Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00803/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00803-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARRISON S. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:10-cv-00803-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 10, 2010, Plaintiff Garrison S. Johnson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint

is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983

is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint identifies the following individuals and county as Defendants in this

action: (1) Matthew Cate, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR); (2) John Doe , Director, CDCR; (3) K. Harrington, Warden, Kern 1

Valley State Prison (KVSP); and (4) Kern County.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On February 9, 2009, Plaintiff was sent to KVSP, where he presently remains.

During his incarceration at KVSP, “[P]laintiff has been subjected to high levels of arsenic

as a result of consuming the drinking water at KVSP.” (Compl. at 6.)

 The Court presumes that Plaintiff intended to designate the CDCR Director as a John Doe 1

defendant as his name was omitted in between the word “Defendant” and his title. (Compl. at 5.)

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Sometime in 2001, the “Environmental Protection Agency ordered a reduction in the

maximum level of arsenic in drinking water from 50 parts per billion to 10.” (Id. at 7.) The

deadline for the reduction was January 23, 2006. The Defendants commissioned a

filtration system in order to meet the new standard but decided not to build it. (Id.) Plaintiff

learned that the current arsenic level at KVSP was 22 parts per billion and requested a

remedy via an inmate appeal which was denied by the Defendants. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also

discovered that Kern County has a policy to permit the building of prisons where the water

contains impermissible levels of arsenic. (Id.)

“[D]ue to high levels of arsenic exposure [P]laintiff’s injuries consist of: Shortness

of Breath, Chronic Arsenic Toxicity, Nerve Damage, Stomach Pain. Also, Plaintiff is at risk

of developing” various cancers and other diseases due to his continued exposure. (Id.)

IV. ANALYSIS

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243,

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its

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face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant

committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment right be free from cruel and

unusual punishment and asserts claims pursuant to California state law for professional

negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud and negligent

misrepresentation.

A. Eighth Amendment

"[W]hile conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they

‘must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.'" Morgan v. Morgensen,

465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347

(1981)). The Eighth Amendment, which protects prisoners from inhumane conditions of

confinement, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), is violated when prison

officials act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate's health

or safety, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th

Cir. 2010); Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Two requirements must be met to show an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834. First, the deprivation must be, objectively, sufficiently serious. Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, prison officials must have a sufficiently

culpable state of mind, which for conditions-of-confinement claims is one of deliberate

indifference. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Prison officials act with deliberate indifference

when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837

(quotation marks omitted). 

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The exposure to toxic substances can support a claim under section 1983. See

Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1995) (exposure to asbestos). However,

Plaintiff has failed to allege non-speculative facts that would provide a basis to conclude

that the arsenic exposure alleged, even though above recommended levels, is sufficiently

serious as to constitute a risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health. The fact that the amount of

arsenic believed to be present is less than half of what formerly had been the permissible

standard suggests that typical exposure is unlikely to have measurable consequences in

humans. Plaintiff has alleged that he has various adverse health conditions attributable

to the exposure, but provided no facts that would enable the Court to conclude that this is

anything more than unqualified speculation by an individual and not based on medical or

other training or science.

Plaintiff’s claim also is defective insofar as his attributions of wrongdoing are

conclusory and do not adequately link any of the Defendants to the violations alleged. 

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Complaint alleges that Secretary Cate, Director Doe, and Warden Harrington 

became aware of the excessive arsenic levels sometime after 2001. (Compl. at 7.) It

alleges these Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to this serious risk of harm when

they decided against building the planned water filtration system (id.) and again on

February 24, 2010, when they denied Plaintiff’s appeal (id. at 6). Missing are specific

factual allegations connecting each individual Defendant to the conduct described. The

allegations do not make clear what role each Defendant played in the process and how

each caused or failed to correct the alleged harm and how they had the capacity to correct

it.

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Alleging they were supervisors is not sufficient. To state a claim based on a theory

of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that the supervisory official

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights: such as having

known of the violations and failed to act to prevent them or having promulgated or

“implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d

642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff alleges that he “discovered in 2010, that Defendant Kern County has a

policy or custom to permit the building of prisons in the Kern Valley area where the water

is highly contaminated with arsenic . . . .” (Compl. at 6.) Generally, a claim against a local

government unit for municipal liability requires an allegation that “a deliberate policy,

custom, or practice . . . was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation . . .

suffered.” Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). However, Plaintiff’s claim against Kern County

does not go beyond mere recital of conclusions. Plaintiff must allege facts, not

conclusions, to support his municipality claim. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. To state a

cognizable claim, Plaintiff must support his conclusion with plausible factual allegations

describing in detail a county policy that was the moving force behind the alleged

constitutional violations. Galen, 477 F.3d at 667. Those allegations must show that the

County action was such as to meet the requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation

set forth above.

B. State Law Claims

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Plaintiff alleges California state law causes of action for professional negligence,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The

Court will not address the viability of Plaintiff’s state law claims at this time because it will

not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims unless Plaintiff is able to state

a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy

Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). 

If Plaintiff were otherwise permitted to pursue his state law claims, he would have

to demonstrate compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Under the California Tort

Claims Act (CTCA), a plaintiff may not maintain an action for damages against a public

employee unless he has presented a written claim to the state Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board within six months of accrual of the action. See Cal. Gov’t Code

§§ 905, 911.2(a), 945.4 & 950.2; Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470,

1477 (9th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff may file a written application for leave to file a late claim

up to one year after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4. The purpose

of CTCA’s presentation requirement is “to provide the public entity sufficient information

to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the

expense of litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 706 (1974). 

Thus, in pleading a state law claim, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that he has

complied with CTCA’s presentation requirement. State of California v. Superior Court

(Bodde), 90 P.3d 116, 119 (2004). Failure to demonstrate compliance constitutes a failure

to state a cause of action and will result in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law claims. Id.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief under section 1983. The Court

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will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the

alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-

49. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible

on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also

demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his

rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing

the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55,

57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended Complaint,”

refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury.

Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although accepted as

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form

and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed May 10, 2010;

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to comply

with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2012 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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