Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-1_18-cv-01452/USCOURTS-alnd-1_18-cv-01452-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:1334 Bankruptcy Appeal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

GWENETH DOUGLAS POWERS, 

and ANTHONY D. POWERS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHADWELL HOMES OF 

ALABAMA, LLC,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:18-cv-01452-MHH

On Appeal from Bankr. Case No. 

15-03267-JJR13

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this bankruptcy appeal, pro se litigants Gweneth Douglass Powers and 

Anthony D. Powers move for reconsideration, (Doc. 21), of the Court’s September 

16, 2019 memorandum opinion and order affirming an August 28, 2018 order in 

which the Bankruptcy Court relieved Chadwell Homes of Alabama, LLC from a 

bankruptcy co-debtor stay in Bankr. Case No. 15-03267-JJR1. The co-debtor stay 

relates to Mr. Powers’s interest in real property on which Chadwell Homes purports 

to hold a mortgage lien. For the reasons explained, the Court denies the motion for 

reconsideration. 

FILED

 2020 May-27 AM 09:28

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 1 of 10
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I. STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION 

“In the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources, 

reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy and is employed sparingly.” 

Rueter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1267 

(N.D. Ala. 2006). “Indeed, as a general rule, ‘[a] motion to reconsider is only 

available when a party presents the court with evidence of an intervening change in 

controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct clear error 

or manifest injustice.’” 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (quoting Summit Medical Center of 

Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (M.D. Ala. 2003)); see also

Moten v. Maverick Transp., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00786-KOB, 2015 WL 6593089, at 

*1 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 30, 2015) (“[M]otions for reconsideration should not be an 

automatic response to an adverse ruling.”) (citing Am. Ass’n of People with 

Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2003)). 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

This is the second appeal that Mrs. Powers has pursued in Bankr. Case No. 

15-03267-JJR1. The Court previously issued two memorandum opinions 

summarizing those appeals and the Powerses’ relationship with Chadwell Homes. 

In this opinion, the Court restates only the details relevant to the Powerses’ motion 

for reconsideration. 

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 2 of 10
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On October 1, 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Powers bought property at 1918 Outwood 

Road Fultondale, Alabama. (Doc. 15-15, p. 1). The seller, Vincent Bradley, was a 

business associate of Michael Chadwell, the owner of Chadwell Homes. Drew 

Gambacurta, Mr. Bradley’s attorney, attended the closing and signed the warranty 

deed on Mr. Bradley’s behalf. (Doc. 15-20, p. 11). Chadwell Homes agreed to 

provide Mr. and Ms. Powers with financing in the amount of $129,900 for the 

purchase of the property. (Doc. 15-20, p. 10). In return, Mr. and Ms. Powers 

executed a note and gave Chadwell Homes a mortgage on the property. Since then, 

Mr. and Mrs. Powers have filed multiple bankruptcy petitions. 

Mr. Powers remains personally obligated on the mortgage to Chadwell 

Homes. Mrs. Powers, by contrast, received a discharge of her personal liability in a 

chapter 7 case after she executed the Chadwell Homes mortgage. (Doc. 1-3, p. 7). 

This discharge does not alter Chadwell Homes’s mortgage on the property, but it 

alters Chadwell Homes’s ability to recover the money from Mrs. Powers. Despite 

the discharge, Chadwell Homes may institute foreclosure proceedings in state court 

because a foreclosure concerns Chadwell Homes’s property interest rather than Mrs. 

Powers personal debt relating to that property interest. 

In her first appeal, to avoid the Bankruptcy Court order lifting the automatic 

stay as to her interest in the property on which Chadwell Homes purports to hold a 

mortgage lien, Mrs. Powers challenged the validity of the mortgage lien. The 

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 3 of 10
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Bankruptcy Court proceedings leading to relief from the co-debtor stay order 

concerning Mr. Powers—the order at issue in this appeal—began shortly after this 

Court affirmed the order releasing Chadwell Homes from the automatic stay as to 

Mrs. Powers’s interest in the property on which Chadwell Homes purports to hold a 

mortgage lien. After this Court issued its decision regarding Mrs. Powers’s appeal, 

Chadwell Homes asked the Bankruptcy Court to lift the co-debtor stay. (Doc. 1-1, 

p. 40, docket entry 319). The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion. (Doc. 1-3) 

(August 28, 2018 order in Bankr. Case No. 15-03267-JJR13). This appeal followed. 

(Doc. 1). 

In their notice of appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Powers attached the opinion and order 

granting Chadwell Homes’s motion for relief from the co-debtor stay, pursuant to 

11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(2), and denying their request to alter or amend judgment. (Doc. 

