Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00788/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00788-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TABA KARRON HERBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden,

Respondent. 

 

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Civil No. 12-0788-LAB(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 16)

Taba Karron Herbert (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. Respondent Martin Biter (“Respondent”)

has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. Petitioner has not filed

an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and the lodgments presented therewith,

finds that Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and

that Petitioner’s Petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

be GRANTED.

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I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 27, 1997, a jury found Petitioner guilty of

selling or furnishing cocaine base in violation of California Health

& Safety Code § 11352(a). The jury found true that Petitioner had

sold cocaine base within the meaning of California Penal Code §

1203.073(b)(7).1/ The trial court found true that Petitioner has one

prior prison term conviction [§667.5(b)], and two prior strike

convictions [§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12]. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

174). On January 26, 1998, the trial court imposed an indeterminate

sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for the offense, an

additional one year for the prior prison term enhancement, and a

restitution fine of $10,000 to be paid forthwith. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 1 at 177).

On September 4, 1998, Petitioner filed an appeal in the

California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgments Nos. 2, 3). On

December 10, 1998, the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 4). 

On January 2, 1999, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5). On

February 17, 1999, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition

for Review. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6).

On October 18, 1999, Petitioner constructively2/ filed a

Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court.

1/

All further references to code sections are to the California Penal Code,

unless otherwise noted.

2/

The Court gives Petitioner the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which deems

that a petition is constructively filed when it is delivered to prison officials

for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266(1988).

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(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 7). In the Petition, Petitioner claimed

that his prior convictions, which pre-dated the enactment of

California’s Three Strikes Law (“TSL”), could not be used as

strikes, resulting in a violation of due process, and that he

suffered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On November

29, 1999, the Superior Court denied the Petition. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 8).

On June 5, 2000,3/ Petitioner filed a second Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 9). In the second Petition, Petitioner claimed that his

New Jersey conviction did not qualify as a strike, application of

the TSL to him violated ex post facto laws, he suffered cruel and

unusual punishment, his Miranda rights were violated, and he was

pressured or coerced into giving statements to the New Jersey

Probation Department with regard to his New Jersey conviction. On

July 13, 2000, the Petition was denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

10).

On July 13, 2000, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ Of

Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 11). On November 6, 2000, the Court of Appeal denied

the Petition. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 12).

On June 28, 2002, Petitioner filed in the trial court a

Motion to Reconsider his sentence in light of Andrade v. Attorney

General, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001) and Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 

3/

See footnote 2. There is no date on the Petition. Therefore, the Court

uses June 5, 2000, seven days prior to the filing date on the Petition.

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1019 (9th Cir. 2002). (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13 at 3-5). On June

28, 2002, the Motion was denied. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 13 at 7-

9).

On November 5, 2002, Petitioner filed a second Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 14). Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a

brief that did not present an argument for reversal of Petitioner’s

conviction, but asked the court to review the record for error as

mandated by People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 14). On

November 7, 2002, the Court of Appeal granted Petitioner permission

to file his own brief. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 15).4/ According

to the Court of Appeal, Petitioner claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of selling a controlled

substance, his admission of his New Jersey conviction was not free

and voluntary, the New Jersey conviction was not supported by

substantial evidence, he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel,

the plea bargain underlying the New Jersey conviction was violated

in using the conviction as a strike prior in California, the New

Jersey conviction was for a misdemeanor and it was conditioned on

his co-defendant receiving probation, the trial court failed to hold

a hearing to determine his ability to pay a $10,000 restitution

fine, his California sentence cannot be enhanced by his New Jersey

conviction, and the trial court failed to sua sponte instruct the

jury on possession of a controlled substance. (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 16). On March 7, 2003, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition

4/

Respondent did not provide the Court with a copy of the brief and has

stated that he did not have a copy of the brief.

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for Writ of Habeas Corpus, stating that there was no justification

for the delay in presenting the above-noted claims since they could

have been raised in Petitioner’s direct appeal, and the record did

not explain why appellate counsel failed to raise the claims in

Petitioner’s prior appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 16, 17).

Petitioner did not file a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court.

On November 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a third Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court in which he

claimed that the restitution order should be modified. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 18). On February 22, 2008, the Petition was denied due

to the court’s loss of jurisdiction, and with the court’s comments

that Petitioner cited cases that were no longer good law, the

restitution fine was mandatory and no law allowed it to be waived,

and that Petitioner failed to contest the restitution fine at the

trial court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 19).

On September 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a fourth Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 20). In the Petition, Petitioner claimed that his plea

agreement for his New Jersey conviction was violated because he did

not fully understand its consequences in light of the TSL. On

November 3, 2010, the Petition was denied for failing to meet the

burden of proof, constituting piecemeal litigation and with

citations to case law that stand for the propositions that a

petition that is repetitious and piecemeal will not be entertained,

and that a court may refuse to consider newly presented grounds for

relief which were known to a petitioner at the time of a prior

collateral attack on the judgment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 21).

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On November 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a third Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 22). This Petition contained the same grounds as

presented in the September 3, 2010 Petition. On December 14, 2010,

the Petition was denied as being procedurally barred, untimely and

successive. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 23).

