Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01178/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01178-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Shoals is in custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

serving an indeterminate sentence of 100 years to life plus a determinate sentence of thirteen years, 

based California’s “one strike” law and its “second strike” law. In this action, Petitioner claims the 

trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was required to render a unanimous verdict and 

that it improperly instructed the jury that the testimony of a complaining witness alone was a sufficient 

basis to find him guilty of a sexual assault. Because the Court finds there was no error, it DENIES the 

petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner appealed his convictions in the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District 

(the “5th DCA”), which affirmed. ((Doc. 10, Ex. A). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for review 

in the California Supreme Court that was also denied. (Lodged Document (“LD”) 20). 

BOBBY DIAL SHOALS,

 Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-01178-JLT

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

Case 1:13-cv-01178-JLT Document 26 Filed 10/01/15 Page 1 of 15
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On July 29, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant petition. (Doc. 1). Respondent’s answer was filed 

on September 30, 2013. (Doc. 10). On February 2, 2015, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (Doc. 25). 

Respondent concedes that the two grounds for relief in the petition have been fully exhausted. 

(Doc. 10, p. 8).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision1:

C.B. dated defendant between February and August 2008. She ended their relationship because 

defendant hit her “a couple times.” When they broke up, C.B. took her apartment key back from 

defendant. Defendant called her several times and left “nasty messages” for her, but she never 

returned the calls.

Around 8:00 p.m. on September 5, 2008, C.B. saw defendant at the apartment complex where 

his father lived. Defendant asked C.B. if he could visit her at her apartment, and promised not to 

argue or fight with her. C.B. agreed to a brief visit, and defendant said he would follow her back 

to her apartment. C.B. went back to her apartment but defendant did not arrive when he said he 

would.

Around midnight, Gary Jones arrived at C.B.'s apartment and stayed for several hours. C.B. and 

Jones were in a dating relationship. Around 3:00 a.m., defendant arrived at her apartment, 

knocked on the door, and tapped at the window. Defendant talked to C.B. through the window 

and asked to come in. C.B. said no, that she had expected him earlier, but she had company and 

he needed to leave. Defendant said he was going to “bust all the windows out” if she did not 

open the door. C.B. refused to let him in, and defendant eventually left.

C.B. testified she went back to sleep, and later realized Jones left while she was sleeping. At 

some point after Jones left, C.B. was awakened by her bedroom light being turned on. C.B. saw 

defendant in her bedroom, about three feet away from her. He approached the bed and punched 

C.B. on the left cheek and ear with a closed fist. The force of the blow knocked C.B. off the bed 

and onto the floor.

Defendant continued to strike C.B. while she was on the floor. Defendant hit her in the face, 

mouth, shoulders, and legs. Defendant repeatedly asked C.B. if she was “f* * * * * *?” C.B. 

said no. Defendant grabbed her arm, told her to stand in front of him, and pulled C.B. close to 

him. Defendant placed two fingers inside her vagina. C.B. did not try to stop him because she 

was dizzy and felt physically beaten.

Defendant told C.B. to lie down on the bed. C.B. did not respond, but just stood there and cried. 

Defendant hit her face again, and she fell on the bed. Defendant removed his belt and said, “‘I 

think you [will] like this, this is what you want.’” Defendant hit C.B.'s buttocks with his belt 

one time. C.B. crawled toward the headboard to get away from him.

C.B. was very dizzy and in pain, and her ears were ringing. She begged him to stop. Defendant 

warned C.B., “‘[D]on't make me hit you in the face with this belt.’” C.B. finally complied with 

his order to lie on the bed. Defendant removed his pants, got on top of her, and told her to “be 

quiet and to shut up.” Defendant raped C.B. C.B. was crying, and afraid he would kill her if she 

 

1

The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

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resisted. After he finished the sexual act, he put on his pants and left the room. C.B. remained 

on the bed.

