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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 4, 2016 Decided July 8, 2016 

No. 15-5009

TRENT M. COBURN,

APPELLANT

v.

PATRICK J. MURPHY, HONORABLE, ACTING SECRETARY OF 

THE ARMY

APPELLEE

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01266)

Raymond J. Toney argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Derrick W. Grace, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was R. 

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON,

∗ BROWN, AND PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

 ∗ Judge Henderson was drawn to replace Chief Judge Garland, who originally 

heard argument in this case but did not participate in the opinion. Judge 

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Opinion filed for the Court by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: This case returns following our 

first decision in Coburn v. McHugh, 679 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 

2012) (Coburn I). In that case we remanded to the Army 

Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) so the 

ABCMR could provide a reasoned explanation (if possible) 

for several questions we could not resolve. On remand, the 

parties have largely resolved these questions, but for one, over 

which a significant dispute remains. Today we affirm the 

ABCMR’s decision to terminate Trent Coburn’s disability 

processing and its conclusion that Coburn’s medical 

conditions did not warrant further medical review.

I

Because our opinion in Coburn I explains the facts of this 

case in detail, we will repeat here only the facts necessary to 

understand this appeal.

In 2000, Coburn tested positive for marijuana use in a 

urine test. Although Coburn pled not guilty in non-judicial 

proceedings related to the test, he was found guilty and 

received a negative non-commissioned officer evaluation 

report based on the offense. Coburn challenged these results 

but was not successful, and in 2001, the Army informed 

Coburn he had been denied continued Army service. 

In early 2002, prior to his separation from the Army, 

Coburn contacted his primary care physician, Dr. Mario 

Caycedo of the United States Army Medical Corps, seeking 

an evaluation of his ongoing back pain and requesting that Dr. 

Caycedo initiate a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) to 

 Henderson has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to the recording of 

the oral argument.

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determine whether he was suitable for a medical discharge. 

See Army Reg. 635–40 ¶-4–10 (2012). Dr. Caycedo agreed 

to initiate an MEB, and over the next nine months, Coburn 

underwent a series of appointments with various doctors to 

evaluate his recovery from prior pulmonary problems and his 

ongoing problems with back pain. Two visits to the 

pulmonary clinic determined that Coburn’s pulmonary 

problems had entirely resolved, and a rheumatologist ruled 

out other conditions that could cause the kind of pulmonary 

problems Coburn experienced. Separately, a neurosurgeon 

offered surgery to Coburn to treat a disc protrusion in his 

back. Coburn refused the surgery. 

During this time, the Army tried to effect Coburn’s 

administrative separation, but because MEB proceedings 

generally take precedence over other types of discharges, 

Coburn could not be separated until the MEB was no longer 

ongoing. In October 2002, Dr. Caycedo reviewed Coburn’s 

file, including the latest specialist assessments. He also 

consulted with Colonel Wayne Schirner, another Army 

physician who also reviewed Coburn’s file. Dr. Caycedo 

concluded that Coburn’s MEB processing should be 

terminated, and Colonel Schirner agreed. Dr. Caycedo later 

supplied the following four reasons for terminating the MEB: 

(1) “Mr. Coburn had declined the option for surgery that 

could potentially correct his back pain, thus, I concluded that 

he was not experiencing continual debilitating pain which he 

had described initially;” (2) “In his several visits to the 

clinics, Mr. Coburn did not appear to be in great discomfort, 

and he was able to perform his assigned duties;” (3) “Both the 

rheumatology and pulmonary clinics examined Mr. Coburn 

and determined that he required no physical limitations with 

regards to his pulmonary effusion and the condition had 

resolved;” (4) “Mr. Coburn had raised no new medical 

complaints over the past six months.” J.A. 169. Dr. Caycedo 

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wrote a brief letter, which Colonel Schirner also signed, 

stating that Coburn’s MEB proceedings should be terminated. 

On the same day, Coburn received his Army discharge 

papers.

Coburn challenged various aspects of these proceedings 

before the ABCMR, to no avail. He appealed to the district 

court and then to this Court, where we resolved some of his 

claims and remanded for the ABCMR to reconsider Coburn’s 

case and address five specific questions about which the 

record materials did not evidence a reasoned explanation for 

the Army’s decision-making. Coburn I, 679 F.3d at 934−35. 

Since then, the ABCMR has issued a new opinion in response 

to our remand, affirming the decision to terminate Coburn’s 

MEB and proceed with his discharge. 

