Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00882/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00882-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:7604 Clear Air Act (Emission Standards)

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Because the court denies the motion to modify on

jurisdictional grounds, it need not take judicial notice of the

declaration of Randall Segawa, which was sought by the defendants,

or the exhibits to the declaration of Anne Katten, as sought by the

plaintiffs.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EL COMITE PARA EL BIENESTAR DE

EARLIMART,, et al,

Plaintiffs, Civ. S-04-882 LKK/KJM

v.

O R D E R

MARY-ANN WARMERDAM, et al,

Defendants.

 /

AIR COALITION TEAM,

Intervenor.

 /

The State Defendants have brought a motion seeking the court

to clarify or, in the alternative, to modify its April 26, 2006

Remedy Order. For the reason set forth below, the court denies the

motion.1 The court will, however, grant a brief stay of the

judgment.

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Case 2:04-cv-00882-LKK -KJM Document 179 Filed 12/12/07 Page 1 of 9
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The contents of this letter, including the reduction

commitments and stated timelines for implementing them, are

reproduced in the February 22, 2006 order at 14.

2

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The plaintiffs in this case brought suit against several state

agencies and agency employees in their official capacities to

enforce provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, et seq.

On February 22, 2006, the court granted the plaintiffs’ summary

judgment motion as to their first cause of action and granted the

defendants’ summary judgment motion as to the second cause of

action. The court held that a May 9, 1995 memorandum from

Department of Pesticide Regulation Director James Wells to

California Air Resources Board Director James Boyd was incorporated

into the California State Implementation Plan (“SIP”).

Consequently, when the SIP was approved by the EPA, the state’s

commitment to reduce volatile organic compound emissions as

described in the Wells letter was made binding and enforceable.2

Because the defendants had not carried out their commitments under

the SIP, the court held that they violated the Clean Air Act. See

also April 26, 2006, order at 3, n. 2.

After reviewing additional briefing by the parties as to

remedies, the court issued a remedial order on April 26, 2006. In

it, the court ordered that the defendants “propose, adopt and

submit to the EPA for approval, and implement regulations no later

than January 1, 2008 to achieve the emissions reduction goals as

set forth” in the Wells memo. 

Case 2:04-cv-00882-LKK -KJM Document 179 Filed 12/12/07 Page 2 of 9
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On May 26, 2006, the State defendants appealed the court’s

summary judgment and remedial orders to the Court of Appeals. That

appeal is still pending, as of the date of this order.

II. STANDARD

“Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief from

a court order when ‘it is no longer equitable that the judgment

should have prospective application.’” Rufo v. Inmates of the

Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367(1992). The party seeking the

modification bears the burden of proving that a significant change

of circumstances warrants the modification of the prior order. Id.;

Bellevue Manor Associates v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249, 1255

(9th Cir. 1999). In this situation, the proposed modification must

be tailored to the changed circumstance. Bellevue Manor, 165 F.3d

at 1255. Alternatively, the modification may be made if the party

seeking it shows that “enforcement of the decree without

modification would be detrimental to the public interest.” Rufo,

502 U.S. at 384. 

III. ANALYSIS

In their motion, the State defendants ask the court to modify,

or in the alternative to clarify, its April 26, 2006 remedies

order. The State defendants specifically seek that the court

interpret or modify the remedies order to allow the State to make

gradual reductions of volatile organic compound emissions in

Ventura County until 2012. In 2012, the State defendants assert,

the State will have met the reductions in Ventura County described

in the Wells memo. 

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For the reasons described herein, the court denies the motion.

A. Jurisdiction to Modify the Remedy Order

As a consequence of the defendants’ appeal of the summary

judgment and remedial orders, this court no longer has jurisdiction

to modify the remedial order in the manner that the State

defendants seek.

When a district court’s order is appealed, the district court

is divested of jurisdiction over the matters being appealed.

Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. (“NRDC”) v. Southwest Marine

Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Supreme Court

explained, “it is generally understood that a federal district

court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert

jurisdiction over a case simultaneously.” Griggs v. Provident

Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). This rule promotes

judicial economy and presents the court of appeals with a “fixed,

rather than a mobile, record.” NRDC, 242 F.3d at 1166; Kern Oil &

Refining Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1988);

see also 20 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 303.32[1]

(3rd ed. 2000). 

There are exceptions to this general principle. After an

appeal has been noticed, the district court may act to preserve the

status quo during the pendency of the appeal. See Newton v.

Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 258 U.S. 165 (1922); NRDC, 242

F.3d at 1166; Hoffman v. Beer Drivers & Salesman’s Local Union No.

888, 536 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1976). This exception is

codified in Rule 62(c). See McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley

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Typo., Etc., 686 F.2d 731, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1982). Relatedly, the

district court may take any action that will aid in the appeal. See

9 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, § 303.32[2][b][ii];

In re. Thorp, 655 F.2d 997, 998 (9th Cir. 1981); Resnik v. La Paz

Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1961). This may include,

for example, clarifying the district court’s prior findings or

entering written findings and conclusions. See, e.g., Federal Trade

Com’n v. Enforma Natural Products, Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1215-16

(9th Cir. 2004); Kern Oil, 840 F.2d at 734. 

