Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02176/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02176-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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A 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM H. BREZOVSKI, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth cir~nit 

JUN 111990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) .No. 89-2176 

) 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE; ) 

POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,) 

ANTHONY FRANK, Officially; POSTMASTER ) 

OF ALBUQUERQUE, RODNEY SMITH, ) 

Officially, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 87-1294-JC) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Ruth B. Cohen, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and L.D. Harris, 

Assistant United States Attorney, District of New Mexico, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Jesse L. Butler, Assistant General 

Counsel, and Joan c. Goodrich, Attorney, Office of Labor Law, 

United States Postal Service, Washington, D.C., for DefendantsAppellees. 

Before LOGAN, JONES,* and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

*Honorable Nathaniel. R. Jones, Circuit Judge, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff appeals the district court's dismissal of his 

claims, asserted pursuant to· the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 

29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (1982), alleging the United States Postal 

Service (USPS) unlawfully terminated plaintiff's employment 

because of his mental handicap, described by plaintiff as 

nervousness. 1 The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims for 

failure to file a timely complaint against the proper defendant. 

Plaintiff initially challenged his termination through 

available administrative procedures. On September 10, 1987, the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a final 

determination affirming the. decision of the USPS to reject 

plaintiff's administrative complaint as untimely. Along with its 

final decision, the EEOC issued plaintiff a right to sue letter, 

notifying plaintiff he had thirty days from the date he received 

the EEOC's final decision to file a civil action in federal court. 

See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c) (1982). 2 Plaintiff received the 

EEOC's notice and final decision September 15, 1987, and, acting 

prose, timely filed a complaint with the district court 

October 14, 1987, naming the USPS as the defendant. Pursuant to 

42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c) (1982), however, the head of the agency, 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate 

has determined unanimously that oral argument 

assist the determination of this appeal. See 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is 

submitted without oral argument. 

record, this panel 

would not materially 

Fed. R. App. P. 

therefore ordered 

2 Pursuant to 29 u.s.c. § 794a(a)(l) (1982), Title VII 

procedural requirements, including the thirty-day time period in 

which to file a civil action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982), are 

applicable to claims asserted under the Rehabilitation Act. See 

Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1477-713 

(10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 2 
the United States Postmaster General, was the only proper 

defendant. See Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1478. 

Plaintiff effected service by mail on both the United States 

Attorney for the District of New Mexico and the Albuquerque Post 

Office and Management Sectional Center on December 21, 1987, 

Plaintiff thereafter obtained counsel, who amended the complaint, 

on February 10, 1988, to include as defendants the United States 

Postmaster General and the Postmaster General of Albuquerque. 

Plaintiff's failure to name the proper defendant in the 

original complaint will bar this action unless the amendment to 

the complaint adding the United States Postmaster General relates 

back to the original date of filing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 

See id.; see also Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 1156, 

1158 (8th Cir. 1989). An amendment to add the proper defendant 

will relate back to the date of filing the original complaint if 

all of the following four requirements are met: 

"(l) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct 

set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be 

brought in must have received such notice that it will 

not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that 

party must or should have known that, but for a mistake 

concerning identity, the action would have been brought 

against it; and (4) the second and third requirements 

must have been fulfilled within the prescribed 

limitations period." 

Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1479 (quoting Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 

21, 29 (1986)). Plaintiff's amendment of the complaint to add the 

United States Postmaster General satisfied the first requirement. 

Further, plaintiff's service of the United States Attorney for the 

District of New Mexico was sufficient to meet the second and third 

requ-i-rements. See Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1480 n.5. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 3 
In order to meet the .fourth requirement, however, notice to 

_ ·the United -States Atto~ney must have.been effected within the 

limitations period for commencing the action. See id. It is 

undisputed that plaintiff did not mail the summons and complaint 

to the United States Attorney until December 21, 1987, beyond the 

thirty-day time period for filing a civil action. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-16(c) (1982). Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that the time 

period for filing this civil action should be tolled because the 

language in the EEOC's right to sue notice misled plaintiff into 

naming the USPS, rather than the United States Postmaster General, 

as the defendant. 

The thirty-day time period for filing a civil action under 

the Rehabilitation Act is not jurisdictional and may be subject to 

equitable tolling; Johnson, 861 F.2~ at 1480 (quoting Martinez v. 

Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984)). This time limitation 

will be tolled 

"only where the circumsta·nces of the case rise to a 

level of 'active deception' sufficient to invoke the 

powers of equity. For instance, equitable tolling may 

be appropriate where a plaintiff has been 'lulled into 

inaction by her past employer, state or federal 

agencies, or the courts.' Likewise, if a plaintiff is 

'actively misled,' or 'has in some extraordinary way 

been prevented from asserting his or her rights,' we 

will permit tolling of the limitations period." 

Martinez, 738 F.2d at 1110 (citations omitted); see also Warren, 

867 F.2d at 1159-60 (Supreme Court has suggested courts may toll a 

limitations period when a claimant has received inadequate notice, 

when a motion for appointment of counsel is pending and equity 

would justify tolling limitations period until motion is resolved, 

when the court has led plaintiEf to believe he has done everything 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 4 
required, or when affirmative misconduct on the ·part of a 

defendant lulled plaintiff into.inaction, quoting Baldwin County 

Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)). 

