Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01048/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01048-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADY K. ARMSTRONG,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. PELAYO,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-01048-AWI-SKO (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE ANY CLAIMS 

AGAINST DEFENDANT PELAYO, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Brady K. Armstrong, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 8, 2013. The Court is required to 

screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer 

or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a 

complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or 

malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners 

proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and 

to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the 

plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

A. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations1

Plaintiff is incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State 

Prison in Corcoran, California, and he brings this action against Correctional Officer D. Pelayo. 

Plaintiff alleges that he spends 95% of his time in a wheelchair or in bed due to severe back and 

neck injuries and complications, including brain damage, from diabetes and a stroke. Plaintiff 

alleges that he forces himself to stand holding onto his cane, the bars, or his bunk bed in an effort 

to strengthen his legs and body, but, while he is not paralyzed, his balance is off and he remains 

sitting or lying down due to pain. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pelayo is aware of his condition.

 

1

Pursuant to the order filed on February 12, 2014, this action is proceeding against Defendant Pelayo. (Doc. 20.) 

Plaintiff’s unrelated claims against other defendants were severed. (Id.)

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On February 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal against Defendant Pelayo for 

depriving him of a shower on February 9, 2012, after he defecated on himself. Plaintiff alleges 

that he is entitled to showers are an ADA accommodation, and he was left sitting in his wheelchair 

after he defecated on himself and Defendant denied his request for a shower. 2 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pelayo continues to ignore Plaintiff’s requests for a shower 

when a medical or law library appointment interferes with Plaintiff’s scheduled shower time. 

Other third watch officers allow him to shower, however.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pelayo retaliates against him for filing appeals by 

becoming violent and challenging Plaintiff to combat, and Defendant also withholds his mail.

On March 22, 2012, Plaintiff obtained an ADA shower “chrono,” but Defendant Pelayo 

continued with his “evil acts” against Plaintiff in retaliation for filing appeals. (Comp., p. 6.)

On March 30, 2012, Defendant Pelayo fabricated a rules violation against Plaintiff after 

threatening to write Plaintiff up if he did not drop his appeal. 

On April 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed another appeal against Defendant Pelayo for ongoing 

retaliation and hindrance of Plaintiff’s “ADA showers.” (Id., pp. 6-7.)

On May 11, 2012, the senior hearing officer found Plaintiff not guilty of the rules 

violation.

On October 4, 2012, Defendant Pelayo forced Plaintiff to fall from his wheelchair, which 

caused Plaintiff to injure his lower back/tail bone area. Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal on October 

29, 2012, against Defendant Pelayo for causing him to fall out of his wheelchair and for refusing 

to remove Plaintiff’s back-lock, an ADA accommodation to which Plaintiff is entitled.

B. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2011); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham 

v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

 

2 Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

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elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva, 658 at 1104; Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 

1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff has a right to file prison grievances without being retaliated against for doing so, 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114; Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269; and he alleges that Defendant Pelayo 

harassed him, fabricated a rules violation report against him, deprived him of showers in violation 

of his accommodation chrono, interfered with his mail, and caused him to fall out of his 

wheelchair, all in retaliation against him for filing grievances, Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1270 (the 

mere threat of harm can be sufficiently adverse to support a retaliation claim). However, 

Plaintiff’s description of events is conclusory and he had not pled the absence of a legitimate 

penological purpose underlying the actions.3 Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271-72; Pratt, 65 F.3d at

807-08. The absence of any legitimate penological purpose is a necessary element of Plaintiff’s 

claim, and he must plead facts pertaining to that element.

C. Eighth Amendment Claim

In addition to retaliation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pelayo acted with deliberate 

indifference toward him.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 

101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). Prison officials have a duty to ensure that 

prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal 

 

33 The Court has difficulty envisioning a legitimate penological purpose for verbal harassment or causing Plaintiff to 

fall out of his wheelchair, but the mere possibility of misconduct does not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. Because the circumstances surrounding these events are not described at all, Plaintiff’s allegations fall 

short of supporting a reasonable inference that no legitimate penological purpose existed.

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safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains while in prison represents a constitutional 

violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks omitted). To maintain an Eighth 

Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a 

substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 

611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th 

Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim against Defendant Pelayo for violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Verbal abuse or harassment does not support a claim under section 1983,

Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), and the description of events 

regarding Plaintiff’s shower chrono does not support a claim that Defendant knowingly 

disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff’s health, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 

D. ADA Claim

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to state a claim against Defendant Pelayo for 

violation of the ADA, his claim fails.4 

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12132. Title II applies to the services, programs, and activities provided for inmates by 

jails and prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208-13, 118 S.Ct. 

1952 (1998); Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2010); Pierce v. 

County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008). “To establish a violation of Title II of 

the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was 

excluded from participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s 

services, programs, or activities; and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] 

 

4

Plaintiff may not be seeking redress for violation of the ADA but in light of his pro se status, the issue bears 

addressing.

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disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); accord Simmons, 609 F.3d 

at 1021; McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

Although Plaintiff states that his shower chrono is an ADA accommodation, his complaint 

sets forth no facts supporting a claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of a disability. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff may not seek to impose individual liability on Defendant Pelayo for 

violation of the ADA. Individual capacity suits against individual prison employees in their 

personal capacities are precluded under the ADA. E.g., Heinke v. County of Tehama Sheriff’s 

Dept., No. CVI S-12-2433 LKK/KJN, 2013 WL 3992407, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013); White v. 

Smyers, No. 2:12-cv-2868 MCE AC P, 2012 WL 6518064, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012); 

Mosier v. California Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:11-CV-01034-MJS (PC), 2012 WL 2577524, 

at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2012); Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 

3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691 (D. 

Haw. 2000)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 

1983 or the ADA. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended 

complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th 

Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability may 

not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 

2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

///

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any

claims against Defendant Pelayo;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies in his claims against Defendant Pelayo; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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