Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04021/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD STEWART,

Plaintiff,

v

EDWARD J ALAMEIDA, JR, et al,

Defendants. /

No C-03-4021 VRW

ORDER

Inmate Richard Stewart brings this action against

California corrections officials Edward J Alameida, Jr, Steven

Moore and J S Woodford (collectively “defendants”), asserting

claims under 42 USC § 1983 for violations of his rights under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc #1 (Compl). Stewart claims

that his validation as a gang associate has kept him in San

Quentin’s Adjustment Center, also known as the Security Housing

Unit (“SHU”), in violation of his constitutional rights.

Although defendants initially moved to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, for summary

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 1 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Although Stewart was initially sentenced to death, for reasons

that are not clear from the record, his sentence was changed to life

in prison without the possibility of parole in March 2005. Cattermole

Decl, Ex I, AGO-285.

2

judgment on all claims pursuant to FRCP 56(c), Doc #11, defendants

have since withdrawn their argument that the court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, Doc #25 at 2. For reasons discussed below,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 

I

As a consequence of being convicted for three counts of

first degree murder, Stewart has been in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

since May 1991. At all times relevant to this case, Stewart was

incarcerated at San Quentin. Doc #12 (Cattermole Decl), Ex C, AGO153. All condemned prisoners1

 at San Quentin are classified by the

Inmate Classification Committee (“ICC”) as either “Grade A” or

“Grade B.” Grade B prisoners are viewed as a threat to prison

safety and are typically housed in San Quentin’s Adjustment Center,

also known as the Security Housing Unit (“SHU”). 

Based on Stewart’s episodes of violence at Contra Costa

County Prison prior to his transfer to San Quentin, ICC initially

classified Stewart as Grade B. Id, Ex G, AGO-258. During his time

in prison, Stewart has been found guilty of “flooding” his cell,

“possession of an inmate manufactured weapon,” “battery on a peace

officer” and a “stabbing assault on an inmate.” Id, Ex F, AGO-188,

AGO-178, AGO-180, AGO-184. Because of these episodes Stewart has,

with one documented exception, consistently been classified as

Grade B and housed in the SHU. Id, Ex D. Stewart was briefly

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 2 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

reclassified as Grade A on January 27, 1994, based on his clean

disciplinary record during the preceding six months. Id, Ex G,

AGO-251. Two days later Stewart was involved in a fight with

another inmate that led to his being found guilty of the

aforementioned stabbing assault charge. Id, Ex F, AGO-184. On

February 3, 1994, the ICC reclassified Stewart as Grade B. Id, Ex

G, AGO-247. Stewart has remained discipline-free since 1994, and

has requested reassignment to Grade A housing on multiple

occasions.

One basis for confining an inmate to the SHU is

“validation” as a member or associate of a prison gang. 15 Cal

Code Regs, tit 15, § 3341.5(c)(2)(A)(2). Institutional Gang

Investigators (“IGIs”) are charged with investigating inmates

suspected of gang affiliation. Once an IGI believes there is

sufficient evidence to validate an inmate as a member or associate

of a prison gang, the IGI submits a gang validation package to the

Law Enforcement and Investigations Unit (“LEIU”) for final

validation. 

At a hearing before the Unit Classification Committee

(“UCC”) in November 2001, Stewart requested that he be reclassified

as Grade A. UCC denied Stewart’s request and referred him to the

IGI “for a review and determination of his possible gang status.” 

Cattermole Decl, Ex J, AGO-214; see also id Ex G, AGO-287. On

March 24, 2002, Stewart filed an inmate appeal contesting his

continued Grade B classification. Id, Ex J, AGO-287. Stewart

complained that he had not yet undergone IGI review despite ICC’s

November 2001 order referring his case to the IGI. Understanding

that he could not be reclassified until his possible gang

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 3 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

affiliation had been investigated, Stewart requested that such

review be completed within thirty days. Id. Warden Woodford’s

response to Stewart’s appeal stated that Stewart had been

interviewed by Lieutenant Munoz regarding his gang status, although

it is not clear from the record when this interview occurred or

whether Lieutenant Munoz was an IGI. See id, AGO-295. Woodford

ordered that Stewart be reviewed by the ICC upon completion of the

IGI investigation. Id. 

