Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00515/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00515-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UT VAN HUYNH,

Petitioner,

v.

DAVID LONG,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 14cv515-BAS (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 1]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Cynthia

A. Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On February 7, 2014,

Petitioner, Ut Van Huynh, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

commenced these habeas corpus proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1

(“Pet.”). Petitioner challenges the validity of his state court conviction for sexual intercourse

with a child ten years old or younger. Id. Respondent answered on May 14, 2014 [ECF Nos.

13 & 13-1 (“Ans.”)] and Petitioner filed a traverse on June 30, 2014 [ECF No. 16 (“Trav.”)].

This Court has considered the Petition, Answer, Traverse, and all supporting

documents filed by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

14cv515-BAS (BLM)

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion in People

v. Ut Van Huynh, Appeal No. D062250. See Lodgment 5. This Court presumes the state

court’s factual determinations to be correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from such facts are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness).

Huynh lived with his wife and two daughters–L.H., age eight, and her

sister, age two–in a one bedroom apartment. His wife worked and went to

school, and Huynh worked as a welder at NASSCO. Huynh grew up in

Vietnam but had lived in the United States for the previous 22 years working

various jobs in the fishing and welding industries.

On May 26, 2011, L.H. approached her second grade teacher, Eleanor

Miano during recess. Miano immediately felt something was wrong, as L.H.

merely stood at her desk with tears in her eyes. When Miano asked what

was wrong, L.H. explained in her limited English that her father was sexually

abusing her. L.H. was crying and looked terrified. After it became clear to

Miano there was a problem, she notified her principal as well as Child

Protective Services. The school nurse then brought L.H. to her office. The

nurse noticed L.H. walking gingerly and not being able to sit still. When the

nurse asked if L.H. needed to use the bathroom, L.H. pointed to her crotch

and said, “Hurt, hurt” and “Daddy hurt.” L.H. also made a hand gesture,

inserting the pointer finger of one hand into a circle made by the other. 

When offered water, L.H. said, “Pee hurt. Water bad.” When the nurse

convinced L.H. to use the restroom, she saw bruises on L.H.’s thigh and

arms. She also observed L.H.’s labia appeared as if it had a scarring effect,

and her wrists appeared to have scars as if something had been wrapped too

tightly around them.

Marilyn Kaufold, M.D., examined L.H. later that evening. Dr. Kaufold

observed a bruise on L.H.’s inner thigh and a hyperpigmented band on one

of her wrists. Her examination of L.H.’s genitals revealed her structures

appeared to be uninjured and age appropriate.

Detective Timothy Williams of the San Diego Police Department

interviewed Huynh that same evening. Huynh confessed to putting his “dick”

in L.H.’s “pussy” because L.H. wanted his love. He said he told L.H. that if

she told her mother, he would send her to Vietnam. Huynh also confessed

to a second instance of intercourse with L.H. that happened in the bathroom,

but denied any oral copulation. Huynh then wrote two apology letters, one

to the police and one to L.H.

A few days later, a forensic interviewer spoke with L.H. L.H. again said

Huynh had sexually abused her and gave details of particular instances. 

Later, in June, L.H. met with a protective services worker, who had L.H.

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draw a picture of what worried or scared her. L.H. drew a picture of her

father with a penis and herself with a vagina, explaining while she drew that

her father had hurt her.

At trial, the prosecution presented the foregoing evidence, along with

the testimony of L.H. and various experts. L.H. testified that Huynh had sex

with her “a lot” in his bedroom and one time in the bathroom. She also

testified that Huynh had her orally copulate him “a lot.” L.H. said Huynh

continued the abuse even after she told her mother.

Dr. Kaufold testified that in a majority of cases, children who have

been sexually abused do not have physical findings upon examination. A

forensic child abuse specialist testified that children often delay disclosing

their abuse, particularly if they are close to their abuser or if an initial

disclosure to a parent does not produce a responsive or protective reaction. 

She also testified that when children discuss their abuse, they often have

difficulty sequencing the events chronologically.

The defense presented the testimony of Raymond Murphy, Ph.D., a

psychologist who evaluated Huynh, and Lynne Ticson, M.D., a pediatrician. 

Dr. Murphy testified that Huynh denied sexually abusing his daughter. Dr.

Murphy also testified that Huynh was acquiescent and eager to please, had

an I.Q. of 74 in the mild mental retardation range, and was not, in Dr.

Murphy’s opinion, a pedophile or sexual deviant. Dr. Ticson testified that,

in her opinion, sexual penetration of an eight-year-old victim could not

happen without physical findings on the child’s genital structures.

Lodgment 5 at 3-5.

