Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01173/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01173-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Kenneth Oliver is appearing pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. 

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 28, 2016. On November 19, 2015, the Court dismissed 

the original complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 

7.) Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on February 19, 2016. (ECF No. 12.) On March 8, 2016, 

the Court screened the first amended complaint and directed Plaintiff to either file a second amended 

complaint or notify the Court of his intent to proceed on the claim found to be cognizable. (ECF No. 

13.) 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff‟s third amended complaint, filed July 18, 2016. (ECF 

No. 21.) 

KENNETH OLIVER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

M. DOCANTO, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-01173-DAD-SAB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT, WITH ONE FINAL 

OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

[ECF No. 21]

Case 1:15-cv-01173-DAD-SAB Document 22 Filed 08/18/16 Page 1 of 8
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II.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro per. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff‟s amended complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it 

is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

While persons proceeding pro se are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed 

and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, the pleading standard is now higher, Wilhelm v. 

Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive screening, Plaintiff‟s 

claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to 

reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely consistent with‟ a 

defendant‟s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969.

III.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

On December 18, 2010, Plaintiff occupied cell number 54, in housing unit 4, facility B at the 

California State Prison, Corcoran Security Housing Unit. On this same date, Defendants DoCanto and 

Meza conducted a search of Plaintiff‟s cell. During the search, Defendants DoCanto and Meza 

Case 1:15-cv-01173-DAD-SAB Document 22 Filed 08/18/16 Page 2 of 8
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removed several items of Plaintiff‟s and his cellmate‟s personal property from their cell, namely, 21 

books and 41 magazines. Of the items removed, 14 of the 21 books were personal property belonging 

to Plaintiff. The books that were removed from the cell that belonged to Plaintiff were: (1) Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) Prisoners‟ Survival Guide; 3) Columbia Jailhouse Lawyers Manual; 4) 

Prisoners Self-Help Litigation Manual; 5) Protecting Your Health and Safety; 6) Jailhouse Lawyers; 7) 

Webster‟s Collegiate Dictionary; 8) Rogets Thesaurus; 9) The Art of Leadership, Vol. 1; 10) The Art 

of Leadership, Vol. 2; 11) The New Jim Crow; 12) Blueprint for Black Power; 13) Making of a SinoMarxist Worldview; and 14) Voices of Revolution.

Of the 14 books converted from Plaintiff, eight were legal and reference books, and the 

remaining six were non-fiction socio-political material. Plaintiff‟s books were purchased and received 

through authorized means pursuant to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

(CDCR) regulations. Defendants DoCanto and Meza did not provide Plaintiff any pre or postdeprivation hearing or any other form of opportunity to be heard, in order to demonstrate that his 

books were within the allowable limits of his personal property possession as set forth by CDCR rules 

and regulations. 

Defendants DoCanto and Meza did not provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to mail his 

personal property home at his own expense in accordance with CDCR rules and regulations governing 

confiscation of non-dangerous personal property. 

Defendants DoCanto and Meza did not confiscate and convert Plaintiff‟s personal property for 

reasons that were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, in that CDCR regulations 

provide for Plaintiff to possess unlimited legal books up to one cub foot above and beyond any normal 

property limitations, including, and in addition to, any normal property limitations for the possession 

of publications. 

On or about April 5, 2011, Plaintiff provided Defendant Prudhel and Lambert constructive 

notice that his personal property had been wrongfully confiscated by way of CDCR administrative 

grievance.

On April 11, 2011, Plaintiff provided Defendant Prudhel actual notice that his personal 

property had been wrongfully confiscated without due process of law via a face-to-face interview.

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Defendants Prudhel and Lambert had direct supervisory authority and responsibility over 

Defendants DoCanto and Meza, and both had the ability to question, investigate, modify or correct the 

actions of DoCanto and Meza. Defendants Prudhel and Lambert personally participated in, approved 

of, and ultimately ratified the actions of Defendants of DoCanto and Meza and turned a blind eye to 

CDCR‟s own rules and regulations that required them to provide adequate compensation for the 

unauthorized taking of Plaintiff‟s personal property.

On July 14, 2011,

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Plaintiff provided Defendants Hubbard and Gipson constructive and actual 

notice that his personal property had been wrongfully converted absent due process of law and that he 

was not being compensated in accordance with CDCR policy. Plaintiff provided the notice in writing 

through the CDCR administrative grievance procedure.

Defendants Hubbard and Gipson both had direct supervisory authority and responsibility over 

Defendants DoCanto, Meza, Prudhel, and Lambert. Defendants Hubbard Gipson had authority to 

question, investigate, modify and correct the actions of DoCanto, Meza, Prudhel, and Lambert.

