Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02388/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02388-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUD CAVINESS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2388 GEB DAD PS

v.

GORDON R. ENGLAND, et al. ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

This matter came before the court on October 27, 2006, for hearing on plaintiff’s

renewed motion to transfer and defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment. Attorney

John L. Taylor appeared telephonically for plaintiff. Assistant United States Attorney Kurt

Didier appeared for defendants. Upon hearing the parties’ arguments, the motions were taken

under submission. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s motion to transfer will be denied and

the undersigned will recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on November 8, 2004, by

filing a fee-paid complaint against Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy, and the

Department of the Navy. The action was assigned to District Judge Edward J. Garcia and was

referred to Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski in accordance with Local Rule 72-302(c)(21). 

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By order filed April 12, 2005, the action was reassigned from District Judge Garcia to District

Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Nowinski issued a series of orders addressing the pro se

plaintiff’s failure to effect proper service of process in a timely manner. After service was

effected, defendants appeared by noticing a motion for summary judgment for hearing on

September 21, 2005. Magistrate Judge Nowinski granted the pro se plaintiff’s request for

additional time to respond to the motion and re-set the hearing for February 8, 2006.

On December 22, 2005, attorney John L. Taylor substituted in as counsel for

plaintiff and filed a motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California on the ground that the case had been filed by the pro se plaintiff in

the wrong court. The motion was set for hearing on January 25, 2006. Plaintiff’s counsel

requested additional time to respond to the pending summary judgment motion.

After defendants filed opposition to plaintiff’s motion to transfer, Magistrate

Judge Nowinski took the motion to transfer under submission without appearance and without

argument. After defendants’ summary judgment motion was fully briefed, that motion was also

taken under submission on the papers. Magistrate Judge Nowinski retired shortly thereafter.

On March 8, 2006, the case was temporarily reassigned to Magistrate Judge John

F. Moulds, and on May 24, 2006, the case was temporarily reassigned to Magistrate Judge

Gregory G. Hollows. On August 28, 2006, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Edmund

F. Brennan for further proceedings. After Magistrate Judge Brennan disqualified himself, the

case was reassigned to the undersigned on August 29, 2006. In light of the age of the briefing

filed in support of the pending motions, the undersigned denied the motions without prejudice to

the re-noticing of either or both motions for hearing before the undersigned on October 27, 2006,

with supplemental briefing as to any new arguments. Defendants filed an amended notice of

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not re-notice the motion to transfer but was

permitted to renew the motion at the hearing on October 27, 2006.

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO TRANSFER

The pro se plaintiff brought this Title VII action in 2004 alleging that he was

subjected to race discrimination in his job as a civilian working for the United States Navy. 

Defendants deny that any impermissible discrimination or harassment occurred during plaintiff’s

Navy employment, which ended in December 1996.

Plaintiff’s counsel has moved to transfer this action to the Northern District of

California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Plaintiff asserts that the discrimination occurred in

Concord, which is located in Contra Costa County and therefore lies within the Northern District

of California. Counsel argues that the plaintiff, while proceeding pro se, incorrectly filed his case

in the Eastern District of California and that the case should be transferred to remedy the error. 

Defendants argue that venue is proper in this court and that the motion to transfer

should be denied because there is no defect to cure. Defendants explain that Title VII contains

the applicable venue provision. See Johnson v. Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 950 F.2d

586, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) is the appropriate venue

statute for actions brought under Title VII). Under § 2000e-5(f)(3), plaintiff could have brought

his suit in a court “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice

is alleged to have been committed,” which includes all four judicial districts in California, or in

the District of Columbia, as the principal place of business for the Department of the Navy, or in

the Western District of Washington, where plaintiff’s employment records are located.

Defendants note that plaintiff has not argued that relevant witnesses remain

employed at the Concord facility or that relevant documents are housed in Concord. If plaintiff

were to so argue, defendants point out that plaintiff himself resides in Suisun City, which is

located in Solano County and is within the Eastern District of California. Defendants offer

evidence that (1) the Navy facility in Concord where plaintiff worked was closed in 1997, (2)

plaintiff’s employment records are kept in Bremerton, Washington, (3) none of the significant

witnesses identified by plaintiff during his administrative proceedings, i.e., his five supervisors,

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reside within the Northern District, and (4) one of the five former supervisors is believed to be

residing in Sacramento.