On April 30, 2002, Assistant IGI M Francis reviewed

Stewart’s central file and interviewed Stewart. Id, Ex E, AGO-164. 

Although Stewart does not appear to dispute that this interview

took place, Stewart maintains he was not provided sufficient notice

prior to that time that he was being investigated for possible gang

validation. See Doc #21 (Opp) at 8. According to the form CDC

128-B completed by Francis, Stewart “was interviewed regarding his

gang status, and stated he is not Aryan Brotherhood and never has

been.” Cattermole Decl, Ex E, AGO-164. Following Francis’s

investigation, IGI Lieutenant K Brandon forwarded to LEIU a gang

validation package containing ten items evidencing Stewart’s gang

association. Id. On May 31, 2002, LEIU agent D T Hawkes reviewed

the gang validation package, concluded that four of the ten pieces

of evidence met validation criteria and formally validated Stewart

as an AB associate. Id, AGO-165. The four pieces of evidence that

met validation criteria consisted of a confidential memorandum

regarding an interview with a confidential informant who identified

Stewart as an AB associate, two group photographs in which Stewart

was posing with validated AB associates and a piece of outgoing

inmate correspondence containing a third group photograph. Id. 

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 4 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Stewart’s sworn affidavit states that “[o]n or before May

31, 2002, [he] was never informed that prison authorities were

investigating and deciding whether to validate [him] as a gang

member” and was never asked to “offer [his] views” as to evidence

allegedly indicating his gang membership. Opp, Ex A, ¶¶4-5. 

At a hearing on June 6, 2002, ICC decided to continue

Stewart’s Grade B classification based on his gang validation. 

Cattermole Decl, Ex G, AGO-209. Stewart refused to attend this

hearing. Id. On July 2, 2002, Stewart filed an inmate appeal

challenging his gang validation and the evidence upon which it was

based. Id, Ex J, AGO-298. On August 30, 2002, IGI Lieutenant

Brandon interviewed Stewart in connection with his appeal. Id,

AGO-300. Stewart’s second level appeal was denied by Warden

Woodford on October 9, 2002. Id, Ex J, AGO-302. Stewart’s third

and final formal administrative appeal was denied by CDCR on

February 25, 2003. Id, AGO-306. 

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Stewart

filed a complaint in this court, which asserts three claims. 

Stewart’s first claim alleges that his validation as a gang

associate violates his right of association under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. Second, Stewart claims that he was not

provided with sufficient notice and an opportunity to present his

views in connection with his gang validation. Third, Stewart

claims that his gang validation rested upon an insufficient

evidentiary basis. 

//

//

//

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 5 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

II

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court

must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist,

resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. 

“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material

fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Id. And the burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex

Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is

granted only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by

affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting its claim

that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v

Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987).

The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 

Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id at 249.

The evidence presented by both parties must be

admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in

affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 6 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing

Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979). Hearsay

statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc v

Japan Telecom America Inc, 287 F3d 866, 875 n 1 (9th Cir 2004).

III

A

Stewart claims that by validating an individual as a gang

associate solely on the basis of “simple association” with other

validated gang associates, CDCR is violating Stewart’s

constitutionally protected right to associate freely with others. 

Stewart acknowledges that associational rights are not afforded the

same level of protection in the prison environment as they are in

free society. Nevertheless, Stewart contends, to the extent CDCR

policy permits gang validation decisions to be based solely on

simple association, that policy is impermissibly vague, giving too

much discretion to prison officials making gang validation

decisions and too little notice to prisoners of what conduct might

result in validation as a gang associate. To be clear, Stewart is

not complaining that he is less able to associate freely as a

consequence of his gang validation. Cf Westefer v Snyder, 422 F3d

570, 574-75 (7th Cir 2005) (holding that inmates have no First

Amendment right to belong to a gang). Rather, Stewart challenges

CDCR’s practice of validating inmates as gang associates based on

their “social association with persons categorized as gang

associates.” Compl ¶30.

