Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07318/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07318-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH EVANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

E. BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-07318-YGR (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO REVOKE IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS STATUS AND TO DISMISS 

ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND 

TERMINATING ALL OTHER 

PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison and frequent litigant 

in federal court, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He was 

previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 

The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

status, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 25. 

Also pending before this Court are various pending motions filed by both parties, including 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. 36), his motion for appointment of counsel (dkt. 

37), his motions for default judgment (dkts. 53, 56-61), his other miscellaneous motions (dkts. 29, 

42, 74), and Defendants’ motion to stay discovery (dkt. 45).

Having read and considered the papers submitted, and being fully informed, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status and to dismiss the action for the 

reasons set forth below, and it terminates all other remaining pending motions as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2016, Plaintiff, a practicing Muslim, filed his complaint, alleging that 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 1 of 12
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

prison officials at SQSP have denied him the opportunity to participate in the prison’s “Ramadan 

Meal Program,” in accordance with his Muslim religious beliefs and in violation of his 

constitutional rights and those guaranteed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Dkt. 1 at 4.1 Plaintiff named the following 

Defendants: Governor of the State of California Edmund G. Brown, Jr.; California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Secretary Scott Kernan; SQSP Muslim Chaplain Q. 

Kawsar Hossain; SQSP Appeals Coordinator L. Rangel; and SQSP Correctional Officer C. 

Koenig. Id. at 5. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary and 

punitive damages. Id. at 8-10.

On July 24, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP. Dkt. 15. 

On July 26, 2017, the Court issued an Order of Partial Dismissal and Service. Dkt. 16. The 

following background is taken from the Court’s July 26, 2017 Order, which states as follows:

. . . Plaintiff is a practicing Muslim incarcerated at SQSP. He has 

been practicing Muslim since February 9, 2003. As part of his 

religious beliefs, Plaintiff must eat only Halal food. Because SQSP 

does not offer Halal food, Plaintiff received a CDCR-issued 

“Religious Diet Card” granting him access to a vegetarian 

“Religious Diet” and the “Jewish Kosher” meal plan, because 

“vegetarian and/or Kosher” food is the only acceptable substitute to 

eating strictly Halal recognized by his Muslim faith. Dkt. 1 at 5, 7,

14, 20. However, Plaintiff contends that as a result of obtaining 

these “Religious Diet Card[s]” and attending Jewish Services, 

Defendants have denied him of his right to participate in the 30-day 

“Ramadan Meal Plan” because of “[his] Jewish Diet.” Id. at 7, 22. 

In the present complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have 

denied him of the right to participate in the “Ramadan Meal 

Program” for the past two years. Id. at 22. Plaintiff has attached to 

his complaint copies of his requests to participate in the meal 

program, which include the grievances Plaintiff submitted to 

Defendants Hossain, Rangel, and Koenig, as well as Defendants’ 

responses and explanations with regards to the decision to deny 

Plaintiff’s request for entry into the Ramadan Meal Program. Id. at 

13, 28, 33. As explained by a memorandum authored by SQSP 

Warden Ron Davis, and subsequently provided to Plaintiff in July 

2015, Plaintiff’s aforementioned request was denied as follows: 

“The Religious Diet Program Agreement (CDC 3030A) states you 

may change your religious diet no more than once each year. It 

further states that you will eat only those food items served as part 

 

1

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by the parties.

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 2 of 12
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of the Religious Diet Program, which you indicated as the Jewish 

Kosher specific menu.” Id. at 38. Thus, Plaintiff claims that 

Defendants “determined the Ramadan once a year diet in the month 

of Ramadan is reserved exclusively for Muslims who did not have a 

court order[ed] diet.” Id. at 4. He argues that “[t]his religious 

discrimination is based upon violating Plaintiff’s [rights under the] 

First and Fourtee[nth] Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 

[RLUIPA] . . . .” Id. 

Giving it the liberal construction to which it is entitled, the 

complaint states cognizable claims for violation of Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, First Amendment 

Establishment Clause, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 

rights, and rights under RLUIPA. The complaint adequately links 

Defendants Hossain, Rangel, and Koenig.

