Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05314/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05314-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM SCOTT KOWARSH,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANTHONY HECKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05314-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

AND MOTION TO AMEND; ORDER 

STRIKING “3RD AMENDED 

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT”

Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 19, 21, 27

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Adam Scott Kowarsh sued Defendants,

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alleging violations of his 

constitutional rights as well as state law claims for libel and slander related to his arrest and 

subsequentf prosecution for public intoxication. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 1 & 9, Dkt. No. 7. 

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff‟s initial Complaint without prejudice and granted his in 

forma pauperis application. Dkt. No. 6. Now pending before the Court are two Motions to 

Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6): one filed by Defendants 

Anthony Heckman, James Leal, Michael Carroll, Ted Yamasaki, and John Robertson (the “City 

Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 15), and the other filed by Defendants John Jay and Gregory O‟Connell 

(the “Attorney Defendants”) (Dkt. No. 19). Rather than filing an Opposition, Plaintiff has filed a 

Motion to Amend his Complaint to “respond” to the “alleged deficiencies” identified in the 

Defendants‟ Motions. Dkt. No. 21. Both the City Defendants and the Attorney Defendants 

oppose Plaintiff‟s Motion. Dkt. Nos. 26 (City Defs.‟ Opp‟n) & 23 (Att‟y Defs.‟ Opp‟n). Once 

 

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Plaintiff has named as Defendants Michael Carroll, Graciela Estrada-Scaminaci, Anthony 

Heckman, John Jay, Song Kim, James Leal, Gregory O‟Connell, John Robertson, Aminder Singh, 

Ted Yamisaki. Defendants Graciela Estrada-Scaminaci, Song Kim, and Aminder Singh have not 

yet filed responses to Plaintiff‟s Complaint.

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again, rather than filing a Reply, Plaintiff filed a “3rd Amended Original Complaint.” Dkt. No. 

27. The Court held a hearing on the matter on April 16, 2015. Dkt. No. 28. Having carefully 

considered the parties‟ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the Court 

GRANTS the City Defendants‟ and the Attorney Defendants‟ Motions, and DENIES 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff‟s Motion to Amend for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action pro se on December 3, 2014. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. The Court 

granted Plaintiff‟s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis but dismissed Plaintiff‟s Complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Dkt. No. 6. Specifically, while the 

Court found that Plaintiff “appear[ed] to allege potential claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

related state law claims surround[ing] his arrest and subsequent prosecutions,” the Court was 

ultimately unable to determine the nature of his allegations as written. Id. at 5. The Court noted 

that “Plaintiff‟s Complaint is largely devoid of facts or allegations that adequately identify the 

named defendants and establish causation and harm as to each of them.” Id. In dismissing 

Plaintiff‟s Complaint, the Court also granted Plaintiff leave to amend. Id. at 1. Plaintiff filed his 

FAC, the operative complaint, on January 5, 2015.

According to his FAC, Plaintiff is a “disabled California medicinal cannabis patient.” 

FAC ¶ 9. Plaintiff contends that he was “written a cannabis possession citation despite valid 

identification which represented a valid medical doctor‟s recommendation.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant police officer Anthony Heckman wrote him the citation while Plaintiff was 

walking on private property. Id. ¶¶ 10, 23. Plaintiff alleges that the citation was a crime, as was 

the fact that Heckman “did not turn that citation in[.]” Id. ¶ 22. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that 

Heckman “attacked” him and searched him without Plaintiff‟s consent, including by “forcibly” 

searching Plaintiff‟s genitals in front of Heckman‟s female partner. Id. ¶¶ 10, 22. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was “despondent about being attacked, kidnapped, and charged as 

MY blood was being drawn” and that Heckman “insisted” Plaintiff be “charged, and convicted, 

despite my Clean Blood.” Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts that he was “subsequently charged with 

public intoxication of Toluene, a charge my blood was taken to support.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges 

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that he “gave blood evidence which proved his innocence” but was never allowed to use the blood 

evidence to defend his own innocence. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 9. Plaintiff‟s SAC indicates that this arrest and 

search occurred on “June 1/2, 2009.” SAC at 5.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gregory O‟Connell is the man who maliciously prosecuted 

him and conspired to suppress blood evidence. FAC ¶ 12. Defendant John Jay is the man who 

walked into the courtroom and spoke to O‟Connell and who saw that Plaintiff “had an accident as 

I exited the BART restroom.” Id. ¶ 11. Defendant Graciela Estrada-Scaminaci is “the lady” to 

whom Plaintiff alleges he shouted “But I‟m Not Guilty” when she told Plaintiff to accept the plea 

bargain, “despite the command before entering the courtroom Not to Plea because I am 

INNOCENT and have both Blood Evidence and a Countersuit.” Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that 

Estrada-Scaminaci “misrepresented me into accepting the „Plea‟ under the auspices of a 

countersuit.” Id. Defendants Song Kim and Aminder Singh are Public Defenders, who Plaintiff 

alleges committed “malicious prosecution despite exonerating evidence.” Id. ¶¶ 14-15.

Plaintiff alleges that he complained to the Newark Police Department, “where every effort 

was made to confound any accountability to receive complaint or faithfully administer any form of 

adequately accountability, a contempt demonstrated in the e-mailed correspondence with JAMES 

LEAL and MICHAEL CARROLL.” Id. ¶ 6. Defendant James Leal is the Chief of Police at the 

Newark Police Department, who Plaintiff alleges “attempted to confound complaint first by 

handing the complaint off to MICHAEL CARROLL.” Id. ¶ 16. According to Plaintiff, Leal “was 

Aware of every condition I wrote him about” but “did not adequately address any aspect of 

complaint” and “attempted to subvert accountability.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Michael Carroll is “the officer most aware of the 

conditions” Plaintiff complained about. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff states that Carroll remembers Plaintiff 

“serving 17 days for unsubstantiated terrorist threat charges” made by a woman to rob Plaintiff of 

over “$420 worth of property.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Carroll knows that Plaintiff was 

“pepper-sprayed through a little sliding peephole in a closed steel door” while he sat “handcuffed 

on the floor.” Id. Plaintiff also asserts that Carroll “might be the guy with information” about a 

person in “FPD homicide” who Plaintiff alleges “killed a young man who resembled [Plaintiff], 

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for looking like the Snitch who got on an AC transit bus.” Id. Additionally, Plaintiff contends 

that Carroll is “most likely the man to ask about why RICHARD PRIEST had a shoebox from 

before Mr. Morrison was a Captain at Fremont Police Department, but RICHARD PRIEST is 

missing the same time” as a woman was “out of Newark, vanished, as his Mother filed missing 

person‟s reports.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Carroll “fought harder than anyone else at the 

NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT to defend” Heckman.” Id.

