Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02949/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02949-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

DOH

E-FILED on 5/3/05

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SHELLY ROHM,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES HOMER, an individual, GERALDO

ESPARZA, an individual, LABORERS'

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH

AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 270, a labor union,

and DOES 1-100, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

No. C-04-02949 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

[Re Docket No. 22]

Plaintiff Shelly Rohm ("Rohm") sued her former employer, International Laborers' Union of North

America, Local Union 270 ("Local 270"), and her former supervisors, James Homer ("Homer") and

Geraldo Esparza ("Esparza") (collectively "defendants") for wrongful termination of employment. 

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on Rohm's first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of

action. Rohm opposes the motion. The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered

the arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants defendants' motion in part and

denies it in part.

Case 5:04-cv-02949-RMW Document 37 Filed 05/03/05 Page 1 of 12
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

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I. BACKGROUND

Rohm's complaint alleges as follows. Rohm began working for Local 270 on September 10, 2001

as Homer's secretary. Compl. ¶ 9. Her job performance was satisfactory. Compl. ¶ 9. However, she

was "subject to severe harassment," including (1) Esparza "continually offer[ing] alcohol . . . during business

hours in a threatening manner"; (2) being "constantly sworn at by managing employees"; (3) being

"prohibited . . . from contacting police when the office was vandalized and her vehicle was vandalized

multiple times"; (4) having her car "keyed" and finding a nail in her tire; (5) being called "a stupid white girl"

by Esparza; (6) being prohibited from reporting "suspect union activity, including potential embezzlement" to

law enforcement; (7) "[b]eing told by employee Leo Valdez that he 'dreams about' [her], and referencing

[her] in 'cement' shoes"; and (8) being "subject to continued personal attacks and threats against her person

and her family," including a phone call on March 1, 2003 in which "an unidentified caller told [her], 'we

don't like snitches.'" Compl. ¶ 11. 

On December 20, 2001, Esparza entered Rohm's office and closed the door. Compl. ¶ 33. He

placed a bottle of tequila and a shot glass on Rohm's desk. Compl. ¶ 33. He "approached and touched

[Rohm's] upper body with his upper body, leaning forward and wedging [her] against the corner with no

exit." Compl. ¶ 33. Rohm told Esparza to get out of her office. Compl. ¶ 34. She immediately reported

Esparza's actions to Homer. Compl. ¶ 34. Homer said that "this happens often with . . . Esparza" but that

Homer could do nothing about it because "Esparza is an officer on the union board and employee." Compl.

¶ 35. 

Because of the "severe stress caused by th[is] employment environment," Rohm took medical

leave. Compl. ¶ 13. On May 8, 2003, Rohm filed a discrimination claim against Local 270 with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"). Compl. ¶ 28. In October 2003, she informed Local

270 that she was ready to return to work in January 2004. Compl. ¶ 29. In December 2003, Homer told

her that she had been fired because she had "vacated her position." Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13. Homer also said that

"he could justify paying a 'Hispanic girl' not a 'white girl' based on union membership being 95% Hispanic." 

Compl. ¶ 13. In fact, Local 270 terminated Rohm's employment because of a disability and in retaliation

for the fact that she filed a discrimination claim. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 30. 

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1

 Rohm alleges that she has met all administrative prerequisites for filing this complaint. 

Compl. ¶ 14.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

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On July 24, 2004, Rohm filed this complaint.1 Her six causes of action are styled (1) "Violation of

[the] Americans with Disabilities Act; Title VII"; (2) "Unlawful Discrimination Because of Race; Title VII";

(3) Violation of [the] California Fair Employment Hous[ing] Act[;] Gov't Code § 12940(a)"; (4) Violation

of [the] California Fair Employment Hous[ing] Act[;] Gov't Code § 12940(j)(k); (5) "Retaliatory

Discharge"; (6) "Sexual Harassment in [a] Business Relationship[;] Civil Code §§ 51.9, 52(b)."

