Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00774/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-00774-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s case file.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Erin McKinney, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

Petitioner James Erin McKinney (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner under sentence of

death. Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and to

Enlarge Records. (Dkt . 62.)1 Respondents filed a response, and Petitioner filed a reply.

(Dkts. 63, 64.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 12, 1992, following a dual-jury trial with co-defendant Michael

Hedlund, Petitioner’s jury convicted him on two counts of first degree murder and

Hedlund’s jury returned a guilty verdict on one count of second degree murder and one

count of first degree murder. Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Steven D. Sheldon

sentenced Petitioner to deat h for both of the murders and sentenced Hedlund to death for

the first degree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and

sentences in a consolidated opinion. State v. McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 917 P.2d 1214

(1996). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), an amended PCR

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2

 “ROA-PCR” refers to the two-volume record on appeal from post-conviction

p roceedings prepared for Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court

(Case No. CR-02-0038-PC); “ME-PCR” refers to one volume of minute entries prepared for

that petition; and “PR Doc.” refers to documents listed on the Arizona Supreme Court’s

docket for that petit ion. Certified copies of the trial and post-conviction records were

provided to this Court by the Arizona Supreme Court on January 27, 2005. (Dkt. 58.)

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petition and a second amended petition with the trial court. (ROA-PCR 13, 19, 42.)2

 The

PCR petition was denied without an evidentiary hearing. (ME-PCR 53.) The Arizona

Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review on September 27, 2002.

(PR Doc. 14.)

MOTION DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s motion requests an evidentiary hearing on his argument that the

statutory presumption of correctness set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) is unconstitutional,

joinder in M ichael Hedlund’s motion for evidentiary hearing, and an evidentiary hearing

on Claims 10 to 16.

I. HEARING REGARDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254(E)(1).

Section 2254(e)(1) provides: 

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by

a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a St at e court, a

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be p resumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting t he presumption

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner contends this statutory presumption infringes on his

fundamental right to habeas corp us and is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and

irrational.

In support of t his argument, Petitioner provides statistical information indicating

there is a high reversal rate for Arizona death sentences. Petitioner contends that federal

courts should not defer to state court fact finding in light of the significant number of

death sentences that are overt urned in state and federal court. Petitioner fails, however,

to connect the high reversal rate with his argument that the statute is unconstitutional.

Because death sentences overt urned in state court are not reviewed in a federal habeas

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proceeding, the st at utory deference is never applied in such cases. Further, the study

upon which Petitioner relies includes cases from 1973 to 1995 (dkt. 62 at 10), during which

time there was a predecessor federal statutory provision requiring deference to state court

findings. See LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 692 (1973) (per curiam) (deferring t o

state court factual findings and requiring that they be overcome by convincing evidence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). If, as Pet itioner contends, many death sentences were

reversed in federal court during that time period, the presumption apparently did not

impede the availability of habeas corpus. 

More significantly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate t hat the statutory presumption

of correctness is arbitrary or irrational. The Sup reme Court has noted that deference is

appropriate in the context of a federal court’s collateral review of a state court judgment

because of t he resp ect due to state courts in our federal system and the fact that state

courts generally are in a bet t er p osition to judge evidence presented in state court. See

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (discussing deference in the context of

findings regarding discriminatory intent underlying a Batson claim). Petitioner’s statutory

challenge fails, and his request for a hearing on the issue will be denied.

II. JOINDER IN MICHAEL HEDLUND’S MOTION.

In his May 6, 2005 motion, Petitioner states that he is joining Michael Hedlund’s

request for a hearing, which the Court denied in its entirety in March 2005 (see Hedlund

v. Schriro, CV 02-110-PHX-DGC, dkt. 119). Pet it ioner argues it is appropriate to join

motions of co-defendants. He also argues that issues of shackling and severance are

common to both him and Hedlund. 

Petitioner and Hedlund are not co-defendants before this Court. Because they are

separate pet it ioners with separate cases, it is not proper for Petitioner to join Hedlund’s

motion. Moreover, Hedlund’s motion was denied before Petitioner’s request to join,

Hedlund did not request evidentiary development on the issue of severance, and whether

Pet itioner’s claims were exhausted or diligently developed in state court, and whether the

state court’s decisions regarding those issues violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights,

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are individual quest ions specific to Petitioner. Petitioner’s request to join Michael

Hedlund’s motion for evidentiary development will be denied.

