Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02298/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02298-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

ESTOPPEL DEFENSE

C-00-20905 RMW

E-filed: 9/25/07 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. &

PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE

[Re Docket No. 2436]

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For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

ESTOPPEL DEFENSE

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RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P.,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

RAMBUS INC., 

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

Defendants.

No. C-05-02298 RMW

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.,

Defendants.

No. C-06-00244 RMW

Hynix has moved for summary judgment on its Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 unfair

competition claim against Rambus and its equitable estoppel defense to Rambus's patent

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For the Northern District of California

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28 ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

ESTOPPEL DEFENSE

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3

infringement claims on the basis that the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") August 2, 2006

opinion in In the Matter of Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302 ("Rambus FTC"), established the

necessary elements of that claim and defense. Samsung, Nanya and Micron (collectively with Hynix

the "Manufacturers") are parties in the consolidated "conduct trial" and assert the same or similar

unfair competition claims and estoppel defenses and have supplemented Hynix's briefing. Rambus

opposes the motion. The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered the

arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Hynix's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 2, 2006 the Federal Trade Commission, by unanimous decision, issued an opinion

finding that Rambus violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by engaging in conduct that violated Section

2 of the Sherman Act. Rambus FTC at 27-119. The Commission, in a footnote to its quotation of

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, noted that "[b]ecause we find that Rambus unlawfully monopolized

the four relevant markets delineated by Complaint Counsel . . . , we need not consider the further

allegation[ ] that . . . Rambus's conduct otherwise constituted an unfair method of competition." Id.

at 27, fn. 124. 

The Manufacturers claim that the findings made by the FTC in Rambus FTC establish the

elements of their Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 claims and their equitable estoppel defenses to

Rambus's patent infringement claims. Specifically, Hynix argues that "[t]he fact that the FTC has

determined that Rambus violated Section 5 of the FTC Act (which is appropriate for judicial notice)

establishes a per se violation under the 'unlawful' prong of the FTC." Hynix's Mot. Summ. J. at

2:13-15. In addition, Hynix submits that the FTC's finding that Rambus misled its fellow

participants in a standard setting process to believe that it did not have intellectual property covering

the proposed standard that it intended to enforce fulfills the requirements for a finding of equitable

estoppel. Id. at 15:23-16:19. Rambus disagrees and argues that the FTC's findings can have no

collateral estoppel effect in the current proceedings.

II. APPLICABILITY OF DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

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28 ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

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A. Judicial Notice of FTC Findings Does Not Establish the Facts in Those Findings

 Hynix first argues that this court may grant its motion for summary judgment on its § 17200

claim merely by taking judicial notice of the FTC's decision in Rambus FTC. Hynix claims that

"[t]he FTC's determination that Rambus violated Section 5 establishes the requisite 'unlawful'

conduct under the UCL, and entitles Hynix to summary judgment." Id. at 7:21-23. The court

disagrees. "As a general rule, a court may not take judicial notice of proceedings or records in

another cause so as to supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a

contention in a cause then before it." M/V American Queen v. San Diego Marine Const. Corp., 708

F.2d 1483, 1492 (9th Cir. 1983). Therefore, judicial notice of the Rambus FTC decision cannot

establish the requisite unlawful conduct. 

B. Prima Facie Weighting and Collateral Estoppel Under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act

The Manufacturers' primary argument, however, is that their unfair competition claims and

equitable estoppel defenses are established through the collateral estoppel use of the findings in

Rambus FTC. Rambus submits that collateral estoppel cannot be applied. The parties' dispute

centers on the interpretation of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act which provides:

(a) Prima facie evidence; collateral estoppel

A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal

proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to

the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence

against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party

against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting which said

judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any

testimony has been taken. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to

impose any limitation on the application of collateral estoppel, except that, in any

action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws, collateral estoppel effect shall

not be given to any finding made by the Federal Trade Commission under the

antitrust laws or under section 45 of this title which could give rise to a claim for

relief under the antitrust laws.

15 U.S.C. § 16(a). A parsing of the section shows that only prima facie weighting, and not collateral

estoppel effect, can be given to the findings in the final judgment of the FTC in Rambus FTC if: (1)

the proceeding in Rambus FTC was brought by the United States under the antitrust laws; (2) the

findings were made under the antitrust laws or under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act and could have

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given rise to a claim for relief under the antitrust laws; and (3) the "action or proceeding" to which

the findings are sought to be applied constitutes an action or proceeding brought under the antitrust

laws. 

