Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00580/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00580-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN STRACK,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-0580 RRB DAD P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On April 12, 2007, the undersigned ordered respondent to 

respond to the petition. On May 24, 2007, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds

that petitioner’s habeas petition is time-barred under AEDPA, petitioner does not state claims

subject to federal review, and petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies. On June 13, 2007,

petitioner filed a timely opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND

On August 9, 1994, Correctional Officer Branecki searched petitioner’s cell and

found a document that allegedly described how to circumvent the inmate telephone procedure at

CSP-Solano. (Pet. at 5, Exs. 1 & 2.) Officer Branecki determined that the document was

generated by a computer at petitioner’s job site and issued petitioner a rules violation report for

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

misuse of state property. (Id., Ex. 1.) Petitioner maintained that he received the document from

Ms. Melissa Frakes, the editor of a prison information newsletter at the time. (Id., Exs. 2 & 5.)

According to Ms. Frakes, the document informed prisoners about a prison plan designed to “ripoff” family members of inmates by installing a fifteen minute time limit on telephone calls and

advised them how to save money by not falling prey to this plan. (Id., Ex. 5.) On August 28,

1994, prison officials found petitioner guilty of the rules violation and assessed him thirty days

loss of time credits. (Id. at 5, 7, Ex. 1.) 

Over seven years later, on August 30, 2001, petitioner filed a CDC 602 because he

had been informed that he could not receive computer clearance due to the 1994 rules violation

conviction on his record. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner requested that the rules violation be dismissed and

removed from his file. (Id.) On May 17, 2002, petitioner received the director’s level decision,

stating that the prison officials’ guilty finding was upheld. (Id. at 7-8.) 

After receiving the director’s level decision, petitioner alleges that he tried to

contact Ms. Frakes. (Pet. at 8.) However, petitioner alleges that she had moved, and he had no

way of finding her new address. (Id.) In September 2005, petitioner came across Ms. Frakes’

name in a prisoners’ rights publication. (Id.) Petitioner contacted her and explained what had

happened. (Id.) Petitioner also obtained a declaration from Ms. Frakes signed under penalty of

perjury in which she stated that she sent petitioner the document that resulted in his rules

violation conviction. (Pet., Ex. 5.)

On November 28, 2005, petitioner filed a second CDC 602 to which he attached 

Ms. Frakes’ declaration. Prison officials “screened out” the appeal, rejecting it as untimely. (Pet.

at 8.) Petitioner resubmitted the appeal, arguing that there was no time limit on the submission

of new evidence. (Id.) On December 14, 2005, prison officials again “screened out” the appeal

and informed petitioner that he had exhausted his administrative remedies and could now initiate

any court action he deemed necessary. (Id.)

/////

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

3

On January 11, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Amador County Superior Court, challenging the decision to deny him computer clearance and

the opportunity for a computer-related prison job. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A.) On May 2,

2006, the Superior Court denied the petition as untimely. (Pet., Ex. 7.) The Superior Court also

found that petitioner had failed to state a claim because he did not have a constitutionallyprotected right to a job in prison and that the decision by prison officials to remove him from the

waiting list for a computer-related job was not arbitrary or capricious. (Id.) 

On June 6, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B.)

Therein he alleged that his Superior Court petition was timely-filed, his inmate appeal

challenging the disciplinary decision was wrongly denied, the improper disciplinary decision

resulted in his transfer from a Level III institution to a Level IV institution, and he is not guilty of

the 1994 disciplinary charge. (Id.) On July 27, 2006, the Court of Appeal summarily denied the

petition. (Pet., Ex. 8.)

On October 19, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C.) Petitioner raised the same claims

that he raised in his petition filed with the California Court of Appeal. (Id.) On February 7,

2007, the California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner filed the instant petition on March 26, 2007.

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) petitioner’s

habeas petition is time-barred under AEDPA; (2) petitioner does not state any claims subject to

federal review; and (3) petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies.

First, respondent argues that petitioner’s habeas petition is time-barred under

AEDPA. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Respondent contends that AEDPA applies to the

instant petition, filed March 26, 2007. (Id.) Respondent further argues that petitioner filed the

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

instant petition beyond the one-year statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) & (2). 

(Id. at 5-6.) Accordingly, respondent contends that the court should dismiss this action. (Id. at

8.)

Petitioner alleges that he discovered the “factual predicate” of his claim arising

from the rules violation report on November 28, 2005, and that his inmate appeal regarding that

claim was completed on December 2, 2005. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Based on

petitioner’s allegations, respondent contends that the one-year limitations period began to run no

later than December 3, 2005, the day after prison officials screened out petitioner’s inmate appeal

as untimely. (Id.) Petitioner filed his federal petition on March 26, 2007, 479 days later. 

