Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01101/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-01101-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JERMAINE MITCHELL, #205893, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:11-CV-1101-WHA

) [WO]

)

SCOTT ROUSE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on an amended complaint

filed by Jermaine Mitchell(“Mitchell”), a paraplegic state inmate confined to a wheelchair,

challenging removal of word processing functions from the computer in the law library at

the Hamilton Aged and Infirmed Facility (“Hamilton”). Mitchell also alleges that this

adverse action and a subsequent denial of a request for copies of state law occurred in

retaliation for hisfiling a previous civil rights complaint and this case.In addition, Mitchell

asserts that the defendants conspired against him to violate his rights. The defendants

named in this case are Scott Rouse, Anne A. Hill, Bart Harmon, Katherine S. Jessip, and

Al Butler, attorneys for the Alabama Department of Corrections, and Kim Thomas,

Commissioner for the Alabama Department of Corrections. Mitchell seeks a declaratory

judgment and injunctive relief. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 4 at 6.

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The defendants filed a special report, supplemental special report and supporting

evidentiary materials addressing the plaintiff’s claims for relief. Pursuant to the orders

entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to treat these reports as a motion for

summary judgment. Order of April 17, 2012 - Doc. No. 22. Thus, this case is now pending

on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the plaintiff’s response and documents filed

in support of the response, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is due to be granted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,

1263 (11 Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule

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56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.”). The partymoving forsummary judgment “always bearsthe initial responsibility

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Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 1

summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a)

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- genuine

‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” Id. 

“‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Despite these stylistic changes, the

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of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [-- now dispute --] of material fact.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593 (11 Cir. 1995) (moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine

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dispute of material fact for trial). The movant maymeet this burden by presenting evidence

indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has

failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it

bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324.

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate

evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v.

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

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Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record

including affidavits,relevant documents or other materials]the courtmay... grantsummary

judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered

substance of Rule 56 remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable

to the current rule. 

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undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meetsits burden, “the non-moving party

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or sworn statements], or by

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” demonstrate that there is

a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in

a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment.

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11 Cir. 2014). A genuine

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dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would

allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in itsfavor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263;

Allen v. Bd. of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11 Cir. 2007).

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In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summaryjudgment, Mitchell isrequired to produce “sufficient[favorable] evidence” which

would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ...

or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position

will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably

find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91

L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990).

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Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a

genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for

summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (A

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plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence,

are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916

(11 Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing

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beyond “his own conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman

v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own

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conclusoryallegationsis notsufficient to oppose summaryjudgment....”); Evers v. General

Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11 Cir. 1985) (“[C]onclusory allegations without

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specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set

forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at

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trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case

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the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d

1012, 1023 (11 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary judgment appropriate where no genuine

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dispute of material fact exists). At the summary judgment stage, this court must “consider

all evidence in the record .... [including] pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits,

etc. -- and can only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that

no genuine [dispute] of material fact exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,

692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11 Cir. 2012).

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Forsummaryjudgment purposes, onlydisputesinvolvingmaterial facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami,

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Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

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substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department ofChildren and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only

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factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

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not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the

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party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute]

for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

In cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can

be reduced to admissible form indicatesthere is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment

is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings,

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a

requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275,

1279 (11 Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party

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must produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his

favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se

litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute

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of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this

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court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. The

court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the

record. Aftersuch review, the court findsthat Mitchell hasfailed to demonstrate a genuine

dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment. Matsushita,

supra.

III. DISCUSSION

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Mitchell alleges that in November 2011, during his confinement at Hamilton, the

defendants ordered the removal of the word processing functions from the computer in the

law library. Amended Complaint - Doc. No. 4 at 3. Mitchell maintains that this action

denied him the right of access to the courts and constituted a violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., as it deprived him of one

method by which to prepare and print legal documents. Id. at 1-3. Mitchell also alleges

that this action occurred in retaliation for his filing a prior federal civil rights action

addressing conditions of confinement in the state prison system. Id. at 4. In an amendment

The court limits its review to the allegations set forth in the amended complaint and amendment thereto filed 2

by Mitchell. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald &Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Aplaintiffmay not amend [his] th

complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”); Ganstine v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of

Corrections, 502 Fed. App’x 905, 909-910 (11 Cir. 2012) (plaintiff may not amend complaint at the summary judgment th

stage by raising a new claim or presenting a new basis for a pending claim); Chavis v. Clayton County School District,

300 F.3d 1288, 1291 n. 4 (11 Cir. 2002) (district court correctly refused to address a new theory raised during summary th

judgment because the plaintiff had not properly amended the complaint). 