On November 28, 2011, the District Attorney of San Diego County filed a seven-count

information charging Huynh with two counts of sexual intercourse/sodomy with a child 10

years old or younger in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section 288.7(a),

one count of lewd act upon a child in violation of Penal Code section 288(b), and four counts

of oral copulation/sexual penetration with a child ten 10 years old or younger in violation of

Penal Code section 288.7(b).1

 Lodgment 1 at 7-9.

On April 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress his confession. Id. at 12-24. 

Petitioner argued that his “Miranda waiver was invalid because he lacked the capacity to

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily understand his right to remain silent and/or have

counsel present before any questioning commenced.” Id. at 12. The court denied

Petitioner’s motion to suppress, “finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the

1

 A note on the information indicates that Count 7–oral copulation/sexual penetration with a child 10

years old or younger–was dismissed on May 7, 2012. Lodgment 1 at 9.

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defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his rights pursuant to Miranda v.

Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436" and that Petitioner’s statements were “not the product of any

coercive questioning or interrogation by law enforcement and were voluntarily provided by

[Petitioner].” Id. at 459.

Following a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of the crime of sexual

intercourse with a child 10 years old or younger. Lodgment 1 at 403-04. The jury was

unable to reach a decision on the remaining counts of lewd act upon a child 14 years old or

younger and oral copulation with a child 10 years old or younger. Id. at 407-10. The trial

court declared a mistrial as to the remaining counts, and denied Petitioner’s motion to

dismiss those counts. Id. at 493-94. On June 26, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner

to 50-years-to-life.2

 Id. at 433-34.

On June 27, 2012, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, 

arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial when the

trial court erroneously denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress his statements made to police

because Petitioner lacked the capacity to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his

Miranda rights. Lodgment 3. Petitioner also argued that a sentence of 50-years-to-life

violated the ban against cruel and unusual punishment under both the United States and

California Constitutions. Id. In an unpublished opinion filed September 17, 2013, the Court

of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Lodgment 5. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court, raising the same two claims, which was summarily

denied on November 26, 2013. Lodgments 6 & 7. Petitioner did not seek habeas corpus

relief in state court. On February 7, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant petition asserting the

same two claims he raised in his state court appeals. Pet.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of

2 Petitioner was sentenced to 25-years-to-life for count one and 25-years-to-life for count two, to run

consecutively. Lodgment 1 at 433. For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court will consider

Petitioner’s sentence as 50-years-to-life.

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review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C

§ 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In making this determination, a court may consider a lower court's

analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991) (authorizing a reviewing court

to look through to the last reasoned state court decision). Summary denials are presumed

to constitute adjudications on the merits unless “there is reason to think some other

explanation for the state court's decision is more likely.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct.

770, 784-85 (2011).

A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state

court: (1) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases”; or (2) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision

of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]

precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).

A state court's decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal

law where the state court “‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

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prisoner's case.’” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S.

at 413). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue [a] writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 75-76 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 412. 

If the state court provided no explanation of its reasoning, “a habeas court must

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state

court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree

that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the

Supreme Court].” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786. In other words, a federal court may not

grant habeas relief if any fairminded jurist could find the state court's ruling consistent with

relevant Supreme Court precedent. 

Finally, habeas relief also is available if the state court's adjudication of a claim

“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Wood v.

Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 293 (2010). A state court's decision will not be overturned on factual

grounds unless this Court finds that the state court's factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court. See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at

340; see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) (the fact that "[r]easonable minds

reviewing the record might disagree" does not render a decision objectively unreasonable). 

This Court will presume that the state court's factual findings are correct, and Petitioner may

overcome that presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief. Pet. First, Petitioner contends that his

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constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were denied when the trial court denied

his motion to suppress his confession. Pet. at 5. Second, Petitioner alleges that the

sentence of 50-years-to-life violates the ban on cruel and unusual punishment under the

United States Constitution. Id. at 5-6. Respondent contends that the state court reasonably

and properly denied Petitioner’s claims for relief. Ans. at 8-20.

A. Ground 1-Challenge Based Upon Miranda v. Arizona

Petitioner alleges in his first claim for relief that the state court erred by determining

that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Pet. at 12-13. 

Petitioner argues that he lacked the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his

constitutional rights due to his low I.Q. and his lack of understanding of the English

language. Id. at 13-21; Trav. at 3-15, 17-20. Petitioner additionally alleges that Agent

Pham3

 inaccurately translated the Miranda rights so Petitioner did not understand his

constitutional rights and could not knowingly waive them. Id.

Respondent counters that the state courts’ determination that Petitioner’s Miranda

rights were not violated was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application, of clearly

established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Ans. at 14-17. Respondent further argues that the circumstances of Petitioner’s initial

waiver, as well as Petitioner’s sufficient intelligence and understanding of the English

language, support the state court’s conclusion. Id.

