Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_23-cv-00146/USCOURTS-akd-3_23-cv-00146-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Insurance Contract

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA 

NATIONAL UNION FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

PITTSBURGH, PA, 

Plaintiff and 

Counterdefendant, 

v. 

TRIUMVIRATE, LLC, d/b/a Tordrillo 

Mountain Lodge, et al., 

Defendants and 

Counterclaimants. 

Case No. 3:23-cv-00146-SLG 

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Pending at Docket 51 is Defendants and Counterclaimants Triumvirate, LLC

d/b/a Tordrillo Mountain Lodge, Michael Rheam, Michael Overcast, Jennifer 

Overcast, and Thomas Moe’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment.

1 Plaintiff and Counterdefendant National Union Fire 

Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (“National Union”) responded in opposition 

at Docket 70 and Defendants replied at Docket 86. 

Also pending at Docket 71 is National Union’s Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

2 Defendants responded in opposition at Docket 86 and National Union 

1 Defendants’ sealed motion is at Docket 53-3. For ease of reference, where the parties have 

filed both a public, redacted filing and a sealed filing, the Court refers to the sealed version. 

2 National Union’s sealed Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary 

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replied at Docket 88.3

Also pending, at Docket 86, is Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Alternative Rule 56(d) request. National Union responded in 

opposition at Docket 88 and Defendants replied at Docket 95.4

The Court took the motions under advisement following oral argument on 

December 11, 2024.5

The Court has jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.6 

BACKGROUND 

This is an action for declaratory relief in which National Union, an insurance 

company, seeks a declaratory judgment that it does not have a duty to defend 

Triumvirate, LLC (“Triumvirate”), Michael Rheam, Michael Overcast, Jennifer 

Overcast, and Thomas Moe (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) in a state 

court action related to a 2021 accident or indemnify them for damages arising from 

that action.7 Defendants counterclaimed that National Union has a duty to defend 

Judgment and in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is at Docket 74-1.

3 National Union’s sealed opposition is at Docket 90-1. 

4 Defendants’ sealed reply is at Docket 97-1.

5 Docket 160. There are several other pending motions that the Court will be addressing by 

separate order. 

6 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

7 Docket 24 at ¶¶ 36–50.

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and indemnify them and breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing in refusing 

to do so.8

I. The March 27, 2021 Accident

The following facts regarding the accident appear to be largely undisputed:

On March 27, 2021, Triumvirate chartered a helicopter and a pilot from Soloy 

Helicopters (“Soloy”) for a heli-skiing trip organized by Triumvirate, a heli-ski 

operator, in the Chugach Mountains near Palmer, Alaska.9 The helicopter 

departed from a private residence in Wasilla in the afternoon, traveled to the 

Chugach Mountains, and facilitated five or six ski runs without incident.10 Before 

the last ski run of the outing, at about 6:36 p.m., the pilot attempted to land on a 

ridgeline, but due in part to whiteout conditions, crashed into the ridge.

11 After the 

crash, the main wreckage of the helicopter came to rest about 500 feet below the 

point of initial impact.12 

There was considerable delay in initiating a rescue after the helicopter 

crashed. Ultimately, the Alaska Air National Guard dispatched a rescue helicopter, 

which arrived at the scene of the wreckage at 11:25 p.m., and was able to deliver 

8 Docket 26 at 16–20.

9 Docket 51-2 at 2, 7. The parties do not dispute that Triumvirate is the “local lodge” identified in 

the NTSB’s Aviation Investigation Final Report.

10 Docket 51-2 at 7–8.

11 Docket 51-2 at 2, 7–8, 11.

12 Docket 51-2 at 11.

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rescue personnel to the wreckage at 12:15 a.m.—five hours and 40 minutes after 

the accident.13

Five of the six passengers on board the helicopter at the time of the accident 

died at the scene of the crash.

14 The surviving passenger, David Horvath, was 

extricated from the wreckage of the helicopter nearly six hours after the crash.15 

Mr. Horvath represents that he lost his fingertips on one hand and lost four of his 

fingers on his other hand, broke his ribs, suffered knee injuries, and experienced 

physical and emotional distress.16

Following the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) 

investigated and concluded that the probable causes of the accident related to the 

helicopter pilot’s failure to adequately respond to the whiteout conditions and 

Soloy’s “inadequate pilot training program and pilot competency checks.”17 The 

NTSB also concluded that “[c]ontributing to the severity of the surviving 

passenger’s injuries was the delayed notification of search and rescue 

organizations.”18

13 Docket 51-2 at 16.

14 Docket 51-2 at 2, 16.

15 Docket 51-2 at 2, 16.

16 Docket 51-14 at 9–11.

17 Docket 51-2 at 5.

18 Docket 51-2 at 6.

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II. The Insurance Policies 

At the time of the crash in March 2021, Soloy had an aviation insurance 

policy (“the Policy”) with National Union under which the helicopter was covered.

19 

In January 2021, Soloy executed a Heli-Skiing Contract Agreement with 

Triumvirate in which Soloy agreed to provide helicopters and pilots to Triumvirate 

for use in its heli-skiing operations.

20 Pursuant this agreement, Soloy agreed to 

add Triumvirate, LLC as an “Additional Insured” to the Policy.21 Soloy duly 

acquired an Additional Insured Endorsement, which specified that persons “as 

required by [Soloy]” “are included as additional Insured under liability coverages, 

but only as respects operations of [Soloy].”22 

The Policy provided coverage for “Single Limit Bodily Injury and Property 

Damage Liability”: 

To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall 

become legally obligated to pay as damages because of Bodily Injury 

sustained by any person [including Passengers] and Property 

Damage, caused by an Occurrence and arising out of the ownership, 

maintenance or use of the Aircraft . . . .”23

19 Docket 51-4 at 2 (providing that the Policy Period was from June 7, 2020 to June 7, 2021), 118 

(identifying the helicopter as a covered aircraft); Docket 51-2 at 2 (identifying the same helicopter, 

registration number N351SH, as involved in the accident).

20 Docket 70-3 at 4 (specifying that “this Agreement shall be for a period of 1 year commencing 

January 3rd, 2021 and ending January 3rd, 2022”).

