Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00070/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00070-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 11cv70 JLS(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD EARL GEORGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. URIBE, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 11cv70 JLS(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 23]

Plaintiff Richard Earl George, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, and proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint on January

12, 2011, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1]. On March 21,

2011, United States District Judge Janis L. Sammartino dismissed

Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915A(b), and gave him leave to file an amended complaint [ECF

No. 3]. Plaintiff timely filed a First Amended Complaint against

Warden Domingo Uribe and various correctional officers at Centinela

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1

 Because the First Amended Complaint is not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite to the document using the page

numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

2 11cv70 JLS(RBB)

State Prison (“Centinela”), alleging his constitutional rights were

violated when he was attacked by another inmate on January 8, 2010,

while housed at Centinela. (First Am. Compl. 3,1 ECF No. 5.) On

August 5, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the First

Amended Complaint [ECF No. 23]. On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff

George filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of

Plaintiff [ECF No. 26]. Shortly thereafter, he filed a declaration

in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 29]. 

Defendants did not file a reply. 

The Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is suitable

for resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). 

After reviewing the First Amended Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss,

and Plaintiff’s Memorandum and George’s subsequently filed

Declaration, the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on January 8, 2010, while incarcerated

at Centinela State Prison, he was attacked by other inmates in the

prison yard. (First Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff alleges

that on that date, prison staff at Centinela conducted security

training exercises and that Defendant Captain Hernandez was in

charge of the exercise on facility C yard. (Id.) George claims

that Defendant Hernandez ordered prison staff to keep inmates from

entering the security area unless the inmate had a written entry

pass and identification. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants

Valasquez and Alvarado allowed two inmates, Whiting and Hayes, to

breach security and enter the yard in order to assault Plaintiff. 

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(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that Valasquez and Alvarado watched

the assault from the side wall of the facility four building. 

(Id.) George further claims Sergeant Valasquez was the head yard

officer in charge of all yard staff. (Id. at 6.) 

Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant Farias observed four

inmates, including Plaintiff, fighting on yard two, Farias

allegedly radioed for a “code response” and activated the yard

alarm. (Id. at 4.) Farias ordered all inmates to the ground over

the public address system; however, Plaintiff did not comply. 

(Id.) George claims he received a blow to back of the head and was

struck in the torso area with a fist by inmates. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Carvajal responded to the

radio call made by Defendant Farias and observed Plaintiff and

another inmate preparing to fight each other. (Id.) Carvajal

ordered both inmates to get down on the ground. (Id.) George

allegedly hesitated at first, but eventually complied. (Id.) 

Defendant Carvajal then cuffed Plaintiff and escorted him to a

holding cell before placing him in administrative segregation

housing. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lopez,

Hernandez, and other staff members met to write a fraudulent report

regarding the inmates’ participation in a riot in order to cover up

staff’s negligence and security breach. (Id.) 

George maintains that he asked to see a nurse for his

injuries, and the nurse discovered a golf-ball-sized bump behind

his left ear. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that he experienced a

headache and blurry vision from the incident; he was prescribed

pain relief medication and eye drops, and was scheduled to see an

optometrist. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was diagnosed with

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post-traumatic stress disorder syndrome as a result of the assault. 

(Id.) 

In his Amended Complaint, George maintains that Defendant

Valenzuela was the senior hearing officer conducting the subsequent

115 rules violation hearing, and Valenzuela recommended that George

receive a four-month SHU (segregated housing unit) term. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Valenzuela violated department rules and

regulations by interfering with Plaintiff’s assigned hearing

incident investigator. (Id.) Plaintiff states that Defendant

Gutierrez was his assigned investigator. (Id. at 7.) Gutierrez is

alleged to have shared Plaintiff’s witness questionnaire with

Defendant Valenzuela before the hearing so that Valenzuela could

instruct Gutierrez not to ask certain questions that may show staff

negligence and a breach of security. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Calderon was the chief disciplinary officer,

recommended the amount of time for Plaintiff’s disciplinary action,

and ordered Plaintiff to be transferred from Centinela in an effort

to cover up staff negligence. (Id.) George claims that Defendant

Warden Uribe signed off on the documents and is responsible for

staff’s actions. (Id.)

