Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00134/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00134-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:0271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARBMETRICS, LLC, an Ohio limited 

liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEXCOM, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-CV-134 JLS (KSC)

ORDER ON CLAIM 

CONSTRUCTION

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Arbmetrics, LLC’s (“Pl.’s Br.,” ECF No. 66) 

and Defendant Dexcom, Inc.’s (“Def.’s Br.,” ECF No. 123) Opening Claim Construction 

Briefs, as well as each Party’s response to the other’s Opening Brief (“Def.’s Resp.,” ECF 

No. 68; “Pl.’s Resp.,” ECF No. 69). The parties dispute the meaning of seven terms 

claimed by U.S. Patent No. 6,343,225 (the “’225 Patent”). The Court heard oral argument, 

including tutorials from the Parties, on October 31, 2019. See ECF No. 77. Having 

carefully considered the Parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the law, the Court rules as 

follows.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A determination of infringement involves a two-step analysis. ‘First, the claim 

must be properly construed to determine its scope and meaning. Second, the claim as 

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properly construed must be compared to the accused device or process.’” Omega Eng’g, 

Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Carroll Touch, Inc. v. 

Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

The first step, commonly known as claim construction, is presently before the Court. 

Claim construction is a matter of law for the Court’s determination. Markman v. Westview 

Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“[J]udges, not juries, are the better suited to 

find the acquired meaning of patent terms.”). 

Words of a claim are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.” 

Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[T]he 

ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have 

to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the 

effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 

1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Because the inquiry into the meaning of claim terms is an objective 

one, “a court looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill 

in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean.” Innova/Pure Water, 

Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Those 

sources include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the 

prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the 

meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.”1Id. (citing, inter alia, Vitronics, 90 

F.3d at 1582–83).

Claim construction begins with an analysis of the words of the claims themselves. 

See Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 365 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 

(holding that claim construction “begins and ends” with claim’s actual words). “In some 

cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art 

may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves 

 

1 The first three sources are considered “intrinsic evidence” of claim meaning. See generally Phillips, 415 

F.3d at 1314–17.

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little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood 

words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. The meaning of a claim term, however, as understood 

by ordinarily skilled artisans often is not immediately apparent. Id. In those situations, the 

court looks to “sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art 

would have understood disputed claim language to mean.” Id. Or, when a patentee 

“chooses to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary 

meaning,” the court can use the patentee’s meaning “as long as the special definition of the 

term is clearly stated in the patent specification or file history.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.

In examining the claims themselves, “the context in which a term is used can be 

highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. Moreover, “[o]ther claims of the patent in 

question, both asserted and unasserted can . . . be valuable sources of enlightenment as to 

the meaning of a claim term.” Id. (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). “Because claim 

terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim 

can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims.” Id. Conversely, under 

the doctrine of claim differentiation, “‘different words or phrases used in separate claims 

are presumed to indicate that the claims have different meanings and scope.’” Andersen 

Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Karlin 

Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

“Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term 

not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in 

the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.

“The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims 

or when it defines them by implication.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “In addition to 

providing contemporaneous technological context for defining claim terms, the patent 

applicant may also define a claim term in the specification ‘in a manner inconsistent with 

its ordinary meaning.’” Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 370 F.3d 1354, 1360 

(Fed. Cir. 2004). “Usually, [the specification] is dispositive; it is the single best guide to 

the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582; accord Phillips, 415 F.3d at 

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1317 (“It is . . . entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim construction, to 

rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.”).

Patent claims should ordinarily be construed to encompass the preferred 

embodiments described in the specification, for “[a] claim construction that excludes a 

preferred embodiment . . . ‘is rarely, if ever, correct.’” SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., 

Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583). A court 

should not, however, import limitations from the specification into the claims, Phillips, 415 

F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of 

the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those 

embodiments.”), absent a specific reference in the claims themselves. Reinshaw PLC v. 

Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] party wishing to 

use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a patent’s scope 

must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the claim with which to draw in those 

statements.”).

