Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00921/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00921-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Cameron Lebbon, a married man; Peoria 

Police Officer’s Association Charities, a 

non-profit charitable organization; Peoria 

Police Officer’s Association, a non-profit 

corporation, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

City of Peoria, a municipality, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-00921-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Peoria’s Motion for 

Reconsideration or in the Alternative Motion for Protective Order. (Doc. 41.) For the 

reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion is denied. 

 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g), a motion for reconsideration will be denied “absent 

a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not 

have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonably diligence.” LRCiv. 

7.2(g). Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are not the place for parties to 

make new arguments not raised in their original briefs and arguments. See Northwest 

Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor 

should such motions ask the Court to “rethink what the court has already thought 

through—rightly or wrongly.” See United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 

(D. Ariz. 1998) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 

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99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)). 

 On January 31, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel and ordered 

Defendant to produce the 2010 Investigation, holding that Defendant had failed to show 

that the Investigation was protected by either attorney-client or work-product privilege, 

and that in any event any privilege was waived by Defendant’s disclosure of the results of 

the Investigation in a 2011 Memo to Plaintiff Lebbon. (Doc. 39 at 3.) 

 Defendant now contends that the 2010 Investigation is protected by the work 

product privilege and that the burden is on Plaintiffs to overcome that privilege. As an 

initial matter, the issue of work product privilege was briefed in the previous Motion to 

Compel. Defendant does not set forth new facts or legal authority that could not have 

been brought to the Court’s attention earlier. Nor does Defendant argue that manifest 

error occurred. As such, Defendant has no ground for bringing a Motion for 

Reconsideration. 

 Moreover, Defendant’s assertion that the burden of overcoming work product 

privilege falls initially on Plaintiffs is simply wrong. Defendant claims that “when the 

information being sought is from a consulting expert who is not expected to be called as a 

trial witness, the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure of the privileged 

document.” (Doc. 41 at 3.) Defendant is correct that the burden shifts, but it does not do 

so until the party invoking the work product privilege has established that the privilege 

applies. Garcia v. City of El Centro, 214 F.R.D. 587, 591 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (“The party 

asserting the work product privilege bears the burden of proving that the material 

withheld meets the standards established for material to be classified as work product.”). 

Defendant seems to assume that it has established for the Court that the 2010 

Investigation was the work product of a non-consulting expert. Further, Defendant does 

nothing to establish how, even if it was, it would not have been waived by its subsequent 

conduct. Even were the consultant’s status as a non-testifying expert not at issue, 

Defendant seems to believe that all it needs to do is baldly assert the work product 

privilege to shift the burden to the other party. The sole case cited by Defendant for this 

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proposition states the opposite. In Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corporation, 

this Court squarely held that “[t]he party claiming work product immunity has the burden 

of proving the applicability of the doctrine.” No. CV-91-1764-PHX-DAE, 2006 WL 

1817000 at *4 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2006). 

 Defendant then argues that, notwithstanding the Court’s Order on January 31 

ordering Defendant to disclose the entire 2010 Investigation, the Court should conduct an 

in camera inspection of the Investigation to determine which portions of the Investigation 

were waived. (Doc. 41 at 4.) Again, Defendant does not cite to any new facts or law, or 

point to any manifest injustice, that would warrant this deviation from the Court’s earlier 

Order. As such, there is no ground for Defendant to bring this Motion for 

Reconsideration. Moreover, as discussed above and in the earlier Order, Defendant has 

thus far failed to demonstrate that any privilege whatsoever applies to the 2010 

Investigation. The Court sees no reason to exercise its discretion to inspect the 

Investigation in camera when Defendant has made no effort to show that the 

Investigation is potentially privileged. 

 Finally, Defendant requests that the Court issue a protective order limiting the 

dissemination of the 2010 Investigation and its contents to the parties to this suit. (Id. at 

5.) Defendant asserts that it is entitled to a protective order because the Investigation 

contains statements from witnesses who may be subject to retaliation if their identities 

were released. (Id. at 6.) In addition, Defendant argues that it will suffer “embarrassment, 

annoyance and oppression” from the media if the 2010 Investigation is released to the 

public. (Id.) This is a new argument not raised in the briefing on the Motion to Compel. 

As such, this Motion for Reconsideration is not the proper vehicle for requesting the 

protective order. Northwest Acceptance, 841 F.2d at 925–26. Defendant’s Motion on this 

ground is denied. Defendant is not barred from filing a Motion for Protective Order to 

which Plaintiffs may respond without seeking permission from this Court. See LRCiv. 

7.2(g)(2). 

/ / / 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant City of Peoria’s Motion for 

Reconsideration or in the alternative Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 41) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 20th day of February, 2013. 

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