Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00483/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00483-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GUILLERMO SOLIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF VALLEJO; VALLEJO POLICE 

CHIEF JOSEPH KREINS, individually 

and in his official capacity; VALLEJO 

POLICE OFFICER JOSH CAITHAM, 

individually; COUNTY OF SOLANO; 

SOLANO COUNTY SHERIFF THOMAS 

A. FERRARA, individually and in his 

official capacity; and DOES 1 through 20, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-00483-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on the motion by the County of Solano (“County”) 

and Solano County Sherriff Thomas A. Ferrara (“Sheriff Ferrara”) (collectively, for purposes of 

this motion, “defendants”) to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF 6.) Plaintiff Guillermo Solis (“Mr. Solis” or “plaintiff”) 

opposes the motion. (Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF 7.) The court held a hearing on the matter on April 25, 

2014, at which Nicholas Casper appeared for plaintiff and Martha Thomas appeared for 

defendants. As explained below, the court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part defendants’ 

motion. 

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I. ALLEGED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The claims in this case arise out of an alleged “joint operation involving a 

probation check” of one Alejandro Guizar (“Mr. Guizar”) conducted by the Vallejo Police 

Department (“VPD”) and the Solano County Sheriff’s Department. (Compl. ¶¶ 17–18, ECF 1.) 

Mr. Solis is a 55-year-old man living in the City of Vallejo, California. (Id. ¶ 5. ) Mr. Solis 

resided in a “large [subdivided] home,” where Mr. Guizar rented “a unit in the rear of the 

property.” (Id. ¶ 17.) “Mr. Guizar’s unit was accessible only by walking to the rear of the 

property, up a flight of stairs, and through a separate front door . . . . [It] was not accessible 

through the front entrance of the home, where [Mr. Solis] resided with his family.” (Id.) 

On March 12, 2013, at approximately 3:15 p.m., in conducting a probation check 

on Mr. Guizar, VPD officers and Solano County Sheriff deputies entered Mr. Solis’s home by 

breaking “down [Mr. Solis’s] front door with a battering ram.” (Id. ¶ 20.) They “entered 

[p]laintiff’s home with guns drawn, pointing weapons at [p]laintiff’s family members and 

handcuffing several of the male residents.” (Id. ¶ 21.) At the time when the officers and deputies 

entered plaintiff’s home, plaintiff “was sleeping in his bedroom, adjacent to the front door.” (Id.

¶ 22.) The officers and deputies “barged through [p]laintiff’s bedroom door while pointing guns 

at [p]laintiff, grabbed [p]laintiff from his bed, and carried him in his underwear into the living 

room.” (Id. ¶ 23.) The officers and deputies “slammed [p]laintiff to the living room floor, 

causing [p]laintiff to strike his head on the hardwood floor.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Then, they handcuffed 

plaintiff and placed him “in a chair in the living room, along with other members of the 

household[, where he] remained in his underwear throughout the incident.” (Id.) 

Subsequently, the officers and deputies “confirmed that the probationer, 

Mr. Guizar, neither lived in the main home, nor was present in his unit in the rear of the 

property.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff avers because “there had been prior probation checks of 

Mr. Guizar while he resided [in the rear unit,] . . . the VPD officers and the Sherriff Deputies . . . 

knew or should have known that Mr. Guizar resided in a rear unit of the property with a separate 

entrance to the main home.” (Id. ¶ 19.) 

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“As a result of the head injury that [plaintiff] sustained, . . . he began going into 

visible medical distress.” (Id. ¶ 26.) However, the officers and deputies “were dismissive of 

plaintiff’s clear medical distress, mocking him and accusing him of faking symptoms.” (Id. ¶ 27.) 

“Eventually, an ambulance was called . . . [and plaintiff] was transported to Kaiser Vallejo, and 

then to Kaiser North Valley Sacramento, where he was diagnosed with head trauma.” (Id. ¶ 28.) 

