Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02278/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02278-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alfred Copeland, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-02278-PHX-PGR

ORDER 

 The Court has before it the Report and Recommendation on Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 21), the Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. 22), and the Appendix to Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 27). The Court also has 

reviewed the entire record in this case. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will 

accept and adopt in part and reject in part the Report and Recommendation; will dismiss 

in part the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; and will refer this case to the Magistrate 

Judge for an evidentiary hearing. 

A. Equitable Tolling 

 Alfred Copeland objects to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) finding that 

his habeas petition was delinquent. Copeland does not contest the R&R finding that the 

one year state of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition ran in August 2005; that 

he was not entitled to statutory tolling; and that his Petition, filed November 7, 2013, was 

therefore over eight years delinquent. Rather, Copeland contends that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. 

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 To be entitled to equitable tolling, Copeland must establish both the existence of 

extraordinary circumstances, and that he pursued his rights diligently. See Ramirez v. 

Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). Copeland contends that he meets these 

requirements because he “has pursued redress by state and federal proceedings diligently 

after the appearance in 2009 of new evidence, i.e., the Affidavits recanting and refuting 

the testimonial evidence upon which the convictions for Counts 3, 5, 7 and 8, 11 

depended.” (Doc. 27 at 2.) The “affidavits” to which Copeland refers are actually 

notarized statements from D.P., L.P., and Bobby Copeland. (See Doc. 1 at 28; Doc. 1-1 

at 3-6.) 

 Assuming that the “appearance” of these statements constitutes extraordinary 

circumstances,1

 Copeland has not met his burden of demonstrating that he pursued his 

rights diligently. Copeland’s trial was held in 2002, and he has neither claimed, nor 

provided an explanation as to why, he was unable to previously obtain these statements 

dated June, July, and August 2009 (Doc. 15-5 at 116, 119-122), almost seven years after 

he was convicted. 

 Further, even if Copeland was unable to obtain these statements prior to 2009, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review of his claim on January 4, 2013 (see

Doc. 15-5 at 166), yet Copeland did not file his federal habeas petition until 

November 7, 2013, more than ten months later. Copeland contends that he needed this 

ten month period “to properly familiarize himself with the federal habeas laws applicable 

to his issues so as to properly present them in this court” and that “only today is he aware 

that the court may limit the habeas petition to be filed within 30 days of the final decision 

of the state court of last resort.” (Doc. 27 at 2.) Copeland’s unfamiliarity with the law 

does not, however, excuse his failure to promptly file his federal habeas petition. See 

 

1

 Although Copeland did not argue before the Magistrate Judge that the 

“appearance” of the notarized statements constitute extraordinary circumstances entitling 

him to equitable tolling, the Court will exercise its discretion to address the argument. 

See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court may decline 

to consider new arguments raised for the first time in Objections to Magistrate Judge's 

Report and Recommendation). 

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Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“pro se petitioner’s lack of 

legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable 

tolling”). 

 The Court finds the ten month delay between the state court’s decision and the 

filing of the federal habeas petition demonstrates a lack of diligence in pursuing his 

rights. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding lack of 

diligence where petitioner waited seven months after state court’s decision to return to 

federal court, noting that “thirty days is sufficient time for a petitioner to return to federal 

court following final action by the state courts”). Copeland is not, therefore, entitled to 

equitable tolling. 

B. Jurisdiction of State Trial Court 

 Copeland contends that his claim for relief based on lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction over 9 of the 11 indicted counts “should not be denied because an absence of 

jurisdiction” is cognizable in an action for federal habeas relief and renders the judgment 

against him “void and unenforceable.” (Doc. 27 at 2-3.) Copeland argues that ground 7 

of his petition, in which he claimed that the state trial court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because the indictment was invalid on its face, should survive any perceived 

procedural bar because lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. 

(Doc. 27 at 3.) Copeland also appears to argue that ground 3 (arguing that he was not in 

Arizona during the relevant time period) and ground 4 (that the statute of limitations had 

run prior to the date that he was prosecuted) of his petition also should survive any 

procedural bar because they also are “jurisdictional.” (See id.) 

 As the Magistrate Judge concluded, the mere assertion by Copeland that these 

claims are “jurisdictional” in nature does not avoid the requirement that the claims be 

properly exhausted and timely raised in a federal habeas petition. See Chapman v. Bradt, 

2015 WL 1211683, at *10-*11 (W.D.N.Y 2015) (finding that claim that indictment was 

jurisdictionally defective was procedurally defaulted and thus barred from review in 

federal habeas). Moreover, Copeland’s contention that he was not in Arizona during the 

relevant time raises a sufficiency of the evidence argument rather than a jurisdictional 

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argument, and his contention that the statute of limitations had run is not cognizable in 

federal habeas because it relies on requirements of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”). 

