Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00362-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:741 Shipping

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LT. CMDR RICHARD T. GENGLER )

and CMDR DANIEL S. )

McSEVENEY, )

)

)

)

Plaintiffs/ )

Petitioners, )

)

vs. )

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

THROUGH ITS DEPARTMENT OF )

DEFENSE AND NAVY and )

SECRETARY DONALD C. WINTER, )

)

)

Defendants/ )

Respondents. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-362 OWW/WMW

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS' FEES (Doc. 122)

By motion filed on March 5, 2007, Petitioners moved for an

award of attorneys' fees as prevailing parties pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1). Petitioners

seek attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $115,400.60 due to

1

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 1 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Lewis Brisbois Bisgard & Smith LLP (“Lewis Brisbois”) and 1

$92,295.15 in services and costs provided on a pro bono basis by

attorneys at Bingham McCutchen LLP (“Bingham”).2

The motion was taken under submission after hearing on

August 6, 2007. On October 11, 2007, Petitioners filed a

“Supplemental Declaration of William D. Kissinger and Timothy

Lord Updating Petitioners’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.” On

October 15, 2007, Petitioners filed a “Revised Supplemental

Declaration of William D. Kissinger in Support of Petitioners’

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.” Petitioners assert that their

initial motion for attorneys’ fees documented fees and costs

incurred through February 28, 2007 for services performed by

Bingham and Lewis Brisbois. Petitioners assert that they have

incurred additional attorneys’ fees and costs in connection

finalization of the motion for attorneys’ fees, reviewing

Respondents’ opposition to the motion for attorneys’ fee,

drafting Petitioners’ reply, and preparing for and attending the

August 6, 2007 hearing. Petitioners assert that they have

incurred an additional fees and costs totaling $95,931.43 since

February 28, 2007 for services performed by Bingham and $6,020.00

for services performed by Lewis Brisbois since May 1, 2007,

Lewis Brisbois initially sought $108,540.60 in fees and 1

costs. By supplemental declaration filed on July 24, 2007, Lewis

Brisbois sought recover of additional fees and costs totaling

$6,860.00 for services performed between February 1, 2007 and April

30, 2007.

Petitioners assert that they received approximately $45,000 2

in legal representation from Professor Charles Weisselberg on a pro

bono basis but do not seek recovery for his services.

2

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 2 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

making the total amount sought to be awarded as $310,335.68

($121,420.60 to Lewis Brisbois and $188,915.08 to Bingham). 

Petitioners note that their initial motion for attorneys’ fees

filed on March 5, 2007 advised that they would supplement the

motion with additional fees and costs incurred after February 28,

2007. 

Respondents object to the Supplemental Declaration and

Revised Supplemental Declaration and seek to strike them on

several grounds. First, Petitioners did not obtain leave of

Court to file these supplemental declarations after the motion

for attorneys’ fees was argued and taken under submission. 

Second, Petitioners’ belated filing of these supplemental

declarations precludes any response or challenge to them by

Respondents. Third, the bulk of these additional fees were

incurred by Bingham, who was associated in the case one day

before orders were issued discharging Petitioners from the Navy

and mooting the case. 

Respondents’ objections are well-taken. Petitioners’

statement in a brief filed in March 2007 that they reserved the

right to supplement the fee request does not entitle them to do

so without leave of court months after the motion was argued and

taken under submission, negating Respondents’ right to contest

the supplemental declarations. Petitioners’ supplemental

declarations filed in October 2007 are stricken. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:

(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided

3

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 3 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

by statute, a court shall award a prevailing

party ... fees and other expenses ...

incurred by that party in any civil action

(other than cases sounding in tort) ...

brought ... against the United States ...

unless the court finds that the position of

the United States was substantially justified

or that special circumstances makes an award

unjust.

(B) A party seeking an award of fees and

other expenses shall, within thirty days of

final judgment in the action, submit to the

court an application for fees and other

expenses which shows that the party is a

prevailing party and is eligible to receive

an award under this subsection, and the

amount sought, including an itemized

statement for any attorney or expert witness

representing or appearing on behalf of the

party stating the actual time expended and

the rate at which fees and other expenses

were computed. The party shall also allege

that the position of the United States was

not substantially justified. Whether or not

the position of the United States was

substantially justified shall be determined

on the basis of the record (including the

record with respect to the action or failure

to act by the agency upon which the civil

action is based) which is made in the civil

action for which fees and other expenses are

sought.

A. Prevailing Parties.

To be prevailing parties, Petitioners must meet two

criteria. First, they must achieve a “material alteration of the

legal relationship of the parties.” Second, that alteration must

be “judicially sanctioned.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v.

West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604-605

(2001). 

1. Material Alteration of Legal Relationship.

Petitioners assert that a material alteration of a legal

4

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 4 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

relationship between the parties occurs where the defendant is

required to do something directly benefitting the plaintiff that

the defendant otherwise would not have had to do. Petitioners

rely on Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894 (9 Cir.2005). th

In Carbonell, an alien petitioned for attorneys’ fees under

the EAJA after obtaining a court order incorporating a voluntary

stipulation staying deportation. The Ninth Circuit held in

pertinent part:

Carbonell satisfies the first prong of the

prevailing party test, which requires a

material alteration in the legal relationship

between the parties, as a result of the

parties’ stipulation to a stay of departure. 

The case before the district court primarily

concerned whether Carbonell was entitled to a

stay of deportation until the BIA

reconsidered the question whether his due

process rights had been violated, thus

requiring his case to be reopened. Before

the district court issued its order which

incorporated the stay of deportation, the INS

had the authority to deport Carbonell

immediately. Had the INS done so prior to

the BIA’s deciding his motion to reopen his

case, the BIA would have dismissed his case

and Carbonell would have had no further

recourse. Under the stipulation, however,

the government was required to refrain from

deporting Carbonell for 45 days pending the

BIA’s decision on his motion to reopen. The

stipulation for the stay of deportation thus

‘materially altered the legal relationship

between the parties, because the defendants

were required to do something directly

benefitting the plaintiff[] that they

otherwise would not have had to do.’ ....

... In the instant case, it is irrelevant

that Carbonell’s underlying effective

assistance claim was not resolved, and that

he, therefore, remained under a final order

of deportation. Under the stipulation for a

stay, Carbonell received much of the relief

5

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 5 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

he sought in the district court and thus met

the first requirement to be deemed a

prevailing party.

429 F.3d at 900.

Petitioners contend that the facts in this case parallel

those of Carbonell. Petitioners argue that, at the time this

action was filed, Respondents had the power to deploy active-duty

Naval Officers and Aviators as they saw fit by issuing lawful

orders by virtue of the President’s power as commander-in-chief,

Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850), and by virtue of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 892, allowing

punishment by court marshal for failing to obey any lawful order

or regulation. Petitioners refer to Respondents’ arguments that

“[o]rganizing and mobilizing the military in a time of national

emergency, and protecting the national security of the United

States, are core Executive Branch functions.” (Doc. 25 at 5). 

By refusing to grant Petitioners’ requests for release from

active duty, Petitioners argue, Respondents intended to maintain

legal authority over Petitioners, including the ability to deploy

Petitioners through the issuance of lawful orders.

Petitioners argue that Respondents gave up their right to

deploy Petitioners outside the United States by a series of 

orders entered by this Court. 

Petitioners refer to the Order approving the Stipulation Re

Ex Parte Motion for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order filed on

April 7, 2006 (Doc. 12), wherein it was agreed inter alia that

“Defendants shall maintain Petitioners’ non-deployable status

6

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 6 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

with the Navy through July 10, 2006 and will not deploy

Petitioners to Iraq or any location outside the Continental

United States prior to July 10, 2006.” By Order filed on June

12, 2006, the Court approved the parties’ stipulation extending

Petitioners’ non-deployable status through August 9, 2006 (Doc.

14). Petitioners refer to the Order filed on August 11, 2006

(Doc. 37), denying Petitioners’ application for a temporary

restraining order to order their immediate discharge and to not

change their deployment status, but requiring Respondents “to

give at least 20 days notice of any intent to change Petitioners’

current non-deployment status so they can make application for

appropriate relief to the Court should that occur ....” Finally,

Petitioners refer to the Order filed on November 3, 2006 (Doc.

107) granting Gengler’s motion that he be released from the

custody of the Respondents from November 4, 2006 to December 8,

2006. Petitioners refer to Finding of Fact 21 and Conclusions of

Law 9 and 12of that Order:

21. The government further argues the court

has no authority to determine the legality of

the contract in dispute, the Navy’s actions,

and cannot meddle in the Navy’s conduct of

its business.

...

