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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

· FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

ROSALYN ASBURY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 

) 

LEO BROUGHAM, an individual ) 

and d/b/a BROUGHAM ESTATES } 

and BROUGHAM MANAGEMENT COMPANY, ) 

and WANDA CHAUVIN, an individual, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JAN 3 01989 . 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

86-1877 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 84-2337-S) 

Gregory Bernard King, Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

George Maier, Kansas City, Kansas (Edward H~ Powers, Sr~, Kansas 

city, Kansas, with him on brief), for Defendants-Appellants. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, Circuit ·Judges and PARKER, District 

Judge*. 

PARKER, District Judge*. 

*The Honorable James A. Parker, United States District Judge for 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by designationo 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Rosalyn Asbury brought suit under 42 u.s.c. §1982 1 

and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq (FHA), 2 claiming 

that the defendants refused to rent or to allow her to_inspect or 

negotiate for the rental of an apartment or townhouse at Brougham 

Estates in Kansas City. Defendants Leo Brougham1 individually and 

doing business as Brougham Estates and Brougham Management Company, 

and Wanda Chauvin, his employee, appeal a jury verdict awarding 

Asbury compensatory damages of $7,500 against them upon a finding 

that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race 

andjor sex. 3 Leo Brougham appeals from the jury verdict awarding 

1 42 u.s.c, §1982 provides that "[a]ll citizens of the United 

States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as 

is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, 

sell, hold, convey real and personal property." 

2 42 u.s.c. §3604 provides that 

·~·it shall be unlawful--

(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of 

a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale 

or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 

dwelling to any person because of race 1 color, religion, 

sex, or national origin. 

(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, 

conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities 

in connection therewith, because of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin •••• 

(d) To represent to any person because of race, 

color, religion, sex or national origin that any dwelling 

is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when 

such dwelling is in fact so available. 

3 The basis of liability is not clear from the jury verdict. 

§ 1982 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race; the FHA 

forbids discrimination on the basis of race and gender. The 

verdict form did not require ~he jury_to make a specific finding 

as to whether the discrimination was based on race or gender. 

Defendants did not object to the form of verdict and did not 

request special interrogatories that wo~ld have asked the jury to 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 2 
punitive damages in the amount of $50,000 solely against him. 

Defendants contend that the jury verdict awarding compensatory 

damages is unsupported by the evidence because it failed· to 

establish an intent to discriminate. Defendant Leo Brougham 

appeals the award of punitive damages on t h e additional ground that 

any discriminatory.motivation ·that the jury may have found on the 

part of Wanda Chauvin could not be attributed to Brougham, on whose 

behalf she managed leasing of apartments and townhouses at Brougham 

Estates. The defendants argue, therefore, that the district court 

erred by denying their motion for a new trial. 

I. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting a Finding of Racial 

Discrimination in Violation of § 1982 and FHA. 

42 u.s.c. §1982 and the FHA both prohibit discrimination on 

the basis of race. In order to prevail on a claim made under these 

statutes, plaintiff must prove a discriminatory intent. Denny v. 

Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F. 2d 816, 822 (lOth cir. 1981) . A 

violation occurs when race is a factor in a decision to deny a 

minority applicant the opportunity to rent or negotiate for a 

rental, but race need not be the only factor in the decision. 

Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383 (lOth Cir. 1973). 

specify the type of discrimination that occurred. As discussed in 

the opinion, the evidence indicates a substantial basis for the 

jury 1 s determination of racial discrimination. A finding of racial 

discrimination under § 1982 was necessary to support the jury award 

of $50,000 punitive damages because the maximum punitive damages 

allowed by the FHA are $1,000. 42 u.s.c. § 3612(c). ·consequently, 

it is not necessary to analyze the evidence with reference to the 

claim of gender discrimination. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 3 
In addition, § 3604(d) of the FHA specifically prohibits 

dissemination of false information about the availability of 

housing because of a person 1 s race. Accordingly, failure to 

provide a minority applicant with th~ same information about 

availability of a rental unit or the terms and conditions for 

rental as is provided to white "testers 1 " results in false 

information being provided and is-cognizable as an injury under the 

FHA. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 u.s. 363 (1982). 

