Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02763/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02763-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

DR. SCOTT TANNER, an individual,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN, 

INC., a California corporation, KAISER 

FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, a California 

corporation, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 

PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., a 

California corporation, and DOES 1-50, 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 15-02763-SBA

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Plaintiff Scott Tanner (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant pro se action against his former 

employers Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and The 

Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (erroneously sued as Northern California Permanente 

Medical Group, Inc.) (collectively “Defendants”). By this action, Plaintiff seeks to rescind 

his employment separation agreement with Defendants and the comprehensive release of 

claims contained therein. Plaintiff further seeks to prosecute claims for wrongful 

termination, discrimination, and retaliation. The parties are presently before the Court on 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 6. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Dkt. 15. Having 

read and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter, and being fully 

informed, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion, with partial leave to amend. 

The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7-1(b). 

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. FACTUAL SUMMARY

In 2000, Plaintiff began working for the Kaiser Permanente Pharmacy Department 

(“Kaiser”). Compl. ¶ 13.1

 Plaintiff served as a staff pharmacist, a lead pharmacist, and 

finally, a Pharmacist Supervisor at Kaiser’s Manteca location. Id. On November 15, 2012, 

Kaiser suspended Plaintiff from work. Id. ¶ 71. According to Plaintiff, Defendants never 

explained the basis for his suspension. Id. ¶ 72. On December 23, 2012, while suspended, 

Plaintiff executed a Separation Agreement and General Release (the “Separation 

Agreement”). Id. ¶¶ 75-85.2

The Separation Agreement included a provision entitled “Complete Release of 

Claims,” which released Defendants from all claims of any kind arising out of or related to 

Plaintiff’s employment and/or termination. The release “includes, but is not limited to, all 

claims based in tort or contract, or under any federal, state, or local statute, ordinance, or 

common law, including, but not limited to, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Fair 

Employment and Housing Act, or any claim of discrimination, harassment, breach of 

contract, or public policy, wrongful or retaliatory discharge and all claims for 

compensation, vacation, attorney’s fees, wrongful denial of insurance and employee 

benefits.” Under the terms of the Separation Agreement, Plaintiff’s employment 

 1 The Complaint is attached as Exhibit A to Defendants’ Notice of Removal, Dkt. 1. 

2 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the Separation Agreement, 

which Plaintiff references in, but does not attach to, the Complaint. See Request for 

Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Dkt. 6-1. Plaintiff advocates rescission of the Separation 

Agreement, but does not dispute the document’s authenticity. See Pl.’s Response to RJN, 

Dkt. 26. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to the 

Separation Agreement, Ex A. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 

2007) (a court may consider a writing referenced in the complaint but not explicitly 

incorporated therein if the complaint relies on the document and its authenticity is 

unquestioned). Although the remaining documents, Exs. B and C, describe the larger 

program through which Plaintiff executed the Separation Agreement and provide context 

for the same, the Court DENIES Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to those 

documents, which appear unnecessary to the resolution of the instant motion. 

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terminated effective February 11, 2013, and he received 16 weeks of severance pay totaling 

$45,558.78, plus other benefits. 

The allegations in Plaintiff’s 70-page Complaint are profuse and discursive. In brief, 

Plaintiff alleges that he executed the Separation Agreement under duress, and is therefore 

entitled to rescind the same. Compl. ¶¶ 75-85. Plaintiff further alleges that he was subject 

to harassment, discrimination, and retaliation at work beginning in 2010. Id. ¶¶ 13-73. 

Plaintiff is a white male, over the age of 40, with an undisclosed “physical 

disability/physiological health condition.” Id. ¶¶ 87, 98, 107. According to Plaintiff, 

Kaiser’s pharmacy staff in Manteca is 85-90% Asian, 85-90% female, and 90-100% under 

the age of forty. Id. ¶¶ 89, 107. Plaintiff asserts that he suffered adverse employment 

consequences based on his color, gender, and age, as well as his disability, for which 

Defendants allegedly failed to provide adequate accommodation. Id. ¶¶ 87, 98, 107, 121. 

Plaintiff further asserts that he suffered retaliation based on these same factors, as well as 

for reporting “Defendants[’] misconduct affecting patient safety and care.” Id. ¶ 130. 

Among other allegations of misconduct, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to respond 

to reports of unlawful drug diversion (i.e., drug theft) and drug furnishing irregularities 

(i.e., pharmacist errors). Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants constructively 

discharged him in violation of public policy. Id. ¶¶ 173-179. 

