Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06533/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06533-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE EZELL, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

)

EDWARDS THEATRES, INC., et )

al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:04-CV-6533-SMS

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (DOC. 65)

ORDER DIRECTING THE PARTIES TO

PARTICIPATE IN AN INFORMAL

TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

ON JANUARY 23, 2007, AT 9:00 A.M.

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court. 

By order dated February 23, 2005, entered upon to the parties’

consent, Judge Robert E. Coyle assigned this action to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including the

entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R.

Civ. P. 73(b), and Local Rule 73-301. 

Pending before the Court is the motion of Defendants Edwards

Theatres, Inc., and Turner Security Systems, Inc., for summary

judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, filed on

November 10, 2006, along with a notice of motion, a memorandum in

support of the motion, the declarations of Christine A. Kohler

and Tim Funaoka, and a statement of undisputed facts. Plaintiffs

filed opposition, including a memorandum in response to the

Case 1:04-cv-06533-SMS Document 89 Filed 12/21/06 Page 1 of 43
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motion, factual statement, a motion to seal a document pursuant

to protective order, and a declaration of Elizabeth Brancart in

opposition to the motion. Defendants filed a reply, including a

memorandum, reply statement of undisputed facts, and objections

to evidence. Without leave being sought or granted by the Court,

Plaintiffs filed on December 13, 2006, opposition regarding the

declaration of Denise Sandoval; on December 14, 2006, Defendants

filed a reply to Plaintiff’s response to their evidentiary

objections. 

The matter was heard on December 15, 2006, with all counsel

appearing telephonically. Appearing for the moving Defendants

were Christine A. Kohler and Michael R. Lindsay. Appearing on

behalf of the Plaintiffs was Elizabeth Brancart. After argument,

the matter was submitted to the Court. 

Thereafter Plaintiffs filed a notice of intention to dismiss

their negligence claim, each side to bear its own costs.

Defendants have not responded to such notice. 

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Where a party with the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial as to a matter moves for summary judgment, it must

demonstrate affirmatively by evidence each essential element of

its claim or affirmative defense and must establish that there is

no triable issue of fact as to each essential element such that a

rational trier of fact could render a judgment in its favor.

Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,

888 (9 Cir. 2003). If a party moves for summary judgment with th

respect to a matter as to which the opposing party has the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, then the moving party

must show that the opposing party cannot meet its burden of proof

at trial by establishing that there is no genuine issue of

material fact as to an essential element of the opposing party’s

claim or defense; the moving party must meet the initial burden

of producing evidence or showing an absence of evidence as well

as the ultimate burden of persuasion. Nissan Fire Ltd. v. Fritz

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000). In order to carry th

its burden of production, the moving party must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the opposing party's

claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.

Case 1:04-cv-06533-SMS Document 89 Filed 12/21/06 Page 3 of 43
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1990)). In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on

the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there

is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. 

However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the "purpose of summary

judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments). The evidence of

the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). 

Nevertheless, it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal.

1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the

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Court must not weigh the evidence, the Court must draw reasonable

inferences; evidence that is too insubstantial or speculative may

be insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250,

1255 (9 Cir. 1982); Dept. of Commerce v. U.S. House of Rep., 525 th

U.S. 316, 334 (1999). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the

opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 586. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the opposing

party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a

showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587. 

The showings must consist of admissible evidence,

Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

1335 n.9 (9 Cir. 1980), or pleadings, depositions, answers to th

interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits or declarations, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Affidavits shall be based on personal

knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred

to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

Id. Declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used with

the same force and effect as affidavits. Pollock v. Pollock, 154

F.3d 601, 611, n.20 (6 Cir. 1998). Personal knowledge may be th

inferred from declarations themselves, such as from facts

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concerning a declarant’s position and participation, Barthelemy

v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9 Cir. 1990); th

however, a court cannot draw an inference about facts not

specifically put in the record by a party, and a court will not

assume that general averments embrace specific facts needed to

sustain a complaint, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497

U.S. 871, 887 (1990).

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9 Cir. 2001). th

A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the

benefit of any relevant presumptions that support the motion

provided that the facts giving rise to the presumption are

undisputed. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254

(9 Cir. 1982). th

III. Facts

Many of the facts are undisputed, or are undisputed for

purposes of this motion. 

It is undisputed that a Caucasian woman accompanied by a

Caucasian man sitting two or three rows in front of Plaintiffs

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 Defendants object to the declaration of Denise Sandoval as inadmissible because not produced in 1

discovery, hearsay, immaterial, and incompetence of Sandoval as a witness. However, without waiving these

objections, Plaintiffs admit all facts listed in Plaintiff’s facts and evidence for the purposes of this motion only. The

evidentiary objections are thus not explored because the facts are admitted. 

8

Michelle and Valerie Ezell looked at them and rolled her eyes as

Plaintiffs found their seats. She looked at them in a way that

caused Plaintiff to wonder what was wrong. (Dep. PVE 22, 27-28,

117.)

Denise Sandoval, who sat behind and to the right of

Plaintiffs at the movie, confirmed that the woman had made an

ugly face, as if to say, “Don’t sit by us.”1

Plaintiff testified that when Charlize Theron appeared on

the screen, the whole audience, including two women who were

sitting behind Plaintiffs, commented on her looks. (Brancart

Decl., Ex. 1, Dep. of Pltf. Valerie Ezell, 23-24.) Plaintiff

described the level of her voice as follows: she and her sister

were right next to each other, pretty much face-to-face and

mouth-to-ear, using a normal speaking voice. She also described

the conversation as a whisper among the four women. The women

sitting just behind them also made comments that were audible.

(Dep. PVE 29-33.) Plaintiff characterized the “mouth to ear”

communication with her sister as involving whispering to each

other, and Plaintiff would lean in to her; she did not mean that

they talked at an otherwise normal level, and her voice was

generally low anyway and in any event had not been as loud as it

was in deposition. (Dep. PVE 121.)

At some point in the movie, Plaintiff called the other

female in the movie a “dumb ass.” (Dep. PVE 119-20.) Her comments

to the movie, as distinct from to her sister, were in Plaintiff’s

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normal speaking voice. (Tr. 120.)

During a rape scene about ten to fifteen minutes into the

movie, Plaintiff, her sister, and others in the audience

commented with exclamations regarding the graphic nature of the

rape as presented. Later they engaged in exhortations to the

raped woman to “Get him back. Don’t let him do that to you.”

