Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00629/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00629-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 06CV0629-J (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONY CARAPIA,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 06CV0629-J (RBB)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; 

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

SECOND AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[DOC. NO. 13];

(3) DENYING PETITIONER’S

REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY

HEARING [DOC. NOS. 13, 20]; AND

(4) DENYING PETITIONER’S

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL [DOC. NOS. 13, 20].

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Ruben Brooks’ Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that the Court deny Petitioner Tony Jose Carapia’s (“Petitioner”)

Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No.

13.] Petitioner timely filed Objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 25.] Respondent has not filed a

Reply. For the reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES the Petition

in its entirety. 

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Factual Background 

On June 7, 2001, a dispute arose over a cellular telephone that Richard Goodman loaned

to Petitioner. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 637.) When Stephen Thomas, the actual

owner of the cellular phone, discovered Petitioner was using the telephone; Mr. Thomas told

Petitioner to return the telephone to Mr. Goodman. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 517.)

When Mr. Thomas arrived at Mr. Goodman’s house there were several Hispanic males in

the living room. (Id. at 521.) Mr. Goodman asked Mr. Thomas if he “came prepared” and Mr.

Thomas replied that he was “always prepared.” (Id. at 522.) An argument ensued between Mr.

Thomas and Petitioner during which Petitioner allegedly “flinched” at Mr. Thomas in an

aggressive manner. (Id. at 525.) A physical fight followed in which Mr. Thomas was stabbed

several times. (Id. at 616-17.)

At trial, Petitioner claimed that Mr. Thomas was the aggressor in the altercation and

charged at him first. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1047.) Petitioner’s claim was

corroborated by three other witnesses. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 662, 688-89;

Lodgment No. 1, Rep,’s Tr. vol. 8, 806, 815, 818.) Petitioner also testified that he did not stab

Mr. Thomas. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1051.)

Detective Luis Rudisell, testifying as an expert, provided evidence that Petitioner was a

member of the Westside Gang. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 971-72.) Detective Rudisell

further testified that the crime would benefit the Westside Gang’s narcotic sales by eliminating

competition in the area. (Id. at 980.) Detective Rudisell also testified that a stabbing would be

consistent with an intent to promote the gang. (Id. at 981.) Petitioner denied membership in the

Westside Gang. (Id. at 998-1000.) 

Procedural Background

In count one of an amended information, Petitioner was charged with attempted murder in

violation of California Penal Code § 664 and § 187(a). (Lodgment No. 4, Pet. for Review 3, 

People v. Carapia, No. S131307 (Cal. Mar. 30, 2005.) Count one further alleged that Petitioner

used a dangerous and deadly weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 12022(b)(1). Id.

Count two charged Petitioner with assault with a deadly weapon with a force likely to cause

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great bodily injury in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(1). (Id. at 3-4.) Count two

also alleged that the offenses were committed for benefit of a criminal street gang in violation of

California Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). (Id.) Both counts alleged that the offenses were

committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang in violation of California Penal Code §

186.22(b)(1). (Id. at 4.) The information also alleged a prison prior. (Id.) 

The jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts, including the allegation that Petitioner

committed these crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang in violation of California Penal

Code § 186.22(b)(1). (Id. at 2.) After a bench trial, the judge found that the prior conviction

allegation was true as alleged in the information. (Id.) On July 26, 2002, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to twenty-four years in prison. (Id. at 2; Lodgment No. 3, People v.

Carapia, No. D042110, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004).) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal arguing: (1) insufficient evidence existed to support the

finding that the crimes benefitted a criminal street gang and (2) the trial court prejudicially erred

by denying Petitioner’s motion to bifurcate the gang allegations from the trial on the underlying

offenses. (Lodgment No. 3, People v. Carapia, No. D042110, slip op. at 2.) The California

Court of Appeal, affirming Petitioner’s conviction, found sufficient evidence to support the gang

enhancement and no error in the trial court’s ruling on the bifurcation motion. (Id. at 15.) The

appellate court reversed and remanded for sentencing, however, because it found the judge’s

determination of the aggravating factors was contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). Id. 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court raising the

same two issues originally raised on appeal. (Lodgment No. 4, Pet. for Review 2, People v.

