Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00462/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00462-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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- 1 - [07cv0462]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEANNA MICHELLE MORY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 07CV0462

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST, FOURTH,

FIFTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH

CAUSES OF ACTION WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; (2) STRIKING AND

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

THIRD AND SIXTH CAUSES OF

ACTION WITH PREJUDICE; (3)

ADOPTING MAGISTRATE

JUDGE MAJOR’S R&R; AND (4)

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FOR A

CONTINUANCE UNDER RULE

56(f)

vs.

CITY OF CHULA VISTA ET AL.,

Defendants.

Presently before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 30],

Plaintiff’s Opposition [Doc. No. 43], Defendants’ Reply [Doc. No. 52]; Defendants’ Special Motion

to Strike Plaintiff’s First, Third, and Sixth Causes of Action From the First Amended Complaint

(“Defs.’ Anti-SLAPP Motion”) [Doc. No. 33], Plaintiff’s Opposition [Doc. No. 44], Defendants’

Reply [Doc. No. 53]; Magistrate Judge Major’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) Granting and

Denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Enforce Their Settlement Agreement with Plaintiff [Doc. No.

77]; and Plaintiff’s Application for a Continuance under Rule 56(f) [Doc. No. 85] and Defendants’

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- 2 - [07cv0462]

Response [Doc. No. 93.] 

For the following reasons, this Court: (1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s first, fourth, fifth, seventh,

and eighth causes of action without prejudice; (2) STRIKES and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s third and

sixth causes of action with prejudice; (3) ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R; and (4) DENIES

Plaintiff’s application for a continuance under Rule 56(f). 

BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2006, Plaintiff Deanna Mory (“Mory”) and the Chula Vista Police Officers

Association (“CVPOA”) filed a lawsuit (“Mory I”) against the Chula Vista Police Department

(“CVPD”), City of Chula Vista, Captain Donald Hunter, and Chief Richard Emerson. [See Mory I

Complaint.] The lawsuit arose because the CVPD temporarily denied Mory permission to

participate in beauty pageants while she was in training as a probationary employee. [Id.] Mory

helped make this first lawsuit a matter of public interest by granting interviews to local and

national news agencies and holding press conferences. [Defs.’ Anti-SLAPP Motion at 5-6.] 

Nine of the named Defendants in this action (“Mory II”) are members of the CVPOA. 

[Defs.’ Anti-SLAPP Motion at 4-5.] These Defendants (“Union Defendants”) believe that Mory’s

first lawsuit (Mory I) has no merit or any legitimate objective. [Id.] During a CVPOA meeting in

January 2007, these Defendants expressed their opposition to the CVPOA Board of Director’s

decision to continuously use their membership dues to help Mory pursue that lawsuit (Mory I). 

[Id. at 7.] The Union Defendants have stated that they expressed their opposition on their own

volition and in the exercise of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression. [Id.] 

However, Plaintiff argues that Chula Vista Police Chief Emerson and Captain Donald Hunter used

their higher rank to pressure the Union Defendants to oppose the prosecution of the Mory I lawsuit

at the meeting. [Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 45-49.]

Plaintiff alleges that at the January 2007 union meeting the Union Defendants: (1) insisted

that the CVPOA Board of Directors drop the Mory I lawsuit; (2) called for a membership vote on

whether to proceed supporting the lawsuit; (3) asked about a $100,000 retainer for legal services in

connection with the lawsuit; (4) indicated the Mory I lawsuit would bankrupt the CVPOA; (4)

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28 1 Plaintiff also states City Manager Jim Thomson’s failure to insist on the removal of the teeshirts fostered a hostile work environment. [Pl.’s Opp. at 24.] 

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referred to Mory as a “$1.98 ”employee because she had “nothing vested in [the CVPOA] and it

made no sense to spend this kind of money to defend her rights.” [Id. at 7-8.] 

In response to Defendants’ foregoing acts and statements at the union meeting, Plaintiff

Mory and the CVPOA filed the instant lawsuit on March 13, 2007. [Id. at 8.] On April 30, 2007,

Defendants responded to the original complaint by filing a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), as

well as a special motion to strike portions of the complaint and to request attorneys’ fees under

California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. [Id.] Soon after, the CVPOA dropped out of the lawsuit, leaving

Mory as the only plaintiff. On June 14, 2007, Plaintiff Mory filed an amended complaint. [Id.;

FAC.] 

