Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02042/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02042-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The Court refers to Defendant and his agents collectively as Defendant, unless

it is necessary for purposes of the analysis to identify a particular employee.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALD DUMAGUIT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHN E. POTTER,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-02042 JSW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for summary

judgment filed by Defendant John E. Potter (“Defendant”), as well as the cross-motion for

partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Gerald Dumaguit (“Plaintiff”).1

 Having considered

the parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and having had the

benefit of oral argument, the Court HEREBY GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Defendant’s motion and HEREBY GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s

motion.

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2

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendant objects to Exhibits A-S and Exhibit Y, attached to the declaration of Mary

Dryovage (“Dryovage”), on the basis that the exhibits are inadmissible because Dryovage

cannot, and did not, properly authenticate them. However at the hearing on these motions,

Defendant clarified that he did not object to any exhibit bearing a “USA” prefix. In her

supplemental declaration, Dryovage asserts that Exhibits A-S are documents that Defendant

produced in related litigation. (See Supplemental Declaration of Mary Dryovage (“Supp.

Dryovage Decl.”), ¶¶ 8-9.) Defendant has not disputed that assertion. Although Exhibits N and

S do not bear a USA prefix, based on Dryovage’s supplemental declaration, Defendant’s

objections are OVERRULED. Defendant also objects to the exhibits on the basis that “many of

the documents attached [to the Dryovage declaration] are further inadmissible hearsay.” 

Defendant does not identify which exhibits, or portions thereof, he contends are hearsay. 

Defendant’s objections on this basis are OVERRULED. See N.L.R.B. v. Int’l Union of

Operating Eng’rs, 413 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1969) (“Unobjected to hearsay is admissible and

of probative value in the district courts.”) 

Defendant also objects to Exhibits A through L-5, attached to Plaintiff’s declaration. 

Defendant asserts that these documents consist of inadmissible hearsay and asserts that Plaintiff

cannot, and did not, properly authenticate these exhibits. Defendant’s objections to Exhibits

D2, E1, E4, E7, K1-K5, K9-K14, and L1 are SUSTAINED for lack of proper authentication. 

Defendant’s objections to all other exhibits are OVERRULED.

BACKGROUND

The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) hired Plaintiff in 1978 as a distribution clerk. 

Defendant promoted Plaintiff throughout his tenure with the USPS and, in 1997, Defendant

promoted Plaintiff to the position of EEO Counselor and Investigator, level EAS-17. 

(Declaration of Gerald Dumaguit (“Dumaguit Decl.”), ¶¶ 4-5; Declaration of Andrew Cheng

(“Cheng Decl.”), Ex. C (Deposition of Gerald Dumaguit (“Dumaguit Depo.”) at 14:23-25, 19:3-

10).) In April 1999, Defendant detailed Plaintiff to the position of Manager of EEO Complaints

Processing, level EAS-21. Plaintiff remained in that position until June 2000. (Dumaguit

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28 2 The pages of the exhibit are not numbered and the pagination is the Court’s

own.

3

Decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff received commendations and cash awards while employed with the USPS,

and his supervisors evaluated his work as “excellent” or “outstanding.” (Dumaguit Decl., Ex. A

at 9-192

; Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Deposition of Randall Sims (“Sims Depo.”) at 32:23-

33:5, 34:9-14), Ex. V (Deposition of Maria Robinson (“Robinson Depo.”) at 32:10-14).) There

is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff has been subjected to any form of disciplinary action

in connection with his employment. (See, e.g., Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. at

33:2-5).) 

It is undisputed that the USPS decided to restructure its EEO office (“the 2000

Restructure”) and created “Area” positions and “District” positions. (Declaration of Maria

Robinson (“Robinson Decl.”), ¶ 3; Dumaguit Decl., Ex., E2; Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U

(Sims Depo. at 12:24-13:15).) As part of this process, on July 14, 2000, Randall Sims (“Sims”)

who was a Senior EEO Counselor and Investigator, began to schedule interviews for Area EEO

Counselor and Investigator, level EAS-17 positions (“the EAS-17 Area position”). (See

Dumaguit Decl., Ex. E7; Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. at 40:15-24).) Sims

advised Plaintiff that he would be required to submit to an interview for the position and

attempted to set up an interview with Plaintiff. (Cheng. Decl., Ex. C (Dumaguit Depo. at 24:13-

25:4); Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. at 39:13-18, 44:22-45:25).) 

Plaintiff states that he did not want to interview because Sims could not give him a

reason why there were “two managers of labor relations on the [interview] board.” (Cheng

Decl., Ex. C (Dumaguit Depo. at 25:5-26:3, 30:15-24).) Sims testified that Plaintiff did not

want to interview because he (Plaintiff) believed that Harriet White (“White”), a member of the

interview board, was biased against Filipinos and that she had acted improperly with respect to

one of Plaintiff’s investigations. (Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. at 44:22-46:20).) 

Sims also testified that he spoke with White and with Maria Robinson (“Robinson”) about

Plaintiff’s concerns. Robinson testified that no one raised these issues with her. (Supp.

Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. at 46:21-50:10), Ex. V (Robinson Depo. at 58:17-60:3).) 

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3 The letter lists vacancies within California and vacancies around the country. 

(Id.; Supp. Dryovage Decl. Ex. V (Robinson Depo. at 53:2-57:9).) Plaintiff claims he was

threatened with reassignment outside California.

4

Sims ultimately determined there was no potential conflict with White sitting on the interview

board. (Id.) 

After he failed to appear for the interview, Robinson sent Plaintiff a letter dated July 24,

2000, which states that “[a]s of July 24, 2000, you became an unplaced EAS-17 EEO

professional under Phase II of the EEO restructuring. You will be given a directed

reassignment to an existing vacancy in EEO. You have until August 7, 2000 to express your

preferences.” (Dumaguit Decl., Ex. E8.)3

 Robinson states that she decided which employees

would receive the EAS-17 Area positions. (Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. At 51:6-

16), Ex. V (Robinson Depo. at 61:6-13.) 

On July 24, 2000, Plaintiff sent a letter to Robinson, in which he advised her that he was

“requesting a directed reassignment for the vacant position of Dispute Resolution Specialist at

the San Francisco District.” (Id., Ex. E9; Cheng Decl., Ex C (Dumaguit Depo. at 28:13-29:18).)

Plaintiff testified that he “was basically coerced into submitting this letter. It was either this or

take a risk of getting reassigned somewhere on the East Coast.” Plaintiff states that he advised

Robinson that he requested the reassignment under protest. (Cheng Decl., Ex. C (Dumaguit

Depo. at 28:20-29:7, 30:8-10).) 

Robinson sent Plaintiff a letter dated July 26, 2000, in which she advised him that the

effective date of his reassignment would be July 29, 2000. (Robinson Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. B.) 

Plaintiff asserts that Robinson and others did not comply with the timelines established by the

USPS for the 2000 Restructure. (See, e.g., Dumaguit Decl., Ex. E2.) Plaintiff also avers that

Robinson filled the available EAS-17 Area positions with seven African American employees

and one Caucasian employee. (See Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 15; Supplemental Declaration of Gerald

Dumaguit (“Supp. Dumaguit Decl.”), ¶ 6.) 

After Plaintiff was reassigned to the District office, Area positions at the EAS-21 and

EAS-23 level became available, although Plaintiff claims that the EAS-21 Area position was

vacant well before he was reassigned. (See Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex. V (Robinson Depo. at

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4 In 2004, Siam filed suit against Defendant and alleged that she was subjected

to a hostile work environment based on her race. (See Siam Decl., ¶¶ 11-12, Ex. B.) 

5 Plaintiff also filed several amendments to that complaint in 2001. 

5

51:12-53:1).) According to Plaintiff, “the[se] positions were announced and the selections

made well before the Headquarters plan.” (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 14, Ex. E2.) Plaintiff also

contends that employees were instructed to hide from him, and from Lina Siam (“Siam”), the

fact that these positions were available.4

 (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 14; see also Declaration of Lina

Siam (“Siam Decl.”), ¶ 9.) It is undisputed that these two positions were filled by William

Norris (“Norris”) and Sims, both of whom are Caucasian. (See, e.g., Supp. Dryovage Decl., Ex.

V (Robinson Depo. at 58:3-8); Dumaguit Decl., Ex. E10; Robinson Decl., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff

claims that Norris initially chose to move to a District office but changed his mind and accepted

a demotion in order to stay in the Area office because Robinson wanted him to fill the EAS-21

Area position. (See, e.g., Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 17; see also Declaration of Mary Dryovage

(“Dryovage Decl.”), Ex L at USA000335.) Norris has denied that Robinson worked to ensure

that he received the position. (Reply Declaration of Andrew Cheng, Ex. G (Trial Testimony of

William Norris at 540:21-25).)

On July 31, 2000, Dumaguit requested EEO counseling in connection with his

reassignment to the District office. On September 26, 2000, Dumaguit filed his first EEO

complaint.5

 (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. F1.) In December 2000, Plaintiff took stress leave from

his job and later filed a claim with the Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs (“OWCP”),

which was granted. (See Dumaguit Decl., Ex. F1 (Amendment to EEO Affidavit, dated March

4, 2001); Declaration of Joel A. Fine (“Fine Decl.”), Ex. A at 14.) In January 2001, Plaintiff

was diagnosed with major depression. (Cheng Decl., Ex. C (Dumaguit Depo. at 12:11-13);

Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 27; Fine Decl. at 2, Ex. A at 49.) Plaintiff also avers that he suffers from

chronic gout. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 27.) 

While Plaintiff was on stress leave, USPS employees posted “Wanted” posters of him

and Siam at the office in which they worked. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 21; Siam Decl., ¶ 20, Ex. C.) 

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6 Plaintiff contends that he complained to Bernadine Faison (“Faison”) about

questionable practices in the EEO Office in 1997 and the record suggests that he continued to

voice his opposition to certain practices through 1999. (See Dumaguit Decl., Ex. F1 at 3.) 

