Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00927/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00927-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert L. Conrad, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-0927-PHX-SPL (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Robert L. Conrad filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his 

conviction and sentence for aggravated assault. His Petition alleges that police did not 

have a warrant or probable cause when they entered his home, that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred in various ways. As 

explained below, the Court recommends that Conrad’s Petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 In response to a 911 call about possible domestic violence, police entered 

Conrad’s home and found his wife with “a swollen lip, numerous bruises, scratches, and 

extremely red swollen eyes.” (Doc. 13, Ex. R at ¶ 4) She told police that Conrad had 

assaulted her. (Id. at ¶ 5) Conrad was indicted for one count of aggravated assault in 

Maricopa County Superior Court.1

 (Doc. 13 at Ex. A) Before trial, Conrad moved to 

 

1

 This habeas petition arises from Conrad’s retrial in this matter. (Doc. 13, Ex. O 

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suppress evidence and statements obtained by the police when they entered his home 

because they did not have his consent and had not obtained a warrant. (Doc. 13, Ex. O at 

3) The Superior Court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the police’s 

actions. (Id.) 

 The day his trial was scheduled to start, the Superior Court granted Conrad’s 

attorney’s motion to withdraw and so the trial was continued. At the conclusion of the 

trial, the jury found Conrad guilty of one count of aggravated assault, a dangerous and 

domestic violence offense. (Doc. 13, Ex. L at 11) The Court sentenced Conrad to an 

aggravated term of 15 years with 1,056 days of pre-incarceration credit. (Doc. 13, Ex. M 

at 9) 

 Direct Appeal. Conrad timely appealed; his counsel found no arguable issues of 

law and filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Doc. 

13, Ex. O) Conrad filed a supplemental pro per brief arguing that the trial court should 

have found that the police entry into his home constituted an illegal search and seizure, 

that the prejudicial effect of his tape recorded phone calls to the victim substantially 

outweighed their probative value, and that his presentence incarceration credit was 

calculated incorrectly. (Doc. 13, Exs. P, Q) On November 10, 2011, the Court of 

Appeals filed its memorandum decision affirming Conrad’s conviction and sentence. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. R) Conrad did not move for reconsideration and he did not petition the 

Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 13, Ex. S) 

 First PCR. On November 22, 2011, Conrad filed a Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief and he was appointed counsel. (Doc. 13, Exs. T, U) On January 24, 2012, 

Conrad’s counsel notified the Court that she was unable to raise any viable issues and 

would not file a petition. (Doc. 13, Ex. V) Conrad filed a pro per Supplemental Brief, 

along with an amendment thereto and several letters to the Court. (Doc. 13, Exs. W, X, 

Y, Z, AA, BB, VVV) In response to these filings, the Superior Court accepted Conrad’s 

amended petition. (Doc. 13, Ex. CC) After the State responded and Conrad replied, the 

 at 2) 

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Superior Court summarily denied his post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 13, Exs. DD, 

EE, FF) Specifically, the Superior Court found that several of his claims had been raised 

on direct appeal, that he was precluded from arguing that the trial court should not have 

allowed his counsel to withdraw, and that his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 

counsel claims did not show that his counsel’s performance was deficient or that there 

was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been different but for his 

counsel’s performance. (Doc. 13, Ex. FF) 

 Conrad petitioned the Arizona Court of Appeals for review from the Superior 

Court’s denial of his Petition. (Doc. 13 at Exs. GG, HH, II, JJ) The State responded and 

Conrad replied. (Doc. 13, Exs. KK, LL, MM, NN, OO, PP) On August 23, 2013, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, adopted the trial court’s ruling in its entirety, 

and denied relief. (Doc. 13, Exs. QQ, WWW) Conrad’s untimely motion for 

reconsideration was denied. (Doc. 13, Exs. RR, SS) Conrad did not petition the Arizona 

Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 13, Ex.TT) 

 Successive PCRs. During the pendency of the appeal on his first motion for postconviction relief, Conrad filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief and two motions for 

relief in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 13, Exs. UU, VV, WW) The Superior 

Court dismissed his notice and denied both motions. (Doc. 13, Ex. XX) Subsequently, 

Conrad filed his third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief; the Superior Court dismissed 

it. (Doc. 13, Exs. YY, ZZ) 

 Conrad then filed several motions in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 13, Exs. 

AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, FFF) After he filed a compliant petition for review, the 

Court of Appeals accepted it for review. (Doc. 13, Ex. GGG) Conrad then filed several 

additional motions; the Court of Appeals allowed Conrad to supplement his petition for 

review and denied all of his other motions. (Doc. 13, Exs. HHH, III, JJJ, KKK, LLL, 

MMM, NNN, OOO, PPP) The Court of Appeals then granted review and denied relief. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. QQQ) Conrad’s motion for reconsideration was denied. (Doc. 13, Exs. 

