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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2012 Decided July 5, 2013

No. 11-7158

MARGARETTA SIBERT-DEAN,

APPELLEE

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-02145)

Gerard J. Stief argued the cause for appellant. With him on

the briefs were Carol B. O’Keeffe and Mark F. Sullivan. 

Jacob M. Lebowitz argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief was Peter C. Grenier.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and TATEL and

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: Margaretta Sibert-Dean was

injured when the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority (WMATA) bus on which she was riding struck a car. 

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Evidence at trial showed that the bus hit the car because the

driver was distracted by the attentions of a group of teenage

girls. On appeal, WMATA insists that the district court erred in

instructing the jury that it must treat the driver’s violations of

two District of Columbia traffic regulations as negligence per se,

rather than as evidence of negligence. Because that distinction

is without a material difference in this case, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

I

On February 14, 2006, Sibert-Dean was riding a WMATA

bus in Northwest Washington, D.C. As it pulled away from a

stop, the bus collided with a car that was making a turn in front

of it. Sibert-Dean was thrown from her seat and injured. In her

complaint, she alleged that the accident was the result of the

driver’s failure to pay attention to the road as he pulled away

from the bus stop.

At trial, Sibert-Dean presented evidence that the bus driver,

Dante Dinkins, failed to see that a car was turning in front of

him because he was distracted by a group of teenage girls who

were near the bus stop. Patricia Shelton, another bus passenger,

testified that the teens had been “[l]aughing, talking, . . . horse

playing and carrying on.” 9/22/11 (am) Tr. 13. She said that the

girls started “hollering at the driver,” “laughing,” and “[a]cting

flirty” with him. Id. at 13-14, 18. Dinkins turned around and

looked back at them, smiling, and then continued to watch them

“jumping up and down” as he pulled the bus away from the stop. 

Id. at 13, 17-18.

Sibert-Dean testified that she and other passengers, seeing

that a car was turning in front of the bus as the bus pulled into

traffic, screamed at Dinkins in an effort to forestall the

impending collision. Dinkins attempted a defensive driving

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maneuver, at which point Sibert-Dean was ejected from her seat

and into a steel handrail, which knocked her unconscious. The

bus and the car then collided. Sibert-Dean was taken directly to

the hospital, where she was treated for a variety of injuries. 

Before the jury was instructed, the parties and the court

spent a significant amount of time discussing how the jury

should be told to treat a number of District of Columbia traffic

regulations. These included 18 D.C.M.R. § 2206.1 and 18

D.C.M.R. § 2213.4. The first states that “[n]o person shall start

a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and until

the movement can be made with reasonable safety.” The second

states that “[a]n operator shall, when operating a vehicle, give

full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle.” The

question at issue was whether to tell the jury that a violation of

one or more of the relevant traffic regulations constituted

negligence per se, or only evidence of negligence. After some

debate and consideration of District of Columbia case law, the

court decided to give a negligence per se instruction. 9/28/11

(pm) Tr. 13.

In its instructions to the jury, the court explained that

WMATA had a duty to use ordinary care in carrying passengers,

and that this meant its bus driver had a duty to act as a

reasonable person would under the circumstances. If the driver

failed to live up to that duty, the driver was negligent and

WMATA was liable. Id. at 36. The court also read the text of

several D.C. traffic regulations, including sections 2206.1 and

2213.4, and said that, if the jury found that its bus driver

violated any of them, it must find WMATA negligent. Id. at 37. 

The court went on to explain that, if the jury found WMATA

negligent, it must then decide whether that negligence was a

proximate cause of Sibert-Dean’s injuries. Id. at 40. The jury

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returned a verdict in Sibert-Dean’s favor, requiring WMATA to

pay $337,500 in damages. Order of Judgment 2 (Dec. 4, 2011).1

In its motion for a new trial, WMATA argued that the

district court should have instructed the jury to consider

violations of sections 2206.1 and 2213.4 only as evidence of

negligence, not as negligence per se. The court disagreed. 

