Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00819/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00819-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCES BORICCHIO,

Plaintiff

v.

CHICKEN RANCH CASINO, et al.,

Defendants

_____________________________________

DARCY FOSTER,

Plaintiff

v.

CHICKEN RANCH CASINO, et al.,

Defendants

_____________________________________

CORENA L. RAYMOND,

Plaintiff

v.

CHICKEN RANCH CASINO, et al.,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-818 AWI SMS 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 13)

____________________________________

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-819 AWI SMS 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 12)

____________________________________

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-820 AWI SMS 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 13)

____________________________________

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

These separate but related cases involve an employment discrimination dispute between 

Plaintiffs and their former employer, the Defendant Chicken Ranch Casino (“Casino”). The active 

complaint in each case is a First Amended Complaint. In each complaint, Plaintiffs allege three

causes of action for violation of 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

(“ADEA”)) against the Casino and the Chicken Ranch Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians of 

California (“the Tribe”), Lloyd Mathiesen (“Mathiesen”), and James Smith (“Smith”) (collectively 

“Defendants”). Defendants now move to dismiss each complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. For 

the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be granted. 

 BACKGROUND 

Each Plaintiff was employed at the Casino, but none of the Plaintiffs are members of the 

Tribe. Each Plaintiff is over the age of 50.

On January 18, 2013, Defendants terminated the employment of Plaintiffs Darcy Foster

ROBERT H. WATTS,

Plaintiff

v.

CHICKEN RANCH CASINO, et al.,

Defendants

_____________________________________

CYNTHIA L. NAPOLI,

Plaintiff

v.

CHICKEN RANCH CASINO, et al.,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-821 AWI SMS 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 12)

____________________________________

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-822 AWI SMS 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 13)

___________________________________

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

and Robert Watts. Foster held the position of Floor Manager, and Watts held the position of 

Bingo Manager. On April 15, 2013, Defendants terminated the employment of Cynthia Napoli, 

who held the position of Human Resources Manager. On May 17, 2013, Defendants terminated 

the employment of Plaintiff Corena Raymond, who held the position of Chief Financial Officer. 

On May 20, 2013, Defendants constructively terminated the employment of Francis Boricchio, 

who held the position of Accountant II. Each of the Plaintiffs were replaced by younger less 

qualified employees.

Mathiesen implemented discriminatory adverse employment actions against the Plaintiffs. 

Sometime around April 2013, a Casino employee overheard Mathiesen tell Smith, “Just like I told 

you James, out with the old and in with the young.” Mathiesen also referred to employees as “old 

fucks.” A few days later, Smith was heard congratulating the newly promoted Casino Floor 

Manager. Smith exclaimed, “Out with the old, in with the young!” The new Floor Manager was 

28 years old and had replaced Plaintiff Darcy Foster, who was 61.

Mathiesen and Smith later terminated several other employees who were over the age of 

50, and replaced those employees with younger less qualified employees.

The Tribe is recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior and is located in Tuolumne 

County, California. See Ralston Dec. ¶ 3. The Tribe conducts gaming on its Reservation trust 

lands under the name “Chicken Ranch Casino.” Id. at ¶ 6. The Tribe conducts gaming at the 

Casino pursuant to a Tribal-State Compact between California and the Tribe, and pursuant to the 

requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. Id. at ¶ 13. The Casino is wholly owned and operated 

by the Tribe, and the Casino is not chartered as a corporation under 25 U.S.C. § 477. Id. The 

Tribe doing business as the Casino can only act through its authorized agents and officers. Id. at ¶ 

7. During the relevant time period, Mathiesen was the Tribal Office Chairman of the Tribe, and he 

was acting within the course and scope of his employment as the Tribal Chairman in the exercise 

of the authority delegated to him by the Tribal Council and the Tribal Constitution. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9.

1

 

During the relevant time period, Smith was appointed by the Tribal Council as the acting General 

Manager of the Casino. Id. at ¶ 10. As the General Manager of the Casino, Smith was delegated 

 

1 Each of the FAC’s also allege that Mathiesen had authority and control over the employment decisions of the Tribe. 

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

authority to manage and operate the Casino, including hiring and firing employees. Id. at ¶ 11. 

Smith acted within the course and scope of his employment as the General Manager of the Casino 

in exercise of the management authority delegated to him by the Tribal Council. Id. at ¶ 12.

