Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01578/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-01578-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONUT JOE’S, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERVESTON FOOD SERVICES,

LLC d/b/a DONUT CHEF,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:13-CV-1578-VEH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Donut Joe’s, Inc.’s (“Donut Joe’s”) Motion to Extend

Time for Notice of Appeal.

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 (Doc. 84). Invoking Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii),

Donut Joe’s requests a delay of the running of the 30 day period during which a

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 So denominated on the motion, but that title would be more closely associated with a

motion under Appellate Rule 4(a)(5). It appears that it is uncertain exactly how to accurately

describe the operation of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4), since it neither extends the period during which

a notice of appeal may be filed—that is the job of Appellate Rule 4(a)(5)—nor does it toll the

filing period. See 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, AND

CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3950.4, at 319–20 n. 2 (4th ed.

2008) (“When a statute of limitations is tolled and then re-starts, the lawsuit typically must be

commenced within the remaining portion of the limitations period.”) (emphasis in original). An

Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) motion, in contrast, delays the start of the filing period. Ray Haluch

Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund Intern. Union of Operating Engineers and Participating

Employers, 134 S.Ct. 773, 781 (2014). Nonetheless, a motion under 4(a)(4) is often referred to as

a tolling motion. See, e.g., Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 275 (5th Cir. 2014); Hudson v.

Pittsylvania County, Va., 774 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2014); Weatherly v. Ala.State Univ., 728

F.3d 1263, 1272 (11th Cir. 2013). For convenience, this court will as well. Cf. 16A WRIGHT &

MILLER, ET AL., at 320 n. 2 (“[T]his volume uses [tolling motion] for convenience.”).

FILED

 2015 Sep-23 PM 02:51

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-01578-VEH Document 92 Filed 09/23/15 Page 1 of 7
notice of appeal for the merits of this action must be filed until after judgment is

reached on Interveston Food Services, LLC d/b/a Donut Chef’s (“Interveston”)

request for attorney’s fees. Interveston has opposed the pending motion. (Doc. 88).

Donut Joe’s has replied. (Doc. 91). Accordingly, the motion is under submission.

For the reasons set out below, the motion is DENIED as untimely. 

I. Procedural History

Donut Joe’s filed the complaint in this action on August 27, 2013. (Doc 1).

On January 15, 2014, Interveston moved for summary judgment, doc. 54, and the

court granted the motion on April 22, 2015. (Doc. 72). Interveston timely moved

for the assessment of attorney fees against Donut Joe’s on May 5, 2015. (Doc. 73).

The court granted the motion on July 7, 2015. (Doc. 80). On July 10, 2015, Donut

Joe’s entered a Motion to Extend Time for Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 81). The court

denied Donut Joe’s July 10 motion for failing to comply with the Uniform Initial

Order’s requirement that a motion state whether it is opposed or unopposed. (Doc.

82). A second Motion to Extend Time for Notice of Appeal was filed on July 14,

2015. (Doc 84). By that time, eighty-three days had elapsed since the entry of final

judgment in the case. 

II. Discussion

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Case 2:13-cv-01578-VEH Document 92 Filed 09/23/15 Page 2 of 7
Normally, a party who wishes to appeal a district court’s final judgment

must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court from which the

judgment originated within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P.

4(a)(1)(A). The clock begins to run later for final judgments that are immediately

followed by one (or more) of six kinds of post-judgment motions; a party must

then file his notice of appeal within thirty days of the disposition of the postjudgment motion(s). FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A). The time to file a notice of appeal

is automatically tolled when any of these motions, except a motion for attorney’s

fees, is filed. Id. Accord Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, Va., 774 F.3d 231, 235

(4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) is not mandatory);

Gibbs v. Maxwell House, Div. of Gen. Foods Corp., 701 F.2d 145, 146 (11th Cir.

1983) (describing 4(a)(4), prior to the addition of 4(a)(4)(A)(iii), as mandatory).

Tolling under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii), the variety that Donut Joe’s

requested, is discretionary. Hudson, 774 F.3d at 236 (citing 16A CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, AND CATHERINE T. STRUVE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3950.4 (4th ed. 2008)).

Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) does not do the work on its own. The tolling

process at issue here is the result of that rule’s interaction with several Rules of

Civil Procedure (54, 58, and 59). Since four Rules are involved, it will be

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Case 2:13-cv-01578-VEH Document 92 Filed 09/23/15 Page 3 of 7
important to clarify the name of the order that Donut Joe’s seeks. The Second

Circuit simply calls it a 58/54/59 order. Mendes Junior Intern. Co. v. Banco de

Brasil, S.A., 215 F.3d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 2000). 58/54/59 was popular in some of

the early cases, but this opinion will use “58(e) motion” or “58(e) order,” as

appropriate. Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) provides that the running of the time to

file a notice of appeal only begins “after the entry of the order disposing of the last

such remaining motion: (iii) for attorney’s fees under Rule 54 if the district court

extends the time to appeal under Rule 58.” Civil Rule 54(d)(2) allows a court to

grant attorney’s fees. Civil Rule 58(e) provides that “if a timely motion for

attorney’s fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the court may act before a notice of

appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same

effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under

Rule 59.” Rule 59 provides for motions for new trial and motions to alter or amend

a judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (b) & (e). The upshot is that a district judge can

delay the running of the time to file an appeal of a final judgment while a motion

for attorney’s fees is pending. 

