Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01347/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-01347-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS MAZZEI,

Plaintiff,

v.

GEO SECURE SERVICES, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-01347-JLT-CDB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE 

TO PROSECUTE AND FAILURE TO 

COMPLY WITH THE COURT’S ORDERS 

AND LOCAL RULES

(Docs. 42, 44)

ORDER REQUIRING COUNSEL FOR 

DEFENDANTS TO PAY SANCTIONS OF 

$500

14-DAY DEADLINE

The parties to this action were required pursuant to Local Rule 160 to file dispositional 

documents within 21 days of their filing of a notice of settlement, absent a showing of good 

cause. In response to two orders of the Court requiring them to file dispositional documents, the 

parties have refused to comply and have failed to set forth good cause for any further extensions 

of the deadline. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned will order counsel for Defendants to 

pay monetary sanctions (which order shall be temporarily stayed) and recommends that the action 

be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the case and to comply with the Court’s orders 

and local rules.

Background

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Chris Mazzei (“Mazzei”) originally filed this action in the Superior Court of 

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California, County of Kern, on September 8, 2022. (Doc. 1-2). He asserts various causes of 

action on behalf of himself and a putative class of all current and former California employees of 

Defendants GEO Secure Services, LLC and The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”) employed within four 

years prior to the filing of the complaint. Id. The complaint alleges that GEO engaged in unfair 

competition and committed violations of the California Labor Code by failing to provide meal 

and rest periods, pay wages, comply with employee wage statement requirements, timely pay 

wages at termination, timely pay employees, reimburse business expenses, pay for all hours 

worked, and provide a place of employment that is safe and healthful. Id.

GEO removed the action to this Court on October 20, 2022, on the grounds that the case 

satisfied the federal jurisdictional thresholds under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). 

(Doc. 1). At the parties’ request, the Court delayed scheduling the case to allow them time to 

discuss potential early resolution of their disputes. (Docs. 9-10). Thereafter, following its receipt 

of the parties’ joint report indicating GEO was not amenable to settlement discussions, the Court 

entered a class certification discovery and motion scheduling order. (Doc. 12). 

On May 5, 2023, GEO filed a motion to stay this case until the resolution of six earlierfiled actions in other state and federal courts. (Doc. 16). Among other arguments, GEO 

contended that Plaintiff’s claims are “entirely subsumed by the previously filed lawsuits.” Id. 

GEO also pointed out that the Court is empowered to dismiss or stay this action under the 

Colorado River abstention doctrine given the parallel state court proceedings involving the same 

matter. Id. at 1, 7. After GEO’s motion was fully briefed, the parties filed a joint mid-discovery 

status report on July 11, 2023, in which they jointly represented that GEO objected to Plaintiff’s 

discovery demands and declined to participate in discovery until after the Court ruled on GEO’s 

motion to stay the case. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff never sought relief from the Court to compel GEO’s 

participation in discovery and presumably conceded GEO’s position that discovery would not 

proceed.

On January 18, 2024, at the Court’s direction, the parties filed a joint report in which they 

expressed their intent to explore a “mutually agreeable resolution” to the case in light of the 

preliminary settlement of at least one of the related, earlier-filed actions. (Doc. 28). In the event 

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settlement discussion failed, Defendant represented it intended to file a motion to dismiss or to 

renew its pending motion to stay. Id.

On February 14, 2024, the parties jointly reported to the Court that they were “currently 

engaged in settlement discussions, and anticipate completing those discussions in the next 60 

days.” (Doc. 30). Thereafter, at the Court’s direction, the parties filed several 60-day status 

reports in which they repeated they were “still engaged in settlement discussions.” (Docs. 33, 35, 

37).

On August 20, 2024, the Court convened the parties for status conference, during which 

counsel for Plaintiff expressed his intention to dismiss the class claims without prejudice in light 

of the final settlement of one of the earlier-filed cases (Priscilla Lopez v. GEO Secure Services, 

LLC, California Superior Court for Imperial County, Case No. ECU002060 (filed on September 

9, 2021) (“Lopez”)) and his acknowledgment that Plaintiff’s claims were subsumed by the Lopez 

settlement. (Doc. 39). Thereafter, GEO withdrew its motion to stay, and on October 18, 2024, 

the parties filed a notice of settlement. (Docs. 40-41).