Sibert-Dean v. WMATA, 826 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.D.C.

2011). It held that the regulations in question were sufficiently

specific to warrant a negligence per se instruction. It further

held that, even if it had erred in giving a negligence per se rather

than an evidence-of-negligence instruction, the error was

harmless. It noted that the jury was presented with “significant

evidence” supporting a finding that WMATA’s bus driver was

negligent, and that in light of this evidence, the jury “most likely

would have reached the same verdict” even if it had been

instructed to treat violations of sections 2206.1 and 2213.4 as

evidence of negligence. Id. at 278. After denying WMATA’s

motion for a new trial, the district court entered judgment

against WMATA. Order of Judgment 2 (Dec. 4, 2011).

II

Under District of Columbia law, the default rule for the

application of the negligence per se doctrine is as follows: 

“[W]here a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted

to . . . prevent the type of accident that occurred[,] . . . [an]

unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant

negligent as a matter of law.” Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron,

Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Ceco Corp. v.

1

WMATA had filed a third-party complaint against Norma Jean

Woodson, the driver of the other vehicle. The jury found that both

WMATA and Woodson were negligent, and that the negligence of

each was a cause of the accident. Order of Judgment 1 (Dec. 4, 2011).

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Coleman, 441 A.2d 940, 945 (D.C. 1982)) (emphasis removed);

see Burns v. WMATA, 114 F.3d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1997);

Childs v. Purll, 882 A.2d 227, 235 (D.C. 2005).

WMATA does not dispute that the general conditions for

the default rule were met here.2 Instead, it relies on an exception

to that rule. Under that exception, “a statute or regulation

offered to establish a standard for negligence per se purposes

must not merely repeat the common law duty of reasonable care,

but must set forth ‘specific guidelines to govern behavior.’”

McNeil Pharm. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 579 (D.C. 1996)

(quoting Bell Helicopter, 999 F.2d at 558). WMATA argues

that the exception applies here because sections 2206.1 and

2213.4 are “very general regulations which merely restate[]

common law standards.” WMATA Br. 25.

2

In its reply brief, WMATA suggested that the “sudden

emergency” of a car pulling in front of the bus provided an

exculpatory explanation for Dinkins’ alleged violations of the

regulations in question. Reply Br. 11; see Ceco Corp., 441 A.2d at

945 (“If a party charged with statutory or regulatory negligence

produces competent evidence tending to explain or excuse his or her

violation of the statutory or regulatory standard, the jury is properly

instructed . . . that the violation is evidence of negligence, but not

negligence as a matter of law.”). The brief left unexplained, however,

why another driver’s decision to suddenly pull in front of the bus

would excuse the bus driver’s failure to pay full attention to the

operation of his vehicle, which would violate 18 D.C.M.R. § 2213.4. 

As for 18 D.C.M.R. § 2206.1, we do not see why the suddenness of

the other driver’s behavior would excuse Dinkins’ decision to leave

the bus stop if, at the time he started the bus, it was unreasonably

unsafe to do so. In any event, these arguments are not properly before

us because WMATA did not raise them until its reply brief. Altman

v. SEC, 666 F.3d 1322, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Novak v. Capital

Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 305, 311 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

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We review an alleged failure to submit a proper jury

instruction de novo. Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 453

(D.C. Cir. 2009). But we also apply the harmless error rule,

pursuant to which “the court must disregard all errors and

defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.” FED.R.

CIV. P. 61; see Czekalski, 589 F.3d at 453. This “means that the

error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the

outcome of the district court proceedings.” Muldrow ex rel.

Estate of Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734

(1993)). We first address WMATA’s argument that the district

court erred, and then turn to its argument that the alleged error

was not harmless.3

A

Section 2213.4 requires that “[a]n operator shall, when

operating a vehicle, give full time and attention to the operation

of the vehicle.” 18 D.C.M.R. § 2213.4. WMATA asserts that

this “simply is another way of saying that the bus operator must

exercise ‘due care.’” WMATA Br. 22 (quoting Bell Helicopter,

999 F.2d at 558) (internal alteration omitted). Thus, in its view,

a negligence per se instruction is inappropriate in light of the

exception for statutes that merely restate common law standards.

