Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01290/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01290-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karen Marie Hansen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-1290-PHX-GMS (ECV)

ORDER

Plaintiff Karen Marie Hansen brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against various Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) employees (Doc. 10). Before the

Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80).

The Court will grant the motion and terminate the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during her confinement at the Arizona State Prison ComplexPerryville, Santa Cruz Unit, in Goodyear, Arizona (Doc. 10 at 1). In her First Amended

Complaint she named as Defendants Sergeant Mitchell; Correctional Officer (CO) IV

Michael Backes; CO IIIs Ira Jones and Garcia; and CO IIs K. Rahman, G. Mims, and T.

Thornton (id. at 2-3). Plaintiff alleged that legal mail addressed to her had been returned to

sender without her authorization or any notification and without rationale (id. at 5). Plaintiff

stated that Jones conducted an investigation and discovered that Rahman, Mims, and

Mitchell had returned more that 10 pieces of court and/or attorney correspondence (id. at 5-

6). Plaintiff alleged that Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell’s conduct was in retaliation for

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Plaintiff filing a prior civil rights lawsuit against ADC officials (id. at 6-7, ref. to CV 07-

2105-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz.)). According to Plaintiff, the return of her mail caused financial

detriment and loss of the prospect to file for habeas relief. Count I sets forth a retaliation

claim against Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell based on these facts (Doc. 10 at 4-7), and Count

II sets forth an access-to-courts claim against these three Defendants on the same facts (id.

at 8-11).

In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff alleged that she received an Order to Show Cause in

CV 07-2105, and she delivered her Response to Thornton (id. at 13). Plaintiff claimed that

Thornton, Rahman, Mitchell, and Mims opened and read her Response and then held on to

it so it would be untimely (id. at 14). Plaintiff stated that the Court then dismissed CV 07-

2105 due to her failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause (id.). Plaintiff alleged that she

spoke to Garcia, who refused to provide assistance, and that Garcia, Jones, and Backes

refused to accept her informal grievances when she tried to grieve the delay in transmitting

her Response to the Court (id. at 14-15). Court III alleged a retaliation claim against

Thornton, Rahman, Mims, Mitchell, Garcia, Jones, and Backes based on these facts (id. at

12-15), and Count IV alleged an access-to-courts claim against Thornton, Rahman, Mims,

and Mitchell on the same facts (id. at 16-19).

On January 30, 2012, Defendants filed their pending Motion for Summary Judgment

seeking judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements required to

support a retaliation claim in Count I; (2) Plaintiff has not described an underlying

nonfrivolous claim or established causation to support her access-to-the-courts claim in

Count II; (3) the Defendants named in Count III played no role in sending out Plaintiff’s

legal mail and Plaintiff cannot establish a retaliation claim; and (4) Plaintiff cannot show that

she suffered any harm as a result of Defendants’ conduct alleged in Count IV (Doc. 80).

The Court issued a Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th

Cir. 1998), which advised Plaintiff of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the local rules

governing summary judgment and set a response deadline of March 5, 2012 (Doc. 85). 

On March 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension seeking to extend her

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response deadline by 60 days so that she could conduct additional discovery (Doc. 86). The

Court denied Plaintiff’s motion on the basis that she failed to comply with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56(d) or show specific facts she expected to elicit from further discovery

(Doc. 89). On May 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed another Motion for Extension to extend the time

to file her opposition to summary judgment (Doc. 92). On July 12, 2012, the Court denied

this second request for an extension (Doc. 99). 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is now ready for ruling.

II. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323. 

If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant

to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material,

i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton

Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v.

Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477

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DSOF contains119 paragraphs, many of which are not factual assertions and do not

comply with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(a) (separate statement of facts is to “include

only those facts that the Court needs to decide the motion. Other undisputed facts (such as

those providing background about the action or the parties) may be included in the

memorandum of law, but should not be included in the separate statement of facts”). Some

of DSOF set forth different Defendants’ hypothetical explanations of what they think could

have happened to Plaintiff’s mail, with citations to unsupported and inadmissible declaration

testimony (see e.g. Doc. 81, DSOF ¶¶ 38-41, 63). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (declaration

in support of summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge and set out

admissible facts). Many of DSOF set forth what different Defendants “understand”

Plaintiff’s allegations against them to be (see e.g. DSOF ¶¶ 35, 46, 65, 70, 84, 86, 92, 107,

113). Making the Court’s review even more arduous, DSOF are not in chronological or any

other discernable order. Defense counsel is reminded of his obligation to strictly comply

with the procedural rules governing summary judgment.

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U.S. at 249. The evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. In its analysis, a court need consider only the cited

materials; however, it may also consider other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(3).

III. Counts I and II

A. Facts

In support of their motion, Defendants submit a separate Statement of Facts (DSOF)

(Doc. 81), which is supported by Plaintiff’s deposition (id., Ex. A), court documents (id.,

Exs. B-G), and Defendants’ declarations and attachments (id., Exs. H-M).1

 Although

Plaintiff did not submit a response for consideration, the Court will construe her verified First

Amended Complaint as an affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment motion (Doc.