The patent’s prosecution history, if in evidence, may also shed light on claim 

construction. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “This history contains the complete record of all 

proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office [(“PTO”)], including any express 

representations made by the applicant regarding scope of the claims.” Id. “Like the 

specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor 

understood the patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Although the prosecution history 

“often lacks the clarity of the specification,” it is nevertheless useful to show “how the 

inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the 

course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” Id.

“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any 

ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on 

extrinsic evidence.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583. Thus, expert testimony on the proper 

construction of disputed claim terms “may only be relied upon if the patent documents, 

taken as a whole, are insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms.”

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Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. But, Vitronics does not state a rule of admissibility, nor does it 

“prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even where the patent document is 

itself clear.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 

1999). As the Federal Circuit has made clear:

[B]ecause extrinsic evidence can help educate the court 

regarding the field of the invention and can help the court 

determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

understand claim terms to mean, it is permissible for the district 

court in its sound discretion to admit and use such evidence.

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319; accord Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 

(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]rial courts generally can hear expert testimony for background and

education on the technology implicated by the presented claim construction issues, and 

trial courts have broad discretion in this regard.”). The court is not “barred from 

considering any particular sources or required to analyze sources in any specific sequence, 

as long as those sources are not used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in 

light of the intrinsic evidence.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (emphasis added); see also

Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Extrinsic 

evidence, such as expert testimony, may be useful in claim construction, but it should be 

considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.”).

ANALYSIS

The parties dispute the meaning of seven claim terms in the ’225 Patent. A brief 

description of the ’225 patent is provided below, followed by an analysis of the claim terms.

I. The ’225 Patent

The ’225 Patent is directed to the creation of an implantable glucose sensor for use 

by patients with diabetes. The glucose sensor measures the amount of glucose present in 

the blood through an electrochemical reaction. The reaction is sparked by an enzyme that 

causes glucose to react with oxygen, the end product of the reaction being hydrogen 

peroxide. The amount of hydrogen peroxide created by the reaction is a direct measure of 

the glucose concentration in the sample. The hydrogen peroxide is then oxidized back to 

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oxygen, which transfers electrons to an electrode, creating an electric current that can be 

measured. The electric current measured is directly proportional to the glucose 

concentration in the sample. 

A problem found in many implantable glucose monitors is the high glucose-tooxygen ratios often found in human tissue. This ratio creates problems because a surplus 

of glucose and a shortage of oxygen will lead to a limited number of reactions with the 

enzyme, which lowers the electric current produced and results in inaccurate readings. To 

solve this problem, the present invention attempts to increase the amount of oxygen that 

reaches the enzyme. To do this, the invention teaches to create an enzyme emulsion to 

spark the reaction described above. The emulsion is comprised of, among other things, a 

substance in which oxygen is extremely soluble. The oxygen soluble substance increases 

the oxygen available to the enzyme by creating oxygen reservoirs, from which the enzyme 

can pull to continue the chemical reactions.

The disputed terms are found in Claims 1 and 5 of the ’225 Patent. Claim 1 

describes the present invention as follows: 

An implantable sensor for sensing a concentration of an organic 

substrate, the sensor comprising:

a conductive electrode; and 

a stabilized enzyme emulsion in contact with the electrode, 

the enzyme emulsion comprising: 

an oxidase enzyme that quantitatively oxidizes the 

organic substrate; 

a water immiscible oxygen dissolving substance 

emulsified into intimate contact with the enzyme to 

provide oxygen; and 

a protein crosslinking agent to crosslink and 

insolubilize the enzyme forming a stabilized gel 

comprising crosslinked protein and particles of said 

oxygen dissolving substance.

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’225 Patent at 14:16–29. 

Dependent Claim 5 describes: 

The implantable sensor of claim 1, wherein the oxygen 

dissolving substance is selected from the group consisting of 

perflourocarbons, silicone oils, flourosilicone oils, aromatic and 

aliphatic hydrocarbon oils or solids, carotenoids and steroids. 

Id. at 14:39–43.

II. Disputed Terms

A. “emulsion” (all asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

Plaintiff would construe the term “emulsion” as “a mixture of two or more 

immiscible components, in which one component is dispersed in another component.” 

