Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06394/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-06394-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco Division

JASON BARRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-06394-LB

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: ECF Nos. 25, 31

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jason Barry seeks judicial review of a final decision by Acting Commissioner of the 

Social Security Administration denying his claim for disability benefits under Title II and XVI of 

the Social Security Act.1 He moved for summary judgment on August 10, 2018.

2 The 

Commissioner opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on November 

9, 2018.

3 Under Civil Local Rule 16-5, the matter is submitted for decision by this court without 

oral argument. All parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction.4 The court grants the

 

1 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 1; Mot. – ECF No. 25 at 4. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case 

File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.

2 Mot. – ECF No. 25.

3 Cross-Mot. (amended) – ECF No. 31.

4 Consent Forms – ECF Nos. 12, 13.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 1 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 2

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plaintiff’s motion, denies the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and remands for further proceedings

consistent with this order.

STATEMENT

1. Procedural History

On October 23, 2014, the plaintiff, then aged 42, filed an application for social-securitydisability insurance (“SSDI”) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“SSA”).5 He also 

filed an application for supplemental-security income on October 23, 2014 under Title XVI.6 His 

claims were denied on February 27, 2015, and again on reconsideration on June 8, 2015.7 The 

plaintiff filed a written request for hearing on June 24, 2015.8 He appeared and testified at a 

hearing held on November 1, 2016.9

Administrative Law Judge Teresa L. Hoskins Hart (“the ALJ”) issued an unfavorable decision 

on January 13, 2017.

10 The plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on November 7, 2017 and

moved for summary judgment on August 8, 2018.11 The Commissioner opposed the motion and 

filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on November 9, 2018.12

 

5 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 1.

6

Id.

7 AR 130–33, 137–44. Administrative Record (“AR”) citations refer to the page numbers in the bottom 

right hand corner of the Administrative Record.

8 AR 142. 

9 AR 44.

10 AR 23–38.

11 Compl. – ECF No. 1; Mot. – ECF No. 25.

12 Cross-Mot. (amended) – ECF No. 31.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 2 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 3

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2. Summary of the Administrative Record

2.1 Medical Records

2.1.1 Amy Solomon, M.D. — Treating

Dr. Solomon is the plaintiff’s primary-care doctor and — with other health-care providers at 

Balance Health of Ben Lomand — has treated the plaintiff since 1996.

13 On December 6, 2013, 

Dr. Solomon diagnosed the plaintiff with chronic pain due to trauma, and on May 4, 2015 she 

diagnosed him with chronic pain lasting longer than three months.

14 In August 2014, Dr. Solomon 

diagnosed the plaintiff with a sprain/strain of his shoulder/arm, degenerated-lumbar/lumbosacral 

disc, mixed hyperlipidemia, displaced-lumbar-intervert disc, and testicular hypofunction.

15 On 

December 17, 2014, Dr. Solomon confirmed her prior diagnoses and diagnosed the plaintiff with 

lumbar-spinal stenosis.

16 On May 4, 2015, Dr. Solomon confirmed her prior diagnoses and 

diagnosed the plaintiff with degenerative-cervical-spinal stenosis, degenerative-lumbar-spinal 

stenosis, and elevated-intraocular pressure.

17

On December 6, 2013, Dr. Solomon diagnosed the plaintiff with chronic pain due to trauma.18

The plaintiff was back in school for horticulture and “was moving on from [his] wife’s death.”19

Dr. Solomon noted that the plaintiff was aware of the addictive nature of his medications and was 

trying to decrease morphine use.

20 The plaintiff was “well-appearing, well-nourished in no 

distress,” and he had “intact recent and remote memory, judgment and insight, and normal mood 

and affect.”

21

 

13 See AR 378–505, 512–29, 603–10, 564.

14 AR 381.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 See 381, 514

18 AR 397.

19 AR 396.

20 Id.

21 AR 397.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 3 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 4

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On July 22, 2014, the plaintiff visited Dr. Solomon and PA Julie Gorshe with shoulder pain 

caused by an injury he sustained getting out of a truck.22 The plaintiff’s shoulder was not 

swollen.23 He had moderate pain that was exacerbated when he moved his shoulder, and it was 

hard for him to hold his arm up.24 The plaintiff had difficulty with heavy lifting, and his activity 

was limited.25 His left shoulder was tender.26 An x-ray of his shoulder was negative for acute 

fracture.27 Dr. Solomon recommended that the plaintiff come in for a follow-up appointment in 

five days.28

On August 1, 2014, Dr. Solomon noted that the plaintiff had cracking and popping in his 

shoulder and pain with movement.29 There was no “swelling, warmth, numbness or weakness.”30

The plaintiff had stopped swimming since his shoulder injury.31 He had decreased range of motion 

in his shoulder.

32 Dr. Solomon diagnosed the plaintiff with sprain/strain of the shoulder/arm and 

chronic pain due to trauma.33 Dr. Solomon noted that the plaintiff was too distressed to continue 

with his school, and the stress was making him panic.

34 The plaintiff had tried Cymbalta on 30mg 

three years before and stopped because it did not help.35 The plaintiff was willing to try Cymbalta

again at a higher dose.

36 Dr. Solomon noted that the plaintiff could not find a job and had moved

 

22 AR 408.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id.

26 AR 409.

27 Id.

28 AR 410.

29 AR 393.

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 AR 394.

33 Id.

34 AR 393.

35 AR 394.

36 Id.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 4 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 5

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back in with his mother.37 Dr. Solomon referred the plaintiff to Dr. Victor Li, a pain-medicine 

specialist.

38

On August 21, 2014, Dr. Solomon diagnosed the plaintiff with testicular hypofunction, chronic 

pain due to trauma, a displaced lumbar-intervert disc, and prolonged-depressive reaction.39 Dr. 

Solomon “felt that [the plaintiff] [was] too disabled to work and recommended permanent 

disability.”40 Dr. Solomon said that the plaintiff wanted to go back to work, but was only able to 

perform small chores, including feeding pets and washing dishes.41 Dr. Solomon stated that the 

plaintiff could not walk or swim daily due to shoulder pain.42 Dr. Solomon recommended that the 

plaintiff apply for permanent disability, drop out of school for the semester, and participate in 

volunteer work.

43

On October 16, 2014, the plaintiff told Dr. Solomon that he spoke with his attorney and agreed 

to apply for social-security benefits based on permanent disability.44 Dr. Solomon wrote, “I do not

think he is able to work and may even be permanently disabled between the back and PTSD.”45

Dr. Solomon ordered an x-ray and MRI of the plaintiff’s lower back and suggested that he

participate in a sleep study.46

On December 17, 2014, the plaintiff reported that he had seen Dr. Li, and approval of an MRI 

was pending for the commencement of injections.47

 

37 AR 393.

38 AR 394. 

39 AR 391. 

40 AR 390.

41 Id.

42 AR 391.

43 AR 391, 392.

44 AR 388.

45 AR 389.

46 Id.

47 AR 385. 

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 5 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 6

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On May 4, 2015, after reviewing x-ray and MRI results, Dr. Solomon confirmed her prior 

diagnoses of degenerative-lumbar-spinal stenosis, degenerative-cervical-spinal stenosis, chronic 

back pain, displacement of lumbar-intervertebral disk, and elevated intraocular pressure.48 Dr. 

