Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01541/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01541-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ROBERT EARL KRONCKE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-01541 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On August 8, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 8) on January 22, 2008.

Respondents argue the action for habeas relief was not timely

filed and, therefore, that the petition must be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. Petitioner filed a traverse to the

answer to his habeas petition on February 20, 2008. See Docket

No. 11. Petitioner also filed a pleading titled “Objections to

denial of access to the Courts; Motion for order of temporary

release and other relief” on that date. See Docket No. 10. 

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1

 In CR 94-90617, Petitioner was convicted on May 7, 1996,

on twenty charges comprised of sexual assault, sexual abuse,

kidnapping, aggravated assault, attempted kidnapping, and child

molestation, including some dangerous crimes against children.

Answer, Exh. D. On June 14, 1996, the same date Petitioner signed the

plea agreement involved in this habeas petition, Petitioner was

sentenced in CR 94-90617 to a total of 326.5 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. E.

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I Procedural History

In 1994 Petitioner was charged by indictment with three

counts of theft, all classified as class 3 felonies, and one

count of burglary in the third degree, classified as a class 5

felony. See Answer, Exh. A. The state alleged Petitioner had

previously been convicted of a nondangerous felony. Id., Exh.

B. 

On June 14, 1996, Petitioner entered into a plea

agreement which provided he would plead guilty to one count of

theft, in exchange for which the state would dismiss the other

four charges in the indictment and dismiss the allegation of a

prior conviction. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement stated

Petitioner would be sentenced to the presumptive term of

imprisonment pursuant to his guilty plea to the charge of theft.

Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement also provided the term of

imprisonment would be served concurrently with any sentence

imposed in CR 94-90617,1 and that Petitioner would pay

restitution in the amount of $5,672.00. Id., Exh. C. The plea

agreement further waived Petitioner’s right to a direct appeal

of his conviction or sentence. Id., Exh. C. 

On June 14, 1996, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

five years imprisonment pursuant to his guilty plea and

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resulting conviction on one charge of theft. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner was awarded credit for 698 days of presentence

incarceration and the sentence was imposed concurrently with the

sentence imposed in CR 94-90617. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in

the Superior Court on April 29, 1998. Id., Exh. G. The action

for post-conviction relief was dismissed as not timely filed on

May 28, 1998. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner sought reconsideration

of this decision by the state court, asserting he had not been

of a “sound state of mind when entering said plea and remained

of unsound mind until well after the time for filing his Notice

had run out.” Id., Exh. I. Petitioner also asserted he had not

been informed of nor aware of his right to seek any form of

post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. I.

The motion for reconsideration was denied on July 15,

1998. Id., Exh. J. The state court noted Petitioner had been

informed both orally, by the sentencing judge, and in writing,

of his rights to appellate review pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, after his conviction. Id., Exh. J.

The state court noted Petitioner had sought review of his other

criminal conviction. Id., Exh. J. Petitioner did not seek

review of the trial court’s dismissal of his action for postconviction relief or the denial of his motion for

reconsideration by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. at 4.

Petitioner filed a second state action seeking postconviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court on January 18,

2006. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner asserted in that action that his

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guilty plea was involuntary, that the trial judge was

prejudiced, and that his trial counsel had been ineffective.

Id., Exh. K. The Arizona Superior Court dismissed the action on

February 22, 2006, concluding the action was not timely filed

and that Petitioner’s claims were precluded as waived by his

failure to raise them in a prior, timely action for postconviction relief. Id., Exh. L. Petitioner sought

reconsideration of this decision, which was denied on March 29,

2006. Id., Exh. N. Petitioner sought review of this decision

by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on October

11, 2006. Id., Exh. O. 

In his action for federal habeas relief regarding his

sentence for his conviction on one count of theft, Petitioner

asserts his conviction must be vacated because: (1) he was

denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of

trial counsel; (2) his guilty plea was involuntary due to his

mental incompetence and because he was coerced; (3) the trial

judge was biased against him; (4) he was deprived of his right

to access the courts; (5) the trial court did not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate Petitioner’s guilt or innocence. See

Petition (Docket No. 1).

