Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01865/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01865-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN DIEGO COMIC CONVENTION, a 

California non-profit corporation, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DAN FARR PRODUCTIONS, a Utah 

limited liability company, DANIEL 

FARR, an individual, BRYAN 

BRANDENBURG, an individual, 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14-cv-1865-AJB-JMA 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A 

MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE 50 

(Doc. No. 429) 

 Unwavering in their ultimate defenses, Defendants Dan Farr Productions, Daniel 

Farr, and Bryan Brandenburg (collectively referred to as “DFP”) move for judgment as a 

matter of law on two issues: genericness and likelihood of confusion. (Doc. No. 429.) 

Plaintiff San Diego Comic Convention (“SDCC”) opposes the motion in its entirety. (Doc. 

No. 468.) On May 31, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the motion and then took the 

matter under submission. (Doc. No. 504.) As the record does not permit a conclusion 

contrary to the jury’s verdict, the Court DENIES DFP’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

50 motion. (Doc. No. 429.) 

/// 

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BACKGROUND 

 The Court is already well-versed as to the events leading up to the institution of this 

action. Thus, for the purposes of this Order, the Court will only provide a narrow review 

of this lawsuit’s factual and procedural background. 

 On August 7, 2014, SDCC filed a lawsuit alleging two causes of action against DFP: 

(1) Federal Trademark Infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; and (2) False Designation of 

Origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). (See generally Doc. No. 1.) SDCC is a non-profit corporation, 

formed in 1975, that is dedicated to the awareness and appreciation of comics and related 

popular art forms. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 10.) Every year since 1970, SDCC has produced and held 

its “Comic-Con convention” in San Diego, California. (Id. ¶ 11; Doc. No. 97 at 9.)1

 The 

convention spans several days in length and showcases several hundred events, workshops, 

educational and academic programs, games, award shows, costume contests, as well as 

hosts panels of special guests that include science fiction and fantasy authors, film and 

television actors, directors, producers, and writers. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12; Doc. No. 97 at 9.) In 

2016, attendance to San Diego Comic-Con exceeded over 135,000 attendees. (Doc. No. 97 

at 9.) 

 SDCC’s family of trademarks at issue in this case are: 

1. Comic-Con; 

2. Comic Con International; 

3. Anaheim Comic-Con; and 

4. 

                                                                

1

 Page numbers refer to the CM/ECF number and not the number listed on the original 

document. 

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(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13; Doc. No. 244 at 11.) Each of these registered trademarks is incontestable. 

(Doc. No. 381 at 25:15–25.) Additionally, SDCC states that it has used these Comic-Con 

marks extensively and continuously in interstate commerce and thus the marks have 

become valuable assets as well as symbols of its goodwill and positive industry reputation. 

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 15.) 

 In early 2013, Defendant Dan Farr Productions, a limited liability company, began 

to advertise and promote its own popular arts convention named “Salt Lake Comic Con” 

(“SLCC”). (Doc. No. 234-2 at 7; Herrera Decl. Ex. 5 (“Farr Depo.” 11:4–9, Doc. No. 95-

7).) Similar to SDCC’s convention, SLCC is a three-day fan event featuring the best in 

movies, television shows, gaming, sci-fi, fantasy, and comic books. (Doc. No. 244 at 12.) 

Since 2013, SLCC has been held every year and in the beginning of 2014, Dan Farr 

Productions created its Salt Lake Comic Con FanXperience event, which has also been 

held every year since its inception. (Farr Depo. at 11:10–15; Doc. No. 97 at 11.) 

 Thus, the marrow of this case is whether DFP’s comic arts and popular fiction 

event named “Salt Lake Comic Con” infringed on SDCC’s three incontestable trademarks.2

On December 8, 2017, after an eight-day jury trial, the jury found that DFP had indeed 

infringed on SDCC’s family of service marks. (Doc. No. 395 at 2–5.) As to unfair 

competition and false designation of origin however, the jury found in favor of DFP. (Id. 

at 6.) In total, the jury awarded corrective advertising damages to SDCC in the amount of 

$20,000.00. (Id. at 8.) 

 Post-trial, DFP filed four motions: (1) the present matter, their motion for judgment 

as a matter of law, (Doc. No. 429); (2) a motion for new trial of validity and infringement, 

(Doc. No. 436); (3) a motion for ruling on estoppel defense, (Doc. No. 508); and (4) their 

motion for ruling on unclean hands defense, (Doc. No. 510). 

/// 

                                                                

2

 The Court notes that after the trial, DFP changed the name of their event to “FanX Salt 

Lake Comic Convention.” (Doc. No. 513 at 7–8.) 

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LEGAL STANDARD 

 “[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review 

all of the evidence in the record.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 

133, 150 (2000). In doing so, a court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party . . . and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” 

Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). “The test applied is whether the 

evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the 

jury’s verdict.” Id. In other words, DFP has the high burden of demonstrating that there is 

a “complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached so that no 

reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party.” Eich v. Bd. of Regents for 

Cent. Missouri State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 761 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

DFP moves for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on genericness and likelihood 

of confusion. (See generally Doc. No. 429-1.) As will be explained in great detail below, 

the Court’s review of the record demonstrates that there is substantial evidence to support 

the jury’s verdict. 

