Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02244/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02244-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK KENNETH BENSON,

Petitioner,

vs.

D. K. SISTO, Warden, California State

Prison, Solano,

Respondent.

No. 2:07-cv-02244-JKS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Frank Kenneth Benson, a state prisoner appearing pro se, has filed a Petition

for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Benson is currently in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections, incarcerated at the California State Prison, Solano. 

Respondent has answered and Benson has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In January 1984 Benson was convicted in the Alameda County Superior Court on a nolo

contendere plea of Murder in the Second Degree (Cal. Penal Code, § 187). The Alameda County

Superior Court sentenced Benson to an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life. Benson

does not challenge his conviction or sentence in this proceeding.

In June 2006 Benson appeared at a parole-suitability hearing before the California Board

of Parole Hearings. Benson appeared before the Board at the outset of the hearing to protest the

institution’s requirement that he be physically restrained during the hearing. When his request

that he be permitted to appear unrestrained was denied, Benson voluntarily left the hearing room. 

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 1 of 27
Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1

2008).

Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 2

2

The Board, proceeding in absentia, found Benson unsuitable for parole. Benson timely sought

habeas corpus relief in the Alameda County Superior Court, which denied relief in an unreported,

reasoned decision. Benson’s subsequent petition for habeas corpus relief filed in the California

Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, was summarily denied without opinion or citation to

authority, by a divided vote in an unreported decision. A divided California Supreme Court

summarily denied review without opinion or citation to authority on July 18, 2007. Benson

timely filed his Petition in this Court on October 17, 2007.

On April 5, 2010, this Court stayed further action in this case pending the issuance of the

mandate by the en banc panel of United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in

Hayward. The Court of Appeals has rendered its decision in Hayward; therefore, this Court 1 2

now terminates its stay and decides the case.

As recited by the dissent in the California Court of Appeal, the facts of the underlying

commitment offense are:

In December 1981, Benson strangled his wife and in December 1983 pled

nolo contendere to second degree murder, receiving a sentence of 15 years to life

imprisonment. To date he has served more than 21 years in prison and has been

denied parole on nine consecutive occasions.

The circumstances of the crime were acknowledged by Benson at the

commencement of his most recent parole hearing: “This was Benson’s second

marriage and he had a son Eric who was [11] years old at the time of the crime.

Eric lived with his mother and stepfather. . . . Mrs. Benson suffered from

psychomotor epilepsy and had several incidents of memory loss, rage, and

inexplicable behavior prior to December 1981. An investigation concluded that

the Bensons used marijuana and hashish frequently and had a history of substance

abuse. The Bensons’ marriage was stormy and there were frequent separations.

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 2 of 27
 Docket 10-3, pp. 79-80. 3

See Rules—Section 2254 Cases, Rule 5(b). 4

3

Mrs. Benson’s children had been taken from her by the courts and she felt that if

she could not have her children . . . Benson should not be able to have his son

Eric. Mrs. Benson was openly jealous of Eric and referred to him as the little

creep or a queer. . . . [On the day in question] Benson met his wife for drinks.

They smoked some marijuana on the way to dinner and had a few more drinks

with dinner. They smoked some more marijuana on the way home after dinner.

After dinner they went back to the apartment, played dominos, watched television,

and smoked marijuana. At approximately midnight Mrs. Benson became aware

that Eric was in the apartment and she became enraged. An argument ensued and

kept escalating until . . . Benson told her to shut up and slapped her. . . . Benson

then grabbed her around the neck and told her to shut the fuck up. He continued

strangling for about five minutes. He believed he had killed her and he checked

her pulse finding no signs of life.” He later tied a large brick to her body, which

he drove to the San Mateo Bridge, where he dumped her weighted body into the

bay. He filed a missing person report but confessed when his story unraveled.

During his most recent psychological assessment he reiterated, as he has many

times previously: “on the night of the offense . . . his wife [went] into a lengthy

verbal rage directed toward him and his son. When she began hitting and spitting

on his son he says he lost control and began strangling her to try to keep her quiet.

When she slumped to the floor he realized she was dead. . . .”3

II. GROUNDS RAISED/DEFENSES

Benson raises two grounds for relief: (1) the decision of the Board was unsupported by

sufficient reliable evidence; and (2) the Board violated California law and denied him a fair and

unbiased hearing. Respondent raises no affirmative defense.4

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court renders its decision or “was based

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 3 of 27
 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-06 (2000); see also

5

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-75 (2003) (explaining this standard). 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 6

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). 7

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (alterations by the Court); see Wright v. Van 8

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 127 (2008) (per curiam); Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 678-

79 (9th Cir. 2009); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 753-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the

difference between principles enunciated by the Supreme Court that are directly applicable to the

case and principles that must be modified in order to be applied to the case; the former are clearly

established precedent for purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the latter are not).

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations 9

omitted).

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). 10

4

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly established Federal law” in § 5

2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time

of the relevant state-court decision.” The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the 6

states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory

power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court 7

regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, “it cannot be said that the state court

‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’” When a claim falls under the 8

“unreasonable application” prong, a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent must

be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous. The Supreme Court has made clear 9

that the objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply

believing that the state court determination was incorrect. “[A]bsent a specific constitutional 10

violation, federal habeas corpus review of [state criminal proceedings] is limited to whether the

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 4 of 27
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 11

U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). 

Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007) (adopting the standard set forth in Brecht v.

12

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)).

Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002); see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 13

U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (per curiam) (stating that a federal court cannot grant “habeas relief on the basis

of little more than speculation with slight support”).

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 14

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 15

Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004). 16

 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 17

See id. at 15. 18

5

error ‘so infected the [proceedings] with unfairness as to make the [result] a denial of due

process.’” In a federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the 11

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial is whether the error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome. Because state court

12

judgments of conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality, Benson has the

burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he merits habeas relief.

13

In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state

court. Under AEDPA, the state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the 14

petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. This presumption applies 15

to state trial courts and appellate courts alike.16

IV. DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that Benson does not have a sufficient liberty interest in parole to

support federal habeas corpus relief and, in any event, his due process rights were satisfied. 

17 18

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 5 of 27
Hayward, 603 F.3d at 561-62; Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2010) (per 19

curiam).