10). See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (allegations in a pro se plaintiff’s

verified pleadings must be considered as evidence in opposition to summary judgment);

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (verified complaint may be used

as an affidavit opposing summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets

forth specific facts admissible in evidence). The Court takes judicial notice of the court

dockets in Plaintiff’s prior state court and federal court proceedings, which relate to her

current retaliation and access-to-the-court claims. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Reyn’s Pasta

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In her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she filed the case ending in 2105 in 2005

(Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 22:13-14); however, the federal court docket reflects that Plaintiff

filed CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS in 2007.

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Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (judicial notice of court

filings and other matters of public record is proper).

The record in this case is very convoluted. The Court has extracted the following

relevant facts related to Counts I and II:

In 2007, Plaintiff filed a civil rights action in the District Court for the District of

Arizona against various ADC employees (Doc. 10 at 2, 7; Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 22:6-14;

CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS2

). One of the named defendants in that action was Backes, who is

also a defendant in the instant action. See CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS. Plaintiff’s 2007 civil

rights action alleged due process violations stemming from, among other things, prison

officials’ failure to timely provide Plaintiff with state court documents, Backes’ provision

of allegedly false information to the court, and Backes’ failure to provide Plaintiff with a

Notice of Claim form in a timely manner. Id., Docs. 5-6. The 2007 civil case was terminated

in May 2009. Id., Doc. 71.

Prior to that, in 2003, Plaintiff was sued in state court by her former employer, Titus

Group d/b/a Arizona Earthmovers. Yavapai County Superior Court No. CV 2003-0617.

Judgment was entered in favor of Arizona Earthmovers. Id. Plaintiff filed an appeal to the

Arizona Court of Appeals; she appealed (1) summary judgment entered against her and in

favor of Arizona Earthmovers on claims of conversion and unjust enrichment and (2) the

superior court’s judgment following a bench trial that found Plaintiff liable to Arizona

Earthmovers for constructive fraud (Doc. 81, Ex. K, Attach. 1; CA-CV 07-0560, Dec. 2,

2008 Mem. Decision). The appeal was assigned case number CA-CV 07-0560.

In the instant action, Plaintiff states that on February 14, 2009, she received mail from

the Arizona Court of Appeals and learned that mail related to CA-CV 07-0560 sent to her on

January 15 and 20, 2009, had been returned to the appellate court (Doc. 10 at 5). According

to grievance documents in the record, the returned mail included copies of the state appellate

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court’s December 2, 2008 final ruling and information to Plaintiff as to how to proceed to

the next level in the appeal process (Doc. 81, Ex. K, Attach. 1). Plaintiff states that she had

not authorized the return of mail nor had she been notified that those documents had been

sent from the court (Doc. 10 at 5). 

On December 12, 2008, Arizona Earthmovers sought costs and attorneys’ fees

pursuant to the December 2, 2008 ruling (DSOF ¶ 25; Doc. 81, Ex. B). On January 13, 2009,

the Court of Appeals issued its order awarding costs and fees to Arizona Earthmovers (DSOF

¶ 26; Doc. 81, Ex. B). The copy of the January 13, 2009 Order sent to Plaintiff was returned

on January 22, 2009; the returned mail indicated that the mail was “refused, unable to

forward” (id.). 

Plaintiff’s Arizona Inmate Management System record shows that she was out to the

hospital from December 23-29, 2008, and out to court from January 7-14, 2009 (DSOF ¶ 41).

Plaintiff had returned to the Perryville-Santa Cruz Unit the day before numerous legal

documents were returned on January 15, 2009 (DSOF ¶ 38).

Plaintiff states that after discovering on February 14, 2009, that mail had been

returned without notification or authorization, she contacted CO III Jones, who investigated

the mail issue (Doc. 10 at 5). Plaintiff states that Jones discovered that over ten other court

and attorney-mail documents addressed to Plaintiff from December 2008-February 2009 had

been returned to sender without Plaintiff’s knowledge (id. at 5-6). According to the Rerouted

Legal Mail Log for January 15, 2009, the mail addressed to Plaintiff that was returned to

sender that day included the above mentioned Arizona Court of Appeals documents as well

as two documents from the District Court for the District of Arizona and mail from the

Arizona Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and a private attorney (Doc. 81, Ex. I,

Attach. 1). Defendants state that Plaintiff filed an inmate letter concerning this return-mail

issue, and Backes, who was the Grievance Coordinator for the Santa Cruz Unit, brought the

inmate letter to Jones to investigate (DSOF ¶¶ 81, 83). 

Plaintiff alleges that her mail was returned by Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell, because

those were the names provided to her by ADC and Jones (Doc. 10 at 6; DSOF ¶ 5). Plaintiff

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states that Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell all work at the mail central receiving unit that either

returns mail or sends it forward to inmates (DSOF ¶ 5). Plaintiff further states that she

believes that these Defendants’ actions were orchestrated by Backes, the primary defendant

in Plaintiff’s 2007 civil law suit (Doc. 10 at 7).

