Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03587/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-03587-27/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FUJIFILM CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 12-cv-03587-WHO 

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S AND 

DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR 

JUDGMENT AS MATTER OF LAW OR

FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND ON 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALTER OR

AMEND THE JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 361, 362, 363

INTRODUCTION 

In this lawsuit involving technology used in digital cameras and cellular telephones, a jury 

found defendant Motorola Mobility LLC (“Motorola”) liable for infringement of plaintiff Fujifilm 

Corporation (“Fujifilm”)’s U.S. Patent No. 6,144,763 (the ’763 patent), which concerns 

monochrome conversion in digital photography, and awarded $10.24 million in damages after a 

two-week trial. The jury also considered Fujifilm’s claims of infringement of U.S. Patents Nos. 

8,306,285 (the ’285 patent) and 7,327,886 (the ’886 patent), which concern human face detection 

in digital photography, and U.S. Patent No. 6,915,119 (the ’119 patent), which concerns wireless 

data transmission. The jury found that the ’285 and ’886 patents were invalid and not infringed, 

and that the ’119 patent was infringed but invalid. Each party now moves for judgment as a 

matter of law or for a new trial on virtually every issue on which the jury did not find in its favor. 

In addition, Fujifilm moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the 

judgment to provide for an award of prejudgment interest. 

This Order upholds the jury verdict, except that Fujifilm is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law on the validity of the asserted claims of the ’285 and ’886 patents (the “face detection 

patents”) and on Motorola’s licensing defense concerning claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent. I 

also award prejudgment interest at the prime rate, compounded quarterly. Fujifilm’s motion for 

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JMOL or for a new trial is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, Motorola’s motion is 

DENIED, and Fujifilm’s motion to alter or amend the judgment is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

Fujifilm filed its original complaint in this matter on July 10, 2012 and its first amended 

complaint on November 19, 2012. Dkt. Nos. 1, 16. The first amended complaint, the operative 

complaint in this case, asserts infringement by Motorola of Fujifilm’s ’763 patent, ’285 patent,

’886 patent, ’119 patent, and U.S. Patent No. 5,734,427 (the ’427 patent) (which concerns lowresolution displays in digital cameras). Dkt. No. 16. 

 On December 9, 2014, Motorola moved for summary judgment of noninfringement on 

each of the asserted claims, and also on the issue of willful infringement. Dkt. No. 153. I granted 

the motion with respect to the ’427 patent and denied the motion in all other respects. Dkt. No. 

196 (“Summary Judgment Order”). 

A jury trial was held from April 20 through May 1, 2015. At trial, Fujifilm asserted 

infringement of claims 1, 2, 7, and 11 of the ’763 patent; claim 1 of the ’285 patent; claim 11 of 

the ’886 patent; and claims 1, 13, and 35 of the ’119 patent.

 At the close of Fujifilm’s case, Motorola moved for judgment as a matter of law on all 

claims of infringement, including willful infringement, and on damages. Dkt. No. 307. At the 

close of all evidence, Motorola renewed its request for judgment as a matter of law on 

infringement of the ’886 patent and on willful infringement, and also moved for judgment as a 

matter of law on the validity on each of the asserted claims. Dkt. No. 328. Fujifilm moved for 

judgment as a matter of law on all claims of infringement, including willful infringement, on the 

validity of each of the asserted claims, on the licensing of the asserted claims of the ’119 patent, 

and on damages. Trial Tr. at 1757:20-1759:04. I allowed all issues to pass to the jury. Id. at

1761:21-23. 

 The jury returned its verdict on May 4, 2015. Dkt. No. 337 (“Verdict”). It found that 

Motorola had infringed claims 1, 7, and 11 of the ’763 patent and claims 1, 13, and 35 of the ’119 

patent, but that it had not infringed claim 2 of the ’763 patent, claim 1 of the ’285 patent, or claim 

11 of the ’886 patent. Verdict at 3-4. It also found that claims 1, 2, 7, and 11 of the ’763 patent 

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were not invalid, but that claim 1 of the ’285 patent, claim 11 of the ’886 patent, and claim 13 of 

the ’119 patent were invalid as anticipated and obvious, and that claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 

patent were invalid as obvious. Id. at 5. In addition, the jury found that the ’119 patent was not 

invalid for improper inventorship, and that Motorola was licensed under the Bluetooth 

Patent/Copyright License Agreement (“BPLA”) (Trial Ex. 901) as to claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 

patent, but not as to claim 13 of the ’119 patent. Id. at 6. The jury awarded $10.24 million to 

Fujifilm for past and future damages for infringement of the ’763 patent. Id. at 8. I entered Final 

Judgment on August 6, 2015. Dkt. No. 357. 

 The parties filed their respective post-trial motions on September 3, 2015. I heard 

argument on December 9, 2015. Dkt. No. 379. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The Federal Circuit “reviews decisions on motions for JMOL, motions for a new trial, and 

evidentiary rulings under the law of the regional circuit.” InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, 

Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In the Ninth Circuit, judgment as a matter of law is 

appropriate where “the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.” White 

v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). This standard requires a court to uphold 

“any jury verdict supported by substantial evidence,” substantial evidence being “evidence that a 

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Callicrate v. Wadsworth 

Mfg., Inc., 427 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Neither a “mere scintilla” of evidence, nor pure 

speculation, is enough to sustain a verdict against a motion for JMOL. Lakeside-Scott v. 

Multnomah Cty., 556 F.3d 797, 802-03 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), a trial court “may grant a new trial, even 

though the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, if the verdict is contrary to the clear 

weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound 

discretion of the trial court, a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 

1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wordtech Sys., Inc v. 

Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In considering a motion for 

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a new trial, a court “has the duty to weigh the evidence as the court saw it, and to set aside the 

verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in the court’s 

conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” Molski v. M.J. 

Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit “review[s] [a] district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) 

for an abuse of discretion.” E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 

2009). The denial of a motion for a new trial is reversible “only if the record contains no evidence 

in support of the verdict or if the district court made a mistake of law.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

 Fujifilm moves for judgment as a matter of law that: (1) Motorola has infringed the face 

detection patents; (2) the asserted claims of the face detection patents are not invalid; (3) claims 1, 

13, and 35 of the ’119 patent are not invalid; and (4) Motorola is not licensed under the BPLA to 

practice claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent. Fujifilm Mot. at 1 (Dkt. No. 362). In the alternative, 

Fujifilm requests a new trial on each of these issues. Id. Fujifilm also requests a new trial as to 

willfulness and damages with respect to Motorola’s infringement of the face detection patents and 

of the ’119 patent. Id. 

Motorola moves for judgment as a matter of law that: (1) it has not infringed claims 1, 13, 

and 35 of the ’119 patent; (2) it has not infringed claims 1, 7, and 11 of the ’763 patent; (3) the 

asserted claims of the ’763 patent are invalid; and (4) the lump sum award of $10.24 million for 

infringement of the ’763 patent is not supported by the evidence and is excessive. Motorola Mot. 

at i (Dkt. No. 361). In the alternative, it asks for a new trial (and, with respect to damages, 

remittitur) on each of these issues. Id. Motorola identifies no basis for ordering a new trial on any 

of the infringement or validity issues except to state that “for each of the reasons outlined in [its 

motion for JMOL], the jury’s verdict is clearly not supported by the evidence and is 

unreasonable.” Id. at 41. 

I address the parties’ arguments by patent, starting with the face detection patents, then the 

’119 patent, and finally the ’763 patent. I then address Fujifilm’s request under Federal Rule of 

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Civil Procedure 59(e) for an award of prejudgment interest. I uphold the jury’s verdict except for 

the finding of invalidity of the face detection patents, because the prior art reference on which 

Motorola relied did not anticipate or make obvious the asserted claims of those patents, and the 

finding on the licensing of claims 1 and 35 of the ‘119 patent, because the plain language of the 

BPLA compels the conclusion that Motorola was not granted a license to those claims. With 

respect to the other issues raised by the parties, I cannot find that the jury’s verdict was either 

unreasonable or contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. 

I. THE FACE DETECTION PATENTS 

 The face detection patents share a specification and are titled “Photographing Apparatus, 

Method and Program.” ’285 patent (Trial Ex. 8); ’886 patent (Trial Ex. 6). Claim 1 of the ’285 

patent discloses: 

A photographing apparatus comprising: 

a photographing means for obtaining image data by taking a 

photograph of a subject; 

a display means for displaying various kinds of information 

including the image data; 

a release means for performing photographing operation; 

a storage means for storing various kinds of information including 

the image data; 

a photographing control means for obtaining a moving image of the 

subject by continuously taking photographs with the photographing 

means and displaying the moving image on the display means; 

a face judgment means for performing processing, in a 

predetermined time interval, for judging whether a human face is 

included in a frame included in the moving image until a positive 

result is obtained in the judgment; 

a face detection means for detecting a facial position in a frame, 

which is judged to include a face, if the face judgment means judges 

that the face is included in the frame; 

and a control means for controlling the photographing means, the 

face judgment means, the face detection means, and the storage 

means so that the detected facial position is stored in the storage 

means, judgment is made as to whether the face is included in the 

next frame after the predetermined time, and if the judgment is 

positive, the facial position is detected, the facial position, which is 

stored in the storage means, is replaced by the newly detected facial 

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position and the newly detected facial position is stored in the 

storage means, and until the release means performs the 

photographing operation, judgment is made as to whether the face is 

included in the next frame further after the predetermined time, and 

if it is judged that the face is included in the frame, the facial 

position is detected, and the newly detected facial position is stored 

in the storage means, and a frame obtained when the release means 

performs the photographing operation and/or a plurality of 

temporally precedent and/or subsequent frames of the obtained 

frame are stored in the storage means as the image data. 

