Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00466/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00466-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOYLE D. JORDAN,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN EVANS, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No.07cv466-J(NLS)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

Doyle D. Jordan (“Petitioner”) is a California prisoner serving a term of twenty-five years for

robbery, assault with a firearm, and burglary. He has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising two claims for relief [Doc. No. 1]. Respondent filed

an Answer to the Petition and lodged documents in support [Doc. No. 5], arguing that Petitioner’s

claims are without merit. Petitioner did not file a traverse. After a thorough review, the Court finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the appellate court opinion denying Petitioner’s

habeas petition. This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.

539, 545-47 (1981) (stating that deference is owed to factual findings of both state trial and appellate

courts). 

/ / /

/ / /

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“On December 16, 2002, a man later identified as [Petitioner] entered a shoe store

in Rancho San Diego wearing a green trench coat and carrying a shotgun. The man

approached the manager, cocked the shotgun, causing a shell to fall to the floor, and

demanded money. After taking $153 from the manager, the man left the store in a white

truck with out-of-state plates. The next day, the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department

recovered a stolen white GMC Sierra Truck with out-of-state plates in front of a

residence in Lemon Grove. The Sierra contained a green trench coat, a shotgun and

shells of the same color and type found in the shoe store. Deputies arrested [Petitioner]

in a motor home parked in the driveway of the same residence. 

The shoe store manager believed the man who robbed the store had a lightening

bolt or flame tattoo on his neck and a starburst or compass tattoo on his left hand. 

[Petitioner] does not have a tattoo on his neck but does have a tattoo with points on his

left hand. The manager failed to identify [Petitioner] in a pretrial photographic lineup. A

customer present in the store at the time of the robbery identified [Petitioner] as the man

who committed the robbery in a pretrial photographic lineup. Both the manager and the

customer identified [Petitioner] at trial. 

When shown photographs of the Sierra seized in front of the home where

[Petitioner] was staying, the manager identified the truck as the “very same” truck

involved in the robbery. The customer identified the truck as a similar truck but not the

same truck. The customer was certain the truck involved in the robbery was a Ford F150. Both the manager and the customer described the truck involved in the robbery as

having out-of-state plates.”

[Lodgment No. 6, People v. Jordan, No. D042720, slip op. at 2-3 (Cal.Ct.App. June 25, 2004).]

On April 8, 2003, a jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery, in violation of California Penal Code

(“CPC”) section 211; use of a firearm, a shotgun, during the commission of the robbery, in violation of

CPC sections 12022.53(B) and 12022.5(A)(1); assault with a firearm in violation of CPC section

245(A)(2); burglary in the second degree in violation of CPC 459; use of a firearm, a shotgun, during

the commission of the burglary, in violation of CPC section 12022.5(A)(1); unlawful taking or driving

of a vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code section VC 10851(A); and possession of a firearm

by a felon in violation of CPC 12021(A)(1). [Lodgment No. 2, 662-64.] Petitioner waived his right to a

bench trial on his criminal history allegations, and admitted that a 1996 bank robbery was a “serious

felony” prior and a “strike prior” under California law. [Id. at 673.] On June 25, 2003, Petitioner was

sentenced to a total term of twenty-five years incarceration. [Id. at 907.] 

Petitioner appealed the robbery, burglary, and assault convictions, raising the single claim that

the convictions violated his due process rights because they were based on insufficient evidence. 

[Lodgment No. 3, 9.] The appellate court rejected this claim, finding that the jury’s factual

determinations were supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and

sentence. [See Lodgment No. 6.] Petitioner then requested a rehearing for the appellate court to

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consider whether Petitioner’s upper term sentence was unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s

decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 961 (2004). [See Lodgment No. 7.] The appellate court

granted the request, and ordered briefing on the single issue of whether the Blakely decision had any

impact on Petitioner’s sentence. [See Lodgment No. 8.] Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were

eventually affirmed in full by the appellate court. [Lodgment No. 17, 9.] The California Supreme Court

denied Petitioner’s final Petition for Review on January 18, 2006. [See Lodgment No. 19.] 

