Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02552/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02552-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

APHAYAVONG CHANSAMONE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv2552-IEG (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

vs.

A. MALFI, Warden,

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Chansamone Aphayavong (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings

this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254 (“Petition”)

challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number SDC161852. Petitioner

claims: (1) insufficient evidence supports his conviction for second degree murder (Petition at 6,

Traverse at 8.); (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel (Petition at 7, Traverse at 10.);

and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding lesser included and related

offenses (Petition at 8, Traverse at 11-12.). After reviewing the Petition, Respondent’s

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Answer to Petition for Habeas Corpus

(“Answer”), and all supporting documents submitted by the parties, IT IS RECOMMENDED

that the Petition be DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

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 On June 6, 1995, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm

and was sentenced to three (3) years in prison. (Lodgment No. 2 at 72-73)

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 10, 2002, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an Information

against Petitioner in San Diego County Superior Court, charging Petitioner with a single count of

murder. (Lodgment No. 2 at 3-5.) The Information included two enhancements. (Id.) The first

enhancement, pursuant to California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1), was based on Petitioner’s

association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further and assist in

criminal conduct by gang members. (Lodgment No. 2 at 4.) The second enhancement, pursuant to

California Penal Code sections 667(b) through (i), 1107.12, and 668, was based on Petitioner’s

prior convictions of serious or violent felonies in San Diego Juvenile Superior Court and San

Diego Superior Court.1 (Lodgment No. 2 at 5.) On July 30, 2002, a jury convicted Petitioner of

second degree murder (Count 1). (Lodgment No. 2 at 296.) On December 12, 2002, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to 45 years to life in state prison, consisting of 30 years to life for murder

enhanced by a consecutive 10-year term for his criminal street gang enhancement, plus five years

for a prior serious felony conviction. (Lodgment No. 2 at 414; Lodgment No. 6 at 9-10.)

On December 16, 2002, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Lodgment No. 2 at 401.) and

on or about January 14, 2004, served his Opening Brief to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment No. 3.) Petitioner appealed his conviction on the

grounds: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser

included offense of voluntary manslaughter based upon unreasonable self defense; (2) Petitioner’s

attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request instruction on voluntary manslaughter

and assault; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for second

degree murder; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year consecutive criminal street gang

enhancement under California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1)(c), rather than the alternate

criminal street gang penalty of a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term under Penal Code

section 186.22(b)(5). (Lodgment No. 3.) On February 15, 2005, the state appellate court affirmed

the conviction in an unpublished opinion but reversed the ten-year consecutive criminal street

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2

See In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 56(b)(1).

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gang enhancement. (Lodgment No. 6.) 

On March 23, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Supreme Court of

California. Petitioner raised the sole issue of insufficient evidence to support his conviction for

second degree murder. (Lodgment No. 7.) The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

Petition for Review without explanation on June 8, 2005. (Lodgment No. 8.) 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, on May 2, 2005. (Lodgment No. 9.) Petitioner

raised the sole issue that Petitioner’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

request an instruction on assault. (Lodgment No. 9.) On May 26, 2005, the Court of Appeal

denied Petitioner’s Petition for failure to show relief sought in superior court, citing appellate court

discretion to deny without prejudice habeas corpus petitions not first filed in a proper lower court.2

(Lodgment no. 10.)

On June 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the San Diego

Superior Court, again raising the sole issue that Petitioner’s trial attorney rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to request an instruction on assault. (Lodgment No. 11.) On or about

September 12, 2005, in response to an Order to Show Cause, the San Diego District Attorney’s

Office filed a Return. (Lodgment No. 12.) The San Diego Superior Court denied the Petition on

December 7, 2005. (Lodgment No. 13.)

Petitioner filed the instant Petition in this Court on November 15, 2006. (Doc. No. 1.) On

December 5, 2006, this Court provided Petitioner with a Notice Regarding Possible Failure to

Exhaust and One-Year Statute of Limitations. (Doc. No. 5.) On December 21, 2006, therefore,

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment

No. 14.) As in Petitioner’s direct appeal, Petitioner claimed: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred

by not instructing the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter

based upon unreasonable self defense; (2) Petitioner’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to request instruction on voluntary manslaughter and assault; and (3) there was insufficient

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3

 Petitioner’s additionally claimed the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year consecutive

criminal street gang enhancement under California Penal Code section 186.22(b)(1)(c), rather than

the alternate criminal street gang penalty of a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term under Penal

Code section 186.22(b)(5). (Lodgment No. 14) The California Court of Appeal agreed with

Petitioner’s contention and reversed the trial court’s imposition of the enhancement. (Id.)

