Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00006/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00006-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON LATRELL THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. WILBER, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:10-cv-00006-SKO (PC)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO SEVER CLAIMS INTO 

SEPARATE TRIALS

(Doc. 137)

I. Background

Plaintiff Jason Latrell Thomas (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 4, 2010. On 

September 22, 2014, the Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff for trial. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e).

Following issuance of the Court’s screening order, this action was initially proceeding 

against Defendants Salinas, Jr., Maldonado, Wilber, Vikjord, Frescura, Price, Hernandez, and 

Castro on Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The events at 

issue allegedly occurred between November 2006 and September 2007, during which time 

Plaintiff was housed in the Security Housing Unit at California State Prison-Corcoran. Following 

resolution of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on April 29, 2014, this action was set 

for jury trial on the following three claims: (1) a First Amendment retaliation claim against 

Defendants Frescura and Price arising out of an incident on or around February 18, 2007; and (2) a

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First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Vikjord and (3) an Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim against Defendants Vikjord and Hernandez, both arising out of the same

incident on August 25, 2007. 

On April 8, 2015, approximately two months before trial, Defendants Frescura, Price, 

Vikjord, and Hernandez filed a motion seeking to sever the claims against Frescura and Price from 

those against Vikjord and Hernandez for trial, on the ground that the claims are unrelated and the 

potential prejudice to them outweighs any possible benefits from a joint trial. (Doc. 137.) The 

trial date was subsequently vacated given issues which arose with Plaintiff’s counsel, and on June 

23, 2015, following the appointment of new counsel for Plaintiff, he filed his opposition.

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 (Doc. 

149.) On June 26, 2015, Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 150.) The motion has been submitted on 

the record without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(l), and for the reasons that follow, 

the motion is denied.

II. Discussion

A. Initial Joinder of Claims

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2) provides for the joinder of defendants if “any 

right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or 

arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . 

any questions of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Rule 20 “is to be 

construed liberally in order to promote trial convenience and to expedite the final determination of 

disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.” League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l 

Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted); accord Desert Empire 

Bank v. Ins. Co. of North America, 623 F.3d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). “‘[T]he impulse is 

toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; 

joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.’” League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 

F.2d at 917 (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130 

(1966)).

 

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Jury trial is now scheduled for January 12, 2016.

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Plaintiff’s complaint was statutorily screened for cognizability, and this case proceeded 

forward on multiple claims against eight defendants, arising from an approximately ten month 

period during which Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to repeated acts of retaliation by the 

defendants, acts which were known to but disregarded by two supervising defendants. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A. In addition, with respect to the various claims, the non-supervisory defendants acted 

both alone and in concert with other defendants. This alleged “campaign” of retaliation 

commenced because of Plaintiff’s engagement in filing prison grievances; and, relevant here, one 

of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims was proceeding against all four of the remaining defendants: Price, 

Frescura, Hernandez, and Vikjord. (Doc. 1, Compl., ¶¶14-17.) Thus, at the pleading stage, 

Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 

(9th Cir. 2014), Plaintiff’s multiple claims against multiple defendants were properly joined in one 

action, including claims against the remaining defendants, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18, 20; Desert Empire 

Bank, 623 F.3d at 1375; League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at 917; Armstead v. City of Los 

Angeles, 66 F.Supp.3d 1254, 1262-63 (C.D.Cal. 2014).

Following the close of discovery, Defendants brought a summary judgment motion and on 

April 29, 2014, summary judgment was granted as to four of the defendants, including the 

supervisory officials, and as to multiple claims. Left at issue were the retaliation claim against 

Defendants Frescura and Price arising out of an incident on or around February 18, 2007; and the 

retaliation claim against Defendant Vikjord and the excessive force claim against Defendants 

Vikjord and Hernandez, arising out of an incident on August 25, 2007. Approximately one year 

later, Defendants filed the instant motion to sever Plaintiff’s claims for trial.

B. Bifurcation of Claims into Two Separate Trials

1. Legal Standard

The Court has the discretion to drop a party or sever a claim at any time, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

21, and to order separate trials, Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Under Rule 42(b), “[f]or convenience, to 

avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more 

separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaim, or third-party claims.” The decision to 

bifurcate rests within the trial court’s discretion. Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 

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F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004). “‘A decision ordering bifurcation is dependent on the facts and 

circumstances of each case,’” Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D.Cal. 2005) (quoting 

Saxion v. Titan–C–Manufacturing, 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir.1996)), but bifurcation is the 

exception rather than the rule, Benson Tower Condominium Owners Ass’n v. Victaulic Co., __ 

F.Supp.3d __, __, No. 3:13-cv-01010-SI, 2015 WL 2208444, at *16 (D.Or. May 11, 2015) (citing 

Clark v. I.R.S., 772 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1269 (D.Hawai’i 2009)) (quotation marks omitted).

