Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02314/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02314-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Stay of Execution)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS RAY THOMPSON, Civil No. 06cv2314 IEG (RBB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

DENYING AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO.

6] AND ORDER DENYING SECOND

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL [DOC. NO. 24]

vs.

SCOTT KERNAN, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Travis Ray Thompson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 challenging his Imperial County Superior Court conviction in

case number CF-7718 for one count of assault by a prisoner and one

count of possession of a weapon by a prisoner. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 4, 00937, July 3, 2003.) He contends his federal

constitutional rights were violated for the following reasons: (1)

His appellate counsel was ineffective; (2) the trial court judge

improperly prevented Thompson from presenting an entrapment

defense; (3) the prosecutor failed to investigate and turn over

exculpatory and impeachment information related to the victim and

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1

 Because Thompson has attached additional pages to his First Amended

Petition, the Court has renumbered the pages in order to accurately refer

to them.

2

 The Court notes that Thompson has filed a copy of the July 5, 2002,

transcript as an exhibit to his Traverse. (Notice of Lodgment of Ex. Supp.

Traverse, Ex. J.)

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prosecution witnesses; (4) the prison guards’ union’s excessive

political power interfered with the California courts’ ability to

“do justice;” (5) Thompson was convicted but is actually innocent;

and (6) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he

was forced to represent himself. (See Am. Pet. 6-24.1) His

Petition attempts to divert the Court’s attention from the fairness

of Thompson’s trial and the adequacy of his legal representation to

the alleged corruptness of the California Correctional Peace

Officers Association (“CCPOA”) and its political influence. Only

the former is the proper subject of this proceeding. 

The Court has considered the First Amended Petition,

Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of the Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse and Lodgments, and all

the supporting documents submitted by the parties. In addition,

the Court has reviewed the sealed transcripts of trial court

hearings conducted on February 8, 2002, May, 1, 2002, and July 5

and 11, 2002, pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 118, 465 F.2d

44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970), and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806 (1975).2 Based upon the documents and evidence presented in

this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Amended Petition (“Petition”) be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption

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of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1)(West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S.

20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including

inferences properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to

statutory presumption of correctness). 

The facts found by the state trial and appellate courts are

presumed correct and are supported by the record. Thompson was an

inmate at Centinela State Prison at the time of the underlying

events. Correctional Officer Leopoldo Vega was working at

Centinela and was assigned to Thompson’s unit as a floor officer. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 7, 249-50, June 20, 2003.) On

August 21, 1999, Vega was standing at a podium supervising inmates

who were returning from the evening meal. (Id. at 257-58.) As he

stood there writing in his log book, he was struck two to four

times from behind. (Id. at 262.) When he turned around, Vega saw

Thompson standing behind him. (Id.) A bent, inmate-manufactured

weapon was later found on the floor next to Thompson. (Id. at

264.) Vega ordered Thompson to the ground, and Thompson complied

after the second or third order. (Id. at 298.) 

Correctional Officer Nicole Panzer was assigned to escort

Thompson from the housing unit to the medical technical assistant’s

office and administrative segregation. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr., vol. 7, 320-22, June 20, 2003.) Panzer testified that when

she took control of Thompson, his hands were cuffed behind him,

pursuant to standard procedure. (Id. at 323, 326.) She took him

to the medical technical assistant’s office to be examined for

injuries. (Id. at 324.) Panzer testified that she put Thompson in

a holding cell, at which point he said to “get the f-u-c-k away

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from me” and that he wished the weapon he used to attack Vega had

not bent. (Id. at 325.) 

After Petitioner was medically evaluated, Panzer took him to a

holding cell in the program office to be processed into the

Administrative Segregation Unit. (Id. at 325-26.) She later

returned to take Thompson to the Administrative Segregation Unit. 

(Id. at 326-27.) Officer Panzer opened the cell door and, when she

noticed that Thompson’s hands were no longer cuffed behind him,

tried to close the cell door. (Id. at 327-28.) Thompson kicked

the gate open and crushed Panzer’s hand between the gate and the

wall. (Id. at 328, 330-31.) He then started to choke Panzer with

his hands and by pressing the chain which connected the cuffs to

her throat. (Id. at 331, 338.) Panzer fell to the floor in a

sitting position with her legs folded under her and Thompson

sitting on her lap still choking her. (Id. at 332-33, 369-70.)

Petitioner then reached into Panzer’s jumpsuit and grabbed her

right breast. (Id. at 333-34.) Panzer’s partner, Correctional

Officer Wilson, as well as several other officers came to Panzer’s

aid and finally were able to pull Thompson off of Panzer. (Id. at

334-36; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 8, 412, 429, June 23,

2003.) During the melee, Thompson bit Officer Wilson. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 7, 361, 370; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.,

vol. 8, 412.) 

Petitioner testified at trial and admitted stabbing Vega and

choking Panzer. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 10, 628, 644,

June 26, 2003.) He denied grabbing Panzer’s breast or biting

Wilson. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 9, 604-05, June 24,

2003.) He claimed he was provoked and entrapped into attacking

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Vega because Vega was systematically denying him and other AfricanAmerican inmates showers and favoring Hispanic inmates. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 10, 626-28, 659, 635-37, 659.) He also

claimed that Panzer struck him first and that he was acting in

self-defense when he assaulted her. (Id. at 645, 666-71.) 

Correctional Officer Richard Cook also testified that Thompson told

him, “Fuck you, house nigger, I attacked Panzer.” (Id. at 701.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 25, 2000, the Imperial County District Attorney’s

Office filed a six-count information charging Petitioner with two

counts of assault by a prisoner, a violation of California Penal

Code section 4501 (counts one and three), three counts of battery

on a non-confined person, a violation of California Penal Code

section 4501.5 (counts two, four and six), and one count of

possession of a weapon by a prisoner, a violation of Penal Code

section 4502(a) (count five). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol.

1, 00016-19, Oct. 25, 2000.) As to each count, the information

also alleged that Thompson had two prior serious or violent

felonies within the meaning of Penal Code section 667(b)-(i),

California’s “Three Strikes Law.” (Id.)

Thompson entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 2, 00257, Jan. 11, 2001.) 

Criminal proceedings were suspended pursuant to California Penal

Code section 1368 after Thompson’s appointed counsel expressed

concern about his client’s competency. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr., vol. 2, 00294, April 11, 2001.) A jury trial was held on

whether Thompson was competent to stand trial, with the jury

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concluding that he was competent. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 2, 00303-04, Sept. 4, 2001.) 

