Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04143/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04143-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT DALTON RUSH,

Petitioner,

 v.

ANTHONY P. KANE,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-4143 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DENYING PETITION FOR HABEAS

CORPUS

In September of 1987, after a jury trial in the Superior Court of the State of California,

Petitioner Robert Rush was convicted of second degree murder with the use of a firearm. 

Petitioner was sentenced to 17 years to life and is currently incarcerated at the Correctional

Training Facility in Soledad, California. On March 5, 2003, the Board of Prison Terms (the

“Board”) denied Petitioner parole. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the Board’s

decision and seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set

forth below, the petition is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Commitment Offense

In July 1986 Petitioner murdered his roommate John Heinz. In the days leading up to

the murder, Petitioner and Heinz had been bickering over household matters. In particular,

Heinz had accused Petitioner of using his shampoo. Petitioner, for his part, thought that

Heinz may have instructed his dog to attack Petitioner’s dog. On the day of the murder,

Petitioner and Heinz got into a physical altercation that Petitioner claims left him with a

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bloody nose and lip. During a pause in the tussle, Petitioner procured a .22 caliber rifle from

his bedroom and shot Heinz multiple times at close range, emptying the rifle’s clip. 

Shortly thereafter, another one of Petitioner’s roommates, Mark Hoy, came home. Hoy

helped Petitioner dispose of Heinz’ body. After checking Heinz’ pulse to make sure he was

dead, Petitioner and Hoy wrapped the body in plastic and then in a sleeping bag. They buried

the body in a nearby canyon, but not before removing Heinz’ ring and wallet. Hoy reportedly

pawned the ring and, after removing the money inside, tossed Heinz’ wallet off a cliff. 

Petitioner and Hoy then abandoned Heinz’ truck in a parking lot. On their way home they

stopped at a bar to have a few drinks with Heinz’ money. 

B. The 2003 Parole Eligibility Hearing

Petitioner appeared before the Board on March 5, 2003 in a hearing to determine his

eligibility for parole. The Board denied parole after making the requisite finding that

Petitioner continued to pose “an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety if released from prison.” Resp. Ex. 2, at 95; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(a). In

so concluding, the Board relied on the nature of Petitioner’s commitment offense. Id. The

Board described the manner of that offense as “dispassionate and calculated” as well as “cruel

and callous.” Id. The Board found the crime’s motive “inexplicable and very trivial in

relation to the offense.” Id. In reaching its decision, the Board also noted a 2002 report from

Petitioner’s correctional counselor which concluded that, if released, Petitioner would “pose

an unpredictable degree of threat to the public.” Id. at 98. 

The Board acknowledged Petitioner’s exemplary prison record, including its utter lack

of disciplinary infractions. Id. at 97. The Board also commended Petitioner for continuing

his education and earning both BA and MA degrees while incarcerated. Id. Nevertheless,

these positive aspects of Petitioner’s behavior were not deemed to outweigh those factors

indicating his unsuitability for parole. Id. The Board encouraged Petitioner to continue his

participation in “self-help” programming and deferred any future consideration of Petitioner’s

parole for 2 years. 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino. The Superior Court denied his

petition on the merits, concluding that the record contained “some evidence” to support the

Board’s finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole. Resp. Ex. 5, at 4. 

Petitioner timely appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied

the petition. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court,

which denied review. Petitioner filed the instant petition on October 7, 2005. Respondent

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that several of Petitioner’s claims were not exhausted in

state court. Respondent’s motion was granted in part and denied in part by this Court on

March 16, 2007. Petitioner’s exhausted claims are discussed below. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court must only consider as clearly

established federal law “the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the state court decision.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). “While circuit law may be ‘persuasive

authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state

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courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied.” Id. (internal quotations omitted.) 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411.

The state court decision to which 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423

F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When determining whether the last reasoned decision

affirming a denial of parole merits habeas relief, the Ninth Circuit focuses on the reasons set

forth in the denial. See Rosas v. Nielson, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2005). If the

determination of unsuitability for parole is supported by “some evidence, with some indicia of

reliability,” the state court decision affirming the denial neither unreasonably applies federal

law nor rests on an unreasonable application of federal law. See id. at 1232-33.

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner advances three claims. First, Petitioner contends that the Board’s negative

parole suitability determination denied him due process of law. Second, Petitioner argues that

the Board made its own factual findings and thus enhanced his sentence in violation of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). Third, Petitioner claims that he is a victim of an unlawful “no parole” policy. 

