Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01907/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01907-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KAREN WILLIAMS, individually

and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. S-12-1907 LKK/EFB 

v.

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

and DOES 1-50, inclusive, O R D E R

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff seeks conditional certification of a class of

current and former mortgage underwriters employed by defendant U.S.

Bank. Defendant has requested that the court seal every single

page of most of the substantive exhibits that plaintiff has

submitted in support of the conditional certification motion.1 For

the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s conditional certification

1

 To its credit, defendant has not requested the sealing of

its Form 10-K, a public document, nor the mortgage underwriter job

description. Nor has it requested the sealing of procedural

documents (proposed notice forms, postcard and envelope), and

materials taken from public websites.

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motion will be granted, and defendant’s request to seal will be

denied for the most part, and granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Karen Williams is a former mortgage underwriter for

defendant U.S. Bank (“the bank”). Plaintiff alleges that the Bank

“suffered and permitted” Williams to work overtime hours. 

Complaint (ECF No. 1) ¶ 9. However, the bank did not pay her

overtime wages, even though, Williams alleges, the Fair Labor

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., required the

bank to do so. Id.

The FLSA generally requires an employer to pay overtime wages

for employees working more than 40 hours in a week. 29 U.S.C.

§ 207. The overtime provisions do not apply however, to “exempt”

employees, including “any employee employed in a bona fide ...

administrative ... capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). In this

case, defendant classified plaintiff as exempt pursuant to the

“administrative employee” exemption. See Defendant’s Opposition

to Conditional Certification (“Opposition”) (ECF No. 33) at 6.2

Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class of U.S. Bank

mortgage underwriters, and moves here for conditional certification

of the class pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216. Plaintiff asserts that

the proposed class members were together the victims of a single

policy of defendant’s, namely, that although mortgage underwriters

were all entitled to overtime wages for overtime work, defendant

2

 The page numbers refer to the CMF/ECF page numbers, not the

internal document page numbers.

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uniformly mis-classified them as “exempt” so as to deny them the

overtime wages they were owed. See See Memorandum in Support of

Motion For Conditional Certification and Judicial Notice (“Motion”)

(ECF No. 28) at 7. Plaintiff claims that the mortgage underwriters

performed the same job duties; were uniformly classified (or misclassified), as administrative employees who were “exempt” from the

overtime compensation laws; were paid in a similar manner; and

commonly worked overtime hours without receiving overtime wages. 

See Motion at 6.

Defendant opposes the motion on the grounds that there are

conflicting declarations from the underwriters themselves – those

submitted by plaintiffs versus those submitted by defendant – about

what their job duties are, what authority they have to approve or

deny loans, and what is the basis for evaluating their job

performance. See Defendant's Mem. of Points and Authorities in

Opposition (ECF No. 33) ("Opposition") at 10-12. Defendant also

seeks to exclude plaintiff’s own declaration on the ground that it

is “contrary to her deposition testimony,” and therefore,

“inherently unreliable.” See Opposition at 9-10.

II. STANDARDS

A. Sealing Documents

Courts have long recognized a “general right to inspect

and copy public records and documents, including judicial records

and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597

(1978) (denying release of the “Nixon tapes” that were played in

open court and entered into evidence). “This right extends to

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pretrial documents filed in civil cases.” Estate of Migliaccio v.

Allianz Life Ins. Co. (In re Midlan Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Annuity

Sales Practices Lit.), 686 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012) (per

curiam). “Unless a particular court record is one ‘traditionally

kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the

starting point.” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d

1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).3 In order to

overcome this strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a

judicial record must articulate justifications for sealing that

outweigh the historical right of access and the public policies

favoring disclosure. See id. at 1178–79. 

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the public’s interest

in non-dispositive motions is relatively lower than its interest

in trial or a dispositive motion. Accordingly, a party seeking to

seal a document attached to a non-dispositive motion need only

demonstrate “good cause” to justify sealing. Pintos v. Pac.

Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying “good

cause” standard to all non-dispositive motions because such motions

“are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the

underlying cause of action”) (internal quotation marks and citation

3

 Materials traditionally kept secret include grand jury

transcripts. See Times Mirror Co. v. U.S., 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th

Cir. 1989) (“Traditionally, for example, grand jury proceedings

have been kept secret even though they are judicial proceedings

which are closely related to the criminal fact-finding process”)

(rejecting press access to search warrant materials in an on-going

criminal investigation).

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omitted), cert. denied, 562 U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 900 (2011). “The

party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific

prejudice or harm will result if no [protection] is granted.” 

Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir.

2002). That party must make a “particularized showing of good

cause with respect to any individual document.” San Jose Mercury

News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096,

1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). “Broad allegations of harm,

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning” are

insufficient. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470,

476 (9th Cir.) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d

1108, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 868 (1992).

Conversely, “the resolution of a dispute on the merits,

whether by trial or summary judgment, is at the heart of the

interest in ensuring the ‘public’s understanding of the judicial

process and of significant public events.’” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at

1179 (quoting Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of

Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, a party

seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion

or one that is presented at trial must articulate “compelling

reasons” in favor of sealing. See id. at 1178. “The mere fact that

the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment,

incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without

more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. at 1179 (citing

Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ . . .

exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for

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improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private

spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or

release trade secrets.” Id. (citing Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598).

Under the “compelling reasons” standard, a district court must

weigh “relevant factors,” base its decision “on a compelling

reason,” and “articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without

relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 679

(quoting Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir.

1995)). “[S]ources of business information that might harm a

litigant's competitive standing” often warrant protection under

seal. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.