C.B. was still lying on the bed when defendant returned to the bedroom. Defendant raped her 

again, and then committed an act of sodomy. C.B. repeatedly begged him to stop and said that it 

hurt. Defendant replied that he had almost completed the sexual act. Defendant finally finished 

and left the room. C.B. testified she passed out.

C.B. testified that she woke up and felt defendant lying behind her. Defendant told her, “‘Yes, I 

am laying here and you are going to have to deal with it.’” In the morning, C.B. told defendant 

that she had to go to work. Defendant said that he was not keeping her against her will. C.B. left 

the apartment and went to work.

The victim's injuries

C.B. told her employer what happened to her, and her employer called the police. C.B. went to 

the hospital for a sexual assault examination. C.B. had multiple bruises and abrasions on her 

head, arms, back, and buttocks. Her face was swollen and her ear was bleeding. She suffered a 

ruptured eardrum. She also had superficial lacerations consistent with a nonconsensual act of 

anal sex. It was stipulated that the physician who treated C.B. believed that a ruptured eardrum 

constituted great bodily injury. The prosecution introduced photographs which were taken of the 

victim's injuries.

Defendant's arrest

Later on September 6, 2008, Officer Shearer arrested defendant at his apartment on four 

outstanding warrants. Defendant asked what else he was being arrested for. Shearer again said 

he was being arrested for outstanding warrants, and defendant again asked if there was anything 

else. Shearer asked if there was something else to arrest him for, and defendant did not reply.

Defendant was taken to the police department, and advised of the Miranda warnings. Defendant 

agreed to answer questions. Officer Shearer said he wanted to talk about an incident that 

occurred earlier that morning at C.B.'s apartment. Defendant said he did not know what Shearer 

was talking about, and he did not know C.B.

The police collected defendant's clothing, and also obtained blood, hair, and DNA samples from 

him. Defendant refused to open his mouth for an oral swab.

Defendant then told Officer Shearer that he wanted to talk about the incident. Defendant said 

that he knew C.B. and he had been at her apartment. Defendant admitted he knocked on her 

window and saw another man there. He waited for the other man to leave, and then he went into 

the apartment and talked with C.B. He denied having sex with her that night, and denied hitting 

her. However, defendant said he had sex with C.B. a few days earlier. He also admitted that he 

tried to have anal sex with her a few days earlier, but he stopped when she said that she did not 

like it. C.B.'s DNA was found on biological samples taken from defendant's body.

Defendant was taken into custody. He called C.B. 96 times from jail, from September 6 to 

November 3, 2008. During the various calls, defendant told C.B., “don't testify please,” “they 

can't make you do it,” and “I'm sorry.”

DEFENSE EVIDENCE

Defendant testified at trial and admitted he had a prior conviction for robbery in 1997. 

Defendant testified that he dated C.B. for eight months in 2008. Their relationship ended 

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because C.B. was seeing other people behind his back. She wanted to see other men, and she 

took her apartment key from him. Defendant testified he never hit C.B. during their relationship.

Defendant testified that he saw C.B. at his parents' home on the afternoon of September 5, 2008. 

C.B. invited defendant to her apartment, and he agreed to come by later that day. However, he 

wasn't able to get there until around 11:45 p.m. He knocked on the front and back doors, but she 

did not respond. He tapped on the bedroom window and heard someone ask, “Who is it[?]” 

Defendant identified himself, and C.B. said to wait a minute. He went back to the front door and 

saw Gary Jones walk out. Defendant and Jones briefly spoke, and then defendant went into the 

apartment.

Defendant testified he went into C.B.'s bedroom and talked to her while she was in bed. They 

started to argue, and C.B. slapped defendant. Defendant slapped her back. C.B. kicked and 

threw punches at defendant, and he slapped her about three times. Defendant admitted he swung 

his belt and hit her leg. Defendant testified he had never touched C.B. before that night. 

Defendant admitted he called her a whore, but denied making any threats.

Defendant testified he went into the front room and had something to eat. About an hour later, 

C.B. asked him to return to the bedroom. C.B. apologized and they “kissed and made up.” 

