Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01335/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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r 

ALLISON 

v. 

ROBERT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TEN'l'H CIRCUIT NOV 11990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

R. CHILDS, Clerk ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

LISKEY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 89-1335 

(D.C. No. 87-C-767) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Allison Childs appeals the district court's denial of her 

motion to set aside a written settlement agreement. We affirm. 

The underlying case involves a complaint filed pursuant to 42 

u.s.c. S 1983. In November, 1987, Childs negotiated a settlement 

with all defendants except one. The settling defendants 

(appellees here), and Childs, invoked the assistance and 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1335 Document: 010110047470 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 1 
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intervention of the district court with respect to the settlement. 

The district court held a hearing on the settlement and entered an 

"Order of Dismissal with Prejudice" following the hearing. 

The order recited that the matter came before the court at 

the request of the parties, that the court had jurisdiction, that 

Childs was competent to enter into the settlement, that the 

settlement was fair, equitable, and entered into voluntarily by 

Childs after the terms of the settlement had been fully explained 

to her by her attorney, and that Childs was represented by 

experienced counsel who had consulted with other attorneys 

regarding the propriety of the settlement. R. Vol. I, Tab 4. The 

order then recited that "this action is and shall be dismissed 

with prejudice as to all defendants with the exception of Robert 

Liskey. " Id. 

In March, 1989, Childs settled with the remaining defendant, 

Robert Liskey, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. Id. 

at Tabs 10, 11. On June 5, 1989, and again on July 17, 1989, 

Childs filed motions to set aside the 1987 settlement agreement 

with the appellees. The June 1989 motion to set aside generally 

alleged that Childs was incompetent. Id. at Tab 12. That motion 

was denied on June 29, 1989, and no appeal was taken from that 

denial. Childs then fired her attorney. On July 17, 1989, 

Childs, acting prose, filed another motion to set aside the 

settlement agreement. As grounds, Childs asserted that the 

attorney she had in 1987 (different from the one she had in June, 

1989) incompetently evaluated her lawsuit, pressured her into a 

settlement, and misinformed her about the amount of insurance 

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coverage possessed by the state. She concluded by requesting 

"that the Settlement Agreement between herself and Defendants 

State of Colorado, et al., be set aside on the grounds of fraud 

and material mistake." Id. at Tab 15. The district court held a 

hearing on plaintiff's pro~ motion at which time, as a court 

imposed condition, Childs was represented by counsel. Following 

the hearing the court denied the motion and this appeal followed. 

There is a threshold jurisdictional question. Appellees 

contend that the district court order is not appealable because 

the parties had entered into a stipulation to dismiss pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(a)(l)(ii). See Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 

902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). We disagree, and deny appellee's 

motion on the jurisdictional issue. Neither the parties nor the 

district court indicated that the dismissal entered by the court 

on November 10, 1987, was pursuant to Rule 4l(a)(l)(ii), and the 

active involvement of the court, including two hearings and 

findings pursuant to which the court then dismissed the action 

with prejudice, indicates to the contrary. See Smith v. Phillips, 

881 F.2d at 905. See also McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 

1188-89 (7th Cir. 1985). 

It is arguable that the district court retained jurisdiction 

over the settlement agreement from the outset as a condition to 

dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 4l(a)(2). See,~, McCallBey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d at 1188. It would be unusual for the 

court to do so, and there is nothing in the court's 1987 order 

indicating a retention of jurisdiction for any purpose. The court 

did entertain a motion by Childs to enforce the settlement 

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I 

agreement in 1989, prior to the final dismissal of the lawsuit 

with prejudice as against the remaining single defendant. But the 

motion in question came after the suit was dismissed as to all 

parties, see generally Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 851 

F.2d 316 {10th Cir. 1988), and a motion to set aside a settlement 

is qualitatively different from a motion to enforce. The motion 

to set aside the settlement here was by necessity a motion to set 

aside the judgments of dismissal with prejudice and to reopen the 

lawsuit on the merits. In the circumstances of this case we 

conclude that the closure of the lawsuit deprived the court of any 

jurisdiction traceable to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41{a)(2). See generally 

Fairfax Countywide Citizens Association v. Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978). 

However, the district court did have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to set aside under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Relief 

from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) may be granted for "any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." It 

may be filed "within a reasonable time", although a motion under 

that subsection may not be used merely to avoid the time limits of 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l), (2) and (3). 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, 

Moore's Federal Practice, 160.27[1] at 60-266 (2d ed. 1980). A 

60(b) motion itself need not contain any reference to the rule. 

Laskey v. Continental Products Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 253 n.3 {3rd 

Cir. 1986); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, 160-18[8] at 60-

139. It provided a broad reservation of relief. See Morris v. 

Adams-Millis Corp., 758 F.2d 1352, 1359 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Furthermore the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to determine 

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whether the district court had jurisdiction. See Fairfax 

Countywide Citizens Association v. Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299. There 

is jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. See Mcclendon v. United 

States, 885 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1989). 

"Relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary and may only be 

granted in exceptional circumstances." Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. 

v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., Inc., 909 F.2d 1437 (10th Cir. 1990). 

We will not reverse an order of the district court denying relief 

under Rule 60(b) unless the district court has abused its 

discretion. Id. The abuse of discretion standard would also 

apply to the district court's refusal to set aside its previous 

judgment of dismissal with prejudice, set aside the settlement 

agreement, and reopen the action on the merits, even if 

jurisdiction existed on some basis other than that conferred by 

Rule 60(b). 

The district court held hearings on the settlement agreement 

and on the motion to set aside. It proceeded with extreme care 

and solicitude with respect to the rights of Ms. Childs, and 

Childs was represented by counsel at every important stage. 

Additionally, a previous motion to reopen had been denied without 

appeal. The district court did not err in denying plaintiff's 

motion to set aside the settlement agreement. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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