Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03993/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-03993-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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28 1 The court notes that no class has been certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 in this action

and, as set forth elsewhere in this order, the court's order applies only to plaintiff's individual claims.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

SPT

E-FILED on 9/7/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SCOTT MERSNICK, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

USPROTECT CORPORATION, a Maryland

corporation formerly known as HOLIDAY

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INC., and

DOES 1 TO 25,

Defendants.

No. C-06-03993 RMW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Docket No. 35]

Defendant USProtect Corporation ("USP") moves to dismiss plaintiff's second amended

complaint for failure to state a claim or for more definite statement as to certain allegations.1

Plaintiff Scott Mersnick ("Mersnick") opposes USP's motion. The court heard oral argument on

March 23, 2007. The court has read the moving papers and considered the argument of counsel. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court (1) grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first,

second, third, and sixth claims with prejudice; (2) grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's

fourth, fifth, and eighth claims; and (3) grants plaintiff twenty (20) calendar days from the date of

this order to amend those claims not dismissed with prejudice. The parties shall appear for a further

Case 5:06-cv-03993-RMW Document 46 Filed 09/07/07 Page 1 of 8
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

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case management conference Friday, September 28, 2007, at 10:30 a.m. 

I. BACKGROUND

Mersnick is employed full-time as a security officer in Santa Barbara County. SAC ¶ 2. 

Although not stated in the complaint, the parties do not dispute that Mersnick specifically works at

Vandenberg Air Force Base ("Vandenberg") and that Vandenberg is a federal enclave. USP

provides security and investigation services primarily to government agencies. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff

alleges that such security services are provided under contracts with federal agencies and others in

the United States and outside the United States. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that under these contracts,

USP is "obligated to reimburse employees for costs of certain training and certification, if any"

including state certifications. Id. ¶ 8. According to the complaint, USP agreed to comply with

"various applicable local, state and federal laws" under the contracts. Id. ¶ 9. 

Plaintiff contends that USP failed to comply with its contractual obligations by, inter alia,

not providing for proper meal periods, deducting pay for meal periods even when it expected or

directed the employee to perform duties during the meal period, typically not providing rest periods,

expecting or directing security officers to work "off the clock" without pay, paying less than the

obligated amounts to employees for travel to and participation in training and shooting

qualifications, and assuring officers that they would not need to obtain various certifications and

permits only to later reverse its position. Id. ¶ 10. 

Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of himself and a putative class consisting of:

all persons who currently are or ever have been employed by [USP] as security

officers anywhere in the world on or after June 28, 2002, (which is four years before

the date this complaint was originally filed). 

Id. ¶ 12. 

Plaintiff alleges that USP violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and also alleges

seven claims for relief under California statutory and common law. On December 18, 2006 the

court granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first, second, third, sixth, and eighth claims for

relief with twenty days' leave to amend. Id. Order of December 18, 2006 Denying in Part and

Granting in Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("December 18, 2006 Order"). The court denied

defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's fourth, fifth, and seventh claims, but ordered plaintiff to

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

SPT 3

provide a more definite statement as to his fourth and fifth claims. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. 

Dismissal can be based on the "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1988). The issue is not whether the non-moving party will ultimately prevail but whether it is

entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d

246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). The court's review is limited to the face of the complaint, documents

referenced in the complaint, and matters for which the court may take judicial notice. Levine v.

Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994). 

However, the court is not required to accept conclusory legal allegations "cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

B. First, Second, and Third Claims for Violations of California Labor Laws

The court previously dismissed plaintiff's first, second, and third claims because it found that

Vandenberg was a federal enclave and that plaintiff's first, second, and third claims under California

law were barred by the federal enclave doctrine. Plaintiff did not amend his complaint as to these

claims. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the claims should not be dismissed on the basis that he is

able to assert a new argument if given leave to amend his complaint to allege that plaintiff worked

for USP as an employee pursuant to a contract between USP and the United States, but does not seek

benefits pursuant to this contract. However, the court need only look at the allegations in plaintiff's

complaint. See Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Gilmour v.

