Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00225/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE WAYNE GORMAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv225 MMA (WMc)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS

TO DISMISS;

DENYING AS MOOT MOTIONS

TO STRIKE

[Doc. Nos. 8, 9, 17]

vs.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, et al.,

Defendants.

On February 25, 2013, Plaintiff Joe Gorman, proceeding pro se, filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

Chase Auto Finance, Jay Cocchiara, Rosemary Verjan, James Smith, Tricia

LaFrantz, Sonia Peralta, Del Mar Recovery Solutions, Inc., and Joshua Elias

(respectively “JP Morgan,” “Chase,” “Cocchiara,” “Verjan,” “Smith,” “LaFrantz,”

“Peralta,” “Del Mar,” and “Elias,” and collectively “Defendants”). The FAC alleges

several causes of action arising out of a vehicle loan agreement between Plaintiff and

JP Morgan. On March 19, 2013 and April 1, 2013, Defendants filed three motions

to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Doc. Nos.

8, 9, 17.] Alternatively, Defendants seek to strike certain portions of the FAC under

Rules 12(f) and (g). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DENIES as moot Defendants’ motions to strike.

/ / /

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I. BACKGROUND1

In 2007, Plaintiff purchased a vehicle from a car dealership in Lemoore,

California. Defendant JP Morgan financed the purchase. Sometime thereafter,

Plaintiff began having difficulty making the loan payments, so he requested a cap on

the loan’s interest rate and a reduction of his loan payment. JP Morgan refused. 

Nonetheless, according to Plaintiff, JP Morgan allegedly began accepting half

payments, and even payments as low as $5.00, without complaint.

In December 2012, Plaintiff entered into settlement negotiations with

Defendant Smith, a JP Morgan Chase Auto Finance Representative, to settle his loan

account. On December 30, the parties allegedly agreed to settle Plaintiff’s account

for $5,000. Smith told Plaintiff to obtain a $5,000 cashier’s check, deliver it to a JP

Morgan Chase Bank, and have the bank “FedEx” the check overnight. Plaintiff

attempted to follow these instructions, but Defendant Vergan, the Assistant Bank

Manager, refused to FedEx the check, citing company policy and the fact that it was

late in the work day. However, after a lengthy discussion, Vergan agreed to send a

“Fax Confirmation” to Smith regarding the arrangement with Plaintiff, and told

Plaintiff that Smith would contact him via telephone in several days. Plaintiff,

however, never received a call from Smith. Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants have been verbally abusing him through “Robo-type Hang up calls,”

threats of repossession, and threats of garnishing Plaintiff’s only means of support. 

Accordingly, the present suit ensued. 

Defendant Del Mar is a repossession agency licensed by the Department of

Consumer Affairs for the State of California. Defendant Elias is the President of Del

1

 Plaintiff presents the facts in a confusing, meandering fashion, and mixes relevant facts

together with irrelevant facts and legal argument. Thus, a comprehensive recitation of the facts is

a difficult endeavor. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe

his allegations liberally. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). Furthermore, because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex

Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). 

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Mar. The remaining individual defendants are JP Morgan employees.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion

the defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted,” generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether

a complaint states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 “does not

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ it [does] demand[] more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). In other words, “a

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). “Nor does a

complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is

facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to say that the claim must be probable, but

there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible

entitlement to relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Further, the Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the

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complaint. Id. This review requires context-specific analysis involving the Court’s

“judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted). “[W]here

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility

of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id.

Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must liberally construe the

complaint. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Court have a duty to construe pro se pleadings liberally including pro se motions

as well as complaint.”). In fact, the Supreme Court has held that “a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted

‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co.

v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words,

where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See

Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.

III. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Del Mar and Elias filed a request for judicial notice concurrently with their

motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 8-2.] Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), judicial

notice may be taken of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they

are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

Here, Elias and Del Mar request the Court take judicial notice of the

Repossession Agency License for Del Mar, issued by the Department of Consumer

Affairs, Bureau of Security and Investigative Services, State of California. Applying

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Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), the Court finds that the accuracy of this document

cannot reasonably be questioned, and therefore GRANTS Defendants’ request for

judicial notice.