Petitioner presented this claim to the state supreme court in a petition for review. 

Lodgment 6. The petition was summarily denied without a statement of reasoning or

citation of authority. Lodgment 7. Petitioner presented this claim to the state appellate

court in the same manner as it was presented to the state supreme court. Lodgment 3. The

appellate court denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. Lodgment 5. The Court will

therefore look through the silent denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court

opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804.

3 Special Agent Johnson Pham of the United States Department of Homeland Security assisted

Petitioner as a Vietnamese interpreter during Petitioner’s interview with police. See Lodgment 1 at 80.

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The California Court of Appeal considered and rejected the claim as follows:

After reviewing the recorded interview and transcripts, we conclude the trial

court correctly determined Huynh made a knowing and intelligent waiver. 

Huynh’s contentions that he lacked the capacity to waive his rights because of

his low I.Q., his poor English skills, and the inadequate reading and translation

of the Miranda rights are unavailing. The totality of the circumstances show

Huynh had sufficient intelligence and understanding of the English language

to validly waive his rights, and that the translation of the warnings reasonably

conveyed his Miranda rights.

Lodgment 5 at 13-14 (footnote deleted). In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court

noted that “[t]hough Huynh’s I.Q. and cognitive skills may be below average, they did not

impact his capacity to understand and validly waive his Miranda rights. He had lived in the

United States for 22 years, had maintained a job as a welder in San Diego, and had held

previous welding and fishing jobs around the country. He had attended school to the 10th

grade in Vietnam and obtained technical training here in the United States.” Id. at 15. The

court also found that Petitioner had a sufficient understanding of English because the

majority of the interview was conducted in English, Petitioner’s responses showed a clear

understanding of the substance of the questions, Petitioner used appropriate sexual slang

terms without prompting from the officer, Petitioner admitted some conduct while denying

other actions, and Petitioner showed an ability to “carry on meaningful conversations in

English” with other individuals and at work. Id. at 16. Finally, the Court found that Agent

Pham “adequately translated” the Miranda rights into Vietnamese and that Petitioner

understood the substance of those rights. Id. at 17-19.

Under clearly established federal law, the government may not use a statement made

by a suspect during a custodial interrogation unless it establishes that the accused was

advised of his constitutional rights and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those

rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The suspect must be advised that he has

the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes can be used against him, that he has

the right to legal counsel, and that he has the right to have legal counsel appointed to

represent him. Id. at 444. The Miranda warnings do not have to be given precisely as

written in the Miranda decision; rather, the proper inquiry focuses on whether the warnings

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given to a suspect “reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’”

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355,

361 (1981)).

A suspect may waive his Miranda rights but the government must establish that the

waiver was “made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. This

inquiry has two “distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense

that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,

coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the

consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice

and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that

the Miranda rights have been waived.

Id.; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010). In making this evaluation, a court

must consider the “totality of the circumstances including the background, experience, and

conduct of the defendant.” United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 

An express waiver is not required; “[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning

was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement

establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384. 

The Ninth Circuit recently described the voluntariness inquiry as follows:

[T]he voluntariness inquiry “is not limited to instances in which the claim is

that the police conduct was ‘inherently coercive,’” but “applies equally when

the interrogation techniques were improper only because, in the particular

circumstances of the case, the confession is unlikely to have been the product

of a free and rational will. Ultimately, the voluntariness “determination

‘depend[s] upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the

power of resistance of the person confessing.’” 

. . . These principles have particular application where, as here, the

individual interrogated is of unusually low intelligence. “What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an

experienced criminal.” So, although low intelligence does not categorically

make a confession involuntary, it is “relevant ... in establishing a setting” in

which police coercion may overcome the will of a suspect.

United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also,

Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1008-21 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding statement not voluntarily

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made by sleep-deprived juvenile who was subjected to extremely lengthy, coercive

interrogation).

The appellate court correctly identified Miranda and its progeny as the clearly

established federal law. Lodgment 5 at 11-13. This Court must therefore examine whether

the appellate court reasonably applied the relevant law and made reasonable factual

determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. The Miranda Advisement

The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s contention that he was not properly advised

of his Miranda rights. Lodgment 5 at 17-19. The court first determined that “the totality of

the circumstances show [Petitioner] had sufficient intelligence and understanding of the

English language to validly waive his rights.” Id. at 14, 17-19. The court reviewed the

videotaped interview and transcripts and found that Agent Pham explained each

constitutional right to Petitioner, that he adequately translated each right into Vietnamese,

and that he answered Petitioner’s questions regarding his rights. Id. at 17-19. The court

concluded that “[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances,” Petitioner was adequately

informed of his constitutional rights. Id. at 19. 

