Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00881/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00881-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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28 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. On February 12, 2008, the 1

Honorable Oliver W. Wanger reassigned the case to the undersigned for all purposes. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL D. HESS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:07-cv-00881 GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Documents 21)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael Hess (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) ceasing his eligibility for childhood

disability benefits and denying his eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant

to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’

briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Gary S. Austin, United

States Magistrate Judge.1

///

///

///

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28 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page 2

number.

2

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff’s mother filed an application on behalf of Plaintiff for childhood SSI on

February 15, 1996. AR 39, 99-111, 112-119. The Commissioner initially found Plaintiff not

disabled in May 1996, but revised the determination on June 17, 1998, and found Plaintiff

disabled due to a learning disorder. AR 39-40. After Plaintiff reached the age of 18 on

September 5, 2002, the Social Security Administration reevaluated Plaintiff’s disability status

and found that he was no longer disabled under the adult definition of disability as of January

2003. AR 41, 51-54. In March 2003, Plaintiff requested reconsideration of his disability

cessation. AR 69. A disability officer held a hearing and denied benefits. AR 61-72, 73-81.

After being denied upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 82-84, 85. On September 16, 2005, ALJ David Flierl held a hearing. 

AR 417-453. ALJ Flierl denied benefits on November 3, 2005. AR 16-26. On April 20, 2007,

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. AR 6-9. 

 Hearing Testimony

On September 16, 2005, ALJ Flierl held a hearing in Bakersfield, California. AR 417-

453. Plaintiff appeared and testified. AR 419-434. Plaintiff’s mother, Debra Bates, and

vocational expert, Kenneth Ferra, also appeared and testified. AR 435-453.

At the outset of the hearing, the ALJ explained to Plaintiff that when a person who has

received disability under the childhood standards reaches age 18, the person is re-evaluated

because adult standards for disability are different. AR 420. The ALJ also notified Plaintiff that

he could represent himself or that he could contact an attorney or other person to assist him. AR

420-421. The ALJ permitted the Plaintiff to talk with his mother about how to proceed. AR 421. 

After a break, Plaintiff informed the ALJ that he would proceed by himself. AR 422. The ALJ

then explained to Plaintiff that he would be evaluating Plaintiff’s disabilities based on the adult

standards, whether or not there is any work Plaintiff could perform in the national economy given

his limitations, age, education, past work and medical treatment. AR 422. The ALJ also

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explained that the cessation date in Plaintiff’s case was 1/1/03, and he was going to look at the

case at that time and not as to Plaintiff’s condition at the time of the hearing. AR 422. The ALJ

advised that if Plaintiff thought his condition had worsened since January 2003, then Plaintiff

could file a new application. AR 422. The ALJ reiterated that he wanted Plaintiff to understand

that he was not determining Plaintiff’s disability as of the date of the hearing. AR 422. The ALJ

also discussed the exhibits being admitted into evidence and the reason for the vocational

expert’s presence at the hearing. AR 423. When the ALJ began to question Plaintiff, the ALJ

informed Plaintiff that if there was anything he did not understand at any time, then Plaintiff

should let the ALJ know and the ALJ would rephrase it. AR 424-25. 

Plaintiff testified that he was born on September 5, 1984. AR 425. He weighs about

240-250. AR 425. He is supposed to be 6'2", but because of the Sherman’s disease he thinks he

is 5'10". AR 425. He probably weighed 180 in 2003. AR 425. 

Plaintiff had a back brace with him at the hearing. AR 425. He has had two, three or four

back braces. AR 425. He did not remember when he got the current one. AR 426. 

Plaintiff testified that he is left-handed. AR 426. He has an identification card, but does

not have a driver’s license. AR 426. He receives Social Security benefits. AR 426. He does not

receive any other monies. AR 426. He has never worked or looked for work. AR 426. He

graduated from high school in special ed. AR 426. He can read the local newspaper, but usually

does not. AR 426. His mother gives him the Social Security papers and tells him where to sign. 

AR 427. 

Plaintiff testified that he was put on disability because of his back condition. AR 427. In

high school, he took a regular physical education class. AR 427. He tried to do all the activities

the other students did, but he could not do all of it. AR 427. In 2003, Plaintiff would have pains

in his back. AR 428. He would have the back brace on and start getting dizzy and having

headaches. AR 428. He could have cuts and bruises on his arms and legs from the back brace. 

AR 428. He was using the back brace 24/7 and his mom told him she would let him have it off

for two or three hours a day. AR 428. He has to get the back brace adjusted because he keeps

gaining weight. AR 429. He did not see the brace man every two weeks to adjust the brace. AR

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429. It was too far out of the way. AR 429. It was a two hour trip to get to Dr. King and the

“brace guy.” AR 429. They could not keep going back and forth. AR 429. He does not still see

Dr. King in L.A. AR 429-430. 

Plaintiff testified that he prepares his own meals. AR 430. He has had a checking

account and pays some of the bills himself. AR 430. He took college computer classes in the

previous year. AR 430. In high school, they let him take an extracurricular activity called ROP. 

AR 431. He and a couple of friends went up there and did a computer class. AR 431. He would

work on the computer about an hour a day. AR 431. 

At about the time of the cessation, Plaintiff was living in Palmdale and was in his senior

year of high school. AR 431. On a normal day, he would wake up in the morning, get dressed,

take a shower, go to his class and do his homework when he got home. AR 432. He would help

his mom out around the house--take the trash out or something--and then go to a friend’s house

and hang out for a couple of hours. AR 432. He would come back home, hang out with his

parents for a couple hours and go to sleep. AR 432. 

In January 2003, he was not taking any kind of medication. AR 432. He probably took

Tylenol for his back. AR 432. It was over-the-counter medication. AR 432. To his knowledge,

Dr. King did not prescribe any medication for his back. AR 432-433. 

Plaintiff testified that he still had glasses. AR 433. His problem is distance vision, not

reading. AR 433. 

