Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00668/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carlos Robles, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Michael D. Garvy, et al.

Respondents. 

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No. CV-11-668-TUC-FRZ-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Carlos Robles has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before this Court are

the Amended Petition (Doc. 6) and Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 13). The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, dismiss the

petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of one count of first degree murder and one count of

attempted first degree murder, and sentenced to natural life for the murder and a consecutive

10.5-year sentence on the attempted murder charge. (Doc. 13, Ex. A at 2 n.1; Doc. 13, Ex.

C.) The convictions were based on the January 1, 2005 murder of 16-year-old Santiago

Alvarez and attempted murder of Juan Escalante. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were

affirmed on appeal. (Doc. 13, Ex. A.) He filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) (id.,

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Ex. P), which was denied on the merits by the PCR court (id., Ex. S) and the appellate court

(id., Ex. U.)

DISCUSSION

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of the petition and concede that the claims

are exhausted (Doc. 13 at 4); therefore, the Court assesses Petitioner’s five claims on the

merits.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established a

“substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of

‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206

(2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . .

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7

(1997)).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

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Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction

became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.”

Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

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court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering

a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct,

and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II, 545 U.S.

at 240.

MERITS ANALYSIS

Claims 1, 2 and 3 allege ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing. The

Court addresses them in chronological order, trial first and then sentencing. The Court then

addresses Claims 4 and 5.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard

Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims are governed by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88. 

The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id.

at 689. Thus, to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, deficient performance, a defendant must

overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be

considered sound trial strategy.” Id.

Because an IAC claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the reviewing court

“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id. at 697 (“if it

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is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice

. . . that course should be followed”). A petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at

693. To demonstrate prejudice, he “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id. at 694.

IAC at Trial, Claim 3

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in that he (a) failed to have a biased

juror struck; (b) failed to request a limiting instruction regarding Robles’s teardrop tattoo;

(c) did not argue, as an alternative defense, that the shooting was not premeditated; and

(d) argued an erroneous definition of first degree murder. The PCR court and appellate court

denied each of these claims on the merits.

Claim 3(a)

Petitioner argues counsel erred in failing to have juror Buckwalter removed from the

jury because during voir dire the juror expressed that he would have a negative view if

Robles did not testify. In response to defense counsel’s question about a defendant’s right

not to testify, the following exchange took place:

JUROR BUCKWALTER: I just feel if I did not do it I would be the

first one up there to tell you that I didn’t do it. And I would want to tell you my

side of the story. And if they don’t, then they are hiding something. And I

would be telling everybody that I know. And even though I can tell you it

wouldn’t make any difference, down deep inside it would.

MR. LOUGEE: The judge also told you, and this is what is operating

in this case, is that the law, is that the defense lawyer’s job is to advise the

client as to whether or not his testimony is going to help him. Now the lawyer

will make that decision based on many things. But assuming for the moment

that Mr. Robles doesn’t testify, and I tell you now that I will strongly

recommend that he not testify, the decision really is mine. Would you

understand that and not hold it against him?

JUROR BUCKWALTER: No, I don’t think I would based on

everything I heard on that. But I think there would be a little part of me

thinking he should have been up there.

MR. LOUGEE: Let’s assume for the moment that the defendant

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couldn’t add anything if it came to pass that the defense in this case was I

didn’t do it. I wasn’t there. And my decision was that he would not assist in

that defense by taking the stand. What would your position be?

JUROR BUCKWALTER: Even though it doesn’t add anything, I think

it would make me feel better if I heard him say it.

MR. LOUGEE: If all he could [sic] was I didn’t do it, you would still

want to hear that?

JUROR BUCKWALTER: Yes.

(RT 12/13/05 at 91-92.) Counsel did not request the Court to excuse juror Buckwalter nor

was he struck during peremptories. The jury was instructed:

The State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with its own

evidence. The defendant is not required to testify. The decision on whether or

not to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice of an attorney. You

must not let this choice affect your deliberations in any way.

(RT 12/20/05 at 7.)

The PCR court held that Robles failed to establish that juror Buckwalter had a

negative view of his innocence or that the juror prejudiced his defense. (Doc. 13, Ex. S at 4.)

