Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-06256/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-06256-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OLGA CORTEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-06256-TEH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

This matter comes before the Court on motions to dismiss brought by Defendants 

City of Oakland and Ronald Holmgren and by Defendants Joe Turner and Bryan Budgin. 

The Court finds these motions suitable for resolution without oral argument, see Civil L.R. 

7-1(b), and now GRANTS the motions for the reasons discussed below. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiffs Olga and Nemesio Cortez filed this case, on behalf of themselves and 

their two minor children, to recover damages following an incident at their home on 

December 7, 2015. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cullen Faeth, who was apparently 

intoxicated, banged on the Cortez’s front door at approximately 9:30 PM and repeatedly 

tried to gain entry despite being told by Olga and Nemesio to leave through the closed 

door. Believing that Faeth was trying to rob them, Olga called the Oakland Police

Department for assistance while Nemesio stepped outside to try to detain Faeth. 

 Faeth allegedly kicked Nemesio multiple times in the stomach and, as Olga walked 

nearby them, grabbed Olga in a bear hold and knocked her to the concrete. Olga was 

wearing only a short bathrobe at the time, so Faeth’s actions caused her nude lower body 

to be exposed. Nemesio pulled Faeth off of Olga and held him down, with the assistance 

of neighbors, until police arrived. Unnamed officers took Faeth into custody, took 

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statements from Olga and Nemesio and their neighbors, and took photographs of Olga’s 

and Nemesio’s injuries before leaving the scene. 

 Plaintiffs also allege that a second man, whom they have yet to identify, ran from 

their backyard up their driveway as Olga and Nemesio were following Faeth outside their 

home. This second person is alleged to have “made a gesture simulating a gun pointed at 

[Olga] from underneath his shirt.” Compl. ¶ 23. This person was not detained by police 

but, instead, allegedly ran up the street before speaking to an officer in a patrol car and 

being permitted to leave. He allegedly left the scene in a non-police vehicle. Plaintiffs 

believe that one of Defendants Joe Turner, Trevor Stratton, and Bryan Budgin was the 

unnamed second man, and that the other two Defendants were in that non-police vehicle. 

 Plaintiffs allege that, at 12:30 AM on December 8, three unnamed Oakland Police 

personnel returned to the Cortez home. They allegedly asked Olga and Nemesio to explain 

what happened, “while strongly suggesting that Mr. and Mrs. Cortez were mistaken in 

their understanding of the events.” Id. ¶ 28. Around the same time, unnamed Oakland 

Police officers allegedly visited Plaintiffs’ neighbors to review the owner’s surveillance 

video. 

 Plaintiffs further allege that five Oakland Police officers and supervisors returned to 

the Cortez home three hours later “and wanted Mr. and Mrs. Cortez to reenact the incident. 

The officers wanted Mr. and Mrs. Cortez to be interviewed separately. During Olga 

Cortez’s interview, officers were trying to get her to change her statement and relay the 

events in a way that would be more favorable to the man who was arrested.” Id. ¶ 31. 

Officers also allegedly visited the Cortez’s neighbors again “and asked the owner’s minor 

child to identify a possible suspect,” who “did not even remotely resemble either of the 

men involved or described.” Id. ¶ 30. 

Olga allegedly spoke to numerous unnamed Oakland Police over a period of two 

weeks following the incident, and they all “refused to provide her any additional 

information about the incident.” Id. ¶ 32. She eventually spoke with Defendant Roland 

Holmgren, an Oakland Police lieutenant, who allegedly “told Mrs. Cortez that the two men 

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were City of Oakland officers who ‘mistakenly went to her house’ looking for a party.” Id. 

Holmgren allegedly “brushed off” Olga’s concerns about “her family’s terror and how she 

felt violated,” “said the officers were just ‘being silly,’” and promised a personal apology 

that never came. Id.

 Plaintiffs ultimately learned that Faeth, Turner, Stratton, and Budgin were all 

Oakland Police officers at the time of the incident. All four were placed on paid leave, and 

Faeth was charged with battery and trespass. Plaintiffs have yet to learn the identity of the 

second person who is alleged to have entered their property and made a pointing gun 

gesture. 

 Plaintiffs allege that they suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of 

these events. The complaint includes seven causes of action. The first, violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, is alleged against the Defendant City of Oakland and Does 26-50 and is 

brought under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).1 The fourth 

is a battery claim against Defendant Faeth and Does 1‐25 only. The remaining causes of 

action – violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, negligence, violation of California Civil Code 

section 52.1, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional inflection of 

emotional distress – are brought against all individual defendants. 

 The City and Holmgren have moved to dismiss all claims against them, as have 

Turner and Budgin in a separately filed motion.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a 

plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In ruling on 

a motion to dismiss, courts must “accept all material allegations of fact as true and 

construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Vasquez v. Los 

Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007). However, courts are not “bound to 

 

1

Plaintiffs do not allege any specific actions by any of the fifty Doe Defendants. 

