Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02143/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02143-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS PEREDA RAMOS, ) Case No. 10-CV-02143 DMS (JMA)

)

Petitioner, )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

v. ) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

) HABEAS CORPUS 

J. TIM OCHOA, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

________________________________ )

I. INTRODUCTION

Jesus Pereda Ramos (hereinafter "Petitioner" or “Ramos”), a California state

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 1,

2010, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254, challenging his June 25,

2007 conviction in San Diego Superior Court, case number SCD200065. (Pet. at 1.) 

Petitioner alleges (1) his right to a speedy trial was violated and (2) his right to a jury

trial for the imposition of an upper term in sentencing was violated, pursuant to

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). (Id. at 5.)

Respondent J. Tim Ochoa (hereinafter "Respondent") filed an Answer on

January 18, 2011. (Doc. No. 12.) Respondent argues this Court should deny the

Petition because the California courts' rejection of Petitioner's first and second claims

was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent

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and Petitioner's second claim is unexhausted. (Doc. No. 12-1, Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Answer at 2.) Petitioner filed a Traverse on February 4, 2011, alleging his right to a

speedy trial was violated; his second claim was exhausted; and his right to a jury trial

under Cunningham, supra, for the imposition of an upper term in sentencing was

violated. (Traverse at 2, 4.) 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent's Answer and Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in support thereof, Petitioner's Traverse, and all supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the

Petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner sexually molested his young stepdaughters R. and E. persistently over

the course of nine years until the authorities were notified in May 1983. (Lodgment No.

5, People v. Jesus Pereda Ramos, No. D052150, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 23,

2010).) Petitioner was charged in June, 1983 and arrested in October, 1985. (Id. at 7.) 

Petitioner, who was released on his own recognizance on October 23, 1985 after

signing the O.R. Agreement, fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution for the molestations. 

(Id.) Petitioner was re-arrested in 2006 when he attempted to cross into the United

States from Mexico and was subsequently tried. (Id.)

The following factual summary of Petitioner’s trial is taken from the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One (“California Court of Appeal”)

opinion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1):

The two victims (R. and E.), now adults ages 35 and 39, testified at trial,

describing the sexual molestation that occurred when they were young

girls. The girls lived with Ramos, their mother (Carmen), and two

brothers. Ramos molested R. from about age three or four to 11, and he

molested E. from about age seven to 12.

In the first incident recalled by R., Ramos ducked her head under the

water while she was taking a bath, causing her to feel as if she were

drowning, and then carried her to his bed, laid her on her stomach, and

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R. testified she did not understand anatomy when she was a little girl and she was not certain

which part of her genitalia was involved in the incident.

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According to a social worker who later interviewed R., R. stated that the doctor at the clinic who

examined her did not “find anything wrong with her.”

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inserted his penis into her “genitalia.”1 R. recalled another incident that

occurred when she was about eight years old while she was taking a nap. 

Ramos turned her over and took off her pants. She heard him unzip his

pants, and he then inserted his penis into her genital area. The

molestation involving this type of intercourse occurred once or twice a

year for about nine years. In the spring of 1983, he had “full intercourse

[with her] on the living room floor.” During the nine-year period Ramos

would also perform oral sex on her; this occurred less often than the

intercourse. Additionally, he regularly touched her in a sexual manner. 

When she was washing dishes, he would come and rub his penis against

her back. He also touched her breasts.

The first incident E. recalled was that Ramos put her on his lap and

touched her while she tried to “jiggle away” from him. He touched her on

the “breast area,” tried to kiss her, and tried to coax her to “give in to his

advances.” The molestation was advanced to “full intercourse,” anal sex,

and oral sex. For a period of time while she was in elementary school,

Ramos had intercourse with her on a nightly basis while her mother was at

night school. There were also several incidents of anal intercourse and

oral sex. Ramos would “corner [her]” in the kitchen and touch her and try

to “[s]educe [her].” The intercourse, anal sex, and oral sex continued

through her elementary school years. He also made her touch his penis.

While E. was still in elementary school, E. told her mother what Ramos

was doing to her. Her mother started to cry and said she would talk to

him. When her mother confronted Ramos, he “beat the living day lights”

out of E. When E. was about 11 or 12 years old, she asked R. if Ramos

was “touching her or bothering her.” R. started to cry, and “at that point,

[E.] knew” that R. was also being molested. E. and R. went to their

mother, and E. told her mother that it was “happening to [R.] too.” Their

mother took one or both girls to a clinic to be examined by a doctor, but

never contacted the authorities.2

When E. was about 14 years old and in junior high school, she moved in

with her grandparents because she had started to menstruate and her

mother did not want her to get pregnant. After E. left the home, Ramos

molested R. more frequently. In May 1983, when R. was almost 12 years

old, her school showed a video about improper touching. After seeing this

video, R. told her teacher that her stepfather had molested her. The

authorities were summoned, and R. was removed from her home by the

social services department.

