Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00418/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00418-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Warren N. Richards, IV, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Holsum Bakery, Inc.; Flower Foods, Inc.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV09-00418-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Defendants, Holsum Bakery, Inc., and Flower Foods, Inc., have filed a Motion For

Disqualification of Plaintiff’s Counsel for Improper Ex Parte Communication in Violation

of Ethical Rule 4.2. (Dkt. #42). Because Defendants’ motion prays that Plaintiff’s counsel

be removed from this case, the Court must consider the instant motion before resolving

Plaintiff’s outstanding Motion to Remand to State Court. (Dkt. #16) and Motion for an

Evidentiary Hearing (Dkt. #47). 

I. BACKGROUND

On February 9. 2009, Plaintiff Warren N. Richards, IV, filed suit against Defendants

in Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, alleging breach of contract and seeking

recovery of back salary and healthcare benefits. (Dkt. #1, p.1) On March 02, 2009,

Defendants’ filed their Joint Notice of Removal, invoking this Court’s federal-question

jurisdiction arguing that Plaintiff based his claim on Holsum’s 2007 employee severanceCase 2:09-cv-00418-GMS Document 49 Filed 11/05/09 Page 1 of 13
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benefit plan (the 2007 Plan) governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA) Id. at 2, 4–7. Defendants filed their respective answers to Plaintiff’s complaint on

March 03, 2009. (Dkt. #s 5 & 6)

Plaintiff filed his Motion to Remand to a State Court on April 01, 2009, asserting that

his claim was not predicated on the 2007 Plan, but on a retention-benefits memorandum (the

Memo) sent to him by Holsum Bakery’s President Ed Eisele. (Dkt. #16, p.1–2). Plaintiff

argues remand is necessary because the Memo is not an ERISA Plan, but a freestanding

contract, and, as a result, his claim does not concern federal law. Id. at 3. Two days before

Plaintiff’s remand motion was due, on March 30, 2009, Defendants filed a Supplement to

Joint Notice of Removal, informing the Court that the 2007 Plan had actually been amended

by the First Amendment to the Plan (the Amendment), but the Amendment was inadvertently

not included in its original removal filing. (Dkt. #15, p.1). In response, on April 01, 2009,

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ supplement motion, arguing, pursuant to 28

U.S.C §1446, that it was untimely. (Dkt. #17). On April 02, 2009, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike and vacated the Rule 16 scheduling conference pending its

decision on the Motion to Remand. (Dkt. #20).

Despite the Court’s Order, Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand

(Dkt. #21) and Plaintiff’s Reply (Dkt. #27) devote considerable time discussing the

Amendment. Defendants’ argued that the Memo merely summarized the retention-benefits

program set forth in the Amendment, (Dkt. #21, p.14), while Plaintiff argued that Holsum

Bakery never implemented the Amendment. (Dkt. #27, p.2–7). The controversy over the

Amendment did not dissipate, and on May 13, 2009, Defendants filed a Motion for Protective

Order and/or Motion to Quash. (Dkt. #32). The Motion stemmed from Plaintiff’s attempts,

over the objection of Defendants, to depose Holsum employees Nichole de Parra, Ed Eiselle,

and Frank Coffey concerning the Amendment. Id. at 2–4. On June 02, 2009, this Court

granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion, allowing limited written discovery

concerning subject matter jurisdiction (i.e. the Amendment) to be completed within twenty

days of the Court’s order, with any motions for an evidentiary hearing to be filed no later

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than ten days after that. (Dkt. #39). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Evidentiary Hearing on July

7, 2009. (Dkt. #47).

II. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

On June 12, 2009, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Disqualify Counsel. (Dkt.

#42). In their motion, Defendants ask this Court to disqualify the law firm of Baird,

Williams, & Greer L.L.P., for named partner Daryl Williams’ violation of Arizona Ethics

Rule 4.2 (Rule 4.2). They allege that Mr. Williams violated Rule 4.2 by arranging and

attending a breakfast-meeting with current Holsum-Bakery employee, Nichole de Parra, and

his client, Warren Richards. At this April 24, 2009, meeting, Defendants claim Mr.

