Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04264/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MULTI DENOMINATIONAL MINISTRY OF

CANNABIS AND RASTAFARI, INC, et

al,

Plaintiffs,

v

ALBERTO GONZALES, et al,

Defendants. /

No C–06-4264 VRW

ORDER

On July 12, 2006, plaintiffs sued in pro per seeking,

inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent defendants

from interfering with the exercise of their religion, which

involves the use of marijuana. Doc #1. Defendants have moved to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Doc ##21, 34, 24. 

For reasons that follow, the court GRANTS defendants’ motions to

dismiss.

//

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I

A

“On a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of

material fact are taken as true and construed in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party.” Wyler Summit Partnership v

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc, 135 F3d 658, 661 (9th Cir

1998)(citing Parks School of Business, Inc v Symington, 51 F3d

1480,1484 (9th Cir 1995)). Accordingly, the facts upon which the

court rules are those drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint (Doc #1),

taking their allegations as true.

In August 2002, agents from the federal DEA and sheriff

deputies from Lake County confiscated 288 marijuana plants from

plaintiffs’ property in Upper Lake, California. Doc #1, ¶ 19(c). 

Linda Senti, along with her husband Charles Lepp (who is not a

party to the current suit) brought an action in this court, see

Lepp et al v DEA et al, C-02-5901 VRW, alleging violations of their

constitutional rights arising out of this search and seizure. The

court granted federal and municipal defendants’ motions to dismiss

on November 29, 2004. Doc #58, 02-5901. 

In August 2004, DEA agents, with the assistance of

deputies from the Lake County sheriff’s department, confiscated an

additional 32,500 marijuana plants from the property. Doc #1, ¶

17(f). In response, on February 8, 2005, Senti, Lepp and James

Harris brought suit pro per in this court, see Lepp et al v

Ashcroft et al, C-05-566 VRW, asserting seven causes of action

against federal and municipal defendants stemming from the August

2004 search. Doc #46, 05-566. Plaintiffs sought compensation for

the property seized and a permanent injunction prohibiting

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defendants from seizing plaintiffs’ marijuana in the future. Id. 

Soon thereafter, the court granted motions to dismiss filed by

federal and municipal defendants pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). Id at 22. 

In February 2005, DEA agents confiscated from the same

property an additional 11,500 marijuana plants. Doc #1, ¶ 17(h). 

Due to the allegedly illegal activities taking place on plaintiffs’

property, the federal government filed forfeiture proceedings

against the property; these proceedings are currently pending in

the Northern District of California before Judge Patel. Doc #1,

05-897 - MHP. 

Plaintiffs incorporated Multi Denominational Ministry of

Cannabis and Rastafari (“MDMCR”) on April 17, 2006. Doc #3. Three

months later, plaintiffs filed the present suit, alleging violation

of (1) the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause of the

First Amendment, (2) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

(“RFRA”), (3) the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act, 42 USC § 2000cc (“RLUIPA”) and (4) Proposition 215,

California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996. Doc #1 at 24-27. 

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit

federal, state and local authorities from confiscating marijuana

plants grown on their property. Id. 

Presently before the court are motions to dismiss from

federal, municipal and state defendants. Doc ##21, 34, 24.

B

FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss essentially “test

whether a cognizable claim has been pleaded in the complaint.” 

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Scheid v Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc, 859 F2d 434, 436 (6th Cir

1988). FRCP 8(a), which states that a plaintiff’s pleadings must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” provides the standard for judging

whether such a cognizable claim exists. Lee v City of Los Angeles,

250 F3d 668, 679 (9th Cir 2001). This standard is a liberal one

that does not require a plaintiff to set forth all the factual

details of the claim; rather, all that the standard requires is

that a plaintiff give the defendant fair notice of the claim and

the grounds for making that claim. Leatherman v Tarrant County

Narcotics Intell & Coord Unit, 507 US 163, 168 (1993) (citing

Conley v Gibson, 355 US 41, 47 (1957)). To this end, a plaintiff’s

complaint should set forth “either direct or inferential

allegations with respect to all the material elements of the

claim.” Wittstock v Van Sile, Inc, 330 F3d 899, 902 (6th Cir

2003). 

