Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02488/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02488-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfredo Camargo,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-2488-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation

on Certificate of Appealability

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Background – On January 15, 2015, the undersigned filed an Amended Report 

and Recommendation (Doc. 19) recommending the dismissal of Petitioner’s habeas 

Petition as barred under the habeas statute of limitations. That recommendation was 

based in part on a conclusion that Petitioner had not shown the applicability of the 

prisoner mailbox rule with regard to his first petition for review to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals, and thus that petition was untimely and did not delay the commencement of the 

habeas limitations period. The Report & Recommendation further found that the Court 

need not resolve the authority of the habeas court to rethink a state court’s ruling that a 

post-conviction petition was untimely because Petitioner’s second PCR petition was 

properly found to be untimely under Arizona law.

Petitioner then filed an Objection (Doc. 20) arguing that his first petition for 

review was entitled to application of the prison mailbox rule, and providing an affidavit 

supporting the contention.

In the Order filed March 4, 2014 (Doc. 23), the Court concluded that this habeas 

Court could not second guess the state court’s timeliness ruling, but found that if it 

could, it would find the first petition for review was timely by application of the state’s 

prison mailbox rule. The Court reasoned that the Arizona Supreme Court may have 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 1 of 14
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

overlooked the extension granted by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and thus concluded 

that the petition was untimely even with the application of the prison mailbox rule. On 

that basis, the Court also concluded that Petitioner’s second PCR petition was 

improperly dismissed as untimely, under the assumption that the PCR court had 

calculated its due date from the PCR court’s denial of the first PCR petition rather than 

the dismissal of the petition for review. 

Despite its ruling that the Petition should be dismissed as untimely, the Court 

granted a certificate of appealability. In doing so, the Court observed:

In this case, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit case law appears to 

make it clear that, for purposes of tolling § 2244(d)’s statute of 

limitations, a state court’s determination that a prisoner filed his 

state petition untimely is “the end of the matter.” However, the 

unusual equities of this case may make it appropriate for further 

scrutiny on appeal. Therefore, a certificate of appealability will be 

granted.

(Order 3/4/14, Doc. 20 at 5.) 

Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment – On March 5, 2015, Respondents filed a 

Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment (Doc. 25), arguing that that the March 4, 2015

Order (Doc. 23) failed to specify a substantive claim with respect to which Petitioner had 

shown that reasonable jurists could disagree, and thus asked for an amendment to either 

deny a certificate of appealability or to clarify the meritorious claim.

In response, on March 9, 2015, the Court “temporarily” vacated its Order on the 

Report and Recommendation and the resulting Judgment, and referred the Motion to 

Amend (Doc. 25) to the undersigned for a further report & recommendation after further 

briefing. The report & recommendation is to be limited to determining “whether 

Petitioner’s substantive claims for relief are sufficiently meritorious to justify issuance of 

a certificate of appealability.” (Order 3/9/15, Doc. 26 at 2.) The Court reiterated that it 

stands by the conclusion that jurists of reason would find debatable the Court’s 

procedural ruling.

Consequently, the Court set a briefing schedule on the Motion to Amend/Correct 

Judgment, such briefing to be limited to the issue of the certificate of appealability, i.e

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 2 of 14
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

whether Petitioner has made a substantive claim for relief which is sufficiently 

meritorious to justify issuance of a certificate of appealability. (Order 3/12/15, Doc. 27.) 

In doing so, the Court noted that Respondents had addressed the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims in their Answer (Doc. 14), and Petitioner had already replied thereto 

(Doc. 15). Consequently, the parties were directed to only address whether there is 

sufficient merit to justify a certificate of appealability, i.e. whether “jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). 

Response to Motion - On March 16, 2015, Petitioner responded (Doc. 29) to the 

Motion, arguing in pertinent part that he had a right to effective assistance of counsel in 

his PCR proceeding which was the functional equivalent of direct appeal. Petitioner also 

argues that this Court should reconsider various decisions with regard to the timeliness 

of his Petition etc. 

Reply - On March 17, 2015, Respondents replied in support of the Motion to 

Amend/Correct (Doc. 32). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s right to counsel is not at 

issue, and the referral from Judge Wake on the instant motion was not a reopening of the 

timeliness issue. 