 Following the denial of his state petitions, Petitioner filed this federal Petition on March 12,

2007, raising two claims: (1) violation of his due process rights at trial due to the insufficiency of the

evidence to sustain his robbery, burglary, and assault with a firearm convictions, and (2) the trial court

erred in imposing an upper term sentence for his robbery conviction by finding aggravating factors to be

true without a jury trial in violation of his due process and confrontation rights. [Petition, 6-7.] 

Respondent has answered the Petition, and argues that the California Court of Appeal reasonably

rejected Petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claim. [Answer, 6.] With respect to Petitioner’s

second claim, Respondent contends the claim should be denied because granting relief would violate the

Supreme Court’s holding in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which prohibits the retroactive

application on federal habeas review of a new rule of constitutional law, and in the alternative, that the

claim is unexhausted. [Id. at 7.] 

DISCUSSION

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will

not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that

adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). A federal habeas court may grant relief under the

“contrary to” clause if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the

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1

 Where, as here, the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s claims issued a summary opinion which

does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review under § 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to

reach the merits. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71,

973-78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of Petitioner’s claim is the

opinion of the California Court of Appeal.

4 07cv466-J(NLS)

“unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle

from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. 

Id. Additionally, the state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct, and the petitioner carries

the burden of rebutting this presumption with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

1) Claim One: Insufficiency of the Evidence

 Petitioner contends that the eyewitness testimonial evidence presented at trial was

constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions. [Supplement Memorandum Attached to Petition

for Habeas Corpus (“Petitioner’s Memorandum”), 1.] Petitioner claims that the two witnesses to the

robbery, the store manager and a store customer, each gave detailed descriptions of his physical features

and the “getaway” truck that conclusively excluded Petitioner as the possible perpetrator. [Id.] 

Petitioner argues that the store manager, the individual who had the closest contact with the robber and

handed over the store’s cash, testified that the robber had a tattoo on his neck. Petitioner does not have

a tattoo on his neck. [Id.] The store manager also failed to identify Petitioner out of the initial

photographic lineup, and could not positively identify Petitioner as the robber until he saw him in court. 

[Id. at 2.] Petitioner argues that although the store customer correctly identified him in an initial

photographic lineup, because he incorrectly described the truck used by the robber as a Ford F-150 (the

truck used in the robbery was a GMC) his testimony was unreliable and his identification inherently

improbable. [Id. at 2-3.] Based on these discrepancies, Petitioner argues that their testimony constituted

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of robbery, burglary, and assault

with a firearm. 

Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. [See Lodgment No. 6; Lodgment No. 17.] The

California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument,1

 and concluded that neither the store

manager’s nor the store customer’s testimony was inherently improbable. [Lodgment No. 6, 4;

Lodgment No. 17, 5-6.] Specifically, the appellate court noted:

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“Both [witnesses] positively identified [Petitioner] as the robber in court. Both

described the getaway vehicle as a white pickup truck with out-of-state plates. 

Both described the robber’s shotgun and identified the green trench coat. The

jury was entitled to determine the credibility of these and other witnesses and to

resolve discrepancies in testimony. The factual determinations in this case are

fully supported by substantial evidence.” 

[Id.] Respondent argues that the appellate court correctly rejected this claim and found that the jury’s

factual determinations were amply supported by the testimony presented at trial. [Answer, 6.] 

There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In making such a

determination, a reviewing court is guided by a number of principles which reflect the doctrine that

“deference [is] owed to the trier of fact.” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992). For example, “a

federal habeas court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must

presume - even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record - that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. In

addition, it is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and

to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319; see Walters v. Maass, 45

F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[t]he question is not whether we

are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether rational jurors could reach the

conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). Although the court “normally must accept the jury’s implicit determinations

of credibility” concerning eyewitness testimony, the court is “permitted to disregard inherently

improbable testimony.” United States v. Ramos-Rascon, 8 F.3d 704, 709 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations

omitted).

Petitioner contends that the eyewitness testimony presented at trial was inherently improbable

and should have been disregarded by the jury. He argues that if this testimony is disregarded, the

remaining evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for robbing the shoe store at gunpoint. The

prosecution called the store manager, Larry Foster, as their first witness at trial. [Lodgment No. 2, 9.] 

