Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-00966/USCOURTS-cand-5_10-cv-00966-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1355 Petition for Return of Property

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

**E-Filed 7/19/2010**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SAN FRANCISCO TECHNOLOGY, Inc.,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE GLAD PRODUCTS COMPANY, BAJER

DESIGN & MARKETING INC., BAYER

CORPORATION, BRIGHT IMAGE

CORPORATION, CHURCH & DWIGHT CO.

INC., COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY,

COMBE INCORPORATED, THE DIAL

CORPORATION, EXERGEN CORPORATION,

GLAXOSMITHKLINE LLC, HI-TECH

PHARMACAL CO. INC., JOHNSON PRODUCTS

COMPANY INC., MAYBELLINE LLC, MCNEILPPC INC., MEDTECH PRODUCTS INC.,

PLAYTEX PRODUCTS INC., RECKITT

BENCKISER INC., ROCHE DIAGNOSTICS

CORPORATION, SOFTSHEEN-CARSON LLC,

SUN PRODUCTS CORPORATION, SUNSTAR

AMERICAS INC.,

 Defendants.

Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

Re: Docket Nos. 76, 78, 83, 94, 127,

142, 144, 147, 155, 156, 159, 162, 165,

166, 168, 170, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180,

193, 194, 280 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff San Francisco Technology Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is a Delaware corporation with its

principal place of business in San Jose, California. Complaint ¶ 2. Plaintiff makes no

allegations with respect to the type of business it practices. Defendants are twenty-one whollyunrelated companies that make and sell wholly-unrelated products, they include: The Glad

Products Company (“Glad”), Bajer Design & Marketing Inc. (“Bajer”), Bayer Corporation

Case 5:10-cv-00966-JF Document 315 Filed 07/19/10 Page 1 of 22
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28 On June 14, 2010, the Clerk entered default as to Bright Image. 1

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

(“Bayer”), Bright Image Corporation , Church & Dwight Co. Inc. (“Church & Dwight”), 1

Colgate-Palmolive Company (“Colgate”), Combe Incorporated (“Combe”), The Dial Corporation

(“Dial”), Exergen Corporation (“Exergen”), GlaxoSmithKline LLC (“GSK”), Hi-Tech

Pharmacal Co. Inc. (“Hi-Tech”), Johnson Products Company Inc. (“Johnson Products”),

Maybelline LLC (“Maybelline”), McNeil-PPC Inc. (“McNeil”), Medtech Products Inc.

(“Medtech”), Playtex Products Inc. (“Playtex”), Reckitt Benckiser Inc. (“Reckitt”), Roche

Diagnostics Corporation (“Roche”), SoftSheen-Carson LLC (“SoftSheen”), Sun Products

Corporation (“Sun Products”), and Sunstar Americas Inc. (“Sunstar”). Plaintiff alleges that each

of the twenty-one Defendants makes and sells products that it has marked with one or more

expired patents. These products range from collapsible laundry hampers (Bajer) to lighting

products (Bright Image) to toothpaste (Church & Dwight and Colgate) to mascara (Maybelline)

to fabric softener (Sun Products). 

Plaintiff also claims, upon information and belief, that Defendants “marked [their]

products with patents to induce the public to believe that each such product is protected by each

patent listed and with knowledge that nothing is protected by an expired patent.” Id. ¶¶ 53, 57,

61, 66, 70, 74, 78, 82, 86, 94, 98, 102, 107, 111, 115, 120, 124, 128, 132, 136. Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants marked their products with expired patents with the intent to deceive the

public. Id. 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 5, 2010, alleging that each Defendant has

violated 35 U.S.C. § 292 by marking its own products with expired patent numbers. Plaintiff

does not claim to be in competition with any Defendant. Instead, it brings this action as a qui

tam proceeding to recover civil fines on behalf of the United States government. Defendants

have filed in excess of twenty separate motions. Almost all of the motions fall into one of four

categories: (1) motions to dismiss for lack of standing; (2) motions to dismiss for failure to state

a claim with the required particularity; (3) motions to sever and to transfer venue; and (4)

motions to stay pending a decision by the Federal Circuit in Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc.,

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 Some of the Defendants also assert individual bases for dismissal: (1) Bayer moves to 2

dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7); (2) a few Defendants

argue that Section 292 violates the Take Care clause of Article II of the Constitution so far as it

permits assignment of a sovereign injury that may be said to arise from the violation of laws to a

qui tam relator; (3) SoftSheen moves to dismiss pursuant to the “first to file rule;” (4) Roche

moves to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) and under

the “first to file” rule; (5) Exergen moves to dismiss based upon its assertion that Plaintiff lacks

standing because another qui tam relator asserted the same claim against it in an earlier-filed

action; and (6) a number of Defendants contend that their products are not “unpatented” within

the meaning of § 292 because the markings list some patents that are expired and some that are

not. 

 On July 15, 2010, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Roche without prejudice pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Accordingly, Roche’s pending motions to stay, dismiss, sever,

and transfer will be terminated as moot.

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

615 F.Supp.2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). On May 28 and June 22, 2010, the Court entered

2

stipulated orders between Plaintiff and seven of the Defendants – Glad, Bajer, Colgate, Combe,

Dial, Johnson Products, and Reckitt Benckiser – staying all proceedings until the Federal Circuit

issues a final decision in Stauffer. See Dkt. Nos. 189, 238. Accordingly, this order addresses

only those motions filed by Defendants that have not so stipulated. 

