Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05718/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05718-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN LEE McCULLOM,

Plaintiff,

v.

SEAN WHENT, et. al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-5718-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dkt. No. 38

Plaintiff Kevin Lee McCullom, a detainee, filed this pro se 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds under the

amended complaint (Docket No. 15) against Defendant Whittaker 

with allegations that while working at Santa Rita Jail she 

confiscated Plaintiff’s legal mail in one case and prevented mail 

from being delivered in another case.1 Defendant filed a motion 

for summary judgment. Plaintiff has been provided four months to 

file an opposition but has failed to oppose the motion.2

 

Regardless, the Court has still reviewed the motion for summary 

judgment on the merits and for the reasons that follow, 

 1 Service was ordered on another Defendant, T.S. Jacobs. Defendant 

Whittaker’s attorney filed a notice that T.S. Jacobs does not 

exist nor was employed at Santa Rita Jail. Docket No. 44. Plaintiff was ordered to provide more information so this 

Defendant could be served, but Plaintiff has failed to provide 

any additional information. 2 Despite not filing an opposition in this case, Plaintiff has 

continued to file motions in another case in this Court from

December 2016 to February 2017. See Docket Nos. 21-27 in 

McCullom v. Ahern, Case No. 16-cv-0045 HRL.

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Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. 

I

During the relevant time, Plaintiff was incarcerated at 

Santa Rita Jail.3 Am. Compl. at 1-3. Defendant Whittaker has 

been the mailroom supervisor at Santa Rita Jail since 2013. 

Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”), Whittaker Decl. ¶ 1. 

Defendant oversees four administrative units at the jail that 

comprise 22 staff members. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. Defendant’s 

responsibilities include accounting for the mailroom staff, 

delegating work assignments, resolving problems and addressing 

grievances and appeals arising from mailroom operations. Id. ¶¶ 

2-5. The mailroom at Santa Rita Jail processes over 200,000 

pieces of incoming and outgoing inmate mail a year. Id. 

Defendant does not personally open, inspect, read, or retain 

inmates’ outgoing or incoming mail. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20, 24.

Sorting inmate mail is a multi-step process. Id. ¶ 7. 

Incoming mail is picked up from the United States Post Office by 

mailroom staff and brought to the jail for processing. Id. ¶ 

7(a). After the mail is brought to the mailroom, staff looks up 

each inmate addressee’s housing location and writes the 

information on each envelope. Id. ¶ 7(a)-(b). Visible outer 

“contraband” includes items such as lipstick marks, stickers, 

glitter, etc., which have been deemed hazardous per Santa Rita 

Jail policy are returned to the sender, and staff indicates why 

delivery was prevented Id. ¶ 7(c).

 3 The following facts, unless otherwise noted, are undisputed. Even though Plaintiff has not filed an opposition the Court has 

reviewed his amended complaint.

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Legal mail includes mail specifically marked as “legal” or 

otherwise determined to be from an attorney or court; legal mail 

is bundled without opening and marked with a “Legal Mail” stamp 

which instructs opening “in the presence of inmate by the deputy 

making the delivery” and requires inmate signature to confirm

delivery. Id. ¶ 7(f). Nonlegal mail is automatically opened, 

inspected for contraband (such as drugs, weapons and obscene 

materials) and then re-bundled and sorted by housing unit for 

inmate delivery. Id. ¶¶ 7(f)-(h). 

When incoming mail is dropped off at the separate housing 

units, mailroom staff picks up outgoing mail, which is brought to 

the mailroom for processing. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. Outgoing nonlegal 

mail is not opened or inspected unless deemed necessary due to 

jail security. Id. ¶ 9. With respect to outgoing legal mail, a 

deputy must confirm it is legal mail when picked up from the 

inmate by signing his or her name and badge number on the back of 

the envelope. Id. ¶ 10. Outgoing mail is then taken to the 

United States Post Office. Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff states that on October 22, 2015, his letter to the 

California Supreme Court accusing an attorney of corruption was 

confiscated. Am. Compl. at 1, 3. On November 6, 2015, a 

nonlegal envelope addressed to Plaintiff from the United States 

Postal Service arrived at the jail. MSJ, Kennedy Decl, ¶ 10; Ex. 

