Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07797/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07797-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMJI GOVINDARAJAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-07797-JSC 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Ramji Govindarajan (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Govindarajan”) sues his former insurer 

Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO” or “Defendant”) for failing to defend him 

in a defamation action filed in California state court.1 (Dkt. No. 1.)2 Now before the Court is 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). (Dkt. No. 33.) After careful consideration of 

the parties’ briefing, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. 

L.R. 7-1(b), and GRANTS Defendant’s motion. On this record every reasonable trier of fact 

would have to find that there was no duty to defend because the Policy required Plaintiff to have 

insurance on his primary residence as a condition to insurance coverage and it is undisputed that 

Plaintiff did not have such insurance at any time during the policy period. 

1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 9 & 13.) 

2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 

ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 

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BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed. 

A. The Policy

Plaintiff purchased a GEICO “Personal Umbrella Policy” (the “Policy”) on or around May 

27, 2016. (Dkt. Nos. 35 at ¶ 4 & 42 at ¶ 3.) The Policy became effective on May 28, 2016 and 

covered a period of one year. (Dkt. No. 35-1, Ex. 1 at 2.) The Policy’s declarations page lists 

“Minimum Required Limits of Primary Insurance” for both automobile and “primary residence.” 

(See id.) The Policy defines “primary insurance” as insurance: “(a) for which the minimum 

required liability limit is shown on the declarations; and (b) which is payable on behalf of an 

insured for liability for personal injury or property damage; and (c) which must be maintained as 

a condition of this policy.” (Id. at 5.) 

The Policy provides personal liability insurance arising out of an “occurrence,” defined as 

“an accident or event, including a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which results in 

personal injury or property damage neither expected or [sic] intended by you.” (Id. at 5.) The 

Policy defines “personal injury” as including “libel, slander, [and] defamation.” (Id.) 

The Policy’s “Part V - Defense of Suits Not Covered by Other Insurance” section provides, 

in pertinent part:

1. If the required primary insurance:

(a) is in force but does not cover personal injury or property 

damage due to the nature of the claim against you, and this 

policy does provide coverage, we will provide defense of suits 

in excess of the retained limit.

(b) is in force but does not cover personal injury or property 

damage for any other reason, and this policy does provide 

coverage, we have the right to provide defense. But we are 

not obligated to defend unless the personal injury or property 

damage alleged in the suit exceeds the required limit of 

primary insurance shown in Item 5[ ] of the declarations.

2. When we provide defense, we will:

(a) defend an insured against a claim or suit for damages 

arising out of an occurrence. We may investigate and settle a 

claim or suit we feel is appropriate[.]

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(Id. at 6.) The Policy’s “Part VI – Conditions” section provides, in pertinent part:

2. Defense and Settlement. Except as provided in Part V., we are not 

required to take charge of the investigation, defense or settlement of 

a claim or suit. We have the right at any time to join an insured or 

the primary insurers in the investigation, defense and settlement of 

the claim or suit. If the primary insurance limit is paid, we have the 

option to defend a claim or suit. 

. . . 

8. Policy Period and Territory. We cover personal injury and 

property damage which takes place anywhere during the time this 

policy is in force. 

. . . 

14. You will maintain your primary insurance and notify us of any 

changes in your primary insurance within 30 days. 

(Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff did not maintain primary insurance on his residence at any time during the 

Policy. 

B. The Underlying Defamation Action

On January 7, 2016, Dr. Geeta Murali Ganesh filed the underlying defamation action in the 

Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco on behalf of herself and as principal of 

Rosebank Road Medical Services Ltd. dba Rosebank Road Medical Centre (“Rosebank”). (Dkt. 

No. 34-1, Ex. A.)3 Rosebank is a “primary healthcare service center based in Auckland, New 

Zealand.” (Id. at 3, ¶ 1.) The complaint brought a single claim for defamation, alleging that 

unknown Doe defendants had “published numerous fake reviews about Rosebank and Dr. 

Ganesh” on www.ratemds.com (“RateMDs”), a website that allows users to provide reviews and 

comments on medical facilities and medical professionals. (Id. at 3, ¶¶ 6-7; 6, ¶¶ 26-29.) The 

complaint alleged that the defendants began publishing the “false and defamatory reviews” on 

Rate MDs in October 2014, and that the reviews were intended to “exact revenge” on Dr. Ganesh 

3 The Court grants Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice of documents filed in the 

underlying state court action. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that judicial notice is appropriate for “undisputed matters of public record, including 

documents on file in federal or state courts”) (internal citation omitted); see also Bennet v. 

Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that courts “may take notice of 

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 

proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 

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based on “a dispute with Dr. Ganesh and/or her family members” unrelated to her medical 

practice. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 30-32.) 

Dr. Ganesh and Rosebank filed a first amended complaint on November 8, 2016, naming 

Mr. Govindarajan—her ex son-in-law—as a defendant, along with “Does 2-20.” (Dkt. No. 34-2, 

Ex. B at 3, ¶ 4.) The amended complaint repeats the substantive allegations in the original 

complaint but alleges that the alleged defamatory reviews were first published on RateMDs in 

May 2015. (See id. at ¶ 5.) The amended complaint further alleges that Mr. Govindarajan and Dr. 

Ganesh’s daughter “were previously married” and were “currently involved in a protracted and 

acrimonious custody battle,” and that the “family dispute” was the impetus for the defamatory 

posts. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 29-34.) The amended complaint asserts a single claim for defamation. 

The case was tried before a jury, and on January 10, 2018, the jury returned a verdict in 

favor of Mr. Govindarajan. (Dkt. No. 34-9, Ex. I.) The jury found that he did not make any of the 

22 defamatory RateMDs posts at issue in the action. (See id. at 3-5.) The court entered judgment 

in favor of Mr. Govindarajan in February 2018. (Dkt. No. 34-10, Ex. J.) Dr. Ganesh and 

Rosebank filed an appeal and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in August 

2019. (Dkt. No. 34-12, Ex. L.) 

C. Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Policy and GEICO’s Investigation

On May 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim under the Policy seeking coverage related to the 

underlying action, indicating that he was served with the complaint on January 15, 2017. (Dkt. 

No. 35-2, Ex. 2 at 2-3.) GEICO Claims Attorney Michael A. Stodghill was assigned to investigate 

the claim. (Dkt. No. 35 at ¶¶ 1, 5.) Mr. Stodghill called Plaintiff on May 9, 2017 and 

“subsequently checked GEICO’s records” to determine the status of Plaintiff’s other GEICO 

policies. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Mr. Stodghill discovered that Plaintiff had personal automobile insurance 

but no primary residence insurance. (Id.) 

Mr. Stodghill called Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Edmondson, the following day to discuss the 

claim, and then reviewed the first amended complaint in the underlying action. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Mr. 

Stodghill emailed Mr. Edmondson later that morning and requested documents regarding the 

specific RateMDs posts at issue. (Id. at ¶ 8; see also Dkt. No. 35-4, Ex. 4 at 2.) Mr. Stodghill’s 

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email also stated his understanding that Plaintiff “did not maintain any primary homeowner’s or 

renter’s insurance” at the time of the incident. (Id.) Mr. Edmondson responded by email that day, 

stating that, “[a]s for other insurance policies, [he] believe[d] that there is only the auto policy.” 

(Dkt. No. 35-4, Ex. 4 at 2.) Mr. Edmondson’s email also included a copy of a report generated by 

RateMDs Inc.’s Chief Legal Officer regarding the date, time, and content of the RateMDs posts at 

issue in the underlying action (“RateMDs Report”). (Id. at ¶ 8; see also Dkt. No. 35-4, Ex. 4.) 

After conducting his investigation Mr. Stodghill “determined that the RateMDs Report 

showed that the defamatory reviews at issue in the Underlying Action were all published between 

the dates of June 5, 2015 to January 17, 2016,” and that the first amended complaint referenced 

one date—‘May 2015.’” (Dkt. No. 35 at ¶ 10.) Mr. Stodghill also determined that Plaintiff failed 

to maintain the required primary insurance on his primary residence during the Policy period. (Id.

at ¶ 12.) 

D. GEICO Declines to Defend in the Underlying Action

On May 30, 2017, GEICO issued a letter to Mr. Edmondson detailing Mr. Stodghill’s 

investigation into the facts of the underlying action (including the RateMDs Report) and 

conveying its coverage decision. (Id. at ¶ 13; see also Dkt. No. 35-6, Ex. 6.) The letter states, in 

pertinent part:

[A]t this time, GEICO will not be providing Mr. Govindarajan with a 

legal defense to the lawsuit per the Umbrella Policy’s terms and 

conditions. GEICO will be having separate counsel monitor the 

lawsuit on behalf of GEICO. GEICO reserves the right to later join 

in the defense of the lawsuit.

