Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-02606/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-02606-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIANA GUZMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02606-HSG (KAW)

ORDER REGARDING JOINT 

DISCOVERY LETTER

Re: Dkt. No. 61

Plaintiffs Adriana Guzman, Juan Pablo Aldana Lira, and Jonathan Poot filed the instant 

putative class action, alleging that Defendants Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. and Chipotle Services, 

LLC discriminated against their employees of Hispanic race and/or Mexican national origin. 

(First Amended Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 39.) On November 2, 2018, the parties filed a joint 

letter concerning Plaintiffs' interrogatory seeking a class list of all putative class members, 

including their name, job title(s), dates of employment, employment location(s), and last known 

contact information. (Joint Discovery Letter at 2, Dkt. No. 61.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure broadly interpret relevancy, such that each party has 

the right to the discovery of "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or 

defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Discovery need not 

be admissible to be discoverable. Id. The court, however, "must limit the frequency or extent of 

discovery otherwise allowed" if "(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 

duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, 

or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the 

information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope 

Case 4:17-cv-02606-HSG Document 66 Filed 11/21/18 Page 1 of 5
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permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). Furthermore, "[t]he court may, for good 

cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 

undue burden or expense," including by precluding discovery, by conditioning disclosure or 

discovery on specified terms, by preventing inquiry into certain matters, or by limiting the scope 

of discovery to certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). "Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on 

the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is 

required." Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).

"District courts have broad discretion to control the class certification process, and whether 

or not discovery will be permitted lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." Vinole v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the joint discovery letter does not comply with the 

Court's standing order. The standing order requires that the parties draft and file their joint 

discovery letter "within five (5) business days of the lead trial counsels' meet and confer session." 

(Westmore Standing Ord. ¶ 13.) Here, the parties met and conferred on October 3 and 9, 2018, 

but did not file their letter until November 2, 2018. Rather than terminate the discovery letter, 

however, the Court orders the parties to review the standing order prior to filing any other 

discovery letters. Future failure to comply with the standing order in its entirety may result in the 

Court terminating the discovery letter.

Here, Plaintiffs seek identifying and contact information about the putative class members. 

The putative class is defined as "[a]ll current and former hourly employees of Chipotle, who are 

Hispanic and/or of Mexican national origin, and worked at Chipotle restaurant locations in 

California." (FAC ¶ 82.) Defendants have estimated that approximately 43,000 people employed 

in Defendants' over 400 California restaurants between November 14, 2011 and October 12, 2018 

self-identified as Latino or Hispanic. (Joint Discovery Letter at 5.)

The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of permitting class counsel to 

communicate with potential class members for the purpose of gathering information, even prior to 

class certification. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1981); see also Vinole, 571 F.3d 

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at 942 ("Although a party seeking class certification is not always entitled to discovery on the 

class certification issue, the propriety of a class action cannot be determined in some cases without 

discovery."); Doninger v. Pac. Nw. Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977) ("the better and 

more advisable practice for a District Court to follow is to afford the litigant an opportunity to 

[obtain material through discovery in order to demonstrate] whether a class action was 

maintainable . . . especially when the information is within the sole possession of the defendant."). 

District courts do not abuse their discretion by refusing to allow pre-certification discovery where 

the plaintiff failed to show either a prima facie case for class relief under Rule 23 or that discovery 

was likely to produce substantiation of the class allegations. See Doninger, 564 F.2d at 1313 

(class certification was properly denied without discovery where plaintiffs could not make a prima 

facie showing of Rule 23's prerequisites or that discovery measures were "likely to produce 

persuasive information substantiating the class action allegations"); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 

1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (no abuse of discretion by denying pre-certification discovery where plaintiff 

merely cited "two other complaints filed elsewhere" by similar plaintiffs against the same 

defendant to demonstrate a likelihood that discovery would substantiate class allegations).

Here, Defendants make four arguments opposing Plaintiffs' discovery request. First, 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' request is overbroad because it seeks information on all of 

Defendants' current and former hourly employees of Hispanic and/or Mexican national origin

employed in California. (Joint Discovery Letter at 4.) Defendants contend, however, that 

Plaintiffs' proposed Belaire-West notice concerned discrimination against individuals who are both 

of Hispanic and/or Mexican national origin and who had poor English-speaking skills or spoke 

with an accent. (Id.; see Dkt. No. 58-1.) Ultimately, however, the proposed class is of current and 

former hourly employees of Hispanic and/or Mexican national origin, not the subset of those 

employees who also have poor English-speaking skills or speak with an accent. (See FAC ¶ 82.) 

