Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01502/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01502-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

11 TRACY HOLT, 

12 Plaintiff, 

CASE NO. llcvI502-GPC(KSC) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 

ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

vs. 

MACARTHUR, Registered Nurse; 

CALDERON Registered Nurse' 

STEWART, !?eglstered Nursej HuNT, 

Medical Doctor; SEEL Y1 ¥eaical 

Doctor; and, CANLAS, Medical 

Doctor 

Defendant. 

[Doc. No. 69] 

20 Presently before the Court is defendants' July 31,2013 ex parte Motion to 

21 Enforce Settlement. [Doc. No. 69] On August 19, 2013, plaintiff filed an Opposition 

22 [Doc. No. 70], to which defendant timely filed a Reply [Doc. No. 72]. On October 21, 

23 2013, plaintiff submitted a letter to the Courtl seeking additional argument on the issue. 

24 [Doc. No. 74] After reviewing the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons 

25 articulated below, this Court RECOMMENDS that defendants' Motion to Enforce 

26 Settlement [Doc. No. 69] be GRANTED. 

27 

28 I Despite constituting an improper communication with the Court, the Court 

accepted the letter for filing. [Doc. No. 73] 

- 1 - II cv 1502·GPCCKSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 1 of 23
1 I. BACKGROUND 

2 Tracy Holt ("plaintiff'), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

3 pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. No.1] 

4 Plaintiff claims that while incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility in 

5 San Diego, California, defendants, various prison medical professionals, have been 

6 deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

7 Specifically, plaintiff claims the named defendants have improperly "den[ied] him 

8 effective pain medication for his [back] pain" and have improperly "refus[ ed] to give 

9 him the surgery needed to correct [the] problem." [Doc. No. 22, p. 5] 

10 On December 12, 2011, defendants filed an Answer to plaintiff s Complaint and 

11 Supplemental Complaint. [Doc. No. 28] Shortly thereafter, the Court issued an Order 

12 scheduling a Case Management Conference ("CMC") forJ anuary 18, 2012. [Doc. No. 

13 29] On January 18,2012, the Court held a telephonic CMC to discuss discovery and 

14 other pre-trial proceedings. [Doc. No. 35] In preparation for the CMC, the parties 

15 submitted case management briefs. [Doc. No. 34 (plaintiffs brief)] On January 19, 

16 2012, the Court issued a Scheduling Order regulating discovery and other pre-trial 

17 proceedings ("Scheduling Order"). [Doc. No. 36] 

18 On June 28, 2012, a telephonic Mandatory Settlement Conference ("MSC") was 

19 held. [Doc. No. 54] While the case did not settle, progress was made and the Court 

20 indicated that the parties were going to "continue talks." Id. The Court set a further 

21 MSC and ordered the parties to lodge with the Court more targeted briefing regarding 

22 certain medical records, treatment plans, and witness identities. [Doc. No. 55] On 

23 August 27, 2012, a further telephonic MSC was held. [Doc. No. 58] Appearing at the 

24 MSC was plaintiff, Tracy Holt, and defense counsel, Martin Kosla. The case settled. 

25 [Doc. No. 58] In exchange for plaintiffs dismissal of all claims, defendants agreed to 

26 pay plaintiff $450. The Court ordered defense counsel to prepare a draft of the 

27 Settlement Agreement, as well as a draft ofthe Joint Motion to Dismiss the action, and 

28 to send the documents to plaintiff. Id. 

-2- lJ cv lS02-GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 2 of 23
1 Attached to a letter dated September 25, 2012, defense counsel submitted to 

2 plaintiff a (1) Settlement Agreement and Release; (2) a Voluntary Stipulation to 

3 Dismiss; and, (3) a Payee Data Record form. [Doc. No. 69-1 (Declaration of Martin 

4 Kosla), p. 2, 6] The letter asked plaintiff to review the three documents, to complete, 

5 sign, and date where indicated, and to promptly return the items to defense counsel's 

6 office. Id. at 6. Because plaintiff indicated his desire for the settlement proceeds to be 

7 paid directly to his father, defense counsel included in the settlement documents a 

8 "Payee Data Record" form to facilitate that process. Id. 

9 The first draft ofthe written Settlement Agreement states: "The sum of$450 will 

lobe provided to plaintiff upon the subscription of plaintiff to this settlement agreement 

11 and release of all claims, the attached stipulation of voluntary dismissal, and the 

12 completion of the payee data form." [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 8, ~ 1] The Settlement 

13 Agreement further provided that, pursuant to state statute, all restitution obligations 

14 would be taken out of the settlement proceeds before the final settlement check would 

15 be issued. Specifically, paragraph 3 of the Agreement states, "Pursuant to [California] 

16 Penal Code Section 2085.5, all restitution obligations will be taken out of the proceeds 

17 of the settlement before the final settlement check is drafted. The remainder of funds 

18 after payment of restitution will be payable to plaintiffs father Jim Holt." [Doc. No. 

19 69-1, p. 8] In early October 2012, defense counsel received from plaintiff a signed (1) 

20 Settlement Agreement; (2) Voluntary Stipulation to Dismiss; and, (3) Payee Data 

21 Record form. The signed Settlement Agreement was dated September 29, 2012. [Doc. 

22 No. 69-1, p. 17] 

23 However, upon closer review of the documents submitted by plaintiff, defense 

24 counsel realized that plaintiff, not his father, completed the Payee Data Record form. 

25 In a letter dated October 25,2012, defense counsel submitted to plaintiff a new Payee 

26 Data Record form and explained that "[i]f [plaintiff] want[ s] the settlement check to go 

27 to [his] father, [his father] will need to sign the Payee Data Form and he will need to 

28 provide his social security number." [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 23] Further, defense counsel 

- 3 - llcvI502-GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 3 of 23
1 explained that he enclosed anew Payee form as well as a revised Settlement Agreement 

2 for plaintiff s signature adding language relating to the signing of the Payee Data Form. 

