Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-07-05068/USCOURTS-ca6-07-05068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable Karl S. Forester, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting

by designation. 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0115p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

JULIUS NOE; RAY REYNOLDS; ANNA MAE WILDER;

RUSSELL BOWMAN; NANCY HOOD; WILLIAM

DUNCAN,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

POLYONE CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

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No. 07-5068

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

No. 06-00170—John G. Heyburn II, Chief District Judge.

Argued: September 13, 2007

Decided and Filed: March 19, 2008 

Before: SUTTON and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas J. Schulz, PRIDDY, CUTLER, MILLER & MEADE, Louisville, Kentucky,

for Appellants. Jack F. Fuchs, THOMPSON HINE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Thomas J. Schulz, Alton D. Priddy, PRIDDY, CUTLER, MILLER & MEADE, Louisville,

Kentucky, for Appellants. Jack F. Fuchs, Eric S. Clark, Stephen L. Richey, THOMPSON HINE,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

McKEAGUE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FORESTER, D. J., joined.

SUTTON, J. (pp. 15-18), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

_________________

OPINION _________________

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. This is a retiree health benefits case, in which the court is

asked to determine whether the parties to various labor agreements intended for retiree health

benefits to vest such that any termination of those benefits constitutes a violation of § 301 of the

1

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Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). The district court granted summary judgment for

defendant-employer PolyOne Corp. after concluding that the labor agreements in question were

unambiguous and established no intent to vest retiree health benefits. Having conducted a thorough

review of the record and the applicable law, we arrive at a different conclusion and VACATE the

district court’s judgment. 

 I. BACKGROUND 

Russell Bowman, William Duncan, Nancy Hood, Julius Noe, Ray Reynolds, and Anna May

Wilder, (“Plaintiffs”) are all retirees or the surviving spouse of a retiree from B.F. Goodrich Co.’s

Geon Vinyl Division (“BFG”), which through a series of transactions became PolyOne Corp., the

defendant in this case (“PolyOne”). Plaintiffs or their deceased spouses all retired between 1979 and

1990 from BFG’s Louisville, Kentucky, facility. While employed with BFG, Plaintiffs were

represented in the collective bargaining process primarily by the Distillery, Rectifying, Wine and

Allied Workers’ International Union of America, Local No. 72 (“Union”). During this time period,

the Union and BFG entered into various collective bargaining agreements, none of which

specifically addressed the issue of health benefits. Also during this period, BFG negotiated a series

of agreements with other unions that represented employees working at facilities outside of

Kentucky. These other agreements, which were entitled “Agreements on Employee Benefit

Programs” (“EBAs”), provided employee and retiree health benefits to the applicable group of

employees. Per the terms of the EBAs, retirees were not required to contribute to their health

insurance premiums, they were reimbursed for Medicare Part B, and they paid $1.00 for each

prescription medication. 

Plaintiffs maintain that the health benefits provided by the EBAs were extended to them via

a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) entered into by Plaintiffs’ union and BFG. Effective in

1988, BFG replaced the EBAs with a Flexible Benefit Program (“Flex Program”). The Flex

Program slightly changed the health care coverage available for active employees and those who

retired after August 1988. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs received the health benefits described in

the EBAs or the Flex Program until March 2006, when PolyOne ceased reimbursing Plaintiffs’

Medicare Part B premiums, began requiring Plaintiffs to contribute towards their insurance

premiums, and instituted much higher prescription drug co-pays. Believing that PolyOne’s conduct

violated the EBAs and the Flex Program, Plaintiffs filed the instant action under § 301 of the

LMRA. Finding that the EBAs and the Flex Program did not manifest an intent to vest retiree health

benefits, the district court granted summary judgment for PolyOne. Plaintiffs timely appealed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Nichols v. Moore, 477 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2007). Likewise, de novo review applies to questions of contract

interpretation. Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline Co., 435 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 127

S.Ct. 554, and, 127 S.Ct. 555 (2006). 

There are two types of employee benefit plans: pension plans and welfare benefit plans. Id. at 578. While pension plans are subject to mandatory vesting, welfare benefit plans are not. Maurer

v. Joy Technologies., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir. 2000). Retiree health benefit plans, such as

those involved here, are welfare benefit plans; thus, vesting only occurs if the parties so intended

when they executed the applicable labor agreements. Id. A court may find vested rights “under a

CBA even if the intent to vest has not been explicitly set out in the agreement.” Id. at 915. If the

rights to health coverage have vested, then the unilateral termination of the coverage violates § 301

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of the LMRA. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 578. On the other hand, an employer is free to terminate any

unvested welfare benefits upon the expiration of the relevant CBA. Id. 

The seminal case for determining whether the parties to a CBA intended benefits to vest is

UAW v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983). Under Yard-Man, basic rules of contract

interpretation apply, meaning that courts must first examine the CBA language for clear

manifestations of an intent to vest. Id. Furthermore, each provision of the CBA is to be construed

consistently with the entire CBA and “the relative positions and purposes of the parties.” Id. The

terms of the CBA should be interpreted so as to avoid illusory promises and superfluous provisions.

Id. at 1480. Our decision in Yard-Man also explained that “retiree benefits are in a sense ‘status’

benefits which, as such, carry with them an inference . . . that the parties likely intended those

benefits to continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree.” Id. at 1482. With regard to the “Yard-Man inference,” later decisions of this court have clarified that Yard-Man does not create a

legal presumption that retiree benefits are interminable. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 579. Rather, Yard-Man

is properly understood as creating an inference only if the context and other available evidence

indicate an intent to vest. Id. 

When an ambiguity exists in the provisions of the CBA, then resort to extrinsic evidence may

be had to ascertain whether the parties intended for the benefits to vest. Int’l Union, United Auto.

Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir.

1999). If an examination of the available extrinsic evidence fails to conclusively resolve the issue

and a question of intent remains, then summary judgment is improper. Int’l Union, United Mine

Workers of Am. v. Apogee Coal Co., 330 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 2003). Having provided the broad

analytical framework, we now turn to the task of parsing the language of the various agreements

involved in this case. 

With the exception of Plaintiff Hood, all of the retirees involved in this case received the

health benefits provided by the various EBAs. Although Plaintiffs retired under several different

EBAs, we refer to the EBAs collectively because each agreement contains the same language

regarding the issues involved in this appeal. As for Plaintiff Hood, the merits of her claim will be

discussed separately because the Flex Program governs her retiree health benefits. 

B. Incorporation of the EBAs by the MOA

As a threshold matter, it is necessary to determine if the MOA incorporates the health

benefits provisions of the EBAs to Plaintiffs. In the absence of incorporation, Plaintiffs’ claim fails

because the collective bargaining agreements negotiated between Plaintiffs and BFG are silent as

to health benefits. The MOA states in pertinent part:

The following Article is hereby included in the current Collective Bargaining

Agreement:

The Pension Plan, including the requirement for compulsory retirement at age

seventy, the Hospitalization, Surgical and Medical Expense Insurance Program . . .,

and the Prescription Drug Program presently in effect for the majority of The

BFGoodrich Company’s production and maintenance employees shall be in effect

for the life of this Agreement. 

