Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-01011/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-01011-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JACQUES G. MALLORY, #191 525, )

)

Mallory, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:12-CV-1011-WHA

) [WO]

WARDEN GARY HETZEL, III, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff Jacques Mallory, a state inmate, 

challenges the constitutionality of actions taken against him during his incarceration at 

the Easterling Correctional Facility, in Clio, Alabama.1 The defendants are Warden Gary 

Hetzel, Classification Specialist Larry Anglin, and Correctional Officer Lorenzo Greene.

Mallory alleges that on October 16, 2012, defendant Greene subjected him to excessive 

force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Following the altercation, Mallory

claims that he received a disciplinary for assault on a correctional officer as a “cover up 

scheme” in response to Greene’s actions. Mallory seeks damages and injunctive relief.

Defendants filed an answer, special report, and supporting evidentiary materials 

addressing Mallory’s claims for relief. (Docs. 14, 16). The court informed Mallory that 

it may consider defendants’ special report as a motion for summary judgment, and 

granted Mallory an opportunity to file a response to defendants’ report; Mallory did so. 

 1 Mallory is presently incarcerated at the Bibb Correctional Facility in Brent, Alabama.

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(Docs. 18, 19). Defendants’ special report is construed as a motion for summary 

judgment, and the matter is ripe for consideration.

For the reasons discussed below, upon consideration of the pleadings, the parties’ 

briefs, and the evidence of record, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS 

that the motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED and all claims resolved in 

favor of the defendants.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is 

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 

1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 

56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.”). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying 

those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this burden 

by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing the 

nonmoving party has failed to present evidence to support some element on which it 

bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

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Defendants have met their evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to Mallory

to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute 

material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 

1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly 

support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as 

required [by citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or 

other materials] the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting 

materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled 

to it.”); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-594 (11th Cir. 1995) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, “the nonmoving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn 

statements], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” 

demonstrate there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider 

“specific facts” pled in a Mallory’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to 

summary judgment, and the facts pled in the complaint are treated as affidavit testimony 

for purposes of this recommendation. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 

1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the 

nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a 

verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for 

Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

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must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of 

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord 

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to 

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to 

prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). Consequently, to 

survive defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Mallory must 

produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting 

his claims for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 

56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

“If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is 

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

249-250 (internal citations omitted). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the 

opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the 

[trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 

242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 

1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs likewise cannot 

create a genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion 

for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) 

(plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, 

are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 

(11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing 

beyond his own conclusory allegations challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. 

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own 

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conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when a 

plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will 

bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the 

moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential 

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); 

Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any 

part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require 

submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are 

relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Avenue, 

Miami, Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by 

the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary 

of the Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only 

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will 

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will 

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting 

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 

(11th Cir. 2003). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing 

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts... . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a 

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for 

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trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 

(1986) (internal citations omitted). Where the evidence before the court which is 

admissible on its face or which can be reduced to admissible form indicates there is no 

genuine dispute of material fact and establishes the party moving for summary judgment 

is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-

324 (Summary judgment is appropriate where pleadings, evidentiary materials and 

affidavits before the court show there is no genuine dispute as to a requisite material 

fact.); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 

2001) (to establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce 

evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, 

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a 

genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 

F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Mallory’s pro se status alone does not mandate this 

court’s disregard of the principles of production and proof in a civil case. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Injunctive Relief

Mallory seeks injunctive relief, requesting that immediate action be taken to 

secure his safety and a transfer to another facility “free of harm.” (Doc. 1). However, 

Mallory is no longer incarcerated at Easterling. The transfer or release of a prisoner 

renders moot any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See County of Los Angeles 

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v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); see also Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th 

Cir. 1985) (past exposure to even illegal conduct does not in and of itself show a pending 

case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing 

present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury). As it is clear from the 

pleadings and records before the court that Mallory is no longer incarcerated at 

Easterling, his request for injunctive relief is moot.

B. Absolute Immunity

To the extent that the constitutional violations which Mallory lodges against 

defendants are brought against them in their official capacities, defendants are entitled to 

absolute immunity from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects 

other than name, ... treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 

159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state 

has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, 

see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996). Alabama 

has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated 

Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims 

brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 

1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that defendants are state actors entitled to 

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary 

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damages from them in their official capacity. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. 

Georgia Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994).

C. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force – Qualified Immunity

Regarding Mallory’s excessive force claim against defendant Greene in his

individual capacity, Greene argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The court 

agrees.

Qualified immunity offers complete protection for a government official from suit

– provided that the official was performing discretionary functions and has been sued in 

his individual capacity – if the conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of 

“[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials 

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity protects public 

officials from broad-ranging discovery disruptive to effective government, see id. at 818, 

and operates as a shield against civil damages due to mistaken judgments. See Malley v. 

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) 

(“[Public] officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake 

is one of fact or one of law.”). 

The qualified immunity entitlement will fail only “if an official ‘knew or 

reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official 

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responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].’” Harlow, 457 U.S. 

at 815 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)) (emphasis removed). 