 Finally, even if Copeland’s defective indictment claims were not procedurally 

defaulted, the defects alleged by Copeland are not of the type that would deprive the state 

court of jurisdiction and thus are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Pyle v. Johnston, 

137 F.2d 869, 870 (9th Cir. 1943) (“if a court passing sentence had jurisdiction over the 

person of the defendant and over the offense which the indictment undertook to define, 

its judgment of conviction is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus proceedings 

on the ground that the indictment fails to charge an offense, unless the court was so 

completely without jurisdiction that its proceedings were void”); see also Evans v. Cain, 

577 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 2009) (sufficiency of state indictment not a matter for federal 

habeas relief unless indictment is so defective that convicting court had no jurisdiction); 

Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 821 (11th Cir. 1989) (same). 

 Copeland contends that Count 1 of the indictment was defective because it failed 

to list the element of causation. The Court disagrees and finds that Count 1 sufficiently 

set forth the charged offense by alleging that Copeland had “intentionally or knowingly 

engaged” in “direct or indirect touching, fondling, or manipulating of any part of the 

female breast” of L.P., “a minor under the age of fifteen years of age, in violation of 

A.R.S. §[] 13-1404 . . . .” See A.R.S. § 13-1404(A), (B) (“A person commits sexual 

abuse by intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with . . . any person 

who is under fifteen years of age if the sexual contact involves only the female breast.”); 

see also United States v. Zavala, 839 F.2d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 1988) (an indictment 

generally is sufficient if it tracks the language of the statute). 

 Copeland contends that Count 3 of the indictment was defective because it failed 

to allege that L.P. was under the age of 12 years. However, a review of the statute under 

which Copeland was tried and convicted in Count 3 demonstrates that the indictment 

sufficiently set forth the charged offense by alleging that Copeland “intentionally or 

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knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact” with L.P., “who was a 

minor under the age of fifteen years, (to-wit: vaginal penetration).” See A.R.S. § 13-

1405(A) (“A person commits sexual conduct with a minor by intentionally or knowingly 

engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person who is under 

eighteen years of age.”); A.R.S. § 13-1405(B) (“Sexual conduct with a minor who is 

under fifteen years of age is a class 2 felony and is punishable pursuant to § 13-705.”). 

The factor of “under twelve years of age” is a sentencing factor and did not need to be set 

forth in the indictment. See A.R.S. § 13-705(A) (“A person who is at least eighteen years 

of age and who is convicted of . . . sexual conduct with a minor who is twelve years of 

age or younger shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. . . .”); Almendarez–Torres v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (although indictment must plead all elements of 

a crime, it “need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found 

guilty of the charged crime”). 

 Copeland contends that Count 5 of the indictment was defective because it 

contained a time frame that was too broad. The Court disagrees and finds that 

Count 5 sufficiently set forth the time span of the offense by stating that “on or between 

the 2nd day of April, 1984, and the 2nd day of April, 1985,” Copeland “knowingly 

recorded a visual or print medium, (to wit: Polaroid photos) in which [T.B.], a minor 

under the age of fifteen, was engaged in sexual conduct.” See Dilworth v. Markle, 970 

F.Supp.2d 498, 508 (N.D.W.Va. 2013) (indictment sufficient that charged state prisoner 

“with sexually touching his stepdaughter on ten separate occasions in 2001”); Voymas v. 

Unger, 2011 WL 26700233, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (one year time span on sexual abuse 

charge was not unreasonable because victim was child). 

C. Actual Innocence 

 Copeland asserts “actual innocence” as a basis to avoid the procedural default of 

his claims and to overcome the habeas statute of limitations bar.2

 Specifically, Copeland 

 

2

 To the extent Copeland is seeking to make a freestanding claim of actual 

innocence, such a claim is not cognizable in this non-capital federal habeas case. See 

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contends (1) that he was not in Arizona during the time of some of the offenses on which 

he was convicted, (2) that some of the victims originally told the police that nothing 

criminal happened, and (3) that two of the victims now deny that the abuse of which he 

was convicted ever happened. (See Doc. 1 at 28; Doc. 1-1 at 3-6; see also Doc. 23, 24, 

26.) 

