Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02007/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02007-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Earl Felton Crago, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 14-2007-TUC-FRZ (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is an amended petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, filed on July 31, 2015, by Earl Felton Crago, Jr., an inmate confined in the

Arizona State Prison Complex in Buckeye, Arizona. (Doc. 25) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bowman for report and recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order denying the petition. Crago’s sentencing claims are procedurally

defaulted. His Brady claim should be denied on the merits. 

Summary of the Case

Crago was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial. (Doc. 30-1, p. 4) On

August 21, 1995, the trial court sentenced him to “a LIFE term in the Department of

Corrections.” Id. The trial court further explained that “the Defendant must serve every day

of twenty-five (25) years of the sentence imposed before he is eligible for any type of release.”

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Id. Finally, the court ordered that “pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-603(I), the Defendant will be

required to do mandatory community supervision sentence – one day for every seven days

sentenced to, for a total of 3 years, 7 months.” Id. The community supervision order was

erroneous. It would have been appropriate if Crago had been sentenced to a term of

imprisonment lasting 25 years. Crago, however, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Crago filed a direct appeal and three post-conviction relief (PCR) petitions challenging

various aspects of his trial and his representation. (CV 05-772 TUC FRZ, Docs. 34, 37) He

filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 27, 2005. Id. The petition

was denied as time-barred on December 31, 2008. Id.

On March 18, 2008, Crago filed in state court a “petition for writ of habeas corpus”

(Doc. 30-1, p. 12) Apparently, when Crago began serving his sentence, the Arizona Department

of Corrections (ADOC) recorded a start date and end date for Crago’s community supervision

sentence assuming he was scheduled for release after 25 years.. (Doc. 30-1, p. 18) In early

2008, ADOC amended its records to reflect that Crago was sentenced to life imprisonment and

would not be released on community supervision after 25 years. (Doc. 30-1, p. 20) Crago

argued in his petition that ADOC was unlawfully changing his sentence. The state court

construed the filing as Crago’s fourth notice of post-conviction relief and appointed counsel.

(Doc. 30-1, p. 22) Counsel filed a notice explaining he was unable to find any meritorious

issues. (Doc. 30-1, p. 24) He explained that while a Rule 32 petition can be filed if a person

were held beyond the expiration of his sentence, Crago had not yet served 25 years, so his

argument was not yet ripe. (Doc. 30-1, p. 25) The state court gave Crago time to file a petition

pro se. (Doc. 30-1, p. 28) When Crago failed to file a timely petition, the trial court dismissed

the post-conviction relief proceedings on November 6, 2008. (Doc. 30-1, p. 31)

Four days later on November 10, 2008, Crago filed a Petition for Special Action. (Doc.

30-1, p. 33) He insisted he was given “a life sentence with release after 25 years and to serve

exactly 3 years 7 months community supervision.” (Doc. 30-1, p. 34) He argued ADOC had

changed his sentence to “‘natural life’ with no release eligibility and no community

supervision.” (Doc. 30-1, p. 34) The trial court denied the petition on November 14, 2008,

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apparently on procedural grounds. (Doc. 30-1, p. 40) Crago filed a petition for review with the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 30-2, p. 9)

On May 12, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of

the Rule 32 proceeding because Crago failed to file a petition. (Doc. 30-2, p. 12) The court

remanded the Petition for Special Action for further proceedings. (Doc. 30-2, p. 12) On August

5, 2009, however, Crago voluntarily withdrew his Petition for Special Action. (Doc. 30-2, p.

