Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05378/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05378-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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UNITED 

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For the Northern District of California

NITED 

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For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CNET NETWORKS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

 ETILIZE, INC.,

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-05378 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Claim Construction Memorandum and

Order for United States Patent Nos.

6,714,933 and 7,082,426.

Plaintiff CNET Networks, Inc. (“CNET”) brings this action against defendant Etilize, Inc.

(“Etilize”) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,714,933 (“the ‘933 patent”) and 7,082,426

(“the ‘426 patent”). The ‘426 patent is a continuation-in-part of the ‘933 patent, which claims a

method and system for aggregating content for an online purchasing system. Now before the court

are the parties’ claim construction briefs, filed pursuant to Patent Local Rule 4–5. Having

considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court

construes the disputed terms as follows.

BACKGROUND

This dispute concerns patented methods and systems for aggregating content for online

purchasing and cataloging systems. Plaintiff CNET is a digital media company which provides

customers with, among other things, standardized, easily searchable product information and a

single shopping portal for purchasing products from a variety of vendors. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief

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(“POB”) at 4. CNET currently owns two patents in this area. The ‘933 patent is entitled “Content

Aggregation Method and Apparatus for On-line Purchasing System.” The ‘426 patent is entitled

“Content Aggregation Method and Apparatus for an On-line Product Catalog.” These two patents

integrate a plurality of products from online merchants into a single online interface in order to

facilitate comparison shopping amongst merchants. Additionally, the patented inventions disclose a

method for gathering the product information from a networked computer environment into a

database system. 

Defendant Etilize is a Delaware corporation that markets and sells electronic product

catalogs stored on a server. The catalogs contain product information—such as price, general

descriptions, detailed specifications, unique product IDs, and images—collected from the public

websites of many different manufacturers and suppliers. Etilize markets and sells these product

catalogs to distributors and retailers who, in turn, offer various products, such as digital cameras and

computers, for sale to end-users. Rather than create a catalog of available products on their own,

customers pay Etilize for a subscription service called SpeX, which gives them the right to access

and use the Etilize catalogs. 

All of the product information contained in the Etilize catalog is collected by

Etilize-Pakistan, a separate Pakistani corporation located in Karachi, Pakistan. Etilize-Pakistan

employs human operators in Pakistan who visit vendor websites, one at a time, to collect the

relevant product information and enter it into a template which is then entered into the catalog. In

some circumstances, Etilize-Pakistan's employees create and execute computer programs in Pakistan

to obtain and extract information from a website.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996), the court

construes the scope and meaning of disputed patent claims as a matter of law. Claims are construed

from the standpoint of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive

Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit has stated that in any

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claim construction analysis, courts should first look to the intrinsic evidence. Vitronics Corp. v.

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Intrinsic evidence includes the patent

claims, the specification, and the prosecution history, which includes the prior art cited therein, in

order to determine the meaning of the patent claims. Id. at 1582–84; see also Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). If analysis of the intrinsic evidence resolves

any ambiguity in disputed claim terms, then “it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.” 

Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (citing Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216

(Fed. Cir. 1995)). Extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises, may be

used only if ambiguities remain after analyzing all the intrinsic evidence. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at

1584. 

The first step of the claim construction analysis requires the court to look to the intrinsic

evidence, beginning with the words of the claims themselves. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosca N. Am.,

299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“the claims themselves

provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms”). According to the Federal

Circuit, the court must “indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and

customary meaning.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

(internal quotations omitted). This is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary

skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The claims of a

patent “must [also] be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. at 1315. The

specification may help resolve ambiguity where the words in the claims lack clarity. Teleflex,

299 F.3d at 1325. Yet, the written description “should never trump the clear meaning of the claim

terms.” Comark Commc'n, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations

omitted); see also Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 966

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[a]lthough claims must be read in light of the specification of which they are part,

. . . it is improper to read limitations from the written description into a claim”). By expressly

defining terms in the specification, an inventor may “choose[] to be his or her own lexicographer.” 

Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Finally, a

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court may examine the prosecution history to determine whether the patentee intended to deviate

from a term's ordinary and customary meaning. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326. The prosecution history

may “limit[] the interpretation of claims so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been

disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance.” Id. (quoting

Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

If, after examining all the intrinsic evidence, ambiguities in the claim terms remain, a court

may look to extrinsic evidence. Dictionary definitions and other objective reference materials

available at the time that the patent was issued may help illuminate the meaning of a claim. Phillips,

415 F.3d at 1322; Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

A dictionary “has the value of being an unbiased source, accessible to the public in advance of

litigation.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322 (internal quotation omitted). A court should be cautious,

however, not to rely too heavily on dictionaries, as the resulting construction may be too broad. 

