Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00867/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00867-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MERCED, CITY OF MERCED

POLICE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF

NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT SPECIAL

AGENT SUPERVISOR ALFREDO

CARDWOOD, COUNTY OF MERCED,

MERCED COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT, MERCED COUNTY

DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHN TAYLOR,

MERCED COUNTY DISTRICT

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DISTRICT

ATTORNEY GORDON SPENCER, DOES

6 through 50

Defendants.

1:07-CV-00867-OWW-DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

RE GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 8, 11,

13)

1. INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Merced (“Merced”) and City of Merced

Police Department (“Merced Police”) move to dismiss Plaintiff

John Garcia’s (“Garcia”) complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Defendant Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement Special

Agent Supervisor Alfredo Cardwood (“Cardwood”) moves to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and

for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). 

Defendants County of Merced (“Merced County”), Merced County

Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Dept.”), Merced County Deputy

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Sheriff John Taylor (“Taylor”) and District Attorney Gordon

Spencer (“Spencer”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges

assault and battery, abuse of process, false arrest and

imprisonment, defamation per se, violation of California Civil

Code § 52.1 and a § 1983 claim for unreasonable search and

seizure. Oral argument on this matter was heard on October 15,

2007.

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The third amended complaint was filed on June 15, 2007. The

action was previously removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Section 1441(b) from Merced County Superior Court. (Doc. 1, Third

Amended Complaint (“TAC”).) Defendants Merced and Merced Police

moved to dismiss the TAC on June 19, 2007. (Doc. 8, Merced and

Merced Police Motion to Dismiss TAC (“MTD I”).) Defendants

Merced County, Sheriff’s Dept., Taylor and Spencer moved to

dismiss the TAC on June 28, 2007. (Doc. 11 Merced County and DA

Motion to Dismiss TAC (“MTD II”).) Defendant Cardwood moved to

dismiss and filed a motion for a more definite statement of the

TAC on July 9, 2007. (Doc. 13, Cardwood Motion to Dismiss (“MTD

III”).) On August 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed a fourth amended

complaint. (Doc. 15, Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC” or

“Complaint”).) On August 28, 2007, Defendants Merced and Merced

Police filed a memorandum/correspondence with the Court regarding

the scheduled hearing on the TAC motion to dismiss, requesting to

be heard on the motion to dismiss despite the recently filed FAC.

(Doc. 16, Memorandum/Correspondence from Defendants (“Memo”).) 

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Merced and Merced Police’s counsel filed a letter with the 1

Court on August 28, 2007 describing a history and pattern of

Plaintiff filing amended complaints in response to Defendants’

motion to dismiss/demurrer motions, prohibiting Defendants from

having the opportunity to test the sufficiency of a new

complaint’s allegations. 

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in the Superior Court

of Merced on March 13, 2007. Plaintiff then amended his

complaint and filed his First Amended Complaint on March 21, 2007

to substitute real names for fictitious “Doe” defendants. 

Plaintiff filed yet another amended complaint, his Second Amended

Complaint on April 5, 2007, pursuant to an ex parte application

before Defendants Merced and Merced Police could file a demurrer

on the first amended complaint, which they claim they were

preparing. Defendants Merced, Merced Police and Merced County

timely filed demurrers against the Second Amended Complaint, and

a hearing was set for May 31, 2007. Plaintiff filed yet another

amended complaint, a Third Amended Complaint on May 23, 2007. 

The Superior Court of Merced permitted the hearing on the

demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint to be heard despite the

filing of the Third Amended Complaint. At the hearing the Court

stated that it would allow the Third Amended Complaint but would

allow no further amendments until Defendants have had the

opportunity to test the sufficiency of the new complaint’s

allegations. The Third Amended Complaint contained a federal

cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and, Defendants

removed the action to Federal Court. Defendants then timely

filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint on June 19,

2007. Plaintiff filed his Fourth Amended Complaint on August 20,

2007. Defendants Merced and Merced Police then sought relief

from the Court by their filing on August 28, 2007. 

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In response, a stipulation and order was entered by the Court and

parties on August 31, 2007 setting the motion to dismiss hearing

date on the TAC and the FAC and permitting supplemental briefings

to be filed to address any alleged remaining deficiencies in the

FAC on the pending motions to dismiss. (Doc. 18, Order.) 1

Defendants Merced County, Sheriff’s Dept., Taylor and Spencer

filed their supplemental brief on the motion to dismiss the FAC

on September 4, 2007. (Doc. 19, Merced County and DA Supplemental

Brief (“Suppl. I”).) Defendant Cardwood filed his supplemental

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Defendant City of Merced and City of Merced Police 2

Department claim that Plaintiff’s opposition to their motion was

not filed in accordance with Civil Local Rule 78-230(c) which

requires opposition papers to be filed not less than fourteen

days before the hearing date (October 15, 2007) or if by

electronic service not less than seventeen days before the

hearing date (October 15, 2007) and therefore they were deprived

of five days in which to respond. (Doc. 26, Reply I, pp. 1-2.) 

Defendants request that the Court disregard Plaintiff’s

opposition. The Stipulation and Order entered into on August 31,

2007 by all parties to the action sets forth the due dates of the

opposition and reply papers. (Doc. 18, Order). Plaintiff was to

file his opposition papers to any supplemental briefs by

September 24, 2007 and Defendants were to file their reply papers

by October 1, 2007, a full seven days later. Defendants

correctly note that Plaintiff did not file his opposition papers

on the agreed upon date of September 24, 2007, filing his

oppositions on October 2 and October 3, 2007. However,

Defendants are incorrect that they were deprived five days in

which to respond to Plaintiff’s opposition. Defendants City of

Merced and City of Merced Police Department filed their reply on

October 10, 2007, which provided them seven days to respond, the

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brief supporting the motion to dismiss the FAC on September 10,

2007. (Doc. 20, Cardwood Supplemental Brief (“Suppl. II”).) 

Defendants Merced and Merced Police filed their supplemental

brief on the motion to dismiss the FAC on September 10, 2007.

(Doc. 21, City and Police Supplemental Brief (“Suppl. III”).) 

Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendants’ Merced County,

Sheriff’s Dept., Taylor and Spencer MTD II and Suppl. I on

October 2, 2007. (Doc. 23, Opposition to MTD II.) Plaintiff

filed his opposition to Defendant Cardwood’s MTD III and Supp. II

on October 2, 2007. (Doc. 24, Opposition to MTD III.) Plaintiff

filed his opposition to Defendants’ Merced and Merced Police MTD

I and Suppl. III on October 3, 2007. (Doc. 25, Opposition to MTD

I.) Defendant Merced and Merced Police replied to Plaintiff’s

Opposition to MTD I on October 10, 2007. (Doc. 26, Reply I.)2

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same amount of time specified in the Stipulation and Order of

August 2007. Defendants City of Merced and City of Merced Police

Department were not prejudiced by this late filing, only the

Court was inconvenienced as it did not receive Defendants’ reply

until October 10, 2007, well after the October 1, 2007 deadline

it had ordered.

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Defendant Merced County, Sheriff’s Dept., Taylor and Spencer

filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 23,

Opposition to MTD II.) to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. 11, MTD II

and Doc. 19, Suppl. I.) on October 11, 2007. (Doc. 27, Motion to

Strike.) The Motion to Strike was scheduled for October 15,

2007. Local rule 78-230(b) requires that motions be set “not

less than thirty-one (31) days after mailed or electronic service

and filing of the motion.” The motion is brought on the ground

that Plaintiff filed his opposition papers on October 2, 2007,

more than a week after the stipulated deadline of September 24,

2007. (Doc. 18, Order.) (Doc. 27, Motion to Strike, p. 2:14-20.) 

Defendants also argue that the caption to the FAC does not name

as Defendants, Merced County, Sheriff’s Dept., Taylor and

Spencer. Those persons and entities however, are mentioned as

defendants in the body of the FAC. (Doc. 27, Motion to Strike, p.

2:3-10.) Defendant Merced County, Sheriff’s Dept., Taylor and

Spencer did not file a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition papers. 

Plaintiff filed a declaration by counsel in opposition to

Defendant Merced County’s Motion to Strike on October 12, 2007.

