Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00653/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00653-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Steven Anthony Bonin, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00653-TUC-RM

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (Doc. 22) issued by 

Magistrate Judge Leslie A. Bowman. In the Report and Recommendation, Judge 

Bowman recommends denying Petitioner Steven Bonin’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. No objections were filed. 

I. Standard of Review 

 A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a 

magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C); see also Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing 

2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The advisory committee notes to Rule 

72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that, “[w]hen no timely objection is 

filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record 

in order to accept the recommendation” of a magistrate judge. See also Prior v. Ryan, 

2012 WL 1344286, *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2012) (reviewing for clear error unobjected-to 

portions of Report and Recommendation on § 2254 petition); Johnson v. Zema Sys. 

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Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If no objection or only partial objection is 

made, the district judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.”). 

II. Analysis 

A. Judge Bowman’s Report and Recommendation 

 In his Petition, Mr. Bonin raises seven claims. Judge Bowman found that four of 

these claims had been properly exhausted but nonetheless should be denied on the merits. 

This Court finds no error in Judge Bowman’s thorough and carefully reasoned discussion 

of these four claims. 

 Judge Bowman found that the remaining three claims were incurably procedurally 

defaulted. Each of these claims involves accusations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Specifically, the remaining claims allege that Mr. Bonin’s (1) appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to give him transcripts of voir dire; (2) appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to give him the case file within 30 days of the Arizona Court of 

Appeal’s affirmance of his conviction; and (3) appellate and trial counsel were generally 

ineffective.1

 

 Judge Bowman recognized that a procedural default can be cured if a petitioner 

can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law,” Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998), but 

found that Mr. Bonin could not “demonstrate cause.” Of particular notice to this Court, 

Judge Bowman addressed Mr. Bonin’s argument that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 

(2012), allowed him to demonstrate cause by showing that he did not have counsel during 

the post-conviction relief process—the first opportunity that he had to raise his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 

Bonin further agues his procedural default should be excused pursuant to 

Martinez v. Ryan[]. Martinez holds that procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could be excused if post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective. In this case, Bonin was never appointed post-conviction relief counsel in the first place. Martinez, therefore, does 

1

 Although Mr. Bonin was represented by the same counsel during the trial and direct appeal, only the third claim of general ineffective assistance of counsel puts forth any argument that counsel was ineffective in his representation of Mr. Bonin during trial. 

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not apply to his case. 

Report and Recommendation at 10. 

B. Cause for Procedural Default 

 This Court disagrees with this portion of the Report and Recommendation to the 

extent that it concludes that Martinez is inapplicable if a prisoner was not appointed postconviction counsel. The Supreme Court stated in Martinez that there are two 

circumstances in which “a prisoner may establish cause for a default of an ineffectiveassistance claim[.] The first is where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the 

initial-review collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. The 

second is where appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the 

claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)[.]” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318 (emphasis added). 

 Mr. Bonin’s case presents a factual scenario that was not discussed by the 

Supreme Court in its Martinez opinion. Mr. Bonin was not appointed post-conviction 

counsel because his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was dismissed as untimely before 

the stage of proceedings at which counsel is appointed. It is unclear whether the rule of 

Martinez should apply to these facts. Mr. Bonin alleges he untimely filed his Notice 

because his trial and appellate counsel advised him to not pursue post-conviction relief 

and did not provide him with his case file so that Mr. Bonin could make his own 

independent determination. Mr. Bonin’s counsel’s advice to not pursue post-conviction 

relief is not tied to counsel’s representation in the direct appeal process and could be 

viewed as essentially post-conviction relief legal advice that is arguably ineffective. It 

could also be said that it does not matter under Martinez that Arizona would have 

appointed him counsel if Mr. Bonin had filed a timely Notice because his failure to do so 

was the fault of previous ineffective counsel. However, Mr. Bonin’s case could also 

present a scenario that is simply outside the bounds of Martinez. This Court need not 

decide the issue, however, because even if Martinez does apply, Mr. Bonin has not made 

the requisite showing for overcoming a procedural default under Martinez. 

