Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01577/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01577-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VIRGIL POPESCU,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06CV1577-LAB (LSP)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED

COMPLAINT; AND

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE:

CHANGE OF ADDRESS

[Dkt. Nos. 20, 22]

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, PARKING

MANAGEMENT DIVISION and ROBERT

PAGAN #8073,

Defendants.

On August 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed his complaint, alleging his vehicles were singled out for

parking tickets because he exercised his first amendment rights to express his political views.

Defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment, and Plaintiff sought leave to file a second

amended complaint.

On September 25, 2007, while Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (the “MSJ”) and

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (the “Motion to Amend”) were

pending, Plaintiff submitted a pleading stating he had been arrested and was being held in jail on

charges of stalking. Plaintiff stated he was unable to litigate while in the jail, and therefore requested

a stay. The Court accepted this letter by discrepancy order, noting no proof of service was attached,

Case 3:06-cv-01577-WMC Document 33 Filed 01/25/08 Page 1 of 13
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and ordering Plaintiff promptly to serve it on Defendants and file proofs of service. To date, Plaintiff

has not done so, nor has he communicated with Magistrate Judge Papas’ chambers regarding

scheduled settlement conferences, which have twice been continued since Plaintiff gave notice of his

arrest. Although Plaintiff’s letter filed nunc pro tunc to September 25, 2007 gives a post office box

address for the county jail, Plaintiff expresses uncertainty regarding how long he will stay in the jail

and does not explain whether this is a temporary address or whether he can still receive mail sent to

his address in the docket. Therefore, it does not appear Plaintiff has notified the Court of his current

address as required under Civil Local Rule 83.11(b).

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Summary of Allegations

Plaintiff has alleged that, since 1992 he has parked his Datsun pickup truck on a daily basis on

his property located between Euclid Avenue and 47th Street in San Diego. (First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) at 3:11–15.) He alleges “90% of the car was on Plaintiff’s property and 10% on the alley

which is 25 Feet wide.” (Id. at 3:14–15.) He alleges the portion of his car that jutted into the alley was

no more than ten inches. (Id. at 3:22–24.) He alleges no parking tickets were ever issued until

October 1, 2005, when Officer Robert Pagan issued a ticket for a parking violation. (Id. at 3:16–18.)

He says he wrote a letter explaining his position, and Defendant Parking Management Division

answered his letter, stating among other things that “[a]n unattended vehicle violates this section even

if it extends only partially into any alley.” (Id. at 3:20:4–3.)

Plaintiff alleges the next incident occurred on November 16, 2005 at a nearby address on

Estrella Avenue in San Diego, when he parked his Suburban in front of his garage for about 5 minutes,

with his car protruding 11⁄2 feet into the 18-foot alley. (FAC at 4:5–11, 4:17–18.) He says he was

loading personal items and left the car doors open. (Id. at 4:7–8, 4:15–17.) Apparently while he left

the car unattended, he says Officer Pagan again ticketed his car. (Id. at 4:16–27.) Plaintiff says “huge

moving trucks” are regularly parked in the alley “all day long and [Officer]Pagan or anyone else, never

gives them a ticket.” (Id. at 5:25–28.) He says, as a result of the emotional stress caused by this

incident, he suffered heart problems and had to stay in bed for several days. (Id. at 5:1–16.)

/ / /

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 The FAC was filed on October 10, 2006. Plaintiff was apparently later ticketed by a different

police officer, as discussed in more detail below.

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Plaintiff alleges he was ticketed again on December 14, 2005 under circumstances similar to

the first incident. (FAC at 6:1–3.) After he wrote a note threatening litigation and placed it on his

dashboard, he said no more tickets were issued by Officer Pagan or anyone else.1 (Id. at 6:4–17.)

Plaintiff alleges after each of these incidents he observed many of the other cars similarly

parked and verified with their owners they had not been ticketed. (FAC at 6:25–7:4.)

Plaintiff believes he was being targeted by Defendant Pagan because of Plaintiff’s vocal

support (including signs on his garage and bumper stickers on his vehicles) for the Proposition A, a

recent ballot measure intended to preserve a well-known cross on top of Mt. Soledad, within the City

of San Diego. (Complaint at 7:13–26, 8:10–12.) He characterizes his expressions of support as both

religious and political.

Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his rights under the

First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. His First Amendment

claim is based on allegations that Defendant Pagan retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his right

to express his religious and political views. His Eighth Amendment claim is based on allegations that

the tickets were wrongly issued and therefore the fines were excessive, and that Defendant Pagan

inflicted tremendous emotional distress on him. His Fourteenth Amendment claim is based on

allegations of denial of equal protection. His Ninth Amendment claim contains no separate

allegations, aside from an assertion of a Constitutional right to park, and is essentially a restatement

of his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 

Plaintiff has cited federal law, but not state law as the source of his claims. However, he has

alleged Defendant Pagan’s actions were outrageous and intended to inflict emotional distress on him.

(FAC at 5:18–20.) He describes this as part of the harm giving rise to his Eighth Amendment claim

(id. at 9:10–16), and as part of the harm caused by the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. (Id.

at 10:15–28.) Defendants have not sought summary judgment on any state-law claims. Because

Plaintiff avoided identifying any state law theories, the Court finds he has not raised any state-law

claims clearly enough to put Defendants on notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

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Plaintiff alleges Defendants City of San Diego and Parking Management Division “were fully

aware of Defendant . . . Pagan’s outrageous conduct” and therefore they are equally liable. (FAC at

10:11–13.)

Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing principally that the Eighth and Ninth

Amendments are inapplicable toPlaintiff’s claims, that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant Pagan

acted with a discriminatory intent or purpose, and that there is no factual basis for finding the other

two Defendants liable under a Monell theory.

The parties cite section 86.10.3 of the San Diego Municipal Code as the relevant code

provision governing parking in alleys.

B. Legal Standards

Allegations asserted by pro se plaintiffs, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held “to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519–20

(1972). Thus where, as here, a plaintiff appears in pro per in a civil rights case, as here, the court must

construe the pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Although the Court must construe the

pleadings liberally, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other

litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) empowers the Court to enter summary judgment on

factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary

judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Arpin

v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001).

 The movant is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, nor is he required to offer evidence negating the non-movant’s claims. Lujan v. Nat’l

Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); United Steelworkers v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539,

1542 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the non-moving party’s position

is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252

(1986). Accordingly, the non-moving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment

motion by “rest[ing] on mere allegation or denials of his pleadings.” (Id. at 256.) The non-movant

must go beyond the pleadings to designate specific facts showing that there are genuine factual issues

that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of

either party.” (Id. at 250.) “When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary

judgment is warranted if the non-movant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to its case.” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S.Ct. 1689, 1694

(U.S. 1993) (citations, internal quotations, and alterations omitted). 

In considering the motion, the non-movant’s evidence is to be believed and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Determinations regarding

credibility, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences are jury functions, and

are not appropriate for resolution by the court on a motion for summary judgment. Id.

In reviewing the evidence, this Court restricts its inquiry to facts supported by the record. The

Court does “not give credence to empty rhetoric . . . but credit[s] only those assertions that are

supported by materials of evidentiary quality.” In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d

1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999). In addition, the Court need not draw an unreasonable inference or accept

conclusory allegations; “conclusory or speculative testimony is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of

fact to defeat summary judgment.” Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337,

345 (9th Cir. 1995). “In general, inadmissible hearsay evidence may not be considered on a motion

for summary judgment.” (Id. at 345 n.4.) 

C. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment forbids excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual

punishments. As the Supreme Court has explained, the Eighth Amendment applies to those convicted

of crimes. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 

As Defendants point out, there is no evidence Plaintiff has been convicted of a crime.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence regarding a fine or other punishment imposed.

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2

 A fine of $47 for positioning one’s car in a manner that barely intrudes into a wide alley is,

in the Court’s judgment, overly harsh. The amount of the fine seems less designed to punish or deter

parking violators or protect public safety than to generate revenue for the municipality.

- 6 - 06CV1577

Plaintiff, however, has stated that he did not pay any of the parking tickets, because if he paid, then

he would admit guilt by paying the fine. (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, filed Sept. 26, 2006, at 2:19–21.)

He does not, however, explain why he could not or did not show up for a hearing on the tickets. He

also avers that the Department of Motor Vehicles would not give him his car registration because he

did not pay two of the tickets. (Id. at 2:22–28.) He also says the City of San Diego refused to void

the tickets, (Opp’n to MSJ, at 2:25–28.), and the initial fine of $47 was doubled to $94 after 30 days

and then went to $104. (Id. at 8:3–9.)

Construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, it appears Plaintiff has refused to appear and contest

his parking tickets. There is no suggestion proceedings are underway against Plaintiff in connection

with these tickets. Neither party has briefed the legal effect of this, or whether this constitutes a

conviction for Eighth Amendment purposes. However, because it appears fines of $104 per ticket

have been imposed, or will soon be imposed, and because Plaintiff cannot register his car until they

are paid, the Court will assume for purposes of ruling on the MSJ that the Eighth Amendment applies

to Plaintiff. See Vasudeva v. United States, 214 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2000) (assuming assessment

was a fine for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, and concluding that assessment was not

excessive) (citation omitted). A fine violates the Eighth amendment if it is “grossly disproportional

to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,337 (1998). As

a matter of law, however, the Court holds these penalties do not amount to excessive fines or cruel and

unusual punishment, particularly when coupled with failure to appear in court when required to do so.2

As discussed further in section E(1) below, Plaintiff’s argument that the punishment was

excessive because he did not violate the law cannot form the basis for a claim.

D. Ninth Amendment Claim

The Ninth Amendment states, “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not

be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The Ninth Amendment cannot,

however, support any claim by Plaintiff. However, the Ninth Amendment “has never been recognized

as independently securing any constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil rights claim.”

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Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986). This Amendment, therefore, does

not support any claim by Plaintiff. See id. (dismissing civil rights claims based on Ninth

Amendment). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions (Opp’n to MSJ at 9:23–25), the Ninth Amendment

does not encompass a right to park one’s vehicle wherever one chooses.

E. Remaining Claims Against Defendant Pagan

1. Plaintiff’s Asserted Innocence

Plaintiff contends he is not guilty at all of any parking violations. He does not, however, seek

to have any judgment against him vacated; rather, the sole remedy he seeks is damages. San Diego

Municipal Code § 8.10.3 provides “no person shall stop or stand any vehicle in an alley for a period

of time longer than is necessary for the loading or unloading of passengers or materials.” It further

specifies the loading or unloading time shall not consume more than three minutes for passengers nor

twenty minutes for materials. In addition, this section forbids stopping or standing any vehicle in an

alley in such a manner that would prevent the passage of emergency vehicles.

As a preliminary matter, on the basis of his own admissions it appears Plaintiff violated this

section on October 1 and December 14, 2005. He may have violated this section on November 16,

2005, depending upon whether the approximately five minute period he says he left his car unattended

to load personal items was longer than necessary. The Parking Management Division’s decision that

cars may not extend even partially into an alley appears to be a reasonable interpretation of the

language of § 86.10.3. Plaintiff’s contention that emergency vehicles could pass appears to be

irrelevant, because this provision forbids obstructing the path of emergency vehicles for any amount

of time.

Whether Plaintiff was or is actually guilty, however, is irrelevant to his claims that he was

specifically targeted because of the political views he expressed. See United States v. Cortez, 973 F.2d

764, 767 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining vindictive or selective prosecution claims “do not hinge on the

guilt or innocence of the defendant”). Therefore, even if Plaintiff has been adjudicated guilty, and

could show this Court had jurisdiction to review the state court judgment, the Court would not reach

this issue.

/ / /

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2. Allegations Defendant Pagan Targeted Plaintiff

Plaintiff has alleged Defendant Pagan specifically targeted him because Plaintiff displayed a

political or religious sign and similar political and religious bumper stickers Defendant Pagan

disagreed with. Plaintiff has pointed to evidence he displayed the sign and bumper stickers relating

to Proposition A and the Mt. Soledad Cross that could be seen by someone passing by. (Popescu

Decl. in Supp. of Opp’n to MSJ (“Popescu Decl.”) at 2:24–28.) 

Plaintiff has speculated that Defendant Pagan is hostile to his religious and political views, and

in support of this principally argues that his surname is evidence of this. This does not constitute

evidence. However, as Plaintiff explains, Proposition A was a hotly contested issue. If Plaintiff can

show Defendant Pagan selected his car for ticketing and that the only meaningful difference between

his car and others was his public advocacy of Proposition A, a jury could reasonably infer that

Defendant Pagan’s decision to ticket Plaintiff’s vehicles and not others was based on an intent to

retaliate or discriminate against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration stating that in the five-year period before he began to

display the sign and bumper stickers, police officers and parking enforcement officers passed the

Euclid Avenue property but never ticketed his car, even though it was parked in the same position.

(Popescu Decl. at 2:4–14.) Plaintiff has produced evidence that on November 16, 2005, other cars

parked so that they extended into the alley at least as much as his did were not ticketed. (Id. at 5:8–15;

Ozorio Decl. in Supp. of Opp’n to MSJ at 2:10–21 (referring to Nov. 15 incident).) Plaintiff also

submits evidence Defendant Pagan on at least one other occasion drove slowly through the alley but

did not ticket cars that extended far into the alley. (Smith Decl. in Supp. of Opp’n to MSJ at 2:5–21.)