A. Asbury's Prima Facie case under §1982 and FHA. 

The three-part burden of proof analysis established in 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.So 792 (1973), a Title VII 

employment discrimination case, has been widely applied to FHA and 

§ 1982 claims. ~, Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty. Inc., 610 F.2d 

1032 (2d Cir. 1979); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, 648 F.2d 

548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980); §gg also, Denny v. Hutchinson Sales 

Corp., 649 F. 2d 816, 822-23 (lOth Cir. 1981) ( § 1982) . Under the 

McDonnell Douglas analysis, plaintiff first must come forward with 

proof of a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if 

plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden shifts to 

defendants to produce evidence that the refusal to rent or 

negotiate for a rental was motivated by legitimate, non-racial 

considerations. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981)o Third, once defendants by evidence 

articulate non-discriminatory reasons, the burden shifts back to 

plaintiff to show that the proffered reasons were pretextual. Id. 

at 256. 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 4 
The proof necessary to establish a prima facie case under the 

FHA also establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination 

under §1982. Selden Apartments v. u.s. Dept. ·of Housing & Urban 

Development, 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 1986); Robinson v. 12 

Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir. 1979). In order to 

establish her prima facie case, plaintiff had to prove that: 

(1) she is a member of a racial minority; 

(2) she applied for and was qualified to rent an apartment or 

townhouse in Brougham Estates; 

(3) she was denied the opportunity to rent or to inspect or 

negotiate for the rental of a townhouse or apartment; and 

(4) the housing opportunity remained available. 

Selden Apartments, 785 F.2d at 159; Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1038 . 

A review of the evidence in this case shows that plaintiff 

established her prima facie case. Defendants stipulated that 

Asbury is black. Plaintiff testified that on February 23, 1984, 

she went to Brougham Estates with her daughter to obtain rental 

housing. R. Vol. II at 29. At the rental office at Brougham 

Estates, Asbury encountered Wanda Chauvin, the manager, 4 and 

4 Although there is some dispute in the record concerning the 

precise relationship between Chauvin and Brougham, Chauvin worked 

for Brougham on a commission basis, and he specifically referred 

to her as his employee and rental agent. R. Vol. II at 104 . As 

discussed elsewhere in the opinion, Brougham's liability arises 

directly from establishing discriminatory policies and procedures. 

In addition, discriminatory conduct on the part of Chauvin in her 

capacity as Brougham's rental agent or employee is attributable to 

Brougham as owner and managing partner of Brougham Estates. 

Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel. 'Inc., 648 F.2d 548, 552 (9th 

Cir. 1980) ("The duty of. the owner ... to obey the laws relating 

to racial discrimination is non-delegable.") 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 5 
explained to Chauvin that she was being transferred to Kansas City 

and needed to rent housing. R. Vol. II at 29-30. A:sbury told 

Chauvin that she needed to secure housing by the middle of March 

or the beginning of April.. R. Vol. II at 30. In response, Chauvin 

said there were no vacancies, R. Vol. II at 30, but told Asbury s he 

could call back at a later time to check on availability. R. Vol. 

II at 33. Chauviri provided no information concerning availability 

of rental units that would assist Asbury in her efforts to rent an 

apartment or townhouse at Brougham Estates. R. Vol. II at 32. 

Asbury asked for the opportunity to fill out an application, but 

Chauvin did not give her an application, again stating that there 

were no vacancies and that she kept no waiting list. R. Vol. II 

at 33. Asbury also requested floor plans or the opportunity to 

view a model unit, and Chauvin refused. R. Vol. II at 31. 

Instead, Chauvin suggested Asbury inquire at the Westminister 

Apartments, R. Vol. II at 33, an apartment complex housing mostly 

black fami lies. R. Vol. III at 3-4. Although Chauvin did not ask 

Asbury about her qualifications, plaintiff was employed with the 

Federal Aviation Authority at a salary of $37,599. R. Vol. II at 

25. Based on her ~alary, defendants concede that Asbury would 

likely be qualified to rent an apartment or townhouse at Brougham 

Estates. Brief of Appellants at 8. 