Defendant testified they had consensual oral sex, and twice had consensual sexual intercourse. 

He tried to have anal sex with her, but she asked him to stop. Defendant testified C.B. did not 

have any injuries on her face and never said her ear was ringing.

Later that day, C.B. called defendant and said she was going to the hospital because her ear hurt. 

A few hours later, the police arrived and arrested him. Defendant said the officer only talked to 

him about outstanding tickets. Defendant denied making some of the statements attributed to 

him by the officer and refusing to cooperate with the oral swab sample. Defendant admitted he 

did not tell the police that they had sex that night. Defendant also admitted that he repeatedly 

called C.B. from jail and apologized for slapping her.

(Exh. A, pp. 27-29).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 

7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kings County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds

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by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s 

enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed 

by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 

“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

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presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims.

The instant petition itself alleges the following as grounds for relief: (1) the trial court erred in 

failing to instruct the jury on the need for a unanimous verdict; and (2) the trial court erred in 

instructing the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1190.

A. First Claim

Petitioner first contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a fair trial by 

failing to instruct the jury that its verdict as to Count 8, i.e., assault by means of force likely to cause 

great bodily injury, must be unanimous. Petitioner argues that evidence of either of two assaults, i.e., a 

fist blow to the ear and a belt strike on the victim’s buttocks, would satisfy the elements of the charged 

offense, but that the jury was not instructed to be unanimous in which of the two events they believed 

satisfied the charge. This contention is without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

I. The unanimity instruction was not required for count VIII

In count VIII, defendant was charged and convicted of assault by means of force likely to 

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produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant contends the court should have 

given the unanimity instruction as to this count because there were two separate acts which 

could have supported the offense: either defendant's acts of punching C.B. in the left cheek and 

ear with his closed fist, or hitting her buttocks with his belt.

A. Background

In closing argument, the prosecutor addressed the acts which supported each of the charged 

offenses. In the course of the argument, the prosecutor discussed C.B.'s testimony about the 

sequence of the sexual assault:

“[Defendant] [c]ame in ... [h]e immediately goes to the bedroom, confronts her, and 

when she stands up what is the first thing that he does? Pow, right here. And we have 

got proof of that because you saw the mark, knocks her down, continues to assault her 

and then beats her with a belt”

The prosecutor offered the following analysis for count VIII:

“Now, Count 8, this is the last of the counts, what we call a [section] 245, assault on the 

person, force likely to cause great bodily injury. You will see this in a couple of different 

places. The first element, the defendant did an act, you have heard this one before....

“The defendant did an act by its nature would directly and probably result in the 

application of force to a person. There is two different acts here, take your pick. The fist 

right here or the belt. Now we know the belt was admitted, and you can see the picture. 

You will actually see, and the defendant admitted you could see the stitch marks from 

the belt in the picture.

“The force was likely to cause great bodily injury. We know the fist was likely to 

because it did, but the application of a belted point that it leaves a welt, bruise, call it 

what you will, but you can still see the stitch marks? Yes.

“The defendant did the act willful. Well, he had to, he either hit her or, you know, knew 

what he was doing or do it or the belt is exactly the same thing....

“When the defendant acted he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person ... 

to realize that his act by its very nature would directly and probably result in the 

application of force to somebody. Well, in swinging your fists you know that it is going 

to—if you're swinging at them it is going to hit them. You swing the belt, exactly the 

same analysis.

“Finally, when the defendant acted he had the present ability to apply force likely to 

produce or cause that great bodily injury. We [have] seen the results, so we know that 

that element is met.”

In defense counsel's closing argument, he asserted that defendant's trial testimony was 

consistent and reasonable, that defendant and C.B. argued, C.B. hit defendant, defendant 

reflexively slapped C.B., they made up, and they had consensual sex. Defendant asserted that to 

whatever extent C.B. was injured during their mutual fight, her injuries did not constitute great 

bodily injuries.

