Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01550/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01550-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arturo Gamez-Villagrana,

Petitioner

-vsKatrina Kane,

Respondent

CV-07-1550-PHX-SMM (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the federal Detention Center at Eloy, Arizona,

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 10, 2007

(#1), challenging his continued detention during his immigration proceedings. On November

19, 2007, Respondents filed their Response (#11). Petitioner filed a Reply on January 18,

2008 (#16).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

Allegations of Removability - On June 9, 2004, the Immigration and Naturalization

Service (“INS”) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (Exhibit A), alleging that Petitioner is

a native and citizen of Mexico and not the United States, and asserting that he had been

ordered removed in 1993 but had re-entered the United States illegally in 1995. (Exhibits

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to the Answer, #11, are referenced herein as “Exhibit __.”) (See also Exhibit B, Order of

Deportation, 8/12/93.) However, the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien prepared by

the INS (Exhibit C) reflected that Petitioner’s mother was a native and/or citizen of the

United States, and that Petitioner was claiming derivative citizenship. On June 21, 2004, the

INS filed Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability (Exhibit D), alleging that

Petitioner was deportable by reason of a conviction on a controlled substance violation.

Supplied records reflected a California state conviction on February 8, 2001 for felony

possession of heroin. (Exhibit E.)

Detention - Petitioner was ordered detained on June 9, 2004 (at the time of the Notice

to Appear) pursuant to section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and

related regulations. (Exhibit F, Not. Custody Determ.) Petitioner filed a request for release,

which was denied on June 30, 2004. (Exhibit G, IJ Order dated “6-30-03.”)

Removal Hearing - At the removal hearing, Petitioner admitted to being born in

Mexico, to re-entry in 1995, and to the 2001 heroin conviction, but denied having been

removed and argued his derivative citizenship. The immigration judge rejected the claim of

citizenship, and sustained all three deportability charges: the prior deportation/illegal reentry, the presence without proper documents, and the controlled substance conviction

charges. The immigration judge found no grounds for relief from removal, and ordered

Petitioner removed to Mexico. (Exhibit H, IJ Decision 8/26/04; Exhibit I, IJ Order 8/26/04.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON RE-DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP

Petitioner sought review by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and filed a

Motion to Remand (Exhibit J), asserting that he had obtained evidence that his maternal

grandmother was a native of the United States, thereby supporting his claim of his mother’s

citizenship and his own derivative citizenship. In January, 2005, the BIA sustained the

appeal, and remanded the matter to the immigration judge for a re-determination on

Petitioner’s citizenship claim. (Exhibit K, BIA Order 1/11/05.)

The immigration judge reheard the matter, but again concluded that Petitioner had not

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established his claim of citizenship, and again ordered Petitioner removed. (Exhibit L, IJ

Order 3/11/05; Exhibit X, IJ Dec. 3/11/05.)

Petitioner again appealed to the BIA, noting that he continued to be detained. (Exhibit

M, Not. Appeal.) The BIA rejected his appeal, finding that he had failed to show that his

mother had spent 10 years in the United States prior to Petitioner’s birth in Mexico. (Exhibit

N, BIA Order 9/6/05.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE NINTH CIRCUIT

On September 20, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, and sought a stay of removal. (Exhibit O.) Counsel was appointed for

Petitioner. (Exhibit R, Order 5/1/06.) On August 2, 2007, the Ninth Circuit held the petition

in abeyance and transferred the matter to the district court for the District of Arizona for a

de novo determination of Petitioner’s citizenship claim. The court of appeals also expressed

concern whether Petitioner’s continued detention under INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),

continued to be authorized in light of the length of his detention and the foreseeable process,

and noted his custody could be reviewed in a separate habeas proceeding. (Exhibit W, 9th

Cir. Order 8/2/07.)

D. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE DISTRICT COURT ON CITIZENSHIP

Petitioner’s claims of citizenship were transferred to the District of Arizona, in

Gamez-Villagrana v. Gonzales, CV-07-1519-PHX-FJM. Those claims are set for trial before

District Judge Martone on June 10, 2008. (2:07cv1519, Order 2/7/08, #34.)

E. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF CUSTODY

Petitioner has remained in custody since the 2004 commencement of proceedings.

