Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03171/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

89-3171 

89-3198 

LESLIE R. DERSTEIN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, Appellee, ) 

Cross-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

THE STATE OF KANSAS, ) 

FILED 

U(lited States Courc of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

SEP 2 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

MARJORIE VAN BUREN, ) On Appeal From The - STEVEN SEYB~· 'HERBERT W. ) 

WALTON, KAY FALLEY, ) 

JESS L. DANNER, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

PAGE W. BENSON, J. PATRICK ) 

BRAZIL and JOHN M. JAWORSKY, ) 

) 

Defendants, Appellants, ) 

Cross-Appellees. ) 

' ·United- States Di-strict Court 

For The District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 84-1219-K) 

Brian G. Grace,·Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff, Appellee, CrossAppellant. 

Carl A. Gallagher, Assistant Attorney General (Robert T. Shephan, 

Attorney General, and Nancy L. Ulrich, Assistant Attorney General, 

with him on the briefs), Topeka, Kansas, for Defendants, 

Appellants, Cross-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 1 
Before TACHA and SETH, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge*. 

SETH, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff, a former court services officer, brought this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 against three 

state district court judges alleging he was unlawfully terminated 

of employment in response to allegations of sexual harassment. 

The crux of plaintiff's complaint is that the circumstances of his 

discharge violated his liberty and property interest without due 

process of law. 

After a bench trial, the district court held that the 

pretermination proceedings violated plaintiff's property interest 

without due process. See Derstein v. Benson, 714 F. Supp. 481 

(D. Kan.). Plaintiff was awarded damages for lost income, mental 

and emotional distress. In a post-trial order, the court granted 

plaintiff's request to be reinstated as a state employee for 

purposes of obtaining seniority for employee benefits. We must 

conclude that the,-plaintiff was not denied procedural due process 

and hence we reverse. 

Leslie R. Derstein worked for nine and one-half years as a 

court services officer prior to his discharge. He had no written 

*Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., United States District Judge for the 

District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 2 
contract of employment. As a court services officer, Derstein 

could only be discharged by the administrative judges with 

approval of a majority of the other judges in the district. The 

terms of his employment were governed by the Kansas Court 

···'l'e-rsonnet .. ·Handbook' which"provided that- a .tenured·-emp.1,oyee could .be 

immediately terminated, without a hearing, for a "serious and 

grievous" offense. The term "sexual harassment" was not 

enumerated in the personnel rules as a "just cause" justifying 

immediate discharge. The parties agree that at the time of 

Derstein's discharge he was considered a "tenured" employee. 

Numerous· intra-off±ce ··conflicts ·had·· surf,aced;·· and the court· 

administrator Steven Seyb was advised that an employee intended to 

contact an attorney about bringing charges against the state 

because of Derstein's alleged sexual harassment. As a result Seyb 

asked the Office of Judicial Administration to investigate the 

allegations. An investigation was conducted by Marjorie Van 

Buren, Personnel Officer of the Kansas Judicial Branch. She taperecorded interviews with court employees and transcribed the 

tapes. The transcripts revealed numerous allegations made by 

different employees that Derstein had engaged in physical and 

verbal sexual harassment, over a period of years. 

On May 6, Van Buren met with Seyb and defendant Judges 

Benson, Brazil and Jaworsky to review the transcripts of the taped 

interviews. At that time Judge Benson was a state administrative 

and district court judge while Judges Brazil and Jaworsky were 

state district court judges. The judges believed the incidents 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 3 
described in the transcripts amounted to sexual harassment, which 

in their opinion, constituted a "serious and grievous" offense 

justifying Derstein's immediate discharge. The same day Seyb 

wrote Derstein a memorandum requesting him to meet in Judge 

··''Benson's 'chambers ·the,·next day. · He was not informed of the 

purpose of this meeting. At the meeting Derstein was advised of 

Van Buren's investigation regarding complaints of his "longstanding" problem of alleged verbal and physical sexual harassment 

and that an employee sought to bring a sexual harassment suit 

against the state, Judge Benson told Derstein he would have "ten 

days· in which· to .. resign· or·be terminated." ·At this point, 

Derstein denied any sexual harassment and inquired as to the 

factual basis for the claim. Derstein was advised that he could 

take appeal and would be given a hearing at that time. That same 

day, Derstein retained an attorney and later in the week he 

unsuccessfully attempted to obtain Van Buren's transcripts, 

Derstein's attorney made no such attempt at that time. It was not 

until after this lawsuit was filed (three years later) that he 

actually received a copy of the transcripts. 

