Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00238/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00238-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE JASON MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 13-CV-238 BEN (NLS)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. Nos. 21 and 23.)

Plaintiff Steve Jason Miller (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security

Administration’s (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) decision to deny his claim for

Disabled Adult Child benefits. (Dkt. No. 1) This case was referred for a report and

recommendation on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B). After considering the moving papers, the administrative record, and the

applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment be DENIED, and that Defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment be

GRANTED.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Evaluation of a Disability Under the Social Security Act

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must

show that he or she cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected

to last at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). An individual claiming disability

must prove he was permanently disabled or subject to a condition which became

disabling prior to his last insured date. Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.

1995). The Social Security regulations establish a five-step sequential evaluation

procedure for determining whether an applicant is disabled under this standard. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Batson v. Comm’r of the Social Security Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,

1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 

First, it must be determined whether the applicant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If not, then it must be determined whether the

applicant is suffering from a “severe” impairment within the meaning of the regulations. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the impairment is severe, the third step is to ascertain

whether it meets or equals one of the “Listing of Impairments” in the Social Security

regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the applicant’s impairment meets or

equals a Listing, he or she will be found disabled. Id. If the impairment does not meet or

equal a Listing, it is then determined whether the applicant retains the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform his or her past relevant work (step four). 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the applicant cannot perform past relevant work, it must be

considered whether the applicant can perform other work (step five). 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(v).

While the applicant carries the burden of proving eligibility at steps one through

four, the burden at step five rests on the agency. Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180

(9th Cir. 2003). Applicants not disqualified at step five are eligible for disability benefits. 

Id. In making the determinations, “the ALJ [Administrative Law Judge] has a special

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duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s interests are

considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for Disabled Adult Child disability insurance benefits

on June 20, 2011. Administrative Record (“AR”) 84. He alleges his condition rendered

him disabled on July 1, 1989. AR 32. The application was initially denied on September

6, 2011, and denied again upon reconsideration on November 18, 2011. AR 84-85. On

December 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing. AR 100. 

An ALJ held a hearing on August 16, 2012. AR 27-83. Plaintiff, three doctors,

and a vocational expert testified at the hearing. Id. Based on the testimony and

documentary evidence, the ALJ issued a decision denying the applications for benefits. 

AR 13-21. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, and the ALJ’s

decision became final. AR 4.

Plaintiff filed this complaint for judicial review of Defendant’s final decision. 

(Dkt. No. 1.) He argues the ALJ committed reversible error by improperly discrediting

the testimony and opinions of three doctors. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 9-11.1

) He asks this Court

to reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand for calculation of benefits or for further

administrative proceedings. Id. at 11.

C. Relevant Documentary Evidence

On July 28, 1989, Dr. Allan Rabin admitted Plaintiff, then eighteen years old, to

VillaView Community Hospital. AR 413-14. Dr. Rabin had been called by Plaintiff’s

mother, who reported Plaintiff was being physically abusive towards her and had locked

her out of the house. AR 413. Plaintiff was agitated, had not been sleeping, had episodes

of euphoria and depression, and was experiencing racing thoughts. Id. Dr. Rabin

diagnosed Plaintiff as having an “acute manic episode.” AR 414. The next morning,

Plaintiff escaped VillaView by climbing a fence. AR 429. He returned home, and was

1

 Citations to page numbers in the parties’ submissions refer to those assigned by the ECF system.

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brought to Mesa Vista Hospital the same day. AR 237. Upon admission, he was noted to

be emotionally labile and somewhat agitated, and he reported having “depressive and

specific suicidal thoughts.” AR 239. While at Mesa Vista, Plaintiff experienced some

visual hallucinations, which were related to his medications. AR 240. During the

hospitalization, Dr. Rabin observed that Plaintiff was making fair social contact with the

other patients and played a game of basketball with another patient. AR 239. By the

time Plaintiff was discharged, approximately two weeks after his admission, Plaintiff was

functioning on the open unit, “looking forward to outpatient treatment,” and was thinking

about going away to college in the fall. AR 240.

While hospitalized, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Raymond Fidaleo. AR 242-245. 

