Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03461/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03461-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID YEZEK and SHAWN

FRAZER,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHP OFFICER M. MITCHELL, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C-05 -03461 TEH 

ORDER GRANTING 

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 IN PART AND DISMISSING 

 STATE LAW CLAIMS 

INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of the traffic stop of plaintiffs Shawn Frazer and David Yezek on

August 24, 2004. Defendant California Highway Patrol officer M. Mitchell stopped the

Plaintiffs for speeding on their motorcycles, and then photographed them because he

believed they were “Hells Angels” before giving them their citations and releasing them. As

set out below, the Court finds that although Plaintiffs have raised at least a triable issue of

fact as to whether the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the defendant

officer is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. The Court declines to rule on

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, and

instead DISMISSES these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on August 27, 2004, CHP officer Mark Mitchell stopped

plaintiffs Shawn Frazer and David Yezek for speeding on their motorcycles. Mitchell

entered highway 680 in his marked CHP patrol vehicle. Mitchell alleges that he observed

two motorcycles change lanes and then accelerate away at high speed. (Plaintiffs testified

that traffic in their lane was braking suddenly because of an obstruction, so they switched

lanes and sped up to avoid other vehicles and move away from the obstruction). Mitchell

accelerated after the Plaintiffs. Mitchell claims that he followed the Plaintiffs at 103 mph; 

Plaintiffs admit that they were speeding, but allege that they were going only 75 mph in a 65

mph zone. Mitchell paced the Plaintiffs for approximately one mile, then stopped them by

activating his red lights.

Mitchell claims that after the traffic stop was initiated, but before the Plaintiffs had

stopped, he noticed that Frazer had what he believed was the distinctive “Hells Angels” patch

displayed on the back of his vest. As Mitchell was pulling the Plaintiffs over, he called

dispatch, told them he was making a traffic stop on Hells Angels, and requested a cover unit. 

Once the Plaintiffs stopped, Mitchell saw that Frazer was indeed wearing the “Hells Angels”

patch with the Hell’s Angels logo and the word “California” at the bottom. On the front of

Frazer’s vest was a patch that said “Richmond.” Both Frazer and Yezek were wearing bulky

layered clothing that Mitchell believed could conceal weapons.

While he was waiting for another officer to arrive, Mitchell, in an effort to “break the

ice,” asked Plaintiffs if they were going to a “church meeting” – supposedly, in Defendant’s

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terms, a term for “a meeting involving outlaw motorcycle club gang members.” (Plaintiffs

remember Mitchell asking if they were “late for church.”) Plaintiffs did not respond. 

Mitchell asked Plaintiffs for their licenses and registration. When Frazer opened his

saddlebags to get his papers, Mitchell looked inside the saddlebag with his flashlight and

asked if Frazer was armed. Frazer responded that he was not. Yezek testified that he told

Mitchell he was carrying a knife, but Mitchell just walked back to his car. Whether Mitchell

ever did a pat-down search of the Plaintiffs is disputed: Mitchell testified he did a pat-down

search of both of them after his backup arrived, while Yezek and Frazer remember that he

never did a pat-down. At some point during the interaction, Mitchell also asked Plaintiffs

who was running the Richmond chapter of the Hells Angels, “in an attempt to create a

conversation.” They did not respond. 

Mitchell went back to his patrol car. He radioed in the license and registration

information. He also had dispatch run a warrants check. Mitchell testified that at this point,

he started writing the speeding tickets. While Mitchell was at his car, CHP officer Ocena

arrived at the scene. The checks came back clear; dispatch informed Mitchell that neither

Plaintiff had any warrants, but Yezek had guns registered to him and Frazer was a member of

the Hells Angels. 

