Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00394/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00394-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

BENNIE JOHNSON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 08-0394-CG-C

ANSELL PROTECTIVE :

PRODUCTS, et al., 

:

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), on the removal petition

(Doc. 1), plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 15), the defendants’ opposition

to the remand motion (Doc.19), and the telephone arguments of the parties on

September 16, 2008. Upon consideration of the foregoing pleadings, and the

arguments of counsel, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court

GRANT the motion to remand and REMAND this case to the Circuit Court

of Perry County, Alabama from whence it came.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In April of 2007, plaintiff filed a combined product liability and

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 1 of 26
1 In addition to the assertion of the worker’s compensation claim against Citation

Marion, plaintiff asserted five other claims: (1) negligent failure to warn; (2) design defect; (3)

negligence; (4) negligent construction and assembly; and (5) a product liability claim under

Alabama’s Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine. (See id. at ¶¶ 17-34 & 44-48)

2

worker’s compensation action in the Circuit Court of Perry County, Alabama

against his employer, Citation Marion, Inc., and numerous fictitious parties,

arising out of a workplace accident which resulted in Johnson suffering severe

burns to his face, neck, shoulders, hands and buttocks. (Doc. 1, Exhibit A,

COMPLAINT)1

 Throughout the complaint, plaintiff claims he suffered

damages which include mental anguish (see id. at ¶¶ 21, 25 & 48) and in the

last paragraph he seeks “exemplary damages to the extent permitted by law.”

(Id. at 7) The factual allegations of the complaint read as follows:

12. On January 23, 2006, Plaintiff was employed at

Citation Marion, Inc., which is in the business of manufacturing

cast iron products and is located in Marion.

13. At approximately 5:30 a.m., a coworker was

transferring a ladle of liquid, hot metal to Plaintiff so that

Plaintiff could rake the slag off of the top. Upon information and

belief, this was the first day and first occasion that this particular

ladle had been utilized.

14. As the ladle was being transferred, it exploded and

caused injury to Plaintiff.

15. When the explosion occurred, Plaintiff was

covered in liquid, hot metal. He sustained severe burns to his

face, neck, shoulders, hands and buttocks. Due to the burns,

Plaintiff, Bennie Johnson, is permanently scarred. As a result of

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 2 of 26
3

the injuries that he sustained, Plaintiff has incurred expenses for

medicine, physicians fees and hospital charges. In addition,

Plaintiff lost wages and income. Furthermore, Plaintiff has

endured pain and suffering due to his burns and other injuries.

He has also suffered from emotional distress and mental

anguish.

16. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was wearing

protective clothing. Specifically, Plaintiff was wearing

protective gloves. When the liquid, hot metal touched the

gloves, the gloves began to burn. The gloves were not supposed

to burn and melted to the Plaintiff’s hands. Upon information

and belief, the gloves burned due to a defect.

(Id. at ¶¶ 12-16)

2. In October of 2007, plaintiff amended his complaint and added

as a defendant Liberty Glove, Inc. (See Doc. 1, FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT) Therein, plaintiff alleged that Liberty Glove, Inc.

manufactured the protective gloves plaintiff was wearing at the time of the

accident. (See id. at ¶¶ 6 & 16) Plaintiff did not make any significant or

relevant change to the claims asserted against the named defendants or change

his claim for damages. (See Doc. 1, FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT)

3. On October 25, 2007, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

and therein added as a party defendant Modern Engineering Company, Inc.

(See Doc. 1, SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT) Plaintiff alleged that

Modern Engineering manufactured, distributed and sold the ladle plaintiff and

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 3 of 26
4

his coworker were transferring when the ladle exploded causing injury to

Johnson. (See id. at ¶ 3 & 9) Again, plaintiff did not make any significant or

relevant change to the claims asserted against the named defendants or change

his claim for damages. (See id.)

4. By order dated January 4, 2008, the worker’s compensation

claim asserted against Citation Marion was severed from the remaining claims

for purposes of trial. (See Doc. 1, at ¶ 9)

5. On June 16, 2008, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint and

therein added as parties defendant Ansell Protective Products and Teemark

Corporation. (Doc. 1, THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT) Plaintiff alleges in

his most recent complaint that defendant Ansell Protective Products

manufactured, distributed and sold the protective gloves plaintiff was wearing

when the accident occurred (see id. at ¶¶ 3 & 11) and that defendant Teemark

Corporation manufactured, distributed and sold the ladle plaintiff and his

coworker were transferring when the ladle exploded causing injury to Johnson

(see id. at ¶ 2). Plaintiff made no changes in his theories of recovery asserted

against Ansell and Teemark; all five claims are the same claims he has

consistently pursued in the Circuit Court of Perry County, Alabama, albeit

against different defendants. 

