Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00188/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00188-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Medical Malpractice

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ENID MITCHELL, as personal 

representative of the Estate of 

LAVELL GREEN, deceased,

Plaintiff,

v.

FAIRFIELD NURSING AND 

REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC

et al.,

Defendants.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

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Case No.: 2:15-cv-00188-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Enid Mitchell asserts claims for negligence and wantonness against 

Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC and several related entities and 

individuals. Ms. Mitchell brings her claims as the representative of the estate of 

Mr. Lavell Green, who died at the nursing center in January 2013. In her 

complaint, Ms. Mitchell contends that the defendants caused Mr. Green’s death.

Before this Court may consider the merits of Ms. Mitchell’s claims, the 

Court first must be satisfied that it has jurisdiction over the claims themselves, and 

if a non-resident defendant raises the issue, then the Court also must determine 

whether it may exercise jurisdiction over that defendant. The Court has 

jurisdiction over the state-law claims in this action under 28 U.S.C. §1332 because 

FILED

 2016 Apr-06 PM 04:25

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 1 of 23
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the citizenship of the plaintiff and the defendants is completely diverse, and there 

is more than $75,000 in controversy in this Alabama wrongful death action.

Four non-resident defendants challenge the Court’s ability to exercise 

jurisdiction over them. Defendants D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Norbert Bennett; 

and Donald Denz ask the Court to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Consistent with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, the 

Court must do so if these defendants’ contacts with the state of Alabama are not 

sufficient to cause the defendants to have to litigate a claim in this forum. Having 

reviewed Ms. Mitchell’s complaint, the Court finds that she has failed to allege 

sufficient facts to allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction over these four 

defendants. Consequently, for the reasons discussed in greater detail below, the 

Court has granted these defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As discussed below, the Constitution limits the extent to which a district 

court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Under Rule 12(b)(2) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may assert lack of personal 

jurisdiction as a defense to a claim and may ask a court to dismiss the claim against 

him on that basis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). 

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A plaintiff who sues a non-resident defendant “‘bears the initial burden of 

alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of 

[personal] jurisdiction.’” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 

1350 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 

(11th Cir. 2009)). A court must accept as true the jurisdictional allegations in the 

plaintiff’s complaint, unless “a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction ‘by 

submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position.’” Id. (quoting Madara v. 

Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If 

that happens, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence 

supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant “unless the 

defendant’s affidavits contain only conclusory assertions that the defendant is not 

subject to jurisdiction.” Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace 

Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). When the parties present 

conflicting evidence, a court “must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the plaintiff.” Id. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2013, Mr. Lavell Green was admitted to the Fairfield 

Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC (FNRC) as a hospice resident. (Doc. 8-2, 

¶¶ 9-10). In her complaint, plaintiff Enid Mitchell alleges that FNRC staff and 

personnel neglected Mr. Green and failed to provide Mr. Green with an adequate 

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standard of care, ultimately causing Mr. Green’s death on January 25, 2013. (Doc. 

8-2, ¶¶ 11-13).

On December 29, 2014, Ms. Mitchell, as personal representative of Mr. 

Green’s estate, filed an action in Alabama state court against FNRC and numerous 

other defendants, including Tara Cares/Aurora Cares Enterprise (Tara Cares); DTD 

HC, LLC; and D&N, LLC. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 3-4). On January 26, 2015, Ms. Mitchell 

amended her complaint to add, among others, defendants Donald Denz and 

Norbert Bennett to the list of individuals and entities comprising Tara Cares. (Doc. 

8-2, ¶ 3).1

In her amended complaint, Ms. Mitchell alleges that FNRC is a domestic 

corporation. She adds, upon information and belief, that FNRC:

is a wholly owned subsidiary of the TARA CARES/AURORA 

CARES Enterprise which exercised control over [FNRC] and is liable 

for [FNRC’s] misconduct as well as its own independent misconduct.

(Doc. 8-2, ¶ 2). Ms. Mitchell does not identify in the amended complaint the 

residence of the “TARA CARES/AURORA CARES Enterprise.” 

With respect to the “TARA CARES/AURORA CARES Enterprise,” Ms. 

