Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02252/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02252-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC ENERGETIC

MATERIALS COMPANY (ARIZONA) LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. NO. CV-10-02252-PHX-JRG

ENSIGN-BICKFORD AEROSPACE & 

DEFENSE COMPANY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pending before the court are the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to

Transfer to the United States District Court for [the District of] Connecticut [Docket 18] and the

defendant’s Motion to Transfer to the United States District Court for [the District of] Connecticut

[Docket 37]. For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED. 

I. Background

This case arises out of a series of letters exchanged between the plaintiffs and the defendant

regarding the defendant’s patent portfolio. In the first letter, the defendant stated that its technology

might be of use to the plaintiffs and offered to enter into license negotiations. The plaintiffs allege

that as the communications progressed, the defendant accused the plaintiffs of infringing three

United States patents. The plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 1 of 23
that the defendant’s patents at issue are invalid, unenforceable, and that the plaintiffs are not directly

or indirectly infringing upon them. The plaintiffs additionally allege a state law claim for tortious

interference with a contract. 

Pacific Scientific Energetic Materials Company (Arizona), LLC (“PSEMC-Arizona”) and

Pacific Scientific Energetic Materials Company (California), LLC, (“PSEMC-California”)

(collectively “PSEMC”), are two separate entities. PSEMC-California is a California corporation

with its principal place of business in Valencia, California. PSEMC-Arizona is a Delaware

corporation with its principal place of business in Chandler, Arizona. The companies, both named

plaintiffs, allegedly operate as a single 750-employee unit under their parent company, the Danaher

Corporation. (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss [Docket 33], at 2.) The president, executives, and

staff all serve PSEMC as a whole, and the companies share accounting, expenses, forecasting,

strategic initiatives, planning, and project management. (Id.) PSEMC designs, develops, and

produces ordnance, pyrotechnics, electronics, laser components, and systems for the aerospace,

defense, and commercial industries. (Compl. [Docket 1] ¶ 6.) 

The defendant, Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company (“Ensign-Bickford”), is a

Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut. Ensign-Bickford is also

registered to do business in Arizona. It has designated a registered agent for service of process in

Arizona and has employees who operate full-time out of an office in Arizona. Although EnsignBickford allegedly competes with PSEMC for customers and government and commercial contracts,

the parties had discussed the possibility of a cooperative business arrangement before this dispute

arose. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) 

On May 29, 2009, Ensign-Bickford sent a letter to PSEMC’s president claiming that Ensign2

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 2 of 23
Bickford’s “technology may be of use under U.S. Government programs . . . in which we understand

Pacific Scientific to be involved.” (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1 [Docket 18-1], at 3.) Specifically,

Ensign-Bickford stated that it owns three patents, Nos. 6,584,907, 6,889,610, and 7,278,658, “which

are directed toward an ordnance firing system.” (Id.) Ensign-Bickford then offered to enter into a

licensing agreement with PSEMC. (Id.) According to PSEMC, over the course of sixteen months

Ensign-Bickford sent several additional letters to PSEMC requesting information regarding

PSEMC’s activity in the U.S. Government programs and the patents at issue.1 Ensign-Bickford

claimed that its concerns arose out of “information obtained from customers who have sought either

alternatives to PSEMC or who have been in the process of considering Ensign-Bickford’s system

or PSEMC’s system who understand [Ensign-Bickford’s] patent estate and have expressed that they

don’t see how it is possible that PSEMC is not in conflict with the Ensign-Bickford patent estate.” 

(Compl. ¶ 18.) 

PSEMC maintained that its product, Smart Energetics Architecture (“SEATM ”), is “wholly

distinct from Ensign-Bickford’s patent portfolio in numerous, significant respects” and, therefore,

according to the plaintiffs, does not infringe upon Ensign-Bickford’s patents. (Id. ¶ 14.) PSEMC

further informed Ensign-Bickford that it “had no intention of disclosing the detailed, highly

confidential, proprietary and sensitive competitive information that Ensign-Bickford requested for

its patent infringement allegations, [because PSEMC] fully and reasonably believed it did not

infringe Ensign-Bickford’s patents.” (Id. ¶ 16.) PSEMC did not respond to Ensign-Bickford’s

1

 At some point between May 29, 2009 and November 16, 2009, the presidents of

Ensign-Bickford and PSEMC met in Arizona and discussed the relevant patents as well as a

potential business collaboration. Additionally, PSEMC (according to the defendant, the

California office only) entered into a confidentiality agreement with Ensign-Bickford for the

purpose of “exploring a cooperative business arrangement.” (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Ex. 2, at 6.) 