Qualified immunity “represents the norm” for government officials exercising 

discretionary authority. Id. at 807. 

Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 

liability... .” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, 

the “driving force” behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to 

ensure that “‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to 

discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, n. 2 (1987). Accordingly, the 

Supreme Court “repeatedly ha[s] stressed the importance of resolving immunity 

questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227

(1991) (per curiam). The qualified immunity analysis employs an “objective 

reasonableness standard, giving a government agent the benefit of the doubt unless h[is] 

actions were so obviously illegal in the light of then-existing law that only an official 

who was incompetent or who knowingly was violating the law would have committed 

them.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir. 

1998). “We generally accord ... official conduct a presumption of legitimacy.” United 

States Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991). 

The outcome of an assertion of qualified immunity depends in large measure on 

whether (1) the law allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct 

complained about, and (2) if it was, whether the official’s conduct was objectively 

reasonable in light of the information known to the official at the time. See Creighton, 

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483 U.S. at 641. These are both objective and fact-specific inquiries and, while the court 

addresses them as questions of law, Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–28 & n. 9, it does so by 

viewing the record through the eyes of an objective, reasonable governmental official. 

Nicholson v. Georgia Department of Human Resources, 918 F.2d 145, 147 (11th Cir. 

1990). To determine whether an officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, the court 

looks at the information known to him, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435, 1438 (11th Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g on others 

grounds, 11 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1994).

Qualified immunity is a broad immunity that protects officers not only from 

lawful actions taken in the scope of their discretionary functions, but from certain 

reasonable mistakes as well; an officer is shielded from suit when he makes a reasonable 

mistake of law or fact. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. See also Messerschmidt v. 

Millender, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2012) (“[q]ualified immunity gives 

government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and 

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If an officer’s error is entitled to the 

protection of qualified immunity, such protection “applies regardless of whether the 

government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on 

mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “the salient question ... is whether the state of 

the law [at the time of the events in question] gave respondents fair warning that their 

alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. 

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Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 

741 (2002)).

Once a defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity and has shown that 

his actions were within the scope of discretionary authority, then the plaintiff has the 

burden to overcome the defense. Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1563–64 (11th Cir. 

1988). More specifically, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes a two-part analysis for qualified 

immunity claims. The defendant public official must first prove that “he was acting 

within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts 

occurred.” Id. Second, once the defendant public official satisfies his burden of moving 

forward with the evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show lack of good faith on 

the defendant’s part. This burden is met by proof demonstrating that the defendant public 

official’s actions “violated clearly established constitutional law.” Id. (quoting Zeigler v. 

Jackson, 716 F.2d 847, 849 (11th Cir. 1983)) (other citations omitted). Furthermore, there 

is a temporal requirement related to this inquiry – a plaintiff must show that a reasonable 

public officer would not have believed his actions to be lawful in light of law that was 

clearly established at the time of the purported violation. See Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641; 

Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1091 (11th Cir. 1996).

Because “[t]he defense of qualified immunity completely protects government 

officials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless 

their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known[,]” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), the summary judgment 

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requirement to “review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

party opposing summary judgment,” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023, takes on even greater 

force when, in a case founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state governmental official

interposes the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in a motion for summary 

judgment analysis. In such cases, the court normally must answer the legal question of 

whether the governmental official is entitled to qualified immunity under the plaintiff’s 

version of the facts as supported by the evidence of record when cast in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 204, 201 (2001), overruled 

in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009).

1. Qualified Immunity is Available to a Defendant in an Eighth 

Amendment Excessive Force § 1983 Lawsuit

Certain Eleventh Circuit decisions – notably, Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308 

(11th Cir. 2002), and Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2002) – have been

interpreted at times as providing for a per se bar to qualified immunity in all § 1983 

Eighth Amendment excessive force cases. However, that interpretation sweeps too 

broadly. See Bowden v. Stokley, 576 F. App’x 951, 955 (11th Cir. 2014) (“there is no per 

se rule barring qualified immunity in Eighth Amendment cases[.]”). Read in light of 

subsequent decisions, Johnson and Skrtich stand for the proposition that where the 

plaintiff establishes excessive force that was sadistically and maliciously applied by a 

defendant for the very purpose of causing harm – that is, where plaintiff makes the 

appropriate showing on summary judgment or at trial – there will always be a violation 

of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, because it is clearly established that any

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infliction of excessive force on a prisoner sadistically and maliciously for the very 

purpose of causing harm, and which does cause harm, violates the Constitution. Johnson, 

280 F.3d at 1321–22; Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301;

2 see also, e.g., Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 

F.3d 1212, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009) (Noting that the subjective element required to establish 

an excessive force violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments is so extreme that 

every conceivable set of circumstances in which this occurs is clearly established to be a 

violation of the Constitution.) (citation omitted); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310 

(11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 

701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010) (indicating that once a plaintiff shows an Eighth Amendment 

 2

 Skrtich held that

In this Circuit, a defense of qualified immunity is not available in cases alleging 

excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because the use of force 

“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” is clearly established to be a violation of the 

Constitution by the Supreme Court decisions in Hudson and Whitley. See Johnson v. 

Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). There is simply no room for a qualified 

immunity defense when the plaintiff alleges such a violation. Id. The only question, then, 

is whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss or a 

motion for summary judgment.

Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1301 (emphasis added). The addition of the phrase, “or a motion for summary 

judgment” clouds the issue somewhat because this phrase could mistakenly be taken to suggest that there 

is a per se rule against granting qualified immunity on summary judgment, not just on a motion to 

dismiss, as noted infra. However, the Court’s actual decision in Skrtich refutes that interpretation. As to 

the § 1983 excessive force claims, the district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment on 

its merits and rejected the officers’ qualified immunity arguments raised in that motion. Id. at 1300-01. 

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order and found that, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, the “evidence” before the district court – not the plaintiff’s allegations –

established an Eighth Amendment violation such that “no qualified immunity defense was available to the 

officers[.]” Id. at 1300-03. The Court also found no fault with the district court’s undertaking a qualified 

immunity analysis that was independent of its analysis of the merits of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

claims, and it affirmed the lower court’s qualified immunity reasoning and decision. Id. at 1302-05.

Thus, it is improper to read into Skrtich a per se bar to qualified immunity on summary judgment 

in Eighth Amendment excessive force cases by isolating certain statements from the whole of the 

decision. As with Johnson, Skrtich reaffirmed the point of law that, when an excessive force 

constitutional violation is shown, the clearly established prong is per se satisfied. 

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excessive force violation, qualified immunity is unavailable because the right is clearly 

established as a matter of law).

However, if a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a constitutional violation – that is, if 

plaintiff does not present evidence which, when viewed in the light most favorable to that 

plaintiff, supports an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim – the officer is entitled to 

qualified immunity. A per se rule that qualified immunity is inappropriate on summary 

judgment where a plaintiff has not presented evidence that could sustain an Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim would eviscerate the plaintiff’s burden of proof to 

show a constitutional violation once a defendant evokes qualified immunity and turn Rule 

56 on its head. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 736, and Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (a plaintiff bears 

the burden to show that a constitutional violation occurred to defeat a defendant’s 

assertion of qualified immunity); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; 

Skelly v. Okaloosa County Bd. of County Com’rs, 456 F. App’x 845, 847-48 (11th Cir. 

2012) (engaging in a qualified immunity analysis on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

excessive force claims and distinguishing between a plaintiff’s burden to show a 

constitutional violation in the first instance from the fact that, once a violation is 

demonstrated, the Eighth Amendment right is always clearly established); Fennell, 559 

F.3d at 1216-17 (Granting qualified immunity where plaintiff failed to show that officer’s 

use of force constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.). 

On the other hand, qualified immunity is not available on a motion to dismiss 

where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant used excessive force in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. This is so because, on such a motion, the court must accept as true all wellCase 2:12-cv-01011-WHA-SRW Document 43 Filed 08/26/16 Page 14 of 34
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pleaded factual allegations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

679 (2009). Thus, the plaintiff’s burden of proof in a case in which qualified immunity is 

at issue is dependent on what type of motion is before the court. 

As discussed above, this matter is before the court on a motion for summary 

judgment. Accordingly, where evidence is considered by the court, it is construed in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff; nevertheless, that evidence must support an Eighth 

Amendment excessive force claim in order to avoid qualified immunity.

2. Summary Judgment Facts for Qualified Immunity Purposes

a. Material Facts3

On October 16, 2012, Defendant Greene directed plaintiff to report to his assigned 

dorm. (Doc. 14-2 at 1, 3). Plaintiff testifies that Greene instructed him to “get away from 

that door [in E-1 of E-Dorm]; I repl[ied] by saying that I am not in front of the door, and I 

am not in an unauthorized area of the dorm.” (Doc. 1 at 5). According to plaintiff, Greene 

told him to stay where he was, and plaintiff agreed to do so. (Doc. 1 at 5). Defendant 

Greene then ordered plaintiff to produce his identification card. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 14-2 

at 1, 3). Plaintiff challenged Greene’s directive by asking, “Why do you want my I.D.?” 

(Doc. 1 at 5). Greene replied by asking plaintiff to “just come on in the lobby” of EDorm, and plaintiff complied. (Id.). 

 3 These are the facts for summary judgment purposes only. They may or may not be the actual facts. See 

Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hat we state as 

‘facts’ in this opinion for purposes of reviewing the rulings on the summary judgment motion [ ] may not 

be the actual facts.”) (citation and marks omitted). 

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Once inside the lobby, Greene ordered plaintiff to place his hands on the wall. 

(Id.). Plaintiff for the second time rejected one of Greene’s commands with the question, 

“Why?” (Id.). At this point, Greene removed his “duty belt,” placed it on a table, and said 

“buck buck!”4 (Id.). After plaintiff questioned Greene’s command to stand against the 

wall, Greene “grabbed” plaintiff’s arm. (Id.). Plaintiff resisted Greene by pulling away 

from Greene’s grasp and “told him not to put his hands on me.” (Doc. 1 at 6).

