Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01811/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01811-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY L. SHIVERS, III,

Petitioner,

v.

ON HABEAS CORPUS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-1811 OWW DLB HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PETITIONER BLANK PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On December 8, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Summary Dismissal

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides in pertinent part:

If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the

clerk to notify the petitioner. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ

of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. A petition for habeas corpus should not

be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief can be

pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9 Cir. 1971). th

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28 The Court notes that Ground Two of the petition is cognizable as Petitioner alleges that prison officials 1

improperly denied him staff assistance at his disciplinary hearing. 

2

B. Failure to State a Claim as to Ground One

 In Ground One of the petition, Petitioner contends that he was denied due process by the

prisons failure to review the order placing Petitioner in administrative segregation on the first

work day following the inmate’s placement pursuant to California Administrative Code section

333. When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time credits, due

process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) “Written notice of the charges must be given to the

disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal

the facts and prepare a defense”; (2) “at least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than

24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the disciplinary

committee”; (3) “there must be a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on

and reasons for the disciplinary action”; (4) “the inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should

be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting

him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”; and (5)

“where an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues makes it

unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate

comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to have

adequate substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the staff.” Wolff,

418 U.S. at 564, 566, 570. As Wolff does not require that the administrative placement order be

reviewed on the first working day following the inmate’s placement, Petitioner’s claim fails to

state a cognizable federal constitutional violation, and is subject to dismissal. 

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C. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d

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1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest th

state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis);

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

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Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the instant petition before the Court, Petitioner fails to state whether he sought relief in

the California Supreme Court, and if he did, whether he raised the grounds he presents in this

petition. If the grounds were not presented to the California Supreme Court, they are

unexhausted and the petition must be dismissed to provide Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust

the claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. 

D. Failure to Name a Proper Respondent

In this case, Petitioner has failed to name a Respondent. 

A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state

officer having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2 (a) of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v.

California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person having

custody of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden of the prison in which the petitioner is

incarcerated because the warden has "day-to-day control over" the petitioner. Brittingham v.

United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992); see also, Stanley v. California Supreme Court,

21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the chief officer in charge of state penal institutions

is also appropriate. Ortiz, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. Where a petitioner is on

probation or parole, the proper respondent is his probation or parole officer and the official in

charge of the parole or probation agency or state correctional agency. Id. 

Petitioner’s failure to name a proper respondent requires dismissal of his habeas petition

for lack of jurisdiction. Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360; Olson v. California Adult Auth., 423 F.2d 1326,

1326 (9th Cir. 1970); see also, Billiteri v. United States Bd. Of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 948 (2nd

Cir. 1976). However, the Court will give Petitioner the opportunity to cure this defect by

amending the petition to name a proper respondent, such as the warden of his facility. See West

v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir.1973), vacated in part on other grounds, 510 F.2d

363 (5th Cir.1975) (en banc) (allowing petitioner to amend petition to name proper respondent);

Ashley v. State of Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968) (same).

E. Conclusion

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The instant petition must be dismissed for the above-stated reasons. Petitioner will be

given an opportunity to file a first amended petition to cure the deficiencies. Petitioner is advised

that failure to file a petition in compliance with this order within the allotted time will result in a

recommendation that the petition be dismissed and the action be terminated. Petitioner is advised

that the amended petition should be titled “First Amended Petition” and must reference the

instant case number.

ORDER

Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is

GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order to file an amended petition in

compliance with this order. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner a form petition

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 22, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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