Plaintiff presented as “extremely sedated” during the evaluation with rambling speech,

and reported visual and auditory hallucinations. AR 243-44. Dr. Fidaleo concluded

Plaintiff was experiencing a bipolar manic episode. AR 244. Plaintiff was later

evaluated at the hospital by Dr. James McClure, Jr. AR 246. He determined that Plaintiff

had bipolar affective disorder. Id. In support of this conclusion, Dr. Fidaleo cited

Plaintiff’s hallucinations and “transient paranoid ideation,” racing thoughts, lability of

mood, family history, and the fact that he was “improving rapidly on lithium and

neuroleptic medication[.]” Id. Dr. McClure agreed with continuing the current treatment

“until his moods are essentially stabilized.” Id. He anticipated “continued rapid

improvement.” Id.

Dr. J. Mark Thompson was Plaintiff’s psychiatrist from fall 1989 to spring 1991. 

AR 248, 292. He treated Plaintiff for bipolar disorder and used several medications, but

the response to treatment was limited. AR 292. In a letter dated March 6, 2012, Dr.

Thompson indicated that when Plaintiff was under his care he “was very limited in his

capacity to work or apply himself to academic work.” Id.

On April 7, 1997, Dr. Rabin wrote a letter to Grossmont College stating he was

Plaintiff’s treating physician, and verified that Plaintiff was “mentally fit and

competent[,]” appeared stable, and “has the capacity to function as an allied health

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professional.” AR 471. A 1998 treatment note from Dr. Rabin indicates he encouraged

Plaintiff to pursue the prosthesis field. AR 447. On January 10, 1999, Dr. Rabin wrote a

letter to HealthSouth on Plaintiff’s behalf stating that he had been treating Plaintiff for

Mood Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, and he believed there were no restrictions or

limitations on Plaintiff’s employment. AR 470. 

On March 8, 2012, Dr. Rabin submitted a letter stating that Plaintiff’s bipolar

disorder prevented him from working prior to his twenty-second birthday. AR 293. Dr.

Rabin described symptoms such as agitation, inability to concentrate, racing thoughts,

rapid and drastic mood changes, and inappropriate and dysfunctional behavior patterns. 

Id. He stated Plaintiff’s work history between 1989 and 1999 was “brief and fleeting or

unsuccessful,” and concluded by stating “from June of 1989 through the mid 1990s,

[Plaintiff] fully meets the criteria established by the Social Security Administration as a

Disabled Adult Child[.]” Id.

D. Relevant Testimony from the Hearing

The ALJ held a hearing on August 16, 2012. A psychiatrist, Dr. Mark Zink,

testified at the hearing. AR 34-46. Although he did not specifically remember Plaintiff,

Dr. Zink recalled some of the details of his case after speaking with Plaintiff. AR 35. Dr.

Zink thought he may have treated Plaintiff seven years prior to the hearing; he

remembered a client who wanted to be a doctor and who was very disturbed and hopeless

about his future. Id. Dr. Zink also vaguely remembered Plaintiff’s mother being

involved and her concern about his treatment. AR 36. From his recent conversations

with Plaintiff, Dr. Zink felt that he had an inflated sense of self, poor judgment and

impulse control, and Dr. Zink predicted he would not be able to keep a job. AR 38. 

Although Dr. Zink treated Plaintiff later in his life, Dr. Zink testified he didn’t think his

“condition started the day he walked into [his] office seven years ago[.]” AR 39. 

Plaintiff was unable to obtain the records from the clinic where he treated with Dr. Zink;

the records were either lost or destroyed by the clinic. AR 45. 

Dr. Rabin also testified at the hearing. AR 50-78. He testified that he was the first

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to document Plaintiff’s symptoms of mania, and had arranged for his admission to the

hospital. AR 51-52. Dr. Rabin stated that Plaintiff was psychotic and hallucinating while

in the hospital. AR 54. Plaintiff improved with medication while in the hospital, but

experienced side effects. Id. Dr. Rabin said he was in “pretty good” condition when he

was discharged, and would have been able to function in a job where he did not have to

interact with others. AR 57, 68. Dr. Rabin saw Plaintiff a few times after that, and filled

out some paperwork on his behalf. AR 58, 60-61. He said Plaintiff was functioning

better when he started college than he was presently, and at that time he would have been

able to function in a job where he would not have to deal with people. AR 65-66, 68. Dr.

Rabin remembered Plaintiff as being moody, unstable, and wanted to do types of work

that he “just wasn’t able to do[.]” AR 72. Upon examination by Plaintiff at the hearing,

Dr. Rabin recalled Plaintiff’s many failed attempts to keep a job, and recalled Plaintiff’s

bipolar disorder as severely hampering his ability to sustain work or to train for work

prior to his twenty-second birthday. AR 75, 77-78. 

A third doctor, Dr. Smith, was subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. AR 47. 

