Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02452/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02452-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1Walnut Creek MunicipalCode § 10-2.3.121 prohibits outdoorsales, service, display ofmerchandise

or products, and storage, except in certain circumstances specified in the Ordinance.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROFESSIONAL CARE MANAGEMENT,

INC., dba BELINDA M. DESIGNS, and

BELINDA McNEELY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF WALNUT CREEK,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-2452 SI

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND VACATING HEARING

Defendant City ofWalnut Creek has filed a motion to dismissthe plaintiffs’ complaint forfailureto state

a claim. Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), this Court finds the motion suitable for resolution without oral argument

and therefore VACATES the hearing set for September 23, 2005. Having carefully considered the moving

and opposing papers, and for the reasons set out below, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

On June 16, 2005, plaintiffs Professional Care Management, Inc. and Belinda McNeely (“Plaintiff”)

filed a complaint against defendant City of Walnut Creek (“Defendant”), alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Plaintiff operates a retail store on Main Street in Walnut Creek. She alleges that Walnut Creek has

failed to uniformly enforce Walnut Creek MunicipalCode § 10-2.3.121 (hereafter “the Ordinance”),1 thereby

causingdamage to her. Plaintiff contends, inter alia, 1) that although the Ordinance is intended to limit outdoor

displays of merchandise to uses or situations where no feasible alternatives exist, the City fails to enforce the

ordinance uniformly, allowing large chain-store merchants to violate the Ordinance without repercussion; 2)

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that because McNeely complained to the City about the uneven enforcement, the City intentionally enforced

the Ordinance strictly against her, imposing fines and threatening litigation; 3) that the City instructed its

employees to disallow inquiry into the possibility of discriminatory enforcement of the Ordinance; and 4) that

the City’s conduct has caused plaintiff damage and continues to harm plaintiff’s business. 

Presently before this Court is defendant’s FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Defendant contends that

the requirements for asserting a viable § 1983 claim have not been met because the complaint fails to include

any invidious or unconstitutionalbases supporting plaintiff’s allegations ofdiscriminatory enforcement. Plaintiff

contends that the complaint requirements for her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim have been met because she has

alleged that she was treated differently from others similarly situated, that the difference in treatment was

intentional, and that there was no rational basis for the difference.

LEGAL STANDARD

FRCP 12(b)(6) provides that a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. The question presented by a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff

will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim. Jackson

v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003). In answering this question, the Court must assume that the

plaintiff's allegations are true and draw allreasonable inferencesin the plaintiff'sfavor. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev.

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997). 

A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be denied unless it appears plaintiff is unable to prove any set of

material facts supporting her claim and entitling her to relief. In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir.

2002). Even if the face ofthe pleadings suggeststhat the chance of recovery is remote, the Court must allow

plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259,

1261 (9th Cir. 2004). However, it is improper “to assume that[plaintiff] can prove the facts it has not alleged

or that the defendants have violated [laws] inwaysthat have not been alleged.” Jack Russell Terrier Network

v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

To establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 equalprotectionviolation, plaintiffmust demonstrate 1) that defendant

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was acting under color of state law, 2) that defendant discriminated against plaintiff, and 3) that the

discrimination was intentional. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist. 324 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.

2003); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist.No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendant challenges the

sufficiencyofplaintiff’s pleadings with respect to the second and third elements ofthe claim, i.e., plaintifffailed

to adequately plead that she was discriminated against by Walnut Creek or that such discrimination was

intentional.

The Supreme Court has recognized that equalprotectionclaims exist where the plaintiff allegesthatshe

has been intentionally treated differently fromothers similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

differential treatment. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000). In

Olech, the Court held that a sparsely detailed complaint sufficiently pled facts to make out a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim. The crux of the complaint in that case was “that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement

as a condition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply where the Village required only a

15-foot easement from other similarly situated property owners.” Id. at 565 (emphasis added). Here, as

inOlech, plaintiffallegesthat the Walnut Creek intentionally enforced an Ordinance against her, but not against

others similarly situated. Compl. ¶ 9.

Defendant argues that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Murgia v. Municipal Court, 15

Cal.3d 286 (1978), provides the appropriate standard for determining whether plaintiff’s allegations amount

to a constitutional violation. Defendant contends thatMurgia held that laxity of enforcement and nonarbitrary

bases for selective enforcement of a statute do not implicate equal protection principles. However, Murgia

does not go quite so far. Rather, the Murgia decision states:

The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its

unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal

protection unlessthere isshown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful

discrimination.

Murgia, 15 Cal.3d at 297 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S. Ct. 397, 401 (1944))

(emphasis added).

Plaintiff alleges that Walnut Creek does not uniformly enforce the Ordinance, that Walnut Creek

intentionally enforced the Ordinance against plaintiff more strictly than against other merchants after she

complained about the lack ofuniformity, and thatWalnut Creek has enacted a policy ofdisallowing inquiry into

discriminatory enforcement of the Ordinance. Liberally construing the complaint and making all reasonable

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inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff sufficiently pleads discriminatory treatment and

intention: “[Plaintiff] has complained to the City regarding its uneven enforcement of the Ordinance. In

response, the City has intentionally and strictly enforced the Ordinance against plaintiffs by imposing fines and

threatening litigation. . . .” Compl. ¶ 9. These allegations satisfy even the Murgia standard for successfully

pleading claims of discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s complaint satisfies the requirements for bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the City

ofWalnut Creek. It alleges that the City of Walnut Creek, a municipal corporation acting under color of state

law, intentionally and without rational basis treated plaintiff differently than others similarly situated. For the

foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss

(Docket # 7). The hearing set for September 23, 2005 is VACATED.

Defendant shall file its answer no later than October 3, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2005 _____________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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