Dkt. 16 at 3-4. Upon its initial review of the complaint, the Court dismissed the supervisory 

liability claims against Defendants Brown and Kernan because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts 

to establish supervisorial liability on the part of these Defendants. And, as mentioned above, the 

Court determined that the complaint stated cognizable religious practices claims under section

1983 against Defendants Hossain, Rangel, and Koenig. 

As mentioned above, Defendants filed a motion requesting the Court revoke Plaintiff’s IFP 

status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and to dismiss the instant action. Dkt. 25. Plaintiff filed an 

opposition, Defendants filed a reply, and Plaintiff filed an unsolicited surreply to the reply. Dkts. 

27, 28, 31, 34. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became effective, 

on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any 

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as 

after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997).

Section 1915(g) is commonly referred to as the “three strikes rule.” The three strikes rule 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 3 of 12
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“requires so-called ‘frequent filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts 

may consider their civil actions and appeals.” Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 1127 (10th Cir. 

2001).

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under section 1915(g), the phrase “fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to a case that is 

“of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word “malicious” refers to 

a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“Andrews I”). Only cases within one of these three 

categories can be counted as strikes for section 1915(g) purposes. See id. Dismissal of an action 

under section 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an 

[earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was 

dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. 

Andrews I requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of 

section 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear 

the ultimate burden of persuasion that section 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. Id. A 

defendant seeking to challenge a prisoner’s IFP status has the burden of producing evidence that 

allows the district court to conclude that the prisoner plaintiff has suffered at least three prior 

dismissals that count as strikes under section 1915(g). Id. at 1120. Once the defendants have met 

this initial burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to show why a prior dismissal should not count 

as a strike, or why he is entitled to the imminent danger of serious physical injury exception. Id.

A dismissal under section 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with his action as 

a pauper under section 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at 

the outset of the action. See Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming 

district court’s denial of IFP status and dismissing complaint without prejudice under section 

1915(g)).

B. Plaintiff’s Prior “Strikes”

Defendants allege that Plaintiff has filed, while incarcerated, at least three actions in the

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 4 of 12
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

United States District Court for the Central District of California that were dismissed on the basis 

that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state claim. At the time Plaintiff was granted leave 

to proceed IFP, the Court was unaware that Plaintiff had filed any of these cases or the basis of the 

dismissals of any such cases in other districts, i.e., the United States District Court for the Central

District of California. 

This Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the court documents 

provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff is barred from 

proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).2 Dkt. 26. Defendants argue that the following 

dismissals may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g): (1) Evans v. Brown, et 

al., No. CV 04-2491 UA (SS) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2004) (district court denied IFP status because 

civil rights complaint was frivolous and all defendants were immune from liability); (2) Evans v. 

Lt. Evans, et al., No. CV 05-5044 DDP (SS) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2008) (granting motion for 

judgment on the pleadings upon determining that civil rights amended complaint must be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim as a matter of law); (3) Evans v. Dep’t Corr. & Rehab., et al., 

No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2011) (district court denied IFP status because civil 

rights complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted); and (4) Evans v. Access 

Securepak Co., et al., No. CV 12-9472 UA (SS) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012) (same).

3

 See Dkt. 25 at 

8-10; Dkt. 26-1 at 2-87 (Exs. A-O).

Although Defendants have attempted to list four prior dismissals, only three prior 

 

2

The district court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” 

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (granting request to take judicial notice in section 1983 action of five prior cases in which 

plaintiff was pro se litigant, to counter her argument that she deserved special treatment because of 

her pro se status).

3 Defendants have also listed another case, Evans v. E. Valenzueal, No. CV 12-1758 DDP 

(SS), as one of Plaintiff’s previously filed actions in the Central District. Dkt. 25 at 6. However, 

Defendants do not argue that this action involves a dismissal that may be counted as one of the 

dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g). See id. Instead, Defendants have indicated that the 

Central District “issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the Court should not deem [Plaintiff] a 

vexatious litigant.” Id. (citing Dkt. 26-1 (Exs. D-E).) In addition, Defendants have pointed out 

that the Order to Show Cause noted that Plaintiff “filed fifteen actions in the Central District of 

California since 2003, including two habeas actions and thirteen civil rights actions.” Dkt. 26-1 at 

25-30 (Ex. E).

