Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01297/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

NINTENDO CO., LTD.,

NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1297 

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Washington in No. 2:14-cv-00865-

RSL, Judge Robert S. Lasnik. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 1, 2016

______________________ 

CHARLES JOHN ROGERS, Conley Rose, P.C., Houston, 

TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

GREGORY LOREN MAAG, THOMAS WARDEN, MICHAEL JAMES

GUTHRIE. 

JERRY A. RIEDINGER, Perkins Coie, LLP, Seattle, WA, 

argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by 

TYLER C. PETERSON; MARK CHRISTOPHER NELSON, STEVEN 

M. GEISZLER, RICHARD SALGADO, Dentons US LLP, Dallas, 

TX.

______________________ 

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2 ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C. V. NINTENDO CO., LTD. 

Before LOURIE, DYK, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges. 

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

UltimatePointer, LLC (“UltimatePointer”) appeals 

from a final judgment in favor of Nintendo Co., Ltd. and 

Nintendo of America, Inc. (collectively, “Nintendo”) after 

the district court granted summary judgment (1) that 

Nintendo did not infringe claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 12 of 

UltimatePointer’s U.S. Patent 8,049,729 (the “’729 patent”), UltimatePointer, LLC v. Nintendo Co, No. 2:14-cv00865-RSL, 2014 WL 7340604, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 

22, 2014) (“Infringement Opinion”); and (2) that claims 1, 

3, 5, and 6 of the ’729 patent are invalid as indefinite,

UltimatePointer, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 

1305, 1308–09 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (“Indefiniteness Opinion”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment

of noninfringement and reverse the determination of 

indefiniteness. 

BACKGROUND

UltimatePointer is the owner of the ’729 patent, entitled “Easily Deployable Interactive Direct-Pointing System and Presentation Control System and Calibration 

Method Therefor.” The ’729 patent describes a handheld

pointing device that can be used to control the cursor on a 

projected computer screen, thereby improving a presenter’s ability to control the cursor while making a presentation to an audience. See ’729 patent, col. 1 ll. 24–42. 

Figure 2 illustrates one configuration of the invention:

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Id. fig. 2. The pointing device (20) can measure its location and orientation relative to the projected image (70), 

and use that measurement to determine where on the 

image to display the cursor. Id. col. 7 ll. 11–17. Claim 1 

is exemplary and reads as follows: 

1. An apparatus for controlling a feature on a 

computer generated image, the apparatus 

comprising:

a handheld device including:

an image sensor, said image sensor 

generating data related to the distance 

between a first point and a second 

point, the first point having a predetermined relation to the computer 

generated image and the second point 

having a predetermined relation to a 

handheld enclosure; and 

a processor coupled to said handheld 

device to receive said generated data 

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4 ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C. V. NINTENDO CO., LTD. 

related to the distance between a first 

point and a second point and programmed to use the distance between 

the first point and the second point to 

control the feature on the image. 

Id. col. 33 l. 62–col 34 l. 8. 

The specification describes two types of pointing devices: direct-pointing devices and indirect-pointing devices. Id. col. 1 l. 58–col. 2 l. 3. Indirect-pointing devices, for 

example, computer mice, are those “where the object of 

pointing (e.g., a cursor) bears an indirect relationship to

the physical point-of-aim of the pointing device.” Id. col. 1 

ll. 64–67. Direct-pointing devices, in contrast, are devices 

“for which the physical point-of-aim coincides with the 

item being pointed at, i.e., it lies on the line-of-sight.” Id.

col. 1 ll. 61–63. Examples of direct-pointing devices 

“include the so-called ‘laser pointer’ and the human 

pointing finger.” Id. col. 1 ll. 63–64. According to the 

patentee, direct-pointing systems are “more natural to 

humans, allowing faster and more accurate pointing 

actions.” Id. col. 2 ll. 2–3. “[I]ndirect-pointing methods 

. . . do not provide the speed and intuitiveness afforded by 

direct-pointing systems.” Id. col. 2 ll. 42–43. In previous 

presentation systems, the cursor was often controlled by a 

computer mouse; that is, an indirect-pointing device. See 

id. col. 1 ll. 50–57. 

