Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03525/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03525-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

BARRY JAMESON, 

 Petitioner, 

 vs. 

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden, 

 Respondent. 

Case No: C 13-03525 SBA (PR) 

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 

AS MOOT; AND DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Barry Jameson, a former state prisoner, filed a pro se habeas petition in 

this Court to challenge his putative classification as a Mentally Disordered Offender 

(“MDO”), as defined in California Penal Code § 2962. Respondent has filed an Answer to 

the Petition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the Petition as moot. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On July 30, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant habeas action, claiming that his 

apparent classification as an MDO violated his due process rights by failing to afford him a 

hearing, as specified in California Penal Code § 2966. Dkt. 1 at 9, 12-13. He also alleges 

that the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) improperly denied parole based on findings 

regarding his mental state. Dkt. 1 at 7-9.1

 

At the time Petitioner filed this action, he was incarcerated at San Quentin State 

Prison. Petitioner was subsequently granted parole and released from custody on or about 

December 19, 2014. Petitioner confirmed his release by filing a Notice of Change of 

Address, indicating that his new address is 110 Roundtree Court in Sacramento, California 

 1 Petitioner does not specify the date of the challenged parole denial; however, the 

Court notes that his request for a hearing under California Penal Code § 2966 was sent to 

the Board on December 28, 2012. Dkt. 1-1 at 4-5. Since that request would have been 

made after the denial of parole, it appears that the Board denied parole in 2012. 

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95831. Consequently, on January 13, 2015, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause why 

the instant petition should not be dismissed as moot. Dkt. 18. 

In its Order to Show Cause, the Court explained that Article III § 2 of the United 

States Constitution requires the existence of a case or controversy through all stages of 

federal judicial proceedings. Dkt. 18 at 2 (emphasis added). The Court further explained 

that challenges by an incarcerated convict to the validity of his conviction satisfies the caseor-controversy requirement, because the incarceration constitutes a concrete injury, caused 

by the conviction and redressable by the invalidation of the conviction. Id. at 2 (citing 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “Once the sentence has expired, however, some 

concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration—some ‘collateral 

consequence’ of the conviction—must exist if the suit is to be maintained and not 

considered moot.” Id. Thus, the Court determined that, “[u]nder these legal principles, the 

instant petition may well be moot unless Petitioner can show he suffers from such collateral 

consequences.” Id. at 2. Petitioner filed a response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, 

and Respondent filed a reply thereto. Dkts. 19, 21. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide cases that are moot because the courts’ 

constitutional authority extends to only actual cases or controversies. Iron Arrow Honor 

Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1983). Article III requires a case or controversy in 

which a litigant has a personal stake in the outcome of the suit throughout all stages of 

federal judicial proceedings and has suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision. Id. A petition for writ of habeas corpus becomes moot when it 

no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 

477, 479 (9th Cir. 2003), such as where a petitioner’s claim for relief cannot be redressed 

by a favorable decision of the court issuing a writ of habeas corpus, Burnett v. Lampert, 

432 F.3d 996, 1000-1001 (9th Cir. 2005). A moot petition must be dismissed because 

nothing remains before the Court to be remedied. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18. 

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Here, federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in state law governing 

when a hearing must be conducted if a prisoner seeks to contest his designation as a MDO. 

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Therefore, only Petitioner’s claim that 

he was denied due process at his 2012 parole hearing is potentially cognizable in his habeas 

proceeding. However, his claim challenging the Board’s 2012 decision has been rendered 

moot by the Board’s subsequent decision in 2014 finding him suitable for release on parole. 

As a result, the alleged injury—a constitutionally deficient parole suitability hearing—

cannot be redressed effectively with a new parole hearing because Petitioner has already 

received such relief from the Board. The instant petition has thus lost its character as a 

present, live controversy because the alleged injury cannot be redressed by a favorable 

judicial decision against the Board. See Fendler v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 846 

F.2d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 1988) (habeas challenge to denial of parole will become moot if 

petitioner is released on parole before court considers petition). 

In his response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, Petitioner confirms that he was 

released on parole on December 19, 2014. Dkt. 19 at 2. However, he argues that the 

petition should not be dismissed as moot due to his release because he purports to be a 

“spokesperson” for the thousands of prison inmates who are still subject to the Board’s 

allegedly improper reliance on inmates’ mental state to deny parole. Id. at 2. However, 

Petitioner’s desire to be a “spokesperson” of others has no bearing on whether his petition is 

now moot because he has been paroled. In any event, because this is a habeas proceeding 

and not a civil class action, Petitioner is not in a position to represent the interests of other, 

similarly-situated individuals. But even if this were a class action, Petitioner cannot 

represent a class, given that his claim is moot. See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. 

Dist. of Calif., 495 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff whose individual 

claim was rendered moot by an arbitration award “would lose his status as class representative 

because he would no longer have a concrete stake in the controversy.”). 

Alternatively, Petitioner claims he could “be returned to custody for the minutest 

[sic] of infractions,” and would then appear in front of the Board “that will once again 

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make him a psychiatric prisoner without any of the required due process safeguards.” Dkt. 

19 at 5. Liberally construed, Petitioner appears to argue that his claim falls within the 

“capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine based upon 

the possibility that his parole could be revoked. To qualify for this narrow exception, 

Petitioner must demonstrate that: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to 

be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable 

expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” 

Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). 

It is arguable that the first prong of the foregoing test can be satisfied, as it is 

difficult for a prisoner to complete state exhaustion and obtain a ruling on the merits on a 

subsequent federal habeas petition in the short time frame (i.e., one to three years) between 

parole hearings. Nevertheless, Petitioner has not shown that there is a “reasonable 

expectation” that he will be subjected to the same injury again. As mentioned above, 

Petitioner’s injury in this instant action stems from the Board’s 2012 decision finding him 

unsuitable for parole. In light of the Board’s 2014 decision finding him suitable for parole 

and his eventual release, Petitioner has no real expectation that he will be subjected to the 

same injury as alleged in the instant action. Moreover, the possibility of parole revocation 

does not present a situation which is “‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’” such that 

the doctrine of mootness may not apply. Brady v. United States Parole Comm’n, 600 F.2d 

234, 236 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); see also Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 

999-1001 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding habeas petition still moot after petitioner violated parole 

and was reincarcerated). Finally, even if the relief Petitioner sought could have resulted in 

the possible earlier termination of parole supervision, the mootness doctrine would still be 

applicable. See Fendler, 846 F.2d at 555 (rejecting claim of exception to mootness by 

federal prisoner who could seek review of his eligibility for early termination of parole by 

applying to the parole commission). 

Accordingly, the instant petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Board’s 2014 decision to grant 

Petitioner parole and his eventual release have rendered moot the instant action challenging 

the Board’s 2012 decision to deny him parole. The instant action is DISMISSED as moot. 

Further, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. Petitioner has not shown “that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a 

certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this Order, terminate 

all remaining pending motions as moot, including Petitioner’s Motion for Permission for 

Electronic Case Filing (dkt. 20), and close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket No. 20. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 5/14/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

United States District Judge 

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