On June 13, 2003, a jury trial commenced on the question of

Thompson’s guilt. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00807,

June 13, 2003.) He was found guilty of all charges except count

four, battery on a non-confined person (correctional officer Nicole

Panzer). (Lodgment No. 2, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00905-06, June 30,

2003.) A jury trial on Thompson’s sanity was then conducted, and

the jury concluded that he was sane when he committed the crimes

alleged in counts three and five, assault by a prisoner and

possession of a weapon by a prisoner. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 4, 00937, July 3, 2003.) The jury could not reach a verdict

on Thompson’s sanity, however, as to counts one, two and six, and a

mistrial was declared as to those counts. (Id.) The trial court

subsequently found the allegations of prior strike convictions to

be true. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4 at 00937-38.) 

Thompson was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison with

the possibility of parole. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4,

00956, Sept. 22, 2003.)

Thompson appealed his conviction on counts three and five to

the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v.

Thompson, No. D042750 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 2004).) His courtappointed appellate attorney raised none of the grounds raised in

this federal petition. The state appellate court affirmed

Thompson’s conviction in an unpublished opinion filed January 26,

2005. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Thomspon, No. D042750, slip op.

(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2005).) 

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Thompson filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court on March 7, 2005, which raised two jury instruction claims,

neither of which is raised in the current federal petition.

(Lodgment No. 7, Pet. for Review, People v. Thompson, S132052 (Cal.

Mar. 7, 2005).) The California Supreme Court denied the petition

for review without citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 8, People

v. Thompson, S132052, order (Cal. Apr. 13, 2005).)

Thompson then filed a habeas corpus petition in the Imperial

County Superior Court, which that court denied in a brief,

unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 9, Thompson v. Hickman,

No. EHC00598 (Imperial County Super. Ct. filed Mar. 3, 2005)

(pet.); Lodgment No. 10, In re Thompson, No. EHC00598, order

(Imperial County Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2005).) Thompson filed a

habeas corpus petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One, which was denied in an

unpublished written opinion. (Lodgment No. 11, Thompson v.

Hickman, No. D046375 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 5, 2005) (pet.);

Lodgment No. 12, In re Thompson, No. D046375, order (Cal. Ct. App.

June 20, 2005).) Finally, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the

California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment or

citation of authority. (Lodgment No. 13, Thompson v. Woodford, No.

S138987 (Cal. Nov. 18, 2005) (pet.); Lodgment No. 14, In re

Thompson, No. S138987, order (Cal. Aug. 30, 2006).)

Thompson initiated this federal habeas corpus action by filing

a habeas corpus Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October

13, 2006 [doc. no. 1], and a First Amended Petition on December 26,

2006 [doc. no. 6]. Respondent filed an Answer and a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer to the First

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Amended Petition on April 2, 2007 [doc. no. 16], and Thompson filed

a Traverse on June 13, 2007 [doc. no. 20]. On October 4, 2007, the

Respondent was directed to lodge transcripts of the superior court

proceedings under People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 118, 465 F.2d 44, 84

Cal. Rptr. 156 [doc. no. 21]. The requested sealed transcripts

were received and are part of this record.

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). As amended, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court

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decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa,

497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Woodford v. Viscotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). To obtain federal habeas relief, Thompson

must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets

§ 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from this Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.

Williams, id. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

73-74 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court’s

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,

982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th

Cir. 2003). A state court, however, need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the

result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court

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precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary

to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Thompson raises six claims: (1) His Sixth Amendment rights

were violated when his appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance; (2) his federal due process rights were violated when

the trial court refused to permit him to present an entrapment

defense; (3) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the

prosecutor failed to follow Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87

(1963), and turn over exculpatory and impeachment material related

to the victim; (4) his due process rights to a fair trial were

violated by the political power exerted by the prison guards’

union; (5) he is actually innocent of the charges; and (6) his

Sixth Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to

represent himself. (See Am. Pet. 6-24.) Respondent argues that

the state courts’ resolution of the claims was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. (See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer to Am. Pet. 7-13.)

1. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel (Claim One)

Petitioner appears to contend that he was deprived of the

ability to show that, for political and economic reasons, the

California Correctional Peace Officers Association had a policy of

encouraging members to provoke Black inmates to assault prison

guards; these guards followed that policy; and as a result,

Thompson was forced to arm himself. (Traverse 1-2.) More

specifically, Thompson claims his appellate counsel was

ineffective when she failed to (1) argue the trial court erred when

it prevented Thompson from presenting a defense based on necessity

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or self-defense, (2) argue the trial court erred when it prevented

Thompson from presenting an entrapment or “political” defense, (3)

investigate and present a claim that the prosecution withheld

material exculpatory or impeachment evidence, and (4) argue that

the application of California’s Three Strikes Law to Thompson

violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (See Am. Pet. 7-11.)

Respondent does not address each of Thompson’s allegations. 

But he does address one: Respondent contends that appellate

counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a defense based

on Thompson’s belief that the prison guards engaged in a concerted

effort to provoke him into attacking them for political reasons,

specifically to support their union’s quest for higher pay, because

it was not a legitimate defense to the charges. (Mem. P. & A.

Supp. Answer to Am. Pet. 8-9.) 

The California Supreme Court denied these claims, which 

Thompson raised in a habeas corpus petition, with an unexplained

post-card denial. (See Lodgment No. 14, In re Thomspon, No.

S138987, order.) Thus, this Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address these claims, the

California appellate court’s opinion denying Thompson’s habeas

corpus petition. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That court did not

discuss the merits of Thompson’s ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim and subclaims. Instead, it found that

Thompson had not stated a prima facie case for relief because the

only evidence he presented to support his claim was “newspaper

articles and editorials” which were not evidence. (Lodgment No.

12, In re Thompson, No. D046375, order at 2.) Even if it could

consider those documents, the court concluded, they did not support

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Thompson’s claim. (Id.) Accordingly, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the silent

denial of claim one by the state supreme court and the near-silent

denial by the court of appeal were contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Delgado,

223 F.3d at 982.

“The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate

counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” 

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Smith v. Murray,

477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)). A petitioner must first demonstrate

that his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. He must

then establish he was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. at 694. 

To establish prejudice, Thompson must show a reasonable probability

that he would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s errors. 

Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “The

performance component need not be addressed first ‘[i]f it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack

of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that

course should be followed." Id., n.144 (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697). Finally, counsel’s [f]ailure to raise meritless

arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance.” Boag v.

Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1985).

a. Self-Defense and Necessity Defenses

Thompson contends appellate counsel should have challenged the

trial court’s refusal to permit him to present evidence to support

a defense of necessity or self-defense to count five, the charge of

possession of a weapon by an inmate, a violation of California

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Penal Code section 4502(a). (Am. Pet. 8.) Section 4502(a)

prohibits a prisoner from possessing or carrying any “instrument or

weapon of the kind commonly known as . . . any dirk or dagger or

sharp instrument . . . .” See Cal. Penal Code § 4502(a) (West

2007). Thompson claims that “he was forced to arm himself under

the dangerous conditions on the yard” which were “exacerbated by

the guards fostering racial tension between Blacks/Southern

Hispanics . . . .” (Am. Pet. 8.) He also alleges that such a

defense was supported by evidence presented at a January 2004

California State Senate Hearing that the same behavior by guards

was occurring at Avenal State Prison and California State Prison,

Sacramento (referred to by Thompson as “New Folsom State Prison”). 

(Id.)

In California, “[t]he defense of necessity generally

recognizes that ‘the harm or evil sought to be avoided by [the

defendant's] conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by

the law defining the offense charged.’” People v. Coffman, 34 Cal.

4th 1, 100, 96 P.3d 30, 106, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 800 (2004)

(quoting People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 772, 75 Cal.

Rptr. 597, 600-01 (Ct. App. 1969)). To sustain a defense of

necessity, a defendant must present evidence showing the following:

[T]here must be evidence sufficient to establish that

defendant violated the law (1) to prevent a significant

evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without

creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with

a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such

belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under

circumstances in which he did not substantially

contribute to the emergency. 

People v. Pepper, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1035, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d

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877, 880 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing People v. Slack, 210 Cal. App. 3d

937, 940, 258 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (Ct. App. 1989)). 

Moreover, the defendant must show that the circumstances

facing him were of an “emergency nature, threatening physical harm,

and lacking an alternative, legal course of action.” People v.

Eichorn, 69 Cal. App. 4th 382, 389, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Ct.

App. 1998); see also Comm. on Cal. Crim. Jury Instructions,

California Jury Instructions: Criminal (“CALJIC”) No. 4.40 (2007). 

California courts have squarely rejected the notion that a

prisoner may use the defenses of necessity or self-defense to

justify possession of a weapon, particularly when, as here, the

prisoner has only a generalized fear of attack. In People v.

Velasquez, 158 Cal. App. 3d 418, 420-21, 204 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642-43

(Ct. App. 1984), the court noted “[t]he purpose of [section 4502]

is to protect inmates and officers from assaults with dangerous

weapons perpetrated by armed prisoners,” and “[this] purpose would

be frustrated if prisoners were allowed to arm themselves in

proclaimed or actual fear of anticipated attack by other inmates.” 

See also People v. McKinney, 187 Cal. App. 3d 583, 587, 231 Cal.

Rptr. 729, 731 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that defense of

necessity was not available to prisoner charged with assault and

explaining that “[v]iolence justified in the name of preempting

some future, necessarily speculative threat to life is the greater,

not the lesser evil, particularly in the highly volatile

environment of a prison institution[]”).

Here, the jury was instructed that self-defense was a defense

to the assault charge (count three). (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 10, 742-43, June 26, 2003.) CALJIC No. 5.30 defines selfCase 3:06-cv-02314-BAS-RBB Document 26 Filed 01/25/08 Page 14 of 43
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defense against assault: “[I]f as a reasonable person [he] has

ground for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about

to be inflicted upon [him],” a defendant “may use all force and

means which [he] believes to be reasonably necessary and would

appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar

circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears

to be imminent.” See CALJIC No. 5.30. But the trial court did not

give an instruction that self-defense was a defense to possession

of a weapon by a prisoner (count five). (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 10, 742-43.) Indeed, it does no appear that this

instruction was requested. (Id. at 710-14, June 26, 2003.) At

best, this claimed defense suffers from the same defects as a

necessity defense, which cannot be asserted by a prisoner charged

with assault. See People v. McKinney, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 231

Cal. Rptr. at 731. 

For these reasons, appellate counsel’s failure to challenge

the state court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the defenses of

necessity and self-defense could be considered in connection with

count five was not objectively unreasonable, nor has Thompson shown

that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors. See Smith, 528

U.S. at 285. The state court’s denial of this ground for relief,

therefore, was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. 412-

13.

b. “Political” and Entrapment Defenses

Next, Petitioner claims appellate counsel should have argued

the trial court erred when it denied Thompson the opportunity to

present an entrapment defense or a political defense. (Am. Pet.

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8.) Thompson’s “political” defense rests on his belief that the

CCPOA was systematically instructing its members to increase racial

tensions and provoke assaults by prisoners on guards in order to

promote and support their political objectives of increased pay and

benefits. (Id. 6-8.) 

As Respondent correctly points out, there is no “political

defense” in California. Thus, appellate counsel was not

ineffective when she failed to argue that the trial court erred in

preventing Thompson from presenting a nonexistent defense. Smith,

528 U.S. at 285. Moreover, Thompson has not established the state

court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law because he

has not shown that he would have prevailed had appellate counsel

attacked the state court’s decision not to permit him to present

the defense. Id.

As to the entrapment defense, California law permits a

defendant to assert that he was entrapped into committing a crime

by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, “that the conduct

of the law enforcement agents or officers would likely induce a

normally law-abiding person to commit the crime.” See CALJIC No.

4.60; People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 689-90, 591 P.2d 947, 955,

153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 467 (1979). Although law enforcement officers

may provide the opportunity for a defendant to commit a crime by

using “reasonable, though restrained, steps to gain the confidence

of suspects,” law enforcement officers may not “induce the

commission of a crime by overbearing conduct such as badgering,

coaxing or cajoling, importuning, or other affirmative acts likely 

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to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime.” See

CALJIC No. 4.61.5.

Under California law, “[a] trial court has no duty to instruct

the jury — even at the defendant’s request — unless the defense is

supported by substantial evidence.” People v. Curtis, 30 Cal. App.

4th 1337, 1355, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 314 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing

People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 684-85, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 93,

603 P.2d 1, 10 (1979)). Thompson contends that prison guards

entrapped him into committing the assaults on Vega and Panzer by

engaging in a coordinated effort to foster racial enmity and

conflict between African-Americans and Hispanics. (See Am. Pet. 8-

9; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 10, 712-13.) Even if the Court

were to assume that Thompson could present some evidence that

supported his contention, it would not constitute substantial

evidence that he was entrapped. 

Petitioner was not a “normally law-abiding citizen,” but

rather a state prisoner convicted of violent crimes and combative

behavior in prison. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 10, 616-19.) 

Thompson testified that Officer Vega denied him showers; Officer

Panzer hit him in the face; and at the time of the assault on Vega,

Thompson was aware of an investigation being conducted at Corcoran

and Pelican Bay concerning the prison guards’ union’s “perpetuating

violence and exploiting inmates” for the union’s benefit. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 9, 591-97, 601, 607-08.) This

evidence may have been relevant to self-defense, but the state

trial court reasonably concluded that there was not substantial

evidence to justify an entrapment instruction. This Court agrees. 

