of issues to be decided,” thus 

expediting determination of issues. Id. 

B. Remand after Amendment 

Although a plaintiff can amend his complaint once as a matter of course, he may 

not compel remand by amending to eliminate a federal question upon which removal was based. 

Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Jurisdiction must be analyzed on the basis of the pleadings filed at the time of removal, not on the 

basis of subsequent amendments. Id. Accordingly, if federal questions are eliminated and only 

state claims remain, the court is not required to remand but has discretion to determine whether to 

retain jurisdiction or to remand to state court. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 

350 (1988). 

In making this determination, the court should consider values of “judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id. These values inform the court’s analysis under 

28 U.S.C. § 1367, which discusses factors guiding the court in determining whether to exercise or 

decline jurisdiction. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“[D]iscretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered 

by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c) . . .”). The statutory factors are 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 3 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

(1) whether the state claims raise a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) whether the state 

claims substantially predominate over the federal claims; (3) whether the federal claims have 

been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons 

for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

After considering common law values and statutory factors, the court may also 

consider whether plaintiff has engaged in tactics to manipulate the forum. Carnegie-Mellon 

Univ., 484 U.S. at 357. In deciding whether to remand a case, 

[a] district court can consider whether the plaintiff has engaged in 

any manipulative tactics . . . . If the plaintiff has attempted to 

manipulate the forum, the court should take this behavior into 

account in determining whether the balance of factors to be 

considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine support a remand 

in the case. 

Id. Even if a plaintiff’s decision to eliminate federal claims before moving for remand may raise 

suspicion, “a plaintiff does not engage in manipulative behavior merely by eliminating federal 

claims from an amended complaint that were present in the original complaint.” Valmoja v. Akal 

Sec., Inc., No. 13-00343, 2013 WL 5376038, at *5 (D. Haw. Sept. 24, 2013); see also Baddie v. 

Berkeley Farms, Inc., 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir.1995) (stating plaintiff’s dismissal of federal 

claims does not constitute “manipulative practices.”). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Complaint thirteen days after defendants CDCR 

and Jeffrey Beard filed their motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs thereby complied with the Rules of 

Civil Procedure requirement of filing within twenty-one days of the defendants’ filing their 

motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 

The central question for the court is whether the case should be remanded given 

that federal claims have evaporated. Plaintiffs argue judicial economy and comity support 

remand. See Mot. at 3–6. Additionally, they argue remand satisfies all the factors laid out in § 

1367. Id. Defendants argue remand is an improper attempt to manipulate the forum in which the 

action will be adjudicated. Opp’n at 1. Specifically, defendants contend plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint continues to rely on principles of federal law and this court has an interest in 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 4 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

adjudicating the matter because of its relation to other cases proceeding before the federal courts. 

Id. at 2. In assessing these arguments, the court applies the section 1367(c) factors. 

A. Novel or Complex Issues of State Law 

The First Amended Complaint asks the court do the following: (1) find defendants 

denied representation to plaintiffs during OIG interviews, in violation of POBRA, California 

Government Code § 3300, et seq., and California Penal Code Section 6126.5, (2) provide a 

declaration of rights and defendants’ duties under POBRA and California Penal Code Section 

6126.5, (3) grant injunctive relief under California Penal Code sections 6127.3 and 6127.4 for 

defendants’ alleged improper use of administrative subpoenas, and (4) provide a declaration of 

rights and defendants’ duties under California Penal Code sections 6127.3 and 6127.4. See 

generally FAC. 

Plaintiffs argue the state law claims at issue are novel. See Reply at 4. 

Specifically, they argue adjudication of their POBRA claims will require application of NL.R.B. 

v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), to determine how Weingarten and its progeny affect 

the right to representation guaranteed by POBRA. Id. As to other claims, plaintiffs argue their 

adjudication will require the application of state law. Id. at 4–5. While plaintiffs point to cases 

they say will need to be analyzed, they do not show why the case at hand involves novel or 

complex issues of state law. 

