Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01415/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01415-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PAMELA CHYBA, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC 

aka BAYVIEW and MARILYN 

CORO 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. 14-CV-1415-BEN (BLM) 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING IN PART MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

(2) DENYING MOTION TO 

STRIKE 

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO COMPEL AS MOOT 

[Docket Nos. 50, 51, 53] 

18 Defendants Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC ("Bayview") and Marilyn Coro 

19 filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Strike, which are presently before this 

20 Court. (Docket Nos. 50, 51.) 

21 BACKGROUND 

22 I. Procedural Background 

23 On June 10,2014, Plaintiff Pamela Chyba, proceeding pro se, filed a 

24 Complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair 

25 Credit Reporting Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and the Rosenthal 

26 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (Docket No. 1.) On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff 

27 filed a First Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 25.) On November 12, 2014, 

28 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Strike. (Docket Nos. 27, 28.) 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 1 of 10
1 On March 23,2015, the Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to 

2 state a claim, denied as moot Defendants' motion to strike, and granted Plaintiff 

3 leave to amend. (Docket No. 46.) Plaintiff filed a "Third Amended Complaint" 

4 ("TAC"Y on April 22, 2015, which is the operative complaint in this matter. 

5 (Docket No. 48.) 

6 II. Factual Background2 

7 On October 26,2012, Marilyn Coro, First Vice President of Bayview, 

8 notified Plaintiff that Bayview had become the servicer of her loan on October 16, 

9 2012. (TAC, Ex. 6.) On October 30,2012, Ms. Coro contacted Plaintiff again, 

10 providing more details ofthe loan. (TAC, Ex. 5.) On November 14,2012, Plaintiff 

11 sent her first letter to Defendants disputing the debt's validity. (TAC, Ex. 4.) On 

12 November 20, 2012, Plaintiff sent a "Qualified Written Request" for information 

13 regarding the mortgage loan. (TAC, Ex. 3.) 

14 On October 1,2013, Bayview obtained Plaintiffs credit information, and a 

15 Ms. Killen informed Plaintiff in writing that she was working to bring Plaintiffs 

16 account current. (TAC, Exs. 10, 12.) On November 21,2013, a Mr. Shorts, another 

17 representative of Bayview, informed Plaintiff that her account had been referred to 

18 him. (TAC, Ex. 8.) On December 8, 2013, Plaintiff sent a "third request" for 

19 validation. (TAC, Ex. 2.) On December 20, 2013, Bayview acknowledged receipt 

20 of Plaintiffs dispute. (TAC, Ex. 7.) On January 11,2014, Bayview sent a debt 

21 validation letter to Plaintiff. (TAC, Ex. 9.) The debt validation letter included a 

22 copy of the Note, which indicates the loan was secured by real property located in 

23 Texas. (Jd.) 

24 

25 lAlthough the Second Amended Complaint was stricken from the record the 

Court will refer to the operative amended complaint as the Third Amended Complaint 26 for the sake of consistency and clarity. 

27 2Unless otherwise noted, the following background is drawn from the allegations of Plaintiffs TAC. The Court is not mak:mg any factual findil}gs, but rather only 28 sumpla~izing the relevant facts alleged for purposes of evaluating Defendants' motion 

to dlsmlss. 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 2 of 10
1 On January 26, 2014, Plaintiff expressed her dissatisfaction with the debt 

2 validation letter. (TAC, Ex. 1.) On May 12,2014, Bayview sent a notice of default 

3 to Plaintiff. (TAC, Ex. 11.) Plaintiff alleges the notice of default indicates the loan 

4 went into default on October 1, 2010. (T AC ~~ 22, 24.) Plaintiff also alleges 

5 Bayview called her cell phone ten times between October 2012 and October 2013 

6 by using an automatic telephone dialing system. (TAC ~~ 16, 52.) 

