Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02649/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02649-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Carmine Micolo, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

County of Pinal, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-02649-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants Pinal County and Officer Stacy Sherwood move to dismiss Plaintiff 

Michael Micolo’s third amended complaint.1

 Doc. 63. The issues are fully briefed 

(Docs. 64, 65), and no party has requested oral argument. For the following reasons, the 

Court will grant Defendants’ motion, with prejudice. 

I. Background. 

 On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in Pinal County 

Superior Court. Doc. 1-1 at 9-10. Defendants removed the case to this Court. Doc. 1. 

 On December 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc. 10. The 

Court dismissed all claims against the Pinal County Sherriff’s Department and all of 

Plaintiff’s state law claims. Doc. 24. The remaining claims were stayed pending the 

state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff. Docs. 38, 40, 42, 44, 47. On 

 

1

 Defendants refer to this as Plaintiff’s second amended complaint in their motion to dismiss. This is actually Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. See Docs. 10, 60, 62. 

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February 16, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against 

Defendant Sherwood pertaining to conduct that occurred during the arrest as barred by 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), but permitted Plaintiff leave to amend his 

complaint to address conduct occurring after the arrest. Doc. 56 at 3-6. The Court also 

dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Pinal County under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but granted leave to amend. Doc. 56 at 6. 

 On March 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed his second amended complaint. Doc. 60. The 

Court dismissed the complaint because he failed to allege sufficient facts to state an 

excessive force claim relating to post-arrest conduct. Doc. 61 at 1. The Court dismissed 

Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims as barred by Heck, and again dismissed 

Plaintiff’s state law claims. Id. at 2. The Court granted leave to amend. Id.

 On April 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed his third amended complaint. Doc. 62. This 

complaint contains an excessive force claim pertaining to conduct that occurred after the 

arrest, as well as several state law claims. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A successful 12(b)(6) motion must show either that the complaint lacks a 

cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts sufficient to support its theory. Balistreri 

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint that sets forth a 

cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss as long as it contains “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556). 

 Pro se litigants are subject to the same pleading requirements as everyone else. 

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Calugay v. GMAC Mortg., No. CV-09-1947-PHX-LOA, 2009 WL 3872356, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. Nov. 18, 2009) (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986)). But 

courts have an obligation “‘to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.’” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). If a pro se 

complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must grant 

leave to amend “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

III. Analysis. 

 A. Excessive Force Claim. 

 A successful excessive force claim must show that the officers’ use of force was 

objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “Whether a particular use of force was 

‘objectively unreasonable’ depends on several factors, including the severity of the crime 

that prompted the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and 

whether the suspect was resisting arrest.” Tatum v. City & Cty. of S.F., 441 F.3d 1090, 

1095 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 Plaintiff was arrested for assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, and 

trespassing. Doc. 62 at 3, ¶ 10. Plaintiff admits to resisting arrest.2

 Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Sherwood handcuffed him and, as a result of Plaintiff’s continuing 

to resist arrest, placed leg restraints on Plaintiff. Id. All of these actions presumably 

occurred as part of the Plaintiff’s arrest, and any claim based on them is barred by Heck. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries from a lack of treatment during his 

transport to the hospital. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 15. He appears to claim that these injuries resulted 

from the inability of medical personnel to treat him due to his restraints. Id. But Plaintiff 

makes no allegations against Defendant Sherwood related to these post-arrest incidents. 

 

2

 Plaintiff pleaded guilty to resisting arrest. See Doc. 47 at 1. 

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He does not allege that Defendant Sherwood was present during his transport to the 

hospital, nor does he provide facts from which the Court could conclude that Defendant 

Sherwood’s restraints were excessive when applied or during transport. To the contrary, 

Plaintiff alleges that he was “actively resisting arrest” when the restraints were applied 

(id. at ¶ 12), and that a “fellow officer” – apparently someone other than Defendant 

Sherwood – concluded during transport “that he needed to restrained again” (id. at ¶ 15). 

These facts do not show that Defendant Sherwood engaged in any unconstitutional 

conduct after Plaintiff’s arrest, nor do they provide a basis for concluding that Plaintiff’s 

treatment during transport, apparently by another officer, was improper given his 

continued resistance and need for restraint. What is more, Plaintiff admits that he has no 

independent memory of any of these events. Id. at ¶ 16. 

 Plaintiff’s other allegations regarding Defendant Sherwood, contained mostly in 

his state law claims, include mere conclusions that Sherwood acted improperly. They 

provide no additional factual support for the excessive force claim. Id. at ¶¶ 23-48. 

 Plaintiff has again failed to allege sufficient facts to state an excessive force claim 

against Defendant Sherwood based on post-arrest conduct. This is Plaintiff’s third 

attempt to allege such a claim. The Court is convinced that Plaintiff’s complaint could 

not be cured by further amendments. The Court will therefore dismiss the excessive 

force claim with prejudice. 

B State Law Claims. 

 The Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claims on multiple occasions. See 

Docs. 24, 30, 61. Although Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend his complaint more 

than once, the Court never granted Plaintiff leave to amend or reassert his state law 

claims. For the reasons previously stated (see Doc. 30), and because his state law claims 

continue to contain only conclusions and virtually no facts, the Court will dismiss the 

state law claims with prejudice.

 

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IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 63) is 

granted. 

 2. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. 62) is dismissed with 

prejudice. Plaintiff may not file another complaint in this case. The Clerk of the Court 

shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 20th day of June, 2016. 

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