Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00420/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00420-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEATRIZ ALDAPA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FOWLER PACKING COMPANY INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-00420-DAD-SAB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION IN PART

(Doc. No. 64)

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the assigned magistrate judge‘s order of March 18, 2016, 

granting defendants‘ motion to compel further responses at plaintiffs‘ depositions. (Doc. No. 63.) 

That order required the named plaintiffs to answer certain questions at their deposition seeking 

the identification of other putative class members who attended meetings concerning the

anticipated filing of this class action, permitted defendants to reopen the deposition of Elmer 

Avalos due to post-deposition changes he made to that testimony, and required plaintiffs to pay 

the costs and attorney‘s fees associated with the reopening of that deposition. (Id.) Specifically, 

plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the order compelling them to identify those who attended the 

meetings in question, arguing that such information is protected by both substantive labor law and 

the First Amendment. (Doc. No. 64 at 10–26.) Plaintiffs also seek reconsideration of the order 

awarding costs and attorney‘s fees for the motion to reopen Avalos‘s deposition, though they do 

not seek reconsideration of the order requiring the reopening of that deposition. (Id. at 26–30.) 

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Defendants oppose the motion for reconsideration in its entirety. (Doc. No. 71.)

I. Applicable Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that non-dispositive pretrial matters may 

be referred to and decided by a magistrate judge, subject to review by the assigned district judge. 

See also Local Rule 303(c). The district judge shall modify or set aside any part of the magistrate 

judge‘s order which is ―found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.‖ Local Rule 303(f). See 

also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Discovery motions are non-dispositive pretrial motions which 

come within the scope of Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and thus the orders of a 

magistrate judge addressing such motions are subject to the ―clearly erroneous or contrary to law‖ 

standard of review. Rockwell Intern., Inc. v. Pos-A-Traction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 

(9th Cir. 1983). The magistrate judge‘s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and 

the magistrate judge‘s legal conclusions are reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to 

law. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other 

grounds by Estate of Merchant v. CIR, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). ―A magistrate judge‘s 

decision is  ̳contrary to law‘ if it applies an incorrect legal standard, fails to consider an element 

of applicable standard, or fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of 

procedure.‖ Martin v. Loadholt, No. 1:10-cv-00156-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 3563312, at *1 (E.D. 

Cal. July 18, 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

II. Analysis

1. Plaintiffs’ Request to Reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s Order Requiring Them to 

Identify Other Putative Class Members Present at Meetings with Class Counsel

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the magistrate judge‘s order compelling them to identify 

the others who attended meetings where class counsel were present to discuss the filing of this

lawsuit. In one, but not the other, of the depositions of plaintiffs Aldapa and Avalos, plaintiffs‘ 

counsel objected to questions seeking such identifying information by asserting an associational 

privilege under the First Amendment. (Doc. No. 64 at 10.) Plaintiffs‘ counsel also asserted at

both depositions that substantive labor law protected his clients from being required to answer 

such questions. As to this latter argument, the magistrate judge found no applicable privilege 

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based on substantive labor law, holding in pertinent part that the California Agricultural Labor 

Relations Act (ALRA) does not pre-empt federal discovery rules and that even under the test 

routinely applied by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) such information was subject to 

disclosure. (Doc. No. 63 at 10–13.) The magistrate judge‘s discovery order in this regard was 

neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law, and therefore the undersigned will not disturb it. 

Concerning plaintiff‘s assertion of privilege under the First Amendment, the magistrate 

judge‘s order stated:

Courts advert to balancing three factors when conducting the 

compelling interest/substantial relation inquiry to determine 

whether First Amendment privilege applies: the relevance of the 

information sought, the need for that information, and the extent of 

injury that disclosure may cause to associational rights. See Black 

Panther Party, 661 F.2d 1243, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Adolph 

Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The 

party seeking disclosure bears the burden of proving that the 

balance of these factors weighs in his favor. Id.