Defendants argue that the statute relied upon by plaintiff in support of his motion

to transfer is not applicable because it governs actions in which the original choice of venue was

wrong, which is not the case here. Defendants contend that the moving party bears the burden of

persuading the court that venue is improper and that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in this

case. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979).

Plaintiff did not file a reply addressing any of defendants’ arguments. At the

hearing of the motion to transfer, plaintiff’s counsel merely reiterated that plaintiff worked in the

Northern District and that venue would lie there.

The statute relied upon by plaintiff is titled “Cure or waiver of defects” and

provides as follows:

 The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying

venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in

the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division

in which it could have been brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The venue provision contained in Title VII provides as follows:

 Each United States district court and each United States court of

a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have

jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. Such an

action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which

the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been

committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records

relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the

judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked

but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the

respondent is not found within any such district, such an action

may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent

has his principal office. For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of

Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his

principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which

the action might have been brought.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

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Pursuant to § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue is proper in the United Stated District Court

for the Eastern District of California because the Eastern District is one of the four judicial

districts in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been

committed. There is no venue defect to be cured, and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides no basis for

transfer to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiff’s

motion to transfer is therefore denied.

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment

The “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the

proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Summary

judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. 

Summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

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nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. Summary judgment

should be granted “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). See also First

Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los

Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1979). The party opposing summary judgment must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., may affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

In attempting to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the party opposing

summary judgment may not rely on the allegations or denials of its pleadings but must tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits and/or admissible discovery material in

support of any contention that a dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

586 n.11. Although the party opposing summary judgment need not establish a material issue of

fact conclusively in its favor, “the claimed factual dispute [must] be shown to require a jury or

judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at

631.

In general, the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment is to be

believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court

is to be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences will not be drawn out of the air, however, and the

party opposing summary judgment is obligated to produce a factual predicate from which an

inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45

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 Defendants initially moved for summary judgment on two grounds. The first ground 1

was predicated on findings and recommendations issued by Magistrate Judge Nowinski on July

8, 2005. After those findings and recommendations were vacated by order filed September 22,

2005, defendants withdrew that portion of their motion. (Def’ts’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n at 1 n.1.) 

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(E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). “A scintilla

of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a

genuine issue of material fact” precluding summary judgment. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198

F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150,

1152 (9th Cir. 1997).

II. Defendants’ Arguments and Evidence

Defendants move for summary judgment on judicial estoppel grounds.

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Defendants assert that plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy during the pendency of his

administrative Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claims against the defendants and that,

although the bankruptcy was dismissed, it was not dismissed until plaintiff’s creditors had been

notified of his bankruptcy and plaintiff had a de facto confirmed plan. Defendants assert further

that plaintiff did not disclose his pending EEO claims to the Bankruptcy Court at any time during

the bankruptcy proceedings, as he was required to do.

Defendants argue that, by failing to disclose his EEO claims in the bankruptcy

proceedings, plaintiff either abandoned his EEO claims or deemed them worthless and cannot

come into this court now and sue the defendants on claims that he did not disclose to his

creditors during the pendency of proceedings in which the creditors could have insisted on

liquidation of the claims. Defendants contend that plaintiff gained the benefits of the stay

provisions in his bankruptcy proceedings for 18 months based on his falsely completed written

statements and schedules which the bankruptcy court and plaintiff’s creditors relied upon. For

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these reasons, defendants move for summary judgment to estop plaintiff from going forward with

this action.