9. The Court also finds that there are, at a

minimum, substantial questions going to the

merits of the petition. It is established

that the terms of service contracts of

enlisted personnel are governed by contract

law standards and are enforceable. See,

e.g., Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 549, 554

(9 Cir.2005). Though there is no case th

directly on point, at least one district

court has held that an officer’s agreement to

7

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 7 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

serve additional time as a result of

educational programs is also contractual in

nature, even though an officer is a

Presidential appointee. See Wallace v.

Brown, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156 *20 n.2

(S.D.N.Y.1979).

...

12. The exceptional circumstances of this

petition to resolve Petitioner’s right to be

released from active duty include that

further delay renders nugatory his good faith

expectations and belief as to release from

active duty on which he relied to his

detriment and will obviate any relief in this

case.

Petitioners assert that these orders materially altered the

legal relationship between Petitioners and Respondents by

modifying Respondents’ legal authority to deploy Petitioners at

will through the issuance of lawful deployment orders:

First, the requirement that Respondents

refrain from deploying Petitioners outside of

the Continental United States for

approximately four months directly benefitted

Petitioners as their temporary restraining

order sought an order ‘preventing Defendants

from changing Petitioners’ status from nondeployable to deployable or otherwise sending

them to ... any location outside the United

States.’ (Doc. 2 at 2.) Second, the order

requiring Respondents to ‘give at least 20

days’ notice of any intent to change

Plaintiffs’ current non-deployment status so

they can make application for appropriate

relief to the Court should that occur’

directly benefitted Petitioners as the

language itself gave the Petitioners an

opportunity to seek relief if Respondents

wished to exercise their authority to deploy

Petitioners. Lastly, the Court’s Order

granting Petitioner’s bail motion directly

benefitted ... Gengler as he received the

relief he requested in his habeas corpus

petition. He was released from Respondents’

custody and from active duty, which barred

8

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 8 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Respondents from exercising their authority

over him for the time specified in the bail

order. Notably, Petitioner Gengler offered

the Respondents a mechanism for him to attend

the University of Chicago and not alter the

legal relationship between the parties. With

the Court’s encouragement, he proposed that

the Navy grant him a series of leaves that

would still maintain his active duty status. 

The Respondents, however, rejected that

proposal (Doc. 107, at 10), necessitating the

ruling by this Court that altered Gengler’s

relationship with the Navy by releasing him

from the Navy’s custody.

Respondents argue that Petitioners are not “prevailing

parties” in this action. 

Respondents cite Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112

(1992). In Hobby, the Supreme Court held that a civil rights

plaintiff who recovers damages in any amount, whether

compensatory or nominal, qualifies as a prevailing party under 42

U.S.C. § 1988, but that the court should consider the extent of

plaintiff’s recovery in fixing a reasonable attorneys’ fee award,

and that a plaintiff who received only nominal damages of one

dollar on a claim for $17 million is not entitled to attorneys’

fees under Section 1988. Respondents rely on the following

statement in Farrar:

[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil

rights plaintiff must obtain at least some

relief on the merits of his claim. The

plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment

against the defendant from whom the fees are

sought ... or comparable relief through a

consent decree or settlement. Whatever

relief the plaintiff secures must directly

benefit him at the time of the judgment or

settlement ... Otherwise the judgment or

settlement cannot be said to ‘affec[t] the

behavior of the defendant toward the

9

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 9 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

plaintiff.’ ... Only under these

circumstances can civil rights litigation

effect ‘the material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties’ and thereby

transform the plaintiff into a prevailing

party ... In short, a plaintiff ‘prevails’

when actual relief on the merits of his claim

materially alters the legal relationship

between the parties by modifying the

defendant’s behavior in a way that directly

benefits the plaintiff.

506 U.S. at 111-112. 

Respondents also cite Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760

(1987):

Respect for ordinary language requires that a

plaintiff receive at least some relief on the

merits of his claim before he can be said to

prevail ... Helms obtained no relief. 

Because of the defendants’ official immunity

he received no damages award. No injunction

or declaratory judgment was entered in his

favor. Nor did Helms obtain relief without

benefit of a formal judgment - for example,

through a consent decree or settlement ...

The most that he obtained was an

interlocutory ruling that his complaint

should not have been dismissed for failure to

state a constitutional claim. That is not

the stuff of which legal victories are made.

See also Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 759 (1980)(procedural

and evidentiary rulings may affect the disposition on the merits,

but are themselves not matters on which a party can prevail for

purposes of shifting attorneys’ fees).

Respondents also cite Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc.,

supra, 532 U.S. 598; where a rest home which operated assisted

living residences, failed an inspection by the West Virginia fire

marshal’s office because some residents were incapable of selfpreservation as defined by state law. After receiving orders to

10

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 10 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

close its facilities, Buckhannon filed suit in federal court

against the state and state agencies seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief that the self-preservation requirement violated

the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990. Respondents agreed to stay the orders

pending the court’s resolution. The West Virginia legislature

then eliminated the self-preservation requirement and the

district court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the action

as moot. Buckhannon moved for attorneys’ fees as the prevailing

party under the FHAA and the ADA, basing their entitlement to

attorneys’ fees on the “catalyst theory,” which posits that a

plaintiff is a prevailing party if it achieves the desired result

because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the

defendant’s conduct. The Supreme Court ruled that the “catalyst

theory” is not a permissible basis for the award of attorneys’

fees under the FHAA or the ADA. In so ruling, the Supreme Court

stated:

We have only awarded attorney’s fees where

the plaintiff has received a judgment on the

merits ... or obtained a court-ordered

consent decree ... - we have not awarded

attorney’s fees where the plaintiff has

secured the reversal of a directed verdict

... or acquired a judicial pronouncement that

the defendant has violated the Constitution

unaccompanied by ‘judicial relief,’ ... Never

have we awarded attorney’s fees for a

nonjudicial ‘alteration of actual

circumstances.’ ... While urging an expansion

of our precedents on this front, the

dissenters would simultaneously abrogate the

‘merit’ requirement of our prior cases and

award attorney’s fees where the plaintiff’s

claim ‘was at least colorable’ and ‘not ...

11

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 11 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

groundless.’ ... We cannot agree that the

term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes federal

courts to award attorney’s fees to a

plaintiff who, by simply filing a

nonfrivolous but nonetheless potentially

meritless lawsuit (it will never be

determined), has reached the ‘sought-after

destination’ without obtaining any judicial

relief.

532 U.S. at 606. 

Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Carbonell is distinguishable because Carbonell was under an order

of deportation at the time he obtained a court order

incorporating a voluntary stipulation with the INS staying the

deportation. Here, Respondents contend:

Petitioners had no orders to be deployed

overseas. (Gunter Decl. ¶ 6.) Nor was it

likely Petitioners would be selected for an

assignment overseas. (Doc. 25, Attach. 1, ¶

4.) Instead, Petitioners were scheduled to

stay at VX-9 for the remaining year, since

VX-9 was undermanned for pilots. (Gunter

Decl. ¶ 6.). The stipulation upon which

Petitioners rely maintained their current

non-deployable status, in effect, maintaining

the status quo. In reaching this

stipulation, there was no decision whatsoever

on the merits of Petitioners’ claims. The

stipulation provided Petitioners with the

same relief they already had - assignment to

VX-9 ....

Thus, the stipulation did not materially

alter the legal status of the parties; nor

did the Court’s order requiring the Navy to

give Petitioners 20 days’ notice of any

intent to change Petitioners’ current nondeployable status so that they could make an

application for possible relief.

Petitioner Gengler did obtain a temporary

one-month discharge from the Navy to complete

his first term of business school. However,

this limited interim relief does not alter

12

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 12 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the fact that the Court never ruled on the

merits, recognized at the hearing that there

was no clear right of discharge, and never

ordered the relief sought in the habeas

petitions - Petitioners’ permanent discharge

from the Navy. 

Respondents cite Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517,

524 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 131 (2008): th

Under these facts, to qualify as a prevailing

party under § 1988(b), we hold that the

plaintiff (1) must win a preliminary

injunction, (2) based upon an unambiguous

indication of probable cause of the merits of

the plaintiff’s claims as opposed to a mere

balancing of the equities in favor of the

plaintiff, (3) that causes the defendant to

moot the action, which prevents the plaintiff

from obtaining final relief on the merits. 

Such a test satisfies Buckhannon because it

requires that a party obtain a judicial

ruling which results in a material change in

the legal relationship between the parties. 

It also does not implicate the ‘catalyst

theory,’ which the Supreme Court struck down

in Buckhannon, because this test grants

prevailing party status only when the

defendant moots the plaintiff’s action in

response to a court order, not just in

response to the filing of a lawsuit.

