Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04266/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-04266-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-filed on 3/31/08

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN GABOR and KAY GABOR,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS in their official capacity; ANN

RAVEL, county counsel, in her municipal and

individual capacity; DELORES CARR, district

attorney, in her official and individual capacity;

LAURIE SMITH, sheriff, in her municipal and

individual capacity; CITY OF CAMPBELL, in

its municipal capacity; CITY OF CAMPBELL

CITY MANAGER DANIEL RICH, in his

municipal and individual capacity; CITY OF

CAMPBELL COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT in its

municipal capacity; SUSAN MORGADOGRAY in her municipal and individual

capacity; EDMUND G. BROWN, JR. Attorney

General in his official capacity; UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT N. SCHOOLS in his official capacity

and DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

No. C-07-04266 RMW (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE;

DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF

COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANTS

[Docket No. 21, 23, 60]

Case 5:07-cv-04266-RMW Document 87 Filed 03/31/08 Page 1 of 14
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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Defendants City of Campbell, County of Santa Clara and U.S. Attorney Scott Schools

("Defendants") each move separately to (1) dismiss plaintiffs' complaint as to all defendants for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (2) require plaintiffs to present a more

definite statement, and to strike plaintiffs' pleading should such more definite statement fail to be

provided within ten days of such notice; (3) dismiss all causes of action which allege fraud for

failure to state circumstances constituting such fraud with particularity; and (4) require plaintiffs to

obtain leave of court to file subsequent redundant claims against defendants. Defendant U.S.

Attorney Scott Schools moves additionally to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on grounds of being an

improper defendant, and requests that leave to amend be denied because deficiencies in the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Defendants also ask the court to deny plaintiffs' petition

for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs have not filed written

opposition to any of the motions but did appear to orally oppose them. The court has read the

moving papers and taken judicial notice of documents. For the reasons set forth below, the court

grants defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against all defendants with prejudice, denies

plaintiffs' petition for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and grants defendants'

motion to require plaintiffs to obtain leave of court to file further claims stemming from municipal

attempts to regulate plaintiffs' operation of a"puppy mill" out of their house. 

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se plaintiffs John Gabor and Kay Gabor are the owners of the real property at 590 Smokey

Court, Campbell, California. They operate a "puppy mill" out of their home, breeding and selling dogs.

On August 13, 2007 at 1:45 p.m., defendant Susan Morgado-Gray ("Morgado") came to plaintiffs'

property and knocked on the door. When Kay Gabor, who was home alone, opened the door, Morgado

identified herself as a code enforcement officer and presented her business card. Morgado further

explained that Kay Gabor was on criminal probation to the City of Campbell, and Morgado requested

to enter the house to search for illegal dogs. Kay Gabor refused her request and asked Morgado to

leave. Morgado said she could obtain a warrant to search plaintiffs' house and bring back more officers.

Case 5:07-cv-04266-RMW Document 87 Filed 03/31/08 Page 2 of 14
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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Kay Gabor told Morgado to get a warrant, and closed the door. Compl. ¶ 51. Plaintiffs confirmed in

court at the January 18, 2008 hearing on these matters that these are the facts upon which plaintiffs'

complaint is based. 

As a preliminary matter, the court takes judicial notice that on February 2000, plaintiffs were

convicted and sentenced with respect to their sale of dogs in People v. Kay Gabor, Santa Clara Superior

Court Case No. C-99-27216. Later, on December 12, 2003, Kay Gabor was convicted for violating her

probation arising from the February 2000 conviction. Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.

16-17. After a series of petitions and appeals filed by Kay Gabor, on February 1, 2005, the Appellate

Division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court affirmed the judgment convicting Kay Gabor of

violating her probation. Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 18-22. 

Defendants point out that plaintiffs have a long record of unsuccessful "civil rights" claims and

appeals against municipal and state agencies and officials at all levels. According to defendants, all

claims stem from an alleged "widespread conspiracy" with respect to plaintiffs' "puppy mill" business.

These lawsuits date back to 1994 and all allege similar civil rights violations. Accordingly, the court

takes judicial notice of the following complaints and appeals: 

A. Gabor v. Frazer, et al., (N.D. Cal.) Case No. C-94-20617 JW 

On September 8, 1994, plaintiffs filed their first action against at least 20 individual and entity

defendants. Their claims included, among others, civil rights violations, bribery, and conspiracy.

Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1. On November 18, 1994, Judge Ware dismissed plaintiffs' complaint

with prejudice. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 2. Plaintiffs then appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed

the trial court's dismissal in its Case No. 94-17133, dated February 13, 1996. Request for Judicial

Notice, Ex. 3. Judge Ware recused himself from the case and the case was assigned to Judge Whyte.

Subsequently, Judge Whyte issued an order awarding sanctions against plaintiffs on March 24, 1997,

and a notice of entry of judgment in the amount of $4,026 in favor of defendants. Request for Judicial

Notice, Ex. 5. On October 15, 1996 and December 9, 1996, the United States Supreme Court, by two

opinions, denied plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 6.

B. Gabor v. Board of Equalization, et al., (N.D. Cal.) Case No. C-96-20324 RMW

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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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On April 25, 1996, plaintiffs filed a second action against at least 32 individual and entity

defendants, many of them overlapping with defendants in the Frazer action. The causes of action

asserted in the second action were substantially the same as the first action, including a civil rights

violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy, bribery and obstruction of justice arising from the action

of City of Campbell and Santa Clara County preventing plaintiffs' operation of a for-profit "puppy

mill." Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 7. Judge Ware and Judge Williams recused themselves and the

case was assigned to Judge Whyte. On September 20, 1996, Judge Whyte dismissed the complaint

without prejudice as to all non-federal defendants. By order dated October 10, 1996, Judge Whyte

dismissed the complaint as to federal defendants. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 9. Subsequently, on

July 14, 1997, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal in Case No. 96-17088. Request for

Judicial Notice, Ex. 10. 

C. Gabor v. Seligmann, et al., (N.D. Cal.) Case No. C-04-05320 JF 

On December 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a third lawsuit. They amended their complaint on May

26, 2005, submitting a 80-page complaint against at least 16 defendants, including the United States of

America, District Judge Fogel, and clerk of the court Richard W. Wieking. Among others, this

complaint alleged various claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as corruption

at all levels of Santa Clara County. Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 24. Judge Fogel

dismissed the entire action with prejudice. Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 25. On

February 26, 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal in its opinion in Case No. C-05-

017295. Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 26. 

D. The Instant Case

On August 20, 2007, plaintiffs filed the instant case. Plaintiffs allege ten claims against 13

individual and entity defendants, from the County of Santa Clara to the attorneys general for the State

of California and Northern District of California, all related to the plaintiffs' puppy mill business. 

Plaintiffs seek monetary damages in the amount of $1,000,000 against each defendant and injunctive

relief. 

E. Gabor v. United States, et al., (N.D. Cal.) Case No. C-07-06091 RMW.

Case 5:07-cv-04266-RMW Document 87 Filed 03/31/08 Page 4 of 14
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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

On November 3, 2007 plaintiffs filed yet another complaint suing individual attorneys and

district court staff members apparently for bribery and conspiracy, in connection with the docketing and

filing of orders entered by the court regarding the instant case, specifically with regard to the entry of

orders in this case denying plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. This case was initially

assigned to Judge Fogel. After Judge Fogel recused himself, the case was reassigned by the executive

committee to the undersigned.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint.

Dismissal can be based on the "lack of a cognizable legal theory" or "the absence of sufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacific Police Dept., 90 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988). The issue is not whether the non-moving party will ultimately prevail but whether it is entitled

to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th

Cir. 1997). The court's review is limited to the face of the complaint, documents referenced in the

complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950

F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the court is not required

to accept conclusory legal allegations "cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55

(9th Cir. 1994). 

B. Plaintiffs Assert No Cognizable Claim

Plaintiffs' claims include: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights violations against all defendants; (2)

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy to cause injury against all defendants; (3) state law trespass and larceny

against all defendants; (4) deprivation of the rights secured by Article I, Section I of the California

Constitution against all defendants; (5) deprivation of due process right and privacy right under the

Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against all defendants; (6) deprivation of due process right

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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by illegal taking without just

compensation against all defendants; (7) deprivation of rights secured by Article I, Section 19 of the

California Constitution against all defendants; (8) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1962(d),

interference with commerce by threats, violence, conspiracy, attempted robbery, and extortion under

color of official right against all defendants; (9) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1341, 1962(d), fraud and

conspiracy to collect unlawful debt against all defendants; (10) bribery, false representation of immunity

under color of official right in violation of Article III, Fifth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to

the U.S. Constitution against all defendants.

