Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06556-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLY LOUEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO POLICE OFFICER BRIAN

TWEDT; THE CITY OF FRESNO,

CALIFORNIA

 

Defendants.

CV-F-04-6556 OWW SMS

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION WITH

PREJUDICE (DOC. 116)

I. INTRODUCTION

Brian Twedt and the City of Fresno (collectively

“Defendants”) move to dismiss Holly Louen’s (“Plaintiff”)

complaint under Rule 41(b) based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply

with orders of this court. (Doc. 116, filed June 12, 2006.) 

Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 126, filed July 11, 2006.)

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Holly Louen contends that Defendant Brian Twedt,

an officer with the Fresno Police Department, has engaged in a

series of threatening and intimidating acts against her. (See

Doc. 1, Compl.) Plaintiff seeks to recover under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and California Civil Code § 52.1, seeks damages for

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intentional infliction of emotional distress, and asks for

declaratory relief regarding violations of her constitutional

rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (See id.)

On November 4, 2005, at a hearing on Defendant City of

Fresno’s motion to compel (Doc. 27), the Magistrate Judge ordered

Plaintiff to undergo a mental examination. This order was

memorialized in a written order on December 22, 2005. Pursuant

to Plaintiff’s request, the Magistrate Judge permitted the

proceedings to be tape recorded. Plaintiff did not ask to have

counsel present during the examination.

On December 2, 2005, the date for which the mental

examination was scheduled, Plaintiff’s counsel arrived with

Plaintiff at least fifteen minutes after the agreed-upon starting

time. Plaintiff’s counsel asked Dr. Harold L. Seymour, who was

scheduled to conduct the examination, to attempt to complete it

anyway. Dr. Seymour discovered that Plaintiff’s counsel intended

to be present for the examination. Dr. Seymour refused to

proceed with Plaintiff’s counsel present because doing so would

violate standards and practices of clinical interviewing. 

Plaintiff’s counsel refused to allow Plaintiff to undergo the

examination without being present. At the hearing on January 20,

2006, the Magistrate Judge imposed sanctions, in the amount of

$2,500, for Plaintiff’s failure to undergo the examination,

stayed until the conclusion of this case. At the same hearing,

the Magistrate Judge ordered that a full-day Independent Mental

Examination (“IME”) of Plaintiff was proper under Rule 35 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff had the right to and

did challenge whether a full-day examination was reasonable for

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her IME. 

On a motion for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s

order, District Judge Robert E. Coyle held that the sanction the

district court ordered was proper and that she had not erred in

determining that a full-day IME was appropriate. (Doc. 95, filed

April 19, 2006.) As a practical matter, it is unlikely Dr.

Seymour will take any more time for the IME than is necessary.

Judge Coyle held, in relevant part, as follows:

3. As soon as is practicable, Plaintiff 

shall appear for an Independent Mental 

Examination with Dr. Harold L. Seymour.

4. The parties shall either stipulate to a

date and time for the examination or 

arrange a scheduling conference with 

Magistrate Judge Snyder to do so.

(Doc 95 at 16:15-19.) Thereafter, Plaintiff did not stipulate to

a date for the examination nor cooperate in scheduling one.

In her order of June 6, 2006, the Magistrate Judge found

that there was no excuse for Plaintiff’s failure to cooperate in

arranging a scheduling conference or scheduling an examination. 

(Doc. 107 at 11:21-27.) She sanctioned Plaintiff in the amount

of $768.00 in reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees. (Id. at

12:19-23.) She also ordered Plaintiff to attend a mental

examination with Dr. Seymour on June 9, 2006, at 8:00 a.m. 

On June 7, 2006, this action was reassigned to the

undersigned for all further proceedings due to the senior status

of Judge Coyle. (Doc. 109.)

Plaintiff did not attend the mental examination as ordered. 

Nor did she notify Dr. Seymour or defense counsel to advise them

that she would not be attending. (Doc. 116, Seymour Decl., 

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The court takes judicial notice of the time of filing 1

cataloged on the CM/ECF electronic document filing system. See

Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (C.D. Cal.

2004) (taking judicial notice of documents available on court’s

PACER electronic interface); Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital,

844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988).

