Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-02980/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-02980-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ALICE COTTI and VLADIMIR 

SERDYUKOV,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PA CHANG, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02980-BLF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR RELIEF; GRANTING 

REMAINING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD 

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND; AND 

DISMISSING ACTION 

[RE: ECF 160, 165]

Plaintiffs Alice Cotti and Vladimir Serdyukov filed this action after their two children were 

removed from the family home following police officers’ response to a report of domestic 

disturbance. Plaintiffs were arrested and the children were taken into protective custody by social 

workers who were called to the scene. Plaintiffs claim that the children’s removal was without 

adequate cause, and that social workers’ allegations regarding domestic violence, substance abuse, 

and a non-accidental fracture to one child’s leg were without basis. 

A majority of the twenty-four defendants named in the operative third amended complaint 

(“TAC”) have been dismissed. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Relief, asking the Court to set 

aside prior dismissal orders, appoint counsel, grant leave to file a fourth amended complaint, seal 

documents, and permit them to file future documents under seal or to use pseudonyms. The four 

remaining defendants, Francesca LeRue, Pa Chang, Jeff Johnson, and Phu Nguyen, have filed a 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). The Court vacated 

the hearing on both motions and submitted them for decision without oral argument. See Order 

Vacating Hearing, ECF 169. 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 1 of 26
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief is DENIED; Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and the action is DISMISSED.

 I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed the complaint, first amended complaint, and second amended complaint 

while proceeding pro se. See Compl., ECF 1; FAC, ECF 5; SAC, ECF 34. Plaintiffs thereafter 

retained counsel who, with leave of Court, filed the operative TAC. See TAC, ECF 109.

Third Amended Complaint

The TAC alleges the following facts: on May 23, 2017, San Jose Police officers responded 

to a report of domestic disturbance at Plaintiffs’ home. TAC ¶ 31. Officers Gaona, Preuss, and 

Avila arrived at the scene first, and later were joined by Sergeant Tran. Id. Both Plaintiffs were 

arrested for domestic violence. TAC ¶¶ 35-38, 51. Plaintiffs’ licensed childcare provider, Marissa 

Fernandez, agreed to take custody of their minor children, a three-year-old boy, R.S., and a tenmonth-old girl, T.S. TAC ¶¶ 36, 51. Hernandez went to Plaintiffs’ home, where Plaintiffs made 

arrangements with Hernandez for their children’s care. TAC ¶ 36. Sergeant Tran was aware that 

Plaintiffs had made arrangements for Hernandez to care for the children, but Tran disregarded 

Plaintiffs’ wishes and called the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Child Services to 

request that a social worker respond at the scene for the children. TAC ¶ 37. Social workers Jeff 

Johnson and Phu Nguyen arrived at the scene and took custody of the children. TAC ¶¶ 39-41.

Later that same day, May 23, 2017, social worker Sarah Gerhart met with the children at 

the Valley Medical Spark Clinic. See TAC ¶ 44. A nurse noticed a bruise on T.S. and ordered a 

skeletal survey. See TAC ¶ 45. The skeletal survey indicated that T.S. had a possible fracture of 

her left femur which was suspicious for non-accidental trauma. TAC ¶ 46. Both Plaintiffs denied 

knowledge of the injury. TAC ¶¶ 49-50. Gerhart signed juvenile dependency petitions stating 

that the children were taken into custody as a result of severe domestic violence between Plaintiffs

and following Plaintiffs’ arrest. TAC ¶ 51. The petitions described the circumstances of the arrest 

and Plaintiffs’ history of domestic violence. Pa Chang, a social worker supervisor, confirmed that 

Gerhart’s statements in the petitions were true and correct. TAC ¶ 55.

Nikolas Arnold was appointed to represent Serdyukov during the initial detention 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 2 of 26
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

proceedings and John Faulconer was appointed to represent Cotti. TAC ¶ 59. Superior Court 

Judge Patrick Tondreau presided. TAC ¶ 62. Judge Tondreau set jurisdictional and detention 

hearings for June 15, 2017. Id. At the June 15, 2017 proceedings, Cotti was represented by new 

counsel, Amy Choi. TAC ¶ 65. The court continued the matter to July 3, 2017. TAC ¶ 66. On 

July 3, 2017, Cotti was represented by Wesley Schroeder. TAC ¶ 67. The court set an early 

resolution conference for July 13, 2017. Id. No resolution was reached, and the court ultimately 

sustained the petitions. TAC ¶¶ 68-70. 

R.S. was scheduled to receive therapeutic services from Rebekah Children’s Services. 

TAC ¶ 74. Amy Guy, an attorney appointed to represent R.S. and T.S., told Plaintiffs that she 

would never agree to the children returning home unless Plaintiffs submitted to multiple 

psychological examinations, waived their privacy rights, and dropped their appeals. TAC ¶¶ 24, 

75. On April 13, 2018, the children were returned to Plaintiffs’ custody. TAC ¶ 76. On May 2, 

2018, the parties met to determine whether the previously sustained petitions should be dismissed. 

Id. No agreement was reached. Id. The court advised that it could not set the matter for trial until 

after May 14, 2018. Id. Serdyukov felt compelled to waive trial and agree that the children were 

at risk in the home to speed resolution of the case. TAC ¶ 76. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs’ TAC asserts federal and state law claims against the 

following twenty-four individuals and entities: City of San Jose (“City”); San Jose Police 

Department (“SJPD”); Officer Gaona; Officer Avila; Sergeant Tran; County of Santa Clara

(“County”); Social Security Agency of Santa Clara County (“SSA”); Department of Social Services

(“DSS”); Santa Clara County Department of Family and Child Services (“DFCS”); Francesca LeRue; 

Jeff Johnson; Phu Nguyen; Sarah Gerhart; Pa Chang; Nicolas Arnold; John Faulconer; Wesley 

Schroeder; Amy Choi; Family Legal Advocates (“FLA”); Dependency Advocacy Center

(“DAC”); Legal Advocates for Children and Youth (“LACY”); Amy Guy; Judge Patrick 

Tondreau; and Rebekah Children’s Services. See generally TAC, ECF 109.

The TAC contains a First Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, which is divided into four “counts”: Count 1, Warrantless Removal/Removal without a 

Court Order, Notice, or Exigency; Count 2, Judicial Deception; Count 3, Due Process; and Count 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 3 of 26
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

4, Monell Liability. TAC ¶¶ 77-110. The TAC also contains a Second Cause of Action for legal 

malpractice under California state law. TAC ¶¶ 111-115. 