2005 Review of Custody - While the matter was pending before the Ninth Circuit,

Petitioner’s custody status was reviewed by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement

agency on December 7, 2005. He was ordered to be continued in detention on the basis of

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his administratively final order of removal and his criminal history. (Exhibit P, Custody

Review Worksheet; Exhibit Q, Custody Decision 12/7/05.)

2006 Review of Custody - Petitioner’s custody status was again reviewed on

November 30, 2006, and was again continued on the basis of his removal order, criminal

history, and failure to offer documentation supporting his release. (Exhibit T, ICE Order

11/30/06.)

2007 Review of Custody - Petitioner’s last custody status review was in September

2007, during the pendency of this proceeding. Petitioner presented documents reflecting a

proposed residence with his sister in Los Angeles, a job offer, and completion of ESL and

substance abuse classes. Based upon his threat to public safety and flight risk, he was

ordered to continue in custody. (Exhibit U, Custody Review Worksheet; Exhibit V, ICE

Order 9/26/07.) 

F. CURRENT HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the present proceeding on August 10, 2007 by filing

his pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2441 For a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in

Federal Custody (#1). Petitioner asserts a single ground for relief, arguing that his detention

in custody since 2004 is not authorized as mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226,

pursuant to Kim v. Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). Service was ordered on October 12, 2007

(#4).

Answer - Respondent filed her Answer (#11) on November 19, 2007. Respondent

argues that Petitioner is not detained pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1226, but pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a) (INA § 241), on the basis that Petitioner has, by seeking judicial review and stay

of removal, acted to prevent his removal. Respondent further argues that the Government

has complied with applicable regulations(28 C.F.R. § 241.4) by conducting periodic reviews

of Petitioner’s custody, and concluding on the basis of his criminal record and previous

immigration violations that he is a flight risk and a danger to the community. (Answer, #11

at 10-13.) Respondent argues that because Petitioner’s removal is “reasonably foreseeable”

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1

 The original Reply (#16), filed January 18, 2008, was submitted with only the

memorandum. The Amended Reply (#17) was submitted as a “Notice of Errata,” and

included the entire reply, including the memorandum.

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(having been hindered only by Petitioner’s continued challenges to removal), it is not limited

by the Court’s decision on indefinite detention in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).

(Answer, #11 at 13-15.) Alternatively, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s continued

detention is authorized under § 1226(c) to the extent that his removal period has not yet

commenced because of the pendency of his judicial appeal. (Answer, #11 at 15-21.)

Reply - Petitioner, now represented by counsel, filed his Amended1

 Reply (#17) on

January 21, 2008. Petitioner argues that § 1231 will not apply until after the Ninth Circuit

lifts its stay of removal and thus his detention must be under § 1226. (Reply, #17 at 2-5.)

He argues he has not received the expedited removal process required for detention under §

1226, as determined necessary under Kim v. Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) and Tijani v.

Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), and that the six month standard for § 1231 detention

under Zadvydas was made applicable to detention under § 1226 in Nadarajah v. Gonzales,

443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). (Reply, #17 at 5-10.) Petitioner argues that in light of his

claims to citizenship, his removal is not reasonably foreseeable (id. at 10), and he does not

pose a flight risk or risk to the community (id. at 10-11). Petitioner argues in the alternative

that if his detention is under § 1231, it has been too long under Zadvydas, and no flight risk

or risk to the community justifies his continued detention. (Reply, #17 at 11-12.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. AUTHORITY FOR PETITIONER’S DETENTION

Petitioner’s circumstances reflect a common scenario: he is being detained during a

judicial review of his administratively final order of removal, which has been judicially

stayed. Respondents argue primarily that this custody is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and

Petitioner argues primarily that it is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.

Removal Period Detention Under § 1231 - Section 1231 authorizes detention during

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the “removal period,” and provides: 

During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.

Under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney

General release an alien who has been found inadmissible under section

1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section

1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).

 The statute defines the “removal period” as the 90 day period beginning on the latest

of: (1) when the removal order is administratively final; (2) when a final order is entered on

a judicial review, if stay of removal has been issued; or (3) upon release from other custody

(e.g. a criminal prison term). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) and (B). However, where an alien

fails to assist in his removal or “acts to prevent the alien’s removal”, the running of the 90

day limit is suspended. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C).