C. FTC's Findings Made Under Antitrust Laws

The specific findings for which Hynix seeks preclusive effect are that Rambus violated

Section 5 of the FTC Act and that it misled its fellow participants in a standard setting process to

believe that it did not have intellectual property covering the proposed standard that it intended to

enforce. Hynix's Mot. Summ. J. at 2:21-3:8. It cannot be reasonably disputed that these findings are

findings by the FTC which were either made under the antitrust laws or under Section 5(a) and

"could [have given] rise to a claim for relief under the antitrust laws." See Rambus FTC at 27 n.124

("Because we find that Rambus unlawfully monopolized the four relevant markets delineated by

Complaint Counsel . . . , we need not consider the further allegations that . . . Rambus's conduct

otherwise constituted an unfair method of competition."); id. at 3 ("The Federal Trade Commission .

. . finds that Rambus's acts of deception constituted exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the

Sherman Act, and Rambus unlawfully monopolized the markets for four technologies incorporated

into the JEDEC standards in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act."). Therefore, by its own words,

the FTC has stated that Rambus violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act thus violating Section 5 of

the FTC Act. 

The deception finding is a predicate act on which the FTC based its finding of a violation of

the Sherman Act. The fact that the Section 5 violation was based upon an antitrust violation was

recognized by the concurring opinion of Commissioner Leibowitz who noted "[i]t would be equally

apt [for the FTC], though, to characterize Rambus's conduct as an 'unfair method of competition' in

violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act." Id. at 1 (Concurring Op., Comm'r. Leibowitz). Although the

FTC could make findings that conduct violates the FTC Act without also violating the antitrust laws,

it did not do so here. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966). Since what the FTC

found was that Rambus violated the Sherman Act, any supporting findings were made under the

antitrust laws or at least could have given rise to a claim for relief under the antitrust laws. 

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28 ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

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Therefore, collateral estoppel effect cannot be given to those findings in the consolidated

proceedings to the extent that they are considered antitrust proceedings. 

D. What Constitutes an Antitrust Action or Proceeding

The parties dispute the extent to which the current consolidated federal actions are an "action

or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws." The first step in statutory construction is "to

determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the

particular dispute in the case." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). The inquiry ends "if the statutory language is unambiguous

and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). 

The Manufacturers contend that the unfair competition and estoppel claims are not being

made by them in an antitrust proceeding. Section 5's preclusion of collateral estoppel use of the

FTC's findings only applies "in any action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws" and

Section 5 expressly states that otherwise "nothing contained in this section shall be construed to

impose any limitation on the application of collateral estoppel." Therefore, since agency findings

may generally be given collateral estoppel effect, the Manufacturers submit that the FTC's findings

are entitled to such in the non-antitrust claims of the consolidated cases. Rambus counters that the

current consolidated proceedings are proceedings under the antitrust laws and thus Section 5's bar on

the use of the FTC's findings as collateral estoppel applies. Rambus further argues that Hynix has

failed to show that the FTC made any finding on issues identical to those that Hynix must prove to

show a violation of California's unfair competition law or equitable estoppel. 

There is a dearth of authority on what Congress meant by the language "any action or

proceeding brought under the antitrust laws" as used in Section 5(a). The Manufacturers assert it

means a claim brought under the antitrust laws such as Hynix's Sherman Act claims and covers only

the antitrust claims in a lawsuit that has a mixture of antitrust and other claims. They argue that

when Section 5(a) was enacted, the legislative purpose was to provide an incentive to private

enforcement of the antitrust laws by lessening a private plaintiff's burden because under the thenCase 5:05-cv-02298-RMW Document 303 Filed 09/25/07 Page 6 of 11
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28 ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

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prevailing "mutuality" concept, a private plaintiff could not use collateral estoppel since it was not a

party to a proceeding brought by the government.