21 Docket 70-3 at 5. 

22 Docket 51-4 at 83.

23 Docket 51-4 at 5. 

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The Policy defines “Occurrence” as: 

[A]n accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 

conditions, which results in Bodily Injury or Property Damage during 

the policy period neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 

the Insured. In the event of continuing or progressively deteriorating 

damage over any length of time, such damage shall be deemed to be 

one Occurrence, and shall be deemed to occur only when such 

damage first commences.24

The Policy further defines “Insured” to include “not only the Named Insured but 

also any person while using or riding in the Aircraft and any person or organization 

legally responsible for its use, provided the actual use is with the express 

permission of the Named Insured.”25 The Policy limits the total liability “for all 

damages, including all Related Claims” with respect to “aircraft operating for heliski operations” to $1,000,000.00 per person.26 In addition to providing coverage 

for bodily injury, the Policy provides:

[National Union] shall have the right and duty to defend any suit 

against the Insured seeking damages on account of such Bodily Injury 

or Property Damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 

groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and 

settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, but [National 

Union] shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend 

any suit after the applicable limit of [National Union]’s liability has been 

exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.27

24 Docket 51-4 at 16.

25 Docket 51-4 at 15.

26 Docket 51-4 at 12, 102.

27 Docket 51-4 at 5.

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At the time of the accident, Triumvirate separately had a Commercial 

Liability Insurance Policy from Prime, on which Soloy was listed as an additional 

insured.28

III. The Horvath Settlement 

Shortly after the accident, National Union retained an attorney, Caryn 

Jorgensen, to represent Soloy with respect to claims related to the crash.

29 

Similarly, Prime retained attorney Timothy Lamb of Delaney Wiles to represent 

Triumvirate “and its employees, if necessary, related to the helicopter crash on 

March 27, 2021.”30 In April 2021, Mr. Horvath retained attorney Tracey Knutson

to represent him in connection with any claims against Soloy and Triumvirate and 

all other claims related to the helicopter crash.31 

Over a period of months, Ms. Knutson communicated with Ms. Jorgensen 

and, to a far lesser extent, with Mr. Lamb, in settlement negotiations with respect 

to Mr. Horvath’s claims against Soloy and Triumvirate.

32 During these 

negotiations, Ms. Knutson repeatedly told Ms. Jorgensen that she objected to the 

release of Triumvirate’s liability related to the delayed rescue in the aftermath of 

28 Docket 70-5.

29 Docket 70-6.

30 Docket 73-1 (SEALED).

31 Docket 73-3 (SEALED).

32 See, e.g., Docket 73-5 (SEALED) to Docket 73-36 (SEALED). 

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the crash.

33 Ms. Knutsen also expressly requested that Ms. Jorgensen not share 

these thoughts with Tim Lamb or others associated with Triumvirate.34 Prime 

refused to participate in any settlement negotiations with Solon, as it maintained 

that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Soloy because “there is no coverage

[under Triumvirate’s commercial liability policy] for Soloy as the March 27, 2021 

accident arose out of a helicopter accident.”35 

In early 2022, Mr. Horvath, Soloy, and National Union arrived at a proposed 

settlement agreement in which Mr. Horvath would execute a release of claims 

against Soloy and Triumvirate in exchange for payment of Soloy’s Policy limits.

36 

In February 2022, National Union provided Mr. Lamb with a copy of the proposed 

release.

37 Andrew Wright, an attorney representing Prime; Michael Grisham, an 

attorney representing Triumvirate; and Mr. Lamb all objected to the terms of the 

proposed release.

38 Mr. Lamb, writing on behalf of Triumvirate, noted that “the 

proposed Release of Claims against Triumvirate . . . is not as comprehensive and 

33 See Docket 73-12 (SEALED).

34 Docket 73-12 (SEALED) at 4.

35 Docket 70-37 (December 21, 2021 letter). 

36 Docket 73-28 (SEALED).

37 See Docket 73-32 (SEALED) at 4. 

38 Docket 161-1 (Mr. Wright’s February 14, 2022 letter to Ms. Jorgensen); Docket 73-30 (SEALED) 

(Mr. Grisham’s February 8, 2022 letter to Ms. Jorgenson); Docket 73-29 (SEALED) (Mr. Lamb’s 

misdated letter to Mr. Houghton at National Union). 

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protective as the Release for Soloy.”39 Nonetheless, on February 11 and 15, 2022, 

Mr. Horvath and his attorney signed a “Confidential Settlement Agreement, 

Receipt and Release of Specified Claims.”40 In the release, Mr. Horvath released 

all claims against Soloy

based upon, on account of, arising out of, or in any way resulting from 

the helicopter accident, including its aftermath, that occurred on or 

about March 27, 2021 near Knik Glacier (the “Accident”) in which 

David Horvath was injured, including but not limited to claims for 

bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of 

helicopter N35lSH (“the Helicopter”), and any claim for injuries 

allegedly caused by delay in initiating rescue efforts regardless of the 

cause of such delay.

41

Further, Mr. Horvath released all claims against Triumvirate and its agents and 

employees “based upon, on account of, arising out of, or in any way resulting from

[Soloy’s] operations, the ownership, maintenance or use of the Helicopter on 

March 27, 2021, or [Triumvirate’s] selection, chartering, use, operation, rental, 

service, maintenance, or entrustment to others of the Helicopter (the ‘Helicopter 

Operation Claims.’)”42 Crucially, the release of claims against Triumvirate did not 

include the language in the release of claims against Soloy that released Soloy 

39 Docket 73-29 (SEALED) at 1.

40 Docket 53-2 (SEALED); Docket 73-35 (SEALED).

41 Docket 53-2 (SEALED) at 2.

42 Docket 53-2 (SEALED) at 2–3.

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from “any claim for injuries allegedly caused by delay in initiating rescue efforts 

regardless of the cause of such delay.”43

IV. Mr. Horvath’s State Court Action 

On March 28, 2023, Mr. Horvath initiated a lawsuit against Triumvirate and 

one of its owners, Michael Rheam, in Alaska Superior Court.44 The Complaint 

asserted negligence and gross negligence claims against the defendants for their 

failure to take appropriate steps in the aftermath of the helicopter crash.45 Among 

other claims, the Complaint alleged that Triumvirate failed in its duties with respect 

to communications protocols with the helicopter, flight following, and timely

initiating an emergency plan, and that, as a result, Mr. Horvath suffered many 

physical injuries and severe emotional distress.46 On October 19, 2023, Mr. 

