Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01315/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:206 Social Security Benefits

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER LYNN BERRY, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Case No. 1:13-cv-01315-SKO

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

(Doc. No. 15)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Jennifer Lynn Berry (“Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, 

without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 5, 7.)

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 1 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on November 29, 1959, and alleges disability beginning on August 3, 

2009. (AR 127.) Plaintiff claims she is disabled due to abdominal pain arising from multiple 

surgeries and recurrent diverticulitis, pain in her neck and arms arising from bulging discs and 

bone spurs, severe cramping and numbness in her hands, and mental impairments including 

anxiety, depression, and memory loss. (See AR 146; 164; 169-70; 173; 182; 212.)

A. Relevant Medical Evidence 

1. Medical Record as to Abdominal Pain

Plaintiff was admitted to the Emergency Room at Mark Twain St. Joseph’s Hospital on 

August 3, 2009, for acute abdominal pain associated with nausea and vomiting, and was treated 

for a significant colon perforation and abdominal sepsis. (AR 330-31; 413.) Dr. Peter Oliver, 

M.D., performed a sigmoid resection with an end colostomy and Hartmann’s pouch, and 

appendectomy. (AR 323; 379-81; 469-71; 485-89; 734-41.) Plaintiff developed respiratory 

distress secondary to her sepsis and “the work of breathing,” and had to be intubated. (AR 323;

325.) On August 18th, her wound came apart, and Plaintiff was again operated on for 

debridement of the surgical wound, partial fascial dehiscence repair, and wound vac placement. 

(AR 242-43; 346; 384-85; 467-68; 732-33.) The next day, Plaintiff was described as being “in 

good spirits” and “hopeful” (AR 348), and was described as doing “nice” and “feeling well” from 

the 21st to the 23rd (AR 349-50). At discharge on August 24th, Dr. Oliver opined that Plaintiff’s 

condition was improving, the colostomy was functioning well, and her wound was shrinking. 

(AR 322-24.) 

A computed tomography imaging study (“CT”) taken on September 4, 2009, for follow-up 

on Plaintiff’s colon perforation indicated interval healing of the midline incision and overall 

improvement evidenced by a general decrease in size of fluid collections in the colon (AR 245; 

509; 727); Plaintiff was seen on September 8th for wound cleaning and closure, without incident

(AR 238-41; 319-20; 464-66). Dr. Oliver noted that Plaintiff’s wound was healing well, and that 

she only complained to him of back pain. (AR 240; 315.) A CT scan on September 20th showed 

a small parastomal fluid collection (AR 244; 508; 725), and after the abscess was incised and 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 2 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

drained, Plaintiff was discharged home on September 22nd. (AR 297-302; 480-84; 721-24.) 

A colon barium enema performed on November 17, 2009, revealed scarring from 

diverticulitis and total occlusion of the midsigmoid, presumably secondary to diverticulitis. 

(AR 507; 708-09.) On November 24th, Plaintiff was admitted for colostomy takedown, lysis of 

adhesions, and repair of the ventral incisional hernia leftover from her prior surgeries. (AR 230-

37; 429-30; 446-48; 474-79; 698-705.) Though some minor fascial necrosis and a foul smell was 

observed, Dr. Oliver noted that the colostomy site was healing well and discharged her home with 

a round of antibiotics and Vicodin and Celebrex for pain. (AR 230-31; 462-64.) On November

26th, Dr. Oliver noted that while her physical improvement was “fair,” Plaintiff was “a bit down.” 

(AR 433.) On November 30th, however, Plaintiff was described as “doing well” with “good pain 

control.” (AR 436.) 

On January 5, 2010, Plaintiff was admitted for skin and subcutaneous skin closure. 

(AR 421-22; 424-25; 460-61; 472-73; 545-46; 691-92.) Dr. Oliver noted that the colostomy site 

had healed well, and closed the wound and placed an abdominal binder to maintain the closure. 

(AR 424-25; 460-61; 691-92.) A colon barium enema performed on May 24, 2010, revealed 

“[r]esidual diverticulosis and possible mild acute sigmoid diverticulitis suggested by spasm.” 

(AR 504.) A CT scan on June 28, 2010, found diverticula, indicating Plaintiff suffered from 

chronic or recurrent diverticulitis. (AR 502-03; 539; 623.) 

On July 16, 2010, Plaintiff again went to the emergency room complaining of acute,

spastic abdominal pain, as well as mild nausea and vomiting of the “same character in intensity” 

as she had experienced during her last episode of acute diverticulitis. (AR 551-52.) The following 

day, Dr. Benedicto M. Estoesta, M.D., assessed Plaintiff as having “[r]ecurrent acute diverticulitis 

with CT proven cecitis and diverticulosis/diverticulitis.” (AR 552.) A CT scan taken that day 

showed improved diverticulitis with some diverticulosis, very little stranding and abdominal 

inflammation. (AR 576.) 

Dr. Oliver did a surgical consult on July 20, 2010, opining that he “doubt[ed] that 

[Plaintiff] had diverticulitis or cecitis without a white count, fever or classic inflammation” and 

that he was “perplexed with the etiology of her problem.” (AR 553-54; 814-15.) Noting that it 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 3 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

could be a small bowel obstruction or ischemic colitis, Dr. Oliver recommended against 

continuing antibiotics “as she actually does not have a disease.” (AR 554 (emphasis added).) A 

radiological exam of the abdomen on July 21st was “unremarkable” (AR 577), and an upper GI 

with small bowel follow-thru imaging conducted on July 22nd was “normal” (AR 576; 580). 

Plaintiff was discharged on July 23, 2010, with an order for an outpatient colonoscopy. (AR 582-

83.) 

From October through December of 2010, Plaintiff continued to complain of abdominal 

pain (AR 786; 802-03; 804-05; 809), and on December 17, 2010, she had a colonoscopy with 

polypectomies, searching for an alternative colonic disease that might explain her ongoing 

abdominal pain. (AR 792-93.) Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital on March 22, 2011, for a 

ventral hernia repair with mesh repair, and at discharge on March 24th, was noted to have 

recurring bouts of abdominal pain, “none clearly diverticulitis.” (AR 762-69.)

2. Medical Record as to Neck and Back Pain 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Edmund Yao, M.D., for two months in 2009, complaining of chronic 

neck pain with left radiculopathy and right ankle pain (AR 227), and sinus pain (AR 223). In an 

undated Adult Health History Form accompanying Dr. Yao’s records, Plaintiff reported she had 

neck and shoulder pain and recent back pain, and complained of nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and 

trouble sleeping. (AR 228.) Plaintiff reported she exercised regularly by doing yardwork 3 to 4 

times per weeks, 2 to 4 hours at a time. (AR 229.) On April 8, 2009, a CT of Plaintiff’s cervical 

spine revealed “marked disc space narrowing and spurring in the lower cervical spine, particularly 

C5-C6 and C6-C7” as well as “[s]purs narrow[ing] neural foramina bilaterally at C5-C6[,]” 

indicating “[d]egenerative change with cervical spondylosis and possible muscle spasm.” (AR 

256.) A CT of Plaintiff’s right ankle taken the same day revealed “hypertrophic spurring of the 

distal tibia, and [ ] small plantar and dorsal calcaneal spurs” indicating “[d]egenerative change and 

heel spurs.” (AR 257.) 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Maria Michnowska, M.D., on February 2, 2010, for complaints of chronic 

pain in her abdomen, fatigue, and a feeling that “she has not been herself.” (AR 528-29; 680-81.) 

A Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) study conducted on March 10, 2010, found disc 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 4 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

degeneration and bulging at C4-C5, C5-C6, C6-C7, and C7-T1, broad-based disc bulging at C6-

C7, midline disc bulging at C4-C5, and broad-based disc bulging and flattening of the spinal cord 

and canal at C4-C5 and C6-C8. (AR 517; 541; 542.) 

On April 20, 2010, Dr. Pasquale X. Montesano, M.D., saw Plaintiff for a neurosurgical 

consultation, and noted that she complained of constant, severe neck pain which she self-rated at 

an 8/10, as well as low back pain which she self-rated at a 7/10. (AR 514-15.) Plaintiff claimed 

the pain was made worse “with bending, lifting, twisting, and prolonged standing,” she could only 

lift light objects, and sleeping was difficult. (AR 514.) Dr. Montesano observed that Plaintiff had 

“normal” posture, stance, and gait, and appeared “to be in no acute distress.” (AR 514.) On 

examination, Plaintiff’s neck was “supple” with decreased range of motion, and there was no 

evidence of any crepitus, tenderness, spasm, or atrophy. (AR 515.) Her upper extremities were 

observed to both have full range of motion and intact sensory responses and reflexes, and Dr. 

Montesano opined that Plaintiff had 5/5 motor power of the “deltoids, biceps, triceps, 

brachioradialis, wrist dorsi, and digital dorsi and solar flexors and intrinsic muscle.” (AR 515.) 

Plaintiff’s lumbar spine had slightly decreased range of motion, but Dr. Montesano observed that 

she had full range of motion and normal responses and reflexes throughout her lower extremities. 

(AR 515.) Plaintiff’s thoracic spine, ribs, and pelvis all presented as normal. (AR 515.) 

Dr. Montesano further opined that Plaintiff has a herniated disc at C5-6 and C6-7, and that 

level “C4-5 is not quite normal.” (AR 515.) Based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain

and the radiological studies, Dr. Montesano concluded that Plaintiff “has two choices, live with 

her pain or have surgery.” (AR 515.) Though he recommended follow-up for a surgical 

consultation (AR 515), there is no follow-up opinion in the record to indicate Dr. Montesano’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s surgical options. 

3. Physicians’ Supplementary Certificates in Support of Disability

On February 2, 2010, Dr. Michnowska filled out a physician’s supplementary certificate in 

support of Plaintiff’s claim for state disability, opining that Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain 

and that because Plaintiff was “recovering from multiorgan failure due to bowel perforation” it 

was “difficult to predict” when Plaintiff would be able to return to work. (AR 686.) On April 14, 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 5 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

2010, Dr. Michnowska filled out another physician’s supplementary certificate opining that 

Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain with multifactorial etiology, and indicating that Plaintiff’s

neck pain with hand numbness, abdominal pain, and recovery from multi-organ failure due to 

bowel obstruction prevented her from returning to work. (AR 827.) On September 27, 2010, Dr. 

Michnowska again filled out a physician’s supplementary certificate opining that Plaintiff was 

permanently “unemployable.” (AR 607.) On August 23, 2011, Dr. Paul Jacobson, M.D., filled 

out a physician’s supplementary certificate in support of Plaintiff’s claims, listing diagnoses of 

“cervical radiculopathy degen lumbar arm leg numbness,” and opining that Plaintiff was 

permanently “unemployable.” (AR 839.)

4. Case Analyses by Non-Examining State Agency Physicians

On August 2, 2010, state agency consultative physician Dr. R. Fast, M.D., completed a

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) evaluation form, listing Plaintiff’s primary diagnoses as 

cervical degenerative disc disorder and chronic diverticulitis. (AR 585.) He found Plaintiff could

only occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl, could only 

occasionally lift or carry 20 pounds and frequently lift or carry 10 pounds, and had unlimited gross 

and fine manipulation. (AR 586-87.) Dr. Fast limited Plaintiff’s ability to reach in all directions 

to only occasionally reaching overhead due to neck pain, to standing or walking only 6 hours in an 

8-hour workday, and to sitting only 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. (AR 586-87.) Dr. Fast also 

determined that Plaintiff had no limitations for pushing or pulling, and notes that while a cervical 

MRI confirmed the diagnosis of cervical stenosis and he found Plaintiff’s complaints “[c]redible 

to condition,” her subjective rating of pain at an 8 out of 10 was contradicted by Dr. Montesano’s 

“relatively mild” objective findings. (AR 589-91.) Based on his review of her medical records, 

Dr. Fast determined that Plaintiff could “do light work with postural restrictions.” (AR 589.) 

In a second review on December 23, 2010, agency consultative physician Dr. W. Jackson, 

M.D., noted that Plaintiff had added claims of bruising, abrasions, cuts, and a sprained ankle from 

recurrent falls and leg collapses, and memory loss to her allegations of disability. (AR 636.) He 

noted that the alleged injuries were unsupported by the medical evidence in the file, and found no 

evidence that Plaintiff’s condition had worsened. (AR 637.) Noting that Plaintiff had indicated 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 6 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

that her “memory loss” and anxiety were not “so severe as to cause limitations in her ability to 

work” because her forgetfulness and inability to concentrate were not “severe” and were “good 

when not in pain,” Dr. Jackson found that any psychological impairments were “non severe.” (AR 

637.) Based on his review of the medical evidence, Dr. Jackson affirmed the initial assessment 

and found a “light RFC” to be appropriate. (AR 637.) 

5. Medical Record as to Psychological Condition

A carotid Doppler sonogram conducted on February 22, 2010, revealed no structural 

abnormalities of the cranial arteries, though some minimal scattered plaque was observed. 

(AR 544.) A Psychiatric Review Technique (PRTF) completed on January 3, 2011, by Dr. 

R. Paxton, M.D., found that Plaintiff had a non-severe affective disorder, having found medical 

evidence of a “[d]isturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive 

syndrome[.]” (AR 640-41.) Dr. Paxton found that Plaintiff was mildly limited in activities of 

daily living and social function, but had no difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, 

or pace, and no repeated episodes of decompensation of extended duration. (AR 646.) 

Dr. Donald Van Fossan, M.D., reported on his neurological consultation with Plaintiff on 

February 23, 2011, noting that she had complained of memory difficulty beginning with her 

abdominal surgery, associated with sepsis and respiratory failure. (AR 672-73.) Plaintiff reported 

a progressive decline since that time, feeling that her reaction times had decreased, and reported 

she had experienced “pursing movement of the lips and movement of the jaw when she is not 

wearing her dentures[,]” though those movements improved with wearing dentures. (AR 672.) 

