Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-01153/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-01153-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory Mangum, )) Plaintiff, ) No. CV-05-1153-PCT-PGR ) vs. )) ORDER and OPINION Commissioner of Social Security, )) Defendant. ) ) 

Pending before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #6)

filed by plaintiff Gregory Mangum and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. #10) filed by Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the Commissioner of Social Security. Having

considered the parties' memoranda in light of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the plaintiff's motion should be denied and that the Commissioner's motion

should be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. THIS ORDER AND OPINION IS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

Background

The plaintiff is challenging the Commissioner's denial of his application for

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payments pursuant to Title XVI of the Social

Security Act. The plaintiff applied for the SSI benefits on February 2, 1998, alleging

a disability onset date of April 24, 1997 due to impairments to his memory and left

side resulting from multiple motor vehicles accidents. The Administrative Law Judge

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1

 The ALJ's conclusion that the plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work if just his physical impairments are evaluated is supported by evidence from several

medical sources, including the records from Dr. Robert Barker and Dr. Ernest Griffith, and the

plaintiff does not really argue otherwise.

 

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(ALJ), after holding two short evidentiary hearings, the first on August 14, 2003

in which the plaintiff testified, and the second on April 4, 2004 in which a vocational

expert testified, entered a decision of non-disability on May 19, 2004; the plaintiff

was represented by counsel at both hearings. Although the ALJ concluded that the

plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work due to being severely impaired by

alcohol abuse disorder, possible addiction to pain medications, borderline intellectual

functioning, alcohol induced mood disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and

a pain disorder involving chronic low back pain, neck pain and shoulder pain as a

result of multiple traumas, the ALJ found that the plaintiff was not disabled for Title

XVI purposes because without the limitations resulting from his alcohol abuse

disorder the plaintiff retains the physical and mental residual functional capacity to

perform light and sedentary work. (AR 36-37). The ALJ's decision stands as the

Commissioner's final decision given that the Appeals Council denied the plaintiff's

request for review. (AR 14).

Psychological Evidence

Although the plaintiff suffers from both physical and mental impairments, the

latter are the focus of the plaintiff's challenge to the ALJ's decision.1

 The sole

medical evidence detailing the plaintiff's mental impairments is that provided by

Minette Nance Doss, Ed.D., who performed a complete psychological evaluation of

the plaintiff on September 15, 2003 at the request of the Disability Determination

Services of the Arizona Department of Economic Security. 

Dr. Doss noted as to the plaintiff's intelligence that he had in essence only a

seventh grade education in that he had failed eighth grade, that he scored overall

in the borderline range on the IQ test with a full IQ of 75, and that he presented the

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cognitive profile and demeanor of a slow learner, but not of a retarded individual or

one with specific learning disabilities. (AR 664 & 666). She also noted that the

plaintiff showed no signs of organic impairment in that he performed in the average

range on the visual-motor tests, and that he tested in the borderline to average

range in his memory tests. (AR 666).

Dr. Doss concluded that the results of the plaintiff's MMPI-II personality test

were invalid and did not warrant interpretation because the plaintiff had "certainly

exaggerated his symptomatology and psychological pathology to a very extreme

degree." (AR 666-67).

Dr. Doss noted that the plaintiff's history is significant for drug and alcohol

abuse, that he was then drinking everyday and had drunk regularly all of his life

since 1958, and that alcohol dependence appeared to be present and a severe

problem for many years. (AR 667). Dr. Doss further noted that the plaintiff was in

constant pain and that he overindulges in Vicodin and possibly has a Vicodin

dependence. (AR 667). 

Dr. Doss diagnosed the plaintiff has having an alcohol-induced mood disorder.

(AR 662). In discussing the relationship between the plaintiff's mood disorder and

his alcoholism, Dr. Doss variously commented without elaboration that the plaintiff's

"chronic alcoholism is so closely intertwined with his mood disorder as to make them

inseparable[,]" (AR 662-63), that the plaintiff's "years of depression have also gone

hand-in-hand with the chronic alcoholism. A mood disorder connected with the

alcoholism cannot be separated from it[,]" and that the plaintiff's alcoholism "certainly

is a depressant which pulls him down further and in addition to the chronic pain he

is experiencing. It is very difficult to sort out if any of these problems existed prior

to the drinking behaviors." (AR 668). 

