Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00742/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00742-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

TERRY WAYNE LANFORD, #157 638, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-742-GMB

 ) [WO]

MEDICAL DOCTOR, MR. PEASANT, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action involves a dispute over the adequacy of medical care and 

treatment afforded Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Ventress Correctional Facility in 

Clayton, Alabama. Plaintiff names Dr. John Peasant as the defendant. Plaintiff seeks damages, 

costs and attorney’s fees, and trial by jury. Doc. 1.

Defendant filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary materials addressing 

Plaintiff’s claims for relief. In these documents, Defendant argues this case is due to be dismissed 

because Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust an administrative remedy available to him through the 

prison system’s medical care provider, Corizon, Inc., prior to initiation of this case. Doc. 12 at 14–

16. Defendant bases his exhaustion defense on Plaintiff’s failure to submit any medical grievances

regarding the claims presented. Doc. 12-2 at 6. In addition, Defendant maintains—and the 

evidentiary materials, including Plaintiff’s medical records, indicate—that Plaintiff received 

appropriate medical treatment during the time relevant to the matters alleged in the complaint. 

Docs. 12-2 & 12-3. 

																																																												 1 Previously, upon the parties’ consent, this case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge to conduct all proceedings, including trial, and order the entry of final judgment in accordance with 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Doc. 18.

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 1 of 7
2

On January 8, 2016, the court provided Plaintiff an opportunity to file a response to 

Defendant’s special report in which he was advised to “specifically address Defendant’s argument 

that he [] failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).” Doc. 15 at 1 (footnote omitted). The 

order advised Plaintiff his response should be supported by affidavits or statements made under 

penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. Doc. 15 at 2–3. This order further cautioned 

Plaintiff that unless “sufficient legal cause” is shown within ten days of entry of this order “why 

such action should not be undertaken, the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for 

his filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special 

report and any supporting evidentiary materials as . . . a motion to dismiss and (2) after considering 

any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion in accordance with law.” Doc. 15 at 3–

4. Plaintiff’s response was due on or before January 29, 2016, Doc. 15, but he has filed no response 

as of this date.

Pursuant to the January 8, 2016 order, the court deems it appropriate to treat Defendant’s 

special report as a motion to dismiss regarding the exhaustion defense. This case is now pending 

on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1374-1375 (11th Cir. 2008)

(“[A]n exhaustion defense . . . is not ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment 

[motion]; instead, it should be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a 

motion for summary judgment.”); see also Trias v. Fla. Dept. of Corrs., 587 Fed. App’x 531, 534 

(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that district court properly construed defendant’s “motion for summary 

judgment as a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies”). Therefore, the 

court will treat Defendant’s report as a motion to dismiss.

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 2 of 7
3

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In addressing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e regarding exhaustion, the Eleventh 

Circuit has

recognized that “[t]he plain language of th[is] statute makes exhaustion a 

precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 

1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 

641, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1999)). This means that “until such administrative remedies 

as are available are exhausted,” a prisoner is precluded from filing suit in federal 

court. See id. (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil rights suit for failure to satisfy 

the mandatory exhaustion requirements of the PLRA); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 

1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (“reaffirm[ing] that section 1997e(a) imposes a 

mandatory requirement on prisoners seeking judicial relief to exhaust their 

administrative remedies” before filing suit in federal court), modified on other 

grounds, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Miller v. Tanner, 196 F.3d 1190, 

1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that under the PLRA’s amendments to § 1997e(a), 

“[a]n inmate incarcerated in a state prison . . . must first comply with the grievance 

procedures established by the state department of corrections before filing a federal 

lawsuit under section 1983”); Harper v. Jenkin, 179 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 

1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s civil suit for failure to satisfy 

the mandatory exhaustion requirements of § 1997e(a)); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 

F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s Bivens action 

under § 1997e(a) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit 

in federal court).

Leal v. Ga. Dept. of Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Circuit has, 

therefore, determined that “the question of exhaustion under the PLRA [is] a ‘threshold matter’

that [federal courts must] address before considering the merits of the case. Because exhaustion 

is mandated by the statute, [a court has] no discretion to waive this requirement.” Myles v. MiamiDade County Correctional and Rehabilitation Dept., 476 Fed. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012)

(quoting Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004), and Alexander v. Hawk, 159 

F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1998)).

“When deciding whether a prisoner has exhausted his remedies, the court should first 

consider the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ versions of the facts, and if they conflict, take the 

plaintiff’s version of the facts as true. If in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint 

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 3 of 7
4

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed. If the complaint is 

not subject to dismissal at this step, then the court should make specific findings in order to resolve 

the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” Myles, 476 Fed. App’x at 366 (internal citaitons 

and quotations omitted). A district court “may resolve disputed factual issues where necessary to 

the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust [without a hearing].” Trias, 587 Fed.

