Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-99032/USCOURTS-ca9-08-99032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD D. HURLES,  No. 08-99032

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  CIV-00-0118-PHXRCB CHARLES L. RYAN,*

Respondent-Appellee. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Robert C. Broomfield, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 7, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed July 7, 2011

Before: Harry Pregerson, Dorothy W. Nelson and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge D.W. Nelson;

Dissent by Judge Ikuta

*Charles L. Ryan is substituted for his predecessor, Dora B. Schriro, as

Director for the Arizona Department of Corrections. Fed. R. App. P.

43(c)(2). 

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COUNSEL

Denise I. Young and Michael Aaron Harwin, Tucson, Arizona, for the petitioner-appellant.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, Phoenix, Arizona, for the respondent-appellee.

Kent E. Cattani and J.D. Nielsen, Arizona Attorney General,

Capital Litigation Section, Phoenix, Arizona, for the

respondent-appellee.

OPINION

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

Richard D. Hurles appeals the district court’s denial of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his murder conviction and death sentence. He argues the district court erred on

four issues: judicial bias, ineffective assistance of sentencing

counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and procedural default (related to portions of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district

court’s denial of Hurles’s judicial bias claim. The highly

unusual facts of this case—in which the trial judge became

involved as a party in an interlocutory appeal, was denied

standing to appear as an adversary, and then proceeded to preHURLES v. RYAN 9047

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side over a murder trial and single-handedly determine Hurles’s death sentence—compel us to conclude that Hurles was

denied his right to due process. These exceptional facts raise

the probability of actual bias to an unconstitutional level.

Because counsel requested only a new sentencing at oral

argument, rather than a new trial, we remand to the district

court with instructions to grant a writ of habeas corpus as to

Petitioner’s sentence unless the State of Arizona elects, within

90 days of the issuance of the mandate, to resentence Petitioner before a jury and presided over by a judge other than

Judge Hilliard, within a reasonable time thereafter to be determined by the district court. We do not reach Hurles’s remaining claims, as they are now rendered moot by the relief we

grant for his judicial bias claim.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 12, 1992, just a few months after Hurles was

released from thirteen years of incarceration for previous

crimes, eyewitnesses placed him at the Buckeye Public

Library around 2:00 p.m. One witness saw him in the children’s section just before she left at approximately 2:30 pm.

She observed him “stare” at her, and she smelled alcohol from

feet away. When the last witness left the library, the only two

people remaining were Hurles and Kay Blanton, the librarian.

By about 2:45 p.m., when visitors attempted to enter the

library, they found the front door locked and saw Blanton

lying in a pool of blood. 

Dr. Walter, a defense expert, described Hurles’s account of

that time:

On the day before the present offense, Richard drank

approximately eighteen beers throughout the day and

had only one meal in the evening. The next morning

he was still intoxicated. Richard ate a large breakfast

shortly before his nephew invited him to go meet a

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woman and drink more beer. Allegedly, they both

had consensual sex with the woman before leaving.

While en [ ] route to his brother’s house, an old

acquaintance, a drug dealer, gave Richard a hit of

L.S.D. and congratulated him on getting out of

prison. Once back at home, Richard drank several

more beers before going to the library to return some

books. He is unsure how long he was there and has

no memory of the actual offense. 

Another witness saw Hurles leave the library through the

back door and followed him down the street, where they had

a brief conversation. State v. Hurles, 914 P.2d 1291, 1293-94

(Ariz. 1996). Hurles then went home on a borrowed bicycle

and requested that his nephew Thomas drive him to a Phoenix

bus station. Id. On the way, Hurles dumped his bloody clothes

along the side of the road. Id. After dropping Hurles off,

Thomas later helped police find the discarded clothes, and

Hurles was arrested on a bus headed to Las Vegas. Id. 

In the library, Blanton was found with her clothes removed

from the waist down and thirty-seven stab wounds on her

body. Id. at 1293. The weapon was a paring knife Hurles had

found in the library. Id. She was still conscious when paramedics arrived at the scene, after having attempted to reach a

phone. Id. at 1299. She was transferred to the hospital and

died shortly thereafter. 

Richard Hurles was arrested and charged with first degree

premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, burglary,

and attempted sexual assault. Because he was indigent, the

court appointed an attorney to represent him. When the prosecution decided to seek the death penalty, Hurles’s attorney

made an ex parte request to Judge Hilliard, the trial judge, for

the appointment of co-counsel. The practice of designating at

least two attorneys for capital cases was standard at the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office.1

 Hurles’s attorney

1The public defender’s office was unable to represent Hurles due to a

conflict of interest. Hurles’s attorney was appointed by the court as a solo

practitioner. 

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cited the need to prepare for not only the guilt phase of Hurles’s capital proceedings, in which she would later raise an

insanity defense and need to prepare expert testimony and scientific evidence, but also the complex sentencing phase. After

Judge Hilliard denied the request without explanation, Hurles’s attorney petitioned the court of appeals in a special

action, arguing that the judge had abused her discretion. 

Under Arizona law, a trial judge is a nominal party in special action proceedings. However, this nomenclature is a

“mere formality” warranting no action on the part of the

judge. State ex rel. Dean v. City Court, 598 P.2d 1008, 1011

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); see also Hurles v. Superior Court, 849

P.2d 1, 2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). In this case, however, Judge

Hilliard appeared and filed a responsive pleading defending

her ruling. The judge was represented in the special action by

Colleen French from the Arizona Attorney General’s Office.

As Ms. French admitted in later proceedings, she had at least

some communications with Judge Hilliard about Hurles’s

case in the context of representing Judge Hilliard in the special action proceeding, although the record is ambiguous as to

the nature and extent of those communications. 

In her responsive pleading, Judge Hilliard commented on

the overwhelming evidence of guilt the state had assembled

against Hurles, evidence which rendered the case “very simple and straightforward.” In addition, Judge Hilliard questioned the competence of Hurles’s attorney, stating, “Clearly

there are other attorneys who provide contract services for

Maricopa County who would be able to provide competent

representation in a case as simple as this.” These comments

took place months before any evidence had been presented in

the case. 

The Arizona Court of Appeals published a decision denying Judge Hilliard standing to appear in the special action and

ruling it improper for judges to file pleadings in special

actions solely to defend the correctness of their decisions.

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Hurles v. Superior Court, 849 P.2d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).

Addressing Judge Hilliard’s participation specifically, the

court held that it was “of the inappropriate ‘I-ruled-correctly’

sort,” which violated the “essential [principle] to impartial

adjudication” that judges must have “no personal stake—and

surely no justiciable stake—in whether they are ultimately

affirmed or reversed.” Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). The

court then declined jurisdiction over the petition. Id.

Despite the Court of Appeals’s ruling that Judge Hilliard

had acted improperly, she continued to preside over Hurles’s

trial. On April 14, 1994, a jury found Hurles guilty of all

charges. 

Judge Hilliard then conducted an aggravation/mitigation

hearing on September 30, 1994, to hear evidence regarding

Hurles’s recommended sentence. Under Arizona’s capital

sentencing scheme at the time, Judge Hilliard was the sole

arbiter of Hurles’s sentence. No jury participated in determining his sentence. 

Hurles’s counsel offered the following evidence regarding

a number of alleged mitigating factors, including diminished

capacity, dysfunctional family background, low intelligence

and lack of education, and good behavior while incarcerated:

Richard Hurles was born into a family of poor migrant farm

workers as one of nine children and eight sons.2 Richard was

always slow and was routinely placed in special classes in

school. Various doctors at points in his life have diagnosed

him as mentally retarded, borderline mentally retarded, and

learning disabled. 

Richard’s father John was an abusive alcoholic and sexual

predator, and he passed these traits on to most of the Hurles

2We use the petitioner’s first name in this section so as to distinguish

him from other members of the Hurles family. 

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children. John molested his only daughter Debbie for many

years until she escaped into foster care. According to Edith

Hurles (the ex-wife of one of Richard’s brothers), John also

saw no problem with forcing women to have sex with him,

believing that “if a man wanted a woman, he should take her.

If she did not want it, force her.” John raped Richard’s first

girlfriend after forcing Richard to pull the car over so that he

could take her out by the side of the road. John also routinely

beat the children with a leather belt or a switch from a tree,

and on one occasion he bashed one of his children over the

head with a hammer. Richard’s mother Irene offered no protection from John’s abuse, as she was often the victim herself.

Edith Hurles remembered that John would beat Irene “whenever he got drunk, and he was drunk all the time.” 

Richard began drinking alcohol and sniffing paint, glue,

and gasoline at age nine. John taught his sons to drink at early

ages and fed at least one of the children vodka as a toddler;

alcohol and drug abuse were never discouraged. As Richard

explained, “[I]t was routine for three or four of us to be high

on alcohol, marijuana, or cocaine.” Dr. Stonefeld testified

during the pre-sentence hearing that “[t]he norm in [Hurles’s]

family was abuse of alcohol.” Richard’s education ended permanently in the seventh grade after he was caught sniffing

paint on school property. He sniffed paint once or twice per

week beginning at age twelve. At age fourteen, Richard added

approximately five marijuana joints per week to his drug

intake, and he began experimenting with other drugs, including mushrooms and heroin. At fifteen, he began snorting three

to four lines of cocaine and smoking twenty-five marijuana

joints per week and increased his alcohol intake to a six-pack

of beer per week. By the ages of sixteen to seventeen, “[h]e

[drank] approximately a case of beer, two to three fifths of

wine, two pints of whiskey, smoked eighty marijuana joints,

and snorted two grams or twelve lines of cocaine each week.”

He maintained this level of drug abuse until he was first incarcerated. At that time he reported to Dr. Tuchler that he was

“drinking all day if he ha[d] the money.” 

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Richard has reported hearing voices giving him violent

commands intermittently since age seventeen. During his first

stint in prison in 1978, he was prescribed an anti-psychotic

drug, Mellaril, to suppress the voices. He later took the same

drug again in prison after the murder in 1993. Hurles has

stated that he heard voices telling him to “push other inmates

down the stairs.” He avoided stairs so that he would not do

what the voices told him to do. 

Most doctors who have examined Hurles have found him

mentally and emotionally wanting. Dr. Bendheim, who examined him in 1978 relating to child molestation criminal proceedings, described him as “mentally retarded and illiterate.”

Dr. Tuchler concluded at the same time that Hurles was

incompetent to stand trial due to his “sociocultural and intellectual defect[s]” and “borderline mental retardation.” He was

housed in the prison’s section for the mentally retarded for

over half of the thirteen years he was in jail for previous

crimes. Dr. Walter, who examined him in 1993, described

him as “showing significant levels of neuropsychological deficit” and an “overall degree of dysfunction . . . which represents performance in the ‘brain damaged range.’ ” Dr. Walter

also thought he likely suffered from both depression and a

thought disorder. Dr. Walter’s battery of neuropsychological

testing placed Hurles “in the brain damage range in six out of

seven measures felt to be most sensitive to brain functioning.”

Post-conviction testing revealed an abnormality in the left

frontal lobe of his brain.