(Doc. 28, Opposition to Motion to Strike.) In Plaintiff’s

declaration, counsel apologizes to the Court and Merced County

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Counsel claims that due to an oversight in his office, the 3

due date for the opposition was calendared for October 1, 2007,

not less than fourteen (14) calendar days before the hearing date

of October 15, 2007. And during the process of purchasing a new

computer upon the previous computer’s failure to work, Counsel

missed the incorrectly calendared October 1, 2007 date. Counsel

has agreed to continue the hearing date to permit Merced County

to file a reply. (Doc. 28, Opposition to Motion to Strike, ¶¶ 2-

5.) 

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for his oversight of the due dates. 

3

A. FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT (COMPARISON TO THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT)

(a) This analysis addresses the most recently filed

complaint, the FAC. Defendants motion to dismiss pleadings,

including the supplemental motions to dismiss pleadings,

addressing any remaining deficiencies in the FAC, will be taken

into account in the motion to dismiss analysis on the FAC.

Plaintiff alleges an assault and battery in his first cause

of action. In his previous TAC, Plaintiff did not specifically

name any defendants, referring only to defendants generally in

his cause of action. His amended complaint, the FAC, adds a

specific reference to Defendant Cardwood. Plaintiff also alleges

in his FAC that Plaintiff was: 

apprehensive of harmful or offensive touching when

he was pulled over while driving his car. The

actual touching was unnecessary force by a police

officer because the officers doing the touching, at

the time of the touching, did not reasonably believe

the warrant was valid, and instead, knew that the

warrant was obtained on false information and did

not include essential exculpatory information. 

Placing Plaintiff in apprehension of non-consensual

touching and actually touching Plaintiff was

excessive force because Defendants knew they had no

actual right to arrest Plaintiff or search

Plaintiff’s office. 

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 39.)

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(b) Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges abuse of

process against all Defendants. Under his FAC, Plaintiff adds

three additional allegations to his claim for abuse of process. 

Plaintiff specifically names Defendants Spencer as being involved

in preparing the warrant, and claims Spencer knew the warrant was

fraudulent and an abuse of process. (Doc. 15, FAC ¶ 43.) 

Plaintiff also claims that Spencer, Taylor and other Defendants

do not have immunity, absolute nor investigative, for fabricating

evidence, making false statements or withholding exculpatory

evidence. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 44.) Plaintiff also additionally

alleges that Defendant Spencer was an authorized policymaker and

implemented, created and approved the subordinate Defendant

Merced County Sheriff’s Department, Defendant Taylor and

Defendant Merced Police’s decisions and conduct in obtaining and

executing the fraudulent warrant, using false evidence and

concealing the exculpatory evidence used for obtaining the

warrant. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 46.) Plaintiff concludes that such

ratification by Spencer is “chargeable to the State of

California, the Merced County and the Merced Police Department.”

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 46.

(c) Plaintiff’s third cause of action for false arrest and

imprisonment with a warrant is largely unchanged from the TAC. 

However, Plaintiff no longer states that he will identify and

designate other officers in place of Doe Defendants. Compare

Doc. 1, TAC, ¶ 46 to Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 49.

(d) Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for defamation per se

against Defendant Cardwood is unchanged. 

(e) Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action under the TAC for

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civil conspiracy against all Defendants has been removed as a

cause of action under the FAC and is now at the end of the

complaint under a heading entitled “Prayer for Additional

Recovery as Allowed by Law under the Legal Doctrine of Civil

Conspiracy against All Defendants.” Compare Doc. 1, TAC, ¶¶ 59-62

to Doc 15, FAC, ¶¶ 65-68. 

(f) Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action under the TAC, now the

fifth cause of action under the FAC, alleges Defendants violated

42 U.S.C. § 1983, protecting him from unreasonable search and

seizure. The only addition in the FAC to the sixth cause of

action is a conclusory statement that Defendants are not entitled

to absolute investigative or prosecutorial immunity. (Doc. 15,

FAC, ¶ 61.)

(g) Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action alleging violation

of California Civil Code § 52.1 under the TAC, now the sixth

cause of action under the FAC, is unchanged.

3. FACTUAL HISTORY

On February 6, 2006, Plaintiff, a criminal defense attorney,

was in Merced Superior Court when he was approached by Merced

County prisoner Robert Anthony Plunkett. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 10.) 

Mr. Plunkett told him he was a friend of Plaintiff’s client

Alfonso Robledo and he had something important to tell Plaintiff.

(Doc. 15, FAC ¶ 8, 12.) Plaintiff believed Mr. Plunkett may have

had information relevant to Mr. Robledo’s case and gave Mr.

Plunkett his business card and told him to contact his office and

make an appointment with his investigators. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 13.) 

Approximately, an hour later when Plaintiff stepped outside the

courtroom, Mr. Plunkett approached Plaintiff for the second time.

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(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 13.) 

Mr. Plunkett told Plaintiff that a person named Sylvia told

him he could leave something with Plaintiff to give to Mr.

Robledo. Plaintiff had taken tobacco to his client Mr. Robledo

before and inquired whether it was tobacco. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 14.) 

Mr. Plunkett replied in the affirmative and Plaintiff told him to

take it to his office and leave it with his secretary. (Doc. 15,

FAC, ¶ 14.) 

At 3:30 p.m. Plaintiff was finished with his Court business

when Mr. Plunkett approached Plaintiff a third time as he was

leaving the Court building and informed him he could not find

Plaintiff’s office. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 15.) The office was on the

same street, two blocks away. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 15.) Mr. Plunkett

walked alongside Plaintiff as he was returning to his office.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 15.) Mr. Plunkett identified himself and

informed Plaintiff he had an afternoon pass from the Sandy Mush

correctional facility and he was a cellmate of Mr. Robledo’s.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 16.) 

Mr. Plunkett then handed Plaintiff a Bugler tobacco pouch

and commented that “Sylvia should not have removed the outside

packaging of the tobacco.” (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff

immediately attempted to hand the bag back to Mr. Plunkett asking

if there was anything in the Bugler pouch. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 17.) 

Mr. Plunkett refused to take the Bugler pouch, backing away and

putting his hands behind his back. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 18.) He said

he did not know what was in the bag and could not even if he

wanted to, take the package back because he was on an afternoon

pass from Sandy Mush. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 18.)

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When Plaintiff reached his law office, he opened the Bugler

pouch with his investigator Augie Provencio, discovering a

methamphetamine-like substance. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff

instructed Mr. Provencio to flush the contents down the toilet.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 19.) Plaintiff then drove away from his office. 

During his drive he was pulled over by several vehicles on M

Street between Olive and Yosemite Avenues. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 20.) 

Plaintiff was immediately handcuffed and patted down and informed

that his office and automobile would be frozen and searched.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was taken back to his office

under arrest, while his office was searched and employees

interrogated. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶¶ 20-21.)

Defendant Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement Special Agent

Supervisor Alfredo Cardwood and Defendant Merced County Deputy

Sheriff John Taylor questioned Plaintiff during the search, tape

recording the questioning. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 21.) Plaintiff

agreed to speak to Defendants and provided a recorded statement

to Defendant officers. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 22.) After Plaintiff

made his recorded statement he was informed that Mr. Plunkett was

wearing a recording device during their earlier conversation.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 22.) Defendants Cardwood and Taylor and other

unidentified Defendant Does, informed Plaintiff he could change

or redact any part of his recorded statement. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶

23.) Plaintiff declined. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff

alleges at least a portion of the information Defendants used to

obtain a search warrant for Plaintiff and his office was provided

by Mr. Plunkett. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 9.) 

Plaintiff has requested from Defendants information upon

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which his warrant was based, but claim his request has been

refused. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that the

information on which the warrant is based is false and based on

exculpatory information fraudulently withheld from the

magistrate. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant District Attorney Gordon Spencer

had contacted and arranged with news media outlets, including

television outlets to witness Plaintiff being taken under arrest

from his office to the Merced County city jail. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶

24.)

Plaintiff alleges that at the time Mr. Plunkett was waiting

to be sentenced. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 25.) Mr. Plunkett was a repeat

offender with two strikes against him, exposing him to a sentence

of 25 years to life. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges Mr.

Plunkett was rewarded for his participation in Defendants’

conspiracy by a sentence of only four years arranged by Defendant

Spencer in return for Mr. Plunkett’s cooperation in providing

Defendants with false information as the basis to initiate

proceedings in the investigation against Plaintiff. (Doc. 15,

FAC, ¶ 25.) 

Plaintiff believes the criminal investigation was instigated

in retaliation, intimidation, coercion and defamation because

Plaintiff referred his client, Erika Rivera, to a civil attorney

for prosecution of civil police misconduct. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 8.) 

