Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00447/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00447-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

REGINA BROWN o/b/o )

 ) JOSEPH BROWN, 

 ) 

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-00447-WS-B

)

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, )

Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Regina Brown brings this action on behalf of her

son Joseph Brown seeking judicial review of a final decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for

supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the

Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c. This

action was referred to the undersigned for report and

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Oral

argument was held on June 20, 2005. Upon careful consideration

of the administrative record, oral argument and the memoranda of

the parties, it is recommended that the decision of the

Commissioner be AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural History

On October 31, 2001, Plaintiff Regina Brown (hereinafter

“Plaintiff”) protectively filed an application for supplemental

security income benefits on behalf of her son Joseph Brown

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 1 of 37
1Plaintiff’s application was denied at the initial level and was

a treated as a prototype case; thus, the reconsideration step was

eliminated. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.906, 404.966, 416.1406 and 416.1466. 

(Tr. 62-64).

2

(“Joseph”), alleging that he had been disabled since November 1,

1995 due to borderline intellectual functioning, asthma,

attention deficit disorder, depression, anxiety, panic disorder,

and swelling of extremities. (Tr. 62-64). On May 16, 2002,

Plaintiff’s application was initially denied, and a Request for

Hearing was filed on June 5, 2002.1 (Id. at 65-69). On December

3, 2002, Administrative Law Judge James D. Smith (“ALJ Smith”)

conducted a hearing which was attended by Plaintiff, who

appeared and testified on behalf of her son Joseph, and

Plaintiff’s attorney. (Id. at 40-61). Also in attendance at the

hearing was Peter S. Bertucci, M.D., (hereinafter “Dr.

Bertucci”), a pediatrician at the Mobile Mental Health Center,

(hereinafter “MMHC”). (Id.) 

On February 28, 2003, ALJ Smith entered an unfavorable

decision wherein he found that Brown has the severe impairments

of asthma, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, status post fracture

of the left tibia and fibula, adolescent obesity,

gatroesophageal reflux disease (hereinafter “GERD”), generalized

anxiety disorder, major depression, attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder (hereinafter “ADHD”), learning disorder

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 2 of 37
2Joseph turned thirteen the day following the hearing. (Tr.

46).

3Plaintiff testified that the doctors did not know what caused

Joseph’s weight gain and that the doctors were planning to check his

medications, and check to see if the weigh gain was due to “stress

eating.” (Id. at 51).

3

NOA v. borderline intellectual functioning, and panic disorder

with agoraphobia, and that his impairments, when considered

individually, or in combination, do not meet or medically equal

a Listing, or functionally equal in severity an impairment set

forth in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P,

Appendix. 1, Regulations No. 4. (Id. at 20-37). On June 22,

2004, Plaintiff’s request for review was denied by the Appeals

Council making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security. (Id. at 6-8, 14-19). The

parties agree that this case is now ripe for review and is

properly before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3).

II. Background Facts

Joseph was born on December 4, 1989 and was twelve years old

at the time of the December 3, 20022 administrative hearing.

(Tr. 36, 46). At the hearing, Plaintiff, who testified on her

son’s behalf, stated that Joseph was 5'3" and weighed 193

pounds, having gained over forty pounds in a one year time

frame.3 (Id. at 51). Plaintiff also testified that Joseph had

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 3 of 37
4

to repeat the first grade in school, and although he had been

promoted to the sixth grade, he was not currently in school due

to anxiety and panic attacks. (Id. at 48). According to

Plaintiff, during the most recent school term, Joseph had only

attended three days of school. (Id. at 48, 52-53). She

explained that Joseph’s problems at school had included extreme

crying, diarrhea, vomiting and a refusal to leave the car and

that the counselor indicated that there was nothing the school

could do to assist at that point, and suggested that because

Joseph’s behavior would be disruptive, he should be kept at home

until his anxiety and panic attacks were under control. (Id. at

53). As a result, the school allowed Joseph to withdraw for the

semester. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that she discussed

Joseph’s problems with Dr. Dillon, at Mobile Mental Health

Center, and that they tried different medication therapy which

finally seemed to help Joseph’s anxiety and panic attacks. (Tr.

53). She expressed hope that Joseph would be able to return to

school when the new semester began in January, 2003. (Id. at

53-54).

Plaintiff testified that as long as Joseph is on his

medication, he does not have any problems, except when

encountering a situation or person with whom he is not familiar.

(Id. at 54). Plaintiff also testified that Joseph interacts

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 4 of 37
5

with his brother and sister, and plays with the neighbor’s

child. (Id.) She also indicated that despite her efforts, she

has been unable to interest Joseph in any team or group sports.

(Id.) Plaintiff described Joseph’s daily activities as

sleeping, laying around and eating. (Id.)

Plaintiff also testified that Joseph has orthopedic and eye

problems. (Tr. 49-50, 52). According to Plaintiff, Joseph’s

arthritis medication “play[s] with [his] vision[,]” and causes

him to have stomach pain. (Id. at 52, 55). Plaintiff also

testified that Joseph has trouble with his feet, knees and hips

every day. (Id. at 50-51). He experiences swelling in his

lower extremities, limps and tells her that he is in pain.

(Id.) Plaintiff indicated that “[b]efore the end of the day he

almost has pitted edema in his feet[]” and that “usually

indicates . . . the inflamation is back in a certain joint or

area[]” due to his juvenile rheumatoid arthritis. (Id.)

Plaintiff also testified that Thomas R. Dempsey, M.D.,

(hereinafter “Dr. Dempsey”), of Children’s Rehabilitation

Services, has indicated that Joseph needs new X-rays due to

“swelling in his left knee growth palate[]” and because “they’re

going to have to go in and find out why [he fractured his

foot].” (Id. at 52).

