Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01814/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01814-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT D. MCDANIEL, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

T. FELKER, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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CASE NO. 2:07-cv-01814-RAJ-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner is a California prisoner who is currently incarcerated at the New Folsom 

State Prison in Represa, California. (See Docket 1 at 1.) He was convicted by a jury of first 

degree murder, first degree burglary, and second degree robbery in the Sacramento County 

Superior Court on January 21, 2000. (See Dkt. 18, Lodged Document 1 at 1.) The jury also 

found true the special circumstances that petitioner committed the murder while he was 

engaged in a burglary and robbery, and that he was armed with a firearm during the three 

offenses. (See id.) He was sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of parole for the 

murder with special circumstances, plus one year for the armed enhancement. (See id. at 1-2.) 

Petitioner has filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the robbery and burglary special circumstance findings. (See Dkts. 14 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 

and 15.) Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, together with relevant portions of the 

state court record, and petitioner has filed a traverse in response to the answer. (See Dkts. 17, 

21, and 22.) The briefing is now complete and this matter is ripe for review. The Court, 

having thoroughly reviewed the record and briefing of the parties, recommends the Court 

deny the petition, and dismiss this action with prejudice. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On direct review, the California Court of Appeal summarized the relevant facts as 

follows: 

Keith Peterson was found shot to death in his home. There 

were no signs of forced entry and the front door was locked; but 

the house had been ransacked and property was stolen, 

including jewelry as well as stamps and coins from his 

collections. Peterson suffered six gunshot wounds, with shots 

to his neck. The angle of the shots was consistent with the gun 

having been fired downward, as if Peterson had been kneeling. 

It was known that Peterson was a methamphetamine user and 

that he frequently paid those who worked on his home with 

methamphetamine rather than cash. In general, when “people 

were over at [Peterson’s] house . . . there’s a pretty fair chance 

they were doing methamphetamine.” 

Prior to Peterson’s death, defendant and codefendant Matthew 

Pennucci had met with Ron Tynes three times looking for “an 

honest thief” to steal Peterson’s coin collection. At the third 

meeting, which took place on the day of the murder, Tynes said 

that he had found someone who would do the job, but who 

wanted half of the property taken. Defendant stated that he 

would do it himself. Earlier, defendant had offered Pennucci’s 

girlfriend, Gina Cox, $4,000 to help him rob Peterson. She 

declined. 

Peterson’s friends, the Marlers, saw defendant driving near 

Peterson’s house the afternoon before the murder, then saw him 

drive slowly past Peterson’s house on the night before the 

murder and again a number of hours after Peterson was killed. 

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Codefendant Deanna Cook was defendant’s girlfriend, and Pam 

Hickman was Cook’s mother. In the month following the 

murder, Cook told Hickman “what had happened.” A few days 

later, Hickman and defendant were smoking methamphetamine 

together when he told her that the plan originally involved 

himself, Pennucci, and a third person; “but since the third party 

dropped out, [defendant] came by and picked up [Cook] . . . 

because he needed three.” Defendant said to Hickman that “he 

went back in the house to make sure the guy was dead.” 

Defendant also told Hickman that he was the one who had 

planned the crime, and that it had been planned for several 

months. 

Another time, when Hickman, defendant, Cook, and Pennucci 

were together smoking methamphetamine, Pennucci and 

defendant got into a disagreement about the crime and how the 

stolen coins should be split between them. In Hickman’s 

words, defendant said that “he took a big part of it . . . He had 

the big part of it, you know, because he took all the risk. Then 

[Pennucci] says no, he didn’t, that him [sic] an[d] [Cook] did. 

So the stuff that they got should be split between him and 

[Cook]. . . .” Throughout the disagreement, defendant continued 

to claim that he had done most of the “hard work and that 

[Pennucci] and [Cook], you know, had barely anything to do 

with it.” 

Pennucci’s fingerprint was found in Peterson’s home. Neither 

defendant’s nor Cook’s fingerprints were found at the scene. 