II Analysis

The petition is arguably moot

The Court may “entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2007)

(emphasis added). The case-or-controversy requirement of

Article III, § 2, of the United States Constitution “subsists

through all stages of federal judicial proceedings ... The

parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of

the lawsuit.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477-78, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 1253-54 (1990) (internal quotations

omitted). Accordingly, if it appears that the Court is without

the power to grant the relief requested by a habeas petitioner,

then that case is moot. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7,

118 S. Ct. 978, 982 (1998) (stating a habeas petition is moot

upon the petitioner’s release from custody unless “some concrete

and continuing injury” or “collateral consequence” of the

challenged decision exists); Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d

773, 775 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Petitioner acknowledges that he has served the fiveyear prison sentence imposed in the challenged conviction. See

Docket No. 11. Petitioner states he is “currently serving ‘hard

labor’ slave servitude in the state prison to pay off the

$5,672.00 restitution [] portion of the sentence.” Id.

(emphasis in original).

The Court concludes that, because Petitioner has

finished serving the prison sentence imposed in the conviction

he challenges, the petition is arguably moot because Petitioner

is not, despite his allegations, being held in custody pursuant

to the challenged conviction. Ordinarily, the imposition of

restitution or a “fine only” does not constitute “custody” for

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purposes of federal habeas jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maleng v.

Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 1925-26 (1989)

(holding that, once the sentence imposed for a conviction has

completely expired, the collateral consequences of that

conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual

“in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack); Dremann v.

Francis, 828 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir. 1987); Obado v. New Jersey, 328

F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003). However, to the extent that the

requirement of restitution prevents Petitioner from serving his

prison time “as he pleases,” i.e., without having to work to

earn money to pay the restitution, Petitioner is arguably in

custody because he is suffering a greater restraint on his

liberty than he would otherwise. See, e.g., Hensley v.

Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S. 345,

351-53, 93 S. Ct. 1571, 1574-76 (1973); Barry v. Bergen County

Probation Dep’t, 128 F.3d 152, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1997).

The petition is barred by the statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 2002). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled to

tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of a

“properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

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claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(1994 & Supp. 2007); Artuz v.

Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000).

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced pursuant to his

guilty plea on June 14, 1996. Petitioner waived his right to a

direct appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.1(e) & 27.8(e); Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4033(B). The statute of limitations began

to run upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding

and review of that proceeding, or [upon] the expiration of the

time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers v.

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioner had

ninety days from the date of his conviction and sentence, until

September 11, 1996, to file an “of-right” petition for

post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. See Ariz. R. Crim P. 32.1 & 32.4(a).

Accordingly, the statute of limitations regarding Petitioner’s

federal habeas action began to run on September 12, 1996, and

expired on September 11, 1997, unless it was tolled by a

properly filed state action for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition on

or prior to September 11, 1997. Petitioner did not file any

state action for post-conviction relief during that time period

which would have tolled the applicable statute of limitations.

Petitioner’s filing of an untimely action for state postconviction relief on April 29, 1998, did not restart the

already-expired statute of limitations. See, e.g., Ferguson v.

Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). A state-court

petition that is filed after the expiration of the statute of

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limitations under the AEDPA does not revive the running of the

limitations period. See id.; Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th

Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir.

2001). Additionally, the untimely-filed petition did not toll

the statute of limitations because a state petition that is not

filed within the state’s required time limit is not “properly

filed.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413, 125 S. Ct.

1807, 1811-12 (2005).

Even allowing the most generous construction

conceivable, Petitioner did not have any action for postconviction relief pending in the Arizona state courts for at

least six years, five years beyond the applicable statute of

limitations on his federal habeas petition, from at least 1999

through January 18, 2006, when he filed his second state action

seeking post-conviction relief in the Arizona Superior Court.

In response to the answer to his habeas petition,

Petitioner states he filed a timely petition for review of the

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision filed October 11, 2006. See

Docket No. 11. Petitioner also contends he exhausted his state

remedies on February 21, 2007. Id. Petitioner contends his

“petition was timely filed within 1-year of the removal of the

state impediment to filing an application for relief and

exhaustion of state court remedies once the state-created

impediment was removed.” Id. at 1-2. Petitioner contends that

a state-created impediment to the timely filing of his petition

was “first removed on January 2, 2006 when Kroncke first

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discovered the factual predicates to the claims presented.” Id.

at 2. Petitioner asserts he only learned in 2006 that he could

attack his plea “contrary to false advice of court appointed

trial counsel” Id. at 2. Accordingly, Petitioner argues, his

petition is timely filed because the statute of limitations did

not begin to run until after January 2, 2006. See id.