7 LEGAL STANDARDS 

8 I. MOTION TO DISMISS 

9 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a 

10 complaint if, taking all factual allegations as true, the complaint fails to state a 

11 plausible claim for relief on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 

12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate 

13 if the complaint fails to state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that 

14 discovery will reveal evidence of the matter complained of, or if the complaint lacks 

15 a cognizable legal theory under which relief may be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

16 556. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

17 conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

18 II. MOTION TO STRIKE 

19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(t) authorizes a court to strike from a 

20 pleading "an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

21 scandalous matter." "[T]he function of a 12(t) motion to strike is to avoid the 

22 expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by 

23 dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H Robins Co., 697 

24 F.2d 880,885 (9th Cir. 1983). In ruling upon a motion to strike, a court must view 

25 the pleadings in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In re 

26 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 955,965 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Motions 

27 to strike will not be granted unless the "matter to be stricken could have no possible 

28 bearing on the subject matter ofthe litigation." Chan v. Chancelor, No. 09-cv-

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 3 of 10
1 1839,2011 WL 5924281, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011) (quoting Platte Anchor 

2 Bolt, Inc. v. IHL Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 

3 DISCUSSION3 

4 I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 12(b )(2)-(3) 

5 Defendants move to dismiss the TAC for improper venue and lack of 

6 personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(2) and (3). 

7 "[C]ertain defenses under [Rule 12] must be raised at the first available 

8 opportunity, or, if they are not, they are forever waived. Am. Ass 'n a/Naturopathic 

9 Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). Rule 12(g)(2) 

10 provides: "a party that makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not make another 

11 motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party 

12 but omitted from its earlier motion." Rule 12(h)(1 )(A) states that a party waives any 

13 defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) by omitting it from a motion in the circumstances 

14 described in Rule 12(g)(2)." 

15 On November 12, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the First 

16 Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). This Court granted Defendants' 

17 Rule 12 motion, but permitted Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Now 

18 Defendants move to dismiss the operative TAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), (3), and 

19 (6). Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(2) and (3) is improper because the 

20 defenses of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction were available to 

21 Defendants at the time they brought their first Rule 12 motion. Defendants 

22 therefore waived their right to challenge venue and personal jurisdiction in this 

23 case. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for improper venue and lack of 

24 personal jurisdiction is DENIED. 

25 

26 3 As an initial matter, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 

27 Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice. The Court judicially notices the fact that 

Bayview filed Form S-ll with the SEC, and that Standard and Poor's is a nationally 

28 recognized statistical ratin~ organization (RJN, Ex. 4.) The Court declines to take 

judiCIal notice of Bayview s website (RJN, Ex. 1) and Standard and Poor's website 

(RJN, Exs. 2-3). 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 4 of 10
1 II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 12(b)(6) 

2 A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act - Counts One and Two 

3 (1) "Debt Collector" 

4 For Counts One and Two, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claims under 

5 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") fail because Bayview and 

6 Marilyn Coro are not "debt collectors" within the meaning ofthe Act. 

7 Only a "debt collector" attempting to collect a debt can violate the FDCP A. 

8 The FDCP A defines "debt collector" as any "person ... who regularly collects or 

9 attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or ... due another .... " 15 

10 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). That term does not include "any person collecting or attempting 

11 to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed ... to the extent such activity 

12 ... (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such 

13 person .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 692a(6)(F). 

14 In other words, a debt collector is any person who collects debts, but only if 

15 the person is collecting a debt which was in default before the person acquired the 

16 debt. See De Dios v. Int'l Realty & Invs., 641 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011) 

17 (affirming that defendant was not a debt collector because defendant acquired the 

18 debt before the debt went into default). An employee of a corporation is also 

19 subject to the definition of "debt collector." Cruz v. Int'l Collection Corp., 673 F.3d 

20 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2012)( citing Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 

21 (9th Cir. 1994». 

22 Here, Plaintiff alleges the loan went into default on October 1, 2010, two 

23 years before Bayview began servicing the loan. Taking these facts as true, the loan 

24 was in default before Bayview acquired it. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that 

25 Marilyn Coro, as Vice President of Bayview, regularly engages in debt collection. 

26 Plaintifftherefore alleged facts sufficient to support a claim that Bayview and 

27 Marilyn Coro are debt collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA. 

28 Concluding that Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to support her claim that 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 5 of 10
1 Defendants are debt collectors, the Court now considers whether Plaintiff has 

2 sufficiently pleaded that Defendants engaged in acts that violate the FDCP A. 

3 (2) Count One -15 u.s.c. § 1692g 

4 In Count One, Plaintiff contends that Defendants continued their debt 

5 collection efforts even after Plaintiff disputed the debt. 

6 If the consumer disputes the validity ofthe debt within thirty days of 

7 notification, the debt collector must stop debt collection until it sends to the 

8 consumer verification ofthe debt, or the name and address ofthe original creditor. 

