Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01642/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01642-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1642

FOXXXY LADYZ ADULT WORLD, INC.,

and DIRT CHEAP, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

VILLAGE OF DIX, ILLINOIS,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:13-cv-00482 — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2014 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, owners of an adult entertainment establishment that features nude dancing and 

permits customers to bring their own alcoholic beverages

onto the premises, challenge the enactment of three local ordinances that ban public nudity, open containers of alcohol 

in public, and the possession of liquor in public accommodaCase: 14-1642 Document: 28 Filed: 03/10/2015 Pages: 25
2 No. 14-1642

tions. Plaintiffs argue that the public nudity ban violates the 

free speech protections of the First Amendment, and further 

allege that the Village of Dix lacks statutory authority to pass 

the challenged alcohol restrictions. Dix filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, which the 

district court granted as to both issues. Because we conclude 

that, at this early stage of the litigation, Dix has not established the necessary evidentiary basis for its assertion that 

nude dancing causes adverse secondary effects to the health, 

welfare, and safety of its citizens, we reverse the district 

court’s judgment with respect to the public nudity ordinance. However, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiffs’ challenge to Dix’s alcohol regulations, the enactment of which falls within the parameters of Illinois law and 

is supported by a rational basis.

I. Background

The Village of Dix is a “dry” municipality of approximately 500 residents, located in Jefferson County, Illinois. In 

October 2010, Dirt Cheap, Inc. purchased commercial real 

estate in Dix and opened a nightclub offering erotic entertainment. Two years later, Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World, Inc. 

began to rent the property from Dirt Cheap. Now operated 

by Foxxxy Ladyz, the nightclub features nude dancing and is 

open to all members of the public age twenty-one and over. 

Although Foxxxy Ladyz does not sell alcohol, it allows its 

customers to bring their own alcoholic beverages (“BYOB”) 

onto the premises. Foxxxy Ladyz is one of the few commercial establishments in Dix, and is located across the interstate 

highway from the Village’s other businesses, residences, and 

grade school.

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No. 14-1642 3

In December 2010, shortly after Dirt Cheap opened 

Foxxxy Ladyz’s predecessor, Dix passed three ordinances, 

each of which banned certain behavior throughout the Village. First, Ordinance No. 2010-04 instituted a prohibition on 

open containers of alcohol in public. The preamble to the ordinance explains that “the sale at retail of alcoholic liquor is 

[already] prohibited by law” in Dix, and expresses a desire 

to “preserve the ‘dry’ status of the Village of Dix to the fullest extent permitted by law.” The preamble further asserts 

that “the prohibition on the retail sale and public consumption of alcoholic liquor within [Dix] is in the public interest 

to maintain social order, health, welfare, and safety of citizens.” The ordinance prohibits the possession of “any open 

container of alcoholic liquor” in any “public place” within the 

Village. The ordinance specifies that “public place” includes

any “privately owned [property], which is open to or held out 

for use by the public or is otherwise available to the public.”

Dix next enacted Ordinance No. 2010-05, a public nudity 

ban also aimed at preserving “social order, health, welfare, 

and safety of citizens.” This ordinance replaced Ordinance 

No. 9, Section 7, which had been in effect in Dix since 1930 

and which provided, “No person shall appear in any public 

place in a state of nudity, nor in a dress not belonging to his 

or her sex, or any indecent or lewd dress, or make any indecent exposure of his or her person, ... nor shall commit any 

indecent or lewd act.”1 Expressing a “desire[] to continue the 

prohibition on public nudity within the Village of Dix” and 

1 Plaintiffs allege that Dix’s prohibition on “indecent or lewd dress” is 

unconstitutionally vague. The challenged language, however, has been 

omitted from Dix’s revised public nudity ordinance. We therefore need 

not address this argument.

 

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to “update the [1930 ordinance] to use language which has 

been approved by the Courts as consistent with the Illinois 

and United States Constitution,” Ordinance No. 2010-05 

reads:

No person shall knowingly or intentionally 

appear nude or in a state of nudity in a public 

place. 

“Public place” means any location frequented 

by the public or where the public is present or 

likely to be present or any location where a 

person may reasonably be expected to be observed by members of the public or any place to 

which the public has a right to go or is invited.

“Nude” or “State of Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, vulva, anus, or anal cleft or cleavage 

with less [than] a fully opaque covering, the 

showing of the female breast with less than a 

fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple 

and areola, or the showing of the covered male 

genitals in a discernibly turgid state.

An individual can comport with Ordinance No. 2010-05 by 

wearing pasties and a G-string. 