III. HEARING ON CLAIMS 10 TO 16.

In the Court’s Order of Appointment and General Procedures, counsel was informed

that evidentiary motions are required to:

(1) specifically identify which enumerated claim(s) Petitioner contends

needs further factual development;

(2) describe with specificity the facts sought to be developed;

(3) explain why the facts sought to be developed were not developed in

state court; and

(4) explain why the failure to develop such facts in state court was not

the result of lack of diligence, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s

decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).

In addition, any motion for evidentiary hearing shall address

(1) whet her the factual allegations would, if proved, entitle Petitioner to relief

on a specific habeas claim; and (2) whether the st ate court trier of fact has

reliably found the relevant facts after a full and fair hearing. See Jones v.

Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 1997). Any mot ion for evidentiary

development that is filed prior to the filing of Respondents’ Answer or that

fails to address the above-listed requirements will be summarily denied. 

(Dkt. 7 at 4.)

Petitioner’s motion fails to satisfy the above-stated requirements. Petitioner

requests an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claims –

Claims 10 to 16. Petitioner argues generally that a hearing is necessary because trial and

appellate counsel never asked Petitioner what occurred during the crimes, but he does not

connect t hat factual issue to any specific claim. Neither the motion nor the reply identifies

a single fact to be developed, or discusses why any such fact s were not developed in state

court, whether Petitioner was diligent in attempting to develop these facts in st ate court,

how the fact s t o be developed would demonstrate that Petitioner is entitled to relief as to

the specific claims at issue, or whether the state court found the relevant facts after a full

hearing. Given this lack of explanation, the Court is unable to determine whether an

evidentiary hearing should be held and the mot ion will be denied without prejudice to

refiling. Similarly, although the caption of Petitioner’s motion indicates he is seeking to

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3

 Resolving whether a petitioner has fairly presented his claim to the state court,

t hus permitting federal review, is an intrinsically federal issue which must be determined

by the federal court. Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8t h Cir. 1995); Harris v.

Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1556 (10th Cir. 1994).

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expand the state court record, neither the body of the motion nor the reply requests

expansion as to any claims or documents. T herefore, that request also will be denied

without prejudice to refiling. In preparation for a possible second motion for evidentiary

development of Claims 10-16, the Court at this time will assess the procedural status of

these claims to eliminat e a renewed request as to claims that are procedurally barred or

meritless on their face.

A. Principles of Exhaustion and Procedural Default.

Because this case was filed after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“AEDPA”). Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003). T he AEDPA

requires that a writ of habeas corpus not be granted unless it appears that the petitioner

has properly exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). To

properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly present ” his claims to the

state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 848 (1999).

A claim is “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described t he op erat ive facts and

the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that t he st at e courts have a fair

opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his

const it ut ional claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 277-78 (1971).3 If a petitioner’s habeas claim includes new factual allegations not

presented to the state court, the claim may be considered unexhausted if the new facts

“fundamentally alter” the legal claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v.

Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986).

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A habeas petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in either of two

ways. First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised

in state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court

if the petitioner failed to present the claim in any forum and “the court to which the

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1. This is often

referred to as “technical” exhaustion – although the claim was not actually exhausted in

state court, the petitioner no longer has an available state remedy. See Gray v. Netherland,

518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996) (“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in

state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; t here are no state remedies any

longer ‘available’ to him.”). 

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs when petitioners may

seek relief in post-conviction proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to

their convictions or sentences in state court. Rule 32.2 provides, in part:

a. Preclusion. A defendant shall be precluded from relief under t his

rule based upon any ground: . . . .

