Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02175/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02175-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY UDOM,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11CV2175 WQH (POR)

ORDER

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, Chief Counsel,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

On August 23, 2011, Petitioner initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1

 (ECF No. 1). On October 24, 2011,

Respondent filed a Return to the Petition. (ECF No. 9). On November 8, 2011, Petitioner filed

a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 13). On January 9, 2012, 

Respondent filed a Return to the First Amended Petition. (ECF No. 16). 

I. Allegations of the First Amended Petition

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security. On

February 2, 2011, he was arrested “for deportation proceedings.” (ECF No. 13 at 4). Removal

proceedings were initiated against Petitioner but the proceedings were eventually terminated

by an immigration judge. On July 8, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security reopened

the removal proceedings against Petitioner. The removal proceedings are ongoing. 

1

 The Petition was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Central

District of California and was transferred to this Court on September 19, 2011. 

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Petitioner asserts a claim for violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) and the Fourteenth

Amendment. Petitioner asserts that his deportation arrest was unlawful on the grounds that his

notice to appear did not state that he was a danger to the community and the aggregate

sentence for his deportable offenses is less than the amount required for deportation. Petitioner

asserts a claim for violation of the ex post facto clause on the grounds that the Department of

Homeland Security’s current charge that Petitioner is a danger to the community unlawfully

expands the punishment for his underlying criminal offense. Petitioner requests an “abeyance

and withholding of judgment decision on [his claim pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)] until

Petitioner is released ... to adjudicate Petitioner’s 1990 application or U.S. citizenship.” Id. at

7. Petitioner requests that the court “order [the Department of Homeland Security] to answer

why and what made the 1990 application incomplete ....” Id.

II. Discussion

Respondent contends that the Court is precluded from considering Petitioner’s challenge

to the removal proceeding because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 

Respondent contends that there is no legal basis to stay the removal proceeding to allow

Petitioner to apply for naturalization. Respondent contends that the petition should be denied

as a successive petition under the abuse of writ doctrine. Respondent contends that the First

Amended Petition fails to state a claim. 

Petitioner contends “[a] prudential consideration will lie only if [the Department of

Homeland Security] removal proceeding is properly filed.” (ECF No. 18 at 2). Petitioner

contends that “[i]n this case, [the Department of Homeland Security] filing in immigration

court is not proper, instead it is unconstitutional [resulting in his] an unlawful arrest and

detention.” Id. at 3. 

“[S]ection [2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals

before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th

Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,

548 U.S. 30 (2006)). However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a

prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available ... administrative remedies before

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seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047; see also Singh v. Napolitano,

649 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The prudential exhaustion doctrine is well established....”);

Acevedo-Carranza v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district

court correctly dismissed a petition for failure to exhaust judicial remedies); Rojas-Garcia v.

Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a petitioner must exhaust

administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a habeas petition) (citation

omitted); cf. Ramirez v. Norwood, Case No. CV 07-3851-JVS (RNB), 2009 WL 2949747 at

*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (“A challenge to the execution of a sentence [including matters

such as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials,

prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions] – in

contrast to the imposition of a sentence – is properly filed pursuant to § 2241.”) (citing Levine

v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2006). 

The exhaustion requirement addresses the following prudential concerns: “(1) agency

expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper

decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the

administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct

its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” El Rescate Legal Services, Inc.

v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1991).

In this case, Petitioner challenges his removal proceedings but the removal proceedings

are ongoing. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The

Court finds that the prudential exhaustion doctrine applies to Petitioner’s case. The First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 13) is DISMISSED without prejudice. 

DATED: February 8, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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