4

Petitioner’s appeal was consolidated with that of co-defendant Vilath Xayasomloth for

purposes of direct appeal before the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.)

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evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for second degree murder.3 (Lodgment No. 14.) The

Petition was denied without discussion on June 13, 2007. (Lodgment No. 15.) 

On January 26, 2007, Petitioner submitted to this Court a “Motion for Stay and Abeyance

to Exhaust Additional Issues in the State Supreme Court.” (Doc. No. 14.) On September 19,

2007, following the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s Petition for Habeas Corpus,

this Court denied Petitioner’s “Motion for a Stay and Abeyance to Exhaust Additional Issues in

the State Supreme Court” as moot and ordered the District Attorney’s Office to file a response. 

(Doc. No. 17.) The District Attorney’s Office filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on October 29, 2007. (Doc. No. 19.) Petitioner filed a Traverse on February 27, 2008.

(Doc. No. 22.)

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Title 28, United States Code, section 2254, subsection (e)(1) provides, in relevant part:

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28

U.S.C. § 2245(e)(1). The petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.’ Id.; see also Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc) overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating that

federal courts are required to “give great deference to the state court’s factual findings.”) When

there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to the last

reasoned state-court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Van Lynn v.

Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9 th Cir. 2003). The following facts are taken from the California

Court of Appeal’s opinion regarding Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 6.)4

 

A

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The Tiny Oriental Crips Street Gang

In 1987, Ham Xaysana (Ham), also known as “the General,” started the

Tiny Oriental Crips (T.O.C.), a predominantly Laotian street gang that claimed San

Diego’s Linda Vista neighborhood as its territory. By 2000 the San Diego Police

Department’s gang unit detective (Michael Gallivan) assigned to investigate

Southeast Asian gangs identified 104 documented members of the T.O.C. gang. 

Gallivan learned from T.O.C. gang members that on occasion they carried and used

weapons such as knives, handguns, rifles and machine guns. When a T.O.C. gang

member was in a fight, other gang members would join the fight, even if the other

side were outnumbered. Fights were not necessarily against rival gang members,

but could also be against civilians. Gang fights were “all about winning,” not about

being fair. If a gang member did not “back up the set” by helping a fellow gang

member during a fight, he would be “disrespected” by the other gang members. 

Gang attacks could result in death. 

Ham, Prouneprasith Thirakul (Tho) and Keila were original members of the

T.O.C. gang. Older members of the T.O.C. gang, including Ham, Xayasomloth and

[Petitioner] Aphayavong, were known as Original Gangsters (O.G.’s). Ham’s sister

Khamla Xaysana (Khamla) founded the “T.O.C. Ladies.”

B

The December 2000 Party

On December 9, 2000, beginning in the late afternoon, Ham and Khamla

hosted a party at their parents’ home in Linda Vista (the December 2000 party). 

The party was attended by approximately 20 to 40 people, many of whom were

T.O.C. gang members, including Aphayavong and Xayasomloth. Aphayavong

arrived at the party with his current girlfriend Thiep, a friend of Khamla. Khamla

had seen Aphayavong at T.O.C. gang social events in 1994 and 2000. Khamla had

last seen Xayasomloth with T.O.C. gang members at a party in 1999 or 2000. 

At the December 2000 party, T.O.C. gang members wore blue clothing and

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greeted each other with gang signs. Also attending the party were Khamla’s friends

from outside San Diego. Ultimate victim Getty arrived from Orange County with

his nephew Terry Chanthachone (Jerry), Keoudone Chathavong (John) and

Ketmany Keungmanivong (Ket). Arriving from Temecula shortly afterward were

Tayphrasouky Phramany (Mony), Phouangmalay Douangsavanh (Lynda),

Phouthasth Chounlamany (Bey) and others. 