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to the complaint, Mitchell further complains that the defendants continued to retaliate

against him by failing to update the computer with “new case law rulings” and refusing to

provide him copies of the Alabama Correctional Incentive time in act form rather than

statute form. Amendment to the Complaint - Doc. No. 19 at 2. Finally, Mitchell asserts

that each of the actions about which he complains occurred as the result of a conspiracy

among the defendants.

The defendants denyeach of the plaintiff’s claimsforrelief. Specifically, defendants

Thomas, Rouse, Harmon, Jessip and Butler aver that they had no involvement, direct or

otherwise, with the removal of word processing functions from the law library computer

at Hamilton. Defendants’ Exhibit C to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-3, Defendants’

Exhibit D to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-4, Defendants’ Exhibit E to the Special

Report - Doc. No. 17-5, Defendants’ Exhibit F to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-6 and

Defendants’ Exhibit H to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-8. Defendant Hill, however,

acknowledges that in November of 2011 she “did approve the request by our [Information

Technology] Department to remove all unauthorized software from all law library

computers acrossthe state [as] computers placed in the institution [are] for the sole purpose

of conducting legal research.” Defendants’ Exhibit G to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-

7 at 1. During the relevant period of time, Henry M. Redden served as the Director of

Information Technologyforthe Alabama Department ofCorrections. Mr.Redden explains

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that the decision to remove all unauthorized software from the law library computers

occurred upon his department’sreceipt of a notification advising that “the provider of legal

research material was changing [to LexisNexis] and the replacement software would need

to be installed on the law library equipment. Prior to this request, there had been

occurrences of unauthorized and unlicensed software being loaded on this equipment. The

law library equipment isforthe sole purpose ofinmate legalresearch.” Defendants’ Exhibit

L to the Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 21-2 at 1-2. To complete the software

transition, a member of the Information Technology Department was “required [to make]

a site visit to each institution with a law library system ... to upgrade the research material.

With thisrequirement, it was determined that we would reload the equipment with the new

law research product and only approved software as defined by the ADOC Legal Division.

In addition, we secured the administration of the equipment to the point that only

Information Systems’ staff can add or update the software. Information Systemsis notified

of updates to the research material. At that point, technicians are dispatched to update the

systems.” Id. at 2. LexisNexis furnishes updated material on a quarterly basis and this

information is downloaded to the institutional computer systems at this time. Id.;

Defendants’ Exhibit K to the Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 21-1.

The only probative evidence before the court demonstratesthat defendants Thomas,

Rouse, Harmon, Jessip and Butler were not involved with the decision to remove word

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processing programs from the law library computer systems. The evidentiary materials

further demonstrate that defendant Hill wasthe sole defendant with any involvement in the

challenged action, as she approved the removal of unauthorized and/or unlicensed word

processing programs from the computer systems within the law libraries. In addition, the

undisputed evidentiary materials establish that, throughout his confinement at Hamilton,

Mitchell has been allowed access to the law library and afforded the opportunity to ask

inmate law clerks for assistance with conducting research and preparing legal documents.

Defendants’ Exhibit B to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-2 at 1 (“[T]he facility hasinmate

law libraryworkersthat are required to help other inmates according to their needs. Inmate

Mitchell was advised in March of 2010 that if he needed assistance, help would be

provided.”).

A. Lack of Standing - Claims Alleged on Behalf of Other Inmates

“[A] litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities.”

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961), citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.