Plaintiff asserts that he learned that “not one „Oath of Office‟ document is notarized, and 

that MICHAEL CARROLL does not have a date on his „Oath of Office‟ document.” Id. ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff also asserts claims against two City Clerks, Defendants Ted Yamasaki and John 

Robertson, who Plaintiff alleges are accessories “because they failed so dramatically at their 

station as to put my constitutional rights in imminent risk by co-Defendants.” Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Jerry Tutterow, a security guard, is registered “with 

the DoJ, to whom I complained in regards to him.” Id. ¶ 20. He is “Defendant‟s Accessory and 

Conspirator.” Id. Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges that Heckman conspired with Tutterow to 

“confound complaint in conspiracy subversive to California law.” Id. ¶ 3. 

Plaintiff states that he has been a psychiatric medicine patient since he was 16, and on 

Social Security Permanent Disability for Schizo-Affective disorder with insomnia and anxiety 

since 1998. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that his hospitalizations had tapered off “to almost nil with 

symptom management before November 2013, but that two “episodes” put him into the JohnGeorge Psychiatric Pavilion in San Leandro, CA, “because of [Tutterow] discussing his 

association with [Heckman].” Id. Plaintiff now seeks over $142 billion in damages from 

Defendants, “DUE and PAYABLE to [Plaintiff], by February 1st, 2015.” Id. at 6.

The City Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on February 25, 2015, and the Attorney 

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2015. Among other things, the City 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff‟s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and otherwise fail 

to state a claim against them for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1986. City Defs. Mot. at 1, 

3. The Attorney Defendants likewise challenge Plaintiff‟s FAC, contending that Plaintiff‟s claims 

against them are barred by two Supreme Court rulings: (1) Heck v. Humphrey, which prohibits 

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Plaintiff from bringing a civil rights claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his earlier 

conviction or sentence; and (2) Imbler v. Pachtman, which makes prosecutors absolutely immune 

from civil suits for damages under § 1983 that challenge activities related to their prosecutorial 

functions. Att‟y Defs.‟ Mot. at 1-2. Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to Amend/Correct and 

file his proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on March 5, 2015. Dkt. Nos. 21 (Mot.) 

and 21-1 (SAC). The City Defendants and the Attorney Defendants oppose Plaintiff‟s Motion on 

substantially similar grounds as asserted in their Motions to Dismiss. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 

complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not a 

“probability requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2008). “[D]ismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 

534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the 

basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). 

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), under which a party is only 

required to make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief,” a “pleading that offers „labels and conclusions‟ or „a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

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dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]llegations in a complaint . . . must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively”). The court must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. “Determining whether a complaint states a 

plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

Pro se pleadings are also subject to Rule 8(a)(2). Brazil v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 66 F.3d 

193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). However, pleadings of pro se litigants are held to even less rigid 

standards than those drafted by attorneys. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (citing 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). “Courts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings 

liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints.” Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 

F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). While a pro se plaintiff‟s pleadings will be construed with great 

leeway, “those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a 

defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil, 66 F.3d at 199. “When 

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 

637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs should be given “an opportunity to amend (their) complaint(s) 

to overcome any deficiency unless „it clearly appears . . . that the deficiency cannot be overcome 

by amendment.‟” (citations omitted)). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is 

proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.” Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

B. Motion to Amend

Rule 15 provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within (1) 

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21 days after serving the pleading or (2) 21 days after the earlier of service of a responsive 

pleading or service of a Rule 12(b) motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Outside of this timeframe, 

“a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party‟s written consent or the court‟s 

leave,” though the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(2). “Although the rule should be interpreted with „extreme liberality,‟ leave to amend is not 

to be granted automatically.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(citation omitted).

A court considers five factors in determining whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) bad 

faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 

whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” In re Western States Wholesale Nat. 

Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 

F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Prejudice to the opposing party is the most important factor.” 

Jackson, 902 F.2d at 1387. And the party opposing amendment bears the burden of showing 

prejudice. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). Generally, a 

court must make the determination of whether to grant leave “with all inferences in favor of 

granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

Likely in a lack of familiarity with court procedures, Plaintiff filed both a Motion for 

Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint and then later a third amended complaint, which he 

filed without Defendants‟ consent or leave of Court. Although Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave 

to File a Second Amended Complaint in the midst of Defendants filing their Motions to Dismiss, 

the Court is willing to consider that Motion in parallel with Defendants‟ Motions to Dismiss, as 

Plaintiff‟s Motion was properly filed and noticed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (noting that after the 

time to file an amended pleading “as a matter of course” the party seeking to amend may only do 

so with the “opposing party‟s written consent or the court‟s leave.”). But as to Plaintiff‟s “3rd

Amended Original Complaint”, the Court will not consider that document and STRIKES it as 

improperly filed. 

Turning to Plaintiff‟s Motion for Leave to Amend and Defendants‟ Motions to Dismiss, 

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the Court notes that the viability of Plaintiff‟s Motion turns in part on whether his proposed claims 

are futile, which substantially overlaps with Defendants‟ Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 

F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (a proposed amendment is futile if it would not survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)). As discussed below, because the Court 

finds that the FAC and proposed SAC fail to state a claim, the Court GRANTS Defendants‟ 

Motions To Dismiss and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff‟s Motion to Amend.

