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Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 5, 2005 Decided May 6, 2005

No. 04-5197

JOHN F. KREIS,

APPELLANT

v.

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv02317)

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Charlotte A. Abel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

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Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal stems from Air Force

Major (now retired) John F. Kreis’s continuing efforts to obtain

a correction of his military records and retroactive promotion by

the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records (“the

Board”). Following a remand, Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force,

866 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Kreis I”), the Board found on

April 6, 1992 that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate

the existence of possible error or injustice warranting favorable

action on Kreis’s requests. The district court affirmed, Kreis v.

Sec’y of the Air Force, No. 85-1169 (June 3, 1994), aff’d, 1995

U.S. App. LEXIS 8737 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 1995) (“Kreis II”)

(unpublished order), declining to consider three declarations that

had not been presented to the Board. Id. The Board

subsequently denied Kreis’s motion for reconsideration to which

he attached the three declarations and supplemental statements,

and the district court affirmed. Kreis now contends that the

Board was arbitrary and capricious when it denied

reconsideration without considering his evidence because it

failed to follow its regulation on reconsideration and its

precedent. On de novo review of the grant of summary

judgment to the Board,see Kidwell v. Dep’t of the Army, Bd. for

Corr. of Military Records, 56 F.3d 279, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

we reverse and remand the case to the district court with

instructions to remand to the Board for consideration of Kreis’s

motion for reconsideration on the merits.

I.

The background to this appeal is set forth in Kreis I, 866

F.2d at 1509-11, and Kreis v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 648 F.

Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1986). The only issue before the court is

whether the Board’s denial of Kreis’s motion for reconsideration

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was contrary to law under its regulation and precedent. In

denying reconsideration the Board stated, in full:

The Board examined your request and concluded that it

does not meet the criteria for reconsideration by the

Board. Reconsideration is authorized only when newly

discovered relevant evidence is presented which was not

available when the application was submitted. The

reiteration of facts previously addressed by the Board,

uncorroborated personal observations, or additional

arguments on the evidence of record are not adequate

grounds for reopening a case.

(emphasis added) Whether the Board properly refused to

consider the documents submitted by Kreis for failure to meet

the criteria for reconsideration is governed by the Board

regulation on reconsideration, which provides, in relevant part:

Requests for reconsideration shall provide newly

discovered relevant evidence not reasonably available

to the applicant at the time of a previous application.

All requests . . . will be initially screened by the staff of

the Board . . . . * * * If such [new] factual allegations,

or documentary evidence have been submitted, the

request shall be forwarded to the Board for a

determination [whether to authorize a hearing,

recommend that the records be corrected without a

hearing, or to deny the application without a hearing].

32 C.F.R. § 865.9(c) (1994). Kreis sued the Secretary, alleging

that the Board’s refusal to reconsider his application was

arbitrary and capricious, and the district court granted summary

judgment to the Board, ruling that the decision of the Board is

supported by the evidence.

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II.

As the court stated in Kreis I, while the district court’s

jurisdiction does not reach military personnel decisions, the

court has jurisdiction “to evaluate, in light of familiar principles

of administrative law, the reasonableness of the Secretary’s

decision not to take certain corrective action with respect to

[Kreis’s military] record.” 866 F.2d at 1511. The court need

only “determine whether the Secretary’s decision making

process was deficient, not whether his decision was correct.” Id.

So too the Board’s denial of Kreis’s motion for reconsideration

is subject to review under such principles of administrative law.

See id. at 1512-13. Thus, the court must uphold the Board’s

decision unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A) (2000). The court, therefore, must be able to

conclude that the Board “examine[d] the relevant data and

articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a

‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck

Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). “An

agency’s discretionary order [will] be upheld, if at all, on the

same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.”

Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168-69. While the

Secretary contends that even greater deference is required here

because military personnel decisions are entitled to an

“unusually deferential” standard of review, Kreis I, 866 F.2d at

1513-14, the issue before the court does not involve a military

judgment requiring military expertise, but rather review of the

Board’s application of a procedural regulation governing its case

adjudication process. Upon de novo review of the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to the Board, Kidwell, 56

F.3d at 286, we conclude that a remand to the Board is required

for the following reasons.