At the end of the ten days, Derstein received a termination 

letter that specified the nature of the charges against him and 

advised him of his right to appeal. The next day, counsel for 

Derstein appealed the decision. The appeal board denied 

Derstein's appeal finding it frivolous. Derstein then filed a 

"Motion for Hearing" which was also denied. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 4 
Derstein originally brought this§ 1983 action against the 

State of Kansas, administrators, the judges on the appeal panel 

and Judges Benson, Brazil and Jaworsky, He voluntarily dismissed 

the state and the administrators prior to trial. The district 

court granted summary judgment in favor only of the judges who 

composed the appeal panel. However, the court denied the other 

defendants' motions raising qualified immunity as well as their 

contention that the plaintiff had no property interest in 

employment or, alternatively, that Derstein received due process 

for the deprivation of this interest. After a full hearing on the 

merits, the court in granting judgment in favor of Derstein 

rejected for a second time defendants' claims which were raised in 

their prior motion. See Derstein, 714 F. Supp. at 491-94. 

Defendants now appeal the district court's order granting 

judgment and damages in Derstein's favor. They attack the court's 

order on the following grounds: (1) that the district court erred 

in denying their claim for qualified immunity; (2) that Derstein 

had no protected property interest in employment and 

alternatively, that he received constitutional procedural due 

process; (3) that they-are entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity; (4) the court's damage award was not supported by 

substantial evidence. Further, they urge that it was error for 

the court to order the reinstatement of Derstein. 

Derstein filed a cross-appeal urging that the trial court 

erred in finding he had no protected liberty interest. By reason 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 5 
of our disposition of Derstein's procedural due process claim, we 

need not address defendants' remaining contentions of error. 

Defendants challenge the district court's holding that 

Derstein had a property interest in his employment as a court 

services officer. As a public employee, he was entitled to 

procedural due process only if he was deprived of a property 

interest. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564. We need not 

reach this issue, however, because even assuming that Derstein had 

a property interest in employment we conclude that he received 

procedural due process prior to termination. 

The district court found that defendants' discharge of ~ '' . ~ .. , . ,.. 

Derstein violated his due process right to a pretermination 

hearing defined under Roth or Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532. The court stated that it had "no 

hesitation in concluding that in this case Derstein received 

neither notice, nor an explanation of his employer's evidence, nor 

an opportunity to be heard prior to his discharge." Derstein, 714 

F. Supp. at 495. It found that prior to the May 6 meeting, 

Derstein was not advised of Van Buren's investigation, had "no 

facts which would indicate that [he] should have known, that his 

termination was imminent," and had no opportunity to "tell his 

side of the story." Id. 

The parties do not contest that Derstein was entitled to 

"some form of hearing" prior to discharge. See Roth, 408 U.S. 

564. The more difficult questions of how much notice and 

opportunity are required were addressed by the Supreme Court in 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 6 
Loudermill. Under Loudermill the Supreme Court held that before a 

"tenured public employee" can be discharged, he "is entitled to 

oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation 

of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side 

.~-·o:f-th-e~-story. ·- T0 .. require· m01:e, than this prior to termination 

would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's 

interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee." 470 

U.S. at 546 (citations omitted). 

Defendants urge that Derstein's pretermination hearing 

satisfied the due process requirements under Loudermill. We 

· ~agree.·· ~·This-·circuit··nas·-f-ound ·no 'due· ,process· v-i01ati-on in. similar 

circumstances. See Melton v. Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706 (10th 

Cir.), and Meder v. Oklahoma City, 869 F.2d 553 (10th Cir.). 

