Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00347/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00347-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALDEN LAMONT MOORE,

CDCR #F-49889,

Civil No. 13cv0347 JAH (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350.00

BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S

TRUST ACCOUNT [ECF No. 2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

[ECF No. 3]; 

(3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b); and 

(4) GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND

COMPLAINT [ECF No. 7]

vs.

KAMALA HARRIS; WILLIAM

SUGLICH; E. MARRERO;

C. HAMMAN; J.D. LOZANO,

Defendants.

On February 12, 2013, Alden Moore (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated

at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility located in San Diego, California, and proceeding

pro se, has filed this action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),

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43 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2], a Motion for Appointment of

Counsel [ECF No. 3] and a Motion to Amend Complaint [ECF No. 7]. 

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF No. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

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the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil

action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however,

unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v.

Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),

district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may

be exercised only under “exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017

(9th Cir. 1991). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the

‘likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’ Neither of these issues is dispositive and

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision.” Id. (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon,

789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

II.

INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening

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and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials at the Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) have failed to accommodate his disability as required by the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

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§ 12132, applies in the prison context. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B); U.S. v. Georgia 546 U.S.

151, 154 (2006). In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, however, a plaintiff must

allege:

(1) he ‘is an individual with a disability;’ (2) he ‘is otherwise

qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public

entity’s services, programs, or activities;’ (3) he ‘was either

excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public

entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by the public entity;’ and (4) ‘such exclusion,

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [his]

disability.’

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing McGary

v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d

890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). 

Plaintiff has only named individuals as Defendants in this matter. (See Compl. at 1-2.) 

However, individuals cannot be directly sued under the ADA. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3e

1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the ADA against

individual Defendants must be dismissed. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 3] is DENIED without

prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] 

is GRANTED. 

3. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

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ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey Beard,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Complaint [ECF No.

7] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is

“Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not

re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend

and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 7, 2013 _________________________________________

 HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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