Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02085/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joel Mark Hughes, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. Civ. 06-2085-PHX-NVW (VAM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner submitted a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 29, 2006. [Doc.

1]. Respondents' Answer was filed on October 20, 2006. [Doc.

8]. Petitioner's Reply is dated November 10, 2006. [Doc. 9].

The Court now reports and recommends as follows:

BACKGROUND

In 1992, Petitioner entered a plea of no contest in state

court to a charge of attempted second degree murder. [Doc. 8,

Exhs. A, B, C]. Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with

the stipulated sentence in the plea agreement on March 26,

1992. [Exh. D]. 

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Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. [Doc. 8,

Exh. F]. The order and mandate issued on August 27, 1992.

[Doc. 8, Exh. G]. Between 1992 and 1994, Petitioner pursued

his first petition for post-conviction relief. [Doc. 8, Exhs.

H-O]. The trial Court and Arizona Court of Appeals denied

relief. [Id.]. Petitioner pursued his second and third

petitions for post-conviction relief between May 15, 2001 and

October 4, 2002. [Doc. 8, Exhs. P-Y]. Petitioner was denied

relief with respect to both petitions, on grounds that his

claims were untimely. [Id.]. 

Petitioner's fourth and final petition for post-conviction

relief was filed in state court on January 28, 2003. [Doc. 8,

Exh. Z]. Although Petitioner's petition was filed more than

ten years after his conviction became final, he alleged in his

Petition that he recently discovered he had Hepatitis B and C.

He asserted that the Hepatitis amounted to newly discovered

evidence that may have had an impact on his sentence. [Doc. 8,

Exhs. Z-CC]. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the trial

court might have deemed the plea agreement too harsh or

imposed a more lenient sentence had the judge known about

Petitioner's Hepatitis. [Id.]. 

Petitioner's fourth petition for post-conviction relief was

permitted to go forward on grounds that Petitioner's Hepatitis

amounted to newly discovered evidence. [Doc. 8, Exh. DD].

The Court found that Petitioner diligently pursued "the fact

of diagnosis and petition[ed] the Court for appropriate

relief." [Doc. 8, Exh. DD]. The Court denied relief,

however, finding that Petitioner's diagnosis would not have

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altered his stipulated sentence had it been known at the time

of sentencing. [Id.]. Petitioner sought review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court. [Doc. 8,

Exhs. EE-HH]. The Arizona Court of Appeals denied review on

August 3, 2005. [Doc. 8, Exh. FF] The Arizona Supreme Court

denied review on April 20, 2006. [Doc. 8, Exhs. HH].

Petitioner's federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was

filed in this Court on August 29, 2006. [Doc. 1]. He alleges

three issues: ineffective assistance of counsel(Ground I);

denial of due process (Ground II); and violation of his right

against double jeopardy. [Id.]. Pursuant to this Court's

order of September 12, 2006, [Doc. 3], Respondents filed a

limited Answer asserting that Petitioner's claims are barred

by the statute of limitations and are procedurally defaulted.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that

Petitioner's Petition may be timely under 28 U.S.C.

§2244(d)(1)(D), but that Petitioner's claims are nonetheless

procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends

that the Petition be denied.

DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

As part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging

convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. This

provision, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244, states, in pertinent

part:

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(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State

action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the

right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the statute of limitations

for prisoners whose convictions became final before the

effective date of the AEDPA generally begins to run on April

25, 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). For all other prisoners, the

statutory period generally commences on the date a

petitioner's judgment of conviction becomes "final," measured

from the latest of “the date on which the judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A).

The AEDPA's one-year limitations period is subject to both

statutory and equitable tolling. See Jorss v. Gomez, 311 F.3d

1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002). The AEDPA statutorily tolls the

limitations period during the time in which "a properly filed

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application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). For purposes of

statutorily tolling the limitations period pursuant to §

2244(d)(2), an application for state post-conviction relief is

deemed "properly filed" "when its delivery and acceptance are

in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing

filings." Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An

application for collateral review is "pending" during "the

time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through

proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state court

remedies...." Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.

