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Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2000 Decided July 14, 2000

No. 99-3045

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Michael Johnson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00142-01)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Amul R. Thapar, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown,

and Ronald L. Walutes, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Sentelle, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: In 1991, defendant Michael Johnson was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1), which

imposes a prison term on any person who "uses or carries" a

firearm "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime.

Johnson argues that his conviction must be vacated in light of

the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Bailey v. United

States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which clarified the meaning of

"uses" under that statute. We conclude that the evidence

was sufficient to sustain Johnson's conviction, and that the

district court's erroneous, pre-Bailey instruction constituted

harmless error.

I

On February 22, 1991, District of Columbia police officers

arrived at Johnson's apartment building with a warrant authorizing them to search his apartment for evidence of drug

trafficking. As Officer James Flynn approached the door,

defendant emerged from his apartment with a .380 semiautomatic pistol in his right hand. Flynn identified himself as a

police officer. In response, Johnson raised his gun, pointed it

directly at the officer, slowly retreated back into his apartment, and slammed the door.

Within minutes, the police broke down the door to Johnson's apartment. As they entered, they heard someone running through the apartment and then heard loud "crashing

sounds." Although the officers did not find Johnson, they did

find an air shaft that was accessible through a window in his

bathroom. Hanging on a nail in the air shaft was a plastic

bag containing several small packets of crack cocaine and a

loaded .357 revolver with an obliterated serial number. The

officers then detected "something down in the bottom of the

shaft moving around," and immediately called for a canine

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unit. Upon placing the call, the officers began hearing "loud

smashing noises coming from the shaft."

A few minutes later, a resident of one of the building's

basement apartments informed the police that he had an

intruder. The officers entered the man's apartment and

found Johnson in a child's bedroom, lying on the child's bed.

Defendant was clad only in his underwear. On the bed were

the same clothes Johnson had worn when he pointed the gun

at Officer Flynn, and in the clothes were over thirty packets

of crack cocaine and $700 in cash. The ceiling of the dining

room adjacent to the child's bedroom had been "completely

smashed out." Officer Flynn testified at trial that "[t]here

was plaster all over the floor" of the dining room and "a large

hole in the ceiling" leading up into the air shaft. The police

found a .380 semiautomatic pistol--the same one Johnson had

pointed at Officer Flynn--resting on the lip of the hole in the

ceiling.

Johnson was charged with four felonies: possessing with

intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1); using or carrying a firearm--both the .380 semiautomatic pistol and the .357 revolver--during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1); receiving in interstate

commerce a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(k); and assaulting a police officer

with a deadly or dangerous weapon--specifically, the .380

semiautomatic--in violation of D.C. Code s 22-505(b). At

trial, Johnson claimed that he had been sleeping in his bed

when the police broke down his bedroom door, woke him up,

and hit him on the head with a piece of wood. He testified

that he did not own any guns, had nothing to do with illegal

drugs, and had not known about the air shaft until the trial.

The district court instructed the jury that to establish a

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1), the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) "That the

defendant knowingly and intentionally carried or used a

firearm"; and (2) "That the defendant did so during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime." Tr. at 342. Consistent

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with the then-prevailing law of the circuit, the court defined

the first element of the offense as follows:

In order to prove the first element of this offense, the

government must prove the defendant carried or used a

firearm. The government does not have to show that the

defendant bore the firearm on his person, or actively

employed the firearm in any manner. To satisfy this

first element of the offense, it is sufficient if you find that

at a given time the defendant had both the power and the

intention to exercise dominion and control over the firearm.

Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (holding that actual or constructive possession

satisfies the "uses or carries" requirement of section

924(c)(1)). Because Johnson was charged with using or carrying both the semiautomatic and the revolver, the jury

instruction did not distinguish between the two weapons.

Johnson raised no objection.

On May 31, 1991, Johnson was convicted on all counts. He

appealed on a number of grounds, but again did not question

the validity of the section 924(c)(1) instruction. This court

affirmed the convictions. See United States v. Johnson, No.