June 24, 2019 Order

A number of the defendants filed motions challenging the TAC under one or more of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rules 8, 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). No oppositions were 

filed. On June 24, 2019, the Court issued an order (“June 24 Order”), ECF 125, addressing the 

pending motions and summarizing the status of the case:

(1) Seven defendants were dismissed without leave to amend pursuant to their unopposed 

motions to dismiss: Rebekah Children’s Services, City, SJPD, Judge Tondreau, Choi, Arnold, and 

County. The Court did not rely solely on Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose the motions to dismiss, but 

provided a reasoned decision explaining why the TAC failed to state a claim.

(2) Eight defendants were dismissed sua sponte, without prejudice to a motion for leave to 

amend the pleading, because they were added in violation of the Court’s prior order: Gaona,

Avila, Tran, FLA, DAC, Schroeder, Faulconer, and LACY. Plaintiffs were directed to file any 

motion for leave to amend to add those defendants by July 24, 2019.

(3) Service of process was quashed as to five defendants: LeRue, Chang, Nguyen, 

Johnson, and Gerhart. Plaintiffs were granted thirty days to effect service of process.

(4) Four defendants had not been served: DSS, DFCS, SSA, and Guy. Plaintiffs were 

directed to file a status report as to those defendants, and the defendants as to whom service of 

process was quashed, on or before July 26, 2019.

September 4, 2019 Order

Plaintiffs did not follow the Court’s directions. They did not file a noticed motion for 

leave to amend to add defendants; did not serve LeRue, Chang, Nguyen, Johnson, or Gerhart; and 

did not file a status report with respect to DSS, DFCS, SSA, or Guy. Instead, Plaintiffs filed a 

“Motion to Set Aside Order of June 24, 2019; Motion to Add Defendants; Motion for Leave to 

File Fourth Amended Complaint.” See Pls.’ Motion to Set Aside, ECF 126. Plaintiffs based their 

motion on the fact that their attorney, Michelle Brenot, was ill when Plaintiffs’ oppositions to the 

motions to dismiss the TAC were due. 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 4 of 26
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

On September 4, 2019, the Court issued an order (“September 4 Order”) denying 

Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside its June 24 Order. See September 4 Order, ECF 136. The Court 

found that Plaintiffs had not articulated any legal basis for setting aside the June 24 Order, and that 

even if Plaintiffs’ motion were construed as seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b), Plaintiffs had not demonstrated entitlement to relief under that rule. The Court denied 

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend as procedurally improper, noting that the motion was not 

filed as a noticed motion and was not accompanied by a proposed amended pleading. Finally, the 

Court ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why all unserved defendants should not be dismissed.

November 12, 2019 Order

Plaintiffs’ counsel requested two extensions of the deadline to respond to the Order to 

Show Cause, explaining that she recently had been diagnosed with a serious medical condition. 

See Ex Parte Applics., ECF 148, 150. Both requested extensions were granted, resulting in a 

response deadline of October 7, 2019. See Orders, ECF 149, 151. After more than a month 

elapsed following the October 7, 2019 deadline, the Court issued an order dated November 12, 

2019 (“November 12 Order), noting that Plaintiffs had filed proofs of service of process with 

respect to LeRue, Chang, Johnson, and Nguyen, but not with respect to any of the other unserved 

defendants. See November 12 Order, ECF 152. The Court dismissed the unserved defendants 

without prejudice for failure to effect service of process as required under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(m). The Court discharged the Order to Show Cause with respect to LeRue, Chang, 

Johnson, and Nguyen, and clarified that those four were the only defendants remaining in the case.

Initial Case Management Conference on December 5, 2019

The Court held the Initial Case Management Conference on December 5, 2019. See

Minute Entry, ECF 158. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Ms. Brenot, neither filed a case management 

statement nor appeared on Plaintiffs’ behalf. At the hearing, Defendants’ counsel stated that his 

efforts to reach Ms. Brenot had been unsuccessful. Court staff could not reach Ms. Brenot at the

telephone number provided to the Court. The Court issued an Order Following Initial Case 

Management Conference memorializing these facts and observing that Ms. Brenot previously had 

reported diagnosis of a serious health condition. See Order Following Init. CMC, ECF 159. The 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 5 of 26
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Court indicated, however, that the case needed to proceed and it directed the defendants to file 

their anticipated motion to dismiss. See id.

Remaining Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

On December 19, 2019, LeRue, Chang, Johnson, and Nguyen filed the present motion to 

dismiss. See Defs.’ MTD, ECF 160. Plaintiffs filed a pro se opposition as well as a substitution 

of attorney indicating that they are pro se once again. See Pls.’ Opp., ECF 161; Pls.’ Substitution 

of Attorney, ECF 162. Defendants filed a reply. Defs.’ Reply, ECF 163. The Court vacated the 

March 19, 2020 hearing and submitted the Motion to Dismiss for decision without oral argument. 

See Order Vacating Hearing, ECF 169.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief

On January 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief, asking the Court to set aside prior 

orders, appoint counsel, grant leave to amend, seal documents, and allow them to file future 

documents under seal or use pseudonyms. See Motion for Relief, ECF 165. Previously dismissed 

defendants Choi and Arnold filed opposition, as did remaining defendants LeRue, Chang, 

Johnson, and Nguyen. See Choi/Arnold Opp., ECF 167; Defs.’ Opp., ECF 168. Plaintiffs did not 

file a reply. The Court vacated the March 19, 2020 hearing and submitted the Motion for Relief 

for decision without oral argument. See Order Vacating Hearing, ECF 169.

 II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF

As noted above, Plaintiffs request several forms of relief, addressed in turn as follows.

A. Motion to Set Aside June 24 Order

Plaintiffs ask the Court to set aside its June 24 Order with respect to the dismissal of 

Defendants Tran1, SJPD, Choi, Arnold, and County.