 RULE 12(b)(1) FRAMEWORK

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for a motion to dismiss based on lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). It is a fundamental precept that federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 

374 (1978); K2 Am. Corp. v. Roland Oil & Gas, 653 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011). Limits 

upon federal jurisdiction must not be disregarded or evaded. Owen Equip., 437 U.S. 365, 374 

(1978); Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1984). “It is presumed that a cause lies outside 

this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); K2 Am., 653 F.3d 

at 1027. Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be either facial, where the inquiry is confined to the 

allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court is permitted to look beyond the complaint 

to extrinsic evidence.2 See Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014); Safe Air For 

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When a defendant makes a factual 

challenge “by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party 

opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of 

establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039; see Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121. 

The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations under a factual attack. 

Wood v. City of San Diego, 678 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011); Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039.

The plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence each requirement for subject-matter 

jurisdiction, and as long as the dispute is not intertwined with an element of the plaintiff’s causes

of action, the court may resolve any factual disputes itself. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121 & n.3; 

Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039-40.

 

2 Defendants have submitted, and the Court has considered, extrinsic affidavits. Thus, Defendants are mounting a 

“factual attack” to subject matter jurisdiction. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121. 

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants argue inter alia that dismissal should be granted because they are entitled to 

tribal sovereign immunity. The Tribe is a federally recognized tribe, which entitles it to immunity. 

The Casino is an arm of the Tribe and thus, is entitled to sovereign immunity. Mathiesen and 

Smith were acting on behalf of the Tribe at the Casino in conducting activities within the scope of 

their authority. Thus, they also are entitled to immunity. The ADEA does not waive tribal 

sovereign immunity, and none of the Defendants have consented to this litigation.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Plaintiffs argue inter alia that the Defendants have waived sovereign immunity with 

respect to employment discrimination matters because they acceded to federal law. By acceding 

to “federal law,” the Defendants have declared themselves subject to federal discrimination laws 

and suits thereunder. There is nothing in any employment related documents that state the ADEA 

is inapplicable to Defendants, or that Plaintiffs would be in any way foreclosed from seeking relief 

in federal court. In any event, the ADEA is a statute of general applicability, and the recognized 

exceptions to general applicability do not apply in this case. Therefore, the ADEA applies to 

Defendants and dismissal is improper.

Legal Standard

“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from 

suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 

(1978); M.J. v. United States, 721 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013). This tribal immunity extends 

to tribal governing bodies and to tribal agencies or entities which act as an arm of the tribe. See

Cook v. AVI Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Gold Country 

Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006). Tribal immunity also extends to tribal officials 

when acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority, as well as tribal 

employees acting in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority. See Cook, 548 

F.3d at 727 (tribal employees); Linneen v. Gila River Indian Cmty., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 

2002) (tribal officials). Tribal immunity applies to the tribe’s commercial and governmental 

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

activities. Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 923-924 (9th Cir. 2013). “The immunity . . . extends to 

suits for declaratory and injunctive relief,” and “is not defeated by an allegation that [the tribe] 

acted beyond its powers.” Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 

1271 (9th Cir. 1991). “Suits against Indian tribes are ... barred by sovereign immunity absent a 

clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band 

Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); Pit River Home & Agric. Coop. Ass’n v. 

United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 1994). “There is a strong presumption against waiver 

of tribal sovereign immunity.” Demontiney v. United States, 255 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Waiver of sovereign immunity by a tribe may not be implied and must be expressed 

unequivocally. Allen, 464 F.3d at 1047; Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101 F.3d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Similarly, congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity may not be implied and must be 

“unequivocally expressed” in “explicit legislation.” White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1023-

24 (9th Cir. 2014); Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

“Sovereign immunity involves a right which courts have no choice . . . but to recognize.” Pit 

River, 30 F.3d at 1100. Tribal sovereign immunity deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Alvarado v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Discussion3

The Tribe appears in the Federal Register as a recognized tribe. See 79 Fed. Reg. 4748, 

4749 (Jan. 29, 2014). Plaintiffs do not dispute that this is sufficient to establish the Tribe’s 

entitlement to sovereign immunity. See Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 

F.Supp.2d 953, 957 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the Casino, as an entity 

owned and operated by the Tribe in accordance with 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. and pursuant to a 

tribal compact with California, is an arm of the Tribe that is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. 

See Cook, 548 F.3d at 724; Allen, 464 F.3d at 1046. Finally, each of the FAC’s allege that

Mathiesen and Smith acted pursuant to their authority and control over employment decisions of 

the Tribe as Tribal Office Chairman and acting General Manager, respectively, and that Mathiesen 

 

3 Given the Court’s resolution of Defendants’ motion, it is unnecessary to address arguments other than those relating 

to sovereign immunity.

