Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02598/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02598-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Michael Raupp and Nancy Raupp, 

husband and wife; 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Arizona Public Service Company, an 

Arizona corporation; et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 11-2598-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Arizona Public Service Company’s 

(“APS”) motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) and Plaintiffs James Michael Raupp and Nancy 

Raupp’s motion to remand (Doc. 5). The motion to remand has been fully briefed. Docs. 

5, 15, 21. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion to remand.1

I. Background. 

 On March 26, 2010, Mr. Raupp began to suffer symptoms of a stroke while at 

work. Doc. 1-1 at 12. After trying to load equipment into a truck, Mr. Raupp was sent 

home. Id. at 13. When Ms. Raupp returned home from her work, she found Mr. Raupp 

asleep in his recliner. Id. She checked on him throughout the night and the next morning 

found him crawling on the floor and speaking incoherently. Id. The healthcare 

 

1

 Defendant’s request for oral argument is denied because the parties have fully briefed the issues and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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professionals at a local hospital determined that Mr. Raupp had suffered at least two 

strokes. Id. As a result of the strokes, Mr. Raupp suffered brain damage and lost the use 

of his left hand and leg. Id. 

II. Standard.

The question of whether a claim arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331 must be determined by reference to the complaint. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. 

Laborers Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983). Invoking a federal issue or provision is not “a 

password opening federal courts to any state action embracing a point of federal law.” 

Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 

Instead, a claim “arises under” the laws of the United States only if “a well-pleaded 

complaint establishes either that (1) federal law creates the cause of action; or (2) the 

plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 

federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U .S. at 27-28. As to the second prong, the issue 

turns on whether the complaint includes “allegations of federal law that are essential to 

the establishment of the claim.” Lippit v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 

1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003). A claim does not present a “substantial question” of federal 

law merely because a federal statute is an “ingredient” of a state cause of action. Merrell 

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986) (“[T]he mere 

presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal 

question jurisdiction.”). 

Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. 

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, there is a “strong presumption” 

against removal and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the 

right of removal in the first instance.” Id. The party seeking removal bears the burden of 

establishing federal jurisdiction. See Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 

1265 (9th Cir. 1999). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

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III. Analysis.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges two causes of action: negligence; and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress. Doc. 1-1 at 16, 19. Both counts arise from the allegation 

that APS failed to provide Mr. Raupp with an immediate and effective examination after 

he displayed symptoms of a stroke while at work. Id. at 17-18. Defendants argue that 

this entire case is premised on Plaintiffs’ assertion that the federally-mandated “Fitness 

for Duty” policy imposed a legal duty on APS. Doc. 15 at 1. Defendants contend that 

whether APS undertook to render services to Mr. Raupp by creating the Fitness for Duty 

program and whether APS undertook the program for Mr. Raupp’s protection both 

necessarily depend on interpretation of the purpose and intent of such programs. Id. at 5. 

Plaintiffs argue that the underlying factual allegations supporting the negligence 

claims stem from APS’ failure to act reasonably under the applicable standard of due 

care, and its unreasonable failure to follow and comply with its own corporate safety 

policies. Doc. 5 at 4. Plaintiffs allege that APS has a separate and independent duty 

under Arizona law to act reasonably and appropriately under the circumstances 

surrounding Mr. Raupp’s claim, regardless of the genesis of its Fitness for Duty program 

or its safety policies.2

 Id. at 5. 

Plaintiffs do not challenge any aspect of Defendant’s Fitness for Duty program or 

claim that the program was inadequate or deficient. Plaintiffs do not allege a violation of 

any federal regulation or a negligence per se claim. Doc. 5 at 5. Rather, Plaintiffs 

challenge the allegedly unreasonable handling of Mr. Raupp’s suspected intoxication, and 

assert that this unreasonableness is evidenced by Defendants’ violations of their own 

safety policy. Doc. 5 at 4. Federal question jurisdiction does not exist simply because a 

federal question is an ingredient of the state law claim or because the action may 

 

2

 Plaintiffs state in their motion to remand the NRC regulations could be interpreted in any number of ways (i.e., imposing a duty, not imposing a duty, imposing a partial duty, etc.) without having any influence on the question of APS’ duty and breach under Arizona law. Doc. 5 at 6. 

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implicate a federal issue.3 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807; Empire Healthchoice Assur., 

Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006). The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion to 

remand. 

IV. Motion to Dismiss.

Because the Court will remand this case to state court, it will not address 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc. 5) is granted.

2. The Clerk is directed to remand this case to Maricopa County Superior 

Court. 

 Dated this 29th day of February, 2012. 

 

3

 Even if Defendant were to defend itself by invoking a federal regulation and showing what it requires or does not require, such a defense would be insufficient to 

create a federal question for jurisdictional purposes. Takeda v. Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that federal question jurisdiction does not arise from the defenses or counterclaims alleged by a defendant). 

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