Mitchell had decided to photograph Frazer and Yezek. Mitchell acknowledged that

although he was done writing the tickets, he waited to give the tickets to the Plaintiffs until

after he had photographed them, because he knew that once they signed the citations, they

were free to leave. He went to the trunk of his car and got a camera. He called Frazer to the

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1

 At his deposition, Mitchell explained that he believed he had the authority to take the Plaintiffs to

jail if they refused to be photographed because they would be obstructing a peace officer in the

discharge of his duty in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 148(a). 

2

 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the CAD reports indicated the stop took 23

minutes in its entirety, a figure which Defense counsel did not dispute.

4

patrol unit. Frazer said he did not want his photograph taken. Mitchell said “something to

the effect that you’ll – if you don’t, I’m going to take you to jail.” Mitchell Depo. at 65, 67.1

Frazer remained calm, and did not curse, but continued to refuse to be photographed, and

asked why his picture was being taken. Mitchell responded that he took pictures of people

that he believed were gang members. Frazer said the Hells Angels was not a gang, it was a

motorcycle club. Mitchell took the photograph.

Frazer walked back to Yezek and told him, “you’re having your picture taken or

you’re going to jail.” Yezek Depo. at 33. Mitchell called Yezek over to the patrol car. 

Yezek testified he told Mitchell something like “you’ve got to be kidding,” although

Mitchell testified Yezek made no comments that indicated he objected. Mitchell

photographed Yezek.

After the photographs were taken, Mitchell gave the Plaintiffs citations for violation

of Vehicle Code § 22349(A)(speed over 65 mph) and released them. 

Frazer estimated that Mitchell spent approximately 10 minutes at the patrol car, and

that the total time of the stop was 15 or 20 minutes. Yezek estimated the entire time of the

stop was about 10 or 15 minutes.2 

Plaintiffs contested the tickets. At the hearing on the citation in the Concord Superior

Court, Mitchell testified that he saw the Plaintiffs dart across lanes and he “paced them” at a

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3

 Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice of the transcription of the January 5, 2005 Concord

Superior Court hearing is GRANTED.

5

hundred miles an hour for about a minute. Plaintiffs’ counsel then cross-examined Mitchell. 

Mitchell admitted that he saw Frazer’s Hells Angels jacket patch, that he asked about

“church” and “who’s running Richmond.”3 Mitchell testified that he threatened Frazer with

jail unless he allowed Mitchell to take his picture. Frazer testified he changed lanes to avoid

brake lights and sped up to a maximum rate of 75 mph. Once Mitchell said he wanted to

photograph Frazer, Frazer asked if he could call his attorney because he “knew it was

wrong,” and Mitchell responded that he could call his attorney after the photograph or he

could call his attorney from jail. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the entire purpose of the stop was to do an investigation

(the photograph), and that the speeding was a pretext. The judge offered Mitchell an

opportunity to present a rebuttal, but he testified only that there was no obstruction or

braking on the freeway.

The judge stated he was “somewhat taken aback by some of the events that occurred,

however I am going to take this matter under submission. I do have one question though

and, and ... of your client Mr. Frazer. What were you wearing that evening in terms of

helmet, jacket, attire?” Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. A at 13. Frazer responded he was

wearing a leather vest brand new Hells Angels patch on the back. The court took the matter

under submission. The Notice of Rendition of Judgment, issued on the same day, stated

“you have been found not guilty of violating section CVC 22349A, speed over 65 mph.” 

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6

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material

facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The

court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at

trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than

for the moving party. Id. at 322-23. However, on an issue for which its opponent will have

the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by “pointing out to the

District Court AAA that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.”

Id. at 325. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then “set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” to defeat the motion. Fed.

R. Civ. Pro. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

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ANALYSIS

I. Defendant Mitchell Is Not Collaterally Estopped From Claiming There Was

No Fourth Amendment Violation

Yezek contends Mitchell is collaterally estopped from claiming that there was

probable cause for the stop because the Superior Court traffic commissioner found the

plaintiffs not guilty of violating Vehicle Code § 22349(a). He is not. 

Doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply in a § 1983 case to a state court

judgment on a constitutional claim, assuming that the party against whom an earlier court

decision is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided by the first

court. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980). Federal courts “give the same preclusive

effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State

from which the judgments emerged.” Lance v. Dennis, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1202

(2006)(citations omitted). California law bars relitigation of an issue decided at a previous

proceeding if

(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one

which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final

judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted

was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding]. 

It is implicit in this three-prong test that only issues actually litigated in the initial

action may be precluded from the second proceeding under the collateral estoppel

doctrine. [Citation.] An issue is actually litigated ‘[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the

pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined.

People v. Carter, 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1240 (2005), quoting People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d

468, 484. Collateral estoppel can be applied “offensively” to preclude a defendant from

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relitigating an issue the defendant previously litigated and lost only if the defendant had a

“full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding. Roos v. Red, 130

Cal.App.4th 870, 880 (2005).

Few of these requirements are met here. First, the Fourth Amendment issue was not

necessarily decided by the Superior Court. Plaintiffs clearly raised the Fourth Amendment

issue by arguing the stop was simply pretext to search and photograph an alleged motorcycle

gang member. However, the judgment of “not guilty,” with no explanation, does not prove

this claim was necessarily decided. There was conflicting evidence about how fast the

Plaintiffs were going, and whether there was justification for any speeding: Plaintiffs said

they sped up to 75 to avoid danger, while Mitchell said they were going 100 mph for no

reason. While it seems likely that the dismissal was based on the Hells Angels issue, it could

have been decided on factual grounds. See also Borunda v. Richmond 885 F.2d 1384, 1389

(9th Cir. 1988)(acquittal after trial does not necessarily establish whether probable cause for

arrest existed). 

Second, Mitchell was not a party to the traffic citation hearing or in privity with the

state. Mitchell’s interests as a police officer witness for the state and member of the criminal

justice system were aligned with his interests here as a defendant: to show that Plaintiffs

were speeding and that the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment. But privity is more

than an alignment of interests. The Ninth Circuit and numerous other courts have held that

police officers are not in privity under similar circumstances. Davis v. Eide, 439 F.2d 1077,

1078 (9th Cir. 1971); Hardesty v. Hamburg Tp., 461 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2006)(“police

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officer defendants in a § 1983 case are not in privity with the prosecution of a related

criminal case and do not have a personal stake in the outcome of the criminal case.”); McCoy

v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2000)(same); Duncan v. Clements, 744 F.2d 48,

51-52 (8th Cir. 1984); Kinslow v. Ratzlaff, 158 F.3d 1104, 1105-06 (10th Cir. 1998)(mere

fact that the officers were interested in proving a state of facts which were presented in the

criminal proceedings does not establish that the officers were in privity with any of the

parties in the prior action); Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1057 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1113 (1997). 

Finally, it is not clear that Mitchell had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter

at the traffic hearing. Plaintiffs argue that because Mitchell was handling the state’s case, he

had “tactical control” and a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Mitchell had more

opportunity to present a Fourth Amendment case than the officers in Williams v. Kobel, 789

F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1986) and Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 1995),

who were not permitted to testify an had no tactical control over the state’s case in the

criminal proceedings. Mitchell got to decide what to present, and he could have called

witnesses. Mitchell Depo. at 89, 91. (It is not clear whether he could have cross-examined

Frazer and Yezek. Cf. Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.

1980)(party asserting collateral estoppel has burden)). Nonetheless, being delegated the

state’s prosecution of a speeding citation is not the same as defending a § 1983 suit. The

absence of counsel was critical; while we do expect police officers to have a working

knowledge of what the Fourth Amendment requires of them, Mitchell was not an attorney,

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and he had neither his own counsel nor a prosecutor who could advise him on the Fourth

Amendment issue. 

On the facts of this case, Mitchell is not collaterally estopped from arguing there was

no Fourth Amendment violation. 