The Court dismissed Tran because he was added to the TAC in violation of the Court’s 

prohibition on adding new claims or parties without leave. See June 24 Order at 2. The dismissal 

1 The Court previously dismissed Sergeant Vu Tran. See September 4 Order at 6, ECF 34. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief refers to Sergeant Jeff Tran and Sergeant Ken Tran. See Motion for 

Relief at 2, 6, ECF 165. It is unclear whether Plaintiffs’ references to “Jeff” and “Ken” Tran are in 

error or whether more than one Sergeant Tran was involved in this case. The Court need not 

resolve that question because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated grounds either to set aside the 

dismissal of Sergeant Vu Tran or to add new claims against Vu Tran or another Tran defendant. 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 6 of 26
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

was without prejudice to a noticed motion for leave to amend. See id. Plaintiffs do not 

acknowledge this basis for Tran’s dismissal or explain why dismissal was improper. 

The Court dismissed SJPD, Choi, Arnold, and County on the merits pursuant to their 

unopposed motions to dismiss. See June 24 Order at 9-16. Plaintiffs assert that the failure to 

oppose the motions to dismiss was due to excusable neglect stemming from the illness of their 

attorney, Ms. Brenot, and they seek to set aside the June 24 Order on that basis. As an initial 

matter, the Court did not grant the motions solely on the ground that they were unopposed. As 

reflected in the twenty-page June 24 Order, the Court analyzed the motions to dismiss on the 

merits and concluded that the allegations of the TAC failed to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted with respect to the moving defendants. See June 24 Order, ECF 125. 

Moreover, as the remaining defendants point out, Plaintiffs previously moved to set aside 

the June 24 Order on the ground of excusable neglect, and that motion was denied by the Court in 

its September 4 Order. See September 4 Order, ECF 136. The Court specifically considered 

whether Plaintiffs were entitled to relief on the basis of excusable neglect under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and, after applying the factors set forth in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. 

Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993), it concluded that no relief was warranted. See

September 4 Order at 4-5. Plaintiffs have not sought reconsideration of the September 4 Order

and their attempt to relitigate that order in the context of the current Motion for Relief is improper.

Plaintiffs assert that they provided Ms. Brenot with twenty pages of factual allegations 

about misconduct on the part of Defendants Choi and Arnold “which didn’t make it to the TAC 

due to Plaintiff’s Counsel illness.” Motion for Relief at 3, ECF 165. Choi and Arnold were 

appointed to represent Cotti and Serdyukov, respectively, in the underlying dependency 

proceedings. TAC ¶¶ 18, 21. Plaintiffs present no basis to conclude that Ms. Brenot’s failure to 

include factual allegations regarding Choi and Arnold in the TAC was due to neglect stemming 

from Ms. Brenot’s illness rather than counsel’s exercise of professional judgment. Ms. Brenot 

first appeared in the case while multiple motions to dismiss were pending with respect to 

Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which they had filed pro se. In granting those motions with 

leave to amend, the Court noted that Ms. Brenot had acknowledged that the second amended 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 7 of 26
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

complaint was deficient and promised to clean up the pleading if granted leave to amend. See

Order Granting Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at 2, ECF 93. Ms. Brenot 

subsequently pared down Plaintiff’s eighty-page second amended complaint to the operative 

thirty-five-page TAC. Compare SAC, ECF 34, with TAC, ECF 109. Counsel’s decision to omit 

certain facts from the TAC does not provide a basis for setting aside the Court’s dismissal order.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the June 24 Order is DENIED.

B. Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Complaint 

Plaintiffs seek leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint to add defendants and claims. 

Plaintiffs list the defendants they wish to add and briefly identify their alleged roles in the removal 

of Plaintiffs’ children: Sergeant Tran, who allegedly made the decision to remove the children; 

Braeden Sullivan, counsel for DFCS; Jessica Lum, a nurse practitioner who allegedly submitted 

the children to x-rays without obtaining legal authorization; Doctors James Gamble and Steven 

Frick, whose conduct allegedly interfered with Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; and the Valley 

Medical Spark Clinic, which allegedly is vicariously liable for Nurse Lum. See Motion for Relief 

at 6-7, ECF 165. Plaintiffs also list the claims they wish to add, including claims for unreasonable 

search and interference with familial association in violation of the Fourth Amendment, state 

statutory claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent misdiagnosis, negligent 

infliction of emotional distress, and declaratory relief. See id. at 7-8.

What Plaintiffs have not done is submit a proposed fourth amended complaint with their 

motion. Civil Local Rule 10-1 requires that “[a]ny party filing or moving to file an amended 

pleading must reproduce the entire proposed pleading and may not incorporate any part of a prior 

pleading by reference.” Plaintiffs’ prior motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint was 

denied in part based on their failure to provide a copy of their proposed amended pleading. See

September 4 Order at 6, ECF 136. That denial was without prejudice to a subsequent motion that 

“complies in all respects with the Civil Local Rules and this Court’s Standing Order Re Civil 

Cases.” The Court expressly cautioned Plaintiffs that “[i]n particular, any motion for leave to 

amend must include a proposed amended pleading.” Id.

Because Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the Civil Local Rules and the Court’s 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 8 of 26
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

express direction to provide a proposed amended pleading, their motion for leave to file a fourth 

amended complaint is DENIED.

C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiffs request that the Court appoint counsel to represent them in this case. “Generally,

a person has no right to counsel in civil actions.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.

2009). “However, a court may under ‘exceptional circumstances’ appoint counsel for indigent

civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).” Id. In making a determination whether

exceptional circumstances exist, the court must consider both the ability of the plaintiff to

articulate his or her claims pro se and the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. Id. 

“Neither of these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id.

Plaintiffs do not qualify as “indigent civil litigants” under § 1915(e), as their application 

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was denied. See Order Denying IFP Application, ECF 4. 

Moreover, there is no likelihood that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their claims, because 

this action is subject to dismissal for the reasons stated in this order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 

motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

D. Motion to Set Aside November 12 Order

Plaintiffs ask the Court to set aside the portion of its November 12 Order dismissing 

unserved defendants. See November 12 Order at 2, ECF 152. The Court raised the issue of 

unserved defendants almost a year ago in June 2019. See June 24 Order, ECF 125. Plaintiffs’ 

counsel, Ms. Brenot, was actively litigating the case at that time. She filed several documents in 

July 2019 and August 2019. See ECF 126, 127, 128, 133. In September 2019, the Court issued an 

Order to Show Cause why the unserved defendants should not be dismissed. See September 4 

Order, ECF 136. Ms. Brenot responded by filing proofs of service of process on LeRue, Chang, 

Johnson, and Nguyen in September 2019. See ECF 143, 145, 146, 147. Ms. Brenot also 

requested and received two extensions of the deadline to respond to the Order to Show Cause. See

Orders, ECF 149, 151. A month after expiration of the last extended deadline, the Court 

dismissed all unserved defendants. See November 12 Order, ECF 152. 