Accordingly, appellate counsel’s decision not to raise this claim

was not objectively unreasonable. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. 

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In addition, Thompson has not established he was prejudiced by

appellate counsel’s alleged error because he has not shown a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

been different had appellate counsel raised this issue. There is

little likelihood the jury would have concluded Thompson was

entrapped into assaulting Panzer. A normally law-abiding citizen

would not be induced to stab a person with a sharp instrument,

choke a person, or bite a person under the circumstances of this

case.

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13. Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

c. Exculpatory and Impeachment Evidence Under Brady

Thompson also alleges that appellate counsel should have

investigated his Brady claim that the CCPOA was directing its

members to provoke assaults by prisoners on guards as a way to

support their drive for higher pay and that the guards were lying

about their motives and actions. (Am. Pet. 8-9.) As discussed

above, there is no political defense to the charges Thompson faced,

and appellate counsel’s decision not to pursue this defense was not

objectively unreasonable. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285.

Petitioner argues that appellate counsel should have

investigated specific allegations of perjury, false statements or

provocative actions by Vega and Panzer, but Thompson does not

specify what evidence appellate counsel would have discovered had

she conducted additional investigation and how it would have

affected his appeal. Petitioner’s references to the subsequently

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3

 In Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 522 P.2d 305, 113 Cal.

Rptr. 897 (1974), the California Supreme Court held that a defendant may

move to discover information contained in law enforcement officers’

personnel files which is relevant to issues in the current case, such as

prior incidents of falsifying information or coercing witnesses. The judge

then conducts an in camera review of the files to determine if any

discoverable information is contained in the files. Any relevant evidence

is then turned over to the defendant. See Pitchess, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 536,

522 P.2d at 309, 113 Cal. Rtpr. at 901; see also Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1043-

1046 (West 2007).

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produced “Hagar Report”, (see Traverse 8-9), are insufficient to

show that his counsel’s failure to pursue the CCPOA’s activities

adversely affected his case. Accordingly, he has not established

prejudice. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 285. 

Moreover, appellate counsel did ask the state appellate court

to review the personnel files which were delivered to the trial

court in response to trial counsel’s Pitchess3 motion to determine

whether there was any evidence relevant to Thompson’s defense and

whether the trial court properly ruled on the motion. (See Lodgment

No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief at 32-38, People v. Thompson, No.

D042750.) The appellate court examined the files and concluded

“[t]here was only one complaint of excessive force and the trial

court provided disclosure of this complaint.” (Lodgment No. 6,

People v. Thomspon, No. D042750, slip op. at 6-7.) 

Thompson claims that appellate counsel asked the appellate

court to review the wrong Pitchess motion, contending that she

should have asked for review of the Pitchess motion filed by

Thompson after he began representing himself. (Am. Pet. 10.) The

trial court denied the second motion because Thompson’s former

counsel had already filed a Pitchess motion which had been ruled on

by another judge, and Thompson could not relitigate the Pitchess

issues by simply filing a second motion. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr., vol. 1, 15-17, Apr. 23, 2003.) 

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The Court has reviewed the Pitchess motion filed by Thompson’s

former counsel and the Pitchess motion filed by Thompson. Both ask

for any evidence of excessive force by Panzer as well as personnel,

psychological and psychiatric records. (See Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 00078-92, Nov. 14, 2000; Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr., vol. 3, 00727-34, Mar. 26, 2003.) In fact, Thompson’s

motion is not as thorough as the Pitchess motion filed by counsel. 

(Id.) But, in his motion, Petitioner seeks information relating to

any benefits Officer Panzer received from the union. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 3, 00722-28.)

Nevertheless, Thompson has not established he was prejudiced

by counsel’s alleged error. He has not shown he would have

prevailed had appellate counsel challenged the trial court’s denial

of the second Pitchess motion. The appellate court examined police

personnel records and determined that relevant information was

disclosed by the trial court. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Thompson,

D042750, slip op. at 7.) For the foregoing reasons, the state

court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

d. Eighth Amendment

Finally, Petitioner argues his appellate counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the application of

California’s Three Strikes law to him violated the Eighth

Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. (Am. Pet. 9.) 

In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court concluded that the

only clearly established legal principle which could be discerned

from the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was that

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“[a] gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences

for a term of years . . . the precise contours of which are

unclear, [and which is] applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’

and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Harmelin

v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)). The Supreme Court also

explained that “the governing legal principle gives legislatures

broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the scope

of the proportionality principle –- the ‘precise contours’ of which

‘are unclear.’” Id. at 76 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998.)

Because of this, “[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves

a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case.” Id.

at 77.

Thompson has not established a reasonable probability that he

would have prevailed on an Eighth Amendment claim had appellate

counsel raised one, as required by Smith. 528 U.S. at 285. In

Rummel v. Estelle 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Supreme Court held that

a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant who was convicted

of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses and who had two prior

theft-related convictions did not violate the Eighth Amendment

because Rummel would be eligible for parole in twelve years and the

sentence was not solely the result of his current minor theft

crime, but was premised on Rummel’s recidivism. Id. at 267, 284-

85. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court found a

mandatory term of life in prison without parole for writing a “no

account” check for $100.00 and having three prior convictions

violated the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality requirement. 

Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83. 

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Like the defendant in Rummel, and unlike the defendant in

Solem, Thompson will be eligible for parole after serving twentyfive years. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00956, Sept. 22,

2003.) Moreover, like Rummel, Thompson’s sentence of twenty-five

years to life is not solely the result of his current conviction

but is because of his recidivism. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85. 

Petitioner had two prior violent “strike” convictions when he

committed the crimes he was convicted of in this case. (Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00937-38, July 3, 2003.)

Thompson’s criminal record is more serious than the

defendants’ records in Rummel, Solem, and Andrade. Rummel’s prior

convictions were for fraudulent use of a credit card and passing a

forged check. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66. Helm’s prior

convictions were for burglary, obtaining money by false pretenses,

grand larceny, and driving while intoxicated. Solem, 463 U.S. at

279-80. Andrade’s prior convictions were for misdemeanor theft

offenses, residential burglary, transportation of marijuana, petty

theft and escape from a federal prison. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765-

66. In contrast, Thompson’s prior convictions were for carjacking

and assault with a firearm. (See Lodgment 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1,

00016-20.) 

