Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-04641/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-04641-31/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALFRED LAM, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE CITY & COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 10-cv-4641-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment came on for hearing before this court 

on January 13, 2016. Plaintiff Alfred Lam appeared in pro per, and plaintiff Paula Leiato 

appeared through counsel Albert Boasberg. Defendants appeared through their counsel, 

Boris Reznikov. Having read the papers filed in conjunction with the motion and carefully 

considered the arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, 

the court hereby rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND 

This is the second suit brought by this group of plaintiffs for alleged workplace 

discrimination. Plaintiffs Alfred Lam and Paula Leiato (“plaintiffs”) are employed by San 

Francisco’s Juvenile Probation Department (“JPD”), and bring suit against the City and 

County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) and various individual defendants1

 (referred to 

collectively as “defendants”) for alleged violations of section 1983, section 1981, Title VII, 

 

1

 The individual defendants are Timothy Diestel, Dennis Doyle, Charles Lewis, Toni 

Ratcliff-Powell, John Radogno, Tamara Ratcliff, Mildred Singh, Robert Taylor, and Barry 

Young. 

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and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Plaintiffs identify as 

Asian Pacific Americans (“APAs”), and argue that they were discriminated against, 

especially as compared to African American employees. 

In October 2008, the same plaintiffs2 filed a case very similar to the one that is 

now before the court. See Lam et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, C 08-4702 

PJH (“Lam I”). In Lam I, the plaintiffs filed suit against CCSF and ten individual 

employees (many of whom are also defendants in this case) for alleged violations of 

section 1983, section 1981, Title VII, and FEHA. Plaintiffs’ allegations centered around 

alleged racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by their superiors at JPD. Some 

of the Lam I claims were dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and summary judgment 

was granted as to the remaining claims in April 2012. 

While Lam I was pending, the plaintiffs filed the present suit (“Lam II”). 

Specifically, in October 2010, plaintiffs filed suit alleging the same causes of action as in 

Lam I (alleged violations of §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII, and FEHA) against CCSF and 

individual employees. While the causes of action are nearly identical as those in Lam I, 

the plaintiffs framed Lam II as focused on discrimination in the promotion of employees to 

“acting supervisor” positions, as opposed to Lam I’s focus on discrimination with respect 

to disciplinary decisions. See Dkt. 61 at 17 (hearing transcript where plaintiffs’ counsel 

stated that “We don’t want to re-litigate an issue. We don’t want a second bite at the 

apple. What we want to do is to be able to present the evidence that we have concerning 

promotional manipulation for the purposes of denying promotions.”). 

In June 2011, eight months after the filing of Lam II, the plaintiffs sought to file a 

supplemental complaint in Lam I, claiming that supplementation would capture the 

allegations made by Lam II, such that Lam II could be dismissed if the motion to 

supplement was granted. The court denied the motion to supplement, finding that the 

plaintiffs had not been diligent in seeking leave to supplement, and that supplementation 

 

2

 In addition to plaintiffs Lam and Leiato, this suit was originally filed by plaintiffs Gregory 

Chin and Frank Chen. Plaintiffs Chin and Chen have since been dismissed from this suit. 

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would unduly delay the close of discovery in Lam I. The plaintiffs then sought to 

consolidate Lam I and Lam II only two days before discovery was set to close in Lam I. 

The court denied the motion to consolidate, viewing the consolidation attempt as “as a 

means of achieving what plaintiffs could not achieve by way of their motion to 

supplement.” Lam I, Dkt. 182. 

 As mentioned above, summary judgment was ultimately granted in Lam I, and 

after that, defendants sought to dismiss this case based on the res judicata effect of Lam 

I. The court granted the motion only in part, finding that any allegations that preceded the 

filing of the last operative complaint in Lam I (February 22, 2010) were barred, as they 

either were raised or could have been raised in Lam I. The court further found that one 

post-February 2010 allegation (a denial of a request for leave made by plaintiff Leiato in 

July 2010) was also litigated in Lam I, and thus was barred. 

 Accordingly, the remaining allegations in this case are limited to alleged conduct 

that occurred after February 22, 2010, minus the July 2010 denial of plaintiff Leiato’s 

request for leave. Looking only at that time period, the operative third amended 

complaint (“TAC”) alleges the following with respect to plaintiff Lam: 

(1) In or around March 2010, plaintiff Lam alleges that he “requested vacation time 

in a timely manner,” but the request was “ignored and delayed without 

justification” until it was “finally approved in July 2011, just several days before 

the planned vacation” (TAC, ¶ 39), 

(2) In or around March 2010, plaintiff Lam alleges that he was “denied promotion 

or opportunity for promotion” (TAC, ¶ 40), 

(3) On or about July 27, 2010, plaintiff Lam alleges that he was given “a ‘poor’ or 

‘negative’ work appraisal on his annual performance evaluation without 

justification” (TAC, ¶ 41), 

(4) On or about September 29, 2010, plaintiff Lam alleges that he was given a 

“written notice of ‘inattention to duty’ without merit or justification” (TAC, ¶ 42), 

(5) On or about November 9, 2010, plaintiff Lam alleges that he left his workstation 

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due to the “strong odor of sewage,” yet was “issued a written reprimand” for 

“alleged tardiness that day in reporting to his assigned post” (TAC, ¶ 43), 

(6) On or around January 2011, plaintiff Lam alleges that he “submitted a medical 

advisory to JPD recommending modified duty due to persistent eye irritation,” 

yet was “arbitrarily denied accommodation,” and was instead “refused work” 

and “sent home without cause or justification” between January 15, 2011 and 

January 23, 2011” (TAC, ¶ 44-45), 

(7) On or about January 27, 2011, plaintiff Lam alleges that he was “denied 

participation in a scheduled annual shift bidding process without justification or 

cause (TAC, ¶ 46), 

(8) On or about May 14, 2011, plaintiff Lam alleges that he was “given a written 

reprimand and placed on ‘sick leave restriction’ without justification and merit” 

(TAC, ¶ 47), and 

(9) On or around December 15, 2011, plaintiff Lam alleges that he expressed 

interest in an acting supervisor position, but did not receive one. TAC, pp 52. 

Plaintiff also generally alleges that “throughout his career at the JPD, Lam 

repeatedly and continually asked to be assigned to acting supervisory 

positions,” but “never received such an assignment or appointment.” TAC, 

¶ 48. 

