Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00542/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00542-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Francisco Javier Romero, 

 Romero, 

vs. 

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 CV 08-0542-PHX-ROS (JR) 

 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 Pending before the Court is Francisco Javier Romero’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 63) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance 

with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge 

for report and recommendation. Romero commenced this action by filing his 

original petition on March 19, 2008 (Doc. 1). The matter was stayed from May 4, 

2009, through May 12, 2014, to allow Romero to return to State court to exhaust one 

of his claims. (Docs. 26, 62). On May 12, 2014, Romero filed the pending Amended 

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Petition, raising three grounds for relief (Doc. 63). Respondents filed a response 

(Doc. 66), to which Romero replied (Doc. 72). As explained below, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of the record, 

dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 A. Trial 

 On February 6, 2002, the State charged Romero with four counts of seconddegree murder, class 1 dangerous felonies, and three counts of aggravated assault, 

class 3 dangerous felonies. Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(“Answer”), Ex. C, Att. 1, p. 4.1

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Romero’s 

convictions and sentences, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual 

background as follows:2

[Romero] was driving his black Sports Utility Vehicle 

(“SUV”) south on Pima Road in Scottsdale. The posted 

speed limit was 55 miles per hour. [Romero] was driving 

between 66 to 70 miles per hour faster than the posted 

speed limit. [FN1: The police estimated that [Romero’s] 

pre-collision speed was between 121 and 125 miles per 

hour.] Many other drivers were forced to maneuver their 

vehicles to avoid [Romero’s] erratic driving. 

 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to 

Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 66). 

2

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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 As [Romero’s] vehicle passed through the 

intersection of Pima Road and Happy Valley Road, it 

became airborne and hit an oncoming vehicle. After the 

vehicle landed, [Romero] was unable to gain control and 

the vehicle collided with two additional vehicles. In the 

ensuing collisions, four people, including a family of 

three and one of [Romero’s] passengers, were killed. 

Three others were severely injured, including another of 

[Romero’s] passengers. 

 A nurse and a police officer testified that they had 

smelled alcohol on [Romero’s] person. [Romero’s] 

blood, drawn at the hospital where he received treatment 

for his severe injuries, showed a blood alcohol content 

(“BAC”) of .113. Criminalist John Tew estimated that 

[Romero’s] BAC at the time to the accident had been 

.139. 

 [Romero] testified on his own behalf. He claimed 

that he had not been intoxicated on the day of the 

collision and that his maximum speed had been 70 miles 

per hour. [Romero] also claimed that a dip in the road, 

not his unlawful and excessive driving, had caused his 

vehicle to go airborne and hit the other drivers. However, 

numerous witnesses contested [Romero’s] account of the 

events and his testimony regarding his driving. 

Ex. C, Att. 1, pp. 2-3. 

 The jury found Romero guilty of four counts of manslaughter, class 2 felonies 

and dangerous offenses, and three counts of aggravated assault, class 3 felonies and 

dangerous offenses. Ex. Z. On February 14, 2003, the trial court sentenced Romero 

to concurrent terms of twenty-one years of imprisonment on the four counts of 

manslaughter and to concurrent terms of ten years of imprisonment on the three 

counts of aggravated assault, with the sentences for the manslaughter convictions and 

aggravated assault convictions to run consecutively. Ex. C, p. 3. 

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B. Direct Appeal 

 Romero then appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Answer, Ex. B (Appellant’s Opening Brief). Romero argued that the trial court erred 

in denying his request for a jury instruction on superseding cause. Id., pp. 6-14. 

Romero claimed that a dip in the road caused his vehicle to become airborne and was 

the superseding cause of the accident. Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals determined 

that the trial court had properly declined to give Romero’s requested instruction, and 

affirmed Romero’s convictions and sentences on March 23, 2004. Ex. C, Att. 1. The 

Arizona Supreme Court denied review on August 19, 2004. Ex. D. 

C. First PCR Petition 

 On October 5, 2004, Romero filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“First 

PCR”). Ex. E. In the subsequently filed petition, Romero, relying on Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), argued that the trial court violated his right to trial 

by jury by sentencing him to an aggravated sentence, and that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to inform Romero of the rights described in Blakely. Ex. F. 

On July 22, 2005, the trial court denied Romero’s First PCR. Ex. H. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals denied review of Romero’s First PCR on September 28, 2005. Ex. 

J. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on February 8, 2007. Ex. L. 