B. The Court’s Order to File Dispositional Documents

In their notice that they had reached a settlement of Plaintiff’s individual claims, the 

parties represented that “a formal settlement agreement is being circulated for review and 

signatures.” (Doc. 41 at 2). The parties also reported their intention to file a stipulated dismissal 

“[o]nce the specified terms in the agreement are performed.” Id. Pursuant to Local Rule 160, the 

Court ordered the parties to file dispositional documents within 21 days of the filing of their 

notice of settlement. (Doc. 42).

Instead of filing dispositional documents, on November 6, 2024, the parties filed a “joint 

status report” in which they represented “the formal settlement agreement is still being circulated 

for review and signatures” and requested an additional 60 days within which to file dispositional 

documents. (Doc. 43 at 2). Because Local Rule 160 requires the filing of dispositional 

documents within 21 days of the filing of a notice of settlement absent “good cause,” and because 

the Court found the parties had not demonstrated good cause to extend the deadline, the Court 

denied the parties’ request for extension but continued the filing deadline from November 8 to 

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November 14, 2024. (Doc. 44).

On the extended deadline to file dispositional documents (November 14), the parties again 

filed a joint status report requesting a further 45-day extension of the filing deadline. (Doc. 46). 

In their report, the parties represent that Plaintiff transmitted a draft settlement agreement to GEO 

on October 11, 2024, but that counsel for GEO was still reviewing the agreement and did not 

expect to transmit to Plaintiff its proposed revisions to the agreement until the following week. 

Id.

C. Good Cause Does Not Warrant Further Delay in Dismissing This Case

In refusing to file dispositional documents, the parties seem to take the position that they 

unilaterally may compel this Court to keep the case open while they formalize the terms of and 

perform under their agreement. Indeed, in their initial notice of settlement, the parties announced 

their intention to delay voluntarily dismissing the case under after “the specified terms in the 

agreement are performed.” (Doc. 41 at 2).

As this Court previously explained (see Doc. 44), good cause does not support the parties’ 

request to further delay dismissing this action. Since filing its motion to stay 18 months ago, 

GEO has refused to participate in discovery (without substantive opposition by Plaintiff, see Doc. 

23) and has argued that Plaintiff’s claims could be dismissed under the Colorado River abstention 

doctrine because they are “entirely subsumed” by numerous earlier filed class actions. (Doc. 16). 

Under these circumstances and in light of the parties’ joint representations that they have been 

engaged in settlement discussions for the past ten months and that Plaintiff transmitted a proposed 

settlement agreement to GEO more than one month ago, their suggestion now that they still need 

six additional weeks to review and sign the agreement is dubious.

But even if their claimed need for additional time to finalize a settlement was credible, 

under the circumstances described above, it would be improper to countenance the parties’ 

invitation for the Court to keep this case open while they perform the terms of their settlement 

agreement. That is because (as the undersigned previously advised, see Doc. 44), the parties have 

not shown that exercising jurisdiction over the parties’ anticipated settlement agreement is 

“essential to the conduct of federal-court business.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 

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511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). In particular, the case was removed to this Court pursuant to CAFA. 

Under CAFA, federal courts have jurisdiction over a class action when the parties are minimally 

diverse, the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, and the proposed class has at least 100 

members. Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2020). By its express 

terms, the statute “denies CAFA jurisdiction if ‘the number of members of all proposed plaintiff 

classes in the aggregate is less than 100.’” Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 966 F.3d 1027, 

1033 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B)).

Although Plaintiff’s expressed intention to dismiss the class claims and settle only his 

individual claims does not necessarily divest this Court of jurisdiction over the action, equitable 

principles strongly favor declining to keep the action open while the parties further delay 

voluntarily dismissing the case pending their signing and performance under their settlement 

agreement. Specifically, courts retain discretion to dismiss or remand CAFA-initiated actions 

where the class claims are rejected and the plaintiff foregoes pursuit of future class claims in 

favor of prosecuting his individual claims. See, e.g., Arabian v. Sony Elecs. Inc., No. 05–cv–1741, 

2007 WL 2701340, at *5 (S. D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (dismissing CAFA action following denial of 

class certification and plaintiff’s express representation that he would only pursue the action on 

his individual claims because there was no “reasonably foreseeable possibility” that a class would 

be certified in the future); accord Clausnitzer v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 621 F. Supp.2d 1266, 1270 

(S.D. Fla. 2008) (dismissing action following denial of class certification; “because Plaintiffs can 

no longer amend their complaint to allege a proper class, there is no possibility Plaintiffs will 

obtain certification, and jurisdiction under CAFA no longer exists”) (citing with approval 

Arabian); Giannini v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. C-06-06823-SBA, 2007 WL 1839789, at *2-4 

(N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007) (remanding CAFA action following dismissal of class claims).