In the FAC, Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of several

facts.2

 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s requests, as the facts to be noticed are mere

allegations, and are not capable of accurate and ready determination.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint specifically enumerates five causes of action. The first

four are claims under the FDCPA. Specifically, the Complaint alleges: (1) unfair or

unconscionable means to collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; (2)

improper use of false, deceptive, and misleading collection tactics in violation of 15

U.S.C. § 1692; (3) falsely representing the character, amount, or status of debt in

violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692; (4) placing telephone calls without meaningful

disclosure of the caller’s identity in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6); and (5)

violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Defendants argue that

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim on any of these causes of

action. The Court notes that while Plaintiff opposed two of the three motions to

dismiss, the oppositions raise largely irrelevant matters and fail to respond to the

substantive matters posed in Defendants’ motions.3

/ / /

2 Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice that: (1) Defendant Smith

instructed Plaintiff to fax a copy of a cashier’s check, and that Plaintiff did so; (2) Defendant JP

Morgan admitted to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that an unnamed debt collection

agency impersonated law enforcement, and Defendant Del Mar refused to identify themselves as

required under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the California Rosenthal

Act; and (3) JP Morgan has received numerous complaints of fraud, violations of the FDCPA, and

sundry other torts. 

3

 Plaintiff also filed a Reply, which the Court construes as a Sur-Reply to Defendant JP

Morgan’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 47.] The Local Civil Rules do not

allow for the filing of a Sur-Reply absent leave of court. Nonetheless, the Court has considered

the document, and finds that it also fails to address the substantive issues raised in JP Morgan’s

motion to dismiss. 

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A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to satisfy the

pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Plaintiff neither includes a

“short and plain statement” of his causes of action, nor sets forth allegations that are

“simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d)(1). Confusing complaints

such as the one Plaintiff filed in this case impose unfair burdens on litigants and the

Court. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). As a practical

matter, the judge and opposing counsel, in order to perform their responsibilities,

cannot use a complaint such as the one Plaintiff filed. Id. For instance, the FAC

contemplates and mentions a host of claims, including breach of oral contract and

others. However, the FAC only explicitly lists four FDCPA claims and one FCRA

claim. Deciphering the precise claims of the FAC is a difficult, if not impossible,

endeavor. Defendants are then put at risk that their interpretation of Plaintiff’s

allegations differs from the Court’s, that the Plaintiff will surprise them with

something new at trial which they reasonably did not understand to be in the case at

all, and that res judicata effects of settlement or judgment will be different from what

they reasonably expected. Id. at 1180. Furthermore, “the rights of the defendants to

be free from costly and harassing litigation must be considered.” Von Poppenheim

v. Portland Boxing and Wrestling Comm’n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971).

Here, Plaintiff has filed a lengthy and confusing pleading that largely fails to

provide the individual Defendants with notice of the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s

claims. Plaintiff’s FAC is exactly the type of pleading which Rule 8 endeavors to

prohibit in federal cases, and it is subject to dismissal on this basis. The Court

previously sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s initial Complaint on these same grounds,

and finds the present incarnation of the FAC to be similarly deficient.

B. FDCPA Claims

“The [FDCPA] prohibits debt collector[s] from making false or misleading

representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices.” Heintz

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v. Jenkins, 14 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). To be liable for an FDCPA violation, a

defendant must, as a threshold matter, be a “debt collector” within the meaning of

those acts. Id. at 294.

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is “any person who uses any

instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal

purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts

to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due

another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). This definition includes “any creditor who, in the

process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would

indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.” Id. §

1692a(6). The FDCPA does not, however, cover “the consumer’s creditors, a

mortgage servicing company, or any assignee of the debt, so long as the debt was

not in default at the time it was assigned.” Nool v. HomeQ Servicing, 53 F. Supp. 2d

1047, 1053 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (quoting Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 56 F.2d 1197, 1208

(5th Cir.1985)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (defining “creditor”).

1. JP Morgan

Defendant JP Morgan argues that the FDCPA does not apply to it because it is

not a debt collector, but rather a creditor. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts it is unclear

what role JP Morgan played in the transaction. However, Plaintiff alleges that his

car loan was “financed through JP Morgan.” [FAC at 7.] Thus, the very allegations

of the FAC indicate that JP Morgan was a creditor, rendering inapplicable the

provisions of the FDCPA. Furthermore, upon review of the FAC, the Court finds

that it is devoid of any proper allegations setting forth that JP Morgan is a “debt

collector.” Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under the FDCPA against

Defendant JP Morgan. Further, the Court finds that leave to amend this claim

against JP Morgan would be futile and thereby dismisses this claim with prejudice

and without leave to amend.