D. Second PCR Petition 

 On October 26, 2006, while his First PCR remained pending, Romero filed 

another PCR petition (“Second PCR”). Ex. M. In the Second PCR, Romero argued 

that the Maricopa County jury selection procedures, identified as the “Proximity 

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Weighted Jury Selection System” (variously referred to as the “PWS,” “PWSS” or 

the “PWJS”),3

 violated the United States and Arizona Constitutions. Id., p. 7. The 

trial court accepted Romero’s untimely Second PCR, finding that Romero 

“sufficiently raised a claim of newly discovered material facts.” Ex. N, p. 1. In a 

Minute Entry dated February 28, 2007, the trial court stated that “the method of 

selecting the voir dire panel in [Romero’s] case was not in accordance with the 

statutory scheme and therefore not in conformity with the requirements to the 

Arizona State Constitution,” and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on whether 

Romero had received a trial before a fair and impartial jury. Ex. W. 

 Subsequently, however, by Minute Entry dated March 7, 2007, the trial court 

vacated its previous findings and ordered that Romero’s Second PCR be transferred 

and consolidated with other cases raising similar claims regarding the PWS. Ex. O. 

In April 2007, Judge O’Neil indicated that Romero’s case was subject to the court’s 

“expansive ruling on August 9, 2006, regarding the jury selection process in 

Maricopa County,” and ordered that Romero be provided a copy. Ex. P. Neither 

party has provided a copy of the August 9, 2006 order, however, on October 25, 

2007, Judge O’Neil issued a ruling on the consolidated matter finding that Maricopa 

County’s PWS was random and conformed to the Arizona statutes. Motion for Stay 

of Proceedings (Doc. 19), Ex. J. Judge O’Neil’s decision was appealed, but in a 

decision issued on March 26, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that it was 

 

3

 Unless directly quoting another source, the Court employs the designation “PWS” 

in this Report and Recommendation. 

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without jurisdiction to decide the case because Judge O’Neil’s decision was not 

incorporated into the individual cases and there was no final judgment with regard to 

any completed matter. In re Jury Selection Process in Maricopa Cnty, 220 Ariz. 526, 

528-29 (App. 2009). 

E. Third PCR Petition 

 Subsequently, May 4, 2009, Romero filed a motion to sever his case from the 

consolidated matter, alleging that Romero’s case was given short-shrift by counsel in 

the consolidated cases, explaining that the underlying litigation had concluded, and 

asking that Romero’s case be returned to the trial court. Ex. R. After two years had 

passed without a trial court ruling on the motion to sever, Romero filed a renewed 

motion to sever on May 20, 2011. Ex. S. The trial court granted the motion in June 

2011, and after granting several extensions, Romero filed a third PCR petition on 

March 8, 2012, arguing that: (1) the trial court’s rescinded February 28, 2007 Minute 

Entry (Ex. W) finding that “the method of selecting the voir dire panel in [Romero’s] 

case was not in accordance with the statutory scheme and therefore not in conformity 

with the requirements to the Arizona State Constitution,” entitled him to an 

evidentiary hearing; (2) the trial court did not have the authority to consolidate the 

jury selection claims and refer them to Pinal County Judge O’Neil; (3) Pinal County 

could not properly exercise jurisdiction over the matter; and (4) Judge O’Neil’s 

ruling was incorrect. Ex. T. By order dated July 30, 2012, the trial court denied each 

of the claims, finding that relief was not available under the rescinded February 28, 

2007 Minute Entry, that the presiding Maricopa County judge had the authority to 

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consolidate and transfer the PWS cases to Judge O’Neil, that Pinal County properly 

exercised jurisdiction over the consolidated claims, and that Judge O’Neil’s decision 

could not be revisited as it constituted the “law of the case.” Ex. S, pp. 3-5. 

 Romero sought review of the trial court’s decision, arguing that (1) Judge 

O’Neil exceeded his judicial powers by ruling on issues outside the scope of the 

referral order; (2) that the trial court improperly relied on law of the case doctrine in 

refusing to review the merits of Judge O’Neil’s order; (3) that the PWS violated 

Romero’s right to a fair trial; and (4) that Judge O’Neil’s order was based on suspect 

evidence. Ex. U. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted review by denied relief, 

finding that, because Romero could have, but did not properly challenge, Judge 

O’Neil’s ruling as an individual, and because he did not argue that his claims were 

exempt from preclusion and did not establish the claims were based on newlydiscovered evidence, they were precluded from review. Arizona v. Romero, 2014 

WL 311360 (Ariz. App. Jan. 28, 2014). 

F. Habeas Petition 

 In his original petition filed on March 19, 2008, Romero alleged two grounds 

for relief. In Ground One, he argued that the trial court’s failure to give a jury 

instruction on superseding cause violated his due process rights. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8). 