Dr. Walter concluded that alcohol and drug abuse have a

more pronounced effect on someone with Hurles’s developmental limitations, exacerbating his mental deficits and leading to “more blatant cerebral dysfunction.” Similarly, Dr.

Bendheim explained, “This type of intoxication in a mentally

retarded person further reduces his judgment, his capacity to

adhere to the norms of society and of the law and to fully

appraise the nature and consequences of his action[s] . . . .”

He even opined, relating to Hurles’s conviction for child

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molestation, “According to the history as I was taking it, it is

most unlikely that the alleged offense would have been committed if he had not been severely intoxicated or, given his

type of intoxication, if he had possessed norma[l] intellectual

capacity which he has lacked apparently since birth.” 

In addition to affecting his judgment, drug abuse has also

had an impact on his memory. Dr. Stonefeld explained in his

September 9, 1994 evaluation that Hurles “has significant

memory problems with large gaps in events and time

sequences. These episodes are largely related to periods of

intoxication.” Indeed, Hurles would sometimes lose time

when high on inhalants, including, as he reported to Dr. Bendheim in 1978, “[o]ne time after sniffing paint [when] he found

himself in Buckeye for two days without remembering how

he got there.” 

In contrast to his behavior outside prison, Hurles received

glowing reviews from prison staff who worked closely with

him during his long term with the Arizona Department of

Corrections. Staff described him as “very, very compliant,” “a

very good worker” who “remember[ed] daily tasks” and

whose “attendance was always good,” and someone who

“was never out of control” and never “displayed any . . . problems controlling his temper.” Richard received numerous

evaluations from prison staff describing him as “excellent.”

One staff member commented specifically, “Richard has demonstrated his ability to function well while in prison.” Marilynn Windust, a Correctional Program Officer specializing in

mental health and primary substance abuse at the Arizona

Department of Corrections while Hurles was imprisoned

there, worked with Hurles daily for two years. She stated that,

to her knowledge, he had never received disciplinary infractions or had any difficulty complying with prison programs.

Dr. Stonefeld considered it consistent with his diagnoses of

Hurles that he did and could thrive in the “structured, very

orderly” environment of the prison system. 

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Following the aggravation/mitigation hearing, Judge

Hilliard—as the sole sentencer—sentenced Hurles to death on

October 13, 1994. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on

direct appeal. State v. Hurles, 914 P.2d 1291 (Ariz. 1996).

Hurles filed his first petition for post-conviction review

(“PCR”) on January 8, 1999, alleging four claims, including

both ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in this

appeal. Judge Hilliard again presided over this PCR, and Colleen French from the Attorney General’s office—Judge Hilliard’s attorney in the prior special action proceeding—

represented the State. Judge Hilliard denied the PCR, and the

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed without comment.

Hurles began federal habeas proceedings in 2000, but then

returned to state court to file a second PCR raising additional

claims, including judicial bias and new ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. He requested Judge Hilliard’s removal

from the case and was denied. Judge Hilliard then denied his

second PCR. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed without

comment. 

Hurles filed an amended petition for habeas corpus in the

District of Arizona, raising ten claims. The district court

denied most of them as procedurally barred. After additional

briefing, the district court dismissed the remainder of Hurles’s

claims. The district court then certified four issues for appeal

to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the district court’s decision to deny a 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition de novo, Bribiesca v.

Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2000), and its findings

of fact for clear error, McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233,

1240 (9th Cir. 2003).

When reviewing decisions of the Arizona state courts, the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

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(“AEDPA”) applies to any petition filed after April 24, 1996.

28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S.

202, 204 (2003); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant relief if the state

court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). In addition, a federal court may grant relief with

respect to the factual findings of the state court if those findings were “based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). If the “state court’s factfinding process survives this intrinsic review,” its “findings

are dressed in a presumption of correctness” under Section

2254(e)(1). Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.

2004).

III. JUDICIAL BIAS

Petitioner argues that the trial judge should have recused

herself from his criminal proceedings after she became an

active party in his interlocutory appeal. Her continued

involvement with his case, he contends, denied him due process of law. Given the judge’s conduct in the special action

proceeding, which the Arizona Court of Appeals specifically

deemed improper, the potential for bias was unconstitutionally high. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of

Hurles’s claim. 

A. Clearly Established Supreme Court Precedent

[1] “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of

due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).

Indeed, the “legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately

depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).

This most basic tenet of our judicial system helps to ensure

both litigants’ and the public’s confidence that each case has

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been fairly adjudicated by a neutral and detached arbiter. An

appearance of impropriety, regardless of whether such impropriety is actually present or proven, erodes that confidence

and weakens our system of justice. 

[2] While most claims of judicial bias are resolved “by

common law, statute, or the professional standards of the

bench and bar,” the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment “establishes a constitutional floor.” Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (citations omitted). To

safeguard the right to a fair trial, the Constitution requires

judicial recusal in cases where “the probability of actual bias

on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be

constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47

(1975). “The Court asks not whether the judge is actually,

subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,

129 S. Ct. 2252, 2262 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).3

 The Supreme Court has declared: 

Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the

burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or

which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,

clear and true between the state and the accused,

denies the latter due process of law.

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

3We cite to Caperton, the Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding

judicial bias, throughout this opinion. Although, as the dissent points out,

Caperton is not controlling insofar as it announces new “clearly established Supreme Court precedent” that post-dates the state court decision

at issue here, dissent at 9092 n.13, we refer to it where we find its analysis

of established Supreme Court jurisprudence helpful to our resolution of

the case. We read Caperton to announce no new rule of law that would

affect our analysis here. 

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[3] A claimant need not prove actual bias to make out a

due process violation. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212,

215 (1971); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825

(1986). Indeed, the Supreme Court has pointed out that it

would be nearly impossible for a litigant to prove actual bias

on the part of a judge. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262-63; see

also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (“[W]hen

the trial judge is discovered to have had some basis for rendering a biased judgment, his actual motivations are hidden

from view, and we must presume the process was impaired.”

(citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535). It is for this reason that the

Court’s precedents on judicial bias focus on the appearance

of and potential for bias, not actual, proven bias. Due process

thus mandates a “stringent rule” for judicial conduct, and

requires recusal even of judges “who would do their very best

to weigh the scales of justice equally” if the risk of bias is too

high. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.

In determining what constitutes a risk of bias that is “too

high,” the Supreme Court has emphasized that no mechanical

definition exists; cases requiring recusal “cannot be defined

with precision” because “[c]ircumstances and relationships

must be considered.” Id.; see also Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822

(internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court has just reaffirmed this functional approach. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at

2265-66.

The Court’s call for pragmatism is particularly important in

this instance, for capital cases mandate an even “greater

degree of reliability” than other cases do. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9 (1989); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428

U.S. 280, 304 (1976). We are compelled to acknowledge “that

the penalty of death is qualitatively different” from any other

penalty and that “there is a corresponding difference in the

need for reliability in the determination that death is the

appropriate punishment.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. As

required by the Supreme Court, we therefore utilize a func9058 HURLES v. RYAN

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tional approach to the facts of this case as they relate to the

Court’s established case law.

[4] The Supreme Court’s judicial bias doctrine has evolved

as it confronts new scenarios “which, as an objective matter,

require recusal.” Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259. The most basic

example of probable bias occurs when the judge “ ‘has a

direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a

conclusion against [one of the litigants].’ ” Crater v. Galaza,

491 F.3d 1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Tumey, 273

U.S. at 523). The Court has also held that other financial

interests may mandate recusal, even when they are not “as

direct or positive as [they] appeared to be in [Tumey].” Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); see also Ward v.

Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813. However, financial conflicts of interest are not the only relevant

conflicts for judicial bias purposes. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct.

at 2260 (explaining that judicial bias doctrine encompasses “a

more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to

disregard neutrality”). The Court has thus required recusal if

the judge “becomes ‘embroiled in a running, bitter controversy’ ” with one of the litigants, id. at 2262 (quoting Mayberry

v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971)); if she becomes

“enmeshed in matters involving [a litigant],” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971); or “if the judge acts as

‘part of the accusatory process,’ ” Crater, 491 F.3d at 1131

(quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137). At bottom, then, the

Court has found a due process violation when a judge holds

two irreconcilable roles, such that her role as an impartial

arbiter could become compromised. Murchison, 349 U.S. at

137; see also Crater, 491 F.3d at 1131. 

B. AEDPA Deference

[5] AEDPA applies to any claim “adjudicated on the merits” by a state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), meaning the state

court decision “rest[ed] on substantive, rather than procedural,

grounds.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 966 (9th Cir.

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2004). The applicable state court decision is the “last reasoned

decision” addressing a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Because the

Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Hurles’s appeal on

this claim without comment, we “look through” that opinion

to the last reasoned decision, Judge Hilliard’s denial of Hurles’s second PCR. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806

(1991). Ordinarily, the state court’s factual findings would be

entitled to a presumption of correctness under AEDPA. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, such deference is only warranted if the state court’s fact-finding process survives the

intrinsic review of Section 2254(d)(2). See Taylor v. Maddox,

366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). In other words, the state

court decision must not be “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

[6] In this case, the state court fact-finding process was

fundamentally flawed. Judge Hilliard granted no evidentiary

hearing or other opportunity for Hurles to develop his claim.

Hurles had alleged that Judge Hilliard was improperly

involved in the special action proceeding before the Arizona

Court of Appeal, in which Hurles had appealed her denial of

his request for additional counsel. As discussed above, Judge

Hilliard filed a responsive pleading through her counsel, the

Arizona Attorney General’s office, arguing the merits of her

decision. Hurles alleged that statements in Judge Hilliard’s

brief were attributable to her, and that the brief contained

inappropriate statements about the merits of Hurles’s case and

the competence of his attorney before trial had begun. He

argued that Judge Hilliard’s involvement in the special action

—which the Court of Appeals had found improper—rendered

her unfit to continue presiding over his trial and sentence and

that she should have recused herself. 

[7] Instead of providing a forum for Hurles to present and

develop evidence to establish his claim, Judge Hilliard

“found” facts based on her own recollections and factual

assertions about her conduct. She concluded that she was not

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in fact involved in the Special Action proceeding, that the

brief filed in her name was not her brief, and that statements

in the brief could not be attributed to her. In effect, she testified through her order denying Hurles’s second petition for

post-conviction relief. See Minute Entry, Aug. 9, 2002, at 2,

Hurles v. Schriro, No. CIV-00-0118-PHX-RCB (D. Ariz.

2008), ECF 72-1 at 19 (“Minute Entry”) (“[T]he Attorney

General filed a response on this judge’s behalf but without

any specific authorization of such a pleading. No contact was

made by this judge with the Attorney General and this judge

was a nominal party only.”). Hurles had no opportunity to

challenge Judge Hilliard’s own claimed memory and understanding of events which had taken place years prior. This

procedure is inherently inadequate to evaluate the merits of

Petitioner’s claim. In fact, it is not a procedure at all. See In

re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 138 (1955) (“Thus the judge

whom due process requires to be impartial in weighing the

evidence presented before him, called on his own personal

knowledge and impression of what had occurred in the grand

jury room and his judgment was based in part on this impression, the accuracy of which could not be tested by adequate

cross-examination.”); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1165

(9th Cir. 1988) (finding error when the court relied on “personal knowledge” to resolve a disputed issue of fact).