Defendants state that after Jones investigated the matter, Jones and Backes were

unable to determine exactly what occurred with the legal mail sent to Plaintiff in January

2009 (id. ¶ 111). Defendants state that Backes directed Jones to call the Court of Appeals

to determine the best course of action for Plaintiff under the circumstances since she had

reported that she missed a deadline due to the failure to receive a court document (id.).

Defendants state that the Court of Appeals Clerk was unable to propose a remedy (id.). 

At the relevant time, Rahman was employed at the Perryville Complex Mail and

Property Room, which provides mail functions for the Santa Cruz Unit where Plaintiff was

housed (DSOF ¶ 33). Rahman does not know why Plaintiff’s legal mail was returned on

January 15 or 20, 2009 (DSOF ¶¶ 40, 43). 

At the relevant time, Mims was also assigned to the Perryville Complex Mail and

Property Room (DSOF ¶ 51). The Rerouted Legal Mail Log for January 15, 2009, which

shows that various pieces of mail addressed to Plaintiff were returned to sender, is not in

Mims’ handwriting, and her duties did not include completing Rerouted Legal Mail Log

forms (DSOF ¶¶ 53-55). 

At the relevant time, Mitchell was assigned as supervisor of all operations at the

Perryville Complex Mail and Property Room; his duties did not include the actual handling

and processing of incoming mail (DSOF ¶¶ 68, 72-73). Mitchell states that he never was

asked about any mail addressed to Plaintiff nor did he instruct staff to withhold delivery of

any mail addressed to Plaintiff (id. ¶ 74). 

B. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because she has not established

which individual returned her legal mail to the court, that this individual was aware of her

prior protected conduct, or that she was harmed by any delay in receiving her legal mail

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(Doc. 80 at 4). Defendants assert that, at most, Plaintiff shows that legal mail addressed to

her was mistakenly returned to sender by an unidentified prison official after Plaintiff had

recently been transferred back to ADC and that she should have received her mail (id. at 5).

Defendants contend that even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that Rahman, Mims, or Mitchell

were responsible for returning her legal mail in January 2009, a single mistake or occasional

incident of mishandling mail does not rise to a § 1983 claim (id.). They submit that absent

any evidence that the mail room Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s previous mail

problems, the record supports only a conclusion that Plaintiff “was simply the victim of some

bad luck” (id.). 

As to Plaintiff’s access-to-the-court claim in Count II, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

fails to describe any underlying nonfrivolous clam (id. at 6-7). They add that even if she had

sufficiently described an underlying nonfrivolous claim, she failed to establish who was

responsible for returning her legal mail (id. at 7).

Finally, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff cannot show that she was harmed by any

delay in receipt of mail because in the state appellate case, CA-CV 07-0560, on December

12, 2008, Arizona Earthmovers sought costs and fees pursuant to the December 2, 2008

ruling; thus, Plaintiff had to file any objection within 15 days—which was January 4, 2010

(id., citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)). Defendants also state that Plaintiff cannot argue that the

failure to deliver to her a copy of the January 9, 2009 Order awarding costs and fees affected

her ability to petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review because the Court of Appeals

granted her additional time to file the petition, which she did (id., citing DSOF ¶ 26).

Defendants therefore conclude that Plaintiff was not denied the ability to file her petition, and

her claims in Counts I and II must be dismissed (Doc. 80 at 5, 7-8).

C. Analysis

1. Count I-Retaliation (Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell)

“Of fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment ‘right[s] to file

grievances and pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.’” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d

559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and

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Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d

1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to the

courts, and prison authorities may not penalize or retaliate against an inmate for exercising

that right), overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001). Thus,

allegations of retaliation against an inmate’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a civil rights claim. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-

32 (9th Cir. 1985); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989); see

also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (retaliation claims “fall

within the ‘other protection[s] from arbitrary state action’ . . . because they are based upon

protection of the prisoner’s First Amendment rights, and not their Due Process rights”). 

“[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) [a]n

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. A prisoner “must allege that he was retaliated against

for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance

legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.” Barnett

v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). A variety of conduct can be

actionable as retaliatory if undertaken for an improper purpose. See, e.g., Rizzo, 778 F.2d

at 531-32. And the resulting injury need not be tangible to support the claim. Hines v.

Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) (an injury asserted to be the chilling effect

of an officer’s false accusation on the prisoner’s First Amendment right to file prison

grievances is sufficient to support a retaliation claim).

Retaliation claims must be evaluated in light of the concerns of excessive judicial

involvement in day-to-day prison management, and courts must therefore “afford appropriate

deference and flexibility” to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered legitimate

penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807.

a. Protected Conduct

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The Court notes that although two pieces of legal mail included the reason for return

as “Inmate Not Found No ADC #,” the Rerouted Legal Mail Log form itself lists Plaintiff’s

name and ADC number for each piece of mail (Doc. 81, Ex. I, Attach. 1). 

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Plaintiff alleges that she was retaliated against for previously filing a lawsuit against

ADC officials (Doc. 10). There is no dispute that Plaintiff filed a civil rights action against

various ADC officials in 2007, and this is protected conduct under the First Amendment.

Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 531-32; Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138. 

b. Adverse Action

 The evidence shows that on January 15, 2009, at least eight pieces of legal mail,

including mail from both this Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals, were not delivered

to Plaintiff and were returned to sender (Doc. 81, Ex. I, Attach. 1). The documented reasons

for returning Plaintiff’s legal mail included “Inmate Not Found No ADC #”; “Inactive”; and

“Temporary Abscent [sic]” (id.).3

 There is no dispute that despite these various reasons for

returning her mail, Plaintiff was actually in custody at the Perryville-Santa Cruz Unit on

January 15, 2009, and the legal mail should have been delivered to her (see Doc. 80 at 5

(noting that Pl. “should have received her mail”)). Defendants present no argument that this

failure to deliver Plaintiff her legal mail when she was present at the facility did not

constitute an adverse action, and the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact whether this

amounted to an adverse action.

To support her retaliation claim, however, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants

took the adverse action against her. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567; see Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d

628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (the plaintiff must identify specific facts as to each individual

defendant’s acts or omissions that allegedly caused the deprivation). Defendants argue that

Plaintiff cannot establish that any one of them returned her mail (Doc. 80 at 5).

In a sworn declaration, Mims states that the handwriting on the January 15, 2009

Rerouted Legal Mail Log is not hers and that her duties while working in the Perryville

Complex Mail Room did not include filling out the Rerouted Legal Mail Log (Doc. 81, Ex.

I, Mims Decl. ¶¶ 5-7). Mims further states that she was not involved in returning any of

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Plaintiff’s legal mail on January 15, 2009 (id. ¶ 17). Mitchell avers that he did not process

any inmate mail that came in and he never instructed staff to withhold delivery of mail to

Plaintiff (Doc. 83, Ex. J, Mitchell Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9).

Plaintiff alleges that Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell were involved in the adverse action

by virtue of their positions in the mail room at the relevant time and because CO III Jones

informed Plaintiff that these three were involved (Doc. 10 at 6). But Plaintiff presents no

other documentary evidence linking any of these three Defendants to the returned legal mail.

And, in failing to timely respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff

does not refute Mims and Mitchell’s averments that their duties did not include filling out

a Rerouted Legal Mail Log or processing inmate mail or that neither of them were involved

in returning Plaintiff’s legal mail. Plaintiff presents no evidence to show a connection

between Mims or Mitchell and the withholding or return of her legal mail. Consequently,

Plaintiff fails to show that either of these two Defendants took an adverse action against her,

and she cannot establish the second element necessary to support her retaliation claim. See

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68; Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. Summary judgment will therefore be

granted to Mims and Mitchell on the retaliation claim in Count I.

Rahman states in his declaration that he does not know the actual circumstances that

existed when Plaintiff’s legal mail was processed and returned to sender on January 15 or 20,

2009 (Doc. 81, Ex. H, Rahman Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13). Rahman confirms that his duties included

processing inmate mail, confirming whether an inmate was present at the prison complex,

and completing a Rerouted Legal Mail Log entry if the inmate is not present (id. ¶ 6).

Notably, Rahman refers to the January 15, 2009 Rerouted Legal Mail Log but does indicate

whether he authored any of the Log’s entries (see id.). Nor does he specifically deny any

involvement in the return of Plaintiff’s mail in January 2009 (see id.). Thus, Rahman’s

declaration statements do not foreclose the possibility that he was involved in returning

Plaintiff’s legal mail.

Defendants do not identify who in the mail room was responsible on the relevant dates

for checking inmates’ status and returning mail if necessary, and they do not indicate

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who completed the January 15, 2009 Rerouted Legal Mail Log. This absence of

information—information that Defendants presumably would have access to—leaves a

material question of fact whether Rahman was the individual or one of the individuals who

returned Plaintiff’s legal mail to sender in January 2009 despite Plaintiff being present at the

prison complex. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

c. Adverse Action “Because of” Protected Conduct

The analysis therefore proceeds as to Rahman, and the next step requires Plaintiff to

show that her protected conduct was “the substantial or motivating factor” behind Rahman’s

action. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Soranno’s Gasco, Inc.

v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). To make this showing, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that Rahman knew of the protected conduct and that either (1) there was

proximity in time between the protected conduct and the allegedly retaliatory action, (2) that

Rahman expressed opposition to the speech, or (3) Rahman’s proffered reason for the

adverse action was pretextual. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citation and emphasis omitted); see Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (timing can be considered as

circumstantial evidence of retaliatory event). 

Plaintiff does not provide any specific facts to show that Rahman was aware of

Plaintiff’s 2007 civil rights lawsuit against ADC officials. Rahman was not a party in the

2007 lawsuit, and Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she has no specific or personal

knowledge that Rahman was aware of the 2007 lawsuit (Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 23:19-25).

In his declaration, Rahman specifically avers that he was not aware of Plaintiff’s prior civil

rights lawsuit until mid-2009 (id., Ex. H, Rahman Decl. ¶ 17). 

