Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01342/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-01342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CORDERO L. REID,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANGELA MIREE, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 2:15-cv-01342-RDP-TMP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation on November 18, 2015,

recommending that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). (Doc. 6). Plaintiff has filed 

objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 9). Having considered those objections, 

the court finds as follows: 

Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation because he believes he is being held 

unconstitutionally in disciplinary segregation. (Doc. 9 at 1-2). According to Plaintiff, he was 

placed in segregation due to an alleged assault on a prison official, although he was found not 

guilty at the hearing. (Id.). Plaintiff believes this placement was in retaliation for this alleged 

misconduct, and therefore in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id., at 2). To state a 

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 

(2) the defendant’s retaliatory action adversely affected the protected conduct, and (3) there is a 

causal connection between the protected conduct and the prison official’s actions. Smith v. 

Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 358 Fed. App’x 60, 62 (11th Cir. 2009); citing Smith v. Mosley, 

532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 

2003). While Plaintiff asserts he is in segregation due to retaliation for alleged misconduct, the 

FILED

 2015 Dec-29 PM 01:21

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-01342-RDP-TMP Document 10 Filed 12/29/15 Page 1 of 4
2

pleadings filed to date reflect neither protected conduct, nor any causal connection between 

protected conduct and Plaintiff’s placement in segregation. 

Plaintiff asserts that after the hearing at which he was found not guilty, he was “placed in 

disciplinary segregation, a retaliatory act. While in segregation with no write up. The plaintiff 

suffers great duress by not receiving mail due to a retaliatory act, without any notification.” 

(Doc. 9 at 2). As noted in the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff has no constitutional right 

to not be placed in segregation. See e.g., Anderson v. Chapman, 604 Fed.App’x 810, 813 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (confinement to segregation does not violate due process because segregation is 

“ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.”). Prison officials are “accorded latitude in the 

administration of prison affairs.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). This latitude includes 

“the withdrawal or limitation of many [inmate] privileges and rights.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 

U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, confinement in punitive 

segregation only violates a protected liberty interest when the placement either affects the 

duration of the overall sentence, or imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to ordinary prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-486 (1995). The Court 

stated:

We hold that [the prisoner’s] discipline in segregated confinement did not present 

the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably 

create a liberty interest. The record shows that, at the time of [the prisoner’s]

punishment, disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored 

those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and 

protective custody. 

Id., 515 U.S. at 486. Similarly, Plaintiff here has failed to demonstrate either prong of Sandin. 

Plaintiff also asserts that “[b]ased on the new ruling from the U.S. District Court 

California in Ashker v. Governor of California, the defendant must show why the plaintiff 

remains in segregation . . . .” (Doc. 9 at 2). In Ashker v. Brown, 2013 WL 1435148 (N.D. Cal. 

Case 2:15-cv-01342-RDP-TMP Document 10 Filed 12/29/15 Page 2 of 4
3

2013), the district court held, given that some of the plaintiffs in that case had lived in solitary 

confinement for more than two decades and all had been in solitary confinement for at least 11 

years, the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently serious deprivation of liberty such that the defendant’s 

motion to dismiss was properly denied. That decision is inapposite.1

 

As to Plaintiff’s objection based on not receiving mail, the Magistrate Judge carefully 

considered this allegation in the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 6 at 7-9). As noted, 

Plaintiff alleged only one instance where he did not receive a letter from his sister. (Id., at 9). 

Such an isolated incident is insufficient to implicate the First Amendment. Davis v. Goord, 320 

F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring that an inmate show prison officials “regularly and 

unjustifiably interfered with the incoming legal mail.”). Plaintiff’s reliance on Procunier v. 

Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), is misplaced. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), the 

Supreme Court explicitly stated that Procunier’s statement concerning a First Amendment right 

of a prisoner to send outgoing mail did not extend to the rights of a prisoner to receive incoming 

mail. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413-414. 

Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the court file, 

including the Report and Recommendation, and the objections thereto, the Magistrate Judge’s 

report is hereby ADOPTED and the recommendation is ACCEPTED. Therefore, in accordance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

A Final Judgment will be entered.

 1 In addition to lacking any relationship to the facts here, the ruling by a district court in California is not 

binding on this court.

Case 2:15-cv-01342-RDP-TMP Document 10 Filed 12/29/15 Page 3 of 4
4

DONE and ORDERED this December 29, 2015.

_________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:15-cv-01342-RDP-TMP Document 10 Filed 12/29/15 Page 4 of 4