Id. at 1321. Although “extrinsic evidence in general, and expert testimony in particular, may be

used . . . to help the court come to a proper understanding of the claims[,] it may not be used to vary

or contradict the claim language.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 

DISCUSSION

I. Level of Ordinary Skill

Before the claims can be construed, the level of ordinary skill in the art must be determined. 

Brookhill-Wilk, 334 F.3d at 1298. Here, neither party has identified the person having ordinary skill

in the art. The Federal Circuit has remanded cases for not properly or fully evaluating and

considering the level of ordinary skill in the art during claim construction. See e.g. Bayer AG v.

Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Neomagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc.,

287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, the court must first identify the level of ordinary skill in the art. The relevant art

in these patents involves the use of computer hardware and software to aggregate content from a

networked computer environment in order to create an on-line purchasing system, catalog, and

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integrated interface. The focus is on the software programs and applications that visit sources,

gather and parse information from the sources, and generate the content for the integrated online

purchasing interface. Thus, the person having ordinary skill in the art in the instant action is defined

as: someone with at least a bachelor’s of science degree in a scientific or engineering field, such as

computer science, electrical engineering, or physics, or someone with at least four years of

experience working in the field of web or server application development. This definition is

consistent with that ascertained in patent disputes involving related art. See Allvoice Computing

PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“someone who has a degree

in computer science or something equivalent and 2–3 years experience programming in Windows”

where the art related to voice-recognition software for personal computers); see also Data Race, Inc.

v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 698, 747 n.330 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“Bachelor of Science

degree in electrical engineering, computer science or 3–5 years of recent experience in the field”

where the art related to software and hardware for enabling a remote user to maintain a “virtual

presence” at a corporate office); Katz v. AT & T Corp., 63 F. Supp. 2d 583, 594 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1999)

(“a person of ordinary skill in the art of interactive voice response systems would have had at least a

Bachelor's degree in a scientific or engineering field, such as physics, electrical engineering, or

computer science, and at least two years experience working in the field of computer telephony”).

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II. Claim Construction

The following chart summarizes the court’s construction of the disputed terms. The full

analysis supporting each construction is below.

Term Construction

“crawler” A software program or programs which visit and search sources of

content on a networked computer environment; have the capability to

identify and gather information from the sources; and can include bots,

robots, automated site searchers, and the like. 

“electronically” No construction necessary

“means for generating

a crawler from a

server interconnected

to the network

computer environment

to visit the plurality of

sources”

Subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.

FUNCTION: Generating a crawler to visit the plurality of sources.

CORRESPONDING STRUCTURE: A software product stored on

computer readable media and executable by a computer, which is a

server such as shopping server 20, and equivalents thereof.

A. “Crawler”1

Claim

Term

CNET’s Proposed Construction Etilize’s Proposed

Construction

Crawler A software program or programs that operate to access

servers on the Internet to gather uniform resource

locaters (“URLs”) or other information associated with

the URLs, such as any software that performs searches

of content over a network and can include “bots”,

“robots”, “automated site searchers”, and the like.

Software that

automatically searches

content over a network

from Web server to Web

server without human

intervention or instruction.

In the specification, the patentee attempted to define the term “crawler,” by expressly setting

forth that “[t]he term ‘crawler’ as used herein refers to any software that performs searches of

content over a network and can include bots, robots, automated site searchers, and the like.” ‘933

patent at 10:47–50; ‘426 patent at 8:58–61.2

 When a patentee sets forth an explicit definition for a

claim term, that definition will usually be dispositive. Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake

Enterprises, Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). 

However, the “specification and other claims, must be examined to determine the meaning of terms

in the claims.” Southwall Techs, 54 F.3d at 1576, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 987 (1995). 

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This explicit definition of crawler, standing alone, is not CNET’s proposed construction, as

CNET has added a prefatory clause to explain that the disclosed crawler accesses servers on the

Internet to gather URLs and information associated with the URLs. Etilize’s proposed construction

departs from the definition altogether and adds limitations referring to “automatically,” “from Web

server to Web server,” and “without human intervention or instruction.” As explained below, the

court rejects both parties’ proposed constructions. Instead, the court determines that the term

“crawler” is properly construed as “a software program or programs which visit and search sources

of content on a networked computer environment; have the capability to identify and gather

information from the sources; and can include bots, robots, automated site searchers, and the like.” 

First, it is apparent from the explicit definition, and undisputed by the parties, that a

“crawler” is software that searches content over a network and examples include bots, robots,

automated site searchers, and the like. See ‘933 patent at 10:47–50; ‘426 patent at 8:58–61. 

