Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06352/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06352-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW J. DEITZ, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COMCAST CORPORATION, and

COMCAST CABLE

COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Defendants. /

No. C 06-06352 WHA

TENTATIVE ORDER GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND/OR TO STRIKE

INTRODUCTION

On or before DECEMBER 13, 2006, at NOON, each side may file a memorandum up to

four pages in length (double-spaced, no footnotes, 12-point font), critiquing this tentative order

and shall be prepared to address it as well at the hearing now set for DECEMBER 14, 2006, at

8:00 A.M. 

STATEMENT

At all material times, defendant Comcast Corporation was involved in three principal

lines of business: (1) cable, through the development, management and operation of broadband

communication networks, including video, high-speed internet and phone service;

(2) commerce, through QVC, the company’s electronic retailing subsidiary, and (3) content,

through consolidated programming investments. Defendant’s acquisition of a broadband

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division became the largest cable operator in the United States, serving more than 21 million

cable subscribers (Compl. ¶¶ 15–16).

Plaintiff Andrew Deitz resided in San Francisco and was a basic service customer of

Comcast, which provided cable service to his home. As part of his service, plaintiff rented a

cable converter box and remote control unit from Comcast, although he already owned a

cable-ready television and a VCR capable of receiving basic cable programming without a

converter box. It is unclear how long plaintiff subscribed and paid for his cable box and remote

rental services. Plaintiff, however, eventually terminated his box and remote service, although

he is still a Comcast subscriber for internet and telephone services (Opp. 13). 

Plaintiff filed his original class-action complaint on September 11, 2006, in state court

on his own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly-situated citizens in California who were

allegedly charged for renting and paying for unnecessary cable equipment provided by

Comcast. The federal Cable Communications Act expressly prohibits cable companies from

billing for services or equipment “that the subscriber has not affirmatively requested by name.” 

47 U.S.C. 543(f). The complaint alleges that defendants failed to comply with Federal

Communications Commission (“FCC”) rules and the Act by failing to obtain subscribers’

affirmative request for converters and/or remotes based on full disclosure to the subscriber of

the need for these services (Compl. ¶ 7–9). Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendants

charged for the rental of cable converter box equipment, including the converter box and remote

control, that were not required, at least in his case, to view basic level cable, expanded basic or

standard cable, or other basic, non-premium cable programming in violation of 47 C.F.R.

76.1602(b)(1) (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 34). In addition, plaintiff contends that defendants also failed to

promote the commercial availability of third-party remote controls that subscribers could use

for all levels of service, including premium and basic programming in violation of 47 C.F.R.

76.1603 (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 34). Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated Section17200 of

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Section 17500 of California’s False Advertising Law, and

the CLRA. Furthermore, plaintiff asserts claims of negligent misrepresentation and unjust

enrichment under state law.

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On October 11, 2006, defendants removed the action to this Court, asserting removal

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2)(A), 1441(a) and 1453. Defendants then moved to

dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims. First, defendants argue that plaintiff has no standing to seek

prospective relief because he no longer rents cable equipment from defendants. 

Second, defendants contend that California Civil Code Section 1782 precludes plaintiff’s

damages claims under the CLRA because he failed to comply with its notice provisions. 

Third, defendants argue that plaintiff’s negligent-misrepresentation allegations lack the requisite

specificity. Finally, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s unjust-enrichment claims because

his rights are governed by contract.

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD.

 In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may ordinarily look only at the face of the

complaint. Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, however,

defendants rely on extra-complaint material, namely (i) a notice and demand letter sent by

plaintiff’s counsel to defendants dated September 11, 2006, and (ii) a notice to customers

regarding policies and complaint procedures sent to cable subscribers by defendants. A federal

court must treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 when such

material is entertained, as here. Cunningham v. Rothery (In re Rothery), 143 F.3d 546

(9th Cir. 1998). 

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, declarations, attached

documents and other evidence “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A nonmoving party who bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial must “designate specific

facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324

(1986). It is not the task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of

triable fact. The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity

the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279

(9th Cir. 1996). A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a

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reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. On summary judgment, the

“evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in

his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252, 255 (1986). 

2. ARTICLE III STANDING AND PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.

In this action, plaintiff seeks declaratory relief invalidating defendants’ practice of

charging for unnecessary cable converter box equipment as a willful and knowing violation of

state law, specifically with regard to consumer-fraud and consumer-protection statutes. 