Plaintiff also reported feeling depressed since her mother passed in January 2011, and stated that 

she did “not feel that she was depressed prior to that time.” (AR 672.) 

Dr. Van Fossan noted that an MRI of Plaintiff’s brain had revealed “a few, punctate, 

nonspecific T2 hyper intensities in the white matter, mainly in the left corona radiate.” (AR 672.) 

He found her alert and oriented, though “somewhat flat,” and opined that Plaintiff was able to 

carry on a normal conversation, give good details of her history, and that she scored 30 out of 30 

on “the mini mental status exam.” (AR 672.) Evaluation of her cranial nerves, reflexes, and gait, 

and the motor exam and sensory exam were normal. (AR 673.) 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 7 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

Dr. Van Fossan “suspect[ed] depression may be the underlying cause” of Plaintiff’s 

complaints of memory loss, and did not detect any evidence supporting Plaintiff’s allegations of a

movement disorder. (AR 673.) He did not feel that further evaluation was required, but 

“encouraged her to start the antidepressant” she had been prescribed but had failed to start. 

(AR 673.) 

Dr. Michnowska noted on March 10, 2011, that Plaintiff was “undergoing a lot of stress 

because of her situation at home[,]” between her mother’s death and problems with her daughter, 

as well as nervousness over her upcoming hernia repair. (AR 771.) She seemed “depressed,” and 

was started on Wellbutrin, but did not report “any difference” since starting the medication. 

(AR 771.) Dr. Michnowska’s notes from February 16, April 12, and July 27, 2011, state that 

Plaintiff continued to complain of depressive thoughts, due to her chronic pain (AR 754; 759) and 

her memory loss (AR 758).

B. Testimony

1. Plaintiff’s Work History and Self-Assessment

In a Work History Report completed on June 20, 2010, Plaintiff listed her prior work 

history as a health aide and cook. (AR 158-63.) She explained that as a cook she had “spent the 

last 31 years using [her] arms to stir, whip, use a knife or a spatula, 95% of the time always 

forcing [her] head down” and as a result of the stress of using heavy equipment, like a meat slicer, 

“could feel awfull (sic) burning pain in [her] neck.” (AR 163.) She now has “to keep [her] head 

and arms at a lowered level” because they are painful to lift. (AR 163.) As a result of the pain and 

limitations of the posture she adopted to relieve the pain, Plaintiff claimed she was unable to 

continue working full-time hours in her job as a cook. (AR 163.) Further, as a result of her “acute 

diverticulitis” and surgeries, Plaintiff claimed she must be by a bathroom at all times. (AR 163.) 

In the Pain Questionnaire section, Plaintiff claimed that her neck and shoulder pain, a 

“burning ache” that spread from the neck through her spine and shoulders and down her arms, had 

begun in 2007, and her “severe” abdominal pain had begun in 2009. (AR 164.) She stated that 

the pain was brought on by driving, pushing and pulling movements, raising her head, arms or 

hands in front of her, and from prolonged standing, walking, reaching, and bending. (AR 164.) 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 8 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Plaintiff characterized the pain as “shooting hot” and lasting all day “like a toothache,” and 

claimed that while rest and pain medication relieved her pain “a little,” the pain was constant. 

(AR 164.) Plaintiff noted that she stopped activities “several times daily” due to the pain, and 

needed assistance to drive and carry objects over ten pounds. (AR 166.) Though Plaintiff was 

able to do “household chores (sweep, load dishwasher, dust),” she could not push a vacuum 

cleaner or complete activities requiring “low bending.” (AR 165-66.) She noted that she could 

walk 50 to 100 feet outside of her home, could stand 10 minutes at a time, could sit half an hour to 

an hour at a time (AR 166), and had difficulty using stairs (AR 173). 

In Plaintiff’s Function Report from November 2010, she stated that each day she makes 

her own meals and cleans up the dishes, performs “light house duties” like sweeping, dusting, 

light laundry, and shopping for groceries, and takes short walks of 10 to 30 minutes that are 

limited in length by “bleeding issues.” (AR 175-77, 178, 182.) Plaintiff claims that she needs 

assistance with buttons, and cannot shave her legs or keep her arms above her shoulders to style 

her hair without “great pain.” (AR 176.) She will not shower unless someone else is at home, 

because she gets “dizzy” and had fallen three times in five months. Plaintiff is afraid to drive 

“both physically and mentally” and complains that using the clutch repeatedly “hurts the bottom 

of [her] spine” and she fears that she will “run a stop sign, forget to shift (sic).” (AR 176; see also 

AR 178.) She also complains that she suffers from anxiety and memory loss (AR 176, 180-81, 

182), and notes that the “cramping” in her hands and limited range of motion in her neck have

stopped her from engaging in several hobbies (AR 179, 182). 

2. Plaintiff’s Testimony at Hearing

Plaintiff testified at her September 20, 2011, hearing that she has a GED, with past work 

experience as a home health attendant and as a cook. (AR 49-57.) Plaintiff testified that in 

August of 2009, she was hospitalized with a perforated colon, and has been unable to work since 

that time by her “arms” and her “abdomen.” (AR 49.) She testified that parts of her legs “go 

numb” while sitting for too long (AR 49, 56), that she has “pinched discs and impinged cord, and 

it affects [her] movements” and causes “cramping through [her] arms into [her] hands and fingers” 

and affects her lower back. (AR 50.) She also testified that while Dr. Montesano had 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 9 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

recommended surgical intervention to address her neck complaints, Plaintiff had not scheduled 

surgery because she was “not ready” for neck surgery after “six” abdominal surgeries. (AR 50-

51.) Plaintiff admitted that she had not undergone physical therapy or had injections in her neck 

for the pain, but would take pain pills and keep her arms “resting on something” to alleviate the 

pain. (AR 51.) 

Plaintiff testified she can walk about ten minutes or half a block to a block at a time, and 

she walks to her doctors’ appointments and to the hospital. (AR 52.) She stated she cannot sit for 

too long at one time, and has to alternate between sitting and lying down. (AR 52.) She is able to 

do light chores around the house like washing dishes, but lacks the “downward strength” to wash a 

pan. (AR 52-53.) She can use a lightweight “Swiffer,” but her daughter does any mopping and 

sweeping because the broom is too heavy. (AR 55.) 

Plaintiff also testified she has to use a chair and sit in the shower (AR 53), and has nearly 

fallen while getting out of the bathtub (AR 55). She has some difficulties with standing still, and 

has had three almost-falls within the past year and a half. (AR 55.) She cannot shave her legs, 

style, or cut her hair by herself, because she cannot raise her arms above her head very long and 

cannot use scissors easily. (AR 53.) Plaintiff testified that she takes naps once or twice a day for 

30 to 45 minutes, and has trouble staying asleep at night. (AR 54.) She has to be close to a 

bathroom because she has to urinate ten times a day. (AR 54-55.) Plaintiff also testified that she 

has abdominal pain from sitting, she cannot lift anything over ten pounds off the floor per 

physician’s orders, and that she has “gotten very forgetful” since being put on a morphine drip 

during her first hospitalization in 2009. (AR 56.) 