[8] We have repeatedly held that where a state court makes

factual findings without an evidentiary hearing or other

opportunity for the petitioner to present evidence, “the factfinding process itself is deficient” and not entitled to deference. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 1001 (“If, for example, a state

court makes evidentiary findings without holding a hearing

and giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence, such

findings clearly result in an ‘unreasonable determination of

the facts.’ ”); see also Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 950

(9th Cir. 2006) (“In many circumstances, a state court’s determination of the facts without an evidentiary hearing creates a

presumption of unreasonableness.”) (citations omitted); Nunes

v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,

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543 U.S. 1038 (2004) (“[W]ith the state court having refused

[petitioner] an evidentiary hearing, we need not of course

defer to the state court’s factual findings—if that is indeed

how those stated findings should be characterized—when

they were made without such a hearing.”); Killian v. Poole,

282 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.

1179 (2003) (“Having refused [petitioner] an evidentiary

hearing on the matter, the state cannot argue now that the normal AEDPA deference is owed the factual determinations of

the [state] courts.”); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 363

(9th Cir. 1999) (finding no deference warranted where factual

findings “were not subject to any of the usual judicial procedures designed to ensure accuracy” because “[t]he judge was

not under oath when he wrote the letter, the bailiff was not

under oath when relaying her account of events to the judge,

and neither the judge nor the bailiff was ever questioned by

counsel for either side”); cf. Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462,

1479 n.24 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[Petitioner] raised the issue of

judicial bias in his first post-trial motion for a new trial and

had the benefit of an evidentiary hearing on that claim.”). This

case presents an especially compelling example of a defective

fact-finding process, where the facts “found” by Judge Hilliard involved her own conduct and her “findings” were based

on her own untested memory and assertions.

[9] The dissent suggests that we are re-casting legal disputes as factual ones in order to escape the constraints of

AEDPA. However, we are bound to confront factual disputes

relevant to this claim. Judge Hilliard’s resolution of Hurles’s

due process claim was predominantly a factual one. She did

not review her participation in the special action and the statements in her brief and conclude that they did not constitute a

potential for bias, nor did she review the Arizona Court of

Appeals’s decision and conclude that it indicated no unconstitutional potential for bias. Rather, she supplied additional

facts that, in her judgment, rendered her conduct proper and

prevented the brief’s contents from being attributable to her.

See Minute Entry at 2 (“In the special action in this case, the

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Attorney General filed a response on this judge’s behalf but

without any specific authorization of such a pleading. No contact was made by this judge with the Attorney General and

this judge was a nominal party only.”) (emphasis added).

None of these facts was established by the record. To the contrary, Hurles contended that Judge Hilliard had “injected

[her]self as a direct adversary” in the special action, that she

“filed her own substantive response” in the proceeding, that

she knew the contents of the briefing filed in her name, and

that those contents were therefore attributable to her. The Arizona Court of Appeals explicitly noted that the record was

ambiguous as to Judge Hilliard’s involvement; the Attorney

General had noted at oral argument that the Judge was not

involved, but there was no other evidence to that effect and

the brief was filed in the Judge’s name. See Hurles, 849 P.2d

at 2 & n.2. 

Thus, while the dissent appears to characterize Judge Hilliard’s decision as solely a legal determination based on

undisputed facts, Judge Hilliard’s own (factual) reasoning

belies that characterization of this case. Indeed, she clarifies

in her order that the defect in Hurles’s due process claim is

a lack of sufficient “factual evidence to support his allegations,” but she then fails to afford him a hearing or other

opportunity to develop such factual evidence. Minute Entry at

2. The dissent relies on Judge Hilliard’s own description of

events, which were not tested or challenged through crossexamination, in its description of the relevant facts. See Dissent at 9090. Thus, the dissent adopts one disputed view of

the facts at issue here and then claims they are undisputed.4

4The dissent also seems to suggest that a judicial bias claim based on

appearance of bias could never present a factual question, and that Hurles

has acknowledged as much. Dissent at 9096 n.15. However, that the test

is appearance of bias rather than actual bias does not obviate the need for

facts to support one’s claim. Indeed, all judicial bias claims must proffer

some set of facts that indicate an unconstitutional potential for bias. Hurles

does so by laying out the facts which he contends indicate a potential for

bias and unequivocally arguing that Judge Hilliard’s opinion was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

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Hurles has always contested Judge Hilliard’s version of the

facts and her determination that she was not involved with the

special action proceeding. 

[10] Moreover, Judge Hilliard herself presided over the

collateral proceedings, evaluating Hurles’s claims regarding

her own alleged misconduct during trial and sentencing.

While judges frequently consider contemporaneous motions

for recusal based on their own alleged conflicts of interest, the

Supreme Court has noted the inherently problematic nature of

reviewing such inquiries. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal

Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009) (“[Without objective rules,]

there may be no adequate protection against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in

deciding the case. The judge’s own inquiry into actual bias,

then, is not one that the law can easily superintend or review

. . . .”). We note, however, that this case presents a particularly unusual and problematic scenario. Typically, judges’

considerations of their conflicts of interest take place in the

context of contemporaneous motions for recusal before the

allegedly biased proceedings occurred. In that circumstance,

the judge is merely asked to prevent a future harm from

occurring, see, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 515 (1927),

and the judge is charged simply with determining whether

failure to recuse could create a potential for bias. Here, by

contrast, Judge Hilliard provided a post-hoc justification for

her own conduct in response to allegations that she had

already behaved improperly and violated Hurles’s rights. This

unusual posture distinguishes this case from the routine examples cited by the dissent, dissent at 9097-98, and raises concerns about a judge’s ability to determine impartially whether

she has, in essence, violated the law. See Murchison, 349 U.S.

at 136 (“[N]o man can be a judge in his own case . . . .”).

[11] Based on these flaws in the state court’s fact-finding

process, we find the state court decision resulted in an “unreasonable determination of the facts” and is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under AEDPA. See Maddox, 366

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F.3d at 999 (explaining that application of the “ ‘unreasonable

determination’ clause” is appropriate to situations in which

“the process employed by the state court is defective”) (citations omitted). We therefore turn to consider Hurles’s judicial

bias claim.

C The Merits of the Judicial Bias Claim

In this case, at least three problems raise an unconstitutional potential for bias given Judge Hilliard’s later role as the

sole arbiter of Hurles’s sentence: (1) her unnecessary and

improper participation in the special action to defend her own

ruling against the defendant5; (2) her troubling comments

about the simplicity of his case and the overwhelming evidence of guilt that she made before a single witness had testified; and (3) her comments questioning the competence of

Hurles’s attorney. Taken together, these unique facts point to

the overarching conclusion that Judge Hilliard held two

incompatible roles: that of arbiter and that of adversary.

Therefore, Judge Hilliard’s recusal was required in order to

protect Hurles’s due process right to a fair trial.6

5The Arizona Court of Appeals found the judge’s conduct to be

improper and characterized this type of intervention in a special action

proceeding as one indicating that the trial judge has abandoned her neutral

role. See Hurles v. Superior Court, 849 P.2d 1, 3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)

(internal quotations omitted). 

6The dissent emphasizes the fact that another trial court judge, Judge

Ballinger, reviewed and denied Hurles’s motion to recuse Judge Hilliard

from presiding over his second petition for post-conviction review. Dissent at 9097-98 & n.16. First, under AEDPA, our review is focused on the

last reasoned state court decision, which is Judge Hilliard’s denial of Hurles’s second state post-conviction petition. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 803 (1991). Therefore, Judge Ballinger’s decision is not the decision

we are reviewing. Second, Judge Ballinger’s four-sentence, unreasoned

minute order does not purport to rule on the merits of Hurles’s judicial

bias claim (or any of his other claims for post-conviction relief); rather,

it simply denies Hurles’s motion for a change of judge for cause. It contains no analysis of the facts or applicable law at issue in the case, and

makes no pronouncement as to the merits of any of Hurles’s claims.

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Respondent highlights the fact that Hurles did not raise his

judicial bias claim sooner (either at trial or on direct appeal)

and that the Arizona Court of Appeals did not seek Judge Hilliard’s recusal in the aftermath of its decision denying her

standing in the special action. We find these arguments unpersuasive for several reasons. First, to the extent that the respondent raises a procedural argument regarding the timing of

Hurles’s judicial bias claim, it is meritless. No party has

directly argued that Hurles failed to exhaust or has otherwise

waived or defaulted on his judicial bias claim. The Arizona

Superior Court did not consider or find any procedural problems with Hurles’s claim; rather, the court reached the merits

of Mr. Hurles’s claim and denied it on the merits. Indeed, the

claim was exhausted through “one complete round of the

State’s established review process,” the state court denied the

claim on the merits, and it is now properly before us.

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

In addition, whether Hurles would have been better served

by seeking Judge Hilliard’s recusal earlier, or whether the

Arizona Court of Appeals should have sought her recusal,

does not control our current evaluation of the claim. The burden is on the judge to disqualify herself, even if a party never

seeks recusal. See 17A Ariz. Rev. Stat. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule

81, Code of Jud. Conduct, Rule 2.11(A) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”)

(emphasis added); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (same).

Furthermore, Hurles has raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims with regard to both his trial and appellate counsel.

We do not reach or decide these claims because the judicial

Finally, that one judge has ruled differently in a particular case is not by

itself persuasive in a case where, as here, the specific ruling at issue

(Judge Ballinger’s order) is not entitled to any deference. Habeas review

(and indeed, appellate review more generally) presupposes numerous earlier judgments against a petitioner. Our role is to determine whether those

prior decisions should stand under governing law. 

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bias claim is dispositive, but we hesitate to lend persuasive

weight to the fact that he did not raise his judicial bias claim

while represented by those attorneys. 

1. Judge Hilliard’s Adversarial Role

Judge Hilliard injected herself into a special action proceeding in which Hurles appealed her denial of his request for

additional counsel and argued that she had abused her discretion. As noted above, while special action proceedings in Arizona require the trial judge to be named as the nominal

respondent, this is typically a mere formality and does not

warrant any response or active participation by the judge.

Hurles, 849 P.2d at 2. In this case, however, Judge Hilliard

filed a responsive pleading through her counsel, the Arizona

Attorney General’s office, arguing the merits of her decision.

[12] The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a published

opinion denying the judge’s standing to appear in the special

action and finding that her responsive pleading was improper.

Id. at 4. Specifically, the court held that judges may not file

responsive pleadings in special action proceedings solely to

make “I-ruled-correctly” arguments. Id. Such conduct, the

court found, transformed the judge’s role from that of an

impartial arbiter to that of an adversary. Specifically, the court

characterized this kind of intervention as follows:

[T]he trial judge, that impartial dispenser of justice

. . . stands before the appellate tribunal to defend his

ruling and his honor. The trial judge is no longer

impartial. He is an adversary and an advocate.