Solomon said that the plaintiff would not be able to work and that he could not “sit or stand for 

any length of time and require[d] high dose medication.”49

On January 28, 2016, Dr. Solomon filled out a Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)

questionnaire for the plaintiff’s SSDI application.

50 Dr. Solomon noted that the plaintiff had 

reduced range of motion and positive straight-leg raising on the left and right at 45 degrees.51 Dr. 

Solomon noted that the plaintiff’s impairment was reasonably consistent with his symptoms and 

functional limitations.52 She said that the plaintiff could not walk more than one block without 

taking a rest, could not sit more than twenty minutes before needing to get up, and could not stand 

more than fifteen minutes before needing to sit down.53 The plaintiff needed a job that allowed 

him to sit, stand, or walk at will and the plaintiff could never lift weight more than ten pounds.

54

2.1.2 Victor Li, M.D. — Treating

Dr. Li is a specialist in pain medicine. Dr. Solomon referred the plaintiff to Dr. Li for his 

shoulder injury and back pain.

55 On December 8, 2014, Dr. Li noted that the plaintiff’s chief 

complaint was low-back pain radiating down to his bilateral-lower extremities with a secondary 

complaint of neck pain radiating down to his bilateral-upper extremities.

56 The pain was “aching 

and stabbing,” and the pain in his right knee was constant.57 The plaintiff described the intensity of 

 

48 AR 515.

49 AR 516.

50 AR 564–67.

51 AR 565. 

52 Id.

53 AR 565, 566.

54 AR 566.

55 AR 370–77, 499.

56 AR 370.

57 Id.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 6 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 7

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his pain as a nine out of ten.

58 Walking, bending, lifting, sitting, lying down, coughing and 

sneezing made the pain worse, while lying down, sitting, and resting made the pain better.59

In November 2014, the plaintiff had an x-ray of his lumbar spine, which showed “left-sided 

scoliosis with fairly extensive degenerative-disc disease status post laminectomy.”

60 There was 

“mild to moderate leftward scoliosis centered on L3.”61 There was “narrowing of the right aspect 

of the L3–4 disc space [and] the left aspect of the L1–2 disc space,” and a “more diffuse 

narrowing of all of the lumbar disc spaces with spurring at all the lumbar levels anteriorly.”62

“Some endplate sclerosis [was] seen at L3–4 and L4–5” and the “[a]lignment was otherwise 

maintained.”63

Dr. Li performed lumbar-spine and cervical-spine examinations, and the plaintiff’s muscle 

strength in both examinations was five out of five.

64 Dr. Li prescribed morphine for the plaintiff’s

pain and ordered MRIs of his cervical and lumbar spine to determine structural abnormalities.65

On May 22, 2015, Dr. Li reported that the plaintiff had “continued pain in his low back and 

neck with associated numbness down his bilateral lower extremities, worse on the left,” and “pain 

and numbness radiating to his shoulders and into his bilateral upper extremities and hands.”66 The

plaintiff’s pain level was seven out of ten.

67 Dr. Li found “tenderness to palpation of the lumbar 

and cervical paraspinals” and “[d]istribution of pain along the L3, L4, L5 dermatomes of the 

bilateral lower extremities, left worse than right.”68 Dr. Li suggested that the plaintiff continue 

 

58 AR 371.

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 AR 375.

62 Id.

63 Id.

64 AR 372, 373.

65 AR 371, 373.

66 AR 535.

67 Id.

68 AR 536.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 7 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 8

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with lumbar-epidural-steroid injections and would “consider cervical-epidural-steroid injection 

following lumbar-epidural-steroid injection for relief of neck pain and radiculopathy down the 

upper extremities.”69

On June 29, 2015, Dr. Li found that the plaintiff’s tenderness to palpation and distribution of 

pain was the same as the last visit and that the plaintiff’s level of pain was six out of ten.70 The 

plaintiff denied being depressed and having insomnia.71 Dr. Li stated that he would “consider 

lumbar-epidural-steroid injection as well as cervical-epidural-steroid injection for relief of pain in

plaintiff’s neck and low back in the future.”72 The plaintiff told Dr. Li that he would like to be 

referred to an orthopedic surgeon before proceeding with epidurals.73 Dr. Li referred him to Dr. 

Mathias Daniels, an orthopedic-spinal surgeon.74

2.1.3 Mathias Daniels, M.D. — Treating

Dr. Daniels noted that the plaintiff had low-back pain, degeneration of the intervertebral disc, 

and lumbar radiculopathy.75 Dr. Daniels completed a physical exam and found that the plaintiff 

was obese.76 The plaintiff had a normal gait, no limp, and ambulated without assistive devices.77

He had a flat back with loss of lumbar lordosis on visual inspection.78 There was tenderness of the 

spinous process at L4, the transverse process on the right at L3, the transverse process on the left 

at L3, and the sacrum.79 There also was pain with motion and tenderness to the suspranous 

 

69 Id.

70 AR 530. 

71 Id.

72 AR 531.

73 AR 530.

74 AR 531

75 AR 551. 

76 AR 553.

77 Id.

78 AR 554. 

79 Id.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 8 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 9

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ligament, the paraspinal region at L3, and the iliolumbar region.80 The plaintiff’s motor strength 

was normal and his knee reflexes were diminished.81 The plaintiff had decreased sensation in his 

knee, leg, and foot.

82

On October 21, 2015, the plaintiff visited Dr. Daniels to review lumbar-spine x-rays.83 Dr. 

Daniels said that the plaintiff was likely a surgical candidate.84 He suggested that the plaintiff lose 

weight and decrease his medication to prepare for surgery.85

On December 16, 2015, Dr. Daniels stated that the plaintiff was likely a candidate for LS2–S1 

PSIS.86 He noted that the plaintiff would continue to make attempts at decreasing his weight and 

increasing exercise tolerance.87

On March 21, 2016, the plaintiff reported “lateral and posterior radiating pain left greater than 

right into the dorsum of bilateral feet,” and “numbness in the stools of bilateral feet and 

generalized bilateral leg heaviness.”88 The plaintiff’s level of pain was an eight out of ten.89 His

symptoms included weakness, numbness, tingling and radiation down legs.90 Changing positions, 

resting, and narcotics alleviated the pain, and sitting, standing, walking, twisting, bending and 

squatting, and pushing and pulling aggravated the pain.91 The plaintiff could walk for about ten 

 

80 Id.

81 Id.

82 Id.

83 AR 549. 

84 Id.

85 Id.

86 AR 545.

87 Id.

88 AR 561.

89 Id.

90 Id.

91 Id.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 9 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 10

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minutes before having to sit down because of “heavy legs.”92 Dr. Daniels confirmed his prior 

diagnosis of obesity.93

Dr. Daniels opined that the plaintiff had multilevel-lumbar spondylosis “that had been 

refractory to multiple conservative treatments including activity modification, injections, massage 

therapy, physical therapy, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories and narcotics.”94 The plaintiff was an 

“appropriate surgical candidate,” but considering his current psychosocial status, Dr. Daniels 

found it reasonable that the plaintiff wished “to defer further discussion of operative intervention 

at [that] point.”95 Dr. Daniels stated that “the patient’s functionality ha[d] decreased over 50% 

over the last 2 years. He [was] also having a difficulty [with] mobility and bending activities. His 

activities of daily living such as toileting and cooking [were] limited. The patient [] failed 

individual physical therapy/medication trials and injection therapies.”96 Dr. Daniels opined that the 

plaintiff “met all of the criteria of the MTUS [Medical Treatment Utilization Schedule] guidelines 

for an outpatient functional restoration program evaluation.” 97 Dr. Daniels listed the criteria for an 

outpatient pain rehabilitation program under MTUS:

An adequate and thorough evaluation has been made, which we are requesting 

today.

