Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00376/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00376-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN JUSTIN BROWNLEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SGT. J. BURNES, M. RIVERA, P. 

RODRIGUEZ, and J.J. FLORES,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00376-HBK (PC)

ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

PERMIT PLAINTIFF TO PROCEED ON 

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS AND DISMISS 

REMAINING CLAIMS1

(Doc. No. 18)

 

Plaintiff Benjamin Justin Brownlee is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds on his First 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 18, “FAC”). As more fully set forth below, the undersigned 

finds the FAC states cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive use of force claims against 

Defendants Burnes, Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores, Eighth Amendment sexual assault claims

against Defendants Rivera and Rodriguez, and an Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim 

against Defendant Flores, but no other claims. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that 

Plaintiff be allowed to proceed only on these claims and the remaining claims and defendants be 

dismissed.

1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302 

(E.D. Cal. 2022). 

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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1). 

Because it appeared from the face of the Complaint that this action was not timely filed, the 

undersigned issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), directing Plaintiff to show cause why the 

action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. 

(Doc. No. 12). Plaintiff filed a response asserting, inter alia, that it took three years to complete 

the administrative process regarding his claims. (Doc. No. 15).2 On August 31, 2023, the 

undersigned discharged the OSC, screened the Complaint and found it stated cognizable Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Burnes, Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores, 

but no other claims. (Doc. No. 16 at 1). The Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended 

complaint, file a notice to voluntarily dismiss the Defendants and claims deemed not cognizable,

or stand on his Complaint subject to the undersigned issuing findings and recommendations to 

dismiss the Defendants and claims deemed not cognizable. (Id. at 11-12). On October 11, 2023, 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 18).

B. Summary of the FAC

Plaintiff’s FAC is based on an incident that occurred at California State Prison, Corcoran 

(“CSP Corcoran”) on July 25, 2018. (Doc. No. 18 at 15). The FAC names as Defendants (1) 

Sergeant J. Burnes, (2) Correctional Officer M. Rivera, (3) Correctional Officer P. Rodriguez, and 

(4) Correctional Officer J.J. Flores. (Id. at 14-15). The FAC alleges an Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim, Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim, and a First Amendment 

retaliation claim. (See generally id.). The following facts are presumed true at this stage of the 

2 Per the State of California’s inmate locator, Plaintiff is serving a sentence of “life without the possibility 

of parole. https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/Details.aspx?ID. Because Plaintiff is serving a life sentence, 

his claims are subject to the two-year limitations period and should have been brought in July or August 

2020 at the latest. The action was not commenced until March 2023. California law permits tolling of the 

two-year limitations period during the time a prisoner pursues his administrative remedies. Brown v. 

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a 

prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process.”). The Court’s decision to permit this case to 

proceed after Plaintiff’s response to the OSC is not a ruling on the timeliness of the action nor does it 

preclude Defendants from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, if appropriate. 

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proceedings.

While Plaintiff was in handcuffs and leg restraints, Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez and 

Flores threw Plaintiff to the floor. (Id. at 15). Thereafter, Defendant Burnes kicked Plaintiff

“multiple” times in the face, causing Plaintiff to bleed from his nose and mouth. (Id. at 15-16). 

Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores then punched and kicked Plaintiff in the ribs, legs, 

stomach, back, and chest. (Id. at 16).

Afterwards, Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores ripped off Plaintiff’s clothes “for 

no reason.” (Id.). After they took his clothes off, Defendant Rodriguez was “smacking and

squeezing [Plaintiff’s] buttocks” and Rivera “place[d] his right-hand finger in [Plaintiff’s] butt 

hole . . . five times.” (Id.). “After . . . Defendants [sic] Rivera place [sic] his finger [Plaintiff’s] 

rectum many time [sic]” Defendant Rodriguez told Rivera that it is “his turn” and that Flores was 

going “to rape [Plaintiff] next.” (Id. at 17). Plaintiff “was yelling for help well [sic] he has been 

rape [sic] many time [sic] by the Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores.” (Id.). Defendant 

Flores threatened he would “kill” Plaintiff if he filed a grievance or complaint regarding the 

incident and “make it look like a suicide.” (Id. at 16-17). After Plaintiff filed grievances 

regarding the incident, the Defendants “sent other correctional staff member [sic] to use excessive 

force on [Plaintiff], by having them attack [Plaintiff] in the cell; out of the cell; throwing out 

[Plaintiff’s] mail and not feed [Plaintiff] his food” during mealtimes. (Id. at 17).