These allegations form the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint for

violation of the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and civil

conspiracy. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

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Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula --

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit -- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, __, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there “is no

cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged

to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

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The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged.”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194,

1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay Television Ltd. v.

Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). “The

focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” 

Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes consideration of

“new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to

a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing

Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993)).

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc., 51 F.3d

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at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

1980)). The court may also consider documents “‘whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s]

pleading.’” Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

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defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where

amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial

of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2010); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986).

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Uribe, Hernandez, Lopez, Valasquez, Farias,

Valenzuela, Gutierrez, Alvarado, Calderon, and Carvajal move to

dismiss George's First Amended Complaint in its entirety for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Mot.

Dismiss 1, ECF No. 23.) The Defendants also assert that they are

entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9.)

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A. Prison Yard Defendants (Farias, Carvajal, Valasquez, Alvarado,

Lopez and Hernandez)

George has alleged that Defendants failed to protect him from

an inmate attack in the prison yard in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (First Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 5.) 

1. Eighth Amendment Claim: Failure to Protect

"[T]he treatment a prisoner receives and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The

Eighth Amendment "requires that inmates be furnished with the basic

human needs, one of which is 'reasonable safety.'" Id. at 33

(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.

189, 200 (1989)). Therefore, an inmate has a right to be protected

from violence while in custody. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

833 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000);

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

"Prison officials must take reasonable steps to protect inmates

from physical abuse." Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th

Cir. 1982). When the state takes a person into custody, the

Constitution imposes a duty to assume some responsibility for his

safety and well-being. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 1005. 

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must

show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner's safety. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; see Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1995); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267-68 (N.D. Cal.

1995). The prison official is only liable when two requirements

are met; one is objective, and the other is subjective. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; see Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir.

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2009). The purported violation must be objectively "sufficiently

serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). In addition, the prison official must

subjectively "know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety." Id. at 837.

"First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were

aware of a 'substantial risk of serious harm' to an inmate's health

or safety. Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837) (footnote omitted). This may be satisfied if the prisoner

establishes that the risk posed by the violation was "obvious." 

Id. A plaintiff need not show that an "individual prison official

had specific knowledge that harsh treatment of a particular inmate,

in particular circumstances, would have a certain outcome." Id.

"Rather, [courts] measure what is 'obvious' in light of reason and

the basic general knowledge that a prison official may be presumed

to have obtained regarding the type of deprivation involved." Id.

at 1151 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). For example, if a

substantial risk of inmate attacks was "longstanding, pervasive,

well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the

past," and the defendant "had been exposed to information

concerning the risk and thus 'must have known' about it," a trier

of fact could find defendant had actual knowledge of the risk. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted); see also Thomas, 611

F.3d at 1151. 

"Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no

'reasonable' justification for the deprivation, in spite of that

risk." Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51 (footnote omitted) (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844). "[P]rison officials who actually knew of

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a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free

from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if

the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

The Court will consider the subjective component of the Eighth

Amendment inquiry as it applies to each Defendant separately. See

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The prisoner

must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant's

deliberate indifference.").

2. Defendants Alvarado and Valasquez

George’s failure-to-protect claim against Defendants Alvarado

and Valasquez is based on the allegation that they allowed two

inmates to enter the yard to attack Plaintiff. (First Am. Compl.

4, ECF No. 5.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants Valasquez and

Alvarado allowed inmates Whiting and Hayes to breach security and

enter the yard in order to assault him. (Id.) George also alleges

that Valasquez and Alvarado then watched the assault from the side

wall of the facility four building. (Id. at 6.) In their Motion

to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged

sufficient facts to state a claim against Alvarado and Valasquez

for violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 23.) Defendants point out that Plaintiff

does not offer any facts to support an inference that either

Defendant was aware of a threat to Plaintiff’s safety. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s claim against Alvarado and Valasquez appears to

center around the allegation that Defendants gave inmates Whiting

and Hayes access to the yard, and the inmates subsequently attacked

George. This allegation alone, however, is insufficient to state a

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2 Because the response in opposition is not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite to the document using the page

numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

12 11cv70 JLS(RBB)

claim against Defendants Alvarado and Valasquez for failure to

protect under the Eighth Amendment. 