9 IS U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 

10 According to Plaintiffs exhibits, Plaintiff requested that Defendants validate 

11 the alleged debt in November 2012 and December 2013. It was not until January 

12 11,2014, that Bayview responded to Plaintiffs request for debt validation by 

13 sending her a copy ofthe Note, which included the name ofthe original creditor, 

14 Ryland Mortgage Company, and an address. After Plaintiff disputed the debt, but 

15 before Bayview sent verification, Bayview obtained Plaintiffs credit report. 

16 Plaintiff also claims she received several phone calls from Bayview in connection 

17 with the debt. In addition, Plaintiff received two separate written correspondences 

18 from Bayview alerting Plaintiff that her account might be referred to an attorney for 

19 legal action. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it appears 

20 that Bayview continued its debt collection efforts after it was notified that the debt 

21 was in dispute, but before it provided validation. 

22 However, Plaintiff alleges no facts that indicate Ms. Coro contacted Plaintiff 

23 after Plaintiff first disputed the debt in November 2012. In fact, Plaintiff alleges 

24 that Ms. Coro last contacted Plaintiff in a letter dated October 30, 2012. As a result, 

25 it appears that Ms. Coro did not attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff in violation 

26 of section 1692g(b). 

27 In conclusion, Plaintiff failed to adequately state a claim for relief under 

28 Count One against Ms. Coro. But, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a claim for 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 6 of 10
1 relief under 15 U.S.c. § 1692g(b) against Bayview. Accordingly, Defendants' 

2 Motion to Dismiss Count One as to Ms. Coro is GRANTED, and their Motion to 

3 Dismiss Count One as to Bayview is DENIED. 

4 (3) Count Two -15 Us.c. § 1692e(4) 

5 In Count Two, Plaintiff claims Defendants used false and deceptive 

6 information by sending her the transfer of service notice (TAC, Ex. 6), the 2012 

7 debt letter (TAC, Ex. 5), and the 2014 debt validation letter (TAC, Ex. 9). 

8 Section 1692e ofthe FDCPA proscribes the use of "any false, deceptive, or 

9 misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 

10 Further, "[w]ithout limiting the general application ofthe foregoing," section 1692e 

11 delineates several subsections describing specific conduct that will constitute a 

12 violation. Section 1692e( 4) specifically prohibits a debt collector from representing 

13 or implying that "nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment 

14 of any person or the seizure ... or sale of any property ... unless such action is 

15 lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action." 

16 Courts must consider an alleged violation of section 1692e according to the 

17 "least sophisticated debtor" standard-that is, whether "the least sophisticated 

18 debtor would likely be misled by a communication." Donohue v. Quick Collect, 

19 Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010). Further, a misleading statement must be 

20 material to be actionable. Id. 

21 The transfer notice states that the previous loan servicer was Bank of 

22 America, N.A. (TAC, Ex. 6.) Plaintiff alleges that the 2012 debt letter refers to a 

23 loan number that is not associated with Plaintiff. (T AC, Ex. 5.) The letter also 

24 includes the following statement: "[t]his is a serious matter, which ifleft 

25 unresolved, may result in damage to your credit rating and the eventual loss of your 

26 home." (Id.) The 2014 debt validation letter attached a Note which displays 

27 Plaintiff's signature and lists Ryland Mortgage Company as the creditor. (TAC, Ex. 

28 9.) Defendant Coro signed the 2012 debt letter and the transfer notice. 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 7 of 10
1 Plaintiff argues that these letters are misleading by reporting a previous loan 

2 servicer (Bank of America) and creditor (Bank of New York Mellon) that Plaintiff 

3 is not familiar with. Plaintiff attests she does not recognize the loan number 

4 referred to, and cannot trust that her original loan was in fact transferred to Bayview 

5 and is the same loan that Bayview acquired. 

6 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of section 

7 1692e( 4). Particularly, Plaintiff did not allege that Bayview made any 

8 representation regarding the consequences of failing to pay the debt that it could not 

9 lawfully make. However, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she does not 

10 recognize the creditor's identity, which the courts have found misleading under 

11 section 1692e. See Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1121 

12 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he identity of a consumer's original creditor is a critical piece 

13 of information, and therefore its false identification in a dunning letter would be 

14 likely to mislead some consumers in a material way."); Isham v. Gurstel, Staloch & 

15 Chargo, P.A., 738 F. Supp. 2d 986, 996 (D. Ariz. 2010) ("To preserve the 

16 protections and policies ofthe FDCP A, it is important to know the proper identity 

17 of the creditor."). As the least sophisticated debtor might be misled by such 

18 information, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count Two. 

