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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-2815 

UNITED STATES ex rel. ERIC UHLIG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

FLUOR CORP., et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 4:11-cv-04009 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 11, 2016 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Eric Uhlig brought False Claims Act 

and retaliation claims against his former employer, Fluor Corporation, and related entities (collectively, “Fluor”). Fluor 

contracted with the United States Army to provide, among 

other services, electrical engineering work in Afghanistan. 

Uhlig says Fluor violated the False Claims Act when it 

knowingly breached the terms of its Army contract by using 

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2 No. 14-2815

unlicensed electricians as journeymen and billing the government for the services. Uhlig also contends Fluor wrongfully 

terminated Uhlig as a whistleblower in violation of 31 

U.S.C. § 3730(h). 

The district court granted summary judgment for Fluor. 

We affirm. 

I. Background 

The United States Army uses umbrella agreements known 

as “indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity” (“IDIQ”) contracts with private companies to provide support for military 

personnel. IDIQ contracts provide the general terms under 

which a contractor is to work but do not delineate specific 

conditions. The Army then uses “Task Orders” to assign jobs 

to a contractor. 

In 2007, the Army and Fluor entered into an IDIQ contract 

known as Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV 

(“LOGCAP IV”). LOGCAP IV provided a framework for construction, maintenance, and other services in support of military personnel around the world. 

LOGCAP IV originally contained no specific provisions 

governing personnel qualifications. In August 2008, the Army 

issued LOGCAP IV Contract Modification 4, which provided: 

The Contractor shall ensure that Contractor personnel ... possess a license, certification, training, and/or education commensurate with the 

level of duties to which they are assigned. 

... Contractor will comply with the terms of this 

provision if Contractor develops and reasonaCase: 14-2815 Document: 27 Filed: 10/11/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-2815 3

bly implements a Trades Certification and Validation Plan, as approved by the Government, 

utilizing the master, journeyman, or apprentice 

model. 

Fluor submitted a Trades Certification and Validation Plan 

as required by Modification 4. The Plan divided craft workers 

into four categories using “a combination of licenses held, education, training, and experience.” 

 The Plan defined a “helper” as an apprentice who works 

under constant supervision and a “journeyman” as a skilled 

craftsperson who may work with minimal supervision and 

possesses “verifiable minimum experience and/or holds a 

universally accepted certification, license and/or degree.” The 

Plan also stated that electricians “[m]ay be required to hold a 

license.” 

In January 2009, the government approved the Plan, making it the contractual standard by which Fluor employees’ 

qualifications were to be established. 

In July 2009, Fluor was awarded Task Order 5, which authorized Fluor to perform a variety of services, including electrical work, at military bases in northern Afghanistan. Before 

Fluor, a different contractor, KBR, Inc., had been performing 

this work. To avoid major disruptions in service, the government requested that Fluor attempt to hire KBR employees 

who were already in Afghanistan. Fluor hired American and 

British former KBR employees, as well as employees from 

Bosnia, Macedonia, India, and Pakistan. The employees who 

were not citizens of the United States or Great Britain were 

referred to as “other-country nationals.” 

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Uhlig was one of the KBR employees that Fluor hired. 

Fluor gave Uhlig a one-year foreperson1position starting January 23, 2010. 

In early 2010, Fluor reviewed its procedures for establishing journeyman electricians’ qualifications and decided to require that these electricians hold a state-issued United States 

license or a Great Britain-issued license. Fluor says that it imposed this requirement not because it was obligated to do so 

under Modification 4, but rather because it wanted to streamline its qualification process and promote uniformity. 

Uhlig had graduated from an apprenticeship program but 

did not have an electrician’s license because his home state of 

Missouri—like several other states—did not issue electrician’s 

licenses. 

By mid-2010, Fluor had implemented its licensing requirement for journeyman electricians being hired in the United 

States for deployment to Afghanistan. However, the situation 

was more complicated for electricians like Uhlig, who had already been hired in Afghanistan as “foremen” but lacked 

state-issued electrician’s licenses. No one disputed that the 

unlicensed foremen were qualified to do journeyman work; 

nevertheless, Fluor decided to apply its licensing requirement 

to existing employees. 