Williams questioned Ms. de Parra on issues directly involving the litigation and induced her

to sign a written statement concerning those issues. Id. at 3–4. Defendants further allege that

Mr. Williams took steps to conceal his communications with Ms. de Parra by failing to give

Defendants or Ms. de Parra a copy of her signed statement, and by failing to disclose the

dinner meeting or signed statement when he contacted counsel on April 30, 2009, about

arranging Ms de Parra’s deposition. Id. 

Plaintiff does not dispute the underlying facts of Defendants’ motion. In his reply

(Dkt. #45), Plaintiff admits that he, Mr. Williams, and Ms. de Para, met at a restaurant on

April 24, 2009, where Mr. Williams questioned Ms. de Para about her role at Holsum Bakery

and her knowledge of the Amendment. Id. at 2, 4. Plaintiff also agrees that Mr. Williams

asked Ms. de Para to write and sign an affidavit concerning the information she shared with

him and his client during the meeting. Id. at 5. While Plaintiff does not dispute the facts, he

vehemently disputes Mr. Williams’ actions were violative of Rule 4.2. See id.

A. Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2

Local Rule 1.6(d) provides that “[t]he ‘Rules of Professional Conduct’ as set forth in

Rule 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, shall apply to attorneys

admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.”

Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 states: 

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Plaintiff contends that the test for whether an employee or former employee of an

organization is a “party” under Rule 4.2 is the “functional” test set forth in Samaritan

Foundation v. Goodfarb. 176 Ariz. 497, 862 P.2d 870 (1993). This is incorrect. In

Samaritan the Arizona Supreme Court adopted a functional approach to determine whether

statements of corporate employees are covered by corporate attorney-client privilege. Id. at

879. The case had nothing to do with Rule 4.2. Its one and only reference to Rule 4.2 is

dicta, at best. Id. at 879–880. And, adopting the “functional approach” as to Rule 4.2 would

force this Court to ignore the Lang court’s very clear use of the three-category approach that

is based on Rule 4.2's comments. This, it will not do.

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In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the

representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another

lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or

is authorized by law to do so.

Rule 4.2 is intended to “(1) prevent unprincipled attorneys from exploiting the disparity in

legal skills between attorneys and lay people, (2) preserve the integrity of the attorney-client

relationship, (3) help to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information, and (4)

facilitate settlement.” Lang v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 602, 604 (App. 1992) (citing

Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).

When an organization is one of the litigants—as is the case here—three categories of

employees qualify as “parties” for the purpose of the rule: “(1) those having a managerial

responsibility on behalf of the organization; (2) any person whose act or omission in

connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization; and (3) any person whose

statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.” Id. at 604–605

(citing with approval Comment 2 of Rule 4.2, which sets forth the three categories).1

Because the Parties do not dispute that an ex-parte contact took place, this Court must

determine if Ms. de Para falls within one or more of groups of prohibited individuals. 

Defendants do not argue that Ms. de Para’s act or omission relates to the matter in dispute;

this appears to be correct. See (Dkt. #45, ex. A, ¶10). Accordingly, category two is not

applicable. Instead, Defendants’ allegations focus on groups one and three, arguing that Mr.

Williams violated Rule 4.2 because Ms. de Para exercises managerial responsibilities and

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In the 2002 edition of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the American Bar

Association, perhaps trying to address the ambiguity of the phrase “managerial

responsibility”, changed the applicable comment so that it now “prohibits communications

with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the

organization’s lawyer concerning the matter.” American Bar Association, Model Rules of

Professional Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_4_2_comm.html. Arizona,

however, has not adopted this revision to Rule 4.2.

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because her statements could be used against them as a party admission. The Court will

consider each of these assertions in turn.

