Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02554/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sheldon Walker, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-14-02554-PHX-DJH (JZB)

ORDER 

 On November 18, 2014, Plaintiff Sheldon Walker, who is confined in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex-Eyman, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

1983. (Doc. 1.) On January 28, 2015, after screening Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court 

granted his Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and dismissed without prejudice 

Counts One and Six, the RFRA claims in Counts Two through Five, and Defendants 

Crabtree, Han, and McLaughlin. (Doc. 7.) The Court also ordered Defendants Ryan, 

Vicklund, and Linderman to answer Counts Two, Three, Four, and Five. (Id.) 

 On February 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 9.) On 

April 23, 2015, the Court struck Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for his failure to 

comply with Rule 15.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 15.) On April 30, 

2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File his First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 17.) 

On May 18, 2015, Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, indicating that they 

do not object to his request for leave to amend, but they request the Court screen 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 19.) 

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 As detailed below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and 

order the Clerk of Court to file Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint lodged at Doc. 18. 

Further, after screening the First Amended Complaint, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims in Counts One and Two, and order Defendants Ryan, Vicklund, and Linderman to 

answer the remaining portions of the First Amended Complaint. 

I. Motion for Leave to Amend 

Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “a party may 

amend its pleading . . . with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. 

The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Further, Rule 15.1(a) of the 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure provides the following: 

(a) Amendment by Motion. A party who moves for leave to amend a pleading must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion, which must indicate in what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or striking through the text to be deleted and underlining the text to be added. The proposed amended pleading must not incorporate by reference any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits. 

Here, Defendants have no objection to Plaintiff’s request for leave to file his First 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 19.) The Court further finds that Plaintiff has complied with 

Rule 15.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Docs. 17, 18.) Accordingly, the 

Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and order the Clerk of Court to 

file Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint lodged at Doc. 18. Below, the Court screens 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

. . . . 

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 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

a. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 

In his six-count, First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of his rights 

under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Plaintiff names as Defendants Charles L. Ryan, 

Mike Linderman, Ralph McLaughlin, Stacey Crabtree, D. Han, Jerry Dunn, and Chaplain 

Vicklund. Plaintiff sues these Defendants in their individual and official capacities, and 

he seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. 

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i. Count One 

In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a due process claim relating to his maximum 

custody placement after being found guilty of a disciplinary violation and being removed 

from the “Step[-]Down Program.” Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 10, 1999, he 

was validated as a member of a STG at an STG hearing. Consequently, Plaintiff claims, 

he was placed in the maximum security Browning Unit. Plaintiff asserts that the only 

way he could be removed from administrative segregation is for him to disassociate with 

the STG through either “debriefing” or the Step-Down process. Plaintiff alleges that the 

Step-Down Program allows STG members a way to leave Browning Unit by giving 

members the opportunity to demonstrate that they are no longer involved with the STG. 

Plaintiff asserts that on June 6, 2012, he completed the Step-Down Program and 

became eligible to relocate from the Browning Unit to close custody housing and, on 

June 12, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to close custody housing. However, Plaintiff 

asserts that on January 9, 2013, during a classification hearing held by D. Han, Plaintiff 

was reclassified to maximum custody, because he was “found guilty of fighting with 

another inmate.” Plaintiff alleges that the Maximum Custody Placement Form states that 

his “violent behavior is detrimental to the safe and secure operation of the institution,” 

and Plaintiff was terminated from the Step-Down Program as a result.1

 Plaintiff further 

asserts that Jerry Dunn said Plaintiff was reclassified to maximum custody because he 

was terminated from the Step-Down Program.2

 

. . . . 

. . . . 

 

1

 Plaintiff more specifically alleges in Count Two of his First Amended Complaint that D. Han was responsible for classifying Plaintiff to “an indefinite term in maximum 

custody” based on Plaintiff’s “major” disciplinary infraction. 