-3-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 3 of 23
September 30, 2010, letter because it felt that communications had stalled and any response was

futile. (Id. ¶ 22.) 

As a result of this dispute, PSEMC filed suit on October 21, 2010, seeking a declaratory

judgment that the patents at issue are invalid, unenforceable, and not being directly or indirectly

infringed. PSEMC also alleges that Ensign-Bickford tortiously interfered with PSEMC’s

confidentiality agreements with its customers and potential customers. On January 6, 2011, EnsignBickford moved the court to: (1) dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) dismiss the

action for improper venue; (3) decline to exercise its jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment

Act; (4) dismiss the intentional interference with a contract claim for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted; and (5) transfer the case to the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 [Docket 18]. On May 5, 2011, EnsignBickford filed its Motion to Transfer to the United States District Court for [the District of]

Connecticut, this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 [Docket 37]. The motions have been fully

briefed, and the matter is ripe for review. The court will address each of Ensign-Bickford’s

arguments in turn. 

II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Ensign-Bickford moves the court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. According to

Ensign-Bickford, general jurisdiction does not exist because its principal place of business is in

Connecticut, none of its officers reside in Arizona, its shareholder meeting takes place in

Connecticut, and “[n]one of the activities at Ensign’s Arizona office relate to the patented products

or the patents at issue in this case.” (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 7.) The plaintiffs contend that the court

has general jurisdiction because, among other things, Ensign-Bickford is registered to do business

-4-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 4 of 23
in Arizona, has a registered agent for service of process in Arizona, and maintains an office and

employees in Arizona. (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 6.) The defendant argues that specific

jurisdiction does not exist because the letters and communications exchanged between EnsignBickford and PSEMC during discussions about Ensign-Bickford’s patent estate are the only contacts

directed at the forum state that relate to the claim, and these contacts are insufficient to confer

specific jurisdiction. In response, the plaintiffs assert that these letters amounted to accusations of

patent infringement, and that the case arises out of these contacts. 

a. Standard of Review

When a defendant moves to dismiss a patent case for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court applies Federal Circuit law

“because the jurisdictional issue is intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws.”

Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Hildebrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., Inc., 279 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed.

Cir. 2002) (“[W]e apply Federal Circuit law to personal jurisdiction inquiries over out-of-state

patentees as declaratory judgment defendants.”). When the court addresses the jurisdictional

question without any discovery, the burden is on the plaintiffs to make a prima facie showing that

the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1017. In these

circumstances, a court must accept the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint as true

and resolve factual conflicts in the affidavits in the plaintiffs’ favor. Id. (citing Elecs. for Imaging,

Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). However, the plaintiffs are only entitled to

those inferences that are reasonable. Id. at 1018.

 To assess whether personal jurisdiction can be exercised over a non-resident defendant, the

-5-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 5 of 23
court applies a two-step analysis. Id. at 1017. First, the court determines whether the long-arm

statute of the state in which the federal court sits permits service of process. Second, the court

determines whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant would comport with the Due

Process Clause.2

 Id. (citing Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-76 (1985))). Because

the Arizona long-arm statute is coextensive with the full reach of due process, it is unnecessary in

this case to go through the two-step process to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists. Ariz.

R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining

that when “the state’s long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process, the two-part inquiry

collapses into one”). Rather, the statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the

analysis centers on whether exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant is consistent with

the Due Process Clause.

Exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is consistent with the Due

Process Clause if the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum such that

requiring the defendant to defend a lawsuit in the forum would not “offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff may satisfy the “minimum contacts” requirement by

establishing either “specific jurisdiction” or “general jurisdiction.” See Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at

1017. Establishing general jurisdiction “requires that the defendant have ‘continuous and

2

Because this is a federal question, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

applies. Although the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction

analyzes only state and diversity cases, the Federal Circuit applies the minimum contacts

standard in federal cases. LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.5

(Fed. Cir. 2000). 

