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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

KEVIN 

v. 

JOHN 

MARK 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United St.ates Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

MERRY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

DEMPSEY; ROY ROMER; ) 

MCGOFF; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

JAN 311989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2446 

(D.C. No. 87-F-319) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff appeals the district court's order granting 

defendants' motion for summary judgment on his amended complaint. 

Plaintiff alleged that defendants forced him to live in the same 

prison unit with diagnosed AIDS patients and "to work around the 

tr ash and residue of AIDS patients." Plaintiff complained that 

these circumstances have resulted in his suffering "traumatic 

fears of his safety and extreme mental anguish and duress." 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 1 
According to plaintiff, AIDS patients are confined in 

"admissions unit 3" in the Colorado Territorial Correctional 

Facility (CTCF) with other, apparently healthy, inmates. Inmates 

are confined to this unit prior to assignment to other units or 

facilities. Plaintiff alleged that there is not a separate 

medical isolation unit for AIDS patients. He expressed the 

concern that food is carried in and out of the medical unit at 

each meal and that trash and garbage from AIDS patients must be 

handled by other inmates, allegedly making the latter susceptible 

to the disease. Plaintiff concluded that this situation created a 

"clear possibility" that he would contract AIDS from 

bugs, toilet waste, drainage facilities, trash, 

mosquitoes, laundry facilities, food preparation and 

service, air conditioning, medical facilities [used] by 

all ... inmates, winds and currents, touch infecting 

open sores, cats, pigeons, birds, dust, mail handling, 

heat by forced air and just plain breathing. 

Moreover, plaintiff argued, the AIDS virus could be carried by one 

of several of the above methods to other parts of the prison. 

Finally, plaintiff alleged that the prison staff is not adequately 

trained to prevent the spread of AIDS. Plaintiff sought damages 

and a permanent injunction. He named as defendants the Governor 

of Colorado, the Administrator of the Colorado Department of 

Corrections, the Superintendent of CTCF, and "all unnamed 

parties." 

Plaintiff later amended his complaint to add defendant Walter 

Kavtzky and to assert two more claims. Plaintiff alleged that Mr. 

Kavtzky, the Governor, and the Superintendent of CTCF were 

responsible for transferring plaintiff from the infirmary to the 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 2 
pre-releas e unit without informing plaintiff of his medical 

condition or obtaining a medical release from the infirmary. 

(Plaintiff suffers from a heart condition.) An unspecified 

defendant, presumably Mr. Kavtzky, allegedly required plaintiff to 

choose between moving to the pre-release unit or moving to the 

maximum security facility. Plaintiff complained that the 

"transfers from one correctional facility to another, all of which 

are not sufficiently medically staffed to handle [his] condition," 

caused him to suffer "extreme stress and mental anguish." The 

motivating force behind the transfers, according to plaintiff, was 

an attempt to chill plaintiff's current litigation. 

Finally, plaintiff alleged that defendants forced him "to 

accept responsibility for medical expenses which [were] incurred 

while [plaintiff was] under the protection and care of the 

Department of Corrections." According to plaintiff, defendants 

were "attempting to force [p]laintiff to pay for emergency medical 

treatment [p]laintiff was forced to undergo" when an ambulance 

service took him to the hospital. "Defendants attempted to force 

plaintiff to work at the Longmont Community Treatment Center to 

pay for the emergency medical treatment defendants ordered, 

knowing plaintiff was placed on medical hold by the medical staff 

at the [correctional facility] in Canon City." Plaintiff 

contended that defendants' acts were malicious, intentional, and 

negligent. 

1 Because 

considered 

complaints 

complaint." 

He sought damages and injunctive relief. 1 

of plaintiff's pro se status, the district court 

the allegations in plaintiff's orginal and amended 

together as constituting plaintiff's "amended 

In accordance with this construction, we will refer 

(footnote continued on next page) 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 3 
Plaintiff states in his brief on appeal that he has now been 

released from prison. Although the allegedly unconstitutional 

actions by defendants in the Colorado prison system may continue, 

plaintiff's request for injunctive relief no longer raises a case 

or controversy. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 

105 (1983). Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order 

insofar as it granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on 

plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, and remand for the 

district court to dismiss that portion of plaintiff's amended 

complaint seeking injunctive relief. See Great Western Sugar Co. 

v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92 (1979); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 

340 U.S. 36 (1950). 

The remaining issue on appeal is whether the district court 

correctly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on 

plaintiff's request for damages. The court granted summary 

judgment in favor of defendants on alternative grounds, holding 

either that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from 

suit or that plaintiff had failed to rebut defendants' evidence 

that they were taking adequate precautions to safeguard 

plaintiff's health and that plaintiff was not in danger of 

contracting AIDS. 