As a result of the incident, Plaintiff fears for his life. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary 

damages and “such other relief” as the Court finds he is entitled to. (Id. at 18).

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANAYSIS

A. 8th Amendment Excessive Use of Force

Prison officials who use excessive force against inmates violate the inmate’s Eight 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 832 (1994); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir., 2002). “[W]henever prison 

officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], 

the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or 

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 

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1, 6-7 (1992). When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent 

of injury suffered by an inmate . . . the need for application of force, the relationship between that 

need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ 

and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). While de minimis uses of physical force generally do not 

implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant injury need not be evident in the context of an 

excessive force claim, because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to 

cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.

Here, accepting the allegations as true, the FAC states a cognizable claim of excessive 

force against Defendant Burnes, in his individual capacity, to survive the “low threshold” for sua 

sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). While Plaintiff was handcuffed and placed in leg 

restraints, Defendant Burnes kicked Plaintiff repeatedly in the head, continuing even after 

Plaintiff was bleeding from his nose and mouth. (Doc. No. 18 at 15-16). Because Plaintiff was 

fully restrained and arguably posing no plausible threat to either prison staff or inmates,

Defendant Burnes’ use of force was not necessary to maintain order or restore discipline. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. 

Given that Defendant Burnes kicked Plaintiff in the head hard enough to cause him to 

bleed from the nose, all while Plaintiff was handcuffed and in leg restraints, the Court reasonably 

infers that Defendant Burnes used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 

causing harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Accordingly, the FAC states a cognizable Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim as to Defendant Burnes.

The FAC also states a cognizable claim of excessive force as to Defendants Rivera, 

Rodriguez, and Flores in their individual capacities. The FAC asserts that after Defendant Burnes 

kicked Plaintiff in the face, Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores punched and kicked 

Plaintiff in the ribs, legs, stomach, back, and chest while he laid on the ground. (Doc. No. 18 at 

16). Plaintiff remained in handcuffs and leg restraints at this point and did not plausibly pose a 

threat to others. Thus, Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores’ use of force was not necessary 

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to maintain order or restore discipline, and instead appeared to be used “maliciously and 

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

835. Accordingly, the FAC states a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim as to 

Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores. 

B. Eighth Amendment Sexual Assault Claim 

To state a cognizable sexual assault claim, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that “a 

prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological justification, 

touched [him] in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for the staff member’s 

own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading or demeaning the prisoner.” 

Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). When evaluating a prisoner’s sexual 

assault claim against a corrections officer, courts should consider “whether ‘the officials act[ed] 

with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful 

enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.” Johnson v. Frauenheim, 2021 WL 5236498, *11 

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2021) (findings and recommendations adopted by Johnson v. Frauenheim, 

2021 WL 5982293 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2021)) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994)). 

In Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff alleged that prison 

maintenance employees “embarrass[ed] him” in violation of the Eighth Amendment when one of 

them “grabbed him by the shoulders while [another] grabbed his buttocks with one hand briefly” 

and a third “grabbed Berryhill's buttocks for a moment.” Id. at 1074–75 (indications of alteration 

omitted). The Eighth Circuit found no Eighth Amendment violation because “there is no 

evidence that Berryhill suffered anything more than a brief unwanted touch on his buttocks” and 

“[i]t would be a distortion . . . to characterize the conduct in this case as a sexual assault.” Id. at

1076.