Plaintiffs now request that the Court reinstate the unserved defendants, citing Federal Rule 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 9 of 26
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of Civil Procedure 4(m) for the proposition that the Court must grant additional time for service if 

the plaintiff shows “good cause” for the failure to serve. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiffs’ 

argument is unpersuasive because the Court granted several extensions of time for service before 

dismissing the unserved defendants. Nothing in Rule 4(m) mandates that the Court set aside a 

dismissal for lack of service even if the plaintiff shows good cause. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not 

shown good cause in this case. Plaintiffs assert that they retained a private investigator who was 

unable to serve Gerhart, and that they mailed Gerhart a waiver of service form on November 29, 

2019. However, Gerhart did not return the waiver of service form and Plaintiffs have not taken 

further steps to serve her. Plaintiffs assert that DSS and DFCS were served with process in 

August 2018, directing the Court’s attention to proofs of service filed at ECF 33 and 36. Those 

docket entries contain proofs of service for a number of other defendants, but not for DSS or 

DFCS. See ECF 33 and 36. The Court notes that the proofs of service on individual defendants 

Lightbourne and LeRue indicate that they were served at the offices of DSS and DFCS, 

respectively. See ECF 33 and 36. However, there are no proofs showing that the agencies 

themselves were served with process. 

Plaintiffs argue that they have made good faith efforts to serve all defendants, but that 

defendants have evaded service of process. Plaintiffs do not explain how the state agency 

defendants have evaded service of process when their addresses for service are matters of public

record. Nor do Plaintiffs present evidence that the individual defendants deliberately evaded 

service. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any factual or legal basis to 

vacate dismissal of the unserved defendants and grant additional time for service.

Plaintiffs’ request to set aside the November 12 Order is DENIED.

E. Motion to Seal Documents and/or Use Pseudonyms in Future Filings

Finally, Plaintiffs ask the Court to seal documents containing their full names and to permit 

Plaintiffs to file future documents under seal or to use pseudonyms in lieu of their full names. 

Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the applicable standards for sealing

or using pseudonyms.

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 10 of 26
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1. Sealing

“Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 

and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of 

Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 

U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Consequently, filings that are “more than tangentially related to the 

merits of a case” may be sealed only upon a showing of “compelling reasons” for sealing. Ctr. for 

Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2016). Filings that are only 

tangentially related to the merits may be sealed upon a lesser showing of “good cause.” Id. at 

1097. Sealing motions filed in this district also must be “narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of 

sealable material.” Civil L.R. 79-5(b).

Plaintiffs have not shown either compelling reasons or good cause for sealing documents 

in this case. They express a desire to seal their full names, but they do not provide any reason for 

sealing. Nor have they identified any particular documents or portions of documents to be sealed. 

As a result, their sealing request is not narrowly tailored.

Plaintiffs’ request for sealing is DENIED.

2. Pseudonyms

The use of fictitious names is directly at odds with the public’s common law right of

access to judicial proceedings. See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058,

1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598-99). Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 10 requires a complaint to “name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Litigants may

preserve their anonymity in judicial proceedings only “in special circumstances when the party’s

need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing

the party’s identity.” Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068. The Ninth Circuit has identified 

three situations in which parties have been permitted to proceed anonymously: (1) when

identification creates a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm; (2) when anonymity is

necessary to preserve privacy in a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature; and (3) when

the anonymous party is compelled to admit his or her intention to engage in illegal conduct,

thereby risking criminal prosecution. Id. The Court must attempt to strike a “balance between a 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 11 of 26
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

party’s need for anonymity and the interests weighing in favor of open judicial proceedings.” Id.

at 1069. 

Plaintiffs have not addressed these standards at all. Consequently, they have failed to 

show that this case presents special circumstances in which the need for anonymity outweighs the 

interest in public proceedings. Plaintiffs’ request to proceed under pseudonyms is DENIED.

F. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have failed to establish a factual or legal basis for any of the relief they request. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief is DENIED in its entirety.

 III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

The four remaining defendants, LeRue, Chang, Johnson, and Nguyen (“Defendants”), have 

filed a motion to dismiss the TAC pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b)(6). Johnson and Nguyen are 

social workers employed by DFCS. TAC ¶¶ 13-14. They were called to Plaintiffs’ home by 

police and took custody of the children when Plaintiffs were arrested. TAC ¶¶ 37-41. Chang is a 

supervisor employed by DFCS. TAC ¶ 12. LeRue is the Director of DFCS with “supervisory 

responsibility and authority” over DFCS and its social worker employees.2 TAC ¶ 11. 

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 8

Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “[e]ach allegation must be simple, 

concise, and direct,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). “A complaint violates Rule 8 if a defendant would have 

difficulty responding to the complaint.” Fox v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:19-CV-00567-R(MAA), 

2019 WL 566429, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019). “This Court has discretion to dismiss for 

failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 8 even when the complaint is not wholly without 

merit,” and such failure provides “a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

2 Plaintiffs also allege that LeRue was the Director of SSA. TAC ¶ 11. However, their allegations 

of liability against LeRue center on her supervisory authority over DFCS social workers. TAC ¶¶ 

85, 96.

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 12 of 26
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force 

v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). While 

a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is 

facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

B. Discussion

Each of the remaining Defendants is named in one or more counts of the First Cause of 

Action for Violation of Civil Rights. Count 1, Warrantless Removal/Removal without a Court 

Order, Notice, or Exigency, alleges that the children were taken into protective custody 

unlawfully. Count 2, Judicial Deception, alleges that certain defendants lied to the dependency 

court. Count 3, Due Process, asserts that Plaintiffs were denied Due Process when they did not 

receive adequate notice of certain legal proceedings and they were not given sufficient time to 

review documents in preparation for those proceedings.3 

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting a claim for supervisory 

liability against LeRue; Plaintiffs have not alleged facts supporting a claim for violation of their 

constitutional rights; Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity; and Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity. Plaintiffs argue that they have stated viable claims against LeRue, Chang, 

Johnson, and Nguyen. In the Court’s view, the most sensible approach to these arguments is to 

evaluate them on a Defendant-by-Defendant basis, although the parties’ papers are not structured 

in that manner. The Court therefore addresses the arguments relevant to LeRue first, then the 

arguments relevant to Chang, and finally the arguments relevant to Johnson and Nguyen.