B. Managerial Responsibility

Rule 4.2 and its comments do not define the phrase “managerial responsibility,” and

the Parties have not directed this Court to any Ninth Circuit or Arizona authority providing

a definition. Indeed, another court in this Circuit has commented that “the parameters of the

term ‘managerial responsibility’ are unclear.”2

 Palmer v. Pioneer Hotel & Casino, 19

F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162 (D.Nev. 1998). In Lang, however, the Arizona Court of appeals

states, without citation, that “managerial employees may act for and/or bind the

organization.” 170 Ariz. at 605. Although it is not completely clear, the Lang court seems

to suggest that an employee has managerial responsibility when he has the ability to act for

or bind the organization. Id. This view is supported by the fact that the Lang court’s

language closely mirrors the “managing-speaking” test employed by Nevada and Washington

regarding their identical Rule 4.2 ethical provisions. See Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Associates,

Ltd., 118 Nev. 943 (2002); Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wash.2d 192, 691 P.2d

564 (Wash. 1984); see also Weeks v. Independent School Dist. No. I-89, 230 F.3d 1201,

1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (embracing the managing-speaking test). Under the managingspeaking test, “employees should be considered ‘parties' for the purposes of the disciplinary

rule if, under applicable [state] law, they have managing authority sufficient to give them the

right to speak for, and bind, the corporation.” Wright, 691 P.2d at 569 (citations omitted). 

 In these states, however, the managing-speaking test has replaced the three-category

comments-based test altogether. Palmer, 118 Nev. at 961–62. Arizona, has not yet adopted

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such an approach; the Lang case clearly endorses the three-category test, but seems instead

to use an approximation of the managing-speaking test to define the managerial

responsibility category. 170 Ariz. at 605; see also Palmer, 19 F.Supp.2d at 1157 (applying

managing-speaking test to more clearly define comment's “managerial” category, but

reasoning that other categories of former comment still apply). Accordingly, this Court must

decide whether Ms. de Para, at the time of the ex-parte contact, had the authority to act for

or bind Holsum Bakery.

At the time of the ex-parte contact, Ms. de Para was Holsum’s Assistant Director of

Human Resources. (Dkt. #46-1, ex. A, ¶4). According to her declaration, Ms. de Para is

responsible for overseeing or supervising many of Holsum’s human-resource related

programs, including its 401K and pension plans, health and life insurance administrations,

affirmative action compliance, employee recruitment, employee leaves and absences, payroll

administration, and plant safety preventative measures under OSHA. (Dkt. #42-1, ex.1,¶5).

As part of her employment recruitment responsibilities, Ms. de Para interviews and screens

applicants and develops job descriptions. Id. Additionally, when Holsum is faced with a

lawsuit, Ms. de Para works with its directors and legal counsel to secure appropriate and

necessary documentation. Id. at, ex.1,¶5, 10. Also, according to the Declaration of Donald

A. Thriffilfey, Jr., Senior Vice President of Human Resources for Flowers Foods, Inc.—Ms.

de Para’s current boss —Ms. de Para currently supervises three human-resource support-staff

members; a Payroll Specialist, Human Resources Generalist, and a temporary employee.

(Dkt. #46-1, ex. A, ¶6), As their supervisor, Ms. de Para has authority to discipline theses

employees. Id. She also has the authority to hire and fire non-director level employees,

(Dkt. #42-1, ex. 1, ¶22), investigate employee and union complaints and resolve them on

behalf of Holsum. (Dkt. #46-1, ex. A, ¶7).

Plaintiff, who prior to his termination was Ms. de Para’s supervisor, describes her

responsibilities as merely administrative and ministerial; not permitting discretion. (Dkt.

#45, ex. A, ¶08). In his response, Plaintiff denies that Ms. de Parra has hiring and firing

authority, the ability to make final decisions, or the authority to bind Holsum bakery. (Dkt.

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Plaintiff based this assertion on the ex-parte communication that is the subject of this

Order.

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#45, p.10–11). Instead, he claims that she “was and is the Human Resource department’s

office manager, responsible for ensuring that personnel procedures are followed and that

personnel documents are completed and filed.” Id. at ex. A, ¶03. These claims directly

contradict Defendants assertions that Ms. de Para may hire and fire non-director level

employees, resolve employee and union complaints on behalf of Holsum, and discipline the

employees she oversees. 