Pl.’s Br. at 12. Defendant would construe the term as “a mixture of two or more immiscible 

liquids, in which one liquid is dispersed in another liquid.” Def.’s Br. at 15. The dispute 

therefore centers around whether the emulsion described in Claim 1 of the ’225 Patent

should be limited to liquids, as Defendant contends, or whether it should include any 

mixtures of immiscible components, as Plaintiff contends.2

After reviewing the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the Court agrees with 

Defendant’s proposed construction because it comports with the plain and ordinary 

meaning of “emulsion” as understood by a person with ordinary skill in the art. “As a 

general rule, the ordinary and customary meaning controls unless ‘a patentee sets out a 

definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or . . . the patentee disavows the full scope of 

a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.’” Sumitomo Dainippon 

Pharma Co. v. Emcure Pharm. Ltd., 887 F.3d 1153, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). To act 

as its own lexicographer, the patentee must “clearly set forth a definition of the disputed 

 

2 The Court notes that in its Response, Plaintiff argues that the claims do not refer to emulsion in isolation 

and instead use the full term “enzyme emulsion,” and thus the Court should construe that full term. Pl.’s 

Resp. at 6. Both Parties agreed at the October 31, 2019 hearing, however, that the term to be construed is 

“emulsion,” not “enzyme emulsion.” 

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claim term” and “clearly express an intent to define the term.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. 

AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, both the intrinsic and extrinsic 

evidence leads the Court to determine that the ordinary and customary meaning is 

appropriate because the patentee did not clearly set forth a contrary definition to the term. 

Plaintiff contends that the intrinsic evidence clearly sets forth the patentee’s intent 

to define the term. Plaintiff points to a sentence in the specification that it contends makes 

explicit that the emulsion is not limited to liquids. Pl.’s Br. at 13. That sentence describes 

“tiny solid or liquid particles” of the oxygen dissolving substance and the enzyme that are 

in “insoluble form.” ’225 Patent at 8:56–59. This sentence, however, is not a clear 

indication that the patentee intended to deviate from the ordinary and customary meaning. 

Indeed, as Defendant notes, “the sentence seems to describe the gel formed after the 

emulsion is crosslinked, rather than before as in the claims.” Def.’s Resp. at 11. The “tiny 

solid . . . particles” could therefore be formed after the gel is created and would not be 

present when the claimed emulsion is created. 

Next, Plaintiff points to Claim 5 as evidence that the patentee did not intend for the 

term emulsion to be limited to liquids. Plaintiff asserts that Claim 5 “unambiguously 

defines the ‘oxygen dissolving substance’ of claim 1 as a ‘solid’” and, since one of the 

major components of the claimed emulsion may be a solid, Defendant’s attempt to limit 

the emulsion to liquids must be wrong. Pl.’s Br. at 13. But this evidence is not as clear as 

Plaintiff contends. As Defendant points out, “whenever the ’225 Patent describes solids 

used in the emulsion, it is describing solids that have been dissolved in solution––in other 

words, liquid.” Def.’s Br. at 18. Thus, it is not clear the patentee defined emulsion contrary 

to its plain meaning. 

In support of its position, Defendant turns to the prosecution history. In the 

prosecution history, the patentee distinguishes a prior art reference, U.S. Patent 5,431,160 

(“Wilkens”), because Wilkens discloses a suspension or gel––both of which may contain 

solids––rather than an emulsion. Def.’s Resp. at 10. The fact that the patentee 

distinguished the prior art on this basis shows the patentee did not intend to use the term 

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emulsion to capture these other types of mixtures, which Plaintiff’s construction would do. 

By differentiating the terms, the patentee indicated that he defined the term emulsion 

consistent with its ordinary meaning, not contrary to it. 

Defendant also points out that throughout the intrinsic evidence, the ’225 Patent uses 

words for liquids when describing the emulsion. Def.’s Br. at 17–18; Def.’s Resp. at 

10–11. For example, the prosecution history states that “droplets of the emulsion . . . serve 

as an oxygen reservoir . . . and because there is close contact between droplets of the oxygen 

dissolving substance and the enzyme, the lag due to slow oxygen diffusion through water 

is avoided.” ECF No. 66-14 at 103. “Droplet” is a term for liquids and, as used in the 

prosecution history, describes the components of the emulsion as two liquids. See Def.’s 

Br. at 16. 