’285 patent at 18:34-67. Claim 11 of the ’885 patent discloses a substantially similar invention: 

A computer readable medium storing program for causing a 

computer to execute an image processing method at a photographing 

apparatus including a photographing means for obtaining image data 

by taking a photograph of a subject, a display means for displaying 

various kinds of information including the image data, a release 

means for performing photographing operation, a storage means for 

storing various kinds of information including the image data, and a 

photographing control means for obtaining a moving image of the 

subject by continuously taking photographs with the photographing 

means and displaying the moving image on the display means, the 

program comprising the procedures for: 

performing processing, in a predetermined time interval, for judging 

whether a human face is included in a frame included in the moving 

image until a positive result is obtained in the judgment; 

detecting a facial position in a frame, which is judged to include a 

face, if it is judged that the face is included in the frame; 

and storing the detected facial position in the storage means, judging 

whether the face is included in the next frame after the 

predetermined time, and if the judgment is positive, detecting the 

facial position, replacing the facial position, which is stored in the 

storage means, by the newly detected facial position and storing the 

newly detected facial position in the storage means, and until the 

release means performs the photographing operation, judging 

whether the face is included in the next frame further after the 

predetermined time, and if it is judged that the face is included in the 

frame, detecting the facial position, and storing the newly detected 

facial position in the storage means, and storing a frame, which is 

obtained when the release means performs the photographing 

operation and/or a plurality of temporally precedent and/or 

subsequent frames of the obtained frame in the storage means as the 

image data. 

’886 patent at 21:06-22:20. Fujifilm challenges the jury’s findings of invalidity and 

noninfringement of these claims. See Fujifilm Mot. at 4-27; Fujifilm Reply at 2-13 (Dkt. No. 

375). 

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A. Invalidity 

The jury found claim 1 of the ’285 patent and claim 11 of the ’886 invalid as both 

anticipated and obvious. Verdict at 5. Fujifilm contends that these findings were unreasonable 

and moves for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. 

1. Anticipation 

“Anticipation requires clear and convincing proof that a single prior art reference not only 

discloses all of the elements of the claim within the four corners of the document, but also 

discloses those elements arranged as in the claim.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & 

Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). The reference may disclose the elements of the claim either “expressly or inherently.” 

Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Top-U.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Inherent 

anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material is ‘necessarily present,’ not merely 

probably or possibly present, in the [reference].” Id.; see also Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, 

Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (inherent anticipation “may not be established by 

probabilities or possibilities”). “The dispositive question regarding anticipation is whether one 

skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the prior art reference’s teaching that 

every claim limitation was disclosed in that single reference.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & 

Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). 

Motorola’s anticipation case at trial centered on U.S. Patent No. 7,269,292 to Steinberg 

(“Steinberg” or “Steinberg patent”) (Trial Ex. 960). Fujifilm contends that the jury could not have 

reasonably concluded that Steinberg anticipates the asserted claims of the face detection patents 

because Steinberg does not disclose the “multiple face judgments” required by those claims. See

Fujifilm Mot. at 14-16. Fujifilm points to the language in claim 1 of the ’285 patent requiring “a 

judgment . . . as to whether the face is included in a first frame of the moving image,” and then 

“[a] judgment . . . as to whether the face is included in a second frame of the moving image.” ’285 

patent at 18:54-59. Claim 11 of the ’886 patent similarly requires “judging whether a human face 

is included in a frame included in the moving image,” then “judging whether the face is included 

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in the next frame after the predetermined time,” and then “judging whether the face is included in 

the next frame further after the predetermined time.” ’886 patent at 21:20-22:13. The relevant 

portion of Steinberg is a flow diagram that includes a box stating, “Track face movement,” 

without further explanation. See Steinberg at Fig. 7b. Fujifilm asserts that, rather than “multiple 

face judgments,” Steinberg discloses “a single face judgment, followed by face tracking.” 

Fujifilm Mot. at 14. 

In response, Motorola essentially argues that there was substantial evidence at trial 

indicating that there is no difference between performing “multiple face judgments,” as required 

by the face detection patents, and performing “face tracking,” as disclosed by Steinberg. See 

Motorola Oppo. at 11-14 (Dkt. No. 373). 

I agree with Fujifilm that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support this conclusion. 

The parties do not dispute that to perform “multiple face judgments” within the meaning of the 

face detection patents, there must be successive determinations of whether an object in the image 

is a human face – that is, there must be multiple instances of “face detection,” or “determin[ing] 

whether there is a face in the image and, if there is, determin[ing] [its] coordinates.” Motorola 

Oppo. at 12 (emphasis added).1 By contrast, the jury was told that “face tracking” does not 

necessarily involve repeatedly determining whether the tracked object is indeed a human face. 

Fujifilm’s expert, Dr. Kenneth Castleman, testified that “[i]n this field, tracking generally means 

keeping track of the location of something as it moves in a series of frames,” and that “there are a 

lot of [tracking] techniques that don’t determine what the object is you’re tracking; just, did the 

thing . . . in the last frame move? and where did it move to?” Trial Tr. at 1576:06-20; see also id.

at 1577:10-12 (“So the point is, with tracking you’re keeping track of where the object is and 

where it has been, but you are not, generally, making a determination of what the object is.”). Dr. 

Castleman then addressed Steinberg in particular and opined that it does not disclose all of the 

elements of the face detection patents because “[i]t finds the face one time and does not do the step 

 

1

The parties vigorously dispute whether the face detection patents require successive 

determinations of whether the image includes the same human face (as opposed to just some

human face). But they do not dispute that the face detection patents require successive 

determinations of whether an object in the image is a human face. 

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of repeatedly finding the face or making a judgment that there’s a face in the image. It’s just not 

in there.” Id. at 1599:23-1600:01. The jury also heard testimony that Motorola had previously 

employed “face tracking” but had abandoned that process in favor of one that “serially continues 

to detect faces and identify the location of those faces, frame by frame by frame.” Id. at 1434:03-

07; see also Trial Ex. 505. In line with this evidence, Motorola explicitly conceded in its motion 

for JMOL at the close of all evidence that the prior art did not disclose “multiple face judgments.” 

See Dkt. No. 328 at 20. It stated: “The only thing that was not specifically disclosed in the prior 

art was performing these [face detection] techniques more than once.” Id. 

Motorola now points to excerpts from the testimony of its expert, Dr. Alan Bovik, as 

substantial evidence of an equivalence between the “multiple face judgments” required by the face 

detection patents and the “face tracking” disclosed by Steinberg. See Motorola Oppo. at 11-12. 

For the most part, however, the excerpts merely reinforce the conclusion that to perform the 

“multiple face judgments” required by the face detection patents, there must be successive 

instances of determining whether there is a human face in the image. See Trial Tr. at 1312:04-

1313:02; id. at 1323:13-20; id. at 1328:11-14. The excerpts do not indicate that the “face 

tracking” disclosed by Steinberg involves such a process. The one possible exception is Dr. 

Bovik’s testimony that “face tracking” is the “process of predicting where the face is in the next 

frame and then making a face detector operate around that region,” and his subsequent testimony 

that the “Track face movement” box in Steinberg shows that “[o]ver frames, face tracking is being 

conducted.” Id. at 1312:24-1313:02, 1342:17. But even assuming that this testimony provided a 

substantial basis for the conclusion that “face tracking” can involve “multiple face judgments,” 

there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that this is the type of “face tracking” disclosed by 

Steinberg. As stated above, “[i]nherent anticipation requires that the missing descriptive material 

is ‘necessarily present,’ not merely probably or possibly present, in the [reference].” Trintec, 295 

F.3d at 1295. Motorola identifies nothing in Steinberg regarding the “face tracking” reflected in 

the “Track face movement” box other than the box itself. I agree with Fujifilm that this passing 

reference, even when considered in combination with Dr. Bovik’s testimony, does not provide a 

substantial basis for the conclusion that the “face tracking” disclosed in Steinberg necessarily 

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involves “multiple face judgments.” 

Motorola also relies on the following testimony from Dr. Castleman’s cross-examination 

regarding the meaning of “face tracking” and the sort of “face tracking” disclosed by Steinberg: 

Q. Now, we talked about your definition of . . . tracking 

objects or tracking a face. And I think . . . we’ve confirmed 

that “tracking” means “keeping track of the location of 

something as it moves in a series of frames”? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Okay. So to do that – to track something in a series of 

frames – that means you've got successive frames. Right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you find that object in the first of this series of 

frames. Right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you figure out its position? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And then if you're tracking, you go to the next frame, and 

you find if the object is in that next frame. Right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And you determine its position? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And then you go on to the third frame, and you find if the 

object is in the third frame, and then you determine its 

position. Right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Okay. And that’s the process that's referred to by “Track 

face movement” in Box 784 of the Steinberg patent? 

A. We can assume it is, but there’s no text to go with this 

figure to tell us exactly what that box does. 

Trial Tr. at 1624:18-1625:19. Motorola contends that this testimony amounts to an admission that 

“a person of skill in the art reading Steinberg would know that once a face is detected in a frame, 

the system should determine whether that face is present in successive frames and, if so, determine 

the position of the face in each of the successive frames.” Motorola Oppo. at 14. If that is an 

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accurate characterization of Dr. Castleman’s testimony, it is not a characterization that helps 

Motorola. Under this characterization, Dr. Castleman did not testify that Steinberg discloses the 

use of “multiple face judgments.” Rather, he testified that Steinberg discloses a system that detects 

a human face in a frame and then “determine[s] whether that face is present in successive frames.” 