The specification also supports this construction. See ‘933 patent at 11:61–62, ‘426 patent at

10:17–18 (“crawlers 72 and 74 . . . are software programs”); ‘933 patent at 10:47–50; ‘426 patent at

8:58–61 (“[t]he term ‘crawler’ as used herein refers to any software that performs searches of

content over a network and can include bots, robots, automated site searchers, and the like”); ‘933

patent at 10:58–62, 11:18–20 (“shopping server 20 may be used to aggregate product information

from a plurality of sources connected to Internet 100 . . . [and] is operative to provide at least one

crawler for visiting the plurality of sources”); ‘933 patent at 17:6–67, 18:1–9; ‘426 patent at 34:3–17

(“[the] present invention can be implemented over any type of communications channel, such as the

Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), direct computer connections, or

the like, using any type of communications hardware and protocols”). 

Second, although not apparent from the explicit definition, the specification reveals that a

crawler not only searches content, but also visits a plurality of sources in order to search content

from the sources and has the capability to identify and gather information from those sources. See

‘933 patent at 4:28–38 (causing a crawler “to visit the plurality of sources and gathering product

phrase information from each of the plurality of sources via the crawler”); ‘933 patent at 11:38–44,

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‘426 patent at 9:60–66 (“[i]n the preferred embodiment, . . . crawler 72 and/or . . . crawler 74 may

gather information . . . from each of the plurality of sources”); ‘426 patent at 11:11–15, ‘933 patent

at 12:55–59 (“product literature crawler 72 may crawl through the plurality of linked Web pages . . .

and in the present example, will further likely identify presence of the phrase ‘computer’”); ‘933

patent at 18:48–65, claim 1 (“generating a crawler . . . to visit the plurality of sources; gathering

product phrase information . . . ; and determining whether [the information is relevant]”); ‘426

patent at 14:7–11 (“like . . . crawler 72, . . . crawler 74 gathers product phrase information from

merchant’s Web page 42”).

A person having ordinary skill in the art would also understand that the ability to identify and

gather relevant information that is not already located on a database is what distinguishes a crawler

from other software which merely searches content on networks. The parties’ proposed

constructions also support the court’s determination that crawlers “gather” information. 

CNET’s proposed construction includes a limitation that the crawlers “access servers on the Internet

to gather” URLs, acknowledging the gathering function. At the Markman hearing, Etilize similarly

suggested that its proposed construction might benefit from a substitution of the term “gather” for

“search,” changing Etilize’s proposed construction to “software that automatically gathers content

over a network from Web server to Web server without human intervention or instruction.” 

Third, it is apparent from both the explicit definition and the specification that crawlers

search not only the Internet but also other types of computer networks. The definition uses the

generic term “network,” and the specification of both patents state that although the preferred

embodiment of the invention functions on the Internet using a Web crawler, the invention is not so

limited: 

[I]t should also be noted that one embodiment of the present invention has been

described above where the Internet is the networked computer environment and the

crawler is a Web crawler. . . . However, the present invention is not limited thereto

and may be applied to other types of networked computer environments and other

sources as well. The present invention can be implemented over any type of

communications channel, such as the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide

area network (WAN), direct computer connections, or the like, using any type of

communications hardware and protocols.

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‘933 patent at 17:62–67, 18:1–9; ‘426 patent at 34:3–17. Therefore, the relevant network where

crawlers search is a “networked computer environment” because this is supported by the patent

claims and specification. ‘933 patent at 17:62–65; ‘426 patent at 34:3–6 (“it should also be noted

that one embodiment of the present invention has been described above where the Internet is the

networked computer environment and the crawler is a Web crawler”); ‘933 patent at 4:17–19 (“[i]t

is another object of the invention to provide a method for efficiently gathering product information

from a networked computer environment”); ‘426 patent at 37:59–63, claim 23 (“aggregating product

information from a plurality of sources in a networked computer environment”).

Because both parties’ proposed constructions unnecessarily limit crawlers to Web crawlers

that operate on a particular type of network—the Internet—these constructions are rejected. Etilize

attempts to limit the disclosed crawler to a specific type of crawler that searches “from Web server

to Web server,” effectively limiting the relevant network to the Web or Internet. Etilize argues that

this limitation is proper because this description is taken straight from the “Background of the

Invention” section of both the ‘933 and ‘426 patents. Defendant’s Responsive Brief (“Resp.”) at 4. 

However, Etilize is cherry-picking language to support its position. In the “Background of the

Invention” section of both patents, this phrase is used to describe a typical crawler as a component

of a search engine, not a crawler as claimed by either of the patents-in-suit. See ‘933 patent at

2:40–67, 3:1–2; ‘426 patent at 1:46–67, 2:1–8 (“[s]earch engines typically have . . . a crawler . . .

