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Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HIGH POINT SARL,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION, SPRINT 

SPECTRUM, LP, SPRINTCOM, INC., SPRINT 

COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P., SPRINT 

SOLUTIONS, INC., APC PCS, LLC, APC REALTY

AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY, LLC, STC TWO LLC,

ALCATEL-LUCENT USA INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1298

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas in No. 2:09-cv-02269-CM-TJJ, Judge 

Carlos Murguia.

______________________ 

Decided: April 5, 2016 

______________________ 

 MARTIN J. BLACK, Dechert LLP, Philadelphia, PA, 

argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by DEREK 

J. BRADER; ROBERT RHOAD, Princeton, NJ.

 ERIC J. LOBENFELD, Hogan Lovells US LLP, New 

York, NY, argued for defendants-appellees Sprint Nextel 

Corporation, et al. Also represented by THEODORE JOHN 

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2 HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION

MLYNAR, NICOLE NUSSBAUM, IRA J. SCHAEFER, THOMAS 

SCHMIDT. 

 DAVID A. NELSON, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellee AlcatelLucent USA Inc. Also represented by STEPHEN A.

SWEDLOW. 

______________________ 

Before REYNA, MAYER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

REYNA, Circuit Judge.

High Point SARL (“High Point”) appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment that equitable 

estoppel and laches preclude prosecution of this lawsuit. 

High Point’s predecessors-in-interest to the patents-insuit helped Defendants build a communications network

through licensed and unlicensed activity for over a decade. High Point acquired rights to the patents-in-suit and 

asserted them for the first time against Defendants after

more than six years of unlicensed activity. We hold that 

equitable estoppel applies in this instance and High Point 

is barred from bringing this case against Defendants. We 

affirm the district court’s judgment and decline to address 

the remaining issue of laches.

BACKGROUND

In the early 1990s, AT&T’s Bell Labs developed and 

patented United States Patent Nos. 5,195,090; 5,195,091; 

5,305,308; and 5,184,347 (collectively, the “patents-insuit”). The patents-in-suit cover the transfer of packetized voice traffic between cellular base stations and 

switching centers. The patents-in-suit issued between 

1993 and 1994, and expired in 2011. In 1996, AT&T spun 

off Lucent Technologies (“Lucent”), one of its corporate 

affiliates, as an independent company and assigned the 

patents-in-suit to Lucent. In September 2000, Lucent 

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HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION 3

reorganized and spun off part of its business, including 

the patents-in-suit, to Avaya, Inc. (“Avaya”).1 

In March 2008, Avaya sold the patents-in-suit for $2 

million to High Point, reserving an interest in any proceeds High Point obtained through litigation. J.A. 21850–

52. High Point is based in Luxembourg and does not

practice the patents-in-suit. Within three days of taking 

ownership of the patents-in-suit, High Point began sending demand letters asserting infringement. Sprint Nextel 

Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, “Sprint”) were 

among many to receive a demand letter from High Point. 

Past Conduct Among the Parties 

As early as 1995, Sprint decided to build a network 

based on a new technology called Code Division Multiple 

Access (“CDMA”). CDMA allows a large number of cellphone users to share the same radio frequency by associating each user with a single code. CDMA is now 

standard and used around the world. In September 1995, 

Sprint met with several vendors, including AT&T, Nortel, 

and Motorola, to discuss interoperability standards for its 

nascent network. 

To build the nationwide CDMA network, Sprint contracted with several vendors to supply equipment for the

network. In 1996, Sprint executed a supply agreement 

with Nortel for equipment for the CDMA infrastructure. 

In 1997, Sprint executed a similar agreement with 

Motorola. In 1996 and 1999, AT&T (and later Lucent as 

AT&T’s successor) agreed to supply Sprint with equipment. Each of the supply agreements with AT&T and 

 

1 In High Point SARL v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 

2015-1235, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2734 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 

2016), High Point asserted the same patents, and we 

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case on 

grounds of exhaustion. 

