Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01685/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01685-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACKSON MANIVANH,

CDCR #AY-7787,

Plaintiff,

vs.

OFFICER O. AMANDO;

SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPT.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-cv-01685-BAS(BGS)

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

(ECF No. 2); 

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL FILING 

FEES REQUIRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

Plaintiff Jackson Manivanh, a prisoner at Calipatria State Prison (“CAL”) 

proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 29, 

2016.

1

(ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required to commence 

 

1 On August 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating his 

release from state custody. (ECF No. 5.)

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a civil action by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, he filed a Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 2.)

Plaintiff claims the San Diego Police Department and Officer O. Amando used 

excessive force while effecting his arrest in July 2013. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2, 4-5.) He seeks 

an apology as well as $5,065,000 in compensatory, punitive, and “emotional” damages. 

(Id. at 7.) For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismisses 

this action without prejudice.

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

If the plaintiff is a “prisoner” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h),3as amended by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), at the time of filing, the plaintiff may be granted leave 

to proceed IFP. However, unlike non-incarcerated civil litigants, a prisoner remains 

obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 

630 (2016) (noting that Congress’s PLRA amendments to § 1915 “require[] prisoners to 

 

2

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional 

administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, 

District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 

administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “the term ‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or 

detained in any facility who is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 

violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, 

or diversionary program.”

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pay filing fees for the suits or appeals they launch”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 

847 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, under the PLRA, a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must 

submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for 

the prisoner for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); see also Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an 

initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six 

months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, 

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent 

payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the 

prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire 

filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). “The monthly installment scheme described 

in § 1915(b)(2) also applies to costs awarded against prisoners when they are judgment 

losers.” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(B)).

Plaintiff was incarcerated at CAL when he filed this action; indeed, he so admits in

his Motion to Proceed IFP, to which he has attached a copy of his inmate trust account 

activity as reported by CAL officials. See ECF No. 2 at 1, 4, 6. Thus, Plaintiff is required

“to pay the full amount of a filing fee” in order to commence a civil action. See Bruce, 136 

S. Ct. at 630; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court would usually follow the fee 

collection procedure described above to collect the filing fee from Plaintiff. 

However, Plaintiff’s release from custody renders 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)’s fee 

collection provisions unenforceable in this case. If Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at 

CAL, and he is no longer in the custody of any state or local correctional institution, no 

inmate trust account exists from which his filing fees may be garnished and forwarded to 

the Court. See DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that after a 

prisoner is released, there is “no ‘prisoner’s account’ from which to deduct . . . 

payments.”). “Section 1915(b)(2) provides no method of remitting payments other than by 

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deduction from a prisoner’s account, and thus it does not shed any light on how payments 

should be paid once that prisoner is released.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit has yet to decide how a released prisoner who is obligated to “pay 

the full amount of a filing fee” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) may proceed IFP after he has 

been released, i.e., whether he must prepay the entire civil filing fee at once, whether he 

may proceed by some other partial fee and/or court-ordered installment payment plan, or 

whether his obligation to pay the fee is waived altogether or in part by virtue of his release. 

See Putzer v. Attal, No. 2:13-cv-00165-APG-CWH, 2013 WL 4519351, at *1 (D. Nev. 

Aug. 23, 2013) (noting the “unresolved issue within the Ninth Circuit regarding the 

application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) pauper application requirements 

in cases where the prisoner is released pendente lite, i.e., during the litigation”); see also 

Turner v. San Diego Cty., No. 14cv1965 LAB (WVG), 2014 WL 5800595, at *2-3 (S.D. 

Cal. Nov. 7, 2014) (noting absence of Ninth Circuit authority); Patten v. Walker, No. 1:13-

cv-00346-RBB, 2015 WL 3623687, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2015) (same).

In Putzer, U.S. District Judge Andrew P. Gordon canvassed published cases from 

other circuits, noted a split of authority, and concluded, like the Fifth, Seventh, and District 

of Columbia Circuits, that if an IFP application is filed by a prisoner, the “straightforward 

Congressional command in § 1915(b)(1)” requires that “full payment . . . is triggered upon 

the filing of the . . . complaint,” regardless of “how the requirement is satisfied.” 2013 WL 

4519351, at *1-2 (citing Gay v. Texas Dept. of Corrs., 117 F.3d 240, 241-42 (5th Cir. 

1997); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 

895, 897-99 (7th Cir. 1997)). Judge Gordon therefore rejected the Tenth, Fourth, Sixth, and 

Second Circuit’s contrary conclusions in Brown v. Eppler, 725 F.3d 1221, 1231 n.7 (10th 

Cir. 2013); DeBlasio, 315 F.3d at 397; In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 

1138-39 (6th Cir. 1997); and McCann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 29-30 (2d 

Cir. 1996), that § 1915(b)(1)’s full fee payment requirements do not continue post-release, 

and instead noted that “even prior to the PLRA . . . district courts [in the Ninth Circuit] 

possessed authority under the non-PLRA-related provisions of § 1915 to require partial

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and/or installment payments.” Id. at *2 (citing Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (“We take this opportunity to make the apparent explicit: Courts have discretion 

to impose partial filing fees under the in forma pauperis statute.”)). 

