Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01955/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01955-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

05cv1955

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATT LYON WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants. 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 05-CV-1955-J (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS BY 

DEFENDANT SAN DIEGO COUNTY

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS [Doc. No.

14]

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss

brought by Defendant San Diego County Board of Supervisors

(“Defendant Board”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Plaintiff Matt Lyon Williams (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,

opposes. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted

and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. 

For the following reasons, the Court recommends that Defendant

Board’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement while in custody at the San Diego

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 05cv1955

Central Jail pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predators

Act (“SVP Act”) for approximately 110 days in 2002, 75 days in

2004, and 42 days in 2005. See Compl. at pg. 5. Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that as a civil detainee under the SVP Act, he

should not have been forced into detention at the Central Jail

with criminal detainees. Rather, Plaintiff contends, sexually

violent predators are entitled to separate and distinct housing

conditions. See, e.g., Compl. at pg. 13. 

Plaintiff further alleges that he was subjected to the

following conditions of confinement: exposure to bodily fluids

and wastes, lack of sanitation, uncovered food that was exposed

to bacteria and viruses, being fed by penal detainees which

subjected him to an extremely stressful situation, nonconfidential telephone calls, a cell with lights on 24 hours per

day, a cell with a thin and therapeutically inefficient mattress,

limited personal visits, denial of the opportunity to exercise

his religion, public strip searches, non-confidential mail,

inadequate medical treatment, exposure to physical harm from a

penal arrestee while being transported, exposure to pepper spray

when criminal detainees got into an altercation, and days in a

holding cell without a mattress, blanket, or sheets. See Compl.

at pgs. 15-16. 

On October 14, 2005, Plaintiff commenced this action

alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against Defendant Board and Sheriff Bill Kolender. 

Defendant Kolender filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint on

May 24, 2006. Defendant Board moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 05cv1955

granted. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

claims in the complaint. A claim can only be dismissed if it

“appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The court must accept as true

all material allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable

inferences to be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. N.L. Indus., Inc.

v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks Sch. of Bus.,

Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

The court looks not at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974). Unless it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim, a

complaint cannot be dismissed without leave to amend. Conley,

355 U.S. at 45-46; see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129-

30 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Where a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe

the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of

the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson,

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 05cv1955

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled in the

law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in

pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of

counsel.”). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil

rights complaint, however, a court may not “supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd.

of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty.

Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “The

plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the

plaintiff’s claim.” Jones, 733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation

omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Board is liable for his

injuries because it, in cooperation with Defendant Kolender, “is

responsible for establishing, developing, implementing and

allocating funds for[] all policies, practices and customs for

the San Diego [Central] Jail.” Compl. at pg. 3; see also Pl.’s

Opp’n at 2-3, 6. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Board

“is directly responsible for all aspects of [P]laintiff’s

existence while housed in the Jail, and additionally responsible

for establishing punitive conditions of confin[e]ment to which

the plaintiff has suffered, and which enabled all other

defendants to violate Plaintiff’s rights.” Compl. at pg. 3. In

particular, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Board was

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 05cv1955

responsible for implementing procedures at the Central Jail in

order to ensure compliance with amendments made in 2001 to

California Penal Code sections 1610 and 4002, which address the

confinement of sexually violent predators. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.

Plaintiff is wrong. In California, the responsibility for

operating county jails is placed by law upon the sheriff. See

Cal. Penal Code § 4000. The sheriff is required by statute to

take charge of and keep the county jail and the prisoners in it,

and is answerable for the prisoners’ safekeeping. See Cal. Gov’t

Code § 26605 (“[T]he sheriff shall take charge of and be the sole

and exclusive authority to keep the county jail and the prisoners

in it.”). A county board of supervisors has no duty and no right

to control the operation of the county jail. See Brandt v. Board

of Supervisors, 84 Cal. App. 3d 598, 602 (1978). “The only clear

and present duty enjoined by law upon a board of supervisors with

regard to a county jail is to provide the sheriff with food,

clothing and bedding for the prisoners . . . and to pay as a

county charge other expenses incurred in the keeping of prisoners

. . . .” Id. at 601-02 (citations omitted). “Although the board

of supervisors has authority to supervise county officers in

order to insure that they faithfully perform their duties . . .,

it does not have the power to perform the county officers’

statutory duties for them or to direct the manner in which the

duties are performed.” People v. Langdon, 54 Cal. App. 3d 384,

390 (1976) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 25303); see also Hicks v.

Board of Supervisors, 69 Cal. App. 3d 228, 242 (1977). 

Therefore, the Board and its members are not liable to

Plaintiff under section 1983 because the Board lacks the

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 05cv1955

authority to establish an official policy with respect to the

operation of the county jail. Plaintiff thus cannot establish

that his alleged injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official

county policy or custom implemented by the Board. See, e.g.,

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.

1989). Moreover, the Board, as a local governmental body, cannot

be held liable for the alleged actions of its employees on a

theory of respondeat superior liability. See Monell v. New York

City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);

Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443.

Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant Board’s

motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) be GRANTED

with prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court recommends that

the District Judge issue an Order GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss

by Defendant San Diego County Board of Supervisors with

prejudice.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the

Honorable Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., United States District Judge,

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties on or before December 15, 2006. The document should

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any

reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on or before

December 29, 2006. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 05cv1955

1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 14, 2006

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01955-J-JMA Document 25 Filed 11/14/06 Page 7 of 7