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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FIL i, D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALYnit,ed States Coμrt qf Appeal$ Tenth C1rcu1t 

LLOYD SHANKS , JR. , 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GORDON N. ZELEZ, Colonel, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, BARRETT, EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

DECO 9 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-3271 

(D.C. No. 88-3400-R) 

(Dist. of Kansas) 

Lloyd Shanks, appearing prose, appeals from the orders of 

the district court dismissing his habeas corpus petition and 

denying him leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

In 1980, Shanks was convicted by general military courtmartial of conspiracy, premeditated murder, murder, and 

communication of a threat. He was sentenced to a dishonorable 

discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement 

at hard labor for life. Shanks moved for a new trial. The United 

States Court of Military Review affirmed his conviction and 

* This Order and Judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 1 
sentence. The United States Court of Military Appeals denied his 

petition for grant of review. 

In 1987, Shanks sent a copy of his motion for a new trial to 

the United States Army Defense Appellate Division. The petition 

was denied as out of time. Shanks sent a similar petition to the 

Court of Military Appeals, and that court construed the petition 

as a petition for extraordinary relief and appointed counsel to 

represent Shanks. Shanks' motion was subsequently denied by the 

Court of Military Appeals, as was his motion for reconsideration. 

Thereafter, Shanks filed the habeas corpus petition herein 

alleging that: he was denied due process by the conflict between 

the two-thirds vote of the court-martial required to convict and 

the three-fourths vote of the court-martial required to sentence 

him to life imprisonment; the military judge erred in instructing 

on the meaning of reasonable doubt; and he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. 

Within its order dismissing Shanks' petition for habeas 

corpus, the district court initially observed that the standard 

of review for military habeas corpus cases is extremely narrow, 

and "no review of a petition for habeas corpus [is] possible when 

the defendant's claims [have been] fully and fairly considered by 

the military courts," quoting Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252 

(10th Cir. 1990). Thereafter, the district court applied Dodson 

and Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1990), in finding/ 

concluding that Shanks' claims were fully and fairly considered by 

the military courts, his petition should be dismissed, and all 

relief should be denied. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 2 
Shanks filed a notice of appeal from the court's order of 

dismissal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Fed. R. App. P., rule 

22(b), 28 U.S.C., an appeal may not be taken from the final order 

in a habeas proceeding unless the judge who rendered the order 

issues a certificate of probable cause. The district court, after 

finding that Shank's allegations on appeal were legally frivolous 

and not taken in good faith, declined to issue a certificate of 

probable cause. We grant Shanks' motion for leave to proceed on 

appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. 

On appeal, Shanks raises the exact issues presented to the 

district court. 

Our review of the district court's dismissal of Shanks' 

petition is de novo. Khan v. Hart, 943 F.2d 1261, 1262 (1991). 

However, "[o]ur jurisdiction to review a military conviction for 

constitutional error is limited because habeas jurisdiction of a 

federal civil court does not extend to reassessment of the facts 

and issues fully and fairly considered by a military court." Id., 

citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). Our review is 

limited to determining whether the district court properly 

analyzed Shanks' petition and properly determined that Shanks 

could not make any rational argument on the law or the facts. 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). 

Applying these standards, we are satisfied that the district 

court properly considered Shanks' petition and correctly found 

that Shanks could not make any rational argument in law or in fact 

in support of the issues raised on appeal . We affirm the order of 

the district court denying Shanks' application for a certificate 

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Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 3 
of probable cause substantially for the reasons set forth in the 

district court's Orders of June 24, 1992, and July 30, 1992, 

copies of which are attached hereto and made a part hereof. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

-4-

Entered for the Court: 

James E. Barrett, 

Senior United States 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 4 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF KANSAS 

LLOYD SHANKS, JR., 

Petitioner, 

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CASE NO. 88-3400- R 

COL. GORDON N. ZELEZ, 

Respondent. _____________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

This matter comes before the court on a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 2 8 U.S. C. § 2 2 41. In 1980, 

petitioner was convicted by general court-martial of conspiracy, 

premeditated murder, murder, and communication of a threat. 

Petitioner was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of 

all pay and allowances, and confinement at hard labor for life. In 

this action, petitioner raises three allegations of constitutional 

error: (1) that he was denied due process by the conflict between 

the two-thirds vote of the court-martial required to convict and the 

three-fourths vote of the court-martial required to sentence him to 

a life imprisonment; (2) that the military judge erred when he 

instructed the court on the meaning of reasonable doubt; and (3) 

that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Respondent 

filed an answer and return to the petition and petitioner filed a 

traverse. Thereafter, respondent filed a supplemental memorandum 

disclosing arguably adverse legal authority. Having reviewed the 

record, the court makes the following findings and order. 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 5 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

Factual and Procedural Background 

Petitioner stands convicted of charges resulting from a drug 

deal gone awry. Following a bad drug buy, William Johnson, the 

actual triggerman, and petitioner conspired and carried out the 

gangland-type slaying of Zollie Richardson and Howard Steele. 