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 5 of 12
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

dismissals need qualify under section 1915(g). This Court must review at least three dismissals to 

determine whether they qualify as strikes under section 1915(g). See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1121. 

Here, the Court will review all four dismissals in Case Nos. CV 04-2491 UA (SS), CV 05-5044 

DDP (SS), CV 10-6919 UA (SS), and CV 12-9472 UA (SS), which were all entered before the 

instant action was brought by Plaintiff on December 23, 2016, in order to determine whether they 

may be counted as dismissals for purposes of section 1915(g). As further explained below, these 

dismissals all qualify as “strikes” under section 1915(g). See id.

1. Case No. CV 04-2491 UA (SS) – First Strike

In Evans v. Brown, et al., No. CV 04-2491 UA (SS), the magistrate judge recommended to

deny Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP because his complaint was “legally and/or factually 

patently frivolous” and the named defendants were “immune from liability for monetary 

damages.” Dkt. 26-1 at 51-53 (Ex. J). On April 28, 2004, the Central District adopted the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP. 

Id. at 51.

The Ninth Circuit has held that a case is “dismissed” for the purposes of section 1915(g) 

“when the court denies the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the 

filing fee on the ground that the complaint is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim, and 

thereupon terminates the complaint.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When a district court disposes of an IFP complaint on such grounds, the complaint is “dismissed” 

for the purposes of section 1915(g) “even if the district court styles such dismissal as denial of the 

prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” Id. at 1153 

(finding that the district court necessarily reviewed the complaints and made an assessment on 

their merits in making the determination whether the actions qualified for IFP status). This was 

indeed the case in No. CV 04-2491 UA (SS), wherein the district judge of the Central District

adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and denied Plaintiff’s request to 

proceed IFP because the complaint was frivolous. Dkt. 26-1 at 51. Therefore, the aforementioned 

decision in Case No. CV 04-2491 UA (SS) constitutes a qualifying strike under section 1915(g). 

See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 6 of 12
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2. Case No. CV 05-5044 DDP (SS) – Second Strike

In Evans v. Lt. Evans, et al., No. CV 05-5044 DDP (SS), the magistrate judge of the

Central District recommended to grant Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 

because the amended complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law, and also recommended 

to dismiss the entire action with prejudice. Dkt. 26-1 at 70-82 (Ex. M). On February 25, 2008, the 

Central District issued an order adopting in full the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Id. at 84-85 (Ex. N). Judgment was entered on 

February 25, 2008. Id. at 87 (Ex. O). Plaintiff fails to provide persuasive evidence that rebuts the 

showing by Defendants that failure to state a claim is a qualifying reason for a strike under section 

1915(g). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case 

No. CV 04-2491 UA (SS) was dismissed for a qualifying reason under section 1915(g), and 

therefore counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

3. Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) – Third Strike

Defendants argue that Evans v. Dep’t Corr. & Rehab., et al., No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS)

may be counted as a dismissal for purposes of section 1915(g). Dkt. 25 at 8-9. However, in his 

opposition, Plaintiff argues that Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) is not a case involving him. Dkt. 

27 at 2, Ex. C-2. In support of his argument, Plaintiff attaches to his opposition a letter from an 

attorney, Robert A. Escalante, Esq., entitled “Re: May 7 Letter Concerning Mistaken Identity” and 

relating to Kenneth Evans v. CSP Sacramento, et al., USDC-EDC, Case No. CIV-S-10-1969 GEB 

GGH P. Dkt. 27, Ex. C-2. Attorney Escalante stated that “a letter was sent to [Plaintiff] by 

mistake” and Plaintiff would “no longer receive correspondences with respect to that case 

(Kenneth Evans v. CSP Sacramento, et al., USDC-EDC, Case No. CIV-S-10-1969 GEB GGH 

P.).” Id. The Court notes that the case at issue here—Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS)—is a case 

from the Central District, and the case referenced to by Attorney Escalante in the letter seems to 

have the same case number, but it is from the Eastern District. See id. In addition, while the 

numerical case numbers are identical, the remaining portion of the case numbers are not.

