Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02173/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jose Abel Fierro, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-02173-PHX-PGR (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On October 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) The Court subsequently granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis

status and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim with leave to amend. 

(Doc. 18.) On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 23.) The Court 

screened the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed 

without prejudice counts two through six and defendants Ryan, Pratt, Badilla, Houze, 

Molera, Piotrowsky, Barrera, Stephan, Fizer, Crabtree, Tucker, Morales, Theodore, 

Ratas, Merchant, Does in Central Office Pain Management, Stark, Miller, Stowell, 

Greeley, Anderson, Espinoza, Ghetts, Thompson, Brower, Mattos, Harvey, Lundberg, 

and Wiggins. (Doc. 23 at 16.) The Court directed Defendants McCarville, Ochoa, 

Pruett, Forester, Mcoffy, and Smith to answer count one. (Id.) 

 On June 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint. 

(Doc. 24.) The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for failure to comply with LRCiv 15.1(a), 

which requires that the party seeking to amend a pleading attach a copy of the proposed 

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amended pleading as an exhibit to his motion. (Doc. 25.) Plaintiff has now filed a 

motion for reconsideration of that Order and attached a proposed second amended 

complaint. (Doc. 28.) The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s pending motion be 

construed as a renewed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. 

 Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff needs leave of 

court to file an amended complaint because he has previously amended his complaint. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Court further recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave 

to amend and that his Second Amended Complaint be screened pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a). 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 When screening a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court must dismiss a 

complaint, or any portion of a complaint, in which a plaintiff has raised claims that are 

legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

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specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. 

at 681. 

 But as the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se

filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint 

[filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 

curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint 

 In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four counts against the 

following Defendants: (1) Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (ADC); (2) Badilla #4389, correctional officer (CO) III at Rast UnitBuckeye; (3) Michael McCarville, Associate Deputy Warden of the Rast Unit-Buckeye; 

(4) Houze, CO II at the Cimarron Unit-Tucson; (5) Molera, CO II at Cimarron UnitTucson; (6) Pitrowsky,1

 Sergeant at Cimarron Unit-Tucson; (7) Blanca Ochoa, Associate 

Deputy Warden at Cimarron Unit Tucson; (8) M. Mcoffy, Protective Segregation 

Administrator for ADC; (9) Keith Smith, Security Operations Administrator for ADC; 

(10) Shuster, Associate Deputy Warden, Morey-Unit, Buckeye; (11) Sanders, Associate 

Deputy Warden, Dakota Unit-Yuma; (12) Pruett, Deputy Warden Kaibab Unit-Winslow; 

(13) G. Fizer, Deputy Warden ASPC-Florence; (14) Quintero, Special Security Unit, 

APSC-Florence; (15) M. Stephan, CO III ASPC-Florence; (16) Jackson, Reclassification 

Officer APSC-Florence; (17) P. Wiggin, Reclassification Officer for ADC; 

(18) L. Forester, Associate Deputy Warden Cimarron Unit-Tucson; (19) Cary Tucker, 

Physician Assistant at Morey Unit-Buckeye; (20) Luen, CO III, Stiner Detention UnitBuckeye; (21) Morales, Nursing Supervisor Stiner Unit-Buckeye; (22) B. Rojas, Facility 

Health Administrator at Buckeye; (23) K. Merchant, Medical Doctor, Stiner Detention 

Unit-Buckeye; (24) L. Malachinski, Medical Doctor, Buckley Unit-Buckeye; 

 

1

 Plaintiff spelled this name Piotrowsky in his amended complaint. (Doc. 22.) 

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(25) Rioochi, Registered Nurse, West Medical-Tucson; (26) Lacrone, COII, Cimarron 

Unit-Tucson; (27) Stark, CO III at Dakota Unit-Yuma; (28) Miller, Nursing Supervisor 

Dakota Unit- Yuma; (29) Veckcovic, Medical Doctor, APSC-Florence; (30) F. Stowell, 

Facility Health Administrator ASPC-Winslow; (31) G. Greeley, Facility Health 

Administrator for ASPC-Winslow; (32) S. Anderson, Grievance Coordinator at ASPCFlorence; (33) M. Espinoza, Grievance Coordinator at ADOC; (34) M. Thompson, 

Medical Doctor ASPC-Florence; (35) Ryan Brower, Physician Assistant ASPC-Florence; 

(36) Shruff, Medical Doctor at ASPC-Florence; (37) L Brown, Medical Doctor, 

Manzanita Unit-Tucson; (38) T. Nash, Clinical Coordinator, Medical Complex-Tucson; 

and (39) East, Clinical Coordinator, Medical Complex-Tucson. (Doc. 28 at 4-5.) 

A. Allegations in Count One 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that his safety was threatened in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. As summarized below, Plaintiff alleges that he was threatened and 

assaulted at various ADC facilities. He further alleges that he repeatedly reported these 

threats and assaults and requested protective custody, but the Defendants ignored his 

reports and requests. 

 Plaintiff asserts that in January 2011, he had a “violent physical confrontation” 

with his cellmate, Nieto. (Doc. 28 at 6.) Nieto requested a cell change and was moved to 

a new cell. (Doc. 28 at 6.) After Nieto’s cellmate was transferred, Nieto was moved 

back to Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff and Nieto told Defendant Badilla that the move was not 

going to work and that they had previously had an altercation. Defendant Badilla stated 

that he could not help and left. (Doc. 28 at 6, Doc. 23 at 4.) On January 23, 2011, Nieto 

and Plaintiff had a “second violent confrontation” and, during the altercation, Plaintiff 

broke his right hand. (Doc. 28 at 7, Doc. 23 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant 

Badilla more than once that he did not want to share a cell. (Doc. 28 at 7.) 

 At some point while at ASPC-Lewis, Plaintiff filed a written request for protective 

segregation because he feared the Border Brothers. (Id. at 7.) Defendants McCarville 

and Mcoffy denied Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation “disregarding the 

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excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety,” and placed Plaintiff in the general population in the 

proximity of the Border Brothers. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to Defendant Smith stating his 

safety concerns. (Id.) Defendant Smith denied Plaintiff’s request for protective 

segregation and stated that Plaintiff’s allegations were self-reported and unsubstantiated. 