Plaintiff further testified that he does a little of the laundry. AR 433. They live in a

duplex and he tries to do yard work, like rake or put trash in the trash cans. AR 433. Sometimes

his back will start hurting so he has to drop it. AR 433-434. He had a dishwashing job when he

was nine or ten in a restaurant where his father worked. AR 434. He also had a job on a school

program where they had to go to department stores and work for two days. AR 434. They had

him hang clothes on a hanger and move little objects from place to place. AR 434. 

At the conclusion of questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff also testified that there was nothing

else that he wanted to tell the ALJ about his case that the ALJ had not asked. AR 434. 

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Plaintiff’s mother, Debra Bates, also testified in response to questions from the ALJ. AR

435-436. Prior to answering questions, Ms. Bates notified the ALJ that she had paperwork to

present on behalf of her son from Dr. King. AR 435. Ms. Bates explained that her son is on

Social Security and saw Dr. King through “Children Services.” AR 435. He also has a back

brace through Children Services that no longer fits him now. AR 435. The “last one” she was

supposed to go to was cancelled out because he was considered an adult. AR 435. Dr. King

referred her to VIPA in Bakersfield because they do back braces. AR 435. It is an “electronical

back brace” that they shave down because it cuts and bruises Plaintiff. AR 435. 

After Ms. Bates was sworn in to testify, the ALJ indicated that Ms. Bates had called the

previous day and wanted to know what was going on. AR 436. The ALJ reminded Ms. Bates

that there was a hearing before a hearing officer about a year prior. AR 436. The ALJ explained

to Ms. Bates that once her son turned 18, the law required that the case be re-evaluated under the

adult disability standards. AR 436. The previous hearing officer determined that her son was not

entitled to benefits as of 1/1/03. AR 436. She appealed the decision that her son was able to

work, which was why she was at the hearing. AR 436-437. The ALJ indicated that a written

decision was sent to her. AR 437. Ms. Bates reported that she did not get the decision and the

only thing she got in the mail reinstated her son’s benefits as an adult. AR 437. The ALJ

explained that she must have signed a document requesting that benefits continue pending the

appeal. AR 437. Ms. Bates responded that she understood what the ALJ was saying and the

reason they were going to continue benefits was because she wanted to appeal. AR 437. Ms.

Bates indicated that she did not have her son’s medical background paperwork to give to the

Social Security officer at that time to prove her son has Sherman’s diseases, conosis and

scoliosis. AR 437. 

The ALJ further explained to Ms. Bates that in a normal disability case you look at the

disability up to the present time, but not in this case. AR 437. In this case, he is looking at

Plaintiff’s condition as of 1/1/03, the cessation date. AR 437-438. The ALJ notified Ms. Bates

that if there has been a substantial change in Plaintiff’s condition since 1/1/03, then she should

file a new application for disability under the adult standards. AR 438. Ms. Bates indicated that

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the reason the ALJ did not have anything up to date on Plaintiff is because he does not qualify

under children’s services and has to go under somebody else in Bakersfield. AR 438. The ALJ

reiterated his point that he is looking at this case as of 1/1/03. AR 439. The ALJ then took

records from Ms. Bates dated 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002. AR 439. 

During questioning, the ALJ informed Ms. Bates that the biggest problem her son had in

the case was with complying with what Dr. King told him to do about wearing the brace. AR

441. Ms. Bates testified that Plaintiff got his back brace from CCS “through Children’s Services

through Opine Motion through Dr. King’s office.” AR 441. Dr. King is the one who referred

him out to children’s services because her son was a child at that time. AR 441. They cared for

him until he was 18 years old. AR 441. Dr. King did not know that the back brace was cutting

and bruising Plaintiff, which is why Plaintiff was sent to Opine Motion and CCS to shave it

down and correct him. AR 441. Plaintiff has to wear gauze underneath the brace. AR 441. Ms.

Bates did not think he got a new brace, but that they attached another belt or something because

the pole was choking him. AR 442.

Ms. Bates testified that Plaintiff’s back brace was adjusted several times because he’s

been gaining weight. AR 442. There was no schedule that the doctor had. AR 442. It was

through CCS and Opine Motion, not Dr. King. AR 442. Dr. King tested her son’s back and told

her that it was getting “worse and worse.” AR 442. Dr. King said Plaintiff should see the “brace

man” every two weeks to adjust the brace. AR 443. Ms. Bates and her son would go to CCS

Children’s Service and Opine Motion. AR 443. They noticed the brace was scratching and

cutting Plaintiff because it would gouge his skin. AR 443. She did not think Plaintiff ever had a

new back brace. AR 443. Plaintiff did tell them that it was hurting him and it was too small, so

they adjusted it. AR 442. 

Ms. Bates testified that her son has increased in weight and Dr. King told him to go on a

diet. AR 443A. In the meantime, they adjusted it again. AR 443A. It does not fit Plaintiff’s

back anymore. AR 443A. He has gained wight. AR 443A. When he was supposed to go back

again in September 2004, CCS would no longer see her son because he “turned an adult.” AR

443A. 

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Ms. Bates testified that she and her son left L.A. in June 2004. AR 444. She was pretty

sure that Plaintiff had seen Dr. King between November 2002 and November 2003. AR 444. 

Opine Motion told them her son could no longer see Dr. King at the age of 18. AR 445. Plaintiff

turned 18 in September of 2002. AR 445. Ms. Bates testified that an MRI was not done because

MediCal will not cover it. AR 445. 

Ms. Bates also testified that Plaintiff graduated from high school in 2003. AR 447. He

has a learning disability. AR 447. They tested him and they thought there was something wrong

with his ears. AR 447. He has 80 percent scarring in his right ear. AR 447. He has had tubes

done four times. AR 447. He is 21, but acts like he is 15 half of the time. AR 447. He has

glasses, but does not wear them all the time because they give him headaches and need to be

adjusted. AR 448. 