Defendants Cardwood, Merced Police, Sheriff’s Dept. and certain

named Merced Police officers are being sued in Ms. Rivera’s suit.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 8.)

No criminal charges have been brought against Plaintiff as a

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result of the described events. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 27.)

4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. 12(b)(6) MOTION

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. Gilligan

v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the Court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The question before the court is not whether the plaintiff

will ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff

could prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would

entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.

69, 73 (1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van

Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

5. STATE CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges state law claims for assault and battery

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 Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public 4

entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises

out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public

employee or any other person. Cal.Gov.Code § 815(a).

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by a peace officer, abuse of process, false arrest and

imprisonment, defamation per se and violation of California Civil

Code § 52.1. 

A. STATUTORY BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITIES

Plaintiff brings state law claims against, not only

individual Defendants, but public entities, Merced County, Merced

County Sheriff’s Department, the City of Merced and the City of

Merced Police Department. 

Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to state the

statutory basis for which the public entities are liable. Under

California law a public entity is not liable under a claim

brought by a plaintiff unless liability is provided for by

statute or required by the state or federal constitution. Cal.

Gov. Code § 815; Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co., 155 Cal.App.3d

405, 409 (Cal.App.1.Dist. 1984); Lundeen Coatings Corp. v.

Department of Water & Power, 232 Cal.App.3d 816, 832

(Cal.App.2.Dist. 1991). California Government Code Section 815

requires liability of a public entity be provided by statute.4

“It is not interpreted to mean that public entities are liable in

tort only when the Legislature has enacted a statute imposing

liability which on its face is applicable to public bodies. 

Rather, a liability is deemed ‘provided by statute’ if a statute

defines the tort in general terms.” Levine v. City of Los

Angeles, 68 Cal.App.3d 481, 487 (Cal.App.2.Dist. 1977) (The

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Plaintiff also cites the following California Statutes as 5

the basis for liability of Defendants under his state law claims:

(a) Cal. Gov. Code § 815.3 regulates a public entity’s liability

in the event that an elected official commits an intentional

tort.

(b) Cal. Gov. Code § 818.8 immunizes public entities from

liability caused by intentional or negligent misrepresentations

on the part of their employees, including breaches by the

employee.

(c) Cal. Gov. Code § 820.4 immunizes public employees from

liability arising from acts performed in the execution or

enforcement of any law, with the exception for false arrest or

imprisonment.

(d) Cal. Gov. Code § 822.2 provides that public employees are

immune from liability from injuries caused by their intentional

or negligent misrepresentations, absent actual fraud, corruption

or actual malice.

(e) Cal. Gov. Code § 825 requires public entities to pay claims

and judgments against public employees that arise out of their

public employment, where the public entity has defended the

employee in the action. 

(f) Cal. Penal Code § 835a provides that a “peace officer who has

reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has

committed a public offense may use reasonable force to effect the

arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance.”

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phrase “as provided by statute” is given “its broadest possible

meaning”).

In support, Plaintiff cites California Government Code

Section 815.2 . “A public entity is liable for injury 5

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or

omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a

cause of action against that employee....” Cal. Gov. Code §

815.2. Public employees are liable for injuries caused by their

acts or omissions to the same extent as private persons. Cal.

Gov. Code § 820. “Through this section, the California Tort

Claims Act expressly makes the doctrine of respondeat superior

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applicable to public employers.” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School

Dist., 19 Cal.4th 925, 932 (1998). “Thus, ‘the general rule is

that an employee of a public entity is liable for his torts to

the same extent as a private person [citation] and the public

entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee

causes [citation] to the same extent as a private employer

[citation].’” Gates v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 528

(Cal.App.2.Dist. 1995)(quoting Leger v. Stockton Unified School

Dist., 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1461 (1988)). “A public entity, as

the employer, is generally liable for the torts of an employee

committed within the scope of employment if the employee is

liable. [Citations.]” Thomas v. City of Richmond, 9 Cal.4th 1154,

1157 (1995). Plaintiff has properly alleged a statutory basis

for bringing suit against public entity Defendants.

B. ASSAULT AND BATTERY

Plaintiff’s first claim alleges both assault and battery. 

“Assault and battery are defined in the California Penal Code. 

Assault is the ‘unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability,

to commit a violent injury on the person of another.’ Cal.Penal

Code § 240. ‘A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force

or violence upon the person of another.’ Cal. Penal Code § 242.”

Tekle ex rel. Tekle v. U.S., 457 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir.

2006.). 

Under California civil law, a claim for assault must

allege:(1) that Defendants intended to cause harmful or offensive

contact, or the imminent apprehension of such contact, and (2)

that Plaintiff was put in imminent apprehension of such contact.”

Brooks v. United States, 29 F.Supp.2d 613, 617 (N.D.Cal. 1998)

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(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants, including Defendant Cardwood committed

an assault on Plaintiff by causing Plaintiff to be touched with

the intent to harm or offend. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 38.) Plaintiff

then alleges he was “apprehensive of harmful or offensive

touching when he was pulled over while driving his car” and

alleges that he was placed in “apprehension of non-consensual

touching...” (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 39.) “The tort of assault is

complete when the anticipation of harm occurs.” Kisesky v.

Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 232

(Cal.App.2 Dist. 1983.) Physical injury need not be present for

either a claim of assault or battery. Id. Specific intent to

commit an assault is not required, only an intentional act

coupled with the knowledge of “actual knowledge of the facts

sufficient to establish that the defendant's act by its nature

will probably and directly result in injury to another.” People

v. Williams, 26 Cal.4th 779, 782 (2001).

Under California civil law, the elements of a battery are as

follows: (1) defendant intentionally did an act that resulted in

harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, (2)

plaintiff did not consent to the contact, and (3) the contact

caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff. Tekle, 457

F.3d at 1102 (citing Cole v. Doe 1 thru 2 Officers of Emeryville

Police Dep't, 387 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1101 (N.D.Cal. 2005)). “A

battery involves a touching.” Price v. County of San Diego, 990

F.Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D.Cal. 1998). Plaintiff’s battery claim

alleges that Defendants touched or caused Plaintiff to be touched

with the intent to harm or offend. “A battery is any

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intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with the

person of another...” Piedra v. Dugan, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 36, 48

(Cal.App.4 Dist. 2004)(citing Fluharty v. Fluharty, 69

Cal.Rptr.2d 244 (Cal.App.4 Dist. 1997)). Plaintiff contends that

he did not consent to the touching. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 38.) 

Plaintiff also alleges he was “harmed and offended by Defendants

conduct.” (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 47.) In a battery claim against a

police officer, Plaintiff must prove the officer used

unreasonable force. Munoz v. City of Union City, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d

521, 539 (Cal.App.1 Dist. 2004); Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63

Cal.App.4th 1269, 1272-73 (Cal.App.4 Dist. 1998). Plaintiff

alleges that “[t]he actual touching was unnecessary force by a

police officer because the officers doing the touching, at the

time of the touching, did not reasonably believe the warrant was

valid, and...knew that the warrant was obtained based on false

information and did not include essential exculpatory

information...” (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 39.)

 Plaintiff’s first claim sufficiently pleads a cause of

action for battery and for assault but these two claims should be

separately stated. Plaintiff agreed at oral argument to amend

his pleading to separately state his assault claim and his

battery claim. Under California law, a defendant cannot be

convicted of both assault and battery, as every battery includes

an element of assault, “and is, in fact, a consummated assault.”

People v. Lopez, 47 Cal.App.3d 8, 15 (Cal.App.4 Dist. 1975). 

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his first cause of

action for assault and battery.

III. IMMUNITY ANALYSIS

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Defendant City of Merced and City of Merced Police claim

immunity under California Government Code § 820.2, permitting

immunity for discretionary acts of public employees, even if such

discretion is abused, and immunity is claimed under California

Government Code § 815.2 which limits liability of a public entity

if the public employee is immune. 

California Government Code § 820.2 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public

employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his

act or omission where the act or omission was the

result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion be abused.

The same immunity applies to the public entity under which

the public employee is employed. California Government Code §

815.2(b) provides:

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public

entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an

act or omission of an employee of the public entity

where the employee is immune from liability

However, immunity under § 820.2 is not afforded to 

Defendants if the officer uses excessive and unreasonable force. 

Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal.App.2d 256, 266 (Cal.App.1.Dist.

1967); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.

