Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00380/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00380-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441fd Removal - Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATRADIUS COLLECTIONS, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00380-GPC-MDD

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 3]

Before the Court is Defendant Atradius Collections, Inc.’s (“Defendant’s”) motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 

3.) The motion has been fully briefed. (See ECF Nos. 5, 6.) The Court deems the motion 

suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

Having reviewed Defendant’s motion and the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth 

below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Defendant’s attempts to collect a debt allegedly owed by 

Plaintiff Michael Murphy (“Plaintiff”). On or about July 31, 2015, Defendant began 

contacting Plaintiff on his cellular phone regarding an alleged owed debt. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 

11, ECF No. 1.) Defendant frequently called Plaintiff thereafter, including but not limited 

to, on July 31, 2015, August 25, 2015, August 23, 2015, May 1, 2015, September 1, 2015, 

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September 8, 2015, September 11, 2015 and October 12, 2015. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges 

that during these calls Defendant failed to immediately notify Plaintiff that it was a debt 

collector attempting to collect a debt. (Id. ¶ 8.) On or about November 17, 2015, Plaintiff’s 

counsel sent a written note of representation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used an 

“automatic telephone dialing system” (ATDS) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place 

its repeated collection calls to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts: (1) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (“FDCPA”), and (2) violations of California’s Rosenthal Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788–1788.33 (“FDCPA”).

Defendant moves to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may seek 

to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The federal court is 

one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New York, 790 F.2d 769, 

774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its 

own subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 

83, 95 (1998). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the district court is 

free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior to trial, resolving 

factual disputes where necessary. See Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 

(9th Cir. 1983). In such circumstances, “[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to 

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed facts will not preclude the trial court 

from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id. (quoting Thornhill 

Publishing Co. v. General Telephone & Electronic Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 

1979)). Plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction, has the burden of establishing 

that jurisdiction exists. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994).

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B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal 

is warranted under Rule 12 (b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see also 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss 

a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a complaint may be 

dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under 

that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual 

allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “To 

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when 

the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the non–conclusory ‘factual 

content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a 

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . 

be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); 

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal conclusions, 

however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); W. Mining Council 

v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court 

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may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, 

documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, 

and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. Lee v. Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). 

DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, Defendant characterizes its motion in part as a motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).1 (Mot. Dismiss at 5, 

ECF No. 3.) When deciding a “factual” Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the burden is on the 

nonmoving party to prove that the court has jurisdiction, see Savage v. Glendale Union 

High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003); the court may consider evidence 

outside the pleadings and should not presume that the allegations of the complaint are true, 

see White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000); McCarthy v. United States, 850 

F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). In contrast, when deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court 

generally may only consider the face of the complaint and any documents attached to or 

referenced in it; the court should presume that the allegations of the complaint are true and 

should construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Enesco Corp. 

v. Price/Costco, Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Defendant argues that the FDCPA does not apply in this case because Defendant’s 

obligation to pay is not a “consumer debt” incurred for “personal, household, or family 

purposes” arising under the FDCPA, but a business–related obligation that is not governed 

by the FDCPA. (Mot. Dismiss at 4, 6, ECF No. 3.) Specifically, Defendant argues that

Plaintiff retained CPA’s services to assist in the renewal of a patent and when Plaintiff 

failed to pay for CPA’s services, CPA forwarded the account to Defendant to collect. (Id.

 

1 Although Defendant’s motion is styled a motion to dismiss pursuant to both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),

Defendant’s motion is limited to arguments relating to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and lacks 

discussion relating to the sufficiency of the Complaint. 

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at 4.) Defendant contends that the debt in question is commercial in nature and does not 

fall under the statutory definition of “consumer debt” under the FDCPA. (Id. at 6.) While 

Defendant may ultimately prevail on this question, the Ninth Circuit has held that whether 

a statutory requirement under the meaning of the FDCPA is met is an element of Plaintiff’s 

claim rather than a jurisdictional threshold. See Turner v. Hawaii First Inc., 903 F. Supp. 