After Pennucci was arrested, defendant talked to Gina Cox, 

Pennucci’s girlfriend. Defendant instructed Cox to tell Pennucci 

a story that he could give to the detectives, and to advise him to 

refuse a polygraph. Defendant also said that he had told Cook 

what to say and that they should keep defendant “out of the 

picture.” 

Other evidence recounted in the parties’ briefs implicated 

defendant, Pennucci, and Cook in the burglary, robbery, and 

murder. 

(Dkt. 18, LD 1 at 2-4.) 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 4 

Following his jury trial in Sacramento County Superior Court, petitioner was 

convicted of first degree murder, first degree burglary, and second degree robbery. (See id. at 

1.) The jury also found true special circumstance allegations that petitioner committed the 

murder while he was engaged in a burglary and robbery within the meaning of California 

Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17), and that he was armed with a firearm during his commission of 

the three offenses. (See id. at 1-2; Dkt. 15 at 2.) He was sentenced to life without the 

possibility of parole for the murder with special circumstances, plus one year for the armed 

allegation. (See Dkt. 15 at 2.) The superior court stayed imposition of a sentence for 

petitioner’s burglary and robbery convictions. (See Dkt. 18, LD 1 at 2.) 

Petitioner, through counsel, appealed his judgment and sentence to the California 

Court of Appeal, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the felony-murder special 

circumstances set forth in California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A) and (G). (See Dkt. 9 at 2.) 

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s claim, and affirmed the Sacramento 

County Superior Court’s judgment on February 26, 2003. (See Dkt. 18, LD 1 at 1-8.) 

Petitioner then presented this claim in his April 1, 2003, petition for review to the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on May 13, 2003. (See id., LD 2 at 19-20; id., 

LD 3.) Accordingly, respondent admits in the answer that petitioner has properly exhausted 

his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s special circumstance 

findings. (Dkt. 17 at 2.) 

Petitioner’s initial federal habeas petition, which he filed on September 27, 2006, was 

dismissed without prejudice as prematurely filed by stipulation of the parties. (See Dkt. 9 at 

3.) Petitioner filed a second federal petition on September 4, 2007, and then filed the instant 

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amended petition on March 18, 2008. (See Dkts. 1 and 14.) In the answer, respondent does 

not dispute the timeliness of any claims presented in the amended petition. (See Dkt. 17 at 2.) 

 III. FEDERAL CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

 Petitioner concedes that he was a “major participant” in the robbery and burglary 

which resulted in the victim’s murder. (See Dkt. 22 at 4.) His sole contention is that there 

was insufficient evidence he acted with “reckless indifference to human life” during the 

commission of those crimes, as required to support the special circumstance findings under 

California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A) and (G). (See id. at 1-5; Dkt. 15 at 18-33.) As a 

result, petitioner argues that the robbery and burglary special circumstances, which resulted in 

his sentence of life without the possibility of parole, should be reversed. (See Dkt. 15 at 33.) 

 Respondent alleges that there was sufficient evidence to support the special 

circumstance allegations. (Dkt. 17 at 11-12.) Respondent also asserts petitioner is contending 

that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because of the broad manner in which the 

California courts have construed the felony-murder special circumstances set forth in 

California Penal Code § 190.2(d). (Id. at 10-11.) Petitioner presented this Eighth 

Amendment argument on direct appeal to the California Supreme Court. (See Dkt. 18, LD 2.) 

In the traverse, however, petitioner explains he is not raising an Eighth Amendment claim in 

his federal habeas petition. (See Dkt. 22 at 2.) Rather, the instant petition only challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence “to prove that [petitioner] acted with reckless indifference to 

human life” during the burglary and robbery which resulted in the victim’s murder. (Id. at 3.) 

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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition because it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the California Department of 

Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir.) 

(providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment....”). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition may not be 

granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless petitioner 

demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition was either “contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the United States Supreme 

Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). It is also appropriate to look to 

lower federal court decisions to determine what law has been “clearly established” by the 

Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular application of that law. See Duhaime v. 

