Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01395/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01395-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CYNTHIA LIND,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION;

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action seeking review of a final decision denying

disability benefits for the period February 1, 2003 to October 1, 2003 (the “Relevant Time

Period”). She was granted disability benefits from October 1, 2003 onward.

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge William McCurine for report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. The parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgments and on July 14, 2008, Judge McCurine issued his report and recommendation

(the “R&R”) recommending granting Defendant’s motion and denying Plaintiff’s motion. 

I. Legal Standards

A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision” on a

dispositive matter prepared by a magistrate judge proceeding without the consent of the

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Objections are listed underthree headings:“TheALJ Failed to Establish Plaintiff 1

Could Perform the Full Range of Light Work Activity Prior to October 2003,” (Obj. at

2:1–16:22), “The ALJ’s Finding that Plaintiff Could Perform Her Past Relevant Work Prior

to October 2003 Is Not Based on Substantial Evidence,” (id. at 16:23–17:3), and “The ALJ

Erred in Determining Plaintiff Did Not Suffer From Severe Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

Prior to October 2003." (Id. at 17:4–22:22.) These headings give little guidance as to the

actual objections, however. For example, as part of the third section, Plaintiff objects that

the ALJ erred by not considering her ankle pain to be a disabling impairment. (id.

20:20–21:6, 21:24–22:10.) The actual objections are scattered throughout the different

sections.

- 2 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

parties for all purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “The court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [report and recommendation]

to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Section 636(b)(1) does not require

some lesser review by the district court when no objections are filed. Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). “[T]he court shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)

(en banc) (“The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”)

Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, filed lengthy objections (“Objections”) to

various portions of the R&R, and Defendant filed a reply. Because Plaintiff’s objections are

not clearly organized and do not always include citations showing which evidence she is 1

referring to, a casual reading might suggest Plaintiff was making dozens of different

objections. It appears, however, many of the objections overlap, and Plaintiff is in fact

objecting to only three main recommendations. First, Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s finding

concerning the ALJ’s decision concerning the onset of her disability caused by carpal tunnel

syndrome. Second, she objects to the R&R’s recommendation of harmless error with regard

to the ALJ’s failure to make specific findings showing she was able to work at her former job

during the Relevant Time Period. Third, she objects to the R&R’s rejection of her arguments

that she should have been found disabled because of ankle pain. There are many

subsidiary objections, but they are subsumed within these three broader categories. To the

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

extent Plaintiff may have intended to make other objections, the Court holds she has not

done so clearly.

II. Pleading Issues

The Court notes several problems with the Objections, which are not attributable to

Plaintiff herself and which the Court does not hold against her in reaching its decision, but

which Plaintiff’s counsel should nevertheless take care to correct in future filings. 

First, besides organizational problems, the Objections mistake the role of the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and Judge McCurine. The ALJ and Judge McCurine are

adjudicative officers, not advocates or parties. It is thus inappropriate to refer to their

findings or legal discussion as arguments (see Obj. at 17:12–14) or admissions (id. at

6:–24–7:1), to put the onus on them to establish particular facts (id. at 2:1–3), or to accuse

the Magistrate Judge of misrepresenting the evidence. (Id. at 6:8–11.) The ALJ and

Magistrate Judge could, of course, err, but because their findings and recommendations are

not advocacy, their error do not constitute misrepresentations to the Court. The Court

construes this as awkward attempts to communicate the idea that their decisions were in

error.

Second, the Objections argue that the R&R erred by citing opinions not issued by the

Ninth Circuit. (Obj. at 21:6–9 (arguing two district court opinions “are inapplicable as they

do not represent binding 9 Circuit case law in this Court”).) This is erroneous because the th

Court may consider non-binding opinions as persuasive precedent, consistently with Ninth

Circuit Rule 36-3. Even if it were an accurate statement of law, Plaintiff must do more than

claim adverse precedent is inapplicable; she should show why reliance on it is wrong, or

what the relevant standard is. Otherwise, such a critique is unhelpful and unpersuasive.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s own pleadings have freely cited precedents from other circuits. (See,

e.g., Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at ii–iii (table of cases listing precedents from the 7 , 10 , and th th

D.C. Circuits).)

