Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-01046/USCOURTS-ca4-07-01046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LAUREL SAND & GRAVEL, 

INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,  No. 07-1046

v.

SHARI T. WILSON,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.

(1:06-cv-00615-JFM)

Argued: December 4, 2007

Decided: March 5, 2008

Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges,

and James P. JONES, Chief United States District Judge for the

Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Jones joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Mark John Hardcastle, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Adam Dean Snyder, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Terry B. Blair, Baltimore, Maryland,

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for Appellant. Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee. 

OPINION

GREGORY, Circuit Judge: 

Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc., a mining corporation, appeals from the

district court’s dismissal of its claims on the basis of res judicata and

abstention. Since Laurel raised and adjudicated the same claims in a

state court proceeding and failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court, we affirm the district court’s

decision.

I.

In 1991, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Surface Mine

Dewatering Act ("Dewatering Act") to protect property owners in

counties where karst terrain1 is located from the dewatering of surface

mines. The Dewatering Act established zones of dewatering influence

for all mines and imposed remedial measures on a miner if a well

within the zone of influence failed due to declining ground water or

if damage was caused by subsidence. Md. Envir. Code § 15-812(c).

Specifically, the Dewatering Act provides that a licensed miner within

the zone of influence must:

(1) Replace, at no expense to the owner of real property that

is affected by the surface mine dewatering, a water supply

that fails as a result of declining ground water levels; and (2)

upon a determination by the Department of proximate cause

after the permittee has received proper notice and an opportunity to respond and provide information, pay monetary

1

"Karst terrain" is defined as an irregular topography that is: (1) caused

by a solution of limestone and other carbonate rock; and (2) characterized by closed depressions, sinkholes, caverns, solution cavities, and

underground channels that, partially or completely, may capture surface

streams. Md. Envir. Code § 15-813(a)(3). 

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compensation to the affected property owner or repair any

damage caused as a result of the sudden subsidence of the

surface of the land.

Md. Envir. Code § 15-813(c). However, the Maryland Department of

Environment ("MDE") may not require a licensed miner to replace

water supplies if the miner demonstrates to the MDE by clear and

convincing evidence that pit dewatering is not the proximate cause of

the loss water supply. Id. § 15-813(f). The MDE must also provide

the licensed miner the opportunity for a contested hearing. Id. § 15-

813(g). 

The day after the Dewatering Act became law, Laurel Sand &

Gravel, Inc. ("Laurel"), a Maryland corporation, engaged in the business of mining limestone and other aggregates in Maryland and West

Virginia, along with nine other licensed miners, formed the Maryland

Aggregates Association and challenged the constitutionality of the

Dewatering Act. In Maryland Aggregates, Inc. v. State of Maryland,

655 A.2d 886 (Md. 1995), Laurel facially attacked the constitutionality of the Dewatering Act. Laurel contended that the Dewatering

Act’s statutory procedures for resolving claims were constitutionally

deficient and that the contested case hearing process violated procedural due process. The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected Laurel’s

constitutional claims and dismissed the case.

In February 2002, eleven years after the law’s enactment, the MDE

notified Laurel that a shallow residential well in its zone of influence

was dry due to declining ground water. The well belonged to David

Thomas ("Thomas well"). MDE informed Laurel that, under the

Dewatering Act, it was required to replace the well or lose its mining

license for noncompliance. Laurel replaced the well at a cost of

$3,000 and initiated a contested case hearing. 

At a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), Laurel

argued that a recent severe drought — not its dewatering operations

— was the proximate cause of the Thomas well’s failure. In addition,

Laurel argued that Maryland Aggregates violated federal constitutional law. (J.A. 33.) The ALJ found that because Laurel failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was not the proximate

cause of water supply loss to the Thomas well, it had violated the

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Dewatering Act. Laurel filed exceptions to the ALJ’s proposed decision. However, the MDE’s Final Decision Maker adopted the ALJ’s

findings and conclusions. Laurel did not seek judicial review of the

final decision in the Maryland state courts.

In lieu of seeking judicial review of the administrative decision, a

year later, Laurel filed suit in federal district court against Maryland’s

Secretary of the Environment, Shari T. Wilson, arguing that the

Dewatering Act violates the Due Process and Takings Clause of the

United States Constitution. The district court dismissed Laurel’s

action on the grounds that: (1) res judicata precluded Laurel from

raising the same claims litigated in Maryland Aggregates; (2) Laurel

lacked a property interest to sustain a due process and takings claim

under the Constitution; and (3) Younger abstention applied. 