3

Sibert-Dean contends that we should review only for plain error

because WMATA failed to state distinctly the grounds for its

objection before the jury was instructed, and because it invited any

error by originally proposing negligence per se instructions and then

“wait[ing] until the last minute to change its mind and object.” 

Sibert-Dean Br. 16; see FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b), (c), (d)(2); Long v.

Howard Univ., 550 F.3d 21, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v.

Kanu, 695 F.3d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2012). We need not address that

contention because we affirm even under the harmless error standard,

which is more favorable to WMATA. See Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 168.

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On its face, section 2213.4 does not merely restate the basic

common law duty of reasonable care. As the district court

explained, it requires drivers not only to give “reasonable” or

“due” time and attention to the operation of their vehicles, but

to give their “full” time and attention. See Sibert-Dean, 826 F.

Supp. 2d at 275. It is true that the presence of terms like

“reasonable” or “due” is not required for the exception to the

negligence per se rule to apply. The key question is not whether

the regulation contains certain words or phrases, but whether it

“allow[s a factfinder] to determine whether [it] has been violated

without resorting to a common law reasonable care analysis.” 

Chadbourne v. Kappaz, 779 A.2d 293, 297 (D.C. 2001); see id.

296-97. In Chadbourne, the court found the exception

applicable to a law stating that “[n]o owner of an animal shall

allow the animal to go at large,” because the phrase “allow the

animal to go at large” implied either intentionally letting an

animal run free or negligently failing to prevent it from doing

so. Id.

But we do not think that section 2213.4 directs such an

implicit common law reasonable care analysis. It is one thing to

ask whether a driver has given reasonable attention to the task

at hand. It is quite another to ask whether a driver has given full

attention to his task. One can readily imagine a driver meeting

the former standard but not the latter, and it is the latter that the

regulation imposes. We therefore conclude that the district court

did not err in giving a negligence per se instruction with respect

to 18 D.C.M.R. § 2213.4.

The second regulation at issue, section 2206.1, is a different

matter. This regulation states that “[n]o person shall start a

vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and until

the movement can be made with reasonable safety.” 18

D.C.M.R. § 2206.1. Here the term “reasonable” is present. The

important point is not just the presence of the word, however,

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but how it affects the operation of the regulation as a practical

matter. It is not possible to tell whether a person has violated

the standard set by this regulation without evaluating his or her

actions against a common sense (and common law) baseline of

reasonable behavior. The regulation does not forbid starting a

vehicle unless it is fully safe to do so. It forbids starting a

vehicle unless it is reasonably safe to do so. In that respect,

section 2206.1 closely resembles the aircraft regulations in Bell

Helicopter. There the court, applying District of Columbia law,

found that a negligence per se instruction was inappropriate with

respect to regulations forbidding “careless or reckless” piloting,

or flying at an altitude too low to allow emergency landing

without “undue hazard.” 999 F.2d at 558-59.

Sibert-Dean maintains that section 2206.1 sets forth a

specific standard of conduct because it applies to a very

particular set of circumstances (namely, starting a vehicle). But

so did the altitude regulation in Bell Helicopter and the leash

law in Chadbourne. The question is not whether the regulation

deals with a specific set of circumstances, but what sort of

behavior it prescribes for the circumstances that it governs. If

the regulation provides specific directions that go beyond a mere

admonition of reasonable care, the negligence per se instruction

should be given. Cf. Burns, 114 F.3d at 223 (holding that the

jury should have been instructed that exceeding the 25 mile per

hour speed limit, if proven, constituted negligence per se). But

if the regulation does not provide specific directions for what to

do in the circumstances, so that determining whether a person

has violated the regulation boils down to a common law

reasonableness inquiry, a negligence per se instruction is

unwarranted. See Thoma v. Kettler Bros., 632 A.2d 725, 728 n.8

(D.C. 1993) (holding that a negligence per se instruction would

have been improper because the regulations at issue did “not

differ significantly in their particulars from the common law

standard of reasonable care in the circumstances”). Because

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section 2206.1 says nothing more than that the usual common

law rule applies, it was error to give a negligence per se

instruction.4

B

The error with respect to the section 2206.1 instruction

warrants reversal only if it was not harmless; that is, only if it

“affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” 

Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 168 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 

The question before us, then, is whether giving a negligence per

se instruction with respect to section 2206.1 affected the

outcome of the trial.

WMATA argues that “the prejudice created by giving the

negligence per se instruction” in this case “is clear.” WMATA

Br. 25. As WMATA puts it, “[t]he improper negligence per se

instruction mandated that the jury find WMATA negligent if the

jury determined that . . . very general regulations which merely

restated common law standards” were violated. Id. (emphasis

added). Unfortunately for WMATA, the very structure of its

argument traps it between Scylla and Charybdis. In order to

4

In parts of her brief, Sibert-Dean appears to argue that the

exception to the negligence per se rule for regulations that merely

repeat the common law duty of care should never apply to automobile

traffic regulations. See, e.g., Sibert-Dean Br. 21-22. In support, she

notes that no District of Columbia case has ever applied the exception

in that context. She concedes, however, that no District of Columbia

case has ever held that the exception is inapplicable to automobile

traffic regulations. Oral Arg. Recording at 18:50-19:10. More

important, this court has itself applied the exception to regulations

governing the operation of another kind of vehicle (a helicopter). See

Bell Helicopter, 999 F.2d at 557-59. And Sibert-Dean proffers no

reason why it should be inapplicable to vehicles that cannot leave the

ground.

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prevail, WMATA must show both that there was error and that

the error was not harmless. Yet, if its argument for error is

sound, it appears certain that the error was harmless.

The premise of WMATA’s argument for error is that

section 2206.1 “merely restate[s]” the common law standard

itself. Reply Br. 8; see id. at 6 (arguing that “the challenged

regulations . . . only reiterate the common law duty of

reasonable care”). Indeed, the reason that many jurisdictions

decline to apply the doctrine of negligence per se to statutes that

simply duplicate the common law duty is that in such

circumstances the negligence per se rule is a needless analytic

fifth wheel. As the Restatement explains:

To find that an actor has violated such a statute, the

jury would also need to find that the actor has behaved

negligently. In such situations, the doctrine of

negligence per se is largely superfluous in ascertaining

the actor’s liability. In cases of this sort, courts . . .

frequently . . . reject negligence per se, recognizing its

redundancy and appreciating that it does not serve its

typical function of simplifying or providing structure

to the rendering of negligence determinations.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND

EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. e (2010).

But if the negligence per se instruction was erroneous only

because it was redundant, then the error cannot be prejudicial. 

If the regulation merely restated the common law duty of due

care, a factfinder following the court’s instruction could not

have found that WMATA violated the regulation without also

concluding that it violated that common law duty. See

Chadbourne, 779 A.2d at 297. And if the jury made the latter

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finding as required, the erroneous jury instruction could not have

affected the outcome of the case.

 Because giving a negligence per se instruction with respect

to a statute or regulation that merely restates the common law

standard is redundant rather than harmful, it is unsurprising that

WMATA cannot cite a single case in which any court in the

District of Columbia has reversed a trial court for erroneously

doing so. Oral Arg. Recording, 5:06-7:00; 25:28-25:38

(acknowledgment by WMATA counsel). This case will not be

the first.5

III

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

Affirmed.

5

There may be circumstances in which giving a negligence per se

instruction is harmful, not because of the instruction itself, but because

of the ways in which negligence per se interacts with other tort

doctrines. WMATA argues, for example, that statutory negligence per

se can sometimes limit the availability of defenses like contributory

negligence. WMATA Reply Br. 12-13. No such interactions have

been suggested in this case.

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