Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01454/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01454-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Ken Clark, Warden, California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State Prison, 1

Corcoran, is substituted for Kathleen Dickinson, Warden (A), California Medical Facility. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 25(d).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEITH SOMERS,

Petitioner,

vs.

KEN CLARK, Warden, California 1

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and

State Prison, Corcoran,

Respondent.

No. 2:05-cv-01454-JKS

ORDER

[Re: Motion at Docket No. 46]

I. MOTION PRESENTED

Petitioner, Keith Somers, a state prisoner appearing through counsel, filed a petition for

habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. At Docket No. 46, Respondent has moved this

Court to dismiss the petition as moot. Somers, has opposed the motion. In his motion,

Respondent contends that the grant of parole and the Governor’s decision not to review that grant

render this matter moot and the petition should be dismissed. In his opposition to the motion,

Somers contends that the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) misapplied California law in

setting his release date, thereby leaving matters for this Court to decide. Therefore, Somers

argues the matter is not moot. Somers is currently in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment

Facility and State Prison, Corcoran. 

Case 2:05-cv-01454-JKS Document 49 Filed 04/08/10 Page 1 of 6
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II. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

After a jury trial, Somers was convicted of one count each of Murder in the Second

Degree (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)), Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated (Cal. Penal

Code § 191.5(a)), Evading an Officer (Cal. Vehicle Code § 2800.3), Driving Under the

Influence/Injury (Cal. Vehicle Code § 23153(A)), and Driving Under the Influence (Cal. Penal

Code § 23253(B)). Somers was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life on the murder

conviction, six years on the gross vehicular manslaughter charge, three years on the evading an

officer conviction, and two years on each of the driving under the influence convictions. All

terms were to be served concurrently. Somers does not challenge his conviction and sentence.

In his petition, Somers challenges the action of the Board in denying him parole in 2003. 

After the pleadings were complete and the issues joined, this Court stayed further proceedings in

this action pending the issuance of the mandate by the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, rehrg en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th

Cir. 2008), Case No. 06-55392. Respondent was also ordered to inform this Court should

Somers be granted parole. In compliance with this Court’s order, Respondent has advised this

Court that the Board has found Somers suitable for parole, set his parole date, and the Governor

has declined to exercise his authority to review that decision.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED

Respondent contends that, in light of the fact that the Board found Somers suitable for

parole, set his parole date, and that the Governor has declined to exercise his statutory authority

to review that determination, there is no further effective relief that this Court may grant in this

case. Somers counters that the Board erred in determining and setting his release date; therefore,

Case 2:05-cv-01454-JKS Document 49 Filed 04/08/10 Page 2 of 6
See Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). 2

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th Cir. 1999). 3

Serena v. Mock, 547 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Feldman v. Bomar, 518 4

F.3d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 2008)).

 Cal. Code Regs, title 15, § 2403(c). 5

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there are issues remaining to be resolved in order for Somers to be granted complete relief. The

sole issue before this Court is whether, in light of the action by the Board and the Governor, there

is any remaining effective relief that this Court may grant.

IV. STANDARD APPLIED

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider moot claims. “If there is no longer a 2

possibility that [a party] can obtain relief for his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction.” “The basic question in determining mootness is whether there is a 3

present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.” 

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V. DISCUSSION

Somers contends that, although the Board granted him parole and set a release date, the

Board erred in setting his release date. First, Somers argues that the Board applied the wrong

category under the applicable California regulation: the Board should have used a matrix of 17- 5

18-19 years instead of the 19-20-21 years that was used. Somers also argues that the Board

improperly selected the upper term rather than the mid-term despite a prior state court holding

that the mid-term was appropriate. Finally, Somers argues that the Board improperly added onehalf of his concurrent sentence time for the alternative counts as consecutive time, adding three

years for the vehicular manslaughter conviction and one and one-half years for the evading-anofficer conviction. Thus, according to Somers, his correct release date should have been

Case 2:05-cv-01454-JKS Document 49 Filed 04/08/10 Page 3 of 6
 According to Somers, as calculated by the Board, Somers’s release date will not occur 6

until sometime in 2014. The record before this Court does not contain the determination of the

Board. For the purposes of ruling on this motion, the Court assumes that this factual allegation

made by Somers is correct.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-06 (2000); see also

7

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-75 (2003) (explaining this standard). 

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing cases). 8

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calculated as 18 years instead of the 251⁄2 years calculated by the Board. Consequently, Somers

argues, his release date is past and he should be released immediately.6

In arguing against dismissal, Somers correctly points out that he has not been given

complete relief, i.e., he has not yet been released from custody. Somers contends that although

his suitability for parole has been resolved, there remains a controversy to be resolved—the term. 

Somers requests that this matter be remanded to the Board to set a term that would then be

reviewable, and hence, correctable by this Court, citing two California Court of Appeal decisions

to support his position. 

The problem this Court faces is the constraints under which it may grant relief. First,

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court renders its decision or “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 

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Second, this Court may not consider claims that have not been fairly presented to the state

courts. As presented to this Court in his petition and as ruled on by the California courts, the 8

Case 2:05-cv-01454-JKS Document 49 Filed 04/08/10 Page 4 of 6
See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot 9

reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.

639, 653 (1990) (it is presumed that the state court knew and correctly applied state law),

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see also Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982) (challenging the correctness of the application of state law does not

allege a deprivation of federal rights sufficient for habeas relief); Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455

(2005) (a federal court may not lightly presume that a state court failed to apply its own law). 

See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345 (2006) (quoting Smith v. Philips,

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455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982)); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 86 (1983) (per curiam).

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issue was whether the Board had denied him due process of law by relying on the nature of the

underlying conviction in denying him parole. The issue of when Somers was to be paroled, i.e.,

the setting of a parole date, had not yet been determined by the Board and was not presented to

the California Courts.

Third, to the extent that Somers raises issues of the proper application of state law, they

are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. It is a fundamental precept

of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the

criminal law. Federal courts may only intervene in the state criminal process to correct wrongs 9

of a constitutional dimension.10

The relief requested by Somers is foreclosed by all three of these restrictions on granting

federal habeas relief. The factual and legal bases for the issues raised in Somers’s opposition

have never been presented to any state court. Consequently, they are unexhausted. The issues

raised are strictly confined to the proper interpretation and application of state law, which are

beyond the purview of this Court in these proceedings. Somers raises no issue of constitutional

dimension, let alone one that is contrary to clearly established federal law as established by the

Supreme Court. There is no substantial federal constitutional issue remaining to be resolved by

Case 2:05-cv-01454-JKS Document 49 Filed 04/08/10 Page 5 of 6
See American Casualty Co. v. Baker, 22 F.3d 880, 896 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a 11

case is moot if there is no “present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.”).

 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“reasonable jurists

12

could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Second Circuit R. 22. 13

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this Court or upon which this Court could grant Somers relief. To rule on the issue presented in

the petition, this Court would be doing nothing more than rendering an advisory opinion, which

it may not do. Somers’s proper avenue for relief, if any is available, lies in the California state

courts, not a federal court.

VI. CONCLUSION/ORDER

There being no basis upon which this Court can grant effective relief, the matter is

moot. Accordingly, 11

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the motion to dismiss the petition at Docket

No. 46 is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of

Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court declines to issue a Certificate of

Appealability. Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed to the 12

Court of Appeals.13

The Clerk of the Court is to enter final judgment accordingly.

Dated: April 8, 2010.

/s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

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