Id. Motorola does not dispute that this type of “face tracking” is different from performing 

“multiple face judgments,” i.e., repeatedly “determin[ing] whether there is a face in the image.” 

Id. at 12. 

 The evidence at trial did not provide a substantial basis for finding, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that Steinberg anticipates the asserted claims of the face detection patents. Accordingly, 

Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL on this issue is GRANTED.2 Its request for a new trial is DENIED 

AS MOOT. 

 2. Obviousness 

Without the finding of anticipation, the finding of obviousness cannot stand either. 

Motorola concedes that the only obviousness theory it presented at trial with respect to the face 

detection patents was predicated on Steinberg combined with the skill and knowledge of a person 

of ordinary skill in the art. See Motorola Oppo. at 15-16. The problem is that Motorola did not 

actually present this theory to the jury. Dr. Bovik’s testimony regarding Steinberg was focused 

exclusively on anticipation and did not address obviousness. For example, he introduced his 

analysis of claim 11 of the ’886 patent and Steinberg as follows: 

Q: [H]ow did you go about determining whether claim 11 is 

invalid . . . in light of Steinberg? 

A: Well, I made a limitation-by-limitation comparison between the 

elements of claim 11, and what is explained in the Steinberg patent; 

what is revealed in the Steinberg patent. 

Q: And why did you do that element-by-element comparison? 

A: Well, in order for a piece of prior art to render a claim invalid, 

you have to find every element of that claim in that piece of prior 

art. 

 

2

 I do not address Fujifilm’s other arguments for JMOL on anticipation of the face detection 

patents. 

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[ . . . ] 

Q: Okay. So we have on the screen claim [11] of the ‘886 patent. 

And you’ve got some – some boxes on the right. Are those check 

boxes? 

A: That’s correct. So I’ll check each of those off . . . as I show you 

where those elements are met in the Steinberg reference. 

Trial Tr. at 1338:24 to 1339:18-23. 

Motorola identifies no testimony by Dr. Bovik or any other witness that addresses the 

alleged obviousness of the face detection patents. See Motorola Oppo. at 15-16.3 Without a 

defensible finding of anticipation or any testimony directed at Motorola’s purported obviousness 

theory, the obviousness verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. See InTouch, 751 F.3d at 

1348-49 (holding that patentee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law of nonobviousness 

where defendant’s expert did not “identify sufficient reasons or motivations to combine the 

asserted prior references,” “focus on the relevant time frame,” or “consider any objective evidence 

of nonobviousness.”). Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL on this issue is GRANTED. Its motion for a 

new trial is DENIED AS MOOT. 

B. Noninfringement 

While Fujifilm is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the validity of the face 

detection patents, it has not shown that the jury’s finding of noninfringement should be upset. 

Fujifilm’s argument for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on this issue relies heavily on 

its contention that Motorola and Dr. Bovik presented improper claim construction evidence to the 

jury. See, e.g., Fujifilm Mot. at 8-11, 23-24. There is no question that a party cannot “argue claim 

construction to the jury.” Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 

2009); see also Dkt. No. 256 at 6-7 (“Order on Motions in Limine”). But I am not persuaded that 

Motorola and Dr. Bovik crossed over this line. I agree with Motorola that Dr. Bovik permissibly 

rebutted the testimony of Barbara Fredericksen-Cross, Fujifilm’s expert, and that Fujifilm failed to 

carry its burden regarding infringement. 

 

3 Motorola does cite to one excerpt in which Dr. Bovik uses the word “obvious” in connection 

with the face detection patents. See Motorola Oppo. at 15 (citing Trial. Tr. at 1343:07-17). I 

agree with Fujifilm, however, that Dr. Bovik plainly used the word to mean “self-evident” or 

perhaps “necessarily present,” not to mean obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 

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I also disagree with Fujifim that its proposed final jury instruction on “not . . . import[ing] 

limitations from the specification . . . into the claims” was erroneously denied, given the various 

model jury instructions that were delivered to the jury. See Final Jury Instruction No. 19 (Dkt. No. 

329) (“The claims of a patent are important because it is the words of the claims that define what a 

patent covers. The figures and text in the rest of the patent provide a description and/or examples 

of the invention and provide a context for the claims, but it is the claims that define the breadth of 

the patent’s coverage.”); Final Jury Instruction No. 20 (“By understanding the meaning of the 

words in a claim and by understanding that the words in a claim set forth the requirements that a 

product or process must meet in order to be covered by that claim, you will be able to understand 

the scope of coverage for each claim.”); Final Jury Instruction No. 22 (“A patent’s claims define 

what is covered by the patent.”). And, in light of the standard applied in the Summary Judgment 

Order, I do not find that it was error to not instruct the jury on my “partial construction,” Fujifilm 

Mot. at 25-27, of the face detection patents. 

Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL of infringement of the face detection patents, or for a new trial 

on the issue, is DENIED. 

II. CLAIMS 1 AND 35 OF THE ’119 PATENT 

The ’119 patent is titled “Telephone and Data Transmitting Method for Telephone.” ’119 

Patent (Trial Ex. 4). The parties do not dispute that its priority date is in October 1999. Claims 1 

and 35 state as follows: 

1. A data transmission system, comprising: 

a wireless telephone that receives data of at least one of an image 

and characters through a transmitting provider; 

a designating device on said wireless telephone for designating the 

data for reception by the wireless telephone and for selectively 

designating an apparatus to which the received data is to be 

transmitted; 

a display device on said wireless telephone for displaying 

information from the received data and displaying a designating 

address of the apparatus and displaying a menu for designating at 

least one of transmitting data and receiving data; 

and a wireless communicating device that communicates with the 

apparatus without the transmitting provider and transmits the data to 

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the apparatus designated by said designating device, wherein said 

menu comprises selections for a receive mode for indicating that 

data has been received, a transmit image mode for transmitting an 

image from the wireless telephone to an apparatus, a receive mail 

mode for receiving characters, and a transmit mail mode for 

transmitting characters. 

[ . . . ] 

35. A data transmission system, comprising: 

a wireless telephone that receives data of at least one of an image 

and characters through a transmitting provider; 

a designating device on said wireless telephone for designating the 

data for reception by the wireless telephone and for selectively 

designating an apparatus to which the received data is to be 

transmitted; 

a display device on said wireless telephone for displaying 

information from the received data and displaying a designating 

address of the apparatus and displaying a menu for designating at 

least one of transmitting data and receiving data; 

and a wireless communicating device that communicates with the 

apparatus without the transmitting provider and transmits the data to 

the apparatus designated by said designating device, wherein said 

display includes a menu comprising selections for at least one of a 

transmit image mode for transmitting an image from the wireless 

telephone to an apparatus, a receive mail mode for receiving 

characters, and a transmit mail mode for transmitting characters. 

’119 Patent at 4:33-56, 9:41-63. Fujifilm challenges the jury’s findings on invalidity and licensing 

of claims 1 and 35, while Motorola challenges the jury’s findings on infringement. See Fujifilm 

Mot. at 28-36, 44-46; Fujifilm Reply at 13-22, 24-28; Motorola Mot. at 31-40 (Dkt. No. 361); 

Motorola Reply at 20-30 (Dkt. No. 376). 

A. Invalidity 

The jury found claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent invalid for obviousness. Verdict at 5. 

Fujifilm states that the only obviousness theory advanced by Motorola at trial was based on a 

combination of (1) manuals for certain models of the Nokia 9000i Communicator telephone (Trial 

Exs. 958, 1050C) (the “Nokia Manuals”); and (2) Haartsen, et al. Bluetooth: Vision, Goals, and 

Architecture, Mobile Computing and Comms. R., Oct. 1998 (the “Bluetooth Vision Paper”). 

Fujifilm contends that this obviousness theory is defective because there was no evidentiary basis 

presented at trial for concluding that the Nokia Manuals were “printed publications” within the 

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meaning of the applicable pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 102.4 In the alternative, Fujifilm 

contends that, even assuming that it was adequately established that Nokia Manuals were printed 

publications, Motorola failed to present sufficient evidence that the combination of the Nokia 

Manuals and the Bluetooth Vision Paper rendered claims 1 and 35 obvious. 

 Motorola responds that Fujifilm’s argument “is nothing more than a red herring that 

attempts to distract the Court from the fact that Motorola relied on the Nokia 9000i Communicator 

device as the invalidating prior art reference, not the Nokia 9000i Communicator Manuals.” 

Motorola Oppo. at 37 (emphasis in original). Motorola states that it relied on the Nokia Manuals 

merely “as corroborating evidence to show the functionalities and existence of the Nokia 9000i 

Communicator before October 1999.” Id. “As such,” Motorola contends, “[it] did not need to 

show that the [Nokia Manuals] were printed publications.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the alternative, Motorola argues that it provided the jury with sufficient evidence to reasonably 

conclude that the Nokia Manuals qualified as printed publications before October 1999. Id. at 42-

44.

 In support of its contention that it relied on the Nokia Communicator 9000i device and not 

the Nokia Manuals as the prior art reference, Motorola points to its Amended Reduction of Prior 

Art References, filed on February 27, 2015, which lists “Nokia Communicator 9000i” as a prior 

art reference for the ’119 patent. Dkt. No. 230. Motorola also highlights its Motion to Strike 

Portions of Martin Haeberli’s Expert Reports, filed on February 4, 2015, where it attacked certain 

portions of Haeberli’s rebuttal report regarding the Nokia 9000i Communicator and described the 

 

4

The relevant pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides in relevant part: 

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless: 

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or 

patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 

country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or 

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication 

in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, 

more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in 

the United States, or 

35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b). 

