Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01903/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01903-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Camboni, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

The State of Arizona; Janice K. Brewer,

Governor of the State of Arizona, in her

official capacity; Terry Goddard, Attorney

General of the State of Arizona in his

official capacity; Maricopa County; Keith

Frankel; Judge Ronald I. Karp, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-1903-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the following motions: (1) Motion to Dismiss filed by

Keith Frankel and Maricopa County (Doc. 14); (2) Motion to Dismiss filed by the State of

Arizona, Janice K. Brewer in her official capacity, and Terry L. Goddard in his official

capacity (Doc. 15); and (3) Motion to Dismiss filed by Ronald I. Karp (Doc. 23). For the

reasons discussed below, the Court grants the above motions. 

BACKGROUND

On or about September 8, 2009, Plaintiff’s former insurance agent sought an

injunction against harassment pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1809, barring Plaintiff from contacting

him. The San Marcos Justice Court denied that injunction but granted another injunction

against workplace harassment, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1810, on the same day. After Mr.

Camboni requested and received a hearing on the injunction, the Justice Court denied his

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

request to quash the injunction. As a result of the Justice Court proceedings, Plaintiff alleges

that a number of his civil rights were violated, including double jeopardy, right to a fair trial,

right to legal counsel, lack of equal protection, due process under the law, violation of his

First Amendment rights to free speech and religion, right to trial by jury, right to a speedy

trial, and racial discrimination. Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 12-

809 and A.R.S. § 12-1810 on grounds that they are preempted by federal law and therefore

violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations

. . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.’” Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).

The Court must construe the complaint liberally since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se.

See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (“It is settled law that the allegations of [a pro se

plaintiff’s] complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (citations omitted); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132,

1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to liberally construe

the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”) (citation omitted); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d

1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e hold [plaintiff’s] pro se pleadings to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings prepared by lawyers.”). “Although [the Court] construe[s]

pleadings liberally in their favor, pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” Ghazali

v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987)). 

DISCUSSION

I. County Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Defendants Frankel and Karp

Defendants Frankel and Karp move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them because

they are entitled to absolute immunity as a matter of law. Defendant Frankel is a Justice of the

Peace and Defendant Karp is an attorney appointed to serve as a Justice of the Peace pro tem

in the San Marcos Justice Court. “Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result

on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration

of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act

upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.’”

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872)).

Judges are absolutely immune from damages for all judicial acts performed within their

subject matter jurisdiction, “even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are

alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356

(1978); see also Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006). The immunity

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

similarly attaches even if the judge is accused of making grave errors of law or procedure.

Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). Not even allegations of “bad

faith, personal interest or outright malevolence” are enough to remove the cloak of absolute

immunity from judges acting within the jurisdiction of their courts. Ashelman v. Pope, 793

F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). Such immunity also “extends to actions for declaratory,

injunctive and other equitable relief.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d

1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, regardless of the judge’s status in the judicial

hierarchy, a judge has absolute immunity for acts performed in his or her official capacity.

O’Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1981) (pro tem municipal judge);

Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1982) (justice of the peace).

There are two exceptions to the rule of judicial immunity. First, judicial immunity

does not shield “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Plaintiff’s allegations against the Justices do not arise out of

nonjudicial actions, therefore the first exception does not apply. Second, judicial immunity

does not protect “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Id. at 12. The test for determining when an action is judicial in nature has been

explained as the following: “[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate[s] to the

nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the

expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”

Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; see also Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). Here,

Mr. Camboni’s claims all address acts taken by Justices Frankel and Karp during the course

of presiding over the injunction hearings involving Plaintiff. Specifically, Mr. Camboni

alleges that the Justices denied him due process during two “secret trials” that they conducted

on September 9, 2009. (Doc. 13 at 4). He alleges that the Defendants failed to provide him a

free certified transcript of the proceedings, thereby preventing him from appealing the rulings

and violating his due process rights (id.), and that he was denied fair and equitable treatment

because he was not provided with appointed counsel at taxpayer expense (id. at 5). He further

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In Response, Plaintiff argues that Justices Frankel and Karp violated their oath of

office and therefore have “engaged in acts of treason.” (Doc. 22 at 2). Plaintiff has alleged

no facts that would bring the Justices’ actions within the scope of treason, defined under

Article III, § 3 as “consist[ing] only in levying War against [the United States], or in adhering

to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” 

- 5 -

alleges that statements made by the Justices during the proceedings over which they presided

demonstrated religious and racial discrimination. (Id. at 6, 11). All of the actions pled to

support Mr. Camboni’s claims concern ordinary judicial acts – presiding over an injunction

proceeding – and arise out of Mr. Camboni’s dealings with the Defendants in their judicial

capacity. Thus, the acts of which Mr. Camboni complains are judicial acts. 

As the Supreme Court has explained, judicial immunity “applies even when the judge

is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).

This is so, because recognizing the immunity in all cases promotes the public’s interest in

having judges who are free to use their judicial authority independently without fearing

retribution. Id. There is no basis to assert that the actions by the Justices were taken in the

complete absence of jurisdiction. All were taken in the context of the injunction proceedings

concerning Plaintiff, over which they had jurisdiction. Nor does Mr. Camboni suggest

otherwise.1

 Accordingly, Justices Frankel and Karp are absolutely immune from suit and are

dismissed, with prejudice, as Defendants in this action. 