Plaintiff testified he treated with Dr. Smith in 2000 and 2001, but Dr. Smith had no

recollection of Plaintiff, and his office was not able to locate treatment records from that

time period. AR 47-49. 

Plaintiff testified that he is disabled due to his bipolar I disorder. AR 33. He also

has generalized anxiety disorder and fibromyalgia. Id. Plaintiff stated that he dropped

out of UCLA twice, and “dropped out and got kicked out” of Grossmont College. AR 62. 

He eventually earned a degree from UCLA in 1995. AR 63. Plaintiff testified about his

treatment with Dr. Thompson and the medication issues he had under his care. AR 78-

79. He indicated he is still trying to find the right medication, and still has issues staying

employed. AR 79. Plaintiff asserted that the difficulty in remaining employed was not

only due to “personality clashes,” but also due to depression, restlessness, and racing

thoughts. AR 80. He stated that working alone would not have solved his issues because

of his overall mental instability. Id.

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A vocational expert testified at the hearing. AR 81-82. The ALJ asked her for

examples of “non-public, minimum contact with others, unskilled jobs at the light

level[.]” AR 81. She provided the options of room cleaner, sorter, and packer. Id.

These options did not take into account an individual with a severe mental illness. AR

82.

E. ALJ’s Written Decision

The ALJ issued a written decision on September 28, 2012. AR 13-21. The ALJ

found that Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date, July 1, 1989, occurred before he

reached the age of twenty-two years old, and that he had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged onset date. AR 15. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff

had the severe impairment of bipolar disorder. Id. The ALJ next addressed whether this

impairment met or equaled one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P,

Appendix 1. AR 16. In analyzing this issue, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had mild

restriction in daily living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, and moderate

difficulties with respect to concentration, persistence or pace. Id. He also had one

episode of decompensation. Id. These issues did not meet the necessary criteria, and the

ALJ concluded Plaintiff did not meet or equal a listing. Id.

The ALJ then considered whether there is “an underlying medically determinable

physical or mental impairment,” and whether that impairment “could reasonably be

expect to produce [Plaintiff’s] pain or other symptoms.” AR 17. The ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the

alleged symptoms.” AR 18. Next, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s statements about the

“intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of his symptoms, and found them “not fully

credible to the extent they are inconsistent” with his RFC. Id.

The ALJ determined that objective medical evidence in the record did not support

Plaintiff’s allegations of a disabling mental impairment prior to turning twenty-two years

old. Id. The ALJ noted that there was “very little treatment evidence” from the time

period in question, the evidence showed that Plaintiff “had a relatively quick well

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response to medication treatment,” and Plaintiff was able to attend college after his

hospitalization, although he dropped out twice. Id. The ALJ noted Plaintiff made “fair

social contact with other patients and was even playing basketball with another patient”

while he was hospitalized. Id. The medical record reflected that Plaintiff improved

rapidly on lithium and neuroleptic medication, had more coherent speech, was no longer

hyperactive and impulsive, and “had no obvious psychotic symptoms.” Id. The ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff’s bipolar symptoms “responded well to medication and...he

retained the capacity to perform up to a wide range of unskilled work tasks that required

no interaction with the public and no more than minimum contact with others.” Id.

The ALJ reviewed Dr. Rabin’s testimony and 2012 medical source statement and

gave them little weight, due to the fact that Plaintiff’s condition improved “rapidly” with

lithium and the fact that he was able to go away to college. AR 19. The ALJ stated that

Dr. Rabin provided no treatment records from the relevant period to support his opinion

that Plaintiff was unable to sustain any work dating back to July 1989.2

 Id. The ALJ also

pointed out Dr. Rabin’s 1997 letter indicating Plaintiff was “mentally fit, competent, and

stable[,]” his 1998 treatment note indicating Plaintiff had “good motivation,” and his

1999 letter stating that Plaintiff “had no restrictions or limitations on his employment.” 

AR 20.

The ALJ considered the letter from Dr. Thompson that opined Plaintiff was very

limited in his capacity to work while under his care from 1989 to 1991. Id. This opinion

was given little weight because it was not accompanied by progress notes to support his

conclusions, and it was contradicted by evidence from the relevant period that Plaintiff’s

symptoms were managed by medication and Plaintiff was able to go away to college. Id.

The ALJ also indicated that Plaintiff was not fully credible because his described

activities of daily living were not “limited to the extent one would expect, given the

complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” AR 18. Specifically, the ALJ again

2

It is unclear whether the ALJ considered the fact that Dr. Rabin authored treatment

notes during Plaintiff’s hospitalizations.