3 Id. Specifically, the only language revised in the second draft ofthe Agreement states, 

4 "The sum of $450 will be provided to plaintiff s father Jim Holt upon the subscription 

5 of plaintiff to this settlement agreement and release of all claims, the attached 

6 stipulation of voluntary dismissal, and the completion of a payee date form by 

7 plaintiff s father. If plaintiff fails to provide a payee data form fully completed and 

8 signed by his father, then the settlement funds will be deposited into plaintiffs prison 

9 trust account." [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 25, ~~ 1-2] However, the clause regarding the 

10 statutorily mandated payment of restitution previously included in the first draft of the 

11 Settlement Agreement was omitted from the second draft. [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 8] cf 

12 [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 25] 

13 On October 26, 2012, the Court held a telephonic Settlement Disposition 

14 Conference ("SDC"). [Doc. No. 59] At that conference the parties represented that they 

15 needed additional time to execute the appropriate paper work, specifically the Payee 

16 Data Record form by plaintiffs father. Good cause appearing, the Court set a further 

17 telephonic SDC for January 11,2013. [Doc. No. 59] 

18 In November 2012, defense counsel received from plaintiff a signed revised 

19 Agreement, dated November 16,2012 by plaintiff. [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 34] This was in 

20 turn signed by defendants on November 26,2012. Id. This constituted the second 

21 draft of the Agreement. However, plaintiff again failed to submit a completed Payee 

22 Data Record form. In a letter dated November 30, 2012, defense counsel again 

23 explained to plaintiff that in order for the CDCR to issue the settlement check to 

24 plaintiffs father instead of plaintiff, his father must sign and complete the form. [Doc. 

25 No. 69-1, p. 30] In December 2012, defense counsel received a competed Payee Data 

26 Record form, properly signed and executed by plaintiffs father, Jim Holt. [Doc. No. 

27 69-1,p.35] 

28 //1 

-4- II cv 1502-GPCCKSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 4 of 23
1 A. Outstanding Restitution from prior Criminal Conviction 

2 On January 11, 2013, the Court held a second telephonic SDC. [Doc. No. 60] 

3 According to defense counsel, prior to the teleconference with the Court, he and 

4 plaintiffhad a telephone conversation regarding restitution owed by plaintifffor a prior 

5 criminal conviction. [Doc. No. 69-1, (Declaration of Martin Kosla), p. 3] During the 

6 teleconference with the Court, the parties requested an additional 6 weeks to resolve 

7 any restitution-related issues. Id. Good cause appearing, the Court set a further 

8 telephonic SDC for March 1,2013. [Doc. No. 60] 

9 In a letter to plaintiff dated January 25, 2013, defense counsel memorialized his 

10 January 11,2013 telephone conversation with plaintiff, and raised some of defense 

11 counsel's independent findings regarding plaintiff s outstanding restitution obligations. 

12 [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 37] Defense counsel stated that during the January 11, 2013 

13 conversation, plaintiff"stated that [he has] paid off all of [his] restitution." Id. In this 

14 January 25, 2013 letter, defense counsel explained that, according to CDCR, "while 

15 [plaintiff] paid off [his] restitution with respect to [his] current conviction, [he has] not 

16 done so with respect to [his] previous conviction. The restitution for the earlier 

17 conviction exceeds the amount of the settlement, which means that no proceeds will 

18 be sent to [plaintiffs] father." Thus, defense counsel advised plaintiff, "If you believe 

19 that all of your restitution has been paid off, then please provide us with the necessary 

20 documentation that supports this. We will need to revise the settlement agreement to 

21 reflect the above matters." Id. (emphasis in original). There is no indication that 

22 plaintiff furnished any documentation establishing that all of his restitution obligations, 

23 including those related to his prior conviction, have been paid in full. 

24 In a letter to plaintiff dated February 28, 2013, defense counsel memorialized a 

25 "recent" telephone call with plaintiff regarding settlement and restitution. [Doc. No. 

26 69-1, p. 39] Defense counsel attached a revised Settlement Agreement with "language 

27 which addresses the restitution issue." Id. Defense counsel asked plaintiff to sign and 

28 return the revised agreement. Id. This constituted the third draft of the Agreement. 

- 5 - 11 cv 1502-GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 5 of 23
1 This version of the Agreement deviated from the second in that it re-incorporated the 

2 statutory language regarding the mandatory payment of any outstanding restitution. 

3 In pertinent part, it provided: "Pursuant to [California] Penal Code Section 208.5, 

4 CDCR is obligated to collect any amounts owed by a prisoner under a restitution fine 

5 or order, including any administrative fees related to such amounts. Such amount and 

6 fees will be deducted from the settlement amount and paid on plaintiff's behalf 

7 pursuant to Penal Code Section 2085 .5. Ifthe settlement amount exceeds the restitution 

8 amounts and fees, the excess balance shall be made by check to plaintiff's inmate trust 

9 account." [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 41, ~ 2] However, the third draft ofthe Agreement made 

10 no mention of the funds being distributed to plaintiff's father, Jim Holt. 

11 On March 1,2013, the Court held a third telephonic SDC. [Doc. No. 62] During 

12 the teleconference with the Court, the parties represented that "while the restitution 

13 issued has been resolved, additional time is needed to finalize the settlement agreement 

14 and for the funds to be deposited into plaintiff's trust account." Id. Good cause 

15 appearing, the Court set a further telephonic SDC for May 10,2013 and encouraged 

16 the parties to expedite the payment process to the extent possible. Id. 

