Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02677/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02677-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kenneth D. Meinhardt,

Petitioner,

v. 

Laura Escapule, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02677-PHX-GMS (ESW)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Kenneth D. Meinhardt’s (“Petitioner”) First Amended 

Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “First Amended 

Petition”) (Doc. 8). Respondents have filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 18), and Petitioner 

has replied (Doc. 19). The matter is deemed ripe for consideration. 

Petitioner raises four grounds for habeas relief in the First Amended Petition. The 

undersigned finds that Petitioner has not exhausted any of his federal habeas claims and 

that the claims are not procedurally defaulted. It is therefore recommended that the Court 

dismiss the First Amended Petition without prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Convictions and Sentences

On June 30, 2000, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on five 

counts of armed robbery, each a class 2 felony and dangerous offense. (Doc. 18-1 at 2-

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6). As explained by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

Counts 1 and 2 were based on robberies that occurred on

November 23 and December 19, 1999, at a Little Caesar’s Pizza

shop and a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. Counts 3, 4, and

5 were based on robberies that occurred on June 8, June 11, and

June 16, 2000, at the same 7-11 convenience store. The State

further alleged that [Petitioner] had three historical non-dangerous

felony convictions.

[Petitioner] made a pre-trial motion to sever the five

counts. The trial court granted the motion in part and directed

that Counts 1 and 2 be severed from Counts 3, 4, and 5 and tried

separately. At the commencement of trial on Counts 3, 4, and 5,

the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Count 4. 

Upon trial to a jury, [Petitioner] was found guilty as charged on

Counts 3 and 5.

 At his second trial, which was limited to Count 2,

[Petitioner] was likewise found guilty as charged. Pursuant to a

plea agreement, [Petitioner] thereafter pled guilty to Count 1 in

exchange for the State’s agreement that the sentence on Count 1

would run concurrent to his sentences on Counts 2, 3, and 5.

 [Petitioner] admitted to two prior non-dangerous felonies

and was sentenced as a repetitive offender on Counts 3 and 5

by Judge Crane McClennen, who had presided over the first

trial, to consecutive, presumptive 15.75-year prison terms.

[Petitioner] was subsequently sentenced on Counts 1 and 2 by

Judge Edward O. Burke, who had presided over the second trial 

and accepted [Petitioner’s] plea agreement. Judge Burke

also sentenced [Petitioner] as a repetitive offender based on 

[Petitioner’s] admissions to his prior non-dangerous felonies, and

ordered that he serve a presumptive 15.75-year term on Count 2 

consecutive to the sentences on Counts 3 and 5 and a

concurrent, aggravated 16-year term on Count 1.

(Id. at 79-80).

B. Direct Appeal 

Petitioner timely appealed his convictions and sentences to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Id. at 78-93). In July 2002, the Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner’s 

convictions on Counts 3 and 5 after finding that the trial court abused its discretion by

precluding alibi witnesses from testifying at trial as a sanction for Petitioner’s untimely 

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disclosure of the alibi witnesses. (Id. at 80-86). 

With respect to Counts 1 and 2, the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that the May 

4, 2001 minute entry stated that Petitioner’s sentence on Count 1 is 15.75 years and that 

Petitioner’s sentence on Count 2 is sixteen years. (Id. at 85). After reviewing the 

transcript of the sentencing hearing, the Court of Appeals found that the May 4, 2001 

minute entry “has the sentences on the two counts backwards.” (Id.). “The transcript of 

the sentencing on Counts 1 and 2 makes clear that the trial court sentenced [Petitioner] to 

an aggravated 16-year prison term on Count 1 and a presumptive 15.75-year term on 

Count 2.” (Id.). The court also found that the “transcript is also sufficiently clear that the 

trial court directed the sentence on Count 2 be served consecutive to the sentences 

previously imposed on Counts 3 and 5, and that the sentence imposed on Count 1 be 

served concurrent with the sentences on Counts 2, 3, and 5.” (Id.). Under Arizona law, 

“[w]here there is a discrepancy between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the 

oral pronouncement of sentence controls.” State v. Hanson, 674 P.2d 850, 859 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1983). The Court of Appeals therefore corrected the discrepancies in the May 4, 

2001 minute entry to reflect that Petitioner’s sentences on Counts 1 and 2 are to be served 

concurrently. (Id. at 86). Because the court vacated the convictions on Counts 3 and 5, it

did not address the discrepancies in the minute entry as to those counts. (Id.).

