Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00889/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00889-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EVERETT H, a minor, by and through 

his Guardians Ad Litem REBECCA 

HAVEY and HEATH HAVEY; 

REBECCA HAVEY, an individual; and 

HEATH HAVEY, an individual

Plaintiffs,

v.

DRY CREEK JOINT ELEMENTARY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES OF DRY CREEK JOINT 

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 

MARK GEYER, individually and in his 

official capacity of Superintendent of 

Dry Creek Joint Elementary School 

District; EVONNE ROGERS, 

individually in in her official capacity as 

Assistant Superintendent of 

Educational Services; LYNN 

BARBARIA, individually and in her 

official capacity as Director of Special 

Education; ANDREW GIANNINI, 

individually and in his official capacity 

as Principal at Olive Grove Elementary 

School; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 

OF EDUCATION; and TOM 

TORLAKSON, individually and in his 

official capacity as State 

Superintendent of Public Instruction for 

the State of California,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 138 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 26
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Through the present action, Plaintiffs Heath and Rebecca Havey, both individually 

and on behalf of their son Everett H. (hereinafter “Plaintiffs” unless otherwise indicated)

allege educational harms based on purported violations of Everett’s right as a disabled 

student to a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) pursuant to the provisions of 

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400m et seq.

(“IDEA”) and various state statutes. Plaintiffs also assert associated violations of Title II 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) and § 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”). By way of damages,

Plaintiffs seek compensatory education and reimbursement, compensatory and punitive 

damages, and attorneys’ fees. 

The Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District, Everett’s local school district, 

was originally named as a Defendant by Plaintiffs, along with Dry Creek’s Board of 

Trustees and four individual Dry Creek administrators, Lynn Barbaria, Mark Geyer, 

Andrew Giannini and Evonne Rogers in their official capacities (collectively referred to 

hereafter as “Dry Creek”). On or about November 23, 2014, however, Plaintiffs settled 

their claims against Dry Creek by accepting its offer of entry of judgment pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.1 Although that terminated all claims against Dry 

Creek, Plaintiffs also included the California Department of Education (the “CDE”) as a 

named Defendant in the instant lawsuit, and the claims against the CDE remain ongoing.

Presently before the Court are motions for summary judgment, or alternatively 

partial summary judgment, filed by both Plaintiffs and the CDE. As set forth below, those 

Motions are DENIED, except with respect to the CDE’s request for summary 

adjudication as to the Third Claim for Relief, which is GRANTED.2 Additionally, because 

 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, this matter was submitted 

on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). The Court also notes that both sides have requested that the 

Court judicially notice certain documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Neither party has 

objected to those requests and they are granted. Finally, the Court is aware that CDE has filed numerous 

objections to certain statements made by Plaintiff Heath Havey in his declaration. Because the Court has 

not relied on those statements in reaching its decision herein, it need not rule on those objections and 

declines to do so.

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the Prayer for Relief contained in Plaintiffs’ operative Second Amended Complaint 

(“SAC”) seeks certain damages that are unrecoverable, summary adjudication as to 

portions of said Prayer will also be GRANTED.

STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK

The procedural and substantive standards for educating disabled students in this 

state are delineated within the federal IDEA and California’s Education Code § 56000, 

et seq., along with state and federal implementing regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300 

et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3000, et seq. 

The IDEA provides that a state must, in order to receive federal financial 

assistance, have policies and procedures in effect that assure all students with 

disabilities the right to a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The FAPE requirement means 

that special education and related services must be provided at public expense, under 

public supervision and direction, and without charge to the parent or student. 20 U.S.C. 

§§ 1401(9) and (29). Each student’s special instruction is based upon the development 

of an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) by the school district which, along with 

parental input, is designed to establish both annual and short term objectives and 

individually designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those 

objectives. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).

Under the IDEA, the CDE, as the so-called state educational agency (“SEA”), has 

general supervisory responsibility for the overall provision of special education services 

within California. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412 (a)(11)(A); 1401(32). The IDEA contemplates that 

each individual state will devise its own systems for providing special education services 

through local educational agencies (“LEAs”). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). LEAs apply for SEA 

funding by submitting a plan that ensures compliance with the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1413(a). The SEA can choose, but is not required, to be a direct provider for some of 

whatever services may be necessary. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(b).

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California has elected to participate in IDEA by adopting a state plan and enacting 

a series of statutes and regulations designed to comply with the federal requirements. 

Cal. Educ. Code § 56000, et seq., Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3000, et seq. California law 

places primary responsibility for the provision of FAPE to eligible students on the LEA, 

which is defined as a “school district, a county office of education, a charter school 

participating as a member of a special education local plan area, or a special education 

local plan area.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56026.3. An LEA, like Dry Creek in this instance, is 

generally responsible for providing the requisite FAPE to students within its jurisdictional 

boundaries. Cal. Educ. Code § 48200. That obligation includes both identifying 

students with disabilities, determining appropriate educational placements and related 

services through the IEP process, and providing those needed special education and 

related services. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56300, 45302, 56340, 56344(c). 

The SEA, however, also bears responsibility for ensuring that the LEA fulfills its 

obligation. An SEA like the CDE must monitor implementation of the IDEA, make 

determinations about LEA performance in that regard, enforce the IDEA using 

appropriate enforcement mechanisms and “ensure that LEAs meet the requirements of 

the IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.600; see also Porter v. CDE, et al., Case no. CV 008402 

GAF at VI (a) (C.D. Cal. 2004). Consequently, if an LEA is unable or unwilling to 

establish and maintain programs in compliance with the IDA, the CDE is responsible for 

directly providing services to the disabled child. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B)(ii); 

20 U.S.C. § 1413 (g)(1) (SEA “shall provide services “directly to children with 

disabilities”); 34 C.F.R. 300.227 (SEA “must” provide services “directly to children with 

disabilities”). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the IDEA imposes an obligation 

on the CDE to directly provide services “whenever the local agency refuses or wrongfully 

neglects to provide a handicapped child with [FAPE].” Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 

1492 (9th Cir. 1986).