In addition to the mood disorder, Dr. Doss diagnosed the plaintiff as having a

panic disorder with agoraphobia. (AR 662). She concluded that the plaintiff's anxiety

was probably more problematic than his mood disorder, that he experiences extreme

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anxiety mostly when he goes out in that he will shake, stutter and cry and feel

helpless and panic to the point of throwing up, and that his problems have gotten

progressively worse over the year prior to the testing. (AR 668). She further

concluded that one of the things that the plaintiff cannot do is to get over the panic

of going out. (AR 668-69).

Dr. Doss completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related

Activities (Mental) form on the plaintiff on October 1, 2003. In that form she noted

that, as a consequence of his borderline IQ and negative attitude, the plaintiff had

no impairment in his ability to understand and remember short, simple instructions,

he had a slight impairment in his ability to carry out short, simple instructions, he had

moderate impairments of his ability to understand and remember detailed

instructions and his ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, and

he had a marked impairment of his ability to carry out detailed instructions. (AR 681).

Dr. Doss also noted on the form that due to the plaintiff's panic disorder and

alcoholism and mood disorder, he had a moderate impairment of his ability to

respond appropriately to changes in a routine work setting, and he had marked

impairments of his ability to interact appropriately with the public, with supervisors,

and with co-workers, and to respond appropriately to changes in a usual work

setting. (AR 682). Dr. Doss further noted on the form that the plaintiff's alcoholism

and/or substance abuse contributed to his mood disorder and unreliability, and that

the plaintiff would "not be as depressed & negative" if he was totally abstinent from

alcohol and/or substance abuse. (AR 682).

Vocational Expert's Testimony

George Gluth, a vocational expert, testified at the hearing held on April 6,

2004 that someone with the mental limitations described by Dr. Doss would not be

able to do the plaintiff's past relevant work as an unskilled construction laborer and

that there would not be any work available for such a person in the national

economy. (AR 77-78). 

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Plaintiff's Testimony

The plaintiff testified at the hearing held on May 14, 2003 that he was then 45

years old (AR 57), that he dropped out of school in the eighth grade, at which time

he was in a special education class, because he wanted to work and because he

was having trouble with his classes (AR 58 and 65-66), that he has never obtained

a GED and has never had any vocational training (AR 58), and that he has no

problems with reading and writing and that he can do simple arithmetic (AR 58).

He also testified that he has been in four motor vehicle accidents, in 1982,

1987, 1992, and 1999, two of which were motorcycle accidents and two of which

were automobile accidents (AR 67-68), and that he had concussions in at least

some of them.

He also testified that he cannot work because he has too much pain in his

back, left hip, and both legs (AR 59), that his worst pain is in his back and that pain

is a ten on a one to ten scale (AR 66), that he has pain radiating down his left leg

(AR 67), that the pain in his left arm is a shooting, stabbing pain due to the plates in

his arm (AR 67), that the outside of his hand is numb and he often drops things with

that hand (AR 67), that he was referred to a back specialists who told him that there

was nothing he could do for his back (AR 67), that he has arthritis in his whole body

(AR 67), and that moisture and cold affects his pain level (AR 62).

He also testified that he takes hydrocodone, Vicodin, and ibuprofen for pain

(AR 60), that he takes amitriptyline to help him sleep and he cannot sleep without

it (AR 60, 63 and 71), and that his medications make him nauseous (AR 61).

He also testified that he can only stand or walk for short periods and has to

switch positions a lot (AR 61), that he can lift a gallon of water but not 20 pounds

(AR 61-62), that he has difficulty reaching his arms out in front of him or over his

head and that he is barely able to stoop or bend (AR 62), that he can take care of

his apartment and can do housework (AR 62), that he lives with his 75 year old

mother who has trouble getting around so he has to help her with some of her daily

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activities such as doing grocery shopping for her (AR 68-69), that he has a driver's

license but does not drive because of his medicine makes him groggy (AR 62-63

and 68), and that he sleeps 12 or14 hours a day (AR 68).

He also testified that he drinks alcoholic beverages almost daily which

includes a couple of beers in the evening (AR 63-64), and that he smokes a pack of

cigarettes a day (AR 64).

