Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00884/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00884-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASA A. ALPHONSO,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Case No. 14CV0884-L(JMA)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Asa A. Alphonso, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenges his conviction in San Diego

County Superior Court Case No. SCD235703 for nine felony offenses

against Michelle C.1

 during two incidents consisting of two counts of

corporal injury on a cohabitant, two counts of false imprisonment by

violence, and one count each of assault by means of force likely to cause

great bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon, attempting to

1

 In the interest of protective nondisclosure, the undersigned has adopted the California

Court of Appeal’s practice of referring to Michelle C. by first name.

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dissuade a witness from reporting a crime, rape, and making a criminal

threat. (Lodgment No. 2, CT 179.) The Court has reviewed the Petition,

the Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the

Answer, the Traverse, the lodgments, the record, and all the supporting

documents submitted by both parties. For the reasons discussed below,

the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct. A federal habeas petitioner may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v. Fraley, 506 U.S.

20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness). The following facts are taken from the California Court of

Appeal opinion:

A. The People’s Case

Michelle testified that she met Alphonso through an online dating service as she was going through a divorce, and they

had an “off and on” two-and-a-half-year relationship that ended

in July 2011. The two were cohabitating at her apartment in

San Diego at the time the crimes were committed in this case.

Alphonso was nice and friendly when their relationship started,

but he became verbally and physically abusive over time. He

accused Michelle of dating other people and called her names

like “[w]hore, slut, bitch, [and] stupid.”

Alphonso first used physical violence against her after about a year, when he grabbed her arm in her bedroom, twisted

her hand behind her back, and pushed her neck and head

forward, causing her head to hit a bench. Alphonso apologized,

and Michelle stayed with him because she believed he was

sorry and would not do it again.

Thereafter, for more than half a year, Alphonso verbally abused Michelle, but did not physically abuse her. Although she

tried to break up with him many times, she would end up

reconciling with him when he was nice to her. 

After they broke up in February 2011, Alphonso sent texts and phone messages to Michelle in which he threatened to ruin

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her by sending naked photographs of her to her mother,

children and family. He then posted naked photographs of her

on Craigslist. Michelle called the police and also called

Craigslist to have them remove the photographs. She

reconciled with Alphonso about a month later because he

apologized to her, she loved him, and she hoped they could

stay together. However, Alphonso resumed the physical and

verbal abuse.

Michelle testified that Alphonso held her hostage in February 2011. She tried to leave her apartment when

Alphonso became very angry, but he grabbed her, pushed her

back inside, and locked the door. When she then tried to leave

through the sliding glass door, he again grabbed her, pushed

her back inside, locked that door, shut the curtains, turned up

the music, and told her, “That’s so nobody can hear you

screaming.” Michelle stayed on the couch for several hours and

did not call for help because Alphonso was angry and violent,

and she did not want to get hurt. Alphonso eventually calmed

down and apologized. Michelle did not call for help because

she believed Alphonso would kill her if she did so.

Counts 1-5 and 9

On July 19, 2011 – the date of the first incident on which counts 1-5 were based in this case2

 – Alphonso again held Michelle hostage, this time in her bedroom for nine hours. She

testified she had been sick and was lying down on her bed in

the afternoon when Alphonso arrived. He was angry that she

was still lying down and accused her of being up all night

sleeping with other men. He yelled at her, spat on her, and

called her names. Michelle tried to escape through the door

before Alphonso got too angry, but he grabbed her, pushed

her, told her to return to the bedroom, and locked the door.

Alphonso told her to stay on the bed and took her phone. When

Michelle’s mother called her, Alphonso answered the phone

and told her Michelle was a bad person.

During this incident, Alphonso kicked Michelle’s leg, causing bruising and swelling. He also hit her calf where he had

recently tattooed his first name even though she was reluctant

for him to do so. The tattoo was infected, red and swollen.

Alphonso also hit her head and face with an open hand 20 to

30 times, hit her in the head with the remote control, grabbed

her hair and banged her forehead against the wall, and twice

cut off her breath by smothering her with a pillow. When

Michelle went to the bathroom, Alphonso grabbed her hair, took

a knife out of a drawer, held it against her temple, and told her

to look at the knife because he was going to kill her with it.

Alphonso also threatened to kill her when she was on the bed.

2

 The information charged Alphonso in counts 1 through 5 with corporal injury on a

cohabitant, false imprisonment by violence, assault with a deadly weapon, assault by means of

force likely to cause great bodily injury, and attempting to dissuade a witness, respectively, and

alleged he committed these offenses on or about July 19, 2011.

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He restrained her by holding her arms against the bed and

sitting on her legs.

After the ordeal, Michelle had bruises and lumps all over her forehead and bruising around her eyes from being hit in the

eye with the hard part of a stuffed animal. She testified she did

not leave after Alphonso calmed down because he threatened

to kill her if she left or tried to get help. 

The next day, Michelle cancelled her appointment with her therapist, Sandra Gorchow, because Alphonso did not want

Gorchow to see Michelle’s bruised eye.

Counts 6-9

The second incident– on which counts 6-9 were based3

 – occurred on July 21 or 22 and lasted about six hours. Alphonso

again accused Michelle of sleeping with other men. She

testified that when she saw him getting angry, she thought,

“Here it goes again.” She did not try to leave, and she complied

when Alphonso told her to get on the bed. He told her he was

going to burn her with cigarettes. He went outside to get the

cigarettes because she did not allow smoking inside the

apartment. She could have locked him out on the balcony when

he went to get the cigarettes, but she did not do so. Michelle

testified that when Alphonso returned, he lit a cigarette, sat on

the bed, grabbed her legs, pulled them over to him, and

“started burning [her] feet and upper–or lower part of [her] right

leg.” He burned her eight times and it was very painful. 

Michelle also testified that Alphonso threatened to kill her “many times” that day. He threatened to put a wet towel over

her, tie her up, and let the cats eat her. He talked about

slashing her face, knocking her teeth out, peeling her

fingernails back, and breaking her fingers. Alphonso repeatedly

hit her on the head with the remote control and with his hand.

Toward the end of the six-hour incident, Alphonso told Michelle

he was going to rape her, ordered her to remove her clothes,

and then engaged in forcible sex with her, causing her pain.

Reporting of the Incidents

A few days later, Michelle went to an appointment with her therapist. She put makeup on her facial injuries so that her

therapist would not see them, but she did not cover up the

cigarette burns. Michelle did not disclose the domestic violence

to her therapist because she knew the therapist would call the

police; and Michelle feared Alphonso would kill her. 

At the end of the session, the therapist suggested that she meet with Alphonso and explain to him that it was

3

 The information charged Alphonso in counts 6 though 9 with corporal injury on a

cohabitant, false imprisonment by violence, forcible rape, and making a criminal threat,

respectively, and alleged he committed these offenses on or about July 21 and 22, 2011. 

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appropriate for her to work with him and Michelle for couple’s

therapy. Michelle texted Alphonso about meeting with the

therapist, and she and her therapist picked up Alphonso and

drove him to Michelle’s apartment to talk.