In light of our decisions the record shows that Derstein 

received procedural due process prior to being deprived of his 

asserted property interest in employment. At the May 6 

"pretermination hearing" Derstein was orally informed that 

defendants intended to discharge him because of complaints 

regarding a "long-standing" problem of his alleged verbal and 

physical sexual harassment. He was told of the investigation and 

of the name of an employee who threatened to bring a sexual 

harassment suit against the state due to his conduct. Further, 

Derstein was not terminated at the meeting but given ten days to 

respond. This meeting provided Derstein all that was necessary 

under Loudermill - notice of the charges, the nature of the 

allegations and an opportunity to respond. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 7 
The fact that Derstein may not have known in advance about 

Van Buren's internal investigation, did not receive more facts or 

a copy of the transcript at the pretermination hearing is not 

significant. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532. 

·· .. ·We'"alsa ,rejeetr Derstein< s · argument that he was .not .. given . .an 

opportunity to relate his side of the story. He was given ten 

days before termination. During this time he chose not to 

challenge the factual basis for the allegations. A pretermination 

hearing was never intended to be an adjudicative detailed 

proceeding. 

Our· inqu·iry· "does-· not· end· here. · Sinee Loudermill rested . in 

part on posttermination procedures, we must consider whether such 

procedures were available to Derstein. Counsel for Derstein filed 

an appeal, pursuant to the Kansas Court Personnel Handbook, based 

on two grounds. First, he argued that the defendants did not 

follow the procedures for discharge because Derstein had never 

received a written or oral reprimand for "sexual harassment." He 

also contested whether sexual harassment was a "serious and 

grievous offense" justifying immediate discharge because it was 

not listed as such in the personnel rules. The appeal board 

denied Derstein's appeal finding it frivolous. The board found 

that defendants followed the proper procedure in not issuing 

Derstein a reprimand prior to discharge. It also determined that 

sexual harassment could be considered a "serious and grievous" 

offense. Further, since Derstein did not challenge the factual 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 8 
allegation of sexual harassment, the board determined that no 

hearing was necessary. 

Derstein then filed a "Motion for Hearing" requesting a full 

evidentiary hearing on the merits. In his motion, he stated that 

he filed his initial appeal solely to initiate the administrative 

process. The appeal board unanimously denied this motion on the 

ground that Derstein, in his original appeal, challenged only the 

interpretation of rules and not the factual basis for his 

termination. 

It is important to note that Derstein never contested, even 

after examining Van Buren's transcripts, the factual basis for his 

alleged sexual harassment. He did not argue that his conduct 

never occurred. Rather, Derstein is essentially challenging the 

legal issue of whether his conduct amounted to "sexual harassment" 

and if so, was it a "serious and grievous" offense justifying 

summary termination. Under these circumstances, we hold that the 

posttermination procedure provided to Derstein coupled with the 

pretermination opportunity to respond fully comports with 

Loudermill. 

In his·ccross-appeal 1 ·Ders-tein asserts that he was denied a 

protected liberty interest. The district court found that he had 

no protected liberty interest because he failed to show that his 

discharge was accompanied by public dissemination of information. 

We have stated that "[t]he concept of liberty recognizes two 

particular interests of a public employee: 1) the protection of 

his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity, and 2) his 

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Appellate Case: 89-3171 Document: 01019847943 Date Filed: 09/28/1990 Page: 9 
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." 

Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.). In order for a 

liberty interest to be implicated, Derstein must show that his 

dismissal "resulted in the publication of information which was 

fals-€0-and-·st·igmatizing. u Rich v. -Secretary of the .Army, .135 F.2d 

1220, 1227 (10th Cir.) (quoting Asbill v. Housing Authority of 

Choctow Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir.)) (footnotes 

omitted) (emphasis in original), 

Derstein argues that the "publication" element was satisfied 

when he revealed the reasons for discharge in response to direct 

-qu-estiomr by··prospective "'9mployers. ·· ·This· ·argument. ,d.ir-ectly ., 

conflicts with established precedent. See Rich, 735 F.2d 1220. 

In Rich, we held that no liberty interest was impinged when the 

plaintiff himself publicized the circumstances of his discharge, 

"To impinge on a liberty interest, the stigmatizing information 

must be made public by the offending governmental entity," Id, at 

1227, Derstein presented nothing to show that the allegedly 

stigmatizing evidence was made public by a governmental entity. 

Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Derstein has 

no claim that his interest in "good name, reputation, honor or 

integrity" was impaired, 

However, the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiff 

is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for the reasons hereinabove 

set forth as to the due process issues. 

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