Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01122/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01122-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 899
Nature of Suit: Other Statutes - Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MADHURI TRIVEDI,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01122-JD 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LIMITED LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 18

Plaintiff Madhuri Trivedi is proceeding pro se in this immigration action. Trivedi is a 

citizen of India who currently resides in Alameda County, California. Dkt. No. 1. Trivedi states 

that she has been residing in the United States since 2003. Id. She names as defendants two 

federal governmental agencies (U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services) and six individual government employees in their official capacities (Jeh 

Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security; Leon Rodriguez, Director of USICS; Donald Neufeld, 

Director of USCIS service centers; Greggory Richardson, Director of Texas service center; Mark 

Hazuda, Director of Nebraska service center; John Roth, OIG at DHS; and Maria Odom, DHS). 

Id. ¶¶ 20-26. The complaint centers on the USCIS’s denial of her I-140 immigration petition. See, 

e.g., id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 19. 

Defendants have collectively moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 18. This was a misstep because defendants filed the 

12(b) motion after filing an answer. Dkt. No. 12. The proper procedure is to move under Rule 

12(c), and the Court treats the 12(b)(6) portion of defendants’ motion as a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings made under Rule 12(c). Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 

(9th Cir. 2004). The Court finds that the 12(b)(1) portion of defendants’ motion is properly before 

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the Court “as a Rule 12(h)(3) suggestion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Augustine v. U.S.,

704 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal is granted.

DISCUSSION

The complaint paints with a broad brush, and the gist of Trivedi’s legal claims is difficult 

to discern. Pro se filing are to be liberally construed, and “a pro se complaint, however inartfully 

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). But the Court may not 

construe a pro se complaint so liberally as to supply essential elements of claims that were not 

pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). In 

addition, irrespective of a litigant’s pro se status, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 

and the Court must dismiss an action if it finds at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

For the most part, none of the many laws referenced by Trivedi in the complaint provide a 

basis for proceeding with this case because she cannot state a claim against these defendants under

them. Here are the main deficiencies:

1. Unfair immigration-related employment practices, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (Dkt. No. 1 

¶ 34): This statute prohibits discrimination based on national origin or citizenship status in the 

employment context. Trivedi does not allege that any of the defendants were her employers or

that they otherwise discriminated against her on the basis of national origin or citizenship status 

“with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or 

the discharging of the individual from employment.” 18 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1). Trivedi’s other 

factual allegations make clear that this is a deficiency she cannot save by amendment -- she did 

not have an employment relationship with any of them. The complaint also does not contain any

material, non-conclusory and plausible factual allegations that Trivedi was discriminated against 

by any employer because of her national origin or citizenship status. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The complaint makes clear that Trivedi is instead alleging that 

she was retaliated against as a whistleblower, because she “rais[ed]/report[ed] issues related to GE 

who knowingly and illegally releas[ed] defective medical devices.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 27. Even putting 

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to one side for now Trivedi’s failures to satisfy the procedural preconditions to asserting a private 

right of action under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, the types of factual allegations made by Trivedi in her 

complaint simply do not map onto that statute. Trivedi’s claims against defendants under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1324b are consequently dismissed with prejudice. 

2. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 48-49): Trivedi 

suggests that defendants have violated HIPAA by improperly retaliating against her. Dkt. No. 1 

¶ 49 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(g)). But as that regulation makes clear on its face, any 

prohibition on intimidation or retaliation it imposes applies only to “a covered entity.” See 45 

C.F.R. § 164.530(g) (“A covered entity or business associate may not threaten, intimidate, coerce, 

harass, discriminate against, or take any other retaliatory action . . . ”). Under 45 C.F.R. 

§ 160.103, “[c]overed entity means: (1) A health plan; (2) A health care clearinghouse; [or] (3) A 

health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a 

transaction covered by this subchapter.” None of those definitions applies to defendants, who are 

either federal governmental entities or employees of such entities, and nothing in Trivedi’s 

complaint suggests otherwise. Claims under this regulation, too, are dismissed with prejudice.

3. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3802 (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 50-53): Trivedi alleges 

that the False Claims Act “applies to the actions of all government contractors,” that “General 

Electric is a government contractor,” and that GE “fail[ed] to disclose product defects.” Dkt. 

