Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01898/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01898-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

WO IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

PATRICE MARIE KRIER, )

) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security )

Administration, )

) No. 2:13-cv-1898-HRH

 Defendant. )

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

This is an action for judicial review of the denial of disability benefits under Titles

II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f. Plaintiff has timely

filed her opening brief,1to which defendant has responded.2 Oral argument was not

requested and is not deemed necessary. 

Procedural Background

Plaintiff is Patrice Marie Krier. Defendant is Carolyn W. Colvin, acting Commissioner of Social Security. 

1Docket No. 17. 

2Docket No. 24. 

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Case 2:13-cv-01898-HRH Document 28 Filed 01/13/15 Page 1 of 16
On August 5, 2010, plaintiff filed applications for disability benefits under Titles II 

and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleged that she became disabled on April 2,

2010. Plaintiff claimed that she was disabled due to symptoms from multiple sclerosis. 

Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing on

January 19, 2012, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied plaintiff’s claims. On July 22,

2013, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s

February 23, 2012 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On September 13, 2013,

plaintiff commenced this action in which she asks the court to find that she is entitled to

disability benefits.

General Background

Plaintiff was born on December 1, 1964. She was 47 years old at the time of the

hearing. Plaintiff has a high school education and completed one year of college. Plaintiff’s

adult-age daughter lives with her. Plaintiff’s past relevant work includes work as an

administrative assistant, an accounting clerk, and a travel clerk.

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ first found that plaintiff met “the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through at least December 31, 2014.”3

The ALJ then applied the five-step sequential analysis used to determine whether

3Admin. Rec. at 111. 

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an individual is disabled.4

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since April 2, 2011, the alleged onset date....”5

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had “the following severe impairment: 

multiple sclerosis....”6

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did “not have an impairment or

4The five steps are as follows: 

Step one: Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial

gainful activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not,

proceed to step two.

Step two: Is the claimant’s alleged impairment sufficiently

severe to limit ... her ability to work? If so, proceed to step

three. If not, the claimant is not disabled.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment, or combination of

impairments, meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R.,

pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1? If so, the claimant is disabled. If not,

proceed to step four.

Step four: Does the claimant possess the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform ... her past relevant work? If so,

the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant’s RFC, when considered with the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience, allow ... herto

adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the

claimant is disabled.

Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). 

5Admin. Rec. at 111. 

6Admin. Rec. at 111. 

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combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments

in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1....”7 The ALJ explained that plaintiff’s “medical

records do not describe the degree of disorganization of motor function, the degree of

visual or mental impairment orthe significant, reproducible fatigue of motorfunction with

substantial muscle weakness on repetitive activity, as required under Section 11.09 for

Listing level multiple sclerosis.”8

“Between steps three and four, the ALJ must, as an intermediate step, assess the

claimant’s RFC.” Bray v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The ALJ found that plaintiff had 

the residual functional capacity to perform medium work, as

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), with lifting of 25

pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally, standing or

walking for 6 hours each in an 8 hour day, sitting throughout

the course of the day, occasional climbing of ramps/stairs,

occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, no

climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and no work involving

heights, hazardous machinery or exposure to environmental

irritants.[9]

The ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Levison’s opinion10

and did not give great weight

7Admin. Rec. at 112. 

8Admin. Rec. at 112. 

9Admin. Rec. at 112. 

10On October 8, 2010, Jeffrey Levison, M.D., examined plaintiff. Dr. Levison opined

(continued...)

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to Dr. Bomprezzi’s11

“suggestion in January 2012 that it might be dangerous for the

claimant to walk long distances without a cane or walker.”12

The ALJ considered plaintiff’s symptom statements less than credible because

plaintiff continued “to work for several months after her alleged disability onset date”;

because plaintiff’s treatment records indicate that she quit working because she was laid

off, not because of her alleged disabling symptoms; based on her daily activities; and

because plaintiff was receiving unemployment benefits.13

At step four, the ALJ found, based on the vocational expert’s testimony,14that

plaintiff could perform her “past relevant work as an administrative assistant, an

10

(...continued)

that plaintiff could lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; stand/walk

for 6 hours; had no limitations as to sitting; could occasionally climb ramp/stairs, stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl; could never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds; had no limitations as

to reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling; and should avoid working around heights,

moving machinery, extremes in temperatures, chemicals, and dust/fumes/gases. Admin.