In the FAC, Plaintiff Mory alleges that after the meeting, the Union Defendants displayed

tee-shirts at the workplace marked with the phrase “I Support the Outta Line Nine.” [Id. at 9-10.] 

The phrase referred to the nine Union Defendants that raised objections at the meeting and who are

also named defendants in the instant lawsuit (Mory II). [Id.] Plaintiff argues that the creation and

display of these tee-shirts were part of the Defendants’ conspiracy to intimidate the CVPOA Board

to drop the Mory I lawsuit. [See FAC ¶¶ 37-41]. 1 

As a result of the Defendants’ alleged actions, Plaintiff has sought injunctive relief and

damages: (1) for “unlawful interference with protected rights;” (2) for violations of the Fair Labor

Standards Act; (3) California Labor Code § 1102.5; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (unlawful

intimidation of parties); (5) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (conspiracy to violate civil rights); (6) California

Government Code § 12940(h) (retaliation); (7) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (retaliation); and (8) 42

U.S.C. § 1986 (neglect to prevent conspiracy). [See FAC.] Defendants now move to dismiss

seven of Plaintiff’s eight amended claims on various grounds and also move to strike three of the

claims under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides the vehicle by which a defendant may

attack a complaint that fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s allegations of

material fact are accepted as true and are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Barron

v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the court need not accept as true

allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed by the court. Mullis v. United

States Bank. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1987).

“Dismissal [for failure to state a claim] can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Although the allegations of a complaint

must be taken as true for purposes of a decision on the pleadings, dismissal is proper if the

complaint is vague, conclusory, and fails to set forth any material facts in support of the

allegations. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Finally, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Seven of Plaintiff’s Eight Claims Is Granted

A. Defendants’ Alleged Conduct Constitutes Protected Free Speech

In assessing the seven claims, this Court recognizes that the Union Defendants were

exercising their right to free speech when they objected to the CVPOA Board’s use of their union

dues towards the prosecution of Mory I. Defendants highlight that Congress has specifically

intended to protect speech at union meetings. The federal Labor Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”) states: 

Freedom of speech and assembly. Every member of any labor

organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with

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other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;

and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views,

upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon

any business properly before the meeting, subject to the

organization’s established and reasonable rules pertaining to the

conduct of meetings[.]

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450-51 (2d

Cir. 1963) (stating that the enactment of the LMRDA was motivated by an interest in permitting

union members to question the manner in which the union’s officials handle the union’s funds);

Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1964) (stating freedom of speech is a union

member’s right protected by the LMRDA); Berning v. Local 2209 UAW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

80168, *35 (D. Ind. 2007) (stating same). Plaintiff correctly argues that this statute only applies to

private employee union members and not public employees. However, this Court finds that the

Union Defendants’ statements in this case still warrant protection under the First Amendment. 

The First Amendment protects the rights of public employees to form unions. Smith v.

Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d

686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Cal. Govt. Code § 3500 et. seq. (protecting public employees’

rights to participate in unions). In Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 233-235

(1977), the Supreme Court held that a public teacher had a First Amendment Right to not be

required, as a condition of employment, to contribute union dues towards the advancement of

ideological causes with which the teacher disagreed and which were not “germane” to the union’s

duties as a collective-bargaining representative. The Court explained that “the freedom of an

individual to associate for the purposes of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected” by the First

Amendment and that “a government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed

to him by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment.” Id. 

Similarly, here, the Union Defendants did not “relinquish” their free speech rights by

becoming public employees. They did not relinquish their rights to speak and debate about: (1)

the merits of the Mory I lawsuit–an issue of public concern–and (2) the use of their union dues

towards

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2

 The Court notes that the Mory I lawsuit involved discrimination claims and that such claims

are issues of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, (1983); Riedinger v.

D'Amicantino, 974 F. Supp. 322, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also section (II)(B)(2) of this order

discussing how the Mory I lawsuit is an issue of public interest. 

3

 The Court also finds that the “I Support the Outta Line Nine” tee-shirts, expressing support

for the Union Defendants in this case, constitute protected speech. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,

26 (1971) (applying ordinary First Amendment principles to tee-shirt slogan reading “Fuck the draft”);

Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding “message-bearing” tee-shirts

are “vehicles of . . . ideas and opinions” and can constitute protected speech). 

