Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01433/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01433-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES BRYANT, No. 2:09-cv-01433-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GORDON & WONG LAW GROUP, P.C.

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

 Presently before the Court is a Motion by Defendant Gordon

& Wong Law Group, P.C. (“Defendant”) for Summary Judgment, or in

the alternative summary adjudication of issues, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendant so moves on the

grounds that claims alleged by Plaintiff James Bryant

(“Plaintiff”) are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For the

following reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted.1

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Case 2:09-cv-01433-MCE -DAD Document 37 Filed 02/01/10 Page 1 of 6
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 Plaintiff has since indicated that he withdraws his 2

privacy claim.

2

BACKGROUND

On March 9, 2006, Defendant filed a collection lawsuit

against Plaintiff in Sacramento County Superior Court. The proof

of service filed in Superior Court indicates that Plaintiff was

personally served with the Summons and Complaint. (Pl.’s Ex. B) 

After no response to the Complaint was filed, on December 28,

2006 the state court entered a default judgment against

Plaintiff. To satisfy the judgment for its client, Defendant

obtained a writ of execution to garnish Plaintiff’s bank

accounts.

Plaintiff states that he was never served with the Summons

and Complaint or any court-related documents. Instead, in what

Plaintiff describes to be “out of the blue”, he discovered in

March 2009 that his checking and savings accounts had been

garnished. Consequently, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court

alleging violation of the federal Fair Debt collection Practices

Act (“FDCPA”), California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), and invasion of privacy .

2

Defendants however argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred

by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, as such, this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction. On these grounds Defendant moves

for summary judgment.

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3

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

claiming relief may move...for summary judgment on all or part of

the claim.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file together with

the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

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4

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Schuylkill and Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81

U.S. 442, 448 (1871)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen

the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts....Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

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5

ANALYSIS

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine established the principle that

federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in

substance, appeals from state court judgments. Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Pursuant to federal

statute, final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court

of a state may only be reviewed by the United States Supreme

Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); Elks Nat. Found. v. Weber, 942 F.2d

1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject matter

jurisdiction over a proceeding in which a party losing in state

court seeks what effectively would be appellate review of the

state judgment in a United States district court. Doe v. Mann,

415 F.3d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). A federal district court must

refuse to hear a forbidden de facto appeal from a judicial

decision of a state court. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156

(9th Cir. 2003)

The Supreme Court recently revisited Rooker-Feldman,

clarifying the interpretation of the doctrine. In Exxon Mobile

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., the Supreme Court affirmed that

“the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon

Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 

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6

The crux of Plaintiff’s case rests on the allegation that

Plaintiff was never served with Defendant’s complaint and that

his bank accounts were garnished without any prior notice. 

However in disputing the garnishment of his accounts, Plaintiff

is inherently challenging the entry of default against him and

the writ of execution that authorized the garnishment. The net

effect is that Plaintiff is seeking to undermine the state court

judgments. These judgments were rendered before the current

district court proceeding, and any action by this Court in favor

of Plaintiff on his FDCPA or RFDCPA claims would necessarily

require review of those state court judgments. The RookerFeldman doctrine specifically bars this Court from doing so. If

Plaintiff believes he has been wronged by the actions of the

state court, he must turn to the state for remedy. This Court

lacks jurisdiction to provide redress for Plaintiff’s claims. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 23) is

GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in

favor of Defendant and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 29, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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