Mitchell explains: 

 

1 Ms. Mitchell asserts the following Alabama state law claims against all defendants: (1) 

negligence and/or wantonness; (2) negligent and/or wanton supervision/training; (3) negligent 

and/or wanton retention; (4) negligent and/or wanton hiring; (5) vicarious liability; and (6) 

medical negligence and/or wantonness. (Doc. 8-2).

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[“Enterprise”] is Plaintiff’s terminology given to the series of 

companies formed for the ultimate purpose of generating revenue 

and/or profits for the TARA CARES/AURORA CARES Enterprise 

(however designated or named) – which includes all the defendants 

named in this footnote and those named in paragraphs 2-3 of this 

Complaint – and/or shielding the TARA CARES/AURORA CARES 

Enterprise. The existence of multiple entities within the Enterprise, 

which all have the same ultimate goal – to generate a profit or 

otherwise benefit the Enterprise – are a mechanism employed by the 

defendants in an attempt to shield the ultimate head parent company 

or companies, who receive(s) and/or benefit(s) from the profits 

generated by Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, from 

liability for their actions. In fact, defendants’ actions are nothing 

more than a “shell game,” where they attempt to subdivide their 

liability to asset-less companies in an attempt to avoid liability for 

their actions, while simultaneously reaping profits and/or revenue 

streams generated by the Enterprise.

(Doc. 8-2, ¶ 2 n.2). Ms. Mitchell asserts that the “TARA CARES/AURORA 

CARES Enterprise” consists of D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Tara Cares Health 

Services, LLC; Aurora Cares, LLC d/b/a Tara Cares; Aurora Healthcare, LLC 

d/b/a Tara Healthcare; Tara Therapy, LLC; Norbert Bennett, and Donald Denz. 

(Doc. 8-2, ¶ 3). Ms. Mitchell alleges that each member of the enterprise 

“individually and/or jointly had a responsibility to provide proper care and 

treatment” to Mr. Green so that “all are liable for [FNRC’s] misconduct as well as 

their own independent misconduct.” (Id.). Finally, Ms. Mitchell contends that 

because of the relationship among the defendants, the defendants are jointly and 

severally liable “as a joint enterprise (a/k/a the [T]ARA CARES/AURORA 

CARES Enterprise) . . . for the others[’] actions and inactions with regard to the 

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operation of [FNRC].” (Doc. 8-2, ¶ 4). In her amended complaint, Ms. Mitchell 

does not identify the residences of the members of the purported the “TARA 

CARES/AURORA CARES Enterprise.” 

On January 30, 2015, the defendants removed this action from state court to 

federal court, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as a basis for federal jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). 

Initially, defendants FNRC; DTD HC, LLC; D&N, LLC; Aurora Healthcare, LLC; 

and Aurora Cares, LLC answered the complaint. (Docs. 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7). Shortly 

before the defendants filed their notice of removal, Ms. Mitchell filed an amended 

complaint in state court. Defendants DTD HC, LLC; Aurora Healthcare, LLC; 

D&N, LLC; Aurora Cares, LLC; Chance Becnel; Donald Denz; Norbert Bennett; 

Tara Therapy, LLC; and FNRC answered the amended complaint. (Docs. 9, 10,

11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, & 17). In each of their answers, defendants DTD, D&N, 

Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett asserted that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant. (Doc. 4, p. 1; Doc. 5, p. 1; Doc. 9, p. 1; Doc. 11, p. 1; Doc. 14, p. 1; 

Doc. 15, p. 1). 

On March 26, 2015, FNRC filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 25). 

Defendants Aurora Cares LLC, Aurora Healthcare LLC, and Tara Therapy LLC 

joined in the motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 28). Ms. Mitchell consented to 

arbitration with those defendants and asked the Court to order the remaining 

defendants in the case to participate in the arbitration. (Doc. 31, p. 3). The Court 

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ordered defendants D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Tara Cares Health Services, LLC; 

Norbert Bennett, and Donald Denz to advise the Court on or before April 20, 2015, 

whether they opposed Ms. Mitchell’s request for an order directing them to 

participate in arbitration. (Doc. 32). 

On April 17, 2015, rather than responding to the Court’s order, DTD, D&N, 

Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett filed a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 34).2 Mr. Denz and Mr. Bennett each submitted an 

affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss. (Docs. 34-3, 34-4).3 Ms. Mitchell 

filed a number of exhibits in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Docs. 46-53). 