Where, as here, a dispute arises regarding a disabled student’s educational

needs, federal and California law provides two distinct procedural mechanisms by which 

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an LEA’s educational decisions may be challenged. First, either the LEA or the parents 

can request an administrative “due process” hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); 

(f)(1)(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a); Cal Educ. Code § 56501(a), et seq.; Wyner v. 

Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 223 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); cert. 

denied., 534 U.S. 1140 (2002). Because under the IDEA the entity conducting the due 

process hearing must be impartial and independent from the CDE (20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(f)(1)(A); (f)(3)(A)), the CDE meets this obligation in California by contracting with 

the Office of Administration Hearings (“OAH”) for the services of Administrative Law 

Judges (“ALJs”) to preside over due process hearings. 20 U.S.C. § 56504.5(a); Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 27727. Those hearings are formal in nature and include, inter alia, the 

right to present evidence and arguments, the right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses and to compel their attendance, and the right to obtain written findings of fact 

by the ALJ following the hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h); Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(e). 

The resulting OAH ruling is deemed a final administrative decision. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(i)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(h). Either the parents or the LEA, if 

“aggrieved” by the final administrative decision, may seek de novo judicial review in a 

court of competent jurisdiction like this one. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. 

§ 300.516; Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(k). The 

remedy represented by the administrative due process hearing must be exhausted 

before filing a civil action in federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1).

In addition to the formal due process hearing procedures outlined above, parents 

may also initiate a more informal, and less adversarial, complaint resolution proceeding 

(“CRP”) with an SEA, which, as stated above, is the CDE here in California. 34 C.F.R. 

§§ 300.151-153; Cal. Educ. Code § 56500.2; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 4650. Unlike the 

due process hearings process that is both expressly provided in the IDEA and detailed in 

the regulations, the CRP is described only in the federal regulations. Lucht v. Molalla 

River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000).

///

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A CRP and the due process hearing substantially differ. Unlike the IDEA, which is 

limited to the identification, evaluation, placement and provision of FAPE, a CRP can 

contain any allegation that the LEA violated the IDEA or its implementing regulations. 

34 C.F.R. 300.153(b)(1); Cal. Educ. Code § 56500.2(c)(1); Cal. Code Regs. tit 5, 

§ 4650(a)(7)(E). Additionally, unlike a due process hearing request, a CRP can be 

initiated by any individual or organization, cannot be initiated by an LEA against a 

parent, and need not involve an allegation regarding a specific student. 34 C.F.R. 

§§ 300.153(a); (b)(4); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 4600(c). Additionally, the nature of the 

proceedings differs to the extent that the CRP does not include full procedural 

protections like the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 

When a party files a CRP in California, the CDE must investigate, request all 

documentation and other evidence relating to the allegations and issue an investigation 

report. Cal. Educ. Code § 56043(p); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, §§ 4663-64. A parent or 

LEA can initiate a due process hearing even when a CRP is still pending so long as the 

issues in the due process request are timely, involve the identification, evaluation, 

placement or provision of FAPE and are accordingly within the jurisdiction of the OAH in 

California. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); (f); Cal Educ. Code § 56501(a).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Everett H. is a disabled student who, according to the Complaint, suffered from 

delayed myelination and has been diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder and 

resulting motor and neurological delays such as language impairment. Everett was 

consequently identified as a disabled student with special needs entitled to special 

education and related services. Everett attended school within the Dry Creek Joint 

Elementary School District for approximately five years, from 2007 to March 2, 2012. 

During that period, Plaintiffs and Dry Creek had disagreements about the special 

education program provided by the District to Everett. According to Plaintiffs, Dry Creek 

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made various errors with respect to the provision of FAPE, including in the IEP process, 

Everett’s disability designation placement and providing education to Everett in the least 

restrictive environment (“LRE”). 

Plaintiffs allege that in order to shoehorn Everett into its special education 

agenda, Dry Creek intentionally misrepresented its testing as showing that he was 

“mentally retarded” in order to remove Everett from a general education classroom into a 

segregated classroom where severely handicapped children were warehoused and 

where little education purportedly took place. According to Plaintiffs, beginning in 2010,

they resisted Dry Creek’s attempt to provide fewer services than contemplated within 

Everett’s last IEP, dated September 9, 2009. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the district 

withheld some 290 minutes of daily Specialized Academic Instruction (“SAI”) required 

under the IEP and failed to rectify that shortcoming even after Plaintiffs demanded that 

the services called for under the IEP be provided.

Dry Creek alleges that because Everett began attending a general education fulltime in May of 2010, the obligations set forth in the September 9, 2009 IEP were 

changed through mutual agreement. Dry Creek eventually, on September 12, 2011, 

filed for a special education due process hearing before the OAH with regard to FAPE 

and assessment issues. That resulted in a “stay put” order of October 3, 2011, which 

found that because of Everett’s general education placement he was not entitled to 

receive all the SAI contemplated within his September 9, 2009 IEP.