(2) Finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any p revious

collateral proceeding;

(3) That has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous

collateral proceeding.

b. Exceptions. Rule 32.2(a) shall not apply to claims for relief based

on Rules 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and (h). When a claim under [these subsections] is raised in a successive or untimely petition, the petition must set

forth the reasons for not raising the claim in the previous p etition or in a

timely manner. If meritorious reasons do not appear subst ant iating the claim

and indicat ing why the claim was not stated in the previous petition or in a

timely manner, the petition shall be summarily dismissed. 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (2002)(emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to Rule 32.2, petitioners may

not be granted relief on any claim which could have been raised in a prior Rule 32 petition

for post-conviction relief. Only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d)

through (h) of Rule 32.1) and the p et it ioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a

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prior petition will the preclusive effect of Rule 32.2 be avoided.

Therefore, in the present case, if there are claims which have not been raised

previously in state court, the Court must determine whether Petitioner has state remedies

currently available to him under Rule 32. If no remedies are currently available, petitioner’s

claims are “technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732,

735 n.1. In addition, if t here are claims that were fairly presented in state court but found

default ed on state procedural grounds, such claims also will be found procedurally

default ed in federal court so long as the state procedural bar was independent of federal

law and adequat e t o warrant preclusion of federal review. Harris, 489 U.S. at 262. A state

procedural default is not independent if, for example, it depends up on an antecedent

federal constitutional ruling. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per curiam). A state

bar is not adequate unless it was firmly established and regularly applied at the time of

application by the state court. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).

Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction,

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims.

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). As a general matter, the Court will not review the merits

of procedurally defaulted claims unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the

failure to properly exhaust in state court and prejudice from the alleged constitutional

violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the claim were

not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1.

Ordinarily “ cause” to excuse a default exists if a petitioner can demonstrate that

“ some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply wit h

the State’s procedural rule.” Id.. at 753. Objective factors which const itute cause include

interference by officials which makes compliance with the state’s procedural rule

impracticable, a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably

available to counsel, and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged

constit utional error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish

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prejudice resulting from a procedural default, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of

showing not merely that t he errors at his trial constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that

they worked to his actual and substantial disadvant age, infecting his entire trial with errors

of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

B. Claim 10.

Petitioner alleges he had IAC at trial based on counsel’s failure to: (a) effectively

question nine of the witnesses; (b) call expert witnesses; (c) object to t ranscripts of

Petitioner’s purported confession to his father; and (d) consider abuse, the investigat ion

of mitigat ion, t he presentation of mitigation, and the submission of experts and dual juries.

Respondents concede that Claims 10(a) and (c) are exhausted and prop erly before this

Court for review, but contend that (b) and (d) are defaulted. Further, Respondents argue

that Claim 10 fails to state a claim. 

Regardless of exhaust ion, the Court will dismiss the entirety of the claim as

meritless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing denial of unexhausted claims on the merits);

Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005) (holding t hat a stay is inappropriate in federal

court to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under (b)(2)

as “plainly meritless”). T o p revail on a claim of IAC, Petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). In Claim 10(a), Petitioner alleges counsel was

ineffective in quest ioning specific witnesses, but does not allege any facts regarding how

the questioning was defect ive. Similarly, Petitioner alleges in Claim 10(b) that his counsel

failed to call expert witnesses, but does not identify any type of expert that should have

been called. The entirety of the allegations comprising Claim 10(c) are that counsel “failed

to object to transcripts of purported confession to his father.” (Dkt. 42 at 64.) As to Claim

10(d), Petitioner generically alleges that counsel “did not adequately consider” the listed

items. Moreover, Pet it ioner does not identify any prejudice arising from the alleged

deficiencies. The minimal conclusory allegations set forth in Claim 10 are insufficient for

habeas relief. See Rule 2, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring

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4

 Claim 10(d), to the extent it alleges ineffectiveness relating to mitigation, is

repetitive of some of the allegations raised in Claim 11. The dismissal of Claim 10(d) does

not affect the Court’s assessment of the more specific allegations in Claim 11. See infra

Claim 11.

5

 With respect to Claims 11 and 12, Petitioner also alleges that his due process

rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated. It is the Fourteenth Amendment , not the

Fifth Amendment , t hat protects a person against deprivations of due process by a state.