Supplement - On March 23, 2015, Petitioner filed a Supplement (Doc. 35) to his 

response, arguing that the AEDPA’s deferential standards do not apply in determining 

whether to issue a COA. Petitioner further argues that his Ground One is based on the 

rejection of a favorable plea, not merely an irreconcilable conflict, and that he had a right 

to counsel in his PCR proceeding. Petitioner argues counsel should be appointed for him 

in this proceeding to assert any claims his PCR counsel failed to present.

The matter is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the 

following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), 

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

/ /

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 3 of 14
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

With one exception, the undersigned incorporates by reference the Relevant 

Factual & Procedural Background set forth in the Report and Recommendation filed 

January 15, 2015 (Doc. 19). 

The one exception is made to incorporate the findings made by Judge Wake on 

the basis of Plaintiff’s Objections, in the since vacated Order filed March 4, 2015 (Doc. 

26) relating to the mailing of Petitioner’s first petition for review, and the import of the 

state court rulings on that petition and the subsequent second petition for post-conviction 

relief. (Doc. 26 at 3-4.) 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. APPLICABLE STANDARD

Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the 

“district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order 

adverse to the applicant.” Under the AEDPA, “[a] certificate of appealability may 

issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas 

petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional 

claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 

the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000).

Under the referral from Judge Wake, this Report and Recommendation is limited 

to applying the first component of that standard, namely whether “jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Valid Claim and The “Quick Look” Standard - That valid claim determination 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 4 of 14
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

does not require the Court to make a “definitive” determination of the merits of the 

claims, but rather only a “preliminary” one. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 

(2003). It requires only “a general assessment of their merits,” id. at 336, and not a 

“certainty of ultimate relief,” id. at 337. The Ninth Circuit has taken a particularly broad 

view of this standard, at least in comparison to some other circuits. See David Goodwin, 

An Appealing Choice: An Analysis of and A Proposal for Certificates of Appealability in 

"Procedural" Habeas Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 791, 821 (2013)

(comparing circuits). The Ninth Circuit has concluded: “we will simply take a ‘quick 

look’ at the face of the complaint to determine whether the petitioner has ‘facially 

allege[d] the denial of a constitutional right.’ ” Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 

1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jefferson v. Welborn, 222 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

Thus, in resolving the instant issue, the Court need not evaluate whether Petitioner’s 

claims are ultimately substantiated by the record, but simply whether the Petition has 

made out a constitutional claim.1

Moreover, circuit court precedent is not determinative in deciding whether a claim 

is substantial. “Even if a question is well settled in our circuit, a constitutional claim is 

debatable if another circuit has issued a conflicting ruling.” Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 

946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). 

AEDPA Deference Inapplicable – Respondents ask the Court to apply deference 

under the AEDPA to the state court decisions. For example, Respondents argue that 

Petitioner’s claim of an irreconcilable conflict with counsel was rejected on the merits by 

the state courts, and “Petitioner cannot receive habeas relief unless he shows that the 

state court’s decision was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.’ “ (Motion, Doc. 

25 at 3 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (emphasis in original). 

 

1

This standard is not unlike the “failure to state a claim” standard applied in evaluating 

complaints under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual content ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face....’ ” 

Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended 

(Jan. 26, 2015) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 5 of 14
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner argues that such deference does not apply, citing Smith v. Dretke, 422 

F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2005), and York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522, 528 (10th Cir. 2003). 

(Supplement, Doc. 35 at 3.) 

Respondents have not replied on this issue, and the undersigned has found no 

Ninth Circuit authority explicitly addressing the matter.

The latter case cited by Petitioner, York, does not address the applicability of 

AEDPA deference in issuing a certificate of appealability. 

In Smith, however, the Fifth Circuit did indeed opine: “At the COA stage, we do 

not apply the deferential AEDPA standard of review to examine the merits of the habeas 

petition.” 422 F.3d at 273. In support of that contention, the Fifth Circuit quoted the 

following language from the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322 (2003): “Before the issuance of a COA, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to 

resolve the merits of petitioner's constitutional claims.” 422 F.3d at 273 (quoting MillerEl, 537 U.S. at 342). 