The Ninth Circuit, in Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th

Cir. 2004), gave this Court some guidance as to the kind of

“exceedingly rare” Eighth Amendment claim that warrants federal

habeas relief. In Ramirez, the court concluded that a sentence of

twenty-five years to life for a nonviolent shoplifting of a $199.00

VCR, where the defendant’s prior convictions were two nonviolent

second degree robberies, violated the Eighth Amendment. Ramirez,

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4

 Thompson also admitted that he had been found guilty of several

mutual combat violations while in prison. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol.

9, 569-70.)

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365 F.3d at 775. Ramirez’s prior robberies did not involve

weapons, and the “force” in both was minimal. Id. at 768. The

one-year jail term Ramirez received for the two robberies was also

indicative of the less-than-serious nature of the offenses, and it

“was the only period of incarceration ever imposed upon Ramirez

prior to his Three Strikes sentence.” Id. at 769. Comparing

Ramirez’s case to Rummel, Solem and Andrade, the court concluded

that “this [was] the extremely rare case that gives rise to an

inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at 770. After

conducting intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons of Ramirez’s

sentence, the court found that the state court’s decision to uphold

Ramirez’s sentence was an objectively unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court law. Id. at 770-73. Ramirez’s

case was one of the rare cases entitled to habeas relief. Id. at

775.

Thompson’s prior convictions are much more serious than those

in Ramirez. Although Thompson’s two prior “strike” convictions

arose out of one incident, they were violent crimes involving a

firearm.4 (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 1, 00016-20; Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00937-038.) In contrast to the oneyear sentence Ramirez received, Thompson was serving a multipleyear sentence at the time of the current offenses and had been

involved in several instances of mutual combat while in prison. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol 10, 616-19.) In short,

Petitioner’s case is not the extremely rare case which gives rise

to an inference of disproportionality. See Ramirez, 365 F.3d at

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770. Counsel’s failure to raise an Eighth Amendment claim,

therefore, was not objectively unreasonable. Smith, 528 U.S. at

285. Nor has Thompson established he was prejudiced by his

appellate attorney’s failure to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge

to his sentence because he has not established a reasonable

probability he would have prevailed. Id.

2. Denial of Entrapment Instructions (Claim Two)

Petitioner argues that the state trial court violated his

federal constitutional rights by refusing to give entrapment

instructions to the jury. (Am. Pet. 12-13.) Respondent states

that this is merely a reassertion of Thompson’s claim that he had a

right to present a political defense to the charges, and no such

defense exists in California law. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer to

Am. Pet. 9-10.)

This Court must look through the California Supreme Court’s

unexplained denial of Thompson’s habeas corpus petition to the

California Court of Appeal’s written opinion denying this claim. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. The state appellate court did not

specifically address this ground for relief, stating simply that

Thompson had not presented a prima facie case. (Lodgment No. 12,

In re Thompson, No. D046375, order.) Thus, this Court must conduct

an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Delgado,

223 F. 3d at 982.

The failure to give a jury instruction on the defense theory

of a case rises to the level of a federal due process violation “if

the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it

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applicable.” Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir.

2004) (as amended). In a § 2254 proceeding, the petitioner must

show that the alleged instructional error “had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.” 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos

v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The failure to give a

requested instruction must be considered in the context of the

entire trial record and the instructions as a whole. Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-71 (1991); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508

U.S. 333, 343-44 (1993) (finding that the right to present a

complete defense does not entitle a defendant to a particular set

of jury instructions). “The burden on the habeas petitioner is

‘especially heavy’ where, as here, the alleged error involves the

failure to give an instruction.” Clark v. Brown, 442 F.2d 708, 714

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1106

(9th Cir. 1992) (as amended) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 155 (1977)).

As discussed above, in order to establish that he was

entrapped into committing a crime, Thompson would have to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence “that the conduct of the law

enforcement agents or officers would likely induce a normally

law-abiding person to commit the crime.” See CALJIC No. 4.60;

Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 689-90, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at

467. Thompson was not a normally law-abiding person, having been

convicted of carjacking, assault with a firearm and several rules

violations in prison for mutual combat. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Tr., vol. 10, 616-19.) His entrapment argument is based on the

claim that the CCPOA was directing its members to engage in racial

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harassment and provoke assaults by prisoners. The only evidence

that Vega or Panzer badgered, cajoled, importuned or otherwise

enticed Thompson into committing the assaults was his contention

that Vega had denied him showers. This would not induce a normally

law-abiding citizen to assault someone with a sharp instrument or

choke them.

Thompson appears to view “entrapment” and “self-defense

against assault” as interchangeable. The evidence did not warrant

an instruction on the former, but the trial court did give an

instruction on the latter, which was warranted because Thompson

claimed that Panzer hit him. Still, there was insufficient

evidence to support an entrapment instruction. See Beardslee, 358

F.3d at 577.

In Petitioner’s case, there is no likelihood that the failure

to give an entrapment instruction had a substantial and injurious

effect on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Given

Thompson’s criminal history and the fact that Thompson claims he

was entrapped or induced into assaulting Vega and Panzer as a

result of being denied showers or a concerted effort by the CCPOA

to provoke assaults by inmates, it is highly unlikely the jury

would have applied the entrapment defense to him and acquitted him. 

Thus, the state court’s denial of this claim is neither contrary

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct (Claim Three)

Thompson asserts his due process rights were violated when the

prosecutor failed to investigate his claims that prison guards were

provoking assaults by inmates at the direction of the CCPOA in

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order to promote the union’s political and economic goals. (Am.

Pet. 14-16.) He relies on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, as

support for his argument. (Id. at 14.) Respondent counters that,

under Brady, “[t]here is no duty to disclose evidence that is

speculative.” (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer to Am. Pet. 10-11.) 

The California Supreme Court denied this claim, which 

Thompson raised in a habeas corpus petition, with an unexplained

post-card denial. (See Lodgment No. 14, In re Thomspon, No.

S138987, order.) This Court must look to the last reasoned state

court decision to address these claims, the California appellate

court’s opinion denying Thompson’s habeas corpus petition. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 801-06. As with Thompson’s preceding claims, that

court did not specifically address Petitioner’s prosecutorial

misconduct claim. Instead, it found that Thompson had not stated a

prima facie case for relief. (Lodgment No. 12, In re Thompson, No.

D046375, order.) Consequently, this Court must conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the state

courts’ denial of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Delgado,

223 F.3d at 982.

In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must

disclose all material evidence, including impeachment evidence, to

the defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. In order to establish a

Brady violation, Petitioner must show (1) the evidence was

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently;

(2) the withheld evidence was exculpatory or impeachment material;

and (3) he was prejudiced by the failure to disclose. See

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Benn v. Lambert,

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283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 678 (1985), and United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).)

a. Suppression by Prosecution

Thompson must demonstrate that the prosecutor willfully or

inadvertently suppressed evidence. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. 

