Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00391/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00391-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL WINFIELD,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0391 GEB JFM P

vs.

DOWNING, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed December 22, 2006, plaintiff's

complaint was dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint. On January 3, 2007, plaintiff

filed a document styled as an amended complaint. On February 6, 2007, plaintiff filed a request

to dismiss two defendants from the action and to proceed only against one defendant named in

the amended complaint, Keith Levy. On the same day, plaintiff filed another document styled as

an amended complaint. That document supersedes the amended complaint filed January 3, 2007,

and will be screened by the court pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

In accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must dismiss

a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or 

/////

Case 2:06-cv-00391-GEB -JFM Document 20 Filed 02/28/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 A permanent injunction in Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526 (1986) sets forth the 1

process which must be followed before psychotropic medication can be involuntarily

administrated to an inmate in a California state prison. See California Penal Code § 2600; see

also Department of Corrections v. Office of Administrative Hearings, 53 Cal.App.4th 780, 785

(1997).

2

malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer

v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor,

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Keith Levy is an administrative law judge who has

violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by renewing a so-called Keyhea order for another year of

forced medication. Plaintiff seeks money damages. 1

/////

Case 2:06-cv-00391-GEB -JFM Document 20 Filed 02/28/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The Hirsh court describes another factor derived from Butz: decisions from such

2

hearings should qualify as “controversial enough to stimulate harassing damage actions against

the adjudicators.” Hirsh, at 715.

3

“Administrative law judges . . . are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity so long as

they perform functions similar to judges and prosecutors in a setting like that of a court.” Hirsh

v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9 Cir. 1995) (citing Butz v. th

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17 (1978). To qualify for quasi-judicial immunity, an

administrative law judge must preside over adversarial hearings from which there is an appeal,

and the judge must make factual findings and “perform other adjudicatory functions.” Hirsh, at

715. 

2

The Keyhea injunction provides a process whereby a prisoner who

is subject to mental health treatment, after being administered

involuntary medication for up to 72 hours, may be certified for

additional involuntary medication up to 21 days if the prisoner is

“as a result of mental disorder, gravely disabled and incompetent to

refuse medication for the danger to others, or danger to self.” 

(Keyhea injunction, supra, § II(A), p. 6.) The prisoner, with the

assistance of an attorney or advocate, may contest certification. A

certification review hearing is conducted by the court-appointed

hearing officer and if at the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing

officer concludes that the prisoner is neither gravely disabled and

incompetent nor a danger to others or to self, involuntary

medication must be discontinued. ( Id., at § II(I), (M), pp. 11, 13.)

A prisoner may not be medicated involuntarily for more than 24

days without an order from the superior court. The order

authorizing involuntary medication must find, by clear and

convincing evidence, as above, that the prisoner , as a result of

mental disorder, is gravely disabled and incompetent to refuse

medication or a danger to self. ( Id., § III(F), p. 18.) The

injunction also permits emergency involuntary medication under

certain specified conditions. ( Id. at § III(J), pp. 20-21.)

Most relevant for purposes of this case, the Keyhea injunction

defines “danger to others” “in substantial accord with Welfare and

Institutions Code section 5300,” and requires essentially the same

findings of demonstrated danger and recent dangerousness as in

section 5300, discussed above. ( Keyhea injunction, supra, § I(4).)

A prisoner will be considered a danger to others only if he or she

has attempted, inflicted or made a serious threat of “substantial

physical harm upon the person of another” either after being taken

Case 2:06-cv-00391-GEB -JFM Document 20 Filed 02/28/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 A copy of the Keyhea injunction is available online at website of the State of 3

California’s Office of Administrative Hearings, http://www.oah.dgs.ca.gov. 

4

into custody or as the cause of being taken into custody, as

specified in section 5300, and “presents, as a result of mental

disorder, demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical

harm upon others.” (Keyhea injunction, supra, § I(4)(b), p. 4.)

“Custody” refers to “confinement in an inpatient psychiatric unit.”

The order is only good for 180 days (or a shorter time if specified

by the court) in the case of those determined to be a danger to self

or others, with new orders being subject to the same procedural

protections as the original orders. ( Id., § (III)(I).) 

In re Qawi, 32 Cal.4th 1, 22 (2004). California state courts view a Keyhea hearing as “‘an

adversarial judicial hearing and not a perfunctory step in the process.’” Department of

Corrections v. Office of Administrative Hearings, 53 Cal.App.4th at 789 (internal citation

omitted). By its terms, the Keyhea injunction provides for judicial review of the administrative

law judge’s decision. (Keyhea v. Rushen, Case No. 67432, Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Clarification and Modification of Injunction and Permanent Injunction, filed October 31, 1986, at

¶ IIN.)3

The decision of the administrative law judge at a Keyhea hearing is the type of

decision that gives rise to the protection of quasi-judicial immunity, as described by the court of

appeals in Hirsh. Plaintiff’s allegations bring the decision of defendant Levy squarely within the

protection of that immunity. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this

action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

Case 2:06-cv-00391-GEB -JFM Document 20 Filed 02/28/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 27, 2007.

12

winf0391.56

Case 2:06-cv-00391-GEB -JFM Document 20 Filed 02/28/07 Page 5 of 5