Ms. Bates also testified that Plaintiff is angry because he wants to work, but knows he

cannot because it hurts his back. AR 448. He always has back pains. AR 448. It bothers his

lower back to lift out the trash. AR 448. He has been taking over-the-counter Tylenol and

ibuprofen for his back. AR 448. Dr. King just told him to take Tylenol. AR 449. Dr. King said

there was nothing he could prescribe for Plaintiff and suggested physical therapy, exercises,

Tylenol and wearing the back brace. AR 449. 

At the conclusion of questioning, the ALJ asked Ms. Bates if there was anything else she

wanted to tell him about the case that he had not asked but that she thought he should know. AR

449. Ms. Bates responded “just that it’s still going on. That he is seeing doctors for his back. 

And to see if we can get the back brace fixed again.” AR 449.

The ALJ brought Plaintiff into the room to finish the hearing. AR 450. He allowed Ms.

Bates to remain in the room during questioning of the vocational expert. AR 450. The ALJ then

questioned vocational expert, Kenneth Ferra. AR 450. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked

the VE to assume a person of 18 years of age at the cessation date, a high school education in

“special ed” and no prior work history. AR 450. The ALJ also asked the VE to assume the

person would be limited to the light level of exertion, simple, repetitive work and occasional

stooping, bending and crouching. AR 450. The VE testified there would be some assembly

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positions in the national economy compatible with the hypothetical, with approximately 4,500 of

those jobs in California. AR 450. At this point in the questioning, Ms. Bates indicated that she

did not understand what they were talking about. AR 450. The ALJ explained that he was

asking for jobs at the light level of exertion, of a simple repetitive nature, with only occasional

stooping, bending or crouching. AR 450. 

The ALJ resumed questioning of the VE. AR 450. He inquired whether the jobs

included both sedentary and light. AR 450. The VE testified that it would be light. AR 451. 

The ALJ then asked the VE to further assume that because of the physical condition, the person

would be likely to miss work on an unscheduled basis two to three times a month. AR 451. The

VE testified that there would no jobs. AR 451. 

After the vocational expert testified, Ms. Bates asked the ALJ what job was going hire her

son with his limitations. AR 451. The ALJ indicated that the first question was determining

Plaintiff’s physical condition (what he can do), but that he did not have control over hiring. AR

451. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ indicated that he did not see any need to hold

the record open and that he would make his decision based on the evidence presented at the

hearing, the evidence in the file and the documents brought to the hearing. AR 452. The ALJ

notified Plaintiff and his mother that a written decision would be sent in the mail in about two

months. AR 452. Ms. Bates asked whether she could appeal again. AR 452. The ALJ informed

her that although she could appeal, a denial by the ALJ would end Plaintiff’s benefits. AR 453. 

 Medical Evidence

On September 12, 1991, Sherman L. Thomas, Ph.D., completed a psychologicaleducational evaluation of Plaintiff in the first grade for possible special education eligibility. AR

220-21. Dr. Thomas reported that Plaintiff showed mentally deficient/borderline ability in the

verbal cognitive area and mentally deficient/low average ability in the nonverbal cognitive area. 

AR 221. Dr. Thomas opined that Plaintiff’s most significant learning handicap appeared to be in

spatial relationships, perceptual organization and verbal comprehension. AR 221. Dr. Thomas

further opined that while Plaintiff showed significant problems in the identified areas, he also

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appeared to be able to learn. AR 221. Dr. Thomas concluded that Plaintiff did not appear

eligible for special education. AR 221. 

On January 17, 1996, Plaintiff sought emergency room treatment for leg pain and

possible behavioral problems. AR 192-93. Plaintiff’s mother was directed to schedule an

appointment with Desert Counseling for an ADD evaluation of Plaintiff. AR 193. 

On February 20, 1996, Dr. Thomas completed a psychological-educational evaluation of

Plaintiff. AR 211-12. Dr. Thomas reported that Plaintiff showed mentally deficient/low average

ability in the verbal cognitive area and mentally deficient/borderline ability in the nonverbal

cognitive area. AR 212. Dr. Thomas concluded that Plaintiff’s most significant learning

handicaps appeared to be in perceptual organization, spatial relationships and, to a lesser degree,

conceptual thinking (visual and audio processing). AR 212. Plaintiff also showed strength in the

area of visual logical abstract thinking and freedom from distractability. AR 212. Dr. Thomas

opined that Plaintiff was eligible for special education program consideration, such as a Special

Day Class program or RSP. AR 212. 

On March 7, 1996, Kimball Hawkins, Ph.D., completed a psychological evaluation of

Plaintiff on behalf of Kern Regional Center to determine Plaintiff’s level of intellectual and

adaptive functioning. AR 227-30. Testing revealed scores within the low average range in

intellectual and adaptive functioning. AR 228. Dr. Hawkins concluded that Plaintiff had a

discrepancy between his intellectual ability and his achievement and may need a Resource

Specialist Program. AR 230. Dr. Hawkins recommended that Plaintiff was not eligible for Kern

Regional Center services because he did not have mental retardation or any other developmental

disability. AR 230. Dr. Hawkins further recommended consideration of Resource Specialist

Program classes due to deficits in academic achievement and family therapy because of reports of

significant conflict and behavioral acting out. AR 230. 

On March 7, 1996, Arnold Chun, M.D., M.P.H., completed a medical evaluation of

Plaintiff on behalf of Kern Regional Center. AR 231-34. On physical and neurological

examination, Plaintiff had some scarring over the right tympanic membrane, a slightly distorted

left tympanic membrane and caries. AR 233. The remainder of his examination was otherwise

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unremarkable. AR 233. Dr. Chun reported that Plaintiff had a history of recent concept of

change in behavior within the past 2 1⁄2 years, possible subnormal intellectual functioning, history

of persons with either learning problems or subnormal intellectual functioning in the maternal

family, history of frequent ear infections and right-sided hearing loss with subsequent placement

of two sets of PE tubes and a benign bone cyst of the left tibia with subsequent bone graft

procedure. AR 233. Dr. Chun opined that Plaintiff was not medically eligible for regional center

services because he had no evidence of cerebral palsy, epilepsy or autism. AR 233. Dr. Chun

recommended that Plaintiff be referred for counseling services. AR 234. 