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “should not be dismissed

for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim

which would entitle [it] to relief.” Hughes v Rowe, 449 US 5, 9

(1980) (citing Haines v Kerner, 404 US 519, 520 (1972)). See also

Conley, 355 US at 45-46. All material allegations in the complaint

must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc Sec Litig, 183 F3d 970,

980 n10 (9th Cir 1999). The court may also consider documents

attached to the complaint in connection with a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc v Symington, 51 F3d

1480, 1484 (9th Cir 1995). The court may not, however, consider

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other documents outside the pleadings. Arpin v Santa Clara Valley

Transp Agency, 261 F3d 912, 925 (9th Cir 2001).

II

The court first addresses the procedural defects asserted

by defendants, starting with the argument that sovereign immunity

precludes plaintiffs’ constitutional claim against federal and

state defendants. 

A

The party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden

of proving the facts necessary for such jurisdiction. See Clayton

Brokerage Co of St Louis, Inc v Bunzel, 820 F2d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir

1987). See also Cornelius v Moxon, 301 F Supp 783, 785-86 (D ND

1969) (party seeking relief is required either to plead the basis

of federal jurisdiction or facts that would give rise to such 

jurisdiction).

A suit against federal employees in their official

capacities is considered a suit against the United States and thus

subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. Hawaii v Gordon, 373

US 57, 58 (1963); Larson v Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp, 337 US

682, 704 (1949). Accordingly, such suits cannot be maintained

unless Congress has explicitly waived the sovereign immunity of the

United States. Lane v Pena, 518 US 187 (1996). Absent an explicit

waiver, a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any

claim against the United States. See Orff v United States, 358 F3d

1137, 1142 (9th Cir 2004) (“Any claim for which sovereign immunity

has not been waived must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”)

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(citing Gilbert v DaGrossa, 756 F2d 1455 (9th Cir 1985)). 

Likewise, absent a state’s consent, the Eleventh Amendment bars

suits against state officials in their official capacity. Seminole

Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 55 (1996). 

Federal officers may be sued in their personal capacities

for violating an individual’s constitutional rights. See Bivens v

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US

388, 389 (1971). If an officer is sued in his personal capacity,

as opposed to his official capacity, the suit is not against the

United States, and thus money damages can be received. Id at 395. 

Additionally, under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign

immunity, a party may obtain prospective relief against a state

official provided the official is sued in his personal capacity. 

Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 159-60 (1908); Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 114 (1984). 

In the present case, plaintiffs bring suit against

officers of California and the United States in their official

capacities. Doc #1, ¶¶ 4-6. Accordingly, for this court to have

jurisdiction over these claims, plaintiffs must plead a proper

statute that waives the sovereign immunity. See Williams v United

States, 405 F2d 951, 954 (9th Cir 1969) (“If facts giving the court

jurisdiction are set forth in the complaint, the provision

conferring jurisdiction need not be specifically pleaded”)

(citation omitted).

As for legal theories of relief, plaintiffs’ complaint is

difficult to decipher. The complaint refers to the First, Fifth

and the Fourteenth Amendment. The court construes plaintiffs’

invocation of these amendments as asserting claims for relief under

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Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 US 388 (1971), for

deprivation of their constitutional rights under color of federal

law. But even so construed, plaintiffs’ constitutional claim must

fail: A Bivens action does not lie against federal agencies or the

United States, which possess sovereign immunity; such actions may

be brought only against named federal officers or agents in their

personal capacity. See FDIC v Meyer, 510 US 471, 483-86 (1994). 

Plaintiffs sue state and federal officials in their official

capacities, in violation of the sovereign immunity of California 

and the United States. As sovereign immunity is “jurisdictional in

nature,” id at 475, the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs’

constitutional claim against federal and state officials.

B

 Next, the court addresses municipal defendants’

contention that claims brought by MDMCR should be dismissed because

MDMCR is a corporation represented by laypersons. Doc #24 at 4-5. 