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 4 of 26
5

6. In the notice of removal, filed July 17, 2008, the defendants

contend that removal is proper based on diversity of citizenship. (Doc.1, at ¶¶

15-20) 

AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY

21. This Defendant respectfully submits that the amount in

controversy in this case is satisfied. The plaintiff has failed to

specify or otherwise make claim for a specific monetary amount

of damages in the original and amended complaints. Therefore,

Teemark must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

amount in controversy actually exceeds the $75,000.00

jurisdictional requirement. 

22. While not expressed in the body of the complaint, it is the

understanding and belief of this Defendant that the plaintiff was

“covered” in liquid, hot metal, resulting in burns to his face,

neck, shoulders and buttocks.

23. It is further the understanding and belief of this

Defendant that the plaintiff was partially disabled, suffered

permanent scarring, as well as pain and suffering due to his

burns. He claims that he incurred expenses for medicine,

physicians fees and hospital charges. In addition, the Plaintiff

claims lost wages and income. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claims

that he suffered emotional distress and mental anguish . . . .

24. In addition to seeking compensatory damages for the

injuries allegedly suffered by the Plaintiff, the third amended

complaint makes demand or otherwise seeks “exemplary

damages to the extent permitted by law.” In that regard,

paragraph 32 of the third amended complaint avers that the

Defendants’ breach of duty was both “reckless and wanton.” 

25. It is the understanding and belief of this Defendant that

the Plaintiff has received medical care and treatment for his burn

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 5 of 26
6

injuries (which involved a skin graft for his left hand), resulting

in approximately $24,700.00 in bills associated with that care

and treatment.

26. In determining the amount in controversy, the Honorable

Court should also consider the fact that the plaintiff will likely

seek to recover punitive damages. Prospective punitive damages

must be considered when calculating the amount in controversy

unless it is apparent to a legal certainty that they cannot be

recovered[.] Holl[e]y Equipment Company v. Credit Alliance

Corporation[,] 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987). While

courts have been more likely to reduce awards of punitive

damages, it is not uncommon for punitive damage awards of

three times the compensatory damages to be upheld. In such a

case as this, a compensatory award for as little as $24,700.00,

when coupled with the punitive damage award of three time

that, would exceed the jurisdictional minimum of this court. As

discussed above, the plaintiff seeks to recover exemplary (or

punitive) damages in this case. Similarly, a review of the

Alabama Jury Verdict Reporter, Third Edition, January 2005,

reveals that the median punitive damage award in Alabama

during 2002, 2003 and 2004 exceeded the jurisdictional

minimums of this court. Specifically, in 2004, the average

punitive damage verdict awarded was $70,639,000 (sic), and the

median for 2004 was $78,583,000 (sic). Similarly, in 2003, the

average punitive damage award was $1,127,788,000 (sic) and

the 2003 median punitive damage award was $126,000. Finally,

the average punitive damage award in 2002 was $2,843,162,000

(sic) while the 2002 median punitive damage award was

$103,836. 

27. As has been demonstrated by the Alabama Jury Verdict

Reporter, awards of punitive damages in this state typically of

themselves alone exceed the jurisdictional minimum[] of this

court and accordingly, the amount in controversy in this case has

been met.

28. However, if the plaintiff responds to this pleading and

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 6 of 26
2 Defendant Ansell Protective Products filed its consent to the removal on July 10,

2008. (Doc. 7)

3 Plaintiff does not cite to any case law in support of his argument in this regard;

therefore, it is REJECTED in light of the removal statute’s clear language that “the citizenship

of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also

Davis ex rel. Estate of Davis v. General Motors Corp., 353 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1205 n.3 (M.D. Ala.

2005) (“The court notes that Plaintiffs’ Complaint also lists as defendants several fictitious

parties, the identity of which are not yet known to Plaintiffs. For purposes of removal, the court

does not consider the citizenship of fictitious defendants in assessing complete diversity.”);

Howell v. Circuit City, 330 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (“It is well established that

the court’s diversity jurisdiction is established at the time the notice of removal is filed. . . .

