Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05374/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 24, 2003 Decided July 18, 2003

No. 02-5374

ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv01285)

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were

Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kopp, Director, Thomas M. Bondy and Charles W.

Scarborough, Attorneys, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Mark E. Nagle and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys. B. Michael Rauh entered an appearance.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Elliott H. Levitas argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Dennis M. Gingold and Keith M.

Harper. George W. Austin entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Beneficiaries of Individual Indian

Money trust accounts, as a class, sued the Secretary of the

Interior and other federal officials, in their official capacities,

for breach of fiduciary duty in the management of those

accounts. In an earlier appeal, we affirmed the district

court’s holding that the officials, who serve as trusteedelegates for the federal government, had breached their

fiduciary duties, and we remanded the case to that court for

further proceedings. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (2001)

(‘‘Cobell VI’’).

In April 2001, with the consent of the parties, the district

court appointed Joseph S. Kieffer III as ‘‘Court Monitor’’ and

charged him to ‘‘monitor and review all of the Interior

defendants’ trust reform activities and file written reports of

his findings with the Court.’’ In April 2002 the court reappointed Kieffer as Court Monitor, this time over the defendants’ objection. On September 17, 2002, the court held Gale

A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, and Neal A. McCaleb,

Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, in

contempt of court, elevated Kieffer to the status of ‘‘Special

Master-Monitor,’’ and scheduled further proceedings. The

Department contends that in so doing the district court not

only erred, it took control of functions constitutionally reserved to the Executive Branch. We agree that the district

court erred, and we reverse Kieffer’s reappointment and the

citations for contempt. We lack jurisdiction, however, to

consider the Department’s contention that the court has

overstepped its authority.

I. Background

We recounted the long history of the Government’s trust

responsibilities to Native Americans in Cobell VI, and we

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therefore provide only an abbreviated version of that history

here. Pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119,

24 Stat. 388 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.),

lands that had previously been set aside for Indian tribes

were allotted to individual Indians in fixed amounts; ‘‘surplus’’ lands were opened to non-Indian settlement. The Act

created a system in which allotted lands would be held in

trust by the United States for 25 years or more, during which

period an individual account (‘‘Individual Indian Money’’ account or ‘‘IIM’’ account) would be created for each Indian

with an interest in the allotted lands. The United States

would manage the lands for the benefit of the allottees until

the expiration of the trust period, at which time each allottee

would be issued a fee patent. The Indian Reorganization Act

of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25

U.S.C. § 461 et seq.), ended the practice of allotment but

extended indefinitely the trust period for already-allotted

lands. Through the operation of these two statutes, therefore, the United States came to hold an estimated 11 million

acres of land as trustee for, and with a fiduciary duty to,

individual Indian beneficiaries. In 1994 the Congress enacted

the Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act, Pub. L. No.

103–412, 108 Stat. 4239 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.

§ 4001 et seq.) (‘‘1994 Act’’), recognizing these responsibilities

and identifying some of the Government’s duties to ensure it

meets them. The plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleges a breach of these

responsibilities.

The duties of the United States as trustee have been

delegated to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary

of the Treasury, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 161–161a, 4001–4011, each

of whom is assigned specific tasks. Also relevant to this

appeal is the Office of the Special Trustee within the Department of the Interior (and subordinate to the Secretary),

which was created by the 1994 Act to oversee the trust

reform activities of the Department. Id. §§ 4042–4043.

A. Previous Proceedings

The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in 1996. In 1998 the district

court divided the litigation into two ‘‘phases.’’ Phase I was to

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address ‘‘fixing the system,’’ that is, ‘‘reforming the management and accounting of the IIM trust,’’ and Phase II would

concern ‘‘correcting the accounts’’ by ‘‘performing a historical

accounting of the IIM trust accounts.’’ In 1999 the district

court held Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, Assistant

Secretary Kevin Gover, and Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers had breached their fiduciary duties. The

court issued a declaratory judgment to that effect and remanded the case to the Interior and Treasury Departments

for them to bring themselves into compliance with the law,

and to take certain steps the court deemed necessary to

provide an accounting of the IIM trust. Cobell v. Babbitt, 91

F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C.) (‘‘Cobell V’’). In order to assure

the defendants’ compliance, the court retained jurisdiction

and ordered the defendants to file quarterly status reports

‘‘setting forth and explaining the steps that defendants have

taken to rectify’’ the breach. Id. at 59. Finally, the court

certified its decision for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id.

In February 2001 we affirmed the order of the district

court: The Government indeed had breached its fiduciary

duty. Among many other things, it ‘‘does not know the

precise number of IIM trust accounts that it is to administer

and protect,’’ and ‘‘it does not know the proper balances for

each IIM account.’’ Cobell VI, 240 F.3d at 1089. Although

we determined that the district court had mischaracterized

some of the defendants’ actions – for instance, their failure to

‘‘retrieve and retain all information concerning the IIM trust

that is necessary to render an accurate accounting’’ – as

independent violations of a fiduciary duty, rather than as

‘‘support for the TTT court’s ultimate conclusion that appellants have unreasonably delayed the discharge of their fiduciary obligations to IIM beneficiaries,’’ 240 F.3d at 1104, 1105,

we upheld the district court’s ‘‘ultimate conclusion’’ as fully

justified. Id. at 1105. We also held the district court’s

remand of the matter to the agencies and its retention of

jurisdiction were appropriate remedies. Id. at 1107–09.

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B. The Orders on Appeal

While Cobell VI was pending before us and thereafter, the

Department and its officers took a number of steps relevant

to this appeal. Beginning in March 2000 and continuing

apparently to the present, the Department filed the quarterly

reports required by Cobell V. In April 2000 the Department

published a notice in the Federal Register proposing a method for performing an historical accounting and seeking public

comment thereon; and in December 2000 it chose statistical

sampling as the method it would use.

In April 2001 the district court appointed Kieffer as Court

Monitor. As noted, the Department consented to this appointment, regarding which it expressed the ‘‘hope that this

will in fact be a positive step forward so that resources can be

more directed towards trust reform and less directed towards

litigation.’’ The order appointing Kieffer stated he would

‘‘serve for at least 1 year from this date. Upon order of the

Court, after comment or objection thereto by the parties, his

term of service may be extended for additional terms.’’ In

April 2002 the district court ‘‘propose[d] to extend Mr. Kieffer’s term of service for at least an additional year.’’ The

Department objected to Kieffer’s reappointment unless several conditions were met. The district court accepted some but

not all those conditions, and reappointed Kieffer.

