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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROY B. SCRIVNER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED ·~ United States Court o_f Appu. .... Tenth Clrc:uat 

OCT 1 81995 

PATRICK FISHER _ Clerk 

v. No. 94-2271 

ROBERT J. TANSY, Warden, New Mexico 

State Penitentiary; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

FOR THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV 91-52 JGB/DJS) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Roger A. Finzel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Tom Udall, Attorney General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney 

General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before BALDOCK, HOLLOWAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner-Appellant Roy B. Scrivner appeals from an order of 

the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas 

Appellate Case: 94-2271 Document: 01019280709 Date Filed: 10/18/1995 Page: 1 
corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 22532 and affirm. 

I 

On the night of March 15, 1982, the Griswold Trading Post, 

operated by the Griswold family and located within the exterior 

boundaries of the Navajo reservation, was robbed by three men and 

one woman. To effectuate the robbery, the Griswolds were accosted 

in their home across the street where three of them were tied up 

at gunpoint. Mr. GYiswold was then escorted to the store where he 

opened the safe. The robbers took almost $10,000. 

Scrivner was not at the scene and was never identified by any 

of the victims as one of the assailants. However, one identified 

assailant, William Johnson, admitted the robbery and informed 

investigators that Scrivner talked over the plans before the 

robbery with "Preacher," one participant. ROA Vol. II, Trial Tr. 

at 151, 154-55, 158. Johnson said that Scrivner did not 

participate in the robbery but drove the people out there and 

waited in the van until the robbery had been committed. Id. at 

155. Johnson was the only prosecution witness at Scrivner's trial 

who identified Scrivner as a participant in the crime. 

The only physical evidence presented at trial which linked 

Scrivner to the robbery was two walkie-talkies. Scrivner's 

1 The Appellant has requested oral argument. However, after 

examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 The district court denied Scrivner a certificate of probable 

cause. This court has issued the certificate. 

2 

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business partner, Cliff Harper, testified Scrivner had told him he 

had the walkie-talkies. Id. at 278. Mr. Griswold testified that 

the robbers used a walkie-talkie to communicate with another 

party, id. at 35, who was identified by Johnson as Scrivner, who 

acted as the lookout, id. at 81. Mrs. Griswold testified Scrivner 

had been in the store for a few minutes three days before the 

robbery and had left without purchasing anything. Id. at 26. 

Scrivner did not deny that his van, which was used as the shop 

van, id. at 233-34, was at the scene. Scrivner stated he had 

loaned the van to Johnson, and Johnson said he wanted to move some 

furniture. Id. at 232-33. 

The jury convicted Scrivner of one count of armed robbery, 

one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, one count of 

kidnapping, and three counts of false imprisonment. He was 

sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms of imprisonment plus 

two years' parole on counts I and III.3 Sentences on the other 

counts were imposed to run concurrently with the two ten-year 

terms. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed Scrivner's 

conviction and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari. 

Scrivner later filed state petitions for habeas corpus which were 

denied. Respondent admits Scrivner has exhausted his state court 

3 The sentences imposed on each count were for nine years 

a one-year enhancement for possession of a firearm in 

commission of the crime. ROA Vol. III at 130. 

3 

with 

the 

Appellate Case: 94-2271 Document: 01019280709 Date Filed: 10/18/1995 Page: 3 
remedies and is not procedurally barred from raising any of the 

issues identified in his current federal petition.4 

In his federal habeas petition, Scrivner raised six issues. 

He alleged (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his 

convictions; (2) his due process rights were violated by 

prosecution references to other crimes; ( 3) his right to present 

mitigating evidence was denied because he was sentenced 

immediately after the trial; ( 4) the state court lacked 

jurisdiction over him because he is a Native American and the 

offenses were committed on the reservation; (5) the state court 

lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was arrested in Arizona 

by New Mexico authorities who had no arrest warrant; and (6) he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not 

raise the jurisdictional issue of his Native American ancestry to 

the trial court. On appeal, Scrivner additionally argues the 

district court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing to 

determine whether his due process rights were violated when the 

state trial court denied his motion for a continuance of the 

sentencing hearing. 

