Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04970/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04970-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER LEE BELL, AP-7365,

Petitioner,

 vs.

MARTIN D. BITER, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 15-4970 CRB (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Petitioner Walter Lee Bell, a state prisoner at Kern Valley State Prison in

Delano, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

invalidating a special circumstance murder conviction from Contra Costa County

Superior Court. Per order filed on December 8, 2015, the court found that the

petition appears to state cognizable claims for relief under § 2254, when liberally

construed, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus

should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show cause

and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

 BACKGROUND

A. Statement of the Case

The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an information charging

petitioner with the January 20, 2009 murder of Rylan Fuchs. Cal. Penal Code §

187. The information further alleged that petitioner committed the murder while

engaged in, and an accomplice to, the commission and attempted commission of

a robbery, id. § 190.2(a)(17), and personally and intentionally discharged a

firearm causing great bodily injury and death, id. § 12022.53(b), (c), (d). 

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On May 13, 2013, a jury found petitioner guilty as charged. On June 21,

2013, the Contra Costa County Superior Court sentenced him to a prison term of

25 years to life consecutive to life without possibility of parole. 

On December 31, 2014, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment of conviction and, on March 11, 2015, the Supreme Court of California

denied review. 

On October 29, 2015, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action. 

B. Statement of the Facts

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as

follows:

I. The Prosecution Case

On January 20, 2009 shortly after 9:00 p.m., 17–year–old Rylan

Fuchs was shot once in the neck while standing in front of his home

on El Capitan Drive in Danville. He was shot from a distance of

more than two or three feet. Fuchs’s parents heard a bang and went

out the front door to investigate. Fuchs’s mother called 911. Fuchs

was taken to the hospital where he died the next morning.

There was no exit wound. The bullet recovered at the autopsy was a

hollow-point .38–caliber bullet that had been chambered in a

.38–special or .357–magnum, and was almost certainly fired from a

revolver. A hollow-point bullet is designed to kill a human target. It

lodged in the left side of the neck after transecting the left carotid

artery and jugular vein. Based on the bullet’s trajectory and other

factors, Fuchs may have been on his knees or bending to the right

when shot. The gun was never found. 

Contra Costa County Sheriff’s deputies and fire department

personnel responded to the report of a gunshot injury and set up a

crime scene. No drugs or shell casings were found. A cell phone

was found sitting on a truck parked in the driveway of Fuchs’s

home. No weapons or marijuana were found in Fuchs’s clothing,

which was collected at the hospital.

A. Events Leading Up to the Shooting

Two days before Fuchs was shot, Gene Souza, an acquaintance of

Fuchs's, received a call from Aaron Marks, who was looking for

marijuana. Souza gave Marks Fuchs’s name and telephone number.

Marks used a cell phone with a telephone number ending in 1818 to

call Souza.

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On the afternoon of January 20, 2009, Fuchs and two high school

friends, Mitchell Aasen and Tony Mills, were driving around the

Danville area. Fuchs was supposed to meet Marks to sell him

one-quarter pound of marijuana. Fuchs used his phone to text

Marks about arranging a meeting. Fuchs usually only sold

marijuana to people he knew. Aasen had safety concerns about

Fuchs selling marijuana to Marks by himself, because Marks kept

putting off the meeting and changing times. At 8:00 p.m., Aasen

took Fuchs home. FN2. Both Aasen and Mills urged him not to go

through with the marijuana sale alone.

FN2. Fuchs had an 8:00 p.m. curfew. Fuchs’s mother knew

her son used marijuana but not that he sold it. After Fuchs

arrived home, the front door was locked. Fuchs’s mother

surmised her son had left the house through his bedroom

window because the screen had been removed.

Shortly before 9:00 p.m. on January 20, Jeffrey Koepp, a classmate

and neighbor of Fuchs, left his house to pick up his younger sister

at a dance academy in nearby San Ramon. As he turned left onto

Greenbrook Drive, he saw a group of eight African–American

youths standing around a white Acura parked near a greenbelt, a

walking path for local residents. When he returned on the same

street about 10 minutes later after picking up his sister, the youths

and the car were gone. However, a black Infiniti in front of him

was driving substantially slower than the speed limit. He flashed

his bright lights at the car, which eventually pulled over to let him

pass. The driver appeared to be an Asian male wearing a khaki cap

pulled low over his face.

As Koepp turned onto El Capitan toward home, he saw several

African–American youths wearing hoods and gloves hiding

themselves. One was crouched behind a car; another was behind a

lamppost. Both were looking towards Fuchs’s home. He thought

the person behind the lamppost was wearing the same jacket as one

of the people he had seen earlier on the greenbelt. As Koepp

continued toward home, he saw three or four people crouching

behind bushes, facing Fuchs’s house.

Koepp passed Fuchs’s house just before arriving home at 9:12 p.m.

He saw Fuchs in his driveway talking with an African–American

male who could have been Marks, whom he knew by sight because

they both attended San Ramon High School. Koepp drove home

and went to his room. He did not hear any gunshots but, about a

minute later, he heard sirens and saw lights when he looked outside

his bedroom window. He also saw several African–American males

scatter in different directions. FN3.

FN3. Knowing that Fuchs sold marijuana, when he saw the

African-American youths hiding near Fuchs’s house, it

occurred to Koepp that Fuchs might “get jumped or

something,” but he “wasn’t going to get involved.” He also

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did not call the police because he thought the youths were

just playing around.

B. Events After the Shooting

In late January 2009, Emily Amkhamavong was living in

Richmond, California with her parents, her brother Tony, and

defendant. She and defendant had a serious boyfriend-girlfriend

relationship at the time. They broke up in June or July 2010.

In January 2009, defendant “wanted to get more money.” Emily

knew he robbed marijuana dealers for money. She had seen him

with a gun a couple of times. He sometimes brought money home

after the robberies, and he sometimes texted her while committing

robberies. He used the terms “lick” or “wipe” for robbery and

“grapes” for marijuana. “Jock” was a nickname for Aaron Marks;

“Tay” was a nickname for Tamon Lewis. Defendant used the terms

“thang,” “pistol,” and “cannon” for gun. He sometimes talked about

getting a gun when he was planning a robbery.

At some point on January 19, 2009, defendant went out to get

marijuana and came home about 5:00 a.m. or 6:00 a.m. on January

20. He acted “weird” and “seemed scared and concerned.”

Defendant and Emily watched the television news together at 7:00

a.m. or 8:00 a.m. During a broadcast about a shooting in Danville

involving marijuana, defendant acted “weirder.” Emily asked

defendant if he had done anything wrong. “He was hesitant to tell

me, and he was scared and told me that things didn't go right. [¶] ...