2002) (en banc) ("California denies immunity to police officers

who use excessive force in arresting a suspect."). Plaintiff has

alleged in his FAC that Defendants used unreasonable force and

excessive force, therefore, immunity does not apply. See Doc. 15,

FAC, ¶ 40. 

Defendants City of Merced’s and City of Merced Police

Department’s cannot be granted immunity as a matter of law from

assault and battery claims at the pleading stage. Their motion

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to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action on the basis of

immunity under California Government Codes §§ 820.2 and 815.2 is

DENIED.

Defendants Cardwood, City of Merced, City of Merced Police

Department, Merced County, Merced County Sheriff’s Department,

Merced County Deputy Sheriff Taylor and Merced County District

Attorney Spencer claim immunity under California Government Code

§ 821.6 and § 815.2(b) from Plaintiff’s assault and battery

claim. 

California Government Code § 821.6 provides

A public employee is not liable for injury caused by

his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or

administrative proceeding within the scope of his

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without

probable cause.

If a public employee is immune under § 821.6, the public

entity that employs such employee is not liable under California

Government Code § 815.2

Defendants claim § 821.6 immunizes them for governmental

investigations arising in the context of formal or administrative

proceedings. However, the first cause of action is for assault

and battery based on allegations that officers wrongfully touched

Plaintiff in the course of arresting him on a knowingly invalid

warrant. Executing a knowingly fraudulent warrant is not

instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative

proceeding. Section 821.6 immunity is generally perceived as

prosecutorial immunity and immunity from malicious prosecution.

Kayfetz v. State of California, 156 Cal.App.3d 491, 497

(Cal.App.1 Dist. 1987); accord Citizens Capital Corp. v. Spohn,

133 Cal.App.3d 887, 889 (Cal.App.2.Dist. 1982). 

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Defendants assertion of immunity under California Government

Code § 821.6, for public employees and § 815.2, for public

entities employing public employees fails. Defendants Merced

County, Merced County Sheriff’s Department, Merced County Deputy

Sheriff Taylor and Merced County District Attorney Spencer are

not granted immunity as a matter of law for Plaintiff’s assault

and battery claim at the pleading stage. Their motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s first cause of action on the basis of immunity under

California Government Codes. §§ 821.6 and 815.2(b) is DENIED.

C. ABUSE OF PROCESS

Plaintiff second claim alleges “abuse of process.” The

common law tort of abuse of process arises when one uses the

court's process for a purpose other than that for which the

process was designed. Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 718

(2006)(citing 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts,

§ 459, p. 547). The tort of abuse of process is “interpreted

broadly to encompass the entire range of ‘procedures’ incident to

litigation.” Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn., 7 Cal.3d 94,

104 fn. 4 (1972). The elements are: (1) defendant contemplated

an ulterior motive in using the process, and (2) defendant

committed a willful act in the use of the process not proper in

the regular conduct of the proceedings. Oren Royal Oaks Venture

v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168

(1986). “A showing of malice, whether express or implied, is

required.” Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier Service, 162

Cal.App.3d 1236, 1247 (Cal.App.1 Dist. 1984). “Abuse of process

claims merely require malice, which ‘may be inferred from the

wilful abuse of the process.’” Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v.

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State Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal.4th 800, 825 (2001) (citing

Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal.App.2d 522, 526 (1947)). The

ulterior motive element can be inferred from proof of a willful

improper act, the critical question therefore is whether

Plaintiff has established a “willful act in the use of process

not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings.” Drum v.

Bleau, Fox & Associates, 107 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019

(Cal.App.2.Dist. 1019).

“Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution (and

malicious use of process) in that the gist of the tort is not

commencing an action or causing process to issue without

justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in

itself for an end other than that which it was designed to

accomplish.” Prosser, Law of Torts 856 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes

omitted).

The essence of the tort 'abuse of process' lies in the

misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in

the name of the court and under its authority for the

purpose of perpetrating an injustice....

Brown v. Kennard, 94 Cal.App.4th 40, 44 (Cal.App.3.Dist. 2001)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants abused the legal

process in several ways: 

(1) Defendants wrongfully obtained a warrant by using false

evidence and concealing essential exculpatory evidence

from the magistrate, such warrant was then used to (a)

falsely arrest and imprison Plaintiff and (b) presented

to the District Attorney of Merced County to use in

prosecuting Plaintiff;

(2) Defendant District Attorney Spencer was involved in

preparing the warrant and knew the warrant was

fraudulent and an abuse of process when he prepared the

warrant and when he received the warrant; and

(3) Defendants used these legal procedures for illegal and

ulterior purposes, fraudulently applying for a warrant

and using such warrant to arrest, imprison and

prosecute Plaintiff, use of legal procedures for which

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they were not designed to achieve.

(Doc. 15, FAC. ¶¶ 43-45.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants obtained the false

testimony of Mr. Plunkett to support the arrest warrant. 

Plaintiff contends that such abuse of process was actual fraud

and malice. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 47.) Plaintiff also contends that

each Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing

Plaintiff’s harm. Plaintiff claims that the criminal

investigation was instigated in retaliation, intimidation,

coercion and defamation in reprisal for his client’s referral to

a civil attorney. The referral resulted in an action for a civil

claim of police misconduct against Defendants Cardwood, Merced

Police and Sheriff’s Dept. and certain Merced police officers. 

All of these activities are not purposes for which the court

process is designed to be used. Assuming all allegations of the

non-moving party to be true, the obtaining of an arrest warrant

by false evidence; concealing of exculpatory evidence to an

issuing magistrate, thereby wrongfully obtaining a warrant to

arrest and search Plaintiff’s car and office; then arresting and

imprisoning Plaintiff can amount to abuse of process because an

arrest warrant is not to be used for unlawful retaliation that

results in the wrongful arrest and incarceration of an innocent

party. 

Defendants cite Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 4

Cal.App.4th 857, 885 (1992); a case that involved an abuse of

process claim against the defendant for filing an interpleader to

stay the action and permit resolution of competing claims. The

Court found that such reasons for an interpleader action were

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proper. Cantu, 4 Cal.App.4th at 886. In this case Defendants

invoked the judicial process for a purpose not intended,

obtaining a fraudulent arrest warrant to conduct a search and

seizure based on knowingly fraudulent information, and witheld

exculpatory evidence not presented to the magistrate. 

In an analogous case, a Puerto Rican District Court

(applying Puerto Rican law) held that obtaining a search warrant

by means of false testimony is a proper basis for a claim of

abuse of process, where it is alleged that as a result of a

public official’s romantic overtures, and the Plaintiff’s

invocation of her civil rights to reject the unwelcome conduct,

the official and his colleagues, in retaliation, used their

official position to obtain warrants to search plaintiff’s home

and office. Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 405 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2005). 

Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim is sufficiently pled. 

I. IMMUNITY ANALYSIS

County Defendants, City Defendants and Defendant Cardwood

claim immunity from Plaintiff’s second cause of action of abuse

of process under California Government Code §§ 821.6 and 815.2,

claiming it immunizes not only the formal judicial or

administrative proceedings themselves, but investigations arising

in the context of such proceedings. Amylou R. v. County of

Riverside, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1209-1210 (Cal.App.4 Dist. 1994);

see also Johnson v. City of Pacifica, 4 Cal.App.3d 82, 84

(Cal.App.1.Dist. 1970) (police officers immune for negligent

investigation of a crime); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 212

Cal.App.3d 278, 283-284 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1989), (social worker

immune from negligent investigation of child abuse reports). 

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Section 821.6 immunity applies to both prosecutors and police

officers. Randle v. City and County of San Francisco, 186

Cal.App.3d 449, 456-57 (Cal.App.1.Dist. 1986).

The public policy behind immunity from civil liability for

public officials is to free them from any fear of litigation or

harassment while performing essential duties. Such immunity

applies even if the public officials engage in a malicious abuse

of their power, proceed without probable cause or conceal

exculpatory evidence. Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6; White v. Towers, 37

Cal.2d 727, 730 (1951); Johnson, 4 Cal.App.3d at 84; Randle, 186

Cal.App.3d at 457 fn 9. “[I]n the end it is better to leave

unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than the

subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of

retaliation.” Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal.2d 577, 583 (1957)(quoting

Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 

Pursuant to sections 815.2 and 821.6, Defendants may assert

immunity from liability for the actions or omissions of 

investigating officers and a prosecutor if: (1) Plaintiff's

injuries were caused by acts committed by the officers and

prosecutor to institute or prosecute a judicial or administrative

proceeding or engage in investigative activities; and (2) the

conduct of the officers and prosecutor while instituting or

prosecuting the proceeding was within the scope of their

employment. Obtaining an arrest warrant is an activity conducted

in the process of an investigation and is routinely within the

scope of a prosecutor’s and officer’s employment. 