II.

We review a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem,

85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). A district court’s decision to abstain

under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), however, is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 319 F.3d 151, 153 (4th

Cir. 2003). 

III.

A. Res Judicata

Laurel challenges the constitutionality of the Dewatering Act arguing that § 15-813(c) improperly requires it to immediately replace

another’s dry well in an established zone of influence. Since this process occurs without a pre-deprivation hearing, Laurel argues that the

Dewatering Act violates its procedural due process rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. In addition,

Laurel contends that the Dewatering Act enforces strict liability by

improperly shifting the burden of proof to the miner and that the

$3,000 expended in replacing the Thomas well constitutes an unconstitutional taking. Laurel seeks a declaratory judgment, injunctive

relief, and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court held

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that because these claims were litigated in Maryland Aggregates, res

judicata and collateral estoppel precluded Laurel from raising them

again. 

Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party from

relitigating a claim that was decided or could have been decided in

an original suit. Pueschel v. United States, 369 U.S. 345, 355 (4th Cir.

2004). The doctrine was designed to protect "litigants from the burden

of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and

[to promote] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation."

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). Generally,

the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered in state court is determined by the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered.

Under Maryland law, the elements of res judicata are: (1) that the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties

in the earlier dispute; (2) that the claim presented in the current action

is identical to the one determined in the prior adjudication; and (3)

that there has been a final judgment on the merits. Anne Arundel

County Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 887 A.2d 1029, 1037 (Md. 2005)(citing Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Comm. Ass’n., 761 A.2d 899, 910

(2000)).

Laurel argues that res judicata is inapplicable because an as-applied

challenge to the Dewatering Act’s constitutionality is a different

claim than the facial challenge raised in Maryland Aggregates. The

MDE argues that the claims are not different and were raised in Maryland Aggregates. Because it is undisputed that this case involves the

same parties and a final judgment on the merits was rendered in

Maryland Aggregates, the only issue is whether the two causes of

action are the same for purposes of res judicata. 

The test for deciding "whether the causes of action are identical for

claim preclusion purposes is whether the claim presented in the new

litigation ‘arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions

as the claim resolved by the prior judgment.’" Pittson Co. v. United

States, 199 F.3d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1999)(quoting Harnett v. Billman,

800 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1986)). "Newly articulated claims

based on the same [transactional] nucleus of facts may still be subject

to a res judicata finding if the claims could have been brought in the

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earlier action." Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional

Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To determine whether res judicata applies, we must compare the

allegations set forth in Maryland Aggregates with the allegations set

forth in Laurel’s Amended Complaint. In Maryland Aggregates, Laurel sought a declaratory judgment holding the Dewatering Act unconstitutional on a number of grounds and an injunction against the

enforcement and implementation of the Dewatering Act. Specifically,

Laurel argued: (1) the Dewatering Act violated its right to substantive

due process because there was no rational basis for the legislation; (2)

the statute denied equal protection of the law to resident counties

unaffected by the Dewatering Act; (3) the Dewatering Act interfered

with the mine operators’ constitutional rights to a jury trial; (4) the

Dewatering Act deprived them of property without just compensation;

and (5) that the statutory procedures for establishing zones of

dewatering influence and for resolving claims under the Dewatering

Act were constitutionally deficient. 

Laurel maintains that it was denied due process by not receiving a

pre-deprivation hearing before being found liable to replace the

Thomas well. Although Laurel also emphasizes that its current claim

is an as-applied challenge to the Dewatering Act, this claim is not sufficiently different from the substantive due process claim raised in

Maryland Aggregates challenging the enactment of the statute. 

In Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, the Ninth Circuit noted that

"[o]ften, an as-applied challenge will not be precluded by an earlier

facial challenge because the ‘transactional nucleus of facts’ surrounding the enactment of the regulation will be different from the nucleus

of facts involved when that regulation is applied to a particular property." 322 F.3d at 1080. However, the Ninth Circuit went on to stress

that when the conduct now alleged to cause harm involves the same

nucleus of facts addressed in the prior complaint, and any claim concerning the conduct could have been brought in the prior action, res

judicata applies. Id.

