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Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 4, 2014 Decided December 30, 2014

No. 13-7185

STEPHEN A. WANNALL,

Personal Representative of the Estate of John M. Tyler

APPELLANT

v.

HONEYWELL, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-351)

David M. Lipman argued the cause for appellant. Daniel 

A. Brown filed the briefs.

Michael R. Shebeleskie argued the cause for appellee. 

With him on the brief were Michael A. Brown, Alicia N. 

Ritchie, and John D. Epps.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: After discovery closed 

in this litigation, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an 

opinion addressing a key aspect of the law at issue. The 

development confronted the plaintiff with a strategic choice: 

Acknowledge that the opinion changed the law and seek the

district court’s leave to respond appropriately with new 

evidence? Or deny that any change had occurred and proceed 

on the existing record? He selected the second alternative,

and the district court honored that choice in its opinion 

granting defendant’s renewed motion for summary judgment. 

Wannall v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 

2013). Although the plaintiff came to regret his decision, he 

remains bound by it. We affirm. 

* * *

Shortly after he was diagnosed with malignant pleural 

mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer caused by asbestos, John 

Tyler and his wife filed this action seeking damages from 

various companies that manufactured products containing 

asbestos that he had been exposed to. Tyler died. He was 

replaced in the litigation by the representative of his estate, 

Stephen Wannall; his wife, though initially a co-plaintiff, 

dropped out of the case and does not join this appeal. (In this 

opinion we refer to “plaintiff” in the singular throughout.) 

Appellee Honeywell International, Inc. was named in the 

lawsuit as the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation, 

which manufactured brake shoes that Tyler had used in 

helping friends, family, and neighbors perform automobile 

repairs over 50 years. 

At the close of discovery set by the district court, 

Honeywell moved for summary judgment, contending that the 

plaintiff had failed to establish the causal link required under 

Virginia law between Tyler’s exposure to Bendix brakes and 

his disease. (The parties agree that Virginia law governs.)

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Honeywell argued that Tyler had also been exposed to 

asbestos during his decades-long service in the United States 

Navy and so could not show that the Bendix brake shoes 

proximately caused him to contract mesothelioma. The 

district court denied the motion, and found that the declaration 

of the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Steven Markowitz, raised a 

genuine issue of fact by stating that Tyler’s exposure to 

Bendix brakes was a “substantial” cause of his illness. In re 

Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 10-cv-67422, 2011 WL 

5457546, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011). 

While the parties were preparing for trial, the Supreme 

Court of Virginia changed the legal landscape. In Ford Motor 

Company v. Boomer, 736 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 2013), the court

rejected the “substantial” cause standard that the parties had 

previously understood as controlling, and ruled instead that 

plaintiffs must demonstrate that “exposure to the defendant’s 

product alone must have been sufficient to have caused the 

harm.” Id. at 731. 

Honeywell promptly moved for reconsideration of its 

motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had

not satisfied the standard articulated in Boomer. The plaintiff 

opposed the motion and attached to his opposition a new

declaration from Dr. Markowitz stating that the Bendix 

asbestos exposure was, indeed, a “sufficient” cause of Tyler’s 

mesothelioma. The plaintiff did not seek leave to file the new 

declaration under Rule 26(e), which calls on a party to 

“supplement or correct” certain disclosures previously made 

in discovery, including experts’ reports, as needed to reflect 

“additional or corrective information.” Nor did he move 

under Rule 56(d) for permission to take additional discovery 

in response to Honeywell’s motion. Instead, he argued that 

Honeywell’s motion for reconsideration of the summary 

judgment issue was not justified because “Boomer did not . . . 

change Virginia law.”

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Honeywell moved to strike the new Markowitz 

declaration as untimely under the scheduling order, Rule 26,

and Rule 37(c). The plaintiff filed an opposition, but once 

again failed to argue that Rule 26(e) justified filing the new 

declaration to “supplement or correct” his expert’s prior 

report. Instead, he relied exclusively on his “right” under

Rule 56(c)(4) “to produce an affidavit or declaration to 

support or oppose a summary judgment motion.” 

The district court granted Honeywell’s motion to strike 

the new Markowitz declaration and its renewed motion for 

summary judgment in light of Boomer. Wannall, 292 F.R.D. 