Mr. Foster described the events surrounding the 10:50 a.m. robbery in great detail, and was able to

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positively identify Petitioner, the type of vehicle he drove, and the type of weapon he used:

Q: What type of vehicle was the man in?

A: White pickup truck.

( . . . )

Q: The man that got out of the truck, to the best of your ability, can you describe

what that person looked like?

A: Approximately six foot four. It’s hard to judge weight. He had a large green coat

on, came down past the knees. Goatee. Long hair. Khaki pants. I believe he was

wearing athletic shoes. 

( . . . )

Q: What about the color of his hair?

A: Black with gray.

( . . . )

Q: What race, ethnic background was he?

A: I believe him to be Caucasian. 

Q: About how old?

A: Mid 30's to 40's. ( . . . )

Q: The person that robbed you, do you see that person in the courtroom today?

A: Yes, I do.

( . . . )

Q: What happened after you saw the defendant get out of the white truck?

A: Walked up to the door. When he entered I said, “Good Morning.” He pulled his

coat back and produced a shotgun. 

Q: Could you described to the best of your ability what the shotgun looked like?

A: It had a pistol grip. It was hard to distinguish the gauge. Looked like a regular

size barrel.

Q: Could you tell whether it was automatic or pump action?

A: It looked to be pump action.

[Lodgment No. 2, 13-15.] He went on to testify in further detail regarding the robbery, and described

standing within three feet of Petitioner while at gun point. [Id. at 17.] 

Foster’s identification testimony at trial was not inherently improbable. Although Foster could

not identify Petitioner out of the initial photographic lineup which he viewed the day after the robbery,

he explained under oath during the trial that he had been hesitant to make a positive identification based

solely on a photograph because he felt photographs could make a person appear much different than

they do in person, and he did not want to identify the incorrect person. [Id. at 26.] Foster mistakenly

thought Petitioner had a lightening bolt tattoo on his neck, but correctly remembered observing a tattoo

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on Petitioner’s left hand during the robbery, which at trial was revealed to be a double lightening bolt. 

[Id. at 27; 176; 180.] Foster positively identified Petitioner as the robber at the preliminary hearing, and

again at trial. [Id. at 172.] 

Petitioner argues that the store customer who witnessed the robbery also gave inherently

improbably testimony. The prosecution called Terry Burnworth, the customer, as their second witness

at trial. [Id. at 252.] Mr. Burnworth provided a detailed physical description of the robber that

corroborated Mr. Foster’s testimony and matched Petitioner’s general appearance. [Id. at 253-54.] 

Unlike Mr. Foster, Mr. Burnworth positively identified Petitioner from a photographic lineup, again at

the preliminary hearing, and at trial. [Id. at 263, 270-71.] Mr. Burnworth also corroborated Mr. Foster’s

description of the getaway vehicle as a “white pickup truck” and confirmed that the truck had out-ofstate license plates, although he provided discrepant testimony with respect to the make and model of

the truck. [Id. at 260-61.] 

The prosecution presented additional physical evidence at trial, including photos of the getaway

car after it was seized from in front of Petitioner’s residential location, its out-of-state license plates, and

the clothes Petitioner wore during the robbery, all of which corroborated both men’s testimony and

implicated Petitioner in the crime. After being given standard instructions regarding the factors to be

evaluated in considering eyewitness identification, the jury resolved the minor discrepancies in

testimony in favor of the prosecution. The testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to prove the

identity of a perpetrator of a crime, even if that witness’ testimony is contested. United States v. Smith,

563 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1977). The largely consistent testimony of two eyewitnesses, plus

additional evidence, is more than sufficient to support Petitioner’s convictions.

Petitioner makes the secondary argument that the appellate court based its ruling on an

unreasonable application of controlling law by relying on outdated case law. [Petitioner’s

Memorandum, 3.] Specifically, Petitioner argues that the court applied the incorrect state law test to

determine whether the eyewitness testimony at his trial was inherently improbable and therefore

insufficient to support his conviction. Petitioner contends that the “correct” test is whether the evidence

is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the

court inappropriately judged the evidence under a “plainly false” standard. [Id.] In its ruling, the

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appellate court specifically states: “Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of

solid value.” [Lodgment No. 6, 3; Lodgment No. 17, 4.] The appellate court did not rely upon outdated

law, cited the correct standards of law, and applied them in a reasonable manner to conclude that

sufficient evidence supported Petitioner’s convictions. The appellate court’s rejection of this claim was

not objectively unreasonable, nor did it result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s first claim be DENIED. 