The First Amended Complaint does not state any facts to

support an inference that Defendants had “more than a mere

suspicion that an attack will occur.” Kincheloe, 794 F.2d at 459. 

Specifically, George does not plead any facts to explain why the

two inmates posed a threat to Plaintiff. In his opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss, George concedes that he did not view the inmates

who attacked him as enemies. ([Opp’n] Mem. P. & A. 7,2

 ECF No.

26.) Plaintiff also fails to explain how the Defendants could have

known that inmate Hayes would attack George. He does not allege

any documented past attacks that would have put officials on notice

of the risk to Plaintiff’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

Plaintiff argues that the special training staff conducted on

the day of the attack was “geared to prevent” such an incident, and

the events were the result of “gross negligence.” ([Opp’n] Mem. P.

& A. 7, ECF No. 26.) To the extent George contends that Alvarado

and Valasquez were negligent in allowing the incident to occur, he

fails to establish a claim for deliberate indifference. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of

mind more blameworthy than negligence.”). To state a claim under

the Eighth Amendment, George must show that Defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to

his safety. Id. at 834. Deliberate indifference requires

defendants to know of, and disregard, an excessive risk to

plaintiff’s safety. Id. at 837. Here, Plaintiff does not plead

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any facts that would indicate that inmates Whiting and Hayes

presented a substantial risk to his safety or that Defendants

Alvarado and Valasquez were aware of that risk. 

George’s allegation that Defendants Alvarado and Valasquez

watched the inmate fight from an “out-of-bounds area” is

insufficient, by itself, to state a claim for deliberate

indifference. (First Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 5.) George concedes

that Defendants Farias and Carvajal intervened to stop the fight

between George and Hayes by activating the alarm and directing all

inmates to get to the ground. (Id.) Plaintiff has not alleged

that Defendants Alvarado and Valasquez were in a better position

than Farias and Carvajal to stop the inmate fight. George’s

allegations against Alvarado and Valasquez, as stated in the First

Amended Complaint, are insufficient to support a claim against

these Defendants for failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff may be able to state a claim for deliberate indifference

against these Defendants if he can articulate additional facts that

support an inference that Defendants Alvarado and Valasquez were

aware that allowing inmates Whiting and Hayes into the C yard

presented a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety and that

Defendants disregarded this risk. Accordingly, the Motion to

Dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Alvarado and

Valasquez should be granted with leave to amend.

3. Defendants Farias and Carvajal

Plaintiff’s allegations against Farias and Carvajal are based

on the events that occurred after the attack. George alleges that

when Defendant Farias observed Plaintiff fighting with other

inmates on yard two, he radioed for a code response, activated the

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yard alarm, and ordered all inmates to the ground over the public

address system. (First Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 5.) George contends

that Defendant Carvajal responded to Farias’s radio call and

observed Plaintiff and another inmate, Bryon Hayes, preparing to

fight each other. (Id. at 5.) Carvajal allegedly ordered the

inmates to get on the ground, and Plaintiff eventually complied. 

(Id.) Carvajal then handcuffed Plaintiff and escorted him to a

holding cell. (Id.) 

Defendants Farias and Carvajal argue that Plaintiff has not

alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against them for

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 3, ECF No. 23.) George must allege that Defendants were

aware of a "substantial risk of serious harm" to Plaintiff. 

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150. Deliberate indifference requires an

actual perception of risk. Bonty v. Ramsey, No. C 10–5360 LHK

(PR), 2011 WL 6330656, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011); see also

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836 & n.4. 

The standard does not require that the guard or official

"'believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to

attack another at a given place at a time certain before

that officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such

an assault. But, on the other hand, he must have more

than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.'"

Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting State

Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1983)). 

Advance notification is not a necessary element of an Eighth

Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 849. 

Plaintiff’s allegations, without more, do not support a

failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth Amendment against

Defendants Farias and Carvajal. George has not alleged that either

Farias or Carvajal was aware of a 'substantial risk of serious

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the Court’s electronic case filing system.

