Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02937/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02937-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNETH CALIHAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MATTHEW CATE, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-2937-MCE-EFB P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Knipp moves to dismiss and to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant.1 

ECF No. 30. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted 

and the motion to declare plaintiff vexatious be denied. 

I. Background

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges the following facts: On December 9, 2011, 

plaintiff (an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison, hereinafter “MCSP”) was attacked by fellow 

inmate Tab Bennett and suffered “major injuries.”2

 ECF No. 17 at 2. Bennett was a “level four” 

inmate, while plaintiff was “level two.” Id. According to prison policies, inmates with such 

disparate classification numbers must not be placed on the same yard. Id. In addition, defendant 

 1

 Knipp is the sole remaining defendant in this action. ECF Nos. 18, 23. 

2

 As of May 2013, Bennett was being prosecuted in Amador County for the attack against 

plaintiff. Id. at 6. 

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Knipp, the warden at MCSP, knew that plaintiff had good reason to fear for his safety, having 

testified against Mexican Mafia members in another trial. Id. at 1, 3. According to the complaint, 

another witness in the same trial was killed for having testified. Id. at 3. Nevertheless, Knipp 

allegedly did not tell his staff about plaintiff’s safety concerns. Id. at 1. 

II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 

A. Failure to State a Claim 

Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted and thus dismissal is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In order 

to survive a motion to dismiss under that rule, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-

55, 562-63, 570 (2007) (stating that the 12(b)(6) standard that dismissal is warranted if plaintiff 

can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief “has been 

questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough,” and that having “earned its retirement,” 

it “is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard”). Thus, 

the grounds must amount to “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action. Id. at 1965. Instead, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal citation omitted). Dismissal may be 

based either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to 

support cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). 

 The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted as true. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. 

Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1984). The court construes the pleading in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff and resolves all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. 

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). General allegations are presumed to include 

specific facts necessary to support the claim. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 

(1992). 

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 The court may disregard allegations contradicted by the complaint’s attached exhibits. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, 

Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998). Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as 

true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 

1987)). The court may consider matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other 

papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 

1986) (abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 

(1991)). “[T]he court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual 

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. 

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither need the court accept 

unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure its 

defects, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the complaint before 

dismissal. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Noll v. Carlson, 

809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant arises under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution. “‘Prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of 

other prisoners.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. 

Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). The failure of prison officials to protect 

inmates from attacks by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation 

when: (1) the deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently serious” and (2) the prison officials 

had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” acting with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 834 (internal quotations omitted). “Deliberate indifference entails something more than mere 

negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of 

causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. To show deliberate 

indifference, “an inmate must prove that the official was both aware of facts from which the 

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inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, and he must also have 

drawn the inference.” Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because plaintiff has not 

alleged that defendant knew that Bennett, in particular, posed a risk of harm to plaintiff. 

Defendant argues that, because there is nothing in the complaint suggesting that Bennett attacked 

plaintiff because of his testimony, or that would have indicated to defendant that Bennett posed a 

risk specifically to plaintiff, plaintiff’s claim fails. 

No case authority is cited holding that the defendant must be aware that another inmate 

poses a risk of harm specific to the plaintiff to state a claim for deliberate indifference. The 

absence of such authority is not surprising – such a rule would permit prison officials to 

deliberately place inmates they know to be uncontrollably violent in the general prison 

population, so long as the violent inmate did not have a specific target in mind. Here, plaintiff 

has alleged that it was indifferent of defendant to place Bennett and himself in the same yard due 

to their disparate custody levels, which in turn are based at least in part on an assessed risk of the 

inmate’s propensity for violence. These general allegations are sufficient for the parties and the 

court to infer that defendant knew it would be risky to place Bennett on the lower-custody yard, 

but did so anyway. See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3375 (providing the classification process, 

and noting, “A lower placement score indicates lesser security control needs and a higher 

placement score indicates greater security control needs.”).3

 Plaintiff alleges that defendant was 

aware of Bennett’s higher custody level, as well as plaintiff’s specific fears of retribution, but 

nevertheless placed Bennett on the yard with plaintiff. These allegations sufficiently claim that 

defendant was aware of facts from which a substantial risk of serious harm could be inferred. 