(Dkt. No. 35-6, Ex. 6 at 2.) The letter states that GEICO was reserving its rights in part pursuant 

to Condition 8 of the Policy: 

Per Condition 8, the Umbrella Policy is an occurrence policy that 

covers a covered “personal injury” or “property damage” that takes 

place during the time the Umbrella Policy was in force. The Lawsuit 

alleges numerous, very specific, defamatory statements made that are 

the basis for the Lawsuit. The information we have received indicates 

that all of those statements were made and posted to the Website 

before the Umbrella Policy's inception date of May 28, 2016. To the 

extent the claim and Lawsuit are based on allegations of “personal 

injury” or “property damage” that occurred before the Umbrella 

Policy’s inception, they are not covered by the Umbrella Policy. 

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(Id. at 7.) The letter also notes that Plaintiff failed to carry the required primary insurance, and

states: 

Per Condition 2, we are not required to defend a suit except as 

provided in Part V, though we have the right to join in the defense at 

any time. Part V, in turn, provides that we will defend an insured in 

suits in which the primary insurance is in force, but does not cover the 

personal injury or property damage for certain specified reasons. Part 

V does not require us to defend an insured in a lawsuit when the 

insured does not carry the required primary insurance at all. 

Therefore, in accordance with Condition 2 and Part V, GEICO will 

not be providing Mr. Govindarajan a legal defense to the Lawsuit at 

this time.

(Id. at 8.) Mr. Edmondson responded by letter dated June 3, 2017, asserting that GEICO denied 

coverage in bad faith because the first amended complaint in the underlying did not include “the 

dates of the allegedly defamatory posts,” and the extrinsic evidence did not “conclusively establish 

that no coverage exists.” (Dkt. No. 35-7, Ex. 7 (emphasis omitted).) Mr. Edmondson also 

asserted that the Policy’s requirement that Plaintiff maintain primary insurance rendered the Policy 

“worthless at the time it was sold” because GEICO did not confirm with Plaintiff that he carried 

the required insurance before selling him the Policy. (Id. at 2.) GEICO responded by letter dated 

June 12, 2017, addressing Mr. Edmondson’s arguments and confirming its decision to decline to 

defend Plaintiff in the underlying action. (Dkt. No. 35-8, Ex. 8.) 

Because GEICO asserted reservations of rights as to the defamation claim in the 

underlying action, it assigned “monitoring counsel” to attend the trial “in the event that the 

evidence . . . showed that the allegedly defamatory posts were published during the policy period.” 

(Dkt. No. 43-1 at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff spent over $350,000 in defending the underlying action. (Dkt. 

No. 41 at ¶ 8.) 

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed his complaint in December 2018, bringing claims for: (1) breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing – failure to defend; (2) declaratory relief; and (3) 

breach of contract – failure to defend. (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 15-31.) Defendant timely answered the 

complaint, (Dkt. No. 7), and moved for summary judgment in May 2019, (Dkt. No. 22). The 

parties then filed a joint stipulation to stay the case pending the appeal in the underlying action, 

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which the Court granted, (Dkt. No. 30). The Court granted the parties’ stipulation to lift the stay 

in November 2019, (Dkt. No. 32), and Defendant refiled its motion for summary judgment 

thereafter, (Dkt. No. 33). The motion is fully briefed, (see Dkt. Nos. 40 & 43). 

DISCUSSION

California law applies to this diversity action. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. 

ConocoPhillips Co., 546 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying California law to interpret 

insurance policy). Plaintiff, as the insured, “has the burden of establishing that a claim, unless 

specifically excluded, is within basic coverage, while the insurer has the burden of establishing 

that a specific exclusion applies.” Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 49 Cal. 4th 315, 322 (2010). 

All of Plaintiff’s claims are premised on Defendant’s alleged duty to defend him in the underlying 

action. Thus, for Plaintiff to prevail on his claims at trial he must first demonstrate that Defendant 

had a duty to defend under the Policy’s terms. 

A. Duty to Defend Generally

An “insurer owes a broad duty to defend its insured against claims that create a potential 

for indemnity.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 6 Cal. 4th 287, 295 (1993). Thus, insurers 

“must defend a suit which potentially seeks damages within the coverage of the policy.” Id.

(emphasis, quotation marks, and citation omitted.) “The determination whether the insurer owes a 

duty to defend usually is made in the first instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint 

[in the underlying action] with the terms of the policy.” Id. Further, “[f]acts extrinsic to the 

complaint also give rise to a duty to defend when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be 

covered by the policy.” Id. There is no duty to defend, however, where “it has been shown that 

there is no potential for coverage.” Id. 

