Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00108/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00108-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM RAY LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

P. SANTOYO, D.D.S, C.

ROBERTSON, C.D.O.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 09cv00108 W(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS P. SANTOYO

AND C. ROBERTSON’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND/OR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ON SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO.

131] AND ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S [EX PARTE]

APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING

PLAINTIFF TO FILE REPLY [ECF

NO. 170]

Plaintiff Adam Ray Lopez, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on January 16, 2009,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF Nos. 1, 4]. He subsequently

filed a First Amended Complaint on July 15, 2009 [ECF No. 7], and a

Second Amended Complaint on December 13, 2010 [ECF No. 62].1 Lopez

contends that Defendants Santoyo and Robertson violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by

1

 Because the Second Amended Complaint is not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite to it using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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acting with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical

needs. (Second Am. Compl. 5, ECF No. 62.) The Defendants filed an

Answer [ECF No. 98] and a Motion for Summary Judgment and/or

Summary Adjudication on Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 131]. On

August 7, 2012, Plaintiff was given notice, pursuant to Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1988), and Klingele v. Eikenberry,

849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), of his opportunity to submit evidence

in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.

134]. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 163] was filed on November 19, 2012. Defendants

filed their Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 166] on December 6, 2012. On December 17, 2012,

the Court received a document entitled Notice of Plaintiff’s

Application for Order Allowing Plaintiff to File [a] Reply to

Defendants’ Most Recent Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion

for Summary Judgment on Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 170]. On

December 27, 2012, Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiff’s

Ex Parte Application for Order Allowing Plaintiff to File Reply to

Defendants’ Most Recent Reply [ECF No. 173]. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that

Defendants’ Motion be granted in part and denied in part. The

Court denies Plaintiff’s request to file a surreply [ECF No. 170].

I. STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of events that occurred between

July 26, 2006, and July 10, 2007, while Lopez was housed at

Calipatria State Prison (“Calipatria”). (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2, Decl. Timothy J. Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at

11, 18, ECF No. 131.) On July 26, 2006, Plaintiff submitted a

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Health Care Services Request Form CDC 7362 complaining of extreme

pain and discomfort and requesting that his wisdom teeth be

extracted. (Id. at 21-22; Second Am. Compl. Ex. A at 14, ECF No.

62.) The form was classified2

 as priority 1C, which required Lopez

to be seen within sixty days. (Second Am. Compl. Ex. A at 14, ECF

No. 62.) Despite the priority classification, Plaintiff was not

seen by a dentist until Defendant Santoyo, D.D.S., examined Lopez

on November 1, 2006, ninety-one days later. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2, Decl. Timothy J. Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at

22; Second Am. Compl. Ex. B at 16, Ex. C at 18, ECF No. 62.) 

Santoyo’s notes from November 1, 2006, indicate that

Plaintiff’s impacted wisdom teeth were causing pain. (Second Am.

Compl. Ex. B at 16, ECF No. 62.) Santoyo filled out a physician’s

request for services stating that Lopez experienced swelling, pain,

and infection in his mouth and was in urgent need of oral surgery. 

(Id. Ex. C at 18.) Santoyo prescribed Peridex mouth wash and

referred Lopez to an outside oral surgeon, Dr. Torchia, D.D.S.3

(Id. Ex. B at 16.) The notes state Santoyo advised Lopez that the

wait list for outside surgery could be as long as three months.4

(Id.) Defendant Santoyo initially classified Lopez’s priority

after the visit as “1,” but subsequently changed it to “2.” (Id.;

2

 The parties hotly dispute as to who executed the

classification on Lopez’s form 7362. The Court addresses this

dispute below. 

3 Claims against Dr. Torchia were dismissed with prejudice on

September 17, 2010. (Order Adopting Report & Recommendation 12,

ECF No. 55.)

4

 Plaintiff disputes this fact and maintains that Santoyo

never informed him about the long wait period. 

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see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3, Decl. Paul Santoyo 3, ECF No.

131.) 

On January 1, 2007, approximately six months after his initial

request, Lopez submitted an inmate grievance complaining about the

wait time and his ongoing pain, and requested to be sent to an

outside hospital for wisdom tooth extraction. (Second Am. Compl.

Ex. E at 26, ECF No. 62.) His grievance was partially granted at

the informal level on February 20, 2007, and Plaintiff was informed

that he was “on the oral surgery list to be seen by an outside

provider.” (Id.) On February 22, 2007, Lopez appealed that

response to the formal level, stating that the wait time was

unacceptable due to pain, and that his surgery “should be done

forthwith.” (Id.)