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C. Prejudice from Underlying Violation of Federal Law 

 To be able to overcome his procedural default under Martinez, Mr. Bonin must 

show that his underlying ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims are 

substantial, meaning they have “some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318; see also

Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1319-22 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).2

 Mr. Bonin has 

failed to show that his underlying ineffective assistance of trial and appellate claims are 

substantial. 

 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to provide voir dire transcript

 Mr. Bonin first alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to give him a 

transcript of the trial voir dire proceedings after his appeal to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. “[R]epresentation is only constitutionally inadequate if counsel’s conduct is 

unreasonable and results in prejudice to the defendant.” Daire v. Lattimore, 780 F.3d 

1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Mr. 

Bonin does not argue that the deprivation of the voir dire transcripts prejudiced him in 

any specific way, and while “[c]ourts have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally,” 

Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003), this Court cannot find 

any evidence in the record of prejudice resulting from Mr. Bonin’s lack of voir dire 

transcripts. Without evidence of any prejudice, this claim cannot be said to have merit. 

 2. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to provide case file within thirty days of the Court of Appeals’ ruling

 Mr. Bonin next contends that his counsel was constitutionally deficient because 

counsel did not give him his case file within thirty days of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

ruling (i.e., the amount of time Mr. Bonin had to file a timely notice of post-conviction 

relief). He also alleges that his counsel instructed him not to pursue a further appeal 

 

2

 Although Martinez discussed ineffective or nonexistent counsel as cause for the 

procedural default of claims that trial counsel was ineffective, the Ninth Circuit has since 

concluded that the same reasoning and rule applies to the procedural default of claims that appellate counsel was ineffective. Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1293-96 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

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before the Supreme Court, or to seek relief from the post-conviction relief process. 

Assuming without deciding that the alleged conduct occurred and that it was 

unreasonable under prevailing professional standards, Mr. Bonin has not made the 

requisite showing that but for the conduct, “the result would have been different.” United 

States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). 

 Mr. Bonin argues that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to give him his 

case file within the time allotted to file his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief because it 

caused Mr. Bonin to file his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief late, which in turn caused 

the Arizona Superior Court for Pima County to summarily dismiss it. However, even if 

Mr. Bonin had filed his Notice on time, the Superior Court still would have dismissed his 

claims. 

 If he had been able to go forward with the post-conviction relief process, Mr. 

Bonin could have challenged his conviction on eight possible grounds; of the eight 

options, Mr. Bonin raised four issues in his belated Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. See 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a) (conviction or sentence is unconstitutional), (e) (newly 

discovered facts exist that would have changed the outcome of trial), (f) (untimely filing 

of Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was not petitioner’s fault), and (h) (clear and 

convincing evidence shows that no reasonable fact-finder would have found petitioner 

guilty). The Superior Court found as a matter of fact that two of those grounds had no 

merit—i.e., that Mr. Bonin did not have newly discovered facts and that the untimeliness 

of his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was his responsibility—and Mr. Bonin has not 

provided any evidence to rebut the presumption that the court’s finding was correct. See 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), (f); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed 

to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). The remaining two grounds, 

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specifically that Mr. Bonin’s conviction was in violation of the United States Constitution 

and that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find him guilty, are 

properly determined to be meritless by Judge Bowman’s Report and Recommendation. 

See Report and Recommendation at 5-9. Accordingly, no prejudice resulted from 

counsel’s allegedly ineffective conduct, and Mr. Bonin’s claim must fail. 