B. Defendant did not Have a Duty to Defend 

Every reasonable trier of fact would have to find that there was no potential for coverage, 

and therefore Defendant did not have a duty to defend, because Plaintiff did not maintain 

insurance on his primary residence as required for coverage under the Policy. As previously 

discussed, the Policy states that “Primary Insurance” means insurance:

(a) for which a minimum required liability limit is shown on the declarations; and

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(b) which is payable on behalf of an insured for liability for personal injury or property 

damages; and

(c) which must be maintained as a condition of this policy.

(Dkt. No. 35-1, Ex. 1 at 5.) The “declarations” referred to in subsection (a) state that the minimum 

required liability limit of primary insurance is $300,000 on Plaintiff’s primary residence and a 

similar amount on Plaintiff’s automobile. (Id. at 2.) The definition of “Primary Insurance” 

unambiguously states that the minimum required liability limit set forth on the declarations page 

“must be maintained as a condition” of the Policy. Further, the Policy’s “Defense of Suits Not 

Covered by Other Insurance” section states that GEICO will provide a defense “[i]f the required 

primary insurance . . . is in force.” (Id. at 6.) The “Conditions” section of the Policy provides, in 

pertinent part, that “[i]f the primary insurance limit is paid,” GEICO has “the option to defend a 

claim or suit.” (Id. at 7.) The “Conditions” section also provides: “You will maintain your 

primary insurance and notify us of any changes in your primary insurance within 30 days.” (Id.

at 8.) Therefore, a condition to Plaintiff receiving benefits under the Policy was that he maintain 

insurance on his primary residence. There is no dispute that Plaintiff did not carry any insurance 

on his primary residence at any time during the Policy period. Thus, under the Policy’s plain 

terms, Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for defense coverage. See N. Am. Capacity Ins. Co. 

v. Claremont Liab. Ins. Co., 177 Cal. App. 4th 272, 287-90 (2009) (upholding no insurance 

coverage where insured had not satisfied conditions to coverage).

Plaintiff does not dispute that he was required to maintain “primary insurance” as a 

condition to coverage under the Policy; instead, he appears to argue that he satisfied this condition 

by maintaining an automobile policy which he understood was the only primary insurance 

required. But the declarations page states that the minimum required liability limit for primary 

insurance applies to insurance for his automobile and insurance for his primary residence. The 

Policy cannot reasonably be read any other way. See Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 

1, 18–19 (1995), as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 26, 1995) (“Courts will not strain to create an 

ambiguity where none exists”). Further, “to the extent [Plaintiff’s] understanding of the policy is 

contrary to its explicit language, [his] subjective intent is not relevant.” Hervey v. Mercury Cas. 

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Co., 185 Cal. App. 4th 954, 965 (2010); see also Hackethal v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 

1102, 1112 (1987) (“It is a general rule that the receipt of a policy and its acceptance by the 

insured without an objection binds the insured as well as the insurer and he cannot thereafter 

complain that he did not read it or know its terms.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Plaintiff’s reliance on Spray, Gould & Bowers v. Associated Intern’l. Ins. Co., 71 

Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267 (1999,) for the proposition that Defendant’s conduct “raises an issue of 

contractual waiver or equitable estoppel” is misplaced. First, and dispositively, the Policy does 

not obligate Defendant to defend in cases where the primary insurance is not in force. (Dkt. No. 

35-1, Ex. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff cannot assert the equitable doctrines of waiver and estoppel to establish 

coverage where none exists. See Advanced Network, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 190 Cal. App. 4th 

1054, 1066 (2010) (“The rule is well established that the doctrines of implied waiver and of 

estoppel, based upon the conduct or action of the insurer, are not available to bring within the 

coverage of a policy risks not covered by its terms, or risks expressly excluded therefrom . . . .”) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (collecting cases). 

Second, even if waiver or estoppel could apply, the burden is on Plaintiff to prove those 

claims. See Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 31 (“The burden . . . is on the party claiming a waiver of a right 

to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that does not leave the matter to speculation, and 

‘doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver’ [citation].”) (alteration in original). Plaintiff’s 

opposition makes no effort to identify the evidence in the record that could support a finding in his 

favor on waiver or estoppel; indeed, his opposition does not even identify what he must prove. In 

any event, he does not even allege that he spoke to or communicated directly with any GEICO 

agent. Assuming that he could allege a conversation with an agent, as opposed to merely applying 

online, at most he alleges that the agent should have known that his insurance on his primary 

residence had lapsed and therefore should have told Plaintiff that he had to reinstate it or obtain 

other primary residence insurance. (Dkt. No. 42.) This evidence does not support a finding of 

waiver or estoppel, even assuming those doctrines could create coverage where none exists. 

