Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01714/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01714-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nivea Ritchie,

Plaintiff,

v.

Van Ru Credit Corp. et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-12-1714-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class

Action Settlement. (Doc. 87.)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 of the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (the “TCPA”) by using an automated telephone

dialing system (“ATDS”) to call, without permission, her individual cellular telephone and

the cellular telephones of putative class members (the “Lawsuit”). (Doc. 24.) Including the

calls to Plaintiff, Defendants used an ATDS to make 30,378 calls to the cellular phones of

9,042 putative class members from January 1, 2012, to May 31, 2012. (Docs. 79, 87-1 at 42.)

The parties have reached a settlement in which Defendants will set aside $2.3 million (the

“Settlement Fund”) for Plaintiff’s attorneys fees, costs of administration, and for payments

to Plaintiff and the putative class members. Plaintiff now requests the Court preliminarily

certify the class for settlement purposes, preliminarily approve the class settlement

agreement, approve the proposed notice plan, and set the final approval conference.

Case 2:12-cv-01714-SMM Document 89 Filed 03/12/14 Page 1 of 15
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LEGAL STANDARDS

To certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), the named

plaintiff must demonstrate that:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or

defenses of the class; and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class.

 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).

Numerosity is routinely satisfied by hundreds of class members. E.g., Evon v. Law Offices

of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012). Commonality exists “[w]here the

circumstances of each particular class member vary but retain a common core of factual or

legal issues with the rest of the class.” Id. (quoting Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 978-

79 (9th Cir. 2008)). “The test of typicality ‘is whether other members have the same or

similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named

plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of

conduct.’ ” Id. at 1030 (quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.

1992)). Adequacy rests on two questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have

any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their

counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id. at 1031 (quoting Hanlon

v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Provided the elements of Rule 23(a) are met, “the proposed class must satisfy at least

one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).” Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2548. The third such

requirement provides that a class action may be maintained if “the court finds that the

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting

only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for

fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). “The Rule

23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to

warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623

Case 2:12-cv-01714-SMM Document 89 Filed 03/12/14 Page 2 of 15
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(1997). The superiority inquiry requires consideration of four factors:

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense

of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun

by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the

particular forum; and

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In the context of a “settlement-only” certification, any difficulties

in managing the action are ameliorated because the parties propose to avoid trial. Amchem

Prods., 521 U.S. at 620.

Once the class is certified, the class claims “may be settled . . . only with the court’s

approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “If the proposal would bind class members, the court may

approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, . . . adequate,” id.

23(e)(2), “and free from collusion,” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027. Whether a settlement meets

these standards in the context of an unopposed motion seeking both preliminary certification

of the class and approval of the proposed settlement requires consideration of several factors,

including: (1) “the strength of plaintiffs’ case”; (2) “the risk, expense, complexity, and likely

duration of further litigation”; (3) “the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the

trial”; (4) “the amount offered in settlement”; (5) “the extent of discovery completed, and the

stage of the proceedings”; and (6) “the experience and views of counsel.” Id. at 1026. “The

parties seeking approval must [also] file a statement identifying any agreement made in

connection with the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3).

“Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class settlement under Rule 23(e).”

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1025. “For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct

to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including

individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see id. 23(e)(1) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner

to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.”). Rule 23(c)(2)(B) enumerates

seven elements that “[t]he notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood

language.” Id. 23(c)(2)(B).

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DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Class Certification for Purposes of Settlement

Rule 23(a)

First, there are 9,042 putative class members—joinder is clearly impracticable.

Therefore, the numerosity requirement is satisfied. Second, the legal and factual

circumstances of the putative class members’ claims are identical: Defendants used ATDS

to call cellular phones in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227. The Court finds the commonality

requirement satisfied. Third, since Plaintiff is a member of the class, she has the same

interests and claims as the putative class members; Defendants’ defenses would be the same

as to Plaintiff as they would as against each putative class member. Thus, the typicality

requirement is satisfied. Fourth, Plaintiff has no antagonistic or conflicting interests with the

putative class members; rather they all share the same interest in monetary damages. Plaintiff

testified that she understands her responsibility to look out for the best interests of the class

and to ensure equal treatment of the class members (Doc. 79-3 at 3); she is so committed to

certifying and representing the class that she declined more than one offer of judgment that

would have been more than she could have possibly recovered at trial. Plaintiff has retained

experienced class counsel that are determined to prosecute the action. The Court finds the

adequacy requirement satisfied. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the strictures of

Rule 23(a) have been met.