A brawl ensued as Greene attempted to subdue the plaintiff and plaintiff 

physically resisted. Greene grasped plaintiff’s waist, threw him onto a table, and “jumped 

on top” of plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff struggled, and pushed Greene to the other side of the 

table. Greene maintained a grip on plaintiff’s person, and he began punching the plaintiff 

“from the bottom.” (Id.). Plaintiff testifies that he began to “defend” himself. (Id.). 

Witnesses testify that plaintiff “started swinging,” and at some point plaintiff was on top 

of Greene, punching him in the face. (Doc. # 14-2 at 1; Doc. # 14-3, 14-4, 14-5, 14-7, 

14-8, 14-9). The two men “were wrestling on the floor”; neither man maintained the 

upper hand for long. (Doc. 1, 5, 14-2 at 1, 3). 

At some point when Greene had “overpowered” plaintiff, and gotten on top of 

plaintiff and punched him about the face, at least three corrections officers entered the 

room and attempted to pull the men apart. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff resisted those officers’ 

attempts to place him in handcuffs; he testifies that he did so because Greene continued 

 4 Plaintiff argues that, by those actions, Greene adopted an aggressive posture which plaintiff perceived as 

threatening or physically intimidating. (Doc. 19). The parties dispute whether Greene removed his belt or 

said “buck buck.” However, assuming that both events occurred, plaintiff has not explained why Greene’s 

actions are unusual and did not represent Greene’s attempt to cause plaintiff to comply with Greene’s 

directive that plaintiff place his hands on a wall. 

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“attacking me by punching and kicking me.” (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 14-2 at 1, 3). Officer 

Calhoun sprayed plaintiff with a “one second burst of Sabre Red Chemical Agent” (Doc. 

14-2 at 1, 3), and an officer identified by plaintiff as “Sgt. Jones” restrained Greene and 

said, “Greene, what are you doing, man?” (Doc. 1 at 6). 

The men were separated, and three corrections officers placed plaintiff on the floor 

and endeavored to handcuff him. (Doc. 14-4 at 1). According the uncontroverted 

testimony of one of those officers – Officer Rodney Johnson – plaintiff “tried to break 

free and go after Officer Greene again.” (Doc. 14-4 at 1). Once plaintiff was handcuffed 

and subdued, Greene did not use any additional force.5 (Doc. 1; Doc. 5; Doc. 14-2 at 3). 

According to plaintiff’s affidavit testimony, he stopped resisting the officers’ attempts to 

place him in handcuffs only after Greene was physically restrained by his fellow officer. 

(Doc. 1 at 6).

The officers who had subdued and handcuffed the plaintiff escorted him to the 

infirmary, where his condition was evaluated by a nurse. Plaintiff was treated for 

 5 There is disputed evidence that, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Greene “attempted to 

kick and hit [plaintiff after he] was restrained and his aggression had stopped.” (Doc. 14-2 at 28)

(emphasis added). Greene was restrained by a fellow officer at that time, and he did not actually kick or 

hit or otherwise make contact with plaintiff after the plaintiff was subdued and restrained in handcuffs. 

There is no evidence that Greene used force on plaintiff after plaintiff was restrained. See Watson v. 

Edelen, 76 F.Supp.3d 1332, 1371 (N.D. Fla. 2015) (“[A] gratuitous use of force on a handcuffed, 

shackled, and physically compliant prisoner constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 

on the use of excessive force.”). Greene’s alleged attempts to use force on the plaintiff while he was 

subdued and handcuffed is not the same as the use of force. For purposes of the Eighth Amendment, 

“force” is understood to require “physical force.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (“In 

its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison 

officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners.”) (citing Hudson v. 

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (same).			

Moreover, based on the facts of this case, Greene’s attempt to kick plaintiff while the latter was 

handcuffed and prostrate does not give rise to a jury question as to whether Greene acted with malice or 

sadistically prior to the attempted kick. 

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exposure to the chemical agent and released. He sustained “knots” and bruises, but no 

open wounds. (Id.). None of his injuries was noted in the infirmary’s medical records. 

(Id.). 

b. Sham Affidavit

In order to rule on Greene’s assertion of qualified immunity, the court must first 

resolve an evidentiary issue created by plaintiff. Prior to responding to defendants’ 

special report, plaintiff submitted two affidavits in which he provided consistent

substantive testimony regarding the material events supporting his Eighth Amendment 

excessive force claim against Greene. (Doc. 1, 5). That testimony is summarized above. 

Plaintiff’s consistent testimony in the two affidavits at issue is sufficient for the court to 

afford plaintiff’s version of events credence for summary judgment purposes; in addition, 

other evidence of record is also consistent with the testimony contained in plaintiff’s two 

affidavits. (See e.g., Docs. 1, 5, 14-3, 14-4, 14-5, 14-6, 14-7, 14-8). Based solely on this

evidentiary record, the court would conclude that there are no material facts in dispute as 

to plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. 

However, plaintiff also filed a third affidavit in opposition to defendants’ special 

report that differs materially and substantively from his testimony in his prior affidavits. 

(Doc. 19; cf. Doc. 1, 5). The third affidavit creates a dispute of material fact that, if 

considered by the court, would preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff offers no 

explanation for the irreconcilable differences that appear when one compares his third 

affidavit with his prior two affidavits.