Rec. at 239-40. 

11Roberto Bomprezzi,M.D., wasplaintiff’s treatingphysicianatBarrowNeurological

Institute where plaintiff participated in a pharmaceutical research study. Dr. Bomprezzi

treated plaintiff from May 10, 2010 through January 23, 2012. Admin. Rec. at 262-267 &

288-293. 

12Admin. Rec. at 114. 

13Admin. Rec. at 114. 

14Dr. John Komar testified as the vocational expert. Admin. Rec. at 80-83. 

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accounting clerk, and a travel clerk.”15

Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined

in the Social Security Act, from April 2, 2010, through the date of this decision....”16

Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court has the “powerto enter, upon the pleadings

and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, orreversing the decision of

the Commissioner....” The court “properly affirms the Commissioner’s decision denying

benefits if it is supported by substantial evidence and based on the application of correct

legal standards.” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). “Substantial

evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.

(quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). “‘To determine whether

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, [the court] review[s] the administrative

record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from

the ALJ’s conclusion.’” Id. If the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision. Id. But, the

Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed “‘simply by isolating a specific quantum of

15Admin. Rec. at 115. 

16Admin. Rec. at 115. 

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supporting evidence.’” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Discussion

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred as to Dr. Levison’s opinion. The ALJ gave

great weight to Dr. Levison’s opinion.17

 Dr. Levison opined that plaintiff could lift/carry

50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; stand/walk for 6 hours; had no

limitations as to sitting; could occasionally climb ramp/stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and

crawl; could never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds; had no limitations as to reaching,

handling, fingering, and feeling; and should avoid working around heights, moving

machinery, extremes in temperatures, chemicals, and dust/fumes/gases.18 

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Levison only evaluated her “exertional” capacities and that

he recognized that plaintiff had nonexertional limitations that needed to be taken into

consideration. After examining plaintiff, Dr. Levison concluded that plaintiff “has

relapsing, remitting MS which will intermittently fatigue her and will wax and wane

exasperating her fatigue and weakness. This must be taken into consideration when

determining herfunctional status. Today however her exam and functional status appears

17Admin. Rec. at 114. 

18Admin. Rec. at 239-40. 

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to be completely intact.”19 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to take into consideration Dr.

Levison’s opinion that plaintiff’s nonextertional limitations would affect her capacity to

work. Plaintiff argues that Parish v. Califano, 642 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1981) is instructive on

this point. There, the court observed that 

Multiple sclerosis is an incurable, progressive disease subject

to such periods of remission and exacerbation.... Because the

January until August 1975 period wherein plaintiff attempted

to work and attend school was unquestionably a period of

remission, we believe the ALJ erred in placing undue reliance

on this brief and temporary interruption of plaintiff's progressively disabling condition. Rather, he should have considered

that time-span as merely a period of remission in a continuing

disability in making his finding. 

Id. at 193 (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ failed to consider

the full import of Dr. Levison’s opinion, “the ALJ failed to build the requisite ‘logical

bridge’ between the evidence and her conclusion.” Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th

Cir. 2011). Plaintiff insists that the ALJ was not entitled to “cherry pick” the portion of Dr.

Levison’s opinion that supported a finding a nondisability while ignoring the portion that

would support a finding of disability. Id. 

To the extent that the ALJ erred by ignoring Dr. Levison’s statement about plaintiff’s

fatigue, this error was harmless. “An error is harmless if it is ‘inconsequential to the

ultimate nondisability determination[.]’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., ---

19Admin. Rec. at 238. 

