Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00536/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125la Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PERFORMANCE DESIGNED 

PRODUCTS LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

PLANTRONICS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00536-GPC-LL

ORDER

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF No. 

18];

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION [ECF No. 24].

Before the Court are two motions arising from a trademark infringement dispute. 

On April 12, 2019, Defendants Plantronics, Inc., Polycom, Inc., and Poly (collectively, 

“Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Performance Designed Products LLC 

(“Plaintiff)’s First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 18.) The motion is fully briefed. 

(ECF Nos. 21, 33.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s May 10, 2019 motion for 

preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 24.) 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the motions suitable for 

adjudication without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court 

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GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 

injunction. 

I. Factual Background1

Plaintiff is a “leading video game accessory company in the U.S. and worldwide,” 

organized under California law and with its principal place of business in San Diego, 

California. (ECF No. 4, at 2.) 

Defendant Plantronics, Inc., (“Plantronics”) is a Delaware corporation with its 

principal place of business in Santa Cruz, California. (Id.) Defendant POLYCOM, INC.

(“Polycom”), is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in San Jose, 

California. (Id.) After Plantronics acquired Polycom in 2018, the new combined entity 

was revealed to the public as “Poly.” (ECF No. 18-1, at 5 (explaining that Plantronics is 

registered as the parent company).

2

On or about March 21, 2018, Plaintiff developed the below “stylized ‘P’ mark with 

flanges,” for use in connection with headsets. 

 

1 The ensuing facts are taken from Plaintiff’s FAC and are accepted as true upon a Rule 12(b)(6) 

challenge. Defendants have asked the Court to take judicial notice of three types of documents: (1) a 

number of Plantronics’ SEC Filings, (2) corporate webpages explaining the corporate merger between 

Defendants, and (3) Plaintiff’s applications to register the disputed mark with the USPTO (and a related 

filing for voluntary amendment). (ECF No. 18-2, at 2-3.) 

The Court will take judicial notice of some of Defendants’ proffered documents. Although 

Defendants’ documents are generally of the type which may be judicially noticed, see Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b) (permitting cognizance of “matters of public record”), they are not all invoked for a proper Rule 

12(b)(6) purpose. In so far as the documents illustrate Defendants’ merger history, they are noticed for 

background purposes. In so far as Defendants seek to use Plaintiff’s USPTO filings to suggest a pattern 

of duplicitous or less than good faith conduct in initiating this action, those documents have not been 

considered. Defendants have moved to dismiss on the sole basis that the FAC lacks sufficient factual 

allegations as to likelihood of confusion. Plaintiff’s submissions to the USPTO do not bear in any way 

on that issue. 

2

It would thus appear to the Court that “Poly,” which Plaintiff names as a defendant in the FAC, 

is a product of rebranding, rather than a separate entity with the capacity to be sued.

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(ECF No. 4, at 4.) On or about July 3, 2018, Plaintiff placed an initial tooling order with 

one of its factories to produce headsets bearing the mark; on approximately July 12, 

2018, Plaintiff received its first order from a retail partner for the same. On or about 

October 30, 2018, the retail partner started to display the mark on its website. Thereafter 

on January 30, 2019, Plaintiff shipped its headsets to that retail partner and also begun 

accepting orders on its website, www.pdp.com. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants started using a “virtually identical” mark 

sometime after Plaintiff’s first use of the mark. Plaintiff provides a pictorial juxtaposition 

of the two marks: 

Plaintiff’s Mark

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Plaintiff’s Mark Defendants’ Mark

(Id. at 5.) 

On February 28, 2019, Plantronics applied for federal registration of its mark by 

filling an “intent to use” application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office

(“USPTO”), Application Serial No. 88/320,811. Plantronics sought registration of the 

mark for use in connection to a number of diverse classes, goods, and services, ranging 

from “cloud computing services,” “electronic whiteboards,” “sound masking equipment,” 

and “interior design.” (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiff, in its FAC, highlights that listed among the 

various types of goods and services are “headsets.” (Id. at 6.)

II. Procedural Background

On March 21, 2019, Plaintiff filed an original complaint with this Court. (ECF No. 

1.) On March 22, 2019, Plaintiff amended as of right and filed the First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) at issue here. (ECF No. 4.) The FAC presents four causes of action

for injunctive and monetary relief against Defendants for (1) trademark infringement and 

unfair competition under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, (2) 

common law trademark infringement, (3) violation of California’s Unfair Competition 

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Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200, and (4) denial of federal registration marks 

of Plantronics’s USPTO Application Serial No. 88/320,811.

