Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04283/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04283-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Citations to “ex.” without more are to the record filed by the respondent as

attachments to his answer.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PLES CROSS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A. P. KANE, Warden; A. PEREZ, Chair,

Board of Prison Terms; and ARNOLD

SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor, 

Respondents. /

No. C 05-4283 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

HABEAS PETITION

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. 

The petition is directed to denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For

the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

In 1983 petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles County Superior Court of first

degree murder with use of a firearm. Ex. 1 (transcript of hearing) at 1 and pet. at 2.1

 He

was sentenced to prison for twenty-seven years to life. Id.; id. at unnumbered correction

page foll. 56. On September 5, 2003, after a hearing before the Board of Prison Terms

(“Board”), during which petitioner was represented and was given an opportunity to be

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

heard, the Board found petitioner unsuitable for parole. Id. at 57-63. Petitioner’s state

habeas petition challenging the denial was denied by the Los Angeles Superior Court in a

reasoned opinion, pet. ex. A, and the California Court of Appeal and the California

Supreme Court summarily denied subsequent petitions directed to the denial, ex. 2.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a

state trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present

clear and convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness;

conclusory assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

II. Issues Presented

Petitioner contends that (1) the denial of parole was not supported by some

evidence that petitioner is currently an unreasonable risk to society; (2) the Board of Parole

was biased against him, in that it has a policy of almost always denying parole; and (3) the

governor is collaterally estopped from exercising his authority under section 3014.2 of the

penal code, which allows the governor to over-ride parole decisions.

Among other things, respondent contends that California prisoners have no liberty

interest in parole and that if they do, the only due process protections available are a right

to be heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the denial – that is, respondent

contends there is no due process right to have the result supported by sufficient evidence. 

Because these contentions go to whether petitioner has any due process rights at all in

connection with parole, and if he does, what those rights are, they will be addressed first.

///

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

A. Respondent’s Contentions

1. Liberty Interest

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. 

In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.

1 (1979), the Supreme Court found that the inmates had a liberty interest in discretionary

parole that was protected by the Due Process Clause. The right was created by the

“expectancy of release provided in [the Nebraska parole statute.]” That statute provided

that the parole board “shall order” release of eligible inmates unless that release would

have certain negative impacts. Id. at 11–12. The Supreme Court returned to the issue in

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987). There it held that a similar liberty interest

was created even though the parole board had great discretion. Id. at 381. For parole

decisions, this mode of analysis survived the Supreme Court’s later rejection of it for prison

disciplinary decisions in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (Sandin “does not affect the creation of liberty interests in

parole under Greenholtz and Allen.”). 

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence," Greenholtz, at 7, a state's

statutory parole scheme, if it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption that

parole release will be granted when or unless certain designated findings are made, and

thereby give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest, see Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (Montana parole statute providing that board "shall"

release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in

release on parole); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12 (Nebraska parole statute providing that

board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain restrictions, creates due process liberty

interest in release on parole). In such a case, a prisoner has a liberty interest in parole that

cannot be denied without adequate procedural due process protections. See Allen, 482

U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16. 

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Respondent contends that California law does not create a liberty interest in parole.

But California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language and is similar to the schemes in

Allen and Greenholtz which the Supreme Court held gave rise to a protected liberty interest

in release on parole. In California, the panel or board "shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a

parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Under

the clearly established framework of Allen and Greenholtz, “California’s parole scheme

gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). The scheme requires that parole release be granted unless

the statutorily defined determination (that considerations of public safety forbid it) is made. 

Ibid.; Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding initial refusal to set

parole date for prisoner with fifteen-to-life sentence implicated prisoner’s liberty interest). In

sum, the structure of California's parole scheme -- with its mandatory language and

substantive predicates – gives rise to a federally protected liberty interest in parole such

that an inmate has a federal right to due process in parole proceedings.

Respondent relies on In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 92 (2005), as authority for his contention that the California statute does not create a

liberty interest in parole. This argument has been rejected by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1127-

28 (2006). 

Respondent’s argument as to liberty interest is without merit. 

2. Due-Process Protections 

Respondent contends that even if California prisoners do have a liberty interest in

parole, the due process protections to which they are entitled by clearly-established

Supreme Court authority are limited to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement

of reasons for denial. That is, he contends there is no due process right to have the

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

decision be supported by “some evidence.” This position, however, has been rejected by

the Ninth Circuit, which has held that the Supreme Court has clearly established that a

parole board’s decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not

supported by "some evidence in the record", or is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons v. Carey, 479

F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying "some evidence" standard used for disciplinary

hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion, 306

F.3d at 904 (same). The evidence underlying the Board’s decision must also have "some

indicia of reliability." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some

evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established federal law in the parole context for

purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. 

