Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03653/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03653-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3653

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Earle Myers, Jr., also known as

“Bud,”

Appellant,

v.

Richland County; Bryan L. Flaa;

Don Holen; Lynn C. Larsen; Tim

Campbell; Joel Dotzenrod,

Richland County Commissioners,

in their official capacities; Ray

Ward; Steve Campbell; Merlin

Berg; Dave Paulson, former

Richland County Commissioners,

in their individual and official

capacities,

 Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court, District of North

Dakota.

________________

 Submitted: September 14, 2005 

 Filed: November 16, 2005 

________________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 04-3653 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/16/2005 Entry ID: 1975191
1

Jones-Van Tassel v. Richland County, et al., No. 99-CV-60 (D.N.D.). 

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Earle Myers, Jr. (“Myers”) brought this action for breach of contract,

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and defamation arising from an

alleged violation of a settlement agreement. The district court granted the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all three claims. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the

breach of contract claim, vacate the grant of summary judgment on the IIED and

defamation claims and remand with instructions to dismiss the IIED and defamation

claims for lack of jurisdiction. 

I. BACKGROUND

Myers served as the elected State’s Attorney for Richland County, North

Dakota, from 1977 until 2003. In May 2000, a former Richland County employee,

Jewel Jones-Van Tassel (“Jones-Van Tassel”), filed an amended complaint against

Richland County and others in the District of North Dakota alleging claims including

gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1

 In that

litigation, Myers gave deposition testimony that was favorable to Jones-Van Tassel

concerning his knowledge of the behavior of Richland County Sheriff Harlan

Muehler and Richland County Commissioner Dave Paulson toward female employees

of Richland County. The parties settled the case, and Jones-Van Tassel received $1.2

million. The defendant-signatories of the Jones-Van Tassel settlement agreement

who are also defendants in the present action include Richland County and former

Richland County Commissioners Ray Ward, Dave Paulson, Merlin Berg and Steve

Campbell. Paragraph six of the settlement agreement, the “no-retaliation provision,”

provides:

6. No Retaliation. Defendants agree that they will not retaliate with

respect to any employment related matter against any former, present, or

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2

On appeal, Myers attempts to argue that the breach of contract claim was

brought against the individual commissioners as well as Richland County. Yet

paragraph 34 of his Complaint states that the breach of contract count “is brought

against the County,” and Myers’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment states, “Myers alleged three counts in his Complaint. The first

count, breach of contract, is only asserted against the County.” 

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prospective City or County employee, or individual whose compensation

is paid, in whole or in part, by the City or County, who have provided

any support to Plaintiff, whether by affidavit, deposition testimony,

providing information to Plaintiff, or any other manner of support. 

Furthermore, paragraph 17 of the settlement agreement provides, “The parties agree

that the Federal District Court for the District of North Dakota shall retain jurisdiction

of this matter to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement and Release.” The

district court expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement in its

January 10, 2001, Order for Dismissal with Prejudice and Retaining Jurisdiction with

the statement that “this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to enforce the

terms of the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Releases.” 

On November 12, 2002, Myers instituted the present action against Richland

County and current and former members of the Richland County Board of

Commissioners in their individual and official capacities. Myers brought three

claims. The first was a breach of contract claim against Richland County.2

 He

asserted that Richland County breached the Jones-Van Tassel settlement agreement

by retaliating against him for his deposition testimony and that the retaliation resulted

in his defeat in the November 2002 election for State’s Attorney. He also brought

claims for IIED and defamation against present Richland County Commissioners

Bryan L. Flaa, Don Holen, Lynn C. Larsen, Tim Campbell and Joel Dotzenrod, in

their individual capacities, and former Richland County Commissioners Ray Ward,

Steve Campbell, Merlin Berg and Dave Paulson, in their individual capacities. 