On March 20, 1996, Plaintiff was found not eligible for special education services

because he did not have a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement. AR 218-19. 

The resource specialist teacher prepared a letter indicating that Plaintiff had been on a completely

modified program during fifth grade and his teachers were concerned about his academic and

emotional survival in junior high. AR 222. The teacher reported that Plaintiff’s mother was

requesting placement in a Special Day Class. AR 222. 

On March 25, 1996, Plaintiff’s mother requested that Plaintiff be evaluated for placement

in a Special Day Class. AR 257. 

On April 16, 1996, Plaintiff’s fifth grade teacher, C. Gregory, completed a Teacher’s

Questionnaire form. AR 214-17. Ms. Gregory opined that Plaintiff had severe problems

finishing things he starts, organizing work, and learning new skills and keeping up with peers. 

AR 214. He had marked problems concentrating on school work and thinking before acting. AR

214. He also had moderate problems listening, remaining attentive and acknowledging his own

mistakes. AR 214. Ms. Gregory reported that Plaintiff’s writing skills were poor, he struggled

with fine motor skills and he did not appear able to care for his own personal needs, wetting

himself 3 to 4 times during the year. AR 216-17. 

On April 29, 1996, Kern Regional Center prepared an assessment/closing summary report

regarding Plaintiff. AR 225-26. Kern Regional Center determined that Plaintiff did not present

with a diagnosis of mental retardation or any medical diagnosis qualifying him for regional

center services. AR 225. Kern Regional Center recommended that Plaintiff and his family

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become involved in counseling services. AR 226. Plaintiff’s mother reported that she was

unable to pay for such services. AR 226. 

On May 22, 1996, the Kern County Consortium for Special Education developed an

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for Plaintiff. AR 245-54. The IEP team

recommended that Plaintiff be placed in a special day class beginning in August 1996. AR 245. 

Based on testing, the IEP team concluded that Plaintiff had a severe discrepancy between ability

and achievement as a result of a disorder in visual processing. AR 247. 

In May 1996, Aida Berlese, M.D., a state agency medical consultant, completed a Case

Summary and Rationale for Child from Age 3 to Attainment of Age 16 form. AR 235-37. Dr.

Berlese opined that Plaintiff had a moderate to mild impairment of cognitive development, a

mild impairment of motor development, a mild impairment of social development and a mild

impairment of concentration, persistence and pace. AR 235-36. Dr. Berlese concluded that

Plaintiff’s impairment did not substantially reduce his ability to function independently,

appropriately and effectively in an age appropriate manner. AR 237. 

On May 11, 1998, Plaintiff’s IEP was amended to change his placement from RSP to

SDC. AR 241-42. The IEP team explained that Plaintiff had been exhibiting social and

academic difficulties that suggested a special class placement would be more appropriate. AR

242. 

On May 14, 1998, D.V. Pillai, M.D., of Sierra Psychiatric Services, conducted an initial

psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff. AR 243-44. On mental status examination, Dr. Pillai reported

that Plaintiff was easily distracted, had a learning disability, had a low attention span, had violent

outbursts, was self-mutilating and mean to pets and had very poor social sense. AR 244. Dr.

Pillai diagnosed Plaintiff with oppositional defiant disorder and encopresis. AR 244. Dr. Pillai

recommended psychological testing at school, consideration of antidepressants and mood

stabilizers and family counseling. AR 240, 244.

On June 17, 1998, state agency medical consultant Edwin Wiens, M.D., completed a

Childhood Disability Evaluation Form. AR 266-69. Dr. Wiens opined that Plaintiff medically

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equaled a listing and there was sufficient information in the file for a favorable reopening with an

onset date of February 1996. AR 266, 269. 

On March 1, 2002, Kevin Van Laeken, a school psychologist in the Antelope Valley

Union High School District, completed a psycho-educational assessment of Plaintiff. AR 270-

74. In a review of Plaintiff’s academic behavior, the school psychologist noted that Plaintiff had

completed 130 of 150 credits attempted and had passed three of the four required semesters of

physical education without any modifications. AR 271. Following testing, the school

psychologist concluded that Plaintiff did not exhibit a severe ability/achievement discrepancy

between an estimated borderline intellectual ability and any academic area. AR 272. However,

Plaintiff had a disorder of visual and auditory processing that required special education services. 

AR 272. The school psychologist also concluded that while Plaintiff may have had orthopedic

impairments, they were not of sufficient severity to adversely impact Plaintiff’s educational

performance or require specialized instruction. AR 272.

On April 17, 2002, Plaintiff saw Dr. King, of Spine, Pediatric Orthopaedic and Trauma

Surgeons, for follow-up on his back. AR 277. Dr. King reported that he had not seen Plaintiff

since September 2001. AR 277. In 2001, Plaintiff had a 65-degree kyphosis and they ordered a

new back brace. AR 277. Dr. King indicated that Plaintiff only wore the brace two hours a day. 

AR 277. On examination, Plaintiff had grown 2 5/8" in seven months and had gained 19 pounds. 

AR 277. X-rays revealed that Plaintiff’s kyphosis was 38 degrees in the brace. AR 277. Dr.

King recommended that Plaintiff wear the brace full time, 22 hours a day, seven days a week and

see a physical therapist. AR 277. 

On June 19, 2002, Plaintiff again saw Dr. King. AR 276. Dr. King reported that Plaintiff

was wearing his brace for one hour a day. AR 276. X-rays showed that Plaintiff’s kyphosis had

“jumped back up” to 46 degrees and his swayback was 50 degrees. AR 276. Dr. King indicated

that Plaintiff needed to wear his brace 22 hours a day, seven days a week, must do his exercises,

and should see the brace man every two weeks. AR 276. Dr. King opined that Plaintiff was “not

with the program at all.” AR 276. 