6

These two contentions are foreclosed by the en banc decision in Hayward. Hayward made clear

that California law provides the predicate for application of the “some evidence” rule in a federal

habeas proceeding, thus disposing of Respondent’s contentions. 19

Ground 1: Insufficiency of the Evidence.

Benson argues that the decision of the Board to deny him parole was primarily based

upon the nature of the 25-year-old commitment offense and the determination that he would pose

an unreasonable danger to the public was unsupported by reliable evidence. The Board gave the

following explanation for denying Benson parole:

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER FARMER: All right, we’ve returned for a

decision in the matter of Frank Benson, C-80247. The Panel has reviewed all

information available to it at the Hearing contained in Mr. Benson’s File

(indiscernible), the letters that were submitted and the absence of Mr. Benson and

lack of information (indiscernible). We considered all of the above and we rely

upon the following circumstances in concluding that the Mr. Benson remains

unsuitable for parole and would continue to pose an unreasonable risk of danger

to society and a threat to public safety if released. That decision is based initially

on the commitment offense, which was carried out in a specially cruel and callous

manner, that during the course of that, the victim was abused, defiled and

mutilated and (indiscernible) of course, the offense was carried out in a manner

demonstrating an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. The

motive for the crime was either unexplicable in that we really don’t know exactly

what was going on or was the product of extreme rage over the inmate’s son and

was obviously trivial in relation to the resulting death. And these conclusions are

drawn from the circumstances of the offense as recited, which indicates that

during -- in the midst of a relationship that was tumultuous, first by the prisoner’s

own description, and which came to an evening of drug and alcohol taking and a

dispute which had been long simmering over the inmate’s son, it resulted in a

violent outburst by the defendant in which his wife was attacked and strangled.

And then to cover up the crime, the inmate, apparently with his son, transported

her body and dumped in the San Francisco Bay. The District Attorney reported

prior instances of domestic violence reported, none of which had resulted in the

inmate’s conviction, but they were reported in the letter that became part of the

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 6 of 27
 Given context of the rest of the sentence and the concerns raised during the hearing 20

about the currency and specificity of employment prospects [Docket 10-2, pp. 85-76 (Presiding

Commissioner) and pp. 89-90, 96 (Deputy District Attorney Ynostroza)] this appears to be either

a misstatement or erroneous transcription. More likely than not, the Board found the parole plans

to be inadequate, or, at least, of questionable adequacy in the absence of further elaboration.

7

probation report and was obviously considered by the court. So, while Mr.

Benson did not have a history of -- an extensive of criminal conduct, obviously his

history within this relationship was extremely tumultuous. Within the institution,

and by institutional measurements, Mr. Benson would seem to be a model inmate.

He has a total of three 115 disciplinaries, and the last one occurred

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER MAY: 1996.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER MAY: -- 1996, whatever date it was

(indiscernible)

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER MAY: 1988.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER FARMER: 1988, he is essentially has

been disciplinary free. He apparently does his job well. He -- within the context

of the institution, he performs admirably. He appears to get self-help and therapy

and, frankly, he has been in for a long time relative to this offense. He’s been in

custody, I calculated it out to 26 years now. He has parole plans that although

appear to reflect a marketable skill and have previously been found adequate, the

Panel cannot find them to be inadequate (sic, adequate? ), they also are lacking in 20

specificity and, of course, the inmate is unavailable to us to obtain greater

specificity. The psychological reports have been considered, the last one prepared

on February 14, 2004. They again describe the inmate in favorable terms relative

to his institutional status. What is of concern to the Panel is without wishing to

appear to be an expert, which I am not, but under circumstances where you have a

crime that was committed in the context of domestic violence, and that

circumstance does not appear to have been specifically addressed either in any of

the therapy, self-help or assessments by the inmate, there is concern in that,

within the institutional confines, the stresses that present themselves in a domestic

situation are not present nor replicated, and absent those issues being addressed,

there will be -- always potentially be concern as to how the self-help, which the

inmate has admittedly participated in to a great deal through working in substance

abuse counseling and other studies, how that translates into the domestic violence

setting. It is further troubling in that by his absence, the inmate does not have the

-- does not give himself the opportunity to present affirmative evidence to the

Panel which would allow them to make a finding that those issues, which we

deem of significant importance, to be addressed. Further, of concern with respect

to Mr. Benson’s absence, is the fact that certainly there is no quarrel with his right

to address and -- with an institutional setting and potentially before the court, the

issue of his restraint. When given the options in determining what was in his best

interests to appear at the Hearing and present his views regarding the offense, or,

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 7 of 27
 Docket No. 10-2, pp. 99-102. 21

8

and still not appear on the record to acquiesce to the restraint (indiscernible) to

continue to contest that in a manner which would preserve his objection for the

record, he chose despite pleas to remain, not to remain. What this Panel takes as

relevant from that is that Mr. Benson appears by the limited observation of him in

this Hearing setting, and by reports in the correctional counselor's report that a --

referring to the assessment section of the Board report of May 2006, inmate

Benson makes no secret of his delusion with the parole and sentencing process

and certainly that statement is (indiscernible) reflected his appearance today. But

that attitude, while certainly within his rights, leaves a void that cannot be filled

by just looking at the record in a context where, if we are to make a finding of

suitability for release, although the record would show what appears to be positive

factors, that the absence of addressing those concerns and allowing hearing from

the inmate to indicate that the issues relating to domestic violence have been

affirmatively addressed, makes it impossible to ascertain any favorable factors

that exist, nevertheless outweigh the seriousness of the crime and the nature of the

crime and it’s potential and seriousness should he be because of the nature of the

crime and the fact these issues haven't been addressed, he remains in the

Commissioners’ opinions a danger if released at this time. Thus the finding of

unsuitability -- the decision is rendered for one year is to reset for Hearing or

should be calendared for Hearing in June of 2007. He should specifically

continue to remain disciplinary free, and he is encouraged to get self-help and

seek therapy to specifically address the issues of domestic violence. He’s advised

further to continue to document his parole plans and is encouraged to be more

specific, specifically about where he would live and how he would support

himself. And that concludes my observations (indiscernible).21

The Alameda County Superior Court rejected Benson’s arguments, holding:

The Petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. The Petition fails to state

a prima facie case for relief. Even though [Benson] has submitted numerous

documents in support of his Petition, review of the transcripts provided and

documents pertaining to the June 23, 2006 hearing, indicate that there was no

abuse of discretion by the Board of Prison Terms. The factual basis of the BPTs

decision granting or denying parole is subject to a limited judicial review. A

Court may inquire, only whether some evidence in the record before the BPT

supports the decision to deny parole. The nature of the offense alone can be

sufficient to deny parole. (In Re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal4 616, 652, 658, 682; th

In Re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal4 1061[.] The record presented to this Court for th

review demonstrates that there was certainly some evidence, including, but not

limited to the committing offense, [Benson’s] lack of self help programming for

domestic violence and a lack of specific job opportunities or plans. There is

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 8 of 27
 Docket 10-2, p. 160. 22

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (footnotes citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) omitted). 23

In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 549 (Cal. 2008); In re Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573, 582 (Cal. 24

2008).

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562 (omitted footnotes are pinpoint citations to Lawrence)

25

(internal alteration in the original).

9

nothing in the record that indicates that the Board’s decision was arbitrary or

capricious, nor that [Benson’s] equal protection or due process rights were

violated. Thus, [Benson] has failed to meet his burden of sufficiently proving or

supporting the allegations that serve as the basis for habeas relief.22

In this case, this Court “need only decide whether the California judicial decision

approving the [Board’s] decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the

California ‘some evidence’ requirement, or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence.’” Consequently, this Court must canvas and apply California law 23

to the facts in the record. Under California law “some evidence” of future dangerousness is a

sine qua non for denial of parole. As the Ninth Circuit noted: 24

As a matter of California law, “the paramount consideration for both the

Board [of Prison Terms] and the Governor under the governing statutes is whether

the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety.” (Footnote omitted) There

must be “some evidence” of such a threat, and an aggravated offense “does not, in

every case, provide evidence that the inmate is a current threat to public safety.” 

(Footnote omitted). The prisoner’s aggravated offense does not establish current

dangerousness “unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner’s

pre or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and mental state”

supports the inference of dangerousness. (Footnote omitted.) Thus, in California,

the offense of conviction may be considered, but the consideration must address

the determining factor, “a current threat to public safety.” (Footnote omitted.)25

Under California law, a parole release date must be set “unless [the Board] determines

that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 9 of 27
 Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added); Lawrence, 190 P.3d at 546; see 26

Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 202-03.

In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 222 (Cal. 2002). 27

In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783, 786-87, 802-803 (Cal. 2005); see Rosenkrantz.

28

Dannenberg, 104 P.3d at 803 n.16 (citing Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 219). 29

Lawrence, 190 P.3d at 553. 30

See Shaputis, 190 P.3d at 584-85. 31

10

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot

be fixed . . . .” “The nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for 26

denying parole.” The Board must, however, “point to factors beyond the minimum elements of 27

the crime for which the inmate was committed” that demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of

the suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released. The Board “may credit evidence 28

suggesting the inmate committed a greater degree of the offense than his or her conviction

evidences.” “[T]he statutory and regulatory mandate to normally grant parole to life prisoners 29

who have committed murder means that, particularly after these prisoners have served their

suggested base terms, the underlying circumstances of the commitment offense alone rarely will

provide a valid basis for denying parole when there is strong evidence of rehabilitation and no

other evidence of current dangerousness.” Where, however, the record also contains evidence 30

of other factors relevant to showing unsuitability for parole, the aggravating circumstances of the

crime reliably may continue to predict current dangerousness even after many years of

incarceration. 

31

The California Supreme Court has provided substantial guidance on the factors to be

considered in applying these general principles.

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 10 of 27
11

Title 15, section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations sets forth the factors

to be considered by the Board in carrying out the mandate of the statutes. This FN13

regulation is designed to guide the Board’s assessment of whether the inmate

poses “an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” and thus

whether he or she is suitable for parole. (Regs., § 2402, subd. (a).) The FN14

regulation also lists several circumstances relating to unsuitability for paroleFN15—

such as the heinous, atrocious, or cruel nature of the crime, or an unstable social

background; and several circumstances relating to suitability for parole—such as

an inmate’s rehabilitative efforts, demonstration of remorse, and the mitigating

circumstances of the crime. (Regs., § 2402, subds. (c), (d).) Finally, the FN16

regulation explains that the foregoing circumstances “are set forth as general

guidelines; the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.” (Regs.,

§ 2402, subds. (c), (d).) [. . . .]

 Petitioner’s parole suitability is governed by Title 15, section 2402, FN13.

which we addressed in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616, 128

Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174—a discussion excerpted in substantial part

below. In the companion case of Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 82

Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d 535, the inmate’s parole suitability is governed

by Title 15, section 2281, which provides parole consideration criteria and

guidelines for murders committed prior to November 8, 1978. The two

sections are identical.

 These factors include “the circumstances of the prisoner’s social FN14.

history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including

involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented;

the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before,

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions

under which the prisoner may safely be released to the community; and

any other information which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release.

Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for

parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (b).)

 Unsuitability factors are: (1) a commitment offense carried out in an FN15.

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”; (2) a “[p]revious [r]ecord

of [v]iolence”; (3) “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with

others”; (4) “[s]adistic [s]exual [o]ffenses”; (5) “a lengthy history of

severe mental problems related to the offense”; and (6) “[t]he prisoner has

engaged in serious misconduct in prison or jail.” (Regs., § 2402, subd.

(c)(1)-(6).) This subdivision further provides that “the importance

attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.” (Regs., § 2402, subd.

(c).)

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 11 of 27
Id. at 582-83 (emphasis in the original). 32

Id. at 585 (emphasis in the original) (quoting Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 218). 33

12

Factors supporting a finding that the inmate committed the offense

in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner include the following:

(A) multiple victims were attacked, injured, or killed in the same or

separate incidents; (B) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim was

abused, defiled, or mutilated during or after the offense; (D) the offense

was carried out in a manner that demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; and (E) the motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. (Regs., § 2402, subd.

(c)(1).)

 Suitability factors are: (1) the absence of a juvenile record; (2) FN16.