91-3227, 1993 WL 390062 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 1993).

Two years later, the Supreme Court held in Bailey v.

United States that mere possession is insufficient to establish

"use" of a firearm under section 924(c)(1), and that the

government must instead prove the defendant's "active employment" of the weapon. 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995). On April

22, 1996, Johnson filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct

his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255. The district court

denied the section 2255 motion, but granted Johnson's request for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C.

s 2253(c)(1)(B).

II

On appeal, Johnson argues that the evidence at his trial

was insufficient to support a conviction for violating section

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924(c)(1), and that even if the evidence was sufficient, the jury

instructions were erroneous under Bailey. We consider each

contention below.

A

Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, "viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 'any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " United States v.

Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).1 The government

concedes that, after Bailey, the evidence was insufficient to

establish using or carrying with respect to the .357 revolver,

which was found in a bag hanging on a nail at the top of the

air shaft. See Gov't Opp'n to Mot. to Vacate at 4. Defendant, however, was charged with using or carrying both the

revolver and the semiautomatic. See Indictment, Count 2.

When a defendant is charged on the basis of multiple acts, a

verdict cannot be overturned on the ground that the evidence

is insufficient as to one of them. See Griffin v. United States,

502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991) ("[W]hen a jury returns a guilty

verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with

respect to any one of the acts charged.") (quoting Turner v.

United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420 (1970)).2

__________

1 Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, we need not consider whether defendant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it on direct appeal. See discussion infra

Part II.B.

2 Defendant points out that in Yates v. United States, the

Supreme Court stated that a verdict must "be set aside in cases

where the verdict is supportable on one ground but not on another,

and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected." 354

U.S. 298, 312 (1957). In Griffin, however, the Court held that Yates

applies only where the invalid ground involves legal error, not mere

evidentiary insufficiency. See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56-59. We also

note, as we have before, that an indictment charged in the conjunctive (e.g., one charging that the defendant used a semiautomatic

and a revolver), may be proven in the disjunctive (i.e., by evidence

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Here, there is no question that the evidence was sufficient

to support a conviction for using or carrying the .380 semiautomatic, as Officer Flynn testified that Johnson held it in his

hand and pointed it at him. See Muscarello v. United States,

524 U.S. 125, 130 (1998) ("No one doubts that one who bears

arms on his person 'carries a weapon.' "); Bailey, 516 U.S. at

148 ("The active-employment understanding of 'use' certainly

includes brandishing [or] displaying...."). Indeed, defendant conceded below that there was sufficient evidence to

support his conviction with respect to the semiautomatic. See

Def. Supp. to Mot. to Vacate at 4. Accordingly, we reject

defendant's sufficiency challenge.3

B

Defendant also contends, and the government again concedes, that in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Bailey, the district court erred by conflating the terms

"use" and "carry" and instructing the jury that it could

convict defendant under section 924(c)(1) if it found he had

merely possessed a weapon constructively. See Gov't Br. at

22; see also In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d 759, 770-72 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (noting that "use" requires "active employment,"

and that "carry" requires more than "various attenuated

forms of constructive possession"); United States v. Kennedy,

133 F.3d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The remaining question is

whether we have authority to correct the error. See United

__________

that the defendant used one or the other). See United States v.

Joseph, 169 F.3d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

3 Although defendant does not raise the point, the evidence was

also sufficient to establish that the semiautomatic was used or

carried "during and in relation to" a drug trafficking offense. Cf.

infra Part II.B (noting that defendant does contest the "during and

in relation to" element with respect to his claim of instructional

error). More than thirty packets of crack cocaine were found in

Johnson's clothes, which were lying beside him on the bed. A

reasonable jury could readily have concluded that the drugs had

been on Johnson's person when he pointed the gun at Officer Flynn,

and/or that he had both the gun and drugs with him as he fled down

the air shaft.

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States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 727 (1993); United States v.