Previous methods of treating chronic pain have been unsuccessful, as mentioned 

above for this patient.

The patient has significant loss of ability to function, and the patient has decreased 

his/her activities of daily living since the day of injury.

He is not a candidate for other surgical interventions.

The patient exhibits motivation and willingness to forgo secondary gains. . . .

98

 

92 Id.

93 AR 562.

94 Id.

95 Id.

96 AR 563.

97 Id.

98 Id.

Case 3:17-cv-06394-LB Document 32 Filed 03/27/19 Page 10 of 38
ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 11

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On May 11, 2016, Dr. Daniels noted no “change in [the plaintiff’s] axial back complaints.”99

Clinical and imaging studies were consistent with multi-level-lumbar spondylosis refractory to 

multiple conservative modalities.100 Dr. Daniels recommended a chronic-pain psychology 

consultation.101 Dr. Daniels opined that the plaintiff was in the process of obtaining permanent 

disability and that it was prudent for him to “defer surgery until after [his] social economic status 

stabilizes.”102 Dr. Daniels diagnosed the plaintiff with degeneration of intervertebral disc and said 

he was “deciding about surgery for a herniated disc.”103

2.1.4 Aaron Morse M.D. — Treating

The plaintiff visited Central Coast Sleep Disorder Center regarding his sleep problems on May 

21, 2009 and June 4, 2009.104 Nurse Practitioner Helena Norris stated in her preliminary

consultation notes that the plaintiff had “a history of heavy snoring for many years, witnessed 

apneas and choking and excessive daytime sleepiness” and “chronic back pain due to a work 

related injury in 19[9]7.”105 The plaintiff underwent a sleep study on May 29, 2009.

106 Dr. Morse

found that the plaintiff had “severe complex (central and obstructive) sleep apnea.”

107 Dr. Morse 

noted that the “central apnea was [probably] related to his use of narcotic pain medication.”108 The 

plaintiff was put on a continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) machine for apnea.109 Dr. 

 

99 AR 559.

100 Id.

101 Id.

102 Id.

103 Id.

104 AR 339, 341.

105 AR 339.

106 AR 355. 

107 Id.

108 Id.

109 AR 339.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 12

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Morse later reported that the CPAP “resulted in improvement in snoring, apnea and hypopneas, 

and improvement in oxygen saturation.”

110

2.1.5 Christopher Summa, M.D. — Treating 

The plaintiff visited Dr. Summa, a spinal and orthopedic surgeon, on April 6, 2017.111 Dr. 

Summa diagnosed the plaintiff with severe degenerative scoliosis of the lumbar spine, severe

spinal stenosis, obesity, and high-dose opiate dependency.112 Due to the degenerative changes 

present in the plaintiff’s lumbar spine, he was a candidate for a reconstructive procedure to his 

lumbar spine.113 Dr. Summa was concerned that, due to the plaintiff’s weight and high-dose 

opiates, he was at significant risk of post-operative complications.114 Dr. Summa suggested that 

the plaintiff work with Dr. Solomon on his opiate use and engage in an aggressive weight-loss 

program in order to continue with plans for a reconstructive surgery.115

2.1.6 Jennifer Lin, M.D. — Examining 

On January 26, 2015 the plaintiff had an MRI of his lumbar spine.116 Dr. Lin reported the MRI 

findings.117 Dr. Lin indicated there was levoscolioisis of the lumbar spine and multileveldegenerative changes of the lumbar intervertebral discs and facets.118 There was central-canal 

stenosis and neural-foraminal narrowing.119 Dr. Lin also reported that there were multiple areas 

with disc desiccation, loss of disc height, lateral protrusions, and joint arthrosis.120

 

110 AR 345.

111 AR 8–12. 

112 AR 8. 

113 Id.

114 Id.

115 Id.

116 AR 538, 540.

117 AR 538. 

118 AR 539.

119 Id.

120 See AR 538.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 13

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2.1.7 Kim Goldman Psy. D. — Examining

In January 2015, Dr. Goldman performed a complete psychological evaluation of plaintiff at 

the request of the Department of Social Services.

121 Dr. Goldman noted that the plaintiff “was 

widowed on January 7, 2012. He live[d] with his mother in an apartment. His source of income 

[was] food stamps.”122 The plaintiff dropped out of high school, obtained a GED, completed two 

semesters at a community college, and received vocational training in an “iron worker 

apprenticeship [and an] automotive program.”123 The plaintiff’s longest-held job was as an iron 

worker, which he did “over the course of approximately 12 years.”

124 “His most recent job was as 

a caregiver from 2008 through August 15, 2013.125

Dr. Goldman noted that the plaintiff had pain in ‘“[his] whole back, shoulders, knees, [and] 

ankles from all the heaving lifting replacing re-bar, all the labor.’”126 The plaintiff had never been 

psychiatrically hospitalized or treated by an outpatient-mental-health provider.

127 The plaintiff

took Prozac in 2000 for a year until he stopped because he “was feeling better.”

128 The plaintiff

“[drove] a car without restriction. He was able to shower, bathe, groom and dress himself without 

help. He was able to pay bills and keep track of money without help from other people.”129 Dr. 

Goldman continued, “[w]hen asked to describe what he does in a typical day he reported ‘not 

much because my physical condition, sit on the front porch, walk my dog 30 yards.’”130

 

121 AR 507–511. 

122 AR 508.

123 Id.

124 Id.

125 AR 508; see AR 36.

126 AR 509. 

127 Id.

128 Id.

129 Id.

130 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 14

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Dr. Goldman noted that the plaintiff was “pleasant and cooperative throughout the evaluation” 

and that he “presented with a mildly restricted range of affect and mildly dysthymic mood.”

131 The 

plaintiff described his mood as “depressed quite a bit, all the losses I’ve had recently, I can’t do 

the work I used to do because of medical problems, see my friends with their children/family that 

affects me.”132 The plaintiff reported that he had difficulty sleeping due to pain and stress.

133

“No 

problems with appetite were indicated.”134 Dr. Goldman noted that the plaintiff “responded in a 

coherent and relevant fashion,” he “was alert and aware of his surroundings,” his memory was 

intact, his “attention to instructions was fair and his task persistence was fair,” and he “did not 

appear to be responding to internal stimuli.”135

Dr. Goldman concluded that the plaintiff’s verbal comprehension, working memory, 

processing speed, full-scale IQ, logical-memory I, visual-reproduction I, and visual-reproduction 

II were ranked “ low average.”

136

Dr. Goldman diagnosed the plaintiff with depressive disorder and personality disorder and 

ruled out cannabis dependence.