[that] automatically crawls from Web server to Web server”). In context, this particular phrase is

not describing the crawlers that are disclosed in the patent claims. This phrase is merely background

information disclosing the state of the prior art related to crawlers; it is not intended to be an

embodiment of, or a limitation on, the patented invention. CNET’s proposed construction similarly

limits crawlers to software which “operate[s] to access servers on the Internet to gather uniform

resource locators (‘URLs’).” POB at 7. However at the Markman hearing, CNET conceded that its

proposed limitation improperly limited crawlers to those which search the Internet. 

Moreover, limiting “crawlers” to Web crawlers—by adding the “Web server to Web server”

requirement proposed by Etilize or by adopting CNET’s proposed construction which includes

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“Internet” and “URL” limitations—is improper because such a construction would render claim 15

of the ‘933 patent redundant and therefore unnecessary. Claim 1 of the ‘933 patent discloses “[a]

method of aggregating product information for use in a product data base” which comprises a

number of steps. ‘933 patent at 18:49–65. Claim 15 of the ‘933 patent is dependent on claim 1, and

discloses “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein said networked computer environment is the Internet

and said crawler is a Web crawler.” ‘933 patent at 19:54–56. If the crawlers described in the ‘933

patent were limited to searching “Web servers” or “servers on the Internet,” then claim 15 would be

redundant by limiting crawlers to “Web crawlers.” A claim term must be construed in light of the

rest of the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“the claims themselves provide substantial

guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms”). As a result, a construction of a term that

would make claim 1 identical to claim 15 is improper.

Etilize inserts two additional limitations—“automatically” and “without human

intervention”—both of which the court rejects. In support of its construction that crawlers search

“automatically” Etilize focuses on language from the “Background of the Invention” and “Detailed

Description” sections of both patents-in-suit. But just as Etilize cherry-picks language to support its

proposed “Web server” construction, Etilize also cherry-picks language to support its

“automatically” limitation. Etilize observes that the “Background of the Invention” section of both

patents-in-suit states that “[the] crawler automatically crawls,” highlighting the automatic language. 

‘933 patent at 2:40–67, 3:1–2; ‘426 patent at 1:46–67, 2:1–8. In context, however, the background

information simply discloses the state of the prior art related to crawlers and is not intended to be a

limitation on the patented invention. Similarly, Etilize observes that the “Detailed Description”

section of both patents-in-suit describe the crawlers as being automatic. The complete title of this

section, however, is “Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment.” ‘426 patent at 3:44–46

(emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has held that “an accused infringer cannot overcome the

‘heavy presumption' that a claim term takes on its ordinary meaning simply by pointing to the

preferred embodiment or other structures or steps disclosed in the specification or prosecution

history.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1327. The patentee makes it clear that the preferred embodiment is

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simply an example set forth to enable a person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the

invention thereby satisfying the enablement requirement for patentability. The preferred

embodiment is not a limitation, as the patentee explicitly states. See e.g. ‘933 patent at 15:25–27

(“whereas the above aspects of the present invention have been described as applied to computers,

the present invention is not limited thereto”); ‘933 patent at 17:62–63, 18:2–3 (“one embodiment of

the present invention has been described above . . . [h]owever, the present invention is not limited

thereto”). 

Etilize next argues that the prosecution history supports its construction that the crawler

“automatically” searches. In correspondence with the United States Patent and Trademark Office

(“USPTO”), the patentee commented: “it should be clarified that as described in the Detailed

Description, the method of the present invention allows substantially automated determination of

whether a particular phrase is indicative of a product category or a product characteristic associated

with the product category.” Farooqui Dec. ¶ 6, Exh. E, ‘933 patent Response to Office Action at 16. 

The Response, however, was not limiting the claims to only automated crawlers. First, there is no

indication that the “automated determination” is specifically referring or limiting itself to

determination via crawlers. Second, the patentee noted that “the method of the present invention

allows substantially automated determination.” This is an open-ended construction because it uses

the term “allows.” Id. The patentee did not choose to state that “the method of the present invention

is limited to” or “the method of the present invention is only embodied by” automated crawlers. 

Even assuming, arguendo, that the patentee had intended to limit the claims to automated searching

via crawlers, which this court believes it did not, the patentee added the modifier “substantially.” 

Thus, crawlers which automatically search would be encompassed by the claims, as would crawlers

which are not fully automatic. 

