Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01877/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ANTHONY LYMAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DEPUTY LAMBERT, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 06-1877 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE; DIRECTING

DEFENDANTS TO FILE

DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE

REGARDING SUCH MOTION

On March 10, 2006, plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se and currently

incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, filed the above-titled civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that during the time he was housed at the Contra Costa

County Jail, he was beaten by numerous jail guards, including named defendants Deputy

Lambert, Deputy Duggins, Deputy Jolin, Deputy Gray, and Deputy Curran (hereafter

“individual defendants”). Plaintiff has paid the filing fee. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify

any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings,

Case 3:06-cv-01877-MMC Document 3 Filed 06/12/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a

person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint: 

Plaintiff was being escorted in handcuffs from his cell to a different part of the jail,

and had stopped in front of an elevator, at which time Deputy Duggins punched plaintiff

in the side of his head, Deputy Lambert and Deputy Jolin wrestled him to the ground, and

Deputy Duggins kneed him in the head. Deputy Lambert then pulled plaintiff to his feet

by his hair, smashed his face three times into a nearby cement pillar and then ran him into

a nearby elevator and smashed his face into the elevator’s back wall. The elevator doors

closed with plaintiff, Deputy Duggins, Deputy Lambert, and an unnamed deputy inside. 

Deputy Duggins punched plaintiff in the side of his head, Deputy Lambert again slammed

plaintiff’s head against the elevator wall, and Deputy Duggins kneed him in the thigh. 

Deputy Lambert then dragged plaintiff by the hair out of the elevator to a food preparation

area, where he slammed plaintiff’s face into an orange table. Deputy Gray approached

and shot plaintiff in the eye with a taser gun. Deputies, Duggins, Lambert, Gray, Jolin

and Curran then dragged plaintiff backwards upstairs to a cell, with the taser gun pointed

at plaintiff’s face. Plaintiff subsequently received medical attention for his numerous

injuries, including a broken tooth, a broken left elbow, two lacerations on his face, bumps

on his head, a swollen nose, swollen and cut wrists and a bruised thigh,

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993). "After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." 

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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citation omitted); cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10. (1989) (holding pretrial

detainee protected from use of excessive force by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth

Amendment); Pierce v. Multnomah County, Oregon, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996)

(holding Fourth Amendment protects arrestees from use of excessive force until release or

arraignment). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements

are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, see Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 824, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)),

and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, see id. (citing

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297); see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s allegations herein against the individual defendants state a

cognizable claim for the use of excessive force. 

Plaintiff further names as a defendant, however, a county government entity, the

Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”). Local governments

are "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom

causes a constitutional tort. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690

(1978). To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional

rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which

he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that such policy

amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) that the

policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. School

Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, plaintiff does not

allege any policy of the Sheriff’s Department that was deliberately indifferent to his

constitutional rights, or that such policy was the moving force behind the constitutional

deprivation he allegedly suffered. Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim

under § 1983 against the Sheriff’s Department. 

CONCLUSION

1. The claims against defendant Sheriff’s Department are DISMISSED. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Marshall shall serve, at the Contra Costa County Jail, a copy of the complaint in this

matter, all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Deputy Lambert, Deputy

Duggins, Deputy Jolin, Deputy Gray, and Deputy Curran. Additionally, the Clerk

shall mail a courtesy copy of this order and the complaint to the Contra Costa County

Counsel’s Office.

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as

follows:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, defendants

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. Defendants may

refile the motion filed in plaintiff’s previous case, or they may supplement or augment

that motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and

shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor

qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform

the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with

the Court and served on defendants no later than thirty (30) days from the date

defendants’ motion is filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to plaintiffs:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your

case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose

a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of

material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any

fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who

asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you

are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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properly supported by declarations (or other sworn

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint

says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the

facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and documents

and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants,

your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary

judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an

opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a

consent by plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against

plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days

after plaintiff's opposition is filed. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief

is due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on

defendants, or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true

copy of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel.

4. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or

Local Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

5. It is plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep

the Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in

a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

6. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be

granted. However, the party making the motion for an extension of time is not relieved

from his or her duty to comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having

made a motion for an extension of time. The party making the motion must still meet

the deadlines set by the Court until an order addressing the motion for an extension of

time is received. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the

deadline sought to be extended.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 12, 2006 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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