137 She noted that the plaintiff had mild difficulties in maintaining 

social functioning, concentration, persistence, and the ability to work at a pace appropriate for his 

age.138 “No repeated episodes of emotional deterioration in work like situations were indicated.”139

Furthermore, the plaintiff’s ability “to understand, carry out and remember simple instructions was 

not impaired.”140 His abilities to understand, carry out and remember detailed instructions and 

 

131 Id.

132 Id.

133 Id.

134 Id.

135 AR 509, 510.

136 AR 510–11.

137 AR 511.

138 Id.

139 Id.

140 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 15

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complex tasks, respond appropriately to coworkers, respond appropriately to usual work situations 

were mildly impaired due to depression.141

2.2 Disability Determination Explanation — Initial 

Tawnya Brode, Psy. D., analyzed the plaintiff’s mental-health records.142 She concluded that 

the plaintiff would have mild difficulty maintaining social function and mild difficulty with 

concentration, persistence, and ability to work at a pace appropriate for his age.143 She found that 

the plaintiff was mildly impaired in his ability to understand, carry out, and remember detailed 

instructions and complex tasks, his ability to respond appropriately to coworkers, supervisors, and 

the public, and his ability to respond to usual work situations and deal with changes in his work 

setting.144 His ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions was not 

impaired.145

On January 15, 2015, A. Lizarraras, M.D., performed a residual-functional-capacity 

assessment for the plaintiff’s disability determination.

146 Dr. Lizarraras found that the plaintiff 

could occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and could frequently lift and carry ten pounds.

147 The 

plaintiff could stand and walk for a more than six hours on a sustained basis and sit for a total of 

about six hours in an eight-hour workday.148 His ability to push and pull was “unlimited.”149 The

plaintiff had postural limitations: he could “frequently” climb ramps and stairs and balance and

could “occasionally” climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl.150 The

 

141 Id.

142 AR 81–82.

143 AR 82.

144 Id.

145 Id.

146 AR 85–88.

147 AR 85.

148 Id.

149 Id.

150 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 16

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plaintiff had no visual, communicative, or environmental limitations.

151 Dr. Lizarraras said that

“more weight is assigned to the longitudinal evidence that documents [spinal] L4–5 laminectomy 

[without] functionally significant neurological deficits or mechanical signs of radiculopathy or 

symptoms of classical cauda equina syndrome, and [spinal] right knee surgery without e/o 

instability. OSA is stable [with] CPAP.”152 Dr. Lizarraras concluded that, given the plaintiff’s age, 

education, and past relevant work, he was “not disabled.”

153

2.3 Disability Determination Explanation – Reconsideration 

On May 5, 2015, Dr. Pong made another disability determination at the reconsideration 

level.154 Dr. Pong reviewed the plaintiff’s MRI, concluded that the MRI findings were “mild to 

moderate, 5/5, [normal] gait,” and agreed with Dr. Lizarraras’s findings that modified light work 

was appropriate for the plaintiff.

155

Norman Zykowsky, Ph.D., analyzed the plaintiff’s mental-health records and found that he 

had mild restrictions in his activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social 

functioning, and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace.156 The plaintiff 

had no repeated episodes of decompensation.157

2.4 Orlene Daigle — Function Report

Orlene Daigle is the plaintiff’s mother. The plaintiff has lived with her since 2013.158 In a

function report dated January 20, 2015, Ms. Daigle stated that the plaintiff was not able to prepare 

meals, shop, or clean, that he could not “sit or stand for even short periods of time,” he suffered 

 

151 AR 86.

152 Id.

153 Id.

154 AR 122–23.

155 AR 123.

156 Id.

157 Id.

158 AR 252.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 17

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from high levels of pain and anxiety, and he had panic attacks in public.159 She helped the plaintiff

with meals, baths, walking, and taking medications.160 The plaintiff’s sleep was affected because 

he had to wake up to take medications for his pain and suffered from sleep apnea.161 The plaintiff

did not spend time with other people except on the computer or the phone.162 The plaintiff was 

able to walk only a half of a block before having to rest, and he was able to pay attention for about 

five minutes at a time.

163

3. Administrative Proceedings

3.1 Plaintiff’s Testimony

The plaintiff submitted a work history report on January 13, 2015.164 He worked as an iron 

worker from 1996 to 2006, as a mechanic from 2006 to 2007, and as a caregiver from 2007 to 

August, 15, 2013.165 As a caregiver, the plaintiff’s job responsibilities included house cleaning, 

grocery shopping, giving baths, cleaning the bathroom, laundry, and running errands.166 The job 

required the plaintiff to walk, stand, stoop, kneel, crouch, reach, write, and type for a significant 

amount of time.167 It also required lifting and carrying up to 50 lbs.168

The plaintiff submitted an adult-function report on September 13, 2019.169 He described his 

daily routine as follows. He woke up at 6:00 a.m. to take medication and then went back to sleep 

until 9:00 a.m., then he spent forty-five minutes showering and one hour eating after his mother 

 

159 Id.

160 AR 253.

161 Id.

162 AR 256.

163 AR 257.

164 AR 211–21.

165 AR 238.

166 AR 239.

167 Id.

168 Id.

169 AR 213–14.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 18

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prepared his food.

170 He had too much pain when he stood or sat too long and had to lie down to 

ease the pain.171 He also stated that because three people he cared for as a caregiver died, and 

because his pain medicine had side effects, it was difficult for him to be around people.172 His

pain, anxiety and stress kept him from sleeping.173 He was not able to dress himself, take a bath, 

take care of his hair, shave, feed himself, or use the toilet until his pain medication took effect.174

He needed help from his mother to eat meals and to get around. He could walk only 30 yards 

before needing to rest for about two to three minutes.175

The plaintiff testified at the hearing on November 1, 2016.176 The ALJ first asked the plaintiff 

about his work history.177 The plaintiff testified that he was an iron worker for 12 years.178 While 

working as an iron worker, he lifted 50 pounds without assistance and sometimes more than 100 

pounds.179 He also went through training to become an auto mechanic and worked in that capacity 

at two Ford dealerships in Santa Cruz for about three years.180 As a mechanic, the plaintiff lifted 

more than 50 pounds alone, but he did not lift more than 100 pounds.181 The plaintiff supervised 

other people while at Scott’s Valley Ford, which consisted of assigning and inspecting their 

work.182 In 2008, the plaintiff could no longer perform the work of an auto mechanic, and he 

became an in-home healthcare provider for his ill wife and multiple other patients in the County of 

 

170 AR 214.

171 AR 213.

172 Id.

173 AR 214.

174 Id.

175 Id.

176 AR 48. 

177 Id.

178 AR 49. 

179 Id.

180 AR 50–51. 

181 AR 50. 

182 AR 52. 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 19

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Santa Cruz.183 The in-home healthcare-provider job required the plaintiff to perform domestic 

duties, including laundry, shopping, cleaning, and physical care, such as giving baths.184 The 

plaintiff lifted more than 100 pounds while in this job.185 The plaintiff remained in this job until 

September 2013.186 He has not worked since.187

The ALJ asked the plaintiff about his education.188 The plaintiff received his GED in 1991 (he 

went to high school but did not finish twelfth grade).

189 After high school, the plaintiff began and 

completed a three-year apprenticeship as a union iron worker.190 He also completed a six-month 

program to become certified as an auto mechanic.191 In August 2013, the plaintiff completed two 

semesters of school, working toward an associate’s degree in horticulture.192 He was unable to 

complete assignments and sit in class due to pain and medication.193 The plaintiff said that 

“getting to school was an issue, driving, being on medication.”194 He could not sit comfortably 

through a whole class and was unable to concentrate or retain information.195

The plaintiff had a driver’s license and a car, but he no longer drove “because of [his] pain 

medication.”