[¶] He said someone had—had got shot. [¶] ... [¶] He said it was an

accident and he felt really bad.” Later that morning, he changed

both of their cell phone numbers. He said, “[h]e didn’t want the

police to come.”

Acting on leads provided by Gene Souza and others, homicide

detective Fawell identified the cell phone number ending in 1818 as

belonging to Emily Amkhamavong. On January 22, Fawell

authored warrants for records for various cell phones, including

Emily’s, and for Marks’s arrest.

On January 23, the Sheriff’s Office received an anonymous tip

about Marks’s location. He was arrested the same day in Oakland

and his cell phone was seized. His appearance was similar to the

description Koepp gave of the person he saw talking to Fuchs in the

driveway.

Also on January 23, police went to the Amkhamavong home in

Richmond. Tony Amkhamavong was a person of interest because

of Koepp’s information about the Asian driver. He was not at

home, but Emily and defendant were. Although they were not

suspects, Emily and defendant were interviewed separately about

their cell phones. Defendant said he left his phone at his friend

Devin’s house. Emily said hers had fallen out of her pocket while

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she was running to BART, which she and defendant had agreed

beforehand she would say. When the officers asked Emily where

defendant was the night of January 20, she said he was out until

5:00 a.m. or 6:00 a.m.; she did not know defendant had told police

he was with her all night. When defendant was confronted by

police about the discrepancies between his and Emily’s statements,

he ran away. Two officers chased him but were unable to catch

him. After defendant ran away, police re-interviewed Emily. She

told them Aaron Marks was the shooter to protect defendant,

because she thought defendant was the shooter.

In January 2009, Devin McCalope and defendant were close friends

who saw each other daily. McCalope was staying at his

grandmother’s house in Berkeley, but his “play auntie” lived next

door to defendant’s family home on Martin Luther King Boulevard

in Berkeley, and he saw members of defendant’s family all the

time. On the day of the shooting, McCalope saw defendant use

Kevin Dixon’s phone and heard him say something about getting a

“thang,” meaning a gun. Defendant invited McCalope to go with

him to Danville to get some marijuana. When McCalope asked

defendant if he was going to buy it, defendant did not answer.

McCalope got a bad feeling and decided not to go.

On January 21, 2009, defendant and McCalope watched a newscast

about the shooting in Danville. Defendant said he did the shooting

and it was “an accident.” He said the person was running away, and

defendant meant to shoot in the air to scare him, but instead he shot

the person in the neck. He said the person was still alive when he

left. A few days later, McCalope reported what defendant told him

to the Berkeley Police Department. At that point, no one had

threatened him. FN4.

FN4. At trial, McCalope acknowledged he told the

prosecutor’s investigator he was afraid about testifying. He

said he did not want to testify, but he was ready to do so.

Defendant had accused him of talking to the police, which

McCalope denied. Defendant said if he was convicted, he

would know McCalope had been talking to the police. Also,

about a year earlier, after McCalope had testified at another

hearing, defendant’s sister Danika punched him. She was

angry that defendant was in custody, and she blamed

McCalope. Finally, the night before his testimony, Danika

had called him and said that she needed to talk to him. She

came by his house and drove him to meet with the defense

investigator. She stayed in the car or nearby while he talked

with the investigator on the street, and she eventually left.

The investogator told him defendant might go free if

McCalope did not testify, and suggested McCalope could

refuse to testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment.

On January 27, 2009, Berkeley police contacted police in Danville

about McCalope’s statement. Detective Fawell interviewed

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McCalope the next day. Defendant was upset that McCalope had

talked to the police and asked him to lie when he talked to the

Danville investigators. Defendant told him to say he was playing

basketball and ran when he heard the shots. McCalope told the

investigators the basketball story, but later told them the truth. FN5.

FN5. At trial, McCalope admitted convictions for petty theft

in 2003; attempted robbery in 2004; and petty thefts in 2007

and 2012.

On May 18, 2009, Detective Fawell interviewed Kevin Dixon,

whose cell phone had significant contacts with people important to

the investigation. Dixon had heard about what had happened. He

told the police, “That they didn’t buy it. That they didn’t get it.

They didn’t get the weed. It went bad. Dude was leaving and I

guess he died.” McCalope told Dixon defendant got the gun from

Tamon, and that he fired a warning shot that hit the victim in the

neck. After the shooting, defendant and McCalope were not getting

along.

At trial, Dixon reluctantly admitted he let defendant use his cell

phone on January 20, 2009. Later that day, Dixon received an

incoming call from someone he did not know, asking for defendant.

He denied he heard about a murder after letting defendant use his

phone, denied McCalope told him defendant shot someone, and

denied defendant and McCalope were having problems.

In late May 2009, defendant was taken into custody in Alameda

County. He called Emily from jail and asked her to make three-way

calls. She made one three-way call to “Tay”, and defendant told her

to delete that telephone number. Between January 2009 and June or

July 2010, when they broke up, defendant never once told her Aaron Marks or someone o

In June 2009, detectives re-contacted Emily in an attempt to find

defendant. Although Emily knew defendant was in jail, she did not

tell the police. They also re-interviewed her about the shooting. At

first, she again said Marks was the shooter. However, later in the

interview, Emily said it was defendant who shot Fuchs. She also

said defendant had not given her any specifics about the shooting

except that he went to Danville to do a marijuana robbery and “it

was just supposed to be a regular lick,” but the gun went off once

by accident; he only meant to scare the victim. He went to Danville

in Tay’s black car, and he committed the robbery with four or five

people, including Tay, Marks, and others. Emily told the police she

would be honest. In a jail phone call, defendant told her to stop

talking to the police.

Defendant was scheduled to be released from Alameda County jail

on November 18, 2009. He was taken into custody on the Fuchs

murder upon his release. Detective Meth Mirandized and

interviewed defendant at the Martinez Detention Facility. Detective

Meth played for defendant part of his interview the previous day

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with Emily, in which she repeatedly said defendant reported to her

that he accidentally shot the gun and only meant to scare Fuchs.

C. Expert Testimony About Drug Robberies

Sergeant Brian Gardner of the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s

Office testified as an expert in marijuana sales. The terms “lick”

and “wipe” are street terms for a drug robbery. In his experience, it

was not common for people from Alameda County to go to

Danville to buy marijuana; nor was it common for eight people to

travel together to buy four ounces of marijuana; nor would it be

normal to bring a gun to buy four ounces of marijuana.

