Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03300/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03300-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Individual plaintiff Paul Talcott Currier, and corporate defendants CommunicationBridge USA, Inc.

and Communication Bridge Global, Inc. Mr. Currier filed the complaint pro se, purporting to represent both

himself and the corporate plaintiffs. In March, 2005, attorney Jeffrey Marc Weiss appeared on behalf of the

corporate plaintiffs. Thus, since March, 2005, at least some plaintiffs have had counsel in this action.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL TALCOTT CURRIER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ROBERT CHOW, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-03300 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS HOLZ,

DEMERLY, HAAS AND METROFI

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss brought by defendants Otto Holz, PaulDemerly, Chuck

Haas and MetroFi, Inc. All defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, without leave

to amend. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the motions suitable for resolution without oral

argument and therefore VACATES the hearing setfor November 4, 2005. For the reasons set out below, the

Court GRANTS defendants’ motions.

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2004, plaintiffs1filed this action against ten named defendants and an unknown number

of “Doe” defendants. The original complaint was 88 pages long, and consisted of 500 paragraphs of allegations

in support ofits eighteen causes of action. By order dated January 26, 2005, the complaint was dismissed with

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 1 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Partial Leave to Amend; and Vacating

Hearing, dated January 26, 2005, at pages 3-4: “Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint must contain 1) a

short and plain statement ofthe court’s jurisdiction, 2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

plaintiffis entitled to relief, and 3) a demand for judgment for the relief sought by plaintiff. Plaintiff has not met

this requirement in his complaint. The complaint is 88 pages long, is rambling, contains information about

plaintiff’s business strategies and his divorce which is not relevant to any apparent legal theory, and fails to

identify the basis for claimed federaljurisdiction. The Court is unable at this juncture to determine what plaintiff

actually claims and whether he has properly stated any claim against any of the defendants. Plaintiff’s current

pleadings are too confusing and too long to allow a proper evaluation of the separate claims made against each

separate defendant. Neither the defendants, nor the Court, is obliged to rummage through the present pleadings

to try to identify what, if any, claims have merit. [¶] Because of plaintiff’s failure to meet the requirements of

Rule 8, the Court DISMISSES the complaint in its entirety with leave to amend as to all defendants except

MCI.”

2

leave to amend on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed on February 11, 2005 and their Second Amended Complaint

was filed July 15, 2005. On August 12, 2005, plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, which is the

subject of the current motion.

The Third Amended Complaint names twenty-three defendants. It is 81 pages long and contains 409

paragraphs of allegations in support of twenty-one causes of action. It alleges forty-six separate RICO

conspiracies involving the worldwide telecommunications industry. Its conspiracy allegations span the entire

globe, and include, among numerous others, allegationsinvolving“the manufacture of a cutting-edge technology

Trimaran boats [sic],” the “plunder” of the Philippine treasury by former president Ferdinand Marcos, and

“marriage fraud” committed by Currier’s ex-wife. See Pl. Compl. at ¶¶ 87, 74, 73. In addition to the twentythree named defendants, plaintiffs have named sixteen “relevantnon-parties,”allofwhomare former defendants

to the action. In a representative example of the sheer magnitude of plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs request

permission to sue on behalf ofthe people of the United States, because “the Attorney General clearly will not

do so.” Pl. Compl. at ¶ 13.

The complaint is long, rambling, and extraordinarily difficult to follow. The gist of the complaint appears

to be that, in 1995, Currier developed a method of wireless internet voice communications that would have

been faster and less expensive thanwhat was then available. Pl. Compl. at ¶ 66-69. Currier believed this new

invention had the potential to provide affordable wireless internet and telephone products to the entire world,

including to remote areas ofdeveloping nations. Id. In 1999, he founded corporate plaintiff Communication

Bridge Global, Inc. (“CBG”), conceivably to carry out his plan, although the complaint does not make this

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 2 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

clear. Id. at ¶ 70-71. Currier’s other company, Communication Bridge USA, Inc. (“CBUSA”), was later

formed as a subsidiary of CBG. Id. The complaint then describes a vast network of conspiracies involving

the Philippine government, Currier’s ex-wife, and the entire telecommunicationsindustry, the goalofwhichwas

to prevent Currier’s idea fromcoming to fruition, to destroy his companies, and to stealhis intellectualproperty.