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harm' to Plaintiff’s health or safety before the attack occurred. 

See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51. In fact, nothing in the First

Amended Complaint or in the opposition indicates that Defendants

Farias and Carvajal were involved in the events leading up to the

attack. Nor has the Plaintiff alleged that Defendants disregarded

the risk to George by failing to take reasonable measures to stop

the inmate fight. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846-47 & n.9. On the

contrary, George acknowledges that Farias intervened by activating

the alarm and directing all inmates to get to the ground. (First

Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 5.) Similarly, Carvajal responded to the

radio call made by Farias to stop the fight between George and

Hayes. (Id. at 5.) 

In his supplemental opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,

George contends that Defendants had knowledge of the threat “on Cyard” because of “numerous [sic] training activity that took place”

on that day. (Decl. George 4,3 ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff does not

explain how the training exercise conducted by the prison put

Defendants on notice of a potential threat to his safety. To

survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must plead “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, __, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Here, George does not offer

sufficient facts to support an inference that Defendants Farias and

Carvajal perceived an actual risk of harm to George. 

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants “covered up” staff’s

negligence and conspired in failing to protect him from the attack. 

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([Opp’n] Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF. No. 26.) George also contends that

Defendants created an untruthful report as a part of their

conspiracy to avoid liability for the incident. (Id. at 2-3.) The

Court addresses Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claims separately

below. Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Farias or

against Defendant Carvajal for violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Accordingly, the court should grant the motion to dismiss the

Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Farias and Carvajal with

leave to amend. 

4. Defendants Lopez and Hernandez

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lopez met with Defendant

Hernandez and other staff members to prepare a fraudulent report

about the incident in order to cover up staff’s negligence. (First

Am. Compl. 5, ECF No. 5.) Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s

failure-to-protect claims, arguing that Lopez and Hernandez were

not deliberately indifferent to George’s needs, because they did

not become involved in the incident until after the altercation on

the yard occurred. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF

No. 23.) In his opposition, George contends that Lopez and

Hernandez were the “lead authority” on the C yard on the day of the

incident. ([Opp’n] Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No. 26.)

A plaintiff may state a claim for deliberate indifference

against a supervisor based on the supervisor's knowledge of, and

acquiescence in, unconstitutional conduct by his or her

subordinates. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 

"A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 'if

there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the

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constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.'" Id. (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th

Cir. 1989)). "The inquiry into causation must be individualized

and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a

constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d at 633. 

George’s contention that Defendants Lopez and Hernandez were

in charge of the C yard on the day he was attacked is insufficient

to support a causal connection between Defendants’ actions and his

alleged injury. Specifically, Plaintiff does not explain which

actions or omissions by Defendants related to their authority over

the yard and deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. 

Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. Nor does George plead any facts that

indicate that Lopez or Hernandez knew or acquiesced in the wrongful

conduct of others. Id. Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendants Lopez and Hernandez should be dismissed with

leave to amend. 

B. Disciplinary Hearing Defendants (Gutierrez, Valenzuela, Lopez,

Hernandez)

George also alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated during the disciplinary hearing and imposition of

punishment, because he was not treated equally. (First Am. Compl.

11, ECF No. 5.) 

1. Fourteenth Amendment

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

ensures that similarly situated persons are treated alike. City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

This right extends to prisoners. Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

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556 (1974). The equal protection guarantee safeguards not only

groups of people, but also individuals who would constitute a

"class of one." Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564

(2000). 

A plaintiff can establish an equal protection violation by

demonstrating that the defendant intentionally discriminated on the

basis of plaintiff's membership in a protected class, such as race,

religion, national origin, and poverty. Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1998); Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob.

Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th Cir. 1986); see United States v.

Whitlock, 639 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that prisoners

do not constitute a suspect class for equal protection purposes). 

Alternatively, if the state action does not implicate a fundamental

right or a suspect classification, a plaintiff can make an equal

protection claim by establishing that the defendant intentionally

treated plaintiff differently from other similarly situated

individuals without a rational basis for the difference in

treatment. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601

(2008); Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. 