17 Because plaintiff had yet to sign the third draft of the Settlement Agreement, 

18 defense counsel executed a follow-up letter to plaintiff dated AprilS, 2013 which 

19 repeated the substance of his letter dated February 28, 2013 seeking plaintiff's 

20 signature on the revised Agreement. [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 45] cf [Doc. No. 69-1, p. 39] 

21 On May 10,2013, the Court held a fourth telephonic SDC. [Doc. No. 63] The 

22 parties represented that they may have reached an impasse regarding the Settlement 

23 Agreement. !d. Further, plaintiff advised the Court that he intended to seek counsel 

24 to evaluate the proposed Agreement. !d. To allow plaintiff the opportunity to seek 

25 counsel, the Court set a telephonic Status Conference so that the parties and the Court 

26 could discuss more fully the issues related to the alleged impasse in finalizing the 

27 s~ttlement documentation. On May 23, 2013, the Court held a telephonic Status 

28 Conference where the parties were able to more fully articulate the issues. [Doc. No. 

-6- IlcvIS02·GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 6 of 23
1 64] As a result of that teleconference, and to allow plaintiff more time to seek counsel, 

2 the Court set a further telephonic Status Conference for June 25, 2013 and ordered 

3 defense counsel, at plaintiffs request, to provide plaintiff with a copy ofthe operative 

4 Complaint in this action. Id. Further, the Court ordered defense counsel to make 

5 reasonable inquiries into locating plaintiffs allegedly lost legal documents, and to 

6 submit a report to the Court detailing and documenting the allegedly outstanding 

7 restitution related to plaintiffs prior conviction. Id. Nothing in the record or 

8 subsequent conversations with plaintiff indicates that he sought or retained counsel to 

9 review the Agreement. 

10 On June 21, 2013, defense counsel submitted a Status Report regarding 

11 plaintiffs "missing" property and outstanding restitution. [Doc. No. 65] With respect 

12 to the property, defendants ascertained that plaintiff had a total of9 boxes of personal 

13 property prior to his transfer from Chuckawalla Valley State Prison to Valley State 

14 Prison ("VSP"). However, 3 of the 9 boxes contained "disapproved property" not 

15 suitable for transport. Plaintiff elected to mail the 3 boxes, at his own expense, to his 

16 father, Jim Holt. According to the "Mail-out Slips," the remaining 6 boxes were sent 

17 to VSP. Further, according to the "Property Transfer Receipt" forms, all 6 boxes that 

18 were sent to VSP were received by plaintiff. Thus, defense counsel concluded that 

19 none of plaintiffs property went missing during transfer because 6 of his 9 boxes were 

20 received by him, and the remaining 3 were sent by plaintiff to his father. Defense 

21 counsel's conclusion is substantiated by the attached "Mail-out Slips" and "Property 

22 Transfer Receipt" forms. [Doc. No. 65, Exhs. D-F] 

23 With respect to the outstanding restitution, defendants partially confirmed 

24 plaintiffs contention, finding that the restitution obligation for plaintiffs current 

25 conviction (Ventura County Court Case No. 200010277) and incarceration (CDCR No. 

26 T80759) was fulfilled. To corroborate this, defense counsel provided a "Restitution 

27 Search" printout from VSP. [Doc. No. 65, Exh. A] However, restitution owed for 

28 plaintiffs prior conviction (Ventura County Court Case No. CR28973) and 

- 7 - ii cv i502·GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 7 of 23
1 incarceration CCDCR No. H36816) remains unfulfilled, with plaintiff still owing 

2 $724.59. To corroborate this, defense counsel provided true and correct copies of 

3 "Restitution Search" and "Restitution History" printouts from VSP. [Doc. No. 65, Exh. 

4 B] The outstanding restitution is for a conviction that is over 20 years old. 

5 On June 27, 2013, the Court held another telephonic Status Conference. [Doc. 

6 No. 67] Defense counsel indicated that he intended to file a Motion to Enforce the 

7 Settlement. Plaintiff stated that he did not agree to the terms of the Settlement. The 

8 Court set a briefing schedule on the Motion to Enforcement Settlement [Doc. No. 69], 

9 and the parties fully briefed the issue [Doc. Nos. 69, 70, 72, 74]. Accordingly, it is now 

10 ready for disposition by this Court. 

11 B. Motion to Enforce Settlement, Opposition, Reply, and Letter to Court 

12 

13 2012 

Defendants contend that a Settlement was reached in this case on August 27, 

when defense counsel and plaintiff appeared at a telephonic Settlement 

14 Conference with Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford. At the conclusion of that 

15 teleconference, plaintiff verbally agreed to dismiss the case against all defendants in 

16 exchange for the sum of$450. Defendants describe the Agreement as being clear and 

17 complete. Further, they argue that plaintiff personally agreed to the terms of the 

18 Settlement after actively participating in the telephonic conference, and later signed the 

19 first draft of the written Agreement. Defendants speculate that plaintiff"is attempting 

20 to back out of the settlement because he found out that he owes restitution from an 

21 earlier conviction that will have to be paid out ofthe settlement proceeds." [Doc. No. 

22 69, p. 3] 

23 Plaintiff claims that a binding Settlement was never reached. Although the 

24 argument is not well-developed, plaintiff appears to contend that his act of signing and 

25 returning the first draft of the written Settlement Agreement on September 29,2012 

26 constituted a mere "offer" from plaintiff. He further argues defendants never accepted 

27 this offer because they never returned the signed first draft ofthe Agreement. Plaintiff 

28 asserts that he later revoked his September 29, 2012 offer on or about May 15,2013, 

" 8 " 11 cv IS02-GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 8 of 23
1 prior to any communicated acceptance by defendants to plaintiff. [Doc. No. 70, p. 4] 

2 Furthermore, plaintiff argues that defense counsel "repudiated" the offer by sending 

3 "two longer and substantially different proposals without ever communicating 

4 acceptance of the First Proposal executed by Plaintiff." [Doc. No. 70, p. 5] 

5 Plaintiff dismisses as "completely false" defense counsel's argument that 

6 plaintiff withdrew from the Settlement only after learning about his outstanding 

7 restitution obligation from a prior conviction. [Doc. No. 70, p. 6] Rather, plaintiff 

8 explains that in the "almost ten months that Defendants' counsel delayed in accepting 

9 and performing the proposed agreement, Plaintiffs medical condition worsened." 