26. Exclusion of the new Markowitz declaration from 

consideration on the merits proceeded in two steps: a finding 

under Rule 26 that its proffer was untimely and a finding 

under Rule 37(c) that the delay in submission was neither 

“substantially justified” nor “harmless.” Id. at 33-37. We 

take the issues in that order. 

* * *

Untimely under Rule 26. The new Markowitz declaration 

was submitted two years after the close of expert discovery as

set by the district court. The plaintiff now argues that the 

declaration was, nonetheless, timely as a “supplemental”

declaration under Rule 26(e). The district court ruled that the 

plaintiff had waived this argument. 

The district court’s local rules provide that a court may

treat a motion as “conceded” if an opposing brief is not filed 

within the prescribed time. D.D.C. R. 7(b). The rule is 

understood to mean that if a party files an opposition to a 

motion and therein addresses only some of the movant’s 

arguments, the court may treat the unaddressed arguments as 

conceded. Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global 

Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing 

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FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in turn 

citing the predecessor to Local Rule 7(b))). Such a concession 

“acts as waiver,” such that a “party cannot raise [a] conceded 

argument on appeal.” Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1304 

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing predecessor to Local Rule 7(b) and 

Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). We 

review a district court’s finding of waiver under Local Rule 

7(b) for abuse of discretion—though “we have yet to find that 

a district court’s enforcement of this rule constituted [such] an 

abuse.” FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d at 67; see also Twelve 

John Does v. Dist. of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) (“Where the district court relies on the absence of a 

response as a basis for treating [a] motion as conceded, we 

honor its enforcement of the rule.” (citing predecessor to

Local Rule 7(b))). 

The district court held that the plaintiff waived Rule 26(e)

because he did not raise the argument “in his opposition to the 

defendant’s motion to strike.” Wannall, 292 F.R.D. at 34.

The plaintiff’s decision not to invoke Rule 26(e) was 

apparently part of his litigation strategy. He hoped to defeat 

Honeywell’s motion for reconsideration of its summary 

judgment motion by persuading the court that Boomer

effected no change to Virginia law. Invoking Rule 26(e)—or, 

for that matter, Rule 56(d)—would have required admitting 

that Boomer did effect such a change, so the plaintiff declined 

to do so even in response to a motion to strike the new 

declaration as untimely. At oral argument on the various 

motions, plaintiff’s counsel hewed resolutely to that strategy 

in the face of the district court’s apparent puzzlement: 

The Court: And why do you fight it [the proposition 

that Boomer changed Virginia law] so much? . . . I don’t 

understand the litigation strategy. Explain that to me.

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Mr. D. Brown: You know, Judge, sometimes I have a 

question myself.

The Court: I mean, emphatically, you’re fighting it, 

putting yourself into a very difficult box.

Mr. D. Brown: A box. So I’m here trying to get out 

of the box. I’m a jack-in-the-box, Judge.

So why do we say it? Well, we said it strategically 

because we felt that under Your Honor’s standing order 

that motions for reconsideration have to comport with 

59(e) or 60(b), that they had to satisfy the case law that 

goes along with that, which basically – they cast it as an 

intervening change in the law, and we said, is it 

technically?

The Court: So you’re blaming it on my standing 

order.

Mr. D. Brown: No. No. I’m blaming it on myself, 

my team, and how we interpret the law.

The plaintiff invokes the “plain language” of a 

supplemental briefing order issued by the court and claims 

that it somehow absolves him of any waiver in his filing in 

opposition to Honeywell’s motion to strike the new 

Markowitz declaration. The order for supplemental briefing 

invited the parties to state their positions on four issues: 

(1) why the plaintiff has submitted a supplementary 

expert report if Boomer did not constitute an intervening 

change in Virginia law; . . . (2) why the plaintiff’s 

submission of a supplementary expert report, in the 

absence of an intervening change in law and without 

seeking leave of the Court, was “substantially justified” 

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1)[;] . . . (3) 

whether the plaintiff concedes that, in the event that the 

[new] Markowitz Declaration is stricken, the defendant’s 

Motion for Reconsideration must be granted; and (4) if 

the plaintiff does not so concede, what other legal basis or 

bases would exist to deny the defendant’s Motion for 

Reconsideration . . . .