Four days later (April 19) Kieffer, with authorization from

the district court, attended a meeting with Deputy Secretary

of the Interior J. Steven Griles, the Special Trustee, and

other departmental officials; the plaintiffs were not represented at the meeting. The district court found this was one

of many internal DOI meetings Kieffer attended; the meeting

was called at Griles’s request; it was a ‘‘heated meeting [that]

resolved nothing.’’ The district court also found that at the

meeting the Court Monitor discussed with Interior officials

his concerns about the way they were doing their jobs –

concerns that he was subsequently to report to the district

court. The district court characterized Kieffer’s actions as

‘‘an effort to set the stage to convince the parties attending

the meeting to find some way to work together.’’

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On June 14 the Department moved the district court to

revoke Kieffer’s appointment as, and to clarify the role of, the

Court Monitor. The Department argued that its previous

objections ‘‘presaged’’ the April 19 meeting, at which, the

Department claimed, Kieffer demonstrated his intention and

his ability to assert powers constitutionally reserved to the

Executive Branch of the Government.

Meanwhile the Monitor’s reports, which were, to say the

least, unflattering to the DOI, had prompted the district court

to order Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb,

both of whom had taken office in 2001, to ‘‘show cause why

they should not be held in civil contempt of court in their

official capacities’’ on five ‘‘specifications,’’ namely:

(1) Failing to comply with the Court’s Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project.

(2) Committing a fraud on the Court by concealing the

Department’s true actions regarding the Historical Accounting Project during the period from March 2000,

until January 2001.

(3) Committing a fraud on the Court by failing to disclose the true status of the TAAMS project between

September 1999 and December 21, 1999.[

*]

(4) Committing a fraud on the Court by filing false and

misleading quarterly status reports starting in March

2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA [Bureau of Indian

Affairs] Data Clean-up.[

**]

(5) Committing a fraud on the court by making false and

misleading representations starting in March, 2000, regarding computer security of IIM trust data.

* TAAMS, the Trust Asset and Accounting Management System,

is a new computer system expected to enable Interior better to

track the status of property held in trust for IIM account beneficiaries.

** ‘‘BIA Data Clean-up’’ refers to Interior’s effort to remedy

shortcomings in the data in the Department’s current computer

systems so that those data can be transferred into TAAMS.

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Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2002)

(‘‘Contempt Opinion’’). The district court held a 29–day

bench trial on the contempt charges.

On September 17, 2002 the district court issued the three

Orders that are the subject of this appeal. First, the court

issued an Order that, among other things, held Secretary

Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb ‘‘in civil contempt of

court.’’ Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 161, 161 (D.D.C.)

(‘‘Contempt Order’’). The Contempt Order was accompanied

by and explained in the Contempt Opinion, released simultaneously. Second, the district court issued a Memorandum

and Order denying the defendants’ motion to revoke Kieffer’s

appointment as Court Monitor. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F.

Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C.) (‘‘Monitor Order’’). Finally, the court

issued an Order appointing Kieffer to serve as ‘‘Special

Master–Monitor’’ ‘‘[p]ursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.’’ Cobell v. Norton, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

17354, at *1 (D.D.C.) (‘‘Special Master-Monitor Order’’).

In the Contempt Order, the court addressed each of the

five specifications of contempt. With regard to the first

count, the court described Norton’s and McCaleb’s failure to

comply with its earlier order as ‘‘litigation misconduct.’’ In

each of the other specifications, the court found Norton and

McCaleb to have ‘‘committ[ed] a fraud on the Court.’’ 226 F.

Supp. 2d at 161. The district court used some harsh words in

the Contempt Opinion, expressing its dissatisfaction with the

defendants’ conduct. See, e.g., 226 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (‘‘The

Department of Interior is truly an embarrassment to the

federal government in general and the executive branch in

particular. The 300,000 individual Indian beneficiaries deserve a better trustee-delegate than the Secretary of Interior’’); id. at 113 (‘‘The Court is both saddened and disgusted

by the Department’s intransigence’’). Of particular note are

the district court’s statement that ‘‘Secretary Norton and

Assistant Secretary McCaleb can now rightfully take their

place alongside former-Secretary Babbitt and formerAssistant Secretary Gover in the pantheon of unfit trusteedelegates,’’ id. at 161, and the court’s invitation to Secretary

Norton or any other individual at the Department who

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‘‘feel[s] that as a result of th[e] Court’s ruling they are unable

or unwilling to perform their duties to the best of their

ability’’ to ‘‘leave the Department forthwith.’’ Id. at 133.

Turning to the question of relief, the court refused the

plaintiffs’ request that it appoint a receiver to take over the

IIM trust. The court did, however, determine that the relief

it had ordered in Cobell V – remanding the case to the

agencies to carry out their duties as instructed – ‘‘was and is

insufficient,’’ id. at 147, and it therefore contemplated ‘‘granting further injunctive relief.’’ Id. at 148. To that end the

court scheduled further proceedings, which it called the

‘‘Phase 1.5 trial.’’ Id. In order to prepare for the Phase 1.5

trial, the court required Interior to file ‘‘a plan for conducting

a historical accounting of the IIM trust accounts’’ and ‘‘a plan

for bringing themselves into compliance with the fiduciary

obligations that they owe to the IIM beneficiaries.’’ Contempt

Order, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 162. The court also permitted the

plaintiffs (and the Department of the Treasury) to file such

plans, and permitted each party to respond to any other

party’s plan. Id.

In the Monitor Order, the court denied the Department’s

June 14 motion to revoke the appointment of Court Monitor

Kieffer. The court found that Kieffer’s participation in the

April 19 meeting was not inappropriate or beyond his authority because it was ‘‘pursuant to the Secretary of the Interior’s

own request’’ and ‘‘in conformance with the Orders of the

Court.’’ 226 F. Supp. 2d at 169. Finally, in the Special

Master-Monitor Order, the court sua sponte elevated Kieffer

to the position of Special Master-Monitor; Kieffer retained

his duties as Court Monitor and as Special Master assumed

new responsibilities for the management of discovery. 2002

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17354, at *4–7.

Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb appealed all three Orders of the district court. They argue that the

district court overstepped the bounds of judicial authority by

declaring them ‘‘unfit’’ and by ‘‘seizing control of the processes for creating and implementing plans for Indian trust

reform.’’ They also argue that the district court erred when

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it held them in contempt of court, denied their motion to

terminate Kieffer’s tenure as Court Monitor, and appointed

him Special Master-Monitor.*

II. Analysis

We understand the Government to object to three distinct

aspects of the district court’s Orders in this case: (1) the

court’s alleged overreaching through its ‘‘assum[ption of]

control’’ over functions within the DOI; (2) the court’s decisions regarding the status of Mr. Kieffer; and (3) the court’s

holding Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb

in contempt of court. Before we may reach these issues,

however, we must confirm our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.

