Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55307/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55307-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN PELESASA FUE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-55307

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-02436-

DMG-MRW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 28, 2014*

Pasadena, California

Filed January 15, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

Dissent by Judge Bybee

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 FUE V. BITER

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

Affirming the district court’s dismissal, as untimely, of a

California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition, the panel

held that the prisoner failed to act with the requisite diligence

to justify application of the equitable tolling doctrine where

he waited fourteen months before inquiring into the status of

his state habeas petition.

Dissenting, Judge Bybee wrote that, since it is only the

extraordinary case in which the state court fails to send notice

of a decision, a rule requiring prisoners to seek early and

frequent updates about the status of a pending petition would

be a waste of time for prisoners and a heavy administrative

burden for state courts.

COUNSEL

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Michael Tanaka,

DeputyFederal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising

Deputy Attorney General, Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorney

General, Los Angeles, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FUE V. BITER 3

OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

California state prisoner Steven Pelesasa Fue (Fue)

appeals the district court’s dismissal, as untimely, of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the Act),

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Fue contends that he is entitled to

equitable tolling because the state court never notified him

that it had denied his state habeas petition. The district court

held that Fue was not entitled to equitable tolling because he

did not act diligently in waiting fourteen months before

inquiring into the status of his petition. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we agree with

the district court’s conclusion that Fue failed to act with the

requisite diligence.1

I. BACKGROUND

Fue’s habeas petition challenges his 2007 convictions for

armed carjacking. Under the Act, Fue had one year from the

date his convictions became final to file a federal habeas

corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). His convictions

became final on or about May 19, 2009, ninety days after the

California Supreme Court denied his petitions for review on

direct appeal. See Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th

Cir. 2013). Six months later, on November 19, 2009, Fue

1 We have no quarrel with the principle that equitable tolling may

require us to calculate time with the awareness that special treatment may

be warranted “in an appropriate case.” Dissenting Opinion, p. 13 (quoting

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010). We simply disagree that

Fue’s case is “special.”

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4 FUE V. BITER

filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court, thereby tolling the one-year

limitations period while his state post-conviction petition was

pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On May 20, 2010, the

California Supreme Court denied the state habeas petition. 

What happened next is relevant to Fue’s equitable tolling

claim.

According to Fue, the California Supreme Court never

notified him that it had denied his state habeas petition. After

waiting fourteen months for a decision, on January 31, 2011,

Fue mailed a letter to the California Supreme Court to inquire

into the status of his case. By letter dated February 3, 2011,

the Clerk of the California Supreme Court informed Fue that

his habeas case was no longer active.2

Fue’s federal habeas petition, filed on March 7, 2011, was

dismissed as untimely. In this timely appeal, Fue contends

that the district court misapplied the doctrine of equitable

tolling when determining the timeliness of his federal habeas

petition. We do not agree.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s dismissal of a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus for failure to comply with the

applicable one-year statute of limitations de novo. See Sossa,

729 F.3d at 1229. If the underlying facts are undisputed, the

question whether the statute of limitations should be

2 The dissent takes the position that this letter was deceptive. See

Dissenting Opinion, p. 18. We disagree. Informing a habeas petitioner

that his case is no longer active conveys that there are no pending matters

before the court.

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FUE V. BITER 5

equitably tolled is reviewed de novo. See id.; see also Gibbs

v. LeGrand, 767 F.3d 879, 890–93 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing

the district court’s diligence determination de novo). 

Otherwise, a district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for

clear error. See Sossa, 729 F.3d at 1229.

III. DISCUSSION

A prisoner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

showing (1) that an extraordinary circumstance prevented the

timely filing of his habeas petition and (2) that he diligently

pursued his rights. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649

(2010). Lack of knowledge that the state court has reached a

decision on his state habeas petition may constitute an

extraordinary circumstance so as to justify equitable tolling

if the prisoner has acted diligently. See Ramirez v. Yates,

571 F.3d 993, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2009). In order to determine

whether Fue is entitled to such tolling, we consider “(1) on

what date [Fue] actually received notice; (2) whether [Fue]

acted diligently to obtain notice; and (3) whether the alleged

delay of notice caused the untimeliness of his filing and made

a timely filing impossible.” Id. at 998 (citations omitted).

Only the second consideration is at issue in this appeal. 

