Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-57255/USCOURTS-ca9-11-57255-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRYANT KEITH WILLIAMS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-57255

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-04053-

AG-OP

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 4, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed October 23, 2014

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, John T. Noonan,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Noonan;

Dissent by Judge Murguia

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2 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

Reversing the district court’s denial of Bryant Keith

Williams’s habeas corpus petition and remanding, the panel

held that the state trial court’s misstatement that Williams had

pled guilty – a misstatement made immediately before trial

commenced and not corrected until the jury began

deliberating – violated his due process rights by depriving

him of the presumption of innocence, and violated his Sixth

Amendment right to an impartial jury. 

The panel concluded that the California Court of Appeal

decided both Williams’s state and federal claims the same

way: it found error under both state and federal constitutional

law, but concluded that both were harmless. The panel held

that the constitutional error was not rendered harmless by

flawed curative instructions.

Dissenting, Judge Murguia disagreed with the majority’s

conclusion that the California Court of Appeal found state

and federal constitutional error. She would hold that the

California Court of Appeal determined that Williams’s state

and federal constitutional rights were not violated, and that

this was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 3

COUNSEL

William J. Capriola (argued), Sebastopol, California, and

John P. Ward, San Francisco, California, for PetitionerAppellant.

Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles,

California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Bryant Keith Williams seeks federal habeas

relief on the basis that the state trial court’s misstatement that

Williams had pled guilty—a misstatement made immediately

before trial commenced and not corrected until the jury began

deliberating—violated his due process rights by depriving

him of the presumption of innocence, and violated his Sixth

Amendment right to an impartial jury. We agree and reverse

the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

At voir dire, on December 7, 2006, the trial judge stated:

“the defendant has entered a not guilty plea denying that he

is guilty of the[] three charges”—i.e., one count of false

imprisonment and two counts of sexual penetration by a

foreign object. On December 12, 2006, after the jury had

been sworn, the judge stated:

I will now explain the presumption of

innocence and the people’s burden of proof.

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4 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

The defendant has pleaded guilty to the

charges. The fact that a criminal charge has

been filed against the defendant is not

evidence that the charge is true. You must not

be biased against the defendant just because

he has been arrested, charged with a crime, or

brought to trial. A defendant in a criminal

case is presumed to be innocent. This

presumption requires that the people prove

each element of a crime and special

allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Emphasis added.) Trial began that same day. On December

13, after closing arguments, the jury retired to deliberate.

Less than an hour into deliberation, the jury sent the judge

the following note: “As a group we the jury feel we heard the

judge state the defendant pleaded guilty before the trial. Is

this true?”

On the record, before counsel and Williams, the

judge—having reviewed the transcript—admitted hismistake.

Both the court reporter and the district attorney had noticed

the error, but neither said anything. Williams’s counsel

moved for a mistrial.

The judge reserved decision on Williams’s motion. He

summoned the jury and explained his mistake. He stated that

“[t]he defendant has pleaded not guilty. That is why we are

having a trial. If he had pleaded guilty, we wouldn’t be

having a trial. Okay. So I’m sorry. It’s error on my part that

I omitted the word ‘not.’”

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 5

The judge admonished the jury that he had no knowledge

beyond their own as to Williams’s guilt or innocence. He

asked whether any juror would be unable to accept this as

true. The jurors were silent. He raised another concern:

whether “throughout the trial [jurors] didn’t pay attention

because [they] were thinking somehow that he must be guilt

[sic], so in that way it’s tainting the process of [their] ability

to be fair and impartial.” He asked the jury if that was so. The

jurors were silent. He reasserted that Williams had pled not

guilty; asked whether any juror would “not [be] able to set

aside [his misstatement] and be fair to the defendant”; and

invited the jury’s response. The jurors were silent. He ended

with this:

Then is there anyone here who believes that

based on the court’s mistake that they will not

be able to give the defendant his rights in this

case, the rights that I explained to you which

is the right to remain silent, the presumption

of innocence, the burden of proof, and the

standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?

