Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16733/USCOURTS-ca9-12-16733-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONNA CORBELLO,

Plaintiff Appellant,

v.

THOMAS GAETANO DEVITO,

Defendant,

and

FRANKIE VALLI; ROBERT J. GAUDIO;

MARSHALL BRICKMAN; ERIC S.

ELICE; DES MCANUFF; DSHT, INC.,

FKA Dodger State Holding

Theatricals, Inc.; DODGER

THEATRICALS, LTD.; JB VIVA

VEGAS, LP; MICHAEL S. DAVID;

JERSEY BOYS BROADWAY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP; JERSEY BOYS

RECORDS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;

SKUNK, INC.; GETTING HOME, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-16733

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00867-

RCJ-PAL

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2 CORBELLO V. VALLI

DONNA CORBELLO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THOMAS GAETANO DEVITO,

Defendant,

and

FRANKIE VALLI; ROBERT J. GAUDIO;

MARSHALL BRICKMAN; ERIC S.

ELICE; DES MCANUFF; DSHT, INC.,

FKA Dodger State Holding

Theatricals, Inc.; DODGER

THEATRICALS, LTD.; JB VIVA

VEGAS, LP; MICHAEL S. DAVID;

JERSEY BOYS BROADWAY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP; JERSEY BOYS

RECORDS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;

SKUNK, INC.; GETTING HOME, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-15826

D.C. No.

2:08-cv-00867-

RCJ-PAL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 13, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed February 10, 2015

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 3

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Robert D. Sack *,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Concurrence by Judge Sack

SUMMARY**

Copyright

The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment

and vacated its assessment of costs against the plaintiff in a

copyright case involving the musical “Jersey Boys.”

Plaintiff Donna Corbello is the heir of Rex Woodard,

ghostwriter of an unpublished autobiography of Thomas

DeVito, a former member of the band the “Four Seasons.” In

1999 DeVito and another former band member, Nicholas

Macioci, executed an agreement granting two of their former

bandmates, Frankie Valli and Bob Gaudio, the exclusive right

to use aspects of their lives related to the Four Seasons,

including their biographies, in the development of a musical.

Applying New York law, the panel held that the 1999

agreement constituted a transfer of ownership of DeVito’s

derivative-work right in the autobiography, rather than a

* The Honorable Robert D. Sack, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 CORBELLO V. VALLI

nonexclusive license, to Valli and Gaudio. Distinguishing

Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th

Cir. 2008), the panel held that a co-owner of a copyright may

transfer that right without permission from his co-owner. The

panel held that because copyright co-owners must account to

one another for any profits earned by exploiting that

copyright, the district court erred in rejecting Corbello’s

claims for accounting and declaratory relief.

The panel also concluded that the defendants had failed

to establish the existence of a license as an affirmative

defense to Corbello’s copyright infringement claims. The

panel stated that its conclusion that the 1999 agreement

constituted a transfer of ownership of DeVito’s

derivative-work right would ordinarily preclude Corbello’s

infringement claims against Valli and Gaudio because a

co-owner of a copyright cannot be liable to another co-owner

for infringement. But a material issue of fact remained as to

whether the agreement’s reversionary clause later terminated

Valli and Gaudio’s ownership right. The panel held that a

grant of summary judgment was not appropriate on the

ground of an implied license based on DeVito’s conduct.

The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Corbello’s claims for accounting, declaratory

relief, and copyright infringement and vacated the district

court’s assessment of costs against Corbello. It remanded the

case for further proceedings.

Concurring in the judgment, Judge Sack agreed that the

case must be remanded for further proceedings. He

disagreed, however, that the word “biographies” in the 1999

agreement unambiguously included the manuscript of the

autobiography ghost written by Woodard, and that the 1999

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 5

agreement therefore transferred certain derivative rights in the

autobiography to Valli and Gaudio. Judge Sack would

conclude that the language in the agreement was ambiguous

under New York law. He also wrote that, even if the 1999

agreement unambiguouslytransferred DeVito’s interest in the

autobiography, Sybersound compels the conclusion that the

transfer effected only a nonexclusive, rather than an

exclusive, license to use the autobiography for the creation of

a musical.

COUNSEL

Gregory H. Guillot, Gregory H. Guillot, P.C., Dallas, Texas,

argued the cause and, along with Lawrence Kasten and

Robert H. McKirgan, Lewis and Roca, LLP, Phoenix,

Arizona, filed the briefs for the plaintiff-appellant.

Daniel M. Mayeda, Leopold, Petrich & Smith, P.C., Los

Angeles, California, argued the cause and, along with Samuel

S. Lionel and Maximiliano D. Couvillier III, Lionel, Sawyers

& Collins, filed the brief for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether a contractual grant of the

exclusive right to use an individual’s “biographies” to create

a Broadway musical stage play also constitutes a transfer of

a copyright ownership interest in that individual’s

unpublished autobiography.

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6 CORBELLO V. VALLI

I

A

In 1988, Rex Woodard, a lawyer, journalist, and “Four

Seasons” devotee, entered into a written agreement to

ghostwrite the autobiography (the “Work”) of Thomas

DeVito, one of the original members of the band (later known

as “Jersey Boys”). Pursuant to this agreement, Woodward

and DeVito would split the proceeds from publishing or

otherwise exploiting the manuscript. After completing the

Work but before securing publication, Woodward succumbed

to lung cancer in 1991. Unbeknownst to Woodward’s widow

and heir, Donna Corbello, DeVito had registered the Work

with the U.S. Copyright Office solely under his own name in

1991, four months before Woodward’s death.

