Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01778/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01778-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNEST LEE COX, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

VASUKI DARAM, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:21-cv-01778-DJC-JDP (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS BE GRANTED

ECF No. 38

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

Plaintiff Ernest Lee Cox, Jr. is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action 

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that defendants violated his rights under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), and Eighth 

Amendment when they denied him use of a continuous positive air pressure (“CPAP”) machine.

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ECF No. 12 at 2. Defendants have moved to dismiss the case, arguing that his claims are noncognizable. ECF No. 38. For the reasons stated below, I recommend that the motion be granted. 

1 Defendants also reference denial of single-cell status as a separate claim, but my 

screening order found cognizable only the claims related to the CPAP machine. ECF No. 13 at 2-

3. I noted in that order that plaintiff’s other claims, including those related to single cell status, 

would need to be pursued in a separate suit. Id. at 3. 

Case 2:21-cv-01778-DJC-JDP Document 45 Filed 05/16/24 Page 1 of 5
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

I. Legal Standards

A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 

requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 

subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 

F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or 

(2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d at 956. 

Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the claim. 

Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984).

II. Analysis

Defendants argue first that plaintiff is precluded from recovering monetary damages under 

the ADA or RA. ECF No. 38 at 13. I agree. They note that, to recover damages under either act, 

a claimant must show that a defendant intentionally discriminated against him. See Duvall v. 

Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2001) (to recover monetary damages under 

ADA and RA, a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference 

standard). In this context, deliberate indifference requires “knowledge that a harm to a federally 

protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the likelihood.” Id. at 1139. 

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Defendants argue that the complaint does not allege that they failed to act in the face of plaintiff’s 

request for a CPAP machine. ECF No. 38 at 13. Under this prong, a public entity is obligated to 

“to undertake a fact-specific investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable 

accommodation” and “consider the particular individual’s need when conducting its investigation 

into what accommodations are reasonable.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. The complaint (and the 

documents attached thereto) indicate that, after plaintiff requested the return of his CPAP 

machine, he met and communicated with healthcare providers multiple times about the machine. 

ECF No. 12 at 6-7. Additionally, a document attached to plaintiff’s complaint shows that the 

decision to discontinue his use of the CPAP machine was based on a statewide memorandum 

from headquarters. Id. at 35. That memorandum invoked findings that CPAP machines “greatly” 

increased the spread of Covid-19. Id. In so doing, it concluded that “the short term

discontinuation of CPAP is less risky than potential virus spread during the COVID pandemic.” 

Id. These allegations and documents show that defendants’ decision was not based on an intent to 

discriminate against plaintiff. Whether the increased risk of contracting Covid outweighed the 

risk of discontinuing the CPAP machine might be medically debatable, but defendants did not 

shirk their duty to investigate whether the accommodation was reasonable and to consider the 

factors specific to plaintiff.

In his opposition, plaintiff argues that the standard articulated above is incorrect. ECF No. 

40 at 9. But case law makes plain that, under both the ADA and RA, a claimant must show that 

complained-of discrimination was “by reason of his disability.” See O’Guinn v. Nev. Dep’t of 

Corr., 468 F. App’x 651, 652 (9th Cir. 2014). In light of the rationale offered in the documents 

attached to the complaint, I conclude that plaintiff cannot show that the discrimination was by 

reason of his disability.

Second, defendants correctly argue that neither the Title II of the ADA nor section 504 of 

the RA authorize claims against a state official in his or her individual capacity. See Vinson v. 

Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title 

II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). I agree, and nothing in plaintiff’s 

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opposition indicates that this well-established principle is inapplicable here.

Third, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to state cognizable Eighth Amendment 

claims for denial of adequate medical care against them. Again, I agree. As noted above, official 

guidance from the upper echelons of the CDCR was that CPAP use should be temporarily 

discontinued because it increased the risk of spreading the Covid-19 virus. ECF No. 12 at 35. 

Deliberate indifference requires more than an allegation of medical error or even malpractice. 

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Instead, the standard is whether a defendant 

exhibited “subjective recklessness” toward an inmates’ medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994) (“[S]ubjective recklessness as used in the criminal law is a familiar 

and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as 

interpreted in our cases, and we adopt it as the as the test for ‘deliberate indifference’ under the 

Eighth Amendment.”). There is no way to conclude that defendants, by following guidelines 

issued by the CDCR, were subjectively reckless toward plaintiff’s medical needs. Again, 

reasonable minds might differ as to whether the defendants weighted the risks correctly, but that 

is not the standard. The CDCR was hardly alone in restricting CPAP machine use in order to 

lessen the risk of Covid transmission. See United States v. Nuzzolilo, 517 F. Supp. 3d 40, 42

(Dist. Mass. Feb. 3, 2021) (collecting cases that describe prisons’ restriction of CPAP machines 

to combat Covid transmission). 

Having concluded that plaintiff’s claims are non-cognizable, the only remaining question 

is whether dismissal should be with or without leave to amend.2 Generally, dismissal should be 

with leave to amend “unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 

Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A., 910 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018). I cannot conclude that no 

amendment could save plaintiff’s claims and so recommend that dismissal be with leave to 

amend.

It is RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 38, be GRANTED 

and plaintiff’s claims against them be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

2

I find it unnecessary to consider defendants’ other arguments in favor of dismissal. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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