Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01412/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01412-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS JOHN HEILMAN, 

CDCR #H-76785,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. COOK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-CV-1412 JLS (MDD)

ORDER (1) OVERRULING

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS; AND 

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

(ECF Nos. 95, 123, 130)

Presently before the Court are: (1) Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin’s Report 

and Recommendation (“R&R”) advising that the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion to rejoin 

party (“R&R,” ECF No. 123); and (2) Plaintiff Thomas John Heilman’s Objections to the 

R&R (“R&R Obj.”, ECF No. 130). Having considered the facts and the law, the Court (1) 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections, (2) ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and (3) 

DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to rejoin party (ECF No. 95). 

BACKGROUND

Judge Dembin’s R&R contains a thorough and accurate recitation of the factual and 

procedural histories underlying Plaintiff’s motion to rejoin party. (See R&R 2–4,1 ECF No. 

123.) This Order incorporates by reference the background as set forth therein.

 

1 Pin citations refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at the top of each page.

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LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Review of Report and Recommendation

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district 

court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court 

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection 

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United 

States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection, 

however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

II. Amending Complaint to Rejoin Party

Judge Dembin correctly set out the legal standards involved in Plaintiff’s motion, 

which the Court here largely repeats. (See R&R 4–6, ECF No. 123.)

Plaintiff’s motion to amend his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) to rejoin Dr. 

Chau as a party is governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15, 16(b)(4), and 21.

Once the deadline for joining parties and amending pleadings set in the Rule 16(b) 

Scheduling Order has passed, no addition of parties or amendment of pleadings is permitted 

unless the movant shows good cause for modifying the Scheduling Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

16(b)(4); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend where 

plaintiff failed to show good cause for amending the scheduling order).

Rule 15(a)(2) states “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 

requires.” This Rule should be applied with “extreme liberality.” Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of 

Retired Emp. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Owens v. Kaiser 

Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless, courts may

decline to grant leave to amend if there is “strong evidence” of “undue delay, bad faith or 

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

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amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment, etc.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“[T]he consideration of prejudice to the opposing party carries the greatest weight.” (Id.) 

Amendments seeking to add parties are granted less freely than amendments seeking to 

add claims. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Nev. Power Co., 950 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991); 

see Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 F.3d 1054, 1069 (6th Cir. 

1995) (denying amendment to add party over one year after complaint filed denied as too 

prejudicial to new party).

Rule 21 concerning “Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties,” states that “[m]isjoinder 

of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may 

at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against 

a party.” Here, Plaintiff’s request is more appropriately considered under Rules 15 and 16

than Rule 21. Nevertheless, the same test applies to Plaintiff’s request under either Rule. 

“The liberal standard of Rule 15 also applies to Rule 21 motions.” De Malherbe v. Int’l 

Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (citing Fair 

Housing Dev. Fund Corp. v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)). The test of 

whether additions or subtractions of parties should be allowed under Rule 21, like the test 

under Rule 15, is whether such action will prejudice the non-moving party, and whether it 

will serve to avoid multiplicity of suits. Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 105 F. 

Supp. 886, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affirmed 199 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1952). “[P]rejudice to the 

non-moving party will defeat a Rule 21 motion.” Sable Commc’ns of Cal. Inc. v. Pac. Tel. 

& Tel. Co., 890 F.2d 184, 191 n.13 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Helene Curtis Indus., supra).

ANALYSIS

I. Summary of the R&R Conclusion

Judge Dembin concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet his burdens under Rules 15, 

16(b)(4), and 21 to show re-joinder of Dr. Chau should be granted. (R&R 6, ECF No. 123.)

As to Rule 16(b)(4), Judge Dembin concluded that Plaintiff did not claim or attempt 

to show diligence or a reasonable excuse for the delay. (Id. at 7.) Specifically, Judge 

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Dembin noted that Plaintiff did not move the Court to modify its Scheduling Order, made 

no effort to show good cause for modifying the Scheduling Order, and did not explain why 

he could not meet the scheduling deadline or how he was diligent in attempting to comply 

with the deadline set for joining parties. (Id. at 6.) Judge Dembin further noted that Plaintiff 

offered no explanation for why he dismissed Dr. Chau at the outset of discovery only to 

attempt to rejoin him just as the discovery phase was set to expire. (Id. at 6–7.) For example, 

Plaintiff pointed to no new information learned through discovery as the impetus to rejoin 

Dr. Chau, and Judge Dembin noted that Plaintiff’s description of Dr. Chau’s role in the 

initial complaint mirrored Plaintiff’s allegations about Dr. Chau in his motion to rejoin. 