We must decide whether a prisoner who waits fourteen

months before inquiring into the status of his state habeas

petition has acted with sufficient diligence to apprise himself

of the status of his pending proceedings. While the

availability of equitable relief commends a flexible, case-bycase approach, we permissibly look to how other courts have

evaluated various delays to inform our reasonable diligence

inquiry. Holland, 560 U.S. at 650 (recognizing that “courts

of equity can and do draw upon decisions made in other

similar cases”). A brief survey of similar cases in other

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6 FUE V. BITER

circuits reflects that courts have generally determined that a

prisoner who delayed fewer than ten months before inquiring

into the status of his case acted with sufficient diligence. See

Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2008) (nine

months); see also Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491, 495–96

(6th Cir. 2002) (same). On the other hand, a prisoner who

delayed sixteen months and more was deemed not to have

acted with sufficient diligence. See LaCava v. Kyler,

398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005) (twenty-one months);

Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (nearly

two years); Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1288

(11th Cir. 2002) (sixteen months). While not dispositive,

Fue’s delay of fourteen months before inquiring into the

status of his state habeas petition is closer to the majority of

cases finding a lack of reasonable diligence.

Unlike our dissenting colleague, we easily see how

waiting fourteen months before inquiring about the status of

his state court petition was unreasonable in these

circumstances. Although no statute or rule requires prisoners

to seek periodic updates from the California Supreme Court,

reasonable diligence requires action on the part of the

petitioner – including one appearing pro se. See Diaz,

515 F.3d at 155 (suggesting that a pro se litigant should

inquire “as to whether a pending motion has been decided”

after “a substantial period of time has elapsed,” in that case

nine months); see also Miller, 305 F.3d at 496 (noting that the

pro se petitioner “did not passively await decision,” but acted

reasonably in filing a motion asking the court to rule on his

application after approximatelynine months); Drew, 297 F.3d

at 1288 (criticizing the pro se petitioner for sending only one

letter inquiring about this case); Emp. Painters’ Trust v.

Ethan Enters., 480 F.3d 993, 997 n.7 (explaining that

diligence requires “keeping apprised of recent filings”).

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FUE V. BITER 7

The dissent inquires why we would require habeas

petitioners to pursue a “steady stream of correspondence”

regarding filings that have been pending for a considerable

time. Dissenting Opinion, p. 14. The answer is obvious: to

demonstrate the required diligence on the part of the habeas

petitioner. Cf. Drew, 297 F.3d at 1288 (criticizing the

sending of only one letter).

The dissenting opinion rests its analysis largely on the

failure of the California Supreme Court to notify Fue of its

decision. See Dissenting Opinion, pp. 15–17. However, the

failure of the court to notify Fue of its decision has absolutely

nothing to do with Fue’s diligence. Rather, the failure of the

court to notify Fue satisfied the extraordinary circumstances

prong of the equitable tolling equation. See Ramirez,

571 F.3d at 997 (“We agree with our sister circuits that a

prisoner’s lack of knowledge that the state courts have

reached a final resolution of his case can provide grounds for

equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently . . . ”)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added). The diligence requirement is separate and apart from

the extraordinary circumstances requirement. The

extraordinary circumstances requirement focuses on the

action(s) of a party or parties outside the petitioner’s control. 

See Sossa, 729 F.3d at 1229 (describing extraordinary

circumstances as those circumstances “beyond a prisoner’s

control” and attributable to “an external force”). The

diligence requirement focuses squarely on the habeas

petitioner’s actions, or lack thereof. See Holland, 560 U.S. at

649 (clarifying that a habeas petitioner warrants equitable

tolling only if “he has been pursuing his rights diligently”)

(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

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8 FUE V. BITER

We readily acknowledge that we previously determined

in Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001), that

a prisoner was diligent despite a longer delay. However, in

Huizar, the prisoner engaged in a “steady stream of

correspondence” with a non-responsive court. Id. The

prisoner first contacted the court two months after he

delivered his state habeas petition to prison officials. See id. 

Twenty-one months later, after receiving no response from

the court, the prisoner had his sister mail a second copy of the

petition by certified mail. See id. After five months more of

waiting, the prisoner sent yet another letter to the court, his

fourth mailing. See id. It was the prisoner’s “steady stream

of correspondence . . . [that] show[ed] reasonable diligence

on his part.” Id.