Carapia, No. S131307.) On March 30, 2005, the court denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 5,

People v. Carapia, No. S131307, slip. op. at 1 (Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).) 

On March 22, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court

[doc. no. 1]. The Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice for failure to comply with local

rules, allege exhaustion of state court remedies, state a claim, and name the proper respondent

[doc. no. 5]. 

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On July 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

and Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [doc. nos. 8, 9]. On August 23, 2006, this Court

granted the Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis but dismissed the First Amended Petition

without prejudice. [Doc. No. 12.] On September 27, 2006, Petitioner filed his Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [doc. no. 13]. Respondent filed an Answer with

accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a Notice of Lodgment on December

27, 2007 [doc. no. 18.] Petitioner submitted a Traverse on January 31, 2007 [doc. nos. 19, 20]. 

Legal Standard

I. State Prisoner Habeas Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) a federal court may grant a habeas petition if the applicant is

in custody “in violation of the Constitution or other laws or treaties of the United States.” In

other words, a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief from a state court judgment only if

the adjudication was (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal, or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002). 

A state court decision is “contrary to clearly established federal law” if it (1) applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless

arrives at the opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)). A state court

decision is an unreasonable application of the facts ‘if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decision but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

II. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set forth

in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005). The district court must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report...to which objection is made,” and “may accept,

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reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2005); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676

(1980). “When no objections are filed, the district court may assume the correctness of the

magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law.” Johnson v.

Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). “Under such circumstances, the Ninth

Circuit has held that ‘a failure to file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give

de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.’” Id.

(quoting Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989)). In this case, Petitioner filed

objections to the R&R. [Doc. No. 25.] Accordingly, this Court will make de novo determinations of factual findings as to those portions of the R&R to which objections have been made. 

Petitioner’s Objections 

Because Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R, the Court must conduct a de novo

review of the portions of the R&R to which objections were made. Petitioner objects to the

R&R on the basis that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the offense was committed with

the specific intent of benefitting a criminal street gang. Petitioner argues that: (1) his behavior

was not related to a criminal street gang; (2) his behavior was not for the benefit, at the direction

of, or in association with any criminal gang activity; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to

find the specific intent necessary to reach the above conclusion. (Pet’r’s Objs. at 3-4.) 

Discussion

Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process by imposing a gang enhancement that was based upon insufficient evidence to prove that

“the charged crimes were committed for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with the

Westside gang...” (Id. at 7.) Petitioner also maintains that there was insufficient evidence to

show the specific intent “to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members...” 

(Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)).) The magistrate judge found that there was

sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the offense was committed with specific

intent and for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang. (R&R

at 20, 25.) After a de novo review of the factual findings relevant to Petitioner’s Objections and

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a de novo review of all conclusions of law, this Court FINDS that the R&R correctly addressed

the issues raised in the Petition. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS

the R&R in its entirety and DENIES Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, the Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, and Petitioner’s request for appointment of

counsel. 

I. Writ of Habeas Corpus

A. For the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang...

California Penal Code Section 186.22(b)(1) provides that “any person who is convicted of

a felony committed for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street

gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang

members, shall, upon conviction of that felony...be punished by an additional term of 10 years.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2007). The statute requires the state to prove

two elements: (1) the defendant committed the crime for the benefit, at the direction of, or in

association with a criminal street gang and (2) the defendant intended to assist, further, or

promote criminal conduct by gang members. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 615-16, 927

P.2d 713, 720, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 363 (1996); see also Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1103

(9th Cir. 2005).