Here, Defendants seek the identities of the putative class members 

who met with class counsel and Plaintiffs. Defendants are not 

seeking an anonymous members list or information from a group 

that espouses dissident beliefs. There is not a dissident organization 

in the background, such as the Ku Klux Klan, Black Panthers, etc. 

The putative class members are farmworkers who are or were 

employed by Defendants and who are seeking class certification in 

federal court for their proposed class. Plaintiffs have not shown 

that Defendants are likely to harass or retaliate against the 

individuals who have met with Plaintiffs and class counsel. There 

has been no indication that Defendants have engaged in any 

inappropriate conduct in this case. Disclosing the identities of the 

potential class members who met with Plaintiffs and class counsel 

will not have a chilling effect on the putative class members‘ First 

Amendment rights. Furthermore, the information that Defendants 

seek to obtain is relevant to their case. Defendants indicate that 

they may depose putative class members that Plaintiffs may elicit 

testimony from to support Plaintiffs‘ motion for class certification. 

Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs‘ claim of First 

Amendment privilege should be applied to preclude discovery in 

the instant case. 

(Doc No. 63 at 13–14.) 

Unfortunately, in the proceedings before the assigned magistrate judge neither party cited 

to the Ninth Circuit decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Perry 

I‖) in which the court set out the legal standard applicable to resolution of this issue. As a result, 

the magistrate judge did not apply the specific burden-shifting requirements on the parties 

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required by Perry I. Accordingly, the undersigned is compelled to revisit the issue.1 

In moving for reconsideration, plaintiffs suggest various formulations of the legal standard 

applicable where discovery is propounded such as the deposition questions at issue here, 

including that the information sought must be ―so relevant that it goes to the  ̳heart of the 

matter,‘‖ that the evidence sought must be ―directly relevant‖ to a claim or defense, and/or that 

―the inquiring party must exhaust all reasonable alternative sources of information by which he 

could obtain the information in a less chilling manner.‖ (Doc. No. 64 at 22–23.) Plaintiffs 

express a concern that the magistrate judge believed that any privilege shielding disclosure was

available only to dissident groups and thereby improperly shifted the burden upon plaintiffs to 

show the need to withhold the information which defendants sought. (Doc. No. 64 at 24.) 

Defendants counter that: (1) ―none of the cases cited by Plaintiffs include members of a 

putative class in a federal wage and hour class action litigation dispute;‖ (2) that the putative class 

members do not belong to any sort of a formal association; and (3) that the information sought ―is 

directly relevant to Defendants‘ defense in this case and goes to the heart of the matter.‖ (See

Doc. No. 71.)

A hearing was held on plaintiff‘s motion for reconsideration on April 21, 2016, at which 

time the court directed the parties to either agree upon a stipulated protective order with respect to 

the deposition questions at issue or to present further evidence and argument to the court. (Doc. 

No. 84.) Thereafter, a declaration and supplemental brief was filed by plaintiffs on April 27, 

2016 (Doc. No. 85) and by defendants on May 4, 2016 (Doc. No. 86). Having considered the 

 

1

 Defendants argue that the court should not consider any issue or legal argument not presented 

to the magistrate judge. However, the decision whether to review an issue or legal authority not 

brought to the attention of the magistrate judge is a discretionary one for the district judge to 

make. See United States v. Quackenbush, No. 2:14-CR-000079-KJD-PAL, 2016 WL 356027, at 

*2-3 (D. Nev. Jan. 28, 2016) (citing Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d 633, 

638–39 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (a district judge ―may reconsider any

pretrial matter . . . where it has been shown that the magistrate judge‘s order is clearly erroneous 

or contrary to law.‖). Here, it was the court that brought the Perry I decision to the attention of 

the parties because, in the court‘s view, it is largely dispositive of the issue presented by the 

motion for reconsideration. It is appropriate under these circumstances for the court to exercise 

its discretion to consider the binding authority setting out the test with respect to associational 

privileges under the First Amendment even though that authority was not cited by the parties 

initially.