Furthermore, under the amended removal statute, the citizenship of defendants sued under

fictitious names shall not be considered when determining diversity jurisdiction. . . . This court

considers the clear language of the statute to be dispositive of the issue.”).

7

stipulates or otherwise contends that the amount in controversy

is less than $75,000.00 at the trial of the matter in state court,

then this Defendant will consent to the remand of this action.

29. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides only that a notice of

removal contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for

removal.” That statute does not provide for an evidentiary

submission with a notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(5)

does provide for evidentiary hearings by subsequent court order.

If the plaintiff contests that $75,000.00 is in controversy or if

this court believes the issue requires a further evidentiary

hearing, this Defendant respectfully requests that limited

discovery be permitted on that issue.

(Id. (most internal citations omitted))2

7. Plaintiff filed his motion to remand on August 12, 2008. (Doc.

15) Therein, plaintiff argues that because there remains at least one fictitious

defendant to be named and this defendant could be an Alabama defendant

complete diversity is absent. (Id. at 2)3

 In addition, plaintiff contends that

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 7 of 26
4 The undersigned notes that when plaintiff initially filed his complaint on April 20,

2007, the only named defendant was Citations Marion, his employer. 

8

because defendant Teemark did not file its petition for removal within one year

after the action was initiated on April 20, 20074

 the removal petition is

untimely. 

8. In taking plaintiff’s motion to remand under submission, the

undersigned raised sua sponte the issue of whether the removing defendants

had “produced the type of evidence necessary to satisfy their burden of

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy

in this case exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” (Doc. 16, at 1-2)

9. In opposition to the motion to remand, the removing defendants

contend that “while no dollar figure is named, the injuries alleged and damages

sought on the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrate that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.00.” (Doc. 19, at 3-4, citing Sanderson v.

Daimler Chrysler Motor Corp., 2007 WL 2988222 (S.D.Ala. 2007)) 

The amount in controversy is readily apparent from the

Complaint. Indeed, as master of his claims, Plaintiff is the party

most capable of saying whether the “amount in controversy” or

what he “claims” exceeds $75,000.00. Based on the Complaint

alone, the damages at issue more likely than not exceed

$75,000.00. For example, Plaintiff asserts that he “was covered

in liquid, hot metal” during the incident and “sustained severe

burns to his face, neck, shoulders, hands and buttocks.” Besides

being “permanently scarred,” Plaintiff also asserts claims for

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 8 of 26
5 In response to plaintiff’s argument that this action is due to be remanded due to

the defendants’ failure to file the removal petition within the one year limitation set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 1446(b), defendants argue that plaintiff has waived this procedural defect by failing to

timely file his motion to remand. (Doc. 19, at 9-11) While the undersigned agrees with the

defendants that plaintiff has waived all procedural defects by failing to file his motion to remand

within thirty (30) days of the filing of the notice of removal, by couching their argument in this

manner, they appear to be backhandedly admitting that plaintiff makes a valid argument in this

regard. (See id.) However, the undersigned reads nothing in the removal statue which supports

the plaintiff’s argument in this regard. 

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within

thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,

9

medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional distress and

mental anguish.

This is exactly the type of injury that “by [its] nature” is

“so substantial as to make it readily apparent” that more than

$75,000.00 is at issue. This Court is empowered to use its

“common sense and experience” in finding that the

jurisdictional amount in controversy is met, where[,] as here, “it

is either stated clearly on the face of the documents before the

court, or readily deducible from them, then the court has

jurisdiction.” Respectfully, this Court should follow the

rationale of Sanderson, and the precepts of Lowery, to find that

the amount in controversy is readily deducible from the

Complaint and, therefore, the jurisdictional amount is met. 

...

Defendants are not asking this Court to guess or speculate

as to what is in controversy. They merely ask the Court to look

to Plaintiff’s own assessment of the case and the allegations

made in his Complaint to guide the Court as to the true amount

in controversy– an amount that logically exceeds $75,000.00.

(Id. at 7-8 & 9 (internal citations and footnotes omitted; internal emphasis

retained))5

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 9 of 26
of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which

such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of

summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has been filed in court and is

not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of

removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through

service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other

paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has

become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of

jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after

commencement of the action.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (emphasis supplied). There is nothing before the Court to indicated that

either of the removing defendants had knowledge of the plaintiff’s lawsuit until they were served

with the third amended complaint; therefore, the one year language contained in § 1446(b) has

no application to this case at the present moment. That the statute meant to confer upon each

defendant a thirty day period of time to file a notice of removal, upon being served with the

complaint, is clear from the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Bailey v. Janssen

Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202 (2008), appendix opinion released sub nom. Bailey ex rel.