Plaintiff remained there “for over a week, where he was treated for a significant brain injury.” 

(Id. ¶ 29.) 

On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Vallejo, 

Vallejo Police Chief Joseph Kreins, Vallejo Police Officer Josh Caitham, the County, and Solano 

County Sheriff Ferrara. (ECF 1.1) The complaint alleges ten claims: (1) violation of the Fourth 

Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual defendants, including Officer Caitham; 

(2) supervisory liability under § 1983 against Chief Kreins and Sheriff Ferrara; (3) municipal 

liability under § 1983 against the City of Vallejo, Chief Kreins, Sheriff Ferrara, and the County; 

(4) assault against all defendants; (5) battery against all defendants; (6) false arrest and illegal 

imprisonment against all defendants; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all 

defendants; (8) negligence against all defendants; (9) trespass against all defendants; and 

(10) violation of sections 52 and 52.1 of the California Civil Code. (Id.) 

Defendants, the County and Sheriff Ferrara, now move to dismiss plaintiff’s 

complaint. (ECF 6.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. (ECF 7.) Defendants have replied. (ECF 8.) 

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 The complaint also identifies Doe defendants. The Ninth Circuit provides that 

“‘[plaintiffs] should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify [] unknown 

defendants’” “in circumstances . . . ‘where the identity of the alleged defendant[] [is] not [] 

known prior to the filing of a complaint.’” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 

1999) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)) (modifications in the 

original). Plaintiff is warned, however, that such defendants will be dismissed where “‘it is clear 

that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other 

grounds.’” Id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). Plaintiff is further warned that Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 4(m), which states that the court must dismiss defendants who have not been 

served within 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless plaintiff shows good cause, is 

applicable to doe defendants. See Glass v. Fields, No. 1:09-cv-00098-OWW-SMS PC, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Hard Drive Prods. v. Does, No. C 11-01567 LB, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011). 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may dismiss 

“based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to dismiss this short 

and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something more than “an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay 

between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. 

See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court “must presume all factual 

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule 

does not apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, “allegations that contradict 

matters properly subject to judicial notice,” or material attached to or incorporated by reference 

into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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III. BRIEF SUMMARY OF § 1983 PRINCIPLES 

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Congress enacted § 1983 under its power provided in section 5 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to pass “appropriate legislation” enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Crumpton v. 

Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Section 1983 does not serve as an independent 

source of substantive rights, rather it provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). The Ninth Circuit has described 

the requirements of a § 1983 claim as: “(1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or 

created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under 

color of state law.” Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420. “[Section] 1983 . . . contains no state-of-mind 

requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional 

right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1986). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiff’s entire complaint because it “has [not] been 

sufficiently pled.” (ECF 6 at 2.) Plaintiff argues the complaint alleges sufficient facts to survive 

a motion to dismiss. (ECF 7 at 2–3.) The court addresses plaintiff’s claims in turn. 

A. First Claim: Violation of the Fourth Amendment 

In essence, defendants argue because Sheriff Ferrara did not personally participate 

in the acts giving rise to this complaint, he cannot be directly liable. (ECF 6 at 2–3.) 

At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel clarified that plaintiff’s first claim is alleged 

against the individual officers only and not against Sheriff Ferrara. 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS with prejudice defendants’ motion as to 

plaintiff’s first claim as alleged against Sheriff Ferrara. 

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B. Second Claim: Supervisory Liability 

Defendants argue plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for 

supervisory liability because (1) Sheriff Ferrara is “rather obliquely accused of failure to train, but 

there are no specifics pled as to his personal participation in this supposed failure”; (2) “plaintiff 

has not alleged that the sheriff . . . knew of the violations before they occurred and failed to 

prevent them” (ECF 6 at 3); and (3) there are no factual allegations showing “a causal link 

between [Sheriff Ferrara] and the claimed constitutional violation” (id. at 4). 