Although it is conceded that Johnson, not petitioner, fired the 

murder weapon, there was substantial evidence that petitioner was 

completely involved in the planning and carrying out of the crime. 

Petitioner was found guilty of having aided and abetted Johnson, 

later known as Yahmii Balogun Uhuru. 

Following his conviction, petitioner filed a motion with the 

Convening Authority for a new trial. Petitioner claimed that had 

Uhuru been called to testify at petitioner's trial, he would have 

cleared petitioner of any wrongdoing in the crimes. The motion was 

denied. 

The United States Army Court of Military Review (ACMR) affirmed 

the conviction and sentence. The United States court of Military 

Appeals (CMA) denied petitioner's petition for grant of review. 

In 1987, petitioner sent a copy of his original motion for a 

new trial to the United States Army Defense Appellate Division 

(DAD). The petition was construed as a petition for a new trial and 

was denied as out of time. A similar petition was sent to the CMA 

and was construed by that body as a petition for extraordinary 

relief. Counsel was appointed and a petition similar to a writ of 

habeas corpus was filed with the CMA. 

The petition was denied as was petitioner's motion for 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 6 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

reconsideration. 

On October 28, 1988, petitioner filed this action. 

Standard of Review 

The standard of review for military habeas cases is extremely 

narrow. Relying upon Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held "that no review 

of a petition for habeas corpus was possible when the defendant's 

claims were fully and fairly considered by the military courts." 

Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1990). In Dodson, 

the court identified four factors which would be helpful in 

determining whether review of a military conviction on habeas corpus 

is warranted. These factors are: (1) the asserted error must be of 

substantial constitutional dimension; (2) the issue must be one of 

law rather than disputed fact already determined by the military 

tribunals; (3) military considerations may warrant different 

treatment of constitutional claims; and (4) the military must give 

adequate consideration to the issues involved and apply proper legal 

standards. Id. at 1252-53. With these inquiries in mind, the court 

will now review petitioner's claims. 

Conflict between voting ·procedure for conviction and sentence 

Petitioner claims he was denied his constitutionally guaranteed 

right to due process because there is an inconsistency between the 

two-thirds vote necessary to convict and the three-fourths vote 

necessary to sentence to life imprisonment. Article 52(a) of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides that a two-thirds 

vote of court members is required to find an accused guilty of any 

3 

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AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

offense. Article _52(b) provides that a three-fourths vote of court 

members is required to sentence an accused to life imprisonment or 

to confinement for ten years or more. However, Article 118, UCMJ, 

further provides that an accused found guilty of premeditated murder 

"shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may 

direct." The result is a minimum mandatory sentence of life 

imprisonment for premeditated murder. 

The gist of petitioner's argument is that he was essentially 

sentenced to life imprisonment when two-thirds of the court voted 

for his conviction of premeditated murder. Since the death sentence 

requires a unanimous vote, petitioner claims that any vote following 

a non-unanimous vote for death is a matter of form rather than 

substance because the only choice left to the court-martial on a 

premeditated murder conviction is life imprisonment. 

Because this issue is of constitutional dimension and one of 

law rather than fact, this court may review the claim. 

The necessity of a vote of three-fourths of the members of the 

court-martial was recently and thoroughly discussed in Dodson, 

supra. In Dodson, the defendant claimed that the court-martial 

committed reversible error because no three-fourths vote was taken 

on his mandatory sentence. The government argued that on a 

mandatory sentence a vote is unnecessary. Relying on both the 

wording of the statute and the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial, the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held "that a three-fourths vote is 

required on all sentences of life imprisonment, even if the sentence 

is mandatory." Dodson, 917 F.2d at 1260. The court reasoned that 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 8 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

if a three-fourths vote could not be reached, under the wording of 

the Manual, a mistrial is declared, and the convening authority, in 

its discretion, may direct a rehearing on the sentence from another 

court. Id. at 1260-61. The court concluded that the convening 

authority also has the discretion to order no punishment. Id. at 

1261. 

Thus, contrary to petitioner's assertion in the present case 

that his due process rights had been violated by the taking of the l 

three-fourths vote on the sentence, the Tenth Circuit Court of 

) 

Appeals has held that a "court-martial' s failure to follow the J 

statutory requirements" is a violation of a defendant's right to due 

process. 