Order, Wannall v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 10-cv-351 (D.D.C 

Apr. 25, 2013), ECF No. 144. But the district judge 

specifically confirmed that she “did not request any briefing 

on whether the Markowitz Declaration was timely under 

Federal Civil Rule of Procedure 26.” Wannall, 292 F.R.D. at 

34 n.6. That reading of the order appears entirely correct. 

In response to the judge’s call for supplemental briefing, 

the plaintiff filed a brief which claimed—for the first time—

that the new Markowitz declaration was timely under Rule 

26(e). But even then he continued to insist that Boomer did 

“not constitute an intervening change in Virginia law.” Thus 

he disabled himself from invoking Rule 26(e)’s mandate to 

“supplement or correct” material that had become “incomplete 

or incorrect.” He didn’t accompany his mention of Rule 26(e) 

with any explanation of how it might be relevant, but claimed 

that the new declaration was already “permitted by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56” as a “response” to Honeywell’s renewed motion. 

At no point did the plaintiff plead in the alternative: “If you 

find that Boomer changed the law, then Rule 26(e)’s provision 

for supplemental submissions would be applicable.” 

Evidently he regarded such a contingent argument as 

undermining his preferred position—that Boomer changed 

nothing.

Untimely submission neither “substantially justified” nor 

“harmless.” Rule 37(c) provides that “[i]f a party fails to 

provide information . . . as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the 

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party is not allowed to use that information . . . to supply 

evidence on a motion . . . unless the failure was substantially 

justified or is harmless.” Having concluded that the new 

Markowitz declaration was not timely under Rule 26, the 

district court found it excluded from consideration, holding 

that the plaintiff’s failure to meet Rule 26(e)’s requirements 

was neither harmless nor substantially justified. Wannall, 292 

F.R.D. at 35-36. We review this determination for abuse of 

discretion. Kapche v. Holder, 677 F.3d 454, 468 (D.C. Cir. 

2012).

We agree that the late submission was “harmful.”

Allowing the new declaration would have required either 

reopening discovery (and possibly delaying trial) or denying 

Honeywell the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Markowitz

on his new opinions before trial and an adequate chance to 

offer expert testimony in rebuttal. These are exactly the types 

of “harms” that disclosure deadlines are intended to prevent. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Comm. Notes (1993) 

(explaining that expert disclosure requirements allow an 

opposing party “a reasonable opportunity to prepare for 

effective cross examination and perhaps arrange for expert 

testimony from other witnesses”). 

We also agree that the late submission was not 

“substantially justified.” As discussed above, the plaintiff

declined to properly invoke either of the (potentially) proper 

procedural avenues to introduce the declaration—Rule 26(e) 

or 56(d)—apparently because doing so would have 

undermined his litigation strategy: he was determined to 

persuade the district judge that Boomer had effected no

change to Virginia law that would open the door to 

Honeywell’s renewed motion for summary judgment. As a 

direct result of this strategic choice, the new Markowitz 

declaration was not timely submitted. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion by determining that a failure to timely 

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submit a declaration that was the direct result of such a choice

was not “substantially justified.” Again, we note that the 

plaintiff never hedged his bets by voicing an argument 

addressing the contingency that the court might find that 

Boomer justified consideration of Honeywell’s new motion 

for summary judgment.

The plaintiff complains that the district court improperly 

failed to consider lesser sanctions before ordering exclusion, 

which here operated as “a de facto dismissal sanction.” But

the district court did consider (and reject) lesser sanctions

when it evaluated the harmfulness of admitting the late 

declaration. The plaintiff also argues that exclusion was 

“grossly disproportionate” to the violation, because there was 

no finding of bad faith or extreme misconduct. But neither of 

these is required under Rule 37(c). 

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

excluding the new Markowitz declaration.

* * *

The plaintiff also seeks reversal of the court’s grant of 

summary judgment. But his arguments all assume that the 

new Markowitz declaration was or ought to have been 

properly part of the record. Because the declaration was 

appropriately excluded, we find that the plaintiff effectively 

concedes summary judgment and we need not address these 

arguments.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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