However, there is a “clear consensus” that when officers squeeze or grope inmates’ 

buttocks or genitals and make sexual comments, such conduct violates the Constitution. Gleason

v. Franklin, 2021 WL 4813647, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2021), report and recommendation

adopted, 2021 WL 4861785 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2021) (citing Houston v. Buck, 2005 WL 

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1378964, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 2005) (holding triable issue existed when plaintiff alleged 

that guard said “let me feel on you” before squeezing parts of plaintiff’s body including his 

buttocks), report and recommendation adopted by 2005 WL 1561530 (E.D. Cal., June 29, 2005). 

Anal cavity searches, if conduced in a professional manner and with a legitimate penological 

objective, however, do not violate the Eighth Amendment. Everett v. Witcher, 65 F. App’x 153, 

154 (9th Cir. 2003)

The FAC alleges that Defendants Rodriguez, Rivera, and Flores removed Plaintiff’s 

clothes for no reason, that Defendant Rodriguez smacked and squeezed Plaintiff’s buttocks and 

Defendant Rivera placed his finger in Plaintiff’s rectum five times. (Doc. No. 18 at 16). Plaintiff 

asserts that Defendants Rodriguez, Rivera, and Flores all “rape[d] [Plaintiff] with there [sic] 

hands” and asserts while he was “yelling for help he was [sic] been rape [sic] many times by the 

Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores.” (Id. at 17). The FAC alleges that Defendants 

engaged in suggestive and degrading banter, with Defendant Rodriguez stating it was “his turn” 

and that Flores would rape Plaintiff next. (Id. at 16). 

Based on the facts above, the FAC adequately alleges a sexual assault claim against 

Defendants Rivera and Rodriguez. Rivera inserted his finger into Plaintiff’s rectum five times, 

with no apparent legitimate penological objective and Rodriguez smacked and squeezed 

Plaintiff’s buttocks. These alleged facts coupled with the demeaning comments made by 

Rodriguez support an inference that these acts committed on Plaintiff were done either for 

Defendant Rivera’s or Rodriguez’s sexual gratification or to degrade Plaintiff. (Id. at 17). 

However, the conclusory assertion that “Defendants Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores . . . 

rape[d] Plaintiff with there [sic] hands” and that Plaintiff was raped “many times by Defendants 

Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores” is insufficient to state a claim as to Defendant Flores. See

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) (a court does not have to 

accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of 

fact). The FAC does not contain any allegations that Defendant Flores penetrated Plaintiff in any 

way or committed any other physical sexual acts on him. (Doc. No. 18 at 17). Accordingly, the 

FAC fails to state an Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim against Defendants Flores.

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C. Failure to Intervene

A prison official may be liable under § 1983 if he is aware that a fellow official is 

violating a prisoner’s constitutional rights but fails to intervene. See Cunningham v. Gates, 229 

F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow 

officers violate the constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.”) (citation omitted); see also

Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (“An officer who is 

present at the scene who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s 

use of excessive force can be held liable under section 1983 for his nonfeasance.”). A failure to 

intervene can support an excessive force claim where the bystander officers had a realistic 

opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th 

Cir. 2003); Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289.

Liberally, construed, the FAC alleges that in addition to using excessive force against 

Plaintiff, Defendant Flores also failed to intervene when Defendant Rivera and Rodriguez

sexually assaulted Plaintiff. (See Doc. No. 18 at 16-17). Accepting the facts as true, Defendant

Flores took no action to protect Plaintiff during the aforementioned acts. Because the FAC 

sufficiently pleads a claim for sexual assault by Defendants Rivera and Rodriguez when Flores

was present, it follows that he has also stated a claim against Flores for his failure to intervene,

given that he was in a position to prevent the sexual assault and was aware that Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights were being violated. See Castle v. Serrano, 2022 WL 4486137, at *9 (C.D. 

Cal. Aug. 9, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4485805 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 

2022). The FAC thus sufficiently alleges that Defendant Flores was present at the scene and had 

a reasonable opportunity to stop Defendant Rivera or Rodriguez from further harming Plaintiff 

but failed to do so. Thus, the FAC states an Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim against 

Defendant Flores.