II. The Defense Case

Approximately two weeks before his testimony, defense

investigator Edward Stein spoke with Devin McCalope in a parking

lot in Berkeley at defense counsel’s request. He arranged the

interview through defendant’s sister, because she knew him and he

did not. McCalope said he wanted to help, and Stein said: “if you

want to help Walter, you need to tell the truth.” Stein did not say

anything about defendant going free if McCalope refused to testify.

In the conversation, McCalope asked what would happen if he did

not testify, and Stein explained he could be held in contempt and go

to jail. McCalope said he guessed he was going to jail. Stein told

him he would not do defendant any good in jail.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. FN6. In January 2009, he

was going to school at Berkeley City College and living in

Berkeley with his mother. He was getting financial aid, and his

parents were giving him money, but he was also selling marijuana

to support himself. He had started selling marijuana in October

2008. Defendant denied committing any robberies for marijuana.

He said Emily’s testimony to the contrary was a lie.

FN6. Defendant acknowledged juvenile adjudications for

robbery in 2004, misdemeanor grand theft in 2007, and

felony residential burglary in 2009.

Defendant met Aaron Marks in 2007. They were friends who

would smoke and buy marijuana and “hang out” in North Oakland

together. In 2009, Marks, lived in Oakland and San Ramon, and

went to school in San Ramon. On January 20, 2009, Marks said he

was planning to buy some weed and invited defendant to go along;

defendant agreed.

In January 2009, defendant was close with Devin McCalope,

although they occasionally had misunderstandings. Around 12:00

noon on January 20, defendant, McCalope, and Kevin Dixon met

near defendant’s house on Martin Luther King and smoked

marijuana together. Defendant denied telling McCalope he was

going to buy marijuana with Marks or inviting him to come along.

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Defendant admitted using Dixon’s cell phone, but denied using it to

locate a handgun. Defendant used McCalope’s house phone,

because he left his phone charging at his house. He denied Tamon

Lewis gave him a gun, or that he told McCalope Tamon did so.

Later, he met Marks in North Oakland and went with him to buy

marijuana. A Caucasian he did not know was driving. Marks said

nothing about a robbery. When they took a different route than

usual, defendant asked where they were going. Marks said they

were going to Danville to get four “zips,” or ounces, of marijuana.

He did not think it was going to be a robbery because Marks said

“the person he was getting [the marijuana] from was the one he

went to school with. So I didn’t think he was going to rob someone

he went to school with.” They parked in Danville at approximately

8:45 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., and defendant got out of the car to smoke a

marijuana “blunt” while Marks, who was wearing a backpack,

walked away and out of sight to buy the marijuana. Defendant did

not see any occupants of the car with a gun and did not have one

himself. After he lost sight of Marks, he heard a shot, and turned

his head to look in the direction of the shot. At that point, the driver

of the car told him to get in, which he did. As they drove off, he

saw Marks running down the street toward them with something in

his hand that looked like a gun. The driver drove away without

picking him up. They drove to a friend’s house in Berkeley, where

defendant spent the night.

He went to Emily’s house about 7:30 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. the next

morning. They watched a news program about a shooting in

Danville. He denied saying anything to Emily about the incident.

Defendant denied ever telling Emily he shot Fuchs, or planned to

rob him, or planned to commit a robbery in Danville on January 20,

or about trying to scare the person in Danville.

On January 23, detectives came to Emily’s house at 6:30 a.m. or

7:00 a.m. and asked him where he was on January 20. He denied

discussing with Emily what to say about their cell phones or his

alibi. Defendant told the officers he had been in Berkeley on

January 20 because he did not want to put himself in Danville. He

did not think the police “was gonna believe that I just went there to

get marijuana” because “I'm young, and I'm black, African

American so I didn't think they was gonna believe that I was there

when the shooting occurred and I didn’t have anything to do with

it.” He ran from police because they caught him in a number of lies,

and he “just panicked.”

He could not remember which lie caused him to run, but it could

have been the lie about his losing his phone because he knew it

connected him to Marks. There were text messages between him

and Marks about “doing a lick,” and getting a gun to rob someone

in San Ramon on January 16. Defendant and a friend had driven to

San Ramon to meet Marks, but they made sure they were “late on

purpose because we didn’t want to participate in the robbery....” He

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did not participate in the robbery that night. Marks was mad at him

for not joining in, but he “got over it.” No text messages were

exchanged between him and Marks on January 20 about a robbery.

FN7.

FN7. Defendant acknowledged he texted Tamon Lewis on

January 17 about another robbery with Marks. Before the

shooting, Marks told him about another armed robbery he

committed in addition to the one in San Ramon on January

16, but defendant denied supplying Marks with a gun, seeing

Marks commit a robbery, or participating with Marks in a

robbery. 

Around 12:00 noon on January 23, defendant spoke to McCalope.

He told McCalope that homicide detectives came to Emily’s house

and questioned him about his whereabouts on January 20. He

denied discussing with McCalope anything about going to

Danville. He never told McCalope to tell the police he was playing

basketball and heard shots fired.

On January 23, he also went back to Emily’s house. She gave him a

card with a detective’s number on it. He later called the detective

from his mother’s house because he felt he “needed to clear up [his]

story.” He told the detective the truth at some point during the

conversation.

Defendant was cross-examined about his cell phone usage. Cell

phone records for defendant’s phone showed calls to Fuchs at 5:00

p.m. on January 18; at 1:05 p.m., 1:07 p.m., and 3:02 p.m. on

January 19; and at 11:37 a.m. and 1:38 p.m. on January 20. Emily’s

phone was also used on January 19 to call Fuchs.

While he was in jail, defendant spoke to Tamon Lewis and others

on the phone about them talking to the police. It upset him at the

time “because the detectives was saying that my friends was talking

about me.” He told his friends, “How these people gonna say

something about me when they wasn’t even there [?]” Defendant

also spoke with Emily many times and knew she told the detectives

that he told her he shot Fuchs. He worried “the detectives was

gonna try to use her against me.” He urged her to tell the truth in

court, because he knew that what Emily told the officers was a lie.

III. Prosecution Rebuttal

Captain Chris Simmons of the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s

Office interviewed defendant on the porch outside Emily’s house

on January 23. Initially, defendant said he was at Emily’s house all

night on January 20. Confronted with Emily’s statement

contradicting him, defendant said he was somewhere else that

night. Defendant and Emily also contradicted each other about what

happened to defendant's cell phone. Defendant ran off after officers

asked him about his ties to North Oakland.