Nintendo manufactures and sells the Wii video game 

system. The Wii system includes, among other things, a 

handheld Wii remote, a Wii console, and a sensor bar, as 

shown below:

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Joint App. (“J.A.”) 14970. 

The Wii console is a special-purpose computer that 

runs games and various other applications; it also provides audio and video output to a connected television. 

Appellees’ Br. 14. The sensor bar sits above or below the 

television and, contrary to its name, simply emits infrared 

light. J.A. 13667 ¶ 25. The Wii remote is the primary

controller for the Wii system, and allows a user to interact 

with and play Wii games. J.A. 13667 ¶ 25. 

The Wii remote can be used to control an on-screen 

cursor through the interaction of the remote and the 

sensor bar. J.A. 6272 ¶¶ 5, 7, 8. The front of the Wii 

remote detects the infrared light emitted by the sensor 

bar, and transmits information regarding that light to the 

Wii console. J.A. 6271 ¶¶ 5, 8. Based on the received 

information, the console displays the cursor on the television screen. J.A. 6271 ¶¶ 5, 8.

In 2011, UltimatePointer sued Nintendo and retailers 

of the Wii system in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Texas (the “Texas district court”), 

alleging that the Wii system infringed several claims of 

the ’729 patent. UltimatePointer originally alleged that 

the Wii system infringed another patent as well, but has 

since withdrawn those allegations and, accordingly, that 

patent is no longer at issue. Because Nintendo Co. is a 

Japanese corporation with its headquarters in Kyoto, 

Japan, Nintendo of America is a Washington corporation 

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6 ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C. V. NINTENDO CO., LTD. 

with its headquarters in Redmond, Washington, and 

UltimatePointer is a Delaware corporation, Nintendo 

moved to sever and stay the claims against the retailers 

and to transfer the case against Nintendo to the United 

States District Court for the Western District of Washington (the “Washington district court”). In response, UltimatePointer accused new products, sold by the retailers 

but not manufactured by Nintendo, of infringement; 

accordingly, the motions to sever and transfer were denied. Nintendo then petitioned this court for a writ of 

mandamus. 

While the petition for mandamus was pending, proceedings continued in the Texas district court. On May 

28, 2013, the district court issued an opinion construing

numerous claim terms, many of which UltimatePointer 

contests on appeal. As will be explained infra, review of 

only one of those constructions is necessary to resolve this 

appeal: “handheld device” in claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 12. 

The parties disputed whether “handheld device” 

should be limited to a direct-pointing device, or whether 

the term also included indirect-pointing devices. The 

district court adopted Nintendo’s proposed construction, 

construing the term to mean “handheld direct pointing 

device.” UltimatePointer, LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 6:11-

cv-00496-LED, 2013 WL 2325118, at *2–4 (E.D. Tex. May 

28, 2013) (“Claim Construction Opinion”). The court

reasoned that “[t]he specification characterizes the invention as a whole as a direct-pointing system that improves 

upon both indirect-pointing devices and prior directpointing devices,” and that indirect pointing is used only 

when direct pointing is impossible or undesirable. Id. at 

*3.1 Even in those situations, the district court noted, the 

 

1 Although the district court explained its reasoning 

by referencing the written description of the other asserted patent, the specification of the referenced patent is 

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patent indicates that indirect pointing may be used “as 

described in the cited prior art.” Id. Thus, the district 

court concluded that “although the specification mentions 

indirect pointing, it is clear that the invention is aimed at 

direct pointing.” Id.

After claim construction, the petition for a writ of 

mandamus was granted, In re Nintendo Co., 544 F. App’x 

934 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and the action was transferred to the 

Washington district court. On December 22, 2014, the 

Washington district court then granted summary judgment that Nintendo did not infringe claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 

12 of the ’729 patent. Infringement Opinion, 2014 WL

7340604, at *1. 