In 1999, DeVito and another former Four Seasons band

member, Nicholas Macioci, executed an agreement (the

“1999 Agreement”) with two of their former bandmates,

Frankie Valli and Bob Gaudio. Pursuant to this agreement,

DeVito and Macioci granted to Valli and Gaudio the

“exclusive right to use” “aspects of [their lives] related to The

Four Seasons including, by way of example, [their] creative

contributions, biographies, events in [their lives], names and

likenesses (the ‘Materials’)” to develop a musical stage

performance (the “Play”) about the “Four Seasons.” DeVito

and Macioci further waived all claims in connection with the

Materials, including any claim for violation of copyright.

After an abortive attempt to create the Play with an initial

producer, Valli and Gaudio entered into a twenty-four page

letter agreement dated May 1, 2004 (the “2004 Agreement”)

to produce the Play with another production company. 

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 7

Pursuant to this agreement, Valli and Gaudio granted the right

to use the band, the band’s music, and the band members’

names, likenesses, and life stories. In exchange for these

rights, Valli and Gaudio would receive certain specified

advances and royalties calculated as a percentage of gross

box-office receipts from future productions. While the

contract was printed on the letterhead of Dodgers Theatricals,

Ltd., and reserved a space on the signature page for that same

entity, the text of the agreement defines a different entity,

Dodger Stage Holding Theatricals, Inc., as the “Producer.” 

Pursuant to the 1999 Agreement, Valli and Gaudio were to

distribute—and did in fact so distribute—a portion of any

such payments received to DeVito. The musical “Jersey

Boys,” produced pursuant to this Agreement, opened on

Broadway in late 2005 to popular and critical acclaim, and

has enjoyed continued international success.

B

Corbello first discovered arrangements made by DeVito

and his bandmates after she and her sister-in-law renewed

their efforts to publish the Work on the eve of the “Jersey

Boys” debut. Supposing that the Broadway musical might

rekindle interest in the band, she approached DeVito who,

after a month of correspondence, rejected her overtures,

concluding that the Work was “not saleable.” In 2006, the

success of “JerseyBoys” prompted Corbello and her sister-inlaw to confirm the copyright in the Work in the hope of future

exploitation, when they discovered that DeVito had already

registered—solely in his own name—a manuscript virtually

identical to the Work. Corbello subsequently filed a

supplementary application with the U.S. Copyright Office to

add Woodward as a coauthor and co-claimant of the Work,

which prompted the Office to amend the certificate of

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8 CORBELLO V. VALLI

registration to list Woodward and DeVito as coauthors of the

Work and co-claimants thereto.

Based on such revelation, and further accounts from

writers, actors, and others involved in the Play that attributed

inspiration in part to the unpublished autobiography,Corbello

initially brought suit against DeVito for equitable accounting,

declaratory judgment, and breach of contract. Valli’s divorce

proceedings in 2008 brought to public light further

documents, including the 1999 Agreement, regarding

DeVito’s involvement in producing the Play. Corbello filed

a Third Amended Complaint in May 2011, alleging twenty

causes of action, including equitable accounting, declaratory

judgment, and copyright infringement under both U.S. and

foreign law, not only against DeVito but also against Valli

and Gaudio, as well as the writers, directors, and producers of

the Play and various related entities.

Corbello alleges that the Play constitutes, at least in part,

a “derivative work” of the DeVito autobiography, the right to

create which resides exclusively in the copyright-holders of

the underlying work, and their lawful successors, assignees,

and licensees. Corbello thus concludes that she, as legatee of

Woodward’s joint copyright in the Work, deserves to share in

the profits reaped by the various Appellees’ licensing and

assignment, or infringement, as the case may be, of the

underlying rights.

Facing duelingmotions for summary judgment on several

of the counts, the district court issued two orders,

incorporated into the judgment from which Corbello here

appeals, granting summary judgment to all Appellees on

Corbello’s claims for equitable accounting, declaratory

judgment, and copyright infringement. In so ruling, the

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 9

district court concluded that (1) the 1999 Agreement

constituted not an assignment of DeVito’s copyright interest

in, but rather a “selectively exclusive license” to use, the

Work; (2) the 1999 Agreement, the 2004 Agreement, and

DeVito’s subsequent conduct sufficiently licensed Appellees

to use the Work in developing the Play; and (3) because

United States law governs whether the Appellees possessed

a valid license to use the Work, Corbello’s claims for

copyright infringement under foreign law must also fail. 

Corbello timely appealed, disputing all of these conclusions

as well as the district court’s taxation of costs against her.1

II

Corbello first contends that the 1999 Agreement

constituted a transfer of DeVito’s copyright interest in the

Work, rather than a selectivelyexclusive license, and that she,

as the legatee of Woodward—a duly registered co-author and

co-claimant of the Work—is therefore entitled to a portion of

the proceeds resulting from Valli and Gaudio’s exploitation

of that ownership interest.

“A co-owner of a copyright must account to other coowners for any profits he earns from licensing or use of the

copyright.” Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Copyright law considers both exclusive licenses and

assignments to be “transfer[s] of copyright ownership.” 

17 U.S.C. § 101. The statute enumerates various rights that

copyright owners hold, including the right “to prepare

derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” Id.

§ 106(2). Copyright owners may transfer “[a]ny of the

exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any

 

1

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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10 CORBELLO V. VALLI

subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106,” id.

§ 201(d)(2), so long as the transfer is evidenced by a signed

writing, id. § 204(a).

The parties do not dispute that Corbello succeeded to her

husband’s interest in the copyright of the Work. Thus,

Corbello’s claims for declaratory relief and equitable

accounting turn on whether DeVito effectively transferred

some quantum of his copyright co-ownership interest to

Appellees.