Horvath filed a Second Amended Complaint, which added as defendants Michael 

Overcast, Jennifer Overcast, and Thomas Moe, the remaining Triumvirate 

owners.

47 The Second Amended Complaint also adds additional claims, including 

a claim that seeks to pierce Triumvirate’s corporate veil and hold the four individual 

43 See Docket 53-2 (SEALED) at 2–3.

44 Docket 70-56 (complaint).

45 Docket 70-56 at ¶¶ 20–33. 

46 Docket 70-56 at ¶¶ 21–37. 

47 Docket 70-57 at ¶ 2. 

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members—Michael Overcast, Jennifer Overcast, Michael Rheam, and Thomas 

Moe—individually liable for any damages.48

Triumvirate tendered the defense of this state court action to National Union

under the Soloy Policy.

49 In July 2023, National Union refused to defend the suit, 

asserting “there is no coverage – defense or indemnity – available to [Triumvirate] 

and Mr. Rheam for the Horvath Action.”50 National Union wrote: 

As an initial matter, Mr. Rheam is not an additional insured under the 

Policy. Although an additional insured under the Policy, [Triumvirate] 

is not entitled to defense or indemnity under the Policy as the 

applicable policy limits have already been exhausted by settlement, 

and additionally, because the claims in the Horvath Action fall outside 

the available additional insured coverage afforded to [Triumvirate] 

under the Policy.

51

National Union explained that the prior settlement of Mr. Horvath’s claims against 

Soloy and Triumvirate exhausted the limits of liability coverage under the Policy: 

Therefore, regardless of whether the liability alleged in the Horvath 

Action does or does not potentially fall within the insuring agreement 

of the Policy and the additional insured endorsement making 

[Triumvirate] an additional insured, Insurers have no obligation to 

defend or indemnify [Triumvirate] (or Mr. Rheam even if he were an 

Additional Insured, which he is not) for the Horvath Action per the plain 

language of the Policy.52

48 Docket 70-57 at ¶¶ 40–42.

49 See Docket 51-6 at 1 (July 5, 2023 letter). 

50 Docket 51-6 at 3.

51 Docket 51-6 at 3.

52 Docket 51-6 at 13.

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Further, National Union noted that the claims in the state court action “are solely 

in connection with their failure to take appropriate action after the accident when 

it was clear that the Helicopter was overdue to return from its flight and Mr. Horvath 

only seeks damages for injuries that he claims he would not have suffered but for 

these failures.”53 “As such, not only did the ‘bodily injury’ claimed by Mr. Horvath 

in the Horvath Action not ‘aris[e] out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 

Aircraft’, but even if it did, the claims against [Triumvirate] are not ‘as respects 

operations of the Named Insured [Soloy].’”54 

National Union then filed this suit to determine its obligations to defend and 

indemnify.

55 Defendants answered and counterclaimed, asserting that “National 

Union did not inform Triumvirate about the existence or status of its settlement 

negotiations with Mr. Horvath and did not allow any Defendants to participate.”56 

They also allege that Triumvirate’s counsel objected to the settlement because it 

failed to include a full release of all claims by Mr. Horvath against Triumvirate, but 

was instead limited to “Helicopter Operations Claims.”57 Further, they claim that, 

when Mr. Horvath filed his state court action, National Union refused to defend 

53 Docket 51-6 at 13 (emphasis in original).

54 Docket 51-6 at 14 (first and third alterations in original). 

55 Docket 24 at ¶¶ 36–50.

56 Docket 26 at 14, ¶ 14.

57 Docket 26 at 15, ¶¶ 16–18.

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them.58 Accordingly, they assert counterclaims for (1) a declaratory judgment that

National Union owes a duty of defense and indemnity to the Individual Defendants 

as additional insureds on the Soloy Policy; (2) a declaratory judgment that National 

Union owes a duty of defense and indemnity to Triumvirate; and (3) bad faith, 

based on National Union’s alleged failure to adequately communicate with 

Defendants during its settlement negotiations with Mr. Horvath, its devising of the 

terms of the settlement to limit the scope of Triumvirate’s release, and its refusal 

to defend Defendants in the state court action.59

LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to “grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The burden of 

showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact lies with the movant.60 

If the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate “specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”61 The non-moving party may 

not rely on “mere allegations or denials”;62 rather, to reach the level of a genuine 

58 Docket 26 at 15-16, ¶¶ 20–26.

59 Docket 26 at 16-20, ¶¶ 27–48.

60 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

61 Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1986)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248–49 (1986).

62 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 

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dispute, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party.”63 When considering a motion for summary judgment, a 

court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws 

“all justifiable inferences” in the non-moving party’s favor.64 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants initially sought partial summary judgment on their second 

counterclaim for a declaratory judgment on whether the Policy requires National 

Union to defend and/or indemnify Triumvirate against the claims Mr. Horvath 

asserts in state court.65 National Union, in its cross-motion, sought summary 

judgment on its declaratory judgment claims that it has no duty to defend or 

indemnify Triumvirate or its four members.

66 Defendants then cross-moved for 

summary judgment on Counts I and II of its Counterclaims—that National Union 

has a duty to defend and indemnify not only Triumvirate, but also each of

Triumvirate’s four members.

67 Alternatively, Defendants request a Rule 56(d)

extension if resolution of the claims for declaratory judgment first requires a ruling 

288 (1968)).

63 Id.

64 Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).

65 See generally Docket 53-3 (SEALED).

66 See generally Docket 74-1 (SEALED); see also Docket 24 at ¶¶ 36–50. 

67 Docket 86 at 2.

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on their counterclaim for bad faith, on which discovery continues.68 Neither party 

has sought summary judgment on Defendants’ bad faith counterclaim. 

