Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02245/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02245-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

Under Local Rule 78-230(c), Plaintiff’s opposition was due on 1

or before March 5, 2007. Plaintiff did not file an opposition and

instead filed a document on March 16, 2007, in which Plaintiff requests

that he be allowed to submit a late opposition which would be filed at

(continued...)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDDY BERMUDEZ, )

) 2:05-cv-2245-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

OFFICE MAX, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant Office Max seeks summary judgment or summary

adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has not filed a timely

opposition. 

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(...continued) 1

an unspecified time after Plaintiff conducts discovery. Plaintiff’s

March 16 filing failed to satisfy the good cause standard prescribed in

Rule 16(b), applicable to Plaintiff’s scheduling requests.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery impliedly seeks

modification of the December 19, 2006 date by which all discovery was

required to be completed. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975

F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992). Further, since Defendant’s summary

judgment motion was scheduled for hearing on the last hearing date

prescribed for law and motion in the Rule 16(b) scheduling order,

Plaintiff also impliedly seeks continuance of this date. 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant from November 1996

through September 2004. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”)

¶¶ 1, 30.) Plaintiff was first hired as a Receiving Associate and was

subsequently promoted to Receiving Supervisor where his job

responsibilities included record-keeping for all freight coming into

the store, unloading the OfficeMax delivery trucks, and stocking of

merchandise and distribution of supplies throughout the store. (SUF

¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff was transferred from Receiving Supervisor to

Stocking Supervisor in February 2004, where he was required to spend

more time on the sales floor. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10.) The Stocking

Supervisor job title was later changed to Logistics Supervisor in all

OfficeMax stores. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

In May 2004, Defendant implemented the OfficeMax Supervisor

Restructure Strategy, mandated for all OfficeMax stores across the

county. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) The Supervisory Restructure Strategy

changed three supervisory positions, including Plaintiff’s position as

Stocking /Logistics Supervisor. (Id. ¶ 21.) As a result, Plaintiff

was one of three individuals whose position was changed from

“supervisor” to an hourly associate position. (Id. ¶ 22.) However,

Plaintiff’s pay was not reduced. (Id. ¶ 8.) 

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During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff

received several disciplinary warnings for being late to work, taking

excessive lunch breaks, and taking a personal call on his cell phone

while working on the OfficeMax sales floor. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 11, 16, 25.) 

Plaintiff was warned that his actions were violations of Company

policy and could lead to termination. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 18.) Further,

prior to Plaintiff’s termination, Defendant’s manager held a storewide meeting where the Company’s attendance policy was explicitly

articulated. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) On August 9, 2004, Plaintiff received

another disciplinary warning and on that same day, Plaintiff submitted

two letters to Defendant in which he raised claims of discrimination. 

(Id. ¶ 28.) On August 26, 2004, Plaintiff took another excessive

lunch break. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was terminated for repeated

violations of Defendant’s time and attendance policy on September 1,

2004. (Id. ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiff alleges three claims against Defendant in his

Complaint: retaliation for engaging in protected conduct under the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) (prescribed in

California Government Code section 12940(h)); wrongful termination in

violation of public policy under both FEHA and California Penal Code

section 474; and race and national origin discrimination in violation

of FEHA. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-26.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Race and National Origin Discrimination Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima

facie case of race or national origin discrimination because

“Plaintiff was not competently performing his job at the time

[Defendant] terminated his employment.” (Mot. at 6:9-11, 17-18.) To

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establish a prima facie case of race or national origin

discrimination, “[P]laintiff must provide evidence that (1) he was a

member of a protected class, (2) he was . . . performing competently

in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action

. . ., and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory

motive.” Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). 

The evidentiary record supports Defendant’s position that

Plaintiff was not performing his job competently as a result of his

“chronic tardiness and failure to follow the Company’s 30 minute lunch

policy.” (Mot. at 6:18-19.) Plaintiff received a disciplinary

warning for being late to work eight times over a five week period on

October 2, 2003. (SUF ¶ 5.) On February 6, 2004, Plaintiff received

a second disciplinary warning for taking a personal cell phone call on

Defendant’s sales floor in violation of company policy, in which

“Plaintiff was notified that any further violation . . . could result

in additional disciplinary action[,] including termination.” (Id.

¶¶ 11-13.) On May 7, 2004, Plaintiff received a third disciplinary

warning that “outlined the fact that, over the prior two month period,

Plaintiff had taken an excessive period of time for lunch breaks on 13

occasions and had been late to work on 11 other occasions.” (Id.

¶¶ 16-17.) This warning stated that Plaintiff must report on time for

work, take no more than thirty minutes for lunch, and that any future

violations could lead to termination. (Id. ¶ 18.) On August 9, 2004,

Plaintiff received a fourth disciplinary warning for taking more than

30 minute lunch breaks on August 4 and 5, 2004, and was advised that

he must return from lunch on time and that he would be strictly

monitored. (Id. ¶ 25.) Subsequently , Rick Barton, Defendant’s Store

Manager, conducted a store-wide meeting where he emphasized the

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Company’s attendance policy and stated that tardiness to work and

taking more than 30 minutes for lunch breaks “would not be tolerated

and that such future violations . . . could lead to disciplinary

action . . . including termination.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff attended

this meeting. (Id. ¶ 14.) On August 26, 2004, Plaintiff took an

extended lunch period of fifty-four minutes. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff

was terminated on September 1, 2004, based on his “repeated violations

of the time and attendance policy.” (Id. ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that his “job schedule

was frequently changed.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) Further, in one of

Plaintiff’s letters to Defendant dated August 9, 2004, Plaintiff

stated that “since I have been working for years at Office Max I had a

fixed schedule but somehow [the assistant and store managers] kept

changing and rotating my lunch[] schedule.” (Howard Magee Decl., Ex.

