Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00508/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00508-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

John F. Stewart, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00508-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff John F. Stewart seeks judicial review of 

the Commissioner’s decision finding him not disabled. Doc. 11. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income on October 24, 2009, alleging disability beginning on June 1, 2008. Doc. 11 at 1-

2. After a hearing on May 18, 2011, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an 

opinion on July 28, 2011, finding Plaintiff not disabled. Id. at 2. Requests for review 

were twice denied by the Appeals Council, and the ALJ’s opinion became the 

Commissioner’s final decision. Id. 

II. Legal Standard. 

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

Case 2:13-cv-00508-DGC Document 14 Filed 11/21/13 Page 1 of 5
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is sufficient evidence to 

support the Commissioner’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a sequential five-step 

evaluation process. The claimant must show (1) he is not currently engaged in 

substantial gainful employment, (2) he has a severe physical or mental impairment, and 

(3) the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) his residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from performing his past work. If at any step the 

Commissioner determines that a claimant is or is not disabled, the analysis ends; 

otherwise it proceeds to step five. If the claimant establishes his burden through step 

four, the Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the 

RFC to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

III. Analysis. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision is incorrect on two grounds. First, he 

argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinion of a treating physician. He also 

argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective testimony. The Court will 

consider each argument in turn. 

A. Treating Physician Opinion. 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Case 2:13-cv-00508-DGC Document 14 Filed 11/21/13 Page 2 of 5
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). The opinion of a treating or examining physician “can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ryklin’s opinions should have been given controlling 

weight and that the ALJ failed to provide “clear and convincing” reasons for discounting 

them. Doc. 11 at 14-15. The ALJ found that Dr. Ryklin’s notes were “replete with 

comments about how great the [Plaintiff] is doing,” and that he released Plaintiff back to 

work immediately. A.R. 33. The ALJ cited several examples from Dr. Ryklin’s 

treatment records, noting that in April 2008 Plaintiff reported “close to 50% 

improvement, had less severe headaches, and was able to stop using pain medication.” 

Id. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Ryklin’s notes from October 2008 revealed that 

Plaintiff was “considerably improved” and Dr. Ryklin released him to full work duties. 

Id. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Ryklin’s treatment notes from June 2009 showed that 

Plaintiff reported 70% improvement “with particular improvement in sitting, standing, 

bending, and sleeping.” Id. Additionally, she noted that in October 2009 Dr. Ryklin 

recorded that Plaintiff’s medication “was controlling [his] pain reasonably well [and] that 

he had no side effects.” Id. The ALJ concluded that these examples from Dr. Ryklin’s 

notes conflicted with a “Headache Impairment Questionnaire” completed by Dr. Ryklin 

in February 2010. Id. at 34. The ALJ gave this questionnaire little weight because it was 

a “fill-in-the blanks, check-blocks form” that “lacked bases for conclusions.” Id. 

 Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ was required to give “clear and convincing” 

reasons for discounting Dr. Ryklin’s opinion is incorrect. An ALJ must provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting the opinion of a treating physician that is not 

contradicted. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Dr. Ryklin’s opinion 

was contradicted by those of other treating physicians such as Drs. Cowley and 

Case 2:13-cv-00508-DGC Document 14 Filed 11/21/13 Page 3 of 5
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Benjamin, and the ALJ clearly noted that Dr. Ryklin’s own treatment notes and other 

documents were internally inconsistent. The ALJ is not required to give controlling 

weight to an opinion that is not well-supported and inconsistent with other evidence in 

the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404-1527(d)(2). The Court finds no error in the weight 

assigned to Dr. Ryklin’s opinions by the ALJ and further finds that the ALJ’s assessment 

of these opinions is supported by several specific and legitimate reasons as outlined 

above. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

 B. Plaintiff’s Subjective Testimony. 

The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis to evaluate the credibility of a 

claimant’s subjective testimony. “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). If the claimant meets this first test, and there is no 

evidence of malingering, then the ALJ “can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ may consider 

the following factors when weighing the claimant’s credibility: the claimant’s reputation 

for truthfulness, inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or between his 

testimony and his conduct, the claimant’s daily activities, his work record, and testimony 

from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 

symptoms of which claimant complains. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 

finding him not credible. The Court disagrees. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported 

being fired from Subway in 2008 because of excessive medical appointments, but that 

Plaintiff only had four appointments during the time he worked at Subway. A.R. at 36. 

She noted that the evidence – the end of Plaintiff’s employment at Subway and the timing 

Case 2:13-cv-00508-DGC Document 14 Filed 11/21/13 Page 4 of 5
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of medical appointments – seemed to indicate that Plaintiff was in Washington visiting 

his parents for two to three months in 2008 as opposed to the two to three weeks Plaintiff 

claimed to have been there. Id. She further noted Plaintiff’s claim that bright lights and 

noise bothered him, and yet he had no difficulty in the brightly-lit hearing room and his 

neighbor reported that Plaintiff kept the TV on all day, even when he was not watching it. 

Id. at 36-37. The ALJ found the “most telling” fact to be Plaintiff’s own insistence that 

he was ready and willing to work, and the opinions of two treating physicians that he 

could do so. Id. at 37. She finally noted that there was no evidence demonstrating that 

Plaintiff’s condition had worsened since 2010, that he had told his psychiatrist in March 

2010 that he had “no complaints,” and that he had gotten a computer and was playing his 

guitar. Id. at 37. The Court finds that these reasons to be specific, clear, and convincing 

as required by the Ninth Circuit. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on her own observations of Plaintiff 

as a basis for discounting his testimony. Doc. 11 at 18. This is incorrect. Although an 

ALJ may not rely solely on her personal observations to discount a claimant’s credibility, 

her personal observations may be used “in the overall evaluation of the credibility of the 

individual’s statements.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 626, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing S.S.R. 

96-7p at 8). As discussed above, the ALJ provided ample reasons for her assessment of 

Plaintiff’s credibility. That she also included a personal observation does not constitute 

legal error. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion is denied. The Clerk shall terminate this 

action. 

Dated this 21st day of November, 2013. 

Case 2:13-cv-00508-DGC Document 14 Filed 11/21/13 Page 5 of 5