2. Defendants Gutierrez and Valenzuela

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gutierrez was the assigned

investigator for the inmate fight incident, and Defendant

Valenzuela was a senior hearing officer who conducted Plaintiff’s

disciplinary hearing. (First Am. Compl. 2, 7, ECF No. 5.) 

George’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against these Defendants is

premised on the assertion that Gutierrez shared Plaintiff’s witness

questionnaire with Valenzuela before the hearing, which allowed

Valenzuela to instruct Gutierrez not to ask certain questions that

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may incriminate staff. (Id. at 7.) Defendants move to dismiss

this claim, arguing that these allegations do not support a

constitutional violation. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7,

ECF No. 23.) Gutierrez and Valenzuela also contend that they were

complying with California Code of Regulations, title 15, sections

3318 and 3315, when they discussed the findings prior to the

disciplinary hearing and when Valenzuela ruled on the relevancy of

some questions to the rules violation. (Id.) 

Section 3318, entitled “Assistance to Inmates for Serious Rule

Violations,” provides for an investigative employee designated to

gather information and “[s]ubmit a written report to the senior

hearing officer . . . to include witness statements and a summary

of the information collected specific to the violation charged.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3318(a). The inmate has the right to

ask questions of the witnesses at the hearing, however, the senior

hearing officer must “screen all questions to ensure they are

relevant to the violation charged.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3315(e)(5). 

Defendants also point out that because Plaintiff pleaded

guilty to the rules violation charge, it is unclear how any of the

Defendants involved in his hearing could have violated Plaintiff’s

rights. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 23.) At

the hearing, George pleaded guilty to willfully participating in a

riot with use of force, in violation of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3005(d)(1), and he testified that he retaliated to defend himself

after he was struck on the back of his head. (See First Am. Compl.

Attach. #1 Ex. A, at 6, ECF No. 5.) 

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In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of

the right to prepare a defense for the hearing. ([Opp’n] Mem. P. &

A. 7, ECF No. 26.) To plead a procedural due process violation, an

inmate must argue that the challenged conduct “present[s] the type

of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.

472, 486 (1995). A prisoner must allege facts demonstrating an

“atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life” caused by the defendant’s procedural

omissions. See Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d

818 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient factual support

for his claim that Defendants interfered with his right to a

hearing. George was assigned an investigator and was able to

prepare questions for witnesses at the hearing. (See First Am.

Compl. Attach. #1 Ex. A, ECF No. 5.) To the extent George argues

that Defendants deprived him of his rights when Gutierrez shared

Plaintiff’s witness questionnaire with Valenzuela before the

hearing, Defendants’ actions were authorized by title 15 of

California Code of Regulations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3318(a). George’s conclusory statements regarding alleged due

process violations are not supported by the facts as pleaded in the

First Amended Complaint. While legal conclusions can provide the

complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual

allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Based on the allegations

in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

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Defendants Gutierrez or Valenzuela for violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Additionally, because George does not allege that these

Defendants were involved in the yard incident, he cannot state a

failure-to-protect claim against them. Accordingly, the district

court should grant the Motion to Dismiss the claims against

Defendants Gutierrez and Valenzuela with leave to amend.

C. Supervisory Defendants

A plaintiff may state a claim for deliberate indifference

against a supervisor based on the supervisor's knowledge of, and

acquiescence in, unconstitutional conduct by his or her

subordinates. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. "A defendant may be held

liable as a supervisor under § 1983 'if there exists either (1) his

or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or

(2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.'" Id. (quoting

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d at 646). "The inquiry into causation

must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities

of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to

have caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 

A causal connection is established if a defendant sets in

motion a series of acts by others or knowingly refuses to terminate

a series of acts by others that the supervisor reasonably should

have known would lead to a constitutional violation. Starr, 652

F.3d at 1207-08 (citing Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001)). "'A supervisor can be liable

in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction

in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for

his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct

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that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of

others.'" Id. at 1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145

F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)).

1. Warden Uribe

Plaintiff contends that, as head of the institution’s

Administrative Segregation Committee, Uribe signed off on documents

and is responsible for staff members’ actions. (First Am. Compl.