Although there were several bases for the district

court’s decision, the primary basis was that the Wii 

remote was not a “handheld device,” as the term had been 

construed by the Texas court. The Washington court 

began by noting that, under the Texas court’s construction, the claims required a “‘direct,’ as opposed to an 

‘indirect,’ pointing device,” id., which the court characterized as “a product that places the cursor on the screen at 

the physical point of aim,” id. at *2. The Washington 

court concluded that UltimatePointer had not put forth 

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment because 

the Wii remote was an indirect pointing device, not a 

direct one. Id. at *1–2. Specifically, the Washington 

court determined that although the Wii system can give 

the impression that the cursor is placed as a result of the 

user’s aim, “in reality it is the remote’s interaction with 

the Wii sensor bar, not the screen, that is relevant to the 

placement of the cursor.” Id. at *2. Accordingly, “[i]f the 

sensor bar is placed elsewhere, such as perpendicular to 

 

identical to the specification of the ’729 patent, in relevant 

part, so the court’s reasoning applies with equal force to 

the ’729 patent. 

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the screen or behind the user, the user must aim the 

remote towards the sensor bar . . . in order to have the 

cursor appear on the screen.” Id. 

In a separate opinion issued on the same day, the 

Washington district court concluded that the claim limitation “a handheld device including: an image sensor, said 

image sensor generating data . . .” in claims 1, 3, 5, and 6 

of the ’729 patent rendered those claims invalid as indefinite. Indefiniteness Opinion, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1308 

(quoting ’729 patent, col. 33 ll. 64–65). The court reasoned that although the claims were directed to an apparatus (the handheld device including an image sensor), 

the claims also contained a method step (that the image 

sensor generates data). The court therefore determined 

that it was unclear whether the system claims were

infringed when the apparatus was created, or when the 

apparatus was put to the specified use. Id. (citing Rembrandt Data Techs., LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 

1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 

The district court entered judgment against UltimatePointer and for Nintendo on December 24, 2014. 

J.A. 34. UltimatePointer timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

We first address UltimatePointer’s argument that the 

Texas district court erred in its construction of the term 

“handheld device.” 

The ultimate construction of a claim term is a legal 

conclusion that is reviewed de novo; similarly, interpretations of “evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent 

claims and specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history),” are legal conclusions, which are also reviewed de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 

135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Any “subsidiary factfinding” 

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made by the district court based on extrinsic evidence is 

reviewed for clear error. Id.

Words in a claim “are generally given their ordinary 

and customary meaning”; that is, “the meaning that the 

term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in 

question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH 

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is 

deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of 

the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, 

but in the context of the entire patent, including the 

specification.” Id. “[T]he specification ‘is always highly 

relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is 

dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a 

disputed term.’” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. 

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 

See also Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 

___ F.3d ___, No. 15-1146, 2016 WL 386068, at *2–3 (Fed. 

Cir. Feb. 2, 2016).

We have cautioned against importing limitations from 

the specification into the claims when performing claim 

construction, Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 

1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008); however, we have also recognized that “repeated derogatory statements” can indicate 

that the criticized technologies were not intended to be 

within the scope of the claims, Chicago Bd. Options Exch. 

v. Int’l Sec. Exch., 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

UltimatePointer argues that the Texas district court 

imported the “direct pointing” limitation from the specification into claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 12. Although UltimatePointer recognizes that “specific embodiments [in the ’729 

patent] may be ‘aimed’ at direct pointing,” it argues that 

those embodiments do not restrict the broad claim language. Appellant’s Br. 26. The correct analysis, UltimatePointer argues, requires determining whether the 

patentee explicitly defined the relevant claim term or 

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disclaimed claim scope. Because the patentee did not 

provide an explicit definition or disclaim subject matter,

UltimatePointer continues, reading “direct pointing” into 

the claims was incorrect and the Texas district court’s 

construction should be reversed in favor of “a piece of 

equipment or system component intended to be held in 

the user’s hand.” Id. at 24. 