The final limitation that Etilize proposes in its construction relates to a crawler that operates

“without human intervention or instruction.” Etilize argues that because the purpose of the patentsin-suit is “to avoid the arduous task of having human operators search through millions of Web

pages with various content,” this purpose supports its construction that the crawlers operate “without

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human intervention or instruction.” Resp. at 8. Etilize adds that because the crawler utilizes

computational linguistics to achieve this purpose, it necessarily must operate without human

intervention or instruction. Id. It is undisputed that the patents-in-suit have an objective to avoid

having human operators search through the Internet for content, and it is undisputed that the claimed

crawlers utilize computational linguistics to gather product phrase information. However, the

crawlers are not intended or claimed as software which operate perpetually, without any human

intervention or instruction. Neither patent disclaims human initiation of the crawler search. 

Additionally, neither patent discloses methods for terminating a crawler search or modifying,

reconfiguring, or monitoring search functions and settings. Human instruction, intervention, and

initiation are not disclaimed, and therefore Etilize’s limiting construction is improper. 

In sum, the court rejects both parties’ proposed constructions. Both parties attempt to limit

the disclosed crawler to one that operates on a particular type of networked computer environment,

namely the Internet. This limitation is not supported by the express definition or the claims and

specification. Moreover, Etilize’s attempt to limit the disclosed invention to a crawler that operates

“automatically” and “without human intervention or instruction” imposes limitations that are not

supported by the intrinsic evidence. Combining the express definition of crawler with other intrinsic

evidence demonstrating that the crawler not only searches, but also visits sources and identifies and

gathers information, the court arrives at a proper construction of the term “crawler.” The court

construes “crawler” as “a software program or programs which visit and search sources of content

on a networked computer environment; have the capability to identify and gather information from

the sources; and can include bots, robots, automated site searchers, and the like.” 

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B. “Electronically”3

Claim Term CNET’s Proposed Construction Etilize’s Proposed Construction

Electronically

(comparing,

parsing,

generating)

Performed in a large or considerable

degree by a computer program or

electronic device

Performed for the most part

automatically by a computer

program

 The parties’ disagreement over a proper construction of the term “electronically” centers on

whether the claimed activities are automatic and whether the activities may be performed by an

electronic device, as opposed to a computer. The “ordinary meaning of claim language as

understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim

construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning

of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see generally United States Surgical

Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir.1997) (“[c]laim construction is a matter of

resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what

the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement. It is not an

obligatory exercise in redundancy”).

“Electronically” need not be construed because it is neither unfamiliar to the jury, confusing

to the jury, nor affected by the specification or prosecution history. Accord z4 Tech., 507 F.3d at

1351 (affirming district court’s decision to not construe “electronic” in patents for prevention of

software piracy because claims and specification “clearly contemplate[ ] a user choice as to whether

registration will be automatic or manual”). The term will not be unfamiliar to the jury since

“electronically” is a familiar and commonplace word that is used in everyday language by lay jurors. 

The term is not confusing because the lay meaning of electronic is the same meaning as that which a

person having ordinary skill in the art would attribute to the term. 

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the specification or the prosecution history intended

that a different meaning attach to this term. Although Etilize proposes that the electronically

parsing, comparing, and generating steps are “automatic,” the prosecution history of the ‘426 patent

discloses that the patentee intended the ordinary meaning of “electronically.” During prosecution of

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the ‘426 patent, the USPTO cited U.S. Patent No. 5,231,566 (“the ‘566 patent” or “Blutinger”) as

prior art defeating patentability under 35 U.S.C. section 102. Michael Dec., Exh. 4 at 4–5. The

examiner stated:

As to claims 1 and 45 [of the ‘426 patent application], Blutinger teaches a data

processing system comprising: [a number of steps]. Note: some of these steps or

elements are preformed [sic] manually in Blutinger’s system however, the language

of the claims [of the ‘426 patent application] is considered broad enough to include

manual operations.

Id. at 5. The patent applicant attempted to distinguish Blutinger by explaining that the comparing,

parsing, and generating steps of the ‘426 patent claims are “performed electronically, not manually.” 

Michael Dec., Exh. 5 at 28. The applicant added:

However, to expedite the prosecution of the present application, independent claims

1, 23, and 45 have been amended to specifically recite electronic comparing . . . . 

In addition, these claims have been further amended to specifically recite

electronically parsing . . . . Furthermore, these claims have been also amended to

specifically recite electronically generating . . . . Clearly, the cited Blutinger

reference fails to disclose, teach, or otherwise suggest the method and system as

recited in these amended claims.