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parties‘ arguments and evidence, the court will grant plaintiffs‘ motion for reconsideration only 

with respect to the motion to compel regarding questions designed to elicit identification of the 

other individuals who attended pre-litigation meetings with plaintiffs and class counsel.

The Ninth Circuit has established the test for courts in this circuit to apply in considering 

assertions of the First Amendment associational privilege in response to civil discovery requests. 

In this regard, the court has stated:

In this circuit, a claim of First Amendment privilege is subject to a 

two-part framework. The party asserting the privilege must 

demonstrate a prima facie showing of arguable first amendment 

infringement. This prima facie showing requires appellants to 

demonstrate that enforcement of the [discovery requests] will result 

in (1) harassment, membership withdrawal, or discouragement of 

new members, or (2) other consequences which objectively suggest 

an impact on, or chilling of, the members‘ associational rights.

If appellants can make the necessary prima facie showing, the 

evidentiary burden will then shift to the [opposing party to] 

demonstrate that the information sought through [discovery] is 

rationally related to a compelling . . . interest [and] the least 

restrictive means of obtaining the desired information. . . . The 

question is . . . whether the party seeking the discovery has 

demonstrated an interest in obtaining the disclosures it seeks which 

is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect on the free exercise of 

[the] constitutionally protected right of association.

Perry I, 591 F.3d at 1160–61 (citations and quotations omitted). ―The existence of a prima facie 

case turns not on the type of information sought, but on whether disclosure of the information will 

have a deterrent effect on the exercise of protected activities.‖ Id. at 1162. 

In Perry I, a sufficient prima facie showing was made through declarations from 

individuals who noted they would change the way they communicate in the future if the

communications in question were to become public. 591 F.3d at 1163. The declarations—though 

―lacking in particularity‖—created ―a reasonable inference that disclosure would have the 

practical effects of discouraging political association and inhibiting internal campaign 

communications that are essential to effective association and expression.‖ Id. 

Turning to the instant case, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case of First 

Amendment associational privilege, which turns on ―whether disclosure of the information will 

have a deterrent effect on the exercise of protected activities.‖ Id. at 1162. Plaintiffs indicate that 

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the protected activities of the putative class members were ―to gather together to exercise their 

rights to petition to redress employment wrongs,‖ i.e., their meeting to discuss the filing of a class 

action lawsuit. (Doc. No. 64 at 25.) Initially, therefore, the question is whether the anticipated 

filing of a class action lawsuit is protected activity under the First Amendment.

In other contexts, the filing of a lawsuit has routinely been held to be First Amendment 

protected activity. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Blaisdell 

v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013). Moreover, the Supreme Court has observed 

―the principle that  ̳collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a 

fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.‘‖ In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 

426 (1978) (quoting United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)). See also

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231–32 (1977) (―[O]ur cases have never suggested 

that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters . . . is 

not entitled to full First Amendment protection. . . . Nothing in the First Amendment or our cases 

discussing its meaning makes the question whether the adjective  ̳political‘ can properly be 

attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry.‖); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 

431 (1963) (―[A]ssociation for litigation may be the most effective form of political 

association.‖); Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1074 (7th Cir. 1988) (―Subsequent Supreme 

Court decisions have interpreted Button as establishing the principle that  ̳collective activity 

undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection 

of the First Amendment.‘‖); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 604 F. 

