Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02547/USCOURTS-ca10-87-02547-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

---

P U B L I S H 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, ) 

LOCAL UNION NO. 7R, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

SAFEWAY STORES, INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

SANDRA CORTEZ, ) 

) 

Rule 19(a)(2) Defendant-Appellee. ) 

FI LED 

United Srates Court l.)f Appeab 

Tenth Cir:uit 

NOV l 7 1989 

ROBERT L. I-IOECI<"~R 

Clerk 

No. 87-2547 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 86-F-2360) 

Thomas B. Buescher, of Brauer & Buescher, P.C., of Denver, 

Colorado, for the Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Sandra R. Goldman (Gregory 

Denver, Colorado, with her on 

Denver, Colorado, for the 

Incorporated. 

A. Eurich, of Holland & Hart, of 

the brief), of Holland & Hart, of 

Defendant-Appellee Safeway Stores 

Before McKAY, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 1 
The plaintiff, United Food and Commercial workers Local Union 

Number 7R (the Union), appeals from an order of the district court 

denying the Union's motion to vacate an arbitration award in favor 

of defendant Sandra Cortez, an employee of defendant Safeway 

Stores, Inc. (Safeway), and entering judgment against the Union 

for back pay and interest. The Union contends on appeal that 

(1) Cortez has no standing to seek to enforce the award; (2) the 

arbitrator exceeded his authority by assessing part of the back 

pay awar~ against the Union because of its delay in bringing 

Cortez' grievance; and (3) the district court erred in enforcing a 

monetary judgment, including interest, against the Union. We 

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for determination of 

the amount of damages. 

I. 

The arbitration at issue arose out of a grievance br.ought by 

Cortez against Safeway. Cortez was laid off effective May 24, 

1984. She immediately grieved Safeway's failure to recall her to 

another position that had been available on May 20, 1984, 

contending that Safeway had violated the recall provisions.of the 

collective bargaining agreement. When settlement meetings between 

the Union and Safeway proved unsuccessful, the Union informed 

Safeway of its intent to arbitrate the dispute in a letter dated 

June 22, 1984. 

The Union did not pursue arbitration for nearly a year. In 

July of 1985, a Union representative advised Cortez that there was 

no contractual violation stemming from her grievance. The Union 

representative followed up the conversation with a letter dated 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 2 
October 10, 1985, informing Cortez that the Union would withdraw 

her grievance and that she had a right to appeal to the Union's 

Executive Board. 

Cortez successfully appealed her case to the Union's 

Executive Board, and on January 16, 1986, the Union informed 

Safeway of its intent to pursue the matter in arbitration. An 

arbitration hearing was held on August 12, 1986. The arbitrator 

found that Safeway had violated the collective bargaining 

agreement by failing to recall Cortez, and that Cortez was 

entitled to instatement in the grieved position and back pay as a 

remedy for the violation. Because of the Union's delay in 

bringing the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator assessed a 

portion of the back pay award against the ·Union, noting that 

Safeway ~should not be held responsible for the indifference and 

inattention of the Union toward prompt resolution of Cortez' 

grievance." The arbitrator's award did not set the amount of back 

pay, but rather awarded "back pay for the period May 20, 1984 

through July 25, 1986, ••• less any wages, salary, or other 

compensation received by her in the interim." 

The Union sued Safeway to vacate the portion of the award 

assessing liability for back pay against the Union and to modify 

the award to assess all back pay liability against Safeway. The 

court joined Cortez as a necessary party under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure Rule 19(a)(2). Cortez filed a counterclaim, 

alleging that the Union had breached its duty of fair 

representation in connection with its prosecution of her 

grievance. The district court granted partial summary judgment 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 3 
for Safeway and Cortez on the Union's motion to vacate the award, 

holding that the arbitrator's decision-drew its essence from the 

collective bargaining agreement. 

On August 17, 1986, Cortez and the Union jointly filed a 

motion to dismiss Cortez' counterclaim without prejudice while 

settlement negotiations were pending. As part of the motion to 

dismiss, the parties stated that: 

[T]his motion is not intended to be a resolution of any 

claim that defendant Sandra Cortez may have for interest 

accruing on the Arbitrator's Award, and it is understood 

by the plaintiff, (without confessing or admitting to 

the entitlement of post-award interest) that the 

defendant Cortez will apply for an award of interest 

accruing on the back pay from the date of the 

arbitrator's award. 