The third ordinance, No. 2010-06, prohibits the possession of liquor in public accommodations. The ordinance—

whose preamble largely restates the preamble to Ordinance 

No. 2010-04—defines “public accommodation” as “a refreshment, entertainment or recreation facility of any kind 

whose goods, services, facilities, privileges or advantages are 

extended, offered, sold or otherwise made available to the 

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No. 14-1642 5

public.” In enacting these ordinances, Dix conducted no 

studies, nor did it expressly cite other evidence suggesting 

that the operation of Foxxxy Ladyz would lead to increased 

crime or other undesirable “secondary effects” associated 

with sexually oriented businesses. 

An individual who violates any of these ordinances is 

subject to a fine between $100.00 and $750.00 per violation, 

and may also be enjoined from committing further offenses. 

Given that Foxxxy Ladyz is a BYOB establishment that offers 

fully nude dancing, it concededly operates in violation of all 

three ordinances. In March 2013, the Dix Village Board sent 

Foxxxy Ladyz a notice explaining that its actions constitute a 

nuisance, and ordering Foxxxy Ladyz to immediately comply 

with the applicable ordinances. 

Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. They argue that Dix’s public nudity ban violates the free speech protections of the First Amendment (incorporated against the 

states by the Fourteenth Amendment) and the Illinois Constitution.2 Plaintiffs also allege that Dix lacks authority to 

pass the alcohol restrictions embodied in Ordinance Nos. 

2010-04 and 2010-06 as a result of the limitations imposed 

upon municipal regulation of alcohol by the Illinois Liquor 

2 Although plaintiffs contend that the Illinois Constitution’s protection of 

speech is broader than that found in the First Amendment of the United 

States Constitution, this court has determined that “the Constitution of 

the State of Illinois protects an individual’s right to free speech only to the 

same extent that such speech is protected by the Constitution of the United States.” Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 884 n.2 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 

added). Therefore, we need not independently address plaintiffs’ state 

law claims. 

 

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Control Act, 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5. Dix moved to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), and the district court granted Dix’s motion as to 

both claims. With respect to plaintiffs’ challenge to the public nudity ban, the district court concluded first that Ordinance No. 2010-05 is content neutral because it is targeted 

not at the suppression of free expression but instead at reducing the harmful secondary effects associated with nude 

dancing; and second, that the ordinance survives the fourprong test for content-neutral symbolic speech established 

by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 

367 (1968). The district court next concluded that Dix acted 

within the parameters of Illinois law in enacting both of the 

challenged alcohol restrictions. Determining that the open 

container and BYOB regulations abridged no fundamental 

right, the court applied a rational basis test and concluded 

that both prohibitions withstand this deferential standard of 

review. Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s ruling as to both 

issues.

II. Discussion

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, Alexander v. McKinney, 

692 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2012), “constru[ing] the complaint 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true 

all well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 

575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009).

A. Public Nudity Ban

Although “[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition,” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 

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No. 14-1642 7

U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion), “nude dancing ... is 

expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First 

Amendment.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566

(1991) (plurality opinion). Dix contends that Ordinance No. 

2010-05 is targeted not at nude dancing itself, but rather at 

minimizing the deleterious “secondary effects”—such as 

“the impacts on public health, safety, and welfare,” Pap’s 

A.M., 529 U.S. at 291—caused by the presence of adult entertainment establishments. When faced with such a legislative 

justification, this court has “presume[d] that the government 

did not intend to censor speech, even if the regulation incidentally burdens particular instances of expressive conduct.” Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 841 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (citing Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 291). Nevertheless, 

because Dix’s public nudity ban does entail an incidental 

limitation on expressive activity, it must satisfy certain constitutional standards. G.M. Enters., Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 

Wis., 350 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2003).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that municipality-wide 

regulations of public nudity, such as the ordinance at issue 

here, are properly evaluated under the framework set forth 

in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, for content-neutral 

restrictions on symbolic speech. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289; 

see also G.M. Enters., 350 F.3d at 638 (“Regulations of public 

nudity ... are analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny test 

of United States v. O’Brien.”). The Supreme Court first applied the O’Brien standard to a public nudity ordinance in its 

fractured 1991 decision, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 

560. Barnes addressed the constitutionality of an Indiana 

public indecency statute nearly identical to Dix’s regulation, 

which banned “nudity” in a “public place,” effectively requiring exotic dancers to wear pasties and G-strings. Id. at 

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563, 569 n.2. The Court noted that Indiana, like Dix here, 

“ha[d] not banned nude dancing as such, but ha[d] proscribed public nudity across the board” in all public accommodations. Id. at 566. The Court3 determined that the statute 

was unrelated to the suppression of free expression—and

was therefore content neutral—concluding that “while the 

dancing to which [the statute applies] ha[s] a communicative 

element, it [i]s not the dancing that [i]s prohibited, but simply its being done in the nude.” Id. at 570–71. Because Ordinance No. 2010-05 applies to all “public places” within Dix 

and permits erotic dancing so long as pasties and G-strings 

are worn, it merits the same constitutional analysis.