(Id.; Doc. 23 at 3.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred from ASPC-Lewis to ASPC-Tucson, Cimarraon Unit. On 

March 11, 2012, Plaintiff was housed with inmate Gastelum, the head of the Border 

Brothers. (Doc. 28 at 7.) Gastelum learned that Plaintiff had requested protective 

segregation at ASPC-Lewis and went through Plaintiff’s “personal boxes” and took 

“personal items.” (Id.) Plaintiff and Gastelum then had a “violent physical 

confrontation.” (Id.) 

 Defendant Houze took Gastelum to medical. (Id.) Before going to medical, 

Gastelum allegedly told two other inmates, Lopez and Nunez, to “take care of Plaintiff.” 

(Id.) When Defendant Houze returned, Plaintiff “begged” her several times not to open 

the cell door and informed her that the Border Brothers were going to beat him up. 

Plaintiff asked Defendant Houze if he could speak to the sergeant-in-charge. Defendant 

Houze did not tell the control room (Defendant Molera) not to open Plaintiff’s cell door. 

About an hour later, Defendant Molera opened Plaintiff’s cell door three times. (Doc. 28 

at 7-8.) Plaintiff struggled to keep the door closed, but inmates Lopez and Nunez 

eventually entered Plaintiff’s cell and beat and kicked him. (Doc. 28 at 8.) 

 When Defendant Houze returned from letting another pod out for breakfast, 

Plaintiff showed her his bleeding face and asked her why she or Defendant Molera 

opened his cell door. She did not respond. (Doc. 28 at 8.) Plaintiff asked Defendant 

Houze if he could speak with the shift commander. Plaintiff spoke with Defendant 

Pitrowsky and requested protective segregation. (Id.) Defendant Pitrowsky took Plaintiff 

to the North building where he was treated by medical staff members. (Id.) 

 Defendant Pitrowsky took pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries and helped him complete 

a request for protective segregation. (Doc. 28 at 8.) Plaintiff completed a protective 

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segregation inmate statement for Defendants Ochoa’s and Mcoffy’s review. Defendants 

Ochoa and Mcoffy denied Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation even though they 

allegedly knew he was the victim of a violent incident with Lopez and Nunez. (Id.) 

Plaintiff appealed to Defendant Smith, but Defendant Smith denied the appeal stating that 

Plaintiff’s allegations were self-reported and unsubstantiated. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was subsequently transferred back to ASPC-Lewis-Buckeye Morey Unit. 

(Doc. 28 at 8.) On April 5, 2012, Plaintiff reported his problem with the Border Brothers 

to CO II Rich. (Id.) Another inmate, who was Plaintiff’s friend, told him that he could 

not resolve his problem with the Border Brothers and, if Plaintiff stayed in ASPC-Lewis, 

Morey Unit, he would be assaulted. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to the yard office where he 

completed a protective segregation statement for review by Defendants Mcoffy and 

Shuster. (Id.) Defendants Mcoffy and Shuster denied Plaintiff’s request for protective 

segregation. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed that decision to Defendant Smith, who denied the 

appeal. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Yuma, Dakota Unit, general population in May 

2012. (Doc. 28 at 9.) Inmates Hernandez and Castillo approached Plaintiff and told him 

that he “ha[d] to go or else.” (Doc. 28 at 9.) Plaintiff was taken to the yard office and 

completed a protective segregation inmate statement for review by Defendants Sanders 

and Mcoffy. (Id.) Defendants Sanders and Mcoffy denied Plaintiff’s request for 

protective segregation. Plaintiff appealed the denial to Defendant Smith. (Id.) In the 

appeal, Plaintiff stated that he was assaulted on January 27, 2011 and March 11, 2012 and 

stated that he should not be housed with his “enemies,” the Border Brothers. (Id.) 

Defendant Smith denied the appeal. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Winslow and was placed in the general 

population on June 18, 2012. (Id.) That day, someone put a note under Plaintiff’s cell 

door stating that he knew about Plaintiff’s problem and if [Plaintiff] wanted to “run with 

la Raza,” he would have to stab or kill anyone as they instructed. (Id.) Plaintiff told 

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Floor Officer Contreras what had transpired and was taken to the yard office, where he 

verbally requested protective segregation. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff completed a protective segregation inmate statement for Defendants 

Pruett’s and Mcoffy’s review. (Id.) Defendants Pruett and Mcoffy denied Plaintiff’s 

request for protective segregation and placed him in alternative general population. 

Defendant Barrera conducted a second review of Plaintiff’s request and denied it. (Id.) 

Plaintiff appealed the denial to Defendant Smith who denied the appeal. (Id. at 9-10.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Florence. (Id. at 10.) There, Plaintiff ran into 

his friend, Castro, “who had knowledge of the incident that almost occurred back in April 

of 2012, at Morey Unit.” (Id.) Castro wrote a letter to Defendants Fizer and Quintero 

explaining that Mondragon, the head leader of the Border Brothers, gave the “green 

light” to kill Plaintiff in April 2012 and that Nieto and Quinonez were ordered to carry 

out the hit. (Doc. 28 at 10.) Plaintiff did not receive a response to the letter. (Id.) 

 On June 20, 2013, Defendant Stephan approached Plaintiff’s cell door and stated 

that it was time for a maximum custody placement recommendation “or not.” (Id.) 

Defendant Stephan recommended assignment to maximum custody because there were 

no options available for “close custody.” (Doc. 28 at 10.) Plaintiff told Defendant 

Stephan that he “want[ed] maximum custody.” (Id.) Defendant Stephan allegedly 

omitted from Plaintiff’s reclassification form the number of times Plaintiff had been 

physically assaulted by the Border Brothers in close custody yards, level four. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that, although they were aware of the excessive risk to Plaintiff’s 

safety, Defendants Fizer, Wiggin, Jackson, and Quintero denied Plaintiff’s request for 

placement in maximum custody. (Doc. 28 at 11.) Defendant Fizer “had knowledge of 

the threat to Plaintiff” and he withheld that information from other Defendants and prison 

staff. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Tucson, Cimarron Unit where he was assaulted 

by the Border Brothers on March 11, 2012. (Doc. 28 at 11.) An inmate approached 

Plaintiff as soon as he entered the building and told him to “leave or else. You know 

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what happened the last time you were here.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked two COs if he could 

leave the yard. The COs took Plaintiff to the yard office, where a lieutenant asked 

Plaintiff if he wanted protective segregation. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff completed a protective segregation statement for review by Defendants 

