Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00849/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00849-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Because Gillott conceded in his Reply that habeas review of his second ground is

barred by his guilty plea, the Court will not discuss it.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Russell Bruce Gillott, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 09-0849-PHX-FJM (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Russell Bruce Gillott filed a timely writ of habeas corpus, challenging his convictions

following a guilty plea on two counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor and one

count of sexual conduct with a minor, and the imposition of consecutive terms totaling 35

years, to run concurrent with lifetime probation. He raises two grounds for habeas relief:

his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated during plea advice

and at the change of plea proceeding, and his statements constituted an insufficient factual

basis. Respondents contend that the ineffective assistance claims are without merit, and that

the claim of insufficient factual basis is not cognizable on habeas review.1

 For the reasons

stated below, the Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:09-cv-00849-FJM Document 24 Filed 05/26/10 Page 1 of 8
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BACKGROUND

Following the entry of his guilty plea and sentencing, Gillott initiated post-conviction

proceedings by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Doc. #20, Exh E). The trial court

rejected a petition filed by Gillott’s sister, and granted his request to reinstate proceedings

(Id., Exh F, G). Thereafter, Gillott filed a petition, to which the State responded, and Gillott

filed a reply (Id., Exh H, I, J). The trial court granted the State’s motion to strike Gillett’s

Reply, striking all facts and arguments not raised in the petition for post-conviction relief

(Id., Exh K, L). Gillott filed a revised Reply (Id., Exh M). The trial court dismissed all but

the ineffective assistance claims, and ordered an evidentiary hearing, ruling in pertinent part

as follows:

With respect to Defendant’s claim that the ingestion of Prozac had some

sort of impact at the time of his change of plea, the Court finds that the

Defendant expressly denied that the medication had any effect on his ability

to understand what was happening during the change of plea proceeding.

Furthermore, Defendant did not provide any affidavit by an expert that

Defendant’s medication somehow impaired his ability to understand his plea

agreement or the change of plea process.

 (Id., Exh N).

Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, ruling as

follows:

This matter has been under advisement on Defendant’s

Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The court has considered

said petition, the State’s response, the Defendant’s reply thereto,

along with the Notice and Filing of Defendant’s Certification

and Personal Affidavit, as well as the testimony, evidence and

arguments presented at the parties’ evidentiary hearing. The

Petitioner/Defendant asserts that he did not receive the effective

assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to fully

communicate the State’s plea offer and the possible penalties

should he enter a change of plea.

At his evidentiary hearing, the Defendant stated that, “I

guess I lied” when he told the Court that he had read his plea

agreement and, without expressly saying so, implied that he had

lied when he stated that his attorney had explained the

agreement to him. Further, by virtue of his petition, the

Defendant must have also mislead the Court when he stated that

the agreement contained everything that he and the State had

agreed upon, as well as his statement that he understood the

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agreement. While the Defendant stated that he would rather

have gone to trial if he had known that he was eligible for prison

on two of the three counts, he indicated at the time of his change

of plea that he waived his right to a jury trial (see pages 6-7 of

the plea transcript).

The Court finds that the Defendant’s trial counsel met

with the Defendant sometime before the change of plea

proceeding, counsel stating that it was his practice to “never,

ever sign clients up on the chain.”

The Court further finds that the Defendant’s trial counsel

fully explained the terms of the plea agreement, including the

possible penalties and the structure of any sentence (e.g., the

underlined portion of paragraph 1, page 2, of the plea

agreement) to be received by the Defendant.