Defendants argue that Asbury was not rejected because Chauvin 

courteously invited her to call back. However, there is ample 

.evidence in the record · to support the jury's finding that 

defendants• failure or refusal to provide Asbury the opportunity 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 6 
to rent or inspect or negotiate for the rental of a townhouse or 

apartment constituted a rejection because of her race cognizable 

under § 1982 and the FHA. 

Althoug~ there was a conflict in the . evidence as to the 

availability of housing at the time Asbury attempted to inspect 

and negotiate for rental, there was abundant evidence from which 

the jury could find that housing was available. Defendants 

testified that families with a child are housed exclusively in the 

townhouses at Brougham Estates, and that there were no townhouses 

available on the date Asbury inquired. Asbury introduced evidence 

suggesting that both apartments and townhouses were available and, 

in addition, that exceptions previously had been created to allow 

children to reside in the apartments. 

On February 24, 1984, the day after Asbury inquired about 

renting, Asbury's sister-in-law, Linda Robinson, who is white, 

called to inquire about the availability of two-bedroom apartments. 

R. Vol. II at 76. The woman who answered the telephone identified 

herself as "Wanda" and invited Robinson to come to Brougham Estates 

to view the apartments. R. Vol II at 76-77. The following day, 

February 25, 1984, Robinson went to the rental office at Brougham 

Estates and met with Wanda Chauvin. R. Vol. II at 77-78. Chauvin 

provided Robinson with floor plans of available one- and twobedroom apartments at Brougham Estates. R. Vol. II at 78-79. 

Robinson specifically asked Chauvin about rental to families with 

children, and Chauvin did not tell Robinson that children were 

restricted to the townhouse units. R. Vol. II at 80-81. Robinson 

7 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 7 
accompanied Chauvin to inspect a model unit and several available 

two-bedroom apartments. R. Vol. II at 83-85. Upon inquiry by 

Robinson, Chauvin indicated that the apartments were available 

immediate~y and offered to hold an ·apartment for her until the next 

week. R. Vol . II at 84. 

Asbury also provided evidence indicating that townhouses were 

available for rent. On February 1, 1984, Daniel McMenay, a white 

male, notified Brougham Estates that he intended to vacate his 

townhouse. On April 4, 1984, Brougham Estates rented the townhouse 

vacated by McMenay to John Shuminski, a white male. R. Vol. III 

at 9-10. On March 10, 1984, Randall Hockett, a white male, also 

rented a townhouse at Brougham Estates. In addition, Asbury 

provided computer data sheets generated by Brougham Estates which 

indicated that a third townhouse was unoccupied at the time of her 

inquiry on February 23, 1984 and remained vacant as of April 10, 

1984. There was also evidence that a building which included 

townhouse units had been closed for the winter but would b e 

available for rent beginning in the spring. On February 22, 1984, 

one day prior to Asbury's inquiry into vacancies, James Vance, a 

white male, paid a deposit for a townhouse which he occupied when 

the building opened on April 10, 1984. R. Vol. II at 131, 134. 

Since Asbury testified that she told Chauvin she did not need to 

occupy a rental unit until the beginning of April, the jury could 

have concluded that at least one of the townhouses which was 

subsequently rented to the white males was available at the time 

Asbury inquired. Although defendants took the position at trial 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 8 
that the townhouses were closed or out of order for repair and 

therefore not available to rent, the jury was free to accept the 

evidence of availability presented by the plaintiff. 

Since Asbury met her burden of proving a prima facie case of 

racial discrimination, the burden shifted to defendants to prove 

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denial of housing. 

McDannel Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 u.s. 792 (1973); Texas Dep't 

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 

B. Failure of Proof of Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reason 

for Rejection. 

Defendants claimed their legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons for rejecting Asbury arose out of the policies at Brougham 

Estates that families with one child could rent townhouses but not 

apartments, and that families with more than one child were not 

permitted to move into Brougham Estates. R. Vol. II at 113. 

Defendants further argued that they made no exceptions to these 

rules. R. Vol. II at 114. Defendants contended that in accordance 

with these rental policies, no appropriate housing was available 

for Asbury when she inquired. However, plaintiff introduced 

evidence indicating that exc~ptions to these rules had been made 

on several occasions; families with children had rented apartments, 

and families with more than one child had been permitted to move 

into Brougham Estates. R. Vol. II at 163-171. Asbury was not 

provided information about the terms and conditions that gave rise 

to an exception to the policy concerning children being restricted 

to the townhouses. R. Vol. II at 32. The jury could therefore 

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Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 9 
find that defendants' reasons for denying Asbury the opportunity 

to negotiate for rental were not legitimate and nondiscriminatory. 

