Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00315/USCOURTS-alnd-4_15-cv-00315-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

ALYCE LOUISE THOMAS, and

GREGORY WRIGHT, individually

and as representative of class, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

THOMAS ALEXANDER KING, in

his official capacity as Municipal

Judge, City of Gadsden, and

DONALD GARY TUCKER, in his

official capacity as City Prosecutor,

City of Gadsden,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 4:15-CV-315-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction and Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this civil rights lawsuit on February 20, 2015. (Doc. 1).

Plaintiffssued Defendants Thomas Alexander King (“Judge King”) and Donald Gary

Tucker (“City Prosecutor Tucker”) in their official capacities for alleged

unconstitutional conduct, including the claimed improper incarceration of indigent

defendants for minor traffic violations. (Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 1). 

On March 17, 2016, Judge King filed a Motion To Compel (Doc. 21) seeking

an order requiring Plaintiffsto provide him with their overdue initial disclosures and

FILED

 2016 Aug-03 PM 04:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:15-cv-00315-VEH Document 32 Filed 08/03/16 Page 1 of 6
written discovery responses. Id. at 1. The court held a hearing on April 14, 2016, and

granted Judge King’s Motion To Compel on April 15, 2016. (Doc. 26). Pursuant to

this order, the deadline for Plaintiffs to comply with their overdue discovery

obligations was “no later than June 14, 2016.” Id. at 1. Further, the court forewarned

Plaintiffs that “if they fail[ed] to meet the June 14, 2016, deadline in a manner that

fully complies with their discovery obligations, then the court will dismiss their case

with prejudice as a sanction, if one or both of the defendants file a motion requesting

that relief.” Id. at 2.

In the Joint Motion (Doc. 27), Defendants request that relief. They report that

Plaintiffs have not substantially complied with the court’s order compelling them to

cure their discovery deficiencies and seek a dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case with

prejudice as a sanction for their misconduct. On June 21, 2016, the court entered an

order directing Plaintiffs to show cause, no later than July 11, 2016, why the Joint

Motion should not be granted. (Doc. 28). This deadline passed without any filing

from Plaintiffs. Seven days later, on July 18, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a response. (Doc.

29). Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 31) on August 1, 2016. For the reasons explained

below, the Joint Motion is due to be granted. 

II. Analysis

As the foregoing procedural history reveals, Plaintiffs have neither complied

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with their discovery obligations as previously compelled by this court nor provided

any explanation for their non-compliance. Plaintiffs also have not demonstrated good

cause for denying the Joint Motion. In particular, while the two-page response

informsthe court about several medical issuesthat have negatively affected Plaintiffs’

counsel, nowhere in the response do Plaintiffs address how they intend to cure their

substantial discovery deficits. In contrast, Defendants’ eight-page reply with over 30

pages of substantiating attachments casts serious doubts upon the legitimacy of

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s excuses and solidifiesthe merits of their Joint Motion. (See, e.g.,

Doc. 31 at 7 ¶ 8 (“Counsel’s activities have been prolific throughout the State of

Alabama, and he has clearly met with the plaintiffs; yet the undisputed discovery

deficiencies in this case persist in violation of this Honorable Court’s order.”)

(emphasis in original)).

Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f the plaintiff failsto prosecute

or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the

action or any claim against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Additionally, “[u]nless the

dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) . . . operates

as an adjudication on the merits.” Id.

Further, case law reinforces that, as a result of Plaintiffs’ pattern of noncompliance with their discovery obligations and related orders as well as the absence

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of any indication on the record that they still wish to pursue their claims against

Defendants (e.g., such as by providing supplemental discovery responses to

Defendants by the court’s show cause deadline of July 11, 2016), the court possesses

the inherent power to dismisstheir suitsua sponte. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,

370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1389, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962) (“The authority

of a court to dismisssua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered

an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily

vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and

expeditious disposition of cases.”); see also Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535

(11th Cir. 1985) (“The court’s power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority

to enforce its orders and insure [sic] prompt disposition of lawsuits.” (citing Link, 370

U.S. at 630-31, 82 S. Ct. at 1388-89)); cf. Gratton v. Great American

Communications, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that court has

broad authority under Rule 37 to control discovery and enforce its orders); cf. also

FED.R.CIV.P. 1 (“[These rules]should be construed, administered, and employed by

the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action and proceeding.”) (emphasis added). 

“While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an

order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of

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discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)

(citing State Exchange Bank v. Hartline, 693 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11thCir. 1982)). Here,

by virtue of the court’s order compelling Plaintiffs to provide their overdue initial

disclosures and other written discovery to Judge King, Plaintiffs were expressly put

on notice that the court would consider dismissing their lawsuit with prejudice as a

sanction if they failed to timely and adequately comply. (Doc. 26 at 2). 

Nonetheless, they ignored that warning and served incomplete and improper

responsesto Judge King’s discovery requests. (Doc. 27 at 4-7 ¶¶ 9-10). Additionally,

Plaintiffs have not ever served responses to City Prosecutor Tucker’s written

discovery served on February 11, 2016. (Id. at 3 ¶ 7; id. at 2 ¶ 3). Furthermore,

Plaintiffs missed meeting the deadline to show cause why Defendants’ Joint Motion

should not be granted and their late response cured nothing and failed to advance this

litigation in any appreciable fashion.

Guided by the foregoing legal framework and in light of this lawsuit’s

procedural record, the court concludes that granting Defendants’ Joint Motion and

dismissing Plaintiffs’ action “with prejudice” (rather than “without prejudice”) isthe

appropriate measure to take. No lesser sanction reasonably promises an acceptable

turnaround in Plaintiffs’ prosecution of their case. In particular, and despite being

represented by counsel, Plaintiffs have engaged in a neglectful pattern of non5

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compliance with their discovery obligations as well as a flagrant disregard of separate

orders compelling their compliance with the discovery rules and directing them to

show cause why their lawsuit should not be dismissed in light of Defendants’ Joint

Motion. Cf. Phipps v. Blakeny, 8 F.3d 788, 790-91 (11th Cir. 1993) (Even though a

pro se litigant is generally afforded greater latitude than a represented party, “[w]hen

the record clearly demonstrates that a [pro se] plaintiff deliberately and defiantly

refused to comply with several court orders on discovery and tells the court that he

will not comply in the future, a district judge has the authority to deny that plaintiff

further access to the court to pursue the case.”). Additionally, a “with prejudice”

dismissal is consistent the court’s prior warning to Plaintiffs about the negative

consequences for them in the event that they did not timely and adequately cure their

discovery deficiencies as unambiguously ordered. (Doc. 26 at 2).

III. Conclusion

Therefore, Defendants’ Joint Motion is due to be granted and Plaintiffs’

complaint is due to be dismissed with prejudice. The court will enter a separate final

judgment order in conformance with this memorandum opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this the 3rd day of August, 2016.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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