App’x at 535. “The judge properly may consider facts outside of the pleadings to resolve a factual 

dispute as to exhaustion where doing so does not decide the merits, and the parties have a sufficient 

opportunity to develop the record.” Id. (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376). 

 Upon review of the complaint, Defendant’s special report, and the evidentiary materials 

filed in support thereof, the court concludes that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is due to be 

granted.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff challenges the adequacy of medical care received at the Ventress Correctional 

Facility for conditions associated with his contraction of Hepatitis B and C. Doc. 1; see also Doc. 

12. In response to the complaint, Defendant denies he provided Plaintiff with constitutionally 

inadequate medical care and argues this case is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the institutional medical care provider prior to 

filing this complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As 

explained above, federal law directs this court to treat Defendant’s response as a motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust an administrative remedy and allows the court to look beyond the pleadings 

to relevant evidentiary materials in deciding the issue of proper exhaustion. See Bryant, 530 F.3d 

at 1375.

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 4 of 7
5

The Prison Litigation Reform Act compels exhaustion of available administrative remedies 

before a prisoner can seek relief in federal court on a § 1983 complaint. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a) states that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The 

Supreme Court has summarized § 1997(e)(a) as requiring “that an inmate must exhaust irrespective 

of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative remedies.” Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about 

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they 

allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Moreover, “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 93 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules [as a precondition to filing suit in federal court] because no adjudicative 

system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the courts of its 

proceedings . . . . Construing § 1997e(a) to require proper exhaustion . . . fits with the general 

scheme of the PLRA, whereas [a contrary] interpretation [allowing an inmate to bring suit in 

federal court once administrative remedies are no longer available] would turn that provision into 

a largely useless appendage.” Id. at 90–91 & 93. The Supreme Court reasoned that because proper 

exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary, an inmate cannot “satisfy the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement . . . by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective 

administrative grievance or appeal[,]” or by effectively bypassing the administrative process 

simply by waiting until the grievance procedure is no longer available to her. Id. at 83–84; Bryant,

530 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005)) (“To 

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 5 of 7
6

exhaust administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must ‘properly take each 

step within the administrative process.’”); Johnson, 418 F.3d at 1157 (holding that inmate who 

files an untimely grievance or spurns the administrative process until it is no longer available fails 

to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA); Higginbottom, 223 F.3d at 1261 (holding that 

inmate’s belief that administrative procedures are futile or needless does not excuse the exhaustion 

requirement). “The only facts pertinent to determining whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s 

exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 

491 Fed. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012). 

The record is undisputed that the health care provider for the Alabama Department of 

Corrections provides a grievance procedure for inmate complaints related to the provision of 

medical treatment. Doc. 12-2. Defendant submitted evidence reflecting that when inmates are 

processed into the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections they are informed of the 

process and procedure for obtaining medical care and medication and are also educated about the 

availability of the medical grievance process whereby they may voice complaints regarding any 

medical treatment sought or received during their incarceration. Doc. 12-2. Inmate grievance 

forms are available to inmates at Ventress to submit a grievance related to the provision of health 

care, inmate grievances are answered within approximately five days of receipt of the grievance, 

and the inmate grievance form provides information about how an inmate may appeal the response 

he receives to his initial inmate grievance. Doc. 12-2. A written response to a formal grievance 

appeal is provided in approximately five days of receipt. Doc. 12-2. Inmates are provided with a 

copy of the completed grievance and/or grievance appeal containing the health service 

administrator’s response. Doc. 12-2. Defendant’s evidence indicates Plaintiff has submitted no 

medical grievances or medical grievance appeals of any kind. Docs. 12-2 & 12-3.

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 6 of 7
7

The court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the exhaustion defense raised by 

Defendant in his motion to dismiss but he did not do so. The court, therefore, finds a grievance 

system is available at Ventress for Plaintiff’s claims, but he failed to exhaust the administrative 

remedy available to him. Plaintiff does not dispute his failure to submit any grievances related to 

the provision of his medical care at Ventress, and the unrefuted record before the court 

demonstrates he failed to properly exhaust an administrative remedy available to him at the 

institution regarding his allegation of inadequate medical care prior to seeking federal relief, a 

precondition to proceeding in this court on his claims. Any grievances filed after initiation of this 

federal cause of action do not affect Plaintiff’s proper exhaustion of the administrative remedy 

provided by the facility’s medical provider. Terry, 491 Fed. App’x at 83. 

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion seeking dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 

available administrative remedies shall be granted, and such dismissal shall be without prejudice. 

See Ngo, 548 U.S. at 87–94; Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374–75 (dismissing for failure to exhaust an 

administrative remedy when the remedy remains available is not an adjudication of the merits and 

is without prejudice); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87–94.

A separate Judgment will issue.

DONE on this 27th day of April, 2016.

/s/ Gray M. Borden 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 2:15-cv-00742-GMB Document 19 Filed 04/27/16 Page 7 of 7