Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00961/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00961-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Wrongful Death

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Stephanie McCollum, as Conservator for 

the minor wrongful death beneficiaries, on 

behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries; 

and as Personal Representative of the estate 

of Marcela Baca, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UPS Ground Freight Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV11-0961 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiffs have filed a motion for reconsideration. Doc. 122. Defendants have 

filed a response. Doc. 129. For reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion. 

 At the final pretrial conference on December 12, 2012, Plaintiffs objected to the 

inclusion of Gary Glover as a defense witness in the proposed final pretrial order, noting 

that Mr. Glover was never disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(i) 

and was not disclosed during the discovery period. Rather, Mr. Glover was disclosed for 

the first time in early December of 2012 as the parties were preparing the proposed final 

pretrial order. Defendants responded that Mr. Glover was disclosed more than 30 days 

before trial as required by Rules 26(a)(3)(A)(i) and (B). After hearing the parties’ brief 

oral arguments, the Court concluded Mr. Glover should be permitted to testify because he 

was disclosed more than 30 days before trial as required by Rule 26(a)(3)(B). Upon 

receiving Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and Defendants’ response, however, the 

Court has had occasion to review the relevant rules, case law, and statements made by the 

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parties in connection with this issue. The Court concludes that Mr. Glover should have 

been disclosed earlier in the litigation and that Defendants’ failure to disclose is not 

substantially justified or harmless. The Court will therefore preclude Defendants from 

calling Mr. Glover as a witness at trial. 

 Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) provides that a party “must, without awaiting a discovery 

request, provide to the other parties . . . the name, and, if known, the address and 

telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information – along with 

the subjects of that information – that the disclosing party may use to support its claims 

or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” This rule imposes an 

affirmative obligation. Defendants were required to disclose any witness likely to have 

discoverable information and whom Defendants knew they “may use to support” their 

defense. The relevant question, therefore, is whether Mr. Glover has discoverable 

information and whether Defendants knew that they may use him to support their 

defense. If so, Rule 26(a)(1)(i) required his disclosure. 

 Mr. Glover clearly has discoverable information. Defendants’ response to the 

motion to reconsider states that “Mr. Glover will testify regarding UPS Freight’s 

retention, training, and supervision of contract drivers. In addition, Mr. Glover will 

testify specifically about UPS Freight’s retention, training, and supervision of Mr. 

Maldonado and Mr. Duenas [the Defendant drivers in this case who caused the accident 

that injured Plaintiffs], as well as the manner in which Mr. Maldonado and Mr. Duenas 

were compensated by UPS Freight. Mr. Glover will also testify about how routes were 

assigned to Mr. Maldonado and Mr. Duenas and how they were monitored by UPS 

Freight while they were on the road.” Doc. 129 at 2. These are important matters in this 

case. In fact, when Defendants made their late disclosure of Mr. Glover, they suggested 

that Plaintiffs could depose him before trial. Doc. 122-1 at 2. 

 The record also makes clear that Defendants have known from the beginning of 

this case that a witness such as Mr. Glover, the Director of Supplemental Transportation 

at UPS Freight, may be used to support their defense. When the parties addressed this 

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issue during the final pretrial conference on December 12, 2012, defense counsel stated 

that Mr. Glover’s “proposed testimony would frankly be on behalf of the company [and] 

relate to issues that have been the very issues this case has been about since day one.” 

Court’s LiveNote Transcript at 48-49 (emphasis added). Defense counsel further stated 

that Plaintiffs “never asked for any of this in written discovery for us to identify anybody 

who would testify on behalf of the company about the issues they’ve created or identified 

that are issues in this case. At the end of the day, I want somebody who can testify about 

issues that Mr. Alex [Plaintiffs’ counsel] has known have been the very issues in this case 

since he filed this lawsuit.” Id.at 49 (emphasis added). Defendants’ response to the 

motion for reconsideration similarly states that “Plaintiffs chose to name UPS as a 

defendant to this action and therefore cannot be surprised that a representative of UPS 

may be called to testify at trial.” Doc. 129 at 4 (emphasis added). 

 If the likelihood and relevancy of Mr. Glover’s testimony have been evident to 

Plaintiffs since the beginning of this case as Defendants so firmly assert, then the 

likelihood and relevancy of his testimony have also been evident to Defendants from the 

beginning. Mr. Glover, therefore, is an “individual likely to have discoverable 

information” whom Defendants knew they “may use to support” their defense. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). He should have been disclosed under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i). 

