Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05217/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05217-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDDIE OLIVERA,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN SCRIBBER,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-5217 OWW WMW HC

MEMORANDUM

DECISION AND ORDER RE RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 68]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The case is proceeding on the second amended complaint filed June 22, 2007. 

Before the court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 13, 2001, a jury found Petitioner guilty of four counts of assault with a firearm

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(Pen. Code § 245(a)(2)) and a single count of discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle (Pen.

Code§ 246). The jury also found true allegations that Petitioner had personally used a firearm (Pen.

Code §§ 12022.5(a)(1)), and committed the offense as part of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code §

186.22(b)(1)). The court sentenced Petitioner to serve a term of 15 years to life in the state prison.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his conviction. On May 21, 2003, the Court of Appeal,

Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the

California Supreme Court, which the court denied on July 30, 2003.

Petitioner subsequently filed the following five petitions for post-conviction relief in state

court:

1. December 22, 2003: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Tulare County Superior Court

December 23, 2003: petition denied as untimely

2. January 28, 2004: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Tulare County Superior Court

January 30, 2004: petition denied as untimely

3. March 15, 2004: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in Court of Appeal

July 1, 2004: petition denied

4. May 26, 2005: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in California Supreme Court

April 26, 2006: petition denied

5. October 18, 2006: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in California Supreme Court

May 23, 2007: petition denied with citations to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780, and In re 

Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993).

Petitioner filed the present action on February 2, 2004. Petitioner filed a first amended

petition on June 18, 2004, and then filed a second amended petition on June 22, 2007.

LEGAL STANDARDS

 JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

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1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Tulare 

County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

2241(d). Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

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established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on the

ground that it is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner opposes the motion.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be

raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” 

The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss as a request for the court to

dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 th

F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and

case law, the court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule

4.

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

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petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on July 30, 2003. The state appeal

process became “final” within the meaning of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing a

petition for writ of certiorari expired ninety days later, on October 23, 2003. Supreme Court Rule

13, Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9 Cir. 1999). The one-year statute of limitations began running th

the following day - - July 9, 2003. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9 Cir. 2001)(citing th

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)). Thus, absent tolling, the last day to file a federal petition was October 23, 2004. 

STATUTORY TOLLING

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth

Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. 1

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v.

Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The

Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition

to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and

will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end

before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period

does not, however, toll for the time during which a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001)

In opposing Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner repeatedly asserts that by entering a

stay in this case on August 30, 2005, this court stayed the running of the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner is mistaken. This court merely stayed the progress of the case in this court, it did not stay

the running of the statute. Nothing in this court’s order referred to staying the running of the statute. 

Further, as a general matter, the limitations period does not toll for the time during which a petition

for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 544 U.S. 167, 181- 182

(2001).

First Two Petitions Filed in Superior Court

In his motion to dismiss, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the

statute of limitations by virtue of his two petitions to the superior court. Respondent notes correctly

that both petitions were denied as untimely, and argues that they therefore had no tolling effect. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The

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United States Supreme Court, in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361 (2000), held that a

habeas application is "filed" "when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer

for placement in the official record." Id. at 363. A habeas application is “‘properly filed' when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings." 121

S.Ct. at 364. Examples of the “"laws and rules governing filings" include "the form of the

document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the

requisite filing fees." Id. A state’s “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions.” Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-417 (2005). Therefore, if a state court has rejected an

application for collateral relief as untimely, “that [is] the end of the matter.” Id. at 414 (quoting

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)). The application or petition is not properly filed and has

no tolling effect. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417; Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226.

The court must agree with Respondent that because Petitioner’s two habeas petitions filed in

Superior Court were denied as untimely, they were not properly filed and therefore had no tolling

effect. See Pace

Petition to Court of Appeal and First Petition to California Supreme Court

On February 3, 2004, Petitioner filed his original federal petition with this court. This had no

tolling effect on the statute of limitations. See Duncan, 544 U.S. at 181- 182 (the limitations period

does not toll for the time during which a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal

court). On March 15, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of

Appeal. As of that date, 144 days had passed since the statute of limitations began running on July

9, 2003. On July 1, 2004, the Court of Appeal denied the petition.

On May 26, 2005, Petitioner filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court. This petition was filed 329 days after the Court of Appeal denied the

petition to that court. The issue is therefore whether the running of the statute of limitations was

tolled in the period between the denial of the petition by the Court of Appeal and the filing of the

petition in the California Supreme Court.

In Carey v. Saffold, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002), the Supreme Court determined that under

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California’s collateral review process, the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a

new petition in a higher court are within the scope of the statutory word “pending.” Id. at 2140. 

Thus, as in Nino v. Galaza, tolling occurs during the intervals between petitions in the state courts. 

The Supreme Court examined this principle in light of California’s unique original writ system

where the timeliness of a petition is determined according to a “reasonableness” standard. Carey v.