A. Genericness 

 Generic terms are “common descriptive” marks which identify only the type of good 

“of which the particular product or service is a species[.]” Park’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 

and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1983), judgment reversed on other grounds by 

469 U.S. 189 (1985). Generic terms are not protectable because they do not identify the 

source of a product. Id. In determining whether a phrase is generic or not, the main question 

a court must ask itself is whether the “primary significance of the registered mark to the 

relevant public” is as the name for a particular type of good or service irrespective of its 

source. Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 

 Overtime, the holder of a valid trademark may become a “victim of genericide.” 

Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Genericide happens when the public uses a trademark as a 

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generic name for the specific type of good or service “irrespective of its source.” Elliott, 

860 F.3d at 1156. For example, marks such as Aspirin, Cellophane, and Escalator, were 

once “protectable as arbitrary or fanciful marks because they were primarily understood as 

identifying the source of certain goods.” Id. However, over time the marks were 

appropriated by the public and are now primarily understood as generic names for the 

goods. Id. 

 Incontestable marks, like SDCC’s three trademarks, have been in use for five 

consecutive years and are still in use in commerce. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting 

Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2005). An incontestable registration is 

“conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 

However, an incontestable mark can still be subject to challenge through a generic defense. 

See Park’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1985) (citation 

omitted). 

 DFP provides four different arguments to support their belief that the evidence at 

trial “overwhelmingly” shows that SDCC’s marks are generic: (1) widespread use of 

“Comic Con” by SDCC’s competitors; (2) media usage of the phrase; (3) SDCC’s 

purported own generic use of “Comic Con”; and (4) the inapplicability of SDCC’s 

consumer survey and its various defects render it useless to the matter at hand. (Doc. No. 

429-1 at 8–15.) Each of these factors do not on its own demonstrate genericness. See 

Classic Foods Int’l Corp. v. Kettle Foods, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 

2007) (“Federal courts rely on several sources to determine whether a term” is generic). 

Thus, for purposes of this Order, the Court will look at the totality of the evidence to 

determine if the record establishes that no reasonable juror could find for SDCC as to the 

issue of genericness. 

 i. WideSpread use of “Comic-Con” by SDCC’s Competitors 

 DFP contends that SDCC’s failure to police its mark has resulted in over onehundred competitors using “Comic Con,” which is strong evidence of genericide. (Doc. 

No. 429-1 at 9–10.) In opposition, SDCC argues that third-party use of “Comic-Con” is 

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only infringing trademark use, not generic use of the Comic-Con mark and that third-party 

infringing use does not on its own render its mark generic. (Doc. No. 468 at 11–13.) 

 Courts view a mark’s use by competitors as “strong evidence of how the public 

perceives the term.” Classic Foods Int’l Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. Logically, “when 

more members of the public see a mark used by several producers in the industry, the less 

likely they will identify a particular producer with that mark.” CG Roxane LLC v. Fiji 

Water Co. LLC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 

 The Court does not deny that the extensive use of “Comic Con” by SDCC’s 

competitors is evidence that heavily advances DFP’s assertions of genericness. See id. at 

1027–28 (explaining that the evidence weighed in favor of the defendant as it had produced 

evidence of almost two dozen competitors using the mark “bottled at the source” on their 

bottles). However, in reviewing the record in the light most favorable to SDCC, the 

evidence does not permit only one reasonable conclusion—the genericness of the phrase 

“Comic Con.” See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008). 

This is especially in light of the Teflon survey produced by SDCC that established for the 

jury that 83% of the relevant public recognize “Comic-Con” as a brand name and not a 

common term. (Doc. No. 468 at 11.) 

 Accordingly, under this first factor, despite SDCC’s competitors’ widespread use of 

“Comic Con,” there is still adequate evidence to support the conclusion that “Comic-Con” 

is not generic. 

ii. Media Usage of Comic-Con 

The media is often considered to have its finger on the pulse of the general 

public, and its use of a particular term will likely conform to the public’s 

understanding of that term. The press also has the ability to shape public 

interpretation. If consumers repeatedly encounter a term used generically in 

the media, they will be much more likely to use the term generically 

themselves. 

Classic Foods Int’l Corp., 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1189. 

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 To support genericide through media usage, DFP introduced into evidence various 

news articles with titles such as “Comic Con Culture on the Rise,” “Waco Comic Con 

Arrives in Central Texas,” “Comic Con Brand Brings Show to Tulsa for First Time Ever,” 

and “Comic Con Comes to Atlanta.” (Doc. No. 382 at 22:11–13, 26:17–18, 27:5–6, 89:13–

14.) DFP then surmises that as these articles consistently used “comic con” to refer to the 

type of event being offered and not to denote SDCC as the specific producer, that media 

usage of the phrase “Comic Con” supports the conclusion that the mark is generic. (Doc. 

No. 429-1 at 10–12.) 

 To contest DFP’s media evidence, SDCC produced competing media usage to 

demonstrate the exact opposite—that “Comic Con” is used by the media to refer 

specifically to SDCC’s comic convention. For instance, SDCC showed the jury television 

shows such as the Big Bang Theory that built story lines around attending San Diego 

Comic-Con. (Doc. No. 381 at 98:23–99:6.) Additionally, SDCC provided evidence of 

Comic-Con being featured in shows such as “How I Met Your Mother,” “Chuck,” “OC,” 

and “American Dad.” (Id. at 99:1–6.) Moreover, not only were there television shows, but 

SDCC also highlighted that several movies such as “Shaun of the Dead,” “I Wish I was 

There,” two documentaries, and Jeopardy all either took place or talked about San Diego 

Comic-Con. (Id. at 100:1–22.) Finally, SDCC also underscored that Conan, David 

Letterman, Entertainment Tonight, and Extra all did segments on San Diego Comic-Con.3

(Id. at 102:5–7.) 