A

Pursuant to the 1999 Agreement, DeVito “grant[ed] to

[Valli and Gaudio] the exclusive right to use and incorporate

the Materials in one or more theatrical productions, and any

and all ancillary and subsidiary exploitations thereof.” As

defined in the Agreement, “Materials” includes, inter alia,

DeVito’s “biographies.” The 1999 Agreement also contains

a provision by which DeVito agreed to “waive any claim in

connection with the Materials or Works including . . . any

claim that the Works . . . violate any right of . . . copyright.”

Despite concluding that the Agreement’s inclusion of

“biographies” in the definition of “Materials” sufficiently

included the Work so as to grant Valli and Gaudio an

exclusive license to use it in producing the Play, the district

court nevertheless found that the Work fell outside of the

Agreement’s use of “biographies” for the purpose of

transferring ownership of a copyright interest in the Work. 

We are not persuaded by the district court’s interpretation.

The 1999 Agreement is governed by New York law. 

Under New York law, a contract is unambiguous if “on its

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 11

face[, it] is reasonably susceptible of only one meaning.” 

Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 171

(N.Y. 2002). If a contract is unambiguous, the court may not

consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Id. at 170.

In the context of the 1999 Agreement, the term

“biographies” is not ambiguous. Standard dictionary

definitions emphasize that biographies generallyinclude both

a formal and substantial written component: a “biography” is

a “history of a person’s life” (the substance) that is “usually

written” (the form). MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1998); accord OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2010) (“The process of recording the

events and circumstances of another person’s life, esp. for

publication . . . ; the documenting of individual life histories

. . . considered as a genre of writing or social history.”) (first

listed definition); id. (“A written account of the life of an

individual.”) (second listed definition). As an account of

DeVito’s life that has been reduced to writing, the Work, on

its face, qualifies under these straightforward definitions as a

“biography.”

Nor are we persuaded by Appellees’ argument that

“biography,” as used in the 1999 Agreement, refers not to

documented life histories, but rather to the general story of

one’s life. First, this definition, even when offered by

dictionaries, takes a subsidiary position to the more common

definition of a documented history. See OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY (3rd. ed. 2010) (third and final listed definition);

cf.MERRIAM-WEBSTER’SCOLLEGIATEDICTIONARY (10th ed.

1998) (“an account of the life of something (as an animal, a

coin, or a building)”) (third and final listed definition). 

Moreover, under New York law, courts may not choose to

interpret a contractual provision so as to render another term

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12 CORBELLO V. VALLI

superfluous. See Sayers v. Rochester Telephone Corp. Supp.

Mgmt. Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d. Cir. 1993); see

also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE

INTERPRETATIONOFLEGALTEXTS 174–79 (2012)(discussing

surplusage cannon). Here, to read “biography” as referring

to DeVito’s general life story would do just that, as

“Materials” is defined to include not only biographies, but

also “creative contributions, . . . events in your life, names and

likenesses.” Thus, Appellees’ proposed definition cannot be

squared with New York’s rules governing proper contract

interpretation.

Further, to read “biographies” as Appellees urge would

largely defeat the overarching purpose of the Agreement. 

Under New York law, courts should consider individual

contract provisions in light of “the entirety of the agreement

in the context of the parties’ relationship and circumstances.” 

In re Riconda, 688 N.E.2d 248, 252 (N.Y. 1997). Here, as

the Agreement clearly states and uncontradicted by the

evidence in the record, the goal of the parties in executing the

Agreement was to develop a theatrical adaptation of their

own and their band’s own histories.2 DeVito cannot plausibly

claim to have retained his privilege as a copyright co-owner

to create derivative theatrical works of any biographical

manuscript he owns, yet surrendered exclusively to others his

generic “life story,” along with his name and likeness, to

2 The fact that Macioci may never have had a written biography, the

rights to which he could have transferred via the 1999 Agreement, is

perfectly in keeping with such a goal. The ability to use freely a written

biography, if such biography existed, would help Valli and Gaudio create

a Play chronicling the history of the band and its members. The fact that

one of the band members may not have actually had such a biography

does not negate the fact that, had he had such a biography, it would have

assisted Valli and Gaudio in their goal of developing the Play.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 13

create a play. Relinquishing one’s right to exploit creatively

his or her “life story,” while at the same time retaining a

corresponding right over one’s written biography, would be

a self-defeating endeavor. We decline to impute such an

incompatible purpose to the definition of “biographies” in the

1999 Agreement.

Pursuant to the 1999 Agreement, Devito granted Valli and

Gaudio the “exclusive right to use” his “biographies,”

unambiguously including the Work, to create a play. Such

play constitutes a “derivative work,” the right to create which

resides in each copyright holder of the underlying work and

may be transferred by that holder to a third party.

3 Thus, in

granting this exclusive right to create, whether classified as

an exclusive license or an assignment, the 1999 Agreement

constitutes a transfer of ownership of Devito’s derivativework right in the Work to Valli and Gaudio.

B

Appellees argue that our precedent, Sybersound Records,

Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008), prohibits

a co-owner of a copyright, such as DeVito, from transferring

that right without permission from his co-owner, in this

instance, Corbello. But that argument stretches Sybersound’s

holding too far.

3 Despite the concerns expressed by the concurrence, including the Work

in the definition of “biographies” does not restrict DeVito from exercising

those other statutory rights of copyright ownership identified in 17 U.S.C.

§ 106 (assuming, of course, that DeVito has not independently transferred

those rights to third parties). See infra, at 26–28 (Sack, J., concurring). 

The Agreement simply restricts DeVito from alone using the Work to

create a theatrical production.

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14 CORBELLO V. VALLI

Copyright “is a creature of statute, and the only rights that

exist under copyright law are those granted by statute.” 

Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883–84

(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Specifically, “[a] copyright

consists of a bundle of six statutorily created rights, currently

codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106.” Sybersound, 517 F.3d at 1145

n.3.4 While § 106 identifies what rights are included in a

copyright, § 201(d) describes how an owner can transfer a

4 The six statutorily created rights created by 17 U.S.C. § 106 include

the right:

“(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or

phonorecords;

(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the

copyrighted work;

(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the

copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer

of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;

(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and

choreographic works, pantomimes, andmotion pictures

and other audiovisual works, to perform the

copyrighted work publicly;

(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and

choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,

graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual

images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,

to display the copyrighted work publicly; and

(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the

copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio

transmission.”

17 U.S.C. § 106.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 15

copyright and its component parts. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 

Section 201(d)(1) provides that “[t]he ownership of a

copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any

means of conveyance or by operation of law[.]” Id.

§ 201(d)(1). And § 201(d)(2) states that “[a]ny of the

exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any

subdivision of the rights specified in section 106, may be

transferred as provided by [§ 201(d)(1)] and owned

separately.” Id. § 201(d)(2).

We had several occasions prior to Sybersound to interpret

§ 201(d)’s broad language authorizing the alienabilty of

copyrights. In Bagdadi v. Nazar, we explained, “[i]t is

important to note that the various rights included in a

copyright are divisible and that ‘any of the exclusive rights

comprised in a copyright . . . may be transferred . . . and

owned separately.’” 84 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2)). In Gardner v. Nike, Inc., we

added, “[s]ection 201(d)(1) enables the owner to transfer any

fraction of his or her ownership interest to another party,

thereby making that party a whole or joint owner.” 279 F.3d

774, 779 (9th Cir. 2002). And in Silvers v. Sony Pictures, an

en banc panel explained that the six component parts of a

copyright “may be chopped up and owned separately, and

each separate owner of a subdivided exclusive right may sue

to enforce that owned portion of an exclusive right, no matter

how small.” 402 F.3d at 887 (emphasis added). In short, we

made clear prior to Sybersound that copyrights are divisible

and that a copyright owner can freely transfer any portion of

his ownership interests in that copyright; after all, the plain

language of § 201(d) commands as much.

Sybersound dealt with a plaintiff’s standing to sue for

copyright infringement. In that case, several entities together

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16 CORBELLO V. VALLI

owned the copyright to nine songs. 517 F.3d at 1144. One

such owner attempted to transfer to Sybersound the exclusive

right to use those songs for karaoke purposes. Id. at 1142. 

Sybersound later filed a lawsuit against other third parties,

alleging those parties were infringing on Sybersound’s right

to use the songs for karaoke purposes. Id. at 1145.

We held that when one co-owner independently attempts

to grant an exclusive license of a particular copyright interest,

that licensee—in this case, Sybersound—does not have

standing to sue alleged third-party infringers. Id. at 1146. 

After all, one co-owner, acting independently, “may not limit

the other co-owners’ independent rights to exploit the

copyright.” Id. Such a conclusion stems from the selfevident principle that a joint-owner cannot transfer more than

he himself holds; thus, an assignment or exclusive license

from one joint-owner to a third party cannot bind the other

joint-owners or limit their rights in the copyright without their

consent. In other words, the third party’s right is “exclusive”

as to the assigning or licensing co-owner, but not as to the

other co-owners and their assignees or licensees. As such, a

third-party assignee or licensee lacks standing to challenge

the attempted assignments or licenses of other copyright

owners.

The Sybersound court grounds this venerable principle of

copyright law deeply in the statutory text, citing the definition

of a “transfer of ownership” as including an assignment or

license of any of the “exclusive rights comprised in a

copyright . . . but not including a non exclusive license,” id.

(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101), and a provision that permits

subdivision and alienation of “[a]ny of the exclusive rights

comprised in a copyright,” id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)).

But the Court’s emphasis on the word “exclusive” in these

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 17

provisions cannot mean that only sole owners possess

“exclusive” rights, as such a rule would run directly contrary

to another well-settled principle of copyright law: the right of

one joint-owner to sue third-party infringers without joining

any of his fellow co-owners, a right Sybersound itself

expressly recognizes. See id. at 1145 (noting that “co-owners

may bring suit for copyright infringement without joining

other co-owners” (citing Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99 (2d.

Cir. 2007))). After all, the copyright statute permits

infringement suits only if brought by owners of an “exclusive

right” against alleged violators of such “exclusive right.” 

17 U.S.C. § 501 (emphasis added). If an “exclusive right”

could only be possessed by a sole owner of a copyright, a coowner would be unable to bring an infringement action to

protect his interest.

Moreover, such a limitation would contradictthe principle

of the free transferability of copyright ownership interests—a

principle reflected in both the express language of § 201(d)

and our Circuit precedent, neither of which treat

transferability differently based on whether the original

copyright owner is a sole owner or a co-owner. See, e.g.,

Silvers, 402 F.3d at 887; Gardner, 379 F.3d at 779; Bagdadi,

84 F.3d at 1197.5 Thus, Sybersound merely imposes a

5

In fact, we have suggested quite the opposite. We implicitly held prior

to the Copyright Act of 1976 that a co-owner of a copyright can transfer

its interests in a copyright without the permission of the other co-owners. 

See Piantadosi v. Loew’s Inc., 137 F.2d 534, 536–37 (9th Cir. 1943). 

Because the Copyright Act of 1976 removed prior restrictions on dividing

and transferring the component parts of copyrights, see Gardner, 279 F.3d

at 777–79, it stands to reason that if co-owners could unilaterally and

severally transfer their copyright interests before 1976, co-owners could

do the same after 1976. Indeed, § 201(a) specifically contemplates the

existence of copyright co-owners. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“The authors of a

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18 CORBELLO V. VALLI

standing limitation on copyright assignees and licensees that

reflects the basic principle that one cannot give away more

than one’s share in a copyright—it need not, and should not,

be extended to limit a co-owner’s ability to transfer

unilaterally any exclusive copyright interests that he himself

possesses.