10 [Doc. No. 70, p. 6] Plaintiff contends that it was this degeneration in his medical 

11 condition, not the outstanding restitution, that drove him to withdraw from the 

12 Agreement. 

13 Plaintiff acknowledges that at the time he orally agreed and also signed and 

14 mailed the first draft of the written Agreement, "he did not believe that he owed any 

15 restitution." Id. Plaintiffs belief was based on representations made by CDCR, 

16 specifically monthly account statements provided to plaintiffby CDCR. !d. According 

17 to plaintiff, "[F]or every month of the last eight years, [he] has received a statement 

18 indicating that he does not owe any further restitution and that restitution is fulfilled. 

19 Furthermore, the CDCR ceased deducting its customary 55% from [his] earnings while 

20 in prison to apply to restitution." [Doc. No. 70, p. 7, fn 4] Plaintiff provides an "Inmate 

21 Statement Report" (under CDCR #T80759) demonstrating that his restitution 

22 obligations under Court Case # 2000 I 0277 were fulfilled. [Doc. No. 70, p. 14, Exh. B] 

23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 

24 A District Court has the inherent power to enforce a settlement agreement 

25 entered into while the litigation is pending before it. In re City of Equities Anaheim, 

26 Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1995); Callie v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 

27 1987). This enforcement power extends to oral agreements. Doi v. Halekulnai Corp., 

28 276 F.3d 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, a magistrate judge's recollection ofthe 

-9- llcvI502·0PC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 9 of 23
1 terms of an oral agreement are sufficient for purposes of enforcing the agreement. See 

2 Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489-490 (7th Cir. 2002). However, 

3 settlement agreements cannot be enforced where no agreement exists. United States 

4 v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964). The moving party has the burden of 

5 demonstrating that the parties formed a legally enforceable settlement agreement. See 

6 Olam v. Congress Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110,1137 n. 19,1140 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 

7 Under federal law, there are two requirements for an oral agreement to be 

8 enforceable. First, the agreement must be complete. Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 

9 F.3d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1994); Callie, 829 F.2d at 890. Second, both parties must 

10 have directly agreed to be bound by the terms ofthe settlement, or have authorized 

11 their respective representatives to settle the dispute. Harrop v. Western Airlines, Inc., 

12 550F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (9thCir.1977). In addition to the federal standards articulated 

13 above, the "construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are governed by 

14 principles oflocallaw which apply to interpretation of contracts generally." JejJD. v. 

15 Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th 1989). Therefore, even though the underlying cause 

16 of action presented in this litigation is based upon a federal statute, this Court applies 

17 California law regarding the formation and interpretation of contracts in determining 

18 whether a legally enforceable Settlement Agreement was reached. United Commercial 

19 Ins. Servo V. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Harrop, 550 

20 F.2d at 1145 (applying California law). 

21 Under California law, contract formation reqUIres (1) parties capable of 

22 contracting; (2) the parties' consent; (3) a lawful object; and, (4) sufficient cause or 

23 consideration. Lopez V. Charles Schwab & Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 1224,1230 (2004) 

24 (citing CAL. Cry. CODE § 1550). Because the facts of this case do not bring into 

25 question the issues of capacity, lawfulness, or the sufficiency of consideration, this 

26 Court will focus squarely on the parties' consent, or the element of mutual assent. 

27 "Mutual assent usually is manifested by an offer communicated to the offeree and an 

28 acceptance communicated to the offeror." Lopez, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 1230 (citing 

- 10 - II Cy 1502·GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 10 of 23
1 CAL Cry. CODE §§ 1550, 1565). The existence of mutual consent is determined by 

2 objective criteria; the "parties' outward manifestations must show that the parties all 

3 agreed upon the same thing in the same sense." Weddington Prod., Inc., v. Flick, 60 

4 Cal. 4th 793, 811 (1998). 

5 With respect to interpreting the terms of a contract, the primary goal of contract 

6 interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. See Bank of the 

7 West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264 (1992). The parties' mutual intent is 

8 determined by examining a number of factors, including: (1) the words used in the 

9 written agreement; (2) the surrounding circumstances under which the parties 

10 negotiated or entered into the contract; and, (3) the subsequent conduct of the parties. 

11 See Morey v. Vannucci, 64 Cal. App. 4th 904, 912 (1998); Hernandez v. Badger 

12 Construction Equipment Co., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1791, 1814 (1994). 

13 III. DISCUSSION 

14 Defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that the parties formed 

15 a legally enforceable settlement agreement. Based upon its involvement in the actual 

16 Settlement Conference, this Court finds that the parties reached a binding oral 

17 Agreement with the expectation that a written agreement would follow. Specifically, 

18 on August 27, 2012, during a telephonic Mandatory Settlement Conference before the 

19 undersigned Magistrate Judge, the parties agreed that in exchange for plaintiff 

20 dismissing all claims, defendants would pay plaintiff $450. At the conclusion of the 

21 August 27,2012 MSC, the Court ordered defense counsel to prepare drafts of both the 

22 Settlement Agreement and a Joint Motion for Dismissal. [Doc. No. 58] The Settlement 

23 was thereafter noted in a Minute Order issued by the Court. Id. 

24 A. Contract Formation 

25 In instances where parties initially reach an oral agreement with the expectation 

26 that a written agreement would follow, 

27 

28 

two possibilities exist: Negotiations can result in a binding oral contract when 

all orthe terms are definitely understood, even though the parties intend to later 

execute a formal writing. Alternatively, where the parties understood that the 

proposed agreement is not complete until reduceil to a formal writing and 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 11 of 23
1 signed, no binding contract results until this is done. 

2 Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group, 84 Cal. App. 4th 32, 62 (2000). 

