Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01005/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01005-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

ROSEMARY PERDUE, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11cv1005-WKW 

 ) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF ) 

PUBLIC SAFETY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff Rosemary Perdue (“Perdue” or “Plaintiff”) filed her Complaint (Doc. #1) 

alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. Comp. (Doc. 1). 

 On December 5, 2011, the District Judge entered an Order (Doc. #5) referring this 

matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge “for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any 

orders or recommendations as may be appropriate.” 

 On January 12, 2012, this court granted Defendant’s motion for a more definite 

statement. See Order of January 12, 2012. On February 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed an 

Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. (Doc. 24). On February 28, 2012, Defendant 

filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, a Motion for More Definite Statement. 

(Doc. 25). On June 6, 2012, the District Judge entered an Order adopting the 

undersigned’s Recommendation that the Motion be Dismiss be granted as to all 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 1 of 26
2 

individual Defendants and denying the request for a more definite statement. See Order 

of June 4, 2012 (Doc. 29). On September 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended 

Complaint. (Doc. 44). 

 Before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) and 

Brief in Support (Doc. 54). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 53) and Brief in Support 

(Doc. 56). Upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53), the 

pleadings of the parties, and the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, it is the 

Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge that the Motion for Summary 

Judgment be GRANTED. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall 

grant a motion for “summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).1

 Only disputes about material facts will preclude the 

granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 

(1986). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable 

 

1 On December 1, 2010, amendments to Rule 56 became effective. The instant motion was filed 

on December 3, 2010. The amendments to Rule 56 generally reorganize the provisions of the 

Rule and incorporate language which is “intended to improve the procedures for presenting and 

deciding summary judgment-motions and [is] . . . not intended to change the summary-judgment 

standard or burdens.” Farmers Ins. Exchange v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (1st Cir. 

2011) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, because the summary 

judgment standard remains the same, the amendments “will not affect continuing development of 

the decisional law construing and applying” the standard now articulated in Rule 56(a). Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendments. Accordingly, while the Court is 

bound to apply the new version of Rule 56, the undersigned will, where appropriate, continue to 

cite to decisional law construing and applying prior versions of the Rule. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 2 of 26
3 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. An issue is ‘material’ if it might affect the 

outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland 

Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 

 The party asking for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion[,]” and alerting the Court to 

portions of the record which support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

323 (1986). However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-movant is then 

similarly required to cite to portions of the record which show the existence of a material 

factual dispute. Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the non-movant 

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The 

parties must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by 

“citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B). 

 If the non-movant “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact” as 

required by Rule 56(c), then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of 

the motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - 

including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) & (3). 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 3 of 26
4 

 In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. McCormick v. City of Fort 

Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must 

draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. After the non-moving party has responded to the motion for 

summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue 

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 

Per the court’s Order, the parties met and conferred and developed a set of 

uncontested facts. The Court has carefully considered that submission, the pleadings in 

this case, and all documents submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion for 

Summary Judgment. The submissions of the parties establish the following relevant 

facts, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2): 

 Plaintiff filed the Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on July 6, 2011. (Doc. 

1-1 at 6). Defendant, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (DPS), is one of the State 

of Alabama’s largest law enforcement agencies. Until February 16, 2013, DPS’s five 

divisions—Administrative, Highway Patrol, Alabama Bureau of Investigation, Driver 

License, and Service Division—were each typically headed by law enforcement officers 

who obtained the rank of Major. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 4 of 26
5 

Plaintiff’s Employment History with Defendant

 Plaintiff began working for Defendant on March 12, 1990, as a Clerk II in the 

Accident Records Unit of the Driver License Division earning $461 every two weeks. 

Within one year, she was promoted with a pay raise to Clerk Typist II in the Auto Theft 

Unit of the Alabama Bureau of Investigation. Within the next year, she was again 

promoted with a pay raise to Clerk Steno II within the same unit. Plaintiff left 

employment with Defendant in June of 1994 and worked for other state agencies until 

April of 1998. Defendant then hired Plaintiff as a Planning and Economic Specialist 

(PEDS) I/II. That position was under the Administrative Division at all times relevant to 

this case. 

 Plaintiff was promoted to PEDS III in 2000 and was promoted to PEDS IV in 

2008. Plaintiff held that position until she retired. Plaintiff applied for disability 

retirement with the Retirement Systems of Alabama on June 27, 2011. Plaintiff’s 

application was granted and the retirement became effective on August 1, 2011. Before 

Plaintiff retired, her salary was approximately $74,000 a year. Her primary responsibility 

as PEDS IV was to supervise three employees who, along with Plaintiff, sought to obtain 

and maintain funding for Defendant through grants. Plaintiff was also occasionally 

tasked with other assignments. Plaintiff was known within the department to be highly 

skilled at obtaining grants. 