Therefore, Sybersound presents no obstacle to Devito’s

exclusive transfer of his derivative-work right to Valli and

Gaudio under the 1999 Agreement. Because the Agreement

unambiguously transfers Devito’s derivative-work right to

Valli and Gaudio, and copyright co-owners must account to

one another for any profits earned by exploiting that

copyright, the district court erred in rejecting Corbello’s

claims for accounting and declaratory relief.

III

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Appellees with respect to Corbello’s infringement claims

based on its finding that Valli and Gaudio held a license to

use the Work in the production of the Play. See Worldwide

Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110,

1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The existence of a license creates an

affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.”). 

We have concluded, however, that the 1999 Agreement

constituted a transfer of DeVito’s derivative-work interest in

the copyright, rather than a license. Therefore, Appellees

joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.”). Yet nothing in

§ 201(d) purports to authorize broad alienability to sole owners of a

copyright while simultaneously withholding that same right from coowners of a copyright.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 19

have necessarily failed to establish the existence of a license

as an affirmative defense to Corbello’s infringement action.

A

Our conclusion that the 1999 Agreement constituted a

transfer of ownership of DeVito’s derivative-work right in the

Work to Valli and Gaudio would ordinarily preclude

Corbello’s infringement claims against Valli and Gaudio, as

“[a] co-owner of a copyright cannot be liable to another coowner for infringement of the copyright.” Oddo v. Ries,

743 F.2d 630, 632–33 (9th Cir. 1984). But a material issue of

fact remains as to whether the Agreement’s reversionary

clause later terminated Valli and Gaudio’s ownership right,

resulting in the Appellees’ subsequent infringement upon

Corbello’s copyright interest.

The Agreement provided that the rights granted therein

would continue perpetually either (i) if they merged with the

Play pursuant to a contract with an initial producer or

(ii) pursuant to a contract into which Valli and Gaudio might

enter with a second producer within two years of the initial

producer’s rights lapsing.

Corbello argues that Valli and Gaudio did not execute the

2004 Agreement (the second production contract) within that

two-year period. Specifically, she points to evidence in the

record which suggests that the initial producer’s rights

expired on December 10, 2002, and that the 2004 Agreement,

though dated May 1, 2004, was not in fact fully executed

until October 27, 2005. If true, the reversionary clause of the

1999 Agreement would have terminated Valli and Gaudio’s

ownership right as of December 10, 2004, and any

subsequent exploitation by Appellees of the Work may have

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20 CORBELLO V. VALLI

infringed upon Corbello’s copyright interest. Appellees

counter with testimony of Michael David, president of

Dodger Theatricals, which suggests that the parties to the

2004 Agreement may have reached an oral agreement prior

to December 10, 2004. In the face of such contradictory

evidence regarding whether the reversionary clause

terminated Valli andGaudio’s derivative-work right, disputed

material facts preclude summary judgment as to Corbello’s

infringement claims based on Valli and Gaudio’s ownership

of the copyright interest.6

B

Appellees argue alternatively that DeVito’s conduct

resulted in a grant to them of an implied nonexclusive license

to use the Work, effective regardless of the reversionary

clause in the 1999 Agreement. In support of their argument,

they cite DeVito’s delivery of the Work to the writers of the

Playwith the apparent intention that theywould use the Work

to create the Play, along with DeVito’s attendance at

performances of, and acceptance of royalty checks from, the

Play.

6 The district court also held that 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) required DeVito

to give Valli and Gaudio written notice before he could terminate their

rights via the reversionary clause. But § 203(a)(4) is inapplicable in this

case. The Ninth Circuit has held that when “the contract at issue is of a

definite duration, neither Section 203, nor any other provision of the

Copyright Act, governs [a copyright owner’s] right to terminate or rescind

the license [or assignment].” Scholastic Entm’t Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Grp.,

Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2003). In light of the reversionary

clause, the 1999 Agreement was of definite duration, and therefore the

notice requirement of § 203 does not apply.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 21

While we may consider delivery of a copyrighted object

as “a relevant factor” to determine the existence of an implied

license, Asset Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748,

755 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008), the copyright statute forbids courts

from inferring a transfer of copyright or a license from mere

delivery of the material object in which the work is

embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 202. Rather, courts should focus

primarily on “the licensor’s objective intent at the time of the

creation and delivery of the software as manifested by the

parties’ conduct.” Gagnon, 542 F.3d at 756. For instance,

the Ninth Circuit “ha[s] held that an implied license is

granted when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation

of a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular

work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and

(3) the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and

distribute the work.” Gagnon, 542 F.3d at 754–55 (internal

quotation marks and footnote omitted).

Here, DeVito’s intentions in delivering the Work to the

writers are unclear at best. Appellees did not ask DeVito to

create the Work. In fact, the creation of the Work long

predated any specific effort on DeVito’s part to parlay his life

into a Broadway musical. Cf. Gagnon, 542 F.3d at 755

(finding an implied license when, among other things, the

licensor created the copyrighted work at the licensee’s

request). Moreover, DeVito specifically denied that he ever

licensed the Work to Appellees. DeVito initially provided the

Work to the writers for the purpose of providing background

information on DeVito’s friend, Raymond Gyp DeCarlo. In

doing so, DeVito gave explicit instructions that the writers

should not duplicate or circulate the Work and that the Work

should remain confidential, because DeVito wanted to

publish the Work in the future. The writers then returned the

Work to DeVito a mere few days later. DeVito’s apparent

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22 CORBELLO V. VALLI

lack of familiarity with the content of the Work as reflected

in the Play further undercuts any potential connection

between his support of the Play and his support of the

Appellees’ use of the Work in its production. Finally, the

express provisions in the 1999 Agreement governing the use

of the Work further controvert any apparent expectation that

Valli and Gaudio might have had in otherwise using the

Work.