19)

On April 8, 2010, Crago filed his fifth notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 30-2, p. 22)

He states this is the proceeding in which he exhausted Claim (1) and Claim (2) of the pending

petition. (Doc. 25, pp. 6-7); see also (Doc. 30-4, pp. 11-13); (Doc. 30-5, p. 5)

In his notice, Crago asserted that during plea negotiations, the trial court told him in

chambers that if he were convicted at trial, he would get a sentence of 25 years to life. Id. He

maintains he rejected a plea agreement for 22 years’ imprisonment on the strength of that

advice. Id. He filed his petition on October 7, 2010. (Doc. 30-3, p. 2) In that petition, which

was prepared by counsel, Crago abandoned his plea agreement issue and returned to his original

sentencing issue. He argued he was given a minimum sentence of 25 years and ADOC

improperly changed his sentence to natural life imprisonment. (Doc. 30-3, pp. 2-9) On May

4, 2011, the trial court denied the petition holding that Crago got the only sentence permitted

by law – life without possibility of release for 25 years. (Doc 30-4, pp. 7-8) The court held that

the community supervision term was contrary to law but found that the court was unable to

correct it. Id.

On May 23, 2011, Crago filed a petition for review. (Doc. 30-4, pp. 11-15) He argued

that he rejected a plea agreement for “22 years flat” in reliance on the trial court’s incorrect

assessment that he faced “a sentence of incarceration totaling twenty-five years” if he were

convicted at trial. Id., p. 11 He further argued that “[i]f a statute is so vague as to cause a

Senior Superior Court Judge to misunderstand its meaning and wrongly apply it at the plea offer

stage, and the sentencing stage, then it violates the due process requirements of the [F]ifth and

[F]ourteenth [A]mendments.” Id., p. 13 He argued in the alternative that the trial court was

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correct, and he was given a sentence of 25 years imprisonment followed by three years and

seven months of community supervision. Id., pp. 12-13

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that Crago’s issues were precluded citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). (Doc. 30-5, p. 7) In the alternative, the court held that Crago received

a lawful sentence – life without the possibility of release for 25 years – and that ADOC’s

removal of the erroneously imposed term of community service did not cause him prejudice.

(Doc. 30-5, pp. 2-9) The court affirmed the trial court’s determination that “the imposition of

community supervision was contrary to law.” (Doc. 30-5, p. 8) (emphasis in original) The

Arizona Supreme Court denied review on February 23, 2012. (Doc 30-5, p. 11)

On March 12, 2012, Crago filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (CV 12-0176 TUC FRZ (BPV), Doc. 1) The petition was dismissed as

“second or successive.” (CV 12-0176 TUC FRZ (BPV), Doc. 5)

On July 16, 2012, Crago filed his sixth notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 30-5, p.

22) On August 2, 2013, the trial court held that Crago’s claim that counsel failed to correctly

advise him about the sentence he would get if he were convicted at trial was precluded pursuant

to Rule 32.2(a)(3). (Doc. 30-6, p. 10) Crago filed a petition for review on September 9, 2013.

(Doc. 30-6, p. 14) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on March 11, 2014, finding

Crago’s ineffective assistance claim precluded. (Doc. 30-6, pp. 43-46) The Arizona Supreme

Court denied review on July 25, 3014. (Doc. 30-6, p. 48)

On March 21, 2014, Crago filed his seventh notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) in

which he first raised the issue that constitutes Claim (3) of the pending petition. (Doc. 30-7, p.

2); (Doc. 25, p. 8) In his notice, Crago asserted that he received an anonymous letter from

someone in the Cochise County Attorney’s Office who said that he found a note in Crago’s file

stating as follows: “DNA not a positive match, defendant doesn’t know, go ahead and tell the

jury that the victim’s blood was found in the defendant’s vehicle.” (Doc. 30-7, pp. 2-16) Crago

argued that this falsehood was reported to his counsel, who then convinced Crago to testify that

he killed the victim in self-defense. Id. 

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The trial court found that the only DNA report in Crago’s file was dated June 27th , after

his April 1995 trial. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 4-5) The report gives results from two “bloodstains on

seat material.” Id. The results from one stain were “inconclusive.” Id. The results from the

other stain matched the victim’s DNA profile at one locus but was inconclusive at four other

tested loci. Id. 