2) Claim Two: Illegality of his Sentence

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in imposing an upper term sentence for his robbery

conviction by finding aggravating factors to be true without a jury trial. [Petition, 6-7; Petitioner’s

Memorandum, 3.] Petitioner argues that the trial court’s finding of multiple aggravating factors

constitutes a violation of his Sixth amendment right to a trial by jury pursuant to the Supreme Court’s

holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004). Respondent contends that the recent Supreme Court opinion in Cunningham v. California, ---

U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 856 (Jan. 22, 2007), “casts Petitioner’s claim in a significantly different light,” and

Petitioner should be permitted to return to state court to present the claim again in light of Cunningham

while the Petition is stayed in this Court. [Answer, 8.] Respondent alternately contends that although

the claim is unexhausted, the Court should deny it as being without merit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2) on the basis that: (1) habeas relief is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); (2) the

rejection of the claim by the state court was objectively reasonable; and (3) because any error was

harmless. [Answer, 10, 16-17.]

At the conclusion of trial and prior to sentencing, Petitioner waived his rights to a jury or bench

trial on his prior strike allegations and admitted having suffered a prior felony conviction for bank

robbery in 1996. [Lodgment No. 2, 679.] The trial judge made the following statement at sentencing:

“The Court understands the various discretionary sentencing choices that the

Court possesses within the overall sentencing fabric or framework of this case. The

Court, for the record, designates count 1, the robbery offense, as the principal offense in

this case. The base term for robbery is two, three, or five years. The Court has weighed

and considered the mitigants as against the aggravants as applicable to that offense and as

otherwise applicable to Mr. Jordan personally, and the Court concludes that, upon such a

weighing process having been conducted, that the pendulum falls in favor of the upper

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term of five years as the base term sentence choice appropriately in this case. 

As factors in aggravation, the Court cites and gives weight to Rule 4.421,

parentheses A, subparentheses 1, that the defendant’s actions in this case disclosed a high

degree of callousness in that while having the shotgun pointed at the victim, he racked

the weapon which expended an unspent round from the chamber.

Further aggravants are found within the meaning of Rule 4.421, parentheses A,

subparentheses 8, that the manner in which the robbery was carried out indicated

substantial planning. The getaway vehicle had been stolen some days or relatively short

time prior to the robbery. The shotgun was already loaded when Mr. Jordan entered the

store. 

Further, within the meaning of Rule 4.421, parentheses B, subparentheses 2, apart

from the conviction that provides the basis for the strike allegation and the serious felony

allegation, Mr. Jordan otherwise has an extensive prior record of criminal conduct with

numerous felony and misdemeanor convictions.

Further, within the meaning of Rule 4.421, parentheses B, subparentheses 3, the

defendant has served prior prison terms predicated upon the referenced convictions or

some of them.

Further, within the meaning of Rule 4.421, parentheses B, subparentheses 5, the

defendant’s recent performance while on federal supervised release was unsatisfactory. 

He violated the conditions of his release and was recommitted to federal custody.

The Court therefore sets the base term for count 1 at the upper term of five years. 

That base term is doubled by operation of law by reason of the admission of the strike

prior allegation to a sentence of 10 years on count 1.”

[Lodgment No. 2, 905-7.] Due to further enhancements and after calculating the terms on each of the

separate convictions, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to a total term of twenty-five years. [Id. at 910-

11.]

In Apprendi, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth

Amendment right to trial by jury incorporated therein, requires that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77,

490. In Blakely the Court defined the term “statutory maximum” as used in Apprendi to mean “the

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to the holdings in

Apprendi and Blakely, the trial court erroneously relied upon the following factors when sentencing him

to the upper term on the robbery count: 1) defendant’s actions disclosed a high degree of callousness, 2)

the manner in which the robbery was carried out indicated substantial planning, 3) defendant’s prior

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record of convictions, 4) defendant having served prior prison terms, and 5) unsatisfactory performance

while on federal supervised release. [Petitioner’s Memorandum, 3.] 

