Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00229/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marklin Christopher Manuel,

Movant/Defendant, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff. 

No. CV-13-00229-PHX-SRB (BSB)

 CR-91-00264-PHX-SRB 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2255, Marklin Christopher Manuel (Defendant) has filed 

an Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (§ 2255 motion).1

 

(Doc. 4.)2

 The government has filed a response arguing that Defendant’s motion is 

untimely under the statute of limitations that applies to § 2255 motions, and that several 

of Defendant’s claims are procedurally barred. (Doc. 7.) Defendant has filed a reply 

disputing the government’s arguments. (Doc 8.) For the reasons set forth below, 

Defendant=s § 2255 motion should be denied. 

 

1

 On February 1, 2013, Defendant filed a § 2255 motion. (Doc. 1.) On April 22, 2013, the Court denied the motion with leave to amend. (Doc. 3.) On June 10, 2013, Defendant filed the pending amended § 2255 motion. (Doc. 4.) 

2

 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-13-229-PHX-SRB (BSB). Citations to “CR Doc.” are to the docket in CR-91-264-PHX-SRB. Because the criminal matter 

predates the Court’s conversion to CM/ECF, the Court relied on the paper file to confirm the procedural history and background of that case. 

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I. Procedural Background 

 In 1992, a grand jury in the District of Arizona returned a second superseding 

indictment against Defendant and two co-defendants charging them with first degree 

murder and other related charges stemming from the January 1, 1989 murder of Benjamin 

Lopez on the Gila Indian Reservation. (CR Doc. 77.) The charges against Defendant 

included violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153, first-degree murder, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 

using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. (Id.) On June 11, 1992, a jury found 

Defendant guilty on the charges of first-degree murder and using a firearm in relation to a 

crime of violence. (CR Docs. 77, 281.) On September 14, 1992, the Court sentenced 

Defendant to life imprisonment for first-degree murder, a consecutive term of five years’ 

imprisonment for using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and sixty months’ 

supervised release upon his release from imprisonment. (CR Docs. 273, 275.) Defendant 

appealed (CR Doc. 277), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed his convictions in October 1993. 

(Doc. 7 at 1.) The United States Supreme Court denied Defendant’s petition for writ of 

certiorari in May 1994. (Id.) 

II. Defendant’s §2255 Motion 

 Under § 1153, which establishes federal court jurisdiction for certain offenses 

committed in Indian country, including first-degree murder under § 1111, the government 

was required to prove that Defendant was an Indian. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (subjecting 

“[a]ny Indian” who commits one of fourteen major crimes to the criminal laws and 

penalties applicable in areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction). In his § 2255 motion, 

Defendant argues under United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), United 

States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009), United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th 

Cir. 2010), and United States v. Zepeda, 705 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), superseded by 

United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201 (9th Cir. 2013), that the government presented 

insufficient evidence of his Indian status. (Doc. 8 at 7-9.) 

 Specifically, Defendant argues that: (1) the tribal Enrollment Certificate the 

government used to prove his Indian status was not self-authenticating under Rule 902 of 

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the Federal Rules of Evidence and thus was improperly admitted at trial and, therefore, 

the government did not prove Defendant’s Indian status under § 1153 (Count One); 

(2) the government did not allege his Indian status in the indictment and a jury did not 

determine his Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore this Court lacked 

jurisdiction under § 1153 (Count Two); and (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the admission of the Enrollment Certificate at trial and for failing to appeal 

based on its admission (Count Three). (Doc. 4 at 5-7.) Defendant acknowledges that he 

did not raise these claims on direct appeal, but asserts that he failed to do so because he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) 

 The government argues that the § 2255 motion should be dismissed as untimely 

and, alternatively, that several of Defendant’s claims are procedurally defaulted and 

barred from § 2255 review. (Doc. 7.) Defendant argues that his § 2255 motion is not 

time barred because he satisfied the “actual innocence” or “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice exception” under McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). 

(Doc. 4 at 9; Doc. 8 at 1-2) Defendant also argues that he can establish cause and 

prejudice to excuse any procedural bar because he asserts that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. (Doc. 8 at 2-6.) As set forth below, the Court finds that 

Defendant’s § 2255 motion is untimely and should be denied and, therefore, does not 

address the government’s alternative arguments that several of Defendant’s claims are 

procedurally barred. 

III. AEDPA Statute of Limitations 

 A. Defendant’s § 2255 Motion is Untimely Under § 2255(f)(1) 

 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides a oneyear statute of limitations for a federal prisoner to file a motion to vacate, set aside, or 

correct his sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.3

 The one-year limitations period runs 

from the latest of: 

 3

 The one-year statute of limitations for § 2255 motions under the AEDPA is the same as the one-year statute of limitations for writs of habeas corpus by persons in state custody under § 2244. See United States v. Jones, 963 F. Supp. 32, 34 (D.D.C. 1997). 

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 (1) “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final”; 

 (2) “the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by 

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed”; 4 

 (3) “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the 

Supreme Court if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”; or 

 (4) “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could 

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”5

 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) − (4). 

