Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04891/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04891-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO,

Plaintiff

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant /

UTE SISTRUNK,

Plaintiff

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant. /

No C 02-4891 VRW

Related to:

02-5292 VRW

 ORDER

Plaintiffs Continental Casualty Co (“Continental”) and

Ute Sistrunk (“Sistrunk”) move for leave to amend their respective

complaints against defendant United States of America (“the

government”). Docs ##52, 57. Specifically, Continental and

Sistrunk wish to amend their complaints to seek damages in excess

of the damages requested in their administrative claims. 

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Anticipating these motions, the government previously moved to

limit Continental’s and Sistrunk’s damages to the amount stated in

the administrative claims. Doc #45. Additionally, the government

opposes the motions for leave to amend. Doc #66. The court heard

oral argument on these motions on June 9, 2005. Based on the

parties’ arguments and the applicable federal law, the court GRANTS

Continental’s and Sistrunk’s motions for leave to amend and DENIES

the government’s motion as moot.

I

On January 29, 2000, Sistrunk sustained a low back injury

while employed as a nursing assistant at Sunbridge Healthcare. Doc

#53 (Cont Motion) at 2. She was initially treated conservatively

with physical therapy, but when the pain persisted, orthopedist Dr

Samuel Jorgenson recommended surgery. Doc #67 (Cheng Decl), Ex C

at 2. On March 28, 2000, Sistrunk was involved in an automobile

collision with a United States postal employee, David Tyler, who

was operating a Postal Service vehicle. Id. Sistrunk claims that

the auto accident not only made her back worse, but also caused

neck pain and migrainous headaches. Id. In December 2000,

Sistrunk underwent her first back surgery, a posterior lateral

fusion at the L5-S1 level. Cont Motion at 2. Jorgenson conducted

the surgery. Id. 

Following the surgery, Sistrunk’s condition improved, and

she was able to work in a modified capacity from January 2001 to

February 2002. Id. In October 2001, however, Sistrunk again

experienced low back pain and saw Dr Barbara McQuinn regarding this

condition. Doc #67 (Cheng Decl), Ex C at 1. McQuinn concluded

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that due to low back pain, Sistrunk had developed secondary

depression, insomnia and difficulties with adequate pain control. 

Id at 6. Specifically, McQuinn concluded: “[A]t present a referral

for management of these issues at a pain management center would be

quite helpful here.” Id at 6-7. Moreover, McQuinn concluded that

Sistrunk was “not yet Permanent and Stationary, particularly

because matters regarding the utility of, or even the necessity of,

further low back surgery are still apparently unresolved.” Id at

7. McQuinn advised that “perhaps [Sistrunk’s] pain medications and

her depression might be more easily managed, in conjunction with

her othopedic management by Dr Jorgenson, by referral of the

patient to a mutidisciplinary pain center.” Id. 

McQuinn presently states that the pain management program

she recommended for Sistrunk in October 2001 was “a relatively low

level program.” Doc #79 (McQuinn Statement, 4/21/05) at 2. 

In early March 2002, Sistrunk underwent two more

surgeries with Dr Jorgenson -- an anterior spinal fusion at L5-S1

and a removal of hardware at that spinal level. Doc #45 (Gov Mot)

at 4. Following these surgeries in March 2002, Continental and

Sistrunk filed separate administrative claims with United States

Postal Service Delivery Programs Support, as required by the

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 USC § 2675(a). Cheng Decl, Ex D

and B. Continental -- which had paid and continues to pay workers’

compensation benefits to Sistrunk on behalf of Sunbridge Healthcare

as a result of her injuries -- requested $150,000. Cheng Decl, Ex

D. Sistrunk requested $556,935. Cheng Decl, Ex B. When these

administrative claims were denied, Continental and Sistrunk filed

separate complaints in this court pursuant to the FTCA in October

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and November 2002, respectively. Docs ##1, 1 (02-5292 VRW). 

Continental’s and Sistrunk’s complaints did not specify the amount

of damages requested and thus the court will assume –- since

Continental and Sistrunk now seek leave to amend –- that each

complaint requests the same amount of damages listed in the

administrative claim. Id. 

On October 4, 2002, Dr Francis Pecoraro, a pain

management specialist, documented Sistrunk’s continued complaints

of significant low back pain and referred her to Dr Hieu Ball for

surgical consideration. Doc #62 (Cont Decl), Ex D. Ball performed

surgery on Sistrunk in June 2003, replacing the hardware at the L5-

S1 disc level. Cont Decl, Ex F. 

