Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02444/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02444-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ricky Kurt Wassenaar, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

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CIV 09-2444-PHX-JWS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Ricky Kurt Wassenaar, who is confined under Arizona Department of

Corrections’ authority in the Ohio State Penitentiary, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an Answer

(Doc. 12), and Petitioner has filed a traverse (Doc. 17). On February 17, 2011, Respondents

filed Supplementary Exhibits in support of their Answer (Doc. 19).

BACKGROUND

In January 2004, Petitioner and Steven Coy were inmates at the Arizona State Prison

Complex – Lewis, near Buckeye, Arizona. See State v. Wassenaar, 161 P.3d 608, 612-13

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). On January 18, 2004, Petitioner and Coy, using homemade shanks,

overpowered the corrections officer assigned to the kitchen where both inmates worked. See

id. Petitioner then gained entry to the tower dressed as a guard and took two officers

hostage. See id. Petitioner and Coy armed themselves with firearms located in the tower.

See id. From January 18 to February 1, 2004, a standoff ensued between the two inmates and

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a law enforcement tactical team. See id. The inmates surrendered on February 1, 2004. See

id.

Petitioner represented himself at his trial with advisory counsel appointed by the trial

court. (Doc. 12, Reporter’s Transcript (“R.T.”) 12/30/04 at 3-8.) After advising Petitioner

that he would be required to wear a leg brace and stun belt during trial, whether he

represented himself or was represented by appointed counsel, the trial court granted

Petitioner’s request to represent himself and waive appointed counsel. (Doc. 12, R.T.

12/30/04 at 3-8.) Petitioner proceeded to trial with advisory counsel from the Maricopa

County Legal Defender’s Office. (Doc. 12, R.T. 1/19/05 at 10.)

At the request of the sheriff’s deputy providing courtroom security, and over

Petitioner’s objection, the trial court ordered Petitioner to be restrained while seated at the

defense table with a leg brace and stun belt under his civilian clothing, and the court

authorized additional restraint while Petitioner testified. (Doc. 12, R.T. 4/26/05 at 49-50.)

While testifying, Petitioner was tethered to the witness chair with white nylon flex cuffs.

(Doc. 12, R.T. 4/26/05 at 49-50.)

Also over Petitioner’s objection, the trial court required Petitioner’s direct and redirect

examination to be conducted through questions posed by advisory counsel. (Doc. 12, R.T.

3/24/05 at 161-62.) The court permitted Petitioner to write out the questions advisory

counsel would use during Petitioner’s testimony. (Doc. 12, R.T. 3/24/05 at 161-62.)

On May 4, 2005, Petitioner was convicted on five counts of kidnapping, ten counts

of dangerous or deadly assault by a prisoner, and one count each of promoting prison

contraband, escape in the first degree, sexual assault, and aggravated assault causing

temporary but substantial disfigurement. (Doc. 12, R.T. 5/4/05.) The trial court

subsequently imposed consecutive life sentences on 16 of the counts, and lesser prison terms

on Petitioner’s convictions for promoting prison contraband, escape, and aggravated assault.

(Doc. 12, R.T. 6/3/05 at 13-14, 60-63.)

On June 3, 2005, prior to the sentencing hearing, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate

judgment. He appended a letter addressed to him from his investigator, Leland Damner,

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setting forth the unsworn statements of four jurors purporting to have seen or heard from an

outside source that Petitioner wore restraints during his testimony. (Doc. 1, Exh. A.) The

trial court found the motion to vacate untimely. (Doc. 12, Exh. B.) Petitioner later filed

another motion to vacate judgment and request for evidentiary hearing, and the court found

the second motion to vacate untimely and, in any event, summarily denied it. (Doc. 1, Exh.

B; Doc. 12, Exh. B.)

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and counsel appointed from the Office of

the Public Defender filed an opening brief raising seven claims of error alleging: (1) the

denial of his rights to a speedy trial under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 8 and the federal and state

constitutions; (2) the invalid waiver of his right to counsel; (3) the violation of his right to

self-representation; (4) the violation of his right to present a complete defense (precluding

testimony regarding his record in the department of corrections); (5) the violation of his right

to present a complete defense (precluding testimony regarding why he secreted a handcuff

key into the federal correctional facility); (6) the violation of due process when the jurors

allegedly saw him in restraints; and (7) an abuse of discretion in denying him an evidentiary

hearing on whether jurors saw his restraints. (Doc. 12, Exh. C.) On July 17, 2007, The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in a published opinion, State v.