In addition to Plaintiff, pediatrician Dr. Bertucci also

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 5 of 37
6

testified at the administrative hearing. (Tr. 56-61, 79-80).

Dr. Bertucci testified that based upon his review of the medical

records, he opined that Joseph’s edema was pretty well

controlled, and noted that Dr. Dempsey had recently found that

there was no occlusion or swelling of his knee. (Id. at 58-60).

Additionally, Dr. Bertucci testified that if Plaintiff’s

testimony regarding Joseph’s anxiety was accepted as true,

Joseph would have marked limitations in the social and personal

domains. (Id. at 60-61).

The ALJ determined that Joseph has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity. (Id. at 36, Finding 2). The ALJ

further determined that Joseph has the severe impairments of

asthma, juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, status post fracture of

the left tibia and fibula, adolescent obesity, GERD, generalized

anxiety disorder, major depression, ADHD, learning disorder NOS

v. borderline intellectual functioning, and panic disorder with

agoraphobia. (Id., Finding 3). Next, the ALJ concluded that

Joseph does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

which meet or medically equal the criteria for any of the

impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, App. 1, Subpt. P. (Id.,

Finding 4). The ALJ also found that Joseph does not have

severely disabling limitations in specific functions caused by a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment, or

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 6 of 37
4This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s application of legal

principles is plenary. Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1302

(11th Cir. 2000). See also Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th

Cir. 1996).

7

disabling limitations resulting from chronic illnesses, the

nature of the treatment required or the effects of medication.

(Tr. 36, Findings 5-7). The ALJ found further, that Joseph has

less than marked limitations in all of the six domains for

functional equivalency. (Id. at 36-37, Finding 8). The ALJ then

found that Plaintiff’s assertions, relative to Joseph’s

symptomatology, functional limitations and restrictions of

activities of daily living, lack corroboration or substantiation

in the medical evidence and are not credible as to a disabling

impairment. (Id. at 37, Finding 9). The ALJ accordingly found

that Joseph is not disabled. (Id., Finding 10).

III. Issue On Appeal

Whether the ALJ erred by failing to grant controlling weight

to Plaintiff’s testimony?

IV. Analysis

A. Standard Of Review

In reviewing claims brought under the Act, this Court’s role

is limited to determining whether the final decision is supported

by substantial evidence and free of legal error.4 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). See, e.g., Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2002); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439-1440 (11th Cir.

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 7 of 37
5See also Robinson v. Massanari, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1280

(S.D. Ala. 2001). 

8

1997); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1995);

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Walker

v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987); Bloodsworth v.

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This Court may not

decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d

1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986); Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. The

Commissioner’s findings of fact must be affirmed if they are

based upon substantial evidence. Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d

1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 1991); Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239

(concluding that substantial evidence is defined as “more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance[]” and consists of “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate

to support a conclusion[]”). See also Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In determining whether substantial

evidence exists, this Court must view the record as a whole,

taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to

the Commissioner’s decision.5 Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,

131 (11th Cir. 1986); and Short v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. DIST. LEXIS

10163 (S.D. Ala. 1999).

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 8 of 37
6On September 11, 2000, the Commissioner published Final Rules

for determining disability for a child under the age of eighteen. 

See 65 Fed. Reg. 54,747, corrected by 65 Fed. Reg. 80,307. These

rules became effective on January 2, 2001 and thus apply to

Plaintiff’s claim. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 54,751.

9

B. Childhood Disability Law

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of

1996, which amended the statutory standard for children seeking

supplemental security income benefits based on disability, became

effective on August 22, 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.

2105 § 211(b)(2) (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1382c). The

definition of “disabled” for children under 18 is:

An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered

disabled for the purposes of this subchapter if that

individual has a medically determinable physical or

mental impairment, which results in marked and severe

functional limitations, and which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); and 20 C.F.R. § 416.906.6 The

Social Security Regulations provide a three-step sequential

evaluation process for determining childhood disability claims.

20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). 

At step one, a child’s age and work activity, if any, are

identified to determine if the child has engaged in substantial

gainful activity. At step two, the child’s physical and mental

impairments are examined to see if the child has an impairment or

combination of impairments that are severe. Under the

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 9 of 37
7In making this assessment, the reports of the State Agency

medical consultants, the reports or other treating, examining and

non-examining medical sources and, the claimant’s symptoms, including

pain and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be

accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other

evidence, are all taken into consideration. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927 and

10

regulations, a severe impairment is one that is more than “a

slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities that

causes no more than minimal functional limitations.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.924(c). To the extent the child is determined to have a

severe impairment, at step three, the child must establish that

the impairment results in marked and severe functional

limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). The regulations set

forth that an “impairment(s) causes marked and severe functional

limitations if it meets, medically equals or functionally equals

the listings.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). A child’s impairment(s)

meets the Listings’ limitations if the child actually suffers

from limitations specified in the Listings for that child’s

severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(d). A child’s impairment

medically equals the Listings if the child’s limitations are at

least of equal severity and duration to the listed impairment(s).

Id. Where, as in this case, a child’s impairment or combination

of impairments does not meet or medically equal any Listing, then

the Commissioner must determine whether the impairment or

combination of impairments results in limitations which

functionally equal the criteria for a Listing.7 Id. 

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 10 of 37
416.929; and SSR 96-5, 96-6p and 96-7p.

8The degree of limitation in the relevant domains is then

assessed within four ranges: 1) no evidence of a marked limitation;

2) less than marked limitation; 3) marked limitation; and 4) extreme

limitation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).

