Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00781/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00781-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALONZO TREVON TALLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CANTU, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00781-LJO-DLB PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF

THIRTY-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE

Plaintiff Alonzo Trevon Talley (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action on May 22, 2014. Pursuant to Court order, he filed a First 

Amended Complaint on November 21, 2014, and a Second Amended Complaint on April 15, 2015. 

He names LVN Cantu, LVN Nallet and RN K. Powell as Defendants. 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the 

deprivation of his rights. Id. at 1949. This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient 

to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in 

Corcoran, California, where the events at issue occurred.

Plaintiff alleges that on December 25, 2013, Defendant Cantu “wrongfully” called him to 

have his stitches removed. ECF No. 14, at 3. Based on a December 16, 2013, doctor’s note 

indicating that the stitches may be ready to be removed on December 27, 2013, Plaintiff contends 

that Defendant Cantu called him two days too early and therefore wasn’t authorized to take the 

stitches out. Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Cantu knew “she was messing up.” ECF No. 14, at 3. 

He contends that Defendant Cantu and Defendant Nallet had difficulty removing the stitches because 

they were not ready, and as professional nurses, they should have known this. Instead, they “acted 

under all the original claims I previously presented. . .” ECF No. 14, at 4. He contends that that 

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Defendants Cantu and Nallet “wrongful[ly]” participated in the removal and caused the wound to 

open back up a little. ECF No. 14, at 4. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nallet used “excessive force” during the removal, and that 

Defendant Powell incorrectly told Plaintiff on December 27, 2013, that the pain, redness and 

numbness were normal. ECF No. 14, at 4. Plaintiff also showed Defendant Powell the hole in his 

hand caused by Defendant Nallet, but Defendant Powell said it was “alright.” ECF No. 14, at 4. 

Plaintiff contends that all three Defendants acted without reasonable care.

Based on these facts, Plaintiff states that he is challenging the “medical negligence” of 

Defendants, which amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

C. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is an exact copy of his First Amended Complaint, 

though it includes exhibits that were omitted from the First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the 

analysis in the Court’s March 31, 2015, screening order remains applicable.

1. Amended Complaint Supersedes Original Complaint

In the Court’s order dismissing his original complaint, the Court explained that an amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (en banc), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded 

pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

In both his First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff provides 

significantly less detail in his factual allegations. Instead, he appears to be (1) addressing only the 

deficiency identified by the Court, i.e., a failure to demonstrate that any Defendant acted with 

deliberate indifference; or (2) arguing why the prior screening order was incorrect. Plaintiff cites to 

the “original claims” presented in his complaint, without actually including these claims in his 

amended complaint. 

The result, therefore, is an incomplete version of the alleged events. The Court cannot, as 

Plaintiff seems to suggest, refer back to his complaint to discern his “original claims.” Plaintiff 

therefore fails to state a claim because his Second Amended Complaint is incomplete.

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Plaintiff was informed of this deficiency in the prior screening order, but he has failed to 

correct it.

2. Eighth Amendment

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference 

to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat 

[his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006)). Deliberate indifference is shown by 

“(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The 

requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of 

due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

In the prior screening orders, the Court explained that Plaintiff’s facts did not demonstrate 

that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. The Court also explained that even if 

Defendants erred, a finding which was not supported by the record, an Eighth Amendment claim 

may not be premised on even gross negligence. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

As in his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cantu “wrongfully” 

called him in to have his stitches removed two days early, and that she wasn’t authorized to take the 

stitches out. He also alleges that Defendants Cantu and Nallet knew, or should have known, that the 

stitches were not ready to be removed. As to Defendant Powell, he simply alleges that she gave him 

incorrect advice. 

Plaintiff’s claims again fail to demonstrate that any Defendant acted with the requisite state 

of mind. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

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(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person 

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth 

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In other words, even if Defendants “wrongfully” took the stitches out, or gave incorrect 

advice, these facts, alone, do not demonstrate that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. 

The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack 

of due care. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other 

grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against any Defendant. 

He was informed of this deficiency in the prior screening orders, but failed to correct the claim. 

2. Medical Negligence

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action 

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 

III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), 

retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. 

Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state laws claim because 

Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Az., 

Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 

802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted under section 1983. Plaintiff has been informed of the deficiencies on two occasions, and 

each amendment has failed to set forth facts to cure the issues. In the March 31, 2015, order, the 

Court indicated that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint would be his final opportunity to file an 

amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds that further leave to amendment is not warranted, 

especially since the pleading portion of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is an exact copy of 

his First Amended Complaint. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

The Court therefore recommends that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for 

failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30) 

days after date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file written 

objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 5, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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