Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01787/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01787-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Maximiliano Serrano Garcia,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-01787-PHX-JJT (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Maximiliano Serrano Garcia (Petitioner) has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid 

(Ground One), the prosecutor breached the plea agreement (Ground Two), the trial court 

violated its duty to advise him at sentencing (Ground Three), and ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel (Ground Four). (Doc. 8 at 7-10.) Respondents argue that Grounds One and 

Four are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 16 

at 14.) They further argue that Ground Two lacks merit and that Ground Three is not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review and, alternatively, lacks merit. (Id.) 

Petitioner has not filed a reply in support of his Amended Petition and the deadline for 

doing so has passed. (Docs. 9, 13.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends that 

the Amended Petition be denied. 

/// 

/// 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 On August 15, 2007, Petitioner was indicted on three counts of sexual conduct 

with a minor, class two felonies and dangerous crimes against children (Counts One, 

Two, and Three), and three counts of molestation of a child, class two felonies and 

dangerous crimes against children (Counts Four, Five, and Six). (Doc. 16, Ex. A.) The 

charges involved criminal conduct against two victims. (Id.) 

 On April 24, 2008, Petitioner entered a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to 

Count Three, sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen, a class two felony and 

dangerous crime against children in the first degree, and to amended Counts One and Six 

attempted child molestation, class three felonies and dangerous crimes against children in 

the second degree. (Doc. 16, Ex. C at 15-16, Ex. D.) 

 At the sentencing hearing, on May 22, 2008, the trial court heard victim impact 

evidence, including statements from the victims’ mother describing the harm Petitioner 

had done to her sons (Petitioner’s stepsons), and urging the trial court to impose “the 

maximum amount of time” to punish Petitioner and to protect others from being similarly 

victimized. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 5-8.) On Count Three, the trial court imposed the 

maximum stipulated sentence provided for in the plea agreement, twenty-seven years’ 

imprisonment. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 15.) The trial court stated that “Count 3 of the plea 

agreement does call for [a] stipulated sentence between 20 to 27 years. I do find that the 

situation here, the aggravating factor of the two separate victims, different occasions, and 

I guess the most difficult part . . . is the trust that you violated with children that loved 

you and looked to you as a father figure. For those reasons, I am going to impose the 

sentence of 27 years in the Department of Corrections as to Count 3.” (Id.; Ex. F, at 2.) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to lifetime probation for his convictions on Counts 

One and Six. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 16; Ex. F at 2.) 

/// 

/// 

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B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On August 18, 2008, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, and the trial 

court appointed counsel. (Doc. 16, Exs. H, I.) On March 23, 2009, Petitioner’s counsel 

filed a petition for post-conviction relief (Doc. 8 at 49-50, Doc. 8-1 at 1-13)1

 raising the 

following claims: (1) Petitioner’s guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent 

because he was never informed that his sentence on Count Three was statutorily required 

to be served as “flat time” (Doc. 8-1 at 2-7); (2) the trial court had an independent duty 

under Arizona Rule of Criminal procedure 17.2(b) to inform Petitioner that Arizona law 

required him to serve a “flat sentence” for his conviction on Count Three (Doc. 8-1 at 4); 

(3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner that his sentence on Count 

Three would be served as flat time (Doc. 8-1 at 7-8); and (4) the prosecutor “breached the 

spirit of the plea agreement” by failing to follow through on her representation that she 

would “look favorably upon a guilty plea” when recommending a sentence to the trial 

court. (Doc. 8-1 at 8.) 

 On November 20, 2009, the trial court rejected Petitioner’s assertion that his guilty 

plea was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent and his claim that the trial court had an 

independent duty under Rule 17.2(b) to explain the impact of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

604.01 on his sentence on Count Three.2

 (Doc. 8-2 at 18-20.) The court found that, even 

though the trial court did not explain the impact of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, the plea 

colloquy complied with Rule 17.2(b) because § 13-604.01 created a general, not a 

 

1

 Because the documents that Petitioner filed to support his Amended Petition are 

not always completely contained in a single attachment (for example, the first two pages of the petition for post-conviction are attached to the Amended Petition and the 

remaining pages are located at attachment one to the Amended Petition), the Court cites 

to the CM/ECF document and page numbers. 