In Ground Two, he argued that the trial court’s sentencing procedures and 

aggravating factors considered in imposing his sentence violated his Sixth 

Amendment rights to a trial by jury as articulated in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 

296 (2004). (Id., pp. 8-10). In his Amended Petition, Romero repeats his original 

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claims and adds as Ground Three the claim that the State court’s analysis of whether 

the PWS excluded any identifiable group, or whether Romero was prejudiced, 

violated his rights as described in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and 

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 

II. TIMELINESS 

 Respondents’ first contention is that Romero’s Ground Three claim, asserting 

that his rights were violated by the PWS system used by Maricopa County, is timebarred. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of- 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 In Romero’s direct appeal proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

review on August 19, 2004. Ex. C. Romero then had 90 days to petition the U.S. 

Supreme Court for review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999) (if 

a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, 

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the 90-day filing 

period provided by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires). Romero did not seek United 

States Supreme Court review. However, Respondents fail to recognize that the 

limitations period was statutorily tolled when Romero filed his First PCR notice on 

October 5, 2004. Ex. E; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). 

Romero’s properly filed First PCR petition remained pending until February 8, 2007, 

when the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief. See Lawrence v. Florida ̧ 549 U.S. 

327, 332 (2007). 

 Additionally, while his first PCR remained pending, Romero filed a Second 

PCR petition on October 26, 2006. Ex. M. It was in that petition that he argued his 

PWS claim. Id. The trial court accepted the filing, finding that he had “sufficiently 

raised a claim of newly discovered material facts.” Ex. N, p. 1. The PWS issue 

raised in the Second PCR was transferred to Judge O’Neil, who issued his order 

denying the consolidated claims. Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 19), Ex. J. Then 

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things, at least insofar as the calculation of the AEDPA statute of limitations is 

involved, took a very confusing turn. Instead of seeking to have Judge O’Neil’s 

decision incorporated into each of the consolidated cases, Judge O’Neil’s decision in 

the consolidated case was appealed. However, the Arizona Court of Appeals, on 

March 26, 2009, found that it was without jurisdiction to review the consolidated 

cases as a group, but stated the decision was “without prejudice to any party seeking 

relief from Judge O’Neil’s ruling in the individual matter in which the ruling was 

relied upon.” In re Jury Selection Process in Maricopa Cnty, 220 Ariz. at 531. 

 Presumably based on the Court of Appeals’ prompt, on May 4, 2009, Romero 

filed a motion to sever his case from the consolidated matter. Ex. R. After two years 

of inaction on the motion, on May 20, 2011, Romero renewed the motion. Ex. S. 

The trial court granted the motion to sever and allowed Romero to file a Third PCR 

petition. Exs. S, T. On July 30, 2012, the trial court addressed the merits of 

Romero’s claims, finding that “Judge O’Neil’s ruling that the PWSS comports with 

Arizona law disposes of all the issues raised by the defendant, and denied the Third 

PCR petition. Ex. S, p. 5. 

 Romero then sought review of the trial court’s decision and raised his PWS 

claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ex. U. Given that the appeals court had 

previously suggested that the parties seeking relief from Judge O’Neil’s order pursue 

it in their individual matters, it must have come as quite a surprise when the Arizona 

Court of Appeals ruled that Romero could have, but did not properly challenge, 

Judge O’Neil’s ruling as an individual, and because he did not argue that his claims 

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were exempt from preclusion and did not establish the claims were based on newlydiscovered evidence, they were precluded from review. Arizona v. Romero, 2014 

WL 311360 (Ariz. App. Jan. 28, 2014). In support of its decision, the Court of 

Appeals was critical of Romero for failing “to seek review of Judge O’Neil’s ruling 

as an individual . . . .” Id. at *3. The court stated, “[s]pecifically, Romero did not 

seek, as an individual, appellate or special action relief directly from Judge O’Neil’s 

2007 ruling.” Id. This Court guesses he did not individually seek relief directly from 

the ruling because the Arizona Court of Appeals previously told the petitioners in the 

consolidated matter to “seek[] relief from Judge O’Neil’s ruling in the individual 

matter in which the ruling was relied upon.” In re Jury Selection Process in 

Maricopa Cnty, 220 Ariz. at 531. As well as this Court can understand what 

happened, Romero did what the Court of Appeals had instructed him to do and was 

then told by the same court that he had proceeded improperly. 

 With all this said, this Court recommends that the District Court find that 

Romero had a properly filed application for State post-conviction review pending 

from October 4, 2004, the filing date of his First PCR, until January 28, 2014, when 

the Court of Appeals denied relief on his Third PCR. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Romero then had one year pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) to file his federal 

habeas corpus petition. By that measure, Count Three, which first appeared in the 

Amended Petition filed on May 12, 2014, was timely filed. 

