Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02518/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02518-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

 TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Jeffrey Dale Woods, who is confined in an Arizona State Prison, has 

filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

As detailed below, Petitioner’s sentence for his Count Two kidnapping charge was .15 

years longer than the statutory maximum, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The 

Court therefore recommends that the Petition be granted with regard to Ground One and 

Judge Tuchi reduce Petitioner’s sentence from 23.25 to 23.1 years of imprisonment. 

Petitioner’s remaining claims are procedurally barred, not cognizable on habeas review, 

and/or fail on the merits. Accordingly, the Court recommends that those claims be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Trial Court Proceedings 

On August 14, 2009, the State filed an indictment charging Woods with four 

Jeffrey Dale Woods, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

 

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No. CV-13-2518-PHX-JJT (JZB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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counts of sexual assault, one count of kidnapping, and one count of burglary in the 

second degree. (Doc. 13, Ex. A.) On November 4, 2009, Woods pleaded guilty to one 

count of kidnapping and two counts of attempted sexual assault. (Doc. 13, Ex. C.) The 

plea agreement stated that Woods would be sentenced, for the kidnapping count, to no 

fewer than 9.25 years in prison and no more than 23.25 years in prison. (Id.) The 

agreement also stated that Woods would receive lifetime probation for each of the 

attempted sexual assault convictions. (Id.)

 On September 3, 2009, the State filed additional charges against Woods in a 

separate case number. (Doc. 13, Ex. B.) In the second case, the State charged Woods 

with two counts of assault, one count of criminal trespass in the first degree, one count of 

criminal damage, and one count of threatening or intimidating. (Id.) On November 4, 

2009, Woods pleaded guilty to one count of criminal trespass in the first degree. (Doc. 

13, Ex. D.) The plea agreement stated that Woods would be sentenced to no fewer than 

0.75 years in prison and no more than 2.75 years in prison. (Id.) 

 On December 1, 2009, the trial court sentenced Woods on all four counts. The 

court sentenced Woods to a maximum term of 23.25 years in prison for the kidnapping 

conviction and concurrent terms of lifetime probation for the attempted sexual assault 

counts (both of those to run consecutively to the kidnapping count). (Doc. 13, Exs. H, I.) 

It also sentenced him to a maximum term of 2.75 years’ imprisonment for the first degree 

criminal trespass conviction to run concurrently with the kidnapping count. (Id.) All of 

the sentences were within the ranges listed in the plea agreements. (Doc. 13, Exs. C, D.) 

 B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On January 25, 2010, Woods filed a notice of post-conviction relief regarding both 

of the above cases. (Doc. 13, Ex. J.) On June 11, 2010, appointed post-conviction counsel 

filed a notice of completion, informing the court that after reviewing the record and 

transcripts, she was “unable to find any claims for relief to raise in post-conviction relief 

proceedings.” (Doc. 13, Ex. L.) On July 20, 2010, Woods filed a pro se Petition for PostConviction Relief. (Doc. 13, Ex. M.) In the Petition, he raised three issues: (1) ineffective 

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assistance of trial and PCR counsel, (2) evidence improperly submitted at sentencing, and 

(3) sentence imposed outside the scope of the plea agreement. (Id.) The State responded 

on September 3, 2010, and Woods filed a reply on September 16, 2010. (Doc. 13, Exs. N 

& O.) On October 15, 2010, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed Woods’ 

Petition (pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(c)). (Doc. 13, Ex. P.) 

 On November 15, 2010, Woods filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 13, Ex. Q.) On August 16, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied 

Woods’ Petition for Review. (Doc. 13, Ex. S.) 

 On September 17, 2012, Woods filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 13, Ex. T.) On December 12, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court 

also denied review. (Doc. 13, Ex. U.) 

 C. Federal Habeas Proceedings 

 On December 11, 2013, Woods filed the present Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus. (Doc. 1.) 

 In Ground One, Petitioner alleges his sentence violated state law because he was 

sentenced to 23.25 years of imprisonment where the statutory maximum was 23.1 years 

of imprisonment. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges “the trial court used the historical 

prior conviction to [increase his sentencing range] but then used this same fact as an 

aggravating factor to justify imposing an aggravated sentence. . . .” (Doc. 1 at 19.) In 

Ground Three, Petitioner asserts the court failed to allow him “to withdraw from the plea 

agreements” after “the State gained a sentenc[e] using several prior felony convictions it 

promised to give up.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) In Ground Four, Petitioner asserts ineffective 

assistance of counsel, claiming that “trial counsel failed to warn him that the plea 

agreements” could “be misused” through the misuse of his prior felony convictions. 