 DFP attempts to detract from SDCC’s abundance of media evidence by arguing that 

the majority of it is from sources that have a business relationship with SDCC. (Doc. No. 

429-1 at 12.) Thus, this evidence does not reflect the views of the purchasing public. (Id.) 

Unfortunately, the Court’s responsibility at this stage is not to weigh the evidence. See 

                                                                

3

 Bizarrely, DFP’s motion argues that SDCC only provided “scant” evidence of the media 

using “Comic Con” to refer specifically to SDCC’s event. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 11.) DFP 

clearly misrepresents the record. 

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Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Instead, the Court “should simply ask whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient 

evidence to support the jury’s conclusion.” Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 

624 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Under this framework, the record illustrates that SDCC has generated substantial 

evidence of the media using “Comic Con” in a non-generic way that goes to supporting the 

jury’s ultimate verdict. See Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist., 251 F.3d 

1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Substantial evidence is evidence adequate to support the 

jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same 

evidence.”). 

 In addition, the Court notes that the case law DFP employs to support their 

contention that the “biased media sources” do not reflect the views of the purchasing public 

are misplaced. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 12.) In Krav Maga Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Yaniliov, 464 F. 

Supp. 2d 981 (C.D. Cal. 2006), DFP cites to the court’s statement that “[a]ttestations from 

persons in close association and intimate contact with the trademark plaintiff’s business do 

not reflect the views of the purchasing public.” Id. at 988. Thus, in Krav Maga, the 

declarations from former students submitted by the plaintiff were insufficient to raise a 

genuine issue as to the genericness of the term “krav maga.” Id. Regrettably for DFP, the 

Court does not find business associations on the same plane as “intimate” personal 

associations and DFP provides no case law for the Court to bridge this gap. Id. Most 

notably, even if DFP had successfully argued this point, the Court at this juncture “must 

disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to 

believe[,]” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 135, and may not substitute its view of the evidence for that 

of the jury, Gilbrook v. City of Westminister, 177 F.3d 839, 856 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In a further attempt to diminish SDCC’s media evidence, DFP argues that Mr. 

Glanzer’s testimony at trial proves that the media used the term comic-con generically, as 

he had to constantly clarify that the evidence referred specifically to SDCC’s convention. 

(Doc. No. 429-1 at 12.) The portion of the record referenced by DFP is as follows: 

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Q. Do other media outlets like magazines cover comic con? 

A. Yes, they do. 

. . . 

Q. Let’s take a look at Plaintiff’s exhibit 370. Can you identify this exhibit for 

me, sir? 

A. Yes. This is comic con issue of entertainment weekly. 

. . . 

The Court: I have a question. It says what it says, but is it related to San Diego 

Comic Con as opposed to some other entity? 

The Witness: Yes. 

(Doc. No. 381 at 102:8–103:10.) 

 But as already noted, Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that this Court’s limited 

review process does not include making witness credibility determinations. See Chuang v. 

Univ. of Cal., 225 F.3d 1115, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is not the province of a court to spin 

such evidence in [the moving party’s] favor when evaluating its motion” for judgment as 

a matter of law).4

 Accordingly, DFP’s attempt to chip away at Mr. Glanzer’s testimony 

does nothing to undermine the mammoth amount of media use evidence produced by 

SDCC. 

iii. Use of Consumer Surveys to Establish Genericide 

Under this factor, in an effort to throw out SDCC’s Teflon Survey, which is 

unmistakably one of SDCC’s most persuasive pieces of evidence, DFP yet again contends 

that Teflon Surveys are only appropriate where the question is whether a coined or arbitrary 

mark has become generic. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 14.) In support of this argument, DFP points 

to cases from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and the fourth, seventh, and eighth 

circuits. (Id.) 

                                                                

4 Chuang analyzes race discrimination in a summary judgment context. Chuang, 225 F.3d 

at 1129. However, the Court finds its analysis persuasive as the standard for judgment as a 

matter of law “mirrors” the standard for summary judgment, “such that the inquiry under 

each is the same.” Madrigal v. Allstate Insurance Co., 215 F. Supp. 3d 870, 892 (C.D. Cal. 

2016) (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150). 

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 The Court is perplexed that DFP has again brought these unsupported, inapplicable, 

and legally feckless claims—claims the Court already disposed of previously. (See Doc. 

No. 253 at 10–11; Doc. No. 263 at 7–10.) Perhaps recognizing the inadequacy of these 

arguments, DFP’s Reply Brief states that “even if the Court determines that Ninth Circuit 

law differs from that of the jurisdictions cited by DFP” their motion should be granted on 

other grounds. (Doc. No. 471 at 5–6.) 

 DFP again misses the mark. Here, DFP has the burden of persuading the Court that 

“the record as a whole” demonstrates only one thing—that Comic-Con is generic. See 

Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227. Thus, this string of non-dispositive case citations that contain 

no reference to the record are clearly frivolous arguments that only demonstrate DFP’s 

faulty understanding of their burden in this motion. 