A. Claims Against Attorneys John Jay and Gregory O’Connell

Jay and O‟Connell are Deputy District Attorneys with the Alameda County District 

Attorney‟s Office. McKay Decl., Exs. 1-2, Dkt. No. 19-1. As the Attorney Defendants note, 

Plaintiff‟s “claims against [them] appear to be based on allegations involving the District 

Attorney‟s and Defendants Jay‟s and O‟Connell‟s initiation and prosecution of State criminal 

proceedings against Plaintiff (action #234111-2).” Att‟y Defs.‟ Opp‟n at 2-3 (citing McKay Decl., 

Exs. 3-5).2 As this statement indicates, from Plaintiff‟s FAC it is not entirely clear what claims 

Plaintiff asserts against these Defendants, but at the hearing Plaintiff confirmed that he asserts 

claims against Defendants Jay and O‟Connell for malicious prosecution. Likewise, in his FAC, 

Plaintiff alleges that O‟Connell “is the man who maliciously prosecuted [Plaintiff] in Docket 

#231111-2, conspiring to suppress blood evidence . . . to violate Plaintiff‟s federally protected 

constitutional rights for profit and personal gain.” FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff‟s FAC also asserts that Jay 

“walked into the courtroom and spoke to Gregory O‟Connell . . . .” Id. ¶ 11. In his SAC, Plaintiff 

 

2 Defendants Jay and O‟Connell requested that the Court take judicial notice of the documents 

attached to McKay‟s Declaration. Dkt. No. 19-2. Exhibit 3 is the Complaint in People v. Adam 

Scott Korwarsh, Alameda Superior Court action #234111-2; Exhibit 4 is the November 3, 2010 

Clerk‟s Docket in People v. Adam Scott Korwarsh, Alameda Superior Court action #234111-2; 

and Exhibit 5 is the Misdemeanor Advisement of Rights, Waiver and Plea Form signed by 

Plaintiff on November 3, 2010 in People v. Adam Scott Korwarsh, Alameda Superior Court action 

#234111-2. The Attorney Defendants also request the Court take judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 

2, which are California State Bar records showing that they are Deputy District Attorneys with the 

Alameda County District Attorney‟s Office. Considering the nature of these documents, the Court 

takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1-4 of McKay‟s Declaration pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 

201. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 

746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public 

record”). 

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clarifies that “this action is brought against [Defendants Jay and O‟Connell] for violating the 

federal protected Constitutional Rights of [Plaintiff] for their malicious prosecution of Docket 

#234111-2 despite exonerating evidence in the form of [Plaintiff‟s] own clean blood.” SAC at 5.

Defendants Jay and O‟Connell move to dismiss Plaintiff‟s FAC on the ground that Plaintiff 

fails to state a claim against them for which relief can be granted, and similarly challenge 

Plaintiff‟s Motion to Amend on the basis that Plaintiff‟s claims against them are futile on the same 

ground. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff‟s claims against them are barred the 

Supreme Court‟s decisions of Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) and Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994). Att‟y Defs.‟ Opp‟n at 2-8. 

1. Plaintiff‟s Claims are Heck-barred

In Heck, the plaintiff named the county prosecutors as defendants, alleging among other 

things that they had engaged in an “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” leading to 

plaintiff‟s arrest and had “knowingly destroyed” evidence “which was exculpatory in nature and 

could have proved [plaintiff‟s] innocence[.]” 512 U.S. at 479 (citations omitted). The Supreme 

Court found that the plaintiff‟s § 1983 claim was analogous to the common law cause of action for 

malicious prosecution because it permits damages for a sentence “imposed pursuant to legal 

process.” Id. at 484. As such, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ne element that must be alleged 

and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in 

favor of the accused.” Id. (citations omitted).3 The Supreme Court noted that this requirement is 

necessary in cases asserting malicious prosecution because it “avoids parallel litigation” and 

maintains the “strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out 

of the same or identical transaction.” Id. (citation omitted). The requirement additionally stops a 

criminal defendant from collaterally attacking his or her conviction through a civil suit. Id. at 484-

85. The Court concluded by noting that the long-standing “principle that civil tort actions are not 

appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 

 

3 An action terminates in favor of the accused if his sentence is declared invalid, for instance if it is 

“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court‟s issuance of a 

writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 

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1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his 

conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.” Id.

at 486 (footnote omitted).

As a result of the Supreme Court‟s ruling, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed that “[u]nder 

Heck v. Humphrey, [the plaintiff] cannot recover damages in a § 1983 suit if a judgment in favor 

of the plaintiff „would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . unless the 

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.‟” Guerrero 

v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Stated another way, 

if a judgment in favor of a plaintiff on his civil rights claim will necessarily imply the invalidity of 

his conviction or sentence, the claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that 

the conviction or sentence already has been invalidated. Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 584 

(9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he sole dispositive question is whether a plaintiff‟s claim, if successful, would 

imply the invalidity of his conviction.”). Additionally, since Heck, the Ninth Circuit has 

recognized that malicious prosecution claims brought under § 1983 only accrue upon favorable 

termination of the underlying criminal proceeding. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 

F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff‟s “malicious prosecution claim did not accrue until his 

acquittal”); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1060 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a 

claim of malicious prosecution does not accrue until the plaintiff is acquitted, because acquittal is 

an element of the claim”). 

Heck bars Plaintiff‟s claims against the Attorney Defendants for two primary reasons. 

First, under Heck and its successor precedents, Plaintiff cannot provide evidence to prove a 

fundamental element of his malicious prosecution claim—namely, that the underlying criminal 

proceeding ultimately concluded in his favor. Heck, 512 U.S. at 483-87 (§ 1983 claim not 

cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution claim, which includes as an 

element that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff‟s favor). 

