Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00108/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00108-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Terry Lyn McCutcheon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

State of Arizona; et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV 15-0108-TUC-RM (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on July

6, 2015, by Terry Lyn McCutcheon. (Doc. 5) McCutcheon challenges a judgment of

conviction issued by the Pima County Superior Court on April 6, 1987. Id.; (Doc. 10-3, p. 27)

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, the matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bowman for report and recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2).

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order dismissing the petition. It is time-barred.

Summary of the Case

On April 6, 1987, McCutcheon was convicted after a jury trial of “eight counts of armed

robbery, armed kidnapping, and aggravated assault.” (Doc. 10-1, p. 5); (Doc. 10-3, p. 27) The

trial court determined that McCutcheon had been on parole when he committed the offenses and

sentenced him to “eight concurrent life sentences, without possibility of parole for twenty-five

years” on May 8, 1987. (Doc. 10-1, pp. 5, 15, 37)

Case 4:15-cv-00108-RM Document 19 Filed 04/07/16 Page 1 of 7
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On direct appeal, McCutcheon raised various trial issues. (Doc. 10-1, pp. 5-6) He also

argued the trial court erred by making his sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. (Doc.

10-1, p. 12) The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on September

26, 1989. (Doc. 10-1, pp. 2-13) 

Slightly more than 23 years later on January 2, 2013, McCutcheon filed a Notice of

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 10-2, p. 2) He claimed (1) his sentences violated the

Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution because “no reasonable fact finder could or would

have found that he was on parole at the time of the offenses,” (2) he received ineffective

assistance from trial and appellate counsel who failed to raise the issue, (3) his sentences are

not in accordance with the law, and (4) he will be held in custody after his lawful sentences will

have expired. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 2-24) McCutcheon’s petition raised the “intricate and novel”

legal theory that he continued to receive “earned release credit” even after he was released on

parole, so the length of his parole was shortened by one third pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1604.07.

(Doc. 10-3, pp. 29-30)

 The trial court dismissed the petition on May 13, 2013. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 27-32) The

court explicitly rejected McCutcheon’s theory that he was eligible to earn release credits while

on parole pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1604.07. (Doc. 10-3, p. 68) The Arizona Court of Appeals

granted review but denied relief on October 25, 2013. (Doc. 10-3, pp. 72-75) That court held

that McCutcheon’s sentencing error claim was precluded because he failed to raise it on appeal.

Id. The court further held that McCutcheon provided no evidence that “counsels’ failures to

raise this novel issue . . . fell below prevailing professional norms.” Id. The Arizona Supreme

Court denied review on May 28, 2014. (Doc. 10-3, p. 94)

McCutcheon filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 on March 19, 2015. (Doc. 1) He filed the pending amended petition on July 6, 2015.

(Doc. 5) 

McCutcheon claims (1) he was illegally sentenced because the trial court ignored the

plain language of the parole statutes, (2) his sentences violated the Due Process Clause because

no reasonable fact finder could have found he was on parole at the time of the offenses, (3) trial

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counsel and (4) appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to recognize the parole issue, (5)

he has a valid actual innocence claim pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(H) and an insufficiency

of the evidence claim pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(A), and (6) his sentences were grossly

disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 5)

On November 6, 2015, the respondents filed an answer arguing among other things that

the petition is time-barred. (Doc. 10) McCutcheon filed a reply on March 31, 2016. (Doc. 18)

The respondents are correct; the petition is time-barred.

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition,

however, must be filed within the applicable limitation period or it will be dismissed. The

statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

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 McCutcheon’s Claim (6) is an Eighth Amendment claim based on the length of his sentence

and his age at the time it was imposed. His “newly discovered” argument apparently applies only to

the five claims related to his parole issue.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The “one-year statute of limitations . . . applies to each claim in a habeas

application on an individual basis.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012).

The limitation period for all of McCutcheon’s claims was triggered on “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McCutcheon’s convictions and sentence on

September 26, 1989. (Doc. 10-1, pp. 2-13) McCutcheon then had 90 days to petition the U.S.

Supreme Court for review. Sup. Ct. R. 13. When he did not do so, his judgment became final.

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999).

The limitation period did not begin to run immediately, however, because the limitation

statute did not become effective until April 24, 1996. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General,

499 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). The one-year limitation period began the next day and

expired one year later on April 24, 1997. Id. Approximately 18 years later, on March 19, 2015,

McCutcheon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. He filed the pending

amended petition on July 6, 2015. The amended petition relates back to the date the original

petition was filed, but it is still time-barred having been filed some 18 years too late. 