Petitioner does not argue that the prosecutor possessed evidence

supporting Thompson’s suspicions about the CCPOA’s activities which

was not turned over to the defense. Rather, he argues the

prosecutor should have conducted his own investigation of

Thompson’s claims. (Am. Pet. 14.) He does not allege, nor does

he provide any evidence, that the prosecutor withheld any evidence

which he possessed or to which he had access. 

In his Amended Petition, Thompson refers to “the prosecutor’s

obligation to turn over exculpatory information (i.e., the Hagar

Report)” and refers to the habeas petition Thompson filed in

superior court. (Id. at 16.) That superior court filing includes

a September 26, 2003, article from the Los Angeles Daily Journal,

which in turn refers to hearings being conducted by John Hagar, a

federal court-appointed monitor. (Lodgment No. 9, Thompson v.

Hickman, EHC 00598, Mem. at 4.) There is no evidence that the

Hagar Report existed when Thompson’s trial began on June 13, 2003. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00807, June 13, 2003.) In

fact, Petitioner alleges that the report was released in January of

2004. (Am. Pet. 21.) Even if the report existed during Thompson’s

criminal proceedings, “[t]here is no Brady violation if the

‘defendants, using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the

information’ themselves.” Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726

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(5th Cir. 1996). As Respondent points out, the existence of any

evidence to support Thompson’s allegations about the prison guards’

union is speculative at best. Tying Thompson’s theory to Officer

Panzer and the other correctional officers requires an additional

leap of faith. Accordingly, no evidence was suppressed, and

Thompson has not satisfied this prong of Brady. This, alone,

precludes habeas relief on Thompson’s third claim, which suffers

from other shortcomings.

 b. Exculpatory or Impeachment Evidence

Petitioner has not established the claimed evidence had

exculpatory or impeachment value. “Exculpatory evidence includes

material that goes to the heart of the defendant’s guilt or

innocence, as well as that which might alter the jury’s judgment of

the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness.” United States

v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1984.) The evidence the

prosecution failed to turn over must be relevant to an actual,

valid defense to the charges Thompson faced, such as evidence

Thompson was defending himself against an assault by Panzer when he

attacked her. “[E]vidence is material only if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at

682. Petitioner’s assertions that the CCPOA was encouraging its

membership to provoke assaults by inmates in order to support the

union’s political and economic goals was neither material nor

exculpatory because it was too remote to support any recognized

defense in California.

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The material Thompson alleges the prosecution should have

turned over does not rise to the level of impeachment evidence. 

Impeachment evidence is evidence which calls into question the

veracity or accuracy of a witness’s testimony. See United States

v. Savory, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1987); Black’s Law

Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). 

When determining whether impeachment evidence . . . is

material under Brady, the undisclosed impeachment

evidence cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, the

impeachment evidence must be viewed in context, alongside

the witness’s testimony, in light of any other

impeachment evidence, and in light of corroborating

evidence that bears on the witness’s credibility. 

Pederson v. Fabian, 491 F.3d 816, 826 (8th Cir. 2007). General

references to misconduct and corrupt prison guards does not

constitute impeachment evidence against Officer Panzer or other

officers who testified at Thompson’s trial. Petitioner’s belief

that the CCPOA was directing guards to provoke assaults by inmates

was irrelevant. Thompson has failed to show that material

exculpatory or impeaching evidence was in existence.

Besides arguing that the prosecutor should have investigated

Thompson’s claims about the CCPOA, he complains that the prosecutor

withheld Panzer’s “medical reports.” (Am. Pet. 16.) Yet, there is

nothing to show that the documents contain impeachment or

exculpatory evidence. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Thompson,

D042750, slip op. at 7.) Petitioner’s claim does not satisfy this

Brady requirement.

c. Prejudice

Finally, Thompson has not established prejudice. As discussed

previously in this Report and Recommendation, a political defense

to the charges Thompson faced is not available in California. 

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Thus, allegations that the prison guards’ union was directing

guards to provoke assaults by inmates were not material to the

charges Thompson faced. There is no evidence to tie Petitioner’s

speculation to the guards who were victims or witnesses to

Thompson’s acts. His claim is insufficient to establish that the

prosecutor should have investigated union activities which might

have led to admissible evidence that, if disclosed to the defense,

would have led to a reasonable probability that the result in

Petitioner’s case would have been different. See Downs v. Hoyt,

232 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000). The absence of prejudice

precludes relief.

d. Conclusion

Thompson has not shown any of the three prongs necessary to

establish a claim under Brady. See Brady, 373 U.S. 83. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes the state court’s denial of

Thompson’s Brady claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams,

529 U.S. at 412-13.

4. Unlawful Influence by Prison Guards’ Union (Claim Four)

Thompson argues that CCPOA’s political influence prevented the

court from properly administering justice in the case.” (Am. Pet.

17-19.) Essentially, Petitioner blames the CCPOA for exerting

political pressure on the court and his counsel, and as a result,

he was unable to present evidence of the CCPOA’s policy and

practice of encouraging its members to provoke assaults by inmates

as a way of supporting the union’s political and economic goals. 

(Id.) 

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In the Answer to the First Amended Petition, the Respondent

states that all claims were raised in the California Supreme Court

and are exhausted. (See Answer 2.) The Court has reviewed the

habeas corpus petition Thompson filed in the California Supreme

Court, and this claim does not appear to be among the grounds for

relief raised by Thompson. (See Lodgment No. 13, Thompson v.

Woodford, No S138987, pet. at 1-6.) Even if claims are

unexhausted, this Court may deny them “where[, as here], it is

perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable

federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir.

2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because there is no state court

decision to which this Court can defer, the Court must conduct a de

novo review of the claim. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167

(9th Cir. 2002).

In support of his Petition, Thompson has submitted a set of

exhibits which contain the following: (1) public documents

detailing the structure of CCPOA, its expenditures on lobbying

efforts, and contributions by union members and others; (2) a copy

of a California Assembly bill providing for the construction of new

prisons; (3) copies of documents related to expenditures made on

improvements to Centinela State Prison; (4) a copy of a report on

inmate incidents in California prisons, dated calendar year 2000,

from the California Department of Corrections; (5) copies of

newspaper articles regarding California’s Three Strikes law and the

lobbying activities of the CCPOA; and (6) a copy of the reporter’s

transcript of the July 5, 2002, hearing in which Thompson sought to

remove his counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118,

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5

 In Marsden, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant who

is represented by appointed counsel may move to have counsel removed and

appoint substitute counsel. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 123-24, 465 P.2d at 47-

48, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 159-60.

