Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01605/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01605-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Jeffrey Pratt, II, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CIV 13-01605 PHX GMS MEA

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Bradley Carroll, John Lucas, )

Brian Morgenthaler, )

Roibert Englert, Megan Katharine )

Jacobson, Chandler Regional )

Hospital, Chandler Police )

Department, Walmart, )

)

 Defendants. )

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a prisoner civil

rights complaint and an application (Doc. 2) for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on August 7, 2013. Plaintiff docketed

a first amended complaint (Doc. 6) on August 30, 2013. There

are no Jane Doe or John Doe defendants named in the amended

complaint. In the first amended complaint Plaintiff alleged,

inter alia, that, while under arrest by the Chandler Police

Department and at the Chandler Regional Hospital, Defendants

Lucas and Morganthaler, who are Chandler police officers,

forcibly restrained Plaintiff while “nurses” twice inserted a

catheter. See Doc. 6.

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1

 The first page of the screening order indicates a Fourth

Amendment claim, and later in the order the Court references a claim

for excessive force. Plaintiff alleged that, while under arrest, he

had refused to give a urine sample and refused medical care and that

no warrant had been obtained.

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In an order (Doc. 9) issued January 8, 2014, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, dismissed Defendants Walmart, Chandler Regional

Hospital, the City of Chandler Police Department, Carroll, and

Englert, and ordered Defendants Lucas and Morganthaler to answer

Plaintiff’s claim (Count I (in part) and Count IV (in part)) of

the first amended complaint, alleging that these two defendants

forcibly restrained him for the purpose of catheterization in

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free of

an unlawful search and excessive force.1 The Court found that

Plaintiff had also stated a claim for relief based on the tort

of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Doc. 9.

On March 28, 2014, Defendants Lucas and Morganthaler

moved to dismiss Count IV. In an order entered May 19, 2014,

the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See

Doc. 18. A scheduling order was issued June 2, 2014, requiring

that any motion to add parties or amend the complaint be

docketed by October 30, 2014, and that all discovery be

completed by December 4, 2014. The matter was reassigned on

June 30, 2014. See Doc. 21.

On June 2, 2014, Plaintiff docketed a motion (Doc. 30)

captioned as one seeking to “amend pleading or join parties”.

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Plaintiff asked the Court to “bring in” parties, i.e., the

Chandler Regional Hospital and four employees of the hospital.

Plaintiff’s pleading indicated these individuals were witnesses

to the events alleged in his first amended complaint. The

pleading did not indicate any factual claims against these

individuals nor did the pleading attached a proposed amended

complaint and, accordingly, the motion was denied on July 30,

2014. See Doc. 36. The parties have engaged in discovery. The

depositions of Sandra Sovereign and Wilma Egan, who were alleged

to be nurses present at the time of the catheterization alleged

in the complaint, were noticed by Defendants. See Doc. 42 &

Doc. 43. Plaintiff’s deposition was noticed for September 17,

2014. See Doc. 49. 

On September 4, 2014, Plaintiff docketed a motion

seeking to amend the first amended complaint at Doc. 6. See

Doc. 46. Plaintiff averred he had ascertained the identities of

the people in the room when he was forcibly catheterized.

Plaintiff sought to “bring in” to this action as defendants an

unknown Chandler Police Officer, Doctor Keith C. Butler, Sandra

Sovereign, a nurse, Wilma Egan, a nurse, and John Plummer, a

nurse, “all who either ordered the catheterization or took part

in it”. Plaintiff also seeks to add as defendants the Chandler

Regional Hospital and the City of Chandler, based on these

entities’ employment of named Defendants. The motion was denied

on July 30, 2014, because Plaintiff had not lodged a proposed

amended complaint. 

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On September 24, 2014, Plaintiff docketed a motion for

leave to amend his complaint, see 51, and on October 6, 2014,

Plaintiff lodged a proposed amended complaint (Doc. 52).