Plaintiff also includes in his FAC a number of factual assertions regarding Defendant Pagan’s

ticketing or non-ticketing of vehicles on other occasions and in other places. Because Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se and because Plaintiff submitted his FAC (though not other pleadings) under penalty

of perjury, alleged facts he would be competent to testify to can support his opposition to Defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s FAC

supplements the evidence in his opposition by stating that he has parked his car in the same position

/ / /

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on the Euclid Avenue property since 1992 and never received a ticket until Defendant Pagan issued

one on October 1, 2005. (FAC at 3:11-19.) 

The FAC also states after each of the three tickets were issued, Plaintiff observed many cars

parked on the alley in both locations, either partially or totally in the alley, and never saw any parking

tickets on them. (Id. at 6:25–28.) He states he spoke to the vehicles’ owners and learned none of

them had found parking tickets on their vehicles. (Id. at 7:1–4.) While statements of the vehicles’

owners (other than Gladys Ozorio, whose declaration was submitted) are inadmissible hearsay and

therefore not properly considered, Anheuser-Busch, 69 F.3d at 345 n.4, Plaintiff’s own statement that

he looked for parking tickets but saw none is based on his personal knowledge and may therefore be

admissible.

Plaintiff has also attempted to object to what he regards as Defendants’ failure to cooperate in

the discovery process. His objections, however, should have been raised with the Magistrate Judge,

who was overseeing discovery. If he wished to object to any of the Magistrate Judge’s rulings, his

opportunity to do so is past. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (requiring parties to file and serve objections

to rulings by magistrate judges on nondispositive motions within ten days).

Defendants submit evidence that on October 1, 2005 Defendant Pagan issued another ticket

to a car illegally parked in the alley (Dickel Decl. in Supp. of MSJ (“Dickel Decl.”) at 2:4–7), and on

December 14, 2005 Defendant Pagan issued parking tickets to two other vehicles in the alley at Euclid

Avenue. (Id. at 2:16–21.) Defendants submit no evidence Defendant Pagan issued tickets to other

vehicles in the alley at Estrella Avenue. (Id. at 8–11 (stating Plaintiff’s Suburban was ticketed, and

mentioning no other tickets).) Defendants also submit evidence that during the years 2005 and 2006,

Defendant Pagan issued more than 21,000 parking tickets, over 10% of which were issued to vehicles

illegally parked in alleys. (Id. at 3:1–4.)

Defendants’ uncontested evidence demonstrates Defendant Pagan did issue many parking

tickets to vehicles for illegal parking in alleys. Defendants’ evidence does not, however, have any

direct bearing on Defendant Pagan’s ticketing of vehicles in the two alleys in question. 

Defendants have submitted their own evidence suggesting on December 14, 2005, Defendant

Pagan ticketed Plaintiff’s car only after receiving a citizen’s complaint. (Dickel Decl. in Supp. of MSJ

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at 2:15–16.) Because this is a civil action, this may be admissible hearsay under the public records

exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(B). Defendant Pagan’s declaration states he does not remember

issuing the tickets and review of the City Treasurer’s records of the tickets does not refresh his

memory. (Pagan Decl. in Supp. of MSJ at 2:18–20.) 

The Court does not, however, weigh the evidence at this stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Rather, the Court accepts his evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. Applying

this standard, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s evidence that although he had parked in the same place for

years, he was not ticketed until he prominently posted a sign and bumper stickers expressing his

support for a controversial ballot measure. The Court also accepts Plaintiff’s evidence that after each

incident he checked all vehicles in the same alley and, while many protruded into the alley at least as

far as his did, none had been ticketed. Plaintiff has presented no evidence Defendant Pagan was

hostile to the political or religious points of view he expressed. However, as Plaintiff points out,

Proposition A was a highly contentious political issue. The Court considers it a reasonable inference

that Plaintiff’s overt expressions of his religious and political views were the only differences between

him and the owners of similarly-parked vehicles in the same area. The Court therefore concludes a

reasonable jury could conclude Defendant Pagan ticketed Plaintiff’s vehicles and not other vehicles

simply because Plaintiff exercised his First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff therefore has presented evidence in support of his First Amendment retaliation and

Equal Protection claims sufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Village of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 526, 564 (2000) (holding that plaintiff may maintain an equal protection claim where

he alleges he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and there is no

rational basis for the disparate treatment); Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th

Cir. 1989) (holding that if decision to suspend permits was made because of plaintiffs’ exercise of First

Amendment rights, they could maintain a § 1983 claim for violation of First Amendment rights).