Moreover, the facts set forth by Plaintiff suggest that Justices Frankel and Karp

properly followed the procedures set forth in Arizona law related to the ex parte issuance of

injunctions against harassment. Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied constitutional

protections, including the right to not be placed in double jeopardy, right to legal counsel,

right to trial by jury, right to confront witnesses, and right to a speedy trial, overlook the fact

that his proceedings in the San Marcos Justice Court were civil, not criminal, in nature and

therefore the constitutional protections given to the accused in criminal cases do not apply.

A.R.S. §§ 12-1809 and 12-1810 are statutes located in Title 12 of the Arizona Revised

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

Statutes governing “civil proceedings.” See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997)

(finding that “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform

what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty”) (quotations and citations

omitted). Under those statutes, such proceedings are appropriately conducted on an ex parte

basis, provided a defendant against whom an injunction is issued has the opportunity to

challenge the injunction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-809(E),(H) - 1810(E),(G). Plaintiff was afforded

such an opportunity. See Doc. 14, Ex. C; see also Doc. 13 at 6, 9, 10. The fact that Plaintiff

was temporarily forbidden from going near his former insurance agent or other protected

persons or the potential restriction of his right to carry a firearm do not transform the civil

proceeding into a criminal one, as Plaintiff seems to contend.

B. Maricopa County 

Other than noting that the incidents took place in “Maricopa County’s San Marcos

Justice Court”, Plaintiff has not linked the actions of Defendant Maricopa County with the

injuries that he complains about. To the extent Plaintiff appears to allege that Maricopa

County should be held vicariously liable for a Justice of the Peace’s judicial conduct due to

its funding of the Courts or otherwise, this assertion fails as a matter of law. While the

Complaint does not identify 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis of his claim, this statute is

appropriate for the types of claims Plaintiff asserts. “[A] municipality can be found liable

under [section] 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at

issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under [section] 1983.” City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). Liability may attach against a municipality in two

ways. First, the municipality itself may violate an individual’s rights through a policy,

ordinance, regulation or other formal decision. Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

1187 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a County policy or custom that

would support liability under § 1983. To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Maricopa County

“lacked authority under the United States Constitution to enact and/or enforce A.R.S. 12-1809

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Furthermore, pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 24.1, “[a] party drawing in

question the constitutionality of an act of Congress or of any state affecting the public

interest shall forthwith, upon the filing of any pleading or other document which raises the

question, notify in writing the District Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom the case has been

assigned of the pendency of the question in any action, suit or proceeding in the district court

in which the United States or a state or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party.

. . . The purpose of the notice is to enable the Court to comply with the requirements of 28

U.S.C. § 2403.” Plaintiff has failed to file a notice of claim of unconstitutionality before this

Court. 

- 7 -

and A.R.S. 12-1810” (Doc. 13 at 11) because they are preempted by federal law, Plaintiff has

failed to allege any facts to support a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes.2

Second, in certain circumstances, a municipality may be liable based on its omissions if its

employee commits a constitutional violation, even if the municipality did not formally direct

the employee to do so. See Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185. As stated above, Plaintiff has not set

forth any facts which would suggest that the Justices of the Peace who presided over his

injunction proceedings committed a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Maricopa County

is dismissed from this action. 

II. State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff names as Defendants Governor Brewer and former Attorney General Terry

Goddard, in their official capacities, and also the State of Arizona. “Under the Eleventh

Amendment, a state is immune from suit under state or federal law by private parties in

federal court absent a valid abrogation of that immunity or an express waiver by the state.”

In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted), overruled in part

on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). States retain their

immunity against suits by private parties under the Eleventh Amendment, “regardless of the

relief sought.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146

(1993). Arizona has not manifested the intention to waive its sovereign immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment from suit in federal court, nor has there been a valid abrogation of that

immunity. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

the Supreme Court has held “that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official

capacities are ‘persons’ under [section] 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 71 (1989); see also Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir.

1991). Finally, Plaintiff’s allegation that A.R.S. §§ 12-1809, 12-1810 are preempted by

federal law and are therefore unconstitutional fails for the same reasons discussed with respect

to the County’s motion. Plaintiff simply fails to allege any facts to support his claim. 

Moreover, other than naming Brewer and Goddard in the caption and including them

in the description of the parties, neither of them are mentioned anywhere else in the

Complaint. To the extent that Plaintiff may wish to implicate them in the roles they played in

implementing and enforcing the two state statutes which Plaintiff challenges, such allegations

are simply too attenuated. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72 (1976) (holding that

State officials are not subject to suit under section 1983 unless they play an affirmative part

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights). To state a claim against a state official, the

civil rights complainant must allege that the official personally participated in the

constitutional deprivation, or that a state supervisory official was aware of widespread abuses

and failed to take action. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987). The present

case is devoid of any allegations that the governor and former attorney general knew of, or

took part in, any constitutional deprivations. Therefore, this action is dismissed as to Brewer,

Goddard, and the State of Arizona. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judge Frankel and Maricopa County’s Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED. Defendant Keith Frankel is dismissed with prejudice

from this action. Defendant Maricopa County is dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 15) is GRANTED. Defendants Brewer, Goddard and the State of Arizona are

dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judge Karps’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is

GRANTED. Defendant Ronald I. Karp is dismissed with prejudice. 

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendants Keith Frankel and

Ronald I. Karp from this action. 

DATED this 8th day of August, 2011. 

Case 2:10-cv-01903-GMS Document 31 Filed 08/08/11 Page 9 of 9