Defendants opposed the motion on October 6, 2014, arguing that

Plaintiff did not lodge a proposed amended complaint in tandem

with his motion. See Doc. 53. Defendants further argue:

Even if Plaintiff’s recent motion is

interpreted as an amended complaint,

Plaintiff’s renewed motion is also inadequate

because it completely fails to identify any

other defendants by name other than “3

[unidentified] police officers” and “3 [now

still unidentified] hospital personnel” who

catheterized him pursuant to a doctor’s

orders, and how they specifically

participated in the acts. Although

Plaintiff’s earlier motion identified some

medical staff by name, until they are

actually identified in an amended complaint,

it is impossible to determine who he actually

intends to assert claims against. As with his

earlier unsuccessful attempt to bring in an

unknown third police officer, his renewed

motion to amend still only alleges that an

“unknown 3rd police officer” somehow also

participated. Doc. 51 at 5. Plaintiff goes so

far to admit that he “never said” that the

officers “ordered the urinalysis” (Doc 51 at

3), but only that they generally “partook in

it,” (Id.), and were “in the room” (Doc. 51

at 4), but he still fails to plead the

specific acts that allegedly make each

individual liable. Absent these allegations

that the court advised him were necessary, it

is also impossible to conduct additional

discovery.

Defendants also argue: 

Without more than is alleged now it is even

doubtful that the privately owned Dignity

Health, Chandler Regional Medical Center is

liable under section 1983. Kia P. v.

McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 2000)

(privately owned and administered hospital

was not a “state actor” under § 1983 when its

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employees tested child’s urine for drugs).

Additionally, the current filings do not

allege a single fact about any theory of

liability of the City of Chandler.

On October 17, 2014, Defendants filed a motion (Doc.

54) to strike the lodged amended complaint at Doc. 52. On

October 21, 2014, Defendants docketed a motion for summary

judgment. See Doc. 55. Defendants aver:

Defendants John Brett Lucas and Brian

Morgenthaler now move for summary judgment

based on the defense of qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s only remaining claim for

excessive force (alleged in part in Count I)

when Defendants Lucas and Morgenthaler

assisted in holding him down while hospital

nursing staff catheterized him for a urine

sample without his consent or a warrant. See

Doc. 9 (dismissing Count I (in part) and

Counts II & III) & 18 (dismissing intentional

infliction of emotion al distress). This

motion is made on the grounds that qualified

immunity protects the police officers who

assisted medical staff in catheterizing the

Plaintiff on the grounds that the

catheterization and the urine sample was

obtained solely by Chandler Regional Medical

Center medical staff on a doctor’s orders for

medical purposes to treat Plaintiff, and such

urine sample and catheterization was not

requested or ordered by the officers for any

law enforcement or governmental purposes, and

was not used for any such purposes.

Defendants assert:

On September 11, 2012, after receiving a

report of the attempted use of a stolen

credit card being used at a Chandler Walmart,

Chandler Police Officers Lucas and Carroll

encountered the Plaintiff in the checkout

line at the Walmart. DSOF ¶ 1. As Officers

Lucas and Carroll attempted to arrest Pratt,

an altercation ensued in which Pratt

forcefully struggled to get free, yelled,

screamed and resisted the officers’ attempts

to handcuff him. DSOF ¶ 2. During the

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struggle, Pratt was “tased” by one of the

officers, and was eventually handcuffed. DSOF

¶ 3. Officer Morgenthaler arrived shortly

thereafter. DSOF ¶ 4. During the struggle

with officers, Pratt suffered a bleeding head

injury and blood was left on the floor of the

Walmart. DSOF ¶ 5 and ¶ 6. Even after being

handcuffed, as the officers attempted to

search him, Pratt intermittently either

continued to forcefully struggle with

officers or went limp, and they eventually

had to take him to the ground to search him.

DSOF ¶ 7. When Pratt was eventually placed in

the back of a patrol car, he had problems

sitting up, went limp and slumped over, and

was unresponsive to officers’ repeated

inquiries about what was wrong. DSOF ¶ 8.

Because of Pratt’s behavior and

unresponsiveness, Chandler Fire Department

personnel were summoned to treat Pratt’s

injuries and he was transported to the

Chandler Regional Medical Center emergency

room. DSOF ¶ 9. Even while in the ambulance

being transported, Pratt was extremely

agitated, breathing heavily, and yelling

incoherent statements and profanities. DSOF

¶ 10.

