Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02179/USCOURTS-arwd-2_04-cv-02179-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

JEFFREY L. MANCUSO PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-2179

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jeffrey L. Mancuso brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking

judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(Commissioner) denying his claims for period of disability and disability insurance benefits

(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under the provisions of Titles II and XVI

of the Social Security Act (Act). 

Procedural Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI presently before this court were filed on June 16, 2003,

alleging an inability to work since January 12, 2003, due to stomach problems, GERD, asthma

and sinus problems and Bi-Polar disorder. (Tr. 56-59, 198-201). An administrative hearing was

held on April 7, 2004. (Tr. 215-253). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel.

By written decision dated June 7, 2004, the ALJ found that plaintiff has an impairment

or combination of impairments that are severe. (Tr. 24). However, after reviewing all of the

evidence presented, he determined that plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal the level of

severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P,

Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 24). The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity

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(RFC) to perform work involving understanding, remembering and carrying out simple one to

two step task-oriented, as opposed to production oriented, instructions and/or tasks; and work

involving no more than incidental contact with the general public, co-workers or supervisors.

(Tr. 23-24). The ALJ, with the use of vocational expert testimony, found plaintiff can perform

his past relevant work as a spot welder and a hospital food preparer. (Tr. 23-24). 

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Appeals Council. Plaintiff's request for

review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council was denied on July 22, 2004. (Tr. 6-9).

When the Appeals Council declined review, the ALJ’s decision became the final action of the

Commissioner. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision. (Doc. #1). Both parties have

submitted appeal briefs and this case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the

parties. (Doc. #’s 9,10).

Evidence Presented:

At the time of the administrative hearing before the ALJ on April 7, 2004, plaintiff was

forty-one years of age and obtained a high school education. (Tr. 221-222). The record reflects

plaintiff’s past relevant work consists of work as a sales clerk, a welder, and a dietary aide at a

nursing home. (Tr. 223- 225, 227). Plaintiff testified that he has a current driver’s license and

is able to drive. (Tr. 228-229).

Plaintiff testified that he has problems with his stomach. (Tr. 228). When he has a flareup, plaintiff testified he is bedridden.(Tr. 228). Plaintiff reported that he seeks treatment through

the Good Samaritan Clinic and has been prescribed Nexium and Prozac. 

Plaintiff testified that he does not sleep well due to his stomach problems. (Tr. 229). As

for activities, plaintiff testified he does his normal household chores including laundry, cleaning

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his room and doing yard work. (Tr. 229). Plaintiff testified that he had to move in with his

mother because he could not afford to live on his own. (Tr. 230). 

Plaintiff testified he is unable to work due to a combination of stomach and mental

problems. (Tr. 230). Plaintiff, who indicated that he was sweating at the hearing, testified that

when he is nervous he will start to sweat and then he will experience a flare-up of his stomach

problem. (Tr. 230). Plaintiff testified that he has difficulty being around people, in crowds and

around noises or around strangers. Plaintiff testified he is able to “get by” when he is around

family or familiar people. (Tr. 231). Plaintiff testified that he does go shopping at the

convenience store and the super center and that he sometimes gets nervous in these places. (Tr.

231). When this happens, plaintiff testified that he goes outside. When asked how often he

experiences panic attacks, plaintiff testified every day. (Tr. 233). 

Plaintiff testified that he was also told his blood sugar was high and that he needed to go

to the clinic for an evaluation of this problem. (Tr. 237).

Ms. Patricia Bruso, plaintiff’s mother, testified that plaintiff accurately described his

problems and that there are times when plaintiff will stay in his room for days. (Tr. 238). Ms.

Bruso testified she has seen her son try to work a normal job but just cannot do it. (Tr. 239). 

Ms. Consetta Duty, plaintiff’s girlfriend, testified plaintiff’s problems have worsened.

(Tr. 239). She explained that there have been times she and plaintiff had to leave a restaurant

because plaintiff had stomach problems. (Tr. 240). She explained that plaintiff sweats often and

has even had to change the sheets because he “soaked” them. (Tr. 240).

