Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00403/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00403-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY T. MARSHALL,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 04cv0403 L (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

SGT. RAIN; MS. PETERSON, RN; MR.

WILLIAMS, MTA; DONOVAN

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY MEDICAL

STAFF, et al.; LIEUTENANT COBB; John

and Jane Does 1-10,

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Roy Marshall (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner at California Men’s Colony State

Prison, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his

Eighth Amendment rights were violated by prison officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. 

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II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 25, 2004, alleging that prison officials at

Donovan ignored his need for medical treatment after he sustained injuries resulting from a fall.

(Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 3-4.) On October 5, 2004, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies arguing there was no evidence that Plaintiff had filed any

appeals related to medical neglect at Donovan. (Doc. No. 12, Defs. Mtn. To Dismiss at 3.)

On January 31, 2005, Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted without prejudice

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 18, p. 10, lns. 17-18.) Judge McCurine

reported that, although Plaintiff had submitted an initial Form 602 (Doc. No. 18, at p. 6), a

dismissal was warranted because Plaintiff’s Form 602 was rejected as untimely and Plaintiff 

failed to further appeal that rejection, nor did Plaintiff seek relief through any collateral 602

appeals. (Doc. No. 18, at p. 7.)

On March 24, 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided Woodford v. Ngo, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir.

2005). In Ngo, a prisoner’s administrative appeal was rejected as untimely because he had not

filed his appeal within fifteen days of the alleged incident. Ngo, 403 F.3d at 622. The prisoner’s

second grievance was also rejected as untimely. Id. Reasoning that the prisoner had no further

level of appeal available in the prison’s internal grievance process, the Ninth Circuit found that the

prisoner had exhausted all administrative remedies available to him pursuant to the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), and reversed the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Id.

at 630. 

On June 24, 2005, Judge Lorenz issued an Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

(Doc. No. 24 at p. 9, lns. 8-9.) In ruling on Defendants’ motion, the Court found that: (1) Plaintiff

filed administrative appeals concerning his medical treatment and the decision to transport him (Id.

at p. 2, lns. 27-28); (2) the appeals were returned to Plaintiff on January 9, 2003, because he had

not signed them (Id. at pp. 2-3); (3) after Plaintiff returned the signed forms, they were rejected as

untimely on February 3, 2003 (Id. at p. 3, lns. 1-2); and (4) Plaintiff did not appeal the decision,

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but instead instituted this lawsuit on February 25, 2004. (Id. at p. 3, lns. 3-4) Based on these facts,

the Court held that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in “Ngo compels a finding that Plaintiff has

exhausted the state’s prison administrative grievance procedure.” (Id. at p. 5, lns. 5-6.) On June

27, 2005, United States District Judge M. James Lorenz dismissed Defendants Rain and Donovan

Correctional Facility Medical Staff without prejudice for failure to serve. (Doc. No. 24, pp. 8-9.) 

Judge Lorenz further ordered the remaining Defendants Peterson, Williams and Cobb to answer. 

Id. at. p. 9. Defendants Peterson, Williams and Cobb answered Plaintiff’s complaint on July 11,

2005. (Doc. No. 25.) 

On November 14, 2005, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Woodford v.

Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 647, 74 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2005) (No. 05-416). On June 22, 2006, the

Supreme Court issued a decision in Ngo reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 

Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2393 (2006). Specifically, the issue for consideration by the

Supreme Court was “whether a prisoner can satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion

requirement, 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a), by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective

administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 2382. The Supreme Court ultimately held in Ngo that

“proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.” Id. On September 27, 2006,

Defendants brought a second motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

(Doc. No. 52.) On January 3, 2007, Magistrate Judge McCurine issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 60.) United States District Judge M. James Lorenz

denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on procedural grounds due to Plaintiff’s inability to file an

opposition because of problems he experienced receiving legal mail. (Doc. No. 71.) On

September 28, 2007, Defendants Peterson, Williams and Cobb filed a motion for summary

judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 97.) On November 19, 2007,

Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion. (Doc. No. 107.) On January 2, 2008,

Defendants filed their reply in support of the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 109.)

