Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00178/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00178-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

WEALTHY THOMAS, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA B. SCHRIRO, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 07-178-TUC-CKJ 

 

ORDER

On or about April 20, 2007, Petitioner Wealthy Thomas (“Thomas”) filed the instant

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents have filed an Answer. 

Factual and Procedural Background

The Court of Appeals of Arizona, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

sustaining the trial court’s ruling at the suppression hearing, stated the facts as follows:

In November 2003, Tucson Police Officer Timothy Froebe, working undercover as

a potential illegal drug buyer, drove to an apartment complex to purchase crack

cocaine. An unknown female later identified as a confidential informant accompanied

him. When they got out of their vehicle, an unidentified male approached them and

asked Froebe “what [he] was looking for.” Forebe replied he wanted to purchase

crack cocaine, and the unidentified male offered to “hook [Froebe] up with some

product.”

The unidentified male led Froebe and the unknown female inside the apartment

complex and spoke to a group of people. One member of this group, later identified

as Thomas, subsequently approached Froebe and offered to sell him a “40,” i.e., $40

worth of crack cocaine. Thomas asked for the money, but Froebe insisted on first

seeing the cocaine. Thomas told Froebe that he was not intending to “rip [him] off”

and, aiming a revolver at Froebe’s abdomen, noted that, “if he wanted to jack

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[Froebe,] he could do so.” Froebe responded that he “just wanted to buy the 40,” and

Thomas put away his weapon, instructing his son, Wealthy Thomas, Jr., to give

Froebe two rocks of crack cocaine. Thomas, Jr., complied and Froebe handed

Thomas $40.

As Froebe and the unknown female were leaving, Thomas tried to sell Froebe the rest

of his supply of crack cocaine. Although Froebe declined, Thomas showed Froebe

his vehicle, a red Chevrolet Blazer, and encouraged Froebe to find him should he later

return to purchase more drugs. After noting the Blazer’s license plate number, Froebe

and the unknown female left the area. Immediately thereafter, Froebe contacted the

Tucson Police Department (TPD) and relayed to them the license plate number of

Thomas’s Blazer. After less than thirty minutes, Froebe was told that TPD officers

had detained Thomas pursuant to a traffic stop. Froebe drove by and, after a oneperson show-up, positively identified Thomas as the person who had sold him the

crack cocaine.

Answer, Ex. H, pp. 2-3. The Court of Appeals further stated:

After a jury trial, appellant Wealthy David Thomas, Sr., was convicted of sale of a

narcotic drug, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a deadly

weapon during commission of a felony drug offense. The trial court sentenced

Thomas to a combination of enhanced, concurrent and consecutive, presumptive

prison terms totaling twenty-seven years. On appeal Thomas argues the trial court

erred by denying 1) his motion to suppress identification, 2) his requested jury

instruction, and 3) his motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial and judicial

misconduct. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Answer, Ex. H., pp. 1-2.

Thomas filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief claiming that his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by (1) the denial of his request for

disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant or, alternatively, by the denial of his

request for a Willits instruction and (2) the denial of his motion for a new trial based on

prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. Finding that the claims were precluded, without merit,

and untimely, the post-conviction court denied the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The

Court of Appeals of Arizona denied relief, finding that Thomas’ claims were precluded under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(2).

On or about April 20, 2007, Thomas filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a

Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thomas asserts that the trial court

violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying his request for a new trial

based on prosecutorial misconduct and judicial misconduct and by denying his motion to

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disclose the identity of a confidential informant or, alternatively, by denying his request for

a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 191, 393 P.2d 274, 279 (1964).

Thomas also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the postconviction proceedings. Respondents have filed an Answer. The Court extended the time

in which Thomas was to file any Reply; however, Thomas has not filed a Reply.

Standard of Review

Federal courts may consider a state prisoner's petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner's confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 347, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 2296, 129 L.Ed.2d

271 (1994). Indeed, a habeas corpus petition by a person in state custody:

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523,

146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). General improprieties occurring in state proceedings are cognizable

only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently violated a petitioner's

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See generally, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 479, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).

This Court must review claims consistent with the provisions of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). "The Act limits the ability of federal

courts to reexamine questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact." Jeffries v. Wood,

114 F.3d 1484, 1498 (9th Cir. 1997). This Court may only overturn a state court finding if

a petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that the finding was erroneous. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). An "unreasonable application of clearly established law" exists if the

state court identified the correct governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but

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unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the case. See Taylor. 