Plaintiff Valerie testified that in a normal speaking voice her

sister also told the actress to stab the rapist, or to get his

ass, or to shoot or kill him. (Dep. PVE 31-32, 120.) Plaintiff

Valerie Ezell admitted that after the rape scene, she told her

sister that the response of the raped woman was female power,

and, “She got his ass. She got his ass.” Plaintiff Valerie Ezell

admitted that they were loud in talking to the movie screen, but

so was everyone else; she could have been talking in her normal

speaking voice during the comments about the rape, which would

probably seem louder inside of the theater. (Dep. PVE 24, 31-32.)

Defendants admit for purposes of this motion that Sandoval

observed some comments during the rape scene; the sisters were

not doing any more than anyone else in the theater and were not

talking as much as the ladies above them; and Plaintiff Michelle

observed others talking throughout the movie, with a lot of

people reacting to different parts of the movie.

Not even a couple of minutes later during a time when

Plaintiffs were not talking, Leist, the woman sitting below

Plaintiffs, stood halfway up, turned to Plaintiffs, and yelled,

“You two niggers shut up.” (Dep. P Valerie Ezell (PVE) at 24, 34,

37.) Plaintiffs were shocked and confused that she was referring

to them. 

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Defendants admit for purposes of this motion that the white

people turned around and said something like, “shut up you two

niggers.” Further, the sisters looked around, but they were the

only black people in the auditorium.

Defendants admit for the purposes of this motion that the

white people kept turning and looking back at the black ladies,

who remained quiet and watched the movie.

Plaintiff Michelle Ezell told the woman to turn around;

however, the woman continually looked in Plaintiffs’ direction

and once again said, “Yeah, I mean you. I mean you.” Michelle

told her to shut the fuck up and mind her own business. (Dep. PVE

p. 25, 35.) 

Plaintiff testified that the conversations between the woman

and Plaintiff’s sister were audible; Plaintiff’s sister was not

shouting, but Plaintiff was pretty sure that people around them

could hear both speakers. (Dep. PVE 40-41.) Plaintiff Valerie

Ezell Plaintiff told her sister to calm down.

About forty-five minutes into the movie, the woman then

turned and gave Plaintiffs the “middle finger.” Plaintiff again

told her sister to forget about it. (Dep. PVE 38.)

Defendants admit for the purposes of this motion that the

white lady flipped off the Plaintiffs, and then the Plaintiff

with the lighter skin told the white lady to “turn around,

bitch,” which resulted in the while man whispering to the white

woman, who got up and left. 

The white woman left her seat about fifteen or twenty

minutes after beginning the interaction with Plaintiff and her

sister, and her male companion remained in his seat and was

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snickering. (Dep. PVE 26-27, 36.)

During the entire time of the conversation between the woman

and Plaintiffs, Plaintiff Valerie was aware that the woman’s male

companion was laughing audibly as if to support the woman’s

conduct. (Dep. p. 42.)

Plaintiff Valerie Ezell admitted that everyone was laughing

at scenes in the movie, including Plaintiffs, and they once

talked a little bit with two Hispanic ladies sitting behind them,

having a short four-way conversation. (Dep. PVE 26-28.) Plaintiff

Valerie Ezell did not believe that she was talking any more than

anyone else in the theater. (Dep. PVE 40.)

The woman returned to her seat, had a conversation with her

companion, and then no more than five minutes later two security

guards stormed their way into the theater. (Dep. PVE 27.) For the

purposes of this motion only, Defendants admit that Sandoval

observed the white people appear to be pleased that they had

gotten rid of the black ladies; later a police officer came in

and asked the white peole to come to the side to talk; and when

the movie ended, Sandoval approached Plaintiffs in the parking

lot and told them that she had seen what had happened.

Plaintiff Valerie Ezell believed that appropriate behavior

was not to disrupt people round her; people regularly whispered

with a person next to them in a way not to disturb everyone else

around them. It is undisputed for purposes of this motion that

Plaintiff did not believe that her behavior disturbed others but

believed that she and her sister were disturbed. (Dep. PVE 41.)

It is not disputed for the purposes of this motion that no other

person in her vicinity at the theater addressed her or shushed

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her or asked her to stop talking or be quiet. (Dep. PVE 41.)

With respect to the security guards, it is admitted that two

guards rushed in; one of the guards was or appeared Caucasian and

the other Hispanic. One guard told Plaintiffs to get up and get

out of the theater. Defendants admit for the purposes of this

motion that the guards charged in, entered like a swat team, and

yelled at the sisters to get up and come with them. The sisters

had to gather up their belongings and leave their seats.

Plaintiffs responded by asking what was going on and why

they were being asked to leave. Defendants admit that the ladies

looked really surprised; then the security guards got loud and

belligerent, disturbing the people who were trying to watch the

movie and talking to Plaintiffs as if they had done something

really wrong; and the Plaintiffs appeared to be hurt by being

singled out like that. For the purposes of this motion only,

Defendants admit that Sandoval was surprised that the white

people were not also asked to leave by the security guards;

further, Sandoval thought that the Plaintiffs would be back

inside soon.

At a dimly lit area away from the seating area and near the

trash can, the guard told them that it was reported that

Plaintiffs had started an altercation in the theater and that

they would need to leave. Plaintiffs sought to have the

complaining party brought out to discuss the situation, told the

guards about three times each that they had been called “niggers”

inside the theater by the complaining person, and Michelle told

the guards twice that the Caucasian woman had flipped them off.

The guards asked for Plaintiffs’ ticket stubs and addressed them,

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calling them “you people” and “you two” more than twice each, or

according to Plaintiff Michelle, addressing them only in that

fashion. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs testified that the

guards did not listen to their side of the story, shouted at

them, and interrupted them; the guards had a very harsh demeanor

and were pushy, fairly loud, and aggressive, although they did

not touch Plaintiffs, use profanity, or make any express comments

to Plaintiffs about their race. Plaintiffs testified that they

did not use any profanity towards the security guards. It is

admitted that neither officer at deposition testified to

Plaintiffs’ having used any profanity during their contact with

the guards. 

It is admitted for purposes of this motion that although one

guard, Officer Vidrio, asked Plaintiffs for their ticket stubs,

he could not recall if he ever asked to see the stub of Lori

Leist, the complaining white woman. 