Four ofthe defendants have now brought motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. They all

contend that the complaint’slengthy and rambling allegations fail to comply with the minimalpleading standards

established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court agrees.

LEGAL STANDARD

FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “(1) a short and plain statement

of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under Rule 8(e), “each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” The

purpose ofthese requirementsis to “give the defendant fair notice ofwhat the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957). In practicalterms, the

requirements ofRule 8 ensure that a defendant will be able to respond to the allegations against him. Edwards

v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199, 211 (C.D.Cal. 1968)(“Rule 8(a)(2) envisions the presentation

of factual allegations of sufficient clarity and certainty to enable defendants to determine the basis of plaintiff’s

claim and to formulate a responsive pleading.”). They also help frame the lawsuit to guide case management

and discovery. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

The Court findsthat plaintiffs’ complaint is not well-pled. Its convoluted allegations against a litany of

defendants and “relevant non-parties,”which span 81 pages and 409 paragraphs, are simply too confusing to

give the defendants fair notice of the claims against them. Although the complaint provides a fair amount of

detail concerning the telecommunications industry, the failure of the federalgovernment to protect consumers

frommonopolies, and other “background” facts, the complaint fails to provide any detail when it discusses the

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 3 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

actual wrongs the named defendants allegedly committed. Instead, it resorts to sweeping, conclusory

allegations ofvast conspiracies. In short, the Ninth Circuit’s description of a complaint in a similar case applies

fully here: “Despite all the pages, requiring a great deal of time for perusal, one cannot determine from the

complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.”

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178.

Plaintiffs concede that the complaint is lengthy, but argue that the length is necessary because the factual

background of this case is complicated. In defense of their complaint, plaintiffs cite to Washington v.

Baenziger, 673 F. Supp. 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987), and Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172 (N. D. Cal.

1986). Neither of these cases can save the current complaint.

Washington involved a professional baseball player who sued his investment advisor for fraud,

negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. His original complaint was 86 pages long,

contained 33 causes of action against 21 defendants, and attached fifteen pages of exhibits. See Washington

v. Baenziger, 656 F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1987). After this complaint was dismissed under Rule

8(a), the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff “divided the defendants

into relevant groups and specified the causes of action against each group. He also added dates to the

allegations of fraud, and provided greater specificity to the alleged fraudulent acts of each defendant or group

of defendants.” Washington, 673 F. Supp. at 1482. Based upon these changes, the court held that the

complaint complied not only with Rule 8(a), but also with the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b).

Id.

Unlike in Washington, plaintiffs here have not taken steps to clarify the allegations in their complaint.

They have not “divided the defendants into relevant groups,” nor have they “provided greater specificity to the

alleged fraudulent acts.” Rather, plaintiffs have continued to indiscriminately bring vague and conclusory

allegations against the defendants as a single group.

Plaintiffs also cite Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172 (N. D. Cal. 1986), forthe proposition that

a complaint may include a great amount ofdetail and still be in compliance with Rule 8. Velasquez concerned

a civil rights lawsuit against the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, and local police. Id.

at 1174. The court rejected a motion to dismiss under Rule 8(a), finding that “the instant Complaint in no way

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 4 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3Holz makes much the same point in his opposition papers, at 4:8-10.

5

compares to . . . amorphous pleadings; it describes in considerable detailseven separate operations ofthe INS

and Border Patrol that were allegedly planned or executed by certain of the defendants and that allegedly

violated specified statutory and constitutional rights.” Id. at 1178-79. 