In addition, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to require affirmative consumer consent based on

full disclosure for rental of equipment and enjoin the defendants from renting cable converter

box equipment and/or remotes to basic programming customers who have a cable-ready TV or a

VCR. Plaintiff also seeks an accounting for any overcharges. Plaintiff himself rented both a

cable converter box and a remote control from defendants but no longer rents this equipment

from defendants, and does not now subscribe to cable services at all. 

Defendants assert that plaintiff lacks standing for prospective relief because he no longer

rents a converter or remote control from defendants. Plaintiff is no longer a subscriber of any

cable services. 

To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, plaintiff must show that (1) he has

suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete, particularized, and actual (or imminent) rather

than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). Additionally, where a plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief, as in this case, plaintiff must demonstrate that he is “realistically threatened by a

repetition of the violation.” Gest v. Bradbury, 443 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original)). 

Plaintiff asserts that he has standing because defendants’ conduct continues to

negatively affect plaintiff and is bound to cause future harm (Reply Br. 14). Because he lives in

an area where he can still subscribe to cable services, plaintiff argues in vague terms that relief

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 Plaintiff also mischaracterizes the holding of the Gonzales decision in his brief. Plaintiff states that

the Ninth Circuit held that injunctive relief was an effective remedy for the plaintiff. In actuality, the

Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed a grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff. The court instead ordered

summary judgment for the defendants, holding that random drug testing of employees who perform

safety-sensitive functions was constitutional. Gonzales, 73 Fed. Appx. 986, 989–90. 

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would remedy “the harm [he] has suffered through the inconvenience of terminating his

subscription to cable services.” Plaintiff also states that at the very least, the requested

injunctive relief would provide a benefit to him by offering him more potential choices for

obtaining television program services. 

To support his argument, plaintiff relies on an unpublished decision in Gonzales v.

Metropolitan Transportation. 73 Fed. Appx. 986 (9th Cir. 2003). Gonzales, however, is

factually distinguishable from the case at hand. In Gonzales, the plaintiff sought injunctive

relief against her past employer to stop the employer’s practice of random drug testing. 

The Ninth Circuit held her claims were not moot because the plaintiff testified that she would

resume her employment with the defendants once the drug testing was stopped. Unlike the case

at bar, the plaintiff in Gonzales made a clear showing that she could not avoid the injuries she

complained of unless she declined to return to her employment with the defendants.1

The alleged wrong sued on is over as to plaintiff. That history, while relevant, does not

establish standing without some continuing, present adverse effect. O’Shea v. Littleton,

414 U.S. 488, 496–97 (1974). Plaintiff is no longer a cable subscriber and has not demonstrated

there exists a definitive likelihood that he will once again become a subscriber of defendants’

cable services. See O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496–97 (stating that the test for standing in the

injunctive-relief context requires a showing of a definitive likelihood of future harm to the

plaintiff). Here, plaintiff has not stated or demonstrated that he will re-subscribe to cable

services if he is not required to rent cable equipment from defendants. As a result, plaintiff’s

claims of possible future injury are too speculative and attenuated to warrant prospective relief. 

See Hodgers-Durgin v. De Le Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).

 Plaintiff further argues that a class allegation cures his own standing problem. 

Surely, there must be some class members, he urges, who have suffered the same course of

conduct but have not terminated their cable television service with defendants (Opp. 15). 

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The Ninth Circuit held in Hodgers-Durgin, however, that system-wide injunctive relief is not

available based on alleged injuries to unnamed members of a proposed class. Id. at 1045. 

Unless the named plaintiff is himself entitled to seek injunctive relief, he “may not represent a

class seeking that relief.” Ibid. Any injury that unnamed members of the proposed class may

have suffered is irrelevant to the question whether our named plaintiff is entitled to the

injunctive relief he seeks. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claims

for prospective relief for all claims are therefore GRANTED. 

3. UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIMS AND FALSE ADVERTISING CLAIMS.

Plaintiff seeks damages and prospective relief under California Business and Professions

Code Sections 17200 and 17500. As stated above, plaintiff is not entitled to prospective relief

because he has no Article III standing. Plaintiff’s damages claim, however, properly remains at

issue, at least for Article III purposes. 

Section 17200 prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and

unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” The California Supreme Court has

stated that “[t]he Legislature intended this sweeping language to include anything that can

properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” 

Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 553, 560 (1998) (citations omitted). 

Section 17204 authorizes “any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or

property as a result of . . . unfair competition” to sue under Section 17200. 