Second, if Plaintiff had the opportunity to litigate this case and was ultimately successful in 

showing that Defendants Jay and O‟Connell maliciously prosecuted him in the underlying 

criminal case by charging him despite exculpatory evidence, then that success calls into question 

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the state judgment convicting Plaintiff. Cf. Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“a claim does not „necessarily imply‟ the invalidity of a conviction or sentence under Heck unless 

its success will „inevitably‟ call into question the state court judgment that led to the plaintiff‟s 

custody.” (citations omitted)). While the matter is somewhat complicated here because Plaintiff‟s 

conviction is based on his own no contest plea, as discussed below, the Court cannot see how it 

could grant Plaintiff relief that would not call into question his earlier plea. 

In recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit has recognized the so-called “Heck bar” does not 

necessarily apply to cases where the Plaintiff‟s conviction was based upon a no contest plea. See 

Lockett v. Ericson, 656 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011), cited with approval in Jackson v. Barnes, 749 

F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 980 (2015). In Lockett, police officers 

suspected the plaintiff of driving under the influence of alcohol and entered his home to obtain 

evidence, including by having the plaintiff take a breathalyzer and field sobriety tests. 656 F.3d at 

894. The plaintiff did not successfully complete those tests, and after his arrest, he subsequently 

moved to suppress that evidence based on allegations that the police seized that evidence without a 

warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 894-95. The criminal court denied the 

motion to suppress, and the plaintiff then pled no contest to a lesser charge, a “wet reckless.” Id.

at 895. The plaintiff was put on probation for three years. Id. The plaintiff then filed a civil 

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the district court found was barred by Heck v 

Humphrey. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff‟s subsequent § 1983 action 

was not barred by Heck, reasoning that because plaintiff pled no contest, his “conviction derives 

from his plea, not from a verdict obtained with supposedly illegal evidence. The validity of 

Lockett‟s conviction does not in any way depend upon the legality of the search of his home.” Id.

at 897 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Lockett relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit precedent, Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 

2001), where two plaintiffs who had entered pleas of guilty and nolo contendere in their criminal 

proceedings later challenged the blood tests taken after their DUI arrests. Id. at 823. The Ove

Court found that Heck was inapplicable because the validity of those plaintiffs‟ convictions “does 

not in any way depend upon the legality of the blood draws.” Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that 

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“a judgment in [plaintiffs‟] favor will not imply the invalidity of their DUI convictions because the 

convictions do not depend upon the blood draws.” Id. Therefore, in this case, the fact that 

Plaintiff pled no contest to his criminal conviction does not automatically mean his claim is barred 

by Heck. See also discussions in Leon v. San Jose Police Dep’t, 2013 WL 5487543, at *3-4 (N.D. 

Cal. Sep. 30, 2013) and Cooley v. City of Vallejo, 2014 WL 3749369, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 

2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 4368141 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) 

(discussing divergence of Ninth Circuit precedents for applying Heck bar in cases where plaintiff 

pled guilty or no contest in underlying criminal proceedings).

The difference between this case and the Lockett and Ove precedents is that here Plaintiff 

asserts claims for malicious prosecution against the charging prosecutors, whereas in those cases 

the claims were related to the methods used by police to obtain evidence. The Lockett and Ove

plaintiffs‟ pleas of guilty and no contest were not inconsistent with their claims that police 

obtained evidence against them in a way that violated their constitutional rights. But in this case

Plaintiff‟s plea of no contest is inconsistent with his claim that Defendants Jay and O‟Connell 

maliciously prosecuted him because it essentially suggests that Plaintiff did, in fact, contest the 

criminal charges against him. 

In Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, the Ninth Circuit recently considered a similar situation 

where the plaintiff filed a § 1983 complaint after pleading guilty and serving time for the guilty 

charge. 753 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court of Appeal noted that this meant that the 

plaintiff still had an outstanding conviction, which “raises the question whether [plaintiff]‟s § 

1983 action is barred by Heck’s holding that “[a] claim for damages [based] on a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable.” Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). 

The Ninth Circuit ordered the lower court to consider this issue on remand, noting that the district 

court may “wish to consider whether any of the facts [plaintiff] allocuted to in his December 2, 

2008 plea are inconsistent with his allegations in this § 1983 action.” Id. at 899. Although the 

Ninth Circuit did not spell out what sort of inconsistency would make a no contest or guilty plea 

barred by Heck, it implied that such an inconsistency was possible.

The Court finds that such an inconsistency is present here. If Plaintiff successfully showed 

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that Defendants Jay and O‟Connell maliciously prosecuted him by ignoring exculpatory blood 

evidence, this would reveal an inconsistency with his no contest plea by suggesting that he 

contested the charges against him and had evidence to support his opposition. At bottom, his 

current claim implies that the sentence he served as part of his no contest plea was invalid. See 

Blumberg v. Hewitt, __ Fed. App‟x __, 2015 WL 1534414, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015). Under 

the Supreme Court‟s ruling in Heck, this Court cannot hear claims that imply the invalidity of 

Plaintiff‟s conviction. Consequently, Plaintiff‟s malicious prosecution claims against the Attorney 

Defendants as presently alleged in his FAC and his proposed SAC are not properly adjudicated in 

this action.

2. Imbler Prosecutorial Immunity

Even if Plaintiff could show that his sentence was set aside or provide some other reason 

why his no contest plea is not inconsistent with his malicious prosecution claims, Plaintiff‟s claims

against the Attorney Defendants are nevertheless barred under the Supreme Court‟s ruling in 

Imbler. Imbler held that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State‟s case,” the 

prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983. 424 U.S. at 430-31. “This 

immunity covers the knowing use of false testimony at trial, the suppression of exculpatory 

evidence, and malicious prosecution.” Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416; footnote omitted). 