1999). "Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period

in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available only when 'extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible

to file a petition on time' and 'the extraordinary

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v.

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999); Lehman v. United

States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998).

In the present case, Petitioner's conviction became final in

1992, prior to the effective date of the AEDPA. Petitioner

had no proceedings pending in state court between 1994 and

2001. Therefore, absent a showing that he is entitled to

equitable tolling or that his case falls into one of the

categories listed in 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D), the statute of

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limitations commenced on April 25, 1996, and expired one year

later. 

Respondents assert that the only conceivable grounds for

extending the statute of limitations are: (1) the doctrine of

equitable tolling, or (2) subparagraph (D) of §2244(d)(1).

Respondents contend that, in either case, Petitioner's claim

fails because he failed to exercise due diligence in

discovering the basis for his federal claims. Petitioner

replies that he had "no way of knowing that he should even

look for Hepatitis since he wasn't sick" and that he filed for

post-conviction relief "within weeks" of discovering his

condition in 2002. [Doc. 9 at 4].

Were the Court to agree with Petitioner that he exercised

due diligence in discovering his Hepatitis, his habeas corpus

Petition would be timely under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(D). See

also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.

2003)(stating that the statute of limitations on claims

predicated upon newly discovered evidence commences "when the

prisoner could have discovered the new evidence through the

exercise of due diligence"). The Ninth Circuit has explained:

[U]nder AEDPA's exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must

fully present his claim based on newly discovered evidence

to the state courts before he can file a federal habeas

petition. The limitations period is tolled, however, under

§ 2244(d)(2) while the prisoner's claim based on newly

discovered evidence is pending in state court. Thus, for

claims based on newly discovered evidence, the limitations

period begins to run when the new evidence should have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence until the

prisoner files a petition for state collateral review. The

prisoner's federal petition based on that claim becomes ripe

for filing once the state courts have completed a full round

of collateral review.

Redd, at 1083.

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1 Petitioner's Reply states that he learned of his

Hepatitis in 2001. [Doc. 9 at 2]. In light of the

state record, this appears to be a typographical

error. 

2 Petitioner's Petition was dated January 22, 2003.

The Petition was not marked "filed" until January

28, 2003. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court

assumes that Petitioner gave his Petition to prison

officials on the date he signed the Petition.

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)(holding

that a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner is

deemed filed at the moment the prisoner delivers it

to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of

court); See Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1106 n.

2 (9th Cir.1999)(recognizing that the same "prisoner

mailbox rule" applies to habeas corpus petitions

filed under AEDPA).

3 The Court has construed the various dates marked on

all state court papers liberally, using the dates

that are most beneficial to Petitioner. 

4 Petitioner asserts that he discovered his Hepatitis

in October of 2002. He does not specify a date.

The Court has liberally construed the argument and

assumed that Petitioner may not have discovered the

condition until October 31, 2002.

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Here, Petitioner allegedly discovered his Hepatitis in

October 2002. [Doc. 8, Exh. AA at 3, Exh. DD at 1, Exh. EE at

4].1 He submitted a notice of post-conviction relief alleging

claims related to the Hepatitis on January 22, 2003,2 and he

continued to pursue his claims in state court until April 20,

2006. [Doc. 8, Exhs. Z, DD, EE, FF, GG, HH].3 Assuming that

Petitioner exercised the due diligence required by 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations would have commenced

on approximately November 1, 2002.4 The limitations period

would have run for eighty three (83) days until Petitioner's

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5 Petitioner's contention that he had no reason to

know of his Hepatitis prior to 2002 and the state

court's finding that Petitioner's discovery of his

Hepatitis amounted to newly discovered evidence,

raise factual questions regarding whether Petitioner

exercised due diligence. The Court has therefore

construed the facts in Petitioner's favor.

Nonetheless, Petitioner's claims are clearly

procedural defaulted. 

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Notice of Post-conviction relief was filed on January 22,

2003. The statute of limitations would have been tolled

during the pendency of Petitioner's fourth post-conviction

proceedings. The limitations period would have recommenced on

April 20, 2006, and would have expired 282 days later. His

federal petition, which was filed on August 29, 2006, would

therefore be timely.