II. Fourth Amendment Claim

Defendants argue that under Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001),

the photographs were permissible. In Atwater, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth

Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a

misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. Atwater was arrested for a traffic

violation – driving without a seatbelt and other similar offenses. There was probable cause

to believe she had violated the law. The court found that the arrest and processing, while

inconvenient and embarrassing, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Ninth Circuit summed up standards for probable cause for arrest in its recent

decision Tatum v. City of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2006):

A police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect without a warrant if the

available facts suggest a “fair probability” that the suspect has committed a crime. See

United States v. Valencia-Amezcua, 278 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); United States

v. Fixen, 780 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986). An officer who observes criminal

conduct may arrest the offender without a warrant, even if the pertinent offense carries

only a minor penalty. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If

an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very

minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth

Amendment, arrest the offender.”). If the facts known to an arresting officer are

sufficient to create probable cause, the arrest is lawful, regardless of the officer's

subjective reasons for it. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588,

160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (“[a police officer's] subjective reason for making the arrest

need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable

cause”).

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4 First, Plaintiffs argue that Cal. Penal Code § 853.5, provides that officers may only cite and

release for minor traffic violations; because Mitchell intentionally manipulated the process

by giving the plaintiffs their citations only after he had photographed them, they were de

facto arrested, not cited and released, in violation of the California statute. Plaintiffs then try

to distinguish Atwater on the grounds that the arrest in Atwater was lawful under Texas law

(the officer discretion to either cite and release for a traffic infraction, or to arrest), but the

arrest here was unlawful under California law. But mere violation of state statutes does not

render otherwise constitutional acts unconstitutional. People v. McKay, 27 Cal.4th 601, 609-

614 (2002). Although Plaintiffs try to distinguish McKay on factual grounds, they never

address the core constitutional argument.

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Id. at 1094.

Here, Plaintiffs admitted they were going over the speed limit – 75 mph in a 65 mph

zone. There is no question that there was probable cause for the initial traffic stop. 

Defendants argue that because there was probable cause to believe Plaintiffs broke the law,

Atwater applies, and a full-fledged arrest would have been permissible – therefore the much

less invasive photographs and citations were permissible. Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish

Atwater are misguided.4 

Nonetheless, Atwater does not answer the Fourth Amendment question here. 

Mitchell could have arrested the Plaintiffs for the traffic violation, but he did not. Thus,

Atwater does not provide the relevant Fourth Amendment limits here. Cf. United States v.

Childs 277 F.3d 947, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2002)(en banc)( “The reasonableness of a seizure

depends on what the police do, not on what they might have done”).

Although the Plaintiffs’ argument is no model of clarity, they apparently contend that

the traffic stop ripened into a custodial arrest once Mitchell held Plaintiffs for a purpose other

than the traffic stop (the photographs) and told them that they had to submit the photos or go

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5

 Plaintiffs also suggest that the photographs were a search incident to an unlawful arrest – unlawful

because it violated Cal. Penal Code § 853.5. See United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1111-

1112 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1993). However,

photographing a person’s face does constitute a search. United States v. Emmett, 321 F.3d 669, 672

(7th Cir. 2003), citing United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.1972) (“[T]here is no

‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ about one's face.”); see also C.J.S. Searches § 90 (“a law

enforcement officer's photographing a defendant's face does not violate the defendant's Fourth

Amendment rights”); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991)(“Video surveillance

does not in itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. ... the police may record what they

normally may view with the naked eye”).

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to jail. They argue that this “arrest” – separate from the initial traffic stop – required its own

individualized probable cause.5

While this argument has surface appeal, it ignores the fact that this “arrest” took place

entirely within the confines of a stop that ended with the Plaintiffs’ departure. Plaintiffs offer

no authority other than Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) and its progeny, which hold

that a stop ripens into an arrest when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 

Without additional authority, this Court is not prepared to hold that motorists photographed

and then released were arrested, such that separate probable cause is required. 

Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment requires that every seizure be reasonable. As

the Ninth Circuit explained:

The length and scope of detention must be justified by the circumstances authorizing

its initiation. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1968). Thus, when an officer has

obtained sufficient information to issue a citation, a continued detention without

probable cause to arrest for a crime is unreasonable. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d

89, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1973)(per curiam) (finding that an individual stopped for jaywalking may be detained “only the time necessary to obtain satisfactory identification

from the violator and to execute a traffic citation”); see also McKenzie v. Lamb, 738

F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that arrest requires “objective evidence

which would allow a reasonable officer to deduce that a particular individual has

committed or is in the process of committing a criminal offense”); United States v.

Jennings, 468 F.2d 111, 115 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that, after an initial investigative

inquiry on the street is completed, continued detention of an individual for

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6 See also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001)(en banc) (“the Fourth

Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop based on probable cause must be judged by

examining both the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out....[A]

traffic stop should be analyzed under Terry, regardless of whether the stop is based on

probable cause or on some lesser suspicion. ... even if ‘an officer's initial traffic stop [is]

objectively justified by the officer's observation of a minor traffic violation, his investigation

nevertheless will be circumscribed by Terry's scope requirement. ... Even if we were to

abandon Terry for this type of traffic stop, we are convinced we would still apply a scope

requirement since, as indicated by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment constrains the

scope of all searches and seizures.” (citations omitted)). 

13

fingerprinting and photographing is constitutionally invalid without probable cause to

arrest).

Pierce v. Multnomah County, Or., 76 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 1996). These standards

apply today to an investigative traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 467 F.3d

1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006)(an officer cannot expand the scope of questioning or extend

detention without additional reasonable suspicion); United States v. Chavez Valenzuela, 268

F.3d 719, 722, 728 (9th Cir. 2001)(scope of investigative detention “must be carefully

tailored to its underlying justification... and may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate

its purpose”; officer needs reasonable suspicion to prolong traffic stop detention after

dispatch informs the officer that license and registration are valid and no warrants

outstanding).6

Possibly in search of a bright-line rule, the Supreme Court has focused on whether the

detention is prolonged. “A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning

ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably

required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). A “shift

in purpose” to investigation for a separate offense does not require additional justification,

provided a traffic stop is not prolonged. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005), citing

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Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408. Thus, in Caballes, a drug dog sniff was permissible because it

did not extend the lawful traffic stop, id. at 408, and in Muehler, questioning a woman

detained during execution of a search warrant about her immigration status did not violate

the Fourth Amendment or require additional justification because it did not extend the time

of the detention. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-101. The Seventh Circuit used the same

reasoning in Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269 (7th Cir. 2001). There, police photographed

the plaintiff during a traffic stop because he matched the description of a suspect in an

unrelated crime, but the court rejected his § 1983 claim that the photograph violated the

Fourth Amendment because plaintiff did not show he was detained for any extra time for the

photograph. Id. at 1281.

Where a stop is prolonged, then, additional justification is required. In a structurally

analogous case – where an officer stopped writing a traffic ticket in order to conduct a

separate investigation – the district court of Alaska found that the Fourth Amendment

required separate reasonable suspicion. United States v. Turvin, 442 F.Supp.2d 796 (D.

Alaska 2006). Turvin (like Atwater) was stopped for failure to wear a seat belt. Id. at 799,

800. While the officer was writing a ticket, another officer arrived, and, on that officer’s

information, the first officer “stopped his ticket-issuing process and used a tape recorder

solely for the purpose of asking Turvin about drugs and for a consent to search his vehicle.” 

Id. at 799. The drugs found in the subsequent search were suppressed, following ChavezValenzuela, supra, because “police prolonged an otherwise lawful detention of Turvin and

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his passenger” with questioning when there was no reasonable suspicion to justify that

questioning. Id.