He also testified that he has problems getting along with people and likes to

be isolated (AR 64), that he only has a couple of neighbors as friends (AR 64), that

he considers himself to be a nervous person and has anxiety or panic attacks (AR

65), that he has uncontrollable crying at times (AR 71), that he has memory or

concentration problems out of the ordinary (AR 65 and 70) and that he just can't

think anymore (AR 70), that he has days when he does not want to do anything,

even get out of bed (AR 65), that he has feelings of guilt or worthlessness and

thoughts of suicide (AR 65), and that he does not read anything and watches

television four or five hours a day.

The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff suffers from several impairments that he

rated as "severe" within the meaning of the Social Security Act , i.e., "alcohol abuse

disorder, possible addiction to pain medications, borderline intellectual functioning,

alcohol induced mood disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and pain disorder

as a result of old injuries[.]" (AR 31). He further concluded that none of the severe

impairments, either singly or in combination, meet or equal in severity the criteria for

any listed impairment. (AR 31).

The ALJ also concluded that the plaintiff exaggerated the limitations resulting

from his impairments and is not credible because the evidence of record did not

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2

 The plaintiff's motion does not challenge the ALJ's credibility finding.

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support the extreme limitations alleged by the plaintiff.2 (AR 31-32). In support of

his conclusion, the ALJ summarized the medical evidence concerning the plaintiff's

physical impairments provided by the medical reports and records of treating

physicians Dr. Lee Thurston, Dr. Todd Karlik, Dr. Michael Orr, and Dr. Muhammed

Islam, and examining physicians Dr. Robert Barker and Dr. Ernest Griffith. (AR 32-

34). The ALJ, stating that no treating physician had assessed limitations on the

plaintiff's ability to perform work-related activities, accorded "substantial persuasive

weight" to the opinion of Dr. Griffith, an examining doctor, and "the opinions of the

State agency physicians whose opinions are supported by, and consistent with, the

evidence of the entire record." (AR 34). 

The ALJ found that the plaintiff 

retains the physical functional capacity to perform light work. The

claimant has the ability to stand and/or walk six hours in an eight hour

day, sit six hours in the same eight hour period, and lift and/or carry 25 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. The claimant can

occasionally bend, twist, stoop, squat, kneel, crawl, and climb, but is

unable to do repetitive overhead or heavy work with his left upper

extremity, and should avoid machinery and heights. If someone can do

light work, he can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional

limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long

periods.

(AR 34). 

The ALJ then looked at Dr. Doss' psychological evaluation of the plaintiff to

determine the plaintiff's mental limitations and the effect of those limitations on his

ability to work. In so doing he stated:

Dr. Doss indicated the claimant's chronic alcoholism is so closely

intertwined with his mood disorder as to make them inseparable.

However, in the medical source statement, she reported that if the

claimant was totally abstinent from alcohol and/or substance abuse, he

would be less depressed and negative. ... This statement indicates to

the undersigned that the claimant's mood disorder is separable from his

alcoholism.

While the undersigned accepts the opinion of Dr. Doss in regards to the

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claimant's mental residual functional capacity, it is apparent that the

claimant's significant mental limitations result from his abuse of alcohol.

Given the report and testing of Dr. Doss, the undersigned finds the claimant's allegations of a complete inability to work due to his mental

impairments are not credible. Therefore, in addition to the physical

residual functional capacity for light and sedentary work, and absent the

limitations resulting from his alcohol abuse disorder, the claimant has

no restrictions in his ability to understand, remember and carry out

simple instructions, and make judgments on simple work-related

decisions. The claimant has mild limitations in his ability to interact

appropriately with the public, supervisors and co-workers; respond

appropriately to changes in a routine work setting; and, respond

appropriately to work pressures in a usual work setting. When

considering the limitations resulting from his alcohol abuse disorder, the

claimant has marked restrictions in his ability to carry out detailed

instructions, interact appropriately with the public, supervisors and coworkers, and respond appropriately to work pressures in a usual work

setting; and, moderate limitations in his ability to understand and

remember detailed instructions, make judgments on simple workrelated decisions and respond appropriately to changes in a routine

work setting. ...

* * *

... The vocational expert was asked to consider a hypothetical individual

with the claimant's vocational profile and the physical residual functional capacity to perform light and sedentary work. Additionally, the

individual has the mental limitations set forth by Dr. Doss in her

evaluation. Dr. Bluth testified that given the serious mental restrictions,

the individual could not perform the claimant's past work or any other

work found in the national economy. The undesigned accepts as

reasonable the testimony of the vocational expert.