 To excuse procedural default or overcome the habeas statute of limitations bar 

based on a claim of actual innocence, a federal habeas petitioner has the burden of 

presenting new reliable evidence “of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free 

of non-harmless constitutional error.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 

(2013); see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995). “‘[T]enable actual-innocence 

gateway pleas are rare.’” Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928). A petitioner must “persuade the district court that, in 

light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. To determine 

 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (actual “innocence does not be itself provide a basis for relief” 

but is “instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his 

otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits”); In re Swearingen, 556 

F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The Fifth Circuit does not recognize freestanding claims 

of actual innocence on federal habeas review.”); Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 122 (3d 

Cir. 2004) (newly discovered evidence not grounds for federal habeas relief absent 

independent constitutional violation); Johnson v. Bett, 349 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 

2003) (“For claims based on newly discovered evidence to state a ground for federal 

habeas relief, they must relate to a constitutional violation independent of any claim of 

innocence.”); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2003) (“claims of actual 

innocence are not grounds for habeas relief even in a capital case”); David v. Hall, 318 

F.3d 343, 347-48 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The actual innocence rubric . . .has been firmly 

disallowed by the Supreme Court as an independent ground of habeas relief, save 

(possibly) in extraordinary circumstances in a capital case.”); Burton v. Dormire, 295 

F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have squarely rejected the notion that a prisoner 

may receive a writ simply because he claims he is innocent.”); LaFevers v. Gibson, 238 

F.3d 1263, 1265 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n assertion of actual innocence, although 

operating as a potential pathway for reaching otherwise defaulted constitutional claims, 

does not, standing alone, support the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.”). 

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whether a petitioner has met this burden, the Court must “‘assess how reasonable jurors 

would react to the overall, newly supplemented record,’ including all the evidence the 

petitioner now proffers.” Stewart, 757 F.3d at 938 (quoting Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 

929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011)). A petitioner must make the showing of actual innocence on 

each of the charges for which he seeks relief. See Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 

1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 The Magistrate Judge found that Copeland had not met his burden of 

demonstrating actual innocence. (See Doc. 21 at 10-18.) Copeland contends that it was 

premature and improper for the Magistrate Judge to dismiss the recantations of the 

witnesses’ trial testimony3

 as not credible or persuasive without conducting a hearing on 

the issue. (Doc. 21 at 3-4.) 

 1. Dates Copeland was purportedly not in Arizona 

 Copeland has submitted new evidence that indicates that he did not live in Arizona 

during the period of March 1979 to September 1984. Specifically, Copeland has 

submitted notarized statements from his daughter, D.P., and his brother, Bobby 

Copeland, stating that Copeland lived in Houston, Texas from March 1979 to September 

1984. (Doc. 1-1 at 5-6.) In Ground 3 of his petition, Copeland contends that, based on 

this new evidence, no reasonable juror could have found him guilty of Counts 7 and 8 of 

the indictment. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Count 5 of the indictment also appears to be implicated by 

this evidence and thus also will be discussed. 

 a. Count 5 – Photos of T.B. 

 Count 5 of the indictment charges that “on or between the 2nd day of April, 1984, 

 

3

 Copeland also refers to these witnesses’ pretrial statements in connection with 

his actual innocence argument. Although the pretrial statements can be considered in 

conjunction with all of the other evidence, including the newly-submitted evidence, in 

determining whether Copeland has met his burden of demonstrating actual innocence, the 

pretrial statements to which he refers are not new evidence and thus those statements 

cannot form the basis for a showing of actual innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 

(requiring petitioner to show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 

have convicted him in light of the new evidence” (emphasis added).) 

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and the 2nd day of April, 1985,” Copeland “knowingly recorded a visual or print medium, 

(to wit: Polaroid photos) in which [T.B.], a minor under the age of fifteen, was engaged 

in sexual conduct.” (Doc. 1 at 18.) At trial, T.B. testified that Copeland took sexually 

explicit photos of her posing nude for him when they were living in “Phoenix, on Vernon 

Avenue,” when she was either “12 or 13” years old. (Doc. 15-4 at 4.) She remembered 

how old she was because she had gone through puberty and it “was at least a year and a 

half before [she] moved out of his house.” Id. T.B. testified that she was born in 1974 

(Doc. 15-3 at 149), and that at the time of trial in September 2002, she was 28 years old 

(Doc. 15-3 at 147).4

 Based on this testimony, the photos of T.B. were taken by Copeland 

in either 1986 or 1987. This falls outside of the dates the newly submitted evidence 

indicates that Copeland was living in Texas. Accordingly, the newly submitted evidence 

does not establish Copeland’s actual innocence of the conduct alleged in Count 5.5

 b. Counts 7 and 8 – Sexual Conduct with C.U. 