Under the O’Brien test, a regulation of public nudity will 

be upheld if (1) the regulation is within the constitutional 

power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the restriction on alleged First Amendment 

freedoms is no greater than essential to further the government’s interest. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. Ordinance No. 2010-

05 easily satisfies three of these four prongs. With respect to 

the first prong of the analysis, the Supreme Court established in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. that the passage of a substantially similar public nudity ordinance to “protect public 

health and safety [was] clearly within [a] city’s [constitutional] police powers.” 529 U.S. at 296. Dix’s proffered rationale

3 Justice Souter provided the necessary fifth vote in Barnes, and, as the 

narrowest opinion in support of the judgment of the Court, under Marks 

v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), his concurrence is controlling. 

He agreed with the plurality as to the question of content neutrality. See 

Barnes, 501 U.S. at 586 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 

 

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No. 14-1642 9

for Ordinance No. 2010-05—the maintenance of “social order, health, welfare, and safety of citizens”—is essentially 

the same as that advanced by the city of Erie. O’Brien’s third 

prong, which inquires whether the governmental interest is 

unrelated to the suppression of free expression, is identical 

to the antecedent content neutrality inquiry, addressed 

above. Finally, with regard to the fourth prong, which explores whether a challenged restraint on symbolic speech is 

any more restrictive than necessary to further the government’s interests, the Supreme Court has concluded that a 

pasties and G-string requirement imposes only a de minimis 

restriction on freedom of expression, and one that is “minor 

when measured against the dancer’s remaining capacity and 

opportunity to express the erotic message.” Barnes, 501 U.S.

at 587 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also G.M. 

Enters., 350 F.3d at 636 (“The requirement that dancers wear 

pasties and G-strings has only a ‘de minimis’ effect on the expression conveyed by nude dancing.”).

Dix’s public nudity ban fares less well, however, with respect to the second prong of O’Brien, which demands that 

Ordinance No. 2010-05 “further[] an important or substantial 

governmental interest.” 391 U.S. at 377. As we have explained, Dix’s asserted justification for the ordinance’s enactment is the reduction of adverse secondary effects associated with establishments that offer erotic entertainment—an 

interest whose validity the Barnes Court acknowledged. See 

501 U.S. at 582 (crediting Indiana’s “substantial interest in 

combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments”). However, while the minimization of secondary effects may, in the abstract, satisfy O’Brien’s “substantial 

governmental interest” requirement, Dix must nevertheless 

offer some evidence that nude dancing in fact generates such 

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deleterious effects. See G.M. Enters., 350 F.3d at 638–39 (assessing “what quality and quantum of evidence a regulating 

body must consider in order to demonstrate that it has a reasonable basis for believing that the regulated activity generates adverse secondary effects, the reduction of which is a 

‘substantial government interest’ under the ... O’Brien

test[]”). The outcome of this appeal ultimately turns on 

whether, in enacting the challenged ordinance, Dix relied on

evidence sufficient to suggest that public nudity would give 

rise to adverse secondary effects in the Village.

The parties dispute the evidentiary foundation that a 

municipality must establish in order to invoke secondary effects as the justification for an ordinance burdening freedom 

of expression. Plaintiffs contend that Dix must point to actual data—be it from Dix itself or from a comparable municipality—indicating a real harm that the Village’s public nudity ban would serve to mitigate. Dix counters that because 

the language of Ordinance 2010-05 was intentionally modeled after that of public nudity bans that have “been approved by the Courts as consistent with the Illinois and 

United States Constitution,” prior judicial opinions addressing those bans provide all findings necessary to support Ordinance No. 2010-05’s enactment.