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard For Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is a "means to

challenge the sufficiency of the complaint after an answer has been filed." New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356

F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2004). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a motion

to dismiss. "For the purposes of the motion, the allegations of the non-moving party must be accepted as

true, while the allegations of the moving party which have been denied are assumed to be false. Judgment

on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no

material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Rohm's First and Third Causes of Action for Disability Discrimination

Rohm alleges that Local 270 "failed to accommodate [her] illness in a reasonable manner" and

"wrongfully fired her" because of "her illness." Compl. ¶ 15, 22. Rohm claims that Local 270's conduct

violated two statutes that prohibit disability discrimination: the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq. ("the ADA"), and the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§

12920 et. seq. ("the FEHA"). Defendants argue that Rohm has failed to allege that she meets the

requirement of either statute. In addition, Homer and Esparza assert that even if the court determines that

Local 270 is guilty of disability discrimination, they cannot be held liable as individuals.

1. ADA Claim

The ADA's employment-related provisions protect "qualified individuals with a disability." 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). Defendants argue that Rohm fails to allege that she is such an individual. The ADA

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2 Defendants cite Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2000) and

Sanders v. Arneson, 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) for the proposition that "[d]epression or stress

triggered by a personality conflict with a particular supervisor does not establish a plaintiff's disability." Both

cases arose in the summary judgment context and are thus inapposite. In Schneiker, the Seventh Circuit

held that "standing alone," the plaintiff's stress did not make her"disabled" because she failed to prove that

she could not work for a different supervisor. Schneiker, 200 F.3d at 1062. Here, Rohm may prove that

her "stress" was sufficiently "severe" that she could not work for someone else. Similarly, in Sanders, the

Ninth Circuit held that a four-month psychological impairment with "no long-term residual effects" did not

constitute a "disability." Sanders, 91 F.3d at 1354. Because of the early stage of this litigation, the length

and severity of Rohm's alleged impairment are unclear. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

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defines a "disability" as, inter alia, "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of

the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). A "physical impairment" includes "[a]ny

physiological disorder[ ] or condition" that affects a major body system. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). A

"mental impairment" is "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain

syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2). 

Defendants argue that Rohm's allegations that she suffered from an "illness" and "severe stress" do

not suffice to show that she was either physically or mentally impaired. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16. The court

disagrees. "'[S]tress' and 'depression' are conditions that may or may not be considered impairments,

depending on whether these conditions result from a documented physiological or mental disorder." 

Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting EEOC Technical

Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans With Disabilities Act §

2.1(a)(i), at II-3 (1992)). The court may only grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when "it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle

him to relief." New.Net, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. Because it is possible that Rohm will prove that

her stress stemmed from a "documented physiological or mental disorder," the court rejects defendants'

argument.2 

 Defendants also argue that Rohm fails to allege that her impairment "substantially limits . . . [a]

major life activity." Rohm argues that because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) only requires

complaints to contain "a short and plain statement," she has sufficiently pled this element. Both sides find

support in Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 168 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.

1999). In that case, the Tenth Circuit discussed pleading requirements under the ADA, but seemed to

contradict itself: 

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3 The court is not aware of any Ninth Circuit authority on the issue.

4

 Moreover, when confronted with a vague complaint, a defendant may move under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) for a more definite statement. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

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We emphasize that in order to state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must articulate

with precision the impairment alleged and the major life activity affected by that

impairment. This holding does not in any way change the federal notice pleading

requirements. A plaintiff has the option of clarifying his or her position at the pleading

stage or waiting until trial to prove with particularity the impairment and major life

activity he or she asserts are at issue.

Id. at 1232. However, every court to address the issue since Poindexter has held that "an ADA plaintiff,

at the pleading stage, is not required to explicitly assert a substantially limited major life activity." EEOC v.

Northwest Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 939 (D. Min. 2002); see also EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing

Co., 246 F.3d 850, 852-55 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[a] plaintiff would be wise to mention her specific limited

major life activity, but failing to do so is not fatal to her complaint"); Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem'l Med.

Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 117 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's bare allegation that his disability is "a

disorder recognized . . . under the" ADA was "sufficient to meet the notice pleading requirements").3 The

court agrees with this line of authority. The purpose of Rule 8 is to "give the defendant fair notice of the

claim and its supporting facts." J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d at 854. When a plaintiff claims to be

impaired, it is not too difficult to infer which life activities the impairment affects. This approach is also in

harmony with Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court held that

an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination because "[t]he

Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be

decisive to the outcome . . . ." Id. at 514 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).4 Thus, the

court holds that a plaintiff who pleads an impairment with clarity need not explicitly identify a "substantially

limit[ed] . . . major life activity" to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In her complaint, Rohm does not expressly claim that she has been "substantially limit[ed] in a