For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court

will assume that Petitioner acted with due diligence and that

his petition is therefore timely.5 Regardless of whether

Petitioner acted with due diligence, however, his claims must

be denied under the doctrine of procedural default. 

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

1. Controlling Legal Principles

A federal court has authority to review a federal

constitutional claim presented by a state prisoner if

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v.

Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981)(per curiam); McQueary v.

Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion

doctrine, first developed in case law and codified in the

former 28 U.S.C. § 2254, now states:

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(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-

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 (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available

in the courts of the State; or

 (B)(i) there is an absence of available state corrective

process; or

 (ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

.......

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the

remedies available in the courts of the State, within the

meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law

of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the

question presented.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996).

The exhaustion requirement can be satisfied in one of two

ways. First, a petitioner can fairly present his or her

claims to the state’s highest court by properly pursuing them

through either the state’s direct appeal process or through

appropriate post-conviction relief. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509 (1982); Lindquist v. Gardner, 770 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir.

1985); Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 235 (9th Cir. 1981). Only

one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before

bringing a habeas petition in federal court. This is true

even where alternative avenues of reviewing constitutional

issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter,

68 F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d

526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987).

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6 In Arizona, exhaustion may be accomplished by fairly

presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000) (stating

that “except in habeas petitions in capital cases,

claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them”).

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A petitioner must "fairly present his claim to the state’s

highest court to properly exhaust." Brown, 68 F.3d at 1211.6

To fairly present a claim, a federal habeas petitioner must

provide the state courts with a fair opportunity to apply

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon the

federal constitutional claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,

30-34 (2004). See also Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6

(1982)(per curiam); Picard v. O’Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278

(1971). While the petitioner need not recite "‘book and verse

of the federal constitution’", Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78

(quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir.

1958)), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to

support the federal claim were before the state courts or that

a "somewhat similar state law claim was made." Anderson, 459

U.S. at 6.

As an alternative to presenting his claims to the highest

state court, a petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion

requirement by demonstrating that no state remedies remained

available at the time the federal habeas petition was filed.

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 (n. 28)(1982); White v.

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). This failure to

comply with reasonable state procedures is usually

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7 Appellate defaults are examined under the same

standards that apply when a defendant fails to

preserve a claim during trial. Smith v. Murray, 477

U.S. 527, 533 (1986).

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characterized as "procedural default", "procedural bar", or a

"waiver". The burden is on the petitioner to show that he or

she has properly exhausted each claim. 

In many cases, the lack of available state remedies is a

direct result of the petitioner’s failure to avail himself of

the state remedies in a timely or procedurally correct manner.

In such instances, the petitioner has procedurally defaulted,

and may not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent

a showing of "cause and prejudice" sufficient to excuse the

default or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.7 Reed v.

Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,

90-91 (1977); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298

(1989); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988).

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v.

Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). "Prejudice" is

actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional

violation. Id. To show a fundamental miscarriage of justice,

a petitioner must make the extraordinary showing that the

alleged constitutional violation probably resulted in the

conviction of an innocent person. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.

298, 321 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).

The circumstances constituting a fundamental miscarriage of

justice apply in only a "narrow class of cases." Schlup, 513

U.S. at 321. To establish actual innocence, the petitioner

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must show that considering all the evidence, "it is more

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

him." Id. at 327-28. 

2. Analysis

In the present case, none of Petitioner's federal habeas

corpus claims were fairly presented in state court. In ground

one, Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective: for

failing to inform Petitioner that his health condition could

have impacted his sentence; for failing to tell Petitioner he

was faced with two charges for the same crime; and for filing

only one motion on Petitioner's behalf. [Doc. 1]. Although

Petitioner argued in state that counsel was ineffective for

failing to ensure that the State complied with the plea

agreement and for failing to question Petitioner's capacity to

enter a valid plea agreement, he never raised the issues now

presented. [Doc. 8 at Exhs. J, P].

Similarly, Petitioner's second ground for relief was never

presented as a federal claim in state court. In Ground II,

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor violated due process by

failing to disclose evidence of Petitioner's Hepatitis.

