Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00371/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00371-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRANTINA A. DAVIS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CIGNA HEALTHCARE,

Defendant.

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Case No. 1:05-cv-00371-TAG

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND, MOTION FOR

RELIEF OF STAY, AND MOTION TO

AMEND PLEADINGS (Doc. 53)) 

ORDER SETTING STATUS

CONFERENCE

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 17, 2005, plaintiff Grantina A. Davis (“plaintiff”) commenced the instant civil

action against defendant Cigna Healthcare (“defendant”), seeking $2 million in punitive damages

and for “pain and suffering” as a result of alleged sexual harassment by Phil Hinojos, an

employee of defendant, that purportedly created a hostile working environment for plaintiff. 

(Doc. 1). 

On March 23, 2005, the court dismissed the complaint because it did not comply with

F.R. Civ. P. 8(a) by adequately identifying grounds for relief against defendant. (Doc. 7, p. 4). 

Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint. (Id.). On March 30, 2005, plaintiff filed a

first amended complaint, which contained the same allegation of sexual harassment but which

contained additional details to support the claim. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff asked for $50,000 in

“actual, compensatory, and exemplary damages....” (Id.). 

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On April 21, 2005, defendant filed its answer, generally denying plaintiff’s allegations. 

(Doc. 11). As an affirmative defense, defendant contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to

proceed because plaintiff “has agreed in writing to submit all employment-related disputes with

Defendant to binding arbitration.” (Doc. 11, p. 3). 

On June 13, 2005, defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 22). The

following day, defendant filed an amended motion to compel arbitration, accompanied by legal

arguments and declarations in support thereof. (Docs 26, 27, & 28). Defendant included in its

motion exhibits substantiating its claim that plaintiff had agreed to resolve any employment

disputes through binding arbitration, as part of the normal employment procedures utilized by

defendant. (Doc. 28, Exhs. A, B, C, & D). 

On June 28, 2005, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendant’s motion to compel

arbitration. (Doc. 33). In that opposition, plaintiff essentially argued that she was unaware of the

arbitration clause in her employment contract and that, in any event, such a provision was illegal. 

(Doc. 33, p. 4). On July 12, 2005, plaintiff filed an amended opposition, contending inter alia

that she was unaware of the arbitration provision, that she signed the arbitration agreement under

duress, that the documents given to her were confusing, and that the arbitration provision was

unconscionable and unconstitutional. (Doc. 34). 

On July 26, 2005, the court issued an order granting defendant’s motion to compel

arbitration and granting a stay of the proceedings. (Doc. 36). In that order, the court noted that

plaintiff did not “meaningfully challenge arbitration,” and that she “does not deny that she had

signed and read her employment application to commit to arbitration and signed a receipt to

acknowledge she received the employee handbook describing arbitration.” (Id. at p. 7). The

court concluded that plaintiff was “bound by the provisions of the [arbitration] agreement

regardless of whether [she] read it or [was] aware of the arbitration clause when [she] signed the

document.” (Id., quoting Brookwood v. Bank of America, 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1674 (1996)). 

The court also held that plaintiff had raised “no substantive dispute as to a valid agreement to

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Plaintiff’s allegations are unclear and, at times, unintelligible regarding the basis for Berbereia’s 1

purported retaliation against plaintiff.

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arbitrate her employment claims or as to the scope of claims subject to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 8). 

Accordingly, the court ordered a stay of these proceedings and granted defendant’s motion to

compel arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). (Id. at p. 9).

On August 25, 2005, plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions and Appeal of Arbitration. 

(Doc. 37). In that motion, plaintiff contended that defendant was using the district court to

perpetrate “fraud and harassment,” that defendant was attempting to prolong its “fishing

expedition” and cause “undue, burdensome harassment” on plaintiff, that plaintiff was

experiencing a financial burden in litigating this case, and that she required appointment of a

lawyer. (Doc. 37, pp. 2-3). On August 30, 2005, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for

sanctions, her motion for appointment of counsel, and her appeal of the prior arbitration order. 

(Doc. 38). 

On February 9, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion for contempt of court and ex-parte hearing, 

contending that defendant’s employee, Stacey Berbereia made false statements “to legalize and

hold lost wages” of plaintiff, as well as to file a false child abuse report with Tulare County

Health and Human Services Department and the Visalia Police Department. (Doc. 40 , p. 2). 

Plaintiff also contended that Berbereia caused plaintiff to be “termed” in her employment as

retaliation. (Id.). At the same time, plaintiff filed a Motion For Relief Of Stay and to Amend 1

Pleadings. (Doc. 41). In that motion, plaintiff again argues that compelling arbitration violates

plaintiff’s constitutional right to access to the federal courts. (Id. at p. 3). 

 On March 8, 2006, the court issued an order denying plaintiff’s motion for relief of stay

and to amend the complaint. (Doc. 45). In that order, the court noted that plaintiff had alleged

she had served a second amended complaint on defendant that included, inter alia, additional

claims of discrimination, harassment, wrongful discharge, but that all such purported new claims

related to plaintiff’s employment with defendant and were, therefore, included within the broad

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arbitration agreement plaintiff had signed at the outset of her employment. (Doc. 45, p. 3). The

court held that the proposed new claims were subject to arbitration by the AAA and that all

further proceedings must occur before the AAA. (Id.). 

