Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06128/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06128-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM BRADLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. McVAY, et. al,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04-6128 AWI DLB P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s amended complaint

filed.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to

state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint

can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). th

In the instant case, plaintiff brings action against M. McVay, E. Delanda, D. Morales, Sgt.

Beer, Sgt. Scaife, Lt. Rousseau, L. Ramsey, K. Johnson, M. Martinez and Warden Scribner. 

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Plaintiff alleges that he is mobility impaired and requires a wheelchair and cane. He

alleges that on August 13, 2003, he was escorted to the program office for a doctor consultation. 

He states that when he arrived verbally harassed by defendant McVay and then put into a holding

cell. Plaintiff alleges that the inmate in the cell next to him began to tell him that defendant

McVay was “dirty” in that he had a history of assaulting inmates. Plaintiff alleges that McVay

overheard the conversation and came to plaintiff’s cell and falsely accused plaintiff of trying to

hit him with the cane. Plaintiff alleges that McVay attacked him from behind and sprayed him

with pepper spray. Plaintiff states then when other officers arrived, they refused his request to

speak to someone in “authority.” He states that defendant Ramsey refused to give him medical

treatment. 

When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and

sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was

wanton and unnecessary, it is proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force,

the relationship between the need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived

by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The extent of a prisoner’s injury is also a factor that may suggest whether

the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation. Id. 

Although the absence of serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, it is not

determinative. Id. That is, use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel

and unusual punishment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury. Id. at 9. 

Although an inmate need not have suffered serious injury to bring an excessive force claim

against a prison official, “[not] every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal

cause of action. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id.

(citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.)(cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414 U.S.

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1033 (1973)). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of physical force. Id. at 9-

10.

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim for excessive force against

defendant McVay. However, plaintiff does not sufficiently link the other named defendants to

any violation of his constitutional rights.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

Plaintiff has stated a claim against defendant McVay but he has failed to link the

remaining named defendants with some affirmative act or omission. Plaintiff may therefore

either proceed only against defendant McVay or he must file an amended complaint to cure the

deficiencies in the claims against the other named defendants. The court will grant plaintiff one

additional opportunity in which to amend to cure the deficiencies of this complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

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each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there

is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff is also advised that supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section

1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore,

when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858,

862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442

U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory

liability, plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants

either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force

of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal

citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal

pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. 

See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Further, verbal harassment or abuse alone is not sufficient to state a constitutional

deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987),

and threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925

(9th Cir. 1987).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

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complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must

either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court

in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendant McVay on his

excessive force claim; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 21, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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