1-3, pp. 1–13; Doc. 2). Mr. and Mrs. Powers also filed a motion to stay and a motion 

for summary judgment. (Docs. 4, 5). The Court then issued an order asking Mr. 

and Mrs. Powers to please explain how their argument in this appeal differed from 

this Court’s determination in a prior appeal. (Doc. 11). 

Mr. and Mrs. Powers responded in writing, stating that they had “convincing 

and undisputable newly discovered evidence that was not available to Mrs. Powers 

in her prior appeal and never seen by this Court, which would shatter Chadwell 

Homes’ evidence and bring Chadwell’s case to a halt.” (Doc. 12, p. 1). The Court 

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 4 of 10
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held a telephone conference to discuss the response. (Doc. 13). During the 

telephone conference, Mr. and Mrs. Powers represented that there was new evidence 

in the record that the Bankruptcy Court judge ignored—evidence that invalidated 

Chadwell Homes’s interest in the mortgaged property. The Court directed Mr. and 

Mrs. Powers to file their record designations. (Doc. 14). 

The Court received the designations from Bankruptcy Court on June 28, 2019. 

(Doc. 15). After careful review, because the Court found no “new evidence” 

demonstrating that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it lifted the stay as to Chadwell 

Homes, the Court ordered Mr. and Mrs. Powers to please point to the evidence in 

their designations demonstrating that Chadwell Homes does not have an enforceable 

title. (Doc. 16). The Court instructed the Powers to identify “specific document 

numbers and page numbers within the documents cited.” (Doc. 16, p. 3). 

Mr. and Mrs. Powers responded by filing a brief in support of their appeal and 

an “objection and answer” to the Court’s order. (Docs. 17, 18). Mr. and Mrs. Powers 

subsequently filed a reply brief. (Doc. 19). The Court issued a September 16, 2019 

memorandum opinion in which the Court concluded that “this appeal does not rest 

on new evidence.” (Doc. 20, p. 6). 

On September 30, 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Powers moved for reconsideration. 

(Doc. 21). 

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 5 of 10
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III. ANALYSIS 

In its opinion affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s relief from co-debtor stay 

order, the Court concluded that the Powerses’ second appeal did not rest on new 

evidence. (Doc. 20, p. 6). In support of their motion for reconsideration, Mr. and 

Mrs. Powers argue that the Court overlooked a “Motion for Declaring Mortgage

Lien Invalid,” (Doc. 15-20), that Mr. and Mrs. Powers filed in Bankr. Case No. 15-

03267-JJR. (Doc. 21, pp. 2–4). 

The Powerses’ motion to declare the mortgage lien invalid includes three

exhibits. (Doc. 15-20). Exhibit A is a special power of attorney Vincent Bradley 

granted to “Drew Gambacurta.” The Specific Power of Attorney authorized Mr. 

Gambacurta to sell, on Mr. Bradley’s behalf, the property that is subject to Chadwell 

Homes’s mortgage lien. (Doc. 15-20, p. 5). Exhibit B is a warranty deed executed 

by Drew Gambacurta and his wife. (Doc. 15-20, p. 8). Mr. Gambacurta signed the 

warranty deed as “Anthony A. Gambacurta.” (Doc. 15-20, p. 8). Exhibit C is a 

warranty deed transferring the property at issue here to Mr. and Mrs. Powers. (Doc. 

15-20, pp. 10-11). The warranty deed was executed by “Vincent Bradley, by and 

through his attorney in fact Drew Gambacurta.” (Doc. 15-20, p. 11). According to 

Mr. and Mrs. Powers, Exhibit B demonstrates that Mr. Gambacurta’s legal name is 

Andrew, which means, they argue, that “[w]hen the name Drew Gambacurta was 

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 6 of 10
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used and printed on [their] deed, this made their deed invalid under Alabama law.” 

(Doc. 21, p. 5). 

This is another iteration of an argument that this Court has twice rejected. In 

its March 28, 2018 memorandum opinion, the Court stated: 

Ms. Powers’s briefs on appeal and her arguments during the February 

2016 hearing indicate that she wanted the Bankruptcy Court to 

conclusively settle the parties’ respective interests in the Fultondale 

property before reaching Chadwell Homes’s motion for relief. . . . This, 

however, was not a task that the Bankruptcy Court had to undertake. 

Congress intended hearings for stay relief under § 362 to be expedited, 

summary proceedings. In re Regency Woods Apartments, Ltd., 686 

F.2d 899, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). Once Chadwell Homes demonstrated 

cause to lift the stay, it was appropriate to allow the parties to litigate 

the underlying merits of their dispute in state court, given that their 

dispute is a creature of state law. Chadwell Homes made its prima facie 

showing of interest in the property when it offered copies of the original 

mortgage and note and the testimony of Michael Chadwell confirming 

that Chadwell Homes had not sold or transferred its interest in the 

property. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(c)(1) & (f); . . . . The prima facie 

showing of interest coupled with the showing of cause was adequate to 

support an order granting Chadwell Homes relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 

362(d)(1). 