Compare Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) with Case No. CIV-S-10-1969 GEB GGH P. Finally, 

Defendants have submitted documents related to Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS), which have 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 7 of 12
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff’s correct prison number: CDC #C-30681. Dkt. 26-1 at 39. Therefore, the Court finds 

unavailing Plaintiff’s argument that Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) is not his case, and it will now 

consider whether it can be counted as a dismissal for purposes of section 1915(g).

In Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS), the magistrate judge recommended to deny Plaintiff’s 

request to proceed IFP because his complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted and it “sought monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” Dkt. 26-1 at 

39-41 (Ex. H). On March 2, 2011, the Central District adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and 

recommendations and denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP. Id. at 39. As explained above, a 

court’s denial of a plaintiff’s more for leave to proceed IFP constitutes a strike for the purposes of 

section 1915 when the denial is based on one of the three identified grounds in the statute. See 

O’Neal, 531 F.3d at 1152. Thus, Defendants argue that the district court’s denial of IFP status in

Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) constitutes an additional strike against Plaintiff under section 

1915(g). Dkt. 25 at 8-9. While Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ assertion by arguing that Case 

No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) did not involve him, the Court has found his argument unavailing. 

Therefore, Defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS)

counts as a strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

4. Case No. CV 12-9472 UA (SS) – Fourth Strike

In Evans v. Access Securepak Co., et al., No. CV 12-9472 UA (SS), the magistrate judge 

recommended to deny Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP upon determining that his complaint 

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the defendant did not act under 

state law. Dkt. 26-1 at 16-17 (Ex. C). On December 5, 2012, the Central District adopted the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations and denied Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP. 

Id. at 16. Defendants again argue that the district court’s denial of IFP status in Case No. CV 12-

9472 UA (SS) constitutes an additional strike for the purposes of section 1915. Dkt. 25 at 8 

(citing O’Neal, 531 F.3d at 1152). Plaintiff has not challenged Defendants’ assertion. Therefore, 

Defendants have met the burden of establishing that Case No. CV 12-9472 UA (SS) counts as a 

strike. See Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s four aforementioned dismissals constitute “strikes” under section 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 8 of 12
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1915(g).4 Thus, Plaintiff’s IFP status must be revoked unless he can show that he is entitled to the 

imminent danger of serious physical injury exception under section 1915(g).

C. Imminent Danger Exception

A plaintiff barred from bringing an action IFP because he has three strikes may still 

proceed without prepaying court fees if he can show he is “under imminent danger of serious 

physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The availability of the exception turns on the “conditions a 

prisoner faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.” Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Andrews II”). As this is merely a “threshold 

procedural” question, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that district courts should not conduct an 

overly detailed inquiry into whether a particular danger is serious enough under the serious 

physical injury prong. Id. at 1055. Rather, “the exception applies if the complaint makes a 

plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.” Id. In order to satisfy the imminence prong, the prisoner must allege that the danger is 

ongoing. See id. at 1056-57.

A district court should liberally construe the allegations in a complaint filed by a pro se

prisoner facing a section 1915(g) bar. See McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710-11 (8th Cir. 

2002) (liberally construing allegations in complaint for initial determination of whether prisoner is 

under imminent danger of serious physical injury). It is sufficient if any part of the complaint 

plausibly alleges that the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of 

filing. Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1053.

Here, the question is whether Plaintiff was in imminent danger on December 23, 2016, the 

date he filed his complaint. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that he was. 

As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that beginning two years prior to the filing 

date, SQSP officials denied him the opportunity to participate in the prison’s “Ramadan Meal 

Program,” in accordance with his Muslim religious beliefs. Dkt. 1 at 4. The Court notes that 

 

4

The Court points out that even if it had found that Case No. CV 10-6919 UA (SS) did not 

involve Plaintiff, the result would not have changed because only three prior dismissals need 

qualify under section 1915(g). As shown above, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s three other 

dismissals and determined that they all qualified as strikes under section 1915(g). 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 9 of 12
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that he faced an imminent danger of serious physical injury at 

the time he filed his complaint. See generally Dkt. 1. However, in his opposition, Plaintiff claims 

that “at th[e] time of submitting his civil action, [he] was in imminent danger of serious physical 

injury of a liver disease [h]epatitis C . . . [because] Plaintiff has had [hepatitis C] since 2012.” 