Third, and perhaps most seriously, the Objections suffer from some misleading

citation to the evidence and editing of quotations. To cite examples, the Objections state

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

“The Magistrate cited Plaintiff’s progress notes on August 3, 2001 also confirmed the

severity of Plaintiff’s bilateral tunnel syndrome.” (Obj. at 7:12–15 (citing R&R at 9:19–21.).)

This phrasing sounds as if the R&R agreed the progress notes confirmed the severity of

Plaintiff’s symptoms. In fact, the R&R says “Plaintiff cites progress notes from August 3,

2001 as confirmation of the severity of Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel symptoms.”

Furthermore, as discussed below, the progress notes are cursory and do not clearly show

the existence of CTS or the severity of Plaintiff’s hand or wrist pain.

Additionally, when arguing that Plaintiff’s ankle pain constituted a severe impairment,

the Objections report a medical consultant as having stated “Based on the record, we can

stipulate to severe MDI [medical determinable impairment], but I would agree that claimant

should be capable of a [less than full] (sic) LIGHT pRFC . . . .” (Obj. at 20:20–21:3.) The

same passage argues the medical consultant “considered Medical Listing 1.02 specifically

referred to a ‘major dysfunction of a weight-bearing joint/lower extremity eg. Ankle.” ((Id. at

21:3–6 (citing AR at 127).) This creates the impression that the medical consultant’s

recommendation agreed to stipulate that Plaintiff’s ankle pain constituted a severe

impairment. While it is true the medical consultant’s report considered the 1.02 listing, the

recommendation omits it. The partially-quoted sentence actually refers to Plaintiff’s carpal

tunnel syndrome and suggests restrictions on use of her hands, not her ankle. The

remainder of the recommendation rejects limitations because of back problems. Use of the

ellipsis to suggest the medical consultant was referring to ankle problems was thus

misleading.

In view of the state of the Objections’ organization this could well be accidental, but

the fact that the editing appears to favor Plaintiff creates the appearance that the

inaccuracies are intended to bolster Plaintiff’s arguments. Plaintiff’s counsel is admonished

to be accurate in citing to the record, pleadings, and authority.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Citing no portion of the AR, Plaintiff says she was under “treatment” for numbness 2

and tingling for 20 years (Obj. at 10:23–26), but in fact the treatment appears to have

consisted of X-rays and several attempts at diagnosis based on her own reports to doctors.

(AR at 154 (report of Dr. Pacelli).) Dr. Doran testified she was under treatment for

musculoskeletal problems for 20 years. (AR at 238.)

- 5 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

III. Discussion

Much of the relevant factual and legal discussion is provided in portions of the R&R

to which Plaintiff has not objected and which the Court therefore adopts. The Court need

not repeat the R&R’s discussion in full here. 

A. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome

 Plaintiff’s medical records show she was injured in 1978 when she struggled with her

former husband and he grabbed her hand. She has reported numbness and tingling since

that time. It is not clear whether the numbness and tingling was constant, or if it was 2

actually carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”), but it was not disabling, because she was gainfully

employed until 1999.

In various portions of the Objections, Plaintiff argues about the meaning of certain

testimony by the medical expert, Dr. Doran. Essentially, she argues he testified she suffered

from disabling symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome indefinitely into the past, but the ALJ

erroneously construed Dr. Doran’s testimony as referring only to disability after October,

2003. (See, e.g., Obj. at 3:8–11, 4:6–10, 17:23–18:7, 21:13–24.)

The ALJ, citing evidence, found Plaintiff’s first complaint of disabling symptoms of

CTS was made February 4, 2004, when she reported renewed numbness and tingling

beginning three or four months previously. (AR at 17.) This appears to be an error, but a

harmless one, because the report this appears to have been based on was dated February

10, 2004 and gave the time of onset as two months previously. (Id. at 163.) At that time,

Plaintiff reported some weakness but no numbness. (Id.) Two other reports were made in

March of 2004, reporting numbness and tingling beginning about six months previously. (AR

at 244–45 (citing AR at 156, 160).) All three reports state Plaintiff reported the tingling was

brought on by activities such as brushing her hair, cooking, or driving. He also found, citing

evidence, that during the Relevant Time Period she could do ordinary tasks necessary to