 Alternatively, this Court recommends that the AEDPA limitations period be 

equitably tolled. The Supreme Court has concluded that equitable tolling is available 

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to toll the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas 

corpus cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 644 (2010). A litigant seeking 

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing: “(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way,” 

preventing him from timely filing his petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

418 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” As the Ninth Circuit has 

explained: 

To apply the doctrine in “extraordinary circumstances” necessarily 

suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary 

circumstances “stood in his way” suggests that an external force must 

cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely “oversight, 

miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part, all of which 

would preclude the application of equitable tolling. 

Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation 

omitted); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(petitioner must show that the external force caused the untimeliness). 

 In Romero’s case, it was not oversight, miscalculation or negligence that 

delayed the filing of Count Three. Rather, it was the external force exerted by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. Reasonably construed, Romero followed the suggestion 

in the Court of Appeals order denying the direct appeal of Judge O’Neil’s order. Had 

the court been explicit about what it expected from litigants in the consolidated cases, 

surely Romero would have individually appealed Judge O’Neil’s order in the context 

of the consolidated cases and not, as he did, after seeking severance from the 

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consolidated case and proceeding in his own separate case. As the foregoing 

discussion establishes, not being a reader of tea leaves, it was essentially impossible 

for Romero or his counsel to satisfy the Court of Appeals demands and timely file his 

petition. See Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066, (9th Cir. 2005). The Court finds 

that he has carried his burden to establish that he was pursuing his rights diligently 

and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented him from 

timely filing his petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Thus, equitable tolling should be 

granted and Count Three be considered timely filed. 

III. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 

 A state prisoner must exhaust the available state remedies before a federal 

court may consider the merits of his habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] petitioner 

fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, (2) through 

the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations 

omitted). 

 Exhaustion requires that a habeas petitioner present the substance of his 

claims to the state courts in order to give them a “fair opportunity to act” upon these 

claims. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). “To exhaust one’s 

state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first raise the claim in a direct 

appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for post-conviction relief 

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pursuant to Rule 32,” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994), and then 

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Additionally, a state prisoner must not only present the claims to the proper 

court, but must also present them fairly. A claim has been “fairly presented” if the 

petitioner has described the operative facts and federal legal theories on which the 

claim is based. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 

F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly 

presented’ (and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically 

indicated to that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 

904 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must alert the state court to the specific federal 

constitutional guaranty upon which his claims are based, Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 

F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001), however, general appeals in state court to broad 

constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair 

trial, are insufficient to establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. 

Lyons, 232 F.3d at 669. 

 Claims may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review 

in a variety of circumstances. If a state court expressly applied an adequate and 

independent state procedural bar when the petitioner attempted to raise the claim in 

state court review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is barred. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). Arizona courts have been consistent 

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in the application of the state’s procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 

856, 860 (2002) (holding that Ariz.R.Cirm.P. 32.2(a) is an adequate and independent 

procedural bar). In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts on 

either direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review 

because any attempt to return to state court to present them would be futile unless the 

claims fit into a narrow range of exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) 

(precluding claims not raised on direct appeal or in prior post-conviction relief 

petitions), 32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty 

days of trial court’s decision). Because these rules have been found to be 

consistently and regularly followed, and because they are independent of federal law, 

either their specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or their operation to 

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent 

review of the merits of such a claim by a federal habeas court. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. at 860; Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 32, 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. is strictly followed); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-336 (1996) 

(waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in postconviction proceedings). 

A. Ground One 

 It is undisputed that Romero did not federalize his claim that the trial court 

erred by refusing to give a jury instruction on superseding cause. It is quite clear 

from his opening brief on appeal that the claim before the Arizona Court of Appeals 

was based exclusively on Arizona law. Ex. A (Appellant’s Opening Brief on appeal). 

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Because he failed to fairly present this claim to the appellate court, it is not 

exhausted. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. 

 Any attempt by Razo to return to state court to present his Ground One claim 

would be futile because it would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. 1, and 32.2(a) and (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 

(9th Cir. 2002) (a state post-conviction action is futile when it is time-barred); State v. 

Mata, 185 Ariz. at 332-337; Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief is precluded for claims 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.4(a) (notice of post-conviction review “must be filed within ninety days after the 

entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order 

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later”); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9 

(petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). 

Because no state remedies are currently available, Romero’s jury instruction claim is 

technically exhausted and procedurally barred. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 732, 735 n. 1 (1991). 