Plaintiffs’ reference to Velasquez misses the deficiency in their complaint. Unlike the complaint in

Velasquez, plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain “considerable detail” about any of the charges against the

defendants. The only details in the complaint are its juggling of myriad names as it describes – in almost no

detail – the forty-six conspiracies it alleges. The substance of plaintiffs complaint consists of only conclusory

allegations made with broad brushstrokes against the defendants. It is wholly lacking in the details that the

parties, and the Court, need to understand the precise nature of the claims against the defendants.

As the following discussion demonstrates, none of the allegations against Holz, Demerly, Haas, or

MetroFi suffices to provide them with fair notice of the claims against them.

1. Claims against Otto Holz

Plaintiffs’ claims against Otto Holz do not satisfy the standard for notice pleading under Rule 8. The

complaint contains twenty-one causes of action, nineteen of which are brought against “all defendants,”

including Holz. The charges against Holz are based upon the Sherman Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, the

California Cartwright Act, the Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act, and other California statutory and

common law.

It is extremely difficult to divine the precise allegations that apply to Holz, however, because not a single

one of plaintiffs’ enumerated causes of action specifically mentions his name. In addition, many of plaintiffs’

claims against Holz simply have no relation to the complaint’sfactual allegations against him. For example, the

complaint alleges thatHolz violated the antitrust laws, and breached written, oral, and implied contracts. See,

e.g., Pl. Compl. at ¶¶ 218-53, 313-35. Yet the factual allegations against Holz contain nothing that would

support these claims. 

The breadth ofthe complaint, along with its vague and conclusory allegations against Holz, simply do

not provide Holz with proper notice of the charges against him.3 For this reason, the Court GRANTS Holz’s

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 5 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

motion to dismiss.

2. Claims against Paul Demerly

Forsimilarreasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Demerly’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ complaint

specifically names Demerly in only three paragraphs:

31. Defendant PAUL DEMERLY (“DEMERLY”) is a resident of California and a member

of the Golden Gate University faculty and a participant with ROBERT CHOW in a fraud on

the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”).

* * *

103. A further distinct Seventeenth (17th) RICO Conspiracy committed by both of the

CHOWs, the WONG FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, DEMERLY, SCHNEIDER, and

SPOHN, involved fraud of the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”), as

documented then-CPUC staff lawyer, CarolDumond and forensic auditor Kevin Nakamura.

The fraud on the CPUC began in January of 2001, and was detected by the CPUC in the

Chapter 11 proceedings, which CHOW and McINTOSH initiated by their False US

Bankruptcy filing for CBUSA before Judge Montali.

* * *

168. . . . CHO was a part of the RICO Conspiracy No. 17 to defraud the CPUC, along with

DEMERLY, the named WONG defendants, and other on the Golden Gate University telco

educational faculty, as well as key venture capitalist who Plaintiffs believe funded HAAS and

METROFI with 150 million USD.

Pl. Compl. at ¶ 31, 103, 168. 

From these bare allegations, plaintiffs bring nineteen causes of action against Demerly, none of which

refer to him in any way. Plainly, these broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient to provide Demerly with

notice of the charges against him. Thus, the Court GRANTS Demerly’s motion to dismiss.

3. Claims against Chuck Haas and Metrofi

According to the complaint, Chuck Haas is “the founder of both defendant COVAD and defendant

METROFI.” Pl. Compl. at ¶ 20. The complaint describes MetroFi as “a Delaware corporation doing business

in California, providing wireless telecom services.” Pl. Compl. at ¶ 21.

The motion of these defendants presents a closer question than the motions of Holz and Demerly,

because there are some allegations against Haas and MetroFi that are somewhat decipherable. Although the

vast majority of references to Haas and MetroFi are only passing commentary, Paragraphs 115 and 180

appear to allege thatMetroFiwas established, with the help ofHaas, as a vehicle to misappropriate intellectual

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 6 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

property that Currier had developed:

115. In May of 2002, the executive team of COVAD [which apparently includes Haas]

continued in an ongoing continuity of conduct and action and executed Rico Conspiracy

Number Thirty (30), whereby they incorporated a new California corporation known as

METROFI in order to execute the business plans, designs, and technical processes taught by

CURRIER to CHOW, who in turn, illegally breached his (CHOW’s) contract with Plaintiffs

and divulged all this intellectual property of Plaintiffs to the COVAD executive team and

operations groups, as a component to this conspiracy. 