In August 2002, the State petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. (Id. at 95-103). After granting review, the Court 

found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Petitioner’s alibi 

witnesses from testifying as a discovery sanction and reinstated Petitioner’s convictions 

on Counts 3 and 5. (Id. at 105, 108-18). The Court remanded the case to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals for reconsideration of the sentencing issues regarding Counts 3 and 5. 

(Id. at 118). On August 5, 2003, the Court of Appeals corrected Petitioner’s “written 

sentencing order to conform with the oral pronouncement to reflect that the sentence on 

Count 1 shall be served concurrently with the sentences on Counts 3 and 5.” (Id. at 128).

Upon Petitioner’s unopposed request, the Court of Appeals issued an order clarifying that 

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Petitioner’s sentences on Counts 1, 2, and 3 are to be served concurrently with each other 

and that Petitioner’s sentence on Count 5 is to be served consecutively to the sentence on 

Count 3. (Id. at 130-37).

C. Proceedings After Direct Appeal

On March 15, 2004, the trial court issued a minute entry indicating that it received 

a “Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review” from Petitioner’s defense counsel. 

(Id. at 142-43). The trial court gave Petitioner forty-five days in which to file a pro per 

petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Id.). When Petitioner failed to timely file a 

PCR petition, the trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding. (Id. at 149).

On March 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a “Writ of Habeas Corpus for Collateral Relief 

and Motion to Issue Corrected Sentencing Order to the Arizona Department of 

Corrections” (Id. at 151-55). Petitioner alleged that the Arizona Department of 

Corrections’ (“ADOC”) records erroneously reflected “the original sentence[ing] order 

. . . which runs Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 CONSECUTIVELY to each other” instead of the 

corrected sentencing order that provided that “Counts 1, 2, and 3 were to run 

CONCURRENTLY to each other, and that Count 5 was to be served CONSECUTIVE to 

Count 3.” (Id. at 153) (emphasis in original). The trial court deemed Petitioner’s filing 

to be a Petition for Special Action and ordered the State to respond. (Id. at 157). In its 

Response, the State asserted that ADOC “correctly calculated” that Petitioner’s sentences 

for all of the counts are to be served concurrently. (Id. at 161). The State indicated that 

September 13, 2014 is the commencement date for community supervision and October 

30, 2014 is the “earned release credit date with no temporary release.” (Id.). In its 

October 2011 ruling, the trial court stated that “Based on the DOC’s Response, and 

having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court finds that the DOC’s present 

calculation is accurate and that the DOC record as to [Petitioner’s] sentence (as corrected 

after appeal) is correct.” (Id. at 164). 

On November 5, 2014, the State filed in the trial court a “Notice of Sentence 

Recalculation.” (Id. at 167-68). The State explained that after ADOC conducted an audit 

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of Petitioner’s sentence, it was discovered that Petitioner’s sentence was incorrectly 

calculated at the time of Petitioner’s March 2011 special action proceeding. (Id. at 167).

The State could not explain how the State and ADOC reached the conclusion that all of 

Petitioner’s sentences were to run concurrently. (Id. at 168). The State informed the trial 

court that the ADOC recalculated Petitioner’s sentences to conform to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ August 5, 2003 order. (Id.). Based on the recalculation, April 26, 2027 is 

the commencement date for Petitioner’s community supervision and July 13, 2027 is the 

“earned release credit date with no temporary release.” (Id.). On November 26, 2014, 

the trial court adopted the recalculated sentencing structure.1

 (Id. at 170).

