Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02061/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDE STEELE,

Petitioner,

 vs.

J. BROWN, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-2061 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING IN PART

AND GRANTING IN PART

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; SCHEDULING

ORDER

This is a habeas case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Petitioner alleges that denial

of parole in 2004 violated his plea agreement and his Sixth Amendment, due process, and

ex post facto rights. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, petitioner has opposed it

and respondent has filed a reply. The motion is ready for decision.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s grounds for federal habeas relief are that: (1) the Board’s refusal to find

him suitable for parole violated his plea agreement and his Sixth Amendment rights; (2) the

Board’s decision was not supported by “some evidence;” and (3) the Board’s decision

subjects him to a more severe sentence than that actually imposed, thereby violating his

right not to be subjected to an ex post facto law. The motion to dismiss contains argument

as to why each of these claims are without merit.

1. Issue one, plea agreement and Sixth Amendment

Petitioner’s first claim is that the Board’s refusal to set a term and find him suitable

for parole violated his plea agreement and that its use of uncharged and unproved facts to

deny parole violated his right to jury trial. Respondent contends that this “fails to state a

claim.” 

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a motion to dismiss for failure to

Case 4:05-cv-02061-PJH Document 9 Filed 09/07/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

state a claim is not appropriate in habeas cases. O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420

(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269 n. 14

(1978) (dictum)). However, because Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 in the

United States District Courts "explicitly allows a district court to dismiss summarily the

petition on the merits when no claim for relief is stated," the court may conclude that the

facts alleged in the petition were not such as to entitle him to habeas relief as a matter of

law and enter a summary dismissal under Rule 4. O'Bremski, 915 F.2d at 420. In addition,

after Browder and O’Bremski were decided, Rule 4 was amended to explicitly permit a

“motion” as a possible response to a petition, see 2004 Amendments Committee Comment,

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, and the committee comment for the 1976 adoption says that the

language allowing the judge reviewing a petition to take such action as he or she deems

appropriate might include dismissing some claims so that a respondent would only have to

answer those with “some arguable merit.” That is, a motion is an appropriate response to a

petition, and the court may dismiss those claims which do not have some arguable merit. 

 

Respondent contends that petitioner has not alleged that the plea agreement itself

contained a provision that he would be granted release on parole, so there could be no

breach of the plea agreement, however much petitioner may have believed that he was

going to receive such an early release. Petitioner does not contend otherwise in his

opposition. The motion will be granted as to this claim. 

Respondent does not refer to the second part of petitioner’s first claim, that the

Board’s reliance on facts not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt caused his

sentence to be longer than it otherwise would have been and thus violated the principle

announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000), and Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). However, Blakely itself says that it does not

invalidate indeterminate sentencing schemes, noting that although it is true that in

indeterminate schemes a judge or parole board (here, a parole board) makes decisions

affecting the length of incarceration, the statutory scheme does not give the prisoner a right

Case 4:05-cv-02061-PJH Document 9 Filed 09/07/06 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

to a particular sentence upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of specific facts, so there is

no right to a jury trial on those facts. Id. at 2540-41. What matters is not whether the judge

or board is deciding facts which affect the length of the incarceration, but whether the

prisoner actually has a right to a particular length of sentence upon the occurrence of a

particular fact or facts. Id. at 2040. As the Court explained, “[i]n a system that says the

judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking 40 years

in jail. In a system that punishes burglary with a 10-year sentence, with another 30 added

for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a home unarmed in entitled to no more than a 10-

year sentence – and by reason of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that

entitlement must be found by a jury.” Id. (emphasis in original). It thus is clear that

petitioner’s Apprendi/Blakely claim is without merit, and it will be summarily denied.

2. Issue two, some evidence

Respondent contends that petitioner’s second claim, that his due process rights

were violated because the Board’s decision was not supported by some evidence, should

be dismissed because petitioner has no liberty interest in parole, thus no right to due

process protections, which in the parole context might include a right to have decisions be

supported by some evidence. Respondent argues that a decision of the California

Supreme Court, In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), establishes that California

prisoners have no liberty interest in parole. Respondent contends that because he has no

liberty interest in parole, petitioner has no due process right to “some evidence” to support

the Board’s decision, hence his second claim has no constitutional basis. The Ninth Circuit

has recently rejected this contention, so the motion will be denied as to this claim. See

Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 2006 WL 2506393 at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2006). 

3. Issue three, ex post facto

Finally, respondent contends that the ex post facto claim is without merit because

petitioner has no expectation of release on parole, based on the argument that California

law does not create a liberty interest in parole – the argument rejected above. The motion

to dismiss will be denied as to this claim. 

Case 4:05-cv-02061-PJH Document 9 Filed 09/07/06 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

CONCLUSION

The motion to dismiss (document 5 on the docket) is granted in part and denied in

part. It is DENIED as to respondent’s contentions that there is no liberty interest in parole

in California and that petitioner’s ex post facto claim is without arguable merit. It is

GRANTED as to petitioner’s claim that his plea agreement was breached. That claim

(ground for relief two in the court’s list) is DISMISSED. In addition, petitioner’s contention

that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when parole was denied on facts not tried to

a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt is DENIED. 

Respondent shall serve an answer to the order to show cause within sixty days of

the date this order is entered. If petitioner wants to respond to the answer, he shall file a

traverse (response) within thirty days of the date the answer is served upon him. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2006. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.05\STEELE061.MDSMSS

Case 4:05-cv-02061-PJH Document 9 Filed 09/07/06 Page 4 of 4