Similarly, in Walgreen Co. v. Louisiana Department of Health and

Hospital, Walgreens brought an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of Louisiana’s Department of Health regulations governing

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prescription drug reimbursements. 220 Fed. Appx. 309, 312 (5th Cir.

2007)(unpublished). Since Walgreens had previously challenged the

facial validity of the regulations, the Fifth Circuit held that Walgreens

could have raised its arguments in the prior challenge and, therefore,

the claims in the subsequent suit were barred by res judicata. 

Indeed, Laurel could have raised its procedural due process claim

in Maryland Aggregates along with its substantive due process claim.

Even though the MDE had not promulgated regulations establishing

an administrative process to the resolution of water or property damage claims at the time of Maryland Aggregates, Laurel was aware that

the Dewatering Act provided the MDE with the authority to initially

determine a mine operator’s liability2 and that a mine operator

aggrieved by the determination is entitled to demand a contested hearing at the administrative level, which is subject to judicial review.

Thus, at the time of Maryland Aggregates Laurel could have challenged the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing.3

 As a result, Laurel’s "as

applied" claim itself was subsumed by the decision in Maryland

2

In footnote 18 of Maryland Aggregates, the Court notes that: 

In its reply brief, Maryland Aggregates also objects to the procedures for establishing claims to compensation under the Act. The

Act provides that "[t]he Department shall adopt regulations to

establish an administrative process to expedite the resolution

water supply loss or property damage claims arising under this

section." The Department has not yet promulgated any such regulations because of the injunction against enforcement of the

Act. Furthermore, while Maryland Aggregates argues that a mine

operator is not entitled to judicial review of decisions relating to

compensation, we agree with the State that a mine operator or

property owner is entitled to review of a ‘decision of [the

Department of Natural Resources] regarding a finding of proximate cause relating to water supply failure or property damage

within a zone of dewatering influence. This decision is reviewable first as a contested case hearing . . . .’ A party aggrieved by

the result of the contested case hearing may seek judicial review

in the circuit court. 

(J.A. 27.) (internal citations omitted) 

3The MDE argues that in fact Laurel raised these claims in Maryland

Aggregates but that they were unsuccessful. 

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Aggregates. Laurel’s challenge to the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing, essentially challenges the Maryland Aggregates Court’s determinations that the Act provides all the due process that is necessary to

comport with the state and federal constitution. See Mears v. Town of

Oxford, Md., 762 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1985)(claim preclusion applies

if the cause of action is the same and if the same evidentiary facts

would sustain both actions).

Nevertheless, Laurel contends that res judicata is also inapplicable

because Maryland Aggregates was a declaratory action. Laurel argues

that declaratory actions, under Maryland law, are exceptions to the res

judicata doctrine, which only applies if the matter contested was actually raised and decided and not as to matters which could have been

decided. In support, Laurel cites Bankers and Shippers Insurance Co.

of New York v. Electro Enterprise Inc., 415 A.2d 278 (Md. 1980). In

Bankers, the Maryland Supreme Court adopted the Restatement Second of Judgments approach holding that the preclusive effect of

declaratory judgments was limited to matters actually declared by the

judgment. Bankers, 415 A.2d at 654. As to matters not declared, a litigant who solely sought a declaratory judgment in the prior proceeding

is not precluded from bringing those claims. However, the Court notably declined to decide whether the same would be true if "the original

request for a declaratory judgment also include[d] a claim for coercive or other relief." Id.

MDE argues that Bankers is inapplicable here because: (1) Maryland Aggregates did not solely seek declaratory relief; and (2) Laurel’s present claims are not based on the rights determined by the

judgment in Maryland Aggregates. While it is true that courts have

limited the preclusive effect of declaratory judgments, declaratory

judgments have no limiting effect if coercive relief such as damages

or an injunction is also sought. Federal courts have consistently held

that the declaratory judgment exception applies only if the prior

action solely sought declaratory relief. "By asking for coercive relief

(the injunction) in the first suit, the plaintiff lost the right to invoke

the declaratory judgment exception." Stericycle, Inc. v. City of

Delavan, 929 F.Supp. 1162, 1164 (E.D.Wis. 1996)(citing Cimasi v.

