Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01902/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01902-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Ray Lee Vaughn, Sr., asserts his civil rights were violated through the denial of 

participation in the Jewish Kosher Program at Kern Valley State Prison by C. Wegman, the food 

supervisor, and Chaplain Bowman. Because Plaintiff fails to identify facts sufficient to support his 

claims, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

I. Screening Requirement

When an individual seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the 

complaint and shall dismiss a complaint, or portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A plaintiff’s claim 

is frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or 

not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 

25, 32-33 (1992). 

RAY LEE VAUGHN, SR.,

 Plaintiff,

v.

C. WEGMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01902 - LJO - JLT

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

AMEND AS MOOT

(Doc. 10)

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II. Pleading Standards

General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 

complaint must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may 

include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Federal Rules 

adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards” than those 

drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

A complaint must state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and succinct manner. 

Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). The purpose of a complaint 

is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him, and the grounds upon which the 

complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation.] A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation.] The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation.] Where a complaint pleads 

facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). If factual allegations are well-pled, a court should assume 

their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; conclusions in the 

pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. 

The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court “may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a 

complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 

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1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). 

However, the Court may grant leave to amend a complaint to the extent deficiencies of the complaint 

can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. Section 1983 Claims

An individual may bring a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), 

which provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 

of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To plead a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must allege facts from which it may 

be inferred that (1) a constitutional right was deprived, and (2) a person who committed the alleged 

violation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 

529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976).

A plaintiff must allege a specific injury was suffered, and show causal relationship between the 

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976). Thus, 

Section 1983 “requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants 

and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff.” Chavira v. Ruth, 2012 WL 

1328636 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012). An individual deprives another of a federal right “if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do so that it causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In other words, “[s]ome culpable action or in action must be 

attributable to defendants.” See Puckett v. Corcoran Prison - CDCR, 2012 WL 1292573, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Apr. 13, 2012).

IV. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that in March 2014, defendants Wegman and Bowman denied him “the rights 

as a Jewish inmate to continue participating in the Jewish Kosher Program and services, regardless of 

his prior approval in compliance with CDCR.” (Doc. 1 at 3) Accordingly, Plaintiff contends he has 

been unable “to practice [his] faith freely.” (Id.) 

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V. Discussion and Analysis

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to identify any causes of action in his complaint. For 

purposes of this screening order only, the Court presumes Plaintiff seeks to state claims for violations 

of the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 

Persons Act.

A. First Amendment Violation

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment 

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .” U.S. Constitution, amend. I. Inmates “retain 

protections afforded by the First Amendment,” including the free exercise of religion. O’Lone v. 

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). Nevertheless, free-exercise rights are “necessarily 

limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional 

goals or to maintain prison security.” O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). The protections 

of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an 

inmate’s religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct he sincerely believes is mandated by 

his faith. Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987).

In this case, Plaintiff asserts he has been denied participation in a Jewish Kosher program, 

which includes a Kosher diet. The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates “have the right to be provided 

with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” 

Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Consequently, if an inmate is 

denied accommodation for his diet, the First Amendment may be implicated.

Significantly, however, it is not clear that the defendants had the authority to approve or deny 

Plaintiff’s request for participation in the program. Pursuant to California law, a Jewish Chaplin must 

determine whether an inmate should receive the kosher diet. Cal. Code. Regs. Title 15, § 3054.2. 

Specifically, the Regulations provide: “A Jewish Chaplin shall: (1) determine inmate entry into the 

Jewish kosher diet program, oversee the program, and determine Jewish inmate compliance 

violations.” Id. at § 3054.2(g). As food supervisor, defendant Wegman was not empowered to give 

Plaintiff a kosher diet. (Id.) Further, it is not clear from the pleadings whether Bowman was a Jewish 

Chaplain for Kern Valley State Prison, or empowered to determine whether Plaintiff could participate 

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in the Jewish Kosher program at the facility. Consequently, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to 

support a claim for a First amendment violation.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Violation

The Equal Protection Clause states that “no state shall... deny to any person within its 

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV §1. In essence, this 

commands that all persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 

Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Prisoners are protected by the Equal Protection Clause 

from intentional discrimination based upon their religion. See, e.g., Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 

891 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to a reasonable opportunity of 

pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional 

religious precepts”).

To state a cognizable claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff in a 

Section 1983 claim must allege the defendants, “acted in a discriminatory manner and that the 

discrimination was intentional.” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 

2000). A “long line of Supreme Court cases make clear that the Equal Protection clause requires proof 

of discriminatory intent or motive.” Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995). “Intentional 

discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a plaintiff’s protected status.” 

Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts supporting a conclusion that Defendants discriminated 

against him, or that Defendants did so because he practices the Jewish faith. Thus, Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. RLUIPA

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) provides more 

stringent protections than those accorded by the First Amendment. Under RLUIPA, a government 

may not impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a confined person unless the 

government establishes that the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so by 

“the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). RLUIPA must be “construed broadly in 

favor of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 

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F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)).

First, a plaintiff must show that the exercise of his religion is at issue; this includes “any 

exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Next, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant’s 

conduct substantially burdened his religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Significantly, as 

discussed above, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting the conclusion that Defendants burdened his 

religious exercise. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of RLUIPA.

VI. Conclusion and Order 

Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient facts sufficient to support claims for constitutional 

violations. The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in this order 

by providing additional facts to support his claims. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128 (dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim 

is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts that she has alleged and 

that an opportunity to amend would be futile). 

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In addition, the amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. Once Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. The amended complaint must bear the docket 

number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Finally, Plaintiff is 

warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an 

amended complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing London v. 

Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981).

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend; 

2. Within twenty-one days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL file a 

First Amended Complaint; 

3. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 10) is denied as MOOT; and

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4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the action will be dismissed for failure to 

prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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