The appellate court noted that the jurors were instructed that their deliberations could not be

impacted by a defendant’s decision of whether to testify, and the court presumes jurors

follow the instructions. (Doc. 13, Ex. U at 5-6.) The court went on to affirm the PCR court’s

ultimate conclusion. (Id. at 6.)

As found by the state courts, Petitioner fails to establish that he was actually

prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Although juror Buckwalter expressed a desire to hear Robles

testify, he agreed that he would not hold Robles’s failure to testify against him. Further,

courts presume that jurors listen to and endeavor to follow the court’s instructions. Francis

v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985); Weeks v. Angelone, 538 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). The

state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland in deciding that there was not a reasonable

probability the outcome would have been different if juror Buckwalter had been struck from

the jury.

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Claim 3(b)

Petitioner alleges he was prejudiced when counsel did not request a limiting

instruction regarding his tattoo. Robles states that he has a teardrop tattoo. During voir dire

a juror noticed it and assumed it meant Robles had killed someone. (RT 12/13/05 at 45-46.)

The juror acknowledged that might effect his impartiality and he was excused for cause. (Id.

at 46.) Petitioner argues it is likely that other jurors saw it and, without a limiting instruction,

could have formed a negative impression of him.

The PCR court found that Robles presented no evidence that the tattoo negatively

impacted the jurors’ impressions of him, thus, there was no prejudice. (Doc. 13, Ex. S at 4.)

The court of appeals held that matters of trial strategy are left to counsel, Robles’s argument

was entirely speculative, and Robles was not prejudiced. (Id., Ex. U at 6-7.)

Petitioner presented no evidence that any jurors saw the tattoo or perceived anything

negative about Petitioner if they did see it. A petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Petitioner has failed to establish that, if there had been a limiting

instruction about his tattoo, there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted.

Claim 3(c)

Petitioner argues that counsel should have made an alternative argument that the

killing was not premeditated. Petitioner contends the victim was involved in a fight and there

was a crowd of people around, thus, a jury could have found the killing was reckless but not

premeditated. During PCR proceedings, the State submitted an affidavit of trial counsel, in

which he averred, “the defense was third-party culpability and witness misidentification. This

defense was chosen after evaluating all of the evidence, using all of my experience and

training, and consulting with the defendant.” (Doc. 19-1 at 2.) The PCR court found that

counsel made a strategic decision to present a single defense and there is no evidence that

strategy was unreasonable. (Doc. 13, Ex. S at 4.) The court of appeals affirmed that decision.

(Id., Ex. U at 7.)

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First, the Court reviews the state courts’ factual finding that trial counsel made a

strategic decision and assesses whether that finding was objectively unreasonable. See Wood

v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). The only record

evidence on point is the affidavit of counsel attesting that he made a strategic decision to

defend based on third-party culpability. As set forth in the affidavit, counsel has extensive

experience trying serious felonies. Robles has not argued nor submitted evidence countering

counsel’s averment that he consulted with Robles in selecting the defense. The evidence

supports the state courts’ finding that counsel made a strategic decision about the defense to

pursue at trial.

Next, the Court must review the objective reasonableness of the state courts’ ruling

that counsel’s strategic decision fell within reasonable professional judgment under

Strickland. See id. at 850-51 & n.3. Robles has presented no evidence that counsel’s decision

was unreasonable, no opinion from another attorney, no prevailing norms from attorney

guidelines, and no evidence from himself regarding the strategy. See Matylinsky v. Budge,

577 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that defendant presented no evidence of

unreasonableness that could satisfy “heavy burden” of proving that trial strategy was

deficient). At the close of evidence, when counsel and the court were discussing jury

instructions, counsel represented that Robles did not want any instructions on lesser included

offenses; Robles wanted only a first degree murder instruction. (RT 12/16/05 at 122, 126.)

Ultimately, the Court determined there should be a second degree instruction but that there

was no evidence presented at trial of a reckless state of mind and there would be no

instructions on crimes requiring only a reckless mens rea. (Id. at 125, 129.) In light of the

trial court’s finding, and Robles’s request at the time of trial, it was reasonable for counsel

not to argue recklessness and to rely solely on misidentification as a defense. The state

courts’ denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.