See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons

of due process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without

due process by the several St ates.”). Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause

does not provide a cognizable ground for relief regarding Petitioner’s st at e court

conviction, that port ion of Claims 11 and 12 will be summarily dismissed. The Court will

address Petitioner’s claims under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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petition to state the facts in support of each claim); Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th

Cir. 1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding insufficient conclusory

allegations that did not identify what counsel would have done if performing effectively);

Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the pet it ioner’s failure to

assert any result ing p rejudice rendered IAC claims too conclusory for relief). Therefore,

the Court will dismiss Claim 10 on the merits.4

C. Claim 11.

Petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and

present mitigation evidence in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments.5 Specifically, Petitioner asserts that counsel did not request a mitigation

specialist, provide sufficient information to the court in the mitigation phase, and

adequately investigate, prepare and present available mental health mitigation. Petitioner

alleges that the outcome of his sentencing would have been different if counsel had

performed adequately.

In the second amended PCR p et ition, Petitioner alleged that counsel failed generally

t o adequately investigate and present mitigation, and failed specifically to investigate and

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substant iat e t he post-traumatic stress, child abuse and brain injury he suffered, and their

relationship to violent adult behavior. (ROA-PCR 42 at 4, 13, 22-30.) The PCR court ruled

on the merits of that claim. (ME-PCR 53 at 12-13.) In t he petition for review, Petitioner

alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that the abuse

Petitioner suffered as a child impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the law, for

failing generally to adequately investigat e and present all mitigation, and for filing an

unintelligible mitigation memorandum that did not sufficient ly sup p ort a sentence less than

death. (PR Doc. 1 at 3-4, 12.) The Court finds that Petitioner fairly present ed Claim 11 in

his PCR proceedings and it is properly before this Court for review on the merits.

D. Claim 12.

Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial to the state

orally submitting five wit nesses as experts, the court’s allowance of which improperly

bestowed credibility upon the witnesses. Petitioner alleges counsel’s performance was

deficient and he was prejudiced by the bolstering of the witnesses, without which he

would not have been convicted. Petitioner does not allege that there was not a proper

foundation for the witnesses’ test imony or that any of the actual testimony should not

have been admitted; rather, he challenges only the procedure of bestowing “expert status”

on the witnesses in front of the jury. Respondents concede t his claim is exhausted as to

the Sixth Amendment allegation, but contest the Fourteenth Amendment part of the claim.

Regardless of exhaustion, the Court will dismiss the entirety of the claim as meritless. See

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing denial of unexhausted claims on the merits); Rhines, 125

S. Ct. at 1535 (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court to allow claims to be

raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under (b)(2) as “plainly meritless”).

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(1) because t he PCR

court’s ruling was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. To assess a habeas claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first

identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs the sufficiency of t he

claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law includes the holdings of the

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Supreme Court at the t ime the petitioner’s state court conviction became final. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law if it fails to apply the correct controlling Supreme Court authority

or if it applied the correct authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable

from those in a cont rolling Supreme Court case, but nonetheless reached a different result.

Id. at 413; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952,

955 (9th Cir. 2004).

A state court decision amount s t o an “unreasonable application” under § 2254(d)(1)

if the state court correctly identifies the governing “clearly established” legal principle from

the Supreme Court’s decisions, but then makes an objectively unreasonable application

of that principle to the facts of the petitioner’s case. See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. An

“objectively unreasonable” application of federal law involves more than an incorrect or

even clearly erroneous app licat ion of federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11 (“[A]

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.”). The AEDPA mandates deferential review of a state court’s application

of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002) (citing Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7). 

The PCR court ident ified and applied the clearly established Supreme Court law

governing IAC claims, as set fort h in Strickland. (See ME-PCR 53 at 3, 11 (citing State v.

Ysea, 191 Ariz. 372, 377, 956 P.2d 499, 504 (1998) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687),

sup erseded on other grounds by A.R.S. § 13-703(H)(1); Strickland, 446 U.S. at 686, 689)).

The PCR court det ermined that Petitioner had not set forth any alleged acts by counsel that

reflected deficient performance and denied the claim as not meritorious. (Id. at 12.) The

relevant inquiry is whether this determination was an unreasonable application of

Strickland.