City of Fenton, 838 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1988) and Mandarino v. Pollard, 718 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1983)). It is undisputed that, in

Maryland Aggregates, Laurel sought both declaratory relief and an

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injunction against enforcement and implementation of the Dewatering

Act. Thus, the declaratory judgment exception is inapplicable. Since

the Maryland Supreme Court’s finding that the statute was not constitutionally deficient constitutes a final judgment on the merits and

Laurel’s current claim could have been brought in the prior action, the

district court properly found that res judicata bars Laurel’s claims. 

B. Takings Claims

Laurel also challenges the district court’s dismissal of its takings

claim. MDE argues that Laurel’s "as applied" takings claim fails as

a matter of law. The district court found that "the Dewatering Act’s

imposition of a duty upon mine owners to pay the costs of constructing new wells on adjacent property [did] not itself deprive the mine

owners of any interest in their own real property." (J.A. 200.) The district court further noted that the cost of replacing the Thomas well

was only $3,000 and, thus, the cost did not deny Laurel use of its own

real property. 

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits

the taking of private property without just compensation. Lingle v.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). To determine whether a

constitutional taking has occurred, we focus on three factors: the economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which the regulation

interferes with the investment-backed expectations, and the character

of the governmental action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New

York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The aim of the takings clause "is to

prevent the government ‘from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the

public as a whole.’" Id. at 520 (quoting Armstrong v. United States,

364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Therefore, the party challenging the governmental action as an unconstitutional taking bears a substantial burden

of showing that "justice and fairness" requires that the government

compensate for any economic injuries caused by public action. E.

Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 

The Dewatering Act’s remedial scheme provides compensation to

injured landowners when miners’ dewatering causes injury. Maryland’s desire to require miners to compensate injured landowners is

a valid interference with property to adjust the benefits and burdens

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of economic life as well as promote the common good. It is not unreasonable, unfair, or unjust to require Laurel to pay for damages caused

by its mining. Despite Laurel’s arguments, the Dewatering Act’s

remedial scheme is a far cry from the government "short-changing"

a property owner to improve the public condition. See Pennsylvania

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Instead, the character of the

government action here is both legitimate and equitable. 

Moreover, Laurel fails to identify any property taken for public use

or specify a property interest taken by the Dewatering Act. This fact

alone is enough, as the district court found, to dismiss Laurel’s takings claim. Even still, there is no doubt that the Dewatering Act has

not forced a considerable economic impact upon Laurel. In eleven

years, Laurel has had to replace one well for $3,000. Proportionally

speaking, Laurel realized its investment-backed expectations without

being substantially burdened by the Dewatering Act. 

Thus, the district court properly found that an unconstitutional takings has not occurred. 

C. Younger Abstention

Finally, Laurel argues that the district court erred in abstaining

from deciding its claims under Younger v. Harris. The district court

found that Laurel "prematurely terminated" the state proceedings by

not appealing the adverse administrative decision to the Maryland

Circuit Court. Laurel maintains that the doctrine of abstention is inapplicable because: (1) its claim concerns matters essentially legislative

in nature; (2) it seeks wholly prospective relief; (3) the administrative

hearing was not coercive; (4) this matter is not a case of vital or paramount state concern; and (5) there is bias at the administrative level.

The doctrine of abstention articulated in Younger requires a federal

court to abstain from interfering in state proceedings, even if jurisdiction exists, if there is:

(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to

any substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2)

implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and

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(3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise

the federal constitutional claim advanced in the federal lawsuit.

Moore v. City of Asheville, 396 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing

Nivens, 319 F.3d at 153). "Younger abstention represents an accommodation between a state’s pursuit of important interests in its own

forum and the federal interest in federal adjudication of federal

rights." Telco Comm’ns, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th

Cir. 1989). 

In arguing that Younger is inapplicable, Laurel claims that there are

no ongoing state proceedings and that the administrative adjudication

of its claim was a non-coercive legislative action. While Younger

does not require abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding

reviewing a legislative or executive action, this case does not concern

a legislative action. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the

City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). The administrative

hearing procedures are clearly coercive and "judicial in nature" — not

legislative. See Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 291 F.Supp. 2d 443,

455 (S.D.W.Va. 2003), aff’d 396 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding

that "there can be little doubt that the proceedings before the PSC

were ‘judicial in nature’" when they were conducted in an adversarial,

trial-like setting, with discovery, witness testimony and exhibits). The

important issue here is whether a party must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in federal district court. 