D. Retaliation

It is clear prisoners have First Amendment rights to file a grievance or civil rights 

complaint against correctional officials. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F. 3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

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elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). A retaliatory 

motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act or other circumstantial 

evidence, as well as direct evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (9th Cir. 2003);

McCollum v. Ca. Dep’t of Corr. And Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011). Mere 

speculation that a defendant acted out of retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d

899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases).

Where a Plaintiff has engaged in protected First Amendment conduct, a threat of harm in 

response to that conduct “can be an adverse action” for purposes of a First Amendment claim, 

“regardless of whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect.” 

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Shirley v. Barnes, 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 223439, 2017 WL 10509043, at **2-3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5857915 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018) (threats that prison 

officials would make Plaintiff's life a living hell and have him sent to Ad. Seg were adverse 

actions). However, where a correctional officer threatens an inmate with physical harm “to 

convince him to refrain from pursuing legal redress” for past beatings, the “mere naked threat” is 

insufficient to establish a First Amendment violation. Thompson v. Ferrso, 2021 WL 6499812, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2021), quoting Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987); see also

Williams v. Farley, 2020 WL 4586858, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2020) (finding plaintiff failed to 

state Eighth Amendment claim where correctional officers, after physically assaulting plaintiff, 

told plaintiff that if he filed grievances or appealed a rule violation report he would be placed in 

ad-seg or could get “hurt”).

Liberally construed, the FAC alleges that Defendant Flores’ statements after the July 25, 

2018 incident, that he would “kill [Plaintiff] and make it look like a suicide” if he filed a 

grievance concerning the incident, constituted retaliation because it was made to dissuade 

Plaintiff from exercising his First Amendment rights. (See Doc. No. 18 at 16-17). However, “[a]

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mere threat may not state a cause of action” under section 1983, even if it is a threat against 

exercising the right of access to the courts. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (per 

curiam). Moreover, the FAC does not allege that Flores’s statement was made in response to 

Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment conduct, nor that Plaintiff had engaged in any First 

Amendment conduct regarding the incident or stated an intention to do so. Thus, Plaintiff cannot 

satisfy the first element of a retaliation claim. Accordingly, the FAC fails to state a First 

Amendment retaliation claim based on Defendant Flores’ statement.

The FAC also alleges that after Plaintiff filed grievances against Defendants Burnes, 

Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores, unspecified Defendants “sent other correctional staff member [sic] 

to use excessive force on [Plaintiff].” (Doc. No. 18 at 17). Plaintiff asserts these unspecified 

correctional staff attacked him in his cell, out of his cell, threw away his mail, and refused to give 

him food at mealtimes. (Id.). The FAC does not specify the timing of the protected First 

Amendment conduct that allegedly provoked these actions, the timing of the actions by 

correctional staff, nor provide other details that would permit the Court to infer that the actions 

were taken in response to Plaintiff’s protected conduct. Nor does the FAC allege which 

Defendant(s) directed these unspecified correctional staff to act against Plaintiff. To survive 

screening, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims must provide more than conclusory allegations and require 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff was previously advised of the elements of a retaliation claim but has been unable 

to cure those deficiencies. (See Doc. No. 16 at 9-10). The undersigned thus finds further leave to 

amend this claim would be futile. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995); 

McKinney v. Baca, 250 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 2007) citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (discretion to deny leave to amend particularly broad when the plaintiff 

previously had an opportunity to amend his complaint.)

Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 

The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case. 

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Further, it is RECOMMENDED:

1. This action proceed only on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive use of force 

claims against Defendants Burnes, Rivera, Rodriguez, and Flores, his Eighth Amendment sexual 

assault claim against Defendants Rivera and Rodriguez, and his Eighth Amendment failure to 

intervene claim against Defendant Flores.

2. All other claims and Defendants be dismissed from this action based on Plaintiff’s 

failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted. 

NOTICE TO PARTIES

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Dated: October 18, 2023 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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