2

 Although Plaintiff asserts in Count One that he was reclassified to maximum custody due to his removal from the Step-Down Program, Plaintiff specifically alleges in other portions of Count One and in Count Two that he was classified to maximum custody due to his disciplinary infraction. In Count Two, Plaintiff complains that his classification is improper because his specific disciplinary infraction did not cause his score to reach the 

level necessary for maximum custody placement according to the Arizona Department of Correction’s (ADC) Classification Technical Manual. 

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Plaintiff asserts that the ADC created D.O. 806 security threat group policies with 

the express purpose of minimizing “the threat that inmate gang or gang like activity poses 

to the safe, secure and efficient operations of institutions.” Plaintiff claims that pursuant 

to D.O. 806, all recommendations regarding removal from the Step-Down Program must 

be approved by the STG Validation Committee, and inmates may appeal those 

recommendations to the STG Appeals Committee. Plaintiff claims, however, that he was 

never given notice that a hearing was held to consider his removal from the Step-Down 

Program (to the extent it was held), and he was not given an opportunity to participate in 

the Committee process or to otherwise be heard. Plaintiff further asserts that he was 

found guilty of a disciplinary ticket of disorderly conduct when he was defending himself 

during a fight with another inmate. Plaintiff complains that he was not found guilty of 

“assaultive behavior,” being the aggressor, or initiating the incident and, therefore, he 

should not have been removed from the Step-Down Program and reclassified to 

maximum custody. Plaintiff contends that since June 6, 2012, he has not been involved 

in any gang activity or STG activity and his previous STG validation is not sufficient to 

place him in maximum custody pursuant to D.O. 806. 

Plaintiff alleges that on January 23, 2013, he was informed that he could appeal 

his removal from the Step-Down Program to Jerry Dunn. Plaintiff asserts that he sent an 

appeal letter to Dunn to appeal his removal from the Step-Program and his resulting 

reclassification to maximum custody; however, Dunn never responded. 

Plaintiff asserts that in July 2013, he was informed Dunn had retired and had been 

replaced by Defendant McLaughlin and, on July 21, 2013, he submitted his appeal to 

McLaughlin. Plaintiff claims, however, that McLaughlin never responded to that appeal. 

Plaintiff asserts that on September 24, 2013, he filed an informal resolution. However, 

McLaughlin again did not respond. Plaintiff contends that he provided McLaughlin with 

a hard copy of his appeal in January 2014, and that McLaughlin told Plaintiff he should 

not have been removed from the Step-Down Program and returned to maximum custody 

for a disciplinary ticket that was not gang related. 

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Plaintiff asserts that between February and May 2014, CO II Costello contacted 

McLaughlin about Plaintiff’s appeal, and McLaughlin requested that Costello send 

McLaughlin a copy of the disciplinary ticket and incident report so that McLaughlin 

could confirm it was not for gang-related activity. Plaintiff alleges that Costello provided 

McLaughlin with the requested information. Plaintiff contends, however, that 

McLaughlin failed to respond to his appeal, failed to ensure that his rights were afforded 

in his continued confinement in maximum custody, “essentially den[ied him] an appeal 

opportunity, and failed to ensure that D.O. 806.11.1 and D.O. 806 were properly 

implemented. 

Plaintiff also asserts that on October 3, 2014, he appealed his annual classification 

review to Crabtree. Plaintiff contends that even though Crabtree was aware that Plaintiff 

was not afforded due process rights in being removed from the Step-Down Program, 

Crabtree approved Plaintiff’s continued confinement in maximum custody. Plaintiff 

further asserts that Ryan, as the Director of ADC, is responsible for the proper 

implementation of all policies, McLaughlin and Crabtree, and affording inmates their 

constitutional rights. 

ii. Count Two 

In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims against Han and 

Crabtree for “cruel and unusual indefinite disciplinary punishment.” Plaintiff complains 

that Han classified him to an indefinite term in maximum custody, for a “major” 

disciplinary infraction that does not “amount to” maximum placement pursuant to ADC 

policies. Plaintiff further complains that Crabtree denied his appeal of being “classified 

indefinitely” to maximum custody based on his disciplinary infraction not being 

sufficient to require maximum custody placement. Plaintiff also asserts that he has been 