As guests from out of town arrived and entered the backyard, several

individuals including Xayasomloth, looked at them up and down in a mean way

(“maddogging”). Some of the maddogging individuals wore blue clothing and

looked like gang members. When entering the party, Mony felt uncomfortable

because he was wearing a red shirt and worried that people might think he was part

of a rival gang. As Mony’s girlfriend Lynda entered the party, some guests looked

“weirdly” at her and made her feel she did not belong there. 

During the party, Aphayavong and his former girlfriend Khonemala

Didyavong (La) were arguing and cursing at each other. La’s friend separated them

and calmed La down. Getty also stepped in to help break up the argument. 

Later, Tho, who was Xayasomloth’s friend, began arguing with Tho’s exgirlfriend because she had been flirting with Getty. Eventually, the very drunk,

angry and rowdy Tho began throwing bottles and chairs around the backyard. Tho

challenged people to fight by motioning his hands to himself and asking, “Anybody

want some of this?” Although Ham tried to calm Tho, Tho wanted to fight Ham. 

Ham then told the guests the party was over and asked everyone to leave. Tho

continued his angry acting and cursing. Tho then asked Getty, “What’s up, you got

a problem?”

C

The Killing of Getty

After the abrupt end of the party, people began leaving the house. Mony,

Bey, and Jerry saw a drunk Getty carrying a large knife when he left the party. 

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The knife thrown under John’s car was found 170 feet from where Getty was ultimately

stabbed. DNA testing did not reveal the presence of human blood on the knife.

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Getty walked with John, Ket and Jerry around the side of the party house and

headed to John’s parked car across the street. The guests from Temecula left at the

same time. Meanwhile, Aphayavong was driving his car up and down the street,

speeding , squealing tires and revving the engine. As Getty, John, Ket and Jerry

arrived at John’s car, Getty was holding and playing around with a knife that had

been used at the party to cut meat. Jerry took the knife from Getty and threw it

underneath John’s car.5

 

When John entered his car and started the engine, Xaysomloth and Tho

began walking quickly across the street toward John’s car. Xayasomloth and Tho

approached Getty and Ket as they stood on the sidewalk to the right of John’s car. 

Xayasomloth asked Getty, “You got shit?” Getty said “No” and “It’s cool, it’s

cool.” Getty’s hands were empty. As Getty extended his hand to shake

Xayasomloth’s hand, Xayasomloth “sucker punched” Getty in the face, knocking

him to the ground. 

After Getty got up from the ground and began running away down the

street, Xayasomloth and Tho started chasing him. Aphayavong stopped his car in

the middle of the street, emerged from the car, and joined Xayasomloth and Tho in

the chase. Approximately five to 10 other people ran from the party house in

pursuit of Getty.

When Getty eventually fell, he was punched and kicked repeatedly by

people who had been chasing him. As Mony and his friends approached Getty,

several people who had been beating Getty began running back toward the party

house. Getty lay bleeding and moaning in the street when his friends arrived to

help. Getty had been stabbed 10 times and received several subgaleal hemorrhages

over his skull consistent with blunt force trauma. As Getty lay on the ground,

Xayasomloth continued to yell at Getty, shouting, “Get the fuck up, motherfucker,

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you want some more?” and “Fuck you, you got a problem, you want some more?”

Tho knelt down and helped Getty. Phatthana Phrakonkham (Nia) was

screaming, “Take him to the hospital, take him to the hospital.” While in the

driveway of the party house, La heard Nia’s screams and ran toward her. En route,

La saw Tho and Xayasomloth. When asked by La what had happened,

Xayasomloth said: “Nothing happened. Get in your car. Let’s go, let’s go.” La

then heard Nia say, “Getty got stabbed,” and saw Nia on the ground with Getty. 

Mony and Bey put Getty into their car and drove him to the hospital.

After the attack ended, Aphayavong ran back toward the party house, got

into his car that was parked in the street and told his girlfriend Thiep to get him

some napkins so he could wipe off some blood. Aphayavong then drove away. 

Getty died in the hospital from his stab wounds. 