Plaintiffs' claims under the U.S. Constitution and its amendments are not cognizable. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 provides a remedy for deprivation of "all rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and the laws . . . ." The Ninth Circuit has upheld the exclusive nature of § 1983. Where

a plaintiff alleges a cause of action under § 1983, such statute is the exclusive remedy for the alleged

constitutional violations, and plaintiffs cannot assert independent causes of action under various

constitutional provisions. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992)

(plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the U.S. Constitution, a litigant complaining of a

violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Plaintiffs attempt to assert conspiracy claims under various federal statutes. Civil conspiracy

is defined as combination of two or more persons, who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish

some unlawful objective for purpose of harming another which result in damage. Doleman v. Meiji Mut.

Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482, n.3 (9th Cir. 1984). In the instant complaint as in previous

complaints, plaintiffs fail to assert any specific fact demonstrating either concerted action among the

defendants or unlawful objective. Morever, several courts have upheld that in civil actions, an entity

or corporation cannot conspire with its agents or employees when they act in their official capacity. See

Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 78 (1996) (when corporate employee acts in

his or her authorized capacity on behalf of his or her corporate employer, there can be no claim of

conspiracy between corporate employer and corporate employee); see also Thompson v. City of

Galveston, 979 F. Supp. 504, 511 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (single legal entity, such as police department and

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1 Additionally, to the extent that plaintiffs attempt to assert state claims against Scott

Schools, the court notes that he is not a proper defendant in this action. The Federal Tort Claims Act

holds that individual government employees are not personally liable for tort claims against a

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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its officers, is incapable of conspiring with itself for purposes of civil rights conspiracy claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983). Therefore, plaintiffs' conspiracy claims are dismissed. 

Plaintiffs fail to meet the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) as to all fraud allegations

against all defendants. Rule 9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Desaigoudar v. Meyercord, 223 F.3d

1020, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, allegations that are vague or conclusory are insufficient to satisfy

the "particularity" required by Rule 9(b). Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540

(9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs' complaint is full of accusations of "fraud" and "false representation," but yet

fails to provide any specific facts to support these allegations. In addition, with respect to the RICO

claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, it is still unclear even after numerous actions by plaintiffs alleging RICO

violations what conduct is alleged to form the basis for plaintiffs' claim. Accordingly, even under the

liberal pleading standard, the court is not required to draw unreasonable or unwarranted factual

inference in interpreting plaintiffs' pleadings. McKinney v. De Board, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir.

1974). Thus, all claims based on allegations of fraud or mistake are dismissed.

Plaintiffs' civil rights claims are also not cognizable. Based on the complaint and the plaintiffs'

arguments at the hearing on the instant matter, it would appear that plaintiffs base their civil rights claim

on the request by Morgado-Gray to enter the Gabor's residence for a search that Morgado-Gray asserted

was authorized under the terms of Kay Gabor's probation. Ms. Gabor denied Morgado-Gray access to

the premises and no further actions were taken. This request by Morgado-Gray does not constitute or

give rise to any violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights sufficient to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

The remaining claims appear to be claims under the California constitution. Since all federal

law claims are dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law

claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.1

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government employee while acting in the course and scope of his employment. 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d). Such suits can only be brought against the United States of America. Defendant Schools

requests the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Before a party may sue the United

States of America, they must first file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency. 

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The plaintiff in an action under the FTCA must allege that they complied with

the FTCA's administrative claim presentment requirement. Bruce v. United States, 621 F.2d 914,

918 (8th Cir. 1980). Even if the claim were amended to name the proper defendant it would still fail

to comply with the administrative claim presentment requirement. Since the defendant is not a

proper defendant and the plaintiff has not alleged that they complied with the administrative claim

presentment requirement, the claim as to Defendant Schools is dismissed without leave to amend.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the claims are

dismissed. Given the plaintiffs' history of unsuccessful litigation the fact that there is no indication that

the defects set forth above can be cured by amending the complaint, the plaintiffs' claims against all

defendants are dismissed without leave to amend.

C. The Court Denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs have filed a motion asking the court to strike defendants' motions to dismiss because

defendants have not yet answered the complaint. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

defendants are entitled to submit a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Plaintiffs'

motion to strike defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

D. The Court Denies Plaintiffs' Request for Injunctive Relief 

The Ninth Circuit has formulated two tests for evaluating requests for preliminary injunctive

relief. Paisa v. N & G Auto, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 1996). Under the traditional test,

"a court may issue a preliminary injunction if it finds that (1) the moving party will suffer irreperable

injury if injunctive relief is not granted; (2) the moving party will probably prevail on the merits; (3) in

balancing the equities the non-moving party will not be harmed more than the moving party is helped

by the injunction; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public interest." Stanley v. University of

Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the alternative test, "a court may issue

a preliminary injunction if the moving party demonstrates either a combination of probable success on

the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance

of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 674-

75 (9th Cir. 1984). 

