Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02150/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02150-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH WILLIAMS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 05cv2150-J (CAB)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION; and

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

RENEWED MOTION TO

AMEND THE PETITION

v.

C.M. HARRISON, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Keith Williams (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

submitted a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

[Doc. No. 1.] Before the Court is Petitioner’s Renewed Motion for Leave to Amend

Habeas Corpus with Proposed Amended Petition (“Renewed Motion to Amend”). [Doc.

No. 32.] Magistrate Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo has filed a Report and Recommendation

(“R&R”) recommending that Petitioner’s motion be denied. [Doc. No. 41.] Petitioner filed

an objection to the R&R. [Doc. No. 44.] For the reasons discussed below, this Court

ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES Petitioner’s Renewed Motion to Amend the Petition.

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1

 After a reviewing court makes a final determination of an appeal, it must issue a remittitur,

which is to be immediately transmitted, with a certified copy of the opinion, to the trial court. See 22C

Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law § 831. Upon receipt of the remittitur from the reviewing court, jurisdiction

is removed from the reviewing court and restored to the lower court. See id. However, the court has

the inherent power to recall the remittitur and reassert its jurisdiction over the cause. See Bryan v.

Bank of America, 86 Cal. App. 4th 185, 191 (2001). While this power does not generally include

correcting errors of law, an exception may be made when the error would entitle the defendant to a

writ of habeas corpus, in which case the recall of the remittitur is deemed an adjunct to the writ, and

will be granted when appropriate to implement the defendant’s rights to habeas corpus. See People

v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 396-97 (1971).

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Procedural Background

I. State Court Background

On October 23, 2002, a jury convicted Petitioner of murder in the first degree,

carjacking, and robbery. (See Resp’t Lodgm’t No. 1 at 215.) On December 12, 2002,

Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (See id. at 166-67.) On

September 22, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for direct

review of his conviction in the California Superior Court. (See Resp’t Lodgm’t No. 9.) On

November 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Recall of the Remittitur1

 in the California

Supreme Court. (See Mot. to Enlarge, Ex. A.) On December 14, 2005, the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Recall of the Remittitur, which it construed

as a petition for review. (See id.)

II. Federal Court Background

On November 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. No. 1.] On January 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a

Motion to Enlarge Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition (“Motion to Enlarge”). [Doc. No. 10.] 

The magistrate judge construed the document as a “lodgment of exhibits in support of

petition for writ of habeas corpus.” [Doc. No. 9.] On March 1, 2006, Respondent filed an

Answer to the Petition. [Doc. No. 12.]

On April 24, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition

(“Motion to Amend”). [Doc. No. 21.] The magistrate judge found the motion to be “not

entirely clear,” but denied the request without prejudice, given the Court’s duty to read pro

se pleadings liberally. (See Order Regarding Pl.’s Mot. to Amend at 1.) The Court

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instructed Petitioner that he could file a renewed motion to amend the Petition, but must

clearly and simply state any additional claims. (See id. at 2.) On June 14, 2006, Petitioner

filed the instant Renewed Motion to Amend, stating five additional claims. [Doc. No. 32.]

On June 30, 2006, Respondent filed an opposition to the Renewed Motion to

Amend, arguing that it contained unexhausted claims and was barred by the statute of

limitations. (See Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at 3-5.) On January 31, 2007, Magistrate Judge

Bencivengo issued the R&R, recommending that Petitioner’s Renewed Motion to Amend

be denied. [Doc. No. 41.] Petitioner timely filed objections to the R&R. [Doc. Nos. 43,

44.]

Legal Standard

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are set

forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2004). The district court must “make a de

novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” and

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2004); see United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667, 676 (1980).

Discussion

I. Exhaustion

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge their state court convictions must first

exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c) (2004). To exhaust state

judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court

with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal

habeas petition. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275 (1971). A prisoner need exhaust only one avenue of relief in state court before

bringing a habeas petition in federal court, even where alternative avenues are available. 

Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987). For example, by either a writ of

habeas corpus or a motion for recall of the remittitur, a petitioner can raise a claim that he

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was convicted under a statute that did not prohibit his conduct. See Hayward v. Stone, 496

F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1974).

Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to exhaust the five claims presented in

Petitioner’s Renewed Motion to Amend. (See Opp’n to Mot. to Amend at 3-5.) Petitioner

contends that he exhausted the claims by filing the Motion for Recall of the Remittitur in

the California Supreme Court. (See Objection to R&R at 3-4.) The Court must determine

whether Petitioner’s Motion for Recall of the Remittitur presented the California Supreme

Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at

29.

When a petitioner’s application to recall the remittitur is filed under appropriate

circumstances, such as to reinstate an appeal where appellate counsel was ineffective, then

denial of the application, followed by denial of a petition for a hearing in the California

Supreme Court, exhausts the claims. See Hayward, 496 F.2d at 846; see also Gonzales v.

Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 808 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that applications to the California Court

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court to recall the remittitur, and a petition for

review thereof, sufficiently exhausted petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel and lack

of substantial evidence claims for the purpose of bringing them in federal court); People v.

Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 396-97 (1971) (stating that a recall of the remittitur may be deemed

an adjunct to the writ of habeas corpus, and will be granted when appropriate to implement

a defendant’s right to habeas corpus). 

In the instant Renewed Motion to Amend, Petitioner raises four claims pertaining to

judicial error and insufficient evidence, and a separate claim for ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. (See Renewed Mot. to Amend at 2-3.) In his Motion for Recall of the

Remittitur, filed in the California Supreme Court, Petitioner raises each of the same

underlying claims, but does so primarily in the context of a claim for ineffective assistance

of counsel. However, construing the pleadings liberally, each claim in the Renewed

Motion to Amend does appear in the Motion for Recall of the Remittitur. The California

Supreme Court construed the Motion for Recall of the Remittitur as a second petition for

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review and summarily denied it. (See Resp’t Lodgm’t No. 9.) The state supreme court did

not articulate what grounds it considered, or how it made its decision. (See id.) However,

because Petitioner stated the factual and legal basis behind his claims, it is safe to say that

the state supreme court was presented with a fair opportunity to consider the issues. (See

Mot. to Enlarge, Ex. A); see also Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“The state courts have been given a sufficient opportunity to hear an issue when the

petitioner has presented the state court with the issue's factual and legal basis.”). Therefore,

this Court FINDS that Petitioner’s claims in his Renewed Motion to Amend are exhausted.

II. Statute of Limitations

The Court next examines whether the claims raised in the instant Renewed Motion

to Amend are barred by the statute of limitations. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

state court has one year from the date his conviction becomes “final by the [later of the]

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” to file an

application for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2004).

In the instant case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for

review on September 22, 2004. On December 21, 2004, the ninety-day period for seeking

direct review from the United States Supreme Court expired. See Sup. Ct. R. 13; Bowen v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). On December 22, 2004, the statute of

limitations began to run. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). On November 18, 2005, Petitioner filed

his original Petition in this Court. [Doc. No. 1.] This federal Petition, though itself timely

filed, did not toll the statute of limitations as to any claims not raised in the federal petition. 

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001); Fail v. Hubbard, 272 F.3d 1133, 1134

(9th. Cir. 2001). On December 22, 2005, the limitation period expired. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). 

On January 26, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Enlarge, which Magistrate Judge

Bencivengo construed as a lodgment of exhibits. [Doc. Nos. 9, 10.] In this motion,

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Petitioner cites statutory language regarding “amendment or supplement” of a habeas

corpus application, and prays for the Court to allow incorporation of Petitioner’s

“exhausted Recall of the Remittitur with the Writ of Habeas Corpus . . . .” (See Mot. to

Enlarge at 1-2.) Petitioner argues that despite the magistrate judge’s initial determination

that the motion was an attempt to lodge exhibits, it was actually an attempt to amend the

Petition via incorporation of the claims raised in Petitioner’s Motion for Recall of the

Remittitur, which Petitioner attached as an exhibit to the Motion to Enlarge. (See id. at 2,

Ex. A; Objection to R&R at 6-8.) As stated above, the five additional claims Petitioner put

forth in his Renewed Motion to Amend are all contained in some form within the Motion

for Recall of the Remittitur. (See Renewed Mot. to Amend at 2-3; Mot. to Enlarge, Ex. A.) 