D

Events After Getty’s Killing

On December 10, 2000, after midnight, Xayasomloth arrived at the home he

shared with his girlfriend Janette Keovichith (Janette). After receiving a phone call

from Aphayavong, Xayasomloth and Janette left their home and went to Keila’s

home, where they stayed for two or three days. After Xayasomloth and Janette

returned home, they were visited by Aphayavong. Aphayavong told Xayasomloth

that he “beat the crap” out of Getty and cut his knuckles on Getty’s teeth. 

Aphayavong also said that he had asked his girlfriend Thiep for a napkin. 

A few days after the party, Ham saw Xayasomloth at Keila’s house. 

Xayasomloth asked Keila for the name of a good lawyer. Xayasomloth also said he

needed to get the videotape of the party because it depicted the partygoers. During

the conversation, Xayasomloth appeared scared and nervous. When Ham asked

Xayasomloth if he had been involved in the murder, Xayasomloth did not respond. 

In November 2001 after his arrest for Getty’s killing, Aphayavong admitted

to a sheriff’s deputy that he was a member of the T.O.C. gang. 

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(Lodgment No. 6 at 3-8; footnote in original) 

IV. STANDARDS

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254, sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

[. . .]

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim - 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1)-(2).

When determining “clearly established federal law” under section 2254(d)(1), federal

courts look to United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court’s decision. 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412

(2000)). Ninth Circuit law may also be considered for “its persuasive authority in applying

Supreme Court law.” Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on

other grounds, Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.

denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court

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precedent if (1) the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme

Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from

a Supreme Court case, but still reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 412; Bell

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. It is not

required that a state court decision cite to or even be aware of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts it. 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court

precedent, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529

U.S. at 407. Alternatively, an unreasonable application may be found, “if the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it

should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Clark 331 F.3d at 1067. An

unreasonable application of federal law requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect

or erroneous. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76. Instead, the state court’s application must be “objectively

unreasonable.” Id.

If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” however,

federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court unreasonably applied controlling federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000). “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue,

but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is

objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Insufficient Evidence to Support Conviction (Claim One)

In Claim One, Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

for second degree murder. (Petition at 6, Traverse at 8-9) This claim was raised in Petitioner’s

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6

Mens rea is defined as “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must

prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).

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direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 3 at 35-43.) The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument,

finding substantial evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction for second degree murder as an

aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Lodgment No. 6 at 61-

67.) The Court of Appeal found evidence of Petitioner’s “‘presence, companionship, and conduct

before and after the offense’” raised a reasonable inference the Petitioner was guilty of aiding and

abetting the target offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 62, citing People v. Gonzales, 4 Cal. App. 3d 593, 600 (1970).) Though

Petitioner claims he lacked the requisite mens rea6, the Court of Appeal noted that a showing of

intent to kill is not required for conviction of murder under the natural and probable consequences

doctrine. (Lodgment No. 6 at 65-66.) The Court of Appeal found it was reasonably foreseeable

Petitioner’s actions would cause other gang members to join the attack and result in the killing of

the victim, concluding:

[S]ubstantial evidence indicated that when Aphayavong joined [co-defendant]

Xayasomloth and [T.O.C. member] Tho in chasing Getty in the presence of other

gang members while Getty was trying to flee following Xayasomloth’s sucker

punch, it was reasonably foreseeable that other gang members would join in the

chase and assault Getty via a rat-pack takedown that would lead to his fatal

stabbing. Based on that evidence, the jury reasonably determined Getty’s killing

was the natural and probable consequence of Aphayavong’s aiding and abetting the

target crime. Accordingly, Aphayavong’s conviction for second degree murder as

an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine was

amply supported by the evidentiary record.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 67.)

Clearly established federal law provides the Due Process Clause is violated, and an

applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief, “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at

the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” of

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every element of the offense. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); In re Winship, 397

U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable

doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime being charged). Under Jackson, a reviewing

court examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and asks whether “any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319. Federal habeas courts must respect the province of the trier of fact to

determine the credibility of witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Id. “All reasonable

inferences from the evidence must be drawn favorably to the Government as the prevailing party.”

United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1978). 

When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, federal habeas courts must analyze

habeas claims challenging state convictions “with explicit reference to the substantive elements of

the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16. Since there is no

reasoned decision from the California Supreme Court on this ground, this Court must “look

through” to the last reasoned state court opinion as a basis for the analysis. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. 