The statute further provides that after the removal period the alien is to be released on

supervision, § 1231(a)(3), unless he is a criminal alien, in which case he may be detained

beyond the removal period if he “has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk

to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,” § 1231(a)(6).

Detention Pending Removal Decision under § 1226 - Section 1226 authorizes

detention of aliens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Detention is made mandatory for certain inadmissible or

criminal aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Except for mandatory detention cases, the Attorney

General is given authority to release the alien on conditions or bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).

Detention Not Authorized by § 1231 - In the instant case, Petitioner is subject to a

removal order which is administratively final, but which is pending upon judicial review, and

subject to a stay of removal. Accordingly, Petitioner’s removal period will not commence

until “the date of the court's final order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Because section 1231

only authorizes detention “[d]uring the removal period,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), or “beyond

the removal period,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), it cannot authorize Petitioner’s pre-removal

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2

 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s judicial appeal “suspended the removal period”

because it amounted to an affirmative act preventing his removal. (Answer, #11 at 11.) To

the contrary, because a stay was issued, Petitioner’s appeal did not “suspend” the removal

period, but delayed it’s commencement, as provided by § 1231(a)(2)(ii).

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period detention.2

This reading of the plain language of the statute has been followed by a variety of

authorities. See Bejjani v. I.N.S, 271 F.3d 670, 689 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other

grounds by Fernandez Varga v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006) (holding detention not

authorized by § 1231 pre-removal period, i.e. during judicial review with stay of removal);

Kothandaraghipathy v. Department of Homeland Sec., 396 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1107

(D.Ariz.,2005) (Teilborg, D.J.) (§ 1226 rather than § 1231 authorized detention because

“[a]lthough Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order of removal, the ‘removal

period’ has not yet begun because his removal order is currently on appeal to the Ninth

Circuit and because the Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner a stay of his removal.”);

Quezada-Bucio v. Ridge, 317 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1224 (W.D.Wash. 2004) (same); Hang Nam

Yoon v. Crawford, 2007 WL 4609573, 3 (D.Ariz. 2007) reconsideration granted on other

other grounds, 2008 WL 169647 (2008) (McNamee, D.J.) (same). See also Tijani v. Willis,

430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005) (evaluating detention during judicial review under §

1226). Cf. Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006) (§1231 applied despite

pending judicial review, because no valid stay was issued).

The authorities cited by Respondent (see Answer, #11 at 10-11) do not hold to the

contrary without a preceding presumption that “removal proceedings” is by definition limited

to administrative proceedings, and that “final removal order” necessarily refers only to an

administratively final order. Thus, although the Zadvydas court referenced the applicability

of § 1226 “[w]hile removal proceedings are in progress,” 533 U.S. at 683, they did not limit

such removal proceedings to administrative processes. Indeed, the Court noted that § 1231

only applied “[a]fter entry of a final removal order and during the 90-day removal period,”

id. By the terms of § 1231 that removal period does not commence until a final judicial

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order, where there has been an appeal and a stay order.

Similarly, when the BIA decision in In re Joseph, 22 I.&N. Dec. 660, 668 (1999),

referenced the applicability of § 1226 “after an administratively final order,” they were not

faced with an administrative order under judicial review. Rather they were determining

whether authority for detention shifted from § 1226 to § 1231 in “the interval between when

an Immigration Judge issues a decision on the issues of removability and relief and when

there is an administratively final decision on removability” as a result of a BIA decision. 22

I.&N. Dec. at 668-669. Thus, the only finality of relevance in the Joseph decision was an

administrative one. Any further reading of the BIA’s decision would be based upon dicta.

Likewise, Respondents cannot rely upon the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in De la Teja

v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). Although the court found that the alien’s

detention shifted from § 1226 to § 1231 upon issuance of the immigration judge’s decision,

that was based upon the fact that no appeal (administrative or judicial) of that decision had

been made, and thus the alien was within the “removal period.” 321 F.3d at 1363.

Finally, the recognition in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(8) of the Attorney General’s authority

to detain aliens under § 1231 “after a final order of removal” is not persuasive without a

presumption that only administrative finality is relevant, and cannot be read to eviscerate the

provision of § 1231(a)(2)(ii) delaying the removal period until after a judicial review coupled

with a stay.

 Thus, the authorization for Petitioner’s continued detention must come from §

1226(c). 