Defendants’ evidence establishes the following facts: plaintiff was a civilian

employee with the Navy at the Concord Naval Weapons Facility from at least 1984 to 1996,

when plaintiff’s employment was terminated; during his Navy employment, plaintiff filed

numerous EEO complaints alleging racial discrimination, beginning with a complaint filed in

1984; in March 1995, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, In re Caviness, case No. 95-

21795-A13 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.); in May 1995, plaintiff complained of discrimination on his job;

plaintiff completed an EEO Intake Form concerning the May 1995 complaint on June 1, 1995; on

July 25, 1995, five days prior to the dismissal of his first bankruptcy case, plaintiff re-filed for

Chapter 13 bankruptcy in order to keep a protective stay in place, In re Caviness, case No. 95-

26769-A13 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.); on July 31, 1995, case No. 95-21795-A13 was dismissed; on July

31, 1995, plaintiff completed a second EEO Intake Form dated July 31,1995; on August 9, 1995,

plaintiff filed a Statement of Financial Affairs form; under the heading “Suits and Administrative

Proceedings, Executions, Garnishments and Attachments,” plaintiff was instructed to “[l]ist all

suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor is or was a party within one year

immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case”; plaintiff did not list any administrative

proceedings and checked the box “None”; at the end of the Statement of Financial Affairs form,

plaintiff signed the statement “I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read the answers

contained in the foregoing Statement of Financial Affairs and any attachments thereto and that

they are true and correct”; plaintiff submitted bankruptcy schedules with his Statement of

Financial Affairs; on Schedule B, listing personal property, plaintiff checked the box “None”

under “Other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature”; at the end of the schedules,

plaintiff declared under penalty of perjury that he had read “the foregoing Summary and

Schedules, consisting of 12 sheets, and that they are true and correct” to the best of his

knowledge, information, and belief; on August 11, 1995, plaintiff sent his EEO counselor a letter

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in which he requested that the counselor continue to process his EEO complaints and stated that

additional issues needed to be addressed in his formal complaint; on September 11, 1995,

plaintiff amended his bankruptcy schedules but did not declare his pending EEO claims; on

October 5, 1995, plaintiff amended his bankruptcy schedules a second time but did not declare

his pending EEO claims; on October 17, 1995, plaintiff and the bankruptcy trustee executed a

Stipulation for De Facto Confirmation, which established a plan for the trustee to go about

paying creditors; on February 8, 1996, plaintiff amended his bankruptcy schedules a third time

but did not declare his pending EEO claims; on February 26, 1996, the bankruptcy court granted

the motion for a lift-stay filed by plaintiff’s mortgagor; on March 25, 1996, plaintiff amended his

bankruptcy schedules a fourth time but did not declare his pending EEO claims; in June 1996,

the trustee filed a Trustee’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss Prior to Confirmation due to (1)

plaintiff’s failure to make payments as proposed by the plan, (2) unreasonable delay by plaintiff

that was prejudicial to creditors, and (3) the fact that plaintiff’s plan was not feasible; plaintiff

did not oppose the trustee’s motion; in September 1996, plaintiff contacted an EEO counselor

regarding a new complaint of discrimination; in December 1996 plaintiff’s employment with the

Navy was terminated; plaintiff appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board

(MSPB); plaintiff did not notify the bankruptcy court of the termination of his employment or of

his MSPB appeal, as required by Local Rule 3015-1 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.); in January 1997

plaintiff’s second bankruptcy case was dismissed; according to the trustee’s final report, five of

plaintiff’s creditors did not submit claims to the bankruptcy court, and four of those did not

receive notice that plaintiff’s bankruptcy was dismissed.

Defendants note plaintiff’s own allegation that he had filed at least 34 EEO claims

by 1998, of which all but three had been dismissed. The Navy subsequently issued a final agency

decision finding no discrimination with respect to plaintiff’s last three EEO claims, and that

decision was affirmed by the Office of Federal Operations for the EEOC in August 2004. 

Plaintiff filed this action in November 2004 complaining of discrimination going back to 1995.

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Defendants assert that the principle of judicial estoppel bars litigants from taking

inconsistent positions, whether in the same litigation or in separate lawsuits. Defendants argue

that the plaintiff in this case has taken inconsistent positions in his bankruptcy proceedings, in

which he failed to declare any EEO claims, and in this action, in which he presents his EEO

claims as claims having monetary value.

Defendants cite authorities holding that administrative claims are assets that must

be listed on a debtor’s Schedule B in a Chapter 13 proceeding, that it is the debtor’s duty to list

all assets completely and accurately on his bankruptcy schedules, and that the duty of disclosure

carries with it the duty to amend the schedules as necessary due to the fact that the court and the

creditors base their actions on the debtor’s disclosure statements and schedules. Defendants also

cite cases applying judicial estoppel to bar an EEO plaintiff from taking inconsistent positions in

a bankruptcy court and a district court in which the plaintiff alleges employment discrimination. 