B. Analysis

Defendant asserts the court should have given the unanimity instruction as to count VIII, assault 

by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, based on the prosecutor's closing 

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argument that the charge could have been based on defendant's act of either punching C.B. in 

the face or striking her with the belt.

“As a general rule, when violation of a criminal statute is charged and the evidence establishes 

several acts, any one of which could constitute the crime charged, either the state must select the 

particular act upon which it relied for the allegation of the information, or the jury must be 

instructed that it must agree unanimously upon which act to base a verdict of guilty. [Citation.] 

There are, however, several exceptions to this rule. For example, no unanimity instruction is 

required if the case falls within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises ‘when 

the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of one transaction’ [citation], or ‘when 

... the statute contemplates a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of 

time’ [citation]. There also is no need for a unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the 

same defense or defenses to the various acts constituting the charged crime. [Citation.]” (People 

v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.)

“‘[T]he “continuous course of conduct” exception—when the acts are so closely connected that 

they form one transaction—is meant to apply not to all crimes occurring during a single 

transaction but only to those “where the acts testified to are so closely related in time and place 

that the jurors reasonably must either accept or reject the victim's testimony in toto.” [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Jenkins (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 287, 299; People v. Bui (2011) 192 

Cal.App.4th 1002, 1011.)

While this scenario has been described as an exception to the requirement for the unanimity 

instruction, “[i]t would seem more accurate to say that, in this situation, a unanimity instruction 

is required, but the failure to give one is harmless. [Citation.]” (People v. Lueth (2012) 206 

Cal.App.4th 189, 196.)

As applied to the instant case, C.B. described a harrowing scene in her bedroom, where 

defendant surprised her and punched her in the cheek and ear. She fell to the floor, where 

defendant punched and kicked her. He performed an act of digital penetration and then ordered 

her onto the bed. When she hesitated, he removed his belt and hit her in the buttocks. When she 

tried to resist, he threatened to hit her in the face with his belt. He then got onto the bed and 

raped her. The prosecution introduced photographic evidence of the welt inflicted by the belt, 

and it was stipulated that C.B.'s physician believed the injury to her ear constituted great bodily 

injury.

At trial, defendant admitted that he slapped C.B. in the face and hit her with his belt. However, 

he insisted that she punched him first, and he reflexively hit her back. He also insisted that they 

reconciled and had consensual sex, and C.B. never said that she was suffering from any pain. In 

closing argument, defense counsel argued defendant's account was reasonable, and that C.B. did 

not suffer great bodily injury.

Based on the specific facts of this case, the court's failure to give the unanimity instruction was 

necessarily harmless since the violent assault occurred within an extremely short period of time, 

in one isolated location, and defendant tendered the same defense to the entirety of the offenses 

– that they purportedly engaged in mutual combat, C.B. was not injured, and they had 

consensual sex. (See, e.g., People v. Robbins (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 261, 266.)

(Ex. A, pp. 29-31).

2. Federal Standard.

Claims based on instructional error under state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review. 

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71–72. To receive federal habeas relief for an error in jury instructions, 

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Petitioner must show that the error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). “Due process requires that criminal 

prosecutions ‘comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness' and that ‘criminal defendants be 

afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 

(9th Cir.2006) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Additionally, in order to 

obtain federal habeas relief on this claim, Petitioner “must show that the alleged instructional error had 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 

855, 860 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A substantial and injurious 

effect means a reasonable probability that the jury would have arrived at a different verdict had the 

instruction been given.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the burden on 

Petitioner is especially heavy where the alleged error involves the failure to give an instruction. See id. 

An omission or an incomplete instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of law. See 

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155; see also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.1997).

3. Analysis.

Specifically as to unanimity instructions, the U.S. Constitution does not require unanimous 

agreement on the theory underlying a conviction. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817

(1999) (federal jury need not unanimously decide which set of facts make up a particular element of a 

crime); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1991) (plurality holding that conviction under 

different theories does not violate due process); see also McKoy v. N. Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449

(1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[D]ifferent jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of 

evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. [ ] Plainly there is no general requirement that 

the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.[ ]”) (footnotes 

omitted).