 B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit in state court, alleging claims for: (1) Unlawful 

Attainment of Invalid Separation Agreement; (2) Age Discrimination in Violation of 

ADEA and FEHA; (3) Disability Discrimination in Violation of ADA and FEHA; (4) Race, 

Color, Gender, and National Origin Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act and FEHA; (5) Failure to Accommodate Disability; (6) Retaliation; (7) Failure 

to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment or Retaliation; (8) Unlawful Business Practices; and 

(9) Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. 

Defendants removed the instant action to this Court based on federal-question 

jurisdiction. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to remand. Dkt. 19. The remand 

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motion was based in part on Plaintiff’s misconception that exclusive federal jurisdiction is 

required. Dkt. 19. On October 15, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand, but 

granted Plaintiff leave to file a notice dismissing all federal claims within fourteen days of 

the Court’s order. Dkt. 29. Plaintiff filed nothing in response to the Court’s order. 

Defendants filed the instant motion on June 26, 2015, Dkt. 6. Defendants move to 

dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to 

support a claim for rescission of the Severance Agreement, and that he released his 

remaining claims under that agreement. Plaintiff filed an Opposition, Dkt. 15, in response 

to which Defendants filed a Reply, Dkt. 30.3

 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 

729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint 

either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a 

cognizable legal theory.” Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). “Rule 

12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires not only ‘fair notice of the 

nature of the claim, but also grounds on which the claim rests.’” Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 

F.3d 995, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting in part Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 556 n.3 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

 3 Plaintiff filed an 18-page opposition in response to Defendants’ motion. Pursuant 

to this Court’s Standing Orders, “All noticed civil motions (other than motions for 

summary judgment) and any opposition thereto, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages in 

length, exclusive of the table of contents, table of authorities, exhibits, and declarations, if 

required.” Civil Standing Orders, ¶ 6. Although Plaintiff represents himself in this action, 

he remains obligated to comply with the rules and orders of this Court. See King v. Atiyeh, 

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Future transgressions of the Court’s rules or orders 

(e.g., the filing of an oversized brief) may result in the imposition of sanctions (e.g., the 

striking of such briefs from the record). See Swanson v. U.S. Forest Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 

345 (9th Cir. 1996) (the district court has discretion to strike briefs filed in circumvention 

of page limits). Accordingly, the Court hereby warns Plaintiff that further failure to comply 

with any order or applicable procedural rule may result in sanctions. 

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 In assessing the sufficiency of the pleadings, “courts must consider the complaint in 

its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, 

and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). The court is to “accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 

2007). Where a complaint or claim is subject to dismissal, the court generally grants leave 

to amend, unless further amendment would be futile. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. RESCISSION CLAIM

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for 

rescission of the Separation Agreement based on economic duress. Plaintiff challenges this 

contention, arguing that he “was under severe pervasive duress in December 2012” due to 

his unjust suspension and ongoing retaliation and harassment. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. 

 Under California law, economic duress can serve as a basis for rescinding a 

settlement agreement and/or release. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1689 (b)(1) (a party to a 

contract may rescind the same if his or her consent was obtained through duress, menace, 

fraud, or undue influence);4

 see also Johnson v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 891 F. Supp. 

522, 528 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Lanigan v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1034 

(2011)). “Economic duress is an equitable doctrine which ‘come[s] into play upon the 

doing of a wrongful act which is sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person 

faced with no reasonable alternative to succumb to the perpetrator’s pressure.’” Johnson, 

891 F. Supp. at 528-29 (quoting Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Development, Inc., 157 

Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1158-59 (1984)). 

 4 Although Plaintiff also mentions undue influence in his Complaint, see Compl. 

¶ 75, he offers no further allegations or arguments in support of such a claim. 

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 The elements of economic duress are identified as: (1) a sufficiently coercive 

wrongful act on the part of the defendant; (2) no reasonable alternative on the part of the 

plaintiff; (3) knowledge of the plaintiff’s economic vulnerability; and (4) actual inducement 

to contract. Johnson, 891 F. Supp. at 529. “‘The assertion of a claim known to be false or 

a bad faith threat to breach a contract or to withhold a payment may constitute a wrongful 

act for purposes of the economic duress doctrine. [Citations.] Further, a reasonably 

prudent person subject to such an act may have no reasonable alternative but to succumb 

when the only other alternative is bankruptcy or financial ruin. [Citations.]’” Chan v. 