At oral argument, counsel for Stewart clarified that his

challenge is directed at Cal Code Regs, tit 15, § 3378(c)(8). 

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 7 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Subdivision (D) provides that gang validation may be based upon

“[i]ndividual or group photographs with gang connotations such as

those which include insignia, symbols, or validated gang

affiliates.” Subdivision (G) provides that gang validation may be

based upon “[i]nformation related to the inmate/parolee’s

association with validated gang affiliates.”

B

With some exceptions that do not apply here, whether a

prison regulation impermissibly impinges on the constitutional

rights of inmates is governed by the analysis set forth in Turner v

Safley, 482 US 78 (1987). The ultimate question under Turner is

whether the regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Id at 89. The Supreme Court recently had

occasion to limit Turner in Johnson v California, 125 S Ct 1141

(2005). In Johnson, the Court held that prison regulations

involving racial classifications should be subjected to strict

scrutiny. The Court, however, appeared to reaffirm the application

of Turner’s reasonable relationship analysis to “rights that are

inconsistent with proper incarceration,” “including restrictions on

freedom of association.” Id at 1149 (internal quotations omitted). 

Further, the Court recently applied Turner to claims for alleged

violations of the associational rights of inmates. See Overton v

Bazzetta, 539 US 126 (2003). 

The allegation that CDCR’s policies are vague and

overbroad does not render Turner inapplicable. See Bahrampour v

Lampert, 356 F3d 969, 975 (9th Cir 2004) (implicitly rejecting

plaintiff’s argument “that claims of vagueness and over-breadth

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 8 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

must be considered separately from the requirement that prison

regulations must be reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests” (internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the court

is satisfied that Turner’s analysis applies to Stewart’s first

claim.

Before considering whether the regulation is reasonably

related to a valid penological interest, the Ninth Circuit has

instructed that courts should first determine whether the asserted

right is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. “If so,

this ends [the] inquiry.” Gerber v Hickman, 291 F3d 617, 620 (9th

Cir 2002) (concluding that “[d]uring the period of confinement in

prison, the right of intimate association * * * is necessarily

abridged”). Since that time, however (and in the context of claims

based on associational rights), the Supreme Court has proceeded to

consider the reasonableness of a regulation without first

determining whether the asserted right survives incarceration. See

Overton, 539 US at 131-32 (taking this approach and noting that the

Court took a similar approach in Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817

(1974)). 

Following the Supreme Court’s lead, the court finds it

appropriate to analyze the reasonableness of the challenged

regulations without deciding whether Stewart’s asserted right

survived his incarceration. That does not mean, however, that the

compatibility (or lack thereof) between incarceration and the right

asserted is irrelevant. For, as the Supreme Court has made clear,

“[p]erhaps the most obvious of the First Amendment rights that are

necessarily curtailed by confinement are those associational rights

that the First Amendment protects outside of prison walls.” Jones

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 9 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

v North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc, 433 US 119, 125-26

(1977); see also Overton, 539 US at 131 (“The very object of

imprisonment is confinement.”). 

C

Turner prescribed four factors that courts should

consider when determining the reasonableness of a prison

regulation. First among these is whether there is a “valid,

rational connection” between the challenged regulation and the

governmental interest it purports to advance. Turner, 482 US at 89

(internal quotations omitted). Second, courts should consider

whether there are alternative means of exercising the right. “A

third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on

the allocation of prison resources generally.” Id at 90. Finally,

Turner directs attention toward the existence of “ready

alternatives” that accommodate prisoners’ rights at little cost to

valid penological objectives. Id. The court considers these

factors in turn.

1

The court first evaluates whether the challenged

regulations bear a valid, rational connection to the penological

interest they purportedly serve. Gang validation procedures

promote institutional security, “perhaps the most legitimate of

penological goals,” Overton, 539 US at 133, by allowing CDCR to

identify and neutralize gang affiliates through sequestration or

other means. 