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Later that day, defendant called Simmons to apologize for running

away. The call was recorded. He said Marks told him he needed a

ride to Danville for a marijuana deal and wanted defendant to go

with him, but he did not want to go, even though Marks said there

was a lot of marijuana and it would be worth it. Eventually,

defendant admitted he went to Danville and waited with the driver,

who was African–American, outside the car. Defendant said he did

not see a second car, but he did not deny there was a second car of

perpetrators. He heard a gunshot and left with the driver of the car

while Marks ran after them. He said Marks had the gun in his hand;

he also said Marks had the gun in his pocket. The next morning, he

watched the news of the shooting with Emily. He told her he was

there, and that Marks was the shooter.

Simmons also testified he was aware of the media coverage of the

homicide. Among other things, the media had not published that the

victim was still alive when the shooter left, that the victim ran

before being shot, that the shooter had tried to fire a warning shot,

or that it was an accidental discharge.

People v. Bell, No. A139053, 2014 WL 7463182, at **1-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.

31, 2014) (footnote numbering in original). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.? 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the

claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

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if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than

[the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’

a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme

Court as of the time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive

authority” for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

“reasonably” applied. Id.

B. Claims & Analysis

Petitioner raises three cognizable claims for habeas relief under § 2254:

(1) improper exclusion of a recorded telephone call, (2) improper exclusion of

Marks’s out-of-court statements, and (3) improper exclusion of petitioner’s

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family members from the courtroom during McCalope’s testimony.

1. Improper Exclusion of Recorded Telephone Call

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s exclusion of his November

17, 2009 recorded telephone call to Emily to impeach her testimony and

corroborate his own testimony violated his due process right to a fair trial and to

present a full defense. ECF No. 1 (Pet.) at 5. The claim is without merit.

a. Background

Emily was petitioner’s serious girlfriend at the time of

Fuchs’s murder. In January 2009, Emily knew petitioner “wanted to get more

money,” and she knew he robbed marijuana dealers for money. Bell, 2014 WL

7463182, at *3. Petitioner sometimes talked about getting a gun when he was

planning robberies, and she had seen him with one. He sometimes texted her

while committing the robberies, and later brought home money. Petitioner left to

get marijuana in the evening on January 20, 2009 and returned to Emily’s home

early in the morning on January 20. Emily said he acted “weird” and “seemed

scared and concerned.” Id. That morning, they watched the news together,

which covered the murder in Danville. Emily said petitioner acted “weirder”

during the broadcast. Id. When she asked if he had done anything wrong, Bell

was hesitant but told her “that things didn’t go right. [¶] ... [¶] He said someone

had—had got shot. [¶] ... [¶] He said it was an accident and he felt really bad.” 

Id. Petitioner changed both of their phone numbers. Id.

On January 23, police came to Emily’s house looking for her brother

Tony, who was a person of interest at the time. Emily and petitioner were home

at the time, and the police asked them about their cell phones. Emily told the

police that petitioner had been out until the early morning on January 20, not

knowing petitioner had claimed he was with her all night. Petitioner ran away

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when the officers confronted him with the discrepancy. 

The police then re-interviewed Emily, who told them Aaron Marks was

the shooter “to protect [petitioner], because she thought [petitioner] was the

shooter.” Id. In late May 2009, while petitioner was in custody in Alameda

County, he called Emily to have her make a three-way call to “Tay.” Id. at *4. 

In June 2009, police re-contacted Emily to find petitioner. She knew he

was in jail, but did not tell the police. The officers then re-interviewed her about

the Fuchs shooting. In the beginning of the interview, she maintained that Marks

was the shooter, but later in the interview said it was petitioner. She said

petitioner did not give her any specifics other than he had gone to Danville to do

a marijuana robbery and that the gun went off once by accident—he only meant

to scare Fuchs. She told the officers petitioner went in Tay’s black car and

committed the robbery with others, including Marks. Petitioner told Emily to

stop talking to the police. The two broke up in June or July of 2010. 

At trial, petitioner testified in his own defense. He denied Emily’s

testimony that he had ever committed any marijuana robberies. He admitted to

arriving at Emily’s home in the morning of January 20 and watching the news

about the Danville shooting. But he denied saying anything about the incident or

ever telling her he shot Fuchs. Petitioner denied any conversation with Emily

about his alibi or their cell phones. He knew Emily told the police he shot Fuchs

and claims he urged her to tell the truth in court—because what she told the

officers was a lie. 

The prosecution called a witness who testified that the media did not

publish that the shot was either accidental or intended as a warning. 

At trial, Emily testified that from 2009 through 2010, petitioner never

claimed that someone else had shot Fuchs. She testified that petitioner never told

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her Marks was the shooter or anything to make her think someone else shot the

gun. To impeach her testimony, petitioner attempted to introduce a recorded

phone call between Emily and himself from November 17, 2009 where he

“repeatedly tells her that, you know, he never did anything, he never did

anything, he’s not going to confess to something he didn’t do.” Id. at *7. The

prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds and the trial court excluded the evidence,

finding that it did not actually impeach Emily’s testimony. Petitioner’s counsel

conceded petitioner never implicated anyone else in the recording. 

On appeal, petitioner argued the trial court erred because the “unqualified

and unequivocal testimony elicited from Emily by the prosecutor that [he] never

said anything that would make her believe he did not shoot Rylan Fuchs” was

contradicted by his own “unequivocal and unqualified denials of culpability

seven times during the course of the November 17 conversation.” Id. Petitioner

further argued that he indirectly pointed to someone else when he said “[t]ell

whoever did it? [inaudible] So they – you think I’m going down for some whoos

[sic] person on what somebody else did?” Id. at *8. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim on the ground

that the exclusion of the November 17, 2009 recorded conversation was “proper.” 

Id. The court found that petitioner did not proffer any exception to the hearsay

rule, and that there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the recording even if

it was not excludable hearsay because petitioner did not make an adequate

showing in support of his theory that “someone other than himself shot Fuchs.”

Id. at *9 (citation omitted). The court explained that California law holds that

even third-party culpability evidence should be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice or confusion, and

that the probative value of the recording at issue was “slight, whereas its potential

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for delay and confusion of issues was great.” Id. (citing People v. Prince, 40

Cal.4th 1179, 1243 (2007)).

The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner’s claim that

excluding the recording for impeachment purposes implicated his right to

confront witnesses under Ortiz v. Yates, 704 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2012), because,

unlike in Ortiz, the recording here would not show that Emily’s testimony was

influenced by intimidation or threats. See Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at *10

(discussing Ortiz).