Crago submitted a number of other documents that he stated were “records given to the

defendant” (Doc. 30-10, p. 5) One of these documents purported to be a DNA test performed

prior to his trial, on March 23, 1995. Id. The trial court gave the documents no weight because

their provenance was not established. Id. 

The trial court found, among other things, that nothing supported Crago’s argument that

the prosecution lied to Crago’s counsel about the DNA before trial and that lie induced counsel

to convince Crago to change his trial theory to self-defense. Crago’s trial counsel announced

on February 22, 1995 that Crago would assert self-defense. (Doc. 30-10, p. 14) There were no

DNA tests performed before that date. (Doc. 30-10, p. 18)

Moreover, if Crago had pursued an alibi defense instead of self-defense, he still would

have been convicted. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 18-27)

Crago filed a petition for review on November 3, 2014. (Doc. 30-11, p. 2) The Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on February 25, 2015. (Doc. 30-11, p. 18) The court

of appeals held that Crago failed to present “evidence contradicting the court’s determination

that the only DNA tests were completed after trial.” (Doc. 30-11, p. 20) On July 21, 2015, the

Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 30-13, p. 4)

Previously, on March 13, 2014, the Ninth Circuit held that “the 2011 state court

decisions effectively amended the petitioner’s judgment of conviction by removing the

community supervision provision from his sentence.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 9) Accordingly, Crago

could file a “second-in-time” petition for writ of habeas corpus without obtaining the prior

authorization required for filing a “second or successive” petition. Id. On April 7, 2014, Crago

filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1)

The petition was stayed while Crago exhausted his seventh PCR proceeding.

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On July 31, 2015, Crago filed the pending amended petition for writ of habeas corpus

(Doc. 25) He claims (1) “the state court misinformed [him] as to the mandatory minimum

sentence he faced” so he could not “make informed decisions about whether or not to accept a

plea offer,” (2) “the Arizona truth-in-sentencing statute is vague, misleading and incomplete

in structure as it applies to first degree murder mandatory minimum sentences,” and (3) the

state violated Brady by misrepresenting the DNA results. Id. The petition is not a “second or

successive” petition because the Arizona Court of Appeals “effectively amended the petitioner’s

judgment of conviction by removing the community supervision provision from his sentence.”

(Doc. 25, p. 36)

 In their answer, the respondents argue Crago’s three claims are procedurally defaulted.

(Doc. 26) Crago filed a reply on December 31, 2015. (Doc. 42)

The court finds that Crago’s sentencing claims are procedurally defaulted. His Brady

claim should be denied on the merits. 

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If the petitioner is

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, the writ will not be granted unless prior

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petitioner must shoulder an additional burden if the state court

considered the issues and made findings of fact.

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of

a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by

clear and convincing evidence.

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28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (e)(1).

“[The] standard is intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372,

1376 (2015). “‘[C]learly established Federal law’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court’s decisions.” Id. 

A decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if that Court already confronted

“the specific question presented in this case” and reached a different result. Woods, 135 S.Ct.

at 1377. A decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent only if it is

“objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Id. at 1376.

“To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the state court’s ruling on

the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Id. (punctuation modified) 

If the highest state court fails to explain its decision, this court looks to the last reasoned

state court decision. Young v. Runnels, 435 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006).

Federal habeas review is limited to those issues that have been fully presented to the state

court. This so-called “exhaustion rule” reads in pertinent part as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears

that – (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the

State. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 

To be properly exhausted, the federal claim must be “fairly presented” to the state courts.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971). In other words, the state courts

must be apprised of the issue and given the first opportunity to rule on the merits. Id. at 275-76.

Accordingly, the petitioner must “present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the

federal courts.” Id. “The state courts have been given a sufficient opportunity to hear an issue

when the petitioner has presented the state court with the issue’s factual and legal basis.”

Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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In addition, the petitioner must explicitly alert the state court that he is raising a federal

constitutional claim. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-366 (1995); Casey v. Moore, 386

F.3d 896, 910-11 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1146 (2005). The petitioner must make

the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing specific provisions of federal law or

federal case law, even if the federal basis of a claim is “self-evident,” Gatlin v. Madding, 189

F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1087 (2000), or by citing state cases that

explicitly analyze the same federal constitutional claim, Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153,

1158 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

 If the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a judgment imposed by the State of Arizona,

he must present his claims to the state appellate court for review. Castillo v. McFadden, 399

F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 818 (2005); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). If state remedies have not been

exhausted, the petition may not be granted and ordinarily should be dismissed. See Johnson v.

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). In the alternative, the court has the authority to deny

on the merits rather than dismiss for failure to exhaust. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

A claim is “procedurally defaulted” if the state court declined to address the issue on the

merits for procedural reasons. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002).

Procedural default also occurs if the claim was not presented to the state court and it is clear the

state would now refuse to address the merits of the claim for procedural reasons. Id. 

Procedural default may be excused if the petitioner can “demonstrate cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate

that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Boyd v.

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998). “To qualify for the fundamental miscarriage

of justice exception to the procedural default rule, however, [the petitioner] must show that a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction when he was actually innocent

of the offense.” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008).

Discussion

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In Claim (1), Crago argues his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments

were violated when “the state court misinformed [him] as to the mandatory minimum sentence

he faced for the charge of first degree murder” so he was unable to “make informed decisions

about whether or not to accept a plea offer.” (Doc. 25, p. 20) In Claim (2), he argues his rights

under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because “the Arizona truth-insentencing statute is vague, misleading and incomplete in structure as it applies to first degree

murder mandatory minimum sentences.” (Doc. 25, p. 24)

He maintains he presented these issues in his fifth post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 25,

pp. 6-7) The court assumes, without deciding, that Crago did so. (Doc. 25, Exhibit U) The

Arizona Court of Appeals, however, held that all of Crago’s sentencing issues were precluded

citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). (Doc. 30-5, p. 7); (Doc. 30, Exhibit V, p. 6) Presumably, Crago

could have raised these issues earlier either in his direct appeal or in his fourth post-conviction

relief petition. Accordingly, Claim (1) and Claim (2) are procedurally defaulted. See Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Crago argues that “[t]he court’s finding of preclusion was based on its erroneous finding

that removing the community supervision release from Crago’s sentence did not amount to an

amendment of the judgment of conviction.” (Doc. 42, p. 23) This argument is not entirely

clear. The record contains an order from the Ninth Circuit holding that because the state court

amended his sentence, Crago could file a “second-in-time” § 2254 petition without the need for

obtaining prior authorization to file a “second or successive” petition. (Doc. 1-1, p. 9) Crago

may be confusing a federal legal principle that a petitioner is “precluded” from filing a second

or successive habeas petition absent prior approval from the court of appeals with a state legal

principle that a petitioner is “precluded” from raising claims in a subsequent post-conviction

relief petition that should have been raised earlier. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A);

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). Claims (1) and (2) are procedurally defaulted because the Arizona

Court of Appeals explicitly stated that Crago’s sentencing claims were precluded citing

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). (Doc. 30-5, p. 7); (Doc. 30, Exhibit V, p. 6) 

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Crago further argues that his claims are not procedurally defaulted because the Arizona

Court of Appeals reached the merits of his claims. He is incorrect. The Arizona Court of

Appeals reached the merits of his petition in an alternative holding that addressed only Crago’s

contention that the BOP somehow changed his sentence from a determinant sentence of 25

years to life imprisonment. (Doc. 30-5, pp. 7-9), (Doc. 30, Exhibit V, pp. 6-8) The Arizona

Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of Crago’s plea negotiation claims. Id. Moreover,

it would not matter if it had. An alternative holding on the merits does not mitigate the

preclusive effect of that court’s original procedural bar. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as

here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”).

