Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05395/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05395-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 1996 Decided January 10, 1997

No. 95-5395

ELAINE MITTLEMAN,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv01741)

Elaine Mittleman, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Nancy R. Page, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence and Mark E. Nagle, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Michael T. Ambrosino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: We deal here with the United States's exhaustion defenses to

several tort claims originally brought in 1986 against various government officials. The Federal

Employees Liability and Reform Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the "Westfall Act"), Pub. L. 100-

694, 102 Stat. 4563, transformed these claims into ones against the United States under the Federal

TortsClaims Act ("FTCA"). It thus subjected them to the FTCA's requirement that claims be initially

presented to the responsible agencywithin two years after the claimaccrued, and filed in court within

six months after denial by the agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); see also id. § 2675(a). Congress

recognized that plaintiffsmightsuppose their claimsto be against an individualgovernment employee

(as indeed they would still be if the employee had not been acting within the scope of his

employment), and thus might fail to timely present their claims to the agency, so it fashioned special

rulesto account for the possibility. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5). It also recognized that persons such

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as Mittleman, whose claims antedated the Westfall Act and originally did run against officials rather

than the government, might be caught short by after-the-fact application of the FTCA's requirement

of timely presentation; so it fashioned a transitional rule for that situation. See Pub. L. 100-694, §

8(d). Applying these rules to the present case, we find that the one claim whose boundaries are

readily ascertainable was not timely presented even with the benefit of the special provisions; we

affirm the district court's dismissal of that claim. The two remaining claims are not clear enough for

us to apply the pertinent rules, and accordingly we remand the case for clarification and application

of the controlling principles.

* * *

In 1986 Elaine Mittleman sued several government officials in federal district court, alleging

both statutory violations and torts in their conduct toward her between 1980 and 1983, first when

she worked at the Treasury Department as part of the team handling the Chrysler bailout, and later

when she was denied a job by the Commerce Department. Mittleman's complaint, in its several

variations, essentially maintains that in retaliation for her raising questions about Chrysler, Treasury

officials made false and damaging statements about her, and otherwise mistreated her, with the

consequence that she had to leave her job, suffered emotional distress and was later denied

employment at Commerce. See Mittleman v. United States Treasury, 773 F. Supp. 442 (D.D.C.

1991) ("Mittleman I").

Congress's enactment of the Westfall Act rendered Mittleman's suit against the officials

obsolete. The Act provided that the United States would be substituted as a party whenever a federal

employee was sued for tortious acts occurring within the scope of his employment. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(b) (making a lawsuit against the United States the exclusive remedy for such claims).

Accordingly, on certification by the Attorney General that the officials had been acting within the

scope of their employment, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), the suit became one against the United States

under the FTCA. See Mittleman I, 773 F. Supp. at 454; 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (giving district courts

exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims for money damages against the United States). Since

Mittleman had not presented the tort claims to the various pertinent agencies as required by the

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FTCA, the district court dismissed them for want of jurisdiction. See Mittleman I, 773 F. Supp. at

454.

Following the dismissal, Mittleman presented her claims to the Treasury, the Secret Service,

the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), and the Commerce Department. In 1992, after the

several agencies denied the claims, she filed a new lawsuit against the United States. She also

amended the complaint filed in the 1986 suit. The district judge dismissed both the 1992 suit (which

consisted entirely of tort claims), and the tort claims included in the 1986 suit. See Mittleman v.

United States Department of Treasury, 919 F. Supp. 461, 466 (D.D.C. 1995) ("Mittleman II").

Because of a still extant Privacy Act claim in the 1986 lawsuit, however, there is no final judgment

in that suit, and both parties agree that only the 1992 action is before us.

* * *

As we have said, the FTCA requiresthat claims be presented to the agency in question within

two years of accrual, and filed in court within six months after denial by the agency. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2401(b); see also id. § 2675(a). A claim not so presented and filed is "forever barred." Id. §

2401(b).

Because substitution of the United States as a party might occur long after this two-year

presentation period ran out, the Westfall Act contained a savings provision that creates a 60-day

grace period for presentation to the agency for claims originally filed against an individual employee

and then dismissed for want of presentation. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5) provides:

(5) Whenever an action or proceeding inwhich the United Statesissubstituted

as the party defendant under this subsection is dismissed for failure first to present a

claim pursuant to section 2675(a) of this title, such a claim shall be deemed to be

timely presented under section 2401(b) of this title if

(A) the claim would have been timely had it been filed on the date the

underlying civil action was commenced, and

(B) the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60

days after dismissal of the civil action.

28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5).

