Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01037/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01037-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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28 On January 29, 2007, the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii assigned the action to the undersigned Magistrate 1

Judge for all purposes.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMIE LANDA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-001037-SMS

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S SOCIAL SECURITY

COMPLAINT (DOC. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THE ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT MICHAEL J.

ASTRUE AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF

JAMIE LANDA

Plaintiff is represented by counsel and is proceeding in

forma pauperis with an action seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner)

denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits

(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (Act). Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the

jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings

in this matter, including ordering the entry of final judgment.1

The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs,

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which have been submitted without oral argument to the Honorable

Sandra M. Snyder, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff in July 2003 filed an application for DIB,

alleging disability beginning January 22, 2003, due to open heart

surgery, disc disease, pain in the chest and lower back, and

becoming easily tired. (A.R. 56-59, 86.) In August 2003,

Plaintiff filed an application for SSI, alleging disability due

to heart surgery beginning February 14, 2003. (A.R. 248-51.) 

After Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on

reconsideration, Plaintiff requested, and appeared by video

conference at, a hearing before the Honorable Bernard A. Trembly,

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Social Security

Administration (SSA), held on February 14, 2006. (A.R. 24-29,

252-53.) Plaintiff testified and was represented by an attorney.

(A.R. 15, 260-72.) On March 14, 2006, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s

application for benefits. (Id. at 15-20.) Plaintiff appealed the

ALJ's decision to the Appeals Council. After the Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review on June 9, 2006, (Tr. 5-7),

Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on August 7, 2006.

Briefing commenced on March 7, 2007, and was completed with the

filing on May 18, 2007, of Plaintiff’s reply brief.

II. Standard and Scope of Review 

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of

the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits under the Act. In

reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner

is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla,"

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a

preponderance, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10

(9th Cir. 1975). It is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must consider the record

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion; it may

not simply isolate a portion of evidence that supports the

decision. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9 Cir. th

2006); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). It

is immaterial that the evidence would support a finding contrary

to that reached by the Commissioner; the determination of the

Commissioner as to a factual matter will stand if supported by

substantial evidence because it is the Commissioner’s job, and

not the Court’s, to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Sorenson

v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 (9 Cir. 1975). th

In weighing the evidence and making findings, the

Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. Burkhart v.

Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must

review the whole record and uphold the Commissioner's

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, and if the

Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

See, Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 812 F.2d

509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d at 995. If

the Court concludes that the ALJ did not use the proper legal

standard, the matter will be remanded to permit application of

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the appropriate standard. Cooper v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

III. Disability

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish

that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due

to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 1382c(a)(3)(A).

A claimant must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do the

claimant’s previous work, but cannot, considering age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C.

1382c(a)(3)(B); Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th

Cir. 1989). The burden of establishing a disability is initially

on the claimant, who must prove that the claimant is unable to

return to his or her former type of work; the burden then shifts

to the Commissioner to identify other jobs that the claimant is

capable of performing considering the claimant's residual

functional capacity, as well as her age, education and last

fifteen years of work experience. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d

1273, 1275 (9 Cir. 1990). th

The regulations provide that the ALJ must make specific

sequential determinations in the process of evaluating a

disability: 1) whether the applicant engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged date of the onset of the

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28 All references are to the 2006 version of the Code of Federal Regulations unless otherwise noted. 2

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impairment, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1997); 2) whether solely on the 2

basis of the medical evidence the claimed impairment is severe,

that is, of a magnitude sufficient to limit significantly the

individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); 3) whether solely on the

basis of medical evidence the impairment equals or exceeds in

severity certain impairments described in Appendix I of the

regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 4) whether the applicant

has sufficient residual functional capacity, defined as what an

individual can still do despite limitations, to perform the

applicant’s past work, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a); and

5) whether on the basis of the applicant’s age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, the applicant can

perform any other gainful and substantial work within the

economy, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). 

With respect to SSI, the five-step evaluation process is

essentially the same. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.

Here, Plaintiff was fifty-one years old at the time of the

hearing, had an eleventh-grade education, and had worked as a

certified nursing assistant, medical secretary, and telemetry

technician. (A.R. 262-63.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had

severe impairments of status post cardiac bypass surgery,

degenerative disc disease, and back pain which did not meet or

medically equal a listing; Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work, and

specifically, Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a

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medical secretary. Hence, Plaintiff was not disabled. (A.R. 17-

20, 260.)

