Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00930/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-00930-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

QURIO HOLDINGS, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) Case No. 14 C 7504 

 ) 

DISH NETWORK CORP. and ) 

DISH NETWORK, LLC, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

Qurio Holdings, Inc. has sued DISH Network Corp. and DISH Network, LLC 

(collectively "DISH") for infringement of three U.S. patents. The patents involve 

technology for distributing television programs to personal communication devices. 

Although Qurio is headquartered in New Hampshire, it filed suit here in Chicago. 

 DISH, which is headquartered in Engelwood, Colorado (near Denver) has moved 

to transfer the case not to the District of Colorado but to the Northern District of 

California. DISH has filed its motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides that 

"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 

may transfer any civil action to any other district . . . where it might have been 

brought[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

 To obtain a transfer under section 1404(a), the moving party must demonstrate 

that the proposed transferee forum is "clearly more convenient." Heller Fin., Inc. v. 

MidWhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989); Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 1 of 13
2 

Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219–20 (7th Cir. 1986). "'Unless the balance is strongly in favor 

of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.'" In re Nat'l 

Presto Indus., Inc., 347 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 

330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). "Where the balance of convenience is a close call, merely 

shifting inconvenience from one party to another is not a sufficient basis for transfer." 

Research Automation, Inc. v. Schrader–Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 

2010). 

1. Convenience of the parties and witnesses 

 In evaluating the convenience of the parties and witnesses, a court considers (1) 

the plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the situs of material events, (3) the relative ease of 

access to proof, (4) the parties' convenience, and (5) the witnesses' convenience in 

litigating in the respective forums. Amoco Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 

958, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2000); see also Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978.

a. Plaintiff's choice of forum 

Courts ordinarily give substantial weight to the plaintiff's choice of a forum, 

particularly when it is the plaintiff's home forum. See In re Nat'l Presto Indus., 347 F.3d 

at 664 (plaintiff's choice "should rarely be disturbed"); cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 

454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (common law forum non conveniens doctrine). DISH 

says, however, that a plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled to "little if any deference" if 

"none of the conduct occurred in [that] forum" or "if another forum bears a stronger 

relationship to the dispute." Defs.' Reply at 1. The first part of this contention is not that 

far off, at least in a case where the plaintiff has not chosen its home forum. The 

Seventh Circuit has said, in a case where the plaintiff sued outside her home forum, that 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 2 of 13
3 

the plaintiff's choice of forum "has minimal value where none of the conduct complained 

of occurred in the forum selected by the plaintiff . . . ." Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 

R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Minimal value, however, does not mean no value. 

 The second part of DISH's contention, however, is incorrect. Though the 

proposition that the plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled to little deference if another 

forum has a stronger relationship to the dispute appears in some district court decisions, 

it finds no support in the Seventh Circuit's cases. The proposition cannot possibly be 

correct. If it was, it would mean that the plaintiff's forum choice gets deference only if 

the plaintiff picks the forum with the greatest connection to the dispute, and that the 

plaintiff's choice does not get deference even if the plaintiff has chosen its home forum. 

Neither of these is an accurate statement of the law, at least not in this Circuit. 

 Here Qurio has not chosen its home forum. That reduces the amount of 

deference given to Qurio's choice, but it does not eliminate it entirely. Piper Aircraft, a 

common law forum non conveniens case cited by DISH and often cited on the section 

1404(a) question, does not say that the plaintiff's choice is entitled to no deference if it is 

not the plaintiff's home. Rather, it says (speaking of a non-U.S. plaintiff) that "[w]hen the 

home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. 

When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. 

Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the 

trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less deference." Id. at 255-56. 

Less deference does not mean no deference. 

 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 3 of 13
4 

b. Situs of material events 

 The events underlying the litigation have no relationship with this district. 

Infringement is claimed to have occurred here, but given the products at issue, this does 

not differentiate this district from any other federal district. See In re Acer Am. Corp., 

626 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[T]he sale of an accused product offered 

nationwide does not give rise to a substantial interest in any single venue."). There is 

no basis to say that the degree of infringement in this district is more significant than in 

other districts generally, or in the proposed transferee district in particular. 

 Qurio's attorneys in this lawsuit are located here, but it does not argue that this is 

a relevant factor. Though the Court can imagine a case where it might be, this is not 

such a case; reliance on this factor would permit a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit 

to pick its venue by its choice of attorneys. 

 No events of significance took place in this district. First, the patented products 

and methods appear to have been developed in North Carolina, and the patents were 

likewise prosecuted by attorneys located there. See Compl., Exs. A, B & C. 

