Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01931/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01931-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Respondent Sisto’s correct middle initial is “K.” The Clerk of the Court is 1

directed to update the docket to reflect this correction. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASPEL SINGH, No. CIV S-06-1931-FCD-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

D.K. SISTO, et al., 1

Respondents.

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondents’ motion to

dismiss (Doc. 5). In their motion, respondents argue that the instant petition is untimely. 

Petitioner filed an opposition (Doc. 7) in which he argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Respondents have filed a reply to this argument (Doc. 12). 

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Petitioner pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and assault with a deadly

weapon and was sentenced on October 7, 2002, to a determinate prison term of 13 years. 

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. On March 10, 2005, petitioner filed his first habeas corpus

petition in state court. That petition was denied on April 5, 2005. Petitioner filed two more state

habeas petitions in 2005, both of which were denied. Petitioner filed this federal petition on

August 28, 2006. Respondents argue that, because the one-year limitations period for federal

habeas review expired before petitioner filed his first state court post-conviction challenge, the

instant action is time-barred. 

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of:

(1) the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek

direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Where direct review is sought, the one-year

limitations period begins running the day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to

seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001). 

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)

(holding that, regardless of whether there are exceptions to a state’s timeliness bar, time limits

for filing a state post-conviction petition are filing conditions and the failure to comply with

those time limits precludes a finding that the state petition is properly filed). A state court

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application for post-conviction relief is “pending”during all the time the petitioner is attempting,

through proper use of state court procedures, to present his claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between state court

applications, however, there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214 (2002). If the state court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as untimely,

the federal court must independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id. at 226-

27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

In this case, petitioner did not seek direct review. The statute of limitations began

to run the day after the time to do so expired. The time to seek direct review expired 60 days

after the October 7, 2002, sentencing date, or on December 6, 2002. The one-year statue of

limitations began to run the following day and, absent tolling, expired on December 6, 2003. 

Because petitioner did not seek state post-conviction relief until after this date, he is not entitled

to statutory tolling for the time his state habeas petitions were pending. 

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations

for three reasons: (1) he is mentally impaired; (2) he cannot speak or write in English; and (3)

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), announced a new rule retroactive on collateral

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). Because the statute of limitations under AEDPA

is not jurisdictional, it is subject to traditional equitable tolling principles. See Calderon v.

United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

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grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

To be entitled to equitable tolling, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) he has been diligent

in pursuing his rights; and (2) extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time. 

See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19.

In Pace, the Supreme Court held that equitable tolling was not applicable because

“petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation.” Id. at 419. In Beeler, the district

court granted equitable tolling and the respondent sought a writ of mandamus to reverse the

district court’s order. See id. In denying the respondent’s mandamus petition, the Ninth Circuit

addressed the district court’s decision to grant equitable tolling as follows:

Having decided that [the statute of limitations] can be tolled, we

have no basis for upsetting the district court’s decision to allow Beeler

more time to file his petition. The district court found that Beeler’s lead

counsel, Scott Braden, had diligently pursued the preparation of Beeler’s

petition. Braden, however, withdrew after accepting employment in

another state, and much of the work product he left behind was not usable

by replacement counsel – a turn of events over which Beeler had no

control. There were thus “extraordinary circumstances” which justified

tolling [the] statute of limitations. Id. at 1289. 

In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit again denied mandamus relief and held that equitable tolling was

appropriate because:

[A]s part of its order that Kelly be mentally evaluated, the district court

ordered “that all other aspects of this case be, and hereby are, stayed

pending final determination by this Court of the Petitioner’s mental

capacity to proceed.” The only reasonable reading of this order was that it

prohibited Kelly’s attorney’s from filing a habeas petition, which is how

the district court itself construed it. . . . This stay of the proceedings

prevented Kelly’s counsel from filing a habeas petition and, in itself,

justifies equitable tolling. Id. at 541. 

In addition, the egregious misconduct of counsel may warrant equitable tolling. See Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003). Mental incompetence may also warrant equitable tolling

for the period the prisoner was incompetent if he can show that the incompetency in fact caused

the filing delay. See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has

concluded, however, that equitable tolling is not appropriate based on the ordinary negligence of

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counsel. See Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001). 

As to petitioner’s mental impairment, petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling

because he has not demonstrated how the impairment prevented him from filing his petition

sooner. Similarly, as to petitioner’s lack of understanding of the English language, he has not

demonstrated that it caused the delay. In fact, as respondents note, petitioner has been able to

comply with this court’s orders and has filed numerous state court habeas petitions

notwithstanding his language difficulties. Thus, it has not been shown on the current record that

petitioner’s lack of understanding of the English language caused him to miss the AEDPA filing

deadline. 

Finally, as to petitioner’s assertion that Blakely v. Washington, announces a new

retroactive rule, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that Blakely does not apply retroactively. See

United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C),

under which the one-year clock begins to run on the date a new constitutional right retroactive

on collateral review has been recognized by the Supreme Court, does not help petitioner. 

Moreover, because petitioner pleaded guilty and thereby admitted all the facts relevant in

imposing sentence, Blakely and its progenitor Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

simply do not apply. 

Because the one-year limitations period expired before petitioner filed any of his

state post-conviction petitions, and because petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to

equitable tolling, the court agrees with respondents that the instant petition is untimely. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that respondents’ motion to

dismiss be granted, that this petition be dismissed, and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to

enter judgment and close this file.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 27, 2007.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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