-6-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 6 of 23
systematic’ contacts with the forum state and confers personal jurisdiction even when the cause of

action has no relationship with those contacts.” Id. at 1017 (citing Silent Drive v. Strong Indus., Inc.,

326 F.3d 1194, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, must be based on

activities that arise out of or relate to the cause of action, and can exist even if the defendant’s

contacts are not continuous and systematic.” Id. Because the court finds that there is general

jurisdiction over Ensign-Bickford in Arizona, the court need not address whether specific

jurisdiction exists. 

General jurisdiction is appropriate only where the defendant’s contacts with the forum are

“continuous and systematic.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415

(1984). Applying the principle of general jurisdiction requires navigating between two Supreme

Court mileposts: Helicopteros, in which the Court found general jurisdiction lacking, and Perkins

v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), in which the Court found it satisfied. 

In Perkins, an Ohio court exercised personal jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation that was

operating in Ohio as its “home away from home” during the Japanese occupation of the

Phillippines. See 342 U.S. at 438, 445. The president of the company kept an office in Ohio, where

he maintained files, held meetings, and carried on correspondence. These contacts convinced the

Court that the foreign company was “carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited,

part of its general business,” thus justifying exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.

at 438. In Helicopteros, by contrast, the defendant never had an office in the Texas, never was

authorized to perform business in Texas, never had a registered agent for service of process, and

never had an employee based there, performed any services there, or sold any product there. See

466 U.S. at 411. In short, the Court found that the defendant’s fleeting contacts with Texas did not

-7-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 7 of 23
“constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist

in Perkins.” Id. at 416.

Once a party has sustained a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, the court must

determine whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable. Patent Rights Prot. Grp. v. Video 

Gaming Tech., 603 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The factors commonly considered as part of

this analysis include: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating

the dispute; (3) the importance of the chosen forum to the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4)

the most efficient forum for judicial resolution of the dispute; and (5) the “shared interest of the

several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). When the defendant purposefully directs its activities at the

forum, it must present a compelling case that the presence of other factors renders jurisdiction

unreasonable. These compelling cases “are limited to the rare situation in which the plaintiff’s

interest and the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they

are clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum.” 

Patent Rights Prot. Grp., 603 F.3d at 1369 (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.,

21 F.3d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 

b. Discussion

To determine whether a defendant’s activities with the forum state are “continuous and

systematic,” the court must look at the facts in each case and make a determination. LSI Indus. Inc.

v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Ensign-Bickford has the following

contacts with Arizona: (1) it is registered to do business in Arizona; (2) it has designated a registered

-8-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 8 of 23
agent for service of process; (3) it maintains an office in Tempe, Arizona;3

 and (4) as of January

2011, two engineers worked at the Tempe office as Ensign-Bickford employees. Furthermore,

Ensign-Bickford does not controvert the plaintiffs’ assertion that Ensign-Bickford has negotiated

and entered into an asset purchase agreement with Special Devices, Incorporated, an Arizona-based

corporation, and is a major supplier to Raytheon Missile Systems and Orbital Sciences Corporation

in Arizona. (Pls.’ Res. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 6.) See LSI Indus. Inc., 232 F.3d at 1375 (finding

that the defendant’s millions of dollars of sales of lighting products in Ohio over several years

combined with its broad distributorship network in Ohio established general jurisdiction over the

defendant in Ohio). The plaintiffs point to several additional contacts: (1) Ensign-Bickford solicited

and hired Arizona residents, including former PSEMC employees; (2) it sent employees to

continuing education courses in Arizona; and (3) it attends supplier conferences in Arizona. 

Considering all of these contacts together, I find that the plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing

that Ensign-Bickford is conducting a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general

business in Arizona, and therefore has sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona. See Perkins, 342

U.S. at 438.4

3

 Ensign-Bickford does not suggest that either the employees operating in Arizona or the

business office licensed with the Secretary of State are somehow legally distinct from the main

Ensign-Bickford campus in Connecticut. 

4

 Ensign-Bickford relies on two Arizona state cases, rather than Federal Circuit cases, in

support of its position that it is not subject to general jurisdiction in Arizona, both of which are

inapposite to the court’s holding in this case. First, it asserts that the mere act of naming a

registered agent for service of process in a state does not subject a corporation to general

jurisdiction. See Armstrong v. Aramco Services Co., 746 P.2d 917, 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 

In that case, one of the defendants was qualified to do business in Arizona, but none of the

defendants owned any facilities in Arizona or had any employees in Arizona. Rather, the

defendants generally recruited employees from Arizona to work elsewhere. See id. at 918-19. 