I. The Policy Covers Injuries Mr. Horvath Alleges He Suffered Due to the 

Delayed Rescue Following the Helicopter Crash. 

Defendants assert that National Union has a duty to defend and indemnify 

them because the accident and Triumvirate’s response constitute a single event 

arising out of the use of the aircraft—an “occurrence” that is covered by the 

Policy.69 In their view, Alaska law provides that a duty to defend arises when a 

covered event “may be viewed as a proximate cause of the injuries” and Mr. 

Horvath’s injuries in the aftermath of the crash were proximately caused by the 

crash.70 Defendants further highlight that the terms of Mr. Horvath’s release of

Soloy recognize that claims related to the aftermath of the crash result from the 

crash.71 And they assert that “accident,” which the Policy does not define, should 

be reasonably interpreted to encompass the alleged lack of training prior to the 

crash, the crash itself, and the ensuing rescue.72 Defendants further contend that, 

68 Docket 86 at 8 n.12.

69 Docket 53-3 (SEALED) at 15–23.

70 Docket 53-3 (SEALED) at 17 (emphasis omitted) (citing C.P. ex rel. M.L. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

996 P.2d 1216, 1224 (Alaska 2000)). 

71 Docket 53-3 (SEALED) at 18 (releasing all claims against Soloy “resulting from the helicopter 

accident, including its aftermath” (quoting Docket 53-2 (SEALED) at 2)). 

72 Docket 53-3 (SEALED) at 19–23.

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even if the Court finds there is no duty to indemnify Triumvirate, there is 

nonetheless a duty to defend against claims that are potentially within the Policy.73

National Union responds that the Policy does not require it to defend or 

indemnify Mr. Horvath’s claims because the Policy’s limits have been exhausted.74

Additionally, National Union maintains that any claim that Mr. Horvath did not 

release against Triumvirate falls outside the coverage of the Policy, as the release 

provision for Triumvirate closely mirrors, and therefore is coextensive with, the 

Policy’s coverage provision.75 Alternatively, National Union submits that the long 

delay in initiating the rescue “acted as an event sufficiently independent to disrupt 

any causal link that may be found between the helicopter crash and the injuries.”76

“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state 

substantive law and federal procedural law.”77 Whether declaratory relief is proper 

is a procedural matter, so federal procedural law—the Declaratory Judgment Act, 

73 Docket 53-3 (SEALED) at 28–31.

74 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 28–32.

75 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 37–39.

76 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 39–42.

77 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).

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28 U.S.C. § 2201—applies.78 “State law, however, controls the substantive 

issues . . . .”79

Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, “any court of the United States, upon 

the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal 

relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.”80 Here, the requested 

declaratory relief hinges on the Court’s interpretation of the Policy. “The 

construction of an insurance contract is a matter for the court, unless its 

interpretation is dependent upon the resolution of controverted facts.”81 “In 

addressing the proper interpretation of an insurance policy [under Alaska law], 

[courts] look to (1) the language of the disputed provisions in the policy, (2) other 

provisions in the policy, (3) extrinsic evidence, and (4) case law interpreting similar 

provisions.”82 “Insurance policies are construed in such a way as to honor the 

reasonable expectations of a layperson seeking coverage.”83 Alaska law requires 

78 Douglass v. Bank of Am. Corp., Case No. CV-12-0609-JLQ, 2013 WL 2245092, at *5 (E.D. 

Wash. May 21, 2013); see also Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cos., 103 F.3d 750, 752 (9th 

Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (en banc).

79 Diversified Cap. Invs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., Case No. 15-cv-03796-HSG, 2016 WL 

2988864, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016).

80 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

81 O’Neill Investigations, Inc. v. Ill. Emp. Ins. of Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1981)

(citations omitted).

82 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Houle, 269 P.3d 654, 657–58 (Alaska 2011).

83 United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Neary, 307 P.3d 907, 910 (Alaska 2013); see also Safety Nat’l

Cas. Corp. v. Pac. Emps. Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 748, 750 (Alaska 1996) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted) (“Insurance contracts are interpreted in accordance with the reasonable 

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that courts construe ambiguity in insurance policies in favor of the insured.84 But 

“ambiguity exists only when the contract, taken as a whole, is reasonably subject 

to differing interpretations.”85

The Court will first address whether there is a duty to defend or indemnify, 

without considering the fact that the Policy’s limits have been exhausted. The 

Policy covers “damages because of Bodily Injury sustained by any person 

[including Passengers] and Property Damage, caused by an Occurrence and 

arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the Aircraft.”86 The Policy also 

defines “occurrence” to mean “an accident, including continuous . . . exposure to 

conditions, which results in Bodily Injury or Property Damage during the policy 

period neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the Insured. In the 

event of continuing . . . damage over any length of time, such damage shall be 

deemed to be one Occurrence, and shall be deemed to occur only when such 

damage first commences.”87

expectations of the insured. This is true even if painstaking study of the policy provisions would 

have negated those expectations.”).

84 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 160 P.3d 134, 138 (Alaska 2007).

85 Downing v. Country Life Ins. Co., 473 P.3d 699, 704 (Alaska 2020) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

86 Docket 51-4 at 2, 5. 

87 Docket 51-4 at 16.

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Injuries that Mr. Horvath suffered in the aftermath of the helicopter crash due 

to the delayed rescue are covered by the Policy as they constitute bodily injuries 

“caused by an Occurrence and arising out of the . . . use of the Aircraft.”88 First, 

these alleged injuries were “caused by an Occurrence.” The language of the Policy 

suggests that an “occurrence” includes both the helicopter accident in this case 

and the period of time that immediately followed the crash until rescuers arrived. 

For in its definition of “occurrence,” the Policy explicitly states that “[i]n the event 

of continuing . . . damage over any length of time, such damage shall be deemed 

to be one Occurrence, and shall be deemed to occur only when such damage first 

commences.”89 Here, Mr. Horvath’s injuries, which he alleges were exacerbated 

by the delay in rescue, are the type of “continuing . . . damage” expressly covered 

by the Policy. 

