Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00185/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00185-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 751
Nature of Suit: Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Amie M. Gressett, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Central Arizona Water Conservation 

District, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-00185-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Amie Gressett’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

and Related Non-Taxable Expenses, (Doc. 185), and Defendant Central Arizona Water 

Conservation District’s Motion for Leave to Supplement its Response, (Doc. 204). The 

Court now rules on the motions. 

I. Background 

Ms. Gressett seeks an award of $702,465 in attorneys’ fees, as well as an 

additional $51,542.45 in non-taxable expenses (Doc. 186 at 8). The parties do not dispute 

that (a) the fee award is governed by 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3), (b) Ms. Gressett was 

successful on the merits of her action, and (c) Ms. Gressett is entitled to reasonable 

attorneys’ fees. (Doc. 194 at 2; Doc. 202 at 1–2). Rather, the parties dispute the amount 

of attorneys’ fees the Court should award to Ms. Gressett. (Doc. 186; Doc. 194; Doc. 

202). Central Arizona Water Conservation District (“CAP”) argues that the Court should 

reduce the fee award by at least $309,121 for several reasons (Doc. 194 at 18), each of 

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which is discussed below. Additionally, CAP argues that the Court should not award 

more than $16,656.25 in non-taxable expenses, also addressed below. (Doc. 194 at 18). 

Assuming familiarity with the factual and procedural history of this action, the 

Court will recount only those aspects of this litigation that are relevant to the pending 

issue of attorneys’ fees and costs. See Gressett v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 

2015 WL 1505774 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2015); Gressett v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation 

Dist., 2014 WL 4053404 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2014). Ms. Gressett brought a Family and 

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claim against CAP in January 2012. (Doc. 1). In March 

2015, the jury awarded Ms. Gressett $140,000 in compensatory damages. (Doc. 174). 

The Court awarded Ms. Gressett an additional $140,000 in liquidated damages and 

$80,360.50 in front pay, (Doc. 177), and entered judgment in her favor, (Doc. 178). 

II. Ms. Gressett’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Related Non-Taxable 

Expenses 

 Ms. Gressett requests a total award of $754,007.45 in attorney fees and expenses. 

(Doc. 186 at 8). CAP argues that the Court should reduce Ms. Gressett’s award on several 

different grounds, which the Court now addresses. 

 A. Contingent Fee Agreement 

 CAP argues that Ms. Gressett’s fee agreement constitutes an impermissible 

enhancement of a fee award. (Doc. 194 at 4). This argument, however, appears to be the 

result of a misunderstanding of both the fee agreement and Ms. Gressett’s claim for fees. 

CAP incorrectly claims that the fee agreement entitles Ms. Gressett’s counsel to 40% of 

the total recovery, as well as to any fees that may be awarded by the Court. (Doc. 194 at 

3). Rather, the agreement allows Ms. Gressett’s counsel to take either 40% of the total 

recovery or the fees awarded by the Court, whichever is greater. (Doc 186-1 at 7). 

 CAP correctly notes that increasing a fee award for a contingency fee is generally 

an impermissible enhancement. (Doc. 194 at 4). However, Ms. Gressett is not seeking a 

contingency enhancement to the lodestar calculation. Therefore, the Court will not reduce 

Ms. Gressett’s fees on that basis. 

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B. Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees

 The FMLA requires that the Court “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 2617(a)(3). CAP raises several objections to the reasonableness of Ms. Gressett’s 

requested fees. 

 1. Attorneys’ Fees Incurred by Ms. Gressett Prior to Filing a 

 Notice of Appearance and by Prior Counsel 

 Ms. Gressett claims entitlement to fees incurred as early as February 2010, when 

her first attorney sent CAP a demand letter. (Doc. 186 at 8). CAP cites Schneider v. 

Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 187 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 1999), to support the 

proposition that “pre-suit fees may be awarded . . . only for ‘discrete’ work ‘that was both 

useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the . . . litigation to the stage it 

reached.’” Schneider, 187 F.3d at 33 (citations omitted) (ruling on 42 U.S.C. § 1988); 

(Doc. 194 at 13). The Court finds the fees incurred by Ms. Gressett’s current counsel 

prior to filing a notice of appearance were reasonable and necessary to advance the 

litigation. The Court will award those fees. However, as the fees associated with Ms. 