Further, Judge Gordon reasoned that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit . . . , the district court 

retains the discretion to order installment payments even without the specific statutory 

payment mechanisms otherwise applicable when the plaintiff is incarcerated.” Putzer, 2013 

WL 4519351, at *2. He thus concluded that while “the amount of the initial partial payment 

and installment payments may be determined either from the plaintiff’s prior inmate 

account balance and/or based on upon the plaintiff’s post-release assets and income, . . . 

the fact that a different, but pre-existing method of enforcing the full-payment requirement 

of the statute must be utilized does not justify disregarding the Congressional command as 

to what is required.” Id.

In the absence of binding authority on point, the Court finds Judge Gordon’s 

reasoning in Putzer to be persuasive. Indeed, this Court’s Local Rules governing actions 

brought IFP have long provided that “[i]n considering a non-prisoner’s request to proceed 

in forma pauperis, the court may, in its discretion, impose a partial filing fee partial fee 

which is less than the full filing fee that is required by law, but which is commensurate 

with the applicant’s ability to pay.” See CivLR 3.2(d). And while the PLRA’s amendments 

to § 1915(b)(1) do not permit imposition of a fee less than the “full amount” that is owed 

because Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time of filing, this Court finds that it may assess, 

based on the financial information provided in Plaintiff’s inmate trust account statements, 

a partial initial fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), and thereafter exercise its pre-PLRA discretion 

under Olivares and Local Rule 3.2(d) to collect the remainder of the $350 filing fee 

balance, due in installments, and dependent on Plaintiff’s post-release ability to pay. See

Putzer, 2013 WL 4519351 at *3; Olivares, 59 F.3d at 112 (remanding fee payments to 

district court in order to “review [plaintiff’s] present economic situation and fit a fee to the 

economic facts if [he] [wa]s still interested in pursuing his claim”). 

//

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However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) also provides that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner 

be prohibited from bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has no assets 

and no means by which to pay the initial filing fee.” See Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (noting 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP 

case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered”). Here, the Court does not have before it any financial affidavit which 

reflects Plaintiff’s current post-incarceration income, assets, or ability to pay. Therefore, 

the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) without prejudice. 

Further, should he wish to further prosecute this action, the Court directs Plaintiff to file a 

supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP which documents his current post-release income, 

assets, and expenses within 30 days of this Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

If he does, Plaintiff is cautioned that even if his supplemental Motion to Proceed 

IFP is granted, he will nevertheless remain obligated to pay the full $350 civil filing fee 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) due to his status as a prisoner at the time this action was 

commenced. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). His status as a prisoner at filing will also subject 

Plaintiff to other restrictions placed on prisoners under the PLRA: his Complaint will be 

immediately subject to the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 

dismissed if it is found to be frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim, or if it seeks 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune, and regardless of any fees which will 

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remain due.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 

(9th Cir. 2010). Such a dismissal may also count as a future “strike” against him pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a 

prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.”).5

II. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2) without prejudice and DISMISSES this civil 

action without prejudice for failure to prepay filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

//

 

4 The Court further notes that although it will defer the full mandatory screening 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) until after Plaintiff makes a decision as to whether he 

wishes to continue to proceed IFP, a preliminary review of his pleading indicates that at 

least with respect to Defendant San Diego Police Department, Plaintiff’s Complaint will 

be subject to sua sponte dismissal because it fails to state a plausible claim upon which 

relief may be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Vance v. Cty. of 

Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Naming a municipal department as 

a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a 

municipality.”) (citation omitted); see also Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 762–63 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (holding municipal liability requires that “the action that is alleged to be 

unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or 

decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers,” or is made “pursuant 

to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval 

through the body’s official decision-making channels” (quoting Monell v. New York Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 (1978)).

5 The Court takes judicial notice of its own dockets and notes that Plaintiff appears to 

have already had at least one prior civil action, also filed while he was incarcerated, 

dismissed as “frivolous” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Order, Manivanh v. 

Qualcomm, Inc., et al., No. 3:16-cv-01666-AJB-KSC (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2016), ECF No. 

6; Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting a federal court “‘may 

take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (quoting Bennett 

v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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The Court GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave in which to re-open his case by 

filing a supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP that includes an affidavit documenting his 

current post-release income, assets, and expenses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). If Plaintiff 

elects to file this supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP, he is cautioned that he will still be 

required to pay the full $350 civil filing fee, but pursuant to a partial installment payment 

plan devised by the Court dependent on his income, as funds are available, and regardless 

of whether his case is subsequently dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) or for any 

other reason.

If Plaintiff does not to comply with this Order within the time permitted, this civil 

action will remain DISMISSED without prejudice for the reasons stated herein and 

without any further Order by the Court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 11, 2016 

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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