Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02297/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02297-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MDR

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Joseph Garcia, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dr. Kenneth Jackimczyk, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 08-2297-PHX-DGC (MEA)

ORDER

On December 16, 2008, Plaintiff Robert Joseph Garcia, who is confined in the

Maricopa County Towers Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. In a January 16, 2009 Order, the Court dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff

had failed to state a claim and gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured

the deficiencies identified in the Order.

On February 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. In a March 3, 2009

Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state

a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint that cured the

deficiencies identified in the Order.

On April 7, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #8). The Court

will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

Case 2:08-cv-02297-DGC--MEA Document 9 Filed 04/29/09 Page 1 of 4
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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the

allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). 

II. Second Amended Complaint

In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Defendant Dr. Kenneth

Jackimczy, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment regarding Plaintiff’s medical care.

Plaintiff claims that his hand was broken and placed in a splint. He saw Defendant

Jackimczyk two months later and Defendant Jackimczyk removed the splint. Plaintiff

alleges: “Dr. Jackimczyk said, my hand was still broke[n], but for it to heal as it’s set. If we

need to re-br[eak] it later that’ll be costly.” Plaintiff alleges that he has not had any followup

appointments and continues to have pain in his hand. 

III. Failure to State a Claim

A pretrial detainee’s claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement arises from

the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause rather than from the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

(1979). Nevertheless, the same standards are applied, requiring proof that the defendant

acted with deliberate indifference. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

However, not every claim by a pretrial detainee that he has received inadequate medical

treatment states a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim,

a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by

demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or

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the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was

deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know of and disregard

an excessive risk to inmate health; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw

the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the

medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain

or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.

Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies,

delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the

prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference

must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. 

Plaintiff describes conduct by Defendant Jackimczyk that does not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Defendant Jackimczyk and Count

One.

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IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the Court will dismiss his Second

Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is

subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.

1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff

has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v.

United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one

of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires granting leave to amend.

Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and has been unable to

do so despite specific instruction from the Court. Further opportunities to amend would be

futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint without leave to amend. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #8) is dismissed for failure to

state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 29th day of April, 2009.

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