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff quibbles with the ALJ’s finding that she could do housework during the 3

Relevant Time Period. (Obj. at 18:24–19:3 (citing AR at 235).) Plaintiff’s testimony does not

show she could not do housework during the Relevant Time Period, but rather that she hired

someone to do her housework some time in 2004 and before that, her son and his fiancee

did it until they moved out of state. (AR at 235.) She did not say when her son and his

fiancee began doing housework. The ALJ’s interpretation of her testimony is reasonable in

light of her previous testimony that her husband hired people to do work she could no longer

do (id. at 234–235), the question her testimony was responding to (“When did you stop

[doing housework]?”), and Plaintiff’s own reports of her other activities during and even after

the Relevant Time Period.

- 6 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

care for herself, such as gardening, shopping, housework, and driving. (Id. at 19.) This was 3

the subject of Dr. Doran’s testimony. (Id. at 240.)

The ALJ, citing evidence, found Plaintiff was disabled as a result of bilateral CTS

beginning October 1, 2003. (AR at 18.) It is reasonable to date the onset of disability at

least this far back because Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling tingling and numbness that

eventually led to the diagnosis of CTS date back no more than six months before March,

2004. Plaintiff’s arguments notwithstanding, the cited evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

Although Plaintiff had reported numbness, tingling, or pain after being injured in 1978 and

these complaints are memorialized in medical reports, these symptoms are not by

themselves a disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (requiring a claimant to demonstrate

inability to engage in substantial gainful activity), nor are they the same as CTS.

Furthermore, the ALJ took note of Plaintiff’s evidence but on the basis of cited evidence

found it did not support a finding of disability during the Relevant Time Period. (AR at 18–19,

21.) As the ALJ noted, no physician ever opined Plaintiff was disabled during the Relevant

Time Period. (Id. at 19.) 

Plaintiff’s reading of Dr. Doran’s testimony as stating she was disabled during the

Relevant Time period is not reasonable. Dr. Doran referred to records well after the

Relevant Time Period to support his assessment. (AR at 238–242; see especially id. at 240

(identifying medical records showing Plaintiff’s disabling symptoms of CTS began at the end

of the Relevant Time Period).) Dr. Doran mentioned medical reports from 2001 (id. at

246–47), but these mentioned no tingling, pain, or numbness. (AR at 185–86.) There is no

indication Dr. Doran was testifying about Plaintiff’s limitations before October 1, 2003.

Based on the ALJ’s citation of evidence, it appears he relied on medical records showing the

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 A record of Plaintiff’s physical on April 2, 2003 reports no joint pain or stiffness (AR 4

at 172) and notes no problems with Plaintiff’s extremities (other than heel fissures) or

musculoskeletal system. (Id. at 173.)

- 7 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

absence of CTS-related disability, and testimony regarding the onset of disabling symptoms

to find Plaintiff was not disabled due to CTS during the Relevant Time Period. Most of

Plaintiff’s arguments thus rely on an unreasonable blurring of the timeline. Reference to the

entire transcript and to the records Dr. Doran cited, however, sufficiently shows the ALJ

correctly interpreted the evidence.

Plaintiff points to a few portions of the record during and before the Relevant Time

Period that she believes support her claim. She points out the ALJ mentioned a progress

note from March 12, 2003 indicated Tinel’s sign was positive on her left wrist only (AR at 17)

and from this argues there was evidence she was disabled at that time. (Obj. at 12:9–12.)

The year cited appears to be a typographical error, however, because the examination took

place on March 12, 2004, not 2003. (AR at 160.) This error is harmless, both because it 4

favors Plaintiff and because the ALJ’s decision was unaffected by it. Plaintiff argues

progress notes dated June 29, 2001 showed she was suffering pain in her hands. (Obj. at

7:8–11; see also AR at 191–92 (medical report).) This report, however, reports Plaintiff was

previously told she did not have CTS (AR at 191), and the treating physician suspected

arthritis or bony spurs, not CTS. (Id. at 192.) Plaintiff also contends a medical report of

August 3, 2001 confirmed she was suffering from bilateral CTS. (Obj. at 7:2–15, 9:1–6.)