On December 11, 2014, Petitioner filed a document in the trial court that is 

captioned “Motion to Strike Respondent’s ‘Notice of Sentence Recalculation’ . . . .” (Id. 

at 172-93). In the Motion, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s November 26, 2014 

minute entry that adopted the ADOC’s recalculation of Petitioner’s sentence. (Id. at 

175). Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s October 2011 order, which found that all of 

Petitioner’s sentences were to run concurrently, should be enforced. (Id. at 172-75). On 

December 19, 2014, the State filed a “Notice of Receipt of Defendant’s ‘Motion to Strike 

. . . .” (Id. at 195-96). The State wrote that Petitioner’s Motion is “in effect, a motion for 

reconsideration” and informed the trial court that pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(e), it 

will not respond to Petitioner’s Motion unless and until the trial court orders a response. 

(Id. at 195). As of the date of this Report and Recommendation, the trial court has not 

ruled on Petitioner’s Motion nor has it ordered the State to respond to the Motion. 

On December 12, 2014, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding by 

filing a document captioned in part: “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 USC § 

2241” (Doc. 1) (the “Original Petition”). The Court construed the Original Petition as 

being filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and dismissed the Original Petition for failure to 

1 Although the minute entry was issued on November 26, 2014, it was not filed until December 4, 2014. Both parties refer to the minute entry by the date it was issued, 

not filed. The exact date of the minute entry is not dispositive of Petitioner’s claims. To 

enhance the clarity of this Report and Recommendation in relation to the parties’ filings, 

the undersigned refers to the minute entry by using the November 26, 2014 issuance date. 

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use the court-approved from. (Doc. 5). On April 22, 2015, Petitioner filed the First 

Amended Petition (Doc. 8) on the court-approved form for a person in state custody who 

seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2

 The Court ordered 

Respondents to answer (Doc. 9). Respondents filed their Limited Answer on September 

16, 2015 (Doc. 18). Petitioner replied on September 24, 2015 (Doc. 19).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A “state prisoner must normally exhaust available state remedies before a writ of 

habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“It has been settled since 

Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886), that a state prisoner 

must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will 

entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”). The rationale for the doctrine relates to the 

policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is 

designed to give a state the initial opportunity to review and correct alleged federal rights 

violations of its state prisoners. Id. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “it would be 

unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state 

court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional 

violation.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 

2 In a footnote on the first page of the First Amended Petition, Petitioner requests that the Court construe the First Amended Petition as being brought under 28 U.S.C. § 

2241. However, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the exclusive avenue for a prisoner, who is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, to challenge the constitutionality of his or her detention. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1005-06, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the 

general grant of habeas authority in § 2241 is available for challenges by a state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment-for example, a defendant in pre- trial detention or awaiting extradition”), overruled on other grounds by Hayward v. 

Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit decision Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004), 

which Petitioner cites to support his argument that the First Amended Petition should be construed as being brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is distinguishable from this case. In 

Stow, the petitioner remained in custody after his judgment of conviction was vacated because the state sought a retrial, which the petitioner challenged on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 886-88. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the habeas petition was “properly considered under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not § 2254, because at the time Stow filed his 

petition he was not ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’” Id. at 882. 

Here, Petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 is the exclusive avenue by which Petitioner may challenge his incarceration.

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11 (1984) (“[W]e have long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of 

comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a federal 

court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that 

a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) “exhausted” the 

available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an “absence of available State 

corrective process”; or (iii) shown that “circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A district 

court has the discretion to stay a habeas petition that contains both exhausted and 

unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Regarding petitions containing only unexhausted 

claims, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that “[o]nce a district court 

determines that a habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire 

further . . . Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust.” 

Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

III. DISCUSSION

In the First Amended Petition, Petitioner asserts that he should have been released 

from prison in 2014 pursuant to the trial court’s October 2011 minute entry. (Doc. 8 at 1, 

n.1). All four of Petitioner’s grounds for habeas relief pertain to the trial court’s 

November 26, 2014 minute entry that adopted the ADOC’s recalculation of Petitioner’s 

sentence: 

Ground One: “After considerable ongoing litigation arising from 

ambiguities in the sentence as pronounced . . . the 

trial court entered the final result, calculated by 

ADOC and presented by the Attorney General in 

special action of 21 October 2011. As the release 

date neared of 9/13/14 . . . the local complex 

calculated a release date without reference to the 

appellate corrections, and changed from the final 

concurrent format, to a consecutive on, effectively 

overruling the court of appeals and special action.” 

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(Id. at 6). 

Ground Two: “Rather than upholding the decision of the appellate 

proceedings . . . [the State] chose to embrace the 

local complex consecutive sentence structure, 

presenting a ‘notice of sentence recalculation’ in 

complete disregard for res judicata, and a violation 

of Amendment V due process, and of double 

jeopardy.” (Id. at 7). 

Ground Three: “In adopting the ‘sentence recalculation’ the trial 

court ignored any input of the Petitioner . . . 

allowing for an ex parte ‘recalculation’ to be 

entered by the court in complete absence of 

jurisdiction.” (Id. at 8). 

Ground Four: “Where all release arrangements had been made . . . 

to pull back someone days from release which he 

had earned after over fourteen years of 

imprisonment constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment, in violation of Amendment VII of the 

United States Constitution.” (Id. at 9).3

The only document that Petitioner has filed in state court pertaining to the trial 

court’s November 26, 2014 minute entry is the “Motion to Strike Respondent’s ‘Notice 

of Recalculation’ . . . .” (Doc. 18-1 at 172-89). As Respondents explain in their Limited 

Answer (Doc. 18 at 8-11), Petitioner’s Motion is currently pending in the trial court and 

Petitioner has not filed a PCR petition raising the claims presented in this habeas 

3 In the First Amended Petition, Petitioner states that “Ground Three and Four are 

respectfully also submitted under 42 USC § 1983 . . . in addition to grounds for habeas 

relief.” To the extent Petitioner intends to present civil rights claims, Petitioner must file 

a separate action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 

750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its 

duration are the province of habeas corpus . . . . [R]equests for relief turning on the circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.”). Petitioner also states that Grounds Three and Four are also submitted for “reference to the United States Attorney pursuant to 18 USC § 4 under 18 USC § 1201,” 

which are the statutes setting forth the elements of the crimes of Misprision of Felony and 

Kidnapping. The Court lacks jurisdiction to institute criminal charges. A civil litigant has no private right of action under a criminal statute. See, e.g, United States v. 

Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales 

Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2nd Cir. 1994). Criminal actions in the federal courts are 

initiated by the United States Attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 547; Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). 

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proceeding. The deadline for a PCR petition has expired.4 However, an Arizona court 

may allow Petitioner to file an untimely PCR petition that contains Petitioner’s claims in 

Grounds One through Four. This is because all of the claims allege that Petitioner is 

being incarcerated after the expiration of his sentence. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(d), 

32.4(a) (providing that an untimely PCR petition may proceed for a claim that a 

defendant is being held in custody after the defendant’s sentence has been imposed). The 

undersigned therefore does not find that Petitioner’s habeas claims are procedurally 

defaulted. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a 

habeas claim was not procedurally defaulted where it was not clear that the Arizona 

courts would hold petitioner’s claim barred under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3)); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(c) (a habeas petitioner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies 

available in the courts of the State . . . if [the petitioner] has the right under the law of the 

State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented” in the habeas petition) 

(emphasis added). Because Petitioner has not exhausted his habeas claims in state court 

and the claims are not procedurally defaulted, the undersigned recommends that the 

Court dismiss the First Amended Petition (Doc. 8) without prejudice. Rasberry, 448 F.3d 

at 1154.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss the First Amended Petition

(Doc. 8) without prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., the parties shall have fourteen days 

4 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) provides that in all non-capital cases, except those where a defendant is entitled to an of-right PCR proceeding, “the [PCR] notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” 

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from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific 

written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which 

to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to any factual 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 22nd day of March, 2016. 

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