Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01024/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01024-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

EARL N. EPPS, PH.D. and KAREN

EPPS, husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

PHOENIX ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, and its GOVERNING

BOARD, a political subdivision of the

State of Arizona, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-1024-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants

Phoenix Elementary School District and its Governing Board. (Dkt. # 15.) For the reasons

set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Earl N. Epps is an African-American man who was over the age of 40 at all

times relevant to this action. Plaintiff was formerly employed by Defendant Phoenix

Elementary School District (“the District”) as the principal of Bethune Elementary School

(“Bethune”). Plaintiff was hired in 1995 and remained principal until June 30, 2005, when

his employment contract expired. During his last few years of employment with the

District, Plaintiff was supervised by then-superintendent Dr. Rene Diaz. On April 5, 2005,

the District’s Governing School Board (“the Board”) voted not to renew Plaintiff’s

employment contract, ostensibly because of the possible closure of Bethune as a result of

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the school’s low academic performance. The next day, Plaintiff received written notice of

the Board’s decision as well as a teaching contract offer and an invitation to apply for open

positions within the District. Plaintiff declined the teaching offer and did not apply for any

of the open positions. On May 31, 2005, the Board voted to close Bethune for the 2005-2006

school year. It is not entirely clear from the record when Bethune actually closed its doors,

nor is it clear what was happening at Bethune during the 2005-2006 school year. Eventually,

however, in July of 2006, Bethune was reopened and a Caucasian female under the age of

40 became principal for the 2006-2007 school year. 

Around the time of Plaintiff’s non-renewal, the District also declined to renew the

contracts of two other principals, Albert Castruita (a Hispanic) and Tom Weaver (a

Caucasian), again on the basis of the possibility that their schools would be closed.

Castruita’s school was eventually closed and, like Plaintiff, he was invited to apply for

administrative vacancies. He did so and was hired. Ultimately, the Board voted not to close

Weaver’s school, and, as a result, it extended him a new contract.

Plaintiff also alleges in his Complaint that during his employment he witnessed

disparate treatment of two similarly-situated employees of the District, one Caucasian and one

African-American. Plaintiff suspected that both had been involved in embezzlement and that

the African-American employee received a much harsher punishment than the Caucasian

employee. Plaintiff claims that when he voiced his concern of disparate treatment to Diaz,

in November of 2004, Diaz reacted with hostility. Plaintiff also claims that, after he informed

his leadership team (who in turn informed parents and community members) of the Board

meeting on March 1, 2005, in which the possible closure of Bethune was discussed, Diaz once

again became very upset with him.

Plaintiff filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) on October 13, 2005, alleging that the District’s treatment of him violated Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act as well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).

(Dkt. # 16 Ex. D.) Plaintiff did not allege in the charge that he was retaliated against either

for reporting disparate treatment based on race or for informing his leadership team of the

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Board meeting addressing the potential closure of Bethune. Nor did Plaintiff check the

“Retaliation” box on the EEOC charge form. Rather, in his charge Plaintiff only claimed that

the non-renewal of his employment contract resulted from both race and age discrimination.

(Id.) The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on February 28, 2007. (Dkt. # 16 at 4.) On May

22, 2007, Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action, alleging that Defendants

discriminated against him on the basis of race and age. (Dkt. # 2 at 2-3.) Plaintiff also

alleged retaliation based on his allegations that others were disparately treated based on their

race and his discussion with his leadership team regarding the closure of Bethune. (Id. at 3.)

Finally, Plaintiff makes state law claims for retaliatory discharge, wrongful termination,

breach of contract, and defamation. (Id. at 2-3.) On October 31, 2008, Defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. # 15.)

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Citadel

Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the party opposing

summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s]

pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586-87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.

1995); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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1

 Defendants do not argue that the acts underlying Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fail to

constitute “protected activity.” Wrighten v. Metro. Hosp., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.

1984) (explaining that in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, he

must show, among other things, that he was engaged in protected activity). Thus, for the

purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that Plaintiff’s factual allegations implicate

protected activity.

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II. Analysis

A. Federal Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in response to his accusation of

racially disparate treatment and based on his discussion with his leadership team regarding

the potential closure of Bethune. (Dkt. # 19 at 2-3.) Defendants assert, however, that

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is precluded because Plaintiff did not include these allegations in

his charge with the EEOC. (Dkt. # 15 at 7.) More specifically, Defendants argue that,

because the allegations included in his EEOC charge are based on different facts than his

retaliation claim, and because Plaintiff failed to check the box marked “Retaliation” on the

EEOC form, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his claim is

therefore precluded. (Id.)