UltimatePointer also argues that, even if the Washington district court was correct in construing the 

“handheld device” to be a direct-pointing device, the court 

incorrectly further limited the claim construction in 

resolving summary judgment by requiring that the Wii 

remote “place[] the cursor on the screen at the physical 

point of aim.” Id. at 28–31.

Nintendo responds that direct pointing “is intertwined 

with every facet of the ’729 patent.” Appellees’ Br. 33. At 

every turn, Nintendo argues, the specification of the ’729 

patent extolls direct pointing and disparages indirect 

pointing. Because the inventor described his invention as 

encompassing direct pointing and repeatedly criticized 

indirect pointing, Nintendo continues, UltimatePointer 

may not now claim that indirect pointing is within the 

claim scope. 

We agree with Nintendo that the district court did not 

err in construing “handheld device” as “handheld direct 

pointing device.” The specification repeatedly emphasizes 

that the invention is directed to a direct-pointing system. 

The title of the invention explicitly states that the invention is an “Easily-Deployable Interactive Direct Pointing

System . . .” (emphasis added). See Exxon Chem. Patents, 

Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 

(using patent title to inform claim construction). The 

specification also repeatedly emphasizes that the system 

is for interacting with a presentation in a “directpointing” manner, ’729 patent, col. 14 ll. 25–28, 33–36, 

46–49; col. 15 ll. 3–6; col. 20 ll. 32–35, and even describes 

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the handheld device as a “direct-pointing device,” id. col. 

24 ll. 45–46, 51–53; col. 31 ll. 21–24. 

The written description also emphasizes how direct

pointing is superior to indirect pointing. In the “Background of the Invention,” the patentee notes that “pointing devices may be classified” as either direct or indirectpointing devices, id. col. 1 ll. 58–60, and that “[i]t needs 

no argument that direct-pointing systems are more natural to humans, allowing faster and more accurate pointing 

actions,” id. col 2 ll. 1–3. 

The written description further disparages indirect 

pointing. For example, indirect pointing is criticized as 

“less natural” than direct pointing, id. col. 2 ll. 35–36, and 

as not providing “the speed and intuitiveness afforded by 

direct-pointing systems,” id. col. 2 ll. 41–43. Even a prior 

art hybrid system, using both direct and indirect pointing, 

is criticized as not “afford[ing] the fast and more accurate 

interactive pointing actions provided by some other directpointing systems,” id. col. 4 ll. 52–54, and another hybrid 

system is criticized for not providing “the desired flexibility afforded by truly direct-pointing methods,” id. col. 5 

ll. 1–3. Although the ’729 patent does include one embodiment where the handheld device “may include a conventional, indirect pointing device,” indirect pointing is only 

used “where direct pointing is not possible or not desired,” 

id. col. 30 ll. 23–26, thus even further disparaging indirect 

pointing. 

Taken together, the repeated description of the invention as a direct-pointing system, the repeated extolling of 

the virtues of direct pointing, and the repeated criticism 

of indirect pointing clearly point to the conclusion that the 

“handheld device” in claims 1, 3, 5, 6, and 12 is limited to 

a direct-pointing device. 

UltimatePointer’s arguments do not require a different result. UltimatePointer argues that the term 

“handheld device” has an ordinary meaning not limited to 

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direct pointing and, absent a clear definition or clear 

disclaimer from the patentee, that plain meaning should 

control. Appellant’s Br. 25. Adopting UltimatePointer’s 

“ordinary meaning,” however, would incorrectly require 

us to divorce the claim language from the repeated directpointing description and indirect-pointing criticism in the 

specification. In Decisioning.com, Inc. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., we rejected a proposed broad claim 

construction that was not supported by the specification, 

although we recognized that the construction was plausible if “[d]ivorced from the specification.” 527 F.3d 1300, 

1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Even in Pacing Technologies, LLC v. Garmin International, Inc., the main case 

that UltimatePointer relies on to support its argument, 

we stated that “claim terms are construed in light of the 

specification and prosecution history, not in isolation.” 

