Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00366/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nikia Timothy Striet 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Apker, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 10-366-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on June 16, 2010. (Doc. 1) Petitioner, Nikia Timothy

Striet, alleges that he was denied his Constitutional due process rights during prison

disciplinary proceedings. (Petition, p.4) Striet also alleges he was denied a visitor

pursuant to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) policy which denies visitors to

inmates unless they knew the inmate prior to incarceration; Petitioner alleges this policy

violates equal protection under the United States Constitution. (Petition, p.5)

Respondent filed an Answer and Response in Opposition to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus with exhibits one through three attached (“Answer”). (Docs. 13,14)

Respondent contests the Petition, asserting Petitioner has failed to exhaust

administrative remedies and has procedurally defaulted Ground One of his Petition.

Respondent also argues that Petitioner’s claims are without merit.

Also pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 15) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 7) 

Case 4:10-cv-00366-DCB Document 17 Filed 06/17/11 Page 1 of 11
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1 Petitioner’s exhibits are not labeled or indexed. Therefore, the court will

refer to them using the Court’s electronic filing (CM/ECF) numbers. The

Petition was entered into the Court’s electronic filing system as

Document 1, pages 1-32, followed by Document 1-1, pages 1-32. For

ease of reference, documents entered as Documents 1-1 will be referred

to in this Report and Recommendation with an asterisk (“*”) before the

page number. 

- 2 -

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order dismissing the Petition as procedurally defaulted. The

Magistrate Judge also recommends that the District Court enter an order denying the

Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the time Striet filed the present Petition he was an inmate at the United States

Penitentiary (“USP”) in Tucson, Arizona. (Petition; Answer, Ex. 1) Striet alleges the

BOP violated his due process rights at multiple disciplinary proceedings. Petitioner

refers to the incident reports he received as a result of disciplinary infractions as “shots”

(Petition, p.1-2, 4), and has attached 11 “shots” to the Petition (Petition, p.21,26,30 and

*41

,*17,*18,*19,*20,*22,*23,*30). Petitioner has also attached additional

documentation, including Notices of Discipline Hearing Before the Discipline Hearing

Officer (“DHO”) (Petition, p.20, 28,*24, *27, *31); Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing

(Petition p.21, 29, *25, *28, *32); Investigations (Petition, p.27); Advisements of

Incident Report Delay(s) (Petition p.*29); DHO Packets (Petition, p.14, 22); and DHO

Reports (Petition p.10-13, 115-19, 23-25, 31-32, *1-*3, *5-*8, *9-*12, *13-*16). In

total, Petitioner includes documentation for disciplinary proceedings referring to 12

separate incidents occurring between October, 2003 and December, 2009. 

At the time of these twelve disciplinary proceedings, Striet was incarcerated at

four prison facilities: USP Tucson, USP Terre Haute, USP Atwater, and Federal

Detention Center (“FDC”) Seatac. (Id.) Striet is currently serving a 188-month sentence

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of incarceration for Felon in Possession of a Firearm, and is projected to complete this

sentence on May 14, 2017, via Good Conduct Time (“GCT”) Release. (Answer, Ex. 1,

Attachment 2)

Striet raises two grounds for relief in his Petition: (1) that he was denied his

Constitutional due process rights during the prison disciplinary process; and (2) that he

was denied visitation because of the BOP’s visitation policy, and that the visitation

policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Petition, p.4-5). As

relief, Petitioner requests the Court to expunge the incident reports and restore GCT and

commissary privileges. (Petition, p.9)

The Court directed service to be effected on Respondent and instructed

Respondent to answer the Petition. (Doc. 7) Respondent filed an Answer on October

26, 2010, with a supplemental exhibit filed on October 27, 2010, contesting the claims

raised in the Petition as administratively unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and

without merit. (See generally doc. 13) Petitioner did not file a timely reply to

Respondent’s answer, but filed a motion for summary judgment on February 10, 2011.