On October 28, 2003, Sistrunk saw Dr Joseph Izzo and

informed him that she felt worse after the June 2003 surgery with

Ball. Doc #69 (Cheng Reply Decl), Ex E. Izzo concluded that

“[g]iven [Sistrunk’s] current state of affairs seven months after

her surgery, it is highly unlikely that any significant recovery

will occur, allowing her to pursue any form of meaningful

employment.” Id at 18. Izzo informs the court that “meaningful

employment” meant “going back to her $10.00 per hour job.” Doc #78

(Izzo Supp Statement, 5/1/05). He also explains that his November

7, 2003, statement was a “tentative view awaiting further

evaluation” that was not intended to be a report but simply “a note

to my file, not for dissemination.” Id at 2. 

In November 2004, Izzo concluded that Sistrunk would not

be able to return to work, either at her previous job or any

employment at all. Id. But Izzo was unable to provide Sistrunk

with any opinion as to the “extent, cost or duration of her future

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medical care in terms of pain management.” Id. On October 27,

2004, Sistrunk sent a letter informing the government of the pain

management care she was receiving. Doc #57 (Sist Mot), Ex 8. The

letter stated that the future costs of such care would not be

determined until December 15, 2004. Id at 2. 

Shortly before the January 28, 2005, factual discovery

cut-off date, Doc #43, Continental and Sistrunk informed the

government that they would seek leave to amend their complaints to

increase the damages requested in their administrative claims. Doc

#66 (Gov Opp). Continental and Sistrunk cited Sistrunk’s need for

“lifetime pain management” as the basis for the proposed

amendments. Id. In response, on February 1, 2005, the government

filed a motion to limit damages to the amount stated in the

administrative claims. Doc #45. Continental and Sistrunk

responded by filing motions for leave to amend their complaints on

March 30 and 31, 2005, respectively. Docs ##52, 56. Contrary to

Civ L R 10-1, neither Continental nor Sistrunk supplemented their

motion for leave to amend with a proposed amended complaint. In

its memorandum, however, Continental states that it seeks to

increase the amount of damages requested to $900,000, a $750,000

increase. Doc #52 at 2. Sistrunk’s memorandum (Doc #56) fails to

specify the amount of damages she will request if she is allowed to

amend her complaint. 

The government opposes. In its opposition, the

government offers three arguments why the motions for leave to

amend should be denied. First, the government argues that

Continental and Sistrunk have not met their burden under 28 USC §

2675(b): they have not demonstrated that Sistrunk’s current

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injuries were not “reasonably foreseeable” when Continental and

Sistrunk filed their administrative claims in March 2002. Gov Opp

at 2. Next, the government argues that Continental and Sistrunk

had numerous opportunities to seek leave to amend prior to filing

the current motions in March 2005. Id. Specifically, the

government argues that by waiting until January 2005 to reveal

their intent to seek leave to amend, Continental and Sistrunk

prejudiced the government because it did not have an adequate

opportunity to conduct factual discovery regarding Sistrunk’s need

for pain management. Id; Cheng Decl at 3. Finally, the government

argues that Continental and Sistrunk failed timely to disclose

Sistrunk’s need for lifetime pain management pursuant to FRCP

37(c)(1). Gov Opp at 3; Doc #68 (Gov Reply) at 3. The court

addresses each of these arguments in turn.

II

28 USC § 2675(b) of the FTCA provides that an

Action under this section shall not be instituted

for any sum in excess of the amount of the claim

presented to the federal agency, except where the

increased amount is based upon newly discovered

evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of

presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon

allegation and proof of intervening facts, relating

to the amount of the claim. (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit has held that for a plaintiff to be

granted leave to amend a complaint under § 2675(b), “‘[t]he

allegedly newly discovered evidence or intervening facts must not

have been reasonably capable of detection at the time the

administrative claim was filed’.” Richardson v United States, 841

F2d 993, 999 (9th Cir 1988) (quoting Low v United States, 795 F2d

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466, 470 (5th Cir 1986)). “[W]hen a plaintiff does not know fully

the medical extent of his injuries and expenses at the time of his

administrative complaint, the exceptions to section 2675(b) are

triggered.” Powers v United States, 589 F Supp 1084, 1110 (D Conn

1984) (cited with approval in Richardson, 841 F2d at 999). 

Moreover, a known injury that worsens in “ways not reasonably

discoverable by the claimant and his or her treating physician” at

the time of the administrative claim can constitute “newly

discovered evidence” or “intervening facts.” Michels v United

States, 31 F3d 686, 688 (8th Cir 1994). See also Cole v United

States, 861 F2d 1261, 1262 (11th Cir 1988) (holding that “a

reasonably based change in expectation as to the severity and

permanence of an injury is newly discovered evidence within the

meaning of section 2675(b).”). 

