Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02420/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02420-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TEDDY LEROY WILSON, JR.,

CDC #–78443, Civil No. 06-2420 WQH (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

ISMAEL, et al.,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On November 1, 2006, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the California

Rehabilitation Center in Norco, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his parole agents

violated his “rights of privacy” and used excessive force during his arrest. See Compl. at 2, 5.

Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7.

On February 12, 2007, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint

for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Feb. 12, 2007 Order at 7-8.

On April 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. No. 11].

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I. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss

an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446

(9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court

reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting

service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Lopez, 203

F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating

that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on

the opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see KarimCase 3:06-cv-02420-WQH-BLM Document 12 Filed 05/01/07 Page 2 of 5
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Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

A. Equal Protection claims

In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was denied equal protection

under the law when he was arrested by Defendants. (FAC at 1-2.) Equal protection claims arise

when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are treated differently without a rational

relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a constitutional claim based on a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted

with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of inmates which included

plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (plaintiff alleging violation

of equal protection must allege membership in a protected class); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist.

No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.

1998). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Id. Plaintiff must allege Defendants

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based on his membership in a

protected class. See Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. In its current form, Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint falls short of these necessary pleading requirements, and thus, it must be dismissed

for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27;

Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

B. Excessive Force Claims

Second, to the extent that a liberal construction of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

indicates that Plaintiff also wishes to assert an excessive force claim, the Court will consider

Plaintiff’s pre-custody excessive force claims to arise under the Fourth, rather than the Eighth

Amendment. “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the

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course of an arrest . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’

standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25

F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable

seizures permits law enforcement officers to use only such force as is “objectively reasonable,”

i.e. only that amount necessary to effect the arrest under the circumstances. Graham, 490 U.S.

at 397; see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, because the Fourth

Amendment test for reasonableness is inherently fact-specific, see Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443 (citing

Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1989), it is a test that escapes “mechanical application”

and “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Graham,

490 U.S. at 396; Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humbolt, 211 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

Consequently, in order to state a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 the plaintiff must allege facts which show that a person acting “under color of

state law” violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by effecting an arrest using force

which was excessive given: “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect

pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, . . . (3) whether he [was]

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight,” and any other “exigent

circumstances [that] existed at the time of the arrest.” Chew, 27 F.3d at 1440-41 & n.5 (citing

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 

Here, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state an excessive force claim under

the Fourth Amendment because it fails to allege any facts which might support a finding that

Defendants’ use of force in effecting Plaintiff’s arrest was objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances. The only “use of force” alleged by Plaintiff appears to be when the Defendants

handcuffed Plaintiff. (FAC at 6-7.) Without more, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient

to demonstrate that the officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.

 Thus, for all these reasons, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be dismissed sua

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127

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III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary damages against

Defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff

is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file an

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading.

See S. D. CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Second

Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may

hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 1, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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