3. Plaintiff’s Daughter’s Third Party Assessment 

Plaintiff’s daughter, Katherine Berry (“Katherine”), filled out an adult third-party Function 

Report on November 10, 2010. (AR 183-90.) The report is substantively nearly identical to the 

report Plaintiff herself filled out. Katherine stated Plaintiff suffered from restlessness and pain 

that interrupted her sleep, and during the day she is able to care for Katherine’s son and take 

occasional walks. (AR 183-84.) Plaintiff does light chores around the house for 30 to 60 minutes 

each day, including sweeping, dusting, and dishes, and goes outside once or twice a day on 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 10 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

average. (AR 185-86.) Plaintiff goes shopping two or three times a month, for 10 to 45 minutes 

at a time, but doesn’t drive because she doesn’t feel safe and cannot afford to drive. (AR 186.) 

Katherine stated Plaintiff can walk up to 15 minutes before needing rest, but she must rest for an 

hour before resuming walking. (AR 188.) Katherine noted changes in Plaintiff’s capabilities, 

stating that Plaintiff can no longer lift more than five pounds per her physician’s order, has 

problems/pain when reaching above her head, and experiences pain while climbing stairs and 

sometimes loses her footing. (AR 190.) 

Plaintiff is limited in her self-care in that she occasionally needs assistance with buttons, 

zippers, bras, hair styling, plucking her eye brows, and shaving her legs. (AR 183-84.) Katherine 

noted Plaintiff’s “hands have become stiff like arthritic,” which affects her fine manipulation 

skills. (AR 190.) Katherine also stated that while Plaintiff had formerly enjoyed walking, 

camping, fishing, and arts and crafts, she is unable to do much “since her illness.” (AR 187.) 

Plaintiff socializes on the phone and attends church and other social gatherings, though she 

“doesn’t go out as much due to pain, discomfort and lack of money.” (AR 187-88.) 

Though Katherine described Plaintiff as having memory problems, being confused more 

easily, and needing reminding and occasional help with following instructions, she stated Plaintiff 

is able to pay attention “as long as necessary.” (AR 185; 188-89; 190.) Katherine also described

Plaintiff’s mental state, noting that she experiences mood swings that vary from slight to 

moderate. (AR 189.) 

C. Administrative Proceedings 

On November 10, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision and determined Plaintiff was not 

disabled. (AR 25-37.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments including cervical 

spine with bulging discs, obesity, history of surgically repaired colon perforation, history of 

diverticulosis, and post-repair incisional hernia. (AR 27.) The ALJ determined that these 

impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 30.) The ALJ found Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can lift or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds 

frequently. She can stand or walk up to 6 hours and sit up to 6 hours. She should not be required 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 11 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

to climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding. She should not work at heights or around hazardous 

machinery. She can occasionally perform bilateral overhead reaching.” (AR 30.) 

Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant 

work. (AR 36.) After considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

determined there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy she 

could perform, including work as a cashier, cleaner, and packer. (AR 36-37.) The ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 3, 2009, the 

alleged onset date, to the date of the decision. (AR 37.)

D. Plaintiff’s Complaint

On August 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the 

ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop the medical record 

and improperly based his non-disability finding exclusively on the opinion of a non-examining 

agency consulting physician, and failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for finding 

Plaintiff’s and her daughter Katherine’s statements less than fully credible. (Docs. 11; 14.) 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld by a district 

court if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal 

standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007); 

Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Morgan v. 

Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Heckler, 868 F.2d 

323, 325 (9th Cir.1989); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999); Tidwell v. Apfel, 

161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999); Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985) (the 

findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.) 

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Ryan v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 

(9th Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison 

Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 12 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

“While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only those 

‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 

F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (the Court must review the record as a whole, “weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.”) 

The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by 

isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The role of the Court is not to substitute its discretion in the place of the ALJ – “[t]he ALJ 

is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Macri 

v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (the court 

may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a 

ground upon which he did not rely.”); see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 

1987) (if substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting 

evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive). The 

court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, which exists 

only when it is “clear from the record that an ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

//

//

//

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 13 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 

1382c(a)(3) (A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or 

impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are 

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of 

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that 

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In Step 1, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If not, the ALJ must determine at Step 2 whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic 

work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, the ALJ moves to Step 3 and determines 

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal 

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and is 

therefore presumptively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, at Step 4 the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various limitations 

to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, at Step 5, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers 

in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

//

//

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 14 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to develop the record and by finding 

Plaintiff’s and her daughter Katherine’s testimony less than credible. 

A. The ALJ Did Not Have a Duty to Further Develop the Record 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by not further developing the record once he rejected Drs. 

Michnowska and Jacobson’s physicians’ supplemental certificates opining that Plaintiff was 

“unemployable.” (Doc. 11, 13-14.) Plaintiff’s argument appears to be based on a belief that 

treatment and examining records that do not contain a specific “opinion” from a treating source 

render them inadequate for a proper disability determination. (Doc. 11, 13-14 (“the record 

contains absolutely no assessment from a treating or examining source regarding the specific 

limitations that stem from [Plaintiff’s] disorders” and “the record remains devoid of any specific 

assessments of her [RFC] from a treating or examining source.”).) This inadequacy, according to 

Plaintiff, triggered the ALJ’s duty to recontact the treating source or order a consultative 

examination. 

1. Legal Standard

The ALJ has a duty “to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure the claimant’s 

interests are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). The duty to 

develop the record is “triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is 

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 

459–60 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Ambiguous 

evidence, or the ALJ’s own finding that the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of 

the evidence, triggers the ALJ’s duty to conduct an appropriate inquiry.”); see 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e) (“When the evidence we receive from your treating physician or 

psychologist or other medical source is inadequate for us to determine whether you are disabled, 

we will need additional information to reach a determination or a decision.”); 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3). Where the record itself establishes ambiguity or inadequacy, it 

is unnecessary for the ALJ to make a specific finding of “ambiguity” or “inadequacy” of the 

record to trigger this duty to inquire and further develop the record. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 15 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011). 

2. Although the Four Supplemental Certificates Were Rejected, the Record Was 

Not Inadequate or Ambiguous

The fact that a medical record does not contain a specific opinion from a treating source 

does not, by itself, render that record inadequate or ambiguous. See, e.g., Jewell v. Astrue, No. 

1:09-CV-0348-SKO, 2010 WL 3238849, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) (citing Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 631-34 (9th Cir. 2007) (while a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to deference, 

the absence of such an opinion does not automatically render a medical record insufficient). In

rejecting Dr. Michnowska’s February, April, and September 2010 supplemental certificates (AR 

34-35), and Dr. Jacobson’s August 2011 supplemental certificate (AR 35), the ALJ did not 

automatically render the record inadequate and thereby trigger a duty to further develop the 

record. Jewell, 2010 WL 3238849, at *5. 