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Claim 3(d)

Petitioner argues counsel erred in defining first degree murder to the jury. During

preliminary instructions, the judge told the jurors that the instructions he provided them,

preliminary and closing, provided the law they had to follow when deciding the verdict. (RT

12/14/05 at 7.) At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on the elements of first

degree murder, including premeditation, and on the crime of second degree murder. (RT

12/20/05 at 8-9.) The prosecutor accurately described the elements of first and second degree

murder, including the presence or absence of premeditation, during closing arguments. (Id.

at 22-23.) Defense counsel then told the jury, “I am not going to talk to you about what first

degree murder is, or attempted first degree murder. If you think he pointed that gun and shot,

that is first degree murder.” (Id. at 32.)

The PCR court found there was not a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial

would have been different absent counsel’s error. (Doc. 13, Ex. S at 4.) The appellate court

noted that the prosecutor accurately explained first-degree murder during his closing

argument and the judge provided jury instructions on the elements. (Id., Ex. U at 7-8.) The

court affirmed the PCR court’s finding that there was not a reasonable probability of a

different outcome absent the error. (Id. at 8.)

The jurors were instructed that they were to follow the law provided by the judge and

the judge provided accurate instructions on first and second degree murder. Courts presume

that jurors pay close attention to the language of the court’s instructions and endeavor to

follow them. Francis, 471 U.S. at 324 n.9; see Weeks, 538 U.S. at 234. Arguments of counsel

are not binding and carry less weight than the court’s governing instructions. Ho v. Carey,

332 F.3d 587, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the jury was provided accurate instructions

from the trial court, that they were obligated to follow, the Court finds there is not a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s error.

The state court’s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.

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IAC at sentencing, Claim 1

Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigating evidence at

sentencing. Trial counsel submitted an affidavit for the PCR proceeding, in which he stated

that he did not seek a mitigation hearing because he was concerned that the State would

present aggravation evidence from another criminal case that had been brought against

Robles. (Doc. 19-1- at 2.) The indictment in the other case had been dismissed without

prejudice but counsel averred that Robles was still a suspect and faced jeopardy for those

offenses. (Id.) The PCR court found that counsel’s tactical decision was reasonable and his

performance was not deficient. (Doc. 13, Ex. S at 3.) The appellate court affirmed the finding

that counsel’s decision was tactical and not unreasonable. (Id., Ex. U at 3.)

The Court first finds that the state courts’ factual finding – that trial counsel made a

strategic decision – was not objectively unreasonable. See Wood, 130 S. Ct. at 849. Counsel

explained his considerations in not seeking a mitigation hearing. It was a tactical choice to

avoid opening the door to additional aggravation.

Next, the Court must review the objective reasonableness of the state courts’ ruling

that counsel’s strategic decision fell within reasonable professional judgment under

Strickland. See id. at 850-51 & n.3. Robles’s argument is that counsel failed to put on

available mitigation. The potential mitigation is that Petitioner had a difficult childhood and

joined a gang, used drugs, dropped out of school and (at 18) suffered from untreated

depression. (Doc. 13, Ex. P at 5-8.) He regretted joining a gang and dropping out of school,

and he obtained his GED and a masonry certificate while in prison from ages 18 to 27. (Id.

at 5, 6.) Arizona courts find childhood experiences less weighty when the defendant is long

past that age. See State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 144, 140 P.3d 899, 927 (2006) (finding

childhood experiences of little mitigating value for murders committed at thirty-three where

there was no evidence defendant could not tell right from wrong); State v. Hampton, 213

Ariz. 167, 185, 140 P.3d 950, 968 (2006) (finding horrendous childhood less weighty, in

part, because defendant was thirty at the time of the crime). 

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None of the mitigation presented is extremely weighty. In contrast, the sentencing

court had before it Petitioner’s prior criminal history and the fact that he was absconded from

parole at the time he committed these crimes. It was reasonable for counsel to determine that

the available mitigation was not worth opening the door to the State presenting evidence of

additional adult criminal conduct by Petitioner. The state courts’ determination that counsel

conduct fell within professional norms was not objectively unreasonable.