Petitioners reply that Respondents attempt to distinguish

Carbonell is unavailing: “[U]nder Carbonell what matters is that

the Navy lost the authority to deploy Petitioners outside the

Continental United States, not whether the Navy intended to

exercise that authority.” Petitioners further contend that

Respondents’ assertion is contradicted by the statement of

Respondents’ counsel at the hearing on November 1, 2006:

The government has in good faith, from the

beginning of this case, originally tried to

work it out. The only stipulation we had was

not to deploy these officers to Iraq because

13

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 13 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

that was the concern with the original

temporary restraining order - motion for

temporary restraining order. It was to

prevent them from being deployed to Iraq

because they were going to go for either six

or 12-month deployments.

So we, in a spirit of cooperation, agreed to

find replacements there. I got it cleared

through the Navy to do that.

(Doc. 124 at 87:1-10).

Petitioners further argue that the Supreme Court cases cited

by Respondents do not negate their status as prevailing parties. 

Petitioners cite Ninth Circuit authority that a grant of a

preliminary injunction may satisfy the “prevailing party”

requirements. 

In Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th

Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923 (2003), the Ninth Circuit

held:

A preliminary injunction issued by a judge

carries all the ‘judicial imprimatur’

necessary to satisfy Buckhannon. In this

case, the County was prohibited from

introducing Watson’s report at the

termination hearing for one reason and one

reason only: because Judge Timlin said so. 

Under Williams, Watson was a prevailing

party. And under Buckhannon, he was not a

mere catalyst of an extra-judicial voluntary

change in conduct. There was nothing

voluntary about the County’s inability to use

the report.

We recognize that there will be occasions

when the plaintiff scores an early victory by

securing a preliminary injunction, then loses

on the merits as the case plays out and

judgment is entered against him - a case of

winning a battle but losing the war. The

plaintiff would not be a prevailing party in

that circumstance. But this case is

14

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 14 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

different because Watson’s claim for

permanent injunctive relief was not decided

on the merits. The preliminary injunction

was not dissolved for lack of entitlement. 

Rather, Watson’s claim for permanent

injunction was rendered moot when his

employment termination hearing was over,

after the preliminary injunction had done its

job.

See also Carbonell, supra, 429 F.3d at 899: “[A]lthough Carbonell

obtained relief that was not an enforceable judgment on the

merits or a consent decree, he nonetheless can qualify as a

prevailing party.” But see Center for Biological Diversity v.

Marina Development Co., 535 F.3d 1026, 1037 n.16 (9 Cir.2008): th

The mere fact that the Center achieved a

preliminary injunction will not support an

award of fees. See Sole v. Wyner, ___ U.S.

___, 127 S.Ct. 2188, 2195 ...

(2007)(‘Prevailing party status, we hold,

does not attend achievement of a preliminary

injunction that is reversed, dissolved or

otherwise undone by the final decision in the

same case.’)

Petitioners argue that this line of cases is unaffected by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74

(2007). 

In Sole, an organizer of an event in which participants were

to form a peace symbol with their nude bodies at a state beach

brought a Section 1983 action against state officials seeking

preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting state officials

from interfering with the event or with future such events. The

district court granted a preliminary injunction but, following

the event, denied the motion for a permanent injunction. The

district court awarded attorneys’ fees to the organizer based on

15

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 15 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding

in pertinent part:

Wyner ... urges that despite the denial of a

permanent injunction, she got precisely what

she wanted when she commenced this

litigation: permission to create the nude

peace symbol without state interference. 

That fleeting success, however, did not

establish that she prevailed on the gravamen

of her plea for injunctive relief, i.e., her

charge that state officials had denied her

and other participants in the peace symbol

display ‘the right to engage in

constitutionally protected expressive

activities.’ ... Prevailing party status, we

hold, does not attend achievement of a

preliminary injunction that is reversed,

dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final

decision in the same case.

551 U.S. at 83. However, the Supreme Court cautioned:

We express no view on whether, in the absence

of a final decision on the merits of a claim

for permanent injunctive relief, success in

gaining a preliminary injunction may

sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees. 

We decide only that a plaintiff who gains a

preliminary injunction does not qualify for

an award of counsel fees under § 1988(b) if

the merits of the case are ultimately decided

against her.

Id. at 86.

With regard to the stipulated Order temporarily releasing

Gengler from Respondents’ custody, Petitioners argue that “though

the bail order did not then effect a permanent discharge, it

released him from active duty and achieved some of the relief ...

Gengler sought in his habeas corpus case.” 

Whether Petitioners were prevailing parties under the

governing standards is a close and difficult question. 

16

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 16 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioners’ objectives in the lawsuit were twofold: (1) to

prevent their deployment to Iraq and (2) to secure their

immediate discharge from the Navy. By Court Orders, Respondents’

power to deploy Petitioners was abrogated, when no orders for

Petitioners’ deployment existed. That the Court Orders permitted

Petitioners to remain at VX-9 does not detract from the fact that

Respondents were prevented from issuing orders for Petitioners’

overseas deployment. Petitioner’s discharge was not achieved. 

2. Judicially Sanctioned.

Respondents do not respond to this aspect of the motion. 

From this silence it is inferred that Respondents concede that

Petitioners have demonstrated this prong of the “prevailing

party” test given the Court orders described above. Through this

series of orders, Plaintiffs’ non-deployable status was

maintained until their claims were mooted by their discharge

after eight years, not the seven years their contracts provided,

after they entered into pilot training and service agreements

with the Navy. Gengler also obtained a one month separation to

start graduate business school. Plaintiffs did not achieve

discharge after seven years in accordance with the contract term. 

Their success was limited. 

B. Substantially Justified.

Respondents bear the burden of proving substantial

justification. United States v. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d

1513, 1517 (9 Cir.1991). “A position is ‘substantially th

justified’ if it is ‘justified in substance or in the main,’ that

17

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 17 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

is, if it has a ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’” United

States v. One 1984 Ford Van, Etc., 873 F.2d 1281, 1282 (9th

Cir.1989), quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). 

A position can be justified even though it is not correct. 

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 566 n.2. “In evaluating the

government’s position to determine whether it was substantially

justified, we look to the record of both the underlying

government conduct at issue and the totality of circumstances

present before and during litigation.” Barry v. Bower, 825 F.2d

1324, 1330 (9 Cir.1987). The government’s position must be th

substantially justified at each stage of the proceedings. Corbin

v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9 Cir.1998). The government may th

sustain its burden by showing its position is a novel but

credible extension or interpretation of the law. Petition of

Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1042 (9 Cir.1985). That the government th

lost does not raise a presumption that its position was not

substantially justified and the government need not show that it

had a substantial likelihood of prevailing. Id.

Petitioners argue that Respondents cannot demonstrate that

their position before and during this litigation was

substantially justified under these standards: 

First and foremost, the Navy cannot justify

drafting Service Agreements with seven-year

terms, and then disregarding those terms. 

During discovery, the Navy admitted that at

the time the Service Agreements were drafted

in 1996, the Respondents ‘had knowledge of or

were otherwise aware of the existence of the

eight-year statutory service term ...

codified as 10 U.S.C. § 653.’ (Lopez Decl.,

18

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 18 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Ex. A, Resp. to Req. for Admis. Nos. 97,

107.) If the Respondents truly believed that

10 U.S.C. § 653 set forth unwaivable eightyear active duty service obligations, they

could not be justified in drafting Service

Agreements that obligated the Petitioners to

serve only seven years. The Respondents may

try to assert that its conduct in drafting

the Service Agreements was due to some sort

of good-faith error. It should not be heard

to do so. During discovery, the Respondents

stonewalled on this point, failing to provide

‘any documents or information showing why the

Navy executed Service Agreements with sevenyear active duty requirements for fixed-wing

pilots after 1989, when Congress passed

section 653.’ (Doc. 114, Joint Scheduling

Conference Statement at 3).

...

Of course, once the Navy decided that it had

made a mistake in drafting the Service

Agreements for the Petitioners and an unknown

number of other pilots, the Navy did nothing

to rectify its mistake. It did not inform

Petitioners of the error. It did not try to

accommodate in any meaningful way the

Petitioners’ reasonable expectations about

the length of their Navy service.

Nor does it appear that the Navy has

consistently interpreted § 653. In drafting 

the Service Agreements, the Navy may have

believed that the provision was not

mandatory, and that the Navy could enter into

contracts with different terms. We do not

know what the Navy believed as it drafted the

Service Agreements; the Navy refused to

disclose any information or documents on this

point in discovery. We do know, however,

that even after it decided that the statute

contained a mandatory provision, the Navy has

acted inconsistently.

