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Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 

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' 

FILED 

4 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR O 71989 

K. ROBERT HUNTER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

-vsE. HARLOW SMYTH, 

BERNIE C. PAPY, JR. and 

BURKE RYAN, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 86-1487 

and 86-1542 

(D.C. No. 85-F-103) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, 

District Judge*. 

*Of the United States District Court for the Western, Northern and 

Eastern Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

The issues raised by this appeal are 1) whether defendants 

signed a promissory note in an individual or representative 

capacity; 2) whether defendants were authorized to sign a 

promissory note in a representative capacity; 3) whether the trial 

court erred in concluding that defendants failed to establish that 

it was understood or agreed between the parties that defendants 

were in fact signing only in their representative capacities; and 

4) whether defendants may seek reversal or a new trial on the 

issue of fraud in the inducement, a defense not pleaded or argued 

Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 1 
,. in the trial court but raised for the first time in a motion to 

alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial. 

Robert K. Hunter brought suit against E. Harlow Smyth, 

Bernie C. Papy, Jr. and Burke Ryan on a promissory note dated 

October 1, 1981. The body of the note states as follows: 

Eighteen months after date, 

for value received, we promise to pay to 

the order of K. R. Hunter, lender, at 

620 Elm, Denver, Colorado, Two Hundred 

Thousand Dollars, with interest at the 

rate of 1% over prime, floating, payable 

according to the terms and conditions of 

lender's obligation to the LaSalle 

National Bank of Chicago, Illinois. 

IT IS AGREED that if this note 

is not paid when due or declared due 

hereunder, the principal and accrued 

interest thereon shall draw interest at 

the rate of 18 per cent per annum, and 

that failure to make any payment of 

principal or interest when due or any 

default under any encumbrance or 

agreement securing this note shall cause 

the whole note to become due at once, or 

the interest to be counted as principal, 

at the option of the holder of the note. 

The makers and endorsers hereof 

severally waive presentment for payment, 

protest, notice of non-payment and of 

protest, and agree to any extension of 

time of payment and partial payments 

before, at or after maturity, and if 

this note or interest thereon is not 

paid when due, or suit is brought, agree 

to pay all reasonable costs of 

collection, including a reasonable 

amount for attorney's fees, and if 

foreclosure is made by the Public 

Trustee, N/A 

The signature page of the note is reproduced below: 

2 

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• t 

PROMISSORY NOTE (Cont.) 

AEROSUN INTERNATIONAL, 

INC., 

SHAREHOLDERS 

After a non-jury trial, the district court orally 

announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 

'judgment was entered thereon for plaintiff and against. defendants 

jointly and severally in the principal amount of the note together 

with prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Defendants move 

alternatively for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, 

which motion was denied. 

On appeal, defendants first assert that the trial court 

erred in concluding that defendants' signatures failed to comport 

with Section 3-403 (3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. 

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Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 3 
• § 3403(3)). Defendants assert that this was a legal rather than a 

factual determination. They further assert that the trial court 

should have applied the law of Florida, the place where the note 

was signed, in making this legal determination. Plaintiff 

responds that defendants' signatures were not made in accordance 

with the express requirements of U.C.C. § 3-403 (3), Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 4-3-403(3) (1973), but were made in the manner described in 

U.C.C. § 3-403 (2) (b), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403 (2) (b). Plaintiff 

agrees that this determination is a question of law, but asserts 

that the trial court correctly applied Colorado law. However, 

plaintiff points out that both Florida and Colorado have adopted 

u.c.c. § 3-403. 

The choice of law issue, which is really a non-issue 

since Colorado and Florida have both adopted U.C.C. § 3-403, was 

not raised in the trial court. It may not, therefore, be 

considered here. See CCMS Publishing Co. v. Dooley-Maloof, Inc., 

645 F.2d 33, 37 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Wilhelm v. Continental 

Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 

U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1601, 80 L.Ed.2d 131 (1984). Cf. R. L. Clark 

Drilling Contractors, Inc. v. Schramm, Inc., 835 F.2d 1306 (10th 

Cir. 1987) (district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 

to allow party to raise choice of law issue not set out in 

pretrial order at attorneys' fee stage). Absent exceptional 

circumstances or manifest injustice, an issue not raised in the 

trial court will not be considered on appeal. United States v. 

Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926, 

98 S.Ct. 1493, 55 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). 

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Whether defendants' signatures were made in conformity 

with U.C.C. § 3-403(3), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403(3), is a 

question of law for the court. However, as one commentator has 

stated, "[i]t should ... be held that unless a signing 'clearly' 

shows that the signer is acting in a representative capacity and 

has brought himself within the scope of Code§ 3-403, that he is 

individually bound." 2 R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform 

Commercial Code § 3-403:7(1971) at pp. 913-14. Courts are 

generally in agreement with this statement. In two cases 

remarkably similar to this case courts concluded that whether the 

signatures of corporate officers were made in their representative 

capacities could not be determined as a matter of law because the 

instruments and the capacity in which the corporate officers 

signed were ambiguous as a matter of law. See United American 

Bank of Memphis v. First Citizens National Bank of Dyersburg, slip 

op. (Tenn. App. Oct. 19, 1988) (1988 WL 109383); Trenton Trust Co. 

v. Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. 400, 296 A.2d 275 (1972). See also 

Havatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., 354 S.2d 1235 (Fla. App. 

1978) (face of note patently ambiguous). But cf. Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corp. v. Tennessee Wildcat Services, Inc., 839 F.2d 251 

(6th Cir. 1988) (word "by" before signature is sufficient to 

establish that signer signed in a representative capacity where 

principal is named on face of note) . The conclusions that the 

signers' capacities were ambiguous were not, however, necessary to 

those courts' decisions since both courts would apparently permit 

the introduction of extrinsic evidence as between the parties to 

expand the scope of liability of one who signs an instrument in a 

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Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 5 
representative capacity in accordance with the requirements of 

U.C.C. § 3-403(3). See United American Bank of Memphis v. First 

Citizens National Bank of Dyersburg, slip op. at __ , quoting 4 

U.L.A. 231 (1968) ("The exception permits the introduction of parol 

evidence to expand the liability of a person who apparently signed 

in a representative capacity."); Trenton Trust Company v. 

Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. 400, 296 A.2d at 277 ("To hold that 

appellant should not have the opportunity to prove that the 

endorsements were made in a personal capacity is to read all 

meaning out of the language "[e]xcept as otherwise established" in 

u.c.c. § 3-403(3)). 

Whether the capacity in which defendants signed the note 

is ambiguous is also a question of law for the court, and is 

integral to the question of whether the signatures were made in 

conformity with U.C.C. § 3-403(3), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403(3), 

as a matter of law. See United American Trenton Bank of Memphis 

v. First Citizens National Bank of Dyersburg, supra and Trust 

Company v. Klausman, supra. See generally Metropolitan Paving Co. 

v. City of Aurora, Colo., 449 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1971); 

Denver Center for the Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 299, 306 

(Colo. 1985); Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 

P.2d 1310, 1314 (Colo. 1984); People v. Johnson, 618 P.2d 262, 266 

(Colo. 1980) (whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law 

for the court). "To determine whether the terms of a contract are 

ambiguous, a court must consider the ordinary meaning of the 

language, with reference to all parts of the agreement." Denver 

Center for the Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d at 306; 

6 

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Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Association, 

Inc., 195 Colo. 253, 256, 577 P.2d 748, 750 (1978) (en bane). 

Extrinsic evidence may be admitted conditionally in order to 

determine whether a contract term is ambiguous. Amoco Production 

Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1985); 

Col. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-205, Official Comment 1. See also KN 

Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769 (Colo.), 

cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1022, 105 S.Ct. 3489. 87 L.Ed.2d 623 

(1985); Denver Center for the Performing Arts v. Briggs, 696 P.2d 

at 306; Pepcol Manufacturing Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 

at 1314 n. 3. 

Whether or not the district court considered extrinsic 

evidence in concluding that the capacity in which defendants 

signed the note was ambiguous is immaterial, but it is apparent 

that the district court concluded that the note was ambiguous with 

respect to the capacity in which defendants signed it. We cannot 

say that the district court's conclusions that the note was 

ambiguous in this respect and conversely, that defendants' 

signatures were not made in a representative capacity as a matter 

of law, were incorrect or contrary to law. 

In United American Bank of Memphis v. First Citizens 

National Bank of Dyersburg, the court concluded that an 

endorsement on a cashier's check payable to the order of 

"Investment Ventures and Joseph Hart" was ambiguous. The 

endorsement on the instrument was 

Investment Ventures 

Joseph Hart, pres. 