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As discussed above, in his first two affidavits, plaintiff testifies that he was 

handcuffed and subdued only after several officers arrived on the scene of his physical 

altercation with Greene, and after an officer sprayed a chemical agent into plaintiff’s 

face. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 5 at 4). Plaintiff testified that he and Greene were physically 

separated before he relented and permitted officers to place him in handcuffs. (Id.). This 

version of events corresponds with the testimony of Officer Rodney Johnson (Doc. 14-4 

at 1), Officer Kevin Calhoun (Doc. 14-5 at 1), Correctional Sergeant Lester Grimsley 

(Doc. 14-7 at 1), and Correctional Sergeant Dominic Jones (Doc. 14-8). In other words, 

before plaintiff filed his third affidavit in response to the defendants’ special report, the 

plaintiff’s first two affidavits, as well as the affidavits of four eye witnesses, provide 

undisputed evidence that plaintiff was placed in handcuffs by officers other than Greene 

after he and Greene were separated from one another. 

In the plaintiff’s third affidavit, however, plaintiff testifies that Greene placed him 

in handcuffs while the two men were alone, then called for assistance and “continued to 

punch and knee the Plaintiff while he was in handcuffs on the floor faced down, until 

[Sergeant Grimsley and Sergeant Jones arrived and they] grabbed [Greene] off of the 

Plaintiff and placed [Greene] against the lobby wall.” (Doc. 19 at 3, citing Pl. Ex. 1, 2 

and 5). In his opposition to summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment excessive force 

claim against Greene, plaintiff raises for the first time the legal argument that a prison 

officer who beats a handcuffed and subdued prisoner commits an Eighth Amendment 

violation. (Doc. 19). Clearly, plaintiff’s third affidavit is calculated to defeat summary 

judgment on his excessive force claim, and it ignores the fact that plaintiff’s new version 

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of events conflicts irreconcilably with his own prior sworn testimony, which he 

voluntarily filed into the court’s record on two occasions.

District courts “shall consider all evidence in the record when reviewing a motion 

for summary judgment—pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc.—and can 

only grant summary judgment if everything in the record ... demonstrates that no genuine 

issue of material fact exists.” Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 

1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, there is an exception to that mandate 

when a party tries to escape summary judgment by using an affidavit to create an issue of 

fact where none existed. Under that circumstance, the court is vested with the discretion 

to disregard such an affidavit as a “sham” if it contradicts prior, clear testimony without 

explanation. Van T. Junkins and Assoc. v. U.S. Indus., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 

1984). Under the “sham affidavit” doctrine, when a party gives clear testimony that 

negates the existence of any dispute of material fact, “that party cannot thereafter create 

such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously 

given clear testimony.” Id. 

Recognizing that “[e]very discrepancy contained in an affidavit does not justify a 

district court’s refusal to give credence to such evidence,” and that the court must 

distinguish “between discrepancies which create transparent shams and discrepancies 

which create an issue of credibility or go to the weight of the evidence[,]” this court 

nevertheless concludes that plaintiff’s third affidavit provides a wholly different version 

of material events, plaintiff does not explain why there are material differences, and his 

testimony in the third affidavit is irreconcilable with his previous affidavit testimony. 

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Tippens, 805 F.2d at 953-54 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff clearly testifies 

in his first affidavit that he was handcuffed by officers other than Greene and that Greene 

did not use any force upon the plaintiff after he was placed in handcuffs. (Doc. 1 at 5-6). 

Plaintiff repeats this testimony in his second affidavit. (Doc. 5). The court need not make 

any inferential leap to understand plaintiff’s sworn testimony on those points; therefore, 

there is no need for a jury to make a determination of fact. Plaintiff’s third affidavit is 

equally clear, and it is in direct conflict with plaintiff’s prior testimony. Again, this is not 

a circumstance where plaintiff’s credibility is at issue because of conflicting affidavit 

testimony such that a jury is needed to make a credibility determination and factual 

findings. 

After careful consideration, the court concludes that plaintiff’s third affidavit 

testimony (Doc. 19) is due to be stricken as a sham. It will not be considered on summary 

judgment.

3. Discretionary Authority

In the present case, it is undisputed that Defendant Greene acted within the scope 

of his discretionary authority during the events that form the basis of plaintiff’s 

complaint, and the court so finds. Accordingly, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show 

that Greene violated his constitutional right to be free from excessive force and, if 

plaintiff demonstrates an Eighth Amendment violation, that the right was clearly 

established at the time of the violation. See Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358 (“Once a defendant 

establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.”). 

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4. Constitutional Violation

Once the burden shifts to the plaintiff, “[t]he threshold inquiry a court must 

undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff's allegations [or, if 

qualified immunity is asserted at summary judgment, the evidence construed in a light 

most favorable to the plaintiff], if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope, 536 at 

736; see also Saucier, 533 U.S. 194. In the present case, Mallory cannot meet his burden 

to show that Greene violated his right to be free from excessive force under the Eighth 

Amendment. 

Claims of excessive force by prison officials against convicted inmates are 

governed by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. 

Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit 

summarizes the relevant legal framework for an Eighth Amendment excessive force 

claim as follows:

In ... Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, whether the use of 

force violates an inmate’s constitutional rights “ultimately turns on 

‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 

harm.’” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 

L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d 

Cir.1973)) (establishing the standard for an Eighth Amendment excessive 

force claim)[.] If force is used “maliciously and sadistically for the very 

purpose of causing harm,” then it necessarily shocks the conscience. See 

Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187, 1188 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give equivalent protections against 

excessive force). If not, then it does not.

Under this standard, we look at “the need for the application of 

force; the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was 

used; and the extent of the injury inflicted upon the prisoner.” Id. (citing 

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085). Additionally, we consider “the 

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extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably 

perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to 

them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” 

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085. Not only that, but we must also 

give a “wide range of deference to prison officials acting to preserve 

discipline and security,” including when considering “[d]ecisions made at 

the scene of a disturbance.” Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th 

Cir.1990).

Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations to Fourteenth 

Amendment cases omitted). “From consideration of such factors, ‘inferences may be 

drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or 

instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is 

tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.’” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (quoting 

Johnson Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300-

1301. 

The standard applied to an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim contains both 

an objective and a subjective component. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 

(1992). Regarding the objective component, a plaintiff must show that “the alleged 

wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). 

Not every malevolent touch by a prison official amounts to a deprivation of 

constitutional rights. See id. at 9. Summary applications of force are constitutionally 

permissible when prison security and order, or the safety of other inmates or officers, 

have been placed in jeopardy. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312. In extending Whitley to all cases 

involving allegations of force, the Hudson Court reasoned:

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Many of the concerns underlying our holding in Whitley arise whenever 

guards use force to keep order. Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a 

lesser disruption, corrections officers must balance the need “to maintain or 

restore discipline” through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Both 

situations may require prison officials to act quickly and decisively. 

Likewise, both implicate the principle that “‘[p]rison administrators ... 

should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution 

of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’”

503 U.S. at 6 (citations omitted). 

While the severity of a plaintiff’s injuries is a factor for the court to consider, an 

excessive force claim cannot be dismissed on the basis that the plaintiff sustained 

minimal or no injuries. The Hudson Court clarified that the extent of the injury suffered 

by the inmate is only one of the many factors which should be considered, not a decisive 

one – “[t]he absence of serious injury is therefore relevant to the Eighth Amendment 

inquiry, but does not end it.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. “An inmate who is gratuitously 

beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely 

because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 556 

U.S. 34, 38 (2010); see also Hall v. Bennett, 447 F. App’x 921, 923-24 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(per curiam) (citing Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38) (“[W]hile [plaintiff] medical reports did 

not note any obvious injuries, we are mindful of the fact that the focus of the inquiry is on 

the nature of the force applied, not the extent of the injury.”). Recognizing that the relief

in such a case could be minimal, the Court added that “even if [the inmate] succeeds, the 

relatively modest nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the damages he may 

recover.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 40.

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The subjective component requires that prison “officials act[ed] with a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation under the 

undisputed facts of this case. A prison guard is permitted to use force to maintain order, 

and the use of force during a verbal altercation between prisoner and guard can fall

within the scope of maintaining order. Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 

1990). In Bennett, a case involving more severe force than the instant action and 

significantly greater injury to the prisoner, the Court found that the fact that Bennett 

created a disturbance justified the amount of force used by the defendant officers. After 

complying with a prison guard’s order to clean his cell, Bennett questioned the guard’s 

decision to deny Bennett permission to visit the prison gymnasium. Id. at 1531. Two 

guards were present, and one took issue with Bennett’s query. He ordered Bennett to exit 

his cell, and Bennett complied. The guard grabbed Bennett by the throat, shouted

obscenities and racial slurs, and told Bennett he was under no obligation to allow gym 

access. 

Bennett demanded that the guard release his grip, and Bennett struggled against 

the guard. Once Bennett began to struggle, the second guard pushed Bennett against the 

cell bars, while the other guard, who had a grip on Bennet’s throat, “hit Bennett with a

nightstick on the left side of his head, near the eye.” Id. at 1532. The Eleventh Circuit 

determined that the force used was not excessive, but “was appropriate based on the 

prison’s security interests in maintaining order and the minimal injuries Bennett 

sustained.” Id. at 1535. 

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Similarly, in Brown, 813 F.2d at 1189, the force used by guards was deemed 

justified where a verbal altercation occurred between Brown and prison guards, which 

was followed by Brown’s refusal to enter his cell. A guard grabbed Brown’s arm in an 

attempt to lead Brown into his cell; that precipitated a “confrontation” between prisoner 

and guard which resulted in a guard’s placing a “riot baton” against Brown’s neck “with 

some degree of force” and other officers assisting that guard to force Brown into his cell. 

Id. at 1189. The Eleventh Circuit held that the use and severity of force “was justified 

under the circumstances, and that the force was used for a legitimate security purpose[.]” 

Id.