 3. Claim of general trial and appellate ineffective assistance of counsel 

 This Court can discern two claims within Mr. Bonin’s claim of general ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. First, that counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to introduce evidence during Mr. Bonin’s trial for aggravated 

driving under the influence (“DUI”) that certain medications might have compromised 

the reliability of his blood alcohol content test. Second, that counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to challenge the use of the aggravated DUI statute on the ground that 

its application violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. See 

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 

 a. Failure to present evidence of medicinal effect upon breathalyzer 

 Mr. Bonin argues that his counsel was deficient for failing to introduce evidence 

during trial that medications that he was on when he was arrested might have invalidated 

the blood alcohol content test results. However, the record shows that Mr. Bonin’s expert 

Mr. Chester Flaxmayer did present evidence that certain medications—as well as 

mouthwash, body temperature, and breathing patterns—could influence breathalyzers. 

Accordingly, it cannot be said that counsel’s conduct was either “unreasonable” or 

“result[ed] in prejudice” to Mr. Bonin. Daire, 2015 WL 1259551 at *1. 

 b. Failure to challenge prosecution on ex post facto grounds. 

 Mr. Bonin argues that his counsel was also deficient for failing to argue at trial 

that his prosecution violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 

because the statute under which he was convicted was enacted after certain aggravating 

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factors occurred. The ex post facto clause prohibits the legislature from passing any law 

that, among other things, retroactively criminalizes conduct that was innocent when 

committed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981). “The critical question is 

whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective 

date.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31. That is not the scenario here. 

 Mr. Bonin committed two DUI offenses in 1997. In January 2006, the Arizona 

legislature made it a crime to commit a third DUI offense if the previous two DUI 

offenses were within the preceding sixty months. A.R.S. § 28-1383 (2006) (enacted Jan. 

31, 2006). Later that year, the legislature amended the statute to prohibit the commission 

of a third DUI offense if the previous two DUI offenses were within the preceding 

eighty-four months. A.R.S. § 28-1383 (2006) (enacted Sept. 21, 2006). About a yearand-a-half-later, in February 2008, Mr. Bonin committed his third DUI offense. He now 

argues that because when he committed the first two offenses in 1997, it was not criminal 

to commit a third offense eighty-four months after committing the first two offenses, the 

prosecution of the third offense is unlawful. 

 Mr. Bonin arrives at this conclusion by considering the status of the law at the 

wrong point in time. Mr. Bonin is considering the status of the law at the time that he 

committed the first two DUI offenses. However, the time that dictates whether or not a 

law violates the Ex Post Facto clause is the time at which the act being criminalized is 

committed. See, e.g., Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003); Flemming 

v. Ore. Bd. of Parole, 998 F.2d 721, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, because Mr. 

Bonin was prosecuted and sentenced for committing a third DUI offense, the Court must 

look to the status of the law at the time of Mr. Bonin’s commission of that third DUI 

offense. When Mr. Bonin committed his third DUI offense—the act criminalized by 

§28-1383—committing that act within eighty-four months of the first and second DUI 

offenses had been a criminal act for at least seventeen months. Because Mr. Bonin’s 

third DUI offense was completed after it became criminal to commit such an offense, his 

prosecution did not offend the Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto laws. 

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III. Conclusion 

 After independently reviewing the parties’ briefs and the record, the Court finds 

that Judge Bowman’s Report and Recommendation ultimately correctly concludes that 

Mr. Bonin’s Petition should be denied. 

 Before Petitioner can appeal this Court’s judgment, a certificate of appealability 

must issue. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). A certificate may issue 

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A substantial showing is made if “reasonable jurists 

could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner,” 

or if “the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). Upon 

review of the record in light of the standards for granting a certificate of appealability, the 

Court concludes that a certificate shall not issue because the resolution of the Petition is 

not debatable among reasonable jurists and does not deserve further proceedings. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

 1. Magistrate Judge Bowman’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 22) is 

accepted and adopted, except to the extent that it states that Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 

1309 (2012), is inapplicable in situations where a prisoner is not appointed postconviction counsel. 

 2. Mr. Bonin’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is denied. 

 3. This case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to 

enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 

 4. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 Dated this 4th day of May, 2015. 

Honorable Rosemary Márquez

United States District Judge

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