Coburn appealed the ABCMR’s decision on remand, 

alleging that his MEB had been wrongfully terminated, 

contrary to the decision of the ABCMR. The district court 

disagreed, concluding that the Army “hewed to its regulatory 

program” by applying a reasonable interpretation of its own 

regulations, which the plaintiff could not show to be clearly 

erroneous. Coburn v. McHugh, 77 F. Supp. 3d 24, 30 (D.D.C. 

2014). The district court also rejected Coburn’s claim that the 

ABCMR’s decision to affirm the termination of his MEB was 

arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial 

evidence. See id. at 31. The district court concluded the 

ABCMR appropriately explained the basis for its decision that 

Coburn did not suffer from a condition unfitting for service. 

Id. 

Coburn appeals to this Court.

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II

We review a district court’s summary judgment decision 

in an ABCMR appeal “de novo, applying the same standards 

as the district court.” Fontana v. White, 334 F.3d 80, 81 

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the district court reviewed 

the administrative decision under the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA), we also “review the administrative 

action directly, according no particular deference to the 

judgment of the District Court.” Holland v. Nat’l Mining 

Ass’n, 309 F.3d 808, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Thus, we review 

the ABCMR’s decision on remand to determine whether it 

was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 

not in accordance with law,” according to the standard of 

review for administrative actions set out in section 706 of the 

APA.

1

Coburn’s first claim on appeal is that the ABCMR acted 

arbitrarily and capriciously by upholding the ability of Dr. 

Caycedo and Colonel Schirner to terminate the MEB 

proceedings consistent with Army regulations. To understand 

Coburn’s claim, it is necessary to understand the basic 

contours of the MEB process. The ABCMR, relying in part 

on a staff attorney opinion prepared by the U.S. Army 

Physical Disability Agency (USAPDA), described the process 

as beginning with a soldier’s commander or physician 

 1 Coburn asserts that the Army is not entitled to special deference 

here, which we afford to matters involving “a military judgment 

requiring military expertise.” Kreis v. Sec’y of Air Force, 406 F.3d 

684, 686 (D.C. Cir. 2005). While it is not clear that the Army is 

asking for just this kind of special deference, it is not necessary for 

us to decide the question, either. By applying the ordinary standard 

of review due to any agency decision under the APA, we conclude 

that the Army acted lawfully. We do not apply any special 

deference in reaching this conclusion.

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referring the soldier to an MEB. See Army Reg. 40-400 ¶7-1; 

Army Reg. 40-501 ¶¶3-3 and 3-4. When a physician makes 

such a referral, the physician necessarily determines that the 

soldier does not meet at least one condition required by 

medical retention standards. See Army Reg. 40-501, ch. 3. 

Upon referral, a Medical Training Facility (MTF) takes 

jurisdiction of the matter and (generally) the commanding 

officer of that MTF assigns a physician to complete a medical 

examination and narrative summary of the soldier’s medical 

condition. These documents are then submitted to the MEB, 

which is a board of two or more Army physicians empaneled 

to review the soldier’s file and make a recommendation 

concerning fitness for service or the need for an additional 

referral for disability proceedings. See Army Reg. 40-400, 

¶¶7-2, 7-3. 

Here, Dr. Caycedo was the referring physician who 

initiated the MEB process for Coburn. Colonel Schirner was 

the appointing physician, responsible for convening the MEB 

panel following completion of the medical examination and 

narrative summary. According to Army regulations, Dr. 

Schirner, as appointing physician, also serves as the 

approving physician, who is charged with reviewing the MEB 

panel’s recommendation and either agreeing with that 

recommendation or sending it back to the panel for further 

consideration. Army Reg. 40-400, ¶7-13. Before an MEB 

panel could be convened, however, Dr. Caycedo withdrew his 

referral and Colonel Schirner terminated the MEB process, 

deciding that it was not necessary to empanel physicians for 

an MEB.

The ABCMR concluded both that Dr. Caycedo had the 

authority to revoke his MEB referral, and that Colonel 

Schirner possessed the authority to refuse to empanel 

physicians for an MEB if he determined it would not be 

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warranted. Coburn disagrees, arguing that Colonel Schirner 

lacked the legal authority to terminate the MEB process. 