 Throughout Plaintiff’s career with Defendant, she had many personal issues, and 

those issues were sometimes apparent to her co-workers. Plaintiff cusses like a sailor and 

has used every cuss word at some point in time while working for Defendant. Plaintiff 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 5 of 26
6 

openly had sexual discussions with other people in the workplace. Plaintiff also openly 

discussed her health issues in the workplace. Plaintiff was known for sending countless 

emails throughout the department. From 2001 to 2005, the supervisor responsible for 

Plaintiff’s performance appraisals was Captain Agatha Windsor, a female. In Plaintiff’s 

mid-year appraisal for 2001, Captain Windsor wrote that Plaintiff had difficulty working 

for more than one supervisor, failed to realistically view her role within the department, 

had a tendency to get involved in the business of other employees and agencies, 

exhibited difficult understanding staff-command relationships leading her to operate 

outside of her span-of-control, and sought to obtain department funding without 

discussing it with her immediate supervisor. Captain Windsor continued to note on 

Plaintiff’s performance planning forms in 2002 through 2005 that Plaintiff experienced 

challenges communicating with immediate supervisors leading her to work outside of her 

span-of-control. 

 In December 2009, Major Marc McHenry became the Chief of the Administrative 

Division, which was where Plaintiff worked. In January 2010, Captain Steve Dixon 

became the Assistant Chief of the Administrative Division. That made Plaintiff’s chainof-command from the top down Major McHenry, Captain Dixon, Fran Copeland, and 

Shaundra Morris. In February 2011, Renee Stewart Reese became Plaintiff’s immediate 

supervisor, making the chain-of-command Major McHenry, Captain Dixon, Mrs. 

Copeland, Mrs. Morris, and Mrs. Stewart. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 6 of 26
7 

Facts Surrounding Plaintiff’s ADA/Rehabilitation Claims

 When Major McHenry became the Chief of the Administrative Division, Colonel 

Christopher Murphy was Defendant’s Director, and Lieutenant Colonel F.A. “Bubba” 

Bingham was Defendant’s Assistant Director. When Major McHenry became the 

Division Chief, the Director and Assistant Director met with him to discuss particular 

problems within the Administrative Division. Shortly thereafter, Major McHenry had a 

meeting with Mrs. Morris, Plaintiff’s then immediate supervisor, and instructed Mrs. 

Morris to have a meeting with Plaintiff about how Plaintiff could become a better 

employee. Mrs. Morris then met with Plaintiff on August 25, 2009. In that meeting, 

Mrs. Morris advised Plaintiff to avoid using profanity altogether, to accept responsibility 

and be willing to answer for resulting consequences, to not have a sour attitude, and to 

forward decisions affecting the division, other divisions, and outside agencies through 

the chain-of-command. 

 In October of 2009, Mrs. Copeland, Defendant’s Chief Financial Officer, sent 

Plaintiff an email that requested that any memorandum affecting division chiefs go 

through the chain-of-command and stated, “The hours of work are 8 am to 5 pm with a 

few exceptions. Personnel are expected to be on time. Progressive discipline will be 

exercised with those employees who do not adhere to scheduled work hours.” Def.’s 

Brief (Doc. 54) Ex. B at 46:23-47:15. Plaintiff replied to that email on the same day with 

an email stating that she was requesting a reasonable accommodation under ADA 

because she was diagnosed as bipolar and her medication caused her to sleep late. In that 

email Plaintiff noted that, if she went to bed between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on a 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 7 of 26
8 

regular basis, she had no problems, but that household responsibilities prevented her from 

going to sleep at those hours. In her deposition, Plaintiff described those household 

responsibilities as “chasing dogs that had gotten loose.” 

 Plaintiff was allowed to come in to work at 8:30 a.m., thirty minutes later than the 

traditional time. That remained her designated arrival time until she retired. Plaintiff 

never requested to have her designated arrival time permanently changed. 

 To help deal with Attention Deficit Disorder, Plaintiff requested a Blackberry to 

use for calendaring. Plaintiff was provided the Blackberry, but she had the data plan 

turned off because it did not help her. 