* * * *

180. May of 2002, METROFI incorporated and sought to execute CBUSA and CBG’s

wireless VoIP [Voice over IP] design. CHOW was involved in the founding of METROFI

to misappropriate the intellectualproperty ofCBUSA, CBG, and CURRIER. HAAS, founder

ofCOVAD, BROBECK, COVAD CO., COVAD, INC., FISH, SPOHN and LAZEROW

were allsimilarly involved in the attempt to misappropriate the intellectualproperty ofPlaintiffs,

in continuity of ongoing acts from 1999 forward, which continues to this day, and included

funding by SBC.

Pl. Compl. at ¶ 115, 180. In addition, plaintiffs’ twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action

explicitly name Haas and MetroFi. These causes of action all involve breach of contract or intentional

interference with economic relationship, and all allege that “[t]hese breaches of contract were done at the

direction and/or with the assistance of HAAS and METROFI.” 

Thus, in divining plaintiffs’ claims against Haas and MetroFi, there is slightly more substance than in the

case ofHolz or Demerly. Nonetheless, “[t]he propriety of dismissalforfailure to comply with Rule 8 does not

depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179. Dismissal under Rule

8 is not a commentary on the merits of a complaint, but a recognition of the practical necessities of litigation.

As the Ninth Circuit noted in McHenry:

The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the “short and plain statement” whichRule

8 obligated plaintiffs to submit. He must then manage the litigation without knowing what

claims are made against whom. This leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials, prejudicing

litigants in other case [sic] who follow the rules, as well as defendants in the case in which the

prolix pleading is filed.

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. The complaint in McHenry was only fifty-three pages long, consisting, as does

the complaint in this case, of “‘narrative ramblings’ and ‘storytelling or political griping.’” Id. at 1176. Other

courts have found similar complaints deserving of dismissal. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (district court’s decision to strike a 119-page, 367-paragraph complaint was “hardly a harsh

judgment,” and district court did not err in dismissing 61-page, 105-paragraph first amended complaint);

Lonesome v. Lebedeff, 141 F.R.D. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing 63-page, 452-paragraph complaint

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 7 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

under Rule 8).

The allegations plaintiffs seemto be bringing against Haas and MetroFido not appear to be particularly

complicated. They could have been brought in a far simpler complaint of much more limited scope. Instead,

plaintiffs have chosen to bring those claims in a sweeping indictment of the global telecommunications industry

and of the individuals against whomCurrier appears to hold a grudge. Such pleading is simply not consistent

with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cf. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (expressing

disapproval of complaint that seemed “designed to provide quotations for newspaper stories”).

4. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs request leave to amend their complaint to correct the deficienciesidentifiedby the Court. This

action, however, has proceeded for over a year, and plaintiffs have already had four opportunities to submit

an adequate complaint. It is abundantly clear to the Court that plaintiffs are not interested in formulating their

claims in a simple, concise fashion. Rather, they are more interested in lengthy ramblings and conspiracy

theories about all those who have wronged them in the past. 

In this Court’s August 9, 2005, order granting plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint, the

Court explicitly informed plaintiffs that no further amendmentswould be allowed. Plaintiffs have given the Court

no reason to depart from this decision. Thus, plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend is DENIED.