Id. at 3 (quoting State ex rel. Dean v. City Court, 598 P.2d

1008, 1010 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)). The court thus ruled that

her conduct was improper because it threatened a “principle

. . . essential to impartial adjudication,” that judges have “no

personal stake—and surely no justiciable stake—in whether

they are ultimately affirmed or reversed.” Id. at 4 (emphasis

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in original). Despite this ruling, Judge Hilliard continued to

preside over Hurles’s trial and unilaterally determined his

death sentence after he was convicted.7

[13] Respondent argues that Judge Hilliard was a mere

nominal party in the special action proceedings. However, the

Arizona Court of Appeals’s decision specifically drew a distinction between judges who behave as “nominal” parties and

those who, despite the fact that no response or appearance is

required, nonetheless appear and submit arguments on their

own behalf. The court then determined that, within the category of the more active parties, some kinds of responses are

proper (those based on administrative or policy-based arguments) and some are improper (those that defend the judge’s

decision against the petitioner’s claim). Id. at 3. Thus, the

Court of Appeals found that Judge Hilliard was neither a standard nominal party, nor an appropriate active party. Instead,

it agreed with the Dean court’s assessment that participation

such as Judge Hilliard’s in the special action transformed the

trial judge into “an adversary and an advocate.” Id. at 3. 

The dissent argues that we overstate the Arizona Court of

Appeals’s characterization of Judge Hilliard’s participation in

the special action as “improper”; rather, according to the dissent, the court “merely resolved two competing lines of

authority and determined that a trial judge lacks standing to

defend a specific ruling in a special action proceeding.” Dissent at 9089. This is a strained reading of the Court of

Appeals’s opinion. That its decision was an important and

strong rebuke of active judicial participation in special actions

is apparent from Judge Hilliard’s statement in her later Minute Entry that “judges no longer file an ‘improper’ response

in special actions since the court’s decision in Hurles v. Superior Court.” Minute Entry at 3. Indeed, even the Arizona

7Arizona’s system of allowing judges to deliver death sentences without

a jury has since been held unconstitutional. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,

596-97 (2002). 

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Attorney General’s Office, which represented Judge Hilliard

in the special action, conceded that the Court of Appeals’s

opinion was concerned with protecting the impartiality of

judicial proceedings that was threatened by participation such

as Judge Hilliard’s. See Opp. to Mot. to Recuse at 2, Hurles

v. Schriro, No. CIV-00-0118-PHX-RCB (D. Ariz. 2008), ECF

72-6 at 24 (“The [Arizona Court of Appeals] held that . . . it

is improper for a judge to [act as Judge Hilliard did]. . . . The

court reasoned that when a judge responded to a special action

and claimed that he or she had ruled correctly, it placed the

judge at odds with the party who filed the special action,

which might affect the perception of impartiality of the proceedings.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

Respondent argues that regardless of how we classify Judge

Hilliard’s participation, we should not consider statements in

the responsive pleading to be statements by the judge. However, while Judge Hilliard recalls that she was not involved,

Colleen French, her counsel, conceded otherwise. In a brief

filed with the district court in Hurles’s federal habeas proceedings, Ms. French stated, “Undersigned Counsel’s communications with the Trial Judge during the special action

proceedings cannot be construed to have been ex parte

because Undersigned Counsel represented the Trial Judge at

the time they occurred.” Response to Pet.’s Mot. to Disqualify

at 6, Hurles v. Schriro, No. CIV-00-0118-PHX-RCB (D. Ariz.

2008), ECF 27. Thus, her level of personal involvement in the

special action is, at best, contested. 

[14] Even if we accept Judge Hilliard’s averment that she

had no direct involvement in the special action, however, we

may still properly attribute statements in the brief to her for

at least two reasons. First, the responsive pleading was in the

judge’s name, as stated in the introduction.8 This statement is

8

“Respondent Judge Hilliard, through her attorneys undersigned, hereby

enters her response to Petitioner’s petition for special action.” Response

to Pet. for Special Action, CV-93-0046-SA (Mar. 1, 1993). 

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no different from the language used by counsel for Hurles.9

The presumption that statements in one’s name are statements

of that person is a logical one, and there is no reliable evidence in the record that demonstrates otherwise.10 The Judge

also received copies of the briefing and therefore had an

opportunity to object to any statements made on her behalf,

which the record indicates she did not do. It is unclear why

statements of a client’s attorney should not be imputed to the

client in this instance, as they are in every other scenario.

Whether Judge Hilliard herself actually wrote the language in

her special action brief is irrelevant. She was the respondent

and the brief was filed in her name; statements in the brief are

therefore attributable to her. We need not inquire further into

her subjective state of mind, especially given the Court of

Appeals’s treatment of the issue as a pleading filed by her.

Hurles, 849 P.2d at 4 (“We come then to the question which

sort of pleading the responding judge has offered in this

case.”) (emphasis added). 

Second, petitions for review in the Arizona Supreme Court

challenging the Court of Appeals’s decision in the special

action refer to the judge’s responsive pleading with the presumption that they are her arguments, just as the statements

of counsel are always the statements of the client. The presiding criminal judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court,

Ronald S. Reinstein, petitioned for a special action to the Arizona Supreme Court following the Court of Appeals’s ruling

in Hurles v. Superior Court in order to defend the judges’

9

“Petitioner, Richard Hurles, by and through his undersigned counsel,

respectfully petitions the Court . . . .” Pet. for Special Action, CV-93-

0046-SA (Feb. 18, 1993). 

10The dissent attempts to distance Judge Hilliard from the special action

proceeding by referring to the brief as simply “submitted in Judge Hilliard’s name” and without her involvement. Dissent at 9096. This linguistic strategy merely highlights the key factual dispute in this case: whether

and how much Judge Hilliard was involved in the special action. The dissent and Judge Hilliard resolve this dispute by pointing to Judge Hilliard’s

factual testimony submitted in her minute entry. 

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ability to appear in such proceedings. See Pet. for Special

Action, CV-93-0135-SA (Apr. 20, 1993). In that petition,

Judge Reinstein referred to the pleadings in the Hurles special

action as “Judge Hilliard’s response,” id. at 6, and highlighted

the direct participation of judges in defending their rulings or

policies in special action proceedings. Judge Reinstein’s petition makes no distinction between the judge and any other client, who may be represented by counsel but is nonetheless

speaking directly through his or her legal pleadings. Judge

Reinstein also argues that if judges are not able to appear in

special actions like Hurles’s—actions in which the state has

no standing to appear—the proceeding would “completely

lose[ ] its adversarial quality.” Id. at 4. The Superior Court’s

presiding criminal judge thus assumed judges in this type of

posture are indeed adversaries of the party bringing the

appeal. 

The Arizona Attorney General, Grant Woods, also petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for a special action following the Court of Appeals’s ruling, seeking to have the Court

decide whether the Attorney General’s Office could continue

to represent judges in special action proceedings given the

court’s concern over potential conflicts of interest. Pet. for

Special Action, CV-93-0134-SA, at 5-6 (Apr. 20, 1993). The

petition argues that if the Attorney General cannot represent

judges, they would have to appear themselves or hire private

counsel. Id. This presumes a standard attorney-client relationship in which the primary actor is the client, Judge Hilliard,

not the Attorney General, her counsel. Therefore, we conclude that statements in the brief are properly attributable to

Judge Hilliard.

2. Statements About the Case

[15] In addition to the fact of Judge Hilliard’s participation, the brief itself contains numerous troubling statements

about the merits of Hurles’s case. These statements display a

familiarity with, and prejudgment of, the facts of his case long

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before any evidence had actually been presented. Judge Hilliard’s brief describes the nature of Hurles’s case, concluding

that it was “very simple and straightforward,” with an overwhelming amount of evidence assembled to demonstrate his

guilt for the “brutal murder.” While any judge would need to

make a determination as to whether additional counsel is

needed by evaluating the relative complexity of a case, here

it is the manner in which Judge Hilliard dismissed Hurles’s

case as “simple” that is problematic. Rather than discussing

the simplicity of the case with reference to the number of

expert or percipient witnesses that would need to be prepared,

the number of trial days the case would likely call for, or

other content-neutral factors, Judge Hilliard referred to the

case as “simple” because the state had already purportedly

amassed overwhelming evidence of guilt against the defendant. She writes:

The State’s evidence at this point includes, but is not

limited to the following: eyewitness statements indicating that Petitioner was seen running from the

Buckeye library after a witness saw a woman bleeding profusely inside the locked library building, Petitioner’s statement to his brother that he had stabbed

someone at the library, Petitioner’s shirt and pants

stained with blood of the same PGM type as the victim’s, Petitioner’s footprint in the victim’s blood at

the scene, and the fact that books returned by Petitioner in the return slot at the library place him at the

scene a[t] the time of the murder. 

This description leads to only one conclusion. According to

Judge Hilliard, the case was simple because he was obviously

guilty.

The dissent’s contention that the proceeding “involved an

evaluation of the evidence only for purposes of determining

whether a second counsel was necessary” assumes the conclusion it wishes to draw. Dissent at 9092-93. Judge Hilliard’s

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analysis is quite different from, for example, a detached determination that the case was simple because it would require

very little witness preparation. In fact, on such neutral measures, the case was not simple at all. Judge Hilliard acknowledged that the State had already listed “22 witnesses to be

called at trial” and that the defense witness list was at that

time unknown. While Judge Hilliard attempted to characterize

the scientific evidence required as minimal, by her own

admission there would be, at a minimum, blood, fingerprint,

and footprint analysis. In addition, she focuses solely on guiltphase evidence without mention of the sentencing process,

one of Hurles’s counsel’s chief justifications for requesting

additional counsel. As the subsequent competency evaluations

and testimony at trial and sentencing showed, Hurles’s personal and family background required extensive investigation

into a multitude of alleged mitigating factors. Moreover, she

gives short shrift to the need for extensive investigation on the

part of Hurles’s attorney to prepare a defense, including

alleged bases for legal insanity. Indeed, the evidence amassed

by the prosecution posed significant challenges for the

defense. That the prosecution appeared to have a strong case

for guilt does not render the defense’s job easier or “simpler.”

To the contrary, the more evidence the prosecution has, the

more challenging it would be for the defense to put on a good

case. Therefore, Judge Hilliard could not have been referring

to the case as “simple” in any technical sense. There is no

plausible reading of Judge Hilliard’s statements other than

that the case’s resolution was a foregone conclusion. 

[16] Judges are free to form opinions based on evidence

presented in the same or earlier cases involving the litigant in

question without offending notions of due process. See Crater

v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1130-32 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no

due process violation where the judge’s opinions as to the

likelihood of a guilty verdict against defendant was based on

evidence presented in an earlier, now complete, proceeding

against his co-defendant for the same incident). In this case,

however, the judge’s opinions were formed long before trial

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and before any evidence had been presented. Indeed, the brief

presumes that the State’s amassed evidence is virtually unassailable, for if there were flaws in the scientific evidence, then

the time required to prepare a vigorous defense would be

much more significant than Judge Hilliard suggests.11 Judge

Hilliard’s statements thus indicate a prejudgment of the case

against Hurles months before she would preside over his trial

and, later, unilaterally sentence him to death and adjudicate

his post-conviction claims for relief. 

