Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01270/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01270-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

THOMAS MICHAEL TROLLOPE, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CIV 99-1270 PHX ROS (MEA)

v. )

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TERRY L. STEWART, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER:

Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion at Docket No.

158, captioned as a “Motion to Re-Calendar Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus of 2003-2004 re: Factual Innocence,” filed

January 17, 2008, which was referred to the undersigned for

preparation of a Report and Recommendation on April 8, 2008. 

I Background

On September 13, 1989, Petitioner was charged by means

of a grand jury indictment with nine counts involving felony

dangerous crimes against children. See Docket No. 153, Exh. A.

The charges were comprised of two counts of kidnapping, three

counts of molestation of a child, and one count each of

aggravated assault, criminal trespass in the first degree,

attempted kidnapping, kidnapping, and sexual abuse. See id.,

Exh. A. On May 14, 1990, Petitioner entered into a plea

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -2-

agreement, agreeing to plead no contest to two counts of child

molestation. Id., Exh. B. On August 24, 1990, the trial court

sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 22 years

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction on Count 3 for child

molestation. Id., Exh. E. The trial court also sentenced

Petitioner to a consecutive term of 18 years imprisonment

pursuant to his conviction on a charge of attempted sexual abuse

and a term of lifetime probation on the other conviction for

child molestation. Id., Exh. E.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences, which was denied, and he filed numerous unsuccessful

petitions for post-conviction relief and petitions for review in

the Arizona trial court, the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the

Arizona Supreme Court. See Docket No. 74, Exhs. C, E, H–L, R,

T–Y, EE–II, KK, LL, OO–QQ, SS–UU, WW, CC, DDD, GGG. In his

eighth state petition for post-conviction relief, filed October

31, 1994, Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that he had newly

discovered evidence which cast doubt on his guilt regarding one

of the charges to which he had pled nolo contendere. Id., Exh.

F. After reviewing the pleadings regarding the “newly

discovered” evidence, the Arizona trial court concluded there

was no evidence suggesting the evidence would have made any

difference had it been discovered or presented to the state

court at an earlier time and dismissed the action. Id., Exh. J.

Petitioner sought review of the denial of his eighth petition

for post-conviction relief by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which dismissed the petition for review because it was not

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -3-

timely filed. See Docket No. 74, Exhs. DDD & FFF. The Arizona

Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s subsequent petition for

review of the trial court’s decision regarding his “new

evidence” claim because it was not timely filed. Id., Exhs. GGG

& HHH.

On July 15, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition seeking

a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for

the District of Arizona, raising 46 separate claims for relief.

In Ground 29 of his petition, Petitioner alleges he is entitled

to habeas relief based on newly discovered material facts

bearing on his guilt or innocence, i.e., the phone records from

the Sedona residence. Docket No. 1 at 34. Petitioner filed,

inter alia, a motion for summary judgment, a motion for summary

judgment regarding “prior bad acts,” and numerous memorandums

and briefs, exhibits and appendices in support of these motions.

See Docket Nos. 11-26. Petitioner filed “briefs” in support of

his petition for a writ for habeas corpus on October 28, 1999,

each brief accompanied by appendices and in support of a

separate allegation raised in his habeas petition. See Docket

Nos. 31-66.

On November 2, 1999, Petitioner filed a motion to “late

file briefs” in support of his petition for habeas corpus. See

Docket No. 69. 

On January 19, 2000, Magistrate Judge Verkamp granted

Petitioner’s motion at Docket No. 69, construing it as one

seeking leave to amend his petition to add a claim regarding the

admission of “prior bad acts” evidence. See Docket No. 76. On

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -4-

January 19, 2000, Petitioner filed four “amendments” to his

petition. See Docket No. 79-82.

On March 23, 2000, Magistrate Judge Verkamp issued a

Report and Recommendation, recommending that the petition be

dismissed as untimely despite Respondents’ failure to assert the

statute of limitations defense in their answer. See Docket No.

87. Petitioner filed objections to the Report and

Recommendation on April 13, 2000. See Docket No. 90.

Petitioner also filed exhibits in support of his objections to

the Report and Recommendation and a motion for summary judgment.

On March 22, 2001, the Honorable Roger G. Strand

declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation, and referred

the case back to the magistrate judge for review of any claims

presented in a procedurally appropriate manner. See Docket No.

105. 