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465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).5 (See Pet’rs Exs. Supp.

Traverse.) These documents, some of which precede his trial and

others which follow it, do not establish Thompson’s claim that the

wide-ranging conspiracy exists. At most, they suggest that the

CCPOA wields substantial political influence and that some prison

guards are corrupt. Respondent is correct that there is simply no

evidence in the record that supports Petitioner’s claim that the

union’s corruption of the judicial system deprived him of a fair

trial. Thompson is not entitled to habeas relief for this claim. 

5. Actual Innocence (Claim Five)

Thompson claims he is actually innocent of the charges of

which he was convicted. (Am. Pet. 20-22.) Respondent counters

that “[a]ctual innocence means factual innocence,” and the record

amply supports a conclusion that Thompson is guilty of the crimes

for which he was convicted. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer to Am. Pet.

11.)

Like the preceding claim, it is unclear whether this ground

for relief claim was included in Thompson’s habeas corpus petition

filed in the California Supreme Court. Nevertheless, even if the

claim is unexhausted, this Court may deny it “where[, as here], it

is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a

colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624; see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2). Because there is no state court decision to which

this Court can defer, the Court must conduct a de novo review of

the claim. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

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In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), a majority of the

United States Supreme Court assumed without explicitly deciding

that the execution of an innocent person would violate the

Constitution, but the Court did not specify what kind of showing a

habeas petitioner would have to make to successfully present such a

claim. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400. Herrera noted that “[c]laims of

actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been

held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an

independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying

state criminal proceeding.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has concluded

that Herrera requires a petitioner making a “freestanding claim of

innocence” to affirmatively prove he is probably innocent. Turner

v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002); Carriger v.

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). “‘[A]ctual innocence’

means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998).

Thompson has not “affirmatively proved he is probably

innocent” of the charges of which he was convicted, and indeed,

there is more than sufficient evidence in the record that proves

his guilt. See Carriger, 132 F.3d at 476. Thompson was found

guilty of an assault on Panzer and possession of a weapon by a

prisoner. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 4, 00937-38.) 

Petitioner admitted possessing the weapon, attacking Vega with it,

and choking Panzer. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 10, 622-24,

628, 635, 644, 668-73.) Thompson denied grabbing Panzer’s breast

and biting Wilson, but Panzer testified Thompson grabbed her breast

while he was choking her, and Panzer, Wilson and Correctional

Officer Brian Clark testified Thompson bit Wilson as he tried to

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 Thompson was found not guilty of a battery on Panzer. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr., vol 4, 00906.)

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pull him off of Panzer. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 7, 333,

362, 370; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 8, 412.)6 This evidence

is sufficient for this Court to conclude that Petitioner has not

established he is probably innocent of the charges for which he was

convicted. See Turner, 281 F.3d at 872. Thompson has not

established his freestanding claim of innocence nor has he

established actual innocence based upon newly discovered evidence

in a criminal proceeding infected by a constitutional violation. 

See Turner, id. The fifth ground for relief fails.

6. Involuntary Waiver of Counsel/Right to Conflict-Free

Counsel (Claim Six)

In his sixth ground for relief, Thompson argues that political

influences created a conflict of interest between himself and

counsel, and counsel refused to present the political defense

Thompson wanted. (Am. Pet. 23.) As a result, his decision to

represent himself was not voluntary. (Id.) Respondent contends

that “[w]hether styled as a self-representation claim under Faretta

v. California, 422 U.S. 806, or as a conflicted counsel claim,

there is no indication Petitioner’s decision to represent himself

was not voluntary.” (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer to Am. Pet. 12.) 

The California Supreme Court denied this claim, which 

Thompson raised in a habeas corpus petition, with an unexplained

post-card denial. (See Lodgment No. 14, In re Thomspon, No.

S138987, order.) This Court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address the claim, the California

appellate court’s opinion denying Thompson’s habeas corpus

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petition. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-06. That court did not

specifically discuss Thompson’s involuntary waiver of counsel

claim. (Lodgment No. 12, In re Thompson, No. D046375, order.) 

This Court must therefore conduct an independent review of the

record to determine whether the state courts’ denial of the claims

was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

a. Involuntary Waiver of Counsel

Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a defendant has the

right to represent himself. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-20. If a

defendant waives counsel and chooses to represent himself, the

waiver must be “knowing, voluntary and intelligent,” and he “must

be warned specifically of the hazards ahead.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541

U.S. 77, 88-89 (2004) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806). A waiver

is intelligent if “the defendant ‘knows what he is doing and his

choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. United

States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). No formal script

is required, but courts should consider “a range of case-specific

factors, including the defendant’s education or sophistication, the

complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of

the proceeding.” Id. at 88-89 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.

458, 464 (1938)).

Thompson unsuccessfully moved under Marsden and Faretta to

dismiss his attorney and represent himself twice before the court

agreed to do so. (See Lodgment No. 1, Clerks’s Tr., vol. 2, 00404,

Feb. 8, 2002; Lodgement No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol. 2, 0041, May 1,

2002.) On his third attempt, the Court granted the Marsden motion,

relieved counsel, tentatively appointed another attorney for

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 Thompson was later granted standby counsel, Lee Plummer. ( See

Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 1, 4, April 23, 2003.)

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Thompson, and continued the matter for Thompson to decide whether

he wanted to represent himself. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr., vol.

3, 00536, July 11, 2002.) 

After Thompson indicated he wanted to represent himself, the

trial judge conducted a Faretta hearing, the transcript of which is

sealed. (Id.) At the conclusion of the July 11, 2002, hearing,

the court granted Thompson’s Faretta motion.7 (Id.) Petitioner

asserts that the transcripts of these proceedings support this

claim and urges the Court to consider them. (Traverse 12.) 

The Court has read the sealed transcripts of the Marsden and

Faretta hearings. Based on a thorough review of the record,

Thompson’s waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing and

intelligent. The transcript reflects that Thompson understood the

charges, the sentence he faced, and the basics of the legal system. 

Thompson was warned of the dangers of representing himself. The

trial court weighed all these factors, including Petitioner’s

education, intelligence, and the stage of the proceedings. This is

all that Faretta requires. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88-89. 

Accordingly, the state court’s decision to deny this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

b. Right to Conflict-Free Counsel

Thompson also appears to claim that there was a “conflict of

interest with counsel” due to defense counsel’s refusal to put on

Thompson’s political defense and the union’s political influence. 

(Am. Pet. 23.) A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to

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be adequately represented by counsel at every critical stage of the

proceedings. See Mempa v. Ray, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). 

Petitioner’s disagreement over trial strategy is not a

conflict of interest. Several courts recognize the distinction. 