(Id. at 7 (compare ECF No. 95, at 4, with ECF No. 1, at 35–38 (both alleging that Dr. Chau 

falsified medical records to conceal fellow CDCR personnel’s conduct and was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s injuries and the risks of infection))). Thus, Judge 

Dembin concluded that Plaintiff has not shown diligence in seeking to rejoin Dr. Chau 

under Rule 16 and recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied on this basis. 

Judge Dembin similarly concluded that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied for 

unexplained delay and prejudice to the current Defendants under Rules 15 and 21. (Id. at 

7.) Judge Dembin found that Plaintiff offered no explanation for why he dismissed Dr. 

Chau at the outset of discovery, and that he did not explain why he did not know or should 

not have known of the facts forming the basis for rejoining Dr. Chau sooner. (Id. at 7–8.)

More importantly, Judge Dembin found that leave to amend should be denied because it 

would substantially prejudice the current Defendants and Dr. Chau. (Id. at 8.) Given that 

discovery had almost closed, Dr. Chau would have no meaningful chance to conduct 

discovery. (Id.) And the other Defendants would be prejudiced by having to wait for 

continued discovery and its ensuing delay on their resolution of the case. (Id.) Thus, Judge 

Dembin recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be denied for the unexplained delay and 

prejudice to the current Defendants and Dr. Chau. (Id.)

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Summary of Petitioner’s Objections

Plaintiff objects to a Judge Dembin’s R&R on a few grounds. First, he argues that 

good cause exists to amend his complaint because he only realized his mistake in dropping 

Dr. Chau after he received answers from certain Defendants. (R&R Obj. 2–3, ECF No. 

130.) Second, allowing Dr. Chau to serve as an expert against Plaintiff in this case instead 

of a Defendant would constitute perjury. (Id. at 3.) Third, Plaintiff objects to Judge 

Dembin’s interpretation and application of several cases to his present case. (Id. at 3–5.) 

Fourth and finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court should have liberally construed his 

motion to rejoin Dr. Chau as also including a motion to modify the scheduling order. (Id.

at 8.)

III. Court’s Analysis

The Court will review, de novo, each part of the R&R to which Petitioner has 

objected.

A. Objection One—Good Cause to Amend

Plaintiff argues that there is good cause to amend his FAC. Specifically, Plaintiff 

realized that he had misidentified Defendants Dr. Chau’s and Dr. Cook’s role in his case, 

since Dr. Cook only documented Plaintiff’s injury after Dr. Chau had initiated the 

diagnosis. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff claims that he only realized their proper roles after he received 

certain Defendants’ answers to his Complaint. (Id. at 2–3.) 

However, the Court agrees with Judge Dembin that Plaintiff had already set forth 

similar—and other—allegations against Dr. Chau in his FAC and in his original complaint. 

(See, e.g., FAC 15–17, ECF No. 18; see also ECF No. 1, at 35–38 (collecting allegations 

against Dr. Chau in his original complaint).) So Plaintiff already suspected that Dr. Chau 

played a role in his case, despite Plaintiff’s claim that it was only after receiving certain 

answers that he allegedly confirmed Dr. Chau’s precise role in the matter. The Court agrees 

with Judge Dembin that these similarities weigh against a finding of diligence on Plaintiff’s 

part, and thus the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown diligence or a reasonable 

excuse for the delay.

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Additionally, despite Plaintiff’s allegations against Dr. Chau in his original 

complaint and his FAC, on May 2, 2016 he voluntarily asked the Court to dismiss Dr. Chau 

from the case. (ECF No. 65.) He gave no reason why, a fact that he admits. (R&R Obj. 2, 

ECF No. 130 (“[Plaintiff] admittedly did not provide reasons for a ruling to dismiss Dr. Jo 

Chau as a party.”).) The Court granted his request on May 18, 2016. (ECF No. 68.) In view 

of this, the Court agrees with Judge Dembin that rejoining Dr. Chau would result in 

substantial prejudice to all of the Defendants. As to Dr. Chau, discovery is over and any 

expedited discovery schedule as to him would prejudice his due process rights. 

