Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01647/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01647-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMUNDO SALDOVAL,

Petitioner,

v.

HARRIS,

Respondent.

 /

1: 05 CV 01647 LJO WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 16]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion to

dismiss.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 7, 2000, Petitioner was convicted of possessing tar heroin while confined in a

penal institution, possessing controlled substance paraphernalia while confined in a penal institution,

obstructing a peace officer by force or violence, and possessing a sharp instrument while confined in

Case 1:05-cv-01647-LJO -WMW Document 22 Filed 01/15/08 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a penal institution. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a state prison term of 25 years to life plus

one year for a prior prison term enhancement. Petitioner filed a direct appeal and on November 26,

2001, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Petitioner sought review in the California

Supreme Court, which denied his petition on January 29, 2002.

Petitioner subsequently filed nine pro se petitions for post-conviction relief, the first of them

on July 24, 2003. Petitioner also filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the

first of them on April 24, 2003.

LEGAL STANDARD

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1504 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County

Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). 

Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct.

586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 th

F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other

th

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable

to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Case 1:05-cv-01647-LJO -WMW Document 22 Filed 01/15/08 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will

not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth

Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 th

S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1174 (citations omitted). “Rather,

that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal

conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual

determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made

by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769

(1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1388 (9 Cir. 1997). th

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss this petition on two grounds. Petitioner opposes the motion.

First, Respondent contends that this petition is untimely as filed beyond the applicable one-year

statute of limitations. Second, Respondent contends that this action must be dismissed as a mixed

petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Because the court finds that

Case 1:05-cv-01647-LJO -WMW Document 22 Filed 01/15/08 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondent’s first contention is meritorious, it finds in unnecessary to address the second. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In this case, the statute of limitations began running on April 30, 2002, the day the 90-day

deadline expired for Petitioner to have filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court after the California Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Thus, absent any

tolling, the statute of limitations would have expired on April 29, 2003. Petitioner filed his first

habeas corpus petition on April 24, 2003, after 360 days of the one-year statute of limitations had

expired. Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is

pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an application is pending

in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). Thus, the statute of

limitations continued to run while Petitioner’s first federal habeas corpus petition was pending and

expired on April 29, 2003. The first state habeas corpus petition was not filed until July 24, 2003. 

Because the statute of limitations had already expired by that time, the first state habeas corpus

petition did not have any tolling effect. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000)

Case 1:05-cv-01647-LJO -WMW Document 22 Filed 01/15/08 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). 

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at th

1288-1289. In this case, the court finds no basis set forth in either the petition or the opposition to

support equitable tolling. See, generally., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905,

909 (9 Cir.1986) (pro se prisoner's illiteracy and lack of knowledge of law unfortunate but th

insufficient to establish cause); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710 (5 Cir. 1999); Rose v. Dole, 945 th

F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1991).

In light of the above, the court must conclude that the statute of limitations expired in this

case on April 29, 2003. Thus, the present action, filed December 30 ,2005, is barred by the statute

of limitations.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows;

1) that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED;

2) that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as barred by the statute of

limitations;

3) that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case.

Case 1:05-cv-01647-LJO -WMW Document 22 Filed 01/15/08 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 15, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01647-LJO -WMW Document 22 Filed 01/15/08 Page 6 of 6