(Doc. 15) Respondent filed a response to the motion, requesting that the motion be

denied. (Doc. 16) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

A prisoner who wishes to challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a

sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.2000), and must file the petition in

the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d

672,677 (9th Cir. 1980).

In this case, Petitioner challenges the loss of good time credit and commissary

restrictions without due process, as well as the constitutionality of BOP’s visitation

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policy. Petitioner is challenging the legality of the manner in which his sentence is

being executed. Thus, his petition is proper under 28 U.S.C. §2241.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before bringing a habeas petition a federal prisoner generally must exhaust any

available administrative remedies. See Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th

Cir.1986). Because the exhaustion requirement is not statutory, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241, it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th

Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995).

Nevertheless, federal courts “require as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners

exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under §

2241.” Castro–Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.2001), abrogated on other

grounds Fernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 (2006). While “courts have

discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when prudentially required, this

discretion is not unfettered.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir.2004). A

court may waive the exhaustion requirement where administrative remedies are

inadequate, futile, or pursuit of them would cause irreparable harm. Id. at 1000-01.

Accordingly, if the petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the district court,

in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits or

require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding to

court,” Brown, 895 F.2d 535, unless such remedies are no longer available, in which

instance he may have procedurally defaulted on his claims, see Francis v. Rison, 894

F.2d 353, 354-55 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1990) (applying procedural default rules to

administrative appeals); see generally Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986);

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376,

1378 (9th Cir.1988). If a prisoner is unable to obtain an administrative remedy because

of his failure to appeal in a timely manner, then the petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his habeas corpus claim. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir.

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1994)(citing Francis, 894 F.2d at 354; Martinez, 804 F.2d at 571). If a claim is

procedurally defaulted, the court may require the petitioner to demonstrate cause for the

procedural default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation. See

Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause and prejudice test is the appropriate

test); Murray, 477 U.S. at 492 (cause and prejudice test applied to procedural defaults

on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 906-08 (9th

Cir.1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro se litigants).

The BOP has established an administrative remedy process permitting an inmate

to seek review of an issue relating to “any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28

C.F.R. § 542.10(a). Under that process, an inmate must proceed through four levels: (1)

an attempt at informal resolution; (2) a formal written request to the warden for an

administrative remedy; (3) an appeal to the regional director of the region where the

inmate is confined; and (4) an appeal to the general counsel. 28 C.F.R. §§

542.13-542.15. The appeal to the general counsel completes the administrative remedy

process. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).

 Petitioner alleges he administratively appealed the decisions resulting in the loss

of privileges but that he “never heard back.” (Petition, p.2) Petitioner alleges that he

exhausted all administrative remedies relating to Ground One to the Office of General

Counsel. (Petition, p.4) Petitioner concedes that he did not exhaust administrative

remedies relating to Ground Two because “[t]here was no appeal as to visitation form.

Further[]more exhaustion under 2241, exhaustion requirement is purely a judge made,

prudential requirement, and therefore is not jurisdictional.” (Petition, p.5) 

Respondent submits evidence that Petitioner did not file any administrative

remedies or appeals for disciplinary sanctions imposed by the DHO or UDC in any of

his disciplinary proceedings. (Answer, Ex.1, Curless Declaration, ¶ 5) Neither did he

file any administrative remedies or appeals for the denial of visitation by the placement

of an individual on his visitor list. (Id.) 

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The Magistrate Judge concludes that Petitioner has not exhausted his

administrative remedies. Petitioner first alleges that he administratively appealed the

decision he is challenging, asking the court to “see attached” for filing dates, opinion

and case numbers, and that he “never heard back” regarding the results, presumably of

any of the decisions relating to all twelve of the disciplinary incidents. (See Petition,

p.2) Despite attaching some documentation for all twelve disciplinary incidents,

Petitioner attaches no documentation of any administrative appeal in support of his

assertion that he exhausted even one of the twelve incidents through even one of the

four levels of the administrative remedy process. Further in the Petition, in

contradiction to Petitioner’s first assertion that he “never heard back” regarding his

administrative appeal, Petitioner alleges that he exhausted all available administrative

remedies by presenting the issues in Ground One, presumably again relating to all

twelve incident reports, to the Office of General Counsel (see Petition, p.4), which is

the fourth and highest level of review (see 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-15).