The district court shared Dix’s view. The court rejected 

plaintiffs’ argument that Dix “needed a ‘predicate’—some 

study, factual finding, or other evidence—in order to justify 

that its nudity ban would combat the secondary effects of 

nude dancing.” Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World, Inc. v. Vill. of Dix, 

Ill., No. 13-482, slip op. at 10 n.5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014). According to the court, “The Pap’s A.M. plurality made clear 

that relying on the evidentiary foundation of harmful secCase: 14-1642 Document: 28 Filed: 03/10/2015 Pages: 25
No. 14-1642 11

ondary effects set forth in previous caselaw provides an adequate rationale for passing a nudity ban.” Id. (citing Pap’s 

A.M., 529 U.S. at 296–97). This conclusion was in error. 

While Pap’s A.M. may have suggested that reliance on prior 

case law was sufficient to justify the imposition of a ban on 

public nudity,4 the Supreme Court, in its subsequent decision, City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 

(2002) (plurality opinion), clarified that the evidentiary 

standard a municipality must satisfy in order to constitutionally impose a restriction on adult entertainment venues

is not so lenient.

The Court first addressed this standard in its 1986 opinion, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41. 

There, the city of Renton, Washington (population 32,000) 

enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of any 

“adult motion picture theater” within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school. Id. at 44. Prior to enacting the ordinance, which “was aimed at preventing the secondary effects caused by the presence of even one such theater in a given neighborhood,” the city held public hearings, 

4 To be sure, the district court’s conclusion is not without support from 

the plurality opinion in Pap’s A.M. Evaluating a public nudity ban akin 

to that at issue in Barnes and in the instant case, the plurality concluded, 

“Because the nude dancing at [plaintiff’s establishment] is of the same 

character as the adult entertainment at issue in [prior Supreme Court 

cases], it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that such nude dancing was 

likely to produce the same secondary effects.” 529 U.S. at 296–97 (citing 

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. 

Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion); and California v. 

LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)). However, as we discuss in greater detail below, subsequent case law from the Supreme Court and from our own 

circuit establishes more stringent evidentiary requirements.

 

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considered studies produced by nearby Seattle, and reviewed a report from the City Attorney’s Office detailing

similar developments in other cities. Id. at 44, 50. In evaluating whether Renton had sufficiently demonstrated the existence of adverse secondary effects when it relied heavily on 

data from other cities rather than on legislative findings specific to Renton, the Court endorsed Renton’s reliance on “the 

experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on 

the ‘detailed findings’ summarized in the Washington Supreme Court’s Northend Cinema opinion.” Id. at 51 (citing 

Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (Wash. 

1978)). “The First Amendment does not require a city, before 

enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by 

other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon 

is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the 

city addresses.” Id. at 51–52. This language, which led the 

Court to uphold Renton’s ordinance as a valid governmental 

response to the “admittedly serious problems” created by 

adult theatres, id. at 54, has provided the baseline for all subsequent Supreme Court decisions addressing a municipality’s evidentiary burden in imposing restrictions on adult entertainment establishments. 

Renton was followed by Barnes and Pap’s A.M.—both plurality opinions in which the Court upheld public nudity 

bans over First Amendment challenge, invoking Renton’s evidentiary standard and endorsing reliance on prior case law 

to meet that standard. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 584 (noting that 

because the type of entertainment the government sought to 

regulate was “plainly of the same character as that at issue in 

Renton, .... [i]t is therefore no leap to say that live nude dancing of the sort at issue here is likely to produce the same 

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No. 14-1642 13

pernicious secondary effects”); see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 

296–97. Recognizing that the divided opinions in Pap’s A.M.

and Barnes may have muddied the waters regarding the nature and extent of the evidence a governmental body must 

evaluate in order to conclude that a regulated activity produces adverse secondary effects, the Court granted certiorari 

in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., “to clarify the

standard for determining whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Renton.” 535 U.S. at 433.

In Alameda Books, plaintiff operators of an adult bookstore 

and adult video arcade challenged a 1983 Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the operation of multiple adult businesses 

in the same building. Id. at 431–32. In enacting the ordinance, 

Los Angeles looked to a 1977 study it had conducted, which 

focused not on the effects of multiple adult entertainment 

businesses within a single complex, but rather on the effects 

of a concentration of separate adult establishments within 

close geographic proximity. Id. at 430. Although Los Angeles 

did not consider evidence bearing directly on the alleged 

link between multiple-use adult establishments and negative 

secondary effects, the Supreme Court determined that Los 

Angeles permissibly relied on the 1977 study. See id. at 436 

(“[I]t is rational for the city to infer that reducing the concentration of adult operations in a neighborhood, whether within separate establishments or in one large establishment, will 

reduce crime rates.”).