///

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 8 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS Holz’s, Demerly’s,

and Haas’s and MetroFi’s motions to dismiss with prejudice (Docket Nos. 194, 197, and 208).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 9 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Individual plaintiff Paul Talcott Currier, and corporate defendants CommunicationBridge USA, Inc.

and Communication Bridge Global, Inc. Mr. Currier filed the complaint pro se, purporting to represent both

himself and the corporate plaintiffs. In March, 2005, attorney Jeffrey Marc Weiss appeared on behalf of the

corporate plaintiffs. Thus, since March, 2005, at least some plaintiffs have had counsel in this action.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL TALCOTT CURRIER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ROBERT CHOW, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-03300 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS BY DEFENDANTS HOLZ,

DEMERLY, HAAS AND METROFI

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss brought by defendants Otto Holz, PaulDemerly, Chuck

Haas and MetroFi, Inc. All defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, without leave

to amend. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the motions suitable for resolution without oral

argument and therefore VACATES the hearing setfor November 4, 2005. For the reasons set out below, the

Court GRANTS defendants’ motions.

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2004, plaintiffs1filed this action against ten named defendants and an unknown number

of “Doe” defendants. The original complaint was 88 pages long, and consisted of 500 paragraphs of allegations

in support ofits eighteen causes of action. By order dated January 26, 2005, the complaint was dismissed with

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 10 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Partial Leave to Amend; and Vacating

Hearing, dated January 26, 2005, at pages 3-4: “Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a complaint must contain 1) a

short and plain statement ofthe court’s jurisdiction, 2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

plaintiffis entitled to relief, and 3) a demand for judgment for the relief sought by plaintiff. Plaintiff has not met

this requirement in his complaint. The complaint is 88 pages long, is rambling, contains information about

plaintiff’s business strategies and his divorce which is not relevant to any apparent legal theory, and fails to

identify the basis for claimed federaljurisdiction. The Court is unable at this juncture to determine what plaintiff

actually claims and whether he has properly stated any claim against any of the defendants. Plaintiff’s current

pleadings are too confusing and too long to allow a proper evaluation of the separate claims made against each

separate defendant. Neither the defendants, nor the Court, is obliged to rummage through the present pleadings

to try to identify what, if any, claims have merit. [¶] Because of plaintiff’s failure to meet the requirements of

Rule 8, the Court DISMISSES the complaint in its entirety with leave to amend as to all defendants except

MCI.”

2

leave to amend on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2

Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed on February 11, 2005 and their Second Amended Complaint

was filed July 15, 2005. On August 12, 2005, plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint, which is the

subject of the current motion.

The Third Amended Complaint names twenty-three defendants. It is 81 pages long and contains 409

paragraphs of allegations in support of twenty-one causes of action. It alleges forty-six separate RICO

conspiracies involving the worldwide telecommunications industry. Its conspiracy allegations span the entire

globe, and include, among numerous others, allegationsinvolving“the manufacture of a cutting-edge technology

Trimaran boats [sic],” the “plunder” of the Philippine treasury by former president Ferdinand Marcos, and

“marriage fraud” committed by Currier’s ex-wife. See Pl. Compl. at ¶¶ 87, 74, 73. In addition to the twentythree named defendants, plaintiffs have named sixteen “relevantnon-parties,”allofwhomare former defendants

to the action. In a representative example of the sheer magnitude of plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs request

permission to sue on behalf ofthe people of the United States, because “the Attorney General clearly will not

do so.” Pl. Compl. at ¶ 13.

The complaint is long, rambling, and extraordinarily difficult to follow. The gist of the complaint appears

to be that, in 1995, Currier developed a method of wireless internet voice communications that would have

been faster and less expensive thanwhat was then available. Pl. Compl. at ¶ 66-69. Currier believed this new

invention had the potential to provide affordable wireless internet and telephone products to the entire world,

including to remote areas ofdeveloping nations. Id. In 1999, he founded corporate plaintiff Communication

Bridge Global, Inc. (“CBG”), conceivably to carry out his plan, although the complaint does not make this

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 11 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

clear. Id. at ¶ 70-71. Currier’s other company, Communication Bridge USA, Inc. (“CBUSA”), was later

formed as a subsidiary of CBG. Id. The complaint then describes a vast network of conspiracies involving

the Philippine government, Currier’s ex-wife, and the entire telecommunicationsindustry, the goalofwhichwas

to prevent Currier’s idea fromcoming to fruition, to destroy his companies, and to stealhis intellectualproperty.