Id. at 29. The patentee added the term “electronically” to the claims of the ‘426 patent during

prosecution in order to explicitly distinguish it from the Blutinger reference, which utilized manual

operations, rather than specifically disclaiming any and all manual operations.4 See Teleflex, 299

F.3d at 1327 (“[w]e hold that claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings unless the

patentee demonstrated an intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim

term by redefining the term or by characterizing the invention in the intrinsic record using words or

expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope”). 

The parties’ disagreement boils down to a simple definitional problem. CNET takes the

position that the addition of the term “electronically” simply distinguished the ‘426 patent from

systems which wholly utilize mental processes to compare, parse, and generate content. While

Etilize takes the position that in order to fully distinguish the ‘426 patent claims from Blutinger, the

processes must necessarily be “automatic” or not involving human interaction at any level. The ‘426

patent is directed to a method and system for aggregating content for an on-line catalog system

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utilizing computer hardware and software to complete the tasks that Blutinger left to mental

processes. ‘426 patent at 1:19–21. This method of comparing, parsing, and generating content is

distinct from Blutinger’s method which utilizes wholly mental processes to input, compare, match,

and assign, and the addition of the term “electronically” was intended to convey such a distinction. 

“Electronically” directly embodies the distinction between the Blutinger reference and the ‘426

patent, and it was the term chosen by the applicant to exhibit that distinction. 

Additionally, CNET disputes Etilize’s proposed construction by arguing that the written

descriptions “consistently contemplate[] human resources interacting with the computing device.” 

POB at 12. The specifications disclose that human interaction may be added to, or take the place of,

1) category database 79, ‘426 patent at 11:26–29 (“in addition to, or as an alternative to category

database 79, a human verification process may be provided”); 2) validation tool 93, ‘933 patent at

16:46–47 (“validation tool 93 may preferably be executed by a human editor”); 3) property

definition tool 80, ‘426 patent at 11:67, 12:1–2 (“property definition tool 80 is executed by a human

editor”); and 4) product record creation tool 95, ‘933 patent at 16:64–65 (“the product record

creation tool 95 may preferably be executed by a human editor”). What is unclear from the

specification, however, is how these elements of the preferred embodiment fit into the methods and

systems claimed in the ‘426 patent and therefore align—or do not align—with the electronically

comparing, parsing, and generating steps. 

During the Markman hearing, CNET claimed that these tools, disclosed in the specifications

to include human interaction, directly link up to the electronically comparing, parsing, and

generating steps. Although the court has been unable to draw such an unclouded conclusion based

on its reading of the patents, these links are disclosed in the parties’ joint claim constructions. The

four means-plus-function constructions that include the electronically comparing, parsing, and

generating steps are linked to the aforementioned tools. See Farooqui Dec. ¶ 10, Exh. I, Joint Claim

Construction and Prehearing Statement Pursuant to Patent Local Rule 4-3 at 4–5. Because the

parties have agreed on these constructions, it now seems disingenuous for Etilize to argue that the

human intervention arises only after the electronic steps have occurred. Resp. at 10. At the

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Markman hearing, Etilize similarly attempted to argue that the human interaction is in the

monitoring steps, not the processing, and that the processing is necessarily automatic. However, this

is similarly wrong because property definition tool 80, discussed above, determines whether product

phrase information is a relevant characterization of the product or product category. ‘426 patent at

11:65–67. This determination is plainly a part of the processing step and not part of the monitoring

function.

In sum, the specification does not disclose what level of automation is intended by use of the

term “electronically.” The term “electronically” was chosen to distinguish the patent application

from prior art which taught a completely manual method of creating a catalogue. As a result, this

term was intended to distinguish completely manual operations. The ordinary, customary, and

common meaning of “electronically” does just that. For all of these reasons, the court holds that the

term “electronically” does not require construction. 

C. “Means for generating a crawler from a server interconnected to the network

computer environment to visit the plurality of sources”5

Claim Term CNET’s Proposed Construction Etilize’s Proposed

Construction

Means for

generating a

crawler from a

server

interconnected to

the network

computer

environment to

visit the plurality of

sources

Subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6.

FUNCTION: Generating a crawler from a server

interconnected to the network computer environment

to visit the plurality of sources.

CORRESPONDING STRUCTURE: A software

product stored on computer readable media and

executable by a computer, which is a server such as

shopping server 20, and equivalents thereof.

Claim invalid

under 35 U.S.C. §

112, ¶2. 

Corresponding

structure does not

exist.

Section 112 of the Patent Act authorizes the use of means-plus-function claims. 