 Counts 7 and 8 of the indictment charge that “on or between the 9th day of July, 

1983 and the 8th day of July, 1984,” Copeland engaged in sexual conduct with C.U. 

without her consent by fondling her breasts (Count 7 of the indictment) and fondling her 

genitals (Count 8 o the indictment). (Doc. 1 at 19.) At trial, C.U. testified that she was 

born on July 9, 1966, and that at the time of trial (September 2002), she was 36 years old 

4

 Although the Magistrate Judge stated that T.B.’s testimony was contradictory 

about her present age because she had testified that she was born in 1974, “making her 38 

years old” at the time of the trial (see Doc. 21 at 11), this statement was based on an 

apparent miscalculation by the Magistrate Judge. 

5

 Although T.B. testified the offense occurred on dates that are outside the dates 

specified in the indictment, this variance in dates is not fatal to the conviction. See 

Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1964) (variance not material where 

“allegation and proof substantially correspond, where the variance is not of the character 

that could have misled the defendant at the trial, and where the variance is not such as to 

deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same 

offense”); see also United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d 407, 414 (7th Cir. 1990) 

(evidence was sufficient for marijuana possession conviction despite variance between 

dates alleged in indictment and proved at trial). Further, the variance in dates does not 

establish Copeland’s actual innocence of the offense. 

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(Doc. 15-3 at 66-67.) C.U. testified that her son was born on August 1, 1983, when she 

was 17 years old. (Id. at 75.) She testified that she was living with Copeland on Buckeye 

Road between the time that her son was born and he turned one year old, and that during 

that time period, “[b]efore I turned 18,” Copeland “grabbed my chest and he grabbed my 

vagina over my clothes” after she refused to have sex with him. (Id.at 75-77.) Thus, 

based on C.U.’s testimony at trial regarding her age and her son’s age, the conduct 

charged in Counts 7 and 8 occurred sometime between August 1, 1983, and July 9, 1984, 

on Buckeye Road in Arizona. According to the newly submitted statement, Copeland 

resided in Texas until September 1984. 

 However, C.U. also testified about uncharged incidents that occurred at 

Copeland’s home in Houston, Texas, when she was 13 or 14 years old (Doc. 15-3 at 74-

75, 76-78, 80), which would have been in 1979 or 1980. This is consistent with the dates 

set forth in the newly submitted evidence regarding when Copeland resided in Texas. 

 Further, C.U. was unequivocal in her trial testimony that the charged conduct 

occurred at the home on Buckeye Road, Arizona. Although she testified that it occurred 

when she was still 17 years old, she testified at a pretrial hearing that the charged conduct 

occurred in “September of ‘84” when “we moved from Houston to Phoenix, Arizona” 

and while she was staying with Copeland for a period of “about two months.” (Doc. 15-1 

at 44-46.) Although C.U.’s testimony is somewhat inconsistent, a reasonable juror could 

believe that Copeland was in Texas until September 1984, and still believe C.U.’s 

testimony that the charged conduct of Counts 7 and 8 occurred while Copeland was 

living in Arizona. As the Magistrate Judge found, “[a] reasonable juror could simply 

conclude that C.U. was mistaken about her age and the age of her son at the time of the 

events,” but that that C.U. was correct that the events occurred in Arizona, at the Buckeye 

home, and that they occurred in or after September 1984, after Copeland had moved to 

Arizona from Texas. The slight variance in dates is particularly understandable given 

that the incident had occurred 18 years prior to the date C.U. testified at trial. 

 Finally, as the Magistrate Judge noted, the charges in Counts 7 and 8 were for 

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sexual abuse, and did not allege or require that C.U. was a minor at the time of the 

offense. Thus, that C.U. may have been 18 years old rather than 17 at the time of the 

conduct does not demonstrate actual innocence of the conduct alleged in Counts 7 and 8 

of the indictment. 

 2. Recantation by D.P. 

 Count 6 of the indictment charges Copeland with incest involving D.P., his 

daughter, occurring “on or between the 1st day of January, 2001and the 24th day of 

August, 2001.” (Doc. 1 at 18-19.) In Ground 1 of his habeas petition, Copeland has 

raised claims related to his conviction of Count 6. Specifically, he alleges that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and present exculpatory evidence at trial, and 

that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he was operating under an actual 

conflict of interest in that his counsel’s firm represented both himself and D.P. (Doc. 1 at 

6.) 

 Copeland has, in support of his claim of actual innocence of Count 6, submitted a 

notarized statement from D.P. stating that the charge of incest involving her “is false”: 

My father Alfred Copeland was charged with and convicted of incest with me. 