 In November of 2010, Plaintiff requested that Mrs. Morris monitor Plaintiff’s 

mood because Plaintiff had started taking the drug Chantix to quit smoking, which 

Plaintiff believed to block her prescription drugs Lexapro and Adderral. Plaintiff quit 

taking Chantix on December 5, 2010. 

 On March 31, 2011, Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to park closer to the 

building due to due to back problems. Carrying files was the source of Plaintiff’s back 

problem, not walking. In fact, walking was actually recommended by Plaintiff’s doctor. 

Therefore, Plaintiff was instructed to use a cart to carry items back and forth to her car. 

 On January 4, 2011, Mrs. Copeland emailed Plaintiff and some other Financial 

Services Unit employees, stating that nothing was to go directly to the Colonel, including 

standard transactions, without first going through Captain Dixon or Major McHenry. 

Major McHenry made it clear that he wanted strict compliance with the chain-ofcommand from his employees. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 8 of 26
9 

 On January 17, 2011, Plaintiff had a conversation with Kevin Wright, who was a 

Captain at the time but was to be appointed Lieutenant Colonel and become the Assistant 

Director of the Department the next day. He was not within Plaintiff’s chain-ofcommand. The conversation started with Plaintiff congratulating Kevin Wright on the 

upcoming appointment before Plaintiff initiated a discussion about grant projects on 

which she was working. Plaintiff did not have permission from anyone in her chain-ofcommand to suggest to Kevin Wright that the two of them should have a meeting. 

 Two days later, Plaintiff carbon copied Major McHenry on an email to co-workers 

stating that she had discussed pending projects with “LTC Wright” in the hallway and 

would be meeting with the new directors in the next couple of weeks to fully brief them. 

Plaintiff promptly forwarded that same email to Lt. Col. Kevin Wright. Major McHenry 

became upset that Plaintiff was having a conversation and sending an email to the 

Lieutenant Colonel without receiving permission from her chain-of-command. 

 That same day at 10:16 a.m., Mrs. Copeland emailed Plaintiff about Plaintiff’s 

contact with the Lieutenant Colonel and reminded her to go through the chain-ofcommand. Plaintiff responded to Mrs. Copeland’s email at 10:27 a.m.. Then at 10:43 

a.m., Plaintiff emailed the Lieutenant Colonel, saying: “Remind me not to talk to you 

again without permission or immediately telling my Major. Chewing imminent LOL.” 

Id. at Ex. B at 69:6-70:1. The Lieutenant Colonel wrote back, “Agreed,” to which 

Plaintiff responded, “Change your signature. 606 pending for me. Joy.” Id. at Ex. B at 

70:2-4. 606 is the number of the Defendant’s form used for disciplining an employee. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 9 of 26
10 

 At approximately 5:15 p.m. on January 26, 2011, Plaintiff had a conversation in 

the parking lot with Major Herman Wright and Captain Charles Ward, neither of whom 

were in Plaintiff’s chain-of-command, about Plaintiff being frustrated and stressed 

because of personal issues and job issues, including the workload in her unit, pending 

budget cuts, and the inability to discuss with her supervisors a memo concerning a 

speeding ticket Plaintiff had received. Plaintiff admitted that during this conversation 

that she used “extreme profanity, perhaps at times,” including “probably the F-bomb.” 

 Major Wright sent a memo to Major McHenry about the conversation, which 

stated Plaintiff was upset to the point of being irate and was cussing and ranting about the 

ticket issue. In relation to Plaintiff’s actions in the parking deck and Plaintiff’s contact 

with Kevin Wright, Plaintiff was written up on February 7, 2011, for violation of DPS 

Rules and Regulations 74(IV)(A), 74(V)(A)(1), and 74(V)(A)(2) and Alabama 

Administrative Code §§ 670-X-19-.01(1)(a)(7) and 670-X-19-.01(1)(b)(2). 

 DPS Rules and Regulations 74(IV)(A) defines “conduct unbecoming” and states 

that it will result in punishment ranging from reprimand to termination of the employee. 

It states, 

Conduct unbecoming is any conduct that adversely affects the morale, 

operations, or efficiency of the department; or any conduct which has a 

tendency to adversely affect, lower, or destroy public respect and/or 

confidence in the Department of Public Safety or brings discredit upon 

the officer, employee, or the department as a whole. Conduct 

unbecoming also includes any conduct which brings the department or 

members of the department into disrepute. 