19 B. Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act - Count Four 

20 Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated the Rosenthal Act by violating 

21 section 1692j of the FDCPA. 

22 The Rosenthal Act requires debt collectors to comply with the FDCP A. Cal. 

23 Civ. Code § 1788.17. Section 1692j proscribes the creation of a "false belief in a 

24 consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in 

25 the collection of ... a debt ... when in fact such person is not so participating." 

26 Plaintiff points to the same letters relied upon in Count Two to show that 

27 Bayview has attempted to mislead Plaintiff. However, a review of those letters 

28 shows that Bayview did not suggest that any party other than itself was attempting 

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1 to collect the debt. Thus, Plaintifffaiis to state a claim under section 1692j. 

2 On the other hand, as stated above, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged violations of 

3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b) and 1692e. Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately stated a 

4 claim for relief under the Rosenthal Act, as far as it relates to sections 1692g(b) and 

5 1692e of the FDCPA. Defendants' Motion as to Count Four is DENIED. 

6 C. Telephone Consumer Protection Act - Count Three 

7 Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection 

8 Act ("TCP A") by calling her cell phone regarding the loan in dispute. 

9 Under the TCP A, it is unlawful for a person to use an automatic telephone 

10 dialing system to call someone's cell phone. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A). An 

11 "automatic telephone dialing system" refers to "equipment which has the capacity to 

12 store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential 

13 number generator; and to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(I). 

14 Plaintiff contends that Defendants used an automatic dialing system to make 

15 ten calls to her cell phone without her consent. Plaintiff alleges that she did not 

16 provide Bayview with her phone number. And, Plaintiff claims that at the 

17 beginning of each unsolicited call there was an "artificial time delay." These facts 

18 are sufficient to support a claim under the TCP A. However, Plaintiff alleges no 

19 facts to suggest Ms. Coro used an automated system, or attempted to call Plaintiff. 

20 The Court therefore GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss Count Three against Ms. 

21 Coro, but DENIES the Motion to Dismiss Count Three against Bayview. 

22 D. Fair Credit Reporting Act - Count Five 

23 Plaintiff argues Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") 

24 by obtaining her credit report. 

25 The FCRA provides that consumer reporting agencies may disclose a 

26 consumer's credit information to a third party only for a "permissible purpose." 15 

27 U.S.C. § 1681 b. One such permissible purpose is where a debt collector attempts to 

28 collect a debt owed by the consumer. 15 U.S.c. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); Chyba v. Green 

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Case 3:14-cv-01415-BEN-BLM Document 60 Filed 07/23/15 Page 9 of 10
1 Tree Servicing, LLC, 586 F. App'x 397,398 (9th Cir. 2014). 

2 Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were attempting to collect a debt. (TAC ~ 

3 14, Exs. 2, 4.) Thus, by Plaintiffs admission, Defendants had a permissible purpose 

4 to obtain her credit information. The Motion as to Count Five is GRANTED. 

5 III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 

6 Defendants move to strike Plaintiffs affidavit filed in conjunction with her 

7 verified TAC, because they argue it is redundant and improper. Plaintiffs affidavit 

8 is not likely to cause litigation of irrelevant and spurious issues. The Court 

9 therefore DENIES the Motion to Strike. The Court also DENIES as moot the 

10 Motion to Strike Plaintiffs request for judicial notice. 

11 IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 

12 Plaintiff states that Defendants failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

13 Procedure 7.1 and Local Rule 40.2. As a result, she argues that Defendants' 

14 Motions should be denied. Out of an abundance of caution, Bayview filed a 

15 Corporate Disclosure Statement. Plaintiffs Motion is therefore DENIED as moot. 

16 CONCLUSION 

17 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper 

18 venue is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is 

19 GRANTED in part. Counts One and Three against Marilyn Coro are 

20 DISMISSED. Count Five is DISMISSED as to both Defendants. Defendants' 

21 Motion to Strike is DENIED. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED as moot. 

22 Defendants shall file an Answer on or before August 3. 2015. 

23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

24 

25 Dated: JUlyfl-, 2015 

26 

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