Accordingly, respondent concludes that without tolling the instant petition is untimely.

Respondent acknowledges that AEDPA allows for tolling during the pendency of

a properly filed state court petition. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) State petitions, however,

will only toll the one-year limitations period if the state court explicitly states that the petition

was timely or it was filed within a reasonable time. (Id.) When a state court concludes that a

petition is untimely, a prisoner is not entitled to tolling of the time his improperly filed state court

petition was pending. (Id. (citing Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 2007).)

Here, respondent argues that the Amador County Superior Court’s decision was

the state courts’ only reasoned decision related to petitioner’s 1994 disciplinary hearing and rules

violation conviction . (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) The Superior Court found that the

petition was untimely. (Id.) Respondent argues that, under the look-through doctrine, the Court

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court’s summary denials are deemed to rest on the same

grounds as the Superior Court’s decision. (Id.) Accordingly, respondent concludes that the

petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling while any of his state court petitions were pending

and that his federal petition is untimely as a result. (Id.)

Respondent next argues that the instant petition should be dismissed for failure to

raise any cognizable federal habeas claims. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) Respondent argues

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Respondent also argues that these claims are not based upon a right protected under the 1

U.S. Constitution and that for this reason as well the claims presented in the pending petition are 

not appropriately the subject of review by the federal courts. 

5

that federal habeas corpus relief is not available to address prisoner complaints regarding the 

conditions of their confinement. (Id.) Respondent notes although petitioner alleges that, as a

result of the 1994 disciplinary decision, he was assessed a thirty-day credit loss, he is serving an

indeterminate prison term. (Id.) A prisoner sentenced to an indeterminate term is eligible for

release on parole only after the Board of Parole Hearings finds him suitable for parole. (Id.) 

Respondent argues that petitioner has failed to allege how the 1994 disciplinary decision impacts

either the Board’s consideration of his parole suitability or the fact or duration of his

confinement. (Id.) Accordingly, respondent concludes that petitioner has not raised claims

cognizable under § 2254. (Id.) 

Finally, respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed as presenting

unexhausted claims. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) In this regard, respondent argues that

AEDPA requires petitioner’s federal claims be fairly presented to the state’s highest courts. (Id.) 

In order for the state system to have that opportunity, a federal claim must have been fairly

presented to the state’s highest court. (Id.) Respondent contends that in his petition to the

California Supreme Court, petitioner alleged only that various violations of state law constituted

a denial of his federal due process rights. (Id. at 7.) Respondent argues that these claims

presented to the California Supreme Court were predicated solely on state law and that simply

alleging a due process right in the correct interpretation of state law cannot convert a state law

claim into a cognizable federal claim. (Id.) Thus, respondent asserts, even if petitioner had 1

alleged a violation of his federal due process rights as a result of his 1994 disciplinary conviction,

he did not fairly present such a claim to the California Supreme Court. In this vein, respondent

contends that general statements of broad constitutional principles, such as due process, are

insufficient for purposes of the exhaustion requirement. (Id.) Rather, petitioner was required to

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

describe both the operative facts and the federal legal theory that are the basis for his federal

claim. (Id.) Absent of a description in his state petitions of how respondent allegedly violated

his rights under federal law, petitioner did not comply with the fair presentation requirement and

his petition should be dismissed as presenting unexhausted claims. (Id.) 

PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

In response, petitioner argues that: (1) his petition contains exhausted claims; (2)

he has presented federal constitutional claims that are subject to habeas review by this court; and

(3) his petition was timely filed under AEDPA. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) 

First, petitioner argues that he exhausted the claims presented in his federal

petition. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) In this regard, petitioner contends that

he presented his due process claim to the Amador County Superior Court, the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District, and the California Supreme Court. (Id.) The courts

accepted and considered his claims. (Id. at 5.) Accordingly, petitioner contends that he satisfied

the exhaustion requirement. (Id. at 3.)

Second, petitioner argues that federal courts can overrule the prison’s grievance

system determination that a prison grievance is untimely. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 3.) Petitioner contends that federal courts have ruled in favor of prisoners who have

demonstrated “mitigating circumstances” for filing a late grievance. (Id.) Petitioner also clarifies

that the “computer clearance” he seeks is not merely about a prison job. (Id. at 4.) Rather,

computer clearance would allow petitioner access to schooling, vocation, and any prison job that

has a computer in the work area. (Id.)