Wassenaar, 161 P.3d 608 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).

Petitioner filed a petition for review raising two issues: (1) the Arizona Court of

Appeals set forth an improper standard of review in addressing Petitioner’s shackling issues;

and (2) the Court of Appeals improperly overruled the Arizona Supreme Court on whether

Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether jurors saw his physical

restraints. (Doc. 12, Exh. D.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment

on January 8, 2008. (Doc. 12, Exh. A, order, 1/9/08.)

During the pendency of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction

relief (“PCR”) pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, followed by

a pro per petition for PCR in which he presented four claims: (1) the denial of due process

in imposing restraints on him during trial and while testifying; (2) the invalid waiver of his

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right to counsel because of failure to advise him that advisory counsel would pose questions

during Petitioner’s direct and redirect examination at trial; (3) error in the court’s restitution

order at sentencing; and (4) the Office of the Public Defender had a conflict in representing

Petitioner on appeal because that office had briefly represented Steven Coy before being

replaced by the Legal Advocate because of a conflict on the Coy matter. (Doc. 12, Exh. E.)

The trial court modified its restitution order, but found Petitioner’s first three claims

precluded under Rule 32.2(a) and found the last issue (conflict of appellate counsel)

premature. (Doc. 12, Exh. E, petition for review attachment, minute entry, 11/6/06.) The

trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on February 13, 2007, and later

denied Petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. (Doc. 12, Exh.

A, order, 6/25/07.) The Arizona Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed Petitioner’s

untimely petition for review on June 25, 2007. (Doc. 12, Exh. A, order, 6/25/07.)

On December 26, 2007, again, prior to his direct appeal being final, Petitioner filed

a pro per petition for special action alleging a conflict with the Office of the Public Defender

representing him on appeal. (Doc. 12, Exh. F.) The Arizona Supreme Court declined

jurisdiction on March 11, 2008. (Doc. 1 at 3-4.)

After the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of his direct appeal on January 8,

2008, Petitioner filed a timely notice of PCR on January 28, 2008. (Doc. 12, Exh. E.) He

filed a pro per petition for PCR alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claiming

(1) that counsel failed to properly challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision to have

advisory counsel read Petitioner’s direct examination questions at trial; and (2) that counsel

failed to properly challenge on appeal the trial court’s decision to impose restraints on

Petitioner during trial. (Doc. 12, Exh. E, petition for review attachment, 6/6/08.) The trial

court dismissed the petition on June 6, 2008, finding that Petitioner’s objections to the use

of advisory counsel and to the imposition of restraints had been raised on direct appeal and

were rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore Petitioner “cannot sustain his

burden to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland and Nash.” (Doc. 12, Exh. E, petition for

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 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

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review attachment, 6/6/08.) Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for review, and the Arizona

Court of Appeals denied review without comment on October 26, 2009. (Doc. 12, Exh. A.)

On November 20, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. 1). Petitioner raises four grounds for relief: (1) The Arizona Court of Appeals erred

when it unconstitutionally lowered the standard of review for harmless error analysis; (2)

Petitioner’s right to self-representation was violated; (3) Petitioner’s due process rights and

right to presumption of innocence were violated when the trial court ordered him to wear

visible physical restraints in the presence of the jury during trial; and (4) Petitioner was

denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an

Answer (Doc. 12), and Petitioner has filed a traverse (Doc. 17).

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that each of Petitioner’s claims fail on the

merits. As such, Respondents request that the Court deny and dismiss Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice.

A. Grounds One through Four – Merits Analysis

Pursuant to the AEDPA1

 , a federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect

to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state

court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court; or (2) based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)

(O’Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court as to the AEDPA standard

of review). “When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last

reasoned decision’ by a state court ... .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004).

