Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01962/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01962-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

UNITED STATES ex rel. DONNA M.

McLEAN and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ex rel DONNA M. McLEAN,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, THE

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND

FAMILY SERVICES OF SANTA CLARA

COUNTY, KENNETH BORELLI,

LAWRENCE GALLEGOS, EPIFANIO (“J.R.”)

REYNA, TANYA BEYERS, DR. DEE

SCHAFFER, DR. TOMMIJEAN THOMAS,

DR. RICHARD PERILLO and DOES 1-100,

Defendants. /

No. C05-01962 HRL

ORDER DENYING RELATOR’S

MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF

FINAL JUDGMENT

[Re: Docket No. 237]

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, relator Donna McLean moves for certification of

judgment on the County of Santa Clara’s counterclaims. Defendants oppose the motion. The

matter is deemed suitable for determination without oral argument. CIV. L.R. 7-1(b). Upon

consideration of the moving and responding papers, the court denies the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In this qui tam action, McLean claims that defendants have invented fictional children

for the purpose of overbilling the state and federal governments in connection with requests for

reimbursement for child welfare expenditures. The United States and the State of California

*E-FILED 9/8/2008*

Case 5:05-cv-01962-HRL Document 244 Filed 09/08/08 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Shortly after this court granted her motion for summary judgment as to the

County’s counterclaims, McLean moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(2). (See Docket #161). The County argued that her request for fees was premature

because, among other things, judgment had not been entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2). 

The instant motion for certification followed. At the August 5, 2008 motion hearing,

McLean’s motion for fees was denied without prejudice.

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declined to intervene. The qui tam claims brought on behalf of the State of California have

since been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

The County of Santa Clara (“County”) filed counterclaims against McLean for breach of

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and for declaratory relief. 

It contended that McLean was precluded from pursuing the instant qui tam action by virtue of a

settlement agreement and release resolving several prior lawsuits she filed against the County.

McLean moved to strike the counterclaims pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute,

California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. On July 25, 2006, that motion was denied.

McLean subsequently filed a summary judgment motion as to the counterclaims. On

April 30, 2008, this court granted her motion based on Ninth Circuit authority indicating that a

prefiling release of qui tam claims generally cannot be enforced to bar a subsequent qui tam

action where the release was entered into without the government’s knowledge or consent.

Defendants have filed a summary judgment motion as to the qui tam claims. That

motion is pending.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), realtor now moves for certification of final judgment as

to the County’s counterclaims.1

II. DISCUSSION

In actions involving multiple parties or claims (whether brought as claims,

counterclaims, crossclaims or third party claims), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

authorizes a district court to “direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer

than all of the claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason

for delay.” The United States Supreme Court has outlined a two-step analysis to be conducted

in deciding Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) motions. First, this court must “determine that it is dealing with

a ‘final judgment,’” i.e., “a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief” that is “‘an ultimate

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disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’” CurtissWright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.

Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). Second, this court must determine whether there is any

just reason for delay in entering judgment. Id. In deciding whether there are just reasons for

delay, a district court “must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the

equities involved,” and may consider “such factors as whether the claims under review were

separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims

already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more

than once even if there were subsequent appeals.” Id. Similarity of legal or factual issues

weighs heavily against entry of judgment. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d

962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981).

Nevertheless, motions for certification of final judgment are not routinely granted. 

“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks

of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are

outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some

claims or parties.” Id. “Whether a final decision on a claim is ready for appeal is a different

inquiry from the equities involved, for consideration of judicial administrative interests ‘is

necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic federal policy

against piecemeal appeals.’” Wood v. GCC Bend LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Mackey, 351 U.S. at 438).

In this case, there is no dispute that this court has made a final decision as to the

County’s counterclaims. Nonetheless, taking into account judicial administrative interests, as

well as the equities involved, this court is unpersuaded that the second part of the Supreme

Court’s test for the entry of Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) judgment is satisfied.

