Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-05426/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-05426-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

KAREN L. GARCIA,

 Plaintiff, 

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case No. C 04-05426 JF

ORDER1 GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR REMAND; AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[Docket No. 13, 20, 22]

Plaintiff Karen L. Garcia seeks reversal of the decision by the Commissioner of Social

Security (“Defendant”) denying her disability insurance benefits. The challenged decision was

rendered by Administrative Law Judge Brenton L Rogozen (the “ALJ”) on July 30, 2004. The

ALJ’s decision became final on October 1, 2004, when the Appeals Council of the Social

Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff

filed a motion for summary judgment or remand on June 7, 2005. Defendant filed a crossmotion for summary judgment on August 4, 2005. Plaintiff filed a reply on August 22, 2005. 

The matter was submitted without oral argument.

Case 5:04-cv-05426-JF Document 24 Filed 03/21/06 Page 1 of 9
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Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who was 42 years old at the time of the hearing, has a GED level education and

past relevant work experience as a telephone sales person, department assistant/secretary,

security guard, used car washer, and waitress. She filed her application for disability insurance

benefits on June 14, 1999, alleging inability to work due to Dercum’s disease (adiposis dolorosa),

obesity, back pain, multiple joint pains, headaches, fibromyalgia, and depression. Transcript of

Proceedings (“TR”), p. 26. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff

requested and received a hearing before an ALJ (T. Patrick Hannon), who found that Plaintiff

was not disabled on August 17, 2001. TR, pp. 62-71. On appeal, the Appeals Council reviewed

and vacated ALJ Hannon’s decision, and remanded the case for further review. On March 29,

2004, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Rogozen in the presence of a vocational expert Ron Morrell. 

TR, pp. 20-28.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has not performed substantial gainful activity during the

adjudicative period. TR, p. 27. He further found that Plaintiff has mild degenerative joint

disease and obesity, both of which are considered severe medically determinable impairments for

the purpose of determining eligibility for Social Security disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1521. Nevertheless, Plaintiff was found “not disabled.” According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s

impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of impairments listed in Appendix 1 to subpart P

of regulations No. 4 (“Listing”). Id. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling

pain are not credible and that she has the physical ability to lift and carry weight and has no

mental limitation. Id. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff is able to perform her past work. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has the authority to review the

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only

if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based upon the application of improper

Case 5:04-cv-05426-JF Document 24 Filed 03/21/06 Page 2 of 9
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Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

legal standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966

F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the term “substantial evidence” means “more

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance - it is such relevant evidence that a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also

Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering

adverse as well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation,

the Court must defer to the decision of the Commissioner. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin,

966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving social security benefits if he or she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a physical or mental impairment which

is expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of

at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. The Commissioner

follows a five-step sequential evaluation process in assessing whether a claimant is disabled. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended

April 9, 1996. In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant currently

is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is

denied. Id. If the claimant is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second

step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work

activities; if not, a finding of “not disabled” is made and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant

has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or

equals an impairment in the Listing; if so, disability is conclusively presumed and benefits are

awarded. Id. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or

Case 5:04-cv-05426-JF Document 24 Filed 03/21/06 Page 3 of 9
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 A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what he or she can still do despite existing

exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir.

1989).

3

 Dercum’s disease is characterized by the development of painful or tender fatty deposits

in the subcutis, usually in obese menopausal women, often accompanied by psychic disturbances,

ecchymoses, weakness, and asthenia theat develop with progression of the disease. There is a

predilection of the fat tissue to be deposited in the extremities, especially near the joints. TR, p.

894. 

4

Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine

whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional capacity”2 to perform his past work; if so,

the claimant is not disabled and the claim is denied. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving

that he or she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant

meets this burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. The Commissioner then bears

the burden of establishing that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work; the

determination of this issue comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. 20

C.F.R.§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

III. DISCUSSION

The disputed issues center on: (1) whether the ALJ’s findings with respect “severe”

impairments were improper and unsupported; (2) whether the ALJ improperly rejected the

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians’; and (3) whether the ALJ properly disregarded

Plaintiff’s allegations of subjective pain. 

 A. Consideration of Severe Impairments

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly considered only her obesity and mild

degenerative disc disease as severe impairments and failed to consider Dercum’s disease3 at the

step two analysis. The ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly and conduct

appropriate inquiry. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). Generally

speaking, “greater weight must be given to the opinion of treating physicians, and in the case of a

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4

 In particular, Dr. Enns noted that Plaintiff has a “history of painful subcutaneous

nodules” and “unusual subcutaneous nodules.” 

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“There was no evidence of any joint swelling, inflammation or tenderness of the upper or

lower extremities . . . An X-ray of the claimant’s knees reveals normal joint space between both

knees with no evidence of any degenerative changes. . . while the claimant might have joint pain,

this would not limit her functional abilities.”

6Dr. Mangar’s initial diagnoses include myofascial pain and chronic lower back pain. 

Upon further evaluation, he noted that a physical therapist Nancy Mallick found that there was no

focal findings of pain except generalized deconditioning and obesity. He also recommended

treatment, including nonsterioidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 

7

 Dr. Gable noted that there was no evidence of any fatty tumors about the ankles, no

multiple joint problems, and no pressure points sufficient to substantiate a diagnosis of

fibromyalgia. TR, p. 750.

5

Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

conflict ‘the ALJ must give specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding the opinion of the

treating physician.’” Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the ALJ

discussed treating physician Dr. Greg Enns’ diagnosis of “probable” Dercum’s disease and

treating physician Dr. Dale Helman’s diagnosis of Dercum’s syndrome, but failed to consider the

diagnoses of two other treating physicians, Drs. Jenny A. Schreck and Michael Suval. TR, pp.