Cortez later filed a motion for confirmation of the 

arbitrator's award pursuant to tne United States Arbitration Act 

(Arbitration Act), 9 u.s.c. §§ 1-15, seeking interest from the 

date of the award and entry of judgment for the amount of back pay 

and interest due from the Union. After filing the motion for 

confirmation, but prior to the Union's filing of a response, on 

August 26th Cortez and the Union stipulated to a dismissal of her 

counterclaim with prejudice. Part of that stipulation provided as 

follows: 

The parties further stipulate that no final 

judgment in this action concerning Plaintiff's suit to 

vacate, a portion of the arbitration award be entered 

until this Court has ruled upon Cortez' motion .for 

confirmation of arbitrator's award and for entry of 

judgment. 

Based on that stipulation, the court entered an order dismissing 

Cortez' counterclaim with prejudice. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 4 
The Union then filed its response to Cortez' pending motion 

to confirm the award, contending that Cortez lacked standing to 

seek confirmation under the Arbitration Act because ~he was not a 

"party to the arbitration" under section 9 of the Act. The 

district court rejected this argument as "disingenuous,'' holding 

that in the August 26th stipulation the Union had agreed to 

Cortez' right to pursue confirmation of the award. The court 

entered judgment in favor of Cortez in the amount of $25,261.07 

plus interest from August 29, 1986, the date of the arbitrator's 

award. 

After an unsuccessful motion to alter or amend the judgment, 

the Union filed this appeal. 

II. 

We first address the issue of Cortez' standing to seek 

confirmation and enforcement of the arbitration award. The Union 

challenges Cortez' "standing." We understand the standing 

argument to be a claim that Cortez is barred under either the 

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9, or section 301 of the 

Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 185, from seeking 

judicial confirmation or enforcement of the arbitrator's award of 

contractual rights established by the collective bargaining 

agreement. 

A. 

We agree that Cortez is barred from seeking judicial 

co~firmation and enforcement of the arbitrator's award under the 

Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Act expre$sly excludes from its 

coverage "contracts of employment of . .- . any . . • workers 

-5-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 5 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 u.s.c. § 1. 

Collective bargaining agreements are "contracts of employment" 

within the meaning of this exclusion. American Postal Workers 

Union~ United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 

1987). The Arbitration Act, therefore, is generally inapplicable 

to labor arbitration. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. 

Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 n.9 (1987); Posadas 

de Puerto Rico Assocs., Inc.~ Asociacion de Empleados de Casino 

de Puerto Rico, 873 F.2d 479, 482 (1st Cir. 1989). 1 We thus hold 

that Cortez is not entitled to seek confirmation and enforcement 

of the arbitrator's award under the Arbitration Act. 

B. 

The Union contends that Cortez is ba~red from seeking 

confirmation and enforcement of the arbitrator's award under 

section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act because her 

counterclaim that the Union breached its duty of fair 

representation was dismissed with prejudice. Ordinarily, an 

employee must allege a breach of the duty of fair representation 

in order to avoid dismissal of his or her section 301 suit for 

failure to exhaust exclusive contractual remedies under the 

collective bargaining agreement. Under the peculiar facts of this 

case, the fact that Cortez' breach of the duty of fair 

representation claim was dismissed with prejudice is irrelevant 

1 The federal courts may look to the Arbitration Act for 

guidance in fashioning federal common law to govern suits arising 

under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 

u.s.c. § 185, see Misco, 484 u.s. at , 108 s.ct. at 372 n.9, 

but they are not bound to do so, see,e':g., American Postal 

Workers Union, 823 F.2d 473-77; Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 

719 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir. 1983). -

-6-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 6 
because we hold tnat Cortez has otherwise satisfied the section 

301 exhaustion requirements. 