"Because the test for qualified immunity turns on whether a 

right is clearly established, courts should ordinarily determine 

(continued from previous page) 

to plaintiff's "amended complaint" in this order and 

mean both the original complaint concerning the 

AIDS-infected persons in prison and his amended 

concerning his prison transfers. 

4 

judgment to 

presence of 

complaint 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 4 
the existence and character of the underlying constitutional 

violation(s) before proceeding to the immunity question. Only in 

this way can constitutional rights become clearly established and 

thereby provide preceptive guidance to those who must conform 

their conduct to constitutional standards." Griess v. Colorado, 

841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we turn first 

to the merits of plaintiff's claim that defendants have housed him 

with contagiously ill prisoners. 

On this record, there remains a genuine issue of material 

fact whether AIDS patients and healthy prisoners are assigned to 

the same prison unit. Defendants did not provide factual support 

for their assertion that AIDS-infected prisoners are segregated 

from hea l thy prisoners. Moreover, even if defendants had provided 

factual support for this assertion, plaintiff made contrary 

factual statements, thereby precluding summary judgment on this 

ground. Similarly, defendants did not support factually what 

precautions, if any, they have taken to prevent the spread of the 

disease within the prison units. Therefore, for purposes of 

reviewing the motion for summary judgment, this court will assume 

that the prison is assigning AIDS patients to live with healthy 

prisoners. The issue thus becomes whether the prison has thereby 

violated the constitutional rights of the healthy prisoners. 

Federal courts have traditionally granted great discretion to 

state officials in assigning prisoners to prison units. See 

Meachum v. Pano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 

F.2d 352, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1978). At the same time, however, 

"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 5 
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain 

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. 111 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104 (1976)(citation omitted). As a general rule, deliberately 

placing prisoners with known contagious diseases in the general 

prison population violates the Constitution's proscription against 

cruel or unusual punishment. See Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 

1374 (5th Cir. 198l)("The constant and habitual exposure of 

convicted prisoners to persons who are contagiously ill is . 

reprobated as cruel and unusual punishment."); see also Lareau v. 

Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 198l)(failure to screen incoming 

i nmates for infectious disease, resulting in potential spread of 

disease in general population, evidenced "deliberate indifference 

to se r i ous medical needs" in violation of the eighth amendment); 

Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977)(testimony 

that "persons with contagious or communicable diseases, such as 

scabies or gonorrhea, were incarcerated and left in the midst of 

other inmates, without medical attention for a month or more" 

demonstrated violation of the required standard of adequate 

medical services); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 

194, 202 (8th Cir. 1974)(the nonsegregation of prisoners with 

contagious diseases, who presented a . danger to the entire prison 

population, constituted one of several constitutional violations 

in prison conditions); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1331 (5th 

Cir. 1974)(jeopardy to prisoners' life and health due to "glaring 

unhygienic conditions, including the potential for contagion 

caused by nonsegregated sanitary facilities for the . general 

ward population and hepatitis and tuberculosis ward populations" 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 6 
justified conclusion that prison conditions violated either eighth 

amendment or due process clause), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 

(1975) . 

The unique nature of the AIDS virus, however, raises issues 

not addressed in prior precedent on conditions of confinement. 

Two potentially adversarial groups have litigated the issues 

arising from the presence of persons with the AIDS virus in 

prison . Infected prisoners have alleged that their segregation 

from healthy prisoners violates their constitutional rights. See 

Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(segregation of 

AIDS-infected prisoners from general population held 

constitutional); cf. Doe v. Coughlin, 132 Misc. 2d 709, 505 

N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1986)(holding prison had not violated 

AIDS-infected prisoner's constitutional rights by denying his 

participation in familial visiting program). In contrast, healthy 

prisoners have sought judicial intervention to segregate AIDS 

patients from the general prison population. See Glick v. 

Henderson, 855 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1988); LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 

Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983). The prison 

administration must therefore undertake the difficult task of 

balancing these competing interests. 

In Glick, the plaintiff alleged that the presence of five 

prison inmates testing seropositive for the virus which causes 

AIDS, 2 combined with the prison's failure to test for AIDS and the 

2 "A seropositive test shows that a person has been exposed to 

the AIDS virus but does not indicate whether the person has or 

will acquire AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex." Glick, 855 F.2d at 

538. 