Accordingly, Armstrong stands for the proposition that sporadic contacts coupled with

-9-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 9 of 23
Having determined that the plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that Ensign-Bickford

has sufficient minimum contacts with Arizona, the burden shifts to the defendant to “present a

compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction

unreasonable.” See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-77. Ensign-Bickford has not presented a

compelling case demonstrating that exercising jurisdiction in this case would be unreasonable. 

Accordingly, the court DENIES Ensign-Bickford’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction. 

III. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406

Next, Ensign-Bickford moves this court to dismiss the Complaint for improper venue under

28 U.S.C. § 1406. Ensign-Bickford argues that venue in Arizona is improper because the plaintiffs

failed to establish personal jurisdiction in Arizona. (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 9.) Ensign-Bickford

additionally argues that the plaintiffs failed to show that a substantial part of the events giving rise

to the claim occurred in Arizona. (Id. at 9-10.) The plaintiffs maintain that “[v]enue is proper in

this Court . . . because Ensign-Bickford is subject to personal jurisdiction in this district and thus

resides in this district, and a substantial part of the alleged events or omissions giving rise to the

claims occurred in this district.” (Compl. ¶ 4.) 

registration as a corporation to do business in Arizona are insufficient to subject it to general

jurisdiction. Second, Ensign-Bickford maintains that its office in Arizona does not subject it to

general jurisdiction in Arizona. See, e.g., Van Denburgh v. Tungsten Reef Mines Co., 63 P.2d

647, 651 (Ariz. 1936) (finding no personal jurisdiction in Arizona in an action brought by an

administrator of a deceased stockholder—who was appointed by a California court—to set aside

a contract entered into in California by directors of a Nevada corporation, even though the

Nevada corporation had an office in Arizona and had designated a statutory agent in Arizona,

because there was no “attempt to protect the rights of any citizen of Arizona”). Not only are the

facts in Van Denburgh distinguishable, but the case predates International Shoe and thus has

little, if any, precedential value. 

-10-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 10 of 23
Section 1406(a) of Title 28 provides that “[t]he district court in which is filed a case laying

venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such

case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C.§ 1406(a). Venue

in actions not founded solely on diversity of citizenship is proper when brought in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same

State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is subject of

the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found,

if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If the defendant is a corporation, it “shall be deemed to reside in any judicial

district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28

U.S.C. § 1391(c); see VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed.

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991). 

The court finds that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) and (c) because general

personal jurisdiction exists over Ensign-Bickford in Arizona. Accordingly, Ensign-Bickford’s

motion to dismiss under § 1406(a) is DENIED. 

IV. Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404

In a separate motion, Ensign-Bickford moves the court to transfer this case to the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1404. According to EnsignBickford, because the allegedly infringing components of the SEATM product are made by PSEMCCalifornia, not PSEMC-Arizona, the plaintiffs’ chosen venue of Arizona is entitled to less deference. 

Additionally, the defendant contends that the plaintiffs’ choice is entitled to less deference because

PSEMC filed suit to preempt Ensign-Bickford’s choice of forum. Turning to public interest factors,

Ensign-Bickford argues that due to docket congestion in Arizona, a strong public policy favoring

-11-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 11 of 23
settlement, and the plaintiffs’ attempted forum-shopping, transferring the case to Connecticut is

appropriate and in the interests of justice. Finally, Ensign-Bickford asserts that Connecticut would

have compulsory process over relevant non-party witnesses, that relevant documents are located in

Connecticut, and that litigation would be less expensive in Connecticut. The plaintiffs oppose the

motion by arguing that their choice of forum should be entitled to substantial deference. According

to the plaintiffs, deference should be strong here because “plaintiff chose to file suit in its home

forum and where it has its base of operations.” (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Transfer [Docket 41], at 4.) 