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 10 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Stewart concedes that insitutional security is a

legitimate penological interest, but nonetheless contends that it

bears “no rational connection to the prohibition of interpersonal

association.” Compl 31. This is so, according to Stewart, because

“in the absence of any evidence that he taken [sic] a loyalty oath

to the gang or has participated in illegal activities on the gang’s

behalf,” his association with members or associates of a prison

gang “does not establish that he poses a threat to institutional

security, except by the drawing of inferences from the mere fact of

his associations.” Id. 

The court disagrees. Simply put, there is a valid,

rational connection between institutional security and regulations

designed to isolate threats before their potential is realized. 

This nexus is not destroyed by the possibility that inferences

might sometimes be a necessary substitute for direct evidence that

often will not be available until institutional security has

already been compromised. Indeed, it would be somewhat irrational

to require evidence of illegal —— likely violent —— acts and still

expect gang validation procedures to function as an effective

security measure. The court concludes that the regulations bear a

rational connection to the goal of institutional security. 

2

Next, the court assesses “whether there are alternative

means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” 

Turner, 482 US at 90. Stewart argues that no alternatives exist

because inmates may be validated on the basis of any form of

communication with gang-classified individuals. In other words,

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 11 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Stewart argues that there are no alternative means of 

communicating with individuals validated as gang members or

associates. 

Turner is particularly instructive on this point. There,

one of the challenged regulations barred correspondence between

inmates at different institutions within the Missouri prison

system. After noting that “communication with other felons is a

potential spur to criminal behavior,” the Court concluded that

alternative means of expression existed because the regulation

“bar[red] communication only with a limited class of other people

with whom prison officials [had] particular cause to be concerned

—— inmates within the Missouri prison system.” 482 US at 92-93. 

The regulations here do not create any consequences for

associating with inmates who have not been validated as gang

members or associates. Accordingly, the court finds that

alternative means of engaging in harmless associations with inmates

exist.

3

Third, the court assesses “the impact accommodation of

the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” 

Turner, 482 US at 90. This is closely related to the fourth

factor, which considers the existence or absence of ready

alternatives capable of fully accommodating the prisoner’s rights

without significantly compromising valid penological interests. 

The court finds it appropriate to assess these two factors

together. 

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 12 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

The Supreme Court recently elaborated upon the special

problems posed by prison gangs:

Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based

hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a

means of disciplining their own members and their

rivals, gangs seek nothing less than to control

prison life * * *. Murder of an inmate [or] a guard

* * * is a common form of gang discipline and

control, as well as a condition for membership in

some gangs. Testifying against, or otherwise

informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own

death sentence. It is worth noting in this regard

that for prison gang members serving life sentences,

some without the possibility of parole, the

deterrent effects of ordinary criminal punishment

may be substantially diminished.

Wilkinson v Austin, 125 S Ct 2384, 2396-97 (2005) (citations

omitted).

By limiting gang validation to individuals who have

engaged in gang-related violence or other disruptive conduct, the

challenge described by Justice Kennedy in the above-quoted passage

would become all the more formidable. It would strip prison

officials of a useful prophylactic in protecting against the

security threat posed by gangs —— a threat that endangers inmates

and correctional officers alike. The court simply cannot ignore a

massive, gang-related prison riot that recently occurred at Wayside

Prison in Castaic, California, which bears testament to this truth. 

And as Justice Kennedy observed, gang-related violence cannot

easily be deterred by ex post sanctions. In the prison context,

then, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of deterrence. The

court has little trouble concluding that full accommodation of the

right asserted by Stewart would seriously hinder the objective of

institutional security and compromise the safety of inmates and

correctional officers.

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 13 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

D

In sum, the court concludes that the regulations that are

the subject of Stewart’s first claim bear a reasonable relation to

a valid penological interest. Summary judgment in favor of

defendants on Stewart’s first claim is accordingly GRANTED.

IV

Stewart’s second claim alleges that he was not provided

notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to his gang validation

in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A

To invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause, a

party must first establish that a protected liberty interest is at

stake. E g, Wilkinson, 125 S Ct at 2393. The Due Process Clause

does not itself create a liberty interest in being free from

administrative segregation. Hewitt v Helms, 459 US 460, 468

(1983); Toussaint v McCarthy, 801 F2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir 1986)

(“Toussaint IV”). Accordingly, any liberty interest in being free

from administrative segregation must be the creation of state law. 