With respect to plaintiff Leiato, the TAC makes the following allegations post 

February 22, 2010 (excepting the July 2010 allegations mentioned above): 

(1) On or around March 2010, plaintiff Leiato alleges that she was “denied 

promotion despite nearly fifteen years of experience” (TAC, ¶ 67), 

(2) On or around November 2010, plaintiff Leiato alleges that she “submitted 

competent medical certification to request leave for a doctor’s appointment,” 

but was “arbitrarily denied leave and pay and thereafter charged with ‘misuse 

of sick time’ and being AWOL for her November 24, 2010 medical appointment 

that she notified her superiors of” (TAC, ¶ 70), 

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(3) During some unspecified time period, plaintiff Leiato alleges that she has 

“routinely been assigned to work with two on-call staff,” which “makes it harder 

to perform her job responsibilities, prolonging the time it takes and putting her 

in danger” (TAC, ¶ 71), 

(4) Throughout her career, including in March 2010, September 2011, October 

2011, December 2011, January 2012, and February 2012, plaintiff Leiato 

alleges that she “continually asked to be assigned to acting supervisory 

positions,” but “never received such an assignment or appointment” (TAC, 

¶¶ 72-80). 

Although it does not appear in the TAC, defendants’ motion references an 

additional allegation by Leiato - namely, that in March 2011, she “served a three-day 

suspension for abandoning her post on July 20, 2010.” Dkt. 178 at 12. Because this 

allegation arises out of the July 2010 denial of leave, and because allegations relating to 

the July 2010 denial of leave are barred from this action under res judicata principles, the 

court finds that any allegations relating to the March 2011 suspension are similarly barred 

under principles of res judicata. Moreover, as mentioned above, no allegations regarding 

a March 2011 suspension appear in the operative complaint. 

 Based on the above allegations, plaintiffs assert six causes of action: (1) violation 

of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

against defendant CCSF, (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on disparate treatment 

due to race and national origin, asserted against all defendants, (3) violation of Title VII 

based on disparate treatment due to race and national origin, asserted against CCSF, (4) 

violation of Title VII based on harassment and a hostile work environment due to race 

and national origin, asserted against CCSF, (5) violation of Title VII based on retaliation, 

asserted against CCSF, and (6) violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 based on failure to 

prevent unlawful discrimination and harassment, asserted against CCSF. 

 Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all claims. 

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DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

A party may move for summary judgment on a “claim or defense” or “part of . . . a 

claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. 

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court 

of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery 

responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the 

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A 

dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 

jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 

demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. 

Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue 

where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may 

carry its initial burden of production by submitting admissible “evidence negating an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case,” or by showing, “after suitable 

discovery,” that the “nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential 

element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 2000); 

see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25 (moving party can prevail merely by pointing out to 

the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 

case). 

When the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must respond 

with specific facts, supported by admissible evidence, showing a genuine issue for trial. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). But allegedly disputed facts must be material – the existence 

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of only “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. 

When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. 

Id. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011). 

B. Legal Analysis 

As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ failure to meet the 

administrative exhaustion requirement warrants summary judgment as to a number of 

their claims. Defendants point to plaintiff Lam’s October 2010 charge, in which he 

mentioned only the alleged denial of a promotion, and not any alleged retaliation or 

harassment. Defendants also point to plaintiff Leiato’s 2010 charge in which she alleged 

discrimination and retaliation based on an incident occurring in 2007. However, 

defendants fail to acknowledge a key aspect of this case – the fact that Lam I was 

already pending at the time of all of the alleged conduct, and that plaintiffs originally 

sought to supplement the Lam I complaint with the allegations that are now at issue in 

this case. In Lam I, the court denied the motion to supplement as untimely, but it appears 

undisputed that, if the motion had been timely brought, plaintiffs would have been 

permitted to supplement the Lam I complaint without needing to file a new administrative 

charge. When the motion to supplement was denied, it was unclear whether plaintiffs 

were then required to file a new administrative charge. While exhaustion may indeed 

have been required, defendants have not provided authority for imposing such a 

requirement in a situation such as this. And, as the party seeking summary judgment, it 

is defendants’ burden to make such a showing. Having failed to do so, the court is left 

with no basis to impose an exhaustion requirement for conduct that occurred during the 

pendency of Lam I. The court will instead address plaintiffs’ claims on the merits. 

The bulk of the parties’ briefs relates to the third cause of action, for disparate 

treatment based on race and national origin under Title VII. To establish a prima facie 

case of disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII, plaintiff must show (1) that 

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he/she belongs to a protected class, (2) was performing according to his/her employer’s 

legitimate expectations, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that other 

employees with qualifications similar to his/her own were treated more favorably, or that 

the employer had a discriminatory motive. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317 (2000). This is only a 

minimal evidentiary burden, and a plaintiff need only give rise to an inference of unlawful 

discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Second, if 

the employee produces sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, the burden 

shifts to the employer-defendant to articulate a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for 

the adverse employment action. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2002). Finally, if the employer is able to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason 

for its action, this dispels the inference of discrimination raised by plaintiff’s prima facie 

case, leaving the employee with the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that 

defendant intentionally discriminated against the employee. A plaintiff employee may 

satisfy this burden by proving that the legitimate reasons offered by defendant were 

factually untrue, thereby creating an inference that those reasons were merely a pretext 

for discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 

(2000). 

 The primary allegation of plaintiff Lam is that he was “denied promotion or 

opportunity for promotion, likely due to his race, national origin, and previous complaints 

against CCSF and JPD.” TAC, ¶ 40. Plaintiff Lam alleges that this denial of promotion 

occurred in March 2010, though he separately alleges that he was also denied 

appointment to “acting” supervisory positions throughout his career at JPD. See, e.g., 

TAC, ¶¶ 48-52. Plaintiff Lam alleges that “[a]ssignment to these ‘acting’ positions is used 

by defendants as a de-facto requirement to receive a full time, permanent supervisory 

position.” Id., ¶ 48. However, most of plaintiff Lam’s allegations regarding an acting 

position arise out of conduct that occurred before February 2010, and thus are barred by 

res judicata. The only post-February 2010 allegation is that “[o]n or around December 

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15, 2011, Lam informed supervisor Alardo that he was interested in an 8318 or 8322 

acting position,” but “never received such an assignment or appointment, instead 

plaintiff’s non-APA counterparts received the additional pay and opportunities for 

promotion requested by plaintiff.” Id., ¶ 52. 

 In its motion, defendant CCSF argues that the March 2010 promotions were made 

based on responses to a job announcement that was posted in September 2009. Dkt. 

178 at 3. Applicants were invited to take a job-related examination, and those whose 

scores made them eligible were placed on a list from which promotions were made. 

Defendant CCSF emphasizes that plaintiff Lam did not apply for this set of promotions, 

and was thus ineligible. 

 In his opposition, plaintiff Lam appears not to challenge the fact that he did not 

apply for a promotion, but he argues that “it was generally known throughout the 

Department that Lam and Leiato did inquire several times about being considered for any 

promotions,” and that “neither plaintiff ever was made apprised of the process and no one 

was willing to guide them through whatever corporate ‘hoops’ the plaintiffs had to jump 

through to be considered for promotion.” Dkt. 182 at 8. 