In light of such contradictory facts regarding DeVito’s

intent in delivering the Work, the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on the ground of an implied license—to

the extent it rested on such a ground—was inappropriate.

IV

Relying on its conclusion that the 1999 Agreement

constituted a license of DeVito’s copyright interest, rather

than a transfer of ownership, the district court granted

summary judgment to Appellees on Corbello’s claims of

infringement under foreign law. Because we here conclude

that the Agreement instead constituted a transfer of

ownership, summary judgment on such foreign law grounds

must be reversed as well.

V

Corbello appeals the district court’s assessment of costs

against her. Because we reverse the district court’s grant of

summary judgment, we vacate the award of costs and remand

for reconsideration after other proceedings on remand. See,

e.g., Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 951 (9th Cir. 2001).

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 23

VI

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Appellees, vacate its assessment of costs

against Corbello, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. We award costs on appeal to

Corbello as the substantially prevailing party. See Fed. R.

App. P. 39(a)(4) (“[I]f a judgment is affirmed in part,

reversed in part, modified, or vacated, costs are taxed as the

court orders.”).

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

SACK, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

I agree that we must remand this case to the district court

for further proceedings. I disagree, however, that the word

“biographies” in the 1999 Agreement unambiguously

includes the manuscript of the autobiography of DeVito ghost

written by Corbello’s decedent Woodard for DeVito (“the

Work”), completed some eight years earlier, and that the

1999 Agreement therefore transferred certain derivative

rights in the Work to the counter-parties to the Agreement –

Valli and Gaudio. First, I would conclude that the language

is ambiguous under New York law and remand on that basis

for the district court to decide as a matter of fact whether the

1999 Agreement included a transfer of rights with respect to

the ghost-written autobiography. But second, even if the

1999 Agreement unambiguously transfers DeVito’s interest

in the Work, I think Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp.,

517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008), compels us to conclude that

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24 CORBELLO V. VALLI

the transfer effected only a nonexclusive, rather than an

exclusive, license to use the Work for “the creation of a

musical stage play.”

I

The majority offers a plausible – but not the only

plausible – reading of the language of the 1999 Agreement. 

Because the language at issue “is susceptible to more than

one reasonable interpretation,” Brad H. v. City of New York,

17 N.Y.3d 180, 186, 951 N.E.2d 743, 746 (2011), I agree

with the district court that the 1999 Agreement is ambiguous

under New York law. I think the following account of why

the 1999 Agreement does not include the transfer of or

license in all or part of the Work is also reasonable:

The parties – DeVito/Nicholas “Massi” Macioci,1on the

one side, and Valli/Gaudio on the other – entered into the

1999 Agreement to “authorize the creation of a musical stage

play based on the life and music of ‘The Four Seasons,’” the

singing group of which all four were members, and the story

of which ultimately was reflected in the highly successful

musical “Jersey Boys.” The 1999 Agreement explains that

“the authors of the play [anticipated by the 1999 Agreement]

may wish to use or incorporate certain aspects of your [i.e.,

DeVito’s and Macioci’s] life related to The Four Seasons

including, by way of example, your creative contributions,

biographies, events in your life, names and likenesses (the

1 Nicholas “Massi” Macioci, an early member of “The Four Seasons,”

was also a signatory to the 1999 Agreement. He died in 2000, Nick Massi,

Low Man in the Four Seasons, Dies at 73, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2001,

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/08/national/08MASS.html, however,

and has no role in the current litigation.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 25

‘Materials’).” (Emphasis added). DeVito and Macioci

accordingly granted to Valli and Gaudio “the exclusive right

to use and incorporate the Materials in one or more theatrical

productions.”

In other words, Valli and Gaudio purchased from DeVito

and Macioci the right to use “certain aspects” of their lives,

a category that is then illuminated by several “example[s],”

including “biographies.” In this light, and taking the

document as a whole as we must, S. Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Int’l

Bus. Machs. Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 272, 277, 826 N.E.2d 806, 809

(2005), the term “biographies” is perhaps most naturally read

to refer to a “[p]ersonal history,” or “the events or

circumstances of a person’s life, viewed collectively.” 

Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), available at

www.oed.com/view/Entry/19219.2“[B]iographies,” like

“names and likenesses,” may constitute aspects of both

DeVito’s and Macioci’s lives, rather than particular

recordings of their lives.3 This reading does not, as the

2

I would hesitate to give dispositive effect to the order in which

dictionary editors choose to rank their definitions, Maj. Op. at 11. Cf.

Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 107 (2d Cir. 2006)

(Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I am generally

reticent to invoke dictionary definitions, at least in contexts perhaps

unforeseen by their [anonymous] writers.”). In any event, I note that the

first listed definition in Merriam-Webster’s refer to a biography as

“usually” written, suggesting that there are other appropriate uses of the

term. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003),

available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/biography.

 

3

It may be worth noting, in this connection, that as far as we are aware

there was no written Macioci biography or autobiography ever produced

the rights to which could have been included, although as a one-time

member of the group, he was likely mentioned in DeVito’s ghost-written

autobiography. Insofar as Macioci’s “biography” is concerned, then, it

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26 CORBELLO V. VALLI

majority suggests, Maj. Op. at 11–12, threaten to offend the

canon against superfluity. “[T]he events or circumstances of

a person’s life, viewed collectively” are, by definition, distinct

from the events or circumstances themselves. A collective

viewing may entail characterizing events to form a trajectory

or story arc, rather than a mere collection of individual

events.