“[W]e are unpersuaded by [the defendant’s] further attempt to style

his disagreement with counsel over trial tactics as a ‘conflict of

interest.’” United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 227 (D.C. Cir.

1996). In United States v. White, 174 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir.

1999), the court was not persuaded by the claim that a defendant’s

“routine disagreement with his appointed counsel over defense

strategy [was] a conflict of interest.” 

Petitioner’s argument is more accurately cast as a claim that

there was a “breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.” See

Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Initially, there was no indication that communication between

Thompson and counsel was a problem. Thompson wanted another

attorney or to represent himself. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 2, 00404, 00414.) On July 5, 2002, the court granted

Thompson’s request and relieved defense counsel; the court was

prepared to appoint new counsel. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.,

vol. 3, 00536.) Petitioner requested to proceed pro per. The

court, on July 11, 2002, conducted an inquiry to determine whether

Thompson could competently represent himself. (Id.) After

conducting its inquiry, the court granted Petitioner’s request.

(Id.)

In order to be competent, counsel must be free from conflicts

of interest which adversely affect his performance. Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (discussing actively

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representing conflicting interests); Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d

1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). When a trial court is aware that an

actual or potential conflict exists, the Sixth Amendment requires

the court to “‘either . . . appoint separate counsel or to take

adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk [is] too remote to

warrant separate counsel.’” Campbell, 408 F.3d at 1170 (citing

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978)); see also Jackson

v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1990). “If the trial court

fails to undertake either of these duties, the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment rights are violated.” Campbell, 408 F.3d at 1170.

In Thompson’s case, the trial court did what the Sixth

Amendment requires: It held a hearing, removed counsel and

appointed separate counsel. Thompson rejected separate counsel,

however, and decided to represent himself. After another hearing,

the court granted his request. Before trial, Thompson was given a

third attorney, Lee Plummer, to act as standby counsel. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Tr., vol. 1, 4.) Accordingly, whether characterized

as a conflict of interest or a breakdown in the relationship

between Thompson and his attorney, Petitioner received what he was

entitled to under the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, the state

court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Thompson is not entitled to

habeas relief on this claim.

C. Petitioner’s Second Request for Appointment of Counsel

On November 5, 2007, Thompson filed his second request that

the Court appoint counsel to represent him in litigating his

Petition. (Second Req. for Appointment of Counsel.) His First

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Motion for Appointment of Counsel was denied on March 20, 2007

[doc. no. 15]. This request is more appropriately characterized as

a motion for reconsideration of Thompson’s prior motion. See S.D.

Cal.Civ.L.R. 7.1(i). 

Petitioner urges that counsel should be appointed to represent

him because he has a “deteriorating medical condition” and recently

underwent the “removal of a brain tumor.” (Second Req. for

Appointment of Counsel.) Thompson’s evidence does not support this

request. First, there is no evidence that Petitioner’s condition

is deteriorating. Second, his surgery was for the “evacuation of a

subdural hematoma,” not a brain tumor. (Id., Decl. of Thompson,

Ex. B (discharge summary).)

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to

federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners. McCleskey v.

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428

(9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th

Cir. 1986)); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir.

1986). Nevertheless, financially eligible habeas petitioners

seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain representation whenever the court “determines that the interests of justice

so require.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007);

Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990).

The interests of justice require appointment of counsel when

the Court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the petition or when

the assistance of counsel is “necessary for effective discovery.” 

28 U.S.C.A. Rs. 6(a), 8(c) foll. § 2254 (West Vol. 2 2006); Maybe

v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 675 (2005); Terrovona, 912 F.2d at 1177;

Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. Otherwise, the appointment of counsel

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is discretionary. Maybe, 545 U.S. at 675; Terrovona, 912 F.2d at

1177; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728.

Furthermore, “‘[indigent state prisoners applying for habeas

corpus relief are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the

circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel

is necessary to prevent due process violations.’” Bonin v.

Vasquez, 999 F.2d at 428 (quoting Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

1196 (9th Cir. 1986)). A due process violation may occur in the

absence of counsel if the issues involved are too complex for the

petitioner. Id. at 428-29. 

The Eighth Circuit has suggested the following factors should

be considered when the court exercises its discretion to determine

whether appointment of counsel is appropriate: “the legal

complexity of the case, the factual complexity of the case, and the

petitioner’s ability to investigate and present his claims, along

with any other relevant factors.” Haggard v. Parched, 29 F.3d 469,

471 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

These factors are useful in deciding whether due process

requires the appointment of counsel. The issues and facts that

Thompson presents are not severely complex, and he adequately

explained his claim for relief in his Second Amended Petition and

his Traverse. Further, before and since his surgery, Petitioner

has adequately represented himself. He filed his Amended Petition,

a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pampers, and a Motion for Appointment

of Counsel [doc. nos. 6, 7, 8]. The Amended Petition and Traverse

demonstrate that he understands the relevant law relating to his

claim. (See Am. Pet.; Traverse.) Thompson’s request for counsel

is made “[i]n the event of a recurrence causing dementia . . . .” 

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(Mot. for Appointment of Counsel 2.) Yet, the inmate discharge

summary attached to Petitioner’s declaration indicates that the

surgery was successful, and Thompson “did very well postoperatively

with no postoperative complications. The patient is deemed

medically stable to be discharged back to the facility today

[October 28, 2007.]” (Second Req. For Appointment of Counsel, Decl.

of Thompson, Ex. B (discharge summary).)

Under these circumstances, a district court does not abuse its

discretion in denying a state prisoner’s request for appointment of

counsel as unwarranted. See LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626

(9th Cir. 1987). At this stage of the proceedings, due process and

the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel.

The assistance counsel provides is valuable. “An attorney may

narrow the issues and elicit relevant information from his or her

client. An attorney may highlight the record and present to the

court a reasoned analysis of the controlling law.” Knaubert, 791

F.2d at 729. As the court in Knaubert noted: “[U]nless an

evidentiary hearing is held, an attorney’s skill in developing and

presenting new evidence is largely superfluous; the district court

is entitled to rely on the state court record alone.” Id. (citing

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-57 (1981), and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)). This Court, in denying Petitioner’s request for

appointment of counsel, notes that it has “review[ed] the record

and render[ed] an independent legal conclusion.” Id. 

For the above-stated reasons, the “interests of justice” do

not compel the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

second request for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to Chief

United States District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons

outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation,

and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Second Request for

Appointment of Counsel [doc. no. 24] is DENIED.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 29, 2008, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 17, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 25, 2008

 _____________________________

 Hon. Ruben B. Brooks

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-02314-BAS-RBB Document 26 Filed 01/25/08 Page 43 of 43