3. Statements About Hurles’s Counsel

[17] Finally, Judge Hilliard challenged the professionalism

of Hurles’s attorney, whose credibility would later be important as Hurles’s sole counsel during the trial and sentencing

proceedings. She argued that the attorney’s insecurity over

handling the case on her own placed her competence in doubt.

Judge Hilliard stated: 

[I]f Appointed Counsel believes, because of her

caseload, personal competence, or otherwise, that

she is incapable of rendering “competent representation” of the Petitioner, she is ethically bound to withdraw from this case, and, quite possibly, to withdraw

her name from the list of lawyers who contract to

provide defense services on behalf of Maricopa

County as well. Clearly there are other attorneys

who provide contract services for Maricopa County

11Judge Hilliard’s brief lacks any equivocation as to the strength of the

State’s purported evidence. For example, eyewitnesses do not “claim” or

“allege” to have seen Hurles at the library, but rather they “indicate” that

he was indeed at the library. Similarly, Hurles’s “footprint [was] in the

victim’s blood,” and evidence “place[s] him at the scene a[t] the time of

the murder.” This language leaves no doubt as to what the factual findings

should be in Hurles’s case, even though many months would pass before

any evidence would actually be presented in court and be subject to crossexamination. 

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who would be able to provide competent representation in a case as simple as this.

This point was entirely superfluous to the brief and appears

designed merely to question the competence of an attorney

who determined she needed assistance in a capital case.

Indeed, in addition to questioning her competence in this particular case, the brief even raises the prospect that this attorney should no longer receive gainful employment from

Maricopa County if she did not have the “personal competence” to do so. After having raised questions about Hurles’s

only legal counsel in pleadings to the Arizona Court of

Appeals, Judge Hilliard then had sole responsibility for determining the credibility of mitigating evidence presented by that

attorney. Taken together with her comments about the merits

of Hurles’s case, such direct pre-judgment raises an unconstitutional probability of bias. 

* * * * *

Based on these three deficiencies flowing from the special

action proceeding, the “average” judge would be tempted “not

to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273

U.S. 510, 532 (1927). Judge Hilliard’s conduct falls within

the parameters of behavior prohibited by clearly established

Supreme Court precedent. In Murchison, for example, the

Court found an appearance of bias where the judge who had

acted as a “one-man grand jury” later presided over the defendant’s contempt trial relating to his conduct before the judge

in that grand jury. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955).

The Court determined that “the judge had a conflict of interest

at the trial stage because of his earlier participation followed

by his decision to charge them.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey

Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2261 (2009) (describing the holding of Murchison). Similarly, in Johnson v. Mississippi, the

Court evaluated a judge’s fitness to preside over the petitioner’s criminal contempt proceeding. 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971).

The judge had previously been named as a defendant in a sepHURLES v. RYAN 9075

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arate civil rights suit brought by the petitioner, and subsequently made “intemperate remarks” about civil rights

litigants. Id. Based on the judge’s status as an adversary in the

petitioner’s civil rights suit and his remarks about litigants

such as the petitioner, the Court determined that he was too

“enmeshed in matters involving [the] petitioner” to preside

over his contempt proceeding. Id.

[18] As in Murchison and Johnson, here the judge’s conflict of interest at the trial and sentencing stages arose from

her “earlier participation” as a direct party in the special

action proceeding. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261. The Murchison Court distinguished these circumstances from one in

which a judge simply responded to conduct in open court.

Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137. Similarly, Judge Hilliard’s initial

denial of the motion for additional counsel is not the basis for

any claim of bias, nor was her status as a nominal respondent

in the special action. Rather, it was her direct participation in

the special action that made her “part of the accusatory process” and rendered her ineligible to preside over the remainder of Hurles’s case. Id.

The dissent attempts to distinguish Murchison and Johnson

because Judge Hilliard (a) was only a party in an ancillary

proceeding, rather than in the trial itself, (b) did not assume

a “prosecutorial role” in Hurles’s case, and (c) did not appear

to have “personal animus” towards Hurles. Dissent at

9092-93. This misconstrues the two cases. First, the sources

of the bias at issue in both Murchison and Johnson were separate pretrial proceedings. Id.; Johnson, 403 U.S. at 215. Other

courts have also construed Supreme Court case law to apply

more broadly to the process as a whole. See, e.g., United

States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing necessity for recusal when the judge “has adopted an

adversary posture with respect to the alleged contemnor, as in

Murchison and Johnson”). 

Second, the fact that Hurles initiated the special action proceeding and Judge Hilliard did not have a direct prosecutorial

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role is of no import. Indeed, we find no authority for the proposition that whether a judge affirmatively creates the conflict

determines whether she can proceed impartially. Johnson

itself involved a judge who had been named as a defendant in

the petitioner’s civil rights suit. Johnson, 403 U.S. at 215.

Murchison likewise does not state that the judge must be the

initiator or instigator of the accusatory process; it states

instead that she must recuse herself if she becomes “part” of

the accusatory process. A defendant such as Judge Hilliard is

still part of the process to the extent that she was an adversary

in the special action and then proceeded to preside over Hurles’s trial and single-handedly determine his sentence. See

also Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1322 n.12 (8th Cir.

1991) (finding that judge should have disqualified himself

because he had been “a defendant in Smith’s federal class

action suit”); United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827, 842 (D.C.

Cir. 1972) (emphasis added) (“Thus, the trial judge, by virtue

of his status as a defendant in a suit brought by the alleged

contemnor, was in an adversary posture with respect to him,

and was presumptively biased. This is true even though the

judge’s status as an adversary party was created by an action

of the alleged contemnor (filing suit) . . . .”). Whether Judge

Hilliard was a plaintiff or defendant in the action at issue is

thus irrelevant; what matters is her adversarial posture toward

Hurles.

Finally, the Supreme Court has never required evidence of

“personal animus” in order to demonstrate judicial bias.

Though the Johnson Court made note of the judge’s “intemperate remarks . . . concerning civil rights litigants,” Johnson,

403 U.S. at 215, it grounded its holding in the fact that the

judge had previously been an adversary in the petitioner’s

civil rights suit. This comports with the Court’s longstanding

rule, which the dissent recognizes, that a petitioner need not

demonstrate actual bias in order to succeed on his claim. See

Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262-63. Moreover, as discussed

above, Judge Hilliard also made inappropriate statements in

her response brief, statements which suggested she had preHURLES v. RYAN 9077

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judged the strength of Hurles’s case. That Johnson happened

to involve more direct evidence of personal animus does not

render it inapplicable here.

Respondent’s position that Judge Hilliard “prevailed” in the

special action, and therefore had no incentive to be biased

against Hurles, is both misleading and logically unsound.

While the Court of Appeals declined to exercise jurisdiction

over the petition for special action, it sided with Hurles in

holding that Judge Hilliard had no standing to appear as more

than a nominal respondent in the case, or in any case with the

posture of Hurles v. Superior Court. In fact, the court issued

an opinion solely to point out the impropriety of the judge’s

actions and to set a precedent against any future involvement

of that kind by a judge in a special action proceeding. Hurles,

849 P.2d at 1 (“This petition for special action presents a significant threshold question of standing, which we publish this

order to address.”). Thus, on the subject of the opinion, Judge

Hilliard did not prevail at all; rather, she was called out for

“inappropriate” conduct. Id. at 4. Moreover, depending on the

circumstances of the proceeding, whether the Judge had “prevailed” would not necessarily alter her temptation toward bias

against the defendant. In this case, given the concern

expressed by the Court of Appeals, Judge Hilliard had reason

to be biased against Hurles independent of the fact that the

court did not reach the merits of her order denying additional

counsel. 

[19] We emphasize again that it is the highly unusual facts

of this case that compel us to conclude Hurles was denied his

right to due process. As the Supreme Court has noted, “most

questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to hear a case

are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional

floor, not a uniform standard.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.

899, 904-05 (1997) (citations omitted). We deal here with a

perfect storm of rare incidents that are unlikely to repeat

themselves. Unlike in Caperton, where the Court had to con9078 HURLES v. RYAN

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tend with the possibility that its ruling would unleash a “flood

of recusal motions,” this case presents no such danger. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265; see id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(arguing that the Court’s decision would lead to a drastic

increase in judicial bias litigation). First, as Judge Hilliard

herself pointed out, special action appearances by trial judges

no longer occur in the wake of Hurles v. Superior Court.

Thus, this factual scenario is a relic of past practice in Arizona

courts, rare even at the time and nonexistent today. Second,

in this particular case, the judge in question was the sole arbiter of the defendant’s death sentence; she alone weighed the

evidence and determined that Hurles deserved to die. This

practice is no longer constitutionally permissible in the wake

of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597-98 (2002). Indications

of probable bias are thus all the more troubling in an exceptional case such as this, and the consequences of an unfair

capital sentencing are irreversible. We must therefore conclude that “[o]n these extreme facts the probability of actual

bias rises to an unconstitutional level.” Caperton, 129 S. Ct.

at 2265.

IV. CONCLUSION

At oral argument, when counsel was asked what relief she

was seeking for her client pursuant to his judicial bias claim,

she requested only a new sentencing. Therefore, we remand

to the district court with instructions to grant a writ of habeas

corpus as to Petitioner’s sentence unless the State of Arizona

elects, within 90 days of the issuance of the mandate, to

resentence Petitioner before a jury and presided over by a

judge other than Judge Hilliard, within a reasonable time

thereafter to be determined by the district court.

Because Hurles will receive a new sentencing and, if necessary, a new appeal after his sentence has been determined by

a jury, we do not reach or decide the remainder of his claims

on appeal, including whether his sentencing or appellate

counsel were ineffective, and whether he defaulted on any of

those claims. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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IKUTA Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Today the majority overturns a convicted murderer’s capital sentence, ignoring AEDPA’s command to defer to a state

court’s decision unless it is objectively unreasonable. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). The AEDPA analysis here is straightforward. During the preliminary phases of

Hurles’s capital trial, the state trial judge denied Hurles’s

motion for appointment of a second attorney. Hurles appealed

that denial in a special action proceeding, and the state Attorney General submitted a brief in the trial judge’s name

defending the ruling. Over seven years later, after an unsuccessful direct appeal and post-conviction proceeding, Hurles

claimed that the trial judge’s participation in the special action

proceeding violated his due process rights and moved for her

recusal from further participation in his case. The trial judge

denied Hurles’s motion and rejected his claim that her participation in the special action proceeding created an unconstitutional “appearance of bias.” Hurles now claims that this

conclusion is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. Because

there is no clearly established Supreme Court authority that

even hints the trial court’s decision was wrong, we must defer

to its determination and deny the petition. Murdoch v. Castro,

609 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

The majority’s contrary conclusion that it can avoid

AEDPA deference and grant the petition under § 2254(d)(2)1

is unsupportable. The state court decision at issue is not

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,”

1Section 2254(d)(2) states: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim— . . . (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

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because it is a legal determination as to whether the undisputed facts give rise to an appearance of bias. Neither Hurles

nor the majority has suggested how the state court’s legal conclusion on this issue was based on objectively unreasonable

fact-finding. Because there is no basis for avoiding AEDPA

deference here, we are not authorized to grant habeas relief.

§ 2254(d). I respectfully dissent.