B. Conditional Certification.

The FLSA allows a “collective action” to be brought on behalf

of “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Kress v.

PwC, 263 F.R.D. 623, 627 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (Karlton, J.). The

determination of whether prospective class members are similarly

situated is not made under the analysis required for Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23 class actions. Kress, 263 F.R.D. at 627.4 Rather, the

courts generally apply a two-tiered approach. Kress, 263 F.R.D.

at 627.5

4

 Accord, McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 495 F.3d 1136,

1139 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Section 216(b) notice “has less

to do with the due process rights of the potential plaintiffs”).

5

 There appears to be no definitive guidance on the use of the

two-tiered approach from the Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit. 

However, this court has adopted the two-tiered approach, as have

Courts of Appeals across the country. See Kress, 263 F.R.D. at

627; Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 536 (3rd

Cir. 2012) (The “two-tier approach, while nowhere mandated, ...

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Under the two tiered approach, the first tier is the “notice

stage,” which asks whether the employees are sufficiently

“similarly situated” that notice should be sent to prospective

plaintiffs under Hoffmann–La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165

(1989). Kress, 263 F.R.D. at 627. It is plaintiff’s burden to

show that the class should be conditionally certified. See id.

Plaintiff meets her burden by providing substantial allegations,

supported by declarations or discovery, that the putative class

members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or

plan.6 Id. In determining whether plaintiff has carried her

appears to have garnered wide acceptance. We implicitly embraced

this two-step approach, and we affirm its use here”); Sandoz v.

Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2008) (“More

specifically, collective actions typically proceed in two stages.

First, the plaintiff moves for conditional certification of his or

her collective action. The district court then decides, usually

based on the pleadings and affidavits of the parties, whether to

provide notice to fellow employees who may be similarly situated

to the named plaintiff, thereby conditionally certifying a

collective action. Second, once discovery is complete and the

employer moves to decertify the collective action, the court must

make a factual determination as to whether there are

similarly-situated employees who have opted in. If so, the

collective action may proceed, and if not, the court must dismiss

the opt-in employees, leaving only the named plaintiff's original

claims”) (citations omitted); White v. Baptist Memorial Health Care

Corp., 699 F.3d 869, 877 (6th Cir. 2012) (“District courts

determine whether plaintiffs are similarly situated in a two-step

process, the first at the beginning of discovery and the second

after all class plaintiffs have decided whether to opt-in and

discovery has concluded”); Thiessen v. General Electric Capital

Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We find no error on

the part of the district court in adopting the ad hoc approach”)

cert. denied, 536 U.S. 934 (2002). Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores,

Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558

U.S. 816 (2009).

6

 Although plaintiff has the burden here of showing that she

and the other mortgage underwriters were the victims of a single

decision, policy or plan, the court keeps in mind that it is the

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burden, the court need not consider evidence provided by

defendants. Id., at 628. The determination is made based on a

fairly lenient standard.7

 Id.

To make her showing, plaintiff must provide some allegations

or evidence “indicating that prospective class members share

similar job duties.” Id., at 630. Accordingly, whether the

mortgage underwriters are “substantially similar” must be evaluated

in light of the issues raised by plaintiff’s particular FLSA claim. 

In this case, as noted, plaintiff’s claim is that defendant has

mis-classified the mortgage underwriters as “exempt” administrative

employees.8

 Accordingly, the question to be decided on this motion

is whether plaintiff’s evidence indicates that the propriety of the

classification may be determined on a collective basis. Id. It

is not sufficient to show that defendant’s alleged misdefendant that will bear the burden of proof on the ultimate

question of whether the mortgage underwriters were properly

classified as “exempt.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,

635 F.3d 383, 391 (9th Cir.) (“The employer always has the burden

of showing the exemption applies to its employee”), cert. denied,

565 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011).

7 The certification, which is within the court’s discretion,

is “conditional,” because it may be revisited once the case is

ready for trial. Kress, 263 F.R.D. at 628. If the court finds

initial certification appropriate, it may order notice to be

delivered to potential plaintiffs. Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at

172. We are at the first stage. The second stage is typically

triggered by an employer's motion for decertification, and usually

comes at the conclusion of discovery.

8

 Technically, plaintiff’s claim is only that defendant misclassified her and her fellow mortgage underwriters as “exempt,”

since defendant did not disclose until it filed its Opposition that

the specific exemption it claimed was the “administrative”

exemption.

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classification affected all proposed class members. Id. On the

other hand, plaintiff need not conclusively establish that

collection resolution is proper, because defendant will be free to

revisit this issue at the close of discovery. Id.

Application of the administrative exemption is fact specific. 

Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (“The exempt or nonexempt status of any

particular employee must be determined on the basis of whether the

employee's salary and duties meet the requirements of the

regulations in this part”). In order to qualify for the exemption,

“an employee’s ‘primary duty’ must be the performance of exempt

work,” and the determination of an employee’s “primary duty” is

“based on all the facts in a particular case.” 29 C.F.R. §

541.700(a). However, the need to examine the facts of an

employee's work does not categorically preclude collective

determination of exemption. In cases concerning exemption, courts

have found collective certification appropriate where evidence

indicates that prospective class members' job duties were

substantially similar. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Seal.

Defendant moves to seal the following documents, attached as

exhibits to the Declaration of Matthew C. Helland in Support of

Motion for Conditional Certification:

////

////

////

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1. The entirety of Exhibit 1 (January 17, 2013

Deposition Transcript Excerpts of Alan

Leimkuehler).

a. Description of the exhibit.