According to Plaintiffs, once they began advocating for Everett’s rights in the 

summer of 2010, the District began to engage in retaliatory activity which intensified in 

March of 2012, when Plaintiffs claim they had to remove Everett from school for his own 

safety. Plaintiffs assert that the District began delaying the IEP meeting process, began 

misrepresenting what occurred at IEP meetings when they did take place, and began 

manipulating IEP documentation to delay and mislead Plaintiffs. In addition, Plaintiffs 

assert that Dry Creek engaged in retaliatory behavior that endangered Everett’s safety, 

including depriving him of food and refusing to monitor his food intake, sending him 

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home disheveled and dirty with feces, and otherwise subjecting Everett to repeated 

humiliation. Plaintiffs further claim that Dry Creek interfered with Plaintiff’s attempt to 

move Everett to another school district.

Between January and October of 2012, when the due process hearing between 

Plaintiffs and Dry Creek was pending at the OAH, and for a short time thereafter, 

Plaintiffs filed at least five CRPs against Dry Creek with the CDE which alleged that Cry 

Creek was out of compliance with special educations laws. On January 6, 2012, for 

example, Plaintiff filed a CRP which asked the CDE to remediate Dry Creek’s failure to 

provide required SAI services. This resulted in an April 3, 2012, finding by the CDE that 

Everett had indeed “not receive[d] 290 minutes per day, 5 times per week of SAI 

between January 9, 2011 and October 3, 2011.” Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (“PUF”) No. 14. According to Plaintiffs, however, the CDE obtained 

reconsideration of these findings based on a false argument that they had orally revoked 

their consent to Everett’s SAI services. Plaintiffs contend that the CDE failed to 

investigate the illegality of these conclusions despite being informed of their 

shortcomings by Plaintiffs. Id. at Nos. 15-16

Plaintiffs also filed another CRP on January 6, 2012, which alleged that Dry Creek 

had misrepresented Everett’s classification as mental retardation in order to remove him 

from his least restrictive environment and placing him in a special day class that resulted 

in a denial of FAPE to Everett for three years. Id. at No. 26. Even after obtaining a 

report that Everett’s overall learning capacity was normal, Plaintiffs claim that the CDE 

did not investigate their complaint that Everett was being denied FAPE by being 

misclassified. Id. at No. 27

Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit on May 6, 2013. As against CDE, the Second 

Claim for Relief alleges that the CDE violated Everett’s right to a FAPE by failing to 

ensure that proper services were provided. Although CDE was required to both 

“ensure,” and where necessary to “directly provide,” those services, Plaintiffs claim that 

in fact Everett was denied FAPE by Dry Creek when it failed to follow the last agreedCase 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 138 Filed 09/30/16 Page 8 of 26
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upon IEP, which required 1450 minutes per week of SAI, between May 28, 2010, and 

March 2, 2012. Despite filing complaints against CDE through the CDP process, and 

even though the CDE found that SAI services had not been provided, Plaintiffs still claim 

that the CDE failed to see to it that Everett’s needed services were furnished.

In addition to failing to ensure the provision of FAPE, through their Ninth Claim for 

Relief, Plaintiffs also contend that CDE further violated its obligation to “monitor 

implementation of” and “investigate and enforce the IDEA.” Pls.’ SAC, ¶ 238. Plaintiffs 

further claim that the CDE is not only responsible for IDEA violations, but also for 

violations under Section 504 and the ADA, as alleged in their Seventh and Eleventh

Claims for Relief, respectively. Finally, Plaintiffs also allege retaliation by the CDE under 

both Section 504 and the ADA in their Eighth and Eleventh Claims and contend that 

CDE never required Dry Creek to provide supplemental education, or provide the 

supplemental education itself, as set forth in the Third Claim for Relief.

Both Dry Creek and the CDE filed motions to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ 

lawsuit. Ultimately, the Court denied most of Defendants’ claims on March 26, 2015,

finding, inter alia, that resort to the CRP process may exhaust administrative remedies, 

and that the CDE could consequently be sued on the claims identified. ECF No. 35.

The Court found that filing a complaint under the CRP process was sufficient to exhaust 

administrative remedies, that a private right of action exists for purposes of reviewing a 

CRP, and that Plaintiffs stated viable claims against the CDE. 

Plaintiffs’ currently operative pleading, the Second Amended Complaint, was 

subsequently filed with leave of court on May 23, 2014. Although CDE subsequently 

asked the Court to reconsider its prior ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, that Motion was 

denied by Order filed September 1, 2015. ECF No. 88.

On November 24, 2015, as indicated above, Plaintiffs Accepted a Rule 68 Offer of 

Judgment served by Dry Creek, which terminated Dry Creek’s inclusion as a defendant 

in this matter.

///

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In now seeking summary judgment, Plaintiffs aver that the CDE violated as a 

matter of law its obligations to investigate, monitor and enforce the IDEA. Plaintiff claims 

they have demonstrated the CDE’s liability in this regard by its failure to investigate at 

least 20 violations by Dry Creek complained of by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further claim they 

have established as a matter of law that the CDE acted with deliberate indifference, 

thereby justifying damage awards under both Section 504 and the ADA. Finally, Plaintiff 

urges the court to find that the CDE promulgated illegal policies and practices and 

engaged in acts of discrimination and retaliation directly.

The CDE, on the other hand, through its corresponding summary judgment 

request makes several arguments. First, it argues that Plaintiffs cannot prevail at trial 

because a necessary party, Dry Creek, is no longer a party to this action. Second, 

according to CDE, it is also entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs failed to 

exhaust their administrative remedies as required by law. Third, the CDE claims that 

each and every of Plaintiffs’ claims is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Fourth and finally, the CDE claims that Plaintiffs have not stated viable claims in any 

event.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to 

dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or 

defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may 

move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each 

claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

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Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a 

motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for 

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic 

Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying summary 

judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and 

Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also 

demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question 

before the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but 

whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the 

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party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 

(quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). 