 Even if plaintiff Lam is correct that his supervisors did not help him apply for a 

promotion, the fact remains that he did not apply, and thus was ineligible for a promotion 

in March 2010. This fact alone precludes plaintiff Lam from establishing a prima facie 

case of discrimination as to the March 2010 promotion. See, e.g., Ratti v. City and 

County of San Francisco, 1992 WL 281386 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“[A]pplication to the positon 

is a necessary element of raising a claim for discrimination by disparate treatment.”). For 

that reason, plaintiff Lam has not shown that he suffered an adverse action by not 

receiving a promotion in March 2010. Moreover, plaintiff Lam has not shown that 

defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, or that other similarly situated employees 

were treated more favorably. For those reasons, the court finds that any alleged denial of 

promotion in March 2010 is not actionable as part of plaintiff Lam’s Title VII discrimination 

claim. 

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 However, aside from the alleged denial of promotion in March 2010, plaintiff Lam 

also alleges that he was denied an acting supervisory position in December 2011. There 

is no evidence that acting supervisory positions were subject to the same application and 

examination process as were permanent promotions, so the fact that plaintiff Lam did not 

formally apply for an acting supervisory position is not relevant. CCSF argues that Lam 

“never asked Director Powell for an appointment,” but Lam does allege that he asked his 

supervisor (Alardo) for an appointment, and given the apparent lack of any formal 

procedure for requesting acting supervisory appointments, the court has no basis to draw 

a significant distinction between Lam asking his direct supervisor and asking the JPD 

director. In the absence of any other evidence regarding the procedure for receiving an 

acting supervisory appointment, the court finds that plaintiff Lam has raised at least a 

triable issue as to whether he suffered an adverse action when he was denied an 

appointment to an acting supervisory position. 

 However, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff Lam 

must also present evidence that other employees with qualifications similar to his own 

were treated more favorably, or that the employer had a discriminatory motive. In the 

complaint, plaintiff Lam does allege that plaintiff’s “non-APA counterparts received the 

additional pay and opportunities for promotion requested by plaintiff,” but at this stage of 

the case, more than mere allegations are required. Plaintiff Lam must provide evidence 

showing that similarly situated non-APA employees were in fact treated more favorably. 

 In his opposition brief, plaintiff Lam provides more specifics than he did in the 

complaint, arguing that “[i]n June 2013, at least ten (10) of ‘permanent position’ of 

counselor #8320 were appointed or promoted, the majority of which were African 

Americans,” and that “[i]n December 2014, four (4) of the only ‘acting supervisors’ or 

‘special assignment positions’ all African Americans . . . were promoted to ‘permanent 

supervisor position.’” Dkt. 182 at 3. However, these allegations relate only to the 

promotion to permanent positions, not to the appointment to acting positions. Thus, even 

if these allegations were supported with evidence, they would not be relevant to plaintiff 

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Lam’s claim that the failure to appoint him to an acting position constituted discrimination. 

 Not only does plaintiff Lam fail to provide evidence of non-APAs being appointed 

to acting positions, but defendant CCSF actually presents evidence that two of the 

employees appointed to acting positions during the relevant time period were in fact 

Asian American (Dennis Woo and Scott Kato). See Dkt. 187-1, Ex. C at 238:11-19, 

247:11-13; see also Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 25. 

 Based on plaintiff’s lack of evidence that defendant CCSF acted with a 

discriminatory motive in failing to appoint him to an acting supervisory position or other 

evidence that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, and based on 

CCSF’s evidence that two Asian-American employees were appointed to acting 

positions, the court finds that plaintiff Lam has not established a prima facie case of 

discrimination as to the failure to appoint him to an acting supervisory position in 

December 2011. 

 However, even if plaintiff Lam were able to establish a prima facie case, defendant 

CCSF has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for any alleged adverse 

action – namely, that more qualified candidates would have been appointed over plaintiff 

Lam. See Dkt. 178-5, ¶¶ 24-26. The JPD director stated in a declaration that, even if 

plaintiff Lam had asked her for an appointment to an acting position, she would not have 

appointed him because of “performance issues” such as his “propensity to agitate the 

youth detainees, for example, by having inappropriate conversations with them,” the fact 

that he “did not have the respect of his peers,” the fact that he “demonstrated poor 

judgment with respect to decisions that had safety implications,” and that he “repeatedly 

failed to adhere to department protocols.” Id., ¶ 26. 

 In the opposition brief, plaintiff Lam responds by arguing that his “performance 

was very good and he exhibited qualities and work ethics that many other similarly 

situated employees did not exhibit.” Dkt. 182 at 11. Plaintiff Lam further argues that 

“CCSF’s ‘blanket’ statement that there were more qualified candidates is quite nebulous 

because they fail to indicate whom is more qualified.” Id. 

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 The court agrees that, if CCSF had merely stated that there were more qualified 

candidates, that would be too “nebulous” to constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason. However, CCSF provided a declaration setting forth specific performance 

issues, and plaintiff Lam does not provide evidence showing that the stated performance 

issues were not factually accurate, or that they were offered as a pretext for 

discrimination. 

 For all of the above reasons, the court finds that any alleged denial of appointment 

of plaintiff Lam to an acting supervisory positon in December 2011 is not actionable as 

part of plaintiff Lam’s Title VII discrimination claim. 

The second adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam is that, in March 2010, he 

“requested vacation time in a timely manner,” but the request was “ignored and delayed 

without justification.” TAC, ¶ 39. While plaintiff Lam admits that the request was “finally 

approved in July 2011,” he argues that the approval occurred just a few days before his 

planned vacation, resulting in “unnecessary financial burden and changes of itinerary with 

family members.” Id. 

 Defendant CCSF argues that, because plaintiff Lam’s vacation request was 

ultimately approved, it cannot constitute an “adverse action.” Defendant argues that an 

adverse action must be a “materially adverse change in terms or conditions of 

employment because of an employer’s actions,” and “must be more than a mere 

inconvenience.” Dkt. 178 at 15 (citing Nguyen v. Superior Court, 2015 WL 3322088 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015)) (emphasis added by defendant). Defendant CCSF argues that 

any impact on plaintiff Lam was personal, not professional, as shown by his own 

allegations in the TAC. 

In his opposition, plaintiff Lam concedes that his request was ultimately approved, 

but argues that the delay caused “aggravation and stress” to Lam, and that it “likely 

affected Lam’s position and standing as an employee” and that Lam was “probably then 

exposed to very negative light surrounding his employment situation which only made 

Lam to be left out of other benefits of employment like promotions, overtime 

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opportunities, better work site choices, etc.” Dkt. 182 at 9. 

