Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00979/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00979-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 RT refers to the Reporter’s Transcript of the state court proceedings and CT to the

Clerk’s Transcript, lodged with this court. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH A. JONES, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0979 DFL KJM P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus challenging his Sacramento County conviction for vandalism, false imprisonment,

and criminal threats. 

I. Factual And Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Offense

Stacey Scherbenske began to date petitioner in 1999. RT 204.1 When petitioner

lost his job, he became very possessive, and concerned about who came to visit. RT 206-207. 

On one occasion, he shoved her into her entertainment center; on another, he threw a mug at her;

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on still another, he became angry and stuck a knife into the wall. RT 208, 212. Scherbenske did

not call the police after any of these incidents. RT 210, 214. 

On February 5, 2000, Jones became upset with Scherbenske after she woke him

up to take a phone call from Rada Medjed, a former girlfriend and mother of his child. RT 214-

215. He told her never to wake him up like that again and Scherbenske told petitioner not to talk

to her like that. RT 286. The two argued until Scherbenske suggested petitioner go call Medjed. 

RT 288. Petitioner threw a tequila bottle on the floor between her legs; the bottle shattered,

cutting Scherbenske on both legs. RT 217-219, 288-289. 

Scherbenske went to take a bath, but could hear petitioner yelling and breaking

glasses. RT 219. Petitioner was yelling at Scherbenske to hurry up so he could take a shower. 

RT 223-224, 291. As she went to the dressing room, petitioner slapped Scherbenske. RT 225. 

When she went into her bedroom, petitioner took a knife out of his back pocket, where he

customarily put it when the couple argued. RT 227. Petitioner said repeatedly, “You are lucky

your daughter is here or I would kill you.” RT 230. He also said, “I should just kill you” in an

“ugly” tone. RT 231-232. Petitioner was holding the knife when he said these things. RT 232. 

Scherbenske was aware that petitioner had been convicted after an incident of domestic violence

against Medjed. RT 233. 

As Scherbenske bent to retrieve a shirt from the laundry basket, petitioner swung

the knife toward her. RT 237. Scherbenske slipped and petitioner stuck the knife into the wall. 

RT 237. She tried to calm petitioner as she moved to her daughter’s room and then to the front

door. RT 241-242. Petitioner locked the door and told Scherbenske that she was not going

anywhere. RT 242. She decided not to risk leaving because she did not want any harm to come

to her daughter. RT 244-245. 

Petitioner began to harass Scherbenske to return the money he had contributed for

the January rent. RT 245-246, 271. Scherbenske called several relatives but nobody was home. 

RT 246. Petitioner then ripped the phone cord out of the wall and threw the computer monitor

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across the room, announcing that he would not leave until he broke everything. RT 247-248. 

After petitioner broke Scherbenske’s coffee table, she and her daughter left the house with

petitioner. She felt she did not have a choice. RT 248, 250. 

Scherbenske drove petitioner to the car dealership where petitioner had put a

down payment on a truck, though in Scherbenske’s name. RT 251-253. Scherbenske cancelled

the purchase and received a check for the deposit in her name. RT 253. She had asked the

salesman for cash, but when he told her he could not give her cash, she cried. Petitioner, who

was with her, seemed calm. RT 397. 

After they left the dealership, Scherbenske tried to turn toward her mother’s

house, but petitioner prevented her from turning the wheel. RT 254-255. She eventually took

petitioner to a friend’s house and then headed back to her mother’s, where she left her daughter. 

RT 255. She did not tell her mother what had happened because she did not want her mother to

worry. RT 256. 

Scherbenske then went to see a friend, David Howard, because she needed to

“unwind.” They split a six-pack of beer. RT 257-258. She did not tell Howard what had

happened. RT 258. 

After a couple of hours, Scherbenske returned to her mother’s house with her

friend Maria in tow. RT 259. She waited for her brother Jimmy, and then finally returned home

about 10:30 or 11:00 p.m and called police. RT 260-261. 

Sacramento police officer Stephen Sanguinetti went to Scherbenske’s house

around 10:30 p.m. on February 5th. He noticed broken glass and puncture marks in the kitchen

and bedroom walls. RT 402-403. He found it difficult to take a statement from Scherbenske

who could not give a sequential account of the evening. RT 405. Scherbenske told him she

thought petitioner was going to come back and kill her. RT 417. 

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About a week later, petitioner slashed Scherbenske’s tires after she refused to let

him in the house. She called police to report petitioner’s harassment on February 11th. RT 263-

264. Nevertheless, the couple spent some time together before petitioner’s arrest on March 1st. 

RT 264. In fact, petitioner called Scherbenske when he ran out of money and asked her to cash

the $500 check from the car dealership. RT 297. 