A means-plus-function claim is “expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function

without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112. A claim

recited in means-plus-function language “encompasses the corresponding structure and its

equivalents,” while a claim that recites the structure does not encompass the equivalents. Festo

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Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 589 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc),

rev'd on other grounds, 535 U.S. 722 (2002), on remand, 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003),

cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004) (citing Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1536

(Fed. Cir. 1991)). The term “means” is central to a means-plus-function analysis. Lighting World,

Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing CCS Fitness,

288 F.3d at 1369). A claim limitation that actually uses the word “means” invokes a rebuttable

presumption that section 112 applies. Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1358. Conversely, a claim

limitation lacking the term “means” invokes a rebuttable presumption that section 112 does not

apply. Id.

When a patent-drafter chooses to draft a patent claim in means-plus-function format, claim

construction rules differ from the rules used for other types of patent claims. Section 112 provides

that a means-plus-function claim “shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material,

or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112. 

Construing means-plus-function claims is a two step process. The first step is to identify the

claimed function. Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

(citing Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The second step is

to identify the corresponding structure in the specification. A means-plus-function claim is limited

to structures expressly disclosed in the specification and corresponding equivalents. Symbol Techs,

Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This means that the rest of the patent

specification must be consulted to determine the structure, material, or acts corresponding to the

function recited in the claim. 

When the specification discloses structure, it will be “deemed to be corresponding structure

if the specification clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” 

Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit has

explained:

 [t]he price that must be paid for use of [the] convenience [of claiming in meansplus-function format] is limitation of the claim to the means specified in the written

description and equivalents thereof. If the specification is not clear as to the

structure that the patentee intends to correspond to the claimed function, then the

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patentee has not paid that price but is rather attempting to claim in functional terms

unbounded by any reference to structure in the specification. Such is impermissible

under the statute.

Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Sitting en banc, the Federal Circuit has emphasized the importance of purely functional claim

language when dealing with means-plus-function format. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312

(“[m]eans-plus-function claiming applies only to purely functional limitations that do not provide

the structure that performs the recited function”). Although the term “means” in a claim raises the

presumption that the claim is in means-plus-function format, Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,

318 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003), a claim which recites structure sufficient to perform the

claim’s function in its entirety is not construed pursuant to section 112, paragraph 6. Id. A

recitation of sufficient structure will overcome the presumption that arises from use of the term

“means.” Id. 

As a threshold matter, the parties do not dispute that this term is in means-plus-function

format because the disputed term explicitly uses the word “means.” Nevertheless, the court

acknowledges that an issue exists regarding whether the claims-at-issue recite sufficient structure to

negate the application of section 112, paragraph 6. At the Markman hearing, CNET also recognized

the possibility of this issue. CNET argues that the function disclosed in the claim is “generating a

crawler from a server interconnected to the network computer environment to visit the plurality of

sources.”6

 However this language discloses something more than mere function. The function

disclosed is “generating a crawler to visit the plurality of sources.” The rest of the language—from a

server interconnected to the network computer environment—does not describe function; it

describes structure. This language closely parallels CNET’s proposed corresponding structure—a

software product stored on computer readable media and executable by a computer, which is a

server such as shopping server 20, and equivalents thereof. POB at 13; Reply at 8. Corresponding

structure that is explicitly disclosed in the claim can rebut the presumption that section 112 applies. 

Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1375. However, because the parties do not dispute that this term is in meansplus-function format and because neither party has briefed the issue, the court will construe this term

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based on the presumption that section 112 applies. Nonetheless, the following construction is

subject to reconsideration upon a motion and further briefing on this issue.

Presuming this claim is in means-plus-function format, the function identified by this claim

term is “generating a crawler to visit the plurality of sources.” As discussed above, CNET identified

this function in the Markman hearing, though CNET also included non-functional language in its

proposed construction in the briefs. CNET identifies the corresponding structure to be “a software

product stored on computer readable media and executable by a computer, which is a server such as

shopping server 20, and equivalents thereof.” CNET argues that the function of generating a crawler

is clearly linked to the corresponding structure—a server such as shopping server 20 disclosed in the

specification. POB at 15 (“the specification expressly states that the crawler is generated by a server

such as shopping server 20 to visit the plurality of sources”) (citing the ‘426 patent at

9:39–41, 14:6–7). 

The patent specification clearly links shopping server 20, in the preferred embodiment, to the

function of generating a crawler. The ‘426 patent specification provides: “[i]n accordance with the

preferred embodiment, shopping server 20 is operative to provide at least one crawler for visiting the

plurality of sources,” ‘426 patent at 9:39–41, and “product offerings crawler 74 [] may also be

generated by shopping server 20,” id. at 14:6–7. In addition, the form of CNET’s proposed

corresponding structure is identical to those agreed upon by the parties. See Michael Dec., Exh. 3,

Exh. A at 3, Parties’ Agreed Upon Construction, (“CORRESPONDING STRUCTURE: A software

product stored on computer readable media and executable by a computer, which is . . . “). As such,

this format is appropriate and seemingly agreeable to the parties. 