JA at 646. According to the district court, while “the MOA is far from clear, the parties appear to

have intended that this general reference incorporate the EBA health benefit provisions.” Noe v.

PolyOne Corp., No. 3:06-CV-170H, 2006 WL 3759601, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2006).

Disagreeing with the district court’s determination on this issue, PolyOne argues that Plaintiffs have

failed to offer any evidence—aside from anecdotes and hearsay—showing that the MOA

incorporated the EBAs to Plaintiffs. In response, Plaintiffs argue that the parties’ course of conduct

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illustrates that they intended for the MOA to provide employees and retirees of BFG’s Louisville

facility with the health benefits found in the EBAs. 

Based on our review of the MOA and the conduct of the parties, the district court correctly

held that the MOA incorporated the EBAs to Plaintiffs. Because the MOA itself is unclear on this

issue, the district court properly looked to extrinsic evidence and the course of performance between

the parties in determining that the MOA incorporated the EBAs. As the district court recognized,

the most telling of this extrinsic evidence is the fact that “[e]veryone agrees that [Plaintiffs] actually

received the benefits described in the EBAs and continued to receive them after retirement.” Id. at

*2. Although the terms of the MOA undoubtedly could have been more precise, the evidence

establishes that it was intended by the parties to apply the EBAs to Plaintiffs. Therefore, we proceed

to analyze the EBA provisions themselves to determine whether the district court properly found that

Plaintiffs’ retiree health benefits have not vested. 

C. The Vesting Determination 

The district court held that the retiree health benefits provisions in the EBAs clearly and

unambiguously established that the parties did not intend for Plaintiffs’ health benefits to vest.

Having examined the language of the MOA and the EBAs, this court finds that the district court

improperly granted summary judgment in favor of PolyOne for numerous reasons. First, PolyOne’s

argument that the MOA’s language indicates that Plaintiffs’ health benefits were not intended to vest

fails. Second, the durational provisions relied on by PolyOne and the district court are general in

nature and do not preclude a finding that the parties intended Plaintiffs’ benefits to vest. Third,

provisions in the EBAs expressly tie eligibility for retiree health benefits to eligibility for a pension,

which we have repeatedly held evinces an intent to vest. Fourth, adopting the interpretation urged

by PolyOne and accepted by the district court would render several promises made in the EBAs

illusory, a result in violation of our precedent. Fifth, the presence of specific vesting language in

the pension benefits portion of the EBAs does not lead to the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ health

benefits have not vested.

1. The MOA Language does not Preclude a Finding that Plaintiffs’ Health Benefits 

 were Intended to Vest

PolyOne argues that the MOA itself establishes that the parties never intended for Plaintiffs’

health benefits to vest. PolyOne believes that the MOA negates any intent to vest because it limits

benefits to the duration of the agreement and provides that the agreement may be changed by

subsequent negotiations. 

The MOA states in pertinent part: 

The Pension Plan, including the requirement for compulsory

retirement at age seventy, the Hospitalization, Surgical and Medical

Expense Insurance Program . . ., and the Prescription Drug Program

presently in effect for the majority of The BFGoodrich Company’s

production and maintenance employees shall be in effect for the life

of this Agreement; provided that if during the term of this Agreement

the Plan or Programs are changed for such majority, such changes

shall be made effective on the same date they are made effective for

the majority of The BFGoodrich production and maintenance

employees and remain in effect for the life of this Agreement. 

JA at 646 (emphasis added). PolyOne first asserts that the italicized phrase “shall be in effect for

the life of this Agreement” is a specific durational clause that precludes a finding that Plaintiffs’

health benefits have vested. Plaintiffs counter by arguing that the provision is a general durational

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clause and is insufficient to demonstrate that retiree health benefits have not vested. With regard

to this issue, the district court agreed with Plaintiffs that the MOA’s durational clause was general

in nature. See Noe, 2006 WL 3759601, at *3 n.7. 

As explained in Yolton, “[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits

themselves, courts have held that the general durational language says nothing about those retiree

benefits.” Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581. In Yolton, the court concluded that a provision stating that the

“group insurance plan will . . . run concurrently with this Agreement” was a general durational

clause and did not preclude a finding that retiree health benefits had vested. Id. Like the agreement

in Yolton, there is no language in the MOA specifically stating that retiree health benefits expire

upon the termination of the agreement. It speaks generically of all benefits for all employees;

language that does not constitute a specific durational clause under our precedent. See id.; see also

Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917-18 (finding that a CBA termination clause was not a specific durational

clause because it did not specifically reference retiree benefits). 

PolyOne’s reliance on Linville v. Teamsters Misc. & Indus. Workers Union, Local 284, 206

F.3d 648, 650 (6th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that the MOA language is a specific durational

clause is misplaced. In Linville, the clause at issue expressly stated that health insurance under the

company’s plan “ceases when the individual reaches age sixty-five.” Linville, 206 F.3d at 649. No

such language is present in this case, and there is no discussion in Linville regarding whether a

clause such as that contained in the MOA is a general or specific durational provision. Linville is

also distinguishable because the agreement there stated that no individuals were to receive health

benefits after attaining age sixty-five. Id. Instead, as in Yard-Man and Maurer, the opposite is true

in this case; the EBAs actually contain language indicating that certain health benefits start at age

sixty-five and last until death. See § 12.15(h), JA at 185. Because the MOA language is analogous

to that used in Yolton, and Linville does not apply, we reject PolyOne’s argument and find that the

MOA provision is a general durational clause that does not preclude a finding that Plaintiffs’ health

benefits have vested.

PolyOne next argues that the MOA’s statement that “if during the term of this Agreement

the Plan or Programs are changed for such majority, such changes shall be made effective on the

same date they are made effective for the majority” of BFGoodrich employees at other facilities,

precludes a finding that Plaintiffs’ health benefits have vested. According to PolyOne, this language

authorizes it to alter Plaintiffs’ health benefits at any time; therefore, such benefits have not vested.

While construing the MOA in this manner has some merit on the surface, a close

examination of the entirety of the MOA highlights the error in such an interpretation. The MOA

provision at issue begins with the words “[t]he Pension Plan, including . . . the Hospitalization,

Surgical and Medical Expense Insurance Program . . ., and the Prescription Drug Program.” JA at

646 (emphasis added). Looking to the specific language relied on by PolyOne, the MOA states

“provided that if during the term of this Agreement the Plan or Programs are changed for such

majority, such changes shall be made effective” for Plaintiffs. It is apparent that the use of the word

“Plan” in the latter sentence refers back to the phrase “Pension Plan” in the former sentence, while

the word “Program” in the latter sentence refers back to the former phrase “Hospitalization, Surgical

and Medical Expense Insurance Program . . . and the Prescription Drug Program.” Adopting

PolyOne’s construction that by permitting the company to make changes to the agreements, the

MOA language negates any intent to vest retiree health benefits, would necessarily lead to the

conclusion that the benefits provided by the pension plan are subject to change and not vested. 