The district court considered this without regard to the Westfall Act'sspecial transitionalrule

(discussed below). It construed subsection (A)'s timely filing requirement to mean that the claim

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1The parties do not reach, and we do not discuss, the effect of § 2401(a) (setting outer limit of

six years after "the right of action first accrues" to file a lawsuit) on the Westfall Act's savings

provision. 

against the individuals must have been filed in court within the two years allowed by the FTCA for

presentation to the agency. See Mittleman II, 919 F. Supp. at 466.1 When we bring the special

transitional provision to bear on the analysis, it is apparent that the district court's reading of §

2679(d)(5)(A) was correct as a general matter, but that, for cases such as Mittleman's, where the

cause or action accrued before passage of the Westfall Act, a special provision, § 8(d) of the Westfall

Act, modifies the normal operation of § 2679(d)(5). Section 8(d) states:

With respect to any civil action or proceeding to which the amendments made by this

Act apply in which the claim accrued before the date of the enactment of this Act

[November 18, 1988], the period during which the claim shall be deemed to be timely

presented under section 2679(d)(5) ... shall be that period within which the claim

could have been timely filed under applicable State law, but in no event shall such

period exceed two years from the date of the enactment of this Act.

Westfall Act, Pub. L. 100-694, § 8(d), reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679, "Historical and Statutory

Notes" (1994).

The government reads this provision as having given individuals such as Mittleman a grace

period of up to two years after the enactment of the Westfall Act to present any outstanding claims

to the pertinent agencies. Since Mittleman did not present her claims until 1991, they argue, her suit

should be dismissed regardless of whether the 1986 filing in court wastimely as a matter oflocal law.

The difficulties with this view are twofold. First, as a pure matter of language § 8(d)'s words,

"the period during which the claim shall be deemed to be timely presented under § 2679(d)(5),"

appear to refer to the entirety of the necessary actions under § 2679(d)(5), including, first,

commencement of the underlying civil action referred to in § 2679(d)(5)(A), with presentation to

follow only in the 60-day grace period after dismissal. With that in mind, it appears that § 8(d) simply

substitutes the state statute of limitations for the two-year period prescribed by § 2401(b) as the

applicable time limit for the initial court filing required by § 2679(d)(5)(A).

Moreover, the government'sreading entailsresults assurprising asthey are draconian. First,

a plaintiff whose claim had long been pending in court before the Westfall Act could easily lose her

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2The government may be suggesting that § 8(d) allows presentation at any time up to two

years after enactment, even if the state statute of limitations has run before. While such a reading

is far less draconian, it suffers the even greater problem of totally defying § 8(d)'s language, which

(whatever event it addresses) makes the limit the shorter of the state statute or two years after

enactment. 

chance to present the claimbefore the Act's passage, asthe state statute oflimitations could well have

run in that interim (between the filing of suit and passage of the Westfall Act); yet she would have

had no reason even to consider presenting her claim to the agency.2 Similarly, where a suit against

government employees was filed well before the running of the state statute of limitations, but had

for one reason or another not been promptly dismissed after the substitution of the United States as

defendant (as where substitution was disputed), the plaintiff would have to present her claim to the

agencies before the dismissalreferred to in § 2679(d)(5)(A). Of course the need to make a protective

filing of that sort is not unthinkable, but it is hard to see why the transitional plaintiffshould be worse

off than one whose claim accrued after the Westfall Act and who would be free under § 2679(d)(5)

to hold off presentation until 60 days after dismissal.

If the language compelled such results, of course, that would be an end to the issue. But, as

we have seen, it does not. And the legislative history indicates an affirmative intention not to destroy

claims on such grounds. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-700 at 7, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988) ("Similarly,

no one who has already initiated a suit will lose their claims solely because the procedural

prerequisites associated with the FTCA are being made applicable.").

We note that under thisreading § 8(d) dovetails nicely with § 2679(d)(5). The outer limit for

filing suit for an accrued claim, two years after the enactment of the Westfall Act, matches the two

years effectively required for filing suit under § 2679(d)(5)(A). The only difference is that for the

transitionalclaim(accrued before enactment)the outer limit runsfromthe time of enactment, whereas

for a claim not accrued as of enactment it runs from the accrual of the cause of action (which would

necessarily be later).

Some of the language of § 8(d), to be sure, cuts against this reading. By stating that the

relevant period when a claim will be considered timely "presented" is "that period within which the

claim could have been timely filed" under applicable state law, the provision suggests that the

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3The 1992 lawsuit would be out of time by any standard unless it can be deemed to relate back

to the 1986 complaint. 