6

Plaintiff contends that Holly Bedell (“Bedell”) and May Henderson (“Henderson”) were the

responsible parties. (See, e.g., Siam Decl., ¶ 20.) 

On October 5, 2001, Plaintiff again requested EEO counseling. On January 16, 2002, he

filed his second EEO complaint. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 22.) In March 2003, Plaintiff also filed a

complaint with the Office of the Inspector General. In that complaint, Plaintiff reported that he

believed the Northern California EEO Complaints Processing Center violated Federal

regulations in the course of investigating EEO complaints.6

 (See Dumaguit Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. D4.) 

In June 2004, Brenda Arce requested, and received, approval to separate Plaintiff from

employment with the USPS. (Dumaguit Decl., Ex. L1; Declaration of Diana Cruz-Crowder

(“Cruz-Crowder Decl.”) at 3.) On June 29, 2004, Beverly Harris sent Plaintiff a letter, which

provides:

Our records show that you have been on the rolls of the [OWCP] in excess

of one year. During this time you have been carried in a leave without pay

(LWOP) status with the U.S. Postal Service in the San Francisco District.

In accordance with section 365.342b of the Employee & Labor Relations

Manual (ELM) “If an employee on the rolls of the [OWCP] is unable to

return to work at the end of the initial one year period of LWOP, the LWOP

may be extended for successive additional periods of up to six months each.

Extensions are granted only if it appears likely that the employee will be able

to return to work within the period of the extension. If it does not appear

likely that the employee will be able to return to work during the period of

the extension the employee, upon the approval of the area manager of Human

Resources is separated subject to reemployment rights.” Our office has been

granted approval to separate you from the rolls of the Postal Service for

disability reasons.

(Dumaguit Decl., Ex. L2.) Plaintiff was advised, as an alternative, that he could seek disability

retirement. (Id.) Defendant sent Plaintiff a second notice of the proposed separation, dated

August 19, 2004, which advised him that he or his representative could “answer this proposal

within ten (10) days from [the] receipt of this letter, in person, in writing, or both” to White. 

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28 7 This letter was signed by Diana Cruz-Crowder (“Cruz-Crowder”), but she did

not author it, and she says it was not her decision to send it. (Cruz-Crowder Decl. at 4.)

7

(Id., Ex. L3.)7

 On August 23, 2004, Plaintiff requested EEO counseling. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶

23.) 

On September 8, 2004, Plaintiff sent Cruz-Crowder a letter, in which he stated that he

had attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain retirement counseling. Plaintiff stated that “I am ...

submitting my disability retirement application under duress.” (Id., Ex. L4.) On September 24,

2004, White sent Plaintiff a letter advising him that she had decided to separate him from the

USPS effective September 30, 2004. (Id., Ex. L5.) White stated that “[i]n reaching my

decision, I have considered your past work record, your years of employment, your inability to

perform the duties of your position, and the impact on Postal Service efficiency.” (Id.) 

Although the approval to separate Plaintiff came from “headquarters,” White testified that she

was the final decision maker. (Dryovage Decl., Ex. T1(6/26/07 Deposition of Harriet White

(“White Depo. I”) at 83:10-17, 98:20-22).) On December 28, 2004, Plaintiff filed his third and

final EEO complaint. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 23.)

On March 17, 2006, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court, in which he asserts four

claims for relief: (1) Unlawful Discrimination Based on Race/National Origin; (2) Unlawful

Discrimination Based on Disability; (3) Unlawful Discrimination Based on Retaliation; and (4)

Retaliation - Whistleblower Protection Act. (Compl., ¶¶ 62-100.) 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment.

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the

evidence or make credibility determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light

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8

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.

1997).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is

sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the

outcome of the case. Id. at 248. If the party moving for summary judgment does not have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, that party must produce evidence that negates an essential

element of the non-moving party’s claims, or that party must show that the non-moving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once

the moving party meets his or her initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own evidence, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

In order to make this showing, the non-moving party must “identify with reasonable

particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the party seeking to establish a genuine issue of material fact

must be sure to point a court to the evidence precluding summary judgment because a court is

“‘not required to comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary

judgment.’” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir.

1988)). If the non-moving party fails to point to evidence precluding summary judgment, the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

B. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion is Granted in Part and Denied in Part.

In his answer, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative

remedies and also asserted that Plaintiff’s claims were time barred. (Answer at 7:7, 7:28-8:1.) 

Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on these affirmative defenses, and this

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8 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

9 One exception to this general rule is when there are factual disputes over

whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Costa, 299 F.3d

at 855 n.6.

9

aspect of Plaintiff’s motion is unopposed. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART on this

basis. Plaintiff also cross-moved for summary judgment on the issues of whether he has

established a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation. “It is not normally appropriate

to introduce the McDonnell Douglas8

 burden-shifting framework to the jury.” Costa v. Desert

Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002).9

 Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED IN PART on this

basis. 

C. Defendant’s Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part on Plaintiff’s First

Claim for Relief.