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under 

Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, 

“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

A. Absence of Indispensable Party

In the event that a person or entity cannot be joined in existing litigation, Rule 19 

provides that a court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action 

should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P.

19(b). Among the factors that should be considered in that determination include the 

extent to which any judgment rendered in that party’s absence might prejudice existing 

parties. Id. 

Here, as indicated above, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Dry Creek by 

accepting, on November 24, 2015, a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment served by Dry Creek. 

CDE argues that because that acceptance terminated Dry Creek’s inclusion as a 

defendant in these proceeding, any claims still being asserted against the CDE in the 

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wake of that settlement cannot proceed because of the absence of an indispensable 

party. The CDE states unequivocally that “Dry Creek is a required party because all 

claims against the CDE are premised on underlying allegations against Dry Creek.” 

CDE’s Reply, ECF No. 127, 1:14-15. The CDE also asserts that virtually all of Plaintiffs’ 

claims relate back to shortcomings stemming from the September 9, 2009, IEP 

developed by Dry Creek. According to the CDE, the fact that Plaintiffs have resolved 

their claims against Dry Creek by settlement means that there will be no judicial 

determination between Plaintiffs and Dry Creek as to whether Dry Creek violated their 

rights. The CDE argues that such liability must be established against Dry Creek before 

it can be held accountable for any inadequacies on Dry Creek’s part. The CDE claims it 

will be clearly prejudiced should it be required to defend not only its own position but 

also whether or not Dry Creek shirked its own responsibilities to Plaintiffs.

The CDE’s argument ignores the fact that the CDE has an independent obligation 

to ensure compliance with the IDEA. It must monitor implementation of the IDEA, make 

determinations about LEA performance in that regard, enforce the IDEA using 

appropriate enforcement mechanisms and ensure that LEAs meet the requirement of the 

IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.600; see also Porter v. CDE, et al., Case no. CV 008402 

GAF at VI (a) (C.D. Cal. 2004). Consequently, as indicated above, if an LEA like Dry 

Creek is unable or unwilling to establish and maintain programs in compliance with the 

IDA, the CDE is responsible for directly providing services to the disabled child. 20 

U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B)(ii); 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (g)(1) (SEA “shall provide services “directly 

to children with disabilities”); 34 C.F.R. 300.227 (SEA “must” provide services “directly to 

children with disabilities”). The Ninth Circuit itself has made it clear that the IDEA 

imposes an obligation on the CDE to directly provide services when an LEA is unable or 

unwilling to provide eligible students with a FAPE. Doe v. Maher, 7993 F.2d at 1492.

The CDE’s claim that all allegations made against it relate solely to the 

September 9, 2009, IEP is also misplaced. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have alleged that 

the CDE has directly failed to investigate at least 20 violations of various kinds identified 

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by Plaintiffs as having been committed by Dry Creek. Plaintiffs allege that through its 

own policies and practices, the CDE has created an environment where districts like Dry 

Creek “can act with impunity because they know they will not be subject to meaningful 

remediation.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF 123-1, 2: 22-24. Plaintiffs further allege that by acting with 

deliberate indifference to the violations of their rights by Dry Creek, the CDE further 

violated Section 504 and the ADA. All of these purported failures go well beyond the 

letter of Everett’s IEP despite the CDE’s arguments otherwise.

Significantly, too, the CDE’s contention that Dry Creek’s own responsibility cannot 

now be addressed by these proceedings also misses the mark. The CDE can, should it 

choose to do so, seek leave to file a cross-claim against Dry Creek based on any of Dry 

Creek’s own shortcomings, or subpoena Dry Creek witnesses to testify in the case as it 

is now configured.

B. Statute of Limitation Concerns 

In addition to alleging as a preliminary matter that this action cannot proceed 

against CDE alone in the absence of Dry Creek as an indispensable party, the CDE 

further argues that Plaintiffs’ claims against it are barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations in any event. The IDEA’s statute of limitations is two years pursuant to 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B). Although Section 504 and the ADA are silent on their face with 

respect to any applicable limitations period, case law has generally found the statutory 

bar in such claims to also be two years, whether by borrowing the IDEA rule or by 

looking to the most closely analogous state statute of limitations. P.P. v. West Chester

Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 736-37 (3rd Cir. 2009) (using IDEA period); Doran v. 

Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 2000 WL 34564100 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2000), revd. and 

remanded on other grounds, 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (applying state personal injury 

statute of limitations). Because Plaintiffs did not file their initial complaint until May 6, 

2013, the CDE accordingly argues that it cannot be potentially responsible for any 

misconduct before May 6, 2011. That precludes, according to the CDE, Plaintiffs’ claim 

that Everett was misdiagnosed with mental retardation in 2008, which resulted in the boy 

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being improperly relegated to a special education rather than to placement in the less 

restrictive environment of general education class.

The CDE also takes issue with the timeliness of the CRPs that Plaintiffs filed on 

grounds that under 34 C.F.R. § 300.153(c) it could review issues going back only one 

year before the filing of a CRP. Because Plaintiffs’ first CRP was not received in 

January 6, 2012, more than three and-a-half years after Plaintiffs first registered their 

disagreement over provision of a FAPE to Everett, the CDE argues that any issues 

preceding January of 2011 are also time barred.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, point out that the filing of the first CRP, on January 6, 

2012, was less than two years before the filing of the Complaint on May 6, 2013. 