As noted above, Plaintiff‟s claims against the Attorney Defendants appear to relate to their 

decision to prosecute Plaintiff despite knowledge of exculpatory blood evidence. The Supreme 

Court confronted a similar fact pattern in Imbler, where the plaintiff alleged that, among other 

things, the defendant prosecutor had “prosecuted him with knowledge of a lie detector test that had 

„cleared‟ [him].” 424 U.S. at 416. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals‟ decision 

that such “activities [by the prosecutor] were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the 

criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with 

full force.” Id. at 430. In affirming, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]o be sure, this immunity 

does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose 

malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a 

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prosecutor‟s immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the vigorous 

and fearless performance of the prosecutor‟s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the 

criminal justice system.” Id. at 427-28. Accordingly, the Court held that the prosecutor was 

entitled to absolute immunity.

The rule adopted in light of Imbler is that “[p]rosecutors performing their official 

prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute immunity against constitutional torts.” Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit has 

acknowledged that “[d]etermining what functions are prosecutorial is an inexact science.” Id. It 

explained that “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for the consequences of their 

advocacy, however inept or malicious, because it is filtered through a neutral and detached judicial 

body; they are not necessarily immune for actions taken outside this process, including actions 

logically—though not necessarily temporally—prior to advocacy, such as those „normally 

performed by a detective or police officer,‟ like gathering evidence, [] and those separate from the 

process, like providing legal advice to the police[.]” Id. at 913 (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff‟s FAC and SAC only allege facts suggesting that the Attorney Defendants took 

actions related to their prosecutorial functions, namely by alleging that they “maliciously 

prosecut[ed]” Plaintiff “despite exonerating evidence in the form of [Plaintiff‟s] own clean blood.” 

SAC at 5; FAC ¶¶ 11-12. Plaintiff‟s allegations do not suggest that the Attorney Defendants‟ 

actions in any way related to actions taken outside the judicial process. Because Plaintiff‟s 

allegations relate to the district attorney‟s actions in performing functions intimately associated 

with the judicial phase of the criminal process, Plaintiff‟s claim must be dismissed on grounds of 

prosecutorial immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.

B. Claims Against City Defendants

The City Defendants also challenge Plaintiff‟s FAC under Rule 12(b)(6) as well as 

Plaintiff‟s proposed SAC on futility grounds. The City Defendants contend that Plaintiff‟s SAC 

fails for the same reasons as his FAC: specifically, they argue that (1) both Plaintiff‟s FAC and 

SAC fail to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8; (2) Plaintiff‟s claims are barred by the 

statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 

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1986.4 City Defs.‟ Mot. at 3; City Defs.‟ Opp‟n at 3-11. 

1. Statute of Limitations

A statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss, and a claim may be 

dismissed as untimely “when the running of the statute is apparent from the face of the 

complaint.” Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Conerly v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also U.S. ex rel. Air Control 

Techs., Inc. v. Pre Con Indus., Inc., 720 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013). “[S]uch a motion to 

dismiss should be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, 

would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1278 

(quotations omitted). For purposes of a motion to amend, claims barred by the statute of 

limitations are futile. Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998) (the “general 

rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings . . . does not extend to cases in which any 

amendment would be an exercise in futility, or where the amended complaint would also be 

subject to dismissal . . . .”)). 

Plaintiff appears to allege claims against the City Defendants for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 

1983 and 1986, and for libel and slander; thus, the question is whether these claims are timely. 

Before considering these claims individually, however, the Court finds some of Plaintiff‟s claims 

are tolled. Specifically, California Government Code section 945.3 provides:

No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or other 

accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense may bring a civil 

action for money or damages against a peace officer or the public 

entity employing a peace officer based upon conduct of the peace 

officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged, 

including an act or omission in investigating or reporting the offense 

or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges against the 

accused are pending before a justice, municipal or superior court.

Any applicable statute of limitations for filing and prosecuting these 

 

4

The City Defendants construed Plaintiff‟s conspiracy claims to fail under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 

argued that those claims are likewise futile. Both Plaintiff‟s FAC and SAC suffer from lack of 

clarity, but there is no indication that Plaintiff intended to bring a claim under § 1985. Therefore, 

at this time, the Court will not consider the City Defendants‟ arguments as to a potential § 1985 

claim. 

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actions shall be tolled during the period that the charges are 

pending before a municipal or superior court.

(Emphasis added). 

The first paragraph of section 945.3 is not applicable to § 1983 claims brought in federal 

court, but the tolling provision in the highlighted second paragraph does apply. Harding v. 

Galceran, 889 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1989). The tolling provision operates only so long as the 

criminal charges are “pending,” which means until the date of judgment and conviction. Trimble 

v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995). The state court record before the Court 

shows that the charges stemming from the June 1, 2009 arrest were pending at least until 

November 3, 2010, when Plaintiff entered a no contest plea. McKay Decl., Ex. 4. Thus, section 

945.3 tolls the statute of limitations until at least November 3, 2010 on certain of Plaintiff‟s claims 

arising from events occurring before or during the time charges were pending against him. See 

Ortega v. Mattocks, 2014 WL 2812316, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2014). 

Plaintiff also appears to argue that his claims should be subject to tolling or equitable 

estoppel on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff was on probation until November 3, 2013; and (2) that 

another Defendant, Graciella Estrada-Scaminaci, told Plaintiff that he could not file a countersuit 

until two weeks after Plaintiff‟s probation. The Court is not persuaded that either of these 

arguments merit tolling or equitable estoppel.

As to the first argument related to Plaintiff‟s probation, California‟s two year tolling period 

prescribed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1(a) does not apply, as Plaintiff was 

not incarcerated or otherwise significantly impaired in his ability to enforce his claim. See Cal. 

Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1(a)5; Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff has 

not set forth a basis for tolling his claims in this case as he was only on probation at the time his 

claims accrued, and he has presented no other evidence or argument for how this probation or any 

other disability prohibited him from pursuing his claims. See Diamond v. Gutierrez, 967 F.2d 585 

(9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (noting that “[a]lthough [plaintiff] was on probation, he was not 

 

5 California Civil Procedure Code § 352.1(a) states that “if [plaintiff] is, at the time the cause of 

action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal 

court for a term less than for life, the time of that disability is not a part of the time limited for the 

commencement of the action, not to exceed two years.” 