On November 16, 2010, Fluor emailed its foremen working 

under Task Order 5, including Uhlig, explaining that licensed 

 1 At KBR, Uhlig and other workers were “journeymen.” Uhlig and 

other KBR journeymen were hired by Fluor as “foremen” because Fluor 

did not yet have a job classification named “journeymen,” though KBR’s 

pay scale for journeymen matched Fluor’s pay scale for its foremen. 

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No. 14-2815 5

foremen would be reclassified as “journeymen” and unlicensed foremen would be reclassified as “helpers.” Fluor 

stated that this change was meant to “bring Fluor into better 

alignment with our contractual requirements.” Accordingly, 

of the hundreds of Fluor electricians working under Task Order 5, approximately thirty-one, including Uhlig, became 

“helpers.” The others simply changed titles from “foremen” 

to “journeymen.” 

Other-country nationals were not eligible for licensing by 

a state in the United States. Thus, under Fluor’s self-imposed 

licensing procedure, all such employees became helpers, even 

if, by virtue of their education and experience, they were qualified to perform journeyman work. However, Fluor did not 

plan to terminate unlicensed other-country nationals in the 

same way Fluor terminated Uhlig. Fluor says that it was more 

affordable to retain those employees as helpers because they 

did not get the same overseas benefits as American helpers. 

On November 17, 2010, Fluor offered Uhlig an additional 

year’s employment. However, on November 19 Fluor informed Uhlig that because he did not have a license, he was 

being reclassified as a helper. Fluor further informed Uhlig 

that unless he obtained a license before January 23, 2011, the 

end of his one-year employment, he would be terminated. 

Unfortunately for Uhlig, he was out of vacation days and 

had no opportunity to return to the United States to get an 

electrician’s license by January 2011. Uhlig asked human-resources supervisor Thomas Rizzo for help, but Fluor would 

not change its position. Uhlig was upset that he would be terminated while the unlicensed other-country nationals—also 

now all helpers—would stay on. 

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Uhlig says that after imposing the licensing requirement, 

Fluor directed helpers to perform unsupervised journeyman 

work. Uhlig was particularly frustrated after one assignment 

at a camp called “NKC” and sent an email to Rizzo and Defense Contract Management Agency officer Billy Porter. In it, 

Uhlig said he was given an assignment he did not think he 

should be given as an unlicensed helper. Uhlig further stated: 

“I am a U[S] tax payer losing my job at the end of January 

because ... this company is using my US tax dollars having 

OCN/A[fg]hans [as] unlicensed electricians going against 

government compliance.” Uhlig had not read Modification 4 

or the language of the Trades Certification and Validation 

Plan at that point. 

Rizzo asked Uhlig why he had contacted the government 

directly instead of pursuing available channels through Fluor. 

Uhlig responded in a December 4, 2010 email: “I am just following a US taxpayer’s obligation to report fraud waste and 

abuse from stiffing the US government.” Uhlig again copied 

Porter on the email, but also sent the email to 

mdoyle@doyleraizner.com, stating that Mr. Doyle was his attorney, and to mssparky@mssparky.com. Ms. Sparky was a 

website hosted by a former KBR employee, the stated purpose 

of which was “exposing ... corporate greed among [defense] 

contractors.” Uhlig admits that when he sent the email, he 

had neither retained Doyle as his attorney nor previously 

been in contact with him. Uhlig had simply found Doyle’s 

name and email address on the Ms. Sparky website.2

 2 Uhlig’s email accusations eventually prompted two members of the 

Defense Contract Management Agency’s quality-assurance staff to investigate the tasks that Fluor’s electricians were performing. The staff did not 

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No. 14-2815 7

One week later, Fluor terminated Uhlig. Fluor says Uhlig’s 

email to Ms. Sparky was unacceptable not only because it was 

inflammatory but also because it contained Thomas Rizzo’s 

name, email address, and phone numbers, which were not 

publicly available. Sending this information to the Ms. Sparky 

email address violated Fluor’s computer-use policy. 