According to Yolton, such an argument fails “because the same language was used regarding

pensions and health benefits . . . [g]iven the defendant’s logic, because its pension plan was

incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement, its obligation to provide pensions ended with

the expiration of the agreement.” Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581 n. 7 (quoting to the district court’s opinion

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in Golden). As Yolton seems to have implicitly recognized, such a result is forbidden by ERISA,

which requires that pension benefits automatically vest. See Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580-81; see also

Maurer, 212 F.3d at 914 (stating that pension plans are subject to mandatory vesting under ERISA).

Given that pension benefit plans cannot be changed in the manner PolyOne’s interpretation would

suggest, it follows that the MOA language at issue does not establish that Plaintiffs’ health benefits

under the “Program” were not intended to vest. 

2. Sections 12.1 and 16.4 of the EBAs are General Durational Clauses 

Similar to its MOA arguments, PolyOne’s primary assertion as it relates to the EBAs is that

language found in § 12.1 and § 16.4 of the EBAs specifically limits the availability of retiree health

benefits to the duration of the EBAs. Unlike the district court—which adopted this line of

reasoning—we are not persuaded. As previously explained with regard to the MOA durational

clause, “[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits themselves” a general

durational clause says nothing about the vesting of retiree benefits. Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581.

According to our opinion in Yolton, such general

durational language only affects future retirees-that is, someone who retired after the

expiration of a particular CBA would not be entitled to the previous benefits, but is

rather entitled only to those benefits newly negotiated under a new CBA. Thus, the

retirement package available to someone contemplating retirement will change with

the expiration and adoption of CBAs, but someone already retired under a particular

CBA continues to receive the benefits provided therein despite the expiration of the

agreement itself.

Id. at 581; see also Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917-18 (explaining that “general durational provisions . . .

are not clearly meant to include retiree benefits”). 

In an unpublished case involving language virtually identical to that found in § 12.1 of the

EBAs, we concluded that the provision was general in nature and did not preclude a finding that

retiree benefits had vested. See Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers

of Am. v. Loral Corp., 107 F.3d 11, 1997 WL 49077, at *3 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table

decision). The CBA at issue in Loral contained an introductory clause in the benefits portion of the

agreement, which stated: “Effective August 12, 1988, and for the duration of this Agreement

thereafter, the Employer will provide the following Program of hospital benefits, hospital-medical

benefits, surgical benefits and prescription drug benefits.” Id. There, as here, the employer argued

that the introductory clause limited its obligation to provide retiree benefits to the duration of the

CBA. Id. And there, as here, we were not persuaded. According to the Loral court, the

introductory clause was a general durational provision that did not limit retiree health benefits to the

duration of the CBA. See id. at *3. 

Similarly, in Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 675-76 (6th Cir. 1985), this court

analyzed a durational provision stating that “this Agreement and all terms and conditions hereof

shall terminate as of the end of the term.” The Weimer court held that the quoted language

constituted a “general termination clause [that] does not support a finding that retiree benefits ended

when the agreements expired.” Id. at 676; see also BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d at 774 (finding

that retiree health benefits vested notwithstanding an introductory clause stating that benefits would

be provided “at no cost to the Employees or retirees for the term of this Agreement”). 

In this case, § 12.1 of the EBAs states: “Effective as of April 21, 1979 and for the duration

of this Agreement, the Company will provide the following plan of hospital expense benefits,

hospital-medical benefits, surgical benefits, prescription drug benefits, dental benefits and major

medical benefits . . . .” JA at 172. According to PolyOne, this language “specifically limit[s] the

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1

Furthermore, a close reading of § 16.4 suggests that the purpose of the clause was not to limit the duration of

retiree health benefits; rather, it was to provide active employees with health benefits for a ninety-day period in the event

that the company and the union could not agree to an extension of the agreement. Essentially, § 16.4 continues benefits

for active employees on a temporary basis in the event of a strike or a situation where employees continued to work

without a contract. See United Steel Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Titan Tire Corp., 359 F. Supp.2d 819, 822 (S.D. Iowa

2005). In Titan—pursuant to the same language found in § 16.4—benefits were provided to striking employees for the

specified ninety-day period. Id. at 822. Contrary to the reasoning set forth in the dissent, such a context is clearly the

one in which § 16.4 was meant to apply instead of situations like that involved here. Simply because § 16.4 uses the

word “benefits”—albeit in the most generic sense of the word and in a completely different context—the dissent latches

on to it as support for the proposition that this is a specific durational provision. Dis. Op. at 2. To say that this provision,

which never mentions the word “retirement” or “retiree,” and is not found in the portion of the EBAs addressing retiree

benefits, constitutes a specific durational clause is a stretch of the sort that we are unwilling and unable—as a panel—to

make under our precedent. See Weimer, 773 F.2d at 676 (finding a durational clause that stated “all terms and

conditions” of the agreement expired on the expiration of the CBA to be general because it failed “to specify that retiree

insurance benefits” terminated with the CBA). For an example of a true specific durational clause, see Senn v. United

Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 1992), where the durational clause in question “explicitly provided

that retiree insurance coverage would terminate” upon the expiration of the CBA. 

duration of retiree health benefits to the term of the EBAs.” PolyOne’s argument fails, however,

because § 12.1’s language is indistinguishable from the language we held to be a general durational

provision in Loral and is analogous to that involved in Weimer. As with the durational clauses held

to be general in Yolton, Loral, BVR, and Weimer, the language in § 12.1 does not specifically refer

to retiree benefits; rather, it refers generically to the benefits available for all employees as well as

retirees. Hence, the district court incorrectly held that § 12.1 indicates an intent not to vest retiree

health benefits.

Aside from the language found in § 12.1, PolyOne also asserts that the introductory

statement in Article 2 and the durational language in § 16.4 foreclose Plaintiffs’ claim. For largely

the same reasons as those set forth above, we disagree. Section 16.4 states in pertinent part: “Upon

termination, this Agreement shall terminate in all respects except that the benefits provided by it

shall be extended for ninety (90) days following such termination.” JA at 186. As with § 12.1,

nothing in § 16.4 specifically refers to retiree benefits; instead—like the clauses held to be general

in the cases previously cited—it refers to all benefits available for all employees, active and retired.

Given the lack of any specific reference to “retiree benefits themselves,” Yolton, 435 F.3d at 581,

§ 16.4 is a general durational clause and does not support the district court’s finding in favor of

PolyOne.1 See Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917-18 (finding a CBA clause providing that benefits shall

remain in effect until midnight on the CBA’s expiration date to be a general durational provision

because it was “not clearly meant to include retiree benefits.”); see also United Rubber, Cork,

Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 873 F. Supp. 1093,

1100-01 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that a clause identical in all respects to § 16.4 was a general

durational provision and did not establish that retiree health benefits terminate ninety-days after the

expiration of the CBA.)

Looking to the introductory language of Article 2, it is also a general durational clause.

Article 2 states in pertinent part: “This Agreement constitutes a settlement for the duration of this

Agreement of all retirement, pension, insurance, survivor income benefits, supplemental workers’

compensation, drugs and severance pay demands . . . .” JA at 495. This language from Article 2

refers to all benefits; it does not specifically limit the duration of retiree health benefits as required

by Yolton and its progeny. PolyOne’s argument that this general language indicates that Plaintiffs’

health benefits were not intended to vest fails.