The plaintiffs also maintain that they are not forum-shopping, but merely trying to resolve an longrunning dispute. According to PSEMC, transferring the case to Connecticut would simply shift the

inconvenience from one party to another. Thus, PSEMC asserts, such a transfer is inappropriate and

fundamentally against the interests of justice. 

a. Standard of Review

Section 1404(a) of Title 28 authorizes a district court to transfer a case to another judicial

district “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). This motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) is governed by regional circuit law. See

Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

In deciding whether to transfer a case under § 1404(a), a court must first determine whether

the action might “have been brought” in the transferee district. Then the court must weigh both

public factors and private factors. Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843

(9th Cir. 1986). Courts may consider: (1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated

and executed; (2) the state most familiar with the governing law; (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum;

(4) the parties’ contacts with the forum state; (5) events related to the cause of action that took place

-12-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 12 of 23
in the forum state; (6) differences in cost of litigation between the two forums; (7) availability of

compulsory process for non-party witnesses; and (8) ease of access to sources of proof. Jones v.

GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The party bringing a motion for transfer—here, the defendant—bears the burden of showing

the propriety of transfer. Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843. Moreover, the plaintiff’s choice of

forum is accorded great weight. See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1180 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff need not select the optimal forum for his claim, but only a forum that is not

so oppressive and vexatious to the defendant as to be out of proportion to plaintiff’s convenience.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). The decision whether to transfer a matter to another district under

§ 1404(a) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,

487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). 

b. Discussion

As Ensign-Bickford notes, there is no requirement under § 1404(a) that a transferee court have

personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff; there is only a requirement that the transferee court have

jurisdiction over the defendants in the transferred complaint. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-

44 (1960). Because Ensign-Bickford is registered to do business in Connecticut and has its principal

place of business in Connecticut, for purposes of § 1404(a), this case could have been brought in the

District Court for the District of Connecticut. My inquiry, therefore, focuses on whether EnsignBickford has met its burden of establishing that a transfer to the District of Connecticut is proper. 

1. Location Where the Relevant Agreements Were Negotiated and the State

Most Familiar with the Governing Law. 

The first factor does not influence the court’s decision because there are no “relevant

agreements” at issue in this case. The second factor favors Arizona, although not strongly. Arizona

-13-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 13 of 23
is most familiar with the Arizona state law claim, but the federal courts are equally familiar with the

federal patent law issues presented in this case. 

2. The Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum

The parties dispute the weight that should be given to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. EnsignBickford argues that Arizona is not the home forum because PSEMC-California is the “entity that

makes the potentially infringing products, not Pacific-Arizona.” Therefore, Ensign-Bickford

contends, the plaintiffs’ choice of Arizona is entitled to less deference. (Def.’s Mot. Transfer [Docket

37], at 7.) The plaintiffs assert that PSEMC operates as a single company with its “base” in Arizona

and that “PSEMC’s president in Chandler, Arizona, is ultimately responsible for the accused product,

including its production. Moreover, part of the accused product is manufactured by PSEMC in its

Chandler, Arizona facility.” (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Transfer [Docket 41], at 4-5.) Accordingly,

PSEMC argues that Arizona is the home forum and the plaintiffs’ choice should be given substantial

deference. 

Under § 1404(a), a plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally accorded substantial weight. See

Warfield v. Gardner, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1044 (D. Ariz. 2004). “However, when the plaintiff’s

chosen forum is not his residence, or when the plaintiff’s forum lacks a significant connection to the

events that gave rise to the Complaint, the deference given to Plaintiff’s choice of forum is slight, if

any.” Leyvas v. Bezy, No. CV 07-1032, 2008 WL 2026276, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2008)

(unpublished). 

PSEMC-Arizona’s principal place of business is in Arizona. PSEMC’s president, based in

Arizona, is “ultimately responsible for the accused product.” (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Transfer, at

7.) Moreover, according to the plaintiffs, roughly two dozen Arizona employees work or have

-14-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 14 of 23
worked on the product at issue, and components of the accused product were designed in Chandler,

Arizona, and others were manufactured there. (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 2-3.) Finally,

PSEMC asserts that several of the letters and emails exchanged during their discussions regarding

the patents at issue went to and from Arizona, and Ensign-Bickford’s president met with PSEMC

representatives in Arizona to discuss the dispute. (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Transfer, at 5.) Thus,

because Arizona has significant connections to the events that gave rise to the Complaint, the

plaintiffs’ choice of forum is accorded substantial weight. 

