Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01099/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Pamela Jo Wright-Brown, a married 

woman; and John R. Brown, a married man, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Santander Consumer USA Incorporated, a 

foreign corporation; and Does 1-20, 

fictitious entities, 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-1099-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is the Parties’ Stipulated Motion for Extension of Time 

to File Motion to Remand. (Doc. 10). For the reasons discussed below, this motion is 

denied. 

 Plaintiffs initially filed their Complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court. On 

May 23, 2012, Defendants removed to this Court. On June 25, 2012, the Parties filed the 

instant motion requesting that the Court, pursuant to a stipulation between the Parties, 

extend Plaintiffs’ deadline for filing a motion to remand to July 2, 2012. 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any 

defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the 

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filing of the notice of removal.” “The thirty-day time limit is mandatory, and is intended 

to prescribe a uniform time frame, at the beginning of immediately removable actions, 

within which removal will be effected.” Sandpiper Mgmt., LLC v. JP Morgan Chase & 

Co., 10CV1802, 2010 WL 4055567, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “[T]he thirty-day period may not be enlarged by act of the 

Federal Court, by act of the State Court or by mere consent of the Plaintiff to extend the 

time for removal.” Transp. Indem. Co. v. Fin. Trust Co., 339 F. Supp. 405, 407 (C.D. Cal. 

1972). See also Harris Corp. v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (M.D. Fla. 

2000) (“[S]ection 1446(b)’s mandatory removal period cannot be enlarged by court order, 

stipulation of the parties, or otherwise.). Therefore, “federal courts may not use 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) to enlarge” the thirty-day removal period. Harris Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1151. 

 To the extent that Defendants have represented to Plaintiffs that they will not 

object on timeliness grounds and Plaintiffs have relied upon such representation to their 

detriment, Defendants may have waived the right to make a timeliness objection on any 

motion to remand filed by Plaintiffs. Harris Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (“To silence 

plaintiff’s timeliness objection, defendant must show that it reasonably relied to its 

detriment on plaintiff’s representations that it would not object to removal on timeliness 

grounds.”). However, “litigants cannot stipulate to ignore statutory time periods 

established by Congress.” Id. at 1151. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Parties’ Stipulated Motion for 

Extension of Time to File Motion to Remand (Doc. 10) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 29th day of June, 2012. 

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