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The court observed that if the check had been made payable solely 

to the corporation, the signature of Hart would, as a matter of 

law, have been made in his representative capacity but that an 

ambiguity arose because the check was payable to the corporation 

and its officer. 

In Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. 400, 

296 A. 2d 275, the payee of a note brought suit against the 

endorsers thereof. The face of the note was signed as follows: 

The Shoe Rack 

X Mark Klausman, Sec. 

X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres. 

X Michael Klausman, Pres. 

The back of the note was endorsed as follows: 

X Mark Klausman, Sec. 

X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres. 

X Michael Klausman, Pres. 

The Shoe Rack 

X Mark Klausman, Sec. 

296 A.2d at 278 (Cercone, J., 

dissenting). 

The "narrow issue" presented to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

was "whether it is so clear as a matter of law that the 

endorsements were given in a representative capacity that the 

appellant was correctly precluded from introducing evidence to the 

contrary." 296 A.2d at 276. The court concluded that this was a 

case of "patent ambiguity" of the capacity in which the endorsers 

signed, permitting the introduction of extrinsic evidence to 

resolve the ambiguity. 296 A.2d at 278. The Pennsylvania court 

reached its conclusion that the endorsements were ambiguous with 

respect to the capacity in which the endorsers signed by an 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 8 
analysis markedly similar to that employed by the district court 

in this case: 

In analyzing the capacity in which the 

endorsements are affixed, it is necessary to 

consider not only each word and signature 

within the four corners of the instrument, but 

also the position, style and arrangement of 

the whole writing. Why would the appellees 

have endorsed in a representative capacity 

after having already signed as makers of the 

note for their corporation? Just as Judge 

Watkins observed in Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Chasco 

Supply Co., 219 Pa. Super. 530, 535, 281 A.2d 

765, 767 (1971), that it was illogical and 

unlikely to have the (corporate) customer act 

as his own guarantor; so it is in this case, 

equally unclear why officers would endorse a 

note in their official capacity after issuing 

the same instrument for their corporate 

principal. Was appellee Mark Klausman 

endorsing in a representative capacity not 

only when he placed his signature immediately 

beneath the corporate name towards the bottom 

of the reverse side of the note, but also when 

he had earlier placed his signature nearly 

four inches above the business name near the 

top of the note? Conversely, it can properly 

be asked why are the official titles after the 

signatures if there was an intention that 

there be personal liability. Because answers 

to these questions do not readily spring from 

the face of the instrument, this is a classic 

case of ambiguity. 

296 A.2d at 276-77. 

Interpretation of an ambiguous contract, at least where 

interpretation depends on extrinsic facts and circumstances or 

parol evidence is allowed to explain the contract, is a question 

of fact for the trier of fact, in this instance, the district 

court. See Amoco Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co. , 7 54 

F.2d 303, 309 (10th Cir. 1985); May v. Interstate Moving & Storage 

Co., 739 F.2d 521, 523 (10th Cir. 1984); Metropolitan Paving Co. 

v. City of Aurora, Colo., 449 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1971); 

9 

Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 9 
Jaeco Pump Co. v. Inject-O-Meter Manufacturing Co., 467 F.2d 317, 

320 (10th Cir. 1972); Union Rural Electric Association, Inc. v. 

Public Utilities Commission, 661 P.2d 247, 251 n. 5 (Colo. 

1983) (en bane.) . 

In this case, the district court allowed the parties to 

introduce, and considered in resolution of the ambiguity, 

extensive extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the transaction giving rise to the signing of the 

note, including parol evidence of the parties' subjective intent. 

This was proper both because the court concluded that the note was 

ambiguous with respect to the capacity in which defendants signed 

it and because U.C.C. § 3-403(2) (b), Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 4-3-403 (2) (b), requires that the signing parties be given an 

opportunity to establish, as against a party to the instrument, 

that they signed in a representative rather than in an individual 

capacity. 

Accordingly, our review of the trial court's findings 

concerning the interpretation of the note with respect to the 

capacity in which defendants signed it is circumscribed by the 

"clearly erroneous" standard. F.R.Civ. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City 

of Bessmer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 

L.Ed.2d 518, 528 (1985); Amoco Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas 

Co., 754 F.2d at 309; Volis v. Puritan Life Insurance Co., 548 

F.2d 895, 901 (10th Cir. 1977). Under this standard reversal is 

required only if our review of the record leaves us with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See 

Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845, 850 (10th Cir. 

