Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00777/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00777-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD ADAMS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0777 GEB GGH P

vs.

C. GIBSON, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

filed September 28, 2007, on behalf of defendants Gibson, Tennison, Malfi and Read. In the

motion to dismiss, defendants Kernan and Walker request that they be allowed to file their

answer after resolution of the motion to dismiss.

After carefully considering the record, the court recommends and orders that

defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied in part.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;”

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

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level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading

must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a

legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume

that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 803

(1994), quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). 

Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972).

The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also

consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other

papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

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DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims

This action is proceeding on the original complaint filed April 16, 2007, in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On April 24, 2007, the

Northern District transferred the action to this court. Plaintiff alleges as follows in his complaint

and attached exhibits.

Plaintiff is housed at California State Prison-Sacramento (CSP-Sac) where he

participates in the Mental Health Services Delivery System (MHSDS) within the Correctional

Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS). Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the Hot Weather

Emergency Plan, heat risk inmates like himself must be returned to their housing units to prevent

heat related illnesses when the weather reaches a particular temperature. This plan was

implemented pursuant to the Coleman class action. “Heat risk inmates” are inmates who take

psychotropic medicines which may cause them to suffer illnesses if they are exposed to hot

temperatures.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the Hot Weather Emergency Plan, he has been

forced to stay in his cell for 24 hours a day for long periods of time. Plaintiff alleges that during

the summer of 2006, he was not allowed outdoor exercise, law library access, canteen access or

day room access for three weeks because of the Hot Weather Plan. Plaintiff also claims that his

packages were not delivered during this time.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Gibson, Tennison, Malfi and Read reviewed his

administrative appeals regarding these issues.

As legal claims, plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Equal

Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. 

B. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against them

on grounds that their only alleged involvement in the alleged deprivations was their review of

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and denial of his administrative appeals. Defendants argue that there are no allegations that any

of these defendants were involved in the development of the prison heat plan or that any of these

defendants had any control over or ability to change the heat plan. 

Defendants sued in their individual capacity must be alleged to have: personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed

to act to prevent them; or implemented a policy that repudiates constitutional rights and was the

moving force behind the alleged violations. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646

(9th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040

(9th Cir. 1989). “Although a § 1983 claim has been described as ‘a species of tort liability,’

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S. Ct. 984, 988, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, it is perfectly clear

that not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that

statute.” Martinez v. State of California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S. Ct. 553, 559 (1980). 

“Without proximate cause, there is no § 1983 liability.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d

831, 837 (9th Cir. 1996).

The search, which was performed in accordance with this constitutionally valid 

strip search policy, was subsequently ratified by the School Board when Mr. 

Williams filed a grievance. Therefore, Williams’ only grasp at evoking municipal

liability under § 1983 is to show that this subsequent ratification is sufficient to 

establish the necessary causation requirements. Based on the facts, the Board 

believed Ellington and his colleagues were justified in conducting the search of 

Williams. There was no history that the policy had been repeatedly or even 

sporadically misapplied by school board officials in the past. Consequently, the 

School Board cannot be held liable for the ratification of the search in question, 

because this single, isolated decision can hardly constitute the “moving force” 

behind the alleged constitutional deprivation.

Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 884-885 (9th Cir. 1991).

This court is unwilling to adopt a rule that anyone involved in adjudicating

grievances after the fact is per se potentially liable under a ratification theory. However, this is

not to say that persons involved in adjudicating administrative disputes, or persons to whom

complaints are sometimes made can never be liable under a ratification theory. If, for example, a

reviewing official’s rejections of administrative grievances can be construed as an automatic

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whitewash, which may have led other prison officials to have no concern of ever being

reprimanded, a ratifying official may be liable for having put a defective policy in place. 

Plaintiff alleges that implementation of the Hot Emergency Plan violated his

Eighth Amendment rights in that he was denied outdoor exercise for days at a time. It may be 

true that defendants are not responsible for creation of the plan or decisions regarding how to

implement it. However, their denial of plaintiff’s appeals which upheld the implementation of

the plan may have led other prison officials to have no concern of ever having to address the

allegedly unconstitutional aspects of the plan. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim should be denied.

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim based on their

handling of his administrative appeals. Inmates have no right to an administrative grievance

procedure. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (2003). Accordingly, defendants’ motion

to dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim should be granted.

Defendants also move to dismiss plaintiff’s equal protection claim. “The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction

that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985).

Defendants argue that plaintiff does not argue that he was treated differently from

other similarly situated prisons. Plaintiff argues that “heat risk inmates” subject to the Coleman

plan are treated differently than “non heat risk inmates” who are not subject to the Coleman 

plan. Plaintiff is not similarly situated to “non heat risk inmates” who are not subject to the

Coleman plan. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim should be dismissed.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to link defendant Read to any of the

alleged deprivations. The complaint alleges that defendant Read was assigned to investigate

plaintiff’s claims and appeals. Complaint, p. iii, ¶ 8. Defendants argue that neither the complaint

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nor attachments disclose any involvement by defendant Read in the handling of the appeals.

In his opposition to the pending motion, plaintiff claims that defendant Read

wrote some of the responses to his appeals. The appeals attached to the complaint as exhibits do

not contain defendant Read’s name. Because the complaint does not adequately describe

defendant Read’s involvement in the appeal process, the claims against this defendant are

dismissed with leave to amend. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged.

Although defendants did not move to dismiss the Equal Protection and Due

Process claims made against defendants Kernan and Walker, the court recommends that these

claims made against these defendants be dismissed for the reasons discussed above. 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ September 28, 2007, motion to dismiss is granted as to the claims

against defendant Read with leave to amend; plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within

twenty days of the district court’s adoption of these findings and recommendations; defendants’

response to an amended complaint is due thirty days thereafter; plaintiff’s amended complaint

should not include the Equal Protection and Due Process claims discussed above;

2. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, defendants shall file a response

to the remaining claims within thirty days of the district court’s adoption of these findings and

recommendations;

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ September 28, 2007, motion to dismiss be denied as plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims; defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Equal Protection and Due

Process claims be granted;

2. The Equal Protection and Due Process claims against defendants Walker and

Kernan be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 04/29/08 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

adams.mtd UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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