Plaintiff Valerie believed that the security guards treated

Plaintiffs as they did because of Plaintiff’s race based on the

guards’ conduct appearing to be an extension of the wrong done to

them inside the theater; the guards were on the side of the

people who had wronged Plaintiffs; the guards would not listen to

Plaintiffs; the stance and way of looking at Plaintiffs exhibited

by the Caucasian guard indicated that he did not want to hear

their story. (Dep. PVE 58-59.) The Court accepts this evidence

not as constituting a legal conclusion but rather as evincing

Plaintiffs’ state of mind and understanding.

Plaintiff Michelle also believed that the actions of the

guards were racist because they did not pay attention to

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Plaintiffs’ complaint about having been called “niggers” inside

the theater, they called Plaintiffs “you two” or “you people,”

and they were unwilling to listen to Plaintiffs’ side of the

story and thus simply expected Plaintiffs to have been guilty of

the alleged misconduct. (Decl. of Brancart, Ex. 2, Dep. Plaintiff

Michelle Ezell (PME), 36-37.) Again, the Court accepts this

evidence as reflecting Plaintiff’s state of mind and not as

constituting a legal conclusion.

For the purposes of this motion, Defendants do not dispute

the testimony of Officers Smith and Vidrio, the guards, to the

effect that the guards entered the theater after the white

female, Lori Leist, complained that when she asked them to be

quiet one of the Ezell sisters had told her to “shut the fuck

up.” They had not received any other complaints during that

movie. Officer Smith knew only that there was a report of a

disturbance. Leist pointed out the Plaintiffs to Vidrio. Neither

Vidrio nor Smith observed any disturbance or disruptive behavior

when they entered the theater; everything was quiet. Further, the

theater was not completely full and was little more than half

full.

It is not disputed that the guards refused to give Valerie

their names or badge numbers; Funaoka, the manager, never

provided any information, either. Further, Vidrio admitted at

deposition that although he reported at the time that the police

officer who came out of the auditorium went outside and told

Plaintiffs to leave, he did not really hear what the officer said

because he was inside the building. 

The Edwards operation gives site post orders, patron

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removal, and security personnel guidance to Turner Security

personnel but does not provide training or other written

guidance. Turner and Edwards have a written contract for Turner

to provide security services to the Edwards Fresno theater

location. Guards Smith and Vidrio were both employees of Turner

Security, performing their duties as Turner Security guards. 

The Turner Security manual prohibits discrimination.

With respect to the manager on duty, it is undisputed that

according to Plaintiffs, the theater manager, an Asian man named

Funaoka, approached Plaintiffs in the main theater lobby, asked

Plaintiffs for their ticket stubs, and told them that they needed

to leave the theater. On two or three occasions, the manager

referred to Plaintiffs as “you people” and “you two.” Plaintiffs

testified that they told the theater manager about four times

that they had been called “niggers” inside the theater and twice

told him that the Caucasian woman had flipped them off. 

It is admitted for purposes of this motion that Funaoka

entered the theater to speak with Leist. He spoke with her in the

hallway of the auditorium and wanted her to tell her side of the

story without having to miss any more of the movie than was

necessary; she was rushed and short about her story; and he did

not tell her that Plaintiffs had complained of her use of a

racial slur or profanity but told her that she was being accused

of being a racist, which she dismissed without a verbal response.

Funaoka then thanked her for her time and apologized again and

allowed her to return to the movie. He did not ask to see her

ticket. 

Plaintiff Michelle Ezell testified that she used the word

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“damn” probably about three times in her conversation with the

manager, but no other profanity; Plaintiff Valerie Ezell denied

using any profanity with the manager. It is undisputed that

Funaoka offered Plaintiffs readmission passes. He said, “Listen,

why don’t you people give me your ticket stubs and we’ll give you

a refund.” He did not say anything expressly to Plaintiffs about

their race or use profanity. The manager refused to permit

Plaintiffs to wait for family members watching another movie,

including a daughter who was nine months pregnant, inside the

theater. Plaintiff left the building.

Plaintiff Valerie believed that the manager’s actions were

based on race because he took the Caucasian woman’s side of the

story and referred to Plaintiffs as “you two” and “you people.”

Plaintiff Michelle believed that the managers’s actions were

racist because of the smirk he had on his face when she told him

that Plaintiffs had been called “niggers”; further, he did not

listen to them.

For the purposes of this motion, Defendants admit that

whenever Plaintiff Michelle Ezell told Funaoka they had been

called “niggers,” he put his head down and smirked, a half smile

on his face.

The declaration of Funaoka consists of a statement that he

was the assistant manager at the theater, had personal knowledge

of the facts, and adopted as true and correct and as reflecting

his recollection of the events therein described a statement that

he prepared on the date of the incident, namely, February 7,

2004. The statement reported that Funoaka listened to Plaintiffs’

side of the story, which included the white woman telling them to

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 1746 provides: 2

Wherever, under any law of the United States or

under any rule, regulation, order, or requirement

made pursuant to law, any matter is required or

permitted to be supported, evidenced, established,

or proved by the sworn declaration, verification,

certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in

writing of the person making the same (other

than a deposition, or an oath of office, or an 

oath required to be taken before a specified

official other than a notary public), such

matter may, with like force and effect, be 

supported, evidenced, established, or proved

by the unsworn declaration, certificate,

verification, or statement, in writing of

such person which is subscribed by him, as

true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in

17

shut the fuck up, Plaintiffs’ response of telling her to turn

around, and Plaintiffs being flipped off; security guards talked

to them and told them to leave; the manager was called, talked to

the Plaintiffs, talked to the guards, talked to the Caucasian

woman and a gentleman who also was offended by Plaintiffs, and

obtained statements from both the woman and the man. The manager

then informed Plaintiffs that he wanted their ticket stubs to

refund them; Plaintiffs ripped up the tickets and refused the

offer; wrote the guard’s name down and said they would be filing

suit; and left upon the manager’s direction to them to leave. The

manager also said that in his best judgment, in dealing with all

parties, Plaintiffs were very belligerent, foul-mouthed, and

threatening, and their use of excessive profanity, threatening

body language, and threats of lawsuits were not necessary and

very abrasive. The Caucasian woman and the man were very helpful,

pleasant, and kind, with a calm and sincere attitude. He stated:

Their stories collaborated (sic) in full, my first

impressions of customer A’s [Plaintiffs’] demeanor.