Supp. 280, 288, n. 32 (D.D.C. 1984)(―The right to litigate is clearly protected under the First 

Amendment‘s guarantee of free speech and the right to petition.‖). Likewise, associations 

targeting economic activity have been held protected by the right to associate under the First 

Amendment. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–09 (1982) (noting 

that, concerning the organization of a boycott of local businesses, ―[e]ach of these elements of the 

boycott is a form of speech or conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments‖). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has observed that, under the ―breathing 

space‖ principle, even activity which is not directly protected by the First Amendment falls within 

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its ambit if the activity ―must nevertheless be protected in order fully to vindicate the free speech 

rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.‖ Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 932–34 (9th 

Cir. 2006). While ―only litigation activities which constitute  ̳communication[s] to the court‘ may 

be fairly described as  ̳petitions,‘‖ thus falling within the ambit of the First Amendment‘s petition 

clause, the breathing space principle indicates pre-litigation activities such as the filing of demand 

letters must be protected as well because they are sufficiently connected to the ability to engage in 

litigation. Id. at 932–36 (―We conclude that restrictions on presuit demand letters may therefore 

raise substantial Petition Clause issues if, on examination, such restrictions could impair the right 

of access to the courts protected by the First Amendment.‖). 

Here, plaintiffs and others met with putative class counsel to discuss the possibility of 

filing legal action against their employers to redress damages allegedly caused to them by their 

employers‘ failure to comply with certain labor laws. (Doc. No. 85-1 at 2.) Whether the activity 

for which protection is sought here is construed as predominantly economic, legal, or otherwise, 

under the authorities set forth above it falls sufficiently within the ambit of the First Amendment 

to warrant consideration of the chilling effect on speech. The court concludes that these meetings 

related to protected First Amendment activity thereby bringing into play the First Amendment 

associational privilege addressed by the court in Perry I.

Once invoked, plaintiffs must still show they are entitled to the protection of the privilege. 

A prima facie case requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that disclosure of the information in question 

will have a deterrent effect on the filing of such lawsuits. Perry I, 591 F.3d at 1160–61. 

Plaintiffs allege that disclosure of the identity of those individuals attending the meeting would 

―call undue employer attention‖ upon these individuals, that the individuals requested anonymity 

when they agreed to meet with class counsel, and that disclosure ―would naturally inhibit other 

employees from engaging in such activity, either in this case or other cases.‖ (Doc. No. 64 at 12–

13, 18.) In the joint statement of the discovery dispute, plaintiffs noted that the compelled 

disclosure of the identities of the individuals present at these meetings with counsel—some of 

whom are not named or otherwise involved in this action—would ―result in a risk that potential 

class members may be harassed, intimidated and coerced, in connection with signing the opt-out 

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discovery notice, or for independent reasons.‖ (Doc. No. 54 at 13.) Plaintiffs‘ counsel also aver

that they promised the class members ―that their participation in the meeting with them would be 

maintained as confidential.‖ (Doc. No. 54 at 17.) In his declaration, intended class counsel Edgar 

Aguilasocho states he conducted seven separate meetings at which putative class members 

appeared. According to attorney Aguilasocho:

Putative class members expressed concern with their employer 

knowing they were involved and concern with suffering retaliation 

through harassment at work, being laid off or fired, or not being 

rehired in subsequent seasons—as their employment is seasonal. 

Putative class members also expressed concerns that owner Grant 

Parnagian (whom the workers refer to as ―Grant‖) would learn they 

were participating in the lawsuit and that he would retaliate against 

them by laying them off, firing them, or not rehiring them in 

subsequent seasons. The employees expressed reluctance to 

continue their participation if that participation became known to 

their employers.

(Doc. No. 85-1 at 3.)

Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that compelling the identification of those in 

attendance at these pre-filing meetings will have ―consequences which objectively suggest an 

impact on, or chilling of, the members‘ associational rights.‖ Perry I, 591 F.3d at 1160–61. 

Plaintiffs‘ showing is a sufficient basis from which the court may draw ―a reasonable inference 

that disclosure would have the practical effects of discouraging . . . association and inhibiting . . . 

communications that are essential to effective association and expression.‖ Id. at 1163. 

Specifically, potential class members expressed concern about retaliation and a reluctance to 

continue their participation if their attendance at these initial litigation meetings was revealed. 

