Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00835/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00835-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Account Receivable

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SINGH JR.,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COLLECTIBLES MANAGEMENT 

RESOURCES,

 Defendant.

1:16-cv-00835 LJO BAM

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. 3)

Pro se Plaintiff John Singh (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Collectibles Management Resources 

(“Defendant”) violated both state and federal laws by furnishing and reporting erroneous information on 

Plaintiff’s account and consumer report. Doc. 1, Ex. A, Complaint (“Compl.”). 

Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) on the ground that none of them states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 3 at 1. 

Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. See Doc. 4. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court 

GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff discovered in or around December 2015 that Defendant, a California collections agency,

was reporting a collection account that was erroneous. Compl. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff claims he contacted 

Defendant on January 1, 2016, by mail and telephone and informed Defendant of the error. Id. Plaintiff 

received a letter from Defendant in or around February 2016, stating that the account did in fact belong 

 

1 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint and are assumed as true for purposes of Defendant’s motion. See 

Lazy Y. Ranch LTD. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).

Case 1:16-cv-00835-LJO-BAM Document 6 Filed 07/28/16 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2

to him. Id. Plaintiff contends that he repeatedly attempted to contact Defendant following the receipt of 

the letter, but was unable to make contact and received no relief. Id. 

On May 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in the Superior Court of California for 

the County of Fresno, alleging that Defendant caused him injury by falsely furnishing and reporting 

incorrect credit information. Doc. 1 at 1. In particular, Plaintiff brought four causes of action against 

Defendant for: (1) negligent violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et 

seq.; (2) loss of opportunity; (3) defamation; and (4) negligence. Compl. at 4-6. Defendant removed this 

case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question jurisdiction arising from 

Plaintiff’s FCRA claim. Doc. 1 at 1-2; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.

II. STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. A 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is 

either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 

legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations in the 

complaint, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and 

resolves all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Lazy Y. Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 

2008).

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 

Case 1:16-cv-00835-LJO-BAM Document 6 Filed 07/28/16 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

3

allegations, a Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “bare assertions...amount[ing] to nothing 

more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’...are not entitled to be assumed true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 681. “[T]o be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint...may not simply recite 

the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2011). In practice, “a complaint...must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting 

all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 562; see also Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216 (“the factual allegations that are taken as true must 

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief”).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Fair Credit Reporting Act Claim

Plaintiff has instituted this private right of action against Defendant, a furnisher of consumer 

credit information, for violations of the FCRA. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff alleges that in December 2015 he 

discovered Defendant was “reporting a collection account that should not be reported.” Id. at ¶ 5. 

Plaintiff notified Defendant that the account should not be reported, and Defendant “promised to 

investigate the matter,” but never did despite Plaintiff’s multiple attempts to resolve the dispute. Id.

Plaintiff claims Defendant’s failure to do so violated “Section 1691o(a)” of the FCRA. Id. at ¶ 10. 

Defendant argues the claim fails because Defendant had no duty to investigate Plaintiff’s complaint and, 

accordingly, did not violate the FCRA. Doc. 3-1 at 1.

As a threshold matter, there is no “Section 1691o(a)” of the FCRA. “15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq. is 

the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and does not contain a subsection ‘o(a).’ Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim under the FCRA.” Ali v. Capital One, No. 1:11-CV-02115-LJO, 2012 WL 

260023, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court will 

Case 1:16-cv-00835-LJO-BAM Document 6 Filed 07/28/16 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

4

construe Plaintiff’s FCRA claim as having been brought under § 1681o(a) of the FCRA, which provides 

for civil liability for negligent noncompliance with the FCRA. 

The thrust of Plaintiff’s FCRA claim is that Defendant allegedly furnished inaccurate 

information to Plaintiff, which he disputed, and failed to investigate the dispute. In Nelson v. Chase 

Manhattan Mortgage Corp., the Ninth Circuit explained when a private right of action exists under the 

FCRA against a furnisher of credit information for failure to investigate a dispute: 

It can be inferred from the structure of the [FCRA] that Congress did not want furnishers of 

credit information exposed to suit by any and every consumer dissatisfied with the credit 

information furnished. Hence, Congress limited the enforcement of the duties [owed by 

furnishers of credit information] to governmental bodies. But Congress did provide a filtering 

mechanism . . . by making the disputatious consumer notify a [credit reporting agency (“CRA”)]

and setting up the CRA to receive notice of the investigation by the furnisher. With this filter in 

place and opportunity for the furnisher to save itself from liability by taking the steps required by 

§ 1681s–2(b), Congress put no limit on private enforcement under §§ 1681n & o.

282 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, furnishers have a duty to investigate a dispute with a 

consumer only after the furnisher receives notice of the dispute from a CRA. Capital One, 2012 WL 

260023, at *3 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, to state a claim under the FCRA against 

Defendant for failing to investigate their alleged dispute, Plaintiff must allege that he contacted a CRA, 

who determined the claim was viable, and so informed Defendant. Roybal v. Equifax, 450 F.Supp. 2d 

1177, 1180 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2005). Because Plaintiff does not allege he contacted a CRA, his FCRA 

claim fails. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim with leave to 

amend.

B. Loss of Opportunity, Defamation, and Negligence Claims2

Plaintiff also brings state law claims for loss of opportunity, defamation, and negligence. Compl. 

at 5-6. Defendant seeks to have these claims dismissed on the ground that they are entirely preempted by 

the FCRA. Doc. 3-1 at 7.

 

2 The Court opts to exercise its discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c)(3).

Case 1:16-cv-00835-LJO-BAM Document 6 Filed 07/28/16 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

“As a general rule, the FCRA does not preempt any state law.” Capital One, 2012 WL 260023, 

at *5 (citations omitted). However, there are exceptions to the rule, including the regulation of the 

responsibilities of those who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 

1681t(b)(1)(F). In relevant part, the FCRA provides that “[n]o requirement or prohibition may be 

imposed under the laws of any State with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 

1681s–2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer 

reporting agencies.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F). Because Plaintiff’s state law claims are based on an 

alleged injury arising purely from the reporting of credit information by a furnisher of credit, they are 

completely preempted. See Equifax, 450 F.Supp. 2d at 1181-82. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims without leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendant’s motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s FCRA claim, but GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND his state law claims.

Any amended complaint shall be filed on or before August 29, 2016. Failure to meet this deadline will 

result in this case being dismissed with prejudice for failing to comply with the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00835-LJO-BAM Document 6 Filed 07/28/16 Page 5 of 5