Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-02535/USCOURTS-ca3-18-02535-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

Nos. 18-2535 and 19-2564

________________

K.K.-M., individually and as Kinship Legal Guardian

of the minor children R.M. and A.W.,

Appellant

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;

NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW;

DOMINIC ROTA; GLOUCESTER CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

doing business as Gloucester City Public Schools

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. C. Civil Action No. No. 1-17-cv-11579)

District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler

________________

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on September 11, 2019

Before: MCKEE, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed April 23, 2020)

________________

 OPINION 

________________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 18-2535 Document: 118 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/23/2020
2

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff K.K-M. appeals the District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss her suit 

against the New Jersey Department of Education and other various governmental 

defendants. She argues that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and other 

federal statutes allow her two children, R.M. and A.W., to remain in a public school 

district where they no longer live.1 In an Opinion dated June 25, 2018, the District Court 

concluded that K.K-M. did not have standing to bring her case when the complaint was 

initially filed and therefore held that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the 

case.2 The District Court therefore dismissed the case with prejudice. 

We agree with the reasons set forth by the District Court for determining that the 

standing requirements are not satisfied, as they must be met “at the commencement of the 

litigation” in order for the suit to proceed.3 However, because neither we nor the District 

1 Plaintiff invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction to review 

the District Court’s determination of a lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we can review the District Court’s denial of an injunction pending appeal under Fed. R. 

App. P. 8(a)(2)(A)(ii). 

2

“We review the legal conclusions related to standing de novo.” Shalom Pentecostal 

Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2015). 

3 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 

469, 476 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 

68 n.22 (1997)). Also pending before us are (1) an appeal from the District Court’s 

denial of a stay pending appeal and (2) a motion to enjoin the defendants from 

disenrolling R.M. and A.W. pending appeal. Since these both rely on the underlying 

appeal of the District Court’s June 25, 2018, Opinion, the appeal and the motion are 

dismissed and denied, respectively, as moot.

Case: 18-2535 Document: 118 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/23/2020
3

Court can adjudicate the merits of the case, the District Court was required to dismiss the 

case without prejudice and erred in not doing so.4

K.K-M. has alleged factual developments since the commencement of the 

litigation that are potentially relevant to a new standing inquiry. But as we lack the 

ability to render a decision in this case due to our lack of jurisdiction, the proper forum to 

raise these issues would be in a new complaint.5

Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal order and remand with 

instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice.

4 Kawal v. J. Crew Group, Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 119 (2019).

5 Plaintiff is advised that in addition to demonstrating standing, any future complaint 

would also need to demonstrate that state administrative remedies were exhausted, or in 

the alternative, that the “sparingly invoked” exception for “severe or irreparable harm” 

applies to this case. D.M. v. New Jersey Dept. of Educ., 801 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir.

2015).

Case: 18-2535 Document: 118 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/23/2020