2

 Rule 17.2(b) requires the trial court to inform a defendant of “any special conditions regarding sentence, parole, or commutation imposed by statute.” 

Although Arizona Revised Statute § 13-604.01 was later renumbered as § 13-705, 

the Court refers to the statute as it was identified at the time of Petitioner’s trial and post- conviction proceedings. 

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special, sentencing condition. (Doc. 8-3 at 19-20.) The trial court also found that the 

plea colloquy complied with Rule 17.2(b) because Petitioner was aware of his sentencing 

exposure under the plea agreement, and he was advised of, and understood, the maximum 

and minimum sentences he could receive. (Id.) However, the trial court found that 

Petitioner had presented a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based 

on counsel’s alleged failure to inform him of the effect of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01 on 

his sentence of Count Three, and granted an evidentiary hearing on that issue. (Doc. 8-2, 

at 20.) In a separate minute entry, the court dismissed Petitioner’s claim that the 

prosecutor had breached the “spirit” of the plea agreement as not colorable. (Doc. 16, 

Ex. K.) 

 On March 30, 2010, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 8-3 at 47-48; Doc. 8-4 at 40-50; 

Doc. 8-5 at 1-50; and Doc. 8-6 at 1-23.) After the hearing, on July 15, 2010, the trial 

court denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and dismissed his 

petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 8-3 at 50; Doc. 8-4 at 1-2.) The court found that 

Petitioner’s claim failed because Petitioner had not established that he was prejudiced by 

trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. (Doc. 8-4 at 1-2.) 

 On September 14, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for review from the trial court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 8 

at 19-37; Doc. 16, Ex. L.) Petitioner raised two issues for review: (1) whether the trial 

court had a duty under Rule 17.2(b) to inform Petitioner that the crime of sexual conduct 

with a minor (Count Three) imposed a special sentencing condition that mandated that 

the Petitioner serve a “flat sentence” (Doc. 8 at 29-32); and (2) whether the trial court 

erred by summarily denying his claim that the prosecutor had breached the spirit of the 

plea agreement without holding an evidentiary hearing on that issue. (Doc. 8 at 32-34.) 

On June 1, 2012, the court of appeals summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

(Doc. 8 at 17.) On August 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona 

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Supreme Court (Doc. 16, Ex. M), which the court denied on December 12, 2012. (Doc. 8 

at 15.) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On December 11, 2013, Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in this Court raising four grounds for relief: (1) his guilty plea was not voluntary, 

knowing, or intelligent because he was not informed by the trial court, the prosecutor, or 

his attorney that, pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, he was required to serve his 

entire sentence on Count Three and that he was not eligible for earned release credit (“flat 

time”); (2) the prosecutor breached the “spirit” of the plea agreement by recommending 

an aggravated sentence at the sentencing hearing; (3) the trial court had an independent 

duty to inform him that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01 required his sentence on Count 

Three to be “flat time”; and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform 

Petitioner that his sentence on Count Three was statutorily required to be served as “flat 

time.” 3 (Doc. 8 at 7-10.) As discussed below, Grounds One and Four are procedurally 

barred from federal habeas corpus review, Ground Two lacks merit, and Ground Three is 

not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same); 

Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (stating that, in 

 

3

 Because Respondents state that the Amended Petition, filed December 11, 2013, 

was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the Court does not further address the 

statute of limitations for filing petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 16 at 10 n.5.) 

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Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is 

satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings). A claim has 

been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the 

federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A “state 

prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a 

petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find 

material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a 

petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . . . (2) through 

the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the 

claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations 

omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

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 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

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claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

III. Grounds One and Four 

A. Ground One was not Fairly Presented to the State Courts 

In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not voluntary, 

intelligent, or knowing because he was not advised by the trial court, the prosecutor, or 

trial counsel that his sentence on Count Three was statutorily required to be served as 

“flat time.” (Doc. 8 at 7.) Respondents argue that Ground One is barred from federal 

habeas corpus review because Petitioner did not present that particular claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 16 at 10.) 