During the investigation of the case, R. was interviewed by a police officer,

a detective, and a hospital social worker. Given the lengthy passage of

time, these individuals had little or no independent recollection of the case

at trial. However, they referred to their written reports to detail the

information provided by R. during the interviews. When interviewed by the

detective assigned to the case, R. and E. described numerous incidents of

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 The prosecution did not introduce the Children’s Hospital medical reports into evidence; these

reports were referred to solely during the defense evidentiary presentation.

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The complaint alleged four violations of Penal Code section 288(a), four violations of Penal Code

section 261.5, and one violation of Penal Code sections 286(c) and 288a(c). (ACT at 1-2.) 

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sexual touching and intercourse occurring over the years, and specified

the setting and time period in which several of the incidents occurred.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 2-5). The California Court of Appeal also reviewed the case

presented by the defense:

To refute the prosecution’s case, the defense presented evidence to

support its theories of fabrication and false memories, including that E.

made up the molestation claims because she was unhappy about living

with her mother and stepfather rather than with her grandparents (with

whom she had lived up until age seven), E. implanted the molestation

belief in R.’s mind, and persons who spoke to the girls at the time of

disclosure implanted the molestation belief by asking leading questions. A

psychologist testified about the problem of suggestibility in children, and

stated that in the early 1980's there were no standard protocols for

interviewing children about sexual abuse claims, interviewers may have

been unaware of the problem of suggestibility, and there was a tendency

to believe that if a child made an allegation it was likely true. E. and R.’s

mother testified that she never saw any signs of molestation, and a doctor

at a clinic who examined E. told her there were no indications of

molestation.

A medical doctor called by the defense opined that because of lack of

research and misunderstandings about normal variations in children’s

genitalia in the early 1980's, observations about E.’s and R.’s genitalia set

forth in medical reports from Children’s Hospital could have been

misinterpreted to reflect sexual abuse.3

 Several character witnesses

(including Ramos’s son and stepdaughter from another relationship, his

nephew, and an attorney colleague) testified they had never seen Ramos

engage in inappropriate touching of children. A psychologist who

examined Ramos opined that he had personality characteristics that were

consistent with persons who both do and do not sexually abuse children.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 5-6.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 1, 1983, the People of the State of California filed a criminal complaint

against Petitioner in the San Diego Superior Court, case no. F78416, alleging ten

counts of various sexual violations with a minor.4 (Lodgment No. 1, Augment Clerk’s Tr.

(hereinafter “ACT”)) A warrant was issued and Petitioner was arrested in October 1985. 

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(1) Lewd act upon a child in violation of Penal Code Section 288(a); (2) Unlawful Sexual

Intercourse in violation of Penal Code Section 261.5(a); (3) Sodomy of Person Under 14 With 10 Yrs

Difference in violation of Penal Code Section 286(c)(1); (4) Lewd Act Upon a Child in violation of Penal

Code 288(a); (5) Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in violation of Penal Code Section 261.5(a); (6) Oral

Copulation of a Person Under 14 in violation of Penal Code Section 288a(c); (7) Lewd Act Upon a Child in

violation of Penal Code section 288(a); and (8) Lewd Act Upon a Child in violation of Penal Code section

288(a). (CT at 1-4.)

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(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. (hereinafter “CT”) at 43-47; Lodgment No. 5 at 7.) On

October 15, 1985, Petitioner was arraigned, pled not guilty and was appointed counsel. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Supp. Clerk’s Tr. (hereinafter “SCT”) at 29; Lodgment No. 5 at 7.) On

October 23, 1985, he was released after signing the O.R. Agreement, which required

Petitioner to appear for a felony disposition conference scheduled for November 27,

1985, and a preliminary hearing on December 6, 1985, in exchange for his release. (CT

at 49; Lodgment No. 5 at 7.) On November 27, 1985, Petitioner chose not to appear

and the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. (Lodgment No. 5 at 7, 17.) Nearly

21 years later, in March 2006, Petitioner was arrested during an attempt to enter into

the United States from Mexico. (Id. at 7.)

On July 19, 2006, an Information was filed in the San Diego Superior Court, case

number SCD200065, charging Petitioner with eight counts of various sexual acts with a

minor.5 (CT at 1-4). Petitioner was arraigned and pled not guilty to each of the eight

charges on July 25, 2006. (Id. at 235.)

On September 28, 2006, Petitioner moved to dismiss case no. SCD20065 for

violation of his right to a speedy trial. (Id. at 5-19.) The trial court heard and denied

without prejudice Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on October 23, 2006. (Id. at 237;

Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. on Appeal, Oct. 23, 2006.) On May 25, 2007, Petitioner

filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for a violation of Petitioner’s right to a speedy

trial. (CT at 54-58.) After holding hearings on June 6 and 7, 2007, the court denied the

motion. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Appeal Tr., vol. 1 and 2).

