Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00140/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DANIEL A. PILOT,

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-00140-WS-M

:

COMMISSIONER A.D.O.C.,et al.,

Defendants.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Daniel Pilot, an Alabama prison inmate 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the 

undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local 

Rule 72(a)(2)(R), and is now before the undersigned on 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. After careful 

review of the pleadings, and for the reasons set out below, 

it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment be granted, and that Plaintiff Pilot’s action be 

dismissed with prejudice.

I. Summary of Allegations.

Plaintiff Daniel Pilot is currently within the custody

of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) serving a 

sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a 

1990 murder conviction. (Doc. 1 at 7). He filed this suit 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an excessive force 

violation arising from a failed prison escape in 2014.

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On November 10, 2014, at approximately 5:50 a.m., 

Pilot and three other inmates attempted to escape from 

Holman Correctional Facility.1 (Doc. 4 at 4). The inmates 

were observed at the outer perimeter fence at the back gate 

of the prison (having already broken through the first 

fenced area). (Doc. 25-1 at 1). Sergeant Smith and 

Officers Boudreaux, Pace, Turner, and Tait responded to the 

attempted escape and ordered the inmates to surrender.2 

(Id.).

Pilot alleges he complied with the order to surrender 

(lying face down on the ground with his arms outward), but 

despite his compliance, Sergeant Smith and Officer 

Bourdeaux severely beat him while the remaining officers 

watched. (Doc. 4 at 4). Pilot alleges he “screamed and 

begged for his life as his finger [was] broken” and he was 

“repeatedly struck with [a] baton and kicked in the head 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 At his disciplinary hearing for the charge brought 

against him for the attempt to escape, Pilot testified, “I 

am guilty. I was trying to leave this prison. I have been 

locked up for 30 years and I am tired. I don’t want to die 

here and I know the only way I will get out is to escape.” 

(Doc. 25-11 at 2-4). Pilot’s guilty plea was accepted and 

he received disciplinary segregation for 45 days and loss 

of canteen, telephone, and visiting privileges for 60 days. 

(Id. at 3) 2 Pilot and two other inmates were located by defendants 

at the back gate of the prison, attempting to escape 

through a razor fence. (Doc. 25-8 at 1). There was, 

however, a fourth inmate attempting escape who was 

apprehended approximately five minutes after Pilot was 

secured in restraints. (Doc. 25-1).

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until he passed out.” (Id.). Additionally, Pilot claims 

that, subsequent to the incident, he was taken directly to 

a segregation cell and was refused medical treatment for 

three days. (Id. at 5). As a result of the force used 

against him, Pilot alleges he suffered a broken right 

finger, bruised and cracked ribs, a busted right eardrum, 

lacerations to the head and face, a swollen right eye 

socket, a sprained right wrist, bruising of the entire 

right side of his body, and further complains that he 

continues to endure lasting consequences of severe 

headaches and pain in his right hand. (Doc. 4 at 8). 

Pilot is suing the Alabama Department of Corrections 

Commissioner Jefferson Dunn, Warden Walter Myers, Captain 

Ronzella Howard, Sergeant James Smith, Correctional Officer 

Jeff Pace, Correctional Officer Bryant Moore, Correctional 

Officer Johnnie Tait, and Correctional Officer Harry 

Boudreaux in their individual and official capacities for 

an Eighth Amendment violation of excessive force, failure 

to intervene, failure to train, and denial or delay of 

medical care. (Doc. 4 at 1, 5-6, 9). Pilot seeks monetary 

damages in the amount of $30,000.00 from each defendant for 

the alleged constitutional violations. 

