Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08470/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-08470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Property

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALISON R. O’KEEFE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TARGET CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-08470-JCS 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

REMAND AND ORDERING 

DISCOVERY

Re: Dkt. No. 12

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Alison and Jonathan O’Keefe brought this action in state court against Defendant 

Target Corporation and several Doe Defendants, asserting claims arising from an incident in a 

Target store where Alison O’Keefe was struck by a cart operated by at least one Doe Defendant 

employed by Target. After requesting and receiving a statement of damages from the O’Keefes, 

Target removed to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The 

O’Keefes move to remand on the grounds that Target’s removal was untimely and that an 

impending amendment, once the O’Keefes discover the identity of the employee or employees 

operating the cart, will destroy diversity. The Court finds the matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument, and VACATES the hearing set for February 28, 2020. For the reasons 

discussed below, the motion to remand is DENIED, the O’Keefes are GRANTED leave to serve 

an early interrogatory as specified below no later than February 28, 2020, and, if they do so,

Target is ORDERED to respond no later than March 13, 2020. If warranted by Target’s 

interrogatory response, the O’Keefes may file a motion for leave to amend to identify one or more 

of the Doe Defendants and renewed motion to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) no later than 

Case 3:19-cv-08470-JCS Document 15 Filed 02/25/20 Page 1 of 8
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March 27, 2020.1

II. BACKGROUND

The O’Keefes allege that Alison O’Keefe was struck by a restocking cart in a Target store 

on August 2, 2019. Notice of Removal (dkt. 1) Ex. A (Compl.) ¶ 1. In addition to Target, the 

complaint names as defendants Does 1 through 5, identified only as Target employees who 

negligently operated the cart, and Does 6 through 10, identified only as owning the store and 

employing the first five Does jointly with Target. See id. ¶¶ 7–9. The complaint did not claim any 

particular amount of damages or provide any description Alison O’Keefe’s injury. The O’Keefes 

filed this action in the California Superior Court for the County of Sonoma on October 7, 2019 

and served Target on November 4, 2019. See generally id.

Target requested a statement of damages on December 2, 2019. Roger Dreyer Decl. (dkt. 

8-1) Ex. D. On December 23, 2019, the O’Keefes provided Target with a statement of damages 

totaling close to ten million dollars. Notice of Removal Ex. B. Target removed to this Court on 

December 31, 2019. See generally Notice of Removal. The O’Keefes argue that Target should 

have known that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 earlier based on: (1) an incident 

report prepared by Target employees on the date of the accident, Mot. (dkt. 8) at 3 (citing Roger 

Dreyer Decl. Ex. A); (2) past experience with the O’Keefes’ attorney, who “does not handle cases 

that have valuation of under $75,000” and instead specializes “in handling catastrophic injury 

cases,” id. at 3–4; and (3) a December 9, 2019 email from the O’Keefes’ attorney stating that 

Alison O’Keefe “suffered a serious head injury in the incident,” id. at 4 (citing Roger Dreyer Decl. 

Ex. C). The O’Keefes also argue that the case should be remanded because Target “consent[ed] to 

personal jurisdiction at the state level” by answering the complaint in state court before removing, 

id. at 5, and that they expect that discovering the identity of the Doe Defendant who operated the 

cart will provide a separate basis for remand on account of a non-diverse defendant, id. at 5–6. 

The O’Keefes seek to recover their attorneys’ fees and costs for what they contend is an improper 

removal. Id. at 6–7.

1 The parties have consented to the undersigned magistrate judge presiding over the case for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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Target argues that its removal was timely because it had no indication that the amount in 

controversy exceeded the jurisdictional threshold2until it received the damages statement on 

December 23, 2019. Opp’n (dkt. 11) at 2–5. Target also contends that its filing of an answer has 

no effect on removal, and that the potential addition of an individual defendant is both unnecessary 

to the case and irrelevant to whether Target’s removal without such a defendant being named was 

proper. Id. at 5–6.