When an appeal has divested the district court of jurisdiction

but a party nevertheless seeks relief under Rule 60(b), “the proper

procedure is to ask the district court whether it wishes to

entertain the motion, or to grant it, and then move [the appellate]

court, if appropriate, for remand of the case.” Scott v. Younger,

739 F.2d 1464, 1466 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Gould v. Mut. Life

Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, the court was divested of its jurisdiction to modify its

April 26, 2006 remedy order by the defendants’ notice of appeal

filed in May, 2006. The appeal relates to the very order that the

state defendants now seek to modify via Rule 60(b). If the court

were to grant such a motion, it would cause the precise type of

confusion of a “mobile record” that the jurisdiction-divesture rule

exists to prevent. See NRDC, 242 F.3d at 1166

Moreover, the exceptions to the rule divesting the court of

jurisdiction do not apply. The defendants have moved to modify the

court’s remedies order in order to extend the deadline for VOC

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If the court construes the defendants’ motion as asking this

court whether it would entertain or grant a motion to modify, the

court responds that, based on the record before it, it is not

inclined to entertain or grant such a motion.

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reductions in Ventura County from 2008 to 2012. This is a material

modification that would not simply aid in the appeal or preserve

the status quo. 

Finally, the state defendants have not followed the necessary

procedure if they seek to revest this court with jurisdiction. They

have not asked this court if it would entertain or grant their Rule

60(b) motion, and they have not sought a remand from the Court of

Appeals.3 Consequently, because the defendants’ appeal is still

pending and the case has not been remanded to this court, the court

has not been revested with jurisdiction to consider the Rule 60(b)

motion. 

B. Clarification of The Remedies Order

To the extent that it will assist in the pending appeal, the

court clarifies what is required by the April 26, 2006 remedies

order. The court acknowledges that there is some ambiguity in its

remedies order, as the order may be read to require that the state

implement regulations by January 1, 2008, while permitting the

actual targeted reductions to be achieved after that date. 

The relevant portion of the remedies order states: “Defendants

shall propose, adopt and submit to EPA for approval, and implement

regulations no later than January 1, 2008, to achieve the emission

reductions goals as set forth in the May 9, 1995 memorandum from

James Well [sic] to James Boyd (“Wells memo”).” The Wells memo, as

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In the remedies order, the court ordered that the 1991

inventory was to be used as a surrogate 1990 baseline, consistent

with the court’s holding in its summary judgment order. 

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The court held in the February 22, 2006 summary judgment

order that the Wells memo is part of the State Implementation Plan.

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recreated in relevant part in the February 2006 summary judgment

order, stated:

The Department of Pesticide Regulation commits to adopt

and submit to U.S. EPA by June 15, 1997, any regulations

necessary to reduce volatile organic compound emissions

from agricultural and commercial structural pesticides

by specific percentages of the 1990 base year emissions4,

by specified years, and in specified nonattainment

areas, as listed . . .

The memo then stated that the following reductions of volatile

organic compound emissions would be made in Ventura county: 8% by

1996, 12% by 1999, 16% by 2002, and 20% by 2005. 

While the court’s remedies order may have been ambiguous as

to when the state must achieve emissions reductions in Ventura

county, the Wells memo is not. The Wells memo is clear that a 20%

reduction in VOC emissions must be accomplished by 2005. Where the

Wells memo states that action must be taken “by specified years,”

this requirement plainly refers to the reductions of VOC emissions,

not simply the adoption and submission of regulations. The court

must interpret a State Implementation Plan by its plain meaning.5

See Safe Air for Everyone v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency, 488 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007); Bayview Hunters Point

Community Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 366 F.3d 692 (9th

Cir. 2004). Because the remedies order explicitly ordered the

defendants to achieve the goals described in the Wells memo, the

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Because the summary judgment and remedies orders were issued

in 2006, the 2005 deadline included in the Wells memo had obviously

passed. Therefore, the court gave the defendants until 2008 to

implement regulations to achieve 20% VOC reductions in the five

ozone non-attainment areas. 

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defendants are bound by the memo’s plain directives.6

 The

defendants’ suggestion that this order can allow for a gradual

reduction until 2012 is therefore not tenable. 

C. Stay of the Remedies Order

At oral argument, the defendants requested this court stay its

remedies order so that the state may comply with the California law

requirements for approval of the regulations it is endeavoring to

implement. The defendants represented that this process will take

up to forty-five calendar days. 

Under Rule 62 this court has jurisdiction to stay an

injunction pending an appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 62(c);

Hoffman, 536 F.2d at 1276. While no formal motion under Rule 62(c)

has been filed, the court recognizes that it would be imprudent to

require the defendants to implement their regulations so quickly

as to prevent them from complying with state law. Consequently, the

court stays its April 26, 2006 Remedy Order with regards to

paragraph 1 of the order (page 2, lines 8-11) for forty-five

calendar days from the date of this order. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described herein, the defendants’ motion is

DENIED.

The court’s April 26, 2006 order is STAYED as to paragraph one

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(1) of that order, for forty-five calendar days from the date of

this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 12, 2007.

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