Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00040/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00040-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER ANAYA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDCR,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:16-cv-00040-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM

(ECF No. 127)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING 

MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 95.) He has 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) No other parties have appeared 

in the action.

On February 22, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, and his first, 

second, and third amended complaints, on the ground that none of the complaints were 

complete in themselves without reference to other pleadings. (ECF No. 111.) On March 

Case 1:16-cv-00040-MJS Document 129 Filed 12/08/16 Page 1 of 13
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22, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint for failure to state a 

claim, but gave leave to amend. (ECF No. 116.) On June 17, 2016, the Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint and “supplemental complaint” on the ground that 

neither was complete in itself without reference to the other. (ECF No. 124.) On 

September 21, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s sixth amended complaint for failure 

to state a claim. (ECF No. 126.) Plaintiff’s seventh amended complaint (ECF No. 127) is 

before the Court for screening.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion 

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

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1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility 

(“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California, where the acts giving rise to his complaint occurred. 

He names the following defendants in their individual and official capacities: 

(1) Lieutenant W.S. Wadkins, (2) Correctional Officer T. Lucero, (3) Correctional Officer 

S. Nelson, and (4) Correctional Officer A. Tuzon.

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

Defendants use CDCR computers and confidential mental health records to 

violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and the Privacy Act. Wadkins is the primary culprit 

in this scheme. Lucero stole a password in order to gain access to Plaintiff’s file and 

shared it with Wadkins. The Defendants removed Plaintiff’s mental health records from 

2001 to the present and shared them with all staff and inmates. They typed false 

information in his mental health files indicating that Plaintiff sexually abused a child and 

was himself a victim of sexual abuse. In fact, Plaintiff has no history of sexual offenses 

and his offense involving a child was non-sexual. This conduct also constitutes libel, 

slander, and defamation. 

Additionally, the Defendants have failed to process his grievances, obstructed his 

access to the courts, censored his mail, harassed him and called him names.

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Defendants have used the public address system and med call line to call Plaintiff 

names. They have used “unusual gestures” toward Plaintiff. At chow time, Tuzon has 

told Plaintiff to “go ahead” into the chow hall, while Plaintiff interprets as a “risqué”

“double entendre.”

Defendants have installed “bugs,” or concealed hearing devices to eavesdrop on 

Plaintiff. Correctional Officers follow Plaintiff wherever he goes. Plaintiff’s bunk is 

regularly searched and left in disarray.

Plaintiff’s food tray was contaminated with feces for twenty-one days. This 

“apparently” was the result of actions taken by Defendants due to stigma associated with 

the false allegation that Plaintiff had committed a sexual offense against a child.

Plaintiff’s attempts to appeal these issues through the prison’s administrative 

process have been thwarted.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and money damages.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff’s seventh amended complaint suffers from many of the same defects as 

his earlier complaints. Plaintiff has been advised of the legal standards applicable to his 

claims, but has failed to cure noted defects. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s 

allegations continue to fail to state a claim. As leave to amend appears to be futile, 

further such leave will be denied.

A. Implausible Allegations

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations generally must be accepted as true. 

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) accords judges the authority to “pierce the veil of 

the complaint’s factual allegations” and to dismiss claims “describing fantastic or 

delusional scenarios.” See Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Thus, the 

Court may dismiss claims that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.”

See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992).

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Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants are following him and are eavesdropping on 

him through hidden devices are too implausible, outlandish, and far-fetched to be 

believed. These allegations will be dismissed as frivolous.

B. Inaccurate Prison Records

The due process clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without 

due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a 

cause of action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish 

the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Liberty interests may 

arise from the due process clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 

466-68 (1983).

The inaccuracy of records compiled or maintained by the government is not, 

standing alone, sufficient to state a claim of constitutional injury under the due process 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-714 (1976); see 

also Reyes v. Supervisor of DEA, 834 F.2d 1093, 1097 (1st Cir. 1987) (no claim 

presented where inmate failed to allege false information maintained by police 

department relied upon to deprive him of constitutionally protected interest); Pruett v. 

Levi, 622 F.2d 256, 258 (6th Cir. 1980) (mere existence of inaccuracy in FBI criminal

files not state constitutional claim). 

The existence of a liberty interest created by state law is determined by focusing 

on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). 