Plaintiffs object to the declaration as hearsay. The Court notes

that the declaration meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746.2

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substantially the following form:

(1) If executed without the United States:

“I declare (or certify, verify, or state)

under penalty of perjury under the laws

of the United States of America that 

the foregoing is true and correct. Executed

on (date).

(Signature)”.

(2) If executed within the United States, its

territories, possessions, or commonwealths: 

“I declare (or certify, verify, or state)

under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct. Executed on (date).

(Signature)”.

18

The appropriate declaration of truth under penalty of perjury was

present. Funaoka declared that he had made the statement on the

date of the incident and that the statements he made were true

and correct and reflected his recollection of the events

described therein; rather than reciting that account, he attached

a true and correct copy. It would seem a futile and resourcewasting process to require him to re-type the events. 

Funaoka is not testifying. Thus, the Court rejects

Defendants’ assertion that this constitutes an adoption of a

statement by a witness testifying and subject to crossexamination within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1).

However, it does qualify as a declaration.

With respect to hearsay, it would appear that the statements

made by others that were reported in the declaration of Funaoka

were mentioned not for the purpose of showing that they were

true, but rather to show that they were made and their effect on

those who heard them. Funaoka’s characterizations of the demeanor

and attitudes of the various participants appears to be

descriptive of their conduct and of his reaction or state of mind

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with respect to them, and not necessarily an inadmissible

opinion. Plaintiffs admit that Funaoka made the statement. The

Court overrules Plaintiffs’ objection.

It is admitted for purposes of this motion that Funaoka

spoke with Plaintiffs at a distance of a few feet from the

guards, but the guards could not hear anything that was said in

the conversation despite their proximity; according to the

guards, the manager and Plaintiffs were just talking.

It is admitted for the purposes of this motion that Funaoka

initially testified that when he returned to the lobby after

speaking with Leist, he offered to reseat Plaintiffs, but they

immediately turned him down. Later he testified that he had not

actually offered to reseat them, but rather had informed them

that he would have liked to try to reseat them but it was very

full, he had doubts that he could seat them together, and he

could offer them a refund to return another time. 

It is also admitted for the purposes of this motion that

Funaoka initially testified that the sisters had told him that

the white woman had used racial slurs; after a break requested by

his counsel and after speaking with counsel, Funaoka clarified

that the sisters had not told him a “specific thing” about a

racial slur, but were just basically accusing the guards, Leist,

and him of being racist.

Defendants further admit for the purposes of this motion

that although Funaoka claimed that Plaintiffs used excessive

profanity that shocked him despite his repeated requests not to

use that language, the only words he could identify being used

were “bullshit” and “fuck.” His claim of threatening body

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language was based on Michelle’s ripping up her ticket and

throwing it at his feet. 

It is admitted for purposes of this motion that the manager

on duty had the authority to direct Turner Security guards to

undertake a project or to deal with a problem. Further, he had

the duty to uphold and administer all Regal Entertainment Group

(REG) corporate policies and the responsibility to oversee guest

relations. 

It was undisputed that the movie theater had a right to

maintain a non-distracting, movie-going atmosphere for its

guests.

With respect to the pertinent practices and procedures, 

Defendants admit and do not dispute for purposes of this motion

that as the testimony of various persons in their organization

(Funaoka, general manager Henry Myoshi, District Manager Richard

Herman of Regal Entertainment Group) reflected, the practice and

unwritten policy and training standard of Edwards theater for

ushers and security guards by management when there was a

complaint about profanity or a slur was to gather as much

information as possible, get a balanced presentation of the facts

as possible, and interview other persons who might be neutral or

unbiased and not just interview one set of witnesses. A security

guard or manager would be sent in to the theater to observe; if

it was quiet, the person would observe to see if there actually

was a problem. If there was arguing or verbal exchange, then one

of the parties would be asked to come out to talk so as to defuse

the situation. A guard should determine if the patron was

intoxicated or a further risk to anyone present; if the situation

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was anticipated to escalate, it would be decided whether or not

to ask the patron to come outside to talk more; often all that

needed to be done was to have the usher or security guard tell

the person to keep it down.

If there is a conflict between the accounts of two patrons,

then the policy was to talk to both parties and anyone else

available to determine what had happened while keeping the

parties apart to avoid violence. If after listening to both sides

management does not know who caused the problem, the practice is

to remove both parties or try to separate them, and both parties

are asked to go to a different movie or come back at a different

time; both may be asked to leave. 

These processes had been discussed with Funaoka by general

manager Miyoshi.

The Regal Entertainment Group’s Theatre Management Manual is

the only guidance provided to managers regarding removal or

ejection of patrons from a theater; it was the policy in effect,

and Funaoka was aware of that. It provides that when one or more

patrons are causing a disturbance, it is the usher’s

responsibility to call this matter to their attention and

politely ask them to cease; if patrons are spoken to a number of

times and become belligerent, they must be removed from the

premises

In 2004, it was rare for an adult to be asked to leave the

theater. 

The incident reports written by security guards should be

thorough and accurate. 

Use of a racial slur is grounds for removal of the patron

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making the slur; a patron actually making such a slur should be

spoken to and asked to leave. However, Herman was not aware of

any patron ever being ejected for the use of racial slurs.

It is admitted for the purpose of this motion that because

Michelle Ezell had called police about her complaint of racism

not being heard, and police had come in to the theater, Funaoka

typed a statement, asked security guards to write an incident

report, and obtained statements from Leist and a Dr. Thompson,

whom Leist had identified as supporting her story. He did so by

going in to the movie just as it got out; the statements were

written on pen and paper he provided. He did not think about

asking anyone else besides Leist and Thompson; the officers did

not ask any other patrons for statements or even think about it.

This was the only time in six years at the company that Funaoka

had solicited statements about other patrons. He wrote his own

statement with the threat of a lawsuit in mind.

It is undisputed for this motion that Officer Smith never

told Leist that the ladies said she had behaved badly and perhaps

in a racist manner in the theater. He did not consider

interviewing Leist to find out what Plaintiffs were complaining

about. Officer Vidrio did not consider asking Leist to step out

of the theater or to go in to ask Leist about what the sisters

had said she had done. 