IV. Rejection of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to state legally

adequate reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective claims of

limited concentration and inability to perform physical exertion.

The court in Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9 Cir. th

2007), summarized the pertinent standards for evaluating the

sufficiency of an ALJ’s reasoning in rejecting a claimant’s

subjective complaints:

An ALJ is not “required to believe every

allegation of disabling pain” or other non-exertional

impairment. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th

Cir.1989). However, to discredit a claimant's testimony

when a medical impairment has been established, the ALJ

must provide “ ‘specific, cogent reasons for the

disbelief.’ “ Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599 (quoting Lester,

81 F.3d at 834). The ALJ must “cit[e] the reasons why

the [claimant's] testimony is unpersuasive.” Id. Where,

as here, the ALJ did not find “affirmative evidence”

that the claimant was a malingerer, those “reasons for

rejecting the claimant's testimony must be clear and

convincing.” Id.

Social Security Administration rulings specify the

proper bases for rejection of a claimant's testimony.

See S.S.R. 02-1p (Cum. Ed.2002), available at Policy

Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of

Obesity, 67 Fed.Reg. 57,859-02 (Sept. 12, 2002); S.S.R.

96-7p (Cum. Ed.1996), available at 61 Fed.Reg.

34,483-01 (July 2, 1996). An ALJ's decision to reject a

claimant's testimony cannot be supported by reasons

that do not comport with the agency's rules. See 67

Fed.Reg. at 57860 (“Although Social Security Rulings do

not have the same force and effect as the statute or

regulations, they are binding on all components of the

Social Security Administration, ... and are to be

relied upon as precedents in adjudicating cases.”); see

Daniels v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir.1998)

(concluding that ALJ's decision at step three of the

disability determination was contrary to agency

regulations and rulings and therefore warranted

remand). Factors that an ALJ may consider in weighing a

claimant's credibility include reputation for

truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between

testimony and conduct, daily activities, and

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“unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to

seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of

treatment.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603; see also Thomas, 278

F.3d at 958-59.

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635.

The factors to be considered in weighing credibility are set

forth in the regulations and pertinent Social Security rulings.

They include the claimant’s daily activities; the location,

duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or

other symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the

symptoms; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate the

symptoms; treatment, other than medication, the person receives

or has received for relief of the symptoms; any measures other

than treatment the claimant uses or has used to relieve the

symptoms; and any other factors concerning the claimant’s

functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other

symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; S.S.R. 96-7p.

With respect to the course of analysis directed by the

regulations, the ALJ is first obligated to consider all symptoms

and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted

as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other

evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). Once it is

determined that there is a medically determinable impairment that

could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms,

the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of the

symptoms to determine how the symptoms limit the capacity for

work. §§ 404.1529(b), (c); 416.929(b), (c). The ALJ will consider

all available evidence. To the extent that the claimant’s

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symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with the

objective medical evidence and other evidence, the symptoms will

be determined to diminish the claimant’s capacity for basic work

activities. §§ 404.1529(c)(4); 416.929(c)(4). A claimant’s

statements will not be rejected solely because unsubstantiated by

the available objective medical evidence. §§ 404.1529(c)(2);

416.929(c)(2).

Further, the pertinent Social Security Ruling provides in

pertinent part that an ALJ has an obligation to articulate the

reasons supporting the analysis:

...When evaluating the credibility of an individual's

statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire

case record and give specific reasons for the weight

given to the individual's statements.

The finding on the credibility of the individual's

statements cannot be based on an intangible or

intuitive notion about an individual's credibility. The

reasons for the credibility finding must be grounded in

the evidence and articulated in the determination or

decision. It is not sufficient to make a conclusory

statement that "the individual's allegations have been

considered" or that "the allegations are (or are not)

credible." It is also not enough for the adjudicator

simply to recite the factors that are described in the

regulations for evaluating symptoms. The determination

or decision must contain specific reasons for the

finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in

the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the

individual's statements and the reasons for that

weight. This documentation is necessary in order to

give the individual a full and fair review of his or

her claim, and in order to ensure a well-reasoned

determination or decision.

S.S.R. 96-7p at 4.

Here, Plaintiff testified that she could no longer perform

her previous work because she had trouble concentrating and could

not monitor people’s heart rhythm; she could not sit still for

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eight hours without a break because her back hurt, and her lower

back hurt if she did too much; she had to shift around and put

her feet up because they would swell if she sat still with her

feet hanging down too long. (A.R. 263, 267, 270.) She had

tingling in the arms and numbness at night; she experienced chest

pain if she over-exerted, and her legs swelled. (A.R. 265.)