On April 20, 2007, Plaintiff submitted another health care

request reiterating the pain, discomfort, and swelling caused by

his wisdom teeth. (Id. Ex. F at 30.) Santoyo responded to the

appeal on April 23, 2007. (Id. Ex. E at 27-28.) Plaintiff was

advised that he was scheduled to see the oral surgeon on April 30,

2007. (Id. at 28.) Lopez was transported to Dr. Torchia in San

Diego, California, and received his surgery on April 30, 2007. 

(Id. Ex. G at 32; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2, Decl. Timothy J.

Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at 86, 96, ECF No. 131.) Dr.

Torchia chipped one of Plaintiff’s teeth while performing the

procedure and issued a physician’s order directing Calipatria

dentists to repair the tooth. (Second Am. Compl. Ex. Ex. G at 32,

ECF No. 62.) Torchia gave Lopez a prescription for a five-day

supply of Ibuprofen for the pain. (Id.) Plaintiff continued to

receive Peridex after the surgery. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

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#2, Decl. Timothy J. Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at 102, ECF

No. 131.) 

On May 2, 2007, the Plaintiff submitted another health care

request complaining of extreme pain and swelling to his jaw and

inability to eat. (Second Am. Compl. Ex. H at 34, ECF No. 62.) 

The triage nurse’s notes indicate that Lopez had pain following the

surgery, and that the prescribed Motrin had no effect on the pain. 

(Id.) Lopez was placed on liquid diet. (Id.) On or about May 3,

2007, Lopez was seen by Dr. Robertson, who noted swelling and pain,

and prescribed Boost nutritional beverage.5 (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F at 63, ECF No. 163.) The progress notes from

that day indicate that pain medication was prescribed, but not

issued. (Id.)

Lopez was subsequently seen by Defendant Santoyo on May 15,

2007, and on June 12, 2007. (Id. at 63-64.) On May 31, 2007,

Lopez submitted another health care request indicating that he

needed his chipped tooth filled and his teeth cleaned. (Second Am.

Compl. Ex. I at 36, ECF No. 62.) Santoyo ultimately repaired

Lopez’s chipped tooth on July 10, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Ex. F at 64, ECF No. 163.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, “The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Like the

5 Defendant Robertson’s declaration states that he first

treated Lopez on May 1, 2007, and prescribed pain medication and

Boost nutritional beverage. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. and/or Summ.

Adjudication Second Am. Compl. Attach. #4, Robertson Dec. 2, ECF

No. 131.) 

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standard for a directed verdict, judgment must be entered for the

moving party “if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing Brady v. S. Ry. Co.,

320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)). “If reasonable minds could differ,”

judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.

at 250-51; see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,

470 (9th Cir. 2007).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof that

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Cleveland v.

Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

at 252; see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). “When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to

‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to [its] case.’” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590

(1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322). The absence of a

genuine issue of material fact on a single element of a claim is

sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that claim. Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

pleadings and evidence it “believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323; Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d

1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a

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genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To

successfully rebut a defendant’s properly supported motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiff “must point to some facts in the

record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with

all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[’]s[] favor, could

convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v.

Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). Material issues are those that “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224

F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d

1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a “metaphysical doubt” is

required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

In deciding whether any genuine issue of material fact remains

for trial, courts must “view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . .” Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image

Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (stating that the

nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed and all reasonable

inferences drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor). “When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). While the district court is not

required to search the entire record for an issue of fact, the

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court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider

materials in the record that are not specifically referred to. 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d

1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).

When the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se, the court has a

duty to consider “all of [the nonmovant’s] contentions offered in

motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal

knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and where [the nonmovant] attested under penalty of perjury that

the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct.” 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Deliberate Indifference to Lopez’s Medical Needs

The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that “‘involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . .’” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428

U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (additional citations omitted). The

government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those

whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id. at 103; see also

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,

198 (1989) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04). 

To assert an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical

care, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient to fulfill two

requirements: one objective and the other subjective. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Allen v.

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Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994)); see Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Under the objective requirement, in a medical care claim, the

prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need. See

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). “A ‘serious’ medical need

exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result

in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain’.” Id. at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at

104). “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘the existence of

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important

and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60). 

Defendants assume for the purposes of the summary judgment that

Plaintiff can demonstrate a serious medical need. (Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. and/or Summ. Adjudication Second Am. Compl. Attach. #1,

Mem. P. & A. 13, ECF No. 131.) 