Id. at Ex. A at ¶ 11 & Ex. A2. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 10 of 26
11 

 DPS Rules and Regulations 74(V)(A)(1), and 74(V)(A)(2) state that violations of 

rules or policies and insubordination are examples of conduct unbecoming. Alabama 

Administrative Code § 670-X-19-.01(1)(a)(7) makes “[d]isruptive conduct of any sort a 

violation.” Alabama Administrative Code § 670-X-19-.01(1)(b)(2) makes 

insubordination a violation. As a result of the disciplinary action, Plaintiff was 

suspended on April 4 and April 5, 2011. 

 During a January 25, 2011 meeting between Plaintiff’s supervisors and 

Defendant’s Personnel Manager Cheri Cook concerning Plaintiff’s conduct, issues of 

Plaintiff’s behavior were discussed including her stress, depression, ADHD/ADD, 

excessive absenteeism and tardiness, erratic working patterns, failure to meet deadlines 

or work proactively, and use of profanity. Therefore, Plaintiff was referred to the state’s 

Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The EAP is a short-term counseling and referral 

service designed to help employees become more effective and efficient in their jobs by 

providing professional, confidential assistance to problems that are likely to affect their 

family life and/or job performance. 

 In February of 2011, Mrs. Copeland advised Plaintiff that she should not take off 

work unless she had to do so because Major McHenry was monitoring Plaintiff’s leave. 

From that point until she retired, Plaintiff was still allowed to take time off for 

appointments with her doctor, chiropractor, and physical therapist. Plaintiff was given 

permission by her supervisor to take time off to go to the EEOC. Plaintiff does not recall 

having been denied sick leave after she filled out the required sick leave request form. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 11 of 26
12 

 On March 28, 2011, Plaintiff received written counseling for failing to follow her 

established work schedule by reporting to work at 8:30 a.m.. From September 1, 2010, 

until March 18, 2011, Plaintiff was absent 36 times and tardy 43 other times out of 137 

working days. Plaintiff prepared a spreadsheet that detailed the reasons why she was 

absent or tardy. Among the reasons Plaintiff provided were a wreck on the way into 

work, talking to “old people” while voting, a truck in need of repair, shopping for clothes 

during lunch, drinking bad milk, flat tires, checking pipes and tires for major freezes, 

plumbing issues, a train blocking the tracks, running errands, and a power surge that 

caused the clocks to be off. Plaintiff admits that some of those reasons were unrelated to 

any medical disability. Some of the tardiness was due to Plaintiff working late at night, 

against the orders of her supervisor, and coming in late the next day. 

 The original write-up for the absenteeism and tardiness was done on form 606A, a 

written counseling form, but Major McHenry had Mrs. Morris change the write-up to a 

606B, a complaint violation form. Major McHenry’s stated reason for requiring Mrs. 

Morris to change the write-up from the 606A form to the 606B form is that he wanted a 

record of the write-up to go in Plaintiff’s personnel file, and, unlike the 606B form, the 

606A form is not recorded in the employee’s personnel file. The 606B form states that 

the investigation of the conduct began on March 8, 2011, and Plaintiff initialed it on 

April 6, 2011. The rules Plaintiff was accused of violating were DPS Rules and 

Regulations 74(V)(A)(16) and Alabama Administrative Code §§ 670-X-19-.01(1)(a)(2) 

and 670-X-19.01(1)(a)(3). All of those rules relate to being absent or tardy. Plaintiff was 

not suspended or demoted as a result of the write-up for being absent and tardy. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 12 of 26
13 

 On February 28, 2011, Plaintiff sent Tara Knee, an attorney at the Alabama State 

Personnel Department, an email that stated in full, 

Can you tell life is fun over here right now when you have a Major who is 

ticked off at you? I may not win, but I won’t go down without a fight, 

crossed one too many lines. 

Id. at Ex. B at 87:12-89:9. 

 The email was forwarded back to Major McHenry on March 2, 2011. Plaintiff’s 

then immediate supervisor, Mrs. Stewart, investigated the email to determine if it 

projected a insolent, sullen, or hostile attitude toward Plaintiff’s supervisors in violation 

of DPS Rules and Regulations 74(IV)(A) and Alabama Administrative Code § 670-X-19-

.01(2)(b). The DPS Rules and Regulations’ definition of insubordination includes 

“demonstration of insolent, sullen, or hostile attitude toward supervisors of the 

department [. . .].” Id. at Ex. A at ¶ 12 & Ex. A2. Mrs. Stewart and Mrs. Copeland 

recommended that Plaintiff not be punished, while Mrs. Morris recommended 3 days of 

suspension and Major McHenry recommended 5 days of suspension. Ultimately, 

Plaintiff was suspended on June 13, 2011 through June 17, 2011 for sending the email to 

Mrs. Knee. 

