Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05143/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 8, 2005 Decided March 4, 2005

No. 04-5143

SOUTHEASTERN FEDERAL POWER CUSTOMERS, INC.,

APPELLEE

v.

FRANCIS J. HARVEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY

OF THE ARMY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

STATE OF FLORIDA,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

04-5148

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02975)

James T. Banks and William S. Cox, III argued the causes for

appellants State of Florida and State of Alabama. Charles J.

Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor

General, Parker Thomson, Lauren James Caster, Donald G.

Blankenau and R. Craig Kneisel, Assistant Attorneys General,

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Alabama, and

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Matthew Lembke, Warren B. Lightfoot, and W. Larkin Radney

IV were on brief. 

Michael T. Gray, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, Bruce P. Brown and Clinton A. Vince argued the causes

for the appellees. Robert A. Oakley, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General,

Attorney General’s Office of the State of Georgia, R. Todd

Silliman, William M. Droze, J. Cathy Fogel, David A.

Fitzgerald, Edward J.McGrath,PatriciaT. Barmeyer and Lewis

B. Jones were on brief.

Deborah M. Murray and Mary Maclean Asbill were on the

joint brief of amici curiae Alabama Rivers Alliance et al. in

support of the appellants.

Susan N. Kelly and Wallace F. Tillman were on the joint brief

of amici curiae American Public Power Association et al. in

support of the appellees.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The states of

Alabama and Florida appeal the district court’s approval of a

settlement agreement among the appellees, the United States

Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the State of Georgia, various

Georgia municipal and county water authorities (Water Supply

Providers) and Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc.

(Southeastern), a non-profit association that represents rural

electric cooperatives and municipal electric systems utilities that

purchase hydropower from federal projects. Under the

settlement the Corps agreed to enter into interim contracts with

the Water Supply Providers to lease them water storage space in

Lake Sidney Lanier, a reservoir formed by the Buford Dam,

which the Corps built and operates on the Chattahoochee River

north of Atlanta. In turn, Southeastern’s members, who

distribute hydropower generated by the Buford Dam, will

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receive credits in the amount of the supply rent against the price

they pay for hydropower. After conditionally approving the

settlement agreement, the district court issued an order

dismissing the case as moot. Because we conclude that the case

is not moot, we vacate the dismissal order, dismiss the appeals

from the other, nonfinal orders for lack of appellate jurisdiction

and remand to the district court.

In 1946 the Congress authorized the Corps to design and

construct the Buford Dam project, which was completed in

1956. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-525,

60 Stat. 634, 635 (1946). During the 1970s and the 1980s the

Corps entered into renewable five-year contracts with several

Water Supply Providers, which contracts allowed the latter,

subject to their payment of set fees, to withdraw water either

from the Chattahoochee River downstream of the Buford Dam

or from Lake Lanier itself. Since the last of these contracts

expired in 1990, the Corps has continued to permit the Water

Supply Providers to withdraw water under the terms of the

expired contracts but in increasing amounts. 

In October 1989 the Corps released a draft proposal to

substantially increase the amount of the daily water withdrawal,

prompting Alabama to file suit against the Corps in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in

June 1990. Alabama’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that the

Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v), by failing to consider the potential

environmental effects of the increased withdrawals. On

September 19, 1990 the Alabama district court, upon motion of

the parties, issued a stay order which incorporated the parties’

stipulation they would not “execute any contracts or agreements

which are the subject of the complaint in th[e] action.” JA 332-

33, 329.

On December 12, 2000 Southeastern filed this action in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking

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to enjoin the Corps from permitting the increased water

withdrawals which, Southeastern alleged, impaired the

hydropower capacity of the Buford Dam project to

Southeastern’s financial detriment. Georgia and the Water

Supply Providers moved to intervene in February 2001.

On January 9, 2003, after lengthy mediation, Southeastern,

the Corps, Georgia and the Water Supply Providers concluded

a settlement agreement which provided for interim ten-year

contracts allocating water storage space in Lake Lanier to the

Water Supply Providers which, in turn, were to pay higher fees

for the storage to compensate Southeastern for lost hydropower.

Each interim contract was renewable for an additional ten years

and was to “roll-over” into a permanent contract if such were

authorized by the Congress or by court order. On January 16,

2003 the parties filed the settlement agreement with the D.C.

district court. 

In February 2003 Florida and Alabama moved to intervene in

this action and the motions were granted on October 9, 2003. In

February 2003 they also separately moved to abate or transfer

the action in favor of the pending action in the Northern District

of Alabama. In January 2003, Florida and Alabama had filed a

motion in the Alabama action to enjoin and declare void the

settlement agreement, alleging that it violated the 1990 stay of

that action. 

On October 15, 2003 the Alabama district court issued a

preliminary injunction prohibiting the Corps and Georgia from

“(1) filing the settlement agreement [in the D.C. case], (2)

implementing any part of th[e] settlement agreement, and (3)

entering into any other new storage or withdrawal contracts

affecting the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin

without approval of th[e] court.” JA 1492. On November 7,

2003 the D.C. district court denied the motion to dismiss,

transfer or abate this action. On November 24, 2003 the

Alabama district court issued an order directing that “all

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activity” in that action be stayed until the D.C. district court

issued an order “deciding the validity of the proposed settlement

agreement.” JA 1514. The stay order further directed: “Within

thirty days of [the D.C. district court’s] order, the parties shall

meet and file with the court a status report containing a proposed

outline of how further litigation will proceed.” JA 1515.

