Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01081/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01081-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

Hammerwood Avenue, L.P.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

Thermo Electron Corporation, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C 04-01081 JW 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

On October 23, 2006, Defendants Thermo Electron Corporation, Thermo Electron Scientific

Instruments, L.L.C., and Thermo Securities Corporation (collectively, "Thermo") filed a "Motion for

Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration" ("Motion"). Thermo requests reconsideration of a

portion of the Court's October 13, 2006 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants'

Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication ("Order"). 

To receive leave to file a motion for reconsideration, the moving party must specifically

show one of the following:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists

from that which was presented to the court before entry of the interlocutory order for

which reconsideration is sought. The moving party also must show that in the

exercise of reasonable diligence, it did not know of the fact or law at the time of the

interlocutory order; 

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the issuance

of the interlocutory order;

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). 

Case 5:04-cv-01081-JW Document 138 Filed 11/21/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Thermo does not identify which of these three possibilities is applicable to their motion. Indeed,

Thermo has failed to identify (1) any material difference in fact or law from that presented to the

Court before its Order; (2) any new material facts or change of law occurring after the Order's

issuance; or (3) a manifest failure to consider factual or legal arguments presented to the Court

before the Order was issued.

Rather, Thermo contends as follows. Lead can exist in liquid, gaseous, or solid forms, and

Thermo subsidiaries used lead at the Facility in multiple forms. Accordingly, "[w]hat makes sense,

of course, is that the lead dust that must be the subject of a remediation under governmental

requirements now qualifies as a 'Toxic Material,' not that any and all lead in whatever form and

regardless of risk or government remediation requirement suddenly becomes a Toxic Material." 

(Order at 4.) Thermo appears to contend that there are two possible interpretations of Toxic

Materials: (1) that lead, irrespective of matter state, risk, or government remediation requirement is a

Toxic Material (Thermo's interpretation of the Court's Order) or (2) that solely lead dust is a Toxic

Material to the extent that it requires remediation under government requirements. 

The precise language of the Court's Order was as follows:

The Lease's language, "...requiring remediation under federal, state or local

statutes..." identifies the substances that are Toxic Materials under the Lease. This

language does not operate as a restriction on Thermo's liability for Toxic Materials

contamination only to the extent that a government agency mandates cleanup. The

Court finds that lead is a "Toxic Material" under the Lease. 

(Order at 6.) Since neither party raised the issue at the time, the Court's Order lacked the specificity

that it otherwise would have with respect to matter state. However, the Court need not accept

Thermo's false dichotomy in order clarify its interpretation of the contract language. The Court

clarifies its reading of the Toxic Material provision as follows:

The Lease's language, "...requiring remediation under federal, state or local

statutes..." identifies the substances that are Toxic Materials under the Lease, and in

what matter states and forms those substances qualify as Toxic Materials. This

language does not operate as a restriction on Thermo's liability for Toxic Materials

contamination only to the extent that a government agency mandates cleanup. The

Court finds that lead in any matter state and form subject to government

remediation is a "Toxic Material" under the Lease.

Case 5:04-cv-01081-JW Document 138 Filed 11/21/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In other words, lead existing (1) in a solid matter state (2) in the form of dust particles would be an

example of a Toxic Material under the Lease, because government remediation rules apply to lead in

this matter state and form. However, these government remediation rules are not dispositive, for

summary adjudication purposes, as to the extent to which lead dust is a Toxic Material under the

Lease.

This clarification should sufficiently address Thermo's concern that "we have an explicit

Lease reference to governmental cleanup requirements as the basis for classification of a material as

a 'Toxic Material' and yet the Order would nullify application of those governmental cleanup

standards by rendering all lead at the Facility a 'Toxic Material' for purposes of the parties' Lease." 

(Motion at 6.)

Thermo has failed to make the showing required under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) for leave to

file a motion for reconsideration. The Court DENIES Thermo's motion for leave.

Dated: November 21, 2006 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge

Case 5:04-cv-01081-JW Document 138 Filed 11/21/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO:

A. Bryan Diaz bryan.diaz@berliner.com

Allen Ruby aruby@rubyschofield.com

Anne-Marie Waggoner awaggoner@rubyschofield.com

Christine H. Long christine.long@berliner.com

Glen W. Schofield gschofield@rubyschofield.com

Jonathan David Wolf Jdw@berliner.com

Shannon N. Cogan shannon.cogan@berliner.com

Steven A. Ellenberg sellenberg@rubyschofield.com

Dated: November 21, 2006 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: /s/ JW Chambers 

Elizabeth Garcia

Courtroom Deputy

Case 5:04-cv-01081-JW Document 138 Filed 11/21/06 Page 4 of 4