On April 14, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC. (ECF No. 18-1.) On 

May 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 21.) That same day, 

Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction based on its first three causes of action. 

(ECF No. 24.) Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss on 

July 7, 2019. (ECF No. 33.) 

III. Discussion

The resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiff’s request for 

preliminary injunction depends on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s first three causes of action

for trademark infringement. Defendants have moved to dismiss all three trademark 

infringement counts on a singular basis—that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts 

of a likelihood of confusion between Plaintiff’s goods and Defendants’ goods. 

For reasons explained more fully below, the Court agrees with Defendants that 

Plaintiff has failed to meet its pleading burden on a material element of its claims. The 

Court will dismiss the FAC in its entirety3and deny the motion for preliminary 

injunctive relief as moot. 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is 

proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police 

 

3 Plaintiff has indicated that it does not oppose dismissal of its request to enjoin registration of 

Plantronics’s pending trademark application. (ECF No. 21, at 23.) For that reason, the Court will grant 

that part of Defendants’ motion to dismiss which pertains to Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action with 

prejudice. 

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Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim, the court generally accepts as true the allegations of the complaint in 

question, construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion, and resolves all doubts in the pleader’s favor. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 

956 (9th Cir. 2009).

The plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial 

plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Liberal notice standards provide that “a complaint 

attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (internal citations omitted). At the same time, however, “a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do.” Id. Accordingly, impressionistic and wholly-unelaborated claims do 

not fare well upon a motion to dismiss, as courts are “free to ignore legal conclusions, 

unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions cast in 

the form of factual allegations.” Farm Credit Services v. American State Bank, 339 F.3d 

765, 767 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 679. 

Moreover, courts “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light 

most favorable to plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of 

action.” Student Loan Marketing Ass’n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 

In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations 

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal 

theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562. 

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B. Likelihood of Confusion under the Lanham Act

Plaintiff’s claims for trademark infringement under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 

Act, common law trademark infringement, and unfair competition under the UCL may be 

analyzed “jointly,” Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1079 

(C.D. Cal 2012), because the test for all three turns on whether there is a “likelihood of 

confusion.” Walter v. Mattel, Inc., 210 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleary 

v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Ninth Circuit “has 

consistently held that state common law claims of unfair competition and actions 

pursuant to [the UCL] are ‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham 

Act” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

The Lanham Act provides “national protection of trademarks in order to secure to 

the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers 

to distinguish among competing producers.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, 

Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). To prevail on claim of trademark infringement, Plaintiff 

must prove “(1) that is has a protectible ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that the 

defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.” Network 

Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(citation omitted).

4

 

“The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ 

in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing 

one of the marks.” Entrepreneur Medica, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 

2002). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the eight factors set out in AMF, Inc. v. 

Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) to determine whether a defendant’s mark 

 

4 The Court’s survey of the applicable legal regime focuses only on the second element—

likelihood of confusion—because Defendants did not challenge this element in its motion to dismiss. 

(ECF No. 33, at 14.)

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is likely to confuse consumers. Under Sleekcraft, the court analyzes: “(1) strength of the 

mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual 

confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) degree of care likely to be exercised by the 

consumer; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of 

the product lines.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348–49, 352. The factors are “pliant,” with 

some factors being more important than others and the relative importance of each factor 

being case-specific. Brookfield Commcn’s., Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 

1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).

“Courts may determine the likelihood of confusion as a matter of law on either a 

motion to dismiss or summary judgment.” Infostream Grp. Inc. v. Avid Life Media Inc., 

No. CV 12-09315 DDP (AJWx), 2013 WL 6018030, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2013) 

(citing Murray v. Cable Nat’l Broad. Co., 86 F.3d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1996)). Because 

likelihood of confusion turns on a “factual determination woven into the law,” courts

“routinely treat [it] . . . as [an issue] of fact” better left for resolution by jury. Levi 

Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985). However, 

courts have not hesitated to dismiss claims at the pleading stage where there is no 

likelihood as a matter of law.5 

Moreover, the factual nature of the Sleekcraft inquiry does not absolve plaintiffs of 

complying with the mandates of Iqbal and Twombly, which require complaints to plead a

 