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F.3d ---, 2014 WL 7332774, at *6 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,

1115 (9th Cir. 2012)). Dr. Komar, the vocational expert, testified that a person “who has

intermittent bouts of neurological dysfunctions that wax and wane and would exacerbate

her fatigue and weakness on a regular basis” would be able to perform plaintiff’s past

relevant work.20 Even if the ALJ had included Dr. Levison’s “fatigue” limitation in

plaintiff’s RFC, the outcome of this case would not have changed. 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in finding her symptom statements less than

credible. “An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s

testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d

995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). “‘First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has

presentedobjectivemedical evidence of an underlying impairment which couldreasonably

be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’“ Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v.

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). “In this analysis, the claimant is not

required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity

of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused

some degree of the symptom.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282). “Nor must a

claimant produce ‘objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity

thereof.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282). “If the claimant satisfies the first step of

20Admin. Rec. at 82. 

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this analysis, and there is no evidence of malingering, ‘the ALJ can reject the claimant’s

testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and

convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. at 1014-15 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). “This

is not an easy requirement to meet: ‘The clear and convincing standard is the most

demanding required in Social Security cases.’” Id. at 1015 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). “In evaluating the claimant’s testimony,

the ALJ may use ‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112

(quoting Turner v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010)). “For

instance, the ALJ may consider inconsistencies either in the claimant’s testimony or

between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct, unexplained orinadequately explained

failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and whether the

claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms[.]” Id. 

(internal citations omitted). “While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order

to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant

reports participation in everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a

work setting[.]” Id. at 1112-13 (internal citations omitted). “Even where those activities

suggest some difficulty [in] functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the

claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating

impairment.” Id. at 1113. 

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The ALJ considered plaintiff’s symptom statements less than credible because

plaintiff continued “to work for several months after her alleged disability onset date”;

because plaintiff’s treatment records indicate that she quit working because she was laid

off, not because of her alleged disabling symptoms; because of her daily activities; and

because plaintiff was receiving unemployment benefits.

21 Plaintiff argues thatnone ofthese

reasons were clear and convincing. 

The first reason, that plaintiff continued to work, was not a clear and convincing

reason because an attemptto work isnotnecessarilyinconsistent with disabling limitations. 

The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[i]t does not follow from the fact that a claimant tried to

work for a short period of time and, because of h[er] impairments, failed, that [s]he did not

then experience pain and limitations severe enough to preclude h[er] from maintaining

substantial gainful employment.” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1038. Rather, the court has

“suggested that similar evidence that a claimant tried to work and failed actually

supported h[er] allegations of disabling pain.” Id. 

As forthe second reason, that she reported that she was laid off, plaintiff argues that

this was not a clear and convincing reason for finding her symptom statements less than

credible because she testified that she “either ... had to quit or they were, they will fire

21Admin. Rec. at 114. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ did not find

plaintiff’s symptom statements less than credible based on the objective medical evidence. 

The ALJ simply observed that the objective medical evidence in this case was “limited”,

which was an accurate observation. 

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me.”22

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored this testimony. 

The ALJ did not ignore this testimony. Rather, the ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony

that she left herlast full-time job because of her disabling condition inconsistent with what

she told Dr. Bomprezzi, which was that she had been laid off.23 An ALJ may consider

inconsistencies in a claimant’s statements when assessing the claimant’s credibility. 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff argues, however, that even if she didstop working because she was laid off,

this is not a sufficient reason to find her symptom statements less than credible. See Dodrill

v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (ALJ’s credibility findings, which included a

finding that the plaintiff “left her last job not because of medical necessity,” were

insufficient because the ALJ was “required to point to specific facts in the record which

demonstrate that Dodrill is in less pain than she claims”). 

Plaintiff’s reliance on Dodrill is misplaced because there was no issue of inconsistent

statements in that case. Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff had made inconsistent

statements as to why she left her last full-time job. This was a clear and convincing reason

to find plaintiff’s symptom statements less than credible. 

The third reason given by the ALJ, that plaintiff engaged in daily activities

22Admin. Rec. at 79. 

23Admin. Rec. at 293. 