Four ofthe defendants have now brought motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. They all

contend that the complaint’slengthy and rambling allegations fail to comply with the minimalpleading standards

established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court agrees.

LEGAL STANDARD

FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “(1) a short and plain statement

of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Under Rule 8(e), “each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” The

purpose ofthese requirementsis to “give the defendant fair notice ofwhat the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957). In practicalterms, the

requirements ofRule 8 ensure that a defendant will be able to respond to the allegations against him. Edwards

v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199, 211 (C.D.Cal. 1968)(“Rule 8(a)(2) envisions the presentation

of factual allegations of sufficient clarity and certainty to enable defendants to determine the basis of plaintiff’s

claim and to formulate a responsive pleading.”). They also help frame the lawsuit to guide case management

and discovery. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

The Court findsthat plaintiffs’ complaint is not well-pled. Its convoluted allegations against a litany of

defendants and “relevant non-parties,”which span 81 pages and 409 paragraphs, are simply too confusing to

give the defendants fair notice of the claims against them. Although the complaint provides a fair amount of

detail concerning the telecommunications industry, the failure of the federalgovernment to protect consumers

frommonopolies, and other “background” facts, the complaint fails to provide any detail when it discusses the

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 12 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

actual wrongs the named defendants allegedly committed. Instead, it resorts to sweeping, conclusory

allegations ofvast conspiracies. In short, the Ninth Circuit’s description of a complaint in a similar case applies

fully here: “Despite all the pages, requiring a great deal of time for perusal, one cannot determine from the

complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.”

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178.

Plaintiffs concede that the complaint is lengthy, but argue that the length is necessary because the factual

background of this case is complicated. In defense of their complaint, plaintiffs cite to Washington v.

Baenziger, 673 F. Supp. 1478 (N.D. Cal. 1987), and Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172 (N. D. Cal.

1986). Neither of these cases can save the current complaint.

Washington involved a professional baseball player who sued his investment advisor for fraud,

negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. His original complaint was 86 pages long,

contained 33 causes of action against 21 defendants, and attached fifteen pages of exhibits. See Washington

v. Baenziger, 656 F. Supp. 1176, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1987). After this complaint was dismissed under Rule

8(a), the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff “divided the defendants

into relevant groups and specified the causes of action against each group. He also added dates to the

allegations of fraud, and provided greater specificity to the alleged fraudulent acts of each defendant or group

of defendants.” Washington, 673 F. Supp. at 1482. Based upon these changes, the court held that the

complaint complied not only with Rule 8(a), but also with the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b).

Id.

Unlike in Washington, plaintiffs here have not taken steps to clarify the allegations in their complaint.

They have not “divided the defendants into relevant groups,” nor have they “provided greater specificity to the

alleged fraudulent acts.” Rather, plaintiffs have continued to indiscriminately bring vague and conclusory

allegations against the defendants as a single group.

Plaintiffs also cite Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172 (N. D. Cal. 1986), forthe proposition that

a complaint may include a great amount ofdetail and still be in compliance with Rule 8. Velasquez concerned

a civil rights lawsuit against the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, and local police. Id.

at 1174. The court rejected a motion to dismiss under Rule 8(a), finding that “the instant Complaint in no way

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 13 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3Holz makes much the same point in his opposition papers, at 4:8-10.

5

compares to . . . amorphous pleadings; it describes in considerable detailseven separate operations ofthe INS

and Border Patrol that were allegedly planned or executed by certain of the defendants and that allegedly

violated specified statutory and constitutional rights.” Id. at 1178-79. 