Rule 23(b)

There is complete identity of common factual and legal issues: the central question

is whether Defendants violated the TCPA by calling putative class members. The Court finds

that the proposed class is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation,”

Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623, and that common questions predominate over individual

questions. Thus, the predominance standard is met.

Shifting to the superiority inquiry, there is no discernable reason why any one class

member would have an interest in individually controlling the prosecution of their claims.

As mentioned above, the putative class members’ allegations are homogenous and arise from

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standardized conduct. The only alternative to a nation-wide representative action would be

for putative class members to bring identical suits individually or in smaller groups. Prudent

judicial administration strongly militates against a method of adjudication that would result

in thousands of identical law suits. Since there is no other pending litigation, and the parties

are proposing to settle the action rather than litigate it, the class action is clearly superior to

other methods of adjudication. Thus, the superiority standard is met, and the requirements

of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied.

As both conditions for class certification have been satisfied, the Court preliminarily

certifies the class.

II. Appointment of Class Counsel

“The choice of counsel has traditionally been left to the parties, whether they sue in

their individual capacities or as class representatives.” In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 734

(9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s counsel—and proposed class counsel—Greenwald Davidson

PLLC has ample experience in litigating class actions and has demonstrated an understanding

of applicable law. As mentioned above, Plaintiff’s counsel is determined to tenaciously

prosecute this action, and has done so from its inception. The Court appoints Greenwald

Davidson PLLC as class counsel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).

III. Fairness, Reasonableness, and Adequacy of the Settlement

The Strength of Plaintiff’s Case and the Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status

The parties seem to agree that Plaintiff’s case is indeed strong by virtue of

Defendants’ unaccepted offer of judgment. There is, however, a possibility that Defendants

could moot Plaintiff’s claims by fully satisfying her economic stake in the case. See Diaz v.

First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting GCB

Commc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. South Commc’ns, Inc., 650 F.3d 1257, 1267 (9th Cir. 2011)) (“[A]

case will ‘become moot’ when ‘an opposing party has agreed to everything the other party

has demanded.’ ”); see also id. at 955 (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133

S.Ct. 1523, 1536 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting)) (“[A] court may have ‘discretion to halt a

lawsuit by entering judgment for the plaintiff when the defendant unconditionally surrenders

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and only the plaintiff’s obstinacy or madness prevents her from accepting total victory.’ ”).

Since the inherently transitory relation-back doctrine articulated in Pitts v. Terrible Herbst,

Inc., 653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011), does not apply to claims for statutory damages, see

Genesis Healthcare, 133 S.Ct. at 1531-32 (explaining a defendant’s litigation strategy does

not render a claim for damages inherently transitory because the claim “cannot evade review;

it remains live until it is settled”), mooting Plaintiff’s individual claims would moot the class

action as well, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975) (“There must . . . be a named

plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed, and at the time

the class action is certified by the District Court pursuant to Rule 23 . . . .”); see, e.g., Luman

v. Theismann, No. 2:13-cv-00656-KJM, 2014 WL 443960 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2014)

(dismissing uncertified class action because named plaintiffs’ claims were moot).

Given the uncertainty about whether Plaintiff could certify the class in the absence of

this settlement agreement, the proposed agreement appears fair and reasonable.

The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

Further litigation would not only be contentious, but would likely result in appeals.

Settlement curtails further expense, as well as shortens and simplifies the proceedings. This

factor also lends itself to finding the settlement fair and reasonable.

The Extent of Discovery and the Stage of the Proceedings

Litigation has been progressing for close to two years and the parties have engaged

in substantial discovery; indeed, discovery has now closed. The parties were able to assess

the relative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing party’s positions and to compare the

benefits of the proposed settlement to further litigation. Accordingly, this factor also weighs

in favor of preliminary approval of the settlement.

The Experience and Views of Counsel

The parties engaged in arms-length settlement negotiations which included mediation,

and ultimately arrived at the instant Settlement Agreement. As Plaintiff’s counsel is qualified

to assess the merits of the case and negotiate a class settlement, this factor favors preliminary

settlement as well.

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The Amount Offered in Settlement

The Settlement Agreement provides for a $2.3 million settlement fund from which

claimants will receive a pro rata share after deduction of attorney’s fees, administration

expenses, and Plaintiff’s incentive award. Class members will receive no less than $167, and

depending on how many class members submit claims, they could receive substantially more.