The dissent erroneously suggests that by deeming the durational provisions to be general in

nature, we have in some way turned the Yard-Man inference into a presumption of vesting that may

only be overcome by a “clear statement” that retiree benefits were not intended to vest. Dis. Op. at

15. Such is not the case. The dissent also fails to recognize that requiring specific language

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2

The dissent is correct that in both Golden and McCoy this court was reviewing a district court’s preliminary

injunction decision under the abuse of discretion standard. However, given the unequivocal nature of those

decisions—especially McCoy—such a distinction is one without a difference. Undoubtedly, when the McCoy court

stated that by tying “eligibility for retirement-health benefits to eligibility for a pension . . . [the parties left] little room

for debate that the retiree’s health benefits vested upon retirement,” 390 F.3d at 422, it made a broad pronouncement of

law. A pronouncement that we believe applies regardless of whether this type of case reaches us on appeal from a

preliminary injunction decision or from the grant of summary judgment. It is somewhat difficult to see why such tying

language would leave “little room for debate” that retiree benefits were intended to vest in McCoy, yet suddenly be the

source of much debate here simply because we are reviewing a district court’s summary judgment decision. 

referring to retiree health benefits in order for a durational clause to be characterized as “specific”

is not the same thing as requiring specific anti-vesting language in a CBA; rather, it simply means

that the entire case cannot be resolved on the basis of a durational clause that fails to reference

retiree health benefits as is required by our case law. See Yolton 435 F.3d at 581. As this court has

held time and time again when confronted with similar provisions, general durational clauses of the

sort found in the EBAs do not resolve the vesting issue, and it is necessary to determine if any

provisions in the agreements shed light on whether the parties intended for Plaintiffs’ health benefits

to vest. See, e.g., Maurer, 212 F.3d at 917-18; Weimer, 783 F.2d at 676; Loral, 1997 WL 49077,

at *3. It is to that question that we now turn our attention. 

 3. The EBAs Indicate an Intent to Vest Plaintiffs’ Health Benefits 

Because the durational clauses relied on by PolyOne do not preclude a finding that Plaintiffs’

health benefits have vested, we look to other provisions of the EBAs to determine whether the

parties intended Plaintiffs’ health benefits to vest. Contrary to the district court’s holding, several

provisions in the EBAs and decisions of this court support Plaintiffs’ argument that their health

benefits have vested. 

a. Tying Eligibility for Retiree Health Benefits to Eligibility for a Pension 

According to this court, language in an agreement that ties eligibility for retiree health

benefits to eligibility for a pension indicates an intent to vest the health benefits. See McCoy v.

Meridian Auto. Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 1996).2

 In McCoy, the agreement between the parties stated: “The

Company shall contribute the full premium or subscription charge for Health Care . . . for (i) a

retired employee (including any eligible dependents) provided such retired employee is eligible for

benefits under Article II of the Company’s Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan.” McCoy, 390

F.3d at 419. After outlining the applicable law under Yard-Man and its progeny, the McCoy court

held that because the CBA provision “ties eligibility for retirement-health benefits to eligibility for

a pension . . . there is little room for debate that retirees’ health benefits vested upon retirement.”

Id. at 390. Likewise, the Golden court found an intent to vest retiree health benefits because there

were “provisions in each of the CBAs . . . which tie retiree and surviving spouse eligibility for health

insurance coverage to eligibility for vested pension benefits.” Golden, 73 F.3d at 656; see also

Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580 (citing Golden for the proposition that tying eligibility for retiree health

benefits to eligibility for pension benefits indicates an intent to vest). 

Applying the teaching of McCoy and Golden in the present case leads inescapably to the

conclusion that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for PolyOne. Looking to the

EBAs, several provisions tie eligibility for retiree health benefits directly to eligibility for pension

benefits by using language that is indistinguishable from that involved in McCoy. Section 12.14 of

the EBAs provides in pertinent part: “Employees who retire and who are eligible under the 1979

Employee Benefit Agreement for a Pension (other than a Deferred Vested Pension), shall receive the

benefits described in this Article.” JA at 184 (emphasis added). Another section of the EBAs also

ties eligibility for retiree health benefits to eligibility for a pension. In § 12.7(k), the EBAs state:

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“Employees who retire and who are eligible under this Agreement for a pension (other than a

Deferred Vested Pension), shall receive the Major Medical Benefits described in this Paragraph

12.7. . . . “ JA at 181 (emphasis added). Lending even more support to the argument that the EBAs

tie retiree health benefits to pension benefits is the fact that a key retiree health provision refers to

retirees covered by the provision as “Pensioners.” See § 12.5(h), JA at 185.

 Without citing any authority, the district court disregarded the significance of this tying

language because it “focuses upon an employee’s eligibility for benefits rather than upon the

duration of those benefits.” Noe, 2006 WL 3759601, at *4. Such a statement contradicts McCoy

and Golden, both of which found vesting based on provisions that used the word “eligibility.” See

McCoy, 390 F.3d at 422 (explaining that there was evidence of an intent to vest “[b]ecause the

Supplemental Agreement ties eligibility for retirement-health benefits to eligibility for a pension.”)

(emphasis added); see also Golden, 73 F.3d at 656 (explaining that “provisions in each of the CBAs

at issue . . . tie retiree and surviving spouse eligibility for health insurance cover to eligibility for

vested pension benefits.”) (emphasis added). It is evident that the district court failed to appreciate

that by tying the eligibility for retiree health benefits to the eligibility for a pension, the EBAs were

actually speaking to the duration of the benefits. As we explained in Golden, “[s]ince retirees are

eligible to receive pension benefits for life,” the act of tying retiree health benefits to pension

eligibility indicates “that the parties intended that the company provide lifetime health benefits as

well.” Golden, 73 F.3d at 656 (explaining why the district court in Golden correctly focused on the

presence of tying language). Here, the EBAs undoubtedly tie eligibility for retiree health coverage

to eligiblity for a pension, which is evidence of an intent to vest. 

b. The EBAs’ Promise of a Lifetime Special Medicare Benefit 

Aside from tying eligibility for retiree health benefits to eligibility for a pension, which in

and of itself suggests an intent to vest, there are other provisions in the EBAs that indicate under our

case law that Plaintiffs’ health benefits were intended to vest. Section 12.15(h) of the EBA states:

Subject to the provisions of this Paragraph 12.15(h), a Special Medicare Benefit will

be paid to . . . (ii) a Pensioner who retires on or after April 21, 1979, or (iii) such

Pensioner’s or Employee’s surviving spouse, if such Employee, Pensioner or

surviving spouse is covered for Medical Benefits under this Article 12. 

(1) The Special Medicare Benefit will be equal to the standard

monthly premium for Part B of Medicare . . . 

(2) The Special Medicare Benefit will be payable when an individual

attains age sixty-five (65) or, for an individual less than age sixty-five

(65), when he enrolls for Part B of Medicare . . . 