Ms. Tanya Owen, a vocational expert, testified plaintiff’s past relevant work consists of

work as a food service worker which is considered medium, unskilled work; a sales clerk which

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is considered light, semi-skilled work; and a welder which is considered medium, unskilled

work. (Tr. 241-242). After listening to the ALJ’s hypothetical questions, Ms. Owen testified

plaintiff would be able to perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 242-245). If plaintiff was to be

found credible, Ms. Owen testified there would be no work that he could perform. (Tr. 251).

The pertinent medical evidence in this case reflects the following. From May 2002,

through August 2003, plaintiff presented to the St. Edwards Mercy Medical Center emergency

room. (Tr. 145-165). In May 2002, plaintiff cut his left index finger on a vegetable slicer. (Tr.

165). Staff physicians repaired the damaged digit with a series of four-stitch sutures and sent

plaintiff home with instructions to watch for signs of infection. In August and October 2002,

plaintiff complained of abdominal pain. (Tr. 154-160). On both visits ultrasound examinations

were performed and with the exception of a fatty liver all other organs were normal. (Tr. 154,

159). In November of 2002, plaintiff was treated for a sinus headache. (Tr. 151). In May 2003,

plaintiff presented with complaints of ear pain and shortness of breath. (Tr. 148-149). Plaintiff

was diagnosed with bilateral otitis media and a subacute exacerbation of asthma. Plaintiff was

taught how to use an albuterol MDI and given medication for four days. (Tr. 148). In July of

2003, plaintiff sought treatment for an ankle injury. (Tr. 147). An x-ray revealed no fractures

or osseous abnormality. On August 27, 2003, plaintiff sought treatment for a swollen left jaw and

for anxiety and depression. (Tr. 145). The examiner opined plaintiff had a submandibular gland

obstruction and advised plaintiff to follow-up with a specialist. Plaintiff was instructed to call

the next morning to set up an appointment with an ENT. (Tr. 145).

On August 21, 2002, plaintiff complained of having a depressed mood and wanted to

change his medication. (Tr. 126). Plaintiff also reported major heartburn, rectal bleeding and

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GERD symptoms. After examining plaintiff, Dr. Dan Asbury’s assessment indicated GERD vs.

gallbladder disease, anxiety and bright red blood per rectum. Plaintiff was instructed to

discontinue smoking, elevate his head in bed, lose weight and decrease sodium in his diet. He

was also started on Nexium and Prozac. The notes indicate plaintiff was given samples of

Nexium because he was unable to afford the medication. (Tr. 126). 

On September 6, 2002, plaintiff reported his rectal bleeding had stopped. (Tr. 127).

Plaintiff reported he was doing pretty well. Dr. Asbury noted plaintiff “subjectively feels a lot

better.” Plaintiff’s blood pressure was noted to be a bit elevated. Plaintiff continued to smoke.

Dr. Asbury opined that plaintiff’s GERD was “much improved” and that plaintiff needed to be

treated for high blood pressure. Plaintiff was instructed to take Diovan and Nexium for three

months and then to discontinue using the medication. He was also instructed to lose weight and

to stop smoking. 

On May 25, 2003, plaintiff entered the Sparks Regional Medical Center emergency room

complaining of shortness of breath, a productive cough and no appetite. (Tr. 129). Plaintiff was

diagnosed with an acute exacerbation of asthma. (Tr. 131). An x-ray showed plaintiff’s lungs

were free of lobar or segmental infiltrates and his heart was normal. (Tr. 134). Plaintiff left

against medical advice. (Tr. 131).

On August 13, 2003, plaintiff underwent a consultative general physical examination

performed by Dr. Gordon W. McCraw. (Tr. 135-141). Plaintiff reported that he had not received

treatment from a psychiatrist but that he had been prescribed Prozac. (Tr. 137). Dr. McCraw

noted plaintiff could hear normal voices but he had a fifty percent loss of hearing in his left ear.

Dr. McCraw noted a slight oropharynx impairment but noted plaintiff’s speech was okay. (Tr.