10 

Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 10 
1986); City of Farmington v. Amoco Gas Co., 777 F.2d 554, 561 

(10th Cir. 1985); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 768 

F.2d 1159, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1985), citing Amoco Production Co. 

v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F. 2d at 309. In applying this 

standard in a case tried to the court, we must view the evidence 

and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom in a 

light most favorable to plaintiff, the prevailing party. Amoco 

Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d at 309; Ahern v. 

Veterans Administration, 537 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1976); 

Hart v. Western Investment & Development Co., 417 F.2d 1296, 1300 

(10th Cir. 1969). Furthermore, "we must accord great deference to 

the factual determinations of the trial court, who has the 

exclusive ability to assess witnesses' demeanor and inflection. 

Thompson v. Rockwell International Corp., 811 F.2d 1345, 1350 

(10th Cir. 1987). In the final analysis, 

[I]f the district court's account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record 

viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals 

may not reverse it even though convinced that 

had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it 

would have weighed the evidence differently. 

Where there are two permissible views of the 

evidence, the fact finder is choice between 

them cannot be clearly erroneous. 

Anderson v. City of Bessmer City, 

N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 

1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518, 528 

(1985) (citations omitted). 

The record contains substantial evidence supporting the 

district court's decision. We are convinced, after a thorough and 

careful review of the evidence that the district court's findings 

that defendants signed the note in their individual capacities and 

that there was no agreement between plaintiff and defendants that 

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Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 11 
the latter were signing only in their representative capacities 

were not clearly erroneous. 

Having so concluded, we need not pass on the correctness 

of the district court's conclusion that defendants were not 

authorized to sign in a representative capacity on behalf of 

Aerosun International, Inc. because, as noted by plaintiff, 

this issue is not "outcome-determinative." Answer Brief of 

Appellee at p. 22. Assuming arguendo that defendants were 

authorized, absent proper signatures designating representative 

capacity, see U.C.C. § 3-403 (3), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403 (3), 

and unless an agreement to the contrary were established as 

between parties to the instrument, defendants would nevertheless 

be personally liable on the instrument which bore their 

signatures. u.c.c. § 3-403 (2), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403 (2). 

See Official Comment to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403 (2) (Uniform 

Commercial Code Comment 2) ("Subsection ( 2) applies only to the 

signature of a representative whose authority to sign for another 

is established"). 1 

The issue of fraud in the inducement as a defense to 

enforcement of the note against defendants was raised for the 

1. Indeed, U.C.C. § 3-403, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-3-403, applies 

only to the liability of an authorized agent. 2 R. Anderson, 

Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-403:3 (1971) at p. 

911. Thus, given the district court's conclusion that defendants 

were not authorized to sign in a representative capacity for 

Aerosun International, Inc., the district court's conclusion that 

defendants were personally liable on the instrument should have 

been predicated on U.C.C. § 3-404(1), Colo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 4-3-404 (1), rather than on U.C.C. § 3-403 (2) (b), Colo. Rev. 

Stat. § 4-3-403 (2) (b). Id. at § 3-403:3, p. 911 & § 3-404:5. 

12 

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. 

first time in Defendant Smyth' s alternative motion to alter or 

amend the judgment or for a new trial. See R. Vol. I at Tab 11, 

~ 4 & Tab 12, pp. 19-23. Defendant requested that the trial court 

amend its judgment to conform to what he characterized as 

unrefuted evidence of plaintiff's fraud inducing the shareholder 

defendants, including Smyth, to sign the note, and enter judgment 

in favor of defendants. Id . at Tab 12 , p . 2 3 . Alternatively, 

defendant requested that the court grant a new trial 

to allow the Court to hear more fully 

developed evidence as to the fraud and 

deception practiced by Mr. Hunter and his 

attorney, on the Defendants, which fraud and 

deception were not actually revealed until the 

trial its elf and for [sic] which Defendants 

were therefore not fully prepared to advance 

in a complete and proper manner at trial. 

Id. at p. 27. 

The district court denied defendant's motion. 

Rule 15(b), F.R.Civ. P., deems pleadings amended to 

include issues not theretofore raised in the pleadings but tried 

by express or implied consent of the parties. Amendments of the 

pleadings necessary to conform to the evidence and issues actually 

tried may be made any time, even after judgment. F.R.Civ. P. 