(3) Payment shall commence on the first day of the month following

(i) the month during which the individual attains age sixty-five (65)

. . . The payment of such Benefit shall continue until the individual’s

death . . . (5) Upon the death of a Pensioner or Employee, the Special Medicare

Benefit will be paid to his surviving spouse if such spouse is eligible

to receive Medical Benefits under this Article 12. Such surviving

spouse shall continue to receive the Special Medicare Benefit until

such spouse remarries, dies or is no longer eligible for Part B of

Medicare. 

JA at 185 (emphasis added). As the italicized language makes clear, § 12.15(h) promises that once

a retiree reaches age sixty-five he or she will receive the Special Medicare Benefit until death. And

upon death, the retiree’s surviving spouse will continue to receive the Special Medicare Benefit until

his or her death or remarriage. 

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3

PolyOne repeatedly cites Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Corp., 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18650 (N.D. Ohio

March 14, 1984), in its brief as support for its argument that Plaintiffs’ health benefits have not vested. See Appellee’s

Br. at 39, 41, 42. However, PolyOne neglects to ever mention that the district court’s decision on which it relies so

heavily was actually vacated and remanded by this court on appeal. See Policy, 770 F.2d at 618. Our decision in Policy

specifically rejected the language that PolyOne quotes in bold print at page 42 of its brief as support for the argument

that the provisions in the EBAs promising certain benefits until a deceased retiree’s death or remarriage did not evince

an intent to vest retiree health benefits. See id. at 615 (finding that to construe a provision conferring health insurance

benefits for the duration of the retiree’s life as not providing vested benefits would render the promise “in substantial

part nugatory and illusory”). 

When confronted with similar language in the past, we have held that it establishes an intent

to vest retiree health benefits. See Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609, 615 (6th Cir.

1985).3 In Policy, the CBA provided: “When said Pensioner reaches age 65, the Company will

provide such Pensioner, at the Company’s expense, supplemental medicare and major medical

benefits. The Company will continue to provide at its expense, supplemental medicare and major

medical benefits for Pensioners aged 65 and over.” Id. Reversing the district court’s conclusion that

the retirees’ benefits were not vested, Policy explained that the language of the supplemental

medicare provision “unambiguously confers the stated health insurance benefits for the duration of

the retiree’s life.” Id. (emphasis added). The Policy court’s determination finds support in the

Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993) (en

banc), where Judge Posner, writing for the en banc court, explained that a similar provision could

reasonably “be thought a promise to retired employees that they and their spouses will be covered

for the rest of their lives. For the provision does not say ‘when they die or the collective bargaining

agreement expires, whichever occurs first,’ but simply when they die.” 

As with the provision involved in Policy, § 12.15(h)(3) promises to provide a Special

Medicare Benefit from age sixty-five “until the individual’s death.” We are in agreement with

Policy, that promising to provide a benefit until a person dies undoubtedly means that the benefit

lasts for the person’s life. It is likewise clear to us that § 12.15(h)(5)’s promise to provide the

surviving spouse of a retiree with a Medicare supplement until he or she remarries or “dies” is a

promise that the spouse of a retiree is entitled to lifetime benefits unless he or she remarries. See

generally Loral, 1997 WL 49077, at *3 (concluding that language providing the spouse of a

deceased retiree with benefits “until death or remarriage” indicates that such benefits have vested).

Furthermore, adopting PolyOne’s argument that Plaintiffs’ retiree benefits have not vested

would render portions of § 12.15(h) nugatory, and the promises contained therein illusory, in

violation of Yard-Man and its progeny. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1480 (explaining that courts

must construe CBA provisions “so as to render none nugatory and avoid illusory promises”). With

regard to the analogous provision in Policy, this court explained that to interpret such a benefits

provision as terminating at the end of the relevant CBA would create an illusory promise to those

retirees who would not reach age sixty-five before the CBA’s expiration. Policy, 770 F.2d at 615.

According to Policy, the promise would be illusory because:

if a sixty-two year old employee with twenty years service retired on January 1,

1982, eight months before the collective bargaining agreement expired, and if the

Company were correct in contending that the retiree’s health insurance benefits

ceased with the August 31, 1982, expiration of such agreement, then the Company’s

promise to provide supplemental Medicare . . . to the retiree when he reached age

sixty-five would be of no value.

Id.; see also Bailey v. AK Steel Corp., No. 1:06cv468, 2006 WL 2727732, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22,

2006) (examining a similar Medicare supplement provision for retirees and concluding that the

promise establishes an intent to vest because otherwise it would be illusory for many individuals

who retired as young as age fifty-five). The same conclusion was reached in Yard-Man, where the

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CBA promised to provide certain benefits to retirees when they reached age sixty-five. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481 (explaining that if retiree benefits expired at the end of the CBA then the promise

to provide certain benefits at age sixty-five “is completely illusory for many early retirees under age

62”); see also Maurer, 212 F.3d at 918 (explaining that, “[b]ecause the CBAs permit retirement at

age 55 and promise insurance at age 65, the promise is meaningless if it could be terminated in three

years”). 

Similar to the provisions in Policy, Yard-Man, and Maurer, § 12.15(h) promises that upon

the attainment of age sixty-five the company will begin to provide the Special Medicare Benefit to

retirees. However, as in Maurer, employees of BFG could retire as early as age fifty-five under the

company’s early retirement plan. See § 4.2, JA at 194. For such early retirees, the promise of the

Special Medicare Benefit is rendered illusory under the interpretation urged by PolyOne. See JA

at 194, § 4.2. Likewise, § 12.15(h)’s promise to provide the spouse of a deceased retiree with the

Special Medicare Benefit until his or her death or remarriage would be rendered illusory were this

court to agree with the district court and PolyOne. Under PolyOne’s interpretation, the spouse of

an individual who retired early at age fifty-five and passed away at age fifty-seven would never

receive the promised Special Medicare Benefit even though he or she remained alive and never

remarried.

 Looking to another provision of the EBAs, § 12.14 also promises health benefits to the

surviving spouse of a retiree until the spouse’s death or remarriage. According to § 12.14: 

The surviving spouse of an Employee who is retired by the Company on or after the

effective date of this Agreement shall continue to be eligible to receive such benefits

to the earlier of the date of death or remarriage, provided such spouse, as of the date

of death of such retired former Employee, was covered for these benefits as an

eligible dependent . . . . 

JA at 184 (emphasis added). Accepting PolyOne’s interpretation would require this court to rewrite

§ 12.14 to say that the spouse of a deceased retiree “shall continue to be eligible to receive such

benefits to the earlier of the date of death or remarriage, or the expiration of this agreement.” No

such limiting language is found in § 12.14, and courts should not add words to a contract under the

guise of construing it. See Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 31:5 (4th ed. 2007); see also

Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 608 (explaining that such a provision does not say retiree benefits will be

provided to surviving spouses “‘when they die or the collective bargaining agreement expires,

whichever occurs first’ but simply when they die”). As with the promises made in § 12.15(h),

holding that Plaintiffs’ health benefits have not vested would render § 12.14’s promise of health

benefits until death or remarriage illusory for the spouses of deceased retirees in violation of

precedent. 

