Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00016/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00016-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph G. Stern, Sr.,

Petitioner,

v.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents.

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CV 06-16-TUC-DCB

ORDER

On January 24, 2007, this Court found the Petition filed by Petitioner on January 17,

2006, was time barred and procedurally defaulted, but that because Petitioner argued his

actual innocence, this case might fall within the narrow exception to dismissal under

circumstances which would implicate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Order) (Doc.

33).

The Court found there was no cause or prejudice to excuse Petitioner’s procedural

default and no extraordinary circumstances beyond the prisoner’s control to toll the running

of the one-year statute of limitations. (Order at 10, 12.) Procedural default may also be

excused when a prisoner demonstrates a fundamental miscarriage of justice by showing by

clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror could find him guilty of the offense,

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such as Petitioner’s argument of actual innocence, if he prevailed. Id. (citations omitted). 

The Court noted, “There is an open question as to whether the fundamental miscarriage of

justice/actual innocence gateway exception for procedurally barred claims should also be

extended to cases barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted). “In

the Ninth Circuit, district courts are instructed to consider whether there has been a

fundamental miscarriage of justice . . ..” Id. at 11. 

The Court found further briefing was necessary on the gateway question of actual

innocence before it could determine whether the case was barred by the one-year statute of

limitations for filing under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The Court referred this

matter to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Marshall on March 11, 2008, pursuant to Rules of

Practice for the United States District Court, District of Arizona (Local Rules), Rule (Civil)

72.1(a). On July 13, 2010, Magistrate Judge Marshall issued a Report and Recommendation

(R&R). (Doc. 149) She recommends denying the Petition, pursuant to Lee v. Lampert, 610

F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010), which precludes extending the one-year statute of limitation

period to prevent the fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

The Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (doc. 149) as the findings

of fact and conclusions of law of this Court and denies the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (doc. 1). 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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The duties of the district court in connection with a R&R by a Magistrate Judge are

set forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The

district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Where the parties object to a Report and Recommendation, “[a] judge of the [district] court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). When no

objections are filed, the district court need not review the R&R de novo.

This Court's ruling is a de novo determination as to those portions of the R&R to

which there are objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000

n. 13 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2003)

(en banc). To the extent that no objection has been made, arguments to the contrary have

been waived. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (objections are waived if they

are not filed within fourteen days of service of the R&R), see also McCall v. Andrus, 628

F.2d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so

on appeal); Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United

States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the

court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to

accept the recommendation)).

The parties were sent copies of the R&R and instructed that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1), they had 14 days to file written objections. See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (party

objecting to the recommended disposition has fourteen (14) days to file specific, written

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 1According to Petitioner, Dr. Mendelsohn, a retired neurosurgeon, provided his preliminary

expert medical opinion on 11/29/2005. His attorney provided an affidavit on 12/23/2005, that

he did not know of the medical literature which supported Plaintiff’s accidental minor fall

defense. (Objection at 3.) Neither were provided in time to include them in the Petition, which

was filed 1/17/2006.

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objections). The Court has considered de novo the questions raised by the Objection filed by

the Petitioner, the Government’s Response, and the Petitioner’s Amended Reply.

PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS

Essentially, Petitioner argues that his Strickland claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is a work in progress, with newly discovered evidence coming to light since the

inception of this case. Petitioner argues that this Court’s Order of January 24, 2007, left his

claim of “newly discovered evidence” pending, and now the Court must reach his argument

that the limitation period is tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). According to

Petitioner, in his Traverse he argued his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relied on

newly discovered evidence for its factual basis, and his original Strickland claim plus two

supplemental claims are all made cognizable and supported by new evidence that has been

compiled between November 29, 2005 and 2009. (Objection at 2.)1

 

Under the AEDPA, “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of – . . . the date on which the factual predicate of

the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1) (D).

This tolling provision does not save Petitioner because it does not allow him to leapfrog over state-exhaustion requirements. If Petitioner were dealing with a true “newly

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discovered” factual predicate for a claim, section 2244(d)(1)(D) would afford him one-year

to present the claim to the state courts and subsequently proceed here if the claim is rejected

there. The State of Arizona makes a similar allowance for seeking post conviction relief

(PCR) based on newly discovered facts, under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure,

Rules 32.1(e) and 32.2(b).