In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 406 U.S. 592, 608 (1975), the Supreme

Court stated that "a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party

must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the

District Court." Thus, "a party may not procure federal intervention

by terminating the state judicial process prematurely — forgoing the

state appeal to attack the trial court’s judgment in federal court." New

Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 369; see also Ohio Civil Rights

Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627

(1986)(applying Younger to state administrative proceedings). 

Relying on the principles articulated in Huffman and Ohio Civil

Rights Commission, we have similarly held that "a defendant to a

coercive administrative proceedings must exhaust his state adminisLAUREL SAND & GRAVEL v. WILSON 11

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trative and judicial remedies and may not bypass them in favor of federal court proceeding in which he seeks effectively to ‘annul the

results’ of a state administrative body." Moore v. City of Asheville,

N.C., 396 F.3d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 2005). 

In an attempt "to short-circuit[ ] both the agency’s ability to interpret its statutes in conformity with the Constitution and the state

court’s ability to correct constitutionally infirm agency decisions,"

Laurel forwent state court judicial review of its administrative order

simply because it wanted to litigate in a federal forum. Id. at 396.

Younger abstention was created to prevent such disruption of state

administrative and judicial processes. 

Indeed, the purpose of abstention is to ensure that state courts may

construe state law in a way that avoids unwarranted determinations of

federal constitutional questions and to maintain comity between the

state and federal courts. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S.

1 (1987). Hence, "federal intervention before a state court has had the

opportunity to review an agency’s decision is no less an ‘aspersion on

the capabilities and good-faith of state appellate courts,’ and no ‘less

a disruption of the State’s efforts to protect interests which it deems

important." O’Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 791 (3d Cir.

1994) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608). 

Federal intervention with Laurel’s claim would not only cast aspersions on the MDE process of determining liability but would also

annul the results of MDE’s determination that Laurel is in fact liable

for the Thomas well failure. Although Laurel purports to fall within

an exception to Younger by seeking wholly prospective relief — a

declaration that the Dewatering Act as applied violates constitutional

requirements and an injunction against future application of the

Dewatering Act — this claim is without merit. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977) (holding Younger abstention inapplicable where the suit is in no way "designed to annul the results of a

state trial" and the relief sought is wholly prospective). Laurel seeks

attorney fees incurred in this suit as well as at the administrative level.

Laurel also requests a declaration that the Dewatering Act "as

applied" to the Thomas well violated its constitutional rights. 

We fail to see how Laurel’s requested relief may be characterized

as "wholly prospective." Laurel seeks to not only be compensated for

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an injury that has already occurred but also to annul the results of the

administrative proceedings. Moore, 396 F.3d at 397. Therefore, we

hold that whereas here Laurel seeks to invalidate a state judgment by

filing a federal action and circumventing state-court judicial remedies,

the state proceedings remain "pending" within the meaning of Younger abstention. And based on the relief Laurel requests the "wholly

prospective relief" exception is also inapplicable. 

Next, we must examine whether the proceedings at issue implicate

an important state interest. Laurel argues that the state’s regulation of

water resources, particularly groundwater is not a paramount or vital

state concern. We disagree. Matters relating to property law, land use,

and zoning ordinances have frequently been held to be "important"

state interests justifying Younger abstention. Harper v. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n of WVA, 396 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2005). 

Maryland enacted the Dewatering Act "[i]n order to conserve, protect, and use water resources of the State in accordance with the best

interest of the people of Maryland." Md. Envir. Code § 5-501. Moreover, "it is the policy of the State to control, as far as feasible, appropriation or use of surface waters and groundwaters of the State." Id.

Hence, the district court properly found that regulation of ground

water effected by the Dewatering Act implicates important, substantial, and vital state interests. 

Further, Laurel was provided an opportunity to raise its constitutional challenges at the administrative level. The final prong of Younger’s abstention test is whether the claimant is afforded an adequate

opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state forum. Laurel was not only afforded the opportunity but did in fact raise its constitutional claim at the administrative level. (J.A. 33.) Thus, in sum,

the three prong test for Younger abstention is met.

Because Laurel failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and

could have asserted its constitutional claims in the state proceedings

and the state has a legitimate interest in regulating the groundwater,

we hold that principles of comity demand application of Younger

abstention. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse it discretion

in abstaining from hearing Laurel’s federal claims in deference to the

State of Maryland’s vital interest in regulating dewatering. 

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IV.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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