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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

HELEN TUTTLE, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant,) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

ANR FREIGHT SYSTEMS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APR 2 9 1992 

ROBRRT L. HOECKEB 

Clerl: 

No. 88-1576 

(D.C. No. 84-K-1586) 

(D. Colorado) 

Before HOLLOWAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,** Senior 

District Judge. 

This appeal arises from the district court's dismissal of 

plaintiff Helen Tuttle's Title VII and Equal Pay Act sex and 

compensation discrimination claims and her retaliation claim 

against ANR Freight Systems ("ANR") at the close of Tuttle's case . 

I 

Tuttle was employed by ANR, or its predecessor Neuendorf 

Transportation, from May 1979 until May 1987. During her tenure 

at ANR, Tuttle occupied a variety of accounting positions. She 

maintains that in two of these positions she was paid less than 

two men, Kelly Underwood and Tom Watzell, who were assigned 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1576 Document: 010110246195 Date Filed: 04/29/1992 Page: 1
identical or substantially equal duties. After she filed an EEOC 

charge relating to this alleged discrimination she alleges that 

she was reprimanded, closely monitored, and ultimately fired. She 

believes that these actions were an illegal retaliation against 

her for bringing both the EEOC claim and this lawsuit. 

At trial Tuttle testified in support of her charges of 

violations of the equal treatment provisions of Title VII, 

violations of the Equal Pay Act, and retaliation in violation of 

Title VII. In the course of the proceedings the trial court 

rejected on relevancy grounds Tuttle's offer of the verdict from 

her successful state court action against ANR for breach of 

contract. At the close of Tuttle's testimony, she rested. No 

other testimony was introduced. ANR then moved for an involuntary 

dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial judge found 

that there was no evidence presented of any kind of different 

treatment in positions and no evidence of harassment or 

intimidation in violation of Title VII. With respect to 

retaliation, the court found that plaintiff had filed a charge 

with the EEOC on September 14, 1983 and that she testified she 

received a reprimand on September 22, 1983, which was for having 

overstayed a lunch hour and it was not until approximately a week 

later that others received the same kind of reprimand. The court 

found that this could not be regarded as retaliation. 

With respect to plaintiff's termination, the judge found that 

the claim was properly before the court, although no additional 

claim on that separate subject had been made before the EEOC . The 

judge stated that he had sympathy with plaintiff's position, but 

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noted her evidentiary shortages. Mr . Underwood apparently had 

supervisory authority that plaintiff Tuttle did not have and the 

same was true with Mr. Watzell. (Tr. 90). The court found that 

evidence that a large portion of work in accounting that Underwood 

and Watzell had performed might have been assigned to plaintiff 

Tuttle, and that she did not receive the same amount of pay, was 

not sufficient to constitute a violation of the Equal Pay Act 

without proof as to what all of their duties were, which was not 

offered . (Tr. 91). They could have as easily have been involved 

in long-range planning or the supervision of other employees and 

other kinds of duties, but the judge did not know. 

The judge accepted the plaintiff's statement that she 

undertook the work done by Mr. Underwood which he had performed in 

a competent fashion; however, the judge noted that the evidence 

did not establish what Mr. Underwood's entire responsibility was 

and why his pay was at his level (Tr. 91). The court found there 

was no indication overall of sex discrimination as to whether 

women were being treated differently than men; the judge noted 

that he had to have some basis for comparison of the particular 

individual plaintiff with others and that no such evidence was 

shown with respect to Mr. Underwood or Mr. Watzell (Tr. at 91). 

With respect to termination the judge stated that this was a 

reduction in force and that absent any showing that the plaintiff 

was intentionally placed in a position which was planned for 

elimination, the court could not assume a wrongful termination. 

For these reasons the motions to dismiss the claims were granted, 

with each party to pay their own costs. 

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II 

On appeal, Tuttle claims: (1) that the district 

improperly concluded that Tuttle had failed to establish a 

court 

prima 

facie case of sex discrimination under either the Equal Pay Act or 

Title VII; (2) that the district court improperly concluded that 

Tuttle had failed to establish a prima facie case under the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII; (3) that it was reversible 

error for the trial court not to admit the verdict from the state 

breach of contract action; (4) that the trial court's findings of 

fact were not specific enough to give a reviewing court a clear 

understanding of the factual basis for the trial court's decision; 

and (5) that the trial court failed to consider the weight of the 

new evidence presented in the offer of proof with Tuttle's motion 

to alter or amend its judgment. 