II. MOTIONS TO STAY

A. Legal Standard

The power to grant a stay in pending litigation is incidental to the power inherent in every

court to control the disposition of the cases on its docket. Landis v. North American Co., 299

U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81, L.Ed. 153 (1936). In an exercise of that discretion, the Court

must weigh “the competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a

stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005), citing CMAX Inc. v. Hall,

300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). “Among those competing interests are the possible damage

which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in

being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the

simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to

result from a stay.” Id. “The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.”

Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). “‘If there is even

Case 5:10-cv-00966-JF Document 315 Filed 07/19/10 Page 3 of 22
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 “A qui tam statute authorizes a private person, known alternatively as a ‘relator’ or 3

‘informer,’ to bring suit on behalf of the government and to share in the financial recovery.”

Pequignot I, 650 F.Supp.2d at 719. “The Supreme Court has identified three qui tam statutes

that remain in force in the United States [one of which is] 35 U.S.C. § 292, the false patent

marking statute at issue here. . .” Id. at 719-20. 

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

a fair possibility that the stay ... will work damage to some one else,’ the party seeking the stay

‘must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity” in being required to go forward. Lockyer,

398 F.3d at 1112, quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. “Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in

one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will

define the rights of both. Id. at 1109-10, quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.

B. Discussion

Bayer, Church & Dwight, Exergen, GSK, Hi-Tech, Maybelline, McNeil, Medtech,

SoftSheen, Sun Products, and Sunstar move to dismiss the instant action on the basis of

Plaintiff’s lack of standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. Defendants

contend that Plaintiff has not alleged that it has suffered an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer

standing. The same Defendants also move to stay the instant action either in the first instance or

in the alternative pending the Federal Circuit’s decision in Stauffer. 

District courts have reached different conclusions with respect to the identical standing

inquiry presented here. In Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., the court held that a private, noncompetitor plaintiff suing under 35 U.S.C. § 292 ordinarily would lack Article III standing, but

for the qui tam nature of the statute. 640 F.Supp.2d 714, 718-724 (E.D. Va. 2009) (Pequignot 3

I). The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s status as a qui tam relator made him “a partial assignee

of the government’s claims” and conferred standing upon him. Id. at 724. In Stauffer, the

district court reached the opposite conclusion, concluding that the lack of an actual injury to the

plaintiff, the government, or the public at large required dismissal of the action. Stauffer, 615

F.Supp.2d at 255 (“[T]he complaint fails to allege with any specificity an actual injury to any

individual competitor, to the market. . . , or to any aspect of the United States economy. That

some competitor might somehow be injured at some point, or that some component of the United

States economy might suffer some harm through defendants’ conduct, is purely speculative and

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

plainly insufficient to support standing.”), citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., --- U.S. ----, 129

S.Ct. 1142, 1151-52, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (citations omitted) (finding “some day” harms

“without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any specification of when the some day will

be-do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require”); Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations

omitted) (“Standing is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable’ ... [but] requires

... perceptible harm.” ). 

As Judge Seeborg concluded in a nearly identical case brought by Plaintiff in this district

against fourteen different defendants, “there appears to be little dispute that if the Federal Circuit

affirms the decision in Stauffer there likely will be no way to distinguish it or to otherwise avoid

its application to this case. Conversely, should Stauffer be reversed, that likely will preclude any

further argument that SF Tech lacks standing here.” San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. Adobe

Systems Incorporated, et al., No. 10-01652 RS, 2010 WL 1640397, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19,

2010). On this basis, as well as Plaintiff’s failure to identify any particular prejudice it would

suffer from a stay, Judge Seeborg stayed the action. Id. (“As SF Tech points out, it is not the

general rule that a stay will be granted simply because some appellate decision is pending that

may have some bearing on the case at hand. In this instance, however, a stay pending a decision

in the Stauffer appeal appears warranted.”).

Subsequent to Judge Seeborg’s order in Adobe, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district

court’s decision in Pequignot I. Pequignot v. Solo Cup, — F.3d —, 2010 WL 2346649, at *8

(Fed. Cir. June 10, 2010) (Pequignot II) (affirming the court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of defendant based upon Plaintiff’s failure to “raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a

deceptive purpose.”). However, notwithstanding the district court’s express determination that

plaintiff had standing to bring a qui tam action, the standing issue was not raised in the Pequignot

appeal. Not surprisingly, as Judge Seeborg had predicted, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in

Pequignot did not mention the standing issue, let alone “include a direct holding disposing of the

standing issue one way or the other.” Adobe, 2010 WL 1640397, at *3 n. 5 (staying the action

pending a ruling by the Federal Circuit in Stauffer, rather than Pequignot I). Plaintiff claims that

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 Plaintiff also argues that the Federal Circuit resolved the issue of qui tam standing in 4

Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). However, like Pequignot II,

Forest Group does not address standing. Forest Group involved two competitors and allegations

of competitive harm. While the Federal Circuit did observe that Section 292 permitted

“plaintiffs who have not suffered any direct harm” to bring an action as qui tam relators, it did

not discuss actions in which a qui tam relator does not plead an actual injury to the government

or the public at large. Id. at 1303. 

 The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s stipulation with Dial and Johnson Products to stay 5

all proceedings pending a final decision in Stauffer is dated one day after the Federal Circuit’s

decision in Pequignot. 

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

the Federal Circuit held affirmatively that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. 

Opposition to Motions to Stay at 1, citing Pequignot II, 2010 WL 2346649, at *4. This is not so. 