“told” that he “must complete the STG Step-Down Program, which is not related to any 

disciplinary matters or requirement to be released from maximum custody as a result of 

disciplinary” proceedings. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to spend 

“years in conditions extremely more harsh” than he previously experienced in a lower 

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security classification, including losing the ability to see his sister, who has since passed 

away, having contact visits with other family members, losing his job, and suffering a 

“significant burden” in practicing his religion. 

iii. Count Three 

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that his rights under RLUIPA and the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments were violated when Defendants Ryan, Vicklund, and Linderman 

denied his requests for a kemetic diet. Plaintiff alleges that he is a practitioner of Shetaut 

Neter, an ancient Egyptian religion that requires its adherents to follow a kemetic diet, 

which excludes meat, eggs, wheat, refined sugar, table salt, cow milk, and genetically 

modified or irradiated foods, and requires a four-to-one ratio of raw and cooked 

vegetables. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Vicklund approved his request to change his 

religious preference to Shetaut Neter on May 25, 2011. Plaintiff further asserts that after 

“submit[ting] documentation . . . for a kemetic diet” to Defendants Linderman and 

Vicklund, Plaintiff was “approved . . . for a vegan diet, instead of the requested kemetic 

diet.” Plaintiff claims that he subsequently filed a grievance requesting that he be 

provided a kemetic diet or “at least provide[d] certain items such as fruit, substitute for 

the cow milk, and more fresh vegetable[s] to bring the vegan diet closer to [the] kemetic 

diet.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Ryan denied his grievance. Plaintiff was informed 

that fruit would not be provided because of “security reasons,” but was not given reasons 

for the denial of his other requests. 

iv. Count Four 

Count Four contains a separate claim of interference with Plaintiff’s religious 

freedom. Plaintiff asserts that, as an adherent of the Ausarian tradition of Shetaut Neter, 

he is required to engage in ritual worship that involves statues of nine gods and goddesses 

called “Neteru,” as well as scented oils. Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a request for 

permission to purchase the nine Neteru statues that are “essential” to Shetaut Neter ritual 

worship, and the scented oils. However, Defendants Ryan and Linderman approved the 

purchase of only one statue of no more than four inches tall, and Linderman denied his 

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request for scented oils. According to the First Amended Complaint, Defendant 

Linderman also stated that Plaintiff “may be authorized additional paper images for other 

gods/goddesses.” Plaintiff claims that he was not provided a reason for this decision, and 

now complains that he “cannot properly practice [his] religion without the nine statues.” 

v. Count Five 

In Count Five, Plaintiff asserts a separate religious freedom claim based on the 

size restrictions that Defendants Ryan and Linderman imposed on the statue Plaintiff was 

authorized to purchase. Plaintiff claims that, after writing to all of the approved vendors 

of religious statues for Shetaut Neter, which Defendants Vicklund and Linderman 

provided Plaintiff, Plaintiff received responses indicating that none of those vendors sell 

Shetaut Neter statues of the appropriate size. According to Plaintiff, he has been unable 

to locate a Neteru statue that complies with the height restriction imposed by Defendants 

Ryan and Linderman because the statutes “are mostly made of the same size and height 

of those used by the ancient Egyptians for ritual worship,” i.e., five to ten inches tall. 

Plaintiff also alleges that he is permitted to possess comparably sized items that are made 

of the same material as the statues he wants to purchase. 

vi. Count Six 

 In Count Six, Plaintiff asserts claims that his rights under RLUIPA and the First 

and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by Defendants Ryan and Linderman when 

they denied Plaintiff’s requests to purchase scented oils for use in his ritual worship. 