 Petitioner raised his challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea in his petition 

for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 8-1 at 2-6) After the trial court denied relief on that 

claim, he petitioned for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 8 at 19-37.) On 

appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court had an independent duty under Rule 17.2(b) 

to inform him that his sentence on Count Three would be “flat time” because this 

condition, imposed by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, was a special sentencing condition. 

(Doc. 8 at 29-34.) Petitioner, however, did not challenge the voluntariness of his guilty 

plea in the court of appeals and did not cite federal law to support his claim. (Id.) 

 Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present his federal claim that his plea was 

involuntary to the state courts. See Crowell, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 931-33. To the extent 

that Petitioner challenged his guilty plea based on the trial court’s violation of state law 

(Rule 17.2(b)), the presentation of a state law claim was insufficient to fairly present a 

federal claim on direct appeal, even if the federal basis of the claim was “self-evident.” 

See Lacy v. Belleque, 2010 WL 3866719, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2010) (the petitioner’s 

presentation of a state-law challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal did not 

fairly present a federal sufficiency of the evidence claim and such a claim was barred 

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from § 2254 review). Thus, Petitioner did not properly exhaust Ground One and as 

discussed in Section III.C, that claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus 

review. 

B. Ground Four was not Fairly Presented to the State Courts 

 In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because his 

advice regarding the guilty plea was based on his misunderstanding of the sentencing 

statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01. (Doc. 8 at 10.) Petitioner presented this claim in 

his petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 8-1 at 7-8.) After conducting an evidentiary 

hearing, the court denied relief on this claim. (Doc. 8-3 at 50, Doc. 8-4 at 1-2.) Although 

Petitioner sought review in the appellate court of the trial court’s denial of his petition for 

post-conviction relief, he did not raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that 

he presents in Ground Four. (Doc. 8 at 19-37.) Accordingly, he did not fairly present 

that claim to the state courts. See Crowell, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 931-33. As discussed in 

Section III.C, that claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

C. Grounds One and Four are Procedurally Barred 

 As stated above, Petitioner did not fairly present Grounds One and Four to the 

state courts. It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state court to try to exhaust 

Grounds One and Four because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be 

untimely, and the claims in Grounds One and Four would also be precluded from Rule 32 

review because they could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction 

proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 

P.3d 63, 67 (2006) (“As a general rule, when ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent 

claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal 

quotation omitted). Accordingly, Grounds One and Four are technically exhausted and 

procedurally defaulted. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(finding claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was barred from exhausting his 

claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)); see also Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

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at 848. As discussed below in section III.D, Petitioner has not established any basis to 

excuse the procedural bar to habeas corpus review of Grounds One and Four. 

D. Petitioner has not Overcome the Procedural Bar

 Because Petitioner’s claims in Grounds One and Four are procedurally barred, 

federal habeas corpus review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes “cause and 

prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the procedural bar. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. As set forth below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of 

Grounds One and Four. Accordingly, the Court recommends that habeas corpus review 

of those claims be denied and does not consider the merits of those claims. 

 1. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will result in a 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). A 

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation has 

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing Murray 

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner does not argue that failure to consider the merits of his claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice (Doc. 8), and thus he has not met Schlup’s

high standard. Accordingly, this exception does not excuse the procedural bar. 

 2. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

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“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 If petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need 

not consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Petitioner has not 

asserted cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural bar to habeas corpus review of his 

claims asserted in Grounds One and Four. (Doc. 8.) 

IV. Grounds Two and Three 

 Respondents state that Petitioner properly exhausted Grounds Two and Three by 

presenting those claims to the trial and appellate courts on post-conviction review. 