Plaintiff alleges he was harmed by being falsely arrested

and imprisoned and that Defendants conducted such activities with

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 Cal. Penal Code section 836 states in part: "(a) A peace 6

officer may arrest a person in obedience to a warrant, or,

pursuant to the authority granted to him or her by Chapter 4.5

(commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2, without a

warrant, may arrest a person whenever any of the following

circumstances occur: [¶] (1) The officer has probable cause to

believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public

offense in the officer's presence. [¶] (2) The person arrested

has committed a felony, although not in the officer's presence.

[¶] (3) The officer has probable cause to believe that the person

to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony,

in fact, has been committed." Cal. Penal Code section 847,

subdivision (b) states in part; "There shall be no civil

liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise

against, any peace officer ... or law enforcement officer ...

acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest

or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the

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malice. Malicious acts, however, under § 821.6 immunity, do not

destroy immunity. Defendants Taylor, Cardwood and Spencer are

entitled to immunity for the alleged abuse of process claim. 

Likewise, if their public employees are immune from liability the

public entities, Defendants City of Merced, City of Merced Police

Department, Merced County and County of Merced Sheriff’s

Department, are likewise not liable under California Government

Code section 815.2.

Defendants motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim for

abuse of process on immunity grounds is GRANTED.

D. FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Plaintiff’s third claim alleges false arrest and

imprisonment against all Defendants. False imprisonment is the

unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another. Penal Code

§ 236. The definition of the offense is the same whether alleged

as a crime or a tort. Dillon v. Haskell, 78 Cal.App.2d 814, 816

(Cal.App.2.Dist. 1947). False arrest and false imprisonment are 6

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following circumstances: [¶] (1) The arrest was lawful, or the

peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to

believe the arrest was lawful."

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not separate torts, the former being one way to commit the

latter. Collins v. City and County of San Francisco, 50

Cal.App.3d 671, 673 (Cal.App.1 Dist. 1975) “It is the unlawful

arrest or detention of a person without a warrant, or by an

illegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed.” Donati v.

Righetti, 9 Cal.App. 45, 48 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 1908); Mackie v.

Ambassador Hotel & Inv. Corp., 123 Cal.App. 215, 220 (Cal.App.4

Dist. 1932). A false imprisonment claim based upon an arrest

without a warrant merely requires an allegation that there was an

arrest without process, an imprisonment occurred and damages. 

“Where however the arrest is made with a warrant it is

necessary to allege its unlawfulness by pleading the facts

constituting the invalidity of the legal process. Allegations

that the warrant or judicial process was ‘void,’ ‘illegal,’

‘unauthorized’ [citation] or ‘void upon its face’ or that the

sheriff ‘did unlawfully imprison plaintiff’ [citation] or that

the imprisonment was ‘unlawful and void’ [citation] are

conclusions of law and add nothing to the substantive averments

of the complaint.” Muller v. Reagh, 215 Cal.App.2d 831, 836-37

(Cal.App.1 Dist. 1963) (citations ommitted).

‘The pleading in an action following an arrest with a

warrant is necessarily different from that in an ordinary

action * * * for a truthful statement of the facts will

disclose that the arresting officer had a warrant. In

order to establish the wrongful nature of the

confinement, therefore, the pleader must show that the

arrest was unlawful (not privileged), e. g., that the

warrant was invalid on its face. This calls for a

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pleading of facts; general allegations to the effect that

the warrant, or the affidavit for its issuance, was

‘unlawful,’ or ‘unauthorized,’ or that the imprisonment

was unlawful or void, are wholly insufficient.' 

Witkin, Cal.Procedure, Pleading, § 383, pp. 1360-1361.

California law allows false imprisonment claims to arise

when an officer maliciously arrests and imprisons another by

personally serving an arrest warrant issued solely on information

deliberately falsified by the arresting officer himself. Blaxland

v. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198,

1205, fn 4 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing McKay v. County of San Diego,

168 Cal.Rptr. 442, 443. (1980)). 

The court in Downey v. Allen, 36 Cal.App.2d 269, 273

(Cal.App.2 Dist. 1939), limited liability of peace officers if

the warrant is valid on its face and they were not involved in

obtaining the warrant, irrespective of defects in the proceedings

leading up to the issuance of a warrant. “‘When we speak of

process’ valid on its face ‘in considering whether it is

sufficient to protect an officer, we do not mean that its

validity is to be determined by upon the basis of scrutiny by a

trained legal mind, nor is it to be judged in light of the facts

outside its provisions which the officer may know.’” Collins, 50

Cal.App.3d at 677 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal, 129 Conn.

545, 553 (1943)).

City Defendants argue that the false arrest and imprisonment

claim does not include direct or inferential allegations that if

true would establish the involvement of City Defendants’

employees. Defendant Cardwood contends that Plaintiff does not

identify which Defendants were involved in the arrest and

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imprisonment. 

Plaintiff’s FAC states that “Defendants Cardwood and Taylor

and other officers...” arrested and imprisoned Plaintiff on a

warrant they did not reasonably believe was valid, knew it was

obtained on the basis of false evidence and concealed essential

exculpatory evidence, subjecting Plaintiff to a wrongful arrest.

(Doc. 15, FAC, ¶¶ 49-50.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

knowingly presented false information, knew they wrongfully

obtained the warrant and concealed exculpatory evidence from the

issuing magistrate judge. Plaintiff alleges there were no facts

to support probable cause for obtaining a warrant. Defendants’

wrongful procurement of a warrant based on false or fabricated

information cannot establish probable cause. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶

43.) Defendants did not reasonably believe such warrant was

valid. “All who take part in or assist in the commission of a

false imprisonment are joint tort feasors, and may be joined as

defendants without an allegation or proof of a conspiracy.”

Oppenheimer v. City of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App.2d 551, 553

(Cal.App.2.Dist. 1951). “‘[A] party who ‘authorizes, encourages,

directs or assists an officer to do an unlawful act, or procures

an unlawful arrest, without process, or participates in the

unlawful arrest or imprisonment, is liable.’” Du Lac v. Perma

Trans Products, Inc. 103 Cal.App.3d 937, 941 (Cal.App.2.Dist.

1980)(citing Ramsden v. Western Union, 71 Cal.App.3d 873, 880

(Cal.App.2 Dist. 1977))(overruled on separate issue regarding

privilege of a private person to communicate information to the

police in Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350,

377 (2004); BAJI No. 7.60 (7th ed. 1986). “‘[T]he actor is not

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liable unless his act is done for the purpose of imposing

confinement upon the other, or with knowledge that such a

confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it. It

is not enough that the actor realizes or should realize that his

actions involve a risk of causing a confinement, so long as the

likelihood that it will do so falls short of a substantial

certainty.’” Du Lac, 103 Cal.App.3d at 943 (citing Rest.2d Torts,

§ 35, com. h.). 

Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a cause of action for false

arrest and imprisonment against all Defendants. If no evidence

exists to support the claims, a dispositive motion is appropriate

to address such deficiencies.

I. IMMUNITY ANALYSIS

City and County Defendants claim immunity under California

Government Code §§ 820.2, 821.6 and 815.2. City Defendants also

claim immunity under California Civil Code § 43.55. Defendant

Cardwood claims immunity under § 821.6. 

California Civil Code § 43.55 provides:

(a) There shall be no liability on the part of, and no

cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer

who makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest

regular upon its face if the peace officer in making

the arrest acts without malice and in the reasonable

belief that the person arrested is the one referred to

in the warrant.

(b) As used in this section, a "warrant of arrest

regular upon its face" includes both of the following:

(1) A paper arrest warrant that has been issued

pursuant to a judicial order.

(2) A judicial order that is entered into an automated

warrant system by law enforcement or court personnel

authorized to make those entries at or near the time

the judicial order is made.