1

The Ninth Circuit has held that “Title VII claimants generally establish federal court

jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920

F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). The federal court’s “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction extends

over all allegations of discrimination that either fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual

investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the

charge of discrimination.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotations omitted); see also Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[T]he district court has jurisdiction over any charges of discrimination that are like or

reasonably related to the allegations made before the EEOC. . . .”) (internal quotations

omitted); Sosa, 920 F.2d at 1456. Moreover, this Circuit has repeatedly held that because

such charges are made by those who are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of formal

pleading, the charges are to be construed liberally. Sosa, 920 F.2d at 1456; see also B.K.B.,

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2

Plaintiff argues that he “submitted ample documentary and verbal information to the

EEOC,” and that based on this information the EEOC would have had notice of his

retaliation claim. (Dkt. # 19 at 6.) However, Plaintiff has provided the Court with no such

information aside from the EEOC charge itself. Plaintiff has therefore failed to set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

3

 Additionally, discrimination claims must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days

of the alleged discriminatory acts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Laquaglia v. Rio

Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, assuming that the last

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276 F.3d at 1100; Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir.

1997); Chung v. Pomona Valley Cmty. Hosp., 667 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff failed to mark the box labeled “Retaliation” as a basis for his EEOC charge.

The mere absence of a checked box on his EEOC charge, however, is not necessarily

dispositive of the issue. The content of his charge must be examined to determine whether

it was likely that the EEOC’s investigation would uncover the alleged retaliation. See Leong,

347 F.3d at 1122; B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100. Thus, whether the retaliation charge was “like

or reasonably related” to the allegations made to the EEOC is the dispositive inquiry. Leong,

347 F.3d at 1122. In the written statement describing the particulars of his charge, Plaintiff

alleged only that his employment contract was not renewed and that it was his belief that he

had “been discriminated against because of [his] race . . . and because of [his] age . . . .” (Dkt.

# 16 Ex. D.) The charge includes neither an allegation of retaliation nor facts supporting the

claim Plaintiff now advances. Rather, Plaintiff’s charge to the EEOC was narrow in scope,

focusing solely on race and age discrimination. Plaintiff pointed to no specific acts besides

the fact that his contract was not renewed. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is predicated on a

different set of facts than are his race and age discrimination claims, and thus is not “like or

reasonably related” to his discrimination charge. Given the information in the EEOC charge,

an investigation of the retaliation claim Plaintiff now brings could not reasonably be expected

to grow out of the investigation of his personal discrimination claims.2

 As a result, Plaintiff

has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for the retaliation claim, and it must therefore

be dismissed.3

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discriminatory act that occurred was the non-renewal of Plaintiff’s employment contract,

well over 180 days have passed and Plaintiff is now precluded from filing a retaliation claim

with the EEOC based on these allegations.

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B. Discrimination Claims

As noted above, Plaintiff alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII and age

discrimination in violation of the ADEA. The Court will address each in turn. 

1. Race Discrimination 

As the Supreme Court set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973), and interpreted by Chuang v. University of California-Davis, 225 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.

2000), there are four elements a plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish a prima facie case

of racial discrimination. “[T]he plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class;

(2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and

(4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably.”

Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123. In the event that the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case,

“the burden of production, but not persuasion” then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Id. at 1123-24. If the employer is able

to articulate a non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must be

“afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the] stated reason for [the challenged action] was in

fact pretext.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. If the plaintiff wishes to show indirectly

that the employer’s reason is “unworthy of credence,” the plaintiff’s evidence must be

“specific” and “substantial” in order to create a triable issue. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson Inc., 150

F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has refused to find a “genuine issue”

where the only evidence presented is “uncorroborated and self-serving” testimony. Kennedy

v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie

case of racial discrimination. Specifically, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that “similarly

situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably.” Following the

non-renewal of his contract and closure of his school, Principal Castruita (a Hispanic) was

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invited to apply for administrative vacancies, did so, and was hired. (Dkt. # 16 at 3.) Plaintiff

received a similar invitation in a letter from the Board dated April 6, 2005. (Dkt. #15 at 3.)

The letter also made available a teaching contract. Plaintiff neither accepted the teaching

contract nor applied for any open positions within the District. Under these circumstances, it

cannot be said that Principal Castruita was treated more favorably. When Dr. Diaz

recommended to the Board that Principal Tom Weaver’s school be closed, Weaver’s

employment contract was also not renewed. Weaver is a Caucasian individual and thus outside

of Plaintiff’s protected class. The Board ultimately voted not to close Weaver’s school and as

a result offered Weaver a new contract. No reason is offered why the Board decided not to

close Weaver’s school, but the evidence establishes that Castruita, Weaver, and Plaintiff were

all treated the same when the possibility arose that their respective schools would be closed.

Based on the treatment of these similarly-situated principals, and the absence of any other

evidence of disparate treatment in the record, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie case

of race discrimination.

