Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00122/USCOURTS-alnd-2_06-cv-00122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALBERTO SERRANO, as

Administrator of the Estate

of JUAN-MANUEL MEDINASEVILLA, deceased, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF IRONDALE, et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

CIVIL ACTION NO.

06-AR-0122-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is the renewed Rule 12(b)(6) motion of

defendants, City of Irondale (“Irondale”) and P.S. Kelley

(“Kelley”). Plaintiffs, Alberto Serrano (“Serrano”), as

administrator of the estate of Juan-Manuel Medina-Sevilla,

deceased, and decedent’s surviving spouse, Elizabeth Parra de

Medina (“Parra de Medina”), allege wrongful death by negligence,

violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, police brutality and/or

excessive force and/or oppressive conduct, violations of the state

created danger doctrine, negligence and/or recklessness, civil

conspiracy to commit fraud, breach of contract and/or breach of

warranty, and damage to property and conversion. Plaintiffs do not

have joint standing; they sue separately. Parra de Medina’s only

cause of action is stated in Count IX. All other claims, to the

extent they have any viability, are the claims only of Serrano. 

FILED

 2006 May-11 PM 03:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:06-cv-00122-WMA Document 24 Filed 05/11/06 Page 1 of 4
2

Count I, the Alabama negligent wrongful death claim, survives

against both defendants. Count II, the § 1983 claim, survives

against Kelley to the extent he is being sued in his individual

capacity. However, the § 1983 claim fails insofar as it is made

against Irondale and against Kelley in his official capacity. This

court will not make a determination at this time with respect to

Kelley’s immunity defenses to the suit against him in his

individual capacity. While the court recognizes that the case law

favors a quick resolution of immunity issues, immunity

determinations are questions of law based on facts, and the court

will only be able to fairly assess Kelley’s immunity defenses after

the completion of discovery. 

With respect to the § 1983 claim against Irondale, the only

theory on which Serrano sues Irondale for its alleged

constitutional violations is respondeat superior, through Kelley’s

acts as Irondale’s agent. Respondeat superior cannot be used to

establish a § 1983 claim against a municipality. Marsh v. Butler

County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1035 (11th Cir. 2001); Dean v. Barber, 951

F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1992). Because there are no factual averments

upon which a viable § 1983 claim is stated against Irondale, there

is no need to address the issue of whether a § 1983 wrongful death

claim can be pursued against a municipality in Alabama in light of

a municipality’s § 1983 immunity from punitive damages and

Alabama’s peculiar wrongful death statute that only allows punitive

Case 2:06-cv-00122-WMA Document 24 Filed 05/11/06 Page 2 of 4
3

damages. Nevertheless, the court reiterates its belief,

articulated in Collins v. Double Springs, No. 98-2723 (N.D. Ala.

Feb. 18, 2000), that Alabama municipalities are subject to claims

for compensatory damages in § 1983 wrongful death actions, because

a contrary holding would allow Alabama to exempt itself from

generally applicable federal law. It was dicta then. It is dicta

now. 

With respect to Count III, the court questions whether claims

of police brutality/excessive force/oppressive conduct are anything

but a repetition of the claim for wrongful death by negligence or

wantonness. Nevertheless, to the extent it is distinguishable from

other surviving claims, Serrano will be permitted to proceed against

both defendants on this count. Count IV, which alleges violations

of some purported state created danger doctrine, fails as

incomprehensible. Counts V and VI, which respectively allege

negligent conduct by Kelley and Irondale, are, like Count III,

triable to the extent they are not duplicative of other claims. 

Count VII, the civil conspiracy to commit fraud claim, fails

under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Count VIII, the

breach of contract/breach of warranty claim, fails because there is

simply no express or implied contract or warranty to be breached.

Count IX, Parra de Medina’s damage to property and conversion

claim, survives. They are personal to her. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted in

Case 2:06-cv-00122-WMA Document 24 Filed 05/11/06 Page 3 of 4
4

part and denied in part by separate order. 

DONE this 11 day of May, 2006. th

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00122-WMA Document 24 Filed 05/11/06 Page 4 of 4