///// 

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 Defendant argues that plaintiff may not base his claim on a violation of state prison 

regulations. While this is true enough (James v. Sweeny, No. 1:12-cv-01704-LJO-MJS (PC), 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182344. at *12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2012)), a prison policy may be 

relevant to the question of whether the defendant knowingly disregarded a risk of harm; for 

example, where a defendant flagrantly violates a policy specifically designed to maintain safety. 

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Defendant also argues that the complaint lacks any allegation that defendant actually drew 

the inference of risk. Plaintiff does allege, however, that “defendant[] clearly knew of the 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk[.]” ECF No. 17 at 3. Combined with 

plaintiff’s allegations that defendant knew of facts showing that Bennett posed a risk of harm to 

inmates on plaintiff’s yard, this allegations suffices to plead that defendant actually inferred from 

those facts such risk of harm. 

Defendant next argues that the complaint must be dismissed because plaintiff’s allegations 

regarding his injuries are insufficient to show more than de minimis physical injury as required by 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). That statute provides: “No Federal civil action may be brought by a 

prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of 

physical injury . . . . ” Defendant relies on Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 2002) to 

argue that plaintiff’s allegation that he suffered “major injuries” as the result of Bennett’s attack is 

insufficient under § 1997e(e). Defendant argues that, pursuant to that statute, plaintiff’s 

complaint “alleges no entitlement to damages.” ECF No. 30-1 at 13. 

In Oliver, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiff had 

alleged only de minimis physical injury and thus could not proceed on a claim for emotional 

injury. 289 F.3d at 629. The plaintiff had testified at deposition that his alleged pain was 

“nothing too serious” and did not require medical treatment. Id. He further failed to describe the 

nature, if any, of the physical injuries he sustained in a fight. Id. The court was careful to state, 

however, that the failure to meet the physical injury requirement defeated only the plaintiff’s 

claims for mental and emotional injury and that any other claim for compensatory, nominal, or 

punitive damages remained. Id. at 629-30. 

Here, while plaintiff’s amended complaint does not go into detail about the precise nature 

of the injuries he suffered, it does allege that plaintiff was physically attacked by another inmate 

and consequently suffered “serious” injury to the extent that he was “almost murdered.” ECF No. 

17 at 3. Elsewhere in the complaint plaintiff states that “[d]ue to the major – injuries that plaintiff 

suffered on the date of 12-09-2011, plaintiff can bring a civil rights case . . . .” Id. at 2. While the 

“almost murdered” characterization is not described in terms of what bodily injury occurred, the 

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allegation of having sustained “serious” and “major” injuries suffices at this stage of the 

proceedings to allege more than de minimis physical injury. Accordingly, defendant’s request to 

dismiss the complaint for failure to allege more than de minimis physical injury must be rejected. 

B. Res Judicata and the “Two Dismissal Rule” 

Defendant next argues that the complaint must be dismissed as barred by res judicata 

because plaintiff has already dismissed two prior cases involving the attack by Bennett, and the 

second dismissal was “on the merits” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B).4 

That rule provides that a voluntary dismissal is ordinarily without prejudice. “But if the plaintiff 

previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a 

notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). 

Defendant presents these two prior cases voluntarily dismissed as ground for application 

of the two dismissal rule here: 

1. Kenny Calihan v. M. Kaplan, et al., Amador County Superior Court, Case No. 12-

CVC-07748 (hereinafter Kaplan). Plaintiff filed this action in 2012, alleging 

negligence against correctional supervisor Kaplan (also named a defendant in this 

action prior to screening). ECF No. 30-5. Plaintiff alleged that Kaplan failed to 

supervise his staff at the time Bennett attacked plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff also alleged that 

Kaplan wrongfully allowed Bennett to access the exercise yard at the same time as 

 4

 Defendant presents this argument as two separate arguments: (1) that the complaint 

should be dismissed pursuant to the “two dismissal” rule and (2) that the complaint should be 

dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant states that, under the “two dismissal” 

rule, “the second voluntary dismissal bars a subsequent third action, when it is filed,” citing 