On June 11, 2007, Petitioner’s jury trial began. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Appeal

Tr. Vol. 3.) The jury found Petitioner guilty of all eight charges on June 25, 2007. (CT

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Petitioner received the upper term of eight years for count one; the middle term of eight months

for count two; and the middle term of two years for counts 3 and 7, to be served consecutively for a total of

twelve years, eight months in state prison. Petitioner received the upper term of eight years for count four;

the upper term of three years for count five; and the upper term of eight years for count six, each to be

served concurrently with the twelve year, eight month sentence. (CT at 224-225.1.)

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at 152-159). On December 5, 2007, the trial court sentenced Petitioner.6 (Id. at 224-

225.1.)

On May 19, 2009, Petitioner filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal,

case no. D052150, challenging the judgment of conviction. (Lodgment No. 2, People v.

Jose Pereda Ramos, Case No. D052150 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 19, 2009).) On

February 23, 2010, the California Court of Appeal, affirmed the judgment. (Lodgment

No. 5.) On April 2, 2010, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme

Court. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Jose Pereda Ramos, Case No. S181433 (Cal. filed

April 2, 2010).) On June 17, 2010, the California Supreme Court sitting en banc

summarily denied Petitioner’s request for review. (Lodgment No. 7, People v. Jose

Pereda Ramos, Case No. S181433 (Cal., rev’d en banc June 17, 2010) (docket).)

On October 1, 2010, Petitioner initiated this action in the Central District of

California, filing his Petition along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (Pet.)

(Doc. No. 1 and 6.) The case was transferred to this Court on October 14, 2010. (Doc.

No. 4.) On November 3, 2010, Hon. Dana M. Sabraw dismissed the case without

prejudice because Petitioner failed to allege exhaustion as to claims two and three and

to provide sufficient information to determine his financial status in order to proceed in

forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 7.) That same day, Petitioner paid the filing fee. (Doc. No.

8.) On November 15, 2010, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Amend, abandoning

claims three and four. (Doc. No. 9.) On November 19, 2010 , this Court ordered the

matter reopened with regards to Claims One and Two and issued a briefing schedule. 

(Doc. No. 10.) On January 18, 2011, Respondent filed an Answer to the First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. No. 12.) On February 4, 2011, Petitioner filed

a Traverse. (Doc. No. 14.)

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254(a), as amended by the Anti-terrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214, establishes the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus

claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). As amended, Title 28 United States

Code, Section 2254(d) reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect

to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). To obtain federal habeas relief, a

petitioner must satisfy either section 2254(d)(1) or 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets Section 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Lockyer v.

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Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). Ninth Circuit precedent is persuasive authority

when determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law and what law is clearly established. Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d

1148, 1151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1066 (2005). After Wright v. Van Patten,

552 U.S. 120 (2008) and Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006), however, circuit law

may not be used to fill open questions in the Supreme Court's holdings for purposes of

federal habeas analysis. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d at 760 (citing Musladin, 549 U.S. at

76 and Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1126 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, in

Musladin, the Supreme Court "discussed and accepted" the principle that § 2254(d)(1)

imposes "limits on the relevance of circuit precedent"), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 922

(2008)).

The Supreme Court interprets section 2254(d)(2) as follows:

[A] decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on

a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless

objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the

state-court proceeding.

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (emphasis added). When there is no

reasoned decision from the state's highest court, this Court "looks through" to the

underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). 

If the dispositive state court order does not "furnish a basis for its reasoning," federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether

the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, supra, 538 U.S. at 75-76);

accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court

need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving claims presented on direct or

collateral review. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). "[S]o long as neither the

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

precedent]," id., the state court decision will not be "contrary to" clearly established

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federal law. Id.

B. Claim One - Speedy Trial

Petitioner’s first claim for habeas relief is predicated on his right to a speedy trial. 

(Doc. No. 1, at 5.) He contends law enforcement “did nothing” to locate him for the 21

years following his failure to appear at his pretrial hearing. (Pet., at 5.) During this time

he lived and practiced law in Mexico, traveled across the border without incident, and

maintained California identification. (Id.) This claim was raised to the California

Supreme Court in his petition for review and was denied without comment. 

(Lodgements No. 6 and 7.) The Court, therefore, looks through the summary denial to

the opinion furnished by the Court of Appeal, which ruled Petitioner’s federal

constitutional right to speedy trial had not been violated. (Lodgment No. 5.) Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the following summary of facts relevant to this claim is adopted

from the Court of Appeal’s decision:

The original complaint against Ramos was filed on June 1, 1983, and a

warrant issued for his arrest. He was arrested in October 1985. At his

arraignment on October 15, 1985, Ramos pleaded not guilty and the court

granted his request for appointed counsel. On October 23, 1985, Ramos

was released from jail on his own recognizance. In the “Agreement for

O.R. Release” signed by Ramos, he promised to appear in court on

November 27 and December 6, 1985, the dates set for a felony disposition

conference and the preliminary hearing. The O.R. agreement also

included his promise not to depart the state without the court’s permission. 