When the three arrived at the apartment, the therapist started talking about couple’s therapy. The therapist testified

that Alphonso “became exceptionally animated,” angrily paced

around, and almost berated her. The therapist eventually told

Michelle and Alphonso she had to leave.

Michelle walked with her therapist to the therapist’s car, started crying, and said, “I’m not going to go back in there” or “I

can’t go back in there.” The therapist told her to get in the car,

and she did. Alphonso approached the car and asked, “Why

are you doing that? Don’t get in the ... car. Why do you want

her in the car? Where are you taking her? We can talk.”

Alphonso was standing in front of the car and leaning on the

hood. When he moved to the side, the therapist drove the car

away.

After they drove away, Michelle started telling the therapist about what had happened and said Alphonso would

kill her if the therapist called the police. Michelle showed her

the bumps and bruises she had covered with makeup and the

cigarette burns on her ankle and foot. She had her therapist

feel the bumps on her scalp.

The therapist called 911 when Michelle went to the bathroom at a store. When Michelle returned to the car, the

therapist was still on the phone with the 911 dispatcher. After

the call, the two sat in the car until the police arrived. The

therapist spoke with them first, and then Michelle reluctantly

spoke to them. The therapist testified that Michelle appeared to

be extremely fearful.

San Diego Police Officer Steve Sdringola testified he responded to the 911 call. Michelle initially did not want to talk

to him. Officer Sdringola accompanied the two women back to

the victim’s apartment. Michelle told him she and Alphonso had

been together for two and a half years and that in the last six

months there had been at least 10 incidents of physical abuse

by Alphonso. She told him in particular about the two incidents

on July 19 and July 21 or 22. However, she did not tell him that

Alphonso had raped her, and she made no mention of

Alphonso’s alleged threats to starve her and let her cats eat

her, or break her fingers, or smother her with a wet towel, or

slash her face. At trial, Michelle indicated she did not provide as

much information as possible to the officer because she still

feared Alphonso and she was protecting him for his sake and

hers. 

Officer Sdringola testified he saw eight small, round burn marks on Michelle’s foot; and also saw raised bumps and

bruising on her head. Another officer photographed the injuries.

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A clinical psychologist with the San Diego Family Justice Center testified about the cycle of abuse in domestic violence,

which starts with the “honeymoon” phase, proceeds to the

tension-building phase, escalates to the acute battering phase

and repeats. To maintain power and control, batterers may

engage in intimidation and emotional abuse, may isolate the

victim, may minimize or deny the abuse and blame others for

their own behaviors, may use children, and may use coercion

and threats. As defense mechanisms, victims may minimize,

rationalize, or justify the abuse to stay in the relationship. The

psychologist testified it is difficult for victims of abuse to speak

out about sexual violence in the relationship.

The parties stipulated that Michelle mentioned for the first time at trial two specific prior acts of domestic violence in which

Alphonso pushed her, took her keys, and pushed her against a

wall.

B. The Defense Case

Alphonso’s defense was that Michelle was lying and he did not commit any of the charged crimes. Two residents of the

apartment complex where Michelle lived testified they did not

hear any loud arguments at the complex in July 2011. Also, a

witness who performs computer and telephone forensic

evaluations testified that he examined phone records for the

month of July 2011 for a phone number assigned to Michelle.

Michelle’s cell phone records indicated several calls were made

from and received on her cell phone on July 19, 21 and 22,

including incoming and outgoing calls to her mother and sister. 

(Lod. 6, pp. 4-11.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury found Alphonso guilty of two counts of corporal injury on a

cohabitant, two counts of false imprisonment by violence, and one count

each of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury and

assault with a deadly weapon, attempting to dissuade a witness from

reporting a crime, rape, and making a criminal threat. True findings were

made by the jury that, as to the corporal injury charge, Alphonso personally

used a dangerous weapon. (Lod. 2; CT 10-13, 220-28.) On the same day,

Alphonso admitted he had three prior prison term convictions, and two prior

strike convictions. (CT 229.) The trial court sentenced him to fifty years to

life plus six years. (CT 241-244.)

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Thereafter, Alphonso initiated a direct appeal of his conviction

arguing: 1) the trial court erred when it denied Alphonso’s Batson/Wheeler4

objection and determined he had not made a prima facie showing that the

prosecutor exercised four of her peremptory challenges based on race; 2)

the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial

based on the newly discovered evidence that Michelle had made false

allegations that her husband physically and sexually abused her; 3) the

denial of the motion for a new trial also denied his right to present a

complete defense in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 4) the denial of the motion for a new

trial was prejudicial under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); and

5) Alphonso’s sentences on various counts should have been stayed

pursuant to California Penal Code section 654. (Lod. 3.) On August 27,

2013, the California Court of Appeal issued an opinion affirming the

convictions, but staying the concurrent sentences for six of his convictions.

(Lod. 6.) Alphonso’s petition for review in the California Supreme Court,

case S213605, raising the first three claims (Lod. 7), was denied without

comment on November 20, 2013 (Lod. 8.).5

Alphonso filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on April 14, 2014. [Doc. No. 1.] Respondent

filed an Answer on June 3, 2014. [Doc. No. 11.] Alphonso filed a Traverse

on June 14, 2014. [Doc. No. 15.] 

/ /

/ /

4

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (a shorthand reference to the procedure

under which a prosecutor's peremptory strikes of potential jurors are challenged on the basis

that the strikes are being made on a discriminatory basis, i.e., because they are members of

an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds); People v.

Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (Cal. 1978).

5

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IV. DISCUSSION

Alphonso raises four claims in his Petition. First, he claims the state

trial judge abused his discretion in denying Alphonso’s motion for a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence. [Doc. No. 1, Pet. 31-34 (of 75).]

Second, he argues his right to a fair trial was violated when the trial court

precluded him from presenting testimony to impeach that offered by

Michelle and denied his motion for a new trial. [Id., 34-38.] Third, Alphonso

claims the prejudice for these two errors should be assessed under

Chapman. [Id., 39-41.] Lastly, he claims the trial court infringed his federal

constitutional rights when it denied his Batson/Wheeler motion and did not

find the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude all

non-white jurors. [Id., 41-45.] 

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with

respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless

that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a

state prisoner's habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide

whether it agrees with the state court's determination; rather, the court

applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only whether the

state court's decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v.

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th

Cir. 2004).

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A federal habeas court may grant relief under the "contrary to" clause

if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme

Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535

U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable

application" clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal

principle from Supreme Court decisions, but unreasonably applied those

decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the

"unreasonable application" clause requires that the state court decision be

more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court's

application of clearly established federal law must be "objectively

unreasonable." See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state's highest court,

the Court "looks through" to the underlying appellate court decision and

presumes it provides the basis for the higher court's denial of a claim or

claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not "furnish a basis for its reasoning,"

federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to

determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other

grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme

Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537

U.S. at 8. "[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]" id., the state

court decision will not be "contrary to" clearly established federal law. Id.

Clearly established federal law, for purposes of § 2254(d), means "the

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governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time

the state court renders its decision." Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. 

