Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04350/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Chasmind David Miller,

Plaintiff,

v. 

LHM Corporation ACJ, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-04350-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

On March 23, 2020, the Court entered its second Order to Show Cause why this 

matter should not be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute it. (Doc. 89.) Plaintiff has 

failed to show such cause. The Court therefore will dismiss the matter and order the Clerk 

of Court to close the case.

As the Court has repeatedly warned Plaintiff, the Court may dismiss this action for 

a failure to comply with the Court’s Orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 

See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court 

may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the court), cert. denied, 506 

U.S. 915 (1992). “The duty rests upon the plaintiff at every stage of the proceeding to use 

diligence and to expedite his case to a final determination.” Hicks v. Bekins Moving & 

Storage Co., 115 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1940) (internal quotation omitted); see also Fid. 

Phila. Trust Co. v. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc., 587 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1978). “It is within 

the inherent power of the court to sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of prosecution.” Ash 

v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 

630 (1962)).

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 1 of 10
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In determining whether a plaintiff’s failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the 

case, the Court must weigh the following five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in 

expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk 

of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their 

merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 

1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). “The first two of these factors favor the imposition of sanctions 

in most cases, while the fourth factor cuts against a default or dismissal sanction. Thus the 

key factors are prejudice and availability of lesser sanctions.” Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 

F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff’s pro se status does not provide an excuse for 

him to fail to comply with Scheduling Order deadlines and Court rules. See Am. Ass’n of 

Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 

pro se litigants are not excused from following court rules); Carter v. Commissioner of 

Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).

At the outset of this matter, the Court explicitly warned Plaintiff that if he chose to 

proceed as a self-represented party, he “will be held to comply with all Court Orders in this 

matter, as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of Practice for the 

District of Arizona, the Federal Rules of Evidence and any other applicable federal rules.” 

(Doc. 20.) The Court also advised Plaintiff that as a self-represented party he would have 

to appear at all proceedings related to the matter, and failure to do any of the above “may 

result in the Court imposing sanctions against him for such failure, up to and including 

entry of [] dismissal, as appropriate.” (Doc. 20.)

At the Rule 16 Scheduling Conference in this matter, upon learning for the first time 

that Plaintiff had not complied in full with one of the Court’s Orders, the Court took no 

action but reminded Plaintiff that he was required to follow all Court Orders and schedule 

deadlines and if he was unable to comply with all or part of an Order or deadline he should 

document what he was able to do, and who he communicated with. (Tr. 10/21/19 p. 77:11-

19.) At that hearing, defense counsel raised to the Court for the first time that they were

repeatedly unable to contact Plaintiff at any of the numbers or email addresses he had given 

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 2 of 10
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

them, and the Court required the parties to meet immediately after the hearing and for 

Plaintiff to provide counsel working contact information and to notify counsel within 48 

hours if that information changed thereafter. (Tr. 10/21/19 pp. 89-90.) 

At Defendants’ request and with Plaintiff’s agreement, the Court took the 

extraordinary step, and commensurate effort, to arrange for Plaintiff’s deposition to be 

taken on January 29, 2020, at the Sandra Day O’Connor United States Courthouse.

Defendants served a Notice of Deposition on Plaintiff for that date. (Doc. 62.). Plaintiff 

failed to appear (Doc. 74), incurring wasted time both of Defendants’ counsel, an 

independent court reporter, and a videographer. Thereafter, the Court entered its first Show 

Cause Order in the matter, requiring Plaintiff to demonstrate “why the Court should not 

dismiss this matter for failure to prosecute and failure to follow the Court’s Orders, 

including Scheduling Order, as the Court advised Plaintiff was mandatory.” (Doc. 75.)

Plaintiff filed a Response to that Order on February 18, 2020, stating that he 

“became ill the night before the deposition was scheduled,” and “would not have been able 

to properly give deposition.” (Doc. 78.) Plaintiff also stated he “tried to contact Defendants 

by phone and was unable to do so,” and he then “emailed Defendants to reschedule 

deposition.” (Doc. 78.) Defendants filed a Response thereto, indicating that neither of them 

ever received any telephone message from Plaintiff, on the night before the scheduled 

deposition or any other time, indicating he would not attend, and only one Defendant—

GEICO—received an email to that effect.1(Doc. 80.) That email was sent to GEICO 

counsel’s office account approximately 30 minutes before the time Plaintiff’s deposition 

was to begin, and counsel did not timely receive it because they were all at the deposition 

site already. 