This Court has reviewed the transcript of Petitioner’s interview and finds that it

supports the state courts’ decisions. Initially, Detective Williams accurately told Petitioner

“[y]ou have the right to remain silent.” Lodgment 1 at 110. Agent Pham accurately

translated this right into Vietnamese as “You have the right not to answer. You have the

right to remain silent.” Id. Petitioner then asks whether that right means that “if he asks

me anything I don’t have to answer, right?” and Agent Pham responds “That’s correct.” Id.

The detective then accurately states the next right, “If you give up the right to remain silent,

anything you do say can and will be used in court against you.” Id. That right also is

translated into Vietnamese and when Petitioner indicates he does not understand that right,

Agent Pham explains, “Whatever you answer to him, he can use it in court, do you

understand?” Id. Petitioner then asks, “No, at the what?” and Pham responds “in court”

and Petitioner replies “alright.” Id. at 110-11. 

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Detective Williams then accurately states the next two rights relating to Petitioner’s

right to speak with an attorney before and during questioning and to have an attorney

appointed for him if he cannot afford to hire one.4

 Id. at 111. When Petitioner again

indicates his lack of understanding, Agent Pham explains “[y]ou have the right to hire or to

retain a lawyer to talk to and answer the questions he will ask before he asks” and “[i]f you

have no money, the government will hire a lawyer for you and you do not pay any money

for the lawyer.” Id. After both of these explanations, Detective Williams asked Petitioner

whether he understood his rights. Id. at 111-12. Petitioner initially indicated that he did not

understand all of his rights and stated that he “didn’t go to school” and “didn’t study” the

law. Id at 112. Detective Williams and Agent Pham told Petitioner that they must explain

the rights to Petitioner before they can speak with him “about what’s taking place.” Id. at

112-13. Petitioner then states that he understands and is willing to talk about the case.5

Id. at 113.

Petitioner contends that Agent Pham did not accurately translate the Miranda rights

into Vietnamese and that when the flawed translation is combined with Petitioner’s low

intelligence, it reveals that Petitioner did not understand his constitutional rights. Pet. at 12-

21. Petitioner specifically asserts that he did not understand that he had the right to remain

silent and that he had a right to a free attorney before and during questioning. Id. at 16, 18-

19; Trav. at 9-11. 

A review of the record establishes that the detective and agent properly advised

Petitioner of his Miranda rights. Although Petitioner challenges the adequacy of the

4

 The detective stated “you have the right to speak with an attorney of your choice before I, before

questioning and to have the attorney present during questioning” and “[i]f you cannot afford an attorney, one

will be appointed for you by the court prior to any questioning if you so desire. The attorney will not cost you

anything, those services are free.” Lodgment 1 at 111.

5

 The transcript provides the following: Detective, “Alright, okay. But I”m trying to explain to you that

before I can talk to you about what’s taking place” Petitioner, “Yeah.” Detective, “...I have to tell you what your

rights are.” Petitioner, “Oh, okay.” Agent Pham, “Before asking you, he wants to advise you of your rights.”

Petitioner, “Yeah.” Agent Pham, “Do you understand?” Petitioner, “Yes.” Detective, “Okay, So do you

understand?” Petitioner, “Yeah.” Detective, “Okay. Are you willing to talk to me about the case?” Petitioner,

“Yeah.” Lodgment 1 at 112-13.

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advisement that he had the right to remain silent, the record establishes that Detective

Williams and Agent Pham accurately told him about this right and that Petitioner verified his

knowledge by stating, “if he asks me anything I don’t have to answer, right?” and Agent

Pham replied “That’s correct.” Lodgment 1 at 110. 

Petitioner also challenges the adequacy of the right to counsel advisement, claiming

that he did not understand that he had the right to a free attorney before and during

questioning. Pet. at 17-19; Trav. at 9-13. Again, the record refutes this contention. 

Detective Williams properly advised Petitioner of his rights in this regard in English. 

Lodgment 1 at 109. The Vietnamese translation, while not ideal, adequately advised

Petitioner that he had the right to talk to an attorney before answering any questions asked

by the detective and that the government will pay for the attorney if Petitioner does not

have the money to do so. Id. Taken together, these statements advised Petitioner that he

had the right to speak with an attorney before answering the detective’s questions, to have

an attorney present during questioning, and that if he could not afford to hire an attorney,

the government would pay for the attorney. Thus, there is substantial support for the

appellate court’s conclusion that Detective Williams and Agent Pham adequately advised

Petitioner of all of his Miranda rights. See United States v. Milton, 2010 WL 762184, *4 (D.

Nev. March 4, 2010) (upholding state court’s conclusion that Miranda advisement was

adequate where petitioner was told he had right to speak with an attorney but was not

specifically told that he had the right to have the attorney present during the interrogation). 