IV. Claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States

shall have the same right in every state and territory to make

and enforce contracts as enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. §

1981(a). The burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell

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Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) applies to

suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; a plaintiff must show that he

or she 1) is a member of a protected class; 2) attempted to

contract for certain services; 3) was denied the right to

contract for those services; and 4) such services remained

available to similarly situated individuals who were not members

of the plaintiff’s protected class. Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles,

LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9 Cir. 2006). th

A. Interference with the Right to Contract

The making and enforcing of contracts protected by § 1981

includes the “making, performance, modification, and termination

of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,

terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981(b). A showing that Plaintiffs were denied the enjoyment of

the same conditions of the contractual relationship during the

performance of the contract as white persons would suffice to

show denial of a right; for example, a hostile work environment

claim may support a violation of § 1981 because it interferes

with the enjoyment of all benefits and conditions of a

contractual relationship. Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d

792, 797 (9 Cir. 2003). th

The Court finds to be without merit Defendants’ argument

that Plaintiffs are unable to establish that they were denied the

right to make and enforce a contract. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs contracted for admission, were admitted, began to

watch the film, and then breached that contract by not remaining

silent, talking, and using profanity during the showing of the

movie, which constituted a disturbance. They therefore breached

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their contract and lost the right granted under the contract to

see the entire movie.

Drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to Plaintiffs,

one conclusion made possible by the evidence is that although

Plaintiffs did talk during the movie, they did not do anything

louder than or different from what many or most of the other

persons in the theater did and thus did not initially create a

disturbance. Further, the evidence regarding the tone of voice

used by Plaintiffs was such that various inferences may

reasonably be drawn, including one that with the exception of the

time when almost the entire audience was responding to a scene of

retribution by the female star, Plaintiffs took careful measures

to speak in a voice that was at the level of a whisper. Although

Plaintiffs may have spoken in an ordinary speaking voice,

additional evidence of context revealed that Plaintiffs used low

voices and leaned in to each other; thus, it may be inferred that

even the use of a normal speaking voice under the circumstances

was not disruptive. 

Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the evidence

warrants a reasonable inference that Leist, who had previously

made a very hostile face at Plaintiffs, the only black people

there, and who then used a racial epithet at a time when

Plaintiffs were not causing a disturbance, also used an obscene

gesture towards Plaintiffs. No other person complained about

Plaintiffs. Under the circumstances, it may be inferred that

Leist proceeded to make an unfair or inaccurate report to guards

and management and obtained Plaintiff’s ejection from the

auditorium because of racial animus. Although there was some

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admitted use of profanity on the part of Plaintiffs, the evidence

supports an inference that Leist employed profanity, deeply

offensive racial slurs, and an obscene gesture as well as

disruptive behavior before she left to report the incident. 

As to forfeiture of a contractual right by interaction with

the guards, crediting Plaintiff’s evidence results in an

inference that Plaintiffs used no profanity and simply sought to

be informed of the reason why they and their belongings were

being removed from the auditorium in an undignified manner, and

to have the guards consider the conduct of Leist and address the

racial slur and obscene gesture that they had suffered at her

hands. Further, reference to the governing procedures and

policies at the theater reveals that one reasonable inference is

that the guards and/or management departed from normal procedures

by not observing in the theater and/or giving warnings before

pulling Plaintiffs out; by aggressively removing Plaintiffs when

there was no continuing or escalating conflict; by not listening

to Plaintiffs’ complaints; by favoring Leist by not interviewing

her or asking for her ticket stub or removing her and by

attempting to avoid any interference with her enjoyment of the

movie; and by not investigating fairly due to a failure to seek

witnesses other than the one that appeared to support Leist.

Whether or not Plaintiffs were rightfully removed due to their

interaction with the guards is a disputed issue of fact.

As to Plaintiffs’ conduct with management, the evidence

viewed most favorably to Plaintiffs warrants the conclusion that

Funaoka treated Leist and Plaintiffs differently, evincing no

concern with Plaintiffs’ desire to complete their viewing of the

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film while attempting to facilitate Leist’s enjoyment of her

contractual privileges and not even asking her for her ticket or

about the racial slur or profanity that the evidence warrants a

reasonable inference that she had used. Also, it may be inferred

that Funaoka declined to take seriously Plaintiffs’ complaints;

and he exaggerated the profanity and hostility involved in his

interaction with Plaintiffs, who admitted using “damn” about

three times and whose only assertedly threatening body language

was to tear up the ticket in front of theater agents. A

reasonable trier of fact could find that Funaoka’s version of the

conversation was untrue because of the inconsistencies in his

testimony regarding his offer to reseat Plaintiffs and his

changed testimony after a break with his lawyer with respect to

whether or not Plaintiffs had told him that Leist had used racial

slurs. Further, the fact that Funaoka anticipated a lawsuit could

be considered by a reasonable trier of fact in evaluating the

statement he made on the day in question.

Because the evidence regarding whether or not Plaintiffs

created a disturbance or misbehaved with guards or management is

disputed, there is an issue of material fact as to whether or not

Plaintiff breached their contract. A rational interpretation of

the contract between the parties is that the contract was to

watch the film either to its completion or to a point at which

Plaintiffs voluntarily departed without creating a distracting

atmosphere. It cannot be said that Plaintiffs enjoyed their full

contractual rights because they were ejected from the auditorium

and the theater. Compare, Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,

266 F.3d 851 (8 cir. 2001) (where consumer had purchased his th

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item, contract of purchase was at an end). Jeffery v. Home Depot

USA, Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 1066 (S.D.Cal.2000), cited by Defendants, 

may be distinguished because there the only interference was a

delay in service while a cashier requested to search the bag of

the plaintiff purchaser; the consumer was able to make the

purchase and leave the store. Here, the ejection occurred before

the movie was completed, and the evidence shows that Plaintiffs

clearly wanted to complete their viewing of the film. The delay

in enjoyment of contractual benefits that management suggested

could occur-–that is, the suggestion that Plaintiffs return at

another time to watch the film–-amounted to a cessation of the

privilege for which Plaintiffs had contracted.

Accordingly, Defendants have not shown that they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to

Plaintiff’s showing of interference with the performance and/or

enjoyment of the benefits of a contract.

B. Different Treatment

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show that

individuals similarly situated with them who are not AfricanAmerican were treated differently from Plaintiffs. Defendants

assert that for purposes of management’s determination of who

should leave, because Funaoka stated that Plaintiffs were

belligerent, foul-mouthed and threatening, and because he said

Leist was kind, Plaintiffs were not similarly situated. 