The facts alleged by Plaintiff prevent City Defendants from

claiming immunity under California Civil Code Section 43.55 at

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the pleading stage. Even if the warrant appeared valid on its

face, the Defendant officers are alleged to have acted with

malice in withholding exculpatory evidence and obtaining the

warrant with false evidence. McKay v. County of San Diego 111

Cal.App.3d 251, 256 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1980) (if an officer,

personally executing the warrant, acts without malice and obtains

an arrest warrant based on deliberately false information, no

conditional immunity is afforded the officer under Civil Code

43.55 (formerly 43.5(a))); Harden v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid

Transit Dist., 215 Cal.App.3d 7, 17 (Cal.App.1.Dist.

1989)(applying McKay rule, extended it to non-arresting officer

who “took a very active role in actually securing the arrest

warrant and participated in having it served by a fellow police

officer under his own authority”); Laible v. Superior Court, 157

Cal.App.3d 44, 53 (Cal.App.1 Dist. 1984) (extending McKay

“malice” to instances of withholding significant exculpatory

evidence from magistrate, especially if deliberate or with

reckless disregard for plaintiff’s liberty interests or for some

improper or wrongful motive or purpose, or clearly presenting

falsified documents.) 

Immunity for false arrest or imprisonment also is not

afforded under California Government Code § 820.4, which

provides: 

A public employee is not liable for his act or

omission, exercising due care, in the execution or

enforcement of any law. Nothing in this section

exonerates a public employee from liability for false

arrest or false imprisonment.

Liability for false arrest and imprisonment is specifically

retained in the Government Torts Claims Act, Section 820.4.

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Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710, 721 (1974). 

Likewise for immunity under Section 821.6. “We note, however,

that while an arrest could be considered to be part of the

investigation leading up to a judicial proceeding, it is settled

that section 821.6 does not provide immunity for claims for false

imprisonment.” Amylou R., 28 Cal.App.4th at 1211 fn 2(applying §

821.6 immunity). And because Merced City and Merced County

cannot not establish that their employees are immune for

liability, their immunity defense claims fails at the pleading

stage. Cal.Gov.Code § 815.2(b).

Defendants motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third cause of

action on grounds of immunity for false arrest and imprisonment

is DENIED.

E. DEFAMATION PER SE.

Plaintiff’s fourth claim alleges defamation per se against

Defendant Cardwood. Plaintiff claims:

53. ...making statements to the effect that Plaintiff

is a known drug dealer and delivers drugs into jails by

having his clients take the drugs into the jails. 

54. The alleged statements were made to known persons

other than Plaintiff. The persons to whom the

statements were made reasonably understood the

statements were about Plaintiff and also reasonably

understood the statements to mean that Plaintiff had

committed a crime.

55. ...Cardwood failed to use reasonable care to

determine the truth and falsity of the statements and

further made the statements with intent to cause injury

or with knowing and willful disregard for the probable

dangerous consequences of his conduct and deliberately

failed to avoid that those consequences.

(Doc. 15, FAC. ¶¶ 53-55.)

Defamation per se exists if a statement, is defamatory on

its face, that is untrue. A defamation per se claim is

actionable without proof of special damages. Defamation can

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take the form of the slander or libel. Slander is an oral,

unprivileged communication by radio or any mechanical or other

means. Cal. Civ. Code §46. Libel is a false and unprivileged

publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy or other fixed

representation to the eye. Cal. Civ. Code §45. 

A statement is libelous per se if it defames the plaintiff

on its face, that is, without the need of extrinsic evidence to

explain the statement's defamatory nature. Cal. Civ. Code §45a. 

“An allegation the plaintiff is guilty of a crime is libelous on

its face.” See Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant

Rights of Los Angeles, 117 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1145 fn. 7.

(Cal.App.2 Dist. 2004). A slander per se action is different

from a libel per se action in that California case law has held

four specific types of statements constitute slander per se, as

prescribed by Cal. Civ. Code §46:

 any “false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered” that: 

(1) Charges any person with crime, or with having been

indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; Cal. Civ.

Code §46(1)

(2) Imputes in him the present existence of an

infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease;

Cal. Civ. Code §46(2)

(3) Tends directly to injure him in respect to his

office, profession, trade or business, either by

imputing to him general disqualification in those

respects which the office or other occupation

peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with

reference to his office, profession, trade, or business

that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits;” or

Cal. Civ. Code §46(3)

(4) Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or

Cal. Civ. Code §46(4)

“Imputing dishonesty or lack of ethics to an attorney is also

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actionable under Civil Code section 46 because of the probability

of damage to professional reputation.” Albertini v. Schaefer, 97

Cal.App.3d, 822, 829 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 1979)

If such statements were made in a publication, accusing

Plaintiff of being guilty of the crime of being a drug dealer and

passing drugs to the jails through his client, such statements

are libelous on their face. Fashion 21, 117 Cal.App.4th at 1145

fn 7. Such statements impute dishonesty and lack of ethics on

the part of Plaintiff as an attorney, potentially damaging his

professional reputation. Albertini, 97 Cal.App.3d at 829. The

Complaint is unclear whether the alleged statements were made

orally or through written publication to qualify as a slander per

se or libel per se.

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his fourth claim for

defamation per se, to properly allege a slander per se or a libel

per se claim or both. 

I. IMMUNITY ANALYSIS

Defendant Cardwood claims immunity from Plaintiff’s

defamation per se claim under California Government Code § 821.6. 

 Defendant claims that immunity applies to claims for libel or

slander based on statements made by public employees in the

course of an investigation, citing Kayfetz v. State of

California, 156 Cal.App.3d 491, 497 (Cal.App.1.Dist. 1984),

Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 208 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1499 (Cal.App.6

Dist. 1989) and Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293

(Cal.App.6.Dist. 1999). Public employees are protected under

Section 821.6 even if they act maliciously and without probable

cause. Cal.Gov.Code § 821.6 (emphasis added). 

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In Kayfetz v. State of California, 156 Cal.App.3d 491

(Cal.App.1.Dist. 1984) immunity was afforded to publication of

Plaintiff’s name in an Action Report under California Government

Code Section 821.6. The Court reasoned that the two-fold

coverage under Section 821.6 includes any publication published

as part of the institution or prosecution of proceedings,

including “the charges and the disposition” if such publication

is “within the scope of [defendant’s] employment.” Kayfetz, 156

Cal.App.3d at 497. Similarly, the Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon 208

Cal.App.3d 1496 (Cal.App.6.Dist. 1989) court held that (relying

on Kayfetz), if injury, is caused by or through the process of

initiation or prosecution of the proceeding, immunity which is

applied liberally under Section 821.6, is granted. Terminating

the prosecution does not defeat immunity. Id. at 1499 (libel and

slander claim regarding dissemination of information -- after

plaintiffs were found guilty the investigating officer publicly

announced their guilt). Likewise, the court in Ingram v. Flippo,

74 Cal.App.4th 1280 (Cal.App.6.Dist. 1999), citing the “expansive

interpretation” the immunity statute is given, found a district

attorney who publicized the results of an investigation, immune

under Section 821.6. Id. at 1293 (district attorney had stated in

a press release that school board members had committed minor

violations). 

Immunity under Section 821.6 has also been extended to

police officers for their actions conducted in investigations of

crime, including intentional infliction of emotional distress and

conversion claims. Amylou R., 28 Cal.App.4th at 1208-1211, 1214

(infliction of emotional distress); Baughman v. State of

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California, 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 190-193 (Cal.App.2.Dist. 1995)

(conversion– police officers destroyed plaintiff’s property in

search); Gillan v. City of Marino, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 158, 170-71

(Cal.App.2 Dist. 2007) (officers immune from defamation and

intentional infliction of emotional distress based on statements

made in press releases about an investigation before the

institution of a judicial proceeding, still considered by Court

to be part of the prosecution of a judicial proceeding). 

In the present action Defendant Cardwood, a BNE Agent, made

statements relating to Plaintiff being a known drug dealer, and

delivering drugs to jails through his clients. However,

Plaintiff does not allege under what circumstances the statements

were made, including whether they were made in the course of

Defendant Cardwood’s investigation or the institution or

prosecution of proceedings. The time period such statements were

uttered by Defendant Cardwood is unknown. It is unclear at this

stage in the litigation if Defendant Cardwood is entitled to

immunity under Section 821.6 as a matter of law. Immunity is an

affirmative defense that Plaintiff’s pleading need not

anticipate. 

Defendant Cardwood’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds

Plaintiff’s fourth claim for defamation per se is DENIED.

F. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE §52.1 (UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)

Plaintiff’s sixth claim is brought under California Civil

Code § 52.1. Plaintiff alleges:

63. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by

reference herein as though fully set forth, paragraphs

1 through 62 of this complaint.