15(b); Hardin v. Manitowac-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 456 (10th 

Cir. 1982). In this case, no contention is made that the issue of 

fraud was tried by express consent. Defendants cite and we find 

no stipulation or other evidence of express consent. Thus, any 

consent to trial on the issue of fraud, an issue not raised in the 

pleadings, must be found in plaintiff's knowing acquiescence in 

the introduction of evidence relating to fraud. See Hardin v. 

Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d at 457; 6 C. Wright & A. Miller 

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Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 13 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493 (1971) at pp. 462-63. The 

evidence defendants point to which they claim demonstrates that 

the issue of fraud in the inducement was tried by implied consent 

was relevant to issues already in the case the intent of the 

parties and whether there was an agreement between the parties 

that the shareholders would not be personally liable on the note 

and were signing it only in their representative capacity. There 

is no indication in the record that defendants, when introducing 

this evidence, intended to raise the issue of fraud in the 

inducement and, in view of the relevance of the evidence to issues 

raised by the pleadings, we will not infer that the plaintiff knew 

or should have known that defendants sought to interject this 

issue by introduction of such evidence. Accordingly, we refuse to 

now deem the pleadings amended to include the issue of fraud, see 

Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d at 457; Ellis v. 

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436,440 (10th Cir. 1979), 

cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 1653, 64 L.Ed.2d 239 (1980); 

Cook v. City of Price, Carbon County, Utah, 566 F.2d 699, 702 

(10th Cir. 1977); Cox v. Fremont County Public Building Authority, 

415 F.2d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 1969); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1493 (1971) at p. 466, and we 

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to deem 

the pleadings amended and to alter or amend the judgment to 

reflect adjudication of this issue. See Hardin v. ManitowocForsythe Corp., 691 F.2d at 457 ("Whether the issue was tried by 

consent is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court 

whose judgment will only be 

14 

reversed for an abuse of 

Appellate Case: 86-1487 Document: 010110024543 Date Filed: 03/07/1989 Page: 14 
. 

discretion."). See also Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 

F.2d 436, 440 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 964, 100 

s.ct. 1653, 64 L.Ed.2d 239 (1980); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 

435 F.2d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 1970) (abuse of discretion standard 

for amendments pursuant to Rule 15(b)). 

For similar reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial to allow defendants 

to more fully develop evidence of fraud. A new trial on the 

ground of newly discovered evidence should not be granted where 

the evidence was not in fact discovered after trial and there is 

no showing that defendants were excusably ignorant of the facts, 

despite using due diligence to discover them. See McCullough Tool 

Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 410 (10th Cir. 1965), 

cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933, 86 S.Ct. 1061, 15 L.Ed.2d 851 

(1966) (requirements for granting a new trial on the basis of newly 

discovered evidence). See also Austin v. United States, 461 F.2d 

733, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1972) (new theory rather than newly 

discovered evidence). It is apparent that Defendant Smyth sought 

a new trial only to interject a new defense theory based on 

evidence long known to defendants, a theory which, with diligence 

defendants could have discovered long before trial. 

Finally, because the issue of fraud in the inducement 

was not litigated in the trial court, it cannot be considered or 

serve as a basis for reversal on appeal. See,~, Dumbell Ranch 

Co. v. Cherokee Exploration, Inc., 692 F.2d 706, 707 (10th Cir. 

1982). 

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• Plaintiff recently filed a "Petition to Reserve Right to 

Attorney Fees." He asks that this court remand the determination 

of additional attorneys' fees incurred on appeal to the district 

court, noting that the district court awarded him attorneys' fees 

as a part of the judgment which is the subject of this appeal. 

Defendants have filed no response. Under the terms of the 

promissory note, quoted above, plaintiff is entitled to recover a 

"reasonable amount for attorney's fees" as a part of "all 

reasonable costs of collection." Responding to this appeal under 

the circumstances constitutes a reasonable cost of collection. 

See Edwards v. Mesch, 763 P.2d 1169, 1172 (N.M. 1988) . We remand 

to the district court to determine the appropriate amount of 

attorneys' fees incurred as a result of this appeal. Accord Aspen 

Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co . , 738 F.2d 1509, 1527 

( 1 0th Cir • 19 8 4 ) . 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED and this case is remanded to the 

district court to determine the amount of attorneys' fees incurred 

in this appeal. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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