Here, the parties disagree as to whether the dismissed counterclaims are related,

factually or legally, to the qui tam claims. Relator contends that her qui tam claims are entirely

distinct and separate. Defendants contend that there is some overlap because (a) the

government’s knowledge of McLean’s allegations was a key factor in the dismissal of the

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counterclaims; and (b) in their pending summary judgment motion, defendants seek judgment

on the ground (among others) that McLean was not the original source of the information on

which her qui tam claims are based.

The pending qui tam claims are not directly intertwined with the counterclaims. The qui

tam claims concern whether defendants have engaged in fraudulent conduct; the counterclaims

primarily concern the question whether McLean properly may pursue the qui tam claims at all. 

Even so, it does not follow that her motion must be granted. “Not all final judgments on

individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable

from the remaining unresolved claims.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8. “The function of

the district court under [Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)] is to act as a ‘dispatcher,’” and the determination

as to when a final decision is ready for appeal rests within the sound discretion of the district

court. Id. “This discretion is to be exercised ‘in the interest of sound judicial administration.’” 

Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956)). On this point, the

Ninth Circuit has cautioned:

The greater the overlap the greater the chance that this court will have to

revisit the same facts – spun only slightly differently – in a successive appeal.

The caseload of this court is already huge. More than fifteen thousand

appeals were filed in the last year. We cannot afford the luxury of reviewing

the same set of facts in a routine case more than once without a seriously

important reason.

Wood, 422 F.3d at 882. If this court were to certify final judgment on the County’s

counterclaims, to a certain degree, the Ninth Circuit would still be required to review the same

set of facts twice. As such, the court is not convinced that entering judgment as to the

counterclaims now would spare an appellate court from duplicating its efforts if there were an

immediate appeal and another one following summary judgment or trial of the qui tam claims.

Nor has relator shown sufficient cause for imposing that burden on the Circuit court in

this instance. Here, McLean argues that she should not have to try her qui tam claims with

reference to the counterclaims because “[a] qui tam action is ordinarily tried without a counterclaim or reference to a counter-claim.” (Reply at 3). However, the court has already

determined that the counterclaims will not proceed to trial. So, entering final judgment now as

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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to them streamlines nothing. Indeed, this court finds that certifying final judgment now will

only serve to unnecessarily multiply these proceedings and embroil the parties in litigation in

two forums.

McLean nonetheless argues that the County’s assertion of its counterclaims was merely

a tactic designed to delay or thwart her pursuit of the qui tam claims (e.g., by increasing costs of

this litigation, making it difficult to retain counsel, and keeping alive the threat of litigation as

leverage for her pursuit of the qui tam claims). Even assuming that were true (and McLean has

not substantiated those assertions here), none of those reasons are probative of any prejudice

she would suffer if an appeal as to the County’s counterclaims were brought later instead of

now. McLean tacitly suggests that she will be prejudiced by a delay in payment of judgment. 

But she has not argued, much less shown, that delay of an appeal will inflict severe financial

harm.

In sum, this court does not find any pressing need for immediate appeal which

outweighs the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding

the appellate docket.

III. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, relator’s motion for certification of final judgment pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) is DENIED.

Dated:

 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

September 8, 2008

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5:05-cv-1962 Notice has been electronically mailed to: 

Donna M McLean loofwcd@aol.com 

Joan Eve Trimble joan_trimble@cmwlaw.net, patricia_inabnet@cmwlaw.net 

Melissa R. Kiniyalocts melissa.kiniyalocts@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

Orley Brandt Caudill , Jr brandt_caudill@cmwlaw.net, christopher_zopatti@cmwlaw.net 

Richard Augustus Swenson rsloofwcd@aol.com, rsloofwcd@aol.com 

Sara McLean sara.mclean@usdoj.gov 

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov 

Virginia Stewart Alspaugh Virginia_Alspaugh@cmwlaw.net, Linda_Knobbe@cmwlaw.net,

TheAlspaughs@cox.net 

William C. Dresser loofwcd@aol.com 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have

not registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program.

Copy of order mailed to:

Julia Ann Clayton 

California Attorney General’s Office 

455 Golden Gate Avenue # 11000 

San Francisco , CA 94102-7004

Case 5:05-cv-01962-HRL Document 244 Filed 09/08/08 Page 6 of 6