17, 22 (1960); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-219

(1974) (plaintiff must assert a legally cognizable injury in fact before federal courts have

jurisdiction). “The essence of a standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged ‘such

a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness

which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the

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illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]’ Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82

S.Ct. 691, 703 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).” Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 690

(11 Cir. 1987); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1981) (same).

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Standing involves two aspects. The first is the minimum “case or controversy”

constitutional requirement of Article III. Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690. “To satisfy this

‘irreducible’ constitutional minimum required for standing, a litigant must show 1) that he

personally has suffered an actual or prospective injury as a result of the putatively illegal

conduct; 2) that the injury can be fairly traced to the challenged conduct; and 3) that the

injury is likely to be redressed through court action.” Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690, citing

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,

454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). If any element is

lacking, a plaintiff’s claim is not viable. Second, the Supreme Court has established

severalstanding requirements based on prudential considerations. Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690

(internal citations omitted) (“The Supreme Court has also stated that, in addition to these

essential constitutional requirements, a court should consider the case in light of three

principles which might counsel judicial constraint, referred to as ‘prudential’

considerations.... Those considerations are 1) whetherthe plaintiff’s complaintfalls within

the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue; 2) whether

the complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are

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more appropriately resolved by the legislative branches; and 3) whether the plaintiff is

asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests

of third parties”).

The instant complaint contains claims alleging violations of the rights of other

physically handicapped inmates. In accordance with applicable federal law as set forth

herein, Mitchell lacksstanding to assert the constitutional rights of other persons. Saladin,

supra.; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The prudential limitation applicable in

this case is that a litigant may not assert the legal rights or interests of another person.

With respect to the claims arising from alleged violations of other inmates’ constitutional

rights, Mitchell is not “asserting [his] ... own legal rights and interests [but] rather ... the

legal rights and interests of third parties.” Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690. These claimstherefore

entitle Mitchell to no relief and summary judgment on such claims is due to be granted in

favor of the defendants.

B. Conspiracy

Mitchell alleges that the defendants conspired against him to take the actions about

which he complains. This claim entitles Mitchell to no relief.

“Conspiring to violate another person’s constitutional rights violates section 1983.

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at186 (1980); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421,

425 (11 Cir.1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581,

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584 n.4 (11 Cir.1996).” Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11

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2002). “To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff ‘must show that the parties

“reached an understanding” to deny the plaintiff his or her rights [and] prove an actionable

wrong to support the conspiracy.’ Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11

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Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 2053, 114 L.Ed.2d 459 (1991).... [T]he

linchpin for conspiracy is agreement....” Bailey v. Board of County Comm'rs of Alachua

County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11 Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121

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L.Ed.2d 58 (1992). In order for a plaintiff “to establish the ‘understanding’ or ‘willful

participation’ required to show a conspiracy, ... [he] must [produce] some evidence of

agreement between the defendants.... For a conspiracy claim to survive a motion for

summary judgment ‘[a] mere “scintilla” of evidence ... will not suffice; there must be

enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.’ Walker v. Darby,

911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11 Cir. 1990).” Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1283-1284. Merely “stringing

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together” adverse acts of individuals is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a

conspiracy. Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1133.

The defendants deny they conspired with each other to violate Mitchell’s

constitutional rights or federal law. The court has carefully reviewed the pleadings filed

by Mitchell. He has offered no evidence to support his theory that the defendants engaged

in various conspiratorial acts against him. Specifically, Mitchell has failed to present any

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evidence which demonstratesthat the defendants “reached an understanding” to violate his

rights or committed an “actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.” Bailey, 956 F.2d at

1122; Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 468. At best, Mitchell’s assertions are self-serving, purely

conclusory allegations which fail to assert those material facts necessary to sufficiently

plead a conspiracy between the defendants. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1133; Fullman, 739 F.2d at

556-557. Thus, Mitchell failed to produce any probative evidence of a conspiracy and the

motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants is due to be granted regarding this

claim. Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1122.

C. Respondeat Superior

Anne Hill, General Counsel for the Alabama Department of Corrections, isthe only

defendant who in any manner participated in the decision regarding the programs which

would be available on law library computer systems. Specifically, Ms. Hill approved the

request by IT personnel to remove all unauthorized software from the law library computer

systems. Defendants’ Exhibit G to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-7 at 1. Thus, the

claims against the remaining defendants entitle Mitchell to no relief as these claims are

based on theories of respondeat superior and vicarious liability.

