Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06395/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SAMUEL 0. MCCRORY, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, MOORE and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

. PILED 

lhmed Srares Courc of ~ppeaJs 

Tenth Circuit 

SEP 10 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6395 

(CIV-88-882-A) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

would not be of material assistance in the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. McCrory (Taxpayer) appeals the decision of the district 

court denying his motion for a new trial. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6395 Document: 010110041945 Date Filed: 09/10/1990 Page: 1 
Taxpayer failed to 

years 1977 through 1983. 

file federal income tax returns for the 

In 1985 the IRS mailed statutory notices 

to Taxpayer asserting tax deficiencies for these years. As 

Taxpayer ignored these notices and subsequent demands for payment, 

the IRS issued a notice of levy to Taxpayer's bank for 

approximately $137,000. The bank subsequently issued a cashier's 

check for approximately $2,100. Taxpayer, proceeding prose, 

filed a complaint in the district court suing the United States, 

the IRS, the district director and the revenue officer seeking 

compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief from the 

IRS's continuing tax collection activities. 

Following various motions, some being granted and some being 

denied, the district court, applying the rule of liberal 

construction of pleadings, allowed the matter to go to a bench 

trial upon the issue of the alleged irregularity of the IRS' 

collection process. Following trial the district court entered 

its written order finding that Taxpayer had totally failed to 

establish any procedural irregularity and entered judgment against 

Taxpayer. Taxpayer then requested a new trial. The district 

court denied this motion. 

Taxpayer, still proceeding pro se, asserts: (1) he was 

denied due process and a fair trial based upon the cumulative 

effect "of denying him pre-trial discovery, motion to compel 

production, motion for a discovery conference under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(f), and additional time to locate and retain an attorney due 

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Appellate Case: 89-6395 Document: 010110041945 Date Filed: 09/10/1990 Page: 2 
to circumstances beyond McCrory's control" (Appellant's Brief, p. 

3); and, (2) asserts that the district court's findings of fact 

and conclusions of law were clearly erroneous. We disagree. 

We review the district court's decisions on new trial motions 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Patty Precision Prods. Co. 

v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Addressing Taxpayer's first contentions, we find from the 

record that Taxpayer requested and received considerable discovery 

materials and that which he requested and failed to receive was 

properly barred by the district court. As to the motion for a 

discovery conference, the record discloses this motion was filed 

three days prior to trial and the district court specifically and 

properly found this request to be frivolous. As to the Taxpayer's 

requests for additional time to locate and retain counsel, the 

record discloses the suit was filed by Taxpayer on May 20, 1988, 

and trial was held on August 24, 1989, approximately 16 months 

after filing. Considering that Taxpayer's motion to reschedule 

the trial in order that he could have more time to obtain counsel 

was filed three days prior to trial, we cannot say the district 

court abused its discretion in denying this motion. In summary, 

we hold that Taxpayer's first contention lacks merit. 

The district court's findings of fact shall not be set aside 

unless clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Addressing 

Taxpayer's shotgun contention that the district court's findings 

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Appellate Case: 89-6395 Document: 010110041945 Date Filed: 09/10/1990 Page: 3 
of fact are clearly erroneous, we find this assertion to be 

utterly and completely without merit. As to the facts before the 

district court, Taxpayer ignores that he had the burden of proof 

and complains that the government failed to produce evidence. 

Taxpayer points out what he asserts to be irregularities between 

the office procedures and the IRS' official interpretation of the 

code. Taxpayer is obviously not aware of the standard of review 

which dictates our disposition of this case. When the district 

court has made findings of fact we may not set these findings 

aside merely because an opposite view of the facts is possible. 

We must be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 

U.S. 364, 395, 68 s.ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). An 

examination of the trial transcript convinces us there is 

overwhelming evidence to support the district court's findings of 

fact. 

We next address Taxpayer's contention that he was entitled to 

receive notice of the IRS' levy upon his bank account. 

We first examine the applicable facts. The Taxpayer 

testified that he did not receive notice and demand as required by 

§ 6303(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 1 The IRS agents testified 

they mailed the statutory notice and demand to Taxpayer at his 

1 Section 6303(a) provides that the IRS shall, as soon as 

practicable after the making of an assessment of a tax, give 

notice to the person liable for the unpaid tax. Section 6303(a) 

also provides that notice is adequate if "sent by mail to such 

person's last known address." 

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Appellate Case: 89-6395 Document: 010110041945 Date Filed: 09/10/1990 Page: 4 
last known address. Taxpayer acknowledged that he had lived at 

this address for over 40 years and had received prior 

correspondence from the IRS at this address. The pleadings show 

that Taxpayer continues to reside at this address. The district 

court credited the IRS testimony and evidence and specifically 

found that Taxpayer's testimony was questionable and of dubious 

credibility. In addition, the district court properly found that 

the IRS adequately complied with the requisite notice 

requirements. 

Upon consideration of Taxpayer's motion for a new trial, the 

district court elected to reopen the judgment to enter additional 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Upon filing his motion for new trial, the Taxpayer raised the 

question of the validity of the notice under 26 U.S.C. § 6331. 

This statute provides in part: 

(a) If any person liable to pay any tax 

neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after 

notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary 

to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and 

rights to property Levy may be made upon the 

accrued salary or wages ... by serving a notice of levy 

on the employer 

(d) [l]evy may be made under subsection (a) 

upon the salary or wages or other property of any person 

... only after the Secretary has notified such person in 

writing of his intention to make such levy. 

The statute continues and sets forth that the required notice 

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Appellate Case: 89-6395 Document: 010110041945 Date Filed: 09/10/1990 Page: 5 
shall be given in person or left at the dwelling or usual place of 

business or sent by certified or registered mail to "such person's 

last known address." 

The district court determined that the notice required under 

§ 6331 should be given to the entity which possessed or controlled 

the Taxpayers funds. The district court determined that whether 

the Taxpayer actually received notice under § 633l(d) is 

immaterial. The district court reached this determination by 

examining the IRS' interpretation of the statute as contained in 

Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-l(a)(l) which provides that a "[l]evy may 

be made by serving a notice of levy on any person in possession of 

••• property or rights to property subject to levy, including ... 

bank accounts ..•• " The district court determined that the 

"agency's construction of section 633l(d) [was] reasonable and not 

'plainly inconsistent with the terms of the statute.'" 

Taxpayer takes umbrage with this ruling of the district court 

contending, apparently, either that levies to collect taxes must 

be served upon the Taxpayer or that a notice of levy and a levy 

are distinct and that a notice of a levy must be served on the 

Taxpayer. Both arguments are without merit. Wolfe v. United 

States, 798 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 

U.S. 927 (1987). 

we note that Taxpayer has raised 

upon the introduction of evidence. 

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other arguments touching 

As no objection was raised 

Appellate Case: 89-6395 Document: 010110041945 Date Filed: 09/10/1990 Page: 6 
during trial, we will not consider these matters for the first 

time on appeal. 

Appellee, while not filing a cross appeal, asserts the 

district court was without jurisdiction to decide this case. It 

argues that the suit was in fact an inartfully pleaded protest 

against tax liability. In view of the district court's rulings, 

we are not persuaded by appellee's argument in the case before us. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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