Plaintiffs’ reference to Velasquez misses the deficiency in their complaint. Unlike the complaint in

Velasquez, plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain “considerable detail” about any of the charges against the

defendants. The only details in the complaint are its juggling of myriad names as it describes – in almost no

detail – the forty-six conspiracies it alleges. The substance of plaintiffs complaint consists of only conclusory

allegations made with broad brushstrokes against the defendants. It is wholly lacking in the details that the

parties, and the Court, need to understand the precise nature of the claims against the defendants.

As the following discussion demonstrates, none of the allegations against Holz, Demerly, Haas, or

MetroFi suffices to provide them with fair notice of the claims against them.

1. Claims against Otto Holz

Plaintiffs’ claims against Otto Holz do not satisfy the standard for notice pleading under Rule 8. The

complaint contains twenty-one causes of action, nineteen of which are brought against “all defendants,”

including Holz. The charges against Holz are based upon the Sherman Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act, the

California Cartwright Act, the Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act, and other California statutory and

common law.

It is extremely difficult to divine the precise allegations that apply to Holz, however, because not a single

one of plaintiffs’ enumerated causes of action specifically mentions his name. In addition, many of plaintiffs’

claims against Holz simply have no relation to the complaint’sfactual allegations against him. For example, the

complaint alleges thatHolz violated the antitrust laws, and breached written, oral, and implied contracts. See,

e.g., Pl. Compl. at ¶¶ 218-53, 313-35. Yet the factual allegations against Holz contain nothing that would

support these claims. 

The breadth ofthe complaint, along with its vague and conclusory allegations against Holz, simply do

not provide Holz with proper notice of the charges against him.3 For this reason, the Court GRANTS Holz’s

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 14 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

motion to dismiss.

2. Claims against Paul Demerly

Forsimilarreasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Demerly’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ complaint

specifically names Demerly in only three paragraphs:

31. Defendant PAUL DEMERLY (“DEMERLY”) is a resident of California and a member

of the Golden Gate University faculty and a participant with ROBERT CHOW in a fraud on

the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”).

* * *

103. A further distinct Seventeenth (17th) RICO Conspiracy committed by both of the

CHOWs, the WONG FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, DEMERLY, SCHNEIDER, and

SPOHN, involved fraud of the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”), as

documented then-CPUC staff lawyer, CarolDumond and forensic auditor Kevin Nakamura.

The fraud on the CPUC began in January of 2001, and was detected by the CPUC in the

Chapter 11 proceedings, which CHOW and McINTOSH initiated by their False US

Bankruptcy filing for CBUSA before Judge Montali.

* * *

168. . . . CHO was a part of the RICO Conspiracy No. 17 to defraud the CPUC, along with

DEMERLY, the named WONG defendants, and other on the Golden Gate University telco

educational faculty, as well as key venture capitalist who Plaintiffs believe funded HAAS and

METROFI with 150 million USD.

Pl. Compl. at ¶ 31, 103, 168. 

From these bare allegations, plaintiffs bring nineteen causes of action against Demerly, none of which

refer to him in any way. Plainly, these broad and conclusory allegations are insufficient to provide Demerly with

notice of the charges against him. Thus, the Court GRANTS Demerly’s motion to dismiss.

3. Claims against Chuck Haas and Metrofi

According to the complaint, Chuck Haas is “the founder of both defendant COVAD and defendant

METROFI.” Pl. Compl. at ¶ 20. The complaint describes MetroFi as “a Delaware corporation doing business

in California, providing wireless telecom services.” Pl. Compl. at ¶ 21.

The motion of these defendants presents a closer question than the motions of Holz and Demerly,

because there are some allegations against Haas and MetroFi that are somewhat decipherable. Although the

vast majority of references to Haas and MetroFi are only passing commentary, Paragraphs 115 and 180

appear to allege thatMetroFiwas established, with the help ofHaas, as a vehicle to misappropriate intellectual

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 15 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

property that Currier had developed:

115. In May of 2002, the executive team of COVAD [which apparently includes Haas]

continued in an ongoing continuity of conduct and action and executed Rico Conspiracy

Number Thirty (30), whereby they incorporated a new California corporation known as

METROFI in order to execute the business plans, designs, and technical processes taught by

CURRIER to CHOW, who in turn, illegally breached his (CHOW’s) contract with Plaintiffs

and divulged all this intellectual property of Plaintiffs to the COVAD executive team and

operations groups, as a component to this conspiracy. 