- 6 - [07cv0462]

 that lawsuit.2 

Moreover, this Court also recognizes that “opposition” does not lose its protected status

simply because it angers and upsets the listeners. After all that is the very point of opposition, as

Justice Douglas wrote in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949):

Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of

government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high

purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates

dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to

anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike

at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling

effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why

freedom of speech, though not absolute, [citation] is nevertheless

protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to

produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil

that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.

Thus, the Union Defendants’ statements constitute protected speech.3

B. Defendants’ Motion for a More Definitive Statement as to Plaintiff’s First

Cause of Action is Granted

A Rule 12(e) motion is proper where the complaint is not specific enough to apprise the

defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted. Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp 1450,

1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Specifically, “[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is

so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading,

the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege what statutory or other legal authority prohibits the alleged

conduct contained in the first cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that “[a] government employer is

prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of (or attempts to exercise)

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28 4

 This presentment requirement also applies to suits against public employees. Cal. Gov’t

Code §§ 911.2 (a), 950.2; Longorio v. Jacot, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92125, *12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

- 7 - [07cv0462]

any rights provided pursuant to the Constitution or laws of the United States.” However, Plaintiff

does not cite to any statute or specific legal authority. In the opposition, Plaintiff asserts that this

first claim is based on Section 1983. [Pl.’s Opp. at 4-6.] However, that statute is not referenced

anywhere under that first claim and the fifth claim already specifies it is based on Section 1983

violations. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for a more definitive statement

and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s first claim for relief without prejudice.

C. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action Fails to State a Claim Because Plaintiff

Failed to Timely Present a Tort Claim 

The California Tort Claims Act provides that presentation of a claim for money or damages

against a local public entity, and action thereon by the entity, are prerequisites to filing a civil

lawsuit for damages. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4. The Act provides in part that:

[N]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity4

 on

a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the public entity and has

been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected

by the board . . . [.] 

According to the Ninth Circuit, “one of the primary functions” of the claims presentation

requirement is to put the public entity on notice of a potential claim for damages, “thereby

providing . . . an opportunity to settle meritorious claims without litigation.” Haywood v.

Pasadena, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11984 at *6 (9th Cir. 1991). The California Supreme Court

has held that a plaintiff fails to state a cause of action when he or she fails to allege facts

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. State of

California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (2004). 

In the present action, Plaintiff has raised a claim for damages against Defendants for

violating California Labor Code § 1102.5. [FAC ¶ 68 (“Plaintiff is entitled to an award of

punitive and exemplary damages”). However, Plaintiff has failed to allege that she timely

presented a tort claim to the City of Chula Vista with respect to the conduct alleged under the

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5

 As discussed later in this order, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s third cause of action and

strikes Plaintiff’s third and sixth causes of action under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. Courts find

it inappropriate to grant plaintiffs leave to amend state law claims that are stricken under that statute.

Flores v. Emerich & Fike, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63251, *22-31 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“To allow

amendment after an anti-SLAPP motion to strike has been granted eviscerates the purpose of the

anti-SLAPP statute.”); Thomas v. L.A. Times Communs. LLC, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1017 n.11 (C.

D. Cal. 2002); Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1073-74 (2001). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s third and sixth claims are dismissed with prejudice.

- 8 - [07cv0462]

claim. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s third claim for relief with prejudice.

5

D. Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim for Her Fourth and Eighth Causes of Action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 

1. Plaintiff’s Section 1985 and 1986 Claims Are Conclusory and Fail to

Set Forth Any Material Facts in Support of the Allegations

Plaintiffs can seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) when defendants conspire to violate

their constitutional right to equal protection under the law. Atamian v. Simpson, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 39560, *13 (E.D. Cal. 2007). The Section only reaches conspiracies that are motivated

by racial or class-based discriminatory animus. Id. (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,

101-02 (1971)); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993). A

plaintiff asserting a claim under Section 1985(2) must allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) motivated by

racial or class-based animus, and (3) with the intent to deny equal protection or to injure for

lawfully seeking equal protection. Id. at *14. In the instant lawsuit (Mory II), Plaintiff argues

that Defendants–motivated by a class-based animus towards women–conspired to prevent

Plaintiff from pursuing her first lawsuit (Mory I) that “sought to make women equal to men with

respect to [the] application of the policies of the City of Chula Vista.” [Pl.’s Opp. at 7-9.]