9The regulation sets forth the methods for using each domain to

evaluate functional equivalence to a Listing. 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(f).

10Marked limitation also means a limitation that is: “‘more than

moderate but ‘less than extreme.’” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i).

“It is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to find on

standardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than

three, standard deviations below the mean.” Id. A marked limitation

may arise when several activities or functions are limited or when

one is limited. Id. A child has a marked limitation when he has a

valid score two standard deviations or more below the mean, but less

than three standard deviations, on a comprehensive standardized test

designed to measure ability or functioning in that domain, and the

child’s day-to-day functioning in domain related activities is

consistent with the score. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(iii).

11

To determine whether a child’s impairment functionally

equals a listing, the regulations require consideration of six

domains:8 1) acquiring/using information; 2) attending/completing

tasks; 3) interacting/relating with others; 4) moving

about/manipulating objects; 5) caring for oneself; and 6)

health/physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi).

To satisfy the functionally equivalent standard, a child must

have either a marked limitation in two domains of functioning, or

an extreme limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a).9

A marked limitation in a domain is defined as a limitation that

“interferes seriously with his [the child’s] ability to

independently initiate, sustain or complete activities.”10 20

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 11 of 37
11Extreme limitation also means a limitation “more than marked”

and may arise when several activities or functions are limited or

when one is limited. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). 

12

C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). An extreme limitation is defined as

a limitation that “interferes very seriously with [the child’s]

ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete

activities.”11 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). 

In conducting this analysis, the ALJ may take a wide range

of evidence into account when making a determination about a

child’s impairments, including an individual’s statements about

symptoms, along with information provided by treating or

examining physicians, and all other relevant evidence in the

record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912, 416.913(d) and 416.924a; SSR 96-

7p. See also Shinn v. Commissioner of Social Security, 391 F.3d

1276, 1283-1284 (11th Cir. 2004).

C. Discussion

1. Credibility Determination

In the case sub judice, Plaintiff argues that given Dr.

Bertucci’s testimony, the ALJ should have granted her testimony

controlling weight and should have concluded that Joseph has

marked limitations in the domains of interacting/relating with

others and caring for oneself. (Doc. 11). In support of her

argument, Plaintiff relies upon a narrow portion of Dr. Bertucci’s

hearing testimony, her own hearing testimony, an April 26, 2002

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 12 of 37
13

Teacher’s Questionnaire and an October 8, 2002 ADHD Questionnaire.

(Id.) Based upon a careful review of the record, the undersigned

finds that the ALJ did not err in concluding that Joseph does not

have marked limitations in the domains of interacting/relating

with others and caring for oneself. Rather, the record contains

substantial evidence which supports the ALJ’s findings and reveals

that he carefully considered the evidentiary record as a whole,

including the hearing testimony, and made appropriate credibility

determinations in finding that Joseph is not disabled.

 At the outset, it should be noted that Dr. Bertucci never

opined that Joseph has marked limitations. Instead, Dr. Bertucci

testified that if the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s testimony

was credible, then her testimony would support a finding that

Joseph has marked limitations in the domains of

interacting/relating with others and caring for oneself. (Tr. 58-

61). A review of the ALJ’s decision reflects that he carefully

considered Plaintiff’s testimony, and provided adequate reasons

for discrediting some of the testimony. (Id. at 24-37).

The law is clear that the ALJ was not obligated to

automatically assign controlling weight to Plaintiff’s subjective

testimony; rather, as the finder of fact, an ALJ weighs such

testimony and decides whether or not to credit same. See, e.g.,

Brown, 921 F.2d at 1236. Only when a claimant establishes a

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 13 of 37
12Reversal is required where the ALJ does not apply this pain

standard; however, a verbatim application is not necessary as he need

only make findings that indicate use of the proper standard. Brown,

921 F.2d at 1236. If the ALJ is found to have utilized the proper

standard, then the reviewing court determines whether substantial

evidence supports his finding under the standard. Callahan, 125 F.3d

at 1439. 

14

medically determinable impairment, which can reasonably be

expected to produce the symptoms alleged, is the ALJ required to

consider his or her subjective complaints along with all the other

evidence. Hogard v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (M.D. Fla.

1990). Where a claimant's subjective testimony is supported by

medical evidence that satisfies the standard, such testimony is

itself sufficient to support a finding of disability. Brown, 921

F.2d at 1236; and Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir.

1987). However, before subjective complaints and testimony can

be considered by the ALJ, the claimant must produce: 1) evidence

of an underlying medical condition; and either 2) objective

medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain

arising from that condition or 3) that the objectively determined

medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged pain. See, e.g., Wilson, 284 F.3d

at 1225; Gilmore v. Apfel, 2000 WL 284207, *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 23,

2000); Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560-1562.

12 

The ALJ may reject a claimant’s complaints and subjective

testimony as not credible, but his decision to do so must be

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 14 of 37
13As noted in Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562:

A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial

supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by

a reviewing court. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054

(11th Cir.1986). A lack of an explicit credibility finding

becomes a ground for remand when credibility is critical to

the outcome of the case. Smallwood v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d

1349, 1352 (11th Cir.1982). While an adequate credibility

finding need not cite "particular phrases or formulations

... broad findings that [a claimant] lacked credibility and

could return to her past work alone are not enough to enable

us to conclude that [the ALJ] considered her medical

condition as a whole." Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 588-

90 (11th Cir.1987). If proof of disability is based upon

subjective evidence and a credibility determination is,

therefore, critical to the decision, "the ALJ must either

explicitly discredit such testimony or the implication must

be so clear as to amount to a specific credibility finding."

Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.1983)

(ALJ did not specifically address testimony by claimant and

her daughter about claimant's pain). Explicit credibility

findings are "necessary and crucial where subjective pain is

an issue." Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 839 (11th Cir.

1982) . . . .

15

supported by substantial evidence and he must articulate adequate

reasons for rejecting the testimony in his decision. Brown, 921

F.2d at 1236; Hale, 831 F.2d at 1011; Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-1562.

Failure to do so, requires, as a matter of law, that the

claimant’s testimony be accepted as true. Id. See also Cannon

v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1988).13 Notwithstanding,

credibility determinations regarding witnesses remain the province

of the ALJ; thus, a reviewing court is precluded from re-weighing

the evidence anew. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th

Cir. 2005); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996);

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 15 of 37
16

Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir. 1984) (per

curiam); Kelly v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 631, 632 (11th Cir. 1984). As

discussed herein, the ALJ properly applied the correct standard

and provided legally adequate reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s

testimony regarding the severity of Joseph’s impairments in the

domains of interacting/relating with others and caring for

oneself. In his decision, the ALJ concluded that even when

“giving the claimant [Plaintiff] the full benefit of doubt,”

“[b]ased on the objective evidence of record,” Joseph possessed

less than marked limitations in all of the domains – including the

two at issue. (Tr. 28). According to the ALJ:

[t]he claimant’s assertions relative to [Joseph’s]

symptomatology, functional limitations and restrictions

of activities of daily living have been considered in

light of the factors set forth in 20 CFR § 416.929 and

SSR 96-7p, and are found to lack corroboration or

substantiation in the medical evidence, and are not

credible as to a disabling impairment.

(Id. at 37, Finding 9). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ

considered the record evidence, including Plaintiff’s testimony,

the Teacher Questionnaire, the ADHD Questionnaire, and the medical

records. As detailed below, this evidence fails to demonstrate

that Joseph has a marked limitation in any domain.

 2. Interacting and Relating with Others

The record includes the findings of psychologist John W.

Davis, Ph.D., (hereinafter “Dr. Davis”), who conducted a

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 16 of 37
14Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 552 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984)

(holding that the duty to develop the record includes ordering a

consultative exam if one is needed to make an informed decision). 

17

consultative psychological exam of Joseph on March 11, 2002. 

(Tr. 304-307). Dr. Davis concluded that while testing put Joseph

in the borderline intellectual range of intelligence, he could

perform simple tasks and get along with others; thus, providing

support for the ALJ’s finding that his alleged mental impairments

are not of disabling severity.14 (Id. at 306-307). Additionally,

Dr. Davis made the following observations regarding Joseph: 1)

“[h]is general appearance, dress, and behavior were consistent

with his age and the occasion[]” and “[t]here was nothing unusual

about his gait, posture, mannerisms, or hygiene[;]” 2) he has not

been involved in any legal situations; and 3) he has no 

unusual mannerisms, tics, or gestures. . . . [h]is

speech was spontaneous . . . . [n]ormal communication

was easily accomplished . . . . [h]is affective

expression shows no difficulty in initiating,

sustaining, or terminating emotional responses . . . .

[which] are appropriate to the thought, content, and

situation of the evaluation. He is oriented in all

spheres. There is no indication that he has

hallucinations, delusions, sees visions, hears voices,

or has other circumstances of perceptual disturbance.

There are no indications of feelings of detachment from

his environment.

His thought processes show normal productivity and

continuity of thought. There are no language

impairments. He is able to express himself freely.

There is no indication of loose associations,

incomprehensible speech, etc. He has no preoccupations,

such as phobias, obsessions, ideas of reference,

suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation or hypocondriacal

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 17 of 37
18

symptoms. . . .

* * *

. . . . Rapport was established and maintained. The

patient cooperated with the examiner, appearing friendly

as well as comfortable in the test setting. . . .

* * * 

During the time that Joseph was in this office no

indication of any other disorders were seen. No

indication specifically of ADHD, anxiety, or panic

attacks, etc. These may be controlled by my medication.

* * *

(Id. at 304-307). 

The record also contains a Teacher’s Questionnaire dated

March 18, 2002 and completed by Ms. Amanda Dearman, (hereinafter

“Ms. Dearman”), Joseph’s fourth grade teacher. (Id. at 151-161).

In the Questionnaire, regarding the domain of interacting and

relating with others, Ms. Dearman concluded that Joseph has no

problems: making and keeping friends; seeking attention

appropriately; asking permission appropriately; following rules

(classroom, games and sports); respecting/obeying adults in

authority; relating experiences and telling stories; using

language appropriate to the situation and listener; introducing

and maintaining relevant and appropriate topics of conversation;

taking turns in a conversation; interpreting meaning of facial

expression, body language, hints and sarcasm; and using adequate

vocabulary and grammar to express thoughts/ideas in general

everyday conversation. (Id. at 156). Ms. Dearman only noted a

slight problem on a monthly (rather than weekly, daily or hourly)

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 18 of 37
19

basis with Joseph playing cooperatively with children and

expressing anger appropriately. (Id.) Additionally, Ms. Dearman

concluded that she could understand almost all of Joseph’s speech

as a familiar listener on the first attempt, when the topic of

conversation was both known and unknown. (Tr. 157). Ms. Dearman

added that she could understand almost all of Joseph’s speech

after repetition and/or rephrasing. (Id.) Ms. Dearman opined

that “Joe was a good student who tried really hard[,]” and noted

that:

Joe showed no signs of any major medical problems. He

wanted to be a bully a [sic] times to the other

children. I had to reason with Joe and explain the

consequences of his behavior. He would be fine. Joe

also wanted to have anxiety attacks where he wanted to

go home. I found once I stood up to Joseph and let him

know I was not going to let him have his way he calmed

down and went back to work (This was a one time

episode). I felt as long as Joe has a strong authority

figure he will do fine in school. 

