Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00012/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00012-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL EARLE BOYER, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

ANNE FRANCES PETERS, ) 

 )

Defendant. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00012-AWI-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE:

DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT (Doc. 15)

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se with an

action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil

rights violations. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302 and

72-304. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on June 1,

2006.

I. Screening the Complaint

In cases wherein the plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court is required to screen cases and shall dismiss

the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation

of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

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or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,

whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and 

the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction

to support it, (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 

alternative or of several different types 

may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support

Plaintiff's claim. Id. Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the

allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement

to relief under some viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent.

Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. th

ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6 Cir. 1998). th

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

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(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The

test for malice is a subjective one that requires the Court to

determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good faith.

Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46 (1915); see

Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. 1986). A th

lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive suits

filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of cost-free

filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

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defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

II. The Complaint

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is a twenty-one page

document filled with indirect, vague and conclusional allegations

with eighty pages of attachments in the form of exhibits; many of

the exhibits are copies of court pleadings or documents that are

not fully described or consist of selected pages of reporter’s

transcript. Plaintiff lists as defendants the Superior Court and

clerk Johnna Nunn, the Kern County Sheriff’s Department and

Deputy Sheriff Larry Thatcher, Perry Patterson (a prosecutor),

attorneys Daniel Jon Tobias and Jamie Gelber, Anne Frances Peters

(his former domestic partner and co-owner of property), and

Claudie Duckworth. The complaint concerns the sheriff, court,

court clerk, attorneys, and parties involved in a state court

proceeding concerning an application for a restraining order

against Plaintiff by Defendant Ann Frances Peters, with whom

Plaintiff purchased property intended to be used as a joint

residence. There is also reference to a warrant, and this,

coupled with the naming of a prosecutor, suggests that some

criminal proceedings may have occurred. However, there is no

reference to a particular warrant, accusation, conviction, or

sentence. It appears from the attachments and the complaint that

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a settlement of the parties’ dispute regarding the restraining

order and the underlying real property was entered into on the

record, and then later Plaintiff disputed the enforceability of

the settlement, receiving an unfavorable judgment as well as

similarly unfavorable state appellate review. Plaintiff also sued

in state court his former counsel, Jon Tobias, for professional

negligence and fraud in entering into the settlement. Plaintiff

suffered a nonsuit in that action. Finally, copies of a

reporter’s transcript dated March 16, 2004, indicate that Peters

sought to renew the restraining order. (Cmplt. pp. 27, 31.) In

this action, Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff asserts claims concerning 1) the sheriff’s

investigation of complaints made by both Plaintiff and Defendant

Peters regarding domestic violence, and the prosecutor’s handling

of some aspect of a criminal proceeding or potential criminal

proceeding; 2) the enforceability and/or effectuation of an

allegedly fraudulent settlement agreement reached with respect to

an allegedly malicious restraining order; 3) professional

negligence by his counsel; and 4) a conspiracy among all

Defendants to obtain a false warrant or warrant without probable

cause, or a settlement of the civil dispute regarding domestic

violence and property rights whereby Plaintiff would lose his

interest in the residential property. 

III. The Court’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Suit

Plaintiff names as a defendant the “Superior Court,” which

apparently refers to the Superior Court of the County of Kern,

where the initial state-court litigation occurred; he also names

Clerk Johnna Nunn, who was the deputy court clerk who was present

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in court on February 28, 2001, the date on which the stipulated

agreement in the domestic violence case was entered into on the

record. (Complt., Ex. D.)

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages

or injunctive relief against a state, an “arm of the state,” its

instrumentalities, or its agencies. Durning v. Citibank, N.A.,

950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir.1991). A suit against a

California superior court is a suit against the state and is

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Greater Los Angeles Council on

Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9 Cir. 1987). th

Accordingly, suit against the Superior Court is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment.

Further, if Plaintiff were to amend the complaint to name

instead of the court itself specific judges who have participated

in the state court litigation, those judges would be entitled to

judicial immunity. It is established that judges and officers

whose functions bear a close association to the judicial process

are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damage actions

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for judicial acts taken within the

jurisdiction of their courts. Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156

(9 Cir. 1986). A judge loses judicial immunity for judicial th

acts only when the judge acts in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.