"major life activity." As noted above, however, she is not required to do so. Her allegation that defendants'

allegedly hostile workplace caused her "severe stress" gives defendants adequate notice of the basis for her

claim. Moreover, although Rohm does not use the words "substantially limited" or "major life activity," she

does allege that the "severe stress" caused her to take leave from work. Compl. ¶ 13. "[W]orking is a

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

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major life activity under the ADA." Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996)

(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). Defendants point out that "[f]or an impairment to substantially limit one's

ability to work, it must not merely prevent one from working at a particular job; it must prevent one from

working at a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3). Yet the

court cannot decide whether Rohm's "stress" actually inhibited her ability to work in "a broad range of jobs"

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

Finally, defendants claim that Sheets v. CTS Wireless Components, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1279

(D. N.M. 2002) elucidates why Rohm's pleadings are inadequate. In that case, Sheets claimed that being

transferred to the department where her dead husband once worked exacerbated her depression. Id. at

1282. Sheets also obliquely claimed that she was later "injured." Id. at 1283. Reasoning that "it is unclear

whether . . . Sheets' purported impairment is the identified depression, the unspecific injury, or both," the

court granted the employer's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Id. A fair reading of Rohm's complaint,

however, reveals no such ambiguity. Although Rohm claims to suffer from "severe stress" and an "illness," it

is clear that the "illness" is her "stress." Rohm describes her "stress" in the general allegations section of her

complaint; it is only in the specific causes of action that she refers to her "illness." Thus, unlike Sheets,

Rohm seeks recovery for one, specified impairment. For these reasons, the court denies defendants'

motion.

2. FEHA Claim

The FEHA prohibits discrimination against individuals who have a "physical disability, mental

disability, or medical condition." Cal. Gov't Code § 12920 et seq. The FEHA is broader than the ADA

and "afford[s] additional protections." Cal. Gov't Code § 12926.1(a). For example, "the definitions of

"physical disability" and "mental disability" . . . require a 'limitation' upon a major life activity, but do not

require . . . a 'substantial limitation.'" Cal. Gov't Code § 12926.1(c); see also Colmenares v. Braemar

Country Club, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1019, 1030 (2003) ("the FEHA does not require the federal test's

substantial limitation of a major life activity"). In addition, under the FEHA, "'working' is a major life

activity, regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment

or a class or broad range of employments." Cal. Gov't Code § 12926.1(c). Because Rohm's pleadings

fulfill the ADA's more stringent standards, they also suffice under the FEHA. 

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5

In their reply brief, Homer and Esparza assert that Rohm "has not opposed" their motion

for judgment on the pleadings on the issue of their individual liability under the ADA or the FEHA. Rep.

Br. Supp. Mot. J. Plead. at 4:19-24. In fact, Rohm does oppose this aspect of their motion. Opp. Mot. J.

Plead. at 4:1-17. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

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3. Claims Against Homer and Esparza

Homer and Esparza argue that they cannot be held individually liable as a matter of law for Local

270's alleged disability discrimination under either the ADA or the FEHA. The ADA forbids discrimination

by "employer[s]." An "employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or

more employees . . ., and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Rohm contends that it is

possible that this court will find that Homer and Esparza were acting as "agents" for Local 270, and thus

meet the statutory definition of "employer."5 

The court disagrees. "[T]he actual reason for the 'and any agent' language in the definition of

'employer' was to ensure that courts would impose respondeat superior liability upon employers for the

acts of their agents," not to make "agent[s]" individually liable. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd.,

55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Miller v. Maxwell's Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th

Cir. 1993) (noting in the similar context of Title VII and the ADEA that the "statutory scheme itself indicates

that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees"); Cai v. Chiron Corp., 2004 WL

1837985 *4 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("individual[s] cannot be liable under the ADA"); Stern v. California State

Archives, 982 F.Supp. 690, 692 (E. D.Cal. 1997) ("[t]here is no individual liability even where the

supervisor is the employer's 'agent'"). 

Similarly, the FEHA prohibits "an employer" from discriminating. Cal Gov't Code § 12940(a). An

"employer" includes "any person regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as an agent

of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . ." Cal. Gov't Code § 12926 (d). The California Supreme Court

has held that "individuals who do not themselves qualify as employers may not be sued under the FEHA for

alleged discriminatory acts." Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 663 (1998). Thus, both Rohm's ADA and

FEHA disability discrimination claims must be dismissed with prejudice against Homer and Esparza as

individuals.