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). In this context, Ninth Circuit precedent 

remains persuasive but not binding authority. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Clark v. 

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Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

 In each case, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the state court decision 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine 

whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court looks to the last reasoned 

state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders upholding that judgment are 

presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 

(1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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Finally, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are also bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

V. DISCUSSION 

 

A. Habeas Review of a Claim of Insufficient Evidence to Support the Conviction 

The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a prisoner who challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a state criminal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 has 

clearly stated a federal constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause. See In re Winship, 

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 

with which he is charged.”). For a federal habeas court, “[t]he relevant question is whether, 

after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 

(1990). In this context, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be 

sufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 

1986). If the record supports conflicting inferences, the Court “must presume - even if it does 

not affirmatively appear in the record - that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in 

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. 

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When a state court has considered a sufficiency of the evidence claim, AEDPA 

requires a federal habeas court to afford an additional degree of deference to the state court’s 

decision. Consequently, habeas relief is not warranted unless “the state court’s application of 

the Jackson standard [was] ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 

1275 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005). A federal habeas court must therefore look to state law to establish 

the “essential elements” of the offense, and then turn to the federal question of whether the 

last-reasoned state court decision was objectively unreasonable in concluding that sufficient 

evidence supported the conviction pursuant to the standards set forth in Jackson and Winship. 

See Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009); Allen, 408 F.3d at 1274. 

After a careful review of the record, this Court concludes that the California Court of 

Appeal’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s special 

circumstance findings with respect to petitioner was a reasonable application of the Jackson

standard. As discussed below, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a 

reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with “reckless indifference to human life” during the 

commission of the burglary and robbery. 

B. California’s Felony-Murder Special Circumstance Statute

The “essential elements” of petitioner’s special circumstance convictions are set forth 

in § 190.2 of the California Penal Code, which provides that “the penalty for a defendant who 

is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for 

life without the possibility of parole if one or more . . . special circumstances has been found 

. . . to be true” at trial. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2. See People v. Estrada, 11 Cal.4th 568, 571-

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72 (1995). The felony-murder special circumstance is set forth in § 190.2(a)(17). This 

provision provides that “the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or 

was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight 

after committing, or attempting to commit, [any of twelve specified] felonies,” including 

burglary and robbery. Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17); see id. § 190.2(a)(17)(A) and (G). 

In addition, to meet the special circumstance requirements of § 190.2(a)(17), a 

defendant must have either (1) been the actual killer of the victim, (2) possessed an intent to 

kill the victim, even if that defendant was not the actual killer, or (3) acted with “reckless 

indifference to human life” and as a “major participant” in one of the specified felonies, even 

if the defendant was not the actual killer and did not possess any intent to kill. Id. § 190.2(b) - 

(d). Thus, under § 190.2(d), a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not have intent 

to kill, but “who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, 

abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a felony 

enumerated in [§ 190.2(a)(17)] which results in the death of some person or persons, and who 

is found guilty of murder in the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or 

imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special 

circumstance enumerated in [§ 190.2(a)(17)] has been found to be true . . . .” Id. § 190.2(d) 

(emphasis added). 

The “statutory language of section 190.2(d) . . . derives verbatim from the United 

States Supreme Court’s decision in Tison v. Arizona.” People v. Estrada, 11 Cal.4th 568, 575 

(1995) (internal citations omitted). In fact, subsection (d) was added to § 190.2 in order to 

bring California law into conformity with the Tison decision. See id.; People v. Proby, 60 

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Cal.App.4th 922, 927-28 (1998); People v. Bustos, 23 Cal.App.4th 1747, 1753 (1994). Tison 

involved two brothers sentenced to death for committing first degree murder in connection 

with armed robbery, kidnapping, and theft of a motor vehicle. The U.S. Supreme Court held 

that the death penalty may be constitutionally imposed under the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments on an accomplice to a felony-murder where there was “major participation in 

the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life.” Tison v. Arizona, 

481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987). 