“reasonably stable relationships with others”; (3) signs of remorse; (4) a

crime committed “as the result of significant stress in [the prisoner’s] life”;

(5) battered woman syndrome; (6) the lack of “any significant history of

violent crime”; (7) “[t]he prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism”; (8) “[t]he prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has

developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release”; and (9)

the inmate’s “[i]nstitutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to

function within the law upon release.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (d)(1)-(9).)

“[T]he governing statute provides that the Board must grant parole unless

it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration for the

individual because of the gravity of the offense underlying the conviction.

(Pen.Code, § 3041, subd. (b).) And as set forth in the governing regulations, the

Board must set a parole date for a prisoner unless it finds, in the exercise of its

judgment after considering the circumstances enumerated in section 2402 of the

regulations, that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole. Accordingly, parole

applicants in this state have an expectation that they will be granted parole unless

the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole

in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.” (Rosenkrantz,

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 654, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174, Italics added.)32

“[T]he precise manner in which the specified factors relevant to parole suitability

are considered and balanced lies within the discretion of the [Board]. . . . It is

irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending to

establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability

for parole. As long as the [Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the

specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with

applicable legal standards, the court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether

there is some evidence in the record that supports the [Board’s] decision.”33

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 12 of 27
13

In this case, this Court finds the history of Benson’s appearances before the parole board,

as summarized by the dissent in the California Court of Appeal, particularly relevant.

Benson was first eligible for parole in March 1990. In his first appearance

before the Board in April 1990, he was deemed unsuitable for parole for several

reasons. First were the circumstances of the commitment offense. The Board

recited that “[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner which exhibits a callous disregard for the life or suffering of another. The

motive of the crime is very trivial in relation to the offense. The murder of the

victim did not deter [Benson] from attempting to cover-up his offense by binding

the victim’s hands, weighting her body with concrete and dumping the body off

the San Mateo Bridge.” The Board also pointed to minor disciplinary infractions,

but commended Benson “for remaining disciplinary free since July 1988 and for

receiving numerous laudatory chronos relative to his work ethic.” The Board

pointed out that Benson had not “totally participated in beneficial self-help or

therapy programs. He has failed to demonstrate evidence of positive change.” 

The Board relied in part on the fact that Benson’s January 1990 psychiatric

evaluation was “not totally supportive of release in that Dr. Walk reports that the

prisoner’s violence potential in a less controlled setting is considered to be

average as opposed to below average.” The panel found that Benson’s “gains are

short-term and he must demonstrate an ability to maintain gains over an extended

period of time.”

Benson was next considered for parole in November 1991. In multiple

psychological evaluations performed preparatory to that hearing, his violence

potential was found to be “minimal” and “extremely minimal.” The evaluators 2 3

also agreed that substance abuse did not appear to be a concern. Benson

“expresse[d] deep and authentic remorse and guilt over his actions, and there is no

question that he continues to experience a good deal of pain over his role in the

death of his wife.” However, the evaluators felt that Benson had not yet “dealt

with all the ramifications of his actions” and agreed upon his need for therapy. In

finding that Benson was not yet suitable for parole, the Board first reiterated that it

was relying on the commitment offense (“The offense was carried out in an

especially heinous, atrocious and cruel manner which exhibits a disregard for the

life of others”), but continued: “The panel finds the prisoner needs therapy in

order to face, discuss, understand and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner.

Until progress is made he continues to be unpredictable and a threat to others. [¶]

Nevertheless, the prisoner should be commended for his excellent work reports

and habits, for upgrading his job skills as a machinist, for his involvement in the

Breaking Barriers Program, for his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)

and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) and for being disciplinary free.”

 According to one evaluator, “Mr. Benson's violence potential is minimal. It 2

would be extremely unusual for the complex series of events that resulted in the

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 13 of 27
14

offense to ever recur and without this he is generally a quiet, amiable and decent

man. He is not antisocial, predatory or aggressive to any marked or even minor

extent. He longs for the peaceful and settled life he once had prior to the offense

and should revert to that without any problems upon release. He is so consumed

with guilt about his actions that his chances of ever acting this way again are

almost nil.”

 According to the second evaluator, “Mr. Benson presents with a history that is 3

virtually devoid of any pattern of antisocial or serious criminal activities, save for

the instant offense. Given the evidence considered during the course of this

interview, his potential for future violent actions currently seems extremely

minimal.” 

Benson received another psychological evaluation in September 1993, in

anticipation of his next parole hearing. The evaluator observed, “Since his last

appearance before the Board, and for the past five years he has remained

completely disciplinary free. He has been assigned as a Journeyman Machinist

since July 7, 1993, making satisfactory progress.” The evaluator noted that

Benson had not participated in group therapy, in part because it had not timely

been made available and in part because he did not wish to participate in such a

program, but felt that this did not affect Benson’s “parole readiness.” The

evaluator concluded: “This report is entirely in support of parole. Mr. Benson’s

criminal behavior is not significantly related to any current diagnosable

psychopathology. While incarcerated his level of functioning has greatly

improved and would likely continue improv[ing] in a less controlled setting, such

as the community. His violence potential has been estimated to have been

minimal. At present it is regarded as having been reduced to the point of

negligibility. [¶] . . . While individual or group therapy would perhaps improve

his overall psychological functioning, it is certainly not necessary for parole

readiness. While he possesses many characteristics of a prime therapy candidate,

the clinical need in relation to his successful parole simply is not there. Therefore,

no recommendations are offered at this time.” Nonetheless, at his next parole

hearing on May 12, 1994, Benson was again found unsuitable for parole, the panel

repeating the incantation, “The offense itself was carried out in an especially

heinous, atrocious, cruel and callous manner . . . which exhibits a callous

disregard for the life and suffering of another . . .’ and also rejecting the view that

Benson did not need further therapy. Referring to the conclusions of the 1991

evaluators, the Board stated “the prisoner has not sufficiently participated in

beneficial self-help and therapy programs . . . .” The panel recommended that

4

Benson participate in "any therapy program that might be available to him so that

he might gain insight into the—the offense itself.”