Finally, petitioner argues that he did not fail to timely file his federal petition

under the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss

at 4.) He contends that the AEDPA allows for tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a properly filed state court petition. (Id.) Petitioner argues that the state courts

accepted his habeas petitions, ruled on them and at no time determined that his petitions were not

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

properly filed. (Id.) Accordingly, petitioner contends that his federal habeas petition is timely. 

(Id.) 

Petitioner requests that the court deny the pending motion to dismiss, grant his

petition for writ of habeas corpus, and order that the 1994 rules violation conviction be removed

from his file with a finding of not guilty. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6.) 

Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 5-6.)

ANALYSIS

I. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following provision:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

/////

/////

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The AEDPA one-year statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas

corpus petitions filed after the statute was enacted and therefore applies to pending petition. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). 

II. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(D)

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the one-year period of limitation set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2244 “applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court,’ even if the petition challenges an administrative decision rather than a

state court judgment.” Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

See also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1080-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming without deciding

that the AEDPA statute of limitations applies to collateral attacks on Parole Board decisions). 

When a habeas petitioner challenges an administrative decision, § 2244(d)(1)(D) governs the

date on which the limitation period begins to run. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at

1081-83. Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitation period begins to run “the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

In Redd, a California state prisoner challenged the parole board’s determination

that he was unsuitable for parole. The district court dismissed the prisoner’s federal habeas

petition as untimely on the ground “that ‘the factual predicate’ of Redd’s claims was the Board’s

denial of Redd’s administrative appeal on December 7, 1998, and that the limitations period

began to run on the following day.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1080. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,

explaining that the date of the factual predicate was to be determined “by inquiring when Redd

could have learned of the factual basis for his claim through the exercise of due diligence.”

Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082. The Ninth Circuit concluded:

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Only the Fifth Circuit has held that the limitations period begins to run “when the initial 2

administrative decision is made, before any administrative appeals.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084

n.11 (citing Kimbrell, 311 F.3d at 363-64).

9

We agree with the district court that the factual basis of Redd’s

habeas claims was the Board’s denial of his administrative appeal

on December 7, 1998. Redd does not dispute that he received

notice of the Board’s decision on December 7. The limitations

period therefore began to run the following day.

Id.

The Ninth Circuit also noted in Redd that four other federal courts of appeals had

held that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies to habeas petitions challenging the decisions of

administrative bodies such as parole and disciplinary boards. Id. at 1082 n.8 (citing Wade v.

Robinson, 327 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2003); Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d

274, 280 (2d Cir. 2003); Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003); Kimbrell v.

Cockrell, 311 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth Circuit observed that three of those four

courts had decided that the AEDPA statute of limitations begins running in such cases on the

date the administrative decision becomes final. Id. at 1084 (citing Wade, Cook, and Burger).

2

Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit decided what it had assumed in Redd: 

§ 2244’s one-year limitation period applies to all habeas petitions

filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court,’ even if the petition challenges a pertinent administrative

decision rather than a state court judgment. 

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1062-63 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit again cited the decisions in

Cook, Wade, and Kimbrell, finding them consistent with the language of AEDPA, rules of

statutory construction, and purposes of the AEDPA. Id. at 1063. The court considered and

rejected the Seventh Circuit’s rule that the limitation period does not apply to petitions contesting

administrative decisions. Id. at 1063-65 (discussing Cox v. McBride, 279 F.3d 492, 493-94 (7th

Cir. 2002)). The Ninth Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of Shelby’s habeas petition as

untimely because he had challenged a prison disciplinary decision that resulted in loss of good

/////

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

time credits but failed to file his federal petition within a year after his administrative appeal was

denied. Id. at 1062. 

In the habeas petition pending before this court, petitioner claims that: (1) newly

discovered evidence demonstrated that he was innocent of the 1994 rules violation charge; and

(2) his due process rights were violated when prison officials rejected his CDC 602 presenting

this newly discovered evidence. (Pet. at 5.) As detailed above, all of petitioner’s claims

presented in this court stem from the 1994 rules violation report. (Id., Exs. 1. & 2.) Petitioner

sought to have that 1994 disciplinary conviction reversed on two occasions. First, in 2001, after

prison officials denied petitioner computer clearance, he filed a CDC 602 and pursued it to the

highest level of review under the prison grievance system to no avail. (Id., Ex. 3.) 

