Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01187/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01187-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAUDENCIO VIVAR REYES, Civil No. 07cv1187-J (RBB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RE: DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS [DOC. NO. 1]

AND ORDER DENYING EVIDENTIARY

HEARING

vs.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden, 

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Gaudencio Vivar Reyes (hereinafter “Reyes” or “Petitioner”), a

state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the

August 9, 2005, decision of the Board of Parol Hearings

(hereinafter “Board”) finding him unsuitable for parole. (Pet. 6-

9(a).) Reyes alleges that the failure to release him on parole now

that his minimum parole eligibility date has passed violates his

Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and

equal protection. (Id.) He claims the decision resulted in

(1) the deprivation of a state-created liberty interest in release

on parole and (2) the breach of his plea agreement. (Id.) 

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The Respondent, Warden Marshall, has filed an Answer [doc. no.

4]. Respondent contends that (1) assuming Reyes has a statecreated liberty interest in parole, he received all the process he

was due in connection with his parole hearing; (2) this Court must

defer to the finding of the state appellate court that “some

evidence” supports the Board’s decision; and (3) the appellate

court’s adjudication of Petitioner’s parole hearing claims is

neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 7-13.) 

Warden Marshall also asserts that Petitioner has failed to state a

prima facie case for relief with respect to his plea bargain

claims. (Id. at 13-15.)

Reyes has filed a traverse he titled Petitioner’s Reply to

Answer [doc. no. 9]. He argues that he has a federally protected

liberty interest in parole, and his right to due process was

violated because the Board’s finding of unsuitability is based on

factors which, other than the unchanging facts of his commitment

offense, have no evidentiary support. (Reply 6; Mem. P. & A. Supp.

Reply 5.) With respect to his plea bargain claims, Petitioner

argues that his plea agreement has been breached; he was

fraudulently induced into pleading guilty; he has stated a prima

facie case for relief and is therefore entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on these claims; and because the State destroyed all

evidence related to his plea bargain, the burden should be on

Respondent to refute his characterization of its terms. (Reply 8-

9; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 9.) Reyes also argues that prisoners

similarly situated to him have been released on parole after

///

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serving their minimum terms, thereby demonstrating an equal

protection violation. (Pet. 6; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 8-9.) 

At the Court’s request, Respondent filed a supplemental brief,

along with a supplemental notice of lodgment, addressing whether

Petitioner’s plea bargain claims are barred by the one-year statute

of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) [doc. no. 18]. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner became aware of the factual

predicate of his plea bargain claims in 2001, when he had not been

released after serving sixteen years of his sixteen years-to-life

prison term, but Reyes did not file the present action until 2007,

well outside the limitations period. (Resp’t’s Suppl. Brief 2-3.) 

Reyes filed a reply to Respondent’s supplemental brief [doc. no.

19]. He presents additional arguments on the merits of his claims

but does not address the statute of limitations, other than to say

that he has not seen the supplemental documents lodged by

Respondent and cannot be sure of their accuracy or authenticity. 

(Pet’r’s Suppl. Reply 1-8.)

Based upon the documents and evidence presented in this case,

and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s plea bargain claims are barred by the statute of

limitations, and habeas relief is not available on his parole

hearing claims. The Court therefore recommends the Petition be

DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by information filed in the San Diego

County Superior Court with two counts of murder in violation of

Cal. Penal Code section 187. (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Reyes,

Case No. CRN 9479 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1984) (information

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1).) The information also alleged that Reyes used a deadly weapon,

a machete, during the commission of the murders. (Id.) Petitioner

pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder. (Lodgment No.

1, People v. Reyes, Case No. CRN 9479 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 17,

1985) (abstract of judgment 1).) On May 17, 1985, Reyes was

sentenced to fifteen years-to-life in state prison for the murder

count and received a one-year consecutive term for the deadly

weapon use allegation, for a total term of sixteen years-to-life. 

(Id. at 1.) Petitioner’s minimum parole eligibility date was

January 22, 1994. (Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent Parole Consideration

Hr’g Tr. 1, Aug. 9, 2005.)

At the beginning of the August 9, 2005, parole suitability

hearing, the presiding commissioner read a summary of Reyes’s

commitment offense into the record, which was taken from the

probation officer’s report. (Id. at 8-9.) According to the

summary, on December 31, 1983, Reyes and several others, including

his brother, gathered in an avocado grove and consumed a large

amount of alcohol. (Id. at 8.) Sometime between 10:00 p.m. and

11:00 p.m. that evening, a confrontation occurred between

Petitioner and Amadeo Morales Martinez. (Id.) 

During this confrontation, Petitioner hit Martinez repeatedly

with a machete while the unarmed victim attempted to defend

himself. (Id.) Reyes continued to strike Martinez even after the

victim was incapacitated. (Id.) After Martinez collapsed,

Petitioner’s brother joined in the assault and stabbed Martinez in

the neck and chest with a knife. (Id. at 9.)

