Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01382/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01382-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY RONNELL PERKINS,

CDCR #E-30776,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CLASSIFICATION SERVICE DEP’T; 

D. CURRY; A. MONARREZ; 

F.N. GUZMAN; RAYMOND MADDEN; 

T. RAYBON; DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-01382-JLS-MDD

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND 

28 U.S.C. § § 1915A(b)

I. Procedural History

On July 24, 2019, Plaintiff Gary Ronnell Perkins, proceeding pro se, and currently 

incarcerated at Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (“CVSP”) located in Blythe, California, 

has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In 

addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a), along with a certified Prison Certificate and a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Trust Account Statement Reports (ECF Nos. 2, 3).

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On October 17, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but 

simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file

an amended pleading in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in the 

Court’s Order. (Id.) On November 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). (ECF No. 6.)

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Legal Standard

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) obligates the Court to review complaints filed by 

all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained 

in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 

program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing,” and ideally before the service of process 

upon any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the 

Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, 

malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of § 1915[] is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous 

or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

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complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

While the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in 

civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit 

of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. 

Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements 

of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

On November 27, 2107, Plaintiff “appeared before classification committee” where 

Plaintiff “requested that he be transferred from a Level III facility to a Level II facility 

pursuant to California Code of Regulations subsection 3375.1(a)(2).” (FAC at 1–2.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff requested a transfer to either the California Institution for Men 

(“CIM”) or the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). (See id. at 2.)

In February of 2017, the CDCR “authorized prisoners serving a sentence of ‘life 

without the possibility of parole’ (LWOP) to be housed at any Level II facility which has 

a ‘lethal electrified fence.’” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff, an inmate serving an LWOP sentence, 

alleges that he “met the criteria” permitting him to be housed at a Level II institution. (Id.

at 8.)

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The Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”) “submitted a recommendation to 

classification service for endorsement of Plaintiff to be transferred” to a Level II 

“programming facility at RJD.” (Id.) On December 12, 2017, Defendant Curry, the 

“classification service representative who was assigned to review Plaintiff’s request,” 

denied his transfer and “retained Plaintiff at Centinela State Prison Level III.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims the reason provided was “LWOP status of Plaintiff.” (Id.) 

On November 13, 2018, Plaintiff “appeared for annual review” before the UCC and 

again requested transfer to either Level II facility, RJD or CIM. (Id.) Defendant 

Monarrez, the “classification service representative who was assigned to review Plaintiff’s 

request for transfer” again denied his request “due to LWOP status.” (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff submitted administrative grievances arguing that the denial of his requests 

for transfer were “discriminatory.” (Id.) On January 16, 2018, Defendant Madden 

“authored a memorandum in response to Plaintiff’s grievance denying Plaintiff 602 

grievance at the second level of review.” (Id.) On December 4, 2018, Defendant Guzman 

responded to Plaintiff’s grievance in which she “acknowledged notice of discrimination 

and violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment” rights. (Id.) Defendant Guzman, 

however, “denied Plaintiff’s request to resubmit Plaintiff’s case for placement on Level 

II.” (Id.)

On February 6, 2019, Defendant Madden also responded to Plaintiff’s grievance and 

“denied Plaintiff’s request to be rescheduled for transfer to Level II despite notice of 

discrimination.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff claims Defendants “denial of transfer of Plaintiff to 

a Level II facility and retention at Centinela State Prison Level III was/is discriminatory, 

was arbitrary, capricious and without legitimate penological goal.” (Id. at 10–11.) 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000 and punitive 

damages in the amount of $500,000. (See id. at 13.)

C. U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under 

color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 

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263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive 

rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). To prevail on a claim for the violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that a person acting under the color of state 

law committed the conduct at issue; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of some 

right, privilege, or immunity conferred by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 

See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). A section 1983 suit may be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim “if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that gave rise 

to a plausible inference of either element.” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 

2015).

D. Equal Protection Claims 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires that persons 

similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 

432, 439; Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013). An equal protection claim may 

be established in two ways. The first method requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant 

has intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of his membership in a 

protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Thornton v. City 

of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005). Under this theory of equal 

protection, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants’ actions were a result of his membership 

in a suspect class such as race, religion, or alienage. Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1167. 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege to be a member of any suspect class, and he fails to 

allege Defendants denied him his request to transfer to a prisoner closer to Los Angeles

based on his membership in any suspect class.

To the extent his claims do not involve a suspect classification, Plaintiff may 

establish an equal protection claim only if he alleges facts sufficient to plausibly show 

Defendants intentionally treated similarly situated inmates differently without a rational 

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basis for doing so. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008); 

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 

546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008). But to state an equal protection claim under this “class 

of one” theory, he must allege facts to plausibly show that: (1) he is a member of an 

identifiable class; (2) he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; 

and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 

F.3d 1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564). He must 

further allege discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 

(1976); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997).

In support of this claim, Plaintiff lists four other inmates who were “endorsed” or 

transferred” to a Level II or Level III prisons “closer to Los Angeles during CSR denial of 

Plaintiff.” FAC at 11. These facts are insufficient to plead an equal protection claim. 

Plaintiff fails to show how or why he is similarly situated to these inmates other than they 

are also inmates sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. There are no facts to 

show that the reasons for transfer for these other inmates lack a rational or penological 

interest. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that these inmates made similar requests as 

Plaintiff which were granted while Plaintiff’s requests were denied. There are no 

allegations as to why these other inmates were transferred. Moreover, this is four inmates 

out of potential hundreds of inmates within the CDCR who are serving an LWOP sentence. 

In fact, Plaintiff is now housed at a prison that only has Level II and Level I inmates.1 

Therefore, it seems at some point, which Plaintiff fails to address, Defendants decided to 

transfer him to a Level II institution. 

Thus, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims must be 

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

///

 

1

 See https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/facility-locator/cvsp/ (website last visited Jan. 3, 2019).

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E. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his pleading

deficiencies but failed to correct any of these deficiencies in his FAC. Therefore, the Court 

finds further attempts to amend would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759

F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial 

of . . . leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); 

Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the 

plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the 

requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend 

is particularly broad.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1) DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to 

state a claim upon which Bivens relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).

2) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and 

3) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and to 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2020

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