The supplemental certificates comprise only four pages of an approximately 830-page 

record. (See AR 607, 686, 827, 839.) The supplemental certificate completed by Dr. Michnowska 

in February 2010 concludes, without any detailed description or analysis, that it was “difficult to 

predict” when Plaintiff would be able to perform her regular or customary work while she was

recovering from her bowel perforation and resultant multiorgan failure. (AR 34; 686.) 

Dr. Michnowska’s April 2010 supplement certificate similarly lacks specific findings. (AR 34-

35.) Although it provides an estimated date for Plaintiff to return to work, it ignores the listed 

question of “how the claimant’s condition or impairment prevents her from returning to regular 

and customary work,” and instead recapitulates Plaintiff’s various diagnoses without offering any

opinion as to how those conditions limited her capacity to work. (AR 827.) Dr. Michnowska’s 

September 2010 and Dr. Jacobson’s August 2011 statements were even more terse, limited to 

filling in a blank line with their opined diagnoses, and checking boxes next to “permanent” and 

“unemployable.” (AR 607; 839.) Dr. Jacobson’s sole substantive comment that Plaintiff “was [a] 

cook now [has] difficulty standing or sitting” (AR 839) does not actually offer an opinion as to the 

limitations imposed by his assessed diagnoses. None of these supplemental certificates actually 

describe Plaintiff’s medical history or her observed physical or mental condition, opine to any 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 16 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

limitation imposed by their diagnoses, or provide an explanation for their determination Plaintiff 

was “unemployable.” The ALJ properly rejected the supplemental certificates to the extent that 

they found Plaintiff “unemployable,” a topic reserved to the Commissioner (AR 35), and to the 

extent that the forms were cursory and failed to provide detailed limitations or objective findings 

(AR 34-35.)2 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2002) (“[t]he ALJ need not accept 

the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, 

and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”). 

Even without these four supplemental certificate opinions, the 830-page record was 

unambiguous and adequate for review. Medical evidence from treating physicians Drs. Oliver and

Michnowska, and from examining physicians Drs. Montesano and Van Fossan, was before the 

ALJ. This is not a case where the four rejected supplemental certificates – four pages essentially 

only listing Plaintiff’s diagnoses – comprised the entire treating record and were rejected.

Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ “granted exclusive controlling weight . . . to the opinion of a 

doctor who never examined [Plaintiff] at all” misrepresents the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 11, 15.) 

Aside from discounting the specific opinions contained within Drs. Michnowska and Jacobson’s 

supplemental certificates, the ALJ considered the other treating or examining physicians’ records. 

For example, when discussing Plaintiff’s history of abdominal pain, the ALJ specifically 

pointed to Dr. Michnowska’s treating notes to support his finding that Plaintiff’s abdominal 

condition and subjective pain had “improved” and that by June of 2010, her pain had “almost 

completely resolved.” (AR 31.) Though Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Oliver’s records prove her 

“gastrointestinal condition is most definitely not ‘under control’” (Doc. 11, 15), the ALJ pointed 

directly to Dr. Oliver’s opinion that Plaintiff has “no musculoskeletal, endocrine or hematologic 

problems[,]” his notes opining that he “doubted she had diverticulitis or cecitis” and that her 

diagnosis of acute abdominal pain was “improving” (AR 31). The State agency reviewing 

physician’s opinion that “[w]hile the claimant did undergo several operations for perforated 

 

2

 The ALJ also rejected in part Dr. Jacobson’s August 2011 supplemental certificate, because he could not determine 

whether Dr. Jacobson had actually provided treatment to Plaintiff. Dr. Jacobson was not listed among Plaintiff’s 

treatment providers in Exhibit 12E, and there were no corresponding treatment notes from Dr. Jacobson within the 

record to either establish their treating relationship or to substantiate his opined limitations. (AR 35.) 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 17 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

diverticulitis with complications, it appears this condition is now under control[,]” is based 

directly upon these records. (AR 35.) Finally, though Plaintiff points out she has since 

undergone a follow-up hernia repair in March 2011, Dr. Oliver’s discharge directions imposed 

only temporary limitations to “lifting and straining” and driving. (AR 31-32.) The medical

evidence is not ambiguous as to Plaintiff’s claim of chronic abdominal pain, even without the four 

supplementary certificates. 

Further, when discussing Plaintiff’s history of neck and back pain, the ALJ specifically 

pointed to Dr. Michnowska’s progress notes observing Plaintiff’s ability to ambulate and 

independence in activities of daily living. (AR 32-33.) The ALJ then pointed to spinal surgeon 

Dr. Montesano’s examination of the Plaintiff in April 2010, made with the benefit of an April 

2009 cervical spine x-ray and a March 2010 cervical spine MRI. (AR 32.) Dr. Montesano noted 

Plaintiff’s subjective report of “constant, severe pain,” her reported limitations to lifting light 

objects and difficulty sleeping, and her belief that “her problem was the result of cumulative 

trauma from [her work].” (AR 32.) However, on examination, the findings showed Plaintiff

. . . was neurovascularly intact. She had normal posture and normal stance and 

appeared to be in no acute distress. She had normal stance and normal gait. Her 

neck was supple but motion was slightly decreased. There was no malalignment 

or asymmetry noted. There was no evidence of any crepitus, tenderness or spasm. 

No atrophy was noted. There was full range of motion of both upper extremities. 

There was 5/5 motor power of the deltoids, biceps, triceps, brachioradialis, wrist 

dorsi, and digital dorsi and volar flexors and intrinsic muscle. The biceps, triceps, 

brachioradialis and pectoral reflexes were normal. Sensory exam of both upper 

extremities was intact. Hoffman sign was negative. Her thoracic spine had no 

tenderness or spasm. Range of motion of her lumbar spine was slightly 

decreased. She had full range of motion in both lower extremities. Knee and 

ankle reflexes are normal. Radiological studies were reviewed showing a 

herniated disc at C5-6 and C6-7. C4-5 was “not quite normal” (Exhibit 4F, page 

4). The MRI of the cervical spine showed disc bulge and cord impingement at 

C4-5 and C5-6. Dr. Montesano concluded by noting “I think she has two choices, 

live with her pain or have surgery. She’s going to think about it. I would like to 

see her back in two months for re-evaluation.”

(AR 32-33.) 

The ALJ then reviewed Plaintiff’s subsequent medical history supporting Dr. Montesano’s 

opinion. He noted that Dr. Michnowska observed Plaintiff could ambulate independently on June 

1 and June 4, 2010. (AR 33.) Dr. Oliver observed her as ambulatory and well appearing on 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 18 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

October 27 and November 5, 2010, and ambulatory, independent in activities of daily living, and 

without motor or sensory deficits on December 9, 2010. (AR 33.) Dr. Fossan reported that 

Plaintiff complained of chronic neck pain and decreased range of motion in her neck, but was 

ambulatory and independent in activities of daily living, and appeared well. (AR 33.) On July 27, 

2011, Dr. Oliver observed that Plaintiff’s neck had decreased range of motion while her back was 

normal, her extremities were nontender, she had no motor or sensory deficits, she was ambulatory 

and independent in activities of daily living, and she appeared well. (AR 33.) The medical 

evidence is not ambiguous as to Plaintiff’s claim of chronic neck and back pain, even without the 

four supplementary certificates. This is not an inadequate record requiring further development. 