However, the evidence when viewed most favorably to

Plaintiffs warrants an inference that Leist was similarly

situated in that she created a disruption in the theater by using

a racial slur and profanity, persisted by continuing to look

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around, and used an obscene gesture. Plaintiffs disputed the

extent of their own use of profanity and the nature and tenor of

the conversation. The Court considering all the circumstances

cannot conclude as a matter of law that using “damn” several

times, in a conversation that was not heated and was in a normal

tone of voice, and tearing up theater tickets justified

Plaintiffs’ ouster. Leist’s alleged conduct was a basis for

removal from the theater according to Defendant’s policies, but

she was not treated or investigated in the same way as Plaintiff.

V. Plaintiff’s Showing of Racial Motivation or Animus

Defendants contend, and Plaintiffs agree, that with respect

to all the discrimination claims, the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting model applies to the analysis of discriminatory animus

or motivation, which is required for establishment of a claim

pursuant to § 1981, Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d

1138, 1144 (9 Cir. 2006); § 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (the Civil Rights th

Act of 1964, prohibiting denial of equal access to public

accommodations because of race), Akiyama v. United States Judo,

Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1187 (W.D.Wash.2002); and the

California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Green v. Rancho Santa

Margarita Mortgage Co., 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 694-99 (1994).

Further, it is contended that the California unfair business

practices claim pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code fails if the

practices found unlawful under other laws also fail and are the

only basis for the claim. Lazar v. Hertz Corporation, 69

Cal.App.4th 1494, 1505-06 (1999).

It is admitted that Defendants have a legitimate business

interest in maintaining a non-disruptive, movie-going environment

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for their guests. Thus, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs

behaved in a disrupting manner with the patrons in the

auditorium, with the guards, and with the manager, Defendants

have shown that they had a legitimate business reason for

ejecting Plaintiffs which Plaintiffs cannot rebut.

A plaintiff must carry the initial burden to establish a

prima facie case of racial discrimination. Thereafter, the

employer has the burden of proof to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. The plaintiff

must then show by a preponderance that the employer's stated

reason for the action was in fact mere pretext. McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806 (1973); Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981).

In order to demonstrate a prima facie case, a plaintiff must

offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. A plaintiff may

accomplish this by introducing direct evidence of discriminatory

intent (i.e., evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [here

discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption, Godwin

v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9 Cir. 1998); by th

introducing evidence that suggests that the employment decision

was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion; or by using

factors such as those set forth in McDonnell Douglas at 802

(there, showing membership in a protected class, qualification

for a position, rejections despite qualifications, and the

employer's continuing to seek applicants). Cordova v. State Farm

Ins. Companies, 124 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1997).

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Because the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff, the burden of

persuasion never shifts; rather, a defendant's burden is to rebut

the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the

reason for the challenged action was legitimate and

nondiscriminatory. The defendant need not persuade the Court that

it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons; it is

sufficient that the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue

of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. This requirement is met if the

defendant clearly sets forth through admissible evidence the

reasons for the challenged action that are legally sufficient to

justify a judgment for the defendant. Id. at 255. Once this

burden of production is met, the presumption raised by the prima

facie case is rebutted, and it disappears. Id. 

The plaintiff's burden at this point is to persuade the

Court that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional

discrimination, which may be accomplished either 1) directly by

persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer, or 2) indirectly by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that in a

racial discrimination case under Title VII, the plaintiff, who

must show the employer’s intent to discriminate, may submit

circumstantial evidence and/or direct evidence, and the character

of evidence presented as direct or circumstantial does not

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determine whether to apply the analytical framework of McDonnellDouglas. The Plaintiff may simply produce direct or

circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory

reason more likely than not motivated the actor. McGinest v. GTE

Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122-23 (9 Cir. 2004). Once the th

defendant produces evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason to counter the Plaintiff’s demonstration of a prima facie

case, the McDonnell Douglas presumption of discrimination drops

out of the picture; the sole remaining issue is whether or not

there was discrimination. Id. at 1123. Under either approach, a

plaintiff must produce some evidence suggesting that the

Defendant’s action was due in part or whole to discriminatory

intent in order to counter the employer’s legitimate business

explanation. Id. Types of evidence that may demonstrate pretext

include proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of

credence or evidence, or the more direct path of proof that a

discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer. Desert

Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 5329 U.S. 90, 100 (2003).

Here, Plaintiff has produced evidence that the guards and

manager repeatedly or exclusively referred to Plaintiffs as “you

people.” As noted, the character of the evidence as direct or

circumstantial is not determinative. Evidence of this form of

address can demonstrate discriminatory animus in context. Alexis

v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Massachusetts, 67 F.3d 341, 248 (1st

Cir. 1995) (reference to two sets of people with only one similar

characteristic, race, as “you people” held to evince animus);

E.E.O.C. v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923-24 (11 Cir. th

1990) (statement by actor to a black employee that “you people

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can’t do a ----- thing right” characterized as direct evidence of

discrimination, although there not by a decision maker); see, Ash

v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006) (use of word

“boy” without a modifier was held not benign as a matter of law,

and discriminatory meaning could depend upon context, inflection,

tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage). The Court

acknowledges that there are authorities cited by Defendants

(Reply at 5-6) that indicate that under various circumstances,

references to “you people” were not evidence of discrimination,

as when it was pure speculation that the reference was to blacks,

where some of the people referred to were not black, or where the

reference was to an entire office rather than an ethnic or racial

group. Here, the only people referred to were Plaintiffs, who

were both black. In light of the surrounding circumstances,

including the deviation from procedures and policies in handling

the investigation and ejection, the disparate treatment given to

the white and black participants, the undignified manner in which

Plaintiffs were removed from the auditorium, and the smirk on the

manager’s face when Plaintiffs complained of being called

“niggers,” the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could

have concluded that the use of the term “you people” to refer to

the sisters was indicative of discriminatory animus based on

their race. 

Evidence that Defendant’s guards and manager failed to

investigate the racial slur allegedly used by Leist and,

according to Plaintiffs, repeatedly brought to the attention of

the guards and manager, warrants an inference of racial animus.

As Plaintiffs note, it has been recognized that the word “nigger”

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is perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in

English, a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry. Swinton

v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 817 (9 Cir. 2001). The th

Plaintiffs repeatedly reported the slur, which pursuant to

Defendants’ policies was a basis for Leist’s removal from the

theater; Leist was not even asked about the slur by Funaoka.