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A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05. “A state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule

but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that

is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Ground Four of his habeas petition, Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment

right to effective assistance of appellate counsel was violated. The two-prong test for

establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was established by the Supreme Court in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on an ineffective

assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment

in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

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grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14.

“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient

prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In reviewing a state court’s resolution of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

the Court considers whether the state court applied Strickland unreasonably:

For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], ...

he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’stest if his

claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1),

it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent

judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he

must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner.

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause,

a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather,

it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts

of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted).

1. Ground One

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In Ground One of his habeas petition, Petitioner contends that the Arizona Court of

Appeals applied an improper standard of review in addressing his shackling issues raised on

direct appeal. Specifically, Petitioner states that the appellate court erroneously applied the

standard of review appropriate to “sufficiency-of-the-evidence issues” and claims that the

court should have applied a harmless error review placing the burden on the state to prove

“beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained.”

Initially, the Court notes that Petitioner is not asserting that the appellate court’s

decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court harmless error

precedent. Rather, Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals applied an improper standard

of review in deciding his shackling issues. Absent more, however, the application of an

improper standard of review by an appellate court is not a proper ground for federal habeas

relief. See, e.g., Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 330 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993) (claim that state

appeals court applied wrong standard of review “does not state an independent ground for

federal habeas corpus relief”). The test is whether “the state-court adjudication resulted in

a decision that (1) ‘was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law’ ... or (2) ‘involved an

unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law ... .’” Williams, 529 U.S. at

412-13. To be entitled to the relief he seeks, therefore, Petitioner must establish that the state

court’s ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, not merely that

the court applied an improper standard in arriving at its decision.

In any event, Petitioner misstates the standard of review applied by the Arizona Court

of Appeals. In its decision, the court stated under the “Factual and Procedural Background”

section:

We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict,

and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant. State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 436, ¶ 12, 967 P.2d 106, 111 (1998). In our review of the

record, we resolve any conflict in the evidence in favor of sustaining the

verdict. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).

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Wassenaar, 161 P.3d at 612. While the Court of Appeals applied this standard in construing

the evidence, it expressly applied the an abuse-of-discretion standard, as well as, harmless

error review in addressing the shackling claims on appeal. See id. at 618-19.

Specifically, the court stated,

“Whether a defendant will be shackled is within the sound discretion of the

trial court.” State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 608, 617, 944 P.2d 1222, 1231 (1997)

(quoting State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 532, 703 P.2d 464, 476 (1985)).

“Courtroom security is within the discretion of the trial court ‘absent

incontrovertible evidence’ of harm to the defendant.” Id. (quoting State v.

McKinney, 185 Ariz. 567, 576, 917 P.2d 1214, 1223 (1996)). However, the

determination of whether to shackle a defendant must be case-specific, and

should reflect particular concerns related to the defendant, including special

security needs or the risk of escape. State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 503, ¶ 40,

123 P.3d 1131, 1140 (2005).

Id. The court then determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered

that Petitioner be surreptitiously secured to the witness chair finding that the trial court’s

ruling is “amply supported by the record.” Id. at 618-19. The court also found that “there

was no competent evidence that any juror saw [Petitioner’s] restraints.” Id. at 619. Finally,

in finding that there was no competent evidence that any juror saw Petitioner’s restraints, the

court found no abuse of discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue. The

Court of Appeals provided details derived from the proceedings – including the trial judge’s

own findings – showing why the trial court’s (1) decision to impose restraints, (2) conclusion

that no juror saw the restraints, and (3) decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing, was not

an abuse of discretion. Id. at 618-19. 

In applying harmless error review, the court stated,

if we assume arguendo that one or more jurors did see the restraints, ... it is

apparent their observation did not affect the verdicts. As noted above,

[Petitioner] was not convicted of all counts. Further, the jury found that the

State failed to prove some of the aggravating factors submitted for sentencing

purposes.

Id. at 619. Nothing in the court’s opinion suggests that if error occurred the court failed to

find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by State v. Henderson, 115

P.3d 601, 607 (Ariz. 2005).

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Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground

One of his habeas petition be denied.