Statute of Limitations

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a state

prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas corpus within one year from the date

upon which his judgment became final or the expiration of time for seeking such review. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents agree that Thomas' Petition was timely filed.

Exhaustion of State Remedies

Before a federal court may review a petitioner's claims on the merits, a petitioner must

exhaust his state remedies, i.e., have presented in state court every claim raised in the federal

habeas petition. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d

640 (1991); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1732, 144 L.Ed.2d

1 (1999) (a state prisoner in a federal habeas action must exhaust his claims in the state courts

"by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process" before

he may submit those claims in a federal habeas petition); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008,

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion of state remedies is required in order to give the "State the

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights . . . To

provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present his claim

in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004),

internal quotation marks and citations omitted.

In Arizona, exhaustion is satisfied if a claim is presented to the Arizona Court of

Appeals. A discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court of Arizona is not

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In light of the Ninth Circuit's specific consideration in Swoopes of Sandon, Arizona's

procedurals laws, and the Supreme Court's response to certified questions from the Ninth

Circuit in Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998), this Court finds a

discretionary petition for review to the Supreme Court is not necessary for purposes of

federal exhaustion. See also Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2005).

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necessary for purposes of federal exhaustion.1

 Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; State v. Sandon,

161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989) (in non-capital cases, state remedies are exhausted by

review by the court of appeals). A claim is "fairly presented" if the petitioner has described

the operative facts and legal theories on which his claim is based. Anderson v. Harless, 459

U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct.

509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). In state court, the petitioner must describe not only the

operative facts but also the asserted constitutional principle. The United States Supreme

Court has stated:

If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners'

federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim

that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court,

but in state court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995). A

petitioner does not ordinarily "fairly present" a federal claim to a state court if that court must

read beyond a petition, brief, or similar papers to find material that will alert it to the

presence of a federal claim. See e.g., Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33 (rejecting contention that

petition fairly presented federal ineffective assistance of counsel claim because "ineffective"

is a term of art in Oregon that refers only to federal law claims since petitioner failed to

demonstrate that state law uses "ineffective assistance" as referring only to federal law rather

than a similar state law claim); Harless, 459 U.S. at 6 (holding that mere presentation of facts

necessary to support a federal claim, or presentation of state claim similar to federal claim,

is insufficient; petitioner must "fairly present" the "substance" of the federal claim); Hivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due

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process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state

grounds), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.

1999) (holding that petitioner failed to "fairly present" federal claim to state courts where he

failed to identify the federal legal basis for his claim), cert. denied, 52 U.S. 1087.

Procedural Default

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained the distinction between exhaustion and

procedural default as follows:

The exhaustion requirement is distinct from the procedural default rule. The exhaustion

doctrine applies when the state court has never been presented with an opportunity to

consider a petitioner's claims and that opportunity may still be available to the petitioner

under state law. In contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal

claim applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, but

declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state court

would hold the claim procedurally barred. Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner's

failure to exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. A habeas

petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical

requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer 'available' to him.

A federal claim that is defaulted in state court pursuant to an adequate and independent

procedural bar may not be considered in federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates

cause and prejudice for the default, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice

would result if the federal court refused to consider the claim.

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005), internal quotation marks and citations

omitted. In other words, a habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in

either of two ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was

actually raised in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court

if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement

would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n. 1. This is often referred to as

"technical" exhaustion because although the claim was not actually exhausted in state court, the

petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See id. at 732 ("A habeas petitioner who has

defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there

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Thomas raised this claim in conjunction with the Willits instruction claim in postconviction proceedings. The finding of preclusion as to the Willits instruction claim

necessarily includes a finding of preclusion as to his claim. Moreover, the trial court stated

that “[t]he issues raised within [the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief], having been

addressed and denied during trial and on appeal, are precluded.” Answer, Ex. J, p. 4.

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are no remedies any longer 'available' to him."). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, it may not

be considered by a federal court unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse

the default in state court, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. Id. at 753;

Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). If a claim has never

been fairly presented to the state court, a federal habeas court may determine whether state

remedies remain unavailable. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103

L.Ed.2d 308 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334

(1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Exhaustion and Procedural Default Analysis of Thomas’ Claims

Thomas asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by denying his request for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. This claim

was presented to the state courts. The Court finds Thomas has exhausted this claim.