Commercial Space Management Co. v. Boeing Co., 193 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999). Neither 

that case nor Rule 41(a) itself contains any such language. The rule simply states that the second 

voluntary dismissal of an action “based on or including the same claim . . . operates as 

adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Thus, defendant’s two arguments are 

part of a single analysis: whether plaintiff’s current case is barred by principles of claim 

preclusion due to the effect of second dismissal of prior action being an adjudication on the 

merits. See, generally, Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 933 

F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1991) (referring to the analysis as “Rule 41(a)(1) res judicata”); Melamed v. 

Blue Cross of Cal., 557 F. App’x. 659, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s dismissal 

of third action pursuant to Rule 41’s “two dismissal rule,” applying res judicata principles to 

determine that the adjudication of the second action on the merits under Rule 41 barred a third 

action based on the same nucleus of operative facts). 

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plaintiff, knowing of their disparate custody classifications and plaintiff’s safety 

concerns. Id. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Kaplan in September 2012. ECF Nos. 

30-6, 30-7. 

2. Calihan v. Knipp, Eastern District of California Case No. 2:12-cv-2356 (hereinafter 

Knipp). Plaintiff filed this action one month prior to dismissing Kaplan in the state 

court, alleging that defendant Knipp, along with Kaplan and two other correctional 

staff members (Barroga, who was screened from this action, and Ybarra) failed to 

supervise their inferior correctional officers during the time Bennett attacked plaintiff. 

ECF No. 30-8. Plaintiff claimed that defendants failed to use medical detectors to 

check for weapons on entering the exercise yard. Id. Plaintiff alleged that defendant 

Knipp was not present, in violation of state regulations. Id. Plaintiff voluntarily 

dismissed Knipp in February 2014. ECF No. 30-9. 

Defendant argues that the voluntary dismissal of the second of these cases resulted in an 

adjudication on the merits by operation of Rule 41(a)(1)(B) and that is therefore res judicata as to 

the instant case. 

Res judicata will bar a later suit when an earlier suit “‘(1) involved the same ‘claim’ or 

cause of action as the later suit, (2) reached a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved 

identical parties or privies.’” Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Systems, 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Sidhu v. Flecto Co., 279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)). Thus, to determine 

whether the instant case is barred by the combined effect of Rule 41(a)(1)(B) and res judicata, the 

court must undertake the following step-wise analysis: First, the court must determine whether 

Kaplan and Knipp were “based on or include[ed] the same claim” as that phrase is used in Rule 

41(a)(1)(B). This analysis is identical to determining whether Kaplan and Knipp would be 

considered to involve the same “claim or cause of action” under familiar res judicata law. Lee v. 

Thornburg Mortg. Home Loans Inc., No. 14-cv-00602 NC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137758, at 

*13-14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2014); Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 13-02065 JSW, 2013 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135954, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). If not, there has been no prior 

adjudication on the merits, and res judicata is inapplicable. If so, then Knipp must be considered 

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to have been adjudicated on the merits under the two dismissal rule, and the court must proceed to 

a second step. At the second step, the court must determine whether the instant case and Knipp

involve the same claim or cause of action and involve identical parties or privies. If not, res 

judicata does not apply. If so, the instant case is barred by res judicata. 

Turning to the first step, Kaplan and Knipp will be considered “based on or including the 

same claim” if: (1) the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts; (2) rights or 

interest established by the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the 

second action; (3) the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) substantially the 

same evidence would be presented in both actions. Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987. 

The court must use a “transaction test” to determine whether Kaplan and Knipp arise from 

the same transactional nucleus of fact; i.e., they do if “they are related to the same set of facts and 

. . . could be conveniently tried together.” Id. (quoting Western Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 

871 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that this element – sharing the same nucleus 

of facts – is often outcome-determinative. Id. at 988. Here, it is clear that Kaplan and Knipp pass 

the transaction test – both cases relate to Bennett’s attack on plaintiff and, because both cases 

revolve around plaintiff’s claims that the attack resulted from poor job performance by prison 

officials (and include identical allegations against Kaplan), they could conveniently be tried 

together. 

