Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00770/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00770-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID B. TURNER, Jr.,

CDCR #G-30643, Civil No. 09cv0770 L (POR)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DENYING AMENDED MOTION

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS AS MOOT 

[Doc. No. 5] 

AND

(2) DISMISSING AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND FOR

SEEKING DAMAGES FROM

DEFENDANTS WHO ARE 

IMMUNE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

& 1915A(b)

vs.

METROPOLITAN TRANSIT SYSTEM;

SAN DIEGO TROLLEY; SAN DIEGO

SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; CITY OF SAN

DIEGO; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the California Rehabilitation Center in

Norco, California, and proceeding pro se, has initiated this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. 

I. Procedural Background

On June 4, 2009, the Court granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but sua sponte dismissed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) [Doc. No. 3]. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.

2000); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (2000). Specifically, the Court found that

because, on the face of his pleading, Plaintiff claimed to have been subjected to excessive force

by Metropolitan Transit System agents on June 26, 2004, his claims were barred by the statute

of limitations. See June 4, 2009 Order [Doc. No. 3] at 4-5, citing Cervantes v. City of San

Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the running of the statute of limitations is

apparent on the face of the complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper.)). The

Court further found that while not entirely clear, it appeared Plaintiff claimed to have been

subjected to excessive force and inadequate medical care at the hands of unidentified San Diego

County Sheriff’s deputies and/or employees of the County of San Diego; however, his

Complaint failed to allege he was injured as the result of a municipal policy, custom or practice.

(Id. at 6-7, citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 658, 690-91 (1978)).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel, the Court notified Plaintiff of his pleading

deficiencies and granted him an opportunity to amend his Complaint in order to fix them. (Id.

at 7-8.) See also Lucas v. Dept. of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is

absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect ... a pro se litigant is entitled to notice

of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend.”)

Plaintiff has since filed an Amended Complaint [Doc No. 4], as well as an “Amended”

Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 5]. 

II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court noted in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates it to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff,

who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated

delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial

release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b). 

Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint,

or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks

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damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1

(§ 1915A).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names the Metropolitan Transit System, the San

Diego Trolley, the County of San Diego and the United States of America as Defendants.

(Amend. Compl. at 1-2.) First, Plaintiff cannot sue the United States under § 1983. Under the

well-established legal doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States, its departments, and

agencies cannot be sued without its express consent. See U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212,

(1983).

Second, as noted in the Court’s June 4, 2009 Order, while “municipalities and other local

government units ... [are] among those ‘persons’ to whom § 1983 applies,” Monell, 436 U.S. at

690, Plaintiff must allege an injury resulting from “execution of a government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy.” Id. at 694. There is no respondeat superior liability. Id. at 691. Thus,

four conditions that must be satisfied in order to establish municipal

liability for failing to act to preserve constitutional rights: (1) that

the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he was

deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy

amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional

right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the

constitutional violation.

Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Van Ort v. Estate

of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). While

Plaintiff has been notified of the pleading requirements for stating a claim based on municipal

liability, his Amended Complaint, like his original Complaint, fails to allege any of the elements

essential for pleading a Monell claim, and is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

Finally, while the Court previously found Plaintiff’s claims untimely and permitted him

leave to allege facts that might show he is entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling, see

June 4, 2009 Order at 4-5, citing Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999), his

Amended Complaint includes no such allegations. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d

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1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, for this additional reason, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 5] is DENIED as moot;

and

(2) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 4] is DISMISSED without

prejudice both for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking

damages against defendants who are immune pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and

§ 1915A(b). However, because the Court finds amendment of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims would

be futile at this time, leave to amend is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d

336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further

amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp.

1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an

arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment

would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

(3) Further, this Court CERTIFIES that any IFP appeal from this Order would not

be taken “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant

is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 20, 2009

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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