In an attempt to crystalize the evidentiary standard set 

forth in Renton, the Alameda Books plurality explained,

In Renton, we .... held that a municipality may 

rely on any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” for demonstrating a conCase: 14-1642 Document: 28 Filed: 03/10/2015 Pages: 25
14 No. 14-1642

nection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest. This is not to 

say that a municipality can get away with shoddy 

data or reasoning. The municipality’s evidence 

must fairly support the municipality's rationale for 

its ordinance.5

Id. at 438 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51). Concluding that Los Angeles, “at th[at] 

stage of the litigation, ha[d] complied with the evidentiary 

requirement in Renton,” id. at 439, the Court reversed the 

Ninth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment in plaintiffs’ favor, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Los Angeles’s secondary effects evidence 

was strong enough to justify the challenged ordinance. The 

Court declined, however, to conclusively hold that the ordinance complied with the dictates of the First Amendment.

See id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If 

[Los Angeles’s evidentiary basis] can be proved unsound at 

trial, then the ordinance might not withstand intermediate 

scrutiny.”).

In the wake of Alameda Books, our court has been consistent in requiring that a regulating body produce some 

specific, tangible evidence establishing a link between the 

regulated activity and harmful secondary effects. Our decision in Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 581 F.3d 

5 Justice Kennedy, who provided the necessary fifth vote in Alameda 

Books, agreed with the evidentiary standard set forth by the plurality. In 

analyzing “how much evidence is required to support the proposition” 

that a particular establishment may create negative secondary effects, he 

concluded that “[t]he plurality ... gives the correct answer.” 535 U.S. at 

449 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

 

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460 (7th Cir. 2009), is particularly instructive. In Annex Books, 

Indianapolis revised its ordinances relating to adult businesses, expanding the definition of “adult entertainment 

business” and prohibiting the operation of such businesses 

after midnight or on Sundays. Id. at 461.6 The city attempted 

to justify the restrictions on the ground that they would “reduce crime and other secondary effects associated with adult 

businesses.” Id. at 462. In setting forth the applicable evidentiary standard, we interpreted Alameda Books to require a 

demonstration that a regulation is “‘likely to cause a significant decrease in secondary effects and a trivial decrease in 

the quantity of speech.’ ‘[In other words, a] city must advance some basis to show that its regulation has the purpose 

and effect of suppressing secondary effects ... .’” Id. at 465 

(quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 445, 449).

In revising the challenged ordinances, Indianapolis relied

on a 1984 study that found higher crime rates near adult 

businesses. However, we rejected the study’s probative value, concluding that it was relevant only to a restriction on 

the high concentration of adult businesses in a particular geographic area, which Indianapolis’s ordinances did not seek 

6 Although the regulations at issue in Annex Books were more extensive 

than those at issue in the instant case, it is clear that intermediate scrutiny applies to both sets of regulations. See Annex Books, 581 F.3d at 462 

(“[Indianapolis] concedes that its laws are subject to ‘intermediate’ scrutiny ... .”); Schultz, 228 F.3d at 841 (“[A] general prohibition on all public 

nudity receives intermediate scrutiny ... when the government offers as 

its legislative justification the suppression of public nudity’s negative 

secondary effects.”). Therefore, the district court was incorrect to conclude that Annex Books is not relevant because it involved ordinances 

specifically targeted at adult businesses while Dix’s ordinance is a general village-wide ban on nudity.

 

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to regulate. Id. at 462. We also objected to the fact that most 

of the plaintiffs were book and video outlets, which did not 

offer live entertainment, but that the studies that Indianapolis cited dealt exclusively with live entertainment venues. Id 

at 463. In summarizing the flaws in Indianapolis’s research, 

we explained, 

Indianapolis has approached this case by assuming that any empirical study of morals offenses near any kind of adult establishment in 

any city justifies every possible kind of legal 

restriction in every city. ... But because books 

(even of the “adult” variety) have a constitutional status different from granola and wine, 

... the public benefits of the restrictions must be 

established by evidence, and not just asserted. 

The evidence need not be local; Indianapolis is 

entitled to rely on findings from Milwaukee or 

Memphis (provided that a suitable effort is 

made to control for other variables). But there 

must be evidence; lawyers’ talk is insufficient.

Id. (citations omitted). We ultimately held that the “shortcomings” of the secondary effects evidence cited by Indianapolis “call[ed] the City’s justifications into question and require[d] an evidentiary hearing at which the City must support its ordinance under the intermediate standard of Alameda Books.” Id. at 465.

We reaffirmed this evidentiary standard in New Albany 

DVD, LLC v. City of New Albany, Ind., 581 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 

2009). There, the city of New Albany enacted a prohibition 

on the operation of any sexually oriented business within 

1,000 feet of any church, which prevented plaintiff adult 

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No. 14-1642 17

book and video outlet from operating in its current location. 