Plaintiff confuses Article III subject matter jurisdiction with the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that

it had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). Pequignot II, 2010 WL

2346649, at *4 (“Pequignot timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1295(a)(1).”). 

4

Moreover, despite its view of Pequignot II, Plaintiff concedes that “the Federal Circuit

will more squarely address the standing question in the appeal of Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers.”

Opposition to Motions to Stay at 1. In fact, knowing that a decision in Pequignot II was

forthcoming, Plaintiff stipulated to a stay pending the Federal Circuit’s disposition in Stauffer as

to seven of the defendants in the instant action. Plaintiff does not argue that it will suffer any 5

particular prejudice if the action is stayed. On June 21, 2010, the Federal Circuit announced that

it will hear oral arguments in Stauffer on August 3, 2010. The Federal Circuit’s published

statistics indicate that the median time between oral argument and issuance of an opinion is less

than two months. Declaration of Jason White in Support of GSK’s Motion to Stay, Ex. 1 (Federal

Circuit Caseload Analysis FY 2008 - FY 2009). “A mere delay in any eventual monetary

recovery is not sufficient to require going forward where the threshold issue of standing can be

conclusively resolved by waiting for the Federal Circuit to rule.” Adobe, 2010 WL 1640397, at

*4. Accordingly, because a stay will promote judicial economy, prevent unnecessary expenditure

of resources and cause no prejudice to Plaintiff, the Court will grant the instant motions to stay

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 On July 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed a statement of recent decision with respect to an order 6

issued in the Northern District of Texas, Patent Compliance Group Inc., v. Interdesign, Inc.,

3:10-CV-0404-P, slip op. (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2010). In that case, the court denied defendant’s

motion to stay pending the Federal Circuit’s disposition in Stauffer and determined that plaintiff

had Article III standing. The court determined that “the law is sufficiently in place for

adjudication”, id. at 14, but also distinguished Stauffer, noting that the plaintiff’s complaint

included allegations of injury to the government including “marketplace competition deterrence,

harm to the [plaintiff], harm to the United States, and harm to the public by misleading

impressions.” Id. at 10. Patent Compliance thus is distinguishable from the issue on appeal in

Stauffer and from the instant action. 

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

with respect to any Defendant against whom the instant claims are not transferred, see infra V,

and except for the motion brought by Exergen, see infra III, and terminate without prejudice the

pending motions to dismiss. The motions to dismiss may be renewed as appropriate after the 6

Federal Circuit issues a decision in Stauffer. 

III. EXERGEN’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

 Because Article III standing "pertain[s] to a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction

under Article III, [it is] properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) . . .". White v. Leem, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2002). "A Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual." Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,

1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). With a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack, a court may look

beyond the complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one

for summary judgment. See id. It need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations. 

White, 227 F.3d at 1242, citing Gemtel Corp. v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 23 F.3d

1542, 1544 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Discussion

Exergen argues that even if Stauffer ultimately supports Plaintiff’s position with respect

to standing, an earlier false marking suit that is inclusive of Plaintiff’s claims was filed against it

in Delaware by a different qui tam relator, Jennifer L. Brinkmeier, thus depriving Plaintiff of

standing to sue Exergen here. Exergen reasons that Plaintiff’s sole claim to standing is as an

assignee of a false marking claim originally accruing to the United States government and that

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

the earlier lawsuit filed in Delaware effected an assignment of that claim to Brinkmeier. Plaintiff

disagrees claiming that Plaintiff and Brinkmeier sued Exergen for different markings. 

Brinkmeier’s action alleges that Exergen marks its products, including its temporal artery

thermometers, with the following expired U.S. Patent Numbers: 4,636,091, 5,012,813;

5,199,436; 5,653,238; and 6,047,205. Kent Decl., Ex. A (Complaint) ¶¶ 11-15, 36-37. Plaintiff

alleges that Exergen marks its Comfort Scanner thermometer with four of the same expired

patent numbers. Complaint ¶ 84 (alleging that “U.S. Patents Nos. 4,636,091, 5,012,813,

5,199,436, and 5,653,238 expired no later than 6/28/2005, 12/7/2008, 2/20/2008, 12/7/2008,

respectively.”). While Plaintiff acknowledges that the technology of the products at issue in the

two cases likely is the same, it contends that the packaging of the Comfort Scanner thermometer

sold at Walgreens is different. The Court notes that Exergen’s CEO, Francesco Pompei, admits

that there is special packaging for the Comfort Scanner thermometer sold by Walgreens. Pompei

Decl. ¶ 6 (“The Exergen Temporal Artery Thermometer that is the subject of this lawsuit is

known as the ‘Comfort Scanner,’ which is a TAT-2000C model thermometer specially branded

and packaged for sale at Walgreen’s stores.”). However, Brinkmeier’s complaint, while more

general than Plaintiff’s with respect to packaging, in no way excludes the marks or packaging

that are the subject of the instant suit. Having examined both complaints, the Court concludes

the claims asserted by Plaintiff against Exergen are within the scope of those alleged by

Brinkmeier in her earlier-filed action. For this reason, it appears that even assuming standing

generally, the claims of the United States government previously were assigned to Brinkmeier

depriving Plaintiff of standing to assert them here. 

IV. MOTIONS TO SEVER

Almost all of the Defendants move to sever the claims against them pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 21 based upon their assertion that their joinder in a single action is improper. A plaintiff

may join persons in one action as defendants if:

(A) Any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.