Although 28 USC § 1654 permits “parties to plead their cases

personally,” it does not extend to non-individuals. Eagle

Associates v Bank of Montreal, 926 F2d 1305, 1307 (2d Cir 1991). 

Hence, a corporation must appear in court through an attorney; it

cannot be represented by laypersons. In re America West Airlines,

40 F3d 1058, 1059 (9th Cir 1994) (“Corporations and other

unincorporated associations must appear in court through an

attorney.”); Church of the New Testament v United States, 783 F2d

771, 773 (9th Cir 1986) (citing In re Highley, 459 F2d 554, 555

(9th Cir 1972)). 

//

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Plaintiffs concede that MDMCR is a “religious non profit

corporation of the State of California,” Doc #1 at 3, and is not

represented by counsel. Doc #45. Moreover, in their opposition,

plaintiffs express an unwillingness to obtain counsel for MDMCR. 

Id at 7. Accordingly, the court dismisses with prejudice all

claims brought by MDMCR. 

C

The court turns to defendants’ contention that plaintiffs

lack standing. The constitutional aspect of standing centers on

whether plaintiffs have made out a “case or controversy” within the

meaning of Article III of the Constitution. Warth v Seldin, 422 US

490, 498 (1975). To establish standing under Article III, a

plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) “the plaintiff must

have suffered an injury in fact —– an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) “there

must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of” and (3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision.” Id at 560-61 (internal quotation marks, citations and

footnote omitted). If plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive

relief, as here, they must demonstrate a “real and immediate

threat” of future injury in order to satisfy the “injury in fact”

requirement. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v Norton, 324 F3d

1229, 1241 (11th Cir 2003); City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95,

103-104 (1983).

//

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Defendants argue that plaintiffs, except Linda Senti,

lack standing to bring suit because Senti (and her husband) are the

sole owners of the real property and none of the other plaintiffs

has any legal interest in the subject property. Doc #24 at 5. 

Defendants cite Santos v County of Los Angeles Dept of Children and

Family Services, 299 F Supp 2d 1070, 1079 (CD Cal 2004), for the

proposition that standing requires an established legal interest in

property in order to challenge a search and seizure. Id. But this

argument misses the mark. Plaintiffs assert a violation of the

First Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment; hence, the special

standing requirements from Santos are inapposite. See Doc #1, ¶ 24

(claiming that the attacks on the property occurred in “violation

of the First Amendment’s recognition of our right to establish and

exercise our religion”). 

Because this is a motion to dismiss, all material

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in

the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See In re Silicon Graphics

Inc Sec Litig, 183 F3d 970, 980 n10 (9th Cir 1999). Plaintiffs

plead a recognized injury — violation of their right to establish

and exercise a religion. And this right does not cease at one’s

property line. That plaintiffs lack legal title to the property

where they practice their religion does not preclude them from

having standing to allege violations of the First Amendment. 

D

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ suit is unripe 

because the existence of the dispute between the parties hangs on

future contingencies that may or may not occur. See Doc #21 at 6. 

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In view of the protracted dispute between the parties, the court

disagrees. The allegations in the complaint, if construed in the

light most favorable to plaintiffs, suggest it is unlikely that

defendants will cease from confiscating plaintiffs’ marijuana. 

Defendants have searched the subject property and seized marijuana

and other materials on three different occasions. In addition,

plaintiffs assert they intend to continue growing marijuana as part

of their religious practice. Plaintiffs’ claims are thus ripe for

review.

E

Finally, defendants assert that res judicata precludes

plaintiffs’ suit. Res judicata “bars re-litigation of all grounds

of recovery that were asserted, or could have been asserted, in a

previous action between the parties, where the previous action was

resolved on the merits.” Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council Inc v

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 322 F3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir 2003). 

“It is immaterial whether the claims asserted subsequent to the

judgment were actually pursued in the action that led to the

judgment; rather the relevant inquiry is whether they could have

been brought.” Id. 