Title VII provides that, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s race . . . or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An

employer also may violate Title VII when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. See Faragher v. City

of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

(1993).

1. Legal Standards.

In general, disparate treatment claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, in which “the burden of production first falls on the plaintiff to make a prima facie

case of discrimination.” Coghlan v. American Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.

2005). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to

present evidence “sufficient to permit the factfinder to conclude that the employer had a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (citing St Mary’s

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993)). If the employer meets its burden, “the

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10

McDonnell Douglas framework drops out of the picture entirely, and the plaintiff bears the full

burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer intentionally discriminated against him.” 

Id. That is, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the employer’s reason for the adverse

employment action was pretextual. See, e.g., Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634,

640 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Discussion.

a. Denial of Promotional Opportunities.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant denied him two promotional opportunities because he

was Filipino. Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not select him for the EAS-17 Area position

during the 2000 Restructure. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant denied him the opportunity

to compete for the EAS-21 and EAS-23 Area positions, which were posted shortly after

Plaintiff’s directed reassignment to the District office became effective. 

i. Plaintiff has met his burden to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) he

belongs to a statutorily protected class, (2) he applied for and was qualified for an available

position, (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications, and (4) after the rejection, the position

remained available and the employer continued to review applicants possessing comparable

qualifications.” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002); see also McGinest v.

GTE Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 n.17 (9th Cir. 2004). To meet his burden of proof,

Plaintiff need not offer evidence that “rise[s] to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Wallis v. J.R. Simplot, 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. In addition, the record

reflects that Plaintiff was qualified for the EAS-17 Area position, and that he may have been

qualified to fill the EAS-21 and EAS-23 Area positions, thereby establishing the second and

third prongs of his prima facie case. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot meet the fourth

prong of his prima facie case because he cannot show that any employees who did not interview

for an EAS-17 Area position were hired and because Plaintiff cannot show that any District

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10 Defendant attempts to identify comparable employees by using his

purportedly legitimate reasons for the adverse actions at issue. In the Court’s view, to adopt

Defendant’s argument would unduly restrict Plaintiff’s ability to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination. 

11

employees were hired for the EAS-21 and EAS-23 Area positions, which Defendant contends

were available only to Area employees.10 Plaintiff avers, however, that seven African

Americans and one Caucasian were selected for the EAS-17 Area position for which he had

applied. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶15.) Defendant has not proffered any contrary evidence. It also is

undisputed that the EAS-21 and EAS-23 positions were filled by Norris and Sims, both of

whom are Caucasian. Plaintiff needs only a minimal showing to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination, and the Court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden.

ii. Defendant proffers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

his actions.

Defendant posits that Plaintiff did not receive the EAS-17 Area position because he was

required to submit to an interview and failed to do so. (See Dumaguit Decl., Ex. E7; Supp.

Dryovage Decl., Ex. U (Sims Depo. at 39:13-18, 40:15-24, 44:22-46:20); Robinson Decl., ¶ 9.) 

Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff was not eligible for the EAS-21 and EAS-23 Area positions

because those positions were open only to Area employees, and Plaintiff was a District

employee. (See, e.g., Robinson Decl., ¶ 11.) Defendant has met his burden to show that he had

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not selecting Plaintiff for these positions.

iii. Plaintiff has met his burden to show there are genuine issues of

material fact in dispute about whether Defendant’s reasons were a

pretext for discrimination.

A plaintiff may “show pretext directly, by showing that discrimination more likely

motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the employer’s explanation is unworthy

of credence.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. In Wallis, the Ninth Circuit noted that although a

plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination with minimal evidence, once the

McDonnell Douglas presumption falls away, a plaintiff must do more. Although, a court can

consider the evidence that established a plaintiff’s prima facie case, if a plaintiff relies on

circumstantial evidence of discrimination, that evidence must be “specific and substantial.” 

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11 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant discriminated and retaliated against him

because he was excluded from the “FY 2001 Variable Pay Program,” and because Defendant

failed to return over 1100 hours of used leave to him. (Compl., ¶¶ 47-53, 62-68, 83-94;

Plaintiffs’ Opp. Br. at 8; Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 26; see also Cruz-Crowder Decl. at 5.) 

Defendant did not address these factual allegations in his opening brief or in his reply. 

Assuming Plaintiff intends to maintain a disparate treatment or retaliation claim based on

these actions, the Court concludes that Defendant has not met his burden to show that

summary judgment is warranted. 

12

Wallis, 26 F.3d at 892; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

143 (2000). “[A] plaintiff’s belief that a defendant acted from unlawful motive, without

evidence supporting that belief, is no more than speculation or unfounded accusation about

whether the defendant really did act from an unlawful motive.” Carmen, 237 F.3d at 1028.

Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to suggest that

Defendant’s reason for denying him the EAS-17 Area position was pretextual, Plaintiff asserts

that the manner in which Defendant implemented the 2000 Restructure was designed to prevent

him, and other employees of Filipino descent, from competing for the EAS-21 and EAS-23

Area positions. Plaintiff does not rely merely on his own subjective belief that Defendant’s

actions were motivated by racial considerations. Plaintiff submits evidence that, taken in the

light most favorable to him, suggests that Defendant did not follow established timelines with

respect to his reassignment to the District. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 13, Ex. E2.) Plaintiff also

submits evidence that Defendant’s agents did not post the openings for the EAS-21 and EAS-23

positions until after he had been reassigned, so that Norris and Sims could be given the

positions, although Defendant denies these allegations. Plaintiff’s case may not be the most

compelling but the Court must take the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff. Under that standard, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has met his

burden to show there genuine issues of material in dispute about whether he was denied the

EAS-21 and EAS-21 Area promotional opportunities on account of his race.11

b. Termination.

In order to make a prima facie case under this aspect of his disparate treatment claim,

Plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was performing according to

his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4)

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other employees with similar qualifications to his own were treated more favorably. See

Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006). It is undisputed

that Plaintiff satisfies the first and third elements of his prima facie case. Further, until he went

out on stress leave, there is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff was not living up to

Defendant’s expectations. However, even assuming that Plaintiff could establish the fourth

prong of his prima facie case, the Court concludes that he has not presented sufficient evidence

to show that Defendant’s reasons for terminating him actually were motivated by race.

Defendant contends that he terminated Plaintiff because Plaintiff had been on OWCP

rolls for over two years. According to Defendant, Postal Regulations provide that “[i]f an

employee on the rolls of the [OWCP] is unable to return to work at the end of the initial one

year period of LWOP, the LWOP may be extended for successive additional periods of up to

six months each. Extensions are granted only if it appears likely that the employee will be able

to return to work within the period of the extension. If it does not appear likely that the

employee will be able to return to work during the period of the extension the employee, upon

the approval of the area manager of Human Resources is separated subject to reemployment

rights.” (See Dumaguit Decl., Ex. L3.) The only evidence that Plaintiff proffers to show that

White’s decision to terminate him was racially motivated is his subjective belief that White did

not like Filipinos. (Cheng Decl., Ex. C (Dumaguit Depo. at 147:90-25).) This is not the type of

specific and substantial evidence that would demonstrate pretext. Carmen, 237 F.3d at 1028.

c. Hostile Work Environment.

Defendant did not raise the hostile work environment claim in his opening brief. 

Plaintiff, however, raised his allegations in opposition to Defendant’s motion, and Defendant

addressed the claim on reply, albeit in a footnote. The Court concludes that this claim is ripe

for adjudication. In order to prevail, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he was subjected to verbal

or physical conduct of a harassing nature that was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter

the conditions of his employment. Simple or occasional teasing will not be considered conduct

so extreme as to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment. See Faragher,

524 U.S. at 786-88.

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To support this claim, Plaintiff relies on the fact that either Henderson or Bedell posted

the Wanted poster of him. He also claims that White made a reference to the District office

becoming “Manila Town” if a Filipino employee took over as manager of the personnel office. 

(Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 21, Ex. F1 at 7.) The other incidents on which he relies were directed at

Siam, although Plaintiff says he witnessed some of them. (See, e.g., Dryovage Decl., Ex. A.) 

Indeed, Plaintiff relies heavily on the evidence submitted in Siam’s case. (See, e.g., Dryovage

Decl., Exs. A-S; Supp. Dryovage Decl., ¶ 8; Siam Decl., ¶¶ 11-18, 20.) Judge Patel, however,

granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim and found that Siam had

“shown only a few isolated incidents that were not objectively serious or frequent enough to

interfere with plaintiff’s ability to do her job.” Judge Patel also found that Siam had “not

demonstrated that hostility toward her stemmed from her identity as an Asian female.” (See

Siam Decl., Ex. B (Memorandum and Order at 23:11-19).) 

Construing the evidence submitted in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court

concurs with Judge Patel’s reasoning in the Siam case, and finds that Plaintiff has not presented

evidence to show that the conduct in question was so severe or pervasive that it effectively

altered the terms and conditions of his employment. See, e.g., Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642-44

(finding sporadic references to plaintiff’s race could not support a hostile work environment

claim); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting

claims of hostile work environment premised on explicit racial slurs, posting of a racially

offensive cartoon, and upon claims that Latino officers were treated differently than other

races).

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART on Plaintiff’s

first claim for relief.

D. Defendant Motion is Granted in Part and Denied in Part on Plaintiff’s Second

Claim for Relief.

Pursuant to the ADA, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job

application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

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compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Discrimination,” includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the

known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who

is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such

covered entity.”

Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193

(2002). 

1. Legal Standards.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant terminated him because of his disability and also

contends that Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability. The

Ninth Circuit has adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework in the context of

disability discrimination cases. See Mustafa v. Clark Co. Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1175-76

(9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff first must show that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA;

(2) he is a qualified individual, “meaning [he] can perform the essential functions of [his] job,”

with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) Defendant terminated him. See Nunes v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999). If Plaintiff establishes his prima

facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

terminating Plaintiff. If Defendant proffers such a reason, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to

show that Defendant’s reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. Lucero v. Hart, 915 F.2d

1367, 1371 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987)).

