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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-2078

FRANK W. VINCENZO; SANDRA K. VINCENZO,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

AIG INSURANCE SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Chief

District Judge. (1:07-cv-00026-IMK)

Argued: May 15, 2008 Decided: July 17, 2008

Before TRAXLER and KING, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L. KISER,

Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of

Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Clifford Forrest Kinney, Jr., SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE,

PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Theodore L.

Tsoras, JACOB M. ROBINSON LAW OFFICES, Wheeling, West Virginia, for

Appellees. ON BRIEF: Paula L. Durst, SPILMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE,

PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Jacob M. Robinson,

JACOB M. ROBINSON LAW OFFICES, Wheeling, West Virginia, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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1The Order is found at J.A. 140-53. (Citations to “J.A. __”

refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in

this appeal.)

2

PER CURIAM:

Defendant AIG Insurance Services, Incorporated, pursues this

interlocutory appeal from the district court’s denial of AIG’s

motion to dismiss the state law third-party bad faith claim brought

against it by plaintiffs Frank and Sandra Vincenzo. See Vincenzo

v. AIG Ins. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00026 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 21,

2007) (the “Order”).1

 As explained below, we conclude that the

Order correctly resolved the issue of whether West Virginia’s

savings statute, see W. Va. Code § 55-2-18 (the “Savings Statute”),

preserved the Vincenzos’ claim, which had been timely filed prior

to abolition of private third-party bad faith claims in West

Virginia. Thus, we are content to affirm the Order — ruling that

the Vincenzos’ bad faith claim was not barred when it was refiled

after being dismissed without prejudice — on the basis of the

district court’s reasoning.

I.

A.

In 2000, the Vincenzos filed suit in the Circuit Court of

Monongalia County, West Virginia, against multiple defendants,

seeking recovery for physical injuries sustained on the job by

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Frank Vincenzo. On July 7, 2005, while their suit was pending, the

Vincenzos filed a separate action in the state circuit court

against AIG (the “First Complaint”), alleging a third-party bad

faith claim, then authorized under state law. See Jenkins v. J.C.

Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252, 254 (W. Va. 1981) (concluding

that West Virginia Code section 33-11-4(9) gave rise to cause of

action by third-party claimants against insurance companies for

having engaged in unfair claims settlement practices). In April

2005, however, the West Virginia legislature had enacted West

Virginia Code section 33-11-4a, which abrogated the rule

promulgated in Jenkins, and provided instead for such a claim to be

handled administratively:

A third-party claimant may not bring a private cause of

action or any other action against any person for an

unfair claims settlement practice. A third-party

claimant’s sole remedy against a person for an unfair

claims settlement practice or the bad faith settlement of

a claim is the filing of an administrative complaint with

the Commissioner.

W. Va. Code § 33-11-4a(a) (the “Abrogation Statute”) (emphasis

added). The Abrogation Statute became effective on July 8, 2005,

one day after the Vincenzos filed their First Complaint. The

Vincenzos failed to perfect service of the First Complaint on AIG

within 120 days, as required by Rule 4 of the West Virginia Rules

of Civil Procedure. As a result, on January 24, 2006, the state

circuit court dismissed the First Complaint without prejudice. 

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One year later, on January 24, 2007, the Vincenzos refiled

their third-party bad faith claim against AIG in the state circuit

court (the “Second Complaint”), relying on the Savings Statute.

The Savings Statute provides, in pertinent part, that

[f]or a period of one year from the date of an order

dismissing an action or reversing a judgment, a party may

refile the action if the initial pleading was timely

filed and . . . the action was involuntarily dismissed

for any reason not based upon the merits of the action.

W. Va. Code § 55-2-18(a). In the Second Complaint, the Vincenzos

alleged that, although the Abrogation Statute had abolished private

third-party bad faith claims on July 8, 2005 (a day after they

filed their First Complaint), the Savings Statute preserved their

claim against AIG because the Statute allowed them to refile the

claim within a year from the date of its dismissal due to a failure

to perfect service — a dismissal that was “not based upon the

merits of the action.” 

B.

On February 26, 2007, AIG removed the Vincenzo’s action to the

Northern District of West Virginia, on the basis of diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Shortly thereafter, on March

5, 2007, AIG moved in the district court to dismiss the Second

Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), contending that the

Abrogation Statute barred the third-party bad faith claim asserted

therein, and that the Savings Statute failed to preserve the claim

because it only applied when a statute of limitations issue was

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2

As the district court aptly recognized in its Order, claims

involving unfair settlement practices that arise under the West

Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, see W. Va. Code §§ 33-11-1 to

-10, have a one-year statute of limitations, see Syl. Pt. 1, Wilt

v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 506 S.E.2d 608, 608 (W. Va. 1998),

which begins to run only after the expiration of the appeal period

for the underlying personal injury claim, see Klettner v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 519 S.E.2d 870, 876 (W. Va. 1999). The

parties settled their underlying personal injury claim on March 28,

2006, and a final order was entered on May 1, 2006. Thus, as the

district court concluded, the statute of limitations was not

implicated when the Vincenzos filed their Second Complaint on

January 24, 2007. See Order 3.

3Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), an interlocutory appeal may

be pursued in the following circumstances:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable . . . , shall be of the

opinion that such order involves a controlling question

of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from

the order may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation, he shall so state in writing such

order. The Court of Appeals which would have

jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon,

in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such

order. 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

5

implicated.2 On April 24, 2007, the court heard argument on AIG’s

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and thereafter assessed supplemental briefs

addressing AIG’s contention that the Savings Statute is not

applicable in these circumstances, and only applies to claims that

are time-barred by a statute of limitations. AIG filed its

supplemental brief on May 4, 2007, requesting that, if the court

denied its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court certify an interlocutory

appeal to this Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).3

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On September 21, 2007, the district court issued its Order

denying AIG’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ruling that the

Vincenzos’ third-party bad faith claim against AIG, as alleged in

the Second Complaint, is viable under state law. The Order also

stayed the proceedings in the district court to permit AIG to

pursue an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b), which the court

certified. AIG filed a petition for interlocutory appeal on

October 5, 2007, and, on October 31, 2007, we granted the petition.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the

Savings Statute preserves the third-party bad faith claim alleged

against AIG in the Second Complaint. See Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d

287, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2006) (“We review de novo a district court’s

denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). In arriving

at this conclusion, the district court explained in its Order that

the plain language of the Savings Statute requires that “(1) the

initial complaint be timely filed, (2) the cause of action be

involuntarily dismissed for any reason not based on the merits, and

(3) the complaint be refiled within one year of the involuntary

dismissal.” Order 4. It is undisputed that the Vincenzos had

timely filed their First Complaint, and that it was dismissed

without prejudice. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-18(b) (“[A] dismissal

not based upon the merits of the action includes . . . [a]

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dismissal for failure to have process timely served.”). The court

also concluded that the Vincenzos had satisfied the third

requirement of the Savings Statute, in that they filed their Second

Complaint, on January 24, 2007, within one year of the state

court’s involuntary dismissal of their First Complaint, on January

24, 2006. 

AIG argued that, although the plain terms of the Savings

Statute had been satisfied, the Statute nevertheless did not apply

to the bad faith claim alleged against it in the Second Complaint.

Relying primarily on Browning v. Browning, 100 S.E. 860 (W. Va.

1919), AIG contended that the Savings Statute’s sole purpose was to

extend the statute of limitations on a timely filed claim that was

dismissed through no fault of the plaintiff. Because the statute

of limitations had not expired with respect to the bad faith claim

in the Second Complaint, the Savings Statute was, according to AIG,

inapplicable. In Browning, the defendant had attempted to utilize

the one-year limitations period from an earlier version of the

Savings Statute to bar a claim that had no statute of limitations.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia thus concluded that

the claim was not barred, explaining that

[t]he [Savings Statute] . . . applies only to those

causes of action which, under the general statute of

limitation applicable thereto, would otherwise be barred

before the new action is commenced, and lengthens rather

than shortens the period of limitation prescribed by the

general statute. If there is no such bar, or if there is

one whose limitation has not yet run against the cause of

action, the [Savings Statute] has no application. 

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Syl. Pt. 1, 100 S.E. at 860. Premised on the Browning decision,

AIG asserted that, because the Vincenzo’s bad faith claim was not

time-barred, the Savings Statute did not apply. The district court

rejected AIG’s contention, however, concluding that its

interpretation of Browning was overly broad. The court reasoned

that “[w]hen read in light of its specific facts, Browning actually

stands for the proposition that the savings statute cannot be

utilized to create a statute of limitations for a cause of action.”

Order 10-11. 

As the district court properly recognized, the Savings Statute

has historically been broadly interpreted. In Tompkins v. Pacific

Mutual Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia explained the Savings Statute as “a highly remedial

statute [that] ought to be liberally construed for the

accomplishment of the purpose for which it was designed, namely, to

save one, who has brought his suit within the time limited by law,

from loss of his right of action by reason of accident or

inadvertence.” 44 S.E. 439, 441 (W. Va. 1903). In Crawford v.

Hatcher, the district court in southern West Virginia adopted the

broad reading articulated in Tompkins, concluding that “[i]t can

hardly be questioned that the law favors resolution of disputes on

their merits. Competing principles, such as prompt resolution of

disputes and judicial economy, must give way except in compelling

cases. . . . [T]he savings statute is to be liberally construed in

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4

On May 6, 2008, prior to oral argument of this appeal, we

asked counsel to be prepared to address whether it might be

appropriate to certify the question on appeal to the Supreme Court

of Appeals of West Virginia. See W. Va. Code § 51-1A-3 (“The

supreme court of appeals of West Virginia may answer a question of

law certified to it by any court of the United States . . . if the

answer may be determinative of an issue in a pending case in the

certifying court and if there is no controlling appellate decision,

9

order to effect its intended purpose.” 804 F. Supp. 834, 836-37

(S.D. W. Va. 1992).

In this appeal, AIG seeks to distinguish the Tompkins and

Crawford authorities on the ground that both involved a statute of

limitations issue. But, as the district court observed here, 

neither case expressly limited the reach of the savings

statute to claims that are time-barred by a statute of

limitations. Rather, they recognized that the primary

purpose of the savings statute is to permit claims to be

resolved on their merits. Both thus liberally construed

the savings statute to achieve this purpose. 

Order 9. Relying on Tompkins and Crawford, the district court thus

denied AIG’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, concluding that,

because the Savings Statute must be broadly construed, it applied

to the bad faith claim alleged against AIG in the Second Complaint,

and authorized the Vincenzos to pursue their claim despite the

enactment of the Abrogation Statute. 

III.

After thorough de novo consideration of this appeal, we are

constrained to agree with the district court’s well-reasoned

Order.4 We are accordingly content to affirm on the basis thereof.

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constitutional provision or statute of this state.”). Both parties

expressed their opposition to any such certification, and we have

determined that, in the circumstances, a certification is not

warranted.

10

See Vincenzo v. AIG Ins. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-00026 (N.D. W.

Va. Sept. 21, 2007).

AFFIRMED

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