196 His mother drove him to medical appointments.197

 

183 AR 51. 

184 AR 53. 

185 Id.

186 AR 54.

187 Id.

188 AR 55.

189 Id.

190 Id.

191 AR 56.

192 AR 57, 58. 

193 AR 57.

194 Id.

195 Id.

196 AR 58.

197 AR 59. 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 20

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The ALJ asked the plaintiff about his activities.198 The plaintiff used to be able to surf, hike, go 

rock-climbing and mountain-climbing, and socialize, but he was no longer able to do those 

things.199 The plaintiff could do a 10- to 15-minute walk, equivalent to about 1,000 yards.200 He 

did this about two to three times per week, depending on the severity of his pain.201 It had been 

years since he went biking or swimming.202

The plaintiff lived in a studio apartment with his mother.203 On a typical day, the plaintiff got 

up for about one hour to take his medication and sat in a chair for about 45 minutes waiting for the 

pain medication to “kick[]-in” and ate food that his mother brought him.204 The plaintiff iced his 

back three to four times a day.205 He ate dinner at around 6:00 p.m. and then took pain medication, 

which made him sleepy.

206 The plaintiff watched television, checked email, read magazines, and 

interacted with friends on Facebook.207

The ALJ asked the plaintiff why he was unable to work.208 The plaintiff said that he was in 

severe pain, he was physically dilapidated, and he needed surgery.209

The plaintiff’s attorney asked him about the accident he suffered and his subsequent 

treatment.210 The plaintiff said that in 2014, he fell off a truck and injured his neck, shoulder, and 

 

198 Id.

199 Id.

200 Id.

201 Id.

202 AR 59–60. 

203 AR 60.

204 Id.

205 Id.

206 AR 61. 

207 Id.

208 Id.

209 Id.

210 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 21

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lower back.211 He immediately began seeing his primary doctor, Dr. Solomon.212 Dr. Solomon 

prescribed him hydrocodone and morphine.213 Dr. Li gave the plaintiff epidural injections, which 

were not successful.214 Dr. Daniels ordered an MRI for the plaintiff’s back, and he noted that the 

plaintiff had injections, physical therapy, massage therapy, and medications, which were never 

helpful for his back.215 The plaintiff stated that Dr. Daniels wanted him to lose weight and see his 

psychiatrist before performing surgery.216 The plaintiff had lost 20 pounds and was in the process 

of scheduling his surgery.217

The plaintiff’s attorney asked him about his activities and limitations.218 The plaintiff said that 

he could cook and clean in the past, but he could not do so because he was in “too much pain.”219

The plaintiff could sit 20 to 15 minutes and stand for 15 minutes comfortably.220 He had to lie

down four to six times per day due to back pain.221 His neck pain gave him headaches and caused 

his hands and legs to feel numb.222 It was difficult for the plaintiff to bend, lift, or kneel, and the 

most he could lift was a liter of soda.223 The plaintiff was still on narcotics and had problems with 

 

211 AR 62. 

212 Id.

213 AR 63. The transcript reads “hydro-codeine,” but Dr. Solomon’s records show that he was 

prescribed hydrocodone. AR 383.

214 AR 63.

215 AR 64. 

216 Id.

217 AR 65. 

218 Id.

219 AR 66. 

220 Id.

221 Id.

222 Id.

223 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 22

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attention and concentration.224 He had major problems retaining information, such as remembering 

what he saw on television.225

3.2 Vocational Expert Testimony

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Darlene McQuary testified at the November 1, 2016 hearing.226

The ALJ posed the following hypothetical to the VE: 

Assume an individual who was limited to light exertion that did not require more 

than frequent balancing or climbing of stairs and ramps, and did not require more 

than occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling or climbing of ladders, ropes 

and scaffolds.

227

The ALJ asked whether such a person could perform any of the plaintiff’s prior jobs, and the 

VE said he could not.228 The ALJ asked whether there were other jobs that the hypothetical person 

could do. The VE gave four possible jobs: companion (SVP of 3, light work, 985,230 jobs 

nationally), cashier (SVP of 2, light work, 3,920,000 jobs nationally), agriculture sorting and 

grading (SVP of 2, light work, 500,000 jobs nationally), and egg washing machine operator (SVP

of 1, light work, 75,790 jobs nationally).

229

The ALJ asked the VE to consider the first hypothetical again, and to add “that the person was 

limited to simple, repetitive tasks.”230 The ALJ asked whether such a person could do the jobs the 

VE identified, and the VE said that he could.231

Mr. Barry’s attorney posed the following hypothetical:

 

224 Id.

225 AR 66–67.

226 AR 69–73.

227 AR 69.

228 Id.

229 AR 70–71. Specific Vocational Preparation (“SVP”) is defined “as the amount of lapsed time 

required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility 

needed for average performance in a specific job-worker situation.” On the SVP scale, a 2 refers to any 

training “beyond short demonstration up to and including 1 month.” Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 

App. C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991).

230 AR 71.

231 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 23

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If you added onto the [first hypothetical] someone’s off task more than half the day 

could not pay attention or concentrate[e], perform simple tasks, [was] unable to sit 

or stand more than 20 minutes at a time, and sit and stand cumulatively throughout 

the day for four hours; [would need] unscheduled breaks four to six times a day 30 

minutes each time; unable to use hands for gripping, turning objects limited to 10% 

of the day; unable to use fingers for fine manipulation; unable to use arms for 

reaching; missing four days of work per month. Could such a person do any of the 

jobs you listed. . . ?232

The VE answered that such a person could not do the jobs she identified or any job in the 

national economy.233

3.3 Administrative Findings

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether the

plaintiff was disabled and concluded that he was not.234

At step one, the ALJ found that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since September 1, 2014 (the alleged onset date).

235

At step two the ALJ found that the plaintiff had four severe impairments: degenerative-disc 

disease, status-post-remote-lumbar laminectomy, scoliosis, and obesity.236 The ALJ held that the 

plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments (depressive disorder, personality disorder, 

and affective disorder) and his right-knee orthoscopy were nonsevere because they did not cause 

“more than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.”237 The 

ALJ also found that the plaintiff’s obstructive-sleep apnea was nonsevere because it was “stable 

with the usage of the CPAP machine.”238 The ALJ held that the plaintiff’s left-shoulder injury was 

 

232 AR 71–72.

233 AR 72.

234 AR 23–38.

235 AR 25.

236 Id.

237 AR 26, 28, 29.

238 AR 29.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 24

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nonsevere because he received limited treatment and so it did not “meet the 12-month durational 

requirement to be a severe impairment.”239

The ALJ held that the plaintiff’s possible cannabis dependence was a non-medically 

determinable impairment because Dr. Goldman raised the issue but never made a diagnosis.240 The 

ALJ found that the plaintiff’s alleged anxiety and PTSD were non-medically determinable 

impairments because neither was “established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, 

and laboratory findings.”241 The ALJ found the plaintiff’s alleged learning disorder to be nonmedically determinable because he was “not diagnosed with a learning disability [by] an 

acceptable medical source.”242

At step three, the ALJ found that the plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity requirements of a listing.243 Specifically, 

the ALJ considered listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine) and found that the plaintiff did not meet 

the criteria because there was “no evidence of positive straight-leg raising in both the sitting and 

supine positions, reflex loss, muscle weakness or atrophy; or psuedoclaudication and inability to 

ambulate effectively.”244 While there is no listing specifically addressing obesity, the ALJ held 