Finally, Crago argues that if his claims are defaulted, this default should be excused

because he is actually innocent. He maintains a certain John Wood shot the victim, and he was

on Fort Huachuca at that time. 

“[P]risoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in

light of new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37, 126 S. Ct.

2064, 2076-77 (2006) (punctuation modified). Relief is available only if the petitioner’s case

is truly “extraordinary.” Id. at 537; Id. at 2077.

In his seventh PCR proceeding, Crago made a similar claim. Pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.1(e) he argued he had “newly discovered material facts” that “probably would have changed

the verdict” had they been introduced at the trial. (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, p. 8) The trial court

held to the contrary that if Crago had introduced those facts and had pursued an alibi defense,

he still would have been convicted. See (Doc. 30- 10, pp. 18-26); (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, pp.

17-25); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(e). This court is in agreement. See below. Crago’s procedural

default is not excused under the “actual innocence” exception.

The court finds in the alternative that Claims (1) and (2) are not cognizable. While a

defendant’s decision to plead guilty must be knowing and voluntary, the opposite is not true.

Emery v. Cate, 2013 WL 5728108, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2013). Due process does not require that

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1

 Crago challenges the fairness of his trial in Claim (3) but not here. Here, he objects to plea

negotiations that “caused him to receive a full and fair trial.” See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376,

1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). There is no due process violation. If

counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations, then the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights might

be at issue. See Lafler v. Cooper. Crago raised a Sixth Amendment claim below, but the state courts

found it precluded. (Doc. 30-6, pp. 10, 43)

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a decision to forgo a plea must also be knowing and voluntary. Id. That is because plea

negotiations are not constitutionally mandated, and if the plea is rejected, the negotiations have

no direct affect on the ultimate conviction. Id.; see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561,

97 S. Ct. 837, 846 (1977). Put another way, “[Petitioner] can obtain federal habeas corpus relief

only if his custody is in violation of the Federal Constitution.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,

507, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2546 (1984). Here, Crago is in custody because of a conviction he

received at trial. It is this conviction that receives constitutional scrutiny. And here, this

conviction was obtained after a full and fair trial.1

 His claim is not cognizable. Toepfer v.

United States, 518 F. App’x 834, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Toepfer’s contention that his decision

to go to trial was involuntary does not state a cognizable due process violation, at least not under

existing law.”); Williams v. Grounds, 2015 WL 5579901, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2015), report and

recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 5567745 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Emery v. Cate, 2013 WL

5728108, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2013); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08, 104 S. Ct.

2543, 2546 (1984) (Petitioner could not attack subsequent guilty plea on the grounds that the

government previously took from him a more favorable plea agreement.).

In Claim (3), Crago argues the state violated his “right to due process of law as defined

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland . . . .” (Doc. 25, p. 27) He bases this claim

on an anonymous letter revealing the contents of a note allegedly found in Crago’s prosecution

file. The note allegedly read as follows: “DNA not a positive match, defendant doesn’t know,

go ahead and tell the jury that the victim’s blood was found in the defendant’s vehicle.” (Doc.

25, p. 29) Crago maintains he presented this issue in his seventh post-conviction relief petition.

(Doc. 25, p. 8) The respondents argue this claim was not properly exhausted because Crago did

not mention Brady in his petition before the trial court.

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Assuming, without deciding, that the claim was properly exhausted, the court finds the

claim should be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

 Under Brady, a defendant has a due process right to material exculpatory evidence in the

possession of the prosecution at the time of trial. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.

Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963). “Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls

within the Brady rule.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985). “[A]

constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material

in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 678,

3381. “[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

682, 3383. 