As an initial matter, this Court is skeptical of Plaintiff’s characterization of Ms. de

Para’s responsibility, as it appears to change depending on his needs. In his Reply in Support

of Motion to Remand, Plaintiff argues that as HR Director, he had never seen the

Amendment, then writes: “But it gets stranger. “Holsum’s current manager of human

resources, Nicole de Para, has never seen the document.”3 (Dkt. #27, p.4) (emphasis added).

 In context, the word “current” is used to suggest an equivalence between Nicole de Para’s

position with Holsum Bakery with the one previously occupied by Plaintiff. Id. It is

implausible that Plaintiff would argue that when he was Director of Human Resources he did

not have managerial responsibility. Now, however, that suggesting Ms. de Para exercises

managerial responsibility places counsel in ethical jeopardy, Plaintiff has adopted a

completely inconsistent position. This sudden reversal discredits his characterization of Ms.

de Para’s job responsibilities.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s beliefs concerning Ms. de Para’s job responsibilities are based

on his experiences as her supervisor, but the ex-parte contact occurred after he had been

fired. Since Holsum fired Plaintiff, the evidence demonstrates that Ms. de Para’s job

responsibilities have changed. For example, in a recent union negotiation, she was part of

a group that developed company policies and acted as a Company Representative on the

Bargaining Committee, and also acted as the company’s spokeswoman on benefit proposals

(Dkt. #46, ex. A, ¶5). Additionally, Defendants have provided the Court with an email Ms.

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Had this Court taken a different approach in defining “managerial responsibility,” it

would have followed the lead of its sister court in the District of Kansas and relied on a

“general, common-sense definition of manager.” Hammond v. City of Junction City, 167

F.Supp.2d 1271, 1285 (D.Kan. 2001) A manger is “[a] person who administers or supervises

the affairs of a business, office, or other organization.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.

2004); see Hammond, 167 F.Supp.2d at 1285 (using Black’s Law Dictionary to define

managerial responsibility). Under this definition, the Court’s decision would have been the

same, as Ms. de Para both supervises employees and administers many of Holsum’s humanresources programs. See, e.g., Orlowski v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F.Supp. 723,

728 (N.D.Ill.1996) (holding that hiring, scheduling work shifts, and recommending

terminations are managerial responsibilities);

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That Mr. Williams knew what he was doing was wrong is supported by Ms. de Para’s

declaration. In it, she states that Mr. Williams told her that “opposing counsel would be very

upset if they knew he was even talking to me” and that they “would not be pleased with [the]

meeting without their knowledge and would definitely [sic] furious upon discovery of the

[the] engagement.” (Dkt. #42-1, ex.1,¶19).

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de Para wrote to Ed Eiselle, Holsum Bakery’s President, complaining that after Plaintiff’s

firing she could “no longer move at the pace required to hold down a “director’s” and

“manager’s” responsibilities. The workload has got so overwhelming since . . . Hank’s [the

Plaintiff’s] departure.” (Dkt. #46, ex. A-1). So, even if Plaintiff’s characterization of Ms.

de Para’s job accurately reflects her responsibilities when he was her boss, which this Court

doubts, it does not accurately characterize her current position.

Accordingly, this Court finds the evidence presented by Defendants accurately

describe Ms. de Parra’s job responsibilities and authority. It makes clear that in certain

realms—hiring and firing non-director level employees and resolving employee and union

disputes—Ms. de Parra has the ability to bind or act on behalf of Holsum Bakery.

Accordingly, she is a managerial employee that exercises managerial responsibility on behalf

of the organization.4

 Therefore, this court finds that Mr. Williams knew, or should have

known that Ms. de Para’s was a person with managerial responsibility that should not have

been communicated with ex-parte, and that Mr. Williams’ communications with her violated

Rule 4.2.5

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C. Statements that May Constitute an Admission

The third category of employees that may be a “party” under Rule 4.2 are “any

person[s] whose statement[s] may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.”

“An employee's statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.”