5 Caselaw sheds light on when allegations are so deficient such that a complaint fails to state a 

likelihood of confusion as a matter of law. First, “[i]f goods or services are totally unrelated, there is no 

infringement because confusion is unlikely.” Murray ̧86 F.3d at 861. Second, marks may be so starkly 

dissimilar on their face that they preclude a likelihood of confusion. See e.g., Mintz v. Subaru of 

America, Inc., 716 F. App’x 618, 621 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal because the design and words 

used by the parties were “obviously dissimilar”). Likelihood of confusion may also be decided at the 

pleading stage where the marks at issue are placed on products consumed different groups of purchasers, 

see, e.g., Robinson v. Hunger Free America, Inc., 18cv42-LJO, BAM, 2018 WL 1305722, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 13, 2018), or marketed through different market channels, see, e.g., Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, 

Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1981). 

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minimum quantum of factual content beyond “labels and conclusions” so as to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotation marks omitted). To this end, “the pleading must 

contain something more than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] 

a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“Unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” do not, as a rule, 

survive motions to dismiss, Iqbal, 556 at 678, and conclusory allegations of a likelihood 

of confusion pose no exception to the rule. See, e.g., VMR Prod., LLC v. V2H ApS, No. 

CV 13-7719 CBM (JEM), 2014 WL 12591932, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014); Carter 

v. Oath Holdings, Inc., No. 17-CV-0708-BLF, 2018 WL 3067985, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. 

June 21, 2018).

C. Plaintiff’s FAC is constituted entirely of conclusory allegations 

The crux of Defendants’ motion to dismiss turns on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s 

factual pleadings as to likelihood of confusion. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to 

offer anything more than a bare recital of the elements of trademark infringement. (ECF 

No. 18-1, at 12–15). Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff alleges only that the 

marks are similar and “will likely cause confusion,” and that such assertions, standing 

alone, amount to nothing more than legal conclusions. 

The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s FAC offers very little in the way of facts to support 

likelihood of confusion. Plaintiff’s FAC relies on a pictorial juxtaposition of its and 

Defendants’ marks to show that they are “virtually identical.” Plaintiff also claims that 

Defendants’ mark is “counterfeit” and a “knock off” of its own, but these are legal 

conclusions which the Court may not accept. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that it sells 

headsets bearing the mark, and that Defendants have filed an Intent to Use Application 

for its mark “in connection with, among other things, headsets.” (ECF No. 4, at 6.) 

Beyond these allegations, Plaintiff merely recites the elements of a trademark 

infringement suit: that Defendants’ “use and promotion of the mark will likely cause 

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confusion, mistake or deception as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 

Plaintiff with Defendants, or with regard to the origin, sponsorship or approval but 

Plaintiff of Defendants’ goods, services or commercial activities.” (Id. at 7.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has merely recited an element of trademark 

infringement, because it provided insufficient facts to plausibly state an allegation that 

the public is likely to be confused by Defendants’ use of the mark. As Defendants point 

out, the allegations in the FAC closely resemble, and are even less developed than those 

found insufficient in the complaint dismissed by this Court in Yaros v. Kimberly Clark 

Corp., (“Yaros I”), Case No. 17cv1159-GPC(BGS), 2018 WL 1744675, at *3 (Apr. 11, 

2018). Yaros, the plaintiff, owned a registered mark for the words and mark “Better 

Together” for “disposable wipes” and sued for trademark infringement. Id. at *1. Yaros

alleged that the defendant used the phrase “Better Together” to sell its own disposable 

wipes, and further averred that the defendant’s use of the mark was “likely to cause 

confusion, mistake, and deception of the public.” Id. at *3. The Court dismissed the 

claim because it agreed with the defendant that the complaint offered naught but a 

“formulaic recitation,” of the likelihood of confusion. Id. Without more, the paucity of 

factual pleadings which plagued Yaros similarly undermines Plaintiff. 

D. Plaintiff does not allege facts of competitiveness 

Plaintiff objects that it has sufficiently pleaded two key Sleekcraft factors—factor 

one, similarity of marks, and factor two, competitive goods—which shields its FAC from 

dismissal. 

According to Plaintiff, its allegations bring it squarely within the scenario 

envisioned in Sleekcraft, which held that “[w]hen goods produced by the alleged 

infringer compete for sales with those of the trademark owner, infringement usually will 

be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be expected.” 599 F.2d 

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at 348.