The Court further finds that former counsel’s, as well as

the State’s, reading of the change of plea transcript at page 5,

lines 15-18, is supported by the Court’s explanation of the

possible penalties at lines 19-25 on the same page. In other

words, the initial explanation at lines 15-18 more likely than not

reads “Your agreement says there are no agreements as to

sentencing as to count 6. And count 12, you will be placed on

lifetime probation. On count 9, you will be committed to the

Department of Corrections.” (The Court notes that count 6 was

changed to count 4 later on during the change of plea

proceedings and there is no dispute about that change.) The

aforesaid reading is further supported by the statements made by

former counsel and the State’s attorney to the effect that they

would have corrected the Court if an erroneous explanation had

been given to the Defendant. Indeed, the explanation given by

the Court at lines 19-25 is entirely consistent with the terms of

the agreement itself.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying, with prejudice, the

Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Because the Defendant received an aggravated sentence

on count 4, and the Court having previously found that the

Defendant’s petition was pending when Blakely v. Washington

was decided, the Defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the

issue of whether any aggravating factor existed. Because no

showing has been made that the Defendant waived his right to

a jury trial for the aggravation phase, and the Court having

previously found that the Defendant’s statements at sentencing

did not concede any aggravating factors on which the Court

could enhance his sentence beyond the presumptive,

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IT IS ORDERED scheduling this matter for a Status

Conference on September 12, 2006 at 8:45 a.m. to determine a

date for a sentencing hearing on count 4.

(Id., Exh P).

Following this ruling, the parties waived a jury trial regarding possible aggravators

and stipulated to Gillott being resentenced to the presumptive term (Id., Exh Q). Gillott’s

petitions for review in the court of appeals and supreme court were denied (Doc. #1,

Appendix, Items 9, 10).

DISCUSSION

Gillott argues that trial counsel was ineffective during the plea negotiations and at the

change of plea proceeding. He contends that counsel failed to sufficiently explain the

following aspects of the State’s plea offer: (1) whether the sentences could include more

than one prison term; (2) whether the mandatory prison sentence was required to be served

“flat time,” without eligibility for early release; and (3) whether any prison sentence other

than the mandatory sentence would be required to be served consecutively.

During the change of plea colloquy, Gillott acknowledged the three offenses to which

he was agreeing to plead guilty. In addition, the trial court informed Gillott of the following

specific aspects of sentencing: (1) the range of sentences on all three offenses; (2) the

availability of lifetime probation for the attempted sexual conduct offenses; (3) that there

were no agreements as to sentencing on Count 6 (one of the attempted sexual conduct

counts); (4) that on Count 12 (the other attempted sexual conduct charge), he would be

placed on lifetime probation; (5) that on Count 6, he would either receive lifetime probation

or a prison term; (6) that Gillott had read the plea agreement, that his attorney had explained

it to him, and that it contained everything that he and the State had agreed to about how his

case would be resolved; and that Gillott understood all of these provisions (Id., Exh H,

Attachment C at 4-6).

Gillott argues in his petition that it was his understanding that he would receive a

prison term on one count and probation on the two other counts. He contends that his

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Knapp v. Hardy, 523 P.2d 1308, 1312 (1974). 

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Knapp counsel later withdrew from representation.

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understanding was justified, citing several portions of the state court record. He first points

to the clause in the plea agreement making the two counts of attempted sexual conduct

probation eligible. He also contends that a portion of the transcript of the change of plea

hearing is consistent with his understanding. The transcript provided by the Court Reporter

indicates the following statement by the trial court made to Gillott during the change of plea

colloquy:

THE COURT: Your agreement says there are no agreements as to

sentencing. As to Count 6 and Count 12, you will be placed on lifetime

probation. On Count 9, you will be committed to the Department of

Corrections.

So, in other words, on the completed sexual conduct of a minor, Class

2 felony, you will be sentenced to some term in the Department of Corrections,

be up to the Court to decide. On Count 12, attempt, you will be placed on

lifetime probation. On the other attempt, either probation or prison: is that

your understanding?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

(Id., Exh H, Attachment C at 5) (emphasis added).