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 Plaintiff contends that “[s]ince the harm being redressed in this action is the same for 7

all the defendants, the claims arise out of the same ‘series of transactions or occurrences.’” 

Opposition to Motions Seeking Severance at 2. However, Plaintiff fails to allege any such harm

in its complaint, and the Court is not convinced that any potential harm suffered as a result of the

various Defendants’ disconnected conduct would be common. In its reply brief, Church &

Dwight argues that Plaintiff’s position is “akin to asserting that because Heinz has an alleged

monopoly on ketchup, Gerber has an alleged monopoly on baby food, and Kleenex has an

alleged monopoly on tissues, a plaintiff can join all three in a single lawsuit simply because each

allegedly causes high prices at the supermarket.” Church & Dwight Reply at 2. 

Plaintiff also contends that “[a]dditional common facts underlying the claims and

defenses may exist, but the defendants have stymied efforts to identify them by refusing to

participate substantively in the pre-CMC conference required by Rule 26(f) and this court’s local

rules.” Id. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Rule 26(f) conference is not intended

to provide a plaintiff with additional facts that would enable it to satisfy its pleading standards. 

Second, Plaintiff fails to identify any plausible common facts or defenses that may exist among

the twenty-one separately owned and operated Defendant companies. 

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (emphasis added). In Adobe, the court confronted the identical inquiry

and concluded that “there simply is no basis to join these [type of] defendants in a single suit.” 

Adobe, 2010 WL 1640397, at *2. This Court agrees.

The complaint alleges no connection or relationship between any of the defendants or

their products. Rather, the only commonality among the Defendants is that each of them is 7

alleged to have violated 35 U.S.C. § 292. Rule 20 permits joinder only when there are questions

of law or fact common to all defendants that will arise in the action and the claims alleged

against each of the separate defendants arise out of the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences.” As explained in Adobe, “[t]he requirements of [Rule 20(a)(2)] (A)

and (B) are conjunctive, both must be satisfied. There is no tenable argument that the claims

alleged against each of the these separate defendants arise out of the ‘same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.’” Adobe, 2010 WL 1640397, at *1. Because

Plaintiff fails to allege that its claims against Defendants arise out of the “same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,” the Court will grant the instant motions to

sever. The Court also will sever the claims against the non-moving Defendants pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 21. Id. (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or

drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”). 

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 The Supreme Court has held that “[a] district court [] may dispose of an action by a 8

forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction,

when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.” Sinochem

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

V. MOTIONS TO TRANSFER

A. Legal Standard

"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In the Ninth Circuit, a motion for transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) lies within

the discretion of the district court and depends on the facts of each particular case. Jones v. GNC

Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court must consider both public

factors, which go to the interests of justice, and private factors, which go to the convenience of

the parties and witnesses. See Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843

(9th Cir. 1986). Such factors may include: (1) the location where the relevant agreements were

negotiated and executed; (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law; (3) the

plaintiff's choice of forum; (4) the parties' respective contacts with the forum; (5) the contacts

relating to the plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum; (6) the differences in the costs of

litigation in the two forums; (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of

unwilling non-party witnesses; (8) the ease of access to sources of proof; (9) the presence of a

forum selection clause; and (10) the relevant public policy of the forum state, if any. Jones, 211

F.3d at 498-99. See also Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904-05 (Fed.

Cir. 2008). The moving party bears the burden of showing that transfer is appropriate. Jones,

211 F.3d at 499. 

B. Discussion

Defendants Church & Dwight, Hi-Tech, Medtech, and Sunstar, each move separately,

while Maybelline and SoftSheen move jointly, to transfer the claims against them pursuant to

Section 1404(a). Plaintiff presents its arguments in opposition to these motions in one

consolidated opposition brief. The Court applies the Jones factors to each of the moving

Defendants’ motions below.8

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International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423, 127 S.Ct. 1184,

1192, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007). The Supreme Court premised this holding upon its conclusion that

“[f]orum non conveniens is a nonmerits ground for dismissal.” Id. Accordingly, the Court’s

conclusion in Sinochem applies equally within the context of a motion to transfer pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). See In re: Limitnone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations

omitted)(“as § 1404(a) is nothing more than a codification of the traditional forum non

conveniens rules without the attendant disadvantages of outright dismissal ... it is appropriate to

apply the same rules regarding the necessity of establishing jurisdiction to both.”); Pub.

Employees' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Morgan Stanley, 605 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2009)

(citing Sinochem and Limitnone for the proposition that a “decision to transfer for inconvenient

forum is not a decision on the merits and therefore does not require a finding of jurisdiction.”). 

Accordingly, because the jurisdictional question here is not “readily determine[d],” but one of

first impression currently pending before the Federal Circuit, it is proper for this Court to address

the Defendants’ motions to transfer prior to resolving jurisdiction. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 425.

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

1. The location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed 

Because there are no relevant contracts or forum selection clauses between Plaintiff and

any of the moving Defendants, these factors do not weigh in favor of or against transferring the

action. 

2. The state most familiar with the governing law

The second Jones factor, “the state that is most familiar with the governing law,” also is a

neutral factor. Questions of federal law may be applied by any federal court, and this Court is not

necessarily better able to apply the false marking statute than federal courts in other districts. 