Applying these principles, the court concludes that when

Continental and Sistrunk filed their administrative claims in March

2002, neither could have been aware of the permanence of Sistrunk’s

condition and the necessity of lifetime pain management. The

government cites three cases in support of its argument that

Continental’s and Sistrunk’s lifetime pain management claim was

reasonably foreseeable at the time of their administrative claims. 

Docs ##45, 66, 68 (citing Hill v United States, 2002 WL 855909 (ND

Cal April 26, 2002); Salcedo-Albanez v United States, 149 F Supp 2d

1240, 1244 (SD Cal 2001); Kielwen v United States, 540 F2d 676, 680

(4th Cir 1976)). The court, however, found these cases to be of

little, if any, guidance in resolving the current motion. The

extremely fact-sensitive nature of a § 2675(b) inquiry results in a

plethora of cases that are of limited utility outside the facts of

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each individual case. 

As for actual evidence, the government relies heavily on

Dr McQuinn’s October 2001 report as proof that lifetime pain

management costs were reasonably foreseeable when Continental and

Sistrunk filed their administrative claims in March 2002. Docs

##45, 66, 68. In the report, McQuinn states that Sistrunk was “not

yet Permanent and Stationary” and that pain management “would be

quite helpful here.” Doc #67 (Cheng Decl), Ex C at 7. In addition,

McQuinn commented that the utility and necessity of further low

back surgery was “still apparently unresolved.” Id. The court

finds these statements insufficient reasonably to inform

Continental and Sistrunk of the need for lifetime pain management. 

Indeed, when she saw McQuinn in October 2001, Sistrunk had worked

in a modified capacity since her December 2000 surgery. Moreover,

Sistrunk continued to work until February 2002, four months after

she saw McQuinn. Gov Opp at 5. More importantly, McQuinn’s report

provided no specifics regarding the necessity, level, or duration

of pain management that she believed Sistrunk required; McQuinn

concluded simply that pain management would be “quite helpful.” 

Doc #67 (Cheng Decl), Ex C at 7. 

Finally, McQuinn represents to the court that the pain

management Sistrunk now requires is “a high level program and not

one that was contemplated in my initial recommendation.” McQuinn

Statement at 2. Furthermore, McQuinn states: “In my opinion one

could not have reasonably anticipated with any medical probability

in October 2001 that this would have been [Sistrunk’s] condition

several years later, based on my evaluation of her in October

2001.” Id. Because McQuinn was not aware of either the severity

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or the permanence of Sistrunk’s condition, it is safe to conclude

that Continental and Sistrunk were also unaware. 

The court concludes that Continental and Sistrunk have

satisfied their burden of showing that Sistrunk’s current condition

was not reasonably foreseeable when they filed their administrative

claims in March 2002. Accordingly, § 2675(b) does not bar their

requests for leave to amend.

III

While Continental and Sistrunk are not prohibited from

amending under § 2675(b), the court must still inquire whether FRCP

15 bars the requested amendments. FRCP 15(a) provides in relevant

part that “a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of

court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall

be freely granted when justice so requires.” The Ninth Circuit

directs district courts to apply Rule 15(a) with “extreme

liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v Rose, 893 F2d 1074,

1079 (9th Cir 1990) (citing DCD Programs, Ltd v Leighton, 833 F2d

183, 186 (9th Cir 1987)). 

Courts have identified various factors that alone, or in

combination, may justify denial of leave to amend a pleading. 

These factors are: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory

motive, (3) futility of the proposed amendment, (4) prejudice to

the opposing party and (5) repeated failures to cure deficiencies

by previous amendments. William W Schwarzer, A Wallace Tashima,

James M Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 8:416

(Rutter Group, 2005). The government explicitly argues that it

will be prejudiced by Continental’s and Sistrunk’s proposed

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amendments. Docs ##66, 67. The court finds, however, that the

government has implicitly raised the ground of undue delay. The

court will examine these two issues separately beginning with undue

delay.

A 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “delay alone does not

provide sufficient grounds for denying leave to amend.” Hurn v

Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Industry of

Southern California, 648 F2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir 1981). “Where

there is lack of prejudice to the opposing party and the amended

complaint is obviously not frivolous or made as a dilatory maneuver

in bad faith, it is an abuse of discretion to deny such a motion.” 

Howey v United States, 481 F2d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir 1973).