Finally, the Court finds that the extrinsic evidence supports Defendant’s 

construction. In fact, “all of the dictionaries and texts relied on by both parties define 

emulsion as a dispersion of two or more liquids.” Id. at 15. 

Based on the above, the Court adopts Defendant’s construction and construes the 

term “emulsion” in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning: “a mixture of 

two or more immiscible liquids, in which one liquid is dispersed in another liquid.” 

B. “in contact with” (all asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

Plaintiff would construe the term “in contact with” as “in direct, indirect, or 

diffusional communication with.” Pl.’s Br. at16. Defendant would construe the term as

“touching.” Def.’s Br. at 7. Defendant argues that the term “in contact with” must be 

limited to physical touching, id. at 7–11, while Plaintiff contends that “in contact with” 

does not necessarily require physical touching. Pl.’s Br. at 18.

Plaintiff contends that both the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence supports its 

construction. Pl.’s Br. at 16. Regarding the intrinsic evidence, Plaintiff contends that the 

claim language mandates a broader meaning of contact that includes communication 

because the Patent discloses several different types of contact, all of which require more 

than just physical touching. Id. at 16–17. Plaintiff also points to extrinsic evidence that 

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Plaintiff contends supports its construction, including several dictionary definitions that 

offer definitions of “contact” meaning communication, rather than physical touching. Id.

at 17. 

Defendant argues for the plain and ordinary meaning of “contact,” which it contends 

is “touching.” Def.’s Br. at 7. Defendant contends that the intrinsic evidence, including 

Claims 1 and 15 and the specification, supports this meaning. Id. at 8–11. Defendant 

contends its construction is bolstered by the extrinsic evidence, asserting that every 

dictionary cited in the briefing––including the dictionaries cited by Plaintiff––supports its 

construction. Id. 7–8; Def.’s Resp. at 7. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s construction 

would render the claims indefinite and make much of the claims and specification 

nonsensical. Def.’s Br. at 10–11. 

The Court agrees with Defendant and finds that “in contact with” means “touching.” 

The Court begins with the language of Claim 1 itself. Scanner Techs. Corp., 365 F.3d at 

1303 (holding that claim construction “begins and ends” with a claim’s actual words). 

Claim 1 uses the term in two instances, both of which use “contact” consistent with its 

ordinary and customary meaning of touching. First, Claim 1 describes “a stabilized 

enzyme emulsion in contact with the electrode.” ’225 Patent at 14:19–20. This language 

does not “clearly indicate” the patentee intended the term to embody a special meaning,

such as Plaintiff’s proposed construction of “indirect or diffusional communication.” See

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Indeed, based on the specification’s description of the present 

invention, this sentence in Claim 1 is entirely consistent with the ordinary meaning of 

contact, which is touching. 

Second, Claim 1 describes “the enzyme emulsion, comprising: . . . a water 

immiscible oxygen dissolving substance emulsified into intimate contact with the enzyme 

to provide oxygen.” ’225 Patent at 14:23–25. Plaintiff contends that because the term 

“intimate” modifies “contact,” the meaning given to “contact” as opposed to “intimate 

contact” must be broader and include direct, indirect, or diffusional communication. Pl’s 

Br. at 16–17. While the Court agrees that “intimate” modifies the meaning of “contact” in 

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this sentence, the modification is one of degree and does not mandate Plaintiff’s complete 

deviation from the term’s ordinary and customary meaning. Defendant’s construction, on 

the other hand, is consistent with the ordinary meaning as both “intimate contact” and 

“contact” can describe touching to different degrees. For example, a tap on the shoulder 

and a hug both involve “contact” that constitutes touching, even though a hug might be 

described as “intimate contact” while the tap is not. The same is true here. 