Is there anyone here who believes that based

on the court’s mistake they will not be able to

uphold those rights for the defendant if [sic]

question, please, raise your hand.

No hands were raised. The judge denied Williams’s motion

for a mistrial and the court adjourned for the day.

Two days later, on December 15, 2006, juror number 1

(“Juror 1”) sent the judge the following letter:

I wanted to let you know that I feel a bit

uncomfortable with the happenings that took

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6 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

place on Wednesday regarding the court’s

error in reading that the defendant had

pleaded guilty to the charges. I know common

sense says that if the defendant pleaded guilty,

then there would not be a trial; and that idea

definitely crossed my mind. However, I

decided to override that thought due to the

fact that the court read that he pleaded guilty,

so I thought he was guilty throughout the

entire trial. I did not just say to myself, “The

judge must have made a mistake, I’ll just

assume he pleaded not guilty.” I did not do

this for several reasons:

1. The defense (or prosecution) did not

correct you in your error. Since that is a

crucial part of the instructions, I would

think that someone would have corrected

the court’s error immediately.

2. You originally said that the case would

take 8 days, but then said it would only

take a day and a half. I thought that might

have to do with the defendant pleading

guilty somewhere in between.

3. In my opinion, the defense did not put up

that great an effort to offer alternatives to

the prosecution’s case. To me, another

sign that the defendant had pleaded guilty.

What I am saying in telling you these things is

this: I went through the entire trial thinking

that the defendant had pleaded, and was,

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 7

guilty. I saw everything through that lens. I

think it may be possible to ignore that during

deliberation, but I can not be sure of that. I

also can’t be sure if I subconsciously have

biases, given the false plea; and if I do have

biases, those might play a role in deliberation.

I am sorry I did not bring this to your

attention on Wednesday, but I hadn’t fully

recognized it. I leave it to your discretion as to

whether I am fit to serve on this jury, or if an

alternate is needed in my stead.

The judge read the letter into the record outside the jury’s

presence. Based on this letter, the judge stated, “I do not

believe that [Juror 1] is able to serve on this case.”

Williams’s counsel again moved for a mistrial. She noted

that the judge had thoroughly explained his mistake, had

polled the jury, and yet “we know that at least one person had

grave reservations. And it’s not simply a matter of unringing

the bell . . . because this isn’t something that occurred at the

end of the case. This is something that occurred at the

beginning.” She added: “I don’t think it would be fruitful to

poll [the jury] now because the polling of the jury wasn’t

fruitful Wednesday evening, so I move for a mistrial.”

The court summoned Juror 1. Asked to explain the letter,

Juror 1 told the judge:

[B]ecause you had said that [Williams pled

guilty] and no one objected to that or no one

corrected you, that throughout the trial I had

that in my mind and –

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8 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

[. . .]

That he had pleaded guilty and so throughout

the trial . . . if I heard evidence or heard

testimony to support that fact, that I might

have just said to myself, “Okay. That just

supports his plea,” as opposed to really paying

attention to everything . . . . I had that in my

mind throughout the trial and I kind of looked

at things to support the plea or what I thought

was the plea.

Before being summoned, Juror 1 had told the rest of the

jurors about the note and its content. Juror 1 was dismissed.

The judge convened the remaining jurors, including

alternates, and told them what had happened. The judge

stated:

[Juror 1] was under the assumption that the

defendant had pleaded guilty and so he looked

at the evidence to support the plea. That is

what he said to me.

Now, it cannot be that a juror looks at the trial

from that perspective because then he is not

fair. Right? He is not a fair juror if he is

looking at it to support the plea. So he was

honest about how he looked at the evidence. I

excused him. Now, this is very important,

very, very important obviously that we ensure

that the defendant gets a fair trial. And I fell

on the sword on Wednesday and I am falling

on the sword again. It was my mistake. My

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 9

error. Defendant has never pleaded guilty.