A. Due Process Claims 

Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision to deny parole violated the Due Process

Clause. He argues that the Board’s decision was not supported by “some” evidence and that

the Board impermissibly relied on the facts of his commitment offense. Petitioner contends

that these errors deprived him of a federally protected liberty interest created by California’s

parole regime. 

 It is well-established that there is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted

person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Nevertheless, a state

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can “create a liberty interest protected by the due process guarantees” when it’s parole scheme

employs “statutory language [that] itself creates a protectible expectation of parole.” Id. at

11-12. In California, the Penal Code provides that “prior to [an] inmate’s minimum eligible

parole release date a panel of two or more commissioners or deputy commissioners shall again

meet with the inmate and shall normally set a parole release date.” Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(a) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that this mandatory

language vests inmates with a cognizable liberty interest in a parole date. See, e.g., Sass v.

Cal. Bd. Of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Because inmates have a liberty interest in a parole date, the deprivation of that interest

must comport with due process. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. It is well-established that a Board’s

denial of parole violates due process if the decision is not supported by “some” evidence. 

Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended, 2007 WL 2027359 (9th Cir.

July 13, 2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29. As previously noted, to deny parole, the Board

must conclude that the inmate before it poses “an unreasonable risk of danger to society if

released from prison.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(a). Thus, an inmate is denied due

process if the Board’s “unreasonable risk” determination is not supported by “some”

evidence. Irons, 479 F.3d 662-63.

1. The State Court Applied the Correct “Some” Evidence Standard.

The last reasoned state decision in this case is the California Superior Court’s Order

denying Petitioner habeas relief. Resp. Ex. 5; see Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091-92 (federal habeas

review is of last reasoned state court decision). Petitioner claims that the state court’s

decision erroneously applied a “some” evidence standard to his due process claim. According

to Petitioner, the state court should have applied a “substantial” evidence standard, and its

failure to do so was contrary to established federal law. Petitioner’s argument is

unpersuasive. 

The Supreme Court has never held that a parole board’s suitability determination must

be supported by “substantial” evidence. Rather, as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated, the

“Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of

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 The Board also relied on a 2002 report authored by Petitioner’s correctional officer that

recommended that the Board deny Petitioner a parole date. Resp. Ex. 2, at 98. The correctional

officer’s report, however, drew its conclusion entirely from the facts of Petitioner’s commitment

offense. Resp. Ex. 4, at 2-4. Thus, Petitioner is correct that the Board’s decision rested exclusively on

the immutable facts of his offense. 

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due process with respect to [his or her liberty] interest if the board’s decision is not supported

by ‘some evidence in the record.’” Irons, 479 F.3d at 662 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 457, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985)); accord Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29. 

Accordingly, this Court cannot say that the state court’s application of a “some” evidence

standard was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, established Supreme

Court precedent. 

2. The Board’s Decision was Supported by “Some” Evidence.

Petitioner argues that even if the “some” evidence standard applies, the state court’s

application of that standard was objectively unreasonable. Petitioner contends that there was

“no” evidence to support the Board’s determination that he posed a continued danger to

society if released. This claim must also be rejected. 

As the state court summarized, the Board found Petitioner unsuitable for parole based

on the characteristics of his commitment offense.1

 In particular, the Board determined that (1)

the crime was carried out in a “cruel and callous” manner; (2) the crime was carried out in a

“dispassionate and calculated” manner; and, (3) the motive for the crime was “inexplicable

and very trivial in relation to the nature of the crime.” Resp. Ex. 5, at 3. Each of these factors

is identified by California law as an indication of an inmate’s unsuitability for parole. Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)(1)(B),(D),(E). 

The state court determined that there was “some” evidence supporting each of these

findings. Resp. Ex. 5, at 4. The court emphasized that Petitioner had an opportunity to

withdraw from his altercation with Heinz but instead armed himself with a rifle, entered

Heinz’ bedroom, and emptied the rifle’s entire clip into the victim. Id. The court noted

Petitioner’s deliberate efforts to dispose of the body and abandon Heinz’ vehicle. Id. Further,

the court noted the apparent callousness of using money taken from Heinz’ wallet to go out

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for a drink. Id. Finally, the state court placed particular emphasis on the inexplicable fact that

the murder was provoked by a fight regarding a dog and the unauthorized use of shampoo. Id.

The state court also acknowledged that Petitioner met several of the criterion for parole

suitability. Id. at 4; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(d). Specifically, Petitioner has by all

accounts been a model inmate, earning both BA and MA degrees while in prison and

incurring no disciplinary infractions. See id. at § 2402(d)(9). Petitioner also has no prior

criminal history and discussed at his parole hearing a realistic plan for reintegrating with

society upon release. See id. at § 2402(d)(1),(6),(8). 