2. Parties’ Positions

Defendants seek separate jury trials on the ground that they will be prejudiced by a single 

trial. Specifically, Defendants contend that the jury’s consideration of the evidence presented 

concerning one incident will likely be colored by the evidence concerning the other -- because 

Plaintiff alleges different reasons for the purported retaliation by the defendants, this may cause 

the jury to speculate and unfairly infer liability to the defendants in each incident; and that a 

combined trial would require a jury to keep separate the two incidents and the defendants’ roles in 

each. (Doc. 137, Motion, 5:5-12 (quotation marks omitted).) 

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants fail to identify any specific prejudice to them 

if Plaintiff’s claims are tried together or address why it could not be cured through jury 

instructions. (Doc. 150.) Plaintiff argues that separate trials will not further the goals of 

convenience, expedition, and/or economy.

3. Convenience, Expeditiousness, and Economy

In this case, it is not convenient, expeditious, or economical to conduct two jury trials on 

three claims arising from two incidents, none of which is legally or factually complex. Knight v. 

City of Sacramento Police Dep’t, No. 2:12-CV-0346 JAM-KJN, 2014 WL 1883962, at *3 

(E.D.Cal. May 12, 2014). These factors are of even greater significance in a district laboring 

under one of the heaviest caseloads in the country, a caseload comprised in large part of pro se 

cases which can be especially susceptible to material changes between the initial pleading stage 

and trial as related to joinder of claims and/or parties. See Cortez v. City of Porterville, 5 

F.Supp.3d 1160, 1162 (E.D.Cal. 2014) (addressing caseload and resource shortages). Routine 

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bifurcation for trial of claims that were initially properly joined would result in an insurmountable 

burden on this district. Thus, the factors of convenience, expeditiousness, and economy weigh 

strongly against bifurcation, and the critical factor here is whether it would unfairly prejudice 

Defendants to have the claims against them tried before one jury in one trial. Knight, 2014 WL 

1883962, at *3; Green, 226 F.R.D. at 633-34. The Court is not persuaded that it would. 

4. Prejudice

Legally, Plaintiff’s claims are not complex and they are confined to two legal theories: (1) 

whether adverse action was taken against Plaintiff because of his engagement in protected conduct 

and in the absence of any legitimate penological purpose and (2) whether physical force was used 

against Plaintiff maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 

559 U.S. 34, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010) (per curiam); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 

2009). The claims are also not factually complex. They arise from two events at the prison. First, 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Price and Frescura used physical force against him on or around 

February 18, 2007, while escorting him to the infirmary, and that at the time of the escort, 

Defendant Price told him he was going through what he was going through because they believed 

he filed a grievance regarding a stabbing incident. Second, Plaintiff claims that on August 25, 

2007, Defendant Vikjord called him a crybaby while escorting him in handcuffs from his housing 

unit to the infirmary. When Plaintiff referred to his grievances and his lawsuit against Defendant 

Vikjord, Vikjord punched him several times on the right side of his forehead with a closed fist

while Defendant Hernandez stood there and watched, without intervening.

Given that Plaintiff’s remaining three claims arising from two incidents are neither legally 

nor factually complex, the Court finds that any risk of prejudice due to jury confusion or 

conflation of issues is purely speculative rather than actually articulable. See Knight, 2014 WL 

1883962, at *3 (denying motion to bifurcate where denial would not prejudice the defendants, 

potential jury confusion would be substantially mitigated through jury instructions, bifurcation 

would be substantially burdensome, and defendants waited two years before filing their motion 

two months before trial); Green, 226 F.R.D. at 634 (denying motion to bifurcate because 

bifurcation would likely confuse the jury, would be inconvenient, would not be economical, and 

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there was little if any potential for undue prejudice to defendant); cf. Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 

1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982) (to simply issues for the jury and avoid unnecessary confusion in a 

complex civil rights case involving two alternate theories for a prisoner’s death, court bifurcated 

trial into two phases, with the first phase involving the determination whether the prisoner was 

murdered or died from suicide); Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1074, 1089 

(C.D.Cal. 2002) (bifurcation appropriate in case involving 51 plaintiffs suing 50 separate entities, 

with each claim predicated on different facts). Further, any risk of confusion or conflation is 

readily ameliorated through jury instructions and separate verdict forms, one for Defendants Price 

and Frescura and one for Defendants Hernandez and Vikjord. Benson, __ F.Supp.3d at__, 2015 

WL 2208444, at *16-17; Knight, 2014 WL 1883962, at *3; Renfrow v. Redwood Fire & Cas. Ins. 

Co., 288 F.R.D. 514, 524 (D.Nev. 2013). Finally, the facts in this case are unlikely to shock, 

inflame, or otherwise taint the jury, thereby leading to unfair prejudice. See Hirst, 676 F.2d at 

1254 (one theory of liability was that prisoner was murdered by electrocution and then hanged 

afterward to disguise the murder); Wynn, 234 F.Supp.2d at 1089 (allowing case to proceed as 

structured would “result in a panoply of accusations against individual employers and talent 

agencies that would be imputed on each of their unaffiliated competitors in the industry.”) 

Therefore, the motion shall be denied.

III. Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that no factors weigh in favor of bifurcation 

and Defendants’ motion to sever Plaintiff’s claims into two separate trials, filed on April 8, 2015, 

is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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