Further, since it is clear from the parties’ filings that they have settled their respective 

claims, the claims are subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) even 

though the parties have not complied with this Court’s order to file dispositional documents. This 

dismissal order could issue since “literal compliance with the stipulation requirement has not been 

required where the agreement of all parties is apparent.” Garber v. Chicago Mercantile 

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Exchange, 570 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 

Accord, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that “[t]he court 

reasonably concluded that the parties had the requisite mutual intent to dismiss the action with 

prejudice” when the court “f[ound] that the parties’ ... representations to the court agreeing to a 

dismissal with prejudice constituted a voluntary stipulated dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii)”).

Sanctions Are Warranted

Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules 

or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all 

sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” The Court has the inherent power to 

control its docket and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, 

including dismissal of the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 

2000). Moreover, in order to compel a party to comply with the Court’s orders, the Court may 

issue monetary sanctions until compliance is obtained. See Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 

1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing court’s authority to impose civil sanctions “intended to be 

remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do.”).

“In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is 

required to weigh several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 

(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public 

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 

sanctions.” Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks & 

citation omitted). These factors guide a court in deciding what to do and are not conditions that 

must be met in order for a court to take action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products 

Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the Court’s order to file dispositional documents 

supports dismissal. As summarized above, good cause does not warrant further extensions of 

Plaintiff’s deadline to voluntarily dismiss this action. The case has sat dormant for the better part 

of the past 18 months, the parties have discussed settlement for at least the past ten months, 

neither party has engaged in discovery, and GEO has argued the Court maintains discretion to 

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dismiss the case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. There are no other reasonable 

alternatives available to address Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and counsel’s refusal to 

comply with the Court’s repeated orders to file dispositional documents. Thus, the first and 

second factors – the expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s need to manage its

docket – weigh in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440-41; In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1227. 

For the same reasons, the third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs fairly 

in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable 

delay in prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The 

fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the 

merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends 

little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits 

but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” In re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1228. In refusing 

to comply with the Court’s repeated orders to file dispositional documents, the parties appear to 

presume they may require a Court to keep a settled case active while they finalize and perform 

under a settlement agreement. The Court is aware of no authority for the proposition that a party 

may unilaterally confer upon a court jurisdiction to supervise a settled case – but even if such 

authority existed, as set forth above, the circumstances of this case do not favor permitting 

Plaintiff to further impede final disposition of this action. Therefore, the fourth factor also weighs 

in favor of dismissal. Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440-41.

Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 

dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). In its order of November 7 finding the parties failed to 

demonstrate good cause for a 60-day extension of the deadline to file dispositional documents, the 

Court admonished the parties: “Failure to timely comply with this order will result in the 

imposition of sanctions.” (Doc. 44 p. 3). Plaintiff was adequately forewarned that his failure to 

timely file dispositional documents could result in terminating sanctions.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to comply with this Court’s Local Rules and the 

Court’s orders, and in so doing is failing to prosecute the case, the Court will recommend 

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dismissal of this action.

Separately, the Court hereby imposes monetary sanctions on counsel of record for 

Defendants in accordance with Local Rule 110 based on their failure to comply with the Court’s 

orders requiring filing of dispositional documents (see Docs. 42, 44). The Court will stay this 

order imposing monetary sanctions for a period of 14 days to permit the parties to file 

dispositional documents. If the dispositional documents are filed within this 14-day period, the 

Court will vacate this order and close this case based on the reported settlement reached. If the 

parties fail to comply, the Court will issue an order requiring payment of the monetary sanctions

imposed.

Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons given above, counsel for Defendants SHALL PAY the Clerk of the Court 

$500. This order is stayed until December 2, 2024, to allow the parties to file the necessary 

dispositional documents previously ordered.

Furthermore, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, without 

prejudice, for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and obey this Court’s orders and the Local 

Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Local Rule 110.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to 

this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of service of these 

Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. The 

document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 18, 2024 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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