Lang, 170 Ariz. at 605. A statement is an admission for the purposes of Rule 4.2 if it

constitutes an admission by a party-opponent under Arizona Rule of Evidence 801(d). State

ex rel. Arizona Dept. of Health Services v. Gottsfield 213 Ariz. 583, 586 (App. Div. 1 2006).

Under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), “a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter

within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship”

is an admission by a party-opponent.

In her affidavit, Ms. de Para stated that during her time at Holsum she had never seen

the Amendment, despite the fact it was normal for her to review and file such documents, and

that “on numerous occasions (most recently) I have been asked to locate such a document

[the Amendment] or even assist in possibly referencing any document that could have some

possible reference to retention agreements. In all cases above I have been unable to procure

any such document.” (Dkt. #47, ex. J, p.3). At the time of the ex-parte communications, Ms.

de Para was under Defendants’ employ. The statements contained in the notarized affidavit

secured by Plaintiff very clearly concern a matter within the scope of her employment, as she

recounts tasks she performed at work, at the request of her superiors, and relating to this

lawsuit. Because these statements appear to meet the 801(d) standard, Ms. de Para is a

“party” under Rule 4.2, and Plaintiff’s counsel violated his ethical obligations when he

communicated with her ex-parte.

III. REMEDIES:

A. Disqualification

As part of this Court’s responsibility for regulating the conduct of attorneys appearing

before it, it may decide motions to disqualify counsel. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999

(9th Cir. 1980). Disqualification is an extreme sanction and should only be ordered “after

careful consideration of the client’s rights to be represented by the counsel of her choice, and

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the nature and extent of the ethics violation.” Palmer v. Pioneer Hotel & Casino, 19

F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162 (D.Nev. 1998). In making such a determination, the Court must

balance three factors: 

(1) the client’s interest in being represented by counsel of its choice; 

(2) the opposing party’s interest in a trial free from prejudice due to disclosures of

confidential information; and 

(3) the public’s interest in scrupulous administration of justice.

Complaint of Korea Shipping Corp., 621 F.Supp. 164, 169 (D.Alaska 1985) (citing Grahams

Service Inc. v. Teamsters Local 975, 700 F.2d 420, 423 (8th Cir.1982)). To preserve the

integrity of the judicial system close or doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of

disqualification. Id. (citing Faison v. Thornton, 863 F.Supp. 1204, 1216 (D.Nev. 1993)).

Because, however, of the “great prejudice often associated with an enforced change of

counsel, courts applying these standards have granted disqualification only when the moving

party has demonstrated substantial and irreparable harm growing out of the ethical violation.”

Korea Shipping Corp., 621 F.Supp at 169. A decision to disqualify is reviewed only for

abuse of discretion. Trone, 621 F.2d at 999. 

Clearly, Plaintiff has a strong interest in proceeding with the counsel of his choice.

While this interest is mitigated slightly by the fact that the case is still in its infancy, the

Court finds that the paramount interest in choice of counsel weighs in favor of retention.

And, the remaining two factors do not outweigh this consideration. Mr. Williams ex-parte

communications were clearly wrong and unethical, but the disclosure that occurred in this

case—that Ms. de Para was asked to find and could not locate the Amendment—will not

substantially and irreparably harm Defendants. This information does not go to the heart of

the case. Instead, it is merely a piece of evidence that may be relevant for the purposes of

the motion to remand; it is dispositive of nothing. Additionally, while it is impossible to

know exactly what Plaintiff, Mr. Williams and Ms. de Para discussed at their meeting, the

Court notes that Ms. de Para is not a central figure in this dispute. As a result, it is unlikely

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she provided Plaintiff with other information that could prejudice Defendants’ case. While

this factor tips the scales towards disqualification, it does so only slightly.

