Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00634/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00634-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1145 E.R.I.S.A.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SAN

DIEGO ELECTRICAL PENSION TRUST;

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07-CV-634 – IEG (LSP)

ORDER: 1) DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE DEFENDANT’S ANSWER

AND DEMAND FOR JURY

TRIAL; 2) STRIKING DENIALS

and 3) GRANTING DEFENDANT

LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED

ANSWER

[Doc. No. 8, 13, 16]

vs.

BIGLEY ELECTRIC, INC., a California

corporation,

Defendant.

Presently before the court is a motion to strike defendant’s answer and demand for a jury trial

filed by the Board of Trustees of the San Diego Electrical Pension Trust and a number of other trust

funds (collectively “plaintiffs”). (Doc. No. 8.) For the following reasons, the court denies plaintiffs’

motion and grants Bigley Electric, Inc. (“defendant”) leave to file an amended answer. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are joint labor-management trust funds, which were created by §302(c) of the LaborManagement Relations Act and are governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(“ERISA”). (Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶ 2.) Defendant, a California-licensed contractor, is a signatory

to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and the trust agreements for each plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶

7, 10-11.) According to the complaint, defendant employs electricians who are covered by the CBA.

Case 3:07-cv-00634-JLS-LSP Document 24 Filed 07/12/07 Page 1 of 5
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This lawsuit arises out of defendant’s obligation under the CBA to pay appropriate benefit

contributions to plaintiffs for hours worked by the electrician employees. Specifically, plaintiffs

allege that between the period of June 1, 2003 to September 30, 2007, defendant did not remit benefit

contributions in the amount of $31,077.44. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12.) Plaintiffs further claim that defendant

has refused to provide the payments and reimburse audit fees plaintiffs incurred in examining

defendant’s accounting records. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14.)

On April 9, 2007, plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint: 1) alleging defendant breached the

terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and trust agreements; and 2) requesting injunctive

relief, pursuant to § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, to prevent defendant from employing electricians without

making the requisite benefit contributions. (Doc. No. 1.) On May 10, 2007, defendant filed an answer

and requested a jury trial. (Doc. No. 6.)

On May 29, 2007, plaintiffs filed the instant motion asking the court to strike defendant’s

answer and demand for a jury trial. (Doc. No. 8.) On June 20, 2007, defendant filed an untimely

opposition and plaintiffs filed their reply on June 27, 2007. (Doc. No. 20.) The court finds that the

matter is now fully briefed and amenable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule

71.1(b). 

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), the court may strike any “redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are generally not granted unless it

is clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the

litigation.” LeDuc v. Kentucky Central Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal.1992).

Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance of pleadings in federal

practice. Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal.1991); Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1381 (“Motions to strike a defense as insufficient are not

favored . . . because of their somewhat dilatory and often harassing character. Thus, even when

technically appropriate and well-founded, Rule 12(f) motions often are not granted in the absence of

a showing of prejudice to the moving party.”). 

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In their motion, plaintiffs argue that the court should strike the answer and jury demand

because: 1) defendant filed a blanket denial without specifically admitting or denying each of the

material allegations in the complaint; 2) jury trials are disfavored in ERISA actions; and 3) defendant

has failed to adequately plead its affirmative defenses. (Memo. ISO Motion 2-5.) In its opposition,

defendant does not substantively respond to plaintiffs’ argument but requests the court allow leave to

file an amended answer. Defendant attached a copy of a proposed amended answer as Exhibit A to

its opposition. In reply, plaintiffs concede that defendant’s proposed amended answer addresses most

of the arguments raised in their motion. However, plaintiffs maintain that portions of the proposed

amended answer must be further changed. First, plaintiffs request the court strike defendant’s jury

demand as to its second cause of action for injunctive relief under ERISA because defendant has not

addressed this issue. (Reply at 3.) In its original answer, defendant requested a jury trial with a

specific designation of “Jury Demanded” on the caption. (Doc. No. 6.) In its proposed amended

answer, defendant has no such designation in the caption or anywhere in the pleading. (Opposition

(“Opp.”), Exhibit A.) The court construes this difference as defendant’s withdrawal of a request for

jury trial. Thus, plaintiffs’ request to strike defendant’s jury demand is moot. 

