Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01331/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01331-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LEROY JONES 1 ANI EBONG; ROWLAND NWANKWO i ) 

GIRMA MOLALEGNE; QUICK PICK CABS, INC.; ) 

OSCAR S. TILLMAN, Reverend, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ROBERT TEMMER, CHRISTINE ALVAREZ, ) 

VINCENT MAJKOWSKI, acting in their ) 

official capacities as members of the ) 

Colorado Public Utilities, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 13 i995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-1331 

Appeal from the United states District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 93-B-235) 

William H. Mellor III of Institute for Justice, Washington, D.C. 

(Clint Bolick, Dirk G. Roggeveen, and Scott G. Bullock of 

Institute for Justice, Washington D.C.; and Paula M. Connelly of 

Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker and Grover, Denver, Colorado, 

with him on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Mana L. Jennings-Fader, Assistant Attorney General, Regulatory Law 

Section (Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, and Jeffery A. 

Froeschle, Assistant Attorney General, Regulatory Law Section, 

with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for DefendantsAppellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and SHADUR,* District 

Judge. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

*Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1331 Document: 01019279285 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 against members of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission 

challenging the Commission's regulation of taxicab companies in 

the Denver metropolitan area pursuant to the then-governing state 

statutory scheme. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-10-101 to -120 (1993 

repl. vol.). The district court ruled in favor of defendants and 

plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Colorado 

legislature passed a new law amending a portion of the statutory 

scheme upon which plaintiffs' constitutional challenge was based. 

Plaintiffs now move this court to dismiss the appeal as moot and 

to vacate the district court's earlier opinion and order. 

Defendants contend that the appeal is not moot and oppose the 

motion to vacate. We conclude that the appeal is indeed moot, and 

we vacate the lower court's opinion. 

I. 

Plaintiffs include four residents of Denver who desire to 

open a taxicab company that would serve the Denver metropolitan 

area and a Denver resident who wishes to use the services that 

this company would provide. In their amended complaint, 

plaintiffs alleged that it was impossible for a new taxicab 

company to obtain the required certificate of public convenience 

and necessity under the doctrine of regulated monopoly in place 

under the state statutes as they then existed. Plaintiffs 

asserted infringement of various rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. While this appeal was pending, the Colorado General 

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Appellate Case: 93-1331 Document: 01019279285 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 2 
Assembly passed an act that amended the prior law by replacing the 

doctrine of regulated monopoly with that of regulated competition 

in counties with a population of 60,000 or more. See Colo. Rev. 

Stat. 40-10-105 (2) (a) ( 1994 cum. supp.) . 

Plaintiffs argue that the new law renders their appeal moot. 

They note that their amended complaint alleged constitutional 

violations arising from the insurmountable barriers to entry into 

the taxicab market in Denver created by the doctrine of regulated 

monopoly. They contend that the new law removes these barriers 

with respect to them and thus moots their appeal. 11 The exercise 

of judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution depends on 

the existence of a case or controversy. . . . [A] federal court 

has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor 'to decide 

questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case 

before them.' 11 Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). 

Defendants raise several unpersuasive arguments to support 

their contention that the appeal is not moot. They assert that 

the new law does not address the claim for relief made by the one 

plaintiff who wished to use the company provided by the other 

plaintiffs. However, this claim clearly challenged the operation 

of the prior law in imposing barriers to plaintiffs' entry into 

the Denver taxicab market. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1331 Document: 01019279285 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 3 
Defendants also assert that the appeal is not moot because 

the new law only applies to counties with a population of 60,000 

or more. It is clear from the amended complaint, however, that 

plaintiffs only challenged the operation of the old law as it 

affected their ability to enter the taxicab market in the Denver 

metropolitan area, an area clearly within a county to which the 

new act applies. 

Defendants next argue that the appeal is not moot because 

plaintiffs alleged that anything less than complete deregulation 

of the taxicab industry was unconstitutional and the new law does 

not completely deregulate. This argument mischaracterizes 

plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs only alleged constitutional 

violations flowing from the doctrine of regulated monopoly as 

applied to them and sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement 

of the old doctrine in an unreasonable manner. They did not seek 

complete deregulation, nor was it compelled by the nature of their 

challenge. 

Defendants contend a live controversy exists because 

plaintiffs alleged that the administrative process under the old 

law lacked meaningful criteria to guide discretionary decisions. 

Defendants point out that certificates under the new law are also 

a matter of discretion. Plaintiffs have not suffered any injury 

as a result of defendants' exercise of discretion under the new 

law, and any such injury would result in a different claim under 

different facts. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1331 Document: 01019279285 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 4 
Finally, defendants assert that the claims are not moot 

because the Colorado legislature remains free to reinstate the old 

law at a later date. We view this possibility as too conjectural 

and speculative to avoid a finding of mootness. See Anderson v. 

Green, 115 S. Ct. 1059, 1060 ( 1995) (per curiam) . 

II. 

Having determined that the appeal is moot, we turn to 

plaintiffs' request that we vacate the lower court's opinion. The 

leading case on vacatur is United States v. Munsingwear. Inc., 340 

U.S. 36 (1950). There the Court approved the procedure of 

vacating the judgment below and remanding with directions to 

dismiss in order to eliminate 11 a judgment, review of which was 

prevented through happenstance ... Id. at 39-40. The Supreme Court 

revisited Munsingwear in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 

Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994). The Court 11 [stood] by 

Munsingwear's dictum that mootness by happenstance provides 

sufficient reason to vacate, 11 id. at 391 n.3, stating that 11 [a] 

party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is 

frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness 

be forced to acquiesce in the judgment, 11 id. at 391. The Court 

further pointed out that the pivotal issue is 11 whether the party 

seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness by 

voluntary action. 11 1 Id. 

1 We therefore reject out of hand defendants' argument that 

vacatur should be denied because of an asserted 11 governmental 

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Appellate Case: 93-1331 Document: 01019279285 Date Filed: 06/13/1995 Page: 5 
It is clear that mootness here resulted not from any 

voluntary action by plaintiffs but rather from circumstances 

beyond plaintiffs' control and for which they were not 

responsible. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to vacatur 

under U.S. Bancorp. See also Anderson, 115 S. Ct. at 1060-61 

(party seeking relief from judgment entitled to vacatur under U.S. 

Bancorp when mootness not caused by its voluntary action) ; 

Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of New Haven, 41 F.3d 62, 67-

68 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). 

We DISMISS the appeal as moot. The district court ·opinion is 

vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss. 

interest" in having the lower court opinion available as 

precedent. The Supreme Court has never indicated that such an 

interest is a factor to be considered in the treatment of moot 

cases. Rather, the Court has stated that "[f]rom the beginning we 

have disposed of moot cases in the manner '"most consonant to 

justice 11 • • • in view of the nature and character of the 

conditions which have caused the case to become moot.'" U.S. 

Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 s. Ct. 386, 

391 (1994) (citations omitted). 

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