2. Ground Two

Petitioner asserts in Ground Two that his right to self-representation was violated

because the trial court required him to testify through direct examination questions posed by

advisory counsel. Petitioner contends that he “was denied the right to question the

Defendant; that [he] had to change [his] defensive strategy and tactics during the ongoing

trial; that [he] was not allowed to present [his] case, or even all of [his] questions ...; and that

[he] had been forced to forego [his] right to defend [himself] in order to receive [his] right

to testify.”

A defendant who represents himself with the assistance of advisory counsel “must be

allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to

argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court

and the jury at appropriate points in the trial.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174

(1984). However, there is no absolute bar to advisory counsel’s participation at trial over the

objection of a defendant who is self-represented. See id. at 176. “[T]he primary focus must

be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.” Id. at

177. A defendant’s right to self-representation is not infringed simply because advisory

counsel assists with a defendant’s compliance with routine procedure, protocol or evidentiary

matters. See id. at 183.

On March 24, 2005, a month before Petitioner testified, the trial judge advised

Petitioner that, pursuant to Rule 611(a), he would be required to permit Mr. Curry, advisory

counsel, to conduct direct and redirect examination. (Doc. 12, R.T. 3/24/05 at 161-62.)

Specifically, the court stated that “if you choose to testify, ... I would require it be done by

question and answer. So whether you write the questions for Mr. Curry or you make a

statement and from that statement Mr. Curry and/or you draft questions ... that’s how I expect

you – if you choose to testify and your testimony be given in the normal course of question

and answer.” (Doc. 12, R.T. 3/24/05 at 161-62.) Petitioner objected to the procedure

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claiming that this forced him to accept assistance of counsel in violation of Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). (Doc. 12, R.T. 3/28/05 a.m. at 52.) Instead, he asked to

proceed as he did at his previous trial where he represented himself and was allowed to

testify narratively. (Doc. 12, R.T. 3/28/05 a.m. at 54.) The trial court overruled Petitioner’s

objection noting that it had a responsibility to make sure the jury was presented with

admissible evidence and that the only way to do this during Petitioner’s direct examination

was to use a question-and-answer method. (Doc. 12, R.T. 3/28/05 a.m. at 57.) This would

allow the jurors and the State to know each question before any answer or information was

elicited, and to allow the jurors and State to anticipate the scope of the answer. (Doc. 12,

R.T. 3/28/05 a.m. at 57.)

Petitioner began testimony on April 26, 2005. Before Petitioner’s direct examination,

the court affirmed its decision that Mr. Curry would examine Petitioner with questions

prepared by Petitioner in order that “his testimony be done by way of question and answer”

and Petitioner would make his own objections during cross-examination by the prosecutor.

(Doc. 12, R.T. 4/26/05 p.m. at 7-8.) The court also granted Petitioner’s request to instruct

the jurors that the court had required Mr. Curry to question Petitioner. (Doc. 12, R.T.

4/26/05 p.m. at 5, 7-8.)

On direct appeal, applying the standards set forth in McKaskle and Rule 611(a) of the

Arizona Rules of Evidence, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Petitioner’s right to

self-representation was not violated by requiring that he testify through questions posed by

advisory counsel. Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the state court’s decision

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

“The right of self representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom.

Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.”

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. In McKaskle, the Supreme Court contemplated advisory

counsel performing precisely the role Mr. Curry played in Petitioner’s direct examination:

Faretta rights are ... not infringed when standby counsel assists the pro se

defendant in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the

completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or objecting to

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testimony, that the defendant has clearly shown he wishes to complete. Nor

are they infringed when counsel merely helps to ensure the defendant’s

compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure. In neither

case is there any significant interference with the defendant’s actual control

over the presentation of his defense.

McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183.

Accordingly, we make explicit today what is already implicit in Faretta: A

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are not violated when a trial judge

appoints standby counsel – even over the defendant’s objection – ... to assist

the defendant in overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the

defendant’s achievement of his own clearly indicated goals. Participation by

counsel to steer a defendant through the basic procedures of trial is permissible

even in the unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant’s

appearance of control over his own defense.

Id. at 184.

By requiring Petitioner to prepare his questions for direct examination so that Mr.

