Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00452/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00452-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Arizona Department of Corrections’ records indicate Valdillez was released from confinement

on May 6, 2010. The court presumes he is now serving his period of community supervision. See

(Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit I); Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-603(I). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ephriam Valdillez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV-09-452-TUC-DCB (GEE)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On August 19, 2009, Ephriam Valdillez, an inmate1

 confined at the Arizona State Prison

Complex in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28,

United States Code, Section 2254. (Petition.) Valdillez claims (I) his counsel was ineffective,

(II) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and (III) he has established a sufficient basis

for habeas relief. Id. Before the court are the petition and the respondents’ answer. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the District

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order denying the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus. Valdillez’ claims are procedurally defaulted.

Case 4:09-cv-00452-DCB Document 18 Filed 06/29/10 Page 1 of 5
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Summary of the Case

On August 31, 2007, Valdillez pleaded guilty to attempted sale of a narcotic drug.

(Respondents’ answer, p. 2.) He was initially sentenced to a 2-year term of probation, but after

violating his probation three times, the trial court eventually sentenced him to a 2.5-year term

of imprisonment. Id.

 The trial court appointed post-conviction relief counsel, but counsel filed notice with the

court that he could find no meritorious issues to raise. Id. The trial court then gave Valdillez

a 45-day deadline within which to file a petition pro per. Id. When Valdillez failed to file a

timely petition, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction relief proceedings on July 17, 2009.

Id.

On August 19, 2009, Valdillez filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. (Petition.) He claims (I) his counsel

was ineffective, (II) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and (III) he has established

a sufficient basis for habeas relief. Id. The respondents filed an answer on January 25, 2010.

They concede the petition is timely, but they argue Valdillez’ claims are procedurally defaulted.

Valdillez did not file a reply.

The respondents are correct. Valdillez’ claims are procedurally defaulted.

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to prisoners in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If the petitioner is in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, the writ shall not be granted unless prior

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

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A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if the “state court confronted a set

of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and

nevertheless arrived at a result different from Supreme Court precedent.” Vlasak v. Superior

Court of California ex rel. County of Los Angeles, 329 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003). A

decision is an “unreasonable application” if “the state court identified the correct legal

principles, but applied those principles to the facts of her case in a way that was not only

incorrect or clearly erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.” Id.

Federal review is limited to those issues that have already been fully presented to the

state court. This so-called “exhaustion rule” reads in pertinent part as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that – (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This rule permits the states “the initial opportunity to pass upon and

correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275

(1971). 

 If the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment imposed by the State of Arizona,

he must present his claims to the state appellate court for review. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). If state remedies have not been

exhausted, the petition may not be granted and should ordinarily be dismissed. See Johnson v.

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). In the alternative, the court has the authority to deny

on the merits rather than dismiss for failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

A claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the state court declined to address the issue on the

merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear the

state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. A claim

that is procedurally defaulted must be denied unless the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for

the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate

that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Boyd v.

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Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998). To establish cause, the petitioner must show

that some external impediment prevented him from constructing or raising the claim. Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). The prejudice prong requires the petitioner to show

the alleged errors “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting [the entire

proceeding] with error of constitutional dimension.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494

(1986).

None of Valdillez’ claims were presented to the court of appeals. Accordingly, they

were not properly exhausted. (Respondents’ answer, p. 6.) Moreover, Valdillez cannot return

to state court and exhaust them now because he is precluded from raising them in a subsequent

Rule 32 petition. Id.; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, 32.4; Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. Denied, 538 U.S. 1053 (2003). His claims are procedurally defaulted. 

Valdillez did not file a reply arguing his procedural default should be excused for either

cause and prejudice or to avoid a miscarriage of justice. In his petition, he states generally that

he failed to present his issues to the court of appeals because of either “probation’s threats of

revocation” or because the issues were denied by the trial court. (Petition, pp. 6, 7, 8.) Neither

of these arguments is sufficient to establish cause for his default.

His reference to “probation’s threats of revocation” seems to be an argument as to why

his guilty plea was not voluntary. He does not explain, however, why he did not raise the

voluntariness issue before the trial court and the court of appeals. 

His reference to the trial court’s ruling (dismissing his Rule 32 proceeding) explains in

a procedural sense why he did not raise his issues before the appellate court – he failed to file

a petition before the trial court so he had no issues to appeal. It does not, however, explain what

external impediment prevented him from raising his issues in the first place. 

Valdillez has not established cause for his default. He makes no argument addressing

prejudice or miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, his claims must be denied as procedurally

defaulted.

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RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [doc. #1]

Valdillez’ claims are procedurally defaulted.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See U. S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 29th day of June, 2010.

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