The court finds that plaintiff Lam has not presented sufficient evidence that the 

delayed approval of his vacation request affected his employment, as opposed to 

affecting him as an individual. Plaintiff’s opposition relies on speculation that the delay 

“likely affected” his standing as an employee. And to the extent that plaintiff Lam alleges 

that he was “left out of other benefits of employment like promotions, overtime 

opportunities, better work site choices, etc.,” those alleged adverse actions may be 

independently actionable, but they do not suffice to show that the delayed vacation 

approval was itself an adverse action. 

Moreover, the court also finds that plaintiff Lam has not presented sufficient 

evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the delayed approval of his 

vacation request was based on defendant’s discriminatory motive, or evidence that other 

similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. Plaintiff Lam does not allege 

(let alone provide evidence) that any other employee’s vacation request was approved 

despite an outstanding training requirement, nor does he provide evidence that the 

individual(s) responsible for delaying his vacation request were motivated by an intent to 

discriminate. 

 However, even if plaintiff Lam were able to establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination, defendant CCSF has presented evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse action. Specifically, CCSF argues that it 

had a policy requiring employees to complete all required training before any vacation 

request could be approved, and at the time of plaintiff Lam’s vacation request, he had just 

bid into an assignment in the Admissions Office, which required additional training. Dkt. 

178-5, ¶¶ 4-8. 

This evidence of CCSF’s training policy shifts the burden back to plaintiff Lam to 

show that the “legitimate reasons offered by defendant were factually untrue, thereby 

creating an inference that those reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination.” 

Plaintiff Lam has not presented any such evidence. While he does argue that his 

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vacation request was used “as a bargaining chip or tool to make Lam better conform to 

[defendants’] corporate culture,” he does not argue that the policy evidence is factually 

untrue, nor does he present any other evidence showing that the stated reason was 

pretextual. 

 For all of the above reasons, the court finds that the March 2010 delayed vacation 

approval is not actionable as part of plaintiff Lam’s Title VII discrimination claim. 

 The third adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam is his July 2010 performance 

review, which he describes as “poor” and “negative.” TAC, ¶ 41. Along with its motion, 

defendant CCSF submitted a copy of the review itself, which shows that plaintiff Lam was 

graded on a point scale of 1 to 9 – with 1 to 3 meaning “did not meet expectations,” 4 to 6 

meaning “met expectations,” and 7 to 9 meaning “exceeded expectations.” See Dkt. 

178-5, Ex. 4. The review shows that plaintiff received a “met expectations” rating of 4. 

Id. 

 Defendant CCSF argues that the review was not actually negative, and points to 

plaintiff Lam’s own deposition testimony stating that the review was “okay.” Dkt. 178-1, 

Ex. A at 147:7-12. CCSF further argues that, even if the review were objectively 

negative, it would not constitute an adverse action because negative job reviews are not 

considered adverse actions unless there are immediate consequences to the terms and 

conditions of one’s employment. 

 As a general matter, the court finds that defendant overreaches when it argues 

that an average (or slightly below average) performance review cannot constitute an 

adverse action. Even though plaintiff Lam’s performance review was not wholly negative, 

it still could constitute an adverse action if it were undeservedly low. Lam alleges that his 

work performance was actually “better than satisfactory,” and if he had presented 

evidence to support that assertion, he could have created a triable issue of fact as to 

whether the review was an adverse action. However, plaintiff Lam has not presented 

such evidence, and the court thus finds no triable issue of fact on that issue. 

 Moreover, even putting aside the adverse action issue, plaintiff has also failed to 

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raise a triable issue regarding another element of his prima facie case – whether other 

employees with qualifications and work performance similar to his own were treated more 

favorably, or that the employer had a discriminatory motive. While plaintiff Lam asserts 

that “many employees out of Lam’s protected class received better performance 

evaluations for doing much less work in both quantity and quality,” he does not provide 

evidence to support that assertion. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff Lam has 

failed to adequately establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to the July 2010 

performance review. 

 The fourth adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam is the “inattention to duty” notice 

issued in September 2010. The complaint contains very few facts regarding this incident, 

alleging only that “[o]n or about September 29, 2010, CCSF/JPD employees Lewis and 

Powell issued Lam a written notice of ‘inattention to duty’ without merit or justification.” 

TAC, ¶ 42. 

 In its motion, defendant CCSF argues that “there are no Department records 

indicating that Lam received any type of notice on or about this date for this reason.” Dkt. 

178 at 6. CCSF also explains that JPD uses three types of notices to manage employee 

performance: (1) letters of counseling, (2) records of discussion, and (3) admonishments 

or written reprimands. According to CCSF, only the third type of notice is considered 

disciplinary, as the first two are “written reminders” that are “aimed at improving 

performance,” and records of those two types of notices are generally not maintained. 

 In his opposition brief, plaintiff Lam notes the lack of records, and argues that 

CCSF either “has very poor record keeping procedures or CCSF intentionally destroyed 

the evidence to make Lam’s case less significant.” Dkt. 182 at 9-10. Plaintiff Lam further 

suggests that “the latter is more likely where the document was destroyed along with all 

references to it in correspondence and emails.” Id. at 10. 

 However, plaintiff Lam provides no support for his suggestion that defendant 

CCSF destroyed relevant evidence, nor does he provide testimony from any other 

employee who witnessed the alleged incident. In fact, even plaintiff Lam’s own 

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recollection of the event appears to be hazy. In his deposition, he was asked “Do you 

recall what this allegation is about?” and answered “I’m not sure. It was very minor. 

There is no basis to that.” Dkt. 178-1, Ex. A at 177:11-13. 

 Based on the lack of clear allegations – let alone evidence – relating to the alleged 

“inattention to duty” notice issued in September 2010, the court finds that plaintiff Lam 

cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to this incident. Because there is 

no evidence, the court cannot find a triable issue as to whether any notice constituted an 

adverse action, nor can the court find a triable issue as to any discriminatory motive or 

evidence that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. 

 The fifth adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam is a November 2010 written notice 

for leaving his post. In the complaint, plaintiff Lam alleges that he “smelled a strong odor 

of sewage” that was “so foul that some CCSF employees even refused to report to their 

posts or requested to leave early in order to avoid exposure to toxic fumes.” TAC, ¶ 43. 

Plaintiff Lam alleges that he “made a complaint to his union and asked the union official 

to report the condition to CAL-OSHA.” Id. Lam then alleges that he was “issued a written 

reprimand” for “alleged tardiness that day in reporting to his assigned post.” Id. 

However, Lam maintains that “he was not tardy to his post,” and further alleges that 

“several non-APA employees who were tardy or left early that day did not suffer any 

negative consequences, including Thomasson, Bill, Smith, Sullivan, Burns, and Nelson.” 

Id. 

