Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04150/USCOURTS-arwd-4_04-cv-04150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

JOHN HEIFNER PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 04-4150

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

John Heifner (hereinafter “plaintiff”), brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social

Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his applications for disability insurance

benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”), under Titles II and XVI of the

Act.

Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI now before this court were filed on July 19, 2001, alleging

an onset date of July 2, 2001, due to amputation of his right leg above the knee. (Tr. 86-89, 120).

An administrative hearing was held on May 1, 2003. (Tr. 254-301). On August 26, 2003, the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), found that plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff appealed that

decision, and on January 20, 2004, the Appeals Council granted plaintiff’s request for review, and

remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. (Tr. 72-75). A supplemental

administrative hearing was held on June 8, 2004. (Tr. 302-367). Plaintiff was present and

represented by counsel. 

On August 31, 2004, the ALJ, found that plaintiff had severe impairments, but that those

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impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. 22). After discrediting plaintiff’ssubjective allegations, the ALJ

concluded that he maintained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), to perform sedentary work,

with significant limitations in his capacity for prolonged standing and walking. (Tr. 22). With the

assistance of a vocational expert (“VE”), he determined that plaintiff could not perform his past

relevant work as a logger, but could perform the positions of escort vehicle driver, loader for semiconductor dyes, and telephone questionnaire clerk. (Tr. 23). 

On October 13, 2004, the Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 5-10).

Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned by consent

of the parties. The plaintiff and Commissioner have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready

for decision. (Doc. # 11-13). 

Applicable Law:

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have

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decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words,

if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and

one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.

Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevent him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his

disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final

stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in

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light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42

(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s failure to properly include plaintiff’s

intellectual abilities in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert (“VE”). The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that borderline intellectual functioning represents a

significant nonexertional impairment that must be considered by a VE. See Foreman v. Callahan, 122

F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1997); Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir.1997) (same). 

In the present case, we note that plaintiff was not referred for a consultative mental

evaluation. Instead, he merely underwent a rehabilitation diagnosis and assessment with Arkansas

Rehabilitation Services in Little Rock, Arkansas. (Tr. 194-197). After administering various

psychological tests to plaintiff, Dr. J. Stephen Holt, a psychologist, determined that plaintiff was

suffering from low average to borderline intellectual functioning. (Tr. 196). Test scores also

revealed that plaintiff exhibited a borderline verbal-academic aptitude, borderline sight vocabulary

and word recognition skills, low average visual-motor skills, an eighth grade reading level, a fifth

grade math level, and a sixth grade spelling level. (Tr. 195). To Dr. Holt, this indicated that plaintiff

would likely experience difficulty maintaining an adequate production level, if his position required

more than simple academics. He also opined that plaintiff would experience difficulty reading

advanced technical materials; difficulties requiring special instructional methods; difficulty with

spelling tasks; difficulty relating to others, difficulty coping with the pressures for production; slow

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learning of training/work tasks; limited training potential; feelings that cause him to avoid tasks

involving people; an emotional intensity that may interfere with his task performance; and, a limited

ability to benefit from standard classroom instruction. (Tr. 196). The ALJ, however, did not include

these limitations in the hypothetical question he phrased to the VE. In fact, when plaintiff’s counsel

mentioned these limitations to the VE, the VE indicated that these impairments would prevent

plaintiff from performing any positions that exist in significant numbers within the national

economy. (Tr. 364-365). Asthere is no other information concerning plaintiff’s mental impairments

that would negate Dr. Holt’s findings, we believe that remand is necessary to allow the ALJ to

properly question the VE. In addition, given the fact that plaintiff has undergone only one mental

evaluation, we recommend that the ALJ order a consultative mental evaluation to include academic

and intellectual testing, so that the reliability of Dr. Holt’s findings can be further assessed. See Cox

v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1998) (If a hypothetical question does not include all of the

claimant’s impairments, limitations, and restrictions, or it is otherwise inadequate, a VE’s response

cannot constitute substantial evidence to support a conclusion of no disability.”). 

Further, after reviewing the entire record, it appears that none of plaintiff’s treating physicians

have completed an RFC assessment for the time period in question. See Vaughn v. Heckler, 741 F.2d

177, 179 (8th Cir. 1984) (If a treating physician has not issued an opinion which can be adequately

related to the disability standard, the ALJ is obligated to address a precise inquiry to the physician

so as to clarify the record). The ALJ, in concluding that plaintiff could perform the exertional and

non-exertional requirements of sedentary work, relied on an RFC assessment completed by a nonexamining medical consultant. (Tr. 21-22). We note, that the opinion of a consulting physician who

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examined the plaintiff once or not at all does not generally constitute substantial evidence. See

Jenkins v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999). Therefore, based on the current evidence of

record, we do not find substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ is directed to address interrogatories to the physicians who

have evaluated and/or treated plaintiff, asking the physicians to review plaintiff’s medical records;

to complete a mental and physical RFC assessment regarding plaintiff’s capabilities during the time

period in question; and, to give the objective basis for their opinions, so that an informed decision

can be made regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities on a sustained basis during

the relevant time period in question. Chitwood v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1376, 1378 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986);

Dozier v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff also raises an issue concerning the musculoskeletal listings that were applied to his

impairments. He contendsthat the listings changed after he filed his application, but before the ALJ

rendered a decision. When the ALJ rendered his decision, he allegedly utilized the listings in effect

at that time, rather than those in place at the time plaintiff filed his application. Since plaintiff

contends that this was error on the part of the ALJ, on remand, the ALJ is directed to address this

issue, providing citations to the statutes and case law that support his determination regarding which

regulations should be applied.

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,

and therefore, the denial of benefits to the plaintiff, should be reversed and this matter should be

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remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

DATED this 15th day of December 2005.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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