Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00252/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NATHANIEL HEARN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-00252 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On February 7, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus Limited to Affirmative Defenses (“Answer”) (Docket No. 7)

on April 15, 2008. Respondents contend the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over the petition because Petitioner was no

longer in custody for the conviction or sentence under attack at

the time he initiated his habeas action. Respondents also

assert the action for habeas relief was not timely filed and,

therefore, that the petition must be denied and dismissed with

prejudice. On June 26, 2008, Petitioner filed a response to the

answer to his habeas petition. See Docket No. 11.

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I Procedural History

In the habeas petition filed February 7, 2008,

Petitioner challenges his 1982 conviction and sentence on one

count of sexual assault.

On January 13, 1982, in Maricopa County Superior Court

docket number CR1981-121923, Petitioner pled guilty to one count

of sexual assault, a class 2 felony. See Answer, Exh. B & Exh.

C. The guilty plea was pursuant to a written plea agreement

which provided for dismissal of the remaining two counts against

Petitioner, i.e., one count of sexual assault and one count of

possession of marijuana for sale. See id., Exh. B. A judgment

of conviction against Petitioner on one count of sexual assault

was entered on January 13, 1982. Id., Exh. D. On March 5,

1982, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of one year of “flat”

time in jail and a term of seven years probation. See id., Exh.

D.

After completing his term of incarceration, Petitioner

was twice found to have violated the terms of his probation.

Id., Exh. E & Exh. G. As a result of the first violation, the

state trial court reinstated Petitioner on intensive probation

for a period of 26 months. Id., Exh. F. On November 12, 1987,

as a result of Petitioner’s second probation violation, the

trial court revoked Petitioner’s probation and sentenced him to

seven years imprisonment, the presumptive term for a conviction

of sexual assault, the 1982 charge of conviction, with 451 days

of presentence incarceration credit. Id., Exh. H.

 

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1

 Respondents note:

From the time Petitioner pled guilty in the 1981

Case, on January 13, 1982, through and including

the date his probation was revoked and he was

sentenced to a seven-year term of imprisonment,

November 12, 1987, Petitioner had the right to

seek conventional appellate review. See Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 17(e). It was not until 1992 that

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1(e) was

amended to read: “By pleading guilty or no

contest in a noncapital case, a defendant waives

the right to have the appellate courts review the

proceedings by way of direct appeal, and may seek

review only by filing a petition for

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 and,

if denied, a petition for review.”

Docket No. 7 at 4 n.2.

In 1987, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) provided that

a petition for PCR “may be filed at any time

after entry of judgment and sentence.” Ariz. R.

Crim. P. 32.4(a) (West 1987). In 1992, the

Arizona Supreme Court amended Rule 32.4(a) by

adding time limits for specific claims in

non-capital cases and automatic filing in capital

cases.

Docket No. 7 at 5 n.3.

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After each of the hearings regarding the alleged

violation of the terms of parole, Petitioner signed a form

indicating he had been informed of his right to appeal these

decisions. See id., Exh. I. Petitioner did not, however, seek

appellate review of his 1982 conviction for sexual assault or

the initial sentence imposed pursuant to this conviction, nor

did he seek review of the revocation of his probation and his

resulting incarceration in 1987.1

The sentence of seven years imprisonment imposed in

1987, with credit for 451 days of presentence incarceration and

allowing no accredited time for good behavior, would have

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2 Petitioner filed sexual offender registration change of

address forms in 1991 and 1995. See Answer, Exh. Z at 108. The form

dated October 29, 1991, indicates Petitioner was previously in

custody.

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expired in mid-August of 1993.2 

Arizona’s sexual offender registration statute became

effective July 27, 1983, see Arizona v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171,

173, 829 P.2d 1217, 1219 (1992) (holding the application of the

statute to a crime committed prior to its enactment did not

violate the defendant’s right to be free of ex post facto laws),

after Petitioner entered into the 1982 plea agreement but before

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of incarceration pursuant to

his violation of probation imposed for the sexual assault

conviction. 

On May 8, 2002, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of

possession of narcotic drugs in Maricopa County docket number

CR2002-004244. Id., Exh. Q. On July 12, 2002, the trial court

suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Petitioner on

probation for four years. Id., Exh. R.

On August 26, 2002, shortly after he was placed on

probation in CR2002-004244, Petitioner was charged with one

count of use or possession of methamphetamine and one count of

possession of drug paraphernalia in Maricopa County docket

number CR2002-014683. Id., Exh. S. On January 31, 2003,

pursuant to a plea agreement proving the state would dismiss the

second count in CR2002-014683, Petitioner pled guilty to one

count of possession or use of methamphetamine. Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner’s guilty plea in CR2002-014683 constituted a

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violation of the conditions of his probation imposed in

CR2002-004244. Id., Exh. U. On February 21, 2003, Petitioner

was reinstated to probation in CR2002-004244, see id., Exh. V at

84, and placed on a concurrent three-year probationary term in

CR2002-014683. Id., Exh. W. 