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4 HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION

Lucent had a limited license for several patents, including 

the patents-in-suit. The agreements required certain 

standards and specifications to be met by the vendors so 

the equipment could be interoperable with other vendors’ 

equipment. See J.A. 18769. 

In 1998, Sprint and Lucent entered into a memorandum of understanding about the concept of multi-vendor 

interoperability within Sprint’s CDMA network. In that 

memorandum, Lucent represented a desire to work with 

Sprint and other vendors to develop interoperability 

standards. That same year, Lucent entered into a similar 

licensing arrangement with Nortel, which was later crosslicensed to Sprint. In 2000, Sprint and three of its infrastructure vendors (Lucent, Nortel, and Motorola) signed 

another agreement about interoperability. That agreement did not grant Sprint, or any of Sprint’s vendors, 

rights under the patents-in-suit, but the agreement 

manifested each vendor’s commitment to develop jointly 

interoperability standards, including an understanding 

that the equipment should work among and between 

vendors. J.A. 18727. Avaya succeeded in interest to 

Lucent in 2000, but Avaya did not discuss with any of the 

involved parties the patents-in-suit in an infringement 

context. 

At the inception of the Sprint network, all Sprint 

zones in the network were covered by a license, either by 

the license contained in the Lucent-Sprint supply agreement (which applied to Sprint’s use of Lucent equipment) 

or a cross-license that originated from an agreement with 

Lucent and Nortel (which applied to Sprint’s use of Nortel 

equipment). As the Sprint network grew, Sprint began to 

purchase and use unlicensed equipment supplied by 

several vendors. 

In 2001, Samsung won a competitive bidding process—over Lucent, Motorola, and Nortel—to support 

Sprint’s operations in Puerto Rico. Bidding began around 

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HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION 5

1999, when Lucent was still patentee. J.A. 18260. It is 

undisputed that the Puerto Rican operation involved the 

installation of unlicensed infrastructure provided by 

Samsung. 

In 2004, Sprint began upgrading some of the Lucent 

equipment with equipment provided by Motorola. 

Motorola was not a party to the Lucent-Sprint licensing 

agreement. 

In 2006, Alcatel purchased Lucent, naming the subsidiary Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (“Alcatel-Lucent”). 

According to High Point, that act terminated any license 

as to Sprint’s use of Lucent equipment. 

In 2008, Nortel began selling equipment to Sprint and 

others. At that point, Nortel was no longer a licensee to 

the patents-in-suit. 

The record does not reflect that at any time prior to 

December 2008, High Point, Avaya, or Lucent raised any 

infringement concerns.

Procedural History

On December 29, 2008, High Point sued Defendants 

in the Eastern District of Virginia for patent infringement. High Point accused Defendants of violating the 

licensing agreements and alleged that the Sprint CDMA 

network operated through the combination of licensed and 

unlicensed equipment to facilitate the transmission of 

voice call traffic in an infringing manner. In May 2009, 

the case was transferred to the District of Kansas. While 

the lawsuit was pending, Sprint continued to build its 

network by, among other things, entering into a supply

agreement with Alcatel-Lucent under terms similar to 

those entered into with Sprint’s prior vendors. On February 8, 2013, Alcatel-Lucent intervened as a defendant. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of issues, including laches and equitable estoppel. On 

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December 11, 2014, after reviewing a special master’s 

findings and recommendation, the district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of Defendants that laches 

and equitable estoppel barred the lawsuit. The district 

court reasoned that, by waiting and not asserting any

patent rights, Lucent and then Avaya placed Sprint in 

detrimental reliance. That silence, while Sprint actively 

engaged in the establishment of the CDMA network 

induced through the sale, purchase, and licensing of 

equipment for that network, caused Sprint economic and 

evidentiary prejudice. On January 21, 2015, the district 

court entered final judgment dismissing High Point’s 

claims. 