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Nokia Manuals as “corroborative evidence.” Dkt. No. 190 at 13-14. 

I agree with Motorola that the prior art reference here is the Nokia 9000i Communicator 

telephone, not the Nokia Manuals. Fujifilm contends that Motorola’s obviousness theory fails 

nonetheless because no actual Nokia 9000i Communicator phone was admitted at trial. The 

Federal Circuit has held, however, that materials other than the invalidating device itself may 

provide substantial evidence of the device’s functionality for the purposes of proving invalidity. 

In finding a patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) in Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 

1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Federal Circuit stated, “That the offered product is in fact the claimed 

invention may be established by any relevant evidence, such as memoranda, drawings, 

correspondence, and testimony of witnesses.” Id. at 1263 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Similarly, in Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the 

Federal Circuit relied on a combination of “contemporaneous correspondence, color photographs, 

witness testimony, and promotional videos” to establish the characteristics of an anticipating 

process. Id. at 1352-1354. 

Motorola could have made a stronger showing regarding the Nokia 9000i Communicator. 

Still, its expert, Dr. Harry Bims, gave detailed testimony regarding the specific functionality of the 

Nokia Communicator 9000i based on his review of the Nokia Manuals. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 

1099:10-1102:06; 1141:04-1142:15. Two other witnesses, including Fujifilm’s expert Martin 

Haeberli, also provided testimony, albeit less detailed than Dr. Bims’s, regarding the availability 

and functionality of the device. See Trial Tr. at 549:12-25; Trial Ex. 1236. The jury had a 

substantial basis from which to infer the relevant characteristics of the Nokia Communicator 

9000i. 

Fujifilm contends that Dr. Bim’s description of the Nokia Manuals cannot be reasonably 

attributed to an actual Nokia Communicator 9000i phone from the relevant time period, given that 

there were multiple models of the Nokia Communicator 9000i, not all of which were sold in the 

United States during that time. See Fujifilm Reply at 16-17. This argument might be persuasive if 

there were evidence of material variation among the different Nokia Communicator 9000i models 

– such as evidence that certain of the models did not possess the relevant functionality – but 

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Fujifilm cites no evidence indicating that this was the case. Moreover, before the start of trial, I 

specifically authorized Mr. Haeberli to “offer his opinion on why a product manual . . . may fail to 

accurately describe the underlying product, and why in this case he believes there is insufficient 

evidence that the [Nokia Manuals] accurately describe the [Nokia Communicator 9000i].” 

Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 12-cv-03587-WHO, 2015 WL 1265009, at *13 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). Despite this ruling, Mr. Haeberli did not offer any testimony at trial 

regarding the purported unreliability of the Nokia Manuals. 

 Fujifilm argues in the alternative that the Nokia 9000i Communicator and the Bluetooth 

Vision Paper fail to render claims 1 and 35 obvious because they do not disclose two elements of 

the claims: (1) the “designating device . . . for selectively designating an apparatus to which the 

received data is to be transmitted” element; and (2) the “displaying a designating address” 

element. Fujifilm Mot. at 32-34. It also contends that Motorola failed to present sufficient 

evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the two 

references to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 34-36. Neither of these arguments warrants 

upsetting the jury’s verdict. Dr. Bims specifically explained how both the Nokia Communicator 

9000i and the Bluetooth Vision Paper disclosed the “designating device” element, Trial Tr. at 

1147:16-1149:14, and how the Bluetooth Vision Paper disclosed the “designating address” 

element,” id. at 1150:07-1151-02. The evidence presented by Fujifilm did not require the jury to 

reject this testimony. I also agree with Motorola that the jury was presented with sufficient 

evidence of a motivation to combine the two references to find that their combination rendered 

claims 1 and 35 obvious. Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL or for a new trial on this issue is DENIED. 

B. Licensing 

The jury found that Motorola is licensed under the BPLA as to claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 

patent. Verdict at 6. Fujifilm contends that this conclusion was unreasonable, and that it is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on licensing. Fujifilm Mot. at 44-46. I agree. 

Fujifilm is an Adopter Member of the Bluetooth SIG. Motorola is a Promoter Member of 

the Bluetooth SIG. Section 5(b) of the BPLA describes the license of “Necessary Claims” that 

each Associate and Adopter Member of the Bluetooth SIG grants to each Promoter Member: 

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Effective upon the adoption by Bluetooth SIG of each Bluetooth 

Specification, each Associate and Adopter Member and their 

Affiliates hereby grant to each Promoter Member and Associate and 

Adopter Member and all of their respective Affiliates (also 

collectively, “Licensee”) a nonexclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, 

irrevocable, nontransferable, nonsublicenseable, worldwide license 

under its Necessary Claims solely to make, have made, use, import, 

offer to sell, sell and otherwise distribute and dispose of Compliant 

Portions; provided that such license need not extend to any part or 

function of a product in which a Compliant Portion is incorporated 

that is not itself part of the Compliant Portion. 

BPLA § 5(b) (emphasis added). The BPLA defines “Necessary Claims” in the following two 

sentences: 

“Necessary Claims” means claims of a patent or patent application 

that (a) are owned or controlled by a party or its Affiliates 

(Licensor) now or at any future time while this License Agreement 

remains in effect; and (b) are necessarily infringed by implementing 

those portions of a Bluetooth Specification and/or Foundation 

Specification within the bounds of the Scope, wherein a claim is 

necessarily infringed only when it is not possible to avoid infringing 

it because there is no technically reasonable non-infringing 

alternative for implementing such portions of the Bluetooth 

Specification and/or Foundation Specification within the bounds of 

the Scope. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing sentence, Necessary Claims do not 

include any claims (i) other than those set forth above even if 

contained in the same patent as Necessary Claims; (ii) that read 

solely on any implementations of any portion of the Bluetooth 

Specification or Foundation Specification that are not within the 

bounds of the Scope; or (iii) that, if licensed, would require a 

payment of royalties by the Licensor to unaffiliated third parties. 

Id. § 1(l) (paragraphing added). Finally, the term “Scope” is defined as 

the protocols and data formats needed for Bluetooth interoperability, 

and the electrical signaling characteristics solely to the extent 

disclosed with particularity in a Bluetooth Specification and/or 

Foundation Specification where the sole purpose of such disclosure 

is to enable products to interoperate, interconnect or communicate as 

defined within such Bluetooth Specification and/or Foundation 

Specification. 

For clarification, the Scope shall not include (i) any enabling 

technologies that may be necessary to make or use any product or 

portion thereof that complies with the Bluetooth Specification 

and/or Foundation Specification, but are not themselves expressly 

set forth in the Bluetooth Specification and/or Foundation 

Specification (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing technology, 

compiler technology, object oriented technology, basic operating 

system technology, etc.); or (ii) the implementation of other 

published specifications developed elsewhere but referred to in the 

body of the Bluetooth Specification and/or Foundation 

Specification; or (iii) any portions of any product and any 

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combinations thereof the purpose or function of which is not 

required for compliance with the Bluetooth Specification and/or 

Foundation Specification; or (iv) Application Programming 

Interfaces, applications, or user interfaces; including the technology 

used to generate, display or interact with a user. 

Id. (paragraphing added). 

 At trial, Motorola argued that claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent were “Necessary Claims” 

for the purposes of the Personal Area Network (“PAN”), Dial Up Network (“DUN”), and Object 

Push (“OP”) profiles. However, Motorola presented no evidence to the jury, and does not 

currently dispute, that claims 1 and 35 are not “necessarily infringed by implementing [the PAN, 

DUN, and OPP profiles] within the bounds of the Scope.” BPLA § 1(l). Indeed, Motorola’s 

expert, Dr. James Lansford, admitted at trial that the PAN, DUN, and OP profiles can be 

implemented without infringing claims 1 and 35. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1250:23-25.

 Motorola argues that there is nevertheless sufficient evidence to support the licensing 

verdict because, “[a]s Dr. Lansford explained during trial, claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent are 

Necessary Claims because they recite both (1) in-Scope technology, such as the implementation of 

the [OP profile], and (2) enabling technologies, such as wireless telephones, that are reasonably 

necessary to implement those technologies.” Motorola Oppo. at 49-50 (citing Trial Tr. at 

1237:08-1241:01). This argument turns on the second provision of the second sentence of the 

“Necessary Claims” definition, which states that “Necessary Claims do not include any claims . . . 

that read solely on any implementations of any portion of the Bluetooth Specification or 

Foundation Specification that are not within the bounds of the Scope.” BPLA § 1(l). Pointing to 

this sentence, Motorola contends that “[i]t follows that claims that combine enabling technologies 

with technologies that are within the Scope, i.e., those underlying the basic protocols and data 

formats required to communicate using the Bluetooth Standard, are Necessary Claims, unless 

another exception applies.” Motorola Oppo. at 49 (emphasis omitted). 

 This argument is not persuasive. Its dispositive flaw is that it completely ignores the first 

sentence of the “Necessary Claims” definition, which plainly limits “Necessary Claims” to those 

that “are necessarily infringed by implementing those portions of a Bluetooth Specification and/or 

Foundation Specification within the bounds of the Scope.” BPLA § 1(l) (emphasis added). 

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Motorola’s position appears to be that it is okay to ignore the first sentence of the definition, 

because if the first sentence is given its plain meaning, then the second provision of the second 

sentence (i.e., the provision explaining that “Necessary Claims do not include any claims . . . that 

read solely on any implementations of any portion of the Bluetooth Specification or Foundation 

Specification that are not within the bounds of the Scope”) would merely serve to clarify the first 

sentence and would thus be “wholly unnecessary.” Motorola Oppo. at 49. 