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III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. General Factual Allegations

On December 1, 2002, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“Donovan”). See Compl. at 5. Plaintiff claims that while in route to return kitchen tools,

he slipped on a wet dining room floor and suffered a “sharp pain” in his lower back. Id. Plaintiff

was taken by stretcher to the emergency room. Id. Plaintiff was given a pain killer, crutches, and

a lower bunk assignment. Id. After the medical staff gave their diagnosis, the staff was informed

that no lower bunks were available and Plaintiff was sent back to the prison facility in “extreme

pain.” Id. Plaintiff was told by an unidentified MTA (medical technical assistant) that he was

“faking” and that “there was no pain.” Id. Because of the pain, Plaintiff spent the night “sitting on

the toilet.” Id. 

On or about December 3, 2002, Plaintiff was informed that he was going to be transferred

to another correctional facility. Id. Plaintiff said he could not get up due to his injury. Id. 

Subsequently, Plaintiff was “forced” into a wheelchair by “the sergeant” and then “forced” into a

motor cart by “the sergeant and the assisting officer.” Id. Because Plaintiff was not allowed to

bring crutches onto the transport bus, he was taken off the transport list for that day. Id. at 6. 

Plaintiff was thereafter housed in a holding cell where he “fell to the floor” in pain. Id. at

6. Defendant Rain went to the holding cell and told Plaintiff to “shut up and stop faking.” Id. 

Defendant Peterson brought a wheelchair to the holding cell in an attempt to bring Plaintiff to the 

infirmary, however, Plaintiff informed her he could not get into the wheelchair. Id. Subsequently,

Defendant Williams and an unidentified MTA “came into the holding cell and began to taunt”

Plaintiff. Id. Nevertheless, on or about December 5, 2002, Plaintiff was taken to the Satellite

Clinic and given medication as well as an appointment for an MRI. (Id. at 6, Exhs. A and B to

Defs. MSJ.) On December 11, 2002, Plaintiff was told a back brace had been ordered for him to

use until an MRI was conducted. (Ex. B to Defs. MSJ.) 

On or about December 17, 2002, Plaintiff was transferred from Donovan. (Ex. D to Defs.

MSJ; Plaintiff’s Opp’n at 2:14-16.) On the day of transfer, Plaintiff was told by Lieutenant Cobb

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that he was to be put on the transfer bus “at all cost” [sic.]. See Compl. at 6. Plaintiff “was forced

to CRAWL unto [sic] a bus for transport.” Id. (emphasis in original). When Plaintiff arrived at

Chuckwalla State Prison he was taken to the hospital and was informed he had suffered “nerve

damage.” Id. Plaintiff “was forced to stay in the hospital for approximately 3 months,” was

restricted to a wheelchair, and is classified as “permanant [sic.] mobility impaired.” Id.

B. Factual Allegations Related to Exhaustion

Plaintiff submitted a 602 Form on December 12, 2002, which documented his slip-and-fall

incident at Donovan on December 1, 2002. (Ex A. to Defs. MSJ; Plaintiff’s Decl., paras.1-2.) The

602 Form was not given a log number, but was returned to Plaintiff on January 9, 2003 at

Chuckawalla because he did not sign it. (Ex. C to Defs. MSJ.) Plaintiff signed the returned 602

Form and sent it back to Donovan. (Plaintiff’s Decl., para. 7.) The Appeals Coordinator at

Donovan rejected the 602 Form as untimely on February 3, 2003. (Ex A. to Defs. MSJ.) 

Plaintiff also submitted a second 602 Form to Donovan staff dated December 13, 2002,

which documented his objection to being transported from Donovan while injured and awaiting

treatment. (Ex. B to Defs. MSJ; Plaintiff’s Decl., para. 8.) Although Plaintiff’s second 602 form

was signed, it was also erroneously rejected as untimely on February 3, 2003. (Id.) 

Plaintiff did not object to or appeal the rejection of his December 12, 2002 and December

13, 2002, 602 Forms. (Plaintiff’s Decl., para. 7.)

IV.