(Id. at 160-161).

Ms. LaDonna Hovatter, (hereinafter “Ms. Hovatter”), Joseph’s

fifth grade teacher, also completed a Questionnaire on April 26,

2002. (Id. at 162-172). While Ms. Hovatter observed that Joseph

had some problems interacting/relating with others, she also found

that he had: 1) no problems playing cooperatively with other

children, making and keeping friends, relating experiences and

telling stories, and interpreting meanings of facial expression,

body language, hints and sarcasm; and 2) only a slight problem

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 19 of 37
20

seeking attention appropriately, introducing/maintaining relevant

and appropriate topics of conversation, and using adequate

vocabulary/grammar to express thoughts/ideas in general everyday

conversation. (Id. at 167). Ms. Hovatter stated that she could

understand almost all of Joseph’s speech as a familiar listener

on the first attempt, when the topic of conversation was known,

and 1⁄2-b of his speech when the topic of conversation was unknown.

(Id. at 168). Likewise, Ms. Hovatter stated that she could

understand almost all of Joseph’s speech after repetition and/or

rephrasing. (Tr. 168). Significantly, Ms. Hovatter concluded

that even though Joseph suffers from asthma, anxiety/panic

disorder and ADHD, “in collaborating with his other teachers, we

agree that these conditions do not interfere with Joe’s [Joseph’s]

ability to function[,]” adding that “[w]ith the prescribed

medication and when taken appropriately, Joe could meet his

academic requirements, if he would exhibit more effort.” (Id. at

171). The record reveals that Ms. Hovatter also found that

“[w]hether or not he [Joseph] does well [in school] depends a lot

on how much effort the assignment/test requires . . . Joe does not

study at home . . . if it’s not obtained within the classroom, he

won’t and doesn’t care to get it . . . .” (Id. at 172 (emphasis

in original)). 

On March 15, 2002, John W. Lowery, M.D., (hereinafter “Dr.

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 20 of 37
21

Lowery”), conducted a consultative examination of Joseph and

noted that Plaintiff reported that he was not doing very well at

school; however, he did play during P.E. (Id. at 308-309). Dr.

Lowery’s physical examination revealed no clubbing, cyanosis or

edema. (Id.) Joseph had a full range of motion in all of his

joints. (Id.) His peripheral pulses were 4/5, and his gait was

normal. (Tr. 308-309). Dr. Lowery further observed that the

neurological exam was normal, and that Joseph spoke and was easily

understood. (Id.) 

Treatment notes from Stephen Andrews, M.D., (hereinafter “Dr.

Andrews”), who treated Joseph from July 2001 through March 2002,

are also included in the record. (Id. at 314-323). The notes

reflect that Dr. Andrews treated Joseph for a variety of ailments.

(Id.) In January 2002, Joseph’s mother reported that he was

having joint pains, congestion, loose stool, and reflux problems.

(Id. at 318). His physical examination was normal, except that

mild to moderate tenderness to palpation along the left

contavertebral angle (of the chest area) was observed. (Id.) His

vitals were normal, and no swelling was observed. (Tr. 318). Dr.

Andrews’ assessment was joint pain, hypertriglyceridemia, URI,

gastroenteritis, and GERD. (Id.) During Joseph’s March 7, 2002

visit, his mother reported that Joseph was sent home for high

blood pressure and because he appeared flushed. (Id. at 317).

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 21 of 37
22

She also reported that he was experiencing chest pains, and

increased anxiety. (Id.) His physical examination was

unremarkable, except that mild to moderate tenderness to palpation

along the left contavertebral angle (of the chest area) was

observed. (Id.) Dr. Andrews’ assessment was anxiety disorder and

costachondritis. (Id.) Dr. Andrews increased Joseph’s Prozac to

40 m.g. in the mornings, and continued him on Xanax and Arthrotec.

(Tr. 317). The last recorded visit in the record reflects that

during the March 21, 2002 visit, Joseph’s mother reported that he

was “doing quite well[,]” that he was “no longer having anxiety

attacks[,]” and that he was “quite well adjusted.” (Id. at 316).

His physical examination was unremarkable, except that some

wheezing in the chest was noted. (Id.)

Treatment notes from Jimmy Lawrence, M.D., (hereinafter “Dr.

Lawrence”), of the Pediatric Rheumatology Clinic, are also

included in the record. (Id. at 331-335, 356). The notes cover

the period February 7, 2002 through November 26, 2002. (Id.)

They reflect that Joseph presented with complaints of sleeping

disorder, generalized pain, generalized anxiety, swelling and pain

in his knee and his joints. (Id. at 333). The HENT exam was

unremarkable and no swelling was observed in his knees nor ankles.

(Tr. 333-334). Some tenderness was noted on the interior rotation

of both hips. (Id.) Dr. Lawrence’s impression was possible

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 22 of 37
23

juvenile ankylosing spondylitis, severe generalized anxiety

disorder, juvenile fibromyalgia and attention deficit disorder.

(Id. at 333). On a return visit in August 2002, Joseph presented

with similar complaints. (Id. at 331). Dr. Lawrence noted that

Joseph was not in school because of his severe anxiety, and

directed that his Xanax be started again because it had helped him

in the past. (Id.) He observed that Joseph’s left knee was

markedly improved, but he was still in some pain. (Id.) He also

noted weight gain, and that the HENT exam was unremarkable. (Tr.