As a result, counsel wasted their time preparing for, traveling to and waiting to 

execute the deposition; additionally, a court reporter and videographer appeared and 

accrued charges for their time traveling to and appearing for the deposition. As the Court 

1 Defendant LHM Corp.’s counsel did not directly receive such email because Plaintiff 

apparently sent it to an errant address; GEICO’s counsel forwarded a copy of the email 

eventually received to LHM Corp.’s counsel.

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 3 of 10
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

pointed out in its Order addressing this issue, almost all of these expenditures of time and 

money could easily have been avoided if Plaintiff, upon becoming ill the night before, had 

messaged counsel that night, or even earlier the next morning. 

While the Court still harbored questions about inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s 

explanations to it and to each Defendant about what happened, it concluded that dismissal 

of the matter at that point was too harsh a sanction, and instead sanctioned Plaintiff by 

requiring him to reimburse Defendants for the cost of the court reporter and videographer. 

(Doc. 81.) The Court also ordered Plaintiff to take four actions to address the issues he had 

caused. 

First, the Court ordered Plaintiff to immediately confer with defense counsel to 

confirm Plaintiff had telephone numbers for each of them on which he could actually reach 

counsel during reasonable hours or leave a message that they would receive in short order. 

(Doc. 81.) This would eliminate any situation where Plaintiff would be unable to advise 

the defense about scheduling issues and respond to discovery issues in real time or nearly 

so in the future. Second, the Court ordered Plaintiff to return all telephone or other 

communications from defense counsel within 24 hours of counsel leaving a message for 

him. (Doc. 81.) This would address repeated issues raised to this Court by defense counsel 

about Plaintiff’s non-responsiveness to inquiries about late or incomplete discovery and 

setting conferrals. Third, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide Defendants’ counsel with 

multiple dates and times he would be available to sit for his deposition. (Doc. 81.) And 

fourth, the Court ordered Plaintiff to engage in discussion with Defendants’ counsel about 

his ability to pay the court reporter and videographer costs the Court would impose. 

(Doc. 81.) The Court imposed this last requirement so the parties could evaluate Plaintiff’s 

financial condition and whether a payment plan of a smaller amount each month would 

achieve the Court’s purpose of cost shifting to the responsible party without excessively 

damaging that party’s ability of meet daily financial responsibilities.

On March 19, 2020, two weeks after the Court purged the show cause order and 

ordered Plaintiff to take the additional steps above, Defendant LHM Corp. filed a Notice 

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 4 of 10
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of Plaintiff’s Non-Compliance with Court Order. (Doc. 88.) Counsel advised that Plaintiff 

continued not to return phone calls or messages from counsel, which precluded counsel 

from addressing Plaintiff’s alleged failures to provide certain discovery to Defendants 

timely or at all. Counsel also brought to the Court’s attention that while Plaintiff had stated 

multiple times that certain discovery responses had been provided by U.S. Mail in some 

cases and email in other cases, Defendants had not received the responses in any form, they 

were weeks to months late, and Plaintiff was non-responsive to counsel’s attempts to 

determine what had happened or where discovery responses were. Finally, counsel stated 

that in compliance with the Court’s Order of March 4, the parties had agreed to meet and 

confer by telephone on March 18, 2020, about Plaintiff’s ability to pay the court reporter 

and videographer costs for the deposition false start, and then counsel confirmed the meetand-confer with Plaintiff on March 16; on March 18, however, Plaintiff did not call in and 

counsel could not reach him. Counsel provided contemporaneous documentation to 

support each of these new instances of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s Orders. 

(Doc. 88 Exs. 1-4.)

Upon receipt of Defendant LHM Corp.’s Notice of Plaintiff’s Non-Compliance and 

documentary support, the Court issued the second Order to Show Cause, requiring Plaintiff 

to explain, by no later than March 27, 1) why he did not participate in the scheduled and 

confirmed March 18 teleconference with Defendants’ counsel regarding deposition cost 

reimbursement; 2) why he had not delivered the responses to Defendants’ Requests for 

Admission when they were due in the first instance; and 3) why he then did not respond 

when Defendant’s counsel reached out to him multiple times, via letter, phone and email 

to follow up on the missing discovery and other delinquent issues. (Doc. 89.) Plaintiff failed 

to timely respond to the second Order to Show Cause.

