Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01036/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01036-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e-2ra Job Discrimination (Race)

---

1

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABUCAR NUNOW ABIKAR, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BRISTOL BAY NATIVE 

CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

[ECF No. 37]

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 37.) The motion is fully briefed. (See ECF No. 42 (Defs.’ 

Response); ECF No. 43 (Pls.’ Reply).) For the reasons explained below, the Court 

DENIES the motion because amending the operative complaint to add the two claims 

proposed by Plaintiffs would be futile. Because additional allegations may cause these 

claim to reach the level of plausibility, however, the Court denies the motion to amend

without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on May 18, 2017, asserting claims of 

discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants in this

case are Bristol Bay Native Corporation (“BBNC”), Glacier Technical Solutions, LLC 

(“GTS”), and Workforce Resources, LLC (“Workforce”). Plaintiffs allege that 

Defendants, Plaintiffs’ employers, discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of race,

color, national origin, gender, sex, and religion, and also retaliated against Plaintiffs for 

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10
2

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

speaking out against such discrimination.1 Plaintiffs amended their claim as a matter of 

course on October 6, 2017, adding claims under California’s Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (“FEHA”). (ECF No. 5.) 

On January 9, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”). (ECF No. 18.) In 

that order, the Court dismissed a sizable portion of Plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed 

Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims because, under 43 U.S.C. § 1626(g), Title VII does not govern 

the actions of Defendants as employers. (Id. at 5–6.) That statute provides:

[f]or the purposes of implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 

U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.], a Native Corporation and corporations, partnerships, 

joint ventures, trusts, or affiliates in which the Native Corporation owns not 

less than 25 per centum of the equity shall be within the class of entities 

excluded from the definition of “employer” by section 701(b)(1) of Public 

Law 88-352 (78 Stat. 253), as amended [42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1)], or 

successor statutes.

43 U.S.C. § 1626(g). Because the FAC alleged that BBNC is an Alaskan Native 

Corporation and that BBNC wholly owns GTS and Workforce, the Court found that 

Defendants were not “employers” for purposes of Title VII. (ECF No. 18 at 5–6.) The 

Court also found that the “federal enclave doctrine” caused federal preemption of 

Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims to the extent that those claims were based on work performed at 

Camp Pendleton. (Id. at 10–11.) The Court explained, however, that the federal enclave 

doctrine did not cause preemption of Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims premised on work 

performed outside of Camp Pendleton. (Id. at 11–13.) Last, while the Court rejected 

Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it noted that § 1981 

provided only for claims of disparate treatment on the basis of race, and not for claims 

based on a disparate impact theory or asserting sex or religion discrimination. (Id. at 13–

16.)

 

1 A more detailed description of the factual allegations in this case can be found in the Court’s ruling on 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 18.)

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10
3

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On May 22, 2018, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. 

(ECF No. 37.) The Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“PSAC”), attached to the 

motion, adds claims of (1) breach of contract and (2) fraud and deceit. (See ECF No. 37-

3 (PSAC); ECF No. 44 (redline version of the PSAC, displaying proposed changes to the 

FAC).) 

The new breach of contract claim alleges that while Plaintiffs were employed by 

Defendants, 

written and oral representations were made to [Plaintiffs] stating that as a 

term and condition of their employment, any employee who believed he or 

she was treated in a manner that violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 

VII . . . due to discrimination, harassment, or retaliation as prohibited by 

Title VII had the right to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) the federal agency 

charged by law with receiving and investigating and, if appropriate, 

prosecuting claims of discrimination under Title VII.

