Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05450/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-05450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Respondent requests that Warden A.P. Kane replace former

Warden J. Solis as Respondent in this case. Pursuant to Rule

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court grants

this request. Under this rule the Court also replaces former

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENNIE BLANKENSHIP,

Petitioner,

v.

A.P. KANE, Warden; and

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor,

Respondents.

 /

No. C 04-5450 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING

RESPONDENT'S MOTION

TO DISMISS

In this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner Bennie Blankenship, a prisoner of the

State of California incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility at Soledad, alleges that his right to due process was

violated when former Governor Gray Davis reversed the finding of

the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) that Petitioner was suitable for

release on parole. 

Respondent A.P. Kane1 moves to dismiss this action for lack of

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Governor Gray Davis with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as a

Respondent in this case. In a July 20, 2005 order, the Court

directed the Warden, not the Governor, to file a response to the

petition. Therefore, only Warden Kane moves for dismissal.

2

subject matter jurisdiction. Respondent contends that Petitioner

has no federally protected liberty interest in parole and thus

fails to present a federal question for review. Having considered

all the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Respondent's

motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

Although a convicted person has no inherent or constitutional

right to early release on parole, a State's statutory parole scheme

may create "a presumption that parole release will be granted" if

it uses mandatory language. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska

Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). This presumption of

parole release gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty

interest that cannot be denied without adequate due process

protection. Id. at 11-16; see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987).

In Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that Montana's

statutory parole scheme, which instructed that the parole board

"shall" release a prisoner on parole absent certain conditions,

used mandatory language such that it created a constitutionally

protected right that parole would be granted if those conditions

were not found to exist. Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-78. Also, in

Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held that Nebraska's parole statute,

which instructed that the parole board "shall" release the prisoner

on parole absent certain conditions, created a liberty interest in

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

release on parole if those conditions were found not to exist. 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.

California's parole scheme largely parallels the Montana and

Nebraska schemes. California Penal Code § 3041 instructs that the

BPT "shall set a release date" unless it decides this is

inadvisable based on the nature and timing of the offense and in

consideration of public safety: 

[a] One year prior to the inmate's minimum

eligible parole release date a panel of two or

more commissioners or deputy commissioners shall

. . . meet with the inmate and shall normally set

a parole release date . . . The release date

shall be set in a manner that will provide

uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and

magnitude in respect to their threat to the

public, and that will comply with the sentencing

rules that the Judicial Council may issue and any

sentencing information relevant to the setting of

parole release dates. The board shall establish

criteria for the setting of parole release dates

and in doing so shall consider the number of

victims of the crime for which the inmate was

sentenced and other factors in mitigation or

aggravation of the crime . . . [b] The panel or

the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release

date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses, or the

timing and gravity of current or past convicted

offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration for this individual, and

that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at

this meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a), (b).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the California parole scheme

"gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole"

under the Allen and Greenholtz standards because it "'creates a

presumption that parole release will be granted' unless the

statutorily defined determinations [set forth in § 3041(b)] are

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

made." McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir.

2002)(quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12); see also Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003)(stating that § 3041

creates a liberty interest in parole that is protected by the due

process clause, but holding that parole can be denied based on the

gravity of the commitment offense). Thus, under Ninth Circuit

authority, the mandatory language of California's parole scheme

creates a federally protected liberty interest such that an inmate

has a right to due process in parole release absent the

determinations set forth in § 3041(b).

Citing Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), Respondent

contends that although "states may under certain circumstances

create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process

Clause, . . . these interests will be generally limited to freedom

from restraint" which "imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 

Id. at 483-84. Because Petitioner can expect to be imprisoned for

life, Respondent claims, denial of parole is not an "atypical" or

"significant hardship," so § 3041 does not give rise to a Statecreated liberty interest.

However, Sandin did not foreclose the possibility that a State

parole scheme may create a protectable liberty interest; it did not

discuss parole at all. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Sandin as

applying "to internal disciplinary [prison] regulations" only. 

McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 903. Furthermore, the fact that McQuillion

was decided after Sandin illustrates that the Ninth Circuit

considered Sandin when it held that § 3041 creates a liberty

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

interest in parole, and determined that Sandin did not affect this

holding.

Respondent also relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061

(2005). Dannenberg determined that a prisoner's individual parole

suitability must be ascertained before the BPT attempts to set a

term that would result in uniform parole dates for similar crimes. 

Id. at 1098. In other words, the California Supreme Court

determined that Penal Code § 3041(a)'s term-uniformity concerns

only arise if the inmate is found suitable under § 3041(b). 

However, Dannenberg did not address whether § 3041(b) creates a

federally protected liberty interest in parole. Indeed, Dannenberg

used language that indicated it assumed such a liberty interest

exists: "the Board has always enjoyed broad parole discretion with

deferential judicial oversight. But these well-established

principles do not deny due process. On the contrary, they define

and limit the expectancy in parole from a life sentence to which

due process interests attach." Id. at 1095 n.16; see also id. at

1094 ("sole reliance on the commitment offense might . . .

contravene the inmate's constitutionally protected expectation of

parole.") Thus, Dannenberg did not undermine the Ninth Circuit's

holding in McQuillion that § 3041 creates a federally protected

liberty interest in parole release absent the finding of certain

conditions.

After Dannenberg, several district courts have addressed how

Dannenberg affects the Ninth Circuit's holding in McQuillion. A

court in the Eastern District of California recently held that

Dannenberg stands for the proposition that California's parole

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2Unpublished cases in this district have reached the same

conclusion. See Lewis v. Solis, 2005 WL 3454137 (N.D.

Cal.)(unpublished); Mason v. Hamlet, No. C 02-5363 JF (N.D.

Cal.)(unpublished).

6

scheme is not mandatory, and thus it does not create a federally

protected interest in parole release. Sass v. California Bd. of

Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975, 983 (2005), appeal docketed, No.

05-16455 (9th Cir. July 12, 2005). However, the majority of

district courts that have addressed this issue have determined that

Dannenberg did not address the mandatory nature of the parole

statute, and thus did not affect McQuillion's holding that

California's statute creates a federally protected liberty interest

in parole release. See Guzman v. Kane, 2006 WL 83060 (N.D. Cal.);

Chilchil v. Kane, 2006 WL 83057 (N.D. Cal.); McCauley v. Brown, 2006

WL 83050 (N.D. Cal.); Machado v. Kane, 2005 WL 3299885 (N.D. Cal.);

Thompson v. Carey, 2005 WL 3287503 (E.D. Cal.).2

Because the Ninth Circuit specifically held in McQuillion that

California's parole scheme creates a federally protected liberty

interest, and because Dannenberg did not address this issue, the

Court rejects Respondent's argument that there is no protected

liberty interest in parole for California inmates. Therefore, the

Court has jurisdiction over this petition. Respondent's motion is

denied.

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Respondent's

motion to dismiss. Respondent shall file an answer to the petition 

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

within thirty days from the date of this order. Petitioner shall

file a traverse within thirty days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 2/28/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-05450-CW Document 11 Filed 02/28/06 Page 7 of 7