Repetitive bending from the waist caused problems; kneeling,

stooping, or squatting could be done but not quickly. (A.R. 268.)

She did not know what caused her problems with concentration or

whether or not it was because of her shortness of breath; she

could not concentrate on a book. (A.R. 264.) Plaintiff did

laundry, swept and vacuumed, drove her mother to her doctor’s

appointments, and did grocery shopping, but Plaintiff limited it

to one type of task a day or a shorter period of exertion. (A.R.

264.) Plaintiff testified she could lift seven pounds and walk

fifty to seventy-five feet until her legs would feel heavy; she

experienced shortness of breath in the heat or in changing

temperatures. Plaintiff could sit about an hour and a half to two

hours until she needed to stand. She lay down during the day to

help her foot pain. (A.R. 266-67.) She did not sleep through the

night because she used the bathroom and because she had to awaken

to shake her numb hands; she could dress herself slowly; she

walked a little bit for exercise. (A.R. 269.) 

Plaintiff testified that she had filled out a couple of

applications but could not lift and stand, so she got no callbacks for those jobs. (A.R. 270.)

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged

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 The Court notes that a partially legible document submitted to the Appeals Council reveals that on April 3

2006, a provider from Clinica Sierra Vista opined that Plaintiff should be excused from CALWORKS BACK TO

WORK because of low back pain due to degenerative disc disease. (A.R. 257.)

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symptoms, but Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,

duration, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not entirely

credible. (A.R. 18.) Viewing the ALJ’s decision as a whole, the

Court concludes that the ALJ then articulated several reasons

that were supported by substantial evidence and were of clear and

convincing force.

With respect to Plaintiff’s knee and back pain, the ALJ

noted Plaintiff’s treatment for back and knee pain; however, the

ALJ relied on the medical evidence in concluding that Plaintiff’s

examinations were normal, her symptoms and treatment reflected in

later progress notes were only short-term, and her treatment was

conservative and unaccompanied by any significant associated

clinical or neurological abnormalities. Further, she was not

prescribed any intensive pain regimen or therapy, and medications

were not commensurate with disabling pain. Beginning in March

2004, progress notes revealed no ongoing symptoms or clinical

abnormalities that were incompatible with the residual functional

capacity found by the ALJ. Indeed, Plaintiff denied chest pain

and was prescribed only Ibuprofen or Bextra for lower back pain;

her examinations were unremarkable; Plaintiff had not submitted

evidence of treatment after May 2004, and Plaintiff exhibited 3

only back pain, no neurological abnormalities, and no significant

clinical or laboratory abnormalities. (A.R. 18-19.)

Substantial evidence supports these findings. Plaintiff’s

records of treatment at the Sandrini Clinic in January through

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April 2002 revealed severe disc space narrowing and osteophyte

formation at L3-4 and to a lesser extent at L4-5, with lumbar

scoliosis; mild bulging of lumbar discs; no effusion of the left

knee, heat, or redness; Plaintiff was treated with Vicodin; a low

back brace aggravated the pain, and Plaintiff was in traction for

two hours a day. (A.R. 134, 131.) Treatment records from Oildale

Community Health Center from March through September 2004 reveal

no chest or heart abnormalities; range of motion in the back was

within normal limits; the back was non-tender, without

deformities or motor or sensory deficits; there was flank

tenderness but reflexes were symmetrical and within mormal

limits; and treatment was with Ibuprofen. (A.R. 244.) In March,

Plaintiff reported that she had no chest pain. (A.R. 243.) In

May, she was on aspirin therapy. (A.R. 242.)

With respect to Plaintiff’s chest pain and/or cardiac

condition, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s history of chest pain and

bypass surgery on February 14, 2003. (A.R. 18.) He noted that

Plaintiff suffered no significant residuals that had lasted for

any continuous period of at least twelve months. (Id.) 