6

 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that its identification of “headsets” in its FAC is 

tantamount to an allegation that the parties’ goods are “the same,” and presumably, 

competitive. (ECF No. 21, at 14–16.) Defendants argue that the FAC lacks any pertinent 

factual allegations, and that in any event, there is no legal support for Plaintiff’s theory 

that the Court may presume that a headset is a headset for the Sleekcraft rule. (ECF No. 

33, at 15.7)

However, Plaintiff’s reliance on Sleekcraft is unavailing, because the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has utterly failed to plead any facts relevant to a relationship of competition.

Despite Plaintiff’s entreaties, the Court cannot ignore Iqbal and Twombly and somehow

transform Plaintiff’s passing reference to Defendants’ “headsets” into an allegation of 

competitiveness. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (requiring plaintiffs to plead at least enough 

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 

is liable for the misconduct alleged”) (emphasis added). To that end, Court rejects 

Plaintiff’s suggestion that a pleading which merely alleges the shared use (or intended 

 

6 Competitive goods are distinguishable from related goods. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348 n.10 

(Related goods are those “products which would be reasonably thought by the buying public to come 

from the same source if sold under the same mark.”). Competitiveness depends on, inter alia, market 

overlap, id., at 348 and requires a more fulsome showing than relatedness. See, e.g., Hearts on Fire Co., 

LLC v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 288 (D. Mass. 2009) (“Hearts on Fire is a diamond 

wholesaler, while Blue Nile is an internet diamond retailer; the two companies are not plain or obvious 

competitors.”) (cited with approval by Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 

F.3d 1137, 1154 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

Whereas likelihood of confusion may be presumed where the marks are similar and the goods 

are competitive, Sleekcraft imposes a higher burden on plaintiffs asserting a claim arising from a 

defendant’s related goods. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348 (“When the goods are related, but not 

competitive, several other factors are added to the calculus.”). 

7 Paul Sachs Originals Co. v. Sachs, 217 F. Supp. 407, 414–16 (S.D. Cal. 1963), aff’d, 325 F.2d 

212 (9th Cir. 1963) (“The plaintiff’s position that ‘women’s clothes is women’s clothes’ and that the 

word ‘Sachs’ in a trademark cannot be applied to women’s clothes by any manufacturer but plaintiff 

without a resulting confusion of source of goods is not sustained by the evidence.”). 

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use) of a similar mark with respect the same general type of good, i.e., headsets, suffices 

to allege competitiveness.

Indeed, Sleekcraft itself disapproves of Plaintiff’s proposition. In Sleekcraft, both 

parties designed boats for towing water skiers. The Sleekcraft was envisioned for the 

“highly skilled enthusiast [who] require[d] the higher speeds the Sleekcraft promise[d],” 

while the “Slickcraft line [was] designed for . . . family fun” and relied on promotional 

brochures featuring “small children.” 599 F.2d at 348. Although the Ninth Circuit 

observed a potential market overlap between the parties’ boats, it affirmed the district 

court’s conclusion that the two goods in question were not, in fact, competitive. Thus,

Sleekcraft refutes, rather than supports, Plaintiff’s claim that a cursory reference to 

Defendants’ “headsets” is sufficient to plausibly state a relationship of competition. If a 

boat is not a boat, then a headset is not a headset. But see Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily, 

in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 178 (1922) (“Rose is a rose is a rose.”).

E. Plaintiff’s FAC does not sufficiently allege which of Defendants’ goods are

implicated 

In any event, Plaintiff’s FAC fails for two additional reasons. First, Plaintiff has 

sought to enjoin Defendants from using the mark on any of its products. (ECF No. 4, at 9 

(requesting injunctive relief “prohibiting Defendants from using the mark or any other 

mark that is confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s mark”).) If Defendants’ Intent to Use 

Application is any indication, many different kinds of goods might eventually be 

designated by the mark. Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s cursory pleadings bring 

it within the ambit of the Sleekcraft rule with respect to Defendants’ headsets, Plaintiff 

has failed to plead how its headsets might be considered competitive with any other of 

Defendants’ goods or services. 

Second, and even more fundamentally, Plaintiff has also failed to specify which of 

Defendants’ products are accused of infringement. Basic principles of fairness require 

claimants to articulate a claim which, at minimum, “give[s] the defendant fair notice of 

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what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 

41, 47 (1957) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). To that end, courts have required plaintiffs 

to identify “which of Defendant’s products is utilizing their trademark and which product 

is likely to cause consumer confusion.” See Yaros v. Kimberly Clark Corp., No. 