(Doc. 1 at 23.) In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges PCR counsel’s failure to file a PCR 

petition was “clearly ineffective.” (Doc. 1 at 24.) 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

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unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described the operative 

facts and federal legal theories on which the claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33; 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–78 (1971); Rice v. Wood, 44 F.3d 1396, 1403 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’ (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court 

that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 In order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each 

appropriate state court.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the 

exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct 

appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial post-conviction 

process available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th 

ed. 1998)). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731–32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review when a petitioner failed to present his 

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federal claims to the state court, but returning to state court would be “futile” because the 

state court’s procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of 

the previously unraised claims. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty 

v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A. Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted Claims – Grounds One, Two, 

Three, and Five 

 Ground One is unexhausted because Petitioner never asserted in state court the 

claim that his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum of 23.1 years imprisonment. 

Ground Three is unexhausted because Petitioner never asserted in state court that the trial 

judge erred in failing to allow him to withdraw from his plea. To the contrary, Petitioner 

consistently asserted that he wanted “to correct the sentence imposed” and “was not 

attacking the validity of the plea agreement.” (Doc. 13, Ex. T at 2.) Ground Five is 

unexhausted because Petitioner did not previously claim ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel. 

 Ground Two is unexhausted because Petitioner did not raise this argument in state 

court as a federal claim. Petitioner alleged that “due process requires that any ambiguity 

in a plea agreement be considered against the government.” (Doc. 13, Ex. T at 5.) The 

remainder of Petitioner’s claim was that although “Petitioner and the state agreed on one 

prior felony,” the “trial court used three prior felonies to aggravate Petitioner’s sentence.” 

(Id. at 6.) Petitioner’s sole reference to “due process” is insufficient to exhaust a federal 

claim. A habeas petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely 

by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 

1996). 

 As stated above, proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” 

to the state courts the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative 

facts and federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 78 

(“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he 

urges upon the federal courts.”); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If 

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a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional 

claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in 

state court.”). General and conclusory references to “due process” do not suffice to 

exhaust a claim that the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. See 

Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (exhaustion requirement is not 

“satisfied by the mere circumstance that the ‘due process ramifications’ of an argument 

might be ‘self-evident.’”). 

 Thus, Grounds One, Two, Three, and Five are unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted because Petitioner cannot file another appeal or PCR on these issues in state 

court. Under Rule 31.3, Ariz. R. Crim. P., the time for filing a direct appeal expires 20 

days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Moreover, no provision is made for a 

successive direct appeal. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for review of 

Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. Petitioner is also barred from raising his claims by 

Arizona’s time bars. Rule 32.4, Ariz. R. Crim. P., requires that petitions for postconviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within ninety days after 

the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order 

and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett, 912 P.2d 

1357, 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (applying Rule 32.4 to successive petition, and noting 

that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). 

That time has long since passed. 

B. Overcoming Procedural Default

 Generally, a federal court will not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted 

claim unless a petitioner demonstrates “cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the 

claim in state court and “prejudice” from the alleged constitutional violation, or shows 

that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” would result if the claim were not heard on 

the merits. Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 732). See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1998) (the 

cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those represented 

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by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor 

external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. 

Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 

U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986)). “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional 

violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). 

 Finally, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

procedural default rule,” a petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence “that a 

constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually 

innocent’ of the offense.” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496); 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make 

a credible showing of “actual innocence” by “persuad[ing] the district court that, in light 

of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be credible, such a claim requires a petitioner to 

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

 Here, Petitioner does not argue an objective factor external to the defense impeded 

his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules and the Court finds that a failure to 

consider the claims will not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

C. Respondents’ Waiver of Exhaustion of Ground One 

On April 21, 2015, the Court inquired if Respondents would waive the exhaustion 

requirement regarding the sole issue of whether Petitioner’s sentence of 23.25 years 

imprisonment exceeded the statutory maximum. (Doc. 24.) On May 4, 2015, 

Respondents advised, to their credit, they “will waive the exhaustion requirement for this 

particular state-sentencing-law claim.” (Doc. 26 at 6.) Respondents have the right to 

waive this requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“A State shall not be deemed to 

have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the 

requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”). 