The court concludes petitioner's right to due process was not 

denied. 

Error in the instruction on reasonable doubt 

Petitioner's second claim is that the military judge erred when 

he instructed the panel on reasonable doubt. This issue is also of 

constitutional dimension and a question of law. 

First it must be noted that petitioner raised no 

contemporaneous objection to the instruction. Second, the issue of 

the instruction was thoroughly briefed and reviewed by the ACMR and 

the CMA. The issue, therefore, was fully and fairly heard by the 

military tribunals. Dodson, at 1252-53. 

Respondent, however, has filed a supplemental memorandum 

disclosing adverse authority on the issue of an erroneous reasonable 

doubt instruction. The court will address the issue. 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 9 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

In Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1990), the court 

granted appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus based upon 

such an instruction. Monk challenged an instruction which used the 

terms "substantial doubt" and "willing to act" as part of the charge 

to the members of the court-martial. The Tenth circuit Court of 

Appeals found the combination of the terms constitutionally 

defective. Id. at 890. 

The distinctions between Monk and the present case are 

critical. First, Monk offered an alternative and correct 

instruction and, thus, objected to the infirm instruction. 

Petitioner did not object. And second, the alleged infirm 

instruction in the present case did not contain the term 

"substantial doubt." Therefore the language prohibited by Monk did 

not exist in this case. Furthermore, subsequent to Monk, the Tenth 

Circuit Court of Appeals refused to find reversible error when a 

reasonable doubt instruction contained the term "willing to act." 1 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

at the trial level. Specifically, petitioner claims that had 

counsel secured the testimony of Uhuru at petitioner's trial the 

outcome would have been different. This claim is clearly of 

constitutional dimension and presents a mixed question of law and 

1 In U. s. v. Barrera-Gonzales, 952 F. 2d 12 69 (10th Cir. 1992) , 

the court did not explicitly reject the "willingness to act" 

language but once again encouraged judges to utilize the "hesitate 

to act" language articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954). 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 10 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

fact that has been raised· before the Convening Authority on motion , -

for a new trial; but was not raised before the ACMR or before the 

CMA on appeal. However, in petitioner's motion for extraordinary 

writ before the CMA, and his motion for reconsideration, the issue 

was again raised. 

Petitioner's motion before the CMA was summarily denied. Such 

a denial, however, does not preclude a finding that the issue was 

given a full and fair consideration by the military courts. 

Watson v. Mccotter, 782 F.2d 143, 145 (10th cir.) cert. denied 

U.S. 1184 (1986). 

476 

The court finds this issue was fully and fairly considered by 

the military courts and will not be reevaluated in this fprum. The 

court's conclusion rests upon its finding that the military courts 

had access to documentation adequately demonstrating the performance 

of petitioner's counsel and were thereby able to make an informed 

review of the legal assistance accorded petitioner. 

IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that this action is 

dismissed and all relief denied. The clerk of the court is directed 

to transmit copies of this Memorandum and Order to petitioner and to 

the Office of the United States Attorney. 

DATED: This ~L/}j day of June, 1992, at Topeka, Kansas. 

RIC RD D. ROGERS 

United States District Judge 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 11 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT couRJJL 30 3 lfO i;il '92 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

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LLOYD SHANKS, 

v. 

COL. GORDON N. ZELEZ, 

) 

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Petitioner, ) 

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Respondents. ) _____________________ ) 

0 R D E R 

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CASE NO. 88-3400-R 

Petitioner commenced this action in habeas corpus on 

October 28, 1988. All relief was denied and the action dismissed by 

Memorandum and Order of June 24, 1992. Petitioner has filed a 

Notice of Appeal from the order of dismissal. Under the provisions 

of 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, Title 28, u.s.c., this appeal may not proceed unless a 

district judge or circuit judge issues a certificate of probable 

cause. 

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum and Order of 

June 24, 1992, and because petitioner's allegations on appeal are 

conclusional and frivolous, the court finds the appeal is legally 

frivolous and is not taken in good faith. Accordingly, this court 

declines to issue a certificate of probable cause~ 

17 

Appellate Case: 92-3271 Document: 010110151512 Date Filed: 12/09/1992 Page: 12 
AO 72A 

:Rev. 8/82) 

IT IS BY THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner is 

hereby denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The 

clerk of the court is directed to transmit copies of this order to 

petitioner and respondent. 

. tl 

DATED: This 3D -day of July, 1992, at Topeka, Kansas. 

~~~~$2~ United States District Judge 

2 

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