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137). Plaintiff was found to have a full range of motion in his spine and extremities. (Tr. 138-

139). Plaintiff was neurologically intact and no muscle weakness or atrophy was observed. Dr.

McCraw noted plaintiff could hold a pen, touch fingers to palm, grip seventy-five percent of

normal, oppose thumb to fingers, pick up a coin, stand and walk without assistive devices, walk

on heel and toes and squat and arise from a squatting position. (Tr. 139). Dr. McCraw noted

plaintiff was oriented to time, person and place and did not observe any evidence of psychosis.

He diagnosed plaintiff with GERD and depression. Dr. McCraw opined plaintiff had no

limitations in his ability to walk, stand, sit, lift, carry, handle, finger, see, hear or speak. (Tr. 141).

On August 19, 2003, plaintiff underwent a consultative mental status and evaluation of

adaptive functioning testing performed by Dr. Douglas A. Brown. (Tr. 142-144). The doctor

reported that by history plaintiff had not undergone any psychiatric treatment, but after he was

released from prison he was required to attend a Court ordered treatment program for sexual

predators. (Tr. 242). 

Upon examination, Dr. Brown reported plaintiff was pleasant and somewhat anxious and

hyperactive; he was spontaneous, with clear, coherent, logical and relevant thought patterns; he

showed no evidence of delusions, obsessions, or unusual powers, although he alleged he heard

voices; and he appeared depressed, but had no thoughts of suicide or homicide. (Tr, 142-143).

Plaintiff reported that he was always tired and that his mind never shut down. (Tr. 143). In the

evaluation of plaintiff’s adaptive functioning, regarding communication, Dr. Brown observed

no limitations in speech or language and opined plaintiff communicated effectively. Dr. Brown

noted plaintiff lived with his girlfriend and that he stayed home a lot because there was “nothing

to do in Fort Smith.” (Tr. 144). With regard to personal responsibility, Dr. Brown opined

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plaintiff had no limitations. Dr. Brown noted plaintiff was obese and his concentration,

persistence and pace was “somewhat distracted.” Dr. Brown estimated plaintiff’s I.Q. to be 80

or greater. Dr. Brown opined plaintiff’s ability to understand, carry out and remember detailed

instructions was intact so long as he did not become severely depressed and that work pressure

could be overwhelming. (Tr. 144). 

On August 25, 2003, Dr. Kimberly G. Adametz, a non-examining, medical consultant

opined plaintiff did not have a severe physical impairment. Dr. Adametz’s assessment was

affirmed by Dr. Jerry L. Thomas on November 26, 2003. (Tr. 166-167).

On September 17, 2003, Dr. Brad Williams, a non-examining medical consultant,

completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF). (Tr. 168-181. Dr. Williams opined

plaintiff had mild restrictions of his activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in maintaining

social functioning; moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no

episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. (Tr. 178). Dr. Williams also completed

a mental RFC assessment stating that plaintiff has moderate limitations in the following areas:

in his ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; in his ability to carry out detailed

instructions; in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; in his

ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically

based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length

of rest periods; in his ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors; and in his ability to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (Tr.

182-185). Dr. Williams opined that plaintiff is “able to perform work where interpersonal

contact is incidental to work performed, e.g., assembly work; complexity of tasks is learned and

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performed by rote, few variables, little judgement; and supervision required is simple, direct and

concrete.” (Tr. 184).

Progress notes dated December 29, 2003, report plaintiff’s complaints of stomach

problems and right upper chest pain. (Tr. 194). Plaintiff also reported having black stools.

Plaintiff was diagnosed with dyspepsia, GERD and melena. Plaintiff was re-started on Nexium.

Progress notes dated February 18, 2004, report plaintiff’s history of stomach problems.

(Tr. 193). Plaintiff reported that Nexium helped. Dr. Robert Baker noted plaintiff’s main

problem was reflux and that he used pepcid at night. 

On March 16, 2004, plaintiff indicated he needed a prescription for Prozac. (Tr. 191).

Treatment notes indicate plaintiff denied suicidal ideation and that his affect was normal. The

assessment indicates plaintiff’s history of depression. Plaintiff was given a prescription for

Prozac. (Tr. 192). 