No. 1 ¶ 51. None of defendants are alleged to have been government contractors, or to otherwise 

have presented false claims or committed a violation falling under the False Claims Act. These 

claims are dismissed with prejudice.

4. Patient Safety & Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 299 (Dkt. No. 1 

¶¶ 54-55): As Trivedi acknowledges, this act is directed toward “health care professionals and 

entities.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 54. Section 299b-22(e) provides that “[a] provider may not take an adverse 

employment action . . . against an individual based upon the fact that the individual in good faith 

reported information (A) to the provider with the intention of having the information reported to a 

patient safety organization; or (B) directly to a patient safety organization.” 42 U.S.C. § 299b22(e). None of the named defendants are health care providers or are alleged to have acted as 

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Trivedi’s employer. Any claims against defendants under this statute are dismissed with 

prejudice.

5. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3a (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 57): The Civil Rights 

Act prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or applicants for employment on 

certain specified grounds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Trivedi makes no allegation that she has ever

applied for employment with or been employed by any of the defendants, and her complaint as a 

whole makes clear that is not the nature of her grievance against defendants. Claims under this act 

are dismissed with prejudice.

6. Tampering with / retaliation against a witness and perjury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 

1513, 1621 (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 62, 72, 73): The facts alleged by Trivedi do not fit these statutes. She 

was not, for example, a witness in an official proceeding. And these are criminal statutes for 

which there is no private right of action. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Trivedi’s claims under these statutes are dismissed with prejudice. 

7. Intentional infliction of emotional distress (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 63-69): Trivedi alleges 

that defendants USCIS and DHS intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 64. 

This claim, too, is fatally flawed. To the extent Trivedi seeks monetary damages for this alleged 

tort, dismissal is warranted because Trivedi did not first seek an administrative resolution of her 

claim as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Trivedi neither presented 

a claim to the USCIS and DHS, nor had a claim been “finally denied” by either agency. See 

McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 111 (1993). Trivedi “believes that exhaustion of Federal Tort 

Claims Act claims with administrative remedy with such LAWLESS agenc[ies] is NOT required.” 

Dkt. No. 24 at 6 (emphases in original). But that is decidedly not the law. Our circuit has 

“repeatedly held that this ‘claim requirement of section 2675 is jurisdictional in nature and may 

not be waived.’” Jerves v. U.S., 966 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The 

Supreme Court, too, has emphasized that this “straightforward statutory command” must be 

adhered to, even in cases filed by pro se litigants, stating, “we have never suggested that 

procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those 

who proceed without counsel.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. To the extent Trivedi seeks injunctive 

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relief for her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (in the form of an order “restraining 

DHS/USCIS from further acts” causing her “emotional distress,” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 133), the claim is 

barred on a different ground: Trivedi lacks Article III standing. Under City of Los Angeles v. 

Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983), Trivedi has failed to allege, and her allegations show that she 

cannot sufficiently plead, a “sufficient likelihood that [s]he will again be wronged in a similar 

way.” Trivedi’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are dismissed with prejudice.

8. Request for review of denial of I-140 petition: Defendants “admit” that the Court 

would have jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704, to review the 

USCIS’s denial of Trivedi’s I-140 petition for classification as an alien of “extraordinary ability” 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1). Dkt. No. 18 at 17-18. But the Court finds that the current version of 

Trivedi’s complaint does not squarely present a request for the Court to perform such a review. 

Because such a request likely can properly be made to this Court, see, e.g., Sodipo v. Rosenberg, 

77 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1001-02 (N.D. Cal. 2015), the Court grants Trivedi leave to amend her

complaint to present that request, if she wishes to do so, in a more direct and focused manner.

CONCLUSION

The complaint is dismissed with prejudice with the limited exception of the claim seeking 

review of the USCIS’s denial of the I-140 petition. The amended complaint must be filed by 

December 30, 2016. Trivedi may not add any new claims or defendants without seeking leave of 

the Court first. Trivedi is advised that failure to follow this order will result in summary dismissal 

of the amended complaint. 

This order terminates docket number 18, and Trivedi’s other pending motions, Dkt. 

Nos. 37, 39, 41, 45, are terminated as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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