The record supports the ALJ’s characterization. As the ALJ

noted, on discharge four days after her surgery, Plaintiff was

instructed to begin a healthy diet, avoid heavy lifting and

driving, and begin a home walking program. (A.R. 144-45.) Two

weeks later, Plaintiff was doing well and was advised to increase

activities as tolerated. (A.R. 182.) The ALJ noted the report and

opinion of Dr. Tomas B. Rios, a consultative examiner (A.R. 199-

202), who performed a comprehensive internal medicine examination

of Plaintiff on November 3, 2003, concerning her heart surgery

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and chronic back pain. (A.R. 18.) Dr. Rios noted that Plaintiff

reported that since her surgery, her chest pain had resolved

except for some residual tenderness along the operative site.

Plaintiff reported that for severe back pain, she took over-thecounter Advil. (A.R. 199, 201.) Dr. Rios’s findings on physical

examination were essentially normal; there was no palpable spasm

in the back, negative Kemp’s test, some tenderness along the

lumbosacral juncture, with normal motor strength and muscle tone

in the upper and lower extremities. Dr. Rios found chronic back

pain and hypertension but no abnormality of the heart; he opined

that Plaintiff could lift and carry twenty-five pounds frequently

and fifty pounds occasionally, but she could not engage in

forceful pushing or pulling and should not engage in repetitive

bending and stooping; there were no associated findings of nerve

root irritation or spasms identified with respect to Plaintiff’s

spinal tenderness. (A.R. 200-02.) There was no end organ damage

from hypertension that contributed to any of the functional

limitations. (A.R. 18-19, 202.)

The ALJ also noted that the record did not reflect

longitudinal symptoms, signs, or findings consistent with greater

limitations; Plaintiff exhibited no clinical or laboratory

abnormalities incompatible with the ability to perform sedentary

work. (A.R. 19.). He relied on the opinion of the state agency

physician finding Plaintiff able to perform light work. (A.R.

18.) State agency medical consultants Carmen Lopez, M.D., and

Elpidio Fonte, M.D., opined in March and August 2004,

respectively, that Plaintiff could lift and carry twenty-five

pounds frequently, fifty pounds occasionally, stand and/or walk

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for six hours, sit about six hours, and perform occasional

postural activities, but no climbing ladders or scaffolding.

(A.R. 226-31.) Because these opinions were based on the

consistent findings of examining Dr. Rios, they constituted

substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s findings. The

opinion of a non-treating, non-examining physician can amount to

substantial evidence as long as it is supported by other evidence

in the record, such as the opinions of other examining and

consulting physicians, which are in turn based on independent

clinical findings. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th

Cir. 1995). 

Further, the ALJ reasoned that no treating cardiologist or

orthopedist had opined disability. (A.R. 19.) Again, the record

supports this reasoning. 

The ALJ rejected contrary opinions from treating Dr.

Fuentes, who in September 2004 opined that Plaintiff, who had

objective findings of coronary artery disease and was status post

bypass graft surgery, could not perform any work at any

exertional level because of osteoarthritis and degenerative joint

disease. No objective findings were stated. Dr. Fuentes opined

that Plaintiff had to elevate her legs for a half hour every two

to three hours; Plaintiff had been so disabled since her bypass

surgery. Plaintiff could lift and carry five pounds frequently,

ten pounds occasionally, but could not bend, squat, or crawl, and

could only occasionally climb and reach; she had mild

environmental restrictions. (A.R. 240- 41.) The ALJ reasoned that

the opinion was not fully supported by the record in view of

Plaintiff’s minimal conservative care for her orthopedic

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condition, absence of objective findings supporting the opinion,

lack of significant residuals of heart disease, absence of

sustained clinical or neurological compromise, lack of reports of

ongoing symptoms or clinical or laboratory abnormalities

consistent with the opinion, and the fact that the prescribed

medications were Ibuprofen and Bextra. (A.R. 19.) Again,

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, and as

previously discussed, the ALJ’s reliance on the opinion of the

consulting internal medicine examiner was appropriate.

With respect to Plaintiff’s mental condition, Plaintiff

claims incorrectly that the only reason given by the ALJ for

rejecting the extent of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

concerning her mental condition was Plaintiff’s failure to obtain

medical treatment. The ALJ did reason that although Plaintiff

alleged a depressive disorder, she admitted that she had

undergone no mental health treatment. (A.R. 17.) This finding was

supported by substantial evidence because Plaintiff reported to

an examining physician that she had never been psychiatrically

hospitalized, and that her treating physician had said that he

would address her depression after Plaintiff’s cholesterol was

stabilized. (A.R. 235.) 