Petitioner did not raise this issue in his first direct appeal because the Blakely decision had not

yet been rendered. [See Lodgment No. 3.] Subsequent to Blakely, Petitioner sought rehearing before the

appellate court. [See Lodgment No. 7.] The court granted his petition for hearing and affirmed his

convictions, but concluded that the appropriate relief under Blakely was remand to the trial court for resentencing because there was “no finding by the jury to support all of the factors relied on by the trial

court in its selection of its upper term” sentence. [Lodgment No. 11, 10.] Both Petitioner and the

prosecution appealed the appellate court’s rulings. [See Lodgment Nos. 12 & 13.] The California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for review, but granted the prosecution’s petition for review. 

[See Lodgment No. 14.] The California Supreme Court in People v. Black attempted to salvage

California’s sentencing scheme by finding that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes was the

entire range of terms, from lower through upper, and that because the factors used to impose upper terms

were subject to a reasonableness requirement, they were the functional equivalent of the advisory

provisions of the federal guidelines. People v. Black, 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1255-56 (2005), vacated by

Black v. California, 127 S.Ct. 1210 (2007). Subsequent to its ruling in Black, the state supreme court

ordered the appellate court to vacate its previous determination that Petitioner’s sentence violated

Blakely and to reconsider the issue. [See Lodgment No. 15.] That was the state of the law at the time

Petitioner sought relief in the state appellate and supreme courts, and at the time his conviction became

final. 

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court of Appeals was bound to follow the decision of the

State’s highest court. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (1962). Citing

Black, upon rehearing the appellate court determined that the trial court had not violated Petitioner’s

Sixth amendment rights when imposing an upper term sentence based on its finding of aggravating

factors. [Lodgment No. 17, 9.] The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s Blakely claim on the basis that

the California Supreme Court had determined in Black that California’s sentencing scheme did not

violate the Sixth Amendment. [Id.] 

In Cunningham v. California, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 856 (Jan. 22, 2007), the Supreme Court,

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citing Apprendi and Blakely, rejected the California Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Black and held

that California’s determinate sentencing law (“DSL”) violates a defendant’s right to a jury trial to the

extent it permits a trial court to impose an upper term based on facts found by the court rather than a

jury. The Court held that because California Penal Code section 1170(b) and the implementing

California Rules of Court allow for imposing an upper term only by a fact that a judge finds by a

preponderance of the evidence, the jury trial and reasonable doubt requirements of due process were

missing in California’s determinate sentencing scheme. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868. The Supreme

Court vacated Black and remanded for reconsideration in light of Cunningham. Black v. California, 127

S.Ct. 1210 (2007). Upon remand, the California Supreme Court reconsidered Black and held that:

“Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need

only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, .

. . [California’s sentencing law] violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior

conviction, ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 

California law provides that the existence of prior convictions is an aggravating factor which can

support the imposition of an upper term. Had the trial judge here imposed the upper term based solely

on the fact that Petitioner had suffered the prior convictions, admitted by Petitioner after he waived his

state right to a trial as to the prior conviction allegations, the Sixth Amendment would not be implicated

due to the Apprendi exception. However, the trial judge also relied on several other factors in imposing

the upper term, including 1) the degree of callousness evidenced by Petitioner’s use of the shotgun

during the robbery to intimidate his victim, 2) the substantial planning evidenced by the pre-loaded

shotgun and the stolen getaway vehicle, 3) defendant’s prior criminal history, including Petitioner’s

prior prison terms, and 4) the fact that the crime was committed while Petitioner was serving a term of

federal supervised release. [Lodgment No. 2, 905-7.] Thus, this Court must determine whether a federal

Constitutional violation occurred when the trial judge selected the upper term sentence for Petitioner’s

robbery conviction. This requires addressing Respondent’s argument that clearly established federal

law was not violated because Cunningham does not prevent imposition of upper term sentences when

they are imposed on the basis of prior convictions, but that even if the rule of Cunningham was violated,

Teague precludes application of such a new rule. 

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 The Court notes that Respondent filed his Answer prior to the California Supreme Court’s

reconsideration of its holding in People v. Black. 