 DFP then switches gears and tersely argues that the jury was presented with evidence 

that demonstrated that SDCC’s Teflon survey is flawed. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 14–15.) Thus, 

the jury should have afforded little weight to the survey. (Id. at 14.) Specifically, DFP is 

referencing Andrew Baker’s testimony where he stated: 

A. Well, these types of studies are difficult to design. There can always be 

some mistakes, but the question is how many mistakes there are and how 

profound they are with respect to the key results that we are reporting. And in 

the case of Mr. Ezell’s study, there are too many substantial mistakes, 

rendering his final number -- I have no confidence that number does or does 

not reflect the reality of the percentage of people who think Comic-Con is a 

brand. 

(Doc. No. 398 at 32:20–33:2.) 

 Unfortunately for DFP, the jury was free to disbelieve and disregard the testimony 

of Mr. Baker and the Court cannot at this stage make any credibility determinations.5 See 

                                                                

5

 Further evidence that highlights DFP’s misunderstanding of their burden and the Court’s 

limited review process in a motion for JMOL is their argument that the Court itself voiced 

its own fears regarding the accuracy of the survey. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 15.) The testimony 

DFP points to is: 

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Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2011) 

(emphasizing that the district court “is not to make credibility determinations or weigh the 

evidence . . . [and] must accept the jury’s credibility findings consistent with the verdict.”) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227 

(explaining that the jury is free to disbelieve or disregard evidence favorable to the moving 

party). 

In sum, under the proper standard for motions for JMOL, SDCC’s Teflon Survey is 

substantial evidence to support a reasonable juror’s finding that SDCC’s trademarks are a 

brand name and are not victims of genericide. 

 iv. SDCC’s Own Use of the Trademark “Comic-Con” 

 DFP briefly argues that the emails between SDCC’s executives demonstrates that 

they themselves used the term “Comic-Con” in a generic sense. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 13.) 

SDCC retorts that DFP has distorted the factual record. (Doc. No. 468 at 16.) 

 The statement DFP clings to is one made by Mr. Glanzer in an email: “I think it’s 

really important that we state, as we did at wondercon, how we are different from other 

shows, especially other comic cons.” (Doc. No. 382 at 71:13–15 (emphasis added).) 

                                                                

Ms. Herrera: Defendants don’t have a survey of their own. And Mr. Baker -

- his criticisms of Mr. Ezell’s surveys were not well taken. At this point I 

question his qualifications as an expert to testify as to surveys, period. But I 

know we are kind of past that point. 

Mr. Sears: Really, your Honor, do we have to denigrate the witness like that? 

The Court: There was no challenge to his credentials so we need not 

speculate what would have happened had there been. 

I thought some of his observations logically made sense. I could see some of 

the logic. Ezell, as you point out, was the only survey. And it was right on 

genericide in the sense of primary significance of the term to the public . . . 

I’m not sure I’d take the 83 percent to the bank, but that is not my job at this 

stage. 

(Doc. No. 403 at 106:4–20.) All in all, the Court is puzzled as to how the Court’s statement 

supports DFP’s motion as the statement was not made before the jury. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

50(a) (explaining that in a motion for JMOL, the court will not consider evidence that was 

not before the jury when it rendered its verdict). 

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However, when questioned about the email at trial, Mr. Glanzer stated that he was not using 

the phrase comic con to refer to other comic conventions, but was using it to refer to “other 

people who are using [SDCC’s] mark.” (Id. at 71:17–22.) 

Another email produced at trial stated: “Interesting, Wizard has teamed with a 

company to provide a comic con channel featuring product that will be of interest to comic 

con fans.” (Id. at 73:2–4 (emphasis added).) However, similar to the email above, when 

Mr. Glanzer was asked whether he was referring to fans of comic conventions, he 

responded that he was not, but that he was simply relating Wizard’s ideas as they called 

themselves a comic con channel. (Id. at 73:5–10.) 

 Thus, as a whole, though reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be 

drawn from the evidence presented, there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that 

SDCC’s executives did not use the mark generically. 

v. Conclusion 

A party seeking judgment as a matter of law has a “very high” standard to meet. 

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). Ultimately, a moving 

party’s “burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility 

assessment.’” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). 

 Presently, despite DFP’s aggressive posture, the majority of their motion for JMOL 

advances under a false understanding of their burden and the Court’s limited review 

process. Consequently, they have not illustrated that the evidence is so “overwhelmingly 

in favor of [them] that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” 

Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001). Instead, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to SDCC, the Court finds that the evidence 

is more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Thus, DFP’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law on genericness is DENIED.

6 See Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore 

                                                                

6

As evidence of the extremely high standard a defendant must meet under a motion for 

JMOL, the Court highlights the Ninth Circuit’s decision in M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy 

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Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that the JMOL standard is 

“heavily weighted in favor of preserving the jury’s verdict.”).

B. Likelihood of Confusion 

 The second half of DFP’s Rule 50 motion asks that the Court enter JMOL in their 

favor as to likelihood of confusion. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 15–25.) In support of this assertion, 

DFP runs through all of the Sleekcraft factors. (Id. at 15.) 

i. Evidence Disproving Confusion 

 As an initial matter, DFP asserts that SDCC’s failure to offer a survey showing the 

existence of confusion, the minimal amount of confusion evidence produced at trial, and 

the testimony of SDCC’s own damages expert, Dr. Patrick Kennedy, affirmatively 

disproves confusion. (Id. at 16–17.) The Court wholeheartedly disagrees. 