At trial, Crago admitted that he killed the victim, put the body in his car, and dumped it

in a wash. (Doc. 30-10, p. 11) He maintained, however, that the killing had been in selfdefense. Id. He now claims the prosecution falsely told his counsel that DNA evidence linked

the victim to his car, and as a result, his counsel convinced him to testify falsely that he killed

the victim in self-defense. See (Doc. 30-10, p. 13) He argues that if the true DNA evidence had

been disclosed, he would have maintained his innocence. See (Doc. 30-10, p. 8) He says now

that he was on Fort Huachuca at the time of the killing, and a certain John Wood was the actual

killer. See (Doc. 30-10, p. 19)

The trial court analyzed in detail Crago’s false-DNA-evidence claim. The court had

doubts about the reliability of the anonymous letter. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 2-27); (Doc. 30, Exhibit

OO) Crago’s file was in storage so it is unlikely that a whistle blower in the Cochise County

Attorney’s Office would have had an opportunity to examine it. (Doc. 30-10, p. 3, n.1); (Doc.

30, Exhibit OO, p. 3, n. 1) The alleged DNA strategy note referred to in the letter is not in the

file. Id. There is a DNA analysis in the file, but it is dated approximately two months after the

trial was completed. Id., pp. 4-5; Id., pp. 3-4 Moreover, the jury was not presented with any

scientific evidence, DNA or otherwise, linking the victim to the stains found in the defendant’s

vehicle. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 6-7); (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, pp. 5-6) Nevertheless, the state court

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considered whether a misrepresentation of the DNA evidence could have caused a change in

the outcome of the trial: What would have happened if Crago had adopted an alibi defense

rather than claiming self-defense?

The trial court concluded that even if Crago had adopted an alibi defense, he still would

have been convicted. At trial, 15-year-old S.A. testified that he heard gunshots at approximately

5:00 a.m. in his Sierra Vista neighborhood. (Doc. 30, p. 2); (CV 05-772 TUC FRZ, Doc. 11-9,

p. 58) From his bedroom window, he saw Crago standing next to his Nisan 300ZX in the

driveway of S.A.’s house. Id. S.A. then went into the living room from where he saw Crago

pick up the victim’s body from the driveway. Id. He then heard the car drive off. Id. S.A.

recognized the victim, Charlie Davidson, because he was his mother’s boyfriend. (Doc. 30,

Exhibit OO, p. 25) He further testified that he saw Davidson and Crago together at his house

“five to ten times.” Id. On one occasion, Crago showed S.A. a gun that he said was a .38. Id.

Several other neighbors testified that they heard the gunshots and saw a man lying in

S.A.’s driveway next to a small hatchback vehicle. (Doc. 30, p. 3); (CV 05-772 TUC FRZ,

Doc. 11-9, pp. 58-59) They saw someone place the man in the passenger seat of the car and

drive away. Id. The victim’s body was found in the desert four days later. Id.

Crago was arrested the day after the murder in Texas. (Doc. 30, p. 4); (CV 05-772 TUC

FRZ, Doc. 11-9, pp. 58-59) He told police that “he did not know a Carl Davidson.” (Doc. 30-

10, p. 10) Police found what appeared to be bloodstains on the front passenger seat of Crago’s

Nissan. Id.

Detention Officer Pedro Velasquez testified that he overheard Crago “bragging to the

effect how he took this guy, killed him.” (Doc. 30-10, p. 25); (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, p. 24)

Crago related “[h]ow he blew this guy away, and he was motioning how he even held the gun.”

Id., pp. 25-26; Id., pp. 24-25.

The evidence of guilt presented at trial was quite strong. In contrast, Crago’s proposed

alibi evidence is fairly weak. Crago asserts he was on Fort Huachuca at 5:10 a.m. when the

victim was killed, but there is no evidence to support that. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 19-20); (Doc. 30,

Exhibit OO, pp. 18-19) There is a record of his obtaining a visitor’s pass that morning, but

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Kevin W. Brant, the guard on duty, “indicated he did not recall having seen [Crago’s] vehicle

enter Post nor did he recall having seen it exit.” Id.; Id.; (Doc. 30-8, p. 21); (Doc. 30, Exhibit

KK, exhibit B) Tovah Sitts testified that Crago gave her a ride home that morning and left the

Fort around 4:30 a.m. (Doc. 30-10, p. 20); (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, p. 19) That still would have

given Crago time to drive from the Fort to the scene of the murder by 5:10 a.m., the time of the

shooting. Id., pp. 19-20; Id. pp. 18-19.