Estate of Beal v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 2008 WL 2898214, *1 (2008) (per curiam

unpublished opinion issued simultaneously with published opinion and reversing in part and

affirming in part the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s First Amended Complaint). “We

hereby adopt the last-served defendant rule, which permits each defendant, upon formal service

of process, thirty days to file a notice of removal pursuant to § 1446(b).” 536 F.3d at 1209; see

also id. at 1205 (“[W]e reject appellant’s argument and interpret § 1446(b) to permit each

defendant thirty days in which to seek removal.”). 

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff’s untimeliness argument is due to be REJECTED.

This is important because of the impact it has on an argument advanced by the removing

defendants. The removing defendants suggest that if this Court engages in an expansive reading

of Lowery “personal injury suits in Alabama would never be subject to removal.” (Doc. 19, at 5

n.1) In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. What Lowery teaches is that district courts

should never speculate when it comes to damages and their jurisdiction and, therefore, should

necessarily reject prematurely filed removal petitions. Cf. 483 F.3d at 1215, n.63 (finding it

“highly questionable whether a defendant could ever file a notice of removal on diversity

grounds in a case such as the one before us–where the defendant, the party with the burden of

proof, has only bare pleadings containing unspecified damages on which to base its

notice–without seriously testing the limits of compliance with Rule 11. Unlike the typical

plaintiff who originally brings a diversity action in federal court, the removing defendant

10

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 10 of 26
generally will have no direct knowledge of the value of plaintiff’s claims.”). Accordingly,

defendants should eschew knee-jerk removals where damages in excess of this Court’s

jurisdiction are not clear on the face of the complaint or readily deducible from evidence set

forth in the removal petition. See Constant v. International House of Pancakes, Inc., 487

F.Supp.2d 1308, 1308 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (“If this court turns out to be right when, by separate

order, it grants the motion to remand filed by plaintiff . . ., the court will have come close to

proving that the day of the knee-jerk removal of diversity tort cases from state to federal court

within the three states comprising the Eleventh Circuit came to an end on April 11, 2007, when

Lowery v. Alabama Power Company, 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007), was decided.

‘Circumspection’ and ‘compunction’ will be the future watchwords for diversity removing

defendants in the Eleventh Circuit, except in the few cases which begin with a state court

complaint with an ad damnum clause praying for more than $75,000.”). Instead, defendants in

this position should await “other paper” from which it can be ascertained that the case is

removable. Lowery, supra, 483 F.3d at 1215, n.63 (“To the extent the defendant does obtain

knowledge of the claims’ value, it will generally come from the plaintiff herself in the form of

information in an ‘other paper.’ [] This is so because a plaintiff who has chosen to file her case in

state court will generally wish to remain beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction, and as a result,

she will not assign a specific amount to the damages sought in her complaint. In such a case, like

the case before us, the defendant would need an ‘other paper’ to provide the grounds for removal

under the second paragraph of § 1446(b). In the absence of such a document, the defendant’s

appraisal of the amount in controversy may be purely speculative and will ordinarily not provide

grounds for his counsel to sign a notice of removal in good faith.”); see Middlebrooks v. Johnson

& Johnson Co., 2008 WL 4003926, *3 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (“Plaintiff’s position-that it was ‘readily

deducible’ from her complaint that the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory limits-is

untenable in light of Lowery. Defendants in this case heeded the Eleventh Circuit’s warning and

intentionally refrained from filing a notice of removal until they could meet their burden of

proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that removal was appropriate. . . . From the outset

of this case, Defendants sought an unambiguous statement from the Plaintiff regarding the

amount in controversy, but it was not until the April 1, 2008 hearing that the Plaintiff provided

Defendants with an unambiguous statement regarding the value of her claim [for the wrongful

death of her son]. Thus, the time for filing a notice of removal did not begin to run until April 1,

2008. Since Defendants filed their notice of removal within thirty days of this date, the Court

finds Defendants’ notice of removal timely.”). When a case is removed under these

circumstances, this Court will not inconsistently accept an opposing plaintiff’s argument that

given the nature of his injuries and damages and verdicts in similar cases that his complaint was

removable thirty days from service of the complaint. See, e.g., Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

534 F.Supp.2d 1239 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument in support of remand that it

was facially apparent from the detailed listing of injuries in the complaint that the case was

removal within thirty days of service of the complaint; finding Wal-Mart had no basis to remove

plaintiff’s lawsuit based solely on her complaint). 

