Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02108/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-02108-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONDALEE MORRIS,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO,

Respondent.

1

Case No. 14-cv-02108-VC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Re: Dkt. No. 18

Condalee Morris is a state prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison. He has 

filed a pro se habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a prison disciplinary 

action which took place at Salinas Valley and which resulted in the forfeiture of 150 days of good 

time credits. Respondent William Muniz has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. The petition is dismissed as untimely, because Morris 

filed it several months after the federal one-year deadline expired, and there is no basis for 

statutory or equitable tolling. 

BACKGROUND

On January 7, 2012, Morris received a Rules Violation Report. At a February 18, 2012 

disciplinary hearing stemming from this report, the hearing officer found that Morris was guilty of 

battery on a peace officer, and assessed him 150 days of good time credits. Morris filed an 

administrative appeal, arguing the hearing officer violated Morris’ due process rights by not 

allowing him to call witnesses or to make a statement. Morris’ appeal was rejected at the Second 

 

1

In accordance with Habeas Rule 2(a) and Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

the Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute Acting Warden William Muniz as Respondent 

because he is Petitioner's current custodian.

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Level of Review as untimely. It was denied at the Third Level of Review for bypassing the 

Second Level of Review. Morris resubmitted his appeal several times at the Second and Third 

Levels of Review. Each time it was dismissed at the Second Level as untimely and at the Third 

Level for bypassing the Second Level. It was denied for the last time at the Third Level on 

September 6, 2012. On November 19, 2013, Morris signed a proof of service for a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court.2 On February 11, 2014, the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition with a citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921, 925-

26 (1979).3 On March 20, 2014, Morris signed the proof of service for this federal petition. See

Dkt. 1-1 at 57. 

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Limitations Period

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on 

April 24, 1996 and imposed a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by 

state prisoners. Since then, petitions filed by prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or 

sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment 

became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; 

(B) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if 

such action prevented the petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right asserted was 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The AEDPA limitation period also applies when a prisoner is challenging an 

administrative decision such as the revocation of good time credits. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 

1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 

2As a pro se prisoner, Morris receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which deems most 

documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. See Stillman 

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 

3

The citation to Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d at 925-26 refers to the failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies.

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Administrative decisions are not governed by section 2244(d)(1)(A) because the word "judgment" 

in that section refers to a judgment of conviction and sentence, and the phrase "direct review" 

refers to the direct appellate review of that judgment. Redd, 343 F.3d at 1081. Instead, 

administrative decisions are governed by section 2244(d)(1)(D). Section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides 

that the limitations period to file a federal habeas petition will begin to run on "the date on which 

the factual predicate of the claim . . . presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence." For administrative appeals, the "factual predicate," which causes the limitations 

period to run, is the denial of a prisoner's administrative appeal. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066. 

It is difficult to ascertain exactly when Morris’ administrative appeal was denied. 

However, giving Morris the benefit of all of his administrative filings, the Court assumes it was

the date of the third level response to his last administrative appeal, which was September 6, 2012. 

The statute of limitations began to run on the next day, September 7, 2012, and Morris was 

required to file his federal petition by September 7, 2013. Morris filed his federal petition on 

March 20, 2014, which exceeds the one-year limitations period by more than six months. 

Therefore, absent statutory or equitable tolling, the petition is untimely.

AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the “time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” However, once the federal statute of limitations on 

a claim has run, statutory tolling is no longer available. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003). Because Morris filed his state petition on November 19, 2013, after the 

September 7, 2013 federal deadline had expired, statutory tolling does not apply. 

AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). However, “a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if 

he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be 

appropriate.”). 

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Morris argues that he was not required to file his federal petition by September 7, 2013 

because he had filed an amended civil rights complaint on June 10, 2013, in Morris v. Sandoval, 

case number C 12-6132 LHK (PR). Morris refers to his Exhibit B, page 46, lines 14-28, the 

district court’s July 15, 2013 order in his civil rights case, dismissing his claim for due process 

violations during his disciplinary hearing as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 

(1994), because a ruling in his favor would imply the invalidity of the disciplinary judgment. The 

court stated that, if Morris wished to challenge the decision that resulted in the credit forfeiture, he 

must do so in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex. B., page 47. 

It is unclear how Morris construes the dismissal of his civil rights claim as affecting the 

statute of limitations for his federal habeas petition. He seems to be arguing that the federal statute 

of limitations began to run on July 15, 2013, the day the district court dismissed his due process 

claim and, because his petition was filed on March 20, 2014, it was timely. However, Morris 

offers no authority for this argument, nor is the Court aware of any. The fact that Morris first filed 

a civil rights claim that was barred by Heck v. Humphrey does not constitute the extraordinary 

circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling of his federal petition. Nor does Morris argue 

that he was actually innocent. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (if failure 

to hear untimely constitutional claim would result in a miscarriage of justice, it may proceed); 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (“miscarriage of justice” exception limited to habeas 

petitioners who can show “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one 

who is actually innocent.”). 

Because Morris’ petition was filed over six months after the federal deadline and he has 

not shown that statutory or equitable tolling apply or that he is actually innocent, his petition is 

untimely. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Court grants the motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition is untimely. The 

Court does not address Muniz’s alternative arguments that the petition is unexhausted and 

procedurally defaulted.

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2. The Court does not issue a certificate of appealability because jurists of reason would 

not find debatable whether the procedural ruling was correct. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

3. The Clerk of the Court will issue a separate judgment, terminate all pending motions and 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

April 8, 2015

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