Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06624/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06624-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SY LEE CASTLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. K. SCRIBNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-CV-06624-AWI-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF CLAIM

AGAINST DEFENDANT DILL, WITH

PREJUDICE

(Doc. 14)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Second Amended Complaint

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Sy Lee Castle (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Americans with Disabilities Act).

This action was removed from Kings County Superior Court by defendant Scribner (“defendant”)

on November 30, 2004. On May 11, 2005, pursuant to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff’s due

process claim and claim based on non-compliance with theArmstrong remedial plan were dismissed,

with prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although defendant did not move for dismissal of

plaintiff’s other two claims, plaintiff sought and was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff’s amended

complaint was filed in on May 11, 2005.

On September 15, 2005, the court issued an order finding that plaintiff’s amended complaint

contained a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Scribner but did not contain any

other claims upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff was order to either file a second amended

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complaint or notify the court of his willingness to proceed only against defendant Scribner. Plaintiff

opted to file a second amended complaint on October 21, 2005.

B. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

C. Summary of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at California State Prison-Corcoran,

where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names Warden A. K. Scribner and Correctional

Officer Dill as defendants, and alleges that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff is seeking money damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. For the reasons

set forth below, the court shall recommend that plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

be dismissed from this action. 

“A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a

matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood

Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve

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a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings

and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.” United States v.

Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). In the event that this action reaches trial and the

jury returns a verdict in favor of plaintiff, that verdict will be a finding that plaintiff’s constitutional

rights were violated. Accordingly, a declaration that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights is

unnecessary.

With respect to injunctive relief, plaintiff is seeking an order mandating the expungement of

all documents pertaining to this lawsuit from plaintiff’s central file. A federal court is a court of

limited jurisdiction. Because of this limited jurisdiction, as a threshold and preliminary matter the

court must have before it for consideration a “case” or “controversy.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,

88 (1968). If the court does not have a “case” or “controversy” before it, it has no power to hear the

matter in question. Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F. 2d 1159, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1972). Because the

expungement sought would not remedy the Eighth Amendment claim at issue in this action, the court

lacks jurisdiction to issue such an order.

D. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

In its order of September 15, 2005, the court informed plaintiff that his allegations were

insufficient to give rise to a claim for relief against defendant Dill for violating the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff was informed that his “allegations do not support a claim that defendant Dill

deprived plaintiff “of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and “‘acted with

deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Hallett, 296 F.3d at 744

(citation omitted)).” (Doc. 13, 4:2-5.) Plaintiff was provided with the opportunity to file a second

amended complaint curing the deficiencies in his claim against defendant Dill.

Rather than alleging additionalfacts that would support a claim that defendant Dill acted with

deliberate indifference, plaintiff omitted several key allegations from his second amended complaint

in an attempt to cure his claim. The court will not permit plaintiff to “plead around” the previously

identified deficiencies by omitting facts that led the court to find that his claim was deficient. For

that reason, for the purpose of screening plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, the court takes judicial

notice of the following allegations set forth in the amended complaint of May 11, 2005:

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Plaintiff alleges that in May of 2003, he was issued a priority pass to the Acute Care

Hospital at CSP-Corcoran to see a neurologist for a spinal injury and lower extremity

weakness. Defendant Dill arrived to escort plaintiff to his appointment. Plaintiff

informed defendant that he was permanently mobility impaired in his lower

extremities, had a severe spinal cord injury, and suffered from muscle loss, muscle

spasms, loss of motor coordination, and paralysis. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

saw his orthopedic shoes, ankle brace, and cane. Plaintiff asked defendant to provide

transportation, but was told that if he did not walk, he would be “refusing.” (Amend.

Comp., p. 3 ¶ 4.) Defendant told plaintiff that she authored a memo to defendant

Scribner requesting that he or his subordinates provide transportation for mentally

and physically disabled inmates who could not ambulate or who would suffer

significant hardship if they ambulated, but until the memo request was honored,

plaintiff had to walk or be marked as a “refusal.” Defendant Dill told plaintiff to file

a grievance against defendant Scribner for denying transportation for mentally and

physically disabled inmates. Plaintiff alleges that while walking to the Acute Care

Hospital, he almost fell down three times, and almost walked into defendant Dill due

to muscle loss, muscle spasms, paralysis, loss of motor coordination, and chronic

lower back pain. 

On June 3, 2003, plaintiff filed a grievance, which was granted at the first level. On

June 19, 2003, plaintiff was informed by defendant Dill that defendant Scribner

denied her request to provide transportation for mentally and physically disabled

inmates. 

(Doc. 11.)

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate 

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indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Construed liberally, the court finds that plaintiff’s second amended complaint states a claim

against defendant Scribner based on his policy or practice of not providing transportation to medical

appointments for inmates in need of such transportation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004);

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 2003); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d

1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). However, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give rise to a

claim for relief under section 1983 against defendant Dill. 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff’s allegation that on one occasion, defendant Dill, who was sympathetic to plaintiff’s

plight, informed him that pursuant to defendant Scribner’s policy, he was required to choose between

walking to his medical appointment or being marked down as refusing to go does not give rise to an

Eighth Amendment claim. The court therefore recommends that the claim be dismissed, with

prejudice.

E. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s second amended complaint contains a cognizable Eighth

Amendment claim against defendant Scribner, but does not contain a cognizable claim against

defendant Dill. Plaintiff was previously given leave to amend to cure the deficiencies in his claim

against defendant Dill but was unable to do so. Accordingly, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS

that:

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1. This action proceed on plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed October 21, 2005,

against defendant Scribner for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

2. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against defendant Dill be dismissed, with

prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 

3. Defendant Dill be dismissed from this action based on plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim against her; 

4. Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief be dismissed; and

5. Defendant Scribner be ordered to file a response to plaintiff’s second amended

complaint within thirty (30) daysfrom the date of service of the district court’s order

adopting this Findings and Recommendations, if adopted.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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