Since petitioner’s arrest, Scherbenske has visited him in jail and petitioner has

written to her. RT 265-266. One letter read in part:

Stacey, I went - well, went to Court today. Not a very - not a very good

day for me. They tried to add three more charges to my case, but my

lawyer talked them out of that, thank God. By the way, thanks for not

going to the DA. That helps me a lot. I owe you one, baby. But - it would

be [sic] really help if you don’t show up for my trial as a victim or witness. 

I’ll still be looking at two years at 85 percent. At least I’ll be clean and off

of that fucking dope.

RT 267. 

In the hall during a noon break on one day of petitioner’s trial, Scherbenske told

petitioner, “They made me do this.” RT 332. She wanted to let petitioner know she was “not

trying to put him away for that long.” RT 339.

Linda Barnard, marriage and family counselor, testified about the impact domestic

abuse may have on a woman’s willingness to report incidents and to reconcile with her abuser. 

RT 351-393. 

B. The Prior Incident

In 1997, Kimberley Aardahl was friends with Rada Medjed, who was petitioner’s

girlfriend. RT 163-164. Around 6:00 a.m. on June 23, 1997, Medjed and her daughter Crystal

came to Aardahl’s apartment. RT 166. Over the course of the day, petitioner called many times

for Medjed, threatening to kill her, pointed a gun at the women as they stood on Aardahl’s

balcony, and broke into Aardahl’s apartment and again pointed a gun at them. RT 167, 170, 172-

173.

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 The sentence included a concurrent term for a probation violation on a prior burglary

conviction. 

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C. Conviction And Sentence

The jury found petitioner not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, but guilty of

making criminal threats, false imprisonment and vandalism. RT 576-581. The court sentenced

petitioner to a total term of seven years, four months in prison. CT 251.2

II. AEDPA Standards

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a

judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Although “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one

methodology,” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S 63, 71 (2003), there are certain principles which

guide its application. 

First, the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses are different. As

the Supreme Court has explained:

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to”

clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing

law set forth in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we

have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. The court

may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the

state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from

our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the

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particular case. The focus of the latter inquiry is on whether the

state court’s application of clearly established federal law is

objectively unreasonable, and we stressed in Williams [v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000)] that an unreasonable application is different

from an incorrect one.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). It is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show the state

court’s decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). It is appropriate to look to lower court decisions to

determine what law has been "clearly established" by the Supreme Court and the reasonableness

of a particular application of that law. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir.

2000). 

Second, so long as the state court adjudicated petitioner’s claims on the merits, its

decision is entitled to deference, no matter how brief. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76; Downs v. Hoyt,

232 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2000). The California Supreme Court’s “postcard” denial of a

petition for review is a ruling on the merits of the petition, but this court “looks through” that

denial to the last reasoned decision in the case to determine whether the state courts applied

clearly established federal law in an unreasonable fashion. Gaston v. Palmer, 387 F.3d 1004,

1013 (9th Cir. 2004); Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). However, when the

state court does not issue a “reasoned opinion,” this court must undertake an independent review

of the claims. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982. (9th Cir. 2002). 

Third, in determining whether a state court decision is entitled to deference, it is

not necessary for the state court to cite or even be aware of the controlling federal authorities “so

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v.

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). Moreover, a state court opinion need not contain “a formulary

statement” of federal law, so long as the fair import of its conclusion is consonant with federal

law. Id. 

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III. Sufficiency Of Evidence Of Criminal Threat

In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court examined the role

of a habeas court in considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).

The court continued:

[A] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical

facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it

does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must

defer to that resolution.

Id. at 326. Constitutionally sufficient evidence need not rule out every hypothesis except that of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This court must apply the Jackson standard with “explicit

reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324

n.16.

Petitioner argues here, as he argued in the Court of Appeal, that his threat did not

convey an immediate prospect of execution as required by California Penal Code section 422. 

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument:

We conclude a reasonable jury could find that at least defendant’s

threat, “I should just kill you,” was sufficiently unequivocal,

unconditional, immediate, and specific to convey an immediate

prospect of execution under the circumstances in which defendant

made that threat. There is substantial evidence in the record that

the relationship between defendant and Stacey had soured, leading

to more than one argument in which defendant wielded a knife,

thrusting it into a wall on at least one previous occasion. On the

present occasion, defendant had already broken a bottle at Stacey’s

feet, broken wine glasses in the dining room, and slapped Stacey in

the face. Pursuing her into the bedroom with a knife in hand, he

stood above her as she sat on the bed and said in an ugly tone, “I

should just kill you,” after already telling her, “You are lucky your

daughter is here or I would kill you.” Under all of the surrounding

circumstances, the jury could reasonably find that defendant’s

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statement, “I should just kill you,” was sufficient to convey to

Stacey an immediate prospect – i.e., possibility–that he would do

just that.