Facts surrounding Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim

 Plaintiff alleges that in December 2010 one of her female subordinates, Renee G. 

Fuller, was denied a promotion by Major McHenry that Plaintiff had requested for Ms. 

Fuller. Plaintiff alleges that Major McHenry told Plaintiff that the pay scale that Plaintiff 

sought for Ms. Fuller was designated for someone with supervisory responsibilities and 

that Ms. Fuller did not qualify for it because she had no supervisory responsibilities. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 13 of 26
14 

Plaintiff alleges that the pay scale that she sought for Ms. Fuller is the same pay scale 

currently in use by departmental employees at the rank of Sergeant and Lieutenant who 

are male. Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Ms. Fuller were not included in her EEOC 

Charge of Discrimination. 

 Plaintiff alleges that, during a termination proceeding before the Alabama State 

Personnel Board, Lieutenant Clifford Nall, a DPS employee, complained that his 

supervisor, Captain Ricky Dale, who was male, cussed in front of him and that the 

Personnel Board ruled the complaint invalid. Plaintiff does not know when the incident 

between Nall and Dale occurred, what the context of the conversation was, how long the 

conversation lasted, or who were Dale’s supervisors. Plaintiff stated in her deposition 

that she has no firsthand knowledge of the incident but was told about it from Neil Tew. 

Neil Tew’s sworn affidavit states that he recalls being asked for details about the incident 

by Plaintiff but that he told her that he knew nothing about it. 

Facts Surrounding Plaintiff’s Due Process Claim

 Plaintiff’s first due process claim revolves around her contention that the email to 

Ms. Knee about the Major being ticked off at her was an attempt to appeal to the State 

Personnel Board for discrimination and that punishment for sending the email interfered 

with her due process. 

 Plaintiff’s other due process claims are in relation to her contention that 

Defendant’s internal policies were not precisely followed during investigations of her 

alleged misconduct and also when she submitted grievances. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 14 of 26
15 

Facts Surrounding Plaintiff’s Grant Whistleblower Retaliation Claim

 Plaintiff alleges she was retaliated against in 2002, 2005, and 2006 for being a 

whistleblower on alleged grant violations by Defendant and its employees. Below are the 

quotes from Plaintiff’s deposition when she was asked about her actions in trying to stop 

the alleged violations: 

Q What actions did you take to stop the violations? 

 A I kept my documentation. There wasn’t anything I could do. I was 

 a lonely civilian. If I had – 

 Q You didn’t really take any actions, did you? 

A No. Because if I had, we would have lost every bit of our grant 

 funding. The examiners caught it in 2005, ordered us to pay back 

 $326,000 for one year. 

Id. at Ex. B at 155:18-156:5. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Title VII Claims 

 Perdue makes two claims under Title VII: gender discrimination and disparate 

treatment. The claims are intertwined. Under a liberal reading of the Second Amended 

Complaint, the court can glean that Perdue presents her disparate treatment claim as one 

based on gender.2

 Thus, the court will discuss them together. 

 

2

 Without this liberal reading, Perdue has failed to make out any disparate treatment claim, as Title VII prohibits 

discrimination based on an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 15 of 26
16 

 Many of the instances Perdue points to in support of her Title VII claims in the 

Second Amended Complaint are titled “Female vs. Female” and offer a comparison of 

how she was treated compared to other female employees of Defendant. Perdue’s claims 

in those instances cannot survive summary judgment, as she is unable to establish a 

prima facie case of gender discrimination, or disparate treatment based on her gender, 

because she cannot show that she was “treated less favorably than a similarly-situated 

individual outside h[er] protected class.” Maynard v. Board of Regents of Div. of 

Universities of Florida Dept. of Educ. ex rel. University of South Florida, 342 F.3d 1281, 

1289 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the court will address Perdue’s claims of gender 

discrimination titled “Female vs. Male.” 

 Perdue’s first allegation is that Renee G. Fuller was denied a promotion and the 

promotion was given to a male. As Defendant rightly observes, Perdue lacks standing to 

bring this claim on Fuller’s behalf, because Fuller is not a party to this litigation. and 

Perdue may not raise claims on her behalf. Indeed, Perdue admits that she did not intend 

that her allegations regarding Fuller state a distinct claim. See Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 56) at 

38. 