According to Crago, the witnesses saw a certain John Wood remove the victim’s body

from the crime scene. He is incorrect. None of the witnesses was able to identify the two men

in the driveway except for S.A. Id., pp. 22, 24; Id., pp. 21, 23. And S.A. said Crago was the

one who removed the body, not Wood. Id., p. 24; Id., p. 23. John Wood was stopped by

police in the neighborhood shortly after the shooting, but contrary to Crago’s assertions, there

is no evidence that he was driving the vehicle that removed the victim from the scene. Id., p.

22; Id., p. 21. Wood knew the victim, Davidson, and S.A.’s mother, Cecelia. Id., pp. 23-24;

Id., pp. 22-23. He apparently dropped Davidson off at Cecelia’s house the previous evening.

Id. He told his mother-in-law that when Cecelia learned of the murder from her son, she paged

him asking him to come back to the house. Id. That explains his presence in the neighborhood

early that morning.

In light of the strong evidence of guilt and the weak evidence of alibi, the trial court

concluded that “there is no compelling reason to believe that the jury would have accepted

defendant’s alibi, nor that it would have concluded that John Wood killed Charlie Davidson.”

(Doc. 30-10, p. 26); (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, p. 25) Accordingly, the trial court found that Crago

did not make a colorable claim of “newly-discovered evidence” and Crago did not merit postconviction relief. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 8-9, 26-27); (Doc. 30, Exhibit OO, pp. 7-8, 25-26) Crago

appealed citing, among other things, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).

(Doc. 30-11, p. 11); (Doc. 30, Exhibit RR, p. 10) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief

without specific analysis of Brady. (Doc. 30-11, p. 20); (Doc. 30, Exhibit SS, p. 3)

Assuming the Arizona Court of Appeals considered Crago’s Brady issue, its decision

rejecting this claim was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” federal law. See

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091-1092 (2013)

(“[W]hen a defendant convicted in state court attempts to raise a federal claim . . . and a state

court rules against the defendant and issues an opinion that addresses some issues but does not

expressly address the federal claim in question, . . . the federal claim at issue . . . must be

presumed to have been adjudicated on the merits. . . .”). Neither was it “a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” Id. Crago cannot show the state failed to disclose material exculpatory

evidence in its possession at the time of trial. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.

Ct. 1194, 1196-97 (1963).

 The trial court found there was no DNA evidence in the state’s possession prior to the

trial. (Doc. 30-10, pp. 4-5); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“[A] determination of a factual

issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”). Crago produced a DNA test

dated March 23, 1995, but the trial court rejected it because Crago did not establish foundation

for the document. Id. Crago did not produce clear and convincing evidence rebutting the

presumption that the state court’s decision on this issue was correct. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (e)(1).

Moreover, even if the test Crago produced was genuine, it was not material evidence

because its disclosure would not have changed the results of the proceeding. Crago argues the

state’s failure to produce this evidence caused him to adopt an unsuccessful self-defense theory

at trial. But Crago noticed his self-defense theory on February 22, 1995, before the date of the

DNA test – March 23, 1995. (Doc. 30-10, p. 5); (Doc. 30-10, p. 14) Failure to disclose the

test could not have caused him to reject his alibi defense and adopt his unsuccessful self-defense

theory. 

Finally, the court holds that if Crago had presented an alibi defense at trial rather than

a self-defense theory, he still would have been convicted. The evidence of guilt was strong, and

the evidence of alibi was weak. Therefore, the DNA test was not material evidence and the

state’s failure to disclose it, assuming it existed, did not violate Brady. This claim should be

denied on the merits.

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RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The Local Rules permit a response to an objection.

They do not permit a reply to a response.

DATED this 4th day of April, 2016.

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