17CV1159-GPC(BGS), 2018 WL 1744675, at *3 (“Yaros I”) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2018); 

see also McCall’s Country Canning, Inc. v. Paula Deen Enters., LLC, No. 09-CV-0952-

LAB (BLM), 2010 WL 11508996 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).) 

In so far as Plaintiff has broadly gestured to Defendants’ “headsets,” such a 

reference is too capacious to carry the day. See McCall’s, 2010 WL 11508996, at *2 

(finding complaint which “doesn’t specify which candles have a rustic appearance, or 

what exact features . . . render [defendant’s] candles ‘confusingly similar’ or ‘identical’ to 

its own . . . . simply not enough” to present a facially plausible claim). In so far as 

Plaintiff wishes to enjoin Defendant from using the mark on any good or service it may 

offer, such a claim plainly fails for an utter lack of specificity. 

F. Plaintiff has failed to plead likelihood of confusion 

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion, an indispensable 

element of his trademark infringement and false designation claims under the Lanham 

Act. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1046 n.6. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s federal claims fail as 

a matter of law. See Spearmint Rhino Companies Worldwide, Inc. v. Chiappa Firearms, 

Ltd., No. CV 11-05682-R-MAN, 2012 WL 8962882, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012). 

Further, as both parties recognize, Plaintiff’s state law claims under the UCL and for

common law trademark infringement rise and fall with the federal claims, and must also 

be dismissed. See, e.g., Guardian Pool Fence Sys. Inc. v. Sunwest Indus., Inc., No. 

SACV160824DOCJCGX, 2017 WL 2931413, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) (dismissal

of Lanham Act claims dooms related UCL unfair competition claims); Switchmusic.com, 

Inc. v. U.S. Music Corp., 416 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (common law 

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trademark infringement claims employ the same likelihood of confusion test as Lanham 

Act claims). 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s FAC is dismissed in its entirety. However, dismissal as to the first three 

causes of action will be with leave to amend, since there is good indication that the 

pleading deficiencies may be curable upon amendment. 

To elaborate on this point: although the Court has relied only on the allegations in 

the FAC in considering the motion to dismiss, the Court observes that Plaintiff’s laterfiled motion for a preliminary injunction provides substantially more factual allegations

in support of its infringement claims. Had those allegations found their way into 

Plaintiff’s FAC, the outcome of the instant motion to dismiss may well have been 

different. But instead of amending the complaint at the time it filed its motion for 

preliminary injunction, Plaintiff—for reasons which frankly escape the Court—elected to 

proceed on the basis of a skeletal complaint. The consequences of Plaintiff’s election are 

suboptimal, both for the parties’ interest in a speedy resolution, and for the Court’s 

conservation of judicial resources. All involved have devoted considerable resources 

appraising the plausibility of threadbare, but apparently redeemable, claims. 

With no operative complaint, Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction must be 

denied as moot. See, e.g. Red Eyed Jacks Sports Bar Inc. v. City of San Diego, No. 14-

CV-0823-L RBB, 2014 WL 3015189, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) (motion for 

preliminary injunction denied as moot in light of dismissal of operative complaint); Silvas 

v. G.E. Money Bank, 449 F. App’x 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the operative 

complaint has been dismissed, we dismiss this interlocutory appeal [for preliminary 

injunctive relief] as moot.”). 

Accordingly, mindful of streamlining the present litigation, the Court orders as 

follows: 

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• Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED; the fourth cause of action is 

dismissed with prejudice, and the first three causes of action are with leave 

to amend. 

• Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot.

• The motion hearings set on the two aforementioned matters are hereby 

VACATED. 

• Should Plaintiff choose to file a Second Amended Complaint addressing the 

pleading deficiencies identified in this Order, it must do so no later than 

July 19, 2019. 

• Any renewed motion for a preliminary injunction must also be filed by July 

19, 2019. Any opposition would be due July 26, 2019; any reply by August 

2, 2019. In the event that Plaintiff chooses to file a renewed motion, the 

Court is prepared to hold a hearing on the matter on August 16, 2019 at 

1:30PM in Courtroom 2D. Plaintiff may directly file the motion without 

calling chambers to secure a hearing date. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 12, 2019

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