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incarcerated,” and that tolling did not apply “because the restrictions imposed by probation 

„neither precluded nor significantly impaired his ability to enforce his claim.‟” (quoting Deutch v. 

Hoffman, 165 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155 (1985)). 

Plaintiff‟s second argument that Defendant Estrada-Scaminaci told Plaintiff he would have 

to wait until after his probation to file suit is essentially an equitable estoppel claim. Under 

California law, equitable estoppel requires that: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of 

the facts; (2) that party must intend that his or her conduct be acted on, or must so act that the 

party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the 

estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must 

reasonably rely on the conduct to his or her injury. Honig v. S.F. Planning Dep’t, 127 Cal. App. 

4th 520, 529 (2005). But Plaintiff has not pled that he relied on the City Defendants‟ misconduct 

in failing to file in a timely manner. Id. at 706-07. Nor does he allege that they took any actions 

to prevent Plaintiff from filing on time. Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1051-52 (“California equitable 

estoppel is thus similar to and not inconsistent with federal common law, as both focus on actions 

taken by the defendant which prevent the plaintiff from filing on time.” (citations omitted)). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff “must plead with particularity the facts which give rise to the claim of 

fraudulent concealment.” Guerrero, 442 F.3d at 706-07 (quotation omitted). But Plaintiff has not 

pled with any particularity facts that would demonstrate that these Defendants‟ active conduct 

prevented Plaintiff from complying with the statute of limitations. While this Order does not 

consider any claims against Defendant Estrada-Scaminaci, neither Plaintiff‟s FAC or SAC as 

presently alleged show that the City Defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the 

statute of limitations defense. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that certain of Plaintiff‟s claims arising from events that 

occurred before or during the time that charges were pending against him are tolled under section

945.3 until at least November 3, 2010. But otherwise, Plaintiff is not entitled to tolling or 

equitable estoppel against the City Defendants for asserting a statute of limitations defense. The 

Court now considers the timeliness of each of Plaintiff‟s claims.

//

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a. Libel/Slander Claims

First, as to Plaintiff‟s libel/slander claims, under California Law, the statute of limitations 

for libel and slander is one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c). In his SAC, Plaintiff admits that 

“the libel/slander continued until November 3, 2013, when the measure towards the statute of 

limitations began[.]” SAC at 7. Based on Plaintiff‟s admission, the statute of limitations for his 

libel/slander claim accrued at least by November 3, 2013, and Plaintiff was required to file suit 

within one year of that date, i.e., November 3, 2014. See Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 573 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (“A statute of limitations begins to run on the date on which the plaintiff‟s claim 

„accrues.‟” (citation omitted)). However, by waiting to file his Complaint until December 3, 2014, 

the statute of limitations now bars Plaintiff‟s libel and slander claims. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s 

libel and slander claims in both his FAC and SAC are dismissed as untimely and barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations.

b. Section 1983 and 1986 Claims

Second, the Court considers whether Plaintiff asserted timely claims against the City 

Defendants for violations of §§ 1983 and 1986. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege violations 

of §§ 1983 and 1986 based on claims for malicious prosecution, unlawful search and seizure, and 

conspiracy. 

Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, thus the federal courts 

traditionally apply the forum state‟s statute of limitations for personal injury actions, except to the 

extent inconsistent with federal law. See Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 

1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). California‟s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two 

years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. Section 1986 claims have a one year statute of limitations. 

42 U.S.C. § 1986 (“no action under the provision of this section shall be sustained which is not 

commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”). The question then is when 

Plaintiff‟s claims accrued.

The accrual date of a § 1983 claim is a question of federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 

384, 388 (2007). Accrual occurs “when the plaintiff has „a complete and present cause of action,‟ 

. . . that is, when „the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief[.]‟” Id.; see also Canatella v. Van De 

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Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007) (the statute of limitations period began to run when 

Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his action). “[A] § 1983 

action is commenced in federal district court for purposes of the statute of limitations when the 

complaint is filed.” Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002). The same is true 

for Plaintiff‟s § 1986 claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff‟s malicious prosecution claim against the City Defendants 

appears to be related to the allegedly exculpatory blood evidence, and that claim is barred by Heck 

v. Humphrey as discussed above with the Attorney Defendants. A favorable judgment on this 

claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff‟s no contest plea as the claim is premised 

on the notion of Plaintiff‟s actual innocence. Under Heck, the Court may not hear this claim.

However, Heck and Plaintiff‟s no contest plea do not necessarily bar his claims for 

unlawful search and seizure. See Lockett, 656 F.3d at 897. Thus, the Court considers the City 

Defendants‟ challenge that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff‟s unlawful search and seizure 

claims. “[U]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of 

the injury which is the basis of the action.” Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 

1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). With respect to Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful searches and 

seizures, the claim accrues at the time of the search or seizure. Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 

1144, 1146 (9th Cir.1983) (“[W]here false arrest or illegal search and seizure is alleged, the 

conduct and asserted injury are discrete and complete upon occurrence, and the cause of action can 

reasonably be deemed to have accrued when the wrongful act occurs.”). Plaintiff alleges that 

Officer Heckman unlawfully searched and seized him on June 1 or 2, 2009. SAC at 5. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claims based on a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be 

free from unreasonable search and seizure accrued, at the latest, on June 2, 2009. See Wallace, 

549 U.S. at 388-90. Even if Plaintiff‟s claim is tolled until November 3, 2010 under California 

Government Code section 945.3, Plaintiff would have had to bring his § 1983 claims within two 

years of that date, i.e., November 3, 2010. As Plaintiff failed to file by that time, his wrongful 

search and seizure claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

As to Plaintiff‟s conspiracy claim, claims of civil conspiracy accrue in accordance with the 

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“last overt act doctrine,” under which the statute of limitations runs separately from each overt act 

that is alleged to have caused harm to the plaintiff. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 

(9th Cir. 1986) (“[i]njury and damage in a civil conspiracy action flow from the overt acts, not 

from the mere continuance of a conspiracy.” (citation omitted)). Consequently, a plaintiff may 

recover only for the overt acts that are specifically alleged to have occurred within the statute of 

limitations period. Id.