Moreover, according to Plaintiffs, once they discovered that Plaintiff was not receiving 

SAI services provided for by his IEP in January of 2011, they filed their first CRP with the 

CDE less than a year later.

Moreover, the only misconduct alleged against either Dry Creek or the CDE 

falling outside the applicable statute of limitations in any event rested with the 

consequences of Everett’s misdiagnosis of mental retardation in 2008, and Plaintiffs 

claim they did not discover that misdiagnosis was incorrect until an IEP meeting until 

2011. According to Plaintiffs, Dry Creek did not disclose that it was not providing SAI 

and related services until January of 2011, after Plaintiffs began questioning in October 

of 2010 just what services were being provided under the IEP. Because Plaintiffs claim 

they relied on misrepresentations by Defendants as to Everett’s diagnosis and services, 

and accordingly neither knew nor should have known of the falsity of those 

representations until 2011, they allege the statute was equitably tolled during that period. 

Whether or not equitable tolling indeed applies under the facts of this particular case 

entails the weighing of disputed issues not amenable to determination on summary 

judgment, and accordingly the CDE’s challenge to Plaintiffs’ claims as time barred fails 

at this juncture.

///

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C. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Although this Court already rejected, in ruling on the CDE’s Motion to Dismiss, the 

CDE’s contention that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to 

filing this lawsuit, the CDE reiterates those claims now in moving for summary judgment. 

In the Court’s review, its previous exhaustion analysis is equally applicable here.

As before, the CDE alleges that as a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court on 

special education, Section 504 and ADA claims that seek relief available through an 

OAH due process hearing, Plaintiffs must first exhaust the OAH process. Here, since

Plaintiffs seek IDEA remedies in the form of compensatory education, the State 

Defendants assert that as a prerequisite to this civil action, Plaintiffs had to pursue a due 

process hearing with Dry Creek, as the applicable LEA, to completion. 

As this Court has already noted, exhaustion of available administrative remedies 

is required before filing a civil suit seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA. 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). The CDE points to the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Payne v. 

Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, for the proposition that Plaintiffs’ claims are both 

unexhausted and subject to dismissal at this juncture. They correctly cite Payne for the 

proposition that exhaustion is required: 1) when a plaintiff seeks an IDEA remedy or its 

functional equivalent; 2) where a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief to alter an 

IEP or the educational placement of a disabled student; and 3) where a plaintiff is 

seeking to enforce rights that arise as a result of a denial of FAPE, whether pled as an 

IDEA claim or otherwise. 653 F.3d at 875. State Defendants assert that the CRPs 

submitted to the CDE cannot satisfy this exhaustion requirement.

This Court cannot determine as a matter of law that the CRPs presented by 

Plaintiffs were inadequate for exhaustion purposes under this standard. Plaintiffs allege 

that they filed CRP complaints against the CDE, but that the CDE refused to investigate 

those claims, and thereby stymied Plaintiffs’ attempts to exhaust administrative 

remedies. SAC, ¶¶ 45, 131. They further allege that they filed additional complaints 

with both the Office of Civil Rights and the United States Department of Justice 

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regarding both its complaints against Dry Creek and its complaints against the CDE. Id. 

at ¶¶ 41, 46, 51. Plaintiffs have gone on to point to evidence showing that they 

repeatedly attempted to complain through the CRP process to the CDE about the CDE, 

both through CRPs themselves, motions for reconsideration, allegations that the CDE 

was not following the law, and a detailed letter of July 5, 2012, which stated it was an 

attempt to exhaust against the CRP. See Decl. of Jane Canty, ECF No. 116-3, 

Exhs. 4-13, 15; Decl. of Heath Havey. ECF No. 124-3, Exhs. 1-2. Admissible evidence 

also shows that, by way of the CRP process, Plaintiffs exhausted, or tried to exhaust 

claims pertaining to their contentions under both the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA, as 

well as claimed constitutional and California Education Code violations. Id. Plaintiffs 

have also identified the evidence showing their additional exhaustion attempts through 

the Office of Civil Rights and the Department of Justice. See Havey Decl., Exhs. 4, 12.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that CRPs can suffice for exhaustion purposes 

under several different circumstances. In Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 

1023, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000), the court found that “the CRP and the due process 

hearing procedure are simply alternative (or even serial) means of addressing a § 1415 

complaint” and “[a]lthough different, a CRP is no less a proceeding under § 1415 than a 

due process hearing.” Then, in Porter v. Bd. of Trustees of Manhattan Beach Unified 

Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit again confirmed that the CRP 

can suffice for exhaustion purposes:

Our statement in Hoeft that the CRP may serve as a 

substitute for due process system exhaustion is consistent 

with the traditional exception to exhaustion requirements 

based on futility or inadequacy. See Honig, 484 U.S. at 327. 

Where the challenge is to a facially invalid policy, and the 

state refuses to alter the policy after a CRP complaint, then 

further exhaustion may be excused because the 

administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise 

predetermined the issue before it.” McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 

148. Exhaustion of a CRP may also render the due process 

hearing futile where all the educational issues are resolved, 

leaving only issues for which there is no adequate 

administrative remedy. See Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 

197 F.3d 1271, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, we agree with 

the statement in Hoeft that there may be instances when 

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exhaustion of the CRP may be a substitute for exhaustion of 

the due process hearing.

Id. at 1073-74, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1194 (2003) (emphasis added). Porter further held 

that because administrative hearing officers are not authorized to adjudicate questions of 

statutory compliance, and because such non-compliance was alleged by plaintiffs with 

respect to enforcement of a final order, further administrative exhaustion would have 

been futile. Id. at 1074. 