IAC at sentencing, Claim 2

Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective in advising Robles that an allocution

statement could be used against him on appeal. He argues that if he knew it would not have

been held against him he would have expressed his remorse for the victim’s death and given

condolences to the victim’s family, as well as providing the court more information about his

background and character. In his affidavit, counsel averred that he advised Robles not to

make a statement because he wanted to appeal the case and still faced jeopardy in this case

and in the other case that had been dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 19-1 at 2.) The PCR

court concluded that counsel’s affidavit contained a reasonable explanation and his

performance was not deficient. (Doc. 13, Ex. S at 3.) The court of appeals affirmed, finding

that counsel’s decision was tactical and reasonable. (Id., Ex. U at 3.)

First, Petitioner misunderstands the law underlying this claim. While statements made

by a defendant for preparation of a presentence report cannot be used against him there is no

such exception for statements made in open court at sentencing. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.

26.6(d)(2). Thus, counsel did not provide him erroneous advice on this point. The state

courts’ determination that counsel’s performance was reasonable was not objectively

unreasonable under Strickland. 

Claim 4

Petitioner argues that the pretrial witness identification by Juan “Chico” Escalante was

impermissibly suggestive in violation of his right to due process. According to Petitioner,

Escalante was interviewed approximately 5 to 6 hours after the shooting and stated that

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Robles was the shooter. Escalante stated that he had known Robles for a period of time but

provided no description of him nor any physical description of the shooter. During the

interview, Escalante was shown one photo of Robles and identified him as the shooter. 

The trial court held a hearing regarding Escalante’s pretrial identification of Robles.

(RT 11/28/05.) Escalante testified that he was present some time after 2 a.m. on January 1,

2005, when Santiago Alvarez was shot. (Id. at 3, 6-7, 9-10.) He stated that he had not

consumed any alcohol or drugs that night. (Id. at 7.) He was looking at Alvarez with good

visibility from approximately eight feet away when Alvarez was shot. (Id. at 14-15.)

Escalante testified that he saw Alvarez get shot in the back of the head and saw the person

holding the gun. (Id. at 15-16.) He stated that he recognized the shooter as Carlos Robles. (Id.

at 17.) After the shooting, he looked at Robles and said, “why did you have to do that. I know

you, I told him.” (Id. at 35.) Robles then pointed the gun at him. (Id. at 36.)

When he was younger, around 12, Escalante and Robles were friends and would

skateboard and ride bikes together. (Id. at 25-26.) That ended around the age of 14 (he was

29 at the time of the hearing). (Id. at 18, 26, 32.) He stated that Robles had been incarcerated

for a long period of time. (Id. at 26-27.) Robles’s older brother Julian had died approximately

a month before the shooting and, just after he died, Escalante had seen Robles passing by his

house. (Id. at 27-29.) Escalante testified that the night of the shooting Robles was wearing

a black sweater with a hood and shorts. (Id. at 19.) He also stated the shooter had a mustache

and goatee. (Id. at 20-21.) The morning of the shooting, police showed him one photograph

and asked him if he recognized the person; he was not shown a group of pictures and asked

to select the shooter. (Id. at 3, 23.) He identified the picture he was shown by the police,

stating that it was Carlos Robles. (Id. at 21-22.) The photograph had Robles’s name on it,

however, Escalante testified that the police had folded the writing so he could not see the

name. (Id. at 22, 37.) He was positive the person in the picture shot Alvarez. (Id. at 37-38.)

The trial court denied the motion to suppress Escalante’s pretrial identification,

finding that it was reliable although the procedure was inherently suggestive. (Doc. 13, Ex.

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A at 4.) In support of its decision, the Court noted that Escalante knew the defendant by

name, named his brother and was aware the defendant had been incarcerated. (Id.) Further,

Escalante had ample opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the shooting. (Id.) The

court of appeals concluded that, although showing Escalante one photo was inherently

suggestive, Escalante’s identification of Robles was sufficiently reliable. (Id. at 6.) In support

of its ruling, the Court stated that Escalante knew Robles personally, thus his failure to

provide a description of the shooter before viewing the photograph did not render it

unreliable. (Id. at 5.) Further, after the shooting Escalante called out Robles’s name and

Robles aimed his gun at him, thus, he had opportunity to observe Robles. (Id. at 5-6.)