On December 28, 2010, Petitioner filed Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 24). The

Petition sought review of the December 14, 2010 decision of the

Court of Appeal. The California Supreme Court sent a letter to

Petitioner indicating that he needed to file an application

requesting relief from default. On January 13, 2011, the Court lost

jurisdction before receiving the application. On January 18, 2011,

the court closed the matter. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 25).

On February 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 26). In the Petition, Petitioner claimed that his due

process rights were violated when the trial court used his New

Jersey conviction as a strike, there was a violation of his plea

agreement for his New Jersey conviction, he suffered ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel and violation of his civil rights by

the San Diego Police Department. On July 27, 2011, the Petition was

denied with citations to case law that stand for the propositions

that untimely, repetitious and piecemeal petitions will not be

entertained. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 29).

While the February 9, 2011 Petition was pending, on April 13,

2011, Petitioner filed a fourth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 27).

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On May 12, 2011, the Petition was denied because it was untimely,

repetitious, and successive. (Respondent’s Lodgment Nos. 28, 29).

On August 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a fourth Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 30). In the Petition, Petitioner claimed that he was

denied proper medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and

pleaded for immediate release due to a then-recent United States

Supreme Court case. On October 25, the Petition was denied.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 31).

On May 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a second Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 32). On August 8, 2012, the Petition was denied as

untimely, repetitious, piecemeal, containing only vague and

conclusory allegations, and containing claims that could have been

presented in prior appeals, but were not. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

33). 

Prior to the California Supreme Court’s denial of the May 10,

2012 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, on March 29, 2012,

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court.

On April 6, 2012, the Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice

because Petitioner failed to satisfy the filing fee requirement,

failed to use the proper form, failed to allege exhaustion of his

state court remedies, and failed to state a cognizable federal

claim.

On May 11, 2012, Petitioner paid the filing fee. On August

14, 2012, Petitioner filed the First Amended Petition that is now

before the Court. On November 14, 2012, Respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss the First Amended Petition.

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II

PETITIONER’S PETITION IS BARRED

BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1. The AEDPA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“the AEDPA”)

statute of limitations. The provisions of the AEDPA apply to

petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court after

the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997). Therefore, because the

Petition was filed on August 27, 2010, the AEDPA applies to this

case.

Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA on April 24, 1996, “state

prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding when to file

a federal habeas petition.” Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118

U.S. 897 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“[D]elays of more than a decade did not necessarily bar a prisoner

from seeking relief.” Id. 

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time frame

for seeking federal habeas relief was dramatically limited. The

AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by, in part, adding subdivision (d),

which provides for a one-year limitation period for state prisoners

to file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)

states, in pertinent part:

 (d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of -

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(A) the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review 

or the expiration of the time for seeking 

such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to

filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by

such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional

right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Petitioner’s conviction became final at the end of the time

he could have sought review by the United States Supreme Court of

the California Supreme Court’s denial of his Petition for Review on

his direct appeal. On February 17, 1999, the California Supreme

Court denied the Petition for Review. Petitioner had 90 days to seek

review in the United States Supreme Court. Wixom v. Washington, 264

F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2000); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir. 1999). Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction was final on May 18,

1999, 90 days after February 17, 1999.

Therefore, absent tolling, Petitioner had one year or until 

May 18, 2000, to file his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court. However, as explained in detail below, Petitioner waited a

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dozen years to file the Petition that is now before the Court, thus

making it untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner filed multiple petitions for post-conviction

relief in the California Superior, Appellate, and Supreme Courts.

The statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state

habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. Under the

holding of Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), the

“statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state

habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects

petitioner’s final collateral challenge,” provided the petitions

were properly filed and pending during that entire time. The statute

of limitations is not tolled from the time a final decision is

issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case “pending” during

that interval. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006

The meaning of the terms “properly filed” and “pending” in

Nino have been clarified by the United States Supreme Court. In

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), the Court held that the time

between denial in a lower California court and the filing of a

subsequent petition in the next higher court does not toll the

statute of limitations, if the petition is ultimately found to be

untimely. Id. at 223-226. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408

(2005), the Court held that statutory tolling is not available for

the period a petition is under consideration, if it is dismissed as

untimely. Id. at 413.

In Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court held that

in the absence of a clear indication by the California Supreme Court

that a petition is untimely, “the federal court must itself examine

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the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would

have held in respect to timeliness.” Id. at 197. The Evans Court

gave some guidance in making that determination: federal courts must

assume (until the California courts state otherwise) that California

law regarding timeliness does not differ significantly from other

states which use thirty or sixty day rules for untimeliness and, a

six month unexplained delay is presumptively unreasonable. 

Statutory tolling is unavailable for the interval between

successive filings in the same court. Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984,

986 (9th Cir. 2001); Camacho v. Hernandez, 2009 WL 192483 at *4 (S.D.

Cal. 2009).

However, the Ninth Circuit applies a two part test to

determine whether the period between the denial of one petition and

the filing of a second petition in the same court should be tolled.

Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Hamerle v.

Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the court must

ask whether the petitioner’s subsequent petitions are limited to an

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first

petition. King v. Roe, 340 F. 3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). If the

petitions are not related, the subsequent petition constitutes a new

round of collateral attack, and the time between them is not tolled.

Banjo, supra, at 969, citing Hemerle, supra, at 1075. If the

successive petition was attempting to correct deficiencies of a

prior petition, then the petitioner is still making “proper use of

state court procedures” and habeas review is still pending. Banjo,

supra, at 969, citing King, supra, at 823.

Petitioner’s first petition for relief after his convictions

and sentence became final was filed on October 18, 1999 in the San

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Diego Superior Court. On November 29, 1999, the Superior Court

denied the Petition. From May 18, 1999 (the date Petitioner’s

convictions and sentence became final) to October 18, 1999, (the

date Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

San Diego Superior Court) (5 months), the statute of limitations was

not tolled because there was no case pending during that interval.

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006.

Petitioner waited until July 13, 2000 to file a Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. On November

6, 2000, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition. From November 29,

1999 (the date the San Diego Superior Court denied the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus) to July 13, 2000 (the date Petitioner filed

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of

Appeal), (7 months, 14 days), the statute of limitations was not

tolled because a six month (or more) delay is presumptively

unreasonable and does not toll the statute of limitations. Evans,

546 U.S. at 197.

From November 6, 2000 to June 28, 2002, Petitioner did

nothing to pursue his Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus in the

California courts. From November 6, 2000 to June 28, 2002, 1 year,

7 months, 22 days elapsed. During this time, the statute of

limitations was not tolled because a six month delay (or more) is

presumptively unreasonable and does not toll the statute of

limitations. Evans, 546 U.S. at 197.5/

On June 28, 2002, Petitioner filed in the trial court a

Motion to Reconsider his sentence in light of then-new case law. On

5/

By this time, the statute of limitations was not tolled for 2 years, 1

month, 6 days.

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that same date, the Motion was denied. Since it appears that

Petitioner was attempting to pursue his state court remedies by

filing the Motion in the trial court, the Court will give Petitioner

the benefit of the doubt that the statute of limitations was tolled

on June 28, 2002.

Between June 28, 2002 to May 10, 2012, Petitioner filed

numerous Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego

Superior, California Appellate and Supreme Courts. These Petitions

were denied either on the merits, or because they were untimely,

repetitious, piecemeal, successive, procedurally barred, vague,

contained only conclusory allegations, and contained claims that

could have been presented in prior appeals, but were not. From June

28, 2002 to May 10, 2012, 9 years, 10 months, 12 days elapsed. The

last of these Petitions was denied on April 6, 2012. The statute of

limitations was not tolled during this interval because they were

successive filings in the same courts, which did not elaborate on

the facts related to claims in prior petitions. Dils, supra, at 986,

Banjo, supra at 968, King, supra at 823. 

Adding together the periods of time when the statute of

limitations was not tolled (5 months + 7 months, 14 days + 1 year,

22 days + 9 years, 10 months, 12 days), results in a total of 11

years, 11 months and 18 days, which is well beyond the one year

statute of limitations mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

Accordingly, Petitioner failed to file his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in a timely fashion and it is therefore barred.

2. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling of the

Statute of Limitations

Petitioner does not argue that he is entitled to equitable

tolling of the statute of limitations. Respondent argues that

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Petitioner’s Petition is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that equitable tolling is

available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). see Holland v. Florida, 130

S.Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562 (2010). In Holland, the Court recognized

equitable tolling of the AEDPA one-year limitations period when the

prisoner can show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in

his way.” Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The Ninth

Circuit has held that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is

subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d

530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). However, the Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted

that “equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as

extensions of time will only be granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Id. [quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States,

107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)]. The Beeler court wrote that

district judges must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate

the federal habeas process” and “only authorize extensions when this

high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at 1289.

The burden is on Petitioner to show that the “extraordinary

circumstances” he has identified were the proximate cause of his

untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman v.

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling “is

unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

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(9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable

tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the

rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

 The obligation to act diligently “does not pertain solely to

the filing of the federal habeas petition, rather it is an obligation that exists during the period appellant is exhausting state

court remedies as well.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 972 (9th Cir.

2006) citing Lacava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3rd Cir. 2005). When

courts assess a habeas petitioner’s argument in favor of equitable

tolling, they must conduct a “highly fact-dependent” inquiry.

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000), Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). The extraordinary

circumstances must be the “but-for and proximate cause” of the

untimely filing. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Petitioner has not presented anything to the Court to

suggest that his Petition is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. Consequently, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition is not entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations.

 III

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The decision on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is not a close

call. Waiting approximately 12 years to file the Petition now before

the Court without a justifiable reason for the delay violates

Congress’ intent to encourage and compel timely habeas corpus

review. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

Court has determined that Petitioner has failed to comply with the

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AEDPA’s statute of limitations and that he is not entitled to

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2244(d).

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion

to Dismiss be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 28, 2013, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 8, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 4, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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