Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00443/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00443-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 Plaintiff named the following employees: (1) Director Dora Schriro; (2) Warden

Trujillo; (3) Deputy Warden Andre; (4) Major Johnson; (5) Correctional Officer (CO) II

Teed; (6) Nurse Daley; (7) Criminal Investigation Unit Officer Tartaglia; (8) CO II Fischer;

and (9) Facility Health Administrator Sloan (Doc. # 1 at 1-2). Defendant Transportation

Sergeant Doescher was dismissed for failure to serve (Doc. # 44).

WO JWB

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Earl Felton Crago, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-0443-PHX-EHC (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Earl Crago, Jr. brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) (Doc. # 1).1

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 120).

The Court will grant in part and deny in part the motion.

I. Background

A. Complaint

Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendants’ failure to protect him from other

inmates during his April 20, 2004 transfer from the ADC to the Pinal County Jail resulted

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2 Counts II and III were dismissed on summary judgment (Doc. # 118). 

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in violations of his Eighth Amendment rights (Count I) (Doc. #1 at 4).2 Specifically, Plaintiff

contended that he is a Protective Segregation (PS) inmate who had been assaulted previously

during transportation with non-PS inmates. On April 20, 2004, when Plaintiff was to be

transported from the prison to the Pinal County Jail for an upcoming court appearance,

Plaintiff alleged that he informed Teed that the other inmates in the transport vehicle could

see that Plaintiff was a protective segregation (PS) inmate and they knew that there was a

murder order issued on him by a prison gang (id. at 4A). Plaintiff asserted that he personally

told Teed of his PS status and that he had been assaulted on two prior transports by general

population (GP) inmates. He stated that despite his pleas not to be put in the transport van,

Teed threatened to mace Plaintiff if he did not get into the van. Plaintiff claimed that he did

get in the vehicle with a GP inmate who subsequently assaulted Plaintiff (id.). 

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants moved for summary judgment on March 25, 2008 (Doc. # 97). The Count

I Defendants—Teed, Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro—argued that because Plaintiff

was technically no longer in the custody of the ADC when he was assaulted, Defendants

could not have had the requisite personal involvement in any constitutional violation.

Alternatively, Defendants contended that they were not deliberately indifferent to a serious

risk to Plaintiff’s safety. 

The Court denied summary judgment. In its Order, the Court determined Defendants’

failure to cite any authority for their argument that Plaintiff’s transfer to the Pinal County Jail

absolved them of personal responsibility for his safety precluded summary judgment on that

basis. Further, the Court found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether

Defendants were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety.

Specifically, the Court determined that Teed’s acknowledgment that she was concerned

about Plaintiff’s transportation with non-PS inmates created a genuine issue of fact for trial.

As for the supervisory Defendants—Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro—the Court found

that because there were no policies concerning the transportation of PS inmates with non-PS

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inmates summary judgment was not warranted (Doc. # 118). 

C. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

The Count I Defendants have now moved for reconsideration of the Court’s Order

denying summary judgment (Doc. # 120). Defendants present the following arguments for

reconsideration: (1) Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity; (2) the Court erred in

determining that Teed was not entitled to qualified immunity because Teed did not know of

and disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff; (3) the Court overlooked

Eleventh Amendment immunity when it applied a theory of municipal liability against

Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro; and (4) Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro are

entitled to qualified immunity (id.). 

The Court ordered Plaintiff to respond (Doc. # 124). In his response, Plaintiff

contends that Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity and that the Court properly

denied Defendants’ request for qualified immunity (Doc. # 127). 

II. Legal Standard

Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. Defenders

of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Mere disagreement with

a previous order is an insufficient basis for reconsideration. See Leong v. Hilton Hotels

Corp., 689 F. Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988). Nor is reconsideration to be used to ask the

court to rethink what it has already thought through. United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.

Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). Reconsideration is only appropriate if the district court

“(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial

decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.”

School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

“No motion for reconsideration shall repeat in any manner any oral or written argument made

in support of or in opposition to the original motion.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers

Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). 