As there was no judgment in Kaplan, the court cannot assess whether rights established by 

a judgment in that case would have been impaired by the prosecution of Knipp. Nevertheless, 

because Kaplan was a defendant in both actions, if Kaplan had reached a final determination on 

the merits, proceeding against him in Knipp based on the same incident could certainly have 

destroyed or impaired the resolution reached in Kaplan. Additionally, both suits involve the 

infringement of the same right – plaintiff’s right to adequate protection from attack while under 

the care of state prison authorities. Lastly, because plaintiff sued Kaplan in both cases on 

substantially the same claims and alleged many of the same facts, some evidence would have 

been duplicated had both cases proceeded. 

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In sum, these four factors all weigh in favor of a finding that Kaplan and Knipp were 

based on the same claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of Knipp must be viewed 

as a disposition on the merits, and the court must proceed to the second step of the analysis: 

whether the instant case and Knipp involve the same claim or cause of action and involve 

identical parties or privies. 

The court again employs the transaction test to determine whether this case and Knipp

involve the same claim and concludes that the two cases share the same core facts. Again, both 

cases arise out of the attack by Bennett on plaintiff. Both cases allege that the attack was caused 

or allowed by prison official malfeasance and include mostly the same defendants (Knipp also 

raised claims against a correctional officer named Ybarra). Both cases include many of the same 

factual allegations. It is again easy to conclude that the cases share the same core facts and could 

conveniently be tried together and thus that they arise from the same transactional nucleus of fact. 

In addition, because Knipp must be considered to have been dismissed on the merits under 

Rule 41(a)(1)(B) and included the same claims against all defendants named in this action, 

including the only remaining defendant (Knipp), allowing this case to go forward would destroy 

the expectation of those defendants that plaintiff’s claims against them for whatever role they had 

in the incident with Bennett were extinguished. Both this case and Knipp rested on plaintiff’s 

claim that his constitutional rights were violated by these officers’ acts or failures to act during 

and before that incident. Both cases would involve the same evidence. Accordingly, under the 

transaction test, this case and Knipp are based on the same claim. 

By operation of Rule 41(a)(1)(B) as discussed above, Knipp resulted in a final 

determination on the merits. As both cases involved the same parties, all elements of claim 

preclusion have been met here (that is, the cases involve the same claim, the earlier case 

concluded on the merits, and the cases involve the same parties). For that reason, plaintiff’s 

complaint must be dismissed without leave to amend. 

III. Defendant’s Motion to Declare Plaintiff Vexatious

Defendant asks the court to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant, require him to post a 

security before proceeding further in this action, and issue a pre-filing order prohibiting him from 

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filing any future cases against defendant relating to the attack by Bennett without first obtaining 

the court’s permission. 

Under Eastern District of California Local Rule 151(b), 

[T]he Court may at any time order a party to give a security, bond, or undertaking 

in such amount as the Court may determine to be appropriate. The provisions of 

Title 3A, part 2, of the California Code of Civil Procedure, relating to vexatious 

litigants, are hereby adopted as a procedural Rule of this Court on the basis of 

which the Court may order the giving of a security, bond, or undertaking, 

although the power of the Court shall not be limited thereby. 

California Code of Civil Procedure, part 2, Title 3A is entitled “Vexatious Litigants” and includes 

the following provision: 

In any litigation pending . . ., at any time until final judgment is entered, a 

defendant may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order requiring the 

plaintiff to furnish security . . .. The motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to 

furnish security shall be based upon the ground, and supported by a showing, that 

the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probability 

that he or she will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.1. As is relevant to this motion, California law defines a vexatious 

litigant as a person who, in the seven years immediately preceding the motion, has commenced, 

prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims 

court that have been finally determined adversely to the person. Id. § 391(b)(1). To order the 

posting of a security under § 391.1, the court must additionally conclude, after hearing evidence, 