(Doc. 16 at 14.) Accordingly, the Court considers those claims under the standard of 

review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A. Federal Review of Claims Adjudicated in State Court 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

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such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court.4

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

 

4

 When applying the standard set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the district court 

considers the “last reasoned state court opinion” of the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991). When a higher state court (such as the Arizona Court of 

Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court) denies the claim summarily, the federal court looks through to the last reasoned decision. See Avila v. Gomez, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th 

Cir. 2002). Because the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the trial court’s 

decision on post-conviction review, the trial court’s decision is the last reasoned decision 

of the state court. (Doc. 8-2 at 18-20, Doc. 8-3 at 50, Doc. 8-4 at 1-2, Doc. 16, Ex. K.) 

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specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes 

in case-by-case determinations.” Id.

 When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue 

had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

B. Ground Two — Breach of Plea Agreement 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts a due process claim based on his allegation that 

the prosecutor breached the “spirit” of the plea agreement by recommending an 

aggravated sentence to the trial court at the sentencing proceeding and thus violating 

“assurances” to Petitioner and defense counsel that she would request a presumptive 

sentence. (Doc. 8 at 8.) The trial court dismissed this claim because it was not “a 

colorable claim for relief under Rule 32,” and did not hold an evidentiary hearing on that 

claim. (Doc. 16, Ex. K); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1. This summary denial is considered a 

decision on the merits.5

 See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(stating that for purposes of § 2254(d), a state court adjudicated the merits of a 

petitioner’s claim when it denied post-conviction relief based on the substance of the 

claim rather than based on a procedural or other rule precluding state court review of the 

merits). Upon review of this claim, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that the 

 

5

 When a state court’s adjudication on the merits is not supported by the court’s reasons for its decision, the federal court reviews the complete record to determine 

whether habeas relief was properly granted. See Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1175 

(9th Cir. 2001) (stating that we review de novo the grant of a petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254). However, when “a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden must still be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

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state court’s resolution of Ground Two was contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, Supreme Court precedent, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 The controlling Supreme Court precedent on Petitioner’s breach of the plea 

agreement claim is Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, the 

Court stated that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement 

of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 

promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262. A petitioner has a high burden of establishing a 

right to relief on such a claim. In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977), the 

Court explained that the parties’ and the trial court’s statements at the plea colloquy 

significantly undermine later claims of promises outside the plea agreement: 

[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the 

prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of 

verity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible. 

Blackledge 431 U.S. at 73-74 (1977) (citations omitted). 

 In this case, the record includes a transcript of the April 11, 2008 settlement 

conference. (Doc. 8-1 at 15-29.) During the settlement conference, the prosecutor 

explained that because of Petitioner’s advanced age and poor health, the State offered 

him a guilty plea that included a sentencing range of twenty to twenty-seven years on 

Count Three and lifetime probation on Counts One and Six, which was below the 

prosecution’s “policy” of offering thirty-five-year sentences in similar cases. (Doc. 8-1 at 

23.) The prosecutor stated that the State would not make a “better” offer “given the 

length of the abuse in this case, which started when [one of the victims] was 7 or 8 years 

old and continued” for around five years. (Id. at 23-24.) Petitioner told that court that he 

did not have any questions about the State’s plea offer. (Id. at 24.) 

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 The prosecutor stated that Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty was “a way of at 

least starting to make amends” to the victims and that she would “consider that” when 

making her recommendation at sentencing “as to . . . where I am going to fall and 

whatever sentencing range we get.” (Doc. 8-1 at 26.) At the conclusion of the settlement 

conference, the court “[gave Petitioner] another chance” to “ask a question of [the 

prosecutor or defense counsel].” (Doc. 8-1 at 27.) Petitioner stated that he did not have 

any questions but thanked the court for the opportunity to ask the lawyers questions. (Id.) 

He then stated that he had a legal background, he understood the plea offer and the 

consequences of pleading guilty, and he would confer with defense counsel regarding the 

offer. (Doc. 8-1 at 28.) 