The law is well settled “that Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior [or

vicarious liability].... Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516, 8 S.Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed.

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203 (1888) (‘A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position

wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or

servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his

official duties’). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff

must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1948 (2009); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11 Cir. 2003) (“[S]upervisory

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officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on

the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d

1014, 1035 (11 Cir. 2001) (A supervisory official “can have no respondeat superior

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liability for a section 1983 claim.”); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11 Cir.2003)

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(concluding supervisory officials are not liable on the basis of respondeat superior or

vicariousliability); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11 Cir. 1999), citing Belcher

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v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11 Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not allow a

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plaintiff to hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under

either a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.). “Absent vicarious liability,

each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S.Ct. 1949. Thus, liability for actions of

defendant Hill could attach to the other named defendants only if these defendants

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“personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or [if] there is a causal

connection between [their] actions... and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Cottone,

326 F.3d at 1360.

Mitchell, however, has presented no evidence which would create a genuine issue

of disputed fact with respect to the claims lodged against defendants Thomas, Rouse,

Harmon, Jessip and Butler. The only probative evidentiary materials filed in this case

demonstrate that these defendants did not personally participate in or have anyinvolvement

with the claims on which Mitchell seeks relief. In light of the foregoing, defendants

Thomas, Rouse, Harmon, Jessip and Butler can be held liable for actions of defendant Hill

only if their actions bear a causal relationship to the purported violations of Mitchell’s

constitutional rights and federal law. To establish the requisite causal connection and

therefore avoid entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Thomas, Rouse,

Harmon, Jessip and Butler, Mitchell must present sufficient evidence which would be

admissible at trial of either “a history of widespread abuse [that] put[] [these defendants]

on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [they] fail[ed] to do so ...” or

“a ... custom or policy [that] result[ed] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights,

or ... facts [that] support an inference that [these defendants] directed [defendant Hill or

other officials] to act unlawfully, or knew that [she/they] would act unlawfully and failed

to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal punctuation and citations

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omitted). A thorough review of the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted in this

case demonstrates that Mitchell has failed to meet this burden.

The record before the court contains no evidence to support an inference that

defendants Thomas, Rouse, Harmon, Jessip or Butler directed correctional officials to act

unlawfully or knew that they would act unlawfully and failed to stop such action. In

addition, Mitchell has presented no evidence of obvious, flagrant or rampant abuse of

continuing duration in the face of which these defendants failed to take corrective action.

Finally, it is clear that the challenged actions did not occur pursuant to a policy enacted by

Thomas, Rouse, Harmon, Jessip or Butler. Thus, a causal connection does not exist

between the actions challenged by Mitchell and the conduct of these defendants, and

liability under the custom or policy standard is not warranted. Summary judgment is

therefore due to be granted in favor of defendants Thomas, Rouse, Harmon, Jessip and

Butler.

D. Lack of Word Processing Programs

Mitchell alleges that defendant Hill approved the removal of word processing

programs--i.e., word pad, note pad, my documents, etc.-- from the computer in the law

library at Hamilton. Mitchell alleges that this action violated his right of access to the

courts and the ADA because it deprived him of one manner--that is, the use of a computer--

in which to compose and print documents for submission to the courts.

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1. Access to Courts. The law directs that incarcerated persons are entitled to “a

reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental

constitutional rights to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977). In Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), the Supreme Court clarified and limited the right to

assistance recognized in Bounds. Specifically, the Court held that “an inmate alleging a

violation of Bounds must show actual injury” arising from the alleged inadequacies in the

law library, legal assistance program or access provided by officials. Lewis, 518 U.S. at

349. In identifying the particular right protected by Bounds, the Court explained that

“Bounds established no ... right [to a law library or legal assistance]. The right that Bounds

acknowledged was the (already well-established) right of access to the courts.... [P]rison

law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in themselves, but only the means

for ensuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of

fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’” Id. at 350-351 (emphasis in original)

(citations omitted). The Court further stated that Bounds did not require “that the State ...

enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court.... To

demand the conferral ofsuch sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and

indeed largely illiterate prison population is [not something] ... the Constitution requires.”