Id. at 558. The district court granted plaintiff’s motion for a 

preliminary injunction, which the city appealed. Although 

we found fault with the district court’s conclusion that New 

Albany’s ordinance was not narrowly tailored, id. at 558–59, 

we nonetheless agreed that the city—at least at that point in 

the litigation—had not demonstrated that the plaintiff’s establishment, or other comparable businesses, generated any 

adverse secondary effects. Id. at 559. With respect to New 

Albany’s first proffered injurious secondary effect—

increased theft—we concluded that the city had not offered 

evidence that “fairly support[ed]” the contention that adult 

bookstores located near churches attracted thieves. Id. at 560.

We also found that the city had produced insufficient evidentiary support for the ordinance’s alternative justification—an increase in pornographic litter. We determined 

that, in order to salvage the anti-litter rationale on remand, 

New Albany would be required to present evidence establishing “(a) how much sex-oriented litter an adult bookstore 

generates; (b) who is likely to see that litter in the parts of 

New Albany where adult bookstores are allowed to operate; 

and (c) how much adult litter will remain in New Albany’s 

central business area ... if plaintiff is exiled.” Id. at 561. In 

sum, both Annex Books and New Albany require that a municipality enacting an ordinance that burdens freedom of expression demonstrate a reasonable connection between the 

cited evidentiary basis for its regulation and the specific facts 

and circumstances on the ground. 

Applying this precedent to Ordinance No. 2010-05, we 

reverse the district court’s grant of Dix’s motion to dismiss. 

To pass constitutional muster, Dix must provide some conCase: 14-1642 Document: 28 Filed: 03/10/2015 Pages: 25
18 No. 14-1642

crete evidence indicating that public nudity generates adverse secondary effects. Dix has produced no such evidence—either within the Village itself or in an analogous 

municipality. All Dix has offered is the generic maxim that it 

“is in the public interest to maintain social order, health, 

welfare, and safety of citizens.” As we observed in Annex 

Books, if public nudity is “associated with significant crime 

or disorderly conduct, it should be easy for [the municipality] to show it.” 581 F.3d at 463. But, like Indianapolis there, 

Dix here “has not offered an iota of evidence to that effect.” 

Id.

As for the “quality and quantum of evidence” Dix must 

produce, G.M. Enters., 350 F.3d at 638, the Village retains 

considerable flexibility in identifying evidentiary support.

As we explained in Annex Books, Dix is not required to conduct independent studies regarding undesirable secondary 

effects, but rather may rely on evidence from other municipalities—“provided that a suitable effort is made to control 

for other variables.” 581 F.3d at 463. There is also no need for 

the relied-upon evidence to meet the demanding requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 

579 (1993), the governing standard for the admissibility of 

expert testimony at trial. See G.M. Enters., 350 F.3d at 640 (rejecting as “completely unfounded” the contention that a 

municipality cannot establish a reasonable basis for believing its regulations will reduce adverse secondary effects 

“unless the studies it relied upon are of sufficient methodological rigor to be admissible under Daubert”). We recognize 

that Dix is entitled to a “reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to address the secondary effects of protected speech.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439 (plurality opinion) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But this 

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No. 14-1642 19

leeway does not diminish the importance of the evidentiary 

requirement: to establish the constitutionality of Ordinance 

No. 2010-05, Dix must offer evidence sufficient to “demonstrate a reasonable belief in a causal relationship between 

[public nudity] and secondary effects.” G.M. Enters., 350 F.3d 

at 640.

Finally, we emphasize that this dispute is only at the motion-to-dismiss stage. In reversing the district court, we conclude only that Dix—at this early phase of the litigation—has 

not pointed to sufficient secondary effects evidence to permit 

disposing of plaintiffs’ claim altogether. If, on remand, Dix 

produces concrete evidentiary support, and “[i]f plaintiffs 

fail to cast direct doubt on [its proffered] rationale, either by 

demonstrating that [Dix]’s evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes [Dix]’s factual findings,” Ordinance No. 2010-05 should be upheld. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39. By contrast, “[i]f plaintiffs 

succeed in casting doubt on [Dix]’s rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to [Dix] to supplement the record 

with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its 

ordinance.” Id. at 439. To dismiss plaintiffs’ claim now, when 

Dix has not yet made any affirmative showing of adverse 

secondary effects and plaintiffs have therefore not received a 

full and fair opportunity to challenge Dix’s findings,7 would 

be premature.

