Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-02324/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-02324-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE ANTHONY CUEVAS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

GEORGE GALAZA, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 02-2324 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. The

matter is submitted.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of three counts of robbery. See Cal. Penal Code 

§ 211. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that petitioner had four prior felony

convictions and that he had served one prior prison term. Because two of the prior felony

convictions constituted “strikes” under California “three strikes” law, he was sentenced to

prison for eighty-five years to life. As grounds for habeas relief he asserts that: (1) His

sentence was disproportionate, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; (2) his due

process rights were violated by the trial court’s instruction that the jury was not to consider

what punishment he might receive; (3) his due process rights were violated by an

erroneous jury instruction; and (4) his counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress

evidence. 

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Petitioner does not dispute the following facts, which are excerpted from the opinion

of the California Court of Appeal:

The Prosecution’s Case- Count 2

Count 2 of the amended information alleged that on

October 24, 1997, appellant had robbed Rachel Bryan. The

evidence presented at trial was as follows: Rachel Bryan testified

that on October 24, 1997, she was employed as a teller at Bank of

the West on Washington Avenue in San Leandro. . . . [A man]

hand[ed] her a note and [told] her to read it. The note said, “This

is a robbery. Give me your $100 bills. This is serious”. . . . Bryan

opened her drawer and gathered the money, including the “bait”

money that had previously recorded serial numbers, which the

bank kept on file. . . . Bryan handed the man the money, and he

left.

Bryan estimated that she had been able to look at the

man’s face for about four minutes. On December 12, 1997, she

viewed a videotape of a live lineup, and identified appellant as the

man who had robbed her at the bank. She also identified

appellant at his preliminary hearing and at trial. In addition, at trial

she identified appellant as the person shown in bank surveillance

photos taken on the day of the robbery.

The Prosecution’s Case- Count 3

Count 3 of the amended information alleged that on

November 6, 1997, appellant had robbed Mary Moore. Mary

Moore testified that she worked as a teller at Bank of the West on

Second Street in Livermore. On November 6, 1997, about 10:30

a.m., a man came to her window and told her to give him her

hundred, fifty, twenty, ten and five dollar bills. He also showed her

a note that said the same thing. At first she thought he was joking,

but then she “took a good look at him to see if he seemed to be

serious in his intent.” She concluded that he looked very

determined, and that he was serious. She opened her drawer and

gave him some twenties, tens and fives. He told her to give him

hundreds and fifties, and to open her second drawer, where the

majority of the teller’s money is kept. After she opened the second

drawer, the man reached over the counter and grabbed money

from it. He stuffed the money in his pockets and fled. 

Moore was able to observe the robber’s facial features for

about 30 seconds. She was unable to identify anyone in a photo

lineup shown to her on November 21. However, on December 5,

1997, she attended a live lineup, and identified appellant as the

robber. She also identified him at the preliminary hearing and at

trial. 

The Prosecution’s Case- Count 4

Count 4 of the amended information alleged that on

November 12, 1997, appellant had robbed Angela Andrews.

Angela Andrews testified that on November 12, 1997, she was

working as a teller at U.S. Bank on Hesperian Avenue in Hayward.

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About 1:15 p.m. a man came up to her window and showed her a

note that said, “This is a robbery. Give me the money”. . . .

Andrews felt afraid. She turned to her drawer, pressed the alarm,

and gave the man some money. He told her to give him the rest,

so she turned back to her drawer, hesitating over a packet of

money with a tracking device concealed inside, known as a “trackpack.” The man said, “Give me that,” which she did. He unfolded

a small department store bag with handles, put the track-pack

inside, and left. Andrews described the robber as Hispanic, in his

late thirties, about six feet one inch tall, and wearing a black jacket,

flat black hat, black pants and sunglasses. 

When the man left the bank the tracking device began

emitting an electronic signal that could be tracked by the police.