11

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 11 of 26
12

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. “Any civil case filed in state court may be removed by the

defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought originally in

federal court.” Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th

Cir. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen

v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). Federal courts may

exercise diversity jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the action is

between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). However,

“[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal

courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly. . . . Indeed, all doubts

about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”

University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411

(11th Cir. 1999).

2. “[T]he party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden

of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts supporting the existence

of federal jurisdiction.” McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th

Cir. 2002); see also Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287

n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“[T]he removing party bears the burden

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 12 of 26
13

of demonstrating federal jurisdiction.”); Tapscott, supra (“A removing

defendant has the burden of proving the existence of federal jurisdiction.”).

Therefore, in this case, the burden is on the removing defendants to establish

complete diversity, that is, the plaintiffs are all diverse from the defendant,

Triggs, supra, 154 F.3d at 1287 (citation omitted), and, in addition, to establish

by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely

than not exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement, Tapscott, supra, 77

F.3d at 1357 (“[W]e hold where a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand

for damages in state court, a removing defendant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than

not exceeds the $50,000 jurisdictional requirement.”). More specifically, “the

removing defendant[s] must establish the amount in controversy by ‘[t]he

greater weight of the evidence, . . . [a] superior evidentiary weight that, though

not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still

sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather

than the other.’” Lowery, infra, 483 F.3d at 1209, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1220 (8th ed. 2004).

3. The removing defendants have failed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case more

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 13 of 26
6 “Although Lowery was decided in a Class Action Fairness Act case, its holdings

are not limited to that context.” Carswell, infra, at *1, n.1 (citation omitted).

14

likely than not exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional requirement. This Court’s

analysis of this issue is necessarily informed by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent

decision in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (2007), cert. denied

sub nom. Hanna Steel Corp. v. Lowery, U.S. , 128 S.Ct. 2877, 171

L.Ed.2d 812 (2008).6

[W]e conclude that the removal-remand scheme set forth in 28

U.S.C. §§ 1446(b) and 1447(c) requires that a court review the

propriety of removal on the basis of the removing documents. If

the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face of

the documents before the court, or readily deducible from them,

then the court has jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand.

Under this approach, jurisdiction is either evident from the

removing documents or remand is appropriate.

...

[U]nder § 1446(b), in assessing the propriety of removal, the

court considers the document received by the defendant from the

plaintiff-be it the initial complaint or a later received paper-and

determines whether that document and the notice of removal

unambiguously establish federal jurisdiction. This inquiry is at

the heart of a case, such as the one before us, in which the

plaintiffs challenge removal by filing a timely motion to remand

under § 1447(c). In assessing whether removal was proper in

such a case, the district court has before it only the limited

universe of evidence available when the motion to remand is

filed-i.e., the notice of removal and accompanying documents.

If that evidence is insufficient to establish that removal was

proper or that jurisdiction was present, neither the defendants

nor the court may speculate in an attempt to make up for the

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 14 of 26
15

notice’s failings. The absence of factual allegations pertinent to

the existence of jurisdiction is dispositive and, in such absence,

the existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking to

the stars.

...

Though the defendant in a diversity case, unlike the plaintiff,

may have no actual knowledge of the value of the claims, the

defendant is not excused from the duty to show by fact, and not

mere conclusory allegation, that federal jurisdiction exists.

Indeed, the defendant, by removing the action, has represented

to the court that the case belongs before it. Having made this

representation, the defendant is no less subject to Rule 11 than

a plaintiff who files a claim originally. Thus, a defendant that

files a notice of removal prior to receiving clear evidence that

the action satisfies the jurisdictional requirements, and then later

faces a motion to remand, is in the same position as a plaintiff

in an original action facing a motion to dismiss.

Id. at 1211, 1213-1215 & 1217 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

4. In accordance with Lowery, therefore, this Court looks solely to

plaintiff’s complaint and the notice of removal to assess the propriety of

removal. The undersigned quickly discerns that the jurisdictional amount of

$75,000 is nowhere clearly stated on the face of the complaint. Moreover, the

undersigned recommends that the court find that such an amount is not readily

deducible from the complaint or the removal petition. The removing

defendants make several arguments with respect to why this Court should find

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 15 of 26
7 Readily means “easily” or “promptly.” WEBSTER’S II, NEW RIVERSIDE

UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY, at 974 (1994).

