Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_14-cv-00296/USCOURTS-alsd-2_14-cv-00296-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HERLAN O’BRIEN DAVIS, :

 :

Petitioner, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 14-296-KD-M

 :

CHERYL PRICE, :

 :

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an Alabama 

inmate that was referred for report and recommendation pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and Rule 8 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. This action is now 

ready for consideration. The state record is adequate to 

determine Petitioner's claims; no federal evidentiary hearing is 

required. It is recommended that this habeas petition be 

dismissed as time-barred and that judgment be entered in favor 

of Respondent Cheryl Price and against Petitioner Herlan O’Brien 

Davis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). It is further 

recommended that any certificate of appealability filed by 

Petitioner be denied as he is not entitled to appeal in forma 

pauperis.

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder in the Wilcox

County Circuit Court on October 15, 2002 for which he received a 

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life sentence, with no possibility of parole, in the state 

penitentiary (Doc. 1, p. 2; see also Doc. 12, p. 2).1 On appeal, 

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction 

(Doc. 12, Exhibit 2); that Court also overruled Petitioner’s 

application for rehearing (Doc. 12, Exhibit 3). On December 12, 

2003, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Davis’s petition for writ 

of certiorari and entered a certificate of final judgment (Doc. 

12, Exhibit 4).

Petitioner has asserted that he filed a State Rule 32 

petition on September 1, 2004 and that no ruling has ever been 

entered on it (Doc. 1, pp. 4-6). Davis further asserts that the 

failure of a ruling for more than ten years has been in spite of 

his diligence in pursuing it (Doc. 16, pp. 2-3). Wilcox County 

Court records demonstrate, however, that the purported petition 

was never recorded; it also shows that no enquiry concerning the 

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Davis, in his Response to the Answer, asserts that Respondent is 

confused as to which conviction is being challenged herein, pointing 

out her assertion that he is challenging convictions for possession of 

controlled substances, burglary first degree, and attempted assault 

first degree (Doc. 16, p. 1). While Respondent has listed these 

convictions (Doc. 12, p. 1), she discussed Davis’s capital murder 

conviction in Wilcox County (Doc. 12, p. 2) and noted a separate 

capital murder conviction in Conecuh County (Doc. 12, p. 3). The 

Court has reviewed the evidence provided and finds that Respondent has 

correctly identified the conviction being challenged herein as shown 

by the order of Wilcox County Circuit Judge Meigs sentencing Davis to 

life without parole for capital murder in case number 01-40 on October 

15, 2002 (Doc. 1, p. 2; cf. Doc. 12, Exhibit 1b, pp. 148-49).

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petition was ever made (Doc. 12, Exhibit 5).2

Petitioner filed a complaint with this Court on June 24, 

20143 raising the following claims: (1) His trial attorney 

rendered ineffective assistance; (2) his appellate attorney 

rendered ineffective assistance; (3) the trial court allowed 

inadmissible evidence to be presented to the jury; (4) the trial 

court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment or impose a 

sentence; (5) there was insufficient evidence to convict him; 

and (6) the State used its peremptory strikes in a racially 

discriminatory manner in selecting the jury (Doc. 1). 

Respondent has answered the petition, arguing that it 

should be dismissed as it was not filed within the one-year 

statute of limitations period (Doc. 12, pp. 5-7). Respondent 

refers to provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter AEDPA) that amended, in 

pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The specific provision states 

as follows: 

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The State acknowledges that it “does not have a complete copy of 

the record from direct appeal and other related documents” (Doc. 12, 

p. 2 n.1). Nevertheless, the Court finds that the case action summary 

satisfactorily demonstrates that the Rule 32 petition was never filed.

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Respondent correctly notes that Petitioner neither signed nor 

dated his petition (Doc. 12, p.4 n.2). Respondent has assumed the 

presumptive filing date was the date of the postmark on the petition’s

envelope (see Doc. 1, p. 29). The Court will also use that date. 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to 

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an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation 

period shall run from the latest of the date 

on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. Goodman v. 

United States, 151 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 12, 2003, 

the day on which the Alabama Supreme Court issued a certificate 

of judgment (Doc. 12, Exhibit 4). The AEDPA limitations clock 

began to run the next day and ran until December 11, 2004 at 

which time the clock stopped.

Davis’s habeas corpus petition was not filed in this Court 

until June 24, 2014, more than nine years too late. The Court 

finds that Petitioner has provided no cause for ignoring the 

dictates of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (see Doc. 16): this action is time-barred.4

For the reasoning stated herein, it is recommended that 

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Respondent also asserts that four of Davis’s six claims were 

never raised in the State Courts and are unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted and should not be considered because Davis cannot 

demonstrate both cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claims 

previously (Doc. 12, pp. 7-11). As the Court has already found this 

petition barred by AEDPA, there is no need to take up this argument.

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this habeas petition be dismissed as time-barred and that 

judgment be entered in favor of Respondent Cheryl Price and 

against Petitioner Herlan O’Brien Davis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d).

Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases, the undersigned recommends that a certificate of 

appealability (hereinafter COA) in this case be denied. 28 

U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 11(a) (“The district court must issue 

or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final 

order adverse to the applicant”). The habeas corpus statute 

makes clear that an applicant is entitled to appeal a district 

court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition only where a 

circuit justice or judge issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

A COA may issue only where “the applicant has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). Where a habeas petition is being denied on 

procedural grounds, “a COA should issue [only] when the prisoner 

shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000). As Davis has not filed this action in a timely manner, 

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a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that this Court is 

in error in dismissing the instant petition or that he should be 

allowed to proceed further. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (“Where a 

plain procedural bar is present and the district court is 

correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist 

could not conclude either that the district court erred in 

dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed 

to proceed further”). 

CONCLUSION

It is recommended that Petitioner’s petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, be denied. 

It is further recommended that any certificate of appealability 

filed by Petitioner be denied as he is not entitled to appeal in 

forma pauperis.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who 

objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file 

specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 72(B); S.D. ALA. L.R.72.4. 

In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific 

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finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate 

Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate 

Judge is not specific.

DONE this 24th day of February, 2015.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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