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Respondent first argues that Petitioner’s claim is unexhausted because the state court has not had

an opportunity to apply the Supreme Court’s holding in Cunningham to Petitioner’s case.2

 [Answer, 8-

10.] Petitioner’s claim was denied by the appellate court here on the basis of the now-invalid holding of

Black. In the interim period, the state supreme court decided that Cunningham rendered California’s

DSL unconstitutional, and the state legislature has enacted a new sentencing scheme. As such, state

court remedies remain available to Petitioner, and his claim is technically unexhausted. See Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971) (noting that it is an open issue whether intervening change in federal

law can render a previously exhausted claim unexhausted), citing Blair v. California, 340 F.2d 741 (9th

Cir. 1965) (holding that an intervening change in federal law that casts a claim in a fundamentally

different light can render an exhausted claim unexhausted). 

The Court notes, however, that the Petition can be denied notwithstanding the fact that the claim

is unexhausted. Section 2254(b)(2) provides that: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2). However, the Ninth Circuit has held “that a federal

court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant

does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005),

cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1336 (2006). This standard is satisfied only if it is perfectly clear that Petitioner

“has no chance of obtaining relief.” Id. at 624. The Court in Cassett held that such a high standard was

necessary to give due consideration to the principles of comity and the legislative goals of AEDPA, and

to thereby avoid “depriv[ing] state courts of the opportunity to address a colorable federal claim in the

first instance and grant relief if they believe it is warranted.” Id. 

Respondent contends that Petitioner has no chance of obtaining relief on his claim because

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prevents him from taking advantage on collateral review of the

new rule of constitutional law announced in Cunningham. In Teague, the Supreme Court held that a

new procedural (as opposed to substantive) rule of constitutional law cannot be applied retroactively on

federal collateral review to upset a state conviction or sentence. See id. There are two exceptions to

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3 In explaining whether a new rule of law should be considered “substantive” or “procedural,” and thus

whether it should be applied collaterally to convictions that have become final, the Supreme Court in Schriro held

that:

“When a decision of this Court results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending

on direct review. As to convictions that are already final, however, the rule applies only in limited

circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions that narrow

the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place

particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish. Such rules apply

retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of “an act

that the law does not make criminal”’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. We

have sometimes referred to rules of this latter type as falling under an exception to Teague’s bar on

13 07cv466-J(NLS)

non-retroactivity: 1) “rules forbidding punishment of certain primary conduct or to rules prohibiting a

certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” and 2)

“watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the

criminal proceeding.” Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416-17 (2004). 

In order to determine the threshold question of whether the right recognized in Cunningham is a

“new rule” within the meaning of Teague, courts must determine whether the rule was dictated by the

precedent of Apprendi, Blakely and/or United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), such that it cannot

be considered “new.” Respondent correctly points to Ninth Circuit cases finding that Apprendi, Blakely

and Booker have each announced a new rule under Teague, and argues that Cunningham announced a

new rule for the same reasons. [Answer, 13, citing Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 442 (2005) (Apprendi), Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th

Cir. 2005) (Blakely), and United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,

126 S.Ct. 1181 (2006) (Booker).).] For example, in Schardt the Ninth Circuit held that Blakely does not

apply retroactively to convictions that became final prior to its final publication on June 24, 2004. 

Schardt, 414 F.3d at 1027. The court reasoned that Blakely did not announce a new substantive rule and

only announced a new procedural rule because it merely allocated some of the decision-making

authority previously held by judges to juries. Schardt, 414 F.3d at 1036. Specifically with respect to

the issue of whether these types of changes in the law should be considered substantive or procedural,

the Supreme Court held in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), that a rule “requiring that a jury

rather than a judge find the essential facts bearing on punishment” in capital cases was a “prototypical”

procedural rule under Teague.

3

 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 354. Thus, following consistent Supreme Court

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retroactive application of procedural rules; they are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not

subject to the bar. 

New rules of procedure, on the other hand, generally do not apply retroactively. They do not produce a

class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that

someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. Because

of this more speculative connection to innocence, we give retroactive effect to only a small set of 

“‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the

criminal proceeding.” That a new procedural rule is ‘fundamental’ in some abstract sense is not enough;

the rule must be one ‘without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.’ 