After Martinez appeared to be dead, Reyes chased another man

in the group, Fidel Ortega, who was also unarmed, although Reyes

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claimed Ortega was trying to hit him with a stick. (Id.) 

Petitioner hit Ortega with the machete numerous times and “returned

to the camp covered with blood, carrying a bloody machete.” (Id.) 

Numerous blows to Ortega’s head caused brain hemorrhaging and,

ultimately, his death. (Id.) Petitioner agreed that the factual

summary given was accurate. (Id.) 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board found Reyes

unsuitable for parole, based primarily on the “cruel and callous

manner” of his commitment offense and the inexplicable and trivial

motive for the crime. (Id. at 45-46.) The Board considered a

letter from the District Attorney of San Diego County, outlining

her opposition to Reyes’s parole. (Id. at 17-20.) She explains

that Reyes and his brother were “enraged” by a statement by the

sixteen-year-old victim that Petitioner and his brother did not

stand a chance in a fight with Martinez. (Id. at 19.) During the

course of the parole hearing, Deputy Commissioner Smith expressed a

concern about the likelihood of Petitioner committing another

violent crime upon release. (Id. at 28-29.) Although Reyes’s

psychological evaluation placed his likelihood of future violence

in the high end of the low range, Smith noted that Dr. Giles, who

completed a psychological evaluation of Reyes, found that

Petitioner did not understand the pivotal role alcohol played in

his commitment offense. (Id. at 26-29.) The deputy commissioner

believed additional anger management programming was necessary. 

(Id. at 28.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board

recommended Petitioner stay discipline free and obtain a general

equivalency diploma. (Id. at 48.)

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Reyes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the San

Diego County Superior Court on November 4, 2005, challenging the

finding of unsuitability for parole. (Lodgment No. 3, Reyes v.

Marshall, Case No. HCN830 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 4, 2005)

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) On January 12, 2006, the

superior court denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 4, In re Reyes,

Case No. HCN0830, order den. pet. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 12,

2006).) Reyes filed a habeas petition in the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 5, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No. D048134 (Cal.

Ct. App. filed Mar. 3, 2006) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) 

The court of appeal denied the petition on May 19, 2006. (Lodgment

No. 6, In re Reyes, Case No. D048134, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Ct. App.

May 19, 2006).) On August 25, 2006, Reyes filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California. 

(Lodgment No. 7, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No. S146099 (Cal. filed

Aug. 25, 2006) (petition for Writ of habeas corpus).) The petition

was summarily denied on March 14, 2007. (Lodgment No. 8, In re

Reyes, Case No. S146099 (Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (docket).) 

On June 29, 2007, Reyes filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this Court [doc. no. 1]. Respondent filed an Answer and

a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support on September 7,

2007 [doc. no. 4]. Petitioner then submitted a Reply with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support on October 17, 2007

[doc. no. 9].

The Court ordered further briefing on the issue of whether

Petitioner’s plea bargain claims were barred by the statute of

limitations and directed Respondent to lodge a copy of the

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transcript from Reyes’s parole hearing held on May 25, 2003 [doc.

no. 10]. Respondent filed a supplemental brief on September 26,

2008, and lodged the requested parole hearing transcript along with

a chronological inmate history for Reyes [doc. no. 18]. Petitioner

filed a reply on October 8, 2008 [doc. no. 19].

IV. DISCUSSION

The Petition sets forth five claims alleging due process and

equal protection violations which the Court will analyze in two

categories. Claims three and four allege a federal due process

violation in connection to the deprivation of Petitioner’s statecreated liberty interest in parole release. (Pet. 8-9.) Claims

one, two, and five allege due process and equal protection

violations in connection to the breach of, and the fraudulent

inducement into, Reyes’s plea agreement. (Pet. 6-7, 9(a).)

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), as amended by the

Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, sets forth the following scope

of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added). As amended, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

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(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly

established Supreme Court precedent (1) “if the state court applies

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases[]” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of

[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000). A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. An unreasonable application

may also be found, “if the state court either unreasonably extends

a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application

must be objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

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63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed

to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions

. . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 

Habeas relief is also available if the state court’s

adjudication of a claim “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(2)

(West 2006). In order to satisfy this provision, a federal habeas

petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which

the state court’s adjudication of his claims rest are objectively

unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

B. Due Process in Denial of Parole

Reyes alleges in claims three and four that his federal due

process rights have been violated by the deprivation of his statecreated liberty interest in release on parole. (Pet. 8-9.) In

claim three, he argues that the factors used by the Board to

support the finding of unsuitability for parole were “arbitrary,

capricious and whimsical because [they are] totally lacking

evidentiary support.” (Pet. 8.) He also contends that the

appellate court’s findings regarding his parole plans are

unsupported by the record, and there is no post-conviction evidence

supporting the finding that he would pose an unreasonable threat to

public safety if released. (Id.) In claim four, Reyes contends

that the Board’s continued reliance on the static facts of his

commitment offense to find him unsuitable for parole violates due

process. (Pet. at 9.)