There also is substantial support in the trial record for the court’s conclusion that

Petitioner understood his rights. Initially, it is undisputed that Detective Williams properly

advised Petitioner of his Miranda rights in English. As discussed in more detail below, the

record provides substantial support for the appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner

understood English sufficiently well to understand and waive his Miranda rights in English. 

Moreover, the Vietnamese translation, while not perfect, adequately conveyed the essence

of the rights to Petitioner and was not affirmatively misleading in any way. As such, there

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is support for the court’s conclusion that Petitioner understood his Miranda rights. See

United States v. Botello-Rosales, 2009 WL 3734117 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2009) (denying motion

to suppress statements where defendant advised of Miranda rights in English and Spanish

and English recitation was complete and accurate and Spanish translation was adequate and

noting that defendant had lived in the United States for 16 years, admitted he understood

English, and answered many questions before the Spanish translation was completed);

Prysock, 453 U.S. at 360-61 (“nothing in the warnings given ... suggested any limitation on

the right to the presence of appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to

a lawyer in general, including the right ‘to a lawyer before you are questioned, ... while you

are being questioned, and all during the questioning.’”).; cf. United States v. San Juan-Cruz,

314 F.3d 384, 387-88 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Miranda advisement and waiver insufficient

where government agent presented defendant with two versions of the Miranda rights and

they conflicted with each other in material ways). 

2. The Miranda Waiver

Petitioner argues that as a result of his low I.Q. and “poor grasp of the English

language,” he “lacked the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional

rights.” Pet. at 12; Trav. at 3-13. Initially, the appellate court acknowledged that “the

validity of a Miranda waiver depends upon the totality of the circumstances,” including “the

defendant’s age, education experience, intelligence, mental and physical condition at the

time of questioning, and familiarity with law enforcement.” Lodgment 5 at 13. The court

concluded that “[t]hough [Petitioner’s] I.Q. and cognitive skills may be below average, they

did not impact his capacity to understand and validly waive his Miranda rights.” Id. at 15. 

In reaching this decision, the court considered all of the relevant facts and noted Petitioner’s

education, employment history, understanding of and ability to carry on a conversation in

the English language, and length of time residing in the United States. Id. at 13-16.

Again, there is ample evidence in the record to support the appellate court’s

conclusions that Petitioner’s low I.Q. and cognitive ability and limited English skills did not

prevent him from understanding and validly waiving his Miranda rights. First, as noted by

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the appellate court, the majority of Petitioner’s interview occurred in English. Lodgment 1

at 87-186.6

 Detective Williams asked questions in English and Petitioner answered them in

English with responses that showed he understood the English question. Id. For example,

the vast majority of the preliminary questions and answers were in English and Petitioner

spoke in English on several topics. Id. at 87-106. During this time, Petitioner independently

confirmed that Agent Pham spoke Vietnamese (id. at 93) and then when he had trouble

describing one of his tattoos, asked Agent Pham in Vietnamese for the correct English word

(id. at 96). 

Similarly, after the Miranda advisement and waiver, Petitioner answered the majority

of the detective’s questions in English and used Agent Pham to translate for him when

Petitioner felt it was necessary. Id. at 111-86. Petitioner’s responses showed a clear ability

to communicate in English and there were few instances in which Petitioner needed the

Vietnamese translation. Id. As noted by the appellate court, Petitioner used English slang

sexual terms correctly, without prompting from the detective. Id. at 125, 129. Moreover,

the record establishes that Petitioner did not merely answer yes to all of the detective’s

questions; Petitioner explained what he did to his daughter and why, mostly in his own

words in English. Id. at 125-54. Also, Petitioner specifically denied engaging in certain

sexual acts, even though Detective Williams indicated he thought Petitioner had engaged in

the identified sexual acts. Id. at 132-33 (denying both oral and anal sex); 140-41, 147

(explaining that he did not ask for oral sex during the incident they currently were

discussing). 

Second, there is substantial evidence to support the appellate court’s conclusion that

while Petitioner’s “I.Q. and cognitive skills may be below average, they did not impact his

capacity to understand and validly waive his Miranda rights” because, among other things,

Defendant had lived in the United State for 22 years, had held several jobs, including many

years as a welder, and had obtained a 10th grade education in Vietnam and technical

6

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training in the United States. Lodgment 5 at 15. The trial record supports the court’s factual

findings. Petitioner stated during his interview that he was 45 years old and that he works

for a NASSCO contractor as a welder on a Navy ship. Lodgment 1 at 89-90. He also

identified other companies for whom he had worked. Id. at 92. Petitioner stated that he

was born in Vietnam, lived in Thailand in the 1980s, and has lived in the United States since

the late 1980s, working several different jobs. Id. at 95-99. The psychologist retained by

Petitioner stated in a report that Petitioner went to school for 10 years (through the 10th

grade) in Vietnam and obtained technical training in welding in the United States,

specializing in “mig and stick welding.” Id. at 27-28. Petitioner told the psychologist that

he initially worked in Seattle and Alaska in the fishing business, but he then moved to

Louisiana where he “studied welding and was trained in the shipyards.” Id. at 28. Petitioner

reported that he has worked in the welding field since that training and that for the last nine

years he has worked for NASSCO Ship Building. Id. The psychologist repeated many of

these facts during his trial testimony. Lodgment 2 at 470-87. In addition, the victim’s

school teacher testified that Petitioner introduced himself to her in English and that the few

conversations they had were in English. Lodgment 2 at 234-37.