Alternatively, Ensign-Bickford argues that this declaratory judgment was simply a race to the

courthouse and, as a result, the choice of forum should be given little deference. PSEMC asserts that

this is not an attempt at forum-shopping because Connecticut does not have personal jurisdiction over

PSEMC; thus, PSEMC is not preempting Ensign-Bickford from filing there. Additionally, the

plaintiffs assert that they are seeking to resolve a long-running dispute by clearing their name and

clarifying legal rights. 

 Despite the futility of any further negotiations, there is no evidence that Ensign-Bickford was

poised to file suit, and Ensign-Bickford has not filed a patent infringement suit to date. Cf. Z-Line

Designs, Inc. v. Bell’O Int’l, LLC, 218 F.R.D. 663, 665 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“A suit is anticipatory when

the plaintiff filed [an action] upon receipt of specific, concrete indications that a suit by defendant

was imminent.”). The court finds that PSEMC’s declaratory judgment action was not anticipatory

and the forum-shopping argument lacks merit. Therefore, the weight awarded the plaintiffs’ choice

of forum is not affected. 

In sum, because Arizona has a significant connection to the events that gave rise to the

Complaint and because there is no evidence of forum-shopping, the plaintiffs’ choice of forum is

-15-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 15 of 23
awarded considerable weight. Accordingly, this factor weighs against transferring this case to

Connecticut.

 3. Parties’ Contacts with the Forum State

Both parties in this case have contacts with Arizona. PSEMC is based in Arizona and the

disputed product was designed and created in Arizona, as well as California. PSEMC’s president is

in Chandler, Arizona, and PSEMC’s vice president and members of the design and development team

split their time between Arizona and California. Even if, as the defendant argues, the components

manufactured in Arizona are not the infringing components of the product, the plaintiffs maintain

significant contacts with the forum state. Ensign-Bickford also has significant ties to the forum state. 

Ensign-Bickford is registered to do business in Arizona, has designated a registered agent for service

of process in Arizona, and has employees who operate full-time out of an office in Arizona. Both

parties’ numerous contacts with the forum state persuade the court that this factor weighs strongly

in favor of the Arizona venue.

4. Events Related to the Cause of Action That Took Place in the Forum State

“Courts have observed that intellectual property infringement suits often focus on the

activities of the alleged infringer, its employees, and its documents; therefore the location of the

alleged infringer’s principal place of business is often the critical and controlling consideration in

adjudicating transfer of venue motions.” Spiegelberg v. Collegiate Licensing Co., 402 F. Supp. 2d

786, 791-92 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).

In the instant case, numerous events related to the cause of action, including design work and

product manufacturing, allegedly took place in Arizona. Moreover, according to Ensign-Bickford,

the majority of additional events related to the cause of action took place in California. Either way,

-16-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 16 of 23
this factor does not weigh in favor of transferring the case to Connecticut.5

5. Differences in Cost of Litigation Between the Two Forums and Ease of

Access to Proof

With respect to this factor, Ensign-Bickford mainly argues that “highly relevant documents

are located in Connecticut” and that “[i]f the trial is held in Connecticut . . . the material witnesses

located in Connecticut will not have to travel [and] the total cost of litigation will be reduced.” 

(Def.’s Mot. Transfer, at 14.) The defendant also notes that the plaintiffs’ witnesses in California will

have to travel regardless of whether the trial is held in Arizona or Connecticut. These arguments are

unpersuasive. There are relevant documents in Arizona and Connecticut, so that issue does not

persuade the court that transfer is appropriate. Moreover, the plaintiffs have named several key

witnesses who either reside in Arizona or split time between Arizona and California. The court has

no way of determining where these witnesses will be located at the time of the trial or whether they

will need to travel to attend the trial. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh heavily in the

determination of whether to transfer to Connecticut.

6. Availability of Compulsory Process for Non-Party Witnesses

Ensign-Bickford asserts that a named inventor for all three patents at issue resides in

Connecticut. The attorney familiar with the prosecution of the applications of the patents is also in

Connecticut. Finally, Ensign-Bickford asserts that “[o]ther witnesses with relevant testimony also

reside in Connecticut,” and Connecticut can compel the attendance of these witnesses. (Id. at 12.) 

5

 Ensign-Bickford argues that a relevant confidentiality agreement was signed by

PSEMC-California, not PSEMC-Arizona, and thus relevant events occurred in California. While

this document lists PSEMC as having an office and place of business in California, it is unclear

whether this document applies only to PSEMC-California, as Ensign-Bickford asserts. (Def.’s

Mot. Transfer, at 7 n.4.) 