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

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In analyzing the propriety of a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court begins with these basic principles. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court 

authority under Rule 56 to render "judgment as a matter of 

law" to a party who moves for summary judgment. Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that "[t]he court 

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 

2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986), the Supreme Court held that 

summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." However, all 

of the evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn 

from the evidence must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 

(1970); Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 

1280 (11th Cir. 2004).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) further 

provides:

If a party fails to properly support an assertion 

of fact or fails to properly address another 

Case 1:16-cv-00140-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 24
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party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 

56(c), the court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or 

address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of 

the motion;

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and 

supporting materials—including the facts 

considered undisputed—show that the movant is 

entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the 

initial responsibility of informing the district court of 

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 

'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence 

showing there is no dispute of material fact or by pointing

out to the district court that the nonmoving party has 

failed to present evidence in support of some element of 

its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. 

Id. at 322-25.

Once the moving party has satisfied its 

responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See 

Stabler v. Fla. Van Lines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 11-0103-WS-N, 

Case 1:16-cv-00140-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/14/16 Page 5 of 24
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2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1637, 2012 WL 32660, at *5 (S.D. Ala. 

Jan. 6, 2012) (citing Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 

F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991)). Summary judgment is 

proper when "a party fails to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an essential element of that 

party's case." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is 

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury 

to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the evidence 

is merely colorable, . . . or is not significantly 

probative, . . . summary judgment may be 

granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) (internal 

citations omitted). "After the nonmoving party has 

responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court 

must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law." AGSouth Genetics, LLC v. Cunningham, 

No. CA 09-745-C, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51790, 2011 WL 

1833016, at *2 (S.D. Ala. May 13, 2011).

While the court is to view all evidence and factual 

inferences in a light most favorable to Pilot, the 

nonmoving party, Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 

Case 1:16-cv-00140-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/14/16 Page 6 of 24
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1330 (11th Cir. 1988), "the mere existence of some alleged 

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; 

the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 

material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247-48, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). 

III. Discussion.

A. Defendants’ Immunity Defense. 

It is clear from the pleadings that the defendants 

were state officials at the time the action arose and are 

entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment 

for claims seeking monetary damages from them in 

their official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 

(1985)(Official capacity lawsuits are "in all respects 

other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the 

entity."); Lancaster v. Monroe Cnty., 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 

(11th Cir. 1997) (Alabama state officials are immune from 

claims brought against them in their official capacities.). 

Therefore, the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity 

from Plaintiff’s claims asserted against them in their 

official capacities. Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 

1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007) (state defendants sued in their 

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official capacity for monetary damages are immune from suit 

under the Eleventh Amendment).

As to the claims of excessive force, failure to 

intervene and train asserted against the defendants in 

their individual capacities, the defendants argue that they 

are entitled to qualified immunity.3 (Doc. 25 at 6-7). 

It is clear in the Eleventh Circuit, however, that the 

defense of qualified immunity "is not available in cases 

alleging excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, because the use of force 'maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm' is clearly established to be a 

violation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court 

decisions in Hudson and Whitley." Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 

F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

"Moreover, an officer who is present at the scene and who 

fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of 

another officer's use of excessive force can be held 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3 The Supreme Court has held that "government officials 

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 

S. Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982),. (citations omitted); 

see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S. Ct. 

2074, 2080, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) ("Qualified immunity 

shields federal and state officials from money damages 

unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the 

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and 

(2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the time of 

the challenged conduct."). 

Case 1:16-cv-00140-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/14/16 Page 8 of 24
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personally liable for his nonfeasance." Id. (citations 

omitted). As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, "[t]here 

is simply no room for a qualified immunity defense when the 

plaintiff alleges such [] violation[s]."4 Id. Accordingly, 

in answering the questions of whether the facts 

alleged/established by Pilot make out violations of his 

Eighth Amendment rights, the undersigned looks, in turn, at 

the force utilized by the defendant officers.

B. Supervisory Liability.

In his complaint, Pilot asserts claims against ADOC 

Commissioner Jefferson Dunn, Warden Walter Myers, and 

Captain Ronzella Howard for being “responsible for [the] 

actions conduct and training of every [corrections] 

officer.” (Doc. 4 at 5-6). Such claims are rooted in the 

theory of respondeat superior and are not actionable in a § 

1983 action. 