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filed June 12, 2006, ¶ 2; Doc. 116, Camarena Decl., filed June

12, 2006, ¶ 1.) On June 9, 2006, at 12:27 p.m., four hours after

she failed to attend the examination, Plaintiff filed a document

labeled “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,” indicating her

intention to seek appellate review of, among other things, the

orders that she attend a full-day mental examination. (Doc. 1

111.) Plaintiff contends that the orders violate her

constitutional rights to due process, privacy, and liberty,

arguing that the more extensive mental examination was ordered in

part as a discovery sanction. (Doc. 111 at 2:13-18.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal of an action or any

claim based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with any order of

the court. See also L.R. 11-110 (“Failure of counsel or of a

party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court

may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all

sanctions authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent

power of the Court.”).

The Ninth Circuit has enumerated five factors district 

courts may consider in determining whether dismissal under Rule

41(b) is appropriate: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious

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resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the

public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and

(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Hernandez v.

City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). Dismissal

is a harsh penalty that should “only be imposed in extreme

circumstances.” Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit may affirm a

dismissal where four or more factors support dismissal or where

at least three factors “‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Id.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction of the Court Regarding the IME

Plaintiff asserts that the document he filed on June 9, 2006

(Doc. 111), initiated an appeal of a collateral order under Cohen

v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), and

divested this court of jurisdiction over the IME. A collateral

order appeal “divests the district court of its control over

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v.

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

The court’s order that Plaintiff undergo a mental

examination is unappealable at this stage based on the general

rule that orders regarding discovery are reviewable only on

appeal from a final judgment. In re Subpoena Served on Cal. Pub.

Utils. Comm’n, 813 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1974)). Discovery orders

are generally inappropriate subjects for collateral review

because they are not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a

final judgment.” Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 709 (2d Cir.

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In full, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 provides as follows: 2

(a) The Supreme Court and all courts

established by Act of Congress may issue all

writs necessary or appropriate in aid of

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1987) (quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424

(1985)). Under exceptional circumstances, discovery orders can

be subject to mandamus review. See Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d

1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984).

In Cullen, the plaintiffs sought interlocutory appeal of the

district court’s refusal to allow plaintiff class members to

proceed with their claims anonymously. 811 F.2d at 709. The

court of appeals held that the district court’s disclosure order

was not effectively unreviewable on appeal. Id. at 710. 

Plaintiff class members were free to refuse to disclose their

identities, then appeal from the final judgment after they are

denied damages. Id. 

Here, Plaintiff can choose to refuse to undergo the mental

examination, suffer the consequences, and then to appeal any

sanctions after the court enters final judgment. While

disobeying an order of the court and risking adverse judgment may

prove costly, such a requirement ensures that “the order is in

fact of great importance to the aggrieved party.” 15A Charles

Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 400 (2d Ed.

1992).

Because Plaintiff is not entitled as of right to a

collateral order appeal under Cohen, it appears that Plaintiff is

actually petitioning for mandamus relief under the All Writs Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1651. Mandamus review is appropriate for certain 2

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their respective jurisdictions and agreeable

to the usages and principles of law.

(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be

issued by a justice or judge of a court which

has jurisdiction.

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interlocutory orders that are not otherwise appealable. See

Credit Suisse v. United States Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1342,

1345-46 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that mandamus review was

appropriate where appeal of a final decision under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and permissive appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) were not

available). Because mandamus petitions are only granted in

exceptional circumstances, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

do not provide for an automatic stay of district court

proceedings while a petition for writ of mandamus is pending.” 

Woodson v. Surgitek, 57 F.3d 1406, 1416 (5th Cir. 1995); see

Ellis v. United States Dist. Court (In re Ellis), 360 F.3d 1022,

1023 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Indeed, in the context of an extraordinary

writ such as mandamus, there is no need for us to relinquish our

jurisdiction to the district court because it was never deprived

of jurisdiction over the underlying case.” (citing Woodson, 57

F.3d at 1416)). In its discretion, either the district court or

the court of appeals may grant a stay while a petition for

mandamus relief is pending. Woodson, 57 F.3d at 1416. Such a

stay is inappropriate in this case where the relief sought

appears to be hopeless and is being pursued solely to delay these

proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s filing of her “Notice of

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Interlocutory Appeal” has not divested the court of jurisdiction

over the IME. 

B. Disobedience of Court Orders

Plaintiff argues that her conduct does not present a basis

for any sanctions whatsoever. Plaintiff presents a series of

arguments to mitigate or excuse the conduct on which the court’s

prior sanctions have been based. For instance, Plaintiff argues

once again that she did not violate the court’s order that she

attend the mental examination on December 2, 2005.

(Doc. 126 at 4:3-13.) Judge Coyle’s order of April 19, 2006, has

already conclusively resolved that issue. (See Doc. 95.) 