Under the subjective requirement, the prisoner must allege

facts that show that the defendant acted with “‘deliberate

indifference’ to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03 (1991) (indicating that

there is no significant distinction between wantonness and

deliberate indifference); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he official must

be both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

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a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “This is true whether

the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response

to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally

denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally

interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 104-05 (footnotes omitted). The indifference to medical needs

must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to malpractice, or

even gross negligence, does not amount to a constitutional

violation. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105-06); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004).

Deliberate indifference does not require an express intent to

cause harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36. It does, however, require

more than mere negligence. Id. at 835; Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A defendant’s acts

or omissions will not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation unless there is a reckless disregard for a risk of

serious harm to the prisoner. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. The

official must have “know[n] that [the] inmate[] face[d] a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by

failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. 

Plaintiff fails to show deliberate indifference as a matter of

law where defendant has based his actions on a difference in

medical opinion and “either of two alternative courses of treatment

would be medically acceptable under the circumstances . . . .”

Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08). Likewise, a difference of opinion

between an inmate and medical personnel regarding medical diagnosis

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and treatment does not establish a claim of deliberate

indifference. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir.

1989); Franklin v. Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1344

(9th Cir. 1981). Where there is a “‘mere delay in surgery,’ a

prisoner can make ‘no claim for deliberate medical indifference

unless the denial was harmful.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(quoting Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs., 766 F.2d

404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985); Esposito v. Khatri, No. 08cv742-H (WMc),

2009 WL 702218, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2009) (citations

omitted); Chrisman v. Smith, No. 08cv975-IEG-LSP, 2008 WL 4891235,

at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008) (citation omitted); Velasquez v.

Barrios, No. 07cv1130-LAB (CAB), 2008 WL 4078766, at *9 (S.D. Cal.

Aug. 29, 2008). The prisoner does not need to show that the harm

was substantial, although doing so would support his claim of

deliberate indifference. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2006)(citation omitted). 

B. Defendant Santoyo

Defendant Santoyo moves for summary judgment, arguing that

there is no evidence he was deliberately indifferent to Lopez’s

serious medical needs. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. &

A. 13, ECF No. 131.) For purposes of their Motion, both Defendants

assume that Plaintiff can demonstrate a serious medical need. 

(Id.) 

1. Denial of Pain Medication

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Santoyo was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to prescribe

pain relief medication. (Second Am. Compl. 6-7, ECF No. 62.) 

Lopez testified that at the time Santoyo examined him on November

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1, 2006, Lopez was experiencing extreme pain and discomfort due to

the swelling in his mouth. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2, Decl.

Timothy J. Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at 38, ECF No. 131.) 

Plaintiff stated that Santoyo declined to prescribe any pain

medication:

A. I told him I need – I was in pain. I need some

pain medication.

Q. You’re referring to November 1st, 2006?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he actually say “I’m refusing to give you

medication?”

A. Not in those exact words.

Q. This is when he said you can hold out?

A. Exactly.

(Id. at 71.)

 The parties agree that after examining Lopez on November 1,

2006, Defendant Santoyo gave him a prescription of Peridex, a

mouthwash. Whether this constituted adequate pain relief under the

circumstances is disputed. 

Defendant argues that the oral rinse solution Peridex

prescribed by Santoyo to Lopez was sufficient to relieve

Plaintiff’s pain pending his surgery. (Id. Attach. #3, Decl. Paul

Santoyo 2.) Defendant Santoyo claims that there is no evidence

that he refused to prescribe pain medication to Lopez during the

pendency of Plaintiff’s surgery, because the prescription of

Peridex, an antimicrobial oral rinse, was sufficient to treat

Plaintiff’s problem. (Id. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 13-14.) 

Defendant argues that Peridex reduces the amount of bacteria in the

patient’s mouth, thereby reducing or preventing the infection, the

underlying cause of Plaintiff’s swelling and pain. (Id. at 14.) 

In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

Lopez submits evidence that Peridex is not a pain relief

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medication. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 5-6, ECF No. 163;

id. Exs. D, E.) Lopez argues that Peridex is used to treat

gingivitis as characterized by redness and swelling of the

gingivae. (Id. Ex. D.) Plaintiff points out that he was not

diagnosed with, or suffering from, gingivitis. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’

Mot. Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 163.) 

Defendant replies that Lopez admitted that he received Peridex

every day between November 1, 2006, and April 30, 2007, and that

the mouthwash helped alleviate his pain. (Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Opp’n

Mot. Summ. J. 5, ECF No. 166.) In his deposition, Lopez stated

that he used the Peridex mouthwash daily in lieu of using a

toothbrush because he could not brush his teeth due to pain and

swelling: “It was difficult for me to brush my teeth, so that —

that worked.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2, Decl. Timothy J.

Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at 63, ECF No. 131.) Plaintiff

also testified, however, that despite the oral rinse, he continued

to experience pain. (Id. at 62-64, 69.) 

Santoyo has not presented evidence that Peridex is a pain

relief medication. Instead, he argues that its effect on swelling

and inflammation can reduce the underlying pain. Plaintiff's

condition, however, involved not only swelling and infection, but

also impacted wisdom teeth. Defendant concedes that Plaintiff’s

wisdom teeth were “impacted, that is misaligned and entrapped in

the jaw bone or prevented from erupting due to the adjacent teeth

or dense overlying soft tissue.” (Id. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A.

16.) Although Peridex may alleviate pain caused by infection,

Defendant has not offered any evidence as to whether the oral rinse

can alleviate pain associated with the pressure of impacted teeth

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on the jaw bone, soft tissue, or adjacent teeth. A disputed issue

of fact remains, therefore, as to whether Peridex could help

Plaintiff with pain caused by the impacted wisdom teeth. 

Defendant Santoyo argues that Lopez did not complain about his

dental pain to non-dental health staff, even though he was treated

for chronic knee pain in December 2006 and March 2007. (Id. at

14.) This argument challenges Lopez’s serious medical need, which

Defendant assumed for the purposes of his Motion. (See id. at 13.) 

In response, Lopez rejects Defendant’s suggestion that he was

required to seek medication for his dental pain from non-dental

medical staff. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 17, ECF No. 163.) 

Lopez nonetheless points out that he did request and receive pain

medicine from an orthopedist on one occasion. (Id. Ex. I.) 

The parties also disagree on whether Defendant Santoyo was

aware of Plaintiff’s dental condition between the time Lopez

submitted his health care request on July 26, 2006, and when

Santoyo saw him during an office visit on November 1, 2006. 

Defendant Santoyo’s declaration states that prior to Santoyo’s

examination of Plaintiff on November 1, 2006, he had no knowledge

of Lopez’s condition. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3, Decl. Paul

Santoyo 2, ECF No. 131.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Santoyo

had to know about Lopez’s condition because the priority

designation on the health care request was made by Santoyo, as

required by the Division of Correctional Health Care Services

Dental Services Manual. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 11, ECF

No. 163.) Santoyo alleges that Plaintiff’s dental treatment

priority 1C classification on July 27, 2006 was made “by

unidentified staff” based on the triage of Lopez’s complaint of

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pain and discomfort. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. &

A. 15, ECF No. 131; see also id. Attach. #3, Decl. Paul Santoyo 3.) 

Santoyo argues that he classified Plaintiff’s dental treatment

priority as “2” when he saw Lopez on November 1, 2006, because his

findings did not support the claim of extreme pain.6 (Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 14-15, ECF No. 131.) Santoyo

thus contends that a prescription of Peridex was appropriate for

Lopez’s condition, and no additional prescription was warranted. 

(Id. at 15; Decl. Michael Adu-Tutu, D.D.S., Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ.

J. 5-6, ECF No. 132.)

As mentioned earlier, Lopez contests this claim and argues

that the priority designation on his Health Care Services Request

Form 7362 submitted on July 26, 2006 appears to be in Santoyo’s

handwriting. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 11, ECF No. 163;

see Second Am. Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 62.) Lopez also offers a copy

of Chapter 5.3 of the Division of Correctional Health Care Services

Dental Services Manual from April 2006, which provides that the

CDCR dentist “shall review, initial, and date all requests for

dental services daily to establish dental priorities of an emergent

(Emergency) or urgent (Priority 1) nature.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C at 34, ECF No. 163.) There is sufficient

evidence from which a jury can question Dr. Santoyo’s assertion

that the priority 1C classification was not made by him.

In their Reply, both Defendants allege that the policies and

procedures relied on by the Plaintiff had not been implemented at

Calipatria at the time of Plaintiff’s dental issues. (Defs.’ Reply

6

 Admittedly, Santoyo initially classified Lopez’s priority as

“1,” and only subsequently changed it to “2.” (Defs.’ Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #3, Decl. Paul Santoyo 3, ECF No. 131.) 

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Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 166.) Defendants contend that

a “version of these Policies and Procedures was not initially

implemented at Calipatria State Prison until the middle of 2007.” 