A. Jurisdiction

The Department argues we have jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). In the alternative

it seeks a writ of mandamus.

Section 1292(a)(1) provides that ‘‘the courts of appeals shall

have jurisdiction of appeals from TTT [i]nterlocutory orders of

the district courts of the United States TTT granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing

to dissolve or modify injunctions.’’ As the Supreme Court

stated in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84

(1981), § 1292(a)(1) provides jurisdiction over not just an

injunction so-denominated, but over any order having the

‘‘practical effect’’ of an injunction if the order threatens a

‘‘serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence’’ and is of such a

nature that it can be ‘‘effectually challenged only by immediate appeal.’’ ‘‘An order by a federal court that relates only to

the conduct or progress of litigation before that court ordinarily is not considered an injunction and therefore is not

* Norton and McCaleb also moved to present arguments in their

individual capacities. Construing these as motions to appear as

amici curiae, we grant them and dispose of other motions pending in

this case in an order issued today.

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appealable under § 1292(a)(1).’’ Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.

v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988).

A writ of mandamus is ‘‘an extraordinary remedy, to be

reserved for extraordinary situations.’’ Id. at 289. Mandamus does not lie unless the petitioner’s right to relief is ‘‘clear

and indisputable,’’ and there is ‘‘no other adequate means’’ by

which the petitioner may attain the relief it seeks. In re

Sealed Case, 151 F.3d 1059, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

With these legal principles in mind, we consider our jurisdiction over each of the Department’s three claims.

1. Judicial Overreaching

The Department argues we have jurisdiction over its claim

of judicial overreaching pursuant to § 1292(a)(1) because the

district court’s rulings (1) imposed an injunction; or (2) had

‘‘the practical effect of an injunction’’; or (3) worked ‘‘a

modification of a declaratory judgment that the [district]

court has [since] held to be indistinguishable from a mandatory injunction.’’ The gravamen of the Department’s argument,

however expressed, is that the district court orders ‘‘both

require[ ] action and implicitly enjoin[ ] the Secretary’s future

exercise of discretion.’’

We disagree. As the plaintiffs demonstrate, the Orders

and the Opinion were full of sound and fury, but they

signified very little to be done by the DOI. In the Contempt

Order the court appointed a Special Master–Monitor, 226 F.

Supp. 2d at 163 ¶ ¶ 13–16, and required the defendants, in

anticipation of the Phase 1.5 trial, to ‘‘file with the Court TTT

a plan for conducting a historical accounting of the IIM trust

accounts’’ and to file a plan for ‘‘bringing themselves into

compliance with [their] fiduciary obligations.’’ Id. at 162

¶ ¶ 2, 3. It also held Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb in contempt, id. at 161 ¶ ¶ 1–5, and ordered

them to pay the expenses the plaintiffs had incurred for the

contempt trial. Id. at 162 ¶ ¶ 9–10.*

* In the Contempt Order the district court also entered a declaratory judgment on an unrelated matter, see 226 F. Supp. 2d at 161–

62 ¶ 1, and referred certain matters to another special master. Id.

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None of this had the ‘‘practical effect’’ of an injunction.

The Contempt Order compels the Department only to prepare

for the Phase 1.5 proceedings by making certain filings with

the court. As such, we think it more akin to an ‘‘order TTT

relat[ing] only to the conduct or progress of litigation,’’ Gulfstream Aerospace, 485 U.S. at 279, than to an injunction.

The Department also points to the district court’s statement that it will order new relief following the Phase 1.5 trial

rather than ‘‘simply remand[ing] the matter back to the

agency,’’ Contempt Opinion, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 152, as

evidence that the court intends to take over the management

of trust reform. Such a claim is premature. To be sure, the

district court stated it ‘‘has determined that it will grant

further injunctive relief,’’ id. at 146 – specifically, ‘‘a structural injunction,’’ id. at 146 n.154 – presumably upon completion

of the Phase 1.5 trial. Any such injunction, once issued,

would be appealable under § 1292(a)(1). But no such injunction has yet issued. At worst, the district court has threatened to take action that, according to the Department, would

violate the separation of powers. Until the district court

takes such action, however, we are without power under

§ 1292(a)(1) to review its decisions.

Anticipating that the court might lack jurisdiction to hear

the present appeal, the Department asks us in the alternative

to issue a writ of mandamus providing equivalent relief. But

we may not do that, either. The Department’s challenge does

not meet the criteria for the writ; in particular, the Department has not shown that an appeal from the district court’s

eventual entry of an injunction, if and when that occurs,

would not provide it with adequate relief.

2. Kieffer’s Appointment as Monitor and as Special Master-Monitor

The Department concedes that ‘‘[t]he court’s order elevating the Court Monitor to the judicial role of Special Master

would not generally be immediately appealable.’’ Nevertheat 162–63 ¶ ¶ 11–12. The Department does not seek review of those

provisions of the Contempt Order.

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less the Department claims that Kieffer’s appointment is

subject to interlocutory review both because it ‘‘forms an

integral part of the relief the court believed was required’’

and because it ‘‘has the effect of an injunction.’’ These claims

are essentially a restatement of those we have already rejected as part of the Department’s claim of judicial overreaching.

We see no need to revisit them under a new heading.

The orders appointing Kieffer – first as Court Monitor, and

later as Special Master-Monitor – and the order denying the

Department’s motion to revoke Kieffer’s appointment as

Court Monitor do, however, present an appropriate occasion

for mandamus. First, as we explain below (in Part II.B), the

Department’s entitlement to relief is clear. Second, there is

no other way for the Department to obtain effective relief on

its claims that Kieffer should not have been appointed Special

Master–Monitor, nor permitted to continue as Court Monitor.

The ordinary route to relief from an adverse interlocutory

order is to appeal from the final judgment. When the relief

sought is recusal of a disqualified judicial officer, however, the

injury suffered by a party required to complete judicial

proceedings overseen by that officer is by its nature irreparable. As the Supreme Court has explained:

The remedy by appeal is inadequate. It comes after the

trial and, if prejudice exist, it has worked its evil and a

judgment of it in a reviewing tribunal is precarious. It

goes there fortified by presumptions, and nothing can be

more elusive of estimate or decision than a disposition of

a mind in which there is a personal ingredient.

Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921); see In re

United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981) (‘‘A case

involving a motion for disqualification is clearly distinguishable from those where a party alleges an error of law that TTT

may be fully addressed and remedied on appeal’’). The

parties agree that after his elevation to Special MasterMonitor status, Kieffer was serving as a judicial officer.