Therefore, summary judgment on these claims against Defendant Pagan will be denied.

F. Claims Against the City of San Diego or Its Parking Management Division

There is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under § 1983, although a municipality

may be liable for violations pursuant to its policy or custom. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs.,

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436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Plaintiff has made general allegations that the City of San Diego or its

Parking Management Division has a policy of targeting citizens based on political or religious beliefs,

but he points to no evidence of this. The allegations he sets forth in the FAC and his opposition to the

MSJ are conclusory and do not demonstrate Plaintiff has any personal knowledge of these facts. In

his opposition to the MSJ, Plaintiff says he wishes to introduce evidence of other isolated instances

of unfair parking tickets being issued, but these do not suffice to demonstrate the existence of a policy

or practice. (Opp’n to MSJ at 13:1–22.) Furthermore, Plaintiff has alleged Defendant Pagan acted on

the basis of his own political or anti-religious bigotry. (Popescu Decl. at 3:4–9)

The only other evidence Plaintiff provides is an additional parking ticket issued to Plaintiff on

March 10, 2007 by a different police officer, Officer Rosenbloom or Rosembloom, whom he surmises

is Jewish and therefore, he believes, “just lost his mind” after seeing the bumper sticker. (Popescu

Decl. at 4:6–17.) Accepting Plaintiff’s assertions as true, Officer Rosenbloom was not acting pursuant

to any City or Division policy, but out of his own personal motives.

II. Motion to Amend

Plaintiff seeks to amend solely to add a claim arising out of the incident on March 10, 2007

where Officer Rosenbloom ticketed his car, and to increase damages accordingly. 

As noted, the City of San Diego or its Parking Management Division is being dismissed as a

Defendant because there is no evidence Defendant Pagan acted on the basis of municipal policy or

custom. Similarly, Plaintiff has alleged Officer Rosenbloom acted on the basis of his own prejudices,

rather than any municipal policy or custom. Therefore, there is no relationship between the existing

claim and the proposed claim. The only common links are a similar fact pattern and the fact that

Plaintiff is the alleged victim. The proposed claim involves a different Defendant and a different

occurrence. There is therefore no provision for joining Officer Rosenbloom as a Defendant. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permitting joinder of defendants if claims arise out of a common transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and a common question of fact or law will arise).

There appears to be no reason Plaintiff could not or should not bring this claim as a separate action.

/ / /

/ / /

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IV. Plaintiff’s Change of Address

As noted above, Plaintiff filed but apparently did not serve a letter stating he was being held

in the county jail on a charge of stalking. Since that time, Plaintiff has not filed proof of service as

ordered, nor has he communicated with the Court in any way. It is unclear whether Plaintiff is still

in jail, or whether he has been released. Settlement conferences have been re-set, and it appears

Plaintiff has neglected his responsibilities under the Civil Local Rules regarding the upcoming pretrial

conference currently on calendar for Monday, January 28, 2008 at 10:45 a.m. See Civil Local Rule

16.1(f). As provided in Civil Local Rule 83.1, failure of any party to comply with these rules or with

any order of the Court may be ground for sanctions including dismissal of the action.

Because Plaintiff never filed proof of service as ordered, the Court will not consider his request

for a stay. The Court will construe his letter, filed nunc pro tunc to September 25, 2007, as a notice.

V. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ MSJ is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART. Summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims

against Defendant Pagan, but granted as to all other claims.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is DENIED.

Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to file a notice giving his current address (i.e., the facility where

he is being held, or the residence where he is living) and, if different, his mailing address. If he is still

in jail, Plaintiff is ORDERED to include in this notice his expected trial date or release date. If

Plaintiff has been released from jail, he isORDERED to state the date he was released. Plaintiff must

file and serve this notice no later than twenty-one calendar days from the date this order is entered.

If Plaintiff fails to file this notice as ordered within the time permitted, this action may be

dismissed without prejudice without further notice to him, for failure to abide by the Civil Local

Rules.

The pretrial conference currently on calendar for Monday, January 28, 2008 at 10:45 a.m. is

hereby VACATED.

/ / /

/ / /

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The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this order to Plaintiff’s address as stated in his letter

filed nunc pro tunc to September 25, 2007 (Docket no. 30), as well as his address as it appears in the

docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 24, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01577-WMC Document 33 Filed 01/25/08 Page 13 of 13