The O’Keefes all but concede in their reply that Target’s removal was timely under 

applicable Ninth Circuit precedent, but contend that allowing removal here is contrary to public 

policy and that, based on communications between counsel, Target was aware of the amount in 

controversy before receiving the O’Keefes’ damages statement. Reply (dkt. 12) at 2. The 

O’Keefes devote the majority of their reply to arguing that they should be permitted to serve an 

early interrogatory to identify the Target employee who was pushing the cart at the time of the 

incident, and should be granted leave to amend their complaint to name that individual as a 

defendant. Id. at 2–5.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, and may only hear cases falling 

within their jurisdiction. Generally, a defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if 

the action could have been filed originally in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The removal 

statutes are construed restrictively so as to limit removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. 

v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108−09 (1941). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a “strong presumption 

against removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Any doubts as to removability should generally be resolved in favor of remand. 

Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). The defendant 

bears the burden of showing that removal is proper. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 

2 Target erroneously states throughout its opposition brief that the amount in controversy must be 

more than $74,999 to invoke diversity jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1132(a), the amount in 

controversy must “exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000.” That difference of one dollar is not 

material to the present motion. 

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1117 (9th Cir. 2004).

Target asserts that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of 

citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In relevant part, that statute provides federal courts with 

jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 

$75,000” that are between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity 

jurisdiction under § 1332(a) “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is 

diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).

“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after 

the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting 

forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after 

the service of summons upon the defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). “Except as provided 

[elsewhere in the statute], if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 

removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 

otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first 

be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” Id. § 1446(b)(3). “If the 

case stated by the initial pleading is not removable solely because the amount in controversy does 

not exceed the amount specified in section 1332(a), information relating to the amount in 

controversy in the record of the State proceeding, or in responses to discovery, shall be treated as 

an ‘other paper’ under subsection (b)(3).” Id. § 1446(c)(3)(A).

The Ninth Circuit has rejected arguments that “clues” to removability should trigger a duty 

to investigate, and instead adopted a “bright-line approach” that “the first thirty-day period for 

removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) only applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable 

on its face.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694, 697 (9th Cir. 2005).

The jurisdictional and procedural interests served by a bright-line 

approach are obvious. First and foremost, objective analysis of the 

pleadings brings certainty and predictability to the process and avoids 

gamesmanship in pleading. Just as important, an objective baseline 

rule avoids the spectre of inevitable collateral litigation over whether 

the pleadings contained a sufficient “clue,” whether defendant had 

subjective knowledge, or whether defendant conducted sufficient 

inquiry.

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We are unpersuaded by the argument that a predictable rule will result 

in strategic delay in removal, thereby burdening the state courts with 

a case that will ultimately be removed. Once defendant is on notice of 

removability, the thirty-day period begins to run. Defendant has 

neither the incentive nor the ability to tinker with either actual notice 

or the time frame.

Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) prevents, at least in the context of 

removal based on diversity, unreasonable waste of judicial resources 

by limiting the extended period of removal to one year after 

“commencement of the action.” The one-year bar gives the defendant 

sufficient incentive and time to determine the facts to justify removal 

without imposing an undue burden to investigate removal within the 

first thirty days of receiving an indeterminate complaint. [Citation 

omitted.]

Our reluctance to embrace [a “clues”-based] framework is also 

motivated by the concern that defendants may be encouraged to 

engage in premature removals in order to ensure that they do not 

waive their right to removal. Otherwise, defendants will be subject to 

a court’s post-hoc consideration of whether there was a “clue” in the 

initial pleading and whether the defendant exercised due diligence to 

discover the grounds for removability. As observed in Lovern, the 

pressure to file a premature notice of removal may lead to the 

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.

Finally, we are not unmindful of the canon that instructs that removal 

statutes should be construed narrowly in favor of remand to protect 

the jurisdiction of state courts. [Citations omitted.] Our interpretation 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is consistent with the goal of the canon, which 

guards against premature and protective removals and minimizes the 

potential for a cottage industry of removal litigation. By assuring that 

removal occurs once the jurisdictional facts supporting removal are 

evident, we also ensure respect for the jurisdiction of state courts.

Id. at 697–98 (footnotes omitted).

B. Target’s Removal Was Proper

All of the purported early indications of a sufficient amount in controversy on which the 

O’Keefes rely—the August 2019 incident report, which stated that Alison O’Keefe “almost passed 

out” and had pain in her right arm; the complaint, which does not describe her injuries at all; and 

the O’Keefes’ attorney’s usual practice of taking high-value cases—are at most the type of “clues” 

to potential removability that the Ninth Circuit held insufficient in Harris, and weak clues at that. 