The proposed Belaire-West notice does not modify the proposed class; instead, it describes types 

of discrimination allegedly suffered by the class. Thus, the discovery request is not overbroad.

Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to show that discovery is likely to 

substantiate the class claims, relying on Doninger and Mantolete. (Joint Discovery Letter at 5.) 

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The undersigned, however, agrees that "nothing in Doninger and Mantolete suggests that a prima 

facie showing is mandatory in all cases, and it very well may be the case that courts routinely do 

not require such a showing." Kaminske v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., No. SACV 09-00918 JVS 

(RNBx), 2010 WL 5782995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010); see also Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo 

Inc., Case No. 13-cv-581-WHO (DMR), 2014 WL 969692, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014); 

Robinson v. Chefs' Warehouse, Case No. 15-cv-5421-RS (KAW), 2017 WL 836943, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 3, 2017). Instead, as "numerous courts in this District have made clear, the disclosure of 

class members' contact information, such as their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email 

addresses, is common practice in the pre-class certification context." Bell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

Case No. 13-cv-1199-YGR (LB), 2014 WL 985829, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2014); see also 

Harris v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., Case No. 17-cv-446-HSG (KAW), 2017 WL 3948397, at *3 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 8, 2017).

Third, Defendants argue that class discovery should be limited to the locations at which 

Plaintiffs work because Plaintiffs have not produced evidence of companywide violations. (Joint 

Discovery Letter at 5-6.) Defendants rely on non-binding cases from outside this district. 1 Courts 

in this district, however, have permitted statewide discovery, again reasoning that such 

information is necessary for plaintiff to substantiate the class-wide claims. E.g., Currie-White v. 

Blockbuster, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-2593-MMC (MEJ), 2010 WL 1526314, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

15, 2010); Harris, 2017 WL 3948397, at *3-4. Thus, the Court finds that state-wide discovery is 

permissible at this point.

Finally, Defendants contend that the Court should only require a statistically significant 

sample. (Joint Discovery Letter at 6.) Defendants do not propose what a statistically significant 

sample would be. Plaintiffs request a representative sample of half of the statewide class, but 

appear to suggest a 20% sample would be appropriate. (Id. at 4, 4 n.4.) While courts have 

 

1 Defendants also invite the Court to review their September 21, 2018 letter for further information 

on why Defendants should not be required to produce contact information for putative class 

members beyond these two locations. (Joint Discovery Letter at 6.) The Court declines. The 

Court is not obliged to review the entirety of a separate document for arguments that Defendants 

desire to make here, particularly when that document is an improperly filed discovery letter that 

was terminated for failure to comply with the Court's standing order.

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permitted a 20% sample, such samples also involved much smaller classes. E.g., Quintana v. 

Claire's Boutiques, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-368-PSG, 2014 WL 234219, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 

2014) (permitting 20% sample of a putative class of 1,100); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., Case 

No. 10-cv-2389-RMW, 2015 WL 3640518, at *3 (requiring provision of contact information and 

ad-click data for 5,000-person random sample); Harris, 2017 WL 3948397, at *3 (requiring 

provision of contact information for 500 employees out of a 10,000-member putative class).

Here, the putative class is around 43,000 individuals in over 500 locations; a 20% sample 

would be 8,600 individuals. Given the large size of the putative class, the Court finds that a 

sample of 2,000 individuals (approximately 5%) is appropriate. Defendants shall provide the 

names, job title(s), dates of employment, employment location(s), and last known contact 

information (including address, telephone number, and e-mail address) of each member of the 

ample, which shall be obtained randomly.

Furthermore, Plaintiff's counsel is instructed to inform each potential class member that 1) 

he or she has a right not to talk to counsel, and 2) that, if he or she elects not to talk to counsel, 

Plaintiff's counsel will terminate the contact and not contact them again. See Bell, 2014 WL 

985829, at *4.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants shall furnish the contact information for a 

random sample of 2,000 potential class members in response to Plaintiff's interrogatory within 14 

days of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2018

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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