7, ECF No. 5.) Defendant Uribe moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

to support a claim against him as a supervisor. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 23.) In opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Uribe was the

“overall decision maker” for the C yard plan of operations. 

([Opp’n] Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 26.) 

The allegations in the First Amended Complaint are

insufficient to state a claim against Uribe, because George has not

provided any specific facts suggesting a causal connection between

the warden's actions and the injury to Plaintiff. See Redman v.

City of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating

that a plaintiff may state a § 1983 cause of action against a

supervisor when there is an adequate causal connection between the

defendant's breach of duty and the constitutional injury). Based

on George's generalized contentions, the requisite causal

connection cannot be reasonably inferred. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Further, there are no concrete facts

suggesting that Warden Uribe improperly supervised Defendants, or

acted with a reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s

rights. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208 ("We have held that

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'acquiescence or culpable indifference' may suffice to show that a

supervisor 'personally played a role in the alleged constitutional

violations.'")

Accordingly, Defendant Uribe's Motion to Dismiss the First

Amended Complaint should be granted. Because it is unclear whether

George could amend to allege facts sufficient to state a deliberate

indifference claim against Uribe, Plaintiff should be given leave

to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see James, 221 F.3d at 1077.

2. Defendant Calderon

 Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Calderon, the chief

disciplinary officer at Centinela, assessed the amount of time for

Plaintiff’s rules violation. (First Am. Compl. 7, ECF No. 5.) 

George also contends that Defendant Calderon was a member of the

committee that recommended Plaintiff’s transfer to a different

prison to “cover up” the incident. (Id.) Calderon moves to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him, arguing that the

documentation Plaintiff attached to the Amended Compliant does not

support these allegations. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

7, ECF No. 23.) Defendant argues that he was not involved in

George’s disciplinary hearing or disposition. (Id.) In

opposition, George contends that Defendant Calderon is a “part of

the disciplinary process” who helped cover up staff’s gross

negligence. ([Opp’n] Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No. 26.) 

 Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any specific allegations

of culpable action -- or inaction -- by Defendant Calderon. “The

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

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___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by

factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then decide

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 1949. 

Generalized allegations that Defendant Calderon was part of

the disciplinary process are insufficient to state a claim against

him for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally,

because George has not alleged that Defendant Calderon was involved

in the inmate fight incident, he cannot state a claim for violation

of the Eighth Amendment against this Defendant. The allegations in

the First Amended Complaint fail to state a claim against Defendant

Calderon for violation of the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments. 

Accordingly, Defendant Calderon’s Motion to Dismiss the claims

against him should be granted with leave to amend. 

D. Civil Conspiracy

“A plaintiff can state a conspiracy to violate civil rights

claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985.” Deadmon

v. Grannis, Case No. 06cv1382-LAB-WMC, 2008 WL 595883, at *12 (S.D.

Cal. Feb. 29, 2008) (citing Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409,

413 (9th Cir. 1988)). Section 1985 requires “an allegation of

racial or class-based discriminatory animus.” Klingele, 849 F.2d

at 413; see also RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d

1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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Here, it does not appear that § 1985 is applicable, because

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not allege a racial or other

discriminatory motive. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired

to cover up actions by Defendants Valasquez and Alvarado which led

to George being assaulted by inmates Whiting and Hayes. (First Am.

Compl. 9, ECF No. 5.) George also contends that Defendant Lopez

met with Defendant Hernandez and other staff to prepare a

fraudulent report about the incident. (Id. at 5.) 

To prove a conspiracy in violation of § 1983, a plaintiff must

show the following: (1) an agreement between the defendants to

deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right; (2) an overt act

in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) a constitutional

violation. See Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839,

856-57 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850,

853 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit applies a heightened

pleading standard to conspiracy claims under § 1983 and has held

that mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy (i.e. a bare

allegation that a defendant "conspired" with another) are

insufficient to state a claim. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d

1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968

F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d

1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, "[t]o state a claim for a

conspiracy to violate one's constitutional rights under section

1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the

existence of the claimed conspiracy." Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883

F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 679 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs must

allege facts which are "specific and concrete enough to enable the

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defendants to prepare a response”); Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. A

plaintiff can meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging

"which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the

conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights even

though he does not identify which officer said or did what at which

particular time." Harris, 126 F.3d at 1196.