Plaintiff here alleges an “injury in fact” in that he suffered economic loss by being

required to rent cable equipment from defendants, despite the fact that his television was

cable-ready. Because plaintiff’s unfair competition claims set forth a basis for a claim of actual

economic injury that resulted from defendants’ alleged unfair and illegal business practice,

this order holds that plaintiff can properly bring suit under Section 17200, at least insofar as

Article III is concerned. 

 Nonetheless, “[a] plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes must

state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.” 

Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993); Silicon Knights Inc., v.

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Crystal Dynamics Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1303, 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997). Here, plaintiff asserts that

defendants’ conduct of improperly charging basic programming customers for rental equipment

when it was unnecessary constitutes willful and unknowing unfair methods of competition and

deceptive business practices. Plaintiff also claims that defendants failed to comply with the

negative option billing prohibitions in 47 U.S.C. 543(f) and never obtained subscribers’

affirmative request for converters and/or remotes based on full disclosure (Compl. ¶ 70–74). 

With respect to his Section 17500 claim, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ advertisements,

promotions, labeling, policies, acts and practices were intended to and resulted in misleading

customers to their detriment. The complaint, therefore, specifically identifies certain acts by

defendants that relate to violation of a statute, thereby placing defendants on notice of facts

which could support a claim of unfair conduct. Furthermore, defendants do not argue that

plaintiff has failed to meet the standards under these two theories for their damage claims. 

Defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s Section 17200 and Section 17500 claims for damages are

therefore DENIED. 

4. SECTION 1782’S NOTICE REQUIREMENT.

Section 1782 of the CLRA requires a consumer to notify those alleged to have

committed deceptive practices at least thirty days prior to commencing an action for damages. 

The CLRA provides that the consumer may not recover damages if appropriate correction,

repair, replacement or other remedy is given. See Cal. Civ. Code 1782(a)–(c), 1784. 

Plaintiff, in this action, seeks both damages and prospective relief under the CLRA. 

Again, because plaintiff has no Article III standing, only his damages claim under the CLRA

remains at issue. 

Section 1782 scrupulously prohibits any action for damages unless its notice provisions

are met. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1195 (S.D. Cal. 2005). This

order finds that plaintiff failed to satisfy the notice requirement because he did not wait the

required thirty days before seeking damages. On or around September 11, 2006, plaintiff sent

to defendants a written notice and demand letter of their alleged violations of the CLRA

(Escher Decl. Exh. A). On September 11, 2006, the very day he dated his notice and demand

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letter, plaintiff then proceeded to file his complaint, which included a request for damages under

the CLRA. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants misconstrue the language of the complaint by

interpreting it as requesting damages for his CLRA claim. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

paragraph 91 explicitly states that the complaint would be amended to include damages plaintiff

would be entitled to and describes in paragraph 92 if defendants failed to provide adequate

redress within thirty days (Opp. 3–4). Plaintiff contends that this language in the complaint is

clear in expressing that although plaintiff was entitled to damages under Section 1789, such

damages were not presently being sought. 

As defendants correctly point out, however, the language in paragraph 92 is precisely

the same language plaintiff uses affirmatively to seek damages under his other claims:

92. Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to, pursuant to

Civil Code § 1780(a)(2), an order enjoining Defendants’

above-described wrongful acts and practices, providing restitution

to Plaintiffs and members of the Class plus actual damages,

punitive and statutory damages, interest and ordering the payment

of costs and attorneys’ fees and any other relief deemed

appropriate and proper by the Court under Civil Code § 1780.

(Compl. ¶ 92; Reply Br. 6). Plaintiff’s attempt to rewrite and recharacterize his complaint is

unpersuasive. The plain language of the complaint clearly lays out his request for damages

without any conditions. Plaintiff’s inclusion of the confusing language in paragraph 91 does not

cure his failure to wait the requisite thirty days before seeking damages under the CLRA. 

Because plaintiff failed to comply with Section 1782, thereby denying defendants sufficient

notice of alleged violations to permit appropriate corrections or replacements, his claim for

damages under the CLRA is dismissed. 

5. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM.

The following section addresses claimed defects on the face of the complaint. For these

purposes, the motion will be treated as one to dismiss rather than a motion for summary

judgment. 

All agree that the negligent-misrepresentation claim must, at the very least, meet the

notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). The parties disagree, however, over whether

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2 See also Thomas v. Hickman, 2006 WL 2868967, at *24 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (applying Rule 9(b) to a

negligent-misrepresentation claim); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1214,

1219 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that “[i]t is well-settled in the Ninth Circuit that misrepresentation claims are a

species of fraud, which must meet Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement”); Glen Holly Entm’t, Inc. v. Tektronix,

Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (same).

