Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00922/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00922-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 Plaintiff filed motions for appointment of counsel on June 29, 2005 [doc. #9];July

22, 2005 [doc. #17]; March 1, 2006 [doc. #63]; September 13, 2006 [doc. #85]; and a motion for

reconsideration of the denial of his motion for appointment of counsel on September 14, 2005

[doc. #34]; 

05cv922

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY JOE DANIELS,

Plaintiff,

v.

KUZIL RUAN, et al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 05-CV-922-L(NLS)

ORDER OVERRULING

OBJECTION AND AFFIRMING

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION

On April 29, 2005, Bobby Joe Daniels ("plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed this action alleging violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

has requested appointment of counsel on a number of occasions.1

 On October 10, 2006, plaintiff

filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s latest order that denied him appointment of counsel. 

Having carefully considered plaintiff’s arguments, the record in this case, and the magistrate

judge’s Order, the Court affirms the decisions of the magistrate judge and overrules plaintiff’s

objections for the reasons set forth below.

1. Standard of Review

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge within ten

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days after service of the order. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). The magistrate judge's order will be

upheld unless it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A);

Computer Economics, Inc., v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 

The "clearly erroneous" standard applies to the magistrate judge's factual determinations and

discretionary decisions, including orders imposing discovery sanctions. Maisonville v. F2 Am.,

Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1990) (factual determinations made in connection with sanction

award are reviewable for clear error); Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d

236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991) (discovery sanctions are non-dispositive pretrial matters reviewable for

clear error under Rule 72(a)). Under this standard, "the district court can overturn the

magistrate judge's ruling only if the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been made." Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th

Cir. 1997). Issues related to appointment of counsel order are deemed nondispositive, and thus

the magistrate judge's determination of such matters is entitled to deference unless it is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a)

The "contrary to law" standard applies to review of purely legal determinations by a

magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) ("the

phrase 'contrary to law' indicates plenary review as to matters of law."); Medical Imaging

Centers of America, Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F.Supp. 717, 719 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (Brewster, J.)

("Section 636(b)(1) ... has been interpreted to provide for de novo review by the district court on

issues of law."); 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3069 at 350 & 355 (2d ed. 1997). Accordingly, the district court

exercises its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge's legal conclusions. 

Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F.Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff'd 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994). 

2. Discussion

Plaintiff contends the magistrate judge is biased toward him because she has denied his

requests for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge’s orders are a

“smoke screen to hide the fact she is bias against pro se litigants who have a colorable claim.” 

(Objection at 4). Having reviewed all the orders entered by the magistrate judge, there is

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nothing suggesting bias on the part of the magistrate judge. Rather, the magistrate judge has

clearly set forth the legal standard and has explained why plaintiff is not entitled to appointment

of counsel under the law. 

The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in civil cases unless an

indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social

Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive

appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

However, district courts have discretion to appoint counsel to represent an indigent civil litigant

under 28 U.S.C. §1915(d). Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). But an

appointment of counsel may be designated under 28 U.S.C. §1915(d) only in “exceptional

circumstances.” Id.; Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). This rule is

derived from Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963), “which held that ‘the privilege of

pleading in forma pauperis . . . in civil actions for damages should be allowed only in

exceptional circumstances.’ Weller was extended, without comment, to ‘appointment of

counsel’ in United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965).” Wilborn, 789 F.2d at

1331 (quoting Weller, 134 F.2d at 600) (alteration in original). A finding of exceptional

circumstances requires an evaluation of both “the likelihood of success on the merits [and] the

ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved.” Weygandt v. Cook, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Neither of these factors

is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision on a request of

counsel under section 1915(d).” Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331.

As the magistrate judge has noted repeatedly, plaintiff has not demonstrated exceptional

circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. Moreover, plaintiff has not shown that he

is unable to litigate his case and instead has actively litigated the action since its inception. 

Because the magistrate judge reviewed plaintiff’s request, the applicable law, and the

relevant facts as presented by plaintiff, the Court finds no error on the part of the magistrate

judge in denying plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. Accordingly, because the

magistrate judge’s decision was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, plaintiff’s

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objection must be overruled.

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED overruling plaintiff’s objection to the

magistrate judge’s Order denying plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 6, 2006

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. NITA L. STORMES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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