Never. So in listening to the evidence, it could

not be that you were listening to the evidence

to support the plea. That would have been

wrong. That is a point of view that you could

not have in listening to the evidence because

you are supposed to be fair and impartial

throughout the entire trial including the time

in which you are listening to the evidence.

The judge then asked the jurors whether any of them felt

that they had listened to evidence through the lens of the

guilty plea. No juror spoke. Repeating the various

presumptions—silence, innocence, etc.—the judge polled

each juror individually, asking whether they could disregard

the court’s mistake. Every juror answered affirmatively.

Williams’s motion for a mistrial was denied and deliberations

proceeded.

Williams was convicted of one count of false

imprisonment and one of two counts of forcible sexual

penetration by a foreign object. He was sentenced to a

minimum of fifty years.

Williams appealed. The California Court of Appeal

agreed with Williams that “error occurred.” But the court

concluded that the error “was cured and was therefore

harmless under the circumstances.” The California Supreme

Court denied review without comment. On collateral review,

the federal district court agreed that the trial court had “fully

cured [its] error,” and that Williams had failed to negate the

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10 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

presumption that the jury had followed the trial court’s

instructions.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a petition

for habeas corpus. Cavitt v. Cullen, 728 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th

Cir. 2013). Williams’s habeas petition is subject to the

requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, a federal

court may grant a habeas petition with respect to a “claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court” only if the state

court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

AEDPA “leav[es] ‘primary responsibility’ for

adjudicating federal claims to the States.” Johnson v.

Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013) (citing Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2002)). It follows that absent

“evidence lead[ing] very clearly to the conclusion that a

federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court,” a

federal habeas court presumes that the state court reached a

petitioner’s fairly presented federal claim. Id.

No such evidence exists here. Williams’s federal claims

were fully and squarely presented to the California Court of

Appeal: on direct appeal, Williams argued that the trial

court’s misstatement deprived him of his Sixth Amendment

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 11

right to an impartial jury and his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights to the presumption of

innocence. Indeed, at oral argument, the State’s counsel

conceded that the state court had considered and ruled on the

federal constitutional question.

The California Court of Appeal addressed both error and

prejudice in its decision: “According to Williams, the court’s

misstatement was error insofar as it undercut his rights to a

fair and impartial jury that was correctly instructed on the

burden of proof. . . . We agree that error occurred, but

conclude it was cured and was therefore harmless under the

circumstances.”

We are required to defer to the California Court of

Appeal’s determination as to whether federal constitutional

error occurred. In this case, that deference favors Williams.

The state argues, correctly, that California does not require

state courts to “engage in a ‘separate constitutional

discussion’ where a defendant’s federal constitutional claim

merely provides a ‘gloss’” on the state law claim he raises

simultaneously. See also Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 1094–95

(explaining that a state court will often feel no need to rule

expressly on a federal claim because “a line of state precedent

is viewed as fully incorporating a related federal

constitutional right . . . [and the] state appellate court may

regard its discussion of the state precedent as sufficient to

cover a claim based on the related federal right”). We

agree—but this leads to a conclusion opposite to that urged

by the state. Since one claim was “merely . . . a ‘gloss’” on

the other, it is only logical to conclude that the state court

decided both Williams’s state and federal claims in the same

way: it found error under both state and federal constitutional

law, but concluded that both were harmless. See Ayala v.

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12 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

Wong Ayala v. Wong, — F.3d —, No. 09-99005, 2014 U.S.

App. LEXIS 3699, at *4–9 (9th Cir. amended Feb. 25, 2014),

reh’g en banc denied, — F.3d —, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS

3698 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014). Even if we were to read the

state court’s decision as finding error under state law

expressly, we can be sure it would not have reached the

opposite conclusion with respect to federal constitutional

error without even noting that determination. Given the

state’s concession that the state court did decide the federal

constitutional question, we see no possibility that it did not do

so in Williams’ favor.

The determination that federal constitutional error

occurred was not only not contrary to clearly established law,

it was correct.