Respondent’s exhibits demonstrate that Petitioner is aware of the Administrative

Remedy process and has used it for at least thirteen other matters, however, Petitioner

did not exhaust his administrative remedies regarding the instant matter. (See Answer,

Ex. 1, Curless Declaration) Neither has Petitioner, aside from his own undocumented,

contradictory and self-serving allegations, demonstrated that he has previously

attempted to exhaust any of his claims, including the visitation claim. 

In McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992), superseded by statute on

other grounds as stated in, Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir.1997), the

Supreme Court held that “[w]here Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound

judicial discretion governs.” Id. The McCarthy Court noted that “federal courts are

vested with a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise jurisdiction given to them.”

Id. at 146 (internal citations omitted). Courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion

requirement when it is prudentially required. Id; see also El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc.

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v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir.1991). In

determining whether to waive prudential exhaustion, federal courts must balance the

interest of the individual in obtaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against

institutional interests favoring exhaustion. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “[A]dministrative remedies need not be pursued if the

litigant's interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in

the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to

further.” Id. Here, there is no evidence that Petitioner's claims have ever been addressed

at any level of the BOP's administrative process.

The Ninth Circuit has explained why exhaustion is required before a petitioner

may file for habeas relief:

The requirement of exhaustion of remedies will aid judicial review by

allowing the appropriate development of a factual record in an expert

forum; conserve the court's time because of the possibility that the relief

applied for may be granted at the administrative level; and allow the

administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in the

course of administrative proceedings.

Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). In this case, the factual record has

not been developed. This lack of development is compounded by Petitioner’s delay in

filing this Petition challenging disciplinary infractions, the most recent of which was

almost six months old at the time the Petition was filed, well beyond administrative

filing deadlines already (see 28 C.F.R. § 542.14) but some which were more than five

years old at the time of filing of the Petition. Though Petitioner gives no guidance in the

Petition, to either the Court or the agency, as to how his due process rights were

violated in any of the disciplinary proceedings, the agency should have been given the

opportunity to address, and if appropriate, correct any specific errors occurring through

the course of administrative proceedings. 

Respondent correctly argues that Petitioner’s failure to file administrative

remedies on any of his previous disciplinary matters, which involve date-specific

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“charges” places Petitioner in procedural default. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990,

993 (9th Cir. 1994); Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990); Martinez v.

Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Cannon v. Thomas, 2009 WL

259415, *2 n.3 (D.Ariz 2009). 

Cause and prejudice may excuse a procedural default of administrative remedies.

Francis, 894 F.2d at 355, 355 n.2. Petitioner asserts no excuse for failing to file an

administrative remedy in any of his disciplinary proceedings. Petitioner was not

prevented from raising his due process claims by some external impediment, nor does

his pro se status constitute cause for a procedural default. See McClesky v. Zant, 499

U.S. 467, 497-98(1991); Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381.

Accordingly, Ground One of Petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted and

should be dismissed with prejudice. 

Petitioner admits that he did not exhaust administrative remedies relating to

Ground Two, asserting there is no appeal available, and noting that the requirement of

exhaustion is non-jurisdictional. The Court agrees that exhaustion in § 2241 habeas

petitions is a prudential, rather than a jurisdictional, requirement, however, Petitioner

has not demonstrated good cause for this Court to exercise its discretion to waive the

jurisdictional requirement. Respondent has demonstrated that administrative appeal of

this issue is available. See 28 CFR § 542.10 (a). Furthermore, Petitioner does not assert

nor has he demonstrated that administrative remedies regarding prison visitation

policies are inadequate, futile, or pursuit of them would cause irreparable harm. See

Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000-01 (9th Cir.2004); see also Fraley v. United

States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (waiving

exhaustion where the initial request for an administrative remedy was denied based on

official BOP policy and further appeal would almost certainly have been denied based

upon the same policy.) The Magistrate Judge finds no cause to exercise the courts

discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement regarding this claim. 