In determining undue delay in the instant case, the

pertinent questions are: (1) when could Continental and Sistrunk

have reasonably known of the need for lifetime pain management and

(2) how much time passed between when Continental and Sistrunk

reasonably should have known and when they informed the government

of this knowledge? First, the government argues that Continental

and Sistrunk knew of the permanence of Sistrunk’s condition as

early as November 7, 2003, when Dr Izzo drafted his report. Gov

Reply at 5. Defendant relies on the following passage from Izzo’s

report: “Given [Sistrunk’s] current state of affairs seven months

after her surgery, it is highly unlikely that any significant

recovery will occur, allowing her to pursue any form of meaningful

employment.” Id. Accordingly, the government asserts that

Continental and Sistrunk waited more than one year, until January

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2005, to inform it of their intention to seek leave to amend the

amount of damages requested. Id. The court disagrees. 

First, Dr Izzo’s report is far from the “employment death

knell” that the government portrays it to be. Izzo represents to

the court that by stating that Sistrunk could “not pursue

meaningful employment” he meant “going back to her $10.00 per hour

job.” Izzo Supp Statement at 2. Izzo believed that it was still

possible for Sistrunk to return to “some form of sedentary work.” 

Id. Not until November 2004 did Izzo inform Continental and

Sistrunk that Sistrunk was not fit for any type of employment. Id. 

Even at this point, Izzo was still unable to provide plaintiff with

any opinion as to the “extent, cost or duration of her future

medical care in terms of pain management.” Id. 

Dr Pecoraro represents to the court that “not until

approximately more than a year” after Sistrunk’s June 2003 surgery

did it become clear to him that Sistrunk’s condition had evolved to

a point of permanence -- precluding her from “any gainful

employment” and requiring ongoing medical treatment “for the

remainder of her life with little hope for significant

improvement.” Doc #78 (Pec Statement) at 3. (emphasis in

original). 

Second, although Continental and Sistrunk did not

officially inform the government of their intention to seek leave

to amend damages until January 2005, Sistrunk did inform the

government on October 27, 2004, that “costly” “pain management was

being carried out utilizing medications.” Sist Motion, Ex 8 at 1. 

Moreover, Sistrunk stated that although costs for this treatment

would not be calculated until December 15, 2004, costs could range

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from $3,000 to $5,000 per month. Id at 2. 

The court concludes that the earliest Continental and

Sistrunk became aware of Sistrunk’s permanent condition and need

for lifetime pain management was October or November 2004. And it

appears as soon as Sistrunk knew of the high costs of future pain

management, she informed the government via a letter. Moreover,

Continental and Sistrunk had to wait until December 15, 2004, to

find out the exact cost of the future pain management. 

Accordingly, the court concludes there was no undue delay by

Continental and Sistrunk in currently seeking leave to amend. 

 

B

Prejudice to the opposing party is “by far the most

important and most common reason for denying leave to amend.” 

Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial at § 8:424 (emphasis in

original). Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the

remaining reasons for denying leave to amend, “there exists a

presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v Aspeon, Inc, 316 F3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir

2003). Where a motion to amend is brought late in the litigation,

however, delay may prejudice the opposing party’s ability to

respond to the proposed amendment or to prepare for trial. Federal

Civil Procedure Before Trial at § 8-424.1. 

“[T]o justify denial of leave to amend, the prejudice

must be substantial.” Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial at § 8-

424.2 (emphasis in original) (citing Morongo Band, 893 F2d at 1079

(citing inordinate delay, prejudice, and potential futility of the

claims in affirming the denial of plaintiff’s motion for leave to

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amend)). Most important for the present motion, the need for

additional discovery is insufficient by itself to deny a proposed

amended pleading. United States v Continental Illinois National

Bank & Trust, 889 F2d 1248, 1255 (2nd Cir 1989); Genentech, Inc v

Abbott Laboratories, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 9311, *5 (ND Cal 1989)

(Patel, J).

Because Continental and Sistrunk did not move for leave

to amend until after the January 28, 2005, discovery cut-off date,

the government insists that it was prejudiced because it did not

have “an adequate opportunity to conduct factual discovery.” Cheng

Decl at 3. This hardly rises to the level of substantial

prejudice. First, the government arguably did have the opportunity

to conduct discovery of lifetime pain management after it received

Sistrunk’s October 27, 2004, letter informing it of Sistrunk’s

costly treatment. Second, even if the government had not had this

opportunity, the prejudice here is not so substantial to justify

denial of Continental’s and Sistrunk’s motions for leave to amend. 

