Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01901/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01901-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ruben Garza, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-01901-PHX-SRB

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Respondents’ Motion to Strike Juror Declarations (Doc. 59). 

Petitioner Ruben Garza filed a response in opposition, and Respondents filed a reply. 

(Docs. 62, 63.) 

 The juror declarations are among the exhibits attached to Garza’s motion for 

evidentiary development. (Doc. 54-2, Ex’s 17, 18.) Exhibit 17 is a declaration dated July 

17, 2015, from Geno Chisolm, who was seated on the jury for Garza’s 2004 capital 

murder trial. Exhibit 18 is a declaration dated October 22, 2015, from Dena Fisher, an 

alternate juror. Respondents ask the Court to strike the exhibits, along with portions of 

the evidentiary development motion that “rely on the inadmissible portions of the 

declarations.” (Doc. 59 at 1.) 

DISCUSSION 

 In his declaration, Chisolm states that in 1990 he was prosecuted by the same 

prosecutor who tried Garza, a fact that neither Chisolm nor the prosecutor disclosed. 

(Doc. 54-2, Ex. 17, ¶¶ 5–13.) Respondents do not contest that these statements are 

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admissible. (Doc. 59 at 7.) They contend, however, that the other statements in the 

declarations are inadmissible and should be disregarded. The Court agrees. 

 For example, Chisolm states that he was not comfortable with his “votes to convict 

Garza,” that Garza was not “deserving of a death sentence,” and that he had questions 

about the involvement of Larry Franco, the husband of one of the victims, and why he 

wasn’t charged. (Id., ¶ 21.) Chisolm also has questions about Garza’s “mental makeup,” 

stating that if Garza suffered from autism or Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, the jury should 

have been told. (Id., ¶¶ 22–23.) Chisholm also states that he did not understand the jury 

instructions, did not realize that the jury was not required to deliberate until it reached a 

unanimous verdict, and felt pressure from other jurors. (Id., ¶¶ 15–19.) 

 Alternate juror Fisher states that after she was released from the jury she “did 

some research on the case and grew very uncomfortable.” (Doc. 54-2, Ex. 18, ¶ 2.) She 

goes on to state that she believed that pretrial determinations by the court were 

“extremely relevant” to the case; there were important facts about the case that the jury 

was never told; she found it peculiar that Franco was never called as a witness; she 

thought Franco should have been on trial with Garza; there were “spirited” conversations 

about the evidence; she thought the lead detective was hotheaded; she thought Garza was 

immature; and she did not “buy the prosecution’s theory” that Garza hugged his mother 

and sisters on the night of the murders because he might not get another chance. (Doc. 

54-2, Ex. 18, ¶¶ 3–18.) 

 Juror testimony cannot be used to impeach a verdict unless “extrinsic influence or 

relationships have tainted the deliberations.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 

(1987). Rule 606(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits juror testimony “about 

any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of 

anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes 

concerning the verdict or indictment.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). The Rule states that “[t]he 

court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these 

matters.” Id. The only exceptions to the Rule concern questions of whether “extraneous 

prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention,” “outside 

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influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror,” or “a mistake was made in 

entering the verdict onto the verdict form.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(2). 

 In addition, contrary to Garza’s argument, courts have rejected the proposition that 

juror affidavits may be considered under Rule 606(b) in support of ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims. See Brown v. United States, 720 F.3d 1316, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(juror’s affidavit, swearing that additional mitigation evidence gathered during the 

postconviction process might have had an impact on the jury’s penalty phase 

deliberations, was not competent evidence); Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 F.3d 487, 501 (6th 

Cir. 2010) (juror’s affidavit stating that the defendant’s lack of emotion was a factor in 

voting to recommend the death penalty was properly excluded from consideration); 

Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 636 (5th Cir. 1994) (district court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding testimony from jurors as to whether their deliberations would 

have been different if they had been presented with additional mitigating evidence); 

Coleman v. Sisto, No. 2:09-CV-0020-DAD, 2012 WL 6020095, at *23 n.13 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 3, 2012) (“Under [Rule 606(b)], these post-verdict juror affidavits cannot be 

considered as evidence in support of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim.”). 

 The Court will apply these principles to the information contained in the juror 

declarations. To the extent the statements concern the jurors’ deliberative process, the 

Court will disregard them when considering Garza’s motion for evidentiary development. 

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). However, at this point it is not necessary to strike the exhibits, so 

Respondents’ motion will be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED denying Respondent’s Motion to Strike Juror Declarations 

(Doc. 59) as set forth above. 

 Dated this 2nd day of September, 2016. 

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