On or about September 1, 2011, Plaintiff provided Defendants Beard, Davis and Foston 

constructive and actual notice through the CDCR administrative grievance procedure that his personal 

property had been wrongly converted absence due process of law and that he was not being 

compensated in accordance with CDCR policy. 

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Violation

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

protects Plaintiff from being deprived of property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and Plaintiff has a protected interest in his personal property, Hansen v. 

May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). Authorized, intentional deprivations of property are 

actionable under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984); 

Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1985), but the Due Process Clause is violated only when 

 

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Plaintiff presents the date as July 14, 2016; however, it appears that Plaintiff meant to state July 14, 2011. 

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the agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without underlying statutory authority and 

competent procedural protections,” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted).

However, the Due Process Clause is not violated by the random, unauthorized deprivation of 

property so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has an 

adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law and therefore, he may not pursue a due process 

claim arising out of the unlawful confiscation of his personal property. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 

(citing Cal. Gov‟t Code §§ 810-895). 

In this instance, Plaintiff contends that Defendants DoCanto and Meza confiscated and 

converted his personal property for reasons not related to a legitimate penological interest because the 

CDCR regulations allow Plaintiff to possess unlimited legal books up to one cubic feet above and 

beyond any normal property limitations. It is clear that Plaintiff contends the confiscation of his 

publications was unauthorized which does not give rise to a cognizable due process violation, as 

Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law. The mere fact that any state 

law claim was denied and he was not provided compensation does not provide relief in this forum. 

Accordingly, the allegations in the second amended complaint fail to give rise to a cognizable due 

process claim.2 

B. First Amendment Violation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment. However, 

Plaintiff alleges no facts giving rise to a claim under the First Amendment-abridgment of right to free 

speech, and Plaintiff‟s property claim is appropriately addressed under the Due Process Clause. The 

mere fact that Plaintiff‟s publications were confiscated does not give rise to a separate violation under 

the First Amendment protection to free speech. There is no conduct alleged by Defendants that 

prevented Plaintiff from engaging in speech either written or verbally. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

failed to state a cognizable First Amendment violation. 

 

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Nor is a prisoner protected by the Fourth Amendment against the seizure, destruction or conversion of his property. 

Taylor v. Knapp. 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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C. Inmate Appeals Process

Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate 

employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 

977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep‟t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 

(9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A 

supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, 

or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor‟s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 F.3d at 989) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16.

“The Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of 

life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one 

of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Plaintiff does not a 

have protected liberty interest in the processing his appeals, and therefore, he cannot pursue a claim 

for denial of due process with respect to the handling or resolution of his appeals. Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Involvement in reviewing an inmate‟s administrative appeal does not necessarily demonstrate 

awareness of alleged violation. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, 

actions in reviewing a prisoner‟s administrative appeal, without more, are not actionable under section 

1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. 

In this instance, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Prudhel, Lambert, Hubbard, Gipson, Beard, 

Davis, and Foston, as supervisory personnel were provided notice of the alleged constitutional 

violation and failed to remedy the violation. However, a Defendant is not liable because he/she denied 

an appeal relating to the confiscation and compensation of his personal property. Based on Plaintiff‟s 

allegations, it is clear his grievances were reviewed and he simply does not agree with the result of 

such investigation. Plaintiff‟s allegations are insufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation by 

these Defendants. 

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D. State Law Claims

Plaintiff seeks to raise claims under California for failure to discharge a mandatory duty (Cal. 

Gov‟t Code § 815.6) and negligence. Plaintiff‟s attempt to bring a claim under California Government 

Code section 815.6 is misplaced because such statute provides that a public entity may be liable for an 

injury caused by a failure to discharge a duty. See Cal. Gov‟t Code § 815.6. 

“Under California law, „[t]he elements of negligence are: (1) defendant‟s obligation to conform 

to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks (duty); (2) 

failure to conform to that standard (breach of duty); (3) a reasonably close connection between the 

defendant‟s conduct and resulting injuries (proximate cause); and (4) actual loss (damages).‟” Corales 

v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McGarry v. Sax, 158 Cal.App.4th 983, 994, 70 

Cal.Rptr.3d 519 (2008) (internal quotations omitted)).

The “plain language” of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “makes clear that supplemental jurisdiction may 

only be invoked when the district court has the hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang it.” 

Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff may 

amend this claim, but is notified that if he fails to allege a viable federal claim in his amended 

complaint, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim, even if the 

state law claim is cognizable. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Az., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2013); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d at 805. 

V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted. Plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he 

feels he can do so in good faith. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. 

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 

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and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level .

. .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All 

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are 

waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 

1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff an amended civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint, filed July 18, 2016, is dismissed for failure to 

state a claim;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this action 

will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 17, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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