Accordingly, the record establishes that while his I.Q. was 74, Petitioner was educated

through the tenth grade in Vietnam, received additional specialized technical training in the

United States, and was able to communicate in English and conduct many aspects of his

daily living in English. In addition, although a Vietnamese interpreter was available to

Petitioner throughout the interview, Petitioner answered the vast majority of Detective

Williams’ questions in English, without the use of the interpreter. From this evidence, the

court of appeals properly could find that Petitioner understood his rights and knowingly and

intelligently waived them. See Medrano v. Ryan, 2012 WL 682417, *10 (D. Ariz. March 2,

2012) (upholding state court’s determination that petitioner knowingly and intelligently

waived his Miranda rights despite I.Q. of 75 where he “functioned adequately in society for

many years,” attended high school, and worked as a laborer and salesman); Vallejo, 237

F.3d 237 F.3d at 1014-15 (upholding validity of Miranda waiver where defendant was adult

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man whose first language was Spanish but who answered most of the agent’s questions in

English where a Spanish interpreter was available during the interrogation).

Moreover, the record establishes that Detective Williams and Agent Pham adequately

conveyed to Petitioner all of his Miranda rights in a straight-forward manner. They did not

attempt to downplay the significance of the rights, imply that the rights are mere formalities

or mutually beneficial to both Petitioner and the government, or indicate the right to counsel

was only available to people involved in a crime. See Doody, 649 F.3d at 1002-06 (finding

these facts important in determining that juvenile did not knowingly and voluntarily waive

his Miranda rights). Similarly, Petitioner was a 44 year old man, who had lived and worked

in the United States for many years, not a juvenile or young man who lacked sophistication

and therefore was in need of “special caution.” Id. at 1008-09 citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.

1, 45 (1967) (“The Supreme Court “has emphasized that admissions and confessions of

juveniles require special caution.”); Preston, 751 F.3d at 1020 (evaluating confession of 18

year old man, with an I.Q. of 65, whose initial responses to officers “gave them cause to

believe that he had a[] [mental] impairment]”).

While Petitioner does not explicitly challenge the voluntariness of his waiver and

subsequent statements, the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has recently emphasized that

a defendant’s I.Q. and mental capabilities bear directly on voluntariness. Preston, 751 F.3d

at 1016 (“We begin with “[c]onsideration of [Preston’s] reduced mental capacity,” a factor

that is critical because it [may] render[] him more susceptible to subtle forms of coercion.”). 

Here, while Petitioner has a low I.Q. of 74 (Lodgment 1 at 30), it is above the level generally

considered to constitute mental retardation. Medrano, 2012 WL 682417, *10 (citing Perry

v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 308 n.1 (1989)). In addition, Petitioner was able to hold a steady

job for nine years, live and work in the United States for 20+ years, and converse in English. 

A review of the interview transcript shows that Detective Williams did not utilize coercive

questioning techniques and the interview was not lengthy. Lodgment 1 at 87-186. 

Moreover, while Petitioner’s psychologist argued that Petitioner confessed in an effort to

please the officers, the record establishes that Petitioner repeatedly denied engaging in

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specific sexual acts, despite the detective’s indication that there was evidence that he had

committed the acts. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that

the waiver was voluntary, despite Petitioner’s low I.Q., and that his will was not overborne

by the detective’s questions. See Preston, 751 F.3d at 1016-17; Doody, 649 F.3d at 1008-

21.

As set forth above, the appellate court applied the correct law and there is ample

evidence in the trial record supporting the appellate court’s conclusion that Petitioner was

adequately advised of his Miranda rights and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily

waived those rights. Under AEDPA’s highly deferential standard for evaluating state court

rulings, this Court finds that the state court’s decision was not “objectively unreasonable.” 

See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the

correctness of the state court’s decision.”); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (“[A] federal habeas

court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable.”). This Court

therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claims in Ground 1 be DENIED.

B. Ground 2-Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner argues that his sentence of 50-years-to-life is cruel and unusual punishment

in violation of the Eighth Amendment.7

 Pet. at 25-32. Petitioner contends that the sentence

is grossly disproportionate to the crimes of conviction because he has no prior criminal

history and the lengthy sentence is more appropriate for a murder conviction. Id. at 29-30. 

