Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04429/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04429-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SCOTT JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

162 LOS GATOS-SARATOGA ROAD, 

LLC,

Defendant.

Case No.18-cv-04429-VKD 

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

Re: Dkt. No. 28

Plaintiff Scott Johnson asserts claims against defendant 162 Los Gatos-Saratoga Road, 

LLC (“162 Los Gatos”) and Does 1-10 for violations of Title III of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh 

Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53. Dkt. No. 1. 162 Los Gatos filed an administrative motion for 

relief from the schedule imposed by General Order 56, requesting that the Court examine its 

subject matter jurisdiction.1 Dkt. No. 28. The Court requested additional briefing from the parties 

regarding the issues of standing and subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. Nos. 29, 30, 31. 

The Court construes 162 Los Gatos’s administrative motion as a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and finds the matter suitable for resolution 

without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’ moving papers, the Court 

grants 162 Los Gatos’s motion to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Johnson is a level C-5 quadriplegic who relies on a wheelchair for mobility. Dkt. No. 

 

1 All named parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Dkt. Nos. 7, 12.

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1 ¶ 1. He also has significant manual dexterity impairments. Id. Mr. Johnson alleges that in May 

and June 2018, he visited the subject property located at 162 Los Gatos-Saratoga Road, Los Gatos, 

California. Id. ¶¶ 2-4, 9. At the time of those visits, Elgary Massage Therapy (“Elgary”) occupied 

the property. Id. ¶ 9. During these visits, Mr. Johnson observed that the property lacked a 

compliant, accessible parking space in violation of the ADA and the Unruh Act. Id. ¶¶ 9-14, 27-

30. Mr. Johnson also says that during his June 2018 visit, Elgary denied him service when he 

attempted to bring his service animal inside. Id. ¶¶ 15-18, 31-32. Mr. Johnson contends that 162 

Los Gatos owns the subject real property. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. He filed this action on July 23, 2018 against 

162 Los Gatos, but not Elgary. See generally Dkt. No. 1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts can adjudicate only those cases which the Constitution and Congress 

authorize them to adjudicate: cases involving diversity of citizenship or a federal question, or 

those to which the United States is a party. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376–

77 (2012); see also Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 

(9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subjectmatter jurisdiction.”), overruled on other grounds by United States ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic 

Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court has a continuing obligation to ensure 

that it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Any party may raise the 

defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. 

Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434–35 (2011). The plaintiff always bears the burden of establishing 

subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the attack is facial, the Court determines whether the 

allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction, 

accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in favor of the party 

asserting jurisdiction. Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Where the attack is 

factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Safe 

Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute as to the existence of subject 

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matter jurisdiction, the Court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without 

converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id. Once the moving party has 

made a factual challenge by offering affidavits or other evidence to dispute the allegations in the 

complaint, the party opposing the motion must “present affidavits or any other evidence necessary 

to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” 

St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Savage v. Glendale Union 

High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

“Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question jurisdiction are 

exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 

773, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946).” Sun Valley Gas., Inc. v. Ernst Enters., 711 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 

1983). The Supreme Court has determined that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted “where the 

alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statues clearly appears to be immaterial and made 

solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial 

and frivolous.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 682–83.

III. DISCUSSION

A. ADA Claim

1. Standing

162 Los Gatos argues that this case should be dismissed because Mr. Johnson lacks 

standing to pursue his claims. Dkt. No. 28 at 2–3. Because 162 Los Gatos’s motion may be 

disposed of on other grounds, the Court assumes without deciding for the purposes of this motion 

that Mr. Johnson has standing.

2. Mootness

The anti-discrimination provisions of Title III of the ADA apply to “any person who owns, 

leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 162 

Los Gatos brings a factual challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it 

cannot be liable for a Title III violation because the subject property no longer qualifies as a place 

of public accommodation under section 12182(a). According to 162 Los Gatos, Elgary ceased 

operations and vacated the property in January 2019, and the property has since been gutted for 

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renovations and remains unoccupied. Dkt. No. 28 at 2–3; Dkt. No. 31 at 3–4. Therefore, 162 Los 

Gatos says, the barriers that Mr. Johnson experienced have been permanently removed. Id. 