By itself the Fifth Circuit’s quote from Miller-El does not seem to address 

AEDPA deference. In context, however, it is plain that the Supreme Court in Miller-El

was asserting that AEDPA deference was not appropriate in applying the “substantial 

showing” prerequisite for the issuance of a COA. The Supreme Court had, in the 

preceding paragraphs, taken the Fifth Circuit to task for merging the AEDPA standards 

for factual errors under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). 537 U.S. at 341. The Court 

then addressed the applicability of those standards:

The Court of Appeals, moreover, was incorrect for an even more 

fundamental reason. Before the issuance of a COA, the Court of 

Appeals had no jurisdiction to resolve the merits of petitioner's 

constitutional claims. True, to the extent that the merits of this case

will turn on the agreement or disagreement with a state-court factual 

finding, the clear and convincing evidence and objective 

unreasonableness standards will apply. At the COA stage, however, 

a court need not make a definitive inquiry into this matter. As we 

have said, a COA determination is a separate proceeding, one 

distinct from the underlying merits. The Court of Appeals should 

have inquired whether a “substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right” had been proved. Deciding the substance of an 

appeal in what should only be a threshold inquiry undermines the 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 6 of 14
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concept of a COA. The question is the debatability of the 

underlying constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate.

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Thus, Miller-El

distinguishes between a merits determination, where AEDPA deference applies, and a 

COA determination, where it does not apply. For example, the Court opined that 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) “contains the unreasonable [determination of the facts] requirement 

and applies to the granting of habeas relief rather than to the granting of a COA.” 

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 341-342. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) 

(applying Slack/Miller-El standards for issuance of COA, but noting deference under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) was applicable in determining whether to grant relief). 

This reading of Miller-El is not without its critics. One commentator has deemed 

Smith to be contrary to Miller-El. See Christopher Q. Cutler, Friendly Habeas ReformReconsidering A District Court's Threshold Role in the Appellate Habeas Process, 43 

Willamette L. Rev. 281, 352-53 (2007) (“For instance, one circuit frequently refuses to 

consider a COA in light of the AEDPA's deferential standards, in direct contravention of 

Miller-El's mandates.”) (citing Smith). Indeed, Mr. Cutler observes that even the Fifth 

Circuit seems to vacillate between applying AEDPA deference and not. Id. at 352, n. 

285. The difficulty seems to arise from the following language in Miller-El:

The COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of 

the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their 

merits. We look to the District Court's application of AEDPA to 

petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution 

was debatable amongst jurists of reason. This threshold inquiry 

does not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases 

adduced in support of the claims. In fact, the statute forbids it. When 

a court of appeals sidesteps this process by first deciding the merits 

of an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a COA based on its 

adjudication of the actual merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal 

without jurisdiction.

Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336-37 (emphasis added). See e.g. Sosa v. Dretke, 133 Fed. Appx. 

114, 118 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, and proceeding to apply 

AEDPA deference to issuance of COA). 

That language, however, only applies where the habeas petition has been rejected 

by the district court on the merits. As noted by Justice Scalia in his special concurrence 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 7 of 14
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

in Miller-El, there are two standards at play where the petition was denied on procedural 

grounds: (1) the “substantial showing” of a claim requirement under § 2253(c)(2); and 

(2) the requirement under Slack that the procedural ruling be debatable. Miller-El, 537 

U.S. at 349-350 (Scalia, J. concurring). As to the former, AEDPA is not controlling. 

“How the district court applied AEDPA has nothing to do with whether a COA applicant 

has made ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,’ as required by 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), so the AEDPA standard should seemingly have no role in the COA 

inquiry.” Id. at 349. Justice Scalia went on to observe that § 22543(c)(2)’s “substantial 

showing” standard was “a necessary [but] not a sufficient condition” for a COA, and that 

the Court was adopting an additional requirement when the district court decision was on 

the merits. Id. “A circuit justice or judge must deny a COA, even when the habeas 

petitioner has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, if 

all reasonable jurists would conclude that a substantive provision of the federal habeas 

statute bars relief.” Id. at 349-350. 

To give an example, suppose a state prisoner presents a 

constitutional claim that reasonable jurists might find debatable, but 

is unable to find any “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent 

in support of that claim (which was previously rejected on the 

merits in state-court proceedings). Under the Court's view, a COA 

must be denied, even if the habeas petitioner satisfies the 

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” 

requirement of § 2253(c)(2), because all reasonable jurists would 

agree that habeas relief is impossible to obtain under § 2254(d). 

Id. at 350. 

In the instant case, however, this Court has not made a ruling on the merits of 

Petitioner’s claims. Accordingly, the additional requirement adopted in Miller-El, to 

which AEDPA deference and limits apply, of a debatable right to relief, has no 

application here.