The specification also supports Defendant’s construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1315 (noting a patent’s specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 

term”). For example, the specification states that, “[g]enerally the device is not directly in 

contact with the circulatory system so that formation of blood clots does not interfere with 

operation.” ’225 Patent at 6:62–65 (emphasis added). Both Parties argue that this sentence 

supports their constructions. Plaintiff contends that, because the present invention requires 

the monitor to communicate with the blood, this sentence indicates that the device may be 

in indirect communication with the blood. Pl.’s Br. at 16. This interpretation, however, 

fails to take into account the entire passage. The very next sentence states that “[a]ll of the 

body tissues come into glucose equilibrium with the blood fairly rapidly so that placement 

of the device in contact with the blood is not really required.” ’225 Patent at 6:65–67

(emphasis added). If the Court construes the term as Plaintiff requests, it would mean that 

the glucose monitor is “not really required” to be in communication with the blood. This 

would make no sense because the device’s purpose is to measure glucose levels of the 

blood. Defendant’s construction, on the other hand, gives meaning to the entire passage. 

Likewise, Figure 2 of the specification supports Defendant’s construction. Figure 2 

shows the enzyme emulsion touching the electrode. While Figure 2 cannot limit the scope 

of the claim, see, e.g., Playtex Prod., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble, Co., 400 F.3d 901, 907 

(Fed. Cir. 2005), it supports this reading in combination with the other intrinsic evidence. 

Finally, the extrinsic evidence supports the construction proposed by Defendant. 

The Court notes that all of the dictionaries cited by Plaintiff include a definition consistent 

with the plain meaning, touching. See, e.g., Pl.’s Br. Ex. E (Concise Oxford Dictionary 

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(1999) defining “contact” as “the state or condition of physical touching”); Ex. F 

(American Heritage Dictionary (1994) defining “contact” as “[a] coming together or 

touching, as of objects or surfaces”); Ex. G (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

(1999) defining “contact” as “union or junction of surfaces”). 

In conclusion, the Court adopts Defendant’s construction and construes the term “in 

contact with” to mean “touching.” 

C. “water immiscible” (all asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

Similar to the term “emulsion,” the Parties dispute whether the term “water 

immiscible,” should be limited to liquids. Plaintiff would construe the term to mean “will 

not mix with or dissolve in water.” Pl.’s Br. at 20. Defendant would construe the term to 

mean “a liquid that will not mix with water.” Def.’s Br. at 21. The Court agrees with 

Plaintiff and concludes that the term is not limited to liquids only. 

To start, the Claim language supports Plaintiff’s contention that the term does not 

pertain to liquids only. As used in the ’225 Patent’s claims, “water immiscible” describes 

a characteristic of an “oxygen dissolving substance,” not what type of substance it is. This

fact is supported by the claims using “water immiscible” to describe both liquids and solids. 

For example, Claim 5 of the ’225 Patent describes the sensor of Claim 1, wherein the 

“oxygen dissolving substance” is selected from the group consisting of, among others, 

“hydrocarbon . . .solids” and “steroids,” both of which are solids. See ’225 Patent at 14:23–

24. While the Court agrees that the oxygen dissolving substance is part of the emulsion, 

which does require liquids, see supra Section II.A, it is not the term “water immiscible” 

that mandates that the emulsion is liquids. Instead, it is the ordinary meaning of emulsion

in conjunction with the specification. 

The prosecution history also supports Plaintiff’s construction. When distinguishing 

the ’225 Patent from Wilkens, the patentee explicitly references solid particles as being 

immiscible. The patentee states that “[t]he fine particles of graphite used by Wilkins are 

immiscible but do not constitute an oxygen dissolving substance.” Id. The graphite 

///

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materials in Wilkens are all solid, see id., thus, this supports that the patentee did not limit 

the adjective immiscible only to liquids. 

Moreover, the fact that immiscible is an adjective contradicts Defendant’s 

construction. Defendant’s proposal would improperly turn the word into a noun, 

describing the substance and its properties all in one. The Court finds no support for this 

outcome. 

Based on the above, the Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction and construes the term 

“water immiscible” to mean “will not mix with or dissolve in water.” 

