Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00190/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Virgil L. Light, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Karl D. Elledge, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

 CV 16-190-TUC-RM (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 

On June 14, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 8).1

 Plaintiff 

filed a Response on July 21, 2016 (Doc. 13) and Defendants filed a Reply on August 

1, 2016. (Doc. 14). For the reasons stated herein, the Court recommends that the 

District Court grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

I. Factual Background 

 In April of 2014, Plaintiff opened an “old fashion candy store” in Bisbee, 

Arizona; his daughter opened a new age bookstore next to the candy store. Doc. 1, 

¶¶ 16, 17. Plaintiff alleges that he and his daughter immediately began having 

problems with local Bisbee residents and in May of 2015, he had to file a multi-count 

lawsuit in state court alleging defamation and civil conspiracy. Id., ¶ 18. 

 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the docket number in CV 16-190-TUC-RM (JR). 

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 In the present lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that since the commencement of his 

state civil lawsuit in Bisbee, Arizona, he has encountered a constant pattern of 

prejudice, discrimination, inequitable treatment and due process violations. Id., ¶¶ 

18-20. He sues Defendant Elledge, individually and in his official capacity as 

Cochise County Superior Court Judge and Defendant Dunlap, individually and in her 

official capacity as Cochise County Superior Court Clerk. Id., ¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiff also 

sues the entire Cochise County Superior Court and the Cochise County Clerk of 

Courts, as judicial entities exercising constitutional powers in Cochise County, 

Arizona. Id., ¶ 12. 

 Plaintiff alleges four causes of action: violation of his First Amendment rights 

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; negligence, knowing or reckless disregard, malice and 

unconstitutional policies, customs and practices; and deprivation of his constitutional 

rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. Id., ¶¶ 21-36, 37-52, 53-68, 

and 69-79. 

II. Legal Discussion

 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a court 

dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

North Star Int’l. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair 

notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of a cause of action 

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with conclusory allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that 

a violation is not just possible, but also plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). 

 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, a court will 

take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). A court, 

however, need not accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. Nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched 

as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

A. Defendant Elledge 

 Absolute immunity is accorded to judges functioning in their official 

capacities. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004). In 

determining whether a judge was acting in his judicial capacity, courts should look to 

the “nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a 

judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in 

his judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (quoting Stump v. 

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). 

 Judges are immune from suit for all actions within their jurisdiction. Stump, 

435 U.S. at 356, 364. The scope of a judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly 

where the issue is the immunity of the judge. Id. Further, “a judge will not be 

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, 

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or was in excess of his authority.” Id.; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (judicial 

immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice). 

 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Elledge took the following improper actions: 

he admonished Plaintiff not to disparage defense counsel; he ordered Plaintiff’s 

daughter not to display certain evidence in the courtroom; he imposed stringent and 

technical pleading requirements; he refused to schedule a hearing for contempt, a 

temporary restraining order or an injunction; he summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s 

motions; he scheduled hearings up to six months out; he performed his own research; 

he refused to disqualify himself from the case; and he ultimately granted defense 

counsel’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Doc. 1, ¶ 20. 

 If true, all of these actions were performed by Judge Elledge in the course of 

litigation. He was clearly acting in his judicial capacity when he set matters for 

hearing, took control of his courtroom and researched and ruled on motions. All of 

his challenged actions concern duties routinely performed by a judge in the course of 

litigation. Additionally, Judge Elledge, a superior court judge presiding over a civil 

action, had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state lawsuit. 

Plaintiff fails to present evidence otherwise. Defendant Elledge is immune from suit. 

B. Defendant Dunlap 

 Court clerks “have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil 

rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial 

process.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987). In 

Mullis, the plaintiff alleged that the bankruptcy court clerks failed to provide him 

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with proper counseling and notice as required by statute, accepted and filed an 

incomplete bankruptcy petition and later refused to accept an amended petition. 828 

F.2d at 1390. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that even taking 

plaintiff's allegations as true, the clerk’s actions were “all properly . . . characterized 

as integral parts of the judicial process.” Id. The court reasoned that “[t]he clerk of 

court and deputy clerks are the officials through whom such filing is done. 