Plaintiff also attempts to excuse her failure to cooperate in

arranging a scheduling conference or scheduling an examination

following the April 19 order. (Doc. 126 at 4:13-23.) The

Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s conduct was inexcusable. 

(See Doc. 107.)

Plaintiff also attempts to excuse her failure to attend the

mental examination on June 9, 2006. Plaintiff argues that her

counsel had already indicated at the hearing of June 2, 2006,

that she was going to seek an interlocutory appeal of the June 9

order. (Doc. 126 at 4:22-5:3.) Plaintiff also attempts to

excuse her failure to attend the IME by pointing out that, on

June 9, she submitted a notice of interlocutory appeal, which was

filed a few hours after she failed to attend the court-ordered

mental examination. (Id. at 5:2-6.) Finally, Plaintiff’s

counsel argues that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the court’s

order requiring her to attend the mental examination on June 9

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because counsel had not informed her of that order until July 6,

2006. (Id. at 5:5-5:9.)

Plaintiff’s oral statement at the June 2 hearing, that she

intended to file an interlocutory appeal, does not excuse her

failure to comply with the court’s order. Nor did Plaintiff’s

filing of a notice of appeal after the time set to attend her IME

passed excuse her failure. The rule is well established that a

party cannot ignore a court order and seek relief after the

court-ordered deadline. Counsel cannot ignore court orders and

negate the opposing party’s right to bring a matter to trial.

C. Dismissal Factors

The first two Rule 41(b) factors weigh in favor of

dismissal. The public’s interest in expeditiously resolving

litigation and the court’s ability to manage its docket have both

been jeopardized by the Plaintiff’s intentional failures to

undergo the mental examination as ordered. It has been over

eight months since the court first ordered the examination. 

Defendants claim that they have been attempting to obtain this

discovery, which will likely prove crucial to litigating

Plaintiff’s claims of emotional and psychological damages, for 13

months. (Doc. 130, filed July 17, 2006, at 3:16-19.) The

failure to complete the mental examination on December 2, 2005,

and to follow the court’s order on April 19, 2006, have

unjustifiably delayed the litigation. 

The failure to attend the IME on June 9, 2006, without

timely seeking a stay of the order is reckless and irresponsible. 

Plaintiff could have timely filed her notice of appeal and sought

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a stay. She did not notify Defendants and Dr. Seymour of her

intent not to appear. 

Plaintiff also asks the court to look to her “discovery

conduct as a whole,” which she argues has been “far from

dilatory.” (Doc. 126 at 3:19-21.) That Plaintiff has not acted

contumaciously in complying with other discovery requests does

not mitigate the extensive delay her failures to attend the

mental examination have caused.

Plaintiff’s disobedience of the two prior court orders has

substantially delayed these proceedings to the detriment of the

court and Defendants. See Chism v. Nat’l Heritage Life Ins. Co.,

637 F.2d 1328, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal as a

sanction where plaintiff’s “[d]isregard of the discovery process

deprived the defendant of needed information, increased its

litigation expenses and forestalled its preparation for trial”). 

She has taken the law into her own hands.

The third factor concerning prejudice to the defendant

weighs in favor of dismissal. Defendants’ interests in an

expeditious trial and in minimizing their litigation expenses

have been harmed by Plaintiff’s misconduct. The time to complete

expert discovery expired on March 3, 2006, and other deadlines

previously set for pretrial statements, the pretrial conference,

and the trial date are now impossible to meet. Defendants have

been required to file numerous motions to enforce the court’s

discovery orders and to recoup expenses incurred because of

Plaintiff’s disobedience.

The fourth factor, the public policy in favor of disposing

cases on their merits, always weighs against dismissal. This

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policy “is particularly important in civil rights cases.” 

Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399. This factor weighs against

dismissal.

The fifth factor requires the court to consider the

availability of less drastic sanctions. In deciding whether a

district court has properly considered less drastic sanctions,

the Ninth Circuit determines whether the court “(1) explicitly

discussed the alternative of lesser sanctions and explained why

it would be inappropriate; (2) implemented lesser sanctions

before ordering the case dismissed; and (3) warned the offending

party of the possibility of dismissal.” Computer Task Group,

Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The court has already issued monetary sanctions against

Plaintiff on two separate occasions for failing to obey the order

requiring her to undergo a mental examination. Nevertheless,

Plaintiff has continued to disobey the court. That the reason

for Plaintiff’s latest disobedience was her desire to appeal does

not change the fact that she has twice refused to comply with

explicit orders. At a minimum, each failure to comply after the

order of April 19, 2006, demonstrates the ineffectiveness of

money sanctions. The only alternative to dismissal that

Plaintiff has suggested is to order no sanctions whatsoever,

which does not adequately punish Plaintiff or ensure compliance

with future orders. The Magistrate Judge’s June 6, 2006, order

explicitly warned Plaintiff that her failure to comply with the

new discovery order could result in dismissal of the action. 