Because “Tison is the source of the language of section 190.2(d) . . . the constitutional 

standards set forth in that opinion are therefore applicable to all allegations of a felony-murder 

special circumstance [under California law], regardless of whether the People seek and exact 

the death penalty or a sentence of life without parole.” Estrada, 11 Cal.4th at 575-76. 

Significantly, the Tison court observed that “the reckless disregard for human life implicit in 

knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a 

highly culpable mental state . . . .” Id. at 157-58. In the high court’s view, “some 

nonintentional murders may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all . . . [such as] 

the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that 

the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking 

the victim’s property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit 

as shocking to the moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’” Id. at 157. Finally, the Tison court 

noted that although “major participation” and “reckless indifference to human life” are 

distinct requirements, they will frequently overlap. 

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For example, we do not doubt that there are some felonies as to 

which one could properly conclude that any major participant 

necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human 

life. Moreover, even in cases where the fact that the defendant 

was a major participant in a felony did not suffice to establish 

reckless indifference, that fact would still often provide 

significant support for such a finding. 

Id. at 158 n.12. 

The California Supreme Court has also clarified the meaning of the statutory phrase 

“reckless indifference to human life” in § 190.2(d) in the case People v. Estrada. Estrada

involved two defendants who were convicted of committing first degree murder during the 

commission of a robbery and burglary. See Estrada, 11 Cal.4th at 572. Like petitioner, the 

two defendants in Estrada were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, and their 

sentences for the robbery and burglary convictions were stayed by the trial court. See id. at 

573. The Estrada court held that Tison “instructs that the culpable mental state of ‘reckless 

indifference to life’ is one in which the defendant ‘knowingly engage[es] in criminal activities 

known to carry a grave risk of death,’ and it is this meaning that [the California Supreme 

Court] ascribe[s] to the statutory phrase ‘reckless indifference to human life’ in section 

190.2(d).” Id. at 577 (internal citations omitted). In other words, “reckless indifference to 

human life” means that a defendant subjectively appreciated that his or her participation in a 

felony created a grave risk to human life. Id. at 581. 

C. Decision of the California Court of Appeal

In the last reasoned state court decision, the California Court of Appeal made the 

following findings regarding petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient evidence that he 

acted with “reckless indifference to life” during the commission of the burglary and robbery: 

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[D]efendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish 

that he acted with reckless indifference to human life while 

committing the burglary and robbery . . . We disagree. 

“Reckless disregard for human life [is] implicit in knowingly 

engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of 

death . . . .” (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157. . . .) 

Accordingly, “[t]he term ‘reckless indifference to human life’ 

means ‘subjective awareness of the grave risk to human life 

created by his or her participation in the underlying felony.’” 

(People v. Proby, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 928, quoting 

People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578.) 

Defendant, Pennucci, and Cook entered Peterson’s home with 

the intent to steal valuable property from him. They were 

armed with guns, thus demonstrating that they were prepared to 

confront anyone they found in the residence and take the 

property by force if necessary. It was well-known that Peterson 

was a drug user, who himself possessed a gun. In these 

circumstances, “defendant had to be aware of the risk of 

resistance to such an armed invasion of the home and the 

extreme likelihood that death could result.” [internal citations 

omitted] 

Regardless of what role that defendant played in the actual 

shooting, he was liable for the special circumstance because he 

was a major participant in the burglary and robbery, who acted 

with reckless indifference to human life in committing those 

crimes. 

(Dkt. 18, LD 1 at 7-8.) 