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plaintiff must also meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Plaintiff asserts that

the applicable standard to apply to a claim for negligent misrepresentation is Rule 8(a) and

relies on the district court case in In re Heritage Bond Litigation. 289 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D.

Cal. 2003). That decision held that Rule 9(b) does not expressly apply to a claim for negligent

misrepresentation. Id. at 1132. Most district courts within the Ninth Circuit have held,

however, that a negligent-misrepresentation claim is subject to the heightened requirements of

Rule 9(b). See Neilson v. Union Bank of California, N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1141

(C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that the elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation

are the same as those of a claim for fraud, with the exception that the defendant need not

actually know the representation is false).2 This order will follow the guidance of the other

district courts that have consistently held that Rule 9(b) is the correct pleading standard to apply

to negligent misrepresentation claims. 

Rule 9(b) requires that “in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” A pleading is sufficient under

Rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare

an adequate answer from the allegations. Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671

(9th Cir. 1993). Averments of fraud must be accompanied by “the who, what, when, where, and

how” of the misconduct charged in the complaint. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d

1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Throughout his complaint, plaintiff asserts that defendants made material

representations or omissions regarding the need for rental of cable equipment, misrepresented

the availability of this equipment from third parties, and failed to adequately inform subscribers

that they no longer needed to rent this equipment from defendants since channels were no

longer scrambled (Compl. ¶¶ 1–10, 41–59, 64–68, 76–8, 94). The complaint, however, does not

provide the particulars of when, where, or exactly how the alleged misrepresentations occurred. 

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The complaint cites to only one specific source of misrepresentation — defendants’

standardized billing statements. The complaint alleges that defendants’ billing statements

included improper charges for rented cable equipment (Compl. ¶ 82). How a recorded charge

on a billing statement led plaintiff to believe the rental equipment was necessary and would

induce him to rent the equipment solely from defendants is entirely unclear. 

Furthermore, plaintiff’s general allegations that defendants’ “advertisements, promotions,

labeling, policies, acts and practices” were untrue and misleading are likewise too general and

unspecific (Compl. ¶ 94). 

In his opposition, plaintiff makes only a conclusory statement that the complaint has

satisfied the more rigorous requirements of Rule 9(b) (Opp. 8–11). This order holds that the

present allegations are insufficient to fulfill Rule 9(b)’s pleading standards. The deficiencies of

plaintiff’s complaint, however, may possibly be cured by amendment. Consequently, leave to

amend will be GRANTED.

6. UNJUST-ENRICHMENT CLAIM.

With respect to the unjust-enrichment claim, defendants argue that because plaintiff has

pleaded the existence of a valid contract, he cannot also make an unjust-enrichment claim. 

Plaintiff replies that he has not conceded that the parties’ relationship was governed by a

contract (Opp. 5). Defendants rejoin that under California state law, plaintiff does not have a

legal right to claim unjust enrichment where there is no dispute regarding the existence of a

written agreement between the parties (Reply 4–6). 

As defendants have not answered the complaint, it is unclear whether there exists a valid

written agreement between the parties. Defendants have provided the Court with a notice of

defendants’ procedures and policies, which they assert is the governing contract (Br. 5). 

Although this document is informative as to the representations made by defendants, it is too

early to conclude that this document constitutes the governing agreement between the parties. 

The notice does state that it expressly sets forth the customer’s “sole and exclusive remedies

under the agreement” (Escher Decl. Exh. B 2). Such statements, however, are not dispositive as

to whether the notice constitutes a valid contract between the parties. For one, the document

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appears to be a general notice and is not signed by any of the parties. Furthermore, defendants

have not proven that plaintiff either received or reviewed this document. Other sub-issues may

encumber the question. Accordingly, the motion as to this claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims, construed as

a motion for summary judgment, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Because

plaintiff fails to demonstrate Article III standing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to plaintiff’s Section 17200 and 17500 claims for damages, however, is

DENIED. Additionally, because plaintiff has not complied with Section 1782’s notice

requirement, plaintiff’s CLRA claim for damages is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Finally,

with respect to plaintiff’s state claim for negligent misrepresentation, plaintiff has failed to meet

Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard. Consequently, plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim is

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any such amendment must be filed by DECEMBER 21,

2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2006. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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