B. Claims 1 - 3, Denial of Motion for New Trial

Alphonso’s first three claims relate to the trial court’s denial of

his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically,

he claims: 1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion; 2)

the denial of the motion in limine to call Michelle’s estranged husband as

an impeachment witness and the denial of the motion for a new trial

violated Alphonso’s constitutional right to present a defense; and 3) the

prejudice of these two errors should be assessed under Chapman. 

1. Background

The following facts relevant to Alphonso’s first three claims are taken

from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

1. Alphonso’s Motion in Limine

Alphonso moved in limine to be allowed to call Michelle’s then-husband (husband) to testify that she had previously

made false accusations that her husband abused her. At the

hearing on the motion, defense counsel indicated Michelle and

her husband were still married, but they were separated and

dissolution proceedings had been ongoing for several years,

and the husband would testify that he was in the United States

Navy and that Michele had falsely accused him – both to Navy

authorities and in the dissolution proceedings – of domestic

violence against her and sexual abuse of their child.

The prosecutor acknowledged evidence of false allegations “can be admissible,” but argued Michelle denied the

allegations were false and opposed the admission of her

husband’s testimony because it was more prejudicial than

probative and it was “going to be time-consuming.” The

prosecutor had just received “the majority of documents relating

to this,” and she did not foresee this would be an issue in this

case. She had also recently requested the family advocacy file

under the Freedom of Information Act, but she was not certain

she would receive the information before the trial began. Noting

that Michelle and her husband had been married for 27 years,

the prosecutor stated, “In reading through the divorce affidavits

from both parties, there is a lot of meat on this bone.”

Defense counsel stated he intended to limit the scope of husband’s testimony to “the fact [Michelle] falsely accused

him,” and he would not seek to introduce evidence about

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“who’s a good parent and who’s a bad parent” or whether the

children did not like to spend time with the victim. The court

observed it was “in a bit of a vacuum,” recognized the potential

relevance of evidence that “any victim made what turned out to

be false accusation of domestic violence,” and deferred ruling

until the husband could be examined at a separate hearing.

2. Evidence Code Section 402 Hearing and the Court’s

Ruling

After the prosecution rested its case, and outside the presence of the jurors, defense counsel reiterated that in 2007

Michelle falsely accused her husband of physically and

emotionally abusing her and sexually molesting their daughter.

Defense counsel acknowledged that if the husband were to

testify the allegations were false, the prosecutor would call

Michelle to testify to the contrary.

When the court stated that “we have some proceedings that occurred with the United States Navy that at least at some

point led to counseling of the [husband],” defense counsel

replied, “Yes.” The court indicated it was inclined to exclude the

husband’s testimony, stating it was “left with... a ‘he said she

said’” and there was “some type of concession by the

[husband] that something was going on, at least inferentially, by

his accepting the [Navy’s] counseling program.”

The court then heard the testimony of the husband out of the presence of the jurors at a hearing conducted under

Evidence Code section 402. The husband, a retired Navy

Commander, testified he married Michelle in 1991 and they

separated in 2007. They started divorce proceedings in 2009,

but the divorce was still not final. They were the parents of a

17-year-old son and a 15-year-old daughter.

In 2007 Michelle accused her husband of mental, sexual, financial, and physical abuse, and the allegations were handled

through the Navy arbitration system. The husband learned

during the dissolution proceedings that Michelle had reported to

Child Protective Services that he had sexually molested their

daughter, but the matter had been dismissed as

unsubstantiated. 

The husband testified Michelle falsely alleged he mentally abused her when they got into arguments regarding the

handling and care of their children. Her sexual abuse claim was

based on her belief they should not have sex when she was on

medication. She had been on various medications since 2000.

Michelle alleged he had sex with her without her consent when

she was medicated. The husband denied he ever did so. He

said he initially refused her requests for sex when she first

started taking the medications. After she “got normalized” with

the medications, he acquiesced and had sexual relations with

her.

He also testified Michelle’s financial abuse claim 

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stemmed from his decision to take over the family’s bills after

she failed to pay them on time and bounced checks. He

indicated he thought Michelle’s physical abuse claim was

probably related to her sexual abuse claim and stated that

“when the sexual one didn’t pan out... she claimed again later

for physical abuse.” The husband also testified about an

incident in which Michelle took the laptop he needed for work

out of his car, they had a tug of war in which Michelle took the

laptop he needed for work out of his car, they had a tug of war

with the computer, and, when she tired he took her hands off

the computer, put it in the car, shut the door and left. He denied

physically abusing her. 

The husband testified that after the third or fourth

“episode of an allegation,” he asked the Navy mediators how

he could bring it to an end. He was fearful it would hurt his

career and wanted to stop it before he was up for promotion to

captain. The mediators advised him he could take a 16 week

course called the Cypress Men’s Group. The husband asked

what he needed to do to get in to the course, and the mediators

told him that if they found substantiation for a claim, they would

recommend him for the group. He then substantiated the

mental abuse claim by stating he probably did get angry and

was loud and that was probably stressful for Michelle. The

husband thought she made another allegation of mental abuse

after he completed the program. Michelle never told the police

that he forced her to have sex or was violent with her. 

The husband acknowledged the Naval Advocacy Committee substantiated the mental abuse claim in August

2007. He also testified that if Michelle said he kissed his

daughter on the back of her head when she was sleeping and

patted her butt when she was sleeping and awake, this would

be true but he did not consider it to be sexual abuse. He

acknowledged that the Naval Family Advocacy committee

contacted him because of his alleged emotional abuse and

controlling behavior and that the majority of the interactions

between Michele and the committee revolved around these

subjects. 

a. Ruling

After the husband testified, the court excluded his testimony. The court stated that although the husband was “a

highly credible witness,” his testimony “would not provide the

jury with any relevant facts at this point,” and found his

testimony had “no probative value.”

3. Alphonso’s motion for a new trial, the FAP records,

and the court’s ruling

After the jury returned its guilty verdicts, Alphonso moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, namely

records obtained through discovery from the Navy’s Family

Advocacy Program Case Review Committee’s investigation

(the FAP records) that the prosecutor had requested at the start

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of the trial, which the prosecutor received and provided to the

defense after the jury returned its verdicts. In his motion,

Alphonso asserted the FAP records were relevant to the issue

of whether Michelle previously had made false accusation(s) of

physical abuse because they showed that she had alleged her

husband punched her, threw her against a wall, and pushed

and shoved her; that she reported she did not have a car

because she believed her husband would cut the brake lines if

she had one; that she accused her husband of sexual abuse;

and that she claimed he abused her an average of three times

a month. Alphonso pointed out that the husband, during his

testimony at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, testified

he never physically or sexually abused Michelle, but the court

denied the defense request that the husband be allowed to

testify about these allegations. 

In her opposition to the new trial motion, the prosecutor argued the new evidence was cumulative to the evidence

produced in discovery and presented at trial. Specifically, the

prosecutor argued the family court records provided to defense

counsel before trial included a November 2009 declaration in

which Michelle claimed her husband had been violent with her

in the past, the Navy found him guilty of domestic violence, she

stopped driving shortly after she got married because of her

husband’s negative comments about her driving, she never

drove again because of her husband’s comments about

damage he had done to other people’s cars when he became

upset with them, and her husband had a way of threatening her

without actually doing so.