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Reyes presented these claims to the California Supreme Court

in a habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 7, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No.

S146099 (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) That petition was

summarily denied on March 14, 2007, with a single citation to

People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258, 37 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 259, 265 (1995) (setting forth the initial burden assigned

to state prisoners for adequately pleading grounds for habeas

relief). (Lodgment No. 8, In re Reyes, Case No. S146099 (docket).) 

Reyes had asserted these claims in his state appellate court habeas

petition. (Lodgment No. 5, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No. D048134

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The appellate court denied

these claims on the merits in a written order. (Lodgment No. 6, In

re Reyes, Case No. D048134, slip op. at 1-3.) 

In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Court

adopted a presumption which gives no effect to unexplained state

court orders but “looks through” them to the last reasoned state

court decision. The last reasoned decision of the state courts

with respect to Reyes’s parole hearing claims is the appellate

court opinion denying the claims on their merits. The Court will

therefore look through the silent denial by the state supreme court

to the appellate court opinion. After setting forth the applicable

legal standards, and noting the facts surrounding the crimes, the

appellate court stated: 

The facts of Reyes’s crimes are some evidence to

support the Board’s finding that the killing was cruel

and callous because he used a machete to kill two men. 

He repeatedly stuck [sic] the first victim even after the

victim was injured. Then Reyes chased down the second

victim and repeatedly hit him on the head until he died. 

According to witnesses, the victims were unarmed. The

Board also appropriately considered Reyes’s psychological

report in denying him a parole date. The report stated

if released, Reyes’s risk of violent crime is on the high

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end of the low range. It is also unclear what Reyes’s

plans will be once he is deported back to Mexico and that

seeking a GED would be to his benefit.

(Lodgment No. 6, In re Reyes, Case No. D048134, slip op. at 3.)

Clearly established federal law provides that Reyes may

demonstrate a procedural due process violation by showing that

(1) a federally protected life, liberty or property interest exists

“which has been interfered with by the State”; and (2) “the

procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally

[in]sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460

(1989). The Supreme Court has recognized a federally protected

liberty interest in the expectancy of release on parole arising

from state parole statutes. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.

Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (“[T]he expectancy of

release provided in [the Nebraska parole] statute is entitled to

some measure of constitutional protection. However, we emphasize

that this statute has unique structure and language and thus

whether any other state statute provides a protectible entitlement

must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”); see also Board of

Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987) (holding that

mandatory language in Montana parole statute, like the Nebraska

statute, created a presumption that parole will be granted, thereby

giving rise to a protected liberty interest).

The Ninth Circuit has applied Greenholtz and Allen to find

that mandatory language in the California parole statute “gives

rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole[,]”

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), which is

“created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the

incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915

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(9th Cir. 2003). The liberty interest in parole created by Cal.

Penal Code section 3041(b) is clearly established within the

meaning of AEDPA. Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Respondent assumes, without conceding, that Reyes has a

federally protected liberty interest in parole release. (Mem. P.

& A. Supp. Answer 7.) The warden argues, however, citing

Greenholtz, that clearly established federal law provides that an

inmate is entitled only to an opportunity to be heard and a

statement of reasons denying parole. (Id.) Because Reyes had

advance notice of his parole hearing, was allowed to submit

materials for the Board’s consideration, was represented by counsel

at the hearing, and was given an opportunity to be heard both

orally and in writing, Respondent contends Petitioner was provided

more process than he was due. (Id. at 7-8.)

Admittedly, the Greenholtz Court held that when an inmate is

afforded “an opportunity to be heard” at a state parole hearing,

and is informed of the reasons he “falls short of qualifying for

parole,” the inmate has been given due process. Greenholtz, 442

U.S. at 16. In Superintendent of the Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445 (1985), however, the Supreme Court held that the

deprivation of a state-created liberty interest in good-time prison

custody credits comports with the minimum requirements of due

process when the findings of the prison disciplinary board are

supported by some evidence in the record. Id. at 455-56. The

Ninth Circuit has held that the “some evidence” standard announced

in Hill is clearly established federal law applicable to the

accumulation of good time credits and a parole denial, “because

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‘both directly affect the duration of the prison term.’” Sass, 461

F.3d at 1128 (quoting Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389,

1390 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

Respondent contends that the holding in Sass, applying the

Hill standard to parole hearings, has been called into question by

the intervening Supreme Court opinion in Carey v. Musladin, 549

U.S. 70 (2006). (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 9-10.) The warden

argues that the policy reasons behind the Hill Court’s application

of the “some evidence” standard in the prison disciplinary hearing

context do not apply in the parole context; consequently, AEDPA

precludes its application here. (Id.) Respondent acknowledges

that Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2007), which

was decided after Musladin was announced, reiterated that the Hill

standard is clearly established federal law for AEDPA purposes

applicable to parole hearings. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer at 10.) 