This recovery surpasses other recent TCPA class settlements. E.g., Malta v. Fed. Home Loan

Mortg. Corp., No. 10-CV-1290-BEN, 2013 WL 444619, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013) (“If

each of the potential 5,887,508 eligible claimants filed claims, they would receive

approximately $2 each.”); Sarabri v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., No. 10-cv1777-AJB, 2012 WL 3991734, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012) (recovery of $0.85 to $70

depending on how many class members filed claims); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC,

No. 11-CV-1009-JLS, 2011 WL 6300050, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011) (minimum

recovery of $131.69). This suggests the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

Collusion

“[D]istrict courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive awards to determine

whether they destroy the adequacy of the class representatives.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info.

Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). In Radcliffe, “[t]here [wa]s a serious

question whether class representatives could be expected to fairly evaluate whether awards

ranging from $26 to $750 is a fair settlement value when they would receive $5,000 incentive

awards.” Id. Ultimately, the Court in Radcliffe reversed the district court’s approval of the

class settlement because the incentive award was conditioned on the class representative’s

approval of the settlement, but also because of “the significant disparity between the

incentive awards and the payments to the rest of the class members further exacerbated the

conflict of interest caused by the conditional incentive awards.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff will receive a $12,000 incentive award while the putative class

members’ recovery is a pro rata distribution of the settlement fund after Plaintiff’s award and

attorney’s fees and administration costs are deducted. The Court has some reservations about

whether Plaintiff can adequately represent class interests given “the significant disparity

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between the incentive awards and the payments to the rest of the class members.” Id. Since

the parties did not file a statement about any agreement made in connection with the

proposed settlement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3), it is unknown whether Plaintiff’s incentive

payment was conditioned on approval of the settlement.

It is not evident that Plaintiff’s incentive payment is the result of collusion. Likewise,

it does not appear that Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees are the result of collusion, but there is some

doubt as to whether 28% of the settlement fund—$644,000—is fundamentally fair and

reasonable given the circumstances. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th Cir.

2003) (“There is no exception in Rule 23(e) for fees provisions contained in proposed class

action settlement agreements.”); see also id. at 964 (quoting Court Awarded Attorney Fees,

Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 266 (1985)) (“When a large

attorney’s fee means a smaller recovery to plaintiff, a significant conflict of interest between

client and attorney is created.”). In any event, the Court need not resolve these issues at this

time; it is enough if the settlement is “within the range of reason.” Federal Judicial Center,

Manual for Complex Litigation § 22.923, at 454 (4th ed. 2004) (quoting In re Prudential Ins.

Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 324 n.73 (3d Cir. 1998)). 

As the settlement is not outside the range of reason and bears hallmarks of fairness,

reasonableness, and adequacy, the Court preliminarily approves the settlement.

IV. Approval of Class Notice

The proposed notice program provides for direct mail notice to each member of the

class as well as a website devoted to settlement administration. The proposed program also

provides that the settlement administrator will use skip tracing to identify each class member,

thereby reasonably ensuring each class member receives direct mail notice. The content of

the notice clearly explains the meaning, definition, and nature of the class and its claims; the

terms, provisions, and binding effect of the settlement; the costs fees, and awards to be

deducted from the settlement fund; the time and manner for submitting claims, exclusions,

and; the right to appear through an attorney; the parties’ counsel’s contact information for

requesting additional information; and the date, time, and place of the final approval hearing.

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However, the process for submitting objections is unclear: the notice equivocates on

whether the settlement administrator and/or the parties’ attorneys need to receive written

notice by mail. (See Doc. 87-1 at 44-45.) Since Plaintiff’s proposed order is silent as to

mailing objections to the settlement administrator, the Court presumes class members need

not mail their objections to the settlement administrator in order for the objections to be

effective. Provided the notice content is modified to unambiguously explain that objections

must be filed with the Court and mailed to both parties’ counsel, it is adequate.

Since this program, as modified, provides satisfactory individual and direct notice to

all class members, the Court conditionally finds Plaintiff’s proposal to be the best practicable

notice under the circumstances. As the method of notice detailed below is reasonable, the

Court conditionally approves the proposed notice program.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying without prejudice Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction due to Mootness. (Doc. 65.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay

Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction due to

Mootness. (Doc. 70.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for

Class Certification. (Doc. 79.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for

Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (Doc. 87.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

1. JURISDICTION: The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

Lawsuit and over all settling parties hereto.