 Perdue’s second allegation is that she was suspended for two days for using 

profanity at Defendant’s offices, something she admits was in violation of Defendant’s 

policies. Second Am. Comp. (Doc. 44) at 20. Perdue alleges that a similar complaint 

regarding a male employee of Defendant using profanity was ruled “invalid” by a 

reviewing state agency. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 16 of 26
17 

 Because Perdue is attempting to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination 

through circumstantial evidence, the court must utilize the burden-shifting framework 

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. 

“Under this framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination. The establishment of a prima facie case creates a 

presumption of discrimination. The employer must then offer legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action to rebut the 

presumption. If the employer successfully rebuts the presumption, the 

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to discredit the proffered 

nondiscriminatory reasons by showing that they are pretextual.” 

Standard v. A.B.E.L. Serv., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). “To set out a 

prima facie case for disparate treatment in a race or sex discrimination case, the plaintiff 

may show that: (1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the 

position; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse action; and (4) [s]he was treated less favorably 

than a similarly situated individual outside h[er] protected class.” Maynard, 342 F.3d at 

1289. 

 Perdue is unable to establish a prima facie case. Perdue’s claim is that she was told 

by an “ABI Major” that the Alabama State Personnel Department invalidated a complaint 

by an employee of Defendant “with regards to his supervisor using profanity in front of 

him during work hours.” Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 44) at 20. First, Perdue’s claim is 

far too vague to serve as a comparator. She merely asserts that someone else told her that 

this scenario happened and has offered nothing more. There is nothing to suggest the 

context of the conversation or even what type of profane language was used. Second, as 

written, her assertions appear to undermine her claim of disparate treatment. In the above 

scenario involving the male employee, Defendant appears to have treated the male 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 17 of 26
18 

employee similarly, as a compliant against him was issued. That another agency later 

invalidated the complaint does not mean she was treated any different. Third, in the 

instance involving Perdue, she was using extreme profane language to her superiors, not 

the other way around. 

 In any case, even were Perdue able to establish a prima facie case, Defendant has 

proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the suspension. That is, Defendant states that 

the profanity incident involving the male “is a very different circumstance than Plaintiff’s 

conduct which consisted of using extreme profanity to a high-ranking DPS official 

outside of Plaintiff’s chain-of-command concerning Plaintiff’s supervisors’ actions and 

which was combined with other incidents of policy violations.” Def.’s Brief (Doc. 54) at 

31. Once Defendant has set forth non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action, the 

burden shifts to Perdue to establish that Defendant’s proffered reasons were pretextual. 

See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). Perdue fails to meet 

her burden. Instead she merely asserts that “[i]f profanity is considered unacceptable, it is 

considered unacceptable, no matter who it is directed towards.” Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 56) at 

39. This falls well short of the burden to show that the reasons proffered are merely 

pretext to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment as to Perdue’s Title VII claims. 

B. The ADA claims 

 Defendant moves for summary judgment as to all of Perdue’s ADA claims based 

on the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment Immunity. “The 11th Amendment guarantees 

that nonconsenting states cannot be sued for money damages by private individuals in 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 18 of 26
19 

federal court. Although Congress may abrogate the states’ immunity in certain situations, 

it has not done so with regard to suits for monetary damages by private individuals 

pursuant to Title I of the ADA.” Ross v. Jefferson County Dept. of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 

658-59 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). “The Eleventh Amendment protects 

the immunity of not only the states, but of state agencies and entities that function as an 

‘arm of the state.’” Id. at 659. (quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 

2003)). The Alabama Department of Public Safety is a state agency. 

 Perdue concedes that Defendant “does have immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment regarding ADA claims.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc. 56) at 33. Because Eleventh 

Amendment immunity applies only to claims for monetary damages, the court takes 

Perdue’s concession to mean that she is dropper her request for injunctive relief as to her 

ADA claims.3

 Accordingly, the court finds that Defendant’s request for summary 

judgment as to all of Perdue’s ADA claims is due to be granted.4

C. The Rehabilitation Act claims 

 Plaintiff’s claim under the Retaliation Act is that Defendant failed to reasonably 

accommodate her disability. Defendant requests summary judgment, arguing that 

Plaintiff is unable to establish a disability that required the accommodations requested.

 

3

 The injunctive relief requested by Perdue in the Second Amended Complaint in regards to the ADA, was that 

Defendant establish a valid and enforceable ADA policy that did “not permit a subjective application.” Second Am. 

Compl. (Doc. 44) at 26. Defendant asserts that it is already under legal obligations regarding its ADA policies and 

challenges Perdue’s standing to seek this relief. Perdue does not oppose the challenge and admits she lacks standing 

in her Response. See (Doc. 56) at 40. 