II 

"[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are 

not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution--not to correct 

errors of fact." Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993). 

Further, "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to 

4 Scrivner has filed one prior federal habeas petition which 

was dismissed for failure to exhaust. 

4 

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reexamine state court determinations on state law questions." 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Thus, in federal habeas proceedings we review conclusions of 

law de novo, while granting a presumption of correctness to the 

state court's factual findings unless they are not fairly 

supported by the record. Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1453 

(lOth Cir. 1995). In this circuit, we review mixed questions of 

law and fact de novo. Id.; but see Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 

294-95, (1992) (declining to announce a standard for habeas review 

of the state court's application of the law to the facts). 

Scrivner argues the evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction because the evidence against him consisted solely of 

uncorroborated and inherently incredible accomplice testimony. He 

asserts the evidence that the business walkie-talkies were used in 

the robbery was not corroborating because anyone could have had 

access to the walkie-talkies. 

In reviewing a claim questioning the sufficiency of the 

evidence to convict, "the relevant question is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 u.s. 307, 318-19 (1979). "'To be 

sufficient, the evidence supporting 

substantial; that is, it must do more 

of guilt.'" Kelly v. Roberts, 998 

1993) (quoting Beachum v. Tansy, 903 

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 904 (1990)). 

5 

the conviction must be 

than raise a mere suspicion 

F.2d 802, 808 (lOth Cir. 

F.2d 1321, 1332 (lOth Cir.), 

Appellate Case: 94-2271 Document: 01019280709 Date Filed: 10/18/1995 Page: 5 
This court has observed that the assumption that the 

testimony of an accomplice should seldom, if ever, be believed is 

not the law because it is the province of the jury to determine 

the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 

1129, 1140 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Aflleje-Torres v. 

United States, 115 S. Ct. 2599 (1995), and 1995 WL 428158 (U.S. 

Oct. 2, 1995). " [A] jury may convict based on the uncorroborated 

testimony of a co-conspirator" so long as the testimony is not 

incredible on its face and is otherwise capable of establishing 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

While in Torres, a direct criminal appeal, we held that a 

conviction based on accomplice testimony may be affirmed if the 

jury was properly instructed that such "testimony must be 

carefully scrutinized, weighed with great care, and received with 

caution," id. (citations omitted), that holding does not control 

here because that holding was not imposed as a constitutional 

requirement. The Constitution does not prohibit convictions based 

primarily on accomplice testimony. See Takacs v. Engle, 768 F.2d 

122, 127 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The Constitution says nothing about 

accomplice testimony."); cf. Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 874 

(8th Cir. 1993) (" [S] tate laws requiring corroboration do not 

implicate constitutional concerns that can be addressed on habeas 

review."); Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 

1980) (state law requiring independent corroboration of accomplice 

testimony not controlling on collateral review by federal court). 

Scrivner's alibi testimony as presented by various witnesses 

was contradictory. Scrivner points out that some of Johnson's 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-2271 Document: 01019280709 Date Filed: 10/18/1995 Page: 6 
testimony 

weight to 

testimony 

also varied from statements he had made earlier. The 

be given 

depends 

Johnson's testimony and 

on the credibility given 

Scrivner's alibi 

to the witnesses' 

testimony--a determination reserved to the jury. Torres, 53 F.3d 

at 1140. By his testimony, Johnson incriminated himself as well 

as Scrivner. While the adverse effect on Johnson's own penal 

interest is not dispositive, it is one factor entitled to some 

consideration. See United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 954 & 

n.8 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 908 (1987). 

Upon consideration of these factors and our review of the 

record, we are convinced that Johnson's testimony was sufficient, 

and was sufficiently corroborated by physical evidence, so that a 

rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the 

crimes charged against Scrivner beyond a reasonable doubt. 