2. Discussion.

a. Plaintiff has met his burden, in part, to show he is disabled.

The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12012(2); see

also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). The impairments at issue in this case are depression and gout. To

determine whether either of these impairments qualifies as a disability under the ADA, the

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12 In Sutton, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that working is a

major life activity, and Ninth Circuit authority is in accord. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492;

Thornton v. McClatchy, 261 F.3d 789, 795 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit has found

sleeping to be a “major life activity.” McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226,

1234 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended 201 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2000). 

13 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 also sets forth factors used to determine if an individual is

substantially limited in a major life activity. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2.) 

16

Court evaluates the facts as they existed at the time Defendant allegedly refused to

accommodate Plaintiff and as they existed at the time Defendant terminated Plaintiff. See, e.g.,

Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1265 & n. 11 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Mantolete v.

Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985)).

i. Plaintiff has not established that he is actually disabled.

Plaintiff can establish that he is disabled if he can show that depression or gout

substantially limited a major life activity. Plaintiff does not clearly articulate which major life

activity is at issue. Based on the Investigative Report prepared in connection with Plaintiff’s

third EEO complaint, it appears that Plaintiff claims that gout rendered him unable to walk,

drive, or stand for prolonged periods of time. (Dumaguit Decl., Ex. F3 at 16; see also Fine

Decl., Ex. A at 12-13.) In addition, the record also suggests that Plaintiff claims that depression

impacted his ability to sleep and to work.12 

The Supreme Court has held that “substantially limits” means that “an individual must

have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that

are of central importance to most people’s daily lives” and which also is “permanent or long

term.” Toyota Motor Mfg. Co., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 194, 199 (2002); see also

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (noting that “‘substantially’ suggests

‘considerable’ or ‘specified to a large degree’”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (“substantially limits”

means “(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general

population can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration

under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the

condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can

perform that same major life activity”).13

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14 The Court also concludes that Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient evidence to

show that he has a record of a disability because of gout or that Defendant regarded him as

disabled because of gout. 

17

“To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, ... one must be

precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If

jobs utilizing an individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one

is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs

are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492; see

also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (“The inability to perform a single, particular job does not

constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”). 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence to show gout

substantially limited his ability to walk. See Toyota Mfg., 534 U.S. at 199 (holding that medical

diagnosis alone will not suffice to establish that impairment substantially limits a major life

activity). The Court also finds that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence that gout

substantially limited his ability to work, because Dr. Fine suggested that he could perform a job

that would not require prolonged standing. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has not met his

burden to show that he was disabled due to gout.14 

Plaintiff declares, in general, that he had difficulty sleeping, but apart from this general

statement, there is no evidence in the record to show how depression “substantially limited” his

ability to sleep. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d. at 1235 (concluding that genuine issues of material

fact existed where in addition to plaintiff’s testimony, his physician explained that medication

disrupted his normal sleep patterns and caused him to be drowsy at work). The Court concludes

that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that depression substantially limited his ability to

sleep.

Plaintiff testified that he could perform the duties of his job, notwithstanding his

depression, if he did not have to work with certain individuals. (Cheng Decl., Ex. C (Dumaguit

Depo. at 14:1-12.) Similarly, Dr. Fine avers that he could not find “anything in his records

which would indicate that [Plaintiff] could not work in an appropriate position in the [USPS]

with the appropriate accommodations and this has been true since the summer of 2001.” (Fine

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15 Because Plaintiff has not established that he was disabled and because the

record does not suggest that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as disabled, that he had a record of

a disability at the time he claims Defendant failed to accommodate him, he cannot establish

this aspect of his disability discrimination claim.

18

Decl. at 5; see also id., Ex. A at 13, 14 (suggesting Plaintiff could work, albeit under certain

restrictions).) This evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff was not “significantly restricted in the

ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Sutton, 527

U.S. at 492; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown that he was disabled

due to depression.15

ii. Regarded as Having a Disability.

To establish that Defendant regarded him as disabled, Plaintiff must show that (1)

Defendant mistakenly believed that Plaintiff had a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limited one or more major life activities; or (2) Defendant mistakenly believed that

“‘an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.’” 

Walton v. United States Marshals Service, 492 F.3d 998, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). “In both cases, it is necessary that a

covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual - it must believe either that one has

a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially

limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. 

In addition to the testimony cited above by Plaintiff and Dr. Fine, the OWCP determined

that Plaintiff had suffered a compensable on the job injury, and Plaintiff was placed on OWCP

rolls. (See, e.g., Dumaguit Decl., Exs. L2, L3.) Defendant does not dispute that his agents were

that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with depression. Although the letter of separation states that

Defendant’s decision was premised upon Plaintiff’s “inability to perform the essential functions

of [his] position,” there also is also evidence in the record to suggest that Defendant may have

made some efforts to find Plaintiff other positions within the USPS and that it offered him

vocational rehabilitation. (Id., L2; see also Cheng Decl., Ex. D (“Deposition of Harriet White

(“White Depo.”) at 103:9-18 (describing letter of separation as a letter of decision “[t]o separate

[Plaintiff] for disability reasons”); Fine Decl., Ex. A at 4, 16.) 

