Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03072/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03072-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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 At the time the motion to amend was filed, the deadlines for completing

discovery and for filing dispositive motions had not yet passed. Both deadlines

have now passed and all three parties have a motion for summary judgment

pending.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

D. Douglas Gandy, D.O., 

Plaintiff,

vs.

Lynne Shaklan-Brown, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV-06-3072-PHX-PGR 

 

 ORDER

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Lynne Shaklan-Brown’s Motion to

Amend Answer, and to Add Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (doc. #49),

to which co-defendant Robert K. Brown has filed a joinder (doc. #84). The

plaintiff has filed a relatively cursory response in which he objects to the motion

solely on the grounds that the proposed amendments are in effect untimely and

will result in the need for pretrial scheduling deadlines to be extended.1

 Having

considered the parties’ memoranda in light of the record, the Court finds that the

motion should be granted in part and denied in part.

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2

 In light of Shaklan-Brown’s repeated references to the fact that the

Scheduling Order did not contain a deadline for her to amend her answer, the

Court wishes to make very clear that it did not set forth any Rule 15(a)-related

deadline in the Scheduling Order, as it normally does in its scheduling orders,

solely in reliance on the parties’ statement in their Joint Case Management Report

(doc. #21), which was signed on Shaklan-Brown’s behalf by her original counsel,

that “[t]he parties do not intend to file any motions pursuant to Rule 12(b),

Fed.R.Civ.P., motions to amend pleadings and motions to join additional parties[,]”

and the parties’ consequential decision not to propose any such deadlines. While

Shaklan-Brown, through her current counsel, entered into a stipulation (doc. #41)

with the plaintiff prior to the Scheduling Conference to revise certain of the dates

proposed in the Joint Case Management Report, the parties again failed to

reference any desire to amend pleadings or add parties and no proposed Rule

15(a)-related deadline was then requested.

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A. Affirmative Defenses

Shaklan-Brown, acting through substituted counsel, seeks in part to amend

her answer pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) in order to specify various affirmative

defenses. Her answer (doc. #17), filed by her original counsel, merely stated that

she was incorporating those affirmative defenses set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)

and that she would be amending her answer to designate specific affirmative

defenses after her counsel received and reviewed the documents referenced in

the complaint. She now proposes to add affirmative defenses of failure of

consideration, unclean hands, illusory contract, misrepresentation, breach of the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, non-performance, wrongful repossession,

and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

As Shaklan-Brown correctly points out, the liberal amendment standard of

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 15(a), rather than the “good cause” standard of Fed.R.Civ.16

as suggested by the plaintiff, governs the proposed amendment inasmuch as the

Scheduling Order (doc. #43) did not set forth a deadline for amending pleadings

or adding parties.2

 Since Shaklan-Brown’s request to amend her answer was

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not unduly delayed given that it was made less than three months after the

Scheduling Conference was held and since the plaintiff has not established that

he would be unduly prejudiced by the addition of specific affirmative defenses,

the Court will permit Shaklan-Brown to amend her answer.

B. Counterclaim

Shaklan-Brown seeks to add a counterclaim for conversion based on her

allegation that the plaintiff’s agents removed equipment from her office that was

not part of her contract with the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff has not established

any undue delay in seeking the amendment or undue prejudice to him stemming

from the addition of the conversion claim, and apparently cannot since he was

previously made aware of the conversion allegation through the prior disclosure

of preliminary report of Kenneth Goodman, Shaklan-Brown’s expert, and since

the Court believes that the addition of the conversion counterclaim is in the

interest of justice, the Court will permit the counterclaim to be filed pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(f).

Any current need by a party to reopen discovery related to the added

affirmative defenses or counterclaim can be brought to the Court’s attention after

the resolution of the pending motions for summary judgment. 

C. Third-Party Complaint

Shaklan-Brown further seeks to add a third-party complaint against MedSurge Advances, Inc. and its employee, Paul Hershman, and his wife. The gist of

the proposed third-party complaint is that Med-Surge and Hershman made

numerous misrepresentations to Shaklan-Brown and failed to disclose numerous

material facts to her while seeking to have her enter into the sublease with the

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3

 Conceding that the addition of the third-party complaint will necessarily

delay the resolution of the original action, Shaklan-Brown states in her reply that

she is willing to withdraw the third-party complaint from the proposed

amendments if the Court deems it appropriate for her to do so.

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plaintiff.3

Although it is never once mentioned, much less discussed, by ShaklanBrown, Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a) governs the propriety of the filing of the proposed

third-party complaint. It is well established that a third-party claim can be

maintained pursuant to Rule 14(a) only where a third-party defendant’s liability to

the third-party plaintiff is dependent on the outcome of the main claim and is

secondary or derivative thereto. Stewart v. American International Oil & Gas Co.,

845 F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 1988). Since the crucial characteristic of a Rule 14(a)

claim is that the third-party plaintiff is attempting to transfer to the third-party

defendant the liability asserted against her by the original plaintiff, id. at 200, a

proper third-party claim is typically one that involves one joint tortfeasor

impleading another, an indemnitee impleading an indemnitor, or a secondarily

liable party impleading one who is primarily liable. Rule 14(a) does not permit a

third-party complaint to be founded on a defendant’s independent cause of action

against a third-party defendant even if it arises out of the same transaction or

same set of facts underlying the plaintiff’s claim. Id.

The Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, declines to allow

Shaklan-Brown to file the proposed third-party complaint. First, while ShaklanBrown’s claims against Med-Surge and Hershman are obviously transactionally

related to the plaintiff’s claims against her, she has not met her burden of

establishing that her third-party misrepresentation and fraud claims are in fact

wholly dependent upon the outcome of the main claims, i.e. that Med-Surge and

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 The form of the amended answer and counterclaim shall be that set

forth in the lodged proposed document (doc. #50), minus the proposed third-party

complaint.

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Hershman would be liable for indemnification, subrogation, contribution, or under

any other theory that would make them secondarily or derivatively liable to her in

the event she is held liable to the plaintiff. Second, the addition of the third-party

claims would obviously disadvantage the existing action, which is now in the

procedural posture of awaiting resolution of cross-motions for summary judgment.

See Southwest Administrators,Inc. v. Rozay’s Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 777 (9th

Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (“The decision whether to implead

a third-party defendant is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ... It

is not an abuse of discretion to deny an application for impleader where it will

disadvantage the existing action.”) Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Lynne Shaklan-Brown’s Motion to Amend

Answer, and to Add Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (doc. #49) is

granted to the extent that it seeks permission to file an amended answer with

specified affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for conversion, and it is denied

to the extent that it seeks permission to file a third-party complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Lynne Shaklan-Brown shall file

her amended answer and counterclaim no later than October 10, 2008.

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DATED this 30th day of September, 2008.

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