Section 301 provides: 

Suits for violation of contracts between an 

employer and a labor organization representing employees 

in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this 

chapter ••• may be brought in any district court of 

the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, 

without respect to the amount in controversy or without 

regard to the citizenship of the parties. 

29 u.s.c. § 185(a}. Section 301 does not exclude from federal 

jurisdiction suits brought by individual employees for violations 

of collective bargaining agreements. To the contrarj, "section 

301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well 

as between unions and employers.'' Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 

Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976). 

Despite section 30l's provision for individual employee 

suits, an employee can only sue if he or she has exhausted any 

exclusive grievance procedures provided in th~ collective 

bargaining agreement. In Hiries, the Supreme Court held that 

an employee [cannot] sidestep the grievance machinery 

provided in the [collective bargaining agreement] and 

that unless he attempted [first] to utilize the 

contractual procedures for settling his dispute with his 

employer, his independent suit against the employer in 

the District Court [will] be dismissed. 

Id. at 563. This "exhaustion requirement," Vaca v. Sipes, 386 

U.S. 171, 184 (1967), flows from the strong federal policy 

favoring contractual grievance procedures as a means of "giving 

content to the collective-bargaining agreement and determining 

[the parties'] rights and obligations under it'' and "promoting the 

goal of industrial peace." See Bowen v. United States Postal 

Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 225 (1983). The employee's rights under the 

-7-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 7 
collectivi bargaining agreement are protected by the union's duty 

of fair representation, which requires the union always to act in 

good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its 

discretion on behalf of the individual employees it represents. 

See Ford Motor Co. Y.!. Huffman, 345 U.S. •330, 338 (1953). 

·· In order to seek confirmation and enforcement of the 

arbitrator's award under section 301, Cortez must show (1) that 

she has exhausted the grievance procedures under the collective 

bargaining agreement, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 

650, 652 (1965), or (2) that she falls within an exception to the 

exhaustion requirement. The two recognized exceptions are (A) 

where either the union or the employer has repudiated the 

collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, Vaca, 386 

U.S. at 190, or (B) where the union has breached its duty of fair 

representation by acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad 

faith, id. We find that Cortez has satisfied the exhaustion 

requirement because the Union refused to pay Cortez' back pay and 

challenged the award due to its own adverse interest in the 

enforcement of the award. 

The fundamental purpose of the exhaustion bar is to require 

· employees to pursue their grievances through a bargained-for 

grievance procedure that is part of the collective bargaining 

agreement. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 562; Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652-

53. When grievances are resolved through those bargained-for 

procedures the goal of industrial peace and self-government is 

more nearly attained. Cortez properly presented her grievance to 

the Union. The grievance was pursued, after numerous delays, to 

-8-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 8 
final arbitration. Under the collective bargainirig agreement, 

"[a] finding or award of the arbitrator shall be final and 

conclusive upon the parties hereto." Cortez had thus pursued her 

grievance remedies as far as she could under the collective 

bargaining agreement. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement -

- that industrial/commercial grievances be settled through the 

bargained-for procedure -- has thus been served. Allowing Cortez 

' 

to seek to confirm and enforce the arbitrator's award does not 

undermine the bargained-for grievance procedures, but rather 

enhances them by underscoring their finality and conclusiveness. 

This is not a situation where an employee is seeking to upset an 

award, which would implicate the policy concerns of undermining 

bargained-for grievance procedures. 

A justification for allowing the exhaustion requirement to 

bar individual employee's suits under section 301 rests upon the 

union's duty of fair representation, which serves as the "bulwark 

to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of 

traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor 

law." Hines, 424 U.S. at 564 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 82). If 

the union is fairly representing the employee, the employee's 

interests are adequately protected. As the "fairness" of the 

union's representation decreases, however, so does the employee's 

protection and the justification for the exhaustion bar. Thus, if 

the union "refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the 

individual's claim," Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652, or otherwise acts 

arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, Vaca, 386 U.S. at 

190, then the union has breached its duty of fair representation 

-9-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 9 
and the employee is entitled to sue under section 301. Id. The 

union has, in effect, deprived the employee of any ability to 

proceed in the collective bargaining agreement's grievance 

procedure by ceasing to function as the employee's representative 

where the right to proceed rests in the union as representative 

and not in·the employee. Thus, when the union ceases to act as 

the employee's representative, the employee has "exhausted" his or 

her remedies under the collective bargaining agreement. Once this 

exhaustion occurs, the employee is entitled under Maddox, Vaca, 

and Hines to sue under section 301. 