III 

Scrivner next argues his due process rights were violated 

because, while testifying, Johnson made several references to 

other crimes he had been involved in with Scrivner. Our 

responsibility here is to ensure only that Scrivner "was afforded 

the protections of due process, not to exercise supervisory powers 

over the New Mexico state courts." Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 

1250, 1253 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989). 

To prevail on this argument, Scrivner must show Johnson's 

remarks were "so prejudicial in the context of the proceedings as 

a whole that he was deprived of the fundamental fairness essential 

to the concept of due process." Id.; see also Hopkinson v. 

Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1197 (lOth Cir. 1989) (" [W]e will not 

7 

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88sturb a state court's admission of evidence of prior crimes, 

wrongs or acts unless the probative value of such evidence is so 

greatly outweighed by the prejudice flowing from its admission 

that the admission denies defendant due process of law."). 

We cannot say any constitutional error occurred. Johnson's 

statements were unsolicited, see United States v. Copeland, 51 

F.3d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1995) (government is not responsible for 

unsolicited remarks), cert. denied, 1995WL411241 (Oct. 2, 1995), 

although the prosecution did once invite further explanation of 

Johnson's statement. At that point, the court admonished the 

prosecution and the question was withdrawn. ROA Vol. II, Trial 

Tr. at 54. After other remarks were made, the court instructed 

the jury to disregard them. Id. at 57-58, 93. 

Even if we were to conclude the references to other crimes 

was error, we would hold the error to be harmless. In a federal 

habeas case, the harmless error standard announced in Kotteakos v. 

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946), would govern here, i.e., 

whether the error substantially and injuriously influenced the 

jury's verdict. See Tuttle v. Utah, 879, 883 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

In light of the entire record and looking at the totality of the 

evidence presented, id. at 884, we have no "grave doubt" that the 

error complained of here was harmless, id. 

IV 

Scrivner next asserts his right to present mitigating 

evidence was denied because he was sentenced immediately after 

trial and because of the court's denial of counsel's motion for a 

continuance. For Scrivner to prevail on this issue, he must show 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-2271 Document: 01019280709 Date Filed: 10/18/1995 Page: 8 
he had a federal constitutional right to present mitigating 

evidence at sentencing. Cf. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 

(9th Cir. 1990) (to prevail on federal habeas, petitioner must 

demonstrate violation of his constitutional or other federal 

right) . 

A trial court's failure to afford a defendant the right of 

allocution raises neither a jurisdictional nor a constitutional 

error cognizable in habeas.5 Hill v United States, 368 U.S. 424, 

428 (1962); see also Segura v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 249, 252-53 

(lOth Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 946 (1971). 

The Supreme Court's opinions have repeatedly suggested that there 

is no comparable requirement outside the capital context for an 

individualized sentencing doctrine. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 

U.S. 957, 995 (1991). Similarly, no violation of a petitioner's 

Eighth Amendment or due process or equal protection rights occurs 

when the trial court does not consider mitigating factors during 

sentencing in a noncapital case. See United States v. LaFleur, 

971 F.2d 200, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 

1292 (1993). 

Indeed, "the prevailing practice of individualizing 

sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened 

policy rather than a constitutional imperative." Woodson v. North 

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). As Justice Kennedy has noted, 

as a general matter, the responsibility for fixing prison terms is 

5 In Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961), the 

Court discussed the evolution of the common-law right to 

allocution, from its recognition as early as 1689 in English law, 

to its current inclusion in the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, Rule 32(a). 

9 

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properly within the province of legislatures, not courts. See 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 

concurring in the judgment) . Because Scrivner had no 

constitutional right to an individualized sentence, no 

constitutional error occurred when the trial court denied 

Scrivner's motion for a continuance to prepare mitigating evidence 

for presentation at sentencing. Indeed, the trial court did 

permit Scrivner and his counsel to speak at sentencing, see ROA 

Vol. II, Trial Tr. at 323-25. 

v 

Scrivner argues the state court lacked jurisdiction over him 

because he is of Native American ancestry and because the offenses 

were committed on the reservation. The state habeas court held an 

evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded Scrivner was "not 

an Indian within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1153, the Major Crimes 

Act." ROA Vol. I, tab 12, ex. 0 at 4. 