Shucker v.Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9 Cir. 1988). The th

factors relevant in determining whether an act is judicial

“relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a

function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations

of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his

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judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357, 362

(1978). Judicial immunity is not lost by allegations that a judge

conspired with a third party. As long as the judge’s ultimate

acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, immunity applies. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072,

1078 (9 Cir. 1986). th

The allegations of the complaint before the Court establish

that the judges whose actions are mentioned would be entitled to

absolute judicial immunity. The judges referred to in the

complaint or attachments include Judge Oglesby, who presided over

the hearing in February 28, 2001, at which the domestic violence

and property matters were settled (Ex. D.); Judge Quinlen, who

continued the matter from February 21 to February 28 (id.); and

Judge Chapin, who presided over proceedings in September 2005 in

the malpractice and fraud action at which a nonsuit was granted

with respect to Plaintiff’s malpractice and fraud claims, and

found that Plaintiff had agreed on February 28, 2001, to a

settlement of issues and the issuance of a three-year restraining

order (Ex. F, pp. 56, 68, 90, 92, 97 of Doc. 15). The actions or

rulings of which Plaintiff could complain were made by the judges

in cases pending before the court and were within their

jurisdiction and were judicial in nature. 

In the Court’s order of February 28, 2006, dismissing

Plaintiff’s original complaint with leave to amend, Plaintiff was

informed of the law concerning judicial immunity (Order at pp. 6-

7), but Plaintiff has failed to state facts that would render the

judges liable. It is clear that the Plaintiff cannot prevail on

the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

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would be futile. 

Therefore, it will be recommended that this claim against

the court be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

IV. Quasi-Judicial Immunity of the Court Clerk

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the participation of the

court clerk J. Nunn are elliptical and conclusory. Most of them

concern the minute order entry on the day of the reading of a

settlement agreement into the record in the domestic restraining

order proceedings held on February 28, 2001. 

Plaintiff states:

Minute Order of hearing, concealed from Plaintiff

by the clerk and recently discovered falsely

implies clerk corroborates waiver and acquiescence of

Plaintiff where clerk was not present as witness

to a waiver or an acquiescence.

(Complt. at 4.) Plaintiff refers to Exhibit D to the complaint

(Complt. p. 38), a copy of the minute order from February 28,

2001, which indicates that the parties stipulated that the clerk

need not take down the details of the agreement and would rely on

the court reporter’s transcript. Reference to Exhibit G to the

complaint (Complt. at 81-85), which appears to be from a

reporter’s transcript of the proceedings undertaken on that date

and time, reveals that counsel for both parties stipulated that

the clerk was relieved of her duties and that the parties were

documenting their agreement by stating it orally for the record.

It also reflects that Plaintiff agreed that he understood the

agreement recited on the record and agreed with it. In the body

of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Nunn, the clerk, arrived

after a short chambers meeting; Plaintiff claims that his

attorney could not compromise his rights and that the record was

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) provides that statements in a pleading may be 1

adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another

pleading or in any motion. It further provides that a copy of any written

instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all

purposes.

Where there is a disparity between a written instrument annexed to a

pleading and an allegation in the pleading based thereon, the written

instrument will control. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. Ltd. v. Houston National Bank,

515 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (5 Cir. 1975) (concerning a default judgment) (citing th

Simmons v. Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co., 113 F.2d 812, 813 (5 Cir. 1940) th

(concerning a motion to dismiss, and noting that one may plead himself out of

court by attaching exhibits that contradict or refute the allegations of the

complaint)).

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false because no settlement occurred. (Cmplt. at 14-15.) 

Considering the exhibits to the complaint offered by

Plaintiff, it appears that Plaintiff is claiming that it was his

counsel who authorized the use of a reporter’s record, as

distinct from a clerk’s record, of the terms of the agreement.

Further, it appears that although settlement proceedings occurred

on that date, including the reading of the terms of a settlement

agreement into the record with the consent of Plaintiff and his

attorney, Plaintiff is claiming that no settlement really

occurred because Plaintiff “never spoke directly with the judge

and never adequately convened with the attorney of record.”

