Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05541/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05541-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARLENE SANDERS and KEN

McDANIEL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF BAKERSFIELD,

BAKERSFIELD POLICE

DEPARTMENT, ERIC MATLOCK,

GLEN DAVIS, SCOTT THATCHER

and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

sued both in their individual and

official capacities 

Defendants.

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CIV-F 04-5541 AWI TAG

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

The matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the court’s

September 30, 2005 Order granting in part and denying in part cross motions for summary

adjudication. Doc. 53. Plaintiffs have not filed any opposition to the motion. The matter was

taken under submission without oral argument.

I. History

Plaintiffs in this case are Arlene Sanders and Ken McDaniel, who resided at 1905

California Street, Apt. #18; Bakersfield, CA in April 1999. Defendants are the City of

Bakersfield , the Bakersfield Police Department (“BPD”), Eric Matlock (Chief of BPD), Glenn

Davis (BPD officer), Scott Thatcher (BPD Officer), and Does 1 through 10, inclusive (additional

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BPD officers). On the evening of April 6, 1999, Davis and Thatcher responded to a report of a

disturbance at Plaintiffs’ apartment complex. At the scene, the apartment manager stated that

there was a fight going on inside Plaintiffs’ unit. As Davis and Thatcher approached the unit,

they heard loud shouting. They knocked on the door and identified themselves as BPD officers. 

Sanders opened the door, revealing both herself and McDaniel in the living room; Davis and

Thatcher entered. They noticed that Sanders had an abrasion on her cheek and McDaniel put

something behind the couch. Sanders demanded the officers leave and began shouting. Davis

and McDaniel used force to handcuff both Plaintiffs. Davis conducted a sweep of the whole

apartment. Davis found plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine in the right shoe of

a pair of work boots in a bedroom closet; the door to the closet was open. Davis asked McDaniel

if he was on parole; McDaniel affirmed he was on parole for a drug violation. He contacted the

BPD to request a team to conduct a full search of the apartment. BPD officers soon arrived and

seized the bags of cocaine in the course of a second search of the apartment. Defendants also

claim that Davis and Thatcher were informed by another BPD officer, Orbin Love, on April 5,

1999 (the day before the arrests and searches) that McDaniel was a parolee who was suspected of

dealing drugs; Plaintiffs dispute the claim. 

Plaintiffs were charged with possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of California

Health and Safety Code § 11351.5 on May 17, 1999. Plaintiffs plead guilty. Before their plea,

they filed motions to suppress evidence pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5, arguing the initial

search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The motion was denied, but the Fifth District

Court of Appeal reversed the denial on two bases: the search extended beyond adjoining spaces

and a parole search is only valid when the officer is aware of the search condition. People v.

Sanders, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1211, 1220 and 1223 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). On review, the California

Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth District Court of Appeal on the parole search while expressing

no opinion as to the protective sweep. People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 324 n.2 (Cal. 2003). 

The California Supreme Court firmly held that when police are unaware an individual is subject

to a search condition, a search without probable cause constitutes a violation of the Fourth

Amendment and can not be justified after the fact by the search condition.

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On April 8, 2004, Plaintiffs filed this present suit. Broadly, Plaintiffs allege their Fourth

Amendment rights were violated by entry into their apartment and search without consent or

exigent circumstances. The parties filed opposing motions for summary adjudication. By Order

of September 30, 2005, the court determined “The initial entry of Officers Davis and Thatcher on

April 6, 1999 did not violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights....Whether the [initial search]

can be justified as a protective sweep incident to arrest is preserved for trial as the questions of

arrest and plain view have not been fully addressed.” Doc. 53, Order, at 39:22-28. Defendants

shortly thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration. Doc. 56. The motion was eventually denied. 

The present matter is a second motion for reconsideration on different grounds.

II. Legal Standards

Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59(e), any motion to alter or amend judgment shall be filed no

later than ten days after entry of judgment. A motion for reconsideration of summary judgment

is appropriately brought under Rule 59(e). Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir.

1985). A motion to alter or amend judgment is appropriate under limited circumstances, such as

where the court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, where the court “committed clear

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust,” or where there is an intervening change in

controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that McDaniel, as a parolee subject to a search condition, did not have

his Fourth Amendment rights violated when his residence was searched by officers who were not

aware of his search condition at the time that search took place. In essence, Defendants ask the

court to reconsider the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Sanders and come to the

opposite conclusion. 

Defendants base their argument on the intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision in

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). Defendants claim the U.S. Supreme Court found

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that “parolees do not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as

legitimate....a parolee has no reasonable expectation of privacy.” Doc. 60, Reconsideration, at

7:8-13. Review of the case cited finds that the U.S. Supreme Court did indeed state that

“Examining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a parolee, an

established variation on imprisonment, including the plain terms of the parole search condition,

we concluded that petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize

as legitimate.” Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (2006). The circumstances of the

case concerned a suspicionless search of a parolee whom the officer conducting the search knew

was subject to a search condition. However, the court did state that “parolees like petitioner have

severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.” Samson v.

California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 (2006). This statement appears perfectly consonant with the

California Supreme Court’s conclusion that “A parolee’s expectation of privacy certainly is

diminished, but it is not eliminated.” People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 332 (Cal. 2003). 

Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically stated that “Under California precedent, we note, an

officer would not act reasonably in conducting a suspicionless search absent knowledge that the

person stopped for the search is a parolee.” Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006),

citing People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 331-2 (Cal. 2003). While not an affirmation of People

v. Sanders, the language suggests endorsement of the California Supreme Court’s decision

regarding the Fourth Amendment rights of parolees. The court finds this motion for

reconsideration to be without foundation.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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