McCutcheon argues § 2244(d)(1) does not bar his petition because his “sentencing errors

were newly discovered.”1

 (Doc. 5, p. 20) Presumably, he believes the limitation period for his

claims was triggered on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D). And if the court were to find that this date occurred shortly before he filed his

notice of post-conviction relief, his petition might be timely. McCutcheon, however, is

incorrect. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not apply to his parole claims.

The “factual predicate” trigger applies when “the prisoner knows (or through diligence

could discover) the important facts underlying his claim, not when the prisoner recognizes their

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legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the facts

underlying the parole argument were known when McCutcheon was sentenced in 1987. At that

time, he knew what his prior sentence was and when he began serving it; he knew when he was

released on parole; he knew he was receiving earned release credits just prior to being released

on parole, and he knew when he committed the new offenses. These are the facts upon which

his pending parole claims are based. They were known even before his judgment became final.

Therefore, the “factual predicate” trigger does not apply here.

At some later time, McCutcheon developed his novel legal theory that he continued to

receive “earned release credit” even after he was released on parole, so the length of his parole

was shortened by one third. Id. That he did not develop his legal theory until much later is of

no consequence. But see (CV 15-512 PHX PGR (ESW), Doc. 14, p. 3) (McCutcheon

apparently formulated his legal theory by 2011.) It is the date the facts are known that matters,

not the date the legal theory is conceived. McCutcheon’s parole claims are not rescued by the

“factual predicate” trigger. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). His amended petition is still timebarred.

McCutcheon argues in his reply that his petition is not time-barred because of the

operation of the tolling statute – 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). (Doc. 18, p. 29) He asserts his Rule

32 petition was timely filed because he was sentenced before September 30, 1992, when the

current Rule 32 time limits were imposed. Id. He reasons the limitation period was statutorily

tolled when his notice was filed, and tolling continued until the date the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review on May 28, 2014. Id. His original petition was filed in this court less than one

year later on March 19, 2015. (Doc. 18, p. 29) Therefore, he concludes that the pending

petition is timely. The court does not agree.

The limitation period expired on April 24, 1997. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney

General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). The period was not renewed when McCutcheon

filed his Notice of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on January 2, 2013. Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2244(d)(2) did not toll the limitation

period because it had already expired. His petition was filed some 18 years too late.

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In the body of his petition, McCutcheon argues that he has a “valid actual innocence”

claim. Under certain circumstances, a claim of “actual innocence” serves as a “gateway through

which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar or expiration of the

statute of limitations.” Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-938 (9th Cir. 2014). “When an

otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court

cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial

was free of non-harmless constitutional error, the Court may consider the petition on the

merits.” Id. (punctuation modified). “The Supreme Court has recently cautioned, however, that

tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare.” Id. “A petitioner does not meet the threshold

requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror,

acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

To establish a claim of “actual innocence” the petitioner must first present “new reliable

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or

critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324,

115 S. Ct. 851, 865 (1995). Here, however, McCutcheon does not present any new evidence

undermining his convictions. Instead, he presents a new legal theory that his sentence was

illegal because he was not on parole at the time of the offenses because the earned release credit

statute applies to parolees. This is insufficient. See, e.g., Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832,

843 (9th Cir. 2001) (Petitioner who argued “his consecutive sentences were illegal under the

applicable Oregon statute” did not establish factual innocence because he “failed to challenge

the facts underlying his convictions.”). McCutcheon has not made a credible showing of “actual

innocence” to rescue his untimely petition. See, e.g., Hinkhouse v. Franke, 2013 WL 943535,

at *6 (D. Or. 2013); Fox v. Belleque, 2009 WL 2828679, at *5 (D. Or. 2009).

In the alternative, the court finds that if McCutcheon’s parole claims were considered on

the merits, they all would be denied. This court is unable to do what McCutcheon asks – find

that he continued to receive earned release credit even after he was released on parole pursuant

to A.R.S. § 41-1604.07. “[A] state court’s interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76, 126 S. Ct. 602, 604 (2005).

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In this case, the trial court rejected McCutcheon’s novel interpretation of A.R.S. § 41-1604.07.

(Doc. 10-3, p. 31) (“[T]he court finds as a matter of law, on the undisputed facts, that Petitioner

was on parole for felony offenses when he committed criminal offenses on April 25, 1984 . .

. .”). This court is bound by that holding.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus.

(Doc. 5) It is time-barred. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The Local Rules permit a response to an objection.

They do not permit a reply to a response.

DATED this 7th day of April, 2016.

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