4 at 3. The content of the nonlegal envelope was a large manila

envelope from Plaintiff and addressed to the California Supreme 

Court. Ex. 4 at 3. This was the envelope Plaintiff attempted to 

send, though it appears the contents was lost. This inner 

envelope was marked as legal mail. Id. Also included in the 

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nonlegal envelope from the United States Postal Service was a 

letter from the postal service that stated that an empty wrapper 

was found at the postal service sorting facility but the 

accompanying mail was not found. Id. at 3-8. Plaintiff claims 

jail mailroom staff forged this letter from the postal service. 

Am. Compl. at 2.

On a separate occasion, Plaintiff states that a letter this 

Court sent to Plaintiff was returned to the Court as 

undeliverable in the case McCullom v. Bang, Case No. 15-cv-3363-

TEH. Am. Compl. at 3. In Case No. 15-cv-3363-TEH, a Court order

was returned to the Court as undeliverable on September 16, 2015. 

Docket No. 14 in Case No. 15-cv-3363-TEH. No other mail in that 

case was returned to the Court as undeliverable. The mail

returned to the Court has the United States Postal Service yellow 

return-to-sender sticker covering the addressee portion of the 

envelope so it is not clear what the address stated and if it was 

correct. Id. Santa Rita Jail does not use the yellow sticker 

that was on the envelope. Whittaker Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff later 

filed three more actions in this Court against the same 

defendants he had named in Case No. 15-cv-3363-TEH: McCullom v. 

O’Malley, Case No. 16-cv-00899 (N.D. Cal. February 23, 2016); 

McCullom v. Parker, Case No. 16-cv-01054 (N.D. Cal. March 2, 

2016); McCullom v. Whent, Case No. 16-cv-01249 (N.D. Cal. March 

14, 2016).

Defendant in her role as supervisor did not personally 

handle any of Plaintiff’s mail. Whittaker Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 16, 

20-24.

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II

A

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine 

disputes of material fact remain and when, viewing the evidence 

most favorably to the nonmoving party, the movant is clearly 

entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. 

Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). The 

moving party bears the burden of showing there is no material 

factual dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331. Therefore, the Court 

must regard as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported 

by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Id. at 324; 

Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is 

sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 

Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1559 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying 

those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its burden 

of production, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to 

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible 

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan v. 

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 

502 U.S. 994 (1991); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 

210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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Material facts that would preclude entry of summary judgment 

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the 

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which 

facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). Questions of fact regarding immaterial issues 

cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Reynolds v. County 

of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1168-70 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on 

other grounds by Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999 

(9th Cir. 1997). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if 

there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

B

Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive 

mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A 

prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices that impinge 

on a prisoner's First Amendment rights as long as the regulations 

are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Turner

standard applies to regulations and practices concerning all 

correspondence between prisoners and to regulations concerning 

incoming mail received by prisoners from nonprisoners. See

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. 

Prison officials may institute procedures for inspecting 

"legal mail," e.g., mail sent between attorneys and prisoners, 

see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) (incoming 

mail from attorneys), and mail sent from prisoners to the courts, 

see Royse v. Superior Court, 779 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1986) 

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(outgoing mail to court). But the opening and inspecting of 

"legal mail" outside the presence of the prisoner may have an 

impermissible "chilling" effect on the constitutional right to 

petition the government. See O'Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 

322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 

(1972)); but cf. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 

1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (prison officials 

may open and inspect mail to prisoner from courts outside 

prisoner's presence because mail from courts, as opposed to mail 

from a prisoner's lawyer, is not "legal mail"). If so, prison 

officials must establish that legitimate penological interests 

justify the policy or practice. See O'Keefe, 82 F.3d at 327 

(mail policy that allows prison mailroom employees to open and 

read grievances sent by prisoners to state agencies outside 

prisoners' presence reasonable means to further legitimate 

penological interests).

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the 

courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. 

Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To establish a claim for any 

violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must 

prove that there was an inadequacy in the prison's legal access 

program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 

350-55. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that 

the inadequacy in the prison's program hindered his efforts to 

pursue a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or 

conditions of confinement. See id. at 354-55.

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III

A

Plaintiff argues, with no support, that Defendant was 

responsible for the letter to the California Supreme Court being 

lost and for the order from the Court being returned to the 

Court. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

Plaintiff, Defendant has met her burden in demonstrating that 

there is no material factual dispute and she is entitled to 

prevail as a matter of law. While Plaintiff did not file an 

opposition, the Court still looked to Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint, but Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that 

a material dispute exists.