On July 5, 2001, Magistrate Judge Verkamp issued a

second Report and Recommendation, concluding Petitioner had

procedurally defaulted most of his claims for relief. See

Docket No. 109 at 5. The second Report and Recommendation

suggested rejecting some of Petitioner’s claims for relief on

their merits, rather than on the basis of Petitioner’s

procedural default of the claims. The claims Magistrate Judge

Verkamp recommended be rejected on the merits included

Petitioner’s claim that the Arizona courts denied Petitioner due

process of law when they refused to reconsider his conviction

and sentence after he alleged he had newly discovered

exculpatory evidence. Additionally, the second Report and

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -5-

Recommendation concluded the evidence was not “newly discovered”

evidence and that the evidence did not implicate the

constitutionality of Petitioner’s conviction because the

conviction was based on his plea of no contest.

Petitioner twice sought additional time to file

objections to the second Report and Recommendation, which

motions were granted. See Docket No. 111 (dated July 23, 2001).

Petitioner filed objections to the second Report and

Recommendation and exhibits in support of his objections on

August 9, 2001. See Docket No. 117 & Docket No. 118.

On March 29, 2002, Judge Strand adopted the second

Report and Recommendation in part. See Docket No. 119. Judge

Strand concluded, inter alia, that Petitioner had procedurally

defaulted his claim of newly discovered exculpatory evidence.

Therefore, Judge Strand declined to adopt that part of the

second Report and Recommendation recommending the claim stated

in Ground 29 be denied on the merits rather than on the basis of

procedural default. Judge Strand determined the claim should be

denied based on Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust the

claim in the state courts, i.e., his procedural default of the

claim. Judge Strand summarily concluded Petitioner had not

shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from, his procedural

default of the claim which might excuse the procedural default

and allow the Court to consider the merits of the claim. Judge

Strand also summarily stated that Petitioner had not established

a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the merits

of the claim were not considered. Judge Strand ordered the

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -6-

petition for habeas relief be denied on March 29, 2002.

Petitioner filed two motions to extend the time allowed

to seek reconsideration of Judge Strand’s decision denying

habeas relief, which motions were granted. See Docket No. 120

& Docket No. 121. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration

of the denial of relief, and a supplement and an appendix to his

motion, on May 13, 2002. See Docket No. 122. On January 30,

2003, Petitioner sought to stay the motion for reconsideration,

asserting he had claims he wished to proceed with in the state

courts. See Docket No. 130. On April 7, 2003, Judge Strand

denied Petitioner’s motion for a stay and his motion for

reconsideration of the denial of habeas corpus relief. See

Docket No. 131. On April 7, 2003, the Court again denied habeas

relief, and judgment was entered. See Docket No. 132. 

Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability by the

District Court from the denial of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, which was granted on April 28, 2003. See Docket

No. 135.

Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas

corpus on November 1, 2004, while his appeal of the denial of

relief was pending before the Ninth Circuit and more than four

years after his original petition challenging his 1990

conviction was filed, and more than three years after he filed

an amended petition for habeas relief with leave of the Court.

See Docket No. 136. On June 9, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals ordered Petitioner be provided counsel with regard to

his appeal of the denial of habeas relief. See Docket No. 139.

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -7-

On July 29, 2005, Judge Strand ordered the Clerk of the

Court to strike Petitioner’s amended petition for habeas relief.

See Docket No. 142. The order states Petitioner’s amended

petition at Docket No. 136 raises “a claim of ‘actual innocence’

under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(h)...” The order

notes Petitioner had averred his intent to file a “new state PCR

Motion.” The order noted Petitioner’s appeal of the denial of

habeas relief was then pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals and stated: 

Accordingly, in light of the fact that

Petitioner’s appeal is ongoing in the Ninth

Circuit and that this Court therefore lacks

jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Amended

Petition [] ... , IT IS ORDERED directing the

Clerk of the Court to strike Petitioner’s

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

and related documents. [] At the conclusion

of the current appellate proceedings,

Petitioner may re-file said Petition after

first obtaining an order from the Court of

Appeals authorizing this Court to consider

the Petition as required by Rule 9 of the

Rule Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

On March 5, 2007, after full briefing by the parties

and oral argument, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a

memorandum decision finding Respondents had failed to assert

procedural default as a defense to Ground 29 of the petition in

the District Court. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held, Judge

Strand had erred by sua sponte finding Petitioner had

procedurally defaulted this claim and, accordingly, failing to

consider the merits of Petitioner’s pro se claim of newly

discovered evidence. See Docket No. 146. The Ninth Circuit

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -8-

also concluded the other two claims raised in the appeal,

ineffective assistance of counsel and wrongful admission of

expert testimony, were meritless. Id. The Circuit Court of

Appeals therefore affirmed the District Court’s decision in part

and remanded “for the sole purpose of conducting further

proceedings on [Petitioner’s] claim of newly discovered

evidence.” Id.

The matter was re-referred to the undersigned, who

ordered Respondents to brief the merits of Petitioner’s claim of

newly discovered evidence. Respondents complied with the order

and Petitioner filed a response to the pleading filed by

Respondents. See Docket No. 153, Docket No. 154, Docket No.

