Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01818/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01818-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STYAUNO CARTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MIGUEL LOPEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

1: 14-cv-01818-AWI-GSA

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Styauno Carter (―Plaintiff‖), appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis, 

filed the complaint in this action on November 20, 2014. Doc. 1. Plaintiff brings a claim 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Fresno County Public Defenders‘ office, Miguel Lopez, 

an attorney at the Public Defender‘s Office, and an unnamed court-appointed attorney and 

investigator from Ciummo and Associates, the alternate public defender for Fresno County 

(collectively, ―Defendants‖). Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his 

constitutional rights in the course of representing him in a criminal action evidently pending in 

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the Fresno County Superior Court. Upon an initial review of Plaintiff‘s complaint for legal 

sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court recommends that the complaint be 

dismissed in its entirety, without leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

A. Screening Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must conduct an initial review of the 

complaint for sufficiency to state a claim. The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof 

if it determines that the action is legally ―frivolous or malicious,‖ fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to 

amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies in the complaint can be cured by 

amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

A complaint must contain ―a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, 

but ―[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.‖ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth ―sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to  ̳state a claim that is plausible on its face.‘‖ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). More specifically, the plaintiff must present sufficient factual 

allegations as to each claim against each defendant. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short 

of meeting Iqbal’s plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

While well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 

S.Ct. at 1949.

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Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs ―must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.‖ Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 

pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). Accordingly, pro se 

plaintiffs are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his public defender

(Miguel Lopez), the Fresno County Public Defenders‘ office, and an unnamed court-appointed 

attorney and investigator from the alternate public defender‘s office (Ciummo and Associates), all 

of whom apparently represented him—or, in the case of the investigator, worked at the direction 

of Plaintiff‘s attorney—in a criminal case pending in the Fresno County Superior Court. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that ―[t]he Defendants have violated [his] civil rights to due process 

and equal protection under the law and the right to adequate and effective representation.‖ Doc. 1 

at 3. Plaintiff seeks an ―injunctive order, compelling the investigation of legal malpractice 

regarding the criminal case proceedings and illegal pleas as well as misconduct by officers of the 

Court.‖ Doc. 1 at 4. In addition, Plaintiff seeks ―professional sanctions‖ and ―monetary damages 

equal to lost wages and punitive damages based on preventable incarceration.‖ Doc. 1 at 4. 

C. Analysis

1. The Defendants Cannot be Liable under § 1983 Because they are not Sate Actors

The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) 

the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured 

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by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff ―must 

allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must 

show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law‖). 

Plaintiff asserts that he was denied due process and equal protection, as well as competent 

assistance of counsel, by his public defender and other court-appointed counsel, in the course of 

their representation of him. It is well-settled, however, that attorneys do ―not act under color of 

state law when performing a lawyer‘s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding.‖ Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (upholding dismissal of a § 1983 

claim brought by a pro se prisoner against a public defender alleging that the defender failed to 

adequately represent him in criminal proceedings);

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accord Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 

1291–92 (2009); Miranda v. Clark County of Nevada, 319 F. 3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(upholding dismissal of a § 1983 complaint on the basis that public defender was acting in his 

role as plaintiff‘s attorney, whereby he was not representing the interests of the state). Thus, 

Plaintiff does not state a cognizable § 1983 claim against Attorney Lopez, the public defender‘s 

office, or his court-appointed attorney from the alternate public defender‘s office. Similarly, 

Plaintiff cannot state a claim against his court-appointed investigator, as an investigator is subject 

to the direction of the attorney in the course of the attorney performing his traditional function.

2. Plaintiff’s § 1983 action is Subject to the Heck Bar

Even if Plaintiff were able to plausibly allege that the Defendants were state actors, 

Plaintiff‘s action is barred pursuant to the Heck doctrine. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme 

Court held that a plaintiff may not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for ―allegedly 

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,‖ unless he first proved that the 

conviction or sentence has been ―reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

 

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 In Polk County, the Court reaffirmed that ―a person acts under color of state law only when exercising power 

 ̳possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state 

law.‘‖ Id. at 317–18 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Representing a client, the Court 

said, ―is essentially a private function ... for which state office and authority are not needed.‖ Id. at 454 U.S. at 319.

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declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question 

by a federal court‘s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.‖ Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). The Heck bar was again addressed by the Supreme Court in 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005). The Court reiterated that a § 1983 action was not 

cognizable if success in the action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of an outstanding 

criminal judgment, conviction or sentence. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82. Wilkinson further 

clarified that although Heck dealt with a § 1983 suit for damages, the Heck bar applies to § 1983 

actions ―no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief)...if success in that action would 

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.‖ Id. (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff seeks an injunction regarding his ―illegal plea‖ as well monetary damages for his 

―preventable incarceration.‖ Doc. 1 at 4. Although, the procedural history of Plaintiff‘s criminal 

case is not entirely clear from the complaint, Plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 action that would 

call into question the validity of his conviction or sentence until such time as he can prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal or undermined by the issuance of writ 

of habeas corpus. Accordingly, given the posture of Plaintiff‘s criminal case, he cannot presently 

state a cognizable claim under § 1983.2

3. The Deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint Cannot be Cured by Amendment

Finally, the deficiencies in Plaintiff‘s complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Not only 

is Plaintiff barred from proceeding until his conviction and/or sentence are overturned, Plaintiff 

cannot cure the deficiencies in his claim against his attorneys and investigator by alleging 

additional facts. Regarding his § 1983 claim, it is a matter of settled law that the Defendants, in 

representing Plaintiff in his criminal action, are not state actors. Thus, this deficiency in the 

complaint cannot be remedied by supplying additional facts concerning the quality of 

Defendants‘ representation of Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff‘s 

complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 

 

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Plaintiff‘s complaint, filed on November 20, 2014, alleges that the misconduct at issue took place ―from February 

of 2014 to present,‖ during the pendency of the Plaintiff‘s criminal case at the trial-court level. Doc. 1 at 3. 

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RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court recommends that Plaintiff‘s complaint be 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to state a cognizable claim.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the District Court Judge assigned to 

this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Within thirty (30) days after the date of these

Findings and Recommendation, the parties may file written objections with the Court. The 

document should be captioned ―Objections to Magistrate Judge‘s Findings and 

Recommendation.‖ The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court‘s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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