3 The First Cause of Action also contains a fourth count, asserting Monell liability against the 

County. Because the County has been dismissed from the action, Count 4 no longer is at issue.

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 13 of 26
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1. LeRue

LeRue is named as a defendant in Count 1 (Warrantless Removal), Count 2 (Judicial 

Deception), and Count 3 (Due Process) of the First Cause of Action. As noted above, LeRue is 

the Director of DFCS with supervisory authority over its social worker employees. An official 

who is a supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 

1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The only allegations against LeRue appear in paragraphs 11, 85, 88, and 96 of the TAC. In 

paragraph 11, identifying LeRue as a defendant, Plaintiffs allege that LeRue “had the power to 

promulgate and implement policies governing the conduct of Santa Clara County social workers in 

relation to the agency’s handling of juvenile dependency matters.” TAC ¶ 11. In paragraph 85, 

contained in Count 1, Plaintiffs allege that LeRue “willfully improperly and/or negligently 

train[ed] or supervised the social workers and permitted them to unconscionably violate Plaintiffs’ 

rights.” TAC ¶ 85. Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 88 that the conduct of LeRue and other 

defendants “was intentional, done with malice, oppression and fraud, and with conscious disregard 

for the rights of Plaintiffs.” TAC ¶ 88. Finally, in paragraph 96, contained in Count 2, Plaintiffs 

allege that LeRue “had a duty to train and supervise” employees and that she “willfully improperly 

and/or negligently trained or supervise[d]” employees with the result that “Plaintiffs’ civil rights 

have been violated.” TAC ¶ 96. 

 Defendants argue that these allegations are insufficient to make out a claim against 

LeRue. The Court agrees. None of the allegations suggest that LeRue had any personal 

involvement in the children’s removal. Plaintiffs allege liability against LeRue based on her 

authority to promulgate policies and based on her role as a supervisor. Under the standard set 

forth above, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that LeRue promulgated particular policies that 

led to the alleged constitutional deprivations, or that LeRue’s improper training or supervision of 

social workers led to the alleged constitutional deprivations. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. 

Plaintiffs do not allege any facts at all regarding policies LeRue promulgated, LeRue’s training of 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 14 of 26
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

social workers, or LeRue’s supervision of social workers. Nor do Plaintiffs allege any facts 

establishing a connection between such policies, training, or supervision and the children’s 

removal. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against LeRue.

In their opposition, Plaintiffs assert that “it was routine” for LeRue to let DFCS seize 

children without a warrant and without probable cause, condone fabrication of medical records, 

and violate parents’ constitutional rights. Pls.’ Opp. at 9, ECF 161. These allegations do not 

appear in the TAC, and even if they did, they are entirely conclusory and therefore would be 

insufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability against LeRue. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to LeRue.

2. Chang

Chang is named as a defendant in Count 2 (Judicial Deception) and Count 3 (Due Process)

of the First Cause of Action. Chang is a supervisor employed by DFCS. As noted above, an 

official who is a supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 based on either (1) her personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between her 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional deprivation. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207.

The only allegations against Chang appear in paragraphs 12, 55, and 96 of the TAC. In 

paragraph 12, identifying Chang as a defendant, Plaintiffs allege that Chang is a “Social Worker 

Supervisor” employed by DFCS. TAC ¶ 12. In paragraph 55, Plaintiffs allege that, “On or about 

May 24, 2017, Pa Chang, Social Work Supervisor, declared, under penalty of perjury each 

statement made by Gerhart was true and correct which [sic] absolutely false. Pa Chang acted 

either with knowledge that her actions [sic] false or with willful negligence with respect to the 

truth of her statements.” TAC ¶ 55. The “statement[s] made by Gerhart” refer to the Initial 

Hearing Report and Juvenile Dependency Petitions prepared by Gerhart, a social worker who has 

been dismissed from this action. See TAC ¶ 54. Finally, in paragraph 96, Plaintiffs allege that 

Chang “had a duty to train and supervise” employees and that she “willfully improperly and/or 

negligently trained or supervise[d]” employees with the result that “Plaintiffs’ civil rights have 

been violated.” TAC ¶ 96.

It appears that Plaintiffs are asserting liability against Chang based on both her personal 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 15 of 26
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations and her role as a supervisor. Addressing the 

claim of supervisory liability first, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts 

showing that Chang’s improper training or supervision of social workers led to the alleged 

constitutional deprivations. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts at all 

regarding Chang’s training or supervision of social workers. Nor do Plaintiffs allege any facts 

establishing a connection between such training or supervision and the children’s removal. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Chang for supervisory liability.

With respect to liability based on Chang’s personal involvement in the alleged 

constitutional deprivations, Chang signed off on the Initial Hearing Report and Juvenile 

Dependency Petitions prepared by Gerhart. See TAC ¶¶ 54-55. According to Plaintiffs, Gerhart 

made a number of false statements in those documents, and Chang either knew the statements 

were false or acted “with willful negligence” as to whether the statements were false. TAC ¶¶ 51-

54. The Court understands these allegations to be the basis for Plaintiffs’ assertion of Count 2 

(Judicial Deception) against Chang. 

Before evaluating the adequacy of Count 2 (Judicial Deception), the Court observes that 

Plaintiffs’ allegations against Chang are wholly unrelated to Count 3 (Due Process). Count 3 

alleges that “Defendants” failed to give Plaintiffs adequate notice of court proceedings in violation 

of their Due Process rights. See TAC ¶¶ 97-106. Nothing in the TAC suggests that Chang had 

responsibility for, or played a role in, giving Plaintiffs notice of court proceedings. Consequently, 

Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Chang with respect to Count 3 (Due Process). 

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ only potentially viable claim against Chang is Count 2 

(Judicial Deception). A parent has a “due process right to be free from deliberately false 

statements during juvenile court proceedings.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 

2018). “[T]he use of judicial deception to obtain an order to remove a child from his or her 

parent’s custody violates the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to familial association.” 

Sigal v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. 2:17-CV-04851-RGK-AGR, 2018 WL 5899636, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

Jan. 17, 2018). “In order to prevail on a judicial deception claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) 

the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 16 of 26
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1240. The term “deliberate fabrication” 

encompasses both statements that the official knew were false and those the official would have 

known were false had he not recklessly disregarded the truth. See id. The Ninth Circuit has 

summarized the required showing as follows: A plaintiff asserting a claim of judicial deception 

“must make (1) a substantial showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth, and 

(2) establish that but for the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have occurred.” Hart v. 

