Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00100/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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 To the extent Plaintiff argues that this action was inappropriately low numbered to the

undersigned, the court notes that the present action satisfies the criteria and prerequisites of the low

number rule, Local Rule 40.1, including the one-year time limit for seeking to low number an action.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN V. KLAT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv0100 JM(CAB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECUSAL; DENYING MOTION TO

STRIKE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS

vs.

MITCHELL REPAIR INFORMATION

COMPANY, LLC; SNAP-ON

INCORPORATED,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Susan V. Klat moves ex parte to recuse the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §144

and 455, (Docket No. 8), and to strike or dismiss Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that

Defendants did not agree to waive service of the summons and complaint. (Docket No. 10). For the

reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion for recusal and denies the motion to strike

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s arguments for recusal arise from an earlier-filed action involving the same parties.1

On October 16, 2008 Plaintiff filed a complaint against these same Defendants alleging a single claim

for violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Klat v. Mitchell Repair Information Co., 08cv1907

JM(CAB). In that action Defendants sought to take Plaintiff’s deposition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

Case 3:10-cv-00100-JM-DHB Document 14 Filed 03/09/10 Page 1 of 5
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30. Plaintiff objected to the taking of her deposition. On April 28, 2009 the undersigned overruled

Plaintiff’s objections to being deposed. (Docket No. 19). Defendants again noticed the deposition

of Plaintiff. Plaintiff then objected to the deposition going forward and, on May 6, 2009, Magistrate

Judge Bencivengo granted Defendants’ motion to compel and the deposition was once again renoticed.

(Docket No. 23). Plaintiff filed objections to the order compelling her deposition testimony and, on

May 27, 2009, the undersigned overruled Plaintiff’s objections and referred the matter to Magistrate

Judge Bencivengo regarding the imposition of sanctions for her failure to comply with the May 6,

2009 order requiring Plaintiff to submit to a deposition. (Docket No. 32). 

On June 3, 2009 Magistrate Judge Bencivengo conducted a status conference to address the

matter of sanctions. (Docket No. 33). “Plaintiff represented to the Court that despite the two orders

directing her to make herself available for deposition, she would not appear at a deposition noticed

by Defendants.” (Report and Recommendation Regarding Discovery Sanctions at p.2:21-22, Docket

No. 36). Plaintiff objected to the recommended dismissal and, on July 13, 2009, the undersigned

adopted the recommendation and dismissed the action because of Plaintiff’s willful refusal to comply

with two court orders. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit and, on December 9, 2009,

the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the undersigned’s dismissal of the action with prejudice.

(Docket No. 49).

Plaintiff now moves to recuse the undersigned based upon the dismissal of the earlier-filed

action.

DISCUSSION

Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. §455

The court concludes that recusal is not appropriate under Section 455. This section sets forth

a broad ground for recusal: a federal judge must recuse “in any proceeding in which his (or her)

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. §455(a). The obligations set forth in Section

455 are “self-enforcing on the part of the judge.” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867-68 (9th

Cir. 1980). Disqualification is required if a reasonable factual basis exists for questioning the judge’s

impartiality. “The inquiry is objective, from the point of view of a reasonable person with access to

all of the facts.” New York city Housing Develop. Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 1986).

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 The court notes that the “active” status maintained by Magistrate Bencivengo with the State

Bar of California presents no ground for recusal. Moreover, there is no indication by Plaintiff that

Magistrate Judge Bencivengo is, apart from her judicial functions, practicing law in violation of the

rules of professional conduct.

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Section 455(a) requires disqualification “to be evaluated on an objective basis, so that what matters

is not the reality of bias or prejudice, but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548

(1994). The test for disqualification is whether an average, reasonable person knowing all the

circumstances would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas

Corp. of America, 902 F.2d 703, 714 (9th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff moves for recusal “because Judge Miller has personal knowledge of the July 20, 2009

unresolved complaint for judicial misconduct.” (Motion at p.4:226-27). In support of her request for

recusal, Plaintiff submits the complaint for judicial misconduct, dated July 23, 2009. (Klat Affidavit,

Exh. A ¶4). The Complaint of Judicial Misconduct or Disability represents that the statement of facts

is set forth in “2 part attachments w/ support documents.” (Id. at p.8). In the supporting documents,

Plaintiff sets forth the following as the basis for her complaint:

Judge Miller has and is relying on information to issue disposition Orders in the above

entitled case being tried in a United States District Court on the basis of guidance and

opinion of a magistrate judge in possession of an active license to practice law in the

State of California (Cal. Bar # 138791) while simultaneously executing judicial duties

in a manner consistent with an individual acting as an attorney in the case which is

forbidden under Title 28 of the United States Code section 454.

(Id. at p.10). In other words, Plaintiff complains that Magistrate Judge Bencivengo “is practicing law

while holding a position and making decisions as a United States Magistrate Judge in violation” of

28 U.S.C. §454 and Rules of Conduct Rule 3-210 and 2-400. (Id. at p.11).2 

The court concludes that Plaintiff fails to identify any cogent basis for recusal. The fact that

the undersigned considered the Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Bencivengo is

consistent with and specifically authorized by 28 U.S.C. §636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Even if the

undersigned erroneously adopted the Report and Recommendations, the fact that a judge makes

erroneous rulings in a case is not enough to show bias or prejudice. Cintron v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

813 F.2d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, just as judges have an obligation to recuse themselves

when their impartiality may reasonably be questioned, judges also have an obligation to refrain from

recusal when there is no basis for disqualification. New York City Housing Develop. Corp., 796 F.2d

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 The court notes that Defendants filed a Waiver of Service on February 16, 2010. (Docket

No. 6).

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at 980. 

Finally, the court notes that the grounds for recusal identified by Plaintiff would result in the

recusal of every judge of this bench because the Magistrate Judges in this district play an integral role

in every civil action. L.R. 72.1, 72.2, 72.3. Further, the fact that the Magistrate Judges, like the

District Court Judges, are also members of the State Bar of California, is not a basis for recusal.

In sum, as a reasonable, well-informed observer would not reasonably question the

undersigned’s impartiality by using a Magistrate Judge, licensed by the State Bar of California, there

is no basis for recusal. The motion for recusal is denied. 

Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. §144

This provision provides an alternative means for recusal. Under this provision, once a party

“makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit” showing that the judge “has a personal bias or

prejudice” against the party, another judge shall be assigned to hear the matter. 28 U.S.C. §144. The

affidavit “shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists.” Id. Here,

for the above stated reasons, the grounds for recusal identified by Plaintiff are so insubstantial that

Plaintiff fails to make a sufficient threshold showing of bias or prejudice. The unnecessary transfer

of this motion for determination by another judge is inherently inefficient and delays the

administration of justice. Under these circumstances, not only does the court deny the motion but

declines to transfer the motion to another judge because of the insubstantial showing of bias or

prejudice. 

The Motion to Strike Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff also moves to strike or set aside Defendants’ motion to dismiss filed on or about

February 16, 2010 on the ground that Defendants have “not verified, acknowledged, signed or

complied with the necessary return release form verifying entity acceptance of waiver of service of

summons and complaint.” (Motion at p.2:3-5). 3

 As Plaintiff fails to identify any authority requiring

Defendants to waive service under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d) as a condition for bringing a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

motion, the motion to strike is denied.

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In sum, the court denies the motion for recusal and denies the motion to strike Defendants’

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth herein, the court also denies

the motion to recuse Magistrate Judge Bencivengo.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 9, 2010

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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