Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01514/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01514-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROGELIO SANCHEZ OROZCO, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-01514 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

On or about July 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 10) on October 4, 2010.

Respondents contend the action for habeas relief should be

denied and dismissed because Petitioner failed to file his

action within the applicable statute of limitations. On April

18, 2011, Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 22) to the answer to

his petition, a motion (Doc. 23) to proceed in forma pauperis in

this matter (Petitioner is already in forma pauperis), and a

“Motion to Request Leave of the Court to File an Amended Habeas

Corpus Petition,” (Doc. 24), and also lodged a proposed amended

habeas petition.

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I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned January 9, 2003,

charged Petitioner with twelve charges comprised of sexual

conduct with a minor, sexual abuse, and molestation of a child.

See Answer, Exh. D. Three of the charges were dismissed prior

to Petitioner’s first trial. Id., Exh. D. At the conclusion of

his first trial, the jury acquitted Petitioner on two counts and

the jury could not reach a verdict on the other twelve counts.

Id., Exh. D. 

The remaining counts of the indictment were renumbered

to reflect the acquittals and dismissals. Id., Exh. A & Exh. D.

Counts one through six involved one victim and counts seven

through twelve involved a different victim. Id., Exh. A & Exh.

D. Petitioner was tried on these charges and testified at his

trial. On August 20, 2003, after deliberating for less than

three hours, a jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. Id.,

Exh. B. On September 26, 2003, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to concurrent and consecutive terms of twenty years

imprisonment pursuant to seven of his convictions. Id., Exh. C.

Pursuant to all of his convictions, Petitioner received

concurrent and consecutive sentences comprising a term of 174

years imprisonment. Id., Exh. C & Exh. D & Exh. F.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. In his direct appeal Petitioner asserted the trial

court committed fundamental error by allowing an expert to offer

“profile evidence” on the characteristic behavior of child

molesters. Id., Exh. D. On May 3, 2005, the Arizona Court of

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Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id.,

Exh. F. Petitioner filed a pro per petition seeking review of

the appellate court’s decision by the Arizona Supreme Court,

which petition was rejected as untimely on August 24, 2005.

Id., Exh. G.

On June 16, 2005, Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his Rule 32 proceedings. Appointed

counsel notified the trial court that they had reviewed the

record and could find no meritorious issues to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner filed a pro per

petition seeking Rule 32 relief, arguing he was denied his right

to the effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel

did not fully investigate exculpatory evidence. Petitioner also

alleged that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

change counsel. Id., Exh. K. 

On May 3, 2006, citing Rule 32.6(c) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court summarily dismissed

Petitioner’s Rule 32 action. Id., Exh. M. The trial court

noted Petitioner’s motion to change counsel had not been timely

made and that Petitioner’s trial counsel had performed

sufficiently to achieve an acquittal on two counts and a hung

jury on twelve counts at the first trial. Id., Exh. M.

Petitioner sought review of this decision, which was summarily

denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on May 23, 2007. Id.,

Exh. O.

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On June 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a second action

seeking state post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. P. In this

Rule 32 action Petitioner alleged he was entitled to relief

based on the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely v.

Washington. Petitioner also alleged his arrest and trial

violated international law because he was not allowed to consult

with the Mexican Consulate. Petitioner further asserted his

trial counsel’s performance was deficient, inter alia because

counsel did not challenge racial discrimination in the jury

selection; because counsel did not challenge the admission of

the profile evidence; and because counsel allowed Petitioner to

testify at his second trial. Petitioner further argued that his

appellate counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective because

appellate counsel failed to raise meritorious claims in

Petitioner’s direct appeal. Id., Exh. P. 

On July 2, 2008, the state trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s second Rule 32 action, finding the claims

precluded. Id., Exh. Q. Petitioner sought review of this

decision, which was summarily denied by the Arizona Court of

Appeals on October 2, 2009. Id., Exh. S.

In the habeas petition filed July 16, 2010, Petitioner

asserts:

(1) that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel by the trial court’s denial of his request

to change counsel, “where Petitioner requested change of counsel

prior to retrial”;

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(2) that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because counsel “failed to investigate,

and to produce evidence available and material to an issue in

support of defense requested by the Petitioner”;

(3) that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because counsel “failed to call to testify

a relevant, competent, available, and favorable witness for his

defense,” which error also violated Petitioner’s rights pursuant

to the “Compulsory Process Clause”;

(4) that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because at the second trial counsel failed

to call an available alibi witness:

(5) “The Petitioner[’s] State[] conviction or sentence

violated the United States treaty, a federal law under the

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) - When the

Petitioner was detained, and arrested by (state) police, and

police denied his right to access to a consular officer, upon

Petitioner’s request”;

(6) that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel;

(7) that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because counsel “in waiving the

Petitioner’s 5th Amendment right to remain silent, self

incrimination, without Petitioner’s consent”;

(8) “that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel because counsel “fail[ed] to object at

trial to prosecutor misconduct at closing arguments?”;

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(9) 

“Whether the Petitioner’s Constitutional or

fundamental rights of Compulsory Process,

Confrontation, due process, and assistance of

counsel ... were violated - When his trial

counsel fail[ed] to conduct a pretrial

investigation, and raise at trial relevant

evidence to explain [to] the jury why the

alleged victims, and alleged victim’s mother

(state’s witnesses) fabricate the sexual

allegations?”;

(10) “Whether the Petitioner’s conviction or

sentence was in violation of the Unite[d]

States Federal Constitution, and Ariz. Const.