(Cmplt. at 4.) When the attachments to the complaint are

considered, it does not appear that Plaintiff is claiming that

the clerk incorrectly reported what counsel and the court

represented to the clerk; rather, Plaintiff is claiming that

although the record reflects his conduct on that day, the legal

effect of that conduct did not amount to an enforceable meeting

of the minds or agreement.1

Plaintiff also alleges that Clerk Nunn knew that Plaintiff’s

attorney, Tobias, submitted false pleadings known to be redundant

(Cmplt. p. 13); on unspecified occasions Nunn provided an

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incomplete record and concealed a minute order (id. at 15-16),

which Plaintiff finally discovered in July 2005; and Nunn

concealed the minute order because her statement “verifies and

ratifies the methods of collusion of the actors.” He states:

But for the supression (sic) of this document

Plaintiff could have determined the collusion and defense

and the outcome would have been different. Nunn with

intent to conceal fraud of the actors concealed evidentiary

documents requested and rightfully to be available. The

intent to conceal reveals fraud in and surrounding the

chamber meeting where Nunn was not present.

(Cmplt. at 16.) Plaintiff goes on, however, to state that Nunn

furnished Plaintiff’s new counsel, Collins, the minute order, and

yet on unspecified occasions concealed it from Plaintiff. (Cmplt.

at 17.) Plaintiff claims that the clerk thereby caused Collins

mistakenly to assume that Plaintiff had waived evidence and

rights by agreeing to a settlement of a dispute regarding the

land that he and Peters had occupied.

As to any concealment, the circumstances are not stated; it

is not clear under whose direction, by what conduct, or under

what conditions the record was concealed or how concealment of a

part of a public record could even be accomplished. Further, it

is not alleged that any violation of rights resulted from any

conduct of Nunn.

The proponent of a claim to immunity bears the burden of

establishing the justification for such immunity. Antoine v.

Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993). 

Judicial or quasi-judicial immunity has been extended not

only to those who actually adjudicate disputes in an adversarial

setting, but also in appropriate cases to non-jurists who perform

functions closely associated with the judicial process. In re

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Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9 Cir. 2002). The doctrine is th

appropriately applied to persons other than judges who exercise

judgments functionally comparable to those of judges, i.e., those

who exercise a discretionary judgment as part of their function.

Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993)

(holding that a court reporter who was charged with having failed

to provide a transcript and who was bound by statute to provide

verbatim reports of a criminal trial was not entitled to immunity

because she was afforded no discretion in carrying out the duty

to record proceedings). After Antoine, the key question is not

simply whether common law judges performed the task in question,

but rather, whether judges themselves, in performing the function

at issue, would be entitled to absolute immunity. Antoine, 508

U.S. at 435; In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 949 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Traditionally it has been recognized that court clerks have

absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of

the judicial process, such as filing documents and giving

notices. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of

Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9 Cir. 1987). After the decision th

in Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, it has been

recognized in the Ninth Circuit that court clerks who are

performing tasks related to the judicial process of resolving

disputes, and who retain some measure of discretionary judgment

in performing those tasks, continue to be immune from suit. See,

Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (9 Cir. 1996) (holding th

that a court clerk, and a law clerk who assisted a judge by

performing functions closely associated with the judicial process

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and duties most intimately connected with the judge’s own

exercise of judicial function, were entitled to absolute quasijudicial immunity), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1118 (1997); In re

Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, (9 Cir. 2002) (holding that a th

bankruptcy trustee’s clerk was entitled to complete quasijudicial immunity with respect to the clerk’s scheduling of a

hearing and failing to give notice of a hearing because both were

functionally comparable to judicial actions, and were analogous

to judicial action, in that they involved control of the docket,

a task involving the exercise of discretionary judgment related

to the resolution of disputes). 

Although there is a dearth of published authority in this

circuit regarding immunity in the precise circumstances of this

case, the court in Antoine noted that common law judges exercised

discretion in deciding exactly what, and how much, they would

write, and that it was without doubt that judicial note-taking

involved the kind of discretionary decision making that the

doctrine of judicial immunity was designed to protect. Antoine v.

Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993). The present

case involves a court clerk’s judicial note-taking and recordkeeping, functions within this area of discretionary judicial

function. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the claim against

court clerk J. Nunn be dismissed with prejudice and without leave

to amend on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity.

V. Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is so unclear that the

Court cannot know the nature and extent to which any criminal

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proceedings occurred. There are several references to the

prosecutor, and/or to Perry Patterson. Plaintiff alleges that

unspecified court actors knowingly aided Defendant Peters to

obtain a false warrant through “machination of biased

Prosecutor.” (Cmplt. at 2.) It is alleged that after a

confrontation with Peters on the property on January 8, 2001 (id.

p. 8), Plaintiff requested from a deputy sheriff an exculpatory

investigation, but the deputy failed to investigate. Plaintiff

alleged that he then confronted prosecutor Perry Patterson and

Deputy Sheriff Thatcher on February 11, 2001, and brought a

witness. The prosecutor scowled, said that he thought that

Plaintiff was guilty, and also said that he would decide whom to

prosecute. (Id. p. 9.) In a reference to the sheriff deputy’s

continuing failure to investigate, which Plaintiff characterized

as undertaken with knowledge of Peters’ intent to cause issuance

of a warrant through false allegations, Plaintiff characterized

the deputy’s actions as being condoned by the prosecutor. (Id. p.

10.) He further alleged that the prosecutor later denied

knowledge of the investigation. (Id. p. 11.) Plaintiff also made

an additional allegation which is unclear and may be a reference

to the prosecutor, but may instead refer to his own counsel,

Tobias:

Prosecutor relied on Plaintiff’s attorney to subvert

Plaintiff’s defense and prevent Plaintiff from having

a hearing. Plaintiff is prosecuted by his own attorney.

Tobias served Prosecutor as presiding judge for 20 years.

(Cmplt. p. 14.)

State prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil liability

for acts taken in their official capacity that are closely

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associated with the judicial process, such as initiating

prosecution and presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 427, 430-431 (1976); Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d

1004, 1008 (9 Cir. 2001). A prosecutor has absolute immunity th

for the decision to prosecute a particular case and for the

decision not to prosecute a case or group of cases; such a

decision is intimately tied to the judicial process. Botello v.

Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 976-77 (9 Cir. 2005). th

The conduct of the prosecutor alleged in the complaint

before the Court appears to be conduct concerning a decision to

prosecute or not to prosecute. Accordingly, it is recommended

that the claim against Perry Patterson, a prosecutor, be

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.

VI. Attorneys

With respect to his attorney, Tobias, Plaintiff alleges that

his attorney’s substandard and disloyal conduct prevented him

from presenting his defense and resulted in Plaintiff’s belief

that he could accept the stipulation reached with respect to his

property in connection with the restraining order and yet still

contest the loss of his property. Plaintiff also alleged that

Tobias and Gelber, attorney for Peters, ratified Nunn’s role in

the “systemic falsity of the record that a negotiated or

anticipated settlement had occurred.” (Cmplt. at 17.) He further

alleged:

Attorneys Gelber and Tobias further colluded by 

fluffing that affidavits and exhibits were considered

that Plaintiff waived his opportunity to examine them.

(Cmplt. at 18.)

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead

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(1) that the defendant acted under color of state law and (2)

that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781

F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, private parties are

not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939

F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Aside from alleging a

conspiracy (discussed below), Plaintiff has failed to plead any

facts indicating that Gelber or Tobias individually acted under

color of state law; rather, they appear to be private parties,

and thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against them. 

Plaintiff was warned of this requirement in the Court’s

order of May 2, 2006 dismissing Plaintiff’s first amended

complaint with leave to amend. (Order at pp. 10-11.) Plaintiff

was unable to allege facts warranting a conclusion that these

Defendants acted under color of state law. It appears that giving

Plaintiff yet another opportunity to amend on this point would be

futile. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s claim

against attorneys Gelber and Tobias be dismissed with prejudice

and without leave to amend.

VII. Kern County Sheriff’s Department

Plaintiff alleges conduct by Deputy Sheriff Larry Thatcher,

and he also names the Kern County Sheriff’s Department as a

defendant. 

However, Plaintiff does not allege facts concerning any

conduct engaged in by the County that would subject it to

liability under § 1983. The Court notes that a local governmental

unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees

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under a respondeat superior theory of liability; a county could

be liable for its own actions in the nature of policy or customs,

factual circumstances which Plaintiff has not alleged. See Bd. of

County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).

Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating a claim against the

Sheriff’s Department.

Plaintiff was warned of this defect in the Court’s order

dismissing the first amended complaint with leave to amend.

(Order at pp. 9-10.) Plaintiff has not been able to allege facts

that would constitute a basis for liability on the part of the

department or county. 

Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s claim

against the Kern County Sheriff’s Department be dismissed with

prejudice and without leave to amend.

VII. Defendant Peters

Liberally read, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Peters

began a secret and fraudulent spousal abuse scheme whereby

although she actually kicked and dragged Plaintiff, she planned

to obtain his property by proceeding falsely to obtain a

restraining order and ultimately to obtain Plaintiff’s interest

in the shared property. (Cmplt. pp. 2, 7.)