 The panel also stated that Benson needed to reinvolve himself in a substance 4

abuse program, but the record contains nothing that suggests the basis for this

conclusion. No report expressed any concern that Benson had or was likely to

revert to any form of substance abuse. To the contrary, evaluators were in

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 14 of 27
15

agreement that “alcohol and marijuana would seem to have been a minor and

peripheral factor in the commission of this offense . . . .” [I]t is not believed that

conditions of parole will require close monitoring of illegal substances.”

This pattern repeated itself the following year. Benson was again

evaluated by two different psychiatrists, one in September 1994 and another in

February 1995, both of whom expressed the same positive opinions. The

evaluators reported that Benson had become a Buddhist and was attending

meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous. “He has continued to program well, has

numerous laudatory chronos, and his work evaluations are generally excellent. . . . 

He should be able to find work without difficulty if and when paroled in the area. .

. . He has not had a CDC 115 for six years. . . . He has in the past participated in

Narcotics Anonymous and in the “Breaking Barriers” program. He has a clear

understanding of what went wrong on the occasion of the commitment offense

and he feels a profound sense of remorse and, of course, wishes he had handled it

another way, i.e., by separating from his wife before any disaster such as the

instant offense occurred. He takes full responsibility for it. He does not

rationalize it as being related to substance abuse. He, on the other hand

recognizes that he must be abstinent and plans to do that. He has indeed taken a

vow to do so. . . . [¶] CONCLUSIONS: Any diagnosable psychopathology he had

during the earlier part of his incarceration appears to be in remission or to have

disappeared. He seems to have invested considerable energy and time into his

own rehabilitation. It appears he will continue to do so. His violence potential in

the institution is demonstrably lower than average. It would appear that his

violence potential if paroled would continue to be less than average, unless of

course, he became involved with alcohol or other substances of abuse, which at

this point does not seem likely.” Although Benson apparently had not participated

in group therapy as the Board had previously recommended, the psychiatrists

advised that “there is no indication for any treatment at this point and he should

continue to rehabilitate himself along the lines he has chosen to do so.” 

Nonetheless, at the next parole hearing in April 1995, the Board once again found

him unsuitable because he “would pose an unreasonable risk or danger to others if

given a parole date,” explaining “[f]irst of all is the commitment offense where it

shows that you didn’t have any regard at that time for the life and suffering of

another human being.” The panel again commended Benson for doing well in

prison but, without mentioning the contrary recommendations of the psychiatrists,

told him “we don’t feel that you've adequately participated in therapy, and we feel

that this is very important for you.” This time he was denied parole for two years.

The pattern was the same in 1997. Benson was evaluated by still another

staff psychiatrist who concluded that the only aspect of his history that “was new

or different is he has become very actively involved in Buddhism in recent years.” 

Again, the Board repeated, “The panel has reviewed all information received from

the public and relied on the following circumstances in concluding that the

prisoner is not suitable for parole. . . . The offense was carried out in especially a

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 15 of 27
16

cruel and callous manner. The offense was carried out in a manner which exhibits

a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another. . . .” The panel again 5 

mentioned that Benson "should be commended for being disciplinary free since

7/88. He has good work reports,” and he was urged to “remain in your tutoring

program because . . . it does you and the people that you’re helping a lot of good.

And also remain in your-any of the other self-help and therapy programs that

you're currently ... involved in. And I guess you'll remain a lead man in your tool

and die machinist work. It indicates that you've done real well in that area, so keep

that up.” Parole was denied for one year.

 On this occasion the panel also referred to Benson’s supposedly “unstable social 5

history,” prior petty criminality, and minor prison disciplinary offenses prior to

1988. However, these factors find only limited support in the record, they were

entirely discounted in prior evaluations, and they were not mentioned or relied

upon in the April 2005 determination which is the subject of the present petition.

The story was the same the following year. Yet another prison

psychologist reviewed Benson’s entire history, performed a personal evaluation,

and concluded that there were no psychological contraindications to his release on

parole. According to this evaluator, “Mr. Benson has been in custody now for 17

years. He has remained essentially disciplinary-free in the institution. Assessment

of [d]angerousness within the controlled setting of the institution is seen as being

below average in comparison to other inmates. This is based on the fact that he

has remained disciplinary-free and has successfully programmed, is well liked by

supervisors, and is making a good adjustment. If released to the community,

assessment of dangerousness is also seen as being below average in comparison to

other inmates. In fact, in this case, his dangerousness is seen as minimal. At the

time of the offense he was intoxicated on alcohol and Marijuana. If there are any

risks, it would be use of debilitating substances such as alcohol or Marijuana. The

probability of his use of these substances is low. . . . [¶] Mr. Benson has no

program needs. He has excellent vocational skills that will enable him to obtain

viable high-paying employment in the community. He has completed. his.

academic requirements. There is no need in this case of initial psychotherapy or

psychological evaluation. There are no psychological contraindications to this

man's release on parole.” Yet, the conclusions of the Board panel did no more

than mimic findings from prior years. “The panel reviewed all information and

decided that you're not suitable for parole at this time. The offense was carried

out in an especially cruel and callous manner. The offense was carried out in a

manner which exhibits a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another

. . . .” The panel once again commended Benson “for being disciplinary-free and 6

programming well and also for assisting other prisoners in learning reading and

other basic skills" but, drawing upon the findings of prior panels and disregarding

the conclusions of the professional evaluator, stated that Benson “needs therapy in

order to face, discuss, and gain insight into why he committed the crime. The

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 16 of 27
17

prisoner is denied parole for a period of one year. And, of course, the reason is

the cruelty of the crime.”

 This panel also made reference to matters touched upon by the prior panel (see 6

fn. 4, ante) but seemingly attached little significance to them. "The prisoner has a

very limited criminal record that amounted to just a couple of misdemeanor

arrests, one for driving without a license in his possession and the other was a

petty theft. But still it was an unstable social history and, by his own admission,

was using narcotics and drinking alcohol. He failed to demonstrate evidence of a

positive change. Misconduct while incarcerated included three CDC 115's and

four CDC 128(a)s. However, the last 115 was 7/20/88, so he's been disciplinaryfree for a little over ten years.”

In 2000 the reprise was the same. An assessment performed by yet another

psychologist “did not reveal any new problems or changes since the last report.” 