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noted Plaintiff was able to attend college, although he had to drop out twice. Id. In 1998,

Plaintiff was “going to interviews, playing tennis, forcing himself to socialize and had

good motivation[.]” AR 19. At that time, Dr. Rabin encouraged Plaintiff to pursue the

prosthesis field. Id.

The ALJ also noted that, although Plaintiff’s work activity prior to his twentysecond birthday did not constitute substantial gainful activity, it indicated daily activities

greater than Plaintiff reported. Id. The ALJ rejected a third party statement from

Plaintiff’s friend because it covered a time period after the period of adjudication, there

were several things the friend did not know about Plaintiff, and most of the report

stemmed from what Plaintiff told him and displayed for him. Id. As discussed above, the

ALJ did not find Plaintiff fully credible, and found that the friend’s statements were

contradicted by the evidence in the record.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that, prior to attaining twenty-two years of age,

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b), and

retained the capacity for unskilled work tasks “in a work environment that required no

interaction with the public and no more than minimal contact with others.” AR 17. The

ALJ then adopted the vocational expert’s opinion that Plaintiff could have worked as a

room cleaner, a sorter, or a packer. AR 21. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that

Plaintiff was not disabled prior to his twenty-second birthday and therefore not entitled to

Disabled Adult Child benefits. Id.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review Regarding Substantial Evidence 

The Social Security Act provides for judicial review of a final agency decision

denying a claim for disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must

affirm the denial of benefits if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence

and applies the correct legal standards. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. Substantial evidence

means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Security Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir.

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1999). It is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). If the evidence is susceptible to more

than one reasonable interpretation, the agency’s decision must be upheld. Batson, 359

F.3d at 1193. Further, when medical reports are inconclusive, resolution of conflicts in

the testimony and questions of credibility are the exclusive functions of the agency. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

When an individual applies for Disabled Adult Child benefits, he must show that

he was disabled “continuously and without interruption beginning before [his] twentysecond birthday until the time [he] applied for child’s disability insurance benefits.” 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1996). In Plaintiff’s case, he must show

he was disabled prior to December 21, 1992, and continuously up until June 20, 2011. A

period of non-disability within that time frame may defeat a claim. Vicari v. Astrue, No.

C 09-5238 SI, 2012 WL 761686 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012).

B. Assertions of Error

In challenging the ALJ’s denial of benefits, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by

improperly rejecting the opinions of Drs. Rabin, Thompson, and Zink. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at

9.)

Where a treating doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the

Commissioner can only reject the treating doctor's opinion for "clear and convincing"

reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the treating doctor is

contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner must provide "specific and legitimate"

reasons based on "substantial evidence" in order to properly reject a treating physician's

opinion. Id. The ALJ can “meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof,

and making findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of an examining

physician alone can constitute "substantial evidence" because it rests on an independent

examination. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ is not

required to accept any physician's opinion that is conclusory, brief, and unsupported by

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clinical findings. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Finally, the

"ALJ is the final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence." 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

1. Rejection of Dr. Rabin’s Opinion

In arguing that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Rabin’s opinion, Plaintiff makes

the following statement:

ALJ Godfrey rejected Dr. Rabin’s opinion because [Plaintiff’s condition improved rapidly with lithium]. AR 19. Dr. Rabin has explained that by [its] nature, bipolar [disorder] is a waxing and waning condition.

(Dkt. No. 21-1 at 9.) Later in the motion, Plaintiff states the standard law outlined above

regarding the evaluation of medical opinions. Id. at 10. Although unclear, the Court

presumes Plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ did not provide proper reasons for rejecting Dr.

Rabin’s 2012 opinion that Plaintiff met the criteria for Disabled Adult Child benefits. 

Defendant counters that the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Rabin’s

opinion. (Dkt. No. 23 at 4-6.)

 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Rabin’s opinion

for more reasons than just Plaintiff’s improvement on lithium. Specifically, the ALJ cited

Plaintiff’s collegiate achievements, Dr. Rabin’s 1997 statement that Plaintiff was

mentally fit, competent, appeared stable, and had the ability to function as an allied health

professional. AR 20. He also cited to Dr. Rabin’s 1999 statement that he believed there

were “no restrictions or limitations on [Plaintiff’s] employment.” Id. The ALJ took note

of the fact that Dr. Rabin indicated in a 1998 treatment note that he encouraged Plaintiff

to pursue the field of prosthesis, implying that Plaintiff was able to work. Id.