 First, it is true that SDCC did not provide the jury with a likelihood of confusion 

survey. Second, DFP does accurately cite to a case that states “failure to offer a survey 

showing the existence of confusion is evidence that the likelihood of confusion cannot be 

shown.” (Id. at 16 (see Essence Commc’n, Inc. v. Singh Indus., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 261, 269 

(S.D.N.Y. 1988).) In addition to this, DFP also correctly points to two Central District of 

California cases that purportedly demonstrate that SDCC’s lack of survey evidence 

“warrants a presumption that the results would have been unfavorable.” (Doc. No. 429-1 

at 16.)

 However, these arguments generate more heat than light. First, it is unquestionable 

that the New York District Court case mentioned above is not dispositive. Second, and 

most peculiarly, the two Central District of California cases do not support DFP’s position. 

                                                                

Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005). In this case, the district court granted 

judgment as a matter of law. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed finding that at trial, defendant 

SFX Entertainment demonstrated that it was not directly involved in the production, 

manufacturing, marketing, or sale of M2 Entertainment products and was thus not liable. 

Id. It is patently clear that M2 Software is not comparable to this current matter. 

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The Court notes that DFP does correctly cite to Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape 

Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1999), to argue that failure to 

conduct a confusion survey permits the inference that the results would have been 

unfavorable. However, DFP turns a cold shoulder to the remainder of the case that rejects 

their arguments. If DFP had continued to read Playboy Enters., they would have seen the 

court cite to Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1041–42 (C.D. Cal. 1998), 

and its holding that “[s]urvey evidence is not required to establish likelihood of 

confusion[.]” Id. at 1084 (emphasis added). 

The Northern District of California has made a similar conclusion: 

Undoubtedly, survey evidence is “often the most persuasive” evidence 

concerning likelihood of confusion. Moreover, a trier of fact may be entitled 

to presume that one party’s failure to conduct a survey concedes that the 

survey evidence would be unfavorable to it. However, survey evidence is not 

required to show likelihood of confusion. 

Monster, Inc. v. Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corp., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1072 (N.D. 

Cal. 2013) (citation omitted). Thus, though a confusion survey would have been helpful, 

SDCC was under no obligation to provide one and DFP is incorrect in asserting that a lack 

of a confusion survey demonstrates that confusion is not likely. 

 Additionally, despite DFP’s claim that SDCC only offered six instances of 

confusion, the record tells a much different story. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 16.) For instance, Mr. 

Brandenburg testified that there were “several instances” on social media where people 

confused SLCC with SDCC’s Comic-Con—the incidences that he personally experienced 

were “less than a hundred” somewhere from 30–50. (Doc. No. 383 at 83:10–13; 118:22-

119:2.) Additionally, the record demonstrates that Mr. Brandenburg received 

correspondence from consumers asking if SLCC was affiliated with San Diego, (Id. at 

85:1–4), and Ms. Follet testified that she was aware of confusion by vendors, exhibitors, 

attendees, reporters, and others, (Doc. No. 405 at 120–21; Doc. No. 468 at 21). 

 Finally, DFP argues that Dr. Patrick Kennedy’s testimony disproves confusion. 

(Doc. No. 429-1 at 17.) DFP then resorts to picking apart Mr. Kennedy’s statements made 

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at trial. (Id.) However, this personal reflection of Mr. Kennedy’s testimony again ignores 

the “bedrock principles delineating the trial judge’s limited role in reviewing a jury’s 

factual findings,” Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1227, which requires a court to only review a jury’s 

verdict for substantial evidence and does not allow a court to make any credibility 

determinations, see Amor Ministries v. Cent. Surety Co., No. 3:13-cv-01441, 2016 WL 

1388077, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016). Accordingly, DFP’s view of Mr. Kennedy’s 

testimony is diametrically unhelpful in the instant matter. 

 ii. The Sleekcraft Factors 

 The Sleekcraft factors are: “(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) 

similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) 

type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s 

intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.”7 Rearden 

LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit 

has noted that this eight-factor test is a “pliant” one, in which “[s]ome factors are much 

more important than others[.]” Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 

F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 DFP asserts that SDCC did not introduce sufficient evidence to support a finding of 

the likelihood of confusion as to its trademark “Comic-Con” and DFP’s “Salt Lake Comic 

Con” mark. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 17.) The Court disagrees. Viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to SDCC and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, there is 

substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion. See Mockler v. Multnomah Cty., 140 

F.3d 808, 815 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 

 a. Strength of the Mark 

DFP argues that there is no evidence demonstrating that Comic-Con is a strong 

brand. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 18.) Instead, DFP contends that the other one-hundred “comic 

                                                                

7

 Both parties agree that the eighth factor is inapplicable to the present matter. (Doc. No. 

429-1 at 18; Doc. No. 468 at 18–24.) 

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con” events in the marketplace decreases the strength of the mark. (Id. at 19.) SDCC 

mounts in opposition that Comic-Con is both commercially strong and has brand 

recognition. (Doc. No. 468 at 19.) 

“The more likely a mark is to be remembered and associated in the public mind with 

the mark’s owner, the greater protection the mark is accorded by trademark laws.” 

GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). However, “[a] 

mark’s overall strength is relative and cannot be determined by mechanistically assessing 

its conceptual or commercial strengths.” M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 

1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has “previously recognized that a suggestive 

or descriptive mark, which is conceptually weak, can have its overall strength as a mark 

bolstered by its commercial success.” Id. Where a court is dealing with incontestable 

marks, these marks are “presumed to be strong marks.” AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 

F.3d 786, 794 (6th Cir. 2004). 

At trial, SDCC produced the following evidence (1) that all three of its trademarks 

are incontestable; (2) that its Teflon Survey illustrated that 83% of consumers thought that 

“Comic-Con” was a brand; (3) that Comic-Con has been used in commerce for over fortyfive years; and (4) that a multitude of television shows and movies referred to SDCC’s 

event. (Tr. Exs. 35, 36, 38, 370, 372, 643, 645, Doc. No. 392.) In addition, despite DFP’s 

assertions that SDCC commingled the mark with its other marks, the record demonstrates 

an entirely different state of affairs. For instance, SDCC provided a documentary called 

“Comic-Con Episode IV,” articles entitled “Star Trek: Discovery Reveals Exciting ComicCon Plans[,]” “At Comic-Con, Bring Out Your Fantasy and Fuel the Culture,” and “On 

Dipping an Introverted Toe in the Comic-Con Ocean.” (Tr. Exs. 217, 379, 381, 389.) 

Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in SDCC’s favor, there is more than 

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could find that “Comic-Con” is a 

strong mark. See Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1173 (C.D. 

Cal. 2017) (highlighting that the mark “Moroccanoil” is commercially strong as the 

company had made a significant investment in advertising of the brand, received 

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recognition from celebrities and consumers throughout the world, and was featured in 

widely circulated magazines). 

 b. Similarity of Services 

 It is unquestionable that the services provided and events produced by SDCC and 

DFP are almost mirror reflections of each other. SDCC is a non-profit education 

corporation “dedicated to celebrating and promoting comics and the popular arts.” (Doc. 

No. 381 at 17:4–7.) SDCC’s main event is its Comic-Con Convention that takes over San 

Diego for four-days every July and draws famous actors to speak at panels, premieres major 

motion pictures, and allows fans to meet and congregate. (Id. at 19:18–20:25.) 

 At trial, DFP highlighted some unique aspects of their event—that SLCC is Mormon 

and family-friendly, that SLCC has a kid-friendly event called “Kid Con,” and that DFP 

has a strong relationship with the U.S. Air Force. (Doc. No. 383 at 35:15–22, 36:12–19, 

37:10–13.) These miniscule differences, however, do not detract from the overwhelming 

similarities that exist between SLCC and San Diego Comic-Con. In fact, DFP’s motion 

does not attempt to contest this fact. 

 Instead, seeking to challenge the parallels between the two events at issue, DFP 

points the Court to Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 

2002), to argue that similarity of services is afforded little weight when the trademark is 

descriptive. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 20.) However, DFP torpedoes their own claim as SDCC’s 

trademarks are “incontestable” and not descriptive. Moreover, the mark at issue in 

Entrepreneur, was “Entrepreneur.” Id. at 1138. Thus, in making the conclusion that 

similarity of services is afforded little weight when a mark is descriptive, the court was 

focusing on specific policy concerns such as the “broad societal interest in preserving 

common, useful words for the public domain.” Id. at 1148. Presently, the mark “ComicCon” is not a common or straightforward phrase. If the mark in this case had been “Comic 

Convention,” the conclusion in Entrepreneur would have been more persuasive. 

Succeeding on this factor is not difficult. See Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG 

Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (indicating that a finder of fact could find 

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proximity where the plaintiff sponsored science fiction conventions and the defendant was 

a well-known movie studio because, among other things, consumers could easily suspect 

that the studio sponsored conventions at which its merchandise was sold); see also Am. 

Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that “[a]lthough 

the parties are not direct competitors,” their respective financial services “may be 

sufficiently ‘complementary’ or ‘related’ that the public is likely to be confused as to the 

source of the services.”) (citation omitted). Thus, as delineated above, there is sufficient 

evidence to support a reasonable jury’s finding that the services are similar. 

 c. Similarity of the Marks 

 DFP contends that SDCC presented little to no evidence of how Comic-Con was 

used in the marketplace, separate from the eye logo mark and its “Comic Con International” 

trademark. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 20–21.) In opposition, SDCC argues that the jury is entitled 

to give greater weight to the dominant feature of a mark in determining likelihood of 

confusion. (Doc. No. 468 at 22.) 

 Here, SDCC’s incontestable trademark is “Comic-Con” and DFP’s mark is “Salt 

Lake Comic Con.” Though DFP’s mark uses a different font and has the geographic 

identifier in front of the phrase “Comic Con,” the most salient feature of the mark is still 

“Comic Con.” As SDCC has argued repeatedly, the jury is entitled to put more weight on 

the most prevalent part of the mark. See Rearden LLC, 683 F.3d at 1212 (explaining that 

the two logos were very different, but noted the prominence of the word “Rearden” in both 

marks when analyzing the similarity of the marks); see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc., 

408 F.3d at 603–04 (emphasizing that the court could look at the most “salient feature” of 

a logo mark). 