There is really no credible comparison to be made

between Huizar and Fue. Huizar was also entitled to rely on

notice from the California court. But he didn’t just wait for

notice from the court. He undertook an investigation within

a reasonable time after he expected a decision to have been

rendered.3 By contrast, Fue sat on his hands and did not

3 Although the Huizar opinion did not so explain, superior courts in

California at the time Huizar filed his state petition were required to “rule

on a petition for writ of habeas corpus within 30 days after the petition

[was] filed.” Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(a)(3)(A)(1996); see also Cal. R. Ct.

4.550(a) (providing that Rule 4.551 “applies to habeas corpus proceedings

in the superior court”); Jackson v. Superior Court, No. B164449, 2003

WL 22146535, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2003) (applying the 30-day

rule). Judge Bybee correctly observes that the California Supreme Court

does not have an analogous deadline for ruling on habeas petitions, so Fue

did not know exactly when the court would issue its opinion. Dissenting

Opinion, p. 15 n.1. But that fact is quite beside the point. Fue was

undeserving of equitable tolling regardless of what he knew (or didn’t

know) about his petition because it was unreasonable for him not to take

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FUE V. BITER 9

bother to inquire into the status of his petition, even after “a

substantial period of time” – more than a whole year –

“elapsed.” Cf. Diaz, 515 F.3d at 156 (involving less than a

year delay). In addition, Huizar didn’t stop with only one

mailing to the state court. Although the dissent takes issue

with a “steady stream of correspondence” as reflecting due

diligence, see Dissenting Opinion, p. 14, we explicitly held

that Huizar’s “steady stream of correspondence . . . would

show reasonable diligence on his part.” Huizar, 273 F.3d at

1224.

Our colleague in dissent seeks to characterize our holding

in Huizar as sanctioning a delay of twenty-one months in

contacting the state court. See Dissenting Opinion, p. 17. 

However, that characterization completely ignores Huizar’s

initial inquiry after two months, and Huizar’s “steady string

of correspondence” thereafter that persuaded us that Huizar

was reasonably diligent. See Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1224. Fue’s

single inquiry after fourteen months comes nowhere close to

the diligence exercised by Huizar. Cf. Drew, 297 F.3d at

1288 (concluding that the sending of a single letter did not

establish reasonable diligence).

Fue simply did not display diligence similar to that

displayed by Huizar. Rather, he waited fourteen months

before initially inquiring into the status of his state habeas

petition. There was no indication in the record that any

impediment prevented Fue from inquiring earlier about the

status of his habeas petition. The dissenting opinion seeks to

blunt the force of Fue’s dilatoriness by pointing to the relative

alacrity of Fue’s filing in federal court after receiving notice

any action to investigate its status for as many as fourteen months after

filing.

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10 FUE V. BITER

from the state court. See Dissenting Opinion, p. 19. 

However, it is the pre-notice lack of diligence that dooms

Fue’s claim of diligence. See Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1224

(focusing on pre-notice diligence). Fue’s unwarranted delay

persuades us that he failed to act with sufficient diligence to

justify application of the equitable tolling doctrine. See Emp.

Painters’ Trust, 480 F.3d at 999 n.7 (“Once a party appears

in a civil action it is responsible for the diligent presentation

of its case, which includes, inter alia, keeping apprised of

recent filings . . .”).4

Finally, the dissent takes issue with the “fine line” drawn

by our holding. Dissenting Opinion, p. 20. However, our

colleague in dissent would also draw a line. He merely

prefers that the line be drawn on the other side of the facts in

this case. The fact of the matter is that regardless of where

the line is drawn, cases will fall on either side of the line. We

are persuaded that our conclusion is more consistent with the

purpose of the Act, to “encourag[e] prompt filings in federal

court in order to protect the federal system from being forced

to hear stale claims. . . .” Baek v. Long, No. 13CV421-

MMA(BLM), 2013 WL 6587873, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16,

2013) (quoting Guillory v. Rose, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th

Cir. 2003).

The dissent speculates that if Fue had been more diligent

by six weeks, “perhaps then the majority would say he was

sufficiently diligent.” Dissenting Opinion, p. 20. Perhaps

so. But that is not the case before us. Fue did not inquire of

4 The fact that Fue’s case has been pending in this Court for over

fourteen months, see Dissenting Opinion, p. 24 n.5, in no way excuses his

lack of diligence in the state court. See Emp. Painters’ Trust, 480 F.3d at

999 n.7 (requiring a litigant to keep track of court filings).