 

4

 The court notes that much of Perdue’s Second Amended Complaint involves allegations under the ADA. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 19 of 26
20 

 The basic framework for analyzing claims under the Rehabilitation Act is as 

follows: 

The [Rehabilitation] Act prohibits federal agencies [, or recipients of 

federal money,] from discriminating in employment against otherwise 

qualified individuals with a disability. See Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 

1207 (11th Cir.1999). The elements of a claim under § 501 of the Act are 

(1) an individual has a disability; (2) the individual is otherwise qualified 

for the position; and (3) the individual was subjected to unlawful 

discrimination as the result of his disability. See id. The Act defines 

“individual with a disability” as any person who: “(i) has a physical or 

mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's 

major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is 

regarded as having such an impairment.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). In turn, 

“major life activities” are “functions, such as caring for one’s self, 

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 

learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(3). 

Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.2000). 

Under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff can prove disability discrimination 

through either direct evidence of discrimination, or through circumstantial 

evidence. If the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell 

Douglal burden-shifting framework applies. Accordingly, the plaintiff must 

establish a prima facie case for discrimination, the defendant must offer a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the employment decision, 

and the plaintiff must ultimately prove that the defendant's justification is a 

pretext for discrimination. 

Curry v. Secretary, Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 2013 WL 2161791, *4 (11th Cir. May 21, 

2013). 

 From a liberal reading of the pleadings, the court can conclude that the disabilities 

which Perdue claims she suffers are Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”) and depression. 

For the purpose of this analysis, the court will assume, without finding, that Perdue can 

establish that she suffers a disability within the meaning of the Act. The second element 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 20 of 26
21 

of a Rehabilitation Act claim “requires a court to consider whether a plaintiff is a 

‘qualified individual,’ meaning that she, with or without any reasonable accommodation, 

can perform the essential functions of the job.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). The 

court is to “conduct a two-step inquiry” asking “whether a plaintiff can perform the 

essential functions of the job,” and, if she cannot, “whether any reasonable 

accommodation would allow her to do so.” Id. at *4. 

 The accommodations requested by Perdue were that (1) a supervisor monitor her 

mood swings, (2) that she be allowed to arrive at work later than 8:00 am, (3) that she be 

given a Blackberry cellular telephone, and (4) that she be allowed to park closer to the 

office building. The court agrees with Defendant that Perdue’s disabilities are not related 

to these requested accommodations. Perdue has not established that she could not 

perform her essential job functions without the requested accommodations and she has 

not shown that her requests are reasonable accommodations. “The Rehabilitation Act 

does not require an employer ‘to accommodate an employee in any manner in which that 

employee desires.’” Id. (quoting Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir.1998)). 

 i. Mood Swings 

 Defendant asserts that this request was not reasonable. Plaintiff argues in her 

Response that “had Morris (the supervisor) helped to monitor Plaintiff’s moods, Plaintiff 

might have quit taking Chantrix sooner.” Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 56) at 37. Perdue’s request 

that her supervisor monitor her mood swings and effectively act as her medical doctor is 

not a request for a reasonable accommodation. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 21 of 26
22 

 ii. Late Arrival 

 Perdue sent a request by email to her supervisor that she be allowed to arrive at 

work after 8:00 a.m., because the medication she was taking for bipolar disorder5

 made 

her drowsy in the morning. She also stated in the email that if she went to bed between 

8:00 and 10:00 p.m. on a regular basis “there are no problems. However, that is not often 

feasible due to household responsibilities.” Def.’s Exh. B4 (Doc. 54-3) at 99. Perdue’s 

request was not related to her disability. Perdue has made no showing that her disability 

required any accommodation to enable her to arrive at work at the scheduled time. 

Moreover, and just as important, Defendant did allow Perdue to change her scheduled 

arrival time at work to 8:30am and she never requested a later arrival time. Thus, Perdue 

is unable to show that she suffered any discriminatory act.

 iii. Blackberry 

 There is no contested issue here. Perdue apparently requested a Blackberry phone, 

was given the Blackberry, but it proved to be distracting due to her ADD. See Pl.’s Resp. 

(Doc. 56) at 36. 

 iv. Parking 

 In this instance, Perdue asserts that she requested a parking spot closer to her 

office. She claims that her back started hurting after a trip to Atlanta and only started 

feeling better after she started “Rolfing.” Pl. Resp. (Doc. 56) at 37. Perdue asserts that a 

closer parking space was something “that Defendant would have granted to pregnant 

women, and had in fact granted to employees with broken legs and other injuries.” Id. 