On this record, the Court examines the Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss and a 

number of procedural motions that relate to the motion to dismiss. (Docs. 43, 54, 

56). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

“A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise personal 

jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the law of the state in which it sits and to 

the extent allowed under the Constitution.” Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1360. The state 

 

2

Tara Cares Health Services, LLC did not join in the Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, and that 

defendant has neither answered the amended complaint nor responded to the Court’s April 17, 

2015 order concerning arbitration (Doc. 32). Ms. Mitchell voluntarily dismissed her claims 

against defendant Chance Becnel. (Docs. 38, 39).

3

For the reasons explained below, the Court does not discuss these affidavits because the Court 

has not relied on them in ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

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long-arm statute supplies the state law component of the analysis, and the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes the constitutional 

boundaries for personal jurisdiction. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 

1274 (11th Cir. 2009). The state and federal law inquiries merge in this case 

because “Alabama’s long-arm statute permits service of process to the fullest 

extent constitutionally permissible.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurison, 488 F.3d 922, 

925 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b)).

Under the due process clause, “a State may authorize its courts to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has certain 

minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)) (internal quotations omitted). “The Due 

Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws,’ gives a degree 

of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure 

their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will

and will not render them liable to suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).

There are two categories of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and 

specific jurisdiction. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754. General jurisdiction “refers to the 

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power of a court in the forum to adjudicate any cause of action involving a 

particular defendant, irrespective of where the cause of action arose” because the 

defendant is “at home” in the forum. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752. The Supreme 

Court has held that a corporate defendant typically is at home in either its state of 

incorporation or its principal place of business. Id. at 760-62. Under the concept 

of specific jurisdiction, a court may hear a claim against a nonresident defendant 

when the defendant, through its conduct, has established minimum contacts with 

the forum state such that a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant in the 

forum with respect to that conduct does not violate notions of fair play. Walden v. 

Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). “‘[T]he central concern of the [specific 

jurisdiction] inquiry’” is the “‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 

litigation.’” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 

197 (1977)); see also Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121. 

In her attempt to persuade this Court that it may exercise jurisdiction over 

defendants DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett, Ms. Mitchell primarily relies 

on an alter ego theory and argues that because the Court has general jurisdiction 

over FNRC, as a matter of corporate law, the Court also may exercise jurisdiction 

over the related entities of DTD and D&N and individual defendants Mr. Denz and

Mr. Bennett. (Doc. 37, p. 6). Because Ms. Mitchell alleges in her complaint that 

each defendant other than FNRC is liable not only for FNRC’s purported 

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misconduct but also for that defendant’s “independent misconduct” (Doc. 8-2, ¶ 3), 

the Court briefly addresses specific jurisdiction before turning to Ms. Mitchell’s 

alter ego theory of general jurisdiction. 

1. Specific Jurisdiction

As stated above, Ms. Mitchell bears the initial burden of alleging in her

complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction

over the defendants. To the extent that Ms. Mitchell attempts to pursue claims 

against DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett based upon each of the

defendant’s independent conduct, Ms. Mitchell has failed to carry her burden. In 

her amended complaint, she has neither alleged the residency of DTD nor 

described the nature of DTD’s business or the conduct in which the LLC engaged 

that purportedly led to Mr. Green’s death. (Doc. 8-2, pp. 18-20). The same is true 

with respect to Ms. Mitchell’s allegations concerning D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. 

Bennett. Ms. Mitchell’s general allegations that the “Defendants” intentionally 

understaffed FNRC or hired and retained unqualified nurses are too vague to 

enable the Court to determine from the face of the complaint whether it may 

exercise jurisdiction over DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and/or Mr. Bennett with respect 

to those defendants’ independent conduct, especially in the absence of allegations 

concerning the residency of those defendants. 

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 10 of 23
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In her opposition to the Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, Ms. Mitchell 

argues that the arbitration provision in the contract between FNRC and Mr. Green

enables this Court to exercise jurisdiction over DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. 

Bennett. (Doc. 37, pp. 5-6). Specifically, Ms. Mitchell asserts that the arbitration 

provision binds categories of entities and individuals which include the moving 

defendants, and the provision requires arbitration in Alabama, absent the parties’ 

agreement to another location, such that the moving defendants “purposefully 

availed themselves of the privileges of operating in Alabama and reasonably 

anticipated being haled into legal proceedings in Jefferson County, Alabama . . . .” 