64. All Defendants interfered and attempted to interfere

Garcia’s right to be free of unreasonable search and

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seizures, while acting under color of law, by threats,

intimidation, coercion, or attempt to interfere by

threats, intimidation or coercion with Garcia’s

exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the

Constitution of the United States and rights secured by

the Constitution and laws of the State of California.

California Civil Code § 51.2(b) permits an individual whose

“exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the...Constitution or

laws of this state” has been interfered with by “threats,

intimidation, or coercion” (or attempted threats, intimidation,

or coercion) to bring a private right of action for damages. 

Plaintiff however, does not allege what threats, intimidation or

coercion Defendants preponderated on Plaintiff. 

Further, Plaintiff agreed at oral argument to dismissal of

the sixth cause of action due to its similarity to the fifth

cause of action for unreasonable search and seizure ascertainable

under a § 1983 action. 

Defendants motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action for

unreasonable search and seizure is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND.

G. CONSPIRACY: PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff’s complaint contains a section at the end, though

not a separately titled cause of action, entitled “Prayer for

Additional Recovery as allowed by law under the Legal Doctrine of

Civil Conspiracy against all Defendants.” (FAC, ¶ 65-69.) “Under

California law, there is no separate tort of civil conspiracy.”

Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 739 (1987). However, conspiracy

may be alleged as a means of imposing vicarious liability .

Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND to properly plead facts

to allege a conspiracy.

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6. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM

A. § 1983 SUIT AGAINST OFFICIALS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY

(CARDWOOD, TAYLOR AND SPENCER)

Plaintiff brings suit under § 1983 for violation of his

civil rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure

against all Defendants, including against Cardwood, Taylor and

Spencer in their individual capacities. Plaintiff has not

specifically alleged his right to be free from unreasonable

search and seizure is protected under the Fourth Amendment; by

reasonable inference it is evident that this Constitutional

amendment is being relied upon by Plaintiff.

When state officials are sued in their official-capacities,

the suit is treated as against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131

F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). “1983 claims against government

officials in their official capacities are really suits against

the governmental employer because the employer must pay any

damages awarded.” Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 fn. 8 (9th

Cir. 2002). In such suits, the real party in interest is the

entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,

25 (1991). By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to

impose personal liability upon a government official for actions

[taken] under color of state law.” Id. at 165.

I. DEFENDANT CARDWOOD

A suit against Defendants Cardwood, in his official capacity

is the same as a suit against his employer, the State of

California (the California Department of Justice's Bureau of

Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) is a state agency). However,

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Plaintiff did not name BNE or the State of California as a

Defendant in this action. However, “[a]s long as the government

entity receives notice and opportunity to respond to an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated

as a suit against the entity.” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles,

167 F.3d 514, 524, n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). 

Assuming BNE has been given sufficient notice and

opportunity to respond to an official-capacity suit, BNE is a

California State entity and Plaintiff’s cite no Eleventh

Amendment waiver of its sovereign immunity or action by Congress

overriding its Eleventh Amendment immunity. “Unless a State has

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden

it, however, a State cannot be sued directly in its own name

regardless of the relief sought,” in a Section 1983 claim.

Graham, 473 U.S. at 167, n. 14 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.

781 (1978)(per curiam). 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action against Defendant Cardwood

in his official capacity is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

II. DEFENDANT SPENCER, MERCED COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Defendant Spencer, Merced County District Attorney, is also

sued in his official capacity. However, Defendant Spencer, in

preparing and obtaining an arrest warrant acts either in his

investigative or prosecutorial role for the State. Weiner v. San

Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000)(a county

district attorney acts for the state for purposes of

investigating and proceeding with criminal investigations). Like

Defendant Cardwood and BNE, Plaintiff cites no Eleventh Amendment

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waiver or Congressional act overriding the State’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Defendant Spencer sued in his official

capacity is DISMISSED from the suit WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

III. DEFENDANT TAYLOR, MERCED COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPUTY

A suit against Defendant Spencer, Merced County Sheriff’s

Deputy, in his official capacity is the same as a suit against

Merced County, the payor of any damages that may be awarded. 

The Merced County Sheriff’s Department acts on behalf of the

county when investigating crimes and can be subject to Section

1983 liability. Brewster v. County of Shasta, 275 F.3d 803 (9th

Cir. 2001). Brewster “is controlling on the issue of whether

California sheriffs are subject to section 1983 liability.”

Brockmeier v. Solano County Sheriff’s Dept., No. CIV-S-05-2090

MCE EFB PS, 2006 WL 3760276, at *9 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 18, 2006). 

A California decision, Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 87

P.3d 1 (2004) however, differs and held that a sheriff acts for

the state in conducting investigations. The Venegas California

state decision directly conflicts with the earlier Ninth Circuit

decision, Brewster v. County of Shasta, 275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.

2001), that holds California Sheriffs act on behalf of the county

when investigating crimes. The Brewster court did not have the

benefit of the analysis in the later California Venegas case. 

However, “[t]he Venegas court challenges the holding in

Brewster, mistakenly asserting that the Ninth Circuit failed to

follow the ‘guidance given by [California state cases] McMillan,

Pitts and Peters.’” Brockmeier, 2006 WL 3760276, at *8. The

Brewster court did apply and follow McMillan in great detail,

conducting a thorough and expansive analysis, reviewing relevant

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As this Court has stated earlier in Faulkner v. County of 7

Kern, No. 1:04-CV-05964 OWWTAG, 2006 WL 1795107 at *16 (E.D.Cal.

June 28, 2006), a decision following Brewster, that “[b]ecause

the Ninth Circuit considers California sheriffs performing law

enforcement functions to be county officers, the majority's

contrary conclusion here creates a split that results in

immunizing sheriffs from section 1983 liability in actions

brought in state court while exposing them to liability in

identical actions filed in federal court. This effectively drives

California civil rights plaintiffs with actions against a county

sheriff out of our court system and into federal court. To

ensure uniformity in the enforcement of federal civil rights law

in both state and federal courts in California, the United States

Supreme Court should decide which view is correct.” 

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statutory and constitutional provisions to address whether

California sheriffs act on behalf the state or county when

investigating crimes, and the court carefully analyzed and

specifically rejected the Pitts and Peters decisions which were

analyzed with different results by the Venegas court. See

Brockmeier, 2006 WL 3760275, at *8 (lengthy discussion and

analysis of Venegas and Brewster); see also Brewster, 275 F.3d at

807-811. 

The Venegas decision does not overturn Ninth Circuit

precedent on this issue regarding a federal statute. The 7

“ultimate issue is whether or not California sheriffs are subject

to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when executing their law

enforcement duties” and “[t]his is an ultimate question of

federal law even though it requires application of some

principles of state law to resolve it,” Brockmeier, 2006 WL

3760275,at *6. “[T]he question of municipal liability under

section 1983 is one of federal law.” Streit v. County of Los

Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2001)(“even if [Peters] were

on all fours we would not be bound by its conclusions regarding

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section 1983 liability because such questions implicate federal,

not state law”.)

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action against Defendant Spencer, in

his official capacity is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS NOT PROPER DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff brings suit not only against the City of Merced

and the County of Merced but their municipal departments, the

City of Merced Police Department and the Merced County Sheriff’s

Department. Municipal departments, here Merced County Sheriff’s

Department and City of Merced Police Department, are not

appropriate Defendants. Under Section 1983, a “person” acting

under color of law may be sued for for violations of the U.S.

Constitution or federal laws. The term "persons" under section

1983 encompasses state and local officials sued in their

individual capacities, private individuals and entities which

acted under color of state law, and local governmental entities.

Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 995-996

(N.D.Cal. 1996). But “persons” do not include municipal

departments. Id. "Naming a municipal department as a defendant

is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a

municipality." Stump v. Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808, 816 (D.Colo.

1991). The County of Merced is the proper defendant in a § 1983

suit, not the Merced County Sheriff’s Department, which is

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

Likewise, the City of Merced is the proper defendant in a §

1983 suit and the City of Merced Police Department is DISMISSED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

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 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 8

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

Amendment.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v.

Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for

concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.

445, 456 (1976).

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C. DEFENDANTS’ CITY OF MERCED AND MERCED COUNTY MONELL LIABILITY

Plaintiff brings a § 1983 constitutional violation claim 

against the City of Merced and County of Merced for unreasonable

search and seizure. Local governments are “persons” subject to

suit for “constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen 8

v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) “[O]ur

holding...that local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.55. “Local governing bodies,

therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary,

declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that

is alleged to be unconstitutional, implements or executes a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially

adopted and promulgated by that body's officers...[or for]

deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the

body’s official decision making channels.” Id. at 690-91. 

