Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-02244/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-02244-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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28 1 In the alternative, Petitioner asks the Court to issue a certificate of

appealability with respect to Claim 5.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Lynn Styers, )

) CV-98-2244-PHX-EHC

Petitioner, )

) DEATH PENALTY CASE

v. )

)

) ORDER

Dora B. Schriro, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

)

Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. (Dkt. 130.)

The motion is brought in response to the Court’s orders denying Petitioner’s amended

habeas corpus petition and issuing a certificate of appealability. (Dkts. 126, 128.)

Petitioner challenges the Court’s denial of Claim 5, which contested the state court finding

that the “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” aggravating factor, A.R.S. §13-703(6), had

been proved.1

 

DISCUSSION

 A motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is essentially

a motion for reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and appropriate

only if the court is presented with newly discovered evidence, if there is an intervening

change in controlling law, or if the court committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197

Case 2:98-cv-02244-JAT Document 131 Filed 02/05/07 Page 1 of 5
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F.3d 1253, 1255 (9t h Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County,

Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration is not

a forum for the moving party to make new arguments not raised in its original briefs,

Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equipment, Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-926 (9th Cir.

1988), nor is it the time to ask the court to “rethink what it has already thought through,”

United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quotation omitted).

Petitioner contends that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court affirming the

existence of the “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” factor was contrary to and

involved an unreasonable ap p lication of clearly established federal law, under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), and was based upon an unreasonable determination of t he facts under (d)(2).

(Dkt. 130 at 5.) Petitioner does not cite new evidence or a change in law but simply repeats

the arguments offered in previous filings. Because these arguments do not show that the

Court committed clear error in its prior rulings, the motion must be denied. 

In his attack on the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that t he murder of

Christopher Milke evidenced a heinous or depraved state of mind, Petitioner focuses on

subsequent decisions of that court , p art icularly those in which the court discusses the

adequacy of jury instructions regarding the especially heinous or depraved aggravating

factor; e.g., State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 140 P.3d 950 (2006); State v. Anderson, 210

Ariz. 327, 111 P.2d 369 (2005). From these decisions Petitioner draws the conclusion that

a constit ut ionally valid construction of the factor requires “a showing of relishing, and/or

gratuitous violence, and/or mutilation.” (Dkt. 130 at 10). Because relishing, gratuitous

violence, or mutilation were not found with respect to the murder of Christopher Milke,

Petitioner contends that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court upholding the

application of the (F)(6) factor entitles him to habeas relief. Petitioner’s analysis is flawed.

There is no doubt in Petitioner’s case that t he Ariz ona Supreme Court applied the

narrowing construction of the (F)(6) factor set forth in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 52, 659

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2 Gretzler identified five fact ors which may lead to a finding of heinousness

or depravity: (1) relishing of the murder by the killer; (2) infliction of gratuitous violence on

the victim; (3) needless mutilation of the victim; (4) senselessness of the crime; and

(5) helplessness of the victim. 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11.

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P.2d 1, 11 (1983).2 State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 115-16, 865 P.2d 765, 776-77 (1993). Instead,

Petitioner’s contends, as the resp ondent did in Lewis v. Jeffers, “that the Arizona Supreme

Court’s application of its narrowing construction to the facts of his case nevertheless

failed t o distinguish his case from cases in which the court did not find the aggravat ing

circumstance.” 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). This contention is essentially “a claim that the

state court simply misapplied its own aggravating circumstances to the facts of his case.”

Id. As this Court previously explained, because habeas relief does not lie for errors of state

law, review of the state court’s application of the (F)(6) aggravating factor “is limited, at

most, to determining whet her t he state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to

constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. Therefore,

in order to grant relief on Claim 5, the Court must conclude that “ no reasonable sentencer,”

id. at 783, could have found that the murder of Christopher Milke was “especially heinous

or depraved.” 

The victim, a four-year-old child in Petitioner’s care, was driven to a desert wash and

shot three times in the head. Petitioner was convicted of the murder. T he t rial court found

that the murder was especially heinous or depraved, and the Arizona Supreme Court

agreed. Styers, 177 Ariz. at 115-16, 865 P.2d at 776-77. T he finding was based upon the

senselessness of the crime and the helplessness of the victim. Id. 

Under Arizona law, “[o]rdinarily,” State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 18, 951 P.2d 869, 883

(1997) (emphasis added), or “usually,” State v. Prince, 206 Ariz. 24, 27 P.3d 114, 117 (2003)

(emphasis added), a finding of senselessness or helplessness, standing alone, is

insufficient to satisfy the especially heinous or depraved factor. The Arizona Supreme

Court, “however, has upheld depravity findings, predicat ed only on senselessness and

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helplessness, when a defendant murders a child with whom he maintains a parent or

caretaker relationship.” Prince, 206 Ariz. at 27, 75 P.3d at 117-18 (citing State v. Milke, 177

Ariz. 118, 126, 865 P.2d 779, 787 (1993); Styers, 177 Ariz. at 116, 865 P.2d at 777; and State

v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131, 144, 847 P.2d 1078, 1091 (1992)). The execution-style shoot ing of

a four-year-old boy by the child’s caretaker, with the child being lured to his death by the

promise of a visit to Santa Clause, and with the killing being t he culmination of a

conspiracy involving the child’s mother, is not, with respect to the murderer’s state of

mind, an ordinary or usual murder. As the Arizona Supreme Court noted, “[t]he

circumstances of this crime are indeed shocking, and they separate this crime from the

‘norm’ of first degree murders.” Styers, 177 Ariz. at 116, 865 P.2d at 777.

The validit y of t he Arizona Supreme Court’s decision is not affected by the fact that

t he court based its (F)(6) finding on the senselessness and helplessness factors. The court

noted that these circumstances were exacerbated by the part icular facts of the crime,

including the relationship between Petitioner and the victim and t he calculated manner in

which that relat ionship was betrayed. Id. at 115-16, 865 P.2d at 776-77. The court’s

handling of the heinous or depraved factor was in accord with the narrowing construction

set forth in Gretzler, where the court noted that “[e]ither or both of these fact ors

[senselessness or helplessness], considered together with other circumstances present in

a particular case, may lead to the conclusion that an offense was heinous or depraved.” 135

Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11. More significantly, the application of the (F)(6) aggravating

factor to Petitioner’s crime was neither arbitrary or capricious. A rational factfinder could

have determined that Christopher’s Milke’s killer possessed “a vile state of mind at t he

t ime of t he murder” such that the crime was appropriately set apart from the norm of first -

degree murders. Id. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court again finds that Pet it ioner is not entitled to

habeas relief on Claim 5 and that Claim 5 is not suitable for the issuance of a certificate of

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appealability.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Motion to Alter or Amend

Judgment. (Dkt. 130).

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2007.

Case 2:98-cv-02244-JAT Document 131 Filed 02/05/07 Page 5 of 5