(PSAC ¶ 126.) The PSAC lists three such representations: (1) a poster in GTS’s 

Oceanside office stating that employees experiencing discrimination should contact the 

EEOC (PSAC ¶ 126(a)); (2) Workforce’s employee handbook (see ECF No. 13 at 5–102), 

which stated, inter alia, that no Workforce employee “will discriminate against . . . a 

fellow employee because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, 

veteran’s or any other legally-protected status” (PSAC ¶ 126(b) (incorporating by 

reference the relevant portion of Workforce’s handbook, found at ECF No. 13)); and

(3) BBNC’s website, which, at the time the FAC was filed, included a statement that 

BBNC was an “equal opportunity employer” that “recruit[s], employ[s], train[s], 

compensate[s], and promote[s] without regard to race, religion, creed, color, national 

origin, age, [or] gender” and that “EEO is the law,” and also had a link connected to the 

EEOC website and an EEOC poster referring to Title VII and directing employees to file 

complaints of discrimination with the EEOC (PSAC ¶ 126(c)). The PSAC alleges that 

 

2 Pagination citations in this order refer to the pagination provided by the CM/ECF system.

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
4

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

these representations created a contractual obligation on the part of Defendants to comply 

with Title VII by avoiding discrimination and providing Plaintiffs with remedies if they 

experienced discrimination. (PSAC ¶ 127.) The PSAC also alleges that Plaintiffs relied 

on these representations when they accepted employment with Defendants. (PSAC ¶ 

128.) According to the PSAC, Defendants breached these contractual obligations by 

taking the position in their earlier motion to dismiss that Plaintiffs are not entitled to Title 

VII’s protections. (PSAC ¶¶ 129–30.)

The proposed fraud and deceit claim is based on the same factual premise. (See

PSAC ¶ 137.) The PSAC alleges that the representations discussed above were false 

because Plaintiffs were, in fact, not covered by Title VII, and that Defendants knowingly 

made these false statements to induce Plaintiffs to accept and continue their employment 

by Defendants. (PSAC ¶¶ 138–39.) According to the PSAC, Plaintiffs did not discover 

this fraud until they unsuccessfully sought redress as a result of experiencing 

discrimination. (PSAC ¶ 140.)

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs that after a plaintiff amends her 

complaint as a matter of course, she “may amend [her] pleading only with the opposing 

party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” and that “[t]he court should freely give leave 

when justice so requires.” The Court considers “four factors when reviewing a decision 

whether to permit an amendment: (1) bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs; (2) undue 

delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; and (4) futility of the proposed amendment.” 

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiffs should not be granted leave to file the 

PSAC because amending the complaint as proposed would be futile. Considering the 

PSAC as proposed, the Court agrees. 

A proposed pleadings amendment that adds new claims is futile when the proposed 

claims are not supported by facts setting out a plausible claim for relief. See Labrador v. 

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 10
5

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Seattle Mortg. Co., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2010). To state a plausible 

claim for relief, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations,” but must allege 

more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[F]or a complaint 

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable 

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the 

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

A. Breach of Contract

According to Defendants, adding the PSAC’s breach of contract claim would be 

futile because none of the representations at issue created, or were included in, a contract 

between any of Defendants and any of Plaintiffs. Under California law, a plaintiff 

asserting a breach of contract must prove (1) “the existence of the contract,” 

(2) “plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance,” (3) “defendant’s breach,” 

and (4) “the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 

P.3d 1115, 1121 (Cal. 2011). The Court agrees that the PSAC’s proposed breach of 

contract claim does not state a plausible claim for relief.

Defendants argue that the PSAC’s allegation that GTS displayed a poster 

instructing employees to contact the EEOC in the event that they experience 

discrimination does not support a plausible breach of contract claim because it is not 

plausible that Plaintiffs, most of whom cannot read English, read and understood the

poster. But the PSAC cites a statement by Plaintiff Osman M. Mohamed that while 

working for GTS, he saw, read, and understood the poster, and as a result he went to the 

EEOC in light of his facing discrimination. (See ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 3–4.) Thus, Plaintiffs 

have alleged that at least one of them read and understood the poster. Nonetheless, the 

Court agrees that the allegations about that poster do not support a breach of contract 

claim. According to the PSAC and the Mohamed declaration (incorporated by reference 

in the PSAC), the poster in GTS’s office stated that employees who want to complain

about employment discrimination should contact the EEOC. (PSAC ¶ 126(a); ECF No. 

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10
6

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 ¶ 3.) Even assuming that this was a binding promise on Defendants’ part, the PSAC 

does not allege that Defendants breached that promise. There is no allegation that 

Defendants prevented Plaintiffs from contacting the EEOC, which was the only 

“promise” made in the poster as it is described in the PSAC. To the extent the poster 

made any additional promise—such as an assertion that Title VII governs Defendants’ 

actions—the PSAC fails to allege its existence. Because the PSAC does not allege any 

breach of a promise made in the subject poster, the poster cannot serve as the basis for a 

breach of contract claim.

