Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_22-cv-00105/USCOURTS-alnd-5_22-cv-00105-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

GERALD PAULK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TENNESSEE VALLEY 

AUTHORITY, 

Defendant.

________________________________ 

Case No. 5:22-cv-15-CLM 

JOSEPH MILES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TENNESSEE VALLEY 

AUTHORITY, 

Defendant.

__________________________________

TOMMY JONES, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v.

TENNESSEE VALLEY 

AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:22-cv-105-CLM 

Case No. 5:22-cv-114-CLM 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tim Parker moves to dismiss the Electric Power Board of the City 

of Scottsboro (“SEPB”) and the City of Scottsboro’s “Fourth Party 

Complaints.” (Doc. 151); (doc. 159).

.1 Because Parker filed two almost 

identical motions asking the court to dismiss two similar claims, the court 

1 The court cites the record as it appears in Paulk, et al. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al. (5:22-

cv-15-CLM). 

FILED

 2024 Sep-30 PM 03:13

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:22-cv-00105-CLM Document 219 Filed 09/30/24 Page 1 of 5
2

resolves the motions together in one opinion. The court DENIES both of 

Parker’s pending motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Because this case has an extensive filing history, the record already 

contains ample factual summaries. So the court’s factual recitation is 

minimal here. The parties involvement is as follows: 

• Tim Parker owned the Dixie Delight—a liveaboard houseboat that 

caught fire in January 2020. 

• The Dixie Delight was berthed at Dock B that Jackson County owns 

and maintains. 

• SEPB owned and operated the electrical system powering Dock B. 

• The City of Scottsboro—through its fire department—inspected and 

maintained the electrical system.

• Jackson County built Dock B on land the United States granted by 

easement. 

• The Tennessee Valley Authority issued the permit authorizing 

Jackson County to construct the dock. 

The fire started in the Dixie Delight’s inner walls near an electrical 

panel. The fire engulfed the houseboat and spread to neighboring vessels.

Because the Dixie Delight was docked closest to the shore, it prevented 

occupants of other vessels from escaping the fire. The fire resulted in 

deaths, personal injuries, and property destruction.

Shortly after the fire, Plaintiffs filed three state court lawsuits 

against Scottsboro and SEPB. A year later, Plaintiffs filed three federal 

lawsuits against TVA.2 TVA filed a Third-Party Complaint against 

Scottsboro, Jackson County, SEPB, and Parker. (Doc. 118). But TVA 

voluntarily dismissed all pending claims against Parker. (Doc. 149). 

Scottsboro and SEPB answered TVA’s amended complaint and included 

2 The lead case, Paulk, et al. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al. (5:22-cv-15-CLM), is consolidated 

with Miles v. Tennessee Valley Auth., et al. (5:22-cv-105) and Jones, et al. v. Tennessee Valley 

Auth., et al. (5:22-cv-114-CLM).

Case 5:22-cv-00105-CLM Document 219 Filed 09/30/24 Page 2 of 5
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“Fourth Party Complaints” against Parker. (Doc. 151); (doc. 159). Their 

only claim is a right to contribution from Parker for his share of the 

liability. 

Parker moves to dismiss both Scottsboro and SEPB’s contribution 

claims under Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 168); (doc. 169). Parker argues that any 

claim Scottsboro or SEPB has against him should have been brought as a 

compulsory counterclaim in state court. Parker also claims that

contribution isn’t a standalone cause of action. SEPB and Scottsboro 

oppose Parker’s counterclaim theory since TVA wasn’t a party in state 

court. They also argue that contribution is a standalone claim under 

maritime law. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 

enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible on 

its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering the motion, the court accepts 

all factual allegations of the complaint as true and construes them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 

1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

 Parker raises two arguments, neither of which compels dismissal. 

1. Parker argues that the compulsory counterclaim doctrine bars 

SEPB and Scottsboro from bringing a contribution claim in federal court. 

(Doc. 168, p. 5); (doc. 169, p. 5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 13. But the court disagrees. 

SEPB and Scottsboro couldn’t assert contribution in state court because 

TVA wasn’t a party in those actions. And SEPB and Scottsboro request 

contribution from Parker only if the court finds them liable on TVA’s 

third-party complaint. (Doc. 151, p. 24); (doc.159, p. 18–19). SEPB and 

Scottsboro couldn’t have been compelled to assert contribution in state 

Case 5:22-cv-00105-CLM Document 219 Filed 09/30/24 Page 3 of 5
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court because, at that time, they didn’t need to: the need only arose after 

TVA asserted claims against them in federal court. 

2. Parker also argues that contribution is not a standalone claim. 

(Doc. 168, p. 12); (doc. 169, p. 12). But here too Parker is mistaken. 

Contribution is a standalone claim in admiralty law. 1 Admiralty & Mar. 

Law. § 5:16 (Contribution is a cause of action that arises when a tortfeasor 

pays more than his pro rata share of a judgment.”); Ambraco, Inc. v. 

Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 242 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Rule 14(c) permits a 

defendant to implead a third-party defendant for two purposes: (1) to seek 

contribution or indemnification from the third-party defendant, and (2) to 

tender the third-party defendant to the plaintiff.”). In a case like this 

pleaded under Rule 9(h), Rule 14(c)’s plain language allows a defendant 

to bring in a third-party defendant for contribution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c)(1) 

(“If a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h), the 

defendant . . . may, as a third-party plaintiff, bring in a third-party 

defendant who may be wholly or partly liable—either to the plaintiff or to 

the third-party plaintiff— for remedy over, contribution, or otherwise . . . 

.”). The court can use a claim for contribution as the means to evaluate 

and assign liability—even without an accompanying tort claim. 

The court construes both SEPB and Scottsboro’s contribution claims 

as if they were properly pleaded under Rule 14(c). The court treats SEPB 

and Scottsboro as defendants turned third-party plaintiffs and Parker as 

a third-party defendant. By the plain language of Rule 14(c), SEPB and 

Scottsboro are free to use the impleader rules to bring a contribution claim 

against Parker. Because SEPB and Scottsboro don’t need to bring 

separate tort claims with their contribution claims, Parker’s concerns 

about the statute of limitations are also resolved. (Doc. 168, p. 11); (doc. 

169, p. 11). 

Case 5:22-cv-00105-CLM Document 219 Filed 09/30/24 Page 4 of 5
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the court DENIES Parker’s 

Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. 168); (doc. 169).

DONE and ORDERED on September 30, 2024.

 _________________________________

 COREY L. MAZE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 5:22-cv-00105-CLM Document 219 Filed 09/30/24 Page 5 of 5