As noted above, in the instant case the California Court of Appeal addressed the sufficiency of the

evidence in Petitioner’s direct appeal and found there was sufficient evidence to support a

conviction of second degree murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine. (Lodgment No. 6 at 61-67.) This Court must therefore determine whether

the state appellate court opinion “reflected an ‘unreasonable application of’ Jackson and Winship

to the facts of this case.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1275 (9th Cir. 2005).

In California, a person aids and abets the commission of a crime when “he or she, (i) with

knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of

committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids,

promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 22, citing

People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164 (1991); People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 561 (1984).) 

“The logical basis for conviction of an aider and abettor is that with knowledge of the

unlawfulness of the act, one renders some independent contribution to the commission of the crime

or otherwise makes it more probable that the crime will be successfully completed than would [be]

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Actus reus is defined as “[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a

crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability.” BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 

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the case absent such participation.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 22-23, People v. Brady 190 Cal. App. 3d

124, 132 (1987).) “The presence of one at the commission of a felony by another is evidence to be

considered in determining whether or not he was guilty of aiding and abetting; and it has also been

held that presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances

from which one’s participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.” (People v. Moore 120 Cal.

App. 2d 303, 306 (1953), citing Gonzales 4 Cal. App. 3d at 600, disapproved on another point in

People v. Alvarez 14 Cal. 4th 155, 219, fn. 23 (1996).) It is not required that the crime aided and

abetted be the original intent of the perpetrator. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d at 559-60. A person “who

knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime but also of any

other crime the perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the

intended crime. The inquiry is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional

crime, but whether, judged objectively, the occurrence of the additional crime was reasonably

foreseeable.” People v. Mendoza 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133 (1998).

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion that his conviction was based entirely on opinion

testimony given by a prosecutorial expert, the Court of Appeal noted other evidence supporting the

conclusions of the expert, such as Petitioner’s presence at the party on the night of the incident,

and Petitioner’s behavior on the night of the incident, including stopping his car in the middle of

the street to chase the fleeing victim. (Lodgment No. 6 at 62-63.) In fact, Petitioner admitted to

being a T.O.C. gang member after his arrest in 2001. (Id. at 8.) The Court of Appeal concluded

that the Petitioner’s actus reus7 - “(1) aggressively driving wildly up and down the street as T.O.C.

gang members were leaving the December 2000 party; (2) stopping and parking his car in the

middle of the street after Getty began running away following Xayasomloth’s sucker punch; (3)

joining Xayasomloth, Tho and other gang members in chasing Getty down; and (4) beating the

‘crap’ out of Getty - contributed to other gang members joining the chase, the beating and the

stabbing that ensued.” (Id. at 64-65.) The Court of Appeal noted evidence indicating “that when a

T.O.C. gang member became involved in a fight, other gang members would join the fight even

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where, as here, the other side was outnumbered, with the exception that O.G.’s were not

necessarily required to fight in a gang altercation. (Id. at 66.) A gang member who did not back

up the set by aiding his fellow gang member during a fight would be disrespected by other gang

members. . . . Gang members were known to carry and use weapons on occasion.” (Id.)

Petitioner has not demonstrated the state appellate court’s decision was an objectively

unreasonable application of Jackson. Although Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence

supporting his conviction of second degree murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine, the record suggests otherwise. The California Court of Appeal’s

determination that there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s conviction was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, the standard enunciated in Jackson. The evidence

presented at trial could rationally support a finding Petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of second degree murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine. Accordingly, this Court recommends DENYING habeas relief as to

Petitioner’s claim based on insufficient evidence. 

B. Receipt of Ineffective Counsel (Claim Two)

Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment because his attorney failed to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of

voluntary manslaughter. (Petition at 7, Traverse at 10-11.) This Claim was raised in Petitioner’s

direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 3 at 28-34.) Petitioner contends the failure of his trial attorney to

request an instruction on lesser included or related offenses was prejudicial because it prevented

the jury from considering a lesser charge on the theory that the stabbing of the victim was not the

natural and probable consequence of Petitioner’s actions. (Petition at 7, Traverse at 10.) 