The prosecutor also represented that in an April 2010 declaration Michelle stated concern about her husband

“inappropriately” kissing their daughter on the neck while the

daughter slept and tapping her daughter’s buttocks when she

walked near him. In addition, the prosecutor argued the

husband’s declarations described three domestic violence

allegations Michelle made to the Navy, only one of which was

substantiated; and in interviews with the defense the husband

stated that Michelle had called Naval Family Advocacy five or

six times to complain he was mentally abusive to her. 

In her opposition, the prosecutor also asserted that the “voluminous” FAP records produced by the Navy covered the

same information contained in the family court records, the

husband’s statement, and his testimony. The prosecutor

summarized the two referrals to the Family Advocacy Program

and stated that the FAP records indicated that – in the first

case, which was substantiated for emotional abuse– Michelle

claimed her husband would come into her room after she had

taken her sleeping pills and have sex with her without her

consent; and, regarding physical abuse, she stated her

husband had hit her one time many years earlier.

In the second case, which was not substantiated, Michelle spoke to a caseworker who referred the case for

investigation of ongoing emotional abuse and control. Michelle

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told the caseworker that she lived in a separate home from her

husband and that she feared her home might be bugged

because her husband repeated things that she had said when

he was not there. She said her husband controlled the

finances at both homes and used the children to monitor her

activities. During the risk assessment with a clinical provider,

Michelle was asked for a history of abuse, and she responded

that her husband had “punched her, thrown her into walls,

grabbed and pushed her and would then act as if it were an

accident (for example accidently hitting her in the face with his

elbow) or completely deny that anything had happened.”

Michelle said the physical abuse occurred about three times a

month and stopped when they separated 18 months earlier.

She also mentioned she feared that if she owned a car, her

husband would do something to it, like cutting the break (sic) lines. She said her husband had made statements in the past

about what he had done to other cars belonging to people with

whom he was angry, like “they’ll never drive that car again[.]”

The prosecutor also argued Alphonso’s new trial motion should be denied because (among other things) impeachment

evidence does not provide a basis for a new trial.

a. Ruling

At the hearing on the new trial motion during the sentencing proceeding, the parties agreed to submit four pages

of the voluminous FAP records to the court under seal. After

listening to the parties’ arguments, the court ruled that defense

counsel had exercised due diligence, but “to a large extent” the

material was cumulative to what was previously available to

both counsel, and the resolution of what happened between

Michelle and her husband starting years earlier was just not

“that probative to the issues” in the case. The court stated it

was confident there [was] no reasonable probability that had

this information been available and even had it been presented

to a jury that it would have resulted in a different result.”

Accordingly, the trial court denied the new trial motion.

(Lod. 6, pp. 21-28)

2. The California Court of Appeal Decision

The California Supreme Court denied Alphonso’s three claims

predicated on the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial without

citation of authority so this Court must “look through” that denial to the

Court of Appeal’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-806. The Court of Appeal

simultaneously addressed these three claims as follows:

Here, we cannot say the court abused its broad discretion by denying a new trial. Assuming for purposes of discussion

that the other factors discussed in Delgado, supra, 5 Cal. 4th at

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page 328 are satisfied, Alphonso has not shown, and cannot

demonstrate, a reasonable probability the newly discovered

evidence would result in a different result on retrial. 

“[W]hen a defendant makes a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, he has met his burden of

establishing that a different result is probable on retrial of the

case if he has established that it is probable that at least one

juror would have voted to find him not guilty had the new

evidence been presented.” (People v. Soojian (2010) 190 Cal. App. 4th 491, 521.)

Here, Alphonso asserts in a conclusory fashion, without addressing the strong evidence of his guilt presented at trial,

that “[i]t is highly likely -–certainly more than probable—that at

least one juror would have been [sic] entertained a reasonable doubt that [Michelle’s] reports of [Alphonso’s] alleged attacks

were believable, after hearing the testimony of a ‘highly

credible’ (the trial court’s words) former Navy officer about her

prior false claims.” We disagree. Michelle’s trial testimony

regarding Alphonso’s conduct was corroborated not only by the

testimony of Michelle’s therapist Sandra Gorchow and Officer

Sdringola, but by the photographs that another officer took of

the injuries Michelle suffered when Alphonso burned her with a

cigarette.

Specifically, Gorchow testified that after Michelle, who was scared, started telling her in the car about what had

happened, Michelle showed her both the bruises she had

covered with makeup and the cigarette burns on her ankle and

foot, and she also had Gorchow feel the “raised bumps” on her

scalp. Gorchow testified she called 911 after Michelle got out of

the car and went into the bathroom at a store. 

Officer Sdringola, who responded to that call, also corroborated Michelle’s testimony by testifying that Michelle

told him about what had happened during the two incidents.

Officer Sdringola testified he saw eight small, round, apparent

burn marks on Michelle’s foot and also saw raised bumps and

bruising on her head. He stated that another officer

photographed the injuries. 

Due to the strength of the victim’s testimony, as corroborated by the testimony of Gorchow and Officer

Sdringola and the photographic evidence of her injuries, we

conclude Alphonso has failed to meet his burden of showing it

is probable that at least one juror would have voted to find him

not guilty had the new evidence been presented. Accordingly,

we reject Alphonso’s claims that the court abused its discretion

and violated his constitutional right to present a defense by

denying his motion for a new trial. 

(Id., pp. 29-31.)

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3. Claim 1 – Abuse of Discretion

Relying only on California law, Petitioner contends the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. [Doc. No. 1, pp.

31-34 (of 75).] This claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

Federal courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the petitioner's

conviction or sentence is in “violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Alphonso’s abuse of

discretion claim is supported solely by California law in his Petition. [Doc.

No. 1, pp. 31-34 (of 75).] In his Traverse, he attempts to transform his state

law claim into a federal one with a passing reference to the Due Process

Clause. [Doc. No. 15, p. 4 (of 10)]. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held

that a habeas petitioner's mere reference to the Due Process Clause is

insufficient to render his claims viable under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.1994); Miller v.

Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 993-94 (9th Cir.1985). Here, the right that Petitioner

seeks to enforce, his state statutory right to a new trial, emanates from

state law. Consequently, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas

review. See also Washington v. Horel, 2008 WL 4427221, at *4 (C.D. Cal.

Sept .30, 2008) (holding that claim of abuse of discretion in denying new

trial is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings where the petitioner

identifies no constitutional right that was violated and instead relies solely

on California state law and claims the trial court abused its discretion under

such law).

4. Claim 2 – Denial of Right to Present a Defense

In his second claim, Alphonso contends the denial of his motion in

limine to call an impeachment witness and motion for a new trial based on

newly discovered impeachment evidence resulted in the denial of his

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Constitutional right to present a complete defense. As a threshold matter,

the Court notes that although the claim Alphonso presented to the

California Supreme Court discusses the trial court’s preclusion of the

estranged husband’s testimony, he does not appear to have specifically

argued the denial of the motion in limine violated his right to present a

complete defense and instead focused on the denial of the motion for a

new trial. (Lod. No. 7, pp. 16-24.) Irrespective of whether this aspect of

Petitioner's right to present a complete defense claim has been properly

presented to the state courts, the Court may deny it on the merits. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); Acosta–Huerta v.

Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 142 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a district court can

reach the merits of an unexhausted claim under § 2254(b) (2) when the

Court determines it does not present a colorable claim for relief). Petitioner

is not entitled to habeas relief as to this aspect of his right to present a

defense claim because, for the reasons set forth below, he does not

present a colorable claim for relief. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58–60; Strickland, 466

U. S. at 694; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.

A criminal defendant has the fundamental right to present a defense

and to present witnesses. For more than fifty years, the Supreme Court

has clearly and repeatedly articulated these core constitutional guarantees. 

In 1948, Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court, declared that a

defendant's “right to his day in court” is “basic in our system of

jurisprudence” and includes “as a minimum, a right to examine the

witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by

counsel.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (emphasis added). Since

then, the Supreme Court has again and again noted the “fundamental” or

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“essential” character of a defendant's right both to present a defense,

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 687, 690 (1986); California v. Trombetta,

467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972);

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), and to present witnesses as

a part of that defense. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988); Rock v.

Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,

294 (1973); Webb, 409 U.S. at 98; Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. 

The U.S. Supreme Court has variously stated that an accused's right

to a defense and right to present witnesses emanate from the Sixth

Amendment, Taylor, 484 U.S. at 409; United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,

458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Rock, 483 U.S. at 51; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485; Chambers,

410 U.S. at 294; Webb, 409 U.S. at 97; Oliver, 68 S.Ct. at 507, or both.

Crane, 476 U.S. at 690; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85

(1984); Washington, 388 U.S. at 17-18. The Sixth Amendment source of

these rights is the Compulsory Process Clause, which embraces “the right

to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact.” Taylor, 484 U.S. at

409. Washington formally incorporated the Compulsory Process Clause

into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 388 U.S. at

17-19. As the Supreme Court stated:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel

their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to

present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version

of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may

decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to

confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of

challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own

witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental

element of due process of law. 

Id. at 19. 

Alphonso relies on two cases in which the Ninth Circuit granted

habeas relief to state prisoners who were precluded at trial from conducting

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a full cross-examination of witnesses against them. [Doc. No. 1, pp. 37-38

(of 75), citing to Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) and

Fowler v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Dept., 421 F. 3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005)

.] In both cases, the trial courts precluded the defense from crossexamining the victims about prior alleged statements for the purposes of

impeaching their testimony. The Ninth Circuit granted a writ of habeas

corpus in both cases, finding the limitation imposed on the scope of the

cross-examinations abridged the defendants’ rights under the

Confrontation Clause. Holley, 568 F.3d at 1099-1100; Fowler, 421 F. 3d at

1041.

Unlike these cases, however, Alphonso does not allege his right to

present a complete defense was abridged by a restriction on his ability to

cross-examine the victim, but rather by the trial court’s denial of the

admission of extrinsic evidence and the denial of his motion for a new trial

based on newly discovered extrinsic evidence. This case is more akin to

Nevada v. Jackson (133 S.Ct. 1990 (2013)), in which the defendant

unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence for the purpose of showing the

rape victim had previously reported to police the defendant had assaulted

her, but the police were unable to substantiate the allegations. After

exhausting his remedies in state court, he filed a federal habeas petition,

arguing that the trial court's ruling violated his right to present a defense.

Applying AEDPA's deferential standard of review, the District Court denied

relief, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Jackson v. Nevada,

688 F.3d 1091 (2012). The majority, relying on Holley and Fowler, held that

extrinsic evidence of the victim’s prior allegations was critical to the

defense, and that the exclusion of that evidence violated his constitutional

right to present a defense. Id., at 1097–1101. The Supreme Court

reversed, observing “[t]he Ninth Circuit elided the distinction between

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cross-examination and extrinsic evidence by characterizing the cases as

recognizing a broad right to present ‘evidence bearing on [a witness’]

credibility.’” Jackson, 133 S.Ct. at 1994 (citation omitted). The Court

unambiguously stated "[the Supreme] Court has never held that the

Confrontation Clause entitles a criminal defendant to introduce extrinsic

evidence for impeachment purposes." Id., (emphasis original). In rejecting

the broader interpretation of the constitutional right to present evidence

bearing on witness credibility, the Court further remarked the Confrontation

Clause is generally satisfied by the defense's opportunity to "expose

[testimonial] infirmities through cross-examination." Id. (citation omitted). 

Alphonso does not contend he was denied that opportunity. 

In turning to the state courts’ review of Alphonso’s claim he was

denied the right to present a complete defense, the Court does not find that

Alphonso has demonstrated this decision was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. The Court of Appeal noted that although the trial court found

Michelle’s estranged husband to be “a highly credible witness,” it also

found that “his testimony ‘doesn’t frankly establish false allegations of any

substance at all.’” (Lod. 6, p. 25.) The Court of Appeal then weighed the

probity of the extrinsic evidence regarding Michelle’s prior domestic

violence allegations in relation to the strength of her testimony, the

corroborative testimony of her therapist and Officer Sdringola, and the

photographic evidence of her injuries. (Id., pp. 30-31.) After weighing the

evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded Alphonso failed to meet his

burden of showing it was probable the new evidence would have resulted

in a different result at retrial and, accordingly, his constitutional right to

/ / 

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present a defense was not abridged. (Id., p. 31.) The Court does not find

this decision to be objectively unreasonable. 

5. Claim 3 – Prejudice

Alphonso raises, as a separate claim, that the prejudice of any

constitutional error arising from the denial of his motion in limine and his

motion for a new trial should be assessed under Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18 (1967). In habeas proceedings, a federal court applies the

harmless error standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993) to constitutional error by the state courts, rather than the "harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of Chapman. See Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007) (stating that, "whether or not the

state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness

under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in

Chapman," a federal habeas court "must assess the prejudicial impact of

constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and

injurious effect' standard set forth in" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

637 (1993)). 

Under Brecht, "the standard for determining whether habeas relief

must be granted is whether the . . . error ‘had substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623, 637 (quoting and adopting the harmless error standard established in

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The Brecht

harmless error analysis "protects the State's sovereign interest in punishing

offenders and its ‘good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.'" 

Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (per curiam) (quoting

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635). The judge asks directly, "‘Do I, the judge, think

that the error substantially influenced the jury's decision?'" O'Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). If a federal habeas judge is in "grave

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doubt" about whether a constitutional trial error "had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," the error is not

harmless and "the petitioner must win." O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 445.

Alphonso has failed to establish the denial of his motion in limine or

motion for a new trial entailed constitutional error. Even if it did, however,

any such error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence"

on the trial. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. The trial court conducted a hearing,

pursuant to California Evidence Code § 402, during which it heard the

testimony of Michelle’s estranged husband. After hearing his testimony the

court concluded it did not “establish false allegations of any substance at

all.” (Lod. 1, Vol 2, p. 412, lns. 12-14.) The court thus precluded the

testimony because it would not provide the jury with any relevant facts and

had no probative value. (Lod. 1, Vol 2, p. 412, lns. 15-18.) 