3 As to the first possibility, "if the respective parties orally agreed upon all ofthe terms 

4 and conditions of a proposed written agreement with the mutual intention that the oral 

5 agreement should thereupon become binding, the mere fact that a formal written 

6 agreement to the same effect has not yet been signed does not alter the binding validity 

7 of the oral agreement." Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 

8 348,358 (1998). The test of whether there is an enforceable oral agreement is: 

9 

10 

11 

12 

did the minds of the parties meet; that a proposal for a contract was made by one 

party and accepted by another; that the parties definitely understood and agreed 

upon the terms of the contract; and finally, that as part of the mutual 

understanding it was agreed that a written contract embodymg the terms agreed 

upon should be prepared and executed by the respective parties. Under such 

CIrcumstances, neitlier party is at liberty to refuse fo perform. 

Kreling v. Walsh, 77 Cal. App. 2d 821, 834-35 (1947). "Whether the parties intended 

13 

only to be bound upon the execution of a written, signed agreement is a factual issue." 

14 

Callie, 829 F.2d at 890-91. "Where material facts concerning the existence or terms 

15 

of an agreement to settle are in dispute, the Court must conduct an evidentiary hearing, 

16 

if requested." Roundtree v. Adams, 2009 WL 790038 *5 (citing Callie, 829 F.2d at 

17 

891). 

18 

19 

In this instance, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary because no material fact 

are at issue. Based upon the undersigned Magistrate Judge's participation in the 

20 

underlying telephonic Mandatory Settlement Conference, there is no question that the 

21 

parties mutually assented to be bound by the relatively few and simple terms of the oral 

22 

Agreement reached during the teleconference with the Court on August 27, 2012. 

23 

Plaintiff partially acknowledges the same in his August 19, 2013 Opposition to the 

24 

Motion presently before the Court when he states: "Plaintiff agreed that he would 

25 

dismiss his claim[s] upon the payment to his elderly father of$450." [Doc. No. 70, p. 

26 

6] Given plaintiffs admission, and this Court's involvement in the actual 

27 

teleconference where agreement was reached, the Court finds that a binding oral 

28 

contract was formed on August 27,2012. The parties definitely understood and agreed 

- 12 - llcvlS02-GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 12 of 23
1 upon the straightforward terms, specifically plaintiffs dismissal of the entire lawsuit 

2 in exchange for $450. Further, at the end of the teleconference, and based upon an 

3 order of the Court directing defense counsel to draft both the Agreement and a Joint 

4 Motion to Dismiss, there was a mutual understanding that the written contract would 

5 simply embody these terms, as there remained no additional terms or issues to discuss. 

6 Therefore, plaintiff s characterization of his signing and returning of the first 

7 written draft of the Settlement Agreement on September 29, 2012 as the first legal 

8 settlement "offer" fails. Such a characterization disregards the binding oral Agreement 

9 reached during the August 27,2012 teleconference with the Court, and ignores that 

10 defendants prepared the draft of the Settlement Agreement signed by plaintiff as 

11 ordered to confirm in writing what had already been agreed upon. Because this Court 

12 rejects the argument that the signing ofthe initial draft documents constituted the first 

13 "offer," plaintiff s arguments that he revoked this "offer," or that defendants repudiated 

14 this "offer" by sending additional revised drafts ofthe same are without merit. Further, 

15 plaintiffs characterization of the second and third drafts of the written Agreement as 

16 being "longer and substantially different proposals" is unsupported by the facts. [Doc. 

17 No. 70, p. 5] Each of the three versions of the written Agreement were between 3 and 

18 4 pages and contained between 6 and 10 paragraphs. The revisions made were 

19 administrative in nature and involved only plaintiffs outstanding restitution 

20 obligations and the mechanism for facilitating payment, if any, to plaintiffs father 

21 instead of to plaintiff directly. The Court considers them to be immaterial 

22 administrative adjustments, as these terms are statutorily controlled by California law, 

23 and thus outside of the control of parties and not subject to negotiation. As explained 

24 in greater detail below, they did not impact the material terms of the agreement. 

25 B. Defenses to Enforcement 

26 Despite essentially conceding to the contrary, plaintiff raises arguments in his 

27 Opposition attacking contract formation. Although the arguments are not well28 developed, given plaintiff s pro se status, this Court will consider the issues raised by 

- 13 - 11 cvl S02-GPC(KSC) 

Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 13 of 23
1 plaintiff more appropriately as contract defenses or excuses. 

2 1. Rescission by Mistake 

3 Although plaintiff dismisses as "completely false" defense counsel's argument 

4 that plaintiff attempted to withdraw from the settlement only after learning about his 

5 outstanding restitution obligation from a prior conviction, plaintiff acknowledges that 

6 at the time he entered into the Agreement on August 27, 2012, and further signed and 

7 mailed the first draft of the Agreement on September 29,2012, "he did not believe that 

8 he owed any restitution." [Doc. No. 70, p. 6] Plaintiffs outstanding restitution for a 

9 more than 20-year-old conviction raises the defense of mistake. 

10 Plaintiff asserts that his beliefthat all of his criminal restitution obligations were 

11 fulfilled was based on representations made by CDCR, as contained in monthly account 

12 statements provided to plaintiff by CDCR. Id. Plaintiff alleges that "for every month 

13 ofthe last eight years, [he] has received a statement indicating that he does not owe any 

14 further restitution and that restitution is fulfilled. Furthermore, CDCR ceased 

15 deducting its customary 55% from [his] earnings while in prison to apply to 

16 restitution." [Doc. No. 70, p. 7, fn 4] Plaintiff provided an "Inmate Statement Report" 

17 CCDCR #T80759) demonstrating that his restitution obligations under Court Case # 

18 200010277 were fulfilled. [Doc. No. 70, p. 14, Exh. B] 

19 As part of his due diligence while drafting the Settlement Agreement, defense 

20 counsel inquired with CDCR headquarters in Sacramento, California regarding 

21 plaintiffs outstanding restitution obligations.2 It was during this process in January 

22 2013, after the Settlement had been reached, that the issue of plaintiffs outstanding 

23 restitution arose. [Doc. No. 60] The parties brought the issue to the attention ofthe 

24 Court, and on May 23, 2013, this Court ordered defense counsel to provide the Court 

25 with more concrete numbers and documentation of plaintiffs outstanding restitution. 