 DFP stresses that in determining the similarity of marks, the mark must be viewed 

as it is seen in the marketplace. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 20–21.) Accordingly, SDCC’s failure 

to provide evidence of how “Comic-Con” is used in the marketplace, apart from “Comic 

Con International” or the eye logo, disproves confusion. (Id.) However, as already 

discussed supra p. 16, there is ample evidence of “Comic-Con” being used in the

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marketplace. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly expounded, similarities in 

marks “weigh more heavily than differences.” Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & 

Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 444 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). 

 Thus, though reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from 

the evidence presented, there is still sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that 

the marks are similar. 

 d. Empirical Evidence of Confusion 

 In one sentence, DFP contends that the paucity of alleged actual confusion instances, 

the absence of a confusion survey, and Dr. Kennedy’s testimony, hold strongly against a 

likelihood of confusion. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 21.) The Court disagrees. 

 As already noted supra p. 14–15, the record at trial demonstrates that SDCC 

provided a multitude of instances of actual confusion. This evidence “that use of the two 

marks has already led to confusion is persuasive proof that future confusion is likely.” AMF 

Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by 

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, as 

already explained, a confusion survey is not required. Therefore, taking all the evidence in 

SDCC’s favor, there is ample support for a fair-minded juror to conclude that actual 

confusion exists.8 See Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 

2007) (highlighting that a Rule 50(b) motion preserves a challenge to the “sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the verdict in a civil case[.]”). 

/// 

                                                                

8

 DFP argues that the amount of actual confusion presented at trial is miniscule compared 

to the 195,000 estimated attendees who visited SDCC’s event. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 16, 21.) 

Mathematically, DFP is correct that the percentage of actual confusion is not altogether 

that high. However, the Court highlights that actual confusion is incredibly hard to garner. 

See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, in this case, SDCC’s ability to acquire so many instances of 

actual confusion, further enhances and boosts the jury’s likelihood of confusion verdict in 

its favor. 

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 e. Marketing Channels Used 

 “Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion.” 

Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 606 (9th Cir. 1987). 

DFP claims that this factor merits little weight as all companies use the Internet to 

market their products and events. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 22.) SDCC asserts that the internet is 

not the only shared marketing channel used by DFP. (Doc. No. 468 at 24.) Instead, 

according to SDCC, DFP also used traditional media, as well as billboards, both stationary 

and mobile. (Id.) Additionally, SDCC puts great emphasis on the fact that DFP brought an 

Audi R8 sports car to SDCC’s event to serve as a mobile billboard. (Id.) 

Given that both companies use the internet, the “shared use[] of the internet as a 

marketing channel is ubiquitous and, thus, does not shed much light on the likelihood of 

consumer confusion.” Groupion, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1077 (N.D. 

Cal. 2012) (citation omitted). To the extent the parties use other marketing channels, they 

do not overlap to any significant degree. Particularly, the record fails to illuminate that 

SDCC also uses mobile billboards, such as luxury cars to promote its event. Accordingly, 

the evidence in the record demonstrates that this factor weighs neutrally. 

 f. Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by the Purchaser 

 DFP asserts that the price of comic con tickets—$276.00—demonstrates that a buyer 

would exhibit a higher degree of care. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 22.) SDCC states in opposition 

that $276.00 is the cost of a four-day pass and that single day tickets are only $50–70 per 

day. (Doc. No. 468 at 24.) Thus, the degree of care of a consumer attending its comic 

convention is low. (Id.) 

In analyzing this factor, “[c]ourts look to what the reasonably prudent purchaser, 

using ordinary caution, would do to distinguish between the two product lines.” Maxim 

Integrated Prods., Inc. v. Quintana, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009). When 

goods are more expensive, the court assumes purchasers will exercise greater care. E. & J. 

Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1293 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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The Court explicates that what is considered “inexpensive” vs. “expensive” in 

relation to a multi-day comic convention is a fluid concept. It is not as simple as 

determining that a $1000.00 pen is “expensive.” Moreover, in light of the fact that the 

demand for San Diego Comic Convention tickets is well above supply, the Court leans 

towards finding that the event is not per se “expensive.” 

Nevertheless, despite this obscurity, this factor is “entitled to only minimal weight 

in this case” as “given the similarity of the parties’ marks and relatedness of the goods on 

which those marks appear, even purchasers exercising a high degree of care would likely 

be confused, and some, in fact, have been confused.” Boldface Licensing %8F Branding v. 

By Lee Tillett, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 

Thus, without reweighing the evidence or substituting the Court’s view of the record 

in favor of the juries, this factor weighs neutrally.9

 

 g. Defendants’ Intent in Selecting the Mark 

 The intent factor generally carries minimal weight because “an intent to confuse 

customers is not required for a finding of trademark infringement.” Id. at 1195 (citation 

omitted). On the other hand, “intent to deceive is strong evidence of a likelihood of 

confusion” because, “[w]hen the alleged infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to 

another’s, reviewing courts presume that the defendant can accomplish his purpose: that 

is, that the public will be deceived.” Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1148 (citation 

omitted). Therefore, “[w]here an alleged infringer chooses a mark he knows to be similar 

to another, one can infer an intent to confuse.” Id. 

                                                                

9

 DFP cites to Mytee Prods., Inc. v. Shop Vac Corp, No. 13cv1610, 2013 WL 5945060, at 

*5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013), and the court’s statement that “Plaintiff’s air movers appear 

to be priced at $199–$299 . . . and Defendant’s air movers have a suggested retail price of 

$69.99–$79.99 . . . At these prices, the Court believes that the reasonably prudent consumer 

would exercise a high degree of care before making the purchase.” (Doc. No. 429-1 at 22.) 