Respondent counters, in agreement with the Court of Appeal, that Petitioner’s sentence does

7 Petitioner also argues that the sentence violates the California Constitution. Pet. at 25. The appellate

court rejected this argument and this challenge is not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. See Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions”); Higgens v. Hedgpeth, 2010 WL 1904866, *20 n.6 (E.D. Cal. May 10,

2010) (finding petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated the California constitution was not cognizable in a

federal habeas petition).

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not interfere with the United States Constitution due to the gravity of Petitioner’s conviction

of two counts of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of ten. Ans. at 20.

Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for

review on direct appeal (Lodgment 7), this Court must look through to the Court of Appeal’s

decision as the last reasoned state court decision on this claim. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-

06. In considering Petitioner’s claim based on the United States Constitution, the court

correctly stated the applicable federal law:

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies

against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: “Excessive bail

shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 962.) This

includes not only punishments that are barbaric, but also those that “are

disproportionate to the crime committed.” (Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S.

277, 284.) While strict proportionality between the crime and punishment is

not required, the Eighth Amendment forbids “extreme sentences that are

‘grossly disproportionate to the crime.” (Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, at p. 1001 (conc. Opn. Of Kennedy, J.), citing Solem v. Helm, supra, at pp. 288, 303.) Successful proportionality challenges to noncapital punishment

sentences are “‘exceedingly rare.’” (Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263,

374.)

In Solem, the United States Supreme Court set out a three-prong test

similar to the one adopted in California to address claims of disproportionate

sentences:

“[A] court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth

Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same

jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of

the same crime in other jurisdictions.”

(Solem v. Helm, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 292.)

However, the Court subsequently restricted this test, stating the comparative

analyses of the second and third prongs is appropriate only when the analysis

of the first prong “leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” (Harmelin

v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1005.)

Lodgment 5 at 26-27. The Court then incorporated its analysis under the California

Constitution and stated that “Huynh’s crimes were particularly grave; sexual intercourse with

a child under 10 is severe enough in and of itself, but Huynh’s crime is compounded by his

abuse of the father-daughter relationship. Thus, we conclude his sentence was not grossly

disproportionate to his crime.” Id. at 27.

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The Eighth Amendment provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be

inflicted. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. A criminal sentence constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment if it is grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. Lockyer v. Andrade,

583 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). The Court stated that in evaluating “term of years sentences,” such

as the one at issue in this case, a reviewing court must consider “all of the circumstances

of the case to determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.” Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). The Court emphasized that this analysis “does not require

strict proportionality between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences

that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Id. at 60. The Court explained that in

determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, the analysis

must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the

sentence.... [I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold comparison ... leads

to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the

defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the

same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other

jurisdictions.... If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial judgment

that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is cruel and

unusual.

Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has observed that “the precise contours of this

principle are unclear, and it has been applied only in exceedingly rare and extreme

circumstances.” Crosby v. Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2012).

Because the appellate court correctly identified and utilized the appropriate federal

law, this Court only is required to determine whether the state court’s decision was

“‘contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of’ this clearly established gross

disproportionality principle.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. Initially, the Court notes that

Petitioner has not identified any case that indicates that a 50-years-to-life sentence,

consisting of two consecutive 25-years-to-life sentences, for two counts of sexual intercourse

with a child under the age of ten is a grossly disproportionate sentence. Rather, a review

of cases in the Ninth Circuit reveals that numerous courts have upheld the constitutionality

of similar sentences for similar sexual misconduct crimes. See Higgins, 2010 WL 1904866,

*20-21 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2010)(denying Eighth Amendment challenge to sentence of 32-

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years-to-life imposed on 68 year old man with no criminal record or history of violence for

seven counts of child molestation of two or more victims); Garcia v. Knipp, 2011 WL

7299662, *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (denying constitutional challenge where defendant

with no prior convictions sentenced to a total of 45-years-to-life for six counts of committing

a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age); Lawrence v. Ryan, 2011 WL 41906, *1-2 (D.

Ariz. Jan. 6, 2011) (upholding constitutionality of 39 year sentence for three counts of sexual

conduct with a minor under 14 years of age imposed on 29 year old man); United States v.

Shill, 2012 WL 6569394, *4-7 (D. Or. Dec. 17, 2012) (denying constitutional challenge to

imposition of ten year mandatory sentence on man convicted of attempting to entice a 16

year old girl to have sex with him); Cordeiro v. Hernandez, 2011 WL 1626577, *15-16 (S.D.

