Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02116/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02116-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BERIHU HADERA FKADU,

Booking #1551332,

Civil No. 07-2116 JM (CAB)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g) AND DISMISSING CIVIL

ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE

FOR FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL

FILING FEES MANDATED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

[Doc. No. 2] 

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, currently committed at Patton State Hospital (“PSH”) in Patton,

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Although difficult to decipher, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that San Diego

County Sheriff Deputies “over medicated” him while he was incarcerated at George

Bailey Detention Facility in 1995. (Compl. at 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks several million dollars

in compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) 

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access

to the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or

operate as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-82 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1123 (noting constitutionality of § 1915(g), but recognizing that “serious

constitutional concerns would arise if § 1915(g) were applied to preclude those prisoners who had filed

actions who were not ‘frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim’ from proceeding IFP.”). 

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 Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to

commence a civil action; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to

pursue civil litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(2). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section

1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to §

1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id. The objective of

the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation

in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner,

which were dismissed ‘on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to

state a claim.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. Thus, once a prisoner has accumulated

three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other action IFP in

federal court unless he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).1

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While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar

his request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district

court docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one

of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When

applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of

the order dismissing an action, and other relevant information,” before determining that

the action “was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,”

since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121. The

Seventh Circuit likewise requires the district court to cite the specific case names,

numbers, districts and dates of dismissal for each civil action it has determined to be a

“strike” or “prior occasion.” Id. at 1120 (citing Evans v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections,

150 F.3d 810, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1998)).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).’” Id. at 1121 (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of

§ 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398

F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both

factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it

lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied

to a complaint, embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful

factual allegation.”). “A 

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews,

398 F.3d at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

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II. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

The Court notes as an initial matter that Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that

he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Rodriguez,

169 F.3d at 1178; see also Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding

that “allegations that the prisoner faced imminent danger in the past” are insufficient to

trigger section 1915(g)’s imminent and serious physical injury exception). Thus,

regardless of Plaintiff’s financial status, he may not proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 if he has, on three prior occasions while incarcerated, had federal civil actions or

appeals dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failing to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g); Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119-20; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1178. 

A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”

United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244,

248 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has had three prior

prisoner civil actions dismissed in both the Southern and Central Districts of California

on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. See Dekadu v.

State of California, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 04-2065 WQH (POR) (Jan. 4, 2005 Order

Denying IFP and Dismissing Complaint sua sponte as frivolous per 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1) [Doc. No. 3]) (strike one); Fekadu v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, S.D. Cal.

Civil Case No. 04-2173 JM (NLS) (Jan. 3, 2005 Order Denying IFP and Dismissing

Complaint sua sponte as frivolous per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) [Doc. No. 6]) (strike

two); and Fkadu v. Luna, C.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 06-0323 AMS (SH) (Feb. 13, 2006

Order Denying IFP and Dismissing Complaint as legally and/or factually patently

frivolous [Doc. No. 2]) (strike three).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated three “strikes”

pursuant to § 1915(g), and does not presently allege facts sufficient to show that he is

under imminent danger of serious physical injury, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion

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to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121; Rodriguez, 167 F.3d at

1178.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to

Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 2] and DISMISSES the case

without prejudice for failure to pay the full $250 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. §

1914(a).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 15, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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