Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02728/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02728-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

OCTAVIO HERNANDEZ SUAREZ,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

CR. NO. S-02-0246 EJG

CIV. NO. S-06-2728 EJG

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT

SENTENCE

Defendant, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a

motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255. After reviewing the record, the documents

filed in connection with the motion, and the applicable law, the

court has determined the motion may be decided without an

evidentiary hearing because the files and records of the case

affirmatively show the factual and legal invalidity of

defendant’s arguments. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156,

1158-59 (9th Cir. 1989). For the reasons that follow, the motion

is DENIED.

///

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1

 This was the second jury trial. A mis-trial was declared after the first jury was unable to

reach a unanimous verdict, voting 10-2 for guilt.

2

BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted May 12, 2004, following a jury

trial, of one count of conspiracy to distribute more than 50

grams of methamphetamine, and one count of possession with intent

to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.1 At sentencing he affirmed

that he had been convicted of a prior drug felony. He was

sentenced July 30, 2004 to a term of 240 months imprisonment and

120 months supervised release. His convictions and sentence were

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a memorandum

decision filed June 16, 2006. United States v. Suarez, 185 Fed.

Appx. 597 (9th Cir. 2006).

DISCUSSION

Defendant raises three arguments in support of his motion. 

First, he argues his trial attorney was ineffective for failing

to advise him of a plea offer. Second, in a related argument,

defendant contends his counsel was ineffective for failing to

advise him of his right to plead guilty without an agreement. 

Third, defendant argues his prior state conviction should have

been classified as a misdemeanor under federal law, thereby

negating the enhancement he received for a prior felony drug

conviction.

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A. Failure to inform defendant of plea offer

Defendant contends his trial attorney “may” not have

informed him of a plea offer received from the government in

September of 2003, thus violating his sixth amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel. Had this offer been

communicated, argues defendant, he would have accepted it,

elected not to proceed to trial, and have received a much shorter

term of incarceration. 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient and fell below an “objective standard of

reasonableness”, and that but for the deficiencies, “there is a

reasonable probability” the outcome would have been different.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). 

Defense counsel is presumed to have acted reasonably and to have

provided constitutionally adequate assistance. Id. at 690. 

Moreover, second guessing of counsel’s tactical decisions after

conviction cannot form a basis for a claim of ineffective

assistance. 

An attorney’s failure to communicate a plea offer can be

unreasonable conduct under prevailing professional standards. 

See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1466 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In support of his claim, defendant attaches a letter dated

September 16, 2003 from the government to his trial attorney

setting forth the terms of an offer to plead to Count One, in

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exchange for a dismissal of the § 851 information charging a

prior drug felony conviction. Defendant contends he did not know

of the plea offer until provided with the records of his case by

his appellate attorney.

Evidence submitted by the government belies this contention. 

Declarations of defendant’s trial counsel and of the interpreter

establish that plea offers were communicated to defendant by his

attorney through a court-certified interpreter. Bolstering the

declarations are copies of counsel’s time records confirming

meetings with defendant to discuss “offer”, “plea agreement”,

“counter-offer” and “final offer”. Both trial counsel and the

court interpreter explain that defendant was adamant on each

occasion that he was unwilling to except the government’s offer. 

Finally, defendant himself is not sure of the communication, or

lack thereof, of a plea offer. In his memorandum of law in

support of his motion, defendant states that his attorney “may

not have relayed [the] offer. . . .” Memorandum of Law in

Support of Habeas Corpus Motion, p.4 (emphasis added). Based on

the foregoing, this evidence overwhelmingly and “conclusively

show[s]” that defendant is not entitled to relief. See Blaylock,

20 F.3d at 1465, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, this

claim for relief is DENIED.

B. Failure to inform defendant of all options

Defendant also contends that his trial attorney was

ineffective by failing to inform him of the possibility of

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26 5

pleading guilty without an agreement. Specifically, defendant

contends that after his first trial ended in a mistrial, his

attorney should have told him he could plead guilty and receive a

three-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

In support defendant offers his declaration that he was not

informed of all possible options to resolve his case. 

Once again, defendant’s assertions are simply not credible. 

The declarations of trial counsel and the court-certified

interpreter stand in vivid contradiction to defendant’s

unsupported conclusory statement. Defendant, having lost on

direct appeal, is looking for any way he can to ameliorate the

effects of a lengthy term of incarceration. However, he cannot

do it by picking apart the performance of his attorney without

evidence. As the Supreme Court noted, counsel’s performance must

be evaluated without the “distorting effects of hindsight”. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This claim for relief is DENIED.

C. Prior drug conviction

Defendant maintains that his sentence was erroneously

enhanced for a prior state drug conviction which was improperly

classified as a felony, instead of as a misdemeanor. Defendant,

citing the recent Supreme Court Lopez case argues that his

sentence of 180 days for a violation of California Health and

Safety Code § 11351 converts the offense, possession of heroin

for sale, into a misdemeanor. The argument, and defendant’s

reliance on Lopez in support of the argument, are misplaced. In

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Lopez, the Supreme Court made clear that a federal sentence can

be enhanced for a prior state drug conviction only if the offense

is punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances

Act. See United States v. Lopez, 127 S.Ct. 625 (2006). 

Possession of a controlled substance for sale is such an offense. 

See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Defendant’s citation to and reliance on

United States v. Figueroa-Ocampo in his traverse is inapposite. 

In that case the prior state drug conviction was for simple

possession, an offense that could be construed as a misdemeanor

under the federal Controlled Substances Act. United States v.

Figueroa-Ocampo, 494 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2007). See also, 21

U.S.C. § 844(a). The length of the sentence imposed by the state

court is irrelevant to the classification of the offense as a

felony or misdemeanor under federal law. Here, the prior

conviction is for possession for sale, a felony under federal

law. Accordingly, defendant’s sentence was properly enhanced and

this claim for relief is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, defendant’s motion to vacate, set

aside or correct his sentence is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is

directed to close companion case, CIV. NO. S-06-2728 EJG. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2008

 /s/ Edward J. Garcia 

EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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