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On August 1, 2002, Plaintiff saw Dr. King for follow-up treatment of his kyphosis. AR

275. Dr. King reported that Plaintiff was not wearing his brace for more than three or four hours

a day. AR 275. X-rays revealed that Plaintiff’s kyphosis was 47 degrees and his swayback was

48 degrees. AR 275. Dr. King also reported having a long talk with Plaintiff about wearing the

brace full time if he wanted correction. AR 275. 

On November 4, 2002, Plaintiff saw Dr. King for follow-up. AR 280. Dr. King reported

that Plaintiff’s kyphosis was 33 degrees and his swayback was 46 degrees. AR 280. Dr. King

noted that Plaintiff’s brace was broken and had to be adjusted. AR 280. Dr. King opined that

Plaintiff should wear the brace 22 hours a day, 7 days a week and needed to do exercises. AR

280. 

On November 20, 2002, Plaintiff’s special day class teacher completed a Community

Outreach Questionnaire. AR 164-65. The teacher opined that Plaintiff took good care of

himself, did not exhibit any unusual behavior, mannerisms, fears or posturing, did not need

assistance keeping appointments, had no indications of memory loss or problems with

concentration or focusing, was cooperative, arrived on time, was accepted by his peers and was

able to understand and carry out simple verbal and written instructions. AR 164-65. 

On December 3, 2002, Dan Matzke, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, completed a

psychological evaluation of Plaintiff. AR 281-85. On mental status examination, Plaintiff’s

mood and affect were generally appropriate. He was alert and oriented and had no evident

disturbances of thought process or content. He also had good concentration and attention,

unimpaired judgment and fair insight. AR 282-83. On the Folstein Mini-Mental State Test,

Plaintiff had a score of 29, which was not indicative of severe cognitive/intellectual impairment

or dysfunction. AR 283. With regard to functioning, Plaintiff reported that he did some

occasional food shopping and some cooking. AR 283. He also did his own laundry, handled

money and had a checking account. AR 283. Dr. Matzke reported that Plaintiff’s

intellectual/cognitive abilities were estimated to be in the “Low Average” range. AR 283. The

clinical interview and mental status exam “did not reveal any serious cognitive, emotional or

behavioral dysfunction.” AR 283. Dr. Matzke diagnosed Plaintiff with a learning disorder NOS

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and assigned him a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) of 55-60. AR 284. Dr. Matzke

opined that Plaintiff had a fair ability to understand, remember and carry out complex job

instructions and a fair ability to respond appropriately to work situations/requirements. AR 285. 

Plaintiff’s ability to function in these areas was markedly limited, but not precluded by learning

disorders. AR 284-85. 

On December 30, 2002, Dr. King completed a Report of Contact form. AR 286. Dr.

King opined that Plaintiff should be able to perform light work activity, which entailed

standing/walking of 6 hours per day, lifting/carrying of 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds

occasionally, and occasional stooping. AR 286. 

On December 31, 2002, Anne M. Khong, M.D., a state agency medical consultant,

completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. AR 287-94. Dr. Khong

opined that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could

stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, could sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday and could push and/or pull without limitation. AR 289. He occasionally could climb,

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. AR 289. He did not have manipulative, visual,

communicative or environmental limitations. AR 290-91. 

On January 10, 2003, Luyen T. Luu, M.D., a state agency psychiatrist, completed a

Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. AR 295-301. Dr. Luu opined that

Plaintiff was not significantly limited in understanding and memory, sustained concentration and

persistence, social interaction and adaptation. AR 295-96. Dr. Luu further opined that Plaintiff

had sufficient ability to understand and remember simple and detailed instructions and sufficient

ability to carry out short and detailed instructions that did not involve reading, math or writing. 

AR 297. 

On January 10, 2003, Dr. Luu also completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form. AR

302-13. Dr. Luu opined that Plaintiff’s learning disorder NOS was a medically determinable

impairment that did not precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria of an organic mental disorder. 

AR 303. Dr. Luu further opined that Plaintiff had mild restriction of his activities of daily living,

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mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning and mild difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace. AR 312. 

On January 28, 2003, Plaintiff and his mother consented to a special education IEP dated

May 8, 2002. AR 314-44. The Antelope Valley Special Education Local Plan Area (“Antelope

Valley SELPA”) recommended that Plaintiff be placed in a Special Day Class for four periods

per day. AR 315. 

On May 12, 2003, Plaintiff’s teacher completed a Teacher Questionnaire form. AR 359-

66. The teacher reported that Plaintiff had between 36-40 verified illness absences during the

twelfth grade. AR 359. On the form, Plaintiff’s teacher indicated that Plaintiff did not have any

problems acquiring and using information. AR 360. He only had slight problems in

comprehending oral instructions, understanding school and content vocabulary, reading and

comprehending written material, comprehending and doing math problems, expressing ideas in

written form, learning new material and recalling and applying previously learned material. AR

360. Plaintiff’s teacher opined that Plaintiff had no problem interacting and relating with others

and no problem moving about and manipulating objects. AR 362-63. He had slight problems

with taking care of his personal hygiene and using good judgment regarding personal safety and

dangerous circumstances. AR 364. Plaintiff’s teacher also reported that Plaintiff used glasses

and frequently missed school due to illness. AR 365. 

On June 9, 2003, Plaintiff’s special day class teacher completed a Teacher Questionnaire

form. AR 367-74. She reported that Plaintiff had problems acquiring and using information. 