Smith v Noonan, 992 F2d 987, 989 (9th Cir 1993). Liberty interests

created by state law will generally be limited to freedom from

restraint that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Sandin v Conner, 515 US 472, 484 (1995). Technically, “Sandin

requires a factual comparison between conditions in general

population or administrative segregation (whichever is applicable)

and disciplinary segregation, examining the hardship caused by the

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 14 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

prisoner’s challenged action in relation to the basic conditions of

life as a prisoner.” Jackson v Carey, 353 F3d 750, 755 (9th Cir

2003). Stewart’s complaint alleges that confinement in the SHU

imposes “six significant hardships which are not typically endured

by California prisoners” and implicates “four constitutionally

protected liberty interests, which [Stewart] enjoys independently

of the operation of state law.” Compl ¶¶18-19. At oral argument,

defendants assumed (without admitting) for purposes of their motion

that confinement in the SHU implicates a liberty interest. The

court will make the same assumption. 

B

The quantum of process that is constitutionally due to

segregated inmates depends upon whether the segregation is punitive

or administrative in nature. Toussaint IV, 801 F2d at 1099. 

“California’s policy of assigning suspected gang affiliates to the

[SHU] is not a disciplinary measure, but an administrative strategy

designed to preserve order in the prison and protect the safety of

all inmates.” Bruce v Ylst, 351 F3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir 2003). In

the case of administrative segregation,

[p]rison officials must hold an informal

nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after

the prisoner is segregated. The prison officials

must inform the prisoner of the charges against the

prisoner or their reasons for considering

segregation. Prison officials must allow the

prisoner to present his views.

Toussaint IV, 801 F2d at 1099.

Further, the inmate must have “an opportunity to present his views

to the prison official charged with deciding whether to transfer

him to administrative segregation.” Hewitt, 459 US at 476. In the

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 15 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

case of administrative segregation founded upon positive gang

validation, the official charged with deciding whether to transfer

or retain an inmate in administrative segregation is the IGI. 

Toussaint IV, 926 F2d at 803; see also Madrid v Gomez, 889 F Supp

1146, 1276 (ND Cal 1995) (“[I]t is clear that the critical

decisionmaker in the process is * * * the IGI.”). Thus, prior to

validation as a gang member, Stewart was entitled to an “informal

nonadversary hearing” with an IGI. Stewart was further entitled to

a similar hearing before ICC prior to its decision to retain

Stewart in the SHU based on his gang validation.

With these principles in mind, the court turns to

Stewart’s second claim.

1

Stewart claims that he received neither meaningful notice

of being considered for gang validation nor an opportunity to

present his views. 

Documentary evidence submitted by defendants suggests

that Stewart was well aware that he was being considered for gang

validation. In fact, this evidence indicates he requested, more

than once, that his file undergo IGI review. Cattermole Decl, Ex

J, AGO-287.

Nonetheless, Stewart states in a sworn affidavit that he

“was never informed that prison authorities were investigating and

deciding whether to validate [him] as a gang member” prior to May

31, 2002. Opp, Ex A ¶4. The court cannot ignore Stewart’s

affidavit merely because it is inconsistent with documentary

evidence submitted by the moving parties, even though that evidence

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 16 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

includes unsworn statements by Stewart that contradict his

affidavit. See Leslie v Grupo ICA, 198 F3d 1152, 1157-59 (9th Cir

1999) (explaining situations in which the “sham affidavit” rule

does not apply); see also id at 1159 (“Although we can understand

the district court’s disbelief of Leslie’s assertions in his

deposition and sworn declaration, such disbelief cannot support

summary judgment.”). Accordingly, the court is constrained to find

an issue of material fact regarding whether Stewart received notice

of his impending gang validation prior to his interview with the

IGI who recommended that he be validated. 