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III. Analysis

A. Absolute Immunity

Defendants contend that the Court “made a manifest error of law when it found that

[they were] not entitled to absolute immunity for complying with the Pinal County Superior

Court’s transport order” (Doc. # 120 at 3). But this statement is misleading—the Court did

not find that Defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity; rather, Defendants

acknowledge that they did not present an argument for or legal authority supporting an

absolute immunity defense. Defendants maintain that this was an “honest and inadvertent

oversight” and argue that the Court should have sua sponte granted Defendants absolute

immunity (id.). 

“A district court has discretion to decline to consider an issue raised for the first time

in a motion for reconsideration.” Novato Fire Protection Dist. v. U.S., 181 F.3d 1135, 1142

n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The Court will not address Defendants’ absolute

immunity argument now and reconsideration on this basis will be denied.

B. Teed

Defendants next contend that the Court erred in determining that Teed was not entitled

to qualified immunity. Defendants submit that while it was clearly established that inmates

have a constitutional right not to be placed at risk of serious harm from another inmate,

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994), it was not clearly established “when a risk

perceived by a correctional officer changes from being a risk of some harm into a substantial

risk of serious physical harm” (Doc. # 120 at 4). 

Reconsideration on this basis will be denied because Defendants have not established

that the Court committed clear error in its qualified immunity analysis. Indeed, Defendants’

request for reconsideration on this basis is at its core a request for the Court to rethink what

it has already thought through, which is not an appropriate request for reconsideration.

Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp.2d at 1116.

Defendants’ continued reliance on Estate of Ford v. Ramiriez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043

(9th Cir. 2002), is misplaced because of the undisputed facts that: (1) Teed knew that

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3 Defendants question Plaintiff’s allegations that he was previously assaulted (Doc.

# 120 at 6). They contend that those prior assaults were not “corroborated”, and therefore

should not have had any relevance in determining whether Plaintiff was at risk on April 20,

2004. But on summary judgment, the Court must look at the evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff and draw all inferences in his favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322-23 (1986). Because Plaintiff has personal knowledge of those assaults, the Court

views them as Plaintiff does. 

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Plaintiff was a PS inmate; (2) she knew that Plaintiff was going to be transported with nonPS inmates; (3) Plaintiff informed Teed that he had been assaulted twice previously when

transported with non-PS inmates, his materials identified his housing unit and, thus, his

status, and he had a murder order issued on him by a prison gang; (4) Teed drew the

inference of such risk because she expressed her concern to others about what to do; (5) she

ultimately let Plaintiff get in the vehicle; (6) where he was subsequently injured. Teed’s own

actions are the strongest proof of her subjective belief—she questioned whether she should

put Plaintiff in the van because she inferred from Plaintiff’s statements to her that he faced

a substantial risk of serious harm. Sweet v. Hernandez, 2003 WL 21920921 *6 (N.D. Cal.

Aug. 6, 2003). Teed cannot now escape liability by arguing that she did not think the risk

was excessive.

Nor do the other cases cited by Defendants compel reconsideration because they are

factually inapposite to this case. Most striking is Defendants’ reliance on Walters v. Doan,

2006 WL 2506779 (E.D. Cal. August 29, 2006), for the proposition that summary judgment

was granted for defendants on the basis of qualified immunity where the plaintiff, a

restrained protective segregation inmate, was transported with an unrestrained wheelchairbound inmate from a gang yard. Defendants have misstated the facts in Walters. The district

court’s decision was not based on qualified immunity. The court explicitly found that the

plaintiff had provided no evidence that the defendants knew of his vulnerable status or his

assailant’s status. It was for that reason that those defendants were granted summary

judgment, which lies in stark contrast with this case where it is undisputed that Plaintiff told

Teed of his PS status and two prior assaults during transportation with non-PS inmates,3

 and

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4The Court also finds unpersuasive Defendants’ argument regarding Teed’s subjective

belief that there was nothing she could do to stop Plaintiff’s transport. Defendants have

provided no evidence at all to support that contention. 

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Teed’s acknowledgment that she was concerned about Plaintiff’s safety.4 Thus, Walters is

entitled to no weight on reconsideration. 

