Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01023/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01023-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 A third co-defendant was charged on only three counts. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

 Plaintiff/Respondent, ) CR 04-00313 PHX FJM 

) CIV 09-01023 PHX FJM (MEA)

v. )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DERRICK McCREARY, )

) 

Defendant/Movant. )

)

______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

Mr. Derrick McCreary (“Movant”) filed a motion to

correct, vacate, or set aside criminal convictions and

sentences, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on May 14, 2009.

Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to Motion for

Reduction of Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Response”)

(Docket No. 11) on October 19, 2009. Movant’s reply (Docket No.

12) to the response was docketed on November 19, 2009.

I. Procedural History

On March 30, 2004, Movant and two co-defendants were

indicted on nine charges of, inter alia, conspiracy to commit

armed robbery.1 A superseding indictment, charging one count of

conspiracy, two counts of armed bank robbery, and two counts of

the use of the firearm in the commission of a crime, in

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-2-

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), was filed February 16, 2005.

Movant and his non-pleading co-defendant were tried

together and the trial lasted approximately two weeks. At trial

the government introduced the testimony of the pleading codefendant and a “cooperating witness” and evidence of text

messages sent or received by Movant discussing the alleged

conspiracies. The jury instructions included definitions of the

use, carrying, possession, and brandishing of a weapon in

relation to a crime of violence as those terms are relevant to

a violation of section 924. The jury was instructed regarding

guilt both by aiding and abetting and guilt as a conspirator.

On June 22, 2005, a jury found Movant guilty on one

count of conspiracy, two counts of bank robbery, and two counts

of the use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence.

On or about December 14, 2005, Movant was sentenced to an

aggregate sentence of 504 months imprisonment. 

Movant took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. In his direct appeal Movant argued the Court

improperly admitted text messages between Movant and his coconspirators. Movant further argued that the government

elicited conflicting testimony before the grand jury.

Additionally, Movant argued the jury should have received a

“mere presence” instruction and that the government improperly

vouched for testifying co-conspirators at trial. See United

States v. McCreary, 308 Fed. App. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 2008).

Movant’s direct appeal was denied in a decision issued on or

about February 7, 2008. Movant sought certiorari, which was

denied by the United States Supreme Court on June 9, 2008. See

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-3-

Reply at 3.

In his action to vacate his convictions and sentences

Movant asserts the jury instructions unconstitutionally added a

charge of possession of a firearm to Counts Three and Five of

the superseding indictment. Movant also argues he was denied

effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to

appeal or address Movant’s right to be tried, convicted, and

sentenced based upon the exact charges listed in the superseding

indictment. Movant also contends he could not properly be

convicted on Count Five because this count does not state or

charge a federal crime covered by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).

Movant further alleges his convictions should be vacated because

the prosecutor improperly vouched for the honesty and

truthfulness of a government witness.

II. Discussion

Relief is precluded on a section 2255 claim that was

raised and decided in the movant’s direct appeal. See, e.g.,

United States v. Scrivner, 189 F.3d 825, 282 (9th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1985); Odom

v. United States, 455 F.2d 159, 160 (9th Cir. 1972).

Additionally, because “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary

remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal,”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604,

1610 (1998), absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a federal

habeas petitioner procedurally defaults all claims which are not

raised in his direct appeal, other than claims asserting the

petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct.

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-4-

1584, 1594 (1982); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945

(9th Cir. 1993). “[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial

errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made, a

convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his

double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting

from the errors of which he complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-

68, 102 S. Ct. at 1594. See also United States v. Ratigan, 351

F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). A defendant has not established

he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel if his

claims would not have succeeded on appeal. Turner v. Calderon,

281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, the only claims in Movant’s section 2255

which are not precluded are Movant’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

properly raised for the first time in a section 2255 action.

See United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal

defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984).... To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant

must show 1) his attorney’s performance was

unreasonable under prevailing professional

standards; and 2) there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the results would have

been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable

probability as ‘a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996).

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-5-

In order to find that Movant was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel and grant him habeas relief, the

Court must conclude counsel’s performance was incompetent and

that his deficient performance prejudiced Movant. 