Second, Workforce’s employee handbook did not create a contract with Plaintiffs

because the handbook expressly stated that its contents do not create a contract with 

Workforce’s employees. Under California law, an employee handbook that expressly 

clarifies that it is not to be considered part of an employment contract cannot provide the 

basis for a breach of contract claim. See, e.g., Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 

46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 24–25 (Ct. App. 1995) (relying on a handbook’s statement that its 

contents did not create contractual rights to conclude that the handbook could not support

a claim of contractual agreement). Defendants have offered a complete version of the 

handbook.3 The first page of the handbook states the following:

The policies and procedures contained in this manual constitute guidelines 

only and have been prepared for the use and reference of role players 

employed by the Company on a government services contract to support 

U.S. Military training. They do not constitute an employment contract or 

any part of an employment contract, nor are they intended to make any 

commitment to any employee concerning how individual employment action 

 

3 Normally, the Court may not consider evidence offered by a defendant when considering the 

sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations. The Court may consider the contents of the handbook offered by 

Defendants in these circumstances, however, because the handbook is central to Plaintiffs’ claims of 

breach of contract and fraud, the PSAC refers to a copy of the handbook that provides only an excerpt of 

its contents, and Plaintiffs do not contest the authenticity of the copy offered by Defendants. See, e.g., 

United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e may also consider 

unattached evidence on which the complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the 

document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity 

of the document.” (quoting Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10
7

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

can, should, or will be handled. 

(ECF No. 42-2 at 8.) It is clear that Workforce’s handbook disavowed any contractual 

rights stemming from its provisions; as a result, it could not have supported a contractual 

agreement between Workforce and Plaintiffs. See Gariblaid v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. C 

13-02223 SI, 2014 WL 1338563, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (reaching same 

conclusion).

Last, the statement on BBNC’s website regarding discrimination, without further 

supporting allegations, does not alleged a contract between BBNC and Plaintiffs. There 

is no allegation in the PSAC stating that any of Plaintiffs viewed BBNC’s website or read

and understood the statement regarding discrimination. Nor is it reasonable to infer, 

based on the allegations that appear in the PSAC, that any of Plaintiffs did so. As the 

PSAC and its predecessors allege, only a handful of Plaintiffs in this case “speak or 

understand English,” and “[o]f those who speak English, far fewer can read English.” 

(PSAC ¶ 4.) Without any additional allegations suggesting that any of Plaintiffs viewed 

BBNC’s website, let alone read the statement at issue, Plaintiffs cannot rely on that 

statement in asserting a breach of contract claim. Cf. Herrera v. Estee Lauder Cos., Inc., 

No, SACV 12-01169-CJC (ANx), 2012 WL 12507876, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) 

(dismissing on standing grounds plaintiffs’ claim that defendant made false statement on 

a website because plaintiffs failed to allege that they viewed the website). Under 

California law, an essential element of a contract is consent. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1550 

(“It is essential to the existence of a contract that there should be: [1] Parties capable of 

contracting; [2] Their consent; [3] A lawful object; and, [4] A sufficient cause or 

consideration.”). Without ever seeing the representation on BBNC’s website, none of the 

plaintiffs in this case could have consented to that provision as a term of any contract.4

 

4 Defendants also point out that the PSAC alleges that this statement was on BBNC’s website “[a]t the 

time Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint was filed.” (PSAC ¶ 126(c).) According to the declaration of 

Carol Giannini—Workforce’s General Manager until July 2017—Workforce ended Plaintiffs’ 

employment in July 2017. (ECF No. 42-2.) The First Amended Complaint was not filed until October 

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
8

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In sum, the PSAC, as currently proposed, does not present a plausible claim for 

breach of contract. Amending the FAC to add such a claim would therefore be futile.

