Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02286/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332fr Diversity-Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SANDRA BROWN, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

STARBUCKS CORPORATION, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 18cv2286 JM (WVG) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

Defendant Starbucks Corporation (“Starbucks”) moves to dismiss Plaintiff Sandra 

Brown’s complaint under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(2) and to strike Plaintiff’s nationwide 

class allegations. (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. No. 9.) On January 8, 2019, the 

court took this matter under submission. Having carefully considered the moving papers 

and parties’ arguments, the court grants Starbucks’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

BACKGROUND 

 Brown asserts eight claims on behalf of herself and putative class members: (1) fraud 

by omission, (2) negligent misrepresentation, (3) violation of the California Consumers 

Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”), (4) violation of § 17200 of 

the California Business & Professions Code (“UCL”) for unlawful business practices, 

(5) violation of § 17200 of the UCL for unfair business practices, (6) violation of 

California’s False Advertising Law, Business and Professions Code § 17500 et seq. 

(“FAL”), (7) breach of express warranties, and (8) breach of implied warranties. (Doc. No. 

1, “Compl.”) 

Brown alleges that the packaging of Starbucks’ “Sour Gummies” product (the 

“Gummies”) gives the misleading “impression” that the candies contain only natural 

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ingredients. The front packaging states—“Apple, watermelon, tangerine and lemon 

flavored candies.” (Doc. No. 8-3, Exh. A, “Gummies Packaging” at 2.) 1 

An ingredients list on the back packaging states that the Gummies contain “sugar, 

cornstarch, fumaric acid, citric acid, fruit juice concentrates (tangerine, apple, lemon), 

pectin, sodium citrate, color added (saffron, annatto, vegetable and spirulina extracts), 

natural flavors.” (Doc. No. 8-3 at 3.)2

 Fumaric acid is an artificial ingredient. (Compl. ¶¶ 

32, 36-38.) 

When she purchased the Gummies, Brown sought a product that was “flavored only 

with the natural ingredients claimed on the label and which did not contain artificial 

                                                                

1

 Starbucks requests the court take judicial notice of images of the product’s packaging. 

(Doc. No. 8-4.) Brown does not oppose this request. The court grants Starbucks’s request 

as the images are not subject to reasonable dispute. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Kanfer v. 

Pharmacare US, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1098-99 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“Courts addressing 

motions to dismiss product-labeling claims routinely take judicial notice of images of the 

product packaging.”) (collecting cases). 

2

 All page citations refer to those generated by the court’s CM/ECF system. 

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flavoring.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) Brown paid a premium for the Gummies because she believed 

the product was “naturally-flavored,” and would not have purchased the product if she 

knew it contained artificial ingredients. 

Brown alleges that California law required Starbucks to disclose that the Gummies 

contained artificial ingredients on the front packaging. Brown alleges that, among other 

violations, Starbucks violated two federal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 

regulations—21 C.F.R. § 101.22, which regulates the labelling of food containing artificial 

ingredients, and 21 C.F.R. § 102.5, which requires food labels to accurately identify and 

describe the basic nature of the food or its characterizing properties or ingredients.3

 Brown 

relied on “the omission of the fact that this Product contained artificial flavoring” on the 

front packaging to conclude that the Gummies were “naturally-flavored.” (Compl. ¶ 77.) 

Failing to inform the consumer that the Gummies contain artificial ingredients on the front 

packaging, Brown alleges, “falsely informs the consumer, by operation of law, that the 

Product is flavored only with natural juices or flavors.” (Compl. ¶ 35.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the 

legal sufficiency of the pleadings. To overcome such a motion, the complaint must contain 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Facts merely consistent with a defendant’s liability are insufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss because they establish only that the allegations are possible rather than 

                                                                

3

 These FDA regulations are incorporated into California’s Sherman Food, Drug, and 

Cosmetic Act (“Sherman Act”), Cal. Health & Safety Code § 109875 et seq. See Sherman 

Act § 110100 (“All food labeling regulations and any amendments to those regulations 

adopted pursuant to the federal acts in effect on January 1, 1993, or adopted on or after that 

date shall be the food regulations of this state.”). 

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plausible. Id. at 678-79. The court must accept as true the facts alleged in a well-pled 

complaint, but mere legal conclusions are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. The 

court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), a plaintiff must plead fraud with 

particularity. “Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, 

and how of the misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 

1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if “fraud is not a necessary 

element of a [particular] claim,” Rule 9(b) will apply if the plaintiff has “allege[d] a unified 

course of fraudulent conduct and rel[ied] entirely on that course of conduct as the basis of 

[the] claim.” Id. at 1103. 