In the Chandler Regional Medical Center

emergency room, Officers Morgenthaler, Lucas

and Carroll were present with nurses and

other medical staff while the medical staff

treated Pratt’s injuries. DSOF ¶ 11. Because

Pratt was still under arrest and in the

officers’ custody in the emergency room he

was handcuffed to a gurney. DSOF ¶ 13. During

his treatment, Pratt was agitated from time

to time. DSOF ¶ 13.

John Plummer is a registered nurse who worked

at the Chandler Regional Medical Center

emergency room where ambulances typically

off-load patients, and he assisted in Pratt’s

treatment there that day. DSOF ¶¶ 14–15. For

the purposes of assessing and treating

patients in the emergency room, it was

Plummer’s practice to review EMS records that

fire and ambulance personnel typically

provide to emergency room nurses in the

emergency room. DSOF ¶¶ 16-17. When Pratt

arrived there Nurse Plummer’s role and his

practice in assessing patients would have

been to review this record for Pratt, and he

likely did so. DSOF ¶¶ 17-18. According to

Pratt’s EMS record when he arrived at the

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emergency room his condition was described as

“ALOC” (altered level of consciousness), he

had a heart rate of 126, a hematoma injury on

his head, was reported to have

methamphetamine in his possession, and was

aggressive. DSOF ¶ 16. In assessing and

treating Pratt, Nurse Plummer was concerned

with the information on the EMS record that

showed that Pratt was reactive only to pain,

that he had an altered level of consciousness

and a high heart rate of 126, and that Pratt

had been found to be in possession of

methamphetamine. DSOF ¶ 19. During Pratt’s

treatment the attending physician ordered

that a urinalysis be performed. DSOF ¶ 20.

Because of the information about Pratt’s

condition and his reported possession of

methamphetamine, Nurse Plummer was concerned

that Pratt had ingested something such as

methamphetamine, which can cause muscle

breakdown; to reverse the effects of any

drugs, a urinalysis or drug screen was needed

to treat Pratt because it was the only method

to determine “what was going on with him” and

what drugs were “in board.” DSOF ¶¶ 21, 22,

42, 44. Because of Pratt’s altered level of

consciousness and high heart rate, a

urinalysis was also needed determine whether

he had an infection, an electrolyte

imbalance, there was protein or sugar in his

urine, and he was having a diabetic reaction,

or suffering from rhabdomyolosis or

dehydration and renal failure, which can be

fatal. DSOF ¶¶ 23–24. After Pratt either

refused or was unresponsive to Plummer’s

request to provide a urine sample in a

urinal, Plummer asked for and received the

doctor’s permission to obtain a urine sample

by catheterization. DSOF ¶¶ 26-31.

Because Pratt’s violent behavior during

Plummer’s first attempt to catheterize Pratt

for a urine sample caused both the nurses and

the officers to be concerned that they could

be injured. For this reason Plummer knew he

needed help and asked for assistance from

other nurses and the officers in holding

Pratt to avoid an assault or injury to any

medical staff or Pratt. DSOF ¶¶ 32–39.

Plummer had obtained such assistance from

officers in the past in similar circumstances

with violent patients. DSOF ¶ 38. The

officers only assisted medical staff in

holding Pratt during the nurse’s

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catheterization and did not request Pratt to

provide a urine sample, or request or order

the nurses to obtain a urine sample or

catheterize Pratt. DSOF ¶¶ 38–44. Plummer

testified that the officers in the room “were

really the last thing on my mind, to be quite

honest. I wanted to know what was going on

with him [Pratt],” and he did not catheterize

Pratt to assist the officers in any way. DSOF

¶ 44. Pratt’s eventual urinalysis and drug

screen was significant to Plummer because it

was positive for methamphetamine and Pratt

could not be safely sent home immediately but

had to be observed for a period of time. DSOF

¶ 42.

Plummer agreed that he catheterized Pratt

solely from a medical standpoint and to

provide Pratt proper medical treatment.

Doc. 55.

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

that a plaintiff should be given leave to amend his complaint

when justice so requires. See, e.g., United States v. Hougham,

364 U.S. 310, 316, 81 S. Ct. 13, 17 (1960); Howey v. United

States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). “Courts are free

to grant a party leave to amend whenever ‘justice so requires,’

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and requests for leave are generally

granted with ‘extreme liberality.’” Moss v. United States

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Owens

v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th

Cir. 2001). However, granting a plaintiff leave to amend “is

subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause undue

prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is

not futile.” Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d

789, 799 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Additionally, the

Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), requires

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dismissal of allegations that fail to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d

1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Granting or denying leave to amend

is within the Court’s discretion. See Mirmehdi v. United States,

689 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] party is not entitled to

an opportunity to amend his complaint if any potential amendment

would be futile....”(citation omitted)).