On June 19, 2003, Petitioner was charged with failing

to register as a sex offender, a class 4 felony, between March

31, 2003, and June 9, 2003, in Maricopa County docket number

CR2003-035096. Id., Exh. X. The state also alleged that

Petitioner had prior felony convictions and that he committed

the alleged offense, i.e., failure to register as a sex

offender, while on probation. Id., Exh. Y. Petitioner filed a

motion to dismiss the charges stated in docket number

CR2003-035096. Id., Exh. Z. In support of his motion to

dismiss the charge of failing to register as a sex offender

Petitioner attached copies of sex offender registration forms

and address update changes that he had previously completed

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3821, beginning in

January of 1987. Id., Exh. Z at 101-16. The motion to dismiss

was denied.

On December 18, 2003, Petitioner pled guilty to one

count of failure to register as a sex offender in exchange for

the state’s agreement to dismiss the allegation of prior felony

convictions. Id., Exh. AA at 117. Petitioner’s guilty plea in

CR2003-035096 constituted an automatic violation of probation in

both of the 2002 cases. Id., Exh. BB at 121, 123. On June 11,

2004, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s probation in both of

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the 2002 cases and sentenced Petitioner to concurrent prison

terms of 2.5 years dating from that date with credit for

presentence incarceration of 487 days. Id., Exh. CC at 126,

129. The presentence incarceration credit was altered on May 8,

2007, to 660 days in CR2002-004244 and 461 days in CR2002-14683.

See id., Exh. LL.

Also on June 11, 2004, in the 2003 case, CR2003-35096,

the state trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw

from the plea agreement and sentenced Petitioner to the

presumptive term of 2.5 year imprisonment, which sentence was

ordered to run consecutively to the sentences imposed in the

2002 cases. Id., Exh. DD. Petitioner was given credit for 171

days of presentence incarceration, which was amended to 343 days

of presentence incarceration on May 8, 2007. Id., Exh. DD.

Accordingly, as of June 2004, Petitioner was serving a term of

five years imprisonment pursuant to the 2002 and 2003

convictions, including his conviction for failure to register as

a sex offender, and his violation of probation in the 2002

cases. The sentences for the 2002 convictions would have

“begun” on approximately April 19, 2002, and accordingly be

completely served by November of 2004. Petitioner would have

begun serving his consecutive 2.5 year sentence pursuant to his

2003 conviction in December of 2004, and completed it, absent

any credit for presentence incarceration or good time, in June

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3

 The undersigned’s calculations do not comport in all

respects with Respondents’ but, using either calculation, the result

is the same. 

Respondents calculate:

This information is confirmed as follows: (1) A

2.5-year term amounts to 912 days ((365 days

times 2) plus (365 days divided by 2) = 912

days); (2) The 912– day term in CR2002-004244,

reduced by 660 days of presentence custody

credit, began on June 11, 2004 and expired 252

days later, on February 18, 2005; (3) The 912-day

term in CR2002-014683, reduced by 461 days of

presentence custody credit, began on June 11,

2004 and expired 451 days later, on September 5,

2005. See Ex. NN at 205.

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of 2007.3

On March 22, 2005, in Maricopa County docket number

CR2004-006251, Petitioner was sentenced to a 12 year term of

imprisonment and a concurrent six year term of imprisonment,

after being convicted by a jury of robbery and unlawful flight

from a law enforcement vehicle. Id., Exh. MM. Both sentences

were ordered to run consecutively to the sentences imposed in

one of the 2002 cases and the 2003 case. Id., Exh. MM.

On May 30, 2006, 13 years after his seven-year term of

imprisonment in CR1981-121923 had been fully served, but before

his sentence of incarceration with regard to his 2003 conviction

had been served, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction

relief in the state trial court pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. J at 22, 26. Petitioner

asked the state court to order the “state to comply with its

plea agreement and that the defendant is not required to

register as a sex offender.” Id., Exh. J at 25. 

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Petitioner was appointed counsel, who notified the

court that she was unable to find any colorable claims to raise

on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. K. On November 20, 2006,

Petitioner filed a pro per petition in his state Rule 32 action.

Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief because his plea

agreement in the 1982 case was breached when the state began

making Petitioner register as a sex offender. Id., Exh. L at

37-38. Petitioner argued that, because the 1982 plea agreement

did not require him to register as a sex offender, requiring him

to do so was breach of contract in violation of Article I,

section 10 of the United States Constitution. Id., Exh. L at

39. Petitioner further asserted his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process was violated when “[t]he State falsely informed

the Petitioner of the consequences of the plea agreement.” Id.,

Exh. L at 40.

On February 27, 2007, the state trial court summarily

dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 32 action regarding his 1982

conviction “for failure to state a colorable claim for relief.”

Id., Exh. N. The state court concluded Petitioner’s claim for

relief focused on his failure to

register as a sex offender. He pled guilty to

this offense in CR2003-035096. That matter

was appealed and the Court of Appeals

resolved the matter affirming the conviction

but giving [Petitioner] 2 additional days of

pre-incarceration credit. All other claims

flowing from that case were waived.

[Petitioner] seems to be saying that in this

case when he signed his original plea

agreement he should have been advised of all

possible future legislation or requirements

that might be placed upon him. No such

requirements exist for any attorney by any

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standard. The state did not breach its

contract with him in the plea agreement which

was executed. The Legislature subsequently

added a condition which he failed to meet and

admitted he failed to meet in CR2003-035096.

Id., Exh. N.

In the federal habeas petition before the Court

Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas relief because his

right to due process has been violated. Petitioner argues the

state breached the terms of the 1982 plea agreement. Petitioner

alleges that the state’s failure to honor the terms of the 1982

plea agreement was a “law impairing the obligation of the

contract,” in violation of Article I, paragraph 10, of the

United States Constitution. Docket No. 3 at 1-2. Petitioner

also alleges that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary,

in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights,

because he was not informed of all the “[r]amifications of the

consequences and the rights he [would] forfeit” as a result of

the guilty plea i.e., the potential for incarceration if he did

not register as a sex offender. See id. at 1.

II Analysis

A. Petitioner is not “in custody” as that term is

defined by the relevant federal statute governing jurisdiction

over federal habeas petitions

The United States District Courts have the power to

grant a writ of habeas corpus only to individuals “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 

For a federal court to have jurisdiction over

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a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner,

the petitioner must be “in custody”.... The

general rule concerning mootness has long

been that a petition for habeas corpus

becomes moot when a prisoner completes his

sentence before the court has addressed the

merits of his petition.

Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted).

The case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,

paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution “subsists through

all stages of federal judicial proceedings ... The parties must

continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the

lawsuit.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477-78, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 1253-54 (1990) (internal quotations

omitted). If a habeas action seeking the petitioner’s release

from confinement is adjudicated after the petitioner has been

released “some concrete and continuing injury” or “collateral

consequence” of the challenged decision must exist for the

habeas action to be maintained. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S.

1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 982 (1998). 

Petitioner has completely served the term of

incarceration and probation imposed for his 1982 sexual assault

conviction and the prison term imposed for his 2003 failure-toregister conviction. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the

sexual registration requirement imposed on him as a result of

his 1982 sexual assault conviction rises “to a significant

restraint upon his liberty ‘not shared by the public

generally,’” which would render him “in custody” for purposes of

the habeas statute. Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit,

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995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that petitioners who have

completed their prison sentences but are required to register as

sex offenders do not satisfy the “in custody” requirement of

section 2254(a) because registration and notification

requirements are “more properly characterized as a collateral

consequence of conviction rather than as a restraint on

liberty.” Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir.

1998) (holding that Washington sexual offender registration laws

do not render registrant “in custody”). See also McNab v. Kok,

170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the same with

respect to the Oregon sexual offender laws); Henry v. Lungren,

164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding the same with

respect to California’s sexual offender laws). “[M]erely being

subject to a sex offender registry requirement does not satisfy

the ‘in custody’ requirement after the original [sex offense]

conviction has expired.” Zichko, 247 F.3d at 1020.

The Ninth Circuit has held that when a petitioner is

incarcerated for failing to comply with a sex offender

registration statute the petitioner is “in custody” for purposes

of challenging an earlier, expired sex offense conviction that

served as a necessary predicate to the failure-to-register

charge. See id., 247 F.3d at 1019-20 (“[A] habeas petitioner is

‘in custody’ for the purposes of challenging an earlier, expired

rape conviction, when he is incarcerated for failing to comply

with a state sex offender registration law because the earlier

rape conviction ‘is a necessary predicate’ to the failure to

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register charge.”). However, Petitioner cannot challenge his

expired 1982 sexual assault conviction pursuant to this

statement in Zichko because he is no longer incarcerated as a

result of his 2003 conviction for failure-to-register as a sex

offender. Although Petitioner was previously incarcerated for

failure to comply with Arizona’s sex offender registration

statute, see Answer, Ex. NN, he was not confined as a result of

such conviction on February 7, 2008, when the instant petition

was filed. Petitioner is currently in custody pursuant to a

conviction completely unrelated to both his 1982 sexual assault

conviction and his 2003 conviction for failure-to-register as a

sex offender. See id., Ex. NN at 204-05. Because Petitioner

cannot show that he was “in custody” on either his 1982 sexual

assault conviction or his 2003 failure-to-register conviction at

the time he filed the instant petition seeking habeas relief

pursuant to section 2254, this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over the petition challenging the validity of his

1982 conviction.