In support of his argument, Coburn reads the Army’s

regulations governing MEBs expansively. He begins with 

Army Regulation 40-400 at paragraph 7-13, which prohibits 

an appointing authority (here, Colonel Schirner) from 

participating in the MEB proceedings “either as a member, 

witness, consultant, or in any other capacity.” According to 

Coburn, Colonel Schirner exceeded his authority as the 

appointing physician when he terminated Coburn’s MEB 

because doing so amounted to participating in the MEB 

decision-making process, contrary to paragraph 7-13.

Additionally, Coburn asserts that the MEB process cannot be 

terminated once it is underway. Because Dr. Caycedo 

“initiated” an MEB and because Coburn was receiving 

physical disability processing—the first step in any MEB 

process—Colonel Schirner lacked authority (in Coburn’s 

view) to prematurely terminate the MEB process.

Although the regulatory interpretation Coburn advances 

is perfectly plausible, the standard of review he must 

overcome requires more than merely articulating a reasonable 

alternative reading of the relevant Army regulations. Rather, 

he must demonstrate that the Army’s reading of its own 

regulations is affirmatively unreasonable, being instead an 

arbitrary and capricious interpretation according to the 

standard of the APA. Coburn has not and cannot meet that 

standard.

Here, the Army’s interpretation of its own regulation is 

reasonable and neither arbitrary nor capricious. The 

ABCMR concluded that Colonel Schirner, as the appointing 

physician “was responsible for overseeing the overall MEB 

process, and, as such, had the authority to terminate the 

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process if he also believed the applicant’s condition did not 

warrant referral to an MEB.” J.A. 63. Coburn’s MEB 

proceedings never got so far as to compile a narrative 

summary or empanel an MEB. Instead, Colonel Schirner 

“determined it was not necessary to appoint physicians and 

convene an MEB after further medical evaluation was 

conducted.” J.A. 64. Because Colonel Schirner “had the 

authority to appoint physicians and convene an MEB if a 

soldier required evaluation,” it “necessarily follows that 

[Colonel Schirner] ha[d] the authority to not appoint 

physicians to an MEB if he [found] no basis for the MEB.” 

J.A. 64 (emphasis omitted from original). 

While this reading may not be the only plausible way to 

interpret the relevant Army regulations, it is certainly one 

plausible interpretation, and nothing in the regulations 

forecloses it. While paragraph 7-13 would clearly foreclose 

Colonel Schirner as appointing/approving physician from 

participating in MEB panel proceedings once a panel is 

convened, nothing in the regulations prohibits him from 

exercising authority during the parts of the MEB referral 

process over which he is given oversight and control.

Accordingly, we hold that the Army’s interpretation of its 

regulations is neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor contrary to 

law. It was lawful for the ABCMR to conclude that Colonel 

Schirner acted within his authority and discretion when he 

terminated Coburn’s MEB proceedings.

Coburn also challenges the ABCMR’s factual conclusion 

that his condition did not warrant a disability evaluation. 

Here again we must affirm the ABCMR’s decision so long as 

it comports with the APA’s deferential standard. To do so, 

we must conclude that the ABCMR “examined the relevant 

data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action 

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including a rational connection between the facts found and 

the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). We can set aside 

the ABCMR’s decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious or 

not based on substantial evidence.” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 

U.S. 296, 303 (1983).

Coburn asserted to the ABCMR that empaneling an MEB

remained necessary because his condition had not improved 

during the course of the preliminary MEB proceedings. In 

response, the ABCMR advanced three reasons why an MEB 

was not medically necessary (and thus, why a withdrawal of 

the referral was within Colonel Schirner’s discretion): (1) 

Coburn had never been diagnosed with disc herniation; (2) 

Coburn did not suffer from radiculopathy; and (3) Coburn’s 

back condition was successfully managed with conservative 

treatment. Substantial evidence supports each of these 

conclusions. The ABCMR cited to the record of Coburn’s 

case, including numerous medical evaluations, many of which 

occurred after Coburn’s initial referral to the MEB process. 

This evidence amply supports the ABCMR’s conclusion that 

“[n]o post-service medical records close in time to [Coburn’s] 

discharge indicate any evaluation of [his] spine that casts 

doubt on the Army’s conclusions.” J.A. 66.

While Coburn disputes the ABCMR’s interpretation of 

his medical records, we are not entrusted with the authority to 

evaluate the ABCMR’s actions de novo. Rather, we are 

bound to uphold those actions so long as substantial evidence 

supports them. Here, substantial evidence supports the 

ABCMR’s conclusions. 

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III

For these reasons, we affirm the holding of the district 

court.

So ordered.

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