The warden argues, however, that the precedential value of Irons is

questionable because it did not discuss Musladin and because a

petition for rehearing en banc was pending in that case. (Id. at

10 n.4.)

After Respondent filed his Answer, the Ninth Circuit denied

rehearing in Irons. Irons v. Carey, 506 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. Nov. 6,

2007). In addition, Petitioner cites to a decision of a panel of

the Ninth Circuit which cited Musladin, applied the Hill standard,

and was decided after rehearing in Irons was denied. (See Pet’r’s

Supp. Reply at 4-7 (citing Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 542-

38 (9th Cir. 2008), rehearing en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th

Cir. May 16, 2008)).) But that decision is of limited precedential

value because rehearing en banc has been granted in that case. 

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(See id.) The Court notes, however, that the petitioners in Biggs,

Sass, and Irons, unlike Reyes, were all denied parole “prior to the

expiration of their minimum terms.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. The

Court need not determine the exact extent of federal due process

protections afforded in parole hearings to California prisoners

like Reyes who have served past their minimum terms. Even under

the holdings of Irons and Sass, that the “some evidence” standard

of Hill represents clearly established federal law, Reyes’s due

process rights were not violated by the decision to deny him

parole. 

The Sass court, interpreting Hill, held that due process is

satisfied if “some evidence” exists in the record to support the

parole board’s decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. “[T]he relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id.

(quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The Ninth Circuit has also

held that “the evidence underlying the board’s decision must have

some indicia of reliability.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915 (quoting

Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390).

Reyes first contends that he was not accorded due process

because the findings of the Board and the appellate court lack

evidentiary support. Here, the Board found that Reyes’s crimes

were “especially cruel and callous,” and said that was an

“understatement.” (Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent Parole Consideration

Hr’g Tr. 46.) The appellate court held that the facts of

Petitioner’s crime “are some evidence to support the Board’s

finding that the killing was cruel and callous.” (Lodgment No. 6,

In re Reyes, Case No. D048134, slip op. at 3.) The appellate court

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also concluded that the Board had correctly relied on the

psychological evaluation which placed Reyes on the high end of low

risk of violent crime. (Id.) His parole plans were unclear, and

Reyes would benefit from further education. (Id.) 

The Court finds “some evidence” in the record to support the

findings of both the Board and the appellate court that Petitioner

would pose an unreasonable risk to the public safety if released,

and this evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability. First and

foremost is Petitioner’s commitment offense. As the Board noted,

the crime was especially cruel and callous. Petitioner admitted to

hacking two unarmed men to death with a machete. The Board found

that the suffering of the victims was unimaginable, and Reyes

showed no compassion for either victim. (Lodgment No. 2,

Subsequent Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. 46.) The reason for the

murders was “inexplicable and trivial,” in that Reyes murdered the

men because one of them was verbally abusive. (Id.) The appellate

court correctly noted that the facts of Reyes’s crime satisfy the

criteria under California law for a finding of unsuitability for

parole. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c) (listing factors

tending to show unsuitability, including that the crime showed “an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and the

motive “is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the

offense[]”) There is “some evidence” in the record to support the

findings by the Board and the appellate court regarding the callous

nature of the crime and its trivial motive

Because Petitioner admitted these facts were true, they have

sufficient indicia of reliability.

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Reyes argues that the facts of his commitment offense alone

are insufficient to establish that his release poses an

unreasonable risk to the public’s safety. (Pet. 8.) He contends

that he has been a model prisoner during the his more than twenty

years of incarceration, has no criminal record other than his

commitment offense, and has done everything the Board has asked him

to do. (Pet. 8-9; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 7-9.) Reyes maintains

that the Board’s continued reliance on his commitment offense has

transformed his sentence from life with the possibility of parole

to life without the possibility of parole. (Pet. 8-9.) 

In Biggs, the court held that the “continued reliance in the

future on an unchanging factor, [such as] the circumstances of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917. Respondent

not only challenges the language in Biggs that the California

prison system has rehabilitative goals, but argues that the quoted

language in Biggs is dicta and is therefore not clearly established

federal law. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer at 12 & n.5.) The warden

relies on an unpublished memorandum decision of the Ninth Circuit

holding there is no clearly established federal law which limits

the number of times a California prisoner may be denied parole

based on the brutality and viciousness of his commitment offense. 

(Id. at 12-13 (citing Culverson v. Davison, 237 Fed.Appx. 174 (9th

Cir. 2007) (unpublished memorandum), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2475

(2008).) 

The Court is not required to determine whether Biggs provides

additional due process protections, however, because Petitioner is

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incorrect that the Board here relied only on the unchanging factors

of his commitment offense. Rather, as the appellate court noted,

the Board also relied on a psychological report to find a risk of

future violence. The report indicates that Petitioner’s risk of

violence in a free community is at the high end of the low range. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. 29.) In

addition, although the psychological report indicates that Reyes

had completed an anger management program, Deputy Commissioner

Smith expressed concern that the report did not address whether

dealing with anger management should be a continuing process for

Reyes, rather than a single program. (Id. at 28.) 