Aside from alleging a conspiracy (discussed below),

Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would warrant a

conclusion that Peters was acting under color of law. Peters was

a private party who reported an incident to law enforcement and

sought a restraining order. One way to establish action under

color of law is to demonstrate joint action where a private party

is a wilful participant in joint action with the state or its

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agents; the test is whether the state has so far insinuated

itself into a position of interdependence with the private entity

that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the

challenged activity, such as where the state knowingly accepts

the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior. Kirtley v.

Kainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9 Cir. 2003). However, merely th

resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a

lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or joint actor

with a judge. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). Merely

making a single report or request to police to perform peacekeeping responsibilities is generally insufficient to render

action joint. Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 980 (9th

Cir. 2003). Here, absent the conspiracy allegations (discussed

below), there is no further allegation that Peters did anything

more than seek a remedy through the courts.

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the claim against

Defendant Peters be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1983.

VIII. Claim against Claudie Duckworth

Plaintiff makes limited reference to one “Claudie,” a

personal associate of the prosecutor and Peters. (Complt. at 2.)

Plaintiff does not state facts stating a claim against Claudie

“Duckworth,” a named Defendant. The Civil Rights Act under which

this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986). The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to

state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link

each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that

demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.

Here, Plaintiff failed to allege that this Defendant engaged

in any conduct that violated his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim against Defendant Claudie Duckworth.

Plaintiff was informed of the requirements of § 1983 in the

Court’s order dismissing with leave to amend the first amended

complaint. Plaintiff did not state facts stating a claim after

being informed of the legal standard. It appears that giving

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Plaintiff another opportunity to amend in this regard would be

futile. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that the claim against

Claudie Duckworth be dismissed without leave to amend.

IX. Malicious Prosecution or Abuse of Process

Plaintiff does not directly allege that he was prosecuted or

that he suffered a criminal conviction or sentence. Plaintiff

instead makes reference to a warrant, and specifically, a

conspiracy to cause issuance of a warrant without probable cause

(Cmplt. p. 4). However, the complaint does not specify the nature

of any such warrant or any details as to any effectuation or

service of any warrant. It thus does not appear that Plaintiff is

claiming that he was injured by the issuance or service of any

warrant. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a claim concerning

a warrant or a criminal prosecution.

Plaintiff also refers to having false evidence presented at

a “temporary stay-away hearing” or to county officials, and to a

right to be free from a “quasi-criminal permanent stay-away order

unjustifiably imposed upon him by the state of California” which

involved restriction of rights afforded by the United States

Constitution. (Cmplt. p. 2.) It appears that the judicial process

involved in the conduct of which Plaintiff complains was a civil

proceeding concerning the issuance of a temporary and/or

permanent restraining order against Plaintiff at the application

of Defendant Peters, a co-resident of the co-owned real property,

which in turn appears on the basis of the record to have

terminated with a settlement agreement whereby Plaintiff sold his

interest in the property to Defendant Peters.

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In the Ninth Circuit, a claim for malicious prosecution or

abuse of process is not generally cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to

provide a remedy. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556,

561-62 (9 Cir.1987). However, an exception exists when a th

malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a

person of equal protection of the laws or otherwise intended to

subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights. Id. at

562. 

Here, Plaintiff claims that the civil proceeding was

undertaken maliciously and with the purpose of depriving him of

his property interest in the real property which he shared with

Defendant Peters.

A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is based on

state-law elements. Usher, 828 F.2d at 562. The essential

elements of malicious prosecution are the same in criminal and

civil contexts. The plaintiff must plead and prove that the prior

proceeding, commenced by or at the direction of the malicious

prosecution defendant, was 1) pursued to a legal termination

favorable to the plaintiff; 2) brought without probable cause;

and 3) initiated with malice. Ayala v. KC Environmental Health,

426 F.Supp.2d 1070 (E.D.Cal.2006) (citing Villa v. Cole, 4

Cal.App.4th 1327, 1335 (1992). The plaintiff must show that the

defendant prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause,

and that they did so for the purpose of denying the plaintiff

equal protection or another specific constitutional right.

Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Here, it appears that there was a stipulated agreement

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(Cmplt, Ex. D) and that a restraining order was filed after

hearing (id., Ex. F). A termination in civil proceedings

concerning a restraining order is favorable if it tends to

indicate the innocence or lack of fault on the part of the

plaintiff and is inconsistent with liability for conduct

warranting a restraining order. Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal.3d

747, 749-50 (1979); Babb v. Superior Court , 3 Cal.3d 841, 846

(1971) (standard applicable to civil cases); see, Jaffe v. Stone,

18 Cal.2d 146, 149 (1941) (noting that even dismissal of criminal

charges did not necessarily indicate the innocence of the accused

or lack of merit in the action, and thus was not favorable). If

the resolution of underlying litigation leaves some doubt as to

the malicious prosecution plaintiff’s innocence or liability, it

is not a favorable termination and bars the party from bringing a

malicious prosecution action against the adverse party. A

dismissal resulting from negotiation, settlement or consent is

generally not deemed a favorable termination of a proceeding.

Webb v. Youmans, 248 Cal.App.2d 851, 853 (1967). An offer to

stipulate to the precise injunctive relief sought by an opposing

party implies that the offering party was not innocent of the

conduct. StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Servies, Inc., 136

Cal.App.4th 1392, 1400-01 (2006). The general rule is that a case

concluded as a result of settlement does not result in a

favorable termination because such a result is ambiguous and does

not reflect on the merits, but leaves open the question of the

parties’ guilt or innocence. HMS Capital, Inc. v. Layers Title

Co., 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 214-15 (2004).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged a favorable termination of

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the underlying civil action, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for

malicious prosecution. Further, it does not appear that Plaintiff

could allege facts demonstrating a favorable termination of the

proceeding for the restraining order. Accordingly, Plaintiff

failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution with respect to

the proceeding for the restraining order.

X. Equal Protection

Plaintiff claims that the Sheriff’s Department and

unspecified “Court Actors” (Cmplt. P. 2) worked a denial of equal

protection in aid of a subsidiary conspiracy intended to steal

Plaintiff’s ranch property (id.). He alleges that Deputy Thatcher

deprived Plaintiff of a right to equal protection by depriving

him from unspecified requested exculpatory evidence necessary to

safeguard him from the plot. (Id. P. 9.)

With respect to equal protection of the laws, Plaintiff has

not alleged that he is a member of a class deserving of

protection under the laws of the United States or that he has

been treated in a manner inconsistent with others similarly

situated in violation of the equal protection clause of the

Constitution. See, Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158,

1167 (9 Cir. 2005). The facts do not suggest a viable theory of th

equal protection violation.

It is recommended that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim be

dismissed without leave to amend. 

XI. Investigation Leading to Wrongful Conviction

Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Sheriff Larry Thatcher was

compelled to investigate a series of fraudulent acts designed to

implicate Plaintiff falsely (presumably a reference to Peters’

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reports of Plaintiff’s having effected or threatened violence

upon her); Thatcher suppressed all evidence of the investigation

to Plaintiff’s detriment. Peters had called Deputy Thatcher, to

whom Plaintiff had also reported an incident; Thatcher suggested

to Peters that she try to obtain a temporary restraining order.

(Cmplt. pp. 3, 28, 32 (Ex. B)). Plaintiff claims that false

statements were made; reports and evidence were not presented to

the court at the hearing (presumably a hearing on the restraining

order) or to county officials (Cmplt. p. 2); unspecified actors

intentionally omitted knowledge of witnesses and suspects from

the report; and even though Plaintiff requested an exculpatory

investigation, Thatcher neglected to investigate exculpatory

findings in a timely manner, and wilfully and knowingly concealed

the investigation and report from Plaintiff with deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s safety and constitutional rights (id.

pp. 5, 8). Plaintiff also alleges that Thatcher willfully created

a false warrant with intent to cause detriment to Plaintiff

(Cmplt. p. 10) or knowingly aided improper effectuation of a

false warrant (id. p. 12); Thatcher effectuated “the fraudulently

petitioned stay-away warrant” (id. at 10).

Reference to Exhibit J to the second amended complaint

reveals that Thatcher authored a report dated January 10, 2001,

in which he reviewed statements made by Plaintiff and by Peters

regarding their respective versions of a physical confrontation

between Plaintiff and Peters on January 8, 2001; he stated that

the report would be forwarded to the DA’s office for review at

Boyer’s request. (Cmplt. pp. 59-62.)