But res judicata’s preclusive force is extinguished by 

an intervening change in the law. See Clifton v Attorney General

of State Of California, 997 F2d 660, 663 (9th Cir 1993) (citing

State Farm v Duel, 324 US 154, 162 (1945)). That exception applies

here. For reasons discussed infra, the Supreme Court’s decision in

Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S Ct

1211, 1217 (2006), shifted the legal terrain surrounding

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plaintiffs’ suit, thereby warranting reexamination of the grounds

for relief raised in plaintiffs’ previous petition. Accordingly,

the intervening change triggered by the O Centro decision is

sufficient to invoke the exception to res judicata recognized in

Clifton.

III

Having dealt with the procedural defects asserted by

defendants, the court turns to the merits of plaintiffs’ arguments. 

The following claims remain: (1) the RLUIPA claim against all

defendants, (2) the First Amendment claim against municipal

defendants and (3) the RFRA claim against federal defendants. 

Defendants argue that these claims merit dismissal because they are

not premised on a cognizable legal theory. For reasons discussed

below, the court dismisses all three claims, but grants plaintiffs

leave to amend their RFRA claim against federal defendants.

A

Plaintiffs’ claim under the Religious Land Use and

Institutional Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 USC § 2000cc,

warrants dismissal because it does not apply to the present

situation. RLUIPA’s general rule applies if a “land use

regulation,” or the government’s application of a land use

regulation, “substantially burdens a religious adherent’s religious

exercise in a way not representing the least restrictive means or

accomplishing a compelling government interest.” San Jose

Christian College v City of Morgan Hill, 360 F3d 1024, 1036 (9th

Cir 2004). RLUIPA specifically defines a “land use regulation” as:

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[A] zoning or landmarking law, or the 

application of such law, that limits or 

restricts a claimant’s use or development of 

land (including a structure affixed to land), 

and if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold,

easement, servitude, or other property interest 

in the regulated land or a contract or option to

acquire such an interest.”

42 USC §2000cc-5(5).

Under this definition, a government agency implements a “land use

regulation” when it acts pursuant to a “zoning or landmarking law.” 

Prater v City of Burnside, 289 F3d 417, 434 (6th Cir 2002).

Here, plaintiffs challenge the enforcement of the CSA,

which does not constitute a zoning or landmarking law. 

Accordingly, RLUIPA does not apply to the case at bar and this

claim is dismissed.

B

Next, the court addresses plaintiffs’ First Amendment

claim against municipal defendants. The First Amendment provides

that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” US Const

amend I. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Free Exercise

Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit the government from

burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws. 

Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872, 890 (1990). In Smith,

defendant was a member of the Native American church who ingested

peyote for sacramental purposes at a church ceremony. As a result,

defendant’s employer, a private drug rehabilitation organization,

fired him. When defendant applied for unemployment compensation,

the state agency denied his application because a state statute

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disqualified individuals who had been fired for work-related

“misconduct.” Id at 874. Defendant sued, arguing that the denial

of unemployment compensation burdened his First Amendment right to

exercise his religion freely. The Court rejected defendant’s

argument and held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be

applied to religious practices, even when not supported by a

compelling government interest. 494 US at 884-85.

The parallels of Smith to this case are striking. Like

the defendant in Smith, plaintiffs use a controlled substance in

the practice of their religion, and the government proscribes such

use through neutral, generally applicable laws. Under Smith, then,

the government may constitutionally punish plaintiffs, even if

doing so substantially burdens their ability to practice their

religion. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim is

dismissed.

C

Finally, the court addresses plaintiffs’ claim that the

federal government’s enforcement of the CSA violates the Religious

Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The RFRA arises out of a

fascinating interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court,

beginning with the Smith case. See Smith, 494 US at 890. As

mentioned above, the Court in Smith rejected a challenge to an

Oregon statute that denied unemployment benefits to drug users,

including Native Americans engaged in the sacramental use of

peyote. In so doing, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause

of the First Amendment does not prohibit the government from

burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws. 

