Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-04019/USCOURTS-cand-5_02-cv-04019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Partial Dismissal Order; Order of Service

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ANDRADE, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 

GONZALEZ, et. al., 

Defendants. 

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No. C 02-4019 JF (PR)

PARTIAL DISMISSAL

ORDER; ORDER OF

SERVICE

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in

the Eastern District of California against prison employees at the Correctional Training Facility

in Soledad, California. The instant case was transferred to this Court from the Eastern District

on August 20, 2002. Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status in a separate written

order. The Court initially ordered Plaintiff to file a notice of his current address and whether he

wished to continue to pursue the claims set forth in his complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a

notice of intent to prosecute. The Court will review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims and order service of the complaint as to the

remaining claims on the named Defendants. 

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**Original filed 4/27/07 Original filed 4/27/07** 

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BACKGROUND

On July 11, 2001, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility ("CTF")

in Soledad, California. An incident occurred on the recreation yard and Plaintiff was detained in

administrative segregation for battery on an inmate with serious injuries. See Complaint, Exhibit

A (Notice of Administrative Segregation placement dated July 11, 2001). Plaintiff was

interviewed and examined by the medical department to determine if he had any injuries. 

Plaintiff received no injuries. See Complaint, Exhibit B (Medical Report of Injury or Unusual

Occurrence dated July 11, 2001). 

Plaintiff was issued a California Department of Corrections ("CDC") 115 Rules Violation

Report for battery on an inmate with serious injury. See Complaint, Exhibit C (CDC 115 Rules

Violation Report dated July 12, 2001). Plaintiff maintains that there were several discrepancies

included in the reports. The incident was referred to the local District Attorney's office and

prosecution was declined. See id. 

On August 31, 2001, Plaintiff appeared before Defendant Gonzalez, the disciplinary

hearing officer. Plaintiff pled not guilty to the disciplinary charge of battery on an inmate with

serious injury. Plaintiff relied on his medical report and the medical report of the victim, inmate

Urango. See Complaint, Exhibit D. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gonzalez refused to call

Plaintiff’s witnesses and did not explain why, per CDC procedure. Plaintiff maintains that he

was found guilty of the offense based upon unfair and unreasonable logic. See Complaint at 3-4. 

Plaintiff was found guilty based upon a preponderance of the evidence and the medical reports. 

Plaintiff alleges that the fact of the victim's broken teeth should not have been relied upon, since

it could not be proven that the incident was the cause of the broken teeth. Plaintiff contends that

Officer Gonzalez had a duty to call Plaintiff’s witnesses and did not explain why these witnesses

were not called at the hearing. Defendants R.A. Pope and J. Solis approved the findings of

Defendant Gonzalez in the disciplinary hearing and failed to do their appointed task. Defendants

failed to note the fact that based upon the injuries the victim suffered, Plaintiff's medical report

did not match, as he had no injuries. See Complaint at 3-4. Plaintiff was assessed three-hundred

and sixty (360) days forfeiture of credit for this offense. 

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Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Gonzalez intentionally neglected to provide him with a

fair disciplinary hearing by not reviewing all of the evidence or calling witnesses in violation of

due process. Defendants R.A. Pope and J. Solis reviewed the disciplinary findings and

intentionally neglected to review the findings of Defendant Gonzalez and provide Plaintiff with a

fair disciplinary hearing in violation of due process. Plaintiff maintains that he was denied due

process because he did not receive a copy of the incident report by Correctional Officer

Hernandez before the disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff received this report on September 7, 2001,

along with his final CDC 115 Rules Violation Report. Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment for his placement in the security housing unit ("SHU") without

first providing him with a fair hearing and review of the hearing. See Complaint at 5. Plaintiff

alleges that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because his co-defendant Alvarez

was granted a new hearing for a due process violation, based upon the same grounds alleged by

Plaintiff, although Plaintiff was not provided with a new hearing. See Complaint at 4-5. 

 Plaintiff names the following Defendants in his complaint: CTF Correctional Lieutenant

C. Gonzalez; CTF Correctional Facility Captain R.A. Pope; and CTF Associate Warden J. Solis. 

 Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive

monetary damages. See Complaint at 2, 6. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To state a claim a plaintiff must show a specific

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constitutional or federal guarantee safeguarding the interests that have been invaded. Paul v.

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 

1. Due Process

Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by the nature

of the penal system. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Thus, although prison

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due

a defendant in such proceedings does not apply, the Due Process Clause requires certain

minimum procedural protections if (1) State statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of

prison officials to impose the deprivation, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real

substance." See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477-87 (1995); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-57,

571-72 n.19. 

California's regulations concerning discipline provide explicit standards that narrowly

fetter official discretion. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3320(l) (requiring guilt to be proven by

preponderance of evidence standard); § 3320(a) (requiring notice); § 3320(b) (requiring

hearing); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding Nevada regulations,

which are similar to California's, create liberty interest). The Court assumes for the purpose of

this discussion that the sanctions imposed against Plaintiff were deprivations of liberty of real

substance.