The Petitioners’ requests for release from

active duty were denied by the Navy on the

claim that it did not ‘have the authority to

waive Title 10 law and that “misinformation

by a government authority does not form the

basis or justification for violating a

19

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 19 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

statute.”’ (Doc. 59, Ex. 32). But the

Respondents themselves later indicated that

the provision was not mandatory. In the

administrative process, the Navy and the

Secretary of the Navy had the authority to

grant Petitioners’ RAD requests, but the BCNR

‘was not persuaded that such authority should

have been exercised.’ (Doc. 56, Ex. 7). 

More tellingly, even after deciding that §

653 was mandatory, the Navy has discharged

fixed-wing jet pilots prior to their service

of seven years on active duty. The

Respondents were forced to make this

concession during discovery: ‘The United

States admits that its IRAD program and

Voluntary Separation Program resulted in or

will result in the discharge or release of

Naval Aviators prior to the completion of the

applicable statutory service terms contained

in 10 U.S.C. § 653.’ (Lopez Decl., Ex. A,

Resp. to Req. for Admis. No. 86.). The Navy

also admitted that it granted individual RAD

requests of at least five fixed-wing jet

pilots prior to the service of eight years on

active duty. (Lopez Decl., Ex. A., Resp. to

Req. Admis. Nos. 77, 78, 81-85).

After the Petitions were filed in this Court,

Respondents took such positions as ‘the

plaintiffs’ enlistment agreements is [sic]

simply irrelevant’ (Doc. 25 at 6) and that

‘an officer’s commission is indefinite in

term, and an officer serves at the pleasure

of the President and can only resign a

commission effective upon acceptance, which

means, a court may not order that the

resignation be accepted and the officer

discharged.’ (Doc. 78, at 7-17). The Court

rejected all of these claims noting, ‘Under

this position [of the Navy], the length of

time of active duty service is limited by

neither the Service Agreement nor by § 653.’ 

(Doc. 107 at 9.) The Respondents also argued

that ‘the court has no authority to determine

the legality of the contract in dispute, the

Navy’s actions, and cannot meddle in the

Navy’s conduct of its business’ - a position

that was also rejected by this Court. Thus,

Respondents will not be able to meet their

high burden of proving that their actions

20

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 20 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

were substantially justified.

This Court’s bail order establishes that

Respondents’ positions were without

justification ....

Specifically, the Court found that the

‘unusual and exceptional circumstances’

present here were created by the Navy through

its error in drafting the Service Agreement.’

(Doc. 107 at 13. Emphasis added.) In fact

the Court was ‘troubled by the lack of

disclosure, in a contract drafted by the

Navy, which results in a mistake from which

the Navy seeks to benefit, by considering the

express term relating to time of service on

active duty to be invalid and unenforceable.’ 

Id. at 15. The Court stated that it was the

Navy that ‘knew or should have known of the

existence of § 653 and of any conflict

between their Service Agreement and

provisions of § 653 and the minimum term of

active duty’ - not Petitioners. (Id. at 13.) 

The Court further held that the Service

Agreement created a ‘reasonable and

justifiable expectation that [Petitioner]

would only be required to serve on active

duty for seven years after his designation as

a Naval Aviator.’ Id. at 14. Finally, the

Court found that the ‘Navy did not explain or

take any action to resolve the conflict

between the active duty term of the service

agreement and § 653.’ Id.

Respondents argue that the record establishes that their

position was substantially justified under the governing

standards:

Nothing more than negligence has been

established with respect to the incorrect

term in the Service Agreements. There was

absolutely no evidence presented that the

Navy intentionally entered into the Service

Agreements with erroneous terms. Moreover,

Petitioners’ winging orders, executed without

question, contained the correct eight-year

term of service. (Gunter Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. A.) 

The Navy has explained why some officers were

discharged prior to completion of their

21

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 21 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

eight-year terms and why Petitioners’

requests were denied. (See Gunter Decl. ¶¶

4-5 & Ex. C.) In short, the manpower needs

of the Navy changed in 2004, when

Petitioners’ [sic] made their RAD requests,

as a result of the impact of Operation Iraqi

Freedom and the long-term effects of the

Global War on Terror. (Gunter Decl. ¶ 5.) 

In addition, officers who had fallen ‘off

track’ in their careers (which did not

include Petitioners) were discharged through

voluntary incentive programs and involuntary

RAD programs. (Gunter Decl. ¶ 5.)

The Navy has further explained why its legal

analysis with respect to the enforceability

of 10 U.S.C. § 653 was modified. (See Hester

Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Given that the Court has

recognized there is no case directly on point

with the facts here, the Navy’s Office of

Legal Counsel can hardly be criticized for

further researching and evaluating the issue

and ultimately changing its opinion. Neither

legal counsel’s initial opinion or its

modified opinion was contrary to any

established law.

Petitioners set forth sweeping statements

concerning the Court’s purported rejection of

the United States’ arguments in this

litigation. In fact, the Court has

recognized on multiple occasions that the law

is unsettled in this area and has issued two

published decisions on the United States’

motions to dismiss ... With respect to the

United States’ argument that a contrary term

in a service agreement cannot trump a federal

statute, set forth in the first motion to

dismiss, the Court denied the motion without

prejudice to it being renewed following

further factual development. (See Doc. 31.) 

Given the novelty of the issues, and the lack

of controlling case law, the United States’

position in these motions was substantially

justified ....

...

The mere fact that Petitioner Gengler

prevailed in the bail hearing does not create

a presumption that the United States’

22

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 22 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

position was not substantially justified ...

The hearing on Petitioner Gengler’s bail

request consumed several hours. The Court

recognized that the case was close, the

United States had not acted unreasonably in

trying to resolve the case, and some of the

exceptional circumstances were self-created

by Petitioner Gengler. (Doc. 124 ...

79:1015, 80:11-24, 81:16-18, 82:15-18.)

Petitioners reply that the Navy bears full responsibility

for creating “this whole mess” by drafting Service Agreements

with seven-year active duty terms. To the extent Respondents

seek to rely on “new evidence” in arguing that the Navy was

merely negligent in drafting Service Agreements that were

contrary to the statute, Petitioners assert that even a good

faith mistake is not a defense to an EAJA fees motion because the

government’s action must be justified so as to satisfy a

reasonable person. Petitioners further cite In re Application of

Mgndichian, 312 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1262 (C.D.Cal.2003):

Good faith alone, however, does not

demonstrate that the government’s decision to

deny petitioner’s claim and litigate the case

was substantially justified. Taylor v.

United States, 815 F.2d 249, 254 (3rd

Cir.1987)(Becker, J., concurring)(‘ ... we

are not denying attorney’s fees because of

the government’s good faith. Good faith or

laudatory motives are not a defense to an

EAJA claim’); Truckers United for Safety v.

Mead, 201 F.Supp.2d 52,56 (D.D.C.2002)(‘...

the Government’s arguments that its “good

faith belief” equates to substantial

justification of its actions and that the

decisions of other courts provide substantial

justification are without merit’), rev’d on

other grounds, 329 F.3d 891 (D.C.Cir.2003);

Cf. Pierce, supra, 487 U.S. at 563 ... (‘to

be “substantially justified” means, of

course, more than merely undeserving of

sanctions for frivolousness’).

23

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 23 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Petitioners further argue that the government concedes that

their requests were denied in March 2004 on the basis of the “now

repudiated Hester memorandum.” Petitioners assert:

Even though it was disavowed, Mr. Hester’s

memorandum was sent to the BCNR by the Navy

Personnel Command with a recommendation that

the Board follow it. The Navy Personnel

Command did not advise the BCNR that its own

legal counsel had, instead, concluded that

‘the Navy was not necessarily bound by the

eight-year statute.’ (Hester Decl., ¶ 5). 

The BCNR asked Petitioners’ counsel to

respond to Mr. Hester’s March 18 memorandum. 

And the BCNR relied upon the memorandum. The

BCNR ‘substantially concurred’ with Hester’s

finding ‘that [the] eight-year obligation was

established by statute and not subject to

change by contractual agreement.’ 

(Weisselberg Supp. Decl., ¶ 14 & accompanying

Exhibits B, C, D, E & F). 

Petitioners argue that Respondents cannot be “substantially

justified” in using a legal memorandum that the author and his

office disavowed. Petitioners cite Wilderness Soc. v. Babbitt, 5

F.3d 383 (9 Cir.1993): th

The Refuge Manager’s report did not foreclose

the possibility that the Service could

formulate a grazing plan that would be

compatible with purposes of the Refuge. 