Cty. of Los Angeles, 649 F. App’x 462, 463 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

A claim of judicial deception may not be based on statements resulting from negligence or good 

faith mistakes, “[n]or may a claim of judicial deception be based on an officer’s erroneous 

assumptions about the evidence he has received.” Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1224 

(9th Cir. 2009) (addressing claim of judicial deception in context of warrant application).

Plaintiffs allege that “Chang acted either with knowledge that her actions [sic] false or with 

willful negligence with respect to the truth of her statements” that the Initial Hearing Report and 

Juvenile Dependency Petitions prepared by Gerhart were true and correct. TAC ¶ 55. While the 

phrase “willful negligence” does not align precisely with the language used by the Ninth Circuit in 

defining the elements of judicial deception, the Court understands Plaintiffs to be alleging that 

Chang either knew Gerhart’s statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 

Plaintiffs’ judicial deception claim therefore turns on whether they have alleged facts showing that 

the Initial Hearing Report and Juvenile Dependency Petitions prepared by Gerhart contained false 

statements, and that Chang knew as much or acted with reckless disregard for the truth when she 

signed off on those documents.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating the falsity of any 

statements in the Initial Hearing Report or Juvenile Dependency Petitions, or Chang’s knowledge 

of any falsity. Defendants focus on several key statements at the crux of Plaintiffs’ judicial 

deception claim. Those statements are discussed below. 

a. The children “were placed into protective custody by San Jose Police as a 

result of severe domestic violence between the mother, Alice Cotti, and the father, Vladimir 

Serdyukov.” TAC ¶¶ 51-52. Plaintiffs allege that Gerhart’s characterization of the domestic 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 17 of 26
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

violence as “severe” was false, because it did not rise to the level of “severe physical abuse” as 

defined in DFCS Policies and Procedures. See TAC ¶ 51 & n.3. Plaintiffs simply ignore the 

difference between the phrase used by Gerhart, “severe domestic violence,” and the phrase defined 

in the DFCS Policies and Procedures, “severe physical abuse.” Plaintiffs do not allege facts

showing that the two phrases have the same meaning or are used interchangeably by social 

workers. 

Plaintiffs also allege that Gerhart’s characterization of the domestic violence as “severe” 

was false because neither parent was injured. See TAC ¶ 51. However, Plaintiffs do not dispute 

Gerhart’s description of the altercation to include an argument during which Serdyukov started 

taking video of Cotti with his cell phone, Cotti tried to grab the cell phone, and Cotti wrapped her 

arms and legs around Serdyukov and punched, kicked, and bit him. See TAC ¶ 52. That Plaintiffs 

do not view such behavior as “severe” domestic violence does not render false Gerhart’s 

characterization of the violence as “severe.” At most Plaintiffs’ argument demonstrates a 

difference of opinion regarding the severity of the altercation. 

b. “Both parents were arrested for domestic violence leaving the children without a 

caretaker.” TAC ¶¶ 51-52. Plaintiffs appear to assert that this statement was false because only 

Cotti was arrested, although Plaintiffs’ allegation is unclear because of an apparent typo: “Second, 

on [sic] Plaintiff Cotti was arrested for domestic violence.” TAC ¶ 52. As an initial matter, 

Plaintiffs allege elsewhere in the TAC that both parents were arrested. See TAC ¶ 54 (“Even 

though the parents were arrested . . . .”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also refer to “their short and 

temporary arrests” in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. See Pl.’s Opp. at 31, ECF 161

(emphasis added). Accordingly, the asserted falsity of Gerhart’s statement regarding both parents’ 

arrest is not apparent. Moreover, even if it is true that only Cotti was arrested, Plaintiffs allege no 

facts showing that Gerhart knew as much. Gerhart is not alleged to have been at Plaintiffs’ home 

when they were taken into police custody. Based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, it appears that Gerhart 

came into the case when she met with the children at the Valley Medical Spark Clinic on May 23, 

2017. See TAC ¶ 44. Plaintiffs do not allege how Gerhart would have known that the police took 

both parents into custody but ultimately arrested only Cotti. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 18 of 26
19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

allege that Gerhart’s statement that both parents were arrested was knowingly false or made with 

reckless disregard of the truth. 

c. “On 5/23/2017, the skeletal survey indicated that the child [T.S.] has a possible 

fracture on her left distal femur which the radiologist found suspicious. The parents have no 

reasonable explanation for the injury and doctors determined the injury was caused by nonaccidental trauma.” TAC ¶ 51. Plaintiffs allege that because the follow-up of the skeletal survey 

was scheduled for May 26, 2017, it is clear that “doctors” had not yet read the skeletal survey and 

made a determination as to existence and cause of injury when Gerhart signed the Initial Hearing 

Report and Juvenile Dependency Petitions on May 24, 2017.

4

 See TAC ¶ 51. Plaintiffs also argue 

that T.S. did not suffer a fracture while in her parents’ custody and control, and that “[e]ven if T.S. 

had a fracture, that fact alone did not constitute ‘severe physical harm.’” TAC ¶ 51. Plaintiffs 

claim that Gerhart “made unreasonable extrapolation from known facts” to make the challenged 

statements. TAC ¶ 51. 

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations do not support their assertion that Gerhart’s statements were 

false or reckless. Plaintiffs’ allegations that T.S. did not suffer the fracture while in their custody, 

and that the fracture was not serious, are entirely conclusory. With respect to the statement 

regarding the doctors’ determinations, Gerhart may have been referring to the radiologist. A 

radiologist is “a physician specializing in medical radiology.” See Merriam-Webster Online 

Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radiologist (last visited May 19, 2020). 

Plaintiffs appear to assume that the doctors referenced by Gerhart were doctors who had not yet 

evaluated the skeletal survey. However, that assumption is insufficient to form the basis of a 

judicial deception claim.

d. “Further, the mother as [sic] a substance abuse history and uses marijuana on a 

daily basis, including while the children are in the home. . . . The mother’s active substance abuse 

problem interferes with her judgment, which places the children are (sic) risk of physical harm.” 

4 Plaintiffs allege that Gerhart signed the documents on May 24, 2018, but this appears to be a 

typographical error. Based on the other allegations in the TAC, the Court understands Plaintiffs to 

be alleging that Gerhart signed the documents on May 24, 2017, the day after removal of the 

children.