C. Rohm's Second and Fourth Causes of Action for Racial Discrimination Against

Homer and Esparza 

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6 Rohm's cites Hamilton v. Rogers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1986) for the

proposition that "some courts have reasoned that supervisory personnel and other agents of the employer

are themselves employers for purposes of liability." Opp. Mot. Jud. Plead. at 4:5-7. However,

Miller called Hamilton "unsound" and "suspect." See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.

7 California courts "have been guided in their interpretations of FEHA by the federal court

decisions interpreting Title VII." Etter v. Veriflo Corp., 67 Cal. App. 4th 457, 464 (1998).

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

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Rohm's second cause of action is for "[u]nlawful [d]iscrimination [b]ecause of [r]ace" under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Rohm alleges that she was "wrongfully

terminated" because of her race. Compl. §§ 18, 19. Rohm's fourth cause of action makes identical claims

under the FEHA. Homer and Esparza argue that they cannot be individually liable for racial discrimination

under either Title VII or the FEHA.

1. Title VII

Homer and Esparza argue that binding Ninth Circuit precedent holds that individuals cannot be

liable for racial discrimination under Title VII. Homer and Esparza are correct. See Miller, 991 F.2d at

588 (in discrimination claim under Title VII "the defendants in their individual capacities properly were

dismissed for failure to state a claim").6

2. FEHA

Likewise, Homer and Esparza contend that the California Supreme Court has held that individuals

cannot be personally liable for racial discrimination under the FEHA. Again, Homer and Esparza are

correct. See Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 663. Thus, Rohm's racial discrimination claims against Homer and

Esparza as individuals are dismissed with prejudice.

D. Rohm's Second and Fourth Causes of Action for Racial Harassment 

Rohm's second and fourth causes of action also allege that she was "subject to harassment and

improper conduct because of her race." Compl. ¶¶ 18, 24. Rohm claims defendants' conduct violated

both Title VII and the FEHA. Defendants argue that Rohm's pleadings fail to establish actionable racial

harassment. 

To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim under Title VII or the FEHA,7 a plaintiff

must show that "(1) she was 'subjected to verbal or physical conduct' because of her race, (2) 'the conduct

was unwelcome,' and (3) 'the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her]

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8 Defendants acknowledge this additional allegation in their reply brief. Rep. Supp. Mot. J.

Plead. at7:24-25.

9 Defendants provide no examples of courts deciding this issue on a motion for judgment on

the pleadings or a motion to dismiss. Manatt affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor

of an employer when the employee could only show that she had been subject to "simple teasing" and

"offhand comments." Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798. Even without the benefit of a fully-developed summary

judgment record, Rohm's allegations are far more serious. Defendants also cite Aguilar v. Avis Rent A

Car System, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 131 (1999) for the proposition that "'occasional, isolated, sporadic, or

trivial' acts are usually not enough to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile environment." 

Rep. Br. Supp. Mot. J. Plead. at 7:15-22. However, Aguilar made this comment in passing and does not

illuminate the circumstances under which a racial harassment claim is inadequate as a matter of law. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

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employment and create an abusive work environment.'" Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792,

798 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir.2002)). Defendants

argue that it is only "'a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination'" that can

violate Title VII. Rep. Br. Supp. Mot. J. Plead. at 7:12-14 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238

(5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added). Defendants claim that Rohm only alleges a single incident of racial

harassment: being called a "stupid white girl." Mot. Supp. J. Plead. at 10:21-22. Therefore, defendants

argue, Rohm fails to plead racial harassment as a matter of law. 

Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. For one, it ignores the complaint's other allegations: (1) that

Homer told Rohm "he could justify paying a 'Hispanic girl' not a 'white girl,'" Compl. ¶ 13;8 (2) that

managing employees "constantly swor[e]" at Rohm, Compl. ¶ 11; and (3) that Rohm "was subject to

harassment and improper conduct because of her race." Compl. ¶¶ 18, 24. At this stage, Rohm can still

show that some of her general allegations of harassment stemmed from racial bias. Moreover, after

Swierkiewicz, a Title VII plaintiff "need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination" to survive a motion

to dismiss. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (complaint was adequate when it "detailed the events

leading to [the] termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some

of the relevant persons involved with [the] termination"). Although defendants are correct that a hostile

work environment must be "extreme" to be actionable, the fact-specific issue of whether defendants created

such an environment is not appropriate for a motion for judgment on the pleadings.9