That charge is false. When I refused to accuse my father, the detective called me a 

liar. That is contained in the PPD report. After that I was arrested on a Class 6 

Felony for Failure to Protect and Hampering an Investigation. My daughter was 

taken from me and placed with AZ CPS. I was held in the Maricopa County Jail 

for 3 months. The D.A. in the case Jeanine Sorrentino told me that if I didn’t say 

what they wanted me to, she would see to it that I got 25 year[s] in ASPC. Not 

knowing any better I gave in. 

(Doc. 1 at 28.) 

 At trial, D.P. testified that she lived with Copeland pretty much her entire life, and 

that her father’s sexual conduct with her began when she was around five years old; that 

he took her virginity in about 1976, when she was around 13 years old; and that the last 

time she had sex with her father was sometime in the summer of 2001, about a month 

before he was arrested. (Doc. 15-3 at 98-100, 114-22.) 

 D.P. also testified that when she first started talking to detectives in the summer of 

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2001, she initially was not cooperative with them and was less than forthcoming with 

what had happened, explaining that it was because she “felt dirty,” because she “figured 

everybody else would consider all of it a pretty nasty thing too,” and because of the 

problems that she experienced with not being believed when she and her sister had 

previously (in 1975) reported her father’s sexual misconduct to the police. (See Doc. 15-

3 at 123-25.) D.P. testified that she decided to tell the police in 2001 what had been 

going on with her father after she “found out the things about my daughter [L.P.], the 

medical exams and stuff. I figured if they was going to listen and take care of it, then 

let’s get it over with.” (Id. at 124-25.) She testified that she then “came clean about my 

recent sexual behavior with my father.” (Id. at 125.) 

 D.P. testified that, as a result of her initial uncooperativeness and failure to report 

the conduct, and then her subsequent disclosure of what had happened, she was arrested 

and was being prosecuted for obstruction of justice. (Id. at 126.) When asked why, if she 

was being prosecuted for obstruction of justice, she was there testifying against her 

father, D.P. responded, “Because my father has been getting away with this for far too 

long and he’s ruined too many lives.” (Id. at 127.) D.P. testified that she wanted him put 

“behind bars” to “pay for what he [has] done” and that she would “like to see him put 

away for as long as possible.” (Id. at 134.) 

 D.P. denied that she was testifying to help herself out in her own case, and stated 

that instead she was testifying “[b]ecause he’s been doing this for about 30 years.” (Id. at 

137.) D.P. further explained that she is the one who decided to come down to talk to the 

detectives again after her initial denial and to come clean, and that she did this before she 

was arrested and before she was charged with obstruction of justice. (Id. at 138-39.) 

She “called them and talked to them about coming down and talking to them,” and that 

when she came down, she told them “about the on-going sexual abuse that [her] father 

perpetrated against” her. (Id.) She further testified that although her daughter, L.P., was 

taken from her in August 2001, a guardian ad litem was appointed for L.P. by the State of 

Arizona; that it was the guardian ad litem and not the prosecutor who made the decision 

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that L.P. should return home to D.P.; and that, to her knowledge, the prosecutor did not 

have anything to do with the timing of L.P. being returned to D.P. (Id. at 140-41.) 

 In addition to D.P.’s testimony, there was testimony by other witnesses about the 

longstanding incestuous relationship between Copeland and D.P. Victim C.G. testified 

that on a family trip she observed Copeland have D.P. perform oral sex on him; that 

Copeland had D.P. and C.G. fondle each other in his presence; and that Copeland then 

had intercourse with both C.G. and D.P. (Doc. 15-3 at 33-35.) Victim C.U. testified that 

she observed Copeland fondling D.P.’s vagina and also that Copeland told C.U. he 

“would consistently have sex with D.P.” (Id. at 77-78). Victim T.B. testified she 

observed Copeland and D.P. engage in sexual acts on two separate occasions (id. at 156-

57); that D.P. told T.B. that she had previously turned Copeland in for abuse “and it 

didn’t do any good” (id. at 158); and that Copeland told T.B. “that he had gotten [D.P.] 

pregnant and made her have an abortion when she was 19” (Doc. 15-4 at 16). Victim 

K.C. testified that D.P. told him that Copeland had molested her since she was about 12, 

and had molested all the girls in the family. (Doc. 15-2 at 92.) 

 There is no doubt that the evidence at trial regarding Copeland’s acts of incest 

with D.P. over the years was strong and extensive. However, Copeland was convicted of 

incest on or between the periods of January 1, 2001, and August 24, 2001. The only 

evidence regarding incest during that particular time came from D.P. 