On the other hand, under the procedural ruling in this case, AEDPA is applicable 

in determining whether this Court’s procedural ruling is debatable. But that question is 

not up for dispute in this Report and Recommendation. 

The only issue currently under consideration is whether Petitioner has made a 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 8 of 14
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“substantial showing” of a constitutional claim, and the resolution of that issue does not 

depend upon the application of AEDPA deference to the state courts’ decisions. 

Summary – Based upon the foregoing, the Court must determine whether 

Petitioner’s Petition has asserted a valid constitutional claim. That determination is not 

constrained by AEDPA deference, and does not require the evaluation of the ultimate 

merits of the claim, but simply a quick look at the Petition to determine if Petitioner has 

“facially allege[d] the denial of a constitutional right,” Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1026, 

including claims which are merely “debatable” and not supported by circuit law.

B. APPLICATION TO AMENDED PETITION 

1. Ground One – Irreconcilable Conflict

In Ground One of the Amended Petition, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the “constructive denial of the right 

to counsel.” Petitioner asserts that the trial court constructively denied him the right to 

counsel when it denied his motion for change of counsel, in which Petitioner explained 

that he had an irreconcilable conflict with his defense counsel. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 6 at 

6.) 

Respondents argue that this claim is without merit, casting the claim as being 

based upon the lack of a meaningful relationship with counsel, and relying upon the 

absence of Supreme Court authority finding a right to such a relationship. (Motion, Doc. 

25 at 3.) 

However, Petitioner’s Amended Petition does not assert a right to a meaningful 

relationship with counsel. Rather, he asserts an “irreconcilable conflict” and a “complete 

breakdown in the communication between Petitioner and counsel.” (Amend. Petition, 

Doc. 6 at 6.) 

The oft cited polemic is that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a 

“meaningful relationship” between a client and his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 

1, 14 (1983). To be sure, though, forcing a defendant to go to trial with an attorney with 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 9 of 14
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

whom he has an irreconcilable conflict amounts to constructive denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). On 

the other hand, not every conflict between a defendant and his counsel amounts to a 

denial of counsel. “It may be the case, for example, that because the conflict was of [the 

defendant’s] own making, or arose over decisions that are committed to the judgment of 

the attorney and not the client, in fact he actually received what the Sixth Amendment 

required in the case of an indigent defendant.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th 

Cir. 2000). 

The distinction between an irreconcilable conflict and the mere lack of a 

“meaningful relationship” is shown by the language employed by the Ninth Circuit in 

Morris. “The attorney-client relationship involves ‘an intimate process of consultation 

and planning which culminates in a state of trust and confidence between the client and 

his attorney.’” Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd, 461 U.S. 1 

(1983) (quoting McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18, 22 (Alaska 1974)). In rejecting the 

Ninth Circuit’s holding in Morris, the Supreme Court observed: “No court could 

possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney—

privately retained or provided by the public—that the Court of Appeals thought part of 

the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.” Morris, 461 U.S. at 13-14. 

Petitioner’s Petition makes no assertion that he lacked a state of trust and 

confidence, or that he had not been accorded an intimate process of consultation and 

planning. To the contrary, he alleges that trial counsel failed to advise him in other than 

a cursory manner on a proffered plea agreement and instead led Petitioner to enter an 

unadorned plea of guilty to the charges, and then stipulated to the existence of 

aggravating factors at sentencing. The picture Petitioner paints is not one of strained 

relations, or disagreements over tactics, but a failure of communication on the most 

fundamental aspects of the representation. See U.S. v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th

Cir. 1998) (holding that attorney's failure to keep defendant informed of plea 

negotiations and to prepare for trial because he felt physically threatened by defendant 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 10 of 14
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

demonstrated irreconcilable conflict); Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir.1992) 

(an attorney who provided his client with no assistance at sentencing and who said, “Oh, 

I am just standing in for this one,” did not satisfactorily discharge his Sixth Amendment 

responsibilities). 

Moreover, Petitioner alleges that in the face of his motion for a change of counsel, 

the trial court conducted “a perfunctory inquiry.” “When a trial court is informed of a 

conflict between trial counsel and a defendant, the trial court should question the 

attorney or defendant privately and in depth, and examine available witnesses. A conflict 

inquiry is adequate if it eases the defendant's dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern and 

provides a sufficient basis for reaching an informed decision.” Daniels v. Woodford, 428 

F.3d 1181, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A 

“perfunctory inquiry” would not meet those requirements.