Officer Heckman‟s last overt act that Plaintiff alleges caused him harm is Heckman‟s 

alleged search and arrest of Plaintiff on June 1 or 2, 2009. SAC at 5. Plaintiff does not allege that 

Officer Heckman committed any other overt acts that caused him harm. Any conspiracy claim 

against Officer Heckman thus accrued on June 1 or 2, 2009, the date of his last overt act in 

furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. But even tolling Plaintiff‟s claim until November 3, 2010, 

his claims against Heckman are untimely, as Plaintiff failed to bring his § 1983 claim within two

years of that date.

As to Defendants Ted Yamasaki and John Robertson, Plaintiff does not allege any facts 

about when these Defendants took actions that allegedly harmed him. Plaintiff asserts that they 

“did not adequately perform due diligence in regards to the regulation/accountability/records of 

officers who violated” his rights. SAC at 4. He also asserts that “not one „Oath of Office‟ 

document is notarized, and that MICHAEL CARROLL does not have a date on his „Oath of 

Office‟ document.” FAC ¶ 7. Plaintiff contends that “[b]ecause these clerical errors coincide with 

Conspiracy allegations, and because that conspiracy is to confound complaint against the officers 

who violated said documents, damages for TED YAMISAKI and JOHN ROBERTSON pursuant 

to 42 USC 1988 as applied through 42 USC 1983 & 42 USC 1986; 418 U.S. 323, and Gertz v. 

Robert Welch, Inc., (1974), shall only be the $10,000,000.00 each.” Id. Given these facts, it 

appears that Plaintiff alleges ongoing acts by these Defendants. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 

1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (“When a tort involves continuing wrongful conduct, the statute of 

limitations doesn‟t begin to run until that conduct ends.” (citation omitted)).

As to Defendants Carroll and Leal, Plaintiff alleges that they “conspired to confound 

complaint, as evidenced in their correspondence, both to my USPS mail and e-mail 

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correspondence, where MICHAEL CARROLL attempted to „Consider this matter closed‟ by an 

inappropriately short amount of time, after willful outright denial on behalf of ANTHONY 

HECKMAN of ANY wrongdoing[.]” SAC at 4. In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that after May 27, 

2014, he “complained to the NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, where every effort was made 

to confound any accountability to receive complaint or faithfully administer any form of adequate 

accountability, a contempt demonstrated in the e-mail correspondence with JAMES LEAL and 

MICHAEL CARROLL.” FAC ¶ 6. Given these facts, it appears that Plaintiff alleges that the last 

overt acts of these Defendants in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy occurred sometime around 

or after May 27, 2014. 

In sum, as Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint within the two year period after the last 

alleged overt acts by Defendants Carroll, Leal, Robertson, and Yamasaki, his conspiracy claim 

against them under § 1983 is potentially timely. Plaintiff‟s § 1986 claim is also timely as Plaintiff 

filed his Complaint within one year from the last alleged overt acts of Defendants Carroll, Leal, 

Robertson, and Yamasaki. However, the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff‟s unlawful search and 

seizure claim, as well as Plaintiff‟s conspiracy claims against Officer Heckman.

2. Failure to State a Claim Under Sections 1983 and 1986

Having considered Plaintiff‟s FAC and SAC, while his conspiracy claims against 

Defendants Leal, Carroll, Yamasaki, and Robertson may be timely, the Court ultimately finds that 

Plaintiff has not set forth facts supporting the elements necessary to state a claim under § 1983 or 

§ 1986 against the City Defendants.

a. Section 1983 Claim

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the „deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws‟ of the United States.” Wilder v. Va. Hosp. 

Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a 

plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of 

the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

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under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Where multiple 

defendants are involved, the pleadings must establish a nexus between each defendant‟s actions 

and the alleged deprivation of plaintiff‟s constitutional rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 

634 (9th Cir. 1988) (liability may be imposed on individual defendants under § 1983 only if 

plaintiff can show that defendant proximately caused deprivation of a federally protected right). 

Additionally, to prove a civil conspiracy under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the 

conspiring parties reached a unity of purpose or common design and understanding, or a meeting 

of the minds in an unlawful agreement. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th 

Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh’g (July 15, 1999). Specifically, “[a] civil conspiracy is a 

combination of two or more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some 

unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results in damage.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the 

plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy. Id. A 

defendant‟s knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial 

evidence and from evidence of the defendant‟s actions. Id. at 856-57. That said, conclusory 

allegations of conspiracy are not enough to support a § 1983 conspiracy claim. Burns v. Cnty. of 

King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Furthermore, “[c]onspiracy is not itself a 

constitutional tort under § 1983,” and it “does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the 

plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying constitutional violation.” Lacey, 693 F.3d at 935.

In his FAC, Plaintiff does not explain which of his constitutional rights were violated or 

how each of the City Defendants contributed to those violations, let alone that these Defendants 

shared some common objective or intent to harm him. While Plaintiff‟s SAC vaguely asserts a 

“conspiracy against due process” (SAC at 4), it fails to allege how Plaintiff‟s due process rights 

were violated. The procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. 

See Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Comm. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To 

succeed on a substantive or procedural due process claim, the plaintiffs must first establish that 

they were deprived of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). Plaintiff has not 

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demonstrated what constitutionally protected interests or property he was deprived of a result of 

the City Defendants‟ actions. For instance, Plaintiff has not shown how Defendant Carroll‟s or 

Defendant Leal‟s lack of responsiveness to his complaints deprived him of a constitutionally 

protected interest. Likewise, he has not shown how Defendant Yamasaki‟s or Defendant 

Robertson‟s “clerical errors” (FAC ¶ 7) violated his due process rights. Finally, Plaintiff has 

alleged no facts showing that the City Defendants reached a unity of purpose or common design to 

violate Plaintiff‟s constitutional rights. Given the allegations as alleged in his FAC, the Court 

cannot find that Plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim for conspiracy upon which relief can be 

granted. And considering the allegations in Plaintiff‟s SAC, the Court likewise concludes that 

amendment in the SAC‟s current form would be futile.

b. Section 1986 Claim

Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants violated § 1986. Section 1986 states in relevant part:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs 

conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are 

about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in 

preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, 

if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party 

injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such 

wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have 

prevented . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1986. “Section 1986 imposes liability on every person who knows of an impending 

violation of section 1985 but neglects or refuses to prevent the violation.” Karim-Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). “A claim can be stated under section 

1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985.” Id. (citing Trerice v. 

Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 632 

(9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 

1040 (9th Cir. 1990), as amended on denial of reh’g (Feb. 27, 1991), as amended on denial of 

reh’g (May 24, 1991).

Plaintiff has not alleged a claim under § 1985, and to the extent he intends his more 

generalized conspiracy claims to establish a § 1985 claim, the allegations in his FAC and SAC are 

insufficient. See also United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 

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(1983) (to establish a violation of § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege a conspiracy motivated by 

racial or other class-based animus); Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 

1991) (to establish a violation of § 1985(2), a plaintiff must prove the existence of a conspiracy 

“which deter[s] by force, intimidation, or threat a party or witness in federal court” or a conspiracy 

“which obstructs the due course of justice in any State or Territory with intent to deny equal 

protection[,]” requiring an allegation of “a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” 

(quotations and citations omitted)). Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting the required 

elements of either a § 1985 claim or a § 1986 claim. 

As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1986 claim in his FAC, and to permit him leave to 

amend with the allegations in his proposed SAC would likewise be futile. 

CONCLUSION

Given the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants‟ Motions to Dismiss and DENIES

Plaintiff leave to file his second amended complaint in its current form. However, the Court will 

permit Plaintiff leave to file another version of his second amended complaint, which addresses 

the concerns in this Order. Specifically, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may amend his complaint to add malicious prosecution claims only 

if he can allege facts showing that his claims are not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, for 

instance, by showing that Plaintiff‟s conviction was set aside or that Plaintiff‟s malicious 

prosecution claims in this case are not inconsistent with his no contest plea. Additionally, 

Plaintiff may only amend if he can allege facts showing that the Attorney Defendants are 

not entitled to prosecutorial immunity.

2. Plaintiff‟s slander/libel claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as barred by the 

statute of limitations. Plaintiff may amend only if he can show some way in which these 

claims are timely or why tolling or some other equitable estoppel might apply. 

3. Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claims for unlawful search and seizure are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE as barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff may amend only if he can 

show some way in which these claims are timely or why tolling or some other equitable

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estoppel might apply. 

4. Plaintiff‟s § 1983 conspiracy claim against Officer Heckman is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE as barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff may amend only if he can 

show some way in which this claim is timely or why tolling or some other equitable

estoppel might apply. 

5. Plaintiff‟s § 1983 conspiracy claims against Defendants Leal, Carroll, Yamasaki, and 

Robertson are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff 

may amend only if he can allege plausible factual allegations to support the elements of a 

conspiracy claim under § 1983, including by alleging which of Plaintiff‟s constitutional 

rights Defendants allegedly violated through their purported conspiracy and how.

6. Plaintiff‟s § 1986 claim against the City Defendants is DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff may amend only if he can allege 

plausible factual allegations to support the elements of a § 1986 claim, which includes the 

requirement that Plaintiff allege a valid § 1985 claim. In turn, a § 1985 claim requires 

allegations that the conspiracy is motivated by racial or other class-based animus; that the 

conspiracy deterred by force, intimidation, or threat a party or witness in federal court; or 

that the conspiracy obstructed the due course of justice in any State or Territory with intent 

to deny equal protection, based on a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.

Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff‟s FAC and SAC both appear to contain 

references to various state and federal laws, as well as case citations, including “California HS 

11362” and “Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974).” As noted above, it is often unclear which 

allegations are meant to apply to which Defendant(s), and this lack of clarity extends to these case 

and statutory citations that appear somewhat randomly throughout both of Plaintiff‟s FAC and 

SAC. Given the Court‟s difficulty in understanding the precise claims and allegations asserted by 

Plaintiff, the Court provides the following guidance.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must comply with the guidelines set forth 

in Rule 8(a). This rule requires that a complaint for relief include (1) a short and plain statement 

of the grounds for the court‟s jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

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the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought. A pleading may not simply 

allege a wrong has been committed and demand relief; it must state the elements of the claim 

plainly and succinctly. Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity the facts in 

which the Defendant(s) engaged to support the claim. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 

646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

In preparing the amended complaint, Plaintiff may wish to seek assistance from the Legal 

Help Center, a free service of the Volunteer Legal Services Program, by calling 415-782-8982, or 

by signing up for an appointment on the 15th Floor of the Federal Courthouse in San Francisco, 

450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. At the Legal Help Center, Plaintiff will be 

able to speak with an attorney who may be able to provide basic legal help but not representation. 

More information is available at http://cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersf. The Court also 

recommends that Plaintiff obtain a copy of the Court‟s Handbook for Litigants Without a Lawyer, 

which is available free of charge in the Clerk‟s Office, or online at 

http://cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbk. This handbook provides an explanation of the required 

components of a complaint.

Consistent with the instructions in this Order, Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint by 

June 23, 2015. Failure to file an amended complaint by this deadline shall result in the dismissal 

of this case with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close the file in this case if an amended 

complaint is not filed by.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2015 

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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