Smith observed that Reyes refused to recognize the role that

alcohol had in his commitment offense. (Id. at 27-28.) Although

the psychological report, dated May 19, 2005, indicated that Reyes

attended self-help programs relating to alcohol abuse, he was still

unable to identify the role alcohol played in the offense. (Id. at

26, 28.) Reyes admitted to the doctor who prepared the report that

he last drank alcohol in prison in 1998; he had manufactured

alcohol while in prison but was never caught. (Id. at 27.) 

Petitioner admits that he was heavily intoxicated when he committed

the crimes. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 2.) Yet, during the parole

hearing, after admitting he had consumed seven beers and some

tequila at the time of the murders, when asked if he felt drunk at

the time, Reyes answered: “Not a bit.” (Lodgment No. 2,

Subsequent Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. 12-13.) When asked

repeatedly to explain why he attacked the victims, Reyes did not

acknowledge the role alcohol played, but he indicated there was no

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motive or reason for the attacks, other than being offended by what

the victim had said. (Id. at 9-11.)

Reyes argues that the Board’s finding that he had gained no

insight into his alcohol use was not supported by the record. 

(Pet. 8.) On the contrary, Deputy Commissioner Smith stated that

Reyes had acquired insight into his alcohol use, but he had failed

to translate that insight to his behavior during the murders.

(Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. 27.)

Reyes contends his record shows that he knows he is better off

without alcohol, and he has had no serious mishaps involving

alcohol during his incarceration. (Pet. 8.) But he admitted

drinking and making alcohol in 1998 while in prison, but he was

never caught. (Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent Parole Consideration

Hr’g Tr. 27.) In any case, his lack of appreciation for the role

alcohol played in the crimes, and a possible return to alcoholinduced violence, was not identified by Commissioner Sawyer when he

outlined the reasons for denying Reyes’s request for parole. 

Nevertheless, the reliance on the psychological report by the Board

and the appellate court to show a danger of future violence is

supported by “some evidence” in the record which has sufficient

indicia of reliability. 

Petitioner next argues that the appellate court’s finding that

he has vague parole plans is unsupported by the record. (Pet. 8.) 

The appellate court stated: “It is also unclear what Reyes’s plans

will be once he is deported back to Mexico . . . .” (Lodgment No.

6, In re Reyes, Case No. D048134, slip op. at 3.) Reyes argues

that the Board made a detailed inquiry into his parole plans, and

he provided information regarding where he would live and what type

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of jobs he would seek, including continuing his ministerial

training. (Pet. 8.)

In a statement Reyes made to the Board during the hearing, he

identified three goals he wished to achieve upon his release. The

first goal was to continue his religious studies, but he did not

indicate the extent to which he had made efforts to find a place

for continued studies. (Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent Parole

Consideration Hr’g Tr. 43-44.) Second, he intended to teach

“country people how to work the land and make their products”

during the day, and “at nighttime I am going to share with them my

own experiences . . . .” (Id. at 44.) His third goal was to learn

how to work with leather while in prison and set up a factory

making leather goods with the help of his family in Mexico. (Id.) 

Reyes also submitted several letters from individuals in Mexico

indicating that he would have support in finding jobs there,

including in a church, and he would have help continuing his

rehabilitation if necessary. (Id. at 16-17.)

Even were the Court to agree with Petitioner that it was

objectively unreasonable for the appellate court to find that his

parole plans are unclear, there is “some evidence” in the record to

support the ultimate finding that Petitioner poses an unreasonable

risk of danger to society if released. This evidence consists of

the psychological report indicating that Reyes poses a risk of

future violence, and the trivial motive for the brutal and callous

murder of the two victims. These two items alone are sufficient

evidence to support the Board’s decision to deny Reyes’s request

for parole. Although Deputy Commissioner Smith’s concerns

regarding the need for ongoing anger management programming, and

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Petitioner’s failure to come to terms with the connection between

the crime and his alcohol use do not appear in Commissioner

Sawyer’s decision, they reinforce the Board’s decision. 

The Court finds there is sufficient evidence in the record to

support the Board’s determination that Petitioner’s release

unreasonably endangers public safety, and therefore, no due process

violation occurred. Irons, 505 F.3d at 851; Sass, 461 F.3d at

1128; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; Jancsek, 833 F.2d at 1390. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the appellate court’s

adjudication of Petitioner’s due process claim, on the basis that

the parole board’s unsuitability determination was supported by

“some evidence,” is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Reyes is

therefore not entitled to habeas relief as to claims three and four

in the Petition.