On the balance of all factors, however, the state court held that the Board’s

unsuitability determination was supported by “some” evidence. Resp. Ex. 5, at 4. This is not

an unreasonable application of the “some” evidence standard. The circumstances of

Petitioner’s crime, as summarized by the state court, adequately support the conclusion that

the crime was carried out in a cruel, callous, deliberate and calculated manner. Of particular

force is evidence that Petitioner had every opportunity to walk away from the conflict but

chose instead to procure a rifle from his room and empty its entire clip into the victim. The

record also amply demonstrates that the motive for the crime–unauthorized shampoo use and

a dog fight–was extremely trivial and grossly out of step with the seriousness of the offense. 

The presence of positive suitability factors, while significant, does not tip the scales and

render the state court’s application of the “some” evidence standard objectively unreasonable. 

See Irons, 479 F.3d at 660-61, 663 (callousness of offense and trivial motive “some” evidence

of unsuitability despite positive showing on virtually all other suitability factors); In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1074-75 (2005) (substantially same).

3. The Board’s Reliance on the Immutable Circumstances of

Petitioner’s Commitment Offense Did Not Violate Due Process.

Petitioner argues that even if there is “some” evidence supporting the Board’s

determination that he is unsuitable for parole, the Board’s exclusive reliance on the immutable

circumstances of his commitment offense nonetheless violated due process. This argument

touches on a murky and fast-developing area of law. Nevertheless, based on the most recent

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pronouncements from the Ninth Circuit, and the specific facts of this case, it is clear that

Petitioner’s argument must be rejected. 

In any event, the Ninth Circuit has stated that reliance “on an unchanging factor [such

as] the circumstance of the offense . . . runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by

the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d at

910, 917 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Additionally, in Irons the Ninth

Circuit again stated that “in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s

commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate

due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes.” 479 F.3d at 665. However, in Biggs, Irons and Sass this language was dicta, as

each court in fact found no violation of due process despite the Board’s exclusive reliance on

the petitioner’s commitment offense. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; 

Irons, 479 F.3d at 664-65. As such, there is no authoritative case law that requires that this

Court find a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights. 

The Ninth Circuit’s most recent treatment of this issue strongly suggests that while

reliance on an inmate’s commitment offense may potentially violate due process, the violation

does not ripen until the expiration of the inmate’s minimum sentence. See Irons, 479 F.3d at

664-65. Irons is strikingly similar to the case at bar. The habeas petitioner in Irons had been

convicted of second degree murder in the death of his roommate. Id. at 660. The killing was

provoked by an angry argument during which the petitioner accused the victim of stealing

from him. Id. Sometime during this altercation, the petitioner procured a gun from his

bedroom, fired 12 rounds into the victim and then stabbed him twice in the back. Id. While

incarcerated, the petitioner in Irons demonstrated “exemplary” behavior, received positive

psychological evaluations, and was able to articulate a solid plan for the future. Id. at 661-62. 

Nevertheless, the Board denied parole exclusively on the basis of the “callous” nature of the

petitioner’s commitment offense as well as its “trivial” motive. Id. at 663-65. 

The Irons court held that the Board’s denial of parole did not violate due process. In so

holding, the court placed special emphasis on the fact that, as in Biggs and Sass, the petitioner

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 Petitioner contends that at the time of the challenged Board decision, he had served his

minimum 17 year sentence. The record does not bear out this contention. Petitioner was sentenced to

a 17 year term on November 24, 1987. Resp. Ex. 1. Accounting for time served prior to his 1987

sentencing, Petitioner’s 17 years were completed in late July of 2003. The challenged parole hearing,

however, took place on March 5, 2003 and thus within Petitioner’s 17 year term. Moreover, even if

Petitioner had barely served his 17 year sentence at the time of the Board’s decision, this Court would

not be inclined to find that the Board’s continued reliance on his commitment offense amounted to a due

process violation. See Leigh v. Kane, No. 06-2947 CRB, 2007 WL 2417374 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2007)

(“[T]here is no authoritative case law that clearly establishes that [such a] factual scenario amounts to

a due process violation.”). 

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 The fact that Petitioner has not served his minimum sentence distinguishes this case from the

Court’s prior decision in Brown v. Kane, No. 05-5188 CRB, 2007 WL 1373038 (N.D. Cal. May 8,

2007). In Brown, at the time of the challenged parole determination, petitioner had served a “substantial

amount of time beyond his minimal sentence.” Id. at * 6. Indeed, in Brown, the petitioner had served

10 years more than his 15 year minimum sentence. Id. 