Id. at 354 (emphasis in original).

The Court similarly rejected the argument that the mere claim of a systemic defect,

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without a showing of actual injury, presented a claim sufficient to confer standing. Id. at

349. Moreover, Lewis emphasized that a Bounds violation is related to the lack of an

inmate’s capability to present claims. 518 U.S. at 356. “Bounds ... guarantees no

particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability -- the capability of

bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the

courts. When any inmate ... shows that an actionable claim of this nature which he desired

to bring has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being

prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not been provided, he demonstrates”

the requisite actual injury. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court

discerned that the injury requirement is satisfied only when an inmate has been denied “a

reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging [his]

convictions or conditions of confinement.... [I]t is that capability, rather than the

capability of turning pages in a law library, that is the touchstone.” Id. at 356-357

(emphasis added). “[T]he Constitution does not require that prisoners... be able to conduct

generalized research, but only that they be able to present their grievances to the courts -

a more limited capability that can be produced by a much more limited degree of legal

assistance.” Id. at 360. The Court admonished that federal courts should allow prison

officials to determine the best method of ensuring that inmates are provided a reasonably

adequate opportunity to present their nonfrivolous claims of constitutional violationsto the

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courts. Id. at 356. A federal district court must “‘scrupulously respect[] the limits on [its]

role,’ by ‘not ... thrust[ing] itself into prison administration’ and instead permitting

‘[p]rison administrators [to] exercis[e] wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional

requirements.’ [Bounds, 430] U.S. at 832-833, 97 S.Ct. at 1500.” Id. at 363.

Mitchell presents only a conclusory allegation of a constitutional violation and fails

to establish that lack of computer word processing programs deprived him of the capability

to pursue non-frivolous claims before this or any other court. Federal law does not

guarantee a “particular methodology” such as computer word processing programs or

typewriters to provide access to the courts. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Moreover, even if

Mitchell did not have access to a word processing program, it is undisputed that, while at

Hamilton, he had unfettered access to the law library, the ability to conduct legal research

on the computer, which contained the LexisNexis database, and accessto inmate law clerks

for assistance with researching legal references and/or preparing written legal documents.

The evidence further demonstrates that no defendant in no way inhibited Mitchell’s

preparation of legal documents, filing of pleadings or processing of any cause of action.

An exhaustive review of relevant state and federal court records establishes that

Mitchell retained his ability to access the courts during the period of time made the basis

of this case. During this time, Mitchell not only initiated the instant civil action, but also

filed (1) Mitchell v. Thomas, et al., 2:11-CV-474-TMH-SRW (M.D. Ala), transferred to

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the Northern District of Alabama, Mitchell v. Thomas, et al., Civil Action No. 6:11-CV4105-SLB (N.D. Ala. 2012) (good time credit and conditions claimssummarily dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)); (2) Mitchell v. Pearce, Civil Action No. 6:12-CV-1152-

AKK-SGC (N.D. Ala. 2014) (majority of claims dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b) and retaliation claim subsequently dismissed upon motion of plaintiff); and (3)

Mitchell v. Wynne, et al., Civil Action No. 2:12-CV-249-WHA-SRW (M.D. Ala.)

(pending). In addition, Mitchell litigated several actions in the state courts. Throughout

the proceedings in the instant case and his other case pending before this court, Mitchell

has demonstrated that he is both proficient and prolific at presenting and arguing the claims

of his choice to the court of his choosing without using a word processing program. The

challenged lack of access to a word processing program did not improperly impede

Mitchell’s efforts to pursue nonfrivolous legal claims.

Mitchell has failed to come forward with any evidence that the actions about which

he complains deprived him of the capability of pursuing non-frivolous claimsin this or any

other court. In addition, Mitchell does not establish he suffered the requisite injury, Lewis,

518 U.S. at 356. Defendant Hill is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the access

to courts claim. Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11 Cir. 2006) (access to courts

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claim fails because plaintiff did not show he had been denied the capability to pursue

nonfrivolous legal claims); Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11 Cir. 1991) (An inmate

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is entitled to no relief on an access to courts claim in “the absence of any indications of

ultimate prejudice or disadvantage” regarding the capability of pursuing legal relief.).