Forester and Mcoffy and stated that Mondragon had put a hit on him. Defendants 

Forester and Mcoffy were allegedly aware of the excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety, but 

denied Plaintiff’s request for protective segregation status and placed him in alternative 

general population. (Doc. 28 at 11.) Plaintiff appealed to Defendant Smith and requested 

a copy of all of his paperwork. (Id.) Defendant Smith did not send Plaintiff a copy of his 

paperwork and denied the appeal, although he was allegedly aware of the risk to 

Plaintiff’s safety. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred back to ASPC-Lewis, Morey unit, where Mondragon had 

placed the “hit” on Plaintiff. (Doc. 28 at 12.) On December 26, 2013, Plaintiff entered 

the yard and was assaulted by two members of the Border Brothers. (Doc. 28 at 12.) The 

guard tower staff saw the assault and sounded the alarm. Plaintiff again requested 

protective segregation.2

 Plaintiff contends that Defendants Shuster, Pitrowsky, Sanders 

were aware of the risks to Plaintiff’s safety. (Id.) He argues that Defendants Shuster and 

Mcoffy sent him to a prison yard where the Border Brothers are a security threat to the 

guards. (Id.) 

B. Allegations in Count Two 

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that several Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 28 

 2

 Count One also includes allegations regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment that are repeated in Count Two. The Court addresses those allegations in its discussion of Count Two. Plaintiff specifically alleges that he was taken to the medical complex building where he was evaluated by R.N. Bundushi. (Doc. 28 at 12.) Defendant Tucker 

did not follow-up on Plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff was not given any pain medication 

and was left to suffer. (Id.) He was also denied refills for his Gabapentin and Tramadol. (Id.) Medical staff refused Plaintiff’s requests for treatment of his internal injuries. (Id.) 

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at 14-20.) He asserts that he made numerous requests for medical care, but that his 

requests were ignored or that he did not receive appropriate treatment. 

 Plaintiff alleges that, after the December 26, 2013 attack, he was taken to medical. 

(Doc. 28 at 14.) Nurse Rodriguez referred Plaintiff to “complex medical” (Id.) Upon his 

arrival at complex medical, Plaintiff told Nurse Bundushi that he had been kicked in the 

head, face, ear, shoulder, and lower back. (Id. at 15.) Nurse Bundushi evaluated Plaintiff 

and treated his external injuries. (Id.) Nurse Bundushi also consulted with Defendant 

Tucker over the phone. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tucker did not order a 

follow-up appointment for Plaintiff and Plaintiff was not physically examined for his 

internal injuries. (Doc. 28 at 15.) Plaintiff also told Nurse Bundushi that his 

prescriptions for Gabapentin and Tramadol had expired December 19, 2013 and that he 

needed those prescriptions renewed for nerve and chronic pain. (Doc. 28 at 15.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Tucker knew of Plaintiff’s medical problems, including acute right 

lumbar and radiating buttock pain, a herniated disc, and he disregarded an excessive risk 

to Plaintiff’s health, pain, and suffering. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he submitted several 

health needs requests for a renewal of his Gabapentin and Tramadol “with no success. 

Def. Ryan. Statewide.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Luen was responsible for reviewing inmate 

complaints in the Stiner Unit, and that Defendant Morales was responsible for processing 

“medical inmate complaints” at the Stiner Unit. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he sent an 

“inmate informal complaint resolution” to Defendants Luen and Morales requesting 

medical treatment related to the December 26, 2013 incident. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff stated 

that he was repeatedly kicked in the head, face, left ear, right harm right shoulder, right 

hand, and lower right backside. (Id.) He stated that he had headaches, a deviated 

septum, severe ringing in one ear, “kick burns” on his right arm, and that his pre-existing 

shoulder, hand, and sciatic nerve injuries were aggravated in the assault. He stated that 

Nurse Bundushi did not treat his internal injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

Luen and Morales did not respond to his informal inmate complaint. (Id.) 

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 On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an inmate letter to Defendant Rojas 

describing his injuries alleged sustained during the December 26, 2013 assault and asking 

for medical care to address his excruciating pain. (Doc. 28 at 16-17.) On February 4, 

2014, Defendant Rojas responded that Plaintiff should submit a health needs request 

(HNR) directly to nursing staff if he experienced “signs/symptoms.” (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff 

asserts that this response was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because 

Defendant Rojas did not refer him to a specialist. (Id.) 

 On January 20, 2014, Plaintiff wrote an inmate letter to Defendant Luen regarding 

his medical grievances. He requested that Defendant Luen ensure that his January 6, 

2014 grievance was processed because he was suffering from chronic pain. (Id. at 18.) 

On February 9, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an HNR “to medical” complaining that he had 

not received follow-up treatment for his injuries sustained during the December 26, 2013 

assault. (Id. at 17-18.)) 

 In the meantime, on February 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance with CO 

IV Theodore,3

 who is responsible for reviewing and processing grievances at the Stiner 

Unit. (Id.) Plaintiff complained that Defendants Luen and Morales had not resolved his 

complaints about the lack of medical care for his injuries related to the December 26, 

2013 assault. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Theodore did not forward Plaintiff’s grievance to 

Defendant Rojas. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff asserts that he did not receive a response to his 

inmate letter or grievances from Defendants Luen, Morales, or Rojas. (Doc. 28 at 18.) 

 Plaintiff further alleges that, while in Stiner Unit, he “submitted six HNRs to the 

nursing staff” stating that he was in pain and needed to be seen. (Id. at 19.) He received 

a response that he was scheduled for an appointment on February 25, 2014. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was evaluated by Dr. Tucker on February 28, 2014, and he argues 

that Dr. Tucker did not properly review his medical file to appropriately recommend pain 

 

3

 Plaintiff does not specifically name Theodore as a Defendant. (Doc. 28 at 4-5.) 

However, to the extent that he intended to name Theodore as a Defendant, the Court 

recommends that he be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the June 10, 2014 Order. 

(Doc. 23 at 16.) 

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medication that took Plaintiff’s allergy to aspirin and Tylenol into account. (Doc. 28 at 

19.) Plaintiff was also evaluated by Dr. Merchant on January 23, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Dr. Merchant did not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s medical file or test results 

to appropriately recommend pain medication. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff was transferred to Buckley Unit in Buckeye, Arizona and was evaluated 

by Defendant Dr. Malachinski on May 28, 2014. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Malachinski informed him that the electromyography and nerve conduction test studies 

from February 6, 2012 did not establish that Plaintiff had a herniated disc. (Id.) Plaintiff 

asserts that the results from the tests at the University of Arizona Medical Center “state 

otherwise.”4

 (Id.) 