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint 

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Plaintiff does not allege how or whether the state of 

California has created a liberty interest in accurate prison records. The Court is unaware 

of any decision holding that inmates have such a right. Further, plaintiff does not allege 

whether he has fulfilled any procedural requirements for challenging the accuracy of his 

prison record. In addition, because the alleged misstatement is included in his 

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confidential files, it is unclear how such misinformation might be relied upon so as to rise 

to the level of a constitutional violation.

The Court understands that the alleged misstatements are sexual in nature and 

may subject Plaintiff to stigma. However, even classifying Plaintiff as a sex offender is 

insufficient to implicate a liberty interest, absent other circumstances suggesting an 

atypical and significant hardship. See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 

1997) (“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of the attachment of the ‘sex offender’ label 

coupled with the subjection of the targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program 

whose successful completion is a precondition for parole eligibility create the kind of 

deprivations of liberty that require procedural protections.”); see also Cooper v. Garcia, 

55 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Johnson v. Gomez, No. C95-20717 RMW, 

1996 WL 107275, at *2-5 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Brooks v. McGrath, No. C 95-3390 SI, 1995 

WL 733675, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that these 

misstatements create an atypical and significant hardship are insufficient.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants have made inaccurate entries in 

his confidential records fails to state a claim.

C. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 

protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 

omitted). “[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying 

humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk 

of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 

it.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

A conditions of confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective 

component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be . . . 

sufficiently serious,” and must “result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) “[E]xtreme 

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deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).

Second, the prison official must have acted with “deliberate indifference” to inmate 

health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish 

liability.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, a plaintiff must 

show that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an excessive risk to inmate health or 

safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, “the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.” Id.

1. Contaminated Food Tray

Plaintiff alleges that his food tray was contaminated with feces. Plaintiff believes 

this was the result of deliberate actions taken against Plaintiff due to the stigma 

associated with false allegations that Plaintiff committed a sexual offense against a child. 

Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. 

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). While prison food need not be tasty 

or aesthetically pleasing, it must be adequate to maintain health. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 

F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993). “The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign 

objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a 

constitutional deprivation.” Id. (citing Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 

(11th Cir. 1985); see also George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[A] single 

incident of unintended food poisoning, whether suffered by one or many prisoners at an 

institution, does not constitute a violation of the constitutional rights of the affected 

prisoners.”); Islam v. Jackson, 782 F. Supp. 1111, 1114-15 (E.D. Va.1992) (serving one 

meal contaminated with maggots and meals under unsanitary conditions for thirteen 

days was not cruel and unusual punishment, even though inmate suffered symptoms of 

food poisoning on one occasion); Bennett v. Misner, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19568 at 

*63, 2004 WL 2091473 (D. Or. Sept. 17, 2004) (“Neither isolated instances of food 

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poisoning, temporary lapses in sanitary food service, nor service of meals contaminated 

with maggots are sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”)

Plaintiff alleges that his food was contaminated with feces for a period of twentyone days. This is a sufficiently serious deprivation to support a conditions of confinement 

claim. However, he does not allege any facts to show whether any of the Defendants 

personally contaminated his food. Nor does he state facts that would show Defendants 

were aware of the contamination by others but failed to act. His belief that Defendants 

were involved in the contamination appears to be based entirely on speculation. 

Accordingly, this allegation fails to state a claim. (They might also be subject to rejection 

as implausible and thus frivolous, but the Court need not reach that issue here.)

2. Emotional Distress

As an initial matter, under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), enacted as part of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act of 1996, “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner 

confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. . . .” Id. Thus, in order 

to pursue damages based on mental or emotional injury, plaintiff must demonstrate that 

he sustained an actual physical injury. Plaintiff has alleged no such injury here. Plaintiff’s 

mere reference to “physical ailments” that may or may not have any relation to 

Defendants’ conduct is insufficient to support his claims.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations that he suffered emotional distress

and that Defendants failed to address his mental health needs are insufficient to allege a 

substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff also has not alleged that any Defendant was 

aware of a substantial risk but failed to take action to avoid or abate it. 

3. Name Calling

Mere verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a constitutional 

deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th 

Cir. 1987). 

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D. Grievance Process

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed or refused to process his administrative 

grievances. 

As Plaintiff already has been advised, this allegation fails to state a claim. 

Prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance 

process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Failing to properly process a grievance does not constitute 

a due process violation.

To the extent Plaintiff argues that Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s complaints, in 

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the denial of a prisoner’s administrative appeal

generally does not cause or contribute to the underlying violation. George v. Smith, 507 

F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). However, prison administrators 

cannot willfully turn a blind eye to constitutional violations being committed by 

subordinates. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, there may be 

limited circumstances in which those involved in reviewing an inmate appeal can be held 

liable under section 1983. That circumstance has not been presented here. Plaintiff has 

not stated a viable constitutional claim against any other Defendant. Absent facts 

sufficient to show that a constitutional violation occurred in the first place, Plaintiff cannot 

pursue a claim for review of the administrative appeal grieving the underlying allegations.

E. Access to Courts

Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts, and prison officials may 

not actively interfere with his right to litigate. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 

(9th Cir. 2011). The right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil 

rights actions. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). Claims for denial of access to 

the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be 

gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot 

now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 

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(2002). A plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual injury” i.e., prejudice with 

respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing 

deadline or present a non-frivolous claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-49. An “actual injury” is 

one that hinders the plaintiff’s ability to pursue a legal claim. Id. at 351. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim. The Court notes that the basis for 

Plaintiff’s access to courts claim is unclear. To the extent it is based on improper 

processing of his grievances, Plaintiff has failed to allege any actual injury as he has 

thus far been permitted to proceed in this action despite his assertions that he has been 

unable to exhaust administrative remedies.

F. Equal Protection

Plaintiff states that his Equal Protection rights have been violated.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 

(1985). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a 

protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of 

Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Lazy Y 

Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of 

Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff has not set forth any allegations indicating that he and other similarly 

situated individuals were treated differently, whether by virtue of Plaintiff’s membership in 

a protected class or otherwise. He merely alleges that he is a member of a protected 

class and that he was treated differently than others similarly situated without a rational 

basis. He does not allege the nature of the class, nor the nature of the discrimination. He 

has failed to state an Equal Protection claim. 

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G. Fourteenth Amendment Defamation

Defamation can, under certain circumstances, constitute a claim for relief under 

the Fourteenth Amendment. However, reputational harm alone does not state a § 1983 

claim. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-710 (1976). Instead, a plaintiff must allege loss 

of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in conjunction with the allegation 

of injury to reputation. Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1532 (9th Cir.1991), aff'd in

relevant part, 963 F.2d 1220, 1235 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 

Plaintiff does not describe any constitutionally protected interest he was deprived 

of in connection with the injury to his reputation. He fails to state a constitutional 

defamation claim.

H. Cell Searches

An inmate has no “reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell entitling him 

to the protection of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984). Plaintiff’s allegation that his cell 

is frequently searched fails to state a claim.

I. Privacy Act

The Privacy Act provides a private cause of action against federal agencies for 

violating the Act’s provisions. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004); 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a(g)(1). The Privacy Act prohibits, with certain exceptions, the disclosure by an 

agency of “any record which is contained within a system of records” without the prior 

written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).

No federal agency is named in this action or implicated by the facts Plaintiff 

alleges. This allegation fails to state a claim.

J. State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s claims for libel, slander, defamation, and harassment arise under state 

law. Plaintiff’s claim under California Government Code Section 12940 also arises under 

state law. 

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The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim 

absent a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust 

v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. 

Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994). “When . . . the court dismisses the 

federal claim leaving only state claims for resolution, the court should decline jurisdiction 

over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” Les Shockley Racing v. 

National Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged any cognizable federal claims, the Court will not 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman 

Family Revocable Trust, 254 F.3d at 805.

K. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff once again names each of the Defendants in their individual and official 

capacities. 

“Official capacity” suits require that a policy or custom of the governmental entity 

is the moving force behind the violation. McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 783 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Plaintiff has not alleged what custom or policy, if any, motivated Defendants’ 

conduct. His bare, conclusory allegations that a custom or policy exists is insufficient. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief but does not allege a custom or policy behind any 

violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief against Defendants in 

their official capacities.

V. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s seventh amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. He 

previously was advised of pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct 

them. He failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and will

be denied. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim;

2. Dismissal counts as a strike pursuant to the “three strikes” provision set 

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forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the 

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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