Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01474/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01474-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRINA HILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOODFELLOW TOP GRADE,

Defendant.

Case No.18-cv-01474-HSG 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 10

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendant Goodfellow Top Grade. 

Dkt. No. 10. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion.1 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Trina Hill is proceeding pro se. She alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et 

seq. (“Title VII”). See Dkt. No. 1 (Complaint or “Compl.”). Specifically, she brings two causes 

of action: (1) discrimination based on race, color, and sex; and (2) harassment based on race, 

color, and sex. 

Plaintiff signed the Complaint on March 5, 2018 and filed it on March 6. Defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss on April 20, 2018. Dkt. No. 10 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 

4, 2018, Dkt. No. 20 (“Opp.”), and Defendant replied on July 12, 2018, Dkt. No. 21 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” A defendant may move to 

dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 

 

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The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is 

deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b).

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complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 

when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, 

Courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008).

A statute of limitations defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss “[if] the running of 

the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 

F.2d 482, 484 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 

1980). But a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears “beyond doubt” that the plaintiffs 

can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim. Hernandez v. City of El 

Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 402 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). For that reason, “a 

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotations marks and 

citations omitted). In addition, “[i]n civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court 

must construe the pleadings liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim–

Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Did Not Allege Disability Discrimination in Her Charge to the EEOC, 

and Does Not Allege It in This Court.

Before turning to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim, the Court briefly addresses whether Plaintiff 

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has brought a disability discrimination claim. While there initially appeared to be a dispute over 

whether Plaintiff was asserting such a claim, see Mot. at 4-5, Plaintiff has since clarified that she 

is not, see Opp. at 3. Nevertheless, Defendant maintains its request that this Court “dismiss 

Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim based on the Court’s lack[ of] subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Reply at 2. It is true that Plaintiff incorrectly represents that the charge she filed 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleged disability discrimination.

Compare Compl. ¶ 8 (Plaintiff’s representation that her EEOC charge alleged disability 

discrimination), with id. at 8 (EEOC charge checking boxes for discrimination based on race, 

color, sex, and retaliation, but not disability). In any event, the Court does not read the Complaint

to bring a cause of action for disability discrimination in this forum. Accordingly, there is nothing 

further for the Court to address. 

B. At This Stage, Plaintiff Has Pled Facts Demonstrating That Her Title VII 

Claim Is Timely.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is facially time-barred because she 

failed to file it within 90 days of receiving the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter. See Mot. at 2-4. Based 

on the facts alleged, the Court disagrees. 

Upon dismissing a charge of discrimination, “the EEOC must notify the claimant and 

inform her that she has ninety days to bring a civil action.” Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. 

P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). This 90-day 

window “operates as a limitations period.” Id. Right-to-sue letters are presumed to be mailed on 

the letter’s issuance date, id. at 1123, and to be received three days thereafter, id. at 1125. Both 

presumptions are rebuttable. See id. at 1124, 1126. To rebut the latter presumption, “courts look 

for evidence suggesting the receipt was delayed beyond the presumed period.” Id. at 1126. 

(citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit has “found that if a claimant 

presents sworn testimony or other admissible evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred 

either that the notice was mailed later than its typewritten date or that it took longer than three 

days to reach her by mail, the initial presumption is not dispositive.” Id. (citing Sherlock v. 

Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 524 (2d Cir. 1996)). “[G]eneral claims that the mail is 

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sometimes delayed” are insufficient. Id. “Rather, to rebut a mailing presumption, the plaintiff 

must show that she did not receive the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter in the ordinary course.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff’s right-to-sue letter is dated November 30, 2017, and includes a notation 

verifying the letter was mailed on this date. Compl. at 9 (ECF pagination). Accordingly, under 

Payan, the EEOC is presumed to have mailed the right-to-sue letter on Thursday, November 30, 

2017. The third day after November 30 was Sunday, December 3, 2017. Normally, when the last 

day of a period falls on a weekend or holiday, the “period continues to run until the end of the next 

day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Plaintiff is thus 

presumed to have received the letter by Monday, December 4, 2017, unless she can rebut the

presumption as set forth in Payan. Under this presumption, the 90-day clock began on December 

4 and ended on March 5, 2018. In that scenario, because Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 6, 

2018, her Complaint would be untimely and time-barred under Title VII. 

Plaintiff, however, contends that she “received the [right-to-sue] notice on Dec. 6, 2017 

and filed my complaint on March 6, 2018. This was the ninetieth day. Therefore, my complaint 

was filed on time.” Opp. at 3. As support, she submits a declaration in which she states that she 

requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in September 2017. Dkt. No. 20 at 4-7 (Declaration 

of Trina Hill, or “Hill Decl.”) ¶ 4. By November 2017, Plaintiff still had not received a letter, and 

so that month “went to the EEOC” and “spoke to someone... who said I should be receiving the 

letter soon.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff “checked [her] mail daily” after that. Id. ¶ 7. The remainder of 

Plaintiff’s declaration states the following: 

I recall that when I received the EEOC letter it was toward the end 

of the week. I had an appointment that Thurs. and [I] recall 

receiving it that day before. . . . Again my hair appointment was on 

Thurs. I recall receiving [the] letter [the] day before my 

appointment.

Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 

Making all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor—as the Court must do at this stage—the Court 

finds that she has sufficiently alleged that she received the letter not on December 4, 2017, but on 

December 6. Plaintiff alleges, for example, that she “checked [her] mail daily” starting in 

November 2017. Hill Decl. ¶ 7. She further avers facts consistent with her claim that she received 

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the letter on December 6—namely, that she recalls receiving the letter on a Wednesday. See id. ¶¶ 

8-9.2 Based on the record at this stage, the 90-day limitations period thus began on December 6, 

2017 and ended on March 6, 2018, the day Plaintiff filed her Complaint. Plaintiff’s Title VII 

claim is therefore timely-filed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion is DENIED. The Court SETS a further case management conference 

for September 11, 2018 at 2:00 p.m. The parties should be prepared to propose a case schedule, 

and should meet and confer before the hearing to reach an agreed-upon schedule if possible. 

Last, the Court again advises Plaintiff that the Legal Help Center at both the San Francisco 

and Oakland Federal Courthouses provides free information and limited-scope legal advice to pro 

se litigants in civil cases. Services are provided by appointment only. An appointment may be 

scheduled by either: (1) signing up in the appointment book located outside the door of the Legal 

Help Center in San Francisco or Oakland, or (2) calling (415) 782-8982. The Court strongly 

encourages Plaintiff to take advantage of this resource. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

2

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that December 6, 2017 fell on a Wednesday. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 201(b).

8/21/2018

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