Perkins, 161 F.3d 66, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1998). "Ordinarily, where

a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to

raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas

only if the defendant can first demonstrate either cause and

actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent." Perkins,

161 F.3d at 71 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

622 (1998)) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, however, the government did not assert defendant's procedural

default below, and instead argued only that the error was

harmless. See Gov't Opp'n to Def. Mot. at 3. Johnson

contends that this means the government has "waived the

waiver"--i.e., that the government has waived the claim of

defendant's procedural default. As a consequence, defendant

argues, we should not apply the "cause and prejudice" standard. Rather, he urges us to review the case for "harmless

error," the standard applicable on direct appeal when a

defendant has raised the objection at trial, or for "plain

error," the standard applicable on direct appeal when a

defendant has not so objected. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52.

In United States v. Perkins, we surveyed the different

standards of review as well as the ramifications of the government's failure to assert procedural default in the district

court. See Perkins, 161 F.3d at 71-74. We will not do so

again here. Suffice it to say that, as was the case in Perkins,

we need not resolve the standard of review issue because we

conclude that Johnson's conviction must be upheld even if we

employ the standard most favorable to him--harmless error.

See id.; see also Joseph, 169 F.3d at 13 n.7 (finding it

unnecessary to determine standard of review because conviction survived harmless error review); United States v. Toms,

136 F.3d 176, 180 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).

Error is harmless if it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).4

__________

4 Chapman sets the standard for determining, on direct appeal,

whether constitutional error was harmless. Kotteakos v. United

States sets the standard for measuring nonconstitutional harmless

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Where there has been an error in instructions, we have held

such error to be harmless if the jury necessarily found facts

that would have satisfied a proper instruction. In United

States v. Winstead, for example, we found harmless the

failure to give any instruction at all on the element of

materiality in a false statements count, because the jury

returned a guilty verdict on an overlapping mail fraud count

for which it had been instructed on the need to find materiality. 74 F.3d 1313, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In United States

v. Kennedy, a section 924(c)(1) case, we considered an erroneous instruction which, like the one at issue here, "conflated

the terms 'use' and 'carry' " and "defined both [too] broadly."

133 F.3d at 58. Because the defendant in that case was also

convicted of assault for pointing and firing his gun at police

officers, we found that the jury had necessarily "concluded

that appellant carried a gun" while committing an offense

covered by the statute. Id.; cf. United States v. Smart, 98

F.3d 1379, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding error harmless

where, although court improperly defined "using or carrying"

as including constructive possession, jury necessarily found

"carrying" within meaning of s 924(c)(1) because it also convicted defendant of "carrying a pistol without a license").

And we have repeatedly found harmless error in section

924(c)(1) cases where, although the district court erroneously

instructed as to "using," it properly instructed as to "carrying," and the circumstances indicated that the jury necessarily found that carrying had occurred. See Perkins, 161 F.3d

__________

error. 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (holding that nonconstitutional

error is harmless if it did not have "substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury's verdict"). In Brecht v.

Abrahamson, the Supreme Court held that the "less onerous" (from

the point of view of the government) standard of Kotteakos, rather

than that of Chapman, is the appropriate standard for determining

constitutional harmless error on collateral review. 507 U.S. 619,

623 (1993); see id. at 637-38. Although we may have discretion to

do otherwise, we once again give defendant the benefit of the more

favorable standard because the government argued only the Chapman standard below.

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at 74-75; Toms, 136 F.3d at 181; United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Recently, in Neder v. United States, the Supreme Court

found harmless error where the trial judge instructed the

jury that it "need not consider" the materiality of false

statements in a tax fraud case, despite the fact that in an

intervening case the Court had held materiality to constitute

an essential element. 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1831-32 (1999). The

Court made this finding in light of other circumstances and

evidence5--notwithstanding its conclusion that the omission of

a materiality instruction had "preclude[d] the jury from making a finding on the actual element of the offense," id. at 1834,

and that the jury could not fairly be said to have "necessarily"

found materiality, id. at 1837 n.1. Indeed, the Court held

that error can be harmless even if "other facts necessarily

found by the jury" are not the "functional equivalent" of the

omitted or misdescribed element--even under a broad definition of "functional equivalent." Id. at 1836.

