Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07085/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 14-7085 September Term, 2015

FILED ON: JANUARY 29, 2016

EVELYN PRIMAS,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND CATHY L. LANIER, CHIEF OF POLICE, IN BOTH HER OFFICIAL AND 

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02317)

Before: BROWN, KAVANAUGH, and PILLARD, Circuit Judges.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia and on the briefs of the parties. The Court has afforded the issues full 

consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court is hereby 

AFFIRMED.

Evelyn Primas brought an employment discrimination suit against the District of Columbia 

and Police Chief Cathy Lanier. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the 

defendants. Primas now appeals. She raises three primary arguments, none of which is 

persuasive.

First, Primas complains that the District Court did not allow her to argue to the jury that she 

suffered constructive discharge. But Primas proffered insufficient evidence that a reasonable 

person in her position would have found working conditions untenable to the point of feeling 

compelled to resign. See Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Therefore, no 

reasonable jury could find that Primas satisfied the objective test for constructive discharge, and 

the District Court permissibly prevented Primas from offering that theory to the jury.

USCA Case #14-7085 Document #1596038 Filed: 01/29/2016 Page 1 of 2
Second, Primas objects to the jury instructions’ description of the alleged adverse 

employment action. But the District Court’s characterization was consistent with this Court’s 

prior description of Primas’s claim. See Primas v. District of Columbia, 719 F.3d 693, 697 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013). Furthermore, Primas’s proposed language was not materially different from the 

language that the District Court used. See Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 453-55 (D.C. Cir. 

2009).

Finally, Primas argues that the District Court improperly limited evidence of (i) the relative 

qualifications of Primas and Marcus Westover, (ii) Primas’s qualifications for other Commander 

positions within the police department, and (iii) the status of papering reform. But the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the excluded evidence on all three topics was 

cumulative, irrelevant, or both. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.

Because Primas has not identified any reversible error, the judgment of the District Court is 

affirmed.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely 

petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.

 Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Ken Meadows

Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #14-7085 Document #1596038 Filed: 01/29/2016 Page 2 of 2