However, put simply, the evidence demonstrates: (1) that the Union Defendants voiced

objections at a union meeting about the use of their membership dues; (2) Plaintiff sued them as

a result of these objections; and (3) the Union Defendants then expressed support for each other

by creating the tee-shirts at issue. Even if Defendants’ actions and statements do not warrant

first amendment protection, Plaintiff’s allegations still present no basis for concluding that any of

Defendants’ actions were motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus. For

example, in the opposition, Plaintiff attempts to argue there was a gender based animus by

stating: 

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6

 The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff’s eighth claim for relief without prejudice under 42

U.S.C. § 1986 for neglect to prevent conspiracy. “A claim can be stated under section 1986 only if

the complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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Since Defendants could not possibly be in a position to evaluate the

strengths of the merits of Plaintiff’s gender discrimination lawsuit (and

therefore were not in a position to reasonably determine whether the

CVPOA was in fact “wasting its money”), they must have been motivated

by an animus toward the claims in Plaintiff’s first lawsuit: i.e. a classbased animus based on her gender. 

[Pl.’s Opp. at 8 (emphasis added).] This is but one of the various conclusory arguments that

form the basis of this suit and Mory I. Also, the allegations of pressure and intimidation by

Chief Emerson and Captain Hunter are completely unsupported by the evidence before the

Court. [See Defs.’ Reply at 4-7.] Thus, because the allegations are conclusory and there are no

material facts in support of Plaintiff’s charge of a racial or class based animus, the Court

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action under Section 1985 without prejudice.6 

2. Plaintiff’s Section 1985 and 1986 Claims are Barred by the

Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine

Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff had sufficiently plead each of the elements of a prima

facie case for a violation of Section 1985 or 1986, Plaintiff would still be precluded from

maintaining her fourth and eighth causes of action by virtue of the “intracorporate conspiracy

doctrine.” Hoefer v. Flour Daniel, Inc. , 92 F.Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding

that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claims). 

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine provides that, as a matter of law, an entity cannot

conspire with its own employees or agents. A conspiracy requires a meeting of minds. 

See Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). “It is basic in the law of conspiracy that

you must have two persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with

itself anymore than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent

are the acts of the corporation.” Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911,

914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 

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Based on this reasoning, federal courts have held that the intracorporate conspiracy

doctrine bars a Section 1985(2) claim where the conspiratorial conduct challenged is essentially

a single act by a single government body acting exclusively through its own officers, each acting

within the scope of his or her official capacity. Schmitz v. Mars, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D.

Or. 2003) (applying the doctrine to §1985(2) claims); Hoefer v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 92 F. Supp.

2d 1055, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (same); see also Woldeab v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 82191, *9 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that the “modern and majority rule” is that the

doctrine does bar a Section 1985 claim). Thus, Plaintiff’s Section 1985 claim is barred under the

doctrine. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1986 claim is also barred. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at

626. 

E. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim for the Fifth Cause of Action, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights

The elements of a Section 1983 cause of action include: (1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally-protected right (e.g., free speech and association), and (2) that the constitutional

deprivation was caused by “state action.” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (1989). 

“To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under Section 1983, the

plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v.

County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). This heightened pleading standard is met if

the plaintiff alleges “which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy

led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights . . .” Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196

(9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are based on the same conduct as their legally defective

Section 1985 and Section 1986 claims. The FAC alleges that lieutenants and Captain Hunter

conspired to use their positions of authority to intimidate and harass Plaintiff and the CVPOA

Board members into dropping Plaintiff’s lawsuit. [FAC ¶¶ 23-39.] As a result, Plaintiff alleges

that those acts “subjected Mory and CVPOA to a deprivation of their rights to redress their

grievances through the civil litigation process in the federal district court of the United States.” 

[FAC ¶ 79.] These allegations fail on several grounds.

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7

 A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees

or agents. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rather, municipal liability only

attaches where action taken pursuant to official municipal policy causes a constitutional violation.

Id. at 691 n. 55, 690. “If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual

police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of

constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.