 Petitioner later pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. (Doc. 8-1 37-39; 

Doc. 16, Exs. C, D.) During the change of plea hearing, Petitioner confirmed that he had 

read and understood the entire plea agreement, discussed it with counsel, and did not 

have any remaining questions about the plea agreement. (Doc. 16, Ex. C at 9.) Petitioner 

confirmed that the plea agreement was the “only agreement he had with the State that 

would take care of [his] case,” and he agreed with “everything” that was in the plea 

agreement. (Id.) He also stated that he was not forced, threatened, or “promised 

anything other than what [was] contained in the plea agreement,” to enter the plea 

agreement. (Id. at 9-10.) He confirmed that he understood that if he pleaded guilty, he 

faced the penalties “listed in paragraph 1 of the plea agreement.” (Doc. 16, Ex. C at 10.) 

The trial court discussed Paragraph One of the plea agreement, which provided that 

Count Three carried a presumptive sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment, a minimum 

sentence of thirteen years’ imprisonment, and a maximum sentence of twenty-seven 

years’ imprisonment. (Doc. 16, Ex. C at 11; Doc. 8-1 at 37.) It also provided that Counts 

One and Six each carried a presumptive sentence of ten years’ imprisonment, a minimum 

sentence of five years’ imprisonment, and a maximum sentence of fifteen years’ 

imprisonment. (Doc. 8-1 at 37; Doc. 16, Ex. C at 12-14.) 

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 The trial court also discussed the stipulation in the plea agreement regarding 

sentencing. (Doc. 16, Ex. C at 10.) Petitioner confirmed that he understood that the 

stipulation provided that he would be sentenced between twenty to twenty-seven years’ 

imprisonment on Count Three and that he would be placed on lifetime probation on 

Counts One and Six. (Id. at 10-11.) When the trial court asked Petitioner if he had any 

questions about the minimum and maximum penalties, Petitioner responded “No.” (Id. at 

12.) Petitioner also confirmed that he understood the stipulation regarding sentencing. 

(Id. at 14.) 

 During the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it had considered the 

presentence report and the victims’ impact statements. During the hearing, the court 

heard from the victims’ mother, defense counsel, and Petitioner. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 4-

15.) The prosecutor asked the court to impose the maximum sentence of twenty-seven 

years on Count Three.6

 (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 10.) The trial court found as aggravating 

factors the fact that there were “two separate victims, different occasions, and . . . the 

trust [Petitioner] violated with [the victims who] loved [Petitioner] and looked to [him] as 

a father figure.” (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 15.) For those reasons, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner to twenty-seven years’ imprisonment on Count Three, in accordance with the 

plea agreement. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 15.) 

 In his Amended Petition, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor’s recommendation 

that the court impose twenty-seven years’ imprisonment on Count Three violated the 

“spirit” of the plea agreement because the prosecutor had indicated that she would 

request a twenty-year prison sentence. The record does not support Petitioner’s claim. 

Specifically, the transcript of the settlement conference does not support Petitioner’s 

assertion that the prosecutor promised to recommend a twenty-year sentence. (Doc. 8-1 

 

6

 The transcript reads, “I am asking you to sentence him to the maximum sentence 

of 21 years.” (Doc. E at 10.) Because the plea agreement provided for a maximum sentence of twenty-seven years on Count Three (Doc. E at 15), the reference to “21 

years” appears to be a typographical error or a misstatement by the prosecutor. Neither party argues that the prosecutor requested anything less than twenty-seven years’ imprisonment at the sentencing hearing. 

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at 15-29); see Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying 

habeas relief where the defendant’s allegation that his counsel promised him a lenient 

sentence was “wholly unsubstantiated and refuted by the record”). 

 Additionally, the transcript of the change of plea hearing reflects that Petitioner 

denied on the record that any promises were made to him, other than the promises 

contained in the written plea agreement. (Doc. 16, Ex. C at 10); see United States v. 

Rice, 116 F.3d 267, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1997) (when a defendant contends that he harbored 

“private expectations” not revealed to the court during the formal exchanges that 

preceded acceptance of the plea, the judge is entitled to be skeptical). Petitioner’s 

representations at the time of his guilty plea are not “invariably insurmountable,” but 

together with any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, “constitute a formidable 

barrier” to his challenge to his guilty plea. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74. The court is 

entitled to rely on Petitioner’s testimony at the change of plea hearing over his later 

assertions regarding the prosecutor’s alleged promises related to the guilty plea. See 

United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The court was entitled to 

credit [the defendant’s testimony at the taking of the plea] over her subsequent 

affidavit.”). 

