Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01331/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01331-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS RIOS,

Petitioner,

Case No. 15-cv-01331-BAS(RBB)

ORDER:

(1) OVERRULING

PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS 

(ECF No. 33);

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION IN ITS 

ENTIRETY (ECF No. 21);

(3) GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 

No. 7);

(4) DENYING PETITIONER’S EX 

PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 

(ECF No. 15); AND

(5) DECLINING TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, et al.,

Respondents.

Petitioner Carlos Rios is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis. He filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

challenging a disciplinary conviction that resulted in the forfeiture of ninety days of 

custody credits. (ECF No. 1.) On February 8, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge 

Ruben B. Brooks issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that 

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this Court (1) grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition and (2) deny 

Petitioner’s ex parte motion for leave to conduct discovery. (ECF No. 21.) 

Petitioner did not object to the R&R. Therefore, on March 29, 2016, the Court 

approved and adopted the R&R in its entirety and granted Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) The Clerk of the Court entered judgment accordingly. (ECF 

No. 23.) However, Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment on the basis 

that he did not receive the R&R before it was adopted. (ECF No. 25.) On July 1, 

2016, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion and vacated (1) the judgment against 

Petitioner and (2) the Court’s Order adopting the R&R. (ECF No. 32.) In doing so, 

the Court provided Petitioner with another opportunity to object to the R&R, and he

has now filed objections. (ECF No. 33.) 

For the following reasons, the Court (1) OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

objections; (2) APPROVES and ADOPTS the R&R; (3) GRANTS Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss, (4) DENIES Petitioner’s ex parte motion for leave to conduct 

discovery, and (5) DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Petition

Petitioner is a state prisoner incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) He was convicted of murder in 1990 and is serving an 

indeterminate sentence of twenty-seven years to life. (ECF No. 18-1 at 3.) Petitioner 

is challenging his October 16, 2013, disciplinary conviction for fighting that resulted 

in the use of force. (Pet. 1–2.) This conviction led to a forfeiture of ninety days of 

custody credits. (Id. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the disciplinary hearing violated his

due process rights. (Id. 13.) Further, he claims the disciplinary charges he faced were 

false and brought against him in retaliation for filing grievances and a lawsuit against 

prison officials. (Id.)

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Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition, arguing that federal review is barred 

by the doctrine of procedural default. (ECF No. 7.) Respondent also argued that this 

Court lacks habeas jurisdiction over the Petition because Petitioner’s disciplinary 

conviction and the forfeiture of credits assessed against him do not affect his 

indeterminate life sentence. (Id.)

B. Report and Recommendation

On February 8, 2016, Judge Brooks issued an R&R on Respondent’s motion. 

(R&R, ECF No. 21.) In the R&R, Judge Brooks first addressed Respondent’s 

argument that the Court lacks habeas jurisdiction over the Petition. (Id. 7:21–13:5.) 

Judge Brooks reviewed the distinction between petitions for habeas corpus filed 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and prisoner civil rights complaints filed under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. (Id. 8:7–9:5.) He noted that a challenge to a disciplinary procedure that has 

only a speculative or incidental effect on the length of a prisoner’s sentence is not 

within the core of habeas jurisdiction, and is instead cognizable under § 1983. (Id.

9:19–21.) Then, relying on Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 2003), 

Judge Brooks concluded habeas jurisdiction is lacking because expunging 

Petitioner’s disciplinary conviction would not likely accelerate Petitioner’s eligibility 

for parole and Petitioner admitted that his custody credits have been restored. (Id.

10:6–13:5.) 

As for Respondent’s argument that the Petition is barred by the doctrine of 

procedural default, Judge Brooks declined to reach this issue because the lack of 

habeas jurisdiction over the Petition is dispositive. (R&R 13:6–16:10.) Petitioner now

objects to the R&R. (ECF No. 33.)

//

//

//

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which objections are 

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or 

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. But 

“[t]he statute [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c)] makes it clear that the district judge must 

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is 

made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. 

Ariz. 2003) (concluding that where no objections were filed, the district court had no 

obligation to review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the Constitution nor the 

statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and recommendations 

that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121. This 

rule of law is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and this district. See Wang v. 

Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, de novo review of a 

R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); Nelson v. Giurbino, 

395 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting report in its entirety 

without review because neither party filed objections to the report despite the 

opportunity to do so).

III. ANALYSIS

Petitioner objects to the R&R’s conclusion that his Petition should be 

dismissed for lack of habeas jurisdiction. (Objs. 8:8–12:6, ECF No. 33.) He argues

that the overturning and expungement of his disciplinary conviction will likely 

accelerate his eligibility for parole—speeding his release from prison and making 

habeas jurisdiction appropriate. (Id. 11:21–26.) The Court reviews this portion of the 

R&R de novo.

Petitioner’s argument rests on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bostic v. Carlson, 

884 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.1989). (Objs. 11:21–22.) However, an en banc panel of the 

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Ninth Circuit recently overruled Bostic in Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 

2016). In Nettles, the petitioner was assessed a disciplinary violation for threatening 

to stab a corrections officer. 830 F.3d at 925–26. He was given a four-month term in 

the segregated housing unit and lost thirty days of post-conviction credit. Id. at 926. 