796, 799 (1986). The Court has already found that Plaintiff has failed to present any material facts

indicating that her constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, the Section 1983 claim against the

City of Chula Vista is DISMISSED. 

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First, Plaintiff was not deprived of her right to redress her grievance since she is currently

pursuing the claim before this Court. Second, Plaintiff has not stated that she was personally

intimidated by the Union Defendants’ statements. [See Mory Decl.] Third, the CVPOA is no

longer a plaintiff in this action. In the opposition brief, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’

“intimidation” led the CVPOA to drop out of the lawsuit, which hindered the prosecution of her

claim. [Pl.’s Opp. at 12-13.] However, the former co-plaintiff CVPOA members stated that they

withdrew on their own volition and not due to an alleged intimidation conspiracy. [Defs.’ AntiSLAPP Motion at 3 (citing declarations).] Thus, as with Plaintiff’s other civil rights claims, the

Court finds there are no material facts supporting these allegations.7

F. Plaintiff’s Sixth And Seventh Claims for Retaliation under California and

Federal Law Are Dismissed Because Defendants’ Alleged Actions Were Not

“Adverse” 

The California Fair Employment & Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Title VII of the federal

Civil Rights Act contain substantially similar provisions making it an unlawful employment

practice for an employer to discriminate against any person for: (1) opposing any practice

forbidden or made unlawful under those statutes, or (2) filing a complaint, making a charge, or

participating in any proceeding, hearing, or litigation under those laws. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-3(a) (Title VII); Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h) (FEHA). The California Supreme Court has

held that to succeed on a theory of unlawful retaliation under FEHA, an employee must

demonstrate that he or she has been subjected to an adverse employment action that materially

affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36

Cal. 4th 1028, 1051 (2005). 

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The United States Supreme Court has held that Title VII prohibits a broader range of

conduct that need not be “workplace-related or employment-related.” Burlington Northern &

Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006). However, the White Court held

that the conduct must be “materially adverse to a reasonable employee,” in that it is harmful

enough that “it could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination.” Id. at 2409. The White Court explained that material adversity should be

analyzed from the viewpoint of a reasonable employee, thus employing an objective standard;

yet, the Court also made clear that context matters. Id. at 2414-15. 

Finally, the White Court also separated “significant from trivial harms.” It stated that

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from

retaliation that produces an injury or harm,” and explained that trivial harms could not be

actionable since they will not normally be a deterrent to bringing employment claims. Id. at

2414 (“[N]ormally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not

create such deterrence.”). In this action, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ retaliatory acts

include: (1) the objections at the January 2007 union meeting regarding the use of union funds

towards the prosecution of Mory I; (2) the display of the tee-shirts; and (3) Captain Hunter and

Chief Emerson’s failure to require the officers to take the tee-shirts down. [Pl.’s Opp. at 17-24.] 

As mentioned, the union meeting statements and the tee-shirts constitute protected speech and

therefore do not amount to actionable conduct. Second, the Court finds that even if these actions

do not constitute protected speech, they are trivial harms, unrelated to the terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, and thereby non-actionable under both FEHA and Title VII.

Plaintiff has not mentioned, nor is this Court aware of any cases that suggest that this

type of conduct constitutes an “adverse” action under FEHA or Title VII. Courts have held

actionable: a refusal to hire, delay in reinstatement, demotion, refusal to promote, discharge,

unfavorable references, and harassment in the form of interrogations and surveillance of the

employee. 1-34 Matthew Bender, Employment Discrimination § 34.04 [4] (2007). They have

also held that mere inconveniences to an employee will not rise to a level of actionable

retaliation. Id. Thus, after reviewing White, and post-White case law, this Court finds that the

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union statements and the conduct surrounding the tee-shirts is–if not protected speech–a mere

annoyance and inconvenience that falls well short of the level of actionable conduct under FEHA

and Title VII. Therefore, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is dismissed without prejudice.

II. Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike Under California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute is

Granted As to Plaintiff’s Third and Sixth Causes of Action

A. Legal Standard

Section 425.16 of the California Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in order to provide

for the early dismissal of meritless suits aimed at chilling the valid exercise of the constitutional

rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§ 425.16(a); Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1042 (1997);

Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1128 (N.D. Cal.