1. For the benefit...

In order to prove that a defendant committed a crime “for the benefit, at the direction of,

or in association with any criminal street gang,” Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1), the state must

establish the existence of a “criminal street gang.” See Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 616, 927 P.2d at

720, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363. The state must also prove that the defendant committed the crime

“for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with” that gang. Cal. Penal Code §

186.22(b)(1). Magistrate Judge Brooks correctly found that there was sufficient evidence for the

trial court to determine that the state had met its burden in proving that Petitioner acted for the

benefit of the Westside gang.

a. Criminal Street Gang

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California Penal Code Section 186.22(f) defines a criminal street gang as “any ongoing

association of three or more persons that shares a common name or common identifying sign or

symbol; has as one of its primary activities “the commission of specified criminal offenses” and

engages its members in a “pattern of criminal gang activity.” Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 610, 927

P.2d at 715, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358 (summarizing Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(f)). At Petitioner’s

trial, Detective Rudisell testified about the necessary elements for gang enhancements. 

Detective Rudisell described the Westside gang as an association of approximately 135 to 150

Hispanic males. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 905.) He also testified that the gang’s

common signs and symbols include graffiti, tattoos, and hand signs. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 9, 970-72; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 913-14.) Evidence at trial also established

that the Westside gang’s primary activity since the late 1990s involved trafficking and selling

methamphetamine and other drugs. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 905.) After weighing

such evidence, a reasonably trier of fact could conclude that the Westside gang was a criminal

street gang as defined by California Penal Code § 186.22(f).

b. Benefit, Direction or Association

In his Objection, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to find that the

offense was committed in any relation to a criminal gang. Pettioner states that his behavior was

“for no benefit, at the direction, or in association with anyone,” and that Detective Rudisell’s

testimony otherwise is “erroneous if stated as more than inferences or hypotheticals.” (Pet’r’s

Obj. at 4.) Petitioner argues that, as such, Detective Rudisell’s testimony could not have

established the State’s burden. Id. In People v. Romero, an expert testified about gang rivalries

and territories and set forth that shooting any African American man in the area would elevate

the status of the shooters and the entire gang. People v. Romero, 140 Cal. App. 4th 15, 19, 43

Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 865 (Ct. App. 2006). In response, the defendant argued that because the

victim’s were not gang members and the aggressors did not wear gang colors or use gang

slogans, the expert’s testimony was insufficient to support the gang enhancement. Id. at 18, 43

Cal. Rptr. 3d at 864. 

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There, the court found that the expert’s testimony was sufficient to support the finding

that the shooting was done for the benefit, at the direction of, or in association with the gang. Id.

Detective Rudisell testified about the incident concerning Petitioner in a manner similar to the

expert in Romero. Id. Detective Rudisell testified that a violent crime, such as a stabbing,

benefits the gang’s reputation for being tough and discourages other people from challenging the

gang. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 979-81.) There was also evidence that the home in

which the stabbing occurred was marked as the gang’s territory. (Id. at 969.) The Petitioner also

claimed to be a gang member and has committed a crime while claiming to be a member of the

Westside gang. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 910-11; Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9,

985-86.) Taking into account all this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that the violent

confrontation was gang-related and committed for the benefit, at the direction of, or in

association with the Westside gang. 

2. Specific Intent

Petitioner also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he possessed the

specific intent necessary for a gang enhancement. (See Second Am. Pet. 7-8.) In order to prove

specific intent, the state must prove that the defendant specifically intended to assist, further, or

promote criminal conduct by gang members. Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). Under California

state law, juries are permitted to rely on expert testimony about gang culture and habits when

reaching a verdict on a gang related offense or gang allegation. People v. Ferraez, 112 Cal.

App. 4th 925, 930, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 640, 645 (Ct. App. 2003). During the trial, Detective Rudisell

provided his opinion about whether a person in a similar position to Petitioner would be acting

for the sole purpose of establishing reputation. (Lodgment No. 1, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 981.) 