Exhibit 1 consists of excerpts of the January 17, 2013

deposition transcript of Alan Leimkuehler. These excerpts, which

defendant asks this court to seal in their entirety, include: the

title pages; the exhibit list; the page containing nothing more

than Mr. Leimkuehler spelling his name and acknowledging that he

is there for a deposition; the jurat page and the Reporter’s

Certificate page.9 Also included in the blanket Request To Seal

are: a discussion of information contained in defendant’s Form 10-

K, a public document filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange

Commission;10 a discussion of positions and departments within the

bank;11 discussions of the specific job duties of the mortgage

9

 The court lists these absurdities to emphasize the fact the

defendant made no effort at all to seal only those portions of the

substantive exhibits that it actually wanted to protect as

confidential. Counsel should keep in mind that their Request To

Seal is subject to the requirements, and the sanctions, of Rule 11,

which applies to “Every pleading, written motion, and other paper”

filed with this court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (emphasis added); see

also, E.D. Cal. R. 110 (sanctions for noncompliance with rules).

10 Meanwhile, plaintiff filed the Form 10-K itself as an

exhibit, without any objection or request to seal (which would be

equally frivolous), by defendant.

11 During the deposition discussion on positions and

departments, counsel for defendant interjected that “This

conversation about U.S. Bank’s methods to prevent fraud and stuff

is confidential to the bank, so can we mark this portion of the

transcript as confidential?” Tr. at 40. She goes on to state: “To

the extent that it’s gone beyond just identifying positions and

extending the steps that the bank takes, that’s considered

confidential.” Id. This brief interjection indicates that at the

time of the deposition, defendant did not consider it to be

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underwriters;12 training of mortgage underwriters;13 general

statements of mortgage underwriters’ compensation and incentives;14

confidential simply to identify which positions existed at the

bank, although, not surprisingly, counsel wanted to protect any

detailed discussion of fraud prevention tools. Having apparently

abandoned the sensible position it took at the deposition, the bank

now seeks to seal even discussions of what departments and

positions exist at the bank.

12 Yet, defendant itself has submitted the Mortgage

Underwriter Job Description, setting forth a “General Summary,” a

list of “Essential Functions,” a “Specification[]” of the “general

nature and level of work,” and a “Leveling Guide” that

distinguishes the three levels of mortgage underwriter. See

Exh. C. (ECF No. 33-2) to the March 14, 2013 Decl. of Hali M.

Anderson ("Anderson Decl.") (ECF No. 33-1).

Defendant has also submitted deposition transcript excerpts

and declarations that set forth, in some detail, the specific job

duties of the mortgage underwriter. See, e.g., Exh. D (Adams

deposition) (ECF No. 33-2 at 20-26)(describing, among other things,

the impact of specific credit information on the loan decision);

Exh. F (Miller deposition) (ECF No. 33-2 at 36-48) (describing,

among other things, how the mortgage underwriter responds when a

particular type of loan cannot be approved, and describing the

specific steps the mortgage underwriter takes when a loan

application is “suspended”); Exh. G (Bunnell deposition) (ECF No.

33-2 at 49-54) (describing, among other things, when the mortgage

underwriter had to get supervisor authority to approve a loan);

Exh. I (Beckfeld Decl.) (ECF No. 33-2 at 58-65) (describing, among

other things, the specific steps the mortgage underwriter takes

upon receiving a loan application: “the first thing I do is look

at the initial AUS results, the applicant’s credit, analyze their

debt ratio, their assets, and then the appraisal ...”); and Exh. J

(Campbell Decl.) (ECF No. 33-2 at 66-74) (describing, among other

things, how her performance is evaluated).

13 Yet, defendant itself has submitted evidence relating to

the training of mortgage underwriters. See, e.g., Exh. K (Crapser

Decl.) (ECF No. 33-2 at 75-82) ¶ 7 (“U.S. Bank always provides

ongoing training such as self-employed courses, VA training, and

mortgage insurance training”).

14 The deponent talks about documents relating to compensation

and incentives, but is never asked about, nor discloses, any

specific dollar figures or incentive details (other than,

generically, “a bonus”), from those documents.

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discussions about employee discipline; performance expectations for

mortgage underwriters;15 and whether mortgage underwriters are

classified as “exempt” and whether they are eligible for

overtime.16

Unsurprisingly, plaintiff opposed this astoundingly broad

request to seal the entirety of most of plaintiff’s substantive

exhibits.

b. Request to seal Exhibit 1.

Defendant’s request to seal will be denied, both on legal

grounds and on factual grounds. As a legal matter, defendant’s

request to seal is improper under the standards articulated by the

Yet, defendant itself has submitted evidence relating to

compensation and incentives. See, e.g., Exh. L (Dougherty Decl.)

(ECF No. 33-2 at 83-90) (disclosing the dollar amount of her

salary, and the fact that she “can earn incentives for underwriting

a certain amount of loans of good quality,” and that “the incentive

bonus is a reward for working extra hours to review additional

files”).

15 Yet, defendant has submitted evidence relating to the

performance expectations of mortgage underwriters. See, e.g.,

Exh. M (Flach Decl.) (ECF No. 33-2 at 91-98) (describing, among

other things, how “[t]he quality of my underwriting factors into

my performance evaluations,” and that “I am not evaluated only on

my productivity. I understand the quality of my underwriting to

be a critical component of the job and I know U.S. Bank is

evaluating it because it is in our performance evaluations”).

16 These are, of course, the key contentions of this case, and

they are undisputed, yet defendant requests that the court seal the

transcript portions relating to them.