C. Breach of Plea Agreement

In claims one, two, and five, Reyes alleges due process and

equal protection violations in connection with the breach of, and

the fraudulent inducement into, his plea agreement. (Pet. 6-7,

9(a).) Specifically, he argues that his plea agreement provided

that he was to be released on parole after serving his minimum

term, provided he was a model prisoner, which he has been. (Id. at

6.) Petitioner contends that the failure to release him, and the

continuing opposition to his release by the Attorney General,

constitutes a breach of that agreement. (Id. at 7.) Reyes argues

that because the State has deliberately destroyed all evidence of

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his plea agreement, Respondent should bear the burden of refuting

his version of the terms of the agreement. (Id.) He contends that

the Board will continue to rely on the static facts of his

commitment offense to deny him parole, thereby transforming his

bargained-for sentence from life with the possibility of parole to

life without the possibility of parole, and he was therefore

fraudulently induced into pleading guilty by the false promise of a

sentence which contemplates parole. (Id. at 9(a).) Although Reyes

mentions equal protection in the Petition (see Pet. 6), he

identifies the basis for the claim only in his Reply, where he

argues that an equal protection violation has arisen from the fact

that prisoners similarly situated have been released on parole

after serving their minimum terms. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 8-9.)

Respondent maintains that Petitioner became aware of the

factual predicate of these claims in 2001, when he had not been

released after sixteen years, but he did not file the present

action until 2007, well outside the one-year limitations period. 

(Resp’t’s Suppl. Brief 2-3.) Reyes replies that he does not have a

copy of the documents which Respondent has lodged in support of the

statute of limitations argument, but does not dispute that the

facts derived from them are accurate. (Pet’r’s Suppl. Brief 3-4.)

The Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, that the oneyear statute of limitations codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)

applies to state prisoners challenging parole board decisions in 

federal court. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1080 n.4 (9th Cir.

2003). The limitations period begins to run on the latest of- 

 (A) the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review;

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing

an application created by State action in violation

of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

 (D) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). 

Section 2244(d)(1)(A) does not apply here. See Redd, 343 F.2d

at 1081-82. In addition, Petitioner does not contend that a statecreated impediment to his filing of this action ever existed, or

that he is relying on a newly-created constitutional right

recognized by the Supreme Court. The Court will therefore apply

§ 2244(d)(1)(D) in this action. 

In a declaration attached to his state habeas petition, Reyes

indicated that he was informed by his attorney in 1985 when he

pleaded guilty that he could be expected to be released on parole

after serving eight years, on his minimum parole eligibility date,

as long as he did not commit another crime while in prison. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No. HCN830 (Reyes decl. at

¶¶ 3-4).) Petitioner contends that the breach of his plea

agreement occurred between this fifth parole suitability hearing

held on March 25, 2003, and his sixth hearing held on August 9,

2005. (Pet. 6.) Thus, whereas in state court he contended the

breach occurred after serving eight years of his sentence, he

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1

 Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the “mailbox rule” which provides

for constructive filing of court documents as of the date they are submitted to the

prison authorities for mailing to the court. Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574-

75 (9th Cir. 2000).

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contends here that the breach did not occur until after he had

served eighteen years. 

Reyes entered the state prison system on May 29, 1985, and he

was received at Folsom State Prison on June 19, 1985. (Lodgment

No. 10, Inmate Chronological History 1.) His minimum parole

eligibility date was January 22, 1994. (Lodgment No. 2, Subsequent

Parole Consideration Hr’g Tr. 1.) Reyes had his initial parole

hearing on May 7, 1993, and was found unsuitable for parole at

subsequent hearings held on April 26, 1995, June 19, 1997, March

21, 2001, March 25, 2003, and August 9, 2005. (Lodgment No. 10,

Inmate Chronological History 1-3.) Thus, Reyes has been aware of

the factual predicate of his plea bargain claims at least since the

hearing on April 26, 1995, when he was found unsuitable for parole. 

That hearing was held after his minimum parole eligibility date of

January 22, 1994. Reyes did not file the current federal Petition

alleging a breach of his plea agreement until June 6, 2007, when he

states that he handed the Petition to the prison authorities for

mailing to the Court.1 (See Pet. 11.)

Thus, after becoming aware of the factual predicate of his

plea agreement claims, Reyes allowed over twelve years to elapse

before bringing the claims in federal court. Even accepting

Petitioner’s assertion that he became aware of the factual

predicate of his claims following his fifth (fourth subsequent)

parole hearing (see Pet. 6), which was held on March 25, 2003, his

claims are still untimely. That decision became final on June 23,

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2003, and was made more than four years before Reyes initiated

these proceedings. (Lodgment No. 11, Subsequent Parole

Consideration Hr’g Tr. 68, Mar. 25, 2003.) Unless he is entitled

to statutory or equitable tolling of the limitations period,

Reyes’s claims are clearly untimely.

1. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations is statutorily tolled while a

“properly filed” state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the

state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Statutory tolling is not

available if the first state habeas petition is filed after the

limitations period has expired. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001). Reyes filed his first state habeas petition

presenting his plea bargain claims in the state superior court on

November 4, 2005. (Lodgment No. 3, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No.

HCN830 (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 1).) Even accepting

Petitioner’s assertion that he became aware of the factual

predicate of his claim on June 23, 2003, his filing of the state

habeas petition on November 4, 2005, nearly two and one-half years

later, could not statutorily toll the already expired one-year

statute of limitations. Rice, 276 F.3d at 482.

2. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is also subject to

equitable tolling. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon

v. U.S. Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Ninth Circuit in Beeler noted that “[e]quitable tolling will

not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be

granted if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a prisoner’s

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control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. at

1288-89 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696,

701 (9th Cir. 1996)). The burden is on Petitioner to show that the

“extraordinary circumstances” he has identified were the proximate

cause of his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence

on his part. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003);

Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Equitable tolling “is unavailable in most cases.” Miles v. Prunty,

187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he threshold necessary to

trigger equitable tolling (under AEDPA) is very high, lest the

exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Reyes has made no attempt to demonstrate that his lengthy

delay in presenting his plea bargain claims to the state or federal

courts was the result of anything other than a lack of diligence on

his part. Petitioner was able to pursue the claims alleging denial

of due process arising from his most recent parole hearing through

the state and federal courts supports a finding of lack of

diligence. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2005) (holding that equitable tolling was unavailable where

prisoner was not prevented from meeting other filing deadlines);

Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (stating that Petitioner must show that

the “extraordinary circumstances” he has identified were the

proximate cause of his untimeliness, rather than negligence in

general or a lack of diligence). 

Reyes alleges that the Board intends to deny him parole for

the rest of his life by relying on the unchanging facts of his

commitment offense. (See Pet. 9.) He contends that he was

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therefore fraudulently induced into pleading guilty by the promise

of a real chance of parole. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 11-12.) To

the extent Petitioner came to this realization as a result of the

March 25, 2003 hearing, or after any preceding parole hearing, his

claim is barred by the statute of limitations. To the extent Reyes

alleges he came to that realization after his most recent parole

hearing and the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations,

or to the extent this is considered as a basis for equitable

tolling of the plea agreement claims, it is without merit. As set

forth above, the Board considered factors other than the commitment

offense to find Reyes unsuitable for release, including the

psychological assessment of his risk of future violence, and Deputy

Commissioner Smith was concerned about Reyes’s understanding and

dealing with issues involving anger management and alcohol abuse. 

The Court finds, therefore, that this aspect of claim five, to the

extent it is not barred by the statute of limitations, is without

merit for the reasons discussed above with respect to claims three

and four. 

Accordingly, claims one, two, and five, alleging a breach of

Petitioner’s plea bargain, are barred by the one-year statute of

limitations. To the extent the fraudulent inducement aspect of

claim five is not barred by the statute of limitations, the Court

finds it to be without merit.

D. Equal Protection

In claim one, Reyes alleges, in an entirely conclusory

fashion, that his equal protection rights have been violated by the

breach of his plea agreement. (Pet. 6.) Conclusory allegations

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without factual support “do not warrant habeas relief.” James v.

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In his Reply, however, Reyes argues that an equal protection

violation has arisen from the fact that similarly situated

prisoners have been released on parole after serving their minimum

terms. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 8-9.) He lists a number of state

court cases and argues that the facts of those cases support his

claim. (Id.) If Petitioner is presenting a new claim in the

Reply, which was not presented in the Petition itself, the Court

has the discretion to refuse to consider it. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that court

may ignore issue raised for first time in traverse when scope of

traverse has been specifically limited by court order and

petitioner ignores order to file a separate pleading indicating

intent to raise claim); but see Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523,

1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that district court erred in failing

to address issue raised in traverse). Because the Court has a duty

to liberally construe pro se pleadings, Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d

1015, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001), the equal protection claim

Petitioner framed in the Reply will be considered.

Although Reyes did not provide the state supreme court with

the case citations he provides here in support of his equal

protection claim, he did generally argue in the state habeas

petition that his federal equal protection rights were violated by

the failure to release him after he had served his minimum term. 

(Lodgment No. 7, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No. S146099 (petition for

writ of habeas corpus at 3).) That petition was summarily denied

on March 14, 2007, with a single citation to People v. Duvall, 9

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Cal. 4th 464, 474, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265

(1995) (setting forth the initial burden assigned to state

prisoners for adequately pleading grounds for habeas relief). 

(Lodgment No. 8, In re Reyes, Case No. S146099 (docket).) 

Respondent argues that Reyes has not stated a prima facie case as

to his plea bargain claims (grounds two and five), but the warden

does not argue that the citation to Duvall by the state supreme

court is applicable to this aspect of Reyes’s equal protection

claim (ground one). (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 13-15.) Respondent

has not carried the initial burden of ”demonstrating that the bar

is applicable” to this claim. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573,

586 (9th Cir. 2003).