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FUE V. BITER 11

the state court six weeks earlier, and we are persuaded that

the length of his delay and the attendant circumstances place

his case squarely on the non-diligent side of the scale.

We are not persuaded by the dissent’s reliance on Hardy

v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 2009), see Dissenting

Opinion, p. 21. The delay in Hardy was eleven months as

opposed to the considerably longer period of fourteen months

here. Performing the same line-drawing analysis we have

undertaken, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the eleven-month

delay was closer to the eight-month delay in one case than to

the thirty-month delay in a different case. See Hardy, 577

F.3d at 599. It is also completely understandable that the

Fifth Circuit would consider a delay of eleven months to be

comparable to the delay of nine months discussed in Diaz and

Miller. The Fifth Circuit was not called upon to decide the

diligence of a habeas petitioner who delayed longer, and we

do not know how it would have ruled. But we do know that

at least two district courts in California have determined that

delays similar to Fue’s reflected a lack of reasonable

diligence. See Baek, 2013 WL 6587873, at *5 (holding that

a delay of thirteen months “does not constitute the required

diligence”) (citations and footnote reference omitted); see

also Retano v. Janda, No. CV 12-8214-GW (OP), 2013 WL

6499702, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (concluding that a

delay of approximately fifteen months “indicate[d] a lack of

diligence”). Fue’s fourteen-month delay falls squarely

between these two California federal court decisions finding

a lack of diligence.

We can dispose of the dissent’s reliance on Knight v.

Schofield, 292 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 2002), in short order. See

Dissenting Opinion, p. 22. As the dissent acknowledges, the

Eleventh Circuit almost immediately distinguished Knight. 

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12 FUE V. BITER

See Dissenting Opinion, p. 22 n.4; see also Drew, 297 F.3d at

1288 & n.3 (distinguishing Knight and concluding that a

sixteen-month delay reflected a lack of diligence). Although

the dissent takes issue with the basis upon which the Eleventh

Circuit distinguished its prior precedent, see Dissenting

Opinion, p. 22 n.4, the fact remains that Knight was

distinguished by the same court that authored it.

The dissent accuses both the majority and the Eleventh

Circuit of relying “on an instinctive sense of what seems like

a long time . . .” Dissenting Opinion, p. 24 (emphasis in the

original). However, the exact same point could be made

regarding the dissent’s view.

At bottom, comparing the facts of this case to those

within and without our circuit leads us to the conclusion that

the district court committed no error in denying Fue’s request

for equitable tolling, In particular, unlike the prisoner in

Huizar, Fue took no initiative to inquire about the status of

his petition within a time frame we and other courts have

recognized as reasonably diligent. The district court properly

dismissed Fue’s petition as untimely.

AFFIRMED.

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In one of his brilliant books explaining physics to nonrocket scientists, Brian Greene wrote that “[o]f the many

strange things Einstein’s work revealed, the fluidity of time

is the hardest to grasp.” Although “everyday experience

convinces us that there is an objective concept of time’s

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FUE V. BITER 13

passage,” in fact, “[t]he passage of time depends on the

particulars . . . of the measurer.” Brian Greene, The Hidden

Reality: Parallel Universes and the Deep Laws of the Cosmos

66 (2011). As in physics, so in law. At least in equity. In a

case that turns on equitable tolling, unlike one involving

jurisdictional limitations, we must measure time “with

awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard

to predict in advance, . . . warrant special treatment in an

appropriate case.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650

(2010).

No one disputes that Steven Fue has alleged extraordinary

circumstances, beyond his control, that caused him to file his

federal habeas petition after the statutory deadline. The

California Supreme Court decided his habeas petition six

months after he filed it, but the court never told Fue. In fact,

when he wrote the court to inquire about his petition, the

Clerk told him the court had “no record” of his petition. We

have held that this very situation can justify equitable tolling

of AEDPA’s statute of limitations if the prisoner has acted

with reasonable diligence. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993,

997 (9th Cir. 2009).

Yet, with Newtonian precision, the majority holds that

Fue did not behave reasonably—and is thus ineligible for

equitable tolling—because he waited 14 months before

sending a letter to the California Supreme Court asking about

the status of his petition. Maj. Op. at 5–6. But I fail to see

how this was at all unreasonable. The California Supreme

Court is required to “promptly” send a copy of its decisions

to prisoners. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.387(a)(2), 8.532(a). Fue had

not received a copy of any decision, and no statute or rule

requires prisoners to seek periodic status updates from the

California Supreme Court. Perhaps we should expect

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14 FUE V. BITER

prisoners to inquire with the court after an unusually long

time has passed with no decision, but 14 months is not an

unusually long time for a court—least of all the California

Supreme Court—to decide a petition. See Huizar v. Carey,

273 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) (21 months “not an

unusually long time [for a prisoner] to wait for a court’s

decision”).