(Doc. No. 85-1.) That evidence supports the reasonable inference that compelling the deposition 

testimony sought by defendants would chill the associational rights of these individuals by 

inhibiting their ability to meet with putative class counsel and confer about the filing of a lawsuit.

Defendants protest that plaintiffs here are not affiliated with the United Farm Workers 

(UFW) and do not belong to a formal organization. However, the Ninth Circuit has suggested the 

formal organizational status of the protected individuals is immaterial. Thus, in denying a 

subsequent writ of mandamus brought in the Perry litigation, the Ninth Circuit noted:

/////

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In [its] March 22, 2010 order, the district court said as a matter of 

law that ―the First Amendment privilege does not cover 

communications between [or among] separate organizations.‖ If 

the district court meant that the privilege cannot apply to persons 

who are part of a political association spanning more than one 

organization or entity, then this interpretation was questionable. 

Under Perry I, the privilege applies to the core group of persons 

engaged in the formulation of strategy and messages, whether or 

not they are members of a single organization or entity. The 

operative inquiry is whether they are part of an association subject 

to First Amendment protection. We did not hold that the privilege 

cannot apply to a core group of associated persons spanning more 

than one entity.

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011) (―Perry II‖) (emphasis added). 

Associational rights derive from the First Amendment protections afforded to individuals rather 

than the corporate status, if any, in which those individuals have organized. Therefore, it is 

irrelevant for purposes of invoking this privilege whether the individuals belong to a formal,

corporate organization.

Defendants also argue that, ―[t]aken to its logical extreme,‖ affording plaintiffs protection 

from the discovery sought here would mean that ―in any class action case, prior to certification, 

any joint meeting of individuals is not only appropriate, but that the identities of the persons who 

attended those joint factual discussion sessions are protected.‖ (Doc. No. 86 at 2.) Further, 

defendants assert that ―[m]erely being parties to a lawsuit or potential class members does not 

shield one from having their identities from being disclosed if they attend meetings where the 

lawsuit is discussed.‖ (Id. at 2.) Defendants may have a point, were the notion taken to its 

extreme. That, however, is not the case here. It is also true that ―merely‖ being a party to a 

lawsuit does not protect one from having to reveal their identity. However, this is the very point 

underlying the Ninth Circuit‘s balancing test under Perry I. Under that test, the party relying on

the associational privilege must first advance a prima facie case that its invocation is warranted. 

If the court is satisfied with that prima facie showing, the test then affords the party seeking the 

discovery the opportunity to demonstrate why the discovery sought should nonetheless be

produced despite the First Amendment concerns. 

Here, plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that their associational rights will be 

infringed if the plaintiffs are compelled to answer these deposition questions. Accordingly, the 

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burden shifts to defendants to ―demonstrate[ ] an interest in obtaining the disclosures . . . which is 

sufficient to justify the deterrent effect‖ on the putative class members‘ associational rights. 

Perry I, 591 F.3d at 1160–61. In balancing these competing interests the court may take into 

account any of these factors: (1) the importance of the litigation; (2) the centrality of the 

information sought to the issue in the case; (3) the existence of less intrusive means of obtaining 

the information; and (4) the substantiality of the First Amendment interests at stake. Id. at 1161. 

Moreover, it is error for the district court in conducting this balancing to apply ―the Rule 26 

standard of reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence‖ because ―[t]he 

Rule 26 standard . . . fails to give sufficient weight to the First Amendment interests at stake.‖ Id. 

In this case, the court concludes that defendants have demonstrated no valid interest in obtaining 

the sought after discovery at this early stage of the litigation.