1999). These meritless suits often are referred to as “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public

Participation” or “SLAPP” suits, with the result that § 425.16 has come to be called the

“Anti-SLAPP statute.” See id. at 1040 & n.1; see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1023-24

(9th Cir. 2003) (“California law provides for pre-trial dismissal of ‘SLAPPs’ . . . [which are]

lawsuits that ‘masquerade as ordinary lawsuits’ but are brought to deter common citizens from

exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them from doing so.”). Federal courts have

repeatedly confirmed that defendants sued in federal courts can bring Anti-SLAPP motions to

strike state law claims and that defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs when they

prevail. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003); Verizon

Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The statute states:

A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in

furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the

United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue

shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines

that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff

will prevail on the claim.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (stating the statute “shall be construed broadly”).

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8

 The Court should look to the gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action to determine

whether the cause of action “arises from” protected activity. As the California Supreme Court has

explained, “[t]he Anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of

action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability–and whether

that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.” Navellier, 29 Cal.4th at 92; Jarrow

Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728, 734-35 (2003) (the statue does not categorically exempt

any particular type of action). “[W]here a cause of action alleges both protected and unprotected

activity, the cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the protected activity is ‘merely

incidental’ to the unprotected conduct.” Mann v. Quality Old Time Service Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th

90, 103 (2004). 

9

 Defendants need not show that the lawsuit was brought with the subjective intent to “chill”

their rights or demonstrate that their rights were actually chilled. See Equilon Enter. v. Consumer

Cause Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 58-59 (2002). 

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Courts evaluate Anti-SLAPP motions using a two-step process. Commonwealth Energy

Corp. v. Investor Data Exchange, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 26, 31 (2003). In the first step, the

court determines whether “the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause

of action is one arising from a protected activity.” Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 (2002). 

Protected activities include “any act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech

under the Untied States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 425.16(e).8

 Specifically included in these activities are: (1) any written or oral

statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other

official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial

body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or

writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of

public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue

of public interest. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). The latter two categories require a specific

showing that the action concerns a matter of public interest; the first two categories do not. 

Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117-18 (1999).9

Once a defendant establishes the activity is protected under one of the four enumerated

categories, the court then determines “whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of

prevailing on the claim.” Navellier, Cal.4th at 88; Equilon, 29 Cal.4th at 67; Greka Integrated

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Inc. v. Lowrey, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1572, 1577 (2005). “[T]o establish a probability of prevailing

on the claim[,] a plaintiff responding to an Anti-SLAPP motion must demonstrate that the

complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to

sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Huntingdon

Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1244

(2005) (citations omitted); Dupont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Super. Ct., 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 568

(2002) (“substantiation” requires more than mere allegations in an unverified complaint; it

requires sufficient evidence to permit the court to determine whether “there is a probability that

the plaintiff will prevail on the claim”). “In making its determination, the court shall consider

the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2). 

However, the court should only consider evidence that will be admissible at trial. Evans v.

Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1497 (1995). Finally, the court may consider the substantive

merits of the plaintiff's complaint, as well as all available defenses to it, including, but not

limited to, constitutional defenses. ARP Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc.,

138 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1323 (2006); Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath, 118 Cal. App. 4th

392, 398 (2004). 

B. The Union Defendants’ Alleged Actions Forming the Basis of Plaintiff’s

Third and Sixth Claims Are Protected Under the Last Three of the AntiSLAPP Statute’s Four Categories

1. The Union Defendants’ Statements Were Made in Connection with an

Issue (Mory I), Under Consideration by a Judicial Body, Namely, the

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California

Statements made in connection with an issue under consideration by a “legislative,

executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,” are subject to

the Anti-SLAPP statute. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(2). As stated, the Union Defendants

are members of the CVPOA, which is a party to Mory I. At the meeting, the Union Defendants

expressed their opinions that it was futile to spend their membership dues to continue the

prosecution of Mory I because the case was meritless. These statements and the tee-shirts

expressing support for the Union Defendants were in response to issues (the Mory lawsuits) that

are under this Court’s consideration. Therefore, Defendants have satisfied the second category

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of the Anti-SLAPP statute. 

2. Defendants’ Statements Were Made In a Public Forum and

Defendants’ Conduct Was in Furtherance of the Exercise of the

Constitutional Right of Free Speech in Connection With an Issue of

Public Interest

Whether a statement is made in a place open to the public or in a public forum depends

on whether the means of communicating the statement permits open debate. Wilbanks v. Wolk

121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 896 (2004); see also Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal.