Lund, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1173-74 (quoting Rich, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1159, 1173-74). 

 Here, Plaintiff does not allege the necessary elements of economic duress. Plaintiff 

fails to allege any facts showing that he had “no ‘reasonable alternative’ to the action [he] 

now seeks to avoid,” i.e., “agreeing to contract.” Lanigan, 199 Cal. App. 4th at 1034. 

Plaintiff alleges only that he feared termination, particularly in light of his suspension. See 

Compl. ¶ 83. However, Plaintiff’s termination “was not a certainty,” and he had the option 

to return to work after his suspension. Lanigan, 199 Cal. App. 4th at 1034. Moreover, 

even if Plaintiff would have suffered termination, he fails to allege dire economic 

conditions such as “imminent bankruptcy or financial ruin.” Johnson, 891 F. Supp. at 529 

(quoting Rich, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 1154). Absent such conditions, Plaintiff could have 

chosen not to execute the Separation Agreement and its comprehensive release, but rather 

to preserve his claims and pursue legal action against Defendants. 

 Finally, although Plaintiff alleges that he suffered ongoing harassment, retaliation, 

and discrimination in the workplace (conduct which may indeed constitute wrongful acts), 

Plaintiff fails to identify any coercive act on the part of Defendants that would have caused 

or induced him to sign the Separation Agreement. Such a causal relationship between the 

defendants’ acts and the execution of the contract is required. See Johnson, 891 F. Supp. at 

530 (the defendant’s act must induce the assent of the coerced party). 

 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first 

cause of action for rescission of the Separation Agreement. 

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 B. REMAINING CLAIMS

Defendants contend that the Separation Agreement bars the “myriad causes of 

action” arising out of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants. Defs.’ Mot. at 8. Plaintiff 

does not dispute that the Separation Agreement, if enforceable, bars the causes of action 

raised in his Complaint. Instead, Plaintiff relies solely on his argument that the Separation 

Agreement is subject to rescission. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-17. As discussed above, Plaintiff 

has not adequately alleged a basis for rescission. Consequently, all claims covered by the 

Separation Agreement’s comprehensive release are barred. 

Although not addressed by the parties, the Court notes that the Separation 

Agreement acts as a complete bar to all but one of Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action. 

Under the Separation Agreement, Plaintiff waived “any and all claims of any kind, known 

or unknown, arising out of or related to [Plaintiff’s] employment with [Defendants] or the 

termination of [his] employment.” RJN, Ex. A, ¶ 4. By its terms, the release therefore 

precludes the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth causes of action. The 

eighth cause of action, however, requires further analysis. 

The eighth cause of action for unlawful business practices arises under California’s 

Unfair Competition Law (the “UCL”), which makes actionable any “unlawful, unfair or 

fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. With respect to the 

unlawful prong, the UCL incorporates other laws and treats violations of those laws an 

unlawful business practices independently actionable under state law. Chabner v. United 

Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff predicates his 

UCL claim upon violations of the Internal Revenue Code and the California Labor Code. 

Insofar as Plaintiff predicates this claim upon violations of the California Labor Code 

(e.g., the failure to pay Plaintiff overtime in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 510, see Compl. 

¶ 165), it arises out of Plaintiff’s employment and is barred by the Separation Agreement. 

However, insofar as Plaintiff predicates this claim upon violations of the Internal Revenue 

Code (e.g., the “[u]nlawful funneling of profits obtained from [Defendants’] 501(c)(3) taxexempt . . . status,” see Compl. ¶ 166), it does not arise out of Plaintiff’s employment. 

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Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the UCL. “To 

have standing under the California’s UCL, as amended by California’s Proposition 64, 

plaintiffs must establish that they (1) suffered an injury in fact and (2) lost money or 

property as a result of the unfair competition.” Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955, 960 

n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204). “To satisfy the narrower 

standing requirements imposed by Proposition 64, a party must now (1) establish a loss or 

deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic 

injury, and (2) show that the economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair 

business practice . . . that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 

51 Cal.4th 310, 322 (2011); see also Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203-04 

(9th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that he suffered economic injury arising out 

of Defendants’ purported Internal Revenue Code violations; he therefore lacks standing to 

raise such a claim under the UCL. 

In view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s second through ninth causes of action. 

C. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM

Defendants contend that the ninth cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation 

of public policy is also barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in California 

Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Plaintiff disputes that section 335.1 sets forth the 

applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff further argues that he received a right to sue letter 

from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in February 2015, and “filed all 

causes of action together as soon as was reasonably possible.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. 

The two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 335.1 applies to claims for 

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1 (action 

for injury to an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another must be brought 

within two years); see also Lamke v. Sunstate Equip. Co., LLC, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 

1051-52 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (section 335.1 sets forth the applicable statute of limitations for 

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); Mathieu v. Norrell Corp., 115 Cal. App. 

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4th 1174, 1189, n.14 (2004) (same). The statute of limitations began to run on February 11, 

2013, at the time of Plaintiff’s termination, see Romana v. Rockwell Internat., Inc., 14 Cal. 

4th 479, 501 (1996), and expired on February 11, 2015. Plaintiff did not file suit until April 

21, 2015, and thus, his wrongful discharge claim is time-barred. 

The Court notes that, although Plaintiff does not explicitly raise the issue, he appears 

to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling by asserting that he filed all causes of action 

shortly after receiving his right-to-sue letter. Because a cause of action for wrongful 

discharge does not require the filing of an administrative complaint, however, equitable 

tolling does not apply. See Mathieu, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 1189. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ninth 

cause of action on this independent ground. 

D. LEAVE TO AMEND

If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, a district court has 

discretion whether to grant leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). “A pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend ‘[u]nless it is 

absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect.’” Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 

1139 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995)) 

(brackets in orig.); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to support a claim for 

rescission of the Separation Agreement, and the Complaint therefore fails to state a claim as 

to all causes of action barred under the Separation Agreement. Because the Court is not yet 

satisfied that amendment of these claims is futile, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave 

to amend the first through eighth causes of action. 

Plaintiff also fails to state a claim as to that portion of the eighth cause of action not 

barred by the Separation Agreement, i.e., for Defendants’ purported violations of the 

Internal Revenue Code. The Court is doubtful of Plaintiff’s ability to amend successfully 

this portion of the eighth cause of action. However, because Defendants failed to address 

the predicates of the UCL claim in their motion, thus depriving Plaintiff the chance to 

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respond, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the eighth cause of action to demonstrate 

his standing under the UCL. 

Plaintiff’s ninth cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 

is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court therefore dismisses the ninth 

cause of action without leave to amend. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1045 (affirming the 

dismissal of time-barred claims without leave to amend) (citing Jablon v. Dean Witter & 

Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

Plaintiff should be aware than an amended complaint supersedes the original 

complaint and the original complaint is thereafter treated as nonexistent. Armstrong v. 

Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878 n.40 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. 

California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). The amended complaint must therefore be complete in 

itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, as “[a]ll causes of action 

alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are 

waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d at 567 (citations omitted). 

In any amended complaint, the Court encourages Plaintiff to confine his allegations 

to the operative facts supporting each of his claims. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a), all that is required is a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Prolix, redundant, and/or extraneous allegations tend to 

obfuscate the underpinnings of Plaintiff’s claims. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 

1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that prolix complaints are disfavored because they burden 

defendants and the court with the task of determining which allegations are supposed to 

have given rise to the various claims). The amended complaint should provide “clear and 

concise averments” establishing the nature and grounds for each cause of action raised. Id. 

Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff throughout the Complaint refers to all 

individuals currently or formerly employed by Kaiser as “defendants,” despite the fact that 

such individuals are not named as defendants in this action. Plaintiff appears to raise 

certain allegations against these individuals, without attributing liability to any named 

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defendant(s). In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the defendant(s) 

purportedly liable for each alleged wrong. See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1178. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. The request is GRANTED as to the Separation Agreement, Dkt. 6-1, 

Ex. A, and DENIED as to the remaining documents, Dkt. 6-1, Exs. B-C. 

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s ninth cause of 

action for wrongful discharge is dismissed without leave to amend. The first through 

eighth causes of action are dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have twenty-one 

(21) days from the date of entry of this Order to file a First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff 

should be aware that any pleading filed in this Court is subject to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11, and in accordance therewith, Plaintiff may amend only to the extent that 

there exists a good faith basis for doing so. Failure to timely amend the complaint as set 

forth above may result in the dismissal of all claims with prejudice. 

3. This Order terminates Docket No. 6. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 12/1/15 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

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