Plaintiff contends that the instant case also raises a question of California state law – whether

Plaintiff will be entitled to recover its attorney’s fees under California’s public interest litigation

statute. Opposition to Motions Seeking Transfer of Venue at 2, citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

1021.5 (providing that “upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party

against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an

important right affecting the public interest. . .”). Plaintiff argues that this factor “weighs heavily

against transfer” because a district court sitting in another state is likely to be unfamiliar with §

1021.5. However, as Defendants point out, the complaint neither makes reference to § 1021.5

nor seeks attorney’s fees in its prayer for relief. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument that § 1021.5 supports a California venue is circular. 

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 It also appears that the instant action is not the type of public interest litigation that 9

California intended to encourage in enacting § 1021.5. Compare Unocal Corp. v. United States,

222 F.3d 528, 544 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (“The purpose of the

‘private attorney general’ doctrine is to encourage suits of societal importance which private

parties would not otherwise have an incentive to pursue.”), with Pequignot II, 2010 WL

2346649, at *2 n.1 (noting that plaintiff, in an action similar to this one, sought approximately

$5.4 trillion of which fifty percent would go to the United States and the remaining amount

would go to Plaintiff) and 35 U.S.C. § 285 (providing that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may

award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party” in a false marking action).

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ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

Plaintiff contends that § 1021.5 applies because the instant action was filed in California, and

that because § 1021.5 might be applicable, the Court must retain the case in California. In any

event, it would be premature to determine whether the statute applies, as a claim for attorney’s

fees could not be considered by the Court unless and until Plaintiff prevailed on the merits.9

3. Plaintiff’s choice of forum 

On a § 1404(a) motion, a plaintiff's choice of forum generally is accorded substantial

weight, and a court will not transfer a case unless the "convenience" and "justice" factors tip

strongly in favor of the transfer. Florens Container v. Cho Yang Shipping, 245 F.Supp.2d 1086,

1092 (N.D. Cal. 2002), citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309,

1317 (9th Cir. 1985). Defendants contend that while a plaintiff’s choice of forum generally is a

factor that weighs against transfer, the Court should accord little to no weight to Plaintiff’s

choice of forum in a qui tam action. 

Defendants argue that “where there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs, all equally

entitled voluntarily to invest themselves with the. . .cause of action and all of whom could with

equal show of right go into their many home courts, the claim of any one plaintiff that a forum is

appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably weakened,” Johns v. Panera

Bread Co., No. 08-1071, 2008 WL 2811827, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2008), quoting Koster

v.(Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947). In Johns,

the district court analyzed the plaintiff’s choice of forum within the context of a class action,

while in Koster, the Supreme Court determined that this factor was accorded less weight when

the plaintiff sought relief in a derivative action. While the instant scenario is a qui tam action,

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 While Harrington is the only case that involved a qui tam action concerning the false 10

marking statute, Plaintiff makes no attempt to distinguish any of the above cited authority from

the action presently before the Court. 

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(JFLC1)

rather than a class or derivative action, the Supreme Court’s reasoning is arguably applicable

here. Plaintiff is one of “hundreds of potential plaintiffs, all equally entitled voluntarily to invest

themselves with the. . . cause of action and all of whom could with equal show of right go into

their many home courts.” Id. 

Moreover, there is substantial persuasive authority supporting Defendants’ position that a

plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to less weight in a qui tam action. Harrington v. Ciba

Vision Corp., NO. 3:08-CV-00251-FDW, 2008 WL 2893098, at *1 (W.D.N.C., July 23, 2008)

(holding that a plaintiff’s choice of forum may be accorded less weight in the context of a qui

tam false marking action); U.S., ex rel. Roop v. Arkray USA, Inc., No. 1:04 CV 87-M-D, 2007

WL 844691, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2007) (noting that “federal district courts throughout the

nation have held that, in qui tam actions, the plaintiff’s choice of venue is not entitled to the same

level of deference as in other actions.”), citing U.S. ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of University of

California, No. C 99-3864 THE, 2002 WL 334915, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2002) (emphasis in

original) (“a plaintiff's choice of forum is not given substantial weight when the plaintiff is a qui

tam relator, asserting the rights of the United States government.”); U.S. ex rel. Haight v.

Catholic Healthcare West, No. C-01-1202 PJH, 2001 WL 1463792, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,

2001) (holding that the fact that “the United States, rather than relators, is the real party in

interest ... lessen[ed] the deference traditionally accorded the plaintiffs' choice of forum.”); U.S.

ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., No. C-97-3814 MHP, 1999 WL 760610, at *3 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 21, 1999) (holding that “plaintiffs here are also suing in the name of another, the United

States” and that “thus, plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to little consideration.”). U.S., ex rel.

Penizotto v. Bates East Corp., No. CIV.A. 94-3626, 1996 WL 417172, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 18,

1996); United States ex rel. LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 625 F.Supp. 591, 594

(D.N.H. 1985) (plaintiffs' choice of forum “should be given relatively little weight” in a qui tam

action).10

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 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be afforded any 11

weight because “[c]ourts generally do not consider the convenience of counsel to be a relevant

factor in considering a motion to transfer venue.” Zimpelman v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2010

WL 135325, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2010), citing In re Horseshoe Entertainment, 337 F.3d 429,

434 (5th Cir.2003); Solomon v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043, 1047 (3rd

Cir.1973). Here, Plaintiff’s president (and only officer and only employee) is Dan Mount, who is

also the first name partner in the plaintiff’s law firm, Mount and Stoelker. See Declaration of

Dan Mount ¶ 3. Plaintiff and its law firm share the same address. Id., Ex. A. Finally, Plaintiff’s

proposed witnesses do not include Mount. Fingerman Decl. ¶ 2. 

14

Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

 Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish or even acknowledge any of this case authority. 