* * * *

180. May of 2002, METROFI incorporated and sought to execute CBUSA and CBG’s

wireless VoIP [Voice over IP] design. CHOW was involved in the founding of METROFI

to misappropriate the intellectualproperty ofCBUSA, CBG, and CURRIER. HAAS, founder

ofCOVAD, BROBECK, COVAD CO., COVAD, INC., FISH, SPOHN and LAZEROW

were allsimilarly involved in the attempt to misappropriate the intellectualproperty ofPlaintiffs,

in continuity of ongoing acts from 1999 forward, which continues to this day, and included

funding by SBC.

Pl. Compl. at ¶ 115, 180. In addition, plaintiffs’ twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action

explicitly name Haas and MetroFi. These causes of action all involve breach of contract or intentional

interference with economic relationship, and all allege that “[t]hese breaches of contract were done at the

direction and/or with the assistance of HAAS and METROFI.” 

Thus, in divining plaintiffs’ claims against Haas and MetroFi, there is slightly more substance than in the

case ofHolz or Demerly. Nonetheless, “[t]he propriety of dismissalforfailure to comply with Rule 8 does not

depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit.” McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179. Dismissal under Rule

8 is not a commentary on the merits of a complaint, but a recognition of the practical necessities of litigation.

As the Ninth Circuit noted in McHenry:

The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the “short and plain statement” whichRule

8 obligated plaintiffs to submit. He must then manage the litigation without knowing what

claims are made against whom. This leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials, prejudicing

litigants in other case [sic] who follow the rules, as well as defendants in the case in which the

prolix pleading is filed.

McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1180. The complaint in McHenry was only fifty-three pages long, consisting, as does

the complaint in this case, of “‘narrative ramblings’ and ‘storytelling or political griping.’” Id. at 1176. Other

courts have found similar complaints deserving of dismissal. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (district court’s decision to strike a 119-page, 367-paragraph complaint was “hardly a harsh

judgment,” and district court did not err in dismissing 61-page, 105-paragraph first amended complaint);

Lonesome v. Lebedeff, 141 F.R.D. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing 63-page, 452-paragraph complaint

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 16 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

under Rule 8).

The allegations plaintiffs seemto be bringing against Haas and MetroFido not appear to be particularly

complicated. They could have been brought in a far simpler complaint of much more limited scope. Instead,

plaintiffs have chosen to bring those claims in a sweeping indictment of the global telecommunications industry

and of the individuals against whomCurrier appears to hold a grudge. Such pleading is simply not consistent

with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cf. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178 (expressing

disapproval of complaint that seemed “designed to provide quotations for newspaper stories”).

4. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs request leave to amend their complaint to correct the deficienciesidentifiedby the Court. This

action, however, has proceeded for over a year, and plaintiffs have already had four opportunities to submit

an adequate complaint. It is abundantly clear to the Court that plaintiffs are not interested in formulating their

claims in a simple, concise fashion. Rather, they are more interested in lengthy ramblings and conspiracy

theories about all those who have wronged them in the past. 

In this Court’s August 9, 2005, order granting plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint, the

Court explicitly informed plaintiffs that no further amendmentswould be allowed. Plaintiffs have given the Court

no reason to depart from this decision. Thus, plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend is DENIED.

///

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 17 of 18
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS Holz’s, Demerly’s,

and Haas’s and MetroFi’s motions to dismiss with prejudice (Docket Nos. 194, 197, and 208).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03300-SI Document 245 Filed 11/03/05 Page 18 of 18