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

implemented discriminatory policies as the Tribal Office Chairman and employer. Plaintiffs do 

not dispute that Mathiesen and Smith are entitled to sovereign immunity because they are sued in 

their tribal official and tribal employee capacities for conduct within the scope of their authority. 

See Cook, 548 F.3d at 727; Linneen, 276 F.3d at 492. Therefore, the Court concludes that all 

named Defendants are eligible for tribal sovereign immunity.

Plaintiffs contend that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply because the Defendants 

have waived their immunity. Plaintiffs contend that the following language from the Casino’s 

employment application waives tribal sovereign immunity: “We are pleased that you are seeking 

employment with Chicken Ranch Casino. Applicants are considered without regard to . . . age . . . 

or any factors prohibited by federal law. We are proud to be an Equal Opportunity Employer.” 

Plaintiffs are incorrect. 

First, the statements are in the context of an application for employment. Each of the 

Plaintiffs already had an existing employment relationship that went well beyond any prior 

employment application. Statements made with respect to how the Casino will consider an 

applicant is not sufficiently express and unequivocal to constitute a waiver for existing employees,

cf. Allen, 464 F.3d at 1047; Kescoli, 101 F.3d at 1310, especially given the strong presumption 

against waiver. See Demontiney, 255 F.3d at 811.

Second, and more importantly, the Ninth Circuit has addressed a nearly identical argument. 

In Allen, the Ninth Circuit explained: 

Allen’s employment application that he could be terminated “for any reason 

consistent with applicable state or federal law,” or when it stated in the Employee 

Orientation Booklet that it would “practice equal opportunity employment and 

promotion regardless of race, religion, color, creed, national origin . . . and other 

categories protected by applicable federal laws.” These statements are not a “clear”

waiver of immunity. At most they might imply a willingness to submit to federal 

lawsuits, but waivers of tribal sovereign immunity may not be implied.

Allen, 464 F.3d at 1047. The statements in the Casino’s employment application appear to be 

materially the same as the statements in the Allen employment application and employee 

handbook. Like Allen, the statements in the Casino’s application “might imply a willingness” to 

submit to a suit, but they do not constitute an express unequivocal waiver of immunity. Id. 

With respect to Plaintiffs’ argument that the ADEA applies to the Tribe, that argument is 

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

misplaced. “[W]hether an Indian tribe is subject to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for 

violating the statute are two entirely different questions.” Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee 

Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1130 (11th Cir. 1999). “[T]he fact that a statute applies to Indian 

tribes does not mean that Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it.” Bassett v. 

Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Bales v. Chickasaw Nation 

Indus., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1308 (D.N.M. 2009); cf. EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 

260 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (“As a threshold matter, we first address the Tribe’s 

contention that it enjoys sovereign immunity from the EEOC's inquiry and thus from this 

lawsuit.”). Here, the ADEA does not waive a tribe’s tribal sovereign immunity. Tremblay v. 

Mohegan Sun Casino, 599 Fed. Appx. 25 (2d Cir. 2015); Garcia v. Akwesasne Housing Auth., 

268 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001). Since sovereign immunity precludes the exercise of subject matter 

jurisdiction in this case, the Court “need not address Plaintiffs’ argument that the ADEA applies to 

the Tribe.” Colmar v. Jackson Band of Miwuk Indians, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62832, *14 n.4 

(E.D. Cal. June 13, 2011).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 

1985) and EEOC v. Forest Cnty Potawatomi Cmty, 2014 WL 1795137 (E.D. Wis. 2014) is 

misplaced. Those cases were brought against a tribe or tribal entity by the federal government. 

Tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to suits brought by the federal government. Karuk 

Tribe, 260 F.3d at 1075; Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1994).

CONCLUSION

Defendants move to dismiss all of the complaints on the basis of tribal sovereign 

immunity. Defendants have established that they may invoke tribal immunity, and Plaintiffs have 

failed to show either a waiver or abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. Therefore, Defendants 

are entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. See Garcia, 268 F.3d at 88; Colmar, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 62832 at *14. The Court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction, and must dismiss this 

case. See Alvarado, 509 F.3d at 1015-16; Pit River, 30 F.3d at 1100.

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss are GRANTED;

2. The First Amended Complaint in each of the Plaintiffs’ respective cases are DISMISSED 

without leave to amend; and 

3. The Clerk shall close the following cases: 1:14cv818 AWI SMS, 1:14cv819 AWI SMS, 

1:14cv820 AWI SMS, 1:14cv821 AWI SMS, and 1:14cv822 AWI SMS.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 9, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00819-AWI-SMS Document 23 Filed 06/10/15 Page 9 of 9