Here, Plaintiffs argue they were detained for extra time for the photograph, in an

investigation of the Hells Angels that was utterly unrelated to the initial traffic stop. At oral

argument, Mitchell disputed this assertion, claiming that the photographs, like the warrant

checks, were taken for officer safety reasons. At most, this raises a disputed issue of fact. If

the Plaintiffs were detained solely for photographs unrelated to the traffic stop, Mitchell

would need additional reasonable suspicion, beyond the probable cause he had to believe

they had violated traffic laws, for the detention to be reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. He admits he had none. Mitchell Depo. at 74 (Mitchell had no basis to believe

that Frazer had done anything illegal, other than speeding); see also United States v. Mendez,

467 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)(“gang membership alone is not sufficient” to create

reasonable suspicion).

Even if the stop is viewed purely from a reasonableness perspective, Plaintiffs have

raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the length and scope of the stop were reasonable. 

The photographs took an extra five to ten minutes. That amount of time might not rise to the

level of “unreasonable” on its own. Cf. United States v. Childs 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir.

2002)(en banc); Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 1995)(after a high

speed chase, where plaintiff was intoxicated and with combative friend, pointing a gun at the

plaintiff, cuffing him, and detaining him for 24 minutes in a police car not unreasonable). 

But here, Mitchell manipulated the encounter, taking the photographs before he gave the

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was clearly established. But the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity inquiry

refers to the federal right asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not to state law.

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Plaintiffs their citations, because he knew he was permitted only to cite and release them

under state law. Cf. Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 931 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2003)(“[i]n

evaluating a custodial arrest executed by state officials, federal courts must determine the

reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law governing the arrest”). Finally,

Mitchell’s threat to jail the Plaintiffs if they refused to have their photographs taken (with the

circular reasoning that they would be interfering with his ability to take the photograph)

could be viewed as patently unreasonable. 

Nonetheless, the Court finds that even if Plaintiffs were able to prove a Fourth

Amendment violation, Defendant Mitchell is entitled to qualified immunity. Under the

doctrine of qualified immunity, even if a constitutional violation occurred, government

officials are immune from liability if their conduct “does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). Although Plaintiffs argue that the

Fourth Amendment standard was clearly established,7 the Supreme Court’s decision in

Atwater has altered the legal landscape to some degree, and the court finds it was not clearly

established that, in the course of a traffic stop based on probable cause, Mitchell could not

prolong the stop to take the photographs, and Mitchell could have reasonably believed the

photographs were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 205-07 (2001). Some

Courts have held that since Atwater, arrested persons do not have to be released as quickly as

possible, although detentions must remain reasonable. United States v. Childs 277 F.3d at

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952-54; see also United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004)(Childs held

that Terry standards do not apply to stop supported by probable cause). Because no Ninth

Circuit case has directly addressed the impact of Atwater on reasonableness requirements for

a traffic stop, under the circumstances of this case, Mitchell is entitled to qualified immunity.

III. State Law Claims

Defendants moved for summary judgment in a cursory fashion on Plaintiffs’ state law

claims (false imprisonment, defamation and invasion of privacy, and Cal. Civil Code § 52.1

and 52). Plaintiffs failed meaningfully to oppose the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. However, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that it is error to grant a motion

for summary judgment simply because the opponent failed to oppose.” In re Rogstad, 126

F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The Court declines rule on Defendants’ motion as to these claims, or to continue to

exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law causes of action. Under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction, [or]

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.

See also Executive Software N. Am. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1555-59 (9th

Cir. 1994). Here, the state law claims not only predominate, they are all that remain of the

case after the Court’s grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim. The Court finds that

the “values of economy, convenience, fairness and comity,” id. at 1556, will be best served

by allowing California courts to decide the state law claims. The statute of limitations on

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state law claims is tolled while those claims are pending in federal courts and “and for a

period of 30 days after [they are] dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling

period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d); see also Okoro v. City of Oakland, 142 Cal.App.4th 306, 310-

311 (2006)(same). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c).

CONCLUSION

Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is

hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ remaining state law causes of action are hereby DISMISSED

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2007 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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