In the agreement Ramos provided a Tijuana address on Calle Ricardo

Castro. Ramos failed to appear on November 27, and a bench warrant

was issued for his arrest.

Ramos was not arrested until about 21 years later when he attempted to

cross the border from Mexico into the United States in 2006. At the port of

entry, Ramos presented a California DMV identification card. Using the

identification card, the border guard entered a query into the computer and

discovered the outstanding arrest warrant.

In July 2006, the preliminary hearing was conducted, Ramos was bound

over for trial, and an information was filed. On September 26, 2006,

Ramos moved to dismiss the case based on a violation of his right to a

speedy trial.

Ramos submitted evidence showing that he is a licensed Mexican

attorney, and during the 21-year period between his 1985 release and his

2006 arrest he lived at the Calle Ricardo Castro address in Tijuana that he

provided in the O.R. release agreement. Next door to his residence he

maintained his office with a sign displaying his name. He never moved

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The court noted “[t]he San Diego address on the car registration was actually a ‘Postal Annex

type address’ frequently used to receive mail by people who live in Mexico. (Lodgment No. 5 at 8, n.6).

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back to San Diego County, but he maintained contacts in the county. 

From 1992 to 1993, he and ex-wife Carmen had a car registered with the

California DMV with a San Diego County address.7

 In 1992, he tithed to a

church in San Diego County. From about 1992 to 1995 he received mail

at his cousin’s residence in San Diego County; in 1995 he had a San

Diego County bank account using his cousin’s address; and in 1995 he

obtained a California DMV identification card and registered a vehicle with

the DMV using his cousin’s address. In 1997 he submitted a form to the

United States Customs Service to import goods from Mexico. From about

2004 to 2006 he received mail at his son’s residence in San Diego County,

and in 2005 he obtained a California DMV identification card using his

son’s address. He provided his true name and date of birth on the DMV

identification cards. In 2005, he applied for United States citizenship, and

obtained a Social Security card using his son’s address. His relatives,

including at least one of the victims, knew where he lived in Tijuana. Over

the years he repeatedly crossed the border using DMV identification

cards.

The authorities never contacted Ramos’s relatives in San Diego County to

inquire about him. There was no showing the government tried to check

for information about him through DMV records, or to contact him at his

Tijuana address. In 1986 the San Diego district attorney’s office

established an international Liaison Unit which has been used to locate

fugitives in Tijuana and, with the cooperation of Mexican authorities,

secured (sic) their apprehension. This unit never attempted to locate

Ramos or secure his apprehension. In 2006 (apparently after his arrest),

the unit communicated by phone or email with the Mexican authorities and

was provided with information indicating that he was a licensed attorney in

Mexico.

Relevant to the issue of prejudice, the parties submitted information

concerning what evidence was and was not available after 21 years. Both

victims were available to testify. Two of the school personnel who spoke

to R. when she disclosed the molestation were not available (i.e., R.’s

teacher was deceased and the defense had been unable to locate the

school secretary). The school had no records of the disclosure incident. 

However, a school nurse who also spoke with R. was available. The

police officer, detective, and hospital social worker handling the case had

little or no independent recollection of the case, but their written reports

were available. The social services report had been purged from the

county’s files, and the county social worker assigned to the case had no

recollection of the case. The doctors who examined the girls at Children’s

Hospital, as well as the medical reports they prepared, were available. 

However, a medical forensics expert testified that it was not possible to

properly evaluate the medical findings without magnified photographs of

the genitalia, which were not included in the girls’ medical files even

though the technology was used in the 1980's. The defense had been

unable to locate a clinic where Carmen claimed to have taken E. For an

examination and where the doctor had stated there was no evidence of

abuse.

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(Lodgment No. 5 at 7-10.)

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and

public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the

states the obligation to uphold an accused’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth

Amendment. Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). As

observed by the Court of Appeal, the evaluative criteria for post-indictment speedy trial

claims include “[1] whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, [2] whether the

government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, [3] whether, in

due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and [4] whether he

suffered prejudice as the delay's result.” (Lodgment No. 5, at 14, citing Doggett v.

United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530

(1972). "[N]one of the four factors identified above [is] either a necessary or sufficient

condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at

533. The factors are related and “must be considered together with such other

circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities;

courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id.

1. Length of the Delay

Pretrial delays sufficient to presume prejudice trigger inquiry into the remaining

criteria, Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, and such a presumption “intensifies over time.” 

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. Courts measure the length of delay as the period between

indictment and time of trial, United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.