Thomas asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by refusing to order the disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant or,

alternatively, by denying his request for a Willits instruction. As to the claim that the trial

court erred in refusing to order the disclosure, Thomas raised this issue in the post-conviction

proceedings. The state courts found that this claim was precluded under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.2(a)(2). In other words, Thomas raised this claim in the state courts, but the state courts

implicitly found that this claim was defaulted on state procedural grounds.2

 This claim is

procedurally defaulted and federal habeas review of this claim is barred. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 729-30. 

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As to Thomas’ claim that the trial court erred in denying his request for a Willits

instruction, Thomas presented this claim to the state courts. In his appeal, Thomas did not

present this issue as one of federal law. Therefore, Thomas did not fairly present this claim

in his appeal. Moreover, habeas relief is not available for a perceived error of state law.

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 875 (1984). In his post-conviction

proceedings, Thomas presented this issue as arising from the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments. However, Thomas cannot transform his state issue into a federal issue by

simply framing it as a due process violation. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 975 (9th Cir.

1990); Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to

exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state

court only on state grounds), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000).

Additionally, the post-conviction court stated:

Petitioner argues that this Court erred when it refused to include a jury instruction

pursuant to [Willits]. Petitioner argues that there should have been a curative Willits

instruction because the state failed to preserve the identities of the unidentified female

witness who accompanied the officer to the apartment complex and the unidentified

male witness who led [the] officer into the apartment complex.

* * * * *

However, as the Arizona Court of Appeals noted in its decision in this case, the record

did not demonstrate that either the unidentified male or the unknown female had

observed enough of the transaction to refute Froebe’s testimony. Further, Petitioner

has not explained what portions of Froebe’s testimony these individuals would have

refuted, and how their testimony would have been helpful to his defense.

Thus, Petitioner did not sustain his burden of showing that the witnesses’ testimony

would have been material or exculpatory. Therefore, it was not error for the court to

refuse to give a Willits instruction. In addition, this claim, having been raised in

Petitioner’s direct appeal, is precluded.

* * * * * 

* * * * * 

This Petitioner is untimely. The issues raised within it, having been addressed and

denied during trial and on appeal, are precluded. . . . 

Answer, Ex. J., pp. 2-4. Additionally, the Court of Appeals stated:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief only for an

abuse of the court’s discretion, State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 325m 793 P.2d 80, 82

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(1990), and we find no abuse here. Counsel’s acknowledgment of the obvious – that

the issues raised in Thomas’s petition below were previously raised on appeal – brings

those issues squarely within Rule 32.2(a)(2). It provides: “A defendant shall be

precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground: . . . (2) [f]inally

adjudicated on the merits on appeal . . . .” Id.

Having raised these very issues on appeal, Thomas was precluded from raising them

again in a petition for post-conviction relief. Consequently, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying relief. We grant the petition for review but likewise

deny relief.

Answer, Ex. L, pp. 2-3. The state courts found that this claim was precluded under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(2). In other words, although Thomas raised this claim in the state

courts, the state courts found that this claim was defaulted on state procedural grounds. This

claim is procedurally defaulted and federal habeas review of this claim is barred. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 729-30. 

Thomas asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the Rule 32

post-conviction proceedings. Thomas did not present this issue to the state courts.

Moreover, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state collateral proceedings.

Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1993) (“the protections of the Sixth

Amendment right to counsel do not extend either to state collateral proceedings or federal

habeas corpus proceedings”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (“The ineffectiveness or

incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall

not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254.”). Federal habeas relief

on this claim is barred.

Thomas asserts that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the

denial of his motion for new trial based on judicial misconduct. In his appeal, Thomas

asserted this claim on state law grounds, but did not present this issue as one of federal law.

Therefore, Thomas did not fairly present this claim in his appeal. Moreover, habeas relief

is not available for a perceived error of state law. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104

S.Ct. 871, 875 (1984). In his post-conviction proceedings, Thomas presented this issue as

arising from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the post-conviction court

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stated:

Finally, Petitioner claims that his rights to due process under the Arizona and United

States Constitutions were violated when he was not granted a new judge on the basis

of judicial misconduct. Petitioner claims that this Court received prejudicial ex parte

communications relating to Petitioner at the change of plea proceeding for Thomas,

Jr. Petitioner claims that the presiding judge denied his motion for a new trial on this

basis as untimely.