Moreover, defendant itself has asserted that “U.S. Bank has

classified them [‘U.S. Bank’s Mortgage Underwriters’] as exempt

administrative employees.” Opposition at 2. Further, defendant

has provided evidence confirming that its mortgage underwriters are

not paid overtime wages. See, e.g., Exh. N (Glatte Decl.) (ECF No.

33-2 at 99-106) (“I am paid the same base amount regardless of how

many hours per week I actually work”).

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Ninth Circuit. In its Request To Seal, defendant asserts that the

documents (“95 pages total”), “all relate to U.S. Bank’s internal

underwriting and/or compensation policies, procedures, and

practices.” Request To Seal (ECF No. 23-1) at 3 (emphasis added). 

Based upon this assertion, defendant asserts that every page of

most of plaintiff’s substantive exhibits is protected from

disclosure as “trade secrets,” “proprietary information,” and

“information that U.S. Bank considers confidential” based upon the

parties’ stipulated Protective Order.

Defendant has thus failed to identify with any particularity

which of the 95 pages is actually confidential and needs to be

sealed, as required by the Ninth Circuit standards. Instead, it

has requested the sealing of all 95 pages of exhibits, without

regard to the plainly non-confidential nature of most of them as

described above. Possibly worse, defendant seeks to seal

plaintiff’s evidence regarding issues that defendant has produced

evidence on. In many cases, defendant’s evidence is specific and

detailed, yet it fully discloses it, while asking the court to seal

the far more general discussion of the exact same thing, as

submitted by plaintiff.

Given the opportunity to defend and narrow its request to

seal, defendant refused to back down on Exhibit 1. See Reply in

Support of Request To Seal (“Seal Reply”) (ECF No. 23-1) at 2.

Instead, defendant asserts, for example, that the deponent

testified about “the specifics of U.S. Bank’s compensation

policies.” Id., at 2. This is problematic for at least two

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reasons. First, defendant does not identify where in deponent’s

testimony, these “specifics” are located. Second, the court

searches the transcript in vain for these “specifics.” Thus, the

assertion is legally insufficient, and appears to be factually

untrue.

The deposition transcript includes much general information

about compensation: underwriters are paid a “base salary,” and they

may earn an “incentive,” which may be a “bonus.” The most specific

information about the incentive tells, in general terms, how the

incentive is calculated, that is, how many loan files must be

completed and in what time period, in order to earn the incentive.

In any event, nowhere in the deposition transcript is the

amount of the salary disclosed,17 nor the amount of any incentive,

nor the amount of any bonus. Defendant does not advise the court

why any of the information disclosed in the deposition transcript

is confidential. Defendant, in its Reply, asserts that its

“compensation structure” is confidential. However it does not

assert which information in the transcript discloses the

compensation structure: is it that the bank pays its employees;

that the mortgage underwriters are eligible for incentive pay; that

the incentive pay is determined by a formula; or is it the formula

itself? Aside from the specifics of the formula itself, defendant

has freely disclosed all of this, in its declarations opposing

conditional certification. These declarations disclose that the

17 The declarations submitted by defendant disclose specific

salaries of mortgage underwriters.

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employees are paid a salary, that they are eligible for incentive

pay, and that the amount of the incentive depends on how many loans

they underwrite.18

By seeking to seal the entirety of this discussion, defendant

fails to identify with any particularity which portion of it is

really confidential. If defendant wished to seal, for example, a

discussion of the specific formula used to determine incentive pay,

it should have made such a request. It failed to do so, and

accordingly, Exhibit 1 will not be sealed.

Defendant makes a similar request to protect its “confidential

internal policies and guidelines.” But once again, it fails to

identify which portions of the deposition transcript discloses this

information. The court will not guess which information defendant

is referring to.

2. The entirety of Exhibit 2 (Janury 17 & 18, 2013

deposition transcript excerpts of plaintiff).

Exhibit 2 consists of excerpts of two deposition transcripts

of Lisa Park. These excerpts, which defendant asks this court to

seal in their entirety, include: the title pages, Attorney

Appearances page, exhibit list, jurat page, and the Reporter’s

Certification page; the introductory pages, in which the deponent

18 See Beckfeld Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) ¶ 5 (“In addition to my

salary, I am able to earn incentives if I underwrite a certain

amount of loans and the loans are of good quality”); Campbell Decl.

(ECF NO. 33-2) at 68 ¶ 5 (same); Crapser Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) at

77 ¶ 5 (same); Daugherty Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) at 85 ¶ 5 (same);

Flach Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) at 93 ¶ 7 (same); Glatte Decl. (ECF

No. 33-2) at 101 ¶ 5 (same); Jenkins Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) at 109

¶ 5 (same); Larson Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) at 118 ¶ 6 (same); Streff

Decl. (ECF No. 33-2) at 126 ¶ 5 (same).

15

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states her name and that she is there to testify on behalf of

defendant; a discussion of the locations of certain cities and

towns – locations of defendant’s branches – such as “Chicago,”19

“Los Alamitos” (California), “Denver” (Colorado), and “Portland”

(Oregon); the birthplace of plaintiff’s counsel, and the

distinction between where counsel was “born,” and where he is

“from;”20 requirements and expectations of mortgage underwriters;

how mortgage underwriters are evaluated; whether the mortgage

underwriters are classified as “exempt,” and whether they are

eligible for overtime pay; whether mortgage underwriters obtain

training; whether mortgage underwriters’ hours are logged; a

discussion of the deponent’s job; how fraud is detected and

addressed; mortgage underwriter compensation and incentive plans

(apart from the absence of overtime pay); specific programs used

for mortgage underwriter training; how defendant responds when

facing a payment default; mention of the existence of a quality

assurance department; and specifics of how an underwriting

assignment is carried out.