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Id. The Smith decision overturned the Court’s prior interpretation

of the Free Exercise Clause, as articulated in Sherbert v Verner,

374 US 398 (1963), which required courts to inquire whether a

statutory or regulatory prohibition “substantially burdened a

religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified

by a compelling government interest.” City of Boerne v Flores, 521

US 507, 513 (1997).

Congress responded to the Smith decision by enacting the

RFRA for the express purpose of restoring the Sherbert Free

Exercise test. See 42 USC § 2000bb(b)(1); Gonzales v O Centro

Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S Ct 1211, 1217 (2006). 

Under the RFRA, the government may not, as a statutory matter,

substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, “even if the

burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 USC §

2000bb-(1)(a). The only exception recognized by the statute

requires the government to satisfy the compelling interest test: 

to “demonstrat[e] that the application of the burden to the person

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” Id, § 2000bb-1(b).

The RFRA’s judicial relief provision is couched in

exceptionally broad terms: “A person whose religious exercise has

been burdened in violation of this section may assert that

violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain

appropriate relief against a government.” Id § 2000bb-1(c). In

its definition section, the RFRA provides that “[t]he term

‘government’ includes a branch, department, agency,

instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color

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of law) of the United States.” Id § 2000bb-2(1).

As originally enacted, the RFRA applied to states as well

as the federal government. But the Supreme Court ruled in City of

Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997), that Congress lacks the

constitutional authority under § 5 of the 14th Amendment to enforce

the RFRA against the states. 521 US at 536. This decision did

not, however, affect Congress’s power to enforce the RFRA against

the federal government. Worldwide Church of God v Phila Church of

God, Inc, 227 F3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir 2000) (“We have held, along

with most other courts, that the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA

only as applied to state and local governments”). See also Holy

Land Found for Relief & Dev v Ashcroft, 333 F3d 156, 167 (D C Cir

2003). The ironic upshot of the City of Boerne decision is that it

precluded the RFRA’s application to the very situation the Act was

intended to remedy: the Smith decision, after all, concerned a

state statute (the federal government has exempted the use of

peyote for Native Americans churches since the CSA’s enactment). 

See 21 CFR § 1307(31) (2005).

Notwithstanding this turn of events, the RFRA remains on

the books. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently clarified the RFRA’s

effect in Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do

Vegetal, 126 S Ct 1211 (2006), in which the Court upheld an

injunction barring the government’s enforcement of the CSA against

a religious group’s sacramental use of hoasca, a hallucinogenic

tea. In O Centro, the government argued that the CSA precludes any

consideration of individualized exceptions because to do so would

undermine the entire regulatory regime. Id at 1220. The Supreme

Court rejected this argument, asserting it was “fatally

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undermine[d]” by the example of the government’s regulatory

exemption for use of peyote — a Schedule I substance — by the

Native American church. See 21 CFR § 1307(31) (2005). The Court

instead endorsed a “case-by-case consideration of religious

exemptions to generally applicable rules.” Id at 1223. 

Due to the case-by-case inquiry mandated by the O Centro

decision, the RFRA forces courts into the awkward position of

assessing the sincerity of a group’s religious beliefs and then

carving out exceptions to federal statutes in order to accommodate

these beliefs. See O Centro, 126 S Ct at 1222 (concluding that the

RFRA contemplates “judicially crafted exceptions” to federal laws). 

Moreover, the stringent standard provided by the RFRA suggests that

in delegating to the judicial branch the job of ensuring that

federal law accommodates religion, Congress underestimated both the

diversity of America’s religious practices and the resourcefulness

of its practitioners (and their attorneys). The present case thus

serves as a prelude to the litigation to come. 

Reservations aside, the court accepts, as it must,

Congress’s charge under the RFRA and turns to plaintiffs’ claim. 

To establish a prima facie claim of a RFRA violation, plaintiffs

must demonstrate that the federal government’s enforcement of the

CSA works a substantial burden on their ability to practice their

religion freely. Guerrero, 290 F3d at 1222; see also United States

v Israel, 317 F3d 768, 771 (7th Cir 2003) (“[U]nder RFRA, a

plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation if he can demonstrate

that the government’s action was a (1) substantial burden on a (2)

sincere (3) exercise of religion.”). If a prima facie case is

established, the burden shifts to the government to satisfy the

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RFRA’s compelling interest test. Id, § 2000bb-1(b). 