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 D. Exhausted Claim – Ground Four 

 The Court finds that Petitioner’s federal constitutional claim in Ground Four was 

adequately exhausted in state court. Petitioner alleged a violation of the “Sixth 

Amendment” when counsel’s “failure to object” to a “violation of the pleas” resulted in 

“prejudice.” (Doc. 13, Ex. T at 4.) Upon review of the briefing to the state courts, the 

Court finds that these specific claims are more than similar, albeit not identical, to those 

raised in the Petition before this Court. Because the Court finds that these claims were 

presented to the state courts, there is a presumption that they were adjudicated on the 

merits in those courts. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it 

may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of 

any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary .”). 

III. Non-Cognizable Claims – Grounds Two and Three 

 Grounds Two and Three are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings because 

the arguments are rooted in state law. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges “the trial court 

used the historical prior conviction to [increase his sentencing range] but then used this 

same fact as an aggravating factor to justify imposing an aggravated sentence . . . .” 

(Doc. 1 at 19.) Petitioner repeatedly cites to alleged violations of A.R.S. § 13-701 and § 

13-703. (Doc. 1 at 18-19.) In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts the court failed to “allow 

the Defendant to withdraw from the plea agreements” after “the State gained a sentenc[e] 

using several prior felony convictions it promised to give up.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) Petitioner 

alleges that based upon a violation of A.R.S. § 13-703, he should have been given an 

“opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreements.” (Id.) The state court’s alleged 

failure to follow state statutes or state procedural rules is not cognizable on habeas 

review. 

 Federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or 

application of state law, including a state’s statutes regarding imposition of sentences. See

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (stating that “federal habeas corpus relief 

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does not lie for errors of state law”); Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 

2004) (“We may not second-guess the California appellate court’s construction of its own 

state law unless it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to evade 

consideration of a federal issue.” (internal quotations omitted)). Petitioner argues his 

right to due process was violated when the court imposed aggravated sentences in 

violation of his plea agreement and Arizona statutory law. Petitioner has not stated a 

claim for federal habeas relief. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (rejecting 

petitioner’s claim that a state court misapplied its own aggravating circumstance because 

“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law . . . .”); Beaty, 303 F.3d at 

986 (“state claims are not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings”). Although 

Petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated because the state allegedly did 

not follow its sentencing statutes and procedures, the characterization of this claim in this 

fashion does not render it cognizable on federal habeas review. 

IV. Merits Review 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).1

 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is 

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, under the AEDPA, a federal court “shall not” grant habeas 

relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings” unless it: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 

1

 The AEDPA applies only to those cases that were filed after its effective date, 

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law” refers to holdings 

of the Supreme Court in effect at the time the state court rendered its decision. Greene v. 

Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010) (“A legal 

principle is ‘clearly established’ within the meaning of this provision only when it is 

embodied in a holding of this Court.”). A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established precedent if (1) “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). 

 “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable 

application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but applies that 

rule to the facts of a particular case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a 

federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 

presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. 

A. Ground One – Sentence Exceeds the Statutory Maximum 

 In Ground One,2

 Petitioner alleges his sentence violated state law because he was 

 

2

 The Court notes that Petitioner may have failed to submit pages 16 and 17 of his argument for Ground One. Although the docketed Petition contains all 45 pages as submitted, Petitioner’s numbering at the bottom of the document skips from 15 to 18. 

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sentenced to 23.25 years of imprisonment and the statutory maximum was 23.1 years 

imprisonment. Petitioner argues the “maximum sentence for these crimes are 2.75 years 

and 23.1 years for a category two repetitive offender, thus the sentence on the CR 2009-

152513 conviction for the kidnapping crime exceeded the range permissible even if the 

category of repetitive offender used by the sentencing court was correct.” (Doc. 1 at 15.) 

 Petitioner is correct. Under the 2009 version of A.R.S. § 13-703(I) , the maximum 

sentence for a Class Two felony offense with one historical prior felony conviction was 

23.1 years imprisonment. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(I) (2009). The plea 

agreement incorrectly states the statutory maximum for this offense was 23.25 years of 

imprisonment, which had been the maximum until January 1, 2009.3

 (Doc.13, Ex. C at 

1.) Petitioner’s offense was committed in 2009, and he was sentenced December 1, 2009. 

Petitioner’s sentence is .15 years too long. Respondents do not contest this conclusion. 

(Doc. 26 at 4.) 

 Respondents assert that “errors in the application of state-sentencing laws are not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.” (Doc. 26 at 5.) Respondents are correct. 