Curry could read them to Petitioner during his testimony, the trial court afforded Petitioner

control over his own defense as required by Faretta. This procedure complied with the

requirements set forth in Rule 611(a), which authorizes the judge to exercise “reasonable

control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence.” See

United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1973) (a defendant’s right to proceed

without counsel must be balanced against the need that trial be “conducted in a judicious,

orderly fashion”). Mr. Curry never took control of Petitioner’s trial strategy, and the orderly

direct examination procedure used at trial did not create the perception that Petitioner was

not in control of his own defense. At Petitioner’s request, the trial court instructed the jury,

“Mr. Wassenaar is the next witness. On my order, I order that his testimony be done by way

of question and answer. So Mr. Curry is going to be asking the questions of Mr. Wassenaar.”

Wassenaar, 161 P.3d at 616-17. The court also informed the jury that Petitioner, rather than

advisory counsel, would make any objections. See id. Petitioner addressed the jury during

opening statements and closing arguments, made objections for the defense at trial,

introduced evidence, and conducted the examination of witnesses. See id.

Regarding Petitioner’s claim that advisory counsel failed to ask him certain questions

and introduce certain evidence, as a pro per defendant, it was Petitioner’s duty to ensure that

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all evidence Petitioner sought to introduce was introduced. Further, Petitioner fails to

identify what questions advisory counsel did not ask, what evidence he failed to introduce,

or what topics he failed to address.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s right to self-representation was not

violated by requiring that he testify through questions posed by advisory counsel. The Court

will recommend that Petitioner’s claim asserted in Ground Two be denied.

\\\

3. Ground Three

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that his due process rights and right to

presumption of innocence were violated when the trial court ordered him to wear visible

physical restraints in the presence of the jury during trial.

In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970), the Supreme Court observed that “no

person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort” because of the

distinct possibility of “a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant.”

Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that “the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit

the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the

exercise of discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.”

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005); see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-

69 (1986). “Therefore, due process requires the trial court to engage in an analysis of the

security risks posed by the defendant and to consider less restrictive alternatives before

permitting a defendant to be restrained” during trial. Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636

(9th Cir. 1999); see also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 748 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

517 U.S. 1158 (1996). The trial court is “not required to state on the record all its reasons

for imposing shackles, nor must it conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of necessity

before ordering the use of physical restraints” but “the basis for the decision to shackle

should be apparent from the record.” Duckett, 67 F.3d at 749 n.7. In Ghent v. Woodford,

279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (as amended), the Ninth Circuit held that in order for a

defendant to prevail on a due process challenge to shackling in front of the jury,

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[A] court must find that the defendant was indeed physically restrained in the

presence of the jury, that the shackling was seen by the jury, and that the

physical restraint was not justified by state interests. Then, in order for the

unjustified shackling to rise to the level of a constitutional error, the defendant

must make a showing that he suffered prejudice as a result.

Id. at 1132.

The trial court imposed a leg brace and stun belt on Wassenaar for courtroom security

and later required surreptitious nylon flex restraints (tethering him to the witness chair)

during his testimony. (Doc. 12, R.T. 12/30/04 at 3-8; R.T. 4/26/05 at 49-50.) The trial court

made a full record demonstrating that (1) Wassenaar’s restraints could not be seen from the

jury box; (2) the jurors had only a “fleeting opportunity” to see the flex restraints as they

passed from the jury room to the jury box; (3) Wassenaar drew the jurors’ attention to

himself while in the witness box by making jokes as the jurors passed; (4) the jury’s verdicts

were not unfairly biased – acquitting on one count and finding aggravating factors on two

other counts not proven; (5) after the denial of Wassenaar’s Rule 20 motion prior to

Wassenaar taking the witness stand, Wassenaar faced a substantial likelihood of numerous

life sentences; (6) Wassenaar had made several statements saying he would try to escape

again; (7) the witness stand was 6 feet from the jury box and 20 feet from the courtroom

door; (8) the surreptitious restraints were the lesser alternative to having a deputy stand next

to Wassenaar in the witness box in the jury’s constant view; (9) other evidence properly

admitted at trial indicated Wassenaar was already in custody at the time of the crime and had

been in custody since; and (10) Wassenaar suffered no unfair surprise by being restrained.