STANDARD ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The moving

party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party must identify the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, or other evidence which the moving party “believes demonstrates the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

“A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to 

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resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth.” SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306

(9th Cir. 1982).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there

is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly supported

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must point to some facts in the record that

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson

School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323).

V.

 DISCUSSION - Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Defendants Peterson, Williams, and Cobb seek summary adjudication on the ground that

Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. Before the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) was enacted, prisoners challenging the conditions of

confinement under 42 U.S.C. §1983 were not generally required to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing suit in district court. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-01

(1982); Porter v. Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 987 (2002). The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a),

however, to provide that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

section 1983 of this title, or any federal law, by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(a); Porter, 122 S.Ct. at 988; Wyatt v. Terhune, 280 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2002). Under

the PLRA, “exhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court, but is mandatory.

Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). 

The Supreme Court has called “protecting administrative agency authority and promoting

judicial efficiency” the “twin purposes” of administrative exhaustion. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503

U.S. 140, 145 (1992); see also Porter, 122 S.Ct. at 988 (noting that corrective action taken in

response to an inmate’s grievance might improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate and

thereby obviate the need for litigation, help to filter out frivolous claims and provide the court with

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an administrative record that clarifies the contours of the controversy) (citing Booth v. Churner,

532 U.S. 731, 737 (2001).

In Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006), the Supreme Court further defined the

exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, stating: “The text of 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) strongly suggests

that the PLRA uses the term “exhausted” to mean what the term means in administrative law,

where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.” Ngo, 126 S.Ct. at 2387. Proper exhaustion “means

using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the

issues on the merits).” Id. at 2385. (emphasis in original). Specifically, “proper exhaustion

demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the

course of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386. The question to ask is, “not only whether a prisoner has

exhausted his state remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies.” Id. at

2387. (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 

A. The CDC Form 602 Appeal Process 

The administrative appeals system for inmates in the California prison system is set forth in

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. “Any inmate or parolee under the [California

Department of Corrections’] jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition,

or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse affect upon their welfare.” CAL. CODE

REGS. tit. 15 §3084.1(a). In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must first attempt

to informally resolve the problem (within 15 working days of the event complained of) with the

staff member involved in the action or decision being appealed. Id. §§ 3084.2(b), 3084.5(a). If

unsuccessful, the prisoner must then submit a formal appeal on an inmate appeal form (a “602") to

the institution’s Appeals Coordinator or Appeals Office within 15 days of receiving the informal

response. Id., §3084.5(b). If the prisoner is again unsuccessful, he or she must submit a formal

appeal for second level review within 15 days of receiving the first level decision, which is

conducted by the warden or regional parole administrator or his designee. Id. §3084.5(c), (e)(1). 

Third level review, a request for which must be filed within 15 days of receiving the second level

decision, “shall be final and exhausts all administrative remedies available in the Department [of

Corrections].” See Cal. Dep’t. of Corrections Operations Manual, §54100.11; see also 15 C.C.R.

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In requiring proper exhaustion, the Supreme Court in Ngo took into account “the informality and

relative simplicity of prison grievance systems like California’s, as well as the fact that prisoners who litigate

in federal court generally proceed pro se and are forced to comply with numerous unforgiving deadlines and

other procedural requirements.” Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2393 (2006).

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§3084.5(d), (e)(2); Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (S.D. Cal. 2004); see also Ngo,

126 S.Ct. at 2383.1

B. Plaintiff Has Not Exhausted Administrative Remedies As To Lt. Cobb

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not exhausted his available administrative remedies

with respect to Lt. Cobb because Lt. Cobb’s conduct was not raised by Plaintiff in the 602 Forms

submitted on December 12, 2002 and December13, 2002. (Defs. MSJ at 14:3-16.) Defendants

contend that the first mention of Lt. Cobb’s conduct occurs in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Defs. MSJ at

13:2-3) Defendants further argue that because the actions of Lt. Cobb about which Plaintiff

complains occurred on December 17, 2002, it is a temporal impossibility for Plaintiff to have

placed Lt. Cobb on notice of his actions in a 602 Form dated December 12 and December 13

because the conduct had not yet happened. (Defs. MSJ at 12:11-14.)