On February 15, 2011, Uhlig filed False Claims Act and retaliatory-discharge claims against Fluor. The government declined to intervene as the plaintiff on its own behalf under 

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 

Fluor moved for summary judgment, and the district 

court granted Fluor’s motion on August 6, 2014. In dismissing 

the False Claims Act claim, the district court held that Fluor’s 

contract with the Army did not require that journeyman electricians be licensed and therefore that Fluor had not breached 

the contract. The court dismissed Uhlig’s retaliation claim because Uhlig had no objective basis for asserting that Fluor had 

defrauded the government, thus his complaint was not “protected activity” under the False Claims Act. This appeal followed. 

II. Discussion 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable to 

 

find any problems. On-site Defense Contract Management Agency Commander Colonel Cameron Holt said he was not concerned about Uhlig’s 

allegations. Fluor received no written feedback from the Defense Contract 

Management Agency regarding the investigation, and Fluor was never 

asked to change its practices or procedures with respect to the assignment 

of electrical tasks. 

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the nonmoving party. United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A. False Claims 

The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., makes it unlawful to (1) knowingly present a “false or fraudulent claim 

for payment or approval” to the United States government, or 

(2) knowingly make, use, or cause to be made or used a “false 

record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 

Under the Act, private individuals such as Uhlig—referred to as “relators”—may file qui tam civil actions on behalf 

of the United States. To establish civil liability under the False 

Claims Act, a relator generally must show that (1) the defendant made a statement in order to receive money from the government; (2) the statement was false; (3) the defendant knew 

the statement was false; and (4) the false statement was material to the government’s decision to pay or approve the false 

claim. United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 

F.3d 818, 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 

Uhlig says Fluor violated the False Claims Act by knowingly employing unlicensed electricians in breach of its contract and submitting invoices for the unlicensed services to 

the government for payment. However, the contract did not 

require licensing. Modification 4 to the LOGCAP IV contract 

required craft employees to “possess a license, certification, 

training, and/or education commensurate with the level of duties to which they are assigned” (emphasis added). Further, 

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No. 14-2815 9

the Trades Certification and Validation Plan, which was the 

contractual standard by which the employees’ qualifications 

were to be established, also did not require licensing. Rather, 

the Plan defined “journeyman” as a “[s]killed craftsman ... 

having verifiable minimum experience and/or hold[ing] a universally accepted certification, license and/or degree” (emphases added). 

The contract language clearly provided a set of options for 

establishing an employee’s qualifications, and licensing was 

not the exclusive method for doing so. Though Fluor independently decided to phase in a self-imposed requirement 

that journeymen must hold a license, this internal requirement did not change the plain terms of the contract. See Yannacopoulos, 652 F.3d at 826. As a result, Fluor was not in breach 

of its contract with the government when it submitted invoices for electrical work performed by unlicensed electricians. 

Uhlig also argues that Modification 4 is an “alternative 

contract.” As a result, he concludes, once Fluor elected one of 

the four listed means of verifying its electricians’ qualifications, Fluor was required to abide by its choice, or else be in 

breach of the contract. See Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Seneca Ins. Co., 

No. 94 CIV. 9106 (JFK), 1995 WL 733642, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 

12, 1995). 

We disagree. Eagle Star describes an alternative contract 

as: 

one in which a party promises to render some 

one of two or more alternative performances, either one of which is mutually agreed upon as 

the bargained-for equivalent given in exchange 

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for the return performance by the other party. 

Once a party elects its method of performance, 

the contract ceases to be an alternative contract 

and the electing party is obligated to perform in 

accordance with the method of performance 

elected by him. 

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The Letter Agreement in Eagle Star contemplated mutually 

exclusive performance options. See id. at *4. Here, however, 

the language in Modification 4 and the Trades Certification 

and Validation Plan contemplates compatible choices, as indicated by the repeated use of “and/or” in describing the 

qualification options. 