In short, there is nothing in the record from which the inference can be made that in

January 2009, Rahman knew of Plaintiff’s protected conduct. Without this element met,

Plaintiff cannot show that Rahman’s adverse action was motivated by her protected conduct.

Summary judgment will therefore granted to Rahman on Count I.

2. Count II-Access to the Courts (Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell)

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v.

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Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). But this right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas

petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. Claims for denial of access to the courts may

arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a litigating opportunity yet to be gained”

(forward-looking claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002).

Plaintiff presents a backward-looking claim; therefore, she must show “(1) the loss

of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; (2) the official acts frustrating the

litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise

available in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150 (2009). 

a. Nonfrivolous Underlying Claim

A frivolous claim is one without arguable merit either in law or fact, see Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), or one that has “little or no chance of success.” Carroll

v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not have to

show that her claim would have ultimately been successful on the merits. Allen v. Sakai, 48

F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 1994). But she must show that it had arguable merit. Lewis, 518

U.S. at 353 n. 3; see Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (the underlying claim must be “described

well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the

underlying claim is more than hope”). 

In her pleading, Plaintiff states that the return of her legal mail resulted in a financial

detriment of $5,500 pursuant to an Arizona Court of Appeals ruling and affected her prospect

to seek habeas corpus relief in federal court (Doc. 10 at 10). She does not provide any

further specific facts regarding her underlying claims in either the state appellate court or the

federal court. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (the underlying cause of action “must be

addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant”). 

In her deposition, when she was asked whether the access-to-the-court claim in Count

II relates to legal mailings connected to her state court case, Plaintiff testified that Count II

relates specifically to the legal mailings from the federal district court that pertain to her prior

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civil rights lawsuit, CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS (Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 6:9-16). Then, later

in the deposition, Plaintiff’s testimony suggests that the return of the January 13, 2009 final

judgment and costs award from the Arizona Court of Appeals is one of the returned legal

mail documents relevant to Count II (id. 8:14-19). Without more, Plaintiff’s contradicting

statements and lack of any information about her state court appeal fail to demonstrate a

nonfrivolous underlying claim sufficient to support an access-to-the-court claim.

The Court nonetheless reviewed Plaintiff’s underlying claim in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. In her appeal, Plaintiff argued that the superior court (1) violated her due process

rights when it denied her motion to appear in person and required her to participate in trial

telephonically; (2) violated state law when it considered her husband’s deposition and trial

testimony; and (3) improperly denied her motions for a new trial and for relief from

judgment. CA-CV 07-0560, Dec. 2, 2009 Mem. Decision at 5 ¶ 8. In its December 2, 2008

ruling, the appellate court thoroughly analyzed each of Plaintiff’s arguments and determined

that none had merit. Id. at 8-16 ¶ 24. The appellate court further found that Plaintiff’s appeal

was frivolous and filed solely for the purpose of delay and, therefore, awarded costs and

attorneys’ fees to the appellee. Id. at 17-18 ¶ 26. On this record, with respect to any returned

legal mail connected to Plaintiff’s state appellate case, she cannot demonstrate a nonfrivolous

underlying claim. 

Additionally, there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered an actual injury as a result of

the return of her state court legal mail in January 2009. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The

record shows that the Arizona Supreme Court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s request for an

extension of time to file a Petition for Review, which she then filed on April 2, 2009 (Doc.

81, Ex. B (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. I, Docs. 40, 45)). 

As stated, Plaintiff contends that the basis of her Count II claim is the returned mail

related to her prior federal civil rights case. Court records show that in that prior action,

Plaintiff alleged that the U.S. Marshall improperly served ADC officials a petition for

dissolution of marriage and those officials then failed to timely provide the petition to

Plaintiff; as a result, she could not timely respond to the petition and lost property. CV 07-

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4

The Order to Show Cause found that Plaintiff’s claim appeared to challenge the effect

of state court rulings or actions in her divorce proceedings, and a collateral attack on a state

court ruling in federal court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. CV 07-2105-PHXGMS, Doc. 70 at 6, citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). Plaintiff

was therefore ordered to show cause why the action should not be dismissed on that basis.

CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS, Doc. 70.

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2105-PHX-GMS, Doc. 5. The Court cannot conclude that this claim was frivolous; indeed,

the Court screened the Complaint and found that Plaintiff’s allegations stated a constitutional

claim. Id., Doc. 6. 

But Plaintiff testified in her deposition that the documents related to this 2007 federal

case that were returned in the mail in January 2009 “were just orders,” and this returned mail

“did not damage me, per se, other than the fact that I had to get ahold of my counselor to call

the Court Clerk’s office to reissue those documents again” (Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 13:16-

13:22). Plaintiff confirmed that she did, in fact, obtain the documents and did not miss any

deadlines as a result (id. 13:23-14:1). The federal court docket shows that those documents

related to discovery matters, and the Court subsequently granted extensions to discovery

deadlines. CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS, Docs. 60, 64. This evidence shows that the return of

legal mail related to Plaintiff’s civil rights action did not result in any missed deadlines or

actual injury. Without a showing of actual injury, Plaintiff cannot sustain her access-to-thecourts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. 