Plaintiff contends, however, that Lt. Cobb’s actions on December 17, 2002 constituted a

continuing violation of his Constitutional rights such that Lt. Cobb was sufficiently apprised of his

conduct by the submission of Plaintiff’s two 602 Forms on December 12, 2002 and December 13,

2002. (Plaintiff’s Opp’n at 2:4-13, 8:12-9:11.)

In Ornelas v. Giurbino, 358 F. Supp. 2d 955 (S.D. Cal. 2005), plaintiff complained about

the alleged sexual harassment of a certain prison guard against him as well as the alleged

retaliatory actions of other prison staff, which occurred after the initial incident of misconduct. 

Although the plaintiff filed a 602 Form on April 16, 2002, detailing the harassment of the sole

guard who made an offensive overture to him, he did not file a subsequent 602 form to address the

alleged retaliatory conduct initiated by other guards that occurred after April 16, 2002. Finding

that Plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies against the other defendants, the Court

explained: 

“All complaints against the unnamed Defendants involved alleged action occurring after

the Plaintiff’s 602 filing. This made it temporally impossible for these Defendants to

become aware of any grievance against them. Furthermore, nowhere did . . . Plaintiff

submit any documentation or evidence that this claim had been considered by CDC 

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officials at any level of administrative review as to the Defendants in question. Therefore,

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.”

Id. at 961. 

Like the plaintiff in Ornelas, Plaintiff here has alleged misconduct by Lt. Cobb that

occurred on December 17, 2002 - five days after the filing of Plaintiff’s December 12, 2002 and

December 13, 2002 602 Forms. Lt. Cobb could not have been on placed on notice of his conduct

on December 17, 2002, nor given a chance to respond to the allegations made against him based

on the December 12, 2002 and December 13, 2002 602 Forms, which only described conduct that

occurred on December 1, 2, 3, 5, and 11 of 2002 and therefore, pre-dated the alleged incident in

which Lt. Cobb was involved. Because Lt. Cobb was not involved in the events that transpired on

December 1, 2, 3, 5, and 11 of 2002, there is no evidence that his alleged behavior on December

17, 2002 was related to the earlier events, or was in retaliation for the documentation of those

earlier events in Plaintiff’s December 12 and 13, 2002 602 Forms. Moreover, Plaintiff did not

appeal the rejection of his 602 Forms from December 12 and 13, 2002, so there is no

documentation to suggest Plaintiff somehow supplemented his original grievances to add

allegations against Lt. Cobb. Accordingly, there is no evidence to rebut Defendants’ showing as to

lack of exhaustion, nor is there evidence to establish that prison officials at any level of review

considered Plaintiff’s allegation as to Lt. Cobb. For the reasons discussed above, it is therefore

recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies against Lt. Cobb be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Cobb be

dismissed with prejudice. 

C. Plaintiff Has Not Exhausted His Administrative Remedies As To Defendants Peterson

and Williams Because He Failed To Further Appeal His Rejected 602 Forms 

Plaintiff submitted a 602 Form on December 12, 2002, which describes the December 1,

2002 incident at Donovan. (Ex. A to Defs. MSJ.) The 602 Form was not given a log number and

was instead returned to Plaintiff on January 3, 2003 because Plaintiff failed to sign the 602 as

required in “Section B” of the form. (Ex. C to Defs. MSJ). Plaintiff’s second 602 Form, which

was submitted on December 13, 2002, was also returned in error to Plaintiff on January 3, 2003.

(Ex. D. To Defs. MSJ.) At the bottom of the Medical Appeal Notice/Screening Form dated

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January 9, 2003, and attached to Plaintiff’s returned 602 forms, is language advising inmates that

“[t]his screening action may not be appealed unless you allege that the above-reason is not

accurate. Please return this form to the appeals office with the necessary information as indicated

above for processing your CDC 602.” (Ex. C to MSJ.)