DISCUSSION 

 Starbucks moves to dismiss Brown’s complaint for failure to state a claim and for 

lack of personal jurisdiction over Starbucks for claims asserted by out-of-state class 

members. Starbucks also moves to strike Brown’s nationwide class allegations. The court 

finds that Brown fails to a state any claim and dismisses the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). 

A. CLRA, FAL, and UCL Claims 

The CLRA, FAL, and UCL are California consumer protection statutes. The UCL 

prohibits “unfair competition,” which is defined as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 

business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Under the FAL, it is unlawful 

to make or disseminate any statement concerning property or services that is “untrue or 

misleading.” Id. § 17500. The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair 

or deceptive acts or practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. 

The UCL, FAL, and CLRA prohibit “not only advertising which is false, but also 

advertising which although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, 

likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 

939, 951 (2002) (quoting Leoni v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 3d 609 (1985)); Colgan v. Leatherman 

Tool Group, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 680 (2006). Plaintiff’s claims for misleading 

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advertising under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are governed by the “reasonable consumer” 

test. Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Freeman v. 

Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995)). Under this standard, Plaintiff must “show 

that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’” Id. Although the “reasonable 

consumer” is not one who is “versed in the art of inspecting and judging a product,” Yumul 

v. Smart Balance, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2010), this test nonetheless 

“requires more than a mere possibility that [a product’s] label ‘might conceivably be 

misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.’” Ebner v. 

Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 

105 Cal. App. 4th 496 (2003)). “Rather, the reasonable consumer standard requires a 

probability ‘that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted 

consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id. 

The question of whether a business practice is “deceptive” in most cases presents a 

question of fact not amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss. See Williams, 552 F.3d 

at 938. “However, in certain instances, [a] [c]ourt can properly make this determination 

and resolve such claims based on its review of the product packaging.” Pelayo v. Nestle 

USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 

Brown does not dispute that her UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims are based on 

Starbucks’ allegedly misleading advertising. (Doc. No. 9.) The court, like Brown, applies 

the “reasonable consumer” standard to these claims. See Williams, 552 F.3d at 938.4

 

                                                                

4

 To the extent Brown’s claim for violation of the UCL’s unlawful business practices prong 

is predicated on violation of a provision not governed by the reasonable consumer standard, 

this claim is dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 8. The complaint does not identify 

precisely which statutes and/or regulations are the predicate for Brown’s claim for violation 

of the unlawful prong of the UCL. (See Compl. ¶ 131 (alleging “[a]mong other violations, 

. . . [Starbucks] violated U.S. FDA and California packaging and labeling regulations”); Id. 

¶ 130 (alleging Starbucks’ actions were “unlawful under, inter alia, FDA regulations and 

California’s Sherman Law”).) Brown’s opposition also fails to specifically identify the 

predicate provision or the standard governing this provision. 

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Starbucks argues that a reasonable consumer would not be misled by the Gummies’ 

packaging. Brown argues that the Gummies packaging “methodically lists each and every 

fruit flavor on the front of the Product (an affirmative misrepresentation), while failing to 

disclose the source or origin of these flavors (an omission).” (Doc. No. 9 at 11.) In other 

words, “[b]y operation of California law, identifying [the four fruit] flavors by name on the 

Product label without any qualifying language warrants to the consumer that Product is 

flavored only with natural flavors.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) 

The complaint fails to plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would be misled 

by the Gummies’ packaging. The four themes of “reasonable consumer” jurisprudence 

identified by the court in Brady v. Bayer Corporation are instructive here. See Brady v. 

Bayer Corp., 26 Cal. App. 5th 1156, 1172 (Ct. App. 2018) (identifying four themes—

“literal truth,” “common sense,” the “front-back problem,” and “nature of the brand 

name”). First, Brown does not allege that the packaging contains any “literally false” 

statements. See id. Brown argues that “consumers are not unreasonable to assume that a 

Product that lists an assortment of fruit flavors on its front label contains either the actual 

fruit, fruit concentrate, fruit puree, or fruit essence of the fruit listed.” (Doc. No. 9 at 17.) 