Instead, the factor that most weighs in favor of disqualification is the public’s interest

in the scrupulous administration of justice. There is no doubt that Mr. Williams behaved

unethically, and with over 20 years of experience as an attorney, he should have known

better. And, in addition to the Rule 4.2 violations chronicled in this Order, the Court has

determined that Mr. Williams intentionally declined to disclose his ex-parte communications

to Defendants, attempting instead to schedule a deposition of Ms. de Para so that he might

lawfully obtain the information he learned at the dinner-meeting. He further concealed the

meeting by submitting Plaintiff Warren Richard’s affidavit. (Dkt. #27-1, ex.B, ¶8–9). In this

affidavit, Mr. Richards states that he “spoke with Nicole de Para” and asked her if she had

seen the Amendment. Id. He does not mention, however, that this conversation actually

took place at a meeting with Ms. de Para, that was also attended by his counsel, and at which

a signed affidavit was procured. By so doing, Mr. Williams and Plaintiff misled Defendants

and this Court. Such deceptive behavior is unacceptable and it will not be tolerated. Yet,

while potentially a matter of concern to the Arizona Bar, is not so egregious as to require the

disqualification of counsel, as the substantial prejudice Plaintiff would incur by being forced

to obtain new representation outweighs the other considerations. 

B. Other Remedies

This Court, however, will not allow Plaintiff’s ethical violations to go unpunished.

District courts may apply a wide range of sanctions to address ethical violations. Kaiser v.

AT&T, 2002 WL 1362054 at *8 (D.Ariz. Apr. 15, 2002). “Potential sanctions typically

include exclusion of evidence, disqualification, dismissal, and imposition of costs and fees.”

Id. (citing Palmer, 19 F.Supp.2d at 1167–68). Here, Defendants have requested that Plaintiff

should be barred from using any statement, documentation, or information gained from the

ex-parte communication, and that he surrender an notes, memos, copies, or other documents

memorializing it. Additionally, Defendants ask that this Court award reasonable attorneys’

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fees and costs associated with investigating and responding to the inappropriate ex-parte

communications. The Court will grant both of these requests.

IV: OUTSTANDING MOTIONS

Now that this ethical dispute has been resolved, the Court must resolve Plaintiff’s

outstanding Motion to Remand to State Court. (Dkt. #16) and Motion for an Evidentiary

Hearing (Dkt. #47). Given the disagreement among the Parties concerning the Amendment,

an evidentiary hearing will be necessary in this case. Based on the evidence in the Court’s

possession, however, it finds that the Amendment existed prior to and was not created by the

Defendants for purposes of this litigation. Accordingly, the subject of the evidentiary

hearing will be limited to evidence concerning whether or not Holsum Bakery adopted or

implemented the Amendment such that it became part of the Plan. Finally, because Plaintiff

was given an opportunity to conduct discovery concerning the Amendment, and because of

the pivotal role it plays in this case, the Court will withdraw its previous Order granting

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Amendment. (Dkt. #20).

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion For

Disqualification of Plaintiff’s Counsel for Improper Ex Parte Communication in Violation

of Ethical Rule 4.2. (Dkt. #42)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED excluding from any future proceedings any and all

documents and evidence that are the product of counsel’s ex-parte contacts.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel surrender to Defendant all

documentation, including, but notes, memos, and copies, that is related to or a consequence

of counsel’s ex-parte communications with Ms. de Para.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting reasonable attorneys’ fees to Defendants for

costs incurred. Defendants shall submit an application therefore supported by an appropriate

schedule of fees and costs, together with an appropriate affidavit within ten days of service

of this order. Failure to timely file such an application shall be deemed to waive any claim

to an award of fees and costs related to this matter. Plaintiff’s counsel shall file any

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opposition to the application for fees and costs within 10 days from the service of the

application.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED within 20 days of the service of this order, Plaintiff

and Defendants’ counsel shall jointly cause the delivery of a copy of this order to the

appropriate authority within the Arizona State Bar for whatever further investigation, review,

or action it may deem appropriate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED withdrawing the Court’s previous Order granting

Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the First Amendment (Dkt. #20) and denying Plaintiff’s Motion

to Strike. (Dkt. #17).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing

(Dkt. #47) for the purpose of presenting evidence concerning whether or not Defendants did,

in fact, implement the Amendment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting this matter for Evidentiary Hearing on

November 23, 2009 at 3:00 p.m.

 DATED this 5th day of November, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-00418-GMS Document 49 Filed 11/05/09 Page 13 of 13