Appellate Case: 04-3653 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/16/2005 Entry ID: 1975191
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The defendants moved to dismiss the action. The district court denied the

defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 23, 2003, rejecting the arguments that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that Myers lacked standing to enforce the

settlement agreement and that Myers failed to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted. The district court later amended its order so as to dismiss the defendants

who were not signatories to the Jones-Van Tassel settlement agreement–Bryan L.

Flaa, Don Holen, Lynn C. Larsen, Tim Campbell and Joel Dotzenrod. Next, the

parties stipulated that Steve Campbell and Merlin Berg be dismissed from the suit.

The remaining defendants, Richland County, Ray Ward and Dave Paulson,moved for

summary judgment. On September 30, 2004, the district court granted the motion for

summary judgment as to Myers’s remaining claims for breach of settlement

agreement against Richland County, and for IIED and defamation against Ray Ward

and Dave Paulson. Myers appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We first must address the defendants’ argument that this action should be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because “[a]ny party or the court

may, at any time, raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” GMAC Commercial

Credit LLC v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2004). We

review the question of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Gilbert v. Monsanto Co.,

216 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2000). 

The district court found that the breach of contract claim, as well as the IIED

and defamation claims, fell within supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a), and rejected the defendants’ request that the district court exercise its

discretion to decline jurisdiction based on the factors listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

We hold that because the district court expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the

Appellate Case: 04-3653 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/16/2005 Entry ID: 1975191
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Jones-Van Tassel settlement agreement, it had ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over

the breach of contract claim. We also hold, however, that the district court lacked

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(a) over the IIED and defamation claims

because it did not possess original jurisdiction over the action, as required by §

1367(a).

1. Breach of Contract

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Insurance Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Supreme Court held in

Kokkonen that district courts do not have inherent power to enforce a settlement

agreement entered into by parties in federal court. 511 U.S. at 380-81. Because an

action to enforce a settlement agreement is a claim for breach of contract, it should

be heard in state court unless it has “its own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 378. While

the Court found no basis for jurisdiction where the district court’s order did not even

mention the settlement agreement, the Court explained that 

if the parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement

agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal–either by

separate provision (such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the

settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement

agreement in the order. . . . a breach of the agreement would be a

violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement

would therefore exist.

511 U.S. at 381; see also Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n, 824 F.2d 617, 621-22 (8th

Cir. 1987) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction where it did not

incorporate the settlement agreement into the dismissal order or expressly retain

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement). 

Appellate Case: 04-3653 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/16/2005 Entry ID: 1975191
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 Therefore, although we agree with the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction

over the breach of contract claim, we disagree with its rationale. In the October 23,

2003, order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court discussed

Kokkonen and the express retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement

agreement. However, the district court improperly equated this ancillary enforcement

jurisdiction with supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), stating that §

1367(a) “allows state claims such as the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim to ride the

back of a federal claim as long as that claim has an independent basis for

jurisdiction.” Because ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is distinct from § 1367, we

do not analyze whether the breach of contract claim meets the statutory test for

supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.

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Kokkonen distinguished two “heads” of “ancillary jurisdiction (in the very

broad sense in which that term is sometimes used),” explaining that the Court has

asserted it “for two separate, though sometimes related, purposes: (1) to permit

disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,

factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to

manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” 511 U.S.

at 379-80 (citations omitted). The exercise of jurisdiction to enforce a settlement

agreement serves the latter role. Id. at 380-81. This “ancillary enforcement

jurisdiction” is distinct from the type of ancillary jurisdiction exercised pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367.3

 Section 1367 “combines the doctrines of pendent and ancillary

jurisdiction under a common heading” of supplemental jurisdiction. City of Chicago

v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997). It provides in part that “in

any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a). Claims within the action are part of the same case or controversy if they

“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” City of Chicago, 522 U.S. at 165

(quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). 

Appellate Case: 04-3653 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/16/2005 Entry ID: 1975191
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The only mention of § 1367 in Kokkonen is a “cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1367” citation

following the description of the two heads of ancillary jurisdiction and accompanying

citations. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380. The use of a “compare” signal indicates that

§ 1367 is not a complete embodiment of the “very broad” ancillary jurisdiction that

the Supreme Court was discussing.

