Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00324/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00324-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Espinosa,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Loretta Lynch, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-15-00324-TUC-FRZ (BGM)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss; (2) the Magistrate 

Judge’s Report & Recommendation regarding Defendant’s fully briefed motion; 

(3) Plaintiff’s Objections to the R&R; and (4) Defendant’s Response.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the “Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment” and the case was assigned to this Court by “random lot” — although not 

arbitrarily1 — as Article III Courts have jurisdiction over all “cases” or “controversies” 

“arising under the Constitution”.2

 

1

See Doc. 31 (acknowledging the Right to the “impartiality” of an Article III 

adjudicator); see also, Franklin v. Joseph, 15–002, Vol. I at pg. 27 (September 17, 2015) (finding 

“the right of all persons to be free from tyranny is a Privilege and Immunity of Citizenship [and 

that Right] includes protection from arbitrary decisions & processes by government”) (citing 

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book I, Ch. I: OF THE ABSOLUTE 

RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS, pgs. 117-141 (1765)); see further, McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 

561 U.S. 742, 813 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding “the terms ‘privileges’ and 

‘immunities’ had an established meaning as synonyms for ‘rights’ ” as used in the Constitution) 

(also citing W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England).

2 U.S. Con. Art. III § 2 (expounding the constitutional extent of Article III judicial 

Power).

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But, Defendants claim, and the Magistrate Judge agrees, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter beyond determining its own jurisdiction.3

Defendants argue that the Court cannot engage in “judicial review” of this case 

because it involves reviewing a prosecutor’s decision to send a “Giglio letter” to a federal 

executive agency about an agent of the executive — and absolute immunity applies.4

The Magistrate Judge’s R&R also invoked the “separation of powers doctrine” 

and found “judicial review of the [prosecutor’s] decisionmaking process [] inappropriate 

in this case.”5

Whether this Court possesses the Power of Judicial Review is beyond “judicial 

review” in this matter.6 And absolute prosecutorial immunity from Judicial Review 

applies to decisions whether or not to prosecute.7

Here, the prosecutor sent the Giglio letter after it received a prosecution referral 

from the agency.8The prosecutor declined to prosecute, and issued the letter detailing its 

rationale for that decision and stating its intentions to “no longer [use] Plaintiff ‘as a 

government witness in any criminal prosecution.’ ”9

 

3

See Brinkman v. Ryan, 14-CV-2093 (D. Ariz., December 2, 2016) (holding a “U.S. 

Federal District Court possesses the jurisdiction to inquire into its own jurisdiction — a threshold 

question that must be addressed before proceeding to the merits of any argument”).

4

See Doc. 16 at pg. 6 (invoking the doctrines of “separation of powers” and “absolute 

immunity”).

5 Doc. 28 at pg. 12 (finding that “judicial review of the USAO’s decisionmaking process 

to issue a Giglio letter is inappropriate in this case”).

6

See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 17-35105, at pg. 18 (9th Cir. February 9, 2017) (finding 

“it is beyond question that the federal judiciary retains the authority to adjudicate constitutional 

challenges to executive action”); see also, The Law of Judicial Precedent, at pg. 173 (2016) 

(stating “Marbury v. Madison is the quintessential leading case because it settled beyond doubt a 

then-uncertain but extremely important question: whether courts may subject legislative and 

executive actions to judicial review for their constitutionality”).

7

Roe v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1997) (“hold[ing] that 

absolute immunity exists against damage suits against individual prosecutors under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 for decisions not to initiate prosecutions”).

8 Doc. 18 at pg. 4.

9

See id. 

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Plaintiff was subsequently terminated from their position with the executive 

agency and alleges that Defendants deprived them of liberty and property, without due 

process of law, because Plaintiff’s employment was terminated “based solely on” the 

“Giglio letter” and Plaintiff never received notice or a hearing to challenge the 

prosecutor’s decision to issue the letter.10

But Plaintiff’s claimed “liberty interest” — best construed as the Right to be free 

from arbitrary governmental action — was not violated by the Defendants as the Giglio

letter provided a rationale for the prosecutor’s decisions.11

And although Plaintiff may have legitimate “property interest” in continuing 

federal employment;12 Defendants did not employ Plaintiff, nor did Defendants terminate 

Plaintiff’s employment.13

Therefore, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged any deprivation of “liberty” or 

“property” proximately caused by Defendants14 — whose actions merely constituted 

responding to an Article II agency’s intrabranch communication and explaining their 

decision not to prosecute.15

 

10 Doc. 29 at pg. 3-4 (stating Plaintiff “seeks judicial recognition of a constitutional 

protected liberty and property interest in the decision-making process that leads up to a 

[prosecutor’s] Giglio determination” and argues that “[a]t a minimum, discovery should be 

permitted to determine [] policies, procedures, and guidelines as to how letters such as the one in 

this case are issued and whether they are, in fact, a discretionary prosecution function.”). 

11 See Doc. 18 at pg. 4.

12 See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (acknowledging the 

Supreme Court has “held that public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a 

constitutionally protected property interest”); see also, Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 

408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (Stewart, J.) (“Property interests, of course, are not created by the 

Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 

understandings that stem from an independent source.”).

13 See Doc. 28 pgs. 6-7.

14 Koziara v. BNSF Ry. Co., 840 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J.) (“Proximate

causation in contrast creates legal liability, “proximate” denoting in law a relation that has legal 

significance.”).

15 Doc. 28 at pg. 7 (explaining that, in this matter, Plaintiff is only challenging the 

constitutionality of Defendants’ actions and decisionmaking “in the space[time] before the 

decision to issue [the] Giglio letter”); see also, Barnett v. Marquis, 662 F. App'x 537, 540 (9th 

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Any judicial inquiry beyond this “limited judicial review” of the prosecutor’s

actions to ensure constitutional compliance lies beyond the Power of an Article III 

Court.16

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. 28) is ACCEPTED.

17

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) is 

GRANTED.18

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment and close 

this case.

Dated this 28th day of February, 2017.

Honorable Frank R. Zapata

Senior United States District Judge

 

Cir. 2016) (prosecutors “are entitled to absolute immunity for communicating to [an executive 

agency] their decisions not to use [Plaintiff] as a witness or work with [Plaintiff] on any ongoing 

investigations.”).

16 See Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1246 (2015) (Thomas, 

J., concurring) (“The ‘check’ the judiciary provides to maintain our separation of powers is 

enforcement of the rule of law through judicial review.”); see also, Covington v. Harris, 419 

F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“The principal purpose of limited judicial review of 

administrative action is to insure that the decision-makers have (1) reached a reasoned []

decision, (2) by employing the proper criteria, and (3) without overlooking anything of 

substantial relevance.”).

17 See Doc. 29 (admitting that: “The Report accurately articulates the factual background 

in this case”).

18 See, e.g., Eagle Eye Produce v. Agricola Faaer, 16-CV-103 (D. Ariz. September 1, 

2016) (“expounding the Twombly/Iqbal standard for adjudicating Motions to Dismiss).

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