“that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the 

moving defendant.” Id. § 391.3(a). Thus, to issue the order requested by defendant, this court 

must find that: (1) plaintiff has filed five litigations in the past seven years that have been finally 

determined adversely to plaintiff and (2) there is no reasonable probability that plaintiff will 

succeed on his claims against defendant. “One purpose of authorizing security for costs is to 

allow the court to have some control over the administration of a lawsuit.” Sherman v. City of 

Davis, No. S-11-0820 JAM GGH PS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29787, at *31 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 

2012); Ilro Productions, Ltd. v. Music Fair Enterprises, 94 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing 

Leighton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 340 F.2d 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1965). “In determining 

whether to impose a bond, the court may ‘take all the pertinent circumstances into account 

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including the conduct of the litigants and the background and purpose of the litigation.’” Id.

(quoting Leighton, 340 F. 2d at 861). The undersigned does not find that a security is currently 

warranted in this action. 

Defendant also requests that the court issue an order requiring plaintiff to obtain leave of 

court before filing any new cases against him with respect to the attack by Bennett. This court 

has inherent power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), to enter a pre-filing order 

against a vexatious litigant, but a pre-filing order is “an extreme remedy that should rarely be 

used.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007). Such orders 

should be rare because they “can tread on a litigant’s due process right of access to the courts.” 

Id. Prior to issuing such an order, the court must (1) provide plaintiff with an opportunity to be 

heard; (2) compile an adequate record; (3) make substantive findings about the frivolous or 

harassing nature of plaintiff’s litigation; and (4) narrowly tailor the order to closely fit the specific 

vice encountered. Id. 

The federal definition of vexatiousness that plaintiff must fall within for a pre-filing order 

to issue is much narrower than that provided by the California Code of Civil Procedure. The 

court looks to both the number and content of plaintiff’s filings to determine whether his claims 

have been frivolous. Id. at 1059. For a pre-filing order to issue, plaintiff’s claims must not only 

be numerous but also either patently without merit or containing false factual assertions. Id. at 

1060-61. 

 Defendant has summarized 11 prior cases brought by plaintiff but has identified none in 

which the claims were patently without merit or contained false factual assertions. Plaintiff 

voluntarily dismissed four of the actions, four were dismissed for failure to state a claim, one was 

dismissed when plaintiff failed to post a security, one was dismissed because plaintiff had not 

exhausted his administrative remedies, and one was dismissed because plaintiff failed to submit a 

compliant in forma pauperis application as ordered by the court. Defendant has not shown any of 

these cases to be frivolous or filed to harass. Accordingly, the court should decline to enter the 

prefiling order sought by defendant. 

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IV. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Sur-reply

Plaintiff filed a sur-reply to defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant asks the court to 

strike it. The request will be granted. Parties do not have the right to file sur-replies and motions 

are deemed submitted when the time to reply has expired. Local Rule 230(l). The Court 

generally views motions for leave to file a sur-reply with disfavor. Hill v. England, 2005 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 29357, 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz

USA, LLC, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2005)). However, district courts have the 

discretion to either permit or preclude a sur-reply. See U.S. ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health 

Corp., 565 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse discretion in refusing to 

permit “inequitable sur-reply”); JG v. Douglas County School Dist., 552 F.3d 786, 803 n.14 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (district court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to file sur-reply where it did 

not consider new evidence in reply); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (new 

evidence in reply may not be considered without giving the non-movant an opportunity to 

respond). 

Here, plaintiff did not obtain permission to file the sur-reply. The filing is unnecessary to 

the disposition of this motion and will be stricken.

V. Order and Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s sur-reply to the 

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 33) is stricken. 

It is further RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to dismiss and to declare plaintiff 

a vexatious litigant (ECF No. 30) be granted in part, such that: 

a. Defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted and the complaint be dismissed 

without leave to amend; 

b. Defendant’s motion that plaintiff be deemed a vexatious litigant under Local 

Rule 151(b) and be required to post a security be denied; and 

c. Defendant’s motion that plaintiff be subjected to a pre-filing order be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 25, 2015. 

Case 2:12-cv-02937-MCE-EFB Document 37 Filed 02/25/15 Page 13 of 13