2. The ADA Claim. Mitchell claims that lack of a computer word processing

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program violated his rights under the ADA. “Under Title II of the ADA, a ‘qualified

individual with a disability’ cannot be excluded from participating in, or be denied the

benefits of,services, programs, or activities of a public entity ‘by reason of such disability’

or ‘be subjected to discrimination by’ the public entity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.” Flournoy

v. Culver, 534 Fed. Appx. 848, 851 (11 Cir. 2013). Title II of the ADA applies to inmates

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confined in state correctional facilities. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006)

(citing Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)); Bircoll v. MiamiDade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1081 (11 Cir. 2007) (It is well settled law “that a disabled

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prisoner can state a Title II ADA claim if he is denied participation in an activity provided

in state prison by reason of his disability.”).

4

For purposes of this Recommendation, the court assumes arguendo that Mitchell is a qualified individual with 3

a disability. 

In United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 152-154 (2006), the Court advised: 4

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded fromparticipation in or be denied the benefits

of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” § 12132 (2000 ed.). A “‘qualified individual

with a disability’” is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with or without

reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of

architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of

auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the

receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public

entity.” § 12131(2). The Act defines “‘public entity’” to include “any State or local

government” and “any department, agency, ... or other instrumentality of a State,”

§12131(1). 

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“In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the

ADA, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that [he] (1) is disabled, (2) is a

qualified individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination

because of [his] disability.” Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11 Cir.

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2000) (citation omitted). This standard derives from the ADA’s language,

stating that “no [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual

with a disability because of the disability of such an individual.” 42 USC

12112(a)....

Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263-1264 (11 Cir.

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2007).

Defendant Hill denies violating any rights afforded Mitchell regarding his ability

to access the courts. It is undisputed that Mitchell had continued access to the law library,

and was allowed to receive assistance from inmate law clerksto aid in conducting research

or composing legal documents. Consequently, the record is devoid of evidence to show

that the denial of a word processing program excluded Mitchell from use of the law library

or access to the courts. Moreover, Mitchell has failed to show that the decision to remove

unauthorized word processing programs from the computers maintained in the prison

system’slaw libraries occurred due to his disability. Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,

197 F.3d 1332, 1334 (11 Cir. 1999) (plaintiff must present evidence the disability

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constituted a determinative factor in the decision-making process); see also McNely v.

Ocala-Star Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11 Cir. 1996) (the ADA liability standard

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requires proof that the decision at issue occurred because of the alleged disability).

Instead, the probative evidence before the court demonstrates that removal of the word

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processing software transpired because the software was unauthorized and/or unlicensed

for use on the computer system. Thus, Mitchell’s ADA claim provides no basis for relief

E. First Amendment Claims - Retaliation

Mitchell alleges that defendant Hill approved removal of the word processing

software, denied him access to state law regarding correctional incentive time and refused

to update case law in retaliation for his filing federal civil rights actions. Defendant Hill

deniesthese allegations and arguesthat the actions about which Mitchell complains did not

occur in retaliation for Mitchell's exercise of any constitutionally protected right.

The evidentiary materials demonstrate that defendant Hill approved the removal of

word processing programs from law library computers as the software at issue was

unauthorized. Defendants’ Exhibit G to the Special Report - Doc. No. 17-7 at 1. The

evidentiary materials further establish that defendant Hill did not participate in the denial

of written copies to Mitchell of the proposed legislative acts underlying the Alabama

Correctional Incentive Time Act (“ACITA”), Ala. Code § 14-9-40, et seq. Defendants’

Exhibit M to the Supplemental Special Report - Doc. No. 21-3 at 1. It is likewise

undisputed that Mitchell had access to the codified statutes via the LexisNexis system

utilized at Hamilton. Finally, the evidentiary materials indicate that law library computers

are updated by members of the IT staff when relevant information is received from

LexisNexis, usually at quarterly intervals.