Based upon this report, however, the Service

had a duty to investigate the compatibility

of grazing with the Refuge’s purposes prior

to permitting grazing on the Refuge. 

Nonetheless, the Service continued its same

practices, issuing grazing permits for 1990

without any compatibility determination. It

made little headway in formulating a new

management plan prior to the initiation of

the Wilderness Society lawsuit in 1991. In

light of the Refuge Manager’s report, we

cannot find that the Service’s actions were

substantially justified.

Petitioners further argue that Respondents’ positions were

24

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 24 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

not substantially justified:

The Navy took inconsistent positions

throughout these proceedings, insisting at

times that the statute necessarily

invalidates the Service Agreements (i.e., the

Navy has no discretion) but then sometimes

demonstrating that the Navy had some kind of

amorphous, unexplained discretion to release

pilots earlier than eight years. Because the

BCNR ‘substantially concurred’ in Mr.

Hester’s conclusion that the statute

contained no exceptions, however, and because

this conclusion was the basis for the Navy’s

final administrative actions, Petitioners

were required to go to great lengths to prove

that the position was wrong and that the Navy

should be estopped from taking it. 

Petitioners were required to show that the

Navy regularly demonstrated that it had

authority to release pilots prior to the

completion of the eight-year statutory term. 

Through discovery, the Navy was forced to

admit that it granted other pilots’ requests

for release at seven years from active duty

and also released pilots through the VSP and

IRAD Programs. Though the Navy now offers a

variety of reasons for exercising its

discretion to release these other aviators,

Respondents have never explained why signing

the Petitioners’ Service Agreements was not a

valid exercise of such authority. If, as Mr.

Hester belatedly admits, ‘the Navy was not

necessarily bound by the eight-year statute’

(Hester Decl., ¶ 5), nothing prevented the

Navy from signing Service Agreements with

seven-year terms. Even Mr. Hester’s recent

declaration does not provide details of the

Navy’s ‘changed’ position. Nor does it

attempt to explain why a Navy not bound by

the statute would not be free to contract for

a seven-year term.

Finally, with regard to Respondents’ position that the Court

recognized on multiple occasions that the law in this area is

unsettled, Petitioners cite Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255,

1261 (9 Cir.2001)(“[T]here is no per se rule that EAJA fees th

25

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 25 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

cannot be awarded where the government’s litigation position

contains an issue of first impression”) and United States v.

Marolf, 277 F.3d 1156, 1163 n.2 (9 Cir.2002)(“[W]hether an th

issue is one of first impression is but one factor to be

considered; it is not dispositive”).

Respondents have not carried their burden of demonstrating

substantial justification. Respondents’ positions during this

litigation were not justified “in substance or the main” because

they had no reasonable basis both in fact and law. The case was

precipitated by the Navy’s mistake in the term of its contract

with Petitioners. Respondents were unable to show by clearly

established law that Petitioners were not entitled to enforce the

written contract in accordance with its terms. Based on the lack

of certainty in the law, Petitioners achieved limited success in

forestalling their deployment to Iraq. 

C. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees.

Under the EAJA, attorneys’ fees are set at the market rate,

but capped at $125 per hour “unless the court determines that an

increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved, justifies a higher fee”. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).

1. Statutory Cap.

In the Ninth Circuit, three requirements must be satisfied

before the court can exceed this statutory limit: “First, the

attorney must possess distinctive knowledge and skills developed

through a practice specialty. Second, those distinctive skills

26

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 26 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

must be needed in the litigation. Lastly, those skills must not

be available elsewhere at the statutory rate.” Love v. Reilly,

924 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9 Cir.1991). th

In arguing that Petitioners are entitled to a higher hourly

rate, Petitioners submit the Declaration of Timothy R. Lord, a

partner of Lewis Brisbois Bisgard & Smith LLP. Mr. Lord avers in

pertinent part that he was a trial attorney with the United

States Department of Justice from 1992 until 2001 in the DOJ’s

Civil Division, Torts Branch, Admiralty/Aviation Section. ¶ 4. 

Mr. Lord further avers:

5. My 15-year career includes the first nine

with DOJ where I also litigated well over 100

cases in over 25 federal District Courts

throughout the nation and handled numerous

appeals in various Circuit Courts of Appeals,

and on two occasions, assisted the Solicitor

General’s Office at DOJ in briefing two cases

that came before the United States Supreme

Court.

6. My clients at DOJ included Departments of

the United States Military, including the

Navy, when the government’s litigated conduct

implicated admiralty jurisdiction. As part

of my duties, I worked closely with local

United States Attorneys, Navy Jag [sic] and

other government agency counsel on numerous

cases involving contract dispute actions, one

of which I tried in the District Court of

Maryland. I also represented dozens of

seamen and litigated other personal injury

actions where terms of employment contracts

with the government were at issue.

7. My experience at DOJ provided the

necessary, if not unique, experience and

knowledge needed to undertake the

representation of Petitioners in this action. 

This includes knowledge of the myriad of

unique procedural requirements and law

applicable to actions against the United

27

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 27 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

States based on government employment

contracts. My familiarity with and

understanding of the litigation practices of

the United States Attorneys and their clients

and counsel was a unique qualification for

representation of the Petitioners in this

case.

8. In private practice, I have developed a

specialty practice in federal litigation and

government contracts and I have authored

publications in this area of law. I have

represented numerous clients that have either

brought suit against the government or have

been sued by the government on contract

claims.

...

12. My minimum hourly rate for handling

litigation involving the United States

Government is $225.00. In this case, my

hourly rate was discounted to $200.00 per

hour in deference to the Petitioners’

financial situation. Associate, Jeffrey

Stoltz, billed a minimal amount of time at

his normal rate of $150.00 per hour. Mr.

Stoltz [who had been a college roommate of

Petitioner McSeveney] had represented

Petitioners on a pro bono basis at the

Administrative level and was therefore

uniquely suited to assist in the early stages

of litigation.

Petitioners also submit the Declaration of William D. Kissinger,

a partner of Bingham McCutchen. Mr. Kissinger avers in pertinent

part:

2. Bingham has been involved in this lawsuit

since November 2006. Since that time I have

been the lead attorney at Bingham

representing Petitioners in this matter. 

Bingham has represented a number of military

reserve officers and enlisted soldiers in the

past as part of its pro bono practice.

3. ... From 1997-2001, I worked for the

United States Department of State in

Washington in the Office of Legal Adviser. 

28

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 28 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

From 2001-2203, I was senior Deputy Legal

Affairs Secretary to California Governor Gray

Davis. I returned to private practice in

2003, I returned to my former partnership,

which had become Bingham McCutchen, where I

now specialize in energy and environmental

litigation matters as well as a general

litigation practice. My general litigation

practice has included frequent pro bono

representations that have included petitions

for attorneys fees following the successful

prosecution of these matters. As co-counsel

for Petitioners, I have experience in the

litigation matters involved in this

litigation.

4. I was first contacted about this case in

November, 2006. Charles Weisselberg, cocounsel for Petitioners Gengler and

McSeveney, sought my advice and assistance to

finish discovery and prepare the case for an

evidentiary hearing. In light of a similar

matter my firm was handling at the time,

Bingham McCutchen agreed to serve as cocounsel on a pro bono basis. Working with

Mr. Lord and Mr. Weisselberg, Bingham

attorneys reviewed and planned discovery,

consulted with the Petitioners and cocounsel, conducted extensive legal research,

and engaged in many other tasks as the case

moved forward towards an evidentiary hearing. 

I anticipated that we would use our

Washington D.C. office to aid in discovery.

5. I staffed this case as I would have any

other case of this size handled by my firm,

dividing the work into issue areas and

discrete projects. I worked with and

supervised more junior Bingham attorneys who

worked on this matter. I am informed and

believe the following are the professional

backgrounds of these individuals.

6. Jennifer Lopez is a senior associate at

Bingham. She graduated from ... the

University of Southern California School of

Law in 2001. Jennifer has significant

experience will all aspects of litigation at

the federal and state levels. She has been

an associate on this case since Bingham

became co-counsel on this case in November

29

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 29 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2006. She has taken the lead on drafting

motions, preparing for and will attend the

hearing on Respondents’ motion to dismiss on

April 2, 2007 and preparing for and will

attend the hearing on Petitioners’ motion for

attorneys’ fees on April 2, 2007 [sic].

7. David Beach is an associate at Binghan. 

He graduated from ... the University of

California, Hastings College of the Law in

2003. David assisted in research and

drafting Petitioners’ motion for attorneys’

fees. David has significant experience with

habeas corpus proceedings, having prosecuted

a similar matter in 2006.