778 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In other words, 

UltimatePointer’s argument that a court may only deviate 

from the ordinary meaning when there is an explicit 

definition or disclaimer does not apply because the ordinary meaning of “handheld device,” when read in the 

specific context of the specification of the ’729 patent, is 

limited to a direct-pointing device. See Trustees of Columbia Univ., 2016 WL 386068, at *3 (“The only meaning 

that matters in claim construction is the meaning in the 

context of the patent.”).

UltimatePointer’s argument that the Washington district court impermissibly narrowed the Texas district

court’s claim construction is similarly unpersuasive. The 

language used by the Washington court—“a product that 

places the cursor on the screen at the physical point of 

aim”—is taken directly from the patent, where the patentee defined “direct-pointing devices” as “devices for 

which the physical point-of-aim coincides with the item 

being pointed at.” ’729 patent, col. 1 ll. 60–62. Accordingly, the Washington district court did not err in its construction of “handheld device.”

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II. NONINFRINGEMENT

UltimatePointer next argues that even if the Texas 

district court’s construction of “handheld device” was 

correct, the Washington district court nonetheless erred 

in granting summary judgment of noninfringement. 

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary 

judgment under the law of the regional circuit in which 

the district court sits, here, the Ninth Circuit. Classen 

Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 

896 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In the Ninth Circuit, summary 

judgment is reviewed de novo. Burke v. Cty. of Alameda, 

586 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when, drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the nonmovant, there is “no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

UltimatePointer argues that it introduced evidence 

sufficient to generate a genuine dispute of material fact 

that the Wii remote is a “handheld direct pointing device,” 

as required by the claims, because it presented evidence

in the form of Nintendo’s manuals for the Wii system, 

Nintendo’s technical documents, analyses by experts, and 

a verified video exhibit of the Wii remote in operation. 

Specifically, UltimatePointer argues that when the Wii 

system is arranged and used as Nintendo instructs the 

user to arrange and use the system, the system causes the 

cursor to be displayed at the point-of-aim of the Wii 

remote. 

Nintendo responds that the Wii remote does not perform direct pointing because it is the remote’s interaction 

with the sensor bar, not the screen, that controls the 

placement of the cursor; for example, if the sensor bar is 

placed elsewhere, any approximation of direct pointing 

disappears. As a result, according to Nintendo, the Wii 

remote is an indirect, not a direct, pointing device. To be 

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a direct pointing device, Nintendo argues, the Wii remote 

would need to perform various calculations to account for 

distance, the size of the television screen, and the position 

of the Wii remote in space. 

We agree with the district court and Nintendo that the 

Wii remote is an indirect, not a direct, pointing device, 

and that there is no genuine dispute of material fact on 

that point. All of the evidence establishes that it is the 

relationship between the Wii remote and the sensor bar, 

not the Wii remote and the television screen, that allows 

the Wii system to function. The object of pointing, viz., 

the cursor, is displayed, not based on the relationship 

between the Wii remote and where the Wii remote is 

pointing on the television screen, but instead based on the 

relationship between the Wii remote and the sensor bar. 

Although the Wii system may create the illusion of direct 

pointing, in fact, the cursor is displayed based on an 

indirect, not a direct, relationship. 

UltimatePointer’s proffered evidence does not otherwise generate a genuine dispute of material fact. Nintendo’s manuals instruct users how to operate the Wii 

system, and do not describe the interaction between the 

Wii remote and the sensor bar; similarly, the video of the 

Wii’s operation simply illustrates how the Wii remote is 

used, not how it works. Moreover, the manner in which 

Nintendo referred to the Wii remote in its technical 

documents does not mean that the Wii remote performs 

direct pointing as that term is defined within the ’729 

patent. Finally, although UltimatePointer’s technical 

experts opined that the Wii remote performed direct 

pointing, they did not contest the manner in which the 

Wii system functions. As it is that functionality—the 

interaction between the Wii remote and sensor bar—on 

which we rest our holding, those expert opinions cannot 

give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact.