21-22, 371, 374, 437, 899-902. Further, even though both Drs. Enns and Helman gave consistent

diagnoses of actual or “strong possibility” of Dercum’s disease,4 the ALJ relied on the findings of

consulting physicians to make the determination that Dercum’s disease is not a severe

impairment. TR, pp. 374, 378. The consulting physicians’ reports include: (1) Dr. Hideki

Garren’s findings of minimal abnormality;5 (2) Dr. Steven Mangar’s note of “generalized

deconditioning and obesity” from an opinion of a clinical pain therapist;6 and (3) Dr. Clark E.

Gable’s finding of no multiple joint pains.7 TR, pp. 21-23, 23, 749- 751. 

“An ALJ may discredit treating physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and

unsupported by the record as a whole . . . or by objective medical findings.” Batson, 359 F.3d at

1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149). Here, the ALJ did discredit Dr.

Helman’s diagnosis due to lack of a longitudinal physician/patient relationship and objective

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 The ALJ stated that “Dr. Gable assessed the claimant had the ability to lift and/or carry

up to 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally; stand and/or walk for 6 hours in an 8-

hour workday; sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; frequently climb, balance and stoop and

occasionally kneel, crouch and crawl.” TR, pp. 23, 749-756.

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Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

medical findings. However, the ALJ did not discuss or even mention Dr. Schreck’s medical

report. Despite the fact that Dr. Schreck did not explicitly give a diagnosis of Dercum’s disease

and that she appeared to be a one-time treating physician, she did report in a check-mark form

that Plaintiff was able to stand, sit, or walk for only 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; was able to

carry or lift only 10-15 pounds; and was restricted in repetitive motion. TR, pp. 902-903. She

also noted that Plaintiff “has a rare condition which causes diffuse pain with prolong activity or

repetitive work.” Id. These findings are in direct conflict with the opinions of consulting

physician Dr. Gable.8 TR, pp. 749-755. “When presented with conflicting medical opinions, the

ALJ must determine credibility and resolve the conflict.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (9th Cir.

2004). Here, ALJ not only failed to provide any “specific” and “legitimate” reasons to credit Dr.

Gable’s opinion over that of Dr. Schreck, but also failed to consider Dr. Schreck’s medical report

at all.

B. Improper Rejection of Treating Physicians’ Opinions

Plaintiff contends that the opinions of the treating physicians’, Drs. Schreck and Suval,

were improperly excluded from consideration by the ALJ. As discussed above, “the ALJ may

disregard the opinion of the treating physician only if he sets forth ‘specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so.’” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at

1148. Here, Defendant properly points out that neither Dr. Schreck nor Dr. Suval provided

objective evidence to substantiate the finding of Dercum’s disease and Plaintiff’s subjective

description of her conditions. TR, pp. 26, 901-903, 1189-91. However, Dr. Shreck’s opinion,

which was ignored by the ALJ, is consistent with the opinions of treating physicians Drs. Enns

and Helman, but in direct conflict with consulting physicians Drs. Garren, Gable, Ashley Cohen,

and Ellison Chang. TR, pp. 21, 23-25, 365-369, 657-661, 749-751. Similarly, Dr. Suval’s

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Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

opinions were consistent with the opinion of Drs. Enns and Helman, but inconsistent with the

opinions of Drs. Garren, Gable, and Chang. Because the ALJ must give “specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting treating physician’s

medical conclusions, the failure to discuss Drs. Schreck and Suval’s opinions is erroneous. 

C. Rejection of Plaintiff’s Symptom Reporting

Plaintiff also asserts that the ALJ disregarded her symptom-reporting at both hearings

without clear and convincing reasons for rejection. TR, pp. 1141-1158, 1164-1184. “The ALJ

must engage in a two-step analysis” when deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective

symptom testimony. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196 (2004) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273,

1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). The first step requires the claimant to “produce objective medical

evidence of underlying ‘impairment,’” and “show that the impairment, or a combination of

impairments, ‘could reasonably be expected to produce pain or other symptoms.’” Id. If the first

part of the test is satisfied and if the ALJ’s credibility analysis of the claimant’s testimony shows

no malingering, then the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about severity of symptoms

with “specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff testified that she was unable to work due to Dercum’s disease, obesity,

back pain, headaches, fibromyalgia, depression, and memory problems. TR, pp. 189-192, 217-

218, 220-221, 1141-1158, 1164-1184. Relying on mostly consulting physicians’ medical reports

and findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations were not credible. TR, pp. 25-26,

750-751. In addition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “has not taken any anti-depressant medications

for the past 3 years” and thus concluded that her depression was not as severe as she alleges. As

discussed above, the ALJ did not indicate how he resolved the conflicting opinions of treating

and consulting physicians. The ALJ also ignored other evidence provided by Plaintiff to support

her credibility. For example, Plaintiff submitted a statement from registered nurse Carol Beatty,

indicating that Plaintiff was not taking an antidepressant because of her past problems with

various antidepressants and their “negative impact on her liver.” TR, p. 746. 

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Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

 In light of the entire record, the Court concludes that matter should be remanded so that

the ALJ expressly may resolve conflicts between the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and

consulting physicians and may reconsider Plaintiff’s subjective pain allegations once the

conflicts in the medical evidence are resolved.

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS THEREBY ORDERED that

(1) Plaintiff’s motion for remand is GRANTED;

(2) Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and

(3) The Clerk of the Court shall administratively close the file.

DATED: 

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. C 04-05426 JF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND; AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(JFEX2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

James Hunt Miller jimillaw@rcn.com, jim_miller0@yahoo.com 

Sharon Sands sharon.sands@ssa.gov 

Sara Winslow sara.winslow@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov; claire.muller@usdoj.gov 

Case 5:04-cv-05426-JF Document 24 Filed 03/21/06 Page 9 of 9