(Doc. 37, p. 5).

As a matter of substantive law, Ms. Mitchell’s argument potentially has

merit. In evaluating personal jurisdiction, courts have found that a forum selection 

clause in an arbitration agreement may give rise to personal jurisdiction over a 

defendant. See, e.g., Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 

726 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Personal jurisdiction was not lacking because appellants had 

consented to personal jurisdiction by the agreement to arbitrate in Minnesota.”); St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Courtney Enterprises, Inc., 270 F.3d 621, 624 (8th 

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Cir. 2001) (implying consent to personal jurisdiction from the forum selection 

clause in an arbitration agreement).4 

Factually, Ms. Mitchell’s argument potentially has merit too. Though Ms. 

Mitchell’s jurisdictional allegations as to defendants Aurora Cares LLC, Aurora 

Healthcare LLC, and Tara Therapy LLC are as deficient as her allegations 

concerning DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett, the Aurora/Tara defendants 

did not file a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss before they joined in FNRC’s motion 

to compel arbitration.5 In their notice of joinder, the Aurora/Tara defendants

asserted:

[t]he broad scope of the [Jury Trial Waiver and Arbitration 

Agreement] not only covers the claims made by the Plaintiff against 

FNRC, it also encompasses those same claims made against Tara 

Cares, Tara Healthcare and Tara Therapy. Specifically, Mr. Green 

agreed that the Jury Trial Waiver and Arbitration Agreement binds 

him and the facility and the facility’s “members, affiliated entities, 

parent companies, subsidiaries, representatives, medical directors, 

 

4 A court must resolve issues concerning personal jurisdiction before deciding whether an 

arbitration agreement is enforceable. A district court may not deflect jurisdictional analysis to an 

arbitrator. See, e.g., Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. v. Buhler Barth GmbH, 2015 WL 

6689572, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2015) (“For the Court to rule on the motion to compel 

arbitration, it must first find that it has personal jurisdiction over [the defendant].”); 

PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank (Switzerland), 260 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(vacating district court’s order compelling defendant to arbitrate because district court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over defendant); Johns v. Taramita, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 

(finding that because the Federal Arbitration Act does not authorize nationwide service of 

process or personal jurisdiction, the court must first determine whether it has personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant before enforcing an arbitration agreement) (citing Omni Cap. Int’l, 

Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97 (1987)). 

5

In their answers, the Aurora/Tara defendants stated, “the parties are due to resolve this matter 

through binding arbitration.” (Doc. 6, ¶ 1; Doc. 7, ¶ 1; Doc. 10, ¶ 2; Doc. 12, ¶ 1; Doc. 16, ¶ 1).

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 12 of 23
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employees, officers, directors, managers, successors, assigns, and 

agents[.]”

(Doc. 28, p. 3 (quoting Doc. 26-3, p. 2). The Aurora/Tara defendants continued, 

“Tara Cares, Tara Healthcare and Tara Therapy fall under the additional entities 

bound by the Jury Trial Waiver and Arbitration Agreement in that they are 

affiliated entities.” (Doc. 28, p. 3). Thus, the Aurora/Tara defendants appear to 

concede that jurisdiction is proper with respect to them in this forum.6 

Nevertheless, Ms. Mitchell’s argument fails procedurally. In her amended 

complaint, Ms. Mitchell does not mention the Jury Trial Waiver and Arbitration 

Agreement between FNRC and Mr. Green, and she does not allege in her amended 

complaint that DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett are “members, affiliated 

entities, parent companies, subsidiaries, representatives, medical directors, 

employees, officers, directors, managers, successors, assigns, [or] agents” of 

FNRC such that they are bound by the Jury Trial Waiver and Arbitration 

Agreement. More specifically, Ms. Mitchell does not describe the relationship 

between the healthcare entities and DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett. 

Because Ms. Mitchell did not plead facts regarding the terms of the arbitration 

 

6

The Court deems Aurora Cares LLC, Aurora Healthcare LLC, and Tara Therapy, LLC’s 

joinder in the motion to compel arbitration a waiver of any challenge that those defendants might 

make to personal jurisdiction in this forum. See Palmber v. Braun, 376 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (“It is well-settled that lack of personal jurisdiction is a waivable defect, and that a 

defendant waives any objection to the district court’s jurisdiction over his person by not 

objecting to it in a responsive pleading or a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 motion.”).