331). The treatment notes from Joseph’s November 26, 2002 visit

reflect that the Xanax “really helped” with Joseph’s anxiety.

(Id. at 356). Dr. Lawrence noted that Joseph is active, and that

he went to the fair and rode alone. (Id.) He commented that

Joseph is “doing things that he has not done[]” before. (Id.)

The treatment notes also reflect that Joseph complained of joint

pain and reported mild discomfort in his left ankle following

trauma to his left leg. (Id.)

Also contained in the record is an Interdisciplinary

Treatment Plan created for Joseph at MMHC, on June 17, 2002, (id.

at 348), and an ADHD Questionnaire dated October 8, 2002, (Tr.

349), and signed by Leigh Anne Macon, (hereinafter “Ms. Macon”),

a therapist at MMHC. Ms. Macon also signed off on the treatment

plan along with Plaintiff, Joseph and Dr. Maury Diggs. (Id. at

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 23 of 37
24

348). The treatment plan lists Joseph’s strength as family

support of his mother, leisure interests, sense of humor,

motivated for treatment, and religious affiliation/support

network. (Id.) Under the section designated

liabilities/weakness, no problems were noted in the areas of

hygiene, feeding, mobility, sight, hearing, speech, literacy, or

dietary restrictions. (Id.) The only weakness noted, was that

Joseph’s natural father was being treated for depression and ADHD.

(Id.) 

On the ADHD Questionnaire, Ms. Macon indicated that she had

treated Joseph approximately thirty times, but did not state the

last time that she had actually met with him. (Id. at 349). She

also noted that he was taking Zoloft, Remeron, Clonazepam, and

Adderall. (Tr. 349). She opined that Joseph has marked

inattention, marked impulsiveness and marked hyperactivity. (Id.)

Additionally, she opined that Joseph has marked impairments in

age-appropriate cognitive/communication function, age-appropriate

social functioning, personal/behavioral function, and deficiencies

of concentration, persistence and pace resulting in frequent

failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. (Id.) She also

rated Joseph’s GAF at 55. (Id.)

Based upon a review of the record, including that referenced

above, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 24 of 37
25

the ALJ’s decision. In finding that Joseph has a less than marked

limitation in the domain of interacting and relating with others,

the ALJ relied upon portions of Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, and

information contained in the November 2001 Functional Report,

which was completed by Plaintiff. (Id. at 24-37). Additionally,

the ALJ discussed the reports of Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth

grade teachers, as well as the medical reports. (Id.) In

reviewing this evidence, the ALJ correctly concluded that while

Plaintiff testified that Joseph has problems at school with

crying, vomiting and panic attacks, she also testified that the

medications and therapy seemed to be helping, and that the

medication has pretty much gotten his anxiety under control. (Tr.

28, 53). She also expressed optimism that Joseph would be able

to return to school the upcoming semester. (Id. at 28, 53-54).

Additionally, Dr. Davis’ report demonstrates that Joseph’s

condition improved with medication. (Id. at 304-307). Following

a consultative examination of Joseph on March 11, 2002, Dr. Davis

concluded that while the testing placed Joseph in the borderline

intellectual range of intelligence, he could perform simple tasks

and get along with others. (Id.) Dr. Davis further noted that

rapport was easily established with Joseph, and that he showed no

signs of anxiety or ADHD. (Tr. 304-307). 

Moreover, Ms. Dearman’s March 18, 2002 Teacher’s

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 25 of 37
26

Questionnaire likewise support the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 151-

161). As noted supra, Ms. Dearman concluded that Brown has no

problems: making and keeping friends; seeking attention

appropriately; asking permission appropriately; following rules;

respecting/obeying adults in authority; relating experiences and

telling stories; using language appropriate to the situation and

listener; introducing and maintaining relevant and appropriate

topics of conversation; taking turns in a conversation;

interpreting meaning of facial expression, body language, hints

and sarcasm; and using adequate vocabulary and grammar to express

thoughts/ideas in general everyday conversation. (Tr. 156).

While Ms. Dearman noted a slight problem with Joseph playing

cooperatively with children and expressing anger appropriately,

she concluded that he is a good student who tries hard, and who

will do fine in school as long he has a strong authority figure.

(Id. at 156, 159). 

Similarly, Ms. Hovatter’s April 2002 Teacher’s Questionnaire

also reflects that Joseph had no problems playing cooperatively

with other children, making and keeping friends, and relating

experiences and telling stores. (Id. at 162-172). While Ms.

Hovatter reported that Joseph had some problems

interacting/relating with others and a slight problem seeking

attention appropriately, introducing/maintaining relevant and

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 26 of 37
15Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 884 (11th Cir. 1984)(holding

that it is significant that no physician found claimant disabled

under the Act.)

16This Court also notes that Dr. Michael S. Huber, Dr. Mallett’s

associate, had already noted as early as May 25, 2000, that Joseph’s

“depression and asthma are stable on current treatments.” (Tr. 219-

230).

27

appropriate topics of conversation and using adequate

vocabulary/grammar to express thoughts/ideas in general everyday

conversation, she noted that after collaborating with his other

teachers, it was believed that Joseph’s conditions (asthma,

anxiety/panic disorder and ADHD) did not interfere with his

ability to function, and that as long as he complied with his

prescribed medication, he could meet his academic requirements.

(Id. at 167, 171-172).