2003), presuming prejudice when pretrial delays approach one year. Doggett, 505 U.S.

at 652, n.1; see also United States v. Serrano, No. 03CR3061-L, 2011 WL 2003285,

slip op. at *2 (9th Cir. May 23, 2011) (seven year delay triggers further inquiry); United

States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2008) (ten year delay triggers further

inquiry). Petitioner was released on his own recognizance in 1985 and not brought to

trial until 2006, approximately twenty-one years after he fled prosecution. (Lodgment

No. 5, at 2.) This delay well exceeds the one year delay courts generally tolerate and

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the eight-and-one-half year delay Doggett termed extraordinary. Doggett, 505 U.S. at

652, n.1. The California Court of Appeal, thus, properly determined this twenty-one

year delay created a presumption of prejudice, justifying further inquiry into the

remaining Barker factors. (Lodgment No. 5, at 16.)

2. Reason for the Delay

The crucial question is whether it was reasonable for the California Court of

Appeal to conclude Petitioner was more to blame for the delay than Respondent. See

Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. “The government has

‘some obligation’ to pursue a defendant and bring him to trial.” Mendoza, 530 F.3d at

762-63, quoting Sandoval, 990 F.2d at 485, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 878 (1993). 

Defendants pursued by the government with reasonable diligence have no speedy trial

claims. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. “When the defendant seeks to avoid detection by

American authorities and any post-indictment delay can be attributed to him, he waives

the right to a speedy trial.” Sandoval, supra, 990 F.2d at 483 (internal quotations

omitted). When a defendant attempts to avoid detection, the government need not

"‘make heroic efforts to apprehend a defendant who is purposefully avoiding

apprehension.'" Id. at 485 (quoting Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 90 (2nd Cir. 1988)).

“When the defendant is not attempting to avoid detection and the government makes no

serious effort to find him, the government is considered negligent in its pursuit," 

Mendoza, supra, 530 F.3d at 762-63, giving rise to a presumption of prejudice. 

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657.

The California Court of Appeal evaluated the evidence submitted by Petitioner

and weighed his actions against those of the government to assign responsibility for the

delay, concluding:

The government’s role in the delay was, at most, passive negligence

arising from the failure to try to secure the cooperation of Mexican

authorities to bring Ramos to San Diego. When the government’s

arguable passive negligence is balanced against Ramos’s conscious

decision to ignore the pending charges, the balance falls on the side of no

speedy trial violation.”

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8

 Changing residences does not in itself indicate active evasion. See Serrano, supra, at *3. In

Serrano, the defendant, like Petitioner, had numerous contacts with the government using his own name. 

Id. Serrano, however, unlike Petitioner, provided the government his true residential address during those

contacts and was unaware of the indictment against him. Id. 

13

(Id. at 20.) The court’s characterization of the government’s inaction as passive

negligence recognizes a weighing of each party’s actions must take place to assign

responsibility for the delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. The court’s conclusion that

the government was passively negligent puts the weight of the reason for delay on

Petitioner, necessarily requiring Petitioner’s active avoidance of prosecution. The

record can be reasonably interpreted to reach such a result. The court’s assessment of

the government’s inaction in pursuing Petitioner as negligence was reasonable – the

government made very little effort to track Petitioner. In comparison to Petitioner’s

actions, which suggest Petitioner actively evaded discovery, the court found the

government’s negligence did not weigh in favor of a speedy trial violation. (Id. at 20.) 

After his intentional flight and throughout the course of twenty-one years, Petitioner

initiated contact with various government entities, providing them various addresses

which were merely artifice, for he never lived at those addresses and in at least one

instance, the address was not a residence, but a mail box.8 Petitioner’s use of false

addresses clouds his contention he lived openly in Tijuana with the United States

government’s full knowledge. Petitioner provided the government with addresses

indicating he was living in California, not Tijuana, which could reasonably suggest the

purpose of Petitioner’s contacts with the government was to mislead the government

about his true location. 

Applying the California Court of Appeal’s rationale, Petitioner’s active evasion

compared with the government’s passive negligence in tracing his whereabouts weighs

against Petitioner. Doggett instructs that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground

so long as his active evasion “is more to blame for that delay.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at

651. Accordingly, the court reasonably concluded Petitioner was a greater factor in the

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reason for the delay than the government. 

3. Petitioner's Assertion of His Speedy Trial Right

Where a defendant who knows of the charges or indictment against him but

takes action to avoid arrest, the “third factor, concerning invocation of the right to

speedy trial, would be weighed heavily against him.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653. While a

defendant may successfully demonstrate his right to a speedy trial was denied without

having asserted his right, finding success will prove difficult. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 

After all, “the more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.” 

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

In evaluating the circumstances of Petitioner’s invocation of his right to a speedy

trial, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Ramos knew he was charged and that the government was prepared to

proceed with the accusation against him. . .The fact that he knew of the

charges and knew he was required to appear supports that he

intentionally decided not to appear in an attempt to avoid prosecution . . . . 