(Id. at 2.) Defendants’ argument in the Reply is contradicted by

their moving papers. Defendants’ Memorandum in support of their

Motion references the 2006 policies and procedures not once, but

seven times. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 15-18,

20, 23, ECF No. 131.) Additionally, Defendants submitted a

declaration of Michael Adu-Tutu, D.D.S., a dentist who relied on

the 2006 policies and procedures to opine on the appropriateness of

Lopez’s treatment while at Calipatria. (See Decl. Michael AduTutu, D.D.S., Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 2, 6-9, 11, 14, ECF No.

132; id. Ex. C.)

Defendants, as the moving parties, bear the initial burden of

demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Ironically, in this case,

Defendants raised a genuine issue of fact by arguing in the Reply

that the 2006 policies and procedures they had relied on previously

are inapplicable to this case.7 (Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Mot.

Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 166.) 

In light of this contradictory evidence presented, the Court

cannot conclude that Defendant Santoyo met his burden of proving

the absence of disputed material facts. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

7 The Court notes that the Motion and the Reply appear to be

authored by the same attorney, Timothy Kral. Nonetheless, counsel

failed to explain, or even acknowledge, the inconsistency in his

submissions to this Court. Mr. Kral, who is licensed in the State

of California, is presumably familiar with his duties to the Court,

particularly the duty of candor as set out by the California Rule

of Professional Conduct 5-200 and California Business and

Professions Code. 

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322-23. In any event, the parties dispute whether Santoyo refused

to prescribe pain medication to Plaintiff. Plaintiff Lopez has

raised a genuine issue for trial regarding the denial of pain

medication to defeat Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to

his deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Santoyo. 

2. Delaying Treatment and Declining to Perform Surgery

a. More than sixty days 

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Santoyo was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to ensure that

Plaintiff’s surgery would occur within the sixty days mandated by

his priority 1C status and by declining to perform Lopez’s surgery

himself. (Second Am. Compl. 6-7, 9, ECF No. 62.) 

Defendant argues that this claim fails, because Santoyo knew

nothing about Plaintiff’s condition until November 1, 2006, when he

examined Lopez and classified him as priority 2. (Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 17, ECF No. 131; Reply at 6, ECF

No. 166.) 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Santoyo had to know about

Lopez’s condition because the priority designation on the health

care request was made by Santoyo, as required by the Division of

Correctional Health Care Services Dental Services Manual. (Pl.’s

Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 11, ECF No. 163.) Lopez again cites the

2006 policies and procedures, which provide that the CDCR dentist

“shall review, initial, and date all requests for dental services

daily to establish dental priorities of an emergent (Emergency) or

urgent (Priority 1) nature.” (Id. Ex. C at 34.) As discussed

earlier, the applicability of the 2006 policies and procedures to

this case and whether Dr. Santoyo assigned Lopez’s health care

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request priority 1C status are disputed issues of material fact. 

Thus, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant met his burden on

summary judgment with regard to this claim.

b. Surgery at Calipatria

Lopez also claims that Defendant refused to operate on him at

Calipatria, even though Santoyo routinely performed that procedure

on other inmates. (Second Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 62.) Defendant

moves for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that there is no

evidence of Santoyo’s deliberate indifference by failing to perform

Plaintiff’s surgery at Calipatria. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#1, Mem. P. & A. 15-16, ECF No. 131.) Defendant Santoyo claims

that he could not perform the extraction because he was not

qualified as an oral surgeon. (Id. Attach. #3, Decl. Paul Santoyo

5.) 

Santoyo admitted in his responses to Plaintiff’s

interrogatories that he “treated numerous patients with wisdom

teeth issues” and had “extracted wisdom teeth” even though he was

not an oral surgeon. (Decl. Michael Adu-Tutu, D.D.S., Supp. Defs.’

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. K, ECF No. 132.) Santoyo argues that Lopez’s

wisdom teeth were impacted, the extraction was beyond the practice

of a general dentist, and Santoyo had to refer Plaintiff to an oral

surgeon. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF

No. 131.) Santoyo also points out that Lopez required sedation for

the surgery due to the complications associated with Lopez’s

impacted wisdom teeth and that the dental clinic at Calipatria was

not equipped with that type of anesthesia. (Id.) Santoyo contends

that Dr. Torchia used intravenous anesthesia (sedation) for the

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procedure he performed on Lopez. (Id.; Decl. Michael Adu-Tutu,

D.D.S., Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D at 155, ECF No. 132.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff repeats his allegations that Santoyo

had referred another inmate to an outside provider for wisdom teeth

surgery, but after the inmate complained of pain, Defendant

performed the extraction. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 5, ECF

No. 163.) Thus, Lopez contends that it was within Santoyo’s

ability to help Plaintiff with his dental pain by performing the

surgery at Calipatria. 