Section 5 of the Clayton Act was adopted in response to a recommendation by

President Wilson that Congress agree giving private individuals . . . the right to found

their (antitrust) suits for redress upon the facts and judgments proved and entered in

suits by the Government where the Government has . . . sued the combinations

complained of and won its suit . . . Congressional reports and debates on the proposal

which ultimately became § 5 reflect a purpose to minimize the burdens of litigation

for injured private suitors by making available to them all matters previously

established by the Government in antitrust actions.

Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1951) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

The Manufacturers further argue that after Section 5(a)'s enactment, a debate arose as to

whether the prima facie effect rule was a minimum standard or a standard that preempted collateral

estoppel use. Thereafter, a 1980 amendment to Section 5(a) made clear that the limitation to prima

facie effect only applied to use of FTC findings in antitrust claims and not to their use as collateral

estoppel to bar non-antitrust claims. 

However, the Manufacturers fail to explain that if their interpretation is correct, why Section

5(a) says "in any action or proceeding under the antitrust laws" as opposed to saying "in any claim

brought under the antitrust laws." They also do not have a satisfactory answer to Rambus's

contention that the Manufacturers' position would lead to the curious result of having prima facie

weighting apply to the FTC finding used in an antitrust claim but collateral estoppel effect apply to a

non-antitrust claim that is based upon the same nucleus of facts (e.g., Hynix claims the Section 2

violation found by the FTC serves as the "unlawful conduct" element of the unfair competition

claim). 

Rambus submits that "any action or proceeding under the antitrust laws" means in any action

in which there is an antitrust claim. Rambus asserts that the plain meaning of "any action or

proceeding" means the collection of the claims in a lawsuit. It further argues that sound rationale

supports its interpretation as Congress did not want to give collateral estoppel effect to findings

made by the Federal Trade Commission which serves as both prosecutor and judge. Rambus makes

several other arguments as to why collateral estoppel should not apply in this case including

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pointing out the nonsensical result of having collateral estoppel apply to a claim for unfair

competition based upon an antitrust violation but not to the antitrust claim itself.

Rambus's arguments are not entirely convincing, however. It does not satisfactorily explain

why Section 5(a)'s collateral estoppel bar applies only in antitrust cases and not in cases in which no

antitrust claim is involved. Congress could have precluded the use of FTC findings in all actions as

opposed to expressly stating that "[n]othing contained in this section shall be construed to impose

any limitation on the application of collateral estoppel, except . . . ." This language implies that FTC

findings, if properly made in an adjudicatory proceeding, may be entitled to preclusive effect. See

Rest. 2d Judg. § 83(2) ("An adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal is conclusive

under the rules of res judicata only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the determination entailed

the essential elements of adjudication . . . .").

The court concludes "any action or proceeding under the antitrust laws" as used in Section

5(a) means all claims that are asserted under the antitrust laws or that are based upon essentially the

same factual predicate. It does not include unrelated claims or defenses in a consolidated action. 

What this conclusion means here is that Hynix cannot establish its unfair competition claims based

upon Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 by collateral estoppel use of the findings in Rambus FTC. 

This result seems consistent with the intent of Section 5(a) to only give prima facie weight to FTC

findings in actions that are in essence based upon antitrust violations. In other words, it eases the

private antitrust plaintiff's burden but does not foreclose the defendant from showing the trier of fact

why the private plaintiff should not prevail.

The use of collateral estoppel to establish a defense to a patent infringement claim may be

appropriate, however, because Section 5(a) does not preclude collateral effect being given in other

than antitrust actions or proceedings. "Nothing contained in [Section 5(a)] shall be construed to

impose any limitation on the application of collateral estoppel." 15 U.S.C. § 16(a). Here, Hynix is

attempting by its equitable estoppel defense to defeat Rambus's infringement claims; it is not

seeking relief under the antitrust or unfair competition laws. Nevertheless, Rambus argues that the

use of collateral estoppel by Hynix does fall within the exception to Section 5(a) because the patent

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infringement claims are part of the lawsuit that includes Hynix's claims under the antitrust laws. 

Therefore, says Rambus, the equitable estoppel defense is being asserted "in any action or

proceeding brought under the antitrust laws." The court does not believe Congress intended to

preclude the use of collateral estoppel to establish a defense to a non-antitrust claim (here, patent

infringement) if asserted in a lawsuit as an antitrust claim but, on the other hand, allow the use of

collateral estoppel if there is no antitrust claim in the suit. Therefore, "in any action or proceeding

brought under the antitrust laws" logically refers to in any claims brought under the antitrust laws

including claims that are based upon same nucleus of facts.