In light of the above, the Court will grant summary judgment to Rahman, Mims, and

Mitchell on the access-to-the-courts claim in Count II.

IV. Counts III and IV

A. Facts

The following relevant disputed and undisputed facts relate to Counts III and IV: 

On May 7, 2009, the Court in CV 07-2105 issued an Order to Show Cause to Plaintiff

why her case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. 81, DSOF

¶ 11). CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS, Doc. 70.4

 Plaintiff had 15 days in which to file her

Response. Id. Within that time frame, on May 18, 2009, Plaintiff hand-delivered her

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Response to Thornton for mailing, along with five other pieces of legal mail (Doc. 10 at 13;

DSOF ¶¶ 11-12, 95). 

Defendants state that Thornton filled out a Special Mail Transfer Form and Log,

which is used to maintain a written record of legal mail sent out by inmates, and he listed the

six pieces of mail and their destination and then had Plaintiff sign the form (id. ¶¶ 95, 60-61).

Defendants state that Thornton transferred possession of Plaintiff’s legal mail to Officer

Hartley at Complex Mail and Property, who signed off acknowledging receipt (id. ¶ 97).

Normal ADC procedures provide that at this stage, outgoing legal mail is placed into a bin

to be taken to the post office at the earliest possible opportunity (DSOF ¶ 61).

The Court did not receive Plaintiff’s Response until May 26, 2009. CV 07-2105-

PHX-GMS, Doc. 72. The Court did not enter the Response onto the docket, however, until

June 1, 2009. Id. Meanwhile, on May 28, 2009, and before entering Plaintiff’s Response

filing on the docket, the Court entered Judgment and dismissed Plaintiff’s action based on

her failure to comply with the Order to Show Cause. Id., Doc. 71. Plaintiff received

notification of the dismissal of the action on May 29, 2009 (Doc. 10 at 13). 

Plaintiff alleges that Thornton, Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell intentionally opened and

read the Response and held on to it so that it would be untimely (Doc. 10 at 14). Plaintiff

states that on June 1, 2009, she spoke with CO III Garcia, who refused to assist her in

contacting the Court to verify receipt of her Response (id.). Plaintiff further states that

Garcia, Jones, and Backes all refused to accept her informal grievance about this incident

(id.).

At the relevant time, Thornton was working in the Santa Cruz Unit Mail and Property

Room (DSOF ¶ 90). Thornton was not regularly assigned to the Santa Cruz Mail Room, but

on May 18, 2009, he happened to be filling in for the regularly assigned officer who was

absent (id. ¶ 93). Defendants state that Thornton was unaware of Plaintiff’s prior legal mail

difficulties (id.). 

Rahman’s job duties did not involve taking possession of outgoing legal mail and

delivering it to the designated box to be taken to the post office or transporting that box to

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the post office (DSOF ¶ 44). 

As mentioned, Mitchell—as a supervisor—did not process any of the mail that came

through the Complex Mail and Property Room (id. ¶ 72). 

At the relevant time, Jones worked as a CO III at the Santa Cruz Unit (id. ¶ 78). As

a CO III, Jones is not involved in handling legal mail (Doc. 81, Ex. K, Jones Decl. ¶ 10).

At the relevant time, Backes worked as CO IV at the Santa Cruz Unit, where his

duties included processing and investigating inmate grievances (DSOF ¶ 105). Defendants

state that Backes was not personally involved in processing any of Plaintiff’s mail (id. ¶ 116).

B. Defendants’ Arguments 

Defendants argue that neither Rahman, Mims, nor Mitchell played any role in sending

out legal mail on May 18, 2009 (Doc. 80 at 8). They further argue that, likewise, Backes,

Jones, and Garcia did not have anything to do with sending out legal mail that day (id.). As

to Thornton, Defendants assert that he properly handled Plaintiff’s legal mail pursuant to

policy and delivered it to the Complex Mail and Property Room (id.). They add that

Thornton was unaware of Plaintiff’s prior legal-mail issues (id.). 

Defendants state that any grievance related to this incident had to be submitted to

Plaintiff’s assigned CO III, and, although Garcia was her assigned CO III at the time,

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she actually submitted a grievance to him (id.).

As to the access-to-courts claim related to May 2009 incident, Defendants contend

that regardless of whether any Defendant somehow delayed her mail to the Court, her claim

fails because she cannot show that she was harmed by such conduct (id. at 9). According to

Defendants, the Court received her Response before dismissing the action on May 28, 2009,

and her case was not dismissed based on the date her Response reached the courthouse (id.).

Defendants argue that dismissal was based on her deficient response to the Order to Show

Cause; namely, that she did not establish why the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to

her case (id. at 9-10). 

Alternatively, Defendants contend that any delay in sending out Plaintiff’s legal mail

was not Thornton’s doing (id.). And Defendants state that the no other Defendant had

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anything to do with sending out Plaintiff’s legal mail (id. at 9-10). 