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish a 

causal connection between each defendant's "actions, 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4 We created this rule because an excessive-force

violation of the Eighth . . . Amendment[], 'the subjective 

element required to establish it is so extreme that every 

conceivable set of circumstances in which this 

constitutional violation occurs is clearly established to 

be a violation of the Constitution . . . .'" Fennell v. 

Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009), quoting 

Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321-1322 (11th Cir. 

2002) (other citation omitted).

Case 1:16-cv-00140-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/14/16 Page 9 of 24
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orders, customs, policies, or breaches of statutory duty 

and the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights." 

Frankum v. Chapman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133760, 2009 WL 

1118875, *3 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (citations omitted). 

Liability for an alleged constitutional violation cannot be 

established on the basis of a theory of respondeat 

superior. See Edwards v. Ala. Dep't of Corrs., 81 F. Supp. 

2d 1242, 1255 (M.D. Ala. 2000) ("A theory of respondeat 

superior is not sufficient to support [a] § 1983 claim. . . 

.").

"It is well established in this Circuit that 

supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 

for the unconstitutional acts of their 

subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior

or vicarious liability." Hartley v. Parnell, 193 

F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); Gonzalez[ 

v. Reno], 325 F.3d [1228,], 1234, 2003 WL 

1481583, at *4 (concluding supervisory officials 

are not liable on the basis of respondeat 

superior or vicarious liability). Instead, 

supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either 

when the supervisor personally participates in 

the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when 

there is a causal connection between the actions 

of a supervising official and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 

1235, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5; Brown v. Crawford, 

906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). The necessary 

causal connection can be established "when a 

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible 

supervisor on notice of the need to correct the 

alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so." 

Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234, 2003 WL 1481583, at 

*5 (quoting Braddy v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & 

Emp't, 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998)); 

Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Alternatively, the causal 

connection may be established when a supervisor's 

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"'custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights'" or when 

facts support "an inference that the supervisor 

directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or 

knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully 

and failed to stop them from doing so." Gonzalez, 

325 F.3d at 1235, 2003 WL 1481583, at *5 (quoting 

Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 

1991)); Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1263; see also Post 

v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1560-61 

(11th Cir. 1993). "The standard by which a 

supervisor is held liable in [his] individual 

capacity for the actions of a subordinate is 

extremely rigorous." Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234, 

2003 WL 1481583, at *4 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). In 

instances where supervisory liability is based on a 

supervisor's custom or policy, a plaintiff must show that 

the custom or policy was "the 'moving force [behind] the 

constitutional violation.'" Pinkney v. Davis, 952 F. Supp. 

1561, 1569 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (citations omitted). "[I]t is 

clear that not only must there be some degree of 'fault' on 

the part of [defendant] in establishing the policy or 

tolerating the custom, but there must be a causal link 

between the custom or policy and the constitutional 

deprivation." Id. (citations omitted).

In the current action, Plaintiff claims Defendants 

Dunn, Myers, and Howard, solely as supervisors of Holman 

Correctional Facility, are liable for the actions and 

conduct of the officer defendants who responded to the 

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scene of the attempted escape. (Doc. 4 at 5-6). Reading 

the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 

however, the undersigned finds no support for Plaintiff’s 

claim. Contrarily, the record supports that neither 

Defendant Dunn, Myers, nor Howard participated in the 

alleged conduct comprising Plaintiff’s excessive force 

claim.5 Beyond Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that these 

Defendants are the “head of all procedure policy and 

officials” at the prison, the record is completely void of 

facts that Defendants initiated any custom or policy as 

supervisors that can be linked to the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. (Id.); Bennett v. Parker, 898 

F.2d 1530, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1990) (Unsupported, 

conclusory allegations are insufficient to defeat a motion 

for summary judgment.). Instead, the record evidence 

supports the conclusion that Defendants Dunn, Myers, and 

Howard had no part, direct or indirect, in the alleged 

violation. As such, it is recommended that Defendants 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5 Commissioner Jefferson Dunn affirms in his submitted 

affidavit that he was not appointed as commissioner until 

April 1, 2015; thus, he has no knowledge of the complained 

of incident and is not liable for any constitutional 

violation occurring on November 10, 2014. (Doc. 25-3). 