Further, Joseph’s medical records support the ALJ’s

conclusion that Joseph has less than marked limitations in the

domain of interacting and relating with others. The records

reflect that Joseph’s condition responded well to medical

treatment, and that no treating physician nor psychologist ever

concluded that his impairments are of disability severity.15 In

fact, in January 2002, Tara S. Mallett, D.O., (hereinafter “Dr.

Mallet”), of Community Medical Center, who had treated Joseph in

the past, declined to perform an examination of him in connection

with his claim for disability benefits because she did not believe

his hyperactivity was disabling.16 (Tr. 218). Likewise, as

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 27 of 37
17Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584-585 (11th Cir. 1991)

(holding that an ALJ may properly rely upon the opinions of a nonexamining physicians which is consistent with the opinion of the

examining physicians); Perales, 403 U.S. at 408 (concluding that use

of a non-examining medical expert is proper). See also 20 C.F.R. §

416.927(f)(2) and SSR 96-6p. Here, while DDS concluded that “[p]arent

statement is partially credible[] as “[h]e does have some limitations

that are shown on this RFC[,]” the only limitation noted for this

particular domain was a “less than marked” limitation, and Plaintiff

has not disputed any other domain other than caring for oneself for

which no limitations were found. (Tr. 329).

28

stated supra, Dr. Andrews’ treatment notes for March 2002 reflect

that Joseph was “doing quite well,” that he was “no longer having

anxiety attacks” and was “quite well adjusted.” (Id. at 316).

Similarly, Dr. Lawrence also noted that Joseph’s Xanax medication

“really helped” his severe anxiety disorder, that he was now

active, and that he was doing things he had never done before like

riding alone on rides at the fair. (Id. at 356). It is also

noteworthy that Disability Determination Services medical

consultants, (hereinafter “DDS”), reviewed Joseph’s medical

records in May 2002, and concluded that he had a “less than

marked” limitation in this domain.17 (Id. at 324-330).

Although Plaintiff argues that Ms. Macon’s October 8, 2002

ADHD Questionnaire supports her hearing testimony, the undersigned

finds that the ALJ was correct in according little weight to Ms.

Macon’s opinions. The Questionnaire was prepared in October 2002,

although it appears that her opinions were based on Joseph’s June

2002 visit to MMHC. Moreover, the opinions expressed in the

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 28 of 37
1820 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2) (stating that information from

other, non-medical sources may also be considered when assessing a

claimant’s medical condition).

29

Questionnaire are not supported by any underlying treatment

records, and are in stark contrast to all of the other evidence,

including Plaintiff’s own hearing testimony to the effect that

Joseph’s anxiety and panic attacks were controlled with medication

and that all were hopeful that he would be ready to return to

school in January 2003. Because Ms. Macon’s conclusions are

unsupported by the evidence of record, the ALJ properly accorded

them no significance. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-583

(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that even a treating physician’s report

may be discounted when it is not accompanied by supporting

objective medical evidence or is wholly conclusory). 

Finally, Joseph’s school records provide further support for

the ALJ’s decision regarding this domain. As the ALJ noted, even

though Joseph had to repeat the first grade and was placed in

special education classes for a learning disability, his grades

are usually above average. (Tr. 20-37, 117). School psychologist

Frank H. Roberts, Ph.D. (hereinafter “Dr. Roberts”), of the Greene

County School District, an acceptable medical source,18 conducted

a psycho-educational test on Joseph and stated that his scores

placed him in the range of average intelligence, providing support

for the ALJ’s finding that his alleged mental impairments, while

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 29 of 37
30

severe, are not of disabling severity. (Id. at 233-238). 20

C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2) (stating that information from other, nonmedical sources may also be considered in assessing a claimant’s

medical condition). A February 2001 “Summary Report” of Joseph’s

level of performance in the fourth grade (at age 11) also

indicated that while he had “some” difficulties with his attention

span and excessive hyperactive activity, his behavior

“difficulties” were reduced dramatically when he was moved to a

special education classroom. (Id. at 130-131). During the 2001-

2002 school year, when Joseph was entering the fifth grade, an

Individualized Education Program form was completed (id. at 132-

150) which indicated that he worked in mathematics at the grade

level, his weakness was reading, and that he “functions well in

a regular classroom.” (Id. at 132). Also, Leakesville School

District records for this same time period indicate that upon

repeating the first grade, Joseph received mostly A’s and B’s

through the fourth grade. (Id. at 116-119). In sum, this Court’s

review of all of the evidence of record reveals that the ALJ’s

decision, regarding both Plaintiff’s credibility and the domain

of interacting and relating with others, was based upon

substantial evidence. 

3. Caring For Oneself

Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 30 of 37
19Section 416.926a also lists examples of limited functioning in

this domain.

31

Joseph has a less than marked limitation in the domain of caring

for oneself. For this domain, the ALJ considered “[]how well the

child [Joseph] maintains a healthy emotional and physical state,

including how well the child [Joseph] meets physical and emotional

wants and needs in appropriate ways, copes with stress and changes

in his environment, and takes care of his own health, possessions

and living area[,]” and concluded that he has a less than marked

limitation in this domain. (Tr. at 26, 33). 20 C.F.R. §

416.926a(k).19 As correctly determined by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s

statement and reports regarding Joseph support a finding that he

can take care of himself. (Id.) As noted previously, Plaintiff

testified that the medication had pretty much gotten Joseph’s

anxiety under control. (Id. at 53). Additionally, in a November

16, 2001 Functional Report, Plaintiff reported that she was “not

sure” if Joseph’s impairments affected his ability to help himself

or cooperate with others in taking care of personal needs. (Id.

at 33, 91). 