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at issue had not served the statutory minimum number of years for his offense at the time of

the Board’s negative parole determination. Id. at 665. The court also acknowledged the

callousness of the petitioner’s commitment offense and the fact that the Sass court had upheld

the Board’s exclusive reliance on a far less egregious offense. Id. at 664-65 (Sass was

convicted of second degree murder arising from a hit and run incident and felony drunken

driving.). In light of these factors, the court concluded that “[a]ll we held in [Biggs and Sass]

and all we hold today, therefore, is that given the particular circumstances of the offenses in

these cases, due process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for

parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms.” Id.

Here, at the time of the Board’s suitability decision, Petitioner had served 16.5 of his

17 year minimum term.2

 Therefore, in light of Biggs, Sass and Irons, the Court is disinclined

to conclude that the Board’s reliance on the immutable characteristics of Petitioner’s

commitment offense violated due process.3

 This conclusion gains additional support from the

apparent callousness of Petitioner’s offense as well as the exceedingly trivial provocations

that preceded it. That is, Petitioner’s commitment offense is probative of his future danger to

society. See Brown v. Kane, No. 05-5188 CRB, 2007 WL 1373038, at * 7 (N.D. Cal. May 8,

2007) (commitment crime that is not probative of dangerous recidivism is less likely to

constitute “some” evidence supporting parole denial). Because Sass’ less callous offense was

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deemed “some” evidence that he posed a continuing risk to society, this Court cannot reach a

different result with respect to Petitioner. See Irons, 479 F.3d at 664-65.

For these reasons, the Board’s denial of parole cannot, at this point, be deemed to have

violated due process by relying on the immutable circumstances of Petitioner’s offense. 

Nevertheless, the Court reaches no conclusion about whether the unchanging facts of

Petitioner’s crime would be sufficient to sustain the denial of a release date at any future

parole hearing. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (“[I]t is not our function to speculate about how

future parole hearings could proceed.”). 

B. No Authority Supports Petitioner’s Claim that the Apprendi Line of Cases

Apply in the Parole Context. 

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely,

the Court held that for Apprendi purposes the “statutory maximum” is the “maximum

sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. 

Petitioner contends that the parole decision at issue violated Apprendi and Blakely

because it rested on the Board’s characterization of the crime and not facts found by a jury. 

Specifically, as the petitioner recounts, the Board denied parole after determining that the

commitment offense was carried out in a “cruel,” “callous,” “dispassionate,” and “calculated”

manner. Resp. Ex. 2, at 95. The Board also noted that the crime sprung from an

“inexplicable” and “trivial” motive. Id. Petitioner contends that these characterizations of the

underlying offense operated as sentence enhancements in violation Apprendi and Blakely. 

This argument must be rejected because Petitioner cites to no authority, let alone

established Supreme Court precedent, indicating that Apprendi and its progeny apply to

parole suitability determinations. Consequently, this Court simply cannot say (as it must

under AEDPA) that the state court’s failure to apply Apprendi was “contrary to,” or involved

an “unreasonable application” of, established Supreme Court precedent. 

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Moreover, Petitioner’s argument misapprehends the Apprendi line of cases. As

Blakely clarified, the Apprendi rationale does not apply to indeterminate sentencing within

the sentence range permitted by a jury’s verdict. Id. at 308-09. Blakely holds that even

though an indeterminate sentencing regime allows for judicial fact-finding, it is

constitutionally permissible because it does not infringe on the province of the jury. Id. Thus,

so long as he stays within the sentencing range the jury’s verdict will allow, a “judge (like a

parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his

sentencing discretion.” Id. at 309 (emphasis added).

Here, the Board’s negative parole suitability determination did not impose a term

beyond the 17 years to life sentence that Petitioner’s conviction required under California law. 

Thus, whatever fact-finding the Board engaged in did not result in a sentence beyond that

which the jury’s verdict would allow. As such, even if Apprendi and Blakely applied in the

parole context, the logic of those cases was not violated by the parole suitability determination

at issue. 