Indeed, a plain reading of Modification 4 and the Trades 

Certification Validation Plan is that Fluor needed to ensure 

that its electricians were qualified for the duties to which they 

were assigned by virtue of at least one of the following: license, certification, training, or education. Nothing in the contract suggests that Fluor was required to elect one method of 

verifying its electricians’ qualification and that Fluor would 

then be limited to that method. In other words, under the contract, Fluor could ensure that one electrician was qualified via 

education, another via certification, and a third through licensure, so long as each was qualified. Further, the contract did 

not forbid Fluor from applying higher internal licensure policies to American electricians relative to other-country national electricians. The contract at issue, therefore, is not an 

“alternative contract.” 

Finally, Uhlig cites to emails from Fluor employees allegedly interpreting the contract to prohibit unlicensed otherCase: 14-2815 Document: 27 Filed: 10/11/2016 Pages: 13
No. 14-2815 11

country nationals from performing electrical work. However, 

these messages do not change the contract’s plain terms. See 

Yannacopoulos, 652 F.3d at 826 (when “[t]he language of [the 

contract] is clear on its face, ... the intent of the parties is to be 

derived only from the express language of the contract”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Fluor did not breach its contract. Therefore, there was no 

false statement under the False Claims Act, and we affirm the 

district court’s decision. 

B. Retaliation 

Uhlig next argues that the district court erred in dismissing his retaliation claim. An employee can pursue a claim for 

unlawful retaliation if he was discharged “because of lawful 

acts done by the employee ... in furtherance of an action under” the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). In other words, 

a plaintiff must prove that he was engaged in protected conduct and was fired “because of” that conduct. Halasa v. ITT 

Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations 

omitted). 

To determine whether an employee’s conduct was protected, we look at whether “(1) the employee in good faith believes, and (2) a reasonable employee in the same or similar 

circumstances might believe, that the employer is committing 

fraud against the government.” Fanslow v. Chi. Mfg. Ctr., Inc., 

384 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). In assessing 

the second, “objective” prong, we look to the facts known to 

the employee at the time of the alleged protected activity. See 

id. at 479–80; Mann v. Heckler & Koch Def., Inc., 630 F.3d 338, 

345 (4th Cir. 2010). 

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Uhlig’s retaliation claim cannot proceed because he did 

not show that, at the time he sent the December 4, 2010 email, 

a reasonable employee in Uhlig’s position would have believed Fluor was defrauding the government. As a result, his 

conduct was not protected activity that could give rise to a 

retaliation claim. 

Uhlig admits he did not read Modification 4, the Trades 

Certification and Validation Plan, or any other relevant contract language before he sent the December 2010 email. He 

therefore did not have any firsthand knowledge of Fluor’s 

contract obligations to the Army. 

Further, his secondhand knowledge—from two November 2010 emails—was not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to suspect fraud on the part of Fluor. The November 16, 

2010 email explained Fluor’s decision to reclassify unlicensed 

electricians as “bring[ing] Fluor into better alignment with 

[its] contractual requirements.” The November 19, 2010 email 

stated that because Uhlig did not have a license, he was being 

reclassified as a helper “to align [Fluor’s] job titles and basic 

job responsibilities with the appropriate license, in accordance with our contract with the client.” 

Neither of these messages stated that Fluor’s contract with 

the government required all electrical work to be performed 

by licensed journeymen or that there was no role for unlicensed helpers. The emails do not state Fluor’s contractual obligations to the government. Thus, these emails were not 

enough to cause someone in Uhlig’s position to believe that 

Fluor was defrauding the government. 

Even if Uhlig subjectively believed Fluor was breaching its 

contract, he lacked a sufficient basis on which to satisfy the 

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objective component of the protected-activity test. Uhlig’s 

emails attempting to blow the whistle on Fluor’s alleged noncompliance were therefore not protected activity. As a result, 

even if the December 2010 email was the reason for Uhlig’s 

termination, it cannot be the basis for a retaliation claim. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court. 

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