Defendants also argue that evidence of a high percentage of 

minority occupancy in Brougham Estates conclusively rebuts the 

claim of intentional racial discrimination. 5 Although such 

statistical data is relevant to rebutting a claim o f 

discrimination, statistical data is not dispositive of a claim of 

intentional discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 

438 u.s. 567, 5BO {1977). Moreover, there was other evidence from 

which the jury could have determined that race was a motivating 

factor in defendants• decision to refuse to negotiate with Asbury 

for a rental unit. 

II. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Puni tive Damages Award. 

Defendant Brougham contends that there was insufficient 

evidence supporting the jury's award of punitive damages against 

him because he never met or dealt with the plaintiff, the actions 

of Chauvin should not be attributed to him, and he did not 

promulgate any discriminatory policies or procedures. 

Punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant "when the 

defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or 

intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the 

federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 u.s. 30, 

5 Defendants introduced evidence indicating that in 1983 total 

black occupancy was 20% and in 1984 total black occupancy was 25%. 

R. Vol. III at 99-100. 

10 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 10 
56 (1983). The jury has discretion to award·punitive damages to 

punish outrageous conduct on the part of a· defendant and to deter 

similar conduct in the future. Id. at 54. 

Plaintiff . advanced two · theories supporting Brougham's 

liability for punitive damages: (1) Brougham's own discriminatory 

conduct in establishing rental policies, procedures and rules ; and 

(2) his authorization or ratification of discriminatory conduct by 

Chauvin, his employee. We find sufficient evidence to establish 

liability under either theory. 

In this case, Asbury presented evidence that Leo Brougham was 

the managing partner of Brougham Estates and Brougham Management 

Company. R. Vol. II at 102. Brougham established all policies, 

rules and rental procedures for Brougham Estates. R. Vol. II at 

102 . Chauvin worked for Brougham who instructed her about the 

rental policies and procedures. R. Vol. II at 128. Among the 

policies and procedures implemented by Brougham were the 

requirements that Chauvin routinely and untruthfully tell people 

over the phone that there were no vacancies, whether o r not 

vacancies existed, but that Chauvin then encourage the individuals 

to come in, ipspect the premises and discuss upcoming vacancies. 

R. Volo III at 130-31. Brougham established the requirement of 

visual observation of a prospective tenant. R. Vol. II at 102, 

Vol. III at 102 . Although a policy that prospective t enants must 

be visually scrutinized is not necessarily improper, 6 under the 

6

See, Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383 (lOth Cir. 

1973). 

11 

Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 11 
circumstances of this case, the jury could have inferred that the 

policy operated to screen prospective tenants on the basis of race 

a nd that, at a minimum, Brougham was callously indifferent to this 

result of his policy. Indeed, this policy had given rise to 

several administrative complaints by single black females prior to 

Asbury's inquiry about a vacancy. R. Vol. III at 44-52. Brougham 

was aware of previous claims of discriminatory practices in the 

rental of units at Brougham Estates. R. Vol. III at 44-52, 59-63 . 

Another policy established by Brougham was that a family with 

a child could occupy only a townhouse. R. Vol. II at 108-111. 

Chauvin was advised of this policy. R. Vol. II at 114. Brougham 

testified that he made no exceptions to the policy, and he 

testified specifically that no tenant or prospective tenant with 

a child could obtain permission to be excepted from the rule. R. 

Vol. II at 114. Plaintiff, however, produced evidence that 

exceptions had been created on occasion. R. Vol. II at 151-54, 

164-72. Those exceptions had been authorized by Brougham and had 

been made on an individual basis. R. Vol. II at 153-54, 171. The 

rental policies, procedures and rules, 

exceptions, were not kept in written form. 

including criteria for 

R. Vol. II at 107-08. 

From the evidence presented, the jury could have determined that 

the policies established and implemented by defendant Brougham 

directl y fostered the discrimination which Asbury experienced, that 

Brougham should have been aware that this might occur, and that 

Brougham was recklessly or callously indifferent to it happening. 