By the time Plaintiff received the January 3, 2003 Screening Form, he had been transferred

to Chuckawalla Valley State Prison. (Ex. D to Defs. MSJ.) Plaintiff signed the rejected 602

Forms and returned them to Donovan. (Exhs. B and D to Defs. MSJ.) The appeals were then

rejected as untimely on February 3, 2003 by Appeals Coordinator D. Scudder at Donovan. Id. 

Language printed at the bottom of Plaintiff’s Inmate Appeals Screening Form dated February 3,

2003, which rejected Plaintiff’s 602 Forms as untimely, advised “t]his screening decision may not

be appealed unless you allege the above-reason is inaccurate. In such a case, please return this

form to the Appeals Office with the necessary information. You have 15 days to comply.” (Ex. D

to MSJ.) 

In his Declaration in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

admits that he did not appeal the rejection of his December 12, 2002 and December 13, 2002 602

Forms. (Plaintiff’s Decl., para 9.) Consequently, he never received review of his grievance by

prison officials at the formal levels of review. Plaintiff’s only action upon receiving the

untimeliness rejection to his 602s was the filing of the instant action on February 25, 2004, over a

year later. [Doc. No.1 - Complaint.] Plaintiff attributes the failure to further appeal the rejection of

his 602 Forms in part to his uncertainty as to how to proceed and his belief that no further

administrative remedies were available. (Plaintiff’s Decl., para 9.) Plaintiff also contends prison

officials did not respond to his grievance in a timely manner thereby rendering the administrative

process unavailable. (Plaintiff’s Opp’n at 5:17-20.) Finally, Plaintiff argues because prison

officials erroneously deemed his 602 Forms as untimely and rejected them on that incorrect basis,

he was prevented from pursuing additional steps in the prison’s administrative remedy process. 

(Plaintiff’s Opp’n at 7:8-20.) 

In response to Plaintiffs’ contentions and in response to specific issues raised by the

District Court in its March 14, 2007 Order, Defendants argue that unlike the Plaintiff in Ngo, who

filed an untimely Form 602, the Plaintiff here filed a timely, but procedurally defective, claim. 

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Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not only given the opportunity to cure his incomplete 602

Form, which he did, but Plaintiff was also instructed, through clear language on the prison

screening form, on how to appeal the rejection of his 602 Forms for reasons he felt were

inaccurate. (Defs. MSJ at 18:13-21.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff made no attempt to appeal the

prison’s untimeliness determination. (Defs. MSJ at 18:22-19:7.) Defendants also underscore the

availability of the inmate grievance procedure to Plaintiff despite the fact that he was transferred

and hospitalized. Defendants note that, although Plaintiff was transferred to Chuckawalla, he

received correspondence from Donovan and in turn corresponded with Donovan as evidenced by:

(1) the January 9, 2003 screening form, which requested Plaintiff sign his 602 Forms and return

them to Donovan and (2) the February 3, 2003 screening form, which rejected his 602 Forms as

untimely. (Defs, MSJ at 19:10-20:7; Exhs. C and D to Defs. MSJ.) Finally, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff deliberately bypassed the administrative process put in place by the prison when Plaintiff

did not take the clearly delineated steps necessary to appeal any inaccuracies he perceived prison

officials to have made when they rejected his 602 Forms as untimely. (Defs. MSJ at 20:10-23.)

The Court acknowledges the requirement that “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance

with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules ...” Ngo, 126 S. Ct. at 2386. This

requirement, however, must be viewed in light of authority for the proposition that a prison’s

failure to respond to or return an inmate grievance may result in a finding that exhaustion

occurred. See e.g. Boyd v. Corrections Corp. Of America, 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004)

(administrative remedies exhausted where prison failed to respond to grievance within policy time

limits); Jernigan v. Stuchell 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (failing to respond in a timely

manner to inmate grievance renders administrative remedy unavailable); Lewis v. Washington, 300

F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) (where prison officials fail to respond, administrative remedy is

unavailable and thereby exhausted); Brown v. Croak, 312 F. 3d 109, 111 (3d. Cir. 2002)

(administrative remedy unavailable where prisoner was instructed to wait until investigation was

complete before filing grievance, but was never informed that investigation had ended.); Miller v.

Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (a remedy prison officials prevent a prisoner from

utilizing is not an available remedy.)