Plaintiffs allege that to exercise their religion, they

must possess and consume marijuana as mandated by their sincere

religious beliefs in the Rastafari faith. Doc #1, ¶ 17(b). In

particular, plaintiffs allege that marijuana plays a central role

in three sacraments. First, members of MDMCR receive communion by

consuming wafers containing marijuana extract. Id, ¶ 17(b)(4). 

Second, in the “sacrament of the incense,” church leaders

apparently burn marijuana so that church members may “inhal[e] from

the Alter of the Incense.” Id, ¶ 17(b)(5). Third, marijuana is

used in anointing oil, a ritual allegedly performed by Moses. 

Moses wrote that we can make an anointing oil to

anoint sons to be priests. The ingredients include

16 ounces of marijuana extracted into a quart of

oil. This was applied by pouring over the uncut

dreadlocks of the young Nazarene “Sampson” who came

for his anointing. In Psalms it says, poured over

the head until it falls from the edge of the beard

onto the skirt of the garmet. This child was

stoned for a week.

Id, ¶ 18(b). As the Ninth Circuit has already acknowledged,

“Rastafarianism is a legitimate religion, in which marijuana plays

a necessary and central role.” Guerrero, 290 F3d at 1213 (citing

United States v Bauer, 84 F3d 1549, 1556 (9th Cir 1996)). 

Defendants allege that plaintiffs are not sincere Rastifarians, but

plainly it is inappropriate to question the sincerity of

plaintiffs’ religious beliefs in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

To determine whether enforcement of the CSA imposes a

substantial burden, the court finds instructive the pre-Smith case

law applying this standard. Looking to that body of precedent, a

statute burdens the free exercise of religion if it “puts

substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to

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violate his beliefs,” Thomas v Review Bd of Ind Employment Sec Div,

450 US 707, 718 (1981), including when, if enforced, it “results in

the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious

principle or facing criminal prosecution.” Braunfeld v Brown, 366

US 599, 605 (1961). A substantial burden must be more than an

“inconvenience.” Worldwide Church, 227 F3d at 1121.

The existence of a substantial burden on religious

exercise also hinges on the scope of the asserted religious

exemption. For example, in United States v Bauer, 84 F3d 1549 (9th

Cir 1996), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the RFRA may preclude

prosecution against a group of Rastifarian defendants for simple

possession of marijuana, but “[a]s to the counts relating to

conspiracy to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and

money laundering, the religious freedom of the defendants was not

invaded” because “[n]othing before [the court] suggest[ed] that

Rastafarianism would require this conduct.” 84 F3d at 1559. 

Likewise, in Guam v Guerrero, 290 F3d 1210 (9th Cir 2002), the

Ninth Circuit held that the RFRA provides no defense to a defendant

who was prosecuted for importation of marijuana, reasoning that

“Rastafarianism does not require importation of a controlled

substance, which increases the availability of controlled

substances and makes it harder for Guam to control.” Id at 1223

(emphasis in original). Hence, the court concluded that

defendant’s right to exercise his religion freely was not

substantially burdened because the scope of defendant’s conduct

exceeded the religious justification he proffered.

The analysis in Bauer and Guerrero sheds light on the

issues in the present action. Here, plaintiffs allege that the

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United States, via the enforcement of the Controlled Substance Act

(CSA), 21 USC § 841, substantially burdens the exercise of their

religion. Yet the court cannot understand why plaintiffs require

an unconditional injunction in order to partake of the various

marijuana-related sacraments described in their complaint. See Doc

#1, ¶ 56(c) (asking the court to “enjoin[] defendants from

enforcing the CSA against plaintiffs to prohibit [plaintiffs]

growing and use of marijuana on the MDMCR and member properties”). 