Plaintiff also offered evidence tending to prove that Brougham 

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Appellate Case: 86-1877 Document: 01019724169 Date Filed: 01/30/1989 Page: 12 
r 

ratified Chauvin's actions. In March, 1984, shortly after her 

encounter with Chauvin, ·Asbury filed a · complaint with the 

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) claiming 

discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Asbury requested a 

formal apology and that the discriminatory practices cease. 

Following notification by HUD that a complaint had been filed by 

Asbury, Brougham personally took steps to investigate the 

complaint. He drove through the neighborhood where Asbury had 

found a rental and observed several children in front of Asbury's 

home. R. Vol. II at 161. In an attempt to confirm his assumption 

that Asbury had more than one child, Brougham acquired the unl isted 

phone number of a neighbor of Asbury, Judith Hunter, and asked 

Hunter questions about Asbury's living arrangements. R. Vol. II 

at 160-163. Hunter told Brougham that to her knowledge Asbury had 

only one child. R. Vol. II at 163. In addition, Brougham 

testified at trial that he had never gone to Asbury's place of 

employment to seek information about her. R. Vol. I I I at 3 . 

However, in rebuttal, one of Asbury's co-workers testified that 

Brougham had been at Asbury's place of employment and that Brougham 

had asked questions about her. R. Vol. III at 152-155. After 

Brougham took these investigatory steps, he never apologized to 

Asbury, although it appears that he determined Asbury had only one 

child and therefore fit within the residential policies of Brougham 

Estates. Based on the evidence presented, the jury was at liberty 

to decide that Brougham had not been a truthful witness. 

Furthermore, the jury could have drawn the inference that 

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Brougham's failure to apologize or otherwise remedy the situation, 

after personally investigating Asbury's claim of discrimination at 

Brougham Estates, was an acceptance and ratification of Chauvin's 

treatment of Asbury . 

A district court's denial of a motion for new trial will be 

disturbed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. 

Suggs v. state Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 833 F.2d 883, 887, cert. 

denied, ___ u.s. ___ , 108 s . ct. 1732 (1988). Having reviewed the 

record in this case, we find that there was substantial evidence 

supporting and a reasonable basis for the jury's verdict awarding 

both compensatory and punitive damages, and we affirm the district 

court's decision to deny defendants' motion for a new trial. 

III. Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees under 42 U.s.c. § 

1988 and for Damages and Double Costs for Frivolous Appeal. 

Plaintiff seeks costs and attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. § 

1988 for expenses of defending the appeal. Civil rights plaintiffs 

who successfully defend their judgment on appeal are entitled to 

recover such fees under § 1988. Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 

F.2d 303, 310-311 (lOth Cir. 1985). We therefore remand the case 

to the district court for an assessment of additional attorney's 

fees. Id . An award of costs of the appeal will be entered for 

plaintiff on consideration of her bill of costs and any objections 

thereto. Id. 

Plaintiff also seeks an award of damages and double costs for 

d elay based on her contention that the appeal was frivolous. 

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Courts have discretion to award costs and damages as a penalty for 

bringing a frivolous appeal. Fed. R. App. 38; Braley v. Campbell, 

832 F.2d 1504, 1510-12 {lOth cir. 1988). A frivolous appeal is 

"one in which the result is obvious, or where the .appellants 1 

claims are utterly meri tless. 11 Int 1 1 Union of Bricklayer s v. 

Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F ·.2d 1401 {9th Cir. 1985). Subjective bad 

faith is not a prerequisite to an award of damages and double 

costs; an appeal lacking foundation is sufficient. Braley, 832 

F .2d at 1510-12. While we have determined that there was ample 

evidence to support the jury's finding of intentional racial 

discrimination, we cannot say that defendants' appeal of the 

compensatory damages award was utterly meritless. With respect to 

the award of punitive damages, we believe there was a significant 

question as to the sufficiency of the evidence on the issues of 

Brougham's intentional or reckless establishment of discriminatory 

policies and Brougham 1 s ratification of Chauvin's actions. We 

conclude that defendants• appeal was not frivolous, and we 

therefore decline to award damages or double costs. 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. 

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