 Defendant CCSF makes a number of arguments in response. First, it suggests 

that the written notice was not actually an adverse action, because it “is not disciplinary in 

nature” and carries “no tangible consequences.” However, the court is unconvinced by 

this argument. The fact that CCSF creates a written record of the notice (even if it was a 

non-disciplinary “record of discussion” rather than a disciplinary “reprimand”) suggests 

that there could be some consequences – otherwise there would be no reason for CCSF 

to document the discussion. 

 However, plaintiff Lam does fail to establish a different element of a prima facie 

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discrimination case – namely, whether defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, or 

evidence that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. While 

plaintiff Lam does provide names of employees who were allegedly treated more 

favorably, more than mere names are required at this point in the case. In order to avoid 

summary judgment, plaintiff Lam must provide evidence that other employees were 

treated more favorably – for instance, testimony from other employees supporting Lam’s 

allegations. Because no such evidence has been provided, the court finds that plaintiff 

Lam has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to the November 2010 

written notice. 

 Plaintiffs do submit a chart purporting to show “steps of progressive disciplinary 

action taken by SFJPD.” See Dkt. 185, Ex. 4. The chart categorizes various employees 

by race, and then lists the alleged conduct that they participated in and the disciplinary 

action that they received. While this chart demonstrates that plaintiffs are attempting to 

meet their burden to show that APAs were disciplined more harshly than their non-APA 

counterparts, it falls short in a number of ways. First, and most importantly, the chart 

does not allow for an apples-to-apples comparison of similarly situated employees. 

Instead, the chart simply lists 97 incidents of disciplinary action, without any attempt to 

show that employees who engaged in similar conduct were disciplined differently. The 

second, related shortcoming of the chart is that it does not tie the listed incidents to the 

alleged adverse actions that plaintiffs suffered. In other words, for this chart to meet 

plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden, it would need to highlight incidents where non-APA 

employees engaged in the same conduct as did plaintiffs, but were disciplined less 

harshly. Third and finally, the chart contains no references to underlying evidence (such 

as disciplinary records and/or employee testimony), nor was the chart attached to a 

declaration of a person attesting to have personal knowledge of the matters described. 

Overall, the court finds that these deficiencies prevent the chart from serving as the type 

of evidence that would meet plaintiffs’ burden as to the fourth prong of a prima facie 

discrimination case for this and any other alleged adverse action. 

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 Even if plaintiff Lam were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 

based on the November 2010 written notice, defendant CCSF has presented a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the notice. Specifically, CCSF argues that JPD 

has a policy requiring employees to arrive to work on time, and to promptly report to their 

assigned work post and relieve the employee working on that assignment before them. If 

an employee does not promptly relieve the previous employee, that previous employee 

may be required to incur overtime while he waits. Indeed, CCSF presents evidence that 

one of its employees incurred overtime on November 9, 2010, with the reason for the 

overtime requested listed as “Lam relieved late.” See Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 13. 

 Plaintiff Lam does not challenge the truth of CCSF’s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, but instead argues that “[w]hen it comes to budgets and overtime 

provisioning, these types of ‘reminders’ are far from friendly,” and that “[t]he monetary 

aspect alone is sufficient to make CCSF’s action against Lam an adverse employment 

action.” Dkt. 182 at 10. Lam further argues that “[m]anagement looks poorly upon 

employees who create or abuse overtime because it makes their ‘bottom line’ less 

impressive.” Id. 

While plaintiff Lam may take issue with CCSF’s focus on the “bottom line,” his 

arguments actually support the proposition that CCSF was motivated by financial 

reasons, rather than discriminatory reasons. For that reason, plaintiff Lam has not 

presented evidence that would create an inference that CCSF’s stated reasons for the 

November 2010 written notice were “merely a pretext for discrimination,” and thus, the 

court finds that the incident is not actionable as part of plaintiff Lam’s Title VII 

discrimination claim. 

 The sixth adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam relates to his workers’ 

compensation claim filed in January 2011 based on the irritation of his eye. In the 

complaint, he alleges that he “submitted a valid medical advisory” that recommended 

“modified duty due to persistent eye irritation.” TAC, ¶ 44. Specifically, plaintiff Lam 

alleges that he needed accommodation with respect to only one out of 20 available posts 

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– the central control, which entailed “prolonged exposure to flashing security panel lights 

and multiple monitors.” Id. However, Lam alleges that he was “arbitrarily denied 

accommodation,” even as “other non-APA employees have been accommodated even 

for light duty.” Id. Lam further alleges that he was “refused work and sent home without 

cause or justification” between January 15, 2011 and January 23, 2011, and that those 

absences were taken out of his sick days. Id., ¶ 45. 

 In its motion, defendant CCSF argues that there was no adverse action, because 

placing Lam on a nine-day medical leave did not materially change the terms and 

conditions of his employment. CCSF also explains that it is JPD’s practice to pay 

employees out of sick leave while their workers’ compensation claims are pending. If and 

when coverage is granted, the sick leave is replenished. CCSF further points out that 

plaintiff Lam originally filed a workers’ compensation claim, then voluntarily withdrew it. 

 Defendant CCSF also points out that, after plaintiff Lam returned to work on 

January 24, 2011, his only medical restriction was to take a 15-minute break every two 

hours, which was already provided to all JPD employees. JPD informed plaintiff Lam that 

he could make a reasonable accommodation request if he wished, but he chose not to, 

finding that it “wasn’t necessary” since he was already being provided with a break every 

two hours. 

 The court finds that plaintiff Lam has not been entirely clear about what 

constituted the alleged adverse action – whether it was the denial of his requested 

accommodation, or the use of his sick days to cover the missed workdays, or both. In his 

opposition, plaintiff Lam appears to offer a new theory of what constituted the adverse 

action, arguing that “CCSF fails to acknowledge that they put Lam right back in the same 

environment that caused his eye irritation in the first place,” and that “[t]o the reasonable 

person, it would appear that CCSF JPD was trying to exacerbate Lam’s injuries without 

regard to any consequences it may have had to Lam’s future physical and mental health.” 

Dkt. 182 at 10. 

 The court will address each of these possible adverse actions in turn. First, to the 

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extent plaintiff Lam alleged that he suffered an adverse action when he was “arbitrarily 

denied accommodation,” he has not provided sufficient allegations – let alone evidence – 

for the court to determine whether such denial actually was an adverse action. 