A litigant may not hide an EEO claim, which is a potential asset or source of income, from the

bankruptcy court and creditors by failing to list the EEO claim on the Statement of Financial

Affairs or Schedule B and then bring a suit on the same claim. Otherwise, the litigant would gain

a windfall by receiving the protection of the bankruptcy court without having disclosed a

potential asset while retaining the possibility of a settlement or verdict on the basis of the

undisclosed EEO claim.

Defendants argue that plaintiff pursued his EEO claims and bankruptcy

simultaneously, with bankruptcy proceedings continuing from March 1995 to January 1997 and

EEO claims pending before the Navy from May 1995 through September 1995 and again from

September 1996 to the present, and did not disclose the EEO claims in the bankruptcy

proceedings at any time. Five creditors (identified by plaintiff as Alamo Rent a Car, Gary

Kaplan, GEICO, Hubschman & Roman, Roy Gillespie, and the Veterans Administration) did not

file claims in the bankruptcy proceedings, possibly in reliance on plaintiff’s demonstrated

inability to pay his debts according to his schedules and financial statements. The trustee, the

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creditors, and the court were deprived of an opportunity to expedite repayment of plaintiff’s

debts through possible liquidation of his EEO claims, and for 18 months plaintiff benefitted from

the automatic stay that prevented any collection efforts. Plaintiff held his creditors at bay for 18

months while shielding his EEO claims from possible liquidation. Five creditors in the second

bankruptcy did not file claims and were not notified of the dismissal of that bankruptcy, allowing

plaintiff to avoid collection efforts by those creditors indefinitely. Defendants request that

plaintiff be judicially estopped from asserting a position in this case that is inconsistent with his

position in his bankruptcy proceedings.

III. Plaintiff’s Arguments and Evidence

In opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff has not reproduced the itemized

facts in defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts and admitted or denied each fact, supporting

each denial with a citation to evidence. See Local Rule 56-260(b). Nor has plaintiff offered his

own Statement of Disputed Facts, as permitted by the Local Rules. See id. Instead, plaintiff has

offered eleven paragraphs under the heading “Undisputed Facts.” Each paragraph is supported

solely by plaintiff’s own declaration, except for one paragraph that is also supported by a citation

to defendants’ Exhibit 9, a copy of plaintiff’s EEO complaint dated September18, 1996. Thus,

plaintiff has not disputed any of defendants’ facts. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on judicial

estoppel misses the mark and that defendants should be estopped from asserting a position in this

action that is inconsistent with their position in prior administrative proceedings. Plaintiff does

not demonstrate any inconsistency in defendants’ position and cites no authority holding that an

allegedly inconsistent position in an administrative proceeding can be a basis for judicial

estoppel.

On the merits of defendants’ motion, plaintiff argues that his failure to disclose

his EEO claims in his bankruptcy proceedings should be excused because he was representing

himself in those proceedings and did not know he needed to disclose pending EEO claims that

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were supposed to be investigated by the EEOC. Plaintiff argues further that he had no motive to

conceal the EEO claims “because he was only filing the bankruptcy since he was off work due to

Defendant’s conduct toward him and could not afford to pay his house notes.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5.) 

Plaintiff suggests that his failure to amend the bankruptcy schedules to disclose his EEO claims

is moot because he lost his house but eventually paid off all of the other creditors he had when he

filed for bankruptcy. With regard to the new EEO claim filed on September 16, 1996, plaintiff

argues that he had already received notice of the bankruptcy trustee’s motion to dismiss the

second bankruptcy case and knew the case was going to be dismissed.