Plaintiff responds that his allegations show Sheriff Ferrara “exhibit[ed] a 

deliberate indifference to [p]laintiff’s constitutional rights by failing to train his deputies which 

directly and proximately caused [p]laintiff’s harm.” (ECF 7 at 5.) 

“[S]upervisory officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory 

of vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 

2001). But supervisors can be held liable in individual capacity for: “1) their own culpable action 

or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates; 2) their acquiescence in the 

constitutional deprivation of which a complaint is made; or 3) for conduct that showed a reckless 

or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th 

Cir. 2000); see Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). 

“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government 

official for actions [the official] takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 165 (1985). Liability in such cases can be established by showing that the official caused the 

alleged constitutional injury. See id. at 166. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has found 

“supervisorial liability under § 1983 where the supervisor ‘was personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s 

unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 599 F.3d 

946, 961 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Here, the court finds plaintiff’s complaint contains sufficient underlying facts “to 

give fair notice and to enable [Sheriff Ferrara] to defend [himself] effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 

652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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Specifically, plaintiff alleges the Sheriff’s deputies, despite their knowledge “that 

Mr. Guizar resided in a rear unit of the property with a separate entrance to the main home,” 

“broke down [p]laintiff’s front door with a battering ram,” “pointed guns at [p]laintiff’s family 

members,” “barged through [p]laintiff’s bedroom door . . . and carried him . . . into the living 

room,” “slammed [p]laintiff to the living room floor, causing [him] to strike his head on the 

hardwood floor,” and mocked plaintiff, “accusing him of faking his symptoms [of medical 

distress.]” (ECF 1 ¶¶ 19–24; 26–27.) The Sheriff’s failure to train, plaintiff alleges, “proximately 

caused the alleged unconstitutional actions of the Sheriff’s Deputies.” (Id. ¶ 43.) The allegations 

“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief” under failure to train theory of a supervisory liability 

claim. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. 

Accordingly, the court DENIES defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s second 

claim against Sheriff Ferrara. 

C. Third Claim: Municipal Liability against the County and Sheriff Ferrara 

As an initial matter, the court dismisses plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Ferrara as 

a municipal officer with prejudice because plaintiff sues Sheriff Ferrara in his official capacity 

along with the County. See Howard v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 13-03626, 2014 WL 824218, at 

*12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (“[I]f individuals are being sued in their official capacity as 

municipal officials and the municipal entity itself is also being sued, then the claims against the 

individuals are duplicative and should be dismissed.” (emphasis in original; internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s 

municipal liability claim against Sheriff Ferrara in his official capacity, without leave to amend. 

As to plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against the County, defendants argue 

plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to show the County “had a policy, practice and custom of 

violating the Fourth Amendment . . . .” (ECF 6 at 4.) 

Plaintiff responds that his “allegations clearly state the specific policies of 

[d]efendants . . . which were the legal cause of [p]laintiff’s injuries.” (ECF 7 at 6.) 

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In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipal entity may be held liable under § 1983 where its 

municipal policy or custom causes an injury. However, as in supervisory liability claims, and as 

the Court has clarified recently, a local governmental unit may not be held responsible for the acts 

of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Connick v. Thompson, __ 

U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). Hence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged 

constitutional deprivation was the product of a policy or custom of the local governmental entity 

itself. See id.

Specifically, to establish municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff must prove 

“(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the 

municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, 

the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically 

have the force of law.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. A policy of inaction may also meet the 

municipal policy requirement. See Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th 

Cir. 2010). In the absence of an explicit policy, a plaintiff may also show municipal liability by 

demonstrating a permanent practice by the municipality that gave rise to the alleged constitutional 

violation. See Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1232–33 (9th Cir. 2011). 