26 [Doc. No. 64] On June 21,2013, defense counsel submitted a Status Report regarding 

27 

2 Although not contained in any declarations or the moving Pl!pers, defense 

28 counsel explained these efforts to the Court during a telephonic Status Conference on 

May 23, 2013. [Doc. No. 64] 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 14 of 23
1 plaintiffs outstanding restitution. [Doc. No. 65] Defendants confinned plaintiffs 

2 contention that the restitution for his current conviction (Ventura County Court Case 

3 No. 200010277) and incarceration (CDCRNo. T80759) had been fulfilled. [Doc. No. 

4 65, Exh. A] However, restitution owed for plaintiffs previous conviction (Ventura 

5 County Court Case No. CR28973) and incarceration (CDCRNo. H36816) has not been 

6 fulfilled, with plaintiff still owing $724.59. [Doc. No. 65, Exh. B] 

7 In California, rescission by mistake is governed by statute. California Civil 

8 Code § 1689(b)( 1) states in part that a "party to a contract may rescind the contract 

9 ... [i]fthe consent ofthe party rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting with him, 

10 was given by mistake." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689(b)(1). A mistake offact is not "the 

11 neglect of a legal duty on the part of a person making the mistake," but consists of 

12 "[ a]n unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present, material to the 

13 contract" or "[b ]elief in the present existence of a thing material to the contract, which 

14 does not exist, or in the past existence of such a thing, which has not existed." CAL. 

15 CIV. CODE § 1577. A party seeking rescission must also show "that it would suffer 

16 material hann if the agreement were enforced, though that need not be a pecuniary 

17 loss." Habitat Trust/or Wildlife, Inc. v. City a/Rancho Cucamonga, 175 Cal. App. 4th 

18 1306, 1332-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 

19 A factual mistake by one party, or unilateral mistake, provides grounds for 

20 rescission in certain limited circumstances. 3 California law does not adhere to the 

21 original Restatement's requirements "for rescission based upon unilateral mistake-i.e., 

22 only in circumstances where the other party knew of the mistake or caused the 

23 mistake." Donovan v. RRL Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 261,281 (2001). Rather, the California 

24 Supreme Court in Donovan found the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to be 

25 

3 This Court will analyze any mistake of fact as a unilateral one, not mutual. 

26 Although all parties to the Settlement Agreement may have both been equally unaware 

of plaintiffs outstanding restitution obligation, as explained in greater detail below, 

27 plamtiffs restitution situation was not a basic assumption upon which both parties relied in entering in the Agreement. In fact, where or how the $450 settlement amount 

28 would be remitted to plamtiff has no impact on defendants' obligations under the 

Agreement. 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 15 of 23
1 consistent with its prior decisions in MF. Kemper Canst. Co. v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 

2 37 Cal. 2d 696 (1951) and Elsinore Union Elementary Sch. Dist. a/Riverside Cnty. v. 

3 Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380 (1960), and adopted § 153 of the Second Restatement as 

4 California law. Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 281 (adopting Rest. 2d Contacts, § 153). 

5 Section 153 ofthe Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "Where a mistake 

6 of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made 

7 the contract has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is 

8 adverse to him, the contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the 

9 mistake under the rule stated in § 154, and (a) the effect of the mistake is such that 

10 enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other party has reason 

11 to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake." Rest. 2d Contacts, § 153. 

12 Here, there are no facts to indicate that defendants knew or had reason to know about 

13 plaintiff's outstanding restitution obligations prior to formation ofthe Agreement on 

14 August 27,2012. "Where the [defendants have] no reason to know of and [do] not 

15 cause the [plaintiff's] unilateral mistake of fact, the [plaintiff] must establish the 

16 following facts to obtain rescission of the contract: (1) the [plaintiff] made a mistake 

17 regarding a basic assumption upon which the [plaintiff] made the contract; (2) the 

18 mistake has a material effect upon the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse 

19 to the [plaintiff]; (3) the [plaintiff] does not bear the risk of the mistake; and (4) the 

20 effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be 

21 unconscionable." Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 282. 

22 Plaintiff is unable to establish that the mistake at issue was a basic assumption 

23 upon which he entered the Agreement, or that it materially impacts the exchange of 

24 performances in a manner adverse to him. To establish such, plaintiff"must show that 

25 the resulting imbalance in the agreed exchange is so severe that it would be unfair to 

26 require [plaintiff] to perform." Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 282 (citing Rest. 2d Contracts, 

27 § 152, com. C, p. 388). Ordinarily, a party can satisty this requirement by showing that 

28 the exchange is not only less desirable for them, but is also more advantageous to the 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 16 of 23
1 other party. Rest. 2d Contracts, § 152, com. C, p. 388. Measured againstthis standard, 

2 plaintiffs mistake fails to satisfy. Although it "need not be a pecuniary loss" to be 

3 material, the restitution-related mistake is immaterial because it is one of form rather 

4 than substance, and because the statutory scheme demanding priority payment of 

5 restitution obligations is outside of the control of the negotiating parties. 

6 According to the terms of the Settlement, defendants agreed to pay $450 to 

7 plaintiff in exchange for plaintiff s dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit. In weighing 

8 the risks and expenses associated with continued litigation and the burdens he faced 

9 in proving his case at trial, and after arms-length negotiations with opposing counsel 

lOin the presence of the undersigned Magistrate Judge, plaintiff agreed to accept $450 to 

11 settle this case. While plaintiff anticipated the $450 being deposited directly with his 

12 father, by statute, plaintiffs previously unknown restitution obligation takes priority. 

