Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02372/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02372-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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* This motion was determined to be suitable for decision

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1 Plaintiff’s opposition was not timely filed. Plaintiff

filed, concurrently with his opposition, an ex parte application for

extension of time to file the opposition. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN BROWN, )

) NO. CIV 03-2372 GEB KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER* 

)

WAL-MART STORES, INC., ANGELA ) 

WHITLOW, DON FILLA, and DOES )

1 through 25, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s

claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Plaintiff opposes

the motion.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kevin Brown was a Personnel Coordinator for Claims

Management Incorporated (CMI) beginning in April 2000, and was

responsible for ensuring that CMI associates in the Sacramento office

complied with Wal-Mart’s employee policies. (Statement of Undisputed

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2 The facts are set forth in the movants’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts filed on February 18, 2005, and are supported by the

affidavits of Kristin L. Oliveira, Angela Whitlow, and Daniel Filla,

and supporting evidence, as required by Local Rule 56-260.

2

Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 5, 10.)2 In or during March 2003 or early April

2003, Defendant Angela Whitlow, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor,

received an anonymous typewritten letter which stated that Plaintiff

had brought a friend into the office to solicit associates to purchase

pirated satellite equipment, identifying Tom Van Deman and Flarry

Henry as individuals who may have additional information about the

incident. (SUF ¶¶ 7, 19, 20.) Ms. Whitlow then visited the CMI

office in Sacramento, California, and asked Defendant Daniel Filla,

President of CMI, to meet with her to discuss Plaintiff’s potential

wrongdoing and showed Mr. Filla the anonymous letter. (SUF ¶¶ 8, 21,

22.) Ms. Whitlow and Mr. Filla then met with Mr. Van Deman and Mr.

Henry, and another CMI employee, to inquire about whether Plaintiff

had brought a friend of his into the workplace to offer satellite

equipment. (SUF ¶¶ 24, 26, 31, 35.) 

Ms. Whitlow and Mr. Filla then met with Plaintiff. (SUF ¶

38.) Plaintiff admitted that he brought a friend, Marty Johnson, to

the CMI office to meet with a CMI associate and discuss the purchase

of satellite “black boxes.” (SUF ¶ 39.) Ms. Whitlow asked Plaintiff

if he believed that his actions were inappropriate as a personnel

coordinator and Plaintiff told Ms. Whitlow that he believed his

actions were an error in judgment. (SUF ¶¶ 41-42.) Mr. Filla told

Plaintiff that they were concerned because Plaintiff had brought Mr.

Johnson to the workplace and concluded it constituted gross

misconduct/lack of integrity. (SUF ¶ 44.) Ms. Whitlow told Plaintiff

that she was terminating him for gross misconduct/lack of integrity

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3

and completed Plaintiff’s exit interview or termination notice on

April 16, 2003. (SUF ¶¶ 46-47.) Ms. Whitlow declares that at no time

did she consider Plaintiff’s race or color in any decision to

terminate him. (SUF ¶ 61.)

STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all

evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations

omitted). “[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual

dispute for purposes of summary judgment.” Nelson v. Pima Community

College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Witherow v.

Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir. 1995)). The “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order

to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Id. (quoting

Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.

56(e), 28 U.S.C. App., p.626).

DISCUSSION

First Claim: Breach of Contract

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach

of contract claim. Defendants contend Plaintiff was an at-will

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3 Defendants also contend that even if there was an implied

employment contract that Plaintiff would be discharged only for good

cause, Defendants have provided evidence that Plaintiff was terminated

for good cause. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 12-17.) However, this

issue need not be decided since there is no evidence that Plaintiff

was anything other than an at-will employee.

4 In fact, Plaintiff did not even mention the portion of

Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the breach of contract claim in

his opposition.

4

employee and could be terminated at any time with or without cause.3

(Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 8-9.) “[T]here is no evidence that

plaintiff had an express or implied, oral or written, contract of

employment with Wal-Mart.” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 9.) 

“[California] Labor Code section 2922 provides that ‘[a]n

employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of

either party on notice to the other.’ An at-will employment may be

ended by either party ‘at any time without cause,’ for any or no

reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement

of notice.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 335 (2000).

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Plaintiff’s

employment was anything other than at-will employment.4 Plaintiff

signed an Offer Letter for the position as Personnel Coordinator,

accepting that his employment was at-will and he could be terminated

at any time and could terminate his own employment at any time. (SUF

¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s application for employment states that he would be

employed on an at-will basis. (SUF ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also signed an

acknowledgment of the Wal-Mart Associate Handbook, which provides that

all its store associates are employed at-will. (SUF ¶¶ 1-2.) 