AEDPA mandates this Court give deference to the trial court’s

findings of fact and presume them to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); see

also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference

is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate courts). Given

that the trial court determined the testimony offered by Michelle’s estranged

husband did not establish she had made prior false allegations, and

presuming this factual finding to be correct, the Court finds it is unlikely a

jury would have reached a different conclusion and, as a result, would have

rejected or discounted the testimony Michelle gave regarding the acts for

which Alphonso was charged and convicted. Furthermore, as noted by the

Court of Appeal, the probity of the estranged husband’s testimony was

outweighed by the strength of Michelle’s testimony, the corroborative

testimony of her therapist and Officer Sdringola and the photographic

evidence of her injuries. The Court, therefore, does not find the trial court’s

preclusion of the estranged husband’s testimony had a substantial or

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injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, or would have

yielded a different result at retrial.

C. Claim 4, Denial of Batson/Wheeler Motion

In his fourth claim, Alphonso contends the trial court erred when it did

not find the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges to exclude

all non-white jurors. [Doc. No. 1, pp. 41-45.] 

1. Background

The following facts relevant to Alphonso’s fourth claim are taken from

the California Court of Appeal opinion:

During voir dire – after the prosecutor exercised seven peremptory challenges to excuse jurors 9, 15, 11, 7, 22, 26,

and 8 in that order – Alphonso’s counsel requested a sidebar

conference. Outside the presence of the prospective jurors,

defense counsel complained that the prosecutor had used

peremptory challenges to remove “every minority juror that’s

been on the panel so far.” Defense counsel then stated:

“Granted that I don’t have African[-]Americans or Hispanics, but

I pretty much have one of everything. They have pretty much all

been removed by [sic] the panel. My client is not a minority himself. The first p[ere]mptory was of Middle Eastern descent.

The one African[-]American was removed. The one Hispanic

was removed. Right now everybody’s that’s basically left is

Caucasian.”

The prosecutor, Claudine Ruiz, responded that she was a female Hispanic and that she did not recall anyone’s racial

makeup except for the African-American juror, prospective juror

11. The prosecutor stated, “I did not note any other juror as

being Hispanic.”

Defense counsel replied that prospective juror 8 was Hispanic. The court stated “My notes reflect that as I couldn’t

tell,” and the prosecutor said, “I have no idea.” The court then

indicated it would look at the prospective jurors’ names, stating

that “that’s a risky venture to begin with.” The prosecutor

agreed, stating “Especially since we didn’t use the names at all,

and I didn’t look at the names.”

After noting that “[d]etermining ethnic origin by itself is frequently fraught with mistakes,” the court reviewed the

prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges in the order those

seven challenges were made. The court stated that, based on

the name “Sabha,” prospective juror 9 “may well be... of Middle Eastern origin”; but then stated, “I’m not sure that’s a minority.”

The court found prospective juror 15 was a Caucasian male, and prospective juror 11 was an African-American male. Next

the court found prospective juror 7 was a Caucasian female; 

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prospective juror 22 “appeared... to be a Caucasian female”; prospective juror 26 “appeared... to be a Hispanic male,” whose last name “Rivera” “appear[ed] to be consistent with a Hispanic

male”; and prospective juror 8 “appeared” to be a Caucasian or Hispanic male whose “last name of Caravantes would appear

to be of Hispanic origin.” The court noted that Alphonso

appeared to be Caucasian and his last name “would be

consistent with that.”7

 The court asked the prosecutor whether she had anything to add to her previous comments, and the

prosecutor replied, “I guess, at this point, I’ll wait.”

1. Ruling

The court overruled the defense’s Batson/Wheeler

objection, finding there had not been a “pattern of systemic

exclusion of any minority.” The court observed that “other than

the third peremptory challenge to [prospective juror] number 11,

who we all agree is African[-]American, all the rest are to some

extent risky in terms of characterizing their ethnic origin.” The

court noted there was a pair of jurors with Hispanic surnames

that “appear[ed] to be consistent with [their] visual appearance,’

but then stated, “[A]t this point, the court doesn’t believe there’s

been a prima facie case made for the systemic exclusion of

individuals of any particular origin or group.”

7 The probation officer’s report states Alphonso is “White.”

(Lod. 6, pp. 11-13.)

2. The California Court of Appeal Decision

The California Supreme Court denied Alphonso’s Batson/Wheeler

claim without citation of authority, so this Court must “look through” that

denial to the Court of Appeal’s opinion. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801-806. The

Court of Appeal addressed the Batson/Wheeler claim as follows:

“Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based

on group bias, such as race or ethnicity.” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 539, 582 (Davis), citing Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97 & Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal. 3d at pp. 276-277.)

A rebuttable presumption exists that a prosecutor has exercised his or her peremptory challenges in a constitutional

manner, and the burden is on the objecting defendant to

demonstrate impermissible discrimination. (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal. 4th 1, 19; People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal. 4th

704, 732 (Cleveland).)

The California Supreme Court has explained that when the defense raises a timely Batson/Wheeler challenge to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges, a three-stage

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procedure applies: “‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts

gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial

exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for

the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide... whether the

opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial

discrimination.”’” (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 786, quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, italic added.)

Regarding the first stage of Batson/Wheeler error

analysis, the high court has clarified that, “[t]o make a prima

facie showing of group bias, ‘the defendant must show that

under the totality of the circumstances it is reasonable to infer

discriminatory intent.’” (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 582, italics added.)

If the defendant meets his or her burden of making a prima facie showing of group bias under this “reasonable

inference” standard, “[t]he proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler

inquiry... is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral

reasons given [by the prosecution] for the peremptory

challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those

reasons. [Citation.] So, for example, if a prosecutor believes a

prospective juror with long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a

beard would not make a good juror in the case, a peremptory

challenge to the prospective juror, sincerely exercised on that

basis, will constitute an entirely valid and nondiscriminatory reason for exercising the challenge.” (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924.) “All that matters is that the

prosecutor’ reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is

sincere and legitimate, legitimate in the sense of being

nondiscriminatory.” (Ibid.)

The prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to a level that justifies the exercise of a challenge for good cause. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 664.) “[A]dequate justification by the prosecutor may be no more than a “hunch” about the

prospective juror [citation], so long as it shows that the

peremptory challenges were exercised for reasons other than

the impermissible group bias and not simply as “a mask for

race prejudice.’” (Ibid.)

1. Standard of review

When a trial court denies a Batson/Wheeler objection based on its finding that no prima facie case of group bias was

established, the reviewing court considers the record of the voir

dire and affirms the ruling if it is supported by substantial

evidence. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900,993.) The reviewing court “accord[s] particular deference to the trial court

as fact finder, because of its opportunity to observe the

participants at first hand.” (Id. at pp. 993-994.)

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C. Analysis

Having reviewed the record of the voir dire, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling that the

defense failed to meet its threshold burden under

Batson/Wheeler of making a prima facie case of impermissible group bias discrimination.