This request is subject to the same weakness as discussed for

Exhibit 1. Most of the discussion in the transcript is freely

disclosed elsewhere by defendant. The court will not do the

defendant’s job of separating out which portions of the transcripts

need to be sealed, from those that do not. It may well be, for

19 The deponent testifies that it is in Illinois.

20 “I was [born in Edina] ... but I’m not an Edina guy.”

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example, that even the very general discussion about fraud

prevention could be subject to sealing. However, defendant does

not ask that the general discussion on fraud be sealed, rather it

requests that all the transcript excerpts (and most of plaintiff’s

other substantive exhibits) be sealed. The court will not guess

which portions of the transcript defendant really has in mind. 

Accordingly the request to seal Exhibit 2 will be denied.

3. Exhibits 3-5, 8.

Exhibits 3-5 and 8 consist of employee incentive plans. 

Plaintiff has not specifically opposed the request to seal these

exhibits (although they have objected to requests to seal the

deposition testimony in which these exhibits are discussed). These

documents are not necessary for the court’s decision on this motion

for conditional certification, and accordingly, the request to seal

them will be granted, without prejudice, and only with respect to

this motion. That is, plaintiff may re-submit these exhibits, if

they are necessary for the court’s decision on another matter, and

any subsequent request to seal them can be determined at that time.

4. Exhibits 6, 7 and 9.

Exhibit 6 is an “Action Plan” for “Unsatisfactory

Performance,” for a specific, named employee. Exhibit 7 is a

“Performance Review” for a specific, named employee. Exhibit 9 is

a company email regarding the job performance of a specific, named

employee.

Defendant apparently (and sensibly), no longer requests that

these exhibits be sealed in their entireties, and instead agrees

17

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with plaintiff that “employee names in performance reviews and

emails relating to job performance” should be redacted. Defendants

also request that any employee identification numbers be redacted. 

The court accordingly will deny the request to seal these documents

in their entireties, and instead will direct plaintiff to redact

all employee identification numbers from the exhibits. In

addition, plaintiff should redact all employee names where the

employee is the subject of the document. That is, there is no need

to redact the names of the persons writing or receiving an email,

or the person writing the Action Plan or the person writing the

Performance Review.

B. Conditional Certification

1. The Prospective Class Members – Similarly Situated.

The basics of plaintiff’s initial showing are not in dispute. 

Defendant has classified all of its mortgage underwriters, the

prospective class members, as “exempt,” and has done so at least

since 2009. Rule 30(b)6 Dep. of U.S. Bank (Alan Leikmuehler)

(January 17, 2013) (“Leimkuehler Depo.”) / Exhibit 1, Pages 55 &

102.21 Also, the prospective class members are not eligible for

overtime pay. Id., at Page 62. As for the specifics of the

administrative exemption, plaintiff has submitted sufficient

evidence in support of her claim that the prospective class members

are “similarly situated.”

21 The citations to the as-yet unfiled deposition transcripts

refer to the page numbers at the bottom of the transcripts, reading

“Exhibit ___, Page ___.”

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a. Are mortgage underwriters helping to run the

business?

An employee earning over $455 per week22 is exempt as an

“administrative” employee if her “primary duty” is “the performance

of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or

general business operations of the employer or the employer’s

customers,” and her “primary duty includes the exercise of

discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of

significance.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200(a)(2), (a)(3); cf. Miller v.

Farmers Ins. Exchange (In re Farmers Ins. Exchange, Claims

Representatives' Overtime Pay Litigation), 481 F.3d 1119, 1127

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing the 2004 version of the regulation).

In turn, work is “directly related to the management or

general business operations” if it is “directly related to

assisting with the running or servicing of the business.” 29

C.F.R. § 541.201(a). That is, the essence of the exemption is that

the mortgage underwriters must be engaged in, or least assist in,

“the running of a business,” including the determination of “its

overall course or policies.” Bratt v. County of Los Angeles 912

F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 1990) (interpreting an earlier version

of the regulation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991). This does

not include merely “the day-to-day carrying out” of the business’s

affairs. Id.

Plaintiff has presented common proof of what defendant’s

22 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a) (exemptions apply only to

employees “compensated on a salary basis at a rate of not less than

$455 per week”).

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business is, as it relates to the mortgage underwriters. The

defendant’s Form 10-K sets forth in excruciating detail what that

business is. See Declaration of Matthew C. Helland in Support of

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification (“Helland Decl.”),

Exh. 3 (ECF No. 29-3). Plaintiff has also presented common proof

– in the form of declarations and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions of

defendant – of the mortgage underwriters’ job duties, their day-today activities, their compensation, and how they are evaluated. 

At the level of scrutiny appropriate to this stage of the

litigation, this evidence tends to show that the mortgage

underwriters are not engaged in running the defendant’s business. 

Rather, it tends to show that they are engaged in the day-to-day

carrying out of the business of mortgage lending.