This class of rules is extremely narrow, and ‘it is unlikely that any ... ‘ha[s] yet to emerge.’”

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-53 (2004) (Citations omitted).

4

 The Court notes that this determination is consistent with the recent holding in Ayala v. Ayers, 2007 WL

2019538 (S.D.Cal. 2007, 7/9/2007), in which the Chief Judge of this district reasoned that: “Similarly, Petitioner

is precluded from relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. 826 (2007), as that decision

was rendered well after Petitioner’s conviction was finalized. The Ninth Circuit has previously held the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), announced a new rule of

criminal procedure that did not apply retroactively to convictions that became final prior to its publication. See

Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Cunningham

applied Blakely’s reasoning to the California determinate sentencing scheme. See Cunningham, 127 S.Ct 826. 

Accordingly, the Cunningham decision announced a new rule of criminal procedure, one which is not a

“watershed” rule, and thus cannot be applied retroactively to Petitioner’s conviction. Petitioner is barred under

Teague v. Lane from relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ring v. Arizona and Cunningham v.

California.” Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit concur. See e.g., Salerno v. Schriro 2007 WL 2153584

(D.Ariz. 2007, 7/24/2007) (holding that “Although the retroactivity of Cunningham has not yet been addressed in

the Ninth Circuit, because Cunningham relies heavily on the new procedural rule announced in Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and because the Ninth Circuit has already decided that Blakely is not

retroactive, then Cunningham is also not retroactive”). 

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and Ninth

 Circuit precedent in this area, Cunningham announced a new procedural rule of constitutional law.4

 

The second inquiry under Teague is whether the new procedural rule of constitutional law

announced in Cunningham should be applied retroactively to convictions that were final prior to its

publication. New procedural rules do not apply retroactively unless they amount to “watershed rules of

criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Id.;

Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. As in Blakely, the decision in Cunningham shifted decision-making authority

previously held by judges to juries, making it a procedural rule rather than a substantive rule. 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that a change in law that requires juries rather than judges to

make the factual findings on which a sentence is based does not announce a watershed rule in criminal

procedure. Schardt, 414 F.3d at 1036. Thus, Cunningham does not fall under the watershed rule of

criminal procedure exception to non-retroactivity. Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 18,

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2006, ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s final petition for review. See

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Because Petitioner’s conviction became final

before Cunningham was decided on January 22, 2007, Cunningham is not applicable to Petitioner’s

sentence. Teague therefore prevents him from taking advantage of the new rule announced in

Cunningham. 

The Court notes that even if Cunningham were to be retroactively applied, Petitioner could not

prevail on his claim. As stated above, only one aggravating factor need be found to enhance

California’s mid-term to the upper term. See, e.g. People v. Reyes (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 735. In

Petitioner’s case, the trial court relied upon multiple aggravating factors, including Petitioner’s prior

convictions. [Lodgment No. 2, 906-7.] In Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397, 402-03 (9th Cir. 2006), the

Ninth Circuit held that “[a] statutory maximum need not be defined by every one of the facts found at

trial, so long as the defendant is not exposed to a greater punishment than that authorized solely by those

facts or the fact of a prior conviction.” Stokes, 465 F.3d at 402-03 (internal quotations and citations

omitted). Combining this holding with Cunningham’s affirmation of Apprendi’s rule that prior

convictions are explicitly excepted from the requirement that any fact that increases the penalty for a

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, the Court finds that the

state court’s decision to uphold Petitioner’s upper term sentence was reasonable because the sentence

was based on Petitioner’s prior convictions. Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Petitioner’s prior

convictions alone exposed him to the upper term of the sentencing range on the robbery conviction. 

Although the trial judge also found several other aggravating factors, Petitioner’s admitted prior felony

conviction was sufficient to expose him to the upper term. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. In other words,

without any additional jury findings, Petitioner’s prior convictions expanded the sentencing range to

include an upper term sentence. 

Because Petitioner has not shown that adjudication of his second claim in the state court

proceedings was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law

as it existed prior to the date upon which his conviction became final, or that it was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s second claim be

DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 31, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than September 7, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2007

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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