Why would we require Fue, and other prisoners like him,

to pursue a “steady stream of correspondence,” Maj. Op. at 8,

with the California Supreme Court to verify that the court has

followed its own rules? This is a burden I expect neither the

prisoners nor the California Supreme Court will welcome. I

respectfully dissent.

I

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is

‘reasonable diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” 

Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Reasonable diligence is not an exacting

standard. It simply requires “the effort that a reasonable

person might be expected to deliver under his or her

particular circumstances.” Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001,

1015 (9th Cir. 2011).

The key “particular circumstances” in this case are as

follows: Fue, proceeding without the aid of counsel, filed a

habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court. 

Unlike superior courts in California, the California Supreme

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FUE V. BITER 15

Court has no deadline for deciding habeas petitions.1 And,

unlike habeas proceedings in the superior courts, no rule

permits prisoners proceeding before the California Supreme

Court to file a request for decision after a certain amount of

time has elapsed.2 The California Supreme Court has,

however, obligated itself by rule of court to “promptly”

inform prisoners when it renders a decision on their habeas

petitions.3 Habeas petitioners such as Fue may rely on this

rule and look for “prompt[]” delivery when the California

Supreme Court reaches a decision. Conversely, relying on

this rule, they may reasonably assume the court has not

reached a decision when the clerk has not “sen[t them] copies

showing the filing date.”

We are asked to decide what effort a reasonable person

might be expected to undertake in the circumstance in which

1 Superior courts “must rule on a petition for writ of habeas corpus

within 60 days after the petition is filed.” Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(a)(3)(A); see

also Cal. R. Ct. 4.550(a) (providing that Rule 4.551 “applies to habeas

corpus proceedings in the superior court”). Although the California

Supreme Court has no analogous deadline for deciding habeas petitions,

it does have a deadline for deciding petitions for review of lower court

decisions. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.512(b) (petitions for review filed with the

California Supreme Court are “deemed denied” if the court does not rule

on the petition or grant an extension within 60 days).

2

See Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(a)(3)(B) (“If the [superior] court fails to rule on

the petition within 60 days of its filing, the petitioner may file a notice and

request for ruling.”).

3

See Cal. R. Ct. 8.532(a) (“The Supreme Court clerk must promptly file

all opinions and orders issued by the court and promptly send copies

showing the filing date to the parties . . . .”); see also Cal. R. Ct.

8.387(a)(2) (providing that Rule 8.532(a) governs the filing of the

California Supreme Court’s decisions in habeas corpus proceedings).

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16 FUE V. BITER

the court has not sent notice of a decision. In answering this

question, we must keep in mind that, “[f]rom a litigant’s

perspective, it is a difficult, if not impossible endeavor, to

estimate how long a reviewing court will take to decide a

[petition].” Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir.

2002). Understanding this, courts have “see[n] no point in

obliging a pro se litigant to pester a state court with frequent

inquiries as to whether a pending [petition] has been decided,

at least until a substantial period of time has elapsed.” Diaz

v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2008).

In my view, a “reasonable person,” knowing that the court

will send notice when a decision has been made, might

refrain from asking the court about a petition until the petition

has remained pending for an unusually long time. How long

is unusually long depends, of course, “on the particulars . . .

of the measurer.” In light of the “particulars” of a pro se

prisoner, and perhaps thinking of our own docket, we have

charitably allowed that even 21 months is “not an unusually

long time to wait for a court’s decision.” Huizar v. Carey,

273 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001).

In Huizar, a California superior court failed to respond to

a state prisoner’s habeas petition. Knowing that the superior

court must act within 60 days, Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(a)(3)(A),

Huizar first inquired about his petition two months after it

was filed. When he got no reply he waited 21 months before

mailing a second copy to the same court. He waited five

months, got no reply, and sent another letter. Huizar went a

total of 28 months before learning that his petition had not

been received by the superior court and then another four

months before filing his federal petition. Id. at 1222. The

district court dismissed his federal petition as untimely. We

reversed, however, and instructed the district court to

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FUE V. BITER 17

determine on remand if Huizar’s efforts were as he claimed

them to be and, if so, to “deem his petition timely and

consider it on the merits.” Id. at 1224.