Statements by the trial court are “viewed as definitive and

binding statements of the law” and carry great weight with

the jury. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990)

(citations omitted). While it is true that a single statement

must not be judged in artificial isolation, see Boyd v. United

States, 271 U.S. 104, 107 (1926), the trial judge’s

misstatement—not caught or corrected until deliberation—

demonstrably infected the entire trial. Wrote the jury after

testimony, argument of counsel, and receipt of exhibits in

evidence: “As a group, we the jury feel we heard the judge

state the defendant pleaded guilty before the trial.” (Emphasis

added.)

Had the trial court’s misstatement gone uncorrected, it

would have violated Williams’s due process rights. In Dixon

v. Williams, — F.3d —, No. 10-17145, 2014 U.S. App.

LEXIS 11025 (9th Cir. amended June 11, 2014) (per curiam),

the trial court misstated the instruction for self-defense.

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 13

Rather than stating, correctly, that an “honest but

unreasonable belief in the necessity for self-defense does not

negate malice,” the state trial court said “honest but

reasonable belief.” Id. at *4–5 (emphasis in original). That

error, this court held, was constitutionally infirm for reducing

the state’s burden. Id. at *15 (citing Cool v. United States,

409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972)). Here, had the trial court’s

misstatement gone uncorrected, it would have eliminated the

state’s burden entirely.

1

One juror, moreover, admitted that the judge’s

misstatement had impaired his ability to remain impartial—a

clear Sixth Amendment violation. See Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (Sixth Amendment guarantees right

to trial by impartial jury); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722

(1961) (same). Had the misstatement gone uncorrected, the

error would have been structural for “vitiat[ing] all the jury’s

findings.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993)

(emphasis in original).

But the trial judge attempted to correct the misstatement.

Did he succeed?

1

“The state court ‘d[id] not believe that a reasonable juror would

conclude that a trial was underway for a defendant who had pleaded guilty

after [also] being told the defendant’s guilt had to be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ However, ‘general instructions on the State’s burden

of persuasion and the defendant’s presumption of innocence are not

‘rhetorically inconsistent with a conclusive . . . presumption [such as a

guilty plea],’ because ‘[t]he jury could have interpreted the two sets of

instructions as indicating that the [plea] was a means by which proof

beyond a reasonable doubt . . . could be satisfied.’’ Francis v. Franklin,

471 U.S. 307, 319 (1985) (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,

518–19 n.7 (1979)); see also id. at 322 (‘A reviewing court has no way of

knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied

. . . .’).”

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14 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

Juries are presumed to follow the court’s instructions,

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987), but that

presumption may be overcome when “there is an

‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to [do

so], and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence

would be ‘devastating’ to the defendant.” Greer v. Miller,

483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (citing Richardson, 481 U.S. at

208; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968)).

Under Richardson, this court presumes that Williams’s

jury credited the judge’s misstatement that Williams had pled

guilty—at least until the error was revealed. This presumption

is corroborated by the jury’s letter to the court asking whether

it was true that the judge had stated that the defendant had

pled guilty before trial.

There can be no dispute that during trial the jury’s view

of the evidence was seriously compromised by the judge’s

misstatement. But was the misstatement cured? Not by the

judge’s first instruction. The jury was polled, as a group, to

assess compliance and no juror demurred. Yet two days later

Juror 1 indicated that the judge’s misstatement had affected

how he had listened to, heard, and processed the evidence. It

had affected his ability to remain impartial.

The judge’s second curative instruction fared better: no

juror voiced his or her inability to remain impartial; and this,

argues the State, is proof that it worked. But the jury’s silence

proves only that it was silent—not why. And record evidence

supports Williams’s contention that the judge’s extraneous

monologue, which preceded polling, silenced the jury.

Rather than explain Juror 1’s statements, poll the jury,

and leave it at that, the judge rebuked Juror 1 for his

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 15

“reservations about his ability” to ignore the judge’s

misstatement. Juror 1, declared the judge, was “not a fair

juror.” The implication was clear: any juror who questioned

her ability to disregard the judge’s misstatement was “not

fair.” The judge continued:

So in listening to the evidence, it could not be

that you were listening to the evidence to

support the plea. That would have been

wrong. That is a point of view that you could

not have in listening to the evidence because

you are supposed to be fair and impartial

throughout the entire trial including the time

which you are listening to the evidence.