Specifically, plaintiff Lam does not make clear what specific accommodation he 

requested. Moreover, defendant CCSF correctly argues that an employee is not entitled 

to pick his own form of accommodation. See, e.g., Queen v. Hard Rock Hotel and 

Casino, 2011 WL 6753011 (D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2011). However, even if this was an 

adverse action, plaintiff Lam has not provided evidence that other similarly situated 

employees were treated more favorably. To be clear, the complaint alleges that to be the 

case, and even provides names of specific employees whose accommodations were 

provided, but at this stage of the case, plaintiff needs more than allegations – he needs 

evidence. Finally, even if plaintiff Lam could establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination as to the alleged denial of accommodation, defendant CCSF provides a 

declaration stating that JPD’s staffing needs made temporary assignment to another post 

impracticable, necessitating that plaintiff Lam be sent home if he was unable to work at 

his assigned station. Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 10. Plaintiff Lam has not provided evidence showing 

that CCSF’s stated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was merely a pretext for 

discrimination. Accordingly, the alleged denial of accommodation is not actionable. 

 Second, to the extent that plaintiff Lam claims that the use of his sick days was an 

adverse action, the argument fails because Lam was given the option of filing a workers’ 

compensation claim, which he did, and then voluntarily withdrew. Thus, the use of 

plaintiff Lam’s sick days was the result of his own actions, not any adverse action on the 

part of CCSF. Moreover, plaintiff Lam does not allege (let alone provide evidence) that 

other similarly situated employees were treated differently with regard to the use of sick 

days for medical leave. Thus, plaintiff Lam cannot establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination with respect to the use of his sick days. Finally, as before, defendant 

CCSF has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the use of sick days, 

pointing to a JPD policy of using sick days while a workers’ compensation claim is 

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pending. Plaintiff Lam has not provided any basis for finding that stated reason to be a 

pretext for discrimination, and thus, the use of plaintiff Lam’s sick days is not actionable. 

 Third, to the extent that plaintiff Lam alleges that his placement back in the same 

work post was an adverse action, the court first notes that this theory was not pled in any 

of the complaints filed in this case. Moreover, the fact that plaintiff Lam specifically chose 

not to make a further request for accommodation because it “wasn’t necessary” now 

precludes him from arguing that the placement was an adverse action. Accordingly, the 

court finds that plaintiff Lam’s reassignment to his work post after returning from medical 

leave is not actionable. 

 Overall, for the above reasons, the court finds that none of the events surrounding 

plaintiff Lam’s medical restrictions and medical leave are actionable as part of his Title VII 

discrimination claim. 

 The seventh adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam is that “[o]n or about January 

27, 2011, Lam was denied participation in a scheduled annual shift bidding process 

without justification or cause.” TAC, ¶ 46. 

 In its motion, defendant CCSF argues that the shift bid was indeed originally 

scheduled for January 27, 2011, but did not actually occur until April 7, 2011, at which 

time plaintiff Lam actually did participate. However, if it had occurred in January, CCSF 

concedes that plaintiff Lam would not have been eligible, because in order to be eligible 

for a shift bid, an employee must be medically cleared to work at least seven days prior to 

the bid. Because, as discussed above, plaintiff Lam was on medical leave through 

January 23, 2011, he was not eligible to participate in a shift bid on January 27, 2011. 

 In his opposition, plaintiff Lam admits that he participated in the April 2011 shift 

bid, but claims that CCSF “does not acknowledge the hurdles they presented to Lam in 

making this participation,” nor does it “discuss the shift bid processes prior to and 

subsequent to the April 2011 shift bid.” While plaintiff Lam may be correct on those 

points, they are irrelevant to determining whether he suffered an adverse action by being 

“denied participation” in the January 2011 shift bid. And because plaintiff Lam actually 

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did participate in the rescheduled shift bid, the court finds no triable issue as to whether 

plaintiff Lam suffered an adverse action. The court also notes that plaintiff Lam has 

presented no evidence of a discriminatory motive or of other similarly situated employees 

being treated more favorably. Thus, the shift bid-related allegations are not actionable as 

part of plaintiff Lam’s Title VII discrimination claim. 

 The eighth adverse action alleged by plaintiff Lam is that “[o]n or about May 14, 

2011, Lam was given a written reprimand and placed on ‘sick leave restriction’ without 

justification and merit.” TAC, ¶ 47. 

 In its motion, defendant CCSF explains that employees are given 12 sick days for 

every rolling one-year period, and after those days are used, employees must provide a 

doctor’s note after returning to work. JPD’s policy was to issue a written notice of 

placement on “sick leave restriction,” but such notice did not constitute a disciplinary 

action. 

 Defendant CCSF then acknowledges that plaintiff Lam was placed on sick leave 

restriction in May 2011, and points out that many of the 12 sick days already used by 

Lam were the result of his January 2011 medical leave. As mentioned above, Lam chose 

not to pursue his workers’ compensation claim, and as a result, his sick days were never 

replenished. 

 The court previously found that “the use of plaintiff Lam’s sick days was the result 

of his own actions, not any adverse action on the part of CCSF,” and the same rationale 

applies here. Lam’s placement on sick leave was the result of his own decision not to 

pursue his workers’ compensation claim, and thus cannot constitute an adverse action. 

Moreover, plaintiff Lam has not provided evidence of a discriminatory motive or of other 

similarly situated employees being treated more favorably, so he has failed to establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination. Finally, even if he was able to establish a prima facie 

case, defendant CCSF has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the sick 

leave restriction, presenting evidence that this was a department-wide policy used to 

monitor and manage sick leave abuse. Plaintiff Lam has not provided any reason to 

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believe that the policy was a pretext for discrimination, and thus, the court finds that the 

May 2011 sick leave restriction is not actionable as part of plaintiff Lam’s Title VII 

discrimination claim. 

 Having addressed all of the adverse actions alleged as part of plaintiff Lam’s third 

cause of action for discrimination under Title VII, and having found none of them to be 

actionable, the finds that defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED 

as to the third cause of action as asserted by plaintiff Lam. 

 Turning to plaintiff Leiato’s claims, her first alleged adverse action is similar to 

plaintiff Lam’s – she alleges that “[o]n or around March 2010, Leiato was denied 

promotion despite nearly fifteen (15) years of experience, likely due to her race, gender, 

national origin, and previous complaints against JPD and CCSF.” TAC, ¶ 67. And like 

plaintiff Lam, Leiato also alleges that “[t]hroughout her career at the JPD, Leiato 

repeatedly and continually asked to be assigned to acting supervisory positions,” and 

specifically points to instances in March 2010, September or October 2011, December 

2011, January 2012, and February 2012 when she asked to be appointed to such a 

position. Id., ¶¶ 72-80. 

 The analysis for plaintiff Leiato’s “failure to promote” allegations is similar to that 

for plaintiff’s Lam’s “failure to promote” allegations, as set forth above. With respect to 

the March 2010 promotions, plaintiff Leiato appears not to challenge the fact that she did 

not actually apply for the promotion or take the job-related examination, instead arguing 

that “it was generally known throughout the Department that Lam and Leiato did inquire 

several times about being considered for any promotions,” and that “neither plaintiff ever 

was made apprised of the process and no one was willing to guide them through 

whatever corporate ‘hoops’ the plaintiffs had to jump through to be considered for 

promotion.” Dkt. 182 at 8. 