Plaintiff argues that judicial estoppel is not applicable here because there is no

indication that he took a position, accepted by the bankruptcy court, that was inconsistent with a

subsequent position, or that he derived any unfair advantage or imposed any unfair detriment on

any opposing party. Plaintiff reiterates that he was not represented by counsel in his EEO

proceedings, his bankruptcy proceedings, or this court when he filed his complaint. He argues

that, because defendants denied EEO complaints filed before 1995, he had no reason to list the

claims filed in 1995, and he did not file a new claim until he knew the bankruptcy was going to

be dismissed. Plaintiff argues that he had received no feedback from the EEO investigator on his

1995 claims and did not know whether the claims were going to be accepted or what the outcome

would be. Plaintiff also argues that he was merely attempting to save his home from foreclosure

and omitting his EEO claims was due to mere inadvertence or mistake.

In his declaration, plaintiff admits that he completed EEO intake forms on May 9,

1995 and July 31, 1995, characterizes these as “prior EEO complaints,” speculates that they were

never investigated, and states that “no result ever came about.” Plaintiff admits that on June 26,

1996, he received notice that his second bankruptcy case would likely be dismissed. Plaintiff

declares that “the primary reason” he filed for bankruptcy was to protect his home from

foreclosure after he stopped working. He declares that he “eventually paid off all the creditors

/////

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that [he] owed at the time of filing Bankruptcy.” (Pl.’s Decl. in Supp. of Opp’n to Def’ts’ Mot.

for Summ. J. ¶¶ 6-9.)

Plaintiff includes in his opposition a request for an order compelling defendants to

provide discovery requested by plaintiff during EEO proceedings in 2002 but which the

administrative law judge declined to compel. Plaintiff offers no information about his pro se

request for discovery in administrative proceedings but cites Rule 56(f) and requests that

defendants’ motion be continued until he receives the requested discovery. Plaintiff fails to

specify particular facts on which discovery should be had or explain the issues on which

discovery is necessary. Plaintiff also asks the court to allow him to amend his complaint “to

allege any deficiencies which would obviate the need for the summary judgment motion at this

time.” (Opp’n at 5-6.) Plaintiff contends that his request to amend is consistent with his request

for discovery and would allow him to show defendants’ inconsistent positions in the

administrative proceedings and thereby defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment based

on judicial estoppel.

IV. Defendants’ Reply

Defendants reiterate their contention that plaintiff filed bankruptcy for the purpose

of frustrating his creditors, that he withheld disclosure of EEO claims on which he placed value,

that he produced payment plans he had no means of meeting in the absence of settling

undisclosed discrimination claims, and that he now seeks to recover on those undisclosed claims. 

Defendants argue that judicial estoppel applies even if there was no discharge of debts and the

bankruptcy was dismissed, as occurred here, in a case where the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy

trustee, and the creditors relied on the debtor’s schedules and financial statements in agreeing to

his proposed plans and in affording him repeated opportunities to amend and to comply with his

proposed plan. Defendants highlight the fact that the bankruptcy trustee eventually moved to

dismiss plaintiff’s second bankruptcy case in part due to unreasonable delay by plaintiff that was

prejudicial to creditors. 

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Defendants review the factors applicable to judicial estoppel as listed in New

Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 751 (2001), and argue that each factor leads to the

conclusion that judicial estoppel is warranted here: (1) plaintiff asserted inconsistent positions in

his bankruptcy proceedings and in this case by failing to list his pending EEO claims as assets in

bankruptcy documents he signed under penalty of perjury and by arguing in this court that those

same undisclosed EEO claims are meritorious and entitle him to damages; (2) plaintiff’s

bankruptcy filings gained him the advantages of the automatic stay provisions for nearly two

years during which his creditors could not seize his assets or insist on payments outside of a

confirmed plan that was based on a lack of assets; and (3) plaintiff derives an unfair advantage in

this action over his creditors or over the defendants, in that he failed to disclose his EEO claims

to his creditors, thereby implying that his claims were not valid, and now he asserts in this court

that the claims are valid, thereby forcing defendants to defend against claims that are frivolous,

according to his prior position, or valid, in which case they should have been disclosed to the

creditors. 

