Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00846/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00846-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 152
Nature of Suit: Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Default of Student Loan

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Douglas S. Younglove, 

Defendant.

No. CV-10-0846-PHX-JJT 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 After the Government sought to collect on the Judgment entered in this case by 

way of a Writ of Garnishment to the Judgment Debtor\Defendant’s employer, the 

Defendant sought a hearing “to object to the validity of the Judgment and underlying 

debt.” (Doc. 23) The presiding District Judge referred Defendant’s Request for a 

Hearing to the undersigned for the purpose of deciding the motion and, if a hearing was 

warranted, to conduct that hearing. (Doc. 25) 

 Defendant’s motion asserted no grounds for the requested hearing but his response 

to the Government’s objection to the hearing asserted that the most significant portion of 

the debt (that asserted in the “Certificate of Indebtedness #2”) “is made up entirely of a 

debt that Defendant has previously paid in full.” (Doc. 26 at p. 2) This satisfied the 

Court that a hearing was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 3202(d)(3) which provides for a 

hearing: 

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(3) if the judgment is by default and only to the extent that the Constitution 

or another law of the United States provides a right to a hearing on the 

issue, to-- 

(A) the probable validity of the claim for the debt which is 

merged in the judgment; and 

(B) the existence of good cause for setting aside such 

judgment. 

 The Court initiated a three-step process to allow the Defendant to present any 

evidence which might satisfy the statutory requirements. Defendant had informed the 

Court that he had such evidence but that “the documentation is in storage inside one or 

two of numerous boxes that have to be gone through to locate the specific 

documentation.” (Doc. 29) To ensure that Defendant was able to present his claim, the 

Court’s process provided for the Defendant to first request what documents he wished to 

obtain from the United States. Defendant identified these documents by categorical 

description. (Doc. 32) One of these requests was for documents supporting Defendant’s 

new assertion that the Government had breached a side-agreement to the promissory note 

which required the Government to repair Defendant’s credit rating. 

 The Government responded at a February 16, 2016 hearing identifying what 

documents it possessed responsive to the request and promised to provide the available 

documents to Defendant. At this hearing, the Government informed Defendant and the 

Court that it possessed no documents to support this contention about a side-agreement 

and that it could not enter into such an agreement in any event as the Government does 

not determine credit ratings. 

 The stepped process then afforded Defendant the opportunity to produce such 

evidence that would satisfy the statutory requirements set forth above. At the February 

24, 2016 telephonic discovery hearing, the Court reaffirmed that Defendant would have 

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the opportunity at the March 8, 2016 hearing to produce any evidence he had regarding 

his claim about the supposed side-agreement. 

 Defendant appeared at the March 8 hearing and presented no documents or 

evidence in support of his claims. When the Court inquired whether Defendant had 

produced any documents to the Government in compliance with the Court’s three-step 

process, Mr. Younglove responded that he had not produced any documents but that 

instead he “was seeking production of documents”. This response astounded the Court 

because it was utterly inconsistent with the previous discussions on the record. That 

record reflects that the Government told Mr. Younglove what documents it had, the 

Government produced those documents, and the Court then gave Mr. Younglove the 

opportunity at the March 8 hearing to present any documents of his own. Not only did 

Mr. Younglove not produce any evidence supporting his claims, he also seemed to 

disavow that this was expected of him at the March 8 hearing. Mr. Younglove, a member 

of the State Bar of Arizona, is not an unsophisticated and unpracticed person in the 

matters of court. The previous hearings had made it beyond obvious what was expected 

from Defendant at the March 8 hearing. The Court found his response incredible and it 

certainly fell in line with his previous morphing and unsupported representations to the 

Court. First, he had claimed that the debt was “paid in full”, a supposition for which he 

provided no relevant evidence and for which the record evidence seemed plainly 

contrary. Later he contended that there was some side-agreement, again for which he 

provided no evidence, that rendered invalid the debt and which was contrary to the 

certificates of indebtedness and the Declaration of Christian Lee Odum, Loan Analyst for 

the United States Department of Education. (Doc. 38) 

In summation, the Court conducted the requested hearing and was presented with 

no credible or legally supported basis to challenge the requested garnishment. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Government’s Application for 

Writ of Garnishment be granted. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 10th day of March, 2016. 

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