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Tucker, Rojas, Malachinski, Ryan, and Pratt5

failed to create an effective tracking and scheduling system for health care appointments 

or for medical records. (Id.) He further alleges that he asked Defendants Tucker, 

Merchant, Rojas, and Malachinski for appropriate diagnostic tests for his injuries 

sustained on December 16, 2013, but his requests “have fallen on deaf ears.” (Id. at 20.) 

 Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Ryan denied grievance appeal number 

L002-002-014 on May 27, 2014. (Id.) Defendant Ryan explained that Plaintiff had been 

seen by medical staff several times and had been prescribed pain medication. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Ryan did not adequately responded to his grievance and 

has delayed, denied, or interfered with medical care related to Plaintiff’s injuries and 

medical conditions. (Doc. 28 at 20.) 

C. Allegations in Count Three 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff again alleges that several defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff 

 

4

 Plaintiff reiterates these allegations against Defendant Malachinski in Count Three. (Doc. 28 at 27.) The Court does not discuss these allegations again in relation to Count Three. 

5

 Plaintiff does not specifically identify Pratt as a defendant. (Doc. 28 at 4-5.) To 

the extent that Plaintiff intended to name him as a defendant, the Court recommends that 

he be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the June 10, 2014 Order. (Doc. 23 at 16.) 

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alleges that on October 15, 2011, he developed hip pain that radiated into his right foot. 

(Doc. 28 at 21.) He asserts that, on that evening, he was transported to “West Medical.” 

(Id.) Defendant Rioochi, a registered nurse, evaluated Plaintiff. (Doc. 28 at 22.) 

Defendant Rioochi asked, “what is the problem.” (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Rioochi 

that, out of nowhere, he had developed “excruciating pain.” (Id.) Plaintiff speculated 

that his pain might be related to an old gunshot wound or to muscles that he had pulled on 

March 31, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he told Defendant Riochi about his medical 

problem more than once, but Defendant Rioochi “kept asking over and over the same 

thing.” (Id.) He further alleges that Defendant Rioochi did not review his medical file, 

and wanted to give Plaintiff ibuprofen, even though Plaintiff is allergic to it, and did not 

consult the “provider on call” to determine what to do about Plaintiff’s excruciating pain. 

(Doc. 28 at 22.) He alleges that Defendant Rioochi stated that Plaintiff’s complaints of 

pain were inconsistent with what Plaintiff was telling him. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff further alleges that he continued to be in pain on October 17 and 18, 

2011. (Doc. 28 at 23.) On October 20, 2011, he was sent to the “emergency department 

at the University of Arizona” where he was diagnosed with sciatica and a herniated 

lumbrosacal disc. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that on November 18, 2011, he needed his 

cellmate to help him walk, but “Sgt. Sway” threatened Plaintiff with disciplinary action if 

anyone helped him. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was never evaluated by a specialist and 

that a “formal complaint to Deputy Warden Ochoa” was ignored. (Doc. 28 at 23.) 

 On February 6, 2012, Plaintiff was sent “off site” for medical treatment and was 

diagnosed with “severe active right lumbrosacral polyradiculopathy” involving the L-5 

and S-1 nerve roots. (Id.) Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication and diagnostic tests 

were ordered. (Id. at 24.) 

 On March 11, 2012, Plaintiff was assaulted by two inmates and the assault 

allegedly exacerbated his pre-existing medical issues. (Id.) Plaintiff filed several health 

needs requests in April 2012. (Id.) On May 16, 2012, he filed “an inmate informal 

attempt at resolution” with Defendants Stark and Miller. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he had 

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been in excruciating pain since October 16, 2011. Plaintiff did not otherwise describe his 

medical condition. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Stark and Miller did not 

respond to his letter. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleged that he continued to seek medical treatment. After Nurse 

Practitioner Shelby evaluated Plaintiff on June 27, 2012, Plaintiff “received” Tramadol 

for his chronic pain and Gabapentin for his nerve pain. (Doc. 28 at 25.) On September 

13, 2012, Dr. Gibula increased Plaintiff’s dosage of Gabapentin for nerve pain 

management. (Id.) In December 2012, Defendant Dr. Veckcovic “took away Plaintiff’s 

Gabapentin.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that, a day or so after his Gabapentin was 

terminated, his blood pressure “skyrocketed.” (Id.) Although Plaintiff raised the issue 

with Defendant Veckcovic, he did not “call out” Plaintiff to be evaluated. (Id.) Plaintiff 

claims that he continues to be in pain. (Id.) 

 On January 6, 2013, Defendant Ryan “partially” upheld Plaintiff’s medical 

grievance No. W02-051-012. (Doc. 28 at 26.) However, Plaintiff asserts that he has not 

received paperwork that he needs to file a notice of claim under Arizona law. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, although he was written letters to Defendants Espinoza, Stephan, 

Anderson, and Ryan stating that he needs the “paper work for risk management,” they 

have not responded. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff further alleges that he continued to complain to medical personnel about 

his pain related to a herniated disc and a pinched nerve. (Doc. 28 at 26.) On April 25, 

2013, Defendant Brower evaluated Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff complained of pain related to 

his pinched sciatic nerve. Defendant Brower did not prescribe Tramadol or Gabapentin. 

(Id.) Plaintiff saw Dr. Brower again on June 5, 2013. (Id.) Plaintiff again requested pain 

treatment for his pinched sciatic nerve and herniated disc. Plaintiff was in pain and could 

“hardly walk.” (Id.) Defendant Brower did not approve Plaintiff’s request for Tramadol 

or Gabapentin and allegedly refused Plaintiff’s June 14, 2013 request for referral for 

further diagnostic testing. (Id.) On June 20, 2013, a different doctor approved Plaintiff’s 

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request for Gabapentin for his nerve pain. (Id.) On September 12, 2013, Defendant 

Brower again denied Plaintiff’s requests for Tramadol and Gabapentin. (Doc. 28 at 27.) 

 On July 29, 2013, Defendant Dr. Shruff saw Plaintiff for complaints of pain 

caused by his pinched sciatic nerve and herniated disc. (Doc. 28 at 27.) Dr. Shruff 

denied Plaintiff’s request for Tramadol and referred him for an “electrostimulation for his 

spinal cord, lower back, major nerve leaving spine.” (Id.) 

