Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01143/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elena Guzman De Castaneda, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Stephen L. Fickett, District Director,

Phoenix, Arizona, Bureau of Citizenship

and Immigration Services; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. 04-1143-PHX-ROS

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment

filed by Defendants Stephen L. Fickett et al ("Defendants"). For the following reasons, the

case will be dismissed as moot.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Elena Guzman De Castaneda ("Castaneda") is a native and citizen of Mexico.

(Doc. # 1) Plaintiff married Javier Castaneda in Mexico in 1979. (Doc. # 1) Castaneda and

her husband came to the United States in 1980. Castaneda entered the United States with a

visitor's visa. The couple divorced on March 28, 1984. (Statement of Facts, Ex. 15)

Castaneda married Jay Bruce Wallace, a U.S. citizen, on May 7, 1984. (Statement of Facts,

Ex. 15) On January 17, 1985, Wallace filed, on Castaneda's behalf, a Petition to Classify

Status of Alien Relative for Issuance of Immigrant VISA and an Application for Status as

Permanent Resident (Statement, Ex. 3, 4) Wallace withdrew the petition the same day it was

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filed. Wallace stated that he was withdrawing his petition because he had never lived with

Castaneda and their marriage had not been consummated. (Statement, Ex. 5) The

Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") denied the Application for Status as

Permanent Resident based on Wallace's withdrawal of his petition. (Statement, Ex. 6) The

INS later determined that Castaneda and her first spouse had promised Wallace $500 if he

would marry Castaneda and facilitate her immigration. (Statement, Ex. 7)

On September 18, 1985, Castaneda and Wallace divorced. (Statement, Ex. 15)

Castaneda was deported on June 24, 1986. (Statement, Ex. 18) She reentered the United

States without inspection that same day. (Statement, Ex. 18) Castaneda remarried her first

husband, Javier, on August 22, 1988. (Statement, Ex. 15) Castaneda submitted an

Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission Into the United States After

Deportation or Removal ("Form-212") on November 6, 1996. (Statement, Ex. 17) The

government denied Castaneda's Form-212 on August 13, 2002. The written decision

accompanying that denial set forth the favorable and unfavorable factors regarding

Castaneda's application. (Statement, Ex. 18) The favorable factors were that Castaneda was

the spouse of an United States Citizen and was the mother of five United States citizen

children. The unfavorable factors were Castaneda's history of violation of the immigration

laws including her marriage to Wallace and her reentry immediately after deportation. The

denial concluded Castaneda did "not merit a favorable exercise of discretion in this matter

as the unfavorable factors in your case outweigh the favorable factors." 

Castaneda appealed the denial of Form-212, arguing "[t]he service failed to correctly

assess the emotional, financial, and psychological damage to the U.S. citizen spouse and

children." (Statement, Ex. 19) The decision dismissing the appeal stated that many of the

favorable factors were acquired after Castaneda had reentered the United States illegally and

were therefore entitled to diminished weight. Also, Castaneda's "admission that she engaged

in marriage fraud in order to obtain immigration benefits is a serious unfavorable factor" as

was "[t]he fact that she reentered illegally without permission on the day that she was

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1

 Defense counsel originally argued that a different statutory regime was applicable.

(Doc. # 11) But counsel later conceded it had misstated and that 1182(a)(9)(A) applied

(Doc. # 17)

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deported." Accordingly, the Administrative Appeals Office concluded that Castaneda "failed

to establish that she warrants a favorable exercise of discretion." (Statement, Ex. 21) 

Castaneda filed the current suit on June 3, 2004. The suit seeks declaratory judgment

and injunctive relief. Specifically, Castaneda asks the Court to enter judgment declaring

Defendants' denial of her Form-212 "unlawful, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, and of no

force and effect." (Doc. # 1) Castaneda also asks the Court to order Defendants to approve

her Form-212. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. # 10) Castaneda filed a timely response and a cross-motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. # 14) Both parties then filed timely supplemental pleadings. (Doc. # 17, 19) On

November 9, 2005, the Court ordered additional briefing regarding the necessity of Plaintiff

filing a Form-212. 

ANALYSIS 

At the time the Complaint, the motion to dismiss, and the motion for summary

judgment were filed, the parties believed this case was governed by 8 U.S.C. §

1182(a)(9)(A).1

 That statute provides, in relevant part, that an alien who has been ordered

removed "and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or

removal . . . is inadmissible." The statute does, however, contain an exception which states

that an otherwise inadmissible alien may seek permission from the Attorney General to

reapply for admission. In this case, Plaintiff originally believed that she was inadmissible

due to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A) and she sought permission to reapply by filing Form-212.

There is now some confusion about the applicability of § 1182(a)(9)(A) and the need for

Plaintiff to file Form-212. 

In the supplemental briefing ordered by the Court, Plaintiff stated that "17-years after

her deportation and re-entry into the United States in 1986, Plaintiff was not inadmissible

under a clear reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)'s 10-year waiting period."

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2

 In her complaint, Plaintiff asked the Court for four types of relief. First, Plaintiff

sought a declaration that the denial of her Form-212 was "unlawful, arbitrary, an abuse of

discretion, and of no force and effect." Second, Plaintiff asked that Defendants be

permanently enjoined from denying her Form-212. Third, Plaintiff asked that Defendants

be ordered to grant her Form-212. And fourth, Plaintiff asked for other relief the Court

deemed necessary. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has adequately addressed what relief may

be ordered if Form-212 is no longer relevant. 

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(Supplemental Brief at 5) Thus, Plaintiff now believes that she erred by filing Form-212 and

that Defendants erred by not declaring her Form-212 moot. (Id.) Defendants' denial of

Form-212, however, was the entire basis for Plaintiff's Complaint2

 and has served as the focal

point for the litigation. Plaintiff's abandonment of her request that this Court order

Defendants approve her Form-212 means that there is no longer an actual controversy

between adverse litigants. See Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th

Cir. 2005) (observing mootness is jurisdictional issue so court must raise it sua sponte).

Plaintiff no longer seeks the relief originally sought and no alternative relief has been clearly

requested. See Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quotations omitted) (observing case is moot when an event occurs that "makes it impossible

for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party"). Thus, this case

must be dismissed as moot. See Jones Intercable of San Diego, Inc. v. City of Chula Vista,

80 F.3d 320, 328 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding case moot where cable television licensee no longer

had desire to operate a cable system); Nome Eskimo Cmty. v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 813, 815 (9th

Cir. 1995) ("Mootness . . . limits judicial power to cases where the wrong can be redressed

by the lawsuit."); Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1514 (9th Cir. 1994)

("[A] declaratory judgment may not be used to secure judicial determination of moot

questions.").

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that this case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all outstanding motions are denied as moot.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and terminate this action.

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DATED this 24th day of January, 2006.

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