We begin our analysis by noting that Alphonso faults the court for overruling his objection to the prosecution’s use of

peremptory challenges to exclude four “minority jurors”

(prospective jurors 9, 11, 27 & 8),8

 thereby suggesting that “minority jurors” is a cognizable group for purposes of

Batson/Wheeler error analysis. The California Supreme Court has held that “‘people of color’” is not a cognizable group for

purposes of Batson/Wheeler analysis. (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th

at p.583.) By parity of reasoning, “minority jurors” also is not a

cognizable group for purposes of Batson/Wheeler analysis. 

Jurors with Hispanic surnames, however, are a cognizable group for Batson/Wheeler purposes “even when ‘no one knows at the time of challenge whether a particular

individual who has a Spanish surname is Hispanic.’” (Davis,

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 584.)

Here, the prosecutor (Ruiz) stated during the sidebar conference that she did not look at the jurors’ surnames. The

prosecutor also said she was Hispanic, and she did not “recall

anyone’s racial make[]up” with the exception of prospective

juror 11, who she identified as “the African[-]American.” The

prosecutor added that she “did not note any other juror as

being Hispanic.” When defense counsel replied that

Prospective Juror 8 was Hispanic, the prosecutor stated, “I had

no idea.”

The court appeared to share the prosecutor’s views, stating that – apart from the prospective juror who they all

agreed was African-American – “all the rest are to some extent

risky in terms of characterizing their ethnic origin.” The court

indicated it thought prospective juror 26 could be Hispanic

based on his surname; and stated that prospective juror 8 “may

be a Hispanic male” although the court’s notes “reflect[ed] the

person appeared to be Caucasian or Hispanic.”

Significantly, the record shows that defense counsel only identified Prospective Juror 8 as a Hispanic; he did not identify

prospective juror 26 as a Hispanic.

The California Supreme Court has explained that although the exclusion of a single prospective juror may be the

product of an improper group bias, “[a]s a practical matter... the

challenge of one or two jurors can rarely suggest a pattern of

impermissible exclusion.’” (People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 598, first italics added.)

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Given the foregoing record of the sidebar Batson/Wheeler

proceeding and the presumption that the prosecutor exercised

her peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner

(Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 732), we conclude the court did not err in finding Alphonso failed to make the requisite

prima facie showing that it is reasonable to infer that the

prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent or purpose in using

her peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors 9, 11,

26, and 8. (See Davis, supra, 46 Cal. 4th at p. 582.)

In support of his claim that he did make the requisite prima facie showing, and relying on Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 582, Alphonso faults the court for failing to consider (1) whether the

challenged jurors only shared the characteristic of membership

in a protected group, and (2) whether the prosecutor failed to

engage the subject jurors in more that “desultory voir dire” or to

ask them any questions at all. Alphonso’s reliance on Bell is

unavailing.

In Bell, the California Supreme Court identified three nonexclusive9

 types of relevant evidence (which Alphonso refers to as “Bell factors”) that a defendant may use to establish a prima facie case for purposes of Batson/Wheeler error

analysis: (1) evidence that the prosecutor “has struck most or

all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or

has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories

against the group”; (2) evidence that “the jurors in question

share only this one characteristic – their membership in the

group – and that in all other respects they are as

heterogeneous as the community as a whole”; and (3) evidence

that “his opponent [failed] to engage these same jurors in more

than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at

all.” (Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 597.)

Alphonso complains that “[n]o analysis of the Bell factors

was undertaken” and the court erroneously failed to consider

any of the three types of evidence (discussed, ante) identified in Bell. However, Bell does not require a trial court to consider

the three types of evidence in determining whether a defendant

has satisfied his or her burden of establishing a prima facie

case. The language in Bell is permissive and only pertains to the types of evidence on which a defendant “may” properly rely as proof of a prima facie case for purposes of Batson/Wheeler

error analysis.10 (Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 597.)

Here, the record shows that during the sidebar conference, Alphonso’s counsel only relied on the first type of

relevant evidence identified in Bell – evidence that the

prosecutor “ha[d] struck most or all of the members of the

identified group from the venire, or ha[d] used a

disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group”

(Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597) – by arguing that the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to remove “every

minority juror that’s been on the panel so far.” Defense counsel

did not rely on the second and third types of evidence identified

in Bell. That the court considered defense counsel’s argument

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is implicitly shown by the fact that the court proceeded to

review all seven of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges. We

conclude the court did not err by failing to sua sponte consider

the second and third types of evidence identified in Bell.

In support of his claim that the court incorrectly concluded he had failed to make a prima facie case, Alphonso discusses

the voir dire responses of the excluded jurors, and concludes

that the only thing that set those jurors apart from the other

jurors then on the panel was their membership in a protected

class. To the extent Alphonso is asking this court to engage in

a comparative analysis of the challenged jurors and those who

were then on the panel and ultimately served, we decline to do

so because the court properly determined that Alphonso failed

to make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. In

People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313 – a “first stage” Wheeler/Batson case in which the trial court overruled the

defendant’s Wheeler/Batson objections after concluding he had failed to make out a prima facie case that the prosecutor was

engaged in impermissible discrimination – the California

Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling and stated,

“Whatever use comparative juror analysis might have in a thirdstage case for determining whether a prosecutor’s proffered

justifications for his strikes are pretextual, it has little or no use

[in a first-stage case] where the analysis does not hinge on the

prosecution’s actual proffered rationales, and we thus decline

to engage in a comparative analysis.” (Bonilla, at pp. 341, 350.) Here, the case before us is also a “first-stage” Wheeler/Batson

case and, as in Bonilla, comparative juror analysis “has little or no use” because “the analysis does not hinge on the

prosecution’s actual proffered rationales.” (Id. at p. 350.)

Alphonso also complains that the prosecutor did not ask any questions of the challenged jurors. However, that the

prosecutor did not ask the challenged jurors questions

individually is of little importance because, as the Attorney

General correctly points out, the record shows the prosecutor

was able to obtain information about the jurors and observe

their demeanor when the court and defense counsel

questioned them. (See People v. Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at

p. 21.)

We conclude the court properly determined that Alphonso failed to make a prima facie case of Wheeler/Batson error; that is, a showing that under the totality of the circumstances it is

reasonable to infer that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory

intent when she used her peremptory challenges to excuse

prospective jurors 9, 11, 26, and 8. (See Davis, supra, 46

Cal.4th at p. 582.)

8 As noted, ante, the record shows that when defense counsel made his

Batson/Wheeler objection, the prosecutor had also used peremptory

challenges to exclude three Caucasian prospective jurors (prospective

jurors 15, 7 & 22). 

9 The non exclusivity of the three types of relevant evidence mentioned in Bell is

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shown by the high court’s statement that, “[t]hough proof of a prima facie case

may be made from any information in the record available to the trial court, we

have mentioned ‘certain types of evidence that will be relevant for this purpose.’”

(Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597, quoting Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.)

10 Alphonso’s reference to the types of relevant evidence identified in Bell – upon which a defendant may properly rely as proof of a prima facie case

of Batson/Wheeler error – as “Bell factors” inappropriately suggests they

are factors a trial court must consider when conducting a Batson/Wheeler

error analysis, such that failure to consider them constitutes error. 