 Since Plaintiff was an at-will employee, Defendants could

terminate Plaintiff at any time with or without cause. Therefore,

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5 Defendants also contend that their conduct did not violate

any covenant of good faith and fair dealing since there was good cause

for terminating Plaintiff. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 23-30.) But,

this issue need not be decided here.

6 Plaintiff did not mention this claim in his opposition.

5

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of

contract claim is granted.

Second Claim: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing

Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot establish the existence

of an employment contract between the parties, so Plaintiff cannot

establish a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.5 (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 21-24.) 

“[W]ith regard to an at-will employment relationship, breach 

of the implied covenant cannot logically be based on a claim that a

discharge was made without good cause. If such an interpretation

applied, then all at-will contracts would be transmuted into contracts

requiring good cause for termination, and Labor Code section 2922

would be eviscerated.” Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d

654, 699 n.39 (1988); see also Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 350-52.

Since there is no evidence that Plaintiff was anything other

than an at-will employee, and there is no evidence of an agreement to

terminate only upon a showing of good cause, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for breach of an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is granted.6

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6

Third Claim: Race Discrimination

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s racial

discrimination claim, arguing since Defendants terminated Plaintiff

for a legitimate and lawful reason, Plaintiff cannot establish a

racial discrimination claim. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 24-29.) 

Plaintiff argues a prima facie case of racial discrimination

exists since “Plaintiff was treated differently than the white male

co-worker and by the fact that his actions were deemed gross

misconduct.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) Plaintiff

argues that Defendants cannot establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his termination, and that the rationale

provided by Defendants was merely pretextual. 

The basis for Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim is that

Plaintiff was treated differently because of his race since he was

terminated for gross misconduct for inviting Mr. Johnson into the CMI

office, while Mr. Van Deman, a white employee, was not even

investigated, even though Mr. Van Deman allegedly initiated all

efforts with requesting illegal satellite equipment and allegedly

purchased the equipment. (Pl.’s Separate Statement of Disputed Facts

¶¶ 73, 76, 85.) After Plaintiff was discharged, he told Mr. Filla

that Mr. Van Deman purchased the satellite equipment from Mr. Johnson. 

(SUF ¶ 63.) Mr. Filla did not investigate the discrepancy between Mr.

Van Deman’s representation that he did not purchase the satellite

equipment and Plaintiff’s statement that Mr. Van Deman indeed

purchased the equipment. (SUF ¶ 64.) However, Mr. Filla declares

that the decision not to investigate whether Mr. Van Deman purchased

the satellite equipment was not based on Mr. Van Deman’s or

Plaintiff’s race or color. (SUF ¶ 65.)

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7

Plaintiff also contends that “by categorizing Plaintiff’s

actions as gross misconduct, Defendants were able to shield themselves

from conducting a fair and objective investigation” since an employee

found to have engaged in gross misconduct can be terminated without

“coaching for improvement” (written or oral counseling). (Pl.’s Opp’n

to Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) 

However, Defendants have declared that Plaintiff was

terminated because of his poor judgment in inviting Mr. Johnson into

the CMI office, and that the termination was not because of his race. 

Plaintiff only speculates that he was terminated because of his race

but has shown no evidence that Plaintiff’s misconduct was merely a

pretext for discrimination. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim is granted.

Fourth Claim: Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Defendants contend Plaintiff has no evidence he was

wrongfully discharged in violation of any public policy. (Defs.’ Mot.

for Summ. J. at 29-31.) Plaintiff counters that “Plaintiff’s

termination came shortly after he clearly advocated payment to

employees that had worked overtime. The termination of Plaintiff was

such that one could reasonably conclude that Defendants were laying in

wait for an opportunity to terminate Plaintiff for his involvement in

such advocacy.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.) 

“[A]part from the terms of an express or implied employment

contract, an employer has no right to terminate employment for a

reason that contravenes fundamental public policy as expressed in a

constitutional or statutory provision.” Turner v. Anheuser-Busch,

Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1251-52 (1994). Defendants, however, have

established the reason for Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff only

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7 Plaintiff did not mention this claim in his opposition.

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speculates that he was terminated for another reason. Therefore,

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted.

Fifth Claim: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants contend Plaintiff has not provided evidence that

Defendants intentionally caused Plaintiff any emotional distress.

(Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 31-32.) Since the record is devoid of

such evidence, Plaintiff has not countered Defendants’ showing that

they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Therefore,

Defendants’ motion is granted.7

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, summary judgment is entered in favor

of Defendants and against Plaintiff. The Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment in favor of Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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