A difference of opinion between a physician and the prisoner

concerning what medical care is appropriate does not amount to

deliberate indifference. Sanchez, 891 F.2d at 242. To prove

deliberate indifference, Lopez “must show that the course of

treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances, and the plaintiff must show that they chose this

course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's

health.” Jackson, 90 F.3d at 332 (internal citations omitted). 

Here, the parties’ opinions regarding Dr. Santoyo’s expertise

clearly differ. Notably, Plaintiff does not dispute that he

required and received sedation for his surgery. Neither did Lopez

offer any additional evidence to support his contention that

Santoyo’s refusal to operate on him at Calipatria was medically

unacceptable under all of the circumstances. Thus, Plaintiff’s

claim that Defendant Santoyo was deliberately indifferent based on

Santoyo’s referral to an outside surgeon is insufficient to create

a basis for relief, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment

on this claim.

/// 

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c. Delayed repair following surgery 

Finally, Lopez alleged that Santoyo was deliberately

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by failing to

repair Plaintiff’s chipped molar within a reasonable time following

the wisdom tooth surgery, prolonging Lopez’s pain and eating

difficulties for more than two months. (Second Am. Compl. 8-9, ECF

No. 62.) Plaintiff’s molar was chipped during his wisdom teeth

removal on April 30, 2007. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2, Decl.

Timothy J. Kral, Ex. N, Dep. Adam Ray Lopez, at 86, 96, ECF No.

131.) Santoyo examined Plaintiff on May 15, 2007, but did not

repair the tooth until July 10, 2007. (Id. at 98-99, 105; Defs.’

Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 19, ECF No. 131.) Defendant

offers evidence that Lopez had mild swelling after the surgery when

he was seen by Defendant Robertson on May 3, 2007. (Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 19, ECF No. 131; Decl. Michael

Adu-Tutu, D.D.S., Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D at 243, ECF No.

132.) Defendant contends that a repair could have damaged the

remaining tooth, and it was therefore prudent for Santoyo to wait

until the area healed. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. &

A. 19-20, ECF No. 131.) 

Dr. Robertson’s notes from his May 3, 2007 examination of

Plaintiff indicate minor swelling and state that tissues appear

within normal limits. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F at

63, ECF No. 163.) When Santoyo subsequently saw Lopez on May 15,

2007, he recorded “delayed healing” but no swelling of the area. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleged he informed Santoyo of his pain caused by

his chipped tooth and his inability to eat. (Second Am. Compl. 9,

ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff argues that Santoyo told him he could have

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repaired the tooth immediately if he had the time to do so. (Pl.’s

Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 10, ECF No. 163.) Plaintiff claims

Santoyo promised to call Lopez back in a week to perform the

repair, but failed to do so. (Id.) Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that a triable

issue of fact remains whether the two-month delay in treatment of

Lopez’s chipped molar constituted deliberate indifference by

Santoyo. 

C. Defendant Robertson

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Robertson was deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs by refusing to prescribe

pain medication, failing to instruct Santoyo to prescribe pain

medication, refusing to conduct Lopez’s surgery, failing to

instruct Santoyo to conduct the surgery, and failing to ensure that

Plaintiff’s surgery was expedited. (Second Am. Compl. 10, ECF No.

62.) Defendant Robertson moves for summary judgment, arguing that

there is no evidence of his deliberate indifference. (Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 20-22, ECF No. 131.) 

Robertson argues that he was not aware of Plaintiff’s pain

complaints until April 23, 2007, one week before Plaintiff had his

surgery. (Id. at 20; id. Attach. #4, Robertson Decl. 2-3.) 

Defendant points out that Lopez’s condition at that time was

assigned priority 2, which required treatment within 120 days

according to Chapter 5.4 of the California Department of

Corrections Dental Services Manual from April 2006. (Id. Attach.

#1, Mem. P. & A. 23.) Defendants’ expert opines that because

Plaintiff’s dental condition was not classified as “urgent 1A” or

“emergent,” Dr. Robertson was not required to expedite the surgery

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even though Lopez had waited more than 120 days by the time

Robertson allegedly learned about Plaintiff’s condition. (Decl.

Michael Adu-Tutu, D.D.S., Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 13-14, ECF No.

132.) Robertson contends he first treated Lopez on May 1, 2007,

after the oral surgery, when he prescribed Lopez pain medication. 