See Morongo Band, 893 F2d at 1079 (holding as substantial a twoyear delayed amended complaint that “would have greatly altered the

nature of the litigation and would have required the defendants to

have undertaken, at a late hour, an entirely new course of

defense”). In the instant case, additional discovery would enable

the government to examine further the lifetime pain management

costs. See Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust, 889 F2d at

1255; Genentech, Inc, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 9311 at *5. For these

reasons, Continental’s and Sistrunk’s motion to amend can be

granted without prejudicing the government. 

 

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IV

The final issue for resolution is whether Continental’s

and Sistrunk’s motions for leave to amend should be barred as

untimely disclosed under FRCP 37(c)(1) . Rule 37(c)(1) provides in

relevant part:

A party that without substantial justification

fails to disclose information required by Rule

26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to

discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not,

unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use

as evidence at trial, at a hearing, or on a motion

any witness or information not so disclosed.

The duty to supplement or correct prior disclosures or discovery

responses arises “if the party learns that in some material respect

the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect.” FRCP

26(e)(1)-(2). A party must supplement or correct its early

disclosures “at appropriate intervals” and amend incomplete or

incorrect discovery responses “seasonably.” Id. “Supplementations

* * * should be made * * * with special promptness as the trial

date approaches.” Notes on the 1993 Amendments to FRCP 26(e).

As in the previous section, the government’s Rule

37(c)(1) argument is based on the assumption that Continental and

Sistrunk knew as of November 7, 2003, the severity and permanence

of Sistrunk’s condition. Gov Reply at 5. The court, however, has

rejected this argument; Dr Izzo did not inform Continental and

Sistrunk of Sistrunk’s permanent condition until November 2004. 

Izzo statement at 2. Continental and Sistrunk informed the

government in October 2004 of Sistrunk’s pain management treatment

and of their intention to amend in January 2005. Accordingly,

Continental and Sistrunk did not violate Rule 37(c)(1).

On June 8, 2005, the government filed a notice of recent

decision directing the court’s attention to Evenflow Plumbing

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Company, Inc v Pacific Bell Directory, 2005 WL 954469 (ND Cal April

26, 2005) (Laporte, J). (02-5292 VRW) Doc #54. The government

asserts that Judge Laporte’s decision in Evenflow supports its

argument that Continental and Sistrunk failed timely to supplement

or correct prior disclosures as required by Rule 26(e)(1). Id. 

In Evenflow, plaintiff provided Judge Laporte with new

evidentiary exhibits on April 18, 2005, the day of trial. 2005 WL

954469 at *1. These exhibits contained mathematical calculations

of plaintiff’s alleged actual damages based upon a exhaustive

review of company contracts; evidence that had not been timely

presented to the court or defense counsel. Id. Such a submission

explicitly violated Judge Laporte’s Case Management and Pretrial

Order which required all exhibits to be submitted to the court no

later than March 9, 2005. Id. Moreover, plaintiff wanted to use

this untimely exhibit to aid the testimony of a witness who was

already on the stand. Id. Judge Laporte noted that plaintiff had

failed to give this complex new exhibit to defense counsel until

three days prior to the trial, thus preventing defendant from

adequately preparing for cross-examination. Id at 2. Accordingly,

Judge Laporte struck any testimony based on the untimely evidence

and excluded the two exhibits based upon this evidence. Id.

The court finds Evenflow distinguishable in several

important respects from the present case. First, the Evenflow

plaintiff specifically violated Judge Laporte’s pretrial order;

Continental and Sistrunk have not violated any court orders. 

Second, Evenflow plaintiff’s violation substantially prejudiced

defendant by preventing an effective cross-examination at trial; a

prejudice that could not be remedied. In the instant case, any

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prejudice caused by Continental’s and Sistrunk’s motion for leave

to amend can be remedied by additional discovery. 

V

In sum, the court GRANTS Continental’s and Sistrunk’s

motions for leave to amend (Docs ##52, 57) and DENIES as moot the

government’s motion to limit damages to the amount stated in the

administrative claim. Doc #45. To remedy any prejudice that might

befall the government based on the granting of Continental’s and

Sistrunk’s motions for leave to amend, the court will reopen

factual discovery for the government. Specifically, the government

will be permitted to pursue discovery regarding Sistrunk’s need for

lifetime pain management. This factual discovery should be

concluded on or before September 30, 2005.

The parties are ORDERED to appear on October 18, 2005, at

9am for a case management conference and to serve and file a joint

status report not to exceed five pages at least ten days in advance

of the case management conference. If these dates are

inconvenient, counsel are directed to contact the courtroom deputy

Cora Delfin at (415) 522-2039 to arrange alternative dates.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:02-cv-04891-VRW Document 89 Filed 06/22/05 Page 16 of 16