AR 368. He had a serious problem comprehending oral instructions, understanding school and

content vocabulary, reading and comprehending written material, comprehending and doing math

problems, understanding and participating in class discussions, providing organized oral

explanations and adequate descriptions, expressing ideas in written form, learning new material

and applying problem-solving skills in class discussions. AR 368. He had a very serious

problem recalling and applying previously learned material. AR 368. Plaintiff’s teacher also

reported that Plaintiff had problems attending and completing tasks. AR 369. He had an obvious

problem, on a daily basis, with paying attention when spoken to directly, sustaining attention

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during play/sports activities, focusing long enough to finish assigned activity or task, refocusing

to task when necessary, carrying out multi-step instructions and organizing his own things or

school materials. AR 369. He also had a serious problem expressing anger appropriately. AR

370. 

Plaintiff’s teacher opined that Plaintiff had a very serious problem moving and

manipulating things (e.g., pushing, pulling, lifting, carrying, transferring objects, coordinating

eyes and hands to manipulate small objects. AR 371. The teacher noted that, due to illness,

Plaintiff had a hard time lifting. AR 371. She further indicated that Plaintiff was not supposed

to be lifting or bending to lift and he should have been wearing a back brace. AR 371. 

Plaintiff’s teacher further reported that Plaintiff had problems caring for himself. AR 372. He

had a serious problem taking care of personal hygiene on a daily basis. AR 372. He also had an

obvious problems using good judgment regarding personal safety and dangerous circumstances,

identifying and appropriately asserting emotional needs, responding appropriately to changes in

own mood (e.g., calming self) and using appropriate coping skills to meet the daily demands of

the school environment. AR 372. 

On June 9, 2003, Dr. Matzke completed a consultative psychological evaluation of

Plaintiff. AR 375-81. On mental status exam, Plaintiff’s mood and affect were appropriate. AR

377. He was alert and oriented and his memory appeared unimpaired. AR 377. He had no

evident disturbances of thought process or content. AR 377. His concentration and attention

were fair-to-good (mild deficits) and he had some (mild-to-moderate) impulsive tendencies. AR

377. His intellectual functioning appeared to be in the “Average” classification range. AR 377. 

On the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, Plaintiff had mild-to-moderate deficits in visualmotor/perceptual skills and some indicators of impulsiveness. AR 377. On the Wechsler Adult

Intelligence Scale-Third Edition, Plaintiff had a full scale IQ of 90. AR 378. The results

indicated that Plaintiff’s verbal abilities were in the “Average” range, his performance abilities

were in the “Low Average” range, and his overall intellectual/cognitive abilities were measured

in the “Average” classification range. AR 378. Dr. Matzke noted that Plaintiff made several

errors on the subtests due to impulsiveness and inattention. AR 378. The results of the Wechsler

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Memory Scale-Third Edition indicated that Plaintiff’s short term and long term memory were in

the average range. AR 378. Dr. Matzke opined that Plaintiff had no severe cognitive, emotional

or behavioral dysfunction and diagnosed Plaintiff with a Learning Disorder NOS by history. AR

380. He assigned Plaintiff a GAF of 55-60. Dr. Matzke further opined that Plaintiff had a fair

ability to understand, remember and carry out complex job instructions and a fair ability to

respond appropriately to work situations/requirements. AR 381. 

A Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form indicated that Plaintiff could

lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk about 6

hours in an 8-hour workday, could sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and could push and/or

pull without limitation except as shown for lift and/or carry. AR 383. He could never climb a

ladder, rope or scaffolds. AR 384. He occasionally could stoop and crouch. AR 384. He had no

manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental limitations. AR 387-86. 

On June 18, 2003, Keith M. Quint, M.D., a state agency medical consultant, completed a

Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment form. AR 390-93. Dr. Quint opined that

Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions

and moderate limitations in the ability to carry out detailed instructions. AR 390. Plaintiff could

understand and remember adequately to perform simple routine and repetitive tasks -nothing

complex, could sustain concentration and persistence for 2-hour intervals, could adequately

interact with public, peers and supervisors in basic work situations and could adapt to normal

work environment situations at SRT level. AR 392. On June 20, 2003, state agency psychiatrist,

Harvey Biala, M.D., also signed the form. AR 392. 

On June 20, 2003, Dr. Biala also completed a Psychiatric Review Technique form. AR

394-402. Dr. Biala opined that Plaintiff had a learning disorder NOS, which was a medically

determinable impairment that did not precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria of an organic mental

disorder. AR 395. Dr. Biala further opined that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. AR 400. 

On November 11, 2003, Dr. King prepared a Statement of Medical Necessity indicating

that Plaintiff needed an MRI of his lumbar spine for disc prominences. AR 407. On that same

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date, Dr. King prepared a prescription addressed to physical therapy indicating that Plaintiff had

Scheuermann’s kyphosis with swayback. AR 408. Dr. King indicated that the swayback was

causing low back pain and Plaintiff needed “P.T. ie pelvic tilt; abdom. ex, etc.” AR 408. 

Dr. King also prepared a prescription addressed to S.S.I., stating “Continue Benefits because he

can’t work temporarily.” AR 409. 

ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

disability onset date. AR 20, 25. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of

back/spine problem and learning disorder not otherwise specified, but he did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 25. The ALJ further found that

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity for light work activity with occasional stooping,

bending, crouching and crawling. AR 25. Using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework,

the ALJ determined there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff

could perform. AR 25. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that, as of January 1, 2003, the severity of

claimant’s impairments did not meet the adult disability standards and his eligibility for

childhood disability benefits properly was ceased. AR 25-26. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla,

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The record as a whole must be considered,

weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s

conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and

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making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v.

Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the correct legal

standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See

Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 416.920 (a)-(g) (2005). Applying the evaluation process in this case, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff (1) has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of

disability; (2) has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered “severe”

(back/spine problem and learning disorder not otherwise specified) based on the requirements in

the Regulations (20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (2005)); (3) does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or equals one of the impairments set forth in Appendix 1

to Subpart P of Part 404; (4) does not have past relevant work; but (5) can perform jobs that exist

in significant numbers in the national economy. AR 25. The ALJ concluded that as of January

1, 2003, the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the adult disability standards. 