Another definition of the word “biography,” moreover,

suggests that the parties did not necessarily intend to include

the Work in the rights granted under 1999 Agreement. A

“biography,” or “bio,” may (and in my experience in being

asked for a “biography” or “bio” in connection with some

panel discussion, moot court, or the like, very often does)

refer to “a brief summary of a person’s life and work.” 

Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), available at

www.oed.com/view/Entry/19187; see also, e.g.,Doe v. Merck

& Co., 283 A.D.2d 543, 543, 725 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (2d

Dep’t 2001) (discussing a pharmaceutical company’s

educational brochure “which contained photographs and

biographies of HIV-positive individuals”); Charney v.

Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 15 Misc. 3d 1128(A),

841 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (discussing a law

firm website’s use of “biographies of [certain partners],

which list the partners’ clients and some of the deals they

have worked on”). This type of “brief summary,” which a

playwright might well draw upon, does not seem to me to

envision or require a manuscript of a detailed biography that

is hundreds of pages long.

In the absence of the manifestation of a contrary intent

among the parties, it may be preferable to apply either of the

would seem likely that “biography” meant the story of his life.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 27

foregoing definitions, rather than those referring to written

manuscripts, which might inappropriately enlarge the general

category of “aspects of your life.” “When a particular class

[i.e., “aspects of your life”] is spoken of, and general words

[i.e., “biographies”] follow, the class first mentioned is to be

taken as the most comprehensive.” Bers v. Erie R.R. Co.,

225 N.Y. 543, 546, 122 N.E. 456, 457 (1919) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as a general matter, we

should be “extremely reluctant to interpret an agreement as

impliedly stating something which the parties have neglected

to specifically include.” Rowe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,

46 N.Y.2d 62, 72, 385 N.E.2d 566, 572 (1978).

In short, the word “biographies” has here at least three

plausible meanings, only one of which covers the Work. And

the majority’s preferred reading is not the only one that

makes sense. See Maj. Op. at 12–13. The purpose of the

1999 Agreement was to facilitate the creation and production

of a theatrical work based on DeVito’s or Macioci’s life

story. Having transferred his right in a single kind of

derivative work, DeVito may well have sought to retain the

right to publish or otherwise distribute other accounts of his

life through books, film, or other media. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106

(listing, beside the right to prepare derivative works, the

copyright owner’s rights to reproduce, distribute copies of,

publicly perform, publicly display, or transmit the

copyrighted work). If under these circumstances, however,

DeVito creates a theatrical production based on his life, he

runs afoul of the 1999 Agreement and may be liable to Valli

and Gaudio.

In this context, leaving the Work outside the scope of the

1999 Agreement makes a great deal of practical sense. 

Having said nothing in the Agreement explicitly about the

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28 CORBELLO V. VALLI

Work, which had been in existence for more than eight years,

DeVito remained and remains free to do with his

autobiography (subject of course to his obligations to the

widow of Woodard, the person who actually wrote it) what

people normally try to do with their memoirs (if anything): 

He can publish it, distribute copies, sell it, read excerpts at

public events, license movies and audiobooks, and so on, all

without worrying about breaching the Agreement. However,

if and only if he attempts to create a play or other theatrical

work based on his manuscript, he would be hard-pressed to

do so without including events in his life, his life story, etc. 

He might then be liable to Valli and Gaudio under the

Agreement for encroaching on the rights he gave them.

I would, therefore, agree with the district court that the

contract’s language is ambiguous. I think that court erred,

however, in admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret the

contract’s ambiguous language. The question of ambiguity

is a question of law to be resolved by the court, but “[i]f there

is ambiguity in the terminology used, [] and determination of

the intent of the parties depends on the credibility of extrinsic

evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be

drawn from extrinsic evidence, then such determination is to

be made by the jury.” Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.

Wesolowski, 33 N.Y.2d 169, 172, 305 N.E.2d 907, 909

(1973). I would remand this case to the district court for trial.

II

Assuming, despite the foregoing discussion, that the 1999

Agreement does unambiguously include the Work (or were

a jury to find the Agreement includes the Work despite the

Agreement’s facial ambiguity), the question arises: What

kind ofinterest in the Work does the 1999 Agreement transfer

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 29

to Valli and Gaudio? The majority concludes that the

Agreement confers an exclusive license or assignment. Maj.

Op. at 18. I think Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp.,

517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008), compels the conclusion,

however, that the Agreement would then confer a

nonexclusive license.4

In that case, TVT Music Publishing, a co-owner of the

copyright of certain songs, attempted to make Sybersound, a

karaoke record producer, the “exclusive assignee and licensee

of TVT’s copyrighted interests for purposes of karaoke use,

and also the exclusive assignee of the right to sue to enforce

the assigned copyright interest.” Id. at 1142 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The other original co-owners of

the copyright, several record companies, did not join in

granting rights to Sybersound. Id. at 1146. When other

karaoke record producers used songs under license from TVT

to Sybersound without Sybersound’s permission, Sybersound

brought suit against the producers for infringement. Id. at

1142. This Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

the complaint, concluding that Sybersound lacked standing to

sue third-party infringers. Id. at 1146.

I agree with the majority’s analysis of Sybersound except

to the extent it concludes that DeVito was legally capable of

transferring to Valli and Gaudio an exclusive license of any

kind or description. According to Sybersound, one co-owner

of a copyright cannot confer an exclusive license on a

licensee because she or he has no exclusive right to confer. 

4 We are in accord, however, that the 1999 Agreement confers the right

to use the ‘Materials’ to create only one type of derivative work, a

theatrical production, Maj. Op. at 13; the only question is whether that

right is exclusive or nonexclusive.