The police were notified and began following the signal, which led

them to 1408 Timothy Drive in San Leandro, a house that

belonged to appellant’s sister, Gina Cuevas (Gina). Once several

police units had arrived, appellant was ordered to come out of the

house. Appellant told his sister to say that he was not there, but

he eventually came out and was apprehended and searched.

Inside his wallet police found several bills with serial numbers

matching those from U.S. Bank. Appellant was placed inside the

police car, where he asked an officer “what was going on.” He

was told that the police were investigating a robbery, to which he

responded: “There’s no way I was involved. I’ve been at home at

my sister’s house all day . . . . You’ve got the wrong guy.”

Appellant was very nervous and fidgety. 

Detective Edward Muniz explained to Gina that the police

were receiving a tracking signal from inside her house, and asked

for permission to search, which she gave. Inside the house the

signal led officers to the southeast bedroom, where they found a

paper J.C. Penney bag with the tracking device and money inside.

They also found a black jacket, a black hat, a black leather cap

and black sweat pants. In a closet containing appellant’s

belongings police found a hypodermic needle and suspected

heroin. In a search incident to appellant’s arrest, the police found $420 in crisp one hundred and twenty dollar bills. The next day,

the police returned to conduct a further search with Gina’s

consent. In the spare bedroom they found $2,100 in cash inside

a sock. 

About 45 minutes after the robbery, officers brought Angela

Andrews to the Timothy Street house, where she viewed

appellant. She identified him as the person who had robbed her,

but observed that he had changed his clothing.

James Freeman, Gina’s next door neighbor, testified that

around 1:45 p.m. on November 12, 1997, he saw appellant pull up

in a red car in front of Gina’s house. Gina came out and talked to

him, then they the both walked into 1408 Timothy Drive. Appellant

was carrying a jacket and a small brown bag. About 10 minutes

later, the police arrived, and began yelling for appellant to come

out.

The police also searched the car appellant had been seen

driving 10 minutes before the police arrived at Gina’s. Inside,

Detective Stan Brandon found a blank pad of paper. He rubbed

a pencil on the top sheet, and impressions of lettering showed up.

Upon further inspection by a forensic document examiner, it was

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determined that the indentations on the second and third sheets

of the pads were the words: “This is a bank robbery. Give me all

the money now.”

At trial, Angela Andrews identified appellant as the man who

robbed her. She also identified the clothing found in the bedroom

at Gina’s house as similar to that worn by the robber.

Defense case

Appellant testified that he was 33 years old, had grown up

in Hayward, and had spent most of his youth in juvenile hall and

the California Youth Authority. Around October 1997, appellant

was trying to pull his life together after his long incarceration. He

was attending Chabot College, working construction for his uncle,

and seeing a psychiatrist. He testified that he was using drugs in

the fall of 1997, and had just finished shooting up heroin when he

was arrested. He explained that he had been using heroin since

he was nine years old.

 Appellant identified the black sweat pants found in Gina’s

house as his, but did not recognize the jacket. He testified that

toward the end of October 1997 he was hospitalized with

pneumonia, and that he could not remember where he was on the

afternoon of November 6, 1997. 

Appellant admitted convictions for burglary in 1986, robbery

in 1987 and weapon possession in 1992. He also admitted that he

had been convicted for bringing drugs into jail in March of 1999,

after his mother brought heroin to him in jail. 

Ex. E at 2-6.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

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reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

I. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner argues that because the robberies he committed were non-violent his

sentence of eighty-five years to life, imposed pursuant to California’s three strikes law,

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 69 (2003), the Supreme Court held that relief

may be granted to a prisoner in the few cases where the punishment is “grossly

disproportionate” to the crime. The Court also held that two consecutive twenty-five year to

life sentences for a petty theft “third strike” offense were not “grossly disproportionate” and

do not violate federal law. Id. at 77. 

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In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003), the Supreme Court was clear that

when a court reviews the disproportionality of a sentence, it “must place on the scales not

only [petitioner’s] current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. . . . In

imposing a three strikes sentence, the State’s interest is not merely punishing the offense

of conviction, or the “triggering” offense: ‘It is in addition the interest . . . in dealing in a

harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply

incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.” Id. at

30, (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)). 

