Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02756/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02756-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Phillip Ticktin, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carole Fabrics, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-05-2756-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant Carole Fabrics' motion for summary judgment (doc.

31) and statement of facts (doc. 32); plaintiff's response (doc. 37) and statement of facts (doc.

36) and defendant's reply (doc. 42). For the reasons stated below, we grant defendant's

motion.

Defendant Carole Fabrics sells window covering. Plaintiff worked as a Carole Fabrics

Territory Sales Representative from August 1998 until on or about March 3, 2003. See

Plaintiff's Statement of Facts at 4 (citing Affidavit of Phillip Ticktin at 1). Plaintiff failed to

secure new employment in the window covering industry, and suspected that "somebody was

doing something to keep [him] from working." Defendant's Statement of Facts at 4 (citing

Defendant's Exhibit A ("Deposition of Phillip Ticktin") at 162-63). 

As a result, plaintiff's former counsel John Amorison hired private investigator Tom

Hergott. Defendant's Statement of Facts at 4 (citing Deposition of Phillip Ticktin at 40). Per

Case 2:05-cv-02756-FJM Document 73 Filed 02/22/07 Page 1 of 4
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Amorison's instructions, Hergott contacted Bob Johnson, Carole Fabrics' Regional Sales

Manager, on September 20, 2004, and posed as an agent for a company that was

contemplating hiring plaintiff. Defendant's Statement of Facts at 5 (citing Defendant's

Exhibit L at 1). During his conversation with Hergott, Johnson stated that he would not rehire plaintiff. Complaint (doc. 1) at 2. Plaintiff alleges that statement "slandered and

defamed" his reputation. Id.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges one claim for defamation, and asserts that defendants are

liable for punitive and special damages as a result of their defamatory conduct. Complaint

at 2-3. On January 4, 2007, we denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, in which

he moved to add a claim for intentional interference with contract. See January 4, 2007

Order (doc. 60).

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot state a defamation claim, nor any damages

arising from that claim, for four independent reasons: (1) defendant's statements were true;

(2) the statements were non-actionable opinions; (3) the statements were published only to

plaintiff's agent and (4) defendant did not cause plaintiff to suffer reputational damages. See

Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. We need only reach defendant's contention that its

statements are not actionable because they were published only to Hergott, plaintiff's agent.

See id. at 10. 

"A defamation action compensates damage to reputation or good name caused by the

publication of false information." Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, 162 Ariz. 335, 341,

783 P.2d 781, 787 (1989). "To be defamatory, a publication must be false and must bring

the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach plaintiff's honesty,

integrity, virtue, or reputation." Id. However, "[c]onsent is a complete defense to

defamation." Mullenaux v. Graham County, 207 Ariz. 1, 7, 82 P.3d 362, 368 (App. 2004).

A publication may not be actionable as defamation where the communication answers

a letter or request from the allegedly defamed person's agent. Restatement (Second) of Torts

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 The Restatement contemplates that publication to an agent instigated by the agent

may not be actionable as defamation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 cmt. e

(1977). However, it does not "clearly state," as defendant asserts, that this kind of

publication is never actionable. See Reply at 8. Therefore, in deciding this issue, we do not

rely on the Restatement alone. 

2

 As defendant notes, see Reply at 7 n.3, plaintiff also cites to inapplicable

Restatement comments. See Response at 6 (citing § 577 cmt. i and l). 

3

 Although plaintiff's complaint refers to only one defamatory statement, both parties

allude to allegedly defamatory statements. See Response at 3; Reply at 7. However, whether

defendant defamed plaintiff through one statement or several is immaterial. Neither party

disputes that the defamatory communication was spoken by Johnson, instigated by Hergott,

and published to no one other than Hergott. 

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§ 577 cmt. e (1977).1

 Absent controlling authority, Arizona follows the Restatement.

Recovery for defamation will be denied when a plaintiff has "invited or instigated the

publication of defamatory words," because in such a case, the plaintiff has consented to the

defamation. Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts § 114, at 823 (5th ed. 1984); see also

Kelewae v. Jim Meagher Chevrolet, Inc., 952 F.2d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 1992). We thus

conclude that statements solicited by a plaintiff's agent, and published only to that agent,

cannot form the basis of a defamation suit. 

While plaintiff cites the applicable Restatement section comment, he omits the very

portion of that comment applicable here. See Response at 6 (omitting the statement "if the

communication is in answer to a letter or a request from the other or his agent, the

publication may not be actionable in defamation" from its citation to Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 577 cmt. e (1977)).2

 Therefore, his argument is both unresponsive and

unpersuasive. 

Neither party disputes that the allegedly defamatory statement which forms the basis

of this action was solicited by plaintiff's agent, at plaintiff's counsel's request. It is also

undisputed that the statement was only published to plaintiff's agent. As a result, it is not

actionable.3

 

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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant's motion for summary

judgment (doc. 31). 

DATED this 21st day of February, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-02756-FJM Document 73 Filed 02/22/07 Page 4 of 4