In this opinion we consider only one equitable consideration, 

whether the EEOC notice misled the claimant sufficiently that the 

district court should not have dismissed the complaint for failing 

to serve timely the proper defendant. The right to sue notice 

plaintiff received from the EEOC stated 

"You are further notified that if you file a civil 

action, YOU MUST NAME THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AGENCY OR 

DEPARTMENT HEAD AS THE DEFENDANT. Rule 25(d}(2} of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that you may 

describe the defendant by official title rather than by 

name. Failure to provide the NAME OR OFFICIAL TITLE of 

the ageQcy head or, where appropriate, the department 

head, may result in the loss of any judicial redress to 

which you may be entitled. (Please note: For this 

purpose, Department means the overall national 

organization, such as the now defunct Department of 

Health, Education and Welfare, not the local 

administrative department where you might work.) You 

must be sure that the proper defendant is named when you 

file your civil action." 

I R., Doc. 7, Exh, 9 (emphasi~ in oiiginal). Plaintiff argues 

this language reasonably can be read to require a plaintiff to 

name either the official agency or the head of the department as 

the defendant. 

Two circuits have considered whether this language in the 

EEOC right to sue notice is misleading. The First Circuit, in Rys 

v. United States Postal Service, 886 F.2d 443, 447 (1st Cir. 

1989), determined that "[w]hen separated from its surrounding 

sentences, ... the indicted sentence can be read in the 

disjunctive." However, the court also concluded that "when read 

in context, the sentence at issue is not as confusing as when it 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 5 
is examined on its own." Id. Despite its conclusion that the 

. EEOC letter "may be -1Jnclear ,·" the,.court found that the equities 

did not favor tolling in the case before it, largely because ''Rys 

has not persuaded us that he was, in fact, misled by the EEOC's 

right-to-sue letter." Id. 3 

The Eighth Circuit, in Warren v. Department of Army, 867 F.2d 

1156 (8th Cir. 1989), ·determined that this same language in the 

EEOC notice "can be read as requiring the plaintiff to name either 

the agency or its head; it is unclear whether 'head' modifies only 

'department' or also 'agency,' and the remainder of the letter 

leaves this ambiguity unresolved." Id. at 1160. The court 

concluded that the lariguage in the right to sue notice misled the 

plaintiff into believing he had done everything required of him 

when he filed a complaint naming only the Department of the Army 

as a defendant. Id. The Eighth Circuit noted that that fact 

alone might justify tolling the limitations period, but also 

relied upon the fact that the.plaintiff's motion for appointment 

of counsel and application to proceed in forma pauperis remained 

pending before the district court for more than thirty days, thus 

delaying service of the complaint until after the expiration of 

3 In Rys, the plaintiff initially named both the USPS and three 

local department heads as defendants. 886 F.2d at 447. The First 

Circuit noted that "[h]ad [the plaintiff] relied upon and been 

misled by the EEOC letter, he would have named only the USPS. His 

inclusion of local department heads -- in direct contravention to 

the EEOC's missive -- belies his alleged reliance upon its 

instructions." Id. (emphasis in original). In the instant 

appeal, however-,- plaintiff named only the USPS as a defendant, 

consistent with his claim that he was misled by the language of 

the right to sue letter. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 6 
i ; 

the thirty-day limitations period, to justify tolling the 

. limitations Feriod. Id. 

The misleading nature of this language in the right to sue 

letter has been criticized, in dicta, by a number of courts. See 

Williams v. Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 830 F.2d 27, 31 (3d 

Cir. 1987) (strongly urging agencies to notify plaintiffs, in 

right to sue letter, of specific title of the proper defendant); 

Lubniewski v. Department of Navy, 682 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Cal. 

1988) (loss of litigant's federal cause of action due to confusion 

created by language of right to sue letter scandalous), aff'd in 

part, rev'd in part, 891 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1989); Saccardo v. 

United States Postal Serv., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (ENA) 424, 

427 n.l (D. Mass. 1989) ("It is unfortunate that the EEOC is 

apparently un~ble to state the simple requirement contained in 

.. § 2000e-16(c) in plain and readily understood English."); cf. 

Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1052 n.l (D.C. Cir. 

1988)(language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), requiring plaintiff to 

name "head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate," 

unenlightening and of little guidance to litigants). 

We agree with the Eighth Circuit that the challenged language 

in the right to sue letter reasonably can be read either as 

requiring a plaintiff to name the official agency or the head of 

the department as the defendant, or as requiring a plaintiff to 

name the agency head or the department head as the defendant. The 

remainder of the right to sue letter does not clarify this 

ambiguity. See Warren, 867 F.2d at 1160; but see Rys, 886 F.2d at 

447. This language in the right to sue letter was sufficiently 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 7 
misleading to justify tolling the thirty-day limitations period in 

.this .case and, therefore, plaintiff's .amendment of the complaint 

to add the United States Postmaster General as a defendant will 

relate back to the filing of the original complaint. The district 

court, thus, erred in dismissing plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act 

claims on the basis of the reason stated, failure to file timely 

against the proper defendant. 

On appeal, defendant asserts several alternate grounds for 

affirming the district court's dismissal. We do not consider 

these issues because they are more appropriately addressed in the 

first instance by the district court. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED to 

the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. While plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs on 

appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 39; 29 u.s.c. § 794a(a)(l) (1982) 

(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982)), because plaintiff 

has not yet established that he is entitled to relief on the 

merits of his claims, plaintiff's request for an award of 

attorneys' fees at this juncture is DENIED. 

Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756-58 (1980). 

8 

See Hanrahan v. 

Appellate Case: 89-2176 Document: 01019865187 Date Filed: 06/11/1990 Page: 8