In the present case, plaintiff refused Greene’s directive to produce his prison 

identification card, and questioned Greene’s reasons for the command. A prisoner’s 

failure to comply with an officer’s order permits the officer to use some measure of force 

to gain the prisoner’s compliance or to respond to a threat that arises because of the 

prisoner’s failure to comply. See, e.g., Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 

2008) (“Danley created a disturbance by failing to obey orders, and the jailers’ initial use 

of pepper spray was a reasonable response to that threat.”). Greene also ordered plaintiff 

to place his hands on a prison wall. Plaintiff refused; Greene then used a reasonable and 

minimal level of force – i.e., grabbing plaintiff’s arm – to cause plaintiff comply. See 

Brown, 813 F.2d at 1189 (grabbing a prisoner’s arm to force compliance was not 

excessive force). It is undisputed that plaintiff verbally and physically resisted once 

Greene grabbed plaintiff’s arm. Greene escalated his use of force after plaintiff resisted;

he forced plaintiff onto a table and straddled plaintiff’s body. Plaintiff fought back, at 

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which point it would have been reasonable for Greene to fear for his personal safety, 

particularly in light of plaintiff’s continued and escalating resistance to Greene’s 

authority, commands, and forceful attempts to subdue the plaintiff. It was only after the 

two men were separated by other guards that plaintiff was subdued and placed in 

handcuffs. 

The evidence of record, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reveals a 

situation in which Greene used a constitutionally permissible amount of force to maintain 

order, safeguard prison security, and protect himself from the plaintiff. There is no 

evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Greene acted maliciously or 

sadistically. There is a “wide range of deference [given] to prison officials acting to 

preserve discipline and security.” Bennett, 898 F.2d at 1533. “Under the Eighth 

Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial setting as long as it is applied in a 

good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline and not maliciously and sadistically to 

cause harm.” McReynolds v. Ala. Dept. of Youth Services, No. 2:04-cv-850-MEF, 2008 

WL 1927373, *3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2008) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-

21 (1986); Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300). Greene acted within his allotted range of deference 

in this case and, on the evidence presently before the court, there can be no other 

conclusion than that Greene’s use of force was necessary to restore discipline, combat a 

physical threat from the plaintiff, and maintain prison security. 

Thus, plaintiff fails in meeting his burden to show a constitutional violation, and

Greene is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. See Fennell, 559 F.3d at 1216-17. The 

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motion for summary judgment is due to be granted as to the individual capacity claims 

against Greene. 

D. Due Process

Mallory maintains that defendant Greene issued him a false disciplinary charge to 

“shield” the guard’s unwarranted use of force. Mallory also complains that defendant 

Hetzel violated his right to due process by approving the hearing officer’s guilty finding

on the charged violation and the sanctions imposed. (Doc. 1, 5).

Defendants’ evidence reflects that on October 16, 2012, Defendant Greene issued 

Mallory a disciplinary for a violation of Rule #29 – “Assault on an ALDOC Official.”

Following a hearing on the disciplinary charge, the hearing officer found Mallory guilty 

as charged in the disciplinary report and sanctioned him with 45 days’ disciplinary 

segregation and 60 days’ loss of all privileges, which included 15 days in the Restricted 

Privileges Dorm after serving the 45 days of segregation time. The record indicates that it 

was Warden Sconyers, not Hetzel, who approved the disciplinary but reduced sanctions 

to 45 days’ segregation and 45 days’ loss of all privileges on October 30, 2012. The 

disciplinary report also reflects that Mallory was provided advance, written notice of the 

charges against him, an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence 

in his own behalf, and a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on and 

the reasons for the disciplinary action (Doc. 25, Exh. 4 at 2-3). See Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539 (1974); see also Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) (at a prison 

disciplinary hearing, the requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” 

supports the decision of the disciplinary hearing officer). 

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An allegation that an inmate has been wrongly reported or punished for conduct 

which he did not commit does not, without more, assert a valid claim of the denial of due 

process. See Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, Mallory’s claim 

regarding the allegedly false disciplinary report lacks merit. Further, defendants do not 

admit that the information contained in either the incident reports or the disciplinary 

report regarding the October 16, 2012, incident is false. While Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 

F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1991), establishes a constitutional claim for the knowing use of false 

information by prison officials, the instant case is controlled by Slocum v. Georgia State 

Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1982). In Slocum, the Court held 

that prisoners state no due process claim by merely asserting that erroneous information 

may exist in their prison files. Moreover, “prisoners cannot make a conclusory allegation 

regarding the use of [false] information as the basis of a due process claim.” Jones v. Ray, 

279 F.3d 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2001). Mallory merely asserts that Defendants based 

disciplinary action from the October 16, 2012, incident on false information, which

entitles him to no relief.

The Supreme Court has also held that prison regulations on confinement of 

inmates create no liberty interest enforceable in a § 1983 action. Sandin v. Conner, 515 

U.S. 472 (1995). In Sandin, the Court determined that the added restraint of prison 

discipline “did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state 

might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. “As long as the conditions or 

degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed 

upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does 

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not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” 

Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).