 Plaintiff further alleges that on August 19, 2013, he was evaluated by Defendant 

Dr. Thompson in relation to his sciatic nerve pain and his herniated disc. (Id.) Defendant 

Thompson denied Plaintiff’s request for Tramadol and did not explain why he 

discontinued Plaintiff’s Gabapentin. (Doc. 28 at 27.) 

 D. Count Four 

 Count Four asserts additional claims that several defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiff alleges that he broke his hand on January 27, 2011 during a fight with another 

inmate. (Doc. 28 at 28.) He had surgery on his hand on February 23, 2011. (Id.) On 

March 1, 2011, the surgeon removed the external sutures and instructed the prison 

medical coordinator to bring Plaintiff back in thirty days to remove the pins. (Id.) On 

March 3, 2011, the surgeon evaluated Plaintiff and again told the prison medical 

coordinator, Defendant Nash, to bring Plaintiff back to have the pins removed. (Id.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nash disregarded the surgeon’s directive. (Id.) On May 

18, 2011, Plaintiff’s surgeon evaluated him and again told “the prison medical clinical 

coordinator” that the pins needed to be removed from Plaintiff’s hand. (Id.) 

 On June 20, 2011, Plaintiff had surgery to remove the pins. (Id. at 29.) On June 

28, 2011, the surgeon evaluated Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff reported that he had ongoing 

numbness, tingling, and pain. (Id.) Plaintiff states that the surgeon concluded that 

because of the delay in removing Plaintiff’s pins, sensory nerve injury had occurred. 

(Id.) The surgeon wrote a medical incident report for Defendants Nash and East. The 

surgeon recommended a CT scan of Plaintiff’s hand that Plaintiff never received. (Id.) 

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 Plaintiff saw the surgeon again on August 8, 2011 for continued hand pain. (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that the surgeon wrote “in his notes to the prison clinical coordinator 

Def[endant] Nash or Def[endant] East that the hardware in Plaintiff’s hand need[ed] to 

come out due to complications.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “prison medical staff” did not 

pay attention to such risk. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff next alleges that, on September 20, 2011, he was instructed not to eat 

anything because he was having surgery. However, he was not transferred for surgery to 

remove the hardware from his hand because Defendants Nash and East did not approve 

the surgery. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted several HNRs related to his hand pain 

and his request for surgery. (Id.) He claims that Defendants Nash and East were aware 

that he needed treatment, but denied it. (Id.) 

 On March 16, 2012, Defendant Brown ordered x-rays for Plaintiff’s hand that was 

“re-broken” several days before. (Id.) On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff was informed by 

“medical staff” that Defendant Brown has cancelled all medical evaluation or treatment. 

(Id.) On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a “medical/inmate grievance” to Defendant 

Stowell or Defendant Greeley asking for the removal of the hardware from his hand. 

(Doc. 28 at 30.) On July 12, 2012, Defendant Stowell responded that she did not see any 

notes or health needs requests from Plaintiff related to his hand prior to July 10, 2012. 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that he had sent several health needs requests about his hand. (Id.) 

 On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff sent a prison inmate letter to Defendant Greeley 

complaining that his broken right hand had not been treated. He also complained about 

the lack of treatment for pain caused by his pinched sciatic nerve. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts 

that, because he did not get any relief, he filed a grievance appeal to Defendant Ryan on 

October 13, 2012 requesting removal of the hardware in his hand. (Doc. 28 at 31.) 

III. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims 

 To prevail in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the 

defendants (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or 

immunities and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 

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1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game

Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he 

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must 

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Count One 

 Typically, to state an Eighth Amendment claim for threat to safety an inmate must 

allege facts to support that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk 

of harm and that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). To adequately allege deliberate indifference, a 

plaintiff must allege facts to support that a defendant knew of, but disregarded, an 

excessive risk to inmate safety. Id. at 837. That is, “the official must both [have been] 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exist[ed], and he must also [have] draw[n] the inference.” Id. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). 

 1. Defendant Badilla 

 The Court previously dismissed Defendant Badilla, stating that Plaintiff’s 

allegations that he and his cellmate told Defendant Badilla on one occasion that they did 

not want to share a cell, and that Badilla did not act in response to the information, did 

not demonstrate that Badilla disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. (Doc. 23 

at 11.) In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant 

Badilla “more than once” that he did not want to share a cell with his cellmate. (Doc. 28 

at 7.) Plaintiff’s amended allegations against Defendant Badilla are still insufficient to 

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state a threat of safety claim.6 Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant 

Badilla be dismissed. 

2. Defendants Houze and Molera 

 The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff told Defendant Houze that 

his cell door should not be opened because he feared attack by other inmates and that 

Defendant Molera later opened the cell door three times to admit another inmate. 

(Doc. 28 at 7-8.) Plaintiff alleges that on the third time Defendant Molera opened the 

door, two other inmates entered Plaintiff’s cell and attacked him. (Id. at 8.) 

 The Court previously found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the actions of 

Defendant’s Houze and Molera were vague and dismissed those Defendants. (Doc. 23 at 

11.) In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff expands on his claims. He adds that he 

was unable to speak directly with Defendant Molera and argues that Defendant Houze 

did not notify Defendant Molera not to open Plaintiff’s cell door. (Doc. 28 at 7-8.) 

Plaintiff again has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant Molera was 

aware of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, Defendant 

Molera should be dismissed. 

 In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he told Defendant Houze not to 

open his cell because the Border Brother were “going to beat [him] up,” and that he 

“feared for his safety,” because he had had three “violent confrontations” with the Border 

Brothers. (Doc. 22 at 5.) In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff adds that he told 

Defendant Houze not to open his cell door because the Border Brothers were going to 

“assault” him, that he told her several times not to open his cell door, and that she 

responded that she would not open his cell door. (Doc. 28 at 7.) He also alleges that 

about an hour passed from when he told Defendant Houze not to open his cell door and 

when Defendant Molera opened his cell door. (Doc. 28 at 7.) He further adds that 

 

6

 Plaintiff reiterates his claims against Defendant Badilla in Count Four. (Doc. 28 

at 28.) The Court addresses these claims once and does not include them in its discussion 

of Count Four. 