2. CAFA NOTICE: In compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(D), 1453, 1711-1715, and as set forth in the parties’

Settlement Agreement, Defendants shall serve written notice of the proposed

settlement on the U.S. Attorney General and the Attorney General of each state

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no later than Monday, March 23, 2014.

3. CLASS MEMBERS: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), the

Lawsuit is hereby preliminarily certified, for settlement purposes only, as a

class action on behalf of the following class of 9,042 Plaintiffs (the “Class

Members”) with respect to the claims of the Lawsuit:

All persons and entities throughout the United States to whom Van Ru

made or caused to be made one or more calls between January 1, 2012,

through May 31, 2012, directed to a number assigned to a cellular

telephone service, by using an automatic telephone dialing system

where Van Ru’s records show the person’s or entity’s cellular

telephone number was obtained from a skip trace vendor.

4. PRELIMINARY CLASS CERTIFICATION: The Court preliminarily finds

that the Lawsuit satisfies the applicable prerequisites for class action treatment

under of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, for purposes of settlement only:

A. The Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all of them

in the Lawsuit is impracticable.

B. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class

Members that predominate over individual questions.

C. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class

Members.

D. Plaintiff and Class Counsel have fairly and adequately

represented the interests of all the Class Members.

E. Class treatment of these claims is superior to alternative

methods for a fair and efficient adjudication.

5. CLASS REPRESENTATIVE AND CLASS COUNSEL APPOINTMENT:

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court preliminarily

certifies Plaintiff Nivea Ritchie as the Class Representative and Michael L.

Greenwald and James L. Davidson of Greenwald Davidson PLLC as Class

Counsel.

/ / /

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6. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT: The Court preliminarily

approves the parties’ Settlement Agreement, according to its terms and

conditions, as fundamentally fair, reasonable, and adequate.

7. ADMINISTRATION: The Settlement Administrator will be responsible for

mailing the approved class action notice and settlement checks to the Class

Members. All costs of administration shall be paid out of the Settlement Fund.

Upon the recommendation of the parties, the court hereby appoints the

following Settlement Administrator: KCC, 2 North LaSalle Street, Chicago,

IL 60602.

8. NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCESS: Provided the exclusion process was

clarified consistent with this Order, the Court approves the form and substance

of the proposed notice. (Doc. 87-1 at 40-47.) In accordance with the Settlement

Agreement, the Settlement Administrator shall cause the completed notice to

be mailed to the Class Members no later than Friday, April 11, 2014. The

Settlement Administrator shall confirm and update the Class Members’

addresses as necessary. The notice shall reference a website established by the

Settlement Administrator and that website shall contain the full details of the

Settlement and permit Class Members to submit claims. No later than

Monday, June 30, 2014, the Claims Administrator shall file a declaration of

compliance with the notice procedures set forth in the Agreement. This

proposed method of notice constitutes the best notice practicable under the

circumstances and satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(c)(2)(B).

9. SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS: The Settlement Administrator will mail a

settlement check to each Class Member who submits a timely claim form and

does not exclude himself or herself from the class. The settlement checks to

the class members shall be sent via U.S. mail no later than 30 days after entry

of Final Judgment

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10. EXCLUSION PROCESS: Any Class Member who desires to be excluded

from the class must send a written request for exclusion to Class Counsel with

a postmark date no later than Monday, May 26, 2014. To be effective, the

written request for exclusion must state the Class Member’s full name,

address, telephone number, and email address (if available), along with a

statement that the Class Member wishes to be excluded. Any Class Member

who submits a valid and timely request for exclusion shall not be bound by the

terms of the Settlement Agreement.

11. OBJECTION PROCESS: Any Class Member who intends to object to the

fairness of this settlement must file a written objection with the Court no later

than Monday, May 26, 2014. Any objecting Class Member must, within the

same time period, provide a copy of the written objection to Class Counsel,

Attention: Ritchie v. Van Ru Settlement, Greenwald Davidson PLLC, 5550

Glades Road, Suite 500, Boca Raton, FL 33431; and Counsel for Defendants,

Attention: Ritchie v. Van Ru Settlement, Sessions, Fishman, Nathan & Israel,

L.L.C., 55 W. Monroe Street, Suite 1120, Chicago, IL 60603. To be effective,

a notice of intent to object to the Proposed Settlement must:

A. Include the name of the case and the case number;

B. Provide the name, address, telephone number and signature of

the Class Member filing the objection;

C. Be filed with the Clerk of the Court no later than Monday, May

26, 2014;

D. Be sent to Class Counsel and Defendants at the addresses

designated in the Notice by mail postmarked no later than

Monday, May 26, 2014;

E. Contain a detailed statement of the specific legal and factual

basis for each and every objection;

F. Include a list of legal authority the objector will present at the

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Final Approval Hearing; and

G. If the objecting Class Member is represented by an attorney, the

objection must also contain the name, address, bar number and

telephone number of the objecting Class Member’s counsel.