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 19 of 26
20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

TAC ¶ 52. Plaintiffs allege that these statements are false, because although Cotti uses marijuana 

every day, she “usually” waited until Serdyukov got home so that he can care for the children 

while she uses. See TAC ¶ 52. Plaintiffs also object to Gerhart’s characterization of Cotti’s 

marijuana use as a “substance abuse problem,” asserting that there is no evidence that Cotti has a 

problem or that such problem interferes with her judgment. See TAC ¶ 52. That Plaintiffs do not 

view Cotti’s daily marijuana use as a problem, and disagree with Gerhart’s assessment that it 

impacts Cotti’s judgment, does not make Gerhart’s statement false.

f. “Both parents were arrested for domestic violence leaving the children without a 

caretaker.” TAC ¶¶ 51-52. Plaintiffs allege that Gerhart’s statement that the children were left 

without a caretaker was false, because Plaintiffs had arranged for their licensed childcare provider, 

Hernandez, to take charge of the children. TAC ¶ 53. However, Plaintiffs do not allege that 

Gerhart was aware of Plaintiffs’ arrangement with Hernandez. Gerhart is not alleged to have been 

at the home when Plaintiffs were arrested. There are no facts in the TAC suggesting that Gerhart

was informed that Plaintiffs had made arrangements to leave their children with Hernandez. 

Defendants make an additional argument that Plaintiffs did not have a legal right to 

designate a caregiver of their choice when they were arrested, because custody of minor children 

may be transferred only by court order. The California Family Code provisions cited by 

Defendants address who has legal custody of minor children. See Cal. Fam. Code §§ 3010, 7505. 

Those provisions do not speak to the rights of a parent who retains legal custody to designate a 

particular caregiver, and thus do not appear relevant here. However, Plaintiffs’ allegations of 

falsity with respect to the caretaker statement are insufficient for other reasons, discussed above.

After careful review of the TAC, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to allege 

facts showing that Gerhart made deliberately false or reckless statements in the Initial Hearing 

Report and Juvenile Dependency Petitions. Moreover, even if Plaintiffs had alleged as much with 

respect to Gerhart, Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts whatsoever showing that Chang knew the 

documents contained false statements or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. As discussed 

above, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Chang are purely conclusory. “A plaintiff must present 

more than conclusory allegations or a recital of [the] elements to state a claim for judicial 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 20 of 26
21

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

deception.” Wahid v. The Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. CV 15-01088-PHX-JJT (BSB), 2017 

WL 1488324, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2017). The court need not accept conclusory allegations of 

judicial deception that are unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint. See Newt v. Kasper, 

85 F. App’x 37, 38 (9th Cir. 2003).

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs appear to concede that their allegations of 

wrongdoing by Chang are inadequate, and that they need discovery to obtain facts necessary to 

state a claim against Chang. See Pls.’ Opp. at 18, ECF 161. Plaintiffs argue as follows: 

“Plaintiffs Additionally [sic] demand this court to find that any failure to identify any intentional 

lie or a statement made with reckless disregard for the truth by any specific Defendant, such as Pa 

Chang, shall not be enough reason to dismiss because only after discovery will Plaintiff be able to 

determine in such specificity any additional claim.” Id. This argument is without merit. Plaintiffs 

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” in order to proceed 

with their claims against Chang. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A plaintiff may not rely solely on 

the speculative promises of discovery to survive a motion to dismiss.” Kabir v. Flagstar Bank, 

FSB, No. SACV 16-360-JLS (JCGx), 2016 WL 10999326, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2016). 

For all of these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Chang.

3. Johnson and Nguyen

Johnson and Nguyen are named as defendants only in Count 1 (Warrantless Removal) of 

the First Cause of Action. They are the social workers who responded when police called DFCS 

to Plaintiffs’ residence. See TAC ¶¶ 37-39. Plaintiffs allege that when Johnson and Nguyen 

arrived at the home, Hernandez (Plaintiffs’ licensed childcare provider) had already arrived and

was taking care of the children. See TAC ¶ 39. Johnson and Nguyen nonetheless took custody of 

the children and “placed the children at the receiving, assessment and intake center.” TAC ¶ 41. 

Plaintiffs allege that this conduct was unlawful, and that the children should have been left with 

Hernandez or with Serdyukov’s mother. TAC ¶¶ 40-41. The Court understands this count to 

allege a violation of Plaintiffs’ right of familial association. Plaintiffs’ opposition brief confirms 

that understanding, referring to the claim as “deprivation of familial companionship.” See Pls.’ 

Opp. at 10, ECF 161.

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 21 of 26
22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“The substantive due process right to family integrity or to familial association is well 

established.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011). “A parent has a 

fundamental liberty interest in companionship with his or her child.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The violation of the right to family integrity is subject to remedy under § 1983. 

Id. “Parents and children may assert Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims if 

they are deprived of their liberty interest in the companionship and society of their child or parent

through official conduct.” Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1075 

(9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit has provided what appear to be conflicting legal standards for 

deprivation of familial association, holding in some cases that official conduct is actionable only if 

it “shocks the conscience,” see Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1075, and in others that the appropriate 

standard is “unwarranted interference,” see Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 n.23 

(9th Cir. 2010). This Court need not resolve this conflict, as Plaintiffs fail to state a claim even 

under the lower “unwarranted interference” standard.

Plaintiffs allege that social workers Johnson and Nguyen violated Plaintiffs’ right to 

familial association by taking the children into custody. Government officials may intrude on 

parents’ custody of their children without prior judicial authorization when “they possess 

information at the time of the seizure that establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is 

in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably 

necessary to avert that specific injury.” Mabe v. San Bernardino Cty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 

237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As pointed out by 

Defendants, Plaintiffs’ own allegations establish that Johnson and Nguyen knew that both parents 

had been taken into police custody following an incident of domestic violence, and that as a result 

the parents would not be able to care for the children. Because the children were too young to care 

for themselves, the situation presented imminent danger of serious bodily injury unless the 

children were cared for by an adult. Johnson and Nguyen determined that the appropriate 

caregiver was DFCS rather than Hernandez or Serdyukov’s mother, neither of whom was known 

to them. The Court concludes that under these circumstances, the facts alleged do not show that 

taking the children into protective custody constituted “unwarranted interference” with Plaintiffs’ 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 22 of 26
23

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

familial rights rising to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Defendants make an additional argument that Plaintiffs’ claim against Johnson and 

Nguyen fails because only the police had authority to take temporary custody of the minor 

children. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 305. While the cited code section grants authority to 

police to take custody of minors, other code sections grant social workers similar authority. See

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 306. Plaintiffs argue, and the Court agrees, that factual issues regarding 

which individuals and agencies made the decision to take the children into custody are not 

appropriate for disposition at the motion to dismiss stage.