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Taking these facts, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that, at the

time Defendant decided to separate Plaintiff from employment, Defendant mistakenly perceived

Plaintiff to be substantially limited in his ability to work in a broad class of jobs, rather than that

Defendant believed that Plaintiff was unable to fulfill the duties of his former position. See

Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that genuine issues of

material fact were in dispute about whether defendant regarded plaintiff’s mental condition as

disabling, where defendant had twice discussed aberrational behavior with plaintiff, had asked

plaintiff if he had any problems, and was aware of medical diagnoses of anxiety and stress).

b. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute on the remaining

aspects of Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination.

Having concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute about whether

Defendant regarded Plaintiff as disabled at the time Plaintiff was terminated, the Court turns to

the remaining aspects of Plaintiff’s prima facie case. Under the ADA, a “‘qualified individual

with a disability,’ [means] an ‘individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such

individual holds or desires.’” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)); see also

Lucero, 915 F.2d at 1372. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot show that he can perform the

essential functions of his job, because he failed to report to work and argues it would have been

unreasonable to have continued him on an indefinite leave of absence. 

That is not Plaintiff’s claim. Rather, Plaintiff asked to return to work, albeit under a

different supervisor or, in the alternative, that Defendant provide him with another position

within the USPS. Reassignments to vacant positions can be reasonable accommodations under

the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b). The record demonstrates Plaintiff’s qualifications for

his job, and both he and Dr. Fine attest that he could have performed his duties under a different

supervisor or in a different district. Plaintiff also submits evidence that alternate jobs may have

been available. (See Declaration of Diana Cruz-Crowder at p. 3; Supp. Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 8.) 

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Defendant presents no evidence that, at the time Plaintiff was terminated, reassignment would

have posed an undue hardship or that other positions were not available.

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff was terminated because he had been on OWCP rolls

for more than one year. Although this could be a legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff,

Plaintiff presents evidence that suggests Defendant may not have followed proper procedures

before he was terminated because Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to

obtain retirement counseling. (See, e.g., Cruz-Crowder Decl., Ex. B (ELM Manual §

365.342(d), (e), (f)); Dumaguit Decl., Ex. L4.) The Court concludes that genuine issues of

material fact are in dispute about whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff because he regarded

Plaintiff as disabled. 

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART on Plaintiff’s

second claim for relief.

E. Defendant’s Motion is Granted in Part and Denied in Part on Plaintiff’s Third

Claim for Relief.

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any of his employees ...

because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter

or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

1. Legal Standards.

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden

shifting framework. See McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1124; see also Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 644-46. 

Thus, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation. If he does so, the burden shifts

back to a defendant to offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his or her action. If a

defendant meets this burden, a plaintiff must then put forth evidence to show that the

defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for retaliation. Id.

2. Discussion.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in

protected activity under Title VII; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that

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16 It is unclear to the Court whether Plaintiff contends that the decision to

restructure the EEO Office into Area and District positions is an adverse action brought

about by his informal complaints regarding irregularities in the EEO office. To the extent he

does make that assertion, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not proffered evidence that this

decision was causally connected to his informal complaints. Defendant’s motion is

GRANTED IN PART on this basis.

21

there is a causal nexus between the two events. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1124. Defendant does

not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity or that Plaintiff suffered adverse

employment actions. Rather, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite causation

between the adverse employment actions and the protected activity. 

a. Plaintiff has not established the requisite causal connection between

his informal complaints and the denial of the promotional

opportunities in 2000.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s decisions to deny him the EAS-17 Area position and

the EAS-21 and EAS-23 Area positions were made in retaliation for his informal complaints

about the alleged irregularities in the manner in which the EEO office processed complaints.16

The timing of an adverse employment action alone may establish causation when the adverse

employment action follows closely in time to the protected activity. See, e.g., Miller v.

Fairchild Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 505 (9th Cir. 1989) (sufficient evidence to establish prima facie

case of causation where adverse actions occurred less than sixty days after EEOC hearing);

Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that evidence was sufficient to

establish causation where adverse actions occurred less than three months after employee filed

complaint). 

Based on the record, Plaintiff voiced his complaints to Faison at some vague point

between 1997 and 1999. (See Dumaguit Dec., Ex. F1 at 4.) Faison, however, was not involved

with the employment decisions attendant to the 2000 Restructure, and the Court has found no

evidence in the record to suggest that either Sims or Robinson were aware of the fact that

Plaintiff had complained to Faison about these issues. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has

not established the requisite causal connection necessary to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation on this basis.

//

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//

//

b. Plaintiff has not established the requisite causal connection between

his informal complaints and the first EEO complaint and the failure

to accommodate his alleged disability.