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Defendant Molera later opened his cell door to admit inmates Lopez and Nunez, not his 

cellmate. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff again has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendant 

Houze was aware of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety and that she disregarded that 

risk. Plaintiff does not allege that he told Defendant Houze never to open his cell door 

and, even if he did, never opening Plaintiff’s cell door would be impractical. 

Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Houze opened his cell door. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Houze 

be dismissed. 

 3. Defendant Pitrowsky 

 As in the amended complaint, in the Second Amended Plaintiff alleges that, after 

he was attacked in his cell, he told Defendant Pitrowsky that he wanted to be transferred 

to protective segregation. (Doc. 22 at 6; Doc. 28 at 8.) Defendant Pitrowsky took 

pictures of Plaintiff’s injuries, took him to medical, and helped him complete a protective 

segregation request. (Doc. 22 at 6; Doc. 28 at 8.) As the Court previously found, these 

allegations do not demonstrate that Defendant Pitrowsky was aware of, and disregarded, 

an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. (See Doc. 23 at 12.) Accordingly, Defendant 

Pitrowsky should be dismissed. 

 4. Defendant Stephan 

 As in the amended complaint, in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

that, on June 20, 2013, Defendant Stephan approached Plaintiff’s cell door and stated that 

it was time for a maximum custody placement recommendation. (Doc. 22 at ; Doc. 28 at 

10.) Defendant Stephan recommended “prison yard level four” but failed to include the 

number of times Plaintiff had been assaulted in the reclassification form, even though 

Plaintiff had had “numerous issues at close custody yards.” (Doc. 22 at. 9; Doc. 28 at 

10.) Plaintiff told Defendant Stephan that he wanted “maximum custody.” (Doc. 22 at 9; 

Doc. 28 at 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Stephan did not approve his 

placement in maximum custody. (Doc. 28 at 11.) 

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 These allegations do not demonstrate that Defendant Stephan was aware of an 

excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety that he disregarded. (See Doc. 23 at 12.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant 

Stephan and the Court recommends that he be dismissed. 

 5. Defendants Fizer, Quintero, and Wiggin 

 In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, another inmate 

wrote letters to Defendants Fizer and Quintero describing an attack on Plaintiff that 

occurred in 2012. (Doc. 28 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Fizer and Quintero 

did not respond to the letters. (Doc. 28 at 10.) As in the amended complaint, Plaintiff 

also alleges that Defendants Fizer and Wiggin did not approve Plaintiff’s placement in 

maximum custody. (Doc. 22 at 9; Doc. 28 at 10.) In the Second Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiff adds that Defendant Fizer and Quintero were aware of “facts in writing of the 

Plaintiff’s assaults by the [Border Brothers] at Rast Unit-Buckeye Az. Cimarron UnitTucson Az. And the times he was run out of several prison yards.” (Doc. 28 at 10.) 

Plaintiff asserts that “all this information is available to all high ranking staff when [an 

inmate] is known to have issues with a certain gang member.” (Id.) He alleges that this 

information was contained in his “AIMS file and “I/M letters,” “so they knew about this 

issue and placed Plaintiff in harm[’]s way.” (Id.) Plaintiff adds that Defendant Wiggin 

did not review his AIMS File. (Id. at 11.) He further alleges that Defendants Quintero, 

did not approve Plaintiff’s placement in maximum custody. (Id.) 

 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Fizer and 

Wiggin for failure to state a claim because Plaintiff did not demonstrate that they were 

aware of, and disregarded, an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. (Doc. 23 at 12.) 

Although Plaintiff has expanded his allegations against Defendants Fizer and Wiggin, 

those allegations are still insufficient to state a claim against them. (See Doc. 23 at 12.) 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants Fizer and Wiggin be dismissed. 

 Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Quintero are conclusory and do 

not demonstrate that Defendant Quintero was aware of, and disregarded, an excessive 

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risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant Quintero be 

dismissed. 

 6. Defendant Jackson 

 In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jackson 

denied Plaintiff’s placement in maximum custody on July 12, 2013. (Doc. 28 at 11.) 

This conclusory allegation does not demonstrate that Defendant Jackson was aware of, 

and disregarded, an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant Jackson and the 

Court recommends that he be dismissed. 

 7. Defendants McCarville, Ochoa, Pruett, Forester, Mcoffy, Smith, 

 Shuster, and Sanders 

 In the June 10, 2014 Order, the Court ordered Defendants McCarville, Ochoa, 

Pruett, Forester, Mcoffy, and Smith to respond to Count One of the amended complaint. 

(Doc. 23 at 15.) In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same allegations 

against those Defendants as he did in the amended complaint. (Doc. 23 at 5-7; Doc. 28 at 

8-13.) He also asserts similar allegations against Defendants Shuster and Sanders, who 

were not named as defendants in the amended complaint. (Doc. 8-9, 12.) Based on the 

reasoning underlying the Court’s June 10, 2014 Order, liberally construed, Plaintiff has 

stated an Eighth Amendment threat to safety claim in Count One of the Second Amended 

Complaint against Defendants McCarville, Ochoa, Pruett, Forester, Mcoffy, Smith, 

Shuster, and Sanders and the Court recommends that those Defendants be required to 

respond to Count One of the Second Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 23 at 15.) 

B. Count Two 

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that several Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

(Doc. 28 at 14.) To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show that the 

defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

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(1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure 

to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate 

indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the 

indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a 

prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the 

way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 However, “[a] difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to 

[a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

A mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison 

officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 

766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must 

rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

 1. Defendant Tucker 

 Plaintiff alleges that, although Defendant Tucker was aware of Plaintiff’s medical 

problems from his medical file, during “a verbal consult” with Nurse Bundushi on 

December 26, 2013, he did not order follow-up medical care regarding Plaintiff’s injuries 

sustained during the December 26, 2013 attack by two inmates. (Doc. 28 at 15.) He 

further alleges that Defendant Tucker evaluated him on February 28, 2014, but that he 

failed to adequately review Plaintiff’s medical record, or HNRs, and that he wanted to 

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give Plaintiff ibuprofen, although Plaintiff’s medical file indicated that he is allergic to 

aspirin and Tylenol. (Doc. 28 at 19.) 

 Plaintiff asserted similar allegations against Defendant Tucker in the amended 

complaint (Doc. 22 at 12-13), and the Court found them conclusory and concluded that 

they failed fail to state a claim.7

 Although Plaintiff has added some detail to his 

allegations against Defendant Tucker, these allegations are not sufficient to state a claim. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant Tucker be dismissed. 

