Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00844/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00844-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gary S. Duarte, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Catalina Foothills School District No. 16, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-00844-TUC-JAS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are the parties’ motions in limine. For the reasons stated 

below, the motions are denied in part and granted in part. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff, Gary S. Duarte, was employed as a maintenance worker for Defendant, 

Catalina Foothills School District No. 16 (“District”), for 34 years. His work included 

going on roofs of the District’s buildings and making necessary repairs. According to 

Plaintiff, the District’s Director of Facilities (Basil Callimanis-“Basil”) told him in 

January of 2011 that his contract would not be renewed because Plaintiff was too old for 

the job. In contrast, Basil denies making such a statement; rather, his position is that 

Plaintiff’s contract was not renewed due to poor work performance. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 As pertinent to the motions in limine, Fed. R. Evid. 402 provides: "Relevant 

evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: • the United States 

Constitution; • a federal statute; • these rules; or • other rules prescribed by the Supreme 

Court. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 401 defines relevant 

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evidence as follows: "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence 

in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides that: “The court may exclude 

relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or 

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 

delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 

DISCUSSION

Doc. 64: The District’s Motion in Limine No. 2 (Performance Reviews)

 The District moves to exclude written performance reviews that Plaintiff seeks to 

introduce at trial. The reviews Plaintiff intends to introduce include ratings that list 

Plaintiff’s job performance as “exceeding” or “meets” job expectations or requirements. 

Defendant argues that these performance reviews are irrelevant and subject to exclusion 

under Rule 403 as they were not written by Basil who was the ultimate person that 

decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract. In contrast, as Plaintiff correctly argues, these 

performance reviews are highly relevant to whether Plaintiff was truly fired for 

performance, or based on his age. These written reviews were written by Plaintiff’s direct 

supervisor since at least 2004 (Charles “Chuck” Kennedy-“Kennedy”); if Plaintiff’s 

direct supervisor consistently rated Plaintiff’s work as “exceeding” or “meeting” job 

expectations or requirements, such evidence tends to undermine the District’s claim that 

Plaintiff was fired for poor performance. The relevance of this evidence outweighs any 

Rule 403 considerations. Defendant’s motion in limine regarding performance reviews 

(Doc. 64) is denied. 

Doc. 62: Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine Regarding Plaintiff’s Replacement 

 Plaintiff moves to exclude evidence that Defendant seeks to introduce regarding 

the person hired to replace Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that information regarding who 

replaced Plaintiff after Plaintiff’s was fired is irrelevant to whether Plaintiff was fired 

based on his age, and any relevance is outweighed by Rule 403 considerations. The 

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Court disagrees. As Defendant argues, in relation to the Age Discrimination claim, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the District replaced Plaintiff with a substantially 

younger employee. In addition, part of Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination claim includes a 

requirement to show that Plaintiff was part of the protected class covered by the statute 

(i.e., he was age 40 or older when the adverse employment action occurred). However, 

the record reflects that the District hired a replacement who was 52 (i.e., only 6 years 

younger than Plaintiff when he was fired-58), and that Plaintiff’s replacement was also 

part of the protected class under the applicable statute (i.e., age 40 or older). This 

evidence tends to prove that the District did not fire Plaintiff due to a discriminatory 

motive, and the relevance of the evidence outweighs any Rule 403 considerations. 

Plaintiff’s motion regarding his replacement (Doc. 62) is denied. 

Doc. 61: Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine Regarding Reference to a Dismissed Claim 

 Plaintiff moves to preclude any reference to the dismissed claim in this case. The 

record reflects that the Complaint originally included a claim for both Age 

Discrimination and National Origin Discrimination. However, after Plaintiff had an 

opportunity to conduct discovery in this case, Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to dismiss the 

Nation Origin Discrimination claim; as such, the parties submitted a stipulation to 

dismiss this claim, and U.S. District Judge Zipps issued an Order granting the stipulation 

to dismiss this claim. In light of these circumstances, Plaintiff argues that allowing any 

reference to this dismissed claim is irrelevant, and any relevance is outweighed by Rule 

403 considerations. In contrast, the District argues that reference to the dismissed claim 

is relevant to Plaintiff’s credibility. The District argues that Plaintiff previously 

submitted official documents to the Arizona Civil Rights Division (“ACRD”) and this 

Court (i.e., the Complaint) attesting that the District fired him because he is Hispanic, but 

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the facts proved otherwise which led to Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the claim. The 