 Defendants argue that they did not identify Mr. Glover until just before the final 

pretrial conference “because, at the time [of their initial disclosures], Defendants were 

unaware they may need to call him to testify, and in fact did not become aware of such a 

need until the depositions of the Defendant drivers and the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ 

summary judgment motions, which occurred after the close of discovery.” Doc. 129 at 4. 

There are several problems with this statement. First, it directly contradicts Defendants’ 

claim that the likelihood of Mr. Glover’s testimony has been evident from the beginning 

of this case. Second, the statement concerns when Defendants knew they needed to call 

Mr. Glover, but Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) does not require such certainty – it requires 

disclosure of witnesses that Defendants “may use to support” their defense. Third, the 

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Defendant drivers were deposed in March of 2012 (Docs. 74-3 at 2, 74-11 at 2), and 

Defendants were required to timely supplement their initial disclosures. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(e)(1)(A). If Defendants had supplemented their disclosures after the depositions, Mr. 

Glover’s testimony would have been known to Plaintiffs eight months earlier and at a 

time when the Court and parties could have considered whether preclusion was warranted 

or additional discovery should be permitted. 

 Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiffs knew that Mr. Glover or someone like him had 

relevant information and may be called by Defendants to testify at trial did not excuse 

Defendants’ nondisclosure. Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) disclosures communicate more than the 

identity of persons with knowledge; they also disclose the critical fact that the opposing 

party may use an individual as a witness at trial. See Johnson v. United Parcel Service, 

236 F.R.D. 376, 378 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (“[T]he fact Defendant might have been on notice 

[of the undisclosed information] does not excuse Plaintiff’s failure to disclose[.] . . . Rule 

26 puts the burden on the party intending to present [evidence] to notify the other party of 

its intent to do so.”); S. Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, at 495 (West 2011) (“The fact that the other party already knows of a 

potential witness . . . does not, by itself, achieve the critical purpose of the Rule 

26(a)(1)(A) disclosures, which is to inform the other parties which witnesses and 

documents the disclosing party may use to support its claim or defenses.”). 

 Nor does the existence of the pretrial disclosure requirement in Rule 26(a)(3)(A) 

excuse Defendants’ failure to identify Mr. Glover in their initial disclosures or timely 

supplements. By its terms, Rule 26(a)(3)(A) establishes an obligation “[i]n addition to 

the disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) and (2).” (Emphasis added.) Rule 26(a)(3)(A) 

thus is an additional disclosure obligation, not an alternative means of disclosing required 

information. 

 If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A), the undisclosed 

information may not be used at trial “unless the failure was substantially justified or is 

harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Because Defendants have admitted that the 

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relevance of Mr. Glover’s testimony was apparent from the outset of this case, their 

failure to include him in the mandatory Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) disclosures or timely 

supplements was not substantially justified. Nor can the Court conclude that the 

nondisclosure was harmless. Although Plaintiffs may have been able to anticipate that 

Defendants might call such a witness at trial, Plaintiffs were not told, as Rule 

26(a)(1)(A)(i) required, that UPS may use such a witness to support its defense. 

Plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the “critical” purpose of Rule 26(a)(1)(A) – “to inform 

[them] which witnesses and documents the disclosing party may use to support its claim 

or defenses.” S. Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary, at 

495. Plaintiffs were not apprised of this information until discovery had closed, the 

motion for summary judgment had been decided, and the final pretrial conference was 

imminent, and therefore were not afforded an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery 

or formulate their case strategy to account for this evidence. Defendants have suggested 

that Mr. Glover may be deposed before trial (which starts next week), but the Court 

cannot conclude that such a deposition will eliminate all harm when avenues for other 

discovery have been foreclosed by the end of the discovery period and the firm trial date. 

 Because the Court concludes that Mr. Glover should have been timely disclosed 

under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) and that the failure to disclose him was not substantially 

justified or harmless, Defendants may not call him as a witness at trial. The exclusion 

provision of Rule 37(c) is self-executing and automatic when a failure to disclose is not 

substantially justified or harmless. See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Serv., Inc., 541 

F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Dated this 8th day of January, 2013. 

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