 3. Defendants Ryan, Luen, Morales, and Rojas 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ryan, Luen, Morales, and Rojas 

disregarded his informal inmate letter, inmate grievances, or grievance appeals related to 

the lack of medical care for injuries Plaintiff sustained during an attack by two inmates 

on December 26, 2013. (Doc. 28 at 16-20.) Plaintiff alleges that those informal letters 

and grievances described the December 26, 2013 attack and the injuries that he sustained 

during that attack.8

 (Doc. 28 at 16, 18.) He alleges that, to date, he has not received 

proper treatment for his “internal injuries.” (Doc. 28 at 20.) 

 Defendant Rojas responded to Plaintiff’s inmate letter by instructing him that he 

should submit a health needs request if he was experiencing any medical issues. (Doc. 28 

at 16-17.) These allegations do not state a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s 

serious medical needs. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Ryan, Luen, 

 

7

 Additionally, failure to check Plaintiff’s medical file amounts, at most, to 

negligence. See Walter v. Lancaster State Prison Medical Dept., 2010 WL 2680535, at 

*6 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that doctor’s failure to check a plaintiff’s medical file based 

on his statements about his medical condition was no more than negligence). An isolated incident of arguable neglect does not constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (“If the harm is an ‘isolated exception’ to the defendant's ‘overall treatment of the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate indifference.’ ”) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 

1991)). 

8

 Plaintiff stated that he needed medical treatment after two inmates repeatedly kicked him in the head, face, left ear, right arm, right shoulder, right hand, and lower right backside. (Doc. 28 at 16.) He stated that he had severe headaches, a deviated 

septum, his ears would not stop ringing, he had “kick burns” on his right arm, his prior injuries to his right shoulder, previously broken right hand, and sciatica were aggravated during the attack. (Id.) 

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and Morales failed to respond to a single informal inmate grievance do not support a 

claim of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants 

Rojas, Ryan, Luen, and Morales be dismissed. (See Doc. 23 at 16.) 

 4. Defendant Malachinski 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Malachinski evaluated Plaintiff on May 28, 2014 

and stated that Plaintiff did not have sciatica or a herniated disc. (Doc. 28 at 19.) 

Plaintiff alleges that other medical findings conflicted with Dr. Malachinski’s diagnosis. 

Plaintiff further alleges that he told Defendant Malachinski he was in pain, but Defendant 

Malachinski did not order any diagnostic tests. (Doc. 28 at 19-20.) Plaintiff’s or another 

medical provider’s apparent disagreement with Dr. Malachinski’s diagnosis or course of 

treatment does not give rise to a claim of deliberate indifference. See Sanchez, 891 F.2d 

at 242 (“A difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a 

plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted against Defendant Malachinski and the Court 

recommends that he be dismissed.9

 

 5. Defendant Pratt 

 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Pratt did not create an effective tracking or 

scheduling system for health care appointments or for prison medical records. (Doc. 28 

at 19.) Plaintiff raised these same allegations in his amended complaint (Doc. 22 at 13), 

and the Court found that they did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

(Doc. 23 at 12-13.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has again failed to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted against Defendant Pratt and the Court recommends that he be 

dismissed.10 

/ / / 

 

9

 Plaintiff asserts these same allegations against Defendant Malachinski in Count Three. (Doc. 28 at 27.) The Court will not revisit these allegations in its discussion of that count. 

10 Plaintiff also asserts these same allegations against Defendants Tucker, Rojas, Malachinski, and Ryan. (Doc. 28 at 19.) As the Court found in its June 10, 2014 order, 

these allegations fail to state a claim. (Doc. 23 at 12-13.) 

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 6. Defendant Merchant 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Merchant evaluated him on January 24, 2014 and 

did not adequately review Plaintiff’s medical record to appropriately recommend pain 

medication. (Doc. 28 at 19.) Defendant raised these same allegations in his amended 

complaint (Doc. 22 at 13), and the Court dismissed them for failure to state a claim. 

(Doc. 23 at 13-14.) Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant Merchant be 

dismissed. 

C. Count Three

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that several Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

(Doc. 28 at 21-27.) The standard for establishing such a claim is set forth above in 

Section III.B. 

 1. Defendant Rioochi 

 Plaintiff alleges that on a single occasion, Defendant Rioochi disregarded 

Plaintiff’s complaints of “excruciating pain,” and failed to prescribe pain medication or to 

contact the provider on call to determine how to treat Plaintiff’s pain. (Doc. 28 at 22.) 

Plaintiff states that Defendant Rioochi told Plaintiff that his complaints of pain were 

inconsistent with the information he provided about the alleged source of that pain. (Id.) 

He also asserts that Defendant Rioochi did not review his medical file. (Id.) 

 Even if Defendant Rioochi wrongly assessed Plaintiff’s medication condition on 

one occasion, that isolated incident does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096 (“If the harm is an ‘isolated exception’ to the defendant's ‘overall 

treatment of the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate 

indifference.’”) Additionally, failure to check Plaintiff’s medical file is, at most, 

negligence that does not support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Walter, 2010 WL 

2680535, at *6 (finding that doctor’s failure to check a plaintiff’s medical file based on 

his statements about his medical condition was no more than negligence). Accordingly, 

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the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

against Defendant Rioochi and recommends that he be dismissed. 

 2. Defendants Stark and Miller 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Stark and Miller failed to respond to a single 

“informal attempt at resolution” in which Plaintiff stated that he had been in excruciating 

pain since October 16, 2011.11 (Doc. 28 at 24.) As the Court found in its June 10, 2014 

Order (Doc. 23 at 8, 13-14), this isolated incident is not sufficient to state a claim that 

Defendants Stark and Miller were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. Accordingly, Plaintiff has again failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted against Defendants Stark and Miller and the Court recommends that they be 

dismissed. 

 3. Defendant Veckcovic 

 Plaintiff alleges that, in December 2012, Defendant Dr. Veckcovic “took away 

Plaintiff’s Gabapentin.” (Id.) He further alleges that, the next day, his blood pressure 

“skyrocketed” due to his pain and that he “brought the issue to Dr. Veckcovic,” but was 

never “called out” to be evaluated. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Veckcovic’s 

termination of his Gabapentin prescription constitutes deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs. (Id.) Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations, he has stated a 

claim against Defendant Veckcovic. Accordingly, the Court recommends that he be 

required to respond to the Second Amended Complaint. 