 Although D.P’s “‘later recantation of [her] trial testimony does not render [her] 

earlier testimony false,’” Jones, 763 F.3d at 1248 (citations omitted), the Court will, at 

this point, assume the reasons given by D.P. for her trial testimony are true, see Stewart, 

757 F.3d at 942 (“newly-presented evidence giving rise to a Schlup gateway innocence 

claim may require a credibility assessment”; to determine whether an evidentiary hearing 

is needed, district court may assume “newly-presented evidence was credible and 

thoroughly evaluate[] his actual innocence claim in light of the newly-presented 

evidence”). With this assumption of truth, D.P.’s newly-submitted statement causes the 

Court to lose confidence in Copeland’s conviction of incest with D.P. during the 2001 

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time period. Specifically, it is unlikely that any reasonable juror would have convicted 

Copeland of Count 6 if the juror had testimony from D.P., and found such testimony 

credible, that: (1) the charge of incest in 2001 was false; (2) that when D.P. refused to 

accuse her father of the incest in 2001, she was called a liar by law enforcement and was 

arrested and charged with a felony for failing to protect her daughter and hampering an 

investigation; (3) that her daughter was taken from her and placed with child protective 

services; (4) that D.P. was held in the Maricopa County Jail for a period of three months; 

(5) that the prosecutor threatened that D.P. would get 25 years in prison if she didn’t 

testify the way the state wanted her to; and (6) that D.P. gave in and testified at trial the 

way the State wanted her to. 

 The Court will grant an evidentiary hearing at which Copeland will have the 

opportunity to present evidence regarding his actual innocence of Count 6 for the purpose 

of seeking to excuse his procedural default and overcome the statute of limitations bar on 

those portions of Ground 1 of his habeas petition related to Count 6. See Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327; 341-42; Lee, 653 F.3d at 932. 

 3. Recantation by L.P. 

 Count 3 of the indictment charges that Copeland “intentionally or knowingly 

engaged in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with [L.P.], who was a minor under 

the age of fifteen years, (to wit: vaginal penetration).” (Doc. 1 at 17-18.) In Ground 2 of 

his petition, Copeland raises claims related to his conviction of Count 3. Specifically, he 

alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure and present statements 

from L.P. that the conduct alleged in Count 3 never occurred, and failing to investigate 

and present medical evidence, including medical records, that L.P. had been “treated in 

August 2001 for a severe yeast infection, the itching and scratching of which was the 

likely source of the hymenal abnormality.”6

 (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

 

6

 Copeland also contends that trial counsel failed to present available 

“impeachment evidence against the experts” (Doc. 1 at 7), but does not specify the 

evidence to which he is referring. 

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 Copeland has, in support of his claim of actual innocence of Count 3, submitted a 

notarized statement from L.P. stating that the sexual intercourse7

 with Copeland “never 

happened”: 

In 2002, my grandfather, Alfred Copeland was accused of having sexual 

intercourse with me. That never happened. I am still virgin. The D.A. based this 

accusation on the fact that my hymen is missing. This was caused by a severe 

yeast infection. I scratched myself until I was bleeding. My mother took me to an 

emergency clinic in Aug 2001 for treatment. During the course of all these things 

I was taken away from my family. I was alone and scared and didn’t know what 

to do. Now I want to correct this injustice of a lifetime sentence on my 

grandfather for something that did not happen. 

(Doc. 1-1 at 3.) 

 At the time of the charged sexual conduct, L.P. was 8 years old; at the time of 

trial, she was 9 years old. At trial, she testified that Copeland “touched me . . . on my 

private,” and explained, through the use of a stuffed bear, that the “private” was the part 

“right here in between our legs.” (Doc. 15-2 at 135-36.) She further explained that the 

private part between a girl’s legs is called “Fish” and that Copeland “touched” her on her 

private part between her legs; however, she also testified that she did not remember that 

because she was asleep but that someone else told her it happened. (Id. at 136-38.) L.P. 

testified that, other than the time she was asleep, she did not remember whether Copeland 

ever touched her on her private. (Id. at 139.) 

 When asked whether anything ever happened to the inside of her private, L.P. 

testified, “I don’t remember.” (Id. at 140.) L.P. also testified that when she thinks about 

her grandpa (Copeland) “I feel like he’s going to hurt me,” but when asked why she felt 

like he was going to hurt her, she responded, “I don’t know,” and when asked whether he 

had hurt her before, she again responded, “I don’t know.” (Id. at 143.) L.P. was then 

asked whether she was afraid of her other family members – her mother, father, brothers, 

 

7

 “Sexual intercourse” is defined as meaning “penetration into the penis, vulva or 

anus by any part of the body or by any object or masturbatory contact with the penis or 

vulva.” A.R.S. § 13-1401(3). Count 3 of the indictment charged “sexual intercourse” 

through vaginal penetration. 