5 See Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 412 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The first type

of ancillary jurisdiction has been described as ‘supplemental’ jurisdiction, and is

generally codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The second type of ancillary jurisdiction has

been characterized as ‘enforcement jurisdiction’ and recognizes the ‘inherent power

of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in order to enforce their judgments in certain

situations where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking.’”) (citations omitted);

Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The first category of

ancillary jurisdiction identified [in Kokkonen] has largely been codified in the

supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The second category of ancillary

jurisdiction is generally referred to as ‘ancillary enforcement jurisdiction.’”);

Epperson v. Entertainment Express, Inc., 242 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]s the

Peacock Court noted, when Congress codified much of the common law of ancillary

jurisdiction as part of ‘supplemental jurisdiction’ in 28 U.S.C. § 1367, it included the

branch of ancillary jurisdiction premised on factual interdependence, but did not

codify enforcement jurisdiction.”); United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 174

F.3d 1007, 1012 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367 is

distinct from the equitable doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, which allows a court to

adjudicate related claims ‘to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and

effectuate its decrees.’”) (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380). This Court has noted

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The existence of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction apart from the supplemental

jurisdiction embodied by § 1367 is evidenced by Kokkonen’s caveat that its use of the

term “ancillary jurisdiction” was in a “very broad sense” and by its lack of reliance

on § 1367.4

 511 U.S. at 379-80. Furthermore, the distinction is supported by the

Supreme Court’s comment in Peacock v. Thomas that “Congress codified much of the

common-law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as part of ‘supplemental jurisdiction’

in 28 U.S.C. § 1367,” 516 U.S. 349, 354 n.5 (1996) (emphasis added), as well as by

statements from several of our sister circuits recognizing that ancillary enforcement

jurisdiction is a viable doctrine that was not codified in § 1367.5

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that “[i]n 1990, Congress consolidated and codified the common law doctrines of

ancillary and pendant jurisdiction under the title ‘Supplemental jurisdiction,’ in 28

U.S.C. § 1367,” Motion Control Corp. v. SICK, Inc., 354 F.3d 702, 705 (8th Cir.

2003), but has not explicitly addressed whether supplemental jurisdiction under §

1367 includes all forms of ancillary jurisdiction.

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We are not persuaded by the defendants’ contention that jurisdiction fails

because Myers filed a separate action for damages instead of a motion to enforce the

settlement agreement in the prior action. As the Kokkonen Court noted,

“[e]nforcement of the settlement agreement, . . . whether through award of damages

or decree of specific performance, is more than just a continuation or renewal of the

dismissed suit.” 511 U.S. at 378. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that “where a

party to a settlement agreement approved by a federal court brings a new suit in

federal court alleging a breach of the agreement, federal jurisdiction exists over the

suit, provided the federal court incorporated the agreement into its final order or

reserved jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.” Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc.,

231 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added); cf. Miener v. Missouri Dept. of

Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court

lacked jurisdiction over an “action . . . to enforce a settlement agreement reached in

an earlier federal lawsuit” where there was no provision retaining jurisdiction or

incorporating the settlement agreement into the order) (emphasis added). Because

Myers’s breach of contract claim satisfies the requirements for ancillary enforcement

jurisdiction, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over it.

2. IIED and Defamation

Although the district court had ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over the

breach of contract claim, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the IIED and

defamation claims. The only possible source of jurisdiction over these two state tort

claims is the supplemental jurisdiction authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and

supplemental jurisdiction over Myers’s IIED and defamation claims is not proper.

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As noted by the First Circuit, the phrase “civil action of which the district

courts have original jurisdiction” in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 “unambiguously invokes the

language that Congress has used for more than two hundred years to confer

jurisdiction on the federal district courts in civil cases. Nearly every jurisdictional

grant in Title 28 provides that ‘the district courts shall have original jurisdiction’ of

‘civil action[s]’ within the scope of the grant. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal

questions), 1332 (diversity), 1335 (interpleader), 1337 (antitrust), 1338 (intellectual

property), 1339 (postal matters), 1340 (internal revenue).” Rosario Ortega v.

Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 135 (1st Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds sub

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First, the claims are not supplemental to the Jones-Van Tassel discrimination claim.

While the district court did exercise original jurisdiction over the Jones-Van Tassel

discrimination claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, supplemental jurisdiction over

Myers’s tort claims fails because the IIED and defamation claims neither are part of

the same civil action as the Jones-Van Tassel discrimination claim nor stem from the

same nucleus of operative fact as does the Jones-Van Tassel discrimination claim.

See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 355-56.

Second, the IIED and defamation claims are not supplemental to the breach of

contract claim. Although there may be sufficient factual interdependence between

Myers’s tort claims and his breach of contract claim, the district court did not possess

original jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim. Supplemental jurisdiction only

applies to a “civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a). Therefore, before a district court asks whether it can exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over some claims in an action, it must first determine that

it has original jurisdiction over the civil action within the meaning of § 1367(a); in

other words, it must have original jurisdiction over at least one claim in the

complaint. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2620-21

(2005). 

Original jurisdiction is equivalent to independent federal subject matter

jurisdiction.6

 Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, like supplemental jurisdiction under

Appellate Case: 04-3653 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/16/2005 Entry ID: 1975191
nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611 (2005).

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§ 1367, is not original jurisdiction. Both the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit

have held that ancillary jurisdiction does not provide the original jurisdiction needed

for removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which like § 1367 applies to a

“civil action . . . of which the district courts of the United States have original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson,

537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002) (stating that ancillary enforcement jurisdiction “cannot

provide the original jurisdiction” required by the removal statute); Motion Control

Corp., 354 F.3d at 706 (following Syngenta and stating that ancillary jurisdiction

based on factual interdependence “does not authorize removal under § 1441” and “is

not original jurisdiction”). In addition, the Kokkonen Court indicated that ancillary

enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement agreement is not original jurisdiction.

After discussing the district court’s two options for preserving jurisdiction–either

embodying the settlement agreement in the dismissal order or expressly retaining

jurisdiction over the settlement agreement–Kokkonen stated, “Absent such action,

however, enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is

some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.” 511 U.S. at 382. Here, because the

district court did not possess original jurisdiction over the breach of contract claim,

it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the IIED and defamation claims.

Because the IIED and defamation claims are not part of the same civil action

as is the Jones-Van Tassel discrimination claim and the district court’s ancillary

enforcement jurisdiction over the breach of settlement agreement claim is not original

jurisdiction, the district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367

over the IIED and defamation claims.

B. Standing

We next address the defendants’ argument that summary judgment should be

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affirmed because Myers lacks standing to enforce the settlement agreement. We

agree with the district court that Myers has standing to sue as an intended third-party

beneficiary of the settlement agreement. 

A federal court cannot hear Myers’s breach of contract claim unless he has

standing to sue under North Dakota state law. See Metropolitan Express Servs., Inc.

v. City of Kansas City, 23 F.3d 1367, 1369 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying state law of

standing in federal diversity case); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,

693 F.2d 733, 747-48 (8th Cir. 1982) (analyzing standing to raise a state claim in

federal court under state law). We review the district court’s interpretation of state

law de novo. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991). Settlement

agreements are generally construed according to the principles of contract law. See

Vandal v. Peavey Co., 523 N.W.2d 266, 268 (N.D. 1994) (“When a settlement is

fairly made before trial, it ‘takes on the character of a contract . . . and is final and

conclusive, and based on good consideration.’”) (quoting Bohlman v. Big River Oil

Co., 124 N.W.2d 835, 837 (N.D. 1963)); In re Estate of Gustafson, 287 N.W.2d 700,

702-03 (N.D. 1980) (using rules of contract interpretation found in N.D. Cent. Code

chapter 9-07 to determine the intent of parties to a property-settlement agreement

incorporated in a judgment of divorce).