-17-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 17 of 23
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that other fact witnesses reside in Arizona, including

potential witnesses from Raytheon, the parties’ mutual customer. The willingness of non-parties to

testify voluntarily mitigates the relevance of this factor, but the court cannot speculate on which

witnesses would be so willing. Ensign-Bickford has identified two specific and relevant non-party

witnesses in Connecticut, while PSEMC has referenced only potential non-party witnesses over

whom Arizona has compulsory process. This factor weighs in favor of transfer.

7. Other Considerations

Ensign-Bickford raises additional public interest factors that it asserts are relevant to this

court’s consideration, including the congestion of the Arizona docket and the public policy favoring

settlement. Docket congestion is one of many factors that may be considered in a motion to transfer,

but it does not persuade this court that transfer is appropriate in light of the other factors that weigh

against a transfer. Next, although Ensign-Bickford argues that the public policy of settlement favors

transfer to Connecticut, it fails to adequately explain how transfer to Connecticut advances this

policy. The court recognizes that “the first to file rule in [a race to the courthouse situation] would

thwart settlement negotiations, encouraging intellectual property holders to file suit rather than

communicate with an alleged infringer.” Z-Line Designs, Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 665. In this case,

however, the first to file rule is inapposite as there are no similar suits pending elsewhere. 

Accordingly, Ensign-Bickford’s public interest arguments are not sufficient to persuade the court that

transfer to 

Connecticut is appropriate.6

6

 In its Motion to Dismiss, Ensign-Bickford urges the court to decline to exercise its

jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act because the parties’ negotiations were ongoing 

-18-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 18 of 23
Having considered all of the factors set forth in Jones and the relevant public interest

factors, the court concludes that a transfer to Connecticut for convenience or in the interests of

justice is unwarranted. The plaintiffs’ choice of forum is accorded considerable weight, and a

transfer motion will be denied if it would merely shift the inconvenience from the defendant to

the plaintiffs. Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843. In addition, the court is unconvinced that EnsignBickford will suffer any great hardship by litigating away from home in Arizona. In light of the

factors above, the court DENIES the Motion for Transfer of Venue pursuant to §1404(a).

V. Motion to Dismiss Count Four for Failure to State a Claim 

Finally, Ensign-Bickford moves this court to dismiss the state law tortious interference with

a contract claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs, according to

Ensign-Bickford, have not alleged that Ensign-Bickford “had knowledge of the contracts with which

Ensign allegedly interfered[,]” (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 15) and that the claim does not “provide

notice of what contracts are the subject of the claim, and which customers were induced to breach

and the plaintiffs brought their action simply as “tactical maneuvering designed to preempt

Ensign’s choice of forum.” (Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, at 13.) “The Declaratory Judgment Act was

not intended to affix competitor with a right to feign negotiation in order to delay patentee’s

filing of an infringement in an effort to secure a preferable forum.” Trading Tech. Int’l Inc. v.

CGQ, Inc., No. 05 C 4811, 2005 WL 3601936, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2005) (unpublished). 

However, “[a]llowing competitors to sue for declaratory judgment serve[s] to clear the air,

protect their customers, and to define their rights without accumulating injuries related to

waiting for patentee to decide whether to bring suit.” Id. In the instant case, the court finds that

there is no sound basis for refusing to adjudicate the matter. In fact, this appears to be one of the

situations the Act was designed to accommodate. Accordingly, the court will exercise its valid

jurisdiction to hear this case under the Declaratory Judgment Act. “When there is an actual

controversy and a declaratory judgment would settle the legal relations in dispute and afford

relief from uncertainty or insecurity, in the usual circumstances the declaratory judgment action

is not subject to dismissal.” Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir.

1993) (overruled in part on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289

(1995)). 

-19-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 19 of 23
their contracts.” (Id.) In response, the plaintiffs assert that they sufficiently pled Ensign-Bickford’s

knowledge of the contracts and that “Ensign itself informed PSEMC that it had contacted PSEMC’s

customers to obtain information.” (Pls.’ Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dimiss, at 15.) Thus, according to the

plaintiffs, Ensign-Bickford knows with whom there was a business expectancy and which customers

were induced to breach their contracts.

a. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or

pleading. Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). A pleading must contain a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. As

the Supreme Court reiterated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, that standard “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations’ but ‘it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.’” 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986),

for the proposition that “on a motion to dismiss, courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”). A court cannot accept as true legal conclusions in a

complaint that merely recite the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory statements. 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead facts that

allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, and those facts must be

-20-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 20 of 23
more than merely consistent with the defendant’s liability to raise the claim from merely possible to

probable. Id. 