Additionally, the magistrate judge agreed that Petitioner’s Motion to Enlarge may have

actually been an attempt to add some ineffective assistance of counsel claims, rather than to

simply lodge the California Supreme Court’s denial of his appeal as an exhibit to his

current Petition. (See Order Regarding Pl.’s Mot. to Amend at 1.) Given the Court’s duty

to read pro se pleadings liberally, this Court construes Petitioner’s January 26, 2006,

Motion to Enlarge as his first attempt to amend the Petition. However, as noted in the

R&R, Petitioner’s Motion to Enlarge was still filed outside of the limitations period, which

expired on December 22, 2005. (See R&R at 4 n.1.) The Court therefore must determine

whether the doctrines of equitable tolling and relation back apply to the five new claims

raised in the Motion to Enlarge and the Renewed Motion to Amend. 

A. Equitable Tolling

In rare instances, a petitioner may receive equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Equitable tolling is

appropriate only when “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citation omitted) (citing Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 539-40 (9th Cir. 1998)). The burden of proof to show equitable

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2

 For further examples of what constitutes “extraordinary circumstances,” see Spitsyn, 345

F.3d at 801 (finding that a retained attorney’s failure to timely file a petition rose to the level of

egregious behavior justifying equitable tolling, where the attorney failed to respond to numerous

requests from the petitioner to prepare and file the petition, and did not return petitioner’s file), and

Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202-03 (9th. Cir. 2003) (finding that a prison official’s failure

to carry out a promise to fax a signed copy of a habeas petition to the attorney assisting the petitioner

supported equitable tolling).

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tolling falls on the petitioner. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, Petitioner claims that prison lockdowns beginning on December 14, 2005,

prevented him from visiting the prison law library and preparing an amended Petition by

December 22, 2005, the statutory deadline. (See Pet’r’s Reply at 10-11; Objection to R&R

at 12.) Petitioner further argues that equitable tolling should apply because there is no

evidence of abuse, bad faith, or undue prejudice to Respondent. (See Pet’r’s Reply at 9-10;

Objection to R&R at 12.)

While Petitioner has made specific allegations regarding the duration of the

lockdowns, he has provided no evidence of the existence of those conditions. It is not clear

how many lockdowns there were during the stretch Petitioner cites, or if there were any

opportunities between lockdowns for Petitioner to use the law library. But even if

Petitioner was prevented from using the prison law library from December 14, 2005, until

the statutory deadline of December 22, 2005, he still would have lost only nine days of

library time within the limitations period. Standing alone, this impediment does not

amount to “extraordinary circumstances.” See Lampert, 465 F.3d at 969; United States v.

Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that interruptions to a prisoner’s

access to the law library during the final months of the limitations period did not constitute

extraordinary circumstances); United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D.

Cal. 1997) (holding that brief security lockdowns “could hardly be characterized as an

‘extraordinary circumstance’ ”); cf. Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2002)

(finding that transfers which resulted in a prisoner’s loss of access to legal materials for

eighty-two days, during a time when there were open questions about the proper method of

statutory tolling during the pendency of the prisoner’s petition in state court, appear to

satisfy the extraordinary circumstances requirement for equitable tolling).2

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Additionally, while Petitioner claims that the lockdowns prevented him from visiting

the prison law library to prepare his motion, he does not claim that he made any effort to

file his motion after the lockdowns began. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 802 (citing Valverde v.

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)) (noting that “if the person seeking equitable

tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file, after the extraordinary

circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the

failure to file is broken.”) Therefore, this Court FINDS that equitable tolling does not

apply.

B. Relation Back of the Amendments

Because he has failed to establish equitable tolling, the five new claims Petitioner

seeks to add in his amended petition are outside the statute of limitations unless they relate

back to the original claims. An amendment of a petition relates back to the date of the

original pleading when the claim asserted in the amended petition “arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original

[petition].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). In Mayle, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth

Circuit’s view that a new claim relates back if it arises from the same trial and conviction as

the original claims. See 545 U.S. at 656-57, 664-65. It held that an amended habeas

petition “does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA’s one-year time limit) when it

asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both time and type from

those the original pleading set forth.” See id. at 650. Instead, relation back is appropriate

where the claims in the original and amended petitions are tied to a core of operative facts. 

See id. at 664.

The Ninth Circuit has not yet applied the pertinent Mayle standard regarding the

issue of relation back of habeas claims, but the court has recognized the new standard. See

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 660 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging Mayle’s rejection of

the Ninth Circuit’s former broad understanding of relation back). Since Mayle, at least one

district court within the Ninth Circuit and several circuit courts of appeal have made

specific determinations as to whether claims relate back. See Iasu v. Chertoff, 426 F. Supp.