This is not accurate. While an ambiguous note mentions “L - CTA Bilat.,” neither the

complaints nor any other section clearly mention anything about CTS or wrist or hand pain.

(AR at 189). Plaintiff cites no evidence to show that “L - CTA” refers to a diagnosis of CTS

or disability. The pain assessment of 7 out of 10 (Obj. at 7:8–12; see also AR at 190) does

not refer to any particular symptom, though the most reasonable interpretation appears to

be that it refers to the chronic neck and back pain she complained of on that day, rather than

the wrist pains he had complained of just over a month previously. (Id. at 189 (reporting

neck and back pain on August 3), 191 (reporting wrist pain on June 29).)

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

The ALJ did consider Plaintiff’s evidence, but found it did not adequately support her

position. The ALJ correctly noted an absence of objective evidence in the record showing

Plaintiff suffered from CTS or was disabled during or before the Relevant Time Period, and

went on to find Plaintiff’s allegations of pain, symptoms, and limitations for this period were

“in excess of the objective medical findings.” (AR at 18.) The ALJ went on to cite specific

evidence showing why he found her allegations of disability during the Relevant Time Period

were not credible. (Id. at 18–19.)

Because the ALJ’s findings were based on substantial evidence and the ALJ did not

neglect to consider Plaintiff’s evidence, and for other reasons discussed in the R&R, this

group of objections is OVERRULED.

B. Functional Analysis

This group of objections deals with step 4 of the sequential evaluation process set

forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 2 evaluates the severity of impairments, while

step 4 determines whether impairments prevent the claimant from performing past relevant

work. If the claimant is able to perform past relevant work, she is not disabled.

Plaintiff argues the only evidence showed she was incapable of lifting 10 pounds

frequently and thus could not perform light work during the Relevant Time Period. (Obj. at

2:8–3:4, 6:1–11; Pl.’s MSJ at 8:15–18.) She claims the ALJ’s determination of her residual

functioning capacity (“RFC”) did not include accurate information from the testimony of a

medical expert. (Pl.’s MSJ at 8:15–18 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)).) She also argues

Social Security Ruling 96-8p required the ALJ to formulate his decision so as to include a

function-by-function analysis, rather than expressing his determination as an exertional

category (“light,” “sedentary,” etc.) (Obj. at 13:4–16:7; Pl.’s MSJ at 9:5–11.) She also

argues the ALJ’s decision she could perform past relevant work was not based on

substantial evidence. (Obj. at 16:23–17:3.)

The R&R agreed the ALJ erred when he based his decision on Plaintiff’s ability to

work at several of her past jobs, but concluded because she could work at one of them —

customer service clerk — the error was harmless. (R&R at 13:20–17:4.) The Court agrees

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

it was harmless, because Step 4 analysis examines whether an impairment prevents a

claimant from performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (e), 416.920 (e).

Plaintiff’s 14-year job as a customer service representative, by itself, would satisfy this.

Thus, although the ALJ mentioned other jobs that did not qualify as “past relevant work,” a

finding that she could work as a customer service representative would be sufficient. Plaintiff

objected extensively (Obj. at 10:27–14:13) to portions of the R&R that agree with her

position, but these objections are moot. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to make proper findings supporting his conclusion she

could work at her former job as a customer service representative. Plaintiff worked at this

job for over 14 years, from June of 1985 until October of 1999. (AR at 66.) The only fact

at issue is whether the ALJ correctly found Plaintiff’s limitations did not prevent her from

working as a customer service representative. (See AR at 16, 19, 21.)

Plaintiff contends the ALJ merely expressed her limitations as an exertional category,

rather than conducting a function by function analysis, which she says is required. (Pl.’s

MSJ at 9:5–11 (citing SSR 96-8p); Obj. at 13:4–14:4.) An explicit function-by-function

assessment is not required. See Shaw v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 2008 WL 1734761,

slip op. at *5 (N.D.Cal., April 14, 2008) (citing cases). Here, the Dr. Doran testified that the

function-by-function assessment conducted by Dr. Brodsky, noting Plaintiff’s medical history,

represented a composite of all the evidence. (AR at 242 (citing AR at 118–127 (RFC

assessment)).) This assessment concluded only manual manipulation limitations and no

others were appropriate and stipulated that Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently. (Id. at 119, 127.) The ALJ considered the evidence in the record and

agreed with Dr. Doran and Dr. Brodsky on this point, finding that during the Relevant Time

Period, Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. (AR at 18.)