In this case, the Union refused to pay the portion of the 

back pay liability assessed against it by the arbitrator's award. 

The Union also challenged the award in court, seeking to vacate 

the portion of the award assessing liability against it and to 

modify the award to assess all the back pay liability against 

Safeway. By refusing to pay its portion of Cortez' back pay and 

challenging the award because of its own adverse interest the 

Union acted arbitrarily and ceased to function as Cortez' 

representative. We thus hold that where an employee has pursued 

the grievance procedures to the final stage authorized under the 

collective bargaining agreement, obtained a favorable award in 

part against the union, and the union fails to honor or enforce 

the award, thus ceasing to function as the employee's 

representative, then the employee has exhausted his or her 

remedies under the collective bargaining agreement and is entitled 

to seek confirmation and enforcement of the award under section 

301. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 10 
III. 

We next consider whether the arbitrator exceeded his 

authority in awarding back pay against the Union. The scope of 

our review is restricted. 

Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality 

that courts should afford the arbitration process weighs 

heavily in favor of the award, and courts must exercise 

great caution when asked to set aside an award. Because 

a primary purpose behind arbitration agreements is to 

avoid the expense and delay of court proceedings, it is 

well settled that judicial review of an arbitration 

award is very narrowly limited. 

Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 42 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations 

omitted); see Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982). 

When we review labor arbitration decisions, the terms of the 

collective bargaining agreement constitute one of the principle 

limitations upon an arbitrator's authority. 

(A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and 

application of the collective bargaining agreement; he 

does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial 

justice. He may of course look for guidance from many 

sources, yet his award is legitimate only so lpng as it 

draws its essence from the collective bargaining 

agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an 

infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but 

to refuse enforcement of the award. 

United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363.U.S. 593, 

597 (1960). The scope of the issues submitted to the arbitrator 

also controls the arbitrator's authority. "[A]rbitration is a 

matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to 

a~bitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." 

United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 

574, 582 (1960); see Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 ~ 

Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500, 502-03 (10th Cir. 1975). The 

-11-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 11 
parties may, however, agree to extend the arbitrator's authority 

in the submissions. See Sun Ship, Inc. Y.!. Matson Navigation Co., 

785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Even assuming the questions went 

beyond the arbitration provisions of the contract, 'once the 

parties have gone beyond their promise to arbitrate and have 

supplemented the agreement by- defining the issue to be submitted 

to an arbitrator, courts must look both to the contract and to the 

submission to determine his authority.'." (emphasis added) (quoting 

Mobil Oil Corp. Y.!. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 

302 (3d Cir. 1982)); Piggly Wiggly Operators'_Warehouse, Inc. Y.!. 

Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, 

Local No. 1, 611 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1980) ("If the parties 

enter into a submission agreement, this later contract is the 

substitute for legal pleadings; it joins the issues between the 

parties and empowers the arbitrator to decide it."). Extension of 

the arbitrator's authority through submissions is only allowed to 

the extent that the submission does not violate an express 

provision of the collective bargaining agreement. 

"[W]here the question of the submission .to the arbitrator is 

vague, the award of the arbitrator will not be set aside in a 

subsequent court proceeding, unless it can be shown that the 

essence of the resulting award was not drawn from the collective 

bargaining agreement." Kroger Co. v. International Bhd. of 

Teamsters, 380 F.2d 728, 730-31 (6th Cir. 1967); cf. Sav-On 

Groceries, 508 F.2d at 502-03 (holding Kroger inapposite when 

question submitted to arbitrator did not involve remedies, but 

arbitrator's award included remedies). The parties may limit the 

-12-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 12 
discretion of the arbitrator, such as through submitting a precise 

statement of the issues to the arbitrator or through providing 

express limitations in the collective bargaining agreement. See 

Kroger, 380 F.2d at 730-31. When the parties fail to limit the 

scope of the submission, however, we will affirm the arbitrator's 

award .i-f i t··-·d-raws its essence ·from ·the collective bargaining 

agreement and is not contrary to the express language of that 

agreement. See Mistletoe Express Serv. Y...!.. Motor Expressmen's 

Union, 566 F.2d 692, 694 (10th Cir. 1977). 

