Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02436/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02436-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Justin Noel Menendez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02436-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 

 Petitioner Justin Menendez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. On October 20, 2015, Magistrate Judge Metcalf issued a 

Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied. 

Doc. 14 at 48. Petitioner objected to the R&R (Doc. 15) and Respondents filed a 

response (Doc. 16). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Petitioner’s 

objections and accept Judge Metcalf’s recommendations in full. 

I. Background. 

 On November 15, 2006, detectives placed Petitioner under surveillance. Doc. 14 

at 1. That night and into the morning of November 16th, detectives witnessed Petitioner, 

who was wearing dark clothing and dark gloves, and an accomplice, make several trips 

between his house and a nearby unoccupied residence. Id. at 1-2. While the two 

individuals were at the unoccupied residence, “detectives heard a drill-like noise, several 

‘loud bangs,’ and then ‘smaller banging.’” Id. at 2. Each time the two men returned to 

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Petitioner’s house, detectives examined the unoccupied residence and noticed progressive 

damage. Id. After Petitioner’s final visit, detectives observed pry marks near the lower 

door hinge and a broken portion of the side garage door lying on the floor. Id. Later that 

night, police conducted a traffic stop, arrested Petitioner, searched his vehicle, and found 

a pair of black gloves, a flathead screwdriver, and a flashlight. Id.

 On November 24, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior 

Court on charges of attempted burglary in the second degree and possession of burglary 

tools. Id. Prior to trial, the court granted Petitioner’s unopposed motion in limine to 

preclude, among other things, (1) any testimony regarding the police placing Petitioner 

under surveillance because they suspected he was a career burglar, (2) Petitioner’s 

admissions that he was a career burglar, and (3) any testimony relating to another recent 

burglary involving Petitioner. Id. A jury convicted Petitioner on both charges. Id. The 

trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 15 years for attempted burglary in 

the second degree and 5.75 years for possession of burglary tools. Id.

 Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Finding no 

viable issue for appeal, Petitioner’s counsel filed an Anders brief that included eleven 

claims Petitioner wished to present. Id. at 3. Petitioner subsequently filed a 

supplemental opening brief, arguing that the trial court also erred by: (1) admitting 

testimony addressing detectives’ surveillance of Petitioner, (2) denying a jury instruction 

to clarify this testimony, and (3) denying Petitioner’s motions to acquit. Id. The Court of 

Appeals affirmed the conviction in a memorandum decision “addressing claims regarding 

insufficient evidence, withholding of exculpatory information, and denial of clarifying 

jury instruction, and declining to address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

Id. The Court of Appeals also conducted an independent review of the record and found 

no reversible error. Id.

 Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, and on 

November 8, 2010, the court summarily denied his request. Id. Petitioner subsequently 

pursued post-conviction relief. The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum 

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decision granting review of his petition but denying relief because all of Petitioner’s 

claims were either raised or could have been raised on appeal. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner did 

not seek further review. Id. at 4. 

 Petitioner’s federal habeas petition raises six grounds for relief. See Doc. 1 at 7-

20. In his R&R, Judge Metcalf concluded that “Petitioner’s state remedies were 

adequately exhausted, but his claims are without merit.” Doc. 14 at 48. Judge Metcalf 

recommended that the Petition be denied. Id. Judge Metcalf also recommended that “to 

the extent that the Court adopts this [R&R] as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied.” Id. at 49. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A party may file specific, written objections to an R&R within 14 days of being 

served with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 

Rules”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court must 

undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are 

made. Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Section 2254 

Rules 8(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

III. Analysis. 

 Petitioner objected to Judge Metcalf’s findings that Petitioner’s grounds one, four, 

five, and six are without merit. Because Petitioner did not object to Judge Metcalf’s 

findings as to grounds two and three, the Court has no duty to review these grounds. 

Section 2254 Rules 8(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 

Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149-50; Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. Respondents argue that 

Petitioner’s objections to the R&R are untimely and therefore should not be considered. 

The Court will address each argument below, beginning with Respondents’ timeliness 

argument. 

/ / / 

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A. Timeliness of Petitioner’s Objections. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s objections are untimely and should not be 

considered “unless Petitioner can prove that they are timely.” Doc. 16 at 2-3. A party 

wishing to object to a magistrate judge’s R&R must file his objections within 14 days of 

being served with a copy of it. Section 2254 Rules 8(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Judge Metcalf filed his R&R on October 20, 2015. 