We need not press Neder to its limits to decide the case at

bar, because here the jury necessarily found that Johnson

both used and carried the .380 semiautomatic pistol. As in

Kennedy, although the using or carrying instruction was

erroneous, the jury separately convicted Johnson for assaulting a police officer with the same weapon. See Indictment,

Count 4; Judgment (Aug. 2, 1991). The only possible basis

for that conviction is that the jury found Johnson to have

pointed the gun at Officer Flynn--an act that constitutes both

"using" and "carrying." See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 131

(holding that "carry" includes "carrying of weapons directly

__________

5 The government had introduced evidence that Neder failed to

report over $5 million in income. That, the Court said, "incontrovertibly establishes that Neder's false statements were material to a

determination of his income-tax liability. The evidence supporting

materiality was so overwhelming, in fact, that Neder did not argue

to the jury--and does not argue here--that his false statements of

income could be found immaterial." Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1837.

Because it was "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational

jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," the

Court found the error to be harmless. Id. at 1838.

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on the person"); Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148 (holding that "using"

includes "brandishing"); Kennedy, 133 F.3d at 58; cf. Toms,

136 F.3d at 181; Smart, 98 F.3d at 1392-94.

In his reply brief, defendant argues that even if his conviction on the assault charge means that the jury necessarily

found him to have used the semiautomatic, it does not mean

that it necessarily found him to have used the gun "during

and in relation to" a drug trafficking crime. This argument,

made for the first time in the last paragraph of Johnson's

reply brief, comes too late to be considered. See, e.g., Grant

v. United States Air Force, 197 F.3d 539, 542 n.6 (D.C. Cir.

1999). But even if the argument were not too late, it would

certainly be too little. Johnson was convicted of using or

carrying the gun during and in relation to the "drug trafficking crime" charged in the indictment--possessing with intent

to distribute the crack cocaine found in his clothing.6 The

only way in which the semiautomatic could have not been

used or carried in relation to those drugs is if they were not

in his clothing at the time he pointed the weapon at the

officer, and if they somehow traveled down the air shaft and

onto the bed separately from the defendant and his gun. Cf.

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993) ("The phrase

'in relation to' is expansive....").

We decide whether error was harmless based on the evidence at trial, and there was no evidence presented that

would support such an implausible scenario. See Perkins,

161 F.3d at 75. Nor did defendant make such a claim. His

only defense was that he was innocently asleep in bed at the

relevant time. The jury plainly rejected that story when it

convicted him on all charges, which it did, no doubt, because

__________

6 Count 2 of the indictment charged Johnson with using or

carrying a firearm during and in relation to the drug trafficking

crime charged in Count 1. Count 1 charged Johnson with possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base

(crack). As there was substantially less than five grams of cocaine

in the bag found at the top of the shaft, see Tr. at 123, 314, and

substantially more in his clothing, see id. at 22, the jury necessarily

found the drugs in Johnson's clothing to be part of the total.

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the bed in which he was "asleep" was the wrong one: it

belonged not to him but to the child who lived in the

apartment below.

Nor does defendant suggest an exculpatory scenario in his

appellate briefs. Although his reply brief raises the "in

relation to" issue, it suggests no circumstance in which the

jury could have found that he used or carried the weapon

without also finding that he did so during and in relation to a

drug trafficking offense. We have said before that we will

not rest a finding of harm merely on "any hypothetical the

defendant can conjure up." Id. The scenario offered by

defense counsel must be plausible in light of the evidence at

trial, not merely theoretically possible. See id. (citing Smart,

98 F.3d at 1393-94 & n.22). Where, as here, the defense does

not even suggest an exculpatory scenario--plausible or otherwise--we surely will not invent one ourselves.

III

We conclude that the evidence at Johnson's trial was

sufficient to sustain a conviction for violating section 924(c)(1),

and that the district court's erroneous jury instruction was

harmless. We therefore affirm the denial of defendant's

motion to vacate his conviction.

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