Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00820/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00820-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in this case.

SC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Dean Davis, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-0820-PHX-DGC (MEA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Dean Davis, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex,

Browning Unit, in Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc.# 1, 3.)1

 The Court

will dismiss the action.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The statutory

fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time

the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees

according to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the

allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000)

(en banc). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend because the

defects cannot be corrected.

III. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges one count for violation of his due process rights in connection with

disciplinary proceedings. He sues the following employees of the Arizona Department of

Corrections (ADC): Director Charles L. Ryan; Captains Sigona, Russman, Carroll, Shitter,

and Doe; Sergeants Holms, Ving, and Does I and II; and ADC. Plaintiff seeks injunctive,

compensatory, and punitive relief. 

IV. Heck v. Humphrey Bar

Plaintiff filed this action using the court-approved form to seek relief for violations

of his constitutional rights by officials acting under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks relief for the alleged denial of due process in

connection with disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of early release credits, and

hence, affecting the duration of his sentence. Plaintiff’s claim has not yet accrued. 

 A civil rights claim brought pursuant to § 1983 that, if successful, would necessarily

undermine the validity of a conviction or the duration of a sentence may not be brought

before the prisoner has obtained a “favorable termination” of the underlying conviction; a

prisoner’s sole federal remedy to challenge the validity or duration of his confinement is a

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petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Docken

v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004). That is, a civil rights claim under § 1983

does not accrue unless or until the prisoner has obtained a “favorable termination”of the

underlying conviction, parole, or disciplinary action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

489 (1994); Docken, 393 F.3d at 1031. Under the “favorable termination”" rule:

In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by action whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction of sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into question

by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . .

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. The “favorable termination” rule extends to prisoner challenges

to state disciplinary and parole procedures for damages where success thereon would

“necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Osborne v. District

Attorney’s Office for 3d Jud. Dist., 423 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Wilkinson

v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005)); see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997)

(calculation of good time credits); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (parole

revocation proceedings). Thus, success on any claim for damages pursuant to § 1983 that

would necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement, or its duration, does not accrue “and

may not be brought” unless and until the underlying conviction, sentence, or disciplinary

proceeding affecting the duration of the sentence is reversed. Only then may a plaintiff

properly seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violation of his due process rights in connection

with disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of early release credits. Success on

Plaintiff’s due process claim in this action would necessarily undermine the validity of the

disciplinary proceedings and affect the duration of his sentence. Before Plaintiff may seek

relief pursuant to § 1983, Plaintiff must first obtain a “favorable termination” of the

disciplinary action. 

To challenge disciplinary proceedings, a prisoner may seek federal habeas relief

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the “exclusive vehicle” for a state prisoner to seek

relief from an administrative decision in federal court. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002,

1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004). Before a federal court may grant habeas relief, however, a prisoner

must first have exhausted remedies available in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1);

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). The federal court will not entertain a

petition for writ of habeas corpus unless each and every issue has been exhausted. Rose v.

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982); Olvera v. Guirbino, 371 F.3d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 2004)

(district court may not consider a claim until petitioner has properly exhausted all available

remedies). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on the habeas petitioner to show that

he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.

1981) (per curiam). 

To exhaust claims, a prisoner must give the state courts a “fair opportunity” to act on

his claims. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). He must describe both

the operative facts and the federal legal theory so that the state courts have a “‘fair

opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Further, a prisoner seeking to exhaust

claims in state court before filing a federal habeas action should diligently pursue his

available state remedies to avoid application of the one-year limitation period. See Shelby

v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying § 2244(d) to a habeas petition

challenging a disciplinary order). 

 Plaintiff appears to have an available remedy in state court to exhaust his claim

challenging the disciplinary proceedings prior to filing a federal habeas corpus petition.

Although Arizona’s Administrative Review Act does not authorize state judicial review of

prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate may seek such review by bringing a special action

in superior court. Rose v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 804 P.2d 845, 847-50 (Ariz. Ct. App.

1991). If unsuccessful, the inmate must then appeal the superior court’s ruling to the Arizona

Court of Appeals to exhaust his claims before seeking federal habeas relief. See Swoopes

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v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff seeks damages for violation of his constitutional rights in connection with

disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the loss of early release credits. Success on

Plaintiff’s claim would necessarily undermine the duration of his sentence; therefore, he must

first obtain a “favorable termination”of the underlying disciplinary charges before he may

seek relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Plaintiff has not done so, this action will

be dismissed without prejudice to filing a new action when and if he obtains a favorable

termination of the disciplinary charges. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, filed with the Complaint,

is granted. (Doc.# 3.)

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial filing fee.

(3) The Complaint (doc.# 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 29th day of April, 2009.

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