 Motorola places far too much weight on the general rule that contract provisions should 

not be read as overlapping or redundant. As Fujifilm points out, “[e]ven agreements tailored to 

particular transactions sometimes include overlapping or redundant or meaningless provisions.” 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 cmt. b; see also Fujifilm Reply at 25. This is clearly the 

case with the “Necessary Claims” definition. This is exemplified both in that Motorola’s reading 

of the second provision of the second sentence would effectively eviscerate the definition of 

“Necessary Claims” set out in the first sentence, and also by the first provision of the second 

sentence, which explains that “Necessary Claims do not include any claims . . . other than those 

set forth above even if contained in the same patent as Necessary Claims.” BPLA § 1(l). This 

provision is obviously designed to clarify the first sentence; Motorola does not explain how it 

could be reasonably read in any other way. 

 Motorola also contends that its position is supported by the BPLA’s purported purpose of 

“facilitat[ing] sharing of intellectual property among [Bluetooth SIG] members and . . . avoid[ing] 

intellectual property disputes.” Motorola Oppo. at 48; see also id. at 49 (arguing that Fujifilm’s 

position “would undermine the BPLA’s purpose of facilitating sharing of intellectual property 

necessary to practice the Bluetooth standard”). Tellingly, however, Motorola does not provide a 

citation for this sentence and does not identify any evidence in the record to support it. The 

BPLA’s purported purpose does not provide a substantial basis for the conclusion that claims 1 

and 35 of the ’119 patent are “Necessary Claims” under the BPLA. 

 Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL of no licensing of claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent is 

GRANTED. Its request for a new trial on this issue is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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 C. Infringement 

The jury found that the accused products infringe claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent. 

Motorola’s argument for judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement of these claims centers 

on their respective “menu” limitations. See Motorola Mot. at 37-40; Motorola Reply at 28-30. 

Claim 1 requires a “menu compris[ing] selections for a receive mode for indicating that data has 

been received, a transmit image mode for transmitting an image from the wireless telephone to an 

apparatus, a receive mail mode for receiving characters, and a transmit mail mode for transmitting 

characters.” ’119 patent at 4:51-46. Claim 35 likewise requires “a menu comprising selections for 

at least one of a transmit image mode for transmitting an image from the wireless telephone to an 

apparatus, a receive mail mode for receiving characters, and a transmit mail mode for transmitting 

characters.” ’119 patent at 9:59-63.

 The parties do not dispute that to infringe claim 1’s menu limitation, the accused product 

must contain a menu with four modes: a receive data mode, a transmit image mode, a receive mail 

mode, and a transmit mail mode. See, e.g., Motorola Mot. at 38. Motorola argues that Mr. 

Haeberli’s testimony on infringement of this limitation was defective because it involved 

“navigating through a series of different applications and application menus.” Motorola Mot. at 

38; see also Motorola Reply at 28 (“Motorola’s position is that the menu element as understood by 

one skilled in the art cannot be satisfied by combining individual selections that only exist across a 

variety of distinct applications that are not presented to the user at the same time or within the 

same menu.”). Motorola identifies nothing in the ’119 patent that required the jury to reject Mr. 

Haeberli’s testimony on claim 1’s menu limitation, except to repeatedly refer to claim 1’s 

recitation of “a menu.” Mr. Haeberli specifically addressed this same argument in his testimony, 

explaining that the claim says nothing about different applications or “having to jump between 

screens.” Trial Tr. at 1683:21-25. The jury was entitled to credit Mr. Haeberli’s testimony, and to 

rely on their own conclusions as to the menu limitation’s “plain and ordinary meaning to a person 

of ordinary skill in the art,” Final Jury Instruction No. 18, to find that the accused products 

infringe claim 1. 

 Motorola’s argument regarding claim 35’s menu limitation is substantially identical to its 

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argument regarding claim 1’s menu limitation. Motorola contends that Mr. Haeberli’s testimony 

failed to establish infringement of this limitation because the testimony relied on “a multistep 

process, involving multiple menu screens, multiple applications, and multiple user inputs.” 

Motorola Mot. at 40. Motorola again identifies nothing in the ’119 patent to support this argument 

apart from the words “a menu” in claim 35. Mr. Haeberli testified that the accused products 

contain a menu comprising a selection for a transmit image mode because they contain a menu 

selection for transmitting an image to another device via Bluetooth and/or DLNA. Trial Tr. at 

486:07-489:19. He also specifically addressed the same argument Motorola relies on now, 

explaining that claim 35 says nothing about applications or about “navigating through different 

screens,” and reiterating how the menu limitation is found in the accused products. Id. at 1681:01-

1683:11. Again, the jury was entitled to credit Mr. Haeberli’s testimony, and to rely on their own 

conclusions as to the menu limitation’s “plain and ordinary meaning to a person of ordinary skill 

in the art,” Jury Instruction No. 18, to find that the accused products infringe claim 35. 

 Motorola’s motion for JMOL of noninfringement of claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent, or 

for a new trial on the issue, is DENIED. 

III. CLAIM 13 OF THE ’119 PATENT 

Claim 13 of the ’119 patent recites: 

A data transmission system, comprising: 

at least one wireless telephone comprising: 

a first wireless communication device for receiving data; 

a first transmitting and receiving circuit coupled to said first 

wireless communication device; 

a transmitting and receiving buffer coupled to said first 

transmitting and receiving circuit for temporarily storing said data; 

a second transmitting and receiving circuit coupled to said 

transmitting and receiving buffer; 

and a second wireless communication device coupled to said 

second transmitting and receiving circuit for transmitting the data 

to a designated apparatus without a transmitting provider, wherein 

said wireless telephone receives and transmits the data without 

storing the entire data set on the wireless telephone. 

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’119 patent at 6:35-53. As with claims 1 and 35 of the ’119 patent, the jury found claim 13 invalid 

but infringed. Verdict at 4-5. It did not find the claim licensed under the BPLA. Id. at 6. 

Fujifilm challenges the invalidity verdict, while Motorola challenges the infringement verdict. See

Fujifilm Mot. at 36-44; Fujifilm Reply at 22-24; Motorola Mot. at 32-37; Motorola Reply at 22-

28.

A. Validity

The jury found claim 13 invalid as both anticipated and obvious. Verdict at 5. Fujifilm 

contends that neither invalidity finding is supported by sufficient evidence and requests both 

judgment as a matter of law and a new trial on the validity of claim 13. 

 1. Anticipation 

 Fujifilm asserts that Motorola’s only anticipation argument at trial rested on U.S. Patent 

No. 6,714,530 to Haartsen et al. (“Haartsen”), and that Haartsen does not disclose all of the 

elements of claim 13. Specifically, Fujifilm contends that Haartsen does not disclose the claimed 

“data” of claim 13, because Haartsen discloses a “real-time voice transmission system,” and the 

“real-time voice data” transmitted by this system “would not be considered to be the claimed 

‘data,’ as one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that term.” Fujifilm Mot. at 37. 

Fujifilm also contends that Haartsen fails to disclose the claimed “transmitting and receiving 

buffer” of claim 13, because, according to Mr. Haeberli’s testimony, the only buffer identified in 

Haartsen must be located in the disclosed system’s transmitting circuit. Id. at 38. Fujifilm asserts 

that “[t]he presence of the buffer in the transmitting circuit . . . precludes it from being a 

transmitting and receiving buffer.” Id. (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). 

 I am not persuaded by either of these arguments. Dr. Bims testified that the system 

disclosed in Haartsen transmits data and identified multiple places in the patent that describe the 

transmission and receipt of data by the disclosed system. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1113:17-1115:07. 

He also gave his opinion that the plain and ordinary meaning of “data” as used in claim 13 is not 

limited to high-quality image data, but rather extends to low-quality image data, application data, 

text data, video data, and, most relevant here, audio data. Id. at 1201:12-1202:04; see also id. at 

1207:24-1208:02 (“Q: First of all, do you agree that audio data is not data within the meaning of 

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claim 13? A: Audio data is, indeed, data within the meaning of claim 13.”). Mr. Haeberli 

disagreed that Haartsen discloses the sort of “data” recited in claim 13, but the jury was not 

required to credit Mr. Haeberli’s opinion over Dr. Bims’s. 

 With respect to the transmitting and receiving buffer limitation, Dr. Bims testified that the 

“first-in-first-out” (“FIFO”) buffer disclosed in Haartsen is a type of buffer in which the data 

enters the buffer in a particular order, and that this order is preserved when the data leaves the 

buffer. Trial Tr. at 1117:16-20. He specifically stated that the FIFO buffer disclosed in Haartsen 

both transmits and receives data. Id. at 1117:21-23. He explained that this is because the 

disclosed system “relay[s] data in both directions.” Id. at 1117:24-1118:01. The jury was also 

presented with an excerpt from Mr. Haeberli’s deposition, taken after Dr. Bims had already 

rendered his opinion that the FIFO buffer in Haartsen satisfies the transmitting and receiving 

buffer limitation, in which Mr. Haeberli stated that he did not know whether a FIFO buffer would 

satisfy the transmitting and receiving buffer limitation, but that he “can’t imagine that there’s an 

argument that says [it] would not.” Trial Tr. at 1707:16-1708:08. Mr. Haeberli opined at trial that 

the FIFO buffer in Haartsen must be located in the system’s transmitting circuit, and that it does 

not make sense for the buffer to both transmit and receive data. See Trial Tr. 1665:21-1668:09. 