Finally, the ALJ pointed specifically to notes by treating Dr. Michnowska to support his 

findings that Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairment of depression was nonsevere 

and imposed only minimal limitations and no episodes of decompensation. (AR 28-29.) The ALJ 

also pointed to examining neurologist Dr. Van Fossan to support his determination, noting that Dr. 

Van Fossan had opined that Plaintiff carried on a normal conversation, provided good details of 

her history, scored 30/30 on the mini mental status exam, and “depression may be the underlying 

cause” of her complaints of memory loss. (AR 28.) The ALJ only relied on the non-examining 

State agency reviewing physician’s opinion to buttress that determination, as it was “consistent 

with the treatment notes . . . which indicate that the claimant’s mental status has been noted to be 

normal on numerous occasion” and was “also consistent with the rather substantial activities of 

daily living.” (AR 28.) The medical evidence is not ambiguous as to Plaintiff’s claim of mental 

impairment, particularly since the four supplementary certificates did not address the issue. See, 

e.g., Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989) (ALJs may permissibly rely on 

non-examining physicians as substantial evidence when their opinions are supported by and 

consistent with other evidence in the medical record). 

Plaintiff points to no conflict or insufficiency in the medical record that would require the 

ALJ to seek clarification from the physicians who had treated Plaintiff in the past. The medical 

records from those providers were before the ALJ for consideration—even though none of those 

physicians provided a formal written opinion as to Plaintiff’s functional limitation. Plaintiff is 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 19 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

essentially arguing that once the ALJ received records from physicians who had treated her in the 

past, even though the medical evidence of record was clear and provided sufficient evidence to 

decide the claim, the ALJ was under a sua sponte duty to solicit formal and current opinions from 

those physicians. “There simply is no such duty to collect further evidence absent inconsistency, 

conflict, or a lack of evidence in the medical record such that additional or supplement medical 

evidence is necessary to make a decision on the claim.” Jewell, 2010 WL 3238849, at *7; see also 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e). 

Plaintiff further fails to point to any evidence in the record that would contradict the RFC 

finding. Consistent with the diagnoses in the record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s cervical 

spine with bulging discs, obesity, history of surgically repaired colon perforation, history of 

diverticulosis, and post-repair incisional hernia were severe impairments. (AR 27.) There was 

substantial evidence, however, that, despite these impairments, Plaintiff could perform light, 

unskilled tasks. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record to cure any 

deficiencies; however the ALJ did not find the record deficient, and by rejecting the supplemental 

certificates, he did not automatically render the record deficient. The ALJ clearly identified 

substantial evidence within the medical record to support his conclusions. (AR 31-36.) The fact 

that the ALJ relied upon medical evidence detrimental to Plaintiff’s claim, and rejected the four 

cursory and conclusory supplemental certificates that Plaintiff preferred, does not mean the record 

was inadequate or required development. Jewell, 2010 WL 3238849, at *5. 

In sum, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence within the record and 

sufficiently specific to allow the Court to conclude that he did not err by failing to further develop 

the record.

B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff’s Credibility 

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for 

discounting her statements regarding the severity and extent of her ongoing symptoms. (Doc. 11, 

18.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously relied on inconsistencies between the medical 

evidence and her subjective allegations of pain, a single inconsistency between her statements on 

the reasons she cannot drive, and a perceived inconsistency between her activities of daily living 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 20 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

and her claim of disability. (Doc 11, 18-20.) The Commissioner contends the ALJ relied on 

evidence in the record that undermined the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and 

demonstrated “that she was capable of greater functioning than she claimed[.]” (Doc. 13, 7.) 

1. Legal Standard

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ 

must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Bunnell 

v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). First, the ALJ must determine whether 

the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. 

The claimant is not required to show that his impairment “could reasonably be expected to cause 

the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have 

caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). If the 

claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the 

claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives “specific, clear and 

convincing reasons” for the rejection. Id. 

The ALJ also may consider: (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior 

inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained 

failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the claimant’s daily 

activities. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Bray v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2009); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 

(9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. “If the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial 

evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039.

2. The ALJ Pointed to Substantial Evidence in the Record to Discount Plaintiff’s 

Credibility

The ALJ reviewed the medical record from Plaintiff’s original hospitalization for colon 

perforation and diverticulosis in August of 2009 through her subsequent abdominal surgeries. 

(AR 31; 33.) He also reviewed the diagnostic studies and surgical consultation Plaintiff 

underwent to evaluate her chronic neck and back pain. (AR 32-33.) Finally, the ALJ considered 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 21 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

Plaintiff’s allegations that she is unable to perform all work due to her alleged impairment and 

other symptoms. (AR 33.) When considered in light of the objective medical findings and other 

evidence, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements regarding her pain and other symptoms were not 

“particularly convincing or credible” (AR 33) and Plaintiff’s “allegations regarding her degree of 

pain [we]re not supported by the treatment record.” (AR 34.) 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “extract[ed] the single most benign portion of the treatment 

notes” observing that Plaintiff “appeared well” while “wholly ignor[ing] the concomitant findings 

from those notes that she was also suffered (sic) with persistent abdominal pain warranting 

continued prescription of [pain medication[.]” (Doc. 11, 18-19.) The Commissioner disagrees, 

arguing that “while Plaintiff underwent several operations for her gastrointestinal impairment, the 

record showed that her condition improved and came under control.” (Doc. 13, 8.) While the 

inconsistency of objective findings with subjective claims may not be the sole reason for rejecting 

subjective complaints of pain, Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997), it is 

one factor which may be permissibly considered with others, Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 

885 (9th Cir. 2004); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Here, for example, the ALJ pointed to multiple inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s reports of pain 

and treating physician Dr. Oliver’s observations between February 2010 and July 2011: 

While the claimant reported chronic pain on February 2, 2010, she was noted to 

be in no distress (Exhibit 5F, page 11.) On April 20, 2010, the claimant was 

noted to be “pleasant” and in no acute distress despite reporting constant, severe 

pain that she rated as 8/10 (neck pain) and 7/10 (back pain) (Exhibit 4F, page 2). 

On June 4, 2010 (Exhibit 5F, page 2), she said she was feeling much better and 

the pain was almost completely resolved and on June 14, 2010 she said she was 

feeling much better (Exhibit 5F, page 1). Yet in a statement submitted to the 

Administration just six days later, she reported constant pain (Exhibit 5E). On 

September 27, 2010 (Exhibit 13F, page 2) the claimant reported 8/10 pain, but she 

was noted to be well appearing and in no acute distress. On October 27, 2010 she 

was again noted to be well appearing (Exhibit 25F, page 60). On November 5, 

2010, the claimant was (Exhibit 25F, page 55) ambulatory, appeared well, and 

was independent in activities of daily living. The claimant reported chronic 

abdominal pain on March 10, 2011, but she was noted to be in no distress and 

pleasant (Exhibit 25F, page 22). Despite reporting chronic neck pain on April 12, 

2011 (Exhibit 25F, page 7), the claimant appeared well. On July 27, 2011, the 

claimant appeared well (Exhibit 25F, page 3). 