Gates, 382 F.3d 1312, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a non-moving party plaintiff cannot raise

a new legal claim for the first time in response to the opposing party's summary judgment motion). 

Regardless, such a theory does not overcome the fact that the Federal Enclave Doctrine bars these

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2 Prior to September 27, 2006 the CWHSSA was codified at 40 U.S.C. §§ 328 et seq.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

SPT 4

state law claims. Plaintiff concedes that Vandenberg is a federal enclave. The court previously

concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred by the federal enclave doctrine, not based on the

Service Contract Act ("SCA"), 41 U.S.C. §§ 351 et seq., or the Contract Work Hours and Safety

Standards Act ("CWHSSA"), 40 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.2 See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486

U.S. 174, 181 (1988) (holding that "a federally owned facility performing a federal function is

shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal function is carried out by a private

contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such regulation"). Under the Federal Enclave

Doctrine, plaintiff's state claims would be barred regardless of whether or not he seeks benefits

pursuant to the contract between USP and the federal government. Accordingly, the court dismisses

plaintiff's first, second, and third claims with prejudice. 

C. Fourth and Fifth Claims for Promissory Estoppel and Unjust Enrichment

USP moves to dismiss plaintiff's fourth claim for unjust enrichment and fifth claim for

promissory estoppel with prejudice on several grounds: (1) plaintiff has failed to provide a more

definite statement as required by the court's December 18, 2006 Order; (2) plaintiff's claims, as

alleged, essentially seek to enforce rights and remedies under the SCA, which does not provide for a

private cause of action; and (3) plaintiff's fifth claim for promissory estoppel fails because the

alleged duty is already supported by consideration or is a duty imposed by law. Defendant argues

that plaintiff's claims fall under the SCA, which does not provide for a private cause of action. The

SCA governs all contracts entered into by the United States in excess of $2,500 and calling for the

use of service workers. 41 U.S.C. § 352. It requires such contracts to include a provision allowing

for payment of wages at the prevailing rate and payment of fringe benefits at the prevailing rates. 41

U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) & (2). 

At the hearing on defendant's motion, plaintiff clarified the scope of his fourth and fifth

claims. Specifically, plaintiff explained that these claims do not allege that he was not paid overtime

owed to him. Rather, his fourth and fifth claims address only the narrow allegation that he was

promised a straight-time pay rate greater than the (minimum) prevailing rate mandated under the

SCA, but not paid at such higher rate. Plaintiff agrees that if he had only been promised the

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

SPT 5

prevailing rate, the parties' rights would be governed by the SCA. As to his claims that defendant

failed to make expense reimbursements owed to him, plaintiff represented that his fourth and fifth

claims are premised only on the narrow allegation that defendant promised but did not pay expense

reimbursements to plaintiff beyond those reimbursements covered by the contract or contracts

between USP and the federal government. Plaintiff agrees that disputes about expense

reimbursements that fall within the scope of the contract or contracts between USP and the federal

government are governed by the SCA. 

At the hearing, defendant agreed that plaintiff's fourth and fifth claims could proceed based

on the narrow theories articulated by plaintiff at the hearing. In its motion, USP argues that plaintiff

failed to allege the source of the duty allegedly owed. The December 18, 2006 Order required

plaintiff to make a more definite statement of its fourth claim, including the state law or contract

pursuant to which he alleges the relevant duty to reimburse, the types of expenses incurred, and the

agreed-upon reimbursement rates. Dec. 18, 2006 Order at 16:16-18. Plaintiff's SAC alleges that

USP has not reimbursed him for his semi-annual California State Permit for Exposed Firearm ("Gun

Card") recertification and for a mandatory drug-test taken during non-working hours. Further, USP

required plaintiff to attend a full day training without pay in order to receive a California State

Guard Registration ("Guard Card"). SAC ¶¶ 34.5, 36.5. Payments for the permit and registration

total approximately $600 to $800. However, plaintiff's amended complaint lacks factual allegations

supporting his contentions that (1) he was promised a straight-time rate greater than the prevailing

rate, (2) that he was paid less than the promised rate, (3) that he was promised expense

reimbursements, (4) that such promised reimbursements are outside the scope of the relevant

contract or contracts between USP and the federal government. Plaintiff's complaint does not

indicate (1) the straight time pay rate he was promised and (2) the scope of the contract or contracts

between USP and the federal government as to expense reimbursements. Because plaintiff concedes

that claims that fall within the scope of such contracts are governed by the SCA which does not

provide for a private cause of action, his complaint must set forth how his claims are outside the