Approximately four years later, in 2005, petitioner filed a second CDC 602 relying on new

evidence in the form of a declaration from Ms. Frakes. (Id., Exs. 5 & 6.) On December 2, 2005,

prison officials “screened out” his grievance and rejected it as untimely. (Id., Ex. 6.) Petitioner

resubmitted the grievance, reiterating that he was now in possession of new evidence

demonstrating his innocence. (Id.) Prison officials returned the appeal to petitioner a second

time, explaining that petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies and could now initiate

any court action he wished to pursue. (Id.) The screening notice also stated that any further

appeal regarding the 1994 rules violation conviction or his computer clearance would not be

accepted by prison officials. (Id.) 

Based on this chronology, the court finds that December 2, 2005, the day prison

officials “screened out” and rejected petitioner’s second grievance challenging his 1994

disciplinary conviction as untimely is the earliest “date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Accordingly, absent tolling, petitioner had one year from December 3, 2005 to file his federal

petition. Cf. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066 (limitation period began running day after petitioner

received notice of denial of appeal); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082 (same). 

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

III. Application of § 2244(d)(2)

As both parties recognize, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application

for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim

is pending shall not be counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). The statute of limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which

a decision becomes final and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral

challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once state collateral

proceedings are commenced, a state habeas petition is “pending” during a full round of review in

the state courts, including the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition

in a higher court, as long as the intervals between petitions are “reasonable.” Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

However, a petitioner is only entitled to tolling for those time periods during

which his “properly filed” state habeas petitions were pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Pace

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (habeas petition rejected by state court as untimely

was not “properly filed” for purposes of statutory tolling); Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 645

(9th Cir. 2007). When a state post-conviction petition is determined to be untimely by a state

court, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145,

1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 [, 414], 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1812

(2005)). See also Carey, 536 U.S. at 226. In Thorson v. Palmer the Ninth Circuit held that a

state habeas corpus petition denied with citation to “ the very page of Robbins that sets forth ‘the

basic analytical framework’ governing California’s timeliness determinations in habeas corpus

proceedings” was a clear ruling that the state petition was untimely and therefor not properly

filed. 479 F.3d at 645. Id. 

Here, petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the Amador County Superior

Court on January 11, 2006. The court denied the petition as untimely filed, citing the California 

/////

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Although the Superior Court also addressed the merits of the petition, that is of no 3

consequence for purposes of statutory tolling. See Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“[n]either does the fact that the superior court also denied Bonner’s petition on the

merits save his petition.”); see also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002) (if a state court

rules a delay is unreasonable, that is the end of the matter, regardless of whether the court

addresses the merits of a claim or whether a timeliness ruling is “entangled” with the merits). 

12

Supreme Court decisions in In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 778 (1988) and In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th

750, 759 (1993). (Pet., Ex. 7.) Specifically, the court explained that: 

Petitioner has failed to plead, with the requisite specificity, the

reason for the substantial delay of over four years in bringing the

instant petition. He failed to demonstrate that the information

regarding Ms. Frakes could not have reasonably been obtained

earlier. Therefore, the instant petition is deemed untimely.

(Pet., Ex. 7.) 

Subsequently, the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court

denied petitioner’s second and third petitions without comment or citation. (Pet., Exs. 8 & 9.)

These are “unexplained orders,” i.e., “an order whose text or accompanying opinion does not

disclose the reason for the judgment.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991). When

confronted with a state court’s unexplained order, the federal court applies the following

presumption: “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same

ground.” Id. at 803. See also Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). In

applying this look-through presumption, unexplained orders are given no effect. Id. at 804. 

This court has “looked through” the California Court of Appeal and California

Supreme Court’s unexplained orders to the Superior Court’s order and determined that the state

courts found petitioner’s initial state habeas petition to be untimely as a matter of state law.3

Under the decisions in Pace and Bonner such a ruling by the state courts is the end of the matter

for purposes of determining timeliness under § 2244(d)(2). Accordingly, in this case petitioner is

not entitled to any period of statutory tolling. Because more than one year had run on the statute

of limitations from the rejection of petitioner’s second administrative grievance challenging the

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The court need not address respondent’s arguments regarding exhaustion and failure to 4

state cognizable claims under § 2254 given the court’s recommendation that the petition be

dismissed as time-barred. 

13

disciplinary conviction on December 2, 2005, until the filing of his federal petition on March 26,

2007, his federal habeas petition was untimely filed.

Under these circumstances, the court finds that petitioner’s federal petition is

time-barred. Respondent’s motion to dismiss should therefore be granted, and this action should

be dismissed with prejudice.4

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s May 24, 2007

motion to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 18, 2007.

DAD:9

stra0580.157

Case 2:07-cv-00580-JKS-DAD Document 15 Filed 12/19/07 Page 13 of 13