Although this court does not seem to have ruled upon the

propriety of seeking the recusal of a judicial officer by

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petition for a writ of mandamus, every circuit to have addressed the issue has found it proper. The First through

Seventh Circuits and the Tenth Circuit have each issued the

writ for this purpose, see In re Boston’s Children First, 244

F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001); In re IBM Corp., 45 F.3d 641 (2d

Cir. 1995); In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Sch.

Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Rodgers,

537 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Faulkner, 856 F.2d 716

(5th Cir. 1988); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136

(6th Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631 (7th

Cir. 1998); In re Edgar, 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996); Nichols

v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995), and the Eighth, Ninth,

and Eleventh Circuits have suggested they would do so in an

appropriate case. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 536–

37 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding mandamus is an appropriate

avenue to review recusal decision but denying the writ on the

facts presented); Cordoza v. Pac. States Steel Corp., 320 F.3d

989, 999 (9th Cir. 2003) (similar); In re Lopez–Lukis, 113

F.3d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying writ seeking review

of recusal decision because ‘‘petitioners have not carried their

burden of showing their right to issuance of a writ of mandamus’’). The Federal Circuit looks to the law of the regional

circuit in which the officer to be recused sits. Baldwin

Hardware Corp. v. FrankSu Enter. Corp., 78 F.3d 550, 556–

57 (1996); In re Solex Robotics, Inc., Misc. No. 725, 2003 U.S.

App. LEXIS 1595 (Jan. 17, 2003) (unpublished). We join the

unanimous view of our sister circuits and hold that we will

issue a writ of mandamus compelling recusal of a judicial

officer where the party seeking the writ demonstrates a clear

and indisputable right to relief.

We also find it appropriate to issue the writ in order to

clarify that the district court exceeded its authority when it

reappointed Kieffer as Court Monitor over the Department’s

objection. As we discuss below, the Department’s right to

relief is clear, and the injury it alleges – interference with the

internal deliberations of a Department of the Government of

the United States – cannot be remedied by an appeal from

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the final judgment. In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d at 1063.*

3. Contempt Findings

The district court styled the contempt in which it held the

appellants civil in nature. In this circuit an order holding a

party in civil contempt in an on-going proceeding is not

appealable as a final order. Byrd v. Reno, 180 F.3d 298 (D.C.

Cir. 1999) (per curiam). In contrast, ‘‘[c]riminal contempt

judgments are immediately appealable pursuant to § 1291

because they result from a separate and independent proceeding TTT to vindicate the authority of the court and are not

a part of the original cause.’’ Marrese v. Am. Acad. of

Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985). As we

explain below (in Part II.C.1), the district court’s findings of

contempt are functionally criminal rather than civil in nature.

Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal from the

contempt aspects of the Contempt Order.

B. Court Monitor/Special Master-Monitor Issues

We turn now to the merits of the Department’s claim the

district court erred by retaining Kieffer in this case. Specifically, the Department argues both that the court had no

authority to reappoint Kieffer as Court Monitor over its

objection, and that Kieffer was disqualified from serving as

Special Master-Monitor due to his personal knowledge of the

case and the resulting appearance of partiality.

1. Court Monitor

Kieffer was appointed Court Monitor on April 16, 2001,

with the consent of the parties, for a term of one year. In

April 2002 the Government objected to Kieffer’s reappointment unless certain conditions were placed upon the scope of

* The plaintiffs contend we should not issue the writ because the

Department did not file a separate petition for mandamus, which

they claim is required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 21

and Circuit Rule 21. For its part, the Government points to our

prior decision treating an improper interlocutory appeal as a petition for mandamus, Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v. FTC, 981 F.2d 543,

548 & n.6 (1992), in the light of which we deem the Government’s

omission excusable.

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his powers. On April 15, 2002, the district court reappointed

him without regard to one of those conditions. The Department claims this was a clear error. We agree.

The district court claimed authority to appoint the Monitor

in the first instance based upon the ‘‘consent of the [parties],

and TTT the Court’s inherent powers.’’ The Government

claims it did not consent to Kieffer’s reappointment, however,

and neither the district court nor the plaintiffs point to any

case or other authority suggesting a district court has inherent power to appoint a court monitor. Indeed, in their brief

the plaintiffs, tellingly, do not address the Department’s

argument that the district court could not appoint a court

monitor over its objection. At oral argument the plaintiffs

instead rested upon the assertion that the DOI’s consent to

Kieffer’s original appointment as Court Monitor was temporally unlimited and irrevocable.

The plaintiffs’ position is untenable on the facts of this case.

First, the district court did not propose or purport to appoint

Kieffer permanently, so the DOI had no occasion to consent

to his having an unlimited tenure. As we noted earlier, the

order appointing him stated that Kieffer would ‘‘serve for at

least 1 year from this date. Upon order of the Court, after

comment or objection thereto by the parties, his term of

service may be extended for additional terms.’’ The plaintiffs’ suggestion that this order, which explicitly grants the

parties the right to object to Kieffer’s reappointment, actually

served as consent to his unlimited tenure, is absurd. We

conclude the Department effectively withheld its consent to

the court’s reappointment of Kieffer as Monitor, which brings

us to the question whether the district court has inherent

power to appoint a monitor without the consent of the party

to be monitored.

A judicial claim to an ‘‘inherent power’’ is not to be

indulged lightly, lest it excuse overreaching ‘‘[t]he judicial

Power’’ actually granted to federal courts by Article III of the

Constitution of the United States, and the customs and

usages that inform the meaning of that phrase. Such a claim,

therefore, must either be documented by historical practice,

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see, e.g., Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 643–44 (1960) (rejecting contention that federal court sitting in admiralty has

inherent power to order taking of depositions for discovery

because there was no historical record of courts ordering such

depositions); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30,

631 (1962) (noting court’s inherent power to dismiss suit for

failure to prosecute dates to Blackstone’s Commentaries and

‘‘has long gone unquestioned’’), or supported by an irrefutable

showing that the exercise of an undoubted authority would

otherwise be set to naught. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO,

501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (‘‘It has long been understood that

certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts

of justice from the nature of their institution, powers which

cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are

necessary to the exercise of all others’’); cf. All Writs Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1651(a) (granting federal courts power to ‘‘issue all

writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective

jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of

law’’). Often the two go hand in hand. See, e.g., Fisher v.

Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159 (1949) (‘‘Historically and rationally the

inherent power of courts to punish contempts in the face of

the court without further proof of facts and without aid of

jury is not open to question. This attribute of courts is

essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the

administration of justice from falling into disrepute’’). In this

case, however, we find nothing but the district court’s assertion it has inherent power to appoint a monitor, which can

hardly be self-supporting. Therefore, we hold the district

court does not have inherent power to appoint a monitor – at

least not a monitor with the extensive duties the court

assigned to Kieffer – over a party’s substantial objection, here

the Government’s objection that the appointment violated the

separation of powers. As the foregoing sentence conveys, our

holding is a narrow one, tethered to the peculiar facts recounted below.