Case law in Alaska and other jurisdictions supports finding a single 

occurrence when a single, unforeseen event results in multiple injuries that can be 

traced to negligence during, before and after that event. In United Services 

Automobile Ass’n v. Neary, the Alaska Supreme Court analyzed an occurrencebased policy similar to the Policy here.90 There, the Court considered whether a 

single gunshot that physically injured multiple children and emotionally injured their 

88 Docket 51-4 at 2, 5. 

89 Docket 51-4 at 16.

90 307 P.3d 907 (Alaska 2013).

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parents upon witnessing the harm to their children was a single “occurrence,” 

which the relevant insurance policy defined as “an accident, including continuous 

or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which 

results . . . in . . . bodily injury.”91 The plaintiffs argued that each injury, including 

the parents’ later emotional injuries, constituted a separate occurrence. But the 

Court concluded that “[t]here was a single accident in this case—the unforeseen 

and unexpected firing of the single gunshot that caused all of the plaintiffs’ 

injuries—and therefore a single occurrence for purposes of liability coverage.”92 

The Court additionally noted that “[u]nder our case law it is the unforeseen event, 

not every act of negligence preceding it, that constitutes the accident or occurrence 

for purposes of insurance coverage.”93 This tracks the reasonable expectations of 

the insured, as it is “unlikely that the ordinary insured who hears of an accident . . 

. will mentally convert that single event into some other number of accidents 

depending on the number of negligent acts and omissions that led up to it.”94 

The Third Circuit followed a similar logic in Fleming ex rel. Est. of Fleming v. 

Air Sunshine, Inc. in concluding that a plane crash and the subsequent negligent 

rescue acts were one occurrence under an occurrence-based policy, which 

91 Id. at 912–13. 

92 Id. at 912–15.

93 Id. at 913.

94 Id. at 915.

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included a provision addressing continuing damage similar to that in the Policy at 

issue here.

95 In that case, the surviving spouse of a commercial airline passenger 

who had drowned following a plane crash sued the airline.96 The spouse argued 

that the husband’s death by drowning was a separate occurrence from the plane 

crash under the policy’s terms. But the Third Circuit disagreed and held that “[a]ny 

post-crash incidents stemmed from the extreme risk and disorder resulting from 

the collision.”97 The Third Circuit, like the Alaska Supreme Court in Neary, looked 

to the average person’s expectations and noted that the crash itself and the 

subsequent failure to assist the passenger to exit the submerged plane were so 

closely linked in time and space “as to be considered by the average person as 

one event.”98

Neary and Fleming are instructive in this case. Mr. Horvath alleges he 

suffered discrete additional injuries associated with the delay in initiating a rescue 

operation after the helicopter crash. But these injuries arose out of the single

unforeseen event—the helicopter crash. The delayed rescue is reasonably 

encompassed within the Policy’s “continuing damage” definition of an occurrence. 

Further, the crash was closely linked in time and space to the hours-long delay in 

95 311 F.3d 282, 295 (3d Cir. 2002).

96 Id. at 284.

97 Id. at 295. 

98 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Welter v. Singer, 376 N.W. 2d 84, 87 (Wis. 1985)). 

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rescue such that an average person would consider the crash and subsequent 

rescue effort as a single event. Although the time between the airplane crash in 

Fleming and the subsequent allegedly negligence acts was minutes rather than 

hours, this Court finds that the hours-long delay, during which time the helicopter 

wreckage was on the mountain, would not cause an average person to distinguish 

the crash and the delayed rescue as two distinct events. And Mr. Horvath’s claim 

against Triumvirate is for the entire six-hour period, beginning immediately after 

the crash, and indeed alleges negligent operations by Triumvirate prior to the crash 

itself.99 Therefore, the crash itself and the alleged delay in initiating the rescue 

constitute a single occurrence for purposes of the Policy.

Next, the Court considers whether Mr. Horvath’s asserted injuries “aris[e] 

out of the . . . use of the Aircraft.”100 Alaska courts have looked to three general 

factors to determine if an injury arose from the use of a vehicle: “(1) [t]he extent of 

causation between the [vehicle] and the injury; (2) [w]hether an act of independent 

significance occurred, breaking the causal link between ‘use’ of the vehicle and the 

injuries inflicted; and (3) [w]hat type of ‘use’ of the [vehicle] was involved.”101 With 

respect to the first factor, “[t]he vehicle must be an ‘active accessory’ for there to 

99 See Docket 24-2.

100 Docket 51-4 at 2, 5. 

101 Kalenka v. Infinity Ins. Cos., 262 P.3d 602, 609 (Alaska 2011) (citation omitted).

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be an adequate causal relationship.”102 However, an insured need not show that 

their injuries were proximately caused by the use of a vehicle. In C.P. ex rel. M.L. 

v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted an insurance 

policy that provided coverage for injuries “arising from an accident.”103 In that case, 

the parents of a child who had been sexually assaulted by the adult son of the 

homeowners brought suit against the homeowners.104 The homeowners’ insurer 

argued that the child’s damages did not arise from an accident.105 But the Court 

held that the negligent supervision claim against the homeowners was within the

homeowners’ liability coverage. The Court reasoned that the phrase “arising from 

an accident” “does not incorporate any requirement that an accident have been 

‘the proximate cause.’ Nor does it foreclose coverage if an accident was only ‘a’ 

cause.”106 Rather, the Court held that “[t]he language ‘arising from’ is consistent 

with multiple causes” and “that a claimant need only prove that a breach of duty is 

‘a’ proximate cause of harm, not ‘the’ proximate cause.”107 

102 Id. at 609 (citation omitted). 

103 996 P.2d 1216, 1223–24 (Alaska 2000). 

104 Id. at 1218.

105 Id. at 1223.

106 Id. at 1224 (emphasis in original). 

107 Id. 

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As recently as 2024, the Alaska Supreme Court has “reaffirmed the broad 

nature of a[n] . . . insurance policy’s ‘arising from’ coverage provision,” noting that 

an injury can “arise from” an event, even if that event would not constitute a 

proximate cause of the injury.108

Clearly, all of Mr. Horvath’s alleged injuries arise from the use of the 

helicopter in this case, even if the delay in initiating a rescue was an additional 

cause. The crash, to which the helicopter was an “active accessory,” exposed Mr. 