On the other hand, defendants cite several state court decisions involving 

challenges by peace officers who claimed they were denied their right to representation during 

interviews. Opp’n at 5. Although defendants argue the issues raised by the use of administrative 

subpoenas and the alleged denial of representation are not complex, the cases on which 

defendants rely actually demonstrate that plaintiffs’ claims raise questions that fall squarely 

within the ambit of state law. Thus their determination is a task for which the state court is 

uniquely suited. See Fraser v. Washington State Dep't of Corr., No. 11-5273, 2012 WL 1022153, 

at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2012) (“Because state courts have a strong interest in enforcing their 

own laws . . . the value of comity is served by this Court declining jurisdiction.”). 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 5 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

Because primary responsibility for developing and applying state law rests with 

state courts, this factor weighs in favor of remand. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 

n.7; Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir.1994) (“[I]n the usual 

case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point 

toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.”). 

B. State Claims Predominate Over Federal Claims 

Because plaintiffs no longer rely on federal claims, there are no federal claims to 

assess. Naturally, state courts have a strong interest in enforcing their own laws. See CarnegieMellon University, 484 U.S. at 352. The value of comity is served by this court’s declining 

jurisdiction. 

C. Manipulation of Federal Forum 

Defendants contend plaintiffs have engaged in manipulative tactics by eliminating 

their federal claims. Opp’n at 8. Defendants cite Carnegie-Mellon, in which plaintiffs deleted all 

federal law claims from their complaint six months after removal, and then sought to remand to 

state court. Id. (citing 484 U.S. at 343, 346). In Carnegie-Mellon, however, the Supreme Court 

affirmed the district court’s decision to remand the case to state court. Id. at 357. Indeed, the 

Court observed a plaintiff’s attempt to manipulate the forum hardly justifies a categorical 

prohibition on remanding cases initially involving pendant state law claims once the federal 

claims are gone. Id. The Ninth Circuit has found when plaintiffs seek remand after removing 

federal claims, the maneuver can be a “straight-forward tactical decision” that does not preclude 

removal. See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 490–91 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the underlying case has been on this court’s docket for less than four 

months. Nothing before the court supports the conclusion that the timing or method of plaintiffs’ 

amendment is an impermissible jerry-rigging of federal rules or an unfair taking advantage of 

applicable federal laws. See Baddie, 64 F.3d at 490 n. 3 (Such behavior is only considered 

manipulative if the plaintiff's initial inclusion of the federal claim was in bad faith or for the “sole 

purpose of putting defendants through the removal-remand procedure.”). 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 6 of 7
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

D. Exceptional Circumstances or Compelling Reasons to Decline Jurisdiction 

In determining whether to decline jurisdiction, the district court may consider the 

amount of judicial resources already expended and the length of time the case has been pending 

in the federal forum. See Strickler v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., No. 10-1612, 2011 WL 317988, at 

*2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011) (“[T]he district court may retain jurisdiction over the state-law 

claims remaining after a dismissal, especially where judicial resources have been expended.”); 

see also Lankford v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 10-05518, 2012 WL 299965, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

30, 2012) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where matter was in the “early stages” 

before the federal court). Defendants concede the court has not expended significant judicial 

resources. Opp’n at 11. Nonetheless, defendants contend the court should exercise jurisdiction 

because of the vast judicial resources it has expended in the case of Coleman, et al. v. Brown, et 

al., No. 90-00520 (E.D. Cal filed April 23, 1990),which is pending before the undersigned. Id. 

Defendants cite no case law to support their argument that jurisdiction should be exercised merely 

because cases on the court’s docket may be related. In any event, the court determined this case 

is in fact not related to Coleman within the meaning contemplated by the Local Rules. 

 This factor weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, this court declines to retain jurisdiction. 

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ First 

Amended Complaint is DENIED as MOOT. 

This order resolves ECF Nos. 6 and 10. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 22, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-02656-KJM-CKD Document 21 Filed 03/23/16 Page 7 of 7