App. 4th 468, 475-76 (2000) (statements at a meeting of a homeowners’ association board of

directors constituted statements of public significance in a public forum); Ampex Corp. v.

Cargle, 128 Cal .App. 4th 1569, 1576 (2005) (statements made in an internet chat room

regarding a publicly traded company constituted statements of public significance in a public

forum); ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1007 (2001) (same).

 Here, the Union Defendants spoke about the merits of the Mory I lawsuit and the use of

their union dues in a forum of open debate. These acts fall under the third category of the AntiSLAPP statute. Defendants’ actions also fit within the fourth category because they made the

statements and tee-shirts in furtherance of exercising their right to free speech. 

Finally, the union meeting statements and the tee-shirts are based on the Mory

lawsuits–issues of “public interest” within the meaning of the Anti-SLAPP statute. At least one

court has suggested that the “public issue/interest” requirement can be satisfied if the subject of

the statement or activity precipitating the claim involved a person or entity in the public eye or a

topic of widespread public interest. Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and

Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, 105 Cal. App. 4th 913, 924 (2003); see also Ruiz v. Harbor

View Comm. Ass’n,134 Cal. App. 4th 1456, 1468-70 (2005) (finding private communications

with organization members concerning developer’s development plans were in the public

interest). 

In the present action, Plaintiff Mory has held press conferences, she has consented to

interviews on television and radio, and several media outlets have discussed the Mory I

litigation, including MSNBC, NBC 7/39, KUSI San Diego, Clear Channel Radio, and the San

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10 The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s first cause of action (“unlawful

interference with protected rights”) under the Anti-SLAPP statute. Only state claims are subject to

the California Anti-SLAPP statute, and, as mentioned, this first claim is vague and unclear as to

whether it is based on state or federal law. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1109; Verizon Delaware, Inc., 377 F.3d

at 1091. 

11 Plaintiff may argue that the tee-shirts are not protected free speech and that therefore the

Anti-SLAPP statute should not apply. The Court has already provided reasons for why the tee-shirts

are protected. Nonetheless, as stated, “where a cause of action alleges both protected and unprotected

activity, the cause of action will be subject to section 425.16 unless the protected activity is ‘merely

incidental’ to the unprotected conduct.” Mann, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 103. Plaintiff’s claims are based

on both the tee-shirts and the union meeting statements. The union meeting statements are clearly

protected speech and are not “merely incidental” to the display of the tee-shirts. Thus, even if the teeshirts are unprotected speech, Plaintiff’s claims are still subject to the Anti-SLAPP statute.

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Diego Union Tribune. [Defs.’ Anti-SLAPP Motion at 5-6, 22.] Consequently, Defendants’

actions satisfy the third and fourth categories of the Anti-SLAPP Statute.

C. Plaintiff Fails to Establish a “Probability” of Prevailing On Her Claims

After reviewing, the pleadings and declarations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

establish a probability of prevailing on her third and sixth causes of action. In her declaration,

Plaintiff Mory never states that she felt intimidated or harassed by the Union Defendants, nor do

the other declarations indicate that she was in fact intimidated. [See Mory Decl.] As discussed,

the union meeting statements and the tee-shirts are either protected speech or, at a minimum,

trivial nonactionable harms. Last, Plaintiff’s allegation that the Union Defendants were

encouraged by Captain Hunter, Chief Emerson, and Jim Thomson’s actions and/or inactions are

wholly unsubstantiated. Thus, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s

third and sixth causes of action under the Anti-SLAPP statute. 10 11

D. Attorneys’ Fees

Defendants may only recover fees and costs related to the motion to strike, not the

motion to dismiss. Metabolife Int’l Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F.Supp.2d 1220, 1221-24 (S.D. Cal.

2002); Jacobsen v. Katzer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79030 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Lafayette

Morehouse, Inc. v. The Chronicle Publishing Co., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1383 (1996). 

Nonetheless, some of the fees incurred in drafting the motion to strike may overlap those fees

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12 Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: “The court may

determine issues of liability for fees before receiving submissions bearing on issues of evaluation of

services for which liability is imposed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(2)(c). 