In this case the Court Monitor was charged to ‘‘monitor

and review all of the Interior defendants’ trust reform activities’’ and to report to the district court on ‘‘any TTT matter

[he] deem[ed] pertinent to trust reform.’’ The court authoUSCA Case #02-5374 Document #761500 Filed: 07/18/2003 Page 16 of 31
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rized the Monitor to engage in ex parte communications, and

required the DOI to ‘‘facilitate and assist’’ the Monitor, to

‘‘provide [him] with access to any TTT offices or employees to

gather information,’’ and to pay his hourly fees and expenses.

In short, the Monitor acted as an internal investigator, not

unlike a departmental Inspector General except that he reported not to the Secretary but to the district court.

Although the Department initially consented to this arrangement, after a year’s experience it conditioned its renewed consent upon a narrower and more specific definition

of the Monitor’s role: The DOI sought to limit the scope of

the Monitor’s investigation to ‘‘steps taken by the Department to rectify the breaches of trust declared by the Court or

steps taken that would necessarily delay rather than accelerate the ultimate provision of an adequate accounting.’’ It

later augmented its objection to the Monitor’s role, arguing

that the Monitor’s broad-ranging investigation interfered with

the Department’s deliberative process privilege under Hinckley v. United States, 140 F.3d 277, 284–85 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(describing privilege as protecting materials that are both

‘‘predecisional’’ and ‘‘deliberative’’); see also Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (‘‘[I]t was not the function of

the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary in

reaching his conclusions if he [did what] the law required’’),

and that the Monitor otherwise intruded unduly into the

function of the Executive Branch. We need not decide,

however, whether the Department’s objection was meritorious; it is enough for present purposes that the objection was

colorable.

Regardless whether the district court has any inherent

authority to appoint an agent to monitor the conduct of a

party in litigation before it, it was surely impermissible to

invest the Court Monitor with wide-ranging extrajudicial

duties over the Government’s objection. The Monitor’s portfolio was truly extraordinary; instead of resolving disputes

brought to him by the parties, he became something like a

party himself. The Monitor was charged with an investigative, quasi-inquisitorial, quasi-prosecutorial role that is unknown to our adversarial legal system. When the parties

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consent to such an arrangement, we have no occasion to inject

ourselves into their affairs. When a party has for a nonfrivolous reason denied its consent, however, the district court

must confine itself (and its agents) to its accustomed judicial

role.

Although the plaintiffs did not bring it to our attention, we

are aware of the practice of a federal district court appointing

a special master pursuant to Rule 53 to supervise implementation of a court order, especially a remedial order requiring

major structural reform of a state institution. See, e.g., Ruiz

v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161–62 (5th Cir.) (prison reform),

amended in part, reh’g denied in part on other grounds, 688

F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch.

& Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 111 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (reform of

institution for the mentally retarded), rev’d on other grounds,

451 U.S. 1 (1981); Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 601 F.2d

240, 244–45 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); id. (collecting cases);

Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree 55–

57 (2003). Putting aside the question whether those cases

shed any light whatsoever upon the propriety of a federal

court authorizing its agent to interfere with the affairs of

another branch of the federal government, we think the

present case goes far beyond the practice that has grown up

under Rule 53.

Ruiz illustrates the limits of the mandate a district court

may permissibly give its agent. There the district court,

having found the defendant state department of corrections

subjected inmates to cruel and unusual conditions, entered an

injunction and appointed a special master, assisted by several

‘‘monitors,’’ 679 F.2d at 1159, ‘‘to monitor implementation of

the relief ordered.’’ Id. at 1128. The special master was

given ‘‘unlimited access to [the defendants’] premises and

records as well as the power to conduct confidential interviews with TTT staff members and inmates.’’ Id. at 1162. On

appeal, the State argued the appointment was improper

because there was no ‘‘exceptional condition’’ warranting it, as

required by Rule 53. In rejecting that argument, the court of

appeals approved the special master’s mandate, namely, ‘‘to

report on [the department’s] compliance with the district

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court’s decree and to help implement the decree,’’ thereby

‘‘assum[ing] one of the plaintiffs’ traditional roles.’’ Id. at

1161.

The role of the special master in Ruiz was not nearly as

broad as the role of the Monitor in this case. There the

master was specifically instructed ‘‘not to intervene in the

administrative management of [the department] and TTT not

to direct the defendants or any of their subordinates to take

or to refrain from taking any specific action to achieve

compliance.’’ Id. at 1162. Most important, the court of

appeals clarified that the special master and the monitors

were ‘‘not to consider matters that go beyond superintending

compliance with the district court’s decree,’’ thereby assuring

the special master would not be an ‘‘advocate’’ for the plaintiffs or a ‘‘roving federal district court.’’ Id.

The last requirement highlights the problems with the role

of the Monitor in this case, and with his appointment. The

Monitor was not limited to ‘‘superintending compliance with

the district court’s decree,’’ but was instead ordered to ‘‘monitor and review all of the TTT defendants’ trust reform activities,’’ including ‘‘the defendants’ trust reform progress and

any other matter Mr. Kieffer deems pertinent to trust reform.’’ Nor could the Monitor have been limited to enforcing

a decree, for there was no decree to enforce, let alone the sort

of specific and detailed decree issued in Ruiz and typical of

such cases. See Sandler & Schoenbrod, above, at 9 (referring

to ‘‘court decrees that are as thick as phone books’’). The

case had been remanded to the Department ‘‘for further

proceedings not inconsistent with’’ the opinion of the district

court in order ‘‘[t]o allow defendants the opportunity to

promptly come into compliance.’’ Cobell V, 91 F. Supp. 2d at

58. Cf., e.g., Halderman, 612 F.2d at 111 (allowing special

master to administer implementation of injunction and noting

that ‘‘[m]asters are peculiarly appropriate in the implementation of complex equitable decrees which require ongoing

judicial supervision’’). In this case, the district court’s appointment of the Monitor entailed a license to intrude into the

internal affairs of the Department, which simply is not permissible under our adversarial system of justice and our

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constitutional system of separated powers. Accordingly, the

district court should not have reappointed the Court Monitor

on April 15, 2002 over the Department’s objection.

2. Special Master-Monitor

In its June 14 motion to revoke Kieffer’s appointment and

clarify the role of the Court Monitor, the Department among

other things complained that Kieffer’s actions at the April 19,

2002 ex parte meeting had created an appearance of partiality. The district court not only rejected the Department’s

arguments, it supplemented Kieffer’s role by appointing him

Special Master-Monitor. Again the Department claims this

was clear error. Again we agree.