8 As noted by Teemark in the removal petition, it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit

reiterated in Holley Equipment Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531 (1987) that “[w]hen

determining the jurisdictional amount in controversy in diversity cases, punitive damages, must

be considered, unless it is apparent to a legal certainty that such cannot be recovered.” Id. at

1535 (internal citations and footnote omitted). However, this proposition of law does not lessen

the removing parties’ burden to prove that the jurisdictional amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000 nor does it otherwise shift any burden to the plaintiff to prove the contrary; any

suggestion to the contrary is REJECTED. 

9 The comments by defense counsel during the September 16, 2008 telephone

conference, echoing the 3:1 ratio argument contained in the removal petition, are considered by

the undersigned to fall within the category of outside “evidence” rejected in Lowery. See infra.

16

that the jurisdictional amount is readily7 deducible from the complaint. In the

removal petition and in response to the plaintiff’s motion to remand, the

defendants cite to plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, which must be

considered by this Court,8

 and contend that since it is “not uncommon for

punitive damage awards of three times the compensatory awards to be

upheld[]”9

 and plaintiff has expended approximately $24,700.00 on medical

bills (and seeks other damages like mental anguish), they have demonstrated

that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000, exclusive

of interest and costs. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 25-27 (citing general 3:1 ratio principle and

various Alabama publications); Doc. 19, at 9 n.3)) In addition, defendants

make clear in their opposition to the motion to remand that they rely primarily

on an argument they allude to in the removal petition, which is that given the

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 16 of 26
17

nature of the injuries alleged by plaintiff in the complaint (and the damages

sought) it is “facially apparent” or “readily deducible” that the amount in

controversy in this case exceeds the jurisdictional requirement. (Doc. 19, at 3-

8; see Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 22-24) In support of this argument, defendants urge the

undersigned to follow Sanderson v, Daimler Chrysler Motor Corp., 2007 WL

2988222 (S.D. Ala. 2007) and hold that “[c]ertain injuries are by their nature

so substantial as to make it readily apparent that the amount in controversy

requirement is satisfied.” Id. at *1; see also id. at *2 (“[T]he complaint alleges

that Theresa Sanderson has experienced ‘serious and permanent disfigurement

and scarring to her face and body.’ This allegation establishes, for purposes of

the jurisdictional inquiry, that Sanderson’s facial appearance-around which

members of the human race base much of their self-concept-has been badly

damaged and that the damage will last a lifetime.”). Finally, in opposition to

the motion to remand, defendants contend that “past precedent supports the

Defendants’ assertion that more than $75,000.00 is in controversy in this

products liability, punitive damages case.” (Doc. 19, at 8 (citations omitted))

5. As Lowery makes clear, however, such “‘evidence’ . . . fails to

support the defendants’ contention that [this] [] court [has] jurisdiction over

this action.” 483 F.3d at 1220. 

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 17 of 26
10 While Siniard and Carswell plainly lay to rest the removing defendants’ punitive

damages argument in the wake of Lowery, the undersigned would also note that recently, in

Howell v. Fields Realty, LLC, 2008 WL 2705383, *1 (M.D. Ala. 2008), the court stated that “a

demand for punitive damages is insufficient to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement.”

See also id. (“[A] defendant does not meet its burden by pointing out that the plaintiff seeks

punitive damages: ‘[T]his argument begs the question of what those punitive damages are likely

to be-a question that [the defendant] bears the burden of answering.’”).

11 This “evidence” is nothing more than evidence obtained from outside sources

which, as the court in Lowery stated, is not of the sort contemplated by § 1446(b). The “facts”

contained in the cited publications and cases tell this Court nothing about the value of the claims

made in this case. 

18

First, we note that this evidence regarding the value of other tort

claims was not received from the plaintiffs, but rather was

gathered from outside sources. As such, the evidence is not of

the sort contemplated by § 1446(b). Even if the defendants had

received the evidence of other suits from the plaintiffs, we

question whether such general evidence is ever of much use in

establishing the value of claims in any one particular suit.

Looking only to this evidence and the complaint, the facts

regarding other cases tell us nothing about the value of the

claims in this lawsuit. Even were we to look to evidence beyond

that contained within the notice of removal, in the present

dispute-with a record bereft of detail-we cannot possibly

ascertain how similar the current action is to those the

defendants cite.