Horvath to winter conditions and physical and emotional trauma. Thus, the 

helicopter crash was at least a contributing cause of the physical and mental 

injuries Mr. Horvath alleges he suffered in the crash’s aftermath.109 

Next, the Court considers whether an “act of independent significance 

occurred, breaking the causal link between ‘use’ of the vehicle and the injuries 

inflicted.”110 National Union maintains that Triumvirate’s “alleged long delay in 

sending out a rescue team was independent from the transportation by the 

Helicopter, such that [Triumvirate’s] delay acted as an event sufficiently 

108 Thompson v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 542 P.3d 222, 224, 227 (Alaska 2024) (interpreting 

a homeowner’s insurance provision that excluded liability for “bodily injury . . . [a]rising out of . . . 

the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or unloading of . . . an ‘aircraft,” to bar coverage even 

though the claimant was injured while moving an inoperable, partially disassembled airplane)

(alterations in original)).

109 See Docket 70-57 at ¶¶ 28, 31, 35, 39, 44, 46 (alleging that Mr. Horvath suffered unspecified 

“life altering physical and emotional injuries that would not otherwise have been incurred” absent 

the delayed rescue).

110 Kalenka, 262 P.3d at 609. 

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independent to disrupt any causal link that may be found between the helicopter 

crash and the injuries.”111 In its view, the length of delay, over five hours, 

differentiates this case from others and suggests that the delay was an intervening 

event.112 

In Kalenka, the policyholder was injured when, after he was involved in a 

rear-end collision, another driver stabbed him multiple times during a fight that 

ensued outside the vehicle.113 The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the 

stabbing was an act of independent significance that broke the causal chain 

between the use of the vehicle and the injury because the drivers had both exited 

their vehicles prior to the assault.114 Further, the Court noted that the vehicle was 

“only the subject of their fight; [it] played no role in the fight itself,” such that there 

was “insufficient causation” for Kalenka’s death to have arisen out of the “use” of 

the vehicle.115 By contrast, in Shaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Cos., although the Court found the material facts to be in dispute, it allowed for the 

possibility that a driver’s use of his truck to trap another driver in a position in order 

to shoot her was not necessarily “an act of independent significance.”116 The Court 

111 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 39.

112 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 40–41.

113 Kalenka, 262 P.3d at 604–05.

114 Id. at 609. 

115 Id. at 609.

116 19 P.3d 588, 591–93 (Alaska 2001); see also Kalenka, 262 P.3d at 609–10 (stating that the 

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appeared to credit the plaintiff’s argument that the act of violence did not sever the 

causal chain because, under the plaintiff’s version of the facts, the attack required 

the use of the truck “as a truck.”117 

Here, the alleged delay does not sever the causal chain, as Mr. Horvath’s 

subsequent injuries arose from the helicopter’s use as a helicopter. Mr. Horvath’s 

injuries stem initially from the helicopter crash—an undisputed use of the 

helicopter.118 Indeed, when rescuers reached Mr. Horvath, he was still inside the 

helicopter.119 Although Mr. Horvath alleges in his state court action that the delay 

caused or exacerbated his injuries, these injuries were inherently tied to and arose 

from the crash itself. 

Additionally, the “use” of the helicopter in the heli-skiing operation is the 

precise use contemplated by both the Policy and the Heli-Skiing Contract 

Agreement between Triumvirate and Soloy.120 Accordingly, injuries sustained by 

Mr. Horvath in the aftermath of the helicopter crash due to the delayed rescue 

Court in Shaw “held that a driver's use of a vehicle to trap and corner another driver did not 

necessarily constitute an ‘act of independent significance’ even though it was intentional”). 

117 Shaw, 19 P.3d at 592 (emphasis in original). 

118 See Docket 51-14 at 9–10 (noting injuries to his fingers due to frostbite, hypothermia, broken 

bones, joint injuries, and emotional distress).

119 Docket 51-2 at 15.

120 See Docket 70-3.

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constitute bodily injuries “caused by an Occurrence and arising out of the . . . use 

of the Aircraft.”121 

Finally, National Union asserts that the delayed rescue operations were not 

“as respects Soloy’s operations.”122 The Court disagrees. An additional insured 

such as Triumvirate would reasonably interpret this provision to limit its coverage 

under the Soloy Policy to when it was chartering a helicopter from Soloy for heliskiing, and understand that it would not apply to Triumvirate’s other business 

operations or if it chartered with a different helicopter company. 

II. The Individual Defendants Are Not Covered by the Policy. 

Defendants assert that the Individual Defendants are “Insureds” under the 

Policy because they receive the same rights as Soloy’s owners and the Policy’s 

exclusions do not exempt them from coverage.

123 Failing that, Defendants submit 

that National Union cannot now claim the Individual Defendants are not covered 

because the National Union treated them as covered when it settled Mr. Horvath’s 

claims.124 

National Union responds that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the 

Individual Defendants because they are not additional insureds or insureds under 

121 Docket 51-4 at 2, 5. 

122 Docket 90-1 (SEALED) at 14; see also Docket 51-4 at 83 (Policy). 

123 Docket 86 at 20–21.

124 Docket 86 at 24–25.

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the plain language of the Policy.125 National Union also maintains that it “has never 

previously taken a position that the LLC members are additional Insureds.”126 

The Policy defines “Insured” as “not only the Named Insured but also any 

person while using or riding in the Aircraft and any person or organization legally 

responsible for its use, provided the actual use is with the express permission of 

the Named Insured.”127 However, this definition of “Insured” does not apply 

to any person or organization or to any agent or employee thereof 

(other than any employee of the Named Insured while acting in the 

course of his employment by the Named Insured) . . . who is charging 

a fee and/or receiving any remuneration or benefit for providing any 

type of service whatsoever in connection with the ownership, 

maintenance or use of any insured Aircraft.

128 

Additionally, the Policy included an Additional Insured Endorsement, which 

provides that “[t]he scheduled persons or organizations are included as additional 

Insured under liability coverages, but only as respects operations of [Soloy].”129 

Under the heading “Schedule,” the Policy states, “as required by [Soloy].”130 The 

Helicopter Services Agreement between Soloy and Triumvirate specifies that “the 

125 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 34–37.