Plaintiff’s argument that there is no way to know what the ALJ thought her limitations were.

This argument fails because, as noted, the only limitations in the evidence pertained to

manual manipulation, which corresponds with the ALJ’s findings. (Id.)

/ / /

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

The ALJ therefore properly found Plaintiff could do light work during the Relevant

Time Period. (Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).) Dr. Doran’s testimony regarding Dr.

Pacelli’s RFC assessment supported the ALJ’s finding of more restrictive limitations after the

Relevant Time Period. (AR at 243, 18, 197–206; see R&R at 10:15–11:8 and n.10.)

Because the ALJ relied on function-by-function RFC assessments by doctors and on

appropriate evidence, and these support his finding Plaintiff could perform light work during

the Relevant Time Period, the ALJ was not required to repeat the function-by-function

analysis.

The ALJ questioned the vocational expert about Plaintiff’s ability to do light work,

including her work as a customer service representative. (AR 248–49.) The ALJ laid out

Plaintiff’s limitations during the Relevant Time Period, and the vocational expert agreed

Plaintiff could perform this work. (Id. at AR 249.) The ALJ relied on this to find Plaintiff could

perform her past work as a customer service representative. (Id. at 19.) For reasons

explained in the R&R at 15 n.17, the ALJ’s failure to inquire about possible conflicts with the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles does not require remand. See also Massachi v. Astrue, 486

F.3d 1149, 1153–54 and n.19 (procedural error in failing to ask vocational expert whether

her testimony conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and, if so, whether there

was a reasonable explanation for the conflict would be harmless where the vocational expert

provided sufficient support for her conclusion so as to justify any potential conflicts). The

Court also notes Plaintiff herself stated her work as a customer service representative never

involved lifting more than 10 pounds. (AR at 67.) 

For these reasons, as well as reasons explained more fully in the R&R, the Court

therefore OVERRULES this group of objections.

C. Ankle Pain

Plaintiff objects that she was impaired by ankle pain during the Relevant Time Period,

and she faults the ALJ for failing to address this properly. (Obj. at 20:20–21:6, 21:24–22:10.)

The ALJ, however, did note that she was alleging ankle pain as well as several other

symptoms (AR at 16), but found on the basis of cited evidence none of her ailments or

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 07CV1395-LAB (WMc)

symptoms were disabling during the Relevant Time Period. (Id. at 17–19.) It is clear he was

considering the various impairments Plaintiff alleged, and not merely CTS. (Id. at 19

(“[D]uring the relevant period, the objective evidence of record does not reflect the existence

of an impairment or combination of impairments which would have produced the crippling

symptoms and limitations alleged by the claimant.”))

Furthermore, the evidence Plaintiff cites does not support her position. As discussed

in section II supra, Plaintiff has mischaracterized Dr. Brodsky’s RFC as stating her ankle pain

was a limitation. In fact, Dr. Brodsky concluded Plaintiff had a sensation of ankle pain or

instability, but her ankle was not in fact unstable. (AR at 127.) He considered but rejected

the possibility that the condition of her ankle was disabling, and concluded her only

limitations were manual. (Id.) The ALJ, relying on Dr. Doran’s characterization of Dr.

Brodsky’s RFC, found Plaintiff was unrestricted during the Relevant Time Period except with

regard to the amount of weight she could lift. (Id. at 18 (citing Exhibits 2F and 3F).) 

This group of objections is therefore OVERRULED.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R are OVERRULED. The Court

ADOPTS the R&R with the additional explanation included in this order. Plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment is DENIED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED. The relief Plaintiff has requested in her Complaint is DENIED and Plaintiff’s

complaint is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 24, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-01395-LAB-WMC Document 22 Filed 09/24/08 Page 11 of 11