Detention Authorized by § 1226 - Section 1226 authorizes detention of aliens

“pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a). For “criminal aliens” who, like Petitioner have been found removable on the basis

of felony drug convictions, § 1226(c) governs their detention and makes it mandatory. 

Petitioner’s removal decision is still pending before the district court and ultimately

the Ninth Circuit in Petitioner’s appeal of his citizenship determination. “Detention during

removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” Demore v. Kim,

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 Conversely, Respondents request a determination that Petitioner has not raised a

“substantial argument” that he is not removable, and thus to find that Petitioner is not entitled

to application of Tijani. As discussed hereinafter, such a determination is not required.

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538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). Thus, Petitioner’s detention is, without more, authorized under

§ 1226(c).

B. EFFECT OF LENGTH OF DETENTION

Here, Petitioner has been detained for almost four years as his removal proceedings

have plodded along. Petitioner argues that this is too long.

No Relief from Zadvydas - In Zadvydas, the Court acknowledged that there are due

process limits beyond which detention fails to serve its purported purposes, and thus is not

constitutionally permissible. “A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise

a serious constitutional problem.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. However, the Court in Kim

v. Demore, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) distinguished between the valid detention there where the

alien’s removal proceedings were continuing, and that at issue in Zadvydas, where the

removal proceedings were complete. The Kim Court noted that in Zadvydas “removal was

no longer practically attainable” and that “the period of detention at issue in Zadvydas was

‘indefinite’ and ‘potentially permanent.’ ” Id. at 527-28. 

Here, Petitioner’s removal proceedings are continuing, not complete. While his

detention has been lengthy, its length is attributable to the administrative and judicial

processes, and it has a definite termination point. Upon completion of judicial review of his

petition, the stay of the removal order will be lifted. 

Moreover, Petitioner has made no showing that his removal is not practically

attainable. Upon issuance of a ruling adverse to Petitioner, there is no reason to believe that

Petitioner’s removal to Mexico could not be completed forthwith. 

Petitioner invites this habeas court to find a probability that he will never be removed,

based upon the validity of his citizenship claim.3

 (Reply, #17 at 10.) That determination

is beyond the scope of this proceeding. Nothing in Zadvydas requires this habeas court to

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subsume the removal process and to prognosticate on the ultimate outcome of his appeal of

his removal order. In Zadvydas, the removal proceedings were complete (and thus the

detention authorized under § 1231 rather than § 1226), and the only delay in release through

removal was the practical impediments to executing the removal order.

It is true that in Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), the court found

a probability that removal was not reasonably foreseeable, while removal proceedings were

still under way. There, however, the situation was far more complex and far more resolute

than Petitioner’s routine appeal of an adverse citizenship determination. In Nadarajah, the

petitioner was a native of Sri Lanka who had been granted asylum and relief under the

Convention Against Torture by the immigration judge, and upon appeal of the asylum

decision and remand from the BIA, had again been granted asylum by the IJ. That decision

had been upheld on review by the BIA. However, the BIA had then undertaken the unusual

move of referring the matter back to the IJ to allow the government to update its

investigations, and then referred the matter to the Attorney General for a determination of

whether he desired to exercise discretion to review the matter de novo. 443 F.3d at 1075. In

finding that removability was not foreseeable, the Ninth Circuit noted the rarity of a grant of

relief by the immigration judge of the type afforded Nadarajah, and found that although the

grant of asylum was discretionary, the withholding of removal was not. The court

specifically noted that the despite being given “every opportunity to do so,” the government

had not rebutted the petitioner’s showing that he could not be removed to Sri Lanka, and that

there was no other country for removal. 

Unlike Nadarajah, Petitioner has not already been granted administrative relief, nor

has the government placed Petitioner in administrative limbo akin to the BIA’s referral of the

case to the Attorney General in Nadarajah. Rather, Petitioner has repeatedly lost his claims

to citizenship, and the litigation of his removability has proceeded apace through normal

channels, and has not been shuttled into some administrative backwater. Nor has Petitioner

has offered anything to show that upon an adverse resolution of his appeal he cannot be

removed.