 Second, it appears that the development of the infringing products—a relevant 

factor in the analysis, see Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d at 1256—took place in northern 

California, India, and Colorado. Specifically, Qurio accuses DISH of infringing two of 

the patents by making and offering for sale "their ViP DVRs and Hopper DVSs with 

Sling, and related products and services, and by providing and operating the Sling 

technology on their media distribution WAN, and transmitting to customers' devices over 

a WAN." Compl. ¶ 20; see also id. ¶ 36. With regard to the third patent, Qurio accuses 

DISH of infringing by making and offering for sale "their ViP, Hopper, Hopper with Sling 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 4 of 13
5 

DVRs, and Dish Anywhere Mobile Apps and related products and services." Id. ¶ 28. 

Sling, which is not a party to this case, is a subsidiary of EchoStar, which like DISH has 

its principal place of business in Englewood, Colorado. A series of affidavits offered by 

DISH reflects that the Sling technology was developed and marketed in northern 

California "and in Bangalore, India," by persons who likely continue to live in California 

but most of whom no longer work for Sling. See, e.g., Asnis Decl. ¶ 4. Finally, 

EchoStar, which as indicated earlier is located in Colorado, also supplies an accused 

functionality to DISH, specifically, receivers. See Tirpak Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5. 

 Because this is not Qurio's home district and no material events took place here, 

its choice of this district is not entitled to significant weight in balancing the factors under 

section 1404(a). 

c. The parties' convenience 

The only contact of significance between the lawsuit and this district is the fact 

that Qurio has separately sued two other defendants here for infringement of the same 

patents, and the claims in each of these lawsuits overlap. Qurio says the ability to sue 

all three defendants in the same place is why it filed the lawsuit here and that this is a 

significant factor when considering convenience of the parties. Qurio argues that it is 

more convenient for all of its lawsuits concerning the patents in suit to proceed in 

tandem for pretrial purposes (including claim construction), to avoid extra expense, 

duplication of effort, and conflicting rulings. Qurio says that it is not well-heeled and that 

litigating the same issues in different districts would pose a hardship. 

 This is a relevant factor in the analysis, which the Court will take into account. 

The Court notes, however, that procedures exist by which lawsuits pending in different 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 5 of 13
6 

districts, including patent infringement suits, may be transferred to a single district and 

judge for pretrial purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (multidistrict litigation). The Court 

will discuss this point further when addressing the interests of justice. 

 It is typically more convenient for a party to litigate in its home district, and thus 

this factor is usually a tie when a court considers a section 1404(a) motion. In this case, 

however, neither party wants the case in its home district. Qurio says that it might have 

had difficulty obtaining personal jurisdiction over DISH in New Hampshire or in North 

Carolina, but it has not supported this contention (such as by showing that DISH does 

not distribute the accused products into those states). 

 d. Access to sources of proof 

 Because the convenience of witnesses is assessed separately, the factor of 

"access to sources of proof" typically involves relevant records. In this case, there are 

no relevant records in the Northern District of Illinois, at least not that anyone has 

identified. Records relating to the work of the inventors and prosecution of the patent 

likely are located in North Carolina. Records relating to the development and sale of the 

accused devices are located in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. And there are 

records regarding prior art—which might be relevant regarding validity of the patents—

that are, or at least may be, located in the Northern District of California. 

 The Federal Circuit has, at least in some cases, cited the location and 

transportation of records as a significant consideration in assessing convenience. See, 

e.g., In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d at 1345-46 (discussing the "burden on the 

petitioners to transport documents"). Respectfully, it is difficult to take this seriously. 

Although section 1404(a) was adopted in the 1940s, it does not require a court to 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 6 of 13
7 

pretend that lawsuits are litigated and tried as they were in that era. Business records 

nowadays are nearly all maintained digitally. More to the point, as any experienced 

litigator or trial judge can attest, when records are produced in litigation nowadays, they 

are all (or virtually all) produced digitally. The old saw about "backing up the truck" 

when a party seeks broad production of records now has meaning only to litigators of a 

certain age. There is no truck and, for the most part, there are not even boxes. Rather, 

documents are produced on digital media. Records that are in California are barely less 

accessible to a litigant in Illinois than they would be if they were in Illinois. And to 

directly address the point made in Genentech, the days when records had to be 

physically shipped in for trial or even document production during discovery are long 

gone. The Seventh Circuit, whose cases concerning section 1404(a) govern here, has 

acknowledged this. See Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Elite 

Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d 1031, 1037 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing section 1404(a); "Easy 

air transportation, the rapid transmission of documents, and the abundance of law firms 

with nationwide practices, make it easy these days for cases to be litigated with little 

extra burden in any of the major metropolitan areas."). 