 4. Defendants Ryan, Espinoza, Stephan, and Anderson 

 Plaintiff alleges that he needed paperwork to file a notice of claim under Arizona 

law, and that he wrote letters to Defendants Espinoza, Stephan, Anderson, and Ryan 

stating that he needs the “paperwork for risk management,” but they have not responded. 

(Doc. 28 at 26.) Plaintiff’s allegations regarding paperwork allegedly needed to file a 

notice of claim in Arizona do not state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate 

 

11 Plaintiff reiterates his allegations against Defendants Stark and Miller in Count 

Four. (Doc. 28 at 30.) 

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indifference of a serious medical needs. Accordingly, the Court recommends that these 

claims against Defendants Espinoza, Stephan, Anderson, and Ryan be dismissed.12

 5. Defendant Brower 

 Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Brower failed to 

approve pain medication, including Tramadol and Gabapentin, several times during three 

different appointments in 2013, and that Plaintiff continued to be in pain (Doc. 28 at 26), 

Plaintiff has stated a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against 

Defendant Brower and the Court recommends that he be required to respond to the 

Second Amended Complaint. 

 6. Defendants Shruff and Thompson 

 Plaintiff’s allegations that on one occasion Defendants Shruff and Thompson 

denied Plaintiff’s request for Tramadol does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. See 

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (“If the harm is an ‘isolated exception’ to the defendant's ‘overall 

treatment of the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding of deliberate 

indifference.’”) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

Similarly, as the Court found in its June 10, 2014 Order (Doc. 23 at 9, 13-14), Defendant 

Thompson’s one-time failure to explain why he lowered Plaintiff’s dose of Gapaentin 

does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Additionally, although Defendant 

Shruff did not prescribe the medication Plaintiff requested, he referred Plaintiff for other 

treatment. (Doc. 28 at 27.) “A difference of opinion does not amount to deliberate 

indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez, 891 F.2d 242. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted against Defendants Shruff and Thompson and recommends that they be 

dismissed. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

12 Plaintiff reiterates these allegations in support of an alleged Eighth Amendment violation in Count Four. (Doc. 28 at 31.) 

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D. Count Four 

 In Count Four, Plaintiff again alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

(Doc. 28 at 28-30.) The standard for stating such a claim is set forth in Section III.B. 

 1. Defendants Nash and East 

 Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Nash and East 

repeatedly ignored the recommendation of Plaintiff’s surgeon regarding the course of 

treatment for Plaintiff’s hand (Doc. 28 at 28-29), he has stated an Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim in Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint against 

Defendants Nash and East. The Court recommends that those Defendants be required to 

respond to Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint. 

 2. Defendant Brown 

 Plaintiff’s allegations that, on one occasion, Defendant Brown allegedly cancelled 

treatment for his broken hand does not state a claim for an Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference claim. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (“If the harm is an ‘isolated exception’ to 

the defendant's ‘overall treatment of the prisoner [it] ordinarily militates against a finding 

of deliberate indifference.’”) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against 

Defendant Brown and the Court recommends that he be dismissed. 

 3. Defendants Stowell and Greeley 

 Plaintiff’s allegations that on one occasion Defendants Stowell and Greeley failed 

to respond to Plaintiff’s inmate grievances (Doc. 28 at 30) are not sufficient to state a 

claim that those Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical 

needs. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

against Defendants Stowell and Greeley and the Court recommends that they be 

dismissed. 

E. Defendant Lacrone 

 Plaintiff does not include any allegations against Defendant Lacrone in his Second 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 28.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

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which relief can be granted against Defendant Lacrone and the Court recommends that he 

be dismissed. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court construe Plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration as a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 28), grant 

the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and direct the Clerk of Court to 

file the Second Amended Complaint attached to Docket 28. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendants Badilla, Houze, Molera, 

Pitrowsky Stephan, Fizer, Quintero, Wiggin, Jackson, Tucker, Ryan, Luen, Morales, 

Rojas, Malachinski, Pratt, Merchant, Rioochi, Stark, Miller, Espinoza, Anderson, Shruff, 

Thompson, Brown, Stowell, Greeley, Lacrone, Theodore, and Count Two be dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order Defendants 

McCarville, Ochoa, Pruett, Forester, Mcoffy, Smith, Shuster, and Sanders to respond to 

Count One of the Second Amended Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order Defendants 

Veckcovic and Brower to respond to Count Three of the Second Amended Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court order Defendants Nash and 

East to respond to Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED as follows:

 (1) That the Court order the Clerk of Court to send Plaintiff a service packet 

including the Second Amended Complaint, this Order and any order adopting it, and both 

summons and request for waiver forms for Defendants McCarville, Ochoa, Pruett, 

Forester, Mcoffy, Smith, Shuster, Sanders, Veckcovic, Brower, Nash, and East. 

 (2) That the Court order Plaintiff to complete and return the service packet to 

the Clerk of Court within 21 days of the date of Order adopting this Report and 

Recommendation and advise Plaintiff that the United States Marshal will not provide 

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with the Court’s Order. 

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 (3) That the Court warn Plaintiff that if he does not either obtain a waiver of 

service of the summons or complete service of the Summons and Second Amended 

Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 

days of the filing of the Order adopting the report and recommendation, whichever is 

later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (4) That the Court direct the United States Marshal to retain the Summons, a 

copy of the Second Amended Complaint, and a copy of the order adopting the report and 

recommendation for future use. 

 (5) That that Court direct the United States Marshal to notify Defendants of the 

commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to 

Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include 

a copy of this Order and any order adopting it. The Marshal must immediately file 

signed waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned 

as undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the 

request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

 (a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and this 

 Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

 Procedure; and 

 (b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service 

 for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of

 service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service

 upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

 form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

 photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or 

 this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 

 required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

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 pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 

 ordered by the Court. 

 (6) That the Court direct that a Defendant who agrees to waive service of the 

Summons and Second Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the 

United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff. 

 (7) That the Court order Defendants to answer the Second Amended Complaint 

or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable 

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (8) That the Court direct that any answer or response must state the specific 

Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, 

response, or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name 

on whose behalf it is filed. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the District Court’s acceptance of the Report and 

Recommendation without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of August, 2014. 

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