 Further, Petitioner did not object at sentencing when the prosecutor recommended 

the maximum sentence on Count Three, and he indicated that he knew he faced twenty to 

twenty-seven years’ imprisonment on that count. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 10, 14.) Petitioner 

also did not object when the court imposed twenty-seven years’ imprisonment on Count 

Three. (Doc. 16, Ex. E at 15.) Petitioner’s failure to object at the sentencing hearing 

supports a finding that the plea agreement was not violated and that there were no 

misunderstandings about his agreement with the State. See United States v. Mims, 928 

F.2d 310, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a claim that a defendant’s sentence violated a 

plea agreement, noting the absence of objection at sentencing). 

 After reviewing the record and the controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Court 

finds that Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s summary denial of his “breach of 

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plea agreement” claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Two. 

C. Ground Three — Violation of State Procedural Rule 

 In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that the trial court had an “independent duty” 

to inform him of the “flat time” requirement of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, and that its 

failure to comply with that duty violated his right to due process under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 8 at 9.) On post-conviction review, Petitioner argued 

that this “independent duty” was mandated by Rule 17.2(b).7

 (Doc. 8-1 at 4.) The court, 

citing state law, concluded that Rule 17.2(b) did not require the trial court to inform 

Petitioner that, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, he would be ineligible for earned 

release credits. (Doc. 8-2 at 19-20.) 

 As Respondents argue, Petitioner’s claim that the trial court had a duty to inform 

him of the operation of Arizona’s sentencing statute is not cognizable on federal habeas 

corpus review. The habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “unambiguously provides that a 

federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.’” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 15 (2010) (per curiam) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Accordingly, “[a] habeas petition must allege the 

petitioner’s detention violates the constitution, a federal statute or a treaty.” Franzen v. 

Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989). “[F]ederal habeas corpus does not lie for errors 

of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 

U.S. 764, 780 (1990)); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 349 (1993) (stating that 

“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, 

may not be corrected on federal habeas.”). A habeas petitioner cannot “transform a state 

law issue into a federal one by merely asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. 

 

7

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Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 

1389 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 Because Ground Three asserts a violation of a state rule of criminal procedure, 

Rule 17.2(b), it is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. The operation of 

Rule 17.2(b) and Arizona’s sentencing statutes is a matter of state law. See Patterson v.

Ryan, 2010 WL 1193490, at *11 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2010) (finding that petitioner’s claim 

under Rule 17.2 was not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review). On habeas corpus 

review, the Ninth Circuit has refused to consider state law errors in the application of 

state sentencing law. See Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002); Christian 

v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 

(9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to examine state’s determination that a prior conviction was a 

serious felony); Johnson v. Arizona, 462 F.2d 1352, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1972) (rules of 

sentencing adopted by state court do not raise constitutional issues that may be reached 

by habeas corpus). 

 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court had 

an independent duty under Rule 17.2(b) to advise him that Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01 

required his sentence on Count Three to be served as “flat time.” See Engle v. Isaac, 456 

U.S. 107, 119 (1982) (“A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

only on the basis of some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts.”); 

Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Federal habeas courts lack 

jurisdiction . . . to review state court applications of state procedural rules.”). A state 

court’s refusal to reverse a sentence on state law grounds is not reviewable in federal 

habeas corpus proceedings. See Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 Moreover, an alleged misapplication of state law results in a due process violation 

only if the petitioner’s sentence is arbitrary and capricious. See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 

U.S. 40, 50 (1992). Petitioner has not argued or shown that his sentence was arbitrary 

and capricious. See Kennick v. Superior Court, 736 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) (petitioner 

did not allege arbitrariness or discrimination). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim asserted in 

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Ground Three is based on state law and is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review. 

V. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, the Amended Petition should be denied because Grounds One 

and Four are procedurally barred from habeas corpus review, Ground Two lacks merit, 

and Ground Three presents a claim that is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus 

review. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 8) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable or because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 2nd day of October, 2014. 

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