2. Del Mar and Elias

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Similarly, Defendants Del Mar and Elias argue that the FAC fails to allege

that they are debt collectors as defined by the FDCPA. Indeed, the FAC fails to

adequately allege this fact. Furthermore, Defendants cite Burling v. Windsor Equity

Group, Inc., 2012 WL 5330916 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2012) for the proposition that an

entity engaged in the principal business of enforcing security interests, such as a

repossession agency like Del Mar, is not a “debt collector” subject to the FDCPA. 

The Court is unable to discern from the current record whether Del Mar and Elias

acted beyond that of a mere repossession agency. However, because Plaintiff fails to

properly allege that Del Mar and Elias are debt collectors, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the FDCPA against Del Mar or Elias.

3. Remaining Individual Defendants

Finally, Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that individual Defendants

Cocchiara, LaFrantz, Peralta, Smith, and Verjan are debt collectors. Indeed, the

allegations in the FAC only establish that these individuals were employees of JP

Morgan, which, as discussed previously, is not a debt collector. Moreover, a debt

collector does not include a creditor’s officers or employees who act in the creditor’s

name. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A). The Court concludes that any FDCPA claims

against these individual defendants must be dismissed with prejudice and without

leave to amend.

C. FCRA Claim

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for violation of the FCRA is based on

Plaintiff’s allegations that the credit reporting agencies are reporting inaccurate

information as to the Plaintiff’s auto loan account with JP Morgan. Specifically,

Plaintiff claims that his Experian credit report shows a “zero balance,” and a “charge

off” of his account with JP Morgan. [FAC at 15.] According to Plaintiff, these facts

are inaccurate.

In order to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 places

duties on credit reporting agencies and parties that furnish consumer credit

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information to credit reporting agencies. Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584

F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 282

F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b). As a threshold issue,

“[t]o succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that she had a dispute with a

credit reporting agency regarding the accuracy of an account, that the credit

reporting agency notified the furnisher of the information, and that the furnisher

failed to take the remedial measures outlined in the statute.” Von Brincken v.

Mortgageclose. Com, Inc., 2011 WL 2621010, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011); see Gorman,

584 F.3d at 1162. 

A private right of action against furnishers of information exists in Section

1681s–2(b)(1) for violation of the FCRA. Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1162; Matracia v.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2011 WL 1833092 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 2011; 15 U.S.C.

1681s–2(b)(1)(A) (stating that “[a]fter receiving notice pursuant to section 1681

i(a)(2) of this title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any

information provided by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person

shall—conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information . . .”)

(emphasis added). Section 1681i(a)(2) states, “before the expiration of the

5–business–day period beginning on the date on which a consumer reporting agency

receives notice of a dispute from any consumer . . . the agency shall provide

notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of information in

dispute . . . . The notice shall include all relevant information regarding the dispute

that the agency has received from the consumer or reseller.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)

(A) (emphasis added). Thus, an individual consumer may bring a cause of action

against a furnisher of information for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b)(1)(A)

only if a credit reporting agency has notified the furnisher of the consumer’s dispute. 

Matracia, 2011 WL 1833092, at *3; Von Brincken, 2011 WL 2621010, at *5.

Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead facts to establish a cause of action

under the FCRA. Plaintiff does not state that he disputed the inaccurate credit

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information with the credit reporting agency or that the credit reporting agency

notified the furnisher of the allegedly inaccurate information. Thus, Plaintiff has not

satisfied a threshold element for violation of the FCRA. Accordingly, the Court

dismisses the FCRA claim.

D. Other Claims 

The caption of the FAC lists many additional causes of action, including, inter

alia, breach of contract, fraud, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

and violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. 

However, the body of the FAC, though mentioning some of these claims in passing,

fails to separately enumerate these claims. Thus, even when liberally construing the

FAC, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standards of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) with respect to these claims. Yet,

the Court finds that Plaintiff intended to allege some of these additional claims or, at

a minimum, a breach of contract claim. [See FAC at 3 (defining a contract).] Thus,

the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint with respect to these

additional claims for the specific purpose of curing the above-described deficiencies.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 8, 9, 17.] Accordingly, the Court DENIES as moot

Defendants’ Motions to Strike. If he so chooses, Plaintiff may file a second

amended complaint, curing the defects noted herein. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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A newly amended complaint must comply with all terms and conditions of this

Order. With respect to the claims that the Court has dismissed with prejudice, the

amended complaint must not re-allege those claims. Plaintiff must file his second

amended complaint no later than 45 days from the date this Order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 3, 2013 

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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