To establish prejudice under Strickland, a petitioner must show that there is a

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“reasonable p robability” that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner makes only a conclusory allegation that the

outcome would have been different if counsel had objected to the procedure employed by

the prosecut or and allowed by the court. If counsel had objected to the procedure,

however, the five witnesses at issue, although perhaps not designated as experts, would

still have t est ified in full before the jury. It is possible that the jury gave more weight to the

testimony of these witnesses because they were designated as exp ert s, but that possibility

is not sufficient to establish a “reasonable probability” that, without such a designat ion,

Petitioner would not have been convicted. The Court cannot conclude that the PCR

court’s decision constituted an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the

facts of this case. Because no evidentiary development would alter the Court ’s analysis

of this claim, Claim 12 will be denied on the merits.

E. Claims 13-16.

Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the

following claims: erroneous use of dual juries at trial (Claim 13); erroneous reversal of

severance (Claim 14); ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing t o voir dire the jury

regarding their views on the deat h p enalt y (Claim 15); and ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for failing to properly present mitigating evidence (Claim 16).

Pet it ioner asserts that he raised all of these claims in his PCR petition. In the second

amended PCR p et it ion, Petitioner argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for raising

only five issues and failing to raise ot her meritorious arguments. (ROA-PCR 42 at 30-33.)

Petitioner stated generally that some of the meritorious issues to which he referred were

raised by his co-defendant and other issues were not raised by either of them (id. at 31),

but he did not actually identify any issue appellate counsel failed to raise (id. at 30-33).

The PCR court ruled that Petitioner had not “ p resented a single issue that could have been

raised on appeal that would have changed the out come.” (M E-PCR 53 at 13.) In his

petition for review, Petitioner argued only that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

t o raise “several meritorious issues;” no specific issues were identified. (PR Doc. 1 at 17-

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19.)

Petitioner must have fairly presented in state court the factual basis of the acts

alleged to constitute ineffective assistance. “A thorough description of the operative facts

before the highest state court is a necessary prerequisite to satisfaction of t he st andard of

O’Sullivan and Harless t hat ‘a federal habeas petitioner [must] provide the state courts

with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply cont rolling legal precedent to the facts bearing upon his

constitutional claim.’” Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harless,

459 U.S. at 6). Petitioner’s generic allegation of IAC in his petition for review was not

sufficient to fairly p resent to the state court the claims now raised in this Court – that

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert specific claims. See Carriger v. Lewis,

971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992) (treating distinct failures by counsel as separate claims

for exhaust ion and procedural default); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 319-20 & n.1 (9th

Cir. 1982) (finding no fair presentation of eight grounds of IAC not raised in state court);

Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1994) (raising specific claims of IAC in state court

does not exhaust all such claims for federal habeas review); cf. St rickland, 466 U.S. at 690

(requiring identification of the specific “acts or omissions” of counsel and a determinat ion

of whether those acts are outside the range of competent assistance).

Petitioner is now precluded by Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) and

32.4 from obtaining relief on Claims 13 to 16 in state court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b);

32.1(d)-(h); note 6. Thus, Claims 13 to 16 are technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Pet it ioner does not allege a miscarriage of justice. To show cause, Petitioner argues

that Arizona’s PCR process is inadequate because his PCR counsel was ineffective.

Ineffective assistance of counsel can const itute sufficient cause, however, only when it

rises to the level of an indep endent constitutional violation, and there can be no

constitutional violation when a petitioner has no constitutional right to counsel. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 752, 755. There is no constitutional right to counsel in stat e PCR proceedings.

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-12

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(1989) (the Const itution does not require states to provide counsel in PCR proceedings

even when the putative petitioners are facing the death penalty); Bonin v. Vasquez, 999

F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend the right of effective assistance of

counsel to state collateral proceedings); Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1513-14 (9th Cir.

1990). 

Petitioner also raises several specific claims relating to PCR counsel. First, Petitioner

argues he was entitled to the effective assistance of PCR counsel because it was his first

and only opportunity to assert ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims.