I

Because an objective view of the facts and procedural history of Hurles’s case is crucial to a correct understanding of

the legal issues in dispute, I briefly recount the relevant

sequence of events.

A

The facts of Hurles’s crime form the backdrop for the dispute over whether Hurles needed a second attorney, which is

at the heart of his habeas claim. The Arizona Supreme Court

provided the following description:

On the afternoon of November 12, 1992, Hurles

went to the Buckeye public library, a small, housetype building in a residential neighborhood. The only

employee in the library at the time was Kay Blanton.

The last patron, other than Hurles, left the library

just before 2:40 p.m. Hurles then locked the front

doors to the library and attacked Blanton in the back

room. He stripped off her underwear and pulled her

skirt above her waist in an unsuccessful attempt to

rape her. Using a paring knife found in the back

room of the library, Hurles mortally wounded Blanton, stabbing her thirty-seven times and inflicting

blunt force trauma by kicking her to such an extent

he tore her liver. [Hurles then fled the scene.]

. . . .

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Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., Hurles rode [a borrowed] bicycle to the home of his nephew, Thomas,

in Buckeye and asked Thomas for a ride to Phoenix.

Hurles had changed his clothes and cleaned himself

up somewhat, and Thomas, who had been asleep and

was unaware of Blanton’s murder, agreed to drive

Hurles to Phoenix. As the two left the house, Hurles

was carrying a bundle of clothes. During the drive to

Phoenix, Thomas noticed that Hurles had bite marks

on his wrist. When asked about them, Hurles told

Thomas he had been in a fight with a Spanish man

at the library, that he had stabbed the man with the

man’s knife, and that he had received the bite marks

in the fight. As part of his insanity defense, however,

Hurles later claimed he had no recollection of anything that occurred between sitting in the library and

going out the back door.

As they continued toward Phoenix, Hurles had

Thomas pull over so he could toss the bundle of

clothes out the car window. Thomas left Hurles at a

Phoenix bus station, where he purchased a bus ticket

to Las Vegas. Thomas returned to Buckeye, where

he ultimately made contact with the police and told

them of Hurles’ destination. Later that evening, the

police intercepted Hurles’ bus on the way to Las

Vegas; Hurles was removed from the bus, arrested,

and returned to Phoenix.

With Thomas’ help, the police recovered Hurles’

discarded clothes. Police found blood on the clothing

that matched Blanton’s blood type, which occurs in

one percent of the population. Police also found

blood matching Blanton’s type on Hurles’ shoes,

which he was still wearing when taken from the bus.

Four bloody shoeprints at the murder scene matched

the soles of Hurles’ shoes, and Hurles’ palm print

was found on the paring knife left at the scene.

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. . . .

. . . Blanton would have suffered great terror as

she was stabbed repeatedly by Hurles. She also must

have suffered great pain. In addition to the fifteen

defensive stab wounds on her hands, Blanton was

stabbed eight times in the head, twelve times in the

torso, and twice in her lower extremities. She also

suffered blunt trauma consistent with kicking, which

tore her liver.

The barrage of violence inflicted on Blanton, the

fact that she was conscious throughout the attack,

and her struggle to fight off her attacker all indicate

she suffered terribly and far above the norm of even

first-degree murder, leaving no room to doubt that

this murder was especially cruel. 

State v. Hurles (Hurles II), 914 P.2d 1291, 1293-94, 1299

(Ariz. 1996).

B

After Hurles was indicted for this murder, Maricopa

County appointed private defense counsel to represent him.

Hurles made an ex parte motion for the appointment of a second counsel to aid in his defense. He argued that he was entitled to a second attorney because: (1) the case would “involve

numerous civilian and law enforcement witnesses”; (2) the

state would have forensic experts testify regarding suspect

identification and sexual assault; and (3) “[p]reparation for the

possible penalty phase in such a case will [be] in itself a time

consuming, complex process.” To support his arguments on

the third point, Hurles cited to California, rather than Arizona,

law. As later noted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Hurles’s

motion for a second attorney was bare-bones, and failed to

make “a particularized showing on the need for second counsel.” Hurles v. Superior Court, 849 P.2d 1, 4 (Ariz. Ct. App.

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1993). It made no mention of possible defenses, did not discuss the size of the defense’s witness pool for either the guilt

or penalty phase, and did not specify any additional forensic

or other technical information the defense would present on

its own account. In short, it provided no substantial factual

basis upon which the trial court could have concluded that a

second attorney was necessary for Hurles to obtain adequate

representation.

After the state trial court denied the request, Hurles filed a

petition for special action in the Arizona Court of Appeals,2

raising the same arguments he had presented in his motion.

Per Arizona’s rules for special actions, Hurles named the

State of Arizona, represented by the office of the Maricopa

County Attorney, as real party in interest, and the trial judge,

Judge Hilliard, as a nominal respondent. Id. at 2. In response,

the Arizona Attorney General filed a brief in Judge Hilliard’s

name, even though, as the Arizona Court of Appeals noted, it

was not clear from the record that Judge Hilliard had even

authorized a pleading to be filed in her name, nor that “there

was [any] contact between Judge Hilliard and the Attorney

General’s office as the pleading was prepared.”

3

Id.

The majority bases its claim that Judge Hilliard was biased

primarily (if not solely) on the contents of this brief. First, the

2Under Arizona law, the denial of a motion for appointment of a second

attorney is not immediately appealable, and so a petitioner seeks review

of such a ruling by filing a petition for special action in the Arizona Court

of Appeals. See Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 1 n.1, 2. 

3The Attorney General explained that the presiding judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court requested a responsive pleading in this case.

Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 4. Then-current Arizona precedent held that a judge

had the right to appear in a special action, even though the judge was

merely a nominal party. Fenton v. Howard, 575 P.2d 318, 320 (Ariz.

1978). Because the County is the prosecutor, it could not take a position

on the selection of defendant’s counsel in the special action proceeding,

which led the state Attorney General to step in to respond on the trial

judge’s behalf. Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 1. 

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majority contends that the brief demonstrates Judge Hilliard’s

view that “the case was simple because [Hurles] was obviously guilty.” Maj. op. at 9072. The majority’s claim is belied

by an objective reading of the brief. As explained above, Hurles’s motion for appointment of a second counsel put at issue

the question whether the case was too complex to be handled

by one attorney. In ruling on the motion, the trial court had

been obliged to consider the extent and complexity of the evidence likely to be presented in order to rule on the motion.

The brief explained the basis for the trial court’s decision. In

response to Hurles’s claim that a second counsel was required

due to the high number of witnesses and forensic experts, the

brief noted that Maricopa County planned to call “relatively

few” witnesses, namely 10 law enforcement agents, the medical examiner, and several civilians.4

 The State also intended

to present the following physical evidence: Hurles’s clothing,

which was “stained with blood of the same PGM type as the

victim’s,” his footprint in the victim’s blood at the library, and

the “fact that books returned by [Hurles] in the return slot at

the library place him at the scene a[t] the time of the murder.”

Turning to Hurles’s legal argument, the brief asserted that

Hurles’s reliance on California precedent was misplaced

because Arizona had adopted different rules, procedures, and

time frames. Specifically, according to the brief, while California law presumed the necessity of a second attorney in capital cases, Arizona had no such presumption. Further, in

refuting Hurles’s claim that the need to prepare simultaneously for the guilt and penalty phases mandated the

appointment of a second attorney, the brief noted that while

California required sentencing to begin within 20 days of the

verdict, Arizona gave a capital defendant 90 days after the

verdict to prepare for sentencing, as well as the option to seek

4For example, the State intended to present an eyewitness’s statement

that Hurles ran from the Buckeye library after a witness discovered Blanton bleeding on the library floor, as well as Hurles’s statement to his

brother than he had stabbed someone at the library. 

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an extension of that time for good cause; these procedural differences made concurrent preparation for both phases far less

urgent in Arizona than in its sister state. Ariz. R. Crim. P.

26.3. Thus, the majority’s contention that the brief gave “short

shrift” to Hurles’s arguments, or ignored the sentencing phase

and the special burdens of a capital case, Maj. op. at 9072-73,

is wrong.

Finally, the brief opined that defense counsel’s unsupported

request for co-counsel at such an early stage of a case involving a fairly standard workload and flexible system of deadlines amounted to speculation by Hurles’s appointed counsel

that she would render ineffective assistance if she did not

have co-counsel.5

The majority also faults the brief for failing to consider “the

need for extensive investigation” to address the “alleged bases

for legal insanity.” Maj. op. at 9073. But at the time of the

special action, Hurles’s attorney had not yet noticed any

defenses (insanity or otherwise), and Hurles did not argue that

the work involved to prepare an insanity defense was a reason

he needed a second lawyer.

C

Before addressing the merits of the special action petition,

the Arizona Court of Appeals determined that the case raised

“a significant threshold question of standing” that gave the

court the chance to refine its jurisprudence on “whether—or

under what circumstances—the trial court may properly

respond” to a petition for special action. Hurles I, 849 P.2d at

1-2. The court acknowledged that in the seminal case, Fenton

v. Howard, the Arizona Supreme Court had held that “a judge

5The majority makes much of this statement, Maj. op. at 9074, but it

merely underscores the brief’s argument that the state’s case was simple

and straightforward, making appointment of a second attorney unnecessary. 

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does have the right to appear and to be represented in a special action against him, where the judge is a named respondent,” 575 P.2d 318, 320 (Ariz. 1978), and that a later

appellate decision, State ex rel. Dean v. City Court of Tucson,

598 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), had interpreted

Fenton as establishing “a trial judge’s unequivocal right to

respond to a special action, whatever the nature of the decision the judge seeks to defend.” Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 3.6

 Notwithstanding this precedent, the court of appeals concluded

that a later decision, Dunn v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 1164

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), which had interpreted Fenton as allowing a judge to respond to a special action to defend judicial

policy, should govern such cases in the future. Hurles I, 849

P.2d at 3. Building on Dunn, the Arizona Court of Appeals

held that a judge designated as the nominal respondent in a

special action proceeding may file a brief for the purpose of

defending an administrative policy or practice, but “that it is

improper for a judge to respond merely to advocate the correctness of an individual ruling in a single case.” Id. Applying

its new standing rule to the case before it, the court noted that

because “the pleading merely argues that the respondent judge

ruled properly on the evidence before her . . . the trial judge

lacked standing” to file a brief in the special action. Id. at 4.

Turning its attention to the merits of the special action petition, the Arizona Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Hilliard’s denial of Hurles’s motion to appoint a second counsel.

Because Hurles’s counsel had failed to make “a particularized

showing” on the need for a second lawyer and did not “submit

evidence to the trial court regarding customary practice in

6The Arizona Court of Appeals noted that Dean had criticized this

result, and quoted Dean’s statement that its ruling allowed the trial judge

to defend “his ruling and his honor,” such that the trial judge “is no longer

impartial.” Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 3 (quoting 598 P.2d at 1010). The majority relies on this critique, Maj. op. at 9067, but fails to note that Dean nevertheless “interpreted Fenton as categorically permitting a special action

response by any nominal-respondent judge.” 849 P.2d at 3. 

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defense of capital cases,” the court “[found] no matter that

warrants special action intervention at this time.” Id.