Futility of amendment is sufficient to justify denial

of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland,

627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815 (9th Cir. 1995). A proposed amended complaint is futile if

it would be immediately “subject to dismissal” pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted, accepting all of the

facts alleged as true. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143

F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Riverview Health Inst. LLC v.

Medical Mutual of Ohio,601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010); Briggs

v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003). 

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff “must show

(1) that Defendants deprived [him or] her of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that, in

doing so, Defendants acted under color of state law.” Jensen v.

Lane County, 222 F.3d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 2000). For a

deprivation of a right to be committed under color of law, it

“must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege

created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the

state or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and

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2

 In Cook the court found summary judgment was not

appropriate because it was unknown if the urine sample was acquired

for the purpose of providing evidence of a crime, stating: 

The record supports the conclusion that Dr.

Karlin ordered a urine test, but it is silent as

to whether he ordered staff to forcibly

catheterize plaintiff. Kibbee and Smith [the

officers] physically held down plaintiff for the

procedure and obtained a sample for criminal

investigation purposes. Viewing this evidence in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, a

reasonable fact finder could conclude that Kibbee

and Smith helped cause the catheterization to

occur.”)

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“the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may

fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil

Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753-54 (1982). A

section 1983 claim may be brought against a private party when

that party “is a willful participant in joint action with the

State or its agents.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092

(9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).

The proposed amendments are futile. The federal courts

have concluded that when an arrestee is catheterized against

their will for a purely medical purpose, as compared to the

purpose of seizure of evidence, and when the catheterization is

conducted pursuant to the order of a doctor who is an employee

of a private medical facility, even when police officers assist

in restraining the arrestee, the plaintiff may not recover

pursuant to section 1983 for an illegal search and seizure or a

violation of their right to due process. See Sullivan v.

Bornemann, 384 F.3d 372, 376-77 (7th Cir. 2004); Cook v. Olathe

Medical Center Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1008-12 & n.28-32 (D.

Kan. 2011)(collecting and explaining cases)2; Saulsberry v.

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Maricopa County, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116-17 (D. Ariz.

2001)(“Because Plaintiff was catheterized solely for medical

reasons, it does not constitute either a search or a seizure.”);

Rudy v. Village of Sparta, 990 F. Supp. 924, 929 (W.D. Mich.

1996)(holding that where police officer waived inapplicable

search warrant, attempted to restrain plaintiff, and instructed

technician to “just do it”, he was not liable for search because

the doctor ordered the catheterization and police officer told

the technician to “just do it” only after plaintiff refused to

comply with the doctor’s orders); Lovett v. Boddy, 810 F. Supp.

844, 848–49 (W.D. Ky. 1993)(holding that police officer is not

liable for warrantless search where he did not cause the

catheterization to take place). These cases note that, because

section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment are directed at the

states, relief is available only when the alleged injury is

caused by “state action” and not by a private actor, against

whom tort remedies may be sought in state court. Accordingly,

the section 1983 claims stated by Plaintiff in the lodged

amended complaint against the medical personnel and the hospital

are not cognizable. See, e.g., United States v. Walther, 652

F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that “where the private

party had a legitimate independent motivation for” engaging in

the challenged conduct, the Fourth Amendment does not apply);

United States v. Howard, 752 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1985)

(finding that a private party is not an agent of the government

when “the intent of the private party conducting the search is

entirely independent of the government’s intent to collect

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evidence for use in a criminal prosecution”); Rudy, 990 F. Supp.

at 930-31. See also United States v. Chukwubike, 956 F.2d 209,

212 (9th Cir. 1992)(holding that physicians were not government

agents and did not conduct a “search” when they acted for

medical reasons to save plaintiff’s life by removing balloons

containing heroin from plaintiff’s stomach and rectum and that

the lack of plaintiff’s consent did not nullify the physicians’

medical judgment).

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 51) for

leave to amend his complaint be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

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Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2014.

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