Plaintiff requested further EEO counseling in October 2001 and filed his second EEO

complaint in January 2002, in which he claimed that Defendant failed to accommodate his

alleged disability. The Court finds no evidence in the record to suggest that anyone involved in

that decision making process was aware of Plaintiff’s earlier informal complaints or was aware

of his first EEO complaint. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not established

the requisite causation necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation on this basis. 

c. Plaintiff has not established the requisite causation between his

informal complaints, the EEO complaints, the Whistleblowing

complaint, and the decision to terminate him.

Plaintiff made his final request for EEO counseling in August 2004, after he received the

notice of proposed separation. He was terminated in September, 2004. As noted, White

authored the termination letter and, although she did not initiate the separation process, she 

made the final decision to terminate Plaintiff. Based on the evidence presented, it is reasonable

to infer that White knew about Plaintiff’s first EEO complaint and that he had implicated her in

connection with his hostile work environment claim. (See, e.g., Dumaguit Decl., Ex. F3 at 9.) 

However, there is no evidence that she knew of his intervening complaints or that, at the time

she issued the separation letter, that she knew he had requested EEO counseling with respect to

the proposed separation. In light of the time that elapsed between the filing of Plaintiff’s initial

EEO complaint and the date on which he was terminated, and in light of White’s apparent lack

of knowledge of the intervening complaints, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to

establish the requisite causal connection necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation

on this basis.

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17 Plaintiff’s brief suggests that he filed a formal complaint in July 2000, but

Plaintiff’s declaration and exhibits contradict this suggestion. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶ 20, Ex.

D4.) 

23

Plaintiff also argues that he was terminated because of the fact that he filed a

Whistleblowing complaint with the Office of the Inspector General in March 2003.17 Plaintiff

has not presented evidence that anyone involved in the decision to terminate him knew of this

complaint. Moreover, according to his declaration, the fact that he filed this complaint did not

come to light until March 2005, after Plaintiff had been terminated. (Dumaguit Decl., ¶¶ 9-10.) 

The Court therefore concludes he has not established the requisite causal connection to meet his

prima facie case of retaliation based on the filing of that complaint.

d. Plaintiff has established a prima facie case in connection with

the Wanted Poster, and Defendant proffers no reason for that

action.

Plaintiff requested EEO counseling regarding his directed reassignment on July 31,

2000, and filed his first EEO complaint in September 2000. Plaintiff contends that Henderson

retaliated against him by posting the Wanted poster at some point between January and April

2001. (Id., Amendment dated May 21, 2001; Siam Decl., ¶20.) Henderson was named in

Plaintiff’s initial complaint, and one of the amendments to that complaint suggests that the EEO

investigator had contacted Henderson. (Id., Ex. F1 at 7, 9, and Amendment dated May 21,

2001.) It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that Henderson learned of Plaintiff’s EEO complaint

against her. The Court finds that this evidence is sufficient to establish the minimal showing of

causation necessary to meet Plaintiff’s burden of a prima facie case of retaliation. Defendant

has not offered a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for this action. That is not to say Defendant

does not have one. He just has not presented evidence of that reason in connection with these

motions. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant has not met his burden to show

summary judgment is warranted on this portion of Plaintiff’s third claim for relief.

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART on Plaintiff’s

third claim for relief.

Case 3:06-cv-02042-JSW Document 71 Filed 02/13/08 Page 23 of 25
United States District Court

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18 The only Ninth Circuit authority brought to the Court’s attention relating to

this claim is Nazario-Acosta v. Potter, 140 Fed. Appx. 657 (9th Cir. 2005). Although the

Ninth Circuit cited Booker with approval and concluded that the plaintiff could not pursue a

claim under the WPA, the opinion is unpublished and contains no independent analysis of

this issue. 

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F. Defendant’s Motion is Granted on Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief.

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant violated the Whistleblower Protection Act

(“WPA”). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim because the USPS is

exempt from the terms of the WPA. Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of the WPA, defines an “agency” as

an “Executive agency and the Government Printing Office.” “Executive agency” is defined as

“an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.” Id. §

105. Although the USPS is an independent establishment, see 39 U.S.C. § 201, it is excluded

from the definition of an independent establishment under the WPA. See 5 U.S.C. § 104(1); see

also Booker v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 982 F.2d 517 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The plain

language of the statute therefore demonstrates that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot maintain

this claim.

This conclusion is reinforced by the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Booker. In that case,

the court concluded that, although a postal employee can assert whistleblowing activities as an

affirmative defense, an employee cannot bring an independent action based on whistleblowing

activities. Id. at 519; see also Madden v. Runyon, 899 F. Supp. 217, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1995).18 The

Court has considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments on this issue and concludes that the

authorities cited are not inconsistent with the holding in Booker. 

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to the fourth claim for relief.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Order, Plaintiff’s cross-motion is GRANTED IN PART

AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART. The parties are FURTHER ORDERED to appear for a case management conference on

Friday March 14, 2008 at 1:30 p.m. The parties shall submit a joint case management

conference statement by no later than March 7, 2008, setting forth proposed pretrial and trial 

//

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dates and a joint proposal regarding further ADR proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2008 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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