//

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 22 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

(AR 34.) The ALJ also pointed to the contradiction between Plaintiff alleged neck pain of 8/10 

and weakness, and spinal surgeon Dr. Montesano’s “relatively mild” objective findings – made on 

examination with the benefit of diagnostic studies confirming spinal stenosis. (AR 35.) 

The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s subjective testimony because of the overall 

improvement in her condition. (AR 31-34.) Plaintiff contests the ALJ’s emphasis of “the single 

most benign portions of the treating notes” in finding that Plaintiff “appeared well.” However, 

citing observations by four treating and examining physicians over the course of two years is not 

‘cherry-picking’ medical evidence. ALJs may permissibly point to “medical signs and laboratory 

findings that . . . demonstrate worsening or improvement of the underlying medical condition” to 

“draw appropriate inferences about the credibility of an individual’s statements.” See SSR 96-7p. 

Here, the ALJ pointed to substantial medical evidence within the medical record, including 

observations and notes by treating physicians Drs. Oliver and Michnowska, as well as examining 

physicians Drs. Montesano and Van Fossan, as inconsistent with Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

For example, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s reports to her treating physicians in the summer 

of 2010 that she “was feeling much better and the pain was almost completely resolved. She 

denied being in any pain. [S]he was able to ambulate and she was independent in activities of 

daily living.” (AR 31.) When admitted to the hospital for pain she described as being similar in 

intensity to her original hospitalizing pain, Dr. Oliver could find no objective support for her pain 

in diagnostic exams, and discontinued antibiotics because “she actually does not have a disease.” 

(AR 554.) Further, even when reporting extreme chronic pain throughout 2010 and 2011, Plaintiff 

repeatedly appeared “in no acute distress and pleasant” and was observed to be ambulating 

normally, independent in activities of daily living, and “appearing well.” (AR 32-34.) 

The Court must review the medical record as a whole, and if substantial evidence exists to 

support the ALJ’s conclusion, the Court must affirm that decision. Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health 

and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (the Court must review the record as a whole, 

“weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

[Commissioner’s] conclusion.”). When reviewed as a whole, substantial evidence within the 

record indicated that Plaintiff indisputably suffered a gastrointestinal impairment, which 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 23 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

necessitated several surgeries to repair, and subsequent to those surgeries, her condition has 

improved. (AR 33-34.) The ALJ did not error in considering Plaintiff’s records indicating 

improvement in her condition. 

Next, in discounting Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ pointed to inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s 

testimony about why she had stopped driving, noting that she had claimed at one point she could 

not drive for “financial reasons, and because it was difficult to operate the floor pedals (Exhibit 

8E)” and later claimed it was “because her reaction times had decreased and she was afraid to 

drive a car (Exhibit 22F, page 2).” (AR 34.) Plaintiff argues that these statements are not actually 

inconsistent because they were proffered in different contexts and do not actually directly conflict 

with one another. (Doc. 11, 22-23.) She contends that the ALJ “insist[ed] upon a meaningful 

inconsistency” where there “is simply no real inconsistency between her two statement that would 

warrant even questioning her veracity much less discrediting it.” (Doc. 11, 22-23.) However, the 

ALJ did not rely on Plaintiff’s inconsistent explanations as his sole articulated reason for 

discounting her credibility. In listing the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s subjective complaints 

and the medical evidence (AR 33-35), the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff had proffered two 

inconsistent reasons for not being able to drive, one to her examining neurologist and the other on 

a disability form. (AR 34.) This was not the sole basis for the ALJ’s decision; this was one 

additional inconsistency within the record that the ALJ permissibly considered in evaluating 

Plaintiff’s credibility. See Moisa, 367 F.3d at 885; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59; Verduzco v. 

Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJs may consider whether the Plaintiff’s testimony 

is believable or not). Moreover, the ALJ was entitled to make an inference regarding the 

discrepancy between the statements. The fact that Plaintiff can offer a second, rational 

interpretation to synthesize the statements does not permit the Court to discard the ALJ’s 

credibility finding. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041; Sprague, 812 F.2d at

1229-30.

Finally, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility as being inconsistent with her admitted 

activities of daily living. Plaintiff disputes the significance of her ability to engage in these 

activities, and argues that the ALJ should not have “denigrate[d her] credibility on the basis of 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 24 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

[her] ability to perform the most basic of daily activities.” (Doc. 11, 20.) The Commissioner 

responds that “[a]lthough these activities may not directly translate into an ability to perform light 

work, they certainly showed that Plaintiff was able to sit, stand and walk longer than she 

alleged[.]” (Doc. 13, 7.) While the mere fact that a claimant engages in certain daily activities 

does not necessarily detract from her credibility as to overall disability, daily activities support an 

adverse credibility finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of her day engaged in 

pursuits involving the performance of physical functions or skills that are transferable to a work 

setting. Orn, 495 F.3d at 639; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. A claimant’s performance of 

chores such as preparing meals, cleaning house, doing laundry, shopping, occasional childcare, 

and interacting with others has been considered sufficient evidence to support an adverse 

credibility finding when performed for a substantial portion of the day. See Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 

2005); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. Here, the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s admitted 

activities of daily living: 

She has consistently been noted to be independent in activities of daily living 

(Exhibit 5F, page 2, 4; 7F, page 2; 13F, page 2; 25F, pages 7, 52, 55, 60). She 

goes for walks (Exhibit 5E), reads, watches television, prepares meals, cleans the 

dishes, performs light household chores such as sweeping, cleaning laundry, and 

dusting, interacts with her grandchild, shops for groceries, uses public 

transportation, handles her finances, visits with others twice a week, (Exhibit 8E).

(AR 34.) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, her admitted activities are not “the most basic of daily 

activities.” This is not a case where the plaintiff testified that she was completely dependent for 

her activities of daily living. Plaintiff was noted by her treating and examining physicians on 

multiple occasions to be independent in her activities of daily living. (AR 34.) She prepared her 

own meals, performed light household chores, took public transportation, went for daily walks, 

shopped for groceries, did yardwork, and visited with others – these types of activities tend to 

suggest Plaintiff is still be capable of performing the basic demands of unskilled work on a 

sustained basis. See, e.g., Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175 (the ALJ sufficiently explained his 

reasons for discrediting the claimant’s testimony because the record reflected that the claimant 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 25 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

performed normal activities of daily living, including cooking, housecleaning, doing laundry, and 

helping her husband in managing finances – all of which “tend[ed] to suggest that the claimant 

may still be capable of performing the basic demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled 

work on a sustained basis.”). 

Here, the ALJ pointed to substantial evidence within the record to support a finding that 

the breadth of Plaintiff’s admitted daily activities and the underlying medical condition established 

by the medical record were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disabling pain. 