However, this Court denied the motion, not only on the grounds that it was untimely,

but also on the grounds that the motion presented no evidence of bias or partiality by

the Court. The Court of Appeals also addressed this issue, indicating that in his

appeal, Petitioner had failed to present adequate arguments to challenge this ruling.

Thus, this claim has already been raised and denied on two occasions, and is thus

precluded.

This Petition is untimely. The issues raised within it, having been addressed and

denied during trial and on appeal, are precluded.

Answer, Ex. J., p. 4. Additionally, the Court of Appeals stated:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief only for an

abuse of the court’s discretion, State v. Watton, 164 Ariz. 323, 325m 793 P.2d 80, 82

(1990), and we find no abuse here. Counsel’s acknowledgment of the obvious – that

the issues raised in Thomas’s petition below were previously raised on appeal – brings

those issues squarely within Rule 32.2(a)(2). It provides: “A defendant shall be

precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground: . . . (2) [f]inally

adjudicated on the merits on appeal . . . .” Id.

Having raised these very issues on appeal, Thomas was precluded from raising them

again in a petition for post-conviction relief. Consequently, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying relief. We grant the petition for review but likewise

deny relief.

Answer, Ex. L, pp. 2-3. The state courts found that this claim was precluded under

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(2). In other words, although Thomas raised this claim in the state

courts, the state courts found that this claim was defaulted on state procedural grounds. This

claim is procedurally defaulted and federal habeas review of this claim is barred. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 729-30. 

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Thomas asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights by denying his request for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. As to this

claim, the Court of Appeals of Arizona stated:

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Thomas next argues that the court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the

basis of prosecutorial misconduct. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for

new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 287, 908 P.2d 1062,

1072 (1996).

Prior to Thomas’s trial, his son, Thomas, Jr., pled guilty to attempted sale of a

narcotic drug and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited possessor. As his

change-of-plea hearing, the prosecutor explained her decision to offer the plea

agreement to Thomas, Jr., noting:

I would in the plea and in the factual basis for [Thomas, Jr.,] to admit to the

fact that his father was present. I don’t want him to say his father did anything

or didn’t do anything. And I don’t want him to inculpate his father in any

more fashion than that. I do not intend to call Mr. Thomas, Jr., as a witness.

. . . I’m only doing this so Mr. Thomas, Sr., is unable to call his son to give

him either an alibi or provide exculpatory evidence.

Nevertheless, Thomas said he wanted to call his son as a defense witness. Thomas,

Jr., initially took the stand to claim his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, but once he took the stand, he said he wanted to testify. After the court

questioned him, the court found Thomas, Jr., was indecisive about whether he wanted

to testify. The court decided to list him as a prospective witness and wait to see if he

would invoke his Fifth Amendment right when called by the defense. Shortly

thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:

[The Prosecutor]: . . . I’d like to go back and do some research. One is – there

is a case called David Camp – I don’t have the cite. I think it’s Carson – that

may allow me to withdraw from his plea if he gives perjured testimony. I want

to confirm that. I just came across a little bit of history or update on the case.

I want to talk about the research opportunity.

THE COURT: I’d be surprised on that. He’s already been sentenced.

[The Prosecutor]: I would be, too. That’s why it caught my eye when I saw

the e-mail, when we were talking about it, I’ll c[o]me back tomorrow when –

before I do the interview, I’d obviously like to do the research. I can probably

do the interview tomorrow after we have done – completed the trial for the

day.

At that point, Thomas objected, arguing that the state was engaging in misconduct by

leading Thomas, Jr., to believe that he might lose his plea bargain if he chose to

testify.

After the court recessed the hearing, the prosecutor researched whether she could

withdraw from the plea agreement. The prosecutor subsequently informed Thomas,

Jr.’s, counsel that she had been incorrect in her belief that the state could withdraw

from the plea agreement if Thomas, Jr., were to testify, and Thomas, Jr.’s counsel

informed him of this before the defense called him to testify, a fact he acknowledged

to the court. Nevertheless, despite this knowledge, Thomas, Jr., said he wanted to

invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination on the ground that his

statements at trial might contradict those he made under oath in another proceeding,

which would expose him to perjury charges. The court determined that the Fifth

Amendment does not protect a person from future criminal charges such as perjury

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and, thus, that Thomas, Jr., could not invoke the right. Thomas then renewed his

request for a mistrial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. The court found that

Thomas, Jr., had known his legal rights before trial and implicitly denied Thomas’s

motion. Thomas, Jr., testified for the defense and said his father had not participated

in the drug transaction with Officer Froebe. He said that an unidentified black male,

not Thomas, had pointed a handgun at Froebe. However, he refused to name the

person who had been involved in the transaction.