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First, the only fair reading of the Board’s decision is that, in

the Board’s view, the evidence submitted by Kreis did not

provide adequate grounds for the Board to reach the merits of

his request for reconsideration. The Board stated: “The Board

examined your request and concluded that it does not meet the

criteria for reconsideration by the Board.” Admin. Rec. at 123.

Neither has the Secretary argued on appeal that the Board

considered the merits of Kreis’s request. Thus, the Board denied

Kreis’s motion at the threshold level by deciding that the

documents he submitted did not warrant Board consideration of

the underlying merits of his request for reconsideration. This

conclusion is bolstered by a staff recommendation to the Board

that “only addressed the arguments of [Kreis] . . . to the extent

they relate to the appropriateness of this Board reconsidering its

decision.” Id. at 105. 

In that light, the Board’s refusal to consider

“uncorroborated” evidence imposed a requirement not present

in its regulation and inconsistent with its precedent. The

evidence before the Board consisted of three declarations by

military officials, an excerpt from a deposition of a fourth

military official, and an affidavit by Kreis’s counsel regarding

statements made by Larry W. Neptune, a former Air Force

Personnel officer. According to the affidavit, Neptune stated

that a memorandum of Brigadier General William R. Brooksher,

Air Force chief of security police, which had been destroyed,

directed that Kreis should not be assigned to a command

position or to any other position of responsibility in the security

police field. The Board’s reference to “uncorroborated personal

observations” can only be a reference to the Neptune statements.

While the uncorroborated nature of the evidence might

appropriately weigh in the Board’s assessment of its probative

weight, the Board’s order denying reconsideration, fairly read,

was based on its view that the evidence submitted by Kreis

failed to provide a sufficient basis for the Board to reach the

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merits of his motion for reconsideration. In addition, the Board

does not dispute Kreis’s assertion that it failed to follow its

precedent granting requests for reconsideration based on

uncorroborated statements. See Addendum to Record of

Proceedings, A.F.B.C.M.R. No. 9703586 (Dec. 17, 1998);

Addendum to Record of Proceedings, A.F.B.C.M.R. No.

9801126 (Mar. 29, 2000). It is axiomatic that “[a]n agency must

treat similar cases in a similar manner unless it can provide a

legitimate reason for failing to do so.” Indep. Petroleum Ass’n

of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Therefore, the Board’s conclusion that the Neptune statements

did not meet the criteria for reconsideration because they were

“uncorroborated personal observations” is arbitrary and

capricious because it is inconsistent with its regulation and an

unexplained departure from its precedent.

Second, the Board also ignored its precedent in denying

reconsideration without addressing the substantive merits of the

three declarations attached to Kreis’s motion for reconsideration

or an excerpt from a deposition of a fourth military official

submitted as a supplement to his motion. Kreis points to Board

precedent that treated as evidence, not arguments, expert opinion

refuting Board judgments and reasoning. See also Guy v. United

States, 608 F.2d 867, 874 (Ct. Cl. 1979). Yet in denying

reconsideration, he contends, the Board “did not dispute that the

declarations, deposition testimony, and statements that Major

Kreis submitted were newly discovered, relevant, and not

reasonably available at the time of Major Kreis’s 1981

application,” but instead “held them not to be evidence.” Br. for

Appellant at 5-6.

The Board decisions appended to Kreis’s brief on appeal

indicate that while the Board may not give much weight to

expert opinion, upon submission of such expert opinions, the

Board has reached the merits of a motion for reconsideration.

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E.g. Second Addendum to Record of Proceedings,

A.F.B.C.M.R. No. 9103049 (Feb. 16, 1999); see, e.g.,

Addendum to Record of Proceedings, A.F.B.C.M.R. No.