 A federal court may not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim 

unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for his noncompliance and actual 

prejudice, or establish that a miscarriage of justice would result from the lack of 

review. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). To establish cause, a 

petitioner must point to some objective factor external to the defense impeded his 

efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (2004). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as government interference 

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or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 

F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Ignorance of the state’s 

procedural rules or lack of legal training do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” 

for a petitioner’s failure to fairly present a claim. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of 

Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908-10 (9th Cir. 1986); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 

1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the 

constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 

1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 In his Reply, Romero contends that cause exists because his “previous 

appellate counsel failed to anticipate that Petitioner would feel compelled to seek 

habeas review, as evidenced by the dearth of constitutional claims in the underlying 

direct appeal.” Reply to Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 72), p. 10. However, ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims must be separately exhausted in state court before they 

can be offered as “cause” for the procedural default of another claim. Cockett v. Ray, 

333 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). Romero does not contend that he exhausted such a 

claim. As such, he has not presented the sort of external impediment sufficient to 

support a finding of cause for his failure to timely raise this claims in State court. See 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (requiring “some objective factor 

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external to the defense” to support a finding of cause). Therefore, the Court finds 

that this claim is not subject to review.4

B. Ground Three

 In Ground Three, Romero claims that the use of the PWS violated his right to 

a trial before a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community. The Arizona 

Court of Appeals dismissed the claim after finding it precluded under Rule 32.1, 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. The court determined the claim was not exempt from preclusion 

under Rule 32.2(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P., because “Romero could have but did not 

challenge on an individual basis Judge O’Neil’s ruling by filing a direct appeal or a 

special action petition.” Typically, such a procedural misstep would not support a 

finding of “cause” for the default of a claim. Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1152-

53 (failure to comply with state’s procedural requirements bars habeas relief under 

the adequate and independent state ground doctrine). However, as discussed above 

in relation to the timeliness of this claim, the unique circumstances faced by Romero 

 

4

 The Court also notes that “the fact that [an] instruction was allegedly incorrect 

under state law is not a basis for habeas relief.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71–72 (citing 

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 6 (1983)). Claims of error in state jury 

instructions are generally a matter of state law that do not raise a constitutional 

question. Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1993). Romero fails to establish 

a due process violation here because he may not transform his claim of instructional 

error into a federal claim by simply asserting a violation of his constitutional rights. 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (a petitioner cannot transform a 

state-law issue into a federal one by simply asserting a due process violation); see 

also Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir.1988) (an instructional error 

“does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding”) 

(citation omitted). 

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after he raised this claim in the State courts compel a finding that an external 

impediment was created by the Arizona Court of Appeals when it seemingly 

instructed him to proceed as he subsequently did, only to be told later that he had 

proceeded incorrectly. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citations omitted). In this Court’s opinion, Romero’s counsel reasonably interpreted 

the Court of Appeals’ advice to appeal the PWS issue individually as directing him to 

proceed under Romero’s separate case rather than individually in the context of the 

consolidated case. Romero’s reliance on the Court of Appeals’ statement in the 

consolidated case, In re Jury Selection Process in Maricopa Cnty, 220 Ariz. at 531, 

was reasonable and constituted an external factor that impeded his efforts to comply 

with the State’s procedural rules. Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 975 (9th Cir. 2002). 

As such, the Court finds that Romero has established the requisite cause for the 

default of this claim. 

 However, to have his default excused, Romero must also show that “actual 

prejudice” resulted from the trial court’s use of the PWS system. Magby v. 

Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish a prima facie case that the PWS violated the Sixth 

Amendment’s “fair cross-section” requirement, Romero must show: (1) that the 

group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) was not 

fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) that the underrepresentation 

was due to “systematic exclusion” of the group in the jury-selection process. 

Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 130 S.Ct. 1382, 1392 (2010) (citing Duren v. 

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Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). Romero has failed satisfy even these basic 

requirements. 

 In the Amended Petition, Romero explains that the PWS was a computer 

program that selected jurors using “an algorithm that increased the selection of 

potential jurors who were closest to the area of the respective court facility.” 

Amended Petition (Doc. 63), ¶ 63. Romero then details how the system worked, id., 

¶¶ 64-67, and argues that Judge O’Neil’s analysis of Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 

522 (1975) and Duren, 439 U.S. 357, constituted “a decision that was contrary to or 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law . . . ,” 

Amended Petition, ¶ 68. Then, in relation to prejudice, Romero states that “Judge 

O’Neil never made any specific legal findings relative to prejudice suffered by 

Romero and that remains an open question.” Id., ¶ 69. Thus, in the Amended 

Petition, Romero has not identified the allegedly distinctive group, how they were 

systematically underrepresented, or what prejudice he suffered as a result. 