D. “oxygen dissolving substance” (all asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

Plaintiff would construe the term “oxygen dissolving substance” to mean “a 

substance (a particular kind of matter with uniform properties) having a higher oxygen 

solubility or higher oxygen permeability than at least one of a hydrocarbonaceous polymer 

and an oxyhydrocarbon polymer.” Pl.’s Br. at 22. Defendant would construe the term to 

mean “a liquid in which oxygen is preferentially soluble in comparison to water.” Def.’s 

Br. at 23. The Parties’ disagreements regarding this term focus on two characteristics: 

(1) whether the substance is limited to liquids; and (2) whether the substance should be 

preferentially soluble as compared to water or certain polymers. 

Beginning with Defendant’s proposal that the “oxygen dissolving substance” must 

be limited to liquids, the Court finds no basis for this in the evidence. The term is described 

as a solid in both Claim 5 and the specification. As noted above, Claim 5 describes that 

the oxygen dissolving substance may be “hydrocarbon . . . solids” or “steroids.” ’225 

Patent at 14:23–24. The fact that the oxygen dissolving substance is dissolved or 

emulsified into a liquid when part of the claimed emulsion does not mandate that, when 

described in isolation, it is not a solid. 

Likewise, the extrinsic evidence supports that the meaning of “substance” is not 

limited to liquids. As noted by Plaintiff, multiple dictionaries offer definitions that do not 

limit the term “substance” to liquids. See, e.g., Pl.’s Br. Ex. E (Concise Oxford Dictionary 

(1999) defining “substance” as “a particular kind of matter with uniform properties”); Ex. 

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F (American Heritage Dictionary (1994) defining “substance” as “[a] material of a 

particular kind or constitution”); Ex. G (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (1999) 

defining “substance” as “matter of particular or definite chemical constitution”). This 

extrinsic evidence supports Plaintiff’s construction. 

Next, Plaintiff’s proposed construction attempts to add permeability to the term. 

This finds no support in the claims or specification. Dissolving a substance is different 

than diffusion of the substance; consequently, permeability has no place in the construction 

of this term. 

Turning to the solubility of the substance, both Parties agree that the construction 

for this term requires preferential or higher solubility. The question, therefore, is whether 

the substance should be preferentially soluble as compared to water or as compared to 

certain polymers. Plaintiff contends that “hydrocarbonaceous polymer” and 

“oxyhydrocarbon polymer” should be the points of comparison to the solubility of the 

substance. Pl.’s Br. at 24–25. These terms, however, do not come from the intrinsic record 

or the prior art; on the contrary, they come from two separate patents owned by Defendant 

that were issued after the ’225 Patent. See Def.’s Br. at 25. Although Defendant owns 

those patents and they reference similar terms, those references are not prior art and do not 

overcome the fact that the terms find no support in the Patent-in-suit. 

Turning to Defendant’s construction, Defendant contends that the solubility of the 

substance should be compared to water. Def.’s Br. at 24–25. The specification describes 

the solubility of oxygen as compared to water multiple times. See, e.g., ’225 Patent at 

3:33–40 (“This limits the distance that oxygen must diffuse through a poor oxygen carrier 

such as water.”); 13:2–4 (“[A]n advantage is that steroids, like perfluorocarbons, are much 

better at dissolving oxygen than is water.”). While the specification also describes the 

solubility as compared to “biological fluids,” these fluids––as Defendant notes––are 

essentially water. Def.’s Br. at 24. And by describing the solubility as compared to water 

instead of biological fluids, the term avoids possible problems with ambiguity.

/// 

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Based on the above, the Court construes the term “oxygen dissolving substance” as 

“a substance in which oxygen is preferentially soluble in comparison to water.” 

E. “oxygen dissolving substance emulsified into intimate contact with the 

enzyme” (all asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

Plaintiff would construe the term “oxygen dissolving substance emulsified into 

intimate contact with the enzyme” as “[oxygen dissolving substance as construed above] 

placed into close communication with the enzyme, via the emulsion.” Pl.’s Br. at 26. 

Defendant would construe the term as “the oxygen-dissolving substance surrounds the 

enzyme with an emulsion-droplet reservoir of oxygen.” Def.’s Br. at 26.

Both Parties focus their proposed constructions on the meaning of the term “intimate 

contact,” with Plaintiff contending that “intimate contact” means “close communication.” 

