Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01270/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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URITBD STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TEll'l'II CIRCUIT 

EDWARD B. SWANSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

. PILJZO 

Umted Scatff Courc of ~p~ Tenth Ci~-:uir 

(:'£g 15 1~g1 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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No. 90-1270 

ERNIE PYLE & DUANE L. WOODARD, 

Attorney General, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

(D. C. No. 90-B-1116) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGIID1'1'* 

Before JICKAY, SBDIOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner, Edward B. Swanson, is currently serving state 

sentences in Colorado for armed robbery and recidivism. He filed 

this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 

2254, alleging that he was denied his right to a speedy trial 

under Colorado law. Colo. Rev. Stat. S 18-1-405 (defendant must 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1270 Document: 010110099987 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 1 
be tried within 180 days of entering not-guilty plea). After 

granting in forma pauperis status and a certificate for probable 

cause, the district court accepted the recommendation of the 

magistrate and dismissed petitioner's action without prejudice for 

failure to assert a federal constitutional claim. Petitioner 

appeals that ruling and we affirm. 

ANALYSIS 

In order for a state prisoner to receive federal habeas 

corpus relief, the prisoner must have been convicted in violation 

of his or her rights under the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 u.s.c. S 2254(a). Upon reviewing "the petition and 

all materials submitted in support thereof," the district court 

concluded that "[p]etitioner's claim of denial of right to speedy 

trial has consistently ... been one of a violation of the 

Colorado State Statutory right to speedy trial" -- not a violation 

of petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. As a 

result, the court concluded that petitioner" ... failed to 

present an issue of violation of constitutional right." 

We agree with the district court that petitioner failed to 

raise a Sixth Amendment claim in his petition for federal habeas 

corpus relief. Although it is true that petitioner specifically 

cited the Sixth Amendment in both his state appellate court brief 

(attached to federal habeas petition, R. Vol. I, doc. 3, exhibit A 

at 8) and his Objections to Magistrate's Recommendations (filed 

after federal habeas petition, R. Vol. I, doc. 5 at 2), both the 

state and federal habeas petitions turned on the Colorado Speedy 

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Appellate Case: 90-1270 Document: 010110099987 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 2 
Trial statute, not the Sixth Amendment. At no time did petitioner 

advance the Sixth Amendment speedy trial calculus developed in 

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1971). 1 

Moreover, we agree with the district court that to the extent 

that petitioner did raise a Sixth Amendment claim, he has failed 

to exhaust his state remedies. As the Supreme Court noted in 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982): 

28 U.S.C. S 2254 requires a federal habeas petitioner to 

provide state courts with a fair opportunity to apply 

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon 

his constitutional claim. It is not enough that all the 

facts necessary to support the federal claim were before 

the state courts ..• or that a somewhat similar statelaw claim was made. 

(quotations and citations omitted). A careful review of the state 

habeas proceedings demonstrates that the Colorado courts never had 

an opportunity to address petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. 

Therefore, "[s]ince it appears that [petitioner] is still free to 

present his •.. [Sixth Amendment] claim to the .•. [Colorado 

courts], we conclude that he has not exhausted his available 

state-court remedies as required by 28 u.s.c. S2254." Id. at 8. 

Accordingly, we find that, with regard to petitioner's Sixth 

Amendment claim, the district court was correct in dismissing the 

petition without prejudice. 

We note in passing that petitioner might advance an 

additional constitutional claim by characterizing his state law 

claim as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; after all, 

1 Barker identified four factors to be assessed in determining 

whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his or her 

Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. These include: length of 

delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his 

right, and prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1270 Document: 010110099987 Date Filed: 02/15/1991 Page: 3 
"[l]iberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may 

arise from two sources -- the Due Process Clause itself and the 

laws of the States," Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). 

However, the Colorado courts, including the Colorado Supreme 

Court, have already determined that petitioner's state-created 

speedy trial rights were not violated. Since it is by now wellestablished that questions of state substantive law are excluded 

from consideration in federal habeas corpus proceedings, 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977), we decline to 

consider petitioner's would-be due process claim. See also Smith 

v. Erickson, 331 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1964) (federal courts must 

accept state holdings that proceedings satisfied the requirements 

of state statutes, at least where petitioner's claim was not one 

of alleged difference in statutory application among defendants 

involving equal protection but lack of due process). 

CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 

habeas corpus petition without prejudice. Mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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