For example, plaintiff’s evidence is that the decisions about

who will get a loan is made by the defendant, through its lending

guidelines and policies.23 The mortgage underwriters, according to

plaintiff’s evidence, compare the documentation they receive from

a loan applicant against the guidelines and policies set out for

them, to determine whether the loan applicant meets the

requirements of the guidelines and policies. On its face, this is

evidence that the mortgage underwriters – all of them – are not

engaged in running the business or setting underwriting policy, but

23 As defendant points out, the underwriters themselves are

not of one voice on whether they have “final” say on granting or

denying these loans. However, it is undisputed that whether their

say is final or preliminary, it is made only pursuant to the

guidelines and policies set forth by defendant, and which they are

required to follow.

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simply carrying out the day-to-day determinations of whether

Applicant A meets guidelines B, C and D. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.704

(“The section 13(a)(1) exemptions are not available ... for

employees who simply apply well-established techniques or

procedures described in manuals or other sources within closely

prescribed limits to determine the correct response to an inquiry

or set of circumstances”).24

Plaintiff’s evidence includes declarations from prospective

class member mortgage underwriters working in defendant’s offices

in North Dakota, California, Oregon and Colorado. Each states,

that her “primary job duty” is to ensure that “the loans that were

approved by defendants were approved pursuant to various policies,

procedures and guidelines.”25 The Mortgage Underwriter Job

Description plaintiff submitted also indicates that plaintiffs

approve or deny loans “within certain limits,” and sets out

specific duties apparently applicable to all mortgage underwriters

in the prospective class. See Helland Decl., Exh. 8 (“Job

Description”) (ECF No. 29-12).

24 However, “The use of manuals, guidelines or other

established procedures containing or relating to highly technical,

scientific, legal, financial or other similarly complex matters

that can be understood or interpreted only by those with advanced

or specialized knowledge or skills does not preclude exemption

under section 13(a)(1) of the Act or the regulations in this part.

Such manuals and procedures provide guidance in addressing

difficult or novel circumstances and thus use of such reference

material would not affect an employee's exempt status.” Id.

25 See ¶ 3 of the Declarations of Andreasen (ECF No. 28-3),

Leiting (ECF No. 28-4), Trump (ECF No. 28-5), Miller (ECF No. 28-

6), Conner (ECF No. 28-7), and Williams (ECF No. 28-8); Leimkuehler

Depo. at 53.

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According to plaintiff’s evidence, the mortgage underwriters

follow the policies, procedures and guidelines applicable to their

work. See Job Description (evaluates loan applications “in

accordance with industry and business unit standards;” develops

loan underwriting portfolio “consistent with the Bank’s

guidelines”). The prospective class members do not create or

modify these policies, procedures or guidelines.26 They do not

price the loans. Leimkuehler Depo. at 53. They do not monitor the

loans’ compliance with legal requirements. Leimkuehler Depo. at

55. They do not conduct post-closing audits of any loans. 

Leimkuehler Depo. at 56. Although there are different levels or

types of underwriters, they all apply the same guidelines. 

Leimkuehler Depo. at 74. While there is some “flexibility” or

“variance” in how the mortgage underwriters carry out their jobs,

“[a]s part of the day-to-day duties, the variance would be limited

to guidelines given to the underwriters.” Leimkuehler Depo. at 21. 

None of the prospective class members determine what type of loan

would be offered. ECF Nos. 28-3 to 28-8.

The above evidence, taken from plaintiffs’ declarations and

the defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, are sufficient to show

that the prospective class members are “similarly situated” in

respect to whether they are running a business, or simply engaged

26 See ¶ 3 of the Declarations of Andreasen (ECF No. 28-3),

Leiting (ECF No. 28-4), Trump (ECF No. 28-5), Miller (ECF No. 28-

6), Conner (ECF No. 28-7), and Williams (ECF No. 28-8); Leimkuehler

Depo. at 53.

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in the day-to-day carrying out of the business.27

b. Defendant’s showing.

Defendant opposes the motion based upon its assertion that it

has submitted declarations that say “the opposite” of what

plaintiff’s declarations state. Even if defendant were correct in

its assertion, it is not enough to rebut the plaintiff’s showing.28

Defendant asserts that plaintiff is incorrect in asserting

that mortgage underwriters do not make “counter-offers.” 

Opposition at 10-11. Rather, according to defendant,

“understanding the different types of loans U.S. Bank offers, and

suggesting alternatives where appropriate [making counter-offers],

was part of the Mortgage Underwriters’ duties.” Id.

Defendant fails to explain, however, how making counter-offers

affects the determination of whether an employee is exempt. For

example, is defendant arguing that an employee who makes a counteroffer is running the business, or that she exercises discretion and

independent judgment, or both. If defendant is arguing that it

shows discretion and independent judgment, then it is not relevant

to the task at hand, because plaintiff, at this point, has not

relied on that portion of the exemption. Even if counter-offer

27 Plaintiff makes no mention of the other two requirements

for the administrative exemption. Since it will be defendant’s

burden to establish that all three requirements are satisfied,

plaintiff is entitled to take this course, however risky.

28 In any event, defendant is not correct that its

declarations say “the opposite” of what plaintiff’s say. Defendant

has simply submitted declarations that put a different “spin” on

what plaintiff’s declarants have said.

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making demonstrates that mortgage underwriters exercise discretion

and independent judgment, they are still not exempt if they are not

engaged in the running of the business.

Even assuming there is a dispute here relating to the business

and management portion of the exemption, it is irrelevant to the

task of determining whether plaintiff has shown that mortgage

underwriters are “similarly situated” for purposes of the

administrative exemption. All defendant has done is shown that

some U.S. Bank mortgage underwriters believe that making counteroffers is one of their job duties, while others believe that it is

not part of their job.29 However this “dispute” is resolved, it

does not contribute to resolution of the critical question of what

the mortgage underwriters’ “primary duty” is.