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4

 Respondents argue, under the presumption that detention is under § 1231, that the

delay amounts to Petitioner preventing his removal, and thus justifies extended detention

under § 1231(a)(1)(C). (Answer, #11 at 11.) Because the undersigned finds that the

detention can only be authorized under § 1226, which has no comparable provision, this

argument is not addressed.

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No Relief from Kim - Petitioner argues that Kim itself mandates his release, based

upon the sheer length of Petitioner’s detention. (Reply, #17 at 5-6.) It is true that the Kim

Court noted that removal proceedings, and therefore detention under § 1226, normally lasts

only 90 days, a length of time which Zadvydas would have found presumptively reasonable.

538 U.S. at 529. In contrast, Petitioner has been detained for four years. However, the Court

did not adopt any time limitations on detention. Indeed, they noted that appeals would

lengthen the process, and dismissed any deterrent effect, noting:

““the legal system ... is replete with situations requiring the making of

difficult judgments as to which course to follow,” and, even in the

criminal context, there is no constitutional prohibition against requiring

parties to make such choices. 

538 U.S. at 531, n. 14.

Petitioner argues that he should be released because the delay in proceedings is

attributable to entities other than himself.4

 (Reply, #17 at 8.) In his concurrence in Kim,

Justice Kennedy noted that “[w]ere there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing

and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether

the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or

dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.” Kim, 538 U.S. at 532-533 (Kennedy,

J. , concurring). Petitioner offers nothing to show that the Government has acted in anyway

to prolong these proceedings, but merely argues that he is not to blame either. But, it is not

the sheer length of time in removal proceedings that Justice Kennedy thought would raise

constitutional concerns, but rather the inference that the delay and prolonged detention was

for illicit purposes. There is no basis for such an inference here. Rather, it appears that the

parties have both been litigating the matter in good faith, and that Petitioner’s prolonged

detention can be attributed to inherent delays in the process itself.

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 The undersigned is not convinced that the time for administrative and judicial

proceedings must be analyzed separately. At some point, the sheer amount of time spent in

removal proceedings, whether administrative or judicial, would seem to raise the due process

concerns which prompted the construction of § 1226 adopted by Tijani.

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Relief Available Under Tijani - In Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir.

2005), the court expressed concern that expansive detention under § 1226(c) would be

unconstitutional, and held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is authorized only for

“expedited removal of criminal aliens” and that two years and eight months of process,

including his judicial appeals, was not expeditious. 

Proceedings Not Expedited - Here, Petitioner has been in custody for almost four

years, far longer than the alien in Tijani. Of that time, only some 15 months was consumed

prior to Petitioner’s September, 2005 appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The balance of 31 months

has been expended in judicial review.

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s proceedings have not been unreasonably long.

(Answer, #11 at 19.) To the extent that Respondent denies any bad faith on the

Government’s part, the undersigned would agree. No party has been shown to have engaged

in foot dragging. However, Tijani did not rely upon the unreasonableness of the delay, and

did not provide an exception for reasonable delays. The proceeding is either expeditious, or

a bail determination is required.

Respondent argues that a different result is required by Judge Wake’s decision in

Mboussi-Ona v. Crawford, 2007 WL 3026946 (D.Ariz.,2007) (CV-06-2897-PHX-NVW).

 (See Answer, #11 at 20.) In Mboussi-Ona, Judge Wake differentiated between

administrative and judicial delays, and found that to the extent that Tijani required expedited

judicial proceedings, it could not extend to “normal judicial appeal time.” Judge Wake

rightly reasoned that any other reading would turn Tijani into a get-out-of-jail card (or at

least a get-a-bail-hearing card) obtainable by every removable alien by simply appealing a

removal decision.5

 2007 WL 3029646, 5. However, in Mboussi-Ona, the petitioner’s

judicial proceedings had only commenced in April, 2006, and thus had been pending for only

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6

 In commenting on the constitutional questions, the Tijani decision noted that it

involved “lawfully admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.” 430 F.3d at 1242.

There is no suggestion that Petitioner is a lawfully admitted resident alien. However, Tijani

was resolved on statutory construction grounds, and thus the “expedited process” limitation

would apply irrespective of the pre-removal proceeding status of the alien.

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eight months at the time of his December, 2006 habeas petition, and only nineteen months

at the time of the Court’s September, 2007 order. Id. at 2. Moreover, the administrative

proceedings in Mboussi-Ona had lasted only ten months, three of which were as a result of

the petitioner’s own delays. Id. at 1. Thus, he had only been detained a total of 29 months.