In considering such a motion to dismiss, the trial court is 

not required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. Woods v. North American Rockwell Corp., 480 

F.2d 644, 646 (10th Cir. 1973) . Rather, the judge is to resolve 

any conflicts in the testimony and consider whether the plaintiff 

has established her prima facie case by a preponderance of the 

evidence. On appeal, our review is limited; the trial court's 

findings are to be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Crawford 

v. Northeastern Oklahoma State University~ 713 F.2d 586, 588 (10th 

Cir. 1983). 

In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful 

retaliation under Title VII a plaintiff must show that she engaged 

in protected activity, that the employer took adverse employment 

action against her, and that a causal connection exists between 

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the protected activity and the adverse action . Ross v . 

Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). 

- In an Equal Pay Act case, the prima facie elements are that the 

employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for 

equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, 

effort, and responsibility, and are performed under similar 

working conditions. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 

195 (1974). There was some evidence here touchi ng on these 

elements. However, Tuttle ' s own testimony showed that she could 

not say with certainty what Mr. Underwood's duties as the 

accountant for fixed assets were. (R. at 69-71). While she did 

testify that she ultimately assumed "all" of Mr. Watzell's 

responsibilities in the Terminal Profit/Loss division (R. at 51), 

she did not supervise anyone in that division as he had done. 

(R. at 66). Nor was there any evidence that Watzell and 

Underwood ' s duties were limited to those with which Tuttle was 

familiar . Consequently the trial court found that Tuttle had not 

proven that she performed substantially the same work as Tuttle 

and Underwood. Given the fact that Tuttle never held any 

supervisory position and was admittedly uncertain about the full 

nature of her male co-workers' duties, we are not left with "the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. " 

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 

(1948). 

The court made similar findings on the subject of 

retaliation. Although Tuttle was reprimanded shortly after 

commencement of this suit and was ultimately fired, there was no 

showing that these actions were the result of her complaint -- one 

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requirement for such a prima facie case. Tuttle admitted that the 

reprimand she was given for overstaying her lunch hour was also 

given to a number of other employees. (R. at 74). She was not 

fired until over three years after she first went to the EEOC, and 

when she was fired, there was a reduction in force in progress. 

(R. at 8; Defendant's Ex. A-5, p.8). We thus cannot say that the 

district court's finding that there was no causal connection 

between Tuttle's complaint and subsequent disciplinary measures 

was clearly erroneous. 

Tuttle's third claim is that it was error for the trial court 

to exclude evidence of the verdict from a successful breach of 

contract action she had brought against ANR. We review this 

exclusion under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. 

Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988). The two breach 

of contract theories on which Tuttle prevailed were that ANR 

breached a promise to provide her with promotional opportunities 

and pay raises when she transferred to ANR in Denver and that she 

did not receive the additional compensation promised her for the 

extra duties she assumed upon Watzell's resignation. The trial 

judge excluded the jury verdict on these issues as irrelevant. 

Since the substance of Tuttle's discrimination complaint was not 

that she was paid less than promised, but rather that she was paid 

less the men holding comparable jobs, we cannot say that the trial 

court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. 

Rule 4l(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 

findings as provided in Rule 52(a) where the trial judge renders 

judgment against the plaintiff after her evidence is in. Rule 

52(a) provides that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without 

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a jury 

separately its 

provides that 

the court shall find the facts specially and state 

conclusions of law thereon." The Rule also 

it "will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 

conclusions of law are stated orally. " The trial court has 

satisfied the Rule. It is clear from the record that the court 

held that a prima facie case had not been made because it felt 

that Underwood and Watzell had supervisory duties which Tuttle had 

never had, that the reprimand was the result of Tuttle taking a 

long lunch, and that her ultimate firing was part of a general 

reduction in force. The trial judge's oral findings and 

conclusions were adequate. 

Finally, Tuttle argues that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying her motion to alter or amend the judgment. 

In her brief in support of the motion Tuttle contended that she 

had indeed presented a prima facie case of sex discrimination and 

that the court erred by excluding the state court verdict. As 

discussed above, none of these rulings constitutes reversible 

error. Tuttle also made an offer of proof of a number of facts 

which she had held back "for reasons of trial strategy" until 

after the defense's case was in. (Appellant's Brief at 43). Yet, 

" [m]otions for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment must 

clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must 

present newly discovered evidence." Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986). 

Evidence which is kept back for purposes of trial strategy cannot 

be considered newly discovered evidence. The trial court thus did 

not err in refusing to alter the judgment. 

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Although none of Tuttle's claims of error can be sustained, 

they were sufficient for us to hold that the appeal is not 

frivolous and attorneys' fees will not be awarded to the appellee. 

AFFIRMED. 

8 

Entered for the Court 

William J . Holloway Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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