13 Given the fungibility of money, however, plaintiff still benefits because until his 

14 outstanding restitution is paid in full, he will continue to carry the debt and all assets 

15 earned will be levied accordingly. While the benefit may now seem less desirable to 

16 plaintiff, he cannot avoid his statutory obligations by paying the settlement funds 

17 directly to his father. Further, his mistake does not impact defendants' performance in 

18 any way, and defendants do not achieve any sort oftactical advantage as a result. They 

19 agreed to pay $450 to settle the case. Whether it goes to plaintiffs father directly, to 

20 plaintiff directly, or towards plaintiffs restitution obligation is irrelevant. Where the 

21 money is remitted is statutorily controlled and not subject to negotiation. 

22 For all of these reasons, this Court finds that payment to plaintiffs father was 

23 not a basic assumption upon which plaintiff made this Agreement, and further, that the 

24 plaintiffs mistake, if any, did not have a material adverse effect upon the agreed 

25 exchange of performances for plaintiff. Plaintiff was willing to settle this matter for 

26 $450. The application ofthe $450 settlement sum towards plaintiffs roughly $725 in 

27 outstanding restitution still benefits plaintiff, albeit in a manner different than plaintiff 

28 planned or anticipated. Given that plaintiff is still benefitted by the terms of the 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 17 of 23
1 Settlement Agreement, and that this mistake does not advantage defendants in any way, 

2 this Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the resulting imbalance is 

3 so severe that it would be unfair to require him to perform his obligations under the 

4 Agreement. 

5 This Court also finds that plaintiff bears the burden of this mistake. California 

6 has adopted and applies the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154 to determine the 

7 allocation of risk in instances of mistake. Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 283. Section 154 

8 provides that: "A party bears the risk of mistake when: 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or 

he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited 

knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats 

his limited knowledge as sufficient, or 

the risk is allocated to him by the court on ground that it is reasonable in 

the circumstances to do so." 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154. Given that the Agreement did not allocate 

14 

the risk of mistake to plaintiff, and that plaintiff was not consciously ignorant, this 

15 

Court will utilize a reasonableness analysis in allocating the restitution-related mistake. 

16 

17 

18 

This Court finds that, at the time the Agreement was made, plaintiff genuinely 

believed that his restitution obligations were fulfilled. A mistake of fact is not "the 

neglect of a legal duty on the part of a person making the mistake," but consists of 

19 

"[ a]n unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present, material to the 

20 

21 

22 

23 

contract." CAL. Cry. CODE § 1577. Given that both convictions were registered with 

CDCR, that plaintiff received months of statements from CDCR indicating that the 

restitution for his current conviction was fulfilled, and that CDCR ceased deducting 

restitution from his prison trust account, the Court finds plaintiff was unconsciously 

24 

ignorant or forgetful regarding his outstanding obligation. However, for the reasons 

articulated above, the fact was not material to the contract. Further, the genuineness 

26 

of plaintiffs mistake does not shift the risk of that mistake to defendants. To the 

25 

27 

28 

contrary, plaintiff has first hand knowledge of his own criminal history and is on 

constructive notice that he was assigned different case and incarceration numbers for 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 18 of 23
1 his current and prior convictions. Although plaintiff is currently incarcerated and 

2 prosecuting this law suit pro se, he still has reasonable access to CDCR to ascertain 

3 outstanding restitution obligations attached to his name. As the party who initiated this 

4 action, plaintiffbears the burden of prosecuting the lawsuit. Defendants' inquiry into 

5 plaintiff's restitution obligations does not serve to shift plaintiff's burden to 

6 defendants; nor does it alleviate plaintiff of his obligations under § 154. 

7 The final factor plaintiff must establish to obtain rescission based upon mistake 

8 IS to demonstrate that enforcement of the Settlement Agreement would be 

9 unconscionable. "An unconscionable contract ordinarily involves both a procedural 

10 and substantive element: (1) oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, 

11 and (2) overly harsh or one-sided results." Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 291 (citing 

12 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000)). 

13 With respect to the procedural prong, despite plaintiff's pro se and incarcerated status, 

14 this Court finds there was no oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. 

15 To the contrary, the undersigned Magistrate Judge was present during both telephonic 

16 Mandatory Settlement Conferences (held on June 28, 2012 and August 27, 2012, 

17 respectively) and finds that the Settlement Agreement was reached on August 27,2012 

18 following serious, informed, arms-length negotiations. 

19 As to the substantive prong, courts assess whether a unilateral mistake leads to 

20 "overly harsh or one-sided results entitling [the mistaken party] to rescission." 

21 Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 292. California courts typically find substantive 

22 unconscionability in the context of mistaken advertisements or construction bids where 

23 it would be "unjust and unfair to permit [one party] to take advantage of [the other 

24 party's] mistake." Kemper, 37 Cal. 2d at 702-03. The facts of the instant action before 

25 this Court are not analogous to other instances of substantive unconscionability found 

26 by California courts. In other contexts, contracts have been rescinded for mistakes 

27 leading to errors ranging from approximately 7 to 32 percent of the intended contract 

28 price on grounds that it would overly harsh or one-sided. Elsinore, 54 Cal. 2d at 389; 

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1 Donovan, 26 Cal. 4th at 293. Here, however, plaintiff is receiving the same bargained2 for amount of benefit, namely $450. The only impact of plaintiff s mistake is that the 

3 $450 will be credited towards his outstanding criminal restitution and not deposited 

4 into his prison trust account or with his father. Under these circumstances, this Court 

5 finds that plaintiff s mistaken belief regarding his outstanding restitution obligation is 

6 not "unjust and fair" and does not permit defendants, who are still obligated to pay the 

7 same amount, to take advantage ofplaintiffs mistake. 

8 For all of these reasons, any argument by plaintiff seeking rescission of the 

9 contract based on mistake offact should be DENIED. 