Dkt. 27 at 1. Plaintiff claims that “Defendan[t]s’ employer [California] Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation refuse[d] Plaintiff the medical treatment, [including] the new [h]epatitis C 

medication Harvoni saying at the cost of $1,200 per usage the treatment is to[o] expensive.” Id. 

Plaintiff has also attached various medical records to his opposition, which indicate that he also 

suffered from other various ailments, including “significant bunion deformity [in the] left foot.” 

Id., Ex. B at 1.

The Court notes that Plaintiff fails to make reference to any hepatitis C infection or bunion

deformity in his complaint. See Dkt. 1. Such allegations of Plaintiff’s long-standing health 

problems do not show he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of 

filing.” See Andrews II, 493 F.3d at 1055. Said differently, Plaintiff’s argument that he suffered 

from certain health problems two years prior is of no consequence because imminent danger for 

purposes of the section 1915(g) exception is assessed at the time the action at issue was filed, “not 

at some earlier or later time.” Id. at 1053. 

“[A] prisoner who alleges that prison officials continue with a practice that has injured him 

or others similarly situated in the past will satisfy the “ongoing danger” standard and meet the 

imminence prong of the three strikes exception.” See id. at 1056-57. In Andrews II, the plaintiff 

alleged in his complaint that the ongoing practice of not screening and segregating inmates with 

HIV and hepatitis C threatened his health, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 1050. 

The Ninth Circuit determined that plausible allegations by the plaintiff in Andrews II that prison 

conditions may cause or worsen a chronic condition such as HIV or hepatitis C was sufficient to 

bring the complaint within the imminent danger exception. See id. at 1056-57. In contrast, in the 

present action, Plaintiff’s allegations of his hepatitis C condition and bunion deformity do not 

trigger the imminent danger exception because they are completely unconnected to Plaintiff’s 

religious practices claims. Cf. id. (an ongoing danger, such as prison officials continuing with a 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 10 of 12
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

practice that had caused injury to plaintiff or other similarly situated inmates will satisfy the 

imminent danger exception). 

In sum, Plaintiff cannot show that his religious practices claims arising from his exclusion 

from the prison’s “Ramadan Meal Program,” impacted his health conditions such that it created a 

serious danger of physical harm to him, imminent or otherwise. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

shown that he is entitled to the imminent danger exception under section 1915(g) to avoid 

dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiff’s IFP status is therefore revoked. See Banos v. O’Guin, 144 

F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998) (revoking IFP status on appeal on three strikes grounds); Patton v. 

Jefferson Corr. Center, 136 F.3d 458, 461, 465 (5th Cir. 1998) (district court correctly revoked 

IFP upon discovering on remand that plaintiff had five prior strikes). Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, and to dismiss the action without 

prejudice. Dkt. 25.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:

1. This Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the court 

documents provided in support of the motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff is barred 

from proceeding IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. 26.

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to revoke Plaintiff’s IFP status, pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and to dismiss the action without prejudice. Dkt. 25. Leave to proceed 

IFP is REVOKED, and the portion of the Court’s July 24, 2017 Order granting Plaintiff IFP status 

(Dkt. 15) is VACATED. 

3. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing a motion to reopen 

no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order accompanied by the full filing fee 

of $350.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If Plaintiff fails to file a motion to reopen and pay the 

full filing fee within the twenty-eight-day time frame, then he may pursue his claims by filing 

a new civil rights case in which he pays the full filing fee.

4. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all remaining pending motions as moot 

(dkts. 29, 36, 37, 42, 45, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 74) without prejudice to refiling if Plaintiff 

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 11 of 12
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

files a motion to reopen with the new filing fee. 

5. The Clerk shall also close the case.

6. This Order terminates Docket Nos. 25, 29, 36, 37, 42, 45, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 

and 74.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

July 2, 2018

Case 4:16-cv-07318-YGR Document 75 Filed 07/02/18 Page 12 of 12