D. Analysis

As discussed supra, petitioner “concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish 

that he was a ‘major participant’ in the killing of Keith Peterson . . . .” (Dkt. 15 at 22; see 

Dkt. 22 at 4.) He contends, however, that contrary to the findings of the California Court of 

Appeal, there was insufficient evidence that he acted with “reckless indifference to human 

life” during the commission of the burglary and robbery, as required to support the special 

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circumstances that the murder was committed in furtherance of the burglary and robbery 

within the meaning of California Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(A) and (G). (See Dkt. 15 at 18-

33; Dkt. 22 at 1-5.) Specifically, petitioner asserts there was “no evidence whatsoever about 

the circumstances of the shooting” and “[t]he role of each of the three defendants in the 

shooting is unknown . . . At most, the evidence relied on by the Court of Appeal shows that 

the shooting was foreseeable.” (Dkt. 22 at 3 and 5.) 

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the California Court of Appeal’s finding that 

the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that petitioner acted with “reckless 

indifference for human life” because he “had to be aware of the risk of resistance to such an 

armed invasion of the home and the extreme likelihood that death could result” was an 

objectively reasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Allen, 408 F.3d at 1274. 

The evidence presented at trial established that petitioner planned the burglary and robbery of 

the victim over the course of several months while attempting to recruit several other 

individuals, with varying success, to assist him. (See Dkt. 18, LD 12 at 254-55, 354-55, 525-

29, and 678-79.) It was well-known that the victim was a habitual drug user who kept a 

firearm in his home. (See id. at 103-04, 123-25, and 431-32.) Petitioner determined that “he 

needed three” people to successfully carry out the burglary and robbery, and he searched for 

“an honest thief” to help him. (See id. at 256, 276, and 355.) Although petitioner declared on 

one occasion that he could do it himself, he did not carry out the offenses until he had 

successfully recruited two other crime partners. (See id. at 258-59 and 277-79.) Petitioner, 

Pennucci, and Cook then carried out the burglary and robbery, during which the victim was 

shot six times and killed. (See id. at 212-13, 222, 275-76, 350, and 352.) Following the 

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murder, the three perpetrators argued about who did most of the hard work during the crime, 

and how the proceeds should be distributed between them. (See id. at 347, 350-51, and 398-

99.) 

Based upon this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

rational trier of fact could have reasonably inferred that petitioner assembled and armed a 

group of three perpetrators to ensure that the victim was outnumbered during the burglary and 

robbery precisely because petitioner was subjectively aware of the grave risk that death could 

result from the confrontation between the armed perpetrators and the victim, a well-known 

drug user in possession of a firearm. As petitioner concedes in his traverse, “the evidence . . . 

shows that the shooting was foreseeable.” (Dkt. 22 at 3-5.) Furthermore, a rational trier of 

fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with “reckless 

indifference to human life” regardless of “what role [petitioner] played in the actual 

shooting,” because “reckless indifference to human life” does not require evidence that 

petitioner was the actual killer, or possessed any intent to kill at the time of the shooting. 

(Dkt. 18, LD 1 at 8.) See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(b)-(d). 

Petitioner has therefore failed to demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal was 

objectively unreasonable in concluding that sufficient evidence supported the conviction 

pursuant to the standards set forth in Jackson and Winship. See Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 

1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009); Allen, 408 F.3d at 1274. Accordingly, sufficient evidence 

supported the jury’s special circumstances findings under California Penal Code 

§ 190.2(a)(17), and petitioner’s claim for federal relief should be denied. 

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VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been 

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate 

of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under § 2254 may appeal a district court’s 

dismissal of his federal habeas petition only after obtaining a certificate of appealability from 

a district or circuit judge. A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability only where a 

petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). The certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. See id. 

§ 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the 

showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). 

For the reasons set out in the discussion of the merits, above, jurists of reason would 

not find the result debatable. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court decline to issue a 

certificate of appealability. Petitioner is advised that he may not appeal the denial of a 

certificate of appealability in this Court. Rather, he may seek a certificate from the court of 

appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the California Court of Appeal’s decision denying 

petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. I therefore recommend that 

petitioner’s amended habeas petition (Dkt. 14) be DENIED and this action DISMISSED with 

prejudice. Furthermore, I recommend the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response 

to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991). A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 6th day of January, 2010. 

A 

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