Again, however, the jury was not required to credit this testimony over that of Dr. Bims. 

 Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL of no anticipation of claim 13 of the ’119 patent, or for a new 

trial on the issue, is DENIED. 

 2. Obviousness 

“[A]nticipation is the ultimate of obviousness.” In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 

388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Because the jury’s finding of anticipation is supported by substantial 

evidence, the same is necessarily true of its finding of obviousness. See id. Accordingly, 

Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL of no obviousness of claim 13 of the ’119 patent, or for a new trial on 

the issue, is DENIED. 

B. Infringement 

To prove infringement of claim 13, Fujifilm was required to show that the accused 

products include “a transmitting and receiving buffer” that is “coupled to” a “first transmitting and 

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receiving circuit” and a “second transmitting and receiving circuit.” See ’119 patent at 6:42-45. 

Motorola contends that Fujifilm failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably 

conclude that the accused products contain a “transmitting and receiving buffer,” or that the 

transmitting and receiving buffer is “coupled to” the first and second transmitting and receiving 

circuits. 

 1. “Transmitting and Receiving Buffer”

 Mr. Haeberli testified that this limitation is satisfied by the random access memory 

(“RAM”) in the accused phones. See Trial Tr. at 504:16-20 (“The phones each have random 

access memory, which is attached to the application processors in the phone. And a piece of that 

RAM memory is partitioned off for the purpose of holding buffers – that is, packets . . . of data 

that are flowing through the phone.”). He explained that his opinion was based partly on his 

testing and analysis of data flow in the accused phones, partly on his review of some of the 

relevant source code, and also partly on the deposition testimony of Motorola’s own engineers, 

Vissa and Labana. See id. at 504:21-506:02. Vissa agreed at his deposition that there is “separate 

RAM that’s somewhere in the phone in which the buffering occurs.” Trial Ex. at 507 at 61:14-17. 

Labana similarly agreed at his deposition that “the data would then proceed from the transceiver 

and be temporarily stored in RAM.” Trial Ex. at 506 at 152:06-12. The relevant portions of these 

depositions were shared with the jury at trial. 

 Motorola argues that Mr. Haeberli’s testimony, and that of its engineers, cannot establish 

the “transmitting and receiving buffer” limitation because Fujifilm did not identify a particular 

structure in the accused phones that corresponds to the claimed “transmitting and receiving 

buffer.” Motorola cites Cross Med. Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 

1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005), for the propositions that a system claim such as claim 13 “cover[s] what a 

device is, not what a device does,” and that a device “must meet all of the structural limitations” of 

the asserted system claim to infringe. Id. at 1311-12 (emphasis in original; internal quotation 

marks omitted).

 Even assuming that Motorola is right on the law, it is wrong that Fujifilm failed to identify 

a “transmitting and receiving buffer” structure in the accused phones. Mr. Haeberli clearly 

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pointed to the RAM in the accused phones as the claimed “transmitting and receiving buffer.” See

Trial Tr. at 504:16-20. In addition, Dr. Bims specifically identified the RAM in the accused 

phones for the jury using a block diagram. See Trial Tr. at 1094:02-18; Trial Ex. 265 at 7. 

Motorola does not dispute that RAM qualifies as a structure. 

 Motorola next contends that the RAM in the accused phones cannot satisfy the 

“transmitting and receiving buffer” limitation because the ’119 patent “expressly discloses the 

‘transmitting and receiving buffer’ and RAM as two distinct and separate structures.” Motorola 

Reply at 25. It is true that one figure in the ’119 patent displays the “transmitting and receiving 

buffer” and “RAM” as two distinct structures. See ’119 patent at Fig. 2. But Motorola identifies 

nothing in the ’119 patent, much less in the language of claim 13, that requires the transmitting 

and receiving buffer and RAM to be separate structures, or that precludes RAM from serving as 

the transmitting and receiving buffer. The jury was permitted to reject Motorola’s reading of the 

“transmitting and receiving buffer” limitation and to rely instead on Mr. Haeberli’s testimony, 

which is apparently what it did. It did not act unreasonably, or without sufficient evidence to 

support its conclusion, in doing so. 

 2. “Coupled To”

 Motorola’s contention that there was insufficient evidence that the transmitting and 

receiving buffer is coupled to the first and second transmitting and receiving circuits in the 

accused phones is also unconvincing. Mr. Haeberli specifically testified that the “coupled to” 

requirement is satisfied and explained that his testing and analysis of data flow between the 

relevant components confirmed that they are coupled together. See Trial Tr. at 503:01-504:03, 

506:04-507:01; see also id. at 1658:10-15 (“[T]he data flows in through the cellular transceiver, 

through the . . . buffer portion or partition of RAM, and out through the WiFi and Bluetooth 

transceivers of the accused devices.”). Dr. Bims opined that the coupling requirement is not 

satisfied because the RAM in the accused phones is “connected to the CPU” and is not “in line” 

with the cellular transceiver and the Bluetooth and Wi-Fi transceivers. See id. at 1097 at 15-18. 

But there is no “in line” requirement in claim 13; Dr. Bims admitted on cross-examination that the 

claim does not contain those words. See id. at 1175:18-19. Again, the jury was permitted to reject 

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Motorola’s reading of the “coupled to” limitation and to rely instead on Mr. Haeberli’s testimony. 

 In sum, Motorola has not shown that the jury’s finding of infringement of claim 13 of the 

’119 patent was not supported by substantial evidence, or that it was contrary to the clear weight 

of the evidence. Motorola’s motion for JMOL or for a new trial on this issue is DENIED. 

IV. THE ’763 PATENT 

 The ’763 patent is titled, “Method and Apparatus for Compression Coding of Image Data 

Representative of a Color Image and Digital Camera Including the Same.” ’763 patent. At trial, 

Fujifilm asserted infringement of claim 1, an independent claim, and of claims 2, 7, and 11, each 

of which is dependent on claim 1. The jury found each of the asserted claims valid; claims 1, 7, 

and 11 infringed; and claim 2 not infringed. Verdict at 3, 5. The claims are as follows: 

1. An apparatus for compressing and coding image data 

representative of a color image and including a luminance 

component and chrominance components, and outputting resulting 

coded image data, said apparatus comprising: 

a signal processing circuit for processing the image data to output 

processed image data; 

a storage for storing the processed image data and allowing the 

processed image data to be read out in preselected blocks 

component by component; 

a compression coding circuit for compressing and coding the 

processed image data read out of said storage component by 

component to output coded data; 

an outputting circuit for outputting the coded data; 

and a system controller for controlling said compression coding 

circuit in accordance with a mode for compressing the image data; 

said system controller being operative in response to a 

monochrome mode selected for compressing and coding the image 

data such that the image data render a monochrome image to fix 

the chrominance components of the image data to a single, fixed 

value, and control said compression coding circuit to compress and 

code resulting fixed chrominance components and the luminance 

component. 

[ . . . ] 

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2. An apparatus in accordance with claim 1, wherein said signal 

processing circuit transforms an RGB color image signal input 

thereto to the image data including the luminance component and 

the chrominance components, and fixes the chrominance 

components to the fixed value when the monochrome mode is 

selected. 

[ . . . ] 

7. An apparatus in accordance with claim 1, wherein said 

compression coding circuit comprises: an orthogonal transforming 

circuit for executing orthogonal transform with the image data read 

out of said storage to thereby output corresponding transform 

coefficients; a quantizing circuit for normalizing the transform 

coefficients to thereby output normalized transform coefficients; 

and a coding circuit for assigning preselected codes to the 

normalized transform coefficients. 

[ . . . ] 

11. An apparatus in accordance with claim 1, wherein said 

compression coding circuit executes compression coding based on 

a JPEG system. 

’763 patent at 13:49-14:59. Motorola challenges the jury’s findings on validity with respect to 

claims 1, 2, 7, and 11, and the jury’s findings on infringement and damages with respect to claims 

1, 7 and 11. Motorola Mot. at 4-31; Motorola Reply at 2-20. Fujifilm does not raise any 

arguments with respect to the ’763 patent. 

A. Validity 

Motorola does not dispute the jury’s rejection of its anticipation argument for claims 1, 2, 7 

and 11 but contends that the jury erred by failing to find the claims obvious. Specifically, 

Motorola asserts that the claims are obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,486,981 to Shimura et al. 

(“Shimura”), “in combination with the skill and knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time of 

the invention.” Motorola Mot. at 15.5

The problem with this argument is that Motorola failed to raise it at trial. Motorola did not 

 

5

The day before the hearing on these motions, Motorola filed a notice informing the Court that 

Motorola had sought ex parte reexamination on claims 1, 2, 7 and 11 of the ’763 patent, and that 

on November 17, 2015 the PTO had issued an office action rejecting the claims. Dkt. No. 378. 

The parties agreed at the hearing that this does not impact the resolution of these motions, and 

neither party has submitted any additional/updated information about the PTO proceedings. 

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develop for the jury a single obviousness theory involving Shimura. Dr. Bovik’s testimony 

regarding Shimura was focused exclusively on the theory that Shimura teaches all elements of 

claims 1, 2, 7 and 11 of the ’763 patent. See Trial Tr. at 1369:15-1379:08. Dr. Bovik’s 

demonstrative slides for Shimura contained two columns, one listing the elements of the asserted 

claims and another titled “Shimura” with an empty box next to each of the elements. See Fujifilm 

Mot. at 18-19. Counsel for Motorola added a check mark in each empty box as Dr. Bovik 

testified, indicating that the corresponding element is found in Shimura. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 

1377:02-04 (“Q: So in your opinion, . . . does Shimura teach all the elements of claim 1 of the 

’763 patent? A: Yeah. All the boxes have been checked. I didn’t ask you to, but you did it. Yeah, 

I think every element is met.”). In line with Dr. Bovik’s testimony and slides, during closing 

argument counsel for Motorola stated: 

We did talk about invalidity with respect to the ’763 patent, and 

that was the Shimura reference. The Shimura reference is, again, a 

Japanese patent. Professor Bovik discussed it at some length. And 

he concluded that all the elements of the claims are found in the 

Shimura patent. 