High Point appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion decisions on equitable estoppel rendered on summary judgment unless 

genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. Pei-Herng Hor v. Ching-Wu Chu, 699 F.3d 1331, 

1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. 

v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 

2009)). We review evidentiary rulings under the law of 

the regional circuit in which the district court sits, which 

in this case is the Tenth Circuit. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. 

Graphic Controls Corp., 350 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 

2003). The Tenth Circuit reviews evidentiary rulings for 

abuse of discretion. K-Tec, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 

F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “A 

district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it 

based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a 

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Highmark 

Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 

1748 n.2 (2014) (citation omitted). 

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DISCUSSION

High Point asserts that equitable estoppel is an extraordinary remedy that should not apply under these 

facts. High Point contends that a patentee is not obligated to investigate the technical details of its competitor’s 

equipment and then match those specifications to its 

patent portfolio; commercial realities dictate that equitable estoppel should not apply when business transactions 

are complex and varied. 

High Point further suggests that the district court ignored recent case law that required Sprint to demonstrate 

bad faith through the patentee’s course of conduct. According to High Point, silence alone is not enough when 

the parties are sophisticated business partners and there 

is no showing of bad faith. High Point asserts that under 

the licensing agreements, it could not in any event assert 

infringement until 2004 for the Motorola equipment (after 

the Motorola updates to some of the Lucent equipment), 

2006 for the Lucent equipment (after Alcatel acquired 

Lucent), and 2008 for the Nortel equipment (after the 

cross-license was no longer in effect). 

High Point urges that we conclude that the district 

court improperly drew inferences from disputed facts that 

should have obviated summary judgment. According to 

High Point, the district court effectively placed the burden 

on High Point to disprove equitable estoppel by using 

phrases like the “most sensible inference” and “most 

persuasive.” The evidence shows that Avaya was a new 

company in 2000 and could not have known about the 

infringement claim until it had an opportunity to evaluate 

its patent portfolio. High Point further asserts that 

Defendants’ reliance on interoperability is a red herring 

because the equipment accused in this case was not 

subject to any interoperability project. High Point claims 

that Sprint never implemented the CDMA interoperability project. 

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8 HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION

High Point asserts that Sprint cannot claim reliance 

because it was not aware of the patents, and there is no 

evidence that Sprint would have acted differently had it 

known about a potential lawsuit. High Point challenges 

the admissibility of testimony by two Sprint employees 

because those employees are not credible and were not 

involved in strategic decision-making or the projects at 

issue. High Point concludes that both economic and 

evidentiary prejudice are not apparent from the record 

and, at best, any perceived prejudice is a fact issue better 

suited for trial. 

Defendants counter that there is no genuine dispute 

of material fact that High Point should be equitably 

estopped from pursuing the lawsuit. Defendants assert 

that High Point’s predecessors (AT&T, Lucent, and 

Avaya) communicated, both by action and silence, that 

Sprint would not be disturbed in building out a packetbased CDMA network with equipment from multiple 

vendors. Defendants argue that High Point’s predecessors-in-interest were in a position to sue as early as 1996, 

when Sprint entered into a supply agreement with Nortel

and later with Motorola in 1997. Additionally, High 

Point’s predecessors expressly agreed, on multiple occasions, to help Sprint integrate the equipment from other 

vendors. Defendants point to a 1998 letter from Lucent’s 

Vice President, stating that Sprint “continue[d] to place a 

high value on the development of an interoperable 

CDMA” network, and “share[d] Lucent’s desire to document our respective commitments towards that goal in a 

manner consistent with that of Motorola and Nortel.” 

J.A. 21063. Defendants further highlight the 1998 memorandum of interoperability entered into by Sprint and 

Lucent as well as a similar agreement in 2000 involving 

Sprint, Lucent, Motorola, and Nortel. 