Defendant does not assert that plaintiff’s “primary duty” is

making counter-offers, nor is there any evidence that it is. 

Whether an individual, cherry-picked job duty is or is not

applicable to mortgage underwriters simply does not assist the

court in determining whether they shared “primary” job duties. In

other words, even if an underwriter makes a counter-offer once each

month, for example, and assuming that making counter-offers is an

exempt job duty, if she spends the remaining 99% of her job doing

29 In any event, even if the court were simply to credit

defendant’s declarations and disregard plaintiff’s allegedly

contrary ones – even though there is no legal basis for doing so

at this stage – then it would still be the case that the

prospective class members were “similarly situated.” That is, they

are similarly situated because they do make counter-offers when

appropriate (rather than being similarly situated because they do

not make counter-offers).

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non-exempt work, then she is not exempt. Thus, resolving the

esoteric question of whether the mortgage underwriters do or do not

make counter-offers is pointless without the information defendant

has failed to present: is this the mortgage underwriters’ primary

duty? Alternatively, does this, added together with other exempt

duties, comprise the mortgage underwriters’ primary duty? It

simply is not enough to identify isolated activities that a

mortgage underwriter might engage in. The activities must be

exempt, and they must comprise the underwriter’s primary duties.

Defendant appears to argue that 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b) is

conclusive on whether mortgage underwriters are exempt or not. 

However, that regulation only provides “examples” of employees in

the financial services industry who “generally” meet the

requirements for the administrative exemption. This regulation may

be useful when, in due course, the court is called upon to rule on

the merits of the exemption.30 This motion, however, is about

30 The regulation provides:

Employees in the financial services industry generally

meet the duties requirements for the administrative

exemption if their duties include work such as

collecting and analyzing information regarding the

customer's income, assets, investments or debts;

determining which financial products best meet the

customer's needs and financial circumstances; advising

the customer regarding the advantages and disadvantages

of different financial products; and marketing,

servicing or promoting the employer's financial

products. However, an employee whose primary duty is

selling financial products does not qualify for the

administrative exemption.

 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b).

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whether the class should be conditionally certified, not whether

plaintiff or defendant will ultimately prevail on the merits of the

lawsuit.

Defendant further asserts that the declarations contradict

each other on how mortgage underwriters are evaluated. In fact,

there is no contradiction in the declarations. Plaintiff’s

declarations state that they are eligible for incentives if they

complete a certain number of loans, which is exactly what

defendant’s declarations say. Defendant’s declarations go further,

however, and state that the loans must also be of a certain quality

to actually receive the incentive. These statements are not

“opposite” or “contradictory.” Moreover, even if the court were

to accept defendant’s declarations in full, and reject plaintiff’s,

they would show that mortgage underwriters are “similarly situated”

in how they are evaluated.31

The remainder of defendant’s arguments essentially attack

plaintiff’s motion for failing to “prove” that the mortgage

underwriters were mis-classified as exempt. Defendant’s arguments

31 Defendant also asserts that, according to the evidence,

some mortgage underwriters are the final decisionmakers on loans,

while others are not, showing that they are not “similarly

situated.” See Opposition at 12. However, in the same brief,

defendant asserts that they are all final decisionmakers: “U.S.

Bank’s Mortgage Underwriters ... are the final decision-makers for

U.S. Bank.” Opposition at 6. Defendant, in short, is arguing both

that all mortgage underwriters are final decision-makers, and that

some are not. Its “argument” here will be disregarded, although

defendant is well advised to resolve its cognitive dissonance

before the court reaches the merits portion of this case.

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fail because, first, it will be defendant’s burden (not

plaintiff’s) to show that the underwriters were properly classified

as exempt. Second, this is a motion for conditional certification,

and the court is not called upon here to make the merits

determination that defendant seeks.

Even if the court were to consider contradictory evidence at

this stage – which the cases indicate is not appropriate – there

simply is nothing there that contradicts plaintiffs’ evidence. The

defendants’ evidence simply puts a different “spin” on it. For

example, defendant asserts that its evidence shows that mortgage

underwriters engage in “‘analyzing loan applications to determine

a customer’s creditworthiness.’” But that is what plaintiff’s

evidence shows, just phrased differently. Defendant does not

dispute that in analyzing loan applications, mortgage underwriters

are bound by the bank’s guidelines.

B. Williams as Class Representative.

Defendant asserts that plaintiff signed a severance agreement

upon leaving U.S. Bank that waived “all claims upon termination of

her employment.” Opposition at 20. However it appears that “an

individual employee's right to a minimum wage and to overtime pay

under the Act [FLSA],” is “nonwaivable.” Barrentine v.

Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981). It

would appear therefore, that plaintiff’s “waiver” is of no legal

significance.

C. Notice

Plaintiff has submitted a proposed notice to potential class

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members. See Proposed Notice (ECF No. 29-15). Defendant has three

objections to the Proposed Notice.

1. Warning that plaintiffs may be liable for costs and

counterclaims.

Defendant argues that potential class plaintiffs should be

warned that they “may be held liable for costs associated with the

lawsuit and for potential counterclaims that could be asserted

against them.” Opposition at 20-21. The only counterclaim

defendant identifies is something it calls “breach of the Release

of Claims” against an employee who signed a “Release of Claims.” 

However it appears that “an individual employee's right to a

minimum wage and to overtime pay under the Act [FLSA],” is

“nonwaivable.” Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740. Defendant does not

explain how it could have a counterclaim for “breach of Release of

Claim,” even if such a cause of action otherwise exists, in light

of Barrentine.