155. In a Report and Recommendation issued January 29, 2008,

see Docket No. 159, the undersigned concluded Petitioner’s claim

that he is entitled to federal habeas relief because the state

court denied him due process of law when it declined to hold an

evidentiary hearing or grant collateral relief, based on his

claim of newly discovered evidence, should be denied on the

merits. The Court has not yet adopted nor rejected the Report

and Recommendation. 

Petitioner filed his pending motion, captioned as one

to “re calendar” his amended petition seeking a writ of habeas

corpus, on January 17, 2008. See Docket No. 158. Petitioner

“direct[s]” the Court’s attention to his “AMENDED PETITION of

2003-2004”. Petitioner’s motion at Docket No. 158, in addition

to the above-quoted sentence states in its entirety:

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -9-

The AMENDED PETITION specifically delineates

my FACTUAL INNOCENCE/MANIFEST INJUSTICE

claims as “GATEWAY” to this Court’s

considering my other issues, as corollary to

“NEW EVIDENCE” REMAND FROM Ninth Circuit

Court. The contents of the AMENDED PETITION

have a direct bearing on my “NEW EVIDENCE”

claim which was genesis of Ninth Circuit

Court’s REMAND of my case to this Court.

To my recollection, this AMENDED PETITION was

dismissed (without prejudice to revisit at

later date) as my APPEAL was already in the

Ninth Circuit.

I am moving Court to RECONSIDER merits of the

AMENDED PETITION as part of its review of my

“NEW EVIDENCE” proceedings.

II Analysis

The amended habeas petition Petitioner now seeks to “re

calendar” sought to raise a claim that Petitioner was entitled

to federal habeas relief because he was actually innocent. The

undersigned notes the claim is substantially similar to the

“newly discovered evidence” claim which is currently being

considered on the merits by the Court pursuant to the Report and

Recommendation filed January 28, 2008.

The motion at Docket No. 158 could be construed as a

motion seeking to now amend Petitioner’s claims for habeas

relief by means of the “amended petition” lodged at Docket No.

136 and stricken from the record by Judge Strand. A petition

for habeas corpus may be amended pursuant to the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006 & Supp. 2007).

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governs a

petitioner’s motion to amend his habeas petition. See Caswell

v. Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2004).

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -10-

Whether to permit the amendment of a habeas petition,

after responsive pleadings have been filed, is a matter within

the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., id., 363 F.3d at 837;

Duff-Smith v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1175, 1180 (5th Cir. 1992). The

denial of leave to amend is reviewed only for an abuse of

discretion. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir.

1995). The Court’s discretion may be exercised to deny leave to

amend if the Court finds undue delay or a dilatory motive,

futility of amendment, or that the petitioner has previously

been allowed to amend their pleadings. See Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962); Caswell, 363 F.3d at

837-38. The Court may properly deny leave to amend based solely

upon the futility of the proposed amendment. See, e.g., Bonin,

59 F.3d at 845. Where a petitioner has had many opportunities

to timely amend their claims and has failed to do so, a motion

to amend is properly denied. Cf. Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870,

872, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding claims presented in a

successive petition must meet the timeliness and adequacy

requirements of the AEDPA); In re Byrd, 269 F.3d 561, 572 (6th

Cir. 2001). Additionally, 

if it is perfectly clear that the applicant

does not raise even a colorable federal

claim, the interests of the petitioner, the

warden, the state attorney general, the state

courts, and the federal courts will all be

well served ... [if] the district court

denies the habeas petition and the court of

appeals affirms the judgment of the district

court forthwith.

United States ex rel. Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1140

(7th Cir. 1990), quoting United States ex rel. Allum v. Twomey,

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -11-

484 F.2d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 1973). 

To the extent Petitioner might now seek to amend his

petition to add additional claim(s) for federal habeas relief,

or a claim that he is entitled to relief because he was

convicted and he is actually innocent, in addition to his 46

original claims for relief and the four “amendments” to his

petition allowed by the Court, the motion should be denied. To

the extent Petitioner again seeks to assert the state court

erred by not considering or not reaching the correct decision

regarding his “actual innocence,” leave to amend would be futile

because the allegedly erroneous application of substantive state

law is not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.

See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct.

475, 479-80 (1991).

To the extent Petitioner seeks leave to amend to assert

a “free-standing claim of innocence” with regard to a noncapital conviction and sentence, such a claim is not cognizable

in a federal habeas proceeding. Cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506

U.S. 390, 417, 113 S. Ct. 869-70 (1993) (assuming without

deciding that if a free-standing claim of innocence is

cognizable, it would be a claim of “actual innocence” of the

crime with an extremely high standard of proof); Carriger v.