8. Zak Smith is an associate at Bingham. He

graduated from. ... the University of

California at Los Angeles School of Law in

2003. Zak assisted in research and drafting

Petitioners’ motion for attorneys’ fees. Zak

has considerable experience with all aspects

of litigation at the federal and state

levels.

9. Briana Lynn Morgan is an associate at

Bingham. She graduated from ... Hastings

College of the Law in 2004. Briana assisted

in research regarding Respondents’ motion to

dismiss. Briana has experience with all

aspects of litigation at the federal and

state levels.

According to Paragraph 13 of Mr. Kissinger’s declaration his

hourly rate was $500 in 2006 and $540 in 2007; Ms. Lopez’s hourly

rate was $395 in 2006 and $440 in 2007; Mr. Beach’s and Mr.

Smith’s hourly rates were $340 in 2006 and $395 in 2007; and Ms.

Morgan’s hourly rate was $255 in 2006 and $270 in 2007. 

In support of their request to exceed the statutory cap,

Petitioners submit the Declaration of Robert Rubin. Mr. Rubin

avers that he is currently the Legal Director of the Lawyers’

Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area and that

30

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 30 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

he has practiced for the past 25 years in the area of complex

federal and state civil rights litigation. Mr. Rubin further

avers:

5. Since graduating from law school [in

1979], I have participated in the litigation

or more than 60 civil rights matters on

behalf of plaintiffs. Almost all of these

matters involved cases in which prevailing

plaintiffs were entitled to an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs. Of these civil

rights matters, approximately half included

an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Most

awards were made pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 1988

or its California analog, C.C.P. § 1021.5. 

The remaining awards were made pursuant to

... EAJA ....

After listing some of the more significant cases Mr. Rubin has

been involved in, he further avers:

7. I have become familiar with the rates

charged and the billing and work practices of

lawyers in California and the nation in many

ways: (1) from my own considerable

involvement in attorneys’ fees litigation and

expert consultations and testimony; (2) by

discussing attorneys’ fees, billing, and work

practices with other attorneys; (3) by

representing other attorneys’ seeking fees;

(4) by obtaining declarations from other

attorneys regarding market rates, attorneys’

fees, billing and work practices; (5) by

reviewing surveys, legal newspapers, reported

decisions, and treatises regarding prevailing

attorneys’ rates, fees, billing, and work

practices; (6) by reviewing attorneys’ fees

applications and awards in other cases, as

well as unpublished decisions; and (7) by

reviewing rates charged by, and billing, and

work practices of, firms with which my

organization has associated.

...

8. The hourly billing rate of $200 per hour

for Tim Lord (1992 law graduate) and $540 per

hour for Bill Kissinger in 2007 and $500 per

31

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 31 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

hour in 2006 (1987 law graduate) are wholly

consistent with the rates charged by

comparable attorneys in the San Francisco Bay

Area and numerous other locales within

California for work comparable to that

performed in the instant case. (In fact,

they are lower than rates at many San

Francisco Bay Area firms). 

...

10. Mr. Lord’s rate of $200 per hour ...

$540 per hour for Bill Kissinger in 2007 and

$500 per hour in 2006 are wholly appropriate

for lawyers of this background and

experience. Their rates are well within the

range of rates charged and awarded to lawyers

with comparable background, experience, and

skill in cases comparable to the instant

case. 

...

13. In addition to those factors listed in ¶

7 above, I have become familiar with the

rates and practices of law firms through

working with them on pro bono matters. Over

the past 25 years, I have co-counseled cases

with private attorneys in at least 40

instances. And I know the kinds of cases

they’ll accept or reject. I can

unequivocally state that few, if any, private

attorneys would be willing to take a case

such as this one with the knowledge that

their attorneys’ fee claim would be capped at

$150 per hour. The risk and expense are

simply too great. 

Although Petitioners are not seeking an award of the

attorneys’ fees incurred by Charles D. Weisselberg. Mr.

Weisselberg, who is a professor at Boalt Hall, avers in pertinent

part:

3. One of my areas of expertise is federal

habeas corpus practice and procedure. In the

eleven years I taught at USC, I supervised

students in the Post-Conviction Justice

Project. The project represented inmates at

32

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 32 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

FCI Terminal Island under an arrangement with

the Federal Bureau of Prisons. We later

expanded our representation to include state

inmates at CIW Frontera. With my colleagues

and students, I litigated many habeas corpus

and post-conviction cases. My work included

habeas corpus petitions for federal inmates

and detainees under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241

(often on issues such as sentence credit,

parole, and immigration detention). I have

filed federal habeas corpus petitions for

state inmates under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 and

motions to vacate federal convictions under

28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. In addition, I

litigated other federal matters, including

civil rights actions. I continued to handle

post-conviction cases after I moved to Boalt

Hall in 1998. I have been counsel or cocounsel in all federal districts in

California, as well as in the U.S. Courts of

Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,

Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, and the

U.S. Supreme Court.

4. In addition to my habeas corpus

litigation practice, I have studied (and

taught) federal habeas corpus doctrines and

procedures. I was a consultant to the

Federal Courts Study Committee in 1989-1990

on issues of federal habeas corpus. My work

for the Committee was subsequently published

... I also served as a member of the State

Bar of California’s Committee on Federal

Courts. During that time, I was the

principal author of the State Bar’s comments

on proposed amendments to the federal habeas

statutes.

5. I was first contacted about this case on

October 12, 2006. Timothy Lord, counsel for

Petitioners ..., sought my advice and

assistance on federal habeas corpus practice

and procedure. I was moved by the plight of

the Petitioners and I was upset at the

conduct of the Navy. I agreed to serve as

co-counsel on a pro bono basis. In November,

as it appeared that we would need to complete

discovery and prepare for an evidentiary

hearing on an expedited basis, I contacted

William Kissinger of Bingham McCutchen LLP

for assistance. In addition to his deep

33

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 33 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

litigation experience (and his firm’s

experience representing reservists), Bingham

McCutchen has a Washington D.C. office which

could help in completing discovery.

6. Working with Mr. Lord (and later with

counsel from Bingham McCutchen), I researched

and wrote portions of briefs and other

pleadings, argued the Respondents’ (second)

motion to dismiss, argued at the hearing on

the bail motion, reviewed and planned

discovery, spent many hours consulting with

the Petitioners, and engaged in many other

tasks as the case moved forward towards an

evidentiary hearing. I conservatively

estimate that I worked over a hundred hours

on the matter. My billing rate is $450 per

hour. I estimate the value of my services on

this case as at least $45,000.

Respondents argue that Petitioners have not made the showing

required under the EAJA to exceed the statutory cap. Respondents

cite Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572-573 (1988):

[T]he ‘special factor’ formulation suggests

Congress thought that $75 an hour was

generally quite enough public reimbursement

for lawyers’ fees, whatever the local or

national market might be. If that is to be

so, the exception for ‘limited availability

of qualified attorneys for the proceedings

involved’ must refer to attorneys ‘qualified

for the proceedings’ in some specialized

sense, rather than just in their general

legal competence. We think it refers to

attorneys having some distinctive knowledge

or specialized skill needful for the

litigation in question - as opposed to an

extraordinary level of the general lawyerly

knowledge and ability useful in all

litigation. Examples of the former would be

an identifiable practice specialty such as

patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or

language. Where such qualifications are

necessary and can be obtained only at rates

in excess of the $75 cap, reimbursement above

that limit is allowed.

For the same reason of the need to preserve 

34

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 34 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

the intended effectiveness of the $75 cap, we

think the other ‘special factors’ envisioned

by the exception must be such as are not of

broad and general application. We need not

specify what they might be, but they include

nothing relied upon by the District Court in

this case. The ‘novelty and difficulty of

issues,’ ‘the undesirability of the case,’

the ‘work and ability of counsel,’ and ‘the

results obtained,’ ... are factors applicable

to a broad spectrum of litigation; they are

little more than routine reasons why market

rates are what they are. The factor of

‘customary fees and awards in other cases,’

... is even worse; it is not even a routine

reason for market rates, but rather a

description of market rates. It was an abuse

of discretion for the District Court to rely

on these factors.

See also Love v. Reilly, supra, 924 F.2d at 1496 (environmental

litigation is an identifiable practice specialty that requires

distinctive knowledge); Pirus v. Brown, 869 F.2d 536 (9th

Cir.1989)(attorney specialized in social security cases). 

Respondents argue:

Although the issues in this action were

novel, they did not require specialized

skill. And there is certainly no specialized

skill required in researching and filing a

claim under EAJA. An increased EAJA rate is

not justified. Should the Court determine

that an EAJA fee award is proper, the United

States requests leave for additional

discovery on the issue of the reasonableness

of the fees and the enhanced rates requested.

