Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02570/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02570-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0227(b)(3) Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Collette Stark,

Plaintiff,

v.

Simon Poonka, Project Eco, Poonka 

Enterprises, Inc., Eco Home Solutions,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-2570-AJB-KSC

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT 

(Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 14)

Before the Court is plaintiff Collette Starks’ motions for default judgment against 

Defendants Project Eco, Poonka Enterprises, Inc., and Eco Home Solutions.

(Doc. Nos. 11, 12, 14.) For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motions for default 

judgment are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this complaint for alleged violations of the TCPA and CIPA for 

illegal telemarketing calls by Defendants. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 2.) She alleges that Defendant 

businesses Eco Home Solutions, Poonka Enterprises, Inc., and Project Eco called her at 

least nine times using an automated telephone dialing system. (Id. ¶ 72.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court, following default by a 

defendant, to enter default judgment in a case. It is within the sound discretion of the district 

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court to grant or deny an application for default judgment. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In making this determination, the Court considers the following 

factors, commonly referred to as the Eitel factors: (1) “the possibility of prejudice to the 

plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 

policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). “In applying this discretionary 

standard, default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. 

v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citation omitted).

Generally, once the court clerk enters default, the factual allegations of the complaint 

are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). However, although well-pleaded 

allegations in the complaint are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary 

facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 

(9th Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 

4669.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s claims are for violations arising under the TCPA and CIPA. Although 

Plaintiff fails to address the Eitel factors in her motions, the Court will analyze them.

1. Possibility of Prejudice to the Plaintiff

There is a possibility of prejudice to a plaintiff when denying default judgment 

would leave them without an alternate recourse for recovery. See PepsiCo Inc. v. Cal. Sec. 

Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). At an order to show cause motion 

hearing, Defendant Poonka stated that his businesses were in the process of filing for 

bankruptcy. Thus, without default judgment, the Court finds Plaintiff would be severely 

prejudiced as Defendants do not intend on participating in litigation. 

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2. Substantive Merits and Sufficiency of Claim

Under the second and third Eitel factors, the Court must examine whether the 

plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to establish and succeed on its claims. See Eitel, 782 F.2d 

at 1471. These factors require the complaint “state a claim on which the plaintiff may 

recover.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Plaintiff brought claims under the TCPA and 

SIPA. Under the TCPA, Plaintiff must establish that (1) the phone calls were made using 

an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”); (2) she was the “called party;” and (3) 

that Defendants did not have Plaintiff’s prior consent to make the calls. 47 U.S.C. 

§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 77 F.3d 1036, 1043 

(9th Cir. 2012).

Under the first element, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged Defendants’ calls to her were 

made using an ATDS. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 35, 49–51.) Regarding the second element, Plaintiff

alleges she is the “called party” because the phone number Defendants dialed belonged to 

her. (Id. ¶ 55.) As for the last requirement, Plaintiff alleges she never gave Defendants

consent to contact her. (Id. ¶ 54.) Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to 

succeed on her TCPA claim.

3. Sum of Money at Stake 

Here, Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in statutory damages, $500 for intentional or willful

violations, and $1,500 for violations of seven sections. (Doc. No. 1 at 35–36.) 

“[T]he court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the 

seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. Default judgment 

is disfavored where the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable in light of 

defendant’s actions. See Totten v. Hurrell, No. 00–2718, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20259, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001) (stating that “the ‘sum of money at stake’ factor [under Eitel] 

is meant to focus on the size of the award requested, as courts are hesitant to enter default 

judgments where large sums of money are at stake,” and finding an award of $19,977.74 

not a “large money judgment” in today’s world). The Court considers Defendants

declarations, calculations, and other documentation of damages in determining if the 

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amount at stake is reasonable. See Walters v. Shaw/Guehnemann Corp., No. C 03-04058 

WHA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2004) (finding plaintiff’s 

calculations of damages and attorney fees reasonable, based on plaintiff’s sworn 

declarations and pay stubs and other documentation submitted by plaintiffs). 

First, Plaintiff requests $5,000 per violation of California Invasion of Privacy Act 

§ 637.2(a)(1). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ E.) Section 631 of CIPA makes it unlawful to use “any 

machine, instrument or contrivance” to intentionally intercept the content of a 

communication over any “telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable or instrument,” or to 

read, attempt to read, or learn the “contents or meaning of any message, report, or 

communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line or cable” without 

the consent of all parties to the communication. See Cal.Penal Code § 631(a). See In re 

Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2014). However, Plaintiff did not 

adequately plead a CIPA violation. 

Next, Plaintiff requests “$500 plus threefold damages” for each willful violation. 

(Id. ¶ F.) “If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated” the TCPA, 

it may award treble damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Plaintiff only alleges conclusory 

facts regarding Defendants’ willfulness. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 36 (Defendants “knowingly and 

intentionally ma[d]e robo-dialed calls to Plaintiff. . . .”).) There are no facts present 

showing Defendants knew that Plaintiff was not to be contacted except her phone number’s 

placement on the National Do Not Call Registry.

Finally, Plaintiff requests $1,500 for each violation of various subsections of the 

TCPA (failure to state a name at the beginning of a call, spoofing a number, violating the 

Do Not Call registry, etc.) (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ K–Q.) The TCPA provides private plaintiffs 

may recover $500 of statutory damages for each violation and treble damages, or $1,500 

per violation, if the plaintiff can prove the defendant committed it willfully or knowingly. 

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Because a finding of willfulness is inappropriate, the Court finds 

Plaintiff may only recover $500 per violation. Plaintiff alleges with specificity nine 

violations, resulting in a $4,500 recovery, which the Court finds is reasonable. 

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4. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The next pertinent Eitel factor considers whether there are disputed material facts.

“Upon entry of default, all well pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except 

those relating to damages.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 117. Here, Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts to support its claims as analyzed above. Defendants failed to rebut them. 

Thus, there is no dispute of material facts and this factor favors the entry of default 

judgment against Defendants.

5. Excusable Neglect

There is no indication of excusable neglect. After being served with the complaint, 

Defendants simply failed to respond. At a show cause hearing, Poonka relayed that the 

corporations were likely to go bankrupt and would not be hiring an attorney. Consequently, 

this factor weighs in favor of the entry of default judgment.

6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits

Although default judgment is disfavored, a decision on the merits is impractical, if 

not impossible, when the defendant takes no part in the action. Penpower Technology Ltd. 

v. S.P.C. Technology, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Given that Defendants

have failed to respond, the general preference for resolution on the merits is not equally 

applicable. See, e.g., id. In sum, the relevant considerations weigh in favor of entry of 

default judgment against Defendants. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motions for Default Judgment against 

Defendants, (Docs. No. 11, 12, 14), are GRANTED. The Court awards $4,500. The Clerk

is directed to enter judgment consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 5, 2019

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