But again, “[t]he panel reviewed all information received from the public and

relied on the following circumstances in concluding that the prisoner is not

suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a

threat to public safety if released from prison. And number one was the

commitment offense which the panel found was really a brutal and unprovoked

attack on a relatively defenseless woman.” The balance of the decision reiterates

the history taken from prior decisions, again noting that Benson had “remained

disciplinary-free over an extended period of time,” “upgraded vocationally” and

developed job skills, suggesting that he “firm up” his employment plans if granted

parole, and expressing "some concern about the lack of any formalized recent

counseling or programs involving domestic violence or violence potential and we

would like to see him take advantage of those if they become available to him.”

In July 2001, Benson was re-evaluated by the clinical psychologist who

had evaluated him three years before, who found his 1998 assessment “still

current and valid. There is no evidence of any mental or emotional problems. Mr.

Benson has an excellent attitude. He continues to be actively involved in

programming including teaching literacy to other inmates three days a week.

Violence potential, in this case, is definitely low in comparison to other inmates.

He continues to have a strong community support. There are no psychological

factors evident that would interfere with release to the community.” The panel’s

response was the same: “The panel has reviewed all of the information received

from the public and relied on the following circumstances in concluding that the

prisoner is not suitable for parole. . . . The offense was carried out in a very

special-in an especially cruel and very callous manner. It was carried out in a

manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering, and the motive for the crime was very inexplicable and trivial in

relation to the offense. . . .” The decision reiterated the details of the crime and

other historical factors repeated in prior years' decisions. The Board added, 7

however, that Benson had displayed a “matter of fact attitude about the

commitment offense [that] was totally devoid of any apparent regret or remorse

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 17 of 27
18

about taking his wife's life” and “an argumentative posture about providing

documents when we were trying to assist him with his parole plans.” The Board

again commended him “for his involvement in AA, and he did spend two years in

the voc mill and cabinet, and he has been tutoring in the Inmate Literacy program,

and he has been receiving satisfactory work reports.” He was denied

reconsideration for two years and advised that in the future the Board would

require documented confirmation of his parole plans.

 The Board noted that Benson “has a history of unstable or tumultuous 7

relationships especially with his deceased wife,” but there is little if any evidence

in the record that he had tumultuous relationships with others. According to the

evaluation performed in 1991, “Mr. Benson presents with a history that is

virtually devoid of any pattern of antisocial or serious criminal activities, save for

the instant offense.”

The Board decision that is the focus of this habeas corpus petition is the

denial of Benson’s latest application for parole on April 14,2005. In preparation

for the parole hearing another thorough psychological assessment was performed

in December 2004 by still another psychologist. The evaluator’s conclusions

could not have been more positive. “Beginning with psychological evaluations in

1987 through 2000 this inmate has been consistently evaluated to have a low

violence potential and to be a good candidate for parole. It has been note[d] that

[he] expressed genuine guilt for [h] is offense (1987); that he has ‘programmed in

an above average manner and shown good psychiatric stability’ (1990); that he

was not seen as being in need of psychotherapy. It was indicated that he did not

rationalize the offense and accepted full responsibility for the victim’s death

(1993); that there was ‘no evidence of psychopathology in this case.’ It was

noted, ‘He has a clear understanding of what went wrong . . . and feels a profound

sense of remorse.’ (1994); assessment of dangerousness is also seen as being

below average in comparison to the other inmates (1998).” His release plans,

according to the evaluator, were equally positive and realistic. “[H]e hopes to

parole or transfer to Sacramento where one of his brothers reside[s]. He has the

offer of housing, initial financial support and an auto when he paroles. He plans

on working as machinist. . . . [H]is plans are practical and realistic. He has a high

level of stable support in the community and has maintained and even improved

his skills as a machinist in the CDC.”

Finally, the December 2004 report contained an extended evaluation of

Benson’s violence risk factors, beginning with an explanation that an inmate's risk

for violence “can be evaluated based on three key actuarial factors—A) social

history, B) clinical presentation and C) management of future risk” Each of these

factors indicates that Benson presents a low risk of future violence. According to

the report: “A) Social History: . . . This inmate evidences a low number of

historical risk factors. There is no history of serious social and behavioral

problems as a child or adolescent. He has no juvenile record or prior adult

criminal record. Significantly, there is no history of violence predating his

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 18 of 27
19

controlling offense. And he has a stable and productive work history. . . . In this 8

risk domain the inmate presents a low risk of future violence. [¶B) Clinical

Presentation: . . . Based on this evaluation and reviewing past evaluations, this

inmate appears to demonstrate an understanding of this offense. He appears to

take responsibility for his crime and to be remorseful for his actions. His overall

attitude has been positive, as evidence[d] by his long participation in AAlNA and

positive adaptation to the CDC. There is no evidence of a major mental illness or

related symptoms. In this risk domain the inmate presents a low risk of future

violence. [¶] C) Management of Future Risk: . . . This inmate has expanded his

range of work skills as a machinist within the CDC and has maintained a stable

and productive work history. He has been active in furthering his education

through tutoring other inmates for nearly 11 years. And his commitment to

learning and practicing Buddhism is commendable and appears to play a role in

his stable emotional functioning. He has had no serious CDC-l15. His last

disciplinary action was in 1988 for missing a count. His plans for paroling are

practical and he appears to enjoy a high level of support in the community. In this

risk domain the inmate presents a low risk of future violence.” (Underscoring in

original.) The evaluation concludes as follows: “‘Overall, evaluating the three

categories of actuarial risk for this inmate, he is considered a low risk when it

comes to potential future acts of violence, his prior lack of criminal and violent

history are significant as has been his positive adaptation to the CDC these past 20

years. He appears to have matured significantly on an emotional level as

evidenced by his tutoring and religious practices and the high level of work he has

maintained.’”

 The deleted sentences read as follows: “However, beginning at an early age 8

(17), he started abusing drugs and alcohol and developed serious problems. He is

diagnosed a personality disorder and his drug abuse and personality factors were

clearly evident in his offense. There is also a history of unstable interpersonal

relationships.”