 Even if plaintiff Leiato is correct that her supervisors did not help her apply for a 

promotion, the fact remains that she did not apply, and thus was ineligible for a promotion 

in March 2010. This fact alone precludes plaintiff Leiato from establishing a prima facie 

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case of discrimination as to the March 2010 promotion. See, e.g., Ratti v. City and 

County of San Francisco, 1992 WL 281386 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“[A]pplication to the positon 

is a necessary element of raising a claim for discrimination by disparate treatment.”). For 

that reason, plaintiff Leiato has not shown that she suffered an adverse action by not 

receiving a promotion in March 2010. Moreover, plaintiff Leiato has not shown that 

defendant acted with a discriminatory motive, or that other similarly situated employees 

were treated more favorably. For those reasons, the court finds that any alleged denial of 

promotion in March 2010 is not actionable as part of plaintiff Leiato’s Title VII 

discrimination claim. 

 However, like plaintiff Lam, plaintiff Leiato also alleges that she was denied an 

acting supervisory position. And as the court found with respect to plaintiff Lam, because 

there is no evidence of the procedure for requesting appointments to acting supervisory 

positions, the court finds that plaintiff Leiato has raised at least a triable issue as to 

whether she suffered an adverse action when she was denied an appointment to an 

acting supervisory position. 

 However, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff Leiato 

must also present evidence that other employees with qualifications similar to her own 

were treated more favorably, or that the employer had a discriminatory motive. In the 

complaint, plaintiff Leiato does allege that plaintiff’s “non-APA counterparts received the 

additional pay and opportunities for promotion requested by plaintiff,” but at this stage of 

the case, more than mere allegations are required. Plaintiff Leiato must provide evidence 

showing that similarly situated non-APA employees were in fact treated more favorably. 

As mentioned above, in the opposition brief, plaintiffs provide more specifics, but 

they relate only to the promotion to permanent positions, not to the appointment to acting 

positions. See Dkt. 182 at 3. And as also mentioned above, defendant CCSF presents 

evidence that two Asian-Americans (Dennis Woo and Scott Kato) were appointed to 

acting positions during the relevant time period. See Dkt. 187-1, Ex. C at 238:11-19, 

247:11-13; see also Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 25. 

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 Based on plaintiff Leiato’s lack of evidence that defendant CCSF acted with a 

discriminatory motive in failing to appoint her to an acting supervisory position or other 

evidence that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, and based on 

CCSF’s evidence that two Asian-American employees were in fact appointed to acting 

positions, the court finds that plaintiff Leiato has not established a prima facie case of 

discrimination as to the failure to appoint her to an acting supervisory position. 

 However, even if plaintiff Leiato were able to establish a prima facie case, 

defendant CCSF has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for any alleged 

adverse action – namely, that more qualified candidates would have been appointed over 

her. See Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 36. The JPD director (Toni Ratcliff-Powell) acknowledges that 

plaintiff Leiato had been told that she could be recommended for an acting position “if she 

were able to remedy her chronic absenteeism and excessive use of sick leave, as well as 

avoid altercations that led to disciplinary issues,” but that “Leiato did not rectify such 

issues during [Ratcliff-Powell’s] tenure as director.” Id. Moreover, Ratcliff-Powell states 

that, even if Leiato had been able to rectify those issues, other candidates were still more 

qualified because “they did not have performance problems similar to Leiato’s,” such as 

her “refus[al] to work in certain parts of her assigned unit,” her refusal to conduct room 

searches, and the fact that she was on sick leave restriction during Ratcliff-Powell’s entire 

tenure from 2008 through 2013. Id. 

 In the opposition brief, plaintiff Leiato argues that “CCSF’s ‘blanket’ statement that 

there were more qualified candidates is quite nebulous because they fail to indicate 

whom is more qualified.” Dkt. 182 at 14. The court agrees that, if CCSF had merely 

stated that there were more qualified candidates, that would be too “nebulous” to 

constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. However, CCSF provided a 

declaration setting forth specific performance issues, and plaintiff Leiato does not provide 

evidence showing that the stated performance issues were not factually accurate, or that 

they were offered as a pretext for discrimination. 

 For all of the above reasons, the court finds that any alleged denial of appointment 

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of plaintiff Leiato to an acting supervisory positon is not actionable as part of her Title VII 

discrimination claim. 

 The second adverse action alleged by plaintiff Leiato is that “[o]n or around 

November 2010, Leiato submitted competent medical certification to request leave for a 

doctor’s appointment,” but was “arbitrarily denied leave and pay and thereafter charged 

with ‘misuse of sick time’ and being AWOL for her November 24, 2010 medical 

appointment that she notified her supervisors of.” TAC, ¶ 70. 

 Interestingly, in its motion, defendant CCSF does not challenge plaintiff Leiato’s 

failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, even though it appears that 

Leiato has failed to provide evidence of a discriminatory motive, or of similarly situated 

employees being treated more favorably. Because CCSF did not raise the issue, the 

court will not rely on the apparent failure to establish a prima facie case, and will instead 

evaluate CCSF’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying Leiato leave. 

 In its motion, CCSF points out that the day for which Leiato requested leave was 

the day before Thanksgiving, a day that “many others had already asked for and obtained 

approval for vacation,” such that “the Hall could not absorb any more absences.” See 

Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 27. Moreover, CCSF also attaches contemporaneous notes from Leitao’s 

supervisor which shows that the denial of leave was conditional, and that Leiato could 

have had the day off if she “provided proof of medical necessity” in advance, which she 

did not do. Dkt. 178-5, Ex. 18. When Leiato ultimately did not come to work on 

November 24, she was issued a written reprimand. Dkt. 178-5, ¶ 29. 

 Plaintiff Leiato does not appear to address this proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in her opposition brief. In fact, it appears that the November 2010 

denial of leave is not mentioned at all. Leiato does mention one instance where she 

“took a day off without approval,” but she states that she needed the day off for a “family 

event,” which suggests that it is referring to the July 2010 denial of leave that was already 

alleged in Lam I (and thus barred from this suit under principles of res judicata). Thus, in 

the absence of any evidence that undermines CCSF’s stated reason for the discipline, 

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the court finds that the denial of plaintiff Leiato’s request for leave in November 2010 is 

not actionable as part of her Title VII discrimination claim. 

 The third adverse action alleged by Leiato is that she has “routinely been assigned 

to work with two on-call staff, where the common practice is 2:1 permanent to on-call 

ratio.” TAC, ¶ 70. Leiato alleges that “[t]his work assignment makes it harder to perform 

her job responsibilities, prolonging the time it takes and putting her in danger.” Id. 