The court agrees, such a claim might not be dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. See 

Williams, 552 F.3d at 936. But this is not that case. The complaint does not allege that 

the statement the Gummies are “[a]pple, watermelon, tangerine and lemon flavored 

candies,” or any other statement, is false. To the contrary, the ingredients list indicates that 

the Gummies contain fruit juice concentrates. 

Second, common sense dictates that no reasonable consumer would be misled by the 

Gummies’ packaging. See Brady, 26 Cal. App. 5th at 1172. The complaint fails to 

plausibly allege that Starbucks’ fruit “flavors” statement would lead a consumer to believe 

that the Gummies contain only natural ingredients. Starbucks’ statement might lead a 

consumer to draw conclusions about the product’s fruit flavor ingredients, for example, but 

would not lead a reasonable consumer to infer that the Gummies contain only natural 

ingredients. Whether the Gummies contain the fruit flavors listed on its packaging is 

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wholly distinct from the question of whether the product contains any artificial ingredients. 

See Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CV 10-1028-GW AGRX, 2012 WL 5504011, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 25, 2012) (cracker packaging that stated “made with real vegetables” and depicted 

vegetables would not lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the crackers were 

“healthy” or primarily composed of fresh vegetables); Manchouck v. Mondelez Int’l Inc., 

No. 13-cv-2148, 2013 WL 5400285, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013), aff’d, 603 F. App’x 

632 (9th Cir. 2015) (cookie packaging that stated “made with real fruit” when cookies 

contained fruit puree would not lead reasonable consumer to believe product contained 

only “real fruit”). Moreover, the term “flavored” implies that the Gummies contain 

artificial ingredients. Unlike the cases Brown relies on, there are no statements or images 

on the Gummies’ packaging that suggest the candy contains only natural ingredients. See 

Allred v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., No. 17-CV-1345 JLS (BGS), 2018 WL 1185227, at *5 

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss when packaging stated “[n]o artificial 

flavors” but product contained malic acid); Allred v. Kellogg Co., No. 17-CV-1354-AJBBLM, 2018 WL 1158885, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018) (finding a reasonable consumer 

might “construe the packaging as depicting all natural ingredients and flavors” when it 

stated “Salt & Vinegar” and “depicted a pile of salt and two bottles, which impliedly 

contain vinegar,” and salt being sprinkled on the chips). The Gummies are clearly visible 

to the consumer through the transparent packaging. Nothing about the product itself —a 

brightly-colored, gelatinous candy—would lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that 

the Gummies contain only natural ingredients.5

 

                                                                

5

 In her complaint, Brown repeatedly mischaracterizes the Gummies’ packaging. The 

packaging, which the court took judicial notice of, contradicts Plaintiff’s allegations that 

the packaging does not disclose the presence of artificial ingredients. (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 42-

43, 85.) The ingredients list on the back packaging states that the Gummies contain fumaric 

acid. (Doc. No. 8-3 at 3.) Plaintiff’s allegations that Starbucks falsely advertised the 

Gummies as “naturally flavored” are similarly misleading. (Compl. ¶ 24.) The Gummies’ 

packaging does not advertise the product as “naturally flavored.” The only reference to 

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Brown alleges that Starbucks maintains a health and wellness campaign and has 

acknowledged that customers are looking for healthier snacks. Brown fails to explain what 

connection, if any, exists between Starbucks’ health and wellness campaign and its use of 

artificial ingredients. More importantly, nothing in the complaint connects these 

allegations to Brown or the allegedly deceptive Gummies’ packaging. 

Starbucks’ alleged failure to abide by federal and California advertising and food 

labelling requirements, without more, would not mislead a reasonable consumer. In some 

cases, violation of a product labelling requirement may highlight or support a claim that 

the product’s label or the manner of advertising was misleading. But the touchstone of the 

court’s analysis remains whether the packaging would mislead a reasonable consumer. See 

Williams, 552 F.3d at 939; Comm. On Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 

35 Cal. 3d 197, 210-11 (1983). Cf. Trazo v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-2272 PSG, 

2013 WL 4083218, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (“While regulatory violations might 

suggest that these statements might be misleading to a reasonable consumer, that alone is 

not enough to plead a claim under the FAL, CLRA, or the misleading/false advertising 

prongs of the UCL.”). Here, nothing on the Gummies’ packaging suggests that the candy 

contains only natural ingredients. Nor has Brown identified any other circumstances that 

would lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that the Gummies do not contain artificial 

ingredients. The complaint fails to plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would 

simply assume the absence of an artificial ingredients disclosure on the Gummies’ front 

packaging means the product contains only natural ingredients. 