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Case 2:13-cv-01898-HRH Document 28 Filed 01/13/15 Page 12 of 16
inconsistent with a claim of disability, was not a convincing reason to find her symptom

statements less than credible. The ALJ noted that plaintiff “is able to vacuum, do laundry,

cook and perform other household [chores] although it takes herlongerto complete those

tasks. She also reported that she is able to go grocery shopping, go to the mall and attend

church....”24 But, the ALJ made no finding that plaintiff spent a substantial part of her day

engaged in these activities, which is a prerequisite for a negative determination based on

a claimant’s daily activities. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“physical activities did not consume a substantial part of Ms. Vertigan’s day. This court

has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily

activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, orlimited walking for exercise, does not

in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability”). And, the ALJ did not

make any findings as to how these activities would be transferable to a work environment. 

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014). 

As forthe fourth reason, that she was receiving unemployment compensation, there

is no evidence that plaintiff was holding herself out as available for full-time work. The

Ninth Circuit has recognized that “while receipt ofunemployment benefits can undermine

a claimant’s alleged inability to work fulltime,” only if the claimant holds herself out as

available for full-time work is the receipt of such benefits “inconsistent with ... disability

24Admin. Rec. at 114. 

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allegations.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Social Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir.

2008). Defendant is correct that under Arizona law, in order to receive unemployment

insurance, a claimant must hold herself out for full-time work. See A.A.C. R6-3-52190 (“A

claimant who states that he is able and willing to accept a part-time job but is unable to

accept a full-time job because of a physical disability may be presumed to be unable to

work.”). But because there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff held herself out as

being available for full time work, this credibility finding by the ALJ is not supported by

substantial evidence. See Jenson v. Colvin, Case No. CV–13–01018–PHX-BSB, 2014 WL

1878449, at *11 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2014) (“ALJ erred in discounting the claimant’s subjective

complaints based on his receipt of unemployment benefits when the record did not include

the unemployment benefits application”). In addition, defendant has recognized that “a

person can qualify for Social Security disability even though he or she remains capable of

performing some work”25and thus the fact that a claimant is receiving unemployment

benefits is not inconsistent with a claim for Social Security benefits. And finally, basing an

adverse credibility finding on the receipt of unemployment benefits is contrary to Social 

Security regulations, which provide that “[y]ou are not eligible for SSI benefits if you do

not apply for all other benefits for which you may be eligible.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.210(a). 

The ALJ erred as to three of the four reasons given for finding plaintiff’s symptom

25Brief for Plaintiff at 15, Docket No. 17 (quoting November 15, 2006 Memorandum

from Chief Administrative Law Judge). 

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statements less than credible. An error is harmless if “the ALJ’s remaining reasoning and

ultimate credibility determination were adequately supported by substantial evidence in

the record.” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (emphasis omitted). “In other words, after the

erroris removed there must remain specific reasons supporting the credibility finding such

that they constitute substantial evidence.” Coxey v. Astrue, Case No. CIV S-07-0977 JAM

GGH, 2008 WL 4291390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2008). Here, the one remaining reason is

not sufficient. Whether plaintiff quit or was laid off is an inconsistency but on a matter of

no great significance to the ultimate question of whether plaintiff is disabled. Thus, the

ALJ’s error as to credibility was harmful.

Because the ALJ erred in finding plaintiff’s symptom statements less than credible,

the court must decide whether to remand for an award of benefits or for further

proceedings. “Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004)

(emphasis omitted). “Conversely, where the record has been developed fully and further

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the district court should

remand for an immediate award of benefits.” Id.

More specifically, the district court should credit evidence that

was rejected during the administrative process and remand for

an immediate award of benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to provide

legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2) there

are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clearfrom

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the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant

disabled were such evidence credited. 

Id. However, the court is required “to remand forfurther proceedings when, even though

all conditions of the credit-as-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole

creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021. 

If plaintiff’s testimony is credited as true, she would be disabled. Plaintiff testified

she has to lay down 2-4 hours per day some days, not every day but in a “typical” day.26

Dr. Komar testified that a person “who needs to lay down between two and four hours in

a typical eight-hour day” would be unable to do plaintiff’s past relevant work or any other

work.27

 A remand for benefits is appropriate in this case. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed and this matter is

remanded for benefits. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 13th day of January, 2015. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

26Admin. Rec. at 77-78. 

27Admin. Rec. at 83. 

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