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RRR, SSS) Conrad’s petition to the Arizona Supreme Court for review was also denied. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. TTT) 

 Habeas Corpus. On May 1, 2014, Conrad filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus in this Court alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, that 

his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police entered his home without a 

warrant or probable cause, that the trial court should not have permitted his first trial 

counsel to withdraw, and that the trial court should not have admitted certain exhibits into 

evidence. (Doc. 1) Respondents argue that most of his claims are unexhausted and now 

subject to an implied procedural bar, that his Fourth Amendment argument is not 

cognizable on habeas review, and that the exhausted argument fails on its merits. 

Most of Conrad’s Claims Are Barred.

 Exhaustion of Remedies. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Procedural Default. A claim can also be subject to an express or implied 

procedural bar. Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010). An express 

procedural bar exists if the state court denies or dismisses a claim based on a procedural 

bar “that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis 

for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (Arizona’s “Rule 32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of 

federal law because they do not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the 

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merits”); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (“adequate” grounds exist 

when a state strictly or regularly follows its procedural rule). See also Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1100. 

 An implied procedural bar exists if a claim was not fairly presented in state court 

and no state remedies remain available to the petitioner. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298-99 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 

975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 1999); White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989).

 This Court can review a procedurally defaulted claim if the petitioner can 

demonstrate either cause for the default and actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a 

miscarriage of justice. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986); States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

167-68 (1982). 

Conrad’s Unexhausted Claims. 

 Conrad’s first habeas claim is that he received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel for various reasons. (Doc. 1 at 7-10) This claim is composed of several subclaims, and four of these claims are raised for the first time in this habeas petition, 

namely that trial counsel should have (i) objected to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, (ii) 

objected to the admission of certain photographs, (iii) presented a photo technician as a 

witness,2

 and (iv) moved for a mistrial when the victim’s testimony referred to his 

previous trial. Accordingly, these four claims are all unexhausted. 

 Conrad also argues that his second trial counsel was ineffective because he did not 

present testimony from a physician who had examined the victim. (Doc. 1 at 8) Conrad 

first raised this issue in his third PCR petition. (Doc. 13, Ex. YY) The Superior Court 

dismissed his third PCR as untimely and Conrad did not appeal that dismissal to the 

 

2

 Respondents do not address this claim by Conrad. However, because it seems likely that the Respondents would argue that this claim is barred, supplemental briefing on this claim is not necessary. 

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Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 13, Exs. ZZ, QQQ at n.2) Accordingly, this claim is 

unexhausted. 

 In Ground Four of his habeas petition, Conrad claims that his Sixth Amendment 

rights were violated when the Superior Court allowed the jury to hear recordings of 

phone calls Conrad had made to the victim. (Doc. 1 at 13) In his direct appeal, Conrad 

raised a similar argument but made no reference to the Sixth Amendment, or any other 

federal legal theory, as the basis for this alleged error. (Doc. 13, Ex. P at 6-9) The Court 

of Appeals found no error under state law and did not address any federal legal theories. 

(Doc. 13, Ex. R at ¶¶10-12) Thus, Conrad has not fairly presented this argument and so it 

is not exhausted. 

The Court will not consider Conrad’s unexhausted claims. 

 As described above, Conrad has raised six unexhausted claims in his habeas 

petition. For each of these claims, Conrad is now precluded or time-barred from raising 

his claims in a successive and untimely Rule 32 petition under Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) & (b), or 32.4(a). Because no state remedies remain 

available for these unexhausted claims, they are all now subject to an implied procedural 

bar. 

 In his Petition and Reply, Conrad did not demonstrate any cause for his default or 

actual prejudice to excuse his default for these six arguments. (Docs. 1, 14) At various 

points, Conrad claims he is actually innocent. (Id.) This argument was rejected by the 

jury and is insufficient to excuse his default. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321 (1995). 

Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the merits of any of the above six arguments. 

Withdrawal by Conrad’s trial counsel.

 Conrad claims that his first trial counsel was ineffective because he withdrew from 

representation on the eve of trial. (Doc. 1 at 10) Conrad touched on a variant of this 

issue in his First PCR where he argued that the trial court should not have allowed his 

counsel to withdraw. (Doc. 13, Exs. W, X, BB, FF) However, Conrad never raised this 

as an ineffective assistance claim and so the claim is now unexhausted. Further, Conrad 

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is now precluded from raising this claim. Because his claims were waived on appeal, 

Conrad is precluded from post-conviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2(a)(3). In addition, he is now time-barred from initiating post-conviction 

relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4(a). See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 735, n. 1 (1991). Accordingly, this claim is now subject to an implied 

procedural bar. Finally, Conrad has not demonstrated either cause for the default and 

actual prejudice to excuse the default, or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the Court 

cannot reach the merits of this argument. 