In response to plaintiff’s argument that he did not know he was required to

disclose his EEO claims in the bankruptcy case, defendants note that there is literally no evidence

supporting this argument, as plaintiff’s declaration is completely silent on this point. Defendants

assert that the argument is irrelevant in any event because the language of the bankruptcy form is

unambiguous, instructing the debtor to list all administrative proceedings to which he is or was a

party within one year immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case. Defendants also

point out that the EEO intake forms completed by plaintiff in 1995, provided as Exhibits 6 and 7

to defendants’ motion, assert claims of discrimination valued at $300,000. Defendants observe

that, given plaintiff’s history of filing dozens of discrimination claims beginning in 1984,

plaintiff knew the submission of a discrimination claim to an EEO counselor invoked the

administrative process. Defendants cite Ninth Circuit authority holding that judicial estoppel

will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts to know that a potential cause of

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action exists during the pendency of the bankruptcy but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure

statements to identify the cause of action as a contingent asset.

Defendants object to plaintiff’s assertion that he had no motive to conceal the

EEO claims as an asset. In defendants’ view, plaintiff was motivated by his hope of prevailing

on his EEO claims after bankruptcy and either not sharing the proceeds with creditors or having

the ability to pay his creditors when he chose. Defendants reject plaintiff’s contention that he

knew, as early as June 1996, that his bankruptcy case would be dismissed and therefore had no

reason to list his EEO claims on his schedules. Defendants point out that plaintiff amended his

schedules several times prior to June 1996 and did not disclose his EEO claims.

V. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) Request and Request for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff’s counsel has not filed a Rule 56(f) motion but has informally requested

an order compelling the defendants to provide discovery requested by the pro se plaintiff during

administrative proceedings in 2002. This request is unsupported by any applicable authority. It

does not appear that plaintiff has sought discovery in this action pursuant to the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and it is evident from the docket for this action that plaintiff has not filed a

proper motion to compel discovery pursuant to those rules.

A party seeking denial or continuance of a summary judgment motion based on a

need for discovery is required to file a motion under Rule 56(f). Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers &

Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (“References in memoranda and declarations to a

need for discovery do not qualify as motions under Rule 56(f).”). The party must demonstrate

that there are specific facts he hopes to discover that will raise an issue of material fact. Harris v.

Duty Free Shoppers Ltd. Partnership, 940 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1991); Carpenter v.

Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d 1539, 1547 (9th Cir. 1991). “The burden is on the party

seeking to conduct additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts to show that the evidence

sought exists.” Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987). See also 

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Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 n.1 (9th Cir.

1986) (holding that the party opposing summary judgment “has the burden under Rule 56(f) to

show what facts she hopes to discover to raise an issue of material fact”). “Denial of a Rule 56(f)

application is proper where it is clear that the evidence sought is almost certainly nonexistent or

is the object of pure speculation.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991).

In the present case, plaintiff’s request falls far short of the showing required to

support a denial or a continuance of a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not

demonstrated by affidavit that he cannot present facts essential to justify his opposition to

defendants’ motion, as required by Rule 56(f). See also Local Rule 56-260(b) (“If a need for

discovery is asserted as a basis for denial of the [summary judgment] motion, the party opposing

the motion shall provide a specification of the particular facts on which discovery is to be had or

the issues on which discovery is necessary.”) Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) request is denied.

Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is also without merit. Plaintiff indicates a

desire to amend for the purpose of showing that defendants took inconsistent positions in

plaintiff’s administrative proceedings. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he can amend his

complaint to allege facts that would preclude defendants from moving for summary judgment on

the basis of judicial estoppel. Plaintiff’s informal request for leave to amend is denied. See

California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1472

(9th Cir. 1987) (“Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith,

prejudice, and futility.”).

B. Judicial Estoppel

Courts have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the doctrine of judicial

estoppel “is ‘to protect the integrity of the judicial process’ by ‘prohibiting parties from

deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.’” New Hampshire v.

Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (citations omitted). “Because the rule is intended to prevent

‘improper use of judicial machinery’ [citation omitted], judicial estoppel ‘is an equitable doctrine

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invoked by a court at its discretion,’ Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” Id. at 750.

“The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes referred to as the

doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, is invoked to

prevent a party from changing its position over the course of

judicial proceedings when such positional changes have an adverse

impact on the judicial process. ‘The policies underlying preclusion

of inconsistent positions are “general consideration[s] of the

orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of

judicial proceedings.”’ . . . . 