Wolff established five procedural requirements for prison disciplinary hearings

implicating the Due Process Clause. First, "written notice of the charges must be given to the

disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal

the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Second, "at least a brief period of time

after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the

appearance before the [disciplinary committee]." Id. Third, "there must be a 'written statement

by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action." Id.

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, "the inmate facing

disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence

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in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety

or correctional goals." Id. at 566; see also Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th

Cir. 1982) (right to call witnesses is basic to fair hearing and decisions to preclude should be on

case by case analysis of potential hazards of calling particular person). Fifth, "[w]here an

illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the complexity of the issues makes it unlikely that the

inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension

of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to have adequate

substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the staff." Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 570. The Court specifically held that the Due Process Clause does not require that prisons

allow inmates to cross-examine their accusers, see id. at 567-68, and does not give rise to a right

to counsel in the proceedings, see id. at 569-70.

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), the Court held that the minimum

requirements of procedural due process also require that the findings of the prison disciplinary

board be supported by some evidence in the record. Id. at 454. An examination of the entire

record is not required nor is an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or

weighing of the evidence. See id. The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. Id. at 455. The

Ninth Circuit additionally has held that there must be some indicia of reliability of the

information that forms the basis for prison disciplinary actions. See Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d

703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The fact that a prisoner may have been innocent of disciplinary charges brought against

him, however, does not give rise to a constitutional claim. The Constitution demands due

process in prison disciplinary procedures, not error-free decision-making. See Ricker v.

Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406, 1410 (8th Cir. 1994); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863, 868 (5th Cir.

1983).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gonzalez refused to allow him to call witnesses at the

disciplinary hearing and did not explain why. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Gonzalez

intentionally neglected to provide him with a fair disciplinary hearing by not reviewing all of the

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evidence or calling witnesses. Plaintiff claims that Defendants R.A. Pope and J. Solis

intentionally neglected to review the findings of Defendant Gonzalez and provide Plaintiff with a

fair disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff contends that he was denied due process because he did not

receive a copy of the incident report by Correctional Officer Hernandez before the disciplinary

hearing. Plaintiff states that his co-defendant Alvarez was granted a new disciplinary hearing

based upon the same grounds alleged by Plaintiff, however, Plaintiff was not given a second

hearing. Liberally construed, Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim of a

violation of his right to due process in his disciplinary hearing. The Court will order service of

this claim on the named Defendants. 

2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

"[T]he transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for

nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison

sentence." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); cf. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833

(9th Cir. 1997) (contemporary standards of decency are not violated by classification programs

which pursue "important and laudable" goals and are instituted under the state's authority to

operate correctional facilities). An indeterminate sentence in administrative segregation, without

more, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

See Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (no contact with any

other inmate in administrative segregation, either for exercise, day room access or otherwise not

cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916 (1995); Toussaint v. Yockey, 722

F.2d 1490, 1494 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984) (more than usual hardships associated with administrative

segregation required to state Eighth Amendment claim). 

As a matter of law, Plaintiff’s claim that he was subject to cruel and unusual punishment

for his placement in SHU is not cognizable under § 1983. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegation of

cruel and unusual punishment based upon the fact that his co-defendant Alvarez was granted a

new disciplinary hearing upon the same grounds alleged by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff did not

receive a new hearing, is not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. The Court has addressed

Plaintiff’s second allegation in his due process claim, set forth above. Because the Court

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concludes that amendment would be futile, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed

without leave to amend. 

 CONCLUSION 

1. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and 

without further leave to amend. 

2. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, 

without prepayment of fees, copies of the complaint in this matter (docket no. 1), all attachments

thereto, and copies of this order on Defendants: Correctional Lieutenant C. Gonzalez; 

Correctional Facility Captain R.A. Pope; and Associate Warden J. Solis, all located at the

Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California. The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this

order on Plaintiff. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, Defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion, or shall notify the Court that

Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion. The motion

shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor qualified

immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendants are of the opinion that this

case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the

date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date Defendants’ motion

is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if

granted, end your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a

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motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment

must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact--

that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect

the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your

case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other

sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts

shown in the defendant's declarations and documents and show

that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not

submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is

granted in favor of defendants, your case will be dismissed and

there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) (holding party opposing

summary judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an opposition to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a consent by Plaintiff to the

granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th

Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff is also advised that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end his case, albeit without prejudice. 

Plaintiff must “develop a record” and present it in his opposition in order to dispute any “factual

record” presented by the defendants in their motion to dismiss. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).

c. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

4. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants,

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or Defendants’ counsel, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or Defendants’

counsel.

5. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court

and the parties informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16-1 is

required before the parties may conduct discovery.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

4/27/07

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A copy of this ruling was mailed to the following:

Jose Andrade

P.O. Box 1385

Freedom, CA 95019

Constance L. Picciano

California Attorney General’s Office

P.O. Box 944255

1300 I Street, Suite 125

Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

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