Defendants contend that Sprint’s investment in interoperable CDMA infrastructure underscores detrimental reliance on the conduct of and inaction by High 

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Point’s predecessors-in-interest. Defendants represent 

that Sprint had several non-infringing alternatives it 

could have pursued if AT&T, Lucent, or Avaya had indicated any intent to demand royalties or sue for infringement of the patents-in-suit. Sprint’s purchase of 

equipment from multiple vendors is further indication of 

its desire for an interoperable network.

Defendants claim both economic and evidentiary 

prejudice. Defendants note that Sprint continued its 

capital investment from the late 1990s until the time of 

the lawsuit and beyond. Even accepting High Point’s 

infringement start date of 2001, when Sprint installed the 

Samsung equipment in Puerto Rico, Sprint had invested 

billions of dollars in infrastructure before this lawsuit was 

filed in 2008. As to evidentiary concerns, Defendants 

point to the time lapse resulting in loss of evidence relevant to inventorship and Defendants’ defenses. For 

example, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

failure to join the correct inventor was dismissed for lack 

of evidence. J.A. 75. 

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that equitable estoppel precludes 

High Point from bringing this case against Defendants. 

Three elements must be established for equitable estoppel 

to bar a patentee’s suit: 

(1) the patentee, through misleading conduct (or 

silence), leads the alleged infringer to reasonably 

infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce 

its patent against the alleged infringer; (2) the alleged infringer relies on that conduct; and (3) the 

alleged infringer will be materially prejudiced if 

the patentee is allowed to proceed with its claim.

Radio Sys. Corp. v. Tom Lalor & Bumper Boy, Inc., 709 

F.3d 1124, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Although certain facts remain contested in this case, resoluCase: 15-1298 Document: 71-2 Page: 9 Filed: 04/05/2016
10 HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION

tion of equitable estoppel rests on a record without material dispute. 

First, we conclude that High Point’s predecessors’ 

misleading course of conduct caused Sprint to reasonably 

infer that they would not assert the patents-in-suit while 

Sprint purchased unlicensed infrastructure to build its 

network. Misleading conduct occurs when the alleged 

infringer is aware of the patentee or its patents, and 

knows or can reasonably infer that the patentee has 

known of the allegedly infringing activities for some time. 

A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d

1020, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc). If the record indicates silence alone, “mere silence must be accompanied by 

some other factor which indicates that the silence was 

sufficiently misleading as to amount to bad faith.” Hemstreet v. Comput. Entry Sys. Corp., 972 F.2d 1290, 1295 

(Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original); see also Meyers v. 

Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 

The evidence in this case shows both silence and active conduct. There is no dispute that the licensing activity between Sprint and High Point’s predecessors-ininterest covered the patents-in-suit. Although the supply 

agreement had several terms and conditions, among those 

was the identification of the patents-in-suit and what 

Sprint could do with those patents. At varying points 

(2001 for the Samsung equipment, 2004 for the Motorola 

equipment, 2006 for the Lucent equipment, and 2008 for 

the Nortel equipment), those licenses lapsed or were no 

longer in effect prior to the lawsuit being filed. 

The evidence demonstrates that AT&T, Lucent, and 

Avaya were aware of Sprint’s intent to create CDMA 

infrastructure with equipment supplied from various 

vendors. Sprint began entering commercial transactions 

with several vendors in the late 1990s for, what was at 

the time, unlicensed infrastructure. And by 2001, Samsung had agreed to provide Sprint with unlicensed CDMA 

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infrastructure. Although High Point suggests that it was 

not aware of the scope of the Samsung project in Puerto 

Rico, High Point fails to present any evidence to rebut 

Defendants’ showing that the same allegedly infringing 

activity was occurring in Puerto Rico. Yufa v. Lockheed 

Martin Corp., 575 F. App’x 881, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(rejecting attorney argument as evidence); Enzo Biochem, 

Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (same). Lucent—as the then-patentee—was on 

notice of the unlicensed activity because it bid on the 

Puerto Rican project in 1999 and lost to Samsung, an 

entity not covered by Lucent’s licenses. High Point also 

bases its current infringement allegations on public 

information about that project; that evidence demonstrates that for the Puerto Rican project to operate, interoperability with other facets of Sprint’s network was 

necessary. It is undisputed that the parties are sophisticated competitors that were aware of unlicensed activity 

occurring as early as 2001, activity that increased over 

time. 