It is undisputed that Defendant is the supervisor of the 

jail mailroom and does not personally process the mail. It is 

also undisputed that the mailroom processes approximately 200,000 

pieces of mail each year. Plaintiff has presented no evidence 

that any jail mail worker, let alone Defendant, was responsible 

for the first piece of mail being lost or the second piece of 

mail being returned to the Court. 

Plaintiff stated in his amended complaint that Defendant 

forged the letter and forms from the United States Postal Service

informing him of the lost mail and was also responsible for the 

order from this Court being returned to the Court. Defendant has 

met her burden in showing that she did not fabricate the United 

States Postal Service letter or forms and that the loss of his 

mail by the post office had nothing to do with jail mailroom 

staff. She has also shown that she was not responsible for the 

Court order being returned to the Court. It does not appear that 

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the Court order ever reached the jail because it was returned 

with a sticker used by the post office, not the jail. Plaintiff 

has failed to present any evidence or arguments to refute 

Defendant’s evidence. 

Conclusory statements, such as that an opponent is lying or 

that documents have been fabricated without presentation of any 

explanation of what portion of a statement or document is false 

and without offering an explanation of one's view of the true 

state of events are insufficient to raise a triable issue. "When 

the nonmoving party relies only on its own affidavits to oppose 

summary judgment, it cannot rely on conclusory allegations 

unsupported by factual data to create an issue of material fact." 

Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993).

Even if the post office letter was forged and the Court’s 

order was improperly returned, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that 

Defendant was responsible for either act. The jail’s mailroom 

processes more than 200,000 letters each year and there are many

employees who process the mail. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot show 

that he was denied access to the courts by either act because he 

has not demonstrated that he was pursuing a nonfrivolous claim 

and that he suffered an actual injury. When Plaintiff received 

notice that the letter to the California Supreme Court was lost, 

he could have resent a new letter to that court. When 

Plaintiff’s federal action, Case No. 15-cv-3363-TEH, was 

dismissed without prejudice after the Court’s order was returned,

Plaintiff could have moved to reopen the case. It is undisputed 

that after these incidents with his mail, Plaintiff has continued 

to litigate additional civil actions without problems.

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Nor has Plaintiff shown that jail procedures violated his 

First Amendment rights to send and receive mail or that there 

were any violations of his legal rights due the Court order being 

lost and returned. A review of Plaintiff’s other federal actions 

demonstrates that he has been able to send and receive many legal 

letters and that he opened new federal cases after these two 

isolated incidents.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that an isolated 

instance or occasional opening of legal mail outside the inmate's 

presence does not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation. See Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 2003) 

(isolated incident of mail tampering usually insufficient to 

state claim); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir.

1997) (isolated incident of opening legal mail without evidence 

of improper motive or resulting interference with access to 

courts or right to counsel does not support a claim). For all 

these reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.4

B

"A District Court may properly on its own motion dismiss an 

action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such 

defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants 

or where claims against such defendants are integrally related." 

Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 

1981). "Such a dismissal may be made without notice where the 

[plaintiff] cannot possibly win relief." Omar v. Sea–Land Serv., 

 4 Because the Court has not found a constitutional violation, the 

Court will not address the qualified immunity argument.

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Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987). The court's authority 

in this regard includes sua sponte dismissal as to defendants who 

have not been served and defendants who have not yet answered or 

appeared. Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 

44 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We have upheld dismissal with 

prejudice in favor of a party which had not yet appeared, on the 

basis of facts presented by other defendants which had 

appeared."); Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 978–79 

(S.D. Cal. 1998).

Plaintiff only states that Jacobs was involved with the 

letter that was sent to the California Supreme Court being lost 

and with the order being returned to this Court. These 

allegations are similar to the conclusory allegations against

Whittaker which were discussed at length above and Jacobs is 

similarly situated. Jacobs is therefore dismissed from this 

action for the reasons set forth above.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as 

follows:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 38) 

is GRANTED. 

2. The Clerk shall close the file. This order terminates 

Docket No. 38.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/14/2017

________________________

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\CR.15\McCullom5718.sj.docx

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