It seems incongruous to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on newly

discovered evidence, but the Petitioner links the two together by arguing that newly

discovered medical evidence makes it apparent how valuable such evidence would have

been to his defense, which his attorney failed to discern and present in his case. (Traverse

(doc. 30) at 14-15.) While he argues that the affidavit from his attorney makes his Strickland

claim “newly discovered,” this Court noted in its January 24, 2007, Order that this claim was

procedurally defaulted in the state court. “Specifically, the state court found the claim that

his trial counsel failed to investigate and/or pursue medical evidence related to accidental

infant head injuries was precluded from review because it was NOT a newly discovered

material fact (Answer (doc. 23), Ex. K: Decision at 1-2), and therefore, this claim did not

satisfy the exception for filing an untimely appeal under Ariz. R Crim. P. 32.1(e).” (Order at

9.)

Petitioner did not urge this Petition on the basis of newly discovered scientific

evidence, id. at 1, which had been urged and rejected in the state courts. On June 21, 2001,

the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed both and denied his second PCR Rule 32-motion. It

noted that the argument of newly discovered evidence related to “shaken baby syndrome”

was raised and rejected in the first PCR proceeding. The court also rejected the newlyCase 4:06-cv-00016-DCB Document 157 Filed 09/02/10 Page 5 of 9
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discovered evidence argument as waived for failure to raise it in the first PCR proceeding

and precluded any argument related to his claim that his co-defendant Fernane was involved

in an automobile accident about a week before the incident that gave rise to the charges

against Stern. (Answer, Ex. J: Decision at 5.) 

Here, Petitioner argues his failure to timely raise his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim was caused because his attorneys kept arguing newly discovered scientific evidence in

his PCR proceedings. (Order at 10.) The Court rejected this argument because he filed the

3rd PCR motion, which as noted by the state court’s was just another attempt to frame his

claim as “newly discovered” to fit within the Rule 32.1(e) exception to preclusion. Id. This

Court concluded that even if the 3rd PCR sufficed to exhaust this claim, it was filed one year

and two months after disposition of the 2nd PCR, and Petitioner waited another eleven

months to file his federal habeas claim. The Court found no excuse for the delay, and the

claim was time barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Id. 

Petitioner argues that the Court has allowed him to add a substantive claim of

innocence based on newly discovered evidence, pursuant to an Order issued on February 16,

2007. (Order (doc. 35)). This Court did no such thing. The Court expressly struck

Petitioner’s Notice to Defendant of Intent to Seek Intervening “Freestanding Innocence”

claim. The Court merely expressed its commitment to afford the parties full briefing of the

gateway actual innocence argument. The Court explained that “if Petitioner raised

arguments for the first time in his Reply, the Court would allow Respondent to file a surreply rather than strike as waived the otherwise late raised arguments.” (Order (doc. 35) at

2.)

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 Accordingly, the Court rejects the Petitioner’s Objections to the R&R. The Court

incorporates and adopts its discussions, findings, and holdings in its Order issued on January

24, 2007, which were in large part quoted by the Magistrate Judge in her R&R at pages 1

through 3. The only reason this Court did not deny the Petition on January 24, 2007, was

because it found there was an “open question as to whether the fundamental miscarriage of

justice/actual innocence gateway exception for procedurally barred claims should also be

extended to cases barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. at 11 (citation omitted). The

Court held that the law in the Ninth Circuit suggested the exception should apply, and

accordingly both the procedural default and statute of limitations bars could be excepted in

this case if Petitioner could make a gateway showing of actual innocence. Following Lee v.

Lampert, such a showing will no longer excuse the statute of limitation bar. The Petition

must be denied.

“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may

not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in

which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court.” 28 U.S.C.

2253(c)(1)(A). This Court has authority to issue a Certificate of Appealability (COA), if the

Petitioner has made a substantial showing that he was denied a federal constitutional right. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Pursuant to the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings,

Rule 11, this Court must issue or deny a COA when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant. 

"Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the

showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate

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that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong." United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). The issue is somewhat more complicated

where the district court dismisses the petition based on procedural grounds, without reaching

the merits of the underlying claim, then the COA issues if the prisoner shows, at least, that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id. The first step is to decide whether the

petition raises a debatable constitutional question, then the question is whether the

procedural issue raised in the petition is highly debatable. Martin, 226 F.3d at 1046.

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Here, Petitioner’s Strickland claim raises a debatable constitutional claim, but the

Court denied the Petition on procedural grounds, which in light of the unequivocal holding

in Lee v. Lampert, no jurists of reason would find debatable. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Order issued by this Court (doc. 33) is incorporated in its

entirety and affirmed.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that after a full and independent review of the record,

in respect to the objections filed by the Petitioner, the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (149) is

accepted and adopted as the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition (doc. 1) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment

accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is NOT

GRANTED.

DATED this 31st day of August, 2010.

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