Trial Tr. at 1864:03-08. 

 Motorola urges that Dr. Bovik and others provided testimony regarding the skill and 

knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time of the invention. See Motorola Reply at 6-7. 

Motorola also notes that Dr. Bovik’s slides were titled “Invalidity,” not “Anticipation.” Id. But 

Motorola fails to identify any testimony from the record that connects Shimura to the skill and 

knowledge of one skilled in the art at the time of the invention, or that otherwise directly addresses 

this obviousness theory (or any obviousness theory) involving Shimura. I agree with Fujifilm that 

Motorola cannot raise the theory now. See Fractus, S.A. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 876 F. Supp. 2d 

802, 838 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that defendant waived any indefiniteness argument where it 

“failed to present any explicit indefiniteness evidence at trial” and did not “make a single reference 

to indefiniteness during trial;” stating that “[a]llowing [defendant] to revive its [indefiniteness] 

defense post-trial deprives [plaintiff] of any opportunity to substantively respond with its own 

testimony or evidence”); Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 808 F.Supp.2d 715, 735 (D. Del. 2011) 

(finding that defendants “clearly present a different theory of obviousness post-trial than was 

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presented at trial,” and that defendants could not “switc[h] horses by combining pieces of 

testimony . . . into new obviousness theories. As defendants did not allow [plaintiff] to mount a 

defense at trial to the [new obviousness] theories, the court does not entertain them here”).

 Further, even assuming that Motorola’s obviousness argument is not technically waived, 

given Motorola’s total failure to coherently present an obviousness theory to the jury, Motorola’s 

position that the jury was required to find obviousness, despite its undisputedly correct conclusion 

that Shimura patent does not anticipate, is far from convincing. Motorola’s motion for JMOL of 

invalidity of the asserted claims of the ’763 patent, or for a new trial on the issue, is DENIED. 

B. Infringement

Motorola makes two basic arguments regarding the jury’s verdict of infringement of 

claims 1, 7, and 11 of the ’763 patent. The first concerns Dr. Castleman’s testimony regarding 

claim 1’s five hardware limitations, i.e., its “signal processing circuit,” “storage,” “compression 

coding circuit,” “compression coding circuit,” and “system controller” limitations. See Motorola 

Mot. at 7-9. The second concerns the “to fix” limitation in the final paragraph of claim 1. See id. 

at 10-15. Motorola makes no arguments specific to claims 7 and 11 except to note that they are 

dependent on claim 1. 

 1. The Hardware Limitations 

In its opening brief, Motorola argued that Dr. Castleman’s testimony regarding claim 1’s 

five hardware limitations was deficient because Dr. Castleman merely stated that the limitations 

were found in the accused phones but did not identify any specific corresponding structures in the 

phones. Motorola Mot. at 8-9. Motorola asserted that “[s]uch an unsubstantiated statement, 

limited only to the functionality and not the structure required by the claim language, and without 

any support or linking to the accused Motorola products or any evidence beyond Dr. Castleman’s 

conclusory opinion, cannot satisfy Fujifilm’s burden of proving” that the limitations are found in 

the accused phones. Id.

 Fujifilm responded in its opposition brief by citing to Federal Rule of Evidence 705, which 

provides that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion – and give the 

reasons for it – without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be 

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required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 705. Fujifilm noted 

that the Federal Circuit has recognized that Rule 705 is “fully applicable” to patent trials, which 

are “particularly served” by Rule 705’s purpose of “avoid[ing] complex and time consuming 

testimony.” Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Fujifilm also pointed out that Motorola declined to ask Dr. Castleman 

any questions about the five hardware limitations on cross examination, and that Motorola’s own 

expert on the ’763 patent, Dr. Bovik, agreed that these limitations are present in the accused 

phones: 

Q: . . .You’ve gone through these . . . elements before. Would it be 

fair to say that all of the elements down to the said system 

controller, which you’ve described – those would be . . . hardware 

limitations that you said are generally found in prior art in most 

products. Correct? 

A. Yeah. I don’t think anybody in this case has disputed that. 

Q. And there’s no dispute that those elements are found in all of 

the accused ’763 products. Correct? 

A. I have no problem with that statement. 

Trial Tr. at 1400:03-13. Motorola offers no counterargument in its reply brief and appears to have 

abandoned its initial position on the hardware limitations. 

 Whether or not Motorola has indeed abandoned the argument, I agree with Fujifilm that it 

is without merit. In light of the testimony of Dr. Castleman and Dr. Bovik, the total absence of 

cross-examination or any contrary evidence regarding claim 1’s hardware limitations, and Federal 

Rule of Evidence 705, there was more than enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that 

the limitations are found in the accused devices. Motorola’s first argument does not justify 

judgment as a matter of law of noninfringement; nor does it justify a new trial on the issue. 

 2. The “To Fix” Limitation 

 Motorola’s second noninfringement argument is really a group of overlapping arguments 

concerning the “to fix” (or “fixing”) limitation of claim 1 of the ’763 patent. That limitation 

appears in the final paragraph of claim 1, which reads, with emphasis added to the limitation: 

said system controller being operative in response to a 

monochrome mode selected for compressing and coding the image 

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data such that the image data render a monochrome image to fix 

the chrominance components of the image data to a single, fixed 

value, and control said compression coding circuit to compress and 

code resulting fixed chrominance components and the luminance 

component. 

’763 patent at 13:66-14:06 (emphasis added). 

 Motorola attacks Dr. Castleman’s opinion that the accused phones satisfy the “fixing” 

limitation because they employ a process that results in a monochrome image with fixed 

chrominance components. See Motorola Mot. at 10-11. According to Motorola, Dr. Castleman’s 

opinion is flawed because it “reduces the fixing limitation to a tautology: if all monochrome 

images have zero-valued chrominance data, and any process that creates zero-valued chrominance 

data satisfies the fixing limitation, then there is no difference between the ‘render a monochrome 

image’ limitation and the fixing limitation.” Id. at 11. 

 While it is unclear how best to characterize this argument, I agree with Fujifilm that it is 

without merit however characterized. To the extent that it is a claim construction argument, it 

fails because it is not timely. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “litigants waive their 

right to present new claim construction disputes if they are raised for the first time after trial.” 

Lazare Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 628 F.3d 1359, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 

1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). At no point during the course of this litigation has Motorola 

requested construction of the fixing limitation or offered a construction of it, except to argue at 

summary judgment that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting (an argument I rejected). To the 

extent that Motorola’s tautology argument is a claim construction argument, it is barred as 

waived. 

 To the extent that the argument is something other than a claim construction argument, it 

fails because it assumes that there is a redundancy in claim 1 that does not exist – or at least that 

the jury was not required to avoid by rejecting Dr. Castleman’s testimony. In its post-trial 

briefing, Motorola portrays the “fixing” limitation as part of one continuous phrase starting with 

“compressing and coding the image data such that the image data render a monochrome image.” 

See Motorola Reply at 2-3. But this is not the way that Motorola portrayed the “fixing” limitation 

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in its summary judgment briefing. There, Motorola portrayed the final paragraph of claim 1 as 

follows: 

said system controller being operative in response to a 

monochrome mode selected for compressing and coding the image 

data such that the image data render a monochrome image to fix 

the chrominance components of the image data to a single, fixed 

value, and control said compression coding circuit to compress and 

code resulting fixed chrominance components and the luminance 

component. 

Dkt. No. 153 at 18 (emphasis in original). I did the same in the Summary Judgment Order. 

Summary Judgment Order at 23-24. Under this reading, the phrase “compressing and coding the 

image data such that the image data render a monochrome image” pertains to the claimed 

“monochrome mode,” while the “fixing” limitation pertains to the claimed “system controller.” 

In other words, claim 1 defines a “monochrome mode,” one that is “selected for compressing and 

coding the image data such that the image data render a monochrome image.” And claim 1 also 

defines how the “system controller” operates: “in response to a monochrome mode” and “to fix 

the chrominance components of the image data to a single, fixed value.” The phrase 

“compressing and coding the image data such that the image data render a monochrome image” 

explains when the “monochrome mode” is selected, while the “fixing” limitation explains what 

the “system controller” does. Under this reading, there is no redundancy in claim 1. 

 Motorola next contends that there was insufficient evidence that the “fixing” limitation is 

found in the accused phones because those devices do not process color image data in 

chrominance/luminance format. See Motorola Mot. at 11-12. Motorola states: “First, claim 1 

recites a process (fixing) that is done to the chrominance components to create a monochrome 

image. This necessarily requires that there are color chrominance components to operate upon. 

However, color image data in chrominance/luminance format never exists in the accused 

Motorola products.” Id. Like the “tautology” argument, this argument is hard to characterize but 

fails however characterized. To the extent that it is a new claim construction argument, it is 

barred by the waiver doctrine discussed above. To the extent that it is not a new claim 

construction argument, it fails because it is substantially identical to an old one. Motorola raised 

essentially the same purported distinction between claim 1 and the accused products in its motion 

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for summary judgment, albeit in the form of an argument that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. 

See Summary Judgment Order at 24-25. I rejected the argument then, and Motorola does not 

identify, much less establish, grounds that justify reconsideration at this juncture. 