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aunts, uncles - and she testified “no” as to all of them, and also testified “no” as to 

whether any of them ever put their hands in or on her private or ever put anything in her 

private. (Id. at 144-45.) However, when again asked about her grandpa (Copeland), L.P. 

testified “Yes,” she was afraid of him, and then responded “I don’t know,” to each of the 

questions of whether he had ever done anything to hurt her, whether he ever put his hands 

in her private, and whether he ever put anything in her private. (Id. at 146-47.) 

 Wendy Dutton, a forensic interviewer with the Child Abuse Assessment Center at 

St. Joseph’s Hospital, testified at trial that she interviewed L.P. in March 2002. This 

interview was videotaped and played for the jury. During this interview, “L.P. described 

an incident when she was abruptly awakened by Copeland touching her on her genitals. 

L.P. told Dutton during the interview that Copeland had touched her under her clothes 

and that it hurt.”8

 (Doc. 15-5 at 7-8.) 

 Dr. Catherine Coffman, a pediatrician, testified that she examined L.P. in August 

2001, when L.P. was eight years old. (Doc. 15-3 at 7.) Dr. Coffman testified that in her 

opinion, L.P.’s hymen exam was “abnormal.” “I didn’t see any acute trauma. I didn’t 

see any trauma to the labia or anything else. But what I saw was very little hymenal 

tissue.” (Id. at 13.) L.P.’s hymen, “there wasn’t very much of it. . . . It was narrow. . . .” 

(Id. at 14.) “What I saw in L.P., was a very, narrow hymenal – there was hymenal tissue 

here, very narrow, and then there, there was – I didn’t see any hymen really. It was kind 

of flush with the vaginal wall.” (Id.) When asked where, in terms of the face of a clock, 

was the absence of hymen on L.P., Dr. Coffman testified that it was absent “from about 

2:00 to 4:00” and that “from about 4:00 around to 10:00, it was very narrow, but it was 

still present.” (Id.) She explained that she had done thousands of these types of exams 

and she knows “when kids’ hymens are narrower than they should be” and that L.P’s was 

narrower that it should have been. (Id. at 15.) Dr. Coffman opined that L.P’s hymen was 

8

 The videotape was admitted as State’s Exhibit 11 at trial. (See Doc. 15-2 at 177.) 

Although this videotape has not been submitted to this Court, the Court takes as true the 

summary of the video by the Maricopa County Superior Court (see Doc. 15-5 at 7-8), 

which Copeland has not indicated is inaccurate. 

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“not a normal variant, that this is a post-traumatic finding.” (Id. at 16.) 

 Although Dr. Coffman could not really say for sure whether the trauma to cause 

this type of injury would have been a one-time thing or a repeated event, her sense was 

that it “probably would have been repeated . . . because of the complete area of the 

hymen that was abnormal, just not one focal area, but a large – most of it was abnormal.” 

(Id. at 16.) When asked whether she was able to tell what caused the injury, she 

responded: “Other than something penetrating through the hymen, I can’t say what” and 

that she thought it would have been painful. (Id.) When asked whether with this type of 

injury, it was likely that something actually penetrated the vaginal canal, Dr. Coffman 

responded, “Yes.” (Id. at 17.) 

 When asked whether L.P. could have caused this injury by herself by putting 

something inside herself, Dr. Coffman explained, 

Usually the hymen, itself, is sensitive in a painful way. And I compare it to 

touching your eyeball, it hurts, and people don’t do it. 

 The hymen in little girls is like that. I say that because I have made the 

mistake of touching it with a Q-tip on several occasions. I know the response I 

got. I don’t think most children self-injure or do things that hurt themselves. And 

if she were to touch her hymen in particular, she would have to injure it. It would 

be very painful. 

(Id. at 19-20.) Dr. Coffman opined that the injury to L.P.’s hymen is “consistent with the 

history of abuse” that was provided to her about L.P. (Id. at 20.) 

 Detective Barker, a child abuse investigator who interviewed L.P. during the 

pretrial investigation, testified regarding the nature of relationships between children and 

their abusers, the resulting reticence of the child to accuse the abuser, and the reaction of 

abused children when the abuse is accidentally disclosed (e.g., disclosed by another 

person who has observed the abuse). (See Doc. 15-2 at 30-32.) 

