Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_12-cv-03764/USCOURTS-alnd-3_12-cv-03764-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

CASSANDRA THOMPSON, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:12-cv-03764-HGD

)

RONNIE WILLIS, et al., )

)

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND PARTIAL DISMISSAL ORDER

On March 2, 2015, Magistrate Judge Harwell Davis entered a report and

recommendation concerning a partial motion to dismiss. (Docs. 41, 47). Judge

Davis gave the parties fourteen days to file objections to the recommendation. (Doc.

47, p. 44). Neither Ms. Thompson nor any of the defendants has filed objections.

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

When a party makes timely objections to a report and recommendation, the district

court “make[s] a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.

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FILED

 2015 Jun-12 AM 09:49

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:12-cv-03764-HGD Document 49 Filed 06/12/15 Page 1 of 5
When no objections are filed, the district court need not conduct a de novo

review. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United

States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 1050 (1984) (“The failure to object to the magistrate’sfindings of fact prohibits

an attack on appeal of the factual findings adopted by the district court except on

grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”) (internal citation omitted). In Macort

v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit stated:

Most circuits agree that “[i]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a

district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only

satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order

to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident

Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted); accord

Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir.1999) (“If no

objection or only partial objection is made [to the magistrate judge's

report], the district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for

clear error.”); United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir.

1989) (noting that the “clearly erroneous” standard is appropriate where

there has been no objection to the magistrate judge's ruling); Drywall

Tapers & Pointers v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989)

(“Where a magistrate [judge] has been appointed to conduct an

evidentiary hearing, the district court reviews the Report and

Recommendation under the same clearly erroneous standard.”) (citing

Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 875 F.2d 540, 544 (6thCir. 1989)).

Id. The Eleventh Circuit does not appear to have expressly held that a district court

should review a report and recommendation for plain error in the absence of any

objections. However, other courts in this Circuit have adopted such a position. 

Tauber v. Barnhart, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (“[I]ssues upon which no

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specific objections are raised do notso require de novo review; the district court may

therefore accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge, applying a clearly erroneous

standard.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Am. Charitiesfor Reasonable

Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1307 (M.D.

Fla. 2003) (“[W]hen no timely and specific objections are filed, case law indicates

that the court should review the findings using a clearly erroneous standard.”);

Shuler v. Infinity Property &Gas, 2013 WL 1346615, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2013) (portions

of a report and recommendation “to which no objectionsisfiled are reviewed only for

clear error”). 

The Court has carefully reviewed the record and Judge Davis’s March 2, 2015

report and recommendation. Applying the clearly erroneous standard, the Court

ADOPTS the March 2, 2015 report and ACCEPTS Judge Davis’s recommendations

with respect to the defendants’ motion for partial dismissal of Ms. Thompson’s

second amended complaint.

1

1 Although Ms. Thompson did not object to Magistrate Judge Davis’s March 2, 2015 report

and recommendation (Doc. 47), Ms. Thompson did object to Judge Davis’s February24, 2014 report

and recommendation. In that objection, Ms. Thompson challenged Judge Davis’s findings related

to her Title VII claims. (Doc. 22; Doc. 26). Magistrate Judge Davis’s findings regarding Ms.

Thompson’s Title VII claims in his February 24, 2014 report and recommendation are substantively

similar to his findings regarding Ms. Thompson’s Title VII claims in his March 2, 2015 report and

recommendation. (Compare Doc. 22, pp. 8-12 with Doc. 47, pp. 13-17). On June 5, 2015, Judge

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Therefore, the Court ORDERS as follows:

(1) the motion to dismiss of defendants Willis, Witt, Hamilton and Ray is

MOOT as to plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their

official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or, to the extent that

there is ambiguity in the second amended complaint about the relief Ms. Thompson

seeks, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss claims for damages against the

defendants in their official capacities and DISMISSES those claims WITH

PREJUDICE;

(2) the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Ms. Thompson’s Title VII claims

Davis vacated his February 24, 2014 report and recommendation. (Doc. 48). Ms. Thompson’s

failure to renew her objections concerning her Title VII claims after Judge Davis issued the March

2, 2015 report and recommendation preclude the Court from conducting a de novo review of those

findings. The Court notes that even if Judge Davis erred in finding that Ms. Thompson’s Title VII

claims in her first and second amended complaints did not relate back to her original complaint so

that the Title VII claims were untimely, those claims appear to be time-barred for another reason. 

In a Title VII action, “a plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC within

180 days of the last discriminatory act.” H&R Block E. Enterprises, Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285,

1295 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). Ms. Thompson’s Title VII claims in Count 5 are

based on a five-day suspension that Ms. Thompson received on November 11, 2011. (Doc. 39, p.

12). More than 180 days elapsed before Ms. Thompson filed her EEOC charge of discrimination

on June 25, 2012. (See Doc. 27, p. 1). Moreover, to the extent that Ms. Thompson bases her Title

VII claims in Count 5 on any alleged discriminatory remarks, Ms. Thompson’s EEOC charge does

not reference those alleged statements. (See Doc. 27, p. 1). Therefore, these claims likely are barred

because Ms. Thompson did not exhaust her administrative remedies. See Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of

Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[J]udicial claims are allowed if they

‘amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus’ the allegations in the EEOC complaint, but [the Eleventh

Circuit] has cautioned that allegations of new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.”) (quoting Wu

v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

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(Count 5) and DISMISSES those claims WITH PREJUDICE;

(3) the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss any claim of disparate impact

discrimination, to the extent that Ms. Thompson’s second amended complaint may

be construed as having alleged such a claim, and DISMISSES any disparate impact

claim WITH PREJUDICE;

(4) the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Ms. Thompson’s claim for due

process violation (Count 10) and DISMISSES the claim WITH PREJUDICE;

(5) the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Ms. Thompson’s retaliation

claim (Count 12) and DISMISSES the claim WITH PREJUDICE;

(6) the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss all claims against defendant Ray

and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all claims against defendant Ray; and 

(7) the motion to dismiss Ms. Thompson’s claim of “Gender-Based Hostility

in the Work Environment” (Count 7) against defendant Hamilton is MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED this 12

th

day of June, 2015. 

 

MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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