Reyes did not present an equal protection claim in the habeas

petitions filed in the state superior and appellate courts. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No. HCN830 (petition for

writ of habeas corpus); Lodgment No. 5, Reyes v. Marshall, Case No.

D048134 (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The Court must

therefore conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the silent denial of this claim by the state supreme court

is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that when the state court reaches the

merits of a claim but provides no reasoning to support its

conclusion, “although we independently review the record, we still

defer to the state court’s ultimate decision[]”) To the extent the

state supreme Court’s citation to Duvall indicates that it did not

reach the merits of the claim due to a procedural bar, the Court

must conduct a de novo review of the claim. Id. Under either an

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independent or de novo standard of review, the claim does not

provide a basis for federal habeas relief.

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should

be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc.,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)(quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982)). The Court does not inquire into whether one state treats

its prisoners the same as another state, but whether California

treats all similarly situated prisoners the same. See Addington v.

Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (“The essence of federalism is that

states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems

and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.”) The Ninth Circuit

has consistently held that prisoners are not a suspect class. 

Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999); Webber v.

Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998); Mayner v. Callahan,

873 F.2d 1300, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989). Consequently, even if

Petitioner was treated differently than other similarly situated

prisoners in California, any disparate treatment is justified by

showing a rational basis for the disparity. City of Cleburne, 473

U.S. at 440; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

1, 55 (1973) (“The constitutional standard under the Equal

Protection Clause is whether the challenged state action rationally

furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest.”). 

Reyes identifies eight opinions of various California courts

in which he contends the petitioners were convicted of second

degree murder and released on parole after serving their minimum

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terms; he argues that he is similarly situated to those prisoners. 

(Mem. P. & A. Supp. Reply 8-9.) Reyes is not similarly situated to

any of the petitioners in those cases. Furthermore, there is a

rational basis for any disparate treatment between those

petitioners and Reyes, because the cases cited each have factors

distinguishing them from Reyes’s case. See In re Lee, 143 Cal.

App. 4th 1400, 1404-05, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 931, 933-34 (2006)

(describing eighty-one year-old petitioner with numerous severely

debilitating medical conditions and very low risk of violence); In

re Elkins, 144 Cal. App. 4th 475, 480-81, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503,

505-06 (2006) (affirming Board of Parole Hearings where petitioner

convicted of first degree murder for killing his high school

classmate during a robbery, who petitioner blamed for ruining his

life by causing his drug addiction); In re Scott, 133 Cal. App. 4th

573, 579-80; 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905, 908 (2005) (granting habeas

corpus relief to petitioner, who surrendered to police, and was

subsequently convicted of killing the drug dealer his wife was

having an affair with and who had threatened petitioner); In re

Lawrence, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 537, 539-40 (2007) (reversing governor’s

refusal to follow recommendation to parole female petitioner who

killed wife of her lover with firearm and potato peeler, and served

twenty-two years on a seven years-to-life sentence imposed after

she turned down a plea offer of two years), review granted, 168

P.3d 869 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2007); In re Barker, 151 Cal. App. 4th

346, 351-52, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 746, 748-49 (2007) (ordering a new

parole suitability hearing for petitioner convicted of one count of

first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder in the

killing of his friend’s parents and grandfather, when Board of

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Parole Hearings found him unsuitable after he had served twentynine years and obtained his GED); In re Smith, 114 Cal. App. 4th

343, 350-51, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 660-61 (2003) (remanding for a

new parole determination by governor where petitioner killed his

wife after she told him she had been unfaithful and was leaving

him, and then went to a church and asked people to pray for him and

to call the police); In re Ramirez, 94 Cal. App. 4th 549, 553-54,

114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381 (2001) (requiring another parole suitability

hearing for petitioner convicted of second degree murder when

fellow robber and occupant of the car petitioner was driving was

thrown from car and killed while eluding police), disapproved of

by, In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1100, 104 P.3d 783, 806, 23

Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 444 (2005).

Thus, to the extent a liberal construction of the Petition

reveals that Petitioner is presenting an equal protection claim

which is not barred by the statute of limitations, the Court finds,

based on an independent review of the record, that the silent

denial of that claim by the state supreme court was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. To the extent a de novo review of the

record is required as to Reyes’s equal protection claim, the Court

finds habeas relief to be unavailable because the claim is without

merit.

E. Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing as to his

claims. (Reply 9; Mem. P. &. A. Supp. Reply 12-13.) Based on the

finding in this Report that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

relief as to any claim presented, Petitioner’s request for an

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evidentiary hearing is denied. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d

1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is

not required on issues which can be resolved on the basis of the

state court record).

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United

States District Judge Napoleon A. Jones under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined

above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: 

(1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and

(2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 9, 2009, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

January 26, 2009. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 5, 2008

 _____________________________ Hon. Ruben B. Brooks

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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