On April 3, 2020, Defendant GEICO filed a Joint Notice of Plaintiff’s Failure to 

Comply with Discovery Orders. (Doc. 90.) In the Joint Notice, Defendants reported that 

after the Court’s latest OSC, Plaintiff emailed Defendants’ counsel stating he was unaware 

he was to call in to the teleconference on March 18, that counsel had not provided him a 

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 5 of 10
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

phone number to call in, and that Plaintiff had asked for but never received confirmation 

of the teleconference. Defendants attached the email thread in which Plaintiff’s referenced 

message appears. (Doc. 90 Ex. 1.) In that thread, literally just below Plaintiff’s statement 

that he did not get confirmation of the call or any dial-in information, is the March 16 email

to Plaintiff from defense counsel confirming the March 18 call and providing the call-in 

number. (Doc. 90 Ex. 1.) Plaintiff was responding to the confirmation email which bore 

the dial-in number, to tell counsel he did not have notice, confirmation or the dial-in 

coordinates.

Additionally, Defendants noted that Plaintiff represented to them and to this Court 

in his Notice of Service of Discovery (Doc. 84)—which he physically came to the 

courthouse and filed into the docket in this matter on March 10, 2020—that he had as of 

that date “provided” his responses to Defendant LHM Corp.’s Requests for Admission. 

(Doc. 90.) Yet the postmark on the actual responses received by Defendant indicate they 

were not mailed until April 1, 2020, and received April 3, 2020. If the responses were not 

mailed until April 1, then Plaintiff’s March 10 statement to the Court that he complied with 

his discovery obligations and “provided” the responses as of that date was false. As 

importantly, it was false at a time when Plaintiff had just received a second or third chance

from the Court with the purging of the first Order to Show Cause in this matter, and his 

credibility, diligence and compliance with the Court’s orders was very much a determining 

factor in the Court’s apprehension of the matter moving forward.

As of April 6, Plaintiff’s deadline to file a responsive memorandum to the Court’s 

second OSC had passed by nine days, and the Court was entitled under the rules to impose 

sanctions up to and including dismissal of the matter. See LRCiv 7.2(i) (“ . . . if the 

unrepresented party or counsel does not serve and file the required answering memoranda 

. . . such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion 

and the Court may dispose of the motion summarily”). In fact, the Court had drafted an 

Order doing just that and was preparing to enter it when Plaintiff filed a Response nine 

days late. (Doc. 91.) Even if the Court considered Plaintiff’s very untimely Response, it is 

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 6 of 10
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

insufficient to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute 

and to comply with the Court’s Orders and applicable rules.

In the late Response, Plaintiff repeated that he was unaware of the teleconference 

and was not provided with call-in information. Plaintiff also stated that he was without 

telephone service on March 18, and later stated that he was in custody in the Maricopa 

County Sheriff’s Towers Jail on that date. (Doc. 91.) As to the discovery response timing 

discrepancy, Plaintiff repeated that he sent the responses to Defendant’s Request for 

Admission on March 10, 2020, “upon being released from the Towers Jail.” (Doc. 91. 

At 2.)2 Later, although the Response was somewhat unclear on this point, Plaintiff appears 

to state that he was unable to afford to make copies of the documents to email them to 

Defendants, as Defendants had requested, in lieu of mailing them. These points simply do 

not add up. 

First, Plaintiff’s assertion that he was unaware of the March 18 teleconference, 

could not get confirmation for it, did not know he was supposed to call in, and did not have

any call-in instructions, is directly contradicted by the very next entry in the email chain 

Plaintiff himself used to explain away to defense counsel his failure to appear. Just inches 

directly below Plaintiff’s assertions was the email confirming to him the March 18 

teleconference—a date he chose—and giving starkly clear dial-in instructions and codes.

(Doc. 90 Ex. 1.)

Second, in Plaintiff’s representation to the Court that he was in jail on the day of the 

conference call is problematic. As an initial matter, Plaintiff never mentioned being in 

custody to defense counsel when he emailed them to explain why he did not call in. 