 In most circumstances, the statute of limitations under § 2255 begins to run on 

“the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). 

“The Supreme Court has held that a conviction is final in the context of a habeas review 

when ‘a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, 

and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition of certiorari finally denied.’” 

United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Griffith v. 

Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987)). 

 Here, Defendant’s judgment of conviction became final in May 1994 when the 

Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. See Aguirre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d 

1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Clay v. United States, 527 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) 

(following Supreme Court precedent and holding “that finality occurs when the Supreme 

Court ‘affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ 

 

4

 Defendant does not argue that § 2255(f)(2) applies in this case. 

5

 Defendant also does not argue that § 2255(f)(4) applies, but because the 

government discusses that section, the Court considers whether Defendant’s § 2255 motion would be timely under § 2255(f)(4). In his § 2255 motion, Defendant states that 

he told his attorney to object to the Certificate of Enrollment during trial and to challenge its admission on direct appeal. (Doc. 4 at 7.) Thus, the facts underlying Defendant’s substantive challenge to the admissibility of his Certificate of Enrollment were 

discovered during trial or on direct appeal. Both of these dates predate the date on which Defendant’s conviction became final under § 2255(f)(1) and therefore § 2255(f)(4) does not apply. 

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of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.’”)). However, 

because Defendant’s conviction became final before the AEDPA’s April 24, 1996 

effective date, he had a one-year grace period from the effective date (until April 24, 

1997) to file a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (defendants whose convictions became final before the AEDPA’s enactment 

are entitled to a one-year grace period after the AEDPA’s effective date to file a § 2255 

motion). Defendant’s § 2255 motion is untimely under § 2255(f)(1) because he did not 

file his original motion until February 1, 2013, nearly sixteen years after the one-year 

grace period expired. 

 Therefore, the Court considers whether Defendant’s § 2255 motion would be 

timely if the statute of limitations ran from a date after his judgment of conviction 

became final under 2255(f)(1). Liberally construing the § 2255 motion, Defendant may 

be arguing that the statute of limitations did not commence until the Ninth Circuit 

decided Zepeda. (Doc. 4 at 6; Doc. 8 at 9-10.) Defendant asserts that in Zepeda the 

Ninth Circuit recognized a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to the claims in 

his pending § 2255 motion. (Doc. 8 at 9-10.) Thus, Defendant may be arguing that 

§ 2255(f)(3) applies to determine the date the statute of limitations began to run. 

Accordingly, the Court will consider whether § 2255(f)(3) applies to extend the date on 

which the one-year statute of limitations began to run on Defendant’s claims. 

B. Section 2255(f)(3) Does Not Apply to Extend the Limitation Period 

 Section 2255(f)(3) provides that the § 2255 statute of limitations period begins to 

run on “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Thus, as 

the Supreme Court has explained, under § 2255(f)(3) a movant “has one year from the 

date on which the right he asserts was initially recognized by this Court” to file his 

§ 2255 motion. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (emphasis added). 

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 In Dodd, the Court rejected the argument that the limitations period under 

§ 2255(f)(3) runs from the date a newly recognized right “was made retroactively 

applicable.” Id. Instead, the Court held that the statute “identifies one date and one date 

only as the date from which the 1-year limitation period runs: ‘the date on which the right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.’” Id. at 358 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)). The Court explained that the second clause of 

the statute — “if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review” — imposes a condition on the 

applicability of § 2255(f)(3) and requires that the new right be “made retroactively 

applicable,” but “has no impact whatsoever” on the date from which the limitation period 

begins to run. Id. The Court recognized that the statute of limitations in § 2253(f)(3) 

could have “harsh results” for movants seeking to take advantage of a new rule of 

constitutional law “except in the rare case in which this Court announces a new rule of 

constitutional law and makes it retroactive within one year.” Id. at 359. 

 Here, Defendant argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Zepeda, 705 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013), superseded by United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 

201 (9th Cir. 2013), announced a new rule regarding the proof of Indian status that 

applies retroactively to his case on § 2255 review.6

 (Doc. 8 at 9-10.) The government 

argues that the Ninth Circuit did not create a new constitutional rule regarding proof of 

Indian status in Zepeda, but instead reiterated its holdings from two previous cases. 

(Doc. 7 at 5.) The government also argues that even if the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Zepeda announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, it would not apply 

 

6

 “The generally accepted test for Indian status considers ‘(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government recognition as an Indian.’” Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223 

(quoting United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996)). In Zepeda, the Ninth 

Circuit held that “a Certificate of Enrollment in an Indian tribe, entered into evidence 

through the parties’ stipulation, is [not] sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is an Indian for the purpose of § 1153 where the government offers no evidence that the defendant’s bloodline is derived from a 

federally recognized tribe.” Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 24. 

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retroactively to Defendant’s case under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).7 

(Doc. 7 at 6.) 