- Where the Petitioner’s appellate counsel

rendered the ineffective assistance of

counsel for counsel’s failure to raise and

pursue the more potential, and obvious issues

on the Petitioner’s direct appeal, issues of

Constitutional importance which required

reversal?”; and,

(11) “Whether the Petitioner’s trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to raise a

pre-trial challenge to the State’s Grand Jury

or Grand Juror[?] This violated Petitioner’s

procedural right, and right to counsel, as

guaranteed by Amendments 6 and 14 to the U.S.

Constitution, whether Petitioner’s counsel

waived appellate consideration of the claim?”

II Analysis

Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

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entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(2006 &

Supp. 2010). See also Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.

Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053

(9th Cir. 2008). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s direct

appeal on May 3, 2005. Petitioner’s conviction became final 30

days later, on June 3, 2005, when the time for filing a petition

for review to the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Hemmerle

v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Petitioner, therefore, had until June 2, 2006, to file

a federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006

& Supp. 2010). However, the running of the one-year statute of

limitations applicable to a petitioner’s federal habeas action

was tolled during the pendency of any “properly filed” action

for state post-conviction relief. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.

408, 414 (2005). See also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5–7

(2007) (holding that the rule announced in Pace applies even

where there are exceptions to the state-court filing deadlines,

and reaffirming that a state court’s rejection of a petition as

untimely is “the end of the matter” for determining whether a

petitioner is entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(2)); Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002) (observing that if the state

court held that the petitioner’s delay in filing petition was

“unreasonable” under state law, that would be “the end of the

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matter” for tolling purposes); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013,

1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting contention that state must prove

that rules concerning time bars are “firmly established and

regularly followed before noncompliance will render a petition

improperly filed for AEDPA tolling”). See also White v. Martel,

601 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (relying on Zepeda to

reject petitioner’s claim that state timeliness requirement was

not regularly applied, stating, “the adequacy analysis used to

decide procedural default issues is inapplicable to the issue of

whether a state petition was ‘properly filed’ for purposes of

section 2244(d)(2)”).

On June 16, 2005, Petitioner initiated an action for

state post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules

of Criminal Procedure, which tolled the running of the statute

of limitations. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review of

the trial court’s decision dismissing the Rule 32 action on May

3, 2007. Accordingly, the statute of limitations was tolled

until that date. The statute of limitations then began to run

on Petitioner’s federal habeas action and expired on May 2,

2008. Petitioner’s second action for state post-conviction

relief did not toll the statute of limitations because the state

court determined that it was not “properly filed,” i.e., that

Petitioner’s claims did not provide an exception to the rule

that any claim not presented in a direct appeal or first Rule 32

action is waived. 

The statute of limitations with regard to Petitioner’s

federal habeas action expired on May 2, 2008. Therefore, the

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habeas action filed July 16, 2010, was not timely because it was

filed more than two years after the statute of limitations

expired.

In response to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts that 

“state-created ‘external impediments’” have

prevented his “exhaustion of federal claims

in state courts” that would amount to

“extraordinary circumstances,” that would

merit a granting of “equitable tolling,” to

excuse any perceived untimeliness upon

reliance of Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.

2049, 2063 (2010); and could ultimately merit

relief if he returns to state court.

Petitioner asks the Court to “Stay in

Abeyance” these proceedings for 180 days to

allow his return to state court on the

unexhausted issues.

Doc. 22.

With regard to the timeliness of his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts that his conviction and sentence did not

become final on May 3, 2005, because the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision was legally null and void. Id. at 4.

Petitioner asserts that the decision was void because, inter

alia, he was denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel in his direct appeal. Id. Petitioner also asserts that

the ADOC does not provide adequate legal assistance to prisoners

so that they may timely prosecute their habeas claims. Id. at

12. However, Petitioner asserts primarily that his efforts with

regard to his direct appeal and his Rule 32 action were impeded

by his placement in segregation and by “language barriers,” and

does not assert these impediments impaired his ability to file

a habeas petition for the two years subsequent to the conclusion

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of his first Rule 32 proceedings. Petitioner believes the

impediment to consideration of his habeas claims is his failure

to exhaust them in the state courts and asks the Court to stay

this federal habeas action so that he may exhaust claims in the

state courts. 

The other arguments in Petitioner’s response to the

answer to his habeas petition challenge the validity of his

conviction and assert he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel.

Petitioner is not entitled to the equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations. A petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must establish two elements: “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. See also

Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th Cir.

2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris,

515 F.3d at 1054-55 & n.4; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th

Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

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592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000) (holding this remedy is “typically applied

sparingly”). The petitioner must establish a causal connection

between the alleged roadblock to their timely filing of their

federal habeas petition and the actual failure to file the

petition on time. See Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034; Lawrence v.

Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See Espinoza Matthews, 432 F.3d at 1026;

Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Additionally, a federal habeas petitioner seeking equitable

tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence “throughout

the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111,

113 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049; Roy v.

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. Morton, 195

F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).

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III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Orozco’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

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1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 3rd day of May, 2011.

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