Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_19-cv-01134/USCOURTS-alsd-1_19-cv-01134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BILLIE RUTH GRAHAM, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-01134-CG-N

)

McDONALD’S RESTAURANTS OF )

AL INC., ) 

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Billie Ruth Graham, who is proceeding without counsel (pro se),

previously requested, and received, leave to proceed in this action without prepayment 

of fees and costs, or in forma pauperis, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Therefore, her 

complaint (Doc. 1) is subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which provides 

that, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or 

appeal ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Upon review of Graham’s complaint (Doc. 1), the undersigned finds that it is 

due to be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, but with leave to 

file an amended complaint so that Graham may be given a chance to plausibly allege a 

viable claim or claims.

1

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short 

 1 The assigned District Judge has referred Graham’s complaint to the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge for appropriate action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (1/2/2020 

electronic reference).

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and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ... [T]he 

pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it 

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. 

A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked 

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

677–78 (2009) (citations and some quotations omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss [for failure to state a claim], a complaint 

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 

129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). In 

other words, the complaint must contain “factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id.

Hi-Tech Pharm., Inc. v. HBS Int'l Corp., 910 F.3d 1186, 1196 (11th Cir. 2018).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks 

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (citation and quotation marks omitted).2

 2 Courts “hold the allegations of a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Accordingly, [the undersigned] construe[s 

Graham]’s pleadings liberally. Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does 

not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise 

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 

F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation omitted). See also Albra 

v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A]lthough we are to 

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Graham completed her complaint using a form provided by this Court for 

non-prisoner litigants. (See S.D. Ala. Local Rules, Part D “Appendix of Forms” 

(https://www.alsd.uscourts.gov/court-info/local-rules-and-orders)). 3 She has also 

attached to her complaint a charge of discrimination that she submitted to the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on October 17, 2019 (Doc. 1, PageID.5). 

Piecing her sparse allegations together, Graham alleges the following facts:

• Graham was hired by the Defendant, through its agent “Mr. Doris,” on March 

2019. Graham told Mr. Doris during her hiring interview that she had a 

disability. (Id.).

• Graham was “harassed by Kim LNU (Manager, female), and Mike LNU 

(co-woker).” Graham complained she “was being harassed and submitted an 

internal complaint.” (Id.).

• Graham was “three time hit and hold against [her] will and over work not pay at 

all monies and have learning disability they made fun of [her.]” (Id., PageID.1).

• Graham “complained to Mr. Doris about the harassment and he told [her] that he 

was tired of [her] complaining and yelled at [her]. Around April 21, 2019 [she] 

felt compelled to resign [her] position.” (Id., PageID.5). 

Based on these allegations, Graham claims that she was subject to unlawful 

discrimination by the Defendant because of (1) her race, national origin, and religion, in 

 

give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, we nevertheless have 

required them to conform to procedural rules.” (quotation omitted)).

3 However, there is no local rule that required Graham to use this form in submitting 

her complaint. It is merely provided as a convenience to pro se parties.

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violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”),

4 (2) her 

mental disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

5 and (3) 

her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”).6 Given 

that she alleges she was subject to harassment to the point she felt compelled to resign, 

Graham appears to be alleging claims of constructive discharge.

“The law in this circuit with respect to constructive discharge is 

well-established. To show constructive discharge, the employee must prove 

that his working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a 

reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.” Wardwell v. 

School Bd. of Palm Beach County, Florida, 786 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th 

Cir.1986). See Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 

 4 “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 

or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin.’ ” Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 

2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). “To make out a prima facie case of [Title VII] 

discrimination a plaintiff must show (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was 

qualified to do the job; (3) she was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) her 

employer treated similarly situated employees outside her class more favorably.” 

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).

5 “The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a ‘qualified individual with a 

disability,’ defined as an ‘individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 

such individual holds or desires.’ 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Accordingly, an ADA plaintiff 

must show either that he can perform the essential functions of his job without 

accommodation, or, failing that, show that he can perform the essential functions of his 

job with a reasonable accommodation.” D'Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 

1229 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted in second sentence).

6 “The ADEA prohibits employers from firing employees who are forty years or older 

because of their age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1331–32 

(11th Cir. 2013) ... To make a prima facie case of age discrimination, the employee must 

show: (1) he was a member of the protected group between the age of forty and seventy; 

(2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) a substantially younger person 

filled the position from which he was discharged; and (4) he was qualified to do the job 

from which he was discharged.” Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294, 1298 

(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).