7 Plaintiffs claim that Dix “adopted [Ordinance No. 2010-05] solely for 

the purpose of interfering with Plaintiffs’ business and suppressing the 

entertainment offered to willing customers.” While the Supreme Court 

has repeatedly held that it “will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive,” O’Brien, 

391 U.S. at 383, plaintiffs are nevertheless entitled an opportunity to dis-

 

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B. Alcohol Regulations

Plaintiffs also argue that, under Illinois law, Dix lacked 

authority to pass the open container ban (Ordinance No. 

2010-04) and the prohibition on the possession of alcohol in 

public accommodations (Ordinance No. 2010-06). They further contend that, even if Dix acted within the parameters of 

Illinois law in enacting the challenged regulations, the bans 

nevertheless violate the First Amendment because Dix has 

produced no evidence demonstrating that the possession of 

liquor by patrons of a business offering erotic entertainment 

generates adverse secondary effects.

The Illinois Liquor Control Act (“ILCA”), 235 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5, is the primary statute governing the ability of Illinois 

municipalities to regulate the sale and distribution of alcohol, and “prescribes the limits beyond which a municipality 

may not act.” Cheetah Enters., Inc. v. Cnty. of Lake, 317 N.E.2d 

129, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). The ILCA instructs that its provisions “shall be liberally construed, to the end that the 

health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption 

of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted.” 235 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/1-2.

Plaintiffs contend that the challenged ordinances violate 

§ 2-1 of the ILCA, which states, “nothing herein contained 

shall prevent the possession and transportation of alcoholic 

liquor by the possessor for the personal use of the possessor, 

his family and guests.” 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1. But Dix has 

not prohibited the possession or transportation of alcohol for 

pute the evidence offered in support of Dix’s secondary effects rationale.

Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438–39.

 

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No. 14-1642 21

“personal use”; it has simply regulated the possession and 

consumption of alcohol in public.8

Dix argues that its authority to enact the challenged alcohol restrictions derives directly from § 4-1 of the ILCA, 

which permits municipalities to “establish such further regulations and restrictions upon the issuance of and operations 

under local licenses not inconsistent with law as the public 

good and convenience may require.” 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-

1. However, § 4-1 applies specifically to the regulation of 

those establishments that have been granted municipal licenses to sell liquor. As Dix is a dry municipality,9 neither 

Foxxxy Ladyz nor any other commercial establishment within the Village has received such a license, and therefore § 4-1 

does not control. Yet § 4-1 is nonetheless instructive. Given 

that our court has interpreted this provision as a grant of 

8 It is worth noting that the State of Illinois has enacted a statewide ban 

on the transportation of open containers of alcohol in vehicles, so § 2-1 of 

the ILCA cannot fairly be read to guarantee individuals an uninhibited 

right to possess and transport alcohol, no matter the circumstances. See 

625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-502 (“[N]o driver [or passenger] may transport, 

carry, possess or have any alcoholic liquor within the passenger area of 

any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in the original 

container and with the seal unbroken.”). 

9 Pursuant to 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-2, a municipality that currently 

permits the sale of alcohol may not prohibit it without obtaining authorization via a general referendum. Once a municipality has attained “dry” 

status, however, the municipality may remain dry until a general referendum is passed requiring it to again permit the sale of alcohol. 235 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/9-10. According to plaintiffs, § 9-2 implies that Dix could 

not ban the consumption of alcohol in public without conducting a similar referendum. But § 9-2 applies only to prohibitions on the sale of alcohol—not its public consumption. Put simply, the ILCA’s referendum 

requirement is inapplicable to the restrictions at issue here.

 

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“broad discretionary authority” to aid municipalities in their 

regulation of liquor licensees, Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria, Ill., 

735 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2013), it makes little sense to conclude that, where a municipality has properly banned liquor 

licenses altogether, it lacks implicit authority to impose additional restrictions that advance its long-held “dry” status—

particularly where such restrictions further the ILCA’s public safety goals.

Moreover, while the ILCA is silent as to both public consumption and BYOB, Dix finds authorization for the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 2010-04 and 2010-06 in the Illinois 

Municipal Code, 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5. The Code expressly 

endorses Ordinance No. 2010-06, Dix’s prohibition on the 

possession of alcohol in public accommodations, by permitting municipalities to “regulate businesses operating as a 

public accommodation that permit the consumption of alcoholic liquor on the business premises and that are not licensed under the [ILCA].” 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-42-10.1. As 

an “entertainment” facility that permits any individual over 

age twenty-one to enter and consume alcohol, Foxxxy Ladyz 

constitutes a “public accommodation” within the meaning of 

the Code, and Dix therefore acted within its express statutory authority in restricting the possession of alcohol therein. 

