Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03513/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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C-05-3513 DISMISSAL Page 1 of 4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN L. WHEELER,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 05-3513 JL

DISMISSAL

Introduction

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The motion came on for

hearing on November 2, 2005. Plaintiff appeared pro se. Michael Lee Smith appeared for

Defendants. The court considered the written pleadings and the oral arguments of the

parties and the record in this case and hereby grants Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff’s

complaint is dismissed with prejudice. 

Factual/ Procedural Background

State Case

Plaintiff filed suit in the Alameda County Superior Court on December 9, 2003,

seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained in the course of his employment with the

Oakland Unified School District (“District”) on or about April 15, 1968.
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C-05-3513 DISMISSAL Page 2 of 4

The District demurred to Plaintiff’s state court complaint and the trial court sustained

the demurrer with leave to amend. The court held that on its face the complaint alleged

facts indicating that the statute of limitations on all of Plaintiff’s claims began to run in July

of 1968 and his claims were time-barred. 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint for damages in state court on June 16,

2004, in which he expanded his factual allegations about how Defendants had handled his

original injury claim between April 15, 1968 and June 28, 1972. In addition, he alleged that

as a result of his injury, he “suffered psychiatric disability, ...was of such unsound mind that

he was incapable of caring for his property or transacting business or understanding the

nature and effects of his acts,” and consequently was “released....from legal responsibility.”

On this basis he asserted that the statute of limitations should be tolled pursuant to Code

Civ. Proc. §352, and that such tolling continued until he was “restored to sanity.” 

Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to his first amended complaint a “summary of

evidence” presented to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board on February 27,

1973, which contained summaries of the testimony of two physicians concerning his

mental capacity. The District again demurred that the complaint was barred by statutes of

limitations, and that Plaintiff had failed to show that he had ever suffered from a condition

which justified tolling the statute. The state court sustained the District’s demurrer without

leave to amend, again finding that all of Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred.

Plaintiff filed a petition for reconsideration of the ruling on the District’s demurrer, 

which was denied, because Plaintiff had offered “no new facts, circumstances or law that

would warrant a different order.”

Plaintiff then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which held: “The trial court

was clearly correct in sustaining respondent’s demurrer without leave to amend and

dismissing the first amended complaint as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.” 

/ / /

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C-05-3513 DISMISSAL Page 3 of 4

Federal Case

Plaintiff now attempts to litigate the same facts and four of the same causes of

action in federal court. He filed his complaint August 30, 2005. In addition to the four

causes of action that were previously filed in state court, Plaintiff has added three new

causes of action - - violation of federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, conspiracy to

deprive Plaintiff’s civil rights, and Defendants have no defense for violation of Federal Civil

Rights 42 U.S.C. §1983. All parties consented to this court’s jurisdiction as provided by 28

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Civil Local Rule 73. 

Statute of limitations

Federal law determines when a federal civil rights claim accrues. Elliot v. City of

Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 801-802 (9th Cir. 1994). Such a claim accrues when the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. Id. Because §

1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts borrow state statutes of

limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276. 

 At the time plaintiff’s claims accrued, in July of 1968, the applicable statute of

limitations in California was one year. The basis of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendant

on July 5, 1968 stopped paying wages to Plaintiff and subsequently terminated his

employment. Plaintiff had one year from that date to initiate litigation but failed to do so. 

Plaintiff first filed in state court in December of 2003, and the state court dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice as time barred. Plaintiff now asserts § 1983 claims for the

first time in federal court, almost 40 years after his termination. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims are also time barred. This also applies to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for

conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights.

Plaintiff argues that he is not barred by the statute of limitations because he first

filed a claim on May 8, 1968, case No. 68 OAK 27226. However, this was a workmen’s

compensation claim filed with the state of California Department of Industrial Relations,

where a hearing was conducted by the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board. This

was an administrative hearing unrelated to the case at bar. In the case at bar Plaintiff is
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C-05-3513 DISMISSAL Page 4 of 4

suing Defendants for failure to pay wages and terminating his employment. Even if the

cases were related, the statute of limitations would only be tolled during the pendency of

the administrative proceedings, which ended in 1973. Diaz v. Carlson, 5 F.Supp 2d 809

(1997). Plaintiff would then have had to file within a year, which he failed to do. Plaintiff

offers no other reason why the statute of limitations should be tolled.

Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel

Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s newly added § 1983 claims are also precluded by

the judgment of the state court under the doctrine of res judicata, because these claims

relate to the same primary right as the claims in the prior state court action. 

Plaintiff seeks alleged lost wages from 1968 onward after he was injured and placed

on disability, and he seeks redress for employment discrimination. Plaintiff sought redress

for the same primary rights in the prior state court action. The prior judgment was final and

on the merits, and Plaintiff was a party in the prior action. Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hosp.,

844 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1988) citing Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359,

1366 (9th Cir. 1956). 

Additionally, in California under the doctrine of collateral estoppel a party will be

estopped from relitigating an issue if the issue raised in the present action is identical to

that decided previously; the prior judgment was final and on the merits; and the person

against whom estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action. Trujillo, 775 F.2d at

1369. Therefore, Plaintiff is also precluded in this action by collateral estoppel, because

these are the same causes of action in his state Complaint, and Plaintiff had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate these issues in the earlier case. Accordingly, the complaint is hereby

dismissed with prejudice. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2005

__________/s/_______________

 James Larson

United States Magistrate Judge