Petitioners respond that their showing of entitlement to

fees in excess of the EAJA cap “cannot be rebutted” because

Respondents have not filed any declarations countering their

declarations on this issue. Petitioners further contend:

This is a habeas corpus proceeding which

necessarily requires knowledge beyond simply

35

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 35 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

filing a claim under the EAJA. Habeas

petitions are unique from other types of

litigation, requiring lawyers with experience

in this area. Timothy Lord, Charles

Weisselberg and William Kissinger have all

declared that they have specialized skills

and that these skills were necessary for this

litigation.

Petitioners have not shown that any counsel’s “distinctive

skills” were needed in the litigation or that those skills were

not be available elsewhere at the statutory rate, both of which

must also be shown. Specifically, the Court observed that Mr.

Lord, who handled the case before Mr. Weisselberg’s entry to the

case, lacked knowledge of applicable law and did not effectively

advocate in court. None of Mr. Lord’s prior defense department

experiences applied to the circumstances of this case, except the

EAJA fees issue. Mr. Lord is not, by background or performance,

entitled to a rate in excess of the statutory cap. While Mr.

Weisselberg may have the “distinctive skills” in habeas law,

Petitioners do not seek recovery of his fees. In addition, the

fact that Mr. Lord had to retain Mr. Weisselberg as co-counsel is

further indication that Mr. Lord did not have the distinctive

skill required by the case law. That Mr. Lord offered a

Washington, D.C. office, no specialized knowledge or experience

in any field other than military service contract law and habeas

corpus law were required in this case. 

 More noteworthy, federal habeas corpus practice is funded

and managed by federal trial and appellate courts under the

Criminal Justice Act, which establishes rates for panel attorneys

36

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 36 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

in non-capital and capital habeas cases. These rates for 2009

were $110 and $175, respectively. The nature of the applicable

law in this case does not justify exceeding the cap. None of the

associate attorneys, whose time is billed, has demonstrated any

level of distinctive skill required; experience in federal and

state litigation is not a distinctive skill, nor is working on

one habeas matter, nor is conducting legal research as directed

by a senior attorney. Petitioners are not entitled to an award

of attorneys’ fees in excess of the EAJA statutory cap of $125

per hour.

Respondents accurately argue that attorneys’ fees sought by

Petitioners are not reasonable because $92,295.15 of that request

“are claimed by a firm that associated in one day before orders

were issued discharging Petitioners from the Navy and mooting the

case.” The Notice of Association of Counsel advising that

Bingham McCutchen was associating as counsel was executed by

counsel filed on December 12, 2006 (Doc. 115). Petitioners were

advised at the December 13, 2006 Scheduling Conference that

discharge orders had been issued for Petitioners and were

expected to take effect within 24 to 48 hours. (Doc. 117). 

Respondents discharged Petitioners from the Navy on December 19

and 20, 2006. As Respondents correctly contend:

[S]ince Petitioners’ discharge from the Navy,

their numerous attorneys have devoted

extraordinary hours and significant resources

in vehemently opposing a request to dismiss

the case as moot and crafting proposed

stipulated orders with particular and

detailed findings (never reached by the

37

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 37 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Court) to strengthen an attorney fees motion. 

Such conduct is directly contrary to the

policy behind EAJA. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C) provides:

The court, in its discretion, may reduce the

amount to be awarded pursuant to this

subsection, or deny an award, to the extent

that the prevailing party during the course

of the proceedings engaged in conduct which

unduly and unreasonably protracted the final

resolution of the matter in controversy.

In a Supplemental Declaration, Mr. Weisselberg avers in

pertinent part:

3. In late October or early November, the

Petitioners both told me that they could not

afford to continue to pay Mr. Lord. I asked

Mr. Lord whether he and his firm could

represent the Petitioners on a pro bono

basis, but I was informed that they could

not.

4. In late November 2006, the government

responded to our discovery requests and

answered the petitions for writ of habeas

corpus. It became clear that we would need

to seek additional discovery, that the case

would not be resolved through the pleadings

and motions, and that there would be an

evidentiary hearing in late 2006 or early

2007.

5. I concluded that we needed to arrange for

additional (pro bono) counsel in order to

litigate the case to conclusion without

significantly increasing the Petitioners’

financial obligations to Mr. Lord and his

firm. I could not litigate the case by

myself. As a full-time law professor, I do

not have litigation support or a working law

office. I do not have a litigation budget. 

I could not underwrite the expense of

depositions, some of which would likely take

place in Washington, D.C. or elsewhere in the

eastern United States, even if I could

arrange time to complete the discovery myself

given my teaching schedule.

38

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 38 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6. I approached William Kissinger and the

law firm of Bingham McCutchen LLP. They

agreed to take on the case. The firm is

seeking to recover its fees under the Equal

Access to Justice Act, but I understand that

it will not seek to obtain any fees or

expenses from the Petitioners.

7. I specifically went to Bingham McCutchen

because the firm has experience representing

military personnel in similar matters, has

highly skilled counsel and a Washington D.C.

office, and could staff the case fast. I had

in fact called the firm for advice as I was

briefing the Petitioners’ opposition to the

government’s (second) motion to dismiss in

October, and the firm sent me briefs from

another case.

8. The Bingham firm jumped into the case. 

One of the earliest tasks completed by the

Bingham lawyers was drafting a ‘meet and

confer’ letter demanding further discovery,

which I sent to government counsel on

December 11, 2006 ....

...

10. We tentatively agreed to hold a ‘meet

and confer’ session on December 12, 2006 to

discuss outstanding discovery. The

government later asked to hold the session

after our December 13 scheduling conference. 

At the scheduling conference, the government

announced that it would discharge the

Petitioners from the military. The ‘meet and

confer’ session was not held. My recollection

is that I advised the Court at the December

13 conference that the discovery requests

remained outstanding, and that while we of

course were glad that the Petitioners were

being discharged, we were not waiving any

rights with respect to discovery.

The Court finds that no further “discovery” was required

after December 12, 2006. There was no need for another law firm

to attempt to perpetuate and multiply the litigation for EAJA fee

purposes. The extended opposition to the government’s motion to

39

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 39 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

dismiss the case which had been mooted by the Petitioners’

discharges was entirely unnecessary and unjustified. Bingham did

not provide any legal services of value to the resolution of this

action. That law firm did the opposite. The case had been

reduced to a habeas case based on Petitioners’ original counsel,

Mr. Lord’s unfamiliarity or inexperience with the law under which

he advanced other meritless claims eliminated by Rule 12(b)(6)

motions to dismiss. Petitioners’ request for attorneys’ fees is

reduced pursuant to Section 2412(d)(1)(C) by the $92,295.15 in

fees incurred by Bingham, which are denied.

2. Lodestar.

In Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990), the

Supreme Court held:

[O]nce a private litigant has met the

multiple conditions for eligibility for EAJA

fees, the district court’s task of

determining what fee is reasonable is

essentially the same as that described in

Hensley [v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-437

(1983)].

“‘In determining what a reasonable attorneys’ fee entails,

the district court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 423 ... (1983).’ ... ‘The

most useful starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is (1) the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation (2) multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’ ...

The resulting figure is known as the ‘Lodestar.’” Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1040

(E.D.Cal.2007). Although there is a strong presumption that the

40

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 40 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

lodestar represents a reasonable fee, Burlington v. Dague, 505

U.S. 557, 562 (1992), the district court has the discretion to

exclude from the initial fee calculation hours that were not

reasonably expended, for example, cases that are overstaffed. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hensley held:

Counsel for the prevailing party should make

a good faith effort to exclude from a fee

request hours that are excessive, redundant,

or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in

private practice ethically is obligated to

exclude such hours from his fee submission. 

'In the private sector, "billing judgment" is

an important component in fee setting. It is

no less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one's client also are not

properly billed to one's adversary pursuant

to statutory authority.' ....

Id. at 434. As explained in Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 991 (9th

Cir.1988):

Many factors previously identified by courts

as probative on the issue of ‘reasonableness’

of a fee award, see e.g., Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th

Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 ...

(1976), are now subsumed within the initial

calculation of the lodestar amount. Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 ...

(1984)(‘the novelty and complexity of the

issues,’ ‘the special skill and experience of

counsel,’ the ‘quality of the

representation,’ and the ‘results obtained’

are subsumed within the lodestar);

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen’s

Council, 478 U.S. 546 ... (1986), rev’d after

rehearing on other grounds, 483 U.S. 711 ...

(1987)(an attorney’s ‘superior performance’

is subsumed).