See id. (“‘[P]ublic accommodation’ means a refreshment, entertainment, or recreation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, or 

advantages are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made 

available to the public.”).

With regard to Ordinance No. 2010-04—Dix’s open container ban—the Municipal Code makes no express reference 

to open containers of alcohol in public; however, it empowCase: 14-1642 Document: 28 Filed: 03/10/2015 Pages: 25
No. 14-1642 23

ers all Illinois municipalities to “prevent intoxication ... and 

all other disorderly conduct.” 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-5-3. 

Countless municipalities in the State of Illinois have elected 

to prohibit public consumption of alcohol as one method of 

combating intoxication. See, e.g., Chi., Ill., Mun. Code § 8-4-

030 (“It shall be unlawful for any person to drink any alcoholic liquor as defined by law on any public way ... .”). Read 

in conjunction with the permissive language of the ILCA, the 

Municipal Code confirms the Illinois legislature’s intent to 

confer on municipalities broad discretion to regulate alcohol 

consumption in order to promote public health and safety, 

including via the imposition of a prohibition on open containers of alcohol in public. We therefore conclude that Dix’s 

enactment of Ordinance Nos. 2010-04 and 2010-06 falls within the parameters of Illinois law.

Turning to whether the challenged alcohol regulations 

comport with constitutional requirements, that inquiry is a 

simple one. We have unequivocally held that the First 

Amendment does not entitle a bar, its dancers or its patrons, 

“to have alcohol available during a ‘presentation’ of nude or 

semi-nude dancing.” Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Vill. of Somerset, 316 

F.3d 702, 726 (7th Cir. 2003). In Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of 

Somerset, we upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting the 

sale, use, or consumption of alcohol on the premises of 

“Sexually Oriented Businesses.” Id. at 704, 728. Concluding 

that the regulation at issue was “not a restriction on erotic 

expression, but a prohibition of nonexpressive conduct (i.e., 

serving and consuming alcohol) during the presentation of 

expressive conduct,” we subjected the challenged regulation 

to intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 724, 726. However, in contrast 

to the regulation at issue in Ben’s Bar, the challenged ordinances here do not single out “sexually oriented businesses,” 

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which are subject to some limited amount of First Amendment protection; rather, Ordinance Nos. 2010-04 and 2010-06

apply broadly to all public accommodations and do not, on 

their face, target establishments where protected expressive 

conduct is likely to occur. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that Dix’s alcohol ordinances burden no 

fundamental rights, and that the ordinances need only withstand rational basis review.

A regulation satisfies rational basis so long as it is rationally related to some legitimate government interest. Wis. 

Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 653 (7th Cir. 

2013). Such a regulation “bear[s] a strong presumption of 

validity” and the challenging party bears the burden of negating “every conceivable basis which might support it.” 

FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993). Further, under rational basis review, “it is entirely irrelevant ... 

whether the conceived reason for the challenged [regulation] 

actually motivated the legislature.” Id. at 315. “[A] legislative 

choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be 

based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or 

empirical data.” Id.

Based on this deferential standard of review, plaintiffs’ 

challenge fails. Dix’s asserted interests in enacting the alcohol restrictions—maintaining “social order, health, welfare, 

and safety” and “preserv[ing] the ‘dry’ status of the Village 

of Dix to the fullest extent permitted by law”—are undoubtedly legitimate and bear a reasonable relation to the open 

container and public accommodations bans. Although plaintiffs allege that the true motivation behind the alcohol restrictions was to interfere with the successful operation of 

Foxxxy Ladyz, this allegation is insufficient to render a reguCase: 14-1642 Document: 28 Filed: 03/10/2015 Pages: 25
No. 14-1642 25

lation invalid under rational basis review so long as some 

hypothetical legitimate government interest exists to support 

the challenged regulation. See id. Finally, because regulations 

survive rational basis review even if they are “speculation[s] 

unsupported by evidence,” id., Dix was under no obligation

to demonstrate concrete evidence of adverse secondary effects prior to enacting the contested ordinances. The district 

court was therefore correct to dismiss plaintiffs’ challenge to 

Ordinance Nos. 2010-04 and 2010-06.

III. Conclusion

We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

challenge to Dix’s public nudity ban but AFFIRM its dismissal 

of plaintiffs’ challenge to Dix’s alcohol regulations, and 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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