Even assuming that this issue was exhausted and is not now barred, Conrad has 

not provided any explanation of how this withdrawal amounts to ineffective assistance. 

Even giving these arguments a liberal construction because of Conrad’s pro se status, 

Conrad would not be able to establish the factual allegations necessary to review his 

claim. E.g., Hamilton v. United States, 67 F.3d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1995) (liberal 

construction given to pleadings filed by pro se petitioner); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 

205 (9th Cir. 1995) (“bald assertions of ineffective assistance” and “conclusory 

allegations” are insufficient for habeas relief); Boehme v. Maxwell, 423 F.2d 1056, 1058 

(9th Cir. 1970) (“Allegations of fact, rather than conclusions, are required.”). 

Accordingly, the Court declines to review this claim. 

 In a related claim, Conrad claims that the Superior Court violated his rights under 

the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing his first attorney to withdraw 

from representation. (Doc. 1 at 11) Conrad raised this claim in his First PCR and the 

Superior Court found that this claim was precluded under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2(a)(3) because Conrad should have raised it in his direct appeal but did 

not.3

 (Doc.13, Ex. FF at 2) The Court of Appeals adopted the Superior Court’s ruling in 

its entirety. (Doc. 13, Ex. QQ at ¶ 4) 

 

3

 In the same Minute Entry summarily dismissing Conrad’s Rule 32 proceedings, the Superior Court also stated that Conrad had “made no showing that Judge Gaines’ erred in granting prior counsel’s Motion to Withdraw or that had previous counsel not been permitted to withdraw there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome on 

the merits.” (Doc. 13, Ex. FF at 3) This statement does not mean that this Court can 

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 Because the state courts explicitly precluded this argument, it “can ordinarily not 

be reviewed in federal court.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801. Federal review is barred if the state 

court applied a procedural bar that is both “independent” and “adequate.” Id. Rule 

32.2(a)(3) meets both requirements. Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (Arizona’s “Rule 

32.2(a)(3) determinations are independent of federal law because they do not depend 

upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits.”); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 

1195, n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) reversed on other grounds, Stewart v. Smith, supra. (Rule 

32.2(a)(3)(3) is adequate because it is “regularly followed”). Therefore, this Court 

cannot review this claim. 

Conrad’s trial counsel at sentencing. 

 As part of Ground One, Conrad argues that he received ineffective assistance 

because his trial counsel did not mention his health issues during sentencing. (Doc. 1 at 

9) In his First PCR, Conrad claimed that he had received a mitigated sentence in an 

earlier conviction because of these health issues; neither the Superior Court nor the 

Arizona Court of Appeals addressed his argument. (Doc. 13, Ex. X at 6; Ex. BB at 14; 

Ex. FF, Ex. QQ) Thus, for purposes of habeas review, this Court must, “presume that the 

federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096 

(2013). Accordingly, this Court reviews this claim to determine whether the state court 

unreasonably applied the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel established in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 

(2011). 

 The Court will assume, without any supporting evidence in the record, that Conrad 

does have health issues and that he did receive a mitigated sentence in an earlier case 

because of his health issues. Even with these assumptions, Conrad’s argument fails 

because he cannot show that there is a substantial likelihood that the result of his 

sentencing would have been different if his attorney had raised the issue of his health. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111. At sentencing, the State proved Conrad’s prior conviction 

 reach the merits of this claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264, n. 10 (1989). 

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for aggravated assault as an aggravating factor. (Doc. 13, Ex. M at 4-5) The facts of his 

prior conviction were similar to the facts of this case and the Court explicitly relied on his 

previous criminal history when imposing an aggravated sentence. (Id. at 8-9) Because of 

his history of a factually similar aggravated assault, it is substantially likely that Conrad 

would have received an aggravated sentence even if his attorney had mentioned his 

health concerns. Accordingly, this claim is unpersuasive. 

Conrad’s Fourth Amendment claim. 

 In Ground Three of his habeas petition, Conrad argues that he is entitled to relief 

because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his home 

without a search warrant and without probable cause. (Doc. 1 at 12) This issue was 

presented to the Superior Court during trial in a motion to suppress; the Superior Court 

concluded that exigent circumstances had justified the police action and denied his 

motion. (Doc. 13, Ex. O at 3) 

 Conrad is not entitled to relief because when, as here, “the State has provided an 

opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may 

not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an 

unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 

465, 494 (1976). 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Robert L. Conrad’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling 

debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

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recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 10th day of June, 2015. 

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