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accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility does not 

equate to probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Id. Dismissal of claims that do not meet this standard should be with leave to amend 

unless “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Kendall v. Visa 

U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). 

DISCUSSION

I. Monell Claim 

The Court first considers Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Defendant City of 

Oakland. Plaintiffs in this case contend that their First Amendment right of access to the 

courts and their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process were violated, and 

that the City is liable for these violations under Monell, 436 U.S. 658. 

The Court need not decide at this time whether Plaintiffs’ allegations would be 

sufficient to support either of the two alleged constitutional violations because Plaintiffs 

have failed to allege sufficient facts to make municipal liability plausible. Plaintiffs have 

done nothing more than make conclusory allegations: for example, that: 

Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that City 

of Oakland and DOES 26-50, and/or each of them, approved, 

ratified, condoned, encouraged, sought to cover up, and/or 

tacitly authorized the continuing pattern and practice of 

misconduct and/or civil rights violations by the Oakland Police 

Department, for officers both on and off duty, which brought 

about Defendants HOLMGREN, FAETH, TURNER, 

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BUDGIN, STRATTON and DOES 1-50 unlawfully attacking 

the Cortez family and/or subsequently attempting to conceal 

the identity of the Oakland Police Officers responsible for 

engaging in criminal acts against the Cortez family.

Compl. ¶ 39. Plaintiffs’ own opposition recognizes that such “bare allegation[s]” are 

insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Opp’n at 7 (citation omitted). Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Conspiracy Claim 

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action, for conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1985, fares no better. “A claim under this section must allege facts to support the 

allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without 

factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Like Plaintiffs’ Monell claim, their § 1985 claim relies on 

conclusory allegations without any factual specificity. For example, Plaintiffs allege that 

“Defendants HOLMGREN, FAETH, TURNER, STRATTON, BUDGIN, and DOES 1-50 

and each of them acted in concert and conspired to violate Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights of 

access to court and right to bring forth criminal charges and civil remedies against 

assailants known to the Oakland Police Department.” Compl. ¶ 44. This is inadequate to 

state a claim, and Plaintiffs’ § 1985 claim is therefore also dismissed with leave to amend. 

 If Plaintiffs choose to amend this claim, they shall make clear which clause or 

clauses of § 1985 they allege Defendants violated. 

III. State Law Claims

Finally, Defendants Holmgren, Turner, and Budgin move to dismiss all state law 

claims against them. The only non-conclusory allegations against Holmgren are that he: 

told Mrs. Cortez that the two men were City of Oakland 

officers who “mistakenly went to her house” looking for a 

party. Olga Cortez relayed her family’s terror and how she felt 

violated, but Lieutenant Holmgren brushed off her concerns 

and said the officers were just “being silly.” Lieutenant 

Holmgren promised Olga Cortez a personal apology once the 

investigation was complete; [sic] an apology that never came.

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Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs do not argue that these allegations are sufficient to support their 

state law claims against Holmgren but instead argue only that the conspiracy allegations 

support their state law causes of action. Since the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’

conspiracy claim, the Court likewise dismisses the state law causes of action against 

Holmgren with leave to amend. 

The only non-conclusory allegations against Turner and Budgin are that they might 

have been present in a non-police vehicle entered by an as-yet-unidentified man who was 

“running up the middle of the street,” id. ¶ 27, and that they “were later identified” as 

“other involved parties,” id. ¶ 33.2

 Plaintiffs do not argue that these allegations are 

sufficient to support their state law claims against these Defendants. Instead, Plaintiffs 

speculate in their opposition that Turner or Budgin was the unidentified person who, as 

alleged in the complaint, “ran up [Plaintiffs’] driveway” and “made a gesture simulating a 

gun pointed at her from underneath his shirt” as he passed by Olga Cortez. Id. ¶ 23. 

Plaintiffs then argue that these actions of the unidentified person, along with other acts not 

alleged in the complaint, are sufficient to support their state law causes of action against 

both Turner and Budgin. However, they have cited no authority for the proposition that 

allegations against an unnamed person can support causes of action against two named 

individuals, nor can the Court consider allegations not contained in the complaint. 

Accordingly, the state law causes of action against Turner and Budgin are dismissed with 

leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on all of the above, the Court GRANTS both the motion to dismiss by 

Defendants City of Oakland and Holmgren and the motion to dismiss by Defendants 

Turner and Budgin. All claims against these Defendants are dismissed with leave to 

 

2

The complaint also alleges that, “Two weeks prior to this incident Sergeant Joe 

Turner shot and killed Richard Perkins, under suspicious circumstances,” Compl. ¶ 33, but 

this allegation is not relevant to Plaintiffs’ asserted state law claims against Turner. 

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amend. If Plaintiffs wish to file an amended complaint, they must do so on or before 

March 10, 2017. Any dismissed claims not alleged in a timely amended complaint will be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 02/09/17 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge

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