Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01897/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01897-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLIE JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

Y. MAGALLON,

Defendant.

CASE No. 1:15-cv-01897-DAD-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND 

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY DAYS

Plaintiff Hollie Jones, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 21, 2015. Plaintiff’s 

complaint is before the Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner 

has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

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or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

II. PLEADING STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)), and courts “are 

not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 

677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible 

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to 

have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), but nevertheless, 

the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the plausibility standard, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, who is currently being held at the Substance Abuse and Treatment 

Facility in Corcoran, California, brings this action against Medical Clinic Officer Y. 

Magallon (“Defendant”) for violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United 

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States Constitution. 

On March 20, 2015, Plaintiff signed a refusal statement stating “I refuse all medical 

treatment until further notice.” At some point,

1 Defendant called him on the telephone, 

against CDCR policy, to tell Plaintiff to come to the medical clinic. Although he did not 

want to go to the medical clinic, Plaintiff went in a show of good faith and to show that he 

was “programing” (sic). When Plaintiff arrived in the clinic and learned that Defendant

wanted to administer treatment Plaintiff had already refused,2 Plaintiff attempted to leave 

the clinic. Defendant then assaulted and excessively restrained Plaintiff as punishment 

for his refusal of treatment, even though Plaintiff was not a security risk at the time. 

Defendant also filed a false document claiming that Plaintiff attacked her with his cane. 

However, CDCR did not believe Defendant’s report, as they issued Plaintiff a new cane, 

and Plaintiff claims they would not have done so if they believe he had used it as a 

weapon. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff brings his claim against Defendant for excessive force under the 

Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. However, since Plaintiff is a

prisoner, the Court will analyze his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5

(1992) (citations omitted). For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, 

the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

 

1

It is unclear from the complaint whether this incident occurred on the same day he signed the statement 

refusing medical treatment or at some point after.

2

Plaintiff does not describe the nature of the treatment he refused.

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discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 

37 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective component of an 

Eighth Amendment claim is contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of 

decency, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and although de 

minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the malicious and sadistic use of 

force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of 

whether or not significant injury is evident, Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8 (citing Hudson, 503 

U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks omitted); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

At the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant assaulted and 

restrained him could be sufficient to support a claim under section 1983 if accompanied 

by adequate factual allegations to give meaningful context to what are at present

essentially legal conclusions: that Defendant assaulted and excessively restrained him 

when he refused to accept treatment. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (“A pleading that offers 

‘labels and conclusions’ or a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a cause of action will 

not do.”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 

complaint with leave to amend. If Plaintiff elects to amend, he should include detail as to 

what he and Defendant said and did before and while Defendant made physical contact 

with Plaintiff, as to how exactly Defendant made that contact (that is, specify what parts 

of Defendant’s body contacted what parts of Plaintiff’s body), how Defendant restrained 

Plaintiff and what Defendant said to Plaintiff and/or others as to why she was restraining 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff should also clarify the date(s) and time(s) that the alleged incidents took 

place.

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B. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Claim

Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s complaint can be read to set forth a claim against 

Defendant for violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical treatment. 

Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (A “competent 

person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical

treatment.”). In order to determine whether Plaintiff's right to refuse treatment was 

violated, the Court must balance Plaintiff's “liberty interests against the relevant state 

interests.” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. Specifically, the Court must consider “the need for 

the government action in question, the relationship between the need and the action, the 

extent of harm inflicted, and whether the action was taken in good faith or for the purpose 

of causing harm.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997)

(quotation omitted); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) 

(where the Court balanced an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted 

smallpox vaccine against the State’s interest in preventing the disease). So long as 

Plaintiff can show that he posed no risk to himself or others when he refused to accept 

treatment, he can make out a cognizable claim. See Haas v. County of El Dorado, 2:12-

cv-00265, 2012 WL 1414115 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2012) (court found that Plaintiff who 

refused to be taken to the hospital after collapsing at preschool posed no risk to 

coworkers and schoolchildren).

In the prison context, “’[p]rison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring 

the safety of prison staff and administrative personnel . . . but also the duty to take 

reasonable measures for the prisoners’ own safety.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 

210, 223 (1990) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). Plaintiff has not 

specified what type of treatment he refused, but given where Plaintiff is currently housed, 

the Court suspects it involves treatment for mental illness. If the treatment was for a

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mental illness, “given the requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process 

Clause permits the state to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with 

antipsychotic drugs against his will” so long as “the inmate is dangerous to himself or 

others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest” and this determination has 

been made by medical personnel under “fair procedural mechanisms.” Washington, 494 

U.S. at 227-32. Fair procedural mechanisms include giving the inmate notice of the 

proposed treatment, allowing him to be present at an adversarial hearing to dispute the 

imposition of treatment, and allowing him to cross examine witnesses against him, but do 

not include the right to have an attorney present at the proceedings. Id. at 235. 

It is not clear from the instant complaint whether Defendant did in fact administer 

treatment to Plaintiff against his will or otherwise engage in some adverse action in order 

to coerce Plaintiff to accept treatment. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue a claim against 

Defendant for violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical treatment, he 

should describe in his amended pleadings the treatment ordered, specify whether it was 

actually given over Plaintiff’s objections, and explain the reasons given by defendant or 

others for prescribing the treatment, and the nature of the risk allegedly posed by his not 

receiving treatment.

C. Exhaustion

Plaintiff concedes that while he filed an administrative appeal, the process has not 

yet been completed. Plaintiff states generally that “staff members have been losing and 

or destroying [his] grievance forms” (sic) but that he is “still going throug[h] the proper 

channels to exhaust [his] administrative remedies.” Thus, it appears Plaintiff may have 

filed suit prematurely without first exhausting in compliance with section 1997e(a).

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a 

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prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required 

to exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 549 

U.S. 199, 211 (2007); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of 

the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and the 

exhaustion requirement applies to all suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 

U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Thus, even if Plaintiff provides the factual information requested 

by the Court above, his claim may still be subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies or show that exhaustion was excused. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant for use of 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, Plaintiff has not 

previously been provided with notice of the deficiencies in his claims and the Court will 

provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he believes, in good 

faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 

(9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 

809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the 

nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this screening 

order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above. 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint 

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 

57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer 

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serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a blank complaint form along with a 

copy of the complaint filed December 21, 2015;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order or a notice of voluntary dismissal;

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed, 

without prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to obey a court 

order, subject to the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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