There is authority to the effect that a 1983 claim may be

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stated where a person investigated is wrongly convicted,

arrested, or charged on the basis of false evidence that was

deliberately fabricated by the government, or based on a bad

faith failure to preserve or collect potentially exculpatory

evidence. See, Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9 Cir. th

2001); Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 812-13 (9th

Cir. 2003); Gausvik v. Perez, 345 F.3d 813, 817 (9 Cir. 2003). th

However, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was arrested or

charged with a criminal offense, let alone that any prior

criminal proceeding terminated in a manner as to indicate his

innocence. Plaintiff thus cannot make out a claim of a violation

of due process resulting in a wrongful criminal charge or

conviction. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066, 1068

(9 Cir. 2004). th

Further, if Plaintiff were to allege a conviction or

confinement resulting from the allegedly wrongful conduct, then

this case would be governed by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 487 (2005), that a prisoner’s damage suit cannot

proceed if a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence unless the prisoner has

demonstrated that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated. This rule has been applied to civil proceedings only

where there is present the danger of bypassing a habeas corpus

remedy. Huftile v. Miccio-Fopnseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th

Cir. 2005) (applying it to a sexual predator proceeding in which

a civil detained challenged his civil commitment).

It is recommended that to the extent that Plaintiff attempts

to state such a claim, the claim be dismissed without leave to

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amend. 

XI. Lack of Jurisdiction

Some of the claims alleged by Plaintiff involve the

allegedly concerted conduct of all of the parties involved in the

civil restraining order proceedings concerning the domestic

violence and property issues.

A. Conspiracy 

Plaintiff claims that he was injured by the investigation or

other conduct preceding, during, and after the hearing on the

restraining order because he was subjected to the application

for, as well as the proceeding and resulting judgment granting, a

restraining order.

Plaintiff makes numerous vague allegations concerning a

conspiracy of all or among unspecified “actors” or “court

actors,” who allegedly knew that a complaint was groundless, and

acted with the object of stealing Plaintiff’s property and

causing the issuance of a warrant without probable cause, which

resulted in deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to due process of

the law. (Cmplt. pp. 2, 4 , 12, 13, 18, 20.) 

Plaintiff must allege some facts with respect to the

conspiracy. In the context of conspiracy claims brought pursuant

to section 1983, such a complaint must “allege specific facts to

support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” 

Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.

1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must allege that defendants

conspired or acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was

done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of

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California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has alleged various acts, as alluded to

hereinabove. Further, Plaintiff has alleged that various

unspecified actors have shared an object to deprive him of his

property. Plaintiff alleges that the sheriff collaborated in

Peters’ fraud, was compelled to investigate a series of

fraudulent acts designed to implicate Plaintiff falsely, and

suppressed all evidence of the investigation to his detriment; he

refers to abstract “fraud of collusive court actors to prevent

presentation of Plaintiff’s defense.” (Cmplt. pp. 3- 4.) He

refers to unspecified evidence Plaintiff intended to present

(presumably his version of the domestic conflict apparently

embodied in his unsigned “declaration” (Cmplt. Ex. C)), and he

alleges that collusive “court actors” prevented presentation of

his defense, and he refers to his attorney’s collusive false

pleadings. (Cmplt pp. 4-5.) He complains that he never agreed to

sell his ranch or to acquiesce in stay-away orders. (Id. P. 5.)

He alleges that the stay-away order and record were “not rendered

by true belief but for an ulterior purpose of property control”

by unspecified concerted efforts of the sheriff, prosecutor,

attorney, clerks and “court actors.” He asserts that his

attorney, Tobias, “instilled false beliefs to induce Plaintiff to

unwittingly” accept the order, and that this was motivated by a

desire to hide the complicity of “actors” aiding a subsidiary

conspiracy to control the property. (Id. p. 6.) He alleges false

and neglectful investigation as well as failure to investigate on

the part of the deputy sheriff, who wilfully and knowingly

concealed the rightful report with deliberate indifference to

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Plaintiff’s safety and rights and with the intent to deprive

Plaintiff of his property; neglect, lying, and false pleadings by

his attorney; and unspecified concealing of court documents. (Id.

pp. 7, 9-10.) He alleges that clerk Nunn concealed the minute

order of February 28, 2001 and unspecified evidentiary documents

with intend to conceal the fraud of “the actors.” (Id. p. 16.) He

also asserts, however, that by keeping the minute order from the

knowledge of Plaintiff but furnishing it to Collins, his new

attorney, it caused Collins to make mistaken assumptions that

Plaintiff had actually acquiesced in the settlement. (Id. p. 17.)

