Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01935/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01935-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

1

The Honorable Thomas D. Thalken, United States Magistrate Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1935

___________

David J. Westbrook, Jr., *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

City of Omaha, Alan Pepin, *

Tim Cavanaugh, James Roberts, * [UNPUBLISHED]

and Cecil Hicks, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 12, 2007

Filed: March 30, 2007

___________

Before MELLOY, SMITH, and BENTON Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

David J. Westbrook, Jr., sued the City of Omaha, Alan F. Pepin, Timothy W.

Cavanaugh, James A. Roberts, and Cecil Hicks, Jr., under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. All parties moved for

summary judgment. The district court1

 granted summary judgment to Omaha and the

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707
-2-

individual defendants. Westbrook appeals. Having jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. §

1291, this court affirms.

I.

In 2003, Westbrook, an Omaha police officer, arrested Darrel Williams. After

Williams' release from custody, he submitted a citizen's complaint, alleging that

Westbrook took $106 from him at arrest and did not return it. Internal affairs

investigated, as well as a criminal investigator. In the criminal investigation, the city

prosecutor preliminarily decided not to prosecute Westbrook and, later, reexamined

whether prosecution was warranted.

During the internal affairs investigation, witnesses agreed that Williams had

money at the time of arrest. Williams and Westbrook were interviewed. Westbrook

was asked about a casino wager of $120 he made the day after Williams' arrest.

Westbrook stated that he usually took $100 to $200 in cash to a casino, after stopping

at an ATM. Westbrook was ordered to submit his bank records for two dates, the day

of the arrest and the day of the wager. Westbrook complied, submitting a bank

statement that showed no pertinent withdrawals.

Upon completion of the internal investigation, Westbrook received a letter

stating that Williams' complaint of mishandling or theft of $106 had been investigated,

that Williams' polygraph showed truthful responses, and that his polygraph exhibited

deception about the cash. Further, the investigation found evidence that Williams'

money was mishandled and converted by Westbrook to his possession. The letter also

noted that Westbrook acknowledged the existence of the money, but was not truthful

about its whereabouts. The notice concluded that Westbrook violated enumerated

rules of conduct, operating procedures, and the collective bargaining agreement in

mishandling prisoner's property, false reporting, and theft of money. The letter

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707
-3-

recommended dismissal from employment. After receiving the letter, Westbrook was

contacted by local media seeking his comment.

At a pre-termination hearing, Westbrook was represented by counsel, and had

the opportunity to present his side of the story. After the hearing, Westbrook was

discharged. He then participated in post-termination arbitration. At arbitration,

Omaha had the burden of proof on all charges. Numerous witnesses testified. After

the post-termination hearing and review of all evidence, the arbitrator found "good

cause" to terminate Westbrook's employment. 

Westbrook now sues the City of Omaha and defendant police officials, asserting

unlawful search and seizure, and violation of due process springing from his

employment termination. After losing on summary judgment, Westbrook appeals.

II.

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the district court and viewing the record most favorably to the nonmoving

party. Herring v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000).

"Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact remains

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rifkin v. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 1280 (8th Cir. 1996); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

Westbrook first contends the department's order directing him to submit bank

records for the two days in question, without a warrant, violated his possessory and

privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment. He also asserts that the entanglement

between the department's law-enforcement function and its employer status requires

strict application of the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness. He further

claims that because the bank records were requested from him, and not the bank, they

are private records entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. At issue is the

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707
-4-

department's policy governing employees subject to an internal affairs investigation

that states: "An employee may be requested to submit to a financial disclosure

statement."

"Searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private

property of their employees . . . are subject to the restraints of the Fourth

Amendment." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); see Lesher v. Reed, 12

F.3d 148, 150-51 (8th Cir. 1994) ("A government employer's seizure of property

possessed by an employee is clearly subject to Fourth Amendment restraints").

Therefore, 

public employer intrusion on the constitutionally protected privacy

interest of government employees . . . for investigations of work-related

misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under

all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the

inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable . . . .

O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26. "The search will be permissible in its scope when 'the

measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not

excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct]'" Id. at 726 (quoting

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)) (alteration in original).

