Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02420/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cv-02420-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ANTHONY ALSTON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-02420-TLN-CKD PS

ORDER

Before the court is plaintiff Eric Alston, Jr.’s motion for sanctions against defendant Ken 

Lloyd. (ECF No. 64.) Defendant filed an opposition, (ECF No. 65), and plaintiff filed a reply. 

(ECF No. 66.) Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the court ordered that the matter be submitted on

the papers. (ECF No. 67.) For the reasons below, the court denies plaintiff’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this suit against the City of Sacramento, Sheriff Scott Jones, and other city 

officials for injuries he allegedly sustained while being arrested for a domestic violence incident. 

Plaintiff allegedly fell and hurt his knee while being loaded into the patrol car. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 24.) 

He was taken to the hospital, and after he was treated, the deputies took him to jail. Plaintiff 

alleges that upon arriving at the jail, Deputy Ken Lloyd “choke slam[med him] out of [his] 

wheelchair while [he was] handcuffed onto the ground.” (Id. ¶ 27.) The next day, while still at 

the jail, plaintiff allegedly fell again. (Id. ¶ 30.) The deputies provided plaintiff with a 

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wheelchair, and he posted bail that afternoon. (Id. ¶ 30-31.) Two days later, doctors determined 

that plaintiff had suffered a concussion. (Id. ¶ 31.) All criminal charges against plaintiff were 

eventually dropped.

On May 30, 2019, the district court fully adopted the undersigned’s recommendation to

dismiss all claims against all defendants, except for three claims against Deputy Lloyd: (1) a

claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, (2) a claim under California’s Bane Act, 

and (3) a battery claim. (ECF No. 20.)

On December 10, 2019, the undersigned issued a pretrial scheduling order which provided

that all discovery must be “completed” by June 19, 2020. (ECF No. 46 at 2.) As defined in the 

order, “[t]he word ‘completed’ means that all discovery shall have been conducted so that all 

depositions have been taken and any disputes relative to discovery shall have been resolved by 

appropriate order if necessary and, where discovery has been ordered, the order has been 

complied with.” (Id.) 

On June 11, 2020, defense counsel Jill Nathan deposed plaintiff remotely via 

teleconference. Plaintiff refused to answer questions on the grounds that defense counsel was 

inquiring about matters irrelevant to the claims against Deputy Lloyd. The deposition lasted less 

than an hour, and largely consisted of objections and argument regarding the relevance of defense 

counsel’s questioning.

On July 13, 2020, plaintiff filed the present motion for sanctions against defense counsel. 

Plaintiff contends that defense counsel badgered and harassed him during the deposition by 

repeatedly asking questions that pertained to dismissed claims and parties. Plaintiff asks the court 

to sanction defense counsel in the amount of $50,000. Defendant responds that plaintiff’s motion 

is frivolous and asks the court to sanction plaintiff in the amount of $2,000 for the costs and 

attorney’s fees incurred in responding to plaintiff’s motion. The court discusses the parties’

arguments below.

II. DISCUSSION

Both plaintiff and defendant ask this court to impose monetary sanctions on the other 

party. Plaintiff asserts two legal bases to support his sanction request. First, he argues that 

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defense counsel violated this court’s dismissal order by asking questions about dismissed claims 

and parties during plaintiff’s deposition, thereby committing civil contempt under 18 U.S.C. 

section 401 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70. Second, plaintiff argues that defense 

counsel’s line of questioning impeded the deposition, warranting sanctions under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 30(d)(2). 

Defendant also requests sanctions against plaintiff in his opposition. Defendant argues 

that plaintiff’s sanction motion is frivolous and misrepresentative, and thus the court should 

award defendant the attorney’s fees incurred responding to the motion, as permitted by 28 U.S.C. 

section 1927. As discussed below, the court declines to sanction either party.

A. Plaintiff has not shown that sanctions against defendant are warranted.

Plaintiff contends that sanctions are warranted for contempt of court under 18 U.S.C. 

section 401 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70, and for impeding a deposition under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(2).

i. Defense counsel did not commit civil contempt.

Courts have statutory authority to punish both civil and criminal contempt pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. section 401.

1

 “Civil contempt . . . consists of a party’s disobedience to a specific and 

definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.” 

Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 774 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 

2014). “The party alleging civil contempt must demonstrate that the alleged contemnor violated 

the court’s order by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ not merely a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that defense counsel committed civil contempt by disobeying the district 

court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. On May 30, 2019, the district court signed 

an order dismissing all claims against all defendants, except three of plaintiff’s claims against 

1 Plaintiff also seeks to impose sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70. But that 

rule concerns the enforcement of judgments: it permits a court to hold a party in contempt for 

disobeying judgment requiring specific performance, such the conveyance of land. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 70. The court has not entered any judgment against defendant Lloyd in this case, and thus Rule 

70 cannot support plaintiff’s sanctions request.

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defendant Ken Lloyd. Plaintiff argues that during his deposition on June 11, 2020, defense 

counsel inquired about matters irrelevant to the three remaining claims against Lloyd, and thus 

she violated the district court’s dismissal order. For example, defense counsel asked whether 

plaintiff was wearing a walking boot on his right foot at the time of his arrest. Plaintiff refused to 

answer this question because he believed it was irrelevant to Deputy Lloyd and the “choke slam” 

incident.2 (ECF No. 64 at 8.)