 A court need not and should not put on blinders when it considers this factor. As 

the Court has indicated, the fact that section 1404(a) has been around for decades does 

not mean that "access" should be assessed the same way in 2015 as it was in 1948 or 

even, for that matter, in 2000. The Court acknowledges that some Federal Circuit 

decisions seem to point the other way, but they reflect a misunderstanding of how 

litigants and lawyers access relevant records these days. And contrary to the court's 

indication in Genentech, this in no way reads this factor out of the section 1404(a) 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 7 of 13
8 

analysis or renders it "superfluous." Rather, the Court is addressing the weight 

appropriately given this factor in the "individualized, case-by-case consideration of 

convenience and fairness" mandated by the Seventh Circuit, Coffey, 796 F.2d at 219, 

and the Supreme Court. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964). 

 e. Convenience of witnesses 

 As the Court has indicated, neither side identifies any witnesses who are located 

in this district. The inventors and the attorney who prosecuted the patent may be 

witnesses, but they are located in North Carolina. 

 DISH says that witnesses regarding prior art references that were either cited in 

the patents in suit or that are likely relevant on the issue of validity are located in 

California. DISH's contention that prior art witnesses should factor into the analysis is 

unpersuasive. In the overwhelming majority of cases, prior art is proved up via 

documents and expert testimony; testimony by fact witnesses is rare and, in fact, is 

disfavored. See, e.g., Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 

(collecting cases). 

 Some of these same witnesses, however, were involved in the development of 

the Sling technology, which Qurio accuses of infringing at least two of the three patents, 

and possibly all three of them. These witnesses are located, for the most part, in 

northern California. None of them is currently affiliated with DISH, and thus their live 

testimony at trial cannot be assured unless they are within the subpoena power of the 

trial court. This is a significant factor in the section 1404(a) analysis. See Acer Am. 

Corp., 626 F.3d at 1256. 

 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 8 of 13
9 

2. Interests of justice

 Consideration of the "interests of justice" under § 1404(a) "may be determinative 

in a particular case, even if the convenience of the parties and witnesses might call for a 

different result." Coffey, 796 F.2d at 220. The Seventh Circuit has stated that factors 

typically considered "relate to the efficient administration of the court system." Id. at 

221. One such factor involves "where the litigants are more likely to receive a speedy 

trial." Id. In addition, the Seventh Circuit has stated that "related litigation should be 

transferred to a forum where consolidation is feasible." Id.; see also Heller Fin., 883 

F.2d at 1293 ("trying related litigation together" is a relevant interests-of-justice factor). 

Another factor is the respective courts' familiarity with the applicable law. See id. This, 

however, is typically a consideration only in diversity cases. It would be difficult to say, 

perhaps with some small number of exceptions, that any given federal judge is more 

familiar with patent law than any other. Other factors that may be considered include 

"the respective desirability of resolving controversies in each locale and the relationship 

of each community to the controversy." Research Automation, 626 F.3d at 978 (internal 

citation omitted). 

 DISH cites statistics indicating that cases get to trial slightly quicker in the 

Northern District of California than in this district. See 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseload

Statistics/2014/tables/C05Mar14.pdf (last viewed Feb. 8, 2015). The difference, 

however, is immaterial (28.4 months vs. 31.2 months). In any event, only a minuscule 

percentage of go to trial, and the time to disposition for cases that do not go to trial is 

virtually identical in the two districts. Moreover, as the Federal Circuit has noted, "caseCase 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 9 of 13
10 

disposition statistics may not always tell the whole story." Genentech, 566 F.3d at 

1347. The statistics in question cover the whole gamut of civil cases and say nothing 

about the time it takes patent infringement cases to get to trial. One way or another, 

however, the statistics that DISH cites are a neutral factor in the analysis. 

 As far as the relationship of the two communities to the dispute, the Court has 

already addressed this in discussing the situs of the material events. In a nutshell, this 

district has no relationship to Qurio's dispute with DISH. The Northern District of 

California, where DISH proposes to transfer the case, has a more significant 

relationship because it is where the accused Sling technology was developed. It is 

likely, however, that the most significant relationship between the material events and a 

particular venue exists in a forum neither side has proposed, namely the District of 

Colorado. At least one set of infringing products—receivers—appears to have been 

developed there; both DISH, the defendant, and EchoStar, the parent of Sling, are 

located there; and because of this, marketing and sales regarding the accused products 

likely has its base in that district. 