C. No Evidence in the Record Supports Petitioner’s “No Parole” Policy Claim

Petitioner claims that the Board’s negative parole determination was the product of a

gubernatorial “no parole” policy. Specifically, Petitioner contends that former California

governors Pete Wilson (1991-1999) and Gray Davis (1999-2003) established a “no parole”

policy for inmates convicted of murder and that this policy trickled down sub rosa to

individual Board decisions. To support this claim, Petitioner relies on the extensive

evidentiary record developed in Melvyn H. Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms, No. 96-0783,

2005 WL 4629202 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2005). 

In Coleman, the court found that the habeas petitioner before it had “present[ed] a

convincing case that a blanket policy against parole for murderers” affected the fairness and

impartiality of the Board during his 1995 parole hearing. Id. at * 4. The court ordered a new

hearing to be conducted “free of any prejudice stemming from a gubernatorial policy against

parole for murderers.” Id. Accordingly, in July of 2005, the Board held a hearing at which

the petitioner was again found unsuitable for parole. Coleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms, Nos.

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 The Coleman court also considered an April, 9 1999 Los Angeles Times piece which stated

the following:

governor [Davis] was adamant that he believes murderers-even those with second-degree

convictions-should serve at least a life sentence in prison. Asked whether extenuating

circumstances should be a factor in murder sentences, the governor was blunt: “No.

Zero. They . . . must not have been listening when I was campaigning. . . . If you take

someone else’s life, forget it. I just think people dismiss what I said in the campaign as

either political hyperbole or something that I would back away from . . . . We are doing

exactly what we said we were going to do.”

Id. at * 2. 

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05-17380, 06-15478, 2007 WL 1073774, at * 1 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2007). This decision was

then affirmed by the district court. Id. 

In finding that petitioner’s 1995 parole hearing was affected by a “no-parole” policy,

the Coleman court relied substantially on the deposition testimony of two former Board

commissioners. Id. at * 2. According to the Coleman court, the commissioners’ testimony

tended to show that former governor Pete Wilson initiated a sub rosa “no-parole” policy that

affected the petitioner’s 1995 parole hearing. Id. The court cited additional evidence in the

record which it found to suggest that the policy carried over to governor Gray Davis’

administration. In particular, the court noted that between the years of 1992 and 2001, a

period spanning both administrations, less than one percent of inmates convicted of murder

were released on parole. Id.4

Petitioner proposes a number of ways in which this Court should apply the evidentiary

record developed in Coleman. First, Petitioner asks the Court to take judicial notice of

Coleman’s factual findings and apply them to the case at hand. This request must be denied. 

It is well-established that the “[f]actual findings in one case ordinarily are not admissible for

their truth in another case through judicial notice.” Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114

n.5 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1117 n.14 (9th Cir.

2005). Second, Petitioner’s submissions to this Court also appear to request the application of

the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel to establish that his 2003 Board

decision was affected by a “no parole” policy. This the Court cannot do. The Supreme Court

has unanimously rejected the application of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel against

the government. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984). 

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 Moreover, if this Court were to hold that Petitioner’s 2003 hearing was affected by a “no

parole” policy, the remedy, as in Coleman, would be a fair parole hearing unaffected by the

gubernatorial policy. See Melvyn H. Coleman v. Board of Prison Terms, 2005 WL 4629202, at * 1

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2005). But as Petitioner acknowledges, he had a hearing in 2005 at which he was

again denied parole. Pet. Summary of Issues, at *4 n.4. That hearing was conducted under Governor

Schwarzenegger’s administration, and there is absolutely no indication that the “no parole” policy

identified by the Coleman court carried over to the Schwarzenegger administration. Thus, the fair

hearing this Court could order has already been provided, and in this sense, Petitioner’s “no parole”

policy claim is moot. 

13

Perhaps recognizing the dubiousness of these first two applications of Coleman,

Petitioner has requested an evidentiary hearing in which he can present the evidentiary

exhibits from Coleman. This request must be denied because even if the evidentiary record

from Coleman were properly before the Court, it could not be found probative of the Board’s

2003 decision at issue. As the Ninth Circuit recently stated, the evidence from the Coleman

case “was specific and limited to Coleman’s 1995 parole hearing.” Coleman v. Bd. of Prison

Terms, Nos. 05-17380, 06-15478, 2007 WL 1073774, at * 2 n.5 (9th Cir. Apr. 6, 2007). The

evidence from Coleman simply cannot be “extrapolated to parole challenges by other

prisoners,” particularly those, like the one at issue, that arise from a Board decision that took 

place almost a decade after the infirm decision in Coleman. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner has

presented no cognizable evidence that his 2003 parole hearing was affected by a gubernatorial

“no parole” policy.5

 

Accordingly, Petitioner has presented no cognizable evidence that his 2003 parole 

hearing was affected by a gubernatorial “no parole” policy. The state court’s rejection of this

claim was therefore neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of,

established federal law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19 , 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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