Respondents argue that the Court should look beyond the allegations of 

Petitioner’s Amended Petition and decide that “the record indisputably demonstrates” 

that the dispute was of Petitioner’s making and no counsel would have fared better. 

(Motion, Doc. 25 at 3-4.) Such a determination would be critical to determining the 

merits of Petitioner’s Petition. It is not, however, appropriate to the limited inquiry 

mandated under § 2253(c)(2). 

On this quick look, Petitioner’s Ground One has facially alleged the denial of 

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

2. Ground Two – Ineffectiveness of PCR Counsel

In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated because Petitioner was denied effective assistance of 

post-conviction relief counsel. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that his post-conviction 

relief counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court’s constructive denial of 

Petitioner’s right to counsel in a Rule 32 Petition. (Amend. Pet. Doc. 6 at 7.) 

Respondents contend that because Ground Two is derivative of Ground One, it is 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 11 of 14
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

meritless. (Motion, Doc. 25 at 4.) 

It is true that failure to assert a futile claim cannot form the basis of ineffective 

assistance. “It should be obvious that the failure of an attorney to raise a meritless claim 

is not prejudicial.” Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012). However, under 

the limited inquiry under § 2253(c)(2), this Court cannot say that Ground One is 

“meritless.” It is at least facially a valid claim. So to, then is the derivative claim in 

Ground Two.

Ordinarily, if addressing the merits, the undersigned would assert that there is no 

constitutional right to effective assistance of PCR counsel, and thus this claim is not 

facially valid. However, in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Supreme Court 

recognized an exception to the bar of relying on ineffectiveness of PCR counsel as cause 

to excuse a procedural default of state remedies. While a procedural case not applicable 

to the instant dispute, the Martinez opinion did recognize that a right to PCR counsel 

may exist in “initial-review collateral proceedings,” such as those like Petitioner’s where 

it is the only review available to a pleading defendant. 

Coleman had suggested, though without holding, that the 

Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review 

collateral proceedings because “in [these] cases ... state collateral 

review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his 

conviction.” As Coleman noted, this makes the initial-review 

collateral proceeding a prisoner's “one and only appeal” as to an 

ineffective-assistance claim, and this may justify an exception to the 

constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in collateral 

proceedings. 

This is not the case, however, to resolve whether that 

exception exists as a constitutional matter.

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722 (1991)). Thus, Petitioner’s right to effective assistance of PCR counsel has 

not been foreclosed, and remains subject to debate.

At a minimum, therefore, this Court must conclude that jurists of reason would 

find it at least debatable that Petitioner’s Ground Two states a facially valid claim.

/ /

/ /

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 12 of 14
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Ground Three – Ineffectiveness of Trial and PCR Counsel

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated by the actions of counsel as described in Grounds One 

and Two. (Amend. Pet., Doc. 6 at 8; Order 5/5/14, Doc. 7 at 2 (summarizing Ground 

3).) 

Respondents do not separately address this claim in their Motion (Doc. 25). 

Assuming that this ground is not merely repetitive, it is at least cumulative of the 

claims in Grounds 1 and 2. To the extent that those grounds state facially valid claims, 

Ground 3 does as well.

Liberally construed, see Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006), this 

claim also alleges in addition to the cumulative claim that there was a breakdown in 

communications with trial counsel, that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to 

adequately advise Petitioner on the proffered plea agreement; (2) failing to adequately 

advise Petition on his guilty plea; and (3) stipulating to aggravating factors at sentencing. 

Each of these allegations state valid claims. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385 

(2012) (ineffective assistance leading to rejection of plea offer); McMann v. Richardson, 

397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (ineffective assistance leading to guilty plea); U.S. v. 

Crowe, 735 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013) (evaluating counsel’s stipulation under ineffective 

assistance standards). 

Consequently, the allegation that PCR counsel failed to assert these claims also 

states a facially valid claim.

Accordingly, jurists of reason would find it at least debatable that Petitioner’s 

Ground Three states a facially valid claim.

C. CONCLUSION REGARDING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right in each of the three grounds in Petitioner’s Amended Petition (Doc. 6). 

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 13 of 14
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability be 

ISSUED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated: April 16, 2015

13-2488r RR 15 04 09 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:13-cv-02488-NVW-JFM Document 38 Filed 04/16/15 Page 14 of 14