Answer, Ex. B at 9.

The elements of a violation of California Penal Code section 422 are:

(1) that the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which

will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, (2) that

the defendant made the threat with the specific intent that the

statement ... is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of

actually carrying it out, (3) that the threat–which may be made

verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication

device–was on its fact and under the circumstances in which it

[was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and

specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose

and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, (4) that the

threat actually caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear

for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s

safety, and (5) that the threatened person’s fear was reasonabl[e]

under the circumstances.

In re George T., 33 Cal. 4th 620, 630 (2004) (citations omitted). Petitioner challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence of the “immediacy” element, arguing that the words “I should just kill

you” suggest that petitioner “did not intend to kill the victim at that time or at no time.” Petition

(Pet.) at 11.

In People v. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 297 (1998), the California Supreme Court

considered the question whether a conditional threat satisfied the immediacy requirement of

section 422. In that case, defendant had sent a letter from the jail to his daughter’s boyfriend,

which said, among other things, “‘If you ever[] touch my daughter again, I’ll have you

permanently removed from the face of this Earth.” 18 Cal. 4th at 336. The court examined the

statute, which provides that the threat must be “‘so . . . unconditional . . . as to convey to the

person threatened a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution to the victim.’” 

Id. at 339-400. It concluded:

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The use of the word “so” indicates that unequivocality,

unconditionality, immediacy and specificity are not absolutely

mandated, but must be sufficiently present in the threat and

surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and

immediate prospect of execution to the victim. 

Id. at 340 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, 

[a] communication that is ambiguous on its face may nonetheless

be found to be a criminal threat if the surrounding circumstances

clarify the communication’s meaning.

In re George T., 33 Cal. 4th at 635. Such “surrounding circumstances” can include the parties’

history, including previous verbal and physical assaults, the victim’s knowledge of domestic

abuse of prior partners, and physical violence around the time of the communication. People v.

Gaut, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1425, 1431 (2nd Dist. 2002) (threats in letters from jail violated § 422

because of parties’ prior history); People v. Butler, 85 Cal. App. 4th 745, 754 (5th Dist. 2000)

(defendant grabbed victim’s arm when he told her she would “get hurt” if she didn’t mind her

own business). 

The Court of Appeal’s determination was neither an unreasonable determination

of the facts or an unreasonable application of the principles of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979). The state court relied on the “surrounding circumstances” to find petitioner’s statement

“I should just kill you” satisfied the requirement of immediacy. Petitioner’s utterance was

punctuated by his physical violence, ranging from destruction of property to display of a knife. 

RT 217-219, 236. During prior arguments, petitioner had armed himself with a knife. RT 227. 

Moreover, Scherbenske was aware of petitioner’s earlier armed threats against Medjed. RT 233;

see also RT 172-173. There was no federal constitutional error. 

IV. The Letter’s Reference To Penalty

At trial, defense counsel argued that petitioner’s letter to Scherbenske should be

edited to delete the reference to the two years, eight months petitioner was facing and his

prediction that he would then be clean because neither statement was probative. RT 122-123. 

The court denied the request. RT 123. 

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The Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim:

Whatever defendant meant exactly, the evidence has a tendency to

prove that defendant believed a reference to a certain period of

incarceration would help convince Stacey not to testify against

him, implying of course that he knew Stacey’s testimony would be

true and that, with her testimony, he would be convicted of the

offenses with which he was charged. Because defendant’s

reference to the punishment he thought he faced even if Stacey did

not testify tended to bolster the showing of his guilty conscience,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant’s

statement regarding his possible punishment was relevant.

As for defendant’s assertion that the court should have excluded

his statement regarding his possible punishment under Evidence

Code section 352, . . . . [w]e conclude the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it concluded the probative value of defendant’s

statement . . . was not substantially outweighed by a probability

that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue

prejudice. As we explained above, defendant’s statement had

probative value because it tended to prove defendant’s guilty

conscience and therefore his guilt. Against this probative value,

defendant fails to explain what undue prejudice was likely to have

flowed from the jury’s consideration of his statement . . . .

Answer, Ex. B at 12-13 (citations omitted). 

In Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit

explained:

The issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied

due process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is

largely beside the point. . . .The issue . . . is not whether

introduction of [the evidence] violated state law evidentiary

principles, but whether the trial court committed an error which

rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it

violated federal due process.