 In determining whether § 2255(f)(3) applies, and whether Defendant’s § 2255 

motion should be considered timely under that section of the statute, the Court does not 

need to determine whether Zepeda announced a new constitutional rule and, if so, 

whether that new rule would apply retroactively under Teague. Even if the Ninth Circuit 

announced a new rule in Zepeda, and that rule applies retroactively on habeas review, 

§ 2255(f)(3) does not apply to extend the statute of limitations in this case because that 

section only applies when the “Supreme Court,” not a circuit court of appeals, has “newly 

recognized” a right and it has been made “retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (emphasis added); see also Dodd, 545 U.S. at 360 

(stating that the statute must be enforced according to its terms and reiterating that 

§ 2255(f)(3) applies and can extend the statute of limitations only when the Supreme 

Court has newly recognized a right); United States v. Talley, 674 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 

(D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s assertion that, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), the one-year statute of limitations did not start until the effective 

date of the United States Sentencing Guidelines that reduced the offense levels for the 

defendant’s crimes of conviction, noting that the defendant did “not offer any support for 

the proposition that when the U.S. Sentencing Commission lowers an offense level, that 

constitutes a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court under § 2255(f)(3).”); United 

States v. Arjona, 2010 WL 3187043, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2010) (rejecting the 

defendant’s argument that the statute of limitations commenced under § 2255(f)(3) on the 

date of a Sixth Circuit decision because the “United States Supreme Court has not ruled 

 

7

 In Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11, the Supreme Court held that a new constitutional 

rule of criminal procedure that had not been announced at the time of a defendant’s 

conviction could not be applied retroactively on collateral review unless it fit within one 

of two narrow exceptions. Specifically, a new rule announced after a conviction could be 

applied retroactively on collateral review only if the new rule “(1) ‘place[d] certain kinds of primary private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,’ or (2) ‘require[d] the observance of those procedures that . . . are 

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 

F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307). 

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on [the] issue [in that Sixth Circuit decision] . . . .”).8 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s Zepeda

decision has no bearing on the commencement of the statute of limitations under 

§ 2255(f)(3) and Defendant’s § 2255 motion is untimely and is not subject to § 2255 

review unless equitable tolling or an exception to § 2255(f) applies. 

III. Equitable Tolling and Actual Innocence Exception to § 2255(f) 

A. Equitable Tolling 

 A § 2255 movant is entitled to equitable tolling “only if he shows ‘(1) that he has 

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 

his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, ___, 130 S. Ct. 

2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The 

movant must show that the extraordinary circumstances “‘were the cause of his 

untimeliness.’” Bryant v. Ariz. Att’y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)). The defendant has the burden of 

demonstrating that the one-year limitation period was sufficiently tolled. See Pace, 544 

U.S. at 418; Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, Defendant 

does not directly address the standard for equitable tolling and his status as an inmate and 

lack of legal assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting 

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 

(10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the fact that an inmate law clerk was assisting petitioner 

does not relieve petitioner from personal responsibility of complying with the law). 

Accordingly, equitable tolling does not apply under the standards articulated in Holland. 

B. Actual Innocence 

 To avoid the statute of limitations, Defendant argues that he is “actually innocent.” 

(Doc. 8 at 1-2.) In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1294 (2013), the 

 

8

 The Arjona court also noted that § 2255(f)(3) was not applicable because the Sixth Circuit’s decision was not binding on that court and because the Sixth Circuit’s decision had not been made retroactively applicable. Arjona, 2010 WL 318743, at *2. 

These two reasons seem to address the second requirement of § 2255(f)(3), that the right has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, as opposed to the first requirement that the “right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). 

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Supreme Court held that “[a]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through 

which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . [or] 

expiration of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 1928. However, “tenable actual innocence 

gateway pleas are rare.” Id. The court must apply the standards for gateway actual 

innocence claims set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). See McQuiggin, 133 

S. Ct. at 1928. “[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he 

persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, 

would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329 

(emphasizing that this standard is “demanding” and seldom met). The Court in 

McQuiggin explained that the actual innocence rule announced in Schlup, and adopted in 

McQuiggin, is an equitable exception to the application of the statute of limitations. Id. at 

1931. Actual innocence, if proven, merely allows a federal court to address the merits of 

a movant’s constitutional claims. Id. 

 To make a credible claim of actual innocence, a movant must “support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; see also Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 

956, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “habeas petitioners may pass Schlup’s test by 

offering ‘newly presented’ evidence of actual innocence”); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 

982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable 

evidence not presented at trial.”). 

 Here, Defendant has not met the demanding standard for establishing a claim of 

actual innocence to avoid the statute of limitations. Defendant has not presented any 

“new evidence” or established that, “in light of new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, 

would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

332. Accordingly, Defendant has not established a threshold claim of “actual innocence” 

to avoid the statute of limitations. 

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IV. Conclusion 

 Defendant’s § 2255 motion, filed nearly sixteen years after the § 2255 statute of 

limitations period expired, is untimely. Defendant has not established a basis for 

avoiding or tolling the one-year statute of limitations under § 2255(f). Accordingly, the 

§ 2255 motion should be denied as untimely and the Court does not reach the 

government’s alternative argument that several of Defendant’s claims are procedurally 

barred. (Doc. 7 at 4.) 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 4) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Defendant has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should 

not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have fourteen 

days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file 

specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 

72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 27th day of May, 2014. 

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