Instead, it argues that according less weight to its choice of forum would conflict with the

holding of the Federal Circuit in Forest Group. The relevant language from the court’s opinion

is as follows: 

Rather than discourage such activities, the false marking statute explicitly permits

qui tam actions. By permitting members of the public to sue on behalf of the

government, Congress allowed individuals to help control false marking. The fact

that the statute provides for qui tam actions further supports the per article

construction. Penalizing false marking on a per decision basis would not provide

sufficient financial motivation for plaintiffs – who would share in the penalty – to

bring suit. It seems unlikely that any qui tam plaintiffs would incur the enormous

expense of patent litigation in order to split a $500 fine with the government. 

Forest’s per decision construction is at odds with the clear language of the statute

and, moreover, would render the statute completely ineffective. 

590 F.3d at 1303-1304. However, while the Federal Circuit defined “an offense” based partly

upon its conclusion that Congress wished to permit, rather than discourage private individuals

from bringing qui tam actions, nothing in the Forest Group opinion supports the position that a

qui tam plaintiff’s choice of forum must be given the same weight as that of a typical plaintiff. 

While the statute explicitly considers a financial incentive for qui tam relators, the same cannot

be said with respect to choice of forum. Accordingly, the Court concludes that this factor is not

entitled to the considerable weight it typically receives, and the Court finds that this factor

weighs only slightly against transfer.11

4. Respective parties’ contacts with the forum 

While acknowledging that their products are sold in this district, Defendants contend that

their contact with the Northern District of California is limited and that this factor weighs in

favor of transfer. Declaration of Frederick G. Herold in Support of Church & Dwight’s Motions

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(“Herold Decl.”), Ex. B (10-K) (indicating that Church & Dwight’s executive offices and

primary research and development facilities are located in Princeton, New Jersey, that its largest

manufacturing facility (450,000 square feet) and product warehouse (600,000 square feet) are in

Pennsylvania, and that it only has a small factory in California (50,000 square feet); Declaration

of Gina A. Bibby in Support of Hi-Tech’s Motions, Ex. A (Declaration of Gary April (“April

Decl.”)) ¶¶ 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 (asserting that Hi-Tech: (1) has no facilities, employees, real

property, bank accounts, or subsidiaries in California; (2) is not registered with the California

Secretary of State to do business in California; (3) has not manufactured or packaged its accused

product in California; and (4) has not directly advertised its accused product in California);

Declaration of Laura Hastings in support of Maybelline and SoftSheen (“Hastings Decl.”) ¶¶ 10-

21 (asserting that Maybelline and SoftSheen have no distribution warehouses or manufacturing

facilities in the Northern District of California and that they employ approximately 1,000

employees total at the L’Oreal USA headquarters in New York and an additional 3,500

employees in New Jersey); Declaration of Timothy Connors in Support of Medtech’s Motions

(“Connors Decl.”) ¶¶ 7-9 (stating that all of Medtech’s operations including sales, marketing and

legal are managed from New York, all contracts for the manufacture of the concerned products

are negotiated by employees in New York, all decisions regarding product packaging and design

are made by management in New York, and that MedTech has one employee located in

California who services accounts in and outside of California, but that he is located outside of

this District in Mission Viejo, California); Declaration of Richard McMahon in Support of

Sunstar’s Motions (“McMahon Decl.”) ¶¶ 4-15 (claiming that Sunstar’s corporate headquarters,

sole distribution facility, sole manufacturing facility, and advertising staff are located in Illinois

and asserting that to the best of his knowledge “Sunstar has always had minimal contact with the

State of California” and estimating that “less than 13% of its total annual sales are to wholesalers

and retailers in California.”). 

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s contacts with the Northern District of California

are slim and entitled to little weight because San Francisco Technology Inc. was created in July

2009 for the sole purpose of litigating cases such as the instant action. See In re Zimmer

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

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(JFLC1)

Holdings, Inc., — F.3d —, 2010 WL 2553580, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying the Fifth

Circuit’s factors for establishing forum non conveniens and concluding that when the realities of

the case make it clear that a district is convenient only for a party’s litigation counsel that this is

accorded no weight). Plaintiff does not disagree with Defendants’ assertion that it was created

principally to litigate actions such as this one or their argument that its contacts in this district

should be accorded little weight. While Zimmer does not address the precise factual scenario

here – a plaintiff that appears to be an entity created by its attorney solely for the purpose of

litigation and a forum selected by that plaintiff solely for its attorney’s convenience – the basis

upon which the Federal Circuit reached its conclusion in Zimmer appears to apply equally. The

Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of Defendants, as their respective contacts with

California are dwarfed by their contacts with the forums to which they move to transfer. 

5. Contacts relating to the plaintiff's claim for relief in the chosen forum 

Liability under 25 U.S.C. § 292 arises from “(1) a marking importing that an object is

patented (2) falsely affixed to (3) an unpatented article (4) with intent to deceive the public.” 

