Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02683/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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JWB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Hernandez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 09-2683-PHX-DGC (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Edward Hernandez brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles Ryan (Doc. 1). Before

the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity (Doc. 11). The

motion is fully briefed (Doc. 13-14). The Court will deny the motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s single remaining claim stems from his incarceration in the ADC’s

Browning Unit, the facility where validated Security Threat Group members are housed

(Doc. 1 at 1, 5). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment “by requiring Plaintiff to Renounce/Debrief

(Become a prison snitch) putting his life in serious danger in order to be eligible for

restoration of his release credits” (id. at 5-5C). The Court ordered Defendant to answer this

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28 1 The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants upon screening (Doc. 6

at 7).

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claim (Count III),1 and he has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he is entitled to qualified

immunity (Doc. 11). 

II. Motion to Dismiss on Qualified Immunity

A. Legal Standard

A defendant in a § 1983 action is entitled to qualified immunity from damages for

civil liability if his or her conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the Supreme Court

mandated a two-step sequence for resolving a qualified immunity claim: the “constitutional

inquiry” and the “qualified immunity inquiry.” The “constitutional inquiry” asks whether,

when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the facts alleged show that

the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If so, a court would turn to the

“qualified immunity inquiry” and ask if the right was clearly established at the relevant time.

Id. at 201-02. This second inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the

case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. at 201. 

In Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the

Saucier procedure is not an inflexible requirement; judges “should be permitted to exercise

their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis

should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 

Granting dismissal on this basis pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is only appropriate

if the Court can determine from the face of the complaint that qualified immunity applies.

Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001); Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756,

761 (9th Cir. 1999) (because allegations in complaint are regarded as true on a motion to

dismiss, dismissal based on qualified immunity is inappropriate).

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B. Parties’ Contentions

1. Defendant’s Motion

Defendant asserts that no court has held that it is an Eighth Amendment violation to

require a prison-gang member to renounce his gang membership and debrief in order to

regain privileges. Rather, Defendant contends that the few courts to squarely address this

issue have concluded that such debriefing does not violate an inmate’s constitutional rights

(id. at 3, citing cases). As a result, Defendant maintains that it is not clearly established that

debriefing exposes Plaintiff to a violation of his constitutional rights and Plaintiff’s claim for

damages must be dismissed (id. at 4).

2. Plaintiff’s Response

Plaintiff responds that Defendant was aware as early as 2000—when the policy at

issue was enacted—that forcing Plaintiff to debrief in order to regain his release credits was

a violation of his constitutional rights (Doc. 13). Plaintiff further argues that because

Defendant enacted the policy requiring Plaintiff to debrief and personally denied Plaintiff’s

grievance on this issue in 2009, Defendant was aware that his actions would result in a risk

to Plaintiff’s safety (id. at 2-3). Plaintiff also points to several cases recognizing the risk to

inmates who inform on prison gang activities (id. at 5, citing cases).

3. Defendant’s Reply

In his reply, Defendant maintains that no court has ever found a policy similar to the

one at issue to be unconstitutional (Doc. 14). Rather, Defendant asserts that every court to

assess the constitutionality of debriefing policies has found them to be constitutional. As a

result, Defendant argues that he was not on notice that his policy was unconstitutional (id.).

III. Analysis

Defendant focuses solely on the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis; he

argues that no court has ever held that requiring a prison gang member to renounce his gang

membership and debrief is an Eighth Amendment violation (Doc. 11 at 3). Defendant

construes this portion of the qualified immunity test too narrowly. 

The relevant inquiry in determining whether the right violated was clearly established

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is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation presented. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. A right is clearly established if its contours

are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.” Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). It is not necessary that there be a prior

case with the identical facts showing that a right is clearly established; it is enough that there

is preexisting law that provides a defendant “fair warning” that his conduct was unlawful.

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065. 

At this stage, a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds puts the Court in the

difficult position of deciding “far-reaching constitutional questions on a non-existent factual

record.” Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004). Although

government officials have the right to raise qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, it is

not necessarily advisable in every case. Id. 

The Court also disagrees that the right at issue in this case was not clearly established.

It is well-settled that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when the official acts

with deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

833-834 (1994). To limit the “clearly established” aspect of the analysis to cases specifically

addressing a prison-gang debriefing procedure would allow Defendant, and other future

defendants, “to define away all potential claims.” Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir.

1995) (denying qualified immunity when defendant viewed the right at issue with factual

specificity instead of the general right to Eighth Amendment rights in the prison medical

context). 

Nor do either of the two cases Defendant cites aide this Court in its analysis. The

first, Castrellon v. Gomez, No. C-92-1687-VRW, 1997 WL 36119 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 1997),

was decided at the summary judgment stage, with the benefit of a developed record. The

second, Baker v. Patten, No. C-94-1687-VRW, 1994 WL 665189 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1994),

is inapposite because the inmate plaintiff categorically refused to debrief, thereby foreclosing

the possibility of any harm. Here, Plaintiff has not excluded the possibility of debriefing; his

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claim is simply that his life will be placed in danger if he proceeds with the debriefing

process. Resolution of this claim requires factual development to ascertain the debriefing

procedure and how inmates are protected if they provide inculpatory information about other

inmates. Such questions cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference is withdrawn as to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11).

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is denied.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2010.

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