Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00086/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00086-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before the Court is the motion for reconsideration filed by Plaintiff. (Docs. 36, 37) On May 

21, 2013, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss based, in part, on Plaintiff’s failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies for her claims brought under California Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 

96(k). (Doc. 27 at 14-20) In doing so, the Court found that courts have decided the exhaustion issue 

variously but determined that exhaustion was required. Id. Since that time, the California Legislature 

implemented Labor Code § 244 which excuses exhaustion as to every Labor Code violation that does 

not specifically require it. Based upon the Court finding that § 244 applies to this case prospectively, 

the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration.

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ANITA GONZALEZ,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF McFARLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-00086 JLT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

(Docs. 36, 37)

Case 1:13-cv-00086-JLT Document 45 Filed 01/24/14 Page 1 of 5
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I. Reconsideration 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) allows a court to set aside an order within one year if 

it is no longer equitable.1 In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997) the Court held that Rule 

60(b)(5) relief may be granted where there has been an intervening, “significant change” in law.

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality 

and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). A 

reconsideration motion “should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances.” McDowell v. 

Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1059 (1989). A reconsideration 

motion “is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a 

rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’” See Sequa Corp. v. GBJ 

Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). “A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a 

disagreement with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by 

the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.” United 

States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (internal citations 

omitted). “To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the 

court to reverse its prior decision.” Id.

Reconsideration is appropriate when the Court: (1) is presented with newly discovered 

evidence; (2) has committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust; or (3) is presented 

with an intervening change in controlling law. School District 1J, Multnomah County v. AC and S, 

Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1236 (1994). In addition, there may be 

other highly unusual circumstances warranting reconsideration. Id. Under this Court’s Local Rule 

230(j), a party seeking reconsideration must demonstrate “what new or different facts or circumstances 

are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other 

grounds exist for the motion” and “why the facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the 

prior motion.” 

 

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Defendants take the position that Plaintiff must have intended to proceed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). (Doc. 41 at 2)

However, Plaintiff has corrected this assumption and reiterated she seeks to proceed under subsection (b)(5). (Doc. 36 at 1-

2; Doc. 43 at 3-4) Thus, the Court declines to evaluate the motion under subsection (b)(6).

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II. Labor Code section 244

Effective January 1, 2014, California Labor Code section 244, unequivocally determines that 

administrative exhaustion is not required of an employee seeking to vindicate rights brought under any 

section of the Labor Code which does not impose an exhaustion requirement. Section 244 provides,

An individual is not required to exhaust administrative remedies or procedures in order 

to bring a civil action under any provision of this code, unless that section under which 

the action is brought expressly requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy. This 

subdivision shall not be construed to affect the requirements of Section 2699.3

Whether this statute applies to this case, is the question before the Court. “Generally, statutes 

operate prospectively only.” McClung v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 34 Cal. 4th 467, 475 (2004) 

quoting Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 28 Cal.4th 828, 839 (2002). “[A] statute’s 

retroactivity is, in the first instance, a policy determination for the Legislature and one to which courts 

defer absent ‘some constitutional objection’ to retroactivity.” McClung, at 475 quoting Myers, at 840. 

A statute will not apply retroactively where it creates new rights or new liabilities. McClung, 34 

Cal.4th at 475.

Here, SB 666, the bill which enacted § 244, described the bill as “clarify[ing] that an employee 

or job applicant is not required to exhaust administrative remedies or procedures in order to bring a 

civil action under any provision of the Labor Code, unless the provision under which the action is 

brought expressly requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy.2 (Doc. 36-1 at 14) The legislative 

history of SB 666 indicates that drafters intended Labor Code §244 to be a clarification of existing law 

and not an amendment to it. Following a June 18, 2013 meeting of the Assembly Committee on 

Judiciary chaired by Assembly Member Robert Wieckowski, the synopsis states that:

The bill would also clarify that an employee or job applicant is not required to exhaust 

administrative remedies or procedures in order to bring a civil action under any 

provision of the Labor Code, unless the provision under which the action is brought 

expressly requires exhaustion of an administrative remedy. 

Id. Such a declared intention, where the interpretation of the statute is in flux, is entitled to 

consideration, even if it is not determinative. McClung, at 473. Though Defendant argues that the 

 

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The Court may take judicial notice of legislative history. Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1223 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2005).

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issue was settled in Campbell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 35 Cal.4th 311 (2005), as set forth 

extensively in the Court’s order finding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative 

remedies, the Court disagrees and finds instead that interpretation of this issue has been hotly debated

and, prior to implementation of § 244, was not settled. (See Doc. 27 at 14-20) 

On the other hand, whether the statute is found, ultimately, to be retroactive need not be 

determined here. Instead, the key issue is whether the statute applies to the case at bar given that it is 

“pending.” In Elsner v. Uveges, 34 Cal.4th 915, 937 (2004), the California Supreme Court held that 

where a statute does not “substantially affect [ ] existing rights” then “application to a trial of 

preenactment conduct is permitted, because the application is prospective.” This maxim is applied 

even where the Court has ruled contrary to the current state of the statutes. See Governing Board v. 

Mann, 18 Cal.3d 819, 829, (1977); Brenton v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., 116 Cal.App.4th 679, 690

(2004). This authority is in accord with that of the Ninth Circuit which has held that a case is 

“pending” until the appeal is final. Beverly Cmty. Hosp. Ass'n v. Belshe, 132 F.3d 1259, 1264 (9th 

Cir. 1997). Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear that even a discretionary decision which 

when made was sustainable, cannot be affirmed if it was premised upon a legal principle that no 

longer is sound. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997). Here, the Court does not find that §

244 creates new rights or imposes new liabilities. Thus, it has little hesitation in holding that § 244 

applies here and should apply at trial. Thus, the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration.

Defendants argued at the hearing that if the Court grants the motion, in essence, this is the 

equivalent of a new filing such to trigger California’s Tort Claims Act which requires filing of a 

complaint within six months of denial of the tort claim. Cal. Gov. Code. 945.6(a). Thus, Defendants 

argued that the “new filing” would be untimely under the Tort Claims Act. The Court rejects this 

characterization. The effect of the Court’s order granting this motion for reconsideration is merely to 

reinstate the cause of action as it was before the prior order issued. The cause of action was timely 

before the Court granted the motion to dismiss and, therefore, it is timely now.

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ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration (Docs. 36, 37) is GRANTED and 

the third claim for relief (Doc. 33-1 at 6) is REINSTATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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