Additionally, Captain Ronzella Howard was transferred from 

Holman Correctional Facility on July 16, 2014; therefore, 

she was not present at the prison at the time the complaint 

arose. 

Case 1:16-cv-00140-WS-M Document 27 Filed 11/14/16 Page 12 of 24
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Dunn, Myers, and Howard be granted summary judgment and the 

claims against them dismissed. 

C. Defendants Sergeant Smith and Officer Boudreaux.

Plaintiff names Defendants Smith and Boudreaux as the 

defendants liable for using excessive force against him on 

November 10, 2016. Specifically, Pilot claims that,

despite complying with the order to surrender and lying 

facedown on the ground, Smith repeatedly hit him with a 

baton, intentionally broke his finger, and held him down on 

the ground while Officer Boudreaux “kicked him several 

times in the head and face until he passed out.” (Doc. 4 

at 9). Pilot further contends that he received multiple 

injuries due to the force used and was denied medical 

treatment for the sustained injuries. (Id.). However, in 

support of the motion for summary judgment, the defendants 

have provided evidence contradicting Pilot’s accusations, 

and Pilot has not opposed the motion. 6 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 On September 28, 2016, Pilot was ordered to submit a 

response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment by 

November 2, 2016. (Doc. 26). To date, Pilot has failed to 

respond to the motion, file any additional pleadings with 

the court, or dispute the motion in any form. Plaintiff’s 

lack of response has left his position unsupported 

factually. In cases where opposing parties tell different 

versions of the same events, one of which is blatantly 

contradicted by the record—such that no reasonable jury 

could believe it—a court should not adopt the contradicted

allegations. Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 

1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 

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As such, Pilot has failed to carry his burden at this 

stage of summary judgment to “go beyond the pleadings” and 

present competent evidence designating "'specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Moreover, 

and in the alternative, the law pertaining to the issues 

presented indicates a decision in favor of granting summary 

judgment for Defendants. 

To establish his claim, Pilot must prove both an 

objective and subjective component. That is, Plaintiff 

must show that the alleged wrongdoing was objectively 

“harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation 

and that Defendants “’acted with a sufficiently culpable 

state of mind,’” i.e., that the defendant acted 

"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S. Ct. 995, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156 

& 8, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (citation 

omitted); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-

321, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) ("[W]e 

think the question whether the measure taken inflicted 

unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns 

on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

686 (2007)). 

 

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sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.'"). In 

making this determination, the court considers the need for 

the application of force, the relationship between that 

need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably 

perceived, any efforts made to temper the severity of a 

forceful response, and the extent of injury suffered. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7, citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. 

The record before the court, however, supports finding 

that Defendants used force in a good faith effort to 

restore discipline, specifically, to overt a prison escape 

and not for the purpose of causing harm. The courts 

recognize that corrections officials often must make 

decisions "'in haste, under pressure, and frequently 

without the luxury of a second chance." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 

6 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). In the case at hand, 

the defendants were seeking to regain control and custody 

of four inmates who were actively attempting to escape from 

prison. Such a situation appears to exemplify a risky and 

“pressured” situation where officers are given deference. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 

L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)(“[P]olice officers are often forced to 

make split-second judgments - - in circumstances that are 

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - - about the amount 

of force that in necessary in a particular situation.”). 

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Moreover, an inmate "is not at liberty to ignore or 

disobey, without consequence, the lawful orders of his 

custodians or the rules and regulations of a jail." West 

v. Sconyers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123573, 2010 WL 4822084, 

*7 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (unpublished). "Strict adherence to 

rules and orders within a penal institution's walls are 

necessary for discipline, and even more importantly, for 

the safety and security of inmates, guards, and visitors

alike." Id. However, "government officials may not use 

gratuitous force against a prisoner who has been already 

subdued or . . . incapacitated." Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1303 

(citations omitted). However, "[t]he use of force must stop 

when the need for it to maintain or restore discipline no 

longer exists." Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).