7 

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presence of practicing homosexuals in the prison, "placed the 

inmates in immediate danger of contracting AIDS because of the 

daily interactions which take place among inmates and. 

officials at the [prison]." Glick, 855 F.2d at 538. The 

plaintiff in Glick feared, similarly to plaintiff in the case at 

bar, "the sweat of other inmates during work detail," "bites from 

mosquitoes which have bitten other inmates," sneezes from 

homosexuals, food preparation by untested prison employees, and 

prison transfers. Id. at 539. The district court dismissed the 

complaint without prejudice for failure to name the proper 

parties. 

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted, 

On the one hand, this Court can envision situations in 

which courts would be warranted in involving themselves 

in the administration of a prison in order to protect 

inmates from practices conducive to the spread of AIDS. 

On the other hand, Glick's complaint, as it is framed, 

asks this Court to involve itself in a medical 

controversy and to dictate medical guidelines in an area 

where the medical profession has not yet spoken, a task 

this Court is hardly suited for. 

Id. at 538-39. 

The court agreed with the plaintiff "that he could have a 

colorable claim under§ 1983 if he could show that there is 'a 

pervasive risk of harm to inmates' of contracting the AIDS virus 

and if there is 'a failure of prison officials to reasonably 

respond to that risk. 111 Id. at 539-40 (quoting Martin v. White, 

742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984)). Nevertheless, the court 

affirmed the dismissal, relying primarily on two factors: ( 1) the 

lack of any indication in the complaint of which prison policy on 

AIDS was "not in accord with proper practice as established by 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-2446 Document: 01019962444 Date Filed: 01/31/1989 Page: 8 
medical guidelines;" and (2) the fact "that the risk appellant 

allege[d was] based on unsubstantiated fears and ignorance." Id. 

at 539. 

After considering the ways by which the plaintiff had alleged 

he could contract AIDS, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[t}he 

possibility of the transference of AIDS through these means is 

simply too remote to provide the proper basis for appellant's 

complaint as it is currently framed." Id. The court relied on 

the report on the AIDS virus prepared by the United States 

Department of Health and Human Services, recently sent to every 

American household, which explains the many ways a person cannot 

acquire AIDS, including the methods listed in the plaintiff's 

complaint in Glick. Id. at n.l. The Eighth Circuit noted that 

the plaintiff could bring his complaint again if he could "allege 

more sufficiently and clearly all possible facts which demonstrate 

the constitutional deprivation or injury." Id. at 539. Thus, as 

a third factor supporting affirmance, the court emphasized "the 

fact that the district court's dismissal of the case was without 

prejudice." Id. 

The report by the Department of Health and Human Services is 

no doubt reliable and may in some circumstances provide sufficient 

support for dismissal of prisoner complaints which are clearly 

founded on ignorance of universally accepted medical facts about 

the communicability of AIDS. We need not decide, however, whether 

the r eport alone would be sufficient in this case to justify 

dismissal without further factual development of the record. 

Unlike the defendants in Glick, defendants in the court below 

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supported by affidavit their factual statements that plaintiff was 

not in danger of contracting AIDS by the casual contact he alleged 

in his complaint. 

In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants 

submitted an affidavit from Richard E. Hoffman, M.D., the state 

epidemiologist and chief of communicable diseases of the Colorado 

Department of Health. Dr. Hoffman stated that AIDS could not be 

transmitted by the several methods alleged by plaintiff in his 

complaint. Rather, 

[t]he evidence indicates that the virus that causes AIDS 

is transmitted only by: intimate sexual contact; 

receipt of infected blood transfusions or blood 

products; sharing of needles contaminated with 

infectious blood; needlestick (sic) injuries to health 

workers after the needle entered an infected person; 

transplacental transmission to the fetus in utero; 

perinatal transmission to the infant via blood or breast 

milk from an infected mother. 

Plaintiff's response to the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment included a list of authorities suggesting that there was 

an AIDS isolation unit at plaintiff's prison, that dying 

AIDS-infected prisoners would be more comfortable if left in 

prison rather than being released into the population, that AIDS 

is a resilient virus with a long incubation period, that infected 

blood, body fluids, and skin grafts carry the AIDS virus, that 

hospital workers with breaks in their skin are especially 

susceptible to AIDS, and that scientists have discovered a new 

AIDS-like virus as well as an AIDS-like virus in cats. 