Id. at 1220-1221 (footnote added). Thus, the Alabama “punitive damages”10

general rule and publications, along with the “past precedent,”11 cited by the

removing defendants, are due to be rejected. See Siniard v. Ford Motor Co.,

554 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1277 & 1279 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“This is a product

liability case arising out of a motor vehicle accident in Alabama on April 5,

2006, which claimed the life of a Tennessee resident citizen named Deborah

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 18 of 26
19

S. Siniard. . . . Ford acknowledged that the Complaint does not contain a

specific damage request, but noted that Plaintiff sought compensatory and

punitive damages for the wrongful death of Deborah Siniard. As evidence that

the claim in this case necessarily exceeded $75,000, Ford asserted that other

Alabama courts have routinely entered wrongful death verdicts in excess of

$75,000 in product liability claims. In support of this proposition, Ford listed

numerous cases from various courts which resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts in

wrongful death cases each of which exceeded $75,000. . . . While this Court

agrees that the precepts set forth in Lowery require the remand of this case

which was removed on nothing more than speculation about the amount in

controversy, the Court cannot agree that it has the option of ignoring Lowery

until after the mandate issues or the Supreme Court addresses that case.”);

Carswell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2007 WL 1697003, *1 (M.D. Ala. 2007)

(“Prior to Lowery, Alabama personal injury cases and wrongful death cases

with diversity of citizenship but no ad damnum were routinely removed to

federal court and often kept there by the defendant asserting the existence of

more than $75,000 in controversy and citing jury awards in excess of that

amount in similar Alabama cases. In contrast to the former practice, Lowery

now requires that the documents before the court on removal ‘unambiguously

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 19 of 26
12 The Sanderson case appears to be in the minority. Siniard, supra; Carswell,

supra; see also Williamson v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2008 WL 2262044 (S.D. Fla. 2008);

Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 1239 (M.D. Ala. 2008).

13 In other words, the undersigned sees nothing different about the defendants’

citation to and reliance on Sanderson and their citation to and reliance upon Alabama “punitive

damages” publications and general precepts.

20

establish federal jurisdiction.’ District courts in this circuit are no longer able

to ‘speculate in an attempt to make up for the notice’s failings,’ nor are courts

able to consider ‘evidence regarding the value of other tort claims.’”).

6. While the undersigned considers the defendants’ citation to and

reliance on Sanderson12 as yet another impermissible attempt by the removing

parties to establish the value of the claims made in this case by citing to

evidence (that is, another federal judge’s ruling) regarding the value of another

unrelated tort claim,13 the undersigned takes this opportunity to look more

closely at the defendants’ central argument that the amount in controversy

requirement is “readily deducible” (and apparent) from the injuries alleged

(and damages sought) in the complaint. As heretofore indicated, readily means

“easily” or “promptly.” Nothing about plaintiff’s allegations that he sustained

“severe burns to his face, neck, shoulders, hands, and buttocks” and

“permanent scarring” or his claims for medical expenses, pain and suffering,

emotional distress, and mental anguish makes it “easy” for the undersigned to

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 20 of 26
14 In truth, the defendants implicitly admit in the removal petition that they have no

real knowledge of the value of plaintiff’s claims (see Doc. 1, at ¶ 28 (“[I]f the plaintiff responds

to this pleading and stipulates or otherwise contends that the amount in controversy is less than

$75,000.00 at the trial of the matter in state court, then this Defendant will consent to the remand

of this action.”)), and state, moreover, that “[i]f the plaintiff contests that $75,000.00 is in

controversy or if this court believes the issue requires a further evidentiary hearing, this

Defendant respectfully requests that limited discovery be permitted on that issue[.]” In the

undersigned’s opinion, such statements, if not “tantamount to an admission that the defendants

do not have a factual basis for believing that jurisdiction exists[,]” Lowery, supra, 483 F.3d at

1217, certainly cloak their jurisdictional arguments in prohibited speculative clothing, id. at

1215, n.67 (“If the court asserts jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s speculative

assertions, it implicitly accepts rank speculation as reasonable inquiry. This could undermine the

requirement of reasonable inquiry not only in removal situations, but also in other contexts.”).