See also Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990 & n.3

(9 Cir.1986). As the Clark court explained: th

[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that

41

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 41 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

adjustments, both upward and downward to the

lodestar amount are sometimes appropriate,

albeit in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases ...

Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901 ... The possibility

of adjustments to the lodestar amount

necessitates an analysis of various factors

that could justify an adjustment. In this

circuit, the relevant factors were identified

in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526

F.2d 67, 70 (9 Cir.1975). Although several th

of these factors are now considered to be

subsumed within the calculation of the

lodestar figure ..., review of the Kerr

factors remains the appropriate procedure for

considering a request for a fee-award

adjustment.

Id. The Kerr factors, as modified by Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d

1450, 1453 (9 Cir.1993), are: th

(1) the time and labor required of the

attorney(s);

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the

questions presented;

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly;

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the

attorney(s) because of the acceptance of the

action;

(5) the customary fee charged in matters of

the type involved;

(6) any time limitations imposed by the

client or the circumstances;

(7) the amount of money, or the value of the

rights involved, and the results obtained;

(8) the experience, reputation and ability of

the attorney(s);

(9) the ‘undesireability of the action;

(10) the nature and length of the

professional relationship between the

attorney and the client;

42

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 42 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

(12) awards in similar actions.

Id.; see also Rule 54-293(c), Local Rules of Practice. 

The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the

appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit

evidence in support of those hours worked. Hensley, supra at

433, 437. The party opposing the fee application has a burden of

rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district

court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours

charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its

submitted affidavits. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n.5

(1984); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 826 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1987).

Here, because of the reduction pursuant to Section

2412(d)(1)(C) of the attorneys’ fees incurred by Bingham, the

lodestar determination focuses solely on the attorneys’ fees and

costs requested by Lewis Brisbois for Mr. Lord’s services.

Because of the statutory cap, the hourly rate is set at $125

per hour. See discussion supra. 

Respondents do not challenge Petitioners’ documentation of

the hours incurred by the various attorneys at issue in this

motion, i.e., they do not contend that the billing statements or

declarations are not supported or are otherwise deficient. 

However, Respondents contend:

A review of the bills discloses excessive,

duplicate and unreasonable billing. There

are five attorneys of record, as evidenced on

the title page of Petitioners’ motion: two

attorneys from the Lewis, Brisbois firm; two

attorneys from the Bingham, McCutchen firm;

and one law professor. In addition, the

43

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 43 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Bingham firm employed another three

associates in researching the attorney fees

issues and opposing the United States’ motion

to dismiss as moot ... The bills are replete

with interoffice conferences with these

attorneys on virtually every aspect of the

proceedings since the Bingham firm associated

into the case. For example, on December 13,

2006, two attorneys and the law professors

all prepared for and attended the scheduling

conference. All three later conferenced with

counsel for the United States ... There is

simply no justification for the battalion of

lawyers working on this matter after

Petitioners were discharged from the Navy. 

The billing was excessive and duplicative. 

Because Petitioners do not seek recovery of the fees

incurred by Professor Weisselberg and because the fees incurred

by Bingham are disallowed, Respondents’ contention that the

billing was excessive and duplicative is no longer applicable. 

Respondents do not challenge the reasonableness of the hours

incurred by attorneys at Lewis Brisbois prior to the association

of Bingham as co-counsel. Petitioners contend that the fees

incurred by Bingham McCutchen are reasonable in light of the

government’s positions throughout this litigation, including in

this motion:

Bingham McCutchen entered the case because

Petitioners could no longer afford Mr. Lord’s

fees, and there was a need (on shortened

time) to conduct further discovery and

prepare for a hearing ... As soon as they

were retained, the firm began preparing for

discovery and an evidentiary hearing ...

Bingham McCutchen then this [sic] motion for

attorneys fees, which are certainly

recoverable ... Petitioners have submitted

documentation sufficiently explaining all of

the fees that have been incurred.

The most important declaration concerning attorneys’ fees is

44

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 44 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

that of William Kissinger. Although it is understandable that

there would have been conferences between the attorneys from the

two law firms and Mr. Weisselberg about the case concerning the

need to associate Bingham as co-counsel, there are a number of

time entries concerning research, drafting, discussions, etc. of

a voluntary stipulation of dismissal and entries concerning

research about the possibility of damages claims by Petitioners. 

Given that the United States declared its intent to discharge

Petitioners from the Navy and forthwith moved to dismiss the

action as moot, such work is unjustified and was unnecessary. 

That Petitioners opposed that motion to dismiss in lieu of a

voluntary stipulation of dismissal or a cross-motion to dismiss

under Rule 41 is not reasonable and not compensable. There is no

justification for attorney’s fees incurred for researching the

possibility of damages claims by Petitioners at the time the case

was ended. The Court is not required to accept the judgment of

pro bono counsel about how the case should be staffed. 

The Declaration of Timothy Lord filed on March 5, 2007,

(Doc. 122-4) and attached bills establish that Mr. Lord devoted

304.2 hours to Petitioner Gengler’s case and 209.8 hours to

Petitioner McSeveney through January 31, 2007, and that Mr. Stolz

devoted 2.5 hours to Petitioner Gengler and 5.7 hours to

Petitioner McSeveney through January 31, 2007. There was

undoubtedly duplication in the underlying legal work on common

issues of law that were identical for Petitioners. Gengler had

the separate issue of graduate school, which was not a legal

45

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 45 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

issue. Mr. Lord’s declaration filed on July 23, 2007, (Doc. 144-

3) and attached bills establish that Mr. Lord devoted 16.9 hours

to Petitioner Gengler and 17.4 hours to Petitioner McSeveney

between February 1, 2007 and April 30, 2007, presumably on

billing and attorneys fees issues. The total number of hours

devoted by Mr. Lord to Petitioners’ case is 548.3. Multiplied by

the statutory hourly rate of $125.00, the lodestar for Mr. Lord’s

professional services is $68,537.50. The total number of hours

devoted by Mr. Stolz to Petitioners’ case is 8.2. Multiplied by

the statutory hourly rate of $125.00, the lodestar for Mr.

Stolz’s professional services is $1,025.00. The total lodestar

for Lewis Brisbois is $69,537.50.

However, as has been discussed, some of the hours devoted by

Lewis Brisbois after the association of Bingham in December,

2006, were incurred in connection with a meritless opposition to

Respondents’ motion to dismiss the action as moot because of

Petitioners’ discharges from the Navy in late December, 2006. 

From the Court’s review of the bills attached to Mr. Lord’s

declarations, it is difficult to isolate these specific amounts

of time because the bills do not break out the time to specific

tasks. Five hours, in the amount of $625.00, of Mr. Lord’s time

incurred after December 1, 2006 is deleted to eliminate this

unnecessary time. The net recoverable attorneys to Lewis and Lord

are $68,902.50.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners’ pro bono counsel was “upset” by the Navy’s

46

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 46 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

conduct in this case. The Navy was upset by Petitioners’ conduct

to the extent that it lost confidence in their ability to perform

honorably and competently as Naval aviators. The Navy forcefully

argued that Petitioners’ case was about their own selfish

interests, and despite the Navy’s mistake in the written contract

term of service, that all persons, including Petitioners, are

presumed to know the law, as reflected in their winging orders. 

Further, in view of the huge investment the United States makes

in training a Naval aviator, that the eight year statutory term

of service was entirely reasonable. Without engaging in

hyperbole, the Navy characterized the case as one where

Petitioners sought to advance their personal interests over that

of their country’s. The Navy also emphasized that large numbers

of American military service people have had their terms of

service involuntarily extended. Petitioners rejoined they were

entitled to profit from the Navy’s error by strict adherence to

the terms of their written contracts’ terms. It is hard to

discern that any interest has been served in this case, other

than Petitioners’ objective to avoid alleged 8 year statutory

service obligations. This objective was not achieved. The

objective to prevent deployment to Iraq was achieved. It was

categorically unnecessary to have six or more lawyers working on

the case. The size, lack of complexity, and merits of the case

in no way justified such an attorney staffing selection, which

was Petitioners’ choice. They cannot bill the taxpayers for this

over-allocation of resources. For the reasons stated above:

47

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 47 of 48
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1. Petitioners’ motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED IN

PART AND DENIED IN PART;

2. EAJA attorneys fees are awarded to Lewis Brisbois and

Mr. Lord, jointly, in the amount of $68,912.50; 

3. Petitioners’ counsel, Lewis Brisbois Bisgard & Smith

LLP, shall prepare and lodge a form of order consistent with this

Memorandum Decision within five (5) court days following service

of this Memorandum Decision 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

48

Case 1:06-cv-00362-OWW Document 153 Filed 01/12/10 Page 48 of 48