As the panel noted in that case, questions of notice and timeliness invert the effect of the general 

rule to construe removal statutes narrowly, because a holding that Target should have removed at 

the slightest hint of a larger amount in controversy would encourage thinly-supported removals by 

parties fearing that any delay could imperil their potential rights to a federal forum. The approach 

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that Target took instead—asking the O’Keefes for an estimate of their damages, and removing a 

mere eight days after receiving a definitive statement of a sufficient amount in controversy—

comports with the removal statutes, Harris, and considerations of efficiency for the parties and the 

courts.

Assuming for the sake of argument that informal communication between counsel could be 

sufficient to trigger the deadline for removal, the O’Keefes’ argument that such communication 

here renders Target’s removal untimely is frivolous. The only such communication identified by 

the O’Keefes is an email dated December 9, 2019. See Roger Dreyer Decl. Ex. C. Target 

removed the case on December 31, 2019—less than thirty days later. Accordingly, even if the 

thirty-day clock for § 1446’s removal deadline began to run on December 9, 2019, the removal 

was timely.

To the extent that the O’Keefes’ motion suggests that the case should be remanded based 

on their intent to amend to add an individual defendant, such an argument has no basis in law. “In 

determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of [diversity] jurisdiction . . . , the 

citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b)(1). The O’Keefes have not yet identified the person they wish to name as a defendant,

nor have they yet sought or received leave of the Court to so amend. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (“If 

after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject 

matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the 

State court.”). Even if the Court were to grant such leave, it is not yet clear whether the potential 

individual defendant is a citizen of California who would destroy diversity—it is conceivable that 

this person was not domiciled in California despite working here, or that they have since moved 

away before the O’Keefes filed this action. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 695–96 (noting that 

“[d]iversity jurisdiction is based on the status of the parties at the outset of the case,” i.e., “the 

filing of the complaint”). Thus far, the O’Keefes have not shown that the case will ever be subject 

to remand, much less that remand is appropriate on their present complaint.

Finally, the O’Keefes cite no authority for their assertion that a defendant who has 

answered a complaint in state court forfeits any right it might have to remove. Removal on 

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account of diversity jurisdiction is based on coextensive federal court jurisdiction, not a lack of 

personal jurisdiction in the state court. Any act of acquiescence to the state court’s jurisdiction is 

irrelevant.

The motion to remand is DENIED.

C. The O’Keefes’ Request for Discovery

In their reply brief, the O’Keefes seek a Court order authorizing them to serve a single 

interrogatory before the parties’ initial conference under Rule 26(f), in order to determine the 

identity of any employees responsible for the operation of the cart on the day of the accident. 

Reply at 5. The O’Keefes’ proposed interrogatory reads as follows:

State the name of any and all employees of TARGET 

CORPORATION who caused, permitted, constructed, managed, 

operated, drove, maintained, inspected, and/or supervised the subject 

U-Boat [i.e., the cart involved in the accident] on August 2, 2019 at 

the subject location, 401 Kenilworth Drive, Petaluma, California, 

92952.

Reply Ex. C. Aspects of that proposed interrogatory are nonsensical. For example, it is not clear 

what it would mean to “cause” or “permit” a cart. Moreover, the interrogatory goes well beyond 

the desired information described in the O’Keefes reply—the identity of “the individual pushing 

the U-boat,” Reply at 5—and the extraneous information required in response not only imposes an 

added investigatory burden on Target, but also might well serve to obscure the identity of an 

appropriate additional defendant. In the interest of reaching an efficient resolution of whether 

amendment should be allowed and the case should be remanded, the Court instead authorizes the 

O’Keefes to serve the following interrogatory no later than February 28, 2020:

3

State the names of any and all employees of TARGET 

CORPORATION who operated, drove, or pushed the subject U-Boat

cart at or immediately before the time of the incident involving Alison 

O’Keefe at approximately 1:10 PM on August 2, 2019 at the subject 

location, 401 Kenilworth Drive, Petaluma, California, 92952.

Target is ORDERED to respond no later than March 13, 2020.

3 This limitation is without prejudice to the O’Keefes later pursuing the identities of other 

individuals potentially involved in the incident in the normal course of discovery.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the motion to remand is DENIED, without prejudice to

the O’Keefes moving for leave to amend and remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) no later than 

March 27, 2020. The parties shall complete early discovery consisting of one interrogatory as 

stated above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2020

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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