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 “[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he 9

causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his

constitutional rights.’” Brass, 328 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979)(citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

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Although a local government can be held liable for its

official policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an

employee’s actions outside of the scope of these policies or

customs. “[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background

of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that

Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature

caused a constitutional tort. In particular,...a municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. A

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Id. at 691. The statute’s “language plainly

imposes liability on a government that, under color of some

official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s

constitutional rights.” Id. at 692. 

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: (1) The

official(s) must have violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights; (2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and 9

may not be an isolated incident; and (3) A nexus must link the

specific policy or custom to the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 690-92. There are three ways to show a policy or

custom of a municipality:

(1) By showing a longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard

operating procedure of the local

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government entity; 

(2) By showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy in the area of

decision or 

(3) By showing that an official with final

policymaking authority either delegated

that authority to, or ratified the

decision of, a subordinate. 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).

A municipal policy may be inferred from widespread practices or

evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the

errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. 

Id. Municipalities can be held liable "if its deliberate policy

caused the constitutional violation alleged." Blackenhorn, 485

F.3d at 484.

In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under

Section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss ‘even

if based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the

individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy,

custom, or practice.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t,

839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shah v. County of Los

Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants collectively violated his

right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, including,

officials from the City of Merced and County of Merced,

specifically Defendant Taylor as a County Sheriff’s Deputy and

Defendant Spencer, County District Attorney. However, Plaintiff

cites no custom or policy of the City or County followed by

Deputy Taylor or Spencer. Plaintiff does assert in an earlier of

paragraph of the Complaint, which is incorporated into his § 1983

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fifth cause of action, that Defendant Spencer was an authorized

policymaker and implemented and created and approved decisions

and conduct in obtaining and executing the fraudulent warrant by

Merced County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Sheriff John Taylor

and City of Merced Police Department but makes no claim that

there was a custom and policy or that Taylor was a policymaker in

the area of decision. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 46.) 

I. IMMUNITY LIMITED

Municipal corporations are not afforded immunity from suit

like individuals acting under the color of law. Owen v. City of

Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). While a municipality cannot

be held liable under a respondeat superior, it is not afforded

qualified immunity. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). 

For the reasons set forth above Defendant City of Merced’s

and County of Merced’s motion to dismiss the fifth cause of

action for Section 1983 claim for unreasonable search and seizure

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

D. § 1983 SUIT AGAINST INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FOR FOURTH

AMENDMENT DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY FOR UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE

Plaintiff sues Defendants Cardwood, Taylor and Spencer in

their individual capacities for liability under § 1983. To

establish liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the

individual defendant deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the

United States Constitution or a federal law. 

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

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of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336

F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The

rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’” Id.(quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443

(1991)). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs may bring a

civil action for deprivation of rights under the following

circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District

of Columbia. 

To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the

United States Constitution or a federal law and (2) that

the deprivation was effected “under color of state law.”

Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff has claimed he has a “civil right to be free

from unreasonable search and seizure.” (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶

61.) Plaintiff claims he was subjected to unreasonable

search and seizure as a result of Defendant Taylor’s and

Defendant Cardwood’s, and other officers to be identified,

obtaining a warrant to arrest Plaintiff and search his

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vehicle and office through falsified evidence,

misrepresentation, and withholding exculpatory information

from the magistrate who issued the warrant. (Doc. 15, FAC,

¶ 21.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant

Spencer was involved in obtaining the warrant knew at the

time he was preparing the warrant and at the time he

received it, that it was fraudulent. (Doc. 15, FAC, ¶ 43.). 

A warrant based on fraudulent information, including false

statements and withholding exculpatory evidence from the

magistrate judge issuing the warrant is not a warrant

issued on probable cause. “The Fourth Amendment requires

that arrest warrants be based “upon probable cause...”

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997). 

Plaintiff however, does not plead as required under the

second prong of a § 1983 claim that Defendants effected the

deprivation of his right to be free from unreasonable

search and seizure “under color of law.” Broam, 320 F.3d at

1028. All defendants in this case are law enforcement

officers who purported to be enforcing the law, and they

all claim official immunity for activities in the course

and scope of their public employment. 

Plaintiff makes a general allegation that “Defendant’s

are not entitled to absolute investigative or prosecutorial

for immunity the civil rights violated alleged,” (Doc. 15,

FAC, ¶ 61.), but provides no further information to support

this statement.

Defendant Cardwood’s, Taylor’s and Spencer’s motion to

dismiss the fifth cause of action for violation of civil

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rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants is

DENIED. Plaintiff should add in “under color of law”

allegation and provide further support for his general

allegation that Defendants are not entitled to absolute

investigative or prosecutorial immunity, to any amended

complaint.

7. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 12(e)

Defendant Cardwood moves for a more definite statement

under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(e):

The complaint does not set forth facts sufficient

to state a claim against Defendant Cardwood, or

alternatively, requires a more definite statement

in that the complaint does not specify which

defendants participated in each alleged event. 

Doc. 13, MTD III, p.2.) The relevant question here is

whether the complaint gives Defendant Cardwood sufficient

notice of the claims. “A court will deny a motion for a

more definite statement” where the complaint is specific

enough to apprise the defendant of the substance of the

claim being asserted.” Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F.

Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 (E.D.Cal. 2005).

A motion for a more definite statement is proper

only where the complaint is “so vague or

ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond,

even with a simple denial, in good faith or

without prejudice to himself.

Id.

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement must

be considered in light of the liberal pleading standards

set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Bureerong

v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp 1450, 1461 (C.D.Cal. 1996) (citing

Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077

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(C.D.Cal. 1994) (“Motions for a more definite statement are

viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted because of the

minimal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules.”)). A

motion for a more definite statement is proper only where

the complaint is “so vague or ambiguous that the opposing

party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good

faith or without prejudice to himself.” Cellars v. Pacific

Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D.Cal. 1999)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). Whether to

grant a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement

lies within the discretion of the district court. See

Stout, 946 F. Supp. at 804.

The FAC puts Defendant Cardwood on sufficient notice of

the nature of the state and federal law claims against him. 

Any issues concerning sufficiently pled causes of action

have been addressed in the 12(b)(6) analysis above. 

Defendant Cardwood’s motion for more definite statement

is DENIED.

8. DAMAGES

Defendants Merced County, Sheriff’s Dept. Taylor and

Spencer assert that Plaintiff fails to allege facts

sufficient to constitute a basis upon which punitive

damages can be granted as relief against a public entity.

See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247

(1981). Plaintiff, in his opposition pleadings confirms

that he does not seek punitive damages against any public

entity Defendants. (Doc. 23, Opposition to MTD II , p.5.) 

This motion is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

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9. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

(1) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his first cause

of action for assault and battery. Defendants motions to

dismiss the first cause of action on immunity grounds are

DENIED.

(2) Defendants motions to dismiss the second cause of

action for abuse of process on immunity grounds are GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

(3) Defendants motions to dismiss the third cause of

action for false arrest and false imprisonment on immunity

grounds are DENIED.

(3) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his fourth

cause of action for defamation per se against Defendant

Cardwood. Defendant Cardwood’s motion to dismiss the

fourth cause of action on immunity grounds is DENIED.

(4) Defendants Cardwood, Spencer and Taylor sued in

their official capacities under Plaintiff’s fifth cause of

action for § 1983 violations are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. Defendants County of Merced Sheriff’s Department

and City of Merced Police Department sued as departments

under Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for § 1983

violations are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Defendants County of Merced and City of Merced motions to

dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for § 1983

violations under Monell liability are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND. Defendants motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth

cause of action for § 1983 violations against Defendants

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Taylor, Spencer and Cardwood in their individual capacities

are DENIED. And Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND his

fifth cause of action.

(5) Defendants motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s sixth

cause of action for unreasonable search and seizure in

violation of California Civil Code § 52.1 is GRANTED

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

 (9) Defendant Cardwood’s motion for a more definite

statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) is DENIED.

(10) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND the caption

page of the Complaint to name all Defendants in the action.

(11) The motion to strike punitive damages as to any

public entity is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff shall within twenty days following the entry

of this order by the clerk of the court, file any amended

complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 10, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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