Third, the packaging does not present a “front-back” bait-and-switch problem. See 

Brady, 26 Cal. App. 5th at 1172. As in Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., “there is no deceptive act to 

be dispelled” by a disclosure on the front packaging. See Ebner, 838 F.3d at 966 (“Apart 

from the accurate weight label, there are no other words, pictures, or diagrams adorning 

                                                                

“natural flavors” is made in the ingredients list, in conjunction with the complained of 

“fumaric acid.” (Doc. No. 8-3 at 3.) 

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the packaging, as there were in Williams, from which any inference could be drawn or on 

which any reasonable belief could be based about how much of the total lip product can be 

accessed by using the screw mechanism.”). As discussed above, nothing on the packaging 

suggests the Gummies contain only natural ingredients.6

 

Lastly, Brown does not argue that the nature of the brand name is misleading. See 

Brady, 26 Cal. App. 5th at 1172. In sum, it is implausible that a reasonable consumer 

would conclude the Gummies contain only natural ingredients. Accordingly, Brown fails 

to state a claim under the FAL, CLRA, or UCL. 

B. Remaining Claims 

Brown’s failure to plausibly allege that Starbucks made any misrepresentation or 

misleading nondisclosure undermines her remaining claims. Brown does not plausibly 

allege that Starbucks promised, as a basis of the parties’ bargain, that the Gummies would 

not contain artificial ingredients. See Viggiano v. Hansen Nat. Corp., 944 F. Supp. 2d 877, 

893 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“To prevail on a breach of express warranty claim, a plaintiff must 

prove that the seller (1) made an affirmation of fact or promise or provided a description 

of its goods; (2) the promise or description formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the 

express warranty was breached; and (4) the breach caused injury to the plaintiff.”). 

Likewise, Brown fails to state a claim for breach of implied warranties as (1) she does not 

plausibly allege that the Gummies fail to conform to the promises or affirmations of fact 

on the label, (2) she does not plausibly allege that Starbucks warranted the Gummies were 

fit for the specific purpose of “naturally-flavored food product,” and (3) the ingredients list 

discloses that the Gummies contain fumaric acid. See Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2) (the 

implied warranty may be violated if (1) the product does not “[p]ass without objection in 

the trade under the contract description,” (2) is not “fit for the ordinary purposes for which 

                                                                

6

 The parties dispute the effect of the ingredients list on the Gummies’ back packaging, 

which states that the product contains fumaric acid and other ingredients. The ingredients 

list weighs against Plaintiff, but even without considering the ingredients list, the court 

concludes that the front packaging would not plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer. 

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such good [is] used,” or (3) does not “[c]onform to the promises or affirmations of fact 

made on the container or label if any”); Backus v. Biscomerica Corp., No. 16-CV-03916-

HSG, 2017 WL 1133406, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017) (plaintiff failed to state claim 

for breach of implied warranty when cookie packaging disclosed presence of trans fat). 

For the reasons discussed above, Brown also fails to adequately plead the necessary 

element of misrepresentation or nondisclosure to support a fraud or fraudulent concealment 

claim. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 990 (2004) (stating 

that the elements of a fraud claim include a showing of a false representation, concealment, 

or nondisclosure); Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1132-33 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 

(citing Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 748 (Ct. App. 2007)) (noting that under 

California law a fraudulent concealment claim must include an allegation that defendant 

intentionally concealed or suppressed a material fact with the intent to defraud consumers). 

As to her negligent misrepresentation claim, Brown fails to allege any affirmative 

representation by Starbucks. See In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F. Supp. 

3d 1204, 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Lopez v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 201 Cal. App. 4th 

572, 596 (Ct. App. 2011)) (“Under California law, ‘[a] negligent misrepresentation claim 

requires a positive assertion, not merely an omission.’”). 

In sum, Brown’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court grants 

Plaintiff leave to amend as it is not entirely clear that amendment would be futile. 

CONCLUSION 

Starbucks’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is granted. Starbucks’ Rule 12(b)(2) 

motion to dismiss and motion to strike are denied as moot. Plaintiff may file any amended 

complaint within fourteen days of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: March 1, 2019 JEFFREY T. MILLER 

 United States District Judge 

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