Plaintiff’s fleeting reference to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and paragraph seven of 

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counsel’s declaration is likewise insufficient as he has had more than enough time to develop the 

record to support waiver or estoppel, if such a record could be developed (and there is nothing in 

this record that suggests that it could). See Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

In sum, as it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not have insurance on his primary residence at 

any time during the Policy period, and as such insurance was unambiguously a condition to any 

coverage under the Policy, Defendant has met its burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claims. In light of this ruling, the Court need not address 

Defendant’s other argument for summary judgment.

C. Leave to Amend is Denied

Finally, Plaintiff requests “leave to amend [to allege] negligent misrepresentation or fraud 

since GEICO[’s] position is only sustainable if it fraudulently sold the policy, knowing it was 

worthless without the ostensible necessary underlying coverage.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 10.) 

Ordinarily, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)’s liberal standard applies to a plaintiff’s request 

for leave to amend. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 

1992). However, once a district court enters a pretrial scheduling order under Rule 16 that 

“establishe[s] a timetable for amending pleadings,” that Rule’s “good cause” standard controls. 

(Id. at 607-08.) Under Rule 16(b), the plaintiff must first show “good cause” for amendment, and 

if he does so, must then “demonstrate that amendment [is] proper under Rule 15.” Id. at 608. 

The Court issued a pretrial scheduling order on March 28, 2019 setting August 1, 2019 as 

the deadline to move to amend the pleadings. (Dkt. No. 20 at 1.) Defendant filed its original 

motion for summary judgment in May 2019 and the action was then stayed a month later. In

November 2019 the parties stipulated to lift the stay and set a briefing schedule for Defendant to 

re-file its motion for summary judgment. The stipulation said nothing about amending any other 

dates in the pretrial scheduling order. Because the Court has issued a pretrial scheduling order, it 

applies Rule 16(b). 

“Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party 

seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good 

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cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 

975 F.2d at 609 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Good cause” is shown if the 

pretrial order’s deadline could not be met “despite the party’s diligence.” Id. “[T]he focus of the 

inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff fails to show reasonable diligence. He has known since May 2017 the 

grounds for Defendant’s denial of defense coverage under the Policy. Plaintiff filed his complaint 

in December 2018 and did not allege fraud or negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff likewise knew 

in May 2019 the grounds for Defendant’s motion for summary judgment—the same grounds 

asserted in the refiled, instant motion—and the parties did not stipulate to a stay until three weeks 

later. Finally, the parties stipulated to a briefing schedule regarding the instant motion in 

November 2019 after the Court granted their stipulation to lift the stay. At no time did Plaintiff 

move for leave to amend the complaint between the lifting of the stay on November 14, 2019 and 

the filing of his opposition on January 6, 2019. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s belated, one 

sentence request for leave to amend fails to establish “good cause” for modifying the pretrial 

scheduling order. 

D. Evidentiary Objections

Defendant’s reply briefing includes an attachment entitled “Evidentiary Objections” that 

objects on various grounds to the declarations of Plaintiff and his counsel, Mr. Edmonds. (Dkt. 

No. 43-2.) Defendant’s evidentiary objections do not comply with the Civil Local Rules. Under 

Local Rule 7-3(c), any evidentiary objections “to the opposition must be contained within the 

reply brief or memorandum.” Defendant’s objections are not contained within the reply brief but 

are instead included as an attachment to same. Accordingly, the Court declines to consider 

Defendant’s separate “Evidentiary Objections” and “will only address the evidentiary arguments 

to the extent they are raised” in Defendant’s reply brief. See Beauperthuy v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, 

Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying the defendant’s separately-filed 

motion to strike based on a similar violation of Local Rule 7-3(c)), abrogated on other grounds by 

Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018).

//

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CONCLUSION

It is undisputed that the unsuccessful defamation lawsuit Plaintiff’s former in-laws pursued 

against him extracted a heavy financial toll. For the reasons stated above, however, it is also 

undisputed that Plaintiff did not satisfy the conditions to obtaining insurance coverage from 

Defendant for the defense of that lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment. 

The Order disposes of Docket No. 33. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2020

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:18-cv-07797-JSC Document 45 Filed 02/05/20 Page 12 of 12