It is very difficult to square Huizar with our decision in

this case. The majority attempts to distinguish Huizar on the

ground that the prisoner there engaged in a “steady stream of

correspondence” with a non-responsive court. Maj. Op. at

8–9. But that misses the point. The point is that Huizar

found a delay of 21 months between correspondences

followed by a delay of five months to be a “steady stream of

correspondence.” Given the misleading answer Fue received

from the Clerk of the California Supreme Court in response

to his January 31, 2011 inquiry (I discuss the details of the

Clerk’s response below), Fue, hardly less than Huizar,

sufficiently corresponded with a non-responsive court.

Fue never delayed so much as 21 months. Indeed, in

comparison with Huizar, he was downright chatty. After 14

months and no word from the California Supreme Court, Fue

took the initiative and sent a letter to the Clerk of the

California Supreme Court. A prisoner could show his

diligence by sending inquiries to a state court each and every

day after the case has been submitted. Yet that does not mean

that a prisoner who shows something less than hyper

diligence in initially reaching out and then following up with

a state court has acted unreasonably. In other words, simply

because Fue was less proactive than some other prisoner does

not mean Fue has acted unreasonably. In light of Fue’s pro

se status and the California Supreme Court’s obligation to

notify him of its decision, I believe Fue’s actions were

entirely consistent with what a reasonable person might be

expected to do.

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II

Ordinarily, a prisoner must show reasonable diligence not

only before but also after receiving delayed notice of a state

court’s decision. Miller, 305 F.3d at 496 (considering

whether the petitioner “acted promptly after receiving notice

of the appellate court’s decision”); see, e.g., Earl v. Fabian,

556 F.3d 717, 724 (8th Cir. 2009) (petitioner who filed

habeas petition more than eight months after receiving

delayed notice failed to pursue rights with diligence). Here,

however, Fue need not meet that requirement because he did

not receive notice of the California Supreme Court’s decision

until after he filed his federal habeas petition.

The majority says Fue received notice when the Clerk of

the California Supreme Court informed him, in a letter dated

February 3, 2011, “that his habeas case was no longer active.” 

Maj. Op. at 4. But the Clerk told him no such thing. The

Clerk’s February 3, 2011 letter stated in full: “This will

acknowledge receipt of your letter received February 3, 2011,

I checked our dockets and found no record of a pending

petition for writ of habeas corpus having been filed on or

about November 2009.” The misleading implication of the

Clerk’s response was that the court never received Fue’s

November 2009 petition. Certainly that was how Fue

understood it. He “did not know what to think of it,” so he

wrote to his appellate lawyer and asked, “What should I do?” 

The majority understands this letter differently; it thinks the

letter informed Fue “that his case [was] no longer active” and

that there was therefore “no pending matter[] before the

court.” Maj. Op. at 4 n.2. I do not think that is a fair reading

of the Clerk’s language quoted above. Even Fue’s lawyer

understood the Clerk’s response to mean the court never

received Fue’s petition. He told Fue to “explain to the Court

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FUE V. BITER 19

. . . that you already sent your petition” and to seek leave to

file the petition again.

Taking the letter at face value, Fue instead decided to file

his federal habeas petition immediately. In the questionnaire

attached to his petition, he wrote that the date of the

California Supreme Court’s decision on his habeas petition

was “N/A” and the result was “waiting for a response still.” 

Fue claims—and the State does not dispute—that “the first

[he] knew of the denial was when he read the state’s motion

to dismiss the petition in this case.” By that time, of course,

he had already filed his federal habeas petition, so his need to

act with post-notice diligence was moot.

In any event, even if the Clerk’s February 3, 2011 was

sufficient to put Fue on notice that his state habeas petition

had been denied, Fue still acted with complete diligence after

receiving notice of the court’s decision. Based on the facts as

he understood them, Fue expected to have three months after

receiving notice of the California Supreme Court’s decision

to prepare and file his federal habeas petition. (He actually

had six months, but his appellate lawyer misinformed him.) 

Yet once he learned that the California Supreme Court had

“no record” of his petition, he filed his federal petition within

32 days. Cf. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.