2

Defendants contend that they are nonetheless entitled to

summary judgment. Specifically, they argue that regardless of

issues of fact that may exist regarding the procedure Stewart was

afforded prior to his validation, “[a] violation of procedural

rights requires only a procedural correction.” Raditch v United

States, 929 F2d 478, 481 (9th Cir 1991). Defendants point to

Stewart’s August 30, 2002, interview with IGI Lieutenant Brandon. 

This interview was conducted in response to Stewart’s appeal of his

gang validation. Cattermole Decl, Ex J, AGO-298 through AGO-301. 

Stewart availed himself of this opportunity to explain to

Lieutenant Brandon that “he was not a member or associate of the

[AB] or any other gang” and to challenge the evidentiary basis of

his validation. Id, AGO-300. Stewart does not dispute that this

interview took place. Moreover, Stewart’s counsel admits that

Lieutenant Brandon was “the same official who submitted Stewart’s

validation for approval to” LEIU. Opp at 16. 

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 17 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Still, Stewart posits that a hearing on appeal does not

afford adequate process “because an unvalidated inmate suspected of

gang association is likelier to be able to persuade an IGI of his

innocence than a gang-validated inmate appearing before an IGI on

appeal of his validation, because institutional bias inevitably

weighs against the overturning of prior institutional decisions.” 

Id. Thus, Stewart apparently takes the position that due process

requires that his validation be set aside until he has been given

notice and an opportunity to be heard. But the constitution does

not so require. “A violation of procedural rights requires only a

procedural correction, not reinstatement of a substantive right to

which the claimant may not be entitled on the merits.” Raditch,

929 F2d at 481 (emphasis added). Because the IGI concluded that

the initial deprivation was justified (a conclusion that was

adequately supported, see infra V), any deficiency in the predeprivation process could be cured by adequate post-deprivation

process, and if post-deprivation process did not suffice to remedy

the violation, then Stewart is entitled to nothing more than

nominal damages. See id at 482 n 5. 

The court concludes that the post-deprivation remedy

cured any initial procedural defect that may have existed. There

is no question that Stewart was well aware at the time he was

interviewed by Lieutenant Brandon that he was the subject of a gang

validation or that he was aware of much of the evidence upon which

his validation was based. See Cattermole Decl, Ex H, AGO-280

through AGO-284 (confidential information disclosure forms dated

June 5, 2002). At this interview Stewart had the opportunity to

present his views to the same IGI officer who submitted his gang

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 18 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

validation package to LEIU for final review. In other words,

Stewart had a meaningful opportunity to present his views to the

critical decisionmaker. On this set of undisputed facts, Stewart’s

hearing before Lieutenant Brandon afforded Stewart an adequate

procedural remedy. 

3

The court briefly addresses Stewart’s suggestion that he

was entitled to an opportunity to present his views to LEIU agent

Hawkes who formally approved Stewart’s validation. See Opp at 14-

41. This claim was explicitly rejected by Judge Henderson in

Madrid v Gomez, 889 F Supp 1146 (ND Cal 1995). After noting that

the Toussaint IV court identified the IGI as the critical

decisionmaker, Judge Henderson turned to the plaintifffs’ argument

that due process required an opportunity to be heard by the Special

Services Unit (“SSU”), LEIU’s predecessor:

While plaintiffs’ argument has superficial appeal,

it promotes form over substance. Although the SSU

agent formally validates the inmate, it is clear

that the critical “decisionmaker” is the IGI. * * * 

[T]he SSU plays a technically important but

substantively nominal role in the process. Nor are

we persuaded that IGIs are unaware of the

significance of their role. Given that inmates have

an opportunity to present their views to the IGI and

the ICC, the failure to provide a hearing before the

SSU officer does not violate due process.

Id at 1276.

Stewart offers no reason why the Judge Henderson’s reasoning should

be jettisoned in this case. 

//

//

//

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 19 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

4 

Summary judgment in favor of defendants on Stewart’s

second claim is GRANTED.

 

V

Stewart’s third claim alleges that he was validated as an

AB associate without an adequate evidentiary basis in violation of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Prison administrators are empowered “to make segregation

decisions on the basis of ‘some evidence.’” Toussaint IV, 801 F2d

at 1105. The legal standard of “some evidence” was adopted by the

Supreme Court in Superintendent v Hill, 472 US 445 (1985). Under

Hill the “relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the

record that could support the conclusion reached.” Id at 455-56;

see also Bruce, 351 F3d at 1287. A “modicum” of evidence suffices. 