There is no genuine dispute of material fact that High 

Point’s predecessors failed to challenge Sprint when its 

activity fell outside the licenses as early as 2001. The 

effect of equitable estoppel is “a license to use the invention that extends throughout the life of the patent.” SCA 

Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., 

LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). That 

effect can arise when a predecessor’s conduct is imputed 

to its successors-in-interest. Cf. Radio Sys. Corp., 709 

F.3d at 1131 (citing Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. 

Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). High 

Point’s predecessors were not only silent as to infringement concerns, they were actively involved in licensing 

arrangements involving the patents, discussing interoperability with other potentially infringing vendors, and

continuing business relationships, including with respect 

to the unlicensed activity in Puerto Rico. Although High 

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12 HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION

Point suggests that evidence of bad faith must be present 

to establish intent, we have never held that bad faith is 

the sine qua non of intent, especially here where the facts 

demonstrate the predecessors’ active engagement in 

building Sprint’s CDMA network. See Aspex Eyewear, 

Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1311 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s determination of

equitable estoppel and noting that “equitable relief is not 

a matter of precise formula”). The claim that Avaya or 

Lucent were nascent businesses with limited capacity to 

exercise their rights is not supported by the evidence and 

is contrary to their active participation in establishing 

Sprint’s network. 

Second, we agree with the district court that Defendants detrimentally relied on the conduct of High Point’s 

predecessors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting and crediting the unrebutted deposition 

testimony of Sprint’s witnesses, indicating that Sprint 

had several options when building its network and that 

Sprint would have acted differently if the threat of litigation was a possibility. Sprint offered testimony from its 

in-house patent counsel as well as its outside counsel who 

negotiated the CDMA supply contracts with Lucent, 

Nortel, Motorola, and Samsung. The witnesses testified 

that Sprint had many conversations about building its 

network and considered using a different system (e.g., 

Global System Mobile). The witnesses discussed how 

Sprint also considered purchasing equipment solely from 

AT&T and Lucent, or purchasing equipment from licensed 

vendors entirely. The witnesses observed that Sprint 

could have retrofitted the potentially infringing infrastructure with sufficient notice of possible infringement. 

Those witnesses were deposed and testified based on their

unique roles in rendering advice as legal counsel. 

High Point fails to rebut with evidence that Sprint’s 

proposed solutions would have been unrealistic or infeasible. Aspex Eyewear, 605 F.3d at 1312 (“However, to show 

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HIGH POINT SARL v. SPRINT NEXTEL CORPORATION 13

reliance on Aspex’s silence and inaction, Clariti need not 

prove precisely what alternative paths it would have 

taken, or that every marketing decision was based on 

reliance on Aspex’s silence.”). Whether inside or outside 

the licensing arrangements, Sprint systemically worked 

to build a network while High Point’s predecessors continued to sell to Sprint equipment and negotiate the 

interoperability that High Point would come to allege 

constituted unlicensed infringing activity. 

Finally, the district court did not err in finding that 

Defendants suffered prejudice from the delay. There is no 

dispute that Sprint—as early as 1996—worked to build a 

CDMA network at significant cost, totaling billions of 

dollars. Radio Sys. Corp., 709 F.3d at 1130 (affirming a 

district court’s findings of prejudice where the accused 

infringer “relied on this silence by significantly expanding 

its product line”). The district court did not err in finding 

evidentiary prejudice because the unrebutted evidence 

demonstrated that information about the inventor, which 

could have been used for a variety of defense theories, was 

fading or is already absent. High Point failed to present 

evidence to rebut the economic and evidentiary prejudice 

showing made by Defendants. 

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment that High Point is equitably 

estopped from prosecuting this lawsuit against Defendants. We affirm the judgment below. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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