Consequently, the clerks qualify for quasi-judicial immunity unless these acts were 

done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff provides mostly examples of how unnamed clerks 

failed to carry out their duties. Doc. 1, ¶ 20. Plaintiff does not specifically allege 

that Defendant Dunlap performed any task, much less a task that was outside of the 

judicial process. The lawsuit against her must be dismissed. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (to state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and 

show an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant); 

Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (dismissal can be 

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory). 

 Plaintiff does refer to a couple of instances which, if true, would not be 

properly characterized as integral parts of the judicial process. For example, he states 

that the week before his state court case was dismissed two deputy clerks were 

overheard referring to his case as “fossil maintenance.” Doc. 1, ¶ 20. He also alleges 

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that a retired deputy clerk told him in writing, “If you were not born or raised in 

Bisbee. You do not have the right to sue anyone, the only right is GET THE HELL 

OUT OF DODGE!!!!!!!!! You don’t belong here.” Id. Even assuming the Plaintiff 

could affirmatively link his injury to the conduct of these clerks and thereby state a 

valid claim under § 1983, see Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 362, 371-72), the action against 

Defendant Dunlap would nonetheless have to be dismissed. There is no respondeat 

superior liability in section 1983 cases, Monell v. Dep’t of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658, 

691 (1978), and Defendant Dunlap cannot be vicariously liable for the conduct of her 

deputy clerks, retired or otherwise. 

C. Defendants Cochise County Superior Court and Clerk of Courts 

 In Yamamoto v. Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors, 606 P.2d 28 (1979), 

the plaintiff sued the Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors, the Superior Court 

and its clerk. Id. at 29. With respect to the claims against the Cochise County 

Superior Court, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a court is not sui juris, it 

cannot sue or be sued, and therefore, was not a proper defendant and was properly 

dismissed with prejudice. Id.; see also Clark v. Clark, 984 F.2d 272, 273 (8th Cir. 

1993) (holding that a state court is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983). This 

same reasoning applies to the Clerk of Courts. See Parson v. Bourff, 739 F.Supp 

1266, 1266-68 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (dismissing § 1983 claims against clerk of court 

because clerk is a state official). 

 Additionally, Plaintiff’s lawsuit against both the court and the clerk of courts 

is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which 

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prohibits a citizen from suing his own state, directly or through its agencies, without 

its consent. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 

(1993); Beentjes v. Placer Cty. Air Pollution Control Dist., 397 F.3d 775, 777 (9th

Cir. 2005); Clark, 984 F.2d at 273. Consent or waiver is not easily established. 

Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir.1995). “Waiver of Eleventh 

Amendment immunity by a state will be found only where stated by the most express 

language or by such overwhelming implication from the text [of a state statute] as 

[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Id. at 319. Here, 

Plaintiff has offered no authority upon which the Court could find that the Cochise 

County Superior Court or the Clerk of Court have waived their Eleventh Amendment 

Immunity. Accordingly, those State entities are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

III. Leave to Amend 

 If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide whether to grant 

leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 

amend “shall be freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the 

underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the 

pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9thCir.2000) (en 

banc). Generally, leave to amend shall be denied only if allowing amendment would 

unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving 

party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 

532 (9thCir. 2008). 

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 With these low standards in mind, the Court recommends that the District 

Court permit the Plaintiff to file within 30 days an amended complaint to cure the 

deficiencies outlined above. An amended complaint should contain short, plain 

statements advising the Court of the following: (1) the constitutional right violated; 

(2) the name of the defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that defendant 

did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that defendant is connected to the 

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury the Plaintiff 

suffered because of that defendant’s conduct. Plaintiff must repeat this process for 

each person named as a defendant. 

 If Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named defendant 

with the specific injury suffered by the Plaintiff, this Court will recommend that the 

District Court dismiss the allegations for failure to state a claim. 

IV. Recommendation 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) 

and grant Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint subject to the limitations described 

in this recommendation. The Magistrate Judge further recommends that if Plaintiff 

fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of the Court should be 

ordered to, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with 

prejudice. 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. No replies shall be filed without 

leave of the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should be 

designated case number: CV 16-190-TUC-RM. Failure to timely file objections to 

any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 1st day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Jacqueline M. Rateau 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 

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