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Petitioner alleges no facts establishing the date and time he was denied a visitor

pursuant to BOP policy. Nonetheless, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-15, the time to

file an administrative appeal of the denial of a request for any visitor prior to the filing

date of this Petition has passed. Accordingly, Petitioner has also procedurally defaulted

this claim. 

Cause and prejudice may excuse a procedural default of administrative remedies.

Francis, 894 F.2d at 355, 355 n.2. Petitioner asserts no excuse for failing to file an

administrative remedy regarding the denial of visitation. Petitioner was not prevented

from raising his due process or equal protection claims by some external impediment,

nor does his pro se status constitute cause for a procedural default. See McClesky v.

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497-98 (1991); Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381.

Because it is not evident from the Answer that Respondent intended to raise a

procedural default argument as to Ground Two of the Petition, the Magistrate Judge

will allow Petitioner the opportunity to establish cause and prejudice excusing his

default. Petitioner may do so by filing an objection to this Report and Recommendation

and including within the objections the factual and legal basis demonstrating cause and

prejudice for the failure to exhaust his claim raised in Ground Two of the Petition.

Accordingly, absent a demonstration of cause and prejudice in the objections to

the Report and Recommendation, Ground Two of Petitioner's claim is procedurally

defaulted and should be dismissed with prejudice. 

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Petitioner’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be denied as untimely and moot. Pursuant to the District Court’s scheduling

order of September 8, 2010 (doc. 7), Petitioner had 30 days from the date of service of

an answer to file a reply. The Answer was filed on October 26, 2010. (Doc. 13) The

Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on February 10, 2011. (Doc. 15) To the extent

the motion can be construed as a reply to Respondent’s Answer, it is untimely pursuant

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to this Court’s scheduling order. Furthermore, the Motion raises specific factual

allegations that were notably lacking from the Petition. Though a petitioner may allege

material facts after a return is filed (see 28 U.S.C. § 2243), requiring the Respondent

to respond and address the merits of specific claims raised for the first time in an

untimely motion is after the Magistrate Judge has already established that Petitioner has

failed to exhaust any of his claims is a futile exercise in litigation for the Respondent

as well as an inefficient use of judicial resources. Additionally, if the motion is

addressed as a motion for summary judgment on Petitioner’s claims, it is unnecessary

and procedurally improper. Habeas proceedings are, by their nature, presumptively

summary proceedings. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 8 (determination

whether hearing required) and Rule 1 (rules applicable to § 2241 proceedings). In light

of the Magistrate Judges determination that both Grounds One and Two of the Petition

are unexhausted, and procedurally defaulted, and because the motion is untimely and

or procedurally duplicative and unnecessary, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Judge dismiss this motion as untimely and moot. 

IV. NOTICE

The Magistrate Judge hereby gives notice to Petitioner that the Magistrate Judge

has found that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted Ground Two of his Petition by

failing to administratively exhaust the claim. Petitioner may raise grounds for his

procedural default of Ground Two by filing objections to the Petition, as described

below, and raising any grounds for procedural default of Ground Two therein. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, and absent any demonstration of cause and prejudice for

the procedural default of Ground Two, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court, after its independent review of the record:

(1) Enter an order DISMISSING the Petition WITH PREJUDICE as

procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 1.) 

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(2) Enter an order DISMISSING the Motion for Summary Judgment as

untimely and/or moot. (Doc. 15)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The

parties are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case

number: No. CV-10-366-TUC-DCB

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to

the Petitioner and the Respondent. 

DATED this 17th day of June, 2011.

Case 4:10-cv-00366-DCB Document 17 Filed 06/17/11 Page 11 of 11