(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4, Robertson Decl. 2.) 

A factual dispute remains regarding when Robertson became

aware of the Plaintiff’s serious medical condition. Lopez alleged

that Robertson knew of Lopez’s dental condition and the delay in

his surgery as early as November 2, 2006, but did nothing to remedy

the situation. (Second Am. Compl. 2, 6-7, ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff

offers evidence that Robertson, as the chief dental officer at

Calipatria, was required to review Lopez’s health records,

including Santoyo’s November 1, 2006 examination notes, prior to

approving the outside surgery on November 2, 2006. (Pl.’s Opp’n

Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 6, 14, ECF No. 163; id. Ex. C at 33.) 

Plaintiff relies on the California Department of Corrections Dental

Services Manual from April 2006, arguing that Robertson, in his

capacity as chief dentist and a member of the Dental Authorization

Review Committee (DARC), was aware of Lopez’s pain, swelling,

infection, and lack of pain medication. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. 14, ECF No. 163; id. Ex. C.) 

Robertson concedes that the DARC approved the outpatient

surgery request for Lopez on November 2, 2006. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 20, ECF No. 131.) Defendant argues,

however, that there is no evidence that Dr. Robertson “participated

in the approval process” for Plaintiff’s outpatient surgery as a

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member of DARC, because the DARC membership may include a

“designee” of the chief dentist. (Id.) 

This argument is contradicted by the California Department of

Corrections Dental Services Manual from April 2006. Chapter 4.5 of

the manual requires all special dental service requests to be

submitted to, and pre-authorized by, the chief dentist before being

reviewed by the DARC. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C at

33, ECF No. 163.) Defendant Robertson admitted that he served as

the chief dentist at Calipatria during the relevant time period. 

(Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4, Robertson Decl. 1, ECF No. 131.) 

Thus, Chief Dentist Robertson would have received and preauthorized

the request for Lopez’s outside surgery in November 2006,

regardless of his membership in the DARC. 

Notably, Robertson does not disclaim his membership in the

DARC. In his declaration in support of the Motion for Summary

Judgment, he states that his “administrative responsibilities as

chief dentist” included “submitting referrals for specialty

services to the Dental Authorization Review committee, and

tabulating and reporting statistical data regarding dental care

provided to patients.” (Id. at 2.) 

According to Chapter 4.5 of the Dental Services Manual, the

purpose of the DARC is to approve requests for otherwise excluded

dental services, determine the appropriateness of treatment

provided by the institution’s dentists, and review treatment

recommendations for special dental care needs. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’

Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C at 31, ECF No. 163.) The DARC is required to

meet on a monthly basis, and the permanent membership of the DARC

includes the chief dentist or a designee. (Id.) Among its

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functions is to “[e]nsure that all inmates/patients are receiving

equal and timely access to dental care.” (Id. at 32.) A 1C

priority classification requires treatment within sixty days, while

a 2 priority status mandates treatment within 120 days. (Id. at

37.) In this case, Lopez waited 278 days from his initial request

on July 26, 2006, or 179 days from the date his outside surgery was

approved on November 2, 2006, to receive treatment on April 30,

2007. 

Plaintiff points out that Robertson, as chief dentist, was

required to maintain written minutes of all DARC meetings. (Pl.’s

Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 14, ECF No. 163; id. Ex. C at 31.) 

Chapter 4.5 of the Dental Services Manual from April 2006 requires

that the DARC written minutes include “specific recommendations for

action,” and that all recommendations be reviewed “as part of old

business at subsequent meetings” and monitored until resolved. 

(Id. Ex. C at 31.) Thus, Lopez maintains that Robertson was aware

of the delay in surgery from November 2, 2006 through April 30,

2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 14, ECF No. 163.) 

Defendant replies that the 2006 dental policies and procedures

cited by Lopez are inapplicable because they were not implemented

at Calipatria until mid-2007. (Defs.’ Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Summ.

J. 8, ECF No. 166.) As discussed earlier, there is a triable issue

of fact with regard to the applicable rules and procedures at

Calipatria at the relevant time period. Therefore, a dispute

remains as to whether Robertson was aware of Plaintiff’s condition

on November 2, 2006. Accordingly, to the extent Lopez alleged

deliberate indifference based on Robertson’s failure to prescribe

pain medication, order Santoyo to prescribe it, or ensure

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Plaintiff’s surgery was timely performed according to the priority

classification, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied. 