A discrepancy in a doctor’s opinions and observations constitutes “clear and

convincing evidence” for not relying on that doctor’s opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216;

see also Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir. 1989). Although an ALJ cannot

simply parse out evidence that supports his conclusion, see Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d

1450, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1984), there is more than one isolated note in the record. These

are unequivocal statements over the course of two years affirming that Plaintiff is able to

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work. There is also little evidence in the record to dispute Dr. Rabin’s assertions that

Plaintiff was able to work at the time these letters and treatment notes were written. 

Even if the ALJ should have credited Dr. Rabin’s opinion that Plaintiff was unable

to work prior to his twenty-second birthday, in order to be eligible for Disabled Adult

Child disability benefits a claimant must show a continuous and uninterrupted disability

from before his twenty-second birthday up until the date of application for benefits. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1280. Although Dr. Rabin opined in 2012 that Plaintiff was disabled

prior to his twenty-second birthday due to Bipolar I Disorder, and that the illness

continues to be disabling (AR 293), the records described above directly contradict this

opinion with respect to Plaintiff’s abilities in the late 1990s. There is little in the record

to dispute the assertions that Plaintiff was able to work during this time; therefore,

Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate a continuing and uninterrupted disability beginning

prior to December 21, 1992, and lasting up until June 20, 2011. 

Accordingly, this Court finds that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Rabin’s opinion that

Plaintiff was unable to work was based on substantial evidence in the record and is free

from legal error.

2. Rejection of Dr. Thompson’s Opinion

Plaintiff next argues that Dr. Thompson’s opinion that he was limited in his

capacity to work was improperly rejected. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 9.) Plaintiff appears to

believe that the ALJ rejected the opinion because his symptoms were “very well managed

with medication,” and points out Dr. Thompson stated that his response to treatment was

limited. Id. However, this is not the sole reason Dr. Thompson’s opinion was rejected. 

The ALJ also noted there were no progress notes to support Dr. Thompson’s conclusion. 

AR 20. As previously discussed, an ALJ is not required to accept a physician’s opinion

that is “brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas, 278

F.3d at 957. Even if the ALJ were to accept Dr. Thompson’s opinion about Plaintiff’s

abilities when he was under his care, Dr. Thompson has not treated Plaintiff since 1991. 

AR 292. Plaintiff would still need to demonstrate he continued to be disabled for the

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following twenty years and, as noted in the previous section, there is evidence in the

record that Plaintiff was not continuously disabled during that entire time period.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Thompson’s opinion

is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is free from legal error.

3. Failure to Address Dr. Zink’s Testimony

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not addressing or specifically

rejecting Dr. Zink’s opinion. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 9.) Defendant points out that Dr. Zink

had no clear memory of treating Plaintiff or any treatment notes, and therefore his

testimony had no probative value. (Dkt. No. 23 at 7.) 

“[I]n interpreting the evidence and developing the record, the ALJ does not need to

discuss every piece of evidence.” Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012

(9th Cir. 2003). The ALJ is only required to “explain why significant probative evidence

has been rejected.” Vincent on behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th

Cir. 1984). 

Here, Dr. Zink testified that he had a recollection of someone who, like Plaintiff,

had wanted to be doctor but felt hopeless about his future, and that he was “pretty sure it

was [Plaintiff].” AR 35. He also had a “vague recollection” about Plaintiff’s mother

being involved. AR 36. Dr. Zink did not remember other scenarios described by

Plaintiff. AR 40-46. There were no records, and Dr. Zink testified that without the

records he could not “provide many details or particulars.” AR 37. He testified he would

have treated Plaintiff in approximately 2005. AR 35.

It is evident that Dr. Zink’s testimony is neither significant nor probative. He had

no specific recollection of Plaintiff, only of a patient with the same hopelessness of not

being able to be a doctor. There are no records or treating notes, and although he felt at

the time of the hearing that Plaintiff was unemployable (AR 46), that does not address

Plaintiff’s abilities during the time period in question. Accordingly, the ALJ was not

required to address his testimony, and declining to do so does not amount to error.

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III. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, this Court concludes that the ALJ's denial of

benefits is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error. Therefore, the

Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 21) be

DENIED and that Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment (dkt. no. 23) be

GRANTED.

The undersigned submits this Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) to the United States District Judge assigned to this case.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 23, 2014, any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than June 30, 2014. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2014

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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