Because they claim the CDE repeatedly refused to investigate many of their 

claims as set forth above, Plaintiffs allege that the CDE frustrated their attempts to 

exhaust administrative remedies and that further attempts to exhaust would have been 

futile. To the extent they raise the futility exception to exhaustion, such arguments have 

been recognized as questions of fact which should not be determined through summary 

judgment. See, e.g., Abbott Radiological Associates v. Sullivan, 801 F. Supp. 1012, 

1018 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (whether administrative remedies are futile is a question of fact).

Additionally, in their 2004 decision in Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of 

Educ., 384 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit found the district court erred in 

dismissing for failure to exhaust remedies under the IDEA where CRP complaints had 

been made, and where the subject school district was out of compliance in its 

calculations of instructional minutes due autistic students. The Christopher S. court 

found that where systemic allegations of this kind were made, the CRP process could 

suffice for exhaustion purposes. Id. at 1210-11. 

Here, as in Christopher S., the allegations levied against the CDE by Plaintiffs are 

not limited to Everett’s particular case. Although Everett’s own rights are unquestionably 

being pursued, examination of the SAC shows that additional, more far-reaching, 

allegations are in fact made. Paragraphs 55 through 57 make this particularly clear:

55. Plaintiffs are excused from initiating further administrative

proceedings because Plaintiffs allege systemic violations of 

the administrative complaint process, the State Defendants 

have adopted policies and practices contrary to law, the 

severity of the State Defendants’ violations threaten basic 

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statutory goals, and the state policies are challenged in this 

action, and due process hearing officers are not authorized to 

adjudicate questions of statutory compliance.

56. Plaintiffs further allege that the CRP process and OAH 

due process is itself broken, and further pursuing those 

processes would be futile.

57. The State Defendants have also adopted systemic state 

policies contravening and in violation of the IDEA and 

[California Education Code] by denying FAPE to Everett, 

which is a violation severe enough to threaten the basic 

purpose of the IDEA and [the California Education Code].

SAC, ¶¶ 58-60 (emphasis added). The SAC goes on to specifically identify 16 illegal 

policies and practices on CDE’s part, with specific factual examples related to the 

Plaintiffs’ case. Therefore, the overall policies and practices of the CDE are being 

challenged, and not just those related to a particular student, here Everett. Those 

allegations clearly go beyond the scope of student-specific due process charges over 

which the OAH could preside. While the Court recognizes that merely labeling claims as 

systemic as a way of circumventing the administrative process could make the 

requirement to exhaust meaningless (see Doe, 111 F.3d at 683), it cannot summarily 

discount the allegations of the Complaint at this time. Since the pleadings on their face 

make a case for systemic violations that, under pertinent case law, bring Plaintiffs’ 

complaint outside individualized FAPE issues applicable to Everett alone, the Court 

cannot find as a matter of law that exhaustion in general is required, let alone that the 

CRP procedure resorted to by Plaintiffs under the circumstances was inadequate for that 

purpose. 

While the CDE relies on Fairfield-Suisun Unified School Dist. v. California 

Department of Education, 780 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015) in making an argument to the 

contrary, that reliance is unavailing. As a preliminary matter, Fairfield Suisun is factually 

distinguishable from this case since it involves the right of LEAs, and not parents, to sue 

the CDE following redisposition of CRP proceedings. Moreover, while the case did find 

that the school district, as the LEA, had no implied right of action under § 1415 of the 

///

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IDEA to sue the CDE, the Ninth Circuit limited any extension of its holding in that regard, 

stating as follows:

Whether parents have an implied right of action to sue state 

educational agencies for violating the IDEA in the context of 

complaint resolution proceedings is a question we need not 

and do not decide.

Id. at 971.

On a perhaps even more fundamental level, the CDE continues to claim there is 

no private right of action to review a CRP in the first instance, despite the Court’s 

rejection of that contention both in ruling on the CDE’s Motion to Dismiss and its 

subsequent request for reconsideration. The CDE’s argument in this respect remains

incorrect. As the court in Morgan Hill noted, such a position “contradicts Ninth Circuit 

precedent that entertains parties’ appeals from CRP complaints.” Morgan Hill, 2013 WL 

1326301 at *6 n.3 (citing Christopher S., 384 F.3d at 1211). Neither of the cases cited 

by the CDE in advocating a contrary finding is persuasive. As indicated above, the Ninth 

Circuit in Fairfield-Suisun was careful to avoid any finding that parents like Plaintiffs 

herein cannot sue the CDE for violating the IDEA in the context of CRP proceedings. 

Fairfield-Suisun, 780 F.3d at 971. Additionally, in M.M. v Lafayette School District, 767 

F.3d 8642 (9th Cir. 2014), while the Ninth Circuit did find that the IDEA did not confer an 

express right of action on parents to sue the CDE for IDEA violations, it did not make a 

decision about whether a legally cognizable right could be inferred, stating unequivocally 

that “we decline to reach whether a private right of action can be implied in §§ 1412 and 

1415 of the IDEA.” Id. at 861 n.8 (emphasis added). 

Finally, as Plaintiffs point out, some of Plaintiffs’ claims are simply not subject to 

an exhaustion requirement in any event. Exhaustion only applies to the extent there is a 

challenge to the individual identification, evaluation, educational placement, or provision 

of FAPE to a disabled child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); Christopher S., 384 F.3d at 1210. 