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To counter Nintendo’s statement that moving the sensor bar removes any approximation of direct pointing, 

UltimatePointer responds that the fact that a system can 

be arranged in a noninfringing manner does not avoid 

infringement; i.e., that “imperfect practice of an invention 

does not avoid infringement,” Appellant’s Br. 52–53 

(quoting Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics 

Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 20 (Fed. Cir. 1984)), and that “an 

accused device that ‘sometimes, but not always, embodies 

a claim[] nonetheless infringes,’” id. at 53 (quoting Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 

2013)). Although UltimatePointer is correct in principle, 

that principle does not apply to the facts here. Paper 

Converting, Broadcom, and similar cases apply when an 

accused system infringes in one manner of operation, but 

does not infringe in another manner. See, e.g., Bell 

Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 

F.3d 615, 622–23 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In the present case, 

the Washington district court found, and we agree, that 

the Wii system does not infringe in any arrangement. 

Infringement Opinion, 2014 WL 7340604, at *2. That the 

Wii system does not approximate direct pointing when the 

sensor bar is moved simply shows that the Wii remote 

performs indirect, not direct, pointing. Accordingly, the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

of noninfringement.

For the reasons explained previously, the Texas district court did not err in construing the term “handheld 

device,” and the Washington district court did not err in 

granting summary judgment of noninfringement based on 

that construction. Because those determinations entirely 

resolve UltimatePointer’s infringement appeal, we need 

not, and do not, address UltimatePointer’s challenges to 

other claim constructions and the associated infringement 

arguments. 

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III. INDEFINITENESS

UltimatePointer also challenges the Washington district court’s determination that claims 1, 3, 5, and 6 of the 

’729 patent are invalid as indefinite. 

We review a district court’s ultimate determination 

that a claim is invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 

¶ 2 de novo,2 although, as with claim construction, any 

factual findings by the district court based on extrinsic 

evidence are reviewed for clear error. Eidos Display, LLC 

v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). Neither party alleges that the district court relied 

on extrinsic evidence in reaching its conclusion that the 

claims are invalid as indefinite, and so our review is de 

novo. 

Section 112 requires that a patent specification “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out 

and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 

applicant regards as his invention.” The Supreme Court 

has read this provision to require that “a patent’s claims, 

viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the 

invention with reasonable certainty.” Nautilus v. Biosig 

Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014). We have 

held that “a single claim covering both an apparatus and 

a method of use of that apparatus” fails to meet the 

requirements of § 112 because “it is unclear whether 

infringement . . . occurs when one creates a[n infringing] 

system, or whether infringement occurs when the user 

actually uses [the system in an infringing manner].” 

 

2 Because the ’729 patent was filed before the adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 

112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–93 (2011), the prior version of § 112 governs. See Fleming v. Escort, Inc., 774 

F.3d 1371, 1374 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

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IPXL Holdings, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 

1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, “apparatus claims are 

not necessarily indefinite for using functional language.” 

Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments 

Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“MEC”). If an 

apparatus claim “is clearly limited to a[n apparatus] 

possessing the recited structure and capable of performing the recited functions,” then the claim is not invalid as 

indefinite. Id. (emphasis in original). 

The district court concluded that claims 1, 3, 5, and 6 

of the ’729 patent are directed to both an apparatus and a 

method for using that apparatus because they claim “a 

handheld device including: an image sensor, said image 

sensor generating data” and other similar “generating 

data” limitations. Indefiniteness Opinion, 73 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1308 (quoting ’729 patent, col. 33 ll. 64–65). The court 

concluded that the inclusion of the “image sensor generating data” limitation made it unclear whether infringement occurred when an infringing system is assembled, or 

when “the apparatus is used to perform the specified 

function.” Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the 

claims were invalid as indefinite. 