The relevant standard is to be found at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a):

A judicial officer must be disqualified from ‘‘any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’’ that

is, questioned by one fully apprised of the surrounding circumstances. Sao Paulo State of the Federative Republic of

Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 535 U.S. 229, 232–33 (2002)

(per curiam). It is clear, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ objections, that in this Circuit the ethical restrictions of § 455

apply to a special master. Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627,

630–32 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988). So much for the law; for the

facts we rely solely upon the district court’s own recitation,

which establishes that Kieffer’s prior role and personal involvement in this case as Court Monitor would cause a

reasonable person to doubt his ability to remain impartial

while serving as Special Master.

For instance, Kieffer was ‘‘permitted to make and receive

ex parte communications with all entities,’’ Monitor Order,

226 F. Supp. 2d at 165, and in fact engaged in numerous ex

parte communications with officials of Interior. Id. at 167.

Moreover, in the course of his investigation Kieffer acquired

information upon the basis of which he ‘‘apprised the Deputy

Secretary that there was a dispute developing between the

Secretary and the Special Trustee TTT regarding the appropriate role of the Special Trustee.’’ Id. at 170. The Court

Monitor was also present at the ‘‘heated’’ ex parte meeting on

April 19, 2002, about which he reported to the Court that

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‘‘defendants were unwilling to fully accept the Congressionally-mandated role of the Special Trustee.’’ Id. at 171. At that

meeting, Kieffer ‘‘expressed his concerns to the Deputy Secretary about the actions of the Secretary and the Deputy

Secretary regarding the Special Trustee.’’ Id. In particular,

he ‘‘apprise[d] the Deputy Secretary in the presence of the

Special Trustee of the obvious risks faced by the defendants

in this litigation and the additional concerns he had regarding’’ some of the Secretary’s views, in ‘‘an effort to set the

stage to convince the parties attending the meeting to find

some way to work together rather than continue the internecine warfare patently obvious in their own dueling memoranda.’’ Id. at 172.

The district court’s account of these events demonstrates

that Kieffer had a settled opinion about what the Department

should and should not do on remand to comply with the order

of the district court, which opinion he developed in his

extrajudicial role as Court Monitor with access to the internal

deliberations of the Department regarding the lawsuit. The

district court’s account also demonstrates that Kieffer’s opinion was based in part upon ex parte communications received

in his extra-judicial capacity as Monitor. These facts so

clearly cast a shadow over Kieffer’s impartiality that the

district court abused its discretion in appointing Kieffer to be

Special Master (in addition to Monitor).

The plaintiffs argue the April 19 meeting was not ‘‘extrajudicial’’ because it took place with the knowledge and approval

of the district court and of the parties. That does not change

the key fact: The district court appointed Kieffer to a judicial

role in a case in which he had significant prior knowledge

obtained in his role as a Court Monitor, on the basis of which

he had formed and expressed opinions of continuing relevance

to the litigation. A newly appointed judge may not hear a

case in which he previously played any role. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(b)(3) (a judge shall recuse himself ‘‘[w]here he has

served in governmental employment and in such capacity

participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the

merits of the particular case in controversy’’); ABA Model

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Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (a judge is disqualified when ‘‘the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in

controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously

practiced law served during such association as a lawyer

concerning the matter, or the judge has been a material

witness concerning it’’). Similarly here, Kieffer’s experience

as Court Monitor disqualified him from later assuming a

judicial role in this case. Accordingly, the order appointing

Kieffer to be a Special Master-Monitor must be vacated.*

C. Contempt Specifications

The district court held Secretary Norton and Assistant

Secretary McCaleb in ‘‘civil contempt of court’’ (1) for having

engaged in ‘‘litigation misconduct,’’ to wit, ‘‘failing to comply

with the Court’s Order of December 21, 1999,’’ and (2–5) for

having, in each of four ways, ‘‘committ[ed] a fraud on the

Court.’’ Contempt Order, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 161. The

Department claims the district court erred in two respects:

by holding Norton and McCaleb in contempt (1) based upon

conduct of their predecessors in office, and (2) without finding

either officer had disobeyed a clear order of the court. The

Department also argues the district court’s factual findings do

not support its conclusion that there was a fraud on the court.

In response the plaintiffs argue the district court correctly

* In light of this disposition we need not and do not pass upon the

DOI’s objections to the propriety of Kieffer’s actions at the April 19

meeting or at any other time prior to his appointment as Special

Master-Monitor. The events of April 19 do, however, suggest the

Department’s concerns about the scope of the Court Monitor’s role

were well-founded. The district court’s findings indicate that the

Court Monitor’s duties were so wide-ranging as to have a potentially significant effect upon the DOI’s deliberative process. See

Monitor Order, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 172 (Court Monitor’s presentation was ‘‘an effort to set the stage to convince the parties attending

the meeting to find some way to work together’’); id. (Court

Monitor ‘‘sought to TTT enable [DOI officials] to better carry out

[their] trust reform fiduciary obligations’’); id. at 172 n.6 (Court

Monitor, with authorization of district court, ‘‘attempt[ed] to facilitate a resolution of the continuing dispute between the Secretary,

the Deputy Secretary, and the Special Trustee’’).

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applied the law to the facts. We agree with the Department,

although our analysis is somewhat different.

1. Nature of the Contempt

A contempt proceeding is either civil or criminal by virtue

of its ‘‘character and purpose,’’ not by reason of the trial

judge so denominating the proceeding. Int’l Union, United

Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994); Gompers

v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911). Civil

contempt is ordinarily used to compel compliance with an

order of the court, Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, although in some

circumstances a civil contempt sanction may be designed to

‘‘compensate[ ] the complainant for losses sustained.’’ Id. at

829. By contrast, criminal contempt is used to punish, that

is, to ‘‘vindicate the authority of the court’’ following a transgression rather than to compel future compliance or to aid the

plaintiff. Id. at 828.

In this case the nature of the contempt is obscured by the

lack of any clear sanction. Although it did, under the heading

‘‘Further Relief,’’ expand the scope of the plaintiffs’ discovery,

Contempt Opinion, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 159, the district court

itself noted that

much of the relief granted is not dependent on the

Court’s conclusion that the defendants committed several

frauds on the Court. Rather, the Court has fashioned

much of the relief granted today (such as future proceedings and the appointment of a special master) simply

because of the current status of trust reform.