Nettlesomely, neither the Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the Rules of

Civil Procedure provide a time period during which a 58(e) motion must be filed,

except to say that it must be filed before the notice of appeal becomes effective.

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Case 2:13-cv-01578-VEH Document 92 Filed 09/23/15 Page 4 of 7
FED. R. CIV. P. 58(e). Given that the whole purpose of 58(e) is to delay the coming

of the day on which a notice of appeal must be filed, this is not particularly

helpful. Further, it does not appear that the Eleventh Circuit has resolved (or even

considered) the issue. In the absence of any deadline to be found in the Rules and

any guidance from the Court of Appeals, it may be the case that the Rules mean

exactly what they do not say: there is no deadline, and a party can file a Rule 58(e)

motion any time after judgment on the merits is reached and before thirty days

have elapsed after judgment is entered on attorney fees.

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Three of the four Courts of Appeals to consider the issue

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 have rejected such

a reading of the Rules. The Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have concluded

that a 58(e) motion will only be effective if it is filed during the period in which

filing a notice of appeal would otherwise be permissible. See Robinson v. City of

Harvey, 489 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2007); Burnley v. City of San Antonio, 470

F.3d 189, 199 (5th Cir. 2006); Mendes Junior Intern. Co. v. Banco do Brasil, S.A.,

2

 Clearly the music must stop at some point. Even if a 58(e) motion were granted,

Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) only impedes the running of the clock until a judgment is issued on

the motion for attorney fees. At that point, Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)(A) would take over, and the

aggrieved party would have thirty days to appeal. 

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 The Sixth Circuit is the other Court of Appeals to confront the issue of timeliness of a

58(e) motion (then, 58(c)(2)), and they disposed of the case on the ground that the motion was

filed after a notice of appeal had been entered, thereby running afoul of 58(e)’s only explicit

timing requirement. Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Public Schools Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d

604, 610 (6th Cir. 2004).

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Case 2:13-cv-01578-VEH Document 92 Filed 09/23/15 Page 5 of 7
215 F.3d 306, 315 (2d Cir. 2000). For most cases, this would be thirty days. See

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 

The Second Circuit, in Mendes Junior, the first Court of Appeals to address

the issue, reasoned that three principles support restricting time for filing a 58(e)

motion to the period when a party could normally file a notice of appeal. First, “by

stating that any Rule 58/54/59 order must be entered ‘before a notice of appeal . . .

has become effective’ (emphasis added), [the drafters] meant that such an order

may be entered only while there exists the possibility [...] that a notice of appeal

from judgment could become effective.” 215 F.3d at 313 (emphasis added)

(alterations added). If a notice of appeal—which must come after the 58(e)

motion—cannot become effective, “temporal prioritization is meaningless.” Id.

Second, the drafters wrote Rule 58(e) to enhance judicial efficiency by allowing

the judgments on the merits and costs to be bundled together before appeal, but

this goal would be undermined if 58(e) could be used to “resuscitate an expired

right to appeal.” Id. at 313–14. Third, allowing for an indeterminate period to file

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would “subvert the certainty and stability which have hitherto been considered of

first importance in the appellate practice of the federal courts.” Id. at 314. (internal

4

 Cf. Pierce v. Visteon Corp., 791 F.3d 782, 785 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he losing side could

wait forever, if that is how long it took a district court to enter a Rule 58 judgment.”). 

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Case 2:13-cv-01578-VEH Document 92 Filed 09/23/15 Page 6 of 7
quotation omitted). 

The reasoning in Mendes Junior is persuasive, and it has been adopted by

two other Courts of Appeal. See Robinson, 498 F.3d at 868; Burnley, 470 F.3d at

199. As stated there, if “the drafters meant that a rule 58/54/59 order itself would

have the effect of reviving an already expired right to appeal, we surely would

have expected Rule 58 or FRAP Rule 4(a) to state that with some clarity.” Id. at

313. This court is satisfied of the soundness of the Second Circuit’s approach and

agrees that a 58(e) motion must be filed within the time period prescribed by

Appellate Rule 4(a)(1). 

Here, Donut Joe’s submitted its 58(e) motion eighty-three days after the

entry of final judgment. A notice of appeal could only have been submitted within

thirty days of the entry of judgment, FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A), and so a 58(e)

motion is subject to the same time restriction. Since Donut Joe’s motion falls well

outside of the permissible filing period, the motion is DENIED. 

DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 2015. 

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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