Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00791/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00791-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO DONTA GAULDIN,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 12-CV-791-LAB-RBB

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

vs. PETITION

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Respondent.

Gauldin was found guilty in San Diego Superior Court of several crimes: (1) being a

felon in possession of a firearm; (2) burglary; (3) robbery; (4) assault with a deadly weapon;

(5) grand theft of a firearm; (6) making a criminal threat; and (7) evading an officer. He filed

this habeas petition challenging his convictions. At this point, his petition contains just two

claims. The first is that his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment was

violated when the contents of a DNA report were admitted into evidence without live

testimony from the criminalist who prepared the report. The second is that his counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to his co-defendants being identified in court while wearing

prison clothing.

“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's

disposition that has been properly objected to. The district court may accept, reject, or

modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the

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magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

If no objection is made, however, this de novo determination isn't required. United States v.

Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). Because Gauldin is proceeding

pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt.

See Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988). That said, “[p]ro

se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1987).

I. Confrontation Clause Claim1

As the R&R explains, David Cornacchia, a DNA analyst with the San Diego Police

Department, examined the evidence in this case and prepared a report. He wasn’t available

at trial, however, and a supervising criminalist from the Police Department’s DNA laboratory

took his place. That supervisor, Patrick O’Donnell, gave testimony that was informed by

Cornacchia’s report. Gauldin argues that this violated his confrontation rights as articulated

by the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 335 (2009), which held

that “a forensic laboratory report ranked as testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation

Clause.” Flourney v. Small, 681 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Though Gauldin protests the point in his objection to the R&R, the DNA report was

not admitted into evidence at trial. Rather, O’Donnell described the report and explained

how Cornacchia reached the conclusions he’d reached. The R&R is insistent on this point,

and the Court agrees with it. (R&R at 20:8–11; 21:18–19; 26:11–13; 27:21–24.) Gauldin,

on the other hand, insists that “the trial court had allowed a non-testifying criminalist’s report

to be read to the jury without giving Petitioner the opportunity to cross examine the [Author]

of that report and without finding out whether that author was legally unavailable to testify.” 

(Obj. at 3.) But that’s just an empty assertion, and one that is refuted by the record.

/ /

Respondent argues that this claim is procedurally barred because it was forfeited 1

in state court. The R&R disagrees, and Respondent has filed no objection on the issue. 

Following the R&R, the Court is inclined to assess Gauldin’s confrontation clause claim on

its merits.

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Gauldin’s better argument—although it still fails—is that under Melendez-Diaz there’s

no constitutional difference between the outright admission of a laboratory report and, as he

puts it, “surrogate testimony.” (Obj. at 4.) There’s no doubt that, considering the timing of

the state court’s rejection of Gauldin’s Confrontation Clause claim, Melendez-Diaz is the

clearly established federal law the Court has to look to. See Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct.

38, 44 (2011). There’s also no doubt, however, that under Melendez-Diaz the constitutional

difference that Gauldin denies actually does exist. The Ninth Circuit itself, in Meras v. Sisto,

recognized the difference between “a lab report submitted without live testimony” and a

report “introduced through the testimony of the author’s supervisor.” 676 F.3d 1184, 1190

(9th Cir. 2012). And that’s what differentiates this case as well: As the R&R puts it, “the

prosecutor . . . did not introduce the laboratory report into evidence; the only evidence of the

DNA testing was the testimony of O’Donnell, who [sic] petitioner was able to cross-examine.” 

(R&R at 27.) See also Graham v. Nash, 2013 WL 3982271 at *15–17 (C.D. Cal. July 30,

2013) (“Because Melendez-Diaz dealt with the use of affidavits instead of testimony, and this

case dealt with the in-court testimony of a DNA expert, a supervisor who actually conducted

the analysis and reached an independent conclusion about the DNA tests, the court of

appeal’s decision did not involve an unreasonable application of Melendez-Diaz.”); Wise v.

Neotti, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160684 at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (“[F]airminded jurists

could disagree about whether Melendez-Diaz precluded the live testimony of a laboratory

supervisor who reviewed and signed a report prepared by another analyst.”). 

A case subsequent to Melendez-Diaz—too late to benefit Gauldin, but worth

mentioning—would extend the right of confrontation further, but still not in a way that applies

to this case. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). Bullcoming held

the right of confrontation is violated even if the report is admitted through the testimony of

a different expert who had no role in preparing it. But that’s not what happened in this case;

the report was never admitted. Moreover, O’Donnell was asked for his own opinion about

the report, and was able to offer it, because he served as the supervisor of the person who

initially prepared the report. Indeed, one of O’Donnell’s explicit responsibilities as a

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supervisor was to review the lab reports of subordinates, as he did in this case. Justice

Sotomayor’s concurrence in Bullcoming explicitly pointed out that the case does not apply

in these circumstances. She said Bullcoming “is not a case in which the person testifying

is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the

scientific test at issue,” nor one “in which an expert witness was asked for his independent

opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into

evidence.” Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

For these reasons, the California court’s rejection of Gauldin’s Confrontation Clause

claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Gauldin’s objection

to the R&R is overruled, and the claim is DENIED. 

II. Ineffective Assistance Claim

During Gauldin’s trial, two of his co-defendants, Kimberlee Snowden and Eric Carter,

were identified in court while wearing prison clothing and shackles. Gauldin argues this was

prejudicial, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object. He contends that the

appearance of Snowden and Carter in prison dress likely led the jury to believe the victim

and a witness correctly identified them, and that belief would carry over to their identification

of him. In fact, however, Gauldin’s defense at trial was that he didn’t accompany Snowden

and Carter to the scene of the crime, and his counsel reasonably thought it would serve that

defense, and play to Gauldin’s advantage, if Snowden and Carter had the sartorial brand of

“criminal” that prison garb bestows. (R&R at 32.) 

The Supreme Court has held that an accused has a constitutional right to not be tried

in prison clothing. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). But there is no federal law, as

articulated by the Supreme Court, that extends the holding of Estelle to co-defendants, and

to the extent the state law cited by Gauldin does, it’s not relevant to a federal habeas

petition. See Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989). Against that

legal background, Gauldin’s claim articulates nothing other than a disagreement with his

counsel over trial strategy. That can’t be the basis of a Strickland claim. Trial counsel is

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presumed to be competent under Strickland, and the opinion also recognizes that “[t]here

are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.” 466 U.S. 668, 689

(1984).

The California court reviewing Gauldin’s conviction found that his counsel’s

representation didn’t fall below an objective standard of reasonableness or the prevailing

norms of the profession. It also found, moving on to the second prong of Strickland, that the

outcome of his trial would not have been any different had counsel objected to the dress of

Snowden and Carter. These findings were not contrary to clearly established federal law. 

They also weren’t based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The ineffective

assistance claim is therefore DENIED; Gauldin’s objection to the R&R is OVERRULED. 

III. Conclusion

The Court ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety. Gauldin’s objections to the R&R are

OVERRULED, and his petition is DENIED. The Court also denies Gauldin a certificate of

appealability. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 14, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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