Here, the State’s interest in public safety and deterring recidivist felons justifies the

sentence. Id. According to the California Court of Appeal, petitioner’s criminal history

began in 1984, when he received a juvenile adjudication for petty theft, burglary, battery on

a police officer and falsely identifying himself. He spent two years in prison for a burglary

committed in 1985. His parole was revoked in 1987 for an aggravated assault. That same

year he was convicted of three counts of robbery and sentenced to twelve years. In 1992,

he was convicted of possession of a weapon in a prison. Soon after he was put on parole,

he committed the three bank robberies. 

Lengthy periods of incarceration have failed to deter petitioner’s criminality. His

sentence is long, but it is supported by the public interest in incapacitating recidivist felons. 

Id. at 29-30. Further, while petitioner’s victims easily succumbed to his demands and the

bank robberies did not result in violence, the crimes could easily have turned violent. 

Under these circumstances, his sentence was not cruel and unusual, and the California

appellate court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law. 

II. Jury Instruction Not to Consider Punishment or Background 

Petitioner contends his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process were

violated when the trial court instructed the jury not to consider his “narrative testimony”

where he mentioned that he was facing a long sentence under California’s “three strikes”

law. He argues that had the jurors “been permitted to consider that [he] was going to

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spend the rest of his life in prison for three non-violent bank robberies in which he used no

gun, it is unlikely it would have convicted him.” Pet. at 24. 

The following undisputed description of events is taken from the opinion of the

California Court of Appeal:

In its instructions to the jury, the court gave CALJIC 17.42:

“In your deliberations, do not discuss or consider the subject of

penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect

your verdict.” Also, during deliberations, the jury sent out a note,

asking for “clarification from Judge Kurtz as to which portions of

Defendant’s so-called ‘narrative’ testimony can be considered by

the jury. [¶] Specifically, we want to know about the testimony

volunteered by the Defendant after counsel and his Honor left the

bench.” The judge responded that he had reviewed the statement

in question and told the jury: “That was not in response to any

question nor is it relevant to any issue. It does not relate to any

element of the offense nor does it relate to the issue of identity as

to the commission of the offense. Therefore, that is being stricken

and you cannot consider it for any purpose.

Exh. E at 11.

Petitioner argues that the jury is the “conscience of the community” and that it

retains the power to nullify harsh laws and sentences. He contends that to be able to

exercise that power, the jury must be allowed to consider the penal consequences of a

guilty verdict. Pet. at 23.

Petitioner’s claim fails because a defendant has no constitutional right to a jury

nullification instruction. United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Petitioner is correct that “juries [may] acquit out of compassion or compromise or because

of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were

disposed through lenity.” Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980). However,

“the power of juries to ‘nullify’ or exercise a power of lenity is just that– a power; it is by no

means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his

authority to prevent.“ United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997). While a

jury may have the power to ignore the law and exercise leniency, a court has no obligation

to inform the jury of that right. See Powell, 955 F.2d at 1213. 

The Supreme Court also provides authority on the matter, stating that “it is well

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established that when a jury has no sentencing function, [footnote omitted] it should be

admonished to ‘reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.’” 

Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422

U.S. 35, 40 (1975). 

Here, it was the jury’s duty to reach its verdict without considering the penalty. While

jury nullification is a reality within our justice system, it is by no means a right under the

Constitution. Because no constitutional right was violated by the instruction, the state

courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Supreme Court authority. 

III. Misinstruction on Element of Force or Fear

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of “force” in its robbery instruction. At trial,

the court attempted to assist the jury with the following clarification:

Generally, the force by means of which robbery may be

committed is either actual or constructive. The former includes all

violence inflicted directly on the person robbed. The latter

encompasses all means by which the person robbed is put in fear

sufficient to suspend the free exercise of will or prevent resistance

to the taking. The constructive force means force, not actual or

direct, exerted upon the person robbed by operating upon a fear

of injury. Included within the common meaning of ‘force’ is such

threat or display of physical aggression toward a person as

reasonably inspires fear of pain, bodily harm or death.