Thomas argues that, in his interview with the defense investigator, Thomas, Jr., had

named Barnard Johnson as the person who had been with him during the drug

transaction. Thomas then asserts that, after the prosecutor announced the state could

withdraw from Thomas, Jr.’s plea agreement if he perjured himself, Thomas, Jr., had

changed his testimony and refused to name the individual who had helped with the

transaction. As a result, Thomas argues that the prosecutor’s tactics had resulted in

Thomas, Jr.’s altering his testimony, which had prejudiced Thomas by violating his

right to a fair trial, his right to present a defense, and his right to compulsory process.

Rule 24.1(C)(2), Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., provides that a defendant may move for

a new trial when “the prosecutor has been guilty of misconduct.” In United States v.

Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998), the court held that a prosecutor’s

threat, made directly to a defense witness, to withdraw from a defense witness’s plea

agreement if the witness perjured himself at trial, had constituted witness intimidation

and amount to improper conduct. See also Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 97-98, 93

S.Ct. 361, 353, 34 L.Ed.2d 330, 333 (1972) (judge’s threatening remarks to sole

defense witness that he would be prosecuted and convicted if he committed perjury

had caused witness to refuse to testify and denied defendant due process).

Nevertheless, a “prosecutor . . . [is] justified in contacting [the defense witness’s]

counsel, cautioning him against his client’s testifying falsely, and informing him of

the possible consequences of perjurious testimony.” Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1190.

Furthermore, such misconduct only occurs when a prosecutor uses his or her influence

to unjustly and successfully thwart a defense witness from testifying. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, ¶ 21, 4 P.3d 345, 356-57 (2000).

In this case, the prosecutor did not contact Thomas, Jr., directly or make personal

threats to him about withdrawing from his plea agreement should he falsely testify.

Rather, she raised in open court her analysis relating to Thomas, Jr.’s likely testimony.

Compare Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1190. And, before he began his testimony, the court

made sure Thomas, Jr., was aware that the prosecutor’s initial analysis was incorrect

and that the state did not have the legal right to withdraw from his plea agreement.

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thomas’s motion for

a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.

Answer, Ex. H., pp. 7-11. Such an inquiry is extremely fact specific and the state courts

appropriately considered the manner in which the issue is raised (in open court, contact

between prosecutor and witness’ counsel) and the language of the warnings (no direct or

personal threats). See Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1190. This Court does not find the state courts’

determination to be objectively unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 698-99, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (habeas court is not to make its

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own independent judgment, but is to determine whether state court applied federal authority

in an objectively unreasonable manner). 

Cause and Prejudice Analysis

As for Thomas’ procedurally defaulted claims, federal habeas review is barred unless

Thomas demonstrates "cause for the default and prejudice attributable thereto, or

demonstrates that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of

justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-750 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted);

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1721, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992) (generally, if a petitioner "has

failed to develop material facts in state court proceedings, he or she must demonstrate

adequate cause for his or her failure and actual prejudice resulting from that failure). Cause

is defined as a "legitimate excuse for the default," and prejudice is defined as "actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123

(9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639,

2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (a showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that "some

objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts" to raise the claim in state

court). Prejudice need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Murray. To

bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental miscarriage of

justice, a petitioner “must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual innocence[.]” 

Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002), citations omitted. “Actual

innocence can be shown when a petitioner 'presents evidence of innocence so strong that a

court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that

the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.'” Sistrunk, 292 F.3d at 673, quoting

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).

Thomas has failed to show (1) cause – any impediments preventing Thomas from

complying with Arizona's procedural rules, Murray, 477 U.S. at 488; (2) prejudice – any

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constitutional violation so basic as to infect Thomas’ entire trial with error, United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), or (3) fundamental

miscarriage of justice that no reasonable juror could find him guilty, Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

Thomas’ procedural default cannot be excused.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Thomas’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is

DENIED;

2. This matter is DISMISSED with prejudice, and;

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in this

matter.

DATED this 19th day of March, 2009.

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