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Federal law recognizes “that ‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly

urgent problems of prison administration and reform.’ [Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.

396, 405, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807 (1974)]. As the Martinez Court acknowledged, ‘the

problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they

are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.’ Id., at 404-405, 94 S.Ct., at 1807.

Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning,

and the commitment of resources....” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 107 S.Ct. 2254,

2259 (1987). Correctional officials are therefore “accorded latitude in the administration

of prison affairs[,]” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081 (1972), which

necessarily includes “the [inescapable] withdrawal or limitation of many [inmate]

privileges and rights.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804 (1974)

(quotation marks and citation omitted); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861,

1877 (1979).

“In the First Amendment context, ... some rights are simply inconsistent with the

status of a prisoner or ‘with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections

system.’” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 1479 (2001), quoting Pell,

417 U.S. at 822, 94 S.Ct. at 2804. In accordance with this principle, an inmate’s rights

established under the First Amendment are not protected if allowing such protection is

“inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of

the corrections system.” Pell, 417 U.S. at 822, 924 S.Ct. at 2804. Thus, while inmates

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retain a constitutional right protected by the First Amendment to freely exercise their right

of access to the courts, this right is limited by the fact of incarceration and valid

penological objectivessuch as maintaining institutionalsecurity and order. The law is well

settled that “central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of

internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.” Pell, 417 U.S. at 823, 94

S.Ct. at 2804; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.Ct. at 1878 (“[M]aintaining

institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that

may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted

prisoners and pretrial detainees.”). It is therefore clear that preservation of security and

order within a correctional facility is essential to the facility’s effective administration and

constitutes both a compelling and substantial governmental interest. Pell, 417 U.S. at 823,

94 S.Ct. at 2804; Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 512 (11 Cir. 1996); Harris v.

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Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 504 (11 Cir. 1996).

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“The first amendment prohibits state officials from retaliating against prisoners for

exercising their right of free speech. See, e.g., Wright v. Newsome, [795 F.2d 964, 968

(11 Cir. 1986)].... The gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for

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exercising a right [protected by the First Amendment].” Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235,

1241-1242 (11 Cir. 1989); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11 Cir. 2003). “In

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prison, of course, first amendment rights are not absolute. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,

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94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). Legitimate policies and goals of the correction

system may justify restrictions limiting prisoners’ [First Amendment] rights. 417 U.S. at

821.” Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11 Cir. 1986). “A prisoner retains those

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First Amendment rights that are ‘not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the corrective system.’ Prison Legal News v. Cook,

238 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9 Cir. 2001) (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor

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Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (resist)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).... [P]rison authorities have a legitimate penological interest in the

consistent enforcement of prison rules and ... disciplining prisoners who attempt to coerce

a guard into not enforcing prison rules is reasonably related to that interest.” Hargis v.

Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 409-410 (9 Cir. 2002); see also Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235,

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1248 (5 Cir. 1989). The situation is somewhat complicated when the alleged act of

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retaliation is undertaken to assure compliance with prison rules as inmates often attempt

to “inappropriately insulate themselves from [such] actions by drawing the shield of

retaliation around them.” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5 Cir. 1995), cert. denied

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sub nom Palermo v. Woods, 516 U.S. 1084, 116 S.Ct. 800, 133 L.Ed.2d 747 (1996).

To proceed on a claim for retaliation and withstand the entry of summary judgment,

an “inmate must establish ... three elements: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected;

(2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the [defendant’s] allegedly retaliatory

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conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech;

and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected

speech. See Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250, 1254 (11 Cir. 2005).” Smith v.

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Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11 Cir. 2008); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 397

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(6 Cir. 1999). With respect to the causal relationship element, a prisoner must

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demonstrate that correctional officials intended to retaliate for his exercise of a right

protected under the First Amendment and, but for the retaliatory motive, the adverse act

complained of would not have occurred. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166; Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278.

Mitchell alleges that defendant Hill retaliated against him for exercising his right

of access to the courts, thus satisfying the first element of his retaliation claim. Smith, 532

F.3d at 1277. The second element requires Mitchell to demonstrate that these adverse

actions “would likely deter a [prisoner] of ordinary firmness” from filing legal actions. Id.

