Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00677/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00677-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEGAW AMBACHEW,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALEZ, et al.,

Respondents.

1:05-cv-00677-OWW-TAG HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 8)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL (Doc. 7)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A STAY

AND/OR RELEASE PENDING REVIEW OF

HIS HABEAS PETITION (Doc. 9.) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, currently in the custody of the Bureau of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and proceeding pro

se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 8, Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, filed June 21, 2005. The petition alleges that

Petitioner’s continued detention violates his substantive and

procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and is a

violation of Respondent’s statutory authority. Doc. 8 at 4. 

Additionally, petitioner alleges that he is entitled to Temporary

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Protected Status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, because of

“ongoing war and arm[ed] conflict in Ethiopia.” Id. Along with

his habeas petition, Petitioner also filed a motion for

appointment of counsel. Doc. 7. 

On June 27, Petitioner filed an “emergency motion” seeking

both (1) a stay pending resolution of his habeas petition and 

(2) release from detention. Doc. 9. 

II. FACTUAL SUMMARY

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ethiopia and is

currently being detained at the Lerdo Pre-trial Detention

Facility in Bakersfield, California. Doc. 8 at 2-3. On

September 3, 1998, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner

removed from the United States. Doc. 8 at 2. Petitioner

appealed that order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which

denied his appeal on December 3, 2002. Id. Petitioner is now

subject to a final order of removal. Id. Petitioner entered ICE

custody on March 16, 2005, and has been detained continuously by

ICE since that date. Doc. 8 at 3.

Along with his emergency motion, Petitioner has submitted

documentation of recent election-related violence in Ethiopia. 

See attachments to Doc. 8. 

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction Under The Real ID Act

The “Real ID Act,” signed into law May 11, 2005, stripped

the district courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions that

challenge final orders of removal. It pertinent part, the Act

provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory

or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28,

United States Code, or any other habeas corpus

provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a

petition for review filed with an appropriate court of

appeals in accordance with this section shall be the

sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an

order of removal entered or issued under any provision

of this Act, except as provided in subsection (e). 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act

for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief 2005,

Pub L. No. 109-13 (“Real ID Act”)(emphasis added). 

Here, Petitioner maintains that his continued detention is

inherently unlawful under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 

Although a removal order may have precipitated Petitioner’s

detention, the Real ID Act does not preclude the district court’s

exercise of jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s challenge to the

lawfulness of his continued detention. 

Petitioner also asserts that he is not eligible for removal

because he is entitled to temporary protected status under 

8 U.S.C. § 1254a. This assertion is a challenge to the

underlying order of removal. The Real ID act provides that a

petition for review filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of appeals

is the sole and exclusive means for Petitioner to seek review of

this issue. The district court cannot rule on Petitioner’s

entitlement to temporary protected status. Accordingly, this

memorandum opinion addresses only the unlawful detention claim. 

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1The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases can be applied to

petitions other than those brought under § 2254 at the Court’s

discretion. See, Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.

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B. Merits of the Habeas Petition

A federal court may only grant a petition for writ of habeas

corpus if the petitioner can show that “he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution....” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A

habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to

challenge the “legality or duration” of his confinement. Badea

v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991)(quoting Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)); Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.1 However, the

petition must “allege facts concerning the applicant’s commitment

or detention,” 28 U.S.C. § 2242, and the Petitioner must make

specific factual allegations that would entitle him to habeas

corpus relief if they are true. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d

418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Poopola, 881 F.2d 811,

812 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases, the Court is required to make a preliminary review of each

petition for writ of habeas corpus. “If it plainly appears from

the face of the petition...that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief,” the Court must dismiss the petition. Rule 4 of the

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also, Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908

F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the instant case, Petitioner alleges that his mandatory

and indefinite detention by ICE violates the Fifth Amendment and

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exceeds Respondent’s statutory authority. This issue was

addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533

U.S. 678. 

In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court found that the habeas corpus

statute grants federal courts the authority to determine whether

post-removal-period detention is pursuant to statutory authority. 

Id. at 699. In addition, the Court held that the Immigration and

Nationality Act’s (“INA”) post-removal-period detention statute

does not permit indefinite detention, but instead implicitly

“limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the

United States.” Id at 689. When faced with making such a

determination, the Court must consider “the statute’s basic

purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of

removal.” Id. at 699. In addition, the Court must take

appropriate account of the Executive Branch’s “greater

immigration related expertise,” ICE’s “serious administrative

needs and concerns,” and the “Nation’s need to speak with one

voice in immigration matters.” Id. at 700. 

The Supreme Court attempted to limit those occasions when

the federal court would need to make such “difficult judgments”

by setting a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of

six months. Id. at 700-701. The burden is on the alien to show

that there is no reasonable likelihood of repatriation. Id. at

701 ("This 6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that

every alien not removed must be released after six months. To

the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has

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been determined that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future."). 

After six months, and once an alien makes a showing that

there is no “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence

sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. However, where an alien

seeks release prior to the expiration of the presumptive sixmonth period, his claims are unripe for federal review. See

Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)

("[The ripeness doctrine's] basic rationale is to prevent the

courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.").

In this case, Petitioner has been in ICE custody following a

final order of removal since March 16, 2005. Petitioner’s

current detention is still well within the six month

“presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Petitioner

alleges that he has “received no indication that [Ethiopia] will

acquiesce to repatriation in the reasonably foreseeable future,”

and that “[a]s a result of that country’s recalcitrance,” ICE has

“been unable to obtain travel documents” for Petitioner that

would effectuate his removal. Doc. 1 at 3. 

Petitioner’s unsubstantiated allegations alone, however, are

insufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonableness of the

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six month period, and his claims of constitutional violations are

not ripe for review. Should Petitioner’s detention continue

past the six month presumptive period, he may seek any remedies

available to him. re-file the instant federal action and obtain

review. At that time, Petitioner must provide "good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As

currently filed, however, the petition must be DENIED on ripeness

grounds.

B. Motion for Appointment of Counsel.

There presently exists no absolute right to appointment of

counsel in habeas proceedings. See e.g., Anderson v. Heinze, 258

F.2d 479, 481 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958);

Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469

U.S. 823 (1984). However, Title 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, authorizes

the appointment of counsel at any stage of the case "if the

interests of justice so require." See Rule 8(c), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. The dismissal of the instant petition for

lack of ripeness obviates Petitioner’s need for counsel at this

time. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for appointment of

counsel is DENIED AS MOOT. Doc. 4.

C. Motion for Stay and/or Release.

As explained above, Petitioner’s habeas claims must be

dismissed because they are not ripe for review. Accordingly, his

motion for a stay pending judicial review of his habeas petition

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must also be denied as moot. In other words, Petitioner cannot

obtain a stay pending review, because this order disposes of his

habeas petition (i.e., it is no longer pending). 

Petitioner also moves for release on his own recognizance

pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 23 or for an

order that he be granted supervised released. Rule 23 pertains

only to a habeas petitioner’s custody status while review of his

or her habeas petition is pending. Again, because this order

disposes of Petitioner’s habeas claims, he cannot be released

pursuant to Rule 23. The district court does not have

jurisdiction to otherwise order Petitioner’s release. 

Accordingly, the emergency petition for a stay or for

release, Doc. 9, must be DENIED AS MOOT. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 8) is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the claims raised

are not ripe for review;

2. Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 7)

is DENIED AS MOOT; and

3. Petitioner’s motion for a stay or for release pending

review of his habeas petition is DENIED AS MOOT. 

SO ORDERED

Dated: July 7, 2005 /s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

Oliver W. Wanger

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United States District Court

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