Clontech Laboratories, Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, the markings on the concerned products and Defendants’ intention with respect to

marking the products with expired patents are the central material facts that give rise to

Plaintiff’s claim for relief. Defendants present undisputed evidence that their products are

manufactured outside of the Northern District of California and that the persons making the

decisions to affix the allegedly expired patents to the concerned products also are located outside

of the Northern District of California. See McMahon Decl. ¶ 12 (“Sunstar has no employees

located in California that have any decision making authority regarding Sunstar manufacturing,

use of patent numbers in packaging/advertising and/or patents (product development).”); id. ¶ 5

(“Sunstar does not manufacture or package any of its products outside of Chicago, Illinois);

Connors Decl. ¶¶ 6-8 (asserting that the concerned products previously were manufactured in

Georgia and now are produced in Indiana and that “decisions regarding United States product

packaging and design are made by Medtech’s management in its Irvington[, New York]

headquarters.”); April Decl. ¶ 11, 14 (asserting that Hi-Tech’s concerned product was

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partner in the firm representing Plaintiff, describes himself on his firm’s website as “a frequent

traveler to Asia for business and pleasure” who is also a licensed pilot. See

http://www.mount.com/index.cfm?page=attorney&pageid=85&bio=7&languageid_select=.

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(JFLC1)

manufactured and packaged for Hi-Tech in Ontario, Canada and that “Hi-Tech’s patent marking

decisions and activities all originated in New York.”); Hastings Decl. ¶ 17 (“All employees with

knowledge of the [Maybeline and SoftSheen] decisions in the design and creation of packaging

artwork, including patent numbers to be listed, on initial launch of new products, are located in

either New York or Clark, New Jersey). While Plaintiff concedes that this factor weighs in favor

of transfer, it requests that the Court grant it an opportunity to conduct discovery into the sales of

the accused products prior to any ruling on the instant motions. The Court concludes that

discovery of such facts would not affect its analysis, and that this factor weighs strongly in favor

of transfer.

6. Differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums 

Defendants contend that the necessary witnesses and evidence are located in the district to

which they request the claims against them be transferred and that the cost of litigation is greater

in this district. Although Plaintiff does not dispute these assertions, it argues that because most

of the Defendants are large companies they are able to absorb easily the small additional cost of

litigating in California as compared to their home states. Plaintiff contends that as a one-person

company it lacks the resources to send its sole employee across the country on multiple occasions

to attend hearings and trials. Mount Decl. ¶ 3. However, Plaintiff’s claimed hardship appears to

be of its own making. Plaintiff initiated the instant action against twenty-one improperly joined

and unrelated companies. It is only because Plaintiff joined so many Defendants that it now is in

the position to assert that the transfer of its claims against six of the Defendants would cause it

hardship. 

12

Plaintiff also attempts to argue that judicial economy weighs against transferring the

claims against the eight moving Defendants. Plaintiff directs the Court’s attention to IP Co. v.

Oncor Electric Delivery, Co., LLC, et al. No. 2:09-CV-37, slip. op. at 8 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2009)

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 Church & Dwight currently is defending a false marking case in another district court. 13

Church & Dwight contends that transferring Plaintiff’s claims against it to the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania would promote judicial economy because there already is a pending claim against it

in that district (Hirschhorn v. Church & Dwight Co. E.D. Pa. no. 10-cv-1156) concerning some

of the same Church & Dwight patents and products at issue here. Plaintiff does not address this

argument. The Court concludes that these facts support a determination that this factor weighs in

favor of transfer. 

18

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(JFLC1)

(concluding that judicial economy weighed against transfer because “a situation in which two

cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts

leads to wastefulness of time, energy, and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”),

quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009)(citation omitted). 

However, IP Co. was a patent infringement action in which the same patent was asserted against

all five defendants, and there were genuine common issues of fact and a genuine risk of

duplicative discovery. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.13

7. Availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling

non-party witnesses 

With rare exception, the Court's subpoena power only extends outside of this district if

the place of service is "within 100 miles of the place specified for the deposition, hearing, trial,

production or inspection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2). Plaintiff argues that defendants who falsely

mark their products with expired patents often seek to avoid liability by suggesting that the date

when a product is found on a retail shelf does not suggest that it was marked with the expired

patent after its expiration. Plaintiff argues that thirteen unidentified employees from the local

Walgreens and Target stores have relevant “knowledge about the frequency with which their

stores receive shipments of the defendants’ products,” “knowledge about their stores’ sales of the

defendants’ accused products and their recommendations of the defendants’ accused products to

the public,” and “the volumes of the defendants’ accused products sold in their stores and in

other [] stores in this region, as well as the time that typically elapses from when they receive

such products until those products are sold.” Declaration of Dan Fingerman ¶ 2 (identifying

generally “at least two store managers at two different Walgreens stores in San Jose, California

and a manager of a third Walgreens store in Cupertino, California,” “at least two stock clerks at

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those two San Jose Walgreens stores,” “at least three pharmacists at those two San Jose

Walgreens stores,” “two store managers of two different Target stores in San Jose and a third

store manager at a Target store in Cupertino,” and “at least two stock clerks in those two San

Jose Target stores.”). These proposed witnesses would not be subject to compulsory process in

any of the districts to which transfer is sought by the moving Defendants.

This argument is unpersuasive at best and insincere at worst. First, evidence of high

volume sales with rapid turnover at retail stores is not necessarily relevant with respect to a

number of the Defendants. Second, Plaintiff may seek discovery with respect to the value and

sales of Defendants’ products directly from Defendants, making testimony from these

unidentified witnesses unnecessary. Third, even if Plaintiff did have a genuine need for the

testimony of thirteen store clerks to prove its allegations about Defendants’ products, it could

obtain the testimony of clerks from any “national retail chain store” in the country. See contra

Shalaby v. Newell Rubbermaid, Inc., No. C06-07026 MJJ, 2007 WL 3144357, at *5 (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 24, 2007) (considering effect of third party witnesses only after determining that they were

“critical”); International Broth. of Teamsters v. North American Airlines, No. C05-0126 THE,

2005 WL 947083, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2005) (emphasis added) (considering the necessity of

the identified witnesses in analyzing this factor). Defendants do not argue that they will be

forced to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses. Rather, they claim that the

witnesses with information relevant to Plaintiff’s claims are their own employees who have

knowledge related to the marking of the products at issue and their intent when affixing the

allegedly false marks. Accordingly, this factor appears to be neutral. 