On March 29, 2004, Dr. Brown completed a medical assessment of ability to do workrelated activities (mental) form. Dr. Brown opined plaintiff’s ability to make occupational

adjustments was good to fair, except in work stresses and attention. (Tr. 187-188). Dr. Brown

opined plaintiff’s ability to make performance adjustment was good to fair. With regard to

personal-social adjustments, Dr. Brown opined plaintiff had a fair ability to maintain appearance

and demonstrate reliability and a poor to no ability to behave in an emotionally stable manner

or to relate predictably in social situations. 

Applicable Law:

This court's role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

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2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. The ALL's decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner's decision, the court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other

words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALL, the decision of the ALL

must be affirmed. Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one

year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.

Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical ormental impairment” as “an impairment that results

from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3),

1382(3)©). A plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for

at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner's regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial

gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or

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mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal

an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national

economy given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Only

if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff's age, education, and work

experience in light of his residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schwieker, 683 F.2d 1138,

1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Discussion:

We first address the ALJ's assessment of plaintiff's subjective complaints. The ALJ was

required to consider all the evidence relating to plaintiff’s subjective complaints including evidence

presented by third parties that relates to: (1) plaintiff's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency,

and intensity of his pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness, and

side effects of his medication; and (5) functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d

1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). While an ALJ may not discount a claimant's subjective complaints

solely because the medical evidence fails to support them, an ALJ may discount those complaints

where inconsistencies appear in the record as a whole. Id. As the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit recently observed, “Our touchstone is that [a claimant's] credibility is

primarily a matter for the ALJ to decide.” Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir.

2003).

After reviewing the administrative record, it is clear that the ALJ properly evaluated

plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Although plaintiff contends that his alleged stomach problems,

Bi-Polar disorder and depression are disabling, the evidence does not support this contention.

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With regard to plaintiff’s alleged stomach problems, the record does show plaintiff has

sought treatment for stomach pain and GERD symptoms. Plaintiff underwent abdominal

ultrasounds in August and October of 2002, which with the exception of revealing a fatty liver,

were normal. Plaintiff also reported that his symptoms were much improved with the use of

Nexium. We note, an impairment which can be controlled by treatment or medication is not

considered disabling. See Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted). 

Plaintiff also alleges disabling depression and anxiety. A review of the record does show

plaintiff has been prescribed medication to treat depression and anxiety, but there is no evidence

that plaintiff sought treatment from a mental health professional on his own accord or through the

referral of another physician. See Gowell v. Apfel, 242 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that

lack of evidence of ongoing counseling or psychiatric treatment for depression weighs against

plaintiff’s claim of disability). While plaintiff alleges that he has difficulty being around people,

with the exception of reporting this problem to Dr. Brown, the consultative examiner, there is

no indication plaintiff reported these alleged problems with a medical professional. 

Plaintiff's subjective complaints are also inconsistent with evidence regarding his daily

activities. In a Supplemental Interview Outline dated July 6, 2003, plaintiff indicated he was

able to take care of his personal needs; with the exception of taking out the trash, was unable to

perform household chores; was able to shop for groceries and clothes and go to the bank and Post

Office; and was able to prepare meals, pay bills, drive, watch television, listen to the radio, read,

visit with friends and relatives and work in his workshop. (Tr. 72-73). In August of 2003,

plaintiff reported to Dr. Brown that he was able to bathe, dress, feed himself, drive, shop, handle

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finances, clean, do dishes, wash laundry and chauffeur. (Tr. 144). At the hearing in April of

2004, plaintiff testified that he was able to do household chores and yard work. This level of

activity belies plaintiff’s complaints of pain and limitation and the Eighth Circuit has consistently

held that the ability to perform such activities contradicts a plaintiff’s subjective allegations of

disabling pain. See Hutton v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 651, 654-655 (8 Cir. 1999) (holding ALJ’s th

rejection of claimant’s application supported by substantial evidence where daily activities–

making breakfast, washing dishes and clothes, visiting friends, watching television and drivingwere inconsistent with claim of total disability).