North Dakota law provides that intended, but not incidental, beneficiaries have

standing to enforce an agreement. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-02-04 states, “A contract

made expressly for the benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time

before the parties thereto rescind it.” This statute has been construed “to mean that

a party only incidentally benefitted by performance of a contract is not entitled to

maintain an action to enforce it.” Hellman v. Thiele, 413 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.

1987). To determine whether Myers is an intended beneficiary, “we must look to the

intentions of the parties to the contract. The intentions of the parties to a contract

must be ascertained from the written contract alone, if possible, but where the

contract is ambiguous it may be explained by reference to the circumstances under

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which it was made.” O’Connell v. Entm’t Enters., Inc., 317 N.W.2d 385, 388 (N.D.

1982) (emphasis added); see also N.D. Cent. Code § 9-07-02 (“The language of a

contract is to govern its interpretation if the language is clear and explicit and does

not involve an absurdity.”).

Here, the words of the contract alone govern because the language of the JonesVan Tassel settlement agreement is not ambiguous. The no-retaliation provision

prohibits the signatories from “retaliat[ing] with respect to any employment related

matter against any former, present, or prospective City or County employee, or

individual whose compensation is paid, in whole or in part, by the City or County,

who have provided any support to Plaintiff, whether by . . . deposition testimony . .

. or any other manner of support.” As Richland County State’s Attorney, Myers was

an individual whose compensation was paid by Richland County. Myers also

provided deposition testimony in the Jones-Van Tassel suit. Therefore, Myers is an

intended beneficiary of the no-retaliation provision. The district court did not err in

holding that Myers has standing to enforce the settlement agreement.

C. Breach of Contract Claim

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Richland

County on the breach of contract claim. Martin v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 390 F.3d 601,

606 (8th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the record in the light

most favorable to Myers, there is no genuine issue of material fact and Richland

County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We

may affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on any ground supported

by the record. Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2005). After

reviewing the record, we hold that Myers did not produce sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that Richland County breached the settlement

agreement. 

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Myers also argues that the district court erred in dismissing the commissioners

who were not signatories to the settlement agreement and that they may be held

individually liable for breach of the settlement agreement. This argument fails

because Myers brought the breach of contract claim against only Richland County,

not against the commissioners in their individual capacities. See supra note 2. 

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First, Myers challenges the district court’s holding that in order for Richland

County to be liable for breach of the settlement agreement, the actions constituting

the breach must have been accomplished by formal action of the Richland County

Board of Commissioners (“the Board”) or lawfully authorized by the Board.7

 We

agree with the district court. North Dakota law provides that “[e]ach organized

county is a body corporate for civil and political purposes only. As such, the county

may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with . . . .” N.D. Cent. Code §

11-10-01; see also N.D. Cent. Code § 11-11-29 (“A contract shall be entered into .

. . only after it has been approved by the vote of a majority of the members of the

board of county commissioners. The contract . . . may be signed on behalf of the

board by the chairman thereof and the county seal affixed thereto.”). The actions of

individual commissioners are not tantamount to actions of Richland County.

According to the North Dakota Supreme Court, “[T]he board of county

commissioners shall act collectively and as a board, and . . . consequently the county

is not bound by any action taken by the county commissioners as individuals.”

Rolette State Bank v. Rolette County, 218 N.W. 637, 639 (N.D. 1928); see also Hart

v. Bye, 86 N.W.2d 635, 638 (N.D. 1957) (“The county is not bound by any action

taken by a commissioner or commissioners acting individually.”); City of Minot v.

Johnston, 379 N.W.2d 275, 278 (N.D. 1985) (“The Water Board must act collectively

and neither it nor the City as assignee of the easement is bound by any act of an

individual member.”).

