Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01204/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01204-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES LAKE DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

HANFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et 

al.,

Defendants.

1:19-cv-01204-DAD-EPG (PC)

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO:

(1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT;

OR

(2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE WISHES 

TO STAND ON HIS COMPLAINT, SUBJECT 

TO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE CONSISTENT 

WITH THIS ORDER

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE 

Plaintiff, Charles Lake Davis, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this 

action on September 3, 2019 (ECF No. 1). The Complaint is before the Court for screening. For 

the reasons described below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 

against Defendants. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in any case in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma 

pauperis, the Court must conduct a review of the complaint to determine whether it “state[s] a 

claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief 

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against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If the Court determines that the 

complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. An action is frivolous if it is “of little 

weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact” and malicious if it was filed with the 

“intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005).

Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured 

by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept 

the allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 

740 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s 

favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be 

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 

F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally 

construed after Iqbal).

II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings claims against the Hanford Police Department (“Hanford PD”) and the 

Department of Adult Parole Operations, Hanford, CA (“DAPO”). Plaintiff also brought a prior 

civil action, filed on August 21, 2019 (the “prior civil action”) against Defendant DAPO and 

two other individuals. See Davis v. Mendoza, Case No. 1:19-cv-01142 (E.D. Cal. 2019). At the 

time Plaintiff filed the prior civil action, he was incarcerated in the Kings County Jail. 

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Plaintiff alleges that after he filed the prior civil action, he was released from custody, 

and that five days after being released, Defendants (DAPO and the Hanford PD) retaliated 

against him by falsely arresting him for trespass and resisting arrest. Plaintiff appears to allege

that the property on which he is charged with trespassing is the property that bears his address 

of record and that he thus could not have been trespassing on the property; and that the officer 

who arrested Plaintiff was behind him, and because Plaintiff cannot hear and can only lip read, 

he could not have heard or understood the officer’s commands or read the officer’s lips and 

thus could not have been resisting arrest. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered abrasions and bruises 

during the incident, that he is very afraid, that he suffers from disabilities under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and is under chronic care, and that he is a mental health patient 

who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Plaintiff also alleges that he has 

initiated an internal investigation into the circumstances surrounding his arrest. 

III. SECTION 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 

F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 

color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 

federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 

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Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of 

state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, 

‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an 

act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 

Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be 

established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or 

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 

479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely 

resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int'l Bus. 

Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 

F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there 

must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation 

alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978). 

“Local governing bodies... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, 

or injunctive relief where... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or 

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (footnote omitted).

“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove 

that action pursuant to official municipal policy caused their injury. Official municipal policy 

includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and 

practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law. These are 

action[s] for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 60–61 (2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original).

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

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employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds 

a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation 

must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim for 

relief under § 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege some facts 

that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants either personally participated in the 

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent 

them; or promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a 

repudiation of constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). For instance, a supervisor may be 

liable for his “own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates,” “his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is 

made,” or “conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez 

v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations, quotation marks, 

and alterations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Favorable-Termination Rule

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 

held that to recover damages for “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid,” a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence 

was reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. The favorable-termination rule laid out in 

Heck preserves the rule that claims which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity 

of a conviction or sentence, must be brought by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

after exhausting appropriate avenues for relief. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-751 

(2004). 

“The applicability of the favorable termination rule turns solely on whether a successful 

§ 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative 

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sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s confinement.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003). In Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996), the court 

held that, “if a criminal conviction arising out of the same facts and is fundamentally 

inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 

action must be dismissed.” But if the “action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the 

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be 

allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

Here, it is unclear from the allegations in the Complaint whether Plaintiff has been 

convicted of the offenses of trespass, resisting arrest, or another charge related to his arrest. If 

Plaintiff has been convicted of such charges, Plaintiff may file an appeal or potentially a writ of 

habeas corpus. If such charges are still pending, Plaintiff may challenge the alleged unlawful 

nature of those charges in the criminal proceeding. A § 1983 case is not, however, an 

appropriate way to challenge any such charges or underlying convictions. On the other hand, if 

charges related to the arrest have been dismissed or Plaintiff’s conviction of such charges has 

been overturned, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate the dismissal or 

overturning of his conviction.