 He offers little more in his Reply. In Romero’s argument addressing the 

Respondents’ contention that this claim is procedurally defaulted, he explains that the 

forced consolidation of his case with the others challenging the PWS system and the 

delay encountered in seeking severance meant that “[t]he time for Petitioner to resort 

to state remedies ha[d] lapsed and, as a result, his challenge to the PWJS procedure in 

Maricopa County would be lost indefinitely if this court were to find his claims 

procedurally defaulted.” Reply (Doc. 72), pp. 10-11. To the extent that any potential 

prejudice can be discerned in Romero’s argument, it relates to his inability to raise 

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the claim in this habeas proceeding. As noted above, however, he must show that he 

was prejudiced as a result of the alleged constitutional violation. Without that 

showing of prejudice, Romero cannot overcome the procedural default of this claim. 

It is therefore not subject to habeas review. 

IV. MERITS 

 Under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect 

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless 

the state decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 120 

S.Ct. 1495 (2000). A state court’s decision can be “contrary to” federal law either (1) 

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or (2) if it applies the controlling 

authority to a case involving facts “materially indistinguishable” from those in a 

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 

F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a state court decision is 

contrary to federal law, the court must examine the last reasoned decision of a state 

court and the basis of the state court's judgment. Packer v. Hill, 277 F.3d 1092, 1101 

(9th Cir. 2002). A state court's decision can be an unreasonable application of federal 

law either (1) if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but applies it to a 

new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) if it extends or fails 

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to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is 

objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Ground Two

 In Ground Two, Romero alleges that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in 

State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578 (2005), was “an unreasonable application of federal 

constitutional law and the application of Martinez to this case deprived Romero of 

his Sixth Amendment rights to a sentencing jury on all facts used to aggravate his 

sentence. Amended Petition (Doc. 63), ¶ 61. In Martinez, the Arizona Supreme 

Court, applying the United States Supreme Court decisions in Blakely and Apprendi, 

held that “once a jury finds or a defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the 

Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider additional 

factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that 

statute.” Martinez, 210 Ariz. at 585. Romero’s argument that the Arizona court’s 

holding in Martinez was unreasonable under federal law has been uniformly rejected. 

See, e.g., Cruz v. Bartous, 2010 WL 1752506 at *6 (D.Ariz. March 26, 2010); 

Gibson v. Blair, 2008 WL 5329935 at *1 (D.Ariz. December 19, 2008). Thus, to the 

extent Romero argues Martinez was wrongly decided, his claim is without merit. 

 In an alternative argument, Romero contends that his sentence was imposed in 

violation of Blakely because none of the aggravating factors cited by the trial court 

was admitted by Romero or determined by the jury to be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Amended Petition (Doc. 63), ¶ 62. The trial court rejected this claim by 

simply citing to the then recent decision in State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578. Ex. H. 

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The Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court then denied review without 

comment. Exs. J, L. 

 In cases such as this, where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s 

highest court, the federal court “looks through” to the underlying court decision. Ylst 

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). Where the underlying state court 

decision is on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a 

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas 

corpus relief is available under the standards of § 2254(d). Stanley v. Cullen, 633 

F.3d 852, 859-60 (9th Cir. 2011); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 

2003). In such instances, the burden remains with the petitioner to establish there 

was “no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

 The Sixth Amendment proscribes the imposition of a sentence above the 

statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, that is not found by 

a jury or admitted by the defendant. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 

301. In Blakely, the Supreme Court clarified that the “‘statutory maximum’ for 

Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis 

of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant . . . . In other 

words, the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may 

impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 

additional findings.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303–04. Thus, before a trial court can 

impose an aggravated sentence above the statutory maximum, a jury must find 

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beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant must admit, all facts “legally essential” 

to establish the aggravating factors. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313. 

 In Arizona, “the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a defendant 

to an aggravated sentence.” State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 585 (2005) (citing 

A.R.S. § 13–702). “Therefore, once a jury finds or a defendant admits a single 

aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and 

consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the 

maximum prescribed in that statute.” Id. Arizona’s procedure of allowing the 

sentencing judge to consider additional aggravating factors and impose an aggravated 

sentence if the jury finds, or the defendant admits, at least one statutory aggravator, is 

permitted under Apprendi and Blakely because the Supreme Court has stated that trial 

courts may consider any relevant evidence in determining what sentence is 

appropriate within the authorized range. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481. 