Because the only remedy available to Mr. Johnson under Title III is injunctive relief, the removal 

of the alleged barriers moots this claim. 42 U.S.C. § 12188; Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 

(9th Cir. 2002) (“Damages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA—only injunctive relief 

is available for violations of Title III.”); Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 864 

(9th Cir. 2017) (“A request for injunctive relief remains live only so long as there is some present 

harm left to enjoin.”) (quoting Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 

1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In support of its motion, 162 Los Gatos relies on the declarations of Greg Howell, 162 Los 

Gatos’s authorized representative and purchaser of the subject property, as well as photographs of 

the building interior and parking signage. Dkt. No. 28-2, Ex. B; Dkt. No. 31-3. Mr. Howell 

testifies that Elgary vacated the property on January 17, 2019, that the interior space of the 

building has been entirely gutted, and that 162 Los Gatos has no lessees or potential lessees for the 

property at this time. Dkt. No. 28-2, Ex. B ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 31-3 ¶¶ 3, 8, 10. Additionally, Mr. 

Howell testifies that Elgary never had any public parking spaces to offer its patrons, and that the 

unstriped area of asphalt next to the building was reserved for the sole private use of tenants 

residing upstairs. Dkt. No. 31-3 ¶¶ 5. 162 Los Gatos has submitted photos showing that the 

interior of the property has been gutted and that signs existed stating that the parking spaces were 

for the tenants’ private use only, not for the public. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, Exs. B, D. Thus, 162 Los Gatos 

argues, Mr. Johnson’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA is moot.

Mr. Johnson does not offer any contrary evidence, or any other evidence that meets his 

burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201; Savage, 343 F.3d at 

1040 n.2. Instead, Mr. Johnson challenges the evidence 162 Los Gatos has provided. Arguing 

that Mr. Howell’s declaration is “self-serving,” Mr. Johnson first contends that there is insufficient 

evidence that Elgary has vacated the premises. Dkt. No. 30 at 2. Specifically, Mr. Johnson 

contends the evidence is insufficient to show that Elgary has permanently ceased operations at the 

property. He suggests that the Court may infer that Elgary will resume operations because 

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“defendant only closed its business after being sued by plaintiff.” Id. at 2–4 (emphasis original). 

This argument conflates 162 Los Gatos and Elgary. The Court notes that Mr. Johnson elected not 

to name Elgary as a defendant in this action, and Mr. Johnson does not allege that 162 Los Gatos 

ever owned or exercised control over Elgary. 

In any event, the Court need not consider Elgary’s purported motivations for ceasing to 

operate at the subject property or its purported plans to resume operations. The uncontroverted 

evidence shows that no business currently operates at the subject property, Elgary has no interest 

in the real property itself, and the property in its current form is not available for public use,

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rendering implausible Mr. Johnson’s suggestion that Elgary may resume operations at the property 

and that injunctive relief remains available to remedy violations of the ADA.

A claim may become moot if (1) subsequent events have made it absolutely clear that the 

allegedly wrongful behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur, and (2) interim relief or 

events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. NormanBloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. 

Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of 

Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1985)). In Kohler v. Southland Foods, Inc., the Ninth 

Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to defendants because the plaintiff’s claim for 

prospective injunctive relief became moot once the restaurant ceased operation. 459 F. A’ppx 

617, 618 (9th Cir. 2011). In Moore v. Millennium Acquisitions, LLC, the Ninth Circuit found an 

ADA claim moot where defendant had sold the gas station where plaintiff encountered 

architectural barriers, and the gas station was being dismantled. 708 F. App’x 485, 485 (9th Cir. 

2018). In view of the record before the Court, Mr. Johnson cannot plausibly expect to encounter 

any of the alleged barriers in the future. Moore, 708 F. App’x at 485; see also City of Los Angeles 

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). The Court finds Mr. Johnson’s ADA claim is moot and on that 

 

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In connection with his response to the Court’s March 18, 2019 order to show cause why this 

action should not be dismissed or other sanctions not imposed (Dkt. No. 21), Mr. Johnson 

submitted a declaration from his counsel’s private investigator, who visited the subject property on 

March 22, 2019. Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 2. The investigator testified that he “observed that the subject 

property was unoccupied and available for lease” and attached two photographs of the building 

front with a “For Lease” sign in the window. Id. ¶ 4, Ex. 1.

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basis grants 162 Los Gatos’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

B. Unruh Act Claim

The complaint also asserts a claim for violation of the Unruh Act based solely on a

violation of the ADA; it does not assert an independent Unruh Act violation for “intentional 

discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act” or “willful, 

affirmative misconduct.” See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 36-40; Cullen v. Netflix, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1024 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 668 (2009)). Mr. Johnson’s 

Unruh Act alone does not provide an independent basis for federal court jurisdiction merely 

because it incorporates an ADA violation. Kohler, 459 F. A’ppx at 618–19; Wander, 304 F.3d at 

857. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s 

Unruh Act claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants 162 Los Gatos’s motion to dismiss Mr. 

Johnson’s ADA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Johnson’s Unruh Act claim, which is 

dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 3, 2019

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

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