Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01497/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-01497-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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**E-Filed**

July 15, 2005

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DIGITAL ENVOY, INC., 

Plaintiff,

 v.

GOOGLE, INC., 

Defendant.

 /

NO. 5:04-cv-1497 RS

ORDER DENYING 

DIGITAL'S REQUEST FOR

LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Digital Envoy, Inc. ("Digital") requests leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the

Court's order granting in part and denying in part the motions for summary judgment filed by defendant

Google, Inc. ("Google"), issued on May 20, 2005. Specifically, Digital asks the Court to reconsider its

decision granting summary judgment in favor of Google on Digital's claims for relief based on statutory

unfair competition, common law unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and the Lanham Act. Based on all

papers filed to date, as well as on the papers and arguments submitted in conjunction with the summary

judgment motions, the Court denies Digital's request for leave to file a motion for reconsideration on the

basis that Digital has failed to establish the elements set forth in Civil L.R. 7-9, as explained below.

II. BACKGROUND

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1 Digital's motion for entry of a new protective order is presently scheduled to be heard by the Court on August

31, 2005.

2

The Court has issued numerous orders in this case and, therefore, will not reiterate its factual

background. With respect to the unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims, Digital contends that the

Court erred in finding that the identical facts supporting those claims also form the basis of its trade secret

claim and are, therefore, preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("CUTSA"). Contrary to

the Court's findings, Digital argues that "the factual bases for [its] claims arise from different subsets of the

general facts alleged in the Complaint." See Digital's Motion for Leave to File Reconsideration Motion at

p. 3.

Digital also contends that the Court erroneously concluded that Digital and Google must be

competitors in order for Digital to recover under the Lanham Act. Although it concedes that the two

parties must be competitors in order to sustain a claim under section (a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, Digital

argues that its claim is based on false designation of origin under section (a)(1)(A) of the Act, thereby

obviating the "competitor" requirement. See e.g., Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403,

1406 (9th Cir. 1988). Alternatively, Digital states that the two companies are competitors, in direct

contradiction to its position stated to the Court earlier in this case, and notes that it has filed a motion for

entry of a new protective order which would subject Digital to certain restrictions regarding the production

of various materials by Google based on the "fact" that the parties are competitors.1

Google opposes Digital's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that

Digital has failed to fulfill the requirements set forth in Civil L.R. 7-9, which governs the filing of such

requests. Specifically, Google contends that Digital has failed to establish the existence of: (1) a material

difference of fact or law from that which was presented to the Court; or, (2) a manifest failure by the Court

to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments. In addition, Google notes that, in direct

contravention of L.R. 7-9(c), Digital repeats the oral and written arguments previously submitted to the

Court. 

III. STANDARDS

Civil L.R. 7-9(b) states in relevant part that the party moving for reconsideration must specifically

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show:

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order;

or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments

which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.

This Rule conforms to the grounds set forth by the Ninth Circuit: that a motion for reconsideration

may be based only on: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or,

(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Painting Industry of Hawaii Market

Recovery Fund v. United States Department of the Air Force, 756 F. Supp. 452, 453 (D. Hawaii 1990). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Digital bases its request for reconsideration on its assertion that new material facts have emerged

since the issuance of the Court's order, namely, that two emails attached as exhibits to Digital's opposition

to the motions for summary judgment have now been authenticated by Google. Not only is such

authentication not a new "fact," but it is completely immaterial to any findings made by the Court in its

summary judgment order. The exhibits to which Digital refers were not objected to by Google during the

summary judgment proceedings and, accordingly, were considered by the Court and included in its order. 

See Order filed on May 20, 2005 at pp. 5, 10. Accordingly, Digital has failed to establish the emergence

of new material facts or a change of law which occurred after the issuance of the Court's order in May, as

required by Civil L.R. 7-9(b)(2).

Digital also contends that the Court should reconsider its prior order because it failed to consider

material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court. Contrary to Digital's

arguments, however, the order reflects that the Court considered and rejected Digital's contentions

regarding the factual bases for its statutory and common law unfair competition and unjust enrichment

claims. Although Digital seeks to identify "subsets" of facts which would distinguish those claims from its

trade secrets theory, it fails in that effort. In addition, Digital argues that the Court did not consider its legal

arguments concerning the Lanham Act's requirement that the parties be competitors. This contention is

again belied by the Court's order. Moreover, Digital again, in direct contravention of L.R. 7-9(c), repeats

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2As the Ninth Circuit recently clarified, different subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) have different standing

requirements, such that a claim filed under (a)(1)(A) of the Act requires only that a plaintiff allege commercial injury based

on the deceptive use of a trademark, while a claim filed under (a)(1)(B) requires that the parties be competitors. See Jack

Russell v. American Kennel Club, 407 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, had Digital alleged "reverse palming off"

under § 43 of the Lanham Act, it need not have been a Google competitor. However, as Google correctly argued, the

complaint cannot fairly be read to aver such a claim. Moreover, the claim simply restates the trade secrets claim, which does

not give rise to a Lanham Act claim. See e.g., Wolf v. Louis Marx & Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 856, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (trade secret

allegations do not give rise to Lanham Act claim). 

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the prior written and oral arguments it made to the Court in opposing the summary judgment motions.2 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Digital's motion for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 15, 2005 /s/ Richard Seeborg 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT COPIES OF THIS ORDER WERE ELECTRONICALLY

PROVIDED TO:

Brian R. Blackman bblackman@sheppardmullin.com 

P. Craig Cardon ccardon@sheppardmullin.com, msariano@sheppardmullin.com 

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Charles Tait Graves tgraves@wsgr.com 

Stephen C. Holmes sholmes@wsgr.com, pmarquez@wsgr.com 

David H. Kramer dkramer@wsgr.com, dgrubbs@wsgr.com 

Michael S. Kwun mkwun@google.com 

David L. Lansky dlansky@wsgr.com 

Chan S. Park cpark@wsgr.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not registered

for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 7/15/05 Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By:______DM_________________

Chambers

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