(Emphases added.)

Told that “it could not be” that the judge’s misstatement

had affected her judgment—told that “[t]hat would have been

wrong”—what juror would admit that her judgment had been

affected? Told that she “could not have” a point of view that

naturally flowed from the judge’s misstatement, what juror

would admit to having that point of view? What juror would

concede in open court that she was not “fair and impartial”?

It is all well and good to rely on the “naive assumption that

prejudicial effects can be overcome” bya curative instruction,

Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)

(Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted); but it is a

different matter entirely to fault, in open court, jurors unable

to engage in the requisite “mental gymnastic,” Nash v. United

States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.); cf.

Toolate v. Borg, 828 F.2d 571, 574 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting

that the Supreme Court has recognized, in Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123, 135–36 (1968), and Jackson v. Denno,

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16 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

378 U.S. 368, 388–89 (1964), that confessions—and by

extension, those reported by the court as guilty pleas—have

a “powerfully incriminating effect” and are therefore

particularly difficult for a jury to disregard). The judge’s

digression silenced the jury, raising serious doubts as to the

efficacy of the second curative instruction.

As the California Court of Appeal concluded, the trial

judge’s misstatement was constitutional error. Where

constitutional error is found, we assess its prejudicial impact

under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). See

Merolillo v. Yates, 663 F.3d 444, 454 (9th Cir. 2011). We do

so, moreover, “without regard for the state court’s

harmlessness determination”—without, in other words,

analyzing under AEDPA whether the state court’s

harmlessness determination was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

Pulido v. Chrones, 629 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010). Only

Brecht, and not the “clearly established Federal law”

standard, applies here.

Under Brecht, habeas petitioners are entitled to relief if

the error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637

(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)). The Kotteakos Court explained:

[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after

pondering all that happened without stripping

the erroneous action from the whole, that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the

error, it is impossible to conclude that

substantial rights were not affected. The

inquiry cannot be merely whether there was

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 17

enough to support the result, apart from the

phase affected by the error. It is rather, even

so, whether the error itself had substantial

influence. If so, or if one is left in grave

doubt, the conviction cannot stand.

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764–65 (internal citations omitted).

Viewed in the context of the trial as a whole, the judge’s

initial misstatement and his ineffective attempts to cure it

were devastating to Williams. The State’s case was hardly

overwhelming; it relied almost entirely on Christyn’s

testimony. The only other evidence presented by the State

was the recording of a phone call from Williams to Christyn

several weeks after the incident—a recording that, at most,

demonstrated that Williams and Christyn had had some sort

of falling out. No physical evidence and no other eyewitness

testimony tied Williams to the crime. It was therefore of the

utmost importance that jurors presumed him innocent when

they heard and evaluated Christyn’s testimony. Because we

conclude that it is highly unlikely that the attempted curative

instructions rendered the constitutional error harmless, the

error was prejudicial under Brecht.

Williams was convicted on the basis of the victim’s

testimony, which the jury heard while under the impression

that Williams had pled guilty—in other words, while under

the impression that he was guilty. It is, we find, impossible to

say that the “judgment was not substantially swayed by the

[trial judge’s] error.” Williams’s conviction must be reversed.

* * *

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18 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

“[T]rial by jury has been understood to require that ‘the

truth of every accusation . . . be confirmed by the unanimous

suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s] equals and

neighbors.’” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477

(2000) (emphasis and second brackets in original) (quoting

4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 343

(1769)). Where the judge assigns guilt, even inadvertently, he

strips the jury of its fundamental role and subverts the

requirement that the jury must confirm the truth of every

accusation. “The principle that there is a presumption of

innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,

axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the

foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Coffin

v. United States, 156 US. 432, 453 (1895).” The

constitutional error is manifest. It was not rendered harmless

by the flawed curative instructions.

