Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00828/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00828-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES A. PEARSON, )

AIS # 182691, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06cv828-CSC

) (WO)

K.L. BYRD, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

In September 2006, Charles A. Pearson (“Pearson”), filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

against District Attorney Ellen Brooks, Deputy District Attorney Scott Green, Montgomery

Police Officers Kevin Byrd (“Byrd”)and Christopher Gruhn (“Gruhn”), and the Montgomery

County Circuit Court. On September 20, 2006, this court entered a Recommendation that

the claims against Brooks, Green, and the Montgomery County Circuit Court be dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). On November 6, 2006, Byrd and Gruhn filed a

special report and answer. (Doc. No. 14.) 

On November 29, 2006, Pearson filed a motion for an extension of time to file a

response and a motion to join additional defendants. (Doc. Nos. 17, 18, & 19.) This court

granted Pearson’s motions, allowing Pearson to name Don Corkran (“Corkran”), Gary

Reardon (“Reardon”), and Benjamin Harrison (“Harrison”) as defendants in this case. (Doc.

No. 20.) On January 9, 2007, Corkran, Reardon, and Harrison submitted a special report and

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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) and M.D. Ala. LR 73.1, the parties have consented to the United

States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case and ordering the entry of final judgment. 

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answer, in which they assert that, under the circumstances, the use of force against Pearson

was not excessive and that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they were acting

within their discretionary authority as police officers when the incident in the parking lot

occurred. (Id.) 

On May 7, 2007, this court entered an opinion, granting the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to the unlawful arrest claim and denying the motion with

respect to Pearson’s claims of excessive force against Byrd and Gruhn. (Doc. No. 35.) The

court, however, did not discuss Pearson’s excessive force claims against Corkran, Reardon,

and Harrison. (Id.)

The court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants’ January 9, 2007, special report

as a motion for summary judgment.1

 (Doc. No. 24.) Upon consideration of such motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, and the responses filed by Pearson, the court

concludes that the motion for summary judgment with respect to Pearson’s claim that

Corkran, Reardon, and Harrison used excessive force against him in the parking lot is due

to be denied. The court further concludes that, to the extent Pearson asserts that Corkran,

Reardon, and Harrison subjected him to an unlawful arrest, the motion for summary

judgment is due to be granted.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiffs are required to produce some evidence supporting his constitutional claim. See

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). They must “go beyond the pleadings and

... designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 324. A plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient evidence to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995);

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). Consequently, when a party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322;

Barnes v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607 (11th Cir. 1987). Where all the

materials before the court indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir.

1987). Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro

se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Brown

v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). 

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III. FACTS

This court summarized Pearson’s version of the facts in its May 7, 2007, opinion, in

pertinent part, as follows:

On October 3, 2005, Pearson borrowed a friend’s car and

went to the market. (Doc. 6, p. 1.) Along the way, he picked up

a companion. (Id.) During the return trip home, the car stalled.

(Id.) Pearson moved the car into a parking lot and asked his

companion to contact his friend for assistance. (Id.) Pearson’s

companion then left the area. (Id.)

Around the time that Pearson’s car trouble began, Officer

Guy Naguin (“Officer Naguin”) was conducting a separate

investigation. (Doc. No. 14-3, p. 1.) While driving near the area

where Pearson had moved the stalled car, Officer Naguin

observed a brown four-door vehicle speeding down Day Street.

(Id.) The driver of the vehicle was a black male and the

passenger was a black female. (Id.) Officer Naguin also noticed

that the female passenger was holding a beer can in her hand.

(Id.) The brown car ran through the stop sign at the intersection

of Day and Mobile Streets, sliding sideways with locked brakes.

(Id.) The car then proceeded North onto Mobile Street and out

of sight. (Id.) When Officer Naguin turned onto Mobile Street,

he heard patrol units being dispatched to the 600 block of

Mildred Street. (Id.) Officer Naguin then drove to the

intersection of Mobile and Mildred Streets, where he observed

a brown car in a parking lot which appeared to be the same car

he had previously seen traveling onto Mobile Street. 

While Pearson waited in the parking lot for his friend to

come with help, police officers drove into the parking lot, and

one of the officers asked Pearson to approach his police car.

(Doc. No. 6, p. 1.) Pearson complied with the officer’s request.

(Id.) The officer then informed Pearson that the car was

reported as stolen. (Id., pp. 1-2.) When Pearson began

explaining that he had borrowed the car from a friend and that

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he was unaware that the car was stolen, another police officer

shoved him onto the vehicle. (Id., p. 2.) At some point, several

other officers arrived on the scene. The officers used Taser guns

on Pearson, struck and choked him, and dragged him into the

backseat of a police car. (Id.) Pearson did not resist and

attempted to shield himself from the officers’ attack. (Id.) After

Pearson entered the police car, the officers shocked him with

Taser guns, closed the car doors, and sped away from the

gathering crowd of concerned citizens. (Id.) 

(Doc. No. 35, pp. 3-4.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Unlawful Arrest

To the extent Pearson asserts that Corkran, Reardon, and Harrison arrested him

without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court concludes that the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

In Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1996), the Court set forth the following

explanation of the law relating to probable cause to arrest without a warrant:

A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the

Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section 1983 claim.

Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990). An

arrest made with probable cause, however, constitutes an

absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest. Marx, 905

F.2d at 1505. Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he has

reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent

person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the

suspect has committed or is committing an offense. Marx, 905

F.2d at 1505. Probable cause does not require overwhelmingly

convincing evidence, but only “reasonably trustworthy

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2 In addition, Officer Naguin had observed a brown car, which he believed to be the same as

Pearson’s car, speeding through a stop sign with a passenger holding a beer can near the area. (Doc. No. 14-

3, p. 1.) Montgomery Fire Department Chief Kenneth Bolling also noticed a strong smell of alcohol on the

driver’s breath. (Doc. No. 14-4, p.2.) Thus, the officers had reasonably trustworthy information to believe

that Pearson had committed a criminal offense.

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information.” Marx, 905 F.2d at 1506 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225-26, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)).

Id. at 1525. See also United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Probable

cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have facts and circumstances within

their knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or

was committing a crime.").

The undisputed facts establish that Pearson was arrested only after officers were

informed that the vehicle Pearson admitted to driving was stolen. Based on those facts, the

arresting officers had reasonably trustworthy information that would cause a prudent person

to believe that Pearson had committed a crime.2

 Therefore, the officers had probable cause

to arrest Pearson for theft of property. Consequently, the motion for summary judgment with

respect to this claim should be granted in favor of the defendants.

B. The Use of Force

Pearson claims that Corkran, Reardon, and Harrison violated his right to be free from

excessive force. The defendants deny that they used excessive force against Pearson and

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 Pearson does present any material issues of fact demonstrating that Corkran, Reardon, or

Harrison were in any way involved in the incidents of abuse occurring at the police station. Brown

v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990) Therefore, to the extent Pearson asserts that the

defendants used excessive court at the police station, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

due to be granted.

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maintain they are entitled to qualified immunity.3

When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether

the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, and if so, proceed

to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (11th Cir. 2001). While the facts indicate that Pearson had

already been “‘seized’ and, for all intents and purposes, arrested at the time of the alleged

abuses,” it is clear that he had not yet acquired the status of a pretrial detainee. See Calhoun

v. Thomas, 360 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1271-72 (M.D. Ala. 2005). Pearson was not under a formal

arrest at the time the alleged use of force occurred and had yet to be booked into the

Montgomery County Jail. In addition, he had not made an initial appearance before a judge.

Thus, the alleged application of excessive force in this case occurred while Pearson was in

a “legal twilight zone.” Calhoun, supra. An analysis under the Fourth Amendment is

appropriate in post-seizure, pre-detention allegations of excessive force. Id. at 1274.

Consequently, the Fourth Amendment is the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed

by the challenged application of force in this case. Id. See also Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d

1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (analyzing plaintiff’s claim that she was subjected to the use of

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excessive force during a ride to the jail under the Fourth Amendment). 

The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures

encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force. See Graham v.

Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). To determine whether the amount of force used by

a police officer was appropriate, the court must consider “whether a reasonable officer would

believe that this level of force is necessary in the situation at hand.” Willingham v.

Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001). The court must balance “‘the nature and

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 

When balancing the necessity of using some force against an individual’s

constitutional rights, a variety of factors are considered, “including the severity of the crime

at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham,

490 U.S. at 396. Thus, the force used by a police officer “must be reasonably proportionate

to the need for that force, which is measured by the severity of the crime, the danger to the

officer, and the risk of flight.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Pearson alleges that a police officer shoved him onto a patrol car and shocked him

with a Taser gun and that two other officers handcuffed and shackled him. Pearson further

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alleges that, although he did not resist, one of the officers continued to use the Taser gun on

him. He maintains that these officers then threw him into the back of the police vehicle, and

that one of the officers choked and punched him while another officer shocked him with the

Taser gun. Consequently, Pearson has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right. See

Saucier v. Katz, supra. 

The defendants admit that they used some force against Pearson. The defendants,

however, assert that the use of force was necessary because Pearson was a danger to the

officers and nearby citizens. Specifically, the defendants allege that Pearson acted

aggressively toward them, that he did not heed their warnings that he would be “tased” if he

continued to resist, and that he repeatedly refused to comply with their orders. (Corkran’s

Affid.; Reardon’s Affid.; Harrison’s Affid.) Thus, there is a factual dispute concerning

whether there was a need to use force and whether the force used was excessive under the

circumstances. 

The court must also determine whether the officers’ alleged actions violated clearly

established constitutional law. See Saucier, supra. In determining whether qualified

immunity bars the plaintiff’s claim, “[this court] does not look at the subjective intent of the

officers.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002). Rather, “the relevant

dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”

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Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Pearson alleges that, after he complied with the officers’ orders and

did not resist, the defendants handcuffed, shackled, and held him down while Corkran

repeatedly used a Taser gun on him. If the facts asserted by Pearson turn out to be what

actually happened, then Pearson’s excessive force claim would fall within the narrow

category of cases in which the unlawfulness of the conduct is readily apparent. See Smith v.

Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1997). Given the dispute about what happened, the

court cannot conclude that qualified immunity bars the plaintiff’s excessive force claim

against Corkran, Reardon, and Harrison at this time. Of course, at the trial of this case the

court will revisit the issue in accordance with Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1487-88

(11th Cir.1996). The motion for summary judgment with respect to the Fourth Amendment

claim against Corkran, Reardon, and Harrison should be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The motion for summary judgment with respect to the unlawful arrest claim

against the defendants be GRANTED. (Doc. No. 24.)

2. To the extent the plaintiff claims that the defendants used excessive force

against him in the parking lot, the motion for summary judgment be DENIED.

(Doc. No. 24.)

3. The motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining claims be

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GRANTED. (Doc. No. 24.)

Done this 20th day of November, 2007.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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