The Board again denied parole in the familiar manner: “[T]he panel

reviewed all of the information received from the public and relied on the

following circumstances in concluding that you’re not yet suitable for parole and

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. This

is primarily based on the commitment offense. . . . This is certainly a violent

death for this young woman and it was certainly carried out in a manner that

demonstrates a callous disregard for human suffering. And the motive for this

crime was certainly trivial. There were so many other choices that could have

been made here and none of them involved a brutal murder of this young woman.” 

The Board noted a few oft-repeated facts concerning Benson’s prior history (“one

prior arrest that was for petty theft, it was a misdemeanor, and he does have a

history of substance abuse which does go to his own stable social history”) and his

record in prison (“three 115 disciplinary reports but the last one was back in 1988

and has not had a 128(a) counseling chrono since 1999"). As to the most recent

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 19 of 27
 Docket No. 10-3, pp. 80-91. 34

 Docket No.13-8, pp. 91-103. Another justice, indicated that, except for the California 35

Supreme Court’s decision in Dannenberg, he would have joined all but part B of the dissent. 

Docket No. 10-3, p. 78.

20

psychological evaluation, the Board stated simply, “The psych evaluation dated

12-04 by Dr. Freitas was supportive.” The Board again commended Benson for

“doing a good job, you have been involved in Laubach [literacy tutor program] for

11 years which is very commendable. You’ve been disciplinary free since 1988.

You’ve continued to participate in substance abuse programming and you’ve

gotten good work reports and you’ve been very involved obviously in your [Tao]

and Buddhist studies.” The Board also noted that in response to the suggestions

made at his preceding parole hearing Benson had “letters from all three of your

brothers indicating that they would offer you both physical and financial support

until you were able to find work and be on your own.” Nonetheless, the Board

stated that the district attorney of the county in which the offense occurred

“indicate[d] an opposition to a finding of suitability at this time” and concluded 9

that “the positive aspects of behavior do not outweigh the factors of unsuitability.”

The chair of the panel ended the hearing with the suggestion that Benson repeat

programs he had already successfully completed and bring to the next parole

hearing materials to explain his religious studies.10

 The district attorney’s opinion is based solely on Benson’s commitment offense

9

and appears to rely solely on the facts contained in Benson’s probation report

dated January 1983. It fails to address Benson's improvements while in prison or

any of the numerous other factors bearing on Benson’s suitability for parole.

 “[B]ecause of the kind of crime that it was, if you can do something related to 10

domestic violence I think that that would—it’s been quite a while, Breaking

Barriers was a long time ago, it’s been quite a while since that issue has been dealt

with. And I think that one thing that would be really helpful to you, because

probably most of the commissioners are not going to be familiar with the work

that you’re doing in your religious studies, is if you could bring information to the

panels to show them what those studies involve. . . . [¶[B]ecause some of the

issues that are of concern probably are being addressed but unless we see it in

writing it doesn't exist. . . . [¶] And once again continue with the substance abuse

program. . . . Whether the psych report says that it’s being addressed or not, I can

tell you for a fact that if it goes to the Governor’s Office they’re going to make

that an issue so while it’s available to you, you should participate in it.”34

The dissenting justice then performed an extensive analysis under California law at that

time, including Rosenkrantz and Dannenberg. In Part A of the analysis, “The Nature of the 35

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 20 of 27
 Section 2402, subdivision (c) of the Regulations reads in part as follows: 36

Circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability include: (1) Commitment Offense. The

prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The

factors to be considered include: [¶] (A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed

in the same or separate incidents. [¶] (B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate

and calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder. [¶] (C) The victim was

abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense. [¶] (D) The offense was carried

out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering. [¶] (E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense.

 Docket 10-3, pp. 93-94. 37

 Docket 10-3, pp. 94-96. 38

 Docket 10-3, pp. 96-97. 39

21

Commitment Offense,” the dissent discussed the five factors set forth in the Regulations to

support a finding that the offense was committed “in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner,” citing § 2402(c)(1). The dissent noted that neither of the first two factors, multiple 36

victims or that the offense was carried out in a dispassionate or calculated manner had any

application. The dissent also found that, because there was no evidence that would support a 37

suggestion that the viciousness of the offense went beyond the elements of second degree

murder, the Board impermissibly relied on the fourth factor—an exceptional disregard for human

suffering.” 

38

The dissent noted that, while disposing of the body was improvident, there was no

suggestion that Benson took any satisfaction from mutilating the body or experienced any feeling

that suggested he is likely to repeat the offense. This negated the Board’s finding with respect to

the third factor—that “the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense.”39

Finally, the dissent disposed of the fifth factor—triviality of the motive—noting that there is “no

evidence in the record or support from the myriad of mental health professionals who had

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 21 of 27
 Docket 10-3, p. 97. 40

 Docket 10-3, p. 98. 41

 Docket 10-3, p. 103. 42

Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 210. 43

22

examined Benson to support the view that his motive was less significant than the motive

underlying other second degree murders or that Benson is so indifferent to the significance of

killing a person that he is likely to do so again if released on parole.”40

The dissent concluded:

The Board’s conclusion that Benson would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society thus is supported by no evidence—not even a “modicum.” (See

In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Ca1.4th at p. 677.) While the commitment offense

alone can be sufficient to support such a conclusion, as indicated above in order to

do so the facts of the offense must “rationally indicate” that Benson would pose

an unreasonable risk to society if released. As just shown, the evidence in the

record establishes exactly the contrary. (See In re Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th

at p. 369 [“the record provides no reasonable grounds to reject, or even challenge,

the findings and conclusions of the psychologist . . . concerning Smith’s

dangerousness. In the absence of such grounds or other evidence, the . . . view . . .

is unsubstantiated speculation and as such appears to be arbitrary and capricious];

Scott I, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 894-897.)41

Based upon this conclusion, the dissent stated:

I would grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, vacate the denial of

parole, and order the Board to conduct a new parole suitability hearing consistent

with the views expressed in this opinion. (See Scott I, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at

p. 899.)42

This Court is not unmindful that, in a federal habeas proceeding challenging the denial of

parole, it neither re-weighs the evidence nor substitutes it’s judgment for that of the Board. This

Court is also mindful of the fact that under California law, judicial review of a decision denying

parole is “extremely deferential.” Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed by the dissenting 43

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 22 of 27
 This Court notes that the Board considered itself hampered by the fact that Benson 44

chose to absent himself from the hearing. As discussed below in connection with the second

ground, proceeding in absentia in the parole setting does not violate any federal constitutional

provision. By choosing to voluntarily absent himself from the hearing, however, Benson exposes

himself to, and must bear any adverse consequences of, that choice.