The majority’s claims that the opinion by the Arizona

Court of Appeals in this case “called out” Judge Hilliard “for

‘inappropriate’ conduct,” Maj. op. at 9078, and constituted

“an important and strong rebuke of active judicial participation in special actions,” id. at 9068, are contrary to and unsupported by the language of that opinion.7

 While the majority

uses the word “improper” nearly ten times to describe the fact

that a brief was submitted on Judge Hilliard’s behalf, see Maj.

op. at 9051, 9056, 9060, 9065 n.5, 9067(twice), 9068, 9069,

the Arizona Court of Appeals used the word “improper” only

twice, to define when it is appropriate for a trial judge to submit a brief in a special action proceeding (in which case the

7Lacking support in the text of the Court of Appeals’s opinion, the

majority relies on two statements to buttress its position, one by Judge Hilliard, and the other by Assistant Attorney General Colleen French. In her

order rejecting Hurles’s judicial bias claim, Judge Hilliard noted that

“judges no longer file an ‘improper’ response in special actions since the

[Court of Appeals’s] decision in Hurles v. Superior Court.” The majority’s

suggestion that this passage shows Judge Hilliard’s acknowledgment that

the court’s “decision was an important and strong rebuke of active judicial

participation in special actions,” Maj. op. at 9068, is mystifying. If anything, the judge’s use of quotation marks in this context connotes that “improper” was being used as a term of art, following the usage of the Court

of Appeals, rather than its common meaning. The passage cannot fairly be

read as a mea culpa on the part of the trial judge. 

Second, the majority quotes the Assistant Arizona Attorney General as

saying: “ ‘The [Arizona Court of Appeals] held that . . . it is improper for

a judge to [act as Judge Hilliard did],’ ” Maj. op. at 9069 (emphasis

added). The unabridged version of this quotation makes clear that the

Court of Appeals was not specifically criticizing Judge Hilliard, but was

formulating a new rule of law. The full quotation reads: “The court held

that a judge named as a respondent in a special action can file a responsive

pleading only to explain or defend an administrative practice, policy, or

local rule, and that it is improper for a judge to respond ‘merely to advocate the correctness of an individual ruling in a single case.’ ” Opp. to

Mot. to Recuse at 2, Hurles v. Schriro, No. CIV-00-0118-PHX-RCB (D.

Ariz. 2008), ECF 72-6 at *25. The majority’s paraphrase is misleading. 

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judge has standing) and when it is inappropriate (such that the

judge lacks standing).8 Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 3-4. The court

did not use the term “improper” to suggest that a judge who

submits a brief in defense of a particular ruling gives the

appearance of bias or otherwise commits any type of ethical

impropriety.9 Rather, the court of appeals merely resolved two

competing lines of authority and determined that a trial judge

lacks standing to defend a specific ruling in a special action

proceeding. 

Finally, it is noteworthy that at the time of the submission

of the brief on behalf of Judge Hilliard, Hurles did not indicate any concern or otherwise flag this event as being out of

the ordinary. Hurles said nothing about a judicial bias concern

before or after the trial in which the jurors unanimously found

him guilty of premeditated and felony murder. Nor did he

raise such a concern at sentencing, where under then-current

Arizona rules, the trial judge acted alone in imposing the

death penalty. Nor did Hurles’s direct appeal or first petition

for post-conviction relief raise a judicial bias claim.10 This

silence detracts from Hurles’s (and the majority’s) position

that the submission of the brief creates the sort of extraordinary situation that gives rise to a “probability of actual bias”

8The court explained its new rule on standing as follows: “We hold that

it is proper for a judge named as a respondent in a special action to file

a responsive pleading if the purpose of the response is to explain or defend

an administrative practice, policy, or local rule, but that it is improper for

a judge to respond merely to advocate the correctness of an individual ruling in a single case.” See Hurles I, 849 P.2d at 3; see also id. at 4 (“Our

holding that the judge’s responsive pleading was improper makes it unnecessary for us to decide the propriety of the Attorney General appearing on

her behalf.”). 

9By contrast, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that it might be proper

for a judge “attempting to respond to an allegation of ethical impropriety”

to respond in a special action proceeding. 849 P.2d at 3 n.4. The court did

not suggest that Judge Hilliard was guilty of an ethical lapse. 

10Per Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(e), Hurles’s first petition

for post-conviction relief was assigned to Judge Hilliard. The trial court

denied the petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. 

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that is “too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see Maj. op. at 9067-78.

D

A year after the court denied his first petition for postconviction relief, Hurles filed a motion stating that he

intended to file a second petition for post-conviction relief

that would raise his appearance-of-bias due process claim

based on the special action proceeding. He therefore moved

to recuse Judge Hilliard from further involvement in his case.

Hurles’s recusal motion was referred to a different trial court

judge, Judge Ballinger, who ruled that there was no basis to

transfer Hurles’s case to another judge.11 Hurles then submitted his second petition for post-conviction relief, which was

assigned to Judge Hilliard pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(e) and Judge Ballinger’s determination.

Judge Hilliard noted the applicable objective test under Arizona law for recusal, specifically, “whether a reasonable and

objective person knowing all the facts would harbor doubts

concerning the judge’s impartiality.” In describing the facts of

the special action, Judge Hilliard stated that the Attorney General had no specific authorization to file a pleading on her

behalf in the special action, and that she (Judge Hilliard) had

made no contact with the Attorney General. She further noted

that Hurles had not pointed to any aspects of the trial or the

first petition for post-conviction relief that indicated bias.

Relying on Judge Ballinger’s determination, and applying

Arizona’s objective test, Judge Hilliard ruled that the facts did

not require her recusal as a matter of state law, and did not

amount to a due process violation. Therefore, the court

rejected Hurles’s claim. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed

without opinion.

11Judge Ballinger construed Hurles’s motion as a motion for change of

judge for cause, which under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.1,

entitles a defendant “to a change of judge if a fair and impartial hearing

or trial cannot be had by reason of the interest or prejudice of the assigned

judge.” 

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II

As described above, the state trial court determined that

because a reasonable and objective person knowing all the

facts would not harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality,

Judge Hilliard’s role in presiding over the trial and sentence

did not deprive Hurles of his federal due process rights. The

trial court’s decision is the last reasoned decision on this

claim, and therefore the one that we must consider under

AEDPA review. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804

(1991). Under § 2254(d)(1) and Supreme Court precedent, we

are tasked with determining whether this determination was

“contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent,

using the analytic framework set forth below.12

“Supreme Court precedent reveals only three circumstances

in which an appearance of bias—as opposed to evidence of

actual bias—necessitates recusal.” Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d

1119, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007). These three situations are (1)

when a judge “has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary

interest in reaching a conclusion against [one of the litigants],” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio,

273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted);

(2) when “a judge becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy with one of the litigants,” id. (quoting Mayberry v.

Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971)) (internal quotation

marks omitted); and (3) when a judge “acts as ‘part of the

accusatory process,’ ” id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.

133, 137 (1955)). Here there is no claim that Judge Hilliard

had a pecuniary interest in the prosecution of Hurles. Nor

does the majority suggest that Judge Hilliard was embroiled

in a running feud with Hurles. Instead, the majority relies on

three Supreme Court opinions, Murchison, Johnson, and Caper12Because the state court did not expressly apply the Supreme Court’s

decisions considering when a probability of judicial bias rises to a constitutional level, only the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1) is at issue here.

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). 

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ton,

13 as authority for its conclusion that Hurles’s due process

rights were violated because the judge acted as part of the

accusatory process. Maj. op. at 9056-59, 9074-79. 

This contention does not survive scrutiny. A state court

decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent only if “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or

if the state court confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable from those at issue in a decision of the Supreme

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the

Court’s precedent.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73

(2003)). For AEDPA purposes, a point of law is not “clearly

established” if a state court can draw a “principled distinction” between the case before it and the Supreme Court precedent establishing that rule of law. Murdoch, 609 F.3d at 991.

Here, not only could a state court draw a principled distinction between the situation in this case and those in Murchison

and Johnson, but it is quite a stretch to hold that such

Supreme Court precedents apply at all. Murchison involved

the appearance of bias of a Michigan state judge who, while

sitting as a “one-man grand jury,” concluded a witness was

lying, charged him with perjury, and ordered him to show

cause why he should not be convicted of criminal contempt.

13Because Caperton was decided in 2009, and the state court decision

at issue was decided in 2002, Caperton is not “clearly established

Supreme Court precedent” for purposes of AEDPA review. See Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (stating that § 2254(d)(1) requires the

state court’s decision to be measured against the “holdings . . . of [the

Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision”). The majority justifies its reliance on Caperton by asserting it “announce[s] no new rule of law that would affect our analysis here,” Maj.

op. at 9057 n.3, yet its ten citations to that decision belie this claim and

suggest its centrality to the majority’s reasoning. But because the state

court’s decision was not contrary to Caperton, the majority’s mistaken

reliance on this decision does not help its AEDPA analysis. 

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349 U.S. at 134. The Court held that a judge could not act as

a grand jury “and then try the very persons accused as a result

of his investigations.” Id. at 137. Unlike Murchison, Judge

Hilliard did not assume a prosecutorial role in Hurles’s case.

In fact, neither Hurles nor the majority even suggests that

Judge Hilliard participated in any way in the formal accusatory process that resulted in Hurles’s trial, over which Judge

Hilliard later presided. Nor can the special action proceeding,

in which Hurles asked the Arizona Court of Appeals to grant

his request for a second defense attorney, be deemed part of

the “accusatory process.” This proceeding, which was ancillary to any determination of guilt or penalty, involved an evaluation of the evidence only for purposes of determining

whether a second counsel was necessary.

Similarly, Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (per

curiam), involved a civil rights activist who successfully sued

a state trial judge to enjoin the judge from discriminatory

practices in seating juries. Id. at 214-15. Two days after being

so enjoined, the trial judge found the defendant guilty of criminal contempt in a different case. Id. at 215. The Court concluded that due process would not permit the judge, who had

just lost a civil rights case to the defendant (and therefore was

subject to an ongoing federal injunction), to preside over the

defendant’s contempt trial. Id. at 215-16 (holding that because

the judge had been “a defendant in one of petitioner’s civil

rights suits and a losing party at that,” he was plainly “so

enmeshed in matters involving petitioner” as to require his

recusal). Unlike Johnson, the record here does not show that

Judge Hilliard was “enmeshed” in matters involving Hurles,

nor that someone in her position would likely have a personal

animus toward him. Cf. id. at 215 (noting “the affidavits filed

by the lawyers reciting intemperate remarks of Judge Perry

concerning civil rights litigants”). The majority’s position that

the Arizona Court of Appeals’s ruling on standing would give

rise to a temptation on Judge Hilliard’s part “not to hold the

balance nice, clear, and true,” Maj. op. at 9075 (quoting

Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532), is meritless. With all due respect,

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the majority’s holding equating a state court ruling that Judge

Hilliard lacked standing, but had ruled correctly on the merits

of the appointment-of-counsel request, with Johnson’s order

enjoining a judge from further racial and gender discrimination in his courtroom, fails even the straight-face test.