8. Ease of access to sources of proof

In considering this factor, the Ninth Circuit has held that a court must consider the

importance of the witnesses in the case, not just their number and location. See Gates Learjet

Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he court should have examined the

materiality and importance of the anticipated witnesses' testimony and then determined their

accessibility and convenience to the forum”). Here, each of the moving Defendants demonstrates

that its principal place of business or manufacturing headquarters and location of its employees

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 The one partial exception is Church & Dwight, which acknowledges that its

14

headquarters is in New Jersey but asserts that its largest warehouse is in Pennsylvania and that

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a more convenient forum. Herold Decl., Ex. B.

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with knowledge relevant to the marking of the concerned products and the intent of the company

in affixing the allegedly expired patents are outside of this district and in or close to the district to

which they request the action be transferred. See McMahon Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10, 12 (asserting that all 14

of its products are manufactured and packaged in Illinois and that all persons likely to have

information about the present case who would be called to testify at trial are in Illinois); Connors

Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8 (asserting that the products previously were manufactured in Georgia and now are

produced in Indiana, but that "decisions regarding United States product packaging and design

are made by Medtech's management in its Irvington[, New York] headquarters."); April Decl. ¶

11, 14 (asserting that Hi-Tech's concerned product was manufactured and packaged for Hi-Tech

in Ontario, Canada and that "Hi-Tech's patent marking decisions and activities all originated in

New York."); Hastings Decl. ¶ 17 ("All employees with knowledge of the [Maybeline and

Softsheen] decisions in the design and creation of packaging artwork, including patent numbers

to be listed, on initial launch of new products, are located in either New York or Clark, New

Jersey). 

Plaintiff’s sole argument with respect to this factor is that physical evidence such as

“samples of the defendants’ accused products as well as the packaging, labels, and advertising

associated with those products has been identified in San Jose and Cupertino.” Opposition to

Motions to Transfer at 7. However, as Defendants suggest, the same physical evidence can likely

be recovered through discovery should the instant action reach that stage of litigation. Moreover,

it would not be burdensome for Plaintiff to ship or bring its samples of the Defendants’ products

to the relevant district. Accordingly, the location of documents and witnesses weighs heavily in

favor of transfer.

9. Relevant public policy of the forum state, if any. 

Plaintiff and the majority of Defendants do not address the last factor considered in Jones,

which is the public policy of the forum state, and in any event the factor is not relevant to the

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majority of Defendants. However, Church & Dwight contends that California’s public policy of

judicial economy and the avoidance of inconsistent judgments favors transfer. People v. Garcia,

39 Cal.4th 1070, 1079 (2006) (citation omitted) (observing that one traditional public policy

served by the collateral estoppel doctrine is to “promote judicial economy by minimizing

repetitive litigation”); Murphy v. Murphy, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 784, 806 (Ct. App. 2008) (identifying

another public policy purpose of collateral estoppel as “prevent[ing] inconsistent judgments

which undermine the integrity of the judicial system.”). These policies are relevant to Church &

Dwight because it currently is defending a pending action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Church & Dwight argues that if the claims against it are not transferred, both this Court and the

court in Pennsylvania may expend resources seeking to resolve the same factual and legal issues

and there is a risk of inconsistent findings of fact and inconsistent judgments. Accordingly, this

factor weighs in favor of Church & Dwight’s motion. 

Taking all of the relevant factors into consideration, the Court concludes that the

"convenience" and "justice" factors tip strongly in favor of granting each of the instant motions to

transfer. 

VI. ORDER

Good cause therefor appearing, this action is hereby severed as to each and every separate

defendant. 

1. The claims brought by Plaintiff against Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. Inc. are hereby

transferred to the Eastern District of New York. 

2. The claims brought by Plaintiff against Medtech Products Inc. are hereby transferred to

the Southern District of New York. 

3. The claims brought by Plaintiff against Sunstar Americas, Inc. are hereby transferred to

the Northern District of Illinois.

4. The claims brought by Plaintiff against Church & Dwight Co. Inc. are hereby

transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

5. The claims brought by Plaintiff against Maybelline LLC and SoftSheen-Carson, LLC

are hereby transferred to the Southern District of New York. 

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Case Number 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT)

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

(JFLC1)

6. The Clerk shall open new case numbers for each of the following, all to be assigned to

the undersigned, and shall file a copy of the complaint and this order in each.

a. San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. Bayer Corporation

b. San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. Bright Image Corporation

c. San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC

d. San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. McNeil-PPC, Inc.

e. San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. Playtex Products Inc.

f. San Francisco Technology, Inc. v. Sun Products Corporation 

7. Each of the actions remaining in this district shall be stayed, pending the decision of

the Federal Circuit in Stauffer and until further order of the Court. The parties shall notify the

Court promptly when a decision in Stauffer issues. 

8. Except as to Defendant Exergen, the motions to dismiss are terminated, without

prejudice. As to Exergen, the motion to dismiss is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 7/19/2010

____________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

Case 5:10-cv-00966-JF Document 315 Filed 07/19/10 Page 22 of 22