21

deduce that the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied. Simply

put, the foregoing is not clear evidence that the action satisfies the

jurisdictional requirement. Instead, such “evidence” lends itself only to

speculative musings regarding the value of such claims based upon the injuries

alleged, a journey which Lowery does not allow.14 See 483 F.3d at 1214-1215

& 1215 (“If [the notice of removal and accompanying documents are]

insufficient to establish that removal was proper or that jurisdiction was

present, neither the defendant nor the court may speculate in an attempt to

make up for the notice’s failings. . . . The absence of factual allegations

pertinent to the existence of jurisdiction is dispositive and, in such absence, the

existence of jurisdiction should not be divined by looking to the stars.”). The

amount in controversy requirement would have been readily deducible had the

defendants established in their removal papers (and attachments) that

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 21 of 26
22

plaintiff’s medical expenses and lost wages were in excess of $75,000. See

Kok v. Kadant Black Clawson, Inc., 274 Fed.Appx. 856, 867 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“Kok filed a motion to remand and to disavow any recovery beyond $74,999,

but he did not assert that the amount in controversy was less than the

jurisdictional threshold when he filed his complaint. Kadant opposed Kok’s

motion and calculated Kok’s recovery for back pay from the date of his

termination to trial to equal $94,963. . . . To support its calculation, Kadant

submitted Kok’s W-2 form that listed Kok’s gross pay for the first 11 months

of the year at $75,823.66 and an affidavit that stated that Kok’s benefits within

the same period were valued at $7,944.71. The district court correctly

concluded that Kadant established that, at the time of removal, Kok’s

complaint for damages exceeded the amount in controversy required for

diversity jurisdiction.”). Following Lowery, however, “it is insufficient to rely

on the severity of the injuries alleged[]” to establish that it is readily deducible

or “facially apparent that the damages exceed the jurisdictional minimum[.]”

Williamson, supra, at *2; see also Williams, supra, 534 F.Supp.2d at 1243-

1244 (“Williams’ complaint contained only unspecified damages; it stated only

that she was damaged and injured by Wal-Mart’s conduct, and it then listed

her injuries as including a comminuted fracture in her leg and other injuries to

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 22 of 26
23

the femur, a fracture to her right hip, and injuries to her right shoulder that

would require surgery. In spite of the relatively detailed listing of her injuries,

the amount in controversy is not facially apparent from the complaint. Under

these circumstances, with only unspecified damages in Williams’s complaint,

Wal-Mart had no basis to remove Williams’s lawsuit based solely on her

complaint.”); Carswell, supra, at *1 (“Here, the Carswells’ complaint contains

no ad damnum. In its Notice of Removal, Sears attempts to show jurisdictional

compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) by asserting that the plaintiffs’ own

allegations demonstrate that Sally Carswell suffered a head injury that required

surgery and that she is seeking compensation for her medical bills, pain and

suffering, and mental anguish. Sears further states that the Carswells

represented that Sally Carswell had incurred $38,136.96 in medical expenses

as of November 2005. Because medical expenses are only one component of

[the] Carswells’ claim for compensatory damages and the plaintiffs also seek[]

punitive damages, Sears reasons that ‘it is foreseeable that Plaintiff[s] could

constitutionally recover more than $75,000 in damages.[] On the record before

it, however, the court finds that Sears’s conclusion is speculative. The

jurisdictional amount is not clearly stated on the face of the complaint and it

is not readily deducible from the removal documents.”); see Middlebrooks,

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 23 of 26
24

supra, at *1-*3 (court concluded that the jurisdictional amount in controversy

was not readily deducible from a wrongful death complaint filed in the death

of a 19-year old and seeking compensatory and punitive damages; if was

determined that the first “other paper” from which the defendants could

ascertain that plaintiff was seeking in excess of $75,000 was the transcript of

the April 1, 2008 hearing, same reflecting plaintiff’s admission that she was

seeking in excess of $75,000).

7. In light of the undersigned’s understanding of the import of

Lowery and the type of evidence that is needed to establish that removal is

proper, it is recommended that the Court remand this case to state court based

upon the removing parties’ failure to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence the amount in controversy requirement. 

CONCLUSION

The removing defendants have not established by a preponderance of

the evidence that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000,

exclusive of interest and costs. Accordingly, the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the motion to remand this case to the Circuit Court of

Perry County, Alabama (Doc. 15) be GRANTED.

The instructions which follow the undersigned’s signature contain

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 24 of 26
25

important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 22nd day of September, 2008.

 s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 25 of 26
26

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

_s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY____________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:08-cv-00394-CG-C Document 23 Filed 09/22/08 Page 26 of 26