The majority also cites Caperton for the general proposition that a judge’s failure to recuse may constitute a due process violation if “the probability of actual bias on the part of

the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally

tolerable.” 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at

47). Although Caperton is not applicable here, because it was

not clearly established Supreme Court precedent at the time

of the state court decision at issue, the state court’s decision

is not contrary to this rule. The Court has made clear that the

more general the rule laid out by Supreme Court precedent,

the more latitude we must give a state court “to reasonably

determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009). Caperton makes clear that a failure to recuse rises to a constitutional

violation only in the most “exceptional case.” Caperton, 129

S. Ct. at 2263; see also id. (“It is, of course, not every attack

on a judge that disqualifies him from sitting.”) (quoting Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465). Because the Arizona court’s determination that the special action proceeding did not rise to such

an exceptional level was not “ ‘diametrically different’

[from], ‘opposite in character or nature’ [to], or ‘mutually

opposed’ to” the rule of Caperton, it is not “contrary to” that

case, and therefore does not violate § 2254(d)(1). Williams,

529 U.S. at 406.

Accordingly, an objective comparison of Hurles’s case to

the Supreme Court decisions discussed above shows beyond

question that the state court’s conclusion was not “contrary

to” clearly established precedent. Because the court is not

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relieved of AEDPA deference, the district court was correct

in determining it had no authority to grant habeas relief.14

III

Because the correct application of AEDPA here is straightforward, the majority’s anomalous approach to AEDPA is

surprising. Instead of considering whether the state court

opinion was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, the majority focuses on whether the opinion was

“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Maj. op. at

9056 (quoting § 2254(d)(2)).

A

The crucial flaw in this approach is clear: there are no

material facts in dispute in this case. The ultimate question,

whether a specific fact situation involving a judge “created a

constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias,” is a

legal question determined by objective rules. See Caperton.

129 S. Ct. at 2262; see also id. at 2263 (stating that the Due

Process Clause “is implemented by objective standards that

do not require proof of actual bias”). Consistent with this

Supreme Court jurisprudence, Hurles focuses solely on apparent bias because, as he explains, “in the context of judicial

conflicts of interest, due process is offended not by proof of

14Contrary to the requirements of AEDPA, the majority appears to conduct a de novo review of the state trial court’s decision sub silentio. Maj.

op. at 9059-65. But even were we authorized to engage in such review,

there is no support for the majority’s conclusion that Hurles’s due process

rights were violated. The Supreme Court has held that a judge’s failure to

recuse raises due process concerns only in “the most extreme of cases.”

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986). Even the majority’s emotional description of the special action proceeding cannot disguise

the fact that the Attorney General’s submission of a brief supporting Judge

Hilliard’s denial of Hurles’s motion for the appointment of a second counsel does not rise to that level. 

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actual bias (something literally impossible for a party to

prove) but rather by the appearance of impropriety.”

15 Given

the “difficulties of inquiring into actual bias,” the Supreme

Court has noted that the judge’s inquiry into his or her own

motives or bias are irrelevant. Id. at 2263. For this reason,

Judge Hilliard’s explanations of her limited role in the proceeding, which the majority asserts are unreasonable, Maj. op.

at 9064, do not make a difference to the state court’s resolution of the constitutional issue. In her ruling, Judge Hilliard

explained that the special action brief was drafted without her

input or authorization and that she did not make contact with

the Attorney General during the pendency of the special

action. These are the only “facts” Judge Hilliard “found”

based on her own knowledge. Maj. op. at 9060-61, 9062. But

Judge Hilliard’s views regarding her lack of involvement in

the matter are not relevant to Hurles’s claim that the undisputed facts (namely, that a brief was submitted in Judge Hilliard’s name in the special action proceeding, the brief

discussed the evidence the State intended to present, and the

brief questioned whether Hurles’s then-current attorney was

able to render competent, effective assistance) gave rise to an

appearance of bias. Said otherwise, Judge Hilliard’s behindthe-scenes involvement in brief-writing, whether nonexistent,

minimal, or substantial, is irrelevant to Hurles’s claim that the

publicly known facts give rise to a constitutionally intolerable

appearance of bias.

15Hurles has consistently stressed the themes of “appearance of impropriety,” and “structural due process,” rather than any conduct evincing

actual bias on the part of Judge Hilliard. For example, in his Second Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Hurles repeatedly emphasizes that due

process sometimes requires recusal of judges who have “no actual bias.”

Hurles also reminded the court that he “need not necessarily demonstrate

actual subjective bias to prevail on [ ]his claim.” Hurles’s reply brief in the

second post-conviction proceeding likewise argued that: “[C]ourts will

find a due process violation upon a showing of a judge’s conflict of

interest—regardless of whether the complaining litigant can demonstrate

any actual subjective bias at all.” Hurles’s own arguments thus undercut

the majority’s claim that the key inquiry in this case is a factual one. 

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B

The majority tries to escape the force of this conclusion by

asserting that the state court’s decision was based on an

unreasonable fact-finding process. First, the majority claims

that Judge Hilliard erred in resolving the challenge to her own

impartiality. But as the majority acknowledges, Maj. op. at

9064, it is not improper for a judge to rule on his or her own

recusal; rather, it is the standard procedure. Under both federal and Arizona law, judges typically rule on motions seeking to recuse them from a pending matter, and, where

necessary, they determine the relevant facts. Id.; see, e.g., 28

U.S.C. § 455(a); Ariz. Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.11(A); see

also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301,

1301-02 (2000) (statement of Rehnquist, C.J.) (setting forth

the facts regarding his son’s representation of Microsoft in a

different matter, and concluding that those facts did not

require his recusal in a case brought by Microsoft on the same

subject matter because “a well-informed individual would

[not] conclude that an appearance of impropriety exists”

based on those facts); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-

16696 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2011) (statement of Reinhardt, J.) (setting forth the facts regarding his relationship with his wife and

her involvement in the matter before him and rejecting a

motion to recuse because “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would [not] conclude that [his] impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). The majority asserts

that a judge’s determination about the propriety of recusal in

a pending case is different from the same determination

regarding a past case, Maj. op. at 9063-64, but no principled

distinction can be made. In both situations, the judge must

apply the same objective standard: whether the judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned. The majority’s position is particularly tenuous in this case: it is hard to argue

convincingly that Judge Hilliard was objectively unreasonable

in deciding Hurles’s recusal motion, given that another Arizona Superior Court Judge, Judge Ballinger, independently

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reached the same conclusion as Judge Hilliard.16 And as this

discussion has made plain, the majority’s repeated suggestion

that Judge Hilliard behaved “improperly” in submitting a brief

in the special action proceeding (and that the Arizona Court

of Appeals so held) is baseless. 

Second, the majority argues that the state court’s factfinding process was flawed because the court declined to hold

an evidentiary hearing on Hurles’s appearance-of-bias claim.

Maj. op. at 9059-62. This contention also fails; obviously, an

error in a fact-finding process is irrelevant if there are no

material facts in dispute. In the cases cited by the majority, we

have made clear that an evidentiary hearing is necessary only

when a dispute relates to a material fact that must be resolved

in order to fully adjudicate the habeas petitioner’s claims. See,

e.g., Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Where there is no likelihood that an evidentiary hearing

would have affected the determination of the state court, its

failure to hold one does not make such determination unreasonable.”); see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000-01

(9th Cir. 2004). As already noted, however, there was no such

dispute here: Hurles’s claim that Judge Hilliard appeared

biased was based on the undisputed fact that a brief was submitted in her name in the special action proceeding. 

16Presumably because Judge Ballinger’s independent determination that

Judge Hilliard could decide Hurles’s recusal motion completely undermines the majority’s claim that Judge Hilliard was objectively unreasonable in doing so, the majority tries to avoid considering the import of

Judge Ballinger’s decision. Maj. op. at 9065 n.6 (“Judge Ballinger’s decision is not the decision we are reviewing.”). This is an error: in adjudicating a habeas petitioner’s claim, a federal court should consider “the record

that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Moreover, Hurles’s

recusal motion presented the same arguments and bias allegations as his

second petition for post-conviction relief and even incorporated those

arguments by reference; accordingly, Judge Ballinger’s decision was on

all fours with Judge Hilliard’s subsequent resolution of those same arguments. 

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Although Hurles belatedly (in his reply brief in the second

state post-conviction proceeding) stated that he “anticipate[d]

the need for factual development” in order “to explore the

nature of the contacts” between the Attorney General’s office

and the court, he did not indicate what facts could have been

developed that would have supported his due process claim,

or why the nature of the contacts made a difference to his

claim that Judge Hilliard appeared biased based on her participation in the special action proceeding.17 And because his

claim focuses on apparent, rather than actual, bias, the only

salient facts are those already in the record: the fact of Judge

Hilliard’s participation in the special action and her brief’s

statements in that proceeding.

Because there is no basis to conclude that the state court’s

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence, § 2254(d)(2), the majority is not

relieved of AEDPA deference under that prong of the statute.

In holding otherwise, the majority’s decision invites future

habeas petitioners to raise the baseless argument that a state

court’s legal rulings are actually unreasonable factual determinations. Such an approach is directly contrary to Congress’s command in § 2254(d) and blurs a critical line that

extends far beyond our habeas jurisprudence.

IV

The Supreme Court has harshly criticized our noncompliance with AEDPA deference, not only this Term,18 but

in many past years as well.19 Here the majority once again dis17If anything, the nature of those contacts would be relevant only to a

claim of actual bias, which Hurles disclaimed in his state-court papers. See

supra note 15. 

18See, e.g., Cullen, 131 S. Ct. 1388; Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305

(2011) (per curiam); Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011) (per

curiam); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770; Premo v. Moore, 131 S.

Ct. 733 (2011). 

19See, e.g., Schriro v. Smith, 546 U.S. 6, 8 (2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he

Court of Appeals exceeded its limited authority on habeas review . . . .”);

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regards the AEDPA rules that limit a federal habeas court’s

“role and authority,” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 335

(2006), by claiming it is relieved of AEDPA deference due to

the state court’s “unreasonable determination of the facts,”

§ 2254(d)(2). But here the state court’s ruling was a legal one.

There are no disputed material facts, and the only question is

whether applying the Supreme Court’s objective rules to the

undisputed facts reveals a due process violation. Under

§ 2254(d)(1), the state court’s determination that there was no

such violation is not contrary to any Supreme Court precedent. Because the majority’s decision invalidates a lawfully

imposed capital sentence, further frays the (increasingly

threadbare) fabric of our AEDPA and due process jurisprudence, and lays the groundwork for future, even more frivolous habeas challenges to trial judges’ impartiality, I must

dissent.

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam) (“[The Ninth

Circuit’s] conclusion failed to give appropriate deference to the state

court’s decision.”); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (per

curiam) (same); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 20 (2002) (per

curiam) (reversing Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief because it “exceed[ed] the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)”); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002) (per curiam) (admonishing the Ninth Circuit for “repeatedly and erroneously substitut[ing]” the

phrase “ ‘failed to apply’ clearly established Supreme Court law” for “the

more demanding requirement of § 2254(d)(1): that the decision be ‘contrary to’ clearly established Supreme Court law” (emphases added)). 

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