UltimatePointer argues that the claims are not invalid as indefinite because they simply claim a handheld 

device with an image sensor capable of generating data, 

and recite sufficient structure for that capability. UltimatePointer contends that because claims 1, 3, 5, and 6 of 

the ’729 patent claim a structure in connection with the 

claimed functionality, the claims are more similar to those 

in MEC. Id. 60–62.

Nintendo responds that the claims do not clearly tie 

the functional language to the device’s capability. Nintendo argues that the district court’s decision is consistent 

with this court’s precedent, and that the United States 

Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) routinely rejects 

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18 ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C. V. NINTENDO CO., LTD. 

claims similar to those appearing in the ’729 patent on 

IPXL grounds. 

We agree with UltimatePointer that claims 1, 3, 5, 

and 6 of the ’729 patent are not invalid as indefinite, as 

the claims do reflect the capability of the claimed apparatus. Unlike IPXL and similar cases, the claims at issue 

here make clear that the “generating data” limitation

reflects the capability of that structure rather than the 

activities of the user. 

In reaching this conclusion, review of our precedent is 

instructive. In IPXL, our first case to address the claiming of two statutory classes, the claim at issue recited a 

system including input means, wherein “the user uses the 

input means” IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1384. The claims were

unclear whether infringement occurred when the system 

was created, or when the user used the system. See id.

We also affirmed a district court’s conclusion finding a 

claim invalid as indefinite for being directed to two statutory classes in In re Katz Interactive Call Processing 

Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 

In that case, the claims were directed to a system with an 

interface for providing automated voice messages to 

certain callers, “wherein said certain of said individual 

callers digitally enter data.” Id. Although the patentee 

argued that this clause indicated functional capability, we

held that the clause was “directed to user actions, not 

system capabilities.” Id. 

 In MEC, however, we reversed a district court’s 

determination that a claim directed to a computer processor with different stages, including “performing a boolean 

algebraic evaluation,” “producing an enable-write,” later 

“enabling” or “disabling,” and, at a different stage, “determining,” was directed to two different statutory classes. MEC, 520 F.3d at 1371–72. Instead, we found that 

the claim was “clearly limited to a . . . processor possessing the recited structure and capable of performing 

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ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C. V. NINTENDO CO., LTD. 19

the recited functions.” Id. at 1375 (emphasis in original). 

Because the limitation only indicated a capability of the 

structure rather than actual use, the claim was not indefinite. See id.

In HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG, we also 

reversed summary judgment of indefiniteness when the 

claim was drawn to a mobile station for use with a network. 667 F.3d 1270, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The claim at 

issue included “storing,” “holding,” and other functional 

limitations, id. at 1274, but we concluded that those 

limitations “merely establish those functions as the 

underlying network environment in which the mobile 

station operates.” Id. at 1277. As the limitations only 

described the environment in which the network operated 

rather than indicating a method of use, however, the 

claim was not indefinite.

The claims here are most similar to those at issue in 

MEC and HTC Corp. Like those claims, the “data generating” limitations only indicate that the associated structures have this capability (for example, the image sensor 

and processor in claim 1) and do not require that any data 

be actually generated by the user. See ’729 patent, col. 33 

l. 65–col. 34 l. 8. Unlike the claims in IPXL and Katz, the 

claims do not recite functionality divorced from the cited

structure. Therefore, the claims do not reflect an attempt 

to claim both an apparatus and a method, but instead 

claim an apparatus with particular capabilities. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s determination that 

claims 1, 3, 5, and 6 of the ’729 patent are invalid as 

indefinite. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the remaining arguments, but 

find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 

decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

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20 ULTIMATEPOINTER, L.L.C. V. NINTENDO CO., LTD. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

COSTS

No costs.

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