This “presents an objective standard and a factual inquiry.” Id. However, nothing before

this court indicates that the challenged actions would deter an ordinary inmate from filing

lawsuits. In addition, the records of this and other courts establish that these actions had

no deterrent effect on Mitchell, as he continued to file legal actions routinely. Even

assuming arguendo that this standard has been met, Mitchell fails to satisfy the third

element of a retaliation claim -- a causal connection between his constitutionally protected

activity and the adverse actions of defendant Hill. The causal connection inquiry focuses

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on the “subjective motivation of the defendants[,]” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399, and this

court must therefore determine “whether the defendants were subjectively motivated to”

undertake the challenged actions against Mitchell for his engaging in legal activities.

Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278. The subjective motivation issue is resolved by most courts under

the burden-shifting formula set forth in Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576 (1977). Thisformula requiresthat the plaintiff

first meet “his burden of establishing that his protected conduct was a motivating factor

behind any harm” and then “the burden of production shifts to the defendant. If the

defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the

protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d

at 399, referencing the Mt. Healthy motive analysis.

It is essential that federal courts “carefully scrutinize retaliation claims” brought by

prisoners challenging adverse actions of correctional personnel. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.

“[C]ourts must approach prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and particular care.

See Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2 Cir. 1983). This is [necessary because

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prisoners’] ... claims of retaliation are ... easily fabricated [and] pose a substantial risk of

unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general prison administration. This is so

because virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official--even

those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation--can be characterized

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[by the prisoner] as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Dawes v. Walker, 239

F.3d 489, 491 (2 Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

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534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).

An inmate has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful

retaliation by showing “that his conduct was constitutionally protected and that this

conduct ... was a ‘motivating factor’” behind the adverse action of the defendant. Mt.

Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576. Merely alleging the ultimate fact of retaliation,

however, is insufficient. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142, n.6 (7 Cir. 1988); Woods,

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60 F.3d at 1166. Additionally, conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate the

existence of each element requisite to establishing retaliation. Morales, 278 F.3d at 131;

Bennett v. Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2 Cir. 2003) (Because prisoner retaliation claims

nd

are prone to abuse, “we are careful to require non-conclusory allegations.”). If an inmate

meets his burden with appropriate evidence, the burden of production shifts to the

defendant to show that he “would have reached the same decision ... even in the absence

of the protected conduct.” Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576. “Under the Mt.

Healthy approach, if the government official ‘can prove that [he] would have taken the

adverse action in the absence of the plaintiff’s protected conduct, [he] cannot be held

liable.’ Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 388 n.4....” Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278 n.22.

Defendant Hill denies the allegations of retaliation and avers that Mitchell’s legal

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activities played no role in the challenged actions. The evidentiary materials contained in

the record indicate that the adverse actions about which Mitchell complains did not occur

due to retaliation against Mitchell for filing this or any other lawsuit. Instead, the

challenged actions occurred because (1) the word processing software was either

unauthorized or unlicensed, and (2) the requested material was available to Mitchell

through use of the research tools contained in the law library. Nothing before the court

indicatesthat defendant Hill intended to retaliate against Mitchell. Mitchell offers only his

conclusory allegations of ultimate fact that defendant Hill retaliated against him for

exercising his right of access to the courts. These allegations are insufficient to defeat

summary judgment. Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279; Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564, n.6.

Moreover, even if a reasonable factfinder could infer the motivating factor element,

it is clear under Mt. Healthy that defendant Hill would have taken the challenged actions

regardless of Mitchell's accessing the court. In light of the foregoing, defendant Hill is

entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment claims, as Mitchell failsto establish

by appropriate evidence either the likeliness of deterring future legal actions or a causal

relationship between the alleged protected activities and the adverse actions taken against

him, each of which is a required for a retaliation claim. Id. at 1278-1279.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

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1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further

ORDERED that on or before February 23, 2015, the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation to which the partyis objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

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33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981,

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en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

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down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 9th day of February, 2015.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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