Pl.’s Br. at 26–27. As noted above, see supra Section II.B, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s

proposed construction of “in contact with” to mean “communication.” The Court therefore

rejects Plaintiff’s proposal to inject “communication” into “intimate contact” for the same 

reason. 

Plaintiff’s proposed meaning for “intimate,” however, captures the plain and 

ordinary meaning of the word. The Court agrees that a person of ordinary skill in the art 

at the time of the invention would have understood “intimate” as a very close connection, 

association, or contact. This meaning tracks with the use of “intimate” in the specification, 

where the word intimate is used in conjunction with both “contact” and “association.” See, 

e.g., ’225 Patent at 5:23, 8:57, 8:61 (preceding contact); 10:26 (preceding association). In 

both instances, the specification uses “intimate” as a term of degree, describing how close

the components are. 

The extrinsic evidence also supports this ordinary meaning; indeed, all of the 

dictionaries offered by Plaintiff provide a definition of “intimate” including “close.” See

Pl.’s Br. Ex. E (Concise Oxford Dictionary defining “intimate” as “[i]nvolving very close 

connection”), Ex. F (American Heritage Dictionary defining “intimate” as “[m]arked by 

close acquaintance, association, or familiarity”), Ex. G (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

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Dictionary defining “intimate” as “marked by very close association, contact, or 

familiarity”). 

Defendant contends that “emulsified into intimate contact with the enzyme” is a 

coined term, not having an ordinary and customary meaning. Def.’s Br. at 26. Defendant 

argues that without such a definition, the term would be indefinite. Id. The Court does not 

agree and finds that the term, viewed in light of the Patent as a whole, adequately describes 

the proximity and relationship between the oxygen dissolving substance and the enzyme. 

Importantly, Defendant has failed to show that the patentee “clearly set forth a definition 

of the disputed claim term” and “clearly express[ed] an intent to define the term.” GE 

Lighting, 750 F.3d at 1309. Without such a showing, the Court declines to find the term is 

a coined term and declines to deviate from the ordinary and customary meaning of the 

words. 

As for the last remaining word in this disputed term, “emulsified,” neither Party 

indicates any reason why the Court should deviate from the ordinary and customary 

meaning. See Websidestory, Inc. v. Netratings, Inc., No. 06CV408WQH(AJB), 2007 WL 

2019654, at *10 (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2007) (citing Orion IP, LLC v. Staples, Inc., 406 F.

Supp. 2d 717, 738 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“[W]hile every word in a claim has meaning, not 

every word requires construction.”)). The Court therefore adopts the ordinary and 

customary for this term as well. 

Accordingly, the Court construes the phrase “oxygen dissolving substance” as 

defined above, supra Section II.E, and adopts the ordinary and customary meaning for the 

remainder of the term as outlines above: “oxygen dissolving substance [as defined above] 

emulsified into very close contact with the enzyme.” 

F. “electrode” (all asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

Plaintiff would define the term “electrode” as “a conductive material, optionally 

including a membrane.” Pl.’s Br. at 18. Defendant, on the other hand, would construe 

“electrode” to mean “a solid electric conductor through which an electric current enters or 

///

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leaves a substance.” Def.’s Br. at 11. In other words, the Parties dispute whether the term 

“electrode” includes a membrane, or whether membrane and electrode are separate terms. 

Plaintiff contends that “there is nothing in the prosecution history . . . , the 

specification, or the claims that precludes the presence of a membrane or coating on the 

claim electrode.” Pl.’s Br. at 18. The Court agrees this may be true but, at the same time, 

there is zero evidence in the claims or the specification that supports Plaintiff’s construction 

that an optional membrane must be included in the term’s construction, which would 

effectively combine the two terms. And as Defendant points out, dependent Claim 2 

describes a membrane as a separate element, describing “the sensor of Claim 1 further 

comprising a semipermeable membrane covering the electrode.” ’225 Patent at 14:30–33. 

If the Court were to adopt Plaintiff’s construction, dependent Claim 2 would encompass 

the same scope as independent Claim 1 and become superfluous. See Power Mosfet Techs., 

L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]nterpretations that render 

some portion of the claim language superfluous are disfavored.”).