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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief fails under either test. As set forth above, the court finds

that plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim against any defendant. Even assuming it did and there

were any possibility of success, injunctive relief is nevertheless inappropriate. Plaintiffs do not allege

any fact demonstrating that there is a substantial threat that they will suffer irreparable injury if the

injunctive relief is denied, thus, the threatened injury to plaintiffs is unclear. The harm to defendants

like the County of Santa Clara and City of Campbell would, on the other hand, be significant as they

would be unable to exercise their governmental authority with respect to the activities of their residents.

The consequence of issuing the injunctive relief would be contrary to the public interest, because the

County and City defendants have the legal duties to provide for public health and public safety.

Therefore, the court denies plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction. 

 E. The Court Grants Defendants' Motion to Declare Plaintiffs Vexatious Litigants

Defendants request that the court require the plaintiffs to obtain leave of the court prior to filing

any further suits against the City of Campbell, its officers or the City of Santa Clara. Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651(a), a district court can enjoin litigants with abusive and lengthy histories from filing further

actions or papers, requiring the litigant to meet certain requirements, such as obtaining leave of the

court or filing declarations that support the merits of the case. Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d

1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999); see also, O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring

pro se inmate deemed vexatious litigant to show good cause before being permitted to file future

actions); Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1990) (forbidding pro se plaintiff from filing

further complaints without prior approval of district court). However, such pre-filing orders are an

extreme remedy and should rarely be filed. De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990).

The Ninth Circuit has held that before a plaintiff can be enjoined as a vexatious litigant, the court

must find that (1) the plaintiff had notice of the motion and an opportunity to be heard; (2) there was

an adequate record for review showing that the litigant's activities were numerous or abusive; (3) the

court has made substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant's actions; and

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28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISMISSAL; DENYING PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REQUIRE

PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS–C-07-04266

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

(4) the order has an appropriate breadth and is narrowly tailored to fit the specific vice encountered.

Id. at 1147-48. The court held in Molski v Mandarin Touch Restaurant, 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007),

that the five factors set forth in Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d. Cir. 1986),

provide a helpful framework for determining the two substantive factors (factors three and four) of the

Ninth Circuit test. The five Safir factors are (1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular

whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the

litigation; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether litigant has caused needless

expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; (5)

whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.

1. The Plaintiffs Have Had Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard

The plaintiffs have had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. They have been served with

the motion to have them declared vexatious litigants but have thus far failed to file written opposition

to the motion. They had an opportunity to be heard to oppose the motion at the January 18, 2008

hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss.

2. There Is An Adequate Record For Review Detailing the Harassing Nature

of Plaintiffs' Litigations

The record for review consists of this order and the orders dismissing the previous actions filed

by the plaintiffs: Cases No. C-94-20617 JW, No. C-96-20324 RMW and No. C-04-05320 JF. The

record shows that, beginning in 1994, plaintiffs have filed three previous actions all generally containing

similar "civil rights" claims against substantially similar defendants. All previous actions have been

meritless and were dismissed. Each action named between 13 to 32 defendants. 

3. Applying the Safir Factors Shows the Frivolous and Harassing Nature of the

Litigants' Actions

As set forth above, the Ninth Circuit held in Molski that the five Safir factors are helpful in

determining assessing the third and fourth prongs of the Ninth Circuit vexatious litigant test, i.e. whether

the court had made substantial findings of frivolousness and whether the vexatious litigant order was

narrowly tailored to the specific vice encountered. Molski, 500 F.3d at 1047. 

a. The Plaintiffs' History of Litigation

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Plaintiffs have filed the three prior actions described above and have two pending actions,

including the instant case. Each action filed by the plaintiffs has named numerous and often

inappropriate defendants having no connection with the conduct about which plaintiffs complain. Each

action alleges similar "civil rights" and conspiracy claims arising out of the efforts of municipal agencies

to enforce regulations in relation to plaintiffs' operation of a "puppy mill" out of their home. The current

complaint, like the prior complaints, is nearly devoid of comprehensible facts upon which plaintiffs'

allegations are based. Given the large number of defendants to each action, the inappropriateness of

many of the defendants to the actions and the duplicative nature of the claims asserted, the court finds

that the lawsuits are both vexatious and harassing.

b. The Litigants' Motive in Pursuing the Litigation

The plaintiffs continue to assert baseless claims out of a belief that it is unlawful for the City of

Campbell or County of Santa Clara to regulate plaintiff's operation of a "puppy mill" out of their home.