926 F.2d at 919-20 (internal quotation, citations omitted); see also Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d

984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The admission of petitioner’s written prediction of his sentence even if

Scherbenske did not show up for trial did not render his trial arbitrarily or fundamentally unfair. 

Despite the admission of this evidence, the jury was able to consider the strengths and

weaknesses of the evidence and acquit petitioner of the charge of assault with a deadly weapon. 

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RT 576. Nor has petitioner explained how the jury’s awareness of petitioner’s prediction (which

was never shown to be correct or incorrect) caused it to consider the question of his guilt in a

capricious way. The state Court of Appeal’s opinion was not an unreasonable application of

federal law.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct

At trial, the prosecutor asked Scherbenske to tell the jury about “another incident

prior to February 5th where the defendant used a knife in an argument.” Scherbenske replied,

“Just when he gets upset, he always used to go to the kitchen drawer and grab a knife.” RT 211-

212. Defense counsel objected that the answer was non-responsive and the court struck it. RT

212. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor explored the evidentiary basis for the

criminal threats charge, arguing that petitioner’s prior behavior gave immediacy to the threat:

“He had used knives in arguments in the past. She made some statements like whenever we

argue, he went for the knife drawer.” RT 490. Defense counsel objected and asked the court to

declare a mistrial. RT 497-498. The court denied the motion. RT 498-499.

The Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that the prosecutor had committed

misconduct when he referred to the stricken testimony, but found any error de minimis.

Stacey’s unstricken testimony that during arguments on prior

occasions defendant had the knife in his back pocket was

substantially the same as her stricken testimony that when

defendant got upset, “he always used to go to the kitchen drawer

and grab a knife.” In light of this similarity, the prosecutor’s

isolated reference to the stricken testimony did not render the trial

so fundamentally unfair as to violate defendant’s right to due

process. By the same token, we find no reasonable probability that

the prosecutor’s brief reference to the stricken testimony affected

the verdict rendered.

Answer, Ex. B at 16-17.

In general, a prosecutor’s actions will be ground for habeas relief if they “‘so

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” 

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Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.

637 (1974)). In determining the impact of misconduct on the trial, a court must place the

challenged remark in context. Darden, 47 U.S. at 179; Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-66

(1987).

As the state Court of Appeal observed, the prosecutor did refer to Scherbenske’s

statement that petitioner always went for the knife drawer when he got upset, which had been

stricken on defense counsel’s objection that it was unresponsive. RT 211-212. Later, however,

Scherbenske testified without objection that she knew from “prior incidents” that petitioner

would put a knife in his back pocket when the couple argued and had used a knife on at least one

prior occasion to poke a hole in the kitchen wall. RT 227. This “context” of properly admitted

evidence, which conveyed the essence of the stricken testimony, means that the prosecutor’s

argument, whether or not it was improper, did not taint the trial unfairly. The Court of Appeal’s

conclusion is not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

VI. Propensity Evidence

Defense counsel asked the court to exclude evidence of the 1997 incident with

Medjed. RT 42-43. The court rejected counsel’s argument, noting “that incident clearly falls

within the purview of Evidence Code section 1109.” RT 105. The Court of Appeal rejected the

claim of error, relying on People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903 (1999) and People v. Johnson, 77

Cal. App. 4th 410 (3rd Dist. 2000), noting: 

[T]he constitutionality of section 1109 under the due process

clauses of the federal and state constitutions has now been settled.

Answer, Ex. B at 17-18 (citation omitted).

In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991), the Supreme Court left open

the question whether the use of propensity evidence would violate due process. Because the

Court declined to reach the question, there is no clearly established federal law forbidding the use

of such evidence. Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 930

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(2003); see also Smith v. Pliler, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1074-75 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Cal. Evid. 

Code § 1109 does not violate due process); cf. United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026

(9th Cir. 2001) (finding no due process violation in similar provision of Federal Rules of

Evidence). Accordingly, the state Court of Appeal’s decision did not violate clearly established

federal law.

VII. Irregularities In State Procedure

Petitioner argues that the Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court

submitted by appointed appellate counsel contained information from his case and mixed in

documents from the case of a different, “infamous California convicted criminal.” Pet. at 16

(emphasis in original). Irregularities in a state’s post-conviction process, however, do not form

the basis for habeas relief. See Jackson v. Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 1997). A writ

may issue only if a person’s continued confinement violates the federal constitution. See Estelle,

502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a

writ of habeas corpus be denied.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 28, 2005.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2/jone0979.157

Case 2:02-cv-00979-DFL -KJM Document 13 Filed 06/29/05 Page 14 of 14