Petitioner's fourth state petition for post-conviction relief

alleged that he was unaware that his Hepatitis could have been

considered a mitigating factor during sentencing. [Doc. 8,

Exhs. Z-CC]. He further argued that the trial judge might

have imposed a more lenient sentence or declared the plea

agreement too harsh had Petitioner's health been brought to

light. [Id.]. Petitioner did not argue, as he does now, that

his federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of

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8 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32.2(a)(3)

precludes post-conviction relief for any claim that

could have been raised in a previous collateral

proceeding except under limited circumstances. The

Ninth Circuit has determined that the preclusive

effect of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule

32.2(a)(3) is independent from any federal

determination. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860

(2002). See also Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329,

333 (9th Cir. 1992)(rejecting argument that Arizona's

reliance on Rule 32.2(c) as a basis for procedural

default was "so unpredictable and irregular that it

does not provide an adequate ground" for disposal of

claims). But see Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614

(9th Cir. 2005). 

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prosecutorial non-disclosure. His claim was therefore not

fairly presented. 

Petitioner's third ground for relief, which alleges that his

conviction violated double jeopardy, is also raised for the

first time in Petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition.

Petitioner concedes in his Reply that the issue was never

raised in state court. 

Because Petitioner's claims were not presented to the state

court in a procedurally appropriate manner, they were not

fairly presented for purposes of exhaustion. See, e.g.,

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 30-34. Under state law, Petitioner may

not now return to state court and re-assert his unexhausted

federal claims. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) (stating that "[A]

defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based

upon any ground.... (3) that has been waived at trial, on

appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding")8;

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (setting time limits for Arizona

petitions for post-conviction relief). Petitioner's claims

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9 In his Reply, Petitioner suggests that counsel's

ineffectiveness was a fundamental miscarriage of

justice. To the extent this argument can be

construed as alleging cause, the Court rejects it.

Although constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel can constitute cause for a procedural

default, "the mere fact that counsel failed to

recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or

failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it,

does not constitute cause for a procedural default."

Murray, 477 U.S. at 486. Ordinarily, a prisoner

must establish that counsel's assistance was so

ineffective that it fell below constitutional

standards or show that an objective factor external

to the defense impeded counsel's ability to comply

with the state procedural rule. Id. The record

does not support such a conclusion here. 

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are therefore procedurally defaulted. Federal habeas review

of the merits of Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims is

barred unless Petitioner can show cause for the procedural

default and actual prejudice, or that failure to consider his

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321; Murray, 477 U.S. at 496; Wainwright,

433 U.S. at 90-91 (1977).

Petitioner has not put forth any arguments sufficient to

support a finding of cause or prejudice that would excuse his

default with respect to the precluded claims.9 Likewise, the

Court is satisfied that denial of Petitioner's claims will not

amount to a fundamental miscarriage of justice. As noted

above, the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception

applies only to a "narrow class of cases" in which a

Petitioner can make the extraordinary showing that an innocent

person was probably convicted due to a constitutional

violation. Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); Murray, 477 U.S.

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at 496. Throughout his state and federal proceedings,

Petitioner has not argued that he is actually innocent, but

instead argues that his sentence might have been mitigated had

he known he was ill. Neither Petitioner's belief that the

state court judge might have imposed a sentence different than

that agreed to by Petitioner in the plea agreement nor

Petitioner's bald assertion that he would have rejected the

plea had he known of his Hepatitis establish a fundamental of

miscarriage of justice. Petitioner's procedurally defaulted

claims should therefore be denied.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner failed to present his federal habeas corpus

claims in state court. The claims are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has not established cause and prejudice or a

miscarriage of justice. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas

corpus relief. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] be denied.

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is

immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Any notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry

of the district court’s order and judgment. The parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of this Report and

Recommendation within which to file specific written

objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have ten

(10) days within which to file a response to the objections.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual

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determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a

waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the

factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party's right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation.

DATED this 29th day of December, 2006.

Case 2:06-cv-02085-NVW Document 11 Filed 12/29/06 Page 16 of 16