Even if Plaintiff had satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case, however,

Defendants have offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the non-renewal: the

possible closure of Plaintiff’s school due to low academic performance. Plaintiff fails to meet

his burden of offering “specific” and “substantial” evidence that the closure of Bethune was

pretext for his non-renewal. Plaintiff claims that he “can demonstrate that Bethune was

performing and progressing when the appropriate scores are utilized to objectively measure

the school, versus data presented by the Board slanted to merely justify the closure of

Bethune.” (Dkt. #19 at 3.) However, Plaintiff is merely alleging that the scale scores used by

the District to measure school progress in all of its schools are not an accurate indication of his

school’s progress. Plaintiff does not claim or offer evidence that the Board used a different

standard to gauge the progress of his school, nor does he argue or present evidence to suggest

that the standards were adopted merely to facilitate his non-renewal. Rather, Plaintiff seems

simply to disagree with the measurement implemented by the District and he does not assert

or provide evidence to suggest that the scores were adopted merely for the purpose of securing

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4

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff also alleged a violation of the Older Workers Benefit

Protection Act., Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). In their Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendants argue that the Act is not applicable to this case. Plaintiff does not

disagree, nor does he rebut Defendants’ argument. Therefore, the Court enters summary

judgment on this count. See Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2005).

5

 The failure to satisfy the fourth element is not necessarily fatal if a plaintiff can

demonstrate that he was “discharged under circumstances otherwise giving rise to an

inference of age discrimination.” Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207

(9th Cir. 2008). In Diaz, the Ninth Circuit stated that this modified test is appropriate only

in cases involving a reduction in the workforce because, in such cases, no replacement is

usually hired. Id. at n.2. Even assuming the Diaz exception applies, however, Plaintiff has

failed to make out a prima facie case because a plaintiff “must show through circumstantial,

statistical or direct evidence that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to

an inference of discrimination.” Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993)

(emphasis added and quotations omitted). Plaintiff has not argued that any such evidence

exists on his age discrimination claim, and none is evident from the record. Thus, Plaintiff

has failed to make out a prima facie case even under the Diaz exception.

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his termination. For this reason, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of providing “specific”

and “substantial” evidence that the District’s proffered reason for closure was pretext. As a

result, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII racial discrimination

claim.

2. Age Discrimination4

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework also applies to ADEA claims.

Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1986). In order for a plaintiff to establish

a prima facie case of age discrimination, he must show that he was: (1) at least forty years old;

(2) performing his job in a satisfactory manner; (3) discharged; and (4) replaced by a

substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.5

 Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc.,

994 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Tempesta v. Motorola, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 973,

981 (D. Ariz. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because

he has provided no evidence regarding the qualifications of his replacement sufficient to meet

the fourth requirement. In Tempesta, the court held that because the “[p]laintiff has failed to

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provide sufficient admissible evidence of the qualifications of the [younger and allegedly

favored employee,] . . . the Court cannot determine whether the younger employee and Plaintiff

were similarly situated.” 92 F. Supp. 2d at 981; see also Swan v. Bank of America Corp., No.

2:07-CV-00217, 2008 WL 2859066, at *6 (D. Nev. July 22, 2008) (holding that because the

plaintiff bank employee “provide[d] no evidence concerning what prior or relevant experience

or education the replacement [had] or lacked,” and because she failed to “compare her

replacement’s qualifications with her own,” the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case

of age discrimination).

Like the plaintiffs in both Tempesta and Swan, Plaintiff has provided no evidence

regarding the qualifications of the female principal who took his position at Bethune. Both

parties agree that she was under the age of forty, but without any evidence comparing her

experience and education to Plaintiff’s experience and education, Plaintiff “fails to raise a

genuine issue of material fact concerning [his] replacement’s equal or inferior qualifications.”

Swan, 2008 WL 2859066, at *6. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case

of age discrimination, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the ADEA claim.

C. State Claims

Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims. However,

because the Court has entered summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal law claims, the original

basis for federal jurisdiction over this case no longer exists. In this situation, the Court has the

discretion to either retain or decline jurisdiction over the disposition of the remaining state law

claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] federal

district court with power to hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep,

them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c) . . . . That state law claims should be dismissed

if federal claims are dismissed before trial has never meant that they must be dismissed.”)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). That decision is informed by the values of

“economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id. at 1001 (internal quotations omitted). “In

the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors

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. . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).

In this case, the balance of factors counsel that the Court should decline to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. No significant judicial economy will be lost

by declining jurisdiction, and it will certainly be as convenient and fair to the parties to litigate

the state law claims in state court. Moreover, as several of the issues in this case may require

the interpretation of Arizona law, the Arizona courts have a vested interest in interpreting and

applying state law themselves. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Because the Court declines to retain jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims, the

Court need not rule on the aspects of Defendants’ motion implicating those claims.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would prevent entry

of summary judgment on his federal law claims, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. # 15) is GRANTED as to his federal law claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to TERMINATE

this action.

DATED this 14th day of April, 2009.

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