In sum, the California Court of Appeal concluded that petitioner did not

“demonstrate[] the court erred in excluding hearsay evidence of exculpatory

statements [he] made to Emily in a telephone call to impeach her testimony that

[petitioner] never said anything to her that made her believe someone else shot

the victim, and corroborate his testimony that he did not shoot Fuchs or admit to

her that he did. No error appears.” Id. at *10.

b. Clearly established federal law

“State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the

Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes

v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). But this latitude has limits because the Constitution guarantees a

criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See

id. (noting that right to present a complete defense may be rooted in Due Process

Clause of 14th Amendment or in Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses

of 6th Amendment). This guarantee is abridged by evidence rules that infringe

upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the

purposes they are designed to serve. Id. at 324-25.

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1

These factors are circuit-made and not “clearly established” Supreme Court

precedent. See Moses v. Payne. 555 F.3d 742, 760 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, it is not an

“unreasonable application” of “clearly established” Supreme Court precedent if a state

court does not apply these factors. See id. at 758-59.

16

The Supreme Court also has made clear that a criminal defendant has a

right to present evidence in his defense that is “relevant and material, and . . .

vital to the defense,” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16, (1967), and that state

rules of evidence cannot be applied “mechanistically to defeat the ends of

justice,” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). But the Supreme

Court “[o]nly rarely” holds that defense evidence excluded under a state

evidentiary rule violates the right to present a complete defense. See Nevada v.

Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013); see also id. at 1994 (noting that Supreme

Court’s precedents could not be framed so generally as to recognize a broad right

to present evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility). While the Constitution

prohibits exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate

purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, 

“well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its

probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at

326 (citations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit considers five factors to determine whether the

exclusion of evidence violates a criminal defendant’s due process right to a fair

trial or to present a defense: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on a

central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier

of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and

(5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Chia v. Cambra,

360 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).1

 A court also must give due weight to the

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state interests underlying the evidentiary rules on which the exclusion was based. 

Id. at 1006. 

In order to obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner also must demonstrate

that the constitutional violation “had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 623 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

c. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim that the trial court’s exclusion of the November 17, 2009 recorded

telephone conversation between him and Emily violated his due process right to a

fair trial and to present a full defense was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor did it involve an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court of

appeal reasonably determined that the trial court did not violate petitioner’s

constitutional rights by excluding the recording to impeach Emily’s testimony

that petitioner never claimed that someone else had shot Fuchs, or to corroborate

petitioner’s testimony that Marks shot Fuchs. 

Although there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding

that there is a broad constitutional right to present evidence bearing on a

witness’s credibility, see Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1994, this appears to be exactly

what petitioner sought to do with the recording, i.e., to impeach Emily’s

credibility. And unlike in Ortiz, where the proffered evidence was sought to

show that the witnesses’s testimony was influenced by intimidation or threats,

petitioner here did not reveal a substantial motive for Emily to lie that he could 

persuasively challenge with the recording. See Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at *10

(citing Ortiz, 704 F.3d at 1036). In fact, the recording does not even truly

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impeach Emily’s testimony. Accord id. at *9 (“Furthermore, Emily’s testimony,

that [petitioner] ‘never said anything that would make her believe he did not

shoot Rylan Fuchs’ was not contradicted by [petitioner]’s statements that he did

not do it and was not ‘going down for some whoos [sic] person on what

somebody else did.’ She evidently did not believe what [petitioner] said on

November 17, 2009, because she testified at trial to all the things he told her the

morning of January 21, 2009 that made her believe he shot Fuchs, even though he

did not say the words, ‘I shot the gun.’”) (emphasis in original). The court of

appeal reasonably rejected petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s exclusion of the

recording to impeach Emily amounted to constitutional error.

The court of appeal also reasonably rejected petitioner’s claim that the

trial court’s exclusion of the recording to corroborate petitioner’s trial testimony

that Marks or someone other than petitioner shot Fuchs amounted to

constitutional error because the recording was not “relevant and material, and . . .

vital to the defense.” Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added). Application

of the five factors from Chia to the exclusion of the recording confirm this

conclusion. See 360 F.3d at 1004. The first Chia factor – the probative value of

the excluded evidence on a central issue – weighs against petitioner because the

probative value of the recording to petitioner’s claim of third-party culpability

was slight in that petitioner does not even point to a culpable third party in the

recording. Accord Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at *9 (“probative value of the

evidence was slight, whereas its potential for delay and confusion of issues was

great”). So do the second and third Chia factors – reliability and whether it is

capable of evaluation by the trier of fact – because petitioner’s proclamations of

innocence in the recording are self-serving and confusing. The fourth Chia factor

– whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative – also weighs

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against petitioner because petitioner’s proclamations of innocence on the

recording was not the only evidence of his claim of innocence. Petitioner

testified in his own defense and denied ever committing any marijuana robberies

or shooting Fuchs. Finally, the fifth Chia factor – whether it constitutes a major

part of the attempted defense – weighs against petitioner because petitioner “did

not identify any basis for admitting his claims of innocence as circumstantial

evidence relevant to some disputed fact, regardless of their truth.” Id. at *9

(emphasis added). After all, the excluded recording did not even point to a

culpable third party. 

Petitioner is also precluded from federal habeas relief on his claim of

improper exclusion of the recording because he has not shown prejudice. He has

not shown that the exclusion of the recording had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

As noted earlier, the probative value of the excluded evidence was slight;

petitioner’s claim of innocence was otherwise available; and the recording was

not a major part of the attempted defense. Furthermore, Emily was not the only

witness to whom petitioner admitted shooting Fuchs. Petitioner also told

McCalope that he shot Fuchs and that it was an accident. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial

court’s exclusion of the November 17, 2009 recorded telephone conversation

between him and Emily violated his federal constitutional rights.

2. Improper Exclusion of Marks’s Out-of-Court Statements

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s exclusion of Aaron Marks’s

out-of-court inculpatory statements violated his due process right to a fair trial

and to present a full defense. ECF No. 1 (Pet.) at 5. He also claims that he

should have been permitted to cross-examine Koepp about Marks’s reputation for

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committing violent drug robberies. Id. at 8. The claim is without merit. 

a. Background

Defense counsel made an in limine motion to introduce statements

Marks made to his former group home counselor, James Mitchell,

and to police after his arrest. FN12. Marks made two phone calls to

Mitchell after Fuchs’s murder, one on January 21, 2009 at 11:15

p.m., and one on January 22, 2009 at 12:15 a.m. At first, Marks

said he was in Hawaii but, faced with Mitchell’s skepticism,

admitted he was lying, although he refused to disclose his location.

Mitchell advised Marks the police were looking for him and urged

him to turn himself in. Marks acknowledged he had watched the

news and knew the homicide victim. He admitted he had done drug

deals with the victim in the past and had planned to buy drugs from

him the night he was killed. Marks said he did not kill the victim

and was not at the scene, but the police would never believe he was

not involved because of the text messages on his cell phone.