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 13 of 23
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agreement or the extent to which defendants DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. 

Bennett may be bound by the agreement, the Court’s analysis ends with the face of 

the complaint; Ms. Mitchell has not carried her initial burden to plead jurisdictional 

facts. See Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 

(11th Cir. 2000) (“Plaintiff’s burden in alleging personal jurisdiction is to plead 

sufficient material facts to establish the basis for exercise of such jurisdiction.”).7

Ms. Mitchell also argues in her opposition to the motion to dismiss that Mr. 

Denz and Mr. Bennett made “trips” to Alabama to visit FNRC, thereby 

purposefully availing themselves of the privileges of conducting business in 

Alabama and rendering them subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. (Doc. 

37, p. 6). Again, Ms. Mitchell’s complaint makes no mention of such trips to 

Alabama. Thus, Ms. Mitchell’s failure to plead facts concerning either Mr. Denz’s

or Mr. Bennett’s contacts with the State of Alabama is fatal to her attempt to 

establish the Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Denz or Mr. Bennett. See Future Tech. 

Today, 218 F.3d at 1249. The Court expresses no opinion as to whether the bare

 

7

Information about the relationship between the defendants was available to Ms. Mitchell before 

she filed her original complaint in December 2014. See Hill v. Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 

LLC, 134 So. 2d 396, 409-10 (Ala. 2013) (cited in Doc. 37, Ms. Mitchell’s opposition to the 

Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss). The defendants also provided information about their 

residency in their notice of removal. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Nevertheless, Ms. Mitchell filed a motion 

for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (Doc. 54). Because Ms. Mitchell has not satisfied 

her initial burden of alleging a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the moving

defendants, the Court does not have to look to additional facts either supporting or refuting 

personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court finds that jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate 

and has denied Ms. Mitchell’s motion for discovery.

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allegation that Mr. Dentz and/or Mr. Bennett traveled to Alabama to visit FNRC 

would be sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction over those nonresident defendants in this forum or whether such an initial allegation would 

provide a basis for jurisdictional discovery.

2. General Jurisdiction

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign 

country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their 

affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic as to render them 

essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 

v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). As discussed above, in Daimler, the 

United States Supreme Court held that for purposes of general jurisdiction, a 

corporation typically is “at home” in either its state of incorporation or its principal 

place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760-62. Several courts have extended the 

rationale of Daimler to LLCs. For example, in Finn v. Great Plains Lending, LLC, 

2016 WL 705242 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2016), the district court explained: 

While Great Plains is an LLC and not a corporation, the reasoning of 

Daimler applies with equal force. Although the language of Daimler

speaks only in terms of corporations, the subsidiary at issue in 

Daimler was Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”). See Daimler, 

134 S. Ct. at 751. In determining whether the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of California could exercise general 

jurisdiction over Daimler-Chrysler Aktiengesellschaft (“Daimler”), 

the Supreme Court concluded that the district court could not exercise 

general jurisdiction over Daimler because “neither Daimler nor 

MBUSA is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its 

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 15 of 23
16

principal place of business there.” Id. at 761-62. Even though 

MBUSA is an LLC, the Court looked to MBUSA’s place of 

incorporation and principal place of business to determine whether it 

was essentially at home in California and thus subject to general 

jurisdiction in the State.

Id. at *3, n. 3; see also Pittman v. Joe K. Pittman Co., LLC, 2015 WL 8492531 

(E.D. Miss. Dec. 10, 2015); cf. Allen v. IM Solutions, LLC, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 

1204 (E.D. Okla. 2015) (finding that for purposes of general jurisdiction, an LLC 

is “at home” in the states in which the LLC’s members are incorporated and have 

their principal places of business and in the state in which the LLC has its principal 

place of business).

The parties agree that on an individual basis, the Court does not have general

jurisdiction over the moving defendants, and the parties seem to agree that the 

Court may exercise jurisdiction over FNRC under the principle of general 

jurisdiction because FNRC’s principal place of business is in Alabama. Ms. 

Mitchell asserts that the Court has general jurisdiction over the moving defendants

by virtue of their relationships to FNRC. Ms. Mitchell argues in her response to 

the defendants’ motion to dismiss that FNRC is the moving defendants’ alter ego, 

and because the Court has general jurisdiction over FNRC, it also has general 

jurisdiction over the moving defendants. (Doc. 37, p. 6).

