Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00335/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00335-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD D. SAVIDGE,

 NO. CIV. S-05-335 LKK/KJM P

Petitioner,

v. O R D E R

STUART J. RYAN,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner filed for habeas corpus. He challenges convictions

for several sex offenses. On November 23, 2010, this court adopted

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge except

insofar as they recommended that the court confirm the state

appellate majority’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s comments

violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and thereby

granted the petition. The court specifically ordered respondent to

release petitioner within sixty days unless, within that period of

time, proceedings are initiated in the California Superior Court

for a retrial. Thus, pursuant to that order, proceedings must be

Case 2:05-cv-00335-LKK -KJM Document 58 Filed 01/05/11 Page 1 of 3
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instituted by January 24, 2011 to avoid petitioner’s release.

Respondent appealed that order, and seeks a stay pending resolution

of the appeal.

Under Fed. R. App. P. 8, this court has jurisdiction to stay

the grant of relief pending appeal. This court has discretion

whether to issue such a stay, guided by consideration of "(1)

whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay

will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies." Hilton v.

Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The Ninth Circuit conceives

this standard as “two interrelated legal tests” operating along a

continuum. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983).

At one end of the continuum, the moving party may succeed if it

shows that there is a probability of success on the merits as well

as a possibility of irreparable injury. Golden Gate Restaurant

Ass’n. v. City and County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1115-16

(9th Cir. 2008). At the other end, the moving party may succeed if

it shows that it has raised “serious legal questions” and that “the

balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Id. at 1116

(quoting Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435). Finally, the district court must

consider the public interest implicated by the grant of the stay;

this consideration is distinct from the harm to the parties in the

court’s grant or denial of a stay. Natural Resource Defense

Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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Having reviewed these factors, the court denies the motion for

a stay. Respondent has shown a possibility, although not a

likelihood, of success on the question of whether the state court

unreasonably determined that the constitutional violation it found

constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Balancing

the hardships, the court rejects respondent’s contention that a

stay which necessarily prolongs detention will not injure

petitioner because the “time served by Petitioner during the

pendency of his appeal would be credited toward any sentence he

would receive following retrial.” The court also rejects the

argument that a stay furthers the public interest in that

petitioner poses a continuing danger to the community if released

and is a flight risk because these concerns can be addressed in a

state court bail hearing. Ultimately, however, the court concludes

that the balance of hardships, coupled with the possibility of

success on appeal, would only warrant a limited stay of fourteen

days to allow respondent to seek a further stay from the Ninth

Circuit, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(ii). Because the

deadline for the initiation of new criminal proceedings is more

than fourteen days from the issuance of this order, no stay is

warranted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2011.

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