Additionally, ignorance of the teleconference or how to join it is qualitatively a very 

different reason than a complete incapacity to call in due to incarceration. One would think 

if Plaintiff were trying to explain his absence from an agreed commitment, he would 

include what may be the most compelling circumstance keeping him from it. Moreover, 

2 This timeline is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s previous statement that he was in custody as 

of March 18, 2020, and Plaintiff provides no records to support his incarceration dates. 

However, he later states he was released at 9 p.m. on March 22, which could be consistent 

with his assertion that he was in custody March 18.

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 7 of 10
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff has provided no support for his assertion of incarceration in the form of arrest, 

court or jail records, or the like. Such documentation would have been helpful to establish 

not only the fact of incarceration but also the dates thereof, which the Court notes above 

are unclear and contradictory as reported in different passages of Plaintiff’s response 

memorandum. 

Third, Plaintiff fails to address at all the concern raised by counsel that he has misled 

the Court by representing he complied with his discovery requirements as of March 10, 

when the documentary evidence shows he did not mail the RFA responses until more than 

three weeks later on April 1. The Court in its prior Orders attempted to clarify for Plaintiff 

the need to avoid credibility contests by being able to provide corroboration for claims that 

Plaintiff had met his obligations. It took the extraordinary step of requiring Plaintiff to 

acquire valid telephone numbers of counsel that would result in counsel returning contact 

quickly, precisely so no one in the future could claim they had no way of getting hold of 

an opponent. It required Plaintiff to return all messages within 24 hours of receipt similarly 

to avoid competing claims of delay and argument over how long was too long to return a 

call. 

This roadmap was to no avail. In his Response, Plaintiff has no explanation for why 

his RFA responses were not postmarked until three weeks after he says he mailed them, 

and all of the corroborating steps the Court foresees he could have taken he explains away: 

it was too expensive to send the discovery responses via a postal delivery class that was 

trackable; and it was likewise too expensive to make copies for email delivery, which email 

would have borne a verifiable delivery date and time. The reasoning of this last explanation 

escapes the Court, which fails to understand why copies of discovery need to be made in 

order to email them to an opponent. The Court concludes Plaintiff has consistently and

deliberately chosen his modes of operation in this matter specifically to avoid the kind of 

easily and directly verifiable records that would show exactly what was done when. And 

that detracts from his credibility when he offers yet more excuses for his latest noncompliance.

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 8 of 10
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, consistent with the last point above, Plaintiff

does not explain why he has taken no action to rectify discovery, deposition rescheduling,

or reimbursement conference issues since his release from Towers Jail on March 22—over 

two full weeks ago. Even if the Court credited each of Plaintiff’s explanations—that he had 

been in jail until March 22, that he had been homeless before and after his incarceration, 

that his telephone had been disconnected, and that he had no place to receive mail or email 

until he reconciled with his father on April 4—Plaintiff has not addressed why he has done 

nothing to meet with counsel since March 22, or thereafter, about setting a new deposition 

date, discussing a payment plan for reimbursement, or rectifying discovery issues. Even 

now, with all previously identified impediments gone, Plaintiff continues his noncompliance with the Court’s Orders and schedule. It is precisely this continued non-action 

that persuades the Court that a sanction less harsh than the one the Court previously 

rejected—dismissal of the action—would be unsuccessful in bringing about compliance.

The Court thus has considered less drastic measures. It concludes—in light of the 

previous warnings, second chances and prescriptive orders it has provided, which have 

been met by more and different flavors of non-compliance with excuses, all resulting in a 

lack of progress in this matter and increasing the waste of time, effort and money on 

Defendants’ part in meeting their own obligations—that those less drastic measures would 

be ineffective in gaining compliance. Dismissal of the action for non-prosecution is thus

warranted. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED dismissing this matter for failure to prosecute and 

for repeated failure to comply with the Court’s Orders. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying all pending motions (Docs. 40, 49) as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, commencing 60 days after entry of this Order, 

Plaintiff shall pay $25 per month for 12 months to Defendants as reimbursement for wasted 

expenses that occurred when he failed to appear for his deposition in this matter. The first 

6 payments, totaling $150, shall be made to Defendant GEICO through its counsel; the 

final 6 payments, totaling $150, shall be made to LHM Corp. through its counsel.

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 9 of 10
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 

accordingly and close this case.

Dated this 14th day of April, 2020.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

Case 2:19-cv-04350-JJT Document 92 Filed 04/14/20 Page 10 of 10