To the extent Plaintiff based his deliberate indifference

claim on Robertson’s refusal to conduct Lopez’s surgery himself or

failure to instruct Santoyo to conduct the surgery at Calipatria,

both Defendants submitted declarations that they could not have

safely performed the procedure. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3,

Decl. Paul Santoyo 5, ECF 131; id. Attach. #4, Decl. Robertson 4.) 

The Court is reluctant to second-guess the judgment of medical

professionals regarding their own qualifications. As stated

earlier, “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and

prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise

to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d

at 1344 (citing Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.

1970)). Therefore, as to these subclaims, Robertson’s Motion for

Summary Judgment should be granted. 

D. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials who perform

discretionary functions from civil liability when their conduct

does not violate a “clearly established” constitutional right of

which “a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Government officials are

entitled to qualified immunity if, (1) viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged do not demonstrate a

constitutional violation, or (2) the plaintiff’s rights were not

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled on other grounds by

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); see Conner v. Heiman, 672

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F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). A court may consider the two

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis in any order. Chism v.

Washington State, 661 F.3d 380, 386 (9th Cir. 2011).

In conclusion of their Motion, Defendants briefly argue that

even assuming that Plaintiff can show a constitutional violation,

they are entitled to qualified immunity because Lopez cannot raise

a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether reasonable

prison officials under similar circumstances would believe their

actions violated clearly established law. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1, Mem. P. & A. 25, ECF No. 25.) 

“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, the

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Social & Health Services, 648

F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (internal quotations omitted). This inquiry

“must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case,

not as a broad general proposition,” and all disputed facts must be

construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 201; Ford v.

Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). In addressing

whether a reasonable official would consider his conduct unlawful,

courts consider two questions: “(1) Was the law governing the

state official’s conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law

could a reasonable official have believed his conduct was lawful?” 

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

Whether plaintiff's constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of a government official's violation is an

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objective standard in the qualified immunity analysis; defendant’s

subjective understanding of the constitutionality of his conduct is

irrelevant. Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109

(9th Cir. 2011). To determine whether a constitutional right was

clearly established, it is not necessary that the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful, but in the light of

pre-existing law the unlawfulness of the public official's action

must be apparent. Cmty House, Inc. v. City of Boise, Idaho, 623

F.3d 945, 967 (9th Cir. 2010). When an officer's conduct is so

patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable

officials would know without guidance from the courts that the

action was unconstitutional, closely analogous pre-existing case

law is not required to show that the law is clearly established. 

Boyd v. Benton Cnty, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need was well-established prior to the time of the

events in this case. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. The Ninth

Circuit recognized that “[d]ental care is one of the most important

medical needs of inmates.” Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198,

200-01 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 576

(10th Cir. 1980)). Judge Whelan, the district judge assigned this

case, previously held that a reasonable official would know prior

to July 2006 that it is unlawful to show deliberate indifference to

a prisoner’s serious dental needs. (Order (1) Rejecting Report and

Recommendation [Doc. 91], and (2) Denying Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 14, ECF No. 97.) 

Here, Defendant Santoyo examined Lopez in November and

recommended “urgent” outside surgery based on the pain, swelling,

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and infection caused by Plaintiff’s impacted wisdom teeth. 

Defendant Robertson approved this request in his capacity as chief

dentist at Calipatria. Plaintiff then waited approximately five

months to receive the surgery. Construing the facts in favor of

the nonmoving party, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact

that Defendants Santoyo and Robertson failed to timely address his

dental problems and the resulting pain. Because there are disputed

facts related to the Defendants’ deliberate indifference to Lopez’s

condition and such indifference would violate clearly established

law, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Hunt,

865 F.2d at 201 (“Prison officials are deliberately indifferent to

a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or

intentionally interfere with medical treatment.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that

Defendant Santoyo’s Motion be granted on the claim that he was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s dental needs in failing to

perform Lopez’s dental surgery himself. In all other respects,

Santoyo’s Motion should be denied. Defendant Robertson’s Motion

should be granted on the claims that he was deliberately

indifferent to Lopez’s dental condition in failing to perform the

dental surgery himself and failing to order Santoyo to perform the

dental surgery. The remainder of Defendant Robertson’s Motion

should be denied. 

Plaintiff’s [Ex Parte] Application for Order Allowing

Plaintiff to File [a] Reply to Defendants’ Most Recent Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on Second

Amended Complaint [ECF No. 170] is denied.

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This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before February 8, 2013. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before February 22,

2013. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: January 15, 2013 _______________________________

Ruben B. Brooks, Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc:

Judge Whelan

All Parties of Record

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