Cal. April 27, 2011) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 75-years-to-life sentence after

conviction for two counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor, one count of indecent

exposure, and one count of child annoyance, and an additional ten years for two serious

felony priors); Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1290-96 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding sentence

of life without the possibility of parole not “grossly disproportionate” when applied to man

convicted of one count of child molestation (touching child’s genitalia over clothes for a few

seconds) when the defendant had a prior conviction for child molestation); Crosby v.

Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784, (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation for sentence

of 26-years-to-life for two violations of the sex offender registration requirements under

California’s Three Strikes Law).

Second, there is ample law and facts supporting the appellate court’s decision. The

initial analysis requires a court to consider the gravity of the offense and the severity of the

sentence. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021. The appellate court found that the crimes of

conviction were “particularly grave” and “compounded by [Petitioner’s] abuse of the fatherdaughter relationship.” Lodgment 5 at 27. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that

the victim was only eight years old, that the acts of intercourse occurred in the family home,

that both the victim and Petitioner acknowledged that the intercourse caused her pain, that

Petitioner threatened to send the victim to Vietnam if she told her mother about the

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intercourse, and that the crimes have detrimentally affected the victim’s self-esteem,

performance at school, and peace of mind.8

 Id. at 20, 23. The appellate court’s factual

summary is supported by the trial record. Lodgment 1 at 128, 133-35, (Petitioner’s

statement); Lodgment 1 at 709-13 (foster parents’ statements); Lodgment 2 at 115-29

(testimony of a family friend); Lodgment 2 at 190-202, 209-13, 217-22 (victim L.H.’s

statements); Lodgment 2 at 237-39 (testimony of L.H.’s teacher); Lodgment 2 at 518

(Petitioner’s psychologist’s testimony). As such, there is ample evidence supporting the

conclusion that the crimes were “particularly grave.” Because the crimes are particularly

grave, the fact that the sentence is severe9

 does not establish any type of disproportionality

and certainly not gross disproportionality. 

This conclusion is supported by federal law. In Norris, 622 F.3d at 1293, the Ninth

Circuit concluded that sentence of life imprisonment was not a grossly disproportional

sentence for a recidivist defendant who touched a five year old girl’s genitalia over her

clothes for a couple of seconds. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the crime

was a crime of violence and noted that “[t]he impact of [child molestation] on the lives of

[its] victims is extraordinarily severe.” Id. at 1294. Clearly, the instant case, which involves

a father engaging in painful sexual intercourse with his eight year old daughter on two

occasions and threatening her with abandonment if she talks to her mother is a crime of

violence that severely harmed the victim. While the sentence certainly is severe, it is not

grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the crimes. See Garcia, 2011 WL 7299662, *4-5

8

 The appellate court stated that the victim’s foster mother “said L.H. refused to use toilet paper and

had difficulty washing for months because she did not want to touch her private area. She described how L.H.

was afraid to fall asleep and still needs a light on. She further indicated how the abuse has impacted L.H.

academically, causing her to be three to four grades behind in school and to discuss the abuse in class. L.H.

struggles with her self-esteem and with understanding why this happened to her.” Lodgment 5 at 20.

9

 The Court finds that a sentence of 50-years-to-life is a severe sentence, however, the Court notes

that it is not the most severe sentence as Petitioner retains the opportunity for parole. See Solem, 463 U.S.

at 297 (“Whether the opportunity for parole exists is an important factor in determining the harshness of the

penalty.”); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1290-91 (the possibility of parole creates a significantly less severe sentence than

a sentence where parole is not a possibility); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 74 (considering the fact that the defendant

“retains the possibility of parole.”).

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(listing numerous cases “reject[ing] convicted child molesters’ disproportionality challenges

to even the most lengthy sentences”). The fact that this was Petitioner’s first conviction

does not undermine the validity of the court’s conclusion. Id. *5; United States v. Lamere,

337 Fed. App’x 669, 672 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the constitutionality of a mandatory 30

year sentence for knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor under the age of twelve

and stating “the Supreme Court has found constitutional longer sentences for crimes of

lesser gravity committed by first-time offenders. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 111 S.Ct.

2680; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982).”). 

Petitioner’s case is not “the rare case” in which the sentence imposed is grossly

disproportionate to the crimes committed. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the

California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

clearly, established Supreme Court precedent, nor did it constitute an unreasonable factual

determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Ground two

be DENIED.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, this Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present any evidence suggesting

that the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor has Petitioner

made any arguments that further factual development is necessary, such that an evidentiary

hearing would be warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (exceptions where an evidentiary

hearing may be appropriate). As such, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District

Judge issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and

(2) directing that Judgement be entered DENYING the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report must be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than September 26, 2104. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than October 17, 2014. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 28, 2014

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

-23- 14cv515-BAS (BLM)

Case 3:14-cv-00515-BAS-BLM Document 17 Filed 08/28/14 Page 23 of 23