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2d 1124, 1128 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that where the amended petition raises a claim

of United States citizenship and the original petition raised a challenge to Petitioner’s

indefinite detention, there was no relation back, because the claims arose from different

facts). The First Circuit has held that the Rule 15 relation back provision is to be strictly

construed in the habeas corpus context. See United States v. Ciampi, 419 F.3d 20, 23 (1st

Cir. 2005). The court held that a petitioner does not satisfy the Rule 15 “relation back”

standard merely by raising some type of ineffective assistance claim in the original petition,

and then attempting to amend the petition with another ineffective assistance claim based

upon an entirely distinct type of conduct. See id. at 24. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found

that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on cross-examination did not relate back to

the original claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to the admission

of certain evidence. See United States v. Hernandez, 436 F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 2006)

(finding that the claims were not similar enough to satisfy the “time and type” test and did

not arise from the same set of operative facts).

In the instant action, the original Petition states two claims for relief: (1) the trial

court denied Petitioner his due process rights when the court failed to give the jury a

written instruction on duress after determining such instruction was vital to the defense;

and (2) Petitioner was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because the prosecutor

excluded minorities from the jury. (See Pet. Mem. at 1, 5.)

Petitioner wishes to add five new claims: (1) his right to effective assistance of

appellate counsel was denied; (2) the “gun use allegation” was unduly prejudicial and

should not have been admitted during trial; (3) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to

confront and cross-examine witnesses Marcus Brown and Irene Wolberg; (4) there was

insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s intent; and (5) the trial court committed prejudicial

error by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (See

Renewed Mot. to Amend at 2-3.) 

Under Mayle, the first four new claims do not relate back to the date of the original

Petition because they are not tied to a common core of operative facts. See 545 U.S. at 664. 

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The first new claim asserts ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by Lynda A. Romero,

an attorney who represented Petitioner on appeal only. Because the original Petition does

not contain any claim concerning appellate counsel, the first new claim does not relate

back. The second new claim regarding the admission of the “gun use allegation” does not

relate to the original claims, as the original claims did not pertain to admission of evidence

at trial. The third new claim focusing on the right to confront and cross-examine two

witnesses does not relate back, as the original claims do not involve witnesses. The fourth

new claim is unclear, and can be construed to allege the prosecution’s failure to meet its

burden of proof, or the lack of evidence regarding Petitioner’s intent as it relates to a

finding of special circumstances or other underlying charge. However, because no

plausible interpretation of the fourth new claim is based on the same set of facts as the

original two claims, it does not relate back.

The fifth new claim requires a closer examination, because like the first claim in the

original petition, it deals with the trial court’s failure to provide instructions to the jury. 

The first original claim contends that the trial court committed error in failing to give the

jury written instructions on the issue of duress. (See Pet. Mem. at 1.) The fifth new claim

asserts that the trial court should have instructed the jury on voluntary and involuntary

manslaughter. (See Renewed Mot. to Amend at 3.) 

At least one post-Mayle court has found that it was not enough that the original

claim and the amended claim both related to alleged defects in jury instructions. See

Laurore v. Spencer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D. Mass. 2005). It held that where an original

claim is of a distinctly different legal nature than the new claim, the new claim is not

sufficiently similar enough in type to warrant relation back. See id. 

Here, the original claim involves the lack of a written instruction on the defense

theory of duress, while the new claim involves the lack of an instruction on the lesser

offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Not only are these instructions of a

different legal nature, but the factual basis underlying each theory differs as well. The

duress defense involves a theory that the defendant was acting under threat when he

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engaged in the otherwise criminal conduct, while the offenses of voluntary and involuntary

manslaughter concern the criminal conduct itself. Because the two jury instructions are not

based on the same core of operative facts, the fifth new claim does not relate back to the

first original claim. See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664. In sum, the Court FINDS that none of the

new claims raised in the Renewed Motion to Amend relates back to the claims raised in the

original Petition.

Conclusion

Because Petitioner’s new claims are not saved by equitable tolling and do not relate

back to the date of the original Petition, this Court FINDS that they are barred by the

statute of limitations. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s Renewed Motion to

Amend and ORDERS this action to proceed with the claims stated in the original Petition

filed on November 18, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 28, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Bencivengo

All Parties

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