Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02539/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02539-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Constitutionality of State Statutes

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LONNIE PAHL CUMMINGS,

Plaintiff,

v.

KAMALA HARRIS,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-02539-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO 

AMEND

[Re: ECF 38]

In this action, pro se plaintiff Lonnie Pahl Cummings challenges the constitutionality of a 

state law requiring the posting of bail in order to challenge a traffic ticket via a special procedure 

known as a “trial by declaration.” Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant 

Kamala D. Harris, the Attorney General for the State of California (“Defendant,” or “Attorney 

General”). Def.’s Mot., ECF 38. For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Eleventh 

Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

without leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

The present motion concerns Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which names 

Attorney General Kamala D. Harris as the sole defendant in the case. See FAC, ECF 29. 

Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed June 3, 2014, appeared to name two defendants: Attorney 

General Kamala Harris and the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara (“the Superior 

Court”). On October 27, 2014, after a hearing with Plaintiff in attendance, the Court granted the 

Superior Court’s motion to dismiss and afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Order 

Granting Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 27. Plaintiff filed the FAC on November 21, 2014, and the Court 

subsequently dismissed the Superior Court from the case because it appeared that Plaintiff was no 

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longer pursuing his claims against that defendant. See ECF 34.

Aside from the change in defendants, the substance of Plaintiff’s allegations remains

largely unchanged. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of California Vehicle Code § 40902, 

which provides that a defendant cited for a traffic infraction “may elect to have a trial by written 

declaration” upon submission of bail in the amount of the traffic penalty. Cal. Veh. Code § 

40902.1 Plaintiff asserts that he requested a trial by declaration but was unable to post bail due to 

financial inability. FAC ¶¶ 5(b)-(c). As such, he was required to appear before a judge in order to 

contest his traffic ticket. Id. ¶ 5(d). Although not alleged, Plaintiff informed the Court at a 

hearing on October 16, 2014 that the underlying traffic citation was dismissed in September 2014 

because the charging officer did not appear in court.

Plaintiff asserts that the bail requirement for a trial by declaration is unconstitutional, 

referencing a number of provisions from both the United States Constitution and the California 

Constitution. He seeks declaratory relief and asks the Court to answer a number of questions 

posed in the FAC, such as: “Has Plaintiff’s rights to access Superior Court by way of Trial by 

Declaration been violated?”; “If Infractions are not arrest able [sic] crimes then how is the ‘bail’

not a fee?”; and “Is the bail requirement unconstitutional?” Id. ¶ 5(k). Plaintiff seeks “an order 

against the bail/fee access requirement to the Court by way of Trial by Declaration.” Id. at p. 9. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a plaintiff set forth in his complaint a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the 

plaintiff’s statement of his claims. To survive such a motion, a complaint must plead sufficient 

factual matter that, when accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. 

 

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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint again fails to identify the law that he seeks to challenge. As 

noted in the Court’s prior order dismissing the original complaint, the challenged law appears to 

be California Vehicle Code § 40902. See Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 2 n.1, ECF 27.

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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, a federal court has an independent obligation to insure 

that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Snell v. 

Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1), which challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, the burden is on the 

plaintiff, as the party asserting jurisdiction, to establish that subject matter jurisdiction exists. 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. A facial jurisdictional challenge, as advanced here, asserts that even if 

assumed true, “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke 

federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

“[A] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

106 (1976)). “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se 

litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to 

dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoted with 

approval in Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d 1023, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014)). Conversely, 

leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile, and a district court’s discretion to 

deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” where a plaintiff has previously amended 

unsuccessfully. Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Sisseton–

Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant advances three arguments in support of her motion to dismiss: (1) that Plaintiff 

lacks standing to bring his claim; (2) that Defendant is immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment; and (3) that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Def.’s Mot. 5-11. The Court finds 

Defendant’s claim of sovereign immunity dispositive and addresses only that issue here.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial 

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 

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commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The Eleventh Amendment 

erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against a state.” Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 

483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003). “It does not, however, bar actions for prospective declaratory or 

injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities for their alleged violations of 

federal law.” Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 

(1999)). Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment circumscribes a federal court’s 

jurisdiction and must generally be resolved before reaching the merits of a case. Id. at 1133 

(citing In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Here, Defendant contends (and the Court agrees) that Plaintiff’s suit is in reality a claim 

against the State because he has not alleged a claim against Defendant, in her capacity as the 

Attorney General of California, that can properly proceed under the limited exception to Eleventh 

Amendment immunity enunciated in Ex parte Young. Def.’s Mot. 6-8. Indeed, there are no 

allegations concerning Defendant’s conduct in connection with Plaintiff’s claims, nor is she even 

mentioned anywhere in the FAC other than as the defendant to this lawsuit. See generally FAC.

Plaintiff in response contends only that his “complaint is similar to Ex Parte Young as his 

case is for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.” Pl.’s Opp. 8, ECF 39. Plaintiff asserts that “[a]s in 

Young, Plaintiff’s complaint names the Attorney General as defendant in her Official capacity only 

and seeks an order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. The myriad cases that 

Plaintiff cites in his support are not persuasive, however, because they do not address the central 

issue raised by Defendant’s motion: that Plaintiff has sued the wrong government official. Cf. id.

at 9-12. As Ex parte Young itself states:

In making an officer of the state a party defendant in a suit to enjoin 

the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, it is plain 

that such officer must have some connection with the enforcement 

of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a representative 

of the state, and thereby attempting to make the state a party.” 

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit, in interpreting and 

applying the principle of Ex parte Young has consistently policed the “connection” requirement, 

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noting that it “must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory 

power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an 

official to suit.” Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992); see also

Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1998); Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152 

(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 

714 F.2d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege or establish any connection between the challenged law—

Vehicle Code § 40902, which concerns the manner in which a traffic violation can be tried before 

a court—and Defendant—the Attorney General for the State of California, who does not appear to 

be responsible for enforcing this particular challenged section of the Vehicle Code. There are 

furthermore no allegations in the FAC to indicate that Defendant has enforced or has threatened to 

enforce Vehicle Code § 40902 against Plaintiff.2 Thus, his requested declaratory relief is not from 

any “action attributable or traceable to the Attorney General” and is instead, in reality, a suit 

against the State. Long, 961 F.2d at 152; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 

835, 846 (9th Cir.) opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 312 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining 

that cases like Long “are concerned with plaintiffs circumventing the Eleventh Amendment under 

Ex parte Young simply by suing any state executive official”). As such, the Eleventh Amendment 

bars Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant. 

Although the Court is mindful that Plaintiff is unrepresented and attempting to navigate a 

tricky area of constitutional law, the Court previously noted its concerns with Plaintiff’s claim and 

indicated that “he would be well advised to carefully consider who the proper defendant (or 

defendants) would be in this action.” Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 6. In his amended 

complaint, Plaintiff continues to advance a claim against the Attorney General, which this Court 

now finds barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As such, further leave to amend would be futile. 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

 

2 As noted in Long, the “lack of threatened enforcement by [Defendant] also means that the ‘case 

or controversy’ requirement of Article III is not satisfied.” Long, 961 F.2d at 152.

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IV. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss First Amended Complaint is GRANTED without leave to amend. The Clerk of the Court 

shall close the case file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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