(Doc. 12, R.T. 4/26/05 a.m. at 51-52; R.T. 4/26/05 p.m. at 4-7; R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58; Exh. B,

minute entry, 6/22/05.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed the record and agreed with the trial court’s

reasoning, finding no abuse of discretion in imposing the restraints or in denying an

evidentiary hearing. See Wassenaar, 161 P.3d at 618-20. The Court finds that the state

court’s decision was reasonable in view of Supreme Court precedent.

In Deck, the Supreme Court held that the constitution forbids the “routine use of

visible shackles” during the guilt and penalty phases alike, although it does permit a state to

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2

 Incidently, Deck involved the use of visible shackles. Petitioner, however, wore

surreptitious restraints under his clothing, and every effort was made to keep the restraints

hidden.

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shackle a criminal defendant in the presence of a special need. See 544 U.S. at 626. The

Supreme Court held:

[The Constitution] permits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to

take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may

call for shackling. In so doing, it accommodates the important need to protect

the courtroom and its occupants. But any such determination must be case

specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, special

security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial.

Deck, 544 U.S. at 633.

Thus, the Constitution prohibits the “routine” shackling of defendants in accordance

with court or law enforcement policies. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 634-35. The Supreme Court,

however, allows shackling when “case specific” security concerns exist and when the record

contains “formal or informal findings” indicating that the trial judge had required shackling

in response to security or decorum concerns. See id.

Here, the court twice set forth its formal findings explaining its decision to impose

surreptitious restraints. (Doc. 12, R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58; Exh. B, minute entry, 6/22/05.)

These findings articulated “case specific” security concerns related to Petitioner, particularly

while he was testifying from the witness stand. (Doc. 12, R.T. 4/26/05 a.m. at 51-52; R.T.

4/26/05 p.m. at 4-7; R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58; Exh. B, minute entry, 6/22/05.) This is a case

where “the record itself makes clear that there [were] indisputably good reasons for

shackling,” Deck, 544 U.S. at 635, and all of the reasons the court gave for restraining

Petitioner were specific to the circumstances of the case as required by Deck.

2

Furthermore, assuming error under these specific circumstances, the record fails to

show that Petitioner was prejudiced by the restraints. See Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1132; see also

State v. Reid, 559 P.2d 136, 143 (Ariz. 1976) (unjustified restraint of defendant was harmless

error where record contained no evidence that he was prejudiced). Although Petitioner

presented the trial court with a letter from his investigator purporting that four jurors had seen

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or had heard about the restraints, this evidence was untimely offered. (Doc. 1, Exh. A, B.)

Even if the letter had been properly presented to the trial court, it is not dispositive. The

statements were the unsworn statements of individuals relayed via the unsworn letter of the

investigator, and did not constitute competent evidence. In addition, the jury acquitted on

one count and found two aggravating factors not proven, showing that the jurors did not

categorically convict Petitioner. (Doc. 12, R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58; Exh. B, minute entry,

6/22/05.) Thus, even if, one or more jurors saw Petitioner’s flex restraints while he was in

the witness box, they based their verdicts on the evidence.

Moreover, the trial court was consciously protective of Petitioner’s rights. Judge

Granville, together with advisory counsel, personally tested the views from around the

courtroom and found that Petitioner’s restraints could not be seen from the jury box. (Doc.

12, R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58; Exh. B, minute entry, 6/22/05.) The judge found that the jurors had

at best only a “fleeting opportunity” to see the restraints as they passed from the jury room

to the jury box and noted “no halting or indication by any juror of making such an

observation.” (Doc. 12, R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58; Exh. B, minute entry, 6/22/05.) The

surreptitious nylon restraints were the lesser alternative to having a deputy standing next to

Petitioner in the witness box in the jury’s constant view. (Doc. 12, R.T. 6/3/05 at 57-58;

Exh. B, minute entry, 6/22/05.) In addition, it was never disputed that Petitioner was an

inmate at the time the offenses were committed and was serving a 28-year sentence in March

and April 2005 when his trial took place. (Doc. 12, R.T. 4/4/05 p.m. at 9-10.) The Arizona

Supreme Court has upheld the imposition of shackles on defendants already in prison on

other offenses, even in the absence of specific courtroom behavioral problems on the part of

the defendants. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 594 P.2d 514, 526 (Ariz. 1979) (trial judge did

not abuse his discretion in requiring that prison inmate defendants be shackled by leg irons

and guarded at trial after he was informed of prior violent conduct of defendants in prison,

though there was no indication that defendants had tried to escape).