However, the ALJ additionally relied on the opinion of

psychiatrist Dr. Shohreh Ghaemian, M.D., in concluding that

Plaintiff exhibited no significant clinical abnormalities or

limitations related thereto and that her purported depression had

been diagnosed as an adjustment disorder and did not satisfy the

durational requirements of the Act. (A.R. 17.) 

Substantial evidence supports this finding. Dr. Ghaemian

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performed a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff on

July 31, 2004, and found that Plaintiff was cooperative and calm

throughout the examination, with ability to maintain full eye

contact; had logical, tight, and goal-oriented thought process

with concrete thinking, natural and responsive affect, and a

stated mood of depression; was fully oriented, with intact

immediate and recent memory, below-average fund of knowledge,

inability to perform serial sevens or to spell “world” backwards;

but with the ability to perform a three-step command with no

difficulty. (A.R. 17, 234-38.) Dr. Ghaemian concluded that

Plaintiff had an adjustment disorder with depressed mood, rule

out depression secondary to general medical condition; her

prognosis was guarded for the next twelve months; she could

perform routine financial transactions and simple repetitive work

on a regular basis in a work-like environment; she was able to

comprehend more complicated and complex job instructions and was

capable of retraining for more detailed employment; her

interaction with others was limited due to reported irritability;

she did not need psychopharmacological intervention, but a workup concerning medication would be appropriate. (Id.) The record

thus supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not exhibit

any significant clinical abnormalities or limitations related

thereto.

The ALJ also expressly addressed the opinion of a state

agency physician, psychiatrist Dr. Marina C. Vea. (A.R. 19, 203-

25.) Dr. Vea opined that Plaintiff suffered from depressive

symptoms and mood disturbance constituting an adjustment

disorder; Plaintiff was moderately limited in the ability to

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understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions;

Plaintiff had the understanding and memory sufficient for short

and simple tasks, sustained concentration and persistence

sufficient for unskilled work, could maintain attention in twohour increments and tolerate and maintain an ordinary work

schedule, could interact appropriately with others and accept

usual supervision ,and could sufficiently adapt to changes in the

workplace; Plaintiff suffered moderate difficulties in

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.

The ALJ stated that the claimant underwent no treatment, and

her consultative examination was not consistent with a severe

impairment lasting for at least twelve months. (A.R. 19.) Again,

the record supports the conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s lack of

treatment. There was some evidence that Plaintiff was unable to

afford some medications. (A.R. 264 [testimony that Plaintiff was

supposed to take Lipitor for her cholesterol, but she could not

afford it and so was trying to “do” vitamins, diet, and Norvasc,

which was then paid for by her mother].) However, Plaintiff cites

to no evidence that she sought mental treatment or could not

afford mental treatment. It further appears that her treating

physician had set cholesterol control as a priority. (A.R. 235.)

Plaintiff had medical experience and was not experiencing

significant or serious symptoms such that a failure to obtain

treatment could not appropriately be attributed in some measure

to the relative mildness of her condition. An ALJ is entitled to

draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence. Sample v.

Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9 Cir. 1982). th

Finally, as the ALJ reasoned, the report of examining

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consultant Dr. Ghaemian was inconsistent with a severe impairment

lasting for at least twelve months, and the non-exertional

restrictions imposed by the state agency and consulting examining

internist were not supported by the reported symptoms of record,

associated clinical abnormalities during the pertinent period, or

for any continuous period of at least twelve months. (A.R. 19.)

The psychiatric examiner’s findings were largely normal with the

exception of depressed mood, below average fund of knowledge,

inability to perform serial sevens or spell backwards; it was

expressly found that Plaintiff was able to perform a three-step

command without difficulty. (A.R. 236.) Her GAF, or global

assessment of functioning, was 60 to 65, which indicated one with

only mild symptoms or difficulty who was generally functioning

pretty well, or one with moderate symptoms or difficulties at

best. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders at

30, 32 (4 ed.). The GAF was not an assessment of a serious th

problem. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assessment of

the medical record.

Further, Dr. Ghaemian noted that Plaintiff asserted that her

depressed mood was caused by her inability to be able to work,

and she stated that if she were able to work, her depression

would improve. (A.R. 235, 237.) Yet Plaintiff was able to perform

simple tasks, comprehend complicated and complex job

instructions, could be retrained for more detailed employment,

and was no even in need of psychopharmacological intervention,

pursuant to Dr. Ghaemian’s opinion. (jA.R. 238.)