126 Docket 90-1 (SEALED) at 17.

127 Docket 51-4 at 15.

128 Docket 51-4 at 15.

129 Docket 51-4 at 83.

130 Docket 51-4 at 83.

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Charterer will be named as an Additional Insured to its policy.”131 Under the 

agreement, the “Charterer” is “Triumvirate LLC.”132

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Individual Defendants are 

not Insureds under the Policy. None of the Individual Defendants was “using or 

riding in the Aircraft” at the time of the crash. And none of the Individual 

Defendants was “legally responsible for [the helicopter’s] use.” Although Mr. 

Horvath has now asserted a claim in his state court action seeking to pierce 

Triumvirate’s corporate veil and hold the Individual Defendants personally 

responsible his injuries, a successful piercing of the corporate veil would still not 

make the Individual Defendants Insureds under the Policy’s definition.

Further, the Individual Defendants are not Additional Insureds. The 

Helicopter Services Agreement between Soloy and Triumvirate requires that “the 

Charterer will be named as an Additional Insured” on the Policy.133 And that

agreement explicitly defines the “Charterer” as “Triumvirate LLC” and does not 

include the Individual Defendants.134 Further, unlike partners in a partnership, LLC 

members are distinct legal entities from the LLC.135 Indeed, a member of an LLC 

131 Docket 51-3 at 6.

132 Docket 51-3 at 2.

133 Docket 51-3 at 6.

134 Docket 51-3 at 2.

135 Cf. Simmons v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 17 P.3d 56, 60–61 (Alaska 2001) (holding coverage extends 

to partners under an automobile insurance policy naming the partnership as the insured because 

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is not liable for the liability of the LLC solely by reason of being a member of the 

LLC.136 Accordingly, it would make little sense to assume that a policy that insures 

an LLC would also extend to its members, who generally do not share in its liability.

 Defendants’ quasi-estoppel argument also fails. “Quasi-estoppel is an 

equitable doctrine that preclud[es] a party from taking a position so inconsistent 

with one he has previously taken that circumstances render assertion of the 

second position unconscionable.”137 “Among the many factors [courts] consider in 

applying quasi-estoppel are: (1) whether the party asserting the inconsistent 

position has gained an advantage or produced some disadvantage through the 

first position; (2) the magnitude of the inconsistency; (3) whether changed 

circumstances tend to justify the inconsistency; (4) whether the party claiming 

estoppel relied on the inconsistency to his detriment; and (5) whether the first 

assertion was made with full knowledge of the facts.”138

 Without citation, Triumvirate asserts that National Union “included the 

Triumvirate Members within the Horvath Settlement’s release and in doing so 

gained the advantage of settling Horvath’s claims and avoiding further defense 

a partnership is not a distinct legal entity from its partners).

136 Alaska Stat. § 10.50.265.

137 Cooper Leasing, LLC v. Woronzof Condo. Ass’n, 548 P.3d 636, 645 n.15 (Alaska 2024)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

138 Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1223 (Alaska 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

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expenditures.”139 Having reviewed the Confidential Release of Specified Claims, 

the Court assumes that Triumvirate refers to a provision that purports to release 

“Triumvirate LLC, and its related entities, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, 

parent corporations, predecessors, officers, agents, employees, servants, 

representatives, attorneys, insurers, reinsurers, underwriters, as well as all other 

persons, firms, corporations subsidiary to and/or in privity with them, including, but 

not limited to, all and each of them” from certain claims Mr. Horvath might bring.140 

However, this release does not constitute National Union’s adoption of a position 

that the Individual Defendants are covered by the Policy. Moreover, the Individual 

Defendants did not rely on this asserted inconsistency to their detriment. Although 

Triumvirate asserts that the Individual Defendants relied on National Union’s 

assertedly inconsistent position in choosing not to seek additional insurance 

coverage, it is highly improbable that they could have obtained insurance that 

would have retroactively covered their liability stemming from the helicopter crash 

and its aftermath.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Individual Defendants are 

not Additional Insureds under the Policy. 

139 Docket 86 at 24.

140 Docket 53-2 (SEALED) at 2.

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III. It Is Premature to Conclude that the Policy’s Exhaustion Obviates 

National Union’s Duty to Defend. 

National Union asserts that the Policy does not require it to defend or 

indemnify Mr. Horvath’s claims, and that Triumvirate can have no reasonable 

expectation to the contrary, because the Policy’s limits have been exhausted and 

an express provision of the Policy extinguishes National Union’s duties after it pays 

the Policy’s limits.141 It further maintains that it was not required to include 

Triumvirate’s counsel in settlement negotiations and, in any event, the record 

shows that Triumvirate’s attorneys were made aware of the terms of the release,

undercutting any allegation of bad faith.142 And National Union asserts that 

Defendants have not met the procedural requirements for a Rule 56(d) 

extension.

143

Defendants respond that “an insurer cannot use the doctrine of exhaustion 

when it has acted in bad faith” by negotiating a settlement that exhausted the policy 

limits.144 And they assert that the record before the Court amply demonstrates that 

National Union acted in bad faith when it negotiated a release for Triumvirate that 

exposed it to additional claims while negotiating a more protective release for 

141 Docket 74-1 (SEALED) at 28–32.

142 Docket 90-1 (SEALED) at 5–9.

143 Docket 90-1 (SEALED) at 9–10.

144 Docket 86 at 5 (citing Singh v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 428 P.3d 1237, 1244 (Wash. Ct. App. 

2018)). 

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Soloy.145 In particular, Defendants point to National Union’s alleged exclusion of 

Triumvirate “from any knowledge of or involvement in [its] negotiations” with Mr. 

Horvath’s counsel, the difference in language between the two releases, and 

National Union’s failure to file an action for declaratory relief to determine its 

obligations before it paid the Policy limits.146 Defendants also suggest that, 

because discovery with respect to National Union’s bad faith is ongoing, the Court 

should decline to rule on whether exhaustion excuses National Union’s duty to 

defend until a jury determines whether National Union acted in bad faith.147

The Policy includes an exhaustion provision, which provides that National 

Union “shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit 

after the applicable limit of [National Union]’s liability has been exhausted by 

payment of judgments or settlements.”148 There is no dispute that National Union 

paid the $1,000,000.00 per person policy limit plus add-ons to Mr. Horvath.