Court agrees with Plaintiff’s position. As the National Origin Discrimination claim has 

been dismissed, the Court finds that any continued reference to that dismissed claim is 

irrelevant to the one remaining claim in this case (i.e., Age Discrimination). In addition, 

to the extent it could be marginally relevant to Plaintiff’s credibility, the Court finds that 

any reference to this dismissed claim at trial is outweighed by Rule 403 considerations. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion pertaining to any reference to the dismissed claim (Doc. 61) 

is granted.1

Doc. 63: Defendant’s Motion In Limine No. 1 (Hearsay Statements)

 As referenced above, Charles “Chuck” Kennedy was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor, 

and wrote his employee reviews since approximately 2004; the reviews rated Plaintiff’s 

work as “exceeding” or “meeting” job expectations or requirements. Plaintiff seeks to 

testify at trial that Kennedy told him that Basil was not going to renew Plaintiff’s contract 

because the Plaintiff was too old. Defendant argues that any such testimony is hearsay, 

and the hearsay exception for party admissions does not apply to each level of hearsay. 

Defendant argues that Basil, and not Kennedy, was solely responsible for firing Plaintiff, 

and therefore any statement regarding any decision to fire Plaintiff was not within the 

scope of Kennedy’s employment such that the party admission exception does not apply.2

 

The Court disagrees. 

 As Plaintiff correctly argues, the Basil to Kennedy and Kennedy to Plaintiff 

statements are not considered hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) because they are 

statements “offered against an opposing party and ...[were] made by the party’s agent or 

 

1

 Defendant correctly points out that there are certain documents that it seeks to 

introduce that do not reference the dismissed claim. For example, the ACRD’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination does not reference the National Origin claim, but simply dismisses the entire charge without reference to any specific claim. The Court agrees that this is outside the scope of Plaintiff’s motion and may be admitted. However, 

to the extent there are any underlying documents that reference the dismissed claim at 

issue, any references whatsoever to National Origin Discrimination shall be redacted. 

2

 Plaintiff does not oppose the portion of Defendant’s motion seeking to exclude hearsay statements pertaining to Eileen Ruddell; as such, this part of Defendant’s motion 

is granted. 

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employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed . . . ”3 

Kennedy and Basil were both employees of the District at the time the statements were 

made. Basil was Kennedy’s supervisor, and Kennedy was Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. 

Basil’s statement to Kennedy was within the scope of that relationship; Basil (the 

Facilities Director) was informing Plaintiff’s direct supervisor that Plaintiff’s contract 

would not be renewed. This was a decision in which Kennedy would be associated with 

as it involved an employee under his direct supervision. 

 Likewise, Kennedy’s statement to Plaintiff regarding Basil’s statement was within 

the scope of Kennedy’s employment relationship with the District. Kennedy was 

Plaintiff’s direct supervisor who managed Plaintiff’s daily work and work assignments. 

Consequently, Basil would logically keep Kennedy abreast of any matters pertaining to 

employees under Kennedy’s direct supervision, and Kennedy would inform Plaintiff 

about issues directly impacting Plaintiff’s future employment with the District. See 

McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2006)(statements related to 

personnel action against the plaintiff, made by department officials involved in personnel 

management, were within the scope of their employment and properly admitted under the 

party admission exception; emphasizing that for “a statement to be an admission under 

Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), it must be made by a party, a party's agent, or a servant within 

the scope of an agency or employment . . . The employee's station within the organization 

is not relevant to the Rule 801(d)(2) analysis . . . The relevant inquiry is whether the 

employee's statement was made within the scope of employment.”); see also Woodman v. 

Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (1st Cir.1995)(rejecting the argument that 

statements made by a “first-line supervisor” with no firing authority could not be 

admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)). The Court finds that the statement at issue is a 

party admission, and that it is relevant inasmuch as it tends to bolster Plaintiff’s position 

 

3 See also Fed. R. Evid. 805 (“Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against 

hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”). 

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that he was fired based on age, and not based on performance as alleged by Basil. In 

addition, the relevance of this evidence outweighs any Rule 403 considerations. As such, 

Defendant’s motion in limine regarding statements by Kennedy (Doc. 63) is denied. 

CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 

(1) The parties’ motions in limine (Docs. 61, 62, 63, 64) are denied in part and granted in 

part as discussed in the text of this Order. 

 Dated this 10th day of October, 2014. 

Honorable James A. Soto 

United States District Judge 

 

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