Id. at 135. In fact, other than an award of expenses the

plaintiffs incurred in the contempt trial, 226 F. Supp. 2d at

162 – which cannot be considered relief for the underlying

contempt – the only relief granted that could conceivably be

based upon the findings of contempt are the initiation of the

Phase 1.5 proceeding and the appointment of the Special

Master. On its face, that is, the Contempt Order appears to

find the defendants in contempt, and then to impose no

sanction.

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Clearly, however, the district court did not intend its

decision to be without effect. The exceedingly strong words

it used in finding the defendants in contempt – in particular

its statement that Secretary Norton was ‘‘unfit’’ – suggest the

court intended the adjudication and accompanying opinion to

serve as a reprimand to Secretary Norton and Assistant

Secretary McCaleb. Indeed, the defendants reasonably characterize the decision as having ‘‘impose[d] opprobrium’’ upon

them. Norton and McCaleb in particular believed the district

court’s adjudication to be so injurious to their reputations

that they engaged private counsel and sought to intervene as

appellants and to present arguments in their respective personal capacities. We see no reason a district court may not

impose a reprimand as the sole sanction for an adjudication of

contempt, particularly when the contemnor is a public official

acting in her official capacity.

Examining this sanction in light of the principles set forth

in Gompers and Bagwell, therefore, it is clear the proceeding

was, and should have been treated as being, for criminal

contempt. In specifications two through five, the district

court cites completed conduct of the defendants (or of their

predecessors in office), making the proceeding criminal in

nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829 (‘‘When a contempt involves

the prior conduct of an isolated, prohibited act, the resulting

sanction has no coercive effect’’ and is therefore punitive in

nature); id. at 828 (describing a sanction as criminal ‘‘if it is

imposed retrospectively for a ‘completed act of disobedience’ ’’

(quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443)). Moreover, in each of

those four specifications the district court held the defendants

in contempt for ‘‘[c]ommitting a fraud on the Court,’’ Contempt Opinion, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 20, citing as authority a

Supreme Court opinion assimilating fraud on the court to

criminal rather than to civil contempt. Id. at 26 (citing

Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943)). We have

been unable to find any authority for, let alone any reason to

believe, the proposition that fraud on the court constitutes a

civil contempt. We therefore treat the district court’s contempt citations on specifications two through five as criminal

in nature.

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We also note that, although the district court said in the

Contempt Opinion it was not ‘‘issu[ing] a contempt citation at

this time with respect to Specification 1,’’ id. at 118, the

accompanying Contempt Order is ambiguous on this score

and the court later interpreted it otherwise. The statement

that the defendants had ‘‘engaged in litigation misconduct’’

appeared under the heading ‘‘Contempt Specifications.’’ 226

F. Supp. 2d at 161. In a later opinion addressing a motion to

disqualify the District Judge, Special Master-Monitor Kieffer,

and another special master from participation in contempt

proceedings against certain non-parties, the district court

further muddied the waters, stating that on September 17 it

indeed had held the defendants in contempt for, among other

things, ‘‘engaging in litigation misconduct by failing to comply

with the Court’s Order’’ as described in specification one.

Memorandum and Order, at 5–6 (Jan. 17, 2003). We therefore treat specification one as a finding of contempt, also

criminal in nature.

Although one may be held in civil contempt for refusing to

comply with a court order, a sanction for one’s past failure to

comply with an order is criminal in nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S.

at 828–29; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443–44. The district court

clearly intended to punish the defendants for ‘‘failing to

comply with the Court’s Order of December 21, 1999, to

initiate a Historical Accounting Project,’’ Contempt Order, 226

F. Supp. 2d at 161, which is no doubt why its opinion lacks

any suggestion that the defendants could yet comply and

thereby purge themselves of the contempt. See Bagwell, 512

U.S. at 828 (contempt is civil if ‘‘the contemnor is able to

purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an

affirmative act, and thus carries the keys of his prison in his

own pocket’’).

The contempt proceeding being criminal rather than civil in

nature, and the allegedly contumacious behavior occurring

outside the presence of the court, the defendants were entitled to the usual protections of the criminal law, such as trial

by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 826–27.

Because the Department has not objected upon any such

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procedural ground, however, and explicitly disavowed any

such objection at oral argument, we treat the same as waived.

In addressing the merits of the contempt specifications, we

start with the elementary principle that, subject to certain

exceptions clearly not relevant here, and absent respondeat

superior liability, one person cannot be held criminally liable

for the conduct of another. We further note that a finding of

criminal contempt ‘‘requires both a contemptuous act and a

wrongful state of mind.’’ In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564

(D.C. Cir. 1973).*

With these principles in mind, we can dispose quite readily

of some of the district court’s findings of contempt. Secretary Norton took office in January, Assistant Secretary

McCaleb in July, 2001. Because specifications two and three

concern conduct that took place prior to their taking office,

the district court erred as a matter of law in holding either

official in criminal contempt on those counts. The district

court also erred in holding Assistant Secretary McCaleb in

contempt on all five counts without having identified in the

Contempt Opinion any specific act or omission whatsoever on

his part. We address the other specifications of contempt,

therefore, with reference to Secretary Norton alone.

2. Specification One

Specification one charged Secretary Norton with ‘‘[f]ailing

to comply with the Court’s Order of December 21, 1999, to

initiate a Historical Accounting Project.’’ Contempt Opinion,

226 F. Supp. 2d at 20. The district court said with regard to

this specification that Secretary Norton had committed litigation misconduct, referring principally to its finding that ‘‘[b]etween December 21, 1999 and July 10, 2001’’ the Department

had failed to take any steps toward completing an accounting.

* Although we have grave doubts about respondeat superior

liability for a criminal contempt, we need not resolve them in this

case. Even assuming it is permissible to hold a master in criminal

contempt based in part upon the action of a servant, the discussion

below makes clear that the requirements of Farquhar, quoted

above, as well as general principles of contempt, preclude a finding

of criminal contempt in this case.

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Id. at 113. The court characterized the Department’s actions

taken since that time as ‘‘too little, too late,’’ and stated that

‘‘Interior cannot rely on efforts undertaken’’ at the ‘‘late date’’

of June, 2001 ‘‘to avoid a contempt citation.’’ Id. at 115. In

fact, the district court described its holding as being that ‘‘the

defendants unreasonably delayed initiating the historical accounting project.’’ Id. at 118.

Because Secretary Norton cannot be held criminally liable

for contempt based upon the conduct of her predecessor in

office, her contempt conviction cannot stand; she simply

cannot be held criminally to account for any delay that

occurred prior to her assuming office. Of the one and onehalf year delay about which the district court was concerned,

more than a year was on someone else’s watch.