E. Rohm's Sixth Cause of Action for Violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act

Rohm alleges that Esparza's alleged sexual harassment violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act,

California Civil Code §§ 51.9 and 52(b) ("the Act"). Compl. ¶¶ 11, 33-38. The Act provides that "[a]ll

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

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persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex . . . [and]

are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all

business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Cal. Civ. Code § 51. The Act focuses on rectifying

"discrimination against recipients of [a] 'business establishment's . . . goods, services, or facilities'" and

therefore excludes "the employer-employee relationship." Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40

Cal. 3d 72, 83 (1985); see also Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2001)

(challenge to contract termination "stemmed from . . . employment relationships" and thus failed to state a

claim under the Act); Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859, 873-74 (9th Cir.

1996) (doctor cannot bring discrimination claim under Act against medical group because "her relationship

to the [m]edical [g]roup is more like that of an employee than that of a 'client, patron or customer'").

Rohm claims that, in 1994, the Legislature amended the Act to create liability "for sexual

harassment . . . when there is a business, service, or professional relationship between the plaintiff and

defendant." Cal. Civ. Code § 51.9(a)(1). The amendment provides several examples of the relationships

to which it applies, including the relationship between a plaintiff and a "physician, psychotherapist, or dentist

. . . attorney, holder of a master's degree in social work, real estate agent, real estate appraiser, accountant,

banker . . . landlord or property manager . . . [and] teacher." Rohm claims that the Legislature stated when

amending the Act that "[i]t is unlawful to harass an employee . . . because of, among other things, sex." 

Opp. Mot. J. Plead. at 5:20-21 (quoting Legis. Council's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 612 (1994 Reg. Sess.)

(emphasis added)). 

Rohm is mistaken. In its entirety, the Legislative material from which Rohm quotes states:

Existing law makes it unlawful to harass an employee or employment applicant

because of, among other things, sex. These provisions are enforced by the

Department of Fair Employment and Housing. General provisions of existing law

specify that all persons have the right to be free from violence or intimidation by threat

of violence, against their persons or property, because of certain bases of

discrimination. [¶] This bill would provide a cause of action for sexual harassment that

occurs as part of a professional relationship, as specified.

Legis. Council's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 612 (1994 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to Rohm's

claim, the Legislature amended the Act to supplement statutes that forbid workplace harassment with a

provision applicable to "professional relationship[s]." The Legislature did not intend to extend the Act into

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Although it may be unlikely, it is theoretically possible that Rohm could allege new facts that bring her within

the ambit of the Act. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

DOH 11

the employer-employee context. See Brown v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 4th 767, 787-88 (1997) (amendment

was intended only "to plug [a] hole in the civil rights law"). 

Alternatively, Rohm claims that the Act applies to Esparza because "a service/professional

relationship existed such that [Rohm] was an employee of Local 270 and Esparza was a member of the

Executive Board of the union." Opp. Mot. J. Plead. at 5:15-16. However, nothing in the complaint

suggests that Rohm and Esparza had a "business, service, or professional relationship." Cal. Civ. Code §

51.9. Rohm merely alleges that she "was employed" by Local 270. Compl. ¶ 9. She does not claim that

she was a member of the union or a client of Esparza. Her sixth cause of action is thus dismissed without

prejudice.10 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants and denies defendants' motion for judgment on the

pleadings as follows:

1. Defendants' motion on Rohm's first and third causes of action is denied except for Rohm's ADA

and FEHA disability discrimination claims against Homer and Esparza as individuals, which are dismissed

with prejudice.

2. Defendants' motion on Rohm's second and fourth causes of action is denied except for Rohm's

Title VII and FEHA racial discrimination claims against Homer and Esparza as individuals, which are

dismissed with prejudice 

3. Rohm's sixth cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is dismissed without

prejudice. Rohm is given twenty days leave to amend.

DATED: 4/22/05 /s/ Ronald M. Whyte

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONFORJUDGMENTON THEPLEADINGS—

C-03-05807- RMW

DOH 12

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Leslie Holmes lholmes@hoganlaw.com 

Stephen J. Usoz susoz@hoganlaw.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Sandra Rae Benson courtnotices@vanbourg.com 

Alan G. Crowley courtnotices@unioncounsel.net 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered for

e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 5/3/05 /s/ DOH

 Chambers of Judge Whyte

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