Detective Rudisell explained that gang culture thrived on respect and members received more

respect when they committed violent crimes. (Id. at 973-74.) He also testified that a stabbing

increased the general respect towards the Petitioner and, by extension, the Westside gang’s

reputation. (Id. at 980.) Detective Rudisell concluded that with the above reasoning in mind, he

believed that in a hypothetical situation similar to the Petitioner’s, the stabbing would be done

for the sole purpose of establishing a reputation for the gang. Id. at 981. Based on Detective

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Rudisell’s testimony and other evidence stated above, a rational jury could conclude that the

Petitioner acted with specific intent to further, benefit, or promote criminal gang activity. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s claims for habeas relief. 

II. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

Under Baja v. Ducharme, a district court has discretion to grant a motion for an evidentiary hearing. 187 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). In order for a district court to grant an evidentiary

hearing, the Court must “determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the

petitioner’s claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Baja,

187 F.3d at 1078). If there is no factual basis then the court must ascertain “whether the

petitioner has ‘failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State court.’” Insyxiengmay,

403 F.3d at 670 (quoting Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). If the Petitioner has failed to do the above

then the state “must deny a hearing unless the applicant establishes one of the two narrow

exceptions set forth in § 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B).” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (quoting Baja,

187 F.3d at 1078). There are six situations where a habeas petitioner should be entitled to an

evidentiary hearing: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;

(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact

finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;

(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not

adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state

trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Townsend v. Sain,

372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), (overruled on other grounds by Keeny v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5

(1992). 

Petitioner does not take a position with regards to whether the facts underlying his claim

were developed in state court. (See Traverse 2.) Instead, Petitioner claims that he is actually

innocent of the gang enhancement, as defined in California Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1), and that

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of such. (See Traverse 2.) Since this claim

necessarily relies on the facts presented at trial, Petitioner must satisfy one of the six Townsend

factors to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

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None of the six Townsend factors entitle Petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. The merits

of Petitioner’s claim were resolved in the state court. As discussed above, the trial court’s

finding that Petitioner committed the offense with the specific intent to further criminal gang

activity is supported by the evidence presented. Moreover, the fact finding procedure employed

adequately gave Petitioner a full and fair hearing; there is no allegation of newly discovered

evidence; the material facts were adequately developed in the state courts; and it does not appear

that the state courts failed to provide Petitioner with a full and fair hearing. Since Petitioner does

not satisfy any of the Townsend factors, his request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. 

III. Petitioner’s Request for Appointment of Counsel

Petitioner requests that the Court appoint counsel to represent him in litigating his

petition. (Second Am. Pet. 9.) The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal

habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Bonin v.

Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th

Cir. 1986)); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Financially eligible

habeas petitioners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the

court “determines that the interest of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a)(2) (West 2000

& Supp. 2005); Terrovona v. Kinchebe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990). The interests of

justice require appointment of counsel when the court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the

petition or when the assistance of counsel is “necessary for effective discovery.” 28 U.S.C.A.

Rs. 6(a), 8(c) foll. § 2254 (West Supp. 2005); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 675 (2005);

Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. Otherwise, the appointment of counsel

is discretionary. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 675; Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177, Knaubert, 791 F.2d at

728. The Eighth Circuit has, however, suggested that the following factors should be considered

when the court exercises its discretion to determine whether appointment of counsel is appropriate: “the legal complexity of the case, the factual complexity of the case, and the petitioner’s

ability to investigate and present his claims, along with any other relevant factors.” Haggard v.

Purkett, 29 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The issues and facts that Petitioner

presents are not severely complex and he adequately explained his claim for relief in his Second

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Amended Petition and his Traverse. Further, Petitioner has adequately represented himself to

date. Under this analysis, due process and the interests of justice do not require the appointment

of counsel. In light of the above factors, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request to have counsel

appointed. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, this Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES Petitioner’s

Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in its entirety. Additionally, this Court

DENIES Petitioner’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 12, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: All Parties of Record

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