Mitchell opined Marks was intoxicated; Marks said he was

drinking cough syrup and wanted to die. He agreed to turn himself

in the next day.

FN12. Marks was shot to death in Oakland on November 24,

2012, according to a death certificate[] submitted to the

court in connection with the motion. 

While Marks was sitting in the back of a patrol car after his arrest,

Marks asked Detective Meth, “Do you think I’m a bad person for

what I’ve done?” However, when interviewed at 2:30 a.m., Marks

denied knowing Fuchs. He then admitted he had heard something

about Fuchs being killed. Finally, he admitted meeting Fuchs while

living at a group home in Danville and talking with him about

drugs. Marks claimed he was at his aunt’s apartment the entire

night of January 20, 2009, into the next day. He admitted texting

Fuchs about drugs that day. He said he and Fuchs were friends who

enjoyed a good relationship. He stood Fuchs up at the time of the

purchase because he did not have any money and he does not rob

people. He would not say how much marijuana he was supposed to

buy because he did not want to be a snitch. He claimed other people

used his cell phone. Asked about his statement to Mitchell that he

wanted to die, Marks stated he had been misunderstood and was

talking about life in general.

Marks was interviewed again the next day. He asked: What if he

was at the scene to get weed, left, and did not know what happened

after that? Eventually, he admitted he met Fuchs the night of the

shooting and purchased marijuana from him. However, he

adamantly denied being the shooter or going to Danville to rob him.

He felt accused because he was “young and black.”

The court ruled Marks’s statements did not qualify for admission

under Evidence Code section 1230, stating: “[T]he issues really fall

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on whether or not the statements are clearly statements that show

that they are against his penal interest when made. And the Court

has had an opportunity to look at the statements that he made, the

entire context in which they were made, and although they

indisputably contain some admission that appear on their face to be

contrary to Mr. Marks’ interest, in avoiding criminal liability and

punishment.... [¶] However, the statements [are] viewed in the

context to determine whether they are self inculpatory.... [¶] ... He

also tried to paint himself in a different light, his relationship with

the victim, saying they were friends, that they had a good

relationship. With the cell phone messages, that someone else was

using his phone. He says that he did not shoot him, he denied being

the shooter and denied being there for the robbery, and said he was

being accused because he was young and black. [¶] So I think that

the statements, when taken as a whole, show that Mr. Marks is

trying to put himself in a positive light. They were friends, to show

they had a good relationship. And although there are some that are

disserving, that when you take it all in whole, it should not be

admitted because it lacks the trustworthiness. [¶] The Court

considered the possibility of the redaction. However, in light of the

circumstances, the Court finds that the statement lacks sufficient

indicia of trustworthiness to qualify for admission.”

Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at **10-11 (footnote numbering in original).

On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court improperly excluded 

Marks’s out-of-court, partially inculpatory statements and thereby denied him his

right to present a defense of third-party culpability. The California Court of

Appeal evaluated the claim under the state law standard that for third-party

culpability evidence to be admitted, the evidence must “‘be capable of raising a

reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt,’” and rejected it. Bell, 2014 WL 7463182,

at *11 (quoting People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833). The court explained that

Hall could not be read to let rules of evidence “‘impermissibly infringe on the

accused’s right to present a defense.’” Id. (quoting Hall, 41 Cal.3d at 834). But

because Marks’s statements were partially inculpatory and partially exculpatory

“(e.g., one which admits some complicity but places the major responsibility on

others)” they were inadmissible because the partially self-serving nature of the

statements means that they “‘do[] not meet the test of trustworthiness.’” Id. at *11

(quoting In re Larry C., 134 Cal. App. 3d 62, 69 (1982)). The court went further,

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and cited Supreme Court precedent noting that for a statement to be admissible as

against penal interest, it must be “truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely [an]

attempt[] to shift blame or curry favor.” Id. at *11 (quoting Williamson v. United

States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994)). 

The California Court of Appeal specifically found that in the proffered

statements “Marks incriminated himself about relatively minor matters (buying

marijuana from Fuchs the night he was shot), exculpated himself from major ones

(shooting Fuchs, or even being on the scene when Fuchs was shot), prevaricated,

changed narratives, minimized his involvement, and even tried to engender

sympathy for himself.” Id. at *12. The court concluded that the trial court did

not err in excluding Marks’s statements because the statements were “profoundly

lacking in basic trustworthiness and factual truthfulness.” Id. 

The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner’s claim that he was

wrongfully prevented from fully cross-examining Koepp about Marks’s

reputation for committing violent drug robberies. Id. The court noted that the

prosecutor objected to the questioning on foundation grounds and, after an

unrecorded sidebar, the trial court sustained the objection. Id. The court

affirmed the trial court’s ruling because petitioner did not demonstrate error and

its independent review of the record of Koepp’s testimony showed “no

foundation for anything he may have known about Marks, other than his name

and appearance.” Id.

b. Clearly established federal law

It is well established that the exclusion of evidence that

another person may have committed the crime violates due process. See

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973). In Chambers, the

Supreme Court found constitutional violation in mechanistically applying state

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hearsay rules to exclude inculpatory statements by a third party with persuasive

assurances of trustworthiness—as they were within the basic rationale for a

statement against interest exception to the rule against hearsay. See id. at 302. 

Such statements against interest are based on the “commonsense notion that

reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend

not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true.” 

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599. In this respect, the statements of “arrested

accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than

merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor.” Id. at 603. Accord Phillips v.

Herndon, 730 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir. 2013) (not unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme court precedent for state court to conclude that

accomplice’s inculpatory statement was properly excluded as

unreliable/untrustworthy because accomplice gave three conflicting and

contradictory versions of the murder).

In order to obtain federal habeas relief, a petitioner also must demonstrate

that the constitutional violation “had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 623 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

c. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that Marks’s

statements were untrustworthy and therefore inadmissible was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor

did it involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Rather, the court reasonably concluded that due to the partially

inculpatory (as to minor offenses) and partially exculpatory (as to the major

offenses) nature of Marks’s statements to Mitchell and Detective Meth, the

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statements were not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted as evidence that

tended to show Marks’s culpability. 

Unlike in Chambers, where the Court found that the excluded statements

had persuasive assurances of trustworthiness (as they fit well within a statement

against interest exception to the hearsay rule), see 410 U.S. at 302, the California

Court of Appeal found that Marks’s statements did not have such assurances, see

Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at *12. As a whole, the court found that Marks’s

statements instead were “profoundly lacking in basic trustworthiness and factual

truthfulness.” Id. This factual determination is entitled to a presumption of

correctness petitioner does not rebut. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). After all,

Marks’ differing accounts of the night of Fuchs’s murder, even if truly

inculpatory, were unreliable/untrustworthy because of their conflicting nature. 