Further, given the circumstances, a rational trier of fact could

conclude that it was highly unlikely that, as claimed by Funaoka,

Plaintiffs neglected to mention the slur to the manager. The

present case is unlike Lizardo v. Denny’s Inc., 270 F.3d 94 (2nd

Cir. 2001), because here there is significant evidence that the

initially complaining patron herself had previously engaged in

conduct towards Plaintiffs in the auditorium that would have

justified her own ejection. Further, the content and tenor of the

conversations between the guards and the manager on the one hand,

and the Plaintiffs on the other, are disputed. 

Plaintiffs presented evidence that Defendants repeatedly

failed to follow their own procedures in dealing with the problem

at the theater. A failure to follow established policies or

procedures can be evidence of discriminatory animus. Nabozny v.

Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 455 (7 Cir. 1996) (citing Village of th

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 267 (1977)). Defendants failed to question Leist about the

alleged use of the racial slur and profanity (as distinct from

the more general allegation of just being a racist) despite its

being recognized in the policies or procedures as a basis for

speaking to a patron and asking the patron to leave. There is

evidence that the investigation was one-sided in that a rational

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trier of fact could conclude that the guards and manager did not

try to listen to both sides in a balanced manner and did not seek

witnesses for both sides; further, Plaintiffs were pulled out and

told to leave before the investigation was undertaken. The

practice to observe and/or warn before intervening was not

followed; Defendants intervened even though at the time they

entered the theater, there was silence and an absence of any

disturbance.

Defendants argue that it is possible to interpret what the

guards and manager did as being consistent with their policies

and procedures because an investigation was undertaken, and

Defendants’ agents determined that it was Plaintiff’s fault.

Further, at some point Plaintiffs were “unruly” because they used

obscenity towards staff, and thus there was cause to remove them.

However, Plaintiffs denied using profanity towards the guards and

only used “damn” several times during the conversation with the

manager. Thus, the use of “obscenity” is disputed. Although one

Plaintiff did admit that she used “damn” several times in a

conversation with the manager that the guards characterized as

simply a conversation, there is an issue as to whether or not,

given all the surrounding circumstances, this constituted unruly

conduct warranting ejection. The Court further notes that whether

or not Defendants actually followed their procedures depends in

part upon the resolution of disputed facts concerning what

actually happened in the auditorium and the investigation.

Disputed issues of fact as to the underlying conduct of

Plaintiffs and Leist, as well as the behavior of Defendants’

agents in handling the situation remain. Considering all the

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factual context, Plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence to

warrant an inference that the established procedures were not

followed and that this reflected racial animus.

The fact that an investigation into a racial slur is

inadequate may support an inference that the investigator is

racially biased. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1535

(9 Cir. 1995). Here, given the context of the treatment of th

Plaintiffs, a rational trier of fact could infer that the

investigators were racially biased because of the one-sided

nature of the investigation and the failure to seek any specific

factual information from Leist concerning exactly what occurred.

With respect to Defendant’s justification of ejecting

Plaintiffs in order to maintain a non-disruptive atmosphere,

there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the justification

is worthy of belief. As previously noted, there are some disputes

regarding the underlying conduct of the patrons in the theater.

It is undisputed that there was no disruption or dispute visibly

or audibly in progress when the guards entered the theater. There

was no dispute at the time Plaintiffs were removed from the

theater. Funaoka’s statement that Plaintiffs used excessive

profanity during his conversation with them is unsupported by the

testimony of the guards; he characterized Michelle’s ripping up

the ticket as threatening body language, when a rational trier of

fact could have found it not to have been threatening, but rather

indicative or frustration, anger, or upset. Further, Funaoka

acted with anticipation of a lawsuit, and he gave inconsistent

testimony. Specific facts that might permit a negative

credibility inference have been set forth.

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There is evidence before the Court that Funaoka smirked each

time Plaintiffs complained of having been called “niggers.” Given

the context of the humiliating and disparate treatment that

Plaintiffs claimed to have received from Funaoka and his guards,

a rational trier of fact could find that Funaoka’s smirking

indicated amusement at, or approval of, the slur, and thus that

he had discriminatory intent. See, Chuang v. Univerity of

California Davis, Board of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1128 (9 Cir. th

2000) (a dean’s laughing response to a colleague’s statement that

“two Chinks” in the pharmacology department were more than enough

was determined to establish evidence of discriminatory intent on

the part of both speakers).

In view of the evidence that the theater was not full, a

rational trier could infer that Funaoka was untruthful when he

claimed to be unable to reseat the sisters in another part of the

theater because it was full. Evidence of untrue excuses given for

differential treatment is circumstantial evidence of

discriminatory intent. Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC, 447 F.3d

1138, 1151 (9 Cir. 2006). th

The Court concludes that considering all the evidence, and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to permit a

rational trier of fact to conclude that it is more likely than

not that Defendants acted with the intent to discriminate against

Plaintiffs on the basis of their race, and thus to raise disputed

issues of material fact as to the discriminatory intent necessary

to Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. Plaintiff’s evidence is

sufficient in nature and force to raise a triable issue of fact

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as to whether or not Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiffs was

racially motivated.

IV. Similarly Situated Persons Treated Differently

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish that

similarly situated non-African American persons were treated

differently. The Court notes that it is not clear that the

McDonnell Douglas test must be applied in this case in view of

the extent of Plaintiffs’ evidence that warrants an inference of

discriminatory intent. However, assuming for the sake of argument

that it would apply, then Plaintiffs have met the requirements

for this fourth prong of the test. Leist was sufficiently

similarly situated with Plaintiffs because she was accused of

having engaged in conduct that warranted expulsion, but she was

not subjected to the same humiliating treatment as Plaintiffs,

was not subjected to questioning or an investigation with respect

to the alleged wrongful conduct, was not ejected, and was

supported by Defendants’ manager, who sought out witnesses in her

behalf and obtained statements. The mere fact that Leist was the

first to complain does not logically explain the distinction in

treatment considering the severity of the conduct alleged to have

been engaged in by Leist.

The Court stresses that the evidence has come to the Court

in the form of a motion for summary judgment or summary

adjudication. It is established that the Court is constrained to

view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party

and to draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,

including questions of credibility and the weight to be accorded

particular evidence; it is not the judge’s function to weigh the

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evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Suzuki

Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1140

(9 Cir. 2003). th

V. Negligence

Plaintiffs allege in the fifth claim that Defendant Edwards

owed a duty to Plaintiffs to operate the theater in a manner that

was free from unlawful discrimination, and to hire, train,

supervise, and discipline their employees and themselves to

fulfil that duty. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Turner

Security owed Plaintiffs a duty to provide security services in a

manner free from unlawful discrimination , and to hire, train,

supervise, and discipline their employees and themselves to

fulfil that duty. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached that

duty by discriminating against Plaintiffs because of their race,

color, or national origin. (Cmplt. p. 6.)

Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ claim, arguing that there

is no evidence that any risk of harm to Plaintiffs was reasonably

foreseeable. 

Under California law, negligence requires a legal duty to

exercise due care, breach of the duty, and proximate causation of

Plaintiffs’ injury. Federico v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.App.4th

1207, 1210-11 (1997). An employer has a duty to third parties

where the employer knows or has reason to know facts which would

warn a reasonable person that the employee presents an undue risk

of harm to third persons in light of the particular work to be

performed. Id. at 1213-14; Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal.App.4th

1038, 1054-55 (1996). There is no evidence that Defendants knew

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or had reason to know that Funaoka or either of the guards would

act in a racially discriminatory manner.

Plaintiffs’ response is that there is a common law duty on

the part of innkeepers to serve members of the public, citing

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 298 n. 17 (1964) (conc. op.). In

Bell, the pertinent discussion concerned common law rules

providing historical context for the Fourteenth Amendment, and it

was noted that hanging out a sign and opening a house for

travelers implied an undertaking to take in guests. The fact that

historically there may have been some duty on the part of

innkeepers to take people in does not render Defendants liable

for the actions of its employees under California tort law

because there is an absence of evidence of knowledge, or reason

to know, facts that would cause any breach or risk of harm to be

foreseeable.

Because Plaintiffs have the burden of proof of negligence,

and because they have failed to produce evidence of a necessary

element of their negligence claim concerning Defendants’ duty to

hire, train, supervise, and discipline its employees, the Court

concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication on

the negligence claim with respect to liability for negligent

hiring, training, supervision, or discipline.

However, after the hearing, Plaintiffs filed a notice (Doc.

88) that Plaintiffs are willing to dismiss their negligence

claim, each side to bear their own costs.

To the extent that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim has not

otherwise been dismissed as of the time this order is filed, the

Court concludes that Defendants have shown that they are entitled

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to summary adjudication on the negligence claim with respect to

negligent hiring, training, supervision, and discipline. To the

extent that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim has been dismissed by

the time this order is filed, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment or summary adjudication on the negligence claim will be

denied as moot.

VI. Malice

Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, alleging that Defendants

acted with oppression, fraud, and malice, and with wanton and

conscious or reckless disregard of the civil rights of

Plaintiffs. (Cmplt. p. 5.) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs

have not produced evidence that Defendants intended to

discriminate against them or direct evidence sufficient to

establish malice with clear and convincing evidence.

Plaintiffs state that they seek damages not under California

law, but rather pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Johnson v. Railway

Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), and Title VII,

pursuant to which punitive damages may be awarded where the

plaintiff shows by a preponderance that the defendant’s conduct

1) is malicious, such as where it is shown to be motivated by

evil motive or intent or purpose to injure another, or 2) is

wanton, as where it involves reckless or callous indifference to

the federally protected rights of others, such as when under the

circumstances, it reflects complete indifference to the

plaintiff’s safety, rights, or the defendant acts in the face of

a perceived risk that its actions will violate the plaintiff’s

rights under federal law; or 3) is oppressive, such as where it

is done in a manner which injures or damages or otherwise

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violates the rights of another person with unnecessary harshness

or severity as by misuse or abuse of authority or power or by

taking advantage of some weakness or disability or the

misfortunes of another person. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (malice or

reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an

aggrieved individual); see, Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 806-11

(9 Cir. 2005) (§ 1983). No separate showing of extraordinarily th

egregious behavior is required. Kolstad v. American Dental

Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, 538-39 (1999); Zhang v. American Gem

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1041 (9 Cir. 2003) (noting that th

intentional discrimination, or discrimination in the face of a

perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law, can be

sufficient). 

Plaintiffs’ evidence warrants a rational inference that

Plaintiffs were oppressively removed from the auditorium and

directed to leave with unnecessary harshness and through an abuse

of authority; an intent to discriminate may be inferred. 

Further, a rational trier could infer that Defendants

removed Plaintiffs with knowledge of an extreme risk that

Plaintiffs rights against racial discrimination were being

violated. This is sufficient for malice under Title VII.

Defendants argue that something more that mere intentional

discrimination is required for punitive damages. It is true that

mere evidence of an intentional violation has been held

insufficient, but the showing required beyond the threshold level

of intent required for compensatory liability is wilful and

egregious conduct, or conduct that displays reckless indifference

(and not mere negligence) to the Plaintiff’s federal rights such

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that the defendant almost certainly knew that what he was ding

was wrongful and subject to punishment. Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort

Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1303-05 (9 Cir. 1998), amended 156 F.3d th

988, 988-89 (9 Cir. 1998) (holding that merely negligent th

calculations with respect to taking leave did not support

punitive damages). The evidence in this case is sufficient to

raise an issue of fact as to whether or not Defendants’ conduct

was malicious, recklessly indifferent to known federally

protected rights of Plaintiffs, and oppressive. As Plaintiffs

note, a corporate defendant may be held liable for punitive

damages on account of the wilful or egregious conduct of a

managerial employee made within the scope of employment so long

as the managerial conduct is not contrary to the employer’s good

faith efforts to comply with Title VII. Kolstad v. American

Dental Assoc., 527 US. 526, 644-46 (1999). 

Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive

damages.

VII. Scheduling Conference

As the Court noted at the hearing on the motion, an informal

telephonic conference call will be set for the scheduling of

further pretrial and trial proceedings. Plaintiffs ARE DIRECTED

to place a conference call on January 23, 2007, at 9:00 a.m. by

arranging the conference call with the other parties and

directing it to Frances Robles at (559) 499-5690 at the appointed

time.

VIII. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

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1) Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication IS GRANTED in

part with respect to that portion of Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for

negligence that consists of a claim for negligent hiring,

training, supervision, and discipline of Defendants’ employees;

and

2) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment IS otherwise

DENIED; and

3) Plaintiffs ARE DIRECTED to place a conference call on

January 23, 2007, at 9:00 a.m. by arranging the conference call

with the other parties and directing it to Frances Robles at

(559) 499-5690 at the appointed time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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