C. Analysis

1. Count III-Retaliation (Rahman, Mims, Mitchell, Thornton, Garcia,

Jones, and Backes)

a. Protected Conduct

As stated, Plaintiff’s filing of a civil rights lawsuit in 2007 is protected conduct under

the First Amendment. Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 531-32; Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138. 

b. Adverse Action

Defendants present no argument regarding whether the delay in sending out Plaintiff’s

Response constituted an adverse action. Instead, they argue that no Defendant was involved

in sending out or delaying Plaintiff’s outgoing legal mail (see Doc. 80 at 8-9). As discussed

above with respect to Count I, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendantstook or caused the

adverse action. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567; see Leer, 844 F.2d at 634.

There is no dispute that on May 18, 2009, Plaintiff handed her legal mail to Thornton;

that Thornton documented receipt of her legal mail on the appropriate Special Mail Transfer

Form and Log; and that Plaintiff signed this form (Doc. 10 at 13; Doc. 81, Ex. L, Thornton

Decl. ¶ 8). Defendants submit documentary evidence showing that Thornton transferred

Plaintiff’s legal mail that same day to Officer Hartley, who signed off as the receiving officer

(id., Ex. L, Attach. 10). Thornton avers that after transferring the mail to Hartley, Thornton

had no further involvement in delivering it to the post office and relied on other officers

assigned to the mail room to complete that function (id., Ex. L, Thornton Decl. ¶ 11).

Although Plaintiff alleges that Thornton, as well as Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell

opened and read and held on to her Response filing, Plaintiff presents no specific facts to

support her allegation. Nor does she provide specific facts or evidence to show that Rahman,

Mims, or Mitchell ever handled her mail on May 18, 2009. The evidence shows that

following the documented processing of Plaintiff’s legal mail by Thornton and Hartley,

Rahman was not responsible for handling outgoing legal mail (id., Ex. H, Rahman Decl.

¶ 14). Mims avers that he was not involved in accepting any of Plaintiff’s outgoing legal

mail on May 18, 2009 (id., Ex. I, Mims Decl. ¶ 17). And Mitchell, as a Sergeant, did not

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process any mail that came through the mail room (Doc. 83, Ex. J, Mitchell Decl. ¶ 7). 

On this record, there is no evidence to suggest that any of these particular Defendants

were involved in delaying Plaintiff’s outgoing legal mail on May 18, 2009. Summary

judgment will therefore be granted to Thornton, Rahman, Mims, and Mitchell on the

retaliation claim in Count III.

The remaining Count III claim is that Garcia, Jones, and Backes refused to accept

Plaintiff’s informal grievance about the May 2009 incident in retaliation for her protected

conduct (Doc. 10 at 14-15). Jones and Backes do not deny that they may have refused to

accept Plaintiff’s informal grievance; however, they assert that the grievance policy required

Plaintiff to submit any informal grievance to her assigned CO III—Garcia (Doc. 81, Ex. K,

Jones Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. M, Backes Decl. ¶ 11). Defendants do not submit any sworn statement

from Garcia to refute Plaintiff’s claim that Garcia refused to accept her informal grievance.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not shown that “she ever actually submitted any

grievance-related paperwork to [Garcia]” (Doc. 80 at 8). But the allegations in Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint that she spoke to Garcia and Garcia refused to accept her informal

grievance (Doc. 10 at 14), and her deposition testimony that Garcia refused to take her

grievance (Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 41:5-10, 41:16-20, 42:15-21), is evidence—in this case,

undisputed evidence—that is considered on summary judgment. Construing the facts and

evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, these three Defendants refused to accept Plaintiff’s informal

grievance that complained about an outgoing-legal-mail issue. There is no argument

presented by Defendants that this conduct does not amount to an adverse action; thus, there

is a genuine issue of material fact whether Garcia, Jones, and Backes took an adverse action

against Plaintiff.

c. Adverse Action “Because” of Protected Conduct

 Again, to show that her protected conduct was “the substantial or motivating factor”

for the actions of Garcia, Jones, and Backes, Plaintiff must show that they knew about the

protected conduct and that there was proximity in time between the protected conduct and

Defendants’ actions, that Defendants expressed opposition to the speech, or that Defendants’

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reason for their actions was pretextual. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271; Corales, 567 F.3d

at 568. 

Garcia was not a party to the prior lawsuit, and Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not

shown that Garcia was aware of Plaintiff’s prior mail issues (Doc. 80 at 8). There is nothing

in the record to show that Garcia was involved with the January 2009 incident involving

returned mail related to the 2007 lawsuit, nor does Plaintiff allege in her pleading that Garcia

had knowledge of the prior lawsuit (see Doc. 10). Thus, there are no facts or evidence from

which an inference could be made that Garcia knew about the protected conduct. For this

reason, summary judgment will be granted to Garcia on Count III.

As a named Defendant in the 2007 civil rights action, Backes was aware of the

protected conduct. 

Jones was not a party to the prior lawsuit, and he avers that he was not aware of the

issues raised in that lawsuit; however, he does not deny knowledge of the prior lawsuit (Doc.