 

5

 Perdue states that this diagnosis of bipolar disorder was a misdiagnosis. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 22 of 26
23 

Perdue’s claim here is based on a sore back, is not related to her disabilities, and is not 

cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act. 

 Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment is due to be granted as to 

Perdue’s Rehabilitation Act claims. 

D. Whistle blower & Due Process 

 In the Recommendation, adopted by the District Judge, see Order (Doc. 29), this 

court held that Plaintiff was not required to file a more definite statement and that her 

claims were brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), the ADA, 

and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Rec. (Doc. 27) at 1 & 3. Perdue filed her 

Second Amended Complaint to update her address, correct typographical errors, change 

the term “Defendant” to “Employee” in reference to individual employees of Defendant, 

“to question the blatant lies in both the Answer and the Amended answer,” and to “add[] 

information.” Pl.’s Mot. to Amend (Doc. 45) at 1-2. Plaintiff did not assert that she was 

adding new claims. Thus, Perdue’s Second Amended Complaint was not filed to add 

new claims, but to clarify her existing claims. Indeed, in the Second Amended 

Complaint, Perdue states that the additional material on pages 7-10 was included to “add 

additional facts in support of the claim.” Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 44) at 6. What 

appears on pages 7-10 are not sufficient to constitute new claims and do not meet the 

basic pleading requirements of the Civil Rules of Procedure. The court only permitted 

the filing of the Second Amended Complaint because Plaintiff asserted that the new 

information was filed in support of her existing claims. Perdue’s “whistleblower” and 

“due process” claims, then, are not actually proper claims before this court as Perdue may 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 23 of 26
24 

not “raise new claims at the summary judgment stage.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald 

and Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2004). However, because the parties have 

agreed that the claims before the court include a whistleblower claim and due process 

claim, the court will briefly address them. 

 Perdue asserts that she was retaliated against “in 2002, 2005, and in 2006 for being 

a whistleblower on alleged grant violations.” Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 56) at 39. It appears that 

Perdue is attempting to bring a claim pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), which allows 

private persons to bring civil actions for retaliation against whistleblowing for the misuse 

of government funds. Defendant raises three bases for summary judgment: statute of 

limitations; Eleventh Amendment Immunity; and that Perdue never blew any whistle. 

Without deciding the Immunity issue and whether Perdue was a whistleblower, the court 

finds that Perdue’s claim falls outside the statute of limitations. 31 U.S.C 3730(h)(3) 

states that “[a] civil action under this subsection may not be brought more than 3 years 

after the date when the retaliation occurred.” Perdue’s only response to Defendant’s 

assertion that the claim lies outside the statute of limitations, is to reiterate in her 

Response that the alleged retaliation took place as late as 2006, that the statute of 

limitations “is not the issue,” and that she attempted to contact the United States 

Attorney’s Office in 2011, but was referred to the Alabama Bureau of Investigations. 

Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 56) at 39. This action was filed in 2011, well outside the statute of 

limitations, and is barred. 

 As Defendant argues, Perdue’s due process claim is not specific. It appears she 

may be attempting to assert a due process claim against Defendant for failing to follow its 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 24 of 26
25 

own internal policies. Second Am. Compl. (Doc. 44) at 7-9. This reading appears to be 

undermined by Perdue’s statement in the Response that “Defendant’s internal policies 

related to conducting investigations created no due process right.” Pl.’s Resp. (Doc. 56) 

at 39. In addition to agreeing with Defendant the she had no due process right, Perdue 

fails to address Defendant’s argument that she failed to use adequate state remedies. The 

court will not engage in conjuring claims and responses on Perdue’s behalf. “When a 

party moves for final, not partial, summary judgment, we have stated that ‘it [becomes] 

incumbent upon the [nonmovant] to respond by, at the very least, raising in their 

opposition papers any and all arguments or defenses they felt precluded judgment in [the 

moving party’s] favor.’” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1329 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001)). Defendant’s 

arguments are well taken and Perdue fails to raise any genuine issues of material fact as 

to these claims. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to Perdue’s 

whistleblower and due process claims. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate 

Judge that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) be GRANTED. 

 It is further 

 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the 

Recommendation on or before August 20, 2013. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. 

Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 25 of 26
26 

The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, 

therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the 

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by 

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from 

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the 

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. 

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 

(11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en 

banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 

handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981). 

 Done this 6th day of August, 2013. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

Case 2:11-cv-01005-WKW-WC Document 67 Filed 08/06/13 Page 26 of 26