Further, during the 21-year period before Ramos was detained at the

border, he could have elected at any time to effectuate his speedy trial

right by contacting the authorities.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 17-18.) “[T]he record shows Ramos failed to appear even

though he knew about the charges. Thus, he can be properly faulted for failing to

invoke his speedy trial right.” (Id. at 20.) Petitioner knew of the charges against

him in 1985 when he was arrested and arraigned (CT at 43-47), and was well

aware of the requirement he appear in November and December 1985 when he

signed the O.R. Agreement. (Id. at 49.) Only after his 2006 arrest, having waited

twenty-one years, did Petitioner finally choose to invoke his right to a speedy trial

by a motion to dismiss. (Id. at 5-19.) The Court of Appeal’s finding, therefore,

that such a lengthy delay with full knowledge of the charges weighs against a

violation of Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is reasonable and consistent with

U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

/ /

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4. Prejudice

Post-indictment delay can give rise to three forms of prejudice: “oppressive

pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the

[accused's] defense will be impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory

evidence." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Gregory, 322 F.3d at 1163. "Of these forms of prejudice,

the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare

his case skews the fairness of the entire system." Id. (internal citations omitted); see

also Mendoza, 530 F.3d at 764. "This final form of prejudice is not only the most

important, it is also the most difficult to prove because time's erosion of exculpatory

evidence and testimony can rarely be shown.” Mendoza, 530 F.3d at 764, quoting

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (internal citations omitted). “In other words, excessive delays

can compromise[ ] the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that

matter, identify.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Due to these concerns, no showing of

prejudice is required when the delay is great and attributable to the government." 

United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at

657-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686) (internal quotations omitted). When the defendant bears most

of the responsibility for the delay, the defendant must show actual prejudice. Doggett,

505 U.S. at 656.

The only form of pretrial prejudice of which Petitioner has complained is

impairment of his defense. (Lodgment No. 2 at 17; Lodgment No. 4 at 3; Lodgment No.

6 at 6.) Petitioner suffered no oppressive pretrial incarceration because he was

released on his own recognizance in 1985. (CT at 49.) Furthermore, Petitioner has not

raised any claim of anxiety or concern he may have suffered, and the record supports

no such inference. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 100, 120.) As shown above,

the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded Petitioner was primarily

responsible for the delay, requiring Petitioner to demonstrate actual prejudice in

presenting an unimpaired defense. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656.

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 Petitioner states in the Traverse, without elaboration, that he was prejudiced by the delay. 

Petitioner raised these reasons as to why his defense was impaired in his arguments before the California

Supreme Court and California Court of Appeal.

16

Petitioner alleges the delay prejudiced his defense because of unavailable

witnesses, witnesses with no memory of events, and the loss or absence of physical

evidence.9 (Lodgment No. 6.) The California Court of Appeal disagreed, stating “[t]he

record supports that the presumption of prejudice arising from the 21-year delay was

sufficiently rebutted so that the potential for prejudice does not overcome the heavy

weight accorded to Ramos’s responsibility for the delay.” (Lodgment No. 5 at 18-19.) 

The court reasoned:

If the case had gone to trial in the 1980's, the defense may have been

able to more fully examine how the interviews were conducted, but the

defense would not have had the benefit of any subsequently-developed

information concerning suggestibility and contamination. Further, because

the victims were adults by the time the case came to trial, Ramos had the

opportunity to cross-examine them when their rational faculties were fully

developed. Thus, the defense was able to question the adult victims

about their claims of abuse without the difficulties associated with child

witnesses. Ramos has not shown that the potential loss of contamination

evidence so eviscerated the defense as to tip the scales in favor of finding

a violation of his speedy trial right.

(Id. at 19.)

The court’s assessment is reasonable. Petitioner confronted witnesses against

him and introduced testimony to undermine the credibility of interviewing techniques,

medical examinations and reports. He cross-examined both of his victims. (Lodgment

No. 8 at 331, 439.) He cross-examined Michelle Neumann-Ribner, the interviewer who

wrote a report regarding her interview with the victims and had no specific memory of

the case. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. On Appeal at 480-519.) Petitioner questioned

her regarding the interviewing techniques she used with the victims, raising the issue of

whether those techniques subjected the victims’ allegations to suggestibility and

contamination. (Id.) Petitioner examined social worker Ted Silva, who was named in a

police report as having worked on the case, but had no recollection of the case. 

(Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. On Appeal at 61-64.) Petitioner’s intended purpose in

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examining Silva, aside from exposing his lack of memory of the case, was to inquire

about his contact with one of the victims, presumably to inquire into his contamination of

the victims’ allegations. (Id.; Lodgment No. 6 at 9.) The witnesses unavailable to

Petitioner were those school officials Petitioner intended to confront regarding

suggestibility and contamination. Mr. Fricke, one of the victim’s teachers, is deceased. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 21.) Victim R. testified she only told Mr. Fricke something was

wrong and that she preferred to speak with a female. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. On

Appeal at 347.) He did not ask further questions. (Id.) The other two school officials

could not be found. (Id.) Petitioner, by use of “subsequently-developed information

concerning suggestibility and contamination,” (Lodgment No. 5 at 18-19), was able to

call into question the credibility of the witnesses, examinations and reports. If not for

Petitioner’s twenty-one year evasion, this information would have been unavailable to

him and he would not have benefitted from its use. 

Petitioner also examined Dr. Adams, who testified she could not properly analyze

the medical report without photographs. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. On Appeal at 639-

40.) Petitioner argues that because no photographs were taken even though the

technology to take the photographs existed at the time of the examination, he was

prejudiced. (Lodgment No. 6 at 23.) Even without the photographs, Dr. Adams testified

the report contained conclusions which at the time were sound, but have since been

debunked. (Lodgment No. 8, Rep.’s Tr. on Appeal at 621-22.) She testified:

Doctors, in the early ‘80s, were asked to examine children and – who had

described being sexually abused and to say whether or not there were any

physical signs in that child’s examination to support the allegations of

abuse. And, unfortunately, there was very, very little known about what

the normal variation is in the appearance of the hymen and the genital

tissues and the anal tissue in children who had not been abused. And so,

as we were examining children who said that they had been abused and

we saw something that looked unusual, we would conclude, oh, this must

be due to that abuse. And the people who were the pioneers in doing the

examinations, then taught everybody else at conferences that this is what

you see in abused children and so, if you see this, it means the child was

abused. And that was a leap that should not have been taken, but it was.

(Id.) Considering this testimony, Petitioner was able to test the credibility of the reports

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concerning the medical examinations of his victims. (Id. at 636-50.)

Despite Petitioner’s allegations of prejudice, he benefitted from his twenty-one

year evasion. Had Petitioner not fled prosecution and instead faced trial in 1985, he

would not have had access to the developments Dr. Adams discussed, nor would he

have had access to developments in interviewing techniques. Petitioner bears the

primary responsibility for the delay and is, therefore, primarily responsible for the

unavailable witnesses and fading memories of which he now complains. The California

Court of Appeal reasonably concluded the prejudice suffered by Petitioner simply did

not outweigh his responsibility for the delay. Accordingly, this Court recommends the

petition be DENIED as to Ground One.

C. Claim 2 - Cunningham/Ex Post Facto 

Petitioner alleges the trial court sentenced him to the upper term on several

counts of his conviction without a jury determination to support the upper term sentence

as required by Cunningham. (Pet. at 5.) Petitioner elaborates on this claim in his

Traverse, stating “the alleged crime occurred prior to the Legislature amending

California Penal Code Section 1170(b), and that he should be sentenced under the

provisions of Cunningham to a middle term thereof.” (Traverse at 4) (emphasis added). 

Essentially, Petitioner alleges the trial court's upper term imposition for his sentence

violated the ex post facto clause because it was based on legislative amendments not in

force when the alleged crimes were committed. (Id.)

1. Petitioner’s Second Claim is Unexhausted.

“Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust

available state remedies, thereby giving the State the ‘opportunity to pass upon and

correct’ alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights.' “ Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,

29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004), quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). A

state prisoner’s federal habeas petition may not be granted if state remedies are

unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion

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requirement if he has “fairly presented” his federal claim to the highest state court with

jurisdiction to consider it....” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996);

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). State prisoners can satisfy the

“fair presentation” procedural prerequisite in several ways, “for example, by citing in

conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case

deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim ‘federal.’”

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32 (holding a state prisoner ordinarily does not “fairly present” a

federal claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition, a brief, or similar

papers to find material that will alert it to the presence of such a claim).

Petitioner’s second claim was not presented in his Petition for Review to the

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6.) The only issue raised there was the

alleged violation of his speedy trial rights. (Id.) Petitioner admits he did not present his

second claims as a claim for habeas relief before the California Supreme Court. (Pet.,

at 5.) Thus, this claim is unexhausted. Federal courts cannot grant petitions that

contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims, which are often referred to as “mixed

petitions.” See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522. The filing of a mixed petition renders

it subject to dismissal. Id. Petitioner was previously informed his Petition is mixed, in

part due to the inclusion of this claim. (Doc. No. 7.) He was cautioned the mixed

petition was subject to dismissal and was offered four possible options to proceed. (Id.) 

Petitioner responded by abandoning only his third and fourth claims, leaving his

unexhausted second claim and his mixed Petition still pending before the Court and

subject to dismissal. (Doc. No. 9.) 