And on that basis alone, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim that the exclusion of Marks’s statements violated his federal constitutional

rights cannot be said to be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See Phillips, 730 F.3d at 778 (not

unreasonable application for clearly established Supreme court precedent for

state court to conclude that accomplice’s inculpatory statement was properly

excluded as unreliable/untrustworthy because accomplice gave three conflicting

and contradictory versions of the murder). 

The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably reject petitioner’s

claim that the trial court improperly denied him an opportunity to cross-examine

Koepp about Marks’s reputation for violence. The court correctly noted that the

prosecution objected to petitioner’s questioning of Koepp for lack of foundation

and that there was no basis on the record to find that Koepp would have testified

in such a manner that would have tended to point to Marks as the culpable party. 

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The only foundation on the record was that Koepp knew what Marks looked like. 

See Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at *12. 

Petitioner is also precluded from federal habeas relief on his claims of

improper exclusion of Marks’s out-of-court statements, and improper denial of an

opportunity to cross-examine Koep about Marks’s reputation for violence,

because he has not shown prejudice. He has not shown that these alleged errors

had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

The exclusion of Marks’s out-of-court statements cannot be said to have

“resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. at 637 (citation omitted). First, none of

Marks’s statements tended to exculpate petitioner. Marks said he did not kill

Fuchs and was not at the scene, although the police would not believe him

because of various text messages on his phone. See Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at

*10. Marks asked Detective Meth if Meth thought he was a bad person for what

he had done, but Marks did not explain precisely what he did. Marks then said he

never met up with Fuchs because he did not have the money and he does not rob

people. Id. Marks finally admitted to being present the night of the shooting and

buying marijuana from Fuchs, but adamantly denied being the shooter. Id. at

*11. Not one of these statements indicate that petitioner was not actively

involved in the robbery or was not an accomplice to it. Second, the exclusion of

of Marks’s statements cannot be said to have had a substantial and injurious

effect on a jury’s finding that petitioner shot the gun because Marks adamantly

denied being the shooter. 

In regards to petitioner’s claim that the trial court improperly denied him

an opportunity to cross-examine Koep about Marks’s reputation for violence,

petitioner testified as to Marks’s involvement in a January 16, 2009 armed

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robbery. See Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at *12. Thus any potential testimony

from Koepp as to Marks’s reputation for violence would have been cumulative of

other testimony and its exclusion therefore cannot be said to have resulted in

actual prejudice. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims that the trial

court’s exclusion of Marks’s out-of-court statements, and denial of an

opportunity to cross-examine Koepp about Marks’s reputation for violence,

violated his federal constitutional rights. 

3. Improper Exclusion of Family Members from the Courtroom

Petitioner claims that the trial court’s exclusion of his mother and

two sisters from the courtroom during McCalope’s testimony violated his right to

a public trial. ECF No. 1 (Pet.) at 5. The claim is without merit. 

a. Background

Before Devin McCalope testified, the prosecutor made a request in

chambers to exclude defendant’s sister, Danika, from the courtroom

during his testimony. FN13. The prosecutor represented to the court

that, just before he testified, McCalope told the prosecutor that he

would feel safer if Danika was not present while he testified.

McCalope reported that after he testified at the preliminary hearing,

Danika approached him and physically hit him. Then, the day

before his trial testimony, Danika was present at McCalope’s

meeting with the defense investigator, which made him feel

uncomfortable, intimidated, and scared. Based on the prosecutor’s

representations, the court asked Danika to “step outside of the

courtroom during his testimony” over a defense objection.

FN13. The prosecutor also requested leeway “to treat

[McCalope] as a hostile witness, to ask leading questions of

him.” The request was granted because it was apparent to

the court that McCalope was mentally slow and had “some

sort of a disability.”

On direct examination, McCalope testified he had not wanted to

testify a year earlier in this matter, and preferred not to testify at

trial. Asked whether anything bad had happened after his

preliminary hearing testimony, McCalope testified that defendant’s

sister, Danika, was angry because defendant was in custody, and

she blamed McCalope for talking to the police. She had come up to

him in a store and punched him. He acknowledged telling the

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district attorney’s investigator Dominic Medina that he was afraid

to testify. The prosecutor had to repeatedly ask him to remove his

hands from his face.

The next morning, before McCalope resumed his testimony, the

court cleared the courtroom of jurors and audience for an in-camera

hearing at the prosecution’s request. The prosecutor made the

following offer of proof: “This morning Inspector Medina brought

Devin McCalope back to court to finish his testimony; and at some

point this morning, Mr. McCalope saw the defendant’s mother and

the defendant’s other sister, a sister other than Danika, whom we

discussed yesterday. And Mr. McCalope reported to the inspector

that he would not be comfortable testifying in front of the

defendant’s family. He alleges that the mother has called him a

snitch before or told him not to snitch, something along those lines;

and that this sister, the sister of the subject today, has not physically

assaulted him but has, I think, the word used was haggled [sic ]. I

don’t know if that’s Inspector Medina’s word or Mr. McCalope’s

word, him over snitching. [¶] And I’m not sure how well the

testimony came out yesterday, but I know from my review of the

police reports that Mr. McCalope spends a large portion of his time

at his play auntie’s house. Her name is Star Mills, and she lives

right next door to the defendant’s family’s house. Now, I recall that

did come in. They see each other all the time. The families are

intertwined. They’ve known each other for at least a decade. And

he is not comfortable at all, as demonstrated yesterday, in testifying

against this defendant publicly. He has serious concerns. So he has

asked that he not have to testify in front of the mom or any family

members.”

McCalope testified at the ensuing hearing he had seen defendant’s

mother and his sister Luanda in court earlier. It made him feel

“[n]ot good” to see them because “she out there crying.” Asked

how he would “feel about testifying with them in the courtroom,”

McCalope moved his head from side to side and then said, “No.”

He explained defendant’s mother told him that she was not happy

about him telling on her son, and Luanda had said the same thing to

him. He acknowledged defendant’s mother and sister Luanda had

confronted him about “telling on” defendant in 2009 or 2010 when

he first got out of jail, and not since. Luanda was with Danika when

Danika hit him; “Like, they came outside. They seen me. They was,

like, Tell on my brother. That’s all Luanda had said. And then

that’s when his other sister came, and she was like ... Why you

tellin’ on my brother, your partner, whoop, whoop, whoop, and

that’s when she had hit me.” Luanda had not said anything to him

since. However, McCalope saw defendant’s mother and sister every

day. He knew they did not want him to testify. He feared for his

grandmother’s safety. McCalope acknowledged telling Inspector

Medina he would be too afraid to testify with them listening. He

wanted them outside the courtroom and thought he could testify

more freely with them outside.