Next, we address the meaning of the word “retaliate” in the settlement

agreement’s statement that the signatories “will not retaliate with respect to any

employment related matter.” The district court agreed with Myers that it should use

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the plain meaning of the word, but then the court improperly relied on the burdenshifting analysis applicable to retaliation claims as developed under Title VII case law

in the Eighth Circuit. North Dakota law directs us to “construe contractual

agreements to give effect to the parties’ intent, which, if possible, must be ascertained

from the writing as a whole. The clear and explicit language of a contract governs

its interpretation and words are construed in their ordinary sense.” In re Estate of

Littlejohn, 698 N.W.2d 923, 925-26 (N.D. 2005) (citation omitted); see also N.D.

Cent. Code § 9-07-09 (“The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary

and popular sense rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless used by

the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage,

in which case the latter must be followed.”). 

The no-retaliation provision in the settlement agreement is not ambiguous, and

we will use the ordinary meaning of the word “retaliate.” The Supreme Court of

North Dakota looks to the dictionary to ascertain the ordinary meaning of a term in

a contract, “the definition a non law-trained person would attach to the term.” Martin

v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 573 N.W.2d 823, 826 (N.D. 1998). The dictionary

defines “retaliate” as “to repay (as an injury) in kind; to return like for like; to get

revenge.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (11th ed. 2005).

Therefore, as applicable to this case, the settlement agreement provides that Richland

County cannot seek revenge on Myers with respect to any employment-related matter

because he “provided any support” to Jones-Van Tassel “by . . . deposition

testimony.”

Using the ordinary meaning of “retaliate” and taking into account the actions

that could possibly be construed as formal actions of the Board or lawfully authorized

by the Board, we hold that Myers has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome

summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. Myers has failed to present

material evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that Richland County took

certain actions because of Myers’s deposition testimony in the Jones-Van Tassel

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lawsuit and that those actions caused Myers to lose the election. The voters, not

Richland County, decided that Myers would no longer serve as State’s Attorney.

Moreover, the record contains evidence that prior to Myers’s deposition testimony,

the Board had disagreements with Myers and was unsatisfied with Myers’s work as

State’s Attorney.

Myers alleges, as an incident of retaliation, the participation of several

commissioners in persuading Warren Stokes to stand against Myers in the election

for Richland County State’s Attorney. Myers argues that this interference with the

2002 election converted an uncontested race for Myers into a contested one, which

caused Myers to lose the election. After the Jones-Van Tassel settlement,

Commissioner Lynn C. Larsen asked an attorney if he knew of anyone who would be

interested in running against Myers, and Commissioners Bryan L. Flaa and Don

Holen spoke to Warren Stokes. Commissioner Flaa asked Stokes why nobody would

run against Myers for State’s Attorney. Stokes told him it was because the position

was full-time. Flaa did not discuss the matter with Stokes again until he stopped at

Stokes’s house on March 31, 2002, to pick up a letter that Stokes wrote to the Board

informing them that he would not run if the position was to remain full-time. These

actions of individual commissioners were not authorized by the Board and thus

cannot be attributed to Richland County.

As part of this claim of retaliation, Myers argues that the conversion of the

State’s Attorney position to part-time, a formal action of the Board, was part of the

inducement for Stokes to run against him for the office. At board meetings on April

1 and April 4, 2002, the commissioners discussed the 1977 resolution making the

State’s Attorney position full-time, but they failed to rescind the resolution at that

time. Nevertheless, Stokes entered the campaign for State’s Attorney and defeated

Myers. When Stokes was sworn in on January 6, 2003, the Board rescinded the 1977

resolution, thereby changing the position to part-time, and voted not to reduce

Stokes’s salary. However, this change upon Stokes taking office could not constitute

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retaliation with respect to an employment-related matter because it had no impact on

Myers. Myers already had been defeated in the election and was no longer in office.