In determining whether a plausible claim exists, the court must undertake a context-specific

inquiry, “[b]ut where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is

entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A complaint must contain enough

facts to “nudge[] [a] claim across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

b. Discussion

The Supreme Court of Arizona recognizes a cause of action for tortious interference with a

contract.7 Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero, 210 Ariz. 5, 10 (2005). The first issue raised by the

defendant is whether the Complaint sufficiently pled that Ensign-Bickford had knowledge of

PSEMC’s valid contractual relationship or business expectancy. 

The Complaint alleges:

Ensign-Bickford intentionally and improperly interfered with contracts between

PSEMC and several confidential customers by, inter alia, inducing those customers

to disclose PSEMC’s highly confidential, proprietary and sensitive competitive

information to Ensign-Bickford in violation of those customers’ confidentiality

agreements with PSEMC. 

(Compl. ¶ 40.) 

7

 To establish tortious interference, a party must prove the following:

1) existence of a valid contractual relationship;

2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the interferor;

3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach;

4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been

disrupted; and

5) that the defendant acted improperly. 

Safeway Ins. Co., Inc. v. Guerrero, 210 Ariz. 5, 10 (2005).

-21-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 21 of 23
Although the Complaint does not explicitly state that Ensign-Bickford had knowledge of the

contracts, it follows from PSEMC’s allegation that Ensign-Bickford “intentionally . . . interfered with

contracts” that Ensign-Bickford knew the contracts existed. 

The defendant also argues that the Complaint does not provide notice of “what contracts are

the subject of the claim, and which customers were induced to breach their contracts.” (Def.’s Mot.

Dismiss, at 15.) Although the Complaint does not point to individual contracts, its allegation that the

defendant induced the plaintiffs’ customers to violate a specific class of contracts, namely, their

confidentiality agreements with PSEMC, survives a motion to dismiss. See Swingless Golf Club

Corp. v. Taylor, No. C 08-05574, 2009 WL 2031768, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2009) (finding a

complaint stated a claim even though it “does not point to any single contract, it does allege a specific

class of existing contracts that the defendants purportedly induced the breach thereof—those existing

between plaintiff and its customers”). The court thus FINDS that the plaintiffs have satisfied their

burden as to the intentional interference with a contract claim.8

 Accordingly, the court DENIES the

defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Four.

VI. Conclusion

8

 Ensign-Bickford additionally argues that the claim is preempted by the Arizona

Uniform Trade Secrets Acts (“UTSA”). Under Arizona law, however, a claim is not preempted

“to the extent that the [complaint] alleges that the intentional interference of business expectancy

is based on acts, other than the misappropriation of trade secrets, that ‘induc[ed] or otherwise

caus[ed] a third person not to enter into or continue’ a business relationship with [the plaintiff].”

Cosmetic Alchemy, LLC v. R & G, LLC, No. CV-10-1222, 2010 WL 4777553, at *3 (D. Ariz.

Nov. 17, 2010); see also A.R.S. § 44-407(A) (the UTSA does not affect “[o]ther civil remedies

that are not based on misappropriation of a trade secret.”).

 The plaintiffs are not alleging misappropriation of trade secrets. Rather, the plaintiffs

allege that Ensign-Bickford contacted PSEMC customers and induced them to violate their

confidentiality agreements. In doing so, Ensign-Bickford is “taking away PSEMC’s customer

opportunities, and has caused damage to PSEMC’s relationships with its customers.” (Compl.

¶ 41.) Therefore, the court finds that Count Four is not preempted by the UTSA. 

-22-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 22 of 23
For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Ensign-Bickford’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Personal Jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim, and for transfer pursuant to § 1406(a) [Docket

18]. The court further DENIES the Motion for Transfer of Venue pursuant to § 1404(a) [Docket

37].

The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any

unrepresented party.

ENTER: September 23, 2011

-23-

Case 2:10-cv-02252-JRG Document 54 Filed 09/23/11 Page 23 of 23