B. Fraud and Deceit

The second claim Plaintiffs seek to add is for fraud and deceit. Such a claim 

requires a plaintiff to show (1) “misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or 

nondisclosure)”; (2) “knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’)”; (3) “intent to defraud, i.e. to 

induce reliance”; (4) “justifiable reliance”; and (5) “resulting damage.” Engalla v. 

Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 974 (Cal. 1997) (quoting Lazar v. Superior 

Court, 909 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1996)). The PSAC alleges that Defendants engaged in 

fraud and deceit by making the same three representations underlying the proposed 

breach of contract claim discussed above. (See PSAC ¶ 137.) For the same reasons 

discussed above, these statements cannot support a fraud and deceit claim. 

First, the poster at GTS’s office cannot support a claim for fraud because there is 

no allegation in the PSAC that Defendants did anything contrary to what the poster (as it 

is described in the PSAC) stated: there is no allegation, for example, that GTS prevented 

Plaintiffs from contacting the EEOC after Plaintiffs experienced discrimination. As a 

result, the PSAC does not allege, with respect to the poster, any misrepresentation. 

Second, Workforce’s handbook could not have induced any reliance. Its preface stated:

“[t]he policies and procedures contained in this manual constitute guidelines only 

and . . . are [not] intended to make any commitment to any employee concerning how 

individual employment action can, should, or will be handled.” (ECF No. 42-2 at 8.) 

Any reliance on the assertions made inside the handbook would not have been 

reasonable. See OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp., 

 

6, 2017, after Plaintiffs stopped working for Workforce. (ECF No. 5.) This contention does not support 

Defendants’ futility argument, however, because the inquiry here asks only whether it is reasonable to 

infer that Plaintiffs viewed the statement on BBNC’s website. The PSAC’s allegation that the subject

statement was on BBNC’s website on October 6, 2017, enables a reasonable inference that the same 

statement was there prior to that date.

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 10
9

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 863 (Ct. App. 2007) (“To establish [justifiable reliance], plaintiffs 

must show (1) that they actually relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations, and (2) that 

they were reasonable in doing so.” (emphasis added)). Last, the statement on BBNC’s 

website cannot support a fraud claim because there is no allegation that any of Plaintiffs 

viewed the statement. Without at least enabling the inference that anyone viewed the 

statement, Plaintiffs cannot allege reliance. 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, permitting Plaintiffs to file the PSAC as it is currently 

composed would be futile.5 Additional factual allegations, however, might enable 

Plaintiffs to assert a plausible claim of breach of contract and/or fraud and deceit. As a 

result, the Court DENIES the motion to amend without prejudice. If Plaintiffs wish to 

seek further amendment of the operative complaint, they must do so within fourteen days 

of the date this order is issued.

In their opposition to this motion, Defendants highlight the fact that Plaintiffs’ 

counsel has consistently failed to meet Court-established deadlines in this case and has 

failed to adhere to the Court’s local rules. (See ECF No. 42 at 30–31.) The Court 

acknowledges this pattern of conduct, and it warns Plaintiffs’ counsel that it is unlikely to 

grant a last-minute (or untimely) request to extend the deadline for filing any further 

motion to amend the complaint.

//

 

5 At the conclusion of their opposition to the motion to amend, Defendants also assert that, by raising 

these new claims, Plaintiffs are “improperly attempt[ing] to reopen [their] Title VII claims” that the 

Court dismissed in its earlier ruling. (ECF No. 42 at 31–32.) The Court rejects this assertion. As the 

Court explained in its previous ruling, while Title VII does not govern Defendants’ conduct as 

employers, contract and/or tort law may provide Plaintiffs with an analogous claim if Defendants made a 

promise to Plaintiffs that Defendants would adhere to Title VII’s provisions. (See ECF No. 18 at 6 

(“Parties cannot amend a statutory provision via contract. They can, of course, agree on terms in a 

contract paralleling the requirements and prohibitions of a statute. But even if Defendants’ contract with 

the federal government commits Defendants to a nondiscrimination policy mirroring Title VII, Plaintiffs 

would not be able to seek legal redress through Title VII; instead, Plaintiffs would have to rely on a 

different source of law for their claims.”).)

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 10
10

3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2018

Case 3:17-cv-01036-GPC-AGS Document 45 Filed 07/20/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 10