Gressett’s various prior attorneys were not included in the electronic spreadsheet as the 

Court ordered, the Court declines to permit those fees. Therefore, the Court will reduce 

the award of fees by $3,850. 

 2. Attorneys’ Fees for Settlement Efforts 

 CAP objects to Ms. Gressett’s counsel billing 108.7 hours and $32,570 in total 

mediation fees to prepare for and attend the two unsuccessful mediations, claiming that 

the amount of fees is unreasonable and that Ms. Gressett should bear her own fees 

because her unreasonable settlement positions are to blame for the failure of the 

mediation process. (Doc. 194 at 5–7). 

 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the plain language of § 2617(a)(3), 

which requires the Court “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee” to permit the recovery of 

reasonable attorneys’ fees associated with mediation efforts. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). 

Consequently, the Court will examine the reasonableness of Ms. Gressett’s claimed hours 

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and fees for mediation with an eye towards their connection to resolving her claim. 

 CAP argues the amount of fees claimed is unreasonable and Ms. Gressett’s 

unreasonable settlement positions are to blame for the failure of the mediation process. 

(Doc. 194 at 5–7). These two closely related contentions encapsulate the argument that 

Ms. Gressett’s counsel’s time, billed as related to mediation, was not reasonably utilized 

to advance the resolution of Ms. Gressett’s claim and therefore is not recoverable. When 

deciding the reasonable number of hours expended, a court may consider: “(1) the 

novelty and complexity of the issues[;] (2) the special skill and experience of counsel [;] 

(3) the quality of representation[;] and (4) the results obtained.” Cabrales v. Cty. of L.A., 

864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988) cert. granted, vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), 

opinion reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 For the first factor, the Court notes that although Ms. Gressett’s complaint overall 

involved a rather simple and straightforward FMLA claim, the chart created by CAP’s inhouse counsel presented a few novel issues. For the second factor, CAP argues that Ms. 

Gressett’s counsel possessed no special skills and had never litigated an employment 

case. (Doc. 194 at 10). Conversely, Ms. Gressett’s counsel asserts this was not her first 

FMLA case, (Doc. 202 at 6), and that she is experienced in both employment law and 

trial work, (Doc. 186 at 11). For the third factor, there is no direct evidence in the record 

before the Court of the quality of Ms. Gressett’s counsel’s representation during the 

mediation preparation and process. 

 For the fourth and final factor, there is no direct evidence in the record before the 

Court as to the results of the mediation. However, both parties appear to agree that CAP’s 

offer at the second mediation was near the total judgment of $360,000. (Doc. 194 at 6; 

Doc. 202 at 4). When determining whether to accept a settlement offer, it is reasonable to 

consider the amount of attorneys’ fees accrued at time of the offer. CAP observes that by 

the time of the first mediation, Ms. Gressett had incurred approximately $400,000 in fees. 

(Doc. 194 at 8). The Ninth Circuit has held that the amount of attorneys’ fees accrued at 

time of a settlement offer had to be considered when determining whether prevailing 

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plaintiffs improved their positions by going to trial and therefore whether costs should be 

awarded. Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374, 380–81 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling on a fee award 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Given the results obtained and Ms. Gressett’s entitlement to a 

mandatory fee award under § 2617(a)(3), the Court cannot say that it was unreasonable to 

reject the settlement offer. 

 Thus, the Court finds that the mediation was reasonably in furtherance of 

resolving the dispute. Therefore § 2617(a)(3) provides for recovery of the attorneys’ fees 

related to the failed mediation. In sum, the Court will not reduce the costs and expenses 

awarded as unreasonable. 

 3. Background or General Research 

 CAP contends that Ms. Gressett’s counsel is improperly requesting over 109 hours 

in fees spent conducting general background research. (Doc. 194 at 9). The Ninth Circuit 

has noted that research needed to write a brief, rather than general background research, 

is properly charged to the client. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 

1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2004). Similarly, other Circuits have held that “attempting to charge 

an adversary with time spent conducting background research is presumptively 

unreasonable.” Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson Cty., Kan., 157 F.3d 1243, 

1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). However, upon review, the Court finds that the 

hours spent researching are reasonable and are not improper background research. 