While a California trial court may be required under state law to instruct the jury that it must 

unanimously agree on the acts underlying the offense in order to convict, federal law is clear that, at 

least in a non-capital case, there is no federal right to a unanimous jury verdict. Compare, e.g., People 

v. Diedrich, 31 Cal.3d 263, 280-81 (Cal.1982), and People v. Crawford, 131 Cal.App.3d 591, 595–96

(Cal.Ct.App.1982) (unanimity instruction required where defendant was charged with possession of

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one or more firearms by felon and jury could disagree as to particular firearm), with Schad, 501 U.S. at 

634 n. 5 (“a state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous 

jury verdict”), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–13 (1972) (no constitutional right to 

unanimous jury verdict in non-capital criminal cases). Consequently, at least in non-capital criminal 

cases, courts within the Ninth Circuit have routinely dismissed habeas claims arguing that a California 

“unanimity” jury instruction was required. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Borg, 1 F.3d 926, 927–28 (9th 

Cir.1993) (citing Schad to find that instruction allowing California jury to convict defendant of first 

degree murder without unanimity as to whether he had committed felony murder or premeditated 

murder did not violate petitioner's due process rights.)

Because there is no federal law requiring a jury verdict to be unanimous, as with any 

instructional error, the claim fails as a threshold matter. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner is entitled 

to habeas relief only if he can show that the trial court's failure to give a unanimity instruction “so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U .S. at 72 

(quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396 (1973)). As mentioned above, where the 

alleged error is failure to give an instruction, the burden on the petitioner is “especially heavy.” 

Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. 

Petitioner has failed to meet this burden. As found by the state court, the evidence depicted a 

“harrowing” scene in the victim’s bedroom, where, during a relatively short period of time, Petitioner 

surprised the victim, punched her in the cheek and ear, and when she fell to the floor, kicked and 

punched her again. After performing an act of digital penetration on her, he ordered her onto the bed; 

when she hesitated, he removed his belt and struck her in the buttocks with it. The photographic 

evidence of the welts inflicted by the belt, along with the stipulation that the blow to the ear constituted 

great bodily injury both establish key elements of the assaults. Moreover, Petitioner admitted to 

slapping the victim in the face and hitting her with the belt. In addition, the record reflects that the trial 

court gave the following general unanimity instruction: “Your verdict on each count and any special 

finding must be unanimous. This means that to return a verdict all of you must agree to it.” (LD 10, p. 

1310; LD 1, p. 224.) Finally, as Respondent notes, in closing argument, defense counsel expressed his 

theory of the case, i.e., a general denial of guilt, by asking the jury to acquit Petitioner on all charges 

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based on counsel’s criticism of the victim’s behavior, which, counsel suggested, was not consistent 

with how rape victims act. (LD 10, pp. 1275; 1287). Clearly, the jury rejected the defense theory of 

innocence and, under all the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees with Respondent that, given 

the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, it seems unreasonable to suppose that the jury believed 

Petitioner’s blanket denial as to one of the assaults but not as to the other.

Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's refusal to give a unanimity 

instruction did not render Petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair. The decision of the state appellate 

court rejecting this claim is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, 

the claim must be denied.

B. Second Claim

Petitioner next contends that the trial court’s use of the CALCRIM No. 1190 was error. This 

contention, too, is without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the state appellate court ruled as follows:

Defendant next contends the court improperly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1190, as 

to the testimony of a single witness to prove sexual assault offenses. Defendant asserts the 

instruction erroneously reduced the prosecution's burden of proof.

As relevant to defendant's arguments, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1190, 

that “[c]onviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of a complaining 

witness alone.” The court also instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 301: “The 

testimony of only one witness can prove any fact. Before you conclude that the testimony of one 

witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the evidence.”

Defendant acknowledges that his instructional arguments were rejected in People v. Gammage

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 693, which addressed the virtually-identical predecessor instructions, and held 

they were correct statements of the law and did not reduce the prosecution's burden of proof. 

