Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01660/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01660-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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C-05-1660 DISCOVERY ORDER Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERITY, INC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INXIGHT SOFTWARE, INC,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 05-1660 CRB (JL)

ORDER 

Granting Docket # 51 and granting in

part and denying in part Docket # 67 

Introduction

Inxight submitted two separate letter briefs on discovery disputes. Verity submitted

two separate letter briefs in opposition. The letter brief at docket # 51 concerns the

deposition of Brian DiSilvestro, Docket # 70 is Verity’s opposition. The letter brief at docket

#67 concerns the deposition of Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan and production of documents,

Docket # 71 is Verity’s opposition. The briefs did not appear on the Docket Activity Report

for this court and the parties did not submit courtesy copies. The court only became aware

of these briefs fortuitously one month after they were e-filed. 

The court hereby grants the motion to compel further deposition of Brian DiSilvestro

(Docket # 51). Mr. DiSilvestro’s deposition and any other 30(b)(6) depositions of Verity

shall be completed before September 30, 2005. 

The court grants in part and denies in part the motion to compel production of

documents and further deposition answers from Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan (Docket # 67).

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C-05-1660 DISCOVERY ORDER Page 2 of 9

The motion to compel production of documents is denied. However, Dr. Raghavan shall

answer the questions propounded by Inxight to which Verity’s counsel objected on grounds

of attorney-client privilege, with respect to his knowledge of conversations or

communications between Verity and its counsel. His deposition shall be completed before

September 30, 2005.

Docket # 51 – Motion to Compel DiSilvestro 30(b)(6) Deposition

Inxight moves to compel further deposition of Brian DiSilvestro as corporate

designee for Verity. Inxight has already deposed this witness for seven hours in his

individual capacity. Verity opposes this motion on the grounds that it “informed Inxight that

it would produce witnesses – including Mr. DiSilvestro – in response to Inxight’s 30(b)(6)

notice for a total of seven hours on all topics.” Verity offers to produce Mr. DiSilvestro

“provided that Inxight reciprocate in good faith by producing Mr. Hersey for further

deposition on Verity’s Rule 30(b)(6) topics. . .”

This court has previously ordered Inxight to produce Ian Hersey for an additional

four hours of deposition, even though he has already been deposed for two seven hour

days. This court hereby orders Verity to make Mr. DiSilvestro available to testify as a

30(b)(6) witness for a full seven hour day. If Mr. DiSilvestro is not able to testify on any of

the noticed topics, Verity shall designate another witness to testify. Each 30(b)(6) deponent

shall be made available for a full seven hour day, pursuant to Rule 30(d)(2). Accordingly

the motion to compel at docket # 51 is granted. Depositions shall be completed before

September 30, 2005.

Docket # 67 - Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Further Deposition

This court has previously held that fact discovery closed July 29 and that motions to

compel production of documents were due on or before August 9. The letter brief

requesting production of documents was e-filed August 19. This court has also previously 

ruled on the Extractor documents. For both reasons, Inxight’s motion to compel production

of documents in its letter brief at docket # 67 is denied.

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C-05-1660 DISCOVERY ORDER Page 3 of 9

With respect to the remainder of docket # 67, Inxight moves to compel deposition

answers from Dr. Prabhakar Raghavan. Verity’s counsel instructed the witness not to

answer such questions as:

Q. Did you have any conversations with anyone at Verity where lawyers

were not involved about the meeting you had with Ian Hersey?

The Witness:The answer is yes.

Q. Describe those conversations?

Mr. Hahm: And I’m going to instruct the witness not to answer to the extent any

communications of this nature may reveal other conversations or

communications between Verity and its counsel, whether or not

lawyers were present. If you can do so, you may answer the question.

The Witness:Then I don’t answer the question. (Transcript 37:9-11, 38:2-11)

Verity objected and instructed the witness not to answer when his answer would

reveal conversations between Verity and its counsel whether or not lawyers were present.

Inxight contends that this is an improper objection and that the witness should answer the

questions. 