. . . Judicial estoppel is most commonly applied to bar a party from

making a factual assertion in a legal proceeding which directly

contradicts an earlier assertion made in the same proceeding or a

prior one.”

Russell, 893 F.2d at 1037 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has identified three factors that are typically considered by

courts in deciding whether judicial estoppel is warranted: (1) whether a party’s position in a later

judicial proceeding is clearly inconsistent with that party’s earlier position before another court;

(2) whether the party persuaded the first court to accept the earlier position, so that judicial

acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that one

of the two courts was misled; and (3) whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position

would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not

estopped. Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51). Other considerations may be appropriately

considered in specific factual contexts. 532 U.S. at 751.

In the bankruptcy context, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a party is judicially

estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise

mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure statements.” Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783. See

Hay v. First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to

disclose a potential cause of action in a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and disclosure statements

estops the debtor from prosecuting the cause of action and entitles the defendants to summary

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 The Kamont case is very similar to the instant action. Kamont had three EEO 2

complaints pending when she filed a bankruptcy petition, and she filed a fourth EEO complaint

during the bankruptcy proceedings. 258 F. Supp. 2d at 498. Kamont’s bankruptcy petition and

schedules did not disclose any administrative proceedings. Id. The district court ruled that

Kamont was judicially estopped from proceeding on claims raised in the four EEO complaints

despite Kamont’s contention that she did not know the claims were omitted because she was

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judgment). See also Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2003)

(plaintiff who disclosed employment discrimination claims to her attorney and bankruptcy trustee

but failed to disclose the claims in her bankruptcy filings was judicially estopped from pursuing

the claims in district court); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1287-88 (2002)

(plaintiff who failed to disclose employment discrimination claim in concurrent bankruptcy

proceedings was judicially estopped from seeking monetary damages on the claim); In re Coastal

Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a debtor is barred from bringing

claims that were known to the debtor but were not disclosed in the debtor’s bankruptcy

statements and schedules); Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc.,

989 F.2d 570, 571-72 (1st Cir. 1993) (debtor who obtained relief in bankruptcy court on the

representation that no claims existed cannot resurrect the claims and obtain relief on them);

Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3rd Cir. 1988) (debtor who

failed to list potential claims against a creditor was estopped from pursuing the claims). 

“The debtor, once he institutes the bankruptcy process, disrupts the flow of

commerce and obtains a stay and the benefits derived by listing all his assets.” Hamilton, 270

F.3d at 785. In exchange for those benefits, the Bankruptcy Code and Rules impose on the

debtor a duty to disclose all assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims. Id.; 11 U.S.C.

§ 521(a)(1). The bankruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor” as of

the commencement of case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Thus, the bankruptcy estate includes claims

being litigated by the debtor as well as administrative claims. 270 F.3d at 785. See Kamont v.

West, 258 F. Supp. 2d 495, 499-500 (S.D. Miss.), aff’d, No. 03-60392, 2003 WL 22477703 (5th

Cir. Oct. 31, 2003) .2

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suffering from work related stress and depression and did not actively participate in the case

other than to sign the petition and schedules. Id. at 498-99. The court held that a “debtor’s

failure to satisfy its statutory duty to disclose is ‘inadvertent’ only when, in general, the debtor

lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment.” Id. at 500.

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“The debtor’s duty to disclose potential claims as assets does not end when the

debtor files schedules, but instead continues for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding.” 270

F.3d at 785. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1009(a) (providing that schedules may be amended as a

matter of course before the case is closed). “Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor

has knowledge of enough facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the

pendency of the bankruptcy, but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify

the cause of action as a contingent asset.” 270 F.3d at 784.

In the present case, the undersigned finds that the balance of equities tips sharply

in favor of application of judicial estoppel. When plaintiff commenced his second bankruptcy

case on July 25, 1995, plaintiff had a statutory duty to disclose the EEO claim he filed in May

1995. After he filed a second EEO claim on July 31, 1995, he had a duty to amend his

bankruptcy petition and schedules to disclose the second claim. After he filed a third EEO claim

in September 1996, he had a duty to amend his bankruptcy petition and schedules to disclose the

third claim. Plaintiff did not disclose any EEO claim at any time during his bankruptcy

proceedings, despite the fact that he amended his schedules four times prior to the date on which

the trustee moved to dismiss the second bankruptcy case and despite the fact that the case

remained open for seven months after the trustee’s motion was filed.