The ALJ also properly found that Plaintiff’s assertion that

Joseph “did not pick up and put away toys, did not hang up his

clothes, did not help around the house or do what he was told most

of the time, and he did not obey safety rules[]” was of no import,

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 31 of 37
32

because “[e]ven children without impairments may at times display

such behavior.” (Id. at 33). It is noteworthy that Plaintiff

reported that Joseph uses zippers by himself, buttons clothes by

himself, ties shoelaces, takes a bath or shower without help,

brushes his teeth, combs or brushes his hair, washes his hair by

himself, chooses clothes by himself, eats by himself using a

knife, fork and spoon, gets to school on time, and accepts

criticisms or correction. (Id. at 91).

Moreover, in Ms. Dearman’s March 18, 2002 Teacher’s

Questionnaire, she reported that Joseph had only a few problems

with this domain and that they occurred only on a monthly basis

– not on a weekly, daily or hourly basis. (Tr. 159). That being

said, it is significant that Ms. Dearman simultaneously concluded

that Joseph had no problems being patient when necessary; taking

care of his personal hygiene; caring for his physical needs

(dressing, eating, etc.); cooperating in, or being responsible

for, taking needed medications; using good judgment regarding

personal safety and dangerous circumstances; identifying and

appropriately asserting emotional needs; and knowing when to ask

for help. (Id.) Ms. Dearman concluded that he “can do fine in

any setting once he realizes there is a higher authority that

refuses to back down.” (Id.)

Similarly, while Ms. Hovatter indicated in her April 26, 2002

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 32 of 37
20Indeed, Ms. Hovatter emphasized the lack of effort, rather

than an impairment, as Joseph’s problem, because “[w]hether or not he

[Joseph] does well [in school] depends a lot on how much effort the

assignment/test requires . . . Joe does not study at home . . . if

it’s not obtained within the classroom, he won’t and doesn’t care to

get it . . . .” (Tr. 172). 

33

Teacher’s Questionnaire that Joseph displays a great deal of

“nonchalance in his attitude toward[s] assignments,

responsibilities, rules and consequences, and school in

general[,]”20 she concluded that for the vast majority of

activities related to this domain, Joseph has no problems. (Id.

at 163, 170). Ms. Hovatter found that Joseph has no problems

taking care of his personal hygiene; caring for his physical needs

(e.g., dressing, eating); cooperating in, or being responsible

for, taking needed medications; using good judgment regarding

personal safety and dangerous circumstances; identifying and

appropriately asserting emotional needs; using appropriate coping

skills to meet daily demands of school environment; and knowing

when to ask for help. (Id. at 170). Indeed, as noted supra, even

though Ms. Hovatter stated that Joseph is “easily frustrated and

quick to anger,” and suffers from asthma, anxiety/panic disorder

and ADHD, she concluded: “in collaborating with his other

teachers, we agree that these conditions [Joseph’s impairments]

do not interfere with Joe’s ability to function[]” and “[w]ith the

prescribed medication and when taken appropriately, Joe could meet

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 33 of 37
21Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584-585 (holding that an ALJ may properly

rely upon the opinions of a non-examining physicians which is

consistent with the opinion of the examining physicians); and

Perales, 403 U.S. at 408 (concluding that use of a non-examining

medical expert is proper). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2) and

SSR 96-6p. Here, while DDS concluded that “[p]arent statement is

partially credible[] as “[h]e does have some limitations that are

shown on this RFC[,]” there were no limitations noted for this

particular domain and Plaintiff has not disputed any other domain

other than interacting and relating with others. (Tr. 329).

34

his academic requirements, if he would exhibit more effort.” (Tr.

170-171). 

Further, in May 2002, DDS concluded that even though Joseph

was quick to anger and impatient, he had no limitations in this

domain.21 (Id. at 327).

Finally, Ms. Macon’s October 8, 2002 ADHD Questionnaire,

which reflects that Joseph has a marked limitation in this domain

was not entitled to any weight because it does not specifically

address the key factors for this domain (i.e., how well he

maintains a healthy emotional and physical state, how well he gets

his physical and emotional wants and needs met in appropriate

ways, how he copes with stress and changes in his environment and

whether he takes care of his own health, possessions, and living

area). (Id. at 349). Ms. Macon’s conclusions are also not

supported by any treatment notes and are in stark contrast to the

other evidence of record. Thus, the ALJ properly accorded Ms.

Macon’s conclusions no significance. Edwards, 937 F.2d at 583-

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35

583. This Court’s review of all of the evidence of record reveals

that the ALJ’s findings with respect to the domain of caring for

oneself was based upon substantial evidence. 

V. Conclusion

The undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s finding that Joseph does not have a marked limitation in the

two domains of interacting and relating with others and caring for

onself. The ALJ set forth adequate reasons for the credibility

and weight afforded Plaintiff’s testimony and clearly set forth

record evidence upon which his decision was based. For the

reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the

administrative record and memoranda of the parties, it is the

recommendation of the undersigned that the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for

supplemental security income benefits for her son, Joseph, be

AFFIRMED.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to this report and recommendation.

DONE this 29th day of September, 2005.

 /s/SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 35 of 37
36

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); and Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in

more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in

part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served

with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different

time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the

recommendation to which objection is made and the

basis for the objection. The objecting party shall

submit to the district judge, at the time of filing

the objection, a brief setting forth the party’s

arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition

made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the

original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted

or referred to and incorporated into the brief in

support of the objection. Failure to submit a brief

in support of the objection may be deemed an

abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment

can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 36 of 37
37

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00447-WS-B Document 17 Filed 09/30/05 Page 37 of 37