Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05563/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05563-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS J. LYNCH, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

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JAMES A. YATES, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

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1:04-CV-05563 AWI GSA HC

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION

[Doc. #43]

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ENTER JUDGMENT

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On March 13, 2008, the Magistrate Judge issued a Findings and Recommendation that

recommended the petition be DENIED on the merits and for violating the statute of limitations. The

Magistrate Judge further recommended that the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. The Findings and Recommendation was served on all parties and contained notice that

any objections were to be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the order. 

On May 16, 2008, after being granted an extension of time, Petitioner filed objections to the

Case 1:04-cv-05563-AWI-GSA Document 47 Filed 06/11/08 Page 1 of 5
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U.S. District Court

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Findings and Recommendation. In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this

Court has conducted a de novo review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file and

having considered the objections, the court concludes that the Magistrate Judge's Findings and

Recommendation is supported by the record and proper analysis, and there is no need to modify the

Findings and Recommendations based on the points raised in the objections. 

In the objections, Petitioner contends that the use of several jury instructions violated his

rights because they allowed the jury to consider other alleged sexual assaults. As explained by the

Magistrate Judge, there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent that prohibits the

admission of propensity evidence in a state proceeding. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n. 5

(1991). The use of California Jury Instructions (CALJIC) Numbers 2.50 and 2.50.1 did not

impermissibly lower the government's burden of proof by permitting conviction under a

preponderance of evidence standard. While the Ninth Circuit had previously found a problem in

prior versions of these jury instructions, see Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812 (9 Cir. 2004), the revised th

jury instructions expressly instructs the jury that a preponderance of the evidence finding that

Petitioner committed a prior sexual offense is not sufficient to prove the charged offenses beyond a

reasonable doubt. A jury instruction is constitutionally sound if it creates a permissive inference

that allows, but does not require, the jury to infer an essential fact from proof of another fact so long

as “the inferred fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to

depend.” Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9 Cir.1992) (citations and internal th

quotations omitted). 

Petitioner also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Petitioner’s trial counsel was

not ineffective. Petitioner cites to his counsel’s failure to seek the introduction of a washcloth into

evidence, failure to present tape recordings of Petitioner’s and the victim’s phone conversations, and

failure to obtain an expert who would testify as to the time frame during which the victim’s bruising

took place. Petitioner has provided no evidence, as opposed to argument, on what this evidence

would have shown had it been presented by trial counsel. A habeas corpus proceeding is civil in

nature. Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978). As such, Petitioner has the

burden of proving his case. See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992); McKenzie v.

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U.S. District Court

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McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415, 1419 (9 Cir. 1994). th

Finally, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this action was not filed within 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year statute of limitations. The one year federal habeas statute of limitations

tolls while a petitioner exhausts state remedies, and Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state habeas petition is “pending”

during a full-round of review in the state courts, including the time between a lower state court

decision and the filing a new petition at a higher court so long as these intervals are “reasonable.”

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002). In California, the court must determine whether a

state habeas petition was filed within a reasonable period of time. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189,

126 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2006). Based on Petitioner’s own calculations, there was at least a 177 day

delay between the time Petitioner received a response to the Kern County petition and when he filed

the petition in the California Court of Appeal. Although eschewing a bright line test, the United

States Supreme Court held that an unexplained and unjustified gap between filings of six months is

unreasonable and does not warrant “gap tolling.” Id. 126 S.Ct. at 854. Here, Petitioner’s vague

contention that he refined his petition and obtained a legal assistant before filing the petition in the

California Court of Appeal does not sufficiently explain the delay. In addition, Petitioner is not

subject to equitable tolling based on Petitioner’s appellate counsel’s representation that appellate

counsel would file a habeas corpus petition. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the evidence

attached to the objections does not show that Petitioner’s appellate counsel promised to file a state

habeas petition and then failed to file such a petition. Petitioner’s appellate counsel only stated he

would consider making a request to expand his representation of Petitioner to include a habeas

corpus petition. And, Petitioner’s appellate counsel informed Petitioner prior to the date Petitioner’s

statute began running that he would not be filing such a petition. Thus, the petition was filed

outside the statute of limitations, and, in any event, must be denied because the state court’s denial of

Petitioner’s claims is not contrary to clearly established federal law.

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U.S. District Court

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 A state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a

district court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue

a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 (a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability

“if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the

petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more than

the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at

1040.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a

certificate of appealability.

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U.S. District Court

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendation issued March 13, 2008, is ADOPTED IN FULL; 

2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED with prejudice; 

3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent; and

4. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2008 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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