 4. Interoffice conferences 

 CAP argues that any fee award should be reduced for time spent in internal 

conferences. (Doc. 194 at 10). CAP contends that fees billed for internal conferences and 

e-mails are “not reasonable and should be stricken.” (Id.) However, CAP does not cite 

any cases for the proposition that time spent in an internal conference is inherently 

unreasonable, and its two supporting cases are unhelpful. In United States v. Nosal, 2014 

WL 2109948 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2014), the court held that billing by multiple attorneys 

for participating in the same conference was not completely recoverable. 2014 WL 

2109948, at *7. In Crane v. Native Am. Air Ambulance, Inc., 2008 WL 2001281 (D. Ariz. 

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May 7, 2008), the court found “redundant and excessive hours in intra-office 

conferences.” 2008 WL 2001281, at *4. 

Here, CAP does not identify any hours as being redundant or excessive. Rather, 

CAP has compiled a list of every time entry involving an internal conference or e-mail, 

and from this list boldly asserts that the entire amount of time incurred on these subjects 

is excessive. Because CAP fails to identify any particular time entry as unreasonable and 

Ms. Gressett is entitled to an award for time reasonably incurred in conferences, the 

Court will award Ms. Gressett fees for time spent in internal conferences and e-mails. Cf. 

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103–04 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 

(declining to reduce an award of fees for meetings where multiple attorneys were in 

attendance and for intra-office conferencing). 

 5. Clerical Tasks 

CAP claims that Ms. Gressett improperly requests fees for time incurred in clerical 

tasks. (Doc. 194 at 10–11). Purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a 

paralegal or lawyer’s rate. See Davis v. City & Cty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 

1992), vacated in part on other grounds by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court has 

reviewed the billing entries identified as clerical by CAP, and finds some of them to be 

clerical and others to be necessary legal work. Among those tasks which the Court deems 

clerical, and hence not compensable as part of an attorneys’ fee award, are calendaring 

activities, scheduling depositions, and filing documents. The Court therefore will strike 

any attorney time billed for these and other tasks of a clerical nature. 

 6. Duplicative Work 

CAP challenges certain billing entries as duplicative because multiple attorneys 

attended hearings, researched the same law, or worked on the same issues. (Doc. 194 at 

11). The Court is unpersuaded that these entries are unreasonably duplicative, with the 

exception of the clearly duplicative entries conceded by Ms. Gressett (Doc. 202 at 7). 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the participation of more than one 

attorney does not necessarily constitute an unnecessary duplication of effort.” McGrath v. 

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Cty. of Nev., 67 F.3d 248, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 

1435 n.9 (9th Cir. 1989)); Sunstone Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Alameda Cty. Med. Ctr., 

646 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1214 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that duplication of work between 

multiple attorneys was not unreasonable). Here, the Court cannot state that it was 

unreasonable for Ms. Gressett to have several attorneys working on similar matters in the 

course of this litigation. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion and declines to 

reduce the award by these entries. 

 7. Excessive Time 

 Similarly, CAP contends that Ms. Gressett seeks to recover attorneys’ fees for 

“needlessly and inappropriately multiplying the proceedings.” (Doc. 194 at 13). CAP 

does not cite any authority in support of this claim. CAP asserts that billing 0.1 for email 

correspondence throughout the litigation was an example of excessive and unreasonable 

billing entries. However, it is common local practice to bill tenths of an hour for email 

and phone correspondence. CAP also objects to a paralegal billing 8.5 hours to redact 218 

pages of medical records. Given the careful review required when redacting medical 

records, the Court is not persuaded that spending approximately two minutes per page is 

unreasonable or excessive. Upon review of the record, the Court cannot state that the time 

spent by Ms. Gressett’s counsel was unreasonable. The Court will not reduce the award 

by these entries. 

 8. Block Billing 

CAP identifies time entries totaling $39,526 that it claims include improper block 

billing. (Doc. 194 at 13). Block billing, the practice of including unrelated tasks in a 

single time entry, makes it difficult for a reviewing court to assess the reasonableness of 

the time spent on each task. “Where the Court cannot distinguish between the time 

claimed for the various tasks, the Court will reduce the award accordingly.” Moshir v. 