Defendants argue that even if Johnson and Nguyen made the decision to take the children 

into custody rather than leaving them with Hernandez or Serdyukov’s mother, and that decision 

violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Johnson and Nguyen are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Defendants also argue that Johnson and Nguyen are entitled to absolute immunity for their 

conduct. The Court addresses those arguments in turn.

a. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary 

functions from liability for damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Dunn v. 

Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982)). In analyzing whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court 

looks at two distinct questions: (1) whether the facts alleged, construed in the light most favorable 

to the injured party, establish the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was 

clearly established such that a reasonable government official would have known that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 1199. A court may exercise its discretion in 

deciding “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in 

light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 

(2009).

The Court finds it appropriate to begin its qualified immunity analysis with prong two. It 

is Plaintiffs’ burden under the second prong of the qualified immunity framework to identify a 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 23 of 26
24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

case indicating that the right allegedly violated was clearly established. Sharp v. County of 

Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017). The precedent identified must be “controlling – from 

the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court – or otherwise be embraced by a consensus of courts outside 

the relevant jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts – and the Ninth Circuit in particular – not 

to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” City & Cnty. Of San Francisco v. 

Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-76 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, it 

is insufficient for Plaintiffs to identify a case holding generally that parents have constitutional 

rights to familial association. In light of the facts alleged in the TAC, Plaintiffs must identify a 

case decided before May 23, 2017 (the date the children were taken into DFCS custody) clearly 

establishing that when a social worker is called to the scene of a domestic violence incident by 

police, and informed that both parents of minor children have been taken into police custody, the 

social worker must defer to the wishes of the parents to leave the children with a third-party 

caregiver rather than take the children into protective custody. The precedent identified by 

Plaintiffs must be clear enough that any social worker in the factual circumstances confronted by 

Johnson and Nguyen would have known that taking the children into DFCS custody would violate 

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Plaintiffs have not identified such a case.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against Johnson and Nguyen are subject to dismissal on the 

additional basis of qualified immunity.

b. Absolute Immunity

Defendants contend that Johnson and Nguyen are entitled to absolute immunity as well as 

qualified immunity. “Absolute immunity from private lawsuits covers the official activities of 

social workers only when they perform quasi-prosecutorial or quasi-judicial functions in juvenile 

dependency court.” Hardwick v. Cty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017). Unlike 

state statutory immunities, the absolute immunity based on a social worker’s quasi-prosecutorial 

or quasi-judicial conduct extends to § 1983 suits. See Beltran v. Santa Clara Cty., 514 F.3d 906, 

908 (9th Cir. 2008).

“[L]ike a prosecutor, the social worker must make a quick decision based on perhaps 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 24 of 26
25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

incomplete information as to whether to commence investigations and initiate proceedings against 

parents who may have abused their children.” Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 

F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). “Thus, the 

critical decision to institute proceedings to make a child a ward of the state is functionally similar 

to the prosecutorial institution of a criminal proceeding, and, therefore, deserves absolute 

immunity.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The factor that determines whether 

absolute immunity covers a social worker’s activity or ‘function’ under scrutiny is whether it was 

investigative or administrative, on one hand, or part and parcel of presenting the state’s case as a 

generic advocate on the other.” Hardwick, 844 F.3d at 1115. “Absolute immunity is available 

only if the function falls into the latter category.” Id.

It is unclear from the face of the TAC whether Johnson and Nguyen engaged in 

investigative or administrative work that would fall outside the absolute immunity. The Court 

therefore denies the motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity. However, as discussed above 

Johnson and Nguyen are entitled to dismissal based on insufficient facts and qualified immunity.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to Johnson and Nguyen. 

4. Leave to Amend

When the Court grants a motion to dismiss, leave ordinarily must be granted unless one or 

more of the following factors is present: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive,

(3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, 

and (5) futility of amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Eminence 

Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Foman factors). 

The Court finds no undue delay (factor 1) or bad faith (factor 2). While Plaintiffs have repeatedly 

failed to cure deficiencies by amendment, this order represents the first time the Court has offered 

specific guidance to Plaintiffs regarding these Defendants. The Court therefore does not find 

Plaintiffs’ failure to cure deficiencies (factor 3) to weigh against allowing leave to amend.

However, the Court concludes that leave to amend would be futile (factor 5). Nothing in 

this record, or in Plaintiffs’ four iterations of their complaint, suggests that they could state a 

viable claim for relief against LeRue, Chang, Johnson, or Nguyen. Given that conclusion, it 

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 25 of 26
26

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

would be unduly prejudicial to require Defendants to continue litigating these claims (factor 4). 

The Court thus concludes that further leave to amend is not appropriate.

The motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

 IV. DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION IS WARRANTED

The Court now has dismissed all defendants. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is 

appropriate. Dismissal is WITH PREJUDICE as to those defendants whose motions to dismiss 

were granted on the merits: Rebekah Children’s Services, City, SJPD, Judge Tondreau, Choi, 

Arnold, County, LeRue, Chang, Johnson, and Nguyen. Dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE as 

to those defendants who were dismissed as improperly added or for failure to effect service of 

process: Gaona, Avila, Tran, FLA, DAC, Schroeder, Faulconer, LACY, Gerhart, DSS, DFCS, 

SSA, and Guy.

 V. ORDER

(1) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief is DENIED;

(2) The Motion to Dismiss brought by Defendants LeRue, Chang, Johnson, and 

Nguyen is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND;

(3) The action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendants Rebekah 

Children’s Services, City, SJPD, Judge Tondreau, Choi, Arnold, County, LeRue, 

Chang, Johnson, and Nguyen, and WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendants 

Gaona, Avila, Tran, FLA, DAC, Schroeder, Faulconer, LACY, Gerhart, DSS, 

DFCS, SSA, and Guy; and

(4) This order terminates ECF 160 and 165.

Dated: May 21, 2020 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:18-cv-02980-BLF Document 170 Filed 05/21/20 Page 26 of 26