Moreover, the district court’s findings clearly indicate that

in her first six months in office Secretary Norton took

significant steps toward completing an accounting. By June

2001 the Secretary had contracted with EDS, a national

consulting firm, to evaluate the status of the TAAMS project,

id. at 86, and by November 2001 the Department had proposed a reorganization plan aimed at eliminating the problems EDS had identified. Id. at 45. In July 2001 Secretary

Norton created the Office of Historical Trust Accounting,

which has since made significant progress toward completing

an accounting. Id. at 44–45. Hence, the Court Monitor

stated in his Fifth Report, ‘‘[t]here is no doubt the OHTA has

made more progress TTT in six months [July through December, 2001] than the past administration did in six years.’’

These uncontested facts are inconsistent with a finding that

Secretary Norton failed to comply with the district court’s

order of December 21, 1999. Therefore, we hold the district

court erred as a matter of law in holding Secretary Norton in

criminal contempt on specification one.

3. Specification Four

In specification four the Secretary was held in contempt for

committing a fraud on the court. We note initially that fraud

on the court is a narrow concept, limited to ‘‘the most

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egregious conduct involving a corruption of the judicial process itself.’’ 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &

Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2870, at 418

(2d ed. 1995).

The district court held Secretary Norton in contempt for

‘‘filing false and misleading quarterly status reports starting

in March 2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA Data Cleanup.’’

Contempt Opinion, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 124. Of those eight

reports, however, the first four were filed prior to Secretary

Norton’s taking office, and she therefore cannot be held

criminally liable for anything in them. The remaining reports

do not rise to the level of fraud on the court.

The court complained that the fifth report provided a

‘‘positive assessment’’ of the status of TAAMS ‘‘based on

nothing more than speculation and wishful thinking.’’ Id. at

80. Of the sixth report, the district court said the Department was ‘‘misleading’’ the court when it represented ‘‘it was

moving ever closer to being able to implement fully the title

and realty portions of TAAMS,’’ and that it ‘‘had conducted

specific tests that indicated that it was almost ready to deploy

TAAMS.’’ Id. at 82. Regarding the seventh report, the

court noted the Department’s concession that it had not met

certain goals and complained that the Department ‘‘presented

a positive picture of TAAMS despite the fact that the agency

was not ready to deploy or implement the land management

system as scheduled, and TTT clearly was not going to be able

to deploy or implement it anytime soon.’’ Id. at 83. The court

also objected that ‘‘Interior did not provide the Court with

anything close to what can be construed as a complete picture

of the system’s status.’’ Id.

Finally, with regard to the eighth report – which was the

first to be filed after Interior had received EDS’s assessment

of the project – the court noted both Secretary Norton’s

concession that previous reports had been inadequate, and

the Secretary’s attempts to improve the quality of the reports. Id. at 84–85. The district court appeared to have no

quarrel with the content of the eighth report. Instead, the

court inferred from admissions in the eighth report that the

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inadequacies of the previous reports were intentional and

contumacious. See id. at 80 (completion dates in fifth report,

‘‘in light of the later filed quarterly status reports, [were]

based on nothing more than speculation and wishful thinking’’); id. at 82 (sixth report ‘‘particularly misleading (and

troubling) in light of the Department’s Eighth Report’’); see

also id. at 84 (quoting Secretary Norton’s testimony that

seventh report gave ‘‘an insufficient picture’’ and was ‘‘not a

particularly good document’’).

We find the reasoning of the district court mystifying. The

court is surely correct in stating that the eighth report does

not ‘‘absolve[ ] the defendants’’ of responsibility for any past

wrongdoing. Id. at 126. But neither does the Secretary’s

candid critique of prior reports, made in the light shed by

EDS’s evaluation, lead to the conclusion that those reports

were intentionally false and misleading; the district court’s

findings of fact simply do not support its conclusion that

Secretary Norton committed a fraud on the court. To be

sure, the earlier reports painted an overly sunny picture of

the status of the TAAMS project and were misleading about

the progress being made in ways painstakingly identified by

the district court. The district court made no finding, however, that Secretary Norton had any personal knowledge that

the fifth, sixth, or seventh reports were false or misleading.

In light of the above, we conclude that the district court

erred as a matter of law in holding Secretary Norton in

criminal contempt on specification four.

4. Specification Five

In specification five, the district court found the Secretary

committed a fraud on the court by making false and misleading representations ‘‘regarding computer security of IIM

trust data.’’ Id. at 100. The Department made representations on that subject under Secretary Norton in April and

May 2001. The district court’s findings as to those statements do not support its conclusion that Secretary Norton

committed a fraud on the court.

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The April representations appeared in the Department’s

Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Special Master Investigation; in particular, the court identified the statement that

the Department had ‘‘made security a top priority and ha[d]

taken numerous steps to improve the security of the Reston

facility since the Special Master’s visit,’’ id. at 106, and the

Department’s outline of its completed and planned security

improvements. Id. at 106–07. The district court also took

issue with the Department’s May 2001 Opposition to the

Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction, insofar as the defendants argued the

plaintiffs’ ‘‘position [was] wholly without merit.’’ Id. at 107.

The district court apparently found these statements to be

false based upon the Report on IT Security prepared by a

special master (not Kieffer), and upon ‘‘the Department’s

failure to dispute any of the underlying facts’’ set out in that

report. See id. at 108. In the report, the special master had

concluded the Department ‘‘has known about pervasive IT

security deficiencies for more than a decade,’’ id., and found

the Department ‘‘has not taken necessary actions to correct

its numerous and longstanding IT security deficiencies,’’ id. at

109, which the special master chronicled at length.

We see no finding of fact in the Report on IT Security, or

in any opinion of the district court, that directly contradicts

the statements in the Department’s April Opposition, which

the court identified as part of a fraud on the court. Absent a

direct contradiction, the facts of this case do not support the

implicit inference that Secretary Norton ‘‘has acted with an

intent to deceive or defraud the court.’’ United States v.

Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002). With respect to

the statement in the Department’s May Opposition, we think

it inconceivable that a departmental secretary may be held to

have committed a fraud on the court because an attorney

representing her Department argued in an adversarial proceeding that an adversary’s motion critical of the Department

was ‘‘without merit.’’

We therefore conclude the district court erred as a matter

of law in holding Secretary Norton in criminal contempt on

specification five.

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III. Conclusion

The Contempt Order is vacated insofar as it relates to the

appointment and duties of the Special Master-Monitor. The

Special Master-Monitor Order is vacated. The Monitor Order, denying the defendants’ motion to revoke the appointment of Kieffer as Monitor, is vacated, and the district court

is directed to enter an order granting that motion.

The Contempt Order is vacated insofar as it sanctions the

defendants on specifications one through five and directs the

payment of expenses and fees incurred by the plaintiffs. The

case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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