In a Memorandum and Order filed February 10, 2004 the D.C.

district court rejected Florida’s and Alabama’s challenge and

directed that the settlement agreement “is hereby declared valid

and approved, and may be executed and filed and thereafter

performed in accordance with its terms; provided, however, that

the preliminary injunction entered by N.D. Ala. on October 15,

2003, is first vacated.” 301 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Two days later,

on February 12, 2004, the court issued an order dismissing the

action as moot in light of its approval of the settlement

agreement.

Florida and Alabama then filed these appeals challenging the

district court’s approval of the agreement. We conclude the

appeals should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

“ ‘Jurisdiction is, of necessity, the first issue for an Article III

court.’ ” DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 682 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (quoting Tuck v. Pan Am. HealthOrg., 668 F.2d 547,

549 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). “The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals

to review district court actions is limited to ‘final orders,’ ”

Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have

jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district

courts of the United States . . . .”). A “final” decision under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 is generally one “that ‘ends the litigation on the

merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute

the judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop

Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (quoting Catlin v. United

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1Final decisions also include “ ‘a narrow class of decisions that do

not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of “achieving a

healthy legal system,” nonetheless be treated as “final.” ’ ” Pueblo of

Sandia, 231 F.3d at 880 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at

867 (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940))).

States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945))).1 Although the district

court’s February 12, 2004 order of dismissal purported to be a

final decision conclusively resolving the merits, it was not. 

In the February 12 decision the district court dismissed this

case because the court concluded that “all pending claims have

become moot” as a result of its February 10, 2004 decision

“conditionally approving a Settlement Agreement between the

parties (including the intervenors) hereto.” JA 1658 (emphasis

added). The February 12 decision dismissing the case as moot

is appealable because it terminated the action. But contrary to

the district court’s view, the February 10 decision did not render

all claims in the action moot precisely because, as the district

court observed, it approved the settlement agreement

“conditionally,” that is, only if “the preliminary injunction

entered by [the Alabama district court] on October 15, 2003, is

first vacated.” 301 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Yet the contingency on

which the court’s approval hangs—vacatur of the preliminary

injunction by the Alabama district court—while never certain,

has now been shown to be remote. After oral argument in this

case, the Alabama district court issued a memorandum opinion

and order dated February 18, 2005 declining to dissolve the

injunction and resolving to “move forward with an orderly, legal

resolution” of the case before it. It is true that the Alabama court

may yet decide to lift the preliminary injunction, as the appellees

maintain. If so, the district court can then determine the validity

of the settlement agreement and only then might the action

become moot. See Tucson Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 971,

977 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“A federal court lacks jurisdiction to

consider the merits of claims that are deemed ‘moot,’ because

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‘the judicial power extends only to cases or controversies.’ A

case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 & n.7

(1969)). Or the Alabama district court may leave the

preliminary injunction in place indefinitely or replace it with a

permanent injunction, thereby leaving the February 10 decision

in legal limbo. In that event, Southeastern’s claims would

remain unresolved and, without the settlement agreement in

effect, as Southeastern’s counsel represented at oral argument,

Southeastern would then pursue its claims against the Corps

through trial if necessary. Thus, the district court’s conditional

approval of the settlement agreement did not render the action

moot. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 465

n.3 (1978) (“In view of the tentative nature of the settlement,

this case is not moot.”); British Int’l Ins. Co. v. Segura La

Republica, 354 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]here

settlement is tentative, the underlying dispute is not moot.”)

(internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the district court’s

final decision that declared otherwise is wrong and must be

vacated.

This leaves us with the September 7, 2003 order denying the

appellants’ motion to abate the action and the February 10, 2004

order conditionally approving the settlement. With the February

12, 2004 dismissal vacated, these underlying orders are plainly

not final. The appellants agree that the denial of a motion to

abate is not a final order. Cf. Gulfstream Aerospace Corps. v.

Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1988) (“district court’s

denial of a motion to stay litigation pending the resolution of a

similar proceeding in state court” is not immediately

appealable). And, as we have discussed, the conditional nature

of the district court’s approval of the settlement agreement

means that the agreement will not be final unless and until the

future action contemplated—the lifting of the Alabama court’s

injunction—takes place. Cf. Castro County, Tex. v. Crespin,

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2Under these circumstances, a decision on appeal would be merely

advisory, in derogation of our constitutional duty to decide only live

cases or controversies. See United States Nat’l Bank of Ore. v.

Independent Ins. Agents of Am. Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446, (1993) (“ ‘The

exercise of judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution depends

on the existence of a case or controversy,’ and ‘a federal court [lacks]

the power to render advisory opinions.’ ” (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk,

422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)); James v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human

Servs., 824 F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Because we view the

occurrence of these contingencies as unlikely, the declaration of rights

which appellants seek would be an advisory opinion beyond our

jurisdiction.”). 

101 F.3d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (observing that dismissal

order giving parties set period of time in which to reopen case

should settlement talks fail was not final decision).2

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s February 12,

2004 dismissal order is vacated, the appeals of the November 7,

2003 and February 10, 2004 orders are dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction and the case is remanded to the district court.

So ordered.

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