We will not interfere with an arbitrator's decision "unless 

it can be said with positive assurance that the contract is not 

susceptible to the arbitrator's interpretation." Sterling Colo. 

Beef Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 1, 

767 F.2d 718, 720 (10th Cir. 198~). "[A]s long as the arbitrator 

is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting 

within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he 

committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his 

decision." Misco, 484 U.S. at , 108 s. Ct. at 371. Given 

this limited standard of review, we find sufficient basis in the 

collective bargaining agreement and the language of the issues 

-submitted to the arbitrator to uphold the arbitrator's award of 

back pay against the Union. 

We first address whether the arbitrator's decision was within 

the scope of the issues submitted to him. The parties framed the 

issues as follows: 

Did the Company violate the Labor 

faiied to recall Grievant Sandra 

May 20, 1984? If so, to what 

entitled? 

-13-

Agreement when it 

Cortez from layoff on 

relief is Grievant 

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 13 
Safeway is the only p~rty mentioned in the first question dealing 

with breaching the agreement. The question as to remedy, however, 

is not so limited. Safeway's violation of the agreement is a 

prerequisite to the employee's need for any remedy, as there could 

be no damages for the Union's delay in bringing the grievance 

withe-ut some violation by Safeway. Because the issue submitted 

fails to expressly restrict the party from whom relief would be 

available, the arbitrator could interpret it as encompassing 

whatever remedy was necessary and permissible under the collective 

bargaining agreement to compensate the employee for any damages 

arising out of the breach. 

We cannot say that the arbitrator's award is contrary to the 

express language of the collective bargaining agreement. Our case 

is distinguishable from the situation in Local 1837 v. Maine 

Public Service Co., 579 F. Supp. 744 (D. Me. 1984), in which the 

court held that a submission of "what shall be the remedy?" did 

not broaden the arbitrator's authority. In Local 1837, the court 

had found that the arbitrator's award changed contractually 

binding "past practices," thus violating an express "no 

modification'' provision of the collective bargaining agreement. 

Local 1837 merely follows Mistletoe's prohibition on confirming 

arbitrator's awards that are contrary to the express provisions of 

the collective bargaining agreement. Unlike Local 1837, the 

collective bargaining agreement between Safeway and the Union 

contains an express provision imposing a duty on both parties to 

make an "earnest effort ••• to settle such [disputes or 

complaints] promplt~ [sic]," which includes requesting arbitration 

-14-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 14 
"with reasonable promptness.'' This provision supports imposing 

damages upon the breaching party, because delay on the part of 

either party could conceivably magnify iosses suffered by the 

employee or the other party. 

The arbitrator stated that "[i]t is • clear that the 

C6mpany -should not be held-responsible-for the indifference and--

inattention of the Union toward prompt resolution of Cortez' 

grievance." Whether the arbitrator drew this conclusion from the 

language of the collective bargaining agreement is admittedly 

unclear, but "arbitration awards generally need not delineate 

reasons or reasoning, at least when the grounds for the award may 

be gleaned from the record." Ormsbee Dev., 668 F.2d at 1147. The 

mere fact that the arbitrator also allegedly made a reference to 

fairness during the course of the arbitration2 does not ctiange 

this result, as this statement does not necessarily reflect his 

full analysis of the agreement. Fairness is a proper 

consideration as long as the determination of fairness draws its 

essence from the collective bargaining argreement. See Enterprise 

Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. 

"[W]here it is contemplated that the arbitrator will 

determine remedies for contract violations that he finds, courts 

have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that 

respect." Misco, 484 U.S. at , 108 S. Ct. at 371. Although 

we might have decided this issue differently had we been the 

2 The Union states in its brief that during the course of the 

arbitration, the arbitrator informed them that he was "not the 

least bit hesitant" to award back pay against a union, and that in 

his view it was only "fai~" that the union pay if it delays in 

processing a grievance. 