(Doc. 107 at 11:27-12:12.)

Plaintiff argues in disregard of indisputable law that

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Plaintiff also argues that a dismissal with prejudice 3

under Rule 41(b) is unjust because it would have a res judicata

effect on her civil harassment proceedings in Fresno County

Superior Court. It appears that this concern could be cured by

dismissing the action without prejudice under Rule 37(b). See

O’Neill v. AGWI Lines, 74 F.3d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1996) (dismissing

action without prejudice based on failure to comply with

discovery orders). 

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dismissal is inappropriate because she is not, herself,

responsible for the failures to comply with the orders. As the 3

Supreme Court has ruled:

There is certainly no merit to the contention

that dismissal of petitioner’s claim because

of his counsel’s unexcused conduct imposes an

unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner

voluntarily chose this attorney as his

representative in the action, and he cannot

now avoid the consequences of the acts or

omissions of this freely selected agent.

Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. (Link), 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962). 

Nevertheless, some courts have expressed reluctance to penalize a

party for its attorney’s conduct. See, e.g., Coleman v. Am. Red

Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has

recognized that sanctions on a party based on counsel’s conduct

are permissible. Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d

1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34); see

also Chism, 637 F.2d at 1332 (declining, citing Link, to consider

whether sanction fell too harshly on the party for attorney’s

misconduct).

It appears that Plaintiff’s failures to comply with the

court’s orders are attributable to her counsel. The examination

of December 2, 2005, did not go forward, even though Plaintiff

was present, because Plaintiff’s counsel insisted on attending. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel further admits that he did not communicate

the court’s order of April 19, 2006, to Plaintiff until after the

hearing regarding sanctions on June 2, 2006. Finally,

Plaintiff’s counsel did not inform Plaintiff that the court had

ordered her to attend an examination on June 6, 2006, until one

month after the examination date. 

Because Plaintiff’s counsel is to blame for her failures to

comply with the orders, the sanction of dismissal in this case

falls too heavily on Plaintiff. Moreover, the court is hopeful

that this litigation can now proceed to its conclusion in an

expedient fashion. Plaintiff and her counsel are advised,

however, that the court will not tolerate any further failure to

comply with the orders of this court. Any such failure will

result in dismissal of the action.

Defendants have incurred attorney fees in the amount of

$980.00 preparing this motion. (Doc. 116, Camarena Decl. ¶ 4.) 

Dr. Seymour incurred $200.00 of costs in reserving his calendar

of June 9, 2006, for the IME that Plaintiff failed to attend. 

(Doc. 116, Seymour Decl. ¶ 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s counsel

is sanctioned in the amount of $1,180.00 for causing Plaintiff to

fail to attend the IME on June 9, 2006. Counsel shall pay this

sum from his personal funds and shall not seek contribution from

Plaintiff. See FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1382 (5th Cir.

1994) (requiring attorney to pay monetary sanction where he was

responsible for the party’s failure to comply with a discovery

order).

Plaintiff is also directed to pay within 20 days the other

sanctions that have been ordered in this case: the $768.00

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awarded in the order of June 6, 2006 and the $2,500.00 ordered on

February 23, 2006. As the court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel

is responsible for incurring these sanctions, he shall pay these

sums solely from his personal funds. See FDIC, 20 F.3d at 1382. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above: 

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff’s counsel is assessed sanctions in the amount

of $1,180.00 for causing Plaintiff to fail to attend

the IME on June 9, 2006;

3. Within 20 days of the issuance of this order,

Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to pay Defendants

$4,448.00, representing all sanctions ordered against

him in this action to date;

4. Plaintiff is directed to attend a full-day IME with Dr.

Seymour on August 23, 2006, or on August 25, 2006;

5. Within 48 hours of the issuance of this order,

Plaintiff shall notify Defendants and Dr. Seymour as to

which of those days she will attend the IME;

6. The IME will be audio-recorded;

7. No third party, including counsel, may attend the IME;

8. Plaintiff’s counsel shall cause a copy of this order to

be delivered to Plaintiff Holly Louen within seven (7)

days of the issuance of this order; and

9. ANY FURTHER FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL

TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF THIS COURT WILL RESULT IN

DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. 

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SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 10, 2006 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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