“[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 

(quoting Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780). 

 Here, however, Petitioner’s claim that his sentence exceeds the maximum 

authorized by state law properly falls within the scope of federal habeas corpus review 

because the Eighth Amendment bars a prison sentence beyond the legislatively created 

maximum. “A sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum has traditionally been 

viewed as a violation of the [E]ighth [A]mendment’s prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment.” Ralph v. Blackburn, 590 F.2d 1335, 137 (5th Cir. 1979); Echols v. 

Thomas, 33 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Although Echols’ sentencing claim 

ultimately turns on a question of State law, it properly falls within the scope of federal 

habeas corpus review because ‘the [E]ighth [A]mendment bars a prison sentence beyond 

 

3

 In 2012, A.R.S. § 13–703(I) was again amended to change the maximum term for a class 2 felony with one historical prior felony from 23.1 to 23 years’ incarceration. 

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the legislatively created maximum.” See also United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 

569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990) (generally, “so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the 

statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth amendment grounds”).4

 Thus, the 

error is not whether the state erred in the application of state law, but whether the 

sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. 

 Petitioner’s sentence should be amended to the statutory maximum term of 23.1 

years. The Court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief. 

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, federal 

courts are authorized to dispose of habeas corpus matters “as law and justice require.” 

“Conceptually, any habeas remedy ‘should put the defendant back in the position he 

would have been in if the [constitutional] violation never occurred.’” Nunes v. Mueller, 

350 F.3d 1045, 1056–57 (9thCir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 

1468 (9th Cir. 1994)). An adequate remedy “must ‘neutralize the taint’ of a 

constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or 

needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal 

prosecution.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388–89 (2012) (quoting United States v. 

Morrison, 409 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)). 

 Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim, but only to 

cure the Eight Amendment violation. Petitioner’s sentence should be amended from 

23.25 years to 23.1 years of imprisonment on Count Two. The District Court has the 

authority to order such a remedy. See Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 

2008) (remanding with instructions to grant a writ with respect to defendant’s sentence). 

This will place Petitioner back in the position he would have been absent the error and 

abides by the mandate in Lafler not to create a windfall for either party and not squander 

 

4

 Petitioner’s argument is premised on the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. Nonetheless, a pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be construed liberally and with tolerance by the reviewing court. See, e.g., Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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the resources of the State.5

B. Ground Two – Dual Use of Prior Felony Conviction 

 Petitioner alleges “the trial court used the historical prior conviction to [increase 

his sentencing range] but then used this same fact as an aggravating factor to justify 

imposing an aggravated sentence . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 19.) Petitioner argues that it was 

unfair of the trial court to use the same prior felony conviction to increase his sentencing 

range and as an aggravating factor. Petitioner then reiterates the point: “Petitioner here 

argues that it is a violation the Fourteenth Amendment to use the same historical prior 

both to achieve sentencing enhancement and to impose an aggravating sentence within 

that sentencing scheme.” (Doc. 1 at 19.) 

 Essentially, Petitioner argues he pleaded guilty to kidnapping with only one prior 

felony conviction. He contends it was illegal for the court to therefore consider his three 

other felony convictions as aggravating factors warranting the maximum term of 

imprisonment. Petitioner agreed to a term of imprisonment “for no less than the 

presumptive term” of 9.25 years. (Doc. 13, Ex. V at 13.) Petitioner agreed that he had 

reviewed the plea agreement and understood its terms. (Doc. 13, Ex. V at 8.) A 

defendant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his understanding of the plea 

agreement carry substantial weight in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. 

United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court may rely on 

Petitioner’s testimony at his change-of-plea hearing over his subsequent assertions. See 

United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that a district court 

may properly credit a defendant’s testimony at a hearing regarding entry of a guilty plea 

over any subsequent declarations to the contrary). 

 There was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when the trial court 

 

5

 The Court is mindful that prior to Respondent’s filing of its May 4, 2015 Supplemental Response, the State had not briefed this issue at any level. Trial counsel, 

the trial judge, and PCR counsel did not address the statutory-maximum issue. The Court is not convinced that Petitioner’s ability to apply to the Arizona Board of Executive 

Clemency (Doc. 26 at 7) is a sufficient remedy in this matter, especially given the short term of the excessive sentence. 