The record reveals the defendants responded to the 

escape scene with no knowledge of the potential weapons the 

attempted escapees possessed but were aware that the 

inmates had managed to leave their units undetected and 

pass through the first fenced area of the prison. (Doc. 25-

8 at 1). The Incident Report and Defendants’ submitted 

affidavits confirm that Pilot refused multiple orders to 

surrender facedown on the ground7 (Doc. 25-1; Doc. 25-6; 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 7 Defendant Smith affirms that he “gave inmate Pilot 

several orders to lay face down on the ground; however, he 

refused all orders given. I grasped inmate Pilot by his 

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Doc. 25-8); furthermore, increasing the dangerousness of 

the situation, Pilot ran from the defendants once officers 

attempted to apprehend him. (Doc. 28-8). Defendant 

Boudreaux asserts that he used his baton, swinging it at 

Pilot’s arms and legs, in attempt to seize Pilot. 8 (Doc. 

25-8). Accordingly, the record reveals force was used to 

compel compliance, not “maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-8. Moreover, the 

record, which confirms that the use of force immediately 

ceased once Pilot was in custody,9 is void of evidence that 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

arms and placed him face down on the ground. Inmate Pilot 

was immediately handcuffed and all force ceased.” (Doc. 

25-6). 

8 Specifically, Boudreaux affirms in his affidavit that 

due to Pilot’s refusal to surrender, Boudreaux used his 

baton and attempted to: 

strike inmate Pilot on his ulnar nerve (inner 

arm) and radial nerve (top forearm) and also 

tried to strike inmate Pilot on his peroneal 

nerve (upper thigh) and femoral nerve (inner 

thigh) of his legs to prevent him from escaping 

and to get him to comply with the orders to lie 

face down on the ground.

After inmate Pilot complied with my command to 

lie down on the ground he was placed in 

handcuffs. At no time did I kick inmate Pilot in 

his face or head. After inmate Pilot was 

handcuffed, he was lifted to his feet and he 

walked on his own power with the other two 

inmates to Holman’s Health Care Unit for medical 

assessments.

(Doc. 25-8 at 1-2)

9 The immediate offer of medical assistance demonstrates 

an effort to temper the severity of the response. Fennell 

v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009) (per 

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Pilot was hit or kicked in the head during the complained 

of incident. (Doc. 25-1; Doc. 25-4; Doc. 25-8). 

Specifically, the submitted body chart refutes

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants beat him or that he was 

denied medical treatment following the applied force. In 

fact, the record reveals that following the incident Pilot 

was taken directly to the healthcare unit and examined for 

possible injuries.10 (Doc. 25-1). All sustained injuries

are labeled and explained on the “body chart” and include 

approximately four lacerations (one to Pilot’s right 

eyebrow, one located above the right eyebrow, one in 

between the eyebrows, and one in the left corner of his 

lip) and discoloration underneath Pilot’s left eye and left 

cheek were observed. (Id.). Notably, Pilot presented to 

the healthcare unit following the incident with “even, nonlabored breathing” and walking completely on his own –

contrary to indications of a severe beating as alleged in 

Pilot’s complaint. (Id.). Moreover, the body chart 

reveals no evidence (or even verbal complaints) of a broken 

right finger, bruised and cracked ribs, a busted right 

eardrum, a sprained right wrist, or bruising of the entire 

right side of his body, as Pilot alleges in his complaint. 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

curiam).

10 A Body Chart was completed at 6:20 a.m., on November 

10, 2016, following the escape attempt. (Doc.25-2). 

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(Doc. 4 at 8). And, while the lack of a severe injury does 

not negate an excessive force claim, it is relevant to a 

court’s inquiry. Smith v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 524 F. 