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Application of “Some Evidence” Standard

Petitioner contends that the denial of parole was not supported by “some evidence.”

Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is met "does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence

in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472

U.S. at 455; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal, and assures

that "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at

457). 

In several recent cases the Ninth Circuit has discussed whether the “some evidence”

standard can be satisfied by evidence of the nature of the commitment offense and prior

offenses. In Biggs, the court explained that the some evidence standard may be

considered in light of the Board’s decisions over time. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-917. The

court reasoned that "[t]he Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful

balancing and assessment of the factors considered . . . A continued reliance in the future

on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and

could result in a due process violation." Id. Although the Biggs court upheld the initial

denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s

conduct before incarceration, the court cautioned that "[o]ver time, however, should Biggs

continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a

parole date simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious questions

involving his liberty interest." Id. at 916. 

The Sass court criticized the decision in Biggs: "Under AEDPA it is not our function

to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

Sass determined that it is not a due process violation per se if the Board determines parole

suitability based solely on the unchanging factors of the commitment offense and prior

offenses. Id. (prisoner’s commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses amounted

to some evidence to support the Board’s denial of parole). However, Sass does not

dispute the argument in Biggs that, over time, a commitment offense may be less probative

of a prisoner’s current threat to the public safety. 

In Irons the Ninth Circuit emphasized the continuing vitality of Biggs, but concluded

that relief for Irons was precluded by Sass. See Irons, slip op. at 8349. The Ninth Circuit

explained that all of the cases in which it previously held that denying parole based solely

on the commitment offense comported with due process were ones in which the prisoner

had not yet served the minimum years required by the sentence. Id. Also, noting that the

parole board in Sass and Irons appeared to give little or no weight to evidence of the

prisoner’s rehabilitation, the Ninth Circuit stressed its hope that "the Board will come to

recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment

offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process,

given the liberty interest in parole that flows from relevant California statutes." Id. (citing

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917). 

That is not what happened here, however. The Board based its decision upon the

cruelty and callousness of the crime and its calculated manner, the triviality of the motive,

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

petitioner’s escalating pattern of criminality, his unstable social history, problems with his

psychological report, the need for him to “shore up” his employment plans, and the

opposition of the prosecutor. Ex. 1 at 57-60. That is, the decision was based to a

considerable extent on factors in the past – the circumstances of the crime, petitioner’s

prior criminal record, and his unstable social history – but also on other factors. And in any

event the hearing at issue here was held only twenty years into petitioner’s twenty-sevenyears-to-life sentence. Therefore under the reasoning in Irons, the Biggs dictum that at

some point the characteristics of the offense will ease to be “some evidence” does not

apply to this hearing. See Irons, slip op. at 8349. For these reasons, this is not a “Biggs

case.”

Petitioner had given the victim a ring to sell for him. Ex. 1 at 10-11. For reasons

that do not appear in the record, the victim refused to give the ring back. Id. Petitioner

went to the victim’s house with a rifle, waited more than an hour for him to come home,

shot him in back, went through his pockets, then shot him again. Id. at 11-12, 56-58. 

These facts are sufficient to support the Board’s conclusion that the crime was particularly

callous and that the motive was very trivial. In addition, petitioner’s psychological report

contained a statement that petitioner “may have some negative orientations towards

society in general due to his incarceration . . . .” Ex. 1 at 59. There was sufficient evidence

to support the denial. See Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2005) (facts

of the offense and psychiatric reports about the would-be parolee sufficient to support

denial).

Becaue there was no constitutional violation, the state courts’ denial of this claim

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court

authority.

2. Bias

Petitioner contends that the Board was biased. The record shows that the Board

reviewed the evidence extensively and discussed it with petitioner and his attorney. Ex. 1

at 10-56. The Board’s decision explains the facts it relied upon in finding him not suitable

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

for parole. Id. at 57-63. Both these factors tend to negate the accusation of bias, and

petitioner has not provided any evidence that would show otherwise. The state courts’

rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Supreme Court authority.

3. Governor’s Involvement

Petitioner inexplicably states a contention that the governor is collaterally estopped

from over-riding a grant of a parole date by the Board. As petitioner has not been given a

parole date, the governor has not over-ridden the Board as to petitioner. Respondent

points this out in his answer, and petitioner does not dispute it in his traverse. Petitioner

has failed to establish a factual basis for relief on this issue.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.05\CROSS283.RUL.wpd

Case 4:05-cv-04283-PJH Document 9 Filed 10/11/07 Page 9 of 9