ANALYSIS

The federal rules limit the manner in which objections may be made during a

deposition. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(d)(1), any objection during

a deposition must be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative manner. A person may

instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a

limitation directed by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4). Rule 30(d)(4)

authorizes motions for protective order "upon a showing that the examination is being

conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or

oppress the deponent or party ...." Upon such a showing, the court "may limit the scope

and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c)." 

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The court interprets the parties’ letter briefs as Inxight’s motion to compel and

Verity’s motion for protective order.

Does Verity Meet its Burden to Show Privilege?

The court’s first question is whether Verity has met its burden to show that the

communications about which Inxight questioned Dr. Raghavan are privileged. A party

seeking to limit discovery must make a "strong showing" for limitation, and a particular and

specific need for the protective order. Methode Electronics, Inc. v. Finisar Corp., 205

F.R.D. 552, *553 -554 (N.D.Cal.,2001) (internal citation omitted).

The party asserting the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proof for each

communication for which the privilege is claimed. United States v. Goodman, Dunberg &

Hoffman, P.A.,660 F.Supp. 929, 931 (S.D.Fla. 1987). A claim of privilege must be made

expressly with sufficient detail to permit assessment of the privilege assertion, without

disclosure of the privileged information. Rule 26(b)(5), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between a client

and an attorney from disclosure. This privilege applies when “necessary to achieve its

limited purpose of encouraging full and frank disclosure by the client to his or her attorney.”

Clarke v. American Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992). 

"[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A

fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing.

The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'What did you say or write to the

attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely

because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney."

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C-05-1660 DISCOVERY ORDER Page 5 of 9

Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F.Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962), Cited

in Upjohn Co. v United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).

Verity observes that Inxight instructed its CEO, John Laing, not to answer very

similar questions for instance about “communications that involve counsel directly or

indirectly” or communications which the witness “understood to involve . . . counsel’s

advice,” even where counsel was not present. [John Laing Deposition Transcript 38:14-15,

40:5-8]. Id.

Verity claims attorney-client privilege but some of its arguments relate more to the

protections afforded by the work-product doctrine. For example, Verity contends that the

subject conversations “were initiated specifically at the behest of and on advice of its

counsel and in furtherance of counsel’s litigation strategy.” (Verity’s letter brief at 1). Verity

states that “In almost every litigation outside counsel need to communicate with a client

liaison, who then acts on counsel’s authority and advice to conduct internal

communications and investigations without counsel’s direct involvement.’ refusing to

extend the privilege to these communications would chill internal client discussions and

add substantial costs for all parties, as attorneys on both sides would be forced to directly

participate in and micro manage every aspect of the client investigation in order to maintain

the privilege.”(Verity’s letter brief at 2)

If these conversations revealed the attorney’s legal strategy, internal lines of proof,

evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of the case and inferences drawn from interviews

of witnesses, it could be privileged. Kintira v. Covio, 219 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.Cal. 2003).

Unfortunately for Verity, its assertions are too vague to satisfy the requirements to show

privilege under either attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. Verity falls far short

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C-05-1660 DISCOVERY ORDER Page 6 of 9

of the “strong showing” required by the case law. Methode Electronics, supra.

Has Verity Established that Dr.Raghavan has Standing to Assert Privilege?

The court’s second question is who is Dr. Raghavan and what is his relationship to

Verity? Verity identifies him only as “a third party witness.” (Verity’s letter brief at 2) As such

he probably does not have standing to assert the privilege on behalf of Verity. 

