Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00285/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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BL

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Patrick L. Racine, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-0285-PHX-DGC (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Patrick L. Racine filed a pro se civil rights action against the Director of the

Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Dora Schriro, Drs. Adams, Schwimmer, and

Stumpf, Captain Carrol, and Deputy Rivas (Doc. #1). Plaintiff failed to serve Schwimmer,

Stumpf, and Rivas. Schriro, Adams, and Carroll moved to dismiss (Doc. #12). The Court

will dismiss Schwimmer, Stumpf, and Rivas due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve them, grant

Schriro, Adams, and Carroll’s Motion to Dismiss, and dismiss without prejudice the instant

action.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that (1) Schriro, Schwimmer, Adams,

and Stumpf violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate mental health

treatment; (2) Carrol and Rivas violated his constitutional rights by denying him due process

and equal protection in a disciplinary hearing; and (3) Defendants intentionally inflicted

emotional damage, in violation of state law (Doc. #1). Defendants were ordered to answer

the Complaint, and Plaintiff successfully served Schriro, Adams and Carrol (Docs. ##5, 7-11,

14). Plaintiff has not served Schwimmer, Stumpf, and Rivas (Docs. ## 7-9). Schriro,

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 Defendants’ remaining arguments need not be addressed.

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Adams, and Carroll (hereinafter referred to as Defendants) moved to dismiss the instant

action (Doc. #12). Defendants argue, inter alia, that (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to Counts I and III; (2) Count II is barred under Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); and (3) Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege an injury under

state law or file a notice of claim (Doc. #12).1

II. Failure to Respond

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(i) provides that if a party files a motion to dismiss,

and this Court orders a response, and “the opposing party does not serve and file the required

answering memoranda . . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the . . . granting

of the motion.” See also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (providing that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily granting defendants’ motion to

dismiss pursuant to local rule where pro se plaintiff had time to respond to the motion but

failed to do so). 

 Plaintiff was provided notice that Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, advised of

his obligation to respond, and informed that the failure to respond may “be deemed a consent

to the granting of that Motion” (Doc. #) Despite these warnings, Plaintiff failed to respond

to Defendants’ motion, which could be construed as a consent to the granting of it. Out of

an abundance of caution, the merits of Defendants’ motion will be addressed.

III. Failure to Serve 

“If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120

days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after

notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiff filed the instant action on February 8, 2007 (Doc. #1). Plaintiff

was notified in the Court’s March 27, 2007 order that the failure to serve the parties within

120 days of the filing of the Complaint or 60 days from the date of that order could result

in the dismissal of the action against all unserved Defendants (Doc. #3). Plaintiff nonetheless

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failed to serve Schwimmer, Stumpf, and Rivas. These defendants will be dismissed without

prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve.

IV. Motion to Dismiss

A. Failure to Exhaust

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to

Count I and III (Doc. #12). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 unless all available administrative remedies are exhausted. See Roles v. Maddox, 439

F.3d 1016, 1017 (9th Cir.), cert denied 127 S.Ct. 232 (2006). In Count III, Plaintiff alleged

that Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional damage, in violation of state law (Doc. #1).

Plaintiff’s claim is premised on a violation of state law, not with respect to prison conditions

under § 1983. Thus, as to Count III, Plaintiff was not required to exhaust his administrative

remedies.

Plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies on claims that his

constitutional rights were violated by a failure to provide him adequate medical care

(Doc. #1). Exhaustion is mandated “regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). It is required in all inmate suits

regarding prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002). To be “properly

exhausted,” the prisoner “must complete the administrative review process in accordance

with the applicable rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal

court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2384 (2006). 

 Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court considers exhaustion as a matter

of abatement in an unenumerated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) motion and “may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20. The Court has

broad discretion as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988). The proper

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remedy when a “prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies . . . is dismissal of the claim

without prejudice.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.

An inmate wishing to grieve an issue regarding his medical diagnosis or treatment

must first submit a complaint to their assigned Correctional Official III (CO III). The CO III

seeks a response from the appropriate medical staff, investigates the grievance, and attempts

to resolve the complaint. The inmate may appeal the CO III’s response to the Institution/Unit

Grievance Coordinator. The Grievance Coordinator forwards the grievance to the Facility

Health Administrator, who investigates and attempts to resolve the issue. The inmate may

seek to appeal the Facility Health Administrator’s decision to the Director, at which time the

grievance is forwarded to the Deputy Director for Inmate Health Services. The Deputy

Director investigates the grievance and prepares a response, which is then forwarded to the

Director for a response. The Director’s response is final (Doc. #12, ex. A). Plaintiff failed

to file any inmate grievance with regard to health issues (id., exs. A-B).

Defendants demonstrated that there existed an inmate grievance system which was

available to Plaintiff. Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he fully exhausted his

administrative remedies with regard to Count I (Doc. #1), but Plaintiff’s act of checking off

boxes on his Complaint is insufficient to overcome Defendants’ affidavit evidence showing

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court will therefore dismiss

Plaintiff’s Count I claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

B. Edwards v. Balisok

Defendants argue that Count II is barred by Edwards v. Balisok (Doc. #12). “[A] state

prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought

(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading

to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would necessarily

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.

74, 81 (2005) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994); and Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)). Plaintiff attached his

disciplinary hearing, which resulted in the loss of five days of earned released credit (Doc.

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#1). Because success in the instant action would necessarily result in a speedier release,

Count II is barred by Edwards.

C. State Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts an Arizona-law emotional distress claim against Defendants. Arizona

law provides, however, that “[a]ny and all causes of action which may arise out of tort caused

by the director, prison officers or employees of the department, within the scope of their legal

duty, shall run only against the state.” A.R. § 31-201.01. Thus, the only proper Defendant

in Plaintiff’s state-law claim is the State of Arizona, which is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Defendants Schwimmer, Stumpf, and Rivas are dismissed without prejudice

due to Plaintiff’s failure to serve them.

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #12) is granted. Plaintiff’s action is

dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall enter a judgment of

dismissal accordingly.

DATED this 21st day of August, 2007.

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