 Benson, having waived his right to counsel, was not represented at the hearing. 45

23

justice of the California Court of Appeal, even viewing the decision of the Alameda County

Superior Court affirming denial of parole through this doubly deferential lens, based upon the

record before it and upon the subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Court in Lawrence

and Shaputis, this Court holds that the decision of the Alameda County Superior Court was

contrary to California law and based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence. Benson is entitled to relief under his first ground. Thus, this matter will be remanded 44

to the Board for a new hearing consistent with the decision in this case.

Ground 2: Denial of a Fair and Unbiased Hearing.

Normally, this Court having granted relief on the first ground, would not address any

other ground. Because the issue may arise in the new hearing, however, Benson’s second ground

is not necessarily moot. At the outset of the hearing, Benson, shackled in accordance with

institutional policy, declined to attend and participate further in the parole suitability hearing. 

The Board nonetheless proceeded to conduct the hearing in Benson’s absence. Benson argues

that this violated Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(a)(3) and denied him his due process right to a fair

and unbiased hearing. As a result, there was no one present at the hearing to challenge the

information presented to and relied upon by the Board. The Alameda County Superior Court 45

rejected Benson’s argument, holding.

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 23 of 27
 Docket 10-2, p. 159. 46

 Although Benson cites § 3041.5(a)(3), the correct cite is to § 3041.5(a)(2), which states 47

that the defendant shall be permitted to appear. This Court does note that nothing in that

provision, or any reported decision construing it, compels the result Benson seeks.

See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot 48

reexamine a state court’s interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.

639, 653 (1990) (it is presumed that the state court knew and correctly applied state law),

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see also Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982) (challenging the correctness of the application of state law does not

allege a deprivation of federal rights sufficient for habeas relief); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455

(2005) (a federal court may not lightly presume that a state court failed to apply its own law). 

 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15. 49

Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 262 (1993) (citing Taylor v. United States, 414 50

U.S. 17 (1973)).

24

The Court notes that [Benson] refused to remain in the hearing due to the

institutional rule that he be in physical restraints during the hearing. [Benson]

may have been within his rights to object to the institutional policy. However,

[Benson’s] absence deprived the BPT from obtaining additional information about

[Benson’s] programming and updated information about specific job

opportunities. While it is purely speculative as to whether [Benson’s] absence

affected the outcome of the hearing it certainly was not advantageous to

[Benson].46

To the extent that Benson challenges the Board’s action under the state law requirements

set forth in Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(a), this Court declines to consider that challenge for 47

failure to state a federal claim. Thus, this Court renders no opinion as to the validity of 48

Benson’s position on the shackling requirement under state law.

Due process in the parole context only requires that an inmate be afforded an opportunity

to be heard and, if parole is denied, that the inmate be informed in what respects he or she falls

short of qualifying for parole. It is well established that where, as here, a criminal defendant’s

49

voluntarily absence from the proceedings constitutes a waiver of any right to be present and the

tribunal may proceed to adjudication in his or her absence.50

Case 2:07-cv-02244-JKS Document 19 Filed 08/12/10 Page 24 of 27
Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 51

740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

Delgado v. Lewis (Delgado II), 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation 52

omitted); see also Lewis v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004).

Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 53

United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2007). 54

25

The Alameda County Court did not address the implicit question of whether the

institutional policy of requiring inmates be physically restrained at parole suitability hearings

negated the voluntariness of Benson’s absence. When there is no reasoned state-court decision

denying an issue presented to the state court and raised in a federal habeas petition, this Court

must assume that the state court decided all the issues presented to it and perform an independent

review of the record to ascertain whether the state-court decision was objectively unreasonable.51

The scope of this review is for clear error of the state-court ruling on the petition:

[A]lthough we cannot undertake our review by analyzing the basis for the state

court’s decision, we can view it through the “objectively reasonable” lens ground

by Williams. . . . Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does

not supply reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is

required to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of

controlling federal law. Only by that examination may we determine whether the

state court’s decision was objectively reasonable.52

“[A]lthough we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate

decision.”53

As the Ninth Circuit has observed, whether a general policy of physical restraint of

defendants for a proceeding in front of a judge violates due process has not been decided.54

Litigation before the Supreme Court concerning defendants restrained during criminal

proceedings arises in the context of proceedings in front of juries on the basis of a fear that a jury

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See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 55

344 (1970).

United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997). 56

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 57

26

will be prejudiced by seeing the defendant in shackles. The Second Circuit has, however, 55

concluded that, because a judge in a pretrial hearing presumably will not be prejudiced by seeing

a defendant in shackles, the rules regarding restraints do not apply to proceedings before a

judge. The Board, like a judge, presumably would not be prejudiced by seeing an inmate 56

appear before it in restraints. 

Even if shackling were an error of constitutional dimension, the appropriate relief would

be to remand the matter to the Board with directions to the warden of the institution to permit

Benson to appear without restraints. Surely, Benson does not suggest that by voluntarily

absenting himself from the hearing to protest the restraint requirement, he was automatically

entitled to be paroled. Such a result is counterintuitive; otherwise, by simply refusing to appear

at the hearing, inmates could guarantee themselves parole. Accordingly, based upon the record

before it, this Court cannot say the decision of the Alameda County Superior Court in this case

with respect to Benson’s second ground was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” Benson has not presented a question of federal 57

constitutional dimension.

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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Benson is entitled to relief on the first ground raised in his Petition. Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the denial of parole is vacated and this matter is

remanded to the California Board of Parole Hearings for further proceedings consistent with the

decisions of the California Supreme Court in In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535 (Cal. 2008), and In re

Shaputis, 190 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2008).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT, if the Board of Parole Hearings has not held a

hearing within 120 days of the date that this decision becomes final, i.e., no longer subject to

direct review, the Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, must

release Benson to parole status.

The Clerk of the Court is to enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: August 11, 2010.

/s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

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