E. Collateral Estoppel Requirements Not Met for Equitable Estoppel

The fact that Section 5(a) does not preclude giving collateral estoppel effect to the FTC's

findings does not necessarily mean that Hynix is entitled to summary judgment on its equitable

estoppel defense. In A.C. Aukerman v. R.L. Chiades Constr. Co., the Federal Circuit sitting en banc

set forth the three underlying factual elements of equitable estoppel:

1. The patentee, through misleading conduct, leads the alleged infringer to

reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against

the alleged infringer. "Conduct" may include specific statements, action,

inaction, or silence where there is an obligation to speak;

2. The alleged infringer relies on that conduct; [and]

3. Due to its reliance, the alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if the

patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.

960 F.2d 1020, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, these elements require a determination that

Hynix itself (or in the case of another manufacturer, that particular manufacturer) was misled and

would have acted differently had it not been misled. The FTC did find that through misleading

conduct Rambus led members of JEDEC to believe it did not intend to enforce its patents. However,

no finding was made specifically as to whether Hynix, or any other particular JEDEC member or 

manufacturer, was misled. The court concludes that a general finding that JEDEC members were

misled is not sufficiently specific so as to justify a finding that Hynix is entitled to summary

judgment on its equitable estoppel defense. "To foreclose relitigation of an issue under collateral

estoppel: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one alleged in the prior litigation; (2) the

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issue must have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; and (3) the determination of the issue

in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier

action." Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F2d. 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992). The FTC made no

specific finding that Hynix was misled, nor was such a finding a "critical and necessary part" of the

FTC's decision. Finally, although equitable estoppel may be determined by summary judgment, "the

trial court must, even where the three elements of equitable estoppel are established, take into

consideration any other evidence and facts respecting the equities of the parties in exercising its

discretion and deciding whether to allow the defense of equitable estoppel to bar the suit." A.C.

Aukerman Co., 960 F.2d at 1043. Here, there are disputed factual issues as to what would have

occurred if Rambus disclosed its intent which have a bearing on the reach of any equitable estoppel

defense.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Hynix's motion for summary judgment on its

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 claim and equitable estoppel defense.

DATED: 9/25/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING HYNIX'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CAL. BUS. & PR0F. CODE § 17200 CLAIM AND EQUITABLE

ESTOPPEL DEFENSE

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THIS SHALL CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WAS PROVIDED TO:

Counsel for plaintiff:

Daniel J. Furniss

Theodore G. Brown, III

Jordan Trent Jones

Townsend & Townsend & Crew LLP

379 Lytton Ave

Palo Alto, CA 94301

Patrick Lynch

Kenneth R. O'Rourke

O'Melveny & Myers

400 So Hope St Ste 1060

Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899

Kenneth L. Nissly

Susan van Keulen

Geoffrey H. Yost

Thelen Reid Brown Raysman & Steiner LLP

225 West Santa Clara Street, 12th Floor

San Jose, CA 95113-1723

Allen Ruby 

Ruby & Schofield 

125 South Market Street, Suite 1001 

San Jose, CA 95113-2285 

Counsel for defendant:

Gregory Stone

Kelly M. Klaus

Steven M. Perry

Munger Tolles & Olson

355 So Grand Ave Ste 3500

Los Angeles, CA 90071-1560

Peter A. Detre

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke

Munger Tolles & Olson

560 Mission Street, 27th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105-2907

Peter I Ostroff

Rollin A. Ransom 

Michelle B. Goodman

V. Bryan Medlock, Jr.

Sidley Austin Brown & Wood

555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000

Los Angeles, CA 90013-1010

Jeannine Yoo Sano

Pierre J. Hubert

Dewey Ballantine

1950 University Avenue, Suite 500

East Palo Alto, CA 94303

Counsel for Samsung:

Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com 

David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com 

Edward R. Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

Counsel for Micron:

Harold Avrum Barza halbarza@quinnemanuel.com

Robert Jason Becher robertbecher@quinnemanuel.com

John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Counsel for Nanya:

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com 

Kai Tseng hlee@orrick.com

Dated: 9/25/07 TSF 

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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