(District Court Case No. 16-580, Doc. 30, pp. 12–20). 

In its September 16, 2019 memorandum opinion, the Court reaffirmed this 

conclusion: 

The validity of Chadwell Homes’s mortgage is an issue for another day. 

Regardless of the validity of Chadwell Homes’s mortgage, Chadwell 

Homes has standing to bring a claim as a creditor in Mrs. Power’s 

bankruptcy case. Chadwell Homes is a creditor in Mrs. Powers’s 

bankruptcy proceeding in so far as the company made a loan to Mr. and 

Mrs. Powers for the purchase of the Fultondale property and the loan 

has not been repaid. . . . A possible defect in the mortgage interest on 

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the property does not deprive Chadwell Homes of its status as a 

creditor. See In re Bauman, 2015 WL 5008667, at *3. 

(Doc. 20, p. 11). So, while Mr. and Mrs. Powers have a new theory for declaring 

Chadwell’s Home’s mortgage lien invalid, the validity of the mortgage lien still does 

not invalidate the Bankruptcy Court order lifting the co-debtor stay. Chadwell 

Homes still is a creditor in Mrs. Powers’s bankruptcy case and still has demonstrated 

cause to lift the co-debtor stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 

Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that the mortgage lien is invalid under 

Alabama law because the warranty deed was executed by “Vincent Bradley, by and 

through his attorney in fact Drew Gambacurta.” (Doc. 15-20, p. 11). Under 

Alabama law, “‘[o]ne seeking to have a deed declared invalid must show by clear 

and convincing evidence the facts relied upon to demonstrate the invalidity; and that 

party seeking to have the deed set aside bears the burden of proof.’” Smith v. Walker, 

91 So. 3d 77, 85 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (quoting Thompson v. Mitchell, 337 So. 2d 

1317, 1318 (Ala. 1976)). To properly convey real property, Alabama law requires 

that a deed be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or his authorized 

agent. Ala. Code § 35-4-20. 

Mr. and Mrs. Powers argue that “Drew Gambacurta” is a nickname that is not 

sufficient to convey real property under Alabama law. (Doc. 21, p. 5). “A signature 

is ‘1. [a] person’s name or mark written by that person or at that person’s directive. 

2. Any name, mark, or writing used with the intention of authenticating a 

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 8 of 10
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document.’” (District Court Case No. 16-580, Doc. 30, p. 22 (quoting Signature, 

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). Here, Mr. Gambacurta signed a shorthand

version of his name—Drew for Andrew—fairly classified as a “mark,” to 

authenticate the mortgage deed. Mr. and Mrs. Powers have not identified, and the 

Court has not found, Alabama case law that suggests that a signatory’s use of a

nickname or abbreviated name invalidates his signature. And even if “Drew” were 

an insufficient substitute for “Andrew,” in the event of a technical defect in a 

mortgage, “equity will give effect to the intent of the parties according to the 

substance of the transaction.” In re Miller, 320 B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 

2005) (granting stay relief to a creditor even though the mortgage on which the 

creditor’s claim was based was improperly notarized). Thus, Alabama law likely 

would excuse the fact that Mr. Gambacurta signed the warranty deed as “Drew 

Gambacurta.” 

Mr. and Mrs. Powers also argue that the Court denied them due process of law 

by affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order granting relief from the co-debtor stay 

“within a mere 7 days of [Mr. and Mrs. Powers] filing” their reply brief. (Doc. 21, 

p. 5). According to Mr. and Mrs. Powers, this 7-day window did not afford the Court 

enough time “to properly and thoroughly review all of the documents presented.” 

(Doc. 21, p. 5). Mr. and Mrs. Powers cite no case law to support the argument that 

a turn-around time of seven days constitutes a denial of due process. In any event,

Case 1:18-cv-01452-MHH Document 22 Filed 05/27/20 Page 9 of 10
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after multiple challenges to the Bankruptcy Court’s orders granting relief from stays 

relating to the mortgage lien at issue, the Court has a level of familiarity with the 

facts and the arguments for relief that enables the Court to conclude in fairly short 

order that the Powerses’ series of challenges to the validity of Chadwell Homes’s 

lien does not undermine the Bankruptcy Court order lifting the co-debtor stay. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Chadwell Homes is entitled to relief from 

the co-debtor automatic stay. Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. and Mrs. Powers’s 

motion for reconsideration. The Court asks the Clerk of Court to please mail a copy 

of this order to Mr. and Mrs. Powers at their address of record. 

DONE and ORDERED this May 27, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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