In Evitt s v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985), the Court held that a petitioner is entitled to

effective assistance of counsel on his first ap peal as of right. Since Evitts was decided,

however, the courts have clarified that the holding in Evitts applies strictly to a first appeal

as of right , even if particular claims could not have been raised in that appeal, because

there is no constitut ional right to counsel in state PCR proceedings. See Finley, 481 U.S.

at 558; Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir. 1996); Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d

1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996) (IAC claim defaulted for not being raised in first habeas petition,

even though the same counsel represented petitioner in both proceedings, because no

right to counsel in habeas p roceedings); Jeffers v. Lewis, 68 F.3d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1995)

(en banc) (plurality) (ruling an Arizona petitioner had “no Sixth Amendment right to

counsel during his state habeas proceedings even if that was the first forum in which he

could challenge constitutional effectiveness on the part of trial counsel”); see also Evitts,

469 U.S. at 396 n.7 (not ing t hat discretionary appeals are treated differently because there

is no right to counsel). Petitioner’s argument fails because there is no constitutional right

to counsel for PCR proceedings even if it is the petitioner’s first opportunity to raise an

IAC claim.

Second, Petitioner contends Arizona’s court rules render the PCR proceeding part

of a mandatory appellate process for capital cases with a st at ut ory right to counsel, thus,

due p rocess requires such counsel to be effective. The Court disagrees. Petitioner cites

no case, and the Court has found none, which holds that a state is required by the federal

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constitut ion t o p rovide a right to counsel in PCR proceedings. The fact that a state may,

“as a matter of legislative choice,” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618, (1974), provide for

counsel in discretionary appeals following a first ap p eal of right does not extend the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee of effective counsel to discretionary appeals. See Evitts, 469 U.S.

at 394, 397 n.7; Finley, 481 U.S. at 559 (where a state provides a lawyer in a state

post-conviction proceeding, it is not “the Federal Constitution [that] dictates the exact

form such assistance must assume,” rather, it is in a state’s discretion to determine what

p rotections to provide). Further, the Ninth Circuit has held explicitly that “ineffect ive

assistance of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings does not present an independent

violation of the Sixth Amendment enforceable against the st at es through the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1160. Because Petitioner’s PCR

proceeding took place after his appeal of right, it was a discretionary proceeding not

conferring a constitutional right to effect ive assistance of counsel. Thus, even if PCR

counsel’s performance did not conform to minimum st andards, it did not violate the federal

constitution and cannot excuse the procedural default of any claims.

As a final matter, before ineffectiveness may be used to establish cause for a

procedural default, it must have been presented to the state court as an independent claim.

Murray, 477 U.S. at 489. Petitioner did not present in state court any independent

ineffectiveness claims regarding PCR counsel. Therefore, even if cognizable, his allegation

of PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness cannot constitute cause. 

Because Petitioner has not established cause to overcome the defaults, the Court

need not analyze prejudice. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991).

Claims 13 to 16 will be dismissed as procedurally barred.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s request for a hearing on a challenge to the statutory presumption of

correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) is denied. Petitioner’s request t o join Michael

Hedlund’s motion for evidentiary development is denied. Petitioner’s motion for a hearing

and to expand the state court record is denied without prejudice to refiling on any claims

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remaining before this Court. Claims 13-16 are dismissed as procedurally barred. Claims 10

and 12 are dismissed on the merits. If Pet it ioner files a new motion for evidentiary

development, it must comply with the Court’s Order of General Procedures detailing the

requirements for motions for evidentiary development (dkt. 7). In particular, it must discuss

each claim individually, t he facts sought to be developed as to the specific claim, and

whether Petitioner was diligent in attempting to develop the claim in state court. If a

subsequent motion does not comply, it will be summarily dismissed.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following Claims are dismissed with prejudice:

(a) Claims 13-16 based on a procedural bar; (b) the Fift h Amendment aspect of Claims 11

and 12 as not cognizable; and (c) Claims 10 and 12 on the merits as a matter of law.

IT IS FURTHER O RDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and

Motion to Enlarge Records (dkt. 62) is denied without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Petitioner files a renewed motion for evidentiary

development he shall do so within forty-five (45) days of the filing date of this order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if, pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(g), Petitioner or

Respondents file a Motion for Reconsideration of t his Order, such motion shall be filed

within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this Order to

the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington, Phoenix, AZ 85007-3329.

DATED this 3rd day of January, 2006.

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