4. Presence of Specific Vesting Language in Pension Provision 

Next, PolyOne argues that the fact that the EBAs used explicit vesting language with regard

to pension benefits leads to the conclusion that the absence of such explicit vesting language in the

retiree health benefits provisions indicates that they have not vested. The district court was

persuaded by this argument, noting that Article 6 of the EBA “contains strong language stating that

pension payments shall be payable monthly ‘during the life of such Employee, the last payment

thereof being payable for the month in which he dies.’” Noe, 2006 WL 3759601, at *4 (quoting

§ 6.1(a) of the EBA, JA at 197). According to the district court, the absence of such language in the

retiree health benefits portion of the EBAs suggests that the parties did not intend for them to vest.

However, the district court neglected to notice the similarity between § 6.1(a)’s language and

that found in § 12.15(h), which provides that the Special Medicare Benefit will commence when the

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4

Given our conclusion that the plain language of the EBAs indicates an intent to vest retiree health benefits,

the consideration of extrinsic evidence is unnecessary. However, we pause to note that our interpretation of the EBAs

finds considerable support in the available extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Affidavit of Anna May Wilder, JA at 104-05

(“When I began receiving the BFGoodrich health insurance benefits after my husband’s death, I was told that it would

be paid ‘like it is’ for my life by the woman who helped me. That person was a representative of BF Goodrich

Company.”); Affidavit of William Duncan, Jr., JA at 113-14 (“When I retired I spoke with Karen Hicks. She told me

at that time that the only loss I would have by retiring would be a partial loss of my life insurance.”); Deposition of

Kimberly K. Reilly, JA at 595 (indicating that while employed in BFG’s human resources department she instructed

retirees consistent with her training that their health benefits would be provided for the rest of their life). This type of

extrinsic evidence was held to be evidence of vesting in Yolton. See Yolton, 435 F.3d at 583. Looking to the extrinsic

evidence relied on by PolyOne, we are unconvinced that the letter of Ms. Allison Beck, Assistant General Counsel to

the Machinist’s Union, casts any doubt on our conclusion that the EBAs indicate an intent to vest. As Plaintiffs point

out, the letter contains a general statement of law that, unlike pension benefits, retiree health benefits may be altered upon

the expiration of the applicable CBA. The letter indicates that Ms. Beck was speaking in generic terms and not on the

basis of the contractual language of the EBAs involved in this case. Ms. Beck is correct that nothing in ERISA prevents

an employer from terminating retiree health benefits at the end of a CBA; however, under our case law termination of

health benefits is forbidden when—as here—the language of the agreements themselves indicates an intent to provide

retiree reaches age sixty-five and “[t]he payment of such Benefit shall continue until the individual’s

death.” JA at 185. In our opinion, § 6.1(a)’s promise to pay a monthly pension “during the life of

such employee” is indistinguishable from § 12.15(h)’s promise to pay the Special Medicare Benefit

“until the individual’s death.” It is axiomatic that promising to provide a benefit for an individual’s

life (§ 6.1(a)) is the functional equivalent of promising to provide a benefit until an individual’s

death (§ 12.15(h)). Any argument to the contrary is mere semantics and defies common sense. 

In the same vein, PolyOne asserts that the presence in § 8.5 of language specifically

indicating that pension benefits survive the expiration of the EBAs, and the absence of such

language with regard to retiree health benefits demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ health benefits have not

vested. Section 8.5 states: “No Pension or other benefit granted prior to the time of such termination

shall be reduced, suspended or discontinued except as specifically provided in this Pension Plan.”

JA at 201. The force of this argument is blunted first by the provisions discussed above that under

our precedent do indicate an intent to vest, and second by the existence of various provisions in the

EBAs that have specific termination language, whereas the retiree health benefits provisions have

none. 

The presence of specific durational language in other provisions and its absence in the retiree

health benefits provisions suggests an intent to vest under our case law. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at

1481-82. Here, there are several provisions that contain the specific durational provisions referred

to by Yard-Man. First, § 12.9 explains that in the event of a layoff an employee shall receive health

coverage for three months following the date of lay-off. JA at 220-21. Second, § 12.10 specifies

that an employee who is terminated because of a plant closure is entitled to medical benefits under

the EBAs for a twenty-four month period. Id. Third, § 12.11 states that an employee on an

authorized leave of absence shall receive health coverage for “a period not to exceed three

(3) months.” Id. The inclusion of specific durational language “in other provisions of the current

collective bargaining agreement suggests that retiree benefits, not so specifically limited, were

intended to survive the expiration of successive agreements.” Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1481-82; see

also Yolton, 435 F.3d at 582 (discussing, with approval, the district court’s citation of specific

durational provisions in the CBAs for laid-off employees and those on maternity leave as evidence

that retiree benefits vested under Yard-Man).

Thus, these arguments, essentially predicated on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius

canon of interpretation, work to the benefit and detriment of each party. Accordingly, the language

in § 8.5 offers little support for PolyOne’s argument that Plaintiffs’ health benefits were not intended

to vest. This is especially true given the various provisions discussed above that indicate an intent

to vest Plaintiffs’ health benefits.4

 

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such benefits beyond the term of a particular agreement. 

5

Illustrative of this point is the fact that, of the eleven most pertinent Sixth Circuit cases addressing whether

retiree health benefits have vested, this court found evidence of vesting in ten. See Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1478; Policy, 770 F.2d at 611; ABS Indus., Inc., 890 F.2d at 846; Weimer, 773 F.2d at 676; Loral, 1997 WL 49077, at *3; Golden, 73

F.3d at 657; McCoy, 390 F.3d at 422; Maurer, 773 F.3d at 917-18; BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d at 775; Yolton, 435

F.3d at 581-85. 

As the foregoing analysis makes clear, there is nothing earth-shattering about our holding

in this case; it is merely the straightforward application of this circuit’s case law.5 The dissent’s

contention that we have turned Yard-Man into some sort of a presumption in favor of vesting is

premised on a misreading of the court’s opinion. One can search this opinion in vain for any

indication—or even a suggestion—that we presume retiree health benefits were intended to vest

absent a clear statement to the contrary. All we have done today is follow the instructions of YardMan and its progeny by examining the provisions of the EBAs and applying traditional principles

of contract interpretation to ascertain whether the parties intended to vest retiree health benefits. See

Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479-80. While the dissent is correct that—beginning with Yard-Man—this

court has approached the vesting issue differently than have many of our sister circuits, this panel

is not at liberty to cast aside nearly twenty-four years of precedent in order to charter a new course,

no matter how desirable that new course may be. 

Having addressed the EBAs and explained why the district court erred in granting summary

judgment for PolyOne, we proceed now to analyze whether Plaintiff Hood’s health benefits under

the Flex Program have vested. 