Defendants present two principal reasons why they require the identity of the individuals 

who attended the pre-litigation meetings in question. First, defendants suggest they need the 

sought-after information in order to conduct pre-class certification depositions of the to-beidentified individuals, who may or may not offer declarations in support of plaintiffs‘ class 

certification motion. Defendants then add that, ―[j]oint witness preparation is a proper matter for 

discovery.‖ (Doc. No. 86 at 1.) However, taking the deposition of such individuals before it is 

known whether they will even execute declarations would be of highly questionable relevance. 

Moreover, deposition of non-parties prior to class certification is rarely sought, let alone 

permitted. To engage in such premature discovery practice would largely eliminate one of the 

major benefits of class actions, i.e., avoiding time-consuming litigation on issues that can 

appropriately be resolved en masse. Instead, ―[a]t the pre-class certification stage, discovery in a 

putative class action is generally limited to certification issues. . . . class members and parties are 

not treated identically.‖ Dysthe v. Basic Research, L.L.C., 273 F.R.D. 625, 628 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 

Discovery focused on putative or absent class members is normally allowed only in 

special circumstances:

The taking of depositions of absent class members is—as is true of 

written interrogatories—appropriate [only] in special 

circumstances. And, not unlike the use of interrogatories, the party 

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seeking the depositions has the burden of showing necessity and 

absence of any motive to take undue advantage of the class 

members. However, in light of the nature of the deposition 

process—namely, the passive litigants are required to appear for 

questioning and are subject to often stiff interrogation by opposing 

counsel with the concomitant need for counsel of their own—we 

are of the view that the burden confronting the party seeking 

deposition testimony should be more severe than that imposed on 

the party requesting permission to use interrogatories.

Id. at 628 (quoting Withers v. eHarmony, Inc., 267 F.R.D. 316, 320 (C.D. Cal. 2010). ―Generally, 

to depose putative or absent class members, a party must show that  ̳discovery is both necessary 

and for a purpose other than taking undue advantage of class members.‘‖ Id. (quoting Baldwin & 

Flynn v. Nat’l Safety Assocs., 149 F.R.D. 598, 600 (N.D.Cal.1993)). 

While some courts have permitted discovery of absent class 

members, they have done so only where the proponent of the 

discovery establishes that (1) the discovery is not designed to take 

undue advantage of class members or to reduce the size of the class, 

(2) the discovery is necessary, (3) responding to the discovery

requests would not require the assistance of counsel, and (4) the 

discovery seeks information that is not already known by the 

proponent. 

McPhail v. First Command Fin. Planning, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 514, 517 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (citing 

Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 340–42 (7th Cir. 1974)). See also Antoninetti v. 

Chipotle, Inc., Case No. 06cv2671-BTM (WMc), 2011 WL 2003292, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 

2011) (noting that although discovery from absent class members is not usually allowed, the rules 

are flexible ―especially where the proposed deponents have been identified as potential witnesses 

or have otherwise  ̳injected‘ themselves into the litigation,‖ such as after they have submitted 

declarations in support of class certification); Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., Case No. 

CV 05-6838 CAS (MANx), 2008 WL 8116992 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2008); On the House 

Syndication, Inc. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 203 F.R.D. 452, 455–57 (S.D. Cal. 2001); Balwin & 

Flynn v. Nat’l Safety Assocs., 149 F.R.D. 598, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 

Here, defendants have made no showing of any need for the discovery they seek at this 

early stage of the litigation. Success on plaintiffs‘ motion for class certification will almost surely 

not turn on the testimony of percipient witnesses, but rather on data gleaned from the defendants‘ 

own records. Defendants have simply identified no legitimate and specific need to subject 

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unnamed potential class members to the rigors of litigation prior to the filing of a motion for class 

certification in this case.

Second, defendants suggest that they require the identities of the individuals who attended

these meetings because they need to identify and remove all of these individuals, whom they 

describe as ―tainted,‖ from any statistical analysis that may later be conducted in this case. (Doc. 