B. Retaliation

“[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from 

subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. Hartman v. 

Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). “If an official takes adverse action against someone based on 

that forbidden motive, and ‘non-retaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the 

adverse consequences,’ the injured person may generally seek relief by bringing a First 

Amendment claim.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (citations omitted). 

To prevail on a claim for retaliation, “a plaintiff must establish a ‘causal connection’

between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff's ‘subsequent 

injury.’” Id. (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 259). “It is not enough to show that an official acted 

with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause the injury. 

Specifically, it must be a ‘but-for’ cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff 

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would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. (citing Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260 

(recognizing that although it “may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive,” an 

official’s “action colored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort 

if that action would have been taken anyway”)); see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 

U.S. 274, 283-285 (1977) (Even if a teacher’s protected conduct “played a part, substantial or 

otherwise, in [the] decision not to rehire” him, the teacher was not entitled to reinstatement “if 

the same decision would have been reached” absent his protected speech.).

“The plaintiff bringing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of 

probable cause for the arrest.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1724. “Absent such a showing, a retaliatory 

arrest claim fails.” Id. “But if the plaintiff establishes the absence of probable cause, ‘then the 

Mt. Healthy test governs: The plaintiff must show that the retaliation was a substantial or 

motivating factor behind the [arrest], and, if that showing is made, the defendant can prevail 

only by showing that the [arrest] would have been initiated without respect to retaliation.” Id. 

(citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested for trespass and resisting arrest in retaliation 

for his filing of a prior civil rights lawsuit. Plaintiff’s filing of the lawsuit is conduct protected 

by the First Amendment. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff 

has also alleged facts which, construed in the light most favorable to him, indicate that there 

may have been a lack of probable cause to arrest him. Specifically, the allegations indicate that 

the property on which he was charged with trespassing is his address of record, and that the 

arresting officer knew that Plaintiff could not hear the officer’s commands and that Plaintiff 

was thus not intentionally disobeying that officer’s commands. However, Plaintiff has not 

alleged facts demonstrating who the officer is that arrested him, how the officer is connected 

with the prior lawsuit, how the arresting officer is connected to Defendants and how 

Defendants are connected with the allegedly wrongful arrest, or any other factual allegations 

demonstrating that Defendants’ retaliatory motive was a substantial or motivating factor for the 

arrest of Plaintiff. Thus, even if Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the Heck favorabletermination rule, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for retaliation. 

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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claim upon which 

relief may be granted under § 1983. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

“leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will 

provide Plaintiff with time to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

above. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file 

an amended complaint within thirty days if he chooses to do so.

The amended complaint must allege constitutional violations under the law as discussed 

above. Specifically, Plaintiff must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There is no respondeat 

superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for their own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

676. Plaintiff must therefore allege facts demonstrating that each defendant personally 

participated in the alleged wrongful conduct.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 

507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey 

v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete 

in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 

amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 

defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 

titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original 

signed under penalty of perjury.

Plaintiff may also choose to stand on this complaint, in which case the Court will issue 

findings and recommendations to the assigned district court judge, recommending that the case 

be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

by the Court in this order if he believes additional true factual allegations would state a claim, 

within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order;

3. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 1:19-cv-01204-

DAD-EPG; 

4. Alternatively, within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff 

may notify the Court that he wishes to stand on this complaint, subject to this Court issuing 

findings and recommendations to the assigned district court judge, recommending that the case 

be dismissed for failure to state a claim; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or notify the Court that he wishes 

to stand on his complaint within 30 days from the date of service of this order, the Court will 

issue findings and recommendations to the assigned district court judge, recommending that 

Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with a Court 

order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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