 

239 Id.

240 AR 28.

241 Id.

242 Id.

243 AR 29–30.

244 AR 30. The listing in full is as follows. Listing 1.04, Disorders of the spine (e.g., herniated 

nucleus pulposus, spinal arachnoiditis, spinal stenosis, osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease, 

facet arthritis, vertebral fracture), resulting in compromise of a nerve root (including the cauda 

equina) or the spinal cord. With: (A) Evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuroanatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with 

associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if 

there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine); or (B) 

Spinal arachnoiditis, confirmed by an operative note or pathology report of tissue biopsy, or by 

appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by severe burning or painful dysesthesia, 

resulting in the need for changes in position or posture more than once every 2 hours; or (C) 

Lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication, established by findings on appropriate 

medically acceptable imaging, manifested by chronic nonradicular pain and weakness, and 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 25

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that the plaintiff’s obesity “[did] not meet a listing based on [his] other impairments, or in 

combination with [his] other impairments.”245

At step four, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work 

as an iron worker, auto mechanic, or caregiver, which were at medium and/or heavy level.246 The 

ALJ determined that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light 

work with “no more than frequent balancing or climbing stairs or ramps; and no more than 

occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling or climbing ropes, ladders or scaffolds.”

247

The ALJ held that some of the plaintiff’s alleged symptoms could be reasonably expected to 

be caused by his medically determinable impairments, but his statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not consistent with the medical evidence 

and other evidence in the record.”248

The ALJ found that the record did not support the plaintiff’s claims about the ongoing impact 

of his degenerative-disc disease on his life.

249 For example, on December 6, 2013, Dr. Solomon 

reported that the plaintiff was walking three to four times a week for 20 to 45 minutes per day; on 

July 22, 2014, Julie Gorshe, PA, found that the plaintiff’s back was nontender with normal range 

of motion; on October 2, 2015, Dr. Solomon found that the plaintiff’s extremities were warm with 

no C/C/E (cyanosis, clubbing, edema); and in a neurological examination, the strength was five 

out of five, and sensations were intact.250

The ALJ gave great weight to the State-agency-medical consultants’ opinions.251 They

“carefully evaluated the claimant’s medical record” and concluded that the plaintiff was “limited 

 

resulting in inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in 1.00B2b. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, 

appx. 1.

245 AR 30.

246 AR 35, 36.

247 AR 30.

248 AR 33.

249 Id.

250 Id.

251 AR 34.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 26

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to light work, frequently climbing ramps and stairs and balancing; and occasionally climbing 

ropes, ladders, or scaffolds, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling.”252 The ALJ found that 

the consultants’ opinions concerning the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity were “consistent 

with the physical examinations in the medical records, as well as the claimant’s statements of 

swimming, walking, and biking.”253

The ALJ did not give significant weight to Dr. Solomon’s opinion because it was “inconsistent 

with her own treatment notes, the longitudinal treatment course, other medical findings by treating 

specialists, other probative medical opinions, daily activities involving biking, swimming and 

schooling, and other inconsistencies noted in this decision.”254

The ALJ accorded little weight to Orlene Daigle’s third-party function report because she was 

not an acceptable medical source, her report echoed the plaintiff’s function report, and her 

description was inconsistent with the medical records and other evidence.255

At step five, the ALJ determined that, considering the plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, he had acquired work skills from past relevant work 

that were transferrable to other occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the 

national economy.256 The ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony that a person with the plaintiff’s RFC 

could be a companion (985,230 jobs in the national economy), a cashier ( 3,922,000 jobs 

nationally), an agricultural sorter (500,000 jobs nationally), or an egg washer (75,790 jobs 

nationally) and concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled.257

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), district courts have jurisdiction to review any final decision of the 

 

252 Id.

253 AR 34, 35.

254 AR 35.

255 Id.

256 AR 37.

257 AR 37–38.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 27

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Commissioner if the claimant initiates a suit within sixty days of the decision. A court may set 

aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits only if the ALJ’s “findings are based on legal error or 

are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The reviewing court should uphold “such 

inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the evidence.” Mark 

v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). If the evidence in the administrative record 

supports the ALJ’s decision and a different outcome, the court must defer to the ALJ’s decision 

and may not substitute its own decision. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097– 98 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Finally, [a court] may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).

GOVERNING LAW

A claimant is considered disabled if (1) he or she suffers from a “medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the 

“impairment or impairments are of such severity that he or she is not only unable to do his 

previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any 

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(A) & (B). The five-step analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act is as follows. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520). 

Step One. Is the claimant presently working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then the 

claimant is “not disabled” and is not entitled to benefits. If the claimant is not working in a 

substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step one, and the 

evaluation proceeds to step two. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

Step Two. Is the claimant’s impairment (or combination of impairments) severe? If not, the 

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claimant is not disabled. If so, the evaluation proceeds to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

Step Three. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specified impairments 

described in the regulations? If so, the claimant is disabled and is entitled to benefits. If the 

claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the impairments listed in the regulations, 

then the case cannot be resolved at step three, and the evaluation proceeds to step four. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Step Four. Considering the claimant’s RFC, is the claimant able to do any work that he or she 

has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is not disabled and is not entitled to benefits. If the 

claimant cannot do any work he or she did in the past, then the case cannot be resolved at step 

four, and the case proceeds to the fifth and final step. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

Step Five. Considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, is the claimant 

able to “make an adjustment to other work?” If not, then the claimant is disabled and entitled to 

benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is able to do other work, the 

Commissioner must establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy 

that the claimant can do. There are two ways for the Commissioner to show other jobs in 

significant numbers in the national economy: (1) by the testimony of a vocational expert or (2) 

by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R., part 404, subpart P, app. 2. 

For steps one through four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. At step five, the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner. Gonzales v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 784 F.2d 1417, 1419 

(9th Cir. 1986). 

ANALYSIS

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) improperly weighing and crediting the opinions 

of his treating physicians and (2) failing to properly credit plaintiff’s testimony and third-party 

statements about the nature and impact of his functional limitations. The court holds that the ALJ 

erred by discounting the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians and failing to properly credit 

the plaintiff’s testimony and third-party statements about his functional limitations. 

1. Failure to Properly Weigh Medical Evidence

The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

discounting the opinions of Dr. Solomon and Dr. Daniels, the plaintiff’s treating physicians.258

 

258 Mot. – ECF No. 25 at 12–26.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 29

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The court remands because the ALJ did not give specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting their 

opinions.

1.1 Legal Standard

The ALJ is responsible for “‘resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving 

ambiguities.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d 

at 1039). In weighing and evaluating the evidence, the ALJ must consider the entire case record, 

including each medical opinion in the record, together with the rest of the relevant evidence. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(b); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] reviewing 

court [also] must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 

specific quantum of supporting evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“In conjunction with the relevant regulations, [the Ninth Circuit has] developed standards that 

guide [the] analysis of an ALJ’s weighing of medical evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 

F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Social Security regulations 

distinguish among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; 

and (3) non-examining physicians. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c), (e); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). “Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 

physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a reviewing [nonexamining] physician’s.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 830); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996).

An ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating physician, whether or not controverted. 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. “To reject [the] uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). By contrast, if 

the ALJ finds that the opinion of a treating physician is contradicted, a reviewing court will 

require only that the ALJ provide “specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (“If a treating or examining 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 30

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providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians 

may serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical 

findings or other evidence in the record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

An ALJ errs, however, when he “rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight” without 

explanation or without explaining why “another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticiz[es] 

it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.” Garrison, 

759 F.3d at 1012–13.

“If a treating physician’s opinion is not given ‘controlling weight’ because it is not ‘wellsupported’ or because it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, the [Social 

Security] Administration considers specified factors in determining the weight it will be given.” 

Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. “Those factors include the ‘[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination’ by the treating physician; and the ‘nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship’ between the patient and the treating physician.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(2)(i)–(ii) ) (alteration in original). “Additional factors relevant to evaluating any 

medical opinion, not limited to the opinion of the treating physician, include the amount of 

relevant evidence that supports the opinion and the quality of the explanation provided[,] the 

consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole[, and] the specialty of the physician 

providing the opinion....” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3)–(6)).

1.2 Dr. Solomon

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh and credit the opinion of Dr. 

Solomon without giving legitimate reasons for doing so. The court agrees. 

Dr. Solomon’s opinion regarding the plaintiff’s functional limitations was contradicted by the 

opinions of non-examining physicians, Dr. Lizarras and Dr. Pong.259 Thus, the ALJ was required 

to provide specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Solomon’s opinion.

In weighing the medical-opinion evidence from Dr. Solomon, the ALJ did not give Dr. 

 

259 Compare AR 566 with AR 85, 112.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 31

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Solomon’s opinion controlling weight because Dr. Solomon’s residual-functional-capacity 

determination was “inconsistent with her own treatment notes, the longitudinal treatment course, 

other medical findings by treating specialists, other probative medical opinions, daily activities 

involving biking, swimming and schooling, and other inconsistencies noted in [the] decision.”260

“An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply 

cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a 

disability finding.” Escamilla v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-01621-BAS-JMA, 2018 WL 2981156, at *6 

(S.D. Cal. June 14, 2018) (citing Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)). Here, the 

ALJ cites two examinations, where Dr. Solomon noted that the plaintiff had normal gait and 

strength, to arrive at a conclusion that Dr. Solomon’s opinion should be afforded little weight for 

lack of consistency.261 The broader record shows that Dr. Solomon’s RFC determination was 

consistent with her treatment records, other treating doctors’ opinions, and the plaintiff’s 

limitations in daily activities.

For example, Dr. Lin, who reported the plaintiff’s MRI findings, indicated that the plaintiff 

had levoscoliosis of the lumbar spine and multilevel degenerative changes of the lumbarintervertebral discs and facets, disc desiccation, loss of disc height, lateral protrusions, and joint 

arthrosis.262 Dr. Lin opined that the plaintiff had “left-sided scoliosis with fairly extensive 

degenerative disc disease.”

263 Dr. Lin also noted the plaintiff had tenderness to palpitation of the 

lumbar and cervical paraspinals with distribution of pain along L3, L4, L5 dermatomes of the 

bilateral lower extremities.264 In 2016, Dr. Daniels opined that the plaintiff’s functionality had 

 

260 AR 35.

261 Id.

262 AR 538–39.

263 AR 371. 

264 AR 531. 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 32

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decreased by 50% over the last two years.265 Dr. Daniels also stated that the plaintiff had 

multilevel lumbar spondylosis that had been refractory to multiple treatments.266

Dr. Solomon’s findings also were consistent with her own treatment records, where she noted 

chronic pain due to trauma, moderate scoliosis, narrowing of the right aspect of L3 to L4 disc 

space and left aspect of L1–1 disc space, “fairly extensive degenerative disease,” lumbar 

radiculopathy, low-back and neck pain with associated numbness, and lumbar spondylosis, among 

other conditions, over the course of several visits.267 Dr. Solomon’s RFC opinion was the most 

recent RFC opinion on the record. “[A] treating physician’s most recent medical records are 

highly probative.” See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2001). Given that the

plaintiff’s functionality decreased over the course of time, any contradicting information about the 

plaintiff’s functional limitations before Dr. Solomon’s most recent opinion regarding functionality 

is not necessarily inconsistent with her most recent opinion.268

Dr. Solomon’s findings are also consistent with the record and show that the plaintiff has 

experienced increasingly greater limitations in his daily activities. The plaintiff testified in the 

November 2016 hearing that he used to be able to perform multiple activities, like biking and rock 

climbing, but was no longer able to do them due to his pain and medication.269 In 2014, Dr. 

Solomon indicated in her treatment notes that the plaintiff had been trying to walk and swim daily, 

 

265 AR 563. 

266 AR 562. The plaintiff also points out that the ALJ did not consider Dr. Daniels’s opinion that the 

plaintiff’s “‘functionality has decreased by 50% over the last 2 years. He is also having difficult with 

mobility and bending activities. . . . [T]he patient has significant loss of ability to function, and the 

patient has decreased his activities of daily living since the day of the injury.’” Mot. – ECF No. 25 at 

16 (quoting AR 563). The ALJ summarized some of Dr. Daniels’ opinions but did not mention this 

opinion. AR 20–43. This is error. An ALJ must consider each medical opinion and — in weighing the 

medical evidence — cannot reject an opinion or assign it little weight without explanation. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.927(b); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012–12. Moreover, “where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a 

medical opinion, [she] errs.” Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Garrison, 

759 F.3d at 1012). The ALJ can consider Dr. Daniels’s opinion on remand.

267 AR 499, 375, 533, 528, 536, 551 . 

268 AR 563. 

269 AR 59. 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 33

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but his left shoulder pain prevented him from doing so.270 Dr. Solomon noted that the pain, pain 

medication, and sleep apnea made the plaintiff’s schooling difficult.271

Furthermore, the ALJ gave Dr. Solomon’s opinion less than controlling weight without 

addressing the relevant factors for weighing a treating physician’s opinion. Orn, 495 F. 3d at 631. 

The ALJ must consider the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, 

nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency, specialization, and 

other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. Id. The ALJ did not address the fact 

that Dr. Solomon had been treating plaintiff as his primary-care physician since 1996 and the

evidence of at least ten visits in the administrative record since 2013. And as discussed above, Dr. 

Solomon’s opinion is consistent with the record as a whole. 

The ALJ failed to consider the Orn factors and did not offer specific and legitimate reasons for

discounting Dr. Solomon’s opinion. Thus, the ALJ erred by discounting Dr. Solomon’s medical 

opinion. 

2. Failure to Credit Testimony

2.1 Plaintiff’s Testimony

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to credit his testimony without articulating clear and 

convincing reasons. The court agrees.

In assessing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ must make two determinations. Molina, 674 F.3d 

at 1112. “First, the ALJ must determine whether there is ‘objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ligenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Second, if the claimant produces that evidence, and “there is no evidence of malingering,” the ALJ 

must provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting the claimant’s testimony 

regarding the severity of the claimant’s symptoms. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

 

270 AR 390–91.

271 AR 390. 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 34

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omitted). “At the same time, the ALJ is not ‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, 

or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(5)(A).’” Id. (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Factors that an 

ALJ may consider in weighing a claimant’s credibility include reputation for truthfulness, 

inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily activities, and unexplained, 

or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.” 