Doc. 14 at 50. The record does not reflect when Petitioner was actually served with the 

R&R. Although he did not file his objections until November 16, 2015, Petitioner 

indicated that they were “submitted” on November 12, 2015. Doc. 15 at 9. Because the 

14-day objection period is triggered by the R&R’s service, rather than its filing, the Court 

cannot conclude that Petitioner’s objections are untimely. It is possible that Petitioner did 

not receive a copy of the R&R until October 30, 2015, in which event his submission 

would be timely. The Court will consider the merits of Petitioner’s objections.

 B. Ground One. 

Petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated when, contrary to the 

trial court’s ruling on his motion in limine, several State witnesses testified that Petitioner 

was under surveillance. Doc. 15 at 3-4. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion in limine 

to preclude testimony that the police were surveilling him because they believed he was a 

career burglar, testimony that he admitted to being a career burglar, and testimony about 

another recent burglary in which he was involved. Doc. 14 at 28. The State agreed with 

the motion and the trial court granted it. Id. At trial, several of the State’s witnesses 

testified that they were watching Petitioner during the events in question, but without 

explaining why he was under surveillance. Id. at 29-30. After one witness was crossexamined, four jurors posed questions seeking to clarify why Petitioner had been placed 

under surveillance. Id. at 29. Because Petitioner’s counsel objected, the questions were 

never asked of the witness. Id. Petitioner has not identified any trial testimony that he 

was under surveillance because he was a career burglar, that he admitted to being a career 

burglar, or that he was involved in another burglary. 

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 Viewed narrowly, ground one alleges only a state law error – that the State 

witnesses violated the trial court’s order. This argument is factually incorrect. The 

witnesses appear to have adhered to the ruling. But in any event, it is well settled that 

federal habeas relief is not available to correct state law errors. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Such relief is available only when a state prisoner “‘is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Wilson v. 

Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). 

 Viewed more broadly, ground one may be understood as asserting a due process 

violation. In the Ninth Circuit, “a federal court cannot disturb on due process grounds a 

state court’s decision to admit prior bad acts evidence unless the admission of the 

evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” 

Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

 Petitioner objects to testimony by the State’s witnesses that he was “being 

investigated and [was] under surveillance” at the time the officers observed his actions. 

Doc. 15 at 3. The admission of this evidence was not arbitrary. Petitioner asked the trial 

court to exclude the reasons for the surveillance, not the fact that he was under 

surveillance. Doc. 14 at 28-29. The State agreed to this limitation and it was followed at 

trial. In addition, the fact that the officers were conducting surveillance of Petitioner was 

relevant to the jury’s understanding of their testimony and the circumstances that led to 

their observations of Petitioner. 

 Nor can the Court conclude that admission of this evidence was so prejudicial that 

it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner claims that telling the jury he was 

under surveillance “is saying to the jury that the Defendant is an accused person under 

official inquiry of a criminal offense.” Doc. 15 at 3. While it is true that some jurors 

questioned why Petitioner was under surveillance, it is also true that understanding the 

nature of the officer’s observations was relevant to assessing their credibility. The fact 

that they had Petitioner under surveillance was integral to their testimony about what they 

observed, where they observed it, and why they were there. See United States v. Silva, 

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380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If a jury would not otherwise understand why an 

investigation targeted a particular defendant, the testimony could dispel an accusation 

that the officers were officious intermeddlers staking out [the defendant] for nefarious 

purposes.”). Petitioner, the prosecutor, and the trial court agreed before trial that the 

reason for the surveillance would not be disclosed to the jury. This was a reasonable 

limitation on the officers’ testimony that protected Petitioner against undue prejudice. 

The Court cannot conclude, however, that the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair 

because the jury heard truthful testimony about why the officers were in a position to 

observe Petitioner’s burglary activities. 

 The Court finds that the admission of State’s witnesses’ testimony that Petitioner 

was under surveillance does not violate due process. See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. 

C. Ground Four. 

Petitioner argues that he was denied due process when he was sentenced to a 15 

year term after being told that he would receive no more than ten years if convicted at 

trial. See Doc. 15 at 4-6. Petitioner asks the Court to “summons [his] trial attorney of 

record to give a sworn statement” that would support this assertion. Id. at 5-6. 

