Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02779/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02779-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR MANUEL CORREA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2779 MCE EFB P

vs.

CHIEF DEPUTY SHERIFF 

JOHN McGUINESS, et al., 

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). An initial partial filing fee of $80.00 will be assessed by this order. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect

the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 

Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded

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by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account

exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague

and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights

violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he suffered a severe assault by Tony Gomez, an

inmate, as a result of a security breach. Plaintiff asserts that all named defendants engaged in a

conspiracy to facilitate a brutal attack upon plaintiff, and that his Eighth Amendment right was

violated because defendants Walker, Deadman, and McGuiness failed to protect him in reckless

disregard for his safety.

 First, plaintiff claims that defendants Walker and Deadman, deputies at the Sacramento

County Jail, facilitated the security breach through which Gomez was able to pass as part of a

conspiracy with Gomez and Gomez’s wife, who had been an informant in plaintiff’s criminal

case. Plaintiff argues that the attack was obviously a conspiracy because “the only way to

breach [the] security door and circumvent security measures would be through officers Walker

and Deadmans [sic] assistance.” In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant to § 1983,

such a complaint must “allege facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. 

A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988), citing Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239,

245 (6th Cir. 1984); Burnett v. Short, 441 F.2d 405, 406 (5th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff must allege

that defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in

furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974). 

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 It has been held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two criteria

are met. First, a plaintiff’s alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious from an objective

standpoint. Put another way, a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.

2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Second, a prison official must have a state of mind of “deliberate

indifference” to a prisoner’s health and safety. Id. at 834. In the prison context, “only

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” implicates the Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)). Thus, a court can hold a

prison official liable only if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. at

837.

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Plaintiff alleges that defendants Walker and Deadman allowed Gomez to pass through a secured

entrance to an area of the jail, where plaintiff was being held in segregation from the general

population, and beat him so brutally that he suffered seizures and had to be transported via

ambulance to a hospital for emergency assistance. Plaintiff states that the only way for Gomez

to have passed through the security door was with the assistance of defendants Walker and

Deadman. Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Walker and Deadman in fact provided

Gomez access with the agreement that he would commit an assault on plaintiff. Plaintiff has

failed to allege sufficient facts to support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants and

therefore fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983. 

Plaintiff next claims that defendants Walker and Deadman failed to protect him from a

substantial risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that

a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment “only if he knows that inmates face a substantial

risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”1

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under this

standard, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” one of deliberate

indifference to the inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 834. To state a cognizable Eighth

Amendment claim for failure to protect, plaintiff must allege specific facts that help demonstrate

that defendants Walker and Deadman knew of and disregarded the substantial risk of serious

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harm that would result if the security door keeping plaintiff separate from general population

inmates was breached. 

An Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act

believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed

to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. at 842; see also Robins

v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1439-40 (9th Cir.1995) (bystander-inmate injured when guards

allegedly used excessive force on another inmate need not show that guards intended to harm

bystander-inmate). This is a question of fact. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Allegations in a pro se

complaint sufficient to raise an inference that the named prison officials acted with deliberate

indifference--i.e, that they knew that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it – states a “failure-toprotect” claim. Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041-42. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official

is insufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id.

at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. Plaintiff asserts that he was classified as a “P.C.,” or protective

custody, inmate and was being held in segregation from inmates in the general population for his

safety, facts known to prison officials including officers Walker and Deadman. He further

asserts that the only way Gomez was able to gain access and assault him was though a security

door under the watch and control of defendants Walker and Deadman. These allegations, in

combination, are sufficient to state a claim that defendants wantonly failed to take measures to

abate a significant risk of serious harm to plaintiff in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff also claims that defendant John McGuiness, Sacramento County Chief Deputy

Sheriff, violated his Eighth Amendment rights on the same grounds. Plaintiff does not allege

specific facts that defendant McGuiness actually knew of the security breach and failed to

protect plaintiff. The court finds that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant

McGuiness is based solely on a theory of respondeat superior and is therefore insufficient to

state a claim. 

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Plaintiff also alleges that defendants McGuiness and Janet Scully, Sacramento County

District Attorney, furthered this conspiracy by “turning a blind eye” to the attack on plaintiff,

evidenced by the failure to bring criminal charges against Gomez. The extent of plaintiff’s

conspiracy claim regarding these two defendants is that “somewhere between the County Clerk’s

office whom process crimes against Sac. Co. Inmates (only) and D.A. Janet Scully, ‘somebody’

refused to file charges” against the inmate who assaulted him and “the refusal to prosicute [sic]

the assault would leave commensence [sic] to believe that there are other conspirators.” As

stated above, however, “[a] mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is

insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988),

citing Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 1984); Burnett v. Short, 441 F.2d 405, 406

(5th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a conspiracy claim against defendants

McGuiness and Scully. 

Further, “the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file ... generally

rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98

S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). “‘[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement

is not in itself a federal constitutional violation’ so long as ‘the selection was not deliberately

based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Id.