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3 Further, plaintiff acknowledges that he mistakenly did not point to the state law or

contract giving rise to USP's duty. In opposition, he offers to amend the complaint to allege that

USP's duty arises from Cal. Labor Code § 2802. Plaintiff also notes that he will amend his

complaint to allege a class of only California based employees for this claim.

4 Plaintiff does not dispute that § 17200, as codified, did not exist at the time

Vandenberg became a federal enclave. Although plaintiff suggested at the hearing that his claims

might be viable under some common law form of the unfair competition laws then in existence, his

complaint does not set forth such a claim or factual allegations supporting such a claim. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

SPT 6

scope of the SCA.3 

D. Sixth Claim Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200

Plaintiff's sixth claim alleges a violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 based on unfair

and unlawful business practices. The court previously granted defendant's motion to dismiss

plaintiff's § 17200 claim because

plaintiff's claims of violations of wage and hour laws in a federal enclave are

governed by the FLSA, plaintiff's state law claims for such violations are barred by

the Federal Enclave Doctrine. It follows, then, that plaintiff's § 17200 claim,

predicated on the same alleged violations of wage and hour laws are also barred by

the Federal Enclave Doctrine. 

Because plaintiff's allegations, including the new allegations in the SAC, essentially seek to enforce

rights governed by the FLSA, see SAC ¶¶ 40.5-40.9, his § 17200 claim is barred by the Federal

Enclave Doctrine. In addition, plaintiff's argument that the FLSA does not preempt state law or a §

17200 claim is irrelevant as the issue here is whether the claim is barred by the Federal Enclave

Doctrine. Moreover, as defendant points out, plaintiff's claim is barred by the Federal Enclave

Doctrine on the basis that § 17200, as codified, did not exist at the time Vandenberg became a

federal enclave.4

 As such, plaintiff's sixth claim is dismissed with prejudice. 

E. Eighth Claim

Plaintiff's eighth claim alleges a breach of contract. In the December 18, 2006 Order the

court dismissed this claim on the basis that the allegations were insufficient to state a breach of

contract claim. Plaintiff's SAC alleges that there is no express or written contract but that there is an

implied contract which defendant breached because it failed to "pay for the time [plaintiff] provided

services (or made [himself] available to provide services) at the location(s) designated by [USP]." 

Id. ¶¶ 7.5, 52.5. Plaintiff alleges that the terms of the implied contract are that USP will pay plaintiff

hourly for providing services and for being available to provide services. However, "oblique

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5 Likewise, the additional allegations plaintiff seeks to add in a third amended

complaint would not be sufficient absent factual allegations supporting an implied agreement that

USP would compensate plaintiff for the alleged unpaid meal periods, rest periods, and other "off the

clock" periods. 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

SPT 7

language will not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish agreement" and an "[a]greement may be

shown by the acts and conduct of the parties, interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the

surrounding circumstances." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 681 (1988) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations

supporting the existence of an implied contract between plaintiff and defendant with the particular

terms he alleges—for instance, that plaintiff would be paid for the time he made himself available to

provide services.5

 Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a breach of implied contract claim.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court:

1. Grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first, second, third, and sixth claims

with prejudice;

2. Grants defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's fourth, fifth, and eighth claims; and

3. Grants plaintiff twenty (20) calendar days from the date of this order to amend those

claims not dismissed with prejudice.

4. The parties shall appear for a further case management conference Friday, September

28, 2007, at 10:30 a.m.

DATED: 9/6/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS—C-06-03993 RMW

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

Michael Millen MikeMillen@aol.com 

Counsel for Defendant:

Steven R. Blackburn sblackburn@ebglaw.com 

Matthew A. Goodin mgoodin@ebglaw.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 9/7/07 SPT

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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