Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00714/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00714-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DAVID HUGH BALES, #178 239, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-714-WKW

 ) [WO]

CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Easterling Correctional Facility in Clio, Alabama,

filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 29, 2016.

1 The matter is pending on Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint filed against Dr. Jean Darbouze and Corizon Medical Services.

2 Doc. 7. In the amended 

complaint, Plaintiff seeks to challenge the provision of medical care provided by Defendants. 

Specifically, Plaintiff states he suffered a heart attack on October 16, 2012. Although Dr. Darbouze 

was notified of the incident, Plaintiff complains the physician delayed calling an ambulance for 

over twelve hours during which Plaintiff suffered heart attack pain. Dr. Darbouze’s conduct,

 

1 Although the Clerk stamped the present complaint “filed” on August 30, 2016, Plaintiff signed his 

complaint on August 29, 2016. The law is well settled that a pro se inmate’s complaint is deemed filed 

the date it is delivered to prison officials for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-272 (1988); 

Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 1999); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 780 

(11th Cir. 1993). In light of the foregoing and for purposes of the proceedings herein, the court considers 

August 29, 2016, as the date of filing.

2 On September 19, 2016, the court entered an order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. The 

order informed Plaintiff that any claims for relief he wished to present that arose from actions which 

occurred before August 29, 2014, were barred by the two-year period of limitation applicable to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in this court. The September 19 order also informed Plaintiff that his amended 

complaint should name as defendants those individuals he contended were personally responsible for the 

alleged violations of his constitutional rights and should describe how each defendant listed in the 

amended complaint acted in a manner that deprived him of his constitutional rights. See Doc. 4.

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Plaintiff claims, caused him irreparable heart and lung damage. Despite Dr. Darbouze’s alleged 

incompetence, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Corizon Medical Services continues to employ him

which reflects the providers’ deliberate indifference to their patients. Doc. 7 at 1-2. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e)(2)(B), this court is required to screen complaints filed by 

prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis against a governmental entity or officers or employees of 

governmental entities and to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint it finds 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant immune from such relief.3 The court has carefully reviewed the allegations 

in Plaintiff's amended complaint. From that review, the court concludes that dismissal of the 

amended complaint prior to service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)

and (ii).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations. 

Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a challenge to the conduct of Defendants which occurred on 

October 16, 2012, is filed outside the statute of limitations applicable to a federal civil action filed 

in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort actions, subject to the statute 

of limitations governing personal injury actions in the state where the § 1983 action 

has been brought. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946-

47, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). [The plaintiff’s] claim was brought in Alabama where 

the governing limitations period is two years. Ala. Code § 6-2-38; Jones v. Preuit 

& Mauldin, 876 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Therefore, in order to 

have his claim heard, [the plaintiff is] required to bring it within two years from the 

date the limitations period began to run. 

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). 

 

3

By order of September 19, 2016, the court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 3. 

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The allegations relative to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendants

occurred on October 16, 2012. The limitations period begins to run when the cause of action 

accrues, and this is a question of federal law. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). 

Generally, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know (1) that he 

was injured, and (2) who inflicted the injury. Id. at 561–62. By its express terms, the tolling 

provision of Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a) provides no basis for relief to Plaintiff from application of the 

time bar.4 Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on the claims arising from the challenged

conduct on October 12, 2012. The limitation period ran uninterrupted until it expired on October 

16, 2014. Plaintiff filed this action on August 29, 2016. This filing occurred over one year after 

expiration of the limitation period. Thus, the statute of limitations on those claims Plaintiff 

presents regarding actions that occurred on or before October 16, 2012, expired on October 16, 

2014, and review of these claims is, therefore, barred by the two-year period of limitations. 

Unquestionably, the statute of limitations is usually a matter which may be raised as an 

affirmative defense. The court notes, however, that in an action proceeding under section 1983, it 

may consider, sua sponte, affirmative defenses apparent from the face of the complaint. Clark v. 

Georgia Pardons and Parole Board, 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Ali v. Higgs, 

892 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990). “[I]f the district court sees that an affirmative defense would defeat 

the action, a section 1915[(e)(2)(B)(i)] dismissal is allowed.” Clark, 915 F.2d at 640. “The 

expiration of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense the existence of which warrants 

dismissal as frivolous. See Franklin [v. State of Oregon], 563 F. Supp. [1310,] 1330, 1332 [(D.C. 

Oregon 1983)].” Id. at n.2. 

An early determination of the merits of an IFP proceeding provides a significant 

benefit to courts (because it will allow them to use their scarce resources effectively 

 

4

This section allows tolling of the limitations period for an individual who “is, at the time the right 

accrues ... insane....” Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a). The complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff was not legally 

insane at the time of the challenged events so as to warrant tolling under Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a). 

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and efficiently), to state officials (because it will free them from the burdens of 

frivolous and harassing litigation), and to prisoners (because courts will have the 

time, energy and inclination to give meritorious claims the attention they need and 

deserve). “We must take advantage of every tool in our judicial workshop.” Spears 

[v. McCotter], 766 F.2d [179, 182 (5th Cir. 1985)].

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).

Based on the facts apparent from the face of the amended complaint, Plaintiff has no legal 

basis on which to proceed regarding the challenge to the conduct and/or actions of Defendants as 

he filed this cause of action over two years after the challenged conduct occurred. As noted, the 

statutory tolling provision is unavailing. Consequently, the two-year period of limitations 

applicable to Plaintiff’s claims expired over one year prior to him filing the instant complaint, and 

these claims are, therefore, subject to dismissal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

See Clark, 915 F.2d 636.

B. Defendant Corizon Medical Services

Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that his claims against the medical provider, Corizon 

Medical Services, are not barred by the statute of limitations, his complaint against this defendant 

is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). In a § 1983 action, the corporate 

medical provider for prison inmates cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees. Ort v. 

Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 1986); accord Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452-53 

(11th Cir. 1997) (finding that § 1983’s municipality law is to be applied to a corporate medical 

provider); see Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978) (ruling that a municipality cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action under the theory of 

respondeat superior simply because it employs a tortfeasor). A corporate medical provider’s 

liability may be implicated because of its direct involvement regarding the injury complained of 

and/or because of a policy or procedure alleged to have caused the constitutional deprivation. Ort, 

786 F.2d at 1107; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations concern actions taken 

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by an individual physician. Regarding the medical provider, Plaintiff simply complains this entity

employs, in his opinion, an unqualified employee. Consequently, the court finds Plaintiff has failed 

to state a viable § 1983 claim against Defendant Corizon Medical Services. This defendant is, 

therefore, subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against the named defendants challenging events which occurred on 

or before October 16, 2012, be DISMISSED with prejudice under the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(3)(2)(B)(i) as Plaintiff failed to file the complaint regarding these allegations within the time 

prescribed by the period of limitation;

2. The § 1983 claims presented against Defendant Corizon Medical Services, to the extent 

they are not barred by the statute of limitations, be DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);

3. The complaint be DISMISSED prior to service of process under the directives of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before February 17, 2017, Plaintiff may file an objection to the 

Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which Plaintiff objects. Frivolous, 

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. This 

Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on 

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appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except upon 

grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust 

Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 

790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE this 19th day of January, 2017.

/s/Terry F. Moore 

TERRY F. MOORER

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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