Petitioner asserts that ineffective assistance of counsel

prevented him from timely challenging his conviction. Id. at 6.

Petitioner alleges that his counsel’s ineffectiveness was a

state-created impediment to his timely filing of his state

action of post-conviction relief. Id. Petitioner further

declares that “mental incompetence and no access to the court

impeded Kroncke from discovering and litigating the claims

earlier.” Id. at 8. Petitioner also asserts that the statute

of limitations should be tolled while he exhausts his state

remedies regarding his habeas claims. Id. at 9-10.

Additionally, Petitioner maintains that, although the “5-year

prison term part of the sentence has ended, Kroncke is currently

serving the ‘hard labor’ slave servitude portion of the sentence

in state prison until the $5,672.00 restitution portion of the

sentence in this case is paid off via such slave servitude.”

Id. at 10. Petitioner further contends that if he is “ever

released, such as if his other convictions are invalidated ...

[Petitioner] will suffer extreme collateral consequences in this

current case such as the loss of the right to vote...” Id. at

11. Petitioner also states his federal habeas claims were

raised “in the state proceedings filed on Jan. 18, 2006 ...”

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2 This holding does not affect a petitioner’s ability to

raise claims involving a change in the law made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or claims

involving newly-discovered evidence of innocence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(2) (2004 & Supp. 2007). Absent those circumstances, which are

not present here, the strict application of the jurisdictional

deadline is appropriate in a collateral proceeding and is now

established Supreme Court precedent. See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at

2365–66.

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Id.

The undersigned has previously reasoned that section

2254 habeas applicants are no longer entitled to consideration

of the merits of their untimely petitions based on the doctrine

that the statute of limitations could be equitably tolled. The

Supreme Court recently concluded section 2254 petitioners are

not entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s statute of

limitations because this does not comport with the plain meaning

of the statute. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365

(2007) (holding that “time limits enacted by Congress” are

“jurisdictional” and rejecting the argument that the federal

courts could craft an “equitable” exception to the

jurisdictional requirement).2 But see Lawrence v. Florida, 127

S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (assuming, without deciding, that

section 2244(d) provides for equitable tolling).

However, were the Court to conclude the law might

provide for the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations,

Petitioner is still not entitled to the benefit of this

doctrine. Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing

that there were extraordinary circumstances beyond his control

which made it impossible for him to file a timely federal habeas

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petition, or that any state action was the “but for” cause for

his failure to timely file his federal habeas action. See Brown

v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding the

petitioner has a strong burden to plead specific facts

supporting their claim of extraordinary circumstances). See

also Pace, 544 U.S. at 419, 125 S. Ct. at 1815 (concluding that

the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he

was not misled or confused about the exhaustion of his state

remedies and filing his federal habeas petition); Shannon v.

Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Each of the cases

in which equitable tolling has been applied have involved

wrongful conduct, either by state officials or, occasionally, by

the petitioner’s counsel.”). Compare Sanchez v. Cambra, 137

Fed. App. 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

1333 (2006); Faught v. Butler, 135 Fed. App. 92, 93 (9th Cir.

2005). 

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do

not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable

tolling because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.”

See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.

2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004);

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714–716 (5th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner has not stated a legitimate ground for equitable

tolling, i.e., an uncontrollable factor which was the “but for”

cause of his failure to timely file his federal habeas action.

Green v. Hinsley, 116 Fed. App. 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2004)

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(finding that equitable tolling was not available because the

petitioner failed to submit evidence of how his low IQ rendered

him incompetent or prevented him from timely filing his

petition); Fisher, 262 F.3d at 1145 (finding that the

petitioner’s mere allegations of incompetency at the time of his

guilty pleas did not suffice to warrant equitable tolling of the

entire limitations period).

III Conclusion

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is,

arguably, moot, because Petitioner is no longer “in custody”

pursuant to the conviction challenged in the petition.

Additionally, the petition is barred by the statute of

limitations applicable to it pursuant to the AEDPA. Even

allowing for the most generous construction of the applicable

statute of limitations, more than 365 days of un-tolled time

passed after the date Petitioner’s conviction became final and

the date he filed his federal habeas petition. Pursuant to a

recent United States Supreme Court opinion, Petitioner is not

entitled to equitable tolling of the applicable statute of

limitations as a matter of federal statutory law. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Kroncke’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

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Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 26th day of February, 2008.

 

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