It is unclear whether plaintiffs' are bringing this action for purposes of harassing the named defendants,

although based on the number of defendants and the vitriol expressed in the instant complaint, it would

appear that there may be some intent to harass.

c. Whether Litigant is Represented by Counsel

The plaintiffs' suits are always brought in propia persona. Courts are generally protective of pro

se litigants. Molski, 347 F. Supp 2d at 866. However, flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be

tolerated because it enables one person to preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used

to consider the meritorious claims of other litigants. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1001 (1990). 

d. Whether Litigant has Caused Unnecessary Expense to The Parties

or Placed a Needless Burden on the Courts

Plaintiffs have filed multiple largely duplicative suits against similar or identical defendants.

They have appealed many of the district court dismissals of their claims to the Ninth Circuit, which has,

to date, confirmed the dismissal of their claims. These actions have forced the defendants to undertake

unnecessary expense to defend themselves from baseless claims. This court and the appellate court have

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expended considerable time and effort reviewing and ruling on these baseless claims. Plaintiffs'

allegations of conspiracy among district court judges and magistrate judges have prompted several

judges to recuse themselves from their actions. It is the court's view that plaintiffs' have caused

unnecessary expense to the parties and have placed a needless burden on the courts.

e. Whether Other Sanctions Would be Adequate to Protect the Courts

and Other Parties

As the court has noted, plaintiffs have been sanctioned for their actions in the previous suits that

have been filed. However, plaintiffs continue to file actions stemming from their differences of opinion

regarding the legality of their operation of a puppy mill against the same or similar defendants, each

time making baseless allegations. It is the court's view that other sanctions would not be appropriate

to protect the courts and other parties from further frivolous lawsuits being brought by defendants.

4. The Order is Narrowly Tailored to the Specific Vice Encountered

As shown above, plaintiffs have a history of filing "civil rights" type claims and conspiracy

claims against public agencies and individuals arising out of municipal efforts to regulate plaintiffs'

operation of a "puppy mill" out of their home. Any potential order needs to be narrowly tailored to fit

the specific vice encountered. DeLong, 912 F.2d at 1148. 

The court holds that the proper order is to require plaintiffs to obtain leave of court to file any

"civil rights" claims or conspiracy claims arising out of municipal attempts to regulate plaintiffs'

operation of a "puppy mill" out of their home.

III. ORDER

As set forth above, the court finds as follows:

1. Plaintiffs have filed multiple lawsuits alleging substantially similar claims against

substantially similar defendants all stemming from their dispute with the City of

Campbell and the County of Santa Clara regarding the legality of their running a puppy

mill out of their homes. Plaintiffs' complaints are nearly devoid of facts and do not state

legal claims upon which relief can be granted. Each of plaintiffs' complaints has been

frivolous.

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2. Plaintiffs' duplicative and baseless filings have consumed significant judicial resources

of this court and resources of the parties.

3. This order and the previous written orders of dismissal in the prior three cases, and a

transcript of the January 2008 proceedings constitute a record of plaintiffs' conduct.

Accordingly, the court:

1. Grants defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety with prejudice;

2. Denies plaintiffs' petition for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction;

3. Denies plaintiffs' separately filed motion to strike; 

4. Grants defendant's motion for a pre-filing review order. The court will require John

Gabor and Kay Gabor to obtain leave of court before filing any further suits against any

defendants alleging claims arising out of municipal attempts to regulate the operation

of a "puppy mill" out of their home. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of this

Court shall not accept for filing any further complaints filed by John Gabor and/or Kay

Gabor until that complaint has first been reviewed by the court. A two-stage pre-filing

review will be conducted before leave is granted to file the action. First, if the complaint

is related to the Gabor's operation of a "puppy mill" out of their home it will not be filed

unless it presents cognizable claims that are not based on merely conclusory allegations.

Second, other complaints filed by John Gabor and Kay Gabor will be filed if they

contain intelligible factual allegations and claims for relief. All cases filed by John

Gabor and/or Kay Gabor shall be forwarded to the general duty judge, for pre-filing

review.

DATED: 3/31/08 RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

A copy of this document was sent on 4/1/08 to:

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

John and Kay Gabor

590 Smokey Court

Campbell, CA 95008-3717

PRO SE

Counsel for Defendants:

Marcy Berkman marcy.berkman@cco.sccgov.org

Timothy James Schmal tschmal@bvsllp.com

James A. Scharf james.scharf@usdoj.gov

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered

for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

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