Notwithstanding the total-exhaustion rule, there is no statutory impediment to

denying a mixed petition on the merits in its entirety. “An application for a writ of habeas

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the state.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2);

See also Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-624 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding § 2254(b)(2)

codifies the decision in Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987) permitting a

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federal court to deny an unexhausted petition on the merits when “the applicant does

not raise even a colorable federal claim”). As discussed below, Petitioner’s second

claim is without merit. Dismissal is, therefore, appropriate on this basis, as well as on

the grounds that it is unexhausted.

2. Petitioner’s Second Claim Fails on the Merits. 

The California Court of Appeal found the upper term sentence permissible:

[E]ffective March 2007, the Legislature amended section 1170, subdivision

(b) so that the upper term, rather than the middle term, is the prescribed

statutory maximum. When Ramos was sentenced in November 2007, this

amendment was operative. Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to

select upper terms based on its own factual findings because an upper

term is not beyond the statutory maximum.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 21-22.)

"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, §

9, cl. 3. An ex post facto law "imposes a punishment for an act which was not

punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then

prescribed." Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 325-26 (1867); see also Calder v.

Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). "The controlling inquiry is whether retroactive application of the

change [in state law] create[s] a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment

attached to the covered crimes.” Scott v. Baldwin, 225 F.3d 1020, 1022, quoting Garner

v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 259 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). The focus is not on

whether a legislative change produces “some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ ” but

rather “on whether any such change increases the penalty by which a crime is

punishable.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 255 (quoting California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales,

514 U.S. 499, 506-07 n.3 (1995)). “A law does not violate the clause if it ‘created only

the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment

attached to the covered crimes.’ ” Brown v. Palmateer, 379 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th

Cir.2004) (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 513); see also Boulware v. Marshall, 621

F.Supp.2d 882, 893-94 (C.D.Cal.2008).

Cunningham, supra, held California’s determinate sentencing law, pursuant to

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which a judge would impose an upper, rather than middle term sentence after finding an

aggravating circumstance, violated a defendant’s right to a trial by jury. Cunningham,

549 U.S. at 288-89 (2007). “[T]herefore, the middle term prescribed in California’s

statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum.” Id. at 288. To modify

its system, California may “permit judges genuinely to exercise broad discretion within a

statutory range, which everyone agrees encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal.” Id. at

294 (internal quotations omitted).

On March 30, 2007, in response to the Supreme Court's suggestion in

Cunningham that California could cure any constitutional defect in section 1170(b) by

leaving the selection of an appropriate sentence to the judge's discretion, the State

Legislature enacted Senate Bill 40, which amended section 1170(b). Id. at 293-94; Cal.

Stats., ch. 3, § 2, eff. Mar. 30, 2007. Under amended section 1170(b), a trial court still

exercises its discretion in selecting among the upper, middle or lower terms, but no

additional factual finding is required to impose an upper or lower term. CAL. PENAL

CODE § 1170(b); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 652 n. 20 (9th Cir.2008) (“imposition of

the lower, middle, or upper term is now discretionary and does not depend on the

finding of any aggravating factors”); People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825, 843-45 (2007).

In Sandoval, the California Supreme Court found it could judicially reform former

section 1170(b) in a manner consistent with Senate Bill 40 to resentence defendants

whose sentences were invalid under Cunningham. Id. at 845-46. Sandoval held “the

removal of the provision calling for imposition of the middle term in the absence of any

aggravating or mitigating circumstance is not intended to – and would not be expected

to – have the effect of increasing the sentence for any particular crime” [and therefore]

“the federal Constitution does not prohibit the application of the revised sentencing

process ... to defendants whose crimes were committed prior to the date of [this]

decision.” Id. at 855, 857; see also Chioino v. Kernan, 581 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.

2009) (“no ex post facto concerns are generated by remanding for resentencing for a

Cunningham violation if the sentencing court follows the California Supreme Court's

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instructions in Sandoval.”); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 652 n.20 (9th Cir. 2008)

(finding Sandoval controlled by United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir 2005)

(finding retroactive application of judicially-reformed federal sentencing guidelines under

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) not violative of the ex post facto clause)). 

If retroactive application of post-Cunningham judicially-reformed sentencing endorsed in

Sandoval does not violate the ex post facto clause, then neither does retroactive

application of the sentencing guidelines in Senate Bill 40.

Petitioner committed his crimes prior to the legislative amendment in Senate Bill

40. Petitioner was sentenced after this legislative amendment was operative. Because

the legislative amendment is applicable retroactively, Petitioner’s sentence did not

violate the ex post facto clause. The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of

Petitioner’s second claim for the same reasons above, was neither “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, this

Court recommends Petitioner’s second claim be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner's

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. This report and recommendation is

submitted to the Honorable Dana M. Sabraw, the United States District Judge assigned

to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 20, 2011, any party may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should

be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties not later than September 30, 2011. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

/ /

/ /

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raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 DATED: August 30, 2011

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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