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incurred in drafting the motion to dismiss. These fees will also be recoverable since they were

“in connection with” the motion to strike and were “necessary to prevail.” Metabolife Int’l, 213

F.Supp.2d at 1221-24.

However, as Plaintiff notes, Defendants’ billing statements are inadequate because they

do not specifically demonstrate what counsel was doing for the claimed amount of time nor

clearly show that the fees requested are related to the motion to strike. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc.,

214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (applicant “can meet his burden– although just barely–by

simply listing his hours and identifying the general subject matter of his time expenditures”). 

Defendants must submit those same billing statements in an unredacted form so that the Court

may assess the specific fees and so that Plaintiff has an opportunity to respond. Defendants may

also supplement the billing statements with declarations that more clearly explain the fees

incurred. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike, finds that attorneys’ fees are

warranted, and will determine the precise amount of fees after Defendants comply with the

above instructions and Plaintiff has an opportunity to respond.12 

III. The Court Adopts Magistrate Judge Major’s R&R

The Court recognizes that Magistrate Judge Major issued an R&R granting and denying

in part Defendants’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement with Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 77] The

parties did not object to the R&R. Good cause appearing, this Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge

Major’s R&R in its entirety and therefore: GRANTS Defendants’ motion to enforce their

settlement agreement with Plaintiff as to Defendants Becker, Ficacci, Kennedy, Hardman, and

Coulson in their individual capacities; DENIES Defendants’ motion to the extent that they seek

dismissal in their official capacities; and DENIES Defendant Turner’s individual motion to

enforce the settlement. 

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IV. Plaintiff’s Application for a Continuance under Rule 56(f) is Denied

A party seeking a Rule 56(f) continuance must demonstrate “due diligence” both in the

pursuit of discovery before the motion for summary judgment was made, and the pursuit of the

extension of time after the motion is made. Pfingston v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1005

(9th Cir. 2002); Monarch Greenback, LLC v. Monticello Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1068,

1081-82 (D. Idaho 1999). Courts will deny 56(f) motions if a party had prior opportunities to

discover the information and if the information sought is irrelevant. 11-56 Moore’s Federal

Practice - Civil § 56.10 [8][a]; Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir.

1996) (movant must proffer sufficient facts to show that evidence sought exists and that it would

prevent summary judgment); Roark v. City of Hazen, 189 F.3d 758, 762 (8th Cir. 1999) (district

court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for additional time to complete discovery because

plaintiff failed to state what discovery was lacking or what information further discovery might

reveal). The party opposing the summary judgment motion must “state with particularity why it

is unable to oppose the motion, state with specificity what facts it intends to seek through

discovery, and show how its discovery efforts are reasonably expected to create a triable issue.” 

New.Net., Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1101-02 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 

First, California enacted the Anti-SLAPP statute to provide for the “early dismissal” of

meritless aimed at chilling free speech rights. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer

Group, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The hearing for this motion has been

continued five times already. Judge Houston continued the hearing on August 3, 2007, August

30, 2007, and on September 25, 2007. This Court continued the hearing on October 30, 2007

and again on January 15, 2008. Granting a sixth continuance for this hearing would contravene

the intent of the statute.

Second, there appears to be no factual dispute as to what was said at the union meeting. 

Third, Plaintiff has failed to specifically explain why she cannot adequately oppose the motion at

this time or what facts she seeks through discovery. Fourth, Defendants filed their Anti-SLAPP

motion on April 30, 2007 and re-filed it with the same arguments on July 2, 2007 to respond to

Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Plaintiff waited nearly nine months to make this request, filed it

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13 The parties’ evidentiary objections are DENIED as moot because they did not affect this

Court’s determination on the motions before the Court. To the extent that the Court did rely on any

evidence objected to, the objections are overruled. 

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eight days after the Court granted their last request for a continuance, and only six days before

today’s hearing. The untimeliness and lack of diligence heavily weighs against granting this

application. Thus, Plaintiff’s application for a continuance under Rule 56(f) is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court: (1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s first, fourth, fifth,

seventh, and eighth causes of action without prejudice; (2) STRIKES and DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s third and sixth causes of action with prejudice; (3) ADOPTS Magistrate Judge

Major’s R&R; and (4) DENIES Plaintiff’s application for a continuance under Rule 56(f). 13 

DATED: February 11, 2008

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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