However, allegations of single instances of unlawful acts are insufficient to show a municipal 

custom. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714–15 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by establishing that the 

constitutional violation was caused by a failure to train employees sufficiently. See Price v. Sery, 

513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008). That showing depends on the following three elements: 

(1) “the existing training program” must be inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular 

officers must perform”; (2) the officials must have been deliberately indifferent “to the rights of 

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persons with whom the police come into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “must be 

shown to have ‘actually caused’ the deprivation of the alleged constitutional right.” Merritt v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

“Failure to train may amount to a policy of ‘deliberate indifference,’ if the need to 

train was obvious and the failure to do so made a violation of constitutional rights likely.” 

Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. “Similarly, a failure to supervise that is ‘sufficiently inadequate’ 

may amount to ‘deliberate indifference.’” Id. However, “[m]ere negligence in training or 

supervision, . . . does not give rise to a Monell claim.” Id.

“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a 

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. 

at 1360 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A pattern of similar constitutional 

violations by untrained employees is “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate 

indifference for purposes of failure to train” Id. “Without notice that a course of training is 

deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a 

training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id. Whether the plaintiff has 

succeeded in demonstrating such deliberate indifference is generally a question for the jury. See 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 682 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) 

Here, the court finds plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for 

municipal liability and survive a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that “it was the policy, 

practice and custom of . . . [the County] . . . to violate the Fourth Amendment.” (ECF 1 ¶ 46.) 

“Those violations which constituted the policy . . . included, but were not limited to, entering 

private residences without a warrant and without exigent circumstances; pointing firearms at 

residents, in their own home, and who were cooperating with officer commands; detaining 

residents without the requisite cause; and using unreasonable, unjustified, and/or excessive 

force.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges those policies “were the moving forces behind the violation 

of [p]laintiff’s rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.” (Id. ¶ 47.) These allegations give fair 

notice to enable the County to defend itself effectively. 

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Accordingly, the court DENIES defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s 

municipal liability claim. 

D. State Law Claims 

As to plaintiff’s state law claims, defendants argue “[t]he only specific individual 

defendant, other than the generalized ‘DOES,’ is the sheriff and he is not alleged to have had any 

personal involvement in the state claims.” (ECF 6 at 5.) Accordingly, defendants conclude that 

because “[a]s a public official, the sheriff cannot be liable for injury caused by the act or omission 

of another,” plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed. (Id.) 

Plaintiff responds “Sheriff . . . Ferrara is liable pursuant to California Government 

Code [section] 820(a), which renders a public employee liable for injury caused by his or her act 

or omission to the same extent as a private person.” (ECF 7 at 7.) At the hearing, plaintiff’s 

counsel agreed to amend the Complaint, to the extent possible, to allege Sheriff Ferrara’s personal 

participation such that liability will attach under the state law claims. 

Under California Government Code section 820.8, “a public employee is not liable 

for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person.” 

Here, plaintiff alleges the following state law claims against all defendants, 

including Sheriff Ferrara: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) false arrest and illegal imprisonment; 

(4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligence; (6) trespass; and (7) California 

Civil Code sections 52 and 52.1. (ECF 1.) 

The state law claims alleged by plaintiff require Sheriff Ferrara’s individual 

participation for liability to attach. Because the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations 

showing Sheriff Ferrara’s individual acts that could give rise to plaintiff’s state law claims, and 

because Sheriff Ferrara, as a public official, cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of 

others, the court GRANTS defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims as alleged 

against Sheriff Ferrara, with leave to amend if plaintiff can do so consonant with Rule 11. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s first claim, violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, as alleged against Sheriff Ferrara is GRANTED with prejudice. 

2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s second claim, supervisory liability, 

is DENIED. 

3. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s third claim, municipal liability, as 

alleged against Sheriff Ferrara in his official capacity is GRANTED with 

prejudice. 

4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s third claim, municipal liability, as 

alleged against the County is DENIED. 

5. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims as alleged against 

Sheriff Ferrara is GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

6. Plaintiff shall have 21 days from the date of this order to amend the Complaint. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 17, 2014. 

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