Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ernest Valencia Gonzales, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Permission to Appeal and for Stay Pending

Appeal. (Dkt. 189.) Respondents oppose the motion. (Dkts. 192.) Petitioner seeks

permission to file an interlocutory appeal from the Court’s order of April 23, 2008, denying

his motion for a competency hearing. (Dkt. 187). 

DISCUSSION

Background:

As Petitioner notes, the Court originally set an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s

motion for a competency determination pursuant to Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334

F.3d 803, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), which calls for a stay of habeas proceedings “where an

incompetent capital habeas petitioner raises claims that could potentially benefit from his

ability to communicate rationally.” (Dkt. 131) The hearing was subsequently vacated when

the Court granted Respondents’ motion to transfer Petitioner to the Arizona State Hospital

for further evaluation. (Dkt. 147.) Thereafter, the issue of forced medication arose when

Case 2:99-cv-02016-SMM Document 194 Filed 06/10/08 Page 1 of 3
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1 In addition, on October 30, 2007, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in

Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2007), which provided guidance on the application

of the Rohan standard. In Holmes, the Seventh Circuit, proceeding on the assumption that

Rohan was correctly decided, echoed the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between claims that

could potentially benefit from a habeas petitioner’s input and those to which “a lay person

has nothing to contribute.” 506 F.3d at 579. 

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Petitioner withdrew from a regimen of anti-psychotic medication despite the apparently

positive effects of that medication. (See Dkt. 164.) After status conferences on October 15

and December 3, 2007, the Court ordered additional briefing, including on the issue of

Rohan’s applicability to Petitioner’s properly-exhausted habeas claims.1

 (Dkt. 180.) Upon

receiving the parties’ briefs, the Court further reviewed the entire record, including all

proceedings in state court and before this Court. Based upon its review of the record, the

arguments of counsel, and the principles set forth in Rohan, the Court issued its order

denying a competency hearing, finding that Petitioner’s claims were legal and record-based

and therefore could not potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally with

counsel. (Dkt. 187.)

Analysis:

A district court has the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify an appeal from

an interlocutory order in a civil case when the court is of the opinion that such order involves

a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation.” See In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir.

1982). Certification should only be granted when the party seeking the appeal shows that

exceptional circumstances exist such that an immediate appeal could save significant time

and resources. Id. at 1026; see Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 U.S. 463, 475

(1978). 

The Court concludes that its order of April 23, 2008, does not involve a controlling

question of law and that an immediate appeal will not materially advance the termination of

the litigation. 

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A question of law means a “pure question of law,” not a mixed question of law and

fact or an application of law to a particular set of facts. See Ahrenholz v. Board of Trustees

of the University of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674, 675-77 (7th Cir. 2000). A question of law is one

that “the court of appeals could decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the

record.” Id. at 677. Here, the controlling question of law was answered in Rohan, 334 F.3d

at 819, in which the Ninth Circuit decided that a habeas proceeding must be stayed if the

petitioner is not capable of rationally communicating with counsel on claims that may

potentially benefit from his ability to do so. In its order denying Petitioner’s motion for a

competency determination, this Court applied the holding in Rohan to the facts of Petitioner

case and concluded that a stay of the proceedings to determine Petitioner’s competency was

not required. In addition, resolution of this issue on appeal is not controlling because it

would not “materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court.” In re Cement,

673 F.2d at 1026. Whatever the result of an interlocutory appeal, the merits of Petitioner’s

habeas claims will remain to be litigated.

It is equally clear that an immediate appeal from the Court’s order will not advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation. If an interlocutory appeal were granted and the

Ninth Circuit reversed the Court’s order, it would do nothing to end the litigation of

Petitioner’s claims. If the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order, the interlocutory appeal would

have delayed the ultimate termination of this case rather than advanced it.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Permission to Appeal and

for Stay Pending Appeal (Dkt. 189) is DENIED.

DATED this 10th day of June, 2008.

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