It is true that the determination of whether a defendant is 

subject to § 1153 is one of federal law. See United States v. 

Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 n.7 (1977) (§ 1153 federal criminal 

jurisdiction applies to enrolled members of tribes whose official 

status has not been terminated by congressional enactment and who 

committed crimes within the confines of Indian country) . For a 

criminal defendant to be subject to § 1153, the court must make 

factual findings that the defendant "(1) has some Indian blood; 

and (2) is 'recognized' as an Indian by a tribe or by the federal 

government." United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th 

Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 

10 

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572-73 (1846)); cf. United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 

(7th Cir.) (jury instructed as to facts it must find before holding 

defendant was Native American), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984). 

While we review the district court's application of the facts 

to the law de novo, Lawrence, 51 F.3d at 152, as previously noted, 

"[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), state-court findings of fact 'shall 

be presumed to be correct' in a federal habeas corpus proceeding 

" Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105 (1985) (quoting 

§ 2254(d)). Upon ~eview of the record tapes of the habeas 

evidentiary hearing, we conclude Scrivner had a full and fair 

hearing before the state court and the state court's findings are 

supported by the record in accord with § 2254. Because Scrivner 

was found not to be a Native American, the state court had 

jurisdiction to try him. 

VI 

Scrivner next argues the state court lacked jurisdiction to 

try him because New Mexico authorities arrested him in Arizona 

without a warrant. Scrivner waived extradition to New Mexico 

after he was "rearrested" by Arizona authorities. 

However, even if Scrivner had not waived extradition, no 

constitutional error would be present. "An illegal arrest, 

without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent 

prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction." United 

States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980); see also Frisbie v. 

Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (court's power to try a person 

for a crime is not impaired because he was forcibly brought into 

court's jurisdiction); cf. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 

11 

Appellate Case: 94-2271 Document: 01019280709 Date Filed: 10/18/1995 Page: 11 
U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992) (fact that defendant was abducted to United 

States from another nation does not prohibit his trial in United 

States for violations of United States criminal laws when 

Extradition Treaty was not violated by abduction) . 

Due process is satisfied when a defendant is convicted "after 

having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a 

fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural 

safeguards." Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. The Constitution does not 

require a court to permit a properly convicted defendant to escape 

justice solely "because he was brought to trial against his will." 

Id. 

VII 

Next, Scrivner argues he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because counsel did not raise the jurisdictional issue of 

his Native American heritage to the trial court. To prevail on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show 

both "that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

We have already noted 

a 

that a 

Native 

full and 

American 

fair hearing on 

Scrivner's alleged status as resulted in a 

ruling against his claim. That being the case, we cannot see how 

counsel's alleged deficiency of not raising that issue earlier 

could prejudice Scrivner. Thus, the ineffectiveness claim on this 

point fails. 

12 

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VIII 

Finally, Scrivner argues the federal district court should 

have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his due 

process rights were violated when the state trial court denied his 

request for a continuance of the sentencing hearing. If no facts 

are disputed and the issues can be resolved on the basis of the 

record and the law, no evidentiary hearing is required. See 

Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1524 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Even if disputed issues of fact are raised, a habeas 

petitioner is entitled to a hearing in federal court only if he 

"'did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state 

court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral 

proceeding'" which resulted in reliable findings. Coleman v. 

Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217, 1230 (lOth Cir.) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 

372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled in part, Keeney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1053 

(1990); see also Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1362-63 (lOth 

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2564 (1995). 

Our review shows the record was sufficient to resolve all the 

issues raised by Scrivner. The issue of whether Scrivner had a 

constitutional right to a continuance prior to sentencing was a 

legal one. No evidentiary hearing was necessary. 

Accordingly, the decision of the district court denying 

Scrivner's petition for habeas relief is AFFIRMED. 

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