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to provide a fair hearing and by failing to

develop the record. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s findings regarding the severity of

Plaintiff’s mental impairment were not supported by substantial evidence.

DISCUSSION 

A. The ALJ Provided Plaintiff With A Fair Hearing.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by allowing Plaintiff to waive his right to counsel

and by “allowing Plaintiff to proceed without the aid of any representative in light of his mental

condition.” Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, at p. 7. As an initial matter, there is no requirement that

Plaintiff be represented by counsel. See, e.g., Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Further, the “[l]ack of counsel does not affect the validity of the hearing unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate prejudice or unfairness in the administrative proceedings.” Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d

1545, 1551 (9th Cir. 1985); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1981). In this instance,

the ALJ fully advised Plaintiff of his right to counsel and allowed Plaintiff to consult with his

mother regarding legal counsel before proceeding with the hearing. AR 420-22. There is no

indication in the record that Plaintiff did not understand his right to be represented at the hearing. 

Accordingly, the issue is whether the hearing was fair and the record fully developed, not

whether Plaintiff properly waived his right to counsel. 

Duty to Develop the Record

Where a claimant is unrepresented, the Ninth Circuit has long recognized that the ALJ

has an independent duty to fully develop the record. Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th

Cir. 1992). It is “incumbent upon the ALJ ‘to scrupulously and conscientiously probe into,

inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.’ He must be ‘especially diligent in ensuring that

favorable as well as unfavorable facts and circumstances are elicited.’” Cox, 587 F.2d at 991

(citations omitted).

In contending that the ALJ inadequately developed the record, Plaintiff argues that the

ALJ failed to elicit testimony regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief,

at p. 7. This argument is without merit. The ALJ met his burden to explore all relevant facts

regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment by questioning both Plaintiff and his mother regarding

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Plaintiff’s condition and daily activities. In this regard, Plaintiff testified that he took special

education classes and graduated from high school. AR 426. Plaintiff also described a regular

day during the relevant time period as going to classes, doing homework, helping his mother at

home and hanging out with family and friends. AR 432. Plaintiff further testified that he could

read the newspaper, prepare his own meals, handle his own checking account and pay some of

his own bills. AR 426, 430. He also took some computer classes and participated in a

department store job through a school program. AR 434. In addition, Plaintiff’s mother testified

that Plaintiff had a learning disability, but was able to graduate from high school. AR 447. This

testimony, elicited at the hearing, was relevant to Plaintiff’s mental impairment. The ALJ also

permitted Plaintiff and his mother to offer any additional information that the ALJ had not

inquired about. AR 434, 449. Plaintiff did not offer any information regarding a mental

impairment while Plaintiff’s mother offered information only with regard to Plaintiff’s back and

back brace. Id. Further, neither Plaintiff nor his mother contended that Plaintiff’s disabling

condition was due to a mental impairment. Plaintiff himself asserted that he was on disability

solely because of problems with his back. AR 427. Plaintiff’s mother likewise testified that

Plaintiff was angry he could not work due to back pain. AR 427. 

Plaintiff’s additional contention that the ALJ erred by failing to have a medical advisor at

the hearing to testify regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment is also without merit. Generally,

ALJs have a duty fully and fairly to develop the record when the evidence is ambiguous or "the

record is inadequate" to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. See, e.g., Tonapetyan v.

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ obtained and considered treatment

records and evaluations regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairment from school evaluators,

including school psychologists and teachers, and from the consultative psychological examiner. 

AR 20-22. There is no indication that this record was inadequate or ambiguous to preclude

proper evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental impairment. Therefore, the absence of a medical advisor

at the hearing was not error.

Insofar as Plaintiff contends that the hearing was not fair because Plaintiff and his mother

were confused during the hearing, the record reflects that the ALJ spent time explaining to

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Plaintiff and his mother the purpose of the hearing and the issues to be determined, describing

the procedures, and answering any questions raised by Plaintiff or his mother. The ALJ also

informed Plaintiff that if there was anything he did not understand at any time, then he should let

the ALJ know. AR 424-25. There is no indication that Plaintiff and his mother did not

understand the proceedings or any explanations of such proceedings provided by the ALJ.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds no prejudice or unfairness in the administrative

proceeding. 

B. The ALJ’s Determination Regarding Plaintiff’s Mental Impairment is Supported by

Substantial Evidence. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental impairment is not

supported by substantial evidence.

1. Consultative Examiner

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly accepted the opinion of the state agency

physicians over the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Matzke. The opinion of an

examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a nonexamining physician. 

Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.

1984). As is the case with the opinion of a treating physician, the Commissioner must provide

“clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining

physician. Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506. Even if contradicted by another doctor, the opinion of an

examining doctor can be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir.1995).

Plaintiff asserts that the state agency opinion is inconsistent with the greater limitations

found by Dr. Matzke regarding Plaintiff’s ability to carry out complex job instructions and his

ability to respond appropriately to work situations/requirements. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief, at p.

8-10. The Commissioner contends that Dr. Matzke’s opinion is not inconsistent with the state

agency opinion and supports the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s mental impairment. 

In this case, Dr. Matzke conducted two psychological evaluations of Plaintiff. Dr.

Matzke first assessed Plaintiff in December 2002 and concluded that Plaintiff did not have “any

serious cognitive, emotional or behavioral dysfunction.” AR 283. Dr. Matzke opined that

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Plaintiff had a fair ability to understand, remember and carry out complex job instructions and a

fair ability to respond appropriately to work situations/requirements. AR 285. Plaintiff’s ability

to function in these areas was markedly limited, but not precluded. AR 284-85. Dr. Matzke next

assessed Plaintiff on June 9, 2003. AR 375-81. Following completion of a mental status exam,

interview and testing, Dr. Matzke again opined that Plaintiff had no severe cognitive, emotional

or behavioral dysfunction and diagnosed Plaintiff with a Learning Disorder NOS by history. AR

380. Dr. Matzke further opined that Plaintiff had a fair (markedly limited, but not precluded)

ability to understand, remember and carry out complex job instructions and a fair ability

(markedly limited, but not precluded) to respond appropriately to work situations/requirements. 