According to Plaintiff, in addition to statues of the Neteru, Shetaut Neter worship 

involves scented oils that are “an essential element in attracting the presence of the 

Neteru.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ryan and Linderman denied Plaintiff’s request 

for oils because “the scent [of essential oils] can be used to mask illegal and dangerous 

substances.” Plaintiff asserts, however, prison policy allows inmates to purchase 

“heavily scented” products “for cosmetic reasons . . . such as body wash, lotions, 

deodorants, shampoo, hair conditioners, powders, and soaps.” Plaintiff claims that as a 

result of Defendants’ actions, he has been denied the ability to “practice [his] religion” 

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and has been prevented from “receiving spiritual enlightenment and guidance,” which 

prohibits him from “grow[ing] spiritually.” 

b. Failure to State a Claim 

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id.

To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

i. Count One 

Plaintiff asserts in Count One that his due process rights were violated by 

Defendants Ryan, Dunn, Han, McLaughlin, and Crabtree in his maximum custody 

placement. In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether 

Plaintiff was entitled to any process, and if so, whether he was denied any 

constitutionally required procedural safeguard. Liberty interests that entitle an inmate to 

due process are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding 

the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due 

Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on 

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted). 

Even if a court determines that a protected liberty interest has been implicated, a 

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plaintiff must specify the due process safeguard he was denied and by whom. “Prison 

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of 

rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539, 556 (1974). Procedural due process safeguards in a prison disciplinary hearing 

require that the defendant receive: (1) written notice of the charges, no less than twenty 

four hours prior to the hearing; (2) a written statement by the fact-finder as to the 

evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) a limited right to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence when it would not be unduly hazard 

hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals to allow the inmate to do so. Wolff, 

418 U.S. at 565-66. Thus, to assert a claim for denial of due process in connection with 

disciplinary proceedings, a plaintiff must allege the circumstances surrounding the 

disciplinary charge, the safeguard(s) he was allegedly denied, and the punishment 

imposed. For the initial decision to place an inmate in maximum custody, the procedural 

requirements of due process generally are satisfied by notice of the factual basis for the 

placement and an opportunity to be heard. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224-26 

(2005). 

Here, although Plaintiff claims to have been denied notice and an opportunity to 

be heard regarding his alleged removal from the Step-Down Program, Plaintiff alleges 

that the removal was due to being found guilty of a “major” disciplinary violation. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied notice of the disorderly conduct charge or that 

he was prevented from contesting the charge that resulted in his reclassification. Nor 

does Plaintiff claim that he did not receive notice of his reclassification hearing or that he 

was denied the opportunity to be heard during the hearing. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim 

regarding denial of his due process rights with regard to his reclassification to maximum 

security custody fails to state a claim for relief. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that his continued confinement in maximum 

custody violates his due process rights, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint also fails to 

state a claim for relief. After an inmate is placed in maximum security segregation, he is 

entitled to “some sort” of “meaningful” periodic review of his status. Hewitt v. Helms, 

459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983) (“[A]dministrative segregation may not be used as a pretext 

for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of 

periodic review of the confinement of such inmates.”); Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 

F.3d 983, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that an inmate’s 27-month confinement in the 

Intensive Management Unit imposed an atypical and significant hardship that implicated 

a protected liberty interest because his confinement was “fixed and irreducible” and he 

did not receive any meaningful reviews of his classification); see also Hernandez v. 

Schriro, CV 05-2853-PHX-DGC (JJM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79265, at *8 (D. Ariz. 

July 20, 2011) (finding that meaningful annual reviews combined with the option to 

renounce and debrief at any time satisfy due process in continued maximum custody 

confinement). 