Exhaustion is not required, for example, on claims related to Everett’s parents as 

opposed to Everett himself, like the Parent’s claims under Section 504 for discrimination 

///

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and retaliation for exercising their right to advocate for Everett, or for interference with 

that right. 

D. California Education Code § 37252.2

Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief seeks redress for the CDE’s alleged failure to 

provide, as required by California Education Code § 37252.2, certain supplemental 

services for students who are recommended for retention at their current grade levels. 

The CDE argues that unlike the provisions of the IDEA,3 which obligate the CDE to 

ensure enforcement with its provisions, there is nothing on the face of §37252.2 which 

places any implementation responsibility on the CDE as opposed to local school districts 

only. The statute, insofar as it pertains here, applies only to the “governing board of 

each school district maintaining any or all of grades 2 to 9, inclusive.” While there is a 

provision, at subdivision [h] , which prohibits the State Board of Education from waiving 

any of the statute’s provisions, no such allegation is made here. In the absence of any 

direct applicability to the CDE itself, which does appear lacking in this instance, the CDE 

contends it is not liable for the torts of local school districts or their employees. Johnson 

v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 217 Cal. App. 4th 692, 698-700 (1990); Gonzalez v. 

State, 29 Cal. App. 3d 585, 590-92 (1972). 

Plaintiffs have offered no opposition to this argument, which appears to be 

correct. The CDE’s request for summary adjudication as to the Third Cause for Relief is 

accordingly GRANTED.

E. Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Remaining Substantive Claims

Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication as to each of their remaining substantive 

claims. First, as to their IDEA claims (the Second, Ninth and Tenth Claims for Relief) on 

grounds that the CDE failed to appropriately monitor Dry Creek’s compliance with 

special education mandates and to ensure timely correction of noncompliance once 

 3 In ruling on the CDE’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court notes it referred to the third Claim for Relief 

as seeking redress for the failure to provide supplemental instruction as required by the IDEA. That 

characterization was incorrect inasmuch as there is no indication that § 37252.2 is a special education 

statute falling within the purview of the IDEA.

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identified. Plaintiffs further claim that the CDE failed to timely and effectively investigate 

their complaints regarding Everett’s failure to receive a FAPE. According to Plaintiffs, 

this resulted not only in failure to receive FAPE in a least restrictive environment, but 

also abridged Everett’s right to be free of discrimination and retaliation. 

Plaintiffs’ main argument as to FAPE is that the CDE failed to ensure that Everett 

received SAI services in the form of 1450 minutes of instruction per week between May 

28, 2010 and March 2, 2012. Plaintiffs claim that constituted a material failure to 

implement Everett’s IEP. According to Plaintiffs, it is undisputed that a September 9, 

2009, agreement was the last agreed-upon IEP, and that said IEP remained in place 

through March 2, 2012. Plaintiffs further claim that summary judgment should be 

granted as to the Second Claim for Relief because the CDE failed to meet its 

supervisory duties to investigate and remediate Everett’s misclassification as mentally 

retarded despite Plaintiffs’ numerous requests, CRPs, and requests for reconsideration. 

They also argue they are entitled to relief as to their Ninth Cause of Action as well 

because the CDE, through its acts and omissions, violated Everett’s right under the 

IDEA by failing to appropriately and effectively monitor Dry Creek’s compliance with 

special education mandates and ensure correction of noncompliance once identified. 

According to Plaintiffs, the CDE failed to appropriately investigate those complaints and 

to appropriately and effectively enforce the educational mandates of the IDEA. They 

similarly contend via their Tenth Claim for Relief, brought under the auspices of the 

California Education Code, that the CDE has violated Everett’s right to receive FAPE in 

the least restrictive environment and to be free of discrimination and retaliation.

Second, Plaintiffs similarly contend they are entitled to judgment on their federal 

claims for violations of Section 504, as set forth in their Seventh and Eighth Claims, 

which protect Plaintiffs’ right to be free of discrimination and retaliation related to 

Everett’s disability and his parents’ rights to freely advocate for those rights. The 

Eleventh Claim, for violations of the ADA, affords similar protection for any denial of 

public services based solely on disability. 

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Resolution of any of these issues requires the Court to weigh innumerable 

disputed issues. Between January 6, 2012 and October 9, 2012, Plaintiffs filed at least

five CRP complaints with the CDE, along with at least four requests for reconsideration. 

Just one of those requests for reconsideration, filed on April 12, 2012, made numerous 

claims that the CDE did not investigate multiple allegations, including claims pertaining 

to document production and special education records, allegations that Dry Creek made 

misrepresentations and manipulated such records, claims that Dry Creek failed to offer 

the appropriate supplemental instruction, claims that Dry Creek denied Everett FAPE, 

and claims that Dry Creek deprived Plaintiffs of the opportunity to be meaningful 

participants in the IEP process and further interfered with Everett’s parents’ rights to 

advocate on his behalf during the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. Plaintiffs also alleged that 

Dry Creek refused to discuss Plaintiffs’ concerns and recommendations, that they 

retaliated against Plaintiffs and interfered with Plaintiffs’ right to advocate on Everett’s 

behalf, and that Dry Creek denied Plaintiffs the right to challenge misleading information. 

Finally, Plaintiffs further asserted additional allegations of discrimination under the ADA, 

claiming that Dry Creek unlawfully coerced, intimidated, threatened and interfered with 

their rights under the ADA. See Canty Decl., Exh. 4, pp. CDE 000233-241.

