Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01444/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01444-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL A. SPARKMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, et

al., 

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-01444-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN

THIRTY (30) DAYS

SCREENING ORDER

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff Michael A. Sparkman, a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Wilder v.

Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983

is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating

federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The Complaint names the following entity and individuals as Defendants: (1)

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR); (2) F. Igbinosa, Health

Care Manager, Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP); and (3) John Does 1-10.

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On October 2, 2010, Plaintiff contracted Valley Fever at PVSP and has suffered

physical and emotional pain as a result. He attributes the infection and suffering to

negligence on the part of Defendant Igbinosa. Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights. (Compl. at 3.)

///

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243,

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set

forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its

face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant

committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.

B. Linkage Requirement

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.

2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962,

969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this

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plausibility standard. Id.

The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Government officials may

not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Since a government official cannot be held liable under

a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing

that the official has violated the Constitution through his own individual actions. Id. at

1948. In other words, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must link each

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of

Plaintiff's federal rights.

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no factual allegations linking Defendant Igbinosa to

the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights other than to allege he is the Health Care

Manager at the prison and, perhaps inferentially, that he therefore is somehow responsible

for Plaintiff’s health condition. To state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must “set forth specific

facts as to each individual defendant's” deprivation of protected rights. See Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.1988). The mere fact that a Defendant may have

supervised the individuals responsible for a violation is not enough. Defendants may only

be held liable in a supervisory capacity if they “participated in or directed the violations, or

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Other than suggesting Defendant Igbinosa may have been a supervisor, Plaintiff has

not presented the Court with any facts to show that Igbinosa was personally aware of an

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excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and was deliberately indifferent to that risk or otherwise

engaged in acts or omissions for which he could be held liable here. The Court will give

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. In order to state a cognizable claim, he must set forth

sufficient facts showing that each Defendant personally took some action that violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Similarly, Plaintiff identifies ten John Doe Defendants without alleging facts linking

the Does to the conduct alleged. The Court can not determine the viability of Plaintiff’s

claims against the Doe Defendants without factual allegations describing their conduct.

“John Doe” defendant liability must also be properly alleged. A plaintiff may use

“Doe” designations to refer to defendants whose names are unknown; however, he must

number them in the complaint, e.g., “John Doe 1,” “John Doe 2,” so that each numbered

John Doe refers to a different specific person. Plaintiff also must identify how each such

named Defendant, including those named as Doe, is liable for a constitutional violation. 

Dempsey v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 1445460, *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010); Schrubb v.

Tilton, 2009 WL 3334874, *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009).

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff shall either name the defendants involved or list

the Doe defendants involved and describe what each did to violate his rights. If Plaintiff

can only list these defendants as John Doe, Plaintiff should allege specific acts that each

Doe defendant did, such as “John Doe 1 did X” and “John Doe 2 and 3 did Y.” Alexander

v. Tilton, 2009 WL 464486, *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009).

C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The CDCR is named as a Defendant in this action. Plaintiff may not maintain an

action for damages against a state agency. The Eleventh Amendment “‘erects a general

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bar against federal lawsuits brought against the state.’” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d

1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Plaintiff may not bring suit against the CDCR in federal court because it is a state agency

and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488

F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).

D. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges simply that he contracted Valley Fever and has suffered from it. As

pled, the Court can not determine whether Plaintiff is asserting an Eighth Amendment

claim based on exposure to Valley Fever or complaining about the quality his subsequent

medical care. Both claims are addressed below.

1. Conditions of Confinement

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment

and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041,

1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of

confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). In order to

state a claim for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk

of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994);

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d

807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

A prisoner “may state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging

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that [prison officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to [environmental

conditions] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” Helling

v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).

The Courts of this district have repeatedly found that confinement in a location

where Valley Fever is prevalent, in and of itself, fails to satisfy the first element of an Eighth

Amendment claim, i.e. that the condition poses an excessive risk of harm. See, e.g. Smith

v. Yates, 2012 WL 1498891, *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2012) (citing King v. Avenal State

Prison, 2009 WL 546212, *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2009) (“[T]o the extent that Plaintiff is

attempting to pursue an Eighth Amendment claim for the mere fact that he was confined

in a location where Valley Fever spores existed which caused him to contract Valley Fever,

he is advised that no courts have held that exposure to Valley Fever spores presents an

excessive risk to inmate health.”); see also Johnson v. Pleasant Valley State Prison, 2012

WL 1297380, *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (“Even if the risk of contracting Valley Fever is

higher at PVSP than in other areas of the state, the Court declines to find that, due to its

location, the prison itself constitutes a substantial risk of harm to inmates.”); Gilbert v.

Yates, 2010 WL 5113116, *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2010); Willis v. Yates, 2009 WL 3486674,

*3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2009).

Thus, Plaintiff can not state an Eighth Amendment claim based on mere exposure 

to, or contraction of, Valley Fever. However, under certain circumstances exposure to

Valley Fever could conceivably give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. Smith v.

Schwarzenegger, 393 Fed.Appx. 518 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Helling, the Court held that it

was not inconceivable that the Plaintiff could allege a cognizable claim based on Valley

Fever exposure). Courts have deemed the first prong of an Eighth Amendment claim

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satisfied where the plaintiff has identified a factor responsible for either increasing the risk

of contraction or the severity of infection. See, e.g., Stevens v. Yates, 2012 WL 2520464,

*3 (E.D.Cal. June 28, 2012) (nearby construction disturbed soil); Owens v. Trimble, 2012

WL 1910102, *2 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2012) (asthma); Whitney v. Walker, 2012 WL 893783,

*2-4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) (immune system compromised by cancer); Thurston v.

Schwarzenegger, 2008 WL 2129767, *2 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2008) (various medical

conditions, including asthma, and race).

Plaintiff alleges no facts that would suggest he was particularly vulnerable to either

contraction or the effects of infection. He has not identified a sufficiently serious risk of

harm and therefore does not allege a cognizable claim. The Court will grant leave to

amend. In order to state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that

a Defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to

Plaintiff.

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of

the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the

official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id.

(quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff is also reminded, as discussed above, merely being housed in a facility where

Valley Fever is present does not satisfy the substantial risk of serious harm element of his

conditions of confinement claim.

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2. Inadequate Medical Care

“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an

inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The

two part test for deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical

need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant's

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds,

WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations

omitted)). Deliberate indifference is shown by “a purposeful act or failure to respond to a

prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096 (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). In order to state a claim for a violation

of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a claim that the

named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [Plaintiff's] health . .

. .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that

a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980)

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in

diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a

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constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;

see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin, 974

F.2d at 1050. Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

Also, “a difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon,

662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted). To prevail, Plaintiff “must

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under

the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an

excessive risk to plaintiff's health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986)

(internal citations omitted). A prisoner's mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment

does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242

(9th Cir.1989).

The Complaint contains no factual allegations from which the Court could

determine Plaintiff has satisfied either element of his inadequate medical care claim. The

Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. To state a cognizable claim, Plaintiff must

describe a serious medical need and explain how a named Defendant exhibited deliberate

indifference.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief under section 1983. The Court

will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the

alleged acts resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-

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49. Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible

on its face.’” Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also

demonstrate that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his

rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.

2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing

the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55,

57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no longer

serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended Complaint,”

refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury.

Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although accepted as

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form

and (2) a copy of his Complaint, filed September 4, 2012;

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and failure to comply

with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2012 /s/Michael J. Seng 

ci4d6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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