Here, although Plaintiff complains that he has been “indefinitely” confined to 

maximum custody, he does not allege that he has been denied meaningful periodic 

reviews of his placement or an opportunity to leave maximum custody through debriefing 

or completing the Step-Down Program. Further, although he alleges that Crabtree 

improperly denied his appeal of his classification because his disciplinary infraction did 

not result in a score sufficient for maximum custody placement, he asserts that he was 

allowed to submit an appeal and he received a decision regarding his appeal. In sum, 

Plaintiff fails to specifically allege what due process he was owed but not provided 

related to his continued confinement in maximum security custody. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of his due process rights, and Count 

One will be dismissed. 

ii. Count Two 

In Count Two, Plaintiff complains that his “indefinite” confinement to a maximum 

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security unit violates his Eighth Amendment rights because his classification score does 

not warrant maximum security placement. 

 “[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

312, 319, (1986). To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions under the Eighth 

Amendment, a plaintiff must allege an objectively “sufficiently serious” deprivation that 

results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994); 

see Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2002). That is, a 

plaintiff must allege facts supporting that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a 

substantial risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Only deprivations denying the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave for an Eighth 

Amendment violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation 

omitted). These are “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other 

conditions intolerable for prison confinement.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 

(1981). Whether a condition of confinement rises to the level of a constitutional violation 

may depend, in part, on the duration of an inmate’s exposure to that condition. Keenan v. 

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). “The more basic the need, the shorter the time 

it can be withheld.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1287, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In addition to alleging facts to support that he is confined in conditions posing a 

substantial risk of harm, a plaintiff must also allege facts to support that a defendant had a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., that the official acted with deliberate 

indifference to inmate health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In defining 

“deliberate indifference” in the prison context, the Supreme Court has imposed a 

subjective test: “the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Id. A plaintiff must also allege how he was injured by the alleged 

unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (doctrine 

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of standing requires that claimant have suffered or will imminently suffer actual harm). 

 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Han and Crabtree classified him to a 

maximum security placement based on his previous “major” disciplinary violation, even 

though his score did not warrant such a classification. Plaintiff further claims that his 

misclassification has caused him to suffer conditions more harsh than those in a lower 

security facility, including his inability to have contact visits with his family, the loss of 

his job, and restrictions on his ability to practice his religion. Plaintiff fails to allege that 

he is being incarcerated under conditions that impose a substantial risk of harm, or that 

Defendants Han and Crabtree acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health or 

safety. 

 Further, there is no constitutional right to a prison job or contact visits with family 

members. See Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 

1985) (“General limitation of jobs and educational opportunities is not considered 

punishment.”); Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[i]t is wellsettled that prisoners have no constitutional right while incarcerated to contact visits . . 

.”). Additionally, although Plaintiff identifies restrictions on his religious practice in 

Counts Three through Six of his First Amended Complaint, he fails to allege any facts 

sufficient to show that Defendants Han or Crabtree were aware of any restrictions on his 

practice of religion or how any of those restrictions impose a substantial risk of harm. 

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count Two of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. 

c. Claims for Which an Answer Will Be Required 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated claims against Defendants Ryan, 

Vicklund, and Linderman in Counts Three through Six. Accordingly, these Defendants 

will be required to answer Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. 

III. Warnings 

a. Address Changes 

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

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for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

b. Copies 

Because Plaintiff is currently confined in an Arizona Department of Corrections 

unit subject to General Order 14-17, Plaintiff is not required to serve Defendants with a 

copy of every document he files or to submit an additional copy of every filing for use by 

the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 and 

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 5.4. If Plaintiff is transferred to a unit other than one 

subject to General Order 14-17, he will be notified of the requirements for service and 

copies for the Court that are required for inmates whose cases are not subject to General 

Order 14-17. 

c. Possible Dismissal 

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference to the to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) and the screening of Plaintiff’s 

First Amended Complaint. All other matters remain referred to the Magistrate Judge for 

disposition as appropriate. 

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) is granted. 

The Clerk of Court shall file Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint lodged at Doc. 18. 

(3) Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One and Two are dismissed. 

(4) Defendants Ryan, Vicklund, and Linderman must answer the First Amended 

Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the 

applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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(5) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose 

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper 

that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. 

Dated this 18th day of September, 2015. 

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge 

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