Plaintiffs also claim that even where the CDE has addressed allegations made in 

the CRPs, it has wrongfully interpreted applicable standards in a result-driven effort to 

find Dry Creek in compliance. Plaintiffs further contend, in their Seventh Claim for Relief, 

that the CDE acting in bad faith with gross misjudgment, deliberate indifference and 

intentional discrimination against Everett by denying him the benefits of FAPE, 

subjecting him to discrimination at school, and failing to adopt policies, procedures and 

practices, or take appropriate measures necessary to ensure that Dry Creek complies 

with state and federal law. According to Plaintiffs, “there can be no dispute that the CDE 

knew that its failure to exercise appropriate supervisory authority over Dry Creek was 

likely to result in a further denial of Everett’s right to a FAPE.” Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 123-1, 

25:3-5.

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In response to Plaintiffs’ numerous filings, the CDE ultimately issued five reports 

and a reconsideration report relating to Plaintiffs’ CRPs. CDE’s Statement of 

Undisputed Fact Nos. 14-18. The CDE claims it investigated Plaintiffs’ allegations that 

Dry Creek had: 1) failed to attach the parent’s notes and input to the IEP; 2) failed to 

consider parental input at a pre-determined IEP; 3) failed to provide records; 4) failed to 

have a timely IEP in effect; 5) retaliated with respect to observation by an independent 

assessor; 6) failed to implement the IEP by providing SAI and related services; 7) failed 

to provide written notice; 8) retaliated with respect to delay in providing Everett’s records 

to a prospective new school; 9) retaliated having the school’s attorney present at a prehearing mediation conference with the parents without their consent; and 10) disclosed

confidential communications in a pre-hearing mediation conference. See Canty Decl., 

¶¶ 8, 10-13. Plaintiffs nonetheless claim that the CDE did not investigate allegations 

relating to parental input at the IEP as well as other allegations pertaining to retaliation 

and interference relating to both Section 504 and ADA claims. On July 5, 2012, for 

example, Plaintiffs lodged a CRP complaint with the CDE which detailed many of its 

complaints against the CDE, and a similar follow up complaint was forwarded on 

September 6, 2012. See Havey Decl., Exh. 1. 

Plaintiffs have also identified numerous items of correspondence to the CDE 

which it claims document facts and evidence that the CDE ignored. Id. at Exh. 1-3, 6, 

10-11, 14-15, 17-20, 22-23, 25, 27-30. In addition, according to Plaintiffs, the CDE has 

refused to provide documents related to Everett under the Family Educational Rights 

and Privacy Act (“FERPA’) by claiming, contrary to law, that it was not a public agency.

The sheer volume of substantive issues, complaints and correspondence 

presented by this case is, to say the least, voluminous. Particularly when coupled with 

intersecting claims under both the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA, which pertain not 

only to the provision of FAPE but also to allegations of discrimination and retaliation, the 

innumerable factual issues that result make any determination on summary judgment 

impossible. 

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F. Prayer for Relief

The CDE argues that it is entitled to summary adjudication as to certain of the 

remedies sought by Plaintiffs in their Prayer for Relief on grounds that the IDEA limits 

recoverable damages. 

Plaintiffs’ SAC requests not only injunctive and declaratory relief as to Plaintiffs’ 

entitlement to compensatory education services, but also appropriate compensatory 

damages and punitive damages. The CDE points out, however, that compensatory 

damages may not in fact be awarded as to Plaintiffs’ claims made pursuant to the IDEA 

in the Second, Ninth and Tenth Claims. C.O. v. Portland Public Schools, 679 F.3d 1162, 

1166 (9th Cir. 2012); Blanchard v. Morton School Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 

2007). Nor, according to the CDE, can punitive damages be awarded under either the 

IDEA (Chambers v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 587 F.3d 176, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2009) or 

under either Section 504 or the ADA as set forth in the Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh 

Claims. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). The CDE further asserts that 

under Ninth Circuit precedent, compensatory damages are not available for ADA 

retaliation claims, and, consequently, would appear also unavailable under analogous 

Section 504 retaliation provisions since the two statutory schemes are generally 

analyzed in the same manner. See Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 

1269-70 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs offer no authority to counter these restrictions on available remedies 

other than to cite a Third Circuit case, A.W. v. Jersey City Schools, 486 F.3d 791 (3rd 

Cir. 2007) as to Section 504 that appears contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s own Alvarado

decision discussed above. 

Plaintiffs do take issue, however, with the CDE’s claim that because Everett left 

the Dry Creek District nearly four years ago, he has no standing to assert injunctive or 

declaratory relief since he is currently being home-schooled and consequently cannot 

show any imminent or threatened injury capable of redress. Plaintiffs claim they 

removed Everett from Dry Creek for his own safety, that home-schooling places a “heavy 

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strain and burden” on them as parents, and that, accordingly, assurances by way of 

injunctive or declaratory relief could permit Everett to return to Dry Creek, where he 

continues to be geographically zoned, provided that a FAPE can in fact be provided. 

The Court believes that these considerations mandate a finding that standing to assert 

injunctive and/or declaratory relief is indeed present.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, the CDE’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with 

respect to Plaintiffs’ Third Claim for Relief, which alleges a violation of California 

Education Code § 37252.2, and with regard to certain relief sought in the prayer to 

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. The CDE’s Motion is otherwise DENIED. 

Plaintiffs’ corresponding Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 123) is also 

DENIED. Additionally, because the Court believes this is a matter that may well be 

amenable at this juncture to informal resolution, the parties are ordered to participate in 

a settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows and shall contact

Judge Hollows directly within fourteen (14) calendar days from the date this order is 

electronically signed to schedule that conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 29, 2016

Case 2:13-cv-00889-MCE-DB Document 138 Filed 09/30/16 Page 26 of 26