 L.P.’s older brother, K.C., testified that he had observed Copeland fondling L.P.’s 

breast and genitals (the conduct in Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment) while L.P. was 

asleep on the couch next to Copeland. (Doc. 15-2 at 95-99.) He also testified that just a 

few weeks prior to the date Copeland was arrested, the family did not think that L.P. had 

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come home from school, so they went out and started looking for her. (Id. at 102.) She 

was missing for about an hour and a half, and they could not find her. (Id.) K.C. finally 

thought to check in his grandpa’s (Copeland’s) bedroom to see if L.P. was in there, and 

K.C. went and banged on the bedroom door three or four times, calling out Copeland’s 

name about three times. (Id. at 102-04.) At first there wasn’t an answer, but then 

Copeland finally opened the door about five minutes later, and asked what K.C. wanted. 

(Id. at 103-04.) K.C. saw L.P. lying on the bed on her back, staring at the ceiling. (Id. at 

104-05.) “She just seemed like she was in a shock mode,” “[j]ust kind of laying perfectly 

still, just kind of staring at the ceiling.” (Id. at 105.) She didn’t move after the door was 

opened until K.C. told her to get up and come out of there, which she did. (Id.) 

 C.U., another victim, also testified about the incident when L.P. went missing. 

C.U. testified that the family thought L.P. had come home from school but then she was 

missing and she and other family members went looking for her through the 

neighborhood. (Doc. 15-3 at 83-84.) They searched for L.P. for two to two and a half 

hours, but no one had thought to check Copeland’s bedroom. (Id. at 84.) However, 

L.P.’s older brother, K.C., finally started knocking on Copeland’s door. (Id.at 85.) After 

at least five minutes, Copeland came to the door and asked, “What do you want?” (Id.) 

C.U. testified that she could see into the room, and saw L.P. laying on the bed on her 

back and Copeland in his underwear and a t-shirt. (Id. at 86.) L.P. was dressed and 

laying “perfectly still, scared,” looking up at the ceiling with her arms down by her side. 

(Id. at 86-87.) 

 There was extensive and strong evidence at trial of Copeland’s sexual misconduct 

with numerous victims over a period of approximately thirty years. The evidence 

regarding the misconduct with L.P. charged in Count 3 of the indictment was, however, 

more limited. Assuming the newly-submitted statement from L.P. is true, this statement 

causes the Court to lose confidence in Copeland’s conviction of sexual intercourse with 

L.P. Specifically, it is unlikely that any reasonable juror would have convicted Copeland 

of sexual intercourse with L.P. if they had the additional testimony from L.P., and found 

such testimony credible, that: (1) L.P. denied that Copeland had sexual intercourse with 

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her; (2) that L.P.’s hymen was missing due to a severe yeast infection where she 

scratched herself until she bled and resulted in her being taken to an emergency clinic; 

and (3) that L.P. is still a virgin.9

 The Court will grant an evidentiary hearing at which Copeland will have the 

opportunity to present evidence regarding his actual innocence of Count 3 for the purpose 

of seeking to excuse his procedural default and overcome the statute of limitations bar on 

Ground 2 of his habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel related to his 

conviction on Count 3. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; 341-42; Lee, 653 F.3d at 932. 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 

21) is accepted and adopted in part and rejected in part as follows: 

 The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and 

recommendations, as modified and supplemented by this Order, as to Grounds 3, 

4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 1). 

 The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and 

recommendations, as modified and supplemented by this Order, as to Ground 1 of 

the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, except to the extent that Ground 1 raises 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to Count 6 of the indictment. 

 The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and 

recommendations, as modified and supplemented by this Order, as to Ground 2 of 

the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, except to the extent that Ground 2 raises 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to Count 3 of the indictment 

 The Court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Petitioner 

has not established actual innocence of Count 3 and Count 6 of the indictment 

 

9

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the . . . vulva . . . by any part of the body or by any object or masturbatory contact with 

the penis or vulva.” A.R.S. § 13-1401(3). Thus, “sexual intercourse” under the statute 

does not necessarily foreclose L.P. still being a “virgin.” 

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without the necessity of holding an evidentiary hearing. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ground 1 of the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED except to the extent Ground 

1 raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to Count 6 of the indictment. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ground 2 of the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED except to the extent Ground 

2 raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to Count 3 of the indictment. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grounds 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Petition Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) are DISMISSED. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ground 1 claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel related to Count 6 of the indictment, and Ground 2 claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel related to Count 3 of the indictment, are referred back to the 

Magistrate Judge for additional proceedings consistent with this Order, including the 

holding of an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claims of actual innocence on Count 3 

and Count 6, and any other proceedings as deemed necessary and appropriate. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge shall appoint counsel to 

represent Petitioner if he qualifies for such appointment under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. See 

Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

 Dated this 29th day of June, 2015. 

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