D. The Flex Program 

Unlike the other Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Hood’s health benefits are governed by the Flex Program

because her now-deceased husband retired from BFG in 1990, two years after the Flex Program

replaced the EBAs. Although it is clear from our review of the record that the provisions of the Flex

Program differ from those in the EBAs, the district court’s opinion failed to address whether

Plaintiff Hood’s benefits have vested under the Flex Program. In all likelihood, the district court’s

failure to address this issue resulted from the parties’ failure to explain to the court how Plaintiff

Hood’s claim differed from that of the other Plaintiffs. Similarly—aside from PolyOne’s brief

mention of a reservation of rights clause found in the Flex Program’s Summary Plan

Description—neither party has provided this court with any analysis of the Flex Program’s language

or argument as to whether it evinces an intent to vest retiree benefits. Accordingly, whether Plaintiff

Hood’s benefits have vested under the Flex Program is an issue that the district court must consider

on remand.

III. CONCLUSION 

We are cognizant of the overall climate in which this case reaches the court; rising healthcare

costs and foreign competition have certainly placed corporations such as PolyOne in a difficult

economic position. However, in the absence of impossibility of performance, it is not the

prerogative of the judiciary to rewrite contracts in order to rescue parties from “their improvident

commitments.” Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 609. Because the district court erred in concluding that the

EBAs do not indicate an intent to vest Plaintiffs’ health benefits, we VACATE the district court’s

decision granting summary judgment for PolyOne and REMAND the matter for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

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_______________________________________________

CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART

_______________________________________________

 SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Applying the Yard-Man

line of cases to these agreements, the district court concluded as a matter of law that the claimants’

healthcare benefits do not vest upon retirement. Applying the same cases to these agreements, the

majority concludes as a matter of law that the claimants’ healthcare benefits do vest upon retirement.

They are both partly right, which is why I would not rule as a matter of law for either party and

which is why I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 

My first objection to the majority’s approach is its treatment of the claimants as if the

employee-benefit agreements covered them directly. That is not the case. The agreements bear on

this case only because a separate memorandum of understanding incorporates them. And that

memorandum independently limits any expectations claimants otherwise might have about their

future healthcare benefits. As agreed to by the claimants, the memorandum says that, if certain other

unions representing other BFGoodrich workers change their members’ retiree health benefits—in

negotiations not involving the claimants’ union, no less—those changes immediately will alter the

benefits of the soon-to-be retirees of the claimants’ union. See JA 646 (“[I]f during the term of this

Agreement the Plan or Programs are changed for [the] majority [of BFGoodrich’s other production

and maintenance employees], such changes shall be made effective on the same date they are made

effective for [that] majority . . . and remain in effect for the life of this Agreement.”). That means

that, if these other unions and BFGoodrich amend their plans and eliminate (or curtail) retiree health

benefits, the soon-to-be-retirees of the claimants’ union, even someone who planned to retire the

next day and anticipated receiving health benefits for life, will be stuck with the change—at least

until the next round of negotiations. That is not the kind of provision that naturally inspires a worker

to believe his benefits are fixed for life. 

The durational language in § 16.4 of the employee-benefit agreements likewise undercuts

the claimants’ argument that their benefits are immutable for life as a matter of law. It says that,

“[u]pon termination, this Agreement shall terminate in all respects except that the benefits provided

by it shall be extended for ninety (90) days following such termination.” On its face, the agreement

undermines any expectation that the healthcare benefits a worker happens to receive at retirement

are the benefits he will receive throughout retirement. 

Our cases, it is true, appear not to give any weight to “general” durational clauses in

collective bargaining agreements when those clauses do “not specifically refer to the duration of

benefits.” UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983). In Yard-Man, we gave no

weight to a durational clause providing that the CBA should remain in effect until a particular date

because the clause did not “specifically refer to the duration of benefits.” Id. Similarly, in Maurer

v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 212 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 2000), we concluded that provisions indicating that

the CBA and certain other agreements shall terminate on a particular date were “general in nature”

because they “only refer[red] to agreements between the parties, not to benefits created by the

agreements.” Id. at 918 (emphasis added). But § 16.4 of the agreement does “specifically refer to

the duration of benefits.” Indeed, this language satisfies even the suggestion in Yolton that the

durational clause must refer to the “retiree benefits themselves.” Yolton v. El Paso Tenn. Pipeline

Co., 435 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2006). Surely one type of benefits to which the clause could be

referring is retiree benefits. If the majority means to say that a durational clause means nothing

unless it says that “retiree health benefits” terminate (or may be terminated) at a given point, then

it must be saying what our cases (including Yolton itself) have long disclaimed saying—that the

Yard-Man inference creates a presumption in favor of vesting that may be countered only by a clear

statement. See id. at 579. More on that later.

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Nor do I believe that the tying language in § 12.7(k) of the agreement—which says that

“[e]mployees who retire and who are eligible under this Agreement for a pension . . . shall receive

the Major Medical Benefits described in this Paragraph 12.7”—compels the view that claimants

have unalterable benefits for life. McCoy and Golden are not the holy grails claimants say they are

because those cases (like Yolton) reviewed preliminary injunctions granted by the district court, not

a district court’s resolution of summary-judgment motions. See McCoy v. Meridian Auto. Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 2004); Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 651 (6th Cir. 1996).

At issue there was the abuse-of-discretion question whether the district court properly assessed

plaintiffs’ likelihood of success and the balancing of equities caused by an immediate termination

of healthcare benefits, not the de-novo question whether the plaintiffs should prevail as a matter of

law. Nor do those cases indicate whether the agreements contained benefits-specific durational

language, as in this case, or whether a memorandum of understanding between the union and

company limited any expectations otherwise created by the agreements. While I agree with the

majority that the district court should not have disregarded the tying language, I respectfully

disagree with the majority that this language “leads inescapably to the conclusion that the district

court erred in granting summary judgment for PolyOne.” No case, to my knowledge, holds that

tying language alone suffices to permit retirees to fend off summary judgment—much less to

mandate that the benefits vested as a matter of law. 

That is particularly so here in view of the conspicuous inclusion of vesting language in the

pension benefits section of the agreement and its conspicuous omission in the healthcare benefits

section of the agreement. The pension section of the agreement says: “No Pension or other benefit

granted prior to the time of [the] termination [of the Pension Plan] shall be reduced, suspended or

discontinued except as specifically provided in this Pension Plan. In the event of termination or

partial termination of this Pension Plan, the rights of the Employees to benefits accrued to the date

of such termination, to the extent then funded, shall be nonforfeitable . . . .” Now that is vesting

language. Yet nothing like it appears in the healthcare benefits section of the agreement. If our

cases are going to rely on similarities between pension benefits and healthcare benefits (such as

similar eligibility dates) in determining what has vested, they should not ignore marked differences

(such as different language about vesting) in making the same inquiry. Either they both are relevant

to the vesting question, or neither is.

Although §§ 12.15(h) and 12.14 of the agreement provide some support for the retirees’

claim, they too do not establish unalterable benefits for life. Section 12.15(h), as the retirees

emphasize, says that “a Special Medicare Benefit” will be paid to certain employees, pensioners and

surviving spouses. But the retirees overlook the first sentence of that provision, which adds that

those individuals will be provided with “a Special Medicare Benefit” only “if such Employee,

Pensioner or surviving spouse is covered for Medical Benefits under this Article 12.” (emphasis

added). Read together with the introductory language to Article 12—which says that the company

will provide the benefits discussed in Article 12 “for the duration of this Agreement”—this provision

does not unambiguously vest the retirees’ health benefits. The claimants’ reliance on § 12.14 suffers

from a similar problem.

