Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02245/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02245-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFERY LEE MOURNING,

Booking No. 1814430,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WILLIAM D. GORE, Sheriff;

SECURUS TELEPHONE CO.; 

JOHN & JANE DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02245-WQH-RBM

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO 

EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS 

AND COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

Jeffery Lee Mourning (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the San Diego County 

Sheriff Department’s George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) in San Diego, 

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) 

Plaintiff alleges he is a former U.S. Marine who receives a monthly veteran’s 

pension for a non-service related injury. He was booked on a charge of felony vandalism

on July 13, 2018, and claims the Sheriff has acted “in concert with” Securus Telephone 

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Company to restrict his ability to communicate with the U.S. Department of Veterans’

Affairs (“VA”) while he has been in custody. As a result, Plaintiff claims he has been 

denied access to his monthly VA pension and has been unable to use those funds to obtain 

counsel or post a bond securing his pretrial release. (Id. at 2, 4-6.) Plaintiff claims 

Defendants’ practices and telephone policies violate his rights to due process and equal 

protection. (Id. 8-9.) He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as the costs of suit.

(Id. at 10-11.)

Plaintiff did not pay the fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when he filed his 

Complaint; instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 

1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his San Diego County 

Sheriff’s Department Inmate Trust Account Activity for the 6-month period preceding the 

filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 2 at 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that Plaintiff had a single deposit of $25 

to his account, of which only $.24 remained at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 1. 

Based on this accounting, the Court must assess an initial partial filing fee of $.83

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (b)(1), but it also notes Plaintiff may have 

insufficient funds with which to pay that initial fee at the time this Order issues. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from 

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that 

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts 

as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure 

to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact the initial filing fee assessed by this Order because his trust account 

statements suggest he may have “no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and instead 

directs the Watch Commander at GBDF, or his designee, to collect the entire $350 balance 

of the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and to forward all payments to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to the installment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

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II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must review and sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint, and any complaint filed 

by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a 

governmental entity, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages 

from defendants who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to 

ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of 

responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler 

v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

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as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”). However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s contains factual allegations 

sufficient to overcome the “low threshold” set to proceeding past the sua sponte 

screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).

2 See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents punishment of a pretrial detainee prior to 

an adjudication of guilt); Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583, 

595 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh’g (June 18, 1993) (“[T]he First 

Amendment extends to the right to petition an administrative agency.”); see also Lyon v. 

U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 171 F. Supp. 3d 961, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (finding 

triable issues of fact in immigration detainee class action challenging custodial telephone 

restrictions on First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment grounds); Johnson v. Knowles, 

 

2 Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, 

and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [any individual defendant] may choose 

to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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113 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1997) (private actors may act “under color of state law” for 

purposes of § 1983 if they are “willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its 

agents.”).

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the named 

Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall 

issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 

(“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal 

. . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. ORDERS the Watch Commander of the GBDF, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s trust account the $.83 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available 

at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 

owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY 

 

3 Plaintiff includes “John & Jane Does 1 through 10” as parties to this action, but he alleges no personal 

participation or constitutional misconduct as to these unidentified persons. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1); 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated 

the Constitution.”). Thus, before Plaintiff can allege a plausible claim for relief against a Doe defendant, 

he must identify each party by name, and amend his pleading to include “factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. 

Until he does so, an effective summons cannot issue for use by the U.S. Marshal who may be charged 

with the responsibility to effect its service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and 

served within [90] days of the commencement of the action against them); Finefeuiaki v. Maui Cmty. 

Corr. Ctr. Staff & Affiliates, No. CV 18-00249 DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 3580764, at *6 (D. Haw. July 25, 

2018) (noting that “[a]s a practical matter, the United States Marshal cannot serve a summons and 

complaint on an anonymous defendant.”).

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IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Watch 

Commander, George Bailey Detention Facility, 446 Alta Road, San Diego, California, 

92158.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 

1) and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for each named 

Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order, 

a certified copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve these Defendants. 

Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the Form 285s as completely 

and accurately as possible, include an address where each named Defendant may be found 

and/or subject to service, and return them to the United States Marshal according to the 

instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying his IFP package.

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 

upon the named Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to 

him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

6. ORDERS Defendants, once they have been served, to reply to Plaintiff’s 

Complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be 

permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 

jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 

conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and 

thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that 

Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required 

to respond); and

7. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 

serve upon Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 

counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 

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Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 

original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 

manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been was served on 

Defendants or their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any 

document received by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or which 

fails to include a Certificate of Service upon Defendants may be disregarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2019

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