As evidence of retaliation, Myers next points to an investigation regarding his

conduct as State’s Attorney that was unrelated to the Jones-Van Tassel lawsuit. After

the Jones-Van Tassel settlement, some Richland County residents sought recall of

Sheriff Harlan Muehler, Commissioner Dave Paulson and Myers. Myers himself

urged the Board to appoint special counsel to investigate the allegations and decide

whether to file a complaint with the governor seeking removal of any county officials.

The Board and Myers agreed not to limit the scope of the investigation to sexual

harassment and discrimination. The Board hired James M. Vukelic. In the course of

the subsequent investigation, Vukelic met personally with citizens and examined their

complaints about Myers: that Myers refused to prosecute certain individuals,

improperly urged the Commission to destroy county records, misused county funds

and failed to enforce the county’s sexual harassment policy. Vukelic concluded in

a June 1, 2001, report that none of Myers’s behavior constituted misconduct,

malfeasance or neglect of duty. There is no evidence that this investigation into

Myers’s conduct as State’s Attorney constituted retaliation for his deposition

testimony. 

Third, Myers argues that the Board interfered with his role as State’s Attorney

in various ways. Myers asserts that the Board ignored his legal advice and sought

advice from others who were not legally trained, such as the County Auditor.

However, the record shows that Myers rarely attended Board meetings. Myers also

argues that the Board submitted legal questions directly to the North Dakota Attorney

General’s office instead of channeling them through Myers. Regarding one such

incident raised by Myers, Flaa explained that the employee who asked Flaa to submit

a request to the Attorney General’s office involving a Sheriff’s Department slush fund

also told Flaa not to involve Myers or the sheriff. Although Myers took issue with

Flaa’s explanation, Myers admitted that ultimately he allowed the Attorney General’s

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office to proceed with that investigation. Finally, Myers asserts that the Board

submitted two civil complaints that had been filed against Richland County directly

to the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund (NDIRF) instead of to him. Myers

agreed, however, that civil complaints properly went to the NDIRF for appointment

of outside counsel and that it was important for NDIRF to receive the complaints as

soon as possible. Furthermore, on those two occasions when the complaints were

given directly to the NDIRF, Myers received a copy of the complaints within a week.

None of these “interferences” raises a genuine issue of material fact that the Board

retaliated against Myers with respect to any employment-related matter as a result of

his testimony in the Jones-Van Tassel lawsuit. 

Finally, Myers points to a letter given to Richland County employees that he

believed implicitly threatened all County individuals who gave support to or testified

on behalf of Jones-Van Tassel. Richland County Engineer, Tim Schulte, wrote a

letter to Commissioner Flaa, discussing his opinions about the aftermath of the JonesVan Tassel lawsuit and the gossip and infighting in Richland County. In February

2001, Commissioner Flaa disseminated a portion of Schulte’s letter to county

employees at a meeting of the Board, with his own introductory paragraph stating in

part that he had received a letter that he wanted to share, that it “points to the problem

as the author sees it,” and that “if it strikes a nerve with you as you read this, you may

want to think about your involvement in these issues.” Several days later, counsel for

Jones-Van Tassel informed the Board that the letter could be construed as a violation

of the settlement agreement, and Schulte forwarded his original letter in its entirety

to all county employees to give context to his message. We do not find this letter to

constitute retaliation against Myers with respect to any employment-related matter.

The letter disseminated at the meeting was not written by the Board but by the County

Engineer as an expression of his thoughts and opinions. Even if the Board did ratify

the letter as its own, the letter does not make any reference to Myers and there is no

evidence that Myers suffered any negative employment consequences as a result of

the letter.

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In sum, Myers failed to raise a triable question of material fact as to whether

Richland County retaliated with respect to any employment-related matter against

Myers because of his deposition testimony in the Jones-Van Tassel lawsuit. Myers

lost the election because he did not receive more votes than his opponent, not due to

any actions of the Board. Accordingly, summary judgment on Myers’s breach of

contract claim is appropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Richland County as to the breach of contract claim.

We vacate the district court’s judgment on the IIED and defamation claims and

remand to the district court with directions to dismiss those two claims for lack of

jurisdiction.

______________________________

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