The Court therefore agrees with Defendant that membrane and electrode should be 

construed as two separate terms and adopts Defendant’s construction of “electrode” as “a 

solid electric conductor through which an electric current enters or leaves a substance.”

G. “hydrocarbon oils or solids” (claim 5 of the ’225 Patent)

Plaintiff would construe the term “hydrocarbon oils or solids” to mean “oils or solids 

including a chemical group or side chain composed of hydrogen and carbon only.” Pl.’s 

Br. at 28. Defendant would construe the term to mean “oils or solids composed only of 

carbon and hydrogen.” Def.’s Br. at 28. The Parties’ dispute boils down to whether 

“hydrocarbon oils and solids” must be composed of only hydrogen and carbon, as

Defendant proposes, or whether they can be any oil or solid that includes a hydrogen and 

carbon side chain, as Plaintiff proposes. 

Defendant contends that its construction is consistent with the ordinary and 

customary meaning of the term. Conversely, Plaintiff asks the Court to deviate from the 

ordinary meaning primarily based on one sentence from the specification. See Pl.’s Br. at 

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28. That sentence lists examples of substances that may be used as an “oxygen dissolving 

substance,” stating that “[b]esides perflourocarbons hydrocarbon drugs (e.g., cortical 

steroids) silicones, silanes, cyclic silanes, siloxanes, fluorinated silicones and other similar 

organo-silicon compounds are excellent oxygen solvents and are useful in the present 

invention.” ’225 Patent at 8:13–17. Plaintiff notes that the specification refers to 

“hydrocarbon drugs,” including cortical steroids, which are compounds that are not 

composed of hydrogen and carbon only and instead consist of oxygen with hydrogen and 

carbon as a side chain. According to Plaintiff, this precludes any interpretation of the term 

that limits “hydrocarbon oils and solids” to only substances composed of hydrogen and 

carbon. The Court cannot agree. 

Under Plaintiff’s interpretation, several terms in Claim 5 would become redundant 

or illogical. As pointed out by Defendant, “under Plaintiff’s interpretation, hydrocarbon 

would include the claimed silicone oils, flourosilicone oils, carotenoids, and steroids” listed 

in Claim 5 “because these chemical classes include a chemical group or side chain 

composed of hydrogen and carbon only.” Def.’s Br. at 29. This would render Claim 5 

redundant. Because different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings, the 

Court declines to find that “hydrocarbon oils and solids” includes silicone oils, 

flourosilicone oils, carotenoids, and steroids. See SimpleAir, Inc. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile 

Commc’n, 820 F.3d 419, 431 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. 

Sys. v. BENQ Am. Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Different claim terms are 

presumed to have different meanings.”) (citation omitted)). 

The Court therefore adopts Defendant’s construction of “hydrocarbon oils or solids” 

as “oils or solids composed only of carbon and hydrogen.”

///

///

///

///

///

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CONCLUSION

The terms in dispute are construed as follows:

TERM CONSTRUCTION

1. “emulsion” (all asserted claims of the 

’225 Patent)

“a mixture of two or more immiscible 

liquids, in which one liquid is dispersed 

in another liquid”

2. “in contact with” (all asserted claims 

of the ’225 Patent)

“touching”

3. “water immiscible” (all asserted 

claims of the ’225 Patent)

“will not mix with or dissolve in water”

4. “oxygen dissolving substance” (all 

asserted claims of the ’225 Patent)

“a substance in which oxygen is 

preferentially soluble in comparison to

water”

5. “oxygen dissolving substance 

emulsified into intimate contact with the 

enzyme” (all asserted claims of the ’225 

Patent)

“oxygen dissolving substance [as 

defined above] emulsified into very 

close contact with the enzyme.”

6. “electrode” (all asserted claims of the 

’225 Patent)

“a solid electric conductor through 

which an electric current enters or leaves 

a substance”

7. “hydrocarbon oils or solids” (claim 5 

of the ’225 Patent)

“oils or solids composed only of carbon 

and hydrogen”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 30, 2019

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