2000) (petitioner who filed federal habeas petition within one

month of receiving delayed notice pursued rights with

diligence). And Fue was not just sitting on his hands; those

32 days included the time he took to write his appellate

lawyer for advice on how to proceed and then to wait for his

lawyer’s response. These actions clearly show that Fue made

“the effort that a reasonable person might be expected to

deliver under his or her particular circumstances.” Busby,

661 F.3d at 1015.

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20 FUE V. BITER

III

The majority bases its holding on what other circuits have

held in “similar cases.” Maj. Op. at 5. But the majority does

not effectively deal with the cases most similar to ours, and

the unreasonable-delay cases the majority relies on are either

unpersuasive or not similar at all.

The majority divides the cases into two groups. First are

the cases in which the petitioner inquired about a petition

after less than 10 months; in these cases, the courts found, the

petitioners acted with sufficient diligence. Id. at 5. Then are

the cases in which the petitioner waited sixteen months or

more; those petitioners were deemed not to have acted with

sufficient diligence. Id. The majority reasons that because

Fue’s 14 months is “closer to the majority of cases finding a

lack of reasonable diligence,” Fue was therefore not

reasonably diligent. Id. In other words, the majority

effectively argues, because 14 months is closer to 16 months

than it is to 10 months, Fue’s petition cannot be reviewed.

While I cannot argue with the mathematical precision of

the majority’s approach, this certainly draws a fine line. See

Busby, 681 F.3d at 1015 (“Equitable tolling is not the arena

of bright-lines and dates certain[.]”). Under this reasoning, if

Fue had only inquired just six weeks earlier, his delay of 12

and a half months would have been closer to 10 months than

to 16; perhaps then the majoritywould say he was sufficiently

diligent. But the majority’s line-drawing is an exercise in

rule making, not an exercise in equity. Although the majority

does not create a hard deadline—such as might be found in a

statute of limitations—it has created an asymptote, a limit

that approaches a finite number, around 13 months.

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The majority draws the line finer still by its treatment of

the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hardy v. Quarterman, 577 F.3d

596 (5th Cir. 2009). The court there held that a prisoner acted

reasonably in waiting 11 months before contacting the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals about his petition. Id. at 599. 

Two circumstances were particularly relevant to the court:

first, Hardy’s pro se status, and second, the fact that the court

had a legal duty to notify him when it issued a decision. Id.;

see also id. at 598 (noting that, under Texas rules of appellate

procedure, “[t]he [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] is . . .

legally obligated to notify a petitioner once a decision has

been rendered on his habeas petition”). Looking to its own

prior decisions, the court reasoned that “[Hardy’s] elevenmonth wait is much more analogous to the eight months the

petitioner in [one case] allowed to elapse than the two and a

half-year wait in [another case].” Id. at 599. The court also

cited two of the cases cited by the majority here—Diaz v.

Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2008), and Miller v. Collins,

305 F.3d 491, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2002)—and reasoned that

“the timing of Hardy’s inquiry is not significantly different

from time periods found to be reasonable by other circuits.” 

Id.

Our case is quite similar to Hardy. Fue, like Hardy, was

representing himself in his habeas proceedings before the

California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court,

like the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, is legally required

to notify prisoners “promptly” when it has rendered a

decision on their habeas petitions. See Cal. R. Ct.

8.387(a)(2), 8.532(a). And the timing of Fue’s inquiry is not

significantly different from the time period found reasonable

in Hardy, despite the majority’s assertion that a fourteenmonth delay is “considerably longer” than eleven months. 

Maj. Op. at 11.

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22 FUE V. BITER

Another similar case the majority fails to appreciate is

Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 2002). In that

case, the court held that a prisoner’s delay of 18 months

before inquiring about the status of his petition was

reasonable. If Knight’s 18-month delay was reasonable,

Fue’s 14-month delay should be reasonable too.4

Of the three cases cited by the majority that found a

prisoner’s delayunreasonable, two involved much more delay

than 14 months (one was 21 months, the other 24 months),

and both of those cases involved a prisoner who was

represented by counsel. See LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271,

276 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that “LaCava was not entitled to

personal notice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s order”

because he “was represented by counsel during his state

collateral proceedings”); Cousins v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843,

849 (5th Cir. 2002) (declining to grant equitable tolling

4 Soon after Knight was decided, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished it on

the ground that a court clerk told Knight when he filed his petition that he

would be notified as soon as a decision was issued. Drew v. Dep’t of

Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1288 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002). But I believe the Drew

majority was wrong to distinguish Knight on this ground. The court in

Drew treated equitable tolling as though it required equitable estoppel. 