Finally, the ALJ noted that lay opinions had been given less

weight than objective medical evidence and medical source

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statements from disinterested parties. (A.R. 19.) The ALJ thus

discounted the statements of Plaintiff’s daughter-in-law

concerning Plaintiff’s pain, paranoia, forgetfulness, and

attention span. (A.R. 101-09, 104-07 The ALJ’s giving of

specific, germane reasons was sufficient. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12

F.3d 915, 918-19 (9 Cir. 1993). th

It is established that an ALJ may rely on the conservative

nature of treatment or a lack of treatment in rejecting a

claimant’s subjective complaint of pain. Johnson v. Shalala 60

F.3d 1428, 1433-34 (9 Cir. 1995). Included in the factors that th

an ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility are the

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness; inconsistencies either in

the claimant’s testimony or between the claimant’s testimony and

the claimant’s conduct, daily activities, or work record; and

testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the

nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which the

claimant complains. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th

Cir. 2002). Further, it is appropriate to consider the

inconsistency of a documented improvement with claims of constant

pain. Morgan v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Likewise, a doctor’s opinion that a claimant can work is

appropriately considered. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th

Cir. 1995). It was appropriate for the ALJ to consider the lack

of objective indicia of Plaintiff’s impairments, including lack

of objective clinical findings, inconsistent activities of daily

living, use of conservative treatment, extent of efforts to

obtain relief, and effectiveness of medications in controlling

the symptoms. Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. §

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416.929(c)(4)(1)(vii); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1996); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d at 346 (9th Cir. 1991)

Although the inconsistency of objective findings with subjective

claims may not be the sole reason for rejecting subjective

complaints of pain, Light v. Chater, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9 Cir. th

1997), it is one factor which may be considered with others,

Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9 Cir. 2004); Morgan v. th

Commissioner 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9 Cir. 1999). th

Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ cited clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of pain to the extent alleged, and that the ALJ’s

reasons were properly supported by substantial evidence in the

record and sufficiently specific to allow this Court to conclude

that the ALJ rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible

grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit Plaintiff’s testimony.

V. Failure to Find that Plaintiff Suffered from a

 Severe Mental Impairment

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s

adjustment disorder was not a severe mental impairment at step

two of the analysis.

At step two, the Secretary considers if claimant has "an

impairment or combination of impairments which significantly

limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). This is

referred to as the "severity" requirement and does not involve

consideration of the claimant's age, education, or work

experience. Id. The step-two inquiry is de minimis screening

device to dispose of groundless claims. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482

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U.S. 153-54 (1987). The Secretary is required to "consider the

combined effect of all of the individual's impairments without

regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately,

would be of [sufficient medical] severity." 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(F).

Basic work activities include the abilities and aptitudes

necessary to do most jobs, such as physical functions of walking,

standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying,

or handling; capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;

understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;

use of judgment; responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a

routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b).

An impairment or combination thereof is not severe when

medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a

combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than

a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. An

impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit a

claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a), 416.921(a); Soc. Sec.

Ruling 85-28; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9 Cir. th

1996).

Plaintiff argues that Drs. Ghaemian and Vea, the consulting

psychiatric examiner and the non-examining state agency

physician, both opined that Plaintiff had a severe mental

impairment. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites to Dr.

Vea’s assessment of moderate difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace, made by Dr. Vea in the course

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of rating the “B” criteria of the listings. (A.R. 218.) Plaintiff

also cites Dr. Ghaemian’s diagnosis and assessment of adjustment

disorder with depressed mood and GAF of 60-65, her assessment of

ability to perform simple, repetitive jobs regularly, ability to

comprehend more complex job instructions, and to be retrained for

more detailed employment; unspecified limitations on interaction

with others due to irritability; and lack of need for

psychopharmacological intervention. (A.R. 237-38.)

However, the fact that moderate difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace were assessed by an expert in

connection with the “B” criteria does not necessarily make

Plaintiff’s impairment severe. The pertinent regulations provide

that with respect to the functional area of concentration,

persistence, or pace, the SSA uses a five-point scale of none,

mild, moderate, marked, and extreme; it is only the last point on

the scale that represents a degree of limitation that is

incompatible with the ability to do any gainful activity, and

mild limitations are generally consistent with an impairment that

is not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c), (d), 416.920a(c), (d)

(2006). The governing regulations thus do not preclude a finding

of no severity. 

Here, the ALJ expressly relied on the findings of Dr.