Accordingly, the decision to impose restraints during trial and while Petitioner was

in the witness box was a “case specific” determination by the trial court, balancing

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Petitioner’s Sixth Amendments rights with reasonable security concerns. The Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground Three be denied.

4. Ground Four

In ground four of his habeas petition, Petitioner claims that he was denied effective

assistance of appellate counsel. He asserts both that the Office of the Public Defender had

a conflict in representing him on appeal, and that his counsel on appeal was ineffective for

failing to properly challenge the decision to have advisory counsel read him the direct

examination questions and failing to properly challenge the decision to impose restraints.

To establish a conflict of interest in counsel’s representation, Petitioner must show an

“actual conflict,” that is, that counsel’s alleged conflict actually affected the adequacy of his

representation – as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. See Mickens v.

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171-72 (2002). Here, Petitioner cannot show even a theoretical

division of loyalty let alone an actual conflict in his appellate representation.

Petitioner was represented on direct appeal first by Mr. Edgar, who filed the opening

brief, and then by Mr. Collins, who filed the petition for review, both members of the Office

of the Public Defender. While the Public Defender was initially appointed to represent Coy,

Coy’s case never went to trial and was resolved by a guilty plea less than two months after

the inmates’ surrender on February 1, 2004. Coy was represented by a member of the Legal

Advocate’s Office in his plea proceedings. Any temporary involvement by the Office of the

Public Defender in Coy’s case at its initial stages was over a year before Petitioner went to

trial. Petitioner’s advisory counsel at trial was a member of the Legal Defender’s Office, a

separate public office from either the Public Defender or the Legal Advocate. Although

Petitioner claims that the Public Defender withdrew from Coy’s case because of a conflict

with the case, Petitioner does not set forth the specific conflict or explain how the conflict

arose in his own case. Petitioner, thus, has failed to show that any conflict existed that

denied him a constitutional right.

Regarding Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, as the Court has indicated, to show

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s actions fell

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3

 Although not discernable, to the extent Petitioner presents other particular factual

instances of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his habeas petition that were not

first presented to the state courts, Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally

defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a). Although a procedural

default may be overcome upon a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental

miscarriage of justice, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991), Petitioner

has not established that any exception to procedural default applies.

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below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. To show prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 695.

In his habeas petition, Petitioner claims, as he did in his second petition for PCR, that:

(1) counsel failed to properly challenge the decision to have advisory counsel read him the

direct examination questions at trial and (2) failed to properly challenge the decision to

impose restraints.3

 The Court first notes that Petitioner’s complaints appear to involve

strategic choices made on appeal and in his petition for review. It is well established that

counsel’s “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential,” and “a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at

689. Thus, Petitioner cannot identify a constitutional violation simply because appellate

counsel made his own strategic choices of the issues to raise on appeal.

In any event, Petitioner cannot show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 695.

The record is clear and demonstrates that appellate counsel raised both the advisory counsel

(“ultimatum issue”) and shackling issues on direct appeal in the opening brief as substantive

appeal issues. (Doc. 12, Exh. C); see Wassenaar, 161 P.3d at 616-20. Indeed, on June 6,

2008, the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s second petition for PCR finding that Petitioner’s

objections to the use of advisory counsel and to the imposition of restraints had been raised

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on direct appeal and were rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and therefore Petitioner

“cannot sustain his burden to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland and Nash.” (Doc. 12,

Exh. E, petition for review attachment, 6/6/08.)

The Court finds that the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim as alleged in

Ground Four was neither contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of

Strickland. The Court will recommend that Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground Four of

his habeas petition be denied.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Grounds One through Four fail on the merits, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

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to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 28th day of February, 2011.

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