Automobili Lamborghini Am. LLC, 927 F. Supp. 2d 789, 799 (D. Ariz. 2013). However, 

“[b]lock-billing is not inappropriate per se when the party seeking fees meets the basic 

requirements of ‘listing his hours and identifying the general subject matter of his time 

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expenditures.’” Id. (quoting Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2000)); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (stating that although the 

fee applicant bears the burden of submitting “evidence supporting the hours worked and 

rates claimed,” an applicant is “not required to record in great detail how each minute of 

his time was expended”). In Pure Wafer, Inc. v. City of Prescott, 2014 WL 3797850 (D. 

Ariz. July 29, 2014), the Court rejected a block billing objection because the billing 

entries at issue were for tasks closely related to each other, such as both fact checking and 

cite checking the same motion. 2014 WL 3797850, at *5. 

The Court has reviewed the entries identified by CAP as block billed and where 

the Court is unable to distinguish between the time claimed for various tasks, has reduced 

the total fees for those entries by 20%. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously 

approved 20% as an appropriate reduction to hours block billed. See Welch v. 

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). Finally, the Court did not 

take into consideration the time breakdown provided by Ms. Gressett in her reply, as the 

appropriate time to clarify those entries would have been before submitting the time 

entries to the Court. 

C. Non-Taxable Expenses 

CAP argues that the Court should not award more than $16,656.25 in non-taxable 

expenses. (Doc. 194 at 18). For the reasons set forth below, the Court has adjusted the 

award of non-taxable expenses. 

 1. Mediation Costs 

The Court finds that the plain language of § 2617(a)(3), which requires “other 

costs of the action to be paid by the defendant,” to allow for the recovery of reasonable 

mediation costs. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). The cases cited by CAP deal with 28 U.S.C. § 

1920, which is not applicable in this FMLA action. Unlike § 1920, § 2617(a)(3) only 

limits the recovery of attorneys’ fees by requiring that they be reasonable and related to 

the FMLA claim. Furthermore, § 1920 addresses the award of taxable expenses, whereas 

§ 2617(a)(3) requires the award of non-taxable expenses. Section 1920 is utterly 

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irrelevant to this case. See Smith v. AS Am., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-05048-NKL, 2015 WL 

2238268, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 12, 2015) (rejecting contention that mediation expenses 

should not have been awarded under § 1920, as they had been properly awarded under § 

2617(a)(3)). As the FMLA statute requires the award of reasonable expenses, the Court 

will award reasonable mediation costs. 

 2. Costs Incurred for Westlaw Research 

 CAP challenges Ms. Gressett’s request for $4,637.75 in Westlaw research costs on 

two bases. (Doc. 194 at 15–16). First, CAP claims costs for Westlaw and other 

computerized research should be rolled into attorneys’ fees as overhead and are therefore 

not recoverable as separate costs. Id. The cases CAP relies upon deal with 28 U.S.C. § 

1920, which governs the award of taxable expenses and not the non-taxable expenses at 

issue here. In the Ninth Circuit, reasonable charges for computerized research may be 

recovered if separate billing for such expenses is “the prevailing practice in the local 

community.” Trustees of Constr. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Redland Ins. 

Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (ruling on an award of 

fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D)). Thus, the Court will consider reasonable Westlaw 

research costs as recoverable expenses. 

 Second, CAP argues that there are no corresponding time entries for the claimed 

Westlaw costs. (Doc. 194 at 15). CAP contends that Ms. Gressett’s award of costs should 

be reduced for failure of her counsel to specify in several entries the particularity of the 

legal research being done. (Doc. 194 at 15). Although CAP does not cite authority in 

support of its proposition, the failure to adequately identify the research in a time entry is 

a violation of Local Rule 54.2(e)(2)(B) and 54.2(e)(3). See Agster v. Maricopa Cty., 486 

F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1018 (D. Ariz. 2007) (allowing computerized research costs when the 

requirements of both Local Rule 54.2(e)(2)(B) and 54.2(e)(3) were met). Local Rule 

54.2(e)(2)(B) states: 

Legal Research. This time entry must identify the specific 

legal issue researched and, if appropriate, should identify the 

pleading or document the preparation of which occasioned the 

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conduct of the research. Time entries simply stating ‘research’ 

or ‘legal research’ are inadequate and the court may reduce the 

award accordingly. 