Orn, 495 F.3d at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he ALJ must identify what testimony 

is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Burrell v. Colvin, 775 

F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834); see, e.g., Morris v. Colvin, No. 16-

CV-0674-JSC, 2016 WL 7369300, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016).

Here, there was objective medical evidence of the plaintiff’s impairment, and there was no 

evidence of malingering. Thus, the ALJ needed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons 

for rejecting the plaintiff’s testimony. 

The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause some of alleged symptoms” but that the plaintiff’s “statements regarding the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects were not consistent with the medical evidence and other 

evidence in the record.”272 The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s pain symptoms were not consistent 

with his treatment with his specialists.273 The ALJ also discussed the plaintiff’s statements 

indicating that he wanted to postpone his surgery and his statements about daily activities, 

including driving.274

As stated above, an ALJ may not cherry-pick evidence to support the conclusion that a 

claimant is not disabled. Instead she must consider the evidence as a whole in making a reasoned 

disability determination. Williams v. Colvin, No. ED CV 14-2146-PLA, 2015 WL 4507174, at *6 

(C.D. Cal. July 23, 2015). The ALJ selectively relied on some entries in the record while ignoring 

 

272 AR 33. 

273 AR 34. 

274 AR 33. 

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 35

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others. A broader analysis of the record shows that the inconsistencies the ALJ relied on can be 

reconciled with the plaintiff’s statements.

The ALJ cited statements made by Dr. Lin and Dr. Daniels — that the plaintiff should be 

weaned from his narcotic-pain medication before surgery — as inconsistent with the plaintiff’s 

pain symptoms.

275 The ALJ focused on the doctors’ suggestions about the reduction in narcotic 

pain medications in the plaintiff’s treatment as opposed to the treatment record as whole, which 

shows persistent symptoms of pain, worsening of symptoms, and the recommendation of surgery 

as part of his treatment.276 Though Dr. Li did suggest that the plaintiff reduce narcotic-pain 

medications in preparation for surgery, he still treated the plaintiff for his pain through cervical, 

lumbar, and epidural injections.277 Furthermore, as the ALJ noted, more recent treatment notes 

indicate that the plaintiff continued taking narcotic medications for his pain in October 2016 and 

April 2017.278 This is consistent with the plaintiff’s continued complaints of pain. Thus, the 

alleged inconsistence was not a clear and convincing reason to reject the plaintiff’s testimony of 

his pain symptoms. 

The ALJ also stated that the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his inability to drive is inconsistent 

with the record.279 The plaintiff stated that he “no longer drives” and had not driven in the past 

year.280 The ALJ said this was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s statement to Dr. Goldman 21 

months prior to the hearing, in February 2015.281 She also cited the plaintiff’s statements that he 

drove to school in 2013 and 2014 to support her assertion that the statements are inconsistent.282

Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s statement about his inability to drive in the past year is consistent with 

 

275 AR 34. 

276 Id.

277 AR 28. 

278 AR 34, 8. 

279 AR 34. 

280 AR 58. 

281 AR 34.

282 Id.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 36

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evidence of his driving more than one year earlier. This was not a clear and convincing reason to 

reject his testimony. 

The ALJ said that the plaintiff’s statements — indicating that he needed to go through various 

procedures with his doctor prior to surgery — were inconsistent with the plaintiff’s previous 

statements to his doctor that he wanted to put off surgery until his disability case was settled.283

Contrary to the ALJ’s characterization, these two statements are not inconsistent. Dr. Daniels 

recommended a chronic-pain psychology consultation prior to surgery.284 Dr. Daniels opined that 

it was “prudent” for the plaintiff to” defer surgery until after his social-economic status 

stabilizes.”285 Dr. Summa was concerned that, due to the plaintiff’s weight and high-dose opiates, 

he was at significant risk of post-operative complications.286 The plaintiff told Dr. Solomon that he 

was “worried that [his having surgery would] cause too much work for his mom” and that he 

could not afford in-home health care.287 The plaintiff’s desire to postpone surgery appears rooted 

in financial concerns as opposed to reflecting decreased pain symptoms. Thus, this was not a clear 

and convincing reason to reject the plaintiff’s testimony.

In sum, the ALJ erred by rejecting the plaintiff’s testimony about his pain symptoms and 

limitations. 

2.2 Third-Party Testimony

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by discounting Orlene Daigle’s (the plaintiff’s 

mother’s) testimony regarding the plaintiff’s daily activities and limitations.288

The ALJ must consider “other source” testimony and evidence from a layperson. Ghanim, 763 

F.3d at 1161; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111; Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In 

determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness testimony 

 

283 Id.

284 AR 559.

285 Id.

286 AR 9. 

287 AR 576.

288 Mot. – ECF No. 25 at 29–31.

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 37

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concerning a claimant's ability to work”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“Descriptions by friends and family members in a position to observe a claimant's symptoms and 

daily activities have routinely been treated as competent evidence.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 

1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). It is competent evidence and “cannot be disregarded without 

comment.” Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). Moreover, if an ALJ decides 

to disregard the testimony of a lay witness, the ALJ must provide “specific” reasons that are 

“germane to that witness.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations 

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has not “required the ALJ to discuss every witness's testimony on an 

individualized, witness-by-witness basis.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. An ALJ may “point to” 

reasons already stated with respect to the testimony of one witness to reject similar testimony by a 

second witness. Id.

The ALJ accorded “little weight” to Orlene Daigle’s third-party function report because “she 

[was] not an acceptable medical source,” the report echoed with plaintiff’s function report, and it

was inconsistent with the medical records and other evidence.289

That Ms. Daigle was not an acceptable medical source is not a germane reason to disregard her 

testimony. See Senorina G. v. Berryhill, No. 5:18-cv-00534-JDE, 2019 WL 688206, at *8 (C.D. 

Cal. Feb. 19, 2019) (holding that the ALJ’s rejection of a layperson’s testimony simply because it 

is not from a medical professional is an “improper, non-germane” reason). The ALJ erred by

rejecting Ms. Daigle’s testimony. 

The other reason offered by the ALJ — that Ms. Daigle’s testimony was duplicative of the 

plaintiff’s — could be a germane reason to discount her opinion.

290 See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 

 

289 AR 35.

290 Compare AR 213 (the plaintiff stated that he could not stand, sit, or walk for long due to pain and 

that he could not be around a lot of people because of the effects of pain medications) with AR 252 

(Ms. Daigle stated that the plaintiff could not sit or stand for even short periods of time and suffered 

from high anxiety and panic attacks in public); compare AR 214 (the plaintiff stated that he could 

dress himself, take a bath, care for his hair, or shave only after his medication took effect) with AR 253 

(Ms. Daigle stated that the plaintiff had to be medicated before he could dress, bathe, care for his hair, 

and shave); compare AR 218 (the plaintiff stated that he could walk only 30 yards before taking a twoto three-minute break) with AR 257 (Ms. Daigle stated that the plaintiff could walk a half block before 

needing to rest for five minutes).

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ORDER – No. 17-cv-06394-LB 38

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(holding that a layperson’s testimony should be rejected if “it does not change the ultimate 

result.”). Nevertheless, given the court’s remand for reconsideration of the medical-opinion 

evidence and the plaintiff’s testimony, the court remands on this issue too.

CONCLUSION

The court grants the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denies the Commissioner’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment, and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with 

this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2019

______________________________________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge

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