10 2. Unconscionability 

11 Plaintiff explains that in the "almost ten months that Defendants' counsel 

12 delayed in accepting and performing the proposed agreement, Plaintiffs medical 

13 condition worsened." [Doc. No. 70, p. 6] Plaintiff contends that it was this 

14 degeneration in his medical condition, not the outstanding restitution, that drove him 

15 to withdraw from the Agreement. According to California Civil Code § 1670.5(a), a 

16 court may refuse to enforce a contract if it finds, as a matter oflaw, that whole or part 

17 ofthe contract is unconscionable atthe time it was made. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1670.5(a). 

18 Plaintiffs argument regarding the degeneration of his medical condition raises the 

19 issue of unconscionability. However, for the reasons discussed in greater detail below, 

20 this Court will not refuse to enforce the Settlement Agreement on this ground. 

21 As discussed in the mistake section above, unconscionability has both procedural 

22 and substantive elements. Zullo v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 4th 477,484 (2011). 

23 '''The procedural element focuses on two factors: "oppression" and "surprise." 

24 [Citations] "Oppression" arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results 

25 in no real negotiations and "an absence of meaningful choice." [Citations] "Surprise" 

26 involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are 

27 hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed 

28 terms." Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1532 (1997) (quotingA&M 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 20 of 23
1 Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (1982)). Substantive 

2 unconscionability refers to "overly harsh or unjustifiable one-side results." Zullo, 197 

3 Cal. App. 4th at 484. Because a contract is "largely an allocation of risks between the 

4 parties," a contract term is "substantively suspect if, viewed at the time the contract was 

5 formed, it allocates the risks in an unreasonable or unexpected manner." Id. While 

6 both forms of unconscionability must be present in order to invalidate a contract, "they 

7 need not be present in equal parts" and will be measured on a sliding scale. Id. 

8 As discussed above, this Court finds no procedural unconscionability in the 

9 negotiation of the Settlement Agreement. Despite plaintiff's incarcerated and pro per 

10 status, plaintiffinitiated this action and was conferred the benefit of Court involvement 

11 during two telephonic Mandatory Settlement Conferences which ultimately led to the 

12 Agreement between the parties. The Agreement was not adhesive and there was no 

13 absence of meaningful choice because plaintiff had other options, specifically 

14 proceeding with the litigation against defendants or demanding a higher settlement 

15 amount. With the undersigned Magistrate Judge serving as a neutral during these 

16 discussions, there were no elements of oppression or surprise during the settlement 

17 negotiations. 

18 As to substantive unconscionability, the Agreement reached is not one-sided or 

19 harsh. At the time the Agreement was formed, both parties were aware ofplaintiff's 

20 underlying claims. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the named defendants improperly 

21 "den[ied] him effective pain medication for his [back] pain" and improperly "refus[ ed] 

22 to give him the surgery needed to correct [the] problem." [Doc. No. 22, p. 5] This was 

23 the gravity of plaintiff's relatively straightforward suit. "[A] contract is largely an 

24 allocation of risks between the parties." Zullo, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 484. Here, both 

25 parties faced the risk, expense, and uncertainty associated with continued litigation. 

26 Taking these risks into consideration, plaintiff and defendants mutually agreed to settle 

27 the action for $450. More specifically, in exchange for plaintiff's dismissal of all 

28 claims, defendants agreed to pay $450 to plaintiff. The Agreement is not one-sided or 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 21 of 23
1 overly harsh. Treatment for plaintiffs back pain constituted the driving force behind 

2 this litigation. Accordingly, the degeneration of plaintiffs condition was squarely 

3 within the risk plaintiff assumed in choosing to settle. Any buyer's remorse 

4 experienced by plaintiff does not rise to the level of unconscionability. Tabarez v. 

5 Butler, 2011 WL 2681222 *5 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (unpublished). 

6 Under California Civil Code § 1670.5, a Court may refuse to enforce all or part , 

7 of an agreement due to unconscionability. For the reasons discussed above, this Court 

8 finds that the Settlement Agreement was not unconscionable, either in whole or in part. 

9 Therefore, the Court will not refuse to enforce the Agreement on this ground, and any 

10 argument by plaintiff seeking such should be DENIED.4 

11 IV. CONCLUSION 

12 Based on the moving and opposing papers surrounding defendants' Motion to 

13 Enforce Settlement Agreement [Doc. Nos. 69, 70, 72, 74], as well as the undersigned's 

14 involvement in the two telephonic Mandatory Settlement Conferences held in this 

15 action [Doc. Nos. 54, 58], this Court finds that plaintiff and defendants formed a legally 

16 binding Settlement Agreement at the August 27,2012 Settlement Conference, and that 

17 plaintiff understood the nature of the Settlement Agreement and appreciated its 

18 probable consequences. Plaintiffs Opposition to defendants' Motion to Enforce 

19 appears to be based on a case of buyer' s remorse, which is not grounds for overturning 

20 the Agreement reached on August 27,2012. 

21 Accordingly, for the reasons outlined III greater detail above, the Court 

22 RECOMMENDS that defendants' Motion to Enforce Settlement [Doc. No. 69] be 

23 GRANTED. This Report and Recommendation ofthe undersigned Magistrate Judge 

24 is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case pursuant to 28 

25 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I). 

26 

27 4 Nothing in this Report and Recommendation p'rec1udes or prevents plaintiff from presenting to the health care professionals at Ris correctional institution for 

28 further medicaf treatment of his condition should it remain the same, change, or 

worsen. 

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Case 3:11-cv-01502-GPC-KSC Document 76 Filed 12/17/13 Page 22 of 23
1 IT IS ORDERED that no later than 30 days from issuance ofthis Order, any 

2 party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all 

3 parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation 

4 to Grant Dismissal." 

5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed 

6 with the Court and served on all parties no later than ten days after bein2 served with 

7 the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

8 specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's 

9 Order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Date: December_-,1,-7~_, 2013 

- 23 -

United States Magistrate Judge 

11 cv 1 S02-GPCCKSC) 

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