The principles set down in D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. are guides to determine whether

"the natural person who speaks is speaking from the status of a [corporate] client (actual or

prospective), or is merely a witness whose unprivileged communications someone else is

seeking to suppress under a claim of privilege." 60 Cal.2d at 732, 36 Cal.Rptr. 468, 388

P.2d 700. Several of the D.I. Chadbourne, Inc., principles are relevant here: 

When such [the corporation's] employee is not a co-defendant (or person who may

be charged with liability) his communication should not be so privileged unless, under all of

the circumstances of the case, he is the natural person to be speaking for the corporation;

that is to say, that the privilege will not attach in such case unless the communication

constitutes information which emanates from the corporation (as distinct from the

nonlitigant employee), and the communicating employee is such a person who would

ordinarily be utilized for communication to the corporation's attorney; 

When an employee has been a witness to matters which require communication to

the corporate employer's attorney, and the employee has no connection with those matters

other than as a witness, he is an independent witness; and the fact that the employer

requires him to make a statement for transmittal to the latter's attorney does not alter his

status or make his statement subject to the attorney-client privilege; 

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[N]o greater liberality should be applied to the facts which determine privilege in the

case of a corporation than would be applied in the case of a natural person (or association

of persons), except as may be necessary to allow the corporation to speak. 

Where the employee is required to make the communications to the attorney

because the matter on which he speaks stems from his employee responsibilities, then the

communication is of the corporate employer and is privileged. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. (1964)

60 Cal.2d 723, at 737-738, Cited in Connolly Data Systems, Inc. v. Victor Technologies,

Inc. 114 F.R.D. 89, *93 -94 (S.D.Cal.,1987).

These cases all assume that in order to have standing to assert a privilege on behalf

of a corporation the witness must be an employee or equivalent of the corporate party and

that his job requires that he communicate with counsel on behalf of the corporation. Verity

fails to establish that Dr. Raghavan satisfies the requirements to assert privilege on its

behalf.

Did Verity Waive any Attorney-Client Privilege?

The court’s third question is whether Verity, as the holder of the privilege, waived it

by revealing purportedly privileged communications to Dr. Raghavan. The issue of waiver

is closely tied to the element of confidentiality. Specifically, the proponent must prove that

the communication was made in confidence and subsequently maintained as confidential.

See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D.Cal.1985) (confidentiality

and waiver are closely related inasmuch as any voluntary disclosure inconsistent with

confidential nature of attorney-client relationship waives privilege). 

It has long been held that the proponent of the privilege must establish that it has

not been waived. United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir.1997); Weil v.

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Investment/Indicators, Research and Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir.1981). Further,

the proponent has the obligation of establishing for each and every communication all the

elements of the privilege. There is no blanket claim of the privilege. U.S. v. Munoz, 233

F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000). At Dr. Raghavan’s deposition, Verity made a blanket claim

of privilege for all conversations of which Dr. Raghavan had knowledge which might reveal

communications between Verity and its counsel.

Verity has the burden of proof that it has not waived any applicable privilege. See

United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C-94-1885-SBA, 1996 WL 444597 at *4 (N.D.Cal.

May 30, 1996) (once opponent has proffered evidence that claimed privilege has been

waived, party asserting privilege bears ultimate burden of proving that privilege was not

waived). Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 205 F.R.D. 542, *551 (D.Ariz.,2002).

Verity presents no evidence regarding its efforts to keep the communications at

issue confidential and fails to demonstrate that it has not waived privilege. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, Verity fails to justify its claim of privilege in light of the factors discussed

above: 

1) It fails to make the necessary “strong showing” that the communications are

privileged, as either attorney-client communications or attorney work product,

sufficient to meet its burden;

2) It fails to show that Dr. Raghavan has standing to assert a claim of privilege; and

3) Verity has therefore waived any privilege, if it existed, by revealing purportedly

confidential communications to Dr. Raghavan, a third party.

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C-05-1660 DISCOVERY ORDER Page 9 of 9

For all the above reasons, Inxight’s letter brief at Docket # 67 is granted, to the

extent that Verity shall make Dr. Raghavan available for further deposition and Dr.

Raghavan shall answer the questions propounded by Inxight to which Verity’s counsel

objected on grounds of attorney-client privilege, with respect to his knowledge of

conversations or communications between Verity and its counsel. All depositions shall be

completed before September 30, 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 2005

_______/s/_________________________

JAMES LARSON

 Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge

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