Gillott further maintains that his confusion regarding the role of the public defender

in his representation might have justified his misunderstanding. Although the public

defender had been appointed to represent him, Knapp2

 counsel had also been retained to

associate with appointed counsel.3

 He contends that he was under the impression that he was

being represented by this private attorney and not the public defender. He testified at the

evidentiary hearing that he first heard of the plea offer at the time his public defender visited

him in jail and described the terms of the offer. He also testified at the evidentiary hearing

that he could not effectively review the plea offer either in jail or during the change of plea

proceedings because he did not have his glasses. He maintains that trial counsel could not

have read the plea agreement to him “word for word” during the jail visit as counsel testified,

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because had he done so he would have noticed that the agreement did not specify that the

sentence was to be served as “flat time.” He contends that neither the trial court nor counsel

informed him of this special condition. Finally, he contends in his petition that having taken

his prescribed dose of an anti-depressant prior to the change of plea made him impaired and

that trial counsel failed to ensure that he understood the proceedings.

The plea agreement indicates the sentencing range for each charge and the transcript

of the change of plea proceedings reflects the following recitation of that range by the trial

court: that one charge was mandatory prison, one charge was probation eligible, and that

Gillott could be sentenced to prison or given a probationary term on the third charge (Id., Exh

B, H). Gillott’s citation to the transcript portion involving part of the colloquy does not aid

his position. As both trial counsel and the county attorney stated at the evidentiary hearing,

and as the trial court concluded in its denial of his post-conviction petition, there was a

transcription error. Assuming Gillott had been confused by what the trial court initially

stated concerning the possible sentences, it was clarified in the following sentence, where the

trial court repeats the sentencing possibilities to Gillott, making clear to him that on one

count he would be placed on lifetime probation and on the other, either prison or probation

was possible. Gillott then indicated that he understood what the trial court had just explained

to him.

Regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences, the trial court informed Gillott that

the plea agreement required that “[e]ach sentence imposed for any dangerous crime against

children offense must be served consecutively to each other...” (Id., Exh B at 2, Exh H,

Attachment C at 5). Again, Gillott indicated that he understood this special condition. The

record indicates that Gillott was well-informed of the sentencing possibilities. In addition,

Gillott has not established that any substitution of counsel was the cause of a

misunderstanding. His contention that there was no discussion about a plea offer prior to

substitution of counsel is inaccurate. A settlement conference occurred more than nine

months prior to the change of plea hearing (Id., Exh R). In addition, the Court agrees with

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Respondents that the question of when the terms of the plea offer were explained to Gillott

is not determinative of his understanding of its terms and conditions.

Gillott’s assertion that counsel failed to inform him of the “flat time” provision is not

relevant to his claim that his understanding of the plea agreement included prison time on one

count and probation on the other two counts. In addition, Gillott has not shown that either

the trial court or counsel was required to inform him of this provision. The trial court

evaluated Gillott’s testimony and determined that trial counsel had fully explained the terms

of the plea agreement to him. Gillott’s contention concerning his glasses was made for the

first time in his reply brief in the post-conviction proceedings; it was information that was

known to him prior to that time. Therefore, the trial court properly struck this portion of the

brief, and sustained the government’s objection to Gillott’s attempt to present this evidence

at the evidentiary hearing. Assuming the truth of his assertion, it would not negate his

declaration in open court that his attorney had read the plea agreement to him and explained

its provisions. His assertion concerning any possible side effect of his medication is also

without merit. He avowed to the trial court that it had no effect on his ability to understand

the proceedings; his response to questions during the colloquy confirms this.

Other than self-serving avowals, Gillott has presented no evidence to establish that

his guilty plea was the product of any misunderstanding brought on by trial counsel’s

deficient performance. His declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of truth.

United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310, 314 (9th Cir. 1979). In addition, the trial court made

the following factual determinations: (1) that counsel had fully explained the terms of the

plea offer, “including the possible penalties and the structure of any sentence”; (2) that a

transcription error occurred; and (3) that his claim of impairment from the ingestion of an

anti-depressant is contradicted by the record, and is not supported by the production of any

medical evidence. These factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Gillott has not rebutted this presumption with clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. The decision by the trial court was objectively

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reasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See § 2254(d)(2).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Russell Bruce Gillott’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. #1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because Gillott has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have seven

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 25th day of May, 2010.

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