[N]ot every case of deficient performance

under Strickland represents a constructive

denial of the right to counsel. In fact, it

will be the rare claim of ineffective

assistance that is tantamount to a

constructive denial of counsel. Strickland

remains the norm for ineffective assistance

claims, and the Supreme Court has made clear

that it will not countenance a per-se

prejudice exception which will swallow the

actual prejudice Strickland rule. 

Glover v. Miro, 262 F.3d 268, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2001). See also

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Cruz-Mendoza, 147 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1998.

Movant must overcome a strong presumption that his

counsel’s representation was within a wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). Movant must establish that, but for

counsel’s alleged errors, the result of his trial would have

been different. Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154. Additionally, Movant

bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the

Court can conclude his counsel was ineffective. See Turner, 281

F.3d at 878.

Counsel is not ineffective if counsel “fails” to raise

a meritless argument. See, e.g., Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986,

991 (9th Cir. 1999); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 27 (9th Cir.

1994); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427-28 (9th Cir.

1992); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir.

1982) (“The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-6-

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

Movant asserts he was denied the effective assistance

of counsel because his trial counsel failed to address and his

appellate counsel failed to assert Movant’s right to be tried,

convicted, and sentenced based upon the exact charges listed in

the superseding indictment. Movant’s counsel was not

ineffective for “failing” to raise the claims stated by Movant.

Movant has not established prejudice because he has not shown

that, had counsel alleged Movant was not tried, convicted, and

sentenced based upon the exact charges listed in the superseding

indictment, any of these arguments would have successfully

resulted in a reversal. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

840 (9th Cir. 2001). Movant has not shown he was prejudiced by

any alleged failure of counsel to raise a particular argument.

Movant has not provided the Court with a claim that appellate

counsel failed to raise which would have been a “dead-bang

winner.” Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir.

1995). 

Movant contends section 924(c) creates two separate

offenses. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held

that section 924(c) creates only a single offense. See United

States v. Arreola, 467 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2006).

Because Movant asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise an argument which has been rejected, Movant has not

established prejudice arising from his counsels’ allegedly

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Respondent argues:

Pursuant to the superseding indictment, Counts Three and

Five alleged that the defendant and others “did use, carry

and brandish a firearm, that is, a handgun, during and in

relation to a crime of violence, that is, Armed Bank

Robbery” in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A). In the jury

instructions the [] Court explained that the government

must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt, including that (1) “the defendant used, carried,

possessed or brandished the firearm (2) during and in

relation to the crime of armed bank robbery.” (ER-2- Trial

Tr. Vol. VII, 1441-45, June 21, 2005.) Since the jury

instructions explained the elements of a single offense in

a straightforward and cogent manner, the District Court did

not add a charge to the superseding indictment or commit a

plain error by doing so.

-7-

deficient performance.2

In reply to the answer to his section 2255 motion,

Movant again alleges that his conviction violated the Fifth

Amendment because the jury instructions “resulted in a

constructive amendment to the indictment.” Reply at 4. Movant

also contends that, other than a “non-specific pretrial notice

that one or more individuals would testify as to Movant’s

possession of the charged firearm and a witness list the day

before trial, the Movant received no other information or

discovery as to these unindicted charges.” Id. These

allegations simply repeat claims which were denied in Movant’s

direct appeal or were procedurally defaulted by Movant’s failure

to present them in his direct appeal. The only claims properly

presented in this section 2255 action are the claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the merits of which are not

supported by the allegations in Movant’s reply to the answer to

his section 2255 petition.

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-8-

III. Conclusion

Other than his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims, Movant procedurally defaulted his section 2255 claims by

failing to raise them in his direct appeal. Movant has not

shown cause and prejudice regarding his default of these claims.

Movant has not established that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel because Movant has not shown that he was

prejudiced by his counsels’ failure to raise a meritless

argument. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. McCreary’s Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

-9-

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a

waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration of

the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 3rd day of December, 2009.

Case 2:09-cv-01023-FJM Document 13 Filed 12/04/09 Page 9 of 9