The other cases cited also do not support Defendants’ position as they do not involve

scenarios where the defendants knew of the plaintiff’s vulnerability prior to placing him in

a situation where he was ultimately assaulted. Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ argument,

an inmate does not have to disclose a particular threat from a particular inmate. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 842. Teed also did not have to have personal recollection or extrinsic proof of

Plaintiff’s prior assaults for that to constitute notice—Plaintiff told her he had been assaulted

twice before under similar circumstances. In sum, Teed is not entitled to qualified immunity

and reconsideration on this basis will be denied.

C. Supervisory Defendants

Defendants next contend that the Court erred in applying Gibson v. County of

Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) to this case. Specifically, Defendants argue that

Gibson is limited to municipal—not state—liability. Defendants are correct and are entitled

to reconsideration on this ground. The Court will therefore reanalyze whether the

supervisory Defendants—Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro—are entitled to summary

judgment.

1. Official Capacity

State officials in their official capacity are not persons within the meaning of § 1983.

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges

that he is suing Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro in their individual and official

capacities (Doc. # 1 at 3). In his response to Defendants motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff

clarifies that he is suing Defendants in their individual capacity (Doc. # 127 at 4).

Consequently, any failure to protect claim that Plaintiff has presented against Johnson,

Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro in their official capacity is dismissed.

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2. Individual Capacity

A supervisor may be liable only on the basis of their own acts or omissions. There

is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s position as the supervisor

of a person who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not impose liability.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. Of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of

his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. “A plaintiff must

allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in

the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998). Moreover,

[s]upervisory liability under § 1983 cannot attach where the

allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act.

Instead, the liability must be based upon active unconstitutional

behavior. Liability under this theory must be based upon more

than a mere right to control employees and cannot be based

upon simple negligence. 

Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

The record is absent of any evidence that Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, or Schriro had any

personal participation in Plaintiff’s transportation on April 20, 2004. Rather, Plaintiff

contends that the supervisory Defendants’ failure to enact policies requiring the separation

of PS inmates from non-PS inmates during transportation to an outside agency gives rise to

constitutional liability. The summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Johnson, Andre,

and Trujillo did not have any policymaking authority. Summary judgment is appropriate

when a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to his case and on which he would have the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 322-23 (articulating that the moving party need not support its motion with

evidence negating the opponent’s claim). Plaintiff has not introduced any evidence to create

a genuine issue of fact that Johnson, Andre, or Trujillo had any policymaking authority with

respect to PS inmates. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that Johnson and Andre were

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required to review Plaintiff’s transport plan, Defendants have correctly noted that

requirement only applies to transportation within the ADC (Doc. # 116, Ex. F). And because

a party cannot be held responsible for prison conditions beyond their control, Williams v.

Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1388 (11th Cir. 1982), the Court finds that Johnson, Andre, and

Trujillo are entitled to summary judgment. 

D. Schriro

It is undisputed that Schriro has final policymaking authority. See A.R.S. § 41-

1604(A). The question therefore becomes whether Schriro knew of and disregarded a risk

to inmate safety by not enacting a policy regarding transportation of PS inmates with other

agencies. The Court finds that she did not have any knowledge because Plaintiff has failed

to produce any evidence that she was aware of Plaintiff’s problems specifically or a problem

with the transportation of PS inmates being transported by other agencies with non-PS

inmates generally. Consequently, on this record, the Court must find that no genuine issue

of material fact exists as to Schriro. She is entitled to summary judgment.

IV. Conclusion

The Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to reconsideration as to their claim

of absolute immunity or qualified immunity for Teed. Defendants are, however, entitled to

reconsideration as to the supervisory Defendants and Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and Schriro

are all entitled to summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion

for Reconsideration (Doc. # 120). All other matters in this action remain with the Magistrate

Judge for disposition as appropriate.

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. # 120) is granted in part and

denied in part. The motion is granted as to Defendants Johnson, Andre, Trujillo, and

Schriro. They are entitled to summary judgment and are dismissed from this action with

prejudice. 

//

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(3) The motion is otherwise denied.

(4) The remaining claim is Count I against Teed. 

DATED this 29th day of January, 2009.

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