Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02410/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02410-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlos R. Esparza,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.

Respondents. 

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CV-07-2410-PHX-ROS (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Carlos R. Esparza, who is presently confined in the Aspen Unit of the

Arizona State Prison Complex in Phoenix, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) and Respondents’

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”). (Doc. No. 10.) Although

Petitioner was granted an extension of time to file a reply, he failed to do so. The Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to a modified count of attempted armed

robbery, a class 3 felony, committed on January 31, 2003. (Petition, Ex. D.) The plea

agreement provided for the possibility of an exceptional, aggravated sentence of

imprisonment of 8.75 years. (Id.) On November 5, 2003, the trial court held a sentencing

and mitigation hearing at which Petitioner testified. (Answer, Ex. B.) During his testimony,

Petitioner admitted that (1) his brother had pled guilty to being an accomplice in the instant

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offense, and (2) Petitioner had a prior conviction for armed robbery. (Id., pgs. 7, 11.) At the

close of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to the exceptional, aggravated

sentence of 8.75 years. (Id.) The trial court aggravated Petitioner’s sentence based on three

“exceptional” circumstances: (1) Petitioner committed armed robbery with an accomplice,

(2) the victims suffered emotional harm, and (3) Petitioner had been convicted of a felony

within the past ten years. (Id.) 

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law.

Petitioner instituted his first post-conviction relief proceedings pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R.

Crim. P. on December 31, 2003, when he filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. (Answer,

Ex. C.) On January 16, 2004, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his

post-conviction proceedings. (Answer, Ex. D.) After receiving three extensions of time in

which to file a petition for post-conviction relief on Petitioner’s behalf, Petitioner’s courtappointed counsel filed a Notice of Completion Re: Post-Conviction Relief on August 15,

2004. (Answer, Ex. H.) On August 25, 2004, the trial court granted Petitioner 45 days in

which to file a pro se petition. (Answer, Ex. I.) 

On September 16, 2004, Petitioner filed his first petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“First Rule 32 Petition”). (Petition, Ex. A.)

Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Petition raised a single claim: that Petitioner’s sentence violated

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), because the trial court considered facts not

determined by a jury when enhancing Petitioner’s sentence. (Id.) The trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s First Rule 32 Petition on September 30, 2004 on the ground that Blakely did not

retroactively apply to Petitioner’s case. (Id.) Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial

court’s decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals, again arguing that his sentence violated

Blakely. (Petition, Ex. B.) On January 17, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in

which it disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Blakely did not apply, but concluded

that Petitioner’s conviction did not violate Blakely. (Answer, Ex. J.) Accordingly, the Court

of Appeal denied review. (Id.) 

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On August 20, 2007, Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief in the

trial court (“Second Rule 32 Notice”). (Petition, Ex. C.) The Second Rule 32 Notice alleged

six claims for relief: (1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial

counsel changed four times before his change of plea; (2) Petitioner received ineffective

assistance of Rule 32 “of-right” counsel; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing

to grant Petitioner a mental health examination; (4) Petitioner received ineffective assistance

of counsel at sentencing; (5) Petitioner’s sentence violated Blakely; and (6) the Arizona Court

of Appeals took 27 months to issue a decision regarding Petitioner’s petition for review of

the trial court’s denial of his First Rule 32 Petition. (Id.) The trial court dismissed

Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Notice as precluded. (Id.) Petitioner did not petition for review

by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

On November 29, 2007, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner's Petition presents two claims for relief:

Ground 1: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel (a) at sentencing; (b)

when trial counsel promised Petitioner that if he pled guilty he would only receive a 3.5 year

term of imprisonment; and (c) when counsel appointed to represent Petitioner in his first

post-conviction proceedings failed to file a Rule 32 petition;

Ground 2: Petitioner’s sentence violates Blakely because the trial court considered

facts not determined by a jury when enhancing Petitioner’s sentence. (Petition, pgs. 6-7.) 

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied because Petitioner has

failed to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to the claims set forth in Ground 1 and

because Ground 2 is without merit.

A. Exhaustion

i. Legal Standard

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

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Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may

be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim

may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

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ii. Ground 1

Petitioner did not present Ground 1(b) in either his First Rule 32 Petition or his

Second Rule 32 Notice. Petitioner presented Grounds 1(a) and 1(c) in his Second Rule 32

Notice, but did not present those claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Rose, 455 U.S.

at 519 (stating that a petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's

highest court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court

will consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that claim must be presented to the

Arizona Court of Appeals in post-conviction proceedings in order to be exhausted).