App'x 511, 513 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. 

at 38)("[A] lack of serious injury is relevant to the 

inquiry, '[i]njury and force . . . are only imperfectly 

correlated and it is the latter that ultimately counts."); 

Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App'x 948, 953 (11th Cir. 2014) 

("Although the extent of injury is a relevant factor in 

determining whether the use of force could plausibly have 

been thought necessary under the circumstances and may be 

an indication of the amount of force applied, it is not 

solely determinative of an Eighth Amendment claim. . . . 

Instead, the focus of the Eighth Amendment inquiry is on 

the nature of the force applied, rather than the extent of 

injury inflicted."); Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304 ("in the 

excessive-force context, contemporary standards of decency 

may be violated even where no significant injury is 

evident."). In the current action, the relatively minor 

injuries of facial lacerations support the defendants’ 

version of events; that is, the injuries coincide with 

those likely sustained if one is forcibly restrained to the 

ground as claimed by Defendants in their submitted 

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affidavits in support for their (unopposed) motion for 

summary judgment. 

The undersigned concludes after a thorough review of 

the record, and the lack of opposition or response from 

Plaintiff, Defendants use of force against Pilot (a 

prisoner sentenced to life without parole, who was 

attempting to escape from prison, and who refused to obey 

orders to surrender himself) was applied ‘in a good faith 

effort to maintain or restore discipline [and not] 

maliciously or sadistically to cause harm.’ Skirtch, 280 

F.3d at 1300 (internal quotation omitted). Thus, it is 

recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be 

granted and Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed, as Plaintiff 

has failed to prove a constitutional violation of excessive 

force. 

D. Defendants Moore, Pace, and Tait.

As to the remaining defendants, Pilot claims 

Defendants Moore, Pace, and Tait are liable for failing to 

intervene on his behalf and stop the excessive force used 

against him. 

When an officer observes excessive force being used 

against an inmate or suspect and, having both the time and 

ability to intervene, fails to do so, the officer may be 

liable for failure to intervene. Sanchez v. Hialeah Police 

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Department, 357 F. App’x 229, 234 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(defendant officer was on the same side of the car as the 

other officer who began beating plaintiff; Eleventh Circuit 

found under these facts he could be held liable for failure 

to intervene under § 1983); see Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 

1002, 1007 (11th Cir. 1986) ("If a police officer, whether 

supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a 

constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating 

takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable 

under Section 1983."). 

In the case at hand, however, Defendant Moore was not 

working as a corrections officer at Holman Correctional 

Facility on the date this complaint arose (Doc. 25-7), and 

Officers Tait and Pace affirm that they both were actively 

engaged in apprehending other inmates at the time of the 

complained of incident and have no knowledge of the alleged 

force used against Pilot. (Docs. 25-9, 25-10). The 

evidence presented shows that the responding officers 

located three inmates, “sitting in a ditch” at the back 

gate of the prison. (Doc. 25-9). The inmates ignored all 

initial orders to surrender prior to the officers entering 

the gated area, and once the officers entered, the three 

inmates split up - causing Pace, Tait, Smith, and Boudreaux 

to go in separate directions to effectively apprehend the 

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inmates. (Id.). Given the totality of this situation, the 

undersigned determines that Tait nor Pace was in a 

position, in close proximity, or had the ability to 

intervene during the complained of incident. 

In the alternative, inasmuch as the court has 

concluded that no reasonable jury could find that 

Defendants Smith and Boudreaux used excessive force against 

Pilot, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant 

Officers Pace and Tait were liable for failing to 

intervene. Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th 

Cir. 2009); McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. App'x 648, 658 (11th 

Cir. 2006)(defendant could not be liable for failing to 

intervene after court determined no excessive force had 

been used). 

Thus, it is recommended that Defendants Moore, Pace, 

and Tait be granted summary judgment, and the claims 

against them dismissed.

IV. Conclusion. 

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended 

that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, 

and Plaintiff’s action be dismissed with prejudice. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

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A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. L.R. 72(c). The parties 

should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] 

party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the 

court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in 

the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to 

be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

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incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 14th day of November 2016. 

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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