 Petitioner’s claim is directly contrary to the record. At a settlement conference 

prior to trial, Petitioner’s counsel told the settlement judge that Petitioner could be 

sentenced to a minimum of 7.5 years and a maximum of 15 years if he lost at trial. 

Doc. 14 at 42. 

 In addition, Petitioner fails to allege a constitutional violation. A criminal 

defendant does not have a constitutional right to a plea bargain. United States v. 

Forrester, 616 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 

545, 561 (1977)). 

 Finally, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue. To obtain 

an evidentiary hearing, a habeas petitioner must allege facts that, if true, would entitle 

him to habeas relief. West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2010). If the record 

refutes the Petitioner’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district 

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court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. Here, the record refutes 

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel thought the sentence would be capped at ten years. In 

addition, Petitioner has failed to allege facts that would establish a constitutional 

violation. 

D. Ground Five. 

 Petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the trial court refused to 

grant his motion for a directed verdict. Doc. 15 at 7. But the granting of a directed 

verdict in a state criminal trial is a matter of state procedural law, in this case governed by 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20(a). As already noted, federal habeas relief is not 

available to correct state law errors. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Petitioner cites no 

authority to suggest that federal law governs such procedural matters, much less that such 

matters derive from federal constitutional requirements. 

 E. Ground Six. 

Petitioner asserts that he was denied due process because the jury returned a 

verdict that was not supported by sufficient evidence. See Doc. 15 at 7-8. For a 

conviction to comport with due process, the government must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt “every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is 

charged,” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), and “every element of the charged 

offense,” Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 (1989) (citation omitted). In 

reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim, “the relevant question is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

A reviewing court may not substitute its own subjective determination of guilt for that of 

the factfinder and may not weigh the credibility of witnesses. Herrera v. Collins, 506 

U.S. 390, 401-02 (1993) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319-20 n.13). Even circumstantial 

evidence that is “relatively weak” may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Jones v. 

Woods, 207 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the AEDPA, a state court conviction 

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may be overturned for insufficient evidence only if the court’s decision “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented” or “was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Petitioner has failed to identify any specific errors in the formulation of the law, 

fact-finding, or application of law in the state court proceedings. Instead, Petitioner 

argues that additional evidence of guilt might have been expected to convict him. See

Doc. 1 at 15-19. But that is not the correct inquiry. The proper inquiry is whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on 

the evidence actually admitted at trial. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

 During his direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals discussed the following 

facts that were included in the trial evidence. On five occasions on the night in question, 

detectives watched Petitioner enter and exit an unoccupied property without the owner’s 

permission. Petitioner was dressed in dark clothing and wearing dark gloves. While he 

was on the property, detectives heard noises, including drill-like noises, loud bangs, and 

smaller bangs. Between Petitioner’s visits to the property, detectives witnessed 

progressive damage to the points of entry. After Petitioner’s final visit, detectives 

observed pry marks near the lower door hinge and a broken portion of the side garage 

door lying on the floor. Later that night, police arrested Petitioner, searched his vehicle, 

and found gloves, a flathead screwdriver, and a flashlight. Based on these facts and 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact 

could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed attempted 

burglary in the second degree, see A.R.S. §§ 13-1507 and 13-1001(A), and possession of 

burglary tools, see A.R.S. § 13-1505(A)(1). Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

 Petitioner contends that the jury was biased against him to such an extent that it 

ignored the trial court’s jury instructions and convicted him without sufficient evidence. 

See Doc. 15 at 6-8. Petitioner does not challenge the jury instructions themselves; he has 

not alleged that any particular instruction was contrary to established federal law. See 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To the extent Petitioner claims the jury was biased because he 

was being surveilled, that is simply a repackaging of ground one, which the Court has 

already found to be without merit. Petitioner invites this Court to infer that the jury 

declined to follow the trial court’s instructions faithfully. The Court declines this 

invitation. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326 (holding that federal habeas corpus court faced 

with conflicting inferences must presume trier of fact resolved such conflicts in favor of 

prosecution). The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury’s. See 

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401-02. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier 

of fact could have convicted Petitioner of attempted burglary in the second degree and 

possession of burglary tools. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Magistrate Judge Metcalf’s R&R (Doc. 14) is accepted, Petitioner’s 

petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is denied, and a Certificate of 

Appealability is denied. 

 2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 15th day of December, 2015. 

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