The Court is not tasked with substituting its discretion in the place of the ALJ, Edlund, 253 F.3d at

1156; Macri, 93 F.3d at 534; where “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld[,]” 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041. Just because there is more than one way to 

reasonably interpret the evidence in the record, does not mean that the ALJ committed reversible 

error. See, e.g., Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1229-30. The ALJ articulated clear and convincing reasons 

for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and permissibly discounted her credibility. Cf. 

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In sum, the ALJ’s reasons were properly supported by the record and sufficiently specific 

to allow the Court to conclude that he rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds,

and did not arbitrarily discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. 

C. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing the Credibility of Lay Testimony 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ also erred in rejecting the evidence from her daughter

Katherine. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasons for finding her daughter to be less than fully 

credible “fall well short of the exacting ‘clear and convincing’ standard, and the adverse 

credibility finding cannot stand.” (AR 21.) The Commissioner argues that Katherine’s statements 

as to Plaintiff’s physical symptoms were properly discounted as unsupported by the medical

evidence and inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily reported activities, and her statements as to 

Plaintiff’s memory deficits were properly discounted as inconsistent with the medical evidence. 

(Doc. 13, 9.) 

//

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 26 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

1. Legal Standard

Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must take 

into account, unless he expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons 

germane to each witness for doing so. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001); Stout v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 

416.913(d)(4). In rejecting lay witness testimony, the ALJ need only provide “arguably germane 

reasons” for dismissing the testimony, even if she does “not clearly link [her] determination to 

those reasons.” Lewis, 236 F.3d at 512. An ALJ may reject lay witness testimony if it is 

inconsistent with the record. See, e.g., id. at 511-12 (rejecting lay witness testimony conflicting 

with the plaintiff’s testimony and the medical record); Bayliss v. Barhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218

(9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting lay witness testimony conflicting with the medical record). The ALJ 

may “draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence.” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639,

642. Further, “[i]f the ALJ gives germane reasons for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ 

need only point to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different witness.” Molina 

v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir.2012).

2. The ALJ Pointed to Substantial Evidence in the Record to Permissibly 

Discount Plaintiff’s Daughter’s Credibility

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s daughter Katherine had filled out a third-party statement 

indicating that Plaintiff needed assistance while dressing and doing her hair, did not drive, had 

“slight mood swings[,]” and was limited to lifting only 5 pounds “as per her Dr.’s orders.” 

(AR 35-36.) Further, Katherine’s stated that Plaintiff “must rest after walking for 15 minutes and 

ha[d] problems lifting, reaching, climbing, completing tasks, concentrating, understanding, and 

using her hands.” (AR 35.) The ALJ gave Katherine’s statements “reduced weight” because

. . . The limitations are not consistent with the objective findings by the spine 

surgeon, who found relatively minimal limitations. Mental status has been 

essentially normal on numerous occasions, including just one month after this 

statement was written (Exhibit 25F, page 52). The claimant’s activities are not 

consistent with the degree of limitation alleged by Katherine Berry.” 

(AR 36.) 

//

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 27 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

The ALJ was clear the primary reason Katherine’s lay testimony was given reduced weight 

was because it was inconsistent with the preponderance of medical opinions and the observations 

made by medical sources. (AR 36.) The ALJ pointed to Dr. Montesano’s objective findings, 

weighing heavily his observations of Plaintiff’s “normal” posture, stance, gait, and reflexes, “intact 

sensory exam” and “full range of motion” in her upper extremities and lower extremities, the 

absence of observed signs or symptoms of acute distress, tenderness, crepitus, atrophy, or spasm 

despite her reported pain levels, and only slightly decreased neck and lower back motion. (AR 

32.) The ALJ further pointed to Dr. Montesano’s observation that Plaintiff had “5/5 motor power”

of the deltoids, biceps, triceps, brachioradialis, wrist dorsi, and digital dorsi and volar flexors and 

intrinsic muscle, as “relatively minimal” objective findings inconsistent with Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints. (AR 32.) 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. Montesano’s objective findings, because 

Dr. Montesano’s conclusion that Plaintiff could either “live with her pain or have surgery” “can 

hardly be described as the assessment of a ‘relatively minimal’ condition.’” (Doc. 11, 23-24.) 

Based on his observations and Plaintiff’s diagnostic studies, Dr. Montesano did indeed opine that 

Plaintiff could either elect to have surgery to relieve her symptoms, or continue to live with her 

symptoms. (AR 515.) There is, however, no follow-up surgical consultation or surgical plan in 

the record to indicate Dr. Montesano’s opinion on the surgical intervention necessary to treat 

Plaintiff’s symptoms, or the degree of relief reasonably expected from surgical intervention. 

Further, nowhere in the consultative report did Dr. Montesano opine that, absent surgical 

intervention, Plaintiff’s symptoms would worsen. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Dr. Montesano 

did not opine that surgery was absolutely necessary; Dr. Montesano opined that despite a report of 

neck pain of 8/10 and lower back pain of 7/10, Plaintiff’s examination was largely “normal” with 

full range of motion in the upper and lower extremities, and slightly decreased range of motion in 

the lumbar spine. (AR 514-15.) These are “relatively minimal” findings of limitation. 

Further, the ALJ looked at the treating physician’s medical evidence subsequent to Dr. 

Montesano’s report, to indicate whether the medical evidence supported Plaintiff’s pain report. 

One month after Dr. Montesano’s evaluation, Plaintiff rated her pain as 3/10, and two months later 

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 28 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Plaintiff reported “she was feeling much better and the pain was almost completely resolved[.]” 

(AR 33, see AR 525, 520.) Over the next seven months, Drs. Michnowska and Oliver noted 

Plaintiff to be ambulatory, independent in activities of daily living, well appearing, and with no 

motor or sensory deficits. (AR 33, see AR 519, 521, 801, 804, 809.) Dr. Van Fossan observed no 

motor weakness, normal gait, and intact sensation during a neurological examination nearly a year 

after Dr. Montesano’s consultation. (AR 33, see AR 672-73.) The ALJ did not rely on a “mere 

quantum” of medical evidence; he identified sufficient evidence of Plaintiff’s underlying medical 

condition to adequately support his conclusion that Katherine’s lay testimony was inconsistent 

with the medical evidence. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.

The ALJ’s finding that Katherine’s statements conflicted with the weight of the medical 

evidence was a proper reason for rejecting her statements. Lewis, 236 F.3d at 503 (“One reason 

for which an ALJ may discount lay testimony is that it conflicts with medical evidence”). That the 

ALJ gives an additional reason for rejecting Katherine’s lay testimony – that Plaintiff’s daily 

activities are inconsistent with the limitations Katherine alleges – only gives an additional, 

germane reason underlying his decision to discount her testimony regarding the intensity, duration, 

and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms. See, e.g., Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175.

In sum, the ALJ’s reasons were properly supported by the record and sufficiently specific 

to allow the Court to conclude that he rejected Katherine’s testimony on permissible grounds, and 

did not arbitrarily discredit Katherine’s testimony. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

//

//

//

//

//

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 29 of 30
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Jennifer Lynn Berry. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 6, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01315-SKO Document 15 Filed 01/07/15 Page 30 of 30