Ghaemian upon examination, which, as previously detailed, were

essentially normal except for spelling backwards and performance

of serial seven’s, and which included an express finding that

Plaintiff could perform a three-step command with no difficulty.

(A.R. 236.) Further, the doctor’s findings on examination lacked

any significant clinical abnormalities or limitations. (A.R. 17,

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236-37.) The doctor’s functional assessment supported the finding

that Plaintiff’s impairment did not more than minimally affect

her ability to perform basic mental work activities because she

was capable of performing simple, repetitive work, could

comprehend more complicated and complex instructions, was capable

of retraining to more detailed employment, did not have major

depression, and did not even need medication. Dr. Ghaemian’s

limitations concerning interaction with others and her

questionable ability to perform “more complicated and detailed

financial management” (A.R. 237-38) were vague. Dr. Ghaemian

stated only that Plaintiff’s interaction with colleagues and

society was “limited due to her reported irritability,” and thus

it was within the province of the ALJ reasonably to resolve any

ambiguity. To the extent that evidence is inconsistent,

conflicting, or ambiguous, it is the responsibility of the ALJ to

resolve any conflicts and ambiguity. Morgan v. Commissioner, 169

F.3d 595, 603 (9 Cir. 1999). Likewise, it was for the ALJ to th

determine the unclear nature and extent of any limitation on more

complicated and detailed financial management tasks. Because the

ALJ has authority to interpret ambiguous medical opinions,

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993), the Court

must defer to the ALJ’s decision. Here, the ALJ reasonably

reviewed and assessed the evidence and stated specific and

legally adequate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for

his conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental impairment of adjustment

disorder was not severe. He stated reasons for rejecting the

opinion of the state agency physician: Plaintiff was never

treated for her mental impairment, and the opinion of Dr.

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Ghaemian was inconsistent with a severe impairment lasting for at

least twelve months. (A.R. 19.) It was appropriate for the ALJ to

rely on the opinion of the consulting examiner instead of the

opinion of the non-examining state agency physician. The opinion

of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the

opinion of a non-examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Further, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding

that Plaintiff did not establish that her mental impairment was

of sufficient twelve-month duration. An impairment must last or

be expected to last at least twelve continuous months. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1509, 416.909. Further, the inability to work caused by

the impairment must last at least twelve continuous months.

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214-22 (2002). A claimant

carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case of

disability, including that he or she was disabled by an

impairment for the requisite period. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d

179, 182 (9 Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 (DIB), 416.909 th

(SSI). Plaintiff was not treated for her mental condition, so

there is no period of treatment to use for evaluation. Plaintiff

did not present objective medical evidence that she suffered any

non-severe effect for the requisite period. As previously

discussed, the ALJ appropriately rejected Plaintiff’s subjective

claims of inability to concentrate and pain. Plaintiff’s

inability to concentrate was of uncertain origin; Plaintiff did

not attribute her problem to her depression. (A.R. 263-64.)

Further, Plaintiff testified that she had applied for work, and

physical (as distinct from mental) limitations had caused her not

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to be considered for the positions. (A.R> 270.) It further

appears that Plaintiff did not seek or obtain treatment for her

mental impairment after Dr. Ghaemian recommended reassessment of

her need for medications in the future. (A.R. 111.) 

In any event, even if it were erroneous to conclude that

Plaintiff’s impairment was not severe, the ALJ considered all the

claimed limitations from Plaintiff’s mental impairment in

formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. (A.R. 18-19.) The ALJ appropriately

rejected the non-exertional restrictions imposed by the state

agency and consultative examiner as not supported by symptoms of

record or associated clinical abnormalities during the period at

issue for any continuous period of twelve months. (A.R. 19.)

Accordingly, any error of the ALJ at step two was harmless.

It is established that an ALJ’s failure to find an impairment

severe, even if erroneous, is harmless error where at the later

RFC stage of the analysis, the ALJ discussed the impairment, the

medical findings, the pertinent symptoms, and the applicable

opinions concerning functional limitations. Lewis v. Astrue, 498

F.3d 909, 911 (9 Cir. 2007). th

VI. Disposition

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s

decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole and was based on the application of correct legal

standards. 

Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the administrative decision

of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security and DENIES

Plaintiff’s Social Security complaint.

The Clerk of the Court IS DIRECTED to enter judgment for

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Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, 

and against Plaintiff Robert Hunter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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