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30 CORBELLO V. VALLI

Sybersound, 517 F.3d at 1146 (“[U]nless all the other

co-owners of the copyright joined in granting an exclusive

right to Sybersound, TVT, acting solely as a co-owner of the

copyright, could grant only a nonexclusive license to

Sybersound because TVT may not limit the other co-owners’

independent rights to exploit the copyright.”) This

conclusion may be in tension with other elements of

copyright law, as the majority avers, Maj. Op. at 17–18, but

courts and commentators appear to be in universal agreement

that Sybersound stands for the proposition that “a co-owner

of a copyright cannot unilaterally alienate [its] share of the

intellectual property and instead can ‘only grant a

nonexclusive license’ to a third party.” Brownmark Films,

LLC v. Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (E.D.

Wis. 2011) (quoting Sybersound, 517 F.3d at 1146), aff’d on

other grounds, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012); see also, e.g.,

Amaretto Ranch Breedables v. Ozimals Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d

1080, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (similarly reading Sybersound).

The facts of Sybersound are in an important respect

indistinguishable from those before us. Here, as in

Sybersound, a single co-owner (here, DeVito; there, TVT) of

a particular interest attempted to grant an exclusive license to

use a particular part of the co-owner’s derivative work right

(here, the right to create a derivative theatrical work; there,

the right to create a derivative karaoke record) to third parties

(here, Valli and Gaudio; there, Sybersound). Here, as in

Sybersound, the single co-owner attempted to effect this

transfer without the consent of the other co-owner(s) (here,

Corbello; there, the record companies).

Sybersound seems to me to mean that the transfer from

DeVito to Valli and Gaudio, like the transfer from TVT to

Sybersound, effected a nonexclusive license. DeVito, like

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 31

TVT, “succeeded only in transferring what [he] could under

17 U.S.C. § 201(d), a non-exclusive license.” Sybersound,

517 F.3d at 1146. This application of Sybersound does not

“limit a co-owner’s ability to transfer unilaterally any

exclusive copyright interests that he himself possesses.” Maj.

Op. at 18. It does no more than recognize that DeVito had no

exclusive copyright interest in the derivative-work right to a

theatrical production to transfer in the first place. Therefore,

Valli and Gaudio had a nonexclusive license, and Corbello’s

sole accounting remedy lies against DeVito. See 2 William

F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 5.9 (2014) (“Where only one

joint author grants a nonexclusive license, the nongranting

joint author may not obtain an accounting from the

nonexclusive licensee since that licensee is not a joint

copyright owner. Instead, the nongranting joint author must

obtain the accounting from the granting joint author.”).

Commentators have expressed some dissatisfaction with

this aspect of Sybersound’s holding.

5 As a three-judge panel,

we of course are bound by circuit precedent.

6 Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Nor

5 For criticism of Sybersound, see Amaretto Ranch Breedables v.

Ozimals Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing III

Goldstein on Copyright § 15.5 (3d ed. 2011); 4 Nimmer on Copyright

§ 6.10[A][2][d] (rev. ed. 2012); 2 Patry on Copyright § 5:103 (2012)), in

which it was noted that the district court there had to, as we must, follow

Sybersound nonetheless.

6 The majority correctly observes that the circuit’s pre-Sybersound

precedent supports the conclusion “that copyrights are divisible and that

a copyright owner can freely transfer any portion of his ownership

interests in that copyright.” Maj. Op. at 15. But Sybersound reasoned that

those ownership interests are limited in the case of a co-owner, who “is

not the exclusive owner” of the copyright and thus can transfer only a

nonexclusive license. Sybersound, 517 F.3d at 1146.

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32 CORBELLO V. VALLI

can we ignore the substantial similarity between the facts of

Sybersound and those of this case. We are, in my view,

required to treat Valli and Gaudio’s copyright interest as a

nonexclusive license.7Just as this Court rejected

Sybersound’s claim against those who used karaoke versions

of songs contrary to Sybersound’s purported exclusive right

to do so because the purported licensor (TVT) had no right to

grant such exclusive use to Sybersound in the first place, we

should reject the plaintiff’s accounting claim against Valli

and Gaudio.

III

In sum, then, I would decide that the contract is

ambiguous as to whether the Work is included within the

Materials. Because the contract is ambiguous, the district

court erred by determining the meaning of the contract on the

basis of parol evidence at summary judgment. I would

therefore remand to the district court for further proceedings. 

But it would vastly simplify matters, I think, if in that case

the district court first decided the defendants’ summary

judgment motion arguing that Jersey Boys does not infringe

7

I would reject the district court’s apparently newly coined term

“selectively exclusive licence.” The court’s description of the practical

effects of DeVito’s failed attempt to transfer an exclusive license seems

to me correct under Sybersound. But, under the principle of numerus

clausus, I would avoid risking the creation of a new form of copyright

interest. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal

Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,

110 Yale L.J. 1, 3–4 (2000). If we were to fully describe the transaction

between DeVito and Valli and Gaudio, which we need not do in this case,

I think that transaction is better described in terms of an already existing

form of copyright interest (a nonexclusive license), plus a contract-based

promise by DeVito not to re-license the same rights to anyone else.

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CORBELLO V. VALLI 33

the Work as a matter of law in any event, see, e.g., Funky

Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 462 F.3d 1072,

1076–77 (9th Cir. 2006), an issue which it previouslyavoided

bygranting summaryjudgment on contract grounds, Corbello

v. DeVito, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1154–55 (D. Nev. 2012). 

That might be the end of the matter as far as “Jersey Boys”

Valli and Gaudio are concerned irrespective of the difficult

issues that the majority and we address here.

Even if the 1999 Agreement unambiguously included the

Work, as the majority conclude, I would decide that DeVito

granted Valli and Gaudio only a nonexclusive license to use

the Work toward a theatrical production. Corbello’s

accounting action properly lies, then, against DeVito, not

Valli and Gaudio, and the latter action must be rejected.

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