149 

Therefore, the Policy’s limit has been exhausted. However, there remains a 

dispute as to whether National Union acted in bad faith during settlement 

145 Docket 86 at 5–8.

146 Docket 86 at 6–8.

147 Docket 86 at 7–8.

148 Docket 51-4 at 6.

149 Docket 51-4 at 2, 35 (policy limit); Docket 53-2 (SEALED) (settlement agreement).

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negotiations with Mr. Horvath and whether this bad faith, if proven, would impact 

National Union’s duty to defend.150

The Alaska Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether an insurer’s 

duty to defend always terminates once the insurer has paid the policy limits, or if 

there are circumstances where the duty persists. When an issue of state law arises 

and “the state’s highest court has not adjudicated the issue, a federal court must 

make a reasonable determination of the result the highest state court would reach 

if it were deciding the case.”151 On this topic, other state courts have recognized 

that, under certain circumstances, payment of the policy limits is not enough to 

extinguish a duty to defend.

For example, in Brown v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., the North 

Carolina Supreme Court documented a practice where insurers tendered the 

policy limits to a court to satisfy any judgment upon a determination of liability.

152 

The court concluded that unilaterally tendering the limits to the court or to the 

150 Defendants primarily focus on the duty to defend, but on occasion assert that if bad faith is 

established, National Union could also have a duty to indemnify in excess of the policy limits. 

See, e.g., Docket 26 at 19–20. The elements of the bad faith claim and the damages recoverable 

if proven have not been briefed by the parties nor established by the Court at this stage of the 

case, so the Court declines to resolve this issue at this juncture. 

151 Med. Lab’y Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).

152 390 S.E.2d 150, 154–155 (N.C. 1990) (collecting cases); see also Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 

536 So. 2d 417, 423 (La. 1988) (“The concern that in some cases an insurer might attempt to 

circumvent its duty to defend the insured by making an ‘early escape’ from the litigation is a valid 

one.”).

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claimant directly did not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend.153 “[S]imply 

exhausting the limits in any manner” is not enough.154 Other state courts have 

taken similar approaches and held that an insurer’s duties are only exhausted if 

that insurer discharges its obligations to its insured—to settle or defend—in good 

faith.155 However, “[a]n insurer which hastily enters a questionable settlement 

simply to avoid further defense obligations under the policy clearly is not acting in 

good faith.”156

Given these decisions by other state courts, the Court finds it likely that the 

Alaska Supreme Court would conclude that exhausting a policy’s limits is not 

always itself sufficient to eliminate the insurer’s duty to defend. Rather, the 

exhaustion of the policy’s limits would only satisfy an insurer’s duties when the 

insurer executes a good faith settlement of the claims against the insured or a 

judgment is entered against the insured. 

153 Brown, 390 S.E.2d at 154–56; see also Benchmark Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 254 P.3d 617, 623 (Nev. 

2011).

154 Brown, 390 S.E.2d at 154 (emphasis in original).

155 See, e.g., Pareti, 536 So. 2d at 423 (“[T]he insurance company is held to a high fiduciary duty 

to discharge its policy obligations to its insured in good faith—including the duty to defend the 

insured against covered claims and to consider the interests of the insured in every settlement.”); 

Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 83–84 (Ala. 1985) (“[W]e hold that the better rule of 

law is that an insurer, when it obligates itself to defend, as we find the insurer did in this case, 

cannot avoid its duty to defend against an insured’s contingent liability by tendering the amount 

of its policy limits into court without effectuating a settlement or obtaining the consent of the 

insured.”); Douglas v. Allied Am. Ins., 727 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“When an insurer 

merely tenders its limits, without obtaining a settlement of any claim for its insured, a strong 

argument exists that it has not exhausted its policy limits.”).

156 Pareti, 536 So. 2d at 423.

Case 3:23-cv-00146-SLG Document 168 Filed 01/14/25 Page 35 of 37
Case No. 3:23-cv-00146-SLG, National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. 

Triumvirate, LLC, et al.

Order on Motions for Summary Judgment

Page 36 of 37

Here, Defendants claim that National Union engaged in bad faith when it 

entered into a settlement with Mr. Horvath that related to his claims against 

Triumvirate. If proven, this bad faith could render the Policy’s exhaustion provision 

inapplicable, at least with respect to the duty to defend. Therefore, the Court 

cannot yet determine whether the exhaustion of the Policy’s limits satisfies 

National Union’s duties with respect to Triumvirate. Because this is a threshold 

question, summary judgment on the parties’ claims for declaratory relief regarding 

Triumvirate is not appropriate at this time. Therefore, the parties’ cross-motions in 

that regard are DENIED. They may be renewed after the issue of bad faith has 

been determined.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows:

1. Triumvirate’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at Docket 51 on 

Counterclaim II is DENIED. 

2. National Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part as

to Defendants’ Counterclaim 1 and National Union’s Claim I, as National 

Union does not owe a duty of defense or indemnity to the Individual 

Defendants under the Soloy Policy.

3. Summary Judgment is DENIED to both parties on Counterclaim 2 and 

National Union’s Claims II and III for Declaratory Relief. The Soloy Policy 

applies to Mr. Horvath’s claims against Triumvirate for injuries arising in 

Case 3:23-cv-00146-SLG Document 168 Filed 01/14/25 Page 36 of 37
Case No. 3:23-cv-00146-SLG, National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. 

Triumvirate, LLC, et al.

Order on Motions for Summary Judgment

Page 37 of 37

the aftermath of the helicopter crash, but the impact of the exhaustion of 

the policy limits on National Union’s present duty to defend, and 

potentially its duty to indemnify, is dependent on the resolution of 

Triumvirate’s bad faith claim. 

DATED this 14th day of January 2025. 

/s/ Sharon L. Gleason

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:23-cv-00146-SLG Document 168 Filed 01/14/25 Page 37 of 37