“[T]his alter ego analysis is governed by Alabama corporate veil-piercing 

law.” Cahaba Disaster Recovery, LLC v. DRC Emergency Servs., LLC, No. 2:15-

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 16 of 23
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CV-02096-LSC, 2015 WL 9489911, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 2015). Alabama 

law provides:

“‘The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity existing separate and 

apart from the persons composing it is a legal theory introduced for 

purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice. The 

concept cannot, therefore, be extended to a point beyond its reason 

and policy, and when invoked in support of an end subversive of this 

policy, will be disregarded by the courts. Thus, in an appropriate case 

and in furtherance of the ends of justice, a corporation and the 

individual or individuals owning all its stock and assets will be treated 

as identical.’”

Hill v. Fairfield Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 134 So. 3d 396, 407 (Ala. 2013) 

(quoting Cohen v. Williams, 318 So. 2d 279, 280-81 (Ala. 1975)). The Alabama 

Supreme Court repeatedly has held that “[w]hether the separate legal entity of a 

corporation may be ‘pierced’ and personal liability imposed is ‘a question of fact 

treated as an evidentiary matter to be determined on a case by case basis.’” Id. at 

408 (quoting Ex parte AmSouth Bank of Ala., 669 So. 2d 154, 156 (Ala. 1995))

(emphasis in Hill). The Alabama Supreme Court has said that “a parent 

corporation which owns all the stock of a subsidiary corporation is not liable for 

acts of its subsidiary corporation, unless the parent corporation so controls the 

operation of the subsidiary corporation as to make it a mere adjunct, 

instrumentality, or alter ego of the parent corporation.” Id. (quoting Duff v. S. Ry., 

496 So. 2d 760, 762 (Ala. 1986)).

The Duff Court recognized the following indicia of control:

Case 2:15-cv-00188-MHH Document 58 Filed 04/06/16 Page 17 of 23
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(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the 

subsidiary.

(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or 

officers.

(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.

(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the 

subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.

(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.

(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or 

losses of the subsidiary.

(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent 

corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent 

corporation.

(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of its 

officers, the subsidiary is described as a department or division of the 

parent corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is 

referred to as the parent corporation’s own.

(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its 

own.

(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act 

independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take their orders 

from the parent corporation . . . .

(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.

Duff, 496 So. 2d at 762 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As to the alter ego theory of personal jurisdiction, Ms. Mitchell alleges the 

following in a footnote in her amended complaint: 

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[“Enterprise”] is Plaintiff’s terminology given to the series of 

companies formed for the ultimate purpose of generating revenue 

and/or profits for the TARA CARES/AURORA CARES Enterprise 

(however designated or named) – which includes all the defendants 

named in this footnote and those named in paragraphs 2-3 of this 

Complaint – and/or shielding the TARA CARES/AURORA CARES 

Enterprise. The existence of multiple entities within the Enterprise, 

which all have the same ultimate goal – to generate a profit or 

otherwise benefit the Enterprise – are a mechanism employed by the 

defendants in an attempt to shield the ultimate head parent company 

or companies, who receive(s) and/or benefit(s) from the profits 

generated by Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, from 

liability for their actions. In fact, defendants’ actions are nothing 

more than a “shell game,” where they attempt to subdivide their 

liability to asset-less companies in an attempt to avoid liability for 

their actions, while simultaneously reaping profits and/or revenue 

streams generated by the Enterprise.

(Doc. 8-2, ¶ 2 n.2). Beyond this general assertion, the amended complaint contains 

no allegations of fact concerning the relationships among DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, 

Mr. Bennett, and FNRC, even though those facts, which Fairfield apparently 

conceded in Hill, are listed in the Alabama Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in that 

case. As with her theory of specific jurisdiction, Ms. Mitchell has not alleged 

enough facts in her amended complaint to pursue her alter ego theory for imputing

FNRC’s jurisdictional contacts to the moving defendants.

Even if Ms. Mitchell’s allegations were adequate, it is not entirely clear that 

her alter ego theory translates to an LLC such that this Court may exercise 

jurisdiction over DTD, D&N, Mr. Denz, and Mr. Bennett. Moreover, although the 

Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Meier supports Ms. Mitchell’s theory of general 

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jurisdiction in the context of a parent/subsidiary relationship, see Meier ex rel. 

Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that 

the imputation of a subsidiary’s substantial business activity in a forum to its 

foreign parent is enough to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent), the 

Court would have to consider the impact of the Daimler decision on the rationale 

of Meier. In Daimler, the Supreme Court stated that even if a subsidiary 

corporation is regarded as being at home in a particular forum and that subsidiary’s 

contacts with the forum are imputed to the subsidiary’s foreign parent corporation, 

the district court still must perform an independent evaluation of the parent 

corporation’s forum contacts, which might include the contacts imputed from the 

subsidiary. 134 S. Ct. at 760. The Court will not decide the issue here. Because 

Ms. Mitchell has not met her initial burden of alleging facts sufficient to establish 

general jurisdiction with respect to the alter ego theory, the Court finds that it does 

not have general jurisdiction over the moving defendants. See Future Technology, 

218 F.3d at 1249.8

B. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Ms. Mitchell’s Supplement to Her 

Response to the Motion to Dismiss

After the moving defendants filed their motion to dismiss, the Court entered 

an order setting a briefing schedule on the motion. Under the order, Ms. Mitchell

 

8 Because Ms. Mitchell has not carried her initial burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, the 

Court need not consider the moving defendants’ affidavit evidence.

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had until May 8, 2015 to file her response brief, and the moving defendants had

until May 22, 2015 to file their reply brief. (Doc. 36). Ms. Mitchell and the 

moving defendants complied with these deadlines. On August 18, 2015, over three 

months after Ms. Mitchell’s response brief deadline, Ms. Mitchell filed a 

supplement to her original response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 

45). Ms. Mitchell separately filed numerous exhibits in support of her 

supplemental brief. (Docs. 46-53). Ms. Mitchell neither sought leave from the 

Court nor gave an explanation for the supplement to her original response.

The moving defendants filed a motion to strike Ms. Mitchell’s supplement to 

her response brief. (Doc. 56). In her supplemental brief, Ms. Mitchell offers 

several arguments as to why the moving defendants are subject to general 

jurisdiction in Alabama; however, none of Ms. Mitchell’s supplemental arguments 

address Ms. Mitchell’s pleading deficiencies concerning personal jurisdiction. 

Because the arguments in Ms. Mitchell’s supplemental brief do not affect the 

Court’s analysis with respect to personal jurisdiction, the Court has denied as moot 

the moving defendants’ motion to strike. (Doc. 57).

C. Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Exhibit for In Camera Inspection

The moving defendants filed a motion for leave to file an exhibit for in 

camera inspection. (Doc. 43). The defendants ask the Court to inspect in camera 

an insurance document that describes FNRC’s policy limits. In support of this 

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motion, the defendants state that Ms. Mitchell incorrectly cites to an Alabama state 

court decision in positing FNRC’s relevant insurance limits. Because the Court 

has not relied on FNRC’s insurance policy limits, the Court has denied as moot the 

defendants’ motion for in camera inspection. (Doc. 57).

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the factual allegations of personal jurisdiction in Ms. Mitchell’s 

amended complaint are insufficient, the Court has granted the moving defendants’ 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ms. Mitchell filed her 

complaint and her amended complaint in Alabama state court. The Court 

recognizes that Alabama’s pleading requirements differ from the federal pleading 

requirements. See Smith v. Pilot Travel Centers, No. 2:14CV713-MHT, 2015 WL 

1457470, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2015) (“Alabama employs a notice pleading 

standard, which notably does not incorporate Iqbal or Twombly pleading standards. 

Notice pleading must ‘provide defendants adequate notice of the claims against 

them.’ The standard for notice pleading is considered met ‘if the claim for relief 

gives to the opponent fair notice of the pleader’s claim and the grounds upon 

which it rests. The discovery process bears the burden of filling in the factual 

details.’ While federal pleading standards under Iqbal may require ‘sufficient 

factual matter . . . [for] facial plausibility,’ an Alabama complaint cannot be 

dismissed ‘if the pleading contains even a generalized statement of facts which will 

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support a claim for relief.’”) (internal citations omitted). Because of the different 

pleading standards, the Court dismisses Ms. Mitchell’s claims against the moving 

defendants without prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED this April 6, 2016.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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