Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00483/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00483-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASDRUBAL SOLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. JENSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-00483-SKO PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 1)

Plaintiff Asdrubal Solis (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and was incarcerated at Avenal

State Prison at the time of the events described in his complaint. Plaintiff is suing under Section

1983 for the violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff names J. Jensen, C.

Cullen, and Rita Lane as defendants. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint is

dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days.

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading

standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all factual

allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. 

Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that he received a priority ducat to report to the dental department at Avenal

State Prison on March 12, 2008 at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff reported to his work assignment at 7:00 a.m.

and informed his supervisor of the appointment. Plaintiff was released at 1:20 p.m. but was held in

“work-change” until 2:10 p.m., causing him to miss his appointment. Upon arriving at the dental 1

department, Defendant J. Jensen informed Plaintiff that he needed to submit another Health Care

Services Request Form (CDC 7362) to reschedule his appointment. Plaintiff was further informed

that he was in violation of CCR §3014 and would be issued an administrative disciplinary report for

missing his dental appointment.

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Plaintiff mentions “work-change” throughout his complaint but provides no explanation as to its meaning.

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On March 19, 2008, Plaintiff filed an appeal regarding his disciplinary report and requested

that his dental appointment be rescheduled without filing another CDC 7362. Defendant C. Cullen

reviewed the appeal and concluded that Plaintiff was required to file a CDC 7362 if he wanted a new

dental appointment. Plaintiff filed a secondary appeal which was granted; he was given another

appointment without having to submit a CDC 7362. Plaintiff was also told that the disciplinary

report would be rescinded, but Plaintiff complains that it was not rescinded.

III. Discussion

A. Rita Lane as a Defendant

Plaintiff names Rita Lane as a defendant but makes no factual allegations linking actions or

omissions by Lane to a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. 

To establish a prima facie case under Section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate proof that (1)

the action occurred “under color of law” and (2) the action resulted in a deprivation of a

constitutional right or federal statutory right. McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of Section 1983, if that

person does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act

which that person is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is

made. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “The requisite causal connection can

be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also by

setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would

cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 743-44. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege

facts to state a Section 1983 claim against Rita Lane.

B. Claim for Violation of Eighth Amendment Rights

Plaintiff does not specifically identify what constitutional rights or civil rights were violated

by Defendants. However, construing the complaint liberally, the Court assumes that Plaintiff is

seeking relief for the violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, which protects the

“physical, dental, and mental health” of inmates. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9thCir.

1982); see also Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting importance of

providing dental care to prisoners). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment onlywhen two

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requirements aremet: (1) the objective requirement that the deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and

(2) the subjective requirement that the prison official has a sufficiently culpable state of mind. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury creates a cause of action under §1983. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The delay of, or interference with medical treatment

can amount to deliberate indifference. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006);

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th

Cir. 2002); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). However, where the prisoner is alleging that delay of medical

treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury.

See Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407

(9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

The allegations set forth by Plaintiff are insufficient to support a claim for violation of the

Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has not claimed that he suffered any further injury as a result of the

delayed dental appointment. Nor has Plaintiff established that any injury suffered or risk of injury

was serious enough to fall within the purview of the Eighth Amendment. Further, Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts to establish that each Defendant acted with deliberate indifference or with actual

knowledge of the risk to the Plaintiff. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file

an amended complaint.

C. Claim Regarding the Continued Existence of Plaintiff’s Disciplinary Report

Plaintiff complains that the disciplinary report has yet to be rescinded as per his secondary

appeal. It is unclear whether Plaintiff is attempting to raise this issue as another claim based on the

violation of his constitutional or civil rights caused by the continued existence of the disciplinary

report in his record. Plaintiff claims that the report will cause irreparable harm because the

California Board of Parole will consider it as an infraction during Plaintiff’s parole consideration. 

“[I]n order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a

§1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

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expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus....” 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The rule in Heck applies to suits that would

necessarily imply the invalidity of a disciplinary hearing that results in a prisoner’s sentence being

extended due to the loss of good time credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997).

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the disciplinary report has not yet been rescinded despite the

outcome of his secondary appeal. Plaintiff’s claim is premised on the potential injury he may suffer

from the fact that the disciplinary report may extend his length of incarceration. Such a claim is

barred until Plaintiff can show that his disciplinary report was reversed or rescinded. Plaintiff may

seek “a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus” to challenge the possible extension of

his sentence caused by the disciplinary report. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section

1983 claim based on the extension of his prison term is barred until his disciplinary report is reversed

or rescinded by prison officials on appeal or by a habeas proceeding in court.

IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend to cure the deficiencies identified by

the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second amended complaint. 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). If Plaintiff decides

to amend, his amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff must identify how

each individual defendant caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights:

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of

each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). With respect to exhibits, while

they are permissible if incorporated by reference, Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), they are not necessary in the

federal system of notice pleading, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words, it is not necessary at this

stage to submit evidence to prove the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint because at this stage

Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true.

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///

However, although Plaintiff’s factual allegations will be accepted as true and that “the

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matters, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint arewaived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing

to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at

1474. In other words, even the claims that were properly stated in the original complaint must be

completely stated again in the amended complaint.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed for failing to state any claims upon which relief

might be granted;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Plaintiff shall be given leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days

from the date of service of this order; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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