(Id. at p. 700.) Defendant attacks the reasoning in Gammage's majority opinion, asserts that the 

majority opinion is somehow outdated, and urges this court to follow the concurrence in 

Gammage. We decline to do so. We agree with Gammage and are bound by its conclusions. 

(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

(Ex. A, p. 31).

///

///

///

///

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2. Analysis.

2

As Respondent correctly contends, a claim of instructional error that violates state law is not 

cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. To the extent Petitioner contends the appellate court

misinterpreted California law by following the binding precedent of the California Supreme Court in 

Gammage, 2 Cal.4th 693, such claim is not cognizable by way of § 2254. A determination of state law 

by a state appellate court is binding in a federal habeas action, Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629

(1988), unless the interpretation is an “obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.” 

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 n. 11 (1975); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) 

(federal habeas court must respect a state court's application of its own law and must not engage in de 

novo review). A federal court has no basis for disputing a state's interpretation of its own law. Clemons 

v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 739–740 (1990).

Here, as the 5th DCA observed, the intermediate appellate court was required to follow the 

holding of the California Supreme Court in Gammage, as binding precedent. Since such a contention 

involves only state law principles, and since this Court is bound by a state court’s interpretation of its 

own laws, it is not cognizable in these proceedings.

Moreover, even assuming that a federal claim had been stated, instructional error violates 

federal due process only when there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the instruction 

in a way violative of the federal constitution. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In evaluating whether such a due 

process violation has occurred, the Court must consider the context of the instructions as a whole and 

the entire trial record, including arguments of counsel. Id.

CALCRIM 1190 reads, “conviction of a sexual assault crime may be based on the testimony of 

a complaining witness alone.” This instruction followed the trial court's instruction of CALCRIM 

number 301 which reads that the “testimony of only one witness can prove any fact. Before you 

conclude that the testimony of one witness proves a fact, you should carefully review all the evidence.”

In Gammage, the court noted that it was appropriate to give both instructions because even 

though they overlap to some extent, each one has a different focus:

 

2

The standard for a habeas claim of instructional error was discussed previously.

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CALJIC No. 2.27 focuses on how the jury should evaluate a fact (or at least a fact required to 

be established by the prosecution) proved solely by the testimony of a single witness. It is 

given with other instructions advising the jury how to engage in the fact-finding process. 

CALJIC No. 10.60, on the other hand, declares a substantive rule of law, that the testimony of 

the complaining witness need not be corroborated. It is given with other instructions on the 

legal elements of the charged crimes.

Gammage, 2 Cal.4th at 700–01.

Petitioner's argument that these instructions together improperly lightened the prosecutor's 

burden of proof. However, again, Gammage specifically spoke to that argument by observing: “[n]or 

do the instructions dilute[ ] the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt' standard. [citation.] The instructions in 

combination are no less correct, and no less fair to both sides, than either is individually.” Gammage, 2 

Cal.4th at 701. 

Here, Petitioner provided no evidence that the jurors followed these instructions in a manner 

that reduced the prosecution's burden of proof or that they did not follow the instruction regarding proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (noting that jurors are 

presumed to have followed the instructions provided). Therefore, not only has the California Supreme 

Court found that it is proper to give both instructions in combination in cases involving sex offenses, 

Gammage, supra, but it has also ruled that the trial court is required to give instructions on the “one 

witness” standard in all cases, not just those involving sexual crimes. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 

Cal.3d 864, 884–85 (1975). In sum, there is no reason to find that the prosecution's burden of proof 

was misapplied, and the giving of CALCRIM 1190 and 301 cannot be said to have “so infected the 

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 147.

Therefore, Petitioner’s claims fail to establish that the state court’s adjudication was contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the claim must be 

denied. Because Petitioner has failed to raise any claims that merit habeas relief, the Court will deny 

the petition with prejudice.

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

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(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in 

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with 

a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention 

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be 

taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability when a 

petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or 

that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DENIED with prejudice;

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2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file;

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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