Second, plaintiffs argue the First Affirmative Defense in defendant’s proposed amended

answer is inadequate as currently pled because defendant fails to provide any factual basis for the

defense. The First Affirmative Defense states “[p]laintiffs, though under a duty to do so, have failed

and neglected to mitigate their alleged damages, and, therefor, cannot recover against this answering

Defendant, whether as alleged or otherwise.” (Opp., Exhibit A, p. 5.) Having reviewed the applicable

case law and defendant’s pleading, the court finds plaintiffs’ argument unpersuasive. 

Affirmative defenses are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) and defendants must actively plead

19 separate defenses and “any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(c). Affirmative defense pleadings are subject to the general requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8,

which requires only a short and plain statement. Microsoft Corp. v. Jesse's Computers & Repair, Inc.,

211 F.R.D. 681, 684 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1274. “The

key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair

notice of the defense.” Wyshak v. City National Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing

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Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). “The purpose of Rule 8(c) is to give the court and the other

parties fair warning that a particular line of defense will be pursued.” Williams v. Ashland

Engineering Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 1995). “The fair notice pleading requirement is met

if the defendant sufficiently articulated the defense so that the plaintiff was not a victim of unfair

surprise.” Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

A handful of courts have been confronted with the issue of whether a defendant’s mere

allegation that “plaintiff failed to mitigate damages” is sufficient under the pleading requirements of

Rule 8. These courts have typically held that a generalized statement, such as the one used in the

instant case, meets defendant’s pleading burden with respect to the affirmative defense of damage

mitigation. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Balakian, case no. 06-CV-1383, 2007 WL 1649911, at *6-8 (E.D.

Cal. June 1, 2007) (denying motion to strike defendant’s allegation that “[plaintiff] failed to mitigate

[damages]” where plaintiff argued bare statement provided no notice); Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v.

UBM, Inc., case no. 06-3821, 2007 WL 611279, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2007) (rejecting argument

that plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts for its affirmative defense where it pled “[defendant’s]

counterclaim is barred, in whole or in part, by [defendant’s] failure to mitigate his damages”); ElectroMethods, Inc. v. Adolf Meller Co., case no. 06-cv-686, 2006 WL 2850415, at *1-2 (D. Conn. Oct. 6,

2006) (holding that defendant’s assertion that “plaintiff’s recovery is barred or limited by its failure

to mitigate its damages” was sufficient); Chronister v. Superior Air/Ground Ambulance Service, Inc.,

case no. 05-3495, 2005 WL 3019408, at *3, (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2005); Mobley v. Kelly Kean Nissa,

Inc., 964 F. Supp. 726, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s

affirmative answer, which stated “[p]laintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages, if any”). The

court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive and adopts it here. Defendant’s pleading

adequately informs plaintiff of the issue raised. See Sanchez v. La Rosa Del Monte Express, Inc., No.

94 C 3602, 1994 WL 603901, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Nov.1, 1994) (finding allegation that “plaintiff has failed

to mitigate her damages” sufficiently informed plaintiff of the issue); Mobley, 864 F. Supp. at 732.

Furthermore, given the procedural posture of this case, it would be “unreasonable to expect the

defendant to have detailed information about mitigation” or “access to facts to support the defense .

. . at this early stage of litigation . . . .” Chronister, 2005 WL 3019408, at *3. In sum, the court finds

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1

 In addition to filing multiple copies of documents and blank pages, defendant failed to file

its opposition to plaintiff’s motion in a timely fashion. The court advises defendant to familiarize

itself with the local rules and the CM/ECF filing protocol so that it will make future filings properly.

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the allegations in defendant’s First Affirmative Defense sufficient to meet its burden at this stage of

the lawsuit and will not require further amendment as suggested by plaintiff. 

The court notes that since filing its opposition to plaintiffs’ motion, defendant has filed two

documents titled “General Denial” and “Denial.”1 (Doc. Nos. 13, 16.) These filings appear to be

duplicates of the affirmative defenses portion of original answer, which defendant now seeks to

amend. As such, the court will strike Documents 13 and 16. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (stating the

court may strike any “redundant” material). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s

answer and jury demand, (Doc. No. 8), and STRIKES the General Denial and Denial, (Doc Nos. 13,

16). The court GRANTS defendant leave to file an amended answer. Defendant shall file an

amended answer no later than 7 days from the date this order is filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 12, 2007

HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Southern District of California

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