In this case, Omaha's intrusion began with a citizen complaint that Westbrook

took money and wagered at a casino the next day, considered with his assertion of

usually withdrawing money from an ATM before wagering. The scope of the

intrusion was an order for two-days' record of Westbrook's banking, to which he

complied. Under these circumstances, neither the inception nor the scope of intrusion

was unreasonable. The investigation's purpose was to determine employee, workrelated misconduct, and not criminal prosecution. See Uniformed Sanitation Men

Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968) (citing Garrity v. New

Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and stating "that testimony compelled by threat of

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707
-5-

dismissal from employment could not be used in a criminal prosecution of the

witness"). Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the

Fourth Amendment claim.

Westbrook next asserts the district court erred in granting summary judgment

on qualified immunity grounds. He bases this assertion on the ordered disclosure of

his bank records without a warrant. 

When analyzing qualified immunity, courts conduct a two-part inquiry.

The court must first consider the threshold inquiry of whether the facts

alleged, taken in a light most favorable to the party asserting injury,

show the defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right. If a

constitutional right has not been violated, it is unnecessary to inquire

further regarding qualified immunity. 

Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 798 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)) (internal citations omitted). Because a constitutional right

has not been violated, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Grant of summary judgment on this issue, therefore, was not error.

Westbrook finally claims his due process rights were violated by the pretermination and post-termination procedures. Westbrook possessed a property interest

in continued employment. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).

He asserts violation in the pre-termination hearing, citing an inadequate explanation

of evidence against him and an inability to initiate discovery before the hearing, which

(he claims) would show exculpatory evidence of other complaints of missing property

at the detention center. Westbrook also contends a question of material fact remains

whether the name-clearing, post-termination arbitration cured the asserted pretermination defects.

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707
-6-

"Due process requirements are met when a public employer provides a tenured

public employee with appropriate pre-termination and post-termination proceedings."

Smutka v. City of Hutchinson, 451 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 2006). 

To satisfy minimal due-process requirements at the pre-termination

stage, a public employer must give the public employee "oral or written

notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's

evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. To require

more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted

extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory

employee."

Id. at 526-27 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546

(1985)). When the employee is actually fired, he "has an opportunity to receive some

measure of post-termination process, usually a hearing with heightened procedural

safeguards. Loudermill instructs us that extensive post-termination proceedings may

cure inadequate pretermination proceedings." Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist.,

228 F.3d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 2000)(citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-48). 

In this case, at the pre-termination stage, Westbrook was notified of the charges

against him and given an explanation of the employer's evidence. In addition to his

interview, he was notified in writing that the citizen's complaint alleging mishandling

or theft of $106 had been investigated; the citizen's polygraph showed truthful

responses and his polygraph exhibited deception; money was mishandled and

converted by Westbrook to his possession; and he was not truthful about it. The

notice listed charges under enumerated rules of conduct, operating procedures, and the

collective bargaining agreement in mishandling prisoner's property, false reporting,

and theft of money. At the pre-termination hearing, Westbrook was represented by

counsel. His counsel objected to the notice of evidence, but Westbrook had the

opportunity to give his side of the story. See Smutka, 451 F.3d at 527 (no violation

of procedural due process rights in pre-termination consideration of non-noticed

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707
-7-

misconduct); Riggins v. Bd. of Regents, 790 F.2d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 1986) (procedural

due process satisfied although employee did not have prior notice that work history

would be considered in termination decision). Thus, the pre-termination hearing was

not constitutionally defective.

Westbrook was contacted by the media about his termination. He has not

shown that Omaha or its officials publicized his discharge. "The Due Process clause

protects against deprivations of liberty interests as well as property interests." Gibson

v. Caruthersville Sch. Dist. No. 8, 336 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2003). A name-clearing

hearing is appropriate when the government makes public the reasons for discharge

that stigmatize an employee's standing in the community. See id. at 773 (discussing

elements warranting name-clearing hearing); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.

433, 437 (1971)(stating "notice and opportunity to be heard are essential"); Putnam

v. Keller, 332 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 2003) ("An employee's liberty interests are

implicated where the employer levels accusations at the employee that are so

damaging as to make it difficult or impossible for the employee to escape the stigma

of those charges").

The post-termination hearing was conducted by an arbitrator chosen by the

parties. Westbrook was represented by counsel. Numerous witness were examined

by Westbrook and Omaha. Omaha had the burden of proof on all charges. The

hearing was extensive and gave Westbrook the opportunity to address all charges

against him, to refute just cause for termination, and to clear his name. The arbitrator

found that Omaha had just cause for dismissal. Westbrook's procedural due process

rights were not violated. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1935 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/30/2007 Entry ID: 3293707