Consequently, Petitioner has not fairly presented any of the claims contained in Ground 1 and

cannot raise those claims for the first time in federal court. 

Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and

32.4 from obtaining relief on Ground 1 in state court absent an applicable exception, which

Petitioner does not assert. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, Ground 1 is

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, which Petitioner does not assert. See Coleman, 501

U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); Thomas v. Goldsmith,

979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, Ground 1 should be dismissed for failure

to exhaust.

iii. Ground 2

Petitioner properly presented Ground 2 in his First Rule 32 proceedings. Accordingly,

Ground 2 is properly exhausted and the Court will consider the merits of the claim.

B. Merits

i. Standard of Review

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

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petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “whether the state proceedings satisfied due process.”

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner’s confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state court determinations on state law questions.”); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1158

(9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not

review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on

a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the

judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The provisions of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) govern this case and pose special

burdens. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA,

when reviewing a state criminal conviction, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus

only if a state court proceeding "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established

Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth" in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a

result different from" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A

state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision

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"but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002).

ii. Analysis

When applying the AEDPA and reviewing whether a state court decision is contrary

to federal law, this court must look to the state's last reasoned decision as the basis for its

judgment. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 & n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, this Court

must consider whether the Arizona Court of Appeals’ January 17, 2007 decision involved

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding. 

In Ground 2, Petitioner contends that his sentence violates Blakely because the trial

court considered facts not determined by a jury when enhancing Petitioner’s sentence. The

Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner’s sentence did not violate Blakely

because (1) aggravation of a sentence by a prior felony is “Blakely exempt,” and (2) no

reasonable juror could have failed to find that Petitioner was aided in the crime by an

accomplice. (Answer, Ex. J.) 

The Court of Appeals reasonably applied the appropriate federal law to the facts

before the court. Petitioner admitted to a prior felony conviction during his

sentencing/mitigation hearing. (Answer, Ex. B.) In Blakely, the United States Supreme

Court reaffirmed its holding, first expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000), that “other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” 542 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). Thus, Blakely excludes

prior convictions from its holding that aggravating factors must be found by a jury in order

to be considered during sentencing. 

Petitioner also admitted to an accomplice during his sentencing/mitigation hearing.

(Answer, Ex. B.) Blakely permits a sentence to be aggravated by a fact that is admitted by

the defendant, even if that fact is not determined by a jury. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303

(“Our precedents make clear, however, that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes

is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the

jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”) (emphasis added).

Petitioner’s sentence was also aggravated based on one additional “exceptional”

circumstance: the trial court’s finding that the victims suffered emotional harm. Although

the Court of Appeals did not discuss this finding by the trial court in its decision upholding

Petitioner’s sentence, the trial court’s consideration of the victim’s emotional harm in

aggravating Petitioner’s sentence would not constitute a Blakely violation. The rule

announced in Apprendi and reaffirmed in Blakely applies to fact-finding that increases the

penalty for a crime “beyond the statutory maximum.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. As the

Apprendi Court explained, “nothing in [the history of the right to jury trial] suggests that it

is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion--taking into consideration various factors

relating both to offense and offender--in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed

by statute.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (emphasis added). The Court reinforced this

conclusion two years later in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002). In a

plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court stated that while a jury must find

those facts that establish the outer limits of a sentence, facts that limit a judge's sentencing

discretion within the prescribed statutory range, such as those that compel imposition of a

mandatory minimum sentence, may be found by judges rather than juries. Harris, 536 U.S.

at 567. Thus, “[j]udicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence within the

authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and reasonable-doubt

components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Id. at 558. Justice Kennedy specifically

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noted that precedent permitted judges to make factual findings regarding a victim’s

characteristics, including age and relationship to the defendant. Id. at 567-68. 

In the present case, because Petitioner admitted to a prior felony conviction, his

conviction for attempted armed robbery carried a sentencing range of 4.5 to 13 years. See

A.R.S. § 13-604(B). Petitioner was sentenced to 8.75 years. (Answer, Ex. D.) Thus, to the

extent that the sentencing judge aggravated Petitioner’s sentence based on the harm suffered

by the victims, the application of that aggravating factor was within the sentencing range and

therefore did not violate Blakely. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends denying

the Petition with respect to Ground 2.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-07-2410-PHX-ROS.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 19th day of May, 2008.

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