 Even if I were to ignore all of this, I still do not know what has vested as a matter of law.

Is it all retiree health benefits or just certain stated benefits? See Policy v. Powell Pressed Steel Co., 770 F.2d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The court finds that this section unambiguously confers the

stated health insurance benefits for the duration of the retiree’s life.”) (emphasis added). And if it

is all retiree benefits, are there any limitations? “What if the employer reduces health benefits for

active employees or increases the cost of those benefits to active employees? What if the employer

increases some health benefits for active employees but reduces others? Must the retiree take the

bitter with the sweet? Or is it a ratchet with only the improvements in health benefits available to

the retiree but with no compulsion to take any reduction?” Prater v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 505 F.3d

437, 441 (6th Cir. 2007). What happens if the medical insurance provider no longer offers the same

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medical benefits it offered for the term of the prior collective bargaining agreement? And what if

the company’s business takes a turn for the worse? Must it continue paying the same benefits to

retirees that they received at retirement, even if the cost of those benefits means laying off current

workers (and eliminating their health benefits) and means potentially weakening the income stream

that pays for retiree benefits? How long must this continue? Until all of the values that a company

brings to a community but one—irreversible retiree health benefits—are gone?

While there is no reason to think the company is heading in this direction, I fail to see how

we can hold that benefits have vested as a matter of law when we do not know what has vested and

on what terms. In a case like this one—where the memorandum of understanding and durational

language point in the company’s direction, the tying language (at least some of it) and §§ 12.14 and

12.15(h) point in the retirees’ direction and the extrinsic evidence points in both directions—I would

prefer to leave these contractual ambiguities for resolution in the forum in which they belong: a

jury.

One last point. The majority’s conclusion to the contrary suggests that the Yard-Man

inference has become a rebuttable presumption—one that may be overcome only by a clearstatement reservation of rights. “[A]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree benefits

themselves,” as the majority puts it, healthcare benefits vest as a matter of law. 

The majority disclaims doing any such thing. “Yard-Man,” it says, “does not create a legal

presumption that retiree benefits are interminable” but rather “is properly understood as creating an

inference only if the context and other available evidence indicate an intent to vest.” We have said

the same thing before. See, e.g., Yolton, 435 F.3d at 580 (“[U]nder Yard-Man, there is no legal

presumption that benefits vest and . . . the burden of proof rests on plaintiffs. This Court has never

inferred an intent to vest benefits in the absence of either explicit contractual language or extrinsic

evidence indicating such an intent.”) (internal quotation marks, citations and alterations omitted).

But other circuits and observers, looking at what we have said and done in applying the

Yard-Man inference have called it a presumption. See, e.g., Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d

539, 543 (7th Cir. 2000) (“One case [i.e., Yard-Man] holds that benefits are presumed to vest if they

are conferred by a collective bargaining agreement . . . .”) (emphasis added); UAW v. Skinner Engine

Co., 188 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We cannot agree with Yard-Man and its progeny that there

exists a presumption of lifetime benefits in the context of employee welfare benefits.”) (emphasis

added); Am. Fed’n of Grain Millers v. Int’l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 980 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997)

(citing Yard-Man as a case that “apparently presum[ed] that retiree benefits are vested”) (emphasis

added); Roger C. Siske et al., What’s New in Employee Benefits (ALI-ABA Course of Study, July

1–5, 2002), WL SH011 ALI-ABA 59, 322 (“The Sixth Circuit presumes vesting and requires a clear

statement of termination to prove otherwise.”) (emphasis added).

I see their point. What started out as a potential inference became an omnipresent

presumption and now appears to have become a clear-statement rule. Unless a company can point

to explicit language in the relevant agreement stating that “retiree benefits” terminate at a particular

date or do not vest, the benefits seem to vest as a matter of law. What we continually disclaim

presuming we continually seem to presume. 

In the majority’s defense, perhaps the problem is the ineffable nature of the inference. If we

were writing on a clean slate, I could imagine three straightforward approaches to the problem. One:

adopt the position of several circuits and create a presumption against vesting because a company’s

unchangeable promise to pay healthcare benefits for life is a significant and unusual

one—particularly when it arises from a three-year contract. See Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993

F.2d 603, 606–07 (7th Cir. 1993) (“No doubt a court should cast a cold eye on contentions that a

contract with a fixed term actually created a perpetual obligation, and should, therefore, . . . presume

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No. 07-5068 Noe, et al. v. PolyOne Corp. Page 17

that a collective bargaining agreement ceases to obligate the employer when the agreement’s term

(invariably three years) is up.”); see also Skinner, 188 F.3d at 139 (“[I]t must be remembered that

to vest benefits is to render them forever unalterable. Because vesting of welfare plan benefits

constitutes an extra-ERISA commitment, an employer’s commitment to vest such benefits is not to

be inferred lightly and must be stated in clear and express language.”); Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 35 F.3d 851, 855 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); cf. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512,

1517 (8th Cir. 1988) (“disagree[ing] with Yard-Man to the extent that it recognizes an inference of

an intent to vest” and suggesting that “there must be a specific, if not written, expression of the

employer’s intent to be bound”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Two: adopt the position no circuit has yet taken that there should be a presumption in favor

of vesting because retirees who lose benefits often are not in a position either to return to work or

to require their union to negotiate new benefits.

Three: do not adopt any presumption because these contracts should be interpreted no

differently from other collectively bargained contracts. See generally Senior v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas

Corp., 449 F.3d 206, 218 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying the “traditional principles of labor contract

interpretation” because, among other reasons, using a presumption or requiring “certain customary

words” might “interfere with the correct interpretation . . . of the understanding reached by the

parties” and “Congress could easily have created interpretive presumptions by statute” but chose not

to). 

Yard-Man contemplates an in-between inference—not quite a presumption in favor of

vesting but not quite a straight interpretive question either. Yet I wonder whether that slices things

so finely that it places the rule beyond predictable and fair application—a little like adopting a

standard of review between intermediate and strict scrutiny or a level of deference between Chevron

and Skidmore. 

Making this particularly puzzling is that we have adopted the opposite rule—a presumption

against vesting—in the context of employment agreements that are not collectively bargained. See

Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 400 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“To vest benefits is to

render them forever unalterable. Because vesting of welfare plan benefits is not required by law,

an employer’s commitment to vest such benefits is not to be inferred lightly; the intent to vest must

be found in the plan documents and must be stated in clear and express language.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). One might have thought that we would apply the same rule in both

settings or, if we were to put a thumb on just one of the scales, we would do so only where the

employee did not have the benefit of a union negotiating the contract. 

The salient point is that the inference, as this case well shows, has become a presumption.

And we should either say that is what we are doing—and spare future panels, the district courts and

litigants the confusion the inference has created—or abandon the inference altogether. 

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