However, the record demonstrates that Mr. Kennedy testified that SLCC requires attendees 

to pay for photo-ops. (Doc. No. 376 at 22:6–15.) Thus, the Court finds this case 

unpersuasive as an SLCC attendee may end up paying the same if not more to attend SLCC. 

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 DFP asserts that SDCC provided little to no evidence that demonstrated DFP’s state 

of mind and the evidence that was produced did not illustrate intent. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 

22–23.) The Court disagrees. 

 Below is just a small sampling of the evidence produced at trial that illustrates that 

DFP was aware that they were using SDCC’s mark, adopted a mark similar to SDCC’s 

trademarks, and through their own research, found out that SDCC had trademark rights in 

the subject marks. 

1.) An email dated July 13, 2013, an entire year before SDCC sent DFP a cease and 

desist letter, where Mr. Brandenburg stated: “Obviously, Hijacking the comic con 

brand, having major media companies as partners and having $100,000-plus worth 

of celebrity guests is part of the magic formula.” (Doc. No. 383 at 87:19–25.) 

2.) Mr. Brandenburg’s extensive research between January and April 2013 on Comic 

Con events. (Id. at 127:20–25.) 

3.) DFP’s research demonstrated that they were readily aware that SDCC owned 

trademarks for the term “Comic-Con” and knew that they were purportedly 

infringing on those marks as they received a cease and desist letter from SDCC. (Id. 

at 28:15–19; 87:8–13.) 

Thus, drawing all reasonable inferences in SDCC’s favor, there is adequate evidence 

to support the conclusion that DFP intended to select SDCC’s mark. See Boldface 

Licensing, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 (holding the intent factor weighed in favor of confusion 

as the defendant was “unquestionably aware” of the plaintiff’s rights as they made initial 

trademark research that uncovered the plaintiff’s registration, that the defendant had actual 

knowledge of the plaintiff’s rights through the cease and desist letter they received, and 

that despite all of this the defendant “continued unabated” in rolling out its beauty 

products). 

 h. Conclusion 

 The foregoing factors are not of equal importance and do not apply in every case. 

See Thane Int’l Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The list of 

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factors is not a score-card – whether a party ‘wins’ a majority of the factors is not the point. 

Nor should ‘[t]he factors...be rigidly weighed; we do not count beans.’”) (citation omitted). 

In this case, DFP has failed to show that the only reasonable conclusion permitted by the 

evidence on the record is that there is no likelihood of confusion between their “Salt Lake 

Comic Con” mark and SDCC’s “Comic-Con” mark. Accordingly, DFP’s motion for 

judgment as a matter of law as to likelihood of confusion in this respect is DENIED. See 

Krechman v. Cty. of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “[a] 

district court can grant a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law only if there is 

no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”) (citation 

omitted); see also Lawson v. Umatilla Cty., 139 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Judgment 

as a matter of law is proper when the evidence permits a reasonable jury to reach only one 

conclusion.”). 

iii. Likelihood of Confusion as to SDCC’s Two Other Trademarks 

DFP also argues that there is not enough evidence on the record to support the jury’s 

finding that their “Salt Lake Comic Con” mark infringes SDCC’s Comic Con International 

trademark and eye logo mark. (Doc. No. 429-1 at 24–25.) To support these arguments, 

DFP points to similar contentions already discussed at length by the Court in this Order. 

(Id.) SDCC contends that as each of its two other marks use the phrase “comic con,” that 

the jury was entitled to give greater weight to this dominant feature in determining 

likelihood of confusion. (Doc. No. 468 at 25–26.) The Court agrees with SDCC. 

 The Court finds that it need not reiterate its exhaustive analysis of the Sleekcraft 

factors delineated in the foregoing eight pages. Instead, the Court finds that the analysis 

applied above equally applies to the two trademarks here. For clarity, however, the Court 

expounds the most vital points. Here, as to both of SDCC’s other trademarks, there is the 

presumption of the strength of the marks as they are incontestable, the events remain 

identical, the similarity of the marks remains elevated as they all employ “Comic Con,” 

SDCC produced substantial amounts of evidence of actual confusion, and SDCC 

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introduced evidence that DFP intended to select SDCC’s marks knowing that they were 

registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 

 Consequently, reviewing the record as a whole, the Court finds that there is a legally 

sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for SDCC as to likelihood of confusion in 

relation to these two trademarks. See Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir. 

2003); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (explaining that 

judgment as a matter of law may be granted only where “there can be but one reasonable 

conclusion as to the verdict.”); Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A 

jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence 

adequate to support the jury’s conclusion[.]”). Thus, DFP’s motion for judgment as a 

matter of law as to likelihood of confusion in regards to SDCC’s Comic Con International 

and Eye Logo trademarks is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

 DFP as the moving party, had an extremely “high hurdle” to meet on their motion 

for judgment as a matter of law. Costa, 299 F.3d at 859. Unfortunately, proceeding under 

a flawed misunderstanding of their burden and the Court’s limited review process, and 

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to SDCC, there is substantial evidence 

to support the jury’s verdict in regards to genericness and likelihood of confusion. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES DFP’s motion for judgment as a matter of law in its 

entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 23, 2018 

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