Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01378/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01378-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HEATHER JOHNSON; ROBERT

JOHNSON; and MARY JANE DEAN,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 11cv1378 JM(MDD)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Defendant the United States of America (“USA”) moves to dismissthe claims ofPlaintiff Mary

Jane Dean (“DEAN”) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Dean opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds

this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court

grants the motion to dismiss Dean as a party with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

This is one of several actions pending before this court and involving the crash of a

Navy/Marine Corps F/A-18 jet in a residential area near the Marine Corps Air Station Miramar on

December 8, 2008. (Compl. ¶18). Plaintiff Dean’s home is in the vicinity of the crash site. Her home

suffered property damage. (Braley Decl. Exh. A).

On September 21, 2009 Dean filed an administrative claim with the Department of the Navy

using Standard Form 95 (“SF 95"). The administrative claim identified propertydamage in the amount

of $9,900 and in the section provided for personal injury claims, Plaintiff responded N/A (“Not

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Applicable”). Id. Immediately before the signature, the SF 95 provides: “I CERTIFY THAT THE

MOUNT OF CLAIM COVERS ONLY DAMAGES AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE

ACCIDENTABOVEANDAGREETOACCEPT SAID AMOUNTINFULLSATISFACTIONAND

FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CLAIM.” Id. Dean executed the SF 95. Id.

On or about November 9, 2009 the Department of the Navy approved the settlement and

provided Dean with an Approval of Claim and Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). 

Dean executed the Settlement Agreement on November 2 and the USA on November 24, 2009. nd

Among other things, the Settlement Agreement provides that the parties agree “to settle and

compromise each and every claim of any kind, whether known or unknown, arising directly or

indirectly from the acts or omissions that gave rise” to Dean’s claim. (Id. ¶1). The Settlement

Agreement also provided that the payment of $9,900 would satisfy the entirety of Dean’s claim

including “foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries.” (Id. ¶4). The Settlement Agreement

also specifically referred to California Civil Code Section 1542 (providing that a general release does

not extend to unknown claims); and Dean expressly waived the limitations of a general release under

Civil Code §1542. The provision also advised Dean that she could consult with an attorney prior to

signing the agreement. Id. 

One year later, on November 26, 2010, Dean submitted a second SF 95 seeking additional

compensation for the injuries sustained on December 8, 2008. (Braley Decl. Exh. C). Dean sought

$600,000 for her personal injuries. Id. By letter dated December 22, 2010, the Department of the

Navy denied the claim noting that the Settlement Agreement satisfied Dean’s claims. (Braley Decl.

Exh. D).

In light of the above identified factual record, USA moves for dismissal of Dean’s action on

the ground that federal law prevents Dean from asserting anyclaim encompassed within the Settlement

Agreement. Dean opposes the motion.

DISCUSSION

The FTCA

The FTCA provides for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Se 28 U.S.C. §§2671 et seq. 

As a prerequisite to filing suit, a claimant must pursue and complete the administrative claims

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procedures. 28 U.S.C. §2675(a). “The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until

they have exhausted their administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113

(1993). The administrative claim requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Id.

Once a claim is favorably adjudicated, claimant cannot pursue a claim against the United

States. Schwarder v. United States, 974 F.2d 1118, 1124 (9 Cir. 1992). In Schwarder, the Ninth th

Circuit discussed the applicability of state law to FTCA actions. While recognizing that state law

complements the FTCA, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “as a matter of federal law, that an

administrative settlement reached pursuant to section 2672 bars further claims by the settling party,

without regard to the effect it would have as a matter of state law.” Id. The applicable FTCA

provision provides:

The acceptance by the claimant of any such award, compromise, or settlement shall be

final and conclusive on the claimant, and shall constitute a complete release of any

claim against the United States ... by reason of the same subject matter.

28 U.S.C. §2672.

Here, USA comes forward with sufficient evidence to show that Dean reached an

administrative settlement with the Department of the Navy and that any transactionally related claims,

like those identified in Dean’s second administrative claim, are barred by operation of 28 U.S.C.

§2672. The record reveals that Dean waited ten months after the accident before filing the first

administrative claim. On the SF 95, Dean listed her total property damages as $9,900 and responded

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“N/A” for personal injuries. The Government reached a Settlement Agreement with Dean in which

the parties agreed “to settle and compromise each and every claim of any kind, whether known or

unknown, arising directly or indirectly from the acts or omissions that gave rise to” Dean’s

administrative claim. (Braley Decl. Exh. B). Moreover, the Settlement Agreement provided that the

amount of the settlement would satisfy the entirety of Dean’s claims including “foreseen and

unforeseen bodily and personal injuries.” Id. 

The court concludes that the release contained in the settlement agreement is valid and binding

The court highlights that Dean had ten months in which to assess her property and personal

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injuries. This is not a case where the parties rushed to obtain a settlement. Dean had many months

to contemplate, deliberate, and seek advice on the nature of her injuries and the administrative claims

procedures of the FTCA. 

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under either federal or state law. Under either state or federal law, a settlement agreement procured

by “fraud” is not enforceable. 28 U.S.C. §2672. As state law principles complement the FTCA,

Schwarder, 974 F.2d at 1124, Dean argues that the Settlement Agreement was obtained as a result of

fraud in the factum. The fraud in the factum argument rings hollow. In broad brush, fraud in the

factum is defined as “[m]isrepresentation as to the nature of a writing that a person signs with neither

knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or essential terms.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (6 ed. 1990). Stated another way, where a releasor “is under a

th

misapprehension, not of his own neglect, as to the nature and the scope of the release, and if this

misapprehension was induced by the misconduct of the releasee, then the release, regardless of how

competentlyworded, is binding only to the extent actually intended by the releasor.” Casey v. Proctor,

59 Ca.2d 97, 103 (1963).

Dean simply falls woefully short of demonstrating fraud. Dean argues that the following

misrepresentation, contained in a cover letter accompanying the transmission of the SF 95, constitutes

a material misrepresentation:

Claims for property damage and/or personal injury or wrongful death caused by the

negligence of a government employee acting within the scope of employment are

payable under various federal statutes. . . . In orderfor us to adjudicate your claim fairly

and quickly, please fill out the SF-95 according to the following directions.

(Dean Exh. 3). According to Dean, the introductory paragraph of the cover letter is materially

misleading because she reasonably believed, based on the “and/or” language, that she could file the

property claim, and then, at some unidentified future point in time, she could submit a separate claim

for personal injury. The court rejects Dean’s argument that this provision is materially misleading. 

Not only does Dean seek a strained interpretation of this introductory paragraph, but the claim form

submitted by Dean specifically disclaimed any personal injury or wrongful death. The claim form

clearly and concisely disclaims any personal injury. The instructions specifically informed Dean to

indicate N/A if she did not claim “personal injury or wrongful death.” (Dean Exh. 3 ¶10). With

respect to personal injury, Dean disclaimed any such injury. The court furtherrejects Dean’s argument

because, not only does Dean fail to establish any misconduct on the part of USA, but the language in

the Settlement Agreement specifically advised her that the contemplated settlement compromised any

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claim, known or unknown, including “foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries.” (USA

Exh. B ¶4). 

In sum, viewing the entirety of the record, Dean fails to present any evidence that the

Settlement Agreement was procured by fraud. Accordingly, the court grants the motion to dismiss

Dean as a party to this action with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 21, 2012

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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