 Here, it appears that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing 

aggravated sentences for both the manslaughter and aggravated assault charges based 

on aggravating factors that were neither admitted by Romero nor found beyond a 

reasonable doubt by a jury. Under the Arizona sentencing statutes in effect on 

February 14, 2003, the date of Romero’s sentencing, the presumptive sentence for 

manslaughter with a finding of dangerousness, a class 2 felony, was 10.5 years. See 

A.R.S. § 13-604(I) (2003). The presumptive sentence for aggravated assault with a 

finding of dangerousness, a class 3 felony, was 7.5 years. Id. The presumptive 

sentences could be aggravated for a number of reasons listed in A.R.S. § 13-702(C) 

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(2003). Id. The aggravated maximum sentence for manslaughter was 21 years and 

for aggravated assault it was 15 years. A.R.S. § 13-604(I) (2003). 

 Relying on these sentencing statutes, the trial court sentenced Romero to 

aggravated terms of 21 years on each of the four manslaughter counts, and to 

aggravated terms of 10 years on each of the three aggravated assault counts. Ex. Z. 

However, each of the terms for manslaughter were to run concurrently, and each of 

the terms for aggravated assault were to run concurrently, but the terms for 

manslaughter and aggravated assault were to run consecutively, resulting in a 

sentence totaling 31 years. Ex. Z.5

 

 Before imposing the sentences, the trial court stated that: 

 I do find that the aggravating factors in your case do involve the 

enormous physical, emotional and financial impact you’ve had on the 

victims, their family members, that includes the victims who survived 

this accident. The speed and alcohol are aggravating factors. The 

potential lack of remorse or responsibility that you are taking for these 

actions, the suffering of at least one victim from the testimony we 

heard prior to his death because of this accident and the number of 

deaths and the victims I think do require an aggravated sentence, not 

only as to the deaths but also as to the class three felony. 

Ex. Y, p. 89. A review of the statutory aggravating factors listed in A.R.S. § 13-

703(C) (2003), discloses that only one of the factors cited by the trial court, the 

physical, emotional and financial impact on the victims, is clearly included in the list. 

 

5

 As Respondents note, the trial court, without aggravating the sentences, could have 

sentenced Romero to consecutive presumptive terms of imprisonment for 

manslaughter (4x10.5) and aggravated assault (3x7.5) totaling 64.5 years’ 

imprisonment. 

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See A.R.S. § 13-703(C)(9) (2003).6

 However, the record discloses that this factor, or 

any of the non-statutory factors considered, was not admitted by Romero or found to 

be true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. Thus, Romero’s rights under the 

Sixth Amendment were violated when the trial court imposed aggravated sentences. 

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. 

 However, even where constitutional error is present, a habeas court must 

determine whether the error was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 623 (1993). See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2006) (holding 

that harmless error analysis applies to a claim of Sixth Amendment Blakely error 

based on the failure to submit a sentencing factor to a jury). Constitutional error in 

this context is not harmless if it had a “substantial and injurious effect” upon the 

sentence. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. Under that standard, this Court must grant relief 

if it is in “grave doubt” as to whether a jury would have found the relevant 

aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 648 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)). 

 Here, there is no “grave doubt” that a reasonable juror could have failed to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the aggravating factors that the trial 

court considered in imposing the aggravated sentence – the physical, emotional and 

 

6

 Driving under the influence at the time a violation is committed is also listed as an 

aggravating factor, but it requires an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more. A.R.S. § 

13-702(C)(16) (2003). The evidence presented in this case indicates the alcohol 

concentration in Romero’s blood at the time of the collisions was .139. Ex. C, Att. 1, 

pp. 2-3. 

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financial harm to the victims and their families. In conducting harmless error review, 

this Court is permitted to consider evidence presented at sentencing proceedings. 

Butler, 528 F.3d 624, 648 (9th Cir. 2008). A review of the transcript of the 

sentencing hearing in this case not only dispels any doubt, but in fact compels 

certainty that Romero’s actions resulted in severe physical, emotional, and financial 

impact on the victims and their families. 

 In the collision, Romero killed Teri and Efrain Hernandez and their two yearold daughter, Maya. Ex. DD, p. 23. He also killed Antonio Olivares, who was a 

passenger in his vehicle, injured Mark Resiniko, who suffered multiple strains, 

numbness, soreness and bruising, injured Susan Baregray, who suffered a severely 

broken right leg, and Louise Gregara, who suffered a severe closed head injury and 

bleeding on the brain. Id., pp. 22-23. At the sentencing hearing, the court heard from 

one victim, Suzanne Baregray. The vehicle in which Ms. Baregray and her husband, 

victim Mark Resiniko, were traveling was hit by Romero and his SUV. Ex. Y, pp. 6-

7. Ms. Baregray explained to the trial court that a day does not go by without her 

being reminded how her life and marriage have been changed as a result of the 

accident. Id., p. 7. She spent three months in bed and another three months learning 

how to walk after the accident. Id. She was left unable to perform her previous work 

and now works in a position that pays half what she previously earned. Id. The 

change has caused her family financial strife and has impacted her relationship with 

her husband. Id., p. 8. 

