Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00146/USCOURTS-alsd-2_08-cv-00146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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On November 9, 2007, Michael B. Mukasey became the Attorney

General for the United States and should, therefore, be substituted

for Peter D. Keisler, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1). 

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Petitioner has been in the actual custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. 

“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present

physical custody with the United States, he should name his warden as

respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.” 

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KELVIN PYNE, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : 

CIVIL ACTION 08-146-WS-M 

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,1 : 

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

WARDEN DAVID O. STREIFF, : 

Respondents. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Kelvin Pyne, a

citizen and native of Jamaica, who has been detained by the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (Doc. 1).2 This action has been

referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c) and is now ready for

consideration. The record is adequate to determine Petitioner's

claims; no evidentiary hearing is required. It is recommended

that the instant petition be dismissed.

In his petition, Petitioner states that he entered this

country on December 25, 1991 (Doc. 1, p. 2). Pyne asserts that

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Petitioner admitted to several convictions in his Complaint

(Doc. 1, p. 1).

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he was taken into custody by agents of the U.S. Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter ICE) and that on

March 1, 2007, an Order was entered that he should be removed

from this country (see Doc. 1). Petitioner maintains that he has

been detained for too long and that such detention is improper

(id. at pp. 2-3). Pyne seeks release from custody (id. at p. 3). 

Petitioner filed this action on March 17, 2008 (Doc. 1).

Respondents subsequently filed a Response, stating that

Petitioner is being detained through his own failure to cooperate

with United States authorities (Doc. 12). More specifically,

Respondents assert that Pyne refused to cooperate, on two

separate occasion, with ICE’s efforts to repatriate him; they

further assert that he only began to provide requested

information on April 7, 2008 (Doc. 12, pp. 1-2). Respondents

argue that Petitioner’s confinement is proper, in light of Pyne’s

obstruction of the legal process, and that this action should be

dismissed as this action, in light of his behavior, is premature

(id. at pp. 2-3). 

The evidence of record demonstrates that Petitioner has been

convicted of possession and sale of marihuana in the New York

State Courts on numerous occasions (se Doc. 12, Exhibit A, p.

2).3 Following an evidentiary hearings, a U.S. Immigration Judge

found that Petitioner was not a U.S. Citizen and should be

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The Court notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1231, entitled “Detention and

removal of aliens ordered removed,” states, in pertinent part, as

follows: 

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney

General shall remove the alien from the United

States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the "removal period").

(B) Beginning of period

The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes

administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien, the date

of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration

process), the date the alien is

released from detention or

confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in

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deported to Jamaica (see Doc. 12, Exhibit A). A sworn statement

by Calvin Anderson, an ICE Deportation Officer, indicates that

Pyne, on two separate occasions, refused to cooperate with the

Jamaican Consulate (Doc. 12, Exhibit B). Anderson further

testified that Petitioner began to cooperate only as recently as

April 7, 2008, by answering questions which were necessary to the

repatriation process (id.).

The United States Supreme Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001), held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers

jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain actions such as this. 

In interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231,4 the Zadvydas Court held that

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detention during such extended period if the

alien fails or refuses to make timely

application in good faith for travel or other

documents necessary to the alien's departure or

conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal

subject to an order of removal.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1231. 

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the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States. It does not permit indefinite

detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. The Court went on to

hold that “six months [was] a presumptively reasonable period of

time to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation” pursuant

to § 1231. See Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1051 (11th

Cir. 2002). The Zadvydas Court further stated, however, that “an

alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

In Akinwale, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that

the six-month-period “must have expired at the time [the

Petitioner’s] petition was filed in order to state a claim under

Zadvydas.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. The Akinwale Court also

noted that the six-month-period could be interrupted by a

petitioner’s motion for a stay of deportation or removal; this

interruption would necessarily include whatever time was needed

for the court, to which such motion had been made, to rule. 

Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 n.4. 

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The Court has read Plaintiff’s Supplemental Pleadings (Docs. 13,

15) and finds nothing there which leads this Court to believe that his

continued detention is not the product of his own actions. 

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This Court notes that statutory language, previously set

out, allows for a petitioner’s detention period to be extended

“if the alien fails or refuses to make timely application in good

faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's

departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal

subject to an order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pelich v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d

1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003), addressed this issue in a similar

case and held the following: 

The risk of indefinite detention that

motivated the Supreme Court's statutory

interpretation in Zadvydas does not exist

when an alien is the cause of his own

detention. Unlike the aliens in Zadvydas,

Pelich has the “keys [to his freedom] in his

pocket” and could likely effectuate his

removal by providing the information

requested by the INS. 

Id. (citing Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999).

The evidence shows that Pyne has obstructed the removal

process and that his actions have led to his continued

detention.5 As such, Petitioner cannot prove that “there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The Court finds that Pyne’s

continued detention is not improper under 8 U.S.C. §

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1321(a)(1)(C).

Therefore, it is recommended that this action be dismissed

and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondents Michael B.

Mukasey, Michael Chertoff, and David O. Streiff and against

Petitioner Kelvin Pyne.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

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A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 20th day of June, 2008.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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