Plaintiff has maintained inconsistent positions in his bankruptcy proceedings and

this court. Plaintiff’s creditors, the bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy court relied on

plaintiff’s position that he had no administrative or legal claims, which gave plaintiff an unfair

advantage. By failing to disclose his discrimination claims in the bankruptcy proceedings,

plaintiff implied that the claims were of no value. In this court, plaintiff seeks damages in the

amount of $1.2 million on the claims not disclosed in his bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff’s

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failure to disclose claims he now values at $1.2 million gained plaintiff the advantage of an

automatic stay for approximately eighteen months, during which time creditors could not seek his

assets, and prevented his creditors from gaining an interest in or control over his EEO claims. A

de facto confirmation plan executed by plaintiff and the trustee was filed with the bankruptcy

court. That plan was based on a list of assets that did not include plaintiff’s discrimination

claims. Plaintiff amended his bankruptcy schedules four times and did not disclose his

discrimination claims. It is plausible that some of plaintiff’s creditors declined to submit claims

to the bankruptcy court in reliance on plaintiff’s asserted lack of assets, and plaintiff clearly

succeeded in persuading the trustee and the court to accept his position that he had no assets of

value. 

Plaintiff does not deny having knowledge of his discrimination claims during the

pendency of his bankruptcy proceedings. He was actively pursuing those claims during the

relevant time. On August 11, 1995, just two days after filing a disclosure statement and

bankruptcy schedules that did not reveal any administrative claims, plaintiff wrote a letter to his

EEO counselor requesting that the counselor continue to process his EEO complaints. The

bankruptcy forms completed by plaintiff under penalty of perjury are very clear in requiring the

debtor to list “all suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor is or was a party

within one year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case.” Plaintiff’s argument

that he did not understand the disclosure requirement is not credible.

The facts and circumstances of this case contradict plaintiff’s contentions that he

had no motive for concealment of assets and that his failure to disclose the EEO claims was

inadvertent. By failing to list the EEO claims on his bankruptcy schedules, plaintiff deceived his

creditors, the bankruptcy trustee, and the bankruptcy court, all of whom relied on plaintiff’s

petition and schedules to determine what action, if any, they would take in the bankruptcy

proceedings. Plaintiff enjoyed the benefit of the automatic stay, avoided collection efforts that

might otherwise have been made by his creditors, and prevented creditors from obtaining an

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interest in the administrative claims that plaintiff actively pursued during the bankruptcy

proceedings and afterward. While it is true that the trustee moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second

bankruptcy case in June 1996, that fact does not excuse plaintiff’s failure to disclose the EEO

claim that was pending when he filed for bankruptcy in 1995 or his failure to disclose all three

EEO claims in the four amended bankruptcy schedules he filed prior to June 1996.

“‘[T]he integrity of the bankruptcy system depends on full and honest disclosure

by debtors of all of their assets.’” Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785 (quoting In re Coastal Plains, Inc.,

179 F.3d at 208 (internal citations omitted)). Courts cannot permit debtors to obtain relief from

the bankruptcy court by representing that no claims exist and later assert those claims for their

own benefit in other proceedings. Id. In light of the chronology established by the undisputed

facts in the present case and plaintiff’s complete failure to disclose his EEO claims as assets at

any time during his bankruptcy proceedings, plaintiff should be judicially estopped from

pursuing his discrimination claims in this court. The undersigned will therefore recommend that

defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted on the ground of judicial estoppel.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s December 28, 2005 amended motion to transfer, renewed at oral

argument on October 27, 2006, is denied;

2. Plaintiff’s request for discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) is denied;

3. Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is denied;

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ August 15, 2005 motion for summary judgment, renewed by

defendants’ amended notice of motion filed September 18, 2006, be granted; and 

2. Judgment be entered for defendants, and this action be closed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

ten (10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file and

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serve written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to objections shall be filed and

served within ten (10) days after the objections are served. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 2, 2007.

DAD:kw

ddad1\orders.prose\caviness2388.msj.f&r

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