Upon reviewing the submitted deposition excerpts, the undersigned finds that defense 

counsel did not fail to comply with the district court’s May 30, 2019 order. That order gave two 

directives: (1) plaintiff’s claims were dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants, except as to 

defendant Lloyd; and (2) defendant Lloyd was ordered to answer plaintiff’s section 1983, Bane 

Act, and battery claims no later than sixty days from the date of the order. (ECF No. 23.) 

Defendant complied with the order by timely answering plaintiff’s three claims on July 25, 2019. 

(ECF No. 29.) Neither the May 30, 2019 order, nor any other order issued in this case, limited 

the scope of defendant’s questioning during his deposition of plaintiff. Even assuming that 

defense counsel’s questions were irrelevant to the claims against Lloyd, asking irrelevant 

questions cannot constitute contempt absent a specific and direct order proscribing such conduct. 

Thus, plaintiff’s contempt argument fails.

ii. Defense counsel’s deposition questions did not impede, delay, or frustrate the fair 

examination of plaintiff.

Plaintiff also argues that sanctions are appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

30. Rule 30 authorizes courts to “impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable 

expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or 

frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). Argumentative 

objections, suggestive objections, and improper refusals to answer questions are examples of 

2 Defense counsel attempted to explain that her questions were intended develop the foundation 

for plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint, and that they were relevant to plaintiff’s $10,000,000 

damages request. Plaintiff, however, maintained his refusal to answer.

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conduct that impede, delay, or frustrate the fair examination of the deponent. See Security Nat’l 

Bank v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2015).

The submitted deposition excerpts show that defense counsel did not impede, delay, or 

frustrate the deposition. To the contrary, defense counsel appears to have asked reasonable 

questions and to have maintained professionalism, while attempting to explain to plaintiff the 

relevance of her line of questioning. Plaintiff, on the other hand, appears to have been 

obstreperous through his numerous speaking objections and improper refusals to answer. 

Because defense counsel’s conduct did not impede, delay, or frustrate the deposition, the 

undersigned denies plaintiff’s request for sanctions under Rule 30 as well.

B. The court declines to sanction plaintiff under Rule 30 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

In its opposition to plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, defendant Lloyd requests countersanctions against plaintiff for “unreasonable and vexatious conduct, and for reckless 

misstatements of law and fact.” (ECF No. 65 at 7.) Defendant argues that plaintiff’s deposition 

conduct is sanctionable under Rule 30(d)(2). Defendant also argues that sanctions are appropriate 

under 28 U.S.C. section 1927, which authorizes a court to hold a party who unreasonably and 

vexatiously multiplies proceedings in a case liable for the other party’s excess attorney’s fees 

reasonably incurred as a result of the unnecessary proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see also Wages 

v. Internal Revenue Serv., 915 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that pro se litigants may be 

sanctioned under section 1927).

To support his argument that sanctions are warranted under Rule 30, defendant avers that 

plaintiff objected more than twenty times during a one-hour deposition. Defendant avers that 

nearly all of plaintiff’s objections were for relevance, and that plaintiff repeatedly refused to 

answer questions that he deemed irrelevant to the claims against Deputy Lloyd.

3

 Defendant notes

that plaintiff’s refusals were improper, because a deponent may refuse to answer questions only to 

3 Defendant notes that a deponent may refuse to answer questions only “to preserve a privilege, to 

enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3),” which 

allows a party to move to terminate a deposition on the ground that it is being conducted in bad 

faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 30(d).

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preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under 

Rule 30(d)(3).4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d). Thus, defendant contends that it was plaintiff—not defense 

counsel—who impeded, delayed, or frustrated the deposition.

In addition, defendant contends that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is “reckless” and 

potentially made in bad faith, warranting sanctions under section 1927. Defendant argues that 

plaintiff: (1) filed the motion for sanctions one month after discovery closed and all disputes 

related to discovery were to have been presented to the court and resolved; (2) recklessly 

mischaracterized the court’s dismissal order as a protective order limiting the scope of discovery; 

and (3) provided no legal support for the imposition of punitive sanctions against defense counsel. 

In short, defendant argues that plaintiff’s frivolous motion caused an unreasonable multiplication 

of proceedings, causing defendant to incur unnecessary attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,000, 

which should be paid by plaintiff.

Although the court does not approve of plaintiff’s obstructive deposition conduct, and 

although the court finds that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is meritless, the undersigned declines 

to sanction plaintiff at this time. As a pro se litigant, plaintiff is afforded leniency with regard to 

his knowledge of the law. Plaintiff is nevertheless cautioned that his objections and refusals to 

answer—as shown by the deposition transcripts—were improper and disruptive. Similar 

disruptive behavior in the future may result in monetary or terminating sanctions, as appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (ECF No. 64) is DENIED; and

2. Defendant’s request for sanctions against plaintiff is DENIED.

Dated: September 14, 2020

17.2420.sanc

4 Rule 30(d)(3) allows a party to move to terminate a deposition “on the ground that it is being 

conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the 

deponent.”

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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