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Although the prison officials at Donovan did not provide an informal level response to

Plaintiff’s December 12, 2002 and December 13, 2002 602 Forms within the 10-working-day time

limit, they did respond to Plaintiff, who had been transferred to Chuckawalla Valley State Prison,

on January 9, 2003 and gave him an opportunity to correct his incomplete 602 Form by filling in

the signature blank. See Ex. C to Defs’ MSJ; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 §3084.3 (c)(5) (explaining

that an appeal may be rejected if it is “incomplete.”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15 §3084.6 (b)(1)

(stating that “informal level responses shall be completed within 10 working days.”). From

Chuckawalla Valley State Prison, Plaintiff signed and returned the 602 Forms to Donovan, which

were rejected and returned to Plaintiff less than a month later on February 3, 2003. (Ex. D to

Defs’ MSJ.) As the Court noted above in its description of the screening forms, language printed

at the bottom of the February 3, 2003 form indicated “t]his screening decision may not be appealed

unless you allege the above-reason is inaccurate. In such a case, please return this form to the

Appeals Office with the necessary information. You have 15 days to comply.” (Ex. D to MSJ.) 

Based on the undisputed facts that prison officials: (1) responded to Plaintiff’s incomplete

602 Forms as well as the corrected 602 Forms, (2) gave Plaintiff an opportunity and a time frame

in which to appeal the rejection of those forms and (3) Plaintiff made no attempt to appeal the

rejection, this Court is not persuaded by the argument that prison officials made the grievance

system unavailable to him. The facts of Plaintiff’s case are unlike other cases where prison

officials altogether failed to respond to a prisoner grievance, or unreasonably and excessively

delayed their response for months, leaving the prisoner unaware of how or when to proceed. See

e.g. Boyd v. Corrections Corp. Of America, 380 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004); Lewis v.

Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833. Here, Plaintiff received notification that his 602s were rejected

as untimely, and regardless of whether that determination by the prison was correct, Plaintiff was

given instructions and a time frame in which to object to the decision to the extent it was

inaccurate. (Exs. A, B and D to Defs. MSJ.) Plaintiff made no effort to appeal those decisions,

even though it is clear from his receipt of screening forms from Donovan that he was afforded the

opportunity to correspond with Donovan from Chuckawalla. (Plaintiff’s Decl., para. 7.) It is,

therefore, recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust

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administrative remedies against Defendants Peterson, Williams, and Cobb be GRANTED and 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust his claim

through the Director’s Level of review in accordance with Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA.

D. PLAINTIFF’S PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS’ FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT MOTION ARE OVERRULED. 

Plaintiff objects to the filing of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without 

concurrent separate statement of undisputed material fact. (Plaintiff’s Opp’n, 1:15-20.) It is

recommended that Plaintiff’s objection be OVERRULED. Unlike other districts, this district

does not require the filing of a separate statement of material fact in support of a motion for

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Local Civil Rule 7.1

(f)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), See also Lewis Management Co., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 1995 WL

724835, *8, No. 94-1903 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 1995). 

Plaintiff also contends the exhibits in support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment lack authentication. (Plaintiff’s Opp’n, 1:21-25.) Plaintiff, however, authenticated

Exhibit A (December 12, 2002 602 Form), Exhibit B (December 13, 2002 602 Form), Exhibit C

(January 9, 2003 Screening Form), and Exhibit D (February 3, 2003 Screening Form) to

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in his November 27, 2004 declaration, filed under

penalty of perjury, in opposition to Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. See Plaintiff’s Decl. in

support of Opposition - Doc. No. 15, p. 6, paras. 3 and 5. Therefore, it is recommended that

Plaintiff’s objection be OVERRULED.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order GRANTING with prejudice Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants

Peterson, Williams, and Cobb for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1997e(a).

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to United States District Judge M.

James Lorenz pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written 

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties by March 28, 2008. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed by April 16, 2008. The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 28, 2008

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge, U.S. District Court

Copy to:

HONORABLE M. JAMES LORENZ

PRISONER PRO SE

ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL OF RECORD

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