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Asked by the court whether it would interfere with his “ability to

freely testify in this courtroom” if defendant’s family was present,

McCalope answered, “Yes.” The court excluded appellant’s mother

and both sisters from the courtroom for the remainder of

McCalope’s testimony.

After the hearing, on redirect examination, McCalope testified

defendant’s family “was making threats,” and because of that he

wanted them removed from the courtroom.

Bell, 2014 WL 7463182, at **12-13 (footnote numbering in original).

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim that the

exclusion of his mother and two sisters from the courtroom during McCalope’s

testimony violated his right to a public trial. The court noted that although a

violation of the right to a public trial requires automatic reversal, the right to a

public trial is not absolute. Id. at *13. The “‘presumption of openness may be

overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that a closure is

essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 

The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a

reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.’”

Id. (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (2010)). The court also noted

that temporary exclusion of select supporters of a defendant is not an automatic

violation of the right to a public trial. See id. at *14 (citing People v. Esquibel,

16 Cal. App. 4th 539, 554 (2008)). But it requires a full evaluation for the

necessity of the exclusion and the potential alternatives to satisfy both California

statutory requirements as well as constitutional requirements. See id. (citing

Esquibel, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 556). 

The California Court of Appeal then found that 

 [t]he trial court undertook such an evaluation here and, in light of

the prosecution’s offers of proof and McCalope’s testimony in open

court and at the in-camera hearing, correctly concluded that a

temporary exclusion of [petitioner]’s mother and sisters from the

courtroom during McCalope’s testimony only, was essential to

ensuring a fair trial free from witness intimidation.

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Id. at *14 (citation omitted). The court specifically found that the record

supported the trial court’s implied findings that McCalope was a vulnerable

witness due to mental disability and that petitioner’s mother and sisters made him

too fearful to testify freely in their presence, that there were concrete examples of

their intimidating behavior, and that McCalope’s fear was credible and genuine. 

Id. The court concluded:

In the present case, the trial court did hold a hearing and, in our

view, reasonably concluded that the public interest in maintaining

an atmosphere free of witness intimidation justified the exclusion

of family members during a limited portion of the examination of a

single witness. In our view, this was a de minimis infringement

upon [respondent]’s right to a public trial that does not require

reversal.

Id. at *15 (citation omitted). 

b. Clearly established federal law

The Sixth Amendment directs, in relevant part, that “‘[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial. . . .’” Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212 (2010) (emphasis added). The

right to a public trial is for the benefit of criminal defendants because it

discourages perjury and ensures that lawyers, judges and witnesses carry out their

functions responsibly. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. But the right is not absolute,

and “may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the

defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting

disclosure of sensitive information.” Id. at 45. In determining if the public can

be excluded at any stage of a criminal trial, courts must apply the following

standards:

[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding

interest that is likely to prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than

necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable

alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate

to support the closure.

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Id. at 48. See also United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.

1989) (Waller requires that, before a court excludes the public from any stage of

a criminal proceeding, the court must (1) provide the defendant with opportunity

to be heard, (2) make factual findings to support closure and (3) consider

reasonable alternatives to closing courtroom). When a court closes a trial to the

public, it also must articulate the particular interest that would be prejudiced if

the court were not closed along with findings such that a reviewing court can

evaluate the propriety of the closure. See Presley, 558 U.S. at 215. 

In Waller, the Supreme Court addressed a total closure of a portion of a

criminal trial. See 467 U.S. 39. Because it did not address the partial closure of

a portion of a criminal trial, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the standards

adopted by the Waller Court do not necessarily govern partial closures. See

Sherlock. 962 F.2d at 1356-57. For partial closures, the Ninth Circuit holds that

only a “substantial,” rather than a “compelling,” reason for the closure is

necessary. Id at 1357. But the trial court still must (1) provided a defendant with

the opportunity to be heard, (2) make factual findings to support the partial

closure and (3) consider reasonable alternatives to the partial closure. Id. at

1357-59. Protecting a witness from harassment and physical harm is a

“substantial” reason for a partial closure of a criminal trial. See United States v.

Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1979).

c. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim that the exclusion of his mother and sisters from the courtroom during

McCalope’s testimony violated his right to a public trial was not contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor

did it involve an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §

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2254(d). 

As noted in Sherlock, the Supreme Court’s decision in Waller addressed a

total closure to the public of a portion of a criminal trial and not a partial closure

to select supporters of the defendant of a portion of a criminal trial. See 962 F.2d

1356-57. Presley did not address a partial closure to select supporters of the

defendant either. Nor have any other Supreme Court cases. It therefore cannot

be said that there is “clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court,” that the California Court of Appeal ruled contrary to, or

unreasonably applied, in rejecting petitioner’s claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Nor can it be said that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of

petitioner’s claim amounted to an objectively unreasonable application of Waller. 

See id. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). The court of

appeal reasonably determinated that protecting McCalope from fear of

harassment and physical harm constituted a substantial reason for the partial

closure. See Sherlock 962 F.2d 1357 (partial closure must be supported by

substantial reason); Hernandez, 608 F.2d at 747-48 (protecting witness from

harassment and physical harm constitutes substantial reason). The record also

shows that the court of appeal reasonably determined that, in accordance with

Waller, the trial court held a hearing and implicitly found that McCalope was a

vulnerable witness and genuinely fearful of petitioner’s mother and sisters. And

while the trial court did not explicitly consider on the record reasonable

alternatives to the partial exclusion, petitioner does not offer any and none are

apparent. Not surprisingly, the court of appeal reasonably determined that the

trial court’s partial closure was narrowly tailored to the interest at hand. See Bell,

2014 WL 7463182, at *14. After all, the closure applied only to the offending

supporters of the accused – petitioner’s mother and two sisters – and only during

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2

The court will not address petitioner’s conclusory claim of actual innocence

because he did not raise before he filed his traverse and it is well established that the

traverse “is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief.” Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994).

32

McCalope’s testimony. Under the circumstances, petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on his claim that the trial court’s exclusion of his mother and

two sisters from the courtroom during McCalope’s testimony violated his right to

a public trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

CONCLUSION 

After careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is satisfied

that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED.2

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a

certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is DENIED because

petitioner has not demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 5, 2016 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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