2d 1037, 1041 (D. Haw. 2012) (“whether [Defendant] is a ‘debt collector’ under the 

meaning of the FDCPA is not a jurisdictional fact, but rather an element of [Plaintiffs’] 

claim under the FDCPA”) (citing Bennett v. Am. Med. Response, Inc., 226 F. App’x 725, 

727 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514–15 (2006)

(“[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts 

should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”); Fitzpatrick v. Ass’n of 

Apartment Owners of Kai Malu, No. Civ. 10–00569, 2011 WL 197222, at *1 (D. Haw. Jan. 

19, 2011) (“[Defendants] argue that they are not ‘debt collectors’ under the meaning of the 

FDCPA . . . . Notwithstanding the asserted jurisdictional basis of the motion, these 

Defendants are actually arguing that statutory requirements are not satisfied, not that there 

is no federal jurisdiction question. Therefore, this motion is more properly viewed as a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”); Daley v. Provena Hosps., 88 F. Supp. 2d 

881, 885 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (reviewing defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1) because the motion questioned the applicability of the 

FDCPA). 

Defendant’s challenge the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction based on the absence 

of a statutory requirement under the FDCPA fails. Because the FDCPA’s definition of 

consumer debt is nonjurisdictional, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction 

over Plaintiffs’ federal claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and over Plaintiff’s state law claim

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court nextreviews Defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6).

//

//

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B. FDCPA

To state a FDCPA claim, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the plaintiff has been the 

object of collection activity arising from a consumer debt, (2) the defendant attempting to 

collect the debt qualifies as a “debt collector, and (3) the defendant committed some act or 

omission in violation of the FDCPA. Horowitz v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 14CV2512-

MMA RBB, 2015 WL 1959377, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015); Monreal v. GMAC Mortg., 

LLC, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (S.D. Cal. 2013); see also Gutierrez v. State Farm Mut. 

Ins. Co. (Gutierrez I), 2012 WL 398828, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012); Janti v. Encore 

Capital Grp., Inc., 2010 WL 3058260, at *4 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 3, 2010). Defendant argues 

that the debt in question is not a “consumer debt” under the FDCPA, although Defendant 

appears to suggest that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts supporting the existence of 

consumer debt. (See, e.g., Mot. Dismiss at 4, ECF No. 3 (“While artfully–crafted to allege 

that the debt is a “consumer” debt, the facts are contrary and in fact, directly the opposite.); 

Reply at 2, ECF No. 6 (“The Complaint avoids alleging [certain] facts, attempts to hide, 

by means of artful pleading, the facts that show that the claim is meritless.).) 

The FDCPA defines “consumer debt” as any debt where “the subject of the 

transaction [is] primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692a(5). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that debts incurred for business purposes do 

not fall under the scope of the FDCPA. Bloom v. I.C. Sys. Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068–69 

(9th Cir. 1992) (“The FDCPA protects consumers from unlawful debt collection practices. 

Consequently, the Act applies to consumer debts and not business loans.”). Here, Plaintiff 

alleges that on numerous occasions Defendant contacted Plaintiff in an attempt to collect 

an alleged outstanding debt. (Compl. ¶¶ 5–7, ECF No. 1.) Although Plaintiff alleges that 

Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) and Defendant 

is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA, id. § 1692a(6), that was engaged in the 

business of collecting “debt” as defined by the FDCPA, id. § 1695a(5) (Compl. ¶¶ 2–3, 

ECF No. 1), the Court need not accept these legal conclusions as true. Plaintiff does not 

allege any facts suggesting that the debt in question was a consumer debt incurred 

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“primarily for personal, family, or household use.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Assuming the 

truth of all factual allegations and construing all inferences from them in light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not 

alleged the existence of consumer debt under section 1692a(5) of the FDCPA. The Court 

therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 

Rule 12(b)(6). The Court DISMISSES WITOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

If Plaintiff wishes, he SHALL FILE a first amended complaint to correct the deficiencies 

identified herein within thirty (30) days of the date this Order is electronically docketed. 

The hearing set for April 29, 2016 is hereby VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 27, 2016

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