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 The court also heard from a number of Teri, Efrain and Maya’s friends, 

including Maya’s godmother. However, because the relevant aggravating factor 

references the victim’s family, the testimony of the five family members is briefly 

described herein. Marilyn Salomon, Teri’s mother, described the impact of the loss 

of Teri, Efrain and Maya. She explained that her parents taught her about the legacy 

created by conducting her life to set an example for her children, but that 

[n]ow, this natural order of events can never be. Our children are 

leaving their legacy to us. We buried our children. We chose their 

caskets and planned their funeral. We buried with them their dreams 

for continuing to make this world a better place, or sharing the joys of 

parenthood with Maya and with having more children. We buried their 

passion for loving and living and we in turn have buried a part of who 

we were with them for we can never be the same. 

Ex. Y, p. 46. She spoke of Teri’s passion for life and insatiable curiosity, her love for 

Efrain and Maya, her dream of becoming a doctor, and of the irrevocable pain caused 

by her loss. Id., pp. 47-48. She described Efrain’s rich legacy—his struggle and 

success in becoming a United States Citizen, meeting his goal of graduating from 

Mesa Community College, his desire to become a healer, his well-kept garden, and 

his love for Teri and Maya. Id., pp. 50-53. She expressed the delight of dancing, 

singing and eating blueberries with Maya, and witnessing her discover the world. 

Id., p. 54-55. Teri’s dad, Chuck Salomon, recalled Teri’s birth and naming her in 

honor of her two great grandmothers. Id., p. 57. He remembers taking her fishing, 

and her first day of school, and her learning to play the flute, the same instrument he 

played. Id., p. 58. He recalled Teri’s devotion to Maya and his own relationship 

with his granddaughter. Finally, he explained, “I remember all this because it is all I 

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can do. There is no future to look forward to, they are all gone and all I can do is 

remember.” Id., pp. 59-60. 

 Phyllis Koppelman, Teri’s aunt and Maya’s great aunt, described Teri’s 

childhood and caring for Maya, and asked: 

How does one measure the loss of life? By the sadness I feel that has 

no name? By how hard it is to choke back the tears when I see the 

anguish in the eyes of my sister, my brother-in-law, my niece or my 

nephew or by how bittersweet it is to watch my niece Alicia nurse her 

infant son who will never know his cousin? Or does one measure 

grief? Does one measure the loss of life by the unfathomable grief in 

the faces of our family members and friends whose lives they’ve 

touched? 

Ex. Y, pp. 37-38. Teri’s brother, Cliff Salomon, described the emptiness he felt 

without his sister, brother-in-law and niece, and explained that he bought their house 

after they were killed and sleeps in the same room where he held Maya for the first 

time. Id., pp. 40-41. Alicia Williams, Teri’s sister, described growing up with Teri 

and the inspiration she provided. She told the court that her son was named in honor 

of Teri, and that the loss of Teri and her family left “scars on our hearts that can 

never be erased.” Id., pp. 43-45. 

 In light of the testimony of Ms. Baregray and the family members of Teri, 

Efrain and Maya at sentencing, the Court is not only without “grave doubt,” but is 

without any doubt whatsoever that no reasonable juror could have failed to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims and their families suffered through 

unimaginable physical, emotional and financial harm as a result of Romero’s actions. 

As such, the trial court’s consideration of this statutory aggravating factor without 

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first submitting it to a jury was harmless. Under Arizona’s sentencing scheme, once 

one Blakely-compliant aggravating factor was found, Romero was exposed to the 

fully aggravated sentencing range and the trial court was free to consider any 

“additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum 

prescribed in that statute.” Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625; see Nino v. Flannigan, 2007 

WL 1412493, at *4 (D.Ariz. May 14, 2007) (finding that because one Blakelycompliant aggravating factor supports an aggravated sentence, the court’s 

consideration of other factors does not violate the Sixth Amendment). Accordingly, 

Romero is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on Ground Two. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Romero’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 63). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of 

a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with 

the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without 

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first obtaining leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this 

action should be designated case number: CV 08-0542-PHX-ROS. Failure to timely 

file objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be 

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 11th day of February, 2015. 

Case 2:08-cv-00542-ROS Document 73 Filed 02/11/15 Page 31 of 31