The right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is

denied when “a defense attorney’s performance falls below an objective standard of

reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense.” Yarbrough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003),

citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687. In circumstances where

a state court has already considered and rejected an ineffective assistance claim, a federal court

shall not grant habeas relief unless the state court decision rejecting the claim “resulted in a

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decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has held that claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are “mixed questions of law and fact” that should not receive

deference to the full extent of section 2254(d)(1). Strickland, 466 U.S. 698. However, even in

such cases where this Court is presented with a state court rejection of an ineffective-assistance

claim, a petitioner is required to overcome the “presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Bell, 535 U.S. at 698, quoting

Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show both

incompetence and prejudice. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466

U.S. 698. Unless Petitioner “makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . .

resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland,

466 U.S. 687. The standard governing competence set forth in Strickland v. Washington requires

Petitioner to show “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness.” 

Id. at 688. “Judicial scrutiny of a counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. 

Therefore, a strong presumption must be maintained that counsel’s performance falls within “the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. 

However, even if it can be shown counsel has provided assistance that falls below the

allowable standard of reasonableness, a showing of prejudice is required to establish a violation of

the Sixth Amendment. Id. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. The defendant must show with

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is defined as a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. 

As noted above, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s prior claim of ineffective

counsel. (Lodgment No. 6 at 71-76.) The Court of Appeal recounted the trial court proceedings as

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follows:

After discussing jury instructions with counsel, the trial court stated it

would not instruct that voluntary manslaughter was a lesser offense included in the

charged crime of murder since the state of the evidence and reasonable inferences

indicated there was no basis upon which Aphayavong could be convicted on that

lesser offense, an assessment with which defense counsel concurred. Defense

counsel also stated that even if the jury could possibly find Aphayavong guilty on

voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, counsel as a matter of trial

tactics wanted the court not to instruct on that offense. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 71.)

While the record fails to indicate precisely why Petitioner’s trial counsel opted not to

request an instruction regarding the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the

Petitioner bears the burden of showing his trial counsel’s assistance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. People v. Pope 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 (1979), disapproved on another

point in People v. Berryman 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10 (1993). Given the lack of indication in

the record regarding trial counsel’s motives, Petitioner is unable to overcome the presumption that

trial counsel’s decision not to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary

manslaughter was sound trial strategy. It would be reasonable to infer, in fact, that trial counsel

may have wagered that the inclusion of such an instruction would have ensured a conviction of

some kind. Alternatively, without an instruction on a lesser included offense the jury may have

been hesitant to convict the Petitioner of second degree murder and would have preferred to

acquit. Therefore, this Court recommends DENYING habeas relief as to Petitioner’s claim based

on ineffective assistance of counsel. 

C. Trial Court Error in Jury Instruction (Claim Three)

Petitioner claims the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua

sponte, on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter or on the lesser related offense of

assault, based on a theory of imperfect self-defense. (Petition at 8, Traverse at 11.) This Claim

was addressed by the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal and presented to the state

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supreme court in a habeas petition. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 14.) 

i. Lesser Included Offense - Voluntary Manslaughter

With regard to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeal

rejected Petitioner’s Claim on direct appeal. The Court held that in order for Petitioner to seek

conviction for voluntary manslaughter based on unreasonable or imperfect self-defense, Petitioner

would be required to show that the perpetrator who stabbed the victim acted in “an unreasonable

but good faith belief in the need to act in self defense” or otherwise “actually but unreasonably

believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 69,

quoting People v. Robertson, 34 Cal.4th 156, 164-165 (2004); People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186,

199, 201 (1995); and In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th 768, 783 (1994), emphasis added in Court of

Appeal opinion.) However, the Court of Appeal found:

[T]here was no evidence to support Aphayavong’s theory that the

perpetrator actually had a good faith belief that he (the perpetrator) was in

imminent danger of death or great bodily injury when Xayasomloth sucker punched

Getty, when Xayasomloth joined in the chase of Getty in the presence of other gang

members, or when Getty was fatally stabbed. Further, an inference of the existence

of any such actual good faith belief at any of those times would be speculation. 