Hill, 472 US at 455; see also Cato v Rushen, 824 F2d 703, 705 (9th

Cir 1987) (stating that the standard is “minimally stringent”). In

making segregation decisions, prison administrators may properly

rely on their “experience and awareness of general prison

conditions” as evidence. Toussaint IV, 801 F2d at 1105. Further,

“a reviewing court may not reverse the administration’s decision”

if it is supported by some evidence. Id. 

Stewart was validated based on four separate pieces of

evidence: (1) a confidential memorandum dated May 21, 2002,

documenting an interview with an inmate-informant who identified

Stewart as an AB associate, Doc #18 (Cattermole Sealed Decl), Ex D;

(2) a confidential memorandum dated March 9, 1999, containing a

photograph of Stewart posing with six other inmates, three of which

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 20 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

were validated AB associates, id, Exs I & J; (3) a confidential

memorandum dated February 10, 1994, containing a photograph of

Stewart posing with nine other inmates, one of which was a

validated AB member, two of which were validated AB associates, and

the balance of which (including Stewart) were suspected AB

associates, id, Ex L; and (4) a confidential memorandum dated

October 3, 1994, containing a photograph of Stewart posing with

three validated AB associates. 

Stewart asserts that none of these pieces of evidence

bear sufficient indicia of reliability to qualify as some evidence. 

Stewart’s argument misses the mark. First, Stewart’s challenge is

based primarily upon standards established by CDCR regulations, not

the United States Constitution. See 42 USC § 1983 (creating a

federal cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights

and some violations of federal law); see also Campbell v Burt, 141

F3d 927, 930 (9th Cir 1998) (“As a general rule, a violation of

state law does not lead to liability under § 1983.”); Lovell ex rel

Lovell v Poway Unified Sch Dist, 90 F3d 367, 371 (9th Cir 1996)

(“We cannot enlarge federally protected rights simply because

California chose to expand its state-created rights.”). Moreover,

the CDCR regulation cited by Stewart requires a further

determination of reliability only for confidential informants, not

physical evidence such as photographs. See Cal Code Regs, tit 15,

§ 3378(c)(2). In any event, in camera inspection of the

photographs satisfied the court that they are sufficiently reliable

to qualify as “some evidence.” 

With regard to the one piece of evidence that was based

on information obtained from a confidential informant, Stewart

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 21 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

argues that this evidence amounts to a so-called “laundry list”

identification because it identifies Stewart as an AB associate

without reference to any particular gang-related acts performed by

Stewart. Stewart directs the court’s attention to a settlement

reached in another case in this district before Judge Jenkins,

Castillo v Marshall, No C-94-2847-MJJ (the “Castillo settlement”),

of which the court takes judicial notice. By the terms of that

settlement, which was executed in September 2004, the CDCR

defendants agreed that “confidential source[s] must identify

specific gang activity or conduct performed by the alleged

associate or member before such information can be considered as a

source item.” Opp, Ex E ¶21. But even if the court were to find

that the confidential informant in this case did not identify

specific gang-related acts performed by Stewart, there is no

indication that the Castillo settlement was intended to apply

retroactively. And because the May 22, 2002, memorandum states

that the confidential informant had provided reliable information

in the past, it satisfies the constitutional requirement for

reliability. See Zimmerlee v Keeney, 831 F2d 183, 186 (9th Cir

1987) (“Proof that an informant previously supplied reliable

information is sufficient.”). And in any event, “any of the[]

three [photographs] would have sufficed to support [Stewart’s]

validation because each has sufficient indicia of reliability.” 

Bruce, 351 F3d at 1288.

Summary judgment in favor of defendants on Stewart’s

third claim is accordingly GRANTED.

//

//

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 22 of 23
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

VI

In sum, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all

claims is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close the file and

terminate all pending motions.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:03-cv-04021-VRW Document 28 Filed 02/20/06 Page 23 of 23