A panel of California’s Board of Parole Hearings later concluded that the petitioner 

was unsuitable for parole—referencing, among other things, the petitioner’s rule 

violations in custody. Id. The petitioner filed a habeas petition seeking expungement 

of his disciplinary violation and a restoration of his post-conviction credits. Id. at 927. 

The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the petitioner “could not 

show that expungement of the 2008 rules violation report was likely to accelerate his 

eligibility for parole.” Id.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit discussed at length the distinction between habeas 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and prisoner complaints filed under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927–34. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court 

“has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state 

prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a 

§ 1983 action.” Id. at 927 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005)).

The Ninth Circuit ultimately then adopted “the correlative rule that a § 1983 action 

is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that are not within the 

core of habeas corpus.” Id.

In applying this rule to the petitioner’s claim, the Ninth Circuit concluded the 

claim was not cognizable under habeas jurisdiction. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935. The 

court reasoned:

Success on the merits of [the petitioner]’s claim would not necessarily 

lead to immediate or speedier release because the expungement of the 

challenged disciplinary violation would not necessarily lead to a grant of 

parole. Under California law, the parole board must consider “[a]ll 

relevant, reliable information” in determining suitability for parole. A 

rules violation is merely one of the factors shedding light on whether a 

prisoner “constitutes a current threat to public safety.” Because the parole 

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board has the authority to deny parole “on the basis of any of the grounds 

presently available to it,” the presence of a disciplinary infraction does 

not compel the denial of parole, nor does an absence of an infraction 

compel the grant of parole.

Id. at 934–35 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court held the petitioner’s claim 

did not fall within the core of habeas jurisdiction and must be brought under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Id. at 935.

Here, Petitioner’s claims are subject to dismissal because they do not fall 

within the core of habeas jurisdiction. Petitioner, similar to the prisoner in Nettles, 

argues expungement of his disciplinary conviction will likely accelerate his release 

from confinement. (Objs. 11:21–12:3.) But the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument

in Nettles for reasons that are applicable to Petitioner’s claims. Whether Petitioner 

has a disciplinary conviction is only one of many factors to be considered by the 

parole board. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935. Thus, expungement of Petitioner’s 

disciplinary conviction would not necessarily lead to a grant of parole. See id. at 934–

35. Because expungement would not necessarily lead to a grant of parole, 

expungement “would not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release” from

confinement. See id. In addition, although Petitioner states he lost ninety days of 

good-time credits because he has was found guilty at the disciplinary hearing, he 

admits his credits have since been restored. (R&R 12:7–10, 12:19–20.) Accordingly,

because success on Petitioner’s claims would not necessarily lead to his immediate 

or earlier release from confinement, Petitioner’s claims do “not fall within ‘the core 

of habeas corpus,’ and he must instead bring his claim[s] under § 1983.” See Nettles, 

830 F.3d at 935 (citation omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 

(2011)). 

Despite that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable in habeas, this Court has the 

authority to construe the Petition to plead a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In Nettles, the Ninth Circuit held that a “district court may construe a petition for 

habeas corpus to plead a cause of action under § 1983 after notifying and obtaining 

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informed consent from the prisoner.” 830 F.3d at 936. Thus, although the district 

court in Nettles correctly determined that the petitioner’s claim did not fall within the 

core of habeas jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal 

and remanded the action for the district court to consider whether to obtain informed 

consent from the petitioner to construe his action as being brought under § 1983. Id.

In this case, the Court declines to construe the Petition as raising claims under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Court will instead dismiss this action. If Petitioner desires 

to bring his claims under § 1983, he may file a new action invoking § 1983. This 

approach is appropriate in these circumstances because the statute of limitations does 

not prevent Petitioner from filing his claims as a § 1983 action. See Brooks v. Mercy 

Hosp., 1 Cal. App. 5th 1, 3, 7 (2016) (holding that Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352.1 tolls 

the statute of limitations for two years for persons serving a life sentence with a 

possibility of parole). 

Although Petitioner may choose to file a new action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

the Court cautions Petitioner that his action will be subject to the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”), as opposed to the rules governing habeas petitions. If he is 

unable to state a non-frivolous claim, the action will be dismissed, and he will suffer 

a “strike” as that term is defined under the PLRA. If Petitioner suffers three strikes, 

he will not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in future actions in most 

circumstances. The PLRA’s requirements for exhaustion of administrative remedies 

will also apply. In addition, depending on the relief sought, Petitioner’s action under 

§ 1983 may be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478–79 (1994). 

In sum, having conducted a de novo review of the portion of the R&R that 

Petitioner objects to, the Court concludes the magistrate judge’s reasoning is sound. 

Although Judge Brooks issued the R&R before the Ninth Circuit issued its decision 

in Nettles, he correctly concluded that Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable under 

habeas jurisdiction based on authority predating Nettles—authority that the Ninth 

Circuit relied upon in Nettles when overruling its inconsistent precedents. See 830 

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F.3d at 931, 933–34 (relying on Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2003),

and overruling Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004), and Bostic v. 

Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the Court will adopt the R&R in its 

entirety. 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDERS

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections 

(ECF No. 33). Further, the Court APPROVES and ADOPTS the R&R (ECF No. 

21) in its entirety. The Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 

7), DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s ex parte motion for leave to conduct discovery 

(ECF No. 15), and ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.

In addition, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant makes 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

Petitioner has made no such showing. Because reasonable jurists could not debate 

whether “the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 

issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 25, 2016

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