Based on the entire evidentiary record, the undersigned finds that while

the claimant may be disabled when all his impairments are considered,

including the limitations resulting from his alcohol abuse disorder, he is

not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. Without the limitations

stemming from his alcohol abuse disorder, the claimant retains the

physical and mental residual functional capacity to perform a significant

number of jobs existing in the national economy.

(AR 34-35).

Discussion

 The Social Security Act grants this Court only limited authority to set aside the

Commissioner's denial of Social Security disability benefits - the Court is statutorily

required to affirm the Commissioner's decision unless the ALJ's findings are based

upon legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Relevant evidence

relied upon by the ALJ in rendering a decision is substantial if it is more than a mere

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3

 Notwithstanding that the ALJ considered the plaintiff to be disabled when all of his

impairments are considered, the plaintiff nevertheless also argues that the ALJ committed

reversible legal error in failing to properly consider whether his impairments meet or equal

Listed Impairment 12.05C (mental retardation). The Court rejects this argument for several

reasons. First, the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence is sufficiently detailed to constitute

an adequate support his ultimate conclusion that the plaintiff did not meet or equal a listed

impairment. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990). Second, the first

prong of the Listing 12.05C requires a "valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through

70" which the plaintiff does not meet. Dr. Doss, in her summary of the results of the plaintiff's IQ

test, gave him a 75 in verbal, a 78 in performance, and a full scale score of 75. (AR 670).

Based on these scores, Dr. Doss concluded that the plaintiff scored intellectually in the

borderline range (AR 662), but was "certainly not a retarded individual." (AR 666). Third, the

plaintiff has not established that the ALJ was required under Ninth Circuit precedence to obtain

a medical expert to opine on the issue of equivalence.

 

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scintilla and is such that a reasonable person could accept it as adequate to support

the ALJ's conclusion. Id. The Court may not reject the ALJ's conclusion if the

evidence of record is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Id. It is

the ALJ's responsibility to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the medical

evidence, and resolve ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995). 

The plaintiff's main argument is that the ALJ committed reversible legal error

in determining that alcohol abuse was material to the plaintiff's mental disability.3

Under the Social Security Act, as amended by the Contract With America

Advancement Act of 1996, a claimant's application for disability benefits must be

denied if alcohol or drug abuse constitutes a contributing factor material to the

determination of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J). The key factor in making this

determination is whether the claimant would still be found to be disabled if he

stopped using alcohol or drugs. Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.

1998); 20 C.F.R.§ 416.935. The claimant bears the burden of proving that his

alcoholism or drug addiction is not a contributing factor material to his disability

determination. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).

The Commissioner argues, and the Court concurs, that the plaintiff has not

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4

 The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in determining that the plaintiff's

significant mental limitations result from his abuse of alcohol by failing to take into account that

Dr. Doss separated the plaintiff's mental impairments into the separate categories of mood

disorder, panic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. The Court is unpersuaded

because Dr. Doss' report can reasonably be read as linking the plaintiff's substance abuse to

the totality of his mental problems in that her clinical impression was that "[t]his man's problems

on a psychological level mainly center around his alcoholism and possible addiction to Vicodin."

(AR 668).

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met his burden of proving that he would still be disabled for purposes of the Social

Security Act if he stopped drinking. The Court is unpersuaded by the plaintiff's

argument that the ALJ impermissibly substituted his own medical opinion for that of

Dr. Doss in determining that the plaintiff's mental disorder is separable from his

alcoholism.4

 The ALJ did not, as argued by the plaintiff, "reject" Dr. Doss' opinion;

what he did was interpret it differently than the plaintiff did. While the plaintiff's

contention that Dr. Doss' report shows that she was unable to separate the plaintiff's

drinking from his mental problems is certainly not an irrational interpretation of the

report, the Court concludes that the ALJ's interpretation of the report is one that may

be rationally made. The ALJ's determination is supported by more than a scintilla

of evidence in that Dr. Doss expressly diagnosed the plaintiff as having an alcoholinduced mood disorder (AR 662) and stated that the plaintiff would not be as

depressed and negative if he were to abstain from alcohol use. (AR 682). See

Flaten v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)

("If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

[Commissioner's] conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

[Commissioner].")

Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. #6) is

denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. #10) is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

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accordingly.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2006.

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