Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00317/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00317-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENEE LIAS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA,

OFFICE OF COUNTY COUNSEL,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-00317 SI

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION

TO STRIKE, AND VACATING HEARING

On July 5, 2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss and strike portions ofplaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint. The Court takes this motion under submission without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b).

Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss and strike

for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiff’s employment with defendant, the Alameda County Office of County

Counsel. Plaintiff alleges that defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race and gender. Plaintiff

is an African-American woman who was employed as a deputy county counsel from April 28, 2003 to July

30, 2004, when she was terminated. Specifically, she alleges that, when she was hired, defendant represented

that she would be part of a newly organized litigation unit, but that she was primarily given assignments other

than litigation, unlike her Caucasian and male counterparts. She alleges that she was paid less than male and

Caucasian deputy attorneys, and that she was denied retroactive pay for more than six months, while such

retroactive pay was givento a Caucasian female attorney. Plaintiff also alleges that her break time at work was

“micro-managed” and that she was told that there was an office policy of not sending more than one attorney

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to a conference at once, but this policywas not applied to Caucasian attorneys attending training conferences.

Plaintiff was laid off fromwork on July 30, 2004. She alleges that a Caucasian male laid off at the same

time was givenan opportunity to performwork on county cases for a law firm under contract with the County

Counsel’s office, while she was not offered this option. The County has invited her to return on a contract basis

but offered her an hourly rate of $15.00 less than similarly situated Caucasian contract attorneys. In addition,

plaintiff alleges that, during the period of her employment, her supervisor contracted out cases that she was

qualified to handle, helping to create an “economic reason” for plaintiff’s lay-off. According to the complaint,

plaintiff advocated forfair employment practices and equalpay during the six months prior to her removal, and

she alleges that her termination was in retaliation for these protected activities.

Plaintiff filed a timely charge with the United States Equal Opportunity Commission, which issued a

right-to-sue notice. She also filed a government tort claim with the Alameda County Board ofSupervisors on

November 5, 2004, which was rejected on November 18, 2004. She filed this lawsuit on January 24, 2005.

On June 7, 2005, the Court granted a motion by defendant to dismiss plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims without

leave to amend,to dismissthe seventh claim (forintentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress) with leave to amend,

and to strike references to Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200. On June 22, 2005, plaintiff filed a Second

Amended Complaint. 

Inthe Second AmendedComplaint, plaintiffbrings claims forrace and gender discriminationunderTitle

VII ofthe CivilRights Act of1964; retaliation under Title VII; wrongful termination in breach ofpublic policy;

and intentional infliction of emotionaldistress. She also adds several new allegations and requests for punitive

damages that were not in her prior complaint.

Now before the Court is a motion by defendant to dismiss plaintiff’s intentionalinfliction of emotional

distress claim and to strike the references to punitive damages and the new allegations not specifically

authorized by the Court’s June 7, 2005 Order.

LEGAL STANDARDS

1. Motion to dismiss

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The question presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether

the plaintiff will prevail in the action, but whether the plaintiffis entitled to offer evidence in support of the claim.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (2004). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other

grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). In answering this question, the Court must assume that

the plaintiff's allegations are true and must draw allreasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Usher v. City

of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the pleadings suggests that the chance

of recovery is remote, the Court must allow the plaintiff to develop the case at this stage of the proceedings.

See United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Ifthe Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth

Circuit has "repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the

pleading was made, unlessit determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegationofother

facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F. 3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and internalquotationmarks omitted).

2. Motion to strike 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that "the court may order stricken from any pleading

any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Rule 12(f) motions

serve the function of "avoid[ing] the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious

issues by dispensing with those issues priorto trial.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir.

1993) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Rule 12(f) motions are generally disfavored and “should not

be granted unless it is clear thatthe matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter

of the litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 

DISCUSSION

1. Motion to dismiss

Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s Fifth Claim forintentional infliction of emotional distress. This

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claim, which was the Seventh Claim in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, was dismissed by the Court with

leave to amend on June 7, 2005. In its prior order, the Court found that plaintiff had not pled sufficient facts

establishing the County’sliability for emotionaldistress damages under any statute, nor alleged the elements of

emotional distress, specifically the extreme, outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress required. It

granted plaintiff “leave to amend to plead facts – alleging both statutory liability and the elements of the tort –

that would support this claim.” June 7, 2005 Order at 6:5-6.

In her Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff adds several references to Title VII, alleging that

defendant’s conduct included “deliberate engaging in discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII,” thereby

causing severe emotional distress. In addition, she alleges:

Defendants engaged in conduct in failing to protect Plaintiff from being subjected to

discriminationand retaliation, and other offensive conduct ofDefendants described herein, and

such violations of Title VII, which constitutes the egregious conduct element of this claim for

relief, including such other wrongful conduct as herein alleged, Defendants abused their special

position as Plaintiff’ssuperiors, which vested them with substantialpower to controlPlaintiff’s

work environment and to damage Plaintiff’s interest and well being. Through the outrageous

conduct as described above, Defendants acted with intent to cause, or with reckless disregard

for the probability of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress. 

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 66. 

Defendant argues that this claim remains defective because (1) despite the references to Title VII, plaintiff has

not set forth an adequate statutory basis for the claim; and (2) plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts for this

cause of action.

Under California law, where the defendant is a government entity, plaintiffs must specifically allege the

statutory basis for liability, and must plead with particularity every fact essential to that statutory liability. See

Cal. Gov. Code § 815; Forbes v. County ofSan Bernardino, 101 Cal. App. 4th 48, 53 (2002). Here, plaintiff

references Title VII – under which she brings her First, Second, and Fourth Claims – in her intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim, and defendant contends that Title VII cannot simultaneously serve as a separate

cause of action and a statutory basis for the emotionaldistress claim. Defendant cites no specific authority for

this argument, and the Court is aware of none. Nonetheless, even assuming that Title VII is an appropriate

statutory basis for emotionaldistress liability, the Courtfindsthatplaintiff has once again failed to plead sufficient

facts for an intentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress claim. As before, she has not alleged any facts establishing

outrageous conduct by defendant or severe emotional distress. While plaintiff correctly argues that

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discrimination in employment may constitute the outrageous conduct in certain circumstances, her Second

Amended Complaint contains only conclusory statements about defendant’s conduct, not factual allegations

of conduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community,” as this tort

requires. Schlauch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d 926, 936 (1983). Therefore,

defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s Fifth Claim.

Because plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend this claim, and has failed to plead

sufficient facts a second time, the Court considers further amendment to be futile. The claim is DISMISSED

without leave to amend.

2. Motion to strike

Defendant asks the Court to strike references to punitive damages, which plaintiff has included forthe

first time in the Second Amended Complaint. In addition, defendant moves to strike the allegations in

paragraphs 4 and 5; page 8:5-8; paragraphs 46, 52; and paragraph 60 at 9:18-21. In plaintiff’s Opposition,

she does not address defendant’s motion to strike.

The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may not be recovered against government entities

like defendant. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Therefore, the

references to punitive or exemplary damages, found in the Second Amended Complaint at 8:5-8 and 9:18-21,

are hereby STRICKEN. In addition, the Court finds it appropriate to strike paragraphs 4, 5, 46, and 52 of

the Second Amended Complaint as immaterial pursuant to Rule 12(f). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS

defendant’s motion to strike.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’smotion

to dismiss and strike. The hearing set for August 12, 2005 is VACATED. [Docket # 34]

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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