AR 381.

With regard to Plaintiff’s functioning in these areas, state agency physician Dr. Luyen

Luu opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in understanding and memory, in sustained

concentration and persistence, in social interaction and in adaptation. AR 295-96. Dr. Luu also

opined that Plaintiff had sufficient ability to understand and remember simple and detailed

instructions and sufficient ability to carry out short and detailed instructions that did not involve

reading, math or writing. AR 297. Dr. Luu’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to carry out

complex job instructions and his ability to adapt do not appear inconsistent with Dr. Matzke’s

assessment of a fair ability regarding complex job instructions and a fair ability to respond

appropriately to work situations. 

In addition, the opinion of state agency physicians Keith Quint and Harvey Biala were

consistent with Dr. Matzke’s assessment that Plaintiff’s ability to function in these areas was

markedly limited but not precluded. For example, Drs. Quint and Biala opined that Plaintiff had

moderate limitations in the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions and

moderate limitations in the ability to carry out detailed instructions, but he could understand and

remember adequately to perform simple routine and repetitive tasks (nothing complex), could

sustain concentration and persistence for 2-hour intervals, could adequately interact with public,

peers and supervisors in basic work situations and could adapt to normal work environment

situations at a simple, repetitive task level. AR 390, 392. Accordingly, Drs. Quint and Biala

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accounted for Plaintiff’s limitations regarding complex instructions and adaptability in a work

environment by limiting Plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the

ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember and carry out simple, repetitive

tasks has not been eroded by his psychological impairment is consistent with and supported by

both the opinions of state agency physicians and the opinion of Dr. Matzke. AR 24. The opinion

of state agency physicians can amount to substantial evidence, so long as they are supported by

other evidence in the record and are consistent with it. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. 

2. Teacher Questionnaire

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss a teacher questionnaire that

supports his mental limitations. Plaintiff references the questionnaire completed by his teacher in

June 2003 in which she opined that Plaintiff had problems acquiring and using information. AR

368. The teacher further opined that he had serious problems comprehending oral instructions,

understanding school and content vocabulary, reading and comprehending written material,

comprehending and doing math problems, understanding and participating in class discussions,

providing organized oral explanations and adequate descriptions, expressing ideas in written

form, learning new material and applying problem-solving skills in class discussions. AR 368. 

He also had a very serious problem recalling and applying previously learned material. AR 368. 

Plaintiff’s teacher reported that Plaintiff had problems attending and completing tasks. AR 369. 

He also had obvious problems, on a daily basis, with paying attention when spoken to directly,

sustaining attention during play/sports activities, focusing long enough to finish an assigned

activity or task, refocusing to task when necessary, carrying out multi-step instructions and

organizing his own things or school materials. AR 369. 

Lay witness testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is competent evidence which the

Commissioner must take into account. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). The

ALJ may reject such testimony if he does so expressly, in which case "he must give reasons that

are germane to each witness." Id. The ALJ, however, “does not need to meet the impossible

burden of mentioning every piece of evidence” presented to him. Parks v. Sullivan, 766 F.Supp.

627, 635 (N.D.Ill. 1991). As long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion and the

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ALJ explains why “significant probative evidence has been rejected,” an ALJ’s failure to discuss

lay witness testimony constitutes harmless error. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th

Cir. 1984). In Vincent, the court held that the omission of lay testimony in a hearing decision did

not require reversal because the medical evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.

Here, any error by the ALJ in mentioning, but not discussing the third-party questionnaire

completed by Plaintiff’s teacher was harmless for a number of reasons. First, as discussed above,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairment was not

disabling. The opinions of the consultative examiner and the state agency physicians supported

the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff did not have any severe cognitive limitations. 

Second, Plaintiff and his mother both testified that he was able to graduate from high

school. AR 426, 447. Plaintiff also described his functioning level to include having a checking

account, paying some bills himself and taking a computer class. AR 430-431. Plaintiff’s

assertion that he has a representative payee because he is not capable of handling his funds is

without merit. The record reflects that a payee was put into place while Plaintiff was receiving

benefits as a child. AR 47-50, 51-54, 59. 

Third, the questionnaire was limited to Plaintiff’s functioning in a classroom environment

and did not fully assess Plaintiff’s functioning as an adult. And finally, the questionnaire

completed in June 2003 was contradicted by two other teacher questionnaires in the record. For

instance, in November 2002, Plaintiff’s special day class teacher completed a Community

Outreach Questionnaire. AR 164-65. In that questionnaire, Plaintiff’s teacher opined that

Plaintiff took good care of himself, did not exhibit any unusual behavior, mannerisms, fears or

posturing, did not need assistance keeping appointments, had no indications of memory loss or

problems with concentration or focusing, was cooperative, arrived on time, was accepted by his

peers and was able to understand and carry out simple verbal and written instructions. AR 164-

65. In May 2003, Plaintiff’s teacher also completed a questionnaire. AR 359-66. Although the

teacher reported that Plaintiff had between 36-40 verified illness absences during the twelfth

grade, she did not report any significant functional difficulties. AR 359. Plaintiff’s teacher

indicated that Plaintiff did not have any problems acquiring and using information, he only had

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slight problems in comprehending oral instructions, understanding school and content

vocabulary, reading and comprehending written material, comprehending and doing math

problems, expressing ideas in written form, learning new material and recalling and applying

previously learned material. AR 360. Plaintiff’s teacher further opined that Plaintiff had no

problem interacting and relating with others and had no problem moving about and manipulating

objects, and only had slight problems with taking care of his personal hygiene and using good

judgment regarding personal safety and dangerous circumstances. AR 362-64. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. 

Accordingly, this Court DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. The clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in

favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff

Michael Hess.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 4, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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