In a similar vein, plaintiffs’ asserted religious

practices bear little relation to the scope of marijuana production

and distribution acknowledged in their complaint. This disparity

troubled Judge Patel in plaintiffs’ forfeiture proceedings. In

response to plaintiffs’ argument, Judge Patel did not mince words:

That many thousand plants? We’re not talking

religion; we are not talking sacrament; we are

talking about big-time marijuana. 

Doc #57 at 10:11-13

In his dissent in the Smith case, Justice Blackmun drew a

useful comparison between Native American use of peyote and the

sacramental use of wine by Christians, noting that during

Prohibition, the federal government exempted such use of wine from

its general ban on possession and use of alcohol. Smith, 494 US at

915 n 6 (citing National Prohibition Act, Title II, § 3, 41 Stat

308). To Justice Blackmun, the comparison was appropriate because

defendants’ use of peyote was “carefully circumscribed [within the]

ritual context,” in contradistinction to “the irresponsible and

unrestricted recreational use of unlawful drugs.” Id at 914-15. 

Here, portions of plaintiffs’ complaint describe limited

ceremonial practices akin to Native American use of peyote and the

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sacramental use of wine by Christians. But other parts of the

complaint suggest plaintiffs’ activities amount to the

“unrestricted recreational use of unlawful drugs.” See Smith, 494

US at 915. In particular, plaintiffs acknowledge extensive

marijuana production and distribution and seek an unconditional

injunction against government intervention. Nothing before the

court explains why the asserted sacraments of the Rastafari faith

require complete immunity from the federal government’s drug laws. 

Accordingly, the scope of relief sought in plaintiffs’ complaint is

fatal to their prima facie case under the RFRA. 

Because plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled a prima

facie case under RFRA, the court declines to assess whether the

RFRA’s exemption applies, i e, whether the government’s enforcement

of the CSA against plaintiffs furthers a compelling governmental

interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. See 42

USC § 2000bb-1(b). The court may return to this issue and have to

grapple with the perplexities Congress’s enactment of the RFRA has

created if plaintiffs amend their RFRA claim and make out a prima

facie case. 

B

Having dismissed plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court

addresses plaintiffs’ California state law claim. 28 USC §

1367(c)(3) provides that “[t]he district courts may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [supplemental] claim * *

* [if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction.” The Ninth Circuit has held that these

provisions give federal courts discretion either to retain or to

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dismiss a case after all federal claims have been dismissed. 

Albingia Versicherungs AG v Schenker Int'l, 2003 US App LEXIS

24302, *13-15 (9th Cir 2003). When determining whether to retain

supplemental jurisdiction, the court is guided by the values “of

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v Varian Assocs,

114 F3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir 1997) (en banc) (quoting Allen v City of

Los Angeles, 92 F3d 842, 846 (9th Cir 1996)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Nonetheless, “in the usual case in which all

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors * * * will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims.” Executive Software N Am v

United States Dist Court, 24 F3d 1545, 1553 n4 (9th Cir 1994)

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ v Cohill, 484 US

343, 350 n7 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If plaintiffs decline to amend their complaint, then

dismissing plaintiffs’ state claim would be the most appropriate

course of action. Exercising supplemental jurisdiction would

neither promote judicial economy nor convenience to the parties

because the case is still in its early stages. And aside from

defendants’ current motions to dismiss, the court has yet to

consider any dispositive motions in this case. Accordingly,

pursuant to 28 USC § 1367(c)(3), the court DECLINES to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claim. 

Plaintiffs are, of course, free to refile this claim in state

court, subject to the tolling provisions of 28 USC § 1367(d). 

//

//

//

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IV

In sum, the court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss

plaintiffs’ federal claims under FRCP 12(b)(6); dismissal of all

claims by MDMCR and dismissal of all claims by the remaining

plaintiffs except the claims pursuant to the RFRA are with

prejudice. Pursuant to 28 USC § 1367(c)(3), the court DECLINES to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claim. The court GRANTS all plaintiffs except MDMCR leave to file

an amended complaint alleging a claim under the RFRA against

federal defendants by March 20, 2007. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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