-15-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 15 
arbitrator, we cannot say that the award did not draw its essence 

from the collective bargaining agreement. 

IV. 

The Union contends that even if the award draws its essence 

from the collective bargaining agreement, it should not be 

enforced because it is-contrary to public policy.- According to 

the Union, the public policy favoring arbitration as a dispute 

resolution mechanism is compromised if arbitrators are allowed to 

impose damages against unions bringing employee grievances. The 

Union further contends that a conflict of interest is created by 

requiring it simultaneously to prosecute employee claims and to 

defend itself against damages for delay. Such a conflict of 

interest allegedly causes a disincentive for the Union to attempt 

to establish a violation of the agreement on the part of the 

employer. 

As the Supreme Court recently stated, 

a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's 

interpretation of [a collective bargaining agreement] is 

limited to situations where the contract as interpreted 

would violate "some explicit public policy" that is 

"well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by 

reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 

general considerations of supposed public interests.'" 

Misco, 484 U.S. at , 108 S. Ct. at 373 (emphasis in original) 

(quoting W.R. Grace i Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 

(1983)). 

A court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's award 

under a collective-bargaining agreement because it is 

contrary to public policy is a specific application of 

the more general doctrine, rooted in the common law, 

that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that 

violate law or public policy. That doctrine derives 

from the basic notion that no court will lend its aid to 

-16-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 16 
one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or 

illegal act •••• 

Id. (citations omitted). In addition to the requirement that a 

public policy be narrowly defined, "the violation of such a policy 

must be clearly shown if an award is not to be enforced." Id. at 

373-74. "A refusal to enforce an award must rest on more than 

speculation or assumption" regarding such a violation of public 

policy. Id. at 374. 

In the context of this case, the Union failed to show clearly 

a public policy violation. We fail to see how the enforcement of 

the arbitrator's award in this case has any significant tendency 

toward undermining the policy favoring the arbitration of labor 

disputes. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly upheld 

apportionment of damages against a union. See Bowen v. United 

States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 224 (1983) (stating that Vaca 

approves apportionment). Any potential conflict of interest 

between the union and employee clearly could be avoided' by 

submitting a precise statement of the issues to the arbitrator, or 

by limiting the arbitrator's authority with appropriate language 

in the collective bargaining agreement. Enforcing the 

arbitrator's award here reinforces the policy of arbitration by 

permitting the arbitrator's decision to stand to the extent that 

it is drawn from the essence of the agreement and does not exceed 

the scope of the issues submitted. 

v. 

' Finally, the Union contends that the district court erred in 

enforcing the arbitration award to the extent that it directed an 

-17-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 17 
entry of judgment in the amount of $25,261.07, plus accrued 

interest, from the date of the award until the entry of judgment. 

We hold that the district court erred in entering a monetary 

judgment. The arbitration award is silent as to the amount of 

damages. The award merely states that "grievant is awarded back 

pay for the ·period of May 20, 1984 through July 25, 1986, 

[according to an allocation schedule between the Union and 

Safeway], less any wages, salary or other compensation received by 

her in the interim." Apparently, the only basis in the record for 

the amount of damages awarded is the affidavit of Fred LaSavio, 

the Union's business representative, which states in relevant 

part: 

Since Arbitrator Bardwell issued his decision, we 

have been advised by Safeway that before deductions for 

interim earnings and before resolving any question of 

mitigation of damages, the total back pay to which Ms. 

Cortez is entitled is $33,342.84. Under the 

Arbitrator's decisionr Local 7 would be liable for 

$25,261.07b of that amount. 

The figures in this statement clearly reflect the amount due 

before deductions for any interim earnings or mitigation of 

damages. 

The Arbitrator expressly retained jurisdiction over this 

dispute "to the extent that the parties are unable to agree upon a 

determination of the amounts and allocation of back pay due 

Grievant. 11 Therefore, we reverse the district court's order to 

the extent that it imposes a monetary judgment against the Union, 

and direct th~ district court to remand the dispute regarding the 

appropriate amount of back pay to the arbitrator. See Enterprise 

-18-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 18 
Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599 (remand to arbitrator permissible to 

establish exact amount of award). 