81, Ex. K, Jones Decl. ¶ 12). Further, the record shows that Jones investigated the January

2009 returned mail issue, which involved legal mail related to Plaintiff’s prior civil rights

lawsuit (Doc. 10 at 5-6; Doc. 81, DSOF ¶ 81). And Plaintiff testified in her deposition that

Jones would have been aware of the 2007 case because he handled a lot of the paperwork for

Plaintiff (Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 40:4-9). From this evidence, the inference can be made

that at the time relevant to the events in Count III, Jones was aware of Plaintiff’s protected

conduct. 

In light of the material dispute over whether Backes or Jones were aware of the

protected conduct, the Court must address whether any of the other three elements exist. The

Court proceeds directly to the last element—whether Defendants’ proffered reason for their

actions was pretextual. See Corales, 567 F.3d at 568. The only proffered reason for Jones

and Backes refusing Plaintiff’s informal grievance is that under the ADC grievance policy,

they were not the proper officials to whom Plaintiff was to submit an informal grievance

(Doc. 81, Ex. K, Jones Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. M, Backes Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. M, Attach. 1, § 802.08

(inmates must submit informal grievance to their assigned CO III)). But Plaintiff testified

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in her deposition that her assigned CO III, Garcia, refused to accept the informal grievance,

so Plaintiff went to Jones and explained that Garcia refused it, but Jones also refused to

accept it and sent her to Backes, who also refused to accept it and told Plaintiff that he refers

people back to their CO IIIs (Doc. 81, Ex. A, Pl. Dep. 41:5-44:23). Defendants provide no

explanation for Garcia’s refusal to accept Plaintiff’s informal grievance, and Jones avers that

he could have accepted the grievance but does not explain why he refused to so in these

circumstances (id., Ex. K, Jones Decl. ¶ 11). Similarly, Backes does not explain why he did

not assist Plaintiff after the CO IIIs refused to accept the informal grievance (see id., Ex. M,

Backes Decl. ¶ 11). In short, Defendants fail to submit any reason for refusing to accept

Plaintiff’s informal grievance in these specific circumstances, and, as a result, there exists

a genuine issue of material fact whether the proffered “pursuant to policy” reason is simply

pretextual.

d. Chilled First Amendment Rights

As to the fourth element, an allegation that the prisoner-plaintiff suffered more than

minimal harm is sufficient—since such harm almost always has a chilling effect. Rhodes,

408 F.3d at 567-68 n. 11. The proper analysis is whether a person of ordinary firmness

would be chilled or silenced from exercising future First Amendment rights. Id.

Although Plaintiff did not specifically allege a chilling effect as a result of Jones and

Backes’ refusal to assist her with an informal grievance, she can still support her retaliation

claim if she alleges harm that is more than minimal. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,

1114 (9th Cir. 2012). In Count III of her First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that her

injury was the refusal to send out legal mail and the resulting dismissal of her 2007 civil

rights lawsuit (Doc. 10 at 12). That injury, however, does not correspond to the facts alleged

against Backes and Jones, since their alleged adverse action did not occur until after the 2007

lawsuit was already dismissed. Plaintiff states only that Defendants’ refusal to accept her

informal grievance amounted to a refusal to investigate ADC officials (id. at 14-15). But

even assuming that these two Defendants investigated her grievance and found that ADC

officials improperly handled her outgoing legal mail, it would not have had any effect the

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dismissal of her 2007 lawsuit. 

“[W]ithout alleging a chilling effect, a retaliation claim without allegation of other

harm is not actionable.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff does not allege what harm

she suffered as a result of Backes and Jones’ actions, much less how their conduct affected

her ability or intent to exercise her First Amendment rights. As such, there is no triable issue

on the element of harm. Summary judgment will be granted to Backes and Jones on

Count III. 

2. Count IV-Access to the Courts (Rahman, Mitchell, Mims, and

Thornton)

As set forth above with respect to Count II, the Court cannot find that the underlying

claim in Plaintiff’s 2007 civil lawsuit was frivolous or without merit. The Court must still

determine, however, whether Plaintiff suffered any actual injury as a result of Defendants’

alleged delay in delivering her Response to the Court. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349.

The parties’ dispute whether the Court received and considered Plaintiff’s Response

to the Order to Show Cause before entering judgment in CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS. A careful

reading of the docket reflects that Plaintiff is correct on this point. Although the docket

shows that Plaintiff’s Response was received in the Clerk’s Office on May 26, 2009, the

docket entry indicates that the Response was not docketed until June 1, 2009—which was

after judgment was entered automatically on May 28, 2009, pursuant to what appeared on

the docket to be no response to the Order to Show Cause. CV 07-2105-PHX-GMS, Docs.

71-72. Thus, the Court did not consider Plaintiff’s Response to the Order to Show Cause

before it dismissed the action.

Based on the above information, regardless of any delay that may have occurred in

the mail, Plaintiff’s Response reached the Court before judgment was entered. Defendants

did not control the docketing of Plaintiff’ Response. As such, any actual injury Plaintiff may

claim from the delay in docketing cannot be attributed to Defendants’ actions. For this

reason, summary judgment will be granted to Defendants on Count IV.

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IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 80).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80) is granted.

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and terminate the action.

DATED this 30th day of July, 2012.

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