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144 (5th Cir. 1975). Before finding a constructive discharge, this court has 

traditionally required a high degree of deterioration in an employee's 

working conditions, approaching the level of “intolerable.” Wardwell, 786 

F.2d at 1558 (holding that an employer's failure to promote and 

consequent embarrassment to employee, together with employee's added 

workload, “simply do not rise to the intolerable level at which a reasonable 

person would feel compelled to resign”). See Steele v. Offshore 

Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir.1989); Huddleston v. 

Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905 (11th Cir.1988); Bourque v. 

Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.1980); Calcote v. Texas 

Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir.1978); Young, 509 F.2d at 144.

Hill v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 934 F.2d 1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991).

“The threshold for establishing constructive discharge ... is quite high.” Hipp v. 

Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1231 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). “The 

plaintiff must do more than merely show that she was subjected to actionable 

harassment. The standard for proving constructive discharge is higher than the 

standard for proving a hostile work environment.” Walton v. Johnson & Johnson 

Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).7

Graham’s conclusory allegations that she was “harassed” by a manager and 

coworker are the kinds of unadorned “labels and conclusions” that the Court is not 

required to accept as true, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

 7 “The standard for constructive discharge is the same in both the Title VII and ADEA 

contexts[,]” Austin v. FL HUD Rosewood LLC, 791 F. App'x 819, 825 n.3 (11th Cir. 

2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quotation omitted) (citing cases), as well as in the 

ADA context. See Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 707 F. App'x 641, 646 (11th Cir. 2017) 

(unpublished (analyzing Title VII and ADA constructive discharge claims under the 

same standard).

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.”), and her few well-pleaded allegations – that she 

was “three time hit and hold against [her] will and over work not pay at all monies and 

have learning disability they made fun of [her,]” and that Mr. Doris yelled at her once 

when she complained – do not plausibly suggest that her working conditions had 

reached such a high degree of deterioration that a reasonable person would have felt 

compelled to resign. Accordingly, she has failed to plausibly allege a claim under Title 

VII, the ADA, or the ADEA, and those claims are due to be dismissed. 

Moreover, Graham has only alleged facts suggesting that the harassment was, at 

most, due to her disability. She has failed to allege any facts suggesting that the 

harassment was based on her race, national origin, or religion, so as to support a claim 

under Title VII, or that it was based on her age, so as to support a claim under the 

ADEA. For this reason as well, Graham’s Title VII and ADEA claims are also due to 

be dismissed. 

However, the general rule in this Circuit is that, “[w]hen it appears that a pro se

plaintiff's complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court 

should give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint instead of 

dismissing it with prejudice.” Jemison v. Mitchell, 380 F. App'x 904, 907 (11th Cir. 

2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (emphasis added) (citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 

1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“Where a more carefully drafted complaint might 

state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint 

before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.”), overruled in part by 

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 

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(overruling Bank as to counseled parties)). Here, it appears that Graham might be able 

to state a claim through a more carefully drafted complaint.

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1), and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), the 

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Graham’s complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed sua 

sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted, without prejudice to her ability to file an amended complaint by a specified 

date.8

DONE this the 1st day of April 2020.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson 

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 8 Because the defendant has not appeared in this action, and because she has not 

amended her complaint previously, Graham is advised that she need not wait on 

disposition of this Report and Recommendation, and may file an amended complaint as 

a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) (“A party may 

amend its pleading once as a matter of course within[,] if the pleading is one to which a 

responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days 

after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”). Graham is 

advised, however, that her amended complaint “must reproduce the entire pleading as 

amended and may not incorporate any prior pleading by reference.” S.D. Ala. CivLR 

15(a). 

In the event this recommendation is adopted, Graham is cautioned that her 

failure to file an amended complaint by the deadline set by the Court will result the 

dismissal of this case becoming final. See Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., -- F.3d --, No. 16-13596, 2020 WL 1074420, at *3 (11th Cir. 

Mar. 6, 2020) (“[A]n order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend within a specified 

time becomes a final judgment if the deadline to amend expires without the plaintiff 

amending its complaint or seeking an extension of time.” (citing Hertz Corporation v. 

Alamo Rent-A-Car, Incorporated, 16 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 1994)).

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 

3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based 

on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence 

of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if 

necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an 

objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is 

made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s 

report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection 

that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

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