LRCiv 54.2(e)(2)(B). Similarly, Local Rule 54.2(e)(3) states: 

Description of Expenses Incurred. In a separate portion of the 

itemized statement, identify each related nontaxable expense 

with particularity. Counsel should attach copies of applicable 

invoices, receipts and/or disbursement instruments. Failure to 

itemize and verify costs may result in their disallowance by the 

court. 

LRCiv 54.2(e)(3). Ms. Gressett does not respond to this aspect of CAP’s argument. 

 Having independently reviewed Ms. Gressett’s attorneys’ time entries regarding 

legal research, the Court finds that several fail to comply with the specificity 

requirements of Local Rule 54.2(e)(2)(B) and 54.2(e)(3). Ms. Gressett claims a total of 

$130.03 in Westlaw research costs that are supported by such deficient legal research 

descriptions. The Court will reduce the award to Ms. Gressett by that amount for failure 

to comply with Local Rule 54.2(e)(2)(B) and 54.2(e)(3). However, the Court will not 

reduce the award for Westlaw costs that have corresponding time entries reflecting the 

research performed.

 3. Expert Witness Fees

 CAP contests Ms. Gressett’s expert witness fees as unreasonable. (Doc. 194 at 16). 

The Court will address each expert’s fees in turn. 

 a. Ginger McRae 

 CAP objects to the $22,223.45 in costs claimed for Ms. McRae’s services as an 

expert. (Doc. 194 at 16). CAP argues that these costs are unreasonable on two grounds: 

(1) Ms. McRae did not testify and (2) the costs were excessive. The Court is not 

persuaded that it was unreasonable to retain Ms. McRae, even if ultimately her testimony 

was inadmissible. However, the Court finds that the fees incurred during trial were 

excessive and will therefore reduce the fee award by $11,654.45, the total amount 

charged by Ms. McRae during trial. 

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 b. Paul Bjorklund 

 CAP asserts that Ms. Gressett should not be awarded expert fees for the testimony 

of Mr. Bjorklund, as the fees are overly general and excessive. (Doc. 194 at 17). 

However, CAP does not cite any authority to support the proposition that expert 

witnesses are required to keep detailed time records to the same extent that is required of 

legal counsel. Upon a review of the entries, the Court finds that Mr. Bjorklund’s fees 

were not overly general or excessive. 

 CAP further contests as untimely the fees charged for a supplemental report that 

was disclosed one week before trial. (Doc. 194 at 18). As the Court used the 

supplemental report in calculating Ms. Gressett’s front pay, the report was not untimely. 

Thus, the Court will not reduce the award of expert witness fees associated with Mr. 

Bjorklund. 

 c. Cathie Cameron 

 Ms. Gressett requested an additional $1,000 in costs for the first time in her reply 

(Doc. 202 at 12). As this is an untimely request, the Court declines to permit the costs 

associated with Ms. Cameron. 

III. CAP’s Motion for Leave to Supplement its Response 

 CAP’s supplemental response requests to introduce information regarding conduct 

that occurred during the failed mediations. (Doc. 204 at 2). However, CAP’s response 

and the record before the Court were sufficient upon which to determine whether to allow 

fees for the mediation efforts. As the Court did not rely substantially on any of Ms. 

Gressett’s alleged disclosures, any further information provided by CAP would be both 

unhelpful and unnecessary. Accordingly, a supplemental response will not be permitted. 

IV. Conclusion

 The Court has itemized its reductions to the Ms. Gressett’s fee award in the 

spreadsheet attached as an appendix to this Order.1

 

 

1

 With respect to non-taxable expenses, the Court denies the following expenses, as listed in Exhibit 3b to Doc. 186: rows 8, 24, 27, and 39. 

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For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED that Ms. Gressett’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Related 

Non-Taxable Expenses (Doc. 185) is granted in part and denied in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding Ms. Gressett $688,626.00 in attorneys’ 

fees and $39,757.97 in costs. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying CAP’s Motion to Supplement its 

Response (Doc. 204). 

 Dated this 17th day of September, 2015. 

 

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