Ex. E at 8.

Petitioner alleges that the court misinformed the jury that it “need only find that [the

victim’s] fear was objectively reasonable, not that the victim actually, that is subjectively, felt

fear.” Pet. at 17. Petitioner believes the distinction is crucial to his defense in the third

robbery count. He contends that “[i]f the jury believed that [petitioner] did not use any force

and that Moore was not actually afraid, then [he] was entitled to an acquittal on the robbery

charge.” Pet. at 18.

The California Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that when the “prosecution

seeks to prove a robbery was committed by means of fear, it must present evidence ‘from

which it can be inferred that the victim was in fact afraid, and that such fear allowed the

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crime to be accomplished.” Ex. E at 8 (citing People v. Mungia, 234 Cal.App.3d 1703,

1709 (1991)). However, the court held that the necessary subjective element was

conveyed by the instruction as a whole. Id. at 9. 

Not every ambiguity or deficiency in a jury instruction will rise to the level of a due

process violation. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam). Jury

instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be examined in the context

of the trial record and the jury instructions as a whole. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72

(1991). The question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the

challenged instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437.

Here, earlier sections in the instruction conveyed the idea that the victim must

actually feel fear. The instruction said that constructive force “encompasses . . . means by

which the person robbed is put in fear” and that the victim is “operating upon [a] fear of

injury.” Such instructions sufficiently conveyed to the jury that a victim must experience

subjective fear. Further, the arguments of counsel, especially those of defense counsel,

made it “clear that the jury was being called on to consider the actual fear experienced by

Mary Moore.” Ex. E at 9; see Middleton, 541 U.S. at 438 (per curiam) (state court’s

reliance on prosecutor’s argument that resolved ambiguous instruction in favor of

defendant particularly apt in concluding there was no instructional error). Together, these

considerations make clear that there was not a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied

the instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. 

Because petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the trial court’s giving

the instruction, the rejection of this claim by the state appellate courts was not contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority.

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his last claim, petitioner argues that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to move

to suppress evidence obtained through an allegedly unlawful search. Pet. at 11. He claims

that police searched his sister’s house without her permission, and later gained consent

only through psychological coercion by threatening to take away her children. Pet. at 11. 

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He argues that had defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence, crucial evidence

including the track pack, bank money and clothing would have been inadmissible at trial. 

He believes it is reasonably probable that had counsel provided competent legal

representation and this evidence been suppressed, he would not have been found guilty in

Count Four. Pet. at 14. 

A habeas petitioner challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of

counsel must demonstrate two things. First, he must show that his lawyer’s representation

was deficient and fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing

professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687-88 (1984). Second, he must

also show that the deficient legal representation prejudiced his defense, and that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A court need not determine

whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by

the defendant as the result of the alleged deficiencies. Id. at 697.

This court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that it is not reasonably

probable that petitioner would have had a more favorable outcome in Count Four even if

evidence obtained from the search of his sister’s house were suppressed. If the

prosecution’s case were weak, petitioner would be better positioned to show a reasonable

probability that the result of the trial would have been different. See, e.g., Luna v. Cambra,

306 F.3d 954, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, however, the prosecution’s case was

extremely strong and was supported by evidence unrelated to the searches. As indicated

by the California Court of Appeal, the bank teller identified petitioner within an hour of the

robbery, the signal carried by the track-pack brought police to his doorstep, he was seen by

a neighbor entering a house with a bag similar to the one used at the robbery, he appeared

nervous and lied to police during questioning, and a pad of paper with an impression of the

bank demand note was found in his car. 

Because petitioner was not prejudiced by the failure to move to suppress, his right to

effective assistance of counsel was not violated. As a result, the rejection of this claim by

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the state appellate courts was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Supreme Court authority.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The

clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/24/07 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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