Counsel must comply with all applicable laws and rules for

filing pleadings and documents in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona.

12. OBJECTING CLASS MEMBERS’ OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD: Any

Class Member who has timely filed an objection shall appear at the Settlement

Approval Hearing, in person or by counsel, and be heard to the extent allowed

by the Court, applying applicable law, in opposition to the fairness,

reasonableness and adequacy of the Proposed Settlement, and on the

application for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The right to object to the

Proposed Settlement must be exercised individually by an individual Class

Member, not as a member of a group and, except in the case of a deceased,

minor, or incapacitated Class Member, not by another person acting in a

representative capacity.

13. FINAL APPROVAL HEARING: The Court shall conduct a hearing (the

“Final Approval Hearing”) on Monday, July 21, 2014, at 2:30 p.m. in

Courtroom 401, Sandra Day O’Conner U.S. Courthouse, 401 West

Washington Street, Phoenix, AZ 85003. Class Members wishing to be heard

must attend the Final Approval Hearing in person or through counsel. Class

Members not wishing to be heard need not attend the Final Approval Hearing.

The Final Approval Hearing may be rescheduled or continued without notice

to Class Members. At the hearing, the Court will consider the following issues:

A. Whether this action satisfies the applicable prerequisites for

class action treatment for settlement purposes under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23;

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B. Whether the proposed settlement is fundamentally fair,

reasonable, adequate, free from collusion, and in the best

interest of the Settlement Class Members and should be

approved by the Court;

C. Whether the Final Order and Judgment should be entered

according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, thereby

dismissing the Lawsuit with prejudice and releasing Defendants

from any and all claims that Plaintiff and non-excluded Class

Members may have which arise out of the alleged conduct.

D. Any other issues the Court deems appropriate.

14. SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT: Submissions by the parties or by any Class

Member—excluding objections contemplated by ¶ 11 of this Order—shall be

filed with the Court no later than Friday, July 11, 2014. Such submissions

include memoranda supporting and/or opposing the proposed settlement;

responses to objections; petitions for attorney’s fees; and petitions for

reimbursement of costs and expenses by Class Counsel;

15. COMPLETE INSEVERABILITY: If the Settlement Agreement is not finally

approved for any reason, then this order shall be vacated, the Settlement

Agreement shall have no force and effect, and the Parties’ rights and defenses

shall be restored, without prejudice, to their respective positions as if the

Settlement Agreement had never been executed and this order never entered.

In particular, this Order and the Settlement shall be vacated if:

A. The Settlement Agreement is terminated by any of the Parties

for cause, or any specified material condition to the settlement

set forth in the Settlement Agreement is not satisfied and the

satisfaction of such condition is not waived in writing by the

Parties;

B. The Court rejects any material component of the Settlement

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Agreement, including any amendment thereto approved by the

Parties;

C. The Court rejects, in any material respect, the Final Order and

Judgment substantially in the form and content attached to the

Settlement Agreement and/or the Parties fail to consent to the

entry of another form of order in lieu thereof; or

D. The Court approves the Settlement Agreement, including any

amendment thereto approved by the Parties, but such approval

is reversed on appeal and such reversal becomes final by lapse

of time or otherwise.

16. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION: The Court retains continuing and

exclusive jurisdiction over the action to consider all further matters arising out

of or connected with the settlement, including the administration and

enforcement of the Agreement.

17. SCHEDULE: The Court sets the following schedule:

March 12, 2014 Preliminary Approval Order Entered

March 23, 2014 Deadline for service of CAFA notices

April 11, 2014 Deadline for sending notice to Class Members

May 26, 2014 Deadline to Exclude or Object

June 30, 2014 Deadline to file declaration of compliance

July 11, 2014 Deadline to file submissions to the Court

July 21, 2014 Final Approval Hearing

DATED this 12th day of March, 2014.

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