4Despite the above, we are baffled by the lawsuit proliferation present here. Mittleman presses

her tort claims both in an amended complaint in the 1986 lawsuit that is not before us, and in the

complaint in the 1992 suit. District courts dismissing claims in anticipation of later presentation

appear to have contemplated that the lawsuit, once renewed, would be either a new one, see, e.g.,

Jackson v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (D.Colo. 1992) (dismissing without

prejudice), or simply the old one with an amended complaint, O'Neill by O'Neill v. United States,

732 F. Supp. 1254, 1257-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing with leave to amend), but not both. 

deadline is not satisfied by the actual filing of suit, and thus, by default, can be satisfied only by

presentation. But the perversities of such an interpretation appear to us to make the alternative

readingconstruing § 8(d) as establishing a special meaning for § 2679(d)(5)(A) for suits accrued

before enactmentoverwhelmingly more sensible.

Of course none of this even has potential to do Mittleman much good unless the "claim" set

forth in the 1992 lawsuit is essentially the claim set forth in her 1991 presentations to the agencies

and in her 1986 complaintthe "underlying civil action" to which § 2679(d)(5)(A) refers.3

Mittleman's legal theories have varied rather radically, but we think these changes should not be

relevant for purposes of relation back. Where the initial suit was filed in federal court, as here,

presumably Mittleman could have responded to the dismissal, after administrative presentation and

denial of her claims, with an amended complaint in the 1986 lawsuit. Instead she filed a whole new

lawsuit. But that would invariably be true where the filing of the initial local law tort claim, the

controlling step under § 2679(d)(5)(A), had been in state court; the replacement suit in federal court

would necessarily be a new one. So we see no reason why the 1992 complaint should be judged, for

relation back purposes, by harsher standards than would have applied to an amended complaint.4

Thus the principle of Rule 15(c)(2) of the Fed. R. Civ. Proc. appears applicable.

Rule 15(c)(2) allows relation back when the claim set forth in the amended complaint "arose

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original"

complaint. Plaintiff's satisfaction of that standard is not disputed before us. Although normally, of

course, an amendment adding a new party defendant could not relate back if that prejudiced the

added party, cf. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986), there can hardly be fatal prejudice

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where the new defendant has been added simply because that very party, through the exercise of its

sovereign power, required the substitution.

Of course, in an FTCA suit the plaintiff's presentation to the agenciesmust meet the standards

implicit in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b) & 2675(a). We have understood them to require "(1) a written

statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and

(2) a sum-certain damages claim." GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The government raises no issue on this score, and we see none.

The remaining question, then, isthe extent to which Mittleman's claims, initially filed in court

June 30, 1986, met the District of Columbia statutes of limitations made applicable by § 8(d) of the

Westfall Act.

Aslabelled in her 1992 complaint, Mittleman's claims are (putting aside seemingly extraneous

references such as ones to due process) (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) false light

invasion of privacy and (3) negligence. 1992 Complaint WW 54-57. Mittleman argues that as there

is no express statute of limitations for any of the three, we should apply the District's three-year

period for any cause of action which is not "specially prescribed." See D.C. Code § 12-301(8). But

the District does not resort to this default provision every time a plaintiff uses a label that does not

precisely match a specific statute of limitations. If a stated cause of action is "intertwined" with one

for which a limitations period is prescribed, District courts apply the specifically stated period, not

the three-year catch-all. See Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 661-62 (D.C. App. 1990); see also

Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding claim for emotional

damages arising from assault governed by one-year period prescribed for assault).

Applying that standard to the claims at issue, we consider first the false light invasion of

privacy claim. Under the three-year default provision, this would just make it, assuming that

Mittleman got adequate notice only on July 6, 1983, when she received a copy of the OPM report

that is the primary ground of this claim. But in fact the claim is thoroughly "intertwined" with libel

and slander, governed by the one-year provision of D.C. Code § 12-301(4). According to the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, which the District followed in finding that such a claim existed, see

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5Thus we need not reach the issue of whether the false light claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. §

2680(h), barring FTCA claims for libel and slander. 

Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. App. 1985), the sine qua non of a false light

claim is giving "publicity" to a matter which places the plaintiff "before the public" in a false light.

See Restatement (Second) Torts § 652E. Libel and slander similarly involve publication of false

statements about another. Thus, the one-year statute of limitations should apply to both claims. See

D.C. Code § 12-301(4). See also Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1069, 1074 (D.D.C.

1995) (applying one-year defamation statute to invasion of privacy claim as "essentially a type of

defamation").

Mittleman argues that defamation and invasion of privacy protect different intereststhe

former protecting the interest in reputation, the latter the interest in the personal psycheand that

therefore we should not consider them intertwined. But in fact both claims protect both interests.

See Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 594 (plaintiff in invasion of privacy case may recover for emotional

distress and harmto reputation); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 623 ("One who is liable to another

for a libel or slander is liable also for emotional distress...."). As Mittleman was fully aware of the

gravamen of the false light claim no later than when she received the OPM report on July 6, 1983,

the claim is plainly out of time.5

The emotional distress and negligence claims are more obscure. Because the district court

believed that the claims were controlled by a two-year period derived from 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b) &

2675(a), it had no occasion to sort out the possible cores of these claims. This is no easy task, as the

complaint contains 35 pages of "factual background" before it concludes in its statement of three

claims, which themselves are rather diffusely expressed.

Consider the claimfor intentionalinfliction of emotionaldistress. In Saundersthe D.C. Court

of Appeals ruled that such a claim, if grounded in "verbal abuse," was not "dependent" on others for

which a period is specifically prescribed, so that the three-year default provision would apply.

Saunders, 580 A.2d at 662. On the other hand, emotional injury arising out of the publication of false

statements, as from false light invasion of privacy, would be governed by the one-year statute of

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limitations. See Foretich v. Glamour, 741 F. Supp. 247, 251 (D.D.C. 1990) (applying one-year

period for intentional infliction of emotional distress via libel); Thomas v. News World

Communications, 681 F. Supp. 55, 72 (D.D.C. 1988) (same); cf. Hunter, 943 F.2d at 71-72 (claim

for emotional distress due to assault governed by assault period).

Here it appears that the emotional distress claim arises simply out of the defamatory

statements. In paragraph 46 of her complaint, for example, Mittleman alleges:

Plaintiff has been shocked, depressed, disillusioned and demoralized by the

acts and omissions of employees and departments ofthe United States.... Rather than

providing plaintiff encouragement or assistance, the United States and its employees

and agencies, have created false accusations and supporting documents. Plaintiff has

been shocked to learn she was accused, among other things, of being a security risk....

Complaint ¶ 46 (July 24, 1992) (D.D.C., Civ. No. 92-1741). Nonetheless, as the complaint roams

over a vast territory, it remains possible that there are emotional distress claims that depend on

something other than the defamation and that constitute a tort in the District of Columbia that is

embraced by the FTCA. For example, in her presentation to the various administrative agencies,

Mittleman contends that mistreatment at the hands of the Secret Service, as opposed to false

statements, led to her distress. See, e.g., October 28, 1991 Presentation to Treasury Department at

4-5, Civ. A. 86-1852, Record # 126, Vol. 4 (alleging that "for a period of time, she suffered extreme

stressifshe had to go anywhere near the Treasury building .... because of the treatment of her by the

Secret Service, who stopped and detained her when she was trying to process out to receive her last

paycheck."). It appears, however, that these episodes occurred in 1981, too early for Mittleman's

claim to be on time even under the three-year catch all.

The negligence claimisthe least clearly made out, as Mittleman seemsto claimshe was owed

a duty by almost everyone in the government with whom she came into contact:

The United States was negligent in its performance of dutiestoward plaintiff.

Plaintiff relied upon the government's provision of security as carried out by the

Treasury Security Force. Plaintiff asked Lt. Anderson to help her find Roger Altman

after she had a disturbing telephone call with a Chrysler official. Plaintiff also sought

out and relied upon the government's investigation of waste, fraud and abuse as

conducted by the Inspector General, the government's conducting background

investigations, and providing a place of employment which treated its employees with

fundamental fairness and an absence of abuse of power and authority, among other

things. The government breached these duties owed to plaintiff who sought the care

or services of the government.

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Complaint ¶ 57. It is again obscure whether there is any wrong asserted here independent of the

allegedly false statements.

Thus, we remand to the district court for the plaintiff to refine her negligence and emotional

distress claims into clear enough terms so that the court can determine whether either of them is

(besides being a tort, not preempted by federal law, for which recovery is possible in the District and

under the FTCA) independent enough of the false statements to be governed by a statute of

limitations other than the one-year period for slander and libel.

We finally note that if indeed there are claimsindependent ofthe libel and slander (or of other

torts governed by a specific period of less than three years), they may well have accrued too soon,

i.e., before June 30, 1983, three years before the filing of the initial complaint. Mittleman's direct

misfortunes at the Treasury all seem to have occurred in late 1980 or very early in 1981, the point

at which she was dismissed. And the critical sequel, her rejection for a job at the Commerce

Department, occurred at some time before May 17, 1983. See Mittleman I, 773 F. Supp. at 447.

Thus, even accepting the proposition that Mittleman was unaware of the allegedly defamatory

character of government employees' statements until July 6, 1983, it is exceedingly unclear whether

she is alleging any tortious non-defamatory activities of which she might have been unaware as late

asJune 1983. In the absence of such activities, of course, her claims would not be timely even under

the catch-all provision.

The judgment of the court is affirmed as to Mittleman's second claim, relating to false light

invasion of privacy, and otherwise the case is remanded to the district court for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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