 In its motion, defendant CCSF notes that, at her deposition, plaintiff Leiato could 

not provide information about any specific incidents when she was assigned to work with 

on-call staff, nor could she state when the alleged incidents occurred. CCSF also points 

out that the court addressed an identical allegation in Lam I, and while they were alleged 

in the context of a harassment claim (rather than a discrimination claim), the court 

ultimately held that “[n]either [Leiato’s] assignment to work with two newly hired on-call 

counselors, nor the refusal of Leiato’s request to leave work two hours early, constitute 

any material change or alteration in the terms of plaintiff’s employment, such that an 

adverse employment action has been stated.” Lam I, 868 F.Supp.2d 928, 950 (N.D. Cal. 

2012). The court’s previous finding applies with equal force here, and thus, plaintiff 

Leiato is unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Moreover, plaintiff 

Leiato’s inability to provide dates on which she was assigned to work with on-call staff 

prevents the court from being able to make a determination as to whether this allegation 

is barred by res judicata. For all of those reasons, the court finds that any allegations 

regarding plaintiff Leiato’s alleged assignment to work with on-call staff are not actionable 

as part of her Title VII discrimination claim. 

 Having addressed all of the adverse actions alleged as part of plaintiff Lam’s third 

cause of action for discrimination under Title VII, and having found none of them to be 

actionable, the finds that defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED 

as to the third cause of action as asserted by plaintiff Leiato. 

 Turning back to the first and second causes of action, brought under section 1983 

and 1981 respectively. In Lam I, the court noted that “when analyzing claims of disparate 

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treatment in employment under § 1981 or § 1983, a district court is guided by Title VII 

analysis.” Lam I, 868 F.Supp.2d at 951 (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 

502, 506 n. 1 (1993); Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103, (9th Cir. 

2008); Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1180 (9th Cir.1998); Lowe v. 

City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

 Starting with the section 1983 claim, the court extensively addressed this legal 

standard in Lam I: 

To state a claim under section 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause, a plaintiff "must show that the defendants acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a 

protected class," and that plaintiff was treated differently from persons 

similarly situated. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th 

Cir.1998); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001); see 

also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). As the parties 

here note, a plaintiff may satisfy this showing by alleging four separate 

elements: (1) that the plaintiff was treated differently from others similarly 

situated; (2) this unequal treatment was based on an impermissible 

classification; (3) that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent in 

applying this classification; and (4) the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of 

the discriminatory classification. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 

442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); see also T.A. ex rel. Amador v. McSwain Union 

Elementary Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1748793 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

Lam I, 868 F.Supp.2d at 951. 

 The court’s analysis in Lam I also applies with equal force in this case: 

Ultimately, the same deficiencies that preclude a finding that triable issues 

of material fact exist in connection with plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, exist with 

respect to plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim. Namely, and for all the reasons 

highlighted in connection with the court’s discussion of plaintiffs’ Title VII 

claims, plaintiffs’ evidence fails to demonstrate that plaintiffs – each of them 

– were treated differently from others similarly situated, based on an 

impermissible classification. In other words, plaintiffs’ evidence fails to raise 

a triable issue as to the existence of a discriminatory “purpose” in the 

actions taken by plaintiffs’ JPD supervisors. As such, plaintiffs do not 

prevail in establishing a triable issue as to their section 1983 claims. 

 

Moreover, to establish municipal liability of the City under section 1983, 

plaintiffs must show: (1) that they possessed a constitutional right of which 

they were deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy 

amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; and 

(4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 

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Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 

1997). There can be no municipal liability without an underlying 

constitutional violation. See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

Here, because plaintiffs fail to establish the existence of triable issues with 

respect to any equal protection violation that underlies their section 1983 

claims, they also fail to establish the first of the elements necessary for 

liability against the City – i.e., a “constitutional violation.” 

Lam I, 868 F.Supp.2d at 951-52. 

 Accordingly, the court finds that summary judgment must be GRANTED as to 

plaintiffs’ first cause of action brought under section 1983. 

Turning to the section 1981 claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]nalysis of an 

employment discrimination claim under § 1981 follows the same legal principles as those 

applicable in a Title VII disparate treatment case,” and that “[b]oth require proof of 

discriminatory treatment and the same set of facts can give rise to both claims.” Fonseca 

v. Sysco Food Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). Applying that 

standard, based on both plaintiffs’ failure to establish a viable Title VII discrimination 

claim (including their specific failure to present evidence of discriminatory intent), the 

court finds that summary judgment must also be GRANTED as to both plaintiffs’ second 

cause of action under section 1981. 

Next, the court will address plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action, for Title VII 

harassment and hostile work environment based on race and national origin. To prevail 

on a hostile workplace claim premised on race, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he was 

subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature; (2) that the conduct was 

unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment. See 

Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir.1995). The more outrageous the 

conduct, the less frequent must it occur to make a workplace hostile. See Ellison v. 

Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.1991). To determine whether conduct is sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to violate Title VII, the court looks at all surrounding circumstances, 

including frequency, severity, whether the alleged conduct is threatening or humiliating, 

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or merely an offensive utterance, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work 

performance. See, e.g., Vasquez v. City of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 

2004). Finally, the allegations of a racially hostile workplace must be assessed from the 

perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the same racial or ethnic group as the 

plaintiff. See Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002); 

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Both plaintiffs fail to present evidence regarding prongs (1) and (3) – namely, that 

they were subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature, or that the conduct 

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. As mentioned 

repeatedly throughout the discussion of plaintiffs’ Title VII discrimination claim, plaintiffs 

fail to present evidence that any conduct to which they were subjected was based on 

their race or national origin. Nor does the sporadic nature of the alleged conduct meet 

the “severe or pervasive” standard required for a harassment claim. Accordingly, 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the fourth cause of action 

for harassment and hostile work environment under Title VII. 

 Next, the court will address plaintiffs’ fifth cause of action, for retaliation under Title 

VII. Generally, in order to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must 

establish “that [he or she] acted to protect [his or her] Title VII rights, that an adverse 

employment action was thereafter taken against [him or her], and that a causal link exists 

between those two events.” See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 

(9th Cir.1994). 

 In the complaint, plaintiffs allege that they “have alleged instances of racial 

discrimination in the workplace, reported these allegations to their superiors, and filed 

relevant complaints with administrative agencies.” TAC, ¶ 128. Plaintiffs further allege 

that, as a result, “defendant subjected plaintiff to adverse employment actions, including 

but not limited to harassment, reassignment, suspension and discharge,” and that 

“[t]hese adverse actions were meant to dissuade plaintiffs, or any other reasonable 

employees from making or supporting charges of racial discrimination and were causally 

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