As for costs of the lawsuit, plaintiffs’ counsel represents

and states in a Declaration: “In my firm’s fee agreements with

individual Plaintiffs, my firm has agreed to pay all costs imposed

on Plaintiffs, to the extent ethical rules allow. We would not

pass these costs back on to individual Plaintiffs.” Reply

Declaration of Matthew C. Helland (ECF No. 35-1) ¶ 4. Moreover,

defendant has not identified a single instance where an FLSA class

plaintiff has been taxed the costs of suit. In light of this, it

appears that the proposed warning would have the sole effect of

chilling potential plaintiffs’ participation in this lawsuit.

28

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2. Limitations and Opt-In Period.

Defendant argues that the notice be directed only to persons

who are within the two-year statute of limitations, rather than the

three-year period applicable to “willful” violations. Defendant

asserts that plaintiff has failed to establish an “evidentiary

basis” for a willful violation in their motion. Defendant offers

no citation to any authority, nor any explanation for why a motion

for conditional certification should include substantive evidence

of a willful violation. The defendant’s objection appears without

substantive justification and is overruled. Plaintiffs have

sufficiently alleged a willful violation in their complaint, and

will be put to their proof at the appropriate time.32 The

evidentiary burden plaintiffs have in this motion, is to show the

court that the proposed plaintiffs are “similarly situated,” a

burden they have met.

Defendant also objects to the 90-day opt-in period, proposing

instead a 60-day period, “which courts in this Circuit have found

to be reasonable,” citing two cases, one from the District of

Nevada and one from the Northern District of California. The

objection, in other words, offers no independent reason the period

should be reduced from 90 to 60 days, considering that some courts

in this Circuit have approved 60 days, and others have approved 90

32 In any event, plaintiffs’ evidence submitted in support of

the motion for conditional certification clearly shows that

defendant willfully declined to pay overtime wages to employees who

worked overtime hours. The question of whether this is lawful or

not is the ultimate question to be decided by this court.

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days.33 The objection is overruled.

3. Neutral third party administrator.

Defendant reminds the court that “trial courts must take care

to avoid even the appearance of judicial endorsement of the merits

of the action.” Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174. However,

defendant does not explain why the proposed notice would violate

judicial neutrality in this case. The objection is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

33 See, e.g., Gee v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 2011 WL 722111 at

*4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (in an FLSA collective action regarding

mortgage underwriters, the court approves a 90-day opt-in period

for mortgage underwriters) (Seeborg, J.); Ramirez v. Ghilotti

Bros. Inc., 2013 WL 1786636 at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (Breyer, J.) (in

a case involving laborers, the court authorized notice in English

and in Spanish, and rejected defendant’s “proposed reduction of the

opt-in period from 90 to 60 days”); Brewer v. General Nutrition

Corp., 2013 WL 100195 at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (Rogers, J.)

(regarding retail store employees, “[t]he opt-in period shall be

90 days from the date the notice is sent”); Collinge v.

Intelliquick Delivery, Inc., 2012 WL 3108836, 3 (D. Ariz. 2012)

(Sedwick, J.) (regarding delivery drivers, the court rejected

defendant’s 30-day proposal, and plaintiff’s 90-day proposal, and

concluded that “sixty days from the date of the notice is an

appropriate opt-in period”); Sanchez v. Sephora USA, Inc., 2012

WL 2945753 at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Armstrong, J.) (regarding

salespersons, “the Court finds that a notice period of sixty days

sufficiently balances both parties' concerns and is reasonable

under the circumstances presented”) (and collecting cases); Luque

v. AT&T Corp., 2010 WL 4807088 at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (Breyer, J.)

(regarding telephone company field managers, court approves a 60-

day opt-in period); Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F. Supp. 2d

1124, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (Wilken, J.) (regarding bank's

information technology employees, court approved a 75-day opt-in

period); Stanfield v. First NLC Fin. Svcs., LLC, 2006 WL 3190527

at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Armstrong, J.) (regarding loan officers,

court approved 60-day opt-in period); Carrillo v. Schneider

Logistics, Inc., 2012 WL 556309 at *15 (C.D. Cal.) (180–day opt-in

period appropriate for class of low-income migrant workers), aff'd

mem. on another issue, 501 Fed. Appx. 713 (9th Cir. 2012).

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1. Defendant’s Request to Seal Exhibits 1 and 2, is

DENIED, and plaintiff shall file these documents, unredacted, in

the public docket no later than 21 days from the date of this

order;

2. Defendant’s Request to Seal Exhibits 3-5 and 8, is

GRANTED, as unopposed (that is, not on the merits), and without

prejudice to plaintiff’s ability to re-submit them in connection

with another motion;

3. Defendant’s Request to Seal Exhibits 6, 7 and 9, is

DENIED, except to the degree that the request seeks the redaction

of the names of employees who are the subject of those performancerelated documents, and except to the degree that it seeks the

redaction of all employee identification numbers, and plaintiff

shall file redacted versions of these documents in the public

docket no later than 21 days from the date of this order;

4. Plaintiffs shall file unredacted versions of their

memoranda and supporting documents in support of the motion for

conditional certification, retaining only such redactions, if any,

as are necessary to comply with this order;

5. Plaintiff’s motion for conditional certification is

GRANTED; and

6. Plaintiff shall send its Notice of Collective Action

Lawsuit forthwith to all potential class members. The notice shall

contain no advertising, commentary or any other material, other

than what is disclosed at ECF No. 29-15.

////

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 20, 2013.

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