We conclude that plaintiff did not allege sufficient exposure 

to AIDS to create a resulting substantial risk of contagion. None 

of plaintiff's statements in response to the motion for summary 

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judgment rebutted defendants' proffered expert opinion that 

plaintiff was not in danger of contracting AIDS by the methods he 

alleged. Moreover, plaintiff did not allege that he had AIDS; 

rather, his claim for damages was for mental anguish resulting 

from his fear of contracting AIDS. The lack of any allegation 

that plaintiff in fact contracted AIDS in prison, 3 combined with 

the defendants' proof that the possibility of contracting it from 

fellow prisoners was extremely remote, convinces us that there is 

no genuine issue of materia l fact that defendants did not show 

deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious medical needs. The 

district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's 

claim for damages arising fr om his alleged exposure to AIDS. 

In granting summary judgment in defendants' favor, the 

district court did not directly address the allegations in 

plaintiff 's remaining two counts. Moreover, defendants did not 

move for summary judgment on these latter claims and the district 

court did not give plaintiff notice that it was considering 

granting summary judgment on plaintiff's new claims. Summary 

judgment in these circumstances was improper. See United States 

v. Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 651 (10th Cir. 1988). 

An appellate court, however, is '"free to affirm a district 

court decision on any grounds for which there is a record 

sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied 

3 We need not and do not decide whether mental anguish resulting 

from fear of contracting a fatal disease is a compensable injury 

in these or similar circumstances. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 

247, 264 n.20 (1978); Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 773 

F.2d 1116, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1985). 

11 

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upon by the district court."' Griess, 841 F.2d at 1047 (quoting 

Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987)). 

We will therefore review the remaining allegations in plaintiff's 

amended complaint to determine whether he has stated a claim under 

42 u.s.c. § 1983 for the deprivation of a constitutional right. 

For these purposes, we will assume that the allegations in his 

complaint are true. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972). 

In plaintiff's second claim, he challenged his prison 

transfer to the pre-release or work release unit. 4 Plaintiff 

alleged that the prison forced him to transfer to work release 

even though he has a heart condition. He complained that the 

prison required him to choose between the pre-release unit and the 

maximum security unit. Further, plaintiff alleged, no one 

obtained a medical release from the infirmary prior to this 

transfer. 

Even if we accept these allegations as true, plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim for the deprivation of any constitutional 

right. Plaintiff's allegation that he was forced to choose 

between pre-release and maximum security, without more, does not 

state a cognizable claim for a constitutional deprivation. See 

Twyman, 584 F.2d at 355-57. "[T]he due process clause does not 

protect a prisoner from being transferred from one institution to 

another within a state prison system," unless state law creates 

such a right. Id. at 355. Plaintiff did not allege that any 

Colorado statute or prison regulation conferred upon him the right 

4 Pre-release is apparently the same unit as work release. 

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not to be transferred 

Indeed, an alleged right 

to the pre-release unit. Id. at 356. 

not to take the first step towards 

release from prison seems self-contradictory at best. 

Plaintiff also complained, however, that 

transferred him without obtaining a medical release 

the prison 

from the 

prison infirmary. We can envision circumstances in which the 

transfer of an ill prisoner could constitute "deliberate 

indifference to [the] serious medical needs" of that prisoner, and 

accordingly a violation of his eighth amendment right to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. at 104. Even if we accept all of plaintiff's allegations as 

true, however, he has not supported such a claim. Although 

plaintiff alleged he suffers from a heart condition, he did not 

explain why, at the time of the transfer, he should not have been 

moved. Standing alone, the decision by prison officials to 

transfer a prisoner with a heart condition did not demonstrate 

deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious medical needs. 

Plaintiff thus failed to state a claim that prison officials 

violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishement. 

Similarly, plaintiff did not support a claim that his 

treatment by the prison medical staff violated his eighth 

amendment rights. While he alleged that no one at any prison 

facility was equipped to care for his condition, he also noted 

that medical staff attempted to diagnose his condition, and that 

he received emergency medical treatment, including an ambulance 

ride. The medical staff was thus not deliberately indifferent to 

plaintiff's serious medical needs. See id. 

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Plaintiff's third and final claim was that the prison 

insisted tha t he pay for emergency medical treatment he received 

in prison. This complaint also fails to state a claim for the 

deprivation of a constitutional right. Plaintiff did not allege 

the prison deprived him of property; rather, the attempt to force 

him to work off the charges seems to be what bothered him. 

Plaintiff did not allege that prison officials intentionally 

deprived him of any property interest while in prison. See 

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986). Neither did 

plaintiff indicate that he had no effective state remedy for any 

arguable deprivation. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 

(1984). Accordingly, the due process clause is not implicated by 

this claim. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-32; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment against 

plaintiff on his second and third claims on the ground that 

plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for District 

of Colorado is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part, and the cause 

is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this order 

and judgment. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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