Lodgment No. 6 at 69, citing Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th at 164-165, Barton, Cal. 4th at 199, 201.

The Court of Appeal concluded such speculation would be “an insufficient basis upon which to

require the trial judge to give a lesser included offense instruction.” (Lodgment No. 6 at 69, citing

People v. Wilson, 3 Cal. 4th 926, 942 (1992).)

The constitutional right to have the jury instructed on a lesser-included offense in certain

instances was extended to capital murder defendants in 1980. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625

(1980). Since that time the Ninth Circuit in Bashor v. Risley has held “the failure of a state court

to instruct on a lesser offense [in a non-capital case] fails to present a federal constitutional

question and will not be considered in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.” 730 F.2d 1228 (9th

Cir. 1984), quoting James v. Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976). The Bashor court stated

that there may be exceptions to this general statement “because the criminal defendant is also

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Under the doctrine of invited error, a party whose conduct induces or invites the commission

of error by the trial court is estopped from asserting the error as a ground for reversal on appeal. See

Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 350 (1937); Pobor v. Western Pac. R. Co., 55 Cal. 2d 314

(1961); Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal 4th 383 (1999); Telles Transport, Inc. v. W.C.A.B., 92 Cal.

App. 4th 1159 (5th Dist. 2001); Geffcken v. D’Andrea, 137 Cal. App. 4th 1298 (2nd Dist. 2006); R

& B Auto Center, Inc. v. Farmers Group, Inc., 140 Cal. App. 4th 327 (4th Dist. 2006). 

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entitled to adequate instructions on his or her theory of defense.” 730 F.2d 1240. This Court,

however, is barred from creating such a rule, as habeas corpus “cannot be used as a vehicle to

create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989). 

Even if such an exception were recognized, the California Court of Appeal, as noted above, found

no error in the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary

manslaughter because there was not substantial evidence to support such a charge. (Lodgment No.

6 at 71-77.) In addition, the California Court of Appeal noted, “even if such instruction were

supported by the evidence, ‘the doctrine of invited error’8 would bar Aphayavong ‘from

challenging on appeal the trial court’s failure to give the instruction.’” (Lodgment No. 6 at 70,

quoting Barton, 12 Cal.4th at 198.) Therefore, this Court may not address this claim as habeas

relief is not available. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649, 652-654 (2006). 

ii. Lesser Related Offense - Assault

Furthermore, the trial court had no obligation to instruct the jury on the lesser related

offense of assault. The trial court may instruct on a lesser related offense when requested by

defendant and with the prosecution’s consent. However, as noted by the Superior Court:

[The district attorney]’s declaration quite clearly establishes that the

prosecutor would not have concurred in a request for an instruction on the lesser

related offense of assault. [Aphayavong] argues that despite [the prosecutor]’s

declaration, he may have agreed to such an instruction in the interests of justice,

especially with the court’s urging, had his trial attorney acted competently. 

However, this assertion is based on nothing more than speculation and is belied by

[the prosecutor]’s express statements to the contrary. 

Therefore, even if [Aphayavong]’s counsel would have requested the

instruction, the evidence is clear that [the prosecutor] would not have concurred in

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such a request, and the trial court, in turn, would not have been permitted to give

the instruction. Thus, [Aphayavong] cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice

from this error, since he is unable to establish the result would have been different

if his trial counsel had requested the assault instruction. 

One fails to state a prima facie case when he cannot demonstrate any

prejudice resulting from counsel’s alleged errors or omissions. ([Strickland, 466

U.S. 668, 687].) Further, as the Strickland court advised, “a court need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 

([Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697].) As set forth above, Aphayavong has failed to meet

his burden to affirmatively prove that any prejudice resulted from trial counsel’s

alleged error. 

Lodgment No. 13 at 4-5.

Petitioner does not have an established constitutional right to receive an instruction on the

lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter or the lesser related offense of assault. 

Therefore, Petitioner fails to state a federal question and this Court recommends DENYING

habeas relief as to Petitioner’s claim based on trial court instructional error.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that

Judgment be entered denying this Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 18, 2008, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

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and served on all parties no later than May 2, 2008. The parties are hereby advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time period may result in a waiver of those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Ylst, 951

F.2d at 1156. 

DATED: March 16, 2008

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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