 Finally, Motorola argues that the “fixing” limitation “requires that the conversion to 

monochrome include fixing chrominance components to a single, fixed value,” and that “[t]he 

evidence was undisputed that Motorola generates monochrome output via calculation, not via the 

straightforward ‘fixing’ of [claim 1].” Motorola Mot. at 12. Once again, to the extent that this is 

a new claim construction argument, it is barred by the waiver doctrine discussed above. To the 

extent that Motorola is arguing that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the plain 

and ordinary meaning of “to fix” extends to the accused products, the parties presented competing 

expert testimony on this issue. Fujifilm’s expert, Ms. Frederickson Cross, testified that the 

algorithms employed by the accused products operate “to fix” the chrominance components in the 

image data, and that “there is really very little difference” between “fixed” and “calculated” from 

a software standpoint. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1564:19-1566:23. Motorola objects to this testimony 

as beyond the scope of Ms. Frederickson Cross’s expert report and deposition, but while Motorola 

objected to certain aspects of Ms. Frederickson Cross’s testimony on this ground, it identifies no 

point at which it objected to her testimony regarding whether the accused products perform the 

required “fixing.” See Motorola Reply at 5. In any event, while Dr. Bovik opined that there is a 

distinction between the “fixing” disclosed in claim 1 and the “calculating” performed by the 

accused phones, see Trial Tr. at 1368:10-12, I am not persuaded that the jury was required to 

apply his conception of “fixing,” even in the absence of competing testimony from Dr. 

Frederickson-Cross, in particular given that Dr. Castleman’s infringement testimony also 

provided support for a broader reading of “to fix.” 

Motorola’s motion for JMOL of noninfringement of claims 1, 7, and 11 of the ’763 patent, 

or for a new trial on the issue, is DENIED. 

C. Damages 

The jury found that Fujifilm was entitled to a lump-sum award of $10.24 million for past 

and future infringement of the ’763 patent. Verdict at 8. Motorola argues that there is no

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substantial basis for this award, and that at most the record supports a lump-sum award of $2.45 

million, the amount proposed by Motorola’s damages expert, Dr. Nisha Mody, for infringement of 

the ’763 patent. Motorola Mot. at 23. 

 Motorola’s basic argument for upsetting the jury’s damages award is that it far exceeds Dr. 

Mody’s proposed award for infringement of the ’763 patent, and that Fujifilm’s expert, Dr. Gareth 

Macartney, opined that the parties would have entered into a running royalty agreement, not a 

lump-sum agreement. Motorola emphasizes that “[r]unning-royalty agreements can be relevant to 

lump-sum damages,” but that “some basis for comparison must exist in the evidence presented to 

the jury.” Wordtech Sys., Inc v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Motorola, there is no basis for comparison 

here because of various flaws in Dr. Macartney’s testimony. 

 This argument largely boils down to the position that because the jury did not specifically 

apply either of the parties’ experts’ damages figures, their damages award must be overturned. I 

am not convinced. The “factual determination of a reasonable royalty . . . need not be supported, 

and indeed, frequently is not supported, by the specific figures advanced by either party.” 

SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A jury 

is “entitled to choose a damages award within the amounts advocated by the opposing parties.” 

Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also SmithKline, 926 

F.2d at1168 (“[T]he district court may reject the extreme figures proffered by the litigants as 

incredible and substitute an intermediate figure as a matter of its judgment from all of the 

evidence.”). The “jury’s choice simply must be within the range encompassed by the record as a 

whole.” Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The jury’s 

$10.24 million lump-sum award is well within this range and is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Further, most if not all of Motorola’s critiques of Dr. Macartney’s damages opinions are 

reiterations of arguments I previously rejected in ruling on Motorola’s motion to exclude Dr. 

Macartney’s testimony from trial. See Dkt. No. 269 (“Order on Defendant’s Motion to Exclude 

Testimony of Keith Pardy and Dr. Gareth Macartney”). To the extent that the critiques are still 

relevant despite the jury’s decision to award a lump-sum figure instead of a running royalty, they 

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go to weight, not admissibility, and do not provide a basis for upsetting the jury’s damages award. 

 The damages award is “within the range encompassed by the record as a whole,” Unisplay, 

69 F.3d at 519, and is supported by substantial evidence. Motorola’s motion for JMOL on 

damages is DENIED. Its requests for a new trial on damages and for remittitur are also DENIED. 

V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 

Fujifilm moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) for a discretionary award of 

prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court has held that “prejudgment interest should ordinarily be 

awarded [under 35 U.S.C. § 284] absent some justification for withholding such an award.” Gen. 

Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983); see also Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 

F.3d 1335, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“When a patentee asserts a patent claim that is held to be valid 

and infringed, prejudgment interest is generally awarded.”). The purpose of a prejudgment 

interest award in this context is to “compensate[] the patent owner for the use of its money 

between the date of injury and the date of judgment.” Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 

1033 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “In the typical case, an award of prejudgment interest is necessary to 

ensure that the patent owner is placed in as good a position as he would have been in had the 

infringer entered into a reasonable royalty agreement.” Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 655. 

The rate of prejudgment interest is left to the discretion of the district court, which may 

award interest at or above the prime rate. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 

1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991). A court may use the prime rate, the prime rate plus a percentage, the 

United States Treasury Bill (“T-Bill”) rate, a state statutory rate, the corporate rate, or “whatever 

rate the court deems appropriate under the circumstances.” Junker v. HDC Corp., No. 07-cv05094-JCS, 2008 WL 3385819, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2008); accord Apple, Inc. v. Samsung 

Elecs. Co., 67 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2014). In addition to determining the 

appropriate rate of prejudgment interest, the court must also determine whether to award simple or 

compound interest. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This 

matter is also “largely within the discretion of the district court.” Id. 

Fujifilm seeks prejudgment interest at the California statutory interest rate of seven 

percent, compounded quarterly, from the start of infringement, which the parties agree is June 1, 

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2009, until the date that final judgment was entered, August 6, 2015. Rule 59 Mot. at 1-4 (Dkt. 

No. 363). In the alternative, Fujifilm asks that I apply the prime rate of 3.25 percent, also 

compounded quarterly. Id. at 4-5. Dr. Macartney calculates that the state statutory interest rate 

compounded quarterly would result in a prejudgment interest award of $5,486,277. Macartney 

Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1 (Dkt. Nos. 363-1, 363-2). He calculates that the prime rate compounded quarterly 

would result in an award of $2,268,562. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. 1. 

Motorola opposes Fujifilm’s request. Dkt. No. 371 (“Rule 59 Oppo.”). It contends that 

“[g]iven the size of the jury’s award, the Court should deny prejudgment interest all together.” 

Rule 59 Oppo. at 1; see also id. at 2 (“[F]or the reasons set forth in Motorola’s Motion for 

Judgment as a Matter of Law and New Trial, the jury’s award of $10.24 million far exceeds the 

appropriate amount of damages for the ‘763 patent supported by the record.”). In the alternative, 

Motorola asks that I apply the T-Bill rate, either without compounding or compounded annually, 

resulting in a prejudgment interest award of either $208,955 (without compounding) or $210,750 

(compounded annually). Id. at 2-6; Mody Decl. ¶ 7 (Dkt. No. 371-1). 

In support of their respective positions on the appropriate interest rate, the parties offer 

competing characterizations of the quantum of evidence (if any) necessary to justify a 

prejudgment interest award calculated at above the T-Bill rate, and of Fujifilm’s financial 

condition during the period of infringement. Motorola contends that “the [T-Bill] rate is 

appropriate absent evidence justifying a higher amount,” and that “Fujifilm has provided no 

evidence that it has borrowed money at any rate, much less that any debt Fujifilm has taken on 

could have been avoided if it had received the damages award in June 2009.” Rule 59 Oppo. at 2-

3. Citing to Fujifilm’s annual reports, Motorola observes that Fujifilm maintained substantial 

reserves (over $2 billion) throughout the period of infringement. Id. at 3; Mody Decl. ¶ 4. 

Fujifilm responds that a review of its annual reports “reveals that [it] was only able to maintain its 

[cash] reserves through continuous and substantial cost reductions and structured reforms.” Rule 

59 Reply at 4-5 (Dkt. No. 374). Fujifilm also points out that the Federal Circuit has squarely held 

that “it is not necessary that a patentee demonstrate that it borrowed at the prime rate in order to be 

entitled to prejudgment interest at that rate.” Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 

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1545 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 

1564, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a patentee does not have to make “an affirmative 

demonstration, i.e., proof of borrowing at or above prime, . . . to be entitled to an award of 

prejudgment interest at the prime rate”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

I find that the appropriate interest rate here is the prime rate, compounded quarterly. 

Motorola’s arguments for withholding prejudgment interest altogether are not convincing, and 

neither party offers more than a scintilla of evidence in support of its desired rate. Absent a more 

conclusive record, I find that the “the prime rate more nearly approximates the position [Fujifilm] 

would have been in had [Motorola] entered into a reasonable royalty agreement.” A&L Tech. v. 

Resound Corp., No. 93-cv-00107-CW, 1995 WL 415146, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 1995); see 

also Matter of Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 

1395 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“When the record is inconclusive, courts commonly supply the prime rate 

that banks charge for unsecured loans to creditworthy customers.”). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Fujifilm’s motion for JMOL or for a new trial is GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART, Motorola’s motion is DENIED, and Fujifilm’s motion to alter or 

amend the judgment is GRANTED. Fujifilm is awarded prejudgment interest at the prime rate, 

compounded quarterly. An amended Final Judgment in accordance with this Order will issue. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

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