See id. (“[M]ost importantly, [Drew] received no assurances from the

Clerk on which to rely.”). But equitable tolling does not; it only requires

reasonable diligence.

Fue, like Drew, “had every reason to expect that the court would

notify him once it ruled on his petition; every litigant knows that the court

is supposed to inform the parties when a result has been reached.” Id. at

1300 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Indeed, as explained above, the California

Supreme Court’s rules obligate it to notify prisoners promptly when it

rules on their habeas petitions. To suggest “that it would make all the

difference to [Fue]’s case had the Clerk of the [California Supreme Court]

told him, at the time he filed his petition, that he would be notified of the

result [would be] disingenuous.” Id.

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FUE V. BITER 23

because “[t]he petition at issue in this case remained

submitted but unfiled for almost two years, at least in part

because counsel failed adequately to investigate the status of

the case”). These decisions are not similar to ours, so we

should not follow them.

That leaves just one case: Drew v. Department of

Corrections, 297 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2002), which

determined that a prisoner’s 16-month delay before

contacting the court constituted a lack of reasonable

diligence. Notably, however, Drew never held that a 16-

month delay is unreasonable as a matter of law; it held that it

was not clear error for the district court to determine that

Drew’s 16-month delay was unreasonable. Id. at 1289–90. 

Indeed, in the face of statistics showing that Drew’s 16-month

wait was not far off of the average time courts take to rule on

petitions like his, the Drew majority refused to consider the

evidence. To consider the evidence, the majority reasoned,

would amount to “de novo fact-finding” and would

“eviscerate[]” the trial court’s central role. Id. at 1289–90 &

n.4; see also id. at 1289 (“Even if there were some reasonable

debate as to Drew’s diligence, . . . the dissent offers no reason

to find clear error . . . .”). Given that the majority here

reviews the district court’s diligence determination de novo,

Maj. Op. at 4, it makes little sense to hold that Fue’s 14-

month delay was unreasonable because it was “close” to the

16-month delay the Drew majority deemed unreasonable

under a highly deferential standard of review.

Even if we set aside the fact that Drew was decided under

clear-error review, the decision is unpersuasive. I see no

basis articulated in the Drew majority’s opinion for its

“finding . . . that a sixteen month ‘delay’ before contacting

the court about the status of the petition constitutes a lack of

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24 FUE V. BITER

diligence.” Id. at 1301 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The Drew

majority’s opinion, much like the majority’s opinion here,

appears to be based on an instinctive sense of what seemslike

a long time; it does not appear to be based on evidence of

what any reasonable pro se prisoner would know or do under

the circumstances.

If Drew’s 16-month delaywas indeed close to the average

amount of time a court takes to decide petitions like his, it

would seem to me that Drew acted well within the bounds of

reasonable diligence. See id. at 1300–01. Ultimately,

however, such proof is unnecessary. Recognizing that it may

be nearly impossible for a pro se prisoner to know how long

it may take a court to decide a petition, Miller, 305 F.3d at

496, a prisoner should be able to trust that the court will send

notice when a decision has been made—at least until the

petition has remained pending for an unusually long time. 

And neither 16 months nor 14 months is an unusually long

time. Huizar, 273 F.3d at 1224.5

At bottom, the only case cited by the majority that comes

even remotely close to ours (Drew) involved a longer delay,

was decided under a different and highly deferential standard

of review, and refused to consider evidence that the delay

involved there in fact was reasonable. We should not feel

bound by it.

* * *

5

Indeed, it has taken our court a good deal longer than 14 months to

decide Fue’s case. The wheels of justice often turn slowly, and it is not

unreasonable for a pro se prisoner to be aware of that fact and act

accordingly.

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FUE V. BITER 25

Since it is only the extraordinary case in which the state

court fails to send notice of a decision, a rule requiring

prisoners to seek early and frequent updates would be a waste

of time for almost all prisoners, would be a heavy

administrative burden for state courts, and would only

minimally serve the interest of preventing stale federal habeas

petitions. Fue affirmatively inquired with the California

Supreme Court about the status of his petition after 14

months, he sent a letter to his appellate attorney, and he then

promptly filed his federal habeas petition. In doing all this,

Fue acted just as we should expect a reasonable person in his

shoes to act. I would give him his day in federal court. 

Accordingly, I dissent.

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