We reverse the district court’s denial of Williams’s

petition for writ of habeas corpus, and remand with

instructions to grant a writ requiring the state to release him

from custody unless it initiates new trial proceedings within

a reasonable period of time to be determined by the district

court. REVERSED and REMANDED.

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the

California Court of Appeal found state and federal

constitutional error. I would hold that the California Court of

Appeal determined that Williams’s state and federal

constitutional rights were not violated. I would further hold

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 19

that this was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

I.

Under California law, a defendant’s right to a fair and

impartial jury can be violated when there is an objective,

substantial likelihood of juror bias. See People v. Ramos,

101 P.3d 478, 497 (Cal. 2004). The court of appeal’s decision

reads as follows:

According to Williams, the court’s

misstatement was error insofar as it undercut

his rights to a fair and impartial jury that was

correctly instructed on the burden of proof. He

contends that despite these steps, the court’s

error could not be cured because, viewed

objectively, it was so prejudicial that it was

inherently and substantially likely to have

influenced a juror. (See People v. Ramos

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 519.) We agree that

error occurred, but conclude it was cured and

was therefore harmless under the

circumstances.

The one juror who was biased due to the

court’s error was removed. Even though the

error obviously affected that juror, we do not

believe, when the record is viewed as a whole,

that the error was inherently and substantially

prejudicial on an objective basis.

The court of appeal finally concluded that “[u]nder wellestablished principles of harmless error concerning trial court

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20 WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT

instructional misstatements, we hold that the error was

cured,” citing three jury instruction misstatement cases

where, despite the trial court making a misstatement while

instructing the jury, the court of appeal ultimately concluded

that the misstatement was harmless and did not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. See People v. Robinson,

124 P.3d 363, 396 n.24 (Cal. 2005) (harmless error where

trial court mistakenly told the prospective jurors that “race is

not to be considered until reaching the penalty” but later

properly and repeatedly told the jury that race had no place in

its decision-making process) (emphasis in original); People

v. Box, 5 P.3d 130, 169 (Cal. 2000) (harmless error where

trial court misspoke while instructing jury but gave jury

correct written instructions).

It is clear from the court of appeal’s decision that it did

not find constitutional error because, as in each of the cases

it cited, the trial court’s error was harmless and did not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation. We then presume that

the court of appeal also held that the trial court’s

misstatement was not a federal constitutional violation. See

Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094–96 (2013)

(holding that even where a state court does not separately

discuss a federal claim there is a presumption that the state

court adjudicated the federal claim on the merits). We review

this adjudication of the merits of Williams’s claim—that the

trial court’s misstatement that Williams had pled guilty did

not violate Williams’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights—under AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

II.

In my view, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion

that Williams’s federal constitutional right to an impartial

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WILLIAMS V. SWARTHOUT 21

jury was not violated was not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . .

shall not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the claim

. . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law).

There is no per se rule that it is a constitutional violation

when a trial court makes a statement like the regrettable

statement made in this case. A trial court that realizes that it

has made a misstatement of this nature has two options: first,

declare a mistrial, or second, try to cure the error rather than

begin the trial anew. The trial court here decided to take the

latter approach and went to great lengths to cure its

misstatement. After the jury brought the trial court’s

misstatement to its attention, the trial court repeatedly and

emphatically acknowledged its error before the jury, twice

instructed the jury correctly on the presumption of innocence

and the state’s burden of proof, repeatedly questioned the

jurors about whether they remained confused about the

presumption of innocence and the state’s burden, and polled

the jurors on whether they harbored any doubts as to their

ability to fairly deliberate. I disagree with the majority that

the trial court’s second curative instruction operated as a

rebuke that silenced the jurors.

In my view, because no other jurors came forward, a

fairminded jurist could conclude that the trial court’s

measures were sufficient to cure its misstatement. Therefore,

the California Court of Appeal’s decision that Williams’s

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated

was not unreasonable, and we do not reach prejudice under

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent.

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