The granting of prejudgment interest from the date of the 

arbitrator's award in an action seeking to confirm that award is a 

question of federal law entrusted to the sound discretion of the 

district court. See Lodges 743 and 1746 Y.!_ United Aircraft Corp., 

534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); 

Stroh Die Casting Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & 

Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 10, 553 F. Supp. 68 (E.D. Wis. 1982). 

On the record before us, we cannot say that the district court 

abused its discretion in granting interest in this case. 

VI. 

The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED in 

part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings in 

accordance with this opinion. 

-19-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 19 
No. 87-2547, UNITED FOOD AND. COMMERCIAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 

NO. 7R v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC~ and SANDRA CORTEZ 

McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

I dissent from the court's conclusion in part III that the 

arbitrator's award drew its essence from the party's submission of 

issues to him. While I have no quarrel with the rest of the 

court's opinion, I find it unnecessary to reach those points 

because I cannot agree that the arbitrator's award draws its 

essence from the contract and the submission--the latter being_ 

necessary to the validity of the award. See United Steelworkers 

v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ('°A 

,party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute 

which he has not agreed so to submit."); United Steelworkers v. 

Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ("We see no 

reason to assume that this arbitrator has abused the trust the 

parties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas marked 

out for his consideration. It is not apparent that he went beyond 

the submission."); Retail Store Employees Union Local 782 v. SavOn Groceries, ·sos F.2d 500~ 502-03 (10th Cir. 1975) (the issue of 

backpay was not submitted to the arbitrator and thus the arbitration award was null and void insofar as it applied to that issue). 

The full text and limit of the submission is: "Did the Company violate the Labor Agreement when it failed to recall Grievant 

Sandra Cortez from layoff on May 20, 1984? If so, to what relief 

is Grievant entitled?" It strains credibility to suggest that in 

context this submission is vague insofar as who is the object of 

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 20 
the remedies being sought. The majority interprets this submission as if it reads: "If [the company violates the labor agreement], to what relief is Grievant entitled [from the Union]?" The 

court's entire decision is bottomed on this point, and I respectfully cannot agree with it. I believe union liability is not one 

of the ·issues submitted to the arbitrator. 

I would not imply that an arbitration submission, clearly 

framed in terms of employer's breach, is modified to make the 

union a party defendant for remedies purposes merely because it 

does not expressly exclude the union from- remedies. In my judgment, it is clearly an abuse of language and content to so construe a submission which restricts the scope of arbitration 

authority, as well as the contract itself. This is particularly 

true where the effect is to prevent fair notice and to put the 

union in clear conflict with the person it is representing. I 

probably would not hold that such a submission, deliberately and 

expressly entered into, would be illegal as against public policy. 

However, I clearly would not approve an arbitrator implying such a 

submission against the clear context of the submission language, 

thus requiring the union to defend itself against its client while 

at the same time requiring it to give that client fair representation. Although factually distinguishable, I find the principles 

of Local 1837 v. Maine Public Service Co., 579 F. Supp. 744 (D. 

Me. 1984) (the question submitted to the arbitrator: "[W]hat 

shall be the remedy?" did not empower the arbitrator to disregard 

the collective bargaining agreement in fashioning a remedy), 

-2-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 21 
clearly supportive of these views. See also, Courier-Citizen v. 

Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 702 F.2d 273, 281-82 (1st Cir. 

1983) (the question submitted to the arbitrator: "Did the Company 

violate the contract by placing Richard Grant in the laborer's 

job •••• If so, what shall be the remedy?" did not empower the 

arbitrator to provide a back pay remedy to any employee, except 

the senior journeyman in layoff status; and the court refused to 

enforce an arbitrator's award which exceeded the authority conferred in the submission by awarding back pay to two employees). 

I can say with confidence that the arbitrator's award does not 

draw its essence from the submission. "Essence" does not take 

much, but whatever the odor of this arbitration award, it is not 

essence. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 87-2547 Document: 010110089239 Date Filed: 11/17/1989 Page: 22