 The last factor the Court will discuss is the matter of related litigation and the 

possibility of consolidation. The Seventh Circuit, as noted earlier, has specifically 

identified this as a relevant consideration under section 1404(a). Coffey, 796 F.2d at 

220; see also Heller Fin., 883 F.2d at 1293. This is the key factor upon which Qurio 

relies; indeed it is the reason Qurio cites for filing the present lawsuit here. If the case is 

transferred, Qurio argues, the courts will not be able to resolve related litigation 

together. This disserves the interests of justice, because it makes it more likely that 

there will be judicial duplication of effort involving, among other things, construction of 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 10 of 13
11 

patent claims involved in all or more than one of the cases. 

 This is a valid consideration, but in the Court's view it is not appropriately given 

controlling weight in this case, given the lack of any other material connection between 

this district and the parties, the witnesses, or the underlying dispute. The Federal 

Circuit has indicated that in this scenario, the pendency of other related litigation in the 

district where the plaintiff filed is not a basis to defeat transfer of a particular lawsuit. In 

In re Apple, Inc., 581 F. App'x 886 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the court granted (on a 2-1 vote) a 

petition for mandamus directing a district court to grant a defendant's motion to transfer 

venue. The plaintiff had no significant business presence in its chosen venue, and the 

defendant was located in the proposed transferee venue. In addition, there were 

numerous witnesses—including some non-party witnesses—in the transferee venue, 

and none in the plaintiff's chosen forum. See id. at 887. The trial court nonetheless 

declined to transfer the case, relying in large part on the fact that there were other 

pending cases in its district involving the same patents in suit and that it was likely the 

cases could be consolidated, thus achieving "significant judicial economy." Id. at 887-

88. The Federal Circuit concluded that the trial court had clearly abused its discretion, 

making mandamus appropriate. With regard to the related-cases issue, the court said 

that "judicial economy is just one relevant consideration," and that although "transfer 

may mean that some of the other related cases remain in the [plaintiff's chosen forum], 

multidistrict litigation procedures exist to mitigate inefficiencies in this type of situation." 

Id. at 889. Though this "do[es] not render the practical problems factor neutral," the 

court said, "it do[es] mitigate some judicial economy concerns such that the district court 

should not have weighed this factor so heavily against transfer." Id. at 889-90. 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 11 of 13
12 

 There is arguably some tension between In re Apple and the Federal Circuit's 

earlier decision in In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010), in which it 

declined to grant a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to transfer a case. The trial 

court had relied in part on the existence of "co-pending litigation before the trial court 

involving the same patent and underlying technology." Id. at 1346. The Federal Circuit 

concluded that this, along with other factors, "provide[d] a substantial justification for 

maintaining suit" in the plaintiff's chosen forum and declining transfer. Id. at 1346. In 

Vistaprint, however, "no defendant party [was] actually located in the [proposed] 

transferee venue and the presence of the witnesses in that location [was] not 

overwhelming." Id. at 1346-47. 

 The present case falls somewhere between In re Apple and Vistaprint. As in 

Vistaprint, DISH is not located in the proposed transferee district. But unlike in that 

case, and as in Apple, a number of potentially significant infringement-related witnesses 

are located there. And because they are not affiliated with DISH, their presence at trial 

cannot be assured if the case remains in this district. On balance, this case is closer to 

Apple than Vistaprint.

Conclusion

 Qurio chose this forum hoping to litigate three interrelated cases in a single 

district. This was an appropriate objective, but it does not carry the day. Qurio's choice 

of this district is entitled to little weight because it is not Qurio's home district, and its 

dispute with DISH has no significant relationship to this district. No material events took 

place here, and no witnesses are located here. The Court concludes that DISH has 

shown that a different forum is clearly more convenient. A case can be made that the 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 12 of 13
13 

appropriate place to litigate and try the case is the District of Colorado, DISH's home 

forum and the likely location of a number of significant witnesses, perhaps including 

some non-parties. But DISH does not seek transfer to that district. The Court 

concludes that transfer to the Northern District of California is appropriate. Many if not 

most of the accused functionalities were developed there, and a number of significant 

non-party infringement-related witnesses reside there. The Court therefore grants 

defendants' motion to transfer [docket no. 24]. The Clerk is directed to transfer this 

case to the Northern District of California. Plaintiff's motion to consolidated cases is 

terminated as moot [docket no. 31]. 

Date: February 9. 2015 ________________________________ 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Case 4:15-cv-00930-HSG Document 37 Filed 02/09/15 Page 13 of 13