Evaluating whether an identification has been irreparably tainted by a suggestive

procedure requires a two-part analysis. First, the Court must determine whether the

challenged procedure was suggestive. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 381 (1972). “An

identification procedure is suggestive when it ‘emphasize[s] the focus upon a single

individual’ thereby increasing the likelihood of misidentification.” United States v.

Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d

482, 493 (9th Cir. 1985)). As found by the appellate court, the procedure used with Escalante

was suggestive.

Second, if the process was suggestive, the Court must examine the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the witness’s identification is nonetheless reliable.

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). The factors to be considered in assessing

reliability are: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the accused at the time of the crime,

(2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the description, (4) the witness’s

level of certainty, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id.

(citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200). The ultimate question is whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identification procedure “was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise

to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States,

390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).

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Escalante had a good opportunity to view the accused at the time of the shooting, he

was standing near by and after the shooting he spoke to the shooter. His degree of attention

was elevated because he witnessed the shooting of Alvarez and the weapon was then turned

on him. There is no evidence that Escalante provided a description of the shooter before

identifying him in the single photograph he was shown. Escalante expressed certainty about

his identification of Robles. Finally, he identified Robles within a matter of hours after the

shooting.

Petitioner disputes the reliability because Escalante did not come forward with the

identification. Regardless, Escalante provided the identification the same morning that the

shooting occurred; thus, little time had passed. Petitioner also argues that Escalante provided

no physical description of the shooter, therefore, there is no way to know if that person was

Robles prior to the police providing Escalante a photo of Robles. The uncontradicted

testimony is that Escalante knew Robles and they had been friends as adolescents. Escalante

was not being asked to identify someone unknown to him. Rather, the photograph was used

to confirm that Escalante and the police were talking about the same person. In light of these

facts, looking at a totality of the circumstances, there was not a very substantial likelihood

that the identification procedure led to irreparable misidentification. The appellate court’s

denial of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law.

Claim 5

Petitioner alleges there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

Specifically he argues there was no physical evidence connecting him to the crimes, just the

following contradictory witness testimony. Witness Michelle Varela testified that the gun

was put to the right side of the victim’s head and that the shooter was wearing a hat. The

evidence demonstrated that the victim was shot with the gun away from the head on the left

side. Witness Juan Escalante stated that the shooter was not wearing a hat. Further, Escalante

believed Robles was trying to kill him based only on the fact that Robles pointed a gun at

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him and he heard a click. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied this claim, noting that each

witness was cross-examined and the jury heard the conflicting testimony, 

On habeas review, the “rational factfinder” standard is used to determine whether

there is sufficient evidence to support a state court’s finding of the elements of the crime. See

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781 (1990). The question is “whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A habeas court “faced with a record of historical facts

that supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear

in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution and

must defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326; see also Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th

Cir. 2004) (per curiam). This type of claim is properly analyzed under the deferential

standard of § 2254(d)(1); thus, the Court asks whether it was an objectively unreasonable

application of Jackson for the Arizona Court of Appeals to deny this claim. See Sarausad v.

Porter, 479 F.3d 671, 677-78 (9th Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 503 F.3d 822 (9th

Cir. 2007).

After reviewing the entirety of the trial transcripts and viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court concludes the appellate court adequately

summarized the critical evidence presented at trial: 

Shortly after midnight, Santiago A. was engaged in a physical altercation with

various other individuals. During the struggle, Robles fatally shot Santiago in

the head. A witness, Juan E., heard the shot, saw Santiago fall to the ground

and saw Robles standing by Santiago with a gun. Juan called out, “I know who

you are, Carlos Robles.” Robles then pointed his gun at Juan and attempted to

fire it. The gun apparently jammed, and Juan escaped uninjured. Two other

witnesses, Michelle V. and Matthew S., also testified at trial that Robles had

shot Santiago.

(Doc. 13, Ex. A at 3.) As Petitioner contends, the witnesses’ statements were not entirely

consistent and a reasonable person could question their credibility. But that is not the relevant

question on habeas review. Based on the evidence presented, a rational juror could have

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found Robles guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder and attempted first

degree murder. It was not objectively unreasonable for the court of appeals to deny this

claim. 

RECOMMENDATION

Claims 1 to 5 fail on the merits. Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court DISMISS the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 6).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days.

No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the

parties should use the following case number: CV 11-668-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 10th day of April, 2013.

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