6 to Eddy Bermudez Dep. (“Bermudez Dep.”); see Bermudez Dep. at 20:1-

10.) However, this allegation and averment is not sufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was

performing his job competently. The undisputed facts show that

Plaintiff was not performing his job competently and therefore,

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race and national

origin discrimination. Defendant’s motion is granted on this claim. 

II. Retaliation Claim

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim, contending Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of

retaliation. (Mot. at 10:22-24.) “To establish a prima facie case

[of retaliation], [] [P]laintiff must show that he engaged in a

protected activity, his employer subjected him to adverse employment

action, and there is a causal link between the protected activity and

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Plaintiff only references one letter in his Complaint. (See 2

Compl. ¶ 8(g).) However, the record shows that Plaintiff submitted two

letters to Defendant alleging discriminatory treatment. (SUF ¶ 28.) 

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the employer's action.” Flait v. North American Watch Corp., 3 Cal.

App. 4th 467, 476 (1992). 

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that his termination was

“false and pretextual” because it was in retaliation for writing a

letter to Defendant’s Human Resources Officer in which Plaintiff

reported he was subjected to discriminatory treatment. (Compl. ¶ 8

(h),(g).) Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff’s letters

constitute protected activity under FEHA, Plaintiff has not shown that

there is “a causal link between the protected activity and the

employer’s action.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s letters were submitted to 2

Defendant’s Human Resources Department on August 9, 2004. (Bermudez

Dep. at 120:3-14, 20:5-10, Ex. 6, 7; Compl. ¶ 8(g).) However, prior

to the submission of these letters, Plaintiff had already received

several disciplinary warnings from Defendant, including notice that

any further violations of Company policy could lead to termination. 

(SUF ¶¶ 27-28, 5, 11, 16.) Further, Plaintiff took another excessive

lunch break on August 26, 2004. (Id. ¶ 29.) Accordingly, Defendant

had legitimate reasons for terminating Plaintiff on September 1, 2004. 

See Garner v. Motorola, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (D. Ariz.

2000) (“An employer is not and should not be required to ‘back off’

from its pursuit of performance-related concerns merely because an

employee has brought charges of discrimination.”); see also Mesnick v.

General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Were the rule

otherwise, then a disgruntled employee, no matter how poor his

performance or how contemptuous his attitude toward his supervisors,

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could effectively inhibit a well-deserved discharge by merely filing,

or threatening to file, a discrimination complaint.”). The facts show

that there is no causal connection between the alleged protected

activity and Plaintiff’s termination. 

Plaintiff also alleges he engaged in protected conduct under

FEHA by reporting an employee’s alleged theft to Defendant’s store

assistant and manager. (Compl. ¶ 8(I).) However, reporting an

alleged theft is not protected conduct under FEHA and therefore

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation based

upon this allegation. See generally Cal. Govt. Code § 12940 and

12940(h) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . [f]or any

employer . . . to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against

any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden

under this part or because the person has filed a complaint,

testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part.) (Emphasis

added). Since Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of

retaliation, Defendant’s motion on this claim is granted. 

III. Wrongful Termination Claim

Defendant also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

wrongful termination claim. (Mot. at 14:8-9.) Plaintiff’s wrongful

termination claim alleges both a violation of the public policy

embodied in FEHA and that embodied in California Penal Code section

474. (Compl. ¶ 15 (“In violation of public policy, [] Defendants

wrongfully suspended Plaintiff in August 2004 and terminated Plaintiff

on or about [September 1, 2004] due to retaliation for complaining

about discrimination in violation of the public policy contained in

Government Code section 12490 and for reporting theft in violation of

the public policy contained in California Penal Code section 474.”).) 

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Defendant argues that “[b]ecause Plaintiff’s discrimination and

retaliation claims based on FEHA fail . . . , his second claim for

wrongful termination in violation of the public policy embodied in the

FEHA also necessarily fails.” (Mot. at 14:20-25.) Defendant argues

that Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of the

public policy embodied in California Penal Code section 474 fails

because this section does not create a fundamental public policy

against Plaintiff’s termination. (Mot. at 15:1-4.) 

If “[P]laintiff cannot show a prima facie case under FEHA,

[he] cannot show that [he] was wrongly terminated on the grounds of a

violation of public policy premised on FEHA.” Keifer, 2006 WL

2620926, at *8. Since Plaintiff has not established a prima facie

case of race and national origin discrimination or retaliation under

FEHA, he cannot establish a claim for wrongful termination in

violation of public policy under FEHA. 

Further, California Penal Code section 474 provides that

“every person who knowingly and willfully sends by telegraph or

telephone . . . a false or forged message, purporting to be from a

telegraph or telephone office, . . . with the intent to deceive,

injure, or defraud another, is punishable by imprisonment . . . or by

fine.” Cal. Penal Code § 474. Plaintiff does not allege that he was

terminated for engaging in any behavior prohibited by this section. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination in violation

of public policy is not supported by California Penal Code section

474. Therefore, Defendant’s motion on Plaintiff’s wrongful

termination claim is granted. 

/

/

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendant’s summary judgment motion

is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall issue judgment in favor of

Defendant.

Dated: May 2, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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