Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05613/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05613-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILIP J. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLORIA DAVIS, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-5613 EMC

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT

PREJUDICE

On November 5, 2007, Gloria and William Davis initiated this lawsuit in federal court by

filing a document titled “Petition for a New Case Number.” See Docket No. 1. (Although the

Davises initiated the lawsuit, they identified themselves as the defendants in the caption and Philip J.

Miller as the plaintiff.) In their petition, the Davises take issue with a determination by a state court

judge regarding the parties’ dispute over an easement over and removal of a tree from the Davises’

property. 

After reviewing the petition, the Court issued an order instructing the Davises to show cause

why this case should not be dismissed based on a lack of federal jurisdiction as well as a lack of

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Miller. The Davises filed a response on February 28, 2008. Having

reviewed the response, the Court hereby dismisses the case without prejudice.

First, the Davises have failed to show that Mr. Miller was properly served in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In their response, the Davises claim that they served Mr. Miller

at his two last known addresses and at his mother’s residence. There is, however, no evidence to

support this claim, not even a declaration from either Mr. Davis or Ms. Davis. Moreover, even if a

Case 3:07-cv-05613-EMC Document 13 Filed 03/04/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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declaration had been provided, the claim in and of itself does not demonstrate compliance with Rule

4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (allowing for service on an individual “pursuant to the law of the state in

which the district court is located, or in which service is effected” or “by delivering a copy of the

summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the

individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion

then residing therein”).

Second, the Davises contend that this Court has federal question jurisdiction over the case 

because there was a wrongful taking of their property by Mr. Miller, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but a

private actor, as opposed to a state actor, can be held liable for a § 1983 violation only under certain

circumstances. More specifically, 

[a] private individual’s action may be “under color of state law” where

there is “significant” state involvement in the action. The Supreme

Court has articulated four tests for determining whether a private

individual’s actions amount to state action: (1) the public function test;

(2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the

governmental nexus test. 

Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under the joint action test, courts examine whether state

officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a

particular deprivation of constitutional rights. The test focuses on

whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with [the private actor] that it must be recognized as a

joint participant in the challenged activity. A plaintiff may

demonstrate joint action by proving the existence of a conspiracy or by

showing that the private party was a willful participant in joint action

with the State or its agents. To be liable as co-conspirators, each

participant in a conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan,

but each participant must at least share the common objective of the

conspiracy. To be liable as a co-conspirator, a private defendant must

share with the public entity the goal of violating a plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

Id. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, there are insufficient allegations in

the petition that Mr. Miller conspired with the state court judge to deprive the Davises of their

constitutional rights. At best, the Davises have alleged that the state court judge granted Mr. Miller

an easement “as a personal favor to help [Mr. Miller] get out of a financial bind.” Pet. at 2.

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Finally, the Davises have failed to explain why the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar

the Court from exercising jurisdiction over the case, as it is ultimately a “de facto appeal from a state

court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). All that the

Davises state in their response is that, if Kougasian “were in effect in the early 1960s, then the Ku

Klux Klan surely would have used this doctrine to avoid being tried in federal court after being

acquitted in state court lynching, bombing, and murder trials.” Resp. at 2. What the Davises fail to

recognize is that, in Kougasian, the Ninth Circuit simply recognized a doctrine that had been laid out

by the Supreme Court in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and that only a few years ago that

doctrine was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concluded that the Davises’ response is not adequate to

show why this case should not be dismissed. The Court therefore dismisses the action in its entirety. 

Although the Rooker-Feldman problem suggests the dismissal shall be with prejudice, because the

Davises are acting pro se, this dismissal shall be without prejudice. The Davises are cautioned,

however, that unless all of the requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdiction are satisfied,

should they choose to refile an amended complaint, the next dismissal will be with prejudice. The

Davises shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint should they so

choose and 60 days thereafter to serve it properly upon Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 4, 2008

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILIP J. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

GLORIA DAVIS, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-5613 EMC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the U.S. District Court, Northern

District of California. On the below date, I served a true and correct copy of the attached, by placing

said copy/copies in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the person(s) listed below, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail; or by placing said copy/copies into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Office of the Clerk.

WILLIAM DAVIS

GLORIA DAVIS

1508 Spring Street

St. Helena, CA 94574

PAUL G. CAREY

Dickenson Peatman & Fogarty

809 Coombs Street

Napa, CA 94559

Dated: March 4, 2008 RICHARD W. WIEKING, CLERK

By: /s/ 

Leni Doyle

Deputy Clerk

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