9702571 (Aug. 24, 1999). The Secretary does not attempt to

distinguish the Board precedent cited by Kreis; but rather makes

the bald assertion that the Board “is not bound by its previous

decisions” in unrelated cases in which reconsideration was

granted. Br. for Appellee at 11-12. Absent any reasoned

explanation in the Board’s decision for different treatment of

Kreis’s expert military evidence, see Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of

Am., 92 F.3d at 1258, the denial of reconsideration for failure to

meet the criteria for reconsideration under the rule, when it has

previously granted reconsideration upon submission of expert

military opinion, is arbitrary and capricious. 

To the extent the Secretary maintains the expert military

opinions are not newly discovered evidence under 32 C.F.R. §

865.9(c), because they merely reiterate facts already before the

Board and assert opinions that the Board made the wrong

decision in 1992, the declarations and deposition focus on the

military practice rationale and statistical evidence relied on by

the Board in 1992 in concluding that there was insufficient

evidence to demonstrate the existence of possible “error or

injustice” warranting relief. See 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(a)(4).

According to the expert military opinions, the Board’s rationales

for denying Kreis relief departed from the practices of Special

Selection Boards in deciding on promotions. The Declaration

of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Devol Brett (retired),

which was embraced by the Declarations of U.S. Air Force

Colonel Ervin C. Stewart (retired) and U.S. Air Force Colonel

George H. Knudson, Jr. (retired), focuses on the Board’s

methodology of relying on evaluations dated before 1971 –

during Kreis’s first three years as a captain and his service as a

lieutenant – to determine that his record showed “somewhat

erratic performance” and to conclude that a 1979 officer

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effectiveness report bearing a favorable endorsement by

Lieutenant General James D. Hughes, Commander-in-Chief of

the Pacific Air Force, and an assignment to the high-level

position would not have caused Kreis to be selected for

promotion. The Brett Declaration states, “Performance as a

major, not performance as a lieutenant or young captain, is most

important to a lieutenant colonel selection board.” The Brett

Declaration also states that the Board relied on an incorrect set

of statistics – the 31% and 7% overall selection rates for regular

and reserve officers respectively in 1980 – because “[f]irst-time

eligibles, like Major Kreis in 1980, have the highest selection

rates of all officers under consideration” and the “relevant

statistics” were at least 63.7% for the group of first-time

eligibles as a whole and 68.4% for the group falling into a

controlled category to which Kreis belonged. These statistics,

the Brett Declaration stated, indicate that Kreis was more likely

than not to be selected for promotion in 1980. Finally, the Brett

Declaration stated that the Board should have compared Kreis’s

record to the sample of records viewed by the 1980 Special

Selection Board or to any other appropriate sample of records,

as is the practice of Special Selection Boards. In addition, the

excerpt from the deposition of Air Force General Howard J.

Ingersoll of November 8, 1996 confirmed General Brett’s point

that the rank of the reviewing official is very important and that

an endorsement by Lieutenant General Hughes, as “the most

senior Air Force officer who could participate as an endorsing

official, and who was Commander-in Chief of the major aid

command, would have made a marked difference in the opinions

of the board members.”

Having previously considered such expert military opinion

to be “newly discovered relevant evidence” warranting

consideration of a motion for reconsideration on the merits, the

Board, which is a civilian board, Roelofs v. Sec’y of the Air

Force, 628 F.2d 594, 596 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980), failed to explain

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why it treated the expert military opinions here differently.

Therefore, the Board’s conclusion that reconsideration was not

authorized on the basis of newly discovered relevant evidence

was arbitrary and capricious.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the district

court with instructions to remand to the Board for consideration

of the merits of Kreis’s motion for reconsideration; such

reconsideration shall address the merits of the expert military

opinions expressed in the declarations of U.S. Air Force

Lieutenant General Brett, U.S. Air Force Colonel Stewart, and

U.S. Air Force Colonel Knudson, the other evidence Kreis

submitted with his motion, and any supplements to his motion.

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