No. 86 at 2–3.) It is far from clear to the court how any discussions these individuals may have 

had with plaintiffs or putative class counsel will have ―tainted‖ them for the purposes of statistical 

analysis. Defendants appear eager to put the cart before the horse in this regard. It appears likely 

that any statistical analysis will focus almost exclusively on defendants’ records, not the 

testimony of certain unnamed class members. It is unclear to the court how an individual‘s 

perception of—or even bias against—their employer could possibly taint a statistical analysis into 

whether their employer failed to appropriately pay wages and overtime or compensate for 

mandatory rest periods, as required by law and as determined by the employer‘s own records. 

Further, even if there was any conceivable ―taint‖ as claimed by defendants, defense counsel

themselves represent that this class will include at least 14,000 employees. (Doc. No. 86-1 at 2.) 

Notably, defense counsel is not inquiring at plaintiffs‘ depositions as to the number of individuals 

who attended the pre-litigation meetings but rather is only seeking to learn their identities. The 

court surmises that unless a very large number attended, their potential inclusion in any analysis 

and any corresponding ―taint‖ would be statistically irrelevant. Defendants have certainly made 

no showing to the contrary. 

Again, defendants have simply shown no need for the discovery they seek at this early 

stage of the litigation. Because defendants have not demonstrated that their interest in obtaining 

the discovery they seek outweighs its potential impact on the First Amendment associational 

rights of the absent class members, the undersigned grants the plaintiffs‘ request for 

reconsideration on this ground. Perry I, 591 F.3d at 1160–61. Plaintiffs will not be required to 

divulge the identities of those who attended meetings with class counsel concerning the filing of 

this action at this stage of the litigation. Defense counsel will be precluded from attempting to 

elicit this information at plaintiffs‘ depositions.

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2. Plaintiffs’ Request for Reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s Ruling 

Regarding Sanctions Against Plaintiffs Pursuant to the Reopening of Plaintiff 

Avalos’s Deposition 

Plaintiffs also seek reconsideration of the magistrate judge‘s ruling awarding monetary 

sanctions to defendants for the cost of preparing a motion to compel concerning the reopening of 

plaintiff Avalos‘s deposition.

2

Plaintiffs argue there was no basis for sanctions to be imposed 

against them for requiring a motion to be filed. (Doc. No. 64 at 26–30.) As to this aspect of the 

discovery order, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the order was ―clearly erroneous or contrary 

to law.‖ See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Local Rule 303(f), Rockwell Intern., Inc. v. Pos-ATraction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983). Of course, the awarding of sanctions 

is often warranted with respect to discovery disputes necessitating the filing of a motion to 

compel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (―If the motion is granted . . . the court must . . . require 

the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant‘s reasonable 

expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney‘s fees.‖) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs 

argue their failure to agree to the reopening of the deposition was substantially justified, see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii), because plaintiff Avalos provided an explanation for the changes made 

to the deposition transcript and because his testimony was not rendered totally ―useless‖ or 

―incomplete‖ as a result. (Doc. No. 64 at 29.) The undersigned is not persuaded by this 

argument. As the magistrate judge pointed out, some of the changes plaintiff Avalos made to his 

deposition were clearly material, since this is a wage-and-hour class action and the manner of his 

compensation may be important in deciding both whether to certify the class and whether plaintiff 

is a suitable class representative. (See Doc. No. 63 at 17–18.) Accordingly, plaintiffs‘ motion for

reconsideration of the order awarding sanctions against plaintiffs for the costs of litigating a 

motion to compel the reopening of plaintiff Avalos‘s deposition is denied.

/////

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2

 Again, no challenge is brought here to the magistrate judge‘s order compelling the reopening of 

that deposition.

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III. Conclusion

For all of the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs‘ request for reconsideration (Doc. No. 64) 

is granted in part and denied in part. The magistrate judge‘s order requiring plaintiffs at their 

depositions to divulge the identities of putative class members who attended meetings with class 

counsel is overruled. Plaintiffs‘ motion for reconsideration is denied in all other respects.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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