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that, if

recognized, a free-standing innocence claim would require proof

that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime).

For the numerous reasons previously repeatedly stated

in the other Reports and Recommendations filed in this matter,

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -12-

Petitioner has not met the extremely high standard of proof

necessary to establish any potential “actual innocence” basis

for habeas relief in and of itself, see, e.g., Royal v. Taylor,

188 F.3d 239, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999), even if innocence of a

non-capital offense could amount to a “fundamental miscarriage

of justice,” which to the undersigned’s knowledge has never been

established. There is no support for Petitioner’s assertion

that his alleged actual innocence is a cognizable “stand-alone”

claim for federal habeas relief and, as concluded in the

previous Reports and Recommendations, Petitioner has not

established a cognizable claim that his federal constitutional

rights were violated in his criminal plea and sentencing

proceedings. Accordingly, it would be futile to allow amendment

to add an “actual innocence” claim for relief to Petitioner’s

federal habeas petition because it does not present a cognizable

claim for federal habeas corpus relief. 

Alternatively, the relief sought by Petitioner could be

also be construed as seeking reconsideration of Judge Strand’s

decision effectively denying, for lack of jurisdiction, leave to

file an amended habeas petition, i.e., the amended petition

lodged at Docket No. 136, without prejudice. In that respect,

the motion should also be denied as the original order was not

in error. A habeas petition asserting a new claim filed after

the denial of relief based on the original petition is on appeal

is considered a second or successive petition for relief, for

which leave to file must be sought from the Circuit Court of

Appeals before the filing of the pleading. See 28 U.S.C. §

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -13-

2244(b)(3)(A) (2006& Supp. 2007); Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d

538, 541-42 (10th Cir. 2007). This is because a claim which

could have been raised in the initial petition but which was not

raised therein is barred from consideration based on the “abuse

of the writ” doctrine. See, e.g., Benchoff v. Colleran, 404

F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005). 

To the extent Petitioner’s motion at Docket No. 158

seeks to present additional information or argument to the Court

regarding whether Petitioner may pass through the “gateway” of

the “actual innocence” exception to consideration of his “new

evidence” habeas claim on the merits, rather than face denial of

the claim based on his procedural default of the claim in the

state courts, as Judge Strand erroneously decided, the relief

sought by Petitioner is moot. “[A] claim of ‘actual innocence’

is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway

through which a habeas petitioner [can] pass to have his

otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S. Ct. at 862. Because the Ninth

Circuit effectively gave Petitioner a “pass” through the

gateway, the Court’s additional consideration of Petitioner’s

entitlement to the pass is unwarranted and does not constitute

judicial efficiency. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered

the Court to consider the merits of the “new evidence” claim

notwithstanding Petitioner’s alleged procedural default of the

claim in the state courts, and the currently-pending Report and

Recommendation recommends denial of the claim on the merits, not

on the basis of any procedural default or failure to exhaust the

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -14-

claim in the state courts. Accordingly, the issue of whether

Petitioner has established his entitlement to the “actual

innocence” exception to the procedural default rule is not

before the Court. 

The substance of the relief sought by Petitioner could

also be construed as asking the Court to consider the contents

of the amended petition at Docket No. 136 when deciding the

merits of his “new evidence” claim upon remand from the Ninth

Circuit, i.e., to “reopen” the pleading with regard to the

merits of his remaining habeas claim and re-docket these

assertions of fact and supporting documents. All of the

information provided in the amended petition and the appendices

and briefs simultaneously filed, is yet another presentation of

the same allegations and arguments couched elsewhere in

different terms. Accordingly, the motion may also be denied in

this regard as moot because the contents of the amended petition

at Docket No. 136, both factual and argumentative, have been

elsewhere reproduced and presented to the Court by Petitioner in

various contexts.

The undersigned diligently addressed the merits of the

only colorable habeas claim stated by Petitioner, as ordered by

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after considering the

evidence offered in support thereof in Petitioner’s first

petition for habeas relief, see Docket No. 1, the amendments to

the habeas petition filed with leave of the Court, see Docket

Nos. 30-64 and Docket Nos. 79-82, all of Petitioner’s objections

to the first two Report and Recommendations, see Docket No. 90

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -15-

& Docket No. 91, the order of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, and Petitioner’s pleadings in response to Respondents’

brief upon remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, see

Docket No. 155. The undersigned concludes that the Court’s

discretion would not be properly exercised to allow Petitioner

to substantively amend his habeas petition at this time or to

allow Petitioner to “refile” the amended petition which was

previously stricken from the record with leave to re-file only

with permission of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s motion at

Docket No. 158 be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 -16-

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 15th day of April, 2008.

Case 2:99-cv-01270-ROS Document 165 Filed 04/16/08 Page 16 of 16