Saffold, 122 S.Ct. at 2139. Saffold was remanded back to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether

Saffold’s 4 1⁄2 month delay between state habeas petitions was unreasonable and therefore,

insufficient for statutory tolling. Id. Thus, Carey v. Saffold added an additional level of analysis in

determining whether a state collateral review petition is “pending” for purposes of statutory tolling. 

While the intervals between state collateral proceedings are generally entitled to tolling, a California

prisoner, such as Petitioner, may not be entitled to such tolling if an “unreasonable” delay existed

between the filings of such proceedings. 

In Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 126 S.Ct. 846, 854 (2006), the Court found that after the

California Court of Appeal had denied habeas relief, there was an unjustifiable delay of at least six

months before Chavis filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court. In reaching

this conclusion, the Court stated that, “Six months is far longer than the ‘short period[s] of time’ 30

to 60 days, that most States provide for filing an appeal to the state supreme court. Carey v. Saffold,

supra, at 219.” Chavis, 126 S.Ct. at 854. See Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9 Cir. th

2006)(holding that delays of eighteen, fifteen and ten months were unreasonable); Culver v. Director

of Corrections, 450 F.Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 2006)(determining that delays of 97 and 71

days were unreasonable). 

In the present case, Petitioner provides no explanation for the 329 -day gap between the

denial of the petition by the Court of Appeal and the filing of the petition with the California

Supreme Court. In light of the above caselaw, this court finds a 329-day gap to be inherently

unreasonable. Therefore, the court further finds that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for

the 329 -day gap between the denial of the petition by the Court of Appeal and the filing of the

petition with the California Supreme Court.

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As stated above, 144 days of the statutory period had passed by the time Petitioner filed his

petition with the California Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal denied the petition on July 1,

2004, and the statute of limitations began running again the next day, on July 2, 2004. The court

finds, therefore, that the statute of limitations period expired in February of 2005, before Petitioner

filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court.

The Present Petition

Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner timely filed his original federal petition on

February 3, 2004, and his first amended petition on June 18, 2004. He argues correctly, however,

that the statute of limitations was not tolled as a result of those filings. See Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001)(" § 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitations period during the

pendency of a federal habeas petition"); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530

(9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that equitable tolling will not be available in most cases, and will th

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time"). Therefore, Petitioner’s second amended petition, filed June 22, 2007, was filed

after the expiration of the statute of limitations in February of 2005. 

Respondent further contends that Petitioner’s second amended petition filed in this court does

not relate back to the filing of the original petition. As Respondent explains, Petitioner presents four

new claims in his second amended petition The four claims Petitioner asserts in his second

amended petition are the claims he presented to the California Supreme Court in his second petition

for habeas corpus. These four claims are: 1) the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and

Prevention Act (“the STEP Act”) is unconstitutionally vague; 2) enhanced penalties based on gang

affiliation violate equal protection; 3) the STEP Act violates Petitioner’s First Amendment right of

association; 4) use of law enforcement officers as expert witnesses on criminal street gangs

implicates principles of fairness so as to violate due process. Respondent argues that Petitioner has

not carried his burden on demonstrating that these claims relate back to the same core of operative

facts of the claims raised in his first amended petition.

In Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005), the Court addressed the same issue of whether

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an amended petition filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations period related back to the

original petition. In the original petition, the petitioner brought a confrontation clause claim

regarding the admission in his murder trial of videotaped testimony of a witness for the prosecution. 

In the amended petition, the petitioner sought to challenge the admission of inculpatory statements

he made during pretrial police interrogation under the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, his

two claims both involved the admission of out-of-court statements during the prosecution’s case in

chief. The petitioner argued that the two claims arose out of the same “conduct, transaction or

occurrence,” because they both arose out of the same criminal conviction. The United States

Supreme Court rejected this claim, finding that the new, second ground for relief arose out of facts

different in both time and type from those set forth in the original pleading.

In this case, the court must agree with Respondent. Despite having the opportunity to do so

in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner did not address the issue. Petitioner therefore has

not carried his burden of showing that the new claims raised in his untimely second amended petition

relate back to the claims raised in his timely first amended petition. Accordingly, the court finds that

these new claims are barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed.

The court notes that Respondent is incorrect in asserting that Petitioner has dropped the

claims made in his first amended petition. As Petitioner explains in his opposition, he included

express language in his second amended petition stating that he was retaining his original claims. 

Thus, the dismissal of the new claims raised in second amended petition does not resolve this entire

case. This case now goes forward on the claims raised in the first amended petition filed June 18,

2004, to which Respondent filed an answer on March 21, 2005. The matter having been fully

briefed, the court will issue a decision on the merits as soon as possible.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1) Respondent’s motion to modify the briefing schedule is GRANTED nunc pro tunc [Doc. 67];

2) Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the Clerk of the Court is directed to

terminate that motion [Doc. 68];

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2) Petitioner’s second amended petition is DISMISSED as barred by the statute of limitations;

3) This case goes forward only on the claims raised in the first amended petition.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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