At a status conference on May 25, 2006, plaintiff indicated that she wished to file a

motion to address the pending arbitration before the AAA. (Doc. 49, p. 1). The court granted

plaintiff leave until June 8, 2006, within which to file such a motion. (Id.). The court set a new

status conference for August 30, 2006, and, at the same time, admonished plaintiff that the

federal case remained stayed pending arbitration by the AAA. (Id. at p. 2). 

On June 12, 2006, plaintiff requested an additional sixty days within which to file her

motion. (Doc. 50). The court ordered plaintiff to provide a declaration stating good cause for

such a request. (Doc. 51). At the status conference on August 30, 2006, the court ordered that

plaintiff file her new motion by September 15, 2006. (Doc. 52). On September 19, 2006,

plaintiff complied by filing the instant Motion For Remand, Relief of Stay, and To Amend

Pleadings. (Doc. 53). On October 3, 2006, defendant filed its opposition. (Doc. 58). 

Previously, on September 21, 2006, the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California, Fresno Division, reassigned this case to the present Magistrate Judge. 

(Doc. 54). On October 17, 2006, the current Magistrate Judge assigned to this case vacated the

hearing on the instant motion scheduled for October 19, 2006, and took the matter under

submission. (Doc. 60). 

DISCUSSION

Initially, it bears emphasis that the instant motion challenging compelled arbitration is

plaintiff’s third, and possibly fourth, “bite at the apple,” plaintiff having already challenged the

issue of compelled arbitration on three prior occasions, i.e., once in her original opposition to

defendant’s motion (Doc. 33), once immediately following the order to compel arbitration

(Doc. 37), and once in the motion filed on February 9, 2006. (Doc. 41). It appears from this

record that the Magistrate Judge previously assigned to this case took great pains to indulge a

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pro se party and to afford plaintiff every opportunity to fully state her reasons for challenging the

arbitration order. It is also obvious that plaintiff has taken full advantage of the court’s

indulgence by now submitting a seventy-nine page opus that meanders across the landscape of

both state and federal employment law and that contains voluminous attachments, none of which

address the core issue of whether the underlying arbitration clause is valid and should be

enforced. 

Indeed, plaintiff’s motion is best construed as a motion for reconsideration of the order of

July 26, 2005, granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Under Local Rule 78-230(k),

applications for reconsideration must set forth in an affidavit or brief “the material facts and

circumstances surrounding each motion for which reconsideration is sought.” Such facts and

circumstances include: (1) when and to what judge the prior motion was made; (2) what ruling,

decision or order was made thereon; (3) what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed

to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds

exist for the motion; and, (4) why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the

prior motion. Local Rule 78-230(k)(1)-(4)(Emphasis supplied).

A motion for reconsideration will be denied if it is not based on newly discovered

evidence, or it does not identify clear error in the initial decision, or if it is not based on an

intervening change in controlling law. E.g., School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Co. v. AcandS,

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); Van Scoy v. Shell Oil Co., 98 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Defendant correctly argues in its opposition that plaintiff has failed to cite new facts or

circumstances that did not exist at the time the prior Magistrate Judge made the ruling granting

the motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 58, p. 8). Although here plaintiff complains mightily,

and in much greater legal detail than in her two previous efforts, regarding the validity of the

arbitration agreement, its scope, its terms, and its effect of staying the instant proceedings,

ultimately she has alleged no new facts or circumstances that justify revisiting the court’s prior

orders. Neither has plaintiff identified any “clear error” in the prior Magistrate Judge’s ruling nor

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has plaintiff identified any intervening change in law that would affect the court’s disposition of

this motion.

To the contrary, it appears that the only consequence of the court’s long-standing

indulgence of plaintiff has been plaintiff’s indefinite delay of the arbitration proceedings by the

filing of repetitive, confusing, and, ultimately, meritless arguments replete with irrelevant

information and exhibits. 

The court’s indulgence of such conduct, however, is now at an end. Since the court’s

order of July 26, 2006, each subsequent order has contained a bold-faced admonition to plaintiff

that “this federal court action remains stayed in favor of the pending arbitration before the

American Arbitration Association and that the arbitration will continue to proceed unless this

Court orders otherwise.” Plaintiff’s conduct can only be characterized as dilatory, having

successfully delayed arbitration for almost fifteen months, while at the same time having

depleted judicial resources with her repetitive challenges to arbitration. 

The court therefore construes plaintiff’s Motion For Remand, Relief of Stay, and To

Amend Pleadings as a motion for reconsideration of the order to compel arbitration. For the

reasons set forth above, the court hereby denies such reconsideration. The court’s prior orders

regarding the stay of federal proceedings and its reference of this case to arbitration before the

AAA remain in full force and effect. The parties are hereby ordered to appear, telephonically or

in person, for a status conference on February 1, 2007, at 9:30 a.m., to assess the progress of

arbitration. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion For Remand, Relief of Stay, and To Amend Pleadings (Doc. 53), is

DENIED; and 

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2. The parties are ordered to appear, either in person or telephonically, for a status

conference regarding the progress of arbitration before the AAA on February 1, 2007, at

9:30 a.m..

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2006 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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