3. Claim 4 – Batson/Wheeler

Alphonso’s Batson/Wheeler claim here is narrower than the claim he

made to the Court of Appeal. Here, he contends the trial court committed

constitutional error when it found defense counsel did not make a prima

facie showing the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent in exercising

four peremptory challenges against non-white jurors and the California

Court of Appeal erred in its conclusion otherwise. [Doc. No. 1, pp. 43-45 (of

75).]

Under the Equal Protection Clause, a litigant may not exercise a

peremptory challenge to remove a potential juror solely on the basis of the

juror’s race, ethnic origin, or gender. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 85

(race); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (ethnic origin); J.E.B.

Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender). As articulated by the

Court of Appeal, courts employ a three-step process to determine whether

the use of a peremptory challenge infringes Batson or its progeny: First, a

defendant must make a prima facie showing the challenge was based on

an impermissible basis, such as race or gender. Second, if that showing

has been made, the prosecution must provide a race- or gender-neutral

basis for striking the juror in question. Third, if the prosecutor offers such

an explanation, the trial court must decide whether the defendant has

proved the prosecutor’s motive for the strike was purposeful discrimination.

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008); Green v. LeMarque,

532 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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At the first step of a Batson challenge, which is the step that was the

subject of the Court of Appeal’s analysis, a defendant makes a prima facie

showing if “(1) the prospective juror is a member of a ‘cognizable racial

group,’ (2) the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove the juror and

(3) the totality of the circumstances raised an inference that the strike was

on account of race.” Aleman, 723 F.3d at 982 n.5 (citing Crittenden v.

Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

I. The Court of Appeal’s Holding That “Minority Jurors” Is Not a Cognizable Group for Purposes of a Batson/wheeler Analysis Is Neither Contrary To, Nor an Objectively Unreasonable

Application Of, Clearly Established Supreme Court Law

There is no Supreme Court law expressly addressing the issue of

whether non-white jurors, or “people of color,” is a cognizable group for

purposes of a Batson analysis.6

 Because there is no clearly established

Supreme Court law addressing this specific issue, the Court of Appeal’s

decision could not have been contrary to, nor involved an objectively

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See,

e.g., Knowles v. Mirsayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173

L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (holding that “it is not ‘an unreasonable application of

clearly established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply a

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court”);

Wright v. Van Patten, 522 U.S. 120, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746–47, 169 L.Ed.2d

583 (2008) (per curiam) (“Because our cases give no clear answer to the

question presented, let alone one in [the petitioner's] favor, it cannot be

said that the state court unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established

Federal law.”(internal quotation marks omitted)); Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77

(“Given the lack of holdings from this Court regarding” the claim, “it cannot

6 In the context of Batson challenges, African-Americans (Batson, 476 U.S. at 89),

Latinos (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355, and both men and women (J.E.B, 511 U.S. at 143),

among others, have been found to constitute “cognizable groups.”

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be said that the state court ‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established

Federal law.’” (alterations in original)). 

The Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s decision that “minority

jurors” are not a cognizable group for purposes of a Batson/Wheeler

analysis does not contradict these authorities or involve an objectively

unreasonable application of them. The Court finds that, at the very least,

fairminded jurists could disagree regarding whether the decision was

correct. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1426; see also Gill v. Ayers, 342 F.3d 911

(9th Cir.2003) (“[i]t is logical to conclude that if a case presents an issue

close enough for reasonable minds to differ, then a state court's decision

resolving that issue, even if incorrect, would not be objectively

unreasonable.”) 

ii. The Court of Appeal’s Determination That Alphonso Failed to Make a Prima Facie Showing the Prosecutor Exercised

Peremptory Challenges Based on Race Was Not an

Unreasonable Determination of the Facts 

 After rejecting Alphonso’s claim based on the striking of “minority

jurors,” the Court of Appeal considered the peremptory challenges of

prospective jurors 8 and 26, both of whom were identified by the trial court

as possibly being Hispanic. “A state court’s finding that the prosecutor did

not engage in purposeful discrimination is reviewed under the deferential

standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).” Id. at 1224. Therefore, the

state court’s decision will be upheld unless it was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” Id. at 1225 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2)). Indeed, in evaluating habeas petitions premised on a Batson

violation where the trial court’s credibility finding was affirmed by the state

court of appeals, the standard is doubly deferential. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “One level of deference arises from the broad power of a

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trial court to assess credibility of the prosecutor’s statements that were

made in open court. Another level of deference arises from the AEDPA

context where we defer to state court decisions that are not objectively

unreasonable.” Aleman, 723 F.3d at 983.

As described above, the third component of the first step of the

Batson analysis requires the petitioner show that “the totality of the

circumstances raises an inference that the strike was on account of race.”

Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 955. Here, the “totality of the circumstances” does

not raise an inference the prosecutor’s striking of prospective jurors 8 and

26 was on account of race. At the time Alphonso’s Batson/Wheeler motion

was made the prosecutor had exercised a total of seven peremptory

challenges. Only two of the seven prospective jurors who were struck are

identified as being Hispanic. In comparison, three of the seven are

identified as Caucasian.7

 Furthermore, the prosecutor, who is also

Hispanic, stated she did not recall the racial make-up of any of the

prospective jurors, except for the sole African-American juror. (Lod. 1, Vol.

1 of 3, p.162, lns. 3-14.) She also stated she did not look at the prospective

jurors’ surnames. (Id., lns. 8-9.) The trial court’s perception of the

prospective juror pool appears to be in line with the prosecutor’s. The court

stated that apart from the one prospective juror who everyone agreed was

African-American, determining the ethnic origin of the other prospective

jurors was “a risky venture” that is “fraught with mistakes.” Id., lns. 5-23.) 

The transcript of the sidebar hearing regarding Alphonso’s Batson/Wheeler

motion indicates the racial background of prospective jurors 8 and 26 could

not be readily discerned based on their appearance. For example,

prospective juror 8 was identified by Alphonso’s counsel as Hispanic, but

the court stated “[m]y notes reflect that as I couldn’t tell,” and the

7

 Prospective jurors 15, 7 and 22 are identified as Caucasian. 

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prosecutor said “I did not note him at all as being any race.” (Id., lns. 1-14.)

The racial background of prospective juror 26 appears to be just as

unclear, if not more so. Significantly, Alphonso’s counsel only identified

prospective juror 8 as Hispanic and did not identify prospective juror 26 as

such. The determination this individual might be Hispanic for purposes of

the Batson/Wheeler analysis was only made by the trial court during the

sidebar conference, after review of his surname. Thus, given the totality of

the circumstances, the Court finds the Court of Appeal did not err in its

conclusion that Alphonso failed to make a prima facie showing of

Batson/Wheeler error with respect to the prosecutor’s peremptory

challenges of prospective jurors 8 and 26, and that its conclusion was not

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented.

V. RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough and independent review of the record in this matter,

the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that

he is entitled to federal habeas relief under the applicable legal standards. 

Therefore, this Court hereby recommends that the petition be DENIED

WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable M.

James Lorenz, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant

to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 28, 2015, any party may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned "Objections to Report and

Recommendation." 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed no later than September 8, 2015. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: August 12, 2015

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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