 Judge Wake did not propose what constituted normal judicial review time. However,

the fact that this matter has been considered once by the Ninth Circuit, and then referred to

the District Court over nine months ago, suggests that the review of this case has not been

normal. 

Moreover, the Federal Court Management Statistics reports reflect that the national

“Median Time from Filing Notice of Appeal to Disposition” for 2007 was only 12.2 months.

For the Ninth Circuit, it was higher, but still only 17.4 months. See http://www.uscourts.

gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2007.pl (last accessed 5/2/7). In contrast, Petitioner’s judicial proceedings

have lasted 31 months, more than twice as long as the national average and 80% longer than

the Ninth Circuit’s average. Thus the time spent on judicial review in this case cannot be

said to be within the normal judicial review time. 

Thus, even under Mboussi-Ona, the implicit requirement in § 1226(c) for

expeditiousness has not been met.

Relief Available - However, Tijani did not mandate that past some undefined point of

expeditiousness, an alien must be released. Rather, at such point the alien is entitled to a

hearing to grant bail “unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or will be a

danger to the community.” 430 F.3d at 1242.6

Thus, in Hang Nam Yoon v. Crawford, 2008 WL 45405 (D.Ariz. Jan 02, 2008) (NO.

CV-06-3068-PHX-SMM), this Court relied on Tijani, not to release the alien, but to direct

that he be afforded a bail hearing. See also Martinez-Herrera v. Crawford, 2007 WL

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2023469 (D.Ariz.,2007) (NO.CV-07-0267-PHX-NVW) (release conditioned on a grant of

bail hearing); Ali v. Crawford, 2007 WL 1670165 (D.Ariz.,2007) (CV-06-1149-PHX-EHC)

(same); Zhang v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2925192 (D.Ariz.,2007) (CV-06-0892-PHX-ROS)

(same); Makaj v. Crowther, 2007 WL 3224539 (D.Ariz. 2007) (CV-07-0342-PHX-JAT)

(addressing whether a bail hearing was required due to delay).

Here, Petitioner has repeatedly received administrative hearings on his continued

detention. However, they have been reviews by ICE officials, not by an immigration judge.

Moreover, a review of the detention decisions reflects that they have been made under the

purported authority of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. (See Exhibit V, Detention Decision 9/26/07, at 1

(citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1).) That regulation is a delegation of the Attorney General’s

authority to determine custody “under sections 241(a)(6) and 212(d)(5)(A) when there is a

final order of removal.” As discussed above, there is no such order here, and Petitioner’s

custody is pursuant to the pre-removal order provisions of § 1226. “Prior to such final order

. . .the immigration judge is authorized to exercise the authority in section 236 of the Act [8

U.S.C. § 1226].” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1). 

Thus, in Tijani, Yoon, Martinez-Herrera, Ali and Zhang, the courts directed that the

petitioner be given a custody hearing before an immigration judge. Because his removal

proceedings have not been expeditious, Petitioner is entitled to the same.

Lack of “Substantial Argument” Against Removability - Respondent argues that

Petitioner is not entitled to application of Tijani because he has failed to raise a “substantial

argument” that he is not removable. (Answer, #11 at 21.) However, the court’s opinion in

Tijani imposed no such requirement. Rather, as recognized by Respondent, the discussion

on a “substantial argument” arose in Judge Tashima’s concurrence. However, that was in

the context of Judge Tashima’s proposal for a sweeping modification to the jurisprudence

of mandatory detention, i.e. that “[o]nly those immigrants who could not raise a ‘substantial’

argument against their removability should be subject to mandatory detention.” 430 F.3d at

1247. Respondent does not appear to adopt Judge Tashima’s proposal, and cannot morph

its shield into a sword preventing application of the Tijani court’s decision.

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IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed August 10, 2007 (#1) be GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court issue its Order that Respondent

shall either release Petitioner from custody under an order of supervision, or provide a

hearing to Petitioner, within 30 days of the filing of this Order, before an Immigration Judge

with the power to grant him bail unless the Government establishes therein that he is a flight

risk or will be a danger to the community.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: May 13, 2008 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\07-1550-001r RR 08 05 01 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

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