A person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the ‘426 patent was issued would know

that a server connected to a network is a sufficient and customary means for generating a crawler to

visit locations on a computer network. At the time the ‘426 and ‘933 patents were in prosecution,

crawlers were disclosed in the prior art. See Michael Dec., Exh. 4 at 8 (“Call does detail generating

a crawler”) (internal quotations omitted); id. ( “Kirsch disclosed the invention substantially as

claimed including . . . generating a crawler”) (internal quotations omitted). A person having

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ordinary skill in the art would know that crawlers could be generated by servers.7 Therefore, the

proper construction of this term includes a corresponding structure that is “a software product stored

on computer readable media and executable by a computer, which is a server such as shopping

server 20, and equivalents thereof,” which is clearly linked in the specification to the claimed

function.

Etilize argues that the ‘426 patent does not disclose how the crawler is created or originated,

but merely discloses where the crawler resides. This argument neglects the nature of crawlers and

servers. Generally a server system is made up of hardware and server software. See ‘426 patent at

8:31–44, 34:18–31 (“a server may be comprised of a plurality of redundant computers . . . [a]ny

appropriate server . . . software can be used”). As discussed above, a crawler is also software. See

section II(A), supra. Although the patent does not disclose how server software would specifically

generate crawler software to search, identify, and gather content, such a disclosure is unnecessary

because a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the patent was issued would have known

how a server would generate a crawler. The Federal Circuit has explicitly held that subject matter

known to persons having ordinary skill in the art is preferably omitted from patent specifications. 

Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing Hybritech Inc.

v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA

Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“patent documents need not include subject matter that

is known in the field of the invention and is in the prior art, for patents are written for persons

experienced in the field of the invention”) (internal citations omitted).

Finally, at the Markman hearing, Etilize took issue with the patentee’s use of the word

“generating.” Since this argument was not explicitly in Etilize’s brief, it is not completely clear

what Etilize asserts. Etilize seems to argue that “generating” software—a crawler or

crawlers—means creating or compiling the software. It is untenable that Etilize would expect this

court to even consider that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the ‘426 patent was

issued would consider “means for generating a crawler” to mean compiling or creating the software. 

That is such a constricted reading of the claim term that it is incongruous with Federal Circuit

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precedent, which holds that courts may presume the patent examiner gave terms the broadest

reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274

F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir.2000) (“during

examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with

the specification”); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111 (“Claim Interpretation; Broadest

Reasonable Interpretation”).

In sum, this court holds that “a software product stored on computer readable media and

executable by a computer, which is a server such as shopping server 20, and equivalents thereof” is

of well-known structure and performs the function of “generating a crawler to visit the plurality of

sources.” 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court construes the disputed claims as described above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2008 _________________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. The term “crawler” is contained in claims 1, 15, 28, and 36 of the ‘933 patent and claims 20,

23, 24, 52, and 95 of the ‘426 patent. The independent claims are claims 1 and 28 of the ‘933 patent

and claims 52 and 95 of the ‘426 patent. 

2. It is undisputed that the term “crawler,” as used in both patents, refers to the same software

program or programs. Not only do both patents disclose the same explicit definition of crawler,

demonstrating the patentee’s understanding that the crawlers in both patents are the same crawler,

but both patents also utilize the crawlers in the same manner. For this reason, and for simplicity, the

court will not distinguish between the ‘933 and ‘426 patents when construing the term “crawler.” 

3. The term “electronically” is contained in claims 1, 39, 52, 60, and 95 of the ‘426 patent. 

These are all independent claims.

4. It is important to note that since the term “electronically” was added during prosecution as a

means of distinguishing the ‘426 patent from the prior art, the term appears nowhere in the

specification. It only appears in the claims of the ‘426 patent.

5. The term “means for generating a crawler from a server interconnected to the network

computer environment to visit the plurality of sources” is contained in claim 95 of the ‘426 patent. 

This is an independent claim. Plaintiff asserts that claim 60 of the ‘426 patent also includes this

term, but it does not. 

6. At the Markman hearing, CNET recognized that the true function presented in this claim

term is “generating a crawler to visit a plurality of sources.”

7. See e.g. Roland Tretau & Ana Lelescu, IBM WebFountain and WebFountain Appliance

Overview at 3 (Oct. 22, 2004) (in a white paper published by IBM in 2004, WebFountain, which is a

data mining and discovery tool that includes a crawler, is described as being “implemented as a set

of . . . modules running on a distributed cluster of servers”). 

ENDNOTES

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