Although Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss acknowledges that

Plaintiff attempts to plead a conspiracy, Defendants do not address

this specific claim. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11, ECF

No. 23.) Nonetheless, they move to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint in its entirety. (Notice Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss 1, ECF No.

23.) In opposing the Motion, George argues that (1) Defendants

Farias and Carvajal conspired to cover up the inmate fight, and (2)

Defendants Gutierrez and Valenzuela conspired by fabricating false

charges against George of “willfully participating in a riot.” 

([Opp’n] Mem. P. & A. 2, 8, ECF No. 26.) 

The allegations in the First Amended Complaint do not meet the

heightened pleading requirements to allege a civil conspiracy

required by Harris v. Roderick. First, to the extent George

contends that Defendants conspired to cover up the inmate fight, he

does not allege how the Defendants conspired and how this

conspiracy led to a constitutional deprivation. In fact, Plaintiff

acknowledges that the prison officials investigated the inmate

fight. (See First Am. Compl. Attach. #1 Ex. A, ECF No. 5.) 

Secondly, although George claims that the charges against him were

fabricated, his rules violation report indicates that he pleaded

guilty to the charge. (See id. at 6.) His conclusory allegations

do not adequately establish a claim for civil conspiracy. 

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Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff alleged a claim for civil

conspiracy, it should be dismissed with leave to amend.

E. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are each entitled to qualified

immunity because they reasonably believed that their conduct was

lawful. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No. 23.) 

Defendants contend that George has not adequately alleged any

constitutional claim against them, and "reasonable correctional

officials would not have believed that following established prison

policies violated Plaintiff’s rights." (Id. at 10.) 

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from

money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080

(2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see

also Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). This

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

When considering a claim for qualified immunity, courts engage

in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show that the defendant

violated a constitutional right, and was the right clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s purported misconduct? 

Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). A right

is clearly established if its contours are so clear that a

reasonable official would understand his conduct was unlawful in

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the situation he confronted. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199-

1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). This standard ensures

that government officials are on notice of the illegality of their

conduct before they are subjected to suit. Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation omitted). “This is not to say that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the

very action in question has previously been held unlawful . . . .” 

Id.

“[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see

also Delia, 621 F.3d at 1075 (citing Brooks v. Seattle, 599 F.3d

1018, 1022 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010); Bull v. City & County of San

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010)). “If the Officers’

actions do not amount to a constitutional violation, the violation

was not clearly established, or their actions reflected a

reasonable mistake about what the law requires, they are entitled

to qualified immunity.” Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007));

see James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236). 

Courts should generally attempt to resolve this threshold

immunity question at the earliest possible stage in the litigation

“before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult

and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation

that will 'have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236-37); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)

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(noting that the purpose of resolving immunity issues early is so

that officials are not subjected to unnecessary discovery); Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). 

Here, the Court has recommended that George’s causes of action

against Defendants be dismissed with leave to amend. Therefore,

any discussion of qualified immunity is premature until, and if,

the Plaintiff amends his Complaint. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of

Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 793-94 (2nd Cir. 2002) (explaining that ruling

on qualified immunity in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

would be premature because the issue “turns on factual questions

that cannot be resolved at this stage of the proceedings.”); see

also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (stating that government officials are

shielded from liability if their conduct does not violate a

constitutional right that was clearly established); Morley v.

Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that in light

of the fact that allegations in the complaint as accepted as true,

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds was

inappropriate). Consequently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based

on qualified immunity should be DENIED without prejudice as

premature.

VI. CONCLUSION

The district court should GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect and Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claims. Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy

claim should also be dismissed. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before March 9, 2012. The document should be captioned "Objections

to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed on or before March 16, 2012. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 17, 2012 ______________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Sammartino

All Parties of Record

Case 3:11-cv-00070-JLS-RBB Document 37 Filed 02/17/12 Page 30 of 30