Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01411/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01411-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE ECLIPSE GROUP LLP, a California 

limited-liability partnership,

Plaintiff,

v.

TARGET CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15cv1411-JLS-BLM

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

(ECF No. 49)

Presently before the court is intervenor applicant Stephen M. Lobbin’s Ex Parte

Motion to Intervene (Interv. Mot. II) (ECF No. 49). For the reasons stated below, the Court 

GRANTS Lobbin’s Intervention Motion. 

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a fee dispute between plaintiff law firm The Eclipse Group 

LLP (Plaintiff) and Defendants who, among others, are Plaintiff’s former clients. (Compl.

¶¶ 12, 17, 21, 26, ECF No. 1.) Movant attorney Stephen Lobbin stated in his first Motion 

to Intervene, (ECF No. 38), that he worked with Plaintiff as an independent contractor, and

that he “acted as lead (and, most often, sole) counsel during the entire course of the 

representations that are the subject and focus of this action.” (Id. at 2–3 & n.2.) Based on 

his work in these representations, Lobbin states that he is entitled to a significant portion 

of the sums Plaintiff seeks in this case, but that “Plaintiff has expressly repudiated 

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[Lobbin’s] entitlement to his contractual share of the unpaid attorney fees to be recovered 

from the Defendants.” (Id. at 3.) Accordingly, Lobbin seeks to intervene in this matter to 

protect his interests.

On May 26, 2016, the Court issued an Order denying with prejudice Lobbin’s

motion to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and 

denying without prejudice Lobbin’s motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). (First Interv. Order) (ECF No. 48.) Lobbin has again moved 

for permissive intervention, addressing the concerns the Court expressed in its First 

Intervention Order. The Court now considers Lobbin’s current motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) provides the basis for permissive intervention. 

Applicants seeking intervention under Rule 24(b) must meet three criteria:

(1) the movant must show an independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) the 

motion must be timely; and (3) the movant’s claim or defense and the main 

action must have a question of law and fact in common.

Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. Venegas v. Mitchell, 

495 U.S. 82 (1990); see also Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998)

(citing Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended 

on denial of reh’g (May 30, 1996)). “Permissive intervention is committed to the broad 

discretion of the district court.” Cty. of Orange v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 

1986) (citing United States v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency, 769 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 

1985)). “In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will 

unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication or the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

24(b)(3).

ANALYSIS

The Court’s First Intervention Order explained that Lobbin’s first motion seeking 

permissive intervention satisfied criterions two and three. (First Interv. Order 28–29.) So 

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does Lobbin’s present motion. It is timely because the Court has only issued one 

substantive ruling before this Order, and, procedurally, this case is in its infancy. It is also 

clear that Lobbin has claims in common with Plaintiff—in fact, they are the same claims, 

he just purports to be entitled to a portion of the recovery. The threshold requirement that 

there be “a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or 

fact” is therefore also satisfied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).

The remaining requirement Lobbin must show in order to be entitled to permissive 

intervention is an independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction. Lobbin meets this 

requirement with his present motion. 

Federal courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction over civil actions in which 

there is complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(a)(1); Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing McNutt v. Gen. 

Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). Under the “legal certainty”

test, the amount in controversy is met when the sum the plaintiff claims “is apparently 

made in good faith.” Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1039–40 (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. 

Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938)). 

In the present motion Lobbin abandons several of his original claims, leaving only 

two: (1) breach of quasi-contract against Defendants Target and Kmart; and (2) quantum 

meruit against Defendants Target and Kmart. (Interv. Mot. II 4.) Lobbins is a resident and 

domiciliary of California; Target is incorporated in and maintains its principal place of 

business in Minnesota; and Kmart is incorporated in Michigan and maintains its principal 

place of business in Illinois. Accordingly, the complete diversity requirement is met. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (stating that a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every 

State where it is incorporated and every State where it has its principal place of business).

The amount in controversy requirement is all that remains. Lobbin claims at least

$150,000 against Target and $90,000 against Kmart. These figures derive from Lobbin’s 

“conservative estimates” of the alleged 60% fee he is owed on the sums Plaintiffs seek in 

this action. Further, the underlying past-due sums Plaintiff seeks are only slightly lower 

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than those Lobbin uses to calculate these figures. (Compare Claims of Intervenor Stephen 

M. Lobbin 8, ECF No. 49-2, with Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 7–8, ECF No. 50.) Although 

Plaintiff asserts that a compensation contract between Plaintiff and Lobbin limits to below 

60% the amount of recovery to which Lobbin is entitled—either 45% or 55% of the pastdue amounts (see Pl.’s Mot. In Opp’n 6–7, ECF No. 51)—Plaintiff has not proved to a 

legal certainty that Lobbin’s calculations should not control. Plaintiff does not specify 

whether the 45% or 55% provision in the alleged contract controls the fee arrangement in 

the underlying disputes.

1 Further, Lobbin’s proposed claims are equitable causes of action 

against Defendants to whom Lobbin alleges any purported contract between Lobbin and 

Plaintiff would be inapplicable. Accordingly, because Lobbin’s claims appear to be made 

in good faith and Plaintiff has not proven to a legal certainty that Lobbin’s calculations are 

not valid, the amount in controversy is met. Subject matter jurisdiction is therefore 

established.

Finally, there is no indication that granting Lobbin’s motion to intervene will unduly 

delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights. Although adding an 

additional litigant will necessarily add complexity to the case, Lobbin’s shared interest in 

the claims against Defendants indicates that the case should continue to adjudication in a 

timely fashion. Further, if Lobbin’s intervention is denied he likely will bring his own 

lawsuit asserting nearly identical claims against Defendants for the same work forming the 

basis of Plaintiff’s claims. Given these circumstances, any potential delay arising from 

Lobbin’s intervention is therefore not undue. See Venegas, 867 F.2d at 531 (noting that 

“judicial economy is a relevant consideration in deciding a motion for permissive 

intervention” and that in present case district court was “in the best position to decide [the 

relevant] issues” because “[n]o novel or difficult issues of state law appear[ed] to be at 

 

1 The only scenario in which the amount in controversy requirement would not be met is if Lobbin’s fees 

are calculated at 45%, which would be insufficient to support jurisdiction against Kmart. Calculating 

Lobbin’s alleged 60% fee using Plaintiff’s lower past-due estimates would still satisfy the amount in 

controversy requirement against both Target and Kmart, (see Pl.’s First Am. Compl. ¶ 38, ECF No. 50), 

as would calculating Lobbin’s fee at 55% using Plaintiff’s lower past-due estimates. 

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issue . . . , and the district court [wa]s well acquainted with the underlying litigation and 

the parties to this fee dispute”) (citing Austell v. Smith, 634 F. Supp. 326, 335 (W.D.N.C.

1986); Gordon v. Forsyth Cty. Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409 F. Supp. 708, 718–19 (M.D.N.C.

1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part 544 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.1976)).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Lobbin’s Intervention Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 15, 2016

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