He alleges that Thatcher, Peters, the prosecutor, and “all other

actors” shared the same design “with grossly negligent and

deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

(Id. p. 12.) He alleges that the stipulated judgment was obtained

by fraud and thus was void. (Id. pp. 4., 16.) He recounts his

version of the domestic dispute and of the proceedings that

resulted in the issuance of the restraining order and the

settlement. (Id. pp. 7-18.) He asserts that due to his attorney’s

fraud, he believed that he could challenge the ruling by a

separate civil suit, and thereby entered into the settlement, and

was then abandoned by his attorney. (Id. pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff

seeks to be free from the stay-away order “unjustifiably imposed

upon him by the state of California” (id. p. 2) and seeks

injunctive relief as well as damages. (Id. p. 20.)

Broadly read, Plaintiff has alleged that various people

undertook action with a united purpose to deprive Plaintiff of

his property. However, the facts pled by Plaintiff do not state a

basis for jurisdiction in this Court over Plaintiff’s claim of

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conspiracy among judges, a clerk, law enforcement officers, and

others to deprive Plaintiff of due process of law or

constitutional rights by their conduct. Here, loss of Plaintiff’s

property resulted from a state court judgment which has not been

overturned or otherwise invalidated.

Appellate jurisdiction of state court judgments rests in the

United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, not in the federal

district court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that a

federal district court is without subject matter jurisdiction to

hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court. Bianchi v.

Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 896 (2003), cert. denied, Bianchi v.

Rylaarsdam, 540 U.S. 1213, (2004). This Court, as a court of

original jurisdiction, does not have the authority to review

final determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.

Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9 Cir. 1995) (applying th

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and upholding the dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction of a claim that in adjudicating

the plaintiff’s unsuccessful state tort claim, the state court

clerk, judges, and attorneys conspired to deprive him of due

process). This Court may not engage in an impermissible

collateral attack on prior state court decisions. Id. The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of

those judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

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Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1522 (2005).

Here, the Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of

dismissal of the restraining order, a nunc pro tunc accounting of

the property, and damages for malicious abuse of process. (Cmplt.

p. 20.) It is clear that Plaintiff’s claim is essentially an

impermissible collateral attack on the state court’s issuance of,

and upholding upon direct and collateral attack, the restraining

order, as well as the court’s effectuating the parties’

settlement of the property issues. Plaintiff names the state

court and the persons involved in the state court action and

asserts that the state court committed legal errors by

erroneously enforcing a settlement to which Plaintiff had

manifested his assent and by erroneously finding a waiver of

Plaintiff’s rights. (Cmplt. p. 15). Plaintiff’s suit is

essentially a collateral attack on the state court judgment. Cf.,

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1152-59 (9 Cir. 2003). th

Further, even if it were possible to cast some portion of

Plaintiff’s claim as a general constitutional challenge, a

federal district court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction

over general constitutional challenges that are inextricably

intertwined with claims asserted in state court. District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). ;

Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029

(9 Cir. 2001). A claim is inextricably intertwined with a state th

court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent

that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it, or if

the relief requested in the federal action would effectively

reverse the state court decision or void its ruling. Fontana

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Empire Center, LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th

Cir. 2002). Here, there does not appear to be a part of

Plaintiff’s claim that is not inextricably intertwined with the

state court judgment. 

Accordingly, it will be recommended that to the extent that

Plaintiff states a conspiracy claim, and with respect to all

claims and issues inexplicably intertwined with issues decided by

the state court, such claims be dismissed because the Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction.

 RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that:

1) The Court DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against the Superior Court, Clerk

Johnna Nunn, and Prosecutor Perry Patterson because of Eleventh

Amendment and judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial

immunity, respectively;

2) The Court DISMISS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim Plaintiff’s claims against

the Kern County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Larry Thatcher,

attorney Daniel Jon Tobias, attorney Jamie Gelber, Anne Frances

Peters, and Claudie Duckworth; and

3) The Court DISMISS this action based on this Court’s lack

of subject matter jurisdiction over it because it constitutes an 

impermissible collateral attack upon a state court judgment.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

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Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00012-AWI -SMS Document 16 Filed 09/05/06 Page 31 of 31