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considered Petitioner’s other convictions at sentencing. First, a court may consider prior 

felony convictions at sentencing. See United States v. Castillo–Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 

1025 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the district court could consider defendant’s prior 

conviction in imposing sentence enhancement even though such conduct had not been 

charged in the indictment, presented to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt);

State v. Shattuck, 684 P.2d 154, 155 n.l (Ariz 1984) (“Arizona courts have consistently 

interpreted this statute to allow the sentencing judge to impose an aggravated sentence 

based on prior conduct even if a conviction for that conduct has not been alleged.”). 

Significantly, the trial court did not aggravate his sentence based upon the prior felony he 

admitted in his plea agreement. The court stated the following: “Further, the Court finds 

that he has three other felony convictions, which would constitute an aggravating factor 

under A.R.S. 13-702.” (Doc. 13, Ex. W at 27.) 

 Second, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a sentencing range enhanced with only one 

prior felony conviction. Petitioner received the benefit of the plea agreement because he 

received the opportunity for a lesser sentence than if he pleaded guilty with two prior 

historical convictions. Petitioner received a lower presumptive sentence (9.25 years vs. 

15.75 years) and also faced a lower maximum sentence (23.1 years vs. 35 years). See 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(I) and (J). Petitioner received the benefit of the bargain he 

negotiated in the plea agreement. 

 Third, Petitioner knew the trial court had the discretion to impose a sentence above 

the presumptive sentence. At sentencing, he addressed the trial court and said: “I ask one 

more time, Your Honor, to please sentence me with leniency. Please do not aggravate my 

sentence.” (Doc. 13, Ex. W at 25.) When Petitioner requested a presumptive sentence as a 

lenient sentence, he must have known the court had full discretion to impose an 

aggravated sentence. The record does not reflect that Petitioner, someone who has 

previously been sentenced on four prior felony convictions, pleaded guilty “thinking his 

maximum sentence was 9.25 years” (Doc. 19. at 18) as he now claims. 

 Based on the record, Petitioner’s claim fails. Petitioner agreed he had reviewed 

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and accepted the provisions of the plea agreement, one of which stated the maximum 

term of imprisonment exceeded 23 years. Petitioner was aware he could receive an 

aggravated sentence. The trial court was permitted to consider Petitioner’s other prior 

convictions. Petitioner has not shown that his guilty plea was involuntary and has not 

established a due process violation. Petitioner’s plea was voluntary and intelligent as 

required by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 

238 (1969). Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that the state court’s rejection of this 

claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, or that it was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

C. Ground Three – Failure to Provide Opportunity to Withdraw 

 Petitioner asserts the court failed to “allow the Defendant to withdraw from the 

plea agreements” after “the State gained a sentenc[e] using several prior felony 

convictions it promised to give up.” (Doc. 1 at 21.) Petitioner’s claim is fatally premised 

upon his argument in Ground Two. Because the court properly considered his other prior 

felony convictions when it imposed a maximum sentence, the court was not required to 

grant him an opportunity to withdraw from his plea agreement after sentencing. 

 Petitioner did not request to withdraw from his agreement, and he has not 

demonstrated grounds to do so. Rule 17.5, Ariz. R. Crim. P., permits a defendant to 

withdraw from a plea of guilty “when necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” The 

burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that withdrawal from the plea agreement 

is necessary to correct that injustice. See State v. Romers, 766 P.2d 623, 625 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1988). Here, the trial court did not violate the agreement, thus there was no 

injustice to correct. 

 Also, the state court’s decision rejecting this argument regarding withdrawal from 

the plea agreement does not present a federal constitutional issue. See Langford, 110 

F.3d at 1388–89 (holding that the Montana state courts’ application of the state’s “good 

cause” standard to withdraw from a plea does not raise an issue of federal due process). It 

is “well-established” that there is no right to withdraw from a guilty plea. Shah v. United 

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States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). Because there is no “clearly established” 

federal law on the right to withdraw from a plea, the state court’s decision was not 

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as 

determined by the United States Supreme Court. 

D. Ground Four – Counsel was Ineffective for Allowing Misuse of Priors 

 Petitioner asserts that “trial counsel failed to warn him that the plea agreements” 

could “be misused” through the misuse of his prior felony convictions. (Doc. 1 at 23.) 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner 

must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. Under the 

mandate of Strickland, Petitioner’s trial counsel is subject to a presumption of 

competency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

 The negotiation of a plea bargain is “‘a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 

the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. 

Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)). If counsel has 

misadvised a defendant about the law during a plea negotiation, or improperly coerced a 

defendant to accept a plea bargain, counsel’s performance may be found deficient. See

Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (counsel’s erroneous legal advice about possibility of conviction 

that led to rejection of plea offer constituted deficient performance). “If a plea bargain 

has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in 

considering whether to accept it.” Id. at 1387. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong 

when a petitioner has pleaded guilty, he must show that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 

on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (citations omitted). 

 Petitioner alleges his attorney was ineffective for allowing a sentence that “didn’t 

stay within the plea agreement terms.” (Doc. 1 at 23.) The Court resolved this issue 

against Petitioner in Ground Two. Petitioner also asserts that he “pled only to nonCase 2:13-cv-02518-JJT Document 28 Filed 05/28/15 Page 16 of 20
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dangerous non-repetitive criminal conduct.” (Id.) Petitioner previously conceded, as he 

must, that his kidnapping offense was a repetitive offense under the agreement. (Doc. 1 at 

18-19.) 

 Petitioner’s conclusory allegation that he was not “warned” his other “prior 

convictions” could “be added and used to maximize his prison sentence” (Doc. 1 at 23) is 

insufficient to raise a reasonable question as to the adequacy of his trial counsel. “A 

court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that 

counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

Petitioner also bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence from which the Court 

can conclude his counsel was ineffective. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 878 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 Here, Petitioner knowingly accepted a plea agreement that expressly permitted a 

term up to 23.25 years. He asked for a lenient, presumptive sentence of 9.25 years despite 

his claim now that he believed a presumptive sentence was the maximum he could 

receive. He did not complain at sentencing when the trial court listed his prior felony 

convictions as an aggravating factor, or when the court imposed sentence. Ultimately, 

Petitioner asks this Court to believe he was unaware the trial court could consider his 

criminal history at sentencing. The Court finds this claim incredible in light of the record 

in this case and considering Petitioner previously had been sentenced on four felony 

convictions. Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that counsel were ineffective 

and, thus, he was not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was contrary to 

or based on an unreasonable application of federal law, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 Having determined that counsel’s performance was not deficient, and that the state 

court’s determination on that prong was not an unreasonable application of Strickland,

the Court need not consider Strickland’s prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 

(“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

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prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th 

Cir.2002) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to 

consider the other.”). 

E. Ground Five – PCR Counsel was Ineffective 

 In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges PCR counsel’s failure to file a PCR petition was 

“clearly ineffective.” Petitioner alleges no more except that the supporting facts for this 

Ground are contained in “the attached memorandum” (Grounds One through Four). (Doc. 

1 at 24.) Petitioner’s argument is devoid of factual reference or legal citation and is 

unacceptably vague. See United States v. Robinson, 390 F.3d 853, 886 (6th Cir. 2004) 

(“We have cautioned that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by 

some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived, and that it is not sufficient 

for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to 

. . . put flesh on its bones.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The Court has found that reducing Petitioner’s sentence in Count Two 

(Kidnapping) to 23.1 years is appropriate. The Court finds PCR counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to raise other unmeritorious claims presented by Petitioner. See 

Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (“PCR counsel would not be 

ineffective for failure to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to 

trial counsel who was not constitutionally ineffective”). 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim 

was based on an unreasonable determination of facts, or that it was contrary to, or based 

on an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d). 

V. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing 

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2), a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he presents a “meritorious 

claim” and he exercised reasonable diligence in developing the factual record in the state 

proceedings. Williams, 529 U.S. at 434-37. A petitioner exercises the diligence 

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necessary to preserve a claim if “the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of the 

information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 

435. Thus, to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must both: “(1) allege facts 

which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not receive a full 

and fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral 

proceeding.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). No hearing is 

necessary, however, if this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that the 

allegations are without credibility or that the allegations if true would not warrant a new 

trial . . . .” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Based on its review of Petitioner’s claims, as set forth above, the Court finds that 

except for amending the length of sentence in Ground One, Petitioner has not made any 

allegations that, if true, would warrant habeas relief, and finds that his allegations 

(particularly his allegations that he was unaware the trial court could impose an 

aggravated sentence) are without credibility. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not 

warranted. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s sentence in Count 

Two of CR 2009-152513 (kidnapping with one historical prior felony conviction) should 

be amended from 23.25 years to 23.1 years of imprisonment. 

 Otherwise, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred, not cognizable on habeas 

review, and/or fail on the merits. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be GRANTED as to Ground One 

(reducing the length of the sentence to 23.1 years imprisonment in Count Two of CR 

2009-152513). 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of the Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

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 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 27th day of May, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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