(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)) (alteration in the

original). A prosecutor’s discretion is not without limitations, however. While the Supreme

Court demands “exceptionally clear proof” before inferring an abuse of prosecutorial discretion,

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), the Court does

prohibit punishing “a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do.” United

States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The ordinary presumption is that “public officials have properly

discharged their official duties.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157

L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (citations omitted). As such, where a defendant contends that a prosecutor

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made a charging decision in violation of the Constitution, the defendant’s “standard [of proof] is

a demanding one.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d

687 (1996). “To establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must

show either direct evidence of actual vindictiveness or facts that warrant an appearance of such.”

United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1299 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n. 12 (suggesting that “a defendant might prove

through objective evidence an improper prosecutorial motive” in order to establish a

prosecutorial vindictiveness claim); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40

L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (holding that vindictiveness could be presumed where prosecutors brought

additional charges after a defendant appealed his conviction).

Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendants Walker and Deadman and pursue his

Eighth Amendment claim against only those defendants, or he may delay serving any defendant

and attempt to state additional cognizable claims against defendants Walker and Deadman and

any cognizable claims against McGuiness, and Scully. 

If plaintiff elects to attempt to amend his complaint to state cognizable claims against

defendants Walker, Deadman, McGuiness, and Scully, he has 30 days to do so. He is not

obligated to amend his complaint.

If plaintiff elects to proceed forthwith against defendants Walker and Deadman, against

whom he has stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for relief, then within 20 days he

must return materials for service of process enclosed herewith. In this event the court will

construe plaintiff’s election as consent to dismissal of all claims against defendants McGuiness

and Scully without prejudice. 

Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is

brought in the right place and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It

must contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons

who personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional

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right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to

perform an act he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation). If plaintiff

contends he was the victim of a conspiracy, he must identify the participants and specifically

allege facts demonstrating their agreement to deprive him of a specific federal constitutional

right. 

In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or

occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any

heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading).

Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely, and

directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting

point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a

claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 

If plaintiff’s pleading is deficient on account of an omission or technical defect, the court

will not dismiss it without first identifying the problem and giving plaintiff an opportunity to

cure it. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s pleading will be

construed “liberally” to determine if plaintiff has a claim but it will be dismissed if plaintiff

violates the federal rules, once explained, or the court’s plain orders.

An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. Local Rule 15-220; see Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff

files an amended complaint, the original pleading is superseded.

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By signing a first amended complaint plaintiff certifies that he has made reasonable

inquiry and has evidentiary support for his allegations and that for violation of this rule the court

may impose sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 

A prisoner may bring no § 1983 action until he has exhausted such administrative

remedies as are available to him. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The requirement is mandatory. Booth

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). A California prisoner or parolee may appeal “any

departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an

adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 3084.1, et seq. An appeal must

be presented on a CDC form 602 that asks simply that the prisoner “describe the problem” and

“action requested.” Therefore, this court ordinarily will review only claims against prison

officials within the scope of the problem reported in a CDC form 602 or an interview or claims

that were or should have been uncovered in the review promised by the department. Plaintiff is

further admonished that by signing an amended complaint he certifies his claims are warranted

by existing law, including the law that he exhaust administrative remedies, and that for violation

of this rule plaintiff risks dismissal of his entire action, including his claims against defendants

Walker and Deadman. 

Accordingly, the court hereby orders that:

1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 

2. Plaintiff is must pay the statutory filing fee of $350 for this action and make an initial

payment of $80.00. All payments shall be collected and paid in accordance with the notice to

the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

herewith. 

3. Claims against defendants McGuiness and Scully are dismissed with leave to amend. 

Within 30 days of service of this order, plaintiff may amend his complaint to attempt to state

cognizable claims against these defendants. Plaintiff is not obliged to amend his complaint.

////

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4. The allegations in the pleading are sufficient at least to state a cognizable claim

against defendants Walker and Deadman. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. With this order the Clerk of

the Court shall provide to plaintiff a blank summons, a copy of the pleading filed December 8,

2006, two USM-285 forms and instructions for service of process on defendants Walker and

Deadman. Within 20 days of service of this order plaintiff may return the attached Notice of

Submission of Documents with the completed summons, the completed USM-285 forms, and

three (3) copies of the December 8, 2006, complaint. The court will transmit them to the United

States Marshal for service of process pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Defendants Walker and

Deadman will be required to respond to plaintiff’s allegations within the deadlines stated in Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). In this event, the court will construe plaintiff’s election to proceed forthwith

as consent to an order dismissing his defective claims against defendants McGuiness and Scully

without prejudice.

Dated: May 23, 2007.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR MANUEL CORREA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2779 MCE EFB P

vs.

CHIEF DEPUTY SHERIFF 

JOHN McGUINESS, et al., 

Defendants. NOTICE OF SUBMISSION

 / OF DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance with the court's

order filed .

One completed summons

 completed USM-285 forms

 copies of the 

 Complaint/Amended Complaint

DATED: 

 

Plaintiff

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