B. Relevant statute of limitations

Additionally, the habeas petition, attacking a

conviction which became final in 1982, is also barred by the

applicable statute of limitations as found in the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on

state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir.

2002). Additionally, the AEDPA required state prisoners whose

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convictions became final before April 24, 1996, to file any

petition for federal habeas corpus relief from those convictions

by April 24, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is

entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000). 

Because Petitioner’s 1982 state conviction became final

prior to 1996, pursuant to the AEDPA the one-year statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s action for federal habeas relief

began to run on April 24, 1996, and expired on April 23, 1997,

unless it was tolled by any pending action for state postconviction relief. See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1246. 

Petitioner did not file any action seeking state postconviction relief from his 1982 conviction until 2006. This

Rule 32 action could not and did not “restart” the alreadyexpired statute of limitations. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d

1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118,

1120 (10th Cir. 2000).

The undersigned has previously reasoned that section

2254 habeas applicants are no longer entitled to consideration

of the merits of their untimely petitions based on the doctrine

that the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled. The

Supreme Court recently concluded section 2254 petitioners are

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4 This holding does not affect a petitioner’s ability to

raise claims involving a change in the law made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or claims

involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Absent those circumstances, which are

not present here, the strict application of the jurisdictional

deadline is appropriate in a collateral proceeding and is now

established Supreme Court precedent. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at

2365–66.

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not entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations because this does not comport with the plain meaning

of the statute. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365

(2007) (holding that “time limits enacted by Congress” are

“jurisdictional” and rejecting the argument that the federal

courts could craft an “equitable” exception to the

jurisdictional requirement).4 But see Lawrence v. Florida, 127

S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming, without deciding, that

section 2244(d) provides for equitable tolling).

However, assuming the doctrine of equitable tolling

applies, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a

petition on time. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034

(9th Cir. 2003); Malcom v. Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir.

2002). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely claim. See Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). It is Petitioner’s burden

to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his case.

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Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034. 

Petitioner has not established that there were

extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which made it

impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas petition from

his 1982 conviction. A federal habeas petitioner seeking

equitable tolling must also act with “reasonable” diligence

“throughout the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219

F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d

153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that

there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control which

made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

petition throughout the period 1996 through 2007, or that any

state action was the “but for” cause for his failure to timely

file his federal habeas action. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (2005) (concluding that the

petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he was

misled or confused about timing of exhausting his state remedies

and filing his federal habeas petition); Shannon v. Newland, 410

F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases in which

equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful

conduct, either by state officials or, occasionally, by the

petitioner’s counsel.”). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137 Fed.

App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1333

(2006); Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002).

 Petitioner does not claim he was misled about the

statute of limitations or that Respondents acted to inhibit the

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filing of his federal habeas petition. A petitioner’s pro se

status, ignorance of the law, lack of representation during the

applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling. See, e.g., Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716

(5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.

2004) (holding that petitioner’s misunderstanding of state’s

“rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling”). 

III Conclusion

In response to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner asserts that his 1982 conviction does “entail adverse

collateral legal consequences” because his prior conviction was

used to aggravate his sentence in docket number CR 2004-062510.

Docket No. 11 at 1. Accordingly, Petitioner argues, his

conviction “can never be moot, because [his] conviction [may]

also be used in later case for impeachment.” Id. at 2. This

assertion fails for the reasons stated supra citing Zichko.

Petitioner further claims that “he was not guilty for this crime

of sexual assualt (sic) and has never plead guilty to it, but

Alford factual basis, I never admitted guilt. Therefore,

Petitioner’s three claims are not procedurally barred.” Id.

Petitioner’s argument regarding a procedural bar to his federal

habeas petition does not alter the conclusion that his petition

is moot. The Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the

habeas petition because Petitioner is not “in custody” pursuant

to the conviction he seeks to challenge. Additionally, any

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challenge to Petitioner’s 1982 conviction predicated on section

2254 is not timely filed. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hearn’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

/

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DATED this 15th day of July, 2008.

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