Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00314/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00314-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARL PORTIS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 06cv0314 DMS (POR)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND (2)

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

J, MARSHALL,

Respondent.

Petitioner Earl Portis, a prisoner in state custody proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is serving an eight-year prison sentence for

selling cocaine base in violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 11352(a). The

Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that this Court deny

the Petition. Petitioner did not file any objections to the R&R. However, Respondent filed an

objection to that portion of the R&R that found Petitioner’s second and third claims were not

procedurally defaulted. The Court considers this objection below. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

I.

DISCUSSION

“The procedural default doctrine ‘bar[s] federal habeas when a state court declines to address

a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner has failed to meet a state procedural requirement.’”

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Coleman

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v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The doctrine “‘is a specific application of the general

adequate and independent state grounds doctrine.’” Bean, 96 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Wells v. Maass,

28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994)). Under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine,

federal courts “‘will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that

court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support

the judgment.’” Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729). See also Hill v. Roe, 321 F.3d 787, 789 (9th

Cir. 2003); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1151 (9th Cir. 2000); Fields v. Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit set out the burdenshifting analysis applicable to the issue of procedural default. First, the state must adequately plead

“the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense[.]”

Id. at 586. Once the state meets that pleading requirement, “the burden to place that defense in issue

shifts to the petitioner. The petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual allegations

that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating

inconsistent application of the rule.” Id. If the petitioner meets that burden, the “ultimate burden of

proving the adequacy of the California state bar [shifts back to] the State of California.” Id. at 585-86.

Here, the Magistrate Judge found that Respondent had not satisfied his initial burden of

pleading an independent and adequate state procedural rule. (See R&R at 9.) However, this Court

disagrees. In his Answer to the Petition, Respondent stated Petitioner’s presentation of his second and

third claims to the San Diego Superior Court “was procedurally improper under California’s nosecond-appeal rule, also known as the Dixon rule. This ruling is independent of federal law and is

regularly and consistently applied.” (Answer at 2) (citations omitted). These allegations may not

prove the existence of a state procedural bar, but Respondent need not prove the state procedural bar

at the outset of his case. He need only plead it, and he did so in this case.

Having reached this conclusion, the Court must now turn to the second prong of the procedural

default analysis and determine whether Petitioner met his burden of placing the procedural bar at

issue. In his Traverse, Petitioner contested the application of the procedural bar to his second and

third claims for relief. (See Traverse at 4-6.) Petitioner did not set forth specific facts challenging the

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 The Park court clearly held the Dixon rule was not independent of federal law prior to the

California Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998), but reserved on

“whether Robbins established the independence of California’s Dixon rule for the future.” 202 F.3d

at 1153. As Respondent notes in his Objections, the Ninth Circuit has yet to address this issue. 

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independence or adequacy of the Dixon rule, but he correctly cited Park for the proposition that the

Dixon rule is not independent of federal law. (See id. at 6.)1

 According to a recent Ninth Circuit

decision, this citation is sufficient to shift the burden of proof back to Respondent. See King v.

Lamarque, 464 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “simply contesting the adequacy of a state

rule” is sufficient to meet petitioner’s burden under Bennett if Ninth Circuit has “previously found the

rule to be too ambiguous to bar federal review during the applicable time period[.]”) 

Respondent did not file a response to the Traverse, nor did he file any other pleading in an

attempt to meet his burden of proving the Dixon rule is an independent and adequate state procedural

bar. The only pleading Respondent filed after the Traverse is the Objections presently before the

Court, in which he concedes the Ninth Circuit has yet to find the Dixon rule is independent and

adequate. (Objections are 5.) This is insufficient to meet Respondent’s burden of proof, and thus,

Petitioner’s second and third claims are not procedurally defaulted. 

II.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, this Court rejects the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Respondent failed to

satisfy its burden of pleading a procedural bar. However, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s

ultimate decision that Petitioner’s second and third claims for relief are not procedurally barred. In

any event, the Magistrate Judge recommended that these claims be denied on the merits, and no party

has filed an objection to that recommendation. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS in part and

REJECTS in part the R&R, and DENIES the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Clerk shall

terminate this civil action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 4, 2007

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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