The ALJ also considered side effects from prescribed medication. In this case, there was

no indication in the medical record that plaintiff complained of, or sought adjustment of his

prescription of Prozac because of adverse side effects. 

Further, the ALJ also considered the testimony of plaintiff’s mother and girlfriend. After

hearing their testimony, however, the ALJ properly concluded that their testimony was not fully

credible. As the testimony of family members and friends need only be given consideration and

need not be considered credible, the ALJ properly discredited the testimony of the witnesses.

Lawrence v. Chater, 107 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1997).

Therefore, although it is clear that plaintiff suffers with some degree of discomfort, he has

not established that he is unable to engage in any gainful activity. See Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d

433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that mere fact that working may cause pain or discomfort does

not mandate a finding of disability). Neither the medical evidence nor the reports concerning his

daily activities support plaintiff’s contention of total disability. Accordingly, we conclude that

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substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s subjective complaints were

not totally credible. 

We next turn to the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s RFC. RFC is the most a person can do

despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using all relevant

evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations of treating physicians and

others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of his limitations. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798,

801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). Limitations

resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a

“claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704

(8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported

by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Lewis v.

Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required to set forth specifically

a claimant’s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect [his] RFC.” Id. 

In the present case, the ALJ considered a medical assessment prepared by a non-examining

agency medical consultants, the medical statements completed by Dr. Brown, plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, and his medical records. 

The ALJ addressed Dr. Brown’s medical assessment opining plaintiff’s ability to make

occupational adjustments was good to fair, except in work stresses and attention; that plaintiff’s

ability to make performance adjustment was good to fair; and that with regard to personal-social

adjustments, plaintiff had a fair ability to maintain appearance and demonstrate reliability and

a poor to no ability to behave in an emotionally stable manner or to relate predictably in social

situations. Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that ALJ did not err

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in failing to credit treating physician’s opinion because those opinions were inconsistent and not

fully supported by medical evidence); See Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1494 (8th Cir.

1995) (while treating physicians' opinions are ordinarily entitled to great weight, they are not

conclusive and must be supported by medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic data). The ALJ

points out Dr. Brown’s March 2004, assessment, is inconsistent with his one-time evaluation notes

indicating plaintiff retained a mildly restrictive level of adaptive functioning. It is the ALJ's

function to resolve conflicts among the various treating and examining physicians and based on

the above discussion and the record as a whole, we find substantial evidence in the record to

support the ALJ’s findings that plaintiff can perform the RFC listed above. Vandenboom v.

Barnhart, 04-3167,WL 1421695, 3-4 (8 Cir. June 20, 2005) (citations omitted). th

Finally, we believe substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff can

return to his past relevant work as a spot welder and a food preparer. According to the

Commissioner's interpretation of past relevant work, a claimant will not be found to be disabled

if he retains the RFC to perform:

1. The actual functional demands and job duties of a particular

past relevant job; or

2. The functional demands and job duties of the occupation as

generally required by employers throughout the national

economy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); S.S.R. 82-61 (1982); Martin v. Sullivan, 901 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir.

1990)(expressly approving the two part test from S.S.R. 82-61). 

Therefore, even if a claimant cannot perform the actual demands of his particular past job,

if he can carry out his job as it is generally performed in the national economy, he is not disabled

under the regulations. Evans v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1994). We note in this case

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the ALJ relied upon vocational expert testimony. See Gilbert v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 602, 604 (8th

Cir. 1999) ("The testimony of a vocational expert is relevant at steps four and five of the

Commissioner's sequential analysis, when the question becomes whether a claimant with a severe

impairment has the residual functional capacity to do past relevant work or other work")

(citations omitted). Accordingly, the ALJ properly concluded that plaintiff could perform his

past relevant work. 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, having carefully reviewed the record, the undersigned finds substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision denying the plaintiff benefits, and thus the decision should

be affirmed. The undersigned further finds that the plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with

prejudice. 

DATED this 26 day of September 2005. th

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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