Here, Mallory does not demonstrate that the temporary assignment to segregation 

and loss of privileges because of the misconduct charge subjected him to “atypical and 

significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 

U.S. at 484. Because Mallory has not alleged deprivation of a protected liberty interest, 

he fails to state a due process claim based upon the alleged false charge. See id. at 487; 

see also Collins, 743 F.2d at 253–54 (“[i]f the disciplinary proceeding was otherwise fair 

and adequate, the opportunity that it afforded [Mallory] to clear himself of misdeeds 

which he did not commit sufficed.”). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Mallory’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. 

E. Classification

To the extent that Mallory challenges the defendants’ actions regarding a change 

to his security classification level, he is entitled to no relief. Because of the seriousness of 

the disciplinary Mallory received for violating Rule #29 − Assault on a ALDOC Official

− Defendant Anglin recommended to the Central Review Board that Mallory’s 

classification level be increased. After plaintiff received notice of a pending reclassification, a due process hearing was held November 26, 2012. On December 14, 

2012, the Central Review Board approved the recommendation to increase Mallory’s 

security classification from level four to level five. (Doc. 14, Exh. K, L).

The prison officials’ decision to recommend Mallory for a custody increase based 

on his disciplinary for violating Rule #29 does not mark a “dramatic departure from the 

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basic conditions” of his sentence. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. As an inmate confined in the 

Alabama prison system, Mallory has no constitutionally protected interest in the 

procedure affecting his classification level because the resulting restraint, without more, 

does not impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Because Mallory has no constitutionally 

protected interest in the level of his custody classification, correctional officials may 

assign him to any classification level without implicating the protections of due process. 

See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976) (Constitution itself confers no right 

upon an inmate to any particular custody or security classification.); Meachum v. Fano, 

427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (“Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the 

normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to 

impose.”). Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the classification 

decision challenged by Mallory.

F. Conditions

Mallory alleges that he was subjected to an unsafe and hazardous living condition

because he remained housed at Easterling following the incident with Defendant Greene 

and because he was placed in segregation “for an act he did not do.” (Doc. 1). The 

Constitution proscribes those conditions of confinement which involve the wanton and 

unnecessary infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). There is no 

“static test” for determining which conditions violate the Constitution. Id. at 346. To 

prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must show 

he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official 

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acted with “deliberate indifference” to such risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 

834 (1994); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 

Here, Mallory alleges in conclusory terms that he was subjected to a hazardous 

and unsafe condition of confinement when he remained at Easterling in the segregation 

unit following the altercation with Defendant Greene. Mallory, however, fails to 

demonstrate how the conditions about which he complains subjected him to a substantial 

risk of serious harm, much less that defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk. 

Defendants’ evidence reflects that following the incident between Mallory and Defendant 

Greene, the guard was assigned duties outside the institution on October 16, 2012, an

assignment to remain in effect until rescinded by the Warden. Mallory’s assignment to 

segregation and Defendant Greene’s duty assignment on the outside of the institution 

prevented the possibility of their having any contact. Additionally, following the Central 

Review Board’s December 14, 2012, decision to approve Defendant Anglin’s 

recommendation that Mallory be reclassified to a level five facility, he was transferred to 

the St. Clair Correctional Facility on February 7, 2013.6 (Doc. 14, Exhs. K, L). The mere 

fact that the condition described by Mallory existed is insufficient to demonstrate a 

constitutional violation. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 

Mallory’s conditions of confinement claim is due to be granted.

G. The Investigation Claim

 6 Mallory was originally slated to be transferred to the St. Clair Correctional Facility on January 10, 2013, 

but the transfer was rescheduled after prison officials were notified on January 9, 2013, that he was 

scheduled for a court appearance in Baldwin County, Alabama. (Doc. 14-11, 14-12).

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To the extent that Mallory complains that Defendant Hetzel violated his right to 

due process by failing to investigate a complaint he sent the warden regarding the 

incident with Defendant Greene, this claim entitles Mallory to no relief. “It is well-settled 

that § 1983 does not create a federal right or benefit; it simply provides a mechanism for 

enforcing a right or benefit established elsewhere.” See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 

808, 816 (1985). Here, Mallory’s claim that Defendant Hetzel violated his due process 

rights by failing to investigate his complaint of assault by Defendant Greene implicates 

no constitutional right to which he is entitled. Failing to investigate an inmate’s complaint 

properly does not rise to the level of a separate constitutional violation. See generally 

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding there is no 

constitutional right to an investigation of an excessive force claim). Inmates simply do 

not enjoy a constitutional right to an investigation of any kind by government officials. 

See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) 

(“The Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, 

even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of 

which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”). Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on this claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge 

that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief (Doc. 1) be DENIED as moot,

2. Plaintiff’s third affidavit (Doc. 19) be stricken as a sham affidavit,

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3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) be GRANTED, and

4. Final judgment be entered in favor of defendants on all of plaintiff’s claims,

and this case closed. 

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file the Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge and to serve a copy on the parties. The parties may file any objections 

to this Recommendation on or before September 9, 2016. Any objections filed must 

specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s 

Recommendation to which the parties object. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections 

will not be considered by the District Court.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual 

and legal conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of 

justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 

1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

DONE, on this the 26th day of August, 2016.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:12-cv-01011-WHA-SRW Document 43 Filed 08/26/16 Page 34 of 34