Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06136/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06136-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FI LED 

Uofred Scate5 Couit of Appeals 

Tenth Cfr,...,fr: 

JAN ! 6 1990 

xOBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 89-6136 

MICHAEL JAMES DANIELS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(D.C. No. CR-87-211-P) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Michael James Daniels appeals from the order of the district 

court denying relief under 28 u.s.c. § 2255. Daniels contends 

that the district court erred in determining that there was no 

ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion and that the 

defendant was competent to plead guilty. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6136 Document: 01019960695 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 1 
I. 

Daniels was originally indicted on ten counts. As part of a 

plea agreement, Daniels agreed to plead guilty to possession with 

intent to distribute Phencyclidine, a schedule II controlled 

substance, in an amount in excess of one kilogram, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l). The trial court initially sentenced 

Daniels to twenty-five years imprisonment, followed by ten years 

of supervised release. Daniels filed a motion to correct 

sentence, alleging five grounds of error. The court found no 

evidentiary hearing required on four grounds, but granted relief 

on the fifth. The district court thus eliminated the provision 

for supervised release, but refused to reduce the term of 

imprisonment. Daniels now appeals, alleging that he was 

incompetent to plea, that his plea was coerced, and that counsel 

was ineffective. 

II. 

A. 

Daniel's first claim is that he was incompetent to plead 

guilty because of mental retardation and that the district court 

erred in refusing to order an evidentiary hearing to fully examine 

this issue. We disagree. 

The record shows that the district court was made aware that 

Daniels was "possibly brain-damaged as a result of prolonged drug 

use, was a borderline mentally retarded person, had been shot in 

the right eye, and was truly confused" during the proceedings. 

The court found, however, that defendant's demeanor and 

representations throughout the course of proceedings before the 

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Appellate Case: 89-6136 Document: 01019960695 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 2 
court raised no question as to competence, "and in fact indicated 

defendant was fully competent to enter his plea." The record 

shows that Daniels had never been under the care of a doctor or 

hospital for drug addicition or other mental or emotional 

condition; that defendant understood the nature of the charges 

against him; and that defendant was not under the influence of 

drugs, alcohol, or other medication at the time of the plea. The 

district court listed numerous other indicators of reliability in 

its opinion. The district court fully complied with our mandate 

in United States v. Marr, 856 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The statements that were made to the court were directed not at 

competence, but at mitigation, and were accompanied by 

representations from both Daniels and his counsel that Daniels 

fully understood the implications of his plea. On this record, we 

cannot say the district court erred in denying relief or by 

refusing to order an evidentiary hearing. 

B. 

Daniels also challenges the voluntariness of his plea, 

contending that it was based in part on an agreement to dismiss 

charges against his wife. Daniels asserted in the petition to 

change plea and at the time of plea that no such agreement 

existed, however. "A defendant's statements at a plea hearing 

'should be regarded as conclusive [as to truth and accuracy] in 

the absence of a believable, valid reason justifying a departure 

from the apparent truth."' United States~ Estrada, 849 F.2d 

1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hedman~ United States, 527 

F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir. 1975)). We agree with the district court 

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Appellate Case: 89-6136 Document: 01019960695 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 3 
that the record does not support Daniels' claim of coercion. In 

any event, the charges against Daniels' wife were dismissed, so no 

argument that an unfulfilled promise negates the voluntariness of 

the plea can be made. See, e.g., Santobello ~ New York, 404 U.S. 

257 (1971). Daniels' claim of coercion is without merit. 

C. 

Daniels also contends that his plea was the result of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. Daniels has not 

made the showing required by Strickland~ Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984), as applied to guilty pleas by Hill~ Lockhart, 474 

U.S. 52 (1985). The district court specifically addressed this 

contention. It found that Daniels' attorney acted competently, 

and that the attorney's failure to challenge the supervised 

release provision was the result of confusion in the law, not 

gross negligence on the part of the attorney. The district court 

also failed to find any prejudice to Daniels. We agree with the 

district court's analysis. Daniels was competent to plead guilty, 

and even if we assume that Daniels has a borderline case of mental 

retardation and that his attorney provided additional 

documentation of that fact, we are not convinced that any 

prejudice has been shown to Daniels. Nor do we believe that the 

failure of Daniels' trial attorney to object to the supervised 

release is such an act that would implicate the sixth amendment. 

As the district court observed, the law surrounding supervised 

release under section 841 was very confused. Failure to challenge 

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Appellate Case: 89-6136 Document: 01019960695 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 4 
imposition of that term did not render the representation 

incompetent. The test in Strickland is simply not met. 

III. 

Daniels contentions are without merit. The order of the 

district court denying section 2255 relief is AFFIRMED. The 

mandate shall issue forthwith. 

5 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6136 Document: 01019960695 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 5