Additionally, the remaining Defendants would be prejudiced by having to wait for the close 

of discovery against Dr. Chau, regardless of the duration of that process. Thus, the Court 

finds that rejoining Dr. Chau would unduly prejudice the current Defendants and Dr. Chau.

Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s first objection.

B. Objection Two—Dr. Chau as an Expert Witness

Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Chau must be rejoined because to allow him to serve as 

Defendants’ expert witness against him would amount to perjury. (R&R Obj. 3, ECF No. 

130.) However, Plaintiff does not explain how this supports his argument that the Court 

should allow Plaintiff to amend his FAC to include Dr. Chau. And to the extent Plaintiff is 

concerned that Dr. Chau will commit perjury at trial, Plaintiff is free to object to his 

testimony or otherwise challenge his findings. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES

Plaintiff’s second objection.

C. Objection Three—Case Law Citations

Plaintiff argues that two cases cited by Judge Dembin in support of his R&R are 

inapplicable to Plaintiff’s case. First, Plaintiff distinguishes Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363 

(9th Cir. 1994), on the grounds that in Kaplan the plaintiff attempted to amend his 

complaint after discovery was completed and trial was only two months away. (R&R Obj. 

4, ECF No. 130.) But Judge Dembin did not cite Kaplan to compare the stage in litigation. 

Rather, Judge Dembin cited Kaplan because the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of 

amendment where the movant knew or should have known when drafting the complaint 

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about the facts on which he would base his amendment. (See R&R 8, ECF No. 123 (citing 

Kaplan, 49 F.3d at 1370).) While the facts of Kaplan in this regard are different, the Court 

finds that Judge Dembin did not commit error in relying on Kaplan for this proposition, 

and indeed properly extended it to Plaintiff’s case based on the allegations against Dr. Chau 

in Plaintiff’s original complaint and FAC.

Second, Plaintiff argues that Judge Dembin erroneously relied on Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003), because, in that case, the Ninth 

Circuit found the district court abused its discretion when denying plaintiff leave to amend 

his complaint. (R&R Obj. 6–7, ECF No. 130.) However, Judge Dembin merely relied on 

this case for the legal proposition that “prejudice is the ‘touchstone of the inquiry rule under 

rule 15(a),’” (R&R 8, ECF No. 123 (citing Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052)), not for 

support from the case’s underlying facts. 

In addition, while Plaintiff correctly notes that in Eminence Capital the Ninth Circuit 

stated that a denial of leave to amend without any explanation is subject to reversal, 316 

F.3d at 1052, here Judge Dembin has given Plaintiff several reasons why he recommends 

denying Plaintiff leave to amend. (See generally R&R, ECF No. 123.) Indeed, while 

Plaintiff argues that Judge Dembin inappropriately found that Dr. Chau would suffer 

prejudice because he has had no meaningful opportunity to conduct discovery, when 

Plaintiff argues he previously propounded some discovery, (R&R Obj. 7–8, ECF No. 130),

that does not mean that Judge Dembin’s finding was erroneous. Specifically, Judge 

Dembin did not state that Dr. Chau had no opportunity for discovery; rather, he stated that 

whatever discovery Dr. Chau previously propounded was not “meaningful.” (R&R 8, ECF 

No. 123.) In any case, the Court finds that rejoining Dr. Chau would substantially prejudice 

him and the remaining Defendants, as discussed above. (See also id. at 8–9.) Accordingly, 

the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s third objection.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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D. Objection Four—The Court Should Have Liberally Construed Plaintiff’s 

Motion

Finally, Plaintiff objects to Judge Dembin’s order because he argues Judge Dembin 

should have additionally construed his motion to rejoin party as a motion to modify the 

scheduling order. (R&R Obj. 8–9, ECF No. 130.) Plaintiff admits that he did not title his 

motion as one to modify the scheduling order, but he argues that Judge Dembin should 

have liberally construed his pleading given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. (Id